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HISTORICAL DICTIONARY *of*

INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS

PETER LAMB AND
FIONA ROBERTSON-SNAPE

HISTORICAL DICTIONARY

The historical dictionaries present essential information on a broad range of subjects, including American and world history, art, business, cities, countries, cultures, customs, film, global conflicts, international relations, literature, music, philosophy, religion, sports, and theater. Written by experts, all contain highly informative introductory essays on the topic and detailed chronologies that, in some cases, cover vast historical time periods but still manage to heavily feature more recent events.

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Historical Dictionary of International Relations

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Editor's Foreword

This *Historical Dictionary of International Relations* covers the world as it is presently constituted as well as the long formative period of over four centuries during which it became what we know it to be today: a conglomerate of states, big and small, strong and weak, well behaved and less so. Lesser but increasingly important other players—such as international organizations, transnational corporations, and other actors, both regional and global, around the world—are also included. With so many players, there is obviously a pressing need for common rules of the game that all can follow, yet these are presently insufficient and sometimes faulty. Clearly, progress is being made. Just how much becomes clearer on reading this important book, which presents many of the actors, many of the rules, the persons who created or shaped both, and, no less important, precious information about the academic field of International Relations (IR).

This is done in the usual manner of historical dictionaries. It starts with a list of acronyms, and this list should be kept handy while reading, as many of the players are best known by a few letters and not a full name. Then comes the chronology, which traces the long emergence and development of international relations, and gives a better feel for how far we have come and perhaps also how far remains to be covered. Next is the introduction, tracing this evolution in greater detail, highlighting the most important events, the successes and failures. The core of the book is, as always, the dictionary section, including brief biographies of many significant figures who are well known generally but also others whose reputation is limited more to the specific field of IR. There are also entries on organizations, international and regional, large and small, general and specialized, that have contributed heavily to this field. Other entries deal with specific sectors and concepts. The bibliography is certainly not the least important section although it comes last, because there is simply too much to be included in one book so readers are referred to many more.

This latest addition to our series on international organizations should perhaps be the first to be read by newcomers, as it provides a very firm basis and was written by two formidable specialists in the field. Peter Lamb is an associate professor of politics and International Relations at Staffordshire University, after having taught at several other British universities. He has written on the *Communist Manifesto* and Harold Laski, produced the *Historical Dictionary of Socialism*, and authored many articles for learned journals and encyclopedias on political theory and political thought. Fiona Robertson-

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Snape is a senior lecturer at Staffordshire and course leader in the International Studies MA Program; she has also taught elsewhere. Before entering academia, she worked at the NGO Saferworld and for World Monitor Television. This is not the first time, nor will it be the last, that they point interested persons in the right direction.

Jon Woronoff
Series Editor

Preface

The *Historical Dictionary of International Relations* is a general guide to the theory and practice of the relations between states and other actors on the world stage. The academic discipline of International Relations (IR)—which by convention is capitalized to distinguish it from the practice thereof—studies the real-world operations of international relations, the actual relations that are between states, organizations, groups, and people. IR thus deals with the political, economic, social, and other aspects of those relations around the world. It is concerned with regional and global levels of interaction and with contemporary issues and developments in the past that have brought the world to its present condition.

War is, of course, one issue that has had a profound impact on the construction of the present international system as well as on the lives of countless numbers of people through history. Founded in 1919 in the aftermath of World War I, IR had an understanding of war and the promotion of peace as its founding objectives. An interest in peace, as the condition in which other human goods such as security and prosperity can be realized, remains an important area of study within the discipline, not least because of the continuing prevalence of armed conflict around the world and the threat of mass destruction in the technological age. However, the subject matter of IR now extends far beyond the traditional issues of war and peace.

As the process of modernization transforms the life opportunities of hundreds of millions of people across the globe, the need to sustain the complex needs and demands of citizens in advanced consumer societies within the context of a highly intricate and interdependent global system poses ever-growing demands on key actors in international relations. The mass of international interactions has never been more complex, and the need to understand the nature of the key actors, structures, and processes of international relations has perhaps never been greater—and has significantly extended the scope of the discipline. In the present era of globalization, increased knowledge and the technological capacity to act over long distances, combined with the commercial linkages that connect people across cultural and geographic divides, has created new forms of international relations that some argue entail new obligations of justice and humanitarianism. Furthermore, issues such as resource depletion, environmental damage, exploitation, and inequality—the downsides of modernization—are issues beyond the scope of any one state to resolve. In order to sustain human progress, therefore, greater efforts at international cooperation are being made in areas such as the

environment, health, and the protection of human rights, which were not traditionally seen as international issues. An understanding of the actors and processes involved, as well as of the constraining structures within which such cooperative efforts take place, can all be advanced by research and theoretical developments in IR.

No single-volume dictionary can do justice to the full richness and complexity of an almost inexhaustible subject such as IR; as authors, we have of necessity been selective: to have extended the work into multiple volumes would have been detrimental to its availability and usability. We are therefore aware that the work is far from fully comprehensive but are satisfied that it offers an introduction at least to each topic included. We hope that as a general guide it will encourage readers to find out more about the subjects covered, and we provide an extensive bibliography, which is divided into sections for convenience. Readers are urged to use this to find sources for more in-depth study. Except for the section on classic works in International Relations, the bibliography consists mainly of books published in the 21st century. This is not to suggest that earlier books should not be consulted, but clearly some facts and theories in the older works may be outdated.

In order to facilitate the rapid and efficient location of information and to make this book as useful a reference tool as possible, extensive cross-references have been provided in the dictionary section. Within individual entries, terms that have their own entries are in **boldface type** the first time they appear. Related terms that do not appear in the text are indicated in the *See also*. *See* refers to other entries that deal with this topic.

Acronyms and Abbreviations

AFTA	ASEAN Free Trade Area
APEC	Asia–Pacific Economic Cooperation Forum
AR4	Assessment Report Four
ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations
AU	African Union
BFASS	British and Foreign Anti-Slavery Society
BRIC	Brazil, Russia, India, and China
BRICS	Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa
BWC	Biological Weapons Convention
CAR	Central African Republic
CAT	Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment
CBRN	Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Weapons
CCM	Convention on Cluster Munitions
CCP	Chinese Communist Party
CDU	Christlich Demokratische Union (Christian Democratic Union) [Germany]
CE	Council of Europe
CEDAW	Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women
CFSP	Common Foreign and Security Policy
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CPP	Convention People's Party [Ghana]
CWC	Chemical Weapons Convention
DnA	Det Norske Arbeiderparti (Norwegian Labor Party)
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
EC	European Communities
ECB	European Central Bank

ECCC	Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia
ECHR	European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms
ECJ	European Court of Justice
ECLAC	Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean
ECOSOC	Economic and Social Council
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
ECSC	European Coal and Steel Community
EEC	European Economic Community
EEZ	Exclusive Economic Zone
EMU	European Monetary Union
EU	European Union
EUFOR	European Union Rapid Reaction Force
EURATOM	European Atomic Energy Community
ExComm	Executive Committee
FPA	Foreign Policy Analysis
FTA	Free Trade Agreement
GATT	General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
GC	Geneva Conventions
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GEF	Global Environmental Facility
G-8	Group of Eight
G-77	Group of 77
HDR	Human Development Report
IAEA	International Atomic Energy Agency
ICBM	Intercontinental Ballistic Missile
ICC	International Criminal Court
ICHAD	Islamic Cooperation Humanitarian Affairs Department
ICISS	International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty
ICJ	International Court of Justice
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross

IFOR	Implementation Force
IGO	Intergovernmental Organization
ILO	International Labour Organization
IMF	International Monetary Fund
INGO	International Nongovernmental Organization
IO	International Organization
IPCC	Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
IPE	International Political Economy
IR	International Relations
IS	Islamic State
ISAF	International Security Assistance Force
ISIL	Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant
ISIS	Islamic State of Iraq and Syria
IWMA	International Working Men's Association
KGB	Komitet gosudarstvennoy bezopasnosti (Committee for State Security) [Soviet Union]
KLA	Kosovan Liberation Army
LoN	League of Nations
LSE	London School of Economics
MAD	Mutually Assured Destruction
MDA	Magen David Adom Society
MINUSCA	United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic
MINUSTAH	United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti
MIRV	Multiple Independent Reentry Vehicle
MISCA	Mission Internationale de Soutien à la Centrafrique sous Conduite Africaine (African Union Mission in the CAR)
MIT	Massachusetts Institute of Technology
MNC	Multinational Corporation
NAFTA	North American Free Trade Agreement
NAM	Non-Aligned Movement
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
Nazi	National Socialists

NEC	National Executive Committee
NEPAD	New Partnership for Africa's Development
NGO	Nongovernmental Organization
NIEO	New International Economic Order
NPT	Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty
NWS	Nuclear Weapons States
NNWS	Non-Nuclear Weapons States
OAS	Organization of American States
OAU	Organization of African Unity
OECD	Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
OIC	Organization of Islamic Cooperation
OPCW	Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons
OPEC	Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries
PCA	Permanent Court of Arbitration
PCIJ	Permanent Court of International Justice
PFLP	Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine
PNC	Palestine National Council
PRIO	Peace Research Institute Oslo
P5	Permanent Five
RtoP	Responsibility to Protect
SALT	Strategic Arms Limitation Talks/Treaty
SAP	Structural Adjustment Program
SCSL	Special Court for Sierra Leone
SDI	Strategic Defense Initiative
SEA	Single European Act
SFOR	Stabilization Force
SIPRI	Stockholm Institute for Peace Research
SOP	Standard Operating Procedure
SPD	Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands (German Social Democratic Party)
START	Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty
TAN	Transnational Advocacy Network

TNC	Transnational Corporation
UAV	Unmanned Aerial Vehicle
UDHR	Universal Declaration of Human Rights
UMP	Union pour un Mouvement Populaire (Union for a Popular Movement) [France]
UN	United Nations
UNAMA	United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan
UNAMID	United Nations–African Union Hybrid Operation in Darfur
UNCTAD	United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNEP	United Nations Environment Programme
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
UNGA	United Nations General Assembly
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNHRC	United Nations Human Rights Council
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UN-ICTY	United Nations International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia
UNMOVIC	United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission
UNOSOM I	United Nations Operation in Somalia I
UNPROFOR	United Nations Protection Force
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
UNSCOM	United Nations Special Commission
UNTSO	United Nations Truce Supervision Organization
U.S.	United States
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
WFP	World Food Programme
WHO	World Health Organization
WMD	Weapons of Mass Destruction
WTO	World Trade Organization
WWI	World War I

| WWII | World War II |
| 9/11 | 11 September 2001 |

Chronology

1492 European power starts to spread around the globe.

1494 Treaty of Tordesillas divides newly discovered territories beyond Europe between Spain and Portugal.

1510 First slaves are exported to the American colonies.

1532 Publication of Niccolò Machiavelli's *The Prince*, a treatise on statesmanship.

1562 First English slaving expedition.

1600 British East India Company, which became an important agent of the British Empire, is founded to exploit the spice trade.

1602 Dutch East India Company is founded.

1618–1648 Thirty Years' War in the Holy Roman Empire, the last of the religious wars in Europe.

1625 Publication of Hugo Grotius's *On the Laws of War and Peace* marks the emergence of modern international law.

1648 Treaty of Westphalia between all the participants in the Thirty Years' War formally sanctions a decentralized system of independent, sovereign states in Europe and is conventionally seen as the starting point for the contemporary system of states.

1651 Publication of Thomas Hobbes's *Leviathan*, which, due to its depiction of life in the absence of government, has been influential in International Relations.

1713 Treaty of Utrecht is agreed to by belligerents in the Spanish War of Succession, including Spain, France, Great Britain, and Portugal, formalizing a balance-of-power system in Europe.

1775 French government starts to ship war materiel to the American revolutionaries.

1776 Publication of Adam Smith's *The Wealth of Nations*. **June:** Model treaty is drafted by the Continental Congress as a template for future treaties and a guide to good foreign policy. **4 July:** Declaration of Independence by the United States of America marks the birth of what is to become a new global superpower.

1778 Treaty of Alliance signed between France and the United States.

1780 Transatlantic slave trade reaches its peak.

1783 Treaty of Paris ends the U.S. War of Independence and ensures debts owed to British subjects be honored.

1787 Sierra Leone in West Africa is founded by Great Britain as a colony for freed slaves.

1789 Constitution of the United States of America comes into effect, giving the U.S. government the power to form relationships with foreign states. The U.S. Congress establishes the Department of Foreign Affairs, changing its name very soon afterward to the State Department.

1789–1799 French Revolution signals the beginning of the end of the old European order and the birth of nationalism.

1791 Publication of Thomas Paine's *Rights of Man*.

1791–1803 Slave revolt in Saint-Domingue ends French rule in what became Haiti.

1792 First of the revolutionary wars in Europe between France and Austria and Prussia. **22 September:** France abolishes its monarchy and becomes a republic. **19 November:** France declares it will aid any people trying to overthrow their monarch.

1793–1794 Citizen Genêt affair leads the U.S. government to develop a more consistent policy on neutrality, on which it operates throughout the 19th century.

1793 21 January: King Louis XVI of France, the epitome of an absolute monarchy, is executed for treason. **1 February:** France declares war on Great Britain and the Netherlands. **22 April:** United States proclaims its friendly neutrality in the Napoleonic Wars.

1794 February: The National Convention in France votes to end slavery in all of France's colonies; slavery is later reinstated.

1795 United States settles its debts to France.

1796 17 September: In his Farewell Address to the American people, President George Washington advises that in its foreign affairs the United States should avoid permanent "entangling" alliances with other states.

1798–1800 A quasi war occurs between France and the United States over the seizure by France of U.S. shipping.

1800 The United States terminates its only formal alliance, its Treaty of Alliance with France.

1804 Haiti, the first independent black state outside Africa, is established.

1807 2 March: U.S. Congress passes an act to "prohibit the importation of slaves." **25 March:** British Parliament passes the Slave Trade Act, outlawing the slave trade.

1812 24 June: France invades Russia.

1812–1815 United States and Great Britain go to war for a complex set of reasons, including U.S. shipments to France, impressment, and American expansionism.

1815 Napoleon is defeated, bringing an end to the revolutionary wars in Europe. The postwar settlement is negotiated at the Congress of Vienna, and the Concert of Europe is agreed upon.

1823 Monroe Doctrine warns European powers that the United States will not accept any recolonization of Latin America.

1826 France outlaws slavery.

1832 Publication of Carl von Clausewitz's *On War*.

1839 British and Foreign Anti-Slavery Society (BFASS), which replaced the Anti-Slavery Society, is formed to campaign to outlaw slavery across the globe.

1839–1844 First Opium War occurs between Great Britain and China, resulting in the forceful opening up of China to Western trade.

1840 First world antislavery convention held in London.

1844 Treaty of Wangxia, a treaty of peace, amity, and commerce between the United States and China, is declared.

1846–1848 Mexican–American War breaks out as a consequence of the annexation of Texas.

1847 Liberia, a small country in West Africa, is founded by the United States as a colony for freed slaves.

1853 U.S. Commander Perry first forces Japan to open a few ports for trade.

1853–1856 Crimean War between Russia and a coalition of France, Britain, the Ottoman Empire, and Sardinia prevents Russia expanding southward.

1857–1859 Second Opium War.

1860 First Japanese embassy is set up in the United States; Russia acquires territory from China and founds the ice-free port of Vladivostok on the Sea of Japan.

1861 17 March: The Kingdom of Italy is created.

1861 American Civil War begins.

1863 International Committee of the Red Cross is set up.

1864 22 August: First Geneva Convention signed for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded in Armies in the Field.

1865 American Civil War ends.

1866 First transatlantic telegraph cable is laid, transforming communications between the two continents and changing the nature of international diplomacy.

1867 12 June: Austro-Hungarian Empire is formed by a constitutional compromise between Austria and Hungary, becoming the largest political unit in Europe until its demise in 1918.

1868 Meiji Restoration in Japan replaces the old feudal oligarchy with a new ruling elite committed to transforming Japan into a great power. **November:** St. Petersburg Conference, the first international conference with arms control aims, is held.

1869 United States annexes the Midway Islands, a strategically important atoll in the Pacific Ocean. **17 November:** The Suez Canal connecting the Red Sea with the Mediterranean is opened, significantly reducing transit time for global trade and leading to a rush of imperial expansion.

1876 The Red Crescent is adopted as an alternative emblem to the Red Cross for Muslim populations.

1870–1871 Franco–Prussian War between France and a confederation of northern German states led by Prussia breaks out and has a long-term impact on European security.

1871 Germany is unified, unsettling the balance of power in Europe.

1875 1 July: The Berne Treaty, signed by 22 states, establishes the General Postal Union, an early example of functional cooperation between states.

1880–1888 Boer Wars occur between Great Britain and the South African Boers.

1884 October: Meridian Conference agrees that the international meridian is to be in Greenwich, England, reflecting British power. **November:** European powers meet in Berlin to divide Africa among themselves.

1889–1890 International Union of American Republics agreed.

1891 Russia starts construction on the Trans-Siberian Railway to aid its expansion to the East.

1894 Franco–Russian alliance becomes a key alignment in pre–World War I Europe.

1894–1895 First Sino–Japanese War in which Japan's victory demonstrated its post-Meiji Restoration military power and prepares the ground for imperial expansion.

1898 Spanish–American War; U.S. occupation of Cuba and Puerto Rico ends Spanish colonialism in the Americas; Spain cedes the Philippines to the United States.

1898–1901 Boxer Rebellion in China leads to military intervention by European powers and the United States.

1899 First Hague Convention on the Laws of War sets up the Permanent Court of Arbitration.

1899–1902 Philippines–American War is a nationalist war in which Filipinos fight against the annexation of the Philippines by the United States.

1901 First Nobel Peace Prize awarded.

1904–1905 Russo–Japanese war deprives Russia of its possessions in China and demonstrates that a non-European state can defeat a great European power.

1907 Second Hague Convention on the Laws of War. **31 August:** Anglo–Russian agreement is concluded.

1910 Publication of Norman Angell's *The Great Illusion*.

1911 Revolution in China ends dynastic rule and turns China into a republic.

1913 British navy is converted from the use of coal to oil, giving Great Britain a strategic interest in security supplies from Persia and marking the start of the age of oil in international relations. **28 August:** Peace Palace, known as the "seat of international law," opens in The Hague.

1914 28 June: Heir to the Habsburg throne, Archduke Franz Ferdinand, is assassinated in Sarajevo, sparking World War I. **28 July:** Austria-Hungary declares war against Serbia. **1 August:** Germany orders general mobilization and declares war against Serbia. **3 August:** Germany declares war on France and invades Belgium. **4 August:** Great Britain declares war against Germany. **5 August:** Austria-Hungary declares war against Russia. **6 August:** Serbia declares war on Germany. **10 August:** France declares war on Austria-Hungary. **12 August:** Great Britain declares war on Austria-Hungary. **15 August:** Panama Canal opens. **23 August:** Japan declares war against Germany. **25 August:** Austria-Hungary declares war against Japan. **5 September:** Treaty of London is signed by Russia, France, and Great Britain, committing to not making a separate peace with the Central Powers.

1915 7 May: Sinking of the RMS *Lusitania* by a German U-boat kills 114 Americans, firmly turning public opinion in the United States against Germany.

1915–1918 Human tragedy in Armenia, described by many as genocide.

1916 19 May: A secret agreement between France and Great Britain is agreed upon that divides Arab lands, formally of the Ottoman Empire, between them.

1917 Publication of V. I. Lenin's *Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism*. **1 March:** Zimmermann telegram, detailing a German plot to invade the United States with the assistance of Mexico, prompts the United States to abandon its isolationist policy. **8 March:** Czarist government in Russia collapses and is replaced by the provisional government in dual authority with the Petrograd Soviet. **2 April:** United States enters World War I. **14 August:** China declares war on Germany. **2 November:** Balfour Declaration assures Zionists of the British commitment to establish a home for Jewish people in Palestine. **6 November:** A coup in Russia, led by the Bolshevik party, begins communist rule.

1918 3 March: The Brest–Litovsk Treaty, ending the war between Germany and Russia, is signed, at huge cost to the Russians. **28–31 October:** Collapse of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, beginning with the independence of Czechoslovakia, and ending in formal dissolution. **11 November:** Armistice between the Allies and Germany comes into effect.

1918–1921 The Russian Civil War.

1919 18 January: Paris Peace Conference commences. **21 January:** Irish War of Independence breaks out, the first war of decolonization from the British Empire. **April:** Formation of the International Labour Organization; Covenant of the League of Nations is approved. **28 June:** Treaty of Ver-

sailles is signed, formally ending World War I and creating the League of Nations. **August:** The new Weimar Constitution of Germany is introduced. **May:** The Treaty of Versailles is presented to the German delegation, who opposes it. **June:** Germany delegation signs the Treaty of Versailles under duress. **September:** First Chair of International Politics is established in Great Britain at the University of Aberystwyth.

1920 10 January: League of Nations is formed as a new international organization. **19 January:** U.S. Congress votes against U.S. membership of the League.

1922 Permanent Court of International Justice is established. **6 February:** The Washington Naval Treaty is signed to prevent another naval arms race. **31 October:** Benito Mussolini becomes prime minister of Italy and within three years establishes a fascist dictatorship. **1 November:** The Ottoman Empire is officially dissolved, following almost a decade of decline starting with the Italian seizure of Libya in 1912. **30 December:** The Soviet Union is formed.

1923 11 January: The French invasion and subsequent occupation of the Ruhr begins. **November:** After the Munich *Putsch*, Hitler is arrested and while in jail writes *Mein Kampf*.

1924 August: The Dawes Plan is enacted to prevent an economic implosion of Germany under reparations pressures.

1925 17 June: Geneva Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous, or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare is signed. **1 December:** Locarno Treaties are signed, attempting to secure permanent peace in Europe.

1926 8 September: Germany joins the League of Nations. **25 September:** Slavery Convention is signed in Geneva to eliminate slavery and the slave trade.

1927–1937 Chinese Civil War.

1928 27 August: Kellogg–Briand Pact signed by Germany, France, and the United States, and most other states soon after, promising to never use war to resolve any dispute.

1929 29 October: The Wall Street crash leads to worldwide depression through the recall of U.S. debts.

1930 22 April: London Naval Treaty limits the size and capability of naval ships. **28 June:** Forced Labour Convention is signed.

1931 18 September: Japan invades Manchuria.

1932 Geneva Disarmament Conference.

1933 27 January: Hitler becomes chancellor of Germany. **February:** Reichstag fire gives popular excuse for Hitler to gain absolute control. Japan withdraws from League of Nations. **23 March:** Enabling Act in Germany allows all political and military powers to be placed in Hitler's hand, allowing him to act above the law. **October:** Germany leaves the League of Nations.

1934 Soviet Union becomes a member of the League of Nations.

1935 2 May: Franco–Soviet Treaty of Mutual Assistance is seen by Hitler as a violation of the Locarno Treaty and an excuse for Germany to violate its obligations. **3 October:** Italian invasion of Abyssinia. **December:** Hoare–Laval Pact, a secret agreement between Great Britain and France accepting Italian control in Abyssinia, is leaked, causing widespread outrage.

1936 7 March: German forces reoccupy the Rhineland. **17 July:** Spanish Civil War breaks out.

1937 Japan invades China starting the war in the East.

1938 12 March: Austria is incorporated into Germany, becoming a state within the Reich. **30 September:** Munich Agreement is signed between Great Britain and Germany, permitting Germany's annexation of the Sudetenland; Prime Minister of Great Britain Neville Chamberlain announces "Peace in our time." **9 November:** Kristallnacht, government-sanctioned reprisals against the Jews, occurs in Germany.

1939 Publication of E. H. Carr's *The Twenty Years' Crisis*. **23 August:** German–Soviet Nonaggression Pact is signed. **September:** Operation of the League of Nations is suspended. **1 September:** Germany invades Poland, thus starting World War II. **3 September:** Great Britain and France declare war on Germany. **17 September:** Soviet Union invades Poland from the east. **30 November:** Soviet Union invades Finland.

1940 10 May: Germany invades France. **10 June:** Italy declares war on France and Great Britain. **17 June:** France surrenders to Germany.

1941 Hitler invades Soviet Union, breaking the nonaggression pact. **11 December:** Germany declares war on the United States. **7 December:** Japan attacks U.S. Navy at Pearl Harbor**. 8 December:** United States declares war on Japan.

1942 January: Declaration of the United Nations creates a grand alliance against the Axis Powers. **19 January:** Manhattan Project starts work on the development of the atom bomb. **June 4–7:** U.S. Navy defeats the Japanese at the Battle of Midway.

1943 14 January: Casablanca Conference between Churchill, Roosevelt, and some of their allies in Morocco to plan strategy for the remainder of the war. **8 September:** Italy surrenders to the Allies. **13 October:** Italy declares war on Germany, its former ally. **28 November–1 December:** Tehran Conference, first of three conferences between the three big Allied powers to discuss strategy.

1944 June: D-Day landings of British, American, and other Allied troops into northern France; liberation of France. **1–22 July:** Conference held at Bretton Woods to plan the postwar economy; World Bank and International Monetary Fund are created. **21 August:** Dumbarton Oaks proposals are published by representatives of the United States, Great Britain, the Soviet Union, and the Republic of China, setting the groundwork for the United Nations.

1945 February: Yalta Conference is held to agree on the postwar order between Stalin, Roosevelt, and Churchill. **March:** Establishment of the Arab League. **April:** San Francisco Conference to draw up the Charter of the United Nations; United Nations Special Commission on Palestine set up to try to resolve the Arab–Israeli conflict. **May 8:** Germany surrenders and the Allies are victorious. **17 July–2 August:** Potsdam Conference, held in occupied Germany to negotiate the terms of the peace. **6 August:** Atomic bomb dropped by United States on Hiroshima, Japan, and three days later, on Nagasaki. **2 September:** Japan surrenders. **24 October:** United Nations is officially formed. **16 November:** United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization established. **20 November:** Nuremberg Tribunals start.

1946 5 March: Winston Churchill describes an "iron curtain" descending across Europe. **June:** Baruch Plan seeks to put all nuclear weapons under the control of the United Nations. **11 December:** UNICEF established.

1946–1954 French Indochina war.

1947 5 June: U.S. secretary of state George C. Marshall sets out his plan to provide economic aid to Europe. **29 November:** United Nations General Assembly adopts Resolution 181 dividing Great Britain's former Palestinian mandate into Jewish and Arab states.

1948 Publication of Hans J. Morgenthau's *Politics among Nations*. **7 April:** World Health Organization is founded. **30 April:** Organization of American States is established. **May:** British withdraw from Palestine. **14 May:** Jewish state of Israel is proclaimed. **29 May:** United Nations Truce Supervision Organization is formed to supervise the truce in the former British mandate

of Palestine. **9 December:** Genocide Convention is signed. **10 December:** United Nations Declaration of Human Rights is adopted by the United Nations General Assembly.

1948–1949 First Arab–Israeli War.

1948–1993 Arab League imposes a total economic boycott against Israel.

1949 Council of Europe is founded. **12 August:** Geneva Conventions are signed.

1950 First U.S. advisers are sent to French Indochina, marking the first step toward U.S. military involvement in Vietnam. **25 June:** North Korea invades South Korea, commencing the Korean War. **14 December:** United Nations Refugee Agency is established to help millions of Europeans displaced by World War II.

1951 18 April: European Coal and Steel Community is established. **8 September:** Treaty of San Francisco is signed, bringing about the end of U.S. occupation of Japan and concluding the postwar settlements.

1953 5 March: Joseph Stalin dies. **26 July:** Cuban revolution begins. **27 July:** Korean War ends in an armistice, creating the demilitarized zone on the 38th parallel. **3 September:** European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms comes into force.

1954 21 January: Algerian war of independence begins. **1 November:** Victory for Viet Minh in Vietnamese war of independence.

1955 14 May: Warsaw Treaty Organization is formed.

1956 23 October: Hungarian revolution begins. **5 November:** British and French forces invade Port Said on the Suez Canal, commencing their involvement in the Suez crisis. The United Nations' first emergency force is set up to supervise troop withdrawals at the end of the Suez crisis.

1957 25 March: European Economic Community is established by the Treaty of Rome. **30 April:** Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery comes into force. **4 October:** *Sputnik 1* is launched, beginning the space race and the era of the intercontinental ballistic missiles.

1959 1 January: Cuban revolution ends. **1 December:** Antarctica Treaty demilitarizes Antarctica.

1960 May: Trial is held of Adolf Eichmann by Israel under universal jurisdiction for his part in the holocaust. **10 September:** Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries is formed. Twenty-three new states join the United Nations at the peak of new state creation as a consequence of decolonization.

1960–1966 Series of conflicts and proxy wars in Congo.

1961 Publication of Frantz Fanon's *The Wretched of the Earth*. **18 April:** Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations is signed. **13 August:** Berlin Wall is built. **September:** Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development is established in Paris.

1961–1974 Portugal's colonial wars in Guinea, Angola, and Mozambique.

1962 Cuban missile crisis.

1963 25 May: Organization of African Unity is established. **30 August:** "Hot line" is set up between the White House and the Kremlin. **10 October:** Partial Test-Ban Treaty is signed.

1964 Publication of Kwame Nkrumah's *Neocolonialism: The Last Stage of Imperialism*. **23 March:** First United Nations Conference on Trade and Development held in Geneva. **October:** Group of 77 newly independent states is formed.

1965 8 March: Vietnam conflict escalates when 3,500 U.S. marines land in Vietnam. **22 November:** United Nations Development Programme is established.

1966 International Covenant on Civil, Political and Economic Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights open for signatures, constituting, with the Universal Declaration, an international bill of rights.

1967 5–10 June: Six-Day War between Israel and a coalition of Arab states. **2 July:** The Merger Treaty establishes the European Communities. **8 August:** Association of Southeast Asian Nations established. **10 October:** Outer Space Treaty prohibits nuclear weapons from being put into orbit.

1968 Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons Treaty opens for signatures.

1970 Countries of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development agree at the United Nations to give 0.7 percent of their gross national product as aid to the developing countries for long-term development.

1971 The People's Republic of China takes the Chinese seat at the United Nations from Taiwan. General Idi Amin overthrows the elected government of Milton Obote and declares himself president of Uganda, launching a ruthless eight-year regime in which an estimated 300,000 civilians are killed. Publication of Graham Allison's *Essence of Decision*. **August:** President Richard Nixon takes the United States off the gold standard, ending the Bretton Woods system of fixed exchange rates.

1972 26 May: Antiballistic Missile Treaty signed by United States and Soviet Union. **5–16 June:** First United Nations Conference on the Human Environment in Stockholm, Sweden. United Nations Environment Programme is established.

1973 January 1: Great Britain joins the European Communities. **September 11:** President Salvador Allende of Chile is overthrown with backing of the CIA.

1974 21 February: Historic talks between U.S. president Nixon and Chinese premier Mao Zedong. **1 May:** Demands by developing states for a New International Economic Order are made at the United Nations.

1975 26 March: Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention enters into force. **17 April:** The Khmer Rouge seizes power in Cambodia and instigates a five-year reign of terror. **30 April:** South Vietnamese government in Saigon falls to North Vietnamese forces and the last U.S. forces leave. **28 May:** The Economic Community of West African States is established. **7 December:** Indonesia invades East Timor.

1977 Publication of Hedley Bull's *The Anarchical Society*. **4 November:** United Nations mandatory arms embargo is imposed against the apartheid regime in South Africa.

1978 Camp David negotiations seek resolution to the Arab–Israeli conflict. Publication of Edward Said's *Orientalism*. **December:** Vietnam invades Cambodia, ending the murderous regime of Pol Pot.

1979 Publication of Kenneth Waltz's *Theory of International Politics*. **January:** The shah of Iran leaves for an "extended vacation." **1 February:** Ayatollah Khomeini returns from exile and soon after wins a landslide victory in a national referendum; Iran becomes an Islamic republic. Strategic Arms Limitation II Treaty restricts the number of multiple independent reentry vehicles to be held by the Soviets and Americans. **3 May:** Margaret Thatcher becomes British prime minister after parliamentary elections. **December:** Soviet Union invades Afghanistan.

1980 10 October: Geneva Convention on the Prohibition or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects is adopted. **4 November:** Ronald Reagan is elected president of the United States.

1980–1988 Iran–Iraq War.

1981 Publication of Amartya Sen's *Poverty and Famines*. **7 June:** Israel uses force to destroy Iraqi nuclear plant at Osirak.

1982 2 April–14 June: Falklands War between Great Britain and Argentina. **August:** Mexico defaults on its loans, triggering the debt crisis.

1982–1983 Genocide of Mayan Indians in Guatemala occurs.

1983 9 June: Margaret Thatcher retains role as British prime minister after parliamentary elections. **23 July:** Insurgency by the Tamil Tigers begins with the aim of creating an independent Tamil state in the northeast of Sri Lanka. **25 October:** United States invades Grenada.

1984 Operations of the United Nations Trusteeship Council is suspended on the independence of Palau, as its work is complete. **6 November:** Ronald Reagan is reelected U.S. president.

1985 11 March: Mikhail Gorbachev comes to power in the Soviet Union.

1986 Iran–Contra affair in which illegal U.S. arms sales to Iran are used to fund the Contras in Nicaragua.

1987 11 June: Margaret Thatcher retains role as British prime minister after parliamentary elections. **16 September:** The Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer is signed to phase out the production and trading of chlorofluorocarbons. **8 December:** Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty eliminates a whole class of weapons.

1988 15 May: Soviet forces start to withdraw from Afghanistan. **6 December:** Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change is set up. Saddam Hussein of Iraq uses chemical weapons against Iranian troops in the Iran–Iraq War and against Iraqi Kurds. Al-Qaeda is formed by Osama bin Laden.

1989 October: Asia–Pacific Economic Cooperation Forum is established. **9 November:** The Berlin Wall is breached. **3 December:** U.S. president George Bush and Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev declare the Cold War over during the Malta Summit.

1990 11 February: Nelson Mandela is released from jail in South Africa. **2 August:** Iraq invades Kuwait. **5 August:** Cairo Declaration on Human Rights in Islam is agreed to at the 19th Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers. **6 August:** United Nations imposes an almost total trade and financial embargo against Iraq. **3 October:** German unification is complete. **19 November:** The Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty is signed by 22 states, reducing the number of conventional weapons.

1991 17 January: A coalition of states starts military action to remove Iraqi forces from Kuwait. **26 March:** The Economic Community of the Southern Cone is founded, establishing a common market between Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay. **April:** Iraq is subjected to weapons inspection program as part of the terms of postwar settlement. **April 6:** Great Britain,

France, and the United States intervene in northern Iraq to protect Iraqi Kurds. **June:** The Yugoslav republics of Slovenia and Croatia unilaterally declare their independence, leading to war in Croatia. **31 July:** Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty is signed by the United States and the Soviet Union, reducing their nuclear arsenals by almost 30 percent. **26 December:** Soviet Union is dissolved.

1992 7 February: The Treaty on European Union, commonly known as the Maastricht Treaty, creates the European Union. **10 February:** The start of Operation Restore Hope sees emergency supplies being delivered to people in Somalia by the U.S. Air Force. **21 February:** United Nations Security Council authorizes the creation of the United Nations Protection Force for the Former Yugoslavia. **March:** As part of the Vance Peace Accords, 14,000 United Nations peacekeepers start to arrive in Croatia. **April:** War breaks out in Bosnia–Herzegovina. **30 May:** The first of several sets of sanctions is imposed by the United Nations on Serbia. **August:** A no-fly zone is established in southern Iraq. 5 **December:** United States–led intervention into Somalia begins.

1993 13 January: The Chemical Weapons Convention opens for signatures. **25 May:** International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia is established. **14–25 June:** World Conference on Human Rights. **September:** Oslo I Accords between Israel and the Palestinian Liberation Organization are signed in Washington, D.C. **July 16:** North Atlantic Treaty Organization intervenes in Bosnia. **December 8:** North Atlantic Free Trade Agreement is signed into law.

1994 April–June: Rwandan genocide occurs in which an estimated 800,000 people are killed in just three months. **22 June:** United Nations approves a French intervention to create a safe area in Rwanda. **November:** The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda is established. **16 November:** The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea comes into force.

1995 World Trade Organization is established. **April:** United Nations allows partial resumption of Iraq's oil exports to buy food and medicine in an oil-for-food program.

1996 10 September: Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty opens for signatures.

1997 The Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction. **July:** A run on the Thai baht triggers the Asian financial crisis. **11 December:** Kyoto Protocol is adopted.

1998 Gro Harlem Brundtland becomes president of the World Health Organization, thus becoming the first woman elected to run a major UN institution. **28 February–11 June 1999:** Serbian intervention in Kosovo begins. **17 July:** Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court is agreed upon. **7 August:** Al-Qaeda bombs U.S. embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, killing 224 people, of whom 12 were U.S. citizens. **October:** Iraq stops cooperation with United Nations Special Commission to Oversee the Destruction of Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction. **17 October:** Pinochet is arrested in London on a Spanish warrant for crimes of torture committed in Chile. **December:** Operation Desert Fox, a bombing campaign by U.S. and British planes to destroy Iraq's nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons programs, commences.

1999 1 January: Euro becomes a real currency. **March–June:** NATO intervenes successfully in Kosovo against Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

2000 March 26: Vladimir Putin is elected Russian president. **6–8 September:** United Nations Millennium Summit occurs, at which the development goals are agreed upon. **November–December:** George W. Bush is elected president of the United States.

2001 1 January: Canadian-backed International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty presents its report, which leads to the adoption of the responsibility to protect. 7 **May:** U.K. intervenes in Sierra Leone. **11 September:** Al-Qaeda operatives hijack planes and crash them into targets in the United States. 7 **October:** United States–led bombing of Afghanistan begins in support of anti-Taliban Northern Alliance forces, which enter Kabul shortly afterward. **1 December:** Bonn Agreement inaugurates a post-Taliban administration in Afghanistan and authorizes an International Security Assistance Force to enable the Afghan government to provide effective security across the country.

2002 29 January: U.S. president George Bush describes Iraq, Iran, and North Korea as an "axis of evil." **12 February:** Trial of Slobodan Milošević, former president of Serbia, begins at the United Nations War Crimes Tribunal. **March:** United Nations Security Council establishes the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan. **24 May:** Strategic Offensive Reduction Treaty is signed. **1 July:** International Criminal Court begins operations. **24 September:** British government publishes a dossier that claims that Saddam Hussein has chemical weapons that could be launched to hit London in 45 minutes. **November:** United Nations weapons inspectors return to Iraq. **5 November:** African Union is established, replacing the Organization of African Unity. **8 November:** United Nations Security Council passes Reso-

lution 1441, giving Saddam Hussein one last chance to comply with his international obligations. **19 December:** The United Nations says Iraq is in "material breach" of the United Nations resolution.

2003 10 January: North Korea withdraws from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. **29 January:** U.S. president George W. Bush says he is ready to attack Iraq without a United Nations mandate. **7 March:** Weapons inspectors say they need more time to verify Iraq's compliance. **10 March:** French president Jacques Chirac says France would vote against any resolution that includes an ultimatum leading to war. **20 March:** President Bush announces the start of the war against Iraq; Allied forces, predominantly from the United States, Great Britain, and Poland, strike military targets. **March–December:** The European Union's rapid reaction force, a key element in its Common Security and Defense Policy, is first deployed in Macedonia. **9 April:** Regime of Saddam Hussein collapses and Baghdad comes under the authority of the Coalition Provisional Authority. **1 May:** President Bush declares "Mission Accomplished" but an insurgency in Iraq intensifies. **11 August:** North Atlantic Treaty Organization takes control of the International Security Assistance Force under a United Nations mandate. **23 September:** United Nations Convention against Transnational Organised Crime comes into force.

2004 The African Union sets up a Peace and Security Council to promote collective security in the continent. **1 May:** The EU undergoes its largest single enlargement to include former Soviet republics (Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia) and Eastern European states (Hungary, the Czech Republic, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia). **7 May:** Vladimir Putin is reelected president of Russia. **June:** Sovereignty is handed back to an interim government in Iraq headed by Prime Minister Iyad Allawi. **October 9:** Hamid Karzai is elected president of Afghanistan. **November:** George W. Bush is reelected president of the United States.

2005 January: First free elections held in Iraq. **April:** Kurdish leader Jalal Talabani becomes president of Iraq and Ibrahim Jaafari, a Shia, is named as prime minister amid escalating violence. **24 September:** Elections in Germany lead to Angela Merkel becoming chancellor of Germany. **October:** World Summit adopts the responsibility to protect.

2006 United Nations sanctions are imposed on North Korea. **22 April:** President Talabani of Iraq asks Shia compromise candidate Nouri al-Maliki to form a new government. **23 December:** United Nations Security Council passes sanctions on Iran after it refuses to suspend its uranium enrichment program. **30 December:** Saddam Hussein is executed in Iraq. The United Nations estimates 34,000 civilians were killed in Iraq during 2006.

2007 14 July: Russia withdraws from the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe.

2008 Global financial crisis. **11 January:** Israeli military offensive in Gaza. **4 November:** Barack Obama is elected president of the United States. Angela Merkel retains chancellorship of Germany after elections.

2009 May: Sri Lankan military defeats the Tamil Tigers, ending a 25-year civil war. **June:** United States formally hands over the security of Iraq to Iraqi forces. **16 June:** Inaugural summit of the BRIC countries (Brazil, Russia, India, and China). **17 August:** Hamid Karzai, president of Afghanistan, is reelected for a second term.

2010 8 April: New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty between United States and Russia. **August:** The last U.S. combat soldiers leave Iraq. China overtakes Japan as the world's second-largest economy. **December:** Revolutionary uprising in Tunisia spreads across the region, leading to what is to become known as the Arab Spring.

2011 19 March: First responsibility to protect action in Libya. **2 May:** Osama bin Laden is killed in a raid by U.S. Navy SEALs. **June:** Board of International Monetary Fund elects Christine Lagarde as its first female managing director and chairperson. **14 July:** South Sudan becomes the 193rd member of the United Nations. **December:** United States completes its withdrawal from Iraq. **November:** Arab League suspends Syria because of its brutal suppression of antigovernment protests and imposes economic sanctions.

2012 Kyoto Treaty expires. Vladimir Putin is elected president of Russia after a period as prime minister because of constitutional limitations. **6 November:** Barack Obama is reelected president of the United States. **29 November:** United Nations General Assembly votes to give Palestinians status of nonmember observer state.

2013 11 January: France intervenes in the war in Mali against Islamist extremists. **April:** Iraq appears to be descending into full-scale civil war. **May:** U.S. president Barack Obama declares that the "war on terror" is over. **November:** Ukrainian president Viktor Yanukovych abandons agreement with European Union on closer trade ties and seeks closer cooperation with Russia, sparking protests that escalate and eventually lead to start of the Ukrainian crisis the following year.

2014 Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development declares that only five states (Norway, Sweden, Luxembourg, Denmark, and Great Britain) had achieved the target of giving 0.7 percent of gross national product to developing countries. **January:** Islamist surge begins in Iraq. **March:** Larg-

est Ebola outbreak in history leads to a concerted international effort led by the World Health Organization. **18 March:** Russia annexes the Ukrainian territory of Crimea. **April:** United Nations Security Council approves a peacekeeping operation for Central African Republic. **July:** European Union places sanctions against Russia. United States and Iran independently begin to launch air strikes against the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria. **November:** China's plans for a free trade Asia–Pacific region, backed by the Asia–Pacific Economic Cooperation Forum. **8 December:** International Security Assistance Force ceases combat operations in Afghanistan and is disbanded. **24 December:** United Nations Arms Trade Treaty comes into force to regulate international trade in conventional weapons.

2015 United Nations sanctions imposed on Yemen. ASEAN community launched. Migration crisis in Europe begins as more than 1 million migrants and refugees arrive in the continent. **16 March:** United Nations Security Council renews mandate of United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan. **14 July:** International community and Iran reach a Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action to ensure that Iran's nuclear program will be exclusively peaceful. **August:** A court in Guatemala rules that former dictator Efraín Ríos Montt can stand trial on charges of genocide and crimes against humanity but cannot be sentenced due to his dementia. **October:** U.S. president Barack Obama shifts policy to confirm plans to extend the U.S. military presence in Afghanistan beyond 2016. **30 November–12 December:** United Nations Climate Change Conference held in Paris. **25 December:** Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank starts operation.

2016 16 January: International sanctions on Iran are lifted. **February:** International Monetary Fund board reelects Christine Lagarde as managing director and chairperson. **March:** United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees estimates that 135,711 people reached the continent by sea in first three months of the year. **31 May:** Hissène Habré, former president of Chad, is found guilty of crimes against humanity. The African Court of Peoples and Human Rights merges with the African Court of International Justice to form a new African Court of Justice and Human Rights. **23 June:** Voters in Great Britain vote to leave the European Union. **12 July:** The Permanent Court of Arbitration judges in favor of the Philippines against Chinese claims to much of the South China Sea, but China announces that it will ignore the judgment. **August:** The Islamic State chief strategist Abu Muhammad al-Adnani is killed in an air strike in Syria.

Introduction

Throughout history human beings have organized themselves socially and politically in a wide variety of arrangements and groupings. Whether in tight kinship bands or large and complex modern states, humans have always interacted not just with those inside their own group but also with those outside. Those interactions have taken a vast array of different forms—from cooperative relations of trade within a context of mutual recognition to violent clashes for the purpose of conquest—that can all be understood as international relations. In the contemporary era, however, international relations take place in the context of a system of sovereign states. Although other actors such as international organizations, transnational corporations, and nongovernmental groups are increasingly important, relations between different countries, or states, constitute the central focus of international relations.

Beginning roughly 400 years ago, states gradually began to defeat and engulf smaller sovereign entities, leading to the state gradually becoming the dominant form of political organization. The whole world, with the exception of Antarctica, is now divided territorially and politically into states that are independent territorial units with sovereign power. This means that they are the highest legal and political authority over their territory and population. The contemporary world is therefore a decentralized and pluralistic one in which states manage their own relations; there is no world government or other form of overarching power to make the rules or to establish processes for them. For this reason, the system of states is described as anarchical. The discipline of International Relations (IR) has traditionally examined how relations are managed between states within the anarchical context, although more recent developments in global governance raise questions as to the extent to which the traditional focus on order within a condition of anarchy is still relevant.

The discipline of IR was born in 1919 after World War I, when the first chair of International Politics was established in Great Britain at the University of Aberystwyth. Its purpose was to focus directly on the problems of war and peace among the great powers so that another world war could be avoided. The ideas on which the discipline were based, however, had been germinating for several centuries in the thought and writings of statespersons, diplomatic historians, and intellectuals such as Hugo Grotius, Niccolò Machiavelli, and Thomas Hobbes, who produced works that to this day help scholars interpret the features, processes, and practices of states. In the 1920s

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and 1930s, and more particularly during the Cold War, more and more universities in the United States and Great Britain in particular began to offer distinct courses in IR. The academic discipline of IR, which by convention is capitalized to distinguish it from international relations in practice, has created a coherent narrative of the development of international relations that simplifies and generalizes from the complexity of cross-border interactions. Writers within the discipline have "cherry-picked" particular periods and events that they believe demonstrate something particularly useful about international relations and these provide the main subject matter of this dictionary.

The discipline of IR is a largely Anglo–American one, with a focus on the key interests of the powerful in the system. Those events highlighted in the central narrative of the discipline tend, therefore, to be those that have had an impact on the great powers. As the content of the dictionary is drawn from the conventional subject matter of IR, it does not escape this bias. The wars that are included, for example, are wars involving the major powers, which had an impact on the development of the international system as a whole. Given that the center of gravity of world power for the past 500 years or more has been the Western world, and prior to the 20th century specifically the European world, the history of international relations is tied up with the history of Europe. Europe's dominance enabled it to define the structures and processes of the emerging state system, meaning that the history of the European society of states is also a key narrative.

The conventional approach of IR also reflects the privileging of the nation-state in much of the discipline's history: diplomacy, war, statesmen, and great power politics have tended to dominate. In recent decades, the discipline has, however, gone a long way toward correcting that bias, focusing on women in international relations, revealing the power relationships within apparently neutral narratives, and looking beyond the relations of the powerful. These developments are also reflected in this dictionary.

Scholars of IR have analyzed international relationships in the search for historical generalizations that can inform an understanding of cause and effect in international relations. They can, however, see it quite differently, resulting in a range of competing narratives of international relations, reflecting the historical and academic conditioning of the authors. The historical approach to IR is a particularly British one, associated most closely with the English School, which, influenced by the work of Hedley Bull, charts the historical development of the practices and norms of an international society. The fact that this is a historical dictionary means that the choice of entries reflects this historical approach rather than the more social scientific methods of the American discipline; it reflects a more interpretative tradition associated with classical scholarship. Although this no doubt has its limitations, it hopefully provides readers with at least an overview of where contemporary

International Relations has come from. Central to this is the question of why the world is divided into separate states and how such a system emerged. To understand this, a consideration of the early historical development of international relations is required.

THE EARLY HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT
OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Premodern international systems tended to fall into one of two broad groups. The first is that of empire, such as the Roman or Chinese Empires that lacked any conception of the equality of outsiders or of a world of equal states. Rule was based on power, and there was no sense of a balance of power, no sense of the others' equal right to exist—the weak had to submit to the strong. Human history is full of stories of large empires; there is a constant tension in the history of international relations between universalism, such as in an empire in which power is centralized, and particularism, a system in which it is decentralized.

The second broad group is that of the association of independent political authorities. There are fewer examples of this second category. The two key ones that feature in accounts of the history of international relations are the Greek city-states, from about the 8th to the 4th century BCE, and the Renaissance Italian city-states of the 15th century. In both examples, states were territorially and politically distinct, and together constituted a well-defined international system of independent political authorities that acknowledged no superior and that recognized each other as independent, sovereign units. As these more closely conform to a modern state with sovereign power and also to the contemporary international system, these two examples of early international state systems are taken as important precursors to modern international relations. Niccolò Machiavelli's advice to a prince in the 16th century on how to survive and flourish in such a system is considered a classic of International Relations, as is Thucydides's far earlier narrative of the ultimatum given by Athens to Melos to submit to domination or face ruthless military power—an ultimatum the Melians tragically ignored.

Within these early arrangements one can identify certain characteristics of the modern world, such as the beginnings of a diplomatic system. Much can also be learned about the dynamics of power and alliances within a decentralized system as well as the vulnerability of such a system of states to disintegration and conquest. The Greek city-state system, for example, was severely weakened by 27 years of war, as documented by Thucydides in *The Peloponnesian War*, and was ultimately consumed by the monarchical power of Philip of Macedon. The small, independent states had become obsolete in a

world of larger political units that could command greater military power. A similar fate was meted out to the Italian city-states, most of which were unable to maintain their sovereign independence in the face of the domination of rising great powers.

The Italian states system was unique within a European context in which the modern state had yet to emerge from a complex situation of political sovereignties that existed under the Holy Roman Empire. This empire, conceived by the Frankish King Charlemagne in the 800s, sought to regain the advantages of the Roman Empire and to reimpose the order and security that such a universal system could bring. The Holy Roman Empire was hierarchical, with the pope and Holy Roman emperor at its apex and various different classes in a pyramid structure below. The Church, therefore, had to share power with secular authorities, including the nobility, who had more direct, local control and military capability. Moreover, certain cities were independent of both the nobility and the church and governed themselves. Within the system, therefore, power and responsibility were fragmented and localized; yet at the same time, there was the sense and belief in political unity that came from a shared allegiance to the Church and a universal recognition of the pope's authority. This began to break down, however, as secular leaders prevailed in the power struggles that dominated the period, providing the basis for the development of the international system of states. Key to this is the development of raison d'état—the convention that the interest of the state is the highest interest in and of itself, and not as part of a greater whole or holy empire. As the ideal of a unified Europe under the command of the pope declined, the emergence of the state system became possible and was agreed upon at the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648.

Meanwhile, by the end of the 15th century, the Italian Renaissance, the Reformation, and the scientific revolution had ushered in the modern era. The exploration of the world by European explorers was about to reshape the history of international relations. The modern era is that of Western dominance; the trends that define this Western era originated in Europe. Europeans came to dominate the globe, not because they were more socially or technologically developed—they were not more so than the Chinese, for example—but for reasons that are greatly contested among historians. Whether it was their geography, the establishment of the rule of law, the Protestant religion, their institutions, or some other causal factor, the important point is that explorers from Spain, Portugal, Great Britain, and the Netherlands embarked on voyages of discovery, bringing back huge riches, conquering territory, and disseminating Western forms of life, religion, and society. By the time the Westphalian system began to develop in the mid-17th century, the European states of which it was comprised had begun to dominate international relations around the world.

THE WESTPHALIAN ERA

The Westphalian settlement followed the Thirty Years' War in Europe (1618–1648), which was the last of the great religious wars that had devastated Europe over the preceding century. The war and ensuing plague and famine killed over one third of the population of central Europe; some estimates of the death toll in what is now Germany are as high as 50 percent of the population. The result was the widespread collapse of the medieval structures that had been in place in Europe for the previous thousand years. With the Peace of Westphalia, the foundations at least of a state system appeared, thus constituting an important watershed in the development of international relations. Although it really codified innovations that were already evolving and that took a long time to consolidate, Westphalia is nevertheless a useful device for understanding the key changes that brought into existence the contemporary system of states in place of the old universal order.

The new order was based on certain central principles, the most fundamental of which was sovereignty. The sovereignty of rulers over their internal affairs was to be mutually recognized. This amounted to a right of nonintervention from outside powers. A state's sovereignty extended to the determination of religion within its territory, and the status of the pope as a universal authority was downgraded as politics became based on secular rather than religious principles. The notion of universal Christendom as a foundation of international order was thus brought to an end. However, although states were to be formally equal and the sovereignty principle was in theory an antihegemonic one, protecting smaller and weaker states from the ambitions of their more powerful neighbors, it did not amount to equality of power in practice. The key ordering mechanism was the balance of power.

Many aspects of contemporary international relations still derive from the Peace of Westphalia. Convened in two separate congresses, at Münster and Osnabrück, heads of state and state representatives met to negotiate. Although meetings of heads of state in summits are now a common occurrence, it was a significant innovation at the time. The Westphalian system also required a diplomatic system to facilitate communication between the newly independent monarchs. Although in the post-Westphalian period diplomacy was very personal, carried out by trusted appointees of the monarch, over time formal rules and practices developed that persist to this day. This was also the period where modern international law emerged. Hugo Grotius, a Dutch jurist widely seen as the father of international law, witnessed events in the Thirty Years' War as a Swedish diplomat. He recognized that with the collapse of the old universal order and the law of peoples, *ius gentium*, that derived from it, a new body of rules was required to guide relations between

sovereign states. Although Grotius's conception of international law still had God at its center, it represented a giant step toward a secular system of international law, appropriate to a system of religious and political pluralism.

One of the medieval structures that were lost was that of the constraints on individual power. Already on the throne in 1648, though only 10 years of age, King Louis XIV of France (1638–1715) epitomized the trend toward absolute monarchy when he declared, "I am the state. The state is me." Concerned personally and directly with affairs of state, he insisted that all questions of foreign affairs be referred to him, and he was not alone in this among the absolute monarchs of the time. King William III in England, King Frederick in Prussia, and Czarina Catherine in Russia similarly dominated foreign policy, which was often conducted through personal correspondence. The monarchs were closely interrelated through marriage and had much in common: they shared a European culture, court manners, and language; had common traditions of learning and belief; and shared the rank and privilege of royalty. Within Europe, therefore, an international society developed that was relatively stable and in which wars tended to be those of adjustment rather than challenging the foundations of the system itself. The French Revolution of 1789, however, changed all that, bringing about greater participation in the affairs of state and changing forever the nature of international relations as nationalism was born.

France at the time was the major land power in Europe and its monarch epitomized the old absolutist forms of state. Nearly bankrupt due to its involvement in the American wars of independence, France attempted to increase taxes. The chain of events that resulted led ultimately to the overthrow of the entire French system. When the old order in France was swept away, so was the European order based on the club of sovereigns. The revolt of the American colonies against Great Britain had shown the French that determined people could not only change their government but also create an orderly society that was not reliant on a king, nobility, or established church. Revolutionary ideas such as that "all men are created equal" were brought back by hundreds of French officers who had fought in the American War of Independence and resonated strongly in a society in which people had endured abuses of power within an absolutist and despotic system. The principles of equality and liberty were not, however, applied to all. Slaves were not considered equal in the American system or throughout France's overseas possessions. Equality did not mean equality for women either. The French Revolution literally developed *les droits de l'homme* (rights of man). Women who demanded the same rights for French women—such as Olympe de Gouges—were sent to the guillotine.

The radical idea of "the sovereignty of the people" challenged the authority of monarchical sovereignty and required a legitimate state to be based on the will of the people. The French Revolution was therefore a massive asser-

tion of the demand for participation in government. It mobilized French nationalism and led to an upsurge of similar sentiments across Europe. The National Convention of the French nation promised to bring "aid and fraternity to all people who wish to recover their liberty." This evangelical aspect to the revolution was welcomed by many across Europe, at least until the "Great Terror." The first task of the revolutionary government was to create a massive citizens' army, both to spread the revolution and to resist the counterrevolutionary forces of the remaining European monarchs. The Napoleonic Wars that followed were fought on a mass scale. The rather constrained confrontation between the personal armies of monarchs had been replaced by wars fought by whole peoples or nations. Perhaps the most famous commentator on war, Carl von Clausewitz, observed the Napoleonic conflicts and speculated on the potential for absolute war.

In addition to political revolution, profound changes were brought about by industrialization, which, as Karl Marx famously reported, swept across Europe during the 18th and 19th centuries. Steam power, advances in metallurgy and transportation, and a whole host of other innovations supported by an agricultural revolution that freed workers to move to the new centers of industry had a transformative effect on international relations. Market economies expanded with the state, and levels of trade increased as industrialization advanced. Political and industrial revolutions interacted as an emerging commercial class demanded governments adapt to new economic realities. In 1776—the year the United States declared independence—Adam Smith's classic work on laissez-faire economics, *Wealth of Nations*, challenged the mercantilist system under which the European states had sought to increase their relative power and wealth by maintaining a balance of trade surplus. He thus influenced a new era of capitalist global relations. The Industrial Revolution also had a significant impact on warfare, not least transforming the mobility of arms and enhancing land power. Nationalism and industrialization ultimately combined with devastating effect in World War I.

The period of nearly 100 years between the end of the Napoleonic Wars in 1815 and the outbreak of World War I in 1914 was particularly significant in the development of international relations for three key reasons: it was the period of the Concert of Europe; it was the era of high imperialism; and under British hegemonic power, the key principles and processes of the international political economy were set in play. The Concert of Europe was agreed upon at the Congress of Vienna, which concluded the Napoleonic Wars. The congress's main task was to redraw the map of Europe after the defeat of Napoleon. It not only stated the terms of the peace but also established a new system of international relations among the European powers that, it was hoped, would extend that peace into the future. A system of peacetime conferences was set up, and the great powers agreed to consult and inform one another on their foreign policy. This was a milestone in the

multilateral management of international relations. The great powers of Europe worked together in particular to manage a balance of power, with the goal of preventing further attempts at hegemony. The century was one of relative peace in Europe compared to others in its history. Conflicts, however, were often played out in Europe's global empires.

The expansion of European power across the world had started in the 15th century with the colonization of Latin America. Over the next few centuries, more and more of the world came under European control: North America, the Caribbean, Southeast Asia (with the exception of Siam, modern-day Thailand), India, Australia, New Zealand, and Cape Africa. Russia, meanwhile, expanded to the East. The process of imperialism was not a single process with a coherent plan but, rather, a disorganized, ad hoc story. Nevertheless, by the late 19th century, the climax of the process was reached in the "Scramble for Africa." The carving up of Africa was rapid and almost total. In 1880, only one tenth of Africa was under European control and the interior of Africa was still mostly unknown to Europeans. By 1900, only one tenth of Africa—Liberia and what is now Ethiopia—was *not* under direct European rule. European powers had also seized Chinese ports and had further designs on China. By the start of the 20th century, the United States, itself a former colony, also had imperial ambitions in the Pacific and Caribbean. Japan, a new rising power, had aspirations in Korea and China. After World War I, the former territory of the Ottoman Empire in the Middle East also came under the "trusteeship" of Britain and France—a patchwork of colonies in all but name.

Given its scale and diversity colonialism, which took various forms in different places, is difficult to generalize about. The causes of colonialism were also complex and diverse. The Spanish conquistadores who were in the first instance looking for opportunities for trade, actually found vast swathes of land. Colonialism to the east also tended to arise from the desire for commercial opportunities. India was colonized in the first instance not by the British state but by the East India Trading Company; territories were also grabbed to protect vital trade routes; and by the period of mature imperialism, the division of Africa was really an extension of the European balance of power.

Whatever the causes, few parts of the world escaped European domination; those that did were not unaffected by the Europeanization of the globe. One of the few states that was not colonized was Japan, which nevertheless had to adapt to the new power realities of the world. Japan was still a traditional, isolated, inward-looking society in the mid-19th century, with few natural resources. Yet by the end of the century, it had become the first non-Western country to become a modern, imperial state. Japan achieved this by scrapping its old order and adopting Western institutions and practices. It brought in Western advisors, bought Western technology and weapons, and

was so successful in its radical reforms that it became one of the most significant actors in 20th-century international relations, especially after its military victory over Russia in 1905. This outcome had wider symbolic significance too, demonstrating as it did the fallibility of European power and signaling an imminent shift in global power.

The imposition of European practices and institutions, whether done internally or by external power, simply obliterated many precolonial forms of political, social, and cultural organization. European states also provided the model for political and economic development of the new states that emerged from colonial domination in the second half of the 20th century. Imperialism, furthermore, created an interlinked and interdependent world economy. It integrated into a global system those parts of the world that had previously been local markets existing outside the major patterns of trade. This meant that people across the world were now vulnerable to the highs and lows of the international market. The Malayan rubber industry, for example, completely changed both work patterns and social and economic relationships within the colony. It only existed, however, because the British brought the rubber tree over from South America. Dependence on commodity production still continues to affect many former colonies decades after independence.

Both peace and the extension of capitalism were underpinned by British power. Great Britain was the dominant global power throughout the 19th century. This strength derived from its navy, which controlled the world's seas, as well as from the economic advantages it derived from being the first state to industrialize and from the fact that it had the largest empire. Britain's prosperity was dependent on the maintenance of a network of trading relationships that covered the whole world, and it used its power to promote a worldwide, multilateral trading system. High levels of trade, in turn, created demand for British services such as banking, shipping, and insurance. Britain in this period is often described as having a hegemonic position. It had an economic supremacy that no other state, or even combination of states, could match. This dominance allowed it to lay down the rules, the most important of which was free trade; an open world economy was seen as essential for Britain's national interest and this period is viewed by some to be the first era of globalization.

Britain's period of undisputed hegemony reached its peak between about 1860 and 1870. Later in the century, Britain faced a growing military and industrial challenge from new rivals, particularly a newly unified Germany and the United States. These two states resented the extent of Britain's sphere of influence, both in terms of the size of its empire and its dominance of global commerce. By the end of the 19th century, therefore, Britain's dominance was under threat. For the first time, those threats were not only European; Europe's monopoly of modern industrialized production faced chal-

lenges from the United States and Japan. The latter half of that century and the first half of the next were marked by extraordinary changes in the balance of power both within and beyond Europe. The decline of Russia and of the Ottoman and Habsburg Empires, alongside the rise of a unified Germany, threatened both British and international stability and signaled some profound changes in international relations in the 20th century.

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS IN THE 20TH CENTURY

By the beginning of the 20th century, the United States was already the world's biggest economy and had a larger navy than the British. The Germans, with their own naval building program, also threatened Britain's ability to maintain free and open international trade and control the seas. Germany's navy went from being the sixth largest in the world to the second in a matter of decades, unsettling the balance of power at the heart of European politics. The power shifts in Europe culminated in World War I, which brought about the end of Britain's dominance of international relations. This war undermined Britain's economic base and changed its relationship with its empire. It also enhanced U.S. power while failing to deal once and for all with the German "problem." British power was finally broken by World War II. It is sometimes said that Britain lost the war not to Germany but to the United States. It might have been a benign defeat but it nevertheless meant that international relations entered the phase of U.S. dominance.

World War I had been a watershed for the development of international relations. The outbreak of war revealed the weaknesses in Europe's old system of diplomacy. European-centered diplomacy in which the great powers took on the responsibility for the management of the international system was seen to have failed. The balance of power and the system of alliance politics and secret treaties that this had spawned was considered by many, including President of the United States Thomas Woodrow Wilson, to have contributed to the outbreak of war. Developments in technology, the growth of mass media, the emergence of the middle classes in Europe, demands for a meritocratic rather than aristocratic diplomatic system, and the entry into global prominence of the United States also ensured that international relations would change in the coming decades. The Russian Revolutions of 1917 shook the old order to its core, overthrowing the monarchy. The new communist government created the Soviet Union, which was to play a major world role until its collapse in the early 1990s. Furthermore, after World War I the League of Nations was created, signaling the importance of a formal international organization for the century to come.

The idealism of Wilson that underpinned the League was rooted in a long tradition of thinking about peace, with the work of Immanuel Kant perhaps the best example. The ideas behind what was to become a new form of international relations had a long gestation period and developed as much from grassroots demands for change as from above. The idea of a league of nations took hold during the war itself and was promoted by a range of different civil society organizations across the world. People wanted a real departure from old forms of international relations, and these groups shared the common aim of establishing a system that could resolve legal disputes through a court of arbitration and political disputes through a council of the league. By 1917, most of the European governments had accepted President Wilson's proposal that a league be created.

The creation of the League of Nations was one of the 14 points for peace that Wilson announced in 1918, in a speech justifying U.S. involvement in World War I as the means to ensure a new order after cessation of hostilities. His other notable points included disarmament—to break the economic interest of arms companies in war—and national self-determination. The latter principle was to be applied to the oppressed minorities in Eastern Europe. It was also tied up with the idea of democratization as a key to peace: if nations were to govern their own affairs democratically, in the interests of their people, then there would be no reason to resort to war. Because, however, these ideas were only seen to apply to the minorities of Eastern Europe and not to all the other oppressed peoples of the world, the League revealed a huge double standard. Although Wilsonian principles undermined any residual legitimacy and justification of the European empires, the gross hypocrisy on which the League was founded was not fully recognized at the time. Ho Chi Minh, whose appeal for Vietnamese independence from France was ignored, turned to communism instead, and this would prove to be particularly significant for the United States later in the century.

The League was incorporated into the Treaty of Versailles, agreed to at the Paris Peace Conference, and was set up in January 1920. Its fundamental purpose was to replace the old European ways of diplomacy with a system of collective security and arbitration supported by a program of disarmament. The old system had been a self-help one, where states had to rely on their own military strength to resolve conflicts. Under the new system, the League Council was to determine when a violation of the League's constitution or an act of aggression had taken place, and had the responsibility to resolve the conflict, either through negotiation, mediation, or resort to law. The International Court of Justice was set up at this time, charged with providing a dispute-resolution service to states. The idea that a court could resolve international disputes was a central plank of the Wilsonian approach. There was also the support of a system of sanctions that could be imposed in cases of

noncompliance. In the absence of world government, international law would be enforced through collective use of sanctions of either economic or, as a last resort, military nature.

The League of Nations had some success, particularly in its early years. It managed to negotiate a peace between Yugoslavia and Albania in 1921 and other disputes. To some extent, therefore, it did fulfill its mandate of preventing minor crises from escalating into major confrontations. However, when it came to dealing with more serious conflicts, particularly those involving a major power, the League singularly failed. Its most notable failures were to act effectively in response to the German reoccupation of the Rhineland, the Japanese invasion of Manchuria, and the Italian invasion of Abyssinia. Ultimately it also failed to prevent the outbreak of another horrific world war. In particular, the central idea of collective security—that all states would take responsibility for the security of others—proved far from successful, with states unwilling to commit limited resources to operations not directly in the state's interest.

Even though the League failed at one level, it also succeeded in changing forever the nature of international relations. It established, for example, the principle that the international community of states as a whole has some sort of responsibility to alleviate the worst injustices and disasters suffered by individuals. It played an important role in the promotion of health and welfare, leading later on, among other developments, to the establishment of the World Health Organization under the United Nations (UN) system. Moreover, the International Labour Organization, which was set up as part of the League structure designed to improve working conditions for the world's workers, still survives today. The League was progressive and in many ways ahead of its time. Its constitution stated as its object the establishment of universal peace and insisted that this could be established only if based upon social justice. Such ideas underpinned key new approaches in international relations to human security, the development of the human rights regime, and postconflict reconstruction.

The successor organization to the League was the UN, which was largely developed on the same principles. Although the League itself was discredited, the values and principles on which it was constructed went on to have a significant influence on international relations in the remainder of the 20th century. In particular, the importance of international organizations was accepted as they became established as forums for discussion, instigators of key areas of international law, and as bodies capable of imposing sanctions on violators of international law. The idea now of a world without international organizations is unthinkable.

The devastation and slaughter of World War I was also the stimulus that led to the emergence of the formal discipline of IR. Professor Alfred Zimmern was appointed to the first chair of international politics at the Univer-

sity of Aberystwyth in Wales, Great Britain, in 1919. In the early years of the discipline, great hopes were expressed for the Versailles Treaty. This early period was dominated by liberal internationalist thinkers such as Zimmern who believed that peace could be achieved through the enforcement of international law. This era in interwar international relations is often labeled as idealist or, as the IR theorist E. H. Carr put it in 1939, "utopian," because its pioneers sought to change the apparently pervasive reoccurrence of war in human society. There was, however, also considerable skepticism among an increasingly prominent category of thinkers about international relations, including Carr and Reinhold Niebuhr, who came to be known as realists. This skepticism gathered pace as the League appeared increasingly weak in the interwar period and as dictatorships such as Adolf Hitler's Germany, Benito Mussolini's Italy, and Michinomiya Hirohito's Japan treated it with contempt. The economic devastation of the Great Depression along with the rise of economic nationalism and extreme ideologies set the prospects for peace further and further in jeopardy. The realists stressed that this should come as no surprise, as war was an inevitable and recurring phenomenon in international relations. Idealism and realism came to be perceived as two major categories into which international thinkers could be placed. After the outbreak of another world war in 1939—one that brought the League crashing down—these categories remained popular among analysts of IR. Many influential voices suggested that the realists, with their view of power politics, had been vindicated. Realism remained as a prominent approach throughout the remainder of the modern era, represented most strongly by Hans J. Morgenthau from the end of World War II until the late 1970s, while idealism metamorphosed into liberal IR theories.

Notwithstanding the continuing influence of realism, liberal optimism was far from extinguished in the period immediately after the World War II. The postwar period witnessed the creation of a range of international organizations, including the UN and the key economic organizations—the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (which in 1995 became the World Trade Organization)—which were designed to ensure stability and openness in the global economy. The principle of free trade was at the heart of the system, as it had been in the 19th century, but this time it was underpinned by the United States, which, after 1945, fully took its place as the world's greatest power. Eleanor Roosevelt chaired the UN Human Rights Commission that drew up the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, "a statement of aspiration," as she expressed it, that every person in the world should have international protection for their rights, ensuring that the horrors of the holocaust, for example, could never happen again. This was a period of optimism also in the discipline of IR, where analysts considered that a new world was being built around the UN organization—an organization that was based on lessons learned from

the problems of the League—and other, key liberal economic institutions. The optimism of this new order, however, was always qualified as it became increasingly apparent that the new order was to be built around two poles, at each of which was a superpower with the nuclear capacity to cause mass death and destruction. This bipolarity characterized the Cold War. The liberal moment after World War II was short-lived as the world was plunged into this "cold" conflict between the Soviet Union and the United States, the two "superpowers."

The Cold War is the period in history from about 1947 to 1991 that was dominated by rivalry between the two superpowers, each of which had the ability to project its power globally. The dividing line between the two sides in the confrontation split the continent of Europe, and also the state of Germany, in half. This had an important impact on international relations across the globe and on the academic discipline of IR. In the context of constant threat, liberal theories and more critical approaches such as peace studies were marginalized and realism dominated, particularly in the United States, where it became increasingly quantitative in its methods.

The United States and Soviet Union had cooperated together to defeat Germany and Japan in World War II, but their ideological differences meant that their relationship was more naturally one of tension and distrust; as the war drew to a close, their relationship deteriorated. Led by Josef Stalin, the leaders and people of the Soviet Union felt that they had carried the hardest burden of the war with inadequate support from the other allies. They had, furthermore, been excluded from efforts to develop the atomic bomb. The key concern for the United States was Soviet expansion because of Stalin's demands for a postwar buffer zone of "friendly states" in Eastern Europe to guarantee its future security. Poland was the key concern of the Western allies—it was protection of Polish sovereignty that had brought them into World War II and now they were in no position to insist that the Polish people should choose their own government in a free and fair election. Soviet plans to control Eastern Europe also clashed with U.S. plans for an open, liberal-democratic postwar order open to the free exchange of goods and money.

As early as 1946, U.S. leaders were beginning to view the Soviet Union as an intractable foe and began to draw up a foreign policy that aimed to contain the spread of Soviet power and communist influence. In a policy statement in 1947, President of the United States Harry S. Truman called for the global containment of communism. The Truman doctrine was an ideological statement that demonstrated that, rather than go back to prewar isolation, the United States was going to stay militarily engaged in Europe and across the world to put Truman's policy into practice. The refusal of the Soviet Union to accept aid from the Marshall Plan brought what Winston Churchill, who had led Great Britain as prime minister though World War II, called an "iron

curtain" down across Europe. While Western Europe underwent a remarkable program of reconciliation, reconstruction, and growth (integration eventually leading to the establishment of the European Economic Community), Eastern Europe fell under the repressive hegemonic power of the Soviet Union. The division of Europe was highlighted by the creation of two military alliances, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in the West from 1949 and the Warsaw Pact in the East from 1955.

The revolution in China, which brought Chairman Mao Zedong's communists to power in 1949, further aroused U.S. fears. The National Security Council Document 68 (NSC68) predicted a Soviet attack in four to five years and proposed massive increases in U.S. defense spending. When communist North Korea, with the approval of Stalin, invaded South Korea in 1950, U.S. fears appeared to have been realized. The Korean War (1950–1953) was the first of two key wars during the Cold War period, the second being the war in Vietnam (1955–1975). Each of these conflicts involved divided states with the communists in the north and U.S.-supported regimes in the south. In neither case was communism "rolled back." The ceasefire at the end of the Korean War resulted in the permanent division of Korea. The Vietnam War—the United States' longest and costliest war in which nearly 58,000 Americans died—failed to prevent the "fall" of former French Indochina (Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam) to communism in 1975. Other parts of the world saw less direct involvement: in Indonesia and Guatemala, for example, U.S. intervention against communism was in the form of subversive CIA activity.

During the period of the Cold War, there was a series of such confrontations, each one raising tensions and competition between the superpowers. The Cold War was a security system based on formidable nuclear force, and any confrontation between the superpowers was inherently risky. The shadow of mutually assured destruction (with the appropriate acronym MAD) therefore hung over the world, particularly during the most icy period of the Cold War from 1949, when the Soviets exploded their first nuclear device, to 1962 when the Cuban missile crisis brought the world to the edge of the nuclear abyss. After 1962, however, it became an implicit and unwritten rule of superpower relations that nuclear war would never be allowed to happen. The superpowers were careful, for example, to avoid any direct involvement in regional conflicts that might escalate. The dangers of a regional conflict escalating into global nuclear war were most real in the Middle East, with the Americans supporting the Israelis and the Soviets the Egyptians and Arab states. The Middle East war in 1973, as well as interventions throughout the 1970s in Africa, all increased tensions and brought an end to the second phase of the Cold War, a period known as détente in which tensions had

relaxed. With the election of President of the United States Ronald Reagan in 1980, however, hostilities were fully reignited in what became known as the second Cold War.

In 1983, Reagan famously dubbed the Soviet Union the "evil empire," which, he believed, had used the period of détente to gain military superiority. He therefore set out to pursue a policy of massive military spending in the pursuit of military superiority. Although Reagan spoke the language of the 1950s, however, the second Cold War actually involved far more communication and cooperation between the two protagonists. In 1985, Mikhail Gorbachev came to power as the new Soviet leader. Gorbachev sought better relations with the West, and this marked the beginning of the end of the Cold War.

The divisions between the East and West that so dominated the Cold War were not the only notable divisions separating different parts of the world; there was a significant divide, for example, between the rich, developed states mainly located in the North and the far less-developed, poorer states in the South. There was also the divide between colonies and their former colonial masters. The second half of the 20th century, however, was also the main era of decolonization, a process that saw the dismantling of the old European empires and the emergence into the international system of a large number of new states. In the aftermath of World War II, the European powers lacked the resources, political will, and popular support to maintain their empires. India was the first colony to achieve independence from the British Empire in 1946, and from that point onward there were waves of independence across Asia and Africa and a truly global system of states was created. The process was largely concluded by the breakup of the Soviet Union in 1991 when a further 18 new states were created. Membership of the UN grew accordingly as the new states were admitted.

The developing world emerged from colonialism into a world not of its making, adopting the form and features of European statehood. Decolonization therefore did not see a return to precolonial forms of political and social organization but rather the globalization of the European system of states and its principles; those who struggled against colonialism wanted to be self-determining within a sovereign state. However, the borders as they were agreed upon in the decolonization process did not neatly mark out the extent and limits of all the world's nations. This meant that certain groups of people—such as the Tamils in Sri Lanka; the Christians of southern Sudan; the Kurds of northern Iraq, Iran, and Turkey; and the Palestinians—had their own desire for national independence thwarted: none of these peoples got their own state. Furthermore, once states achieved independence, the nationalist demands of minorities within them tended to be either ignored or crushed. Furthermore, the opportunities for minority nations in the new states to themselves achieve independence were severely limited: Bangladesh, Eri-

trea, and South Sudan are three rare examples. Postindependence history for many former colonies has therefore been marked by conflict and violence, exacerbated by economic problems.

In the Cold War era, new states were seen as easy prey by the two superpowers, which competed to bring each one into their sphere of influence. However, developing states often resisted this influence; in 1955, 29 African and Asian states came together in Bandung, Indonesia, to find ways to avoid entanglement in the Cold War. The Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) was formed a few years later in 1961 in Belgrade, Yugoslavia, to enable the host communist country, which had broken ties with the Soviet Union, to join a range of young independent states in the developing world to assert their own interests in international relations. The NAM continues with the same aim despite the ending of the Cold War.

Meanwhile, in the 1960s and 1970s, there were significant developments in the area of international political economy. The decision of President of the United States Richard M. Nixon to end the U.S. dollar's convertibility to gold in 1971 essentially brought the Bretton Woods system of a managed global economy to an end. U.S. dominance of the global economy was waning in the face of growing competition from the rising powers of the European Economic Community and the Japan. The 1973 oil crisis had a profound impact on the global economy, leading to renewed protectionism and an economic slowdown among the economic powers. The importance of such economic issues to international relations could not be avoided, and the 1970s witnessed a shifting focus within the discipline of International Relations. On the liberal wing of IR theory, Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye began, for example, to argue that international relations should be seen in terms of complex interdependence. They stressed that states were not the only significant actors and that economic issues were equally as important as security to an understanding of what was happening in the world.

Reflecting developments in practice, the binary nature of IR theory was similarly challenged in the 1960s and 1970s by the emergence from former colonial states of a new approach: dependency theory. This approach, of which André Gunder Frank was the most prominent theorist, sought to demonstrate that although the international system had undergone substantial formal change, in terms of real power it had not been so dramatically transformed. Even though new states had emerged with formal equality with their former colonial masters, the socioeconomic inequalities were marked. From the perspective of the developing world, the process of colonialism continued beyond formal independence through unequal international structures of finance, economics, and trade. What was needed was a new international economic order; however, calls for some form of redistribution of economic and political power in the international system put forward in the UN in the 1970s failed. Neo-Marxist theories such as those of Frank and Immanuel

Wallerstein, which sought to explain the persistence of international inequality and to conceptualize the relationship between Western and developing states, introduced new methods of economic and class analysis into the mainstream discipline. The debate between these theories and the existing liberal and realist ones became known as the interparadigm debate, which dominated the discipline in the 1970s and 1980s. The influence of this sort of neo-Marxist theory declined, however, with the emergence of economically successful former colonies such as South Korea and Singapore, even though Wallerstein sought to account for these developments with his theory.

In response to such challenges to classical realism, in the late 1970s Kenneth Waltz offered a new version of realism. Although still viewing international relations in terms of a system of competing states, each seeking power in order to protect itself from others, Waltz differed from the classical realists with his groundbreaking theory that the causes of the situation should be sought not in human nature but rather in the structure of the system. Waltz thus pioneered a new sort of IR theory that became known as neorealism, or sometimes structural realism. By the 1980s, liberals who came to be known as neoliberal institutionalists were challenging the neorealist view that the gains that states would always pursue would primarily be relative ones, which increased their position in the system vis-à-vis other states. The neoliberal institutionalists argued that, given the right institutional and organizational framework, states would be equally as likely to pursue absolute gains, which benefited all the states in the system. The importance of understanding the links between politics and economics were, furthermore, stressed by Susan Strange, who was thus a leading intellectual in the new subdiscipline of international political economy (IPE). Some theorists influenced by the work of Marx, such as Robert W. Cox, contributed to IPE from a critical theory perspective. Other critical theorists such as Andrew Linklater combined ideas influenced by Marx and Kant to offer a radical cosmopolitanism.

THE POST–COLD WAR ERA

The Cold War was declared officially over in December 1989 during a summit between President of the United States George H. W. Bush and Gorbachev in Malta, by which time the communist regimes in Eastern Europe were collapsing and the Soviet Union itself was facing disintegration. By 1991, most of the communist regimes in Eastern Europe had gone; Germany, which had been divided at the end of the World War II, was reunited; and the Soviet Union, which had been a federation of 15 republics, was no more. The republics gained their independence and the largest, Russia, lost its empire. Furthermore, relations with the West had been normalized and aid, trade, and

investment were flooding to the East. The total collapse of the Cold War order had not been anticipated by IR theorists and led to some soul-searching within the discipline as to the predictive power of its key theories and some intensive challenges to its key assumptions. The "constructivist challenge" in IR theory, led by academics such as Alexander Wendt, raised key questions about the limits of the dominant realist approach. The constructivists argued that structure and agency and the interaction between them needed to be studied in order to keep in touch with what was really happening in the world.

The Soviet Union quietly disappeared both as a superpower and as a country. The manner of its passing was largely orderly, and this peaceful demise of a leading power is almost historically unique. Normally, states go to war to preserve their positions. One possible explanation for the nonviolent revolution is the existence of nuclear weapons: in the nuclear age, war is too dangerous to be a useful instrument of policy. The collapse of the Soviet Union meant that a profound shift had occurred in the structures of international order, with the United States remaining as the only superpower. The international system was now unipolar and U.S. power was unchecked; it was also global. As a consequence of the Cold War, the United States had what is called global reach—in other words, it had the resources and capability to project its power anywhere in the world. As the only superpower, the United States was largely free to impose its own particular image of international relations on the rest of the world. The image projected at the time by President George H. W. Bush was that of a new world order.

The promise of a new world order was one in which international institutions, led by the UN, would guarantee international peace and security. The release of Nelson Mandela in South Africa after 26 years of imprisonment by the apartheid regime and a wave of democratization and institution building across the globe contributed to a sense of hope for the future. The first test was Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait in August 1990. The Gulf War that followed appeared to support the optimism of the new world order. It was fought by a coalition of 28 states and this cooperative effort was seen to mark the start of an era in which international relations would be characterized by cooperation, mutual interests, value consensus, and stability after the divisions and dangers of the Cold War. Yet, the post–Cold War period was also marked by the eruption of ethnic and intertribal violence, particularly in the Balkans and Africa. The violence that spread throughout these regions during the 1990s cast doubt on the hypothesis that the new world order was more stable and secure.

The international response to the horrors unleashed in countries such as the former Yugoslavia, Somalia, Rwanda, Liberia, and Sierra Leone was slow and patchy. The atrocities raised difficult questions about the responsibilities of the international system in the face of mass human suffering: Did

it have a duty to intervene militarily into conflicts internal to a state for humanitarian purposes? Would this not undermine the principles of the Westphalian system, leaving small states at the mercy of a new form of legitimate intervention by powerful states? During the Cold War, humanitarian intervention had not been considered legitimate action and the Westphalian principle of sovereignty remained sacrosanct. The end of the Cold War, however, created conditions more conducive to intervention, certainly in the West, where there was a view that its liberal values had been vindicated by the defeat of communism. NATO conducted its first military operations in Bosnia in 1995 and intervened again in Kosovo in 1999. During that year, the UN secretary-general, Kofi Annan, said that an international norm to forcibly protect citizens from mass killing was developing. There was a strong consensus that genocides such as that in Rwanda should never be allowed to happen again. Yet as the millennium reached its end, the horrors of war in the Democratic Republic of Congo and genocidal violence in Darfur, Sudan, continued without effective international intervention. The same questions are still raised now (2016) in relation to the war in Syria in particular but also to worsening violence in Libya, despite the 2011 intervention by the French, British, and American air forces. That intervention, which was unusual in the context of 21st-century international relations, took place in the shadow of the attacks on the United States on 11 September 2001 and the subsequent wars in Afghanistan and Iraq.

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS IN THE 21ST CENTURY

The new millennium inspired a renewed collective effort toward a better world. At the UN World Summit in September 2000, heads of government from 149 countries and high-ranking officials from another 40 pledged to remember their collective responsibility "to uphold the principles of human dignity, equality [for both states and individuals] and equity at the global level." They underscored their duty "to all the world's people, especially the most vulnerable and, in particular, to the children of the world, to whom the future belongs." By 2000, the membership of the UN had grown to 188, a large and significant increase from the initial 49 in 1945. The statement, therefore, can be seen as a global declaration of intent. Furthermore, eight development goals were agreed upon to fulfill that responsibility to the world's poorest people.

Other encouraging signs were evident in 2000. The recently agreed (1997) Kyoto Protocol on global climate change was open for signatures. The Canadian government had announced the establishment of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, which had been given the

task of advising how future cases of genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity could be handled. The first ad hoc war crimes tribunals were already underway in the former Yugoslavia and in Rwanda, setting a precedent to be followed in other conflict zones. Preparations were underway, furthermore, for the opening of the permanent International Criminal Court. International relations appeared to be becoming more inclusive, with concern for those whose lives had been shattered by conflict or marred by poverty becoming more prominent. Similar trends were already evident in IR theory.

By the end of the 20th century, International Relations theory had been making a substantial contribution to more sensitive, nuanced, and complex understandings of all the numerous aspects of human experience. This continued in the early decades of the new century. Feminist IR theory, for example, offers a new view of the world from the "bottom up," from the perspective and experience of a marginalized group. Feminism presents different questions to those traditionally asked in IR, asking, for example, "What might the world of international relations look like if women's concerns were central rather than marginal?" Cynthia Enloe, indeed, has asked this question in relation to military security and has exposed the limitations of the emphasis on men and masculinity. J. Ann Tickner has also called for a fundamental revision of security, revealing masculinist assumptions at the very heart of IR theory and demonstrating why it is that mainstream theory, although privileging the concerns of men, seems neutral and universal.

Other writers in IR similarly seek to bring the marginalized voice into International Relations. Influenced by the earlier ideas of theorists such as Frantz Fanon and Edward Said, postcolonialist writers draw attention to the way in which the world has been seen through a Western lens, resulting in Western dominance in practice. Like the feminist theorists, they seek to reveal biases, exclusions, and inequalities in traditional narratives about international relations that have denied and marginalized other identities. Poststructuralist thinkers also place more emphasis and value on different expressions of identity and culture, demonstrating that there is no single "authentic" standpoint from which to construct an understanding of the world. Meanwhile, cosmopolitan normative theory puts forward radical proposals for global redistributive justice and, inspired by the ideas of Karl Marx, critical theory places human emancipation at the heart of its project. Green IR theory, furthermore, considers the needs, rights, and interests not just of all people living now but also of future generations.

There appeared to be something of a "new turn" in International Relations, therefore, both in diplomatic practice and within the academic environment. Yet, the international agenda was about to be rewritten. When the hijacked planes flew first into the twin towers of the World Trade Centers in New York, and then into the Pentagon in Washington, it was clear that the world

had changed. International terrorism was propelled to the top of the international agenda and is still there. The focus of global concern once more returned to Western security and to the foreign policy of the United States. The subsequent wars in Iraq and Afghanistan further contributed to a resurgence of security and strategic studies in the academic discipline.

The attacks of 9/11 and the subsequent war on terror challenged the cohesion and confidence of the Western alliance. The images of the hijacked planes flying into the twin towers are highly symbolic of an order under threat. Subsequent events have raised further questions about the nature of U.S. power in particular, and its ability to achieve desired outcomes. Disturbing images from Abu Ghraib prison and Guantanamo Bay and the policy of extraordinary rendition have led to disaffection with U.S. leadership in much of the world and the loss of U.S. soft power.

The century's second decade has been just as tumultuous. The failure to establish stable and secure democracies in either Afghanistan or Iraq, despite more than a decade of fighting, revealed the limits of Western power and in Iraq has allowed for the rapid rise of the extreme fundamentalist group Islamic State. The rise of fundamentalist Islamic terrorism continues to result in horrifying annual death tolls in countries across the region, particularly Iraq and Pakistan. The Arab Spring, which began in Tunisia with so much initial promise, has been overtaken by war and conflict in much of the Middle East as long-standing autocratic governments have fallen. The conflict that spread throughout Libya led to intervention by an international coalition, the first such action under the new doctrine of responsibility to protect. Although successful in its immediate short-term aims, however, it has led to further conflict and displacement. Moreover, the indecision of world leaders about how to respond to the civil war in Syria has allowed a human catastrophe to emerge. In Yemen, civilians continue to suffer in a war for the control of the state. Beyond the Middle East, Russia's annexation of Crimea and increasing tensions in the South China Sea all appear to indicate that the central concerns of traditional international relations—war, territory, sovereignty—have not gone away. These are not the issues that the world had hoped would dominate the agenda in the 21st century.

Meanwhile, U.S. primacy and the dominance of the West are also starting to be eroded. The emergence of new strong economies in Africa, South America, and Asia, in particular China, alongside increasing economic challenges in the West, all raise questions about the nature of the future order in international relations. Whether the Western alliance led by the United States will reassert its power and continue to underpin the existing liberal, capitalist consensus in international relations is a key question of our age. Indications are that it is not safe to presume that the future is going to continue in the same vein as the recent past. Indeed, there is a range of feasible alternative scenarios. Possibly the most likely in the short term is an increasingly multi-

polar world with power divided between a wider and more globally representative number of states but largely within the existing institutional framework. Alternatively, more centralized and authoritarian states might exert themselves, reconstructing the international system and rewriting its rules in line with their interests, with states becoming more closed to each other and more protective of their internal interests in a postliberal age. On the other hand, the processes of regionalism that became evident in the second half of the 20th century might lead to a world in which regional bodies such as the Organization of American States, European Union (EU), and African Union become the key actors in a future world. The number of possible alternatives for the future order, or disorder, is therefore large, and the further development of the knowledge and analytical tools in IR remains essential—not just to make sense of an ever-changing world but also to inform policy so that change can be to the mutual benefit of all people. That goal, unfortunately, still seems to be a distant one.

Although global shifts in power between the world's states are already evident, there is another shift that in the long term might be even more significant, and that is the shift of power away from the state as the central institution in world politics. As this book was being written, the so-called Islamic State (IS) was rejecting traditional notions of sovereignty and fighting to build a caliphate across and beyond the Arab states, and launching terrorist attacks on their opponents around the world. Despite being a group that shuns the state system itself, it has nevertheless gained not only influence and power but also territory and sovereign authority. IS is an example of a nonstate actor that has become an important player in international relations. There are very many more, though few so violent. Intergovernmental organizations such as the UN, EU, and the World Trade Organization became more prolific and more powerful in the 20th century and are now at the center of international relations. There has been a parallel proliferation of powerful nonstate actors—global businesses, banks, and international nongovernmental organizations being key among them—leading to the question of whether the state remains the most important actor and, indeed, whether traditional state-centric approaches in IR theory remain relevant.

The ultimate challenge to the state is globalization. Although the processes of globalization have been going on for centuries, they have sped up and intensified as advances in communication technologies accelerated in the later decades of the 20th century and the early ones of the 21st. Recent advancements mean that people, money, and goods can be transported around the world increasingly quickly, as can information by electronic means. Together the multiplication of actors, the ever-more-complex economic and financial interdependence, and the processes of cultural and social changes are transforming the theory and practice of international relations in the modern era. The new forces of social media are accelerating this transfor-

mation. The Arab uprising, for example, was escalated by means of such media. Nevertheless, the latter case served to illustrate that optimism is often soon dashed by the forces of reaction.

The traditional idea of the state as a sovereign and autonomous actor operating within a situation of international anarchy has long been challenged. However, there is still no single overarching world power to ensure compliance with global regulations and the voluntary nature of international law; problems with its enforcement mean that international relations still remain distinct from the more ordered environment that exists within most states. Although states are increasingly having to work together and with nonstate actors to confront the problems of the age, this cooperation can prove fragile in the face of resource shortages or other dangers. The failures of the EU to act collectively, decisively, and effectively first in response to the global finance crisis of 2008 and then to the migrant crisis, which reached a critical point in 2016, demonstrates that even the closest relationships are not necessarily enough to persuade states to give up their individual interests in the promotion of the common good, particularly in the face of perceived threat. The decision of the people of Great Britain to leave the EU further indicates that the stability of such cooperative relationships in perpetuity cannot be taken for granted.

Reasons for optimism, nevertheless, have not gone away. Even though every development is imperfect and the challenges of international collective action persist, small steps forward are being achieved. For example, the Kyoto Treaty expired in 2015 but a new climate change agreement to replace it was successfully negotiated in December 2015. It was ratified together by China and the United States in September 2016 in a strong statement of cooperation and awareness of the necessity of joint action. Furthermore, significant progress was made toward the achievement of the millennium goals by their target date of 2015. The United Nations Development Programme report on the targets, produced in 2016, found that the effort to achieve the goal targets had led to the most successful antipoverty movement in history, with the number of people living in extreme poverty more than halved. Moreover, the International Criminal Court is fully operational and has successfully completed four cases. There are many uncertainties about the future and potential points of conflict, but nevertheless, these three developments, among others, indicate that when there is political will, progress can be achieved even on the most entrenched and difficult issues in international relations.

A

AFGHAN WARS. A mountainous, landlocked, and rather isolated country in southwest Asia, Afghanistan has nevertheless featured regularly in the history of international relations. During the 19th century, Afghanistan was a hot spot for tensions and conflict between the British and Russian **Empires**, the location for the "great game" of geostrategic dominance in Central Asia. Afghanistan, a buffer zone between these two expanding empires, was strategically significant and had to deal with substantial interference in its affairs. The experience of the British in three Anglo–Afghan wars, their mistakes, and the resistance and resilience of the Afghans have all been seen to parallel the experience of great powers in their military interventions in Afghanistan in more recent times.

For much of the 20th century, Afghanistan was one of the more stable countries in Asia. However, in the later part of the century it endured three waves of **war** as a consequence of external intervention. The first was by the Soviet Union in 1979, ostensibly to support a tottering **Marxist** regime. Although considered a superpower, the Soviet Union failed to achieve its desired outcomes in Afghanistan. Soviet troops came under relentless pressure by internationally supported anticommunist mujahideen rebels in a long and costly war. Unable to prevail, the Soviet Union eventually withdrew in 1989. The success of the mujahideen in denying victory to one of the world's largest military powers motivated those who chose to carry on the struggle on other fronts, and it was out of these mujahideen groups that **al-Qaeda** was born. In training and funding the anti-Soviet forces, the United States provided resources to and trained what was to become a key enemy, illustrating the dangers of unintended consequences in international relations, or what in military parlance is known as "blow-back."

The Afghan war was a disaster for the Soviet Union. Thousands of Soviet soldiers perished for little obvious gain. The Soviet Union's failure to prevail is seen as a contributing factor to its eventual demise and the ending of the **Cold War**. The cost of the war for Afghanistan was also terribly high, with hundreds of thousands of civilians dead, disabled, or displaced by the vio-

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lence. Furthermore, the war led to a breakdown in the functioning political, economic, and social structures of the **state**; after the Soviet withdrawal, the country descended into civil war.

The years of civil conflict further destroyed Afghanistan as a working state. Within this context, the Taliban—a ruthless, Pakistani-sponsored group—emerged to end the country's civil war and anarchy. The Taliban was anti-Western and antimodern, and Afghanistan became a hard-line Islamic regime, denying even the most basic **human rights** to women and imposing austere restrictions on the whole population. It also harbored **terrorist** training camps and offered a home to **Osama bin Laden**, leader of al-Qaeda. Following al-Qaeda's **attacks on 9/11** in the United States, a U.S. response using **airpower**, special forces, and a rearmed northern alliance of anti-Taliban forces plunged Afghanistan back into war. The Taliban were quickly defeated.

In December 2001, the **United Nations** (UN) brokered negotiations that led to the adoption of "the Bonn Agreement" (officially the Agreement on Provisional Arrangements in Afghanistan Pending the Re-Establishment of Permanent Government Institutions) and inaugurated a post-Taliban interim administration and a framework for the future political and judicial development of Afghanistan. An International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) was established to assist Afghanistan to rebuild key institutions and to train an Afghan National Security Force. Eighteen countries had joined ISAF by early 2002. In 2003, the **North Atlantic Treaty Organization** (NATO) took over ISAF command under a UN mandate.

In March 2002, the **UN Security Council** (UNSC) established the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA). UNAMA, administered by the UN Department of **Peacekeeping** Operations, was given the task of addressing **economic development** as well as humanitarian and political affairs in Afghanistan. The United Nations also supported a presidential election in 2004 and National Assembly elections in 2005. In December 2004, Hamid Karzai became the first democratically elected president of Afghanistan. The National Assembly was inaugurated the following December. Karzai was reelected in August 2009 for a second term.

Despite some progress toward building a stable central government in Kabul, from mid-2011 onward, a resurgent Taliban continually frustrated U.S. and coalition aims, tying down their forces, inflicting casualties, and undermining stability. A key source of revenue for the Taliban inside Afghanistan was poppy cultivation, Afghanistan being the world's largest producer of opium. The Taliban was an elusive and determined enemy, operating on home ground in a challenging environment, and allied forces found themselves in a counterinsurgency situation that had echoes of the **Vietnam War**. As in that war, and indeed in the Soviet intervention, the United States and key allies such as Great Britain had to face mounting public disillusion-

ment and anger over their countries' involvement in a costly, far-off war in which they were unable to prevail. The corrupt nature of President Karzai's administration contributed to the sense that the allies' aim of creating a stable, **democratic** state in Afghanistan was unachievable. The ISAF states started to withdraw their troops.

In 2014, another presidential election was held and Ashraf Ghani became president of Afghanistan. President Ghani's key task was to make Afghanistan self-reliant as foreign troops went home. ISAF ceased combat operations and was disbanded in December 2014, although some troops remained behind in an advisory role as part of ISAF's successor organization, the Resolute Support Mission. President of the United States Barack Obama committed to ending U.S. military operations in Afghanistan by the end of his presidency in 2016, at which time Afghan security forces would become the nation's only defense. However, fears that Afghanistan was not ready and a recognition that **security** had already worsened in many places as foreign troops pulled back, led in 2016 to a further delay in the withdrawal of U.S. troops. There are also concerns that when the last foreign troops finally leave Afghanistan there might be a reduction in **overseas aid** and investment in the country, creating further challenges and instability. The United Nations, however, will remain in Afghanistan. On 16 March 2015, the UN Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 2210, which renewed the mandate of UNAMA, outlining and reiterating the mission's objectives and areas of operation.

The question of whether the 2001 invasion of Afghanistan has succeeded in its aims is open to debate. Some immediate goals were secured: the Taliban government was overthrown and terrorist training camps closed down. The initial hunt for bin Laden, however, failed. Although he was finally killed by U.S. forces in Pakistan in 2011, the longer term goal of creating a secure and democratic state has only partially been met. The future of Afghanistan remains uncertain.

See also BUSH, GEORGE WALKER (1946–); GORBACHEV, MIKHAIL SEGEYEVICH (1931–); IRAQ WAR (2003–2010); REAGAN, RONALD WILSON (1911–2004); WAR ON TERROR.

AFRICAN UNION (AU). The African Union (AU) is the successor to the Organization of African Unity (OAU). The OAU was established in 1964 by 31 African **states** that had recently emerged from European **colonialism**. It was a loose coalition committed to the principles (if not always actualized) of the **Westphalian system of states**: **sovereignty**, formal equality, nonintervention, and territorial integrity. In the postcolonial era, the founding members wanted to prevent any further outside interference in their affairs. Given the arbitrary nature of state boundaries, drawn in large measure for the convenience of colonial powers, the commitment to existing borders as sacro-

sanct was particularly important as an attempt to prevent conflict arising from border changes. Although an informal and voluntary organization, the OAU did have some success in the **diplomacy** of the region, acting to mediate disputes and to present the African interest to the wider world. One of its key goals, the ending of apartheid in South Africa, was achieved in 1994 when the rule of the white minority was ended and Nelson Mandela became South Africa's first black president. The OAU also established an African Court of Peoples' and Human Rights in 1998. Nevertheless, the OAU was never a strong organization. It was seriously divided during the **Cold War** and was virtually silent on issues of **economic development**. In 2002, it was therefore replaced by the AU, which was modeled closely on the **European Union**, considered a more successful example of **regional integration**.

In the era of **economic globalization**, the AU sought to respond to Africa's problems through stronger institutionalization; it also has more exacting criteria for membership. The AU adopted the core principles of the OAU, and the continuing commitment to state sovereignty is reflected in the fact that the key organ of the AU is the Assembly, comprised of heads of state and governments, that operates on consensus. The head of the AU is the chairman of the commission, which is the AU's secretariat. One key difference between the OAU and the AU is that the latter allows for intervention into the affairs of other states in certain "grave circumstances" such as **genocide**, **crimes against humanity**, and violations of **international humanitarian law**. A Peace and Security Council was set up in 2004 to promote **collective security**, with **security** being defined widely to include issues of good governance, economic development, and **human rights**. There is also a pan-African Parliament with five representatives from each member-state and an Economic, Social and Cultural Council to give a voice to civil society organizations. The African Court of International Justice upholds AU progress toward better governance, including key goals such as the establishment of the rule of law, the separation of powers, the reduction in corruption, the establishment of electoral commissions, and the promotion of law. In 2016, it was merged with the African Court of Human and Peoples' Rights to create a new, stronger African Court of Justice and Human Rights.

The AU has been proactive in both the economic development of Africa and its security. In 2002, it launched a flagship regional development strategy, the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD), which included a peer-review mechanism by which African states check on each other's progress toward the organization's goals. Resistance to external interference and a lack of political will still continue to hamper the AU's efforts to achieve all the objectives of NEPAD, however. In the field of security, the AU has been involved in mediation attempts and in regional **peacekeeping**—for example, in Burundi in 2003 and in the Darfur crisis in Sudan in 2004. In 2007, it operated in an AU–**United Nations** hybrid peacekeeping force (UN-

AMID) in Darfur. AU peacekeepers have since been involved in operations in Somalia and the Central African Republic. Despite some success and high-sounding ideals, the AU still has work to do to achieve its goals across the continent.

See also INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS; NKRUMAH, KWAME (1909–1972); PEACE.

AGGRESSION. Aggression is a term used to describe an unprovoked attack. An aggressive person or aggressive state, therefore, is one that launches an offensive attack as opposed to a defensive or preemptive one. An example of an offensive **war** is the invasion of Kuwait by Saddam Hussein's Iraq, which led to the **first Gulf War**. All such acts of aggression are outlawed in **international law**. According to the **United Nations** Charter, **force** can only be used in self-defense or as part of a **collective security** operation. In 2010, the statute of the **International Criminal Court** was amended so that it can exercise jurisdiction over the crime of aggression, though there is some lack of clarity over the agreed-upon definition and it has not yet been tested in a trial.

Biologists and psychologists have sought to account for aggressive behavior, assuming that it is the aggressive tendencies in individuals that lead to conflict. The concept of aggression has also been used in **International Relations Theory** to account for violence and war. **Kenneth Waltz** in *Man, the State, and War* examined the causes of war, identifying three images that can help to explain its occurrence. Aggression relates to his first image, one of the two that identify war's immediate causes. Waltz's first image looks to micro-theories of conflict—in other words, theories that take individual behavior as the point of departure. This first image locates the causes of war in a flawed human nature. Classical realists in the 1950s such as **Hans J. Morgenthau** rooted the conflictual nature of international politics in human nature, but it was the striving for power, rather than an innate aggression, to which they tend to allude. Theories that locate the cause of conflict in aggression, therefore, are more closely associated with **behavioralism** and **conflict analysis** than **classical realism**.

The empirical research done on the aggressive tendencies of human beings in the disciplines of biology and psychology seeks to answer the central question of whether aggression is innate and instinctual, is caused by externally produced frustration, or is learned. Whatever the most convincing view, the difficulty for theorists within the academic discipline of International Relations is the transition of the hypothesis from individual to societal aggression. Although problems enough exist in verifying the frustration-aggression hypothesis in small groups, it is very much harder to apply the theory to large, complex, highly institutionalized social entities such as

states. Nevertheless, where war is the outcome of an individual command by an aggressive dictator such as Saddam Hussein, it is possible that theories of aggression can have some explanatory merit.

See also FOREIGN POLICY; HOBBES, THOMAS (1588–1679); POWER.

AID. *See* OVERSEAS AID.

AIRPOWER. The advent of airpower at the beginning of the 20th century changed the nature of warfare. In **World War II** (WWII), airpower had become essential for the support and protection of ground troops. Aircraft carriers had also become an essential component of a state's military power. Pearl Harbor is a dramatic example of the use of airpower, as well as **sea power**, for surprise attack. Aerial bombardment during WWII was a key reason why civilian deaths in that conflict outnumbered military deaths. Bombing raids over cities such as London, Coventry, Dresden, and Tokyo caused terrible destruction. The **nuclear weapons** that were dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki were dropped by an American B-29 bomber. The intentional targeting of enemy civilians is a means by which airpower is used as a form of coercion.

During the **Cold War**, airpower was to an extent usurped by missile technology, although since the end of the Cold War coercive airpower has again been a feature of the **foreign policies** of certain **states** in **the West**. Their superiority in airpower has enabled them to deploy it successfully. Airpower was essential to Western coalition success in the **first Gulf War** (1990–1991), for example; Colonel Dennis Drew, U.S. Air Force (retired), has argued that airpower reached its maturity in this conflict and was both "overwhelming" and "decisive." It was also used effectively in support of humanitarian objectives after that war in support of Operation Provide Comfort, a British-led **humanitarian intervention** into northern Iraq to create a safe haven for Iraqi Kurds. Airpower has the advantage of being able to be deployed very quickly and with a minimum of risk; it also gives access to strategic targets within the heart of an enemy state.

The **North Atlantic Treaty Organization** (NATO) used airpower in its first combat operation to enforce a no-fly zone over Bosnia during the **wars of the former Yugoslavia**. In the Kosovo crisis, 11 weeks of airstrikes by NATO planes forced Serbia to concede to NATO demands. At that time, airpower was seen as the most vital aspect of military **power** and capable in certain circumstances of achieving key objectives on its own, without naval or land support. There is some debate, however, as to whether it was airpower or the threat of the use of land forces that compelled the Serbs to capitulate. Finally, NATO used its airpower in Libya in its first mission under its

responsibility to protect in 2011, and airpower is currently being deployed in the civil **war** in Syria. Although technological innovations have enabled airpower to be used more effectively in so-called surgical strikes, the use of airpower particularly in pursuit of humanitarian objectives has been controversial because of the large number of civilian deaths (or "collateral damage") that sometimes results. The increasing use of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) is another source of controversy. Also known as drones, these vehicles are piloted remotely and can complement traditional airpower, providing both surveillance and a delivery system for missiles and laser-guided bombs. UAVs have played a key role in the allied air campaign in the **Iraq War** and **Afghanistan**. They have also been used extensively as an important counter-terrorism weapon, in particular to identify and kill **al-Qaeda** and **Islamic State** militants in Somalia and Syria, for example. UAVs are likely to change the way that airpower is delivered in the future.

See also BUSH, GEORGE WALKER (1946–); PUTIN, VLADIMIR VLADIMIROVICH (1952–); TERRORISM; TOTAL WAR; VIETNAM WAR; WAR ON TERROR.

ALLIANCES. States that cannot achieve their objectives or defend their interests on their own tend to form alliances with other states. Alliances are a key way that states advance their interests. Throughout history states have formed and acted through alliances, and alliance **diplomacy** is a key component of a state's **foreign policy**. The term "alliance" is therefore a key term in International Relations, yet its definition is contested. The term can be used broadly to describe any formal or informal relationship of security cooperation, in which case the distinction between an alliance and a **collective security** arrangement is unclear. Alternatively, the term can be defined more narrowly to include only formal agreements that impose the obligation to use **force** on the state parties. In most cases, this is the commitment to use defensive force against an external party in the event of an attack on the alliance or an alliance member.

More than 2,000 years ago, **Thucydides** noted that fear is the most solid basis for an alliance. Traditional thinking in International Relations, associated with **classical realism**, explains alliance formation along the same lines: states form alliances in order to combine their military capabilities and improve their **security** position vis-à-vis an external power. Alliances are therefore an essential component in a **balance of power**: they are the means by which an expanding power can be contained by smaller powers, and a key way in which states counter threat. The **North Atlantic Treaty Organization** (NATO) is an example of a military alliance. NATO is a mutual defense agreement, which means that an attack on one member-state is considered an attack on all. Not all alliances, however, impose an equal requirement on states to deploy force. The Locarno Treaty (1925), for example, was a guar-

antee treaty in which Britain and Italy undertook to come to the assistance of France, Belgium, or Germany if attacked, though there was no reciprocal guarantee.

Alliance theory explores such questions as "Why and under what circumstances do states form alliances?" "Why do alliances endure?" "How are alliance policies determined?" "Do alliances make war less likely?" The work done on these questions by scholars within the academic discipline of International Relations sheds light on a range of different classifications of alliance and on the stability (or otherwise) of alliances between states.

See also WAR ON TERROR; WORLD WAR I; WORLD WAR II.

ALLISON, GRAHAM TILLET (1940–). Born in Charlotte, North Carolina, Graham Allison was educated at Davidson College in his home state. From there he went to Oxford University and then to Harvard University, where he gained his PhD in political science. He has been a distinguished academic and worked for U.S. administrations.

In 1971, Allison's seminal book, *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis*, was published. In this study, he examined the **Cuban missile crisis** through three conceptual lenses, the use of each of which can be seen in terms of a model. Model I was the rational actor model that focuses on acts and choices. Model II was the organizational process model, which focuses on regular patterns of behavior, such as standard operating procedures, of large organizations of the state; these patterns and procedures produce outputs. Model III is the bureaucratic politics model, which focuses on the politics of a government, and in particular on key players in the government. Through this lens, a situation can be seen as a result of bargaining between key players in the government. He argued that even though each of these lenses helps reveal, magnify, and highlight important points about the crisis, each also blurs and neglects significant factors. Hence, he encouraged readers to consider a combination of lenses in order to gain a better understanding of this and other cases. The book became a key text of **foreign policy** analysis.

In 1977, Allison was the founding dean of Harvard's John F. Kennedy School of Government. He held that post until 1989. Thereafter, he remained in the Kennedy School as a professor of government. In one of his major roles for U.S. administrations, he served as special advisor to the secretary of defense under President of the United States **Ronald Reagan**. In his other major role, he was assistant secretary of defense for policy and plans under President of the United States William J. (Bill) Clinton. In the latter role, he coordinated Department of Defense strategy and policy toward the **states** of the former Soviet Union, including Russia.

Essence of Decision was released with a coauthor, Philip Zelikow, in an updated and revised second edition in 1999. This new edition included examples from more recent cases to support the original argument. Having sold more than 450,000 copies, it is one of the best-selling books of political science and **International Relations**.

See also NYE, JOSEPH SAMUEL (1937–).

AL-QAEDA. Formed by **Osama bin Laden** in 1988, al-Qaeda (which translates as "the Base") is a militant Sunni Muslim **terrorist** organization renowned for its global reach. It emerged in Afghanistan during the first of the **Afghan Wars** of the 20th century. Arab fighters had gone to assist the mujahideen guerilla groups. With the backing of the United States, these groups managed to expel the occupying Soviet forces that had been sent in to quell opposition to the communist-controlled **state**; bin Laden organized some of these fighters to form al-Qaeda.

In the late 1990s, from its headquarters in Afghanistan, al-Qaeda sought to replace the secular states in Muslim-populated countries with a single, overarching Islamic leadership. As part of the campaign toward this goal, it was intended that Americans and other non-Muslims would be driven out of the Arabian Peninsula, thus ending the presence of American troops in holy locations. The operations of al-Qaeda were not, however, restricted to the Middle East. It consisted of a network of cells around the world, thus enabling it to have its global reach. It declared jihad (holy war) on Americans, Jews, and those who supported these targeted peoples. The rationale offered for the jihad was that wrongs committed over many years by Christians and Jews against Muslims needed to be avenged. In 1998, al-Qaeda organized terrorist attacks on American soldiers and civilians, including bombings that destroyed two U.S. embassies in Africa, killing more than 220 people. It is also suspected that al-Qaeda was responsible for the suicide attack on the USS *Cole* in 2000, in which 17 servicemen were killed and 39 wounded.

Al-Qaeda's largest and most famous mission was that of 11 September 2001 (9/11), in which approximately 3,000 people were killed in the United States. In response to the **attacks on 9/11**, President of the United States **George W. Bush** launched the **war on terror**. As part of this **war**, the United States–led campaign in Afghanistan in 2001 unseated the Taliban regime that had allowed al-Qaeda to operate from that county. Some high-ranking al-Qaeda leaders were killed and others captured as part of the war on terror, including bin Laden. After many years of fruitless searching, he was tracked down to a location in Pakistan and in May 2011 U.S. Navy SEALs launched the attack that killed him. One month later, Ayman al-Zawahiri, who had always been a prominent figure in al-Qaeda, was named as the new leader of the organization. Al-Qaeda declared that it would continue to conduct jihad under his leadership.

The deaths of some of its important leaders weakened al-Qaeda. It was eclipsed by the more recent **Islamic State** (Daesh) terrorist organization, which sought to build an international caliphate. Nevertheless, al-Qaeda continued to operate in a number of locations in the Middle East, North Africa, and various other parts of the world in the second decade of the 21st century.

See also ARAB–ISRAELI CONFLICT.

AMERICAN PRIMACY. The nature of the dominant power in the international system has a profound effect on the nature of international relations. In the 19th century, **British hegemony** strongly influenced the evolution of international relations. In the 20th century, it was American primacy that shaped the existing structures of world order. The United States has enjoyed two periods of **hegemonic power** in the second half of the 20th century. In the immediate post–**World War II** period, in addition to producing nearly 50 percent of global gross domestic product, the United States also had a monopoly of **nuclear weapons** between 1945 and 1949. In the second phase, with the demise of the Soviet Union in 1991, the United States was the world's only superpower. At both times, the United States had the opportunity and **power** to be an imperial **state**. However, on the whole, the United States has not used its power for direct conquest and in this it is historically unusual. Although the United States is charged by its critics as being an **empire** or "empire lite," strictly speaking an empire involves formal political control and this has not been the American way. In as much as there can be said to be (or to have been) an American empire, it is based on technology, economics, and **culture** rather than territorial expansion. There are, nonetheless, significant inequalities in America's relationships with other states, which it has frequently used for the purposes of exploitation or undue influence. History supplies plenty of examples of the United States using its power in underhanded ways, whether to overthrow **democratically** elected leftish regimes, as it did in both Guatemala and Chile in the 1970s, or to support and keep in power authoritarian regimes with appalling **human rights** records, as it did in its crusade against communism during the **Cold War**. The lasting legacy of American primacy will be an immensely complex and dense international legal order in international relations.

The system of governance that currently operates in the world is in large part a consequence of the power and leadership of the United States. Along with its allies, but very much as a leading partner, the United States put into practice the vision set out in the **Atlantic Charter**. It was instrumental in setting up the **United Nations** (UN) with its mandate to promote international **peace** and **security**; in drawing up the UN Declaration of Human Rights; and at the **Bretton Woods Conference**, establishing the new postwar finan-

cial and monetary system. The ability of the United States to shape the system of international relations to its blueprint promoted U.S. structural power, privileging its interests in the international system.

Throughout the Cold War, U.S. power was restrained by its rivalry with the Soviet Union in a bipolar **balance of power**. Yet, this rivalry served in one respect to further U.S. power by encouraging the extension and projection of U.S. military assets across the world in a global attempt to defeat communism. It led to extraordinary levels of defense spending, eventually forcing the Soviet Union to concede defeat and withdraw from the nuclear **arms race**. From the late 1960s onward, the United States increasingly had to share economic power with the European Economic Community/Economic Union, Japan, and other rising economies in the Asia–Pacific region, but it managed to remain technologically dominant in its position at the leading edge of technological innovation, an important aspect of its power. Most of the world's top universities are in the United States, and it remains at the center of technological innovation in key sectors such as pharmaceuticals and defense technology, a vital part of U.S. military superiority.

The United States' position as the world's greatest military power since 1991 has enabled it not just to threaten **force** but to use force, notably in states such as Haiti, Grenada, Panama, Iraq, and Afghanistan. The organizations created by the United States ought to act as a constraint on the unfettered exercise of power yet successive administrations have chosen to have their freedom of action only selectively restricted by those institutions and agreements that their predecessors set up. The tendency to unilateralism was most prevalent in the administration of President of the United States **George W. Bush**, particularly after the **attacks on 9/11**, after which he explicitly stated that unilateral use of power is appropriate in light of the threat to U.S. security interests. The fact that the United States sometimes acts outside **international law** has been a source of world criticism and condemnation. When it has used its power responsibly by the setting up of **international organizations** and through strong leadership on important issues, U.S. influence, or **soft power**, grows. When it acts contrary to its own professed principles and against the good of the international community, it suffers a diminution of its reputation and influence. The rise of China and other emerging economies has raised the question of whether the period of American primacy is coming to an end. Whether the structures of global order put in place during its ascendency could survive a decline in U.S. power is a key question of the age, and the answer to it will define the nature of international relations in the decades to come.

See also ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT; ECONOMIC GLOBALIZATION; GLOBAL GOVERNANCE; GLOBAL POWER SHIFTS; HEGEMONIC STABILITY THEORY; POSTCOLONIALISM; WEST, THE.

ANARCHY. In **International Relations**, anarchy means the absence of world government. International relations is said to take place in a situation of anarchy because, in contrast to domestic society, there is no executive, legislature, or judiciary in the **international society**. The international system is a decentralized one in which **power** resides in individual **states**. Each state has **sovereignty** and is the highest legal authority over its population and territory. There is therefore no overarching power to impose rules or order between states; states have to achieve these things between themselves. Whether this anarchy means that the international system is necessarily disordered and violent is one of the key debates in the academic discipline of International Relations. Both **classical realists** and **neorealists** conclude that anarchy ensures that **war** and disorder are ever-present possibilities within international relations, and every state must be prepared to help itself in a competitive and dangerous environment. On the other hand, **liberals** are more optimistic about the ability of states to cooperate and mitigate the effects of anarchy through **international law**, organization, and norm formation.

See also BALANCE OF POWER; WESTPHALIAN SYSTEM OF STATES.

ANGELL, RALPH NORMAN (1872–1967). Born in Holbeach, England, Ralph Norman Angell-Lane was brought up by his mother and father, who owned grocery and drapery stores. He attended schools in England, including Dagmar House, Hatfield, before going to France to study at the Lycée de St. Omer in France. He returned to England to attend business school in London and then went to Switzerland to take a year of courses at the University of Geneva, At the age of 17, he immigrated to the United States and applied successfully for U.S. citizenship. For the next seven years, he worked in various states as a vine planter, irrigation-ditch digger, cowboy, homesteader, mail carrier, and prospector, before starting a career in journalism for the St. Louis *Globe-Democrat* and the San Francisco *Chronicle*. In 1898, Angell went to Paris where he became subeditor of the English-language *Daily Messenger* until 1904, when he became editor of the Paris edition of the *Daily Mail*. He also wrote books, including *Europe's Optical Illusion* in 1909 under the shortened name Norman Angell, which he would always use thereafter.

While he was still working for the *Daily Mail* in 1910, Angell's most famous work, *The Great Illusion*, was published, using his book of the previous year as a foundation. The thesis was that no **state** gained commercial advantage from military and political **power** in its relations with others or enriched itself by subjugating any other state. When states went to **war** in the hope of achieving such aims, this was because of the pressure of uneducated public opinion. As politicians and **foreign policy** makers followed such opin-

ion, war disrupted **trade** and diverted finances to armaments. Ordinary people thus needed to be better educated in order to appreciate the realities of international relations. States would thereby be free to build a system of commonly agreed-upon **international law** and an adequate means of policing it. The capitalist international economy would require these measures in order to function efficiently. The publicity that *The Great Illusion* brought Angell led him to leave the *Daily Mail* in 1912 to focus his time on writing books and lecturing.

The Great Illusion was largely ignored until **Henry Noel Brailsford** wrote a review that helped stimulate sales. Nevertheless, Brailsford, who believed that Angell had grossly simplified the situation, subjected the book to influential critique. Although he agreed that warfare was indeed pointless and counterproductive from the standpoint of national self-interest, Brailsford insisted that a small but powerful governing class would find war and **imperialism** perfectly rational, given their own aims rather than those of the nation-state in which they resided. The **total war** of **World War I**, which began in 1914, seemed to some people to substantiate Angell's argument; but others viewed his recommendations as overly optimistic.

Angell argued in his 1921 book, *The Fruits of Victory*, that the war and its outcome did indeed indicate that he had been right in *The Great Illusion*. This was at a time when the formation of the **League of Nations** was promoting significant optimism. Although Angell sought to find a way to achieve **peace**, his belief that strong international policing would be required illustrates that he was less convinced than more-committed advocates of peace through law, such as **Philip Noel-Baker**, of the capability of international law to avoid war.

In 1928, Angell's book *The Money Game* was published. It continued, albeit in a different way, to state the argument he had been making for almost 20 years: economic warfare was rooted in the mercantilist illusion and the misunderstanding of the nature of money itself. The book was accompanied by a series of card games to educate people on the nature of money. The following year he entered the British political system by serving for the Labour Party as a member of Parliament. He relinquished his seat when many left his party to form a national government with the Conservatives. He preferred to side with neither the remaining minority Labour Party nor the national government. From 1928 to 1931, he edited the journal *Foreign Affairs*. In his book *The Unseen Assassins*, published in 1932, he analyzed some of the problems brought about by patriotism, **nationalism**, and imperialism, and once again turned to the necessity, as he saw it, to educate ordinary people. Published the following year, his *The Great Illusion: 1933* explored events and changes in international relations since 1910. **Adolf Hitler** had recently come to power in Germany and Angell argued in this edition, and in *The Great Illusion Now*, published in 1938, that pacifism

would not bring about peace and that **collective security** was instead needed, including the possible use of **force** against **aggressors**. He rejected the claims of aggressor states such as Italy and Japan that their use of force to gain territory was justified. Between the publication of these editions of his major work, he won the 1933 **Nobel Peace Prize** in 1934 for his published work as an educator and for his support for the League of Nations. That year, in *The Menace to Our National Defence*, he proposed the international regulation of civil aviation and collective defense by the use of **airpower**. His book *Peace with the Dictators?* (1938) once again discussed the prospects of collective security for the maintenance of peace. Angell was targeted by realist theorist **E. H. Carr** as one of the **idealist** (or in Carr's terminology, "utopian") thinkers who believed that the **Westphalian system of states** could be reformed according to the principles of **liberal internationalism**.

The outbreak of **World War II** in 1939 led the credibility of liberal internationalism to wane still further than it had in the previous decade. By the end of the war, **realism** was becoming the dominant **International Relations theory**, even though there were continued efforts for international cooperation in practice. In support of such efforts, Angell's book *The Steep Places*, published in 1947, investigated the limitations of national sovereignty in an organized society. In this book, he also continued to argue that in seeking the roots of international conflict, psychological attitudes were more significant than economic motives. He proposed greater cooperation between the United States and the British Commonwealth as a means to achieve international cooperation. In 1951, he published his autobiography, entitled *After All*.

See also BALANCE OF POWER; LIBERAL PEACE; ZIMMERN, ALFRED ECKHARD (1879–1957).

ANTARCTICA. The fifth-largest continent, located at the southern pole, Antarctica is the last of the world's great wildernesses. Its "intrinsic value" as such is recognized in **international law**, which, as it relates to Antarctica, embodies the key norm of environmental protection. Antarctica is unique in that it is the only one of the continents to have no permanent inhabitants and is not to be divided into **states**. Nevertheless, international relations are very much in play in the continent.

Seven states claim **sovereignty** over Antarctic territory: Great Britain, Norway, France, Argentina, Chile, Australia, and New Zealand. These claims are contained, though not resolved, within the **international legal regime** governing Antarctica. At the heart of that regime is the 1959 Antarctic Treaty, which neither denunciates nor supports those claims. No new claims to sovereignty, however, are allowed under the treaty, even though the United States has always reserved the right to make a claim if it chooses to do so.

The Antarctic Treaty restricts activity in Antarctica to that which is peaceful and scientific. A 1991 protocol prohibits any activity relating to mineral resources other than scientific research. About 30 states have scientific bases in Antarctica, and those that undertake significant scientific activity become consultative parties to the treaty and are granted voting rights on Antarctic policy. Given the economic requirements of serious scientific research in Antarctica, consultative parties have tended to be the wealthier states in the system, and the Antarctic regime can be seen to support traditional interests in **the West**. Increased activity in Antarctica by emerging economies such as India and China causes some anxiety that those traditional interests might be challenged along with the normative framework on which the regime operates. The constant increase in the demand for resources also raises concerns over whether a wilderness so rich in resources can be preserved into the future.

See also ARCTIC; ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT; GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS; GLOBAL POWER SHIFTS; GREEN THEORY; SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT.

ARAB LEAGUE. This intergovernmental **international organization** was first conceived by the British as an alliance against the Axis powers in **World War II**. It was not, however, established until March 1945. Its six founding member-**states** were Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, and Saudi Arabia, and their primary concern at that stage was freeing Arab states from **colonialism** and preventing the creation of the state of Israel. Sixteen more Arab states have since joined. Palestine is a member and is considered by the Arab League to be a full, independent state. Between 1948 and 1993, the Arab League imposed a total economic boycott against Israel as part of the **Arab–Israeli conflict**. Even though Palestine has united Arab League members with regard to its status, on other issues it has been more divided. During the **Cold War**, some members were part of the Western **alliance** while others allied themselves with the Soviet Union. Similar divisions were evident during the **Iraq War**, with some Arab states supporting the Americans and others opposing the invasion. These divisions have undermined the effectiveness of the Arab League as an actor in international relations.

According to its charter, the Arab League's main aims are to strengthen relations between the member-states, coordinate their policies, enhance cooperation, safeguard their independence, and uphold their **sovereignty**. The key interests are economic, financial, and commercial, but the Arab League also seeks cooperation on social, **cultural**, health, and functional issues such as communication, transport, visas, and passports. The Arab League is also increasingly involved in regional **security** and has been given more focus by the **Arab uprisings**. In March 2011, it asked the **United**

Nations Security Council to impose a no-fly zone in Libya, giving regional approval for a **responsibility to protect** action carried out by the **North Atlantic Treaty Organization**. In November 2011, it suspended Syria because of its brutal suppression of antigovernment protests, and it imposed economic and political sanctions. In 2015, the Council, the Arab League's highest body, announced its intention to form a joint military **force**. This decision was taken at a time when 10 states under the leadership of Saudi Arabia were involved in air strikes against Shia Houthi rebels in Yemen.

See also AIRPOWER; WAR.

ARAB–ISRAELI CONFLICT. The Arab–Israeli conflict is essentially a regional conflict yet it is more intertwined with world politics than possibly any other regional conflict in history. It is a conflict over territory, history, religion, **culture**, and identity, with roots that extend back to biblical times. The causes of the conflict in the modern era, however, were the product of distinct historical developments—in particular, the rise of Zionism and Arab **nationalism**. The two national projects came into direct conflict over the territory of Palestine.

Palestine had been controlled by the Ottoman **Empire** since 1517. By the end of the 19th century, the Ottoman Empire was in a state of serious decay. Influenced by nationalist ideas from Europe, many Arabs were beginning to promote and anticipate Arab self-determination. British imperial interests, however, stood in their way. Despite a promise that Arabs would have an independent state in order to secure their support in the fight against Turkey during **World War I**, Ottoman lands were made mandate territories of the **League of Nations** and divided up between Great Britain and France. The denial of an Arab nation was a significant factor in a growing Arab opposition to Jewish settlement in Palestine, with many Arabs seeing Jewish **migration** as part of the European **colonialism** of the region.

Zionists, on the other hand, had been assured in the Balfour Declaration of British commitment to "the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people." During the period of its mandate, the British therefore failed to satisfy either side in the conflict. Despite their common opposition to British policy, cooperation between Arabs and Jews proved impossible; two independent communities developed in Palestine, divided by religion, nationalism, culture, language, and socioeconomic differences. The recognition that an "irrepressible conflict" had arisen between Arabs and Jews led Britain to propose the partition of Palestine. This plan was acceptable to neither side in the conflict, each believing itself entitled to **sovereignty** over all of Palestine, and it was dropped as unworkable.

After **World War II**, overwhelmed by competing claims, rising violence and **terrorism** in Palestine, Britain transferred the problem of the Arab–Israeli conflict to the **United Nations** (UN). The UN set up a Special

Commission on Palestine that also concluded that Palestine had to be partitioned. The partition led to both the Arabs and Jews having three noncontiguous territories, and Jerusalem was to be under international control. In May 1948, the British withdrew from Palestine, and a Jewish **state**, Israel, was proclaimed. The British withdrawal left the Arabs and Jews to implement partition themselves with disastrous consequences. Violence erupted on both sides, but Jewish violence proved more brutal and effective; half a million Arabs had abandoned their homes by the end of 1948. The armies of Syria, Transjordan, Lebanon, Iraq, and Egypt came to the aid of the Palestinian Arabs. Jewish fighters were hugely outnumbered, but had the advantage of money raised in the United States by **Golda Meir**, weapons bought with that money, and the experience gained by many Jews in their fight against Nazi Germany. The new state of Israel won a costly but extraordinary victory; hundreds of thousands of Palestinians were displaced into refugee camps in neighboring states and persist to this day.

Global sympathy for the Jews, the strength of Jewish institutions, and sustained lobbying by Zionists led to the sovereignty of the new Jewish state being recognized by the United States, the Soviet Union, and other key states in the system. It was not, however, recognized by Arab states, who resented its existence and its support by the United States. The creation of the state of Israel, therefore, did not resolve the Arab–Israeli conflict; rather it perpetuated it, moving it to a new phrase of major **wars**, smaller skirmishes, and waves of international terrorism. Both sides have sought the help of external powers to achieve their national aspirations, propelling the conflict to the level of global significance both during and since the **Cold War**, with U.S. support for Israel being cited as one of **al-Qaeda**'s key grievances.

The focal point of Arab anger since the Israeli victory in a third Arab–Israeli conflict, the six-day war of 1967 fought against a coalition of Arab states, has been the Israeli occupation of Arab lands. Despite a **United Nations Security Council** resolution calling for the "withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict," Israel refused to withdraw from the territories it won in Sinai, Gaza, and the West Bank, believing them to be vital to its future **security**. The return of Arab land has been a key stumbling block in attempts to find a peaceful solution to the conflict. Other issues in contention are the right to return for Palestinian refugees; the recognition of Israel by Arab states; the problem of Israeli settlers on occupied land; and the status of Jerusalem. Talks have been brokered by a succession of presidents of the United States and some progress has been made. Negotiations hosted by President James (Jimmy) Carter at the presidential retreat of Camp David in 1978, for example, led to Israel's recognition by Egypt and its withdrawal from the Sinai. Many other talks, however, have failed.

The Oslo Agreement of 1993 stipulated that Israeli troops would gradually withdraw from the West Bank and Gaza Strip, and it set up a "Palestinian Interim Self-Governing Authority" that by 2005 had administrative control over the whole of Gaza. Infighting between Palestinian groups, notably Hamas and Fatah, have complicated **peace** efforts and undermined the Oslo Agreement. Conflict with Israel also continues, and President of the United States William J. (Bill) Clinton's attempts to build on the Oslo accords came to an abrupt end in December 2008 with Israel's military offensive in Gaza. Although **George W. Bush** became the first president of the United States to call for a Palestinian state, little further progress was made by his administration. President of the United States Barack Obama has also tried to restart the peace process, but it once more foundered, mainly on the issue of Jewish settlers. Meanwhile Palestine has achieved the status of state representation in the **United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization** (UNESCO) and observer status at the UN. In September 2015, the **United Nations General Assembly** voted to fly the Palestinian flag at the UN, seen by the Palestinians as a symbol of international support for a full state of Palestine.

See also ARAB LEAGUE.

ARAB UPRISINGS. The Arab uprisings were a series of protests against long-standing authoritarian regimes in North Africa that fundamentally changed the region. The unrest started in Tunisia in December 2010 when a street vendor, Tarek al-Tayeb Mohamed Bouazizi, set himself on fire to protest the corruption and police harassment. In the context of economic, political, and social dissatisfaction, protests spread rapidly and within a month led to the exile of the autocratic Tunisian president Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali after 23 years in **power**. The revolutionary uprising spread across the region, uniting discontented and frustrated people. Many protesters were young and were united not in the cause of one political alternative but in the desire for change, **security**, and empowerment. Social media was an important enabling factor. In response to the protests, Algeria, Jordan, and Oman instigated reforms. The regimes of President Hosni Mubarak in Egypt, Colonel Muammar Gaddafi in Libya, and of President Ali Abdullah Salih of Yemen were overthrown after decades of autocratic rule. Protests extended also to other **states**, including Bahrain, Mauritania, and Morocco. In Syria, President Bashir Assad has survived the revolutionaries but Syria has been plunged into a brutal civil **war** and the ensuing chaos has allowed for the birth and spread of the **Islamic State** as one of the most violent religious and political groups of modern times. The uprisings are also known as the Arab Spring but the term with its optimistic connotations of renewal and peaceful transition is misleading. The uprisings have led to the deaths and displace-

ment of hundreds of thousands of people, and hopes for increased freedom and **democracy** have largely been unrealized, with much of the region remaining in turmoil.

See also ARAB LEAGUE; WORLD FOOD PROGRAMME (WFP).

ARCTIC. The Arctic is usually defined as an area encompassed by the Arctic Circle, which rings the globe at 66°32′. Above this latitude, the sun does not set at the summer solstice or rise at the winter one. The Arctic contains an abundance of natural resources, including vast untapped reserves of natural gas and oil. Given the constant growing global demand for **energy security**, the Arctic increasingly has economic and geopolitical significance. Furthermore, melting ice is opening up new trans-Arctic waterways that are expected to shorten global shipping routes considerably, creating new economic opportunities within the Arctic. The economic exploitation of the Arctic is a controversial issue, potentially threatening the way of life of the Arctic's indigenous peoples, its wildlife, and the global environment.

Unlike the **Antarctic**, which is a continent governed by **international law**, the Arctic is made up of territory, territorial waters, and international waters. Given its potential riches, competing claims are emerging as an important issue in international relations. Although parts of the Arctic Ocean are in international waters, five littoral **states**—Canada, Denmark (which includes Greenland), Russia, Norway, and the United States—have exclusive economic zones (EEZs) within Arctic waters. Under the **United Nations** Convention on the Law of the Sea, states have an EEZ of 200 nautical miles. Furthermore, states can claim rights to the sea bed and below as long as they can demonstrate geologically that they are within the state's continental shelf. Various territorial disputes have arisen as a result of claims to an extended continental shelf, such as that between Russia and Canada over their conflicting claims to the Lomonosov Ridge. Canada's claim to the North Pole itself is also disputed. Territorial disputes do not prevent the Arctic states from working together with the indigenous peoples of the Arctic in the Arctic Council. This intergovernmental forum is at the heart of the governance of the Arctic.

See also GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS; GLOBAL GOVERNANCE; GREEN THEORY; SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT.

ARMED CONFLICT. *See* AGGRESSION; CONFLICT ANALYSIS; FORCE; GENEVA CONVENTIONS; INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW; TORTURE; WAR.

ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT. The idea that controlling or limiting arms can contribute to the cause of **peace** is a long-standing one that underpins key **diplomatic** efforts in the history of international relations. The St. Petersburg Conference of 1868 was the first international conference with arms control aims. Delegates from all the major European **states** and the Ottoman **Empire** prohibited the use of projectiles under 400 grams that were either explosive or charged with combustible or inflammable substances. The Hague Conferences in 1899 and 1907 outlawed certain types of weapons, including asphyxiating gases, expanding bullets, and projectiles from balloons, but these were broken during **World War I**. Disarmament featured prominently in President of the United States **Thomas Woodrow Wilson**'s plans for the postwar settlement, and it was a key objective of the newly formed **League of Nations**. The hope for disarmament also galvanized significant grassroots activity. The Women's International League for Peace and Freedom, for example, worked tirelessly for **peace**, including collecting six million signatures in their Disarmament Petition. Its chairwoman, Jane Addams, won the **Nobel Peace Prize** in 1931.

Interwar disarmament efforts, however, only achieved partial success. In 1925, the Geneva Protocol prohibited the use of asphyxiating and poisonous gases and bacteriological weapons in international conflicts. Naval armaments were limited by the Washington Conference (1921–1922) but it was the Geneva Disarmament Conference, which began in 1932, that was the primary institutional outcome of these efforts. Sixty states participated, including both the United States and the Soviet Union, though neither was a member of the League of Nations at that time. The talks failed, however, in part due to Germany, which pulled out of the process in 1933. The conference continued sporadically until 1937, at which time any hope of success was lost as the world entered another period of rapid rearmament as **World War II** loomed. The aim of general disarmament is often associated with **idealism** and, according to **classical realism**, the interwar attempts at disarmament failed because they were made without adequate consideration of the political context or the nature of **power** in international relations. During the **Cold War**, grassroots disarmament efforts—for example, the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament in Great Britain—concentrated on the elimination of **nuclear weapons** and were subject to the same charge of dangerous idealism. The debate as to whether disarmament is a requirement for or a product of peace remains unresolved.

Although the terms *arms control* and *disarmament* are now often used interchangeably, arms control has less idealistic connotations than disarmament and is recognized as a realistic goal of state **foreign policy**. During the Cold War, arms control became an important way in which the superpowers could stabilize their relationship and was a significant area of study for those working in the subfields of **conflict analysis**, **security** studies, and strategic

studies. The **Antarctica** Treaty (1959) demilitarized Antarctica and prepared the ground for further arms control agreements between the superpowers. The **Cuban missile crisis** inspired greater efforts to stabilize the nuclear relationship through arms control, and in 1963 the Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty prohibited nuclear tests in the atmosphere, underwater, and in outer space. The 1967 Outer Space Treaty, furthermore, prohibited nuclear weapons from being put into orbit. The Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons Treaty (NPT), signed by 62 states in 1968, has played a crucial role in limiting **nuclear proliferation** and remains the cornerstone of the nonproliferation regime. Most of the world's states are now signatories though there are exceptions: India, Pakistan, North Korea, and Israel are not party to the NPT and all are now nuclear weapons states. During the 1970s, the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks achieved an Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (1972) and a freeze on the number of submarine-launched nuclear missiles. Strategic Arms Limitation Talks II (1979) restricted the number of multiple independent reentry vehicles (MIRVs). The 1970s also saw the successful negotiation of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (1975).

The Cold War arms control talks were important not just for their outcomes but also for the confidence and trust built up during the negotiation process. Nevertheless, success was limited and talks often floundered on the difficult issue of verification. The most significant arms control agreements of the 20th century, therefore, were achieved toward the end of the Cold War with the coming to power of **Mikhail Gorbachev** in the Soviet Union. For example, the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty (1987) eliminated a whole class of weapons, and the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty (1990) reduced the numbers of conventional weapons. The culmination of arms control in the 1980s was the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START). This was the result of talks that had started in 1982 at the instigation of President of the United States **Ronald Reagan** and committed both the United States and the Soviet Union to move toward reducing their nuclear arsenals by up to 30 percent.

The ending of the Cold War and the dissolution of the Soviet Union led to further significant advances in arms control, indicating that arms control is most successful when other controversies and tensions are resolved. Three states that inherited Soviet nuclear weapons—Kazakhstan, Belarus, and Ukraine—pursued a policy of complete nuclear disarmament, which they achieved by 1992. The year 1993 saw the successful negotiation of the Chemical Weapons Conventions, and in 1996 the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty prohibited all nuclear explosions; both have been ratified by significant numbers of states. The United States and Russia continued the process of nuclear arms control with the Strategic Offensive Reduction Treaty, signed in 2002, which further reduced the number of deployed nuclear weapons, and a new START was signed on 8 April 2010. This treaty is a verifiable

agreement that limits each side to 1,550 strategic nuclear warheads deployed on 700 strategic delivery systems, and limits deployed and nondeployed launchers to 800.

International nongovernmental organizations continue to play a key role in modern arms control and disarmament efforts. For example, the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production, and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction, which was adopted in 1997, was achieved in large part due to the efforts of a transnational network of such organizations. This treaty commits states to never procure or use antipersonnel landmines, to destroy those in their stockpiles, and to clear any on their territory. Furthermore, it commits them to aid mine victims and to provide mine education. The Anti-Landmine Coalition campaigns to "finish the job" by achieving 100 percent ratification. Its founding coordinator, Jody Williams, won the Nobel Peace Prize in 1997. In 2008, the Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM), which "addresses the humanitarian consequences and unacceptable harm to civilians caused by cluster munitions," provided another example of the continuing importance of individual and group effort in the cause of arms control and disarmament. The CCM came into force in August 2010, and by June 2016, 119 states had joined.

See also ARMS RACE; ARMS TRADE; FORCE; GLOBAL GOVERNANCE; INTERNATIONAL LAW; WAR; WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION.

ARMS EMBARGO. An arms embargo prohibits the sale or movement of weapons to a particular state or region. Its aim is usually to stem the flow of weapons into a conflict situation. A mandatory arms embargo is a useful tool of the **United Nations** (UN) and is a means by which it can seek to manage conflict. Arms embargoes can be supported by other forms of **economic sanctions**—for example, those against conflict commodities such as diamonds or by travel bans. The majority of UN arms embargoes have been placed on African states and include an arms embargo against the apartheid regime in South Africa in 1977, an embargo against Eritrea in 2009, and one against Libya in 2011. Beyond Africa, mandatory UN embargoes include those placed on Iraq in 1990, North Korea in 2006, Iran in 2007, and Yemen in 2015.

The greatest number of arms embargoes are imposed not by the UN but by the **European Union** (EU). For example, the EU imposed an arms embargo and other sanctions against Russia in 2014 in response to its involvement in the conflict in Ukraine and its annexation of Crimea. The sanctions prohibit the sale of any military equipment, dual-use items, or military services to Russia. As a consequence, the French were unable to supply two Mistral-class warships due for delivery to Russia in 2015. Other multilateral arms

embargoes include those by the British Commonwealth against Nigeria in 1996, the **African Union** against Togo in 2005, and the **Arab League** against Syria in 2011.

Arms embargoes have an effect on the flow of arms but are not usually watertight. Violations due to inadequate oversight, corruption, or the illegal trade in weapons reduce the impact of an embargo.

See also ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT; ARMS TRADE.

ARMS RACE. A series of interrelated increases in state armaments is known as an arms race. As a form of destabilizing international rivalry, arms races occur between two or more **states** who perceive their relative military strength to be intimately and directly connected. A military advance in state A, be it quantitative or qualitative, is seen by one or more other states to both threaten their **security** and to reduce their relative strength, and they therefore respond with military advances of their own. State A might then up the ante and an action–reaction phenomenon is created. Arms races occur because of perceived threats within a political relationship and because of dissatisfaction with the existing distribution of **power** within a **balance of power**, but not all increases in a state's armaments either lead to or are a result of an arms race. The naval arms race between Great Britain and Germany in the early 1900s is seen as one of the factors that ultimately led to **World War I**. A lot of empirical work has been done in the academic discipline of **International Relations**, particularly within the school of **behavioralism** and the subfield of **conflict analysis** to understand why arms races occur and to test the hypothesis that arms races lead to **war**. The research indicates that arms races can lead to war but only in particular circumstances and when grievances are high.

See also ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT; NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION.

ARMS TRADE. States make and sell arms in support of both economic and strategic interests. States buy weapons both for their **security** and for the prestige that high-technology weapons are seen to bestow. There are different strands of the arms trade: major combat systems, small arms, dual-use technologies, and **nuclear weapons**. Although the trade in nuclear components is the most highly regulated element of the arms trade, it is small arms and their abundance across the globe that cause the most destruction and insecurity. In 2014, the **United Nations** (UN) Arms Trade Treaty came into force to regulate the international **trade** in conventional weapons. It is the result of sustained effort on the part of a network of **international nongovernmental organizations**. It obligates state parties to ensure that weap-

ons are not sold to repressive regimes and do not cross an **arms embargo**. However, much of the trade in small arms is illicit and virtually impossible to control.

See also ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT.

ASIAN FINANCIAL CRISIS. A massive run on the Thai baht in July 1997 led to the Asian financial crisis. In just six months, the baht lost nearly 50 percent of its value. The currencies of other Asian **states** such as Indonesia, South Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Singapore also came under sustained downward pressure as capital flowed out of Asia. This was the most serious financial crisis in the developing world since the 1982 **debt** crisis. Indonesia and South Korea had to seek loans from the **International Monetary Fund** and **World Bank** to hold up their currencies and economies. Although national debt in these states was relatively low, it was very high among commercial banks, causing a banking crisis. Confidence in the Asian economies collapsed.

The crisis also had political ramifications. In Indonesia, for example, the hardest hit of all the Asian states, the collapsing economy undermined the performance legitimacy on which the regime of President Suharto had maintained its power, and led to Suharto leaving office after 31 years. The crisis, however, was only a temporary setback and the Asian economies have since continued to grow steadily.

See also ASIA–PACIFIC ECONOMIC COOPERATION FORUM (APEC); ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS (ASEAN); ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT; ECONOMIC GLOBALIZATION.

ASIA–PACIFIC ECONOMIC COOPERATION FORUM (APEC). The leading economic institution in the Pacific region, the Asia–Pacific Economic Cooperation forum (APEC), is an important example of **regional integration**. It was first conceived by Australian prime minister Bob Hawke, who spoke of it in a speech in January 1989. Just 10 months later, APEC was founded by 12 **states**: Australia, Brunei Darussalam, Canada, Indonesia, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, New Zealand, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and the United States. Since then, membership has increased to 21 members as new states have joined: Chile, People's Republic of China, Hong Kong, Mexico, Papua New Guinea, Peru, the Russian Federation, Chinese Taipei (Taiwan), and Vietnam. According to its mission statement, APEC's primary goal is "to support sustainable economic growth and prosperity in the Asia-Pacific region." This is done through the promotion of free **trade** and investment, economic cooperation and integration, human **security**, and a "sustainable business environment." APEC is market led; economic integration is not supported by political and strategic motives, as in the **European Union**, for

example. Its members are also not under formal treaty obligations but reach voluntary agreements consensually. APEC is a form of "open regionalism," meaning that states are free to agree to unilaterally free trade agreements with nonmember states. APEC's success in reducing tariffs and other trade barriers across the Asia–Pacific region has led to increasing exports. Its members already account for over half of global gross domestic product and its road map for the achievement of a free trade Asia–Pacific region, agreed upon in Beijing in 2014, is anticipated to further fuel growth in the region.

See also INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS; INTERNATIONAL OR-GANIZATIONS.

ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS (ASEAN). Established in 1967 by Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) now has 10 member-**states** since Brunei Darussalam, Myanmar, Vietnam, Laos PDR, and Cambodia have joined. ASEAN was originally designed to be a space in Asia that was independent of the superpower **Cold War** struggle. The founding members wanted to create an **international organization** that could resolve disputes internally rather than relying on the assistance of superpowers. ASEAN in the first instance, therefore, was a political and **security** organization and offered a different model for **regional integration** than the **European Union** (EU). The acceleration of **economic development** within the region, however, is now ASEAN's primary aim.

ASEAN's form of integration is known as the ASEAN way and is strongly based on the norms of state **sovereignty** and nonintervention. ASEAN has never been an organization that attempts to reform the governance practices of its members. The struggle to achieve independence from **colonialism** meant that states were resistant to surrendering their newly won sovereignty to supranational organizations, and Southeast Asian nations are protective of their independence and nationhood. This has had an impact on the nature of ASEAN, which is a less formal set of relationships than the EU and which focuses on the key values of dialogue and consensus rather than formal **international law** and procedure.

Despite its slogan of "One vision, one identity, one community," no common history, **culture**, or religion defines Southeast Asia; ASEAN membership embraces significant differences. For example, it includes Indonesia, which is the largest Muslim state in the world; Thailand, which is a Buddhist country; the Philippines, which is Christian; and Vietnam, which is communist. It also has vastly different levels of income among its states, with very wealthy states such as Singapore sitting alongside poor states such as Myanmar. This diversity has meant that integration has been harder to achieve in this region. However, despite being rather slower than other regions to get started on the road to regional integration, since the 1990s the ASEAN region

has increasingly developed a regional identity and a complex system of overlapping economic and security agreements. Rapid growth rates have stimulated interregional **trade** and investment as well as a degree of institutionalization. The 1997 **Asian financial crisis** led to a deepening of institutional cooperation within the ASEAN member-states and moved them further toward economic integration. In 2015, the ASEAN Community was launched under three pillars, including an economic pillar, and a free trade area within the ASEAN region has been virtually established. The other two pillars of the ASEAN Community are the Political-Security Community and the Socio-Cultural Community.

See also ECONOMIC GLOBALIZATION; INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS.

ATLANTIC CHARTER. A statement of general principles signed on a ship in the mid-Atlantic in August 1941, before the entry of the United States into **World War II**, by U.S. president **Franklin Delano Roosevelt** and British prime minister **Winston Churchill**, the Atlantic Charter set out their goals for the **war** and the postwar order. The principles included national self-determination, disarmament, opposition to **aggression**, and equal access to **trade**. These principles were affirmed by the allies in the 1942 Declaration by the **United Nations** as the normative framework for the postwar order.

ATTACKS ON 9/11. On 11 September 2001, **al-Qaeda** launched its largest **terrorist** attack. This involved 19 hijackers who, directed by **Osama bin Laden**, took control of four commercial passenger planes that had taken off from airports in Boston, Washington, D.C., and Newark, New Jersey. The al-Qaeda agents crashed two of these planes into the World Trade Centers in New York, killing 2,753 people, completely destroying two towers and damaging a number of other buildings. The third plane was flown into the Pentagon building in Washington, D.C., killing 184 people. The fourth, en route to an unknown target in Washington, D.C., crashed in a field in Pennsylvania when, it is widely suspected, some passengers fought the hijackers to try to regain control. All 40 passengers and crew members of this fourth plane were killed. The 19 hijackers all died in the attacks.

In a statement broadcast on Al-Jazeera television shortly after the attacks, bin Laden gave three reasons for them. First, he said there had been 80 years of humiliation and degradation since 1916, when the Middle East was carved up after the collapse of the Ottoman **Empire** during **World War I**. Second, the attacks were in support for the demand for a secure Palestinian **state**. The third reason was to campaign against the existence of "infidel armies" in the

"land of Mohammed" (U.S. troops in Saudi Arabia). In response to the attacks, President of the United States **George W. Bush** launched the **war on terror**.

See also ARAB–ISRAELI CONFLICT; IRAQ WAR (2003–2010); IS-LAMIC STATE (IS).

B

BALANCE OF POWER. When the **power** of one **state** or group of states is checked by the countervailing power of other states, a balance of power is created (if one did not exist before) or maintained (if an existing one was in danger of breaking down). Balance of power is prominent in theories of **realism**. Realists focus on the activity of states that, whether advertently or otherwise, follow balance of power as a doctrine in order to enhance or defend their power. **Classical realism**, which assumes that humans by nature seek power and that this ambition is transferred to the states that they comprise, holds that balance of power is the best means for a state to do this and also, through **diplomacy**, the most reliable means of maintaining equilibrium and hence **peace**. The outbreak of **World War I** (WWI) served as a reminder that the doctrine was flawed. In fact, the proto-realist ancient Greek theorist **Thucydides** identified examples of the breakdown of the balance.

Prior to the outbreak of WWI in 1914, the classical realist argument could be backed by analysis of the existing international system in which, other than balancing, there was no mechanism to prevent **war**. Nevertheless, **liberal internationalist** arguments for building a better mechanism had been voiced earlier in the 20th century by thinkers such as **Norman Angell**. President of the United States **Thomas Woodrow Wilson** became the most prominent thinker and politician in the movement to construct such an alternative based on **collective security**, leading to the foundation of the **League of Nations**. Realists continued to maintain that the balance of power was the best mechanism, notwithstanding its flaws. The collapse of the League and the outbreak of **World War II** presented an example on which they could draw. The debate between realists and liberal internationalists continues in **International Relations theory** as arguments and examples are offered on each side.

Neorealism suggests that the international system has a tendency toward balance of power and thus equilibrium. This is a structural theory in that the system is considered to drive the policies and actions of states, which will balance each other. This argument has been criticized on the grounds that some states go to **war** to fulfill their aims, and thus have no desire for a

balance of power. The leading neorealist theorist **Kenneth Waltz** argued that although indeed some states ignore the structural forces at work, and some do actually fulfill their goals by so doing, most recognize the dangers and do seek the balance.

Polarity has been an issue in debates on the balance of power. Waltz argued in 1979, during the **Cold War**, that the balance of power at that time was bipolar in that two powerful states—the United States and the Soviet Union—could threaten each other's survival. Other states tended to ally with one or the other of these powers. This is in contrast to multipolar balances that have occurred in other periods of history. Waltz argued that, as it is easier than others to manage, a bipolar balance is the most likely to remain stable and keep peace. Most other commentators have argued that as changes in the capacity of one state need to be matched by the other, a bipolar balance is unstable as the match cannot be guaranteed. A multipolar balance is thus widely considered as the most stable as other states can combine to match the enhanced power of a state. There is an argument that, rather than actively balance one another to maintain peace and stability, some states bandwagon, meaning that in the interest of their own **security** they line up behind a state that is becoming powerful.

See also CONCERT OF EUROPE; MEARSHEIMER, JOHN J. (1947–); SOCIAL CONSTRUCTIVISM; WENDT, ALEXANDER (1958–).

BEHAVIORALISM. Starting in the 1950s a behavioral-quantitative approach, which sought to bring scientific precision to study, began to be increasingly influential in the academic discipline of International Relations, particularly in the United States. Behavioralists took advantage of new computer technologies to test some of the discipline's conventional wisdom on such things as **arms races** and the nature and cause of **war**. The quantitative methodology of behavioralism was opposed to the traditional (or classical) approaches of **liberal internationalism** and **classical realism**, which derive from history, philosophy, and law. The debate between traditional and behavioral approaches was the second great debate in **International Relations theory**, though the issues in the debate largely remain unresolved. Within the contemporary discipline, both quantitative and qualitative approaches are used to build advance knowledge.

See also CONFLICT ANALYSIS; STRATEGIC STUDIES.

BIN LADEN, OSAMA BIN MOHAMMED BIN AWAD (1957–2011).
Osama bin Laden was born in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. He was 10 years old when his father, a wealthy businessman in the construction industry, died. He lived with his mother and was raised as a Sunni Muslim. After attending an

elite school, he went to King Abdulaziz University in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia to study economics and business administration. He inherited a substantial portion of his father's wealth.

Bin Laden developed a commitment to violent jihad, or holy **war**, and a hatred for the United States because its **foreign policy** had brought about deaths of Muslims in the Middle East. He was anti-Semitic, believing that Jews controlled Western governments, and he opposed all kinds of secular government, including **democracy** and communism. In the 1980s, he used his wealth to fund the mujahideen in their successful **war in Afghanistan** against the Soviet Union, where he was also involved in some operations. He returned to Saudi Arabia but was arrested for his criticism of the monarchy. He escaped and went to Sudan, where he started to develop and organize the terrorist organization **al-Qaeda**, which he had helped found in 1988. He was expelled from Sudan in 1995.

In 1996, bin Laden went back to Afghanistan, where he supported the extreme interpretation of Sunni Islam imposed by the Taliban government. He began to plan **terrorism** with a global reach. As the head of al-Qaeda, he organized a number of attacks against his perceived enemies in the late 1990s, including bombings of U.S. embassies in Tanzania and Kenya. In 2001, he organized the **attacks on 9/11** on New York and Washington that killed almost 3,000 people. In response, President of the United States **George W. Bush** launched the **war on terror**. Bin Laden was hunted until he was found to be hiding in Pakistan where, under President of the United States Barack Hussein Obama, U.S. forces launched a covert operation in which bin Laden was killed.

See also HUNTINGTON, SAMUEL PHILLIPS (1927–2008).

BRAILSFORD, HENRY NOEL (1873–1958). Born in the Dewsbury area of Yorkshire, England, Henry Noel Brailsford endured a strict, austere childhood that was dominated by his father, a Methodist minister. He was educated by his sister until in 1881 the family moved to Scotland. The family lived in a number of Scottish towns and cities, so he attended several schools. He studied philosophy at Glasgow University and briefly at Oxford, and began a university career as a teaching assistant at Glasgow. In 1896, his commitment to socialism began to develop and, doubting his own commitment to academic life, he abandoned that career. The following year he went to fight for the Greeks, who were defeated in the Thirty Days' War against Turkey, before returning to Great Britain to commence his journalistic career, in which he remained for the rest of his working life.

Brailsford also wrote books that addressed key international affairs. First published in May 1914, 10 editions of his major work, *The War of Steel and Gold*, had been published by 1918 but the main text remained unchanged. In this book, long before the academic discipline of International Relations had

been established, he criticized **balance of power** theory and assessed proposals to replace competition and conflict with international cooperation. He argued that armament was a problem not just because of its use in **war** but also because in the armed **peace** it benefited the vested interests of capitalism. Soon after the first edition had been published in 1914, **World War I** broke out and Germany occupied other countries, including its rival great power France. In his preface to the third edition the following year, he wrote that this illustrated the fact that war resulted from protracted rivalry.

Brailsford and **Norman Angell** each argued that warfare could and should be abolished but their arguments differed. For Angell, the pressure of uneducated public opinion led statesmen to fight wars. Once ordinary people began to appreciate that war disrupted **trade**, diverted finances to armaments, and was uneconomical, **states** would no longer fight wars to satisfy popular opinion. Brailsford, however, argued in *The War of Steel and Gold* that war seemed rational from the standpoint of the powerful governing class, as did the use of armaments to aid expansion without war. **Imperialism**, in which capital was expended in less-developed countries, brought returns. The **diplomacy** of the great powers served the small governing class. In the 1920s, he considered that the **League of Nations** would not succeed in its aims if it failed to deal with the underlying problems of capitalism. He did advocate a league of nations but believed that **sovereignty** would have to be abandoned in order for an international system of government to develop.

In the 1930s Brailsford continued to call for a role for supranational government. In his 1934 book, *Property or Peace*, he suggested that the **Marxist** theory of imperialism presented by **V. I. Lenin** in 1917 was becoming outdated. Brailsford argued that the structure of society had become more complex, as class boundaries were far less clearly defined. In *Why Capitalism Means War* (1938), Brailsford argued that the way to world peace would be through international federalism with interdependent economies within a single commonwealth guided by a socialist view of human relationships on which mutual defense could be organized. In his essay *Socialists and the Empire* in 1945, he argued that it was the responsibility of the imperial powers to help the process toward independence.

See also LASKI, HAROLD JOSEPH (1893–1950).

BRANDT, WILLY (1913–1992). Born in Lübeck, Germany, Karl Herbert Frahm grew up as the son of a single parent, having never met his father. He joined the German Social Democratic Party (Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands, SPD) in the 1920s. After the Nazis came to power in 1933, he left the SPD in protest at what he saw as its weak stance against the rise of **Adolf Hitler**. He adopted the name Willy Brandt to avoid detection by the Nazis but was still forced to flee to Norway, where he was a journalist. He returned to Germany briefly in 1936 to establish an anti-Nazi underground

movement. Having joined the Norwegian army in 1940, he was captured, then released, and went to Sweden. He returned to Germany again in 1945, rejoined the SPD, and was elected to the parliament (Bundestag) in 1949. He became a senior member of the SPD and was chancellor of West Germany from October 1969 to May 1974.

As chancellor, Brandt attempted to ease **Cold War** tensions with his policy of Ostpolitik, for which he won the **Nobel Peace Prize**, but was forced to stand down after a close aide was arrested as a communist spy from East Germany. In 1976, he became president of Socialist International. He used his leadership of this **international nongovernmental organization** to expand its membership into the **third world**. His last major public achievement was chairing the Independent Commission on International Development Issues that produced the report *North South: A Programme for Survival*. The commission adopted the shorter name Brandt Commission and published a second report, *Common Crisis*, in 1983. The reports identified two interlinked relationships among the **states** of the world: the developed industrial ones that exploited the poor countries for their wealth, and the poor countries that were dependent on those of the former category for their **economic development**. Brandt and his commission argued that the economic and social problems of nations located mainly in the southern hemisphere threatened world **peace** and that these countries needed more assistance from the industrialized nations, located mainly in the northern hemisphere. This would require recognition of mutual interests between the global North and global South.

See also DEPENDENCY; DEVELOPMENT; POVERTY.

BRAZIL, RUSSIA, INDIA, CHINA, SOUTH AFRICA (BRICS). *See* ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT; GLOBAL POWER SHIFTS.

BRETTON WOODS CONFERENCE. Formally known as the United Nations Monetary and Financial Conference, the Bretton Woods Conference was held at the Mount Washington Hotel in Bretton Woods, New Hampshire, in the United States between 1 July and 22 July 1944. Delegates from all 44 Allied states in **World War II** attended in order to devise the rules and institutions that were to govern the new global economy, though very much under the leadership of the United States. The system devised was a liberal system operating on the two key principles of free **trade** and monetary stability. Monetary stability was achieved by the introduction of a flexible gold standard: exchange rates were fixed, pegged either to the dollar or to gold. The value of the dollar was pegged at $35 per ounce of gold. A new system of governance was comprised of the **International Monetary Fund** (IMF) and the **World Bank**. Attempts to set up a world trade organization failed,

but there was a General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade known as the GATT. The **World Trade Organization** eventually came into existence in 1995.

The Bretton Woods system operated for 27 years and did bring some stability and prosperity to the international economy. It benefited from the fact that **power** was concentrated in relatively few countries; that those few powerful states shared a commitment to capitalism and to an open international market; and that in the context of the **Cold War** the United States had an interest in cementing the Western **alliance** and bearing the costs of the system as a benign **hegemon**. During the 1960s, however, the system became increasingly difficult and costly to maintain. It depended on a strong dollar, but as the value of the dollar fell because of domestic inflation and the cost of U.S. foreign policy, particularly the **Vietnam War**, the United States lost its willingness to support the Bretton Woods system. It was abandoned in 1971 when President of the United States Richard M. Nixon closed the gold window. The system of fixed exchange rates was replaced by one of floating exchange rates, temporarily disrupting the stability of the global economy.

See also AMERICAN PRIMACY; GREAT DEPRESSION.

BRITISH HEGEMONY. One clear lesson that history teaches is that great powers rise and fall and there is a "circulation of elites" in international relations; at any one time, some states are in decline and other states are rising powers. Throughout the 19th century, the **state** in the ascendancy was Great Britain. British **hegemony** brought a degree of order and stability to the international system. The period from the **Congress of Vienna** to **World War I** was one of relative **peace** and significant human progress in Europe. As this period coincided with the period of British ascendency, the era of British hegemony is also known as Pax Britannica. Whether British hegemony was the cause of peace is an issue of contention. Other stabilizing factors during this period were the **Concert of Europe**, the European **balance of power**, and the safety valve of European **colonialism**. The 19th century is also sometimes seen as the first era of **economic globalization**.

There were three key sources of British **power**: its **sea power**, its dominance of the global economy, and its **empire**. Great Britain's control of the seas was a key reason for its dominance over the globe. Britain had also had the largest navy for much of the 18th century but its dominance was constantly under challenge from the French. The British navy's victory over the French during the Battle of Trafalgar on 21 October 1805, a key battle in the Napoleonic Wars, removed the last remaining naval rival in the way of Britain's rise. Britain could now assert its dominance in the North Atlantic and this gave it control over the key **trade** routes to India and beyond, enabling it to dominate world trade, expand its empire, and grow into the key global power of the 19th century.

Great Britain had hegemonic power within the emerging global economy throughout much of the 19th century. Its economic supremacy came from three key factors: dominance in production, in commerce, and in finance. It dominated global production because of the technological advantages it had derived from being the first state to industrialize (Great Britain was the birthplace of the Industrial Revolution). At its height in about 1860, Britain was responsible for 19.9 percent of world manufacturing output. Its high levels of production required raw materials from around the world as well as markets. British preeminence, therefore, depended on a worldwide network of trade. The emergence of a worldwide, multilateral trading system was one of the notable features of the 19th century, and this system was underpinned by British power and led to the British dominance of global commerce. High levels of trade, in turn, created demand for British services such as banking, shipping, and insurance. Great Britain was also the dominant financial center and its sterling was the strongest world currency. British economic hegemony reached its peak in 1870 when the London stock market was twice as large as the capital markets of all its rivals combined. Britain's economic supremacy could not be matched by any other state or even a combination of states. This allowed Great Britain to assume some of the functions of a world state. In particular, it could write the rules of the system, and the key rule that Britain laid down was that of free trade. Britain had a strong **national interest** in preserving free trade because free trade benefits those with economic power.

As an industrial nation, Britain required resources for its manufacturing, which led it to acquire the largest empire the world had ever seen. The need to secure the trade routes to vital colonies such as India, Burma, and Malaya encouraged further **colonialism** in strategically located regions, such as those around the Suez Canal. At its height, at the beginning of the 20th century, Britain controlled about one fourth of the Earth's land surface and one fifth of the world's population.

Great Britain's period of undisputed hegemony reached its peak between 1860 and 1870. In the second half of the century, Britain began to face a growing military and industrial challenge from new rivals, particularly Germany and the United States. Germany had been formed out of a collection of independent Germanic states in 1871. Once unified, the sheer speed of its industrialization was extraordinary and it quickly challenged British dominance. The United States similarly began to industrialize very rapidly at the end of the American Civil **War**. It had some natural advantages over Great Britain, being a much larger country with plenty of natural resources. It also enjoyed the benefits of significant inward investment from Great Britain. By the end of the 19th century, British hegemony was already under threat. Great Britain was still a key, if not *the* key power, and its economy was still growing, but it was losing ground relative to other powers. By the beginning

of the 20th century, the United States had become the world's biggest economy and had a larger navy than the British. Britain, therefore, had to concede control of the western hemisphere: it could no longer project its power globally.

World War I dealt a devastating blow to British power, and **World War II** broke it. The balance of power between the United States and Britain completely shifted during the war, and it is therefore sometimes said that Britain lost the war not to Germany but to the United States. Britain was displaced as a world power and within a few decades also lost its empire in a postwar period of rapid **decolonization**. In the end, however, it accepted the decline, and this acceptance can be seen in its willingness to ally itself to its successor, the United States, in the period of **American primacy** and to join the European Communities (EC) in 1973. The EC was transformed into the **European Union** (EU) in the early 1990s but in a referendum in 2016 British citizens voted narrowly to leave this **international organization**. There was a sense during the referendum campaign that some of those who voted to leave wanted Great Britain to return to the glories of its past and once more be a global power, independent of European control. Although the days of British hegemony are long gone, Britain's imperial past continues to influence its domestic politics and its relationship with the rest of the world.

See also ALLIANCES; ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT; ECONOMIC GLOBALIZATION; GLOBAL POWER SHIFTS; GREAT DEPRESSION; POSTCOLONIAL RELATIONS; SMITH, ADAM (1723–1790).

BRUNDTLAND, GRO HARLEM (1939–). Gro Harlem Brundtland was born in Oslo, Norway. Her father was a physician and politician. In her childhood and youth, she was active in school and university socialist societies linked to the Norwegian Labor Party (Det norske Arbeiderparti, DnA). She gained a degree in medicine from the University of Oslo in 1963 and a master's degree in public health from Harvard University in 1965. In 1974, she began the activities that would make her a major figure in **global environmental politics**. With the DnA in government, she was appointed minister of the environment. In 1977, she was elected as a member of Parliament for the DnA and passed the ministerial post to a colleague. For nine months in1981, she was Norway's first female prime minister. In 1983, she resumed her commitment to the protection of the natural environment by becoming chairwoman of the United Nations World Commission on Environment and Development. In 1987, this commission published *Our Common Future* (sometimes known as the Brundtland Report), which called for **sustainable development**.

Brundtland was again prime minister from 1986 to 1989 and 1990 to 1996. She resigned from her third term as prime minister in 1996 to make way for a new generation of leaders in the DnA. She then took another important

international role as president of the **World Health Organization** from 1998 to 2003, thus being the first woman elected to run a major **United Nations** (UN) institution. She also became a member of the Council of Women World Leaders. Furthermore, she became the UN special envoy on climate change.

See also GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS; GREEN THEORY.

BULL, HEDLEY (1932–1985). Hedley Bull was born in Sydney, Australia. His mother's family had established a successful store business in the city and he attended a prestigious school before going to university in his home city at the age of 16 to study arts and law. He switched to philosophy and history, but always retained his interest in law, particularly **international law**. After he graduated in 1952, his university awarded him a fellowship for overseas study the following year. He used the funds to travel to England and study philosophy at Oxford University, where he gained his BPhil degree in 1955. He then began a long academic career, taking a post as assistant lecturer at the London School of Economics, where he collaborated in the British Committee on the Theory of International Politics. He was seconded to the Arms Control and Disarmament Research Unit of the British Foreign Office for two years before moving to the Australian National University in Canberra in 1967 to become professor of International Relations (IR). In 1977, he moved back to Oxford University where he was the Montague Burton professor of IR for the remainder of his career.

Bull became an influential IR theorist whose most important contribution was his work on the **international society**. He was a key member of the **English school**. His seminal work, *The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics*, was first published in 1977. Published in four editions, it is now considered a classic of **International Relations theory**. He argued that the modern international system could be understood with reference to each of the Hobbesian, Kantian, and Grotian traditions of thought. The first, which drew on the work of **Thomas Hobbes**, was part of the broader tradition of **classical realism**. It emphasized the struggle for **power** among states. The second of the three traditions, which drew on the work of **Immanuel Kant** and thus emphasized transnational solidarity and universalism, led to **liberal internationalism**. The third of the traditions, which drew on the work of **Hugo Grotius**, was somewhere between the other two, arguing that international relations can be seen in terms of a society of states. In different historical phases of the **Westphalian system of states**, and in different parts of the world, one of these three traditions was the more applicable to account for the policies of states and statesmen.

Bull argued in *The Anarchical Society* that **realism** had provided the crucial concept of **balance of power**, on which international order rested. Realism had also correctly emphasized that the primary unit of the system was the **state**. Nevertheless, he also argued that the Grotian emphasis on agreements,

rules, and norms was crucial to an understanding of the interactions of states, which compose an international society. States must be committed to preserving such a society and to making the balance of power work. In this society, the norm and rules operated through international law and **diplomacy**.

In addition to his work on international society, Bull had many other interests in IR. He was particularly interested in **arms control and disarmament**, Australian defense policy, and Asia's strategic affairs. His last book, *Justice in International Relations*, was published in 1984.

See also COSMOPOLITANISM; SOCIAL CONSTRUCTIVISM.

BUSH, GEORGE WALKER (1946–). Born in New Haven, Connecticut, George W. Bush (Bush Jr.) grew up in a wealthy, political family, his grandfather Prescott Bush having been a senator for Connecticut. Bush Jr.'s father, George Herbert Walker Bush, built an oil business in Texas before holding senior political and diplomatic posts, including those of Republican congressman, U.S. ambassador to the **United Nations**, director of the Central Intelligence Agency, vice president for President **Ronald Reagan** from 1981 to 1989, and president of the United States from 1989 to 1993. As first lady, Bush Jr.'s mother, Barbara Bush, promoted literacy and campaigned to provide help for homeless, people with AIDS, and the elderly.

As a child in 1948, Bush Jr. moved with his family to Midland, Texas, where he attended public schools. The family moved to Houston in 1959 and Bush Jr. went to high school at the Phillips Academy in Andover, Massachusetts, from 1961 to 1964. He studied at Yale University from 1966 to 1968 and served as a pilot in the Texas Air National Guard from 1968 to 1973. From 1973 to 1975, he studied at Harvard and received his master of business administration degree before founding an oil and gas exploration company that he ran until 1988. From 1997 to 1988, he also served as senior advisor to his father's successful presidential campaign.

In 1994, as a Republican, Bush Jr. was elected governor of Texas. He won a second term at the gubernatorial elections of 1998. In June 1999, he declared that he would run for the presidency at the next election. His campaigning message included a commitment to free and fair **trade** and a strong defense. He won the Republican nomination and was elected as president in November/December 2000. He was sworn into office in January 2001; the following month, he ordered an air attack on Iraq. He justified the attack as a routine enforcement of the no-fly zone that had been imposed on that county after the **first Gulf War** (1990–1991) in order to protect Kurds in the north of the country and Shia Muslims in the south, who were persecuted by Iraqi president Saddam Hussein in response to their uprisings.

In September 2001, the **attacks on 9/11** were carried out by **al-Qaeda** agents, on the instruction of **Osama bin Laden** from his headquarters in Afghanistan. Bush responded by launching the **war on terror**. The first stage of this **war** involved sending American troops into Afghanistan to overthrow the Taliban government that harbored al-Qaeda, and to arrest or kill bin Laden himself. The Taliban was defeated but bin Laden escaped and was not found and killed until President Barack Obama had been elected president after the completion of Bush's second term in office.

In 2003 Bush extended the war on terror to Iraq on the stated belief that Saddam Hussein had links to al-Qaeda and posed a threat to the United States, not least because of the alleged possession of **weapons of mass destruction** (WMDs). The United States began the **Iraq War** without the direct approval of the **United Nations Security Council**, and Saddam was captured after his army had been defeated. Nevertheless, U.S. forces became embroiled in an occupation of the country that cost a lot their lives and those of many more Iraqis in a long struggle against a strong insurgency. The struggle continued into Bush's second term, which began in January 2005 after his reelection in November the previous year. In his 2005 State of the Union address, Bush pledged that the United States would help the Iraqi people to establish a democratic government and thus establish a new ally in the war on terror. The Iraqi democratic government was elected in 2005 but the country remained unstable after Bush left office at the end of his second term in 2009. Any links there may have been between Saddam and al-Qaeda were never proven and WMDs were never found. Although Obama accomplished the complete withdrawal of U.S. forces in 2011, the country remains unstable.

See also FORCE.

C

CARR, EDWARD HALLETT (1892–1982). E. H. Carr was born into a middle-class family in London, his father active in the small family business. He won a scholarship to attend Merchant Taylor's School and studied classics at the University of Cambridge. He then went into the British **diplomatic** service. Working in diplomatic affairs with Russia in 1917 when the Russian Revolution broke out in October that year, his task became that of keeping goods out of the new communist country. After **World War I** and the **Paris Peace Conference** of 1919, he supported the foundation of the **League of Nations** but disagreed with the severe treatment of Germany in the terms of the Versailles Treaty. His diplomatic work kept him in Paris until 1922, took him to Riga, Latvia, in 1925, and to Moscow in 1927.

In 1930, Carr began work at the Foreign Office and was promoted to first secretary in 1933 while also publishing books and articles. At this time Great Britain was attempting to make the League of Nations fulfill its goal of avoiding **war**. In 1936, he resigned from the Foreign Office to take the Woodrow Wilson Chair in International Politics at the University College of Wales, Aberystwyth. He had become skeptical of the League and of the **liberal internationalism** of former president of the United States **Woodrow Wilson**. In his inaugural lecture that year, he criticized the idea of using sanctions to punish or deter Japanese use of **force** in Asia, leading to complaints that he opposed the principle of the League. He also favored the appeasement of Nazi Germany. In 1937, he published *International Relations since the Peace Treaties*. He published two books in 1939: *Britain: A Study of Foreign Policy from the Versailles Treaty* and the hugely influential *The Twenty Years' Crisis, 1919–1939: An Introduction to the Study of International Relations*. The latter, published as the world was heading for **World War II**, was a pessimistic study of international relations, influenced in part by **Reinhold Niebuhr**'s *Moral Man and Immoral Society*.

On the basis of *The Twenty Years' Crisis*, Carr came to be regarded, along with the later writers **Hans J. Morgenthau** and **Kenneth Waltz**, among the most important theorists of **realism** in International Relations. Although Carr criticized the **idealist** or utopian views of liberal internationalism and argued

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that **classical realists** such as **Niccolò Machiavelli** and **Thomas Hobbes** had made valuable points about the centrality of **power** to international relations, he did not accept the extreme realist view that morality had no place in world politics. He criticized the liberal notion of a harmony of interests, arguing that this overlooked real conflict between the old powers (the "haves") and the emerging states (the "have-nots"), including **Adolf Hitler**'s Germany, in a world characterized by scarcity. Reflecting the influence of **Marxism** among other sources, he argued that the haves served the interests of dominant groups. The Marxist influence sat uneasily with a restatement in the book of support of the appeasement of Germany. There was no reason, Carr argued, why the have-nots should respect **international law**, which helped the haves maintain their power while limiting that of other **states**. Furthermore, the haves had not abided by international law in the course of building their own power by means of intervention in other parts of the world. The situation could be managed, but not by **international organizations** like the League because power remained with the states that composed them (and those that lay outside the organizations). Instead, the world needed to be restructured on a basis other than that of nation-states, including, again reflecting Marxist influence, fundamental change in the international economy. Otherwise, he predicted, war would be a continuing and inevitable feature of international relations. He was realist in this analysis of the existing world order but did not believe this order was permanent—however entrenched it was in the short term.

Carr took an editorial role at the *Times* newspaper from 1942 to 1946 and also wrote *Conditions of Peace* (1942), *Nationalism and After* (1945), and *The Soviet Impact on the Western World* (1946). In *Conditions of Peace*, Carr criticized federalism for oversimplifying the problems of a world of nation-states. In the second edition (1945) of *The Twenty Years' Crisis*, he conceded that in the first he had too readily assumed that the principal actors of international relations would be nation-states. Like **Harold Laski** and **David Mitrany**, he proposed **functionalism** as an alternative. In *Conditions of Peace*, he proposed an arrangement with larger units for military and economic purposes, and, for some functions, devolution of power from the state to smaller groups. He resigned from Aberystwyth in 1947 but continued to publish extensively, including a multivolume history of the Soviet Union.

See also NATIONAL INTEREST.

CHOMSKY, AVRAM NOAM (1928–). Noam Chomsky was born in Philadelphia to Jewish parents who had migrated from Ukraine and Belarus 15 years earlier. His mother was a teacher and his father a Hebrew scholar. He went to Oak Lane Day School, which was a progressive, independent school, then Central High School, both in his home city. His undergraduate and postgraduate education was at the University of Pennsylvania, where he

gained his BA in 1949, his MA in 1951, and his PhD in linguistics in 1955. That year he started his academic career in linguistics at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT). In 1961, he became a professor and he held professorial positions at MIT for the remainder of his career. He has published extensively on linguistics, on which he is widely recognized as a leading authority.

Chomsky has also published many books on political and social issues, including some influential ones on international relations. As a public intellectual, he was active in opposition to the **Vietnam War** in the 1960s, expressing his views on this in *American Power and the New Mandarins* (1969). He has since been active in the movement against **war** more broadly. He has also expressed his opposition to international capitalism, publishing *Profit over People: Neoliberalism and the Global Order* in 1999. He has criticized major organizations, including the **International Monitory Fund** and the **World Bank**. He has also been a prominent critic of U.S. **foreign policy**. His books in this field include *The Political Economy of Human Rights* (1979) with coauthor Edward S. Herman and *Hegemony or Survival: America's Quest for Global Dominance* (2004). In his books, he has drawn attention to U.S. support for dictatorships that violate **human rights** while at the same time claiming to champion **democracy**. He argued that American intellectuals had manipulated the populace to support U.S. actions and was particularly scathing of **Henry Kissinger** in this respect in *Towards a New Cold War* (1982). He has criticized U.S. activity and intervention in Central America and the Caribbean, including in *Turning the Tide: U.S. Intervention in Central America and the Struggle for Peace* (1985). Nevertheless, during the **Cold War** he also spoke out against the authoritarian nature of communism. His ideological leanings are toward libertarian socialism and anarchism. He has condemned Israel's actions against the Palestinians, under the protection of the United States, in the **Arab–Israeli conflict**, publishing several books on this theme, including *Gaza in Crisis: Reflections on Israel's War against the Palestinians* with coauthor Ilan Pappé in 2010. On these themes, he has published articles in a range of media and delivered lectures in many countries.

CHURCHILL, WINSTON LEONARD (1874–1965). Winston Churchill was born into an aristocratic family in Oxfordshire, England, with the full surname Spencer-Churchill. His parents were Lady and Lord Randolph Churchill. From the ages of two to seven, he lived in Dublin. After returning to England, he attended three independent schools, including from 1888 to 1893 the prestigious Harrow, after which he went to the Royal Military College, Sandhurst for a year. He became a British cavalry officer and concurrently a **war** correspondent for British newspapers. After serving in several campaigns, he left the army in 1899 but resumed his career as a correspon-

dent, covering the Boer War between Great Britain and the Boer republics of South Africa. He was captured but escaped and resumed his military career in the war until 1900. Having stood unsuccessfully for Parliament in Oldham for the Conservative Party the previous year, he now won the seat for the party. In 1904, while still holding the seat, he switched to the Liberal Party.

During **World War I**, Churchill was appointed First Lord of the Admiralty (political head of the Royal Navy). In an attempt to break a stalemate, he organized the invasion of Turkey at Gallipoli in 1915, which went disastrously wrong with a huge loss of life. He resigned and went to fight on the Western Front. After the war, he returned to the Conservative Party and was appointed chancellor of the Exchequer in 1924 but lost his seat when the Conservatives were defeated at the 1929 elections. He published his account of the war in the five-volume *The World Crisis* from 1923 to 1931. From outside Parliament in the 1930s, he was a prominent opponent of the appeasement of **Adolf Hitler** and his Nazi Germany. When appeasement failed in 1939 and Great Britain entered into **World War II** with Germany, Churchill was appointed First Lord of the Admiralty again. The following year, he replaced Neville Chamberlain as prime minister, a post he retained throughout the war, during which he worked closely with President of the United States **Franklin D. Roosevelt**, especially after American entry into the war following the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in December 1941. Along with Roosevelt, Charles de Gaulle of the French government in exile, and the Soviet leader **Josef Stalin**, Churchill was at the Casablanca Conference of 1943 that agreed to pursue the war until the unconditional surrender of Germany, Japan, and their **allies**. In February 1945, Churchill, Roosevelt, and Stalin met at Yalta in the Black Sea to agree on plans for the occupation of Germany, the status of Poland, and other settlements in Eastern Europe after the war. This meeting was controversial. Soon afterward Stalin imposed a communist government on Poland, thus in effect breaking the agreement to hold free and fair elections in Poland. The results of the Yalta Conference became known as the **Yalta agreements**. When Roosevelt died and was replaced by President of the United States Harry S. Truman, Churchill developed good relations with him. Churchill, Truman, and Stalin agreed on postwar plans for Europe at the Potsdam Conference of August 1945.

In the British general elections at the end of the war, the Conservatives were removed from power, so Churchill was no longer prime minister. In a speech in Fulton, Missouri, in 1946 he was the first to use the metaphor "the iron curtain" to depict a barrier between the West on one side and communist Eastern Europe on the other side at the beginning of the **Cold War**. He published his six-volume account, *The Second World War*, from 1948 to 1953. At the elections of 1951, the Conservatives were returned to government and Churchill became prime minister again. He was knighted in 1953 and he resigned as prime minister in 1955 because of his deteriorating health.

See also AMERICAN PRIMACY; BRITISH HEGEMONY.

CLASSICAL REALISM. The term "classical realism" is employed to refer to theories that were described simply as "realist" before the emergence, led by the International Relations (IR) theorist **Kenneth Waltz**, of **neorealism** in the 1970s. Since then, "realism" has been used as a generic term covering classical realism, neorealism, and even a variant known as neoclassical realism. Although classical realism is now considered to include theorists from earlier centuries, such as **Thucydides**, **Niccolò Machiavelli**, and **Thomas Hobbes**, it emerged in its modern form in the 1930s in the work of **Reinhold Niebuhr** and **E. H. Carr**, who criticized **liberal internationalist** (sometimes called idealist) arguments that international relations could be transformed into more cooperative, peaceful arrangements on the basis of a harmony of interests. The exchange of realist and liberal internationalist ideas in the decades between **World War I** and **World War II** is known as the first of the great debates in the discipline of IR.

Classical realism assumed that **power** is ubiquitous in international relations. The pursuit of power and conflict between **states** to maintain or enhance such power were considered to be inescapable features of the relations between states. This was considered to stem from human nature, which was fundamentally flawed. The flaws in human nature were transmitted to the behavior of states. States themselves were deemed to be the key **sovereign** units of the international system, while nonstate units are seen, to varying degrees among realists, to be of lesser significance. The liberal idea that universal moral principles exist was treated with great skepticism, and states that sacrificed their own **national interests** on the basis of such principles in attempts to realize harmony were considered to be courting danger. Indeed, survival was considered the most fundamental aim of states, which should, cautiously, seek to maintain their own power to safeguard against the actions of other states, which may consider that their own **security** is endangered. Classical realists, not unlike the later neorealists, believed that the most likely means to peace between states was to engineer or preserve a **balance of power**. Attempts to build **international organizations** that would maintain **peace** on the basis of **collective security** were criticized on the basis of the flawed nature of humanity. Because of this flawed nature, cooperation—which was more likely in instances where the states had a sense of community between them—could never be guaranteed. The **League of Nations** was the most prominent example in this respect.

After World War II, classical realism became the most prominent **International Relations theory** until the 1970s. A theorist who was hugely influential during this period was **Hans J. Morgenthau**, whose 1948 book *Politics among Nations* became the standard work of realism. He argued that politics was governed by objective laws that have their roots in human nature. These

laws thus derived from the biological drives of human beings. The laws determined that people will be power seeking, and in turn so would states. The central feature of international relations, for Morgenthau, was the competition of states concerned with defending their interests defined in terms of power.

In the 1970s, neorealism challenged the classical realist concern with human nature. The neorealists argued that a better understanding of international relations could be gained by focusing exclusively on the structure of the **Westphalian system of states** and ignoring what went on inside states. In the 1990s, however, some theorists (including Fareed Zakaria and Randall Schweller) argued that neorealism was too parsimonious and that a concern with individuals and states needed to be brought back into realist theories, in addition to the structural factors. This version of realism, which became known as neoclassical realism, was thus concerned with variations at different levels of analysis. For example, leaders with their different views, perceptions, and motivations constituted one variable. Another variable was the strength of the states, which was considered to reflect more than simply capabilities, as the type of state was relevant. For example, some states were concerned with maintaining the status quo while others were revisionist. This bears affinities to Carr's classical realist view in the 1930s that some states, such as Germany under the leadership of **Adolf Hitler**, could be described as "have-nots" while the established states were "haves."

See also ALLIANCES.

CLAUSEWITZ, CARL PHILIPP GOTTLIEB VON (1780–1831). Carl von Clausewitz was born in Burg bei Magdeburg, Prussia (now Germany), to a middle-class family. At the age of 12, he followed his father into the Prussian army and fought against revolutionary France from 1793 to 1795. In 1801, he entered the Institute for Young Officers in Berlin. He fought in the battle of Jena in 1806 and was captured by Napoleon Bonaparte's victorious French army. Upon his release in 1807, he sought, unsuccessfully, to reform the Prussian army. In the Napoleonic Wars, France invaded Russia in 1812 and ordered the Prussian army to participate. Clausewitz refused, joined the Russian **war** effort, and helped persuade the Prussians to change sides and fight against Napoleon at the Battle of Waterloo in 1815. He became a general before being appointed head of the military academy in 1818, where he wrote *On War* (*Vom Kriege*), published posthumously in 1832.

Clausewitz argued that war should be a political instrument used in a controlled and rational way—a continuation of politics by other means. The armed forces must be under political control. The political is one of three aspects (sometimes known as his trinity) that should not interfere with one another. The political aspect is the responsibility of the government, which sets the aims and objectives of the war but does not get involved with the

means considered appropriate for the particular campaign, which is the responsibility of the military. The military is entitled to identify and ask the government for the resources needed, but not to be involved in setting the aims and objectives. The third factor, that of providing the animosity against the enemy and support for the government and military in conducting the campaign, is that of the people. The people should not, however, restrict the freedom of action of those two other players. With this emphasis on war for a political purpose, Clausewitz said war should not be used for crusades or vendettas. Although there are synergies between his work and expectations of warfare today, in other respects his arguments would not be accepted today, as states are expected to abide strictly by **international humanitarian law**. Following **World War I** and **World War II**, states in the late 20th and early 21st centuries are expected to use war for self-defense, to assist other **states** in need of defense, or in **responsibility to protect** by giving **humanitarian intervention** to help people who need protection against their own governments and armed forces. States are not expected to use war for political ends and should only resort to war if **diplomacy** fails or has no prospect of succeeding. *On War* is nevertheless one of the most respected and influential works of military strategy.

See also AFGHAN WARS; BUSH, GEORGE WALKER (1946–); CHURCHILL, WINSTON LEONARD (1874–1965); JUST WAR; PEACE; TERRORISM; TOTAL WAR; VIETNAM WAR; WALTZ, KENNETH NEAL (1924–2013); WALZER, MICHAEL LABAN (1935–); WAR CRIME; WAR ON TERROR.

CLIMATE CHANGE. *See* GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS.

COLD WAR. The period from 1945 to 1991 that was dominated by rivalry between two superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union, is known as the Cold War. During this period in international relations, many theorists have argued that there was a bipolar **balance of power** because **power** was divided between two poles. The immediate origins of the Cold War lie in **World War II**. Although the United States and Soviet Union had cooperated together to defeat Germany and Japan, their relationship as the **war** drew to a close was increasingly characterized by distrust and tension largely due to competing visions of the postwar order. The divisions between the two great powers split the continent of Europe and the **state** of Germany in half. They also had an impact on politics across the globe. The Cold War was characterized by a series of proxy wars in the **third world** as well as ideological difference and a costly **arms race**, both in conventional and **nuclear weapons**.

The Cold War can be understood as the United States' global struggle against communism. In 1947, in a policy statement that became known as the Truman doctrine, President of the United States Harry S. Truman called for the global containment of communism. Under his successor, Dwight D. Eisenhower, this was "upgraded" to the "roll back" of communism. U.S. **foreign policy** throughout the Cold War was defined by containment of communism as in its engagement in the **Vietnam War**. Other parts of the world saw less direct and obvious forms of intervention, such as the provision of **overseas aid** and covert activities. The Cold War coincided with the end of European **colonialism**, which in many cases left a power vacuum that both superpowers were determined to fill. Resistance to superpower influence led to the formation of the **Non-Aligned Movement**.

The history of the Cold War can be divided into three distinct periods. During the height of the Cold War from 1947 to 1963, there was virtually no communication between the two superpowers and tensions were very high, particularly during the **Cuban missile crisis**. From 1963, for a period of roughly 15 years, tensions relaxed gradually in a period called détente. With the election of President of the United States **Ronald Reagan**, there was a reigniting of hostilities in what is known as the Second Cold War. Reagan's presidency was characterized by massive military spending, leading to a significant budget deficit, high interest rates, and third-world **debt**. In 1985, **Mikhail Gorbachev** came to power in the Soviet Union and this marked the beginning of the end of the Cold War. Whether either Reagan or Gorbachev was personally responsible for the easing of tensions is a matter for debate. There is also dispute among scholars as to whether communism imploded, due to its internal characteristics and/or its inability to adapt to a changing international environment, or whether it was defeated by the United States. Although the causes of the end of the Cold War are therefore complex and contested, the relatively peaceful passing of a great power is virtually historically unique.

See also ALLIANCES; CLASSICAL REALISM; CHURCHILL, WINSTON LEONARD (1874–1965); COLLECTIVE SECURITY; DIPLOMACY; NEOREALISM; NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION (NATO); NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION; PEACE; SECURITY; STALIN, JOSEF (1878–1953); SUMMIT; THATCHER, MARGARET HILDA (1925–2013).

COLLECTIVE SECURITY. Collective security is an arrangement in which **states** take responsibility for each other's **security**. **Aggression** against one state is therefore considered aggression against all. Collective security is a multilateral approach to the maintenance of international **peace** and **security** and is an alternative to the **balance of power** as a mechanism of international order. The terrible impact of modern **total war** convinced many

at the end of **World War I** that the old system of European security, based on **alliances** and secret **diplomacy**, had failed and a new conceptual structure was needed to ensure the stability of the international system. The embodiment of the new postwar idea of collective security was the **League of Nations**. The League reflected the view of **liberal internationalism** that the problem of **war** could be solved through **international organizations** and cooperation. The main protagonist of collective security at this time was President of the United States **Woodrow Wilson**.

The system of collective security requires the participation and commitment of great powers and this was not achieved in the interwar period. The League of Nations was therefore not able to constrain the Japanese, the Italians, or the Germans from acts of aggression in the 1930s, and collective security was seen to have failed. A critique of collective security is at the heart of **classical realism**'s rejection of the idealist views of the interwar liberals. Realists argue that states will not commit valuable human or monetary resources to fight a war that is not in their strategic interests. Collective security, however, remains at the heart of **global governance** on peace and security. The principle underpins military **alliances** such as the **North Atlantic Treaty Organization**. The **United Nations** (UN) also works on a system of collective security, although the **Cold War** prevented the required joint action by the world's two superpowers in most cases of conflict. The UN therefore has only fought two **peace enforcement** actions under the principle of collective security. The first was in the Korean War, 1950–1957, in order to preserve the **sovereignty** of South Korea, and the second was in the **first Gulf War** to reinstate the government of Kuwait after the invasion by Iraq.

COLONIALISM. The process of a **state** acquiring formal control over territories and populations beyond its borders is known as colonialism. In the modern era, colonialism is associated with European **power**, which over the past five centuries brought nearly 85 percent of the world's landmass under its control. European **empires**, however, are just the most recent in a long history of colonialism and empire building, which have shaped the course of human history. Others include the Persian, Chinese, Roman, Mongol, and Ottoman Empires. Those with power in international relations tend to use it to extend their control, and in the modern era those states with the most power have been located in **the West**.

The process of Western colonization started with technological development in oceanic travel, which enabled exploration of the "New World" led by Portugal and Spain. The original motivation of those who set sail across the Atlantic in the 15th and 16th centuries was **trade** and riches. Nevertheless, the availability of land, and of an indigenous population who could be made to work it, encouraged settlement and the creation of large, semifeudal estates in South America. An abundance of both precious metals and "pagans"

for conversion further consolidated European interest in the colonization of South America. In 1494 under the Treaty of Tordesillas, the pope divided the newly discovered territories between Spain and Portugal. The Spanish colonies tended to be mixed, meaning that Europeans used indigenous labor, of which there was significant abuse. Brazil, in contrast, given to Portugal, became the blueprint for plantation colonies worked by **slaves** from Africa. This model was copied across the Caribbean and in parts of North America by the French, British, and Dutch, leading to a thriving slave trade and great wealth for European owners.

In North America, "pure" communities of European settlers developed, bringing European culture to a new continent and either eliminating or pushing to the margins indigenous populations. These were the "poor cousins" of the Spanish and Portuguese colonies, lacking as they did both precious metals and a sedentary labor force. However, their economic and social structure was much more similar to the European motherland, encouraging **migration** from across Europe. In time, Britain's American colonies became the richest and most densely populated of all European colonies and enjoyed a high degree of constitutional autonomy; they were also the first to win their independence in 1776. Similar colonies of European settlement were also established elsewhere in the world, notably Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, and Canada. All had significant European characteristics.

The European colonies in the Americas were a result of individual and group enterprise or the desire to establish settlements rather than state policy. Although early settlers had the approval of their monarchs, they did not act as their agents. The state stepped in to declare its ownership of the territories once the settlements had developed. It then sought to extract economic value by asserting a monopoly of colonial wealth and trade, though this was offset by significant expenditure, not least for defense, in the colonies. The British attempt to extract wealth by taxing their American colonies was the issue that led to resistance and ultimately independence. In Asia the extension of European power was similarly driven by private rather than state interests in the first instance. The Dutch East India Company established in 1602 was responsible for the acquisition of land and the transfer of labor to the Spice Islands, which became the Dutch East Indies when its holdings were taken over by the Dutch state in 1800. Dutch control was then extended across most of the Indonesian archipelago. Similarly, the "conquest" of India was achieved by the British East India Company trying to defend its trade. The British Crown only assumed control in 1858, at which point India became the "jewel" in Great Britain's colonial crown, giving it tremendous global power and enabling it to seize control of other Asian territories. British rule was far more autocratic and centralized in India than it had been in the American colonies.

The clear differences in the history of British colonialism in the Americas and in India demonstrate the many different forms that colonialism can take. The story of colonialism in Africa reinforces this point. During the early years of global exploration, conditions in Africa were less supportive of colonial settlement; until the 19th century, European possessions were restricted to a few coastal ports and trading enclaves. As late as 1880, only one tenth of Africa was in European control—yet by 1900 only one tenth of Africa was *not* in European control. The "Scramble for Africa" by the European powers marked the period of high imperialism. Directed by state authority and best understood in the context of European struggles for power, African colonialism was more the colonialism of occupation than settlement, although Algeria is at least one exception to this general rule. Colonies in Africa, as in the later period of colonialism more generally, were also governed more directly and autocratically. A new European power, Germany, had unified in 1871 and also entered the game, seizing control of large parts of West and South Africa. Even Belgium, a relatively small European country, had colonial possessions, controlling not only the Belgian Congo but also Rwanda; these colonies had a unique history, originating as they did as the personal property of King Leopold II rather than having been seized by the state of Belgium. Although not involved in the Scramble for Africa, another European great power, Russia, during the 19th century extended its power across Central Asia.

By the end of the 19th century, therefore, few parts of the world had escaped European colonialism. One state that had, Japan, nevertheless did not remain unaffected by European influence, and during the Meiji Restoration embarked on an extensive program of adopting European practice in most areas of social, military, and economic life. By 1895, Japan itself became a colonial power. The United States, by the end of 19th century, had also started to emulate its former colonial masters and had established colonial possessions in the Caribbean—for example, Puerto Rico in 1898 and Cuba in 1899. The emergence of both Japan and United States as colonial powers signaled the emergence of a new era in which there would be a **global power shift** away from Europe. However, at the turn of the century, the world was still dominated by an extensive system of European colonialism that only began to unravel fully after **World War II**.

During both the world wars, the full value of the allied colonies was demonstrated. Although the question of the economic worth of the European empires is disputed—with their extensive power, Europeans might have been able to extract wealth from the rest of the world without having to incur the costs of colonialism—the value as sources of power is harder to dispute. Colonial possessions brought significant strategic advantages. Germany was not just fighting its European neighbors; it had also taken on the largest empires the world had ever seen. The European war became a world war

because of colonialism. Both French and British colonial troops played an important role. In **World War I**, not only did about 650,000 colonial troops volunteer to fight on the European battlefields but colonial subjects were also recruited to work behind the lines. Colonies such as German East Africa became theaters of **war** in their own right, one in which French colonial troops were used as a force of occupation. In World War II, two and a half million Indians served in every theater of the war, and colonial subjects from across the empire played a vital role not only in the fighting but also in maintenance of transport links and other logistical activities.

Defeat in World War I of both Turkey and Germany saw both stripped of their colonial possessions, with German possessions in Africa and the territories of the Ottoman Empire, which stretched across the Middle East, becoming **League of Nations** mandates. These mandates were colonies in all but name, and gave Great Britain and France further control over Africa and the Middle East. Although at this stage the British and French empires were larger than ever before, the heyday of colonialism had already come to an end as its legitimacy and morality were increasingly questioned and as **nationalism** began to mount a challenge to colonial forms of government. The occupation of European colonies by the Japanese during World War II demonstrated that European states no longer had the power either to defend or to assert their continued control over far-flung colonies. The process of **decolonization** started immediately after the war, and its speed demonstrated that European states, on the whole, did not have the will to hold on to their colonies. Just 20 years later, in 1965, the era of European colonialism had largely come to an end. However, over the previous five centuries, it had shaped the world that we currently live in, extending the **Westphalian system of states** and bringing most parts of the world into a global economy. It had also exported European **culture**, ideas, and institutions across the globe to the extent that the period of European colonialism can be seen to have led to the Westernization of the world.

See also AMERICAN PRIMACY; BRITISH HEGEMONY; POSTCOLONIALISM; POSTCOLONIAL RELATIONS.

CONCERT OF EUROPE. At the end of the Napoleonic Wars in 1815, the Congress of Vienna was held under the presidency of Prince von Metternich, the Austrian chancellor, to determine the postwar order. The new order became known as the Concert of Europe. The main task of the Congress was to redraw the map of Europe in the wake of French emperor Napoleon Bonaparte's defeat and to restore the **balance of power** following France's bid for **hegemony**. Its aim was to set in place a managed balance of **power** in contrast to the more laissez-faire balance of the 18th century. The balance required a stable France, as a discontented France could have again undermined **security** in Europe. France was therefore not punished in defeat as

Germany later was at the **Paris Peace Conference** after **World War I** but was largely returned to her prerevolutionary boundaries, maintaining her status as a great power. **States** bordering France were strengthened to prevent any future bid for **empire**, and other adjustments to territory were made to reinforce the balance, each requiring the mutual agreement of the great powers.

The Congress of Vienna set in motion a new form of international relations. Earlier wars had ended in some sort of conference or congress but these had previously been specifically about negotiating an end to hostilities and dividing up the spoils of war. The Congress of Vienna's aim was not just to end one conflict but to prevent future conflict: it sought to construct an international system that could withstand the ambitions of any future Napoleon. The Congress of Vienna, therefore, set up the first attempt at a multilateral system of management of the international system that was known as the Concert of Europe, and this marked a historic moment in the history of **global governance**.

Representatives of the European states were to meet regularly even in times of **peace**, in an attempt to prevent **war**. The Concert was not a formal **international organization** and had no permanent **international institutions**, but it was a manifestation of the need for all states to cooperate and to act in concert. States, therefore, had to inform each other of their **foreign policy** intentions. All states that had participated in the fight against Emperor Napoleon Bonaparte of France participated in the Congress of Vienna, yet in reality it was something that was negotiated by the big four—Great Britain, Russia, Prussia, and Austria—with France joining later. The Concert was an agreement among the big powers as to how they should manage the European order and those powers granted themselves a special managerial role, causing some resentment among smaller powers. The arrangements were based on the assumption that the great powers could work in concert together, managing the differences between themselves, which is an idea that still underpins the **United Nations Security Council**. However, this proved difficult with an **alliance** of three conservative states—Austria, Prussia, and Russia—contrasting with the more **liberal** approach of Great Britain and France. The Concert of Europe therefore contained an ideological split among its five powers. Over time, it only met when a specific problem arose and this undermined its effectiveness; there was no congress at all between 1822 and 1856. Nevertheless, the system worked quite well until 1848, when Europe once again witnessed an upsurge in revolutionary upheavals and popular **nationalism**. Napoleon III of France once again tried to make France the greatest power in Europe, violating the agreed-upon principles of the Concert system. War returned to Europe with the outbreak of the Crimean, the Franco–Prussian, and the Austro–Prussian wars. The fighting of wars between the

European great powers undermined the credibility of the Concert system. The old order completely collapsed in 1914, resulting in **total war** among the European states.

See also BRITISH HEGEMONY; DIPLOMACY.

CONFLICT ANALYSIS. The central task of conflict analysis is the analysis of conflict and its management. After the end of **World War II**, the desire to search for **peace** remained strong in certain sectors of the academic discipline of International Relations, despite the failure of prewar attempts of **liberal internationalism** to find solutions to the problem of **war**. Attention turned to trying to gain a better understanding of the nature of war and conflict by studying war scientifically so as to avoid the criticisms leveled by **classical realists** at what they termed *idealism*. Conflict analysis was therefore set up to develop a social science similar to economics or psychology, one grounded in the assumption that it is possible to make empirical generalizations. It asked, "What is the evidence for our beliefs about such things as whether there is a recurring pattern of war?" "Do **arms races** lead to war?" and "Do **balances of power** contribute to order?" These things could not just be assumed but needed to be tested. The most well known of the scientific projects is the Correlates of War project, founded by **J. David Singer**, which still collects a mass of data on war and **armed conflict** around the world. Although it started by looking at interstate war, it later began to collect data on internal conflicts as well. Its data is available to the world free of charge. The belief is that proper academic scrutiny and understanding of war from a scientific perspective will lead to clear conclusions on how war can be avoided.

See also BEHAVIORALISM; FIRST ACADEMIC CHAIR OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS.

CONGRESS OF VIENNA. *See* CONCERT OF EUROPE.

CONSTRUCTIVISM. *See* SOCIAL CONSTRUCTIVISM.

COSMOPOLITANISM. As one of the most prominent positions in the **normative theory** category of **International Relations theory**, cosmopolitanism is based on the view that morality is universal, applying to all human beings. Indeed, cosmopolitans argue that humanity should be treated as a single moral community. **Andrew Linklater**, who is often associated with **critical theory**, is prominent among theorists who present arguments for extending the moral community in such a way. The example of Linklater indicates that cosmopolitanism overlaps with some other strands of International Relations theory. Indeed, cosmopolitans such as Charles Beitz and

Thomas Pogge base their theories on liberal individualism. Hugely influential in this respect was the notion of the categorical imperative introduced in the 18th century by **Immanuel Kant**. The categorical imperative insists that human beings should be treated as ends in themselves, not as merely means to an end, and that for a rational being to act morally she or he should act according to universal laws. Each human being thus has equal moral standing.

The cosmopolitan standpoint leads to the argument that, in terms of morality, national borders are irrelevant, and **nationalism** should give way to a moral concern for humanity. Cosmopolitanism is also thus opposed to the various forms of **realism**, each of which in its own different way holds that **states** not only tend to put national self-interest first but also need to do so in the interest of survival in the international system characterized by **anarchy**. Nationalism and realism involve communitarian arguments that insist that to some extent morality needs to put members of one's own group first. A distinction is sometimes drawn between cosmopolitanism and communitarianism. Nevertheless, in reality most people hold views somewhere between extreme cosmopolitanism and extreme communitarianism. The pluralism of theorists such as **John Rawls**, for example, stresses that diversity among states that have different ethics should not be suppressed. Instead, Rawls argued in *The Law of Peoples* that a framework should be built in which states tolerate the **sovereignty** of one another, respect treaties and agreements, and provide assistance to peoples living in outlaw states or those that are so burdened that justice and a decent society are denied to them. Cosmopolitanism and communitarianism can thus be seen to overlap one another in Rawls's position.

Among cosmopolitan positions, a distinction is sometimes drawn between thin and thick cosmopolitanism. Thin cosmopolitanism is concerned primarily with negative duties of nonintervention and refraining from activities that harm people outside one's own state. Thick cosmopolitanism is more concerned than the thin variant to stress duties to act, such as to assist people in other countries. All forms of cosmopolitanism have thin and thick aspects. They differ according to the extent of thick commitments, and there are many positions between strictly thick and thin. Hence there are disputes over the **responsibility to protect** other peoples, which in turn means that there is disagreement over when **humanitarian intervention** should be undertaken.

See also CLASSICAL REALISM; GLOBALIZATION; HUMAN RIGHTS; NEOREALISM.

COX, ROBERT W. (1926–). Born in Montreal, Canada, Robert Cox studied at McGill University, Montreal, graduating in 1946. He worked for the **International Labour Organization** before beginning his academic career, focusing on **international political economy**, in the early 1970s at Columbia

University, New York. He became an important writer in **critical theory** with his reflexive approach, which linked theories to their context and subject. In 1977, Cox moved to York University in Toronto, where he was appointed professor until his retirement in 1992, after which he served as emeritus professor.

In his seminal article, "Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory" (1981), Cox stressed that theory is always for someone and for a social purpose. On this basis he coined the distinction between problem-solving theory and critical theory, arguing that the former was conservative, taking the basic existing **power** relationships as given, and thus maintaining **hegemony**. Critical theory, he argued, is concerned with how the world may be changing. Critical theory questions the very structural conditions that are tacit assumptions for problem-solving theory. He considered **neorealism** to be a problem-solving theory.

In his book *Production, Power, and World Order: Social Forces in the Making of History* (1987), Cox discussed the relationship between material forces of production, ideas, and institutions in three periods. These were the **liberal international** economy of 1789–1873, the era of rival **imperialisms** of 1873 and 1945, and the neoliberal world order that began in 1945. He applied the **Marxist** Antonio Gramsci's theory of hegemony to international relations, focusing particularly on the United States. Domestic and transnational class forces, states, and **international institutions** had together formed a global hegemonic order. He also discussed the possibility of the development of counterhegemonic international forces and argued that the existing hegemonic forces had been able to thwart such development by co-opting and dividing opponents of the existing world order.

See also AMERICAN PRIMACY; INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY; MARX, KARL HEINRICH (1818–1883); NORMATIVE THEORY.

CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY. The category of crimes against humanity was set up by the **Nuremberg** and Tokyo tribunals at the end of **World War II**. This meant that the tribunals could hold individuals accountable not only for specific violations of **international humanitarian law** but also for terrible crimes against humanity itself, such as murder, **torture**, and enforced disappearances. These crimes allow for no immunity, even for heads of **state**, and are subject to **universal jurisdiction**. After the **wars of the former Yugoslavia**, the **United Nations** set up the first ad hoc **war crimes tribunal** with the jurisdiction to try those accused of crimes against humanity among other offences. This was one of the indictments faced by former president of Serbia Slobodan Milošević at the tribunal in The Hague, although he died in 2006 before his trial was completed. In May 2016, however, another former president, Hissène Habré, former president of Chad, was found guilty of

crimes against humanity by a special court in Senegal under an **African Union** mandate, setting an important precedent in **international law**. The case could not be brought to the **International Criminal Court** because the crimes of which Habré was accused predated its establishment. The conviction of a former African head of state for crimes against humanity by another African state has historic significance.

See also GENEVA CONVENTIONS; GENOCIDE; UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION.

CRITICAL THEORY. In the late 20th century, critical theory came to present an influential challenge to the dominant neorealist **International Relations (IR) theory** and to the neoliberal institutionalist alternative. **Neorealism** and **neoliberal institutionalism** were positivist in that they sought to apply methods from natural science to arrive at objective understandings of the international system. As primarily descriptive, positivist theories, neither neorealism nor neoliberal institutionalism could account for major changes in the international **Westphalian system of states**, in particular the collapse of the Soviet Union and East European communism. Critical theory sought to account for the emergence of the existing international system and to consider how the system could be changed in order to achieve the goal of emancipation. Having this key goal makes critical theory distinctly normative. Although some contributions to **normative theory** as a distinctive strand, along with **poststructuralism**, **feminism**, and **postcolonialism**, are also sometimes placed in a broader critical theory category, the narrower use of the term is usually reserved for those that are rooted in **Marxism**. It is the narrower use that is the focus of this entry.

Challenging the understanding of **states** as objective entities, critical theory saw them as subjective agents, the interests of which were shaped in interaction with other states and other international actors and by social circumstances that changed over time. Critical theory should be self-reflective, thus considering its own contribution to the world for which it seeks to provide an understanding. The Marxist understanding of dialectical progression in history was clearly an influence. Critical theory uses the term "immanent critique" to refer to the need to criticize existing society in its own terms to show that other theories legitimize particular structures of dominance. Contradictions are sought and revealed in order to show how a different society is immanent within the existing social order. Critical theory, however, goes beyond the traditional Marxist concern with the development of productive forces and the emancipation of the working classes. Influenced by the work of **Immanuel Kant** as well as that of **Karl Marx**, critical theory is concerned with ethical universals and communicative action as a means to emancipate all human beings.

Two strands of critical theory in IR emerged. One strand was influenced by the political thought of Antonio Gramsci and sought to apply his theory of **hegemony** to IR and particularly in the field of **international political economy**. **Robert W. Cox** is the leading theorist of this strand. He argued that the dominant states, groups, and individuals of international capitalism benefited from hegemony but that alternatives to the system were immanent. Hence, he sought to identify counter hegemonic movements that challenged the dominant structures and principles. The other strand is influenced by the work of Jürgen Habermas, in particular his view of the possibilities of communicative action as the means to bring about radical change, which is immanent within the existing structures. The leading theorist of this strand is **Andrew Linklater**, who argued that political communities within states and at the global level needed to be transformed and extended, while sensitivity was needed to cultural differences among peoples. He thus presented a particular sort of **cosmopolitanism** as a key aspect of his critical theory.

See also STRATEGIC STUDIES.

CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS. The Cuban missile crisis was an event in 1962 that brought the United States and Soviet Union to the brink of nuclear **war**. It was thus a key moment in U.S. **foreign policy** during the **Cold War**. In 1961, President of the United States John F. Kennedy picked Robert McNamara as secretary of defense. In a strategy known as "flexible response," they expanded the United States' conventional war capability, guerrilla warfare forces, and **nuclear weapons**. At the same time, Kennedy expressed a desire for **arms control** and limitations. In response, the Soviet Union increased its nuclear forces. The Soviet leaders did not trust Kennedy, whom they considered to be giving mixed messages. In collaboration with the leader of the Soviet Union, Nikita Khrushchev, the East German communist leader Walter Ulbricht closed West Berlin's access to the **West** that year. Khrushchev rejected Kennedy's request to preserve the existing **balance of power**. This, Khrushchev believed, would have favored the United States. In 1961, the Kennedy administration launched the unsuccessful invasion of Cuba at the Bay of Pigs by providing Cuban exiles with U.S. support, training, and supplies. Khrushchev broke a three-year nuclear test moratorium by testing a massive 58-megaton device. Kennedy, under pressure from critics within the United States, ordered a new series of nuclear weapons tests.

Khrushchev knew the Soviet Union could not match the United States on intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). In August 1962, the Soviet Union began secretly to build missile sites in Cuba, which was a communist ally of the Soviet Union. On 14 October 1962, American U-2 spy planes photographed a missile launch pad under construction in Cuba. Contrary to private and public assurances, the Soviet Union was secretly placing nuclear missiles in Cuba. If launched, the missiles would destroy many American cities.

Kennedy appointed an Executive Committee (ExComm) for advice, led by Robert F. Kennedy, who was U.S. attorney-general. The Kennedys were under pressure from some advisors to attack Cuba but instead imposed a quarantine on military equipment being shipped to Cuba (the word "quarantine" was chosen because **international law** deemed a "blockade" an act of war), placed military forces on full alert, and asked Khrushchev to remove the weapons from Cuba, warning that the launching of a missile would be regarded as an attack by the Soviet Union. On 22 October 1962, President Kennedy announced the situation to U.S. citizens on television.

Khrushchev at first refused to cooperate and accused Kennedy of pushing mankind toward nuclear war. Challenged by the U.S. Navy, some Soviet ships carrying missiles turned back from their journey, but work continued on the sites in Cuba, which were nearing completion. On 26 October 1962, Khrushchev sent a message that he would withdraw the missiles from Cuba if Kennedy withdrew the blockade and promised not to invade Cuba. The following day another message arrived as ExComm was considering the previous one. Khrushchev was now demanding the deal must also involve removing missiles of the **North Atlantic Treaty Organization** from Turkey. The U.S. military Joint Chiefs recommended an air strike on Cuba the next morning. Also, an American U-2 was shot down over Cuba by a Soviet surface-to-air missile. A majority in ExComm agreed that the air strike should go ahead. Kennedy did not accept this and said he was waiting one more day. Robert Kennedy suggested that the president answer Khrushchev's first letter but ignore the second. After debate on this suggestion President Kennedy's public response to Khrushchev only mentioned that if the missiles were to be removed from Cuba work could start on a more general agreement as proposed in the second letter. Also, Robert Kennedy met the Soviet ambassador to the United States and insisted that the missiles be removed from Cuba but also gave an oral pledge to remove the missiles from Turkey within a short time on condition that this must not be made public. The Soviet ambassador conveyed the offer to Moscow and on 28 October Khrushchev announced that the missiles would be removed from Cuba in order to save the world. The crisis was over.

After the crisis, President Kennedy adopted a more moderate tone in dealing with the Soviet Union. A Partial Test Ban Treaty was signed in 1963, prohibiting nuclear tests except for underground ones. Nevertheless, the Soviet Union strengthened its own nuclear forces. McNamara responded by increasing the pace of U.S. production. The **arms race** intensified.

See also AGGRESSION; ALLIANCES; ALLISON, GRAHAM TILLET (1940–); AMERICAN PRIMACY; NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION; WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION.

CULTURE. Culture is about identity, about those aspects of social life that define people and link them to others within some sort of shared community. Culture exists wherever human beings form distinct communities. They produce beliefs, ideas, and practices and are often reinforced by such things as common values, similar ways of life, shared language, a sense of shared history and place, and sometimes a shared religion as well. Cultures exist at various levels, from village culture to that of a civilization, which is the broadest group with which people can identify. Western civilization, embodied in the term "**the West**," for example, encompasses a religious, historic, social, and even aesthetic tradition. No culture or civilization, however, exists in isolation. Culture is constantly changing and evolving as a result of external influences. Western culture has been dominant in the modern era as a consequence of both **empire** and **economic globalization**.

Even though globalization can be seen as enriching cultures, giving people access to ideas and cultural experiences that they might otherwise lack, the diversity of global culture is seen by some to also be under threat from it. There is a perception that globalization is leading to the homogenization of the globe with an inescapable onslaught of consumer icons, shopping malls, and branded restaurants increasingly making many major urban centers across the globe look alike. There are some obvious symbols of global homogenization: Coca-Cola is said to be the most recognized brand in the world, and the spread of other large American corporate brands such as McDonald's and Starbucks continues. Their very existence can influence and change local traditions and behavior and introduce Western problems such as heart disease and obesity to previously unaffected parts of the world.

This homogenization is also seen to reflect inequalities in the world, so can also be viewed as Westernization or Americanization of other cultures. Cultures, however, have always been susceptible to outside **power**, and the Westernization of the world predates the latest intense period of globalization. European empires imposed culture through **force**. Although in the contemporary world Western culture is not imposed through empire and is attractive and aspirational to many, its spread nevertheless reflects the power of global corporations and their marketing strategies to create the desire for their products. Culture goes deeper, however, than what people buy, eat, and wear; it is about the values people hold and their priorities. The global dissemination of certain political beliefs, values, and principles—notably the primacy of the individual, **human rights**, and **democracy**—can also be seen as a challenge to a particular culture. **Liberal** values stress individual freedom and choice, but these values are not universally held and are not seen as compatible with the values of different societies, especially in Asia and Africa, in which societies have tended traditionally to give priority not to the individual but to the community. Lee Kwan Yew of Singapore made the argument in relation to human rights that what is appropriate to Western

culture is not appropriate to the more communitarian Asian way of life. **Samuel Huntington**, in *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* of 1996, argued that since the end of the **Cold War** culture was increasingly having an impact on patterns of international conflict, with many cultures hostile to Western culture.

Many cultures are acutely conscious of the dangers of cultural globalization, particularly those who hold quite different values and who seek to preserve traditional ways of life. Muslim society, in particular, can be very conscious of the cultural elements of globalization, seeing it as a threat to moral and ethical lives. Some Islamic **states**, notably Iran, Sudan, and Afghanistan under the Taliban, have strongly resisted all forms of globalization, as does the nonstate actor **Islamic State**. Indeed, it can be argued that it is the insecurity of the leaders of such traditional cultures, in the face of the attraction of Western value of freedom, which has led to the rise in fundamentalism since the 1970s. States such as China have also resisted penetration by Western cultural values, putting up barriers to the free flow of Western concepts.

See also COLONIALISM; DECOLONIZATION; NEOCOLONIALISM; POSTCOLONIALISM.

D

DEBT. A debt is a capital resource that is owed to another party. A government goes into debt when it spends more money than it receives. **States** commonly amass huge debts; the size of the U.S. debt in January 2016 was $19.1 trillion. The size of a debt is not necessarily a problem; debt becomes a serious issue for a state when it cannot afford to service its debt repayment. The difficulty is a liquidity problem if the shortfall is temporary; it is a solvency problem when the debt is unsustainable. In a globalized economy, a state's debt can be owed to actors across the world, whether an **international organization** such as the **International Monetary Fund** (IMF), an international bank, or another state. The holding of significant debt of one state by another can restrain the autonomy of the debtor country. This is evident in the relationship between China and the United States, with China being the largest state holder of U.S. debt. Debt can therefore affect **foreign policy** as well as threaten the stability of the international financial system. In the 1980s, for example, the insolvency problems that engulfed many developing countries caused concern in the global North because they were seen to threaten the international financial system. In the global South, the crisis was seen as one of **economic development**. It began in 1982 when Mexico defaulted on its debt and spread rapidly.

During the 1970s, the high price of oil meant a lot of money was deposited in commercial banks. Large sums of this money were then lent to the developing world at a very low interest rate and it was not always invested productively. Economic contraction in the North as a consequence of the **oil crisis** led to a decline in demand for commodities from the South and economies stagnated. When the administration of President of the United States **Ronald Reagan** raised interest rates, the impact on many developing states was severe. By the end of 1982, 25 states had sought a restructuring of their loans.

The IMF, the United States, and other leading economies took the lead in preventing the collapse of the international banking system. Starting with "firefighting" measures, they provided emergency loans to prevent a system collapse. The IMF imposed tough economic conditions on the borrower states as the price for debt rescheduling, and hundreds of thousands of people

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across the developing world became impoverished as a consequence. The sorts of services cut in response to the demands for structural adjustment—usually education, health, and social services—have meant that the restructuring has impacted most heavily on women who are, more often than not, responsible for the household and care of children. **Feminist** analysis has therefore pointed out that the impact of neoliberal debt alleviation strategies is an example of how **international institutions** both reflect and perpetuate gender inequalities.

The impact of debt on some of the poorest people in the world has ensured that it has become the focus of significant campaigning activity in global civil society. Jubilee 2000, for example, was a global antidebt campaign and one of the most successful mass movements of the contemporary era. By forcing the issue of debt onto the international agenda, the Jubilee 2000 campaign claims credit for persuading key global economic actors of the need for debt relief and for the implementation of policies such as the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Initiative. Its success, however, has not led to the achievement of its goal: the eradication of all nonpayable debt. Debt continues to be a problem for developing countries and increasingly for more developed states as well. Debt is usually one factor in a financial crisis such as the **Asian financial crisis** of 1997 and the global **financial crisis of 2008**. In the latter, it was the debt of the developed world, particularly that of the United States, and the imbalance of foreign exchange reserves between the United States and emerging economies such as China and South Korea, that contributed to the crisis. For states such as Greece, struggling to deal with a huge debt and public deficit, debt has led to tough public spending cuts, austerity, pain, and social disquiet.

See also AMERICAN PRIMACY; ECONOMIC GLOBALIZATION; POVERTY.

DECOLONIZATION. The process whereby imperial powers withdrew their control of colonial territories, granting them independence, is known as decolonization. The Americas, the first lands to have been settled by the Europeans, were also the first to become independent. The European settler communities in the American colonies won their independence from Great Britain in 1776, with the independence of Mexico in 1821 initiating the disintegration of Spanish rule in South America. Brazil gained its independence from Portugal in 1822, and in 1867 Canada became a British dominion, meaning that it became autonomous and gained equal status to Great Britain while remaining a part of the British **Empire**. The **war** between the United States and Spain in 1898, in which the United States occupied Cuba and Puerto Rico, ended Spanish **colonialism** in the Americas. The French colony of Guiana, on the North Atlantic coast of South America, however, rather than becoming independent, became an overseas department of

France. As such, it is a member of the **European Union** and has the official currency of the Euro. Decolonization in the Americas is therefore not complete.

The British colony of Australia gained dominion status in 1901, followed by New Zealand in 1907 and the Union of South Africa in 1910. The contributions of the dominions to **World War I** granted them significant influence at the **Paris Peace Conference**, and they gained separate representation at the **League of Nations**. Nevertheless, as victors in World War I, the British and French **Empires** were more extensive after the war than ever before as they gained control of German territories and those previously under the Ottoman Empire. However, by the early 20th century, it was already clear that the days of the European empires were numbered. The norm of self-determination, proclaimed so strongly by President of the United States **Woodrow Wilson**, and the growing recognition of the injustice of **imperialism**, was beginning to undermine the perceived legitimacy of empire. With the creation of the Irish Free State in 1922, a precedent was set for self-rule. In the Middle East, Arab **nationalism** against the Ottoman Empire had begun to gain strength in the 19th century and in 1916 Arabs rose up in the Arab Revolt. World War I saw the breakup of the empire, but Ottoman rule over the Arabs was replaced by British and French control in the form of League of Nations mandates. Promises of independence made by the British to secure Arab help to defeat the Turks in the war were broken in a secret agreement with the French in 1916 known as the Sykes–Picot Agreement. Although Iraq achieved independence in 1930, most Arab **states** had to wait until the 1950s.

After **World War II**, decolonization began to happen very quickly. The growth of nationalist sentiment within the colonies fueled a resistance to empire that the European states had neither the will nor the strength to suppress. Furthermore, in the colonies east of India, invading Japanese forces had already severed direct colonial rule. When the Japanese surrendered in 1945, Indonesian nationalists declared independence from the Netherlands, which the Dutch had to recognize by 1949. The United States granted independence to the Philippines on 4 July 1946, and Burma gained independence from Great Britain in 1948. In 1949, France ceded **sovereignty** to Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam, although they remained part of the French Union until 1954. Malaysia became independent in 1957. Until 1965 Singapore was one of Malaysia's 14 states but was expelled and became its own independent state on 9 August 1965.

France gave up its mandates in Syria and Lebanon in 1946. India, the jewel in Britain's colonial crown, became independent in 1947. Independence was preceded by horrific interreligious violence, leading to the creation of two states, India and Pakistan. Pakistan was further divided in 1971 when the state of Bangladesh was created. Violence also accompanied Alge-

ria's attempt to gain independence from France, with a war of independence lasting from 1954 to 1962. In British West Africa, **Kwame Nkrumah** led a nationalist party that won independence in 1957 and formed Ghana. Nkrumah's appointment to prime minister inspired nationalist movements throughout Africa and the process of decolonization accelerated. In 1960, most of the French empire became independent, creating a host of new states that included Ivory Coast, Senegal, Central African Republic, Chad, and Cameroon. Great Britain liberated Nigeria, and the Belgian Congo became independent. Decolonization continued through the 1960s and 1970s and was completed by 1980 when the former British Crown colony of Southern Rhodesia became Zimbabwe.

The Portuguese held on longest to their colonial possessions. Portugal fought a war against armed independence movements in Angola, Mozambique, and Portuguese Guinea during the 1960s and early 1970s until the coup against the fascist dictatorship of António de Oliveira Salazar in April 1974 led to Portugal granting independence to what had been seen as its "overseas provinces." Following independence, both Angola and Mozambique descended into civil wars that were proxy wars, with both sides being supported by one of the superpower protagonists in the **Cold War**. The rapid departure of the Portuguese from East Timor in 1975 led to an invasion by Indonesia, and East Timor therefore only achieved full independence in 2002 after an Australian-led **humanitarian intervention**.

Every former colony has its own decolonization story and, although not all colonies achieved independence as quickly as others, overall the process was remarkably rapid. As states became independent, they joined the **United Nations** (UN) and so the speed and extent of decolonization can be illustrated by the growth in membership of the UN. At the end of 1946, the UN had 55 members; by 1956, it had 80; a decade later, it had 122; and 10 years on, it had 147. By 1986, the UN had 159 members and in the final period of decolonization as the Soviet empire broke up, that increased to 185. The current membership (2016) is 193. **American primacy** throughout the second half of the 20th century was a significant factor because the United States refused to support even its closest allies' attempts to retain influence in their former colonies as demonstrated during the Suez crisis. There are still dependent territories in the world but these are mainly small islands. U.S. dependencies, for example, include Guam, the Virgin Islands, and American Samoa. One of the largest dependent territories is Puerto Rico, controlled quite closely by the United States. Great Britain, which had had the largest empire, retains the greatest number of dependencies, including Bermuda and the Falkland Islands. Most ex-colonial powers also still maintain special **postcolonial relations** with their former possessions.

Decolonization was the process by which the **Westphalian system of states** was globalized. It was not an easy process. Forms of statehood, politics, law, and economics that had evolved in **the West** and been imposed by colonial control were not always suitable or easily adapted to different contexts. The original timetable of a slow, measured approach to decolonization, giving time for a period of apprenticeship for independent government was also abandoned in the rush for sovereignty; most colonies were not adequately prepared for freedom. The immediate postcolonial period was therefore one of instability, and many African states in particular fell to the rule of dictators. Furthermore, independent statehood led to neither full political autonomy nor economic prosperity in many cases, and did not necessarily lead to **peace**. Postcolonial instability was exacerbated by vying for influence in the newly emerging states by the two superpowers during the Cold War. Efforts to counter that influence and to create a neutral space for peaceful **development** led to the formation of the **Non-Aligned Movement**. Other challenges arose from the fact that the principle of national self-determination was not one that had guided the drawing of colonial boundaries. Decolonization created states whose borders were not decided on the basis of the distribution of ethnic groups or nations but rather along lines of convenient administrative control or as a result of negotiation by European powers. The boundaries of new states were therefore often arbitrary, particularly in Africa, and did not relate to preexisting or self-identifying social groupings. Postindependence history therefore saw a spate of secessionist movements. Biafra in Nigeria and Katanga in the Democratic Republic of Congo each succeeded in breaking away as secessionist states but only for a few years.

Few postindependence nationalist movements have succeeded in achieving statehood since decolonization. Conflicts such as those fought by the Tamils in Sri Lanka or by West Papuans in Irian Jaya, Indonesia, have not ended in self-determination. Once the borders of the world's states were fixed, the maintenance of the status quo became a key objective of those states; to support independence movements was to open a Pandora's box of nationalist claims. Ongoing conflicts in states such as Nigeria raise the question of how long some postcolonial states can hold together. Conflicts and divisions created during decolonization, therefore, continue to be a source of conflict and insecurity in international relations. Some argue that the colonial legacy is also still evident in the high levels of **poverty** and underdevelopment in many former colonies, though whether this is the result of colonialism per se rather than a situation of inequality that both predates and postdates colonialism is an issue for debate.

See also BRITISH HEGEMONY; CULTURE; POSTCOLONIALISM.

DEMOCRACY. A **state** is democratic to the extent that its citizens have the opportunity to engage in participation that can influence political decisions. The term "democracy" originated in ancient Athens, where *demos* (people) and *kratia* (rule) comprised *demokratia*. Athens was relatively small by modern and contemporary standards and democracy in the city was direct, with citizens participating in decision making. The citizenry was, however, restricted to free, male Athenians, thus excluding women and **slaves**. Democratic states today tend to be representative democracies, where citizens exercise political power by choosing who makes policy on their behalf. All should be allowed to vote, unless there is some relevant reason to exclude. The principle positions of **power** are filled through regular, free, and fair elections between competing parties. This form of democracy often developed gradually in the 20th century as suffrage was extended.

Democratization is the process where states develop democratic procedures or have them imposed on or required of them. This is sometimes achieved by means of international action by other states and **international organizations**. For example, democracy is a condition for a state to become a member of the **European Union**.

In 1991, **Samuel P. Huntington** described the central procedure of democracy as the election of leaders by the people they govern. Using this criterion he identified several waves of democratization: a first wave in 1828–1926; a reverse wave in 1922–1942; a second wave in 1943–1962; another reverse wave in 1958–1975; and a third wave in 1974–1991. According to this criterion, the number of democracies in the world almost tripled in the final quarter of the 20th century in a wave of democratization. There are limits to Huntington's approach. His was a narrow definition that ignored the extent of democratization, levels of social and economic inequality that mean that some people are more able than others to influence government, and the necessity for good education to enhance democracy.

Sometimes there is international pressure, promotion, encouragement, and help for nondemocratic countries to become new democracies. For example, Iraq is a new democracy. In 2004, **sovereignty** was transferred to an interim government and Iraqi citizens voted in multiparty elections. Afghanistan is also a new democracy. But these were cases of democracy by imposition in the 21st century, as part of the national **security** strategy of President of the United States **George W. Bush**. Democracy by imposition tends to lead to problems. New democracies emerge after transfers of power but often face political problems, including the authoritarian legacy, economic problems such as **poverty**, a large agricultural sector, and/or economic dislocation in transition from the old order. A stable democratic state needs legitimacy, gained by checking abuse of power.

A new democracy sometimes becomes only a semi-democracy or partial democracy. Democratic and authoritarian elements are blended. Rulers are elected but may have little respect for rights. Leaders impose solutions to problems and set the framework for political competition. An example of semi-democracy is Russia since the end of the **Cold War** and fall of communism in 1991. President **Vladimir Putin** was elected in 2000, 2004, and—after a period as prime minister because of constitutional limitations—2012. He has been authoritarian in office. In the early 21st century, where democratization has taken place, it has often stalled, been rolled back, or been of poor quality, such as semi-democracy. This has been described as democratic recession.

Starting in December 2010, a series of uprisings against authoritarian rule and for democratic government took place in North Africa and the Middle East. This became known as the **Arab uprising**. In some cases, there was regime change; in other cases, the struggle continued for many years, including the civil war in Syria.

See also AFGHAN WARS; IRAQ WAR (2003–2010); WAR ON TERROR.

DEMOCRATIC PEACE HYPOTHESIS. *See* LIBERAL PEACE.

DEMOCRATIZATION. *See* DEMOCRACY.

DENG XIAOPING (1904–1997). Born to a landlord family in rural Guang'an, Sichuan province, China, Deng Xiaoping received Confucian training from an educated relative before going to school at the nearby town of Xiexing the following year. He went on to primary school in Guang'an town at the age of 11 and, three years later in 1919, to the middle school in the town. That year, he was active in the May 4th movement that protested against both the **imperialist** decision of the Western powers at the Treaty of Versailles after **World War I** to transfer some Chinese territory to Japan and the weakness of the Chinese government that let it happen. Later, in 1919, he went to school in Chongqing city to pass the examination for a scholarship to study in France. He arrived there in 1920.

While in France, in 1924, Deng joined the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and traveled to Moscow before returning to China in 1926. He was with **Mao Zedong** on the CCP's Long March of 1934–1935 to establish a base in inland China. In 1937, he became a political commissar of a communist division, in which he served during the **war** with Japan that decade and in **World War II**. He became chief commissioner of the CCP's second field army in the civil war in the late 1940s. Having become a secretary in the central committee of the CCP in 1945, after victory in 1949 he became CCP

leader of southwestern China. In 1952, he became a vice-premier of China, in 1954 general secretary of the CCP, and in 1955 a member of the ruling politburo. He was influential in **foreign policy**-making during the 1950s. In the 1960s, he disagreed on a number of issues with Mao's leadership, and hence was removed from his party and governmental posts from 1967 to 1969. He held the respect of the premier **Zhou Enlai**, who influenced the decision to reinstate him to positions including that of deputy premier in 1975. During the **power** struggle that began as Mao was dying and continued in the years after his death, Deng managed to install his supporters as premier and general secretary of the CCP. By 1980–1981, without holding these high offices, he became de facto leader of China. He guarded this position by retaining his chairmanship of the central military commission of the CCP, thus maintaining control of the armed forces.

Deng was determined to modernize China, which required fundamental reform of domestic and international policies. This included the strengthening of **trade** and **cultural** ties with Western counties and **international organizations**, and opening Chinese enterprises to encourage foreign investment. In 1989, he used the army to crush large student demonstrations in Tiananmen Square, with thousands killed and many others jailed or suppressed. Zhou Ziyang, whom Deng had brought in to replace the relatively **liberal** Hu Yaobang, was himself replaced as CCP leader by the hard - line Jiang Zemin. Deng gave up his chairmanship of the military commission later that year but retained authority even without formal leadership posts. By the time of his death, he had transformed China with free-market mechanisms that brought about **economic development** and rapid economic growth but entrenched the authoritarian rule of the CCP and did not solve widespread **poverty**.

See also COLD WAR; GLOBAL POWER SHIFTS; MARXISM.

DEPENDENCY. *See* ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT; FRANK, ANDRÉ GUNDER (1929–2005); GLOBAL POWER SHIFTS; PREBISCH, RAÚL FEDERICO (1901–1986); WALLERSTEIN, IMMANUEL (1930–).

DETERRENCE. A threat-based strategy, deterrence aims to convince another party that the cost of carrying out a particular action would outweigh any potential gain. Deterrence is a useful tool of statecraft and has been an important concept in military doctrine for millennia. The key idea is that **states** maintain a certain level of military **power** in order to discourage other states from launching an attack; it is an inhibitor of **aggression**. In his *History of the Peloponnesian War* (431 BCE), **Thucydides** noted how both sides in that conflict tried to use the system of **alliances** to deter their enemy. Alliance formation and the classic **balance of power**, therefore, are both

based on deterrence. Deterrence theory rests on the assumption that decision makers are rational and that they seek to maximize utility in their decisions to go to **war**. Deterrence also requires that the threat is communicated clearly and effectively, and that there is adequate capability to carry out a credible threat.

With the development of **nuclear weapons**, effective deterrence became a key strategy of the nuclear powers, and the **Cold War** saw a proliferation of deterrence theory. Soviet numerical advantage in conventional weapons at the end of **World War II** ensured that nuclear weapons were at the heart of U.S. strategy to deter Soviet aggression in Western Europe. As the Soviet Union developed its own nuclear weaponry, ever-more-destructive technologies had to be developed for the deterrent threat to remain significant. This led to a nuclear **arms race**, a key characteristic of the Cold War. Both sides developed nuclear arsenals that could have destroyed each other many times over in a deterrence strategy known as "mutually assured destruction" (MAD). MAD ensured that there could be no gain from the use of nuclear weapons. Even in a strategy of flexible response, or limited nuclear war, the possibility of escalation meant it would be irrational to deploy them. A process of **arms control** stabilized the nuclear relationship, preventing the deterrence strategy from collapsing into spontaneous conflict. Nuclear deterrence is credited by some for bringing stability to Europe for the past 70 or so years.

A key risk of nuclear weapons is that they can proliferate, and there are particular concerns about proliferation to a rogue state or to nonstate actors who might not be operating on a cost-benefit analysis and against whom, therefore, deterrence might not work. Given the nature of the regime of North Korea's leader Kim Jong-un, fears are raised particularly in relation to North Korea's nuclear capability. Ironically, however, the risk of **nuclear proliferation** follows directly from the principle assumption in deterrence theory: that a potential attack can be deterred by the possession of nuclear weapons.

See also CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS.

DEUTSCH, KARL WOLFGANG (1912–1992). Karl Deutsch was born in Prague, in the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Upon the establishment of Czechoslovakia following the fall of the **empire** after **World War I**, his mother became one of the first female parliamentarians in the new country. His father was an optician. Deutsch attended the German high school in Prague, gaining honors in 1931. He remained in Prague, enrolling at the German University, where he gained his degree in 1934 and began postgraduate study. As an outspoken critic of **Adolf Hitler**'s Nazi dictatorship in Germany, Deutsch was in danger from pro-Nazi students. Hence, he went to England for two years, before returning to study at the Czech-language Charles

University. He gained a law degree in 1938. He was in the United States when Germany took control of the Sudetenland in Czechoslovakia that year, and did not return home.

Deutsch developed an interest in quantitative political science. In 1939, he won a fellowship for postgraduate study in political science at Harvard University. American entry into **World War II** (WWII) in 1941 interrupted his studies as he worked for the U.S. government, analyzing authoritarian and totalitarian **states**. He contributed to the work of the secretariat of the San Francisco Conference of 1945 that prepared the way for the foundation of the **United Nations**. He taught political science at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) from 1945 to 1956. Meanwhile, he continued his studies at Harvard, gaining his PhD in 1951. In 1956, he moved from MIT to Yale University, where he taught until 1967, when he became professor of government at Harvard, remaining there until retirement in 1983.

Deutsch published a range of books in political science and International Relations (IR), including *Political Community at the International Level* (1954) and *The Analysis of International Relations* (1968 and 1978). In his books and articles, he made an important contribution to the **behavioral** approach. Employing concepts that would bring precision to the study of politics and IR, he sought to test hypotheses regarding human behavior by means of quantifiable indicators. He was particularly concerned with ways in which political communities integrate and disintegrate. This included communities at the international level such as the **European Community** and what he called "security communities" such as those formed by relations between the United States and Canada, the United States and Great Britain, and post–WWII France and Germany. He also published books on these topics with coauthors, including *France, Germany and the Western Alliance* (1967) with Lewis J. Edinger, Roy C. Macridis, and Richard L. Merritt. Through his academic work he sought ways to improve the human condition by avoiding unnecessary suffering, overcoming **poverty** and hunger, and addressing the issues of population growth.

DEVELOPMENT. *See* ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT.

DIPLOMACY. In International Relations, diplomacy has traditionally been communication between **states**. No state can exist in isolation from others and diplomacy is the means by which two or more states have managed their relations. Historically the key concerns of diplomacy have related to **war** and **peace**. Diplomacy was conducted by formal representatives and sought to secure state interests through negotiation, without resorting to violence. Diplomacy can be backed by threats or **force**, however, and this is known as

coercive diplomacy. States can also coerce by threatening **economic sanctions**. Coercive diplomacy is used by states with superior **hard power** to compel less-powerful states.

In the contemporary era, diplomacy has become increasingly diffused; it is no longer the preserve of a club of professional diplomats representing **sovereign** states. The number of different actors involved in contemporary diplomacy is historically unprecedented. Government ministers, international civil servants, **international nongovernmental organizations**, and even certain high-profile individuals can all be important players on the diplomatic stage. The Hollywood actress Angelina Jolie, for example, has been both a **United Nations** (UN) goodwill ambassador and a UN special envoy. The growth in the number of different types of diplomatic actors is largely due to the multiplication of issue areas that are now the subject of international diplomacy. These include many areas that formerly were considered domestic issues, such as **terrorism**, transnational crime, **human rights**, the environment, **poverty**, and health. Much of the negotiation on such issues is carried on in multilateral organizations such as the UN and is known as multilateral diplomacy. However, states continue to employ professional diplomats in permanent diplomatic missions around the world, although the nature of their work is changing. Issues of **security** are increasingly dealt with personally by presidents and prime ministers or other high-ranking politicians in **summits**. Although professional diplomats still have a key role to play in the preparation of such summits, much of their work is now in areas such as **trade** and commerce, policy analysis and advice, provision of consular services, and public diplomacy. Public diplomacy is designed to enhance a state's international reputation; it is the enhancement of soft power by the projection of a positive image and can take many forms, from staging major global events such as the Olympic Games to encouraging student exchanges.

Overseas representation retains important symbolic significance. Diplomacy remains an essential part of statehood and a key institution of **international society**. The breaking of diplomatic relations is therefore only a last resort for states as a means of expressing their displeasure. States might, however, take lesser actions such as expelling or recalling diplomatic staff. Modern diplomatic practice operates within the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations. This treaty came into force in 1964, codifying existing diplomatic laws and establishing others. Among other things, the convention sets out the main functions of a diplomatic mission and the law relating to heads of missions, and also confirms rights to certain diplomatic immunities. The norm of diplomatic immunity for envoys can be traced back as far as the city-states in Ancient Greece and evolved into a key norm of the modern **Westphalian system of states**. The convention provides immunity for the premises of the diplomatic mission; the archive and documents of a mission (wherever they may be); the diplomatic bag; and the person of "diplomatic

agent." The principle that a diplomat cannot be arrested or detained is one of the most fundamental rules in **international law**. The convention, however, relates only to diplomatic activities of states and does not reflect the realities of the diffused nature of contemporary diplomacy.

See also AGGRESSION; KISSINGER, HENRY ALFRED (1923–); POWER.

E

ECONOMIC COMMUNITY OF WEST AFRICAN STATES (ECOW-AS). *See* REGIONAL INTEGRATION.

ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT. The issue of economic development came to the fore in International Relations in the context of **decolonization**. There was a significant gap between the wealth of the former colonies and that of their **colonial** masters, and in the life chances of their peoples. Traditionally states with the largest economies have managed to translate their wealth into military **power** and global influence. The development gap was not only about different levels of state income but also about inequalities in power. Economic development was therefore a key priority of newly independent **states**.

The dominant approach to development within **the West** has been modernization theory, though this has been challenged by **dependency** theory and more recent **human rights**–based approaches to development. Modernization theory regards poor states as backward and in need of development. It utilizes U.S. economist Walt Rostow's model of stages of growth in order to elucidate the transition from traditional (undeveloped) societies to the age of mass consumption (developed). The assumption behind modernization theory is that all states should follow the Western model of development. It has been associated with the adoption of neoliberal policies, which prescribe cutting state spending, inward investment, export-led growth, privatization, and free markets in order to promote economic development.

In contrast to modernization theory, dependency theory argues that developing states are not equivalent to developed states in the past, before "take-off"; rather, they are poor within the system because they have been systematically underdeveloped by their economic relations with the West. It is associated with the theory of **André Gunder Frank** and the policies of **Raúl Prebisch**. They argued that to be sustainable and real, development needs to be indigenous and protected from external competition; development that relies on foreign capital and technologies is dependent development and is in the short-term interest of the investor rather than the long-term

interest of the developing society. Revolutionary change in the system is a precondition for the elimination of global **poverty**, for capitalism always works to the advantage of the rich.

Structural explanations for continued poverty were very influential throughout the developing world in the 1970s and led to calls by some developing states for a **New International Economic Order** that would, for example, offer fairer prices for commodities and an increase in the southern share of manufacturing output. The demands were made in the **United Nations Conference on Trade and Development** (UNCTAD). The demands, however, were not met, and during the 1980s the tenuous developmental achievements of the 1970s were undermined in large part by the **debt** crisis and structural adjustment programs (SAPs). Under a SAP, states in need of further loans to pay the interest on existing debt were required by the **International Monetary Fund** (IMF) to restructure their economies along neoliberal lines as a condition for funds. The programs were not always a success and, in certain very poor states such as Niger, led to the recognition that development cannot be achieved by free market solutions alone. Rather than equating development only with growth in the gross domestic product of a state (GDP), new rights-based approaches to development stress entitlement, distribution, and community solutions. In recent years, the **World Bank** has started to become more socially aware and reformist, though this is not so true of the IMF or the **World Trade Organization** (WTO).

While many states across the world, particularly in Africa and South Asia, continue to struggle to develop, many others have seen remarkably rapid growth and significant development gains. Starting in the 1970s, the rapid development of the Asian Tigers—Taiwan, South Korea, Singapore, and Hong Kong—started to challenge the assumptions of dependency theory. Growth was slowed by the 1997 **Asian financial crisis** but only temporarily and has spread through the region to states such as Malaysia, Indonesia, and Vietnam. More recently the emerging markets of Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa, collectively known as the **BRICS**, have started to indicate a long-term global shift in economic power. China, for example, has made economic development its key priority and hundreds of millions of Chinese people have been lifted out of poverty since China embarked on its program of economic liberalization in 1978. Nevertheless, in China and the other developing economies, although tremendous wealth creation has been accompanied by much positive social change, wealth is not well distributed and economic development has proceeded alongside a growing inequality. Although inequality is not just a problem for emerging markets, each of the BRICS states still contains high levels of poverty. China, for example, has the world's second-largest economy, but in terms of per capita income it was ranked only 79th in the world between 2011 and 2015, according to the World Bank. Problems of inequality are even more acute in the other BRICS.

What this indicates is that in the contemporary era it can be misleading to talk about rich and poor states, or developed and undeveloped states, and it is more meaningful to talk about rich and poor people. Traditional markers of economic development, particularly gross national product, only tell part of the story of economic development.

See also ECONOMIC GLOBALIZATION; GLOBAL POWER SHIFTS; NEOCOLONIALISM; SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT; WORLD FOOD PROGRAMME (WFP).

ECONOMIC GLOBALIZATION. The process of economic globalization is a long-term historical trend of widening and deepening interconnectedness between the world's peoples. The first great wave occurred during the latter half of the 19th century during the period of British imperial dominance. Influenced by key thinkers such as **Adam Smith**, the British as the strongest economic power promoted free **trade**, economic cooperation, and the development of a global economy. The period witnessed a significant **migration** and the movement of money around the world as well as a marked increase in global trade. Global prosperity, though not evenly, grew as a result, notably in rising powers such as Germany and the United States. Growth, however, was interrupted by the outbreak of **World War I**. In the postwar period, attempts were made to resuscitate the global economy but these in turn were interrupted by the **Great Depression**, during which there was a sharp contraction of international economic activity. A second wave of globalization has been in progress since the middle of the 20th century, driven by new communication and information technologies. **States** have always traded, for example, but it is the extent and the complexity of those economic relations in the modern era that defines contemporary globalization. The deepening and widening of **interdependence** has gathered pace and has led not only to unprecedented global wealth but also to growing inequality.

Economic globalization has brought people from around the world into the capitalist global economy, which now encompasses all regions. From a positive perspective, economic globalization is seen to make societies richer through trade and to bring knowledge and information to people around the world—in short, to bring them the benefits and conveniences of modern living. On the other hand, many have also lost out to globalization as companies move out of a region in search of cheaper labor, or as less-expensive sources of raw materials are found. The constant and rapid movement of money around the world has led to financial crises such as the **Asian financial crisis** in 1997 and the global **financial crisis of 2008**. Such crises raise doubts about the continued ability of states to be economically **sovereign** and to be autonomous actors within the global system. The growing size, **power**, and wealth of **transnational corporations** is seen to be challenging the primacy of the state within the system and furthermore raises problems of

accountability and sustainability. Globalization has also led to a high degree of cultural penetration, and this has had an impact on values, priorities, and ways of life, leading potentially to the homogenization of **culture**. Combined with the sometimes devastating impact on traditional patterns of economic productivity, these threats have led to a strong, vocal, antiglobalization movement that transcends state borders and is an example of global civil society in action.

See also AMERICAN PRIMACY; BRITISH HEGEMONY; INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND (IMF); POVERTY; SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT; WORLD BANK; WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION (WTO).

ECONOMIC SANCTIONS. States can use a variety of economic means as instruments of their **foreign policy**, such as **trade** restrictions, the threat of removal of **aid**, an **arms embargo**, and the freezing of assets. All these measures can be described as economic sanctions. The **European Union** (EU) and the United States use this particular foreign policy instrument quite often; it is a way that they can assert their influence and leadership in world affairs. Sanctions can be deployed unilaterally, bilaterally, or multilaterally and have been deployed in support of a range of different policy objectives, including **security** issues and **human rights**. Economic sanctions tend to be deployed by economically powerful states against less-powerful ones. Those imposed by just one state have been almost exclusively the instrument of the United States since 1945; indeed, most other states do not employ unilateral economic sanctions.

By their nature, sanctions are most effective when they are multilateral and this is their usual form. The strongest sanctions are those imposed multilaterally by the **United Nations** (UN). The UN Charter explicitly authorizes multilateral economic interventions in the case of international **aggression** or a threat to international **peace** and security. UN sanctions were imposed, for example, against South Africa's apartheid regime, and against Iraqi president Saddam Hussein after his invasion of Kuwait. In addition to an arms embargo, the **United Nations Security Council** (UNSC) voted unanimously to impose an asset freeze on Libyan leader Colonel Gaddafi. The UN publishes its current list of sanctions and in 2016 had sanctions against a long list of specific individuals, companies, and groups from a range of **states** such as Libya, North Korea, and Uzbekistan.

Sanctions have been shown to be frequently ineffective; they also pose a serious ethical dilemma. Sanctions can have a malign impact on the population of a target state. The UNSC imposed sanctions against Iraq to try to coerce Saddam Hussein into fulfilling his obligation to cooperate with UN weapons inspectors. Although effects of the sanctions were ineffective against the Iraqi elite who were able to shield themselves, they had a devas-

tating impact on ordinary Iraqis; critics of the sanctions viewed them as a violation of human rights. The death toll of civilian Iraqis from sanctions, estimated to be in the hundreds of thousands, challenges the assumption that economic sanctions are necessarily a softer or more ethical alternative to the use of **force**. The UN and other bodies have responded to these sorts of concerns by imposing "smart" sanctions. These are sanctions that target key members in a regime directly, as in the case of EU sanctions against President Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe and just four individuals in the Sudanese regime. Sanctions themselves continue to be seen as a useful policy instrument, and their importance is the fact that they clearly signal that certain policies or forms of government are wrong. Although sanctions might have been shown not to be always effective in actually changing the behavior of states, they remain important as a way that the international community can communicate its disapproval.

See also FIRST GULF WAR (1990–1991); IRAQ DISARMAMENT CRISIS; IRAQ WAR (2003–2010).

EMPIRE. International systems have tended to fall into one of two broad types. An international system might be an association of independent communities, such as the contemporary **Westphalian system of states**, or it might be an empire. The history of international relations can be described in terms of the conflict between the forces seeking to unify the world under their rule and the forces resisting that unification. In most cases, the forces of unification ultimately defeat the resisting forces, and human history is a history of conquest, **power**, and subjugation; history is full of stories of large empires. The Persian Empire, for example, founded by Cyrus the Great around 550 BCE, at its height contained 44 percent of the world's population. The Persians were ultimately defeated by another great empire builder, Alexander the Great in 330 BCE. The world's largest contiguous land empire was the Mongol Empire founded by Genghis Khan in 1206 CE. The Roman Empire included virtually the whole world as known to its inhabitants, and was to all intents and purposes universal. The largest empire the world has even known, however, was the British Empire, which at its height in the immediate post–**World War I** period covered roughly a quarter of the world's territory and one fifth of its total population. This empire, as others before it, has had a profound impact on the geography and conduct of international relations. Empires are about power, and European empires were the means by which European authority and forms of social, political, and economic life were exported around the world. In the era of **American primacy**, the United States is sometimes accused of acting like an imperial power though it lacks the formal structures of empire.

See also BRITISH HEGEMONY; COLONIALISM; DECOLONIZATION; FORCE.

ENERGY SECURITY. Energy is essential to modern life, and energy security is therefore a key concern of **states**, groups, and individuals. Energy security requires a security of supply at affordable prices. The field of energy security incorporates traditional **security** concerns such as the geopolitics of oil as well as a broad range of nontraditional, nonmilitary, transnational issues that come under the "new security" concept such as fuel poverty and climate change. Oil, however, dominates the energy security debate and has driven concerns over energy security since 1913 when **Winston Churchill** as First Lord of the Admiralty decided to convert the British navy from the use of coal to oil. Great Britain then had a strategic interest in securing supplies from Persia, and the politics of oil, particularly in the Middle East, has been at the heart of the issue of energy security for **the West** ever since. The issue tends to rise to the top of the international agenda when there is a threat to the supply and affordability of energy for Western states. Concerns peaked in the early 1970s during the oil crisis when the producer states, acting through the **Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries** (OPEC), asserted their **sovereign** right to national control over their product. The Western states responded in several key ways to create a more secure energy system by reducing consumption, diversifying their overseas supplies, increasing domestic supplies, and building up stockpiles.

After a couple of decades of low oil prices, prices rose rapidly in the 2000s, bringing energy security back onto the international agenda. During this period geopolitical tensions increased in the Middle East, culminating in the 2003 **Iraq War**. The neoconservative agenda in Iraq was very much oil driven, with the overthrow of authoritarian regimes seen as the best way to achieve energy security. Concerns over Iran and its nuclear program contributed further instability. Tensions with other oil- and gas-producing states like Venezuela and Russia contributed to a perception that the West was losing its ability to influence global energy supplies. There was also increasing awareness of the finite nature of global oil supplies and the environmental dangers of continuing to burn fossil fuels.

The rapidly growing demand from the emerging economies, particularly China, further indicated a **global power shift** in the oil market, and China is now facing the same anxieties about energy security as Western states. Concerns in the United States, which arose from importing energy, have been mitigated in recent years by the shale revolution. New technologies, including horizontal drilling and fracking, have enabled a substantial rise in the domestic extraction of both oil and gas in the United States. This has changed the dynamics of the contemporary oil market, forcing prices low and changing the geopolitics of oil, though the United States maintains an interest in the stability of supply and prices for its key economic partners and for the stability of the global economy more widely. Shale gas and also the tar oils that have boosted Canada's domestic production are good illustrations of the

tensions that exist between state energy security and other forms of security. Both forms of extraction have a devastating environmental impact, acting to reduce the incentives toward lower consumption and investment in alternative forms of cleaner energy.

See also AMERICAN PRIMACY; ECONOMIC GLOBALIZATION; GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS; GREEN THEORY; SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT.

ENGLISH SCHOOL OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS. The English school grew out of meetings of the British Committee for the Theory of International Politics, a group of International Relations scholars from British universities who met between 1959 and 1984. Funds were provided for three weekend meetings each year by the Rockefeller Foundation. A number of committee papers were published as *Diplomatic Investigations*, 1966, edited by the first two chairmen of the group, Herbert Butterfield and Martin Wight. This work set out a distinctive English approach to **International Relations theory**, which is interpretive and historical in its method, in contrast to the dominance of **behavioralism** in the United States; the English school is concerned primarily with issues of order and justice in international relations. It is associated in particular with work on the rules and norms of **international society**. The English school has contributed detailed scholarship on the evolution and nature of that society, most notably by Adam Watson, who became chairman of the British Committee after Wight. That role was later taken over by **Hedley Bull**, who continued work into the question of how order is maintained in an **anarchical** system in his classic work, *The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics*, first published in 1977. The committee was discontinued after Bull's death but the English school approach has continued to develop in the writings of a new generation of scholars such as John Vincent, Ian Clarke, Robert Jackson, Barry Buzan, Timothy Dunne, and Nicholas Wheeler.

In terms of its location in International Relations theory, the English school has been seen as a middle position between liberal institutionalism and political **realism**. With its focus on social facts and meanings, the English school is also close to **constructivism**. In more recent years, furthermore, it has been combined by theorists such as **Andrew Linklater** and Timothy Dunne with **critical theory** to create a critical international society approach.

See also WESTPHALIAN SYSTEM OF STATES.

ENLOE, CYNTHIA HOLDEN (1938–). Born in New York City, Cynthia Holden Enloe noticed at an early age that her mother read novels and biographies about accomplished women. Enloe gained her BA from Connecticut

College, her MA from the University of California, Berkeley, in 1963, and her PhD from that institution in 1967. Thereafter she entered an academic career, teaching at universities in many countries. Much of her career was spent at Clark University, Worcester, Massachusetts, where she became a research professor in the Department of International Development, Community, and Environment. The first of her 14 books was *Multi-Ethnic Politics: The Case of Malaysia*, published in 1970.

By the 1980s, Enloe had become one of the leading intellectuals and writers on feminist issues in International Relations. Her work focused on the interactions of **feminism**, women, militarized **culture**, **war**, politics, and the **globalization** of economics in various countries. She analyzed gendered politics in the national and international arenas, including pressures shaping ideas about femininities and masculinities and the exploitation of women's labor in economic, political, and military terms. Furthermore, she focused on the resistance of women. Her best-known book is *Bananas, Beaches and Bases: Making Feminist Sense of International Politics*, first published in 2001. Her other books include *Does Khaki Become You? The Militarization of Women's* Lives (1988), *The Morning After: Sexual Politics at the End of the Cold War* (1993 and 2000), *Maneuvers: The International Politics of Militarizing Women's Lives* (2000), and *The Curious Feminist: Searching for Women in the New Age of Empire* (2004).

In 2010, Enloe published *Nimo's War, Emma's War: Making Feminist Sense of the War in Iraq*. In that book, she focused on the lives of four American women and four Iraqi women and the ways in which they experienced the **war in Iraq** that began in 2003. The book also discusses how wars in general involve and rely on the militarization of the lives of women. A thoroughly revised and updated edition of *Bananas, Beaches and Bases* was published in 2014.

See also TICKNER, JUDITH ANN (1937–).

EUROPEAN ATOMIC ENERGY COMMUNITY (EURATOM). *See* EUROPEAN UNION (EU).

EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK (ECB). *See* EUROPEAN UNION (EU).

EUROPEAN COAL AND STEEL COMMUNITY (ECSC). *See* EUROPEAN UNION (EU).

EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES (EC). *See* EUROPEAN UNION (EU).

EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY (EEC). *See* EUROPEAN UNION (EU).

EUROPEAN UNION (EU). The European project took root in the ruins and devastation caused by **World War II**. The postwar period provided a unique historical opportunity for cooperation because of the convergence of key European interests. Europe's leaders shared the experience of world **war** and a determination not to allow Europe to be torn apart again; they recognized the need for both rehabilitating and pacifying Germany; and they shared an interest in retaining Europe's influence in global politics at a time when the period of European **colonialism** was coming to its end and when global **power** was being divided between the United States and the Soviet Union. The threat of possible Soviet advancement and the spread of communism into Western Europe also gave the United States an interest in supporting the project of European cooperation and integration and promoting European regeneration and prosperity.

The first step toward European integration was taken by West German chancellor Konrad Adenauer, who proposed that key German industrial centers, which were put under French jurisdiction at the end of the World War II, be put under international control. Jean Monnet wrote a plan for a supranational coal and steel community. In April 1951, France, Germany, Italy, and the three Benelux countries (Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg) established the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), which combined the most strategically important industries of these six countries. The ECSC was a free **trade** area and was conceived as the first step toward a common market, which was achieved by its members when in 1957 they signed the Treaty of Rome founding the European Economic Community (EEC) and the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM). Great Britain was invited to join but declined. Its subsequent applications were vetoed by French president Charles de Gaulle. In 1965, EEC institutions were streamlined by the Merger Treaties and became the European Communities (EC).

The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland finally joined the EC in 1973; Denmark and Ireland, close economic partners of Great Britain, joined at the same time. The group of six was now nine and was also developing into a significant economic power on the global level. The EC continued to expand and grow in power, with Greece joining in 1981 followed by Spain and Portugal in 1986. With the entry of these former authoritarian **states**, the EC took on a new role of consolidating and institutionalizing democratic values.

The Treaty on European Union, commonly known as the Maastricht Treaty (1992), created the European Union (EU), provided for a common currency, and strengthened the framework for the development of a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). The Union also continued to expand. At the end of the **Cold War**, Europe's neutral states could consider membership and in 1995 Austria, Finland, and Sweden joined the EU. In 2004, the organ-

ization underwent significant further enlargement with new members that included former Soviet republics (Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia); Eastern European states (Hungary, Czech Republic, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia) and Malta. Cyprus was also admitted, causing consternation in Turkey, which itself had its application denied. Each new member-state was considered to have achieved the stiff criteria set for them as a condition of their membership. These criteria related not only to their economy but also to the successful development of **democratic** political institutions and the enforcement of **human rights**. In 2007, Romania and Bulgaria became members. The last state to join the EU was Croatia in 2013, bringing the total membership to 28.

The original goals of the EEC were a common market, "ever closer union," and economic cooperation more generally. A customs union was achieved by 1968. The pace of integration then slowed until 1986 when the Single European Act (SEA) was signed, which removed the final barriers to a single European market. The SEA also introduced a system of majority voting in the Council of the European Union/Council of Ministers on a range of issues, effectively removing a state's right of veto over EU decisions except in the case of "vital national interest," moving the EU further toward supranationality. The SEA was also significant for formally extending the EC's political competences to **foreign policy**.

The common currency (the euro) replaced the national currencies of 11 member-states in 2002 and the European Central Bank (ECB) was set up. Both the common currency and ECB were significant steps toward fiscal and monetary union. The control of monetary and fiscal policy has always been a key power of **sovereign** states and one that not all states were willing to hand over. The common currency therefore led to a two-tiered Europe with Great Britain, Denmark, and Sweden opting to stay out of European monetary union (EMU). Greece failed in the first instance to meet the economic criteria for membership but was admitted in 2001. Slovenia, Cyprus, Malta, Slovakia, and Estonia are now also members of the Eurozone.

The EU has continued to develop and expand its competency in a series of key treaties since the Maastricht Treaty. During the 1980s and 1990s, it moved further toward closer union under Jacques Delors, eighth president of the commission, who served from 1985 to 1994. It has also sought to enhance its democratic legitimacy, reform its institutions, guarantee certain rights to its citizens, improve its efficiency, and enhance its CFSP. The key treaties that have followed on from the Maastricht Treaty are the Treaty of Amsterdam (which came into force in 1999); the Treaty of Nice (2003); and the Lisbon Treaty, which included the Charter of Fundamental Rights (2009). The Lisbon Treaty also set up a High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy.

While able to agree on many economic issues, the states of Europe have quite diverse and different strategic interests, and this has made any agreement on a single foreign and defense policy very difficult to achieve. However, it persists in its attempts to become a key global player, not only in the economic sphere but also in the field of **security**. The EU's rapid reaction force (EUFOR), a key element in its Common Security and Defense Policy, was first deployed in Macedonia in 2003 and since has been deployed in Bosnia, the Democratic Republic of Congo, the Central African Republic, and Libya. It works alongside the **United Nations** in support of **peace** and redevelopment efforts. Personnel, however, are seconded from national militaries; proposals for the creation of the EU's own armed **force** face resistance from certain member-states such as Great Britain. The EU has various other military initiatives that seek to coordinate an EU response. Nevertheless, the **North Atlantic Treaty Organization** (NATO) continues to be the organization of choice when it comes to security threats such as those that led to the military interventions into Kosovo and Afghanistan. Twenty-two out of 28 of the member-states of the EU are also members of NATO, but Europe has not been able to overcome its reliance on the United States when it comes to issues of security.

The EU is a complex, multilevel organization with complex decision-making procedures that are both supranational and intergovernmental. Its policy agenda is set by the European Council, which is comprised of the heads of government of all the member-states. The European Council meets at least every six months in EU **summits**. The EU's main decision-making body is the Council of the European Union, which is sometimes called the Council of Ministers. The ministers of the member-states meet within this council. Its presidency is held for six months by member-states in rotation. It uses qualitative majority voting, though unanimity is required in sensitive areas, including security, external affairs, and taxation.

The European Commission is made up of representatives appointed by the national governments. It represents and upholds the interests of the EU. It drafts proposals for new European laws, which it presents to the European Parliament and the Council of the European Union. It checks that legislation is properly applied. The European Parliament is elected by voters in EU countries. It shares legislative power equally with the Council of Ministers. The Treaty of Lisbon gave Parliament more policy areas in which it approves EU legislation along with the Council of Ministers. The European Parliament and Council of Ministers together are the EU budgetary authority, deciding each year on expenditure and revenue. Parliament gives assent to accession of new EU member-states and must approve members appointed to the commission. The European Court of Justice (ECJ), set up in 1952, aims to ensure EU legislation is interpreted and applied consistently by member-states. It

settles legal disputes between member-states, EU institutions, businesses, and individuals. It has one judge per member-state. The ECJ should not be confused with the European Court of Human Rights.

The European Union is the largest economy in the world and has successfully created a "zone of peace." European integration, however, remains a controversial project and a difficult political issue for politicians within member-states. A European constitution had to be abandoned because it was not supported in referenda. Anti-European parties such as the UK Independence Party are gaining in popularity, and the **financial crisis of 2008** has led to serious questions about the long-term viability of monetary union.

In June 2016, the British government held a referendum to enable the electorate to decide whether the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland should leave the EU. The result was narrowly in favor of withdrawal.

See also ECONOMIC GLOBALIZATION; FUNCTIONALISM; HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION; INTERDEPENDENCE; INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS; INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS; NEO-FUNCTIONALISM; RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT.

F

FANON, FRANTZ (1925–1961). Frantz Fanon was born in the French colony of Martinique. His father was a customs officer and his mother was a shopkeeper. During **World War II**, when the Vichy French fleet occupied the island, he escaped and fought in the Free French movement in the West Indies, North Africa, and Europe. He was wounded and gained the prestigious Croix de Guerre. He also witnessed segregation by race and discrimination in the forces with which he served. After the **war**, he studied medicine and psychiatry at the University of Lyons, France, and became a psychiatrist. He took a position in Algeria and witnessed the brutal treatment of the Arab population under French **colonialism**. This led him to work both politically and in his professional role for the liberation movement. He thus became a revolutionary and he also became a philosopher, collaborating with radicals such as Aimé Césaire and Jean-Paul Sartre.

Fanon wrote a number of books, his most influential being *Black Skin, White Masks* (1952) and *The Wretched of the Earth* (1961). His work in these books inspired the theories of **postcolonialism** that would later challenge mainstream approaches in **International Relations theory** for overlooking or accepting Western assumptions of superiority and ignoring **cultures** that had been suppressed. In *Black Skin, White Masks*, he argued that freedom from conditions of bondage must be taken rather than given. This must involve a struggle for recognition. As identity had been misrepresented in racial terms under colonialism, the struggle for recognition should involve affirmation of the authenticity of a particular **cultural** identity. In *The Wretched of the Earth*, which he finished just before he died, he argued controversially that revolutionary violence was needed in the struggle for recognition. Influenced to some degree by **Marxism**, he also argued that, along with the removal of colonial structures, the capitalist system should be dismantled. Nevertheless, as he saw it, the Marxist emphasis on capitalism as the force to be opposed overlooked the significance of racial discrimination and oppression.

See also AGGRESSION; FORCE; MARX, KARL HEINRICH (1818–1883); SAID, EDWARD WADIE (1935–2003); WALLERSTEIN, IMMANUEL (1930–).

FEMINISM. Largely neglected in traditional **International Relations theory**, feminism has, since the mid-1980s, become increasingly prominent. One of the main concerns of feminists in International Relations (IR) is **power**, and more specifically, relations of power. These power relations are not only present in biological terms between the male and female sexes but also culturally, between the masculine and feminine genders. Feminism in IR builds on feminist analyses of politics within **states**. In such analyses, feminism challenges the categories of the public and the private that underpin traditional analyses of society, in which politics has been seen as the preserve of the public sphere. The public/private distinction, separating the private world of the family from the public world of work and politics, lies at the root of the traditional conceptualization of politics, thus marginalizing women as political beings and also neglecting issues of particular relevance to them. As the public has been considered more important than the private, power relations have entrenched the dominance of masculinity over femininity in the private sphere, constructing barriers that make it difficult for women to succeed in the public realm. According to feminists, the traditional analyses overlook or ignore the fact that the private is therefore political.

Feminists hold that the power relations extend into international relations, including **foreign policy** making, and that the ways in which IR has traditionally been taught have contributed to this problem, denying, or misrepresenting the international roles of women. In her classic article "Hans Morgenthau's Principles of Political Realism: A Feminist Reformulation," **J. Ann Tickner** argued that, through his principles of **classical realism**, **Hans J. Morgenthau** was hugely influential in this respect. Feminist approaches to IR seek to shed light on these power relations and their consequences and also to draw attention to ways in which women and men challenge the dominant assumptions by sometimes acting in ways that contravene the entrenched societal and political patterns. In the 1990s, for example, Rebecca Grant argued that military matters were no longer quite as exclusively male dominated as they had been. For her, this was in a way a triumph for feminism.

Cynthia Enloe is another feminist IR theorist who focused on the resistance of women. Like Enloe, Grant was concerned about complacency. Grant insisted that feminism must confront the gender bias of theories of international **security** and resolve a possible conflict of values between experiences of female soldiers on the one hand and a range of feminist assumptions about security on the other hand. Enloe has discussed the continuing exploitation of women's labor in economic, political, and military terms. She is also promi-

nent among feminists, including Jean Elshtain, who have emphasized the way in which the private sphere is not only political but also international, as personal identities and relationships are neglected and misrepresented but nevertheless significant in the ways in which international relations are conducted at different levels of analysis.

One of the concerns of feminists in IR has been the consequences of recent processes of **globalization**. The inequality between women and men has been shown to have increased. This is partly due to the consequences of **debt** and the requirements for structural adjustment programs in return for funding from the **International Monetary Fund**. Feminists have also stressed that globalization has increased the numbers of **migrant** women from poor countries who serve as cheap and flexible sources of labor. Another consequence that feminists have highlighted is that of the trafficking of prostitutes.

Other recent feminist studies by writers including Enloe and Laura Sjoberg have focused on the roles of women in the wars in Iraq. Sjoberg studied the **first Gulf War**, the war of **economic sanctions**, and the **Iraq War** that began in 2003. On the basis of these studies, she offered a feminist critique and reconstruction of **just war** theory. Her alternative version emphasized the roles of women.

See also CRITICAL THEORY; NORMATIVE THEORY; STRATEGIC STUDIES.

FINANCIAL CRISIS OF 2008. Unlike previous financial crises, notably the 1982 **debt** crisis and the **Asian financial crisis** of 1997, which were largely crises within the developing world, this crisis started in the United States and has had perhaps the deepest impact in Europe. It began with the subprime mortgage crisis in which irresponsible lending and borrowing led to many poorer people owing more on their loans than their properties were worth. This crisis in the American housing market had a global impact because the toxic debt was repackaged and sold to investors across the world, leading to a crisis in confidence and an unwillingness of banks to lend credit and finance. **States** such as the United States and Great Britain had to institute huge bailouts for their banks and other financial institutions and put in place programs of austerity to combat their deficits. The crisis led to calls for the restructuring of the international financial system to make it more transparent and better regulated. President Nicolas Sarkozy of France called for a new **Bretton Woods**, reflecting a widespread call for the need for a more interventionist approach to the global economy. This call has so far gone largely unanswered.

See also ECONOMIC GLOBALIZATION; POVERTY.

FIRST ACADEMIC CHAIR OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS. The first chair of International Politics was established in 1919 at the University of Aberystwyth in Wales, Great Britain. It was set up in commemoration of students from the university who had died in **World War I** and named in honor of President of the United States **Thomas Woodrow Wilson**, as the founder of the **League of Nations**. It was hoped that the study of international politics might contribute to future **peace**. The first Woodrow Wilson Professor was **Sir Alfred Zimmern**, a leading interwar **idealist**. The early years of the discipline were dominated by legal institutionalist or idealist thinking. In 1946, however, **Edward Hallett Carr** published his seminal work, *Twenty Years' Crisis*, which became influential on both sides of the Atlantic and had the effect of uniting the British and U.S. disciplines within a more **realist** approach.

See also INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY.

FIRST GULF WAR (1990–1991). Iraq under Saddam Hussein invaded the Arab **state** of Kuwait on 2 August 1990. Relations between the two states had deteriorated due to a disputed repayment of a $15 billion loan made by Kuwait to Iraq in support of its **war** against Iran and over both the price of oil and Kuwait's extraction of oil in the al-Rumaila oil field. Iraqi troops easily overcame all resistance and after just three days had completely annexed the country. Although Iraq had a historic claim to Kuwait and viewed its independent existence as "the work of imperialists," Iraq had fully recognized the independence and complete **sovereignty** of Kuwait in 1963. Under **international law**, a border can only be changed with the agreement of all parties and most of the world therefore viewed Iraq's annexation as an illegal act of **aggression**. Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait, thus, was the first test for the new post–**Cold War** order. The **United Nations Security Council** (UNSC) resolution condemning the annexation was passed unanimously and **economic sanctions** were imposed on Iraq. When Saddam Hussein failed to withdraw his forces, a further resolution authorized the United States and its allies to liberate Kuwait as a **United Nations** (UN) enforcement action under Article 7 of the UN Charter. Codenamed Operation Desert Shield, the enforcement action was undertaken by a coalition of 34 states, including key Arab states. Japan and Germany, in addition, provided financial assistance. One view, therefore, is that the **war** was a clear example of UN **collective security**. More critical commentators saw it as a U.S. action in support of a vital interest, oil.

Five months after the original invasion, a massive air and naval bombardment started, which in the first three hours alone dropped a tonnage of high explosives on Iraq equivalent to that of the atomic bomb dropped on Hiroshi-

ma. In response, Iraq fired Scud missiles into both Israel and Saudi Arabia in an attempt to break the coalition. Fears that their warheads might contain chemical weapons were unfounded.

The war was characterized by massive technological superiority on the part of the coalition. The weapons used, particularly in the air bombardment, led to discussion of a revolution in military affairs. The superior technology meant that despite the size of its army, Iraq was easily defeated with minimum casualties on the allied side and the Iraqis were pushed back into their own territory. As they left, however, the Iraqis systematically destroyed Kuwait's infrastructure and set fire to their oil wells. This led to some of the most iconic images of the war. At that point, the UN mandate was fulfilled and the war was stopped. Allied troops did not press into Iraq in order to overthrow the regime of Saddam Hussein. This would have been a violation of international law and would have shattered the allied coalition.

The Gulf War is an interesting case study in International Relations as it is instructive on a range of key issues such as **diplomacy**, international law, the role of the UN, and U.S. **power**. It is a war that is closely associated with the news broadcaster CNN and live broadcasts from the war zone. It also set in motion the chain of events that led to the first **humanitarian intervention** of the post–Cold War era and also ultimately to the **Iraq War**.

See also AIRPOWER; AMERICAN PRIMACY; FORCE; IRAN–IRAQ WAR (1980–1988); IRAQ DISARMAMENT CRISIS.

FOREIGN POLICY. States and some **international organizations**, such as the **European Union**, have external relations that are conducted in official procedures. The decisions that are made by means of these procedures sometimes include a decision to do nothing. All the decisions contribute to the sum of the external relations. It is this sum that is known as foreign policy and the principal actors are known as foreign policy decision-makers. These actors include the official decision makers, such as presidents, prime ministers, secretaries of state, and foreign secretaries.

The scope of issues that need to be addressed by these principal actors covers economic, **security**, environmental, and humanitarian fields, among others. Foreign policy decision-makers sometimes have to make the decision to avoid or go to **war**. Their **power** in relation to other states becomes an issue in such circumstances. Because of this scope and its complexity, the principal actors usually have to rely on other people and organizations at various levels within the state to make routine decisions. The actors at the various levels do not always operate in harmony with one another or with the official decision makers. This is in part because sometimes the decisions contributing to the policy are made according to standard operating procedures (SOPs) of organizations. The official foreign policy decision-makers are not always aware of the decisions that emanate from the routine SOPs.

The wide range and complexity of issues covered by foreign policy decision-makers means that they have to draw on the expertise of policy advisors, including bureaucrats and academics. They also often work closely with **diplomats**.

Like policy makers in the realms of domestic politics and domestic business operations, foreign policy makers often make decisions that have outcomes that they do not expect. This is hardly surprising when one considers that there are many other states and organizations whose policy makers are attempting to implement their own decisions. It is not only the implementation of other states' and organizations' foreign policy decisions that has an effect upon the successful implementation of one's own policies. A foreign policy maker's own later decisions might be influenced by the results of implementation of their previous policies.

In recent decades, foreign policy has been influenced significantly by the **cosmopolitan** view that states have duties not just to their own citizens but also to people in other countries. States have not necessarily become more cosmopolitan in their outlook. Nevertheless, they are increasingly expected not to use **sovereignty** as an excuse to ignore the needs of people who are suffering beyond their national borders. These duties beyond borders include the **responsibility to protect** those who are suffering, to respect **human rights**, and sometimes to engage in **humanitarian intervention** in other states. This all means that foreign policy decision-makers cannot just take notice of the needs of their own citizens. A question that arises, however, is whether the reason states sometimes fail to act on these duties is that it is not considered in their **national interest** to do so. A related question asks whether the duty of foreign policy makers to respect human rights is sometimes treated less seriously than is expected of them.

After **World War II**, the study of foreign policy developed into a particular specialist field known as foreign policy analysis (FPA). FPA seeks to explain or understand decisions that have some kind of effect upon events, processes, people, states, or other bodies outside the decision makers' own nation-state. In order to explain or understand such decisions, FPA focuses on the factors that influence the decision making and also upon the makers of the decisions. The prominent scholars of FPA have included **Graham Allison**, **Harold and Margaret Sprout**, **James Rosenau**, Valerie Hudson, Richard Snyder, and Irving Janis, among many others. Because of the variety of actors and procedures involved in foreign policy, FPA scholars work at a corresponding range of levels of analysis. Foreign policy studies come from various perspectives, including some of the variants of **International Relations theory**, such as **classical realism**, **neorealism**, **liberal internationalism**, **feminism**, and **social constructivism**.

The idea that actions of either individuals or groups can be understood as being based on rationally made decisions has been questioned by many political scientists in recent decades, as has the extent to which rationality actually plays a part in the foreign policy decision-making processes. Human processes of cognition involve filtering on the basis of stereotypes, biases, and heuristics (rules that human beings develop to govern their mental activity). The cognition processes lead humans to simplify and to seek apparent consistency. Their cognitive processes are influenced by beliefs, values, and memories. As a result, rationality is bounded, and foreign policy analysts consider the degree to which this affects decision making.

See also CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS; ECONOMIC SANCTIONS; FORCE; GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS.

FOREIGN POLICY ANALYSIS. *See* FOREIGN POLICY.

FORCE. The right to use force is one of the sovereign powers of the **state**. It is in part the monopoly over the legitimate use of force that gives the state its unique status within the international system. Force has historically been a useful instrument of states, one that they have used to maintain their **sovereignty**, resolve conflicts, gain territory and resources, or preserve a **balance of power**. The **United Nations** Charter, however, now requires that states "refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force," and provides for **collective security** under the auspices of the **United Nations Security Council**. The charter recognizes the right to self-defense, so if a state's territory is invaded by another state, it has a right to seek to regain its sovereign rights. The Falklands War (2 April–14 June 1982) was an armed conflict in which Britain fought Argentina for the return of the Falklands Islands. This can be seen as an example of the use of force in self-defense.

Powerful states can use force or the threat of force in a variety of ways. Ultimately they can resort to **war**. War has always been an instrument of state policy, but as it is the most deadly form of the use of force it has tended to be used as a last resort. There is much a state can do short of war. Force can be useful not just for fighting but to get others to do what they might otherwise not do. For example, a powerful state can use coercive **diplomacy**. This is diplomacy backed up by the threat of sanction. This might be the use of force or it could be an **economic sanction** such as an **arms embargo** or the withdrawal of aid. When it involves the conspicuous display of military **power**, it is sometimes called gunboat diplomacy, a reference to the way that Britain projected its power during the 19th century. Force can also be used in low-intensity armed conflict, meaning in a manner that falls short of full-scale military combat, including operations such as counterinsurgency, pro-insurgency, skirmishes, retaliation, and police-type actions.

See also AGGRESSION; AMERICAN PRIMACY; BRITISH HEGEMO-NY; FOREIGN POLICY; HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION; RESPON-SIBILITY TO PROTECT; SLAVERY.

FORMER YUGOSLAVIA, WARS OF. The **state** of Yugoslavia was formed by the **Paris Peace Conference**, which negotiated the settlement at the end of **World War I**. It lasted until it was invaded by the Germans in **World War II**. In 1943, the Socialist Republic of Yugoslavia was established under the leadership of General Josip Broz Tito. It was constituted by six republics: Slovenia, Croatia, Serbia, Macedonia, Bosnia, and Montenegro, roughly, though far from completely, divided among ethnic lines. The Serbian population, for example, was divided between several states rather than united in Serbia. The 1974 constitution granted greater autonomy both to the six Yugoslav republics and to two autonomous republics within Serbia, Kosovo and Vojvodina. Serbian nationalists were dissatisfied at the lack of a centralized government under Serbian control. The autonomy granted to Kosovo was considered particularly unpalatable as the Serbs who lived there were now a minority in a region that Serbia claimed was rightly theirs.

Tito was a unifying force between the republics. After his death on 4 May 1980, there were concerns that Serbia would attempt to address what was seen as the injustice of the 1974 constitution. Unease was compounded by a bleak economic situation and weak leadership. In 1989, Slobodan Milošević emerged as leader of the Communist Party in Serbia with an **aggressive** nationalist agenda. One of his first moves was to abolish the autonomy of Kosovo, promising to "re-Serb" the province. **Nationalism**, a force that had been assumed to be in decline in international relations, had replaced communism as the dominant ideology in Yugoslavia.

In 1990, more than 88 percent of the electorate in Slovenia voted for a sovereign and independent state, and independence was declared on 25 June 1991. The Yugoslav army attacked on the very next day. After a 10-day war, an agreement was reached and the Yugoslav army was withdrawn. Macedonia also declared independence, and this declaration was not accompanied by violence. Elsewhere, the unraveling of the Yugoslav state led to prolonged and brutal war. In Croatia, fighting had broken out between Serbs and Croats in May 1991 as the Croatian people also voted overwhelmingly in favor of forming their own state. The declaration of independence by Croatia plunged it into war with Serbia. The war led to hundreds of thousands of people being displaced, driven from their homes in a policy of ethnic cleansing, and a refugee crisis not seen in Europe since the 1940s.

By 1992, another war had broken out in Bosnia after it too had declared independence. Bosnian Serbs were determined to remain within Yugoslavia and to build a greater Serbia. Widespread ethnic cleansing, the four-year siege of the Bosnian capital Sarajevo, and the committing of war crimes such

as those at Prijedor marked a level of mass killing not seen in Europe since World War II. In the post–**Cold War** period of liberal ascendancy, the levels of brutality challenged the liberal assumption of human progress. The war led to the first use of **force** by the **North Atlantic Treaty Organization** (NATO), authorized by the **United Nations Security Council** (UNSC) as it used its **airpower** to enforce a no-fly zone over Bosnia. In the worst atrocity of the war, over seven thousand men and boys were killed at Srebrenica within a **United Nations** safe haven, raising serious questions about the international community's duty and ability to protect. This led to a more determined NATO effort and eventually to the 1995 Dayton Peace Accords, brought about by American pressure. Two self-governing entities were created within Bosnia, the Bosnian Serb Republic and the Muslim (Bosnjak)-Croat Federation. The requirement for U.S. involvement revealed serious weaknesses in the **European Union**'s ability to respond to conflict in its own region.

A NATO-led Implementation Force (IFOR) of 60,000 **peacekeeping** troops was given the responsibility to oversee the agreement. The IFOR operation lasted until December 1996, when it was replaced with the Stabilization Force (SFOR). SFOR peacekeepers remained in Bosnia until 2004. The force was granted the authority to arrest war criminals indicted by the **war crimes tribunal** entitled the UN International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (UN-ICTY), which had been set up in The Hague. For the first time in history, the international community (as opposed to the victors in war) took on the responsibility for ensuring justice for the victims of war crimes.

In 1998, nine years after its autonomy had been abolished, Kosovo also descended into war against Serbia. The threats of military action by **the West** failed to curb the escalating violence and in March 1999 NATO mounted a **humanitarian intervention**, launching air strikes in both Kosovo and Serbia, including against the Serbian capital Belgrade. Tens of thousands of Kosovo Albanian refugees started to flee the province, telling of forced displacement and atrocities at the hands of Serb forces. The Serbians, on the other hand, argued that the mass exodus was due to NATO bombing. The air strikes were controversial because it was not clear that medium-altitude bombing was the most effective way to prevent house-to-house atrocities on the ground. The attack was also against a sovereign European state and did not have UNSC approval. Nevertheless, the intervention was widely seen as legitimate and successful. The intervention led to widespread debate within the academic discipline of International Relations, and beyond, about the moral obligations of states to protect **human rights**, the efficacy of the use of force for humanitarian purposes, the relationship between morality and legality, and the question of whether a new norm of humanitarian intervention was developing in the **international society**.

Kosovo became a de facto UN protectorate, which was a major defeat for Slobodan Milošević, who subsequently lost a presidential election in 2000. In 2001, he was handed over to the UN-ICTY to face charges of war crimes and **crimes against humanity**, the first former head of state to face international justice. However, he died in his cell in 2006 before his trial was completed. Also in 2006, Montenegro voted for independence, the last of the republics to leave the union with Serbia. Kosovo declared independence in 2008 although its **sovereignty** has not been recognized by many states, including Serbia and Russia, and its legal status remains contested. Despite the brutality of the wars and residual resentment particularly among the Serbs both at the actions of the international community and the UN-ICTY, normal relations now exist between the former warring provinces, with significant functional linkages and examples of cooperation, leading to what has been described as the reemergence of Yugoslavia in a new guise, that of a "Yugosphere."

FRANK, ANDRÉ GUNDER (1929–2005). André Frank was born in Berlin but escaped from Germany to Switzerland in 1933 when his father, who was a pacifist novelist, recognized that his family was in danger under the Nazi dictatorship of **Adolf Hitler** that had taken **power** that year. Frank went to school in Switzerland until he immigrated with his family to the United States in 1941, where he went to high school in Hollywood and Ann Arbor, Michigan. His school friends called him Gunder and he retained the name. He gained an economics degree from Swarthmore College, Pennsylvania, in 1950 and his PhD at the University of Chicago in 1957, by which time he had rejected mainstream economics and taken a radical, egalitarian line, influenced by **Marxism** but distinct from the earlier work of **Karl Marx** and **V. I. Lenin**. He began his academic career at the University of Brasilia (1962–1965), moved to the National Autonomous University of Mexico, Mexico City (1965–1966), and finally became professor of sociology at the University of Chile, Santiago (1968–1973). In 1973, following the overthrow of President Salvador Allende, whom he supported, by General Augusto Pinochet, Frank left Chile to escape danger under the latter's dictatorship. He returned to Germany, taking a post at the Max Planck Institute, Bavaria (1973–1978), before moving to the University of East Anglia in Great Britain (1978–1983), and finally the University of Amsterdam (1981–1994).

Frank wrote and published prolifically, including many widely acclaimed papers on **economic development** and **dependency**; his first two books, *Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin America* (1967) and *Latin America: Underdevelopment and Revolution* (1969), established his reputation. Following the earlier work of **Raúl Prebisch**, he examined relations between **states** at the center of the international economic system and those at the periphery. Focusing on Latin America, Frank argued that, rather than natural stages through which all states pass, development and underdevelopment

resulted from long-term processes whereby wealth deriving from the peripheral states is accumulated by those at the center. This led to the development of underdevelopment, involving self-sustaining growth in the North (center) and dependent underdevelopment of the peripheral countries of the South. Another aspect of the process was that, within states, wealth was extracted from the rural areas and accumulated by the urban areas, resulting in uneven development. The external and internal situations were parts of a united international economic system—hence his work, like that of Prebisch, is sometimes known as the structuralist view.

Frank differed from Prebisch significantly regarding the solution to the problem, which was not to change the terms of international **trade** but, rather, for states of the South to leave the system and develop autonomously. Some of his critics noted that some previously dependent countries did eventually develop, citing some states in Asia. They argued that while Frank was right to analyze external relations, another factor was that of internal forces, which led to differing outcomes. Although Frank's analyses are widely considered oversimplistic, he is credited with raising issues that required further research. Later world systems theories, notably that of **Immanuel Waller-stein** (the historical grounds of which Frank later criticized), built on Frank's analysis. Frank continued to write until his death, his later work being broadly in the field of **postcolonialism**.

See also THIRD WORLD.

FUNCTIONALISM. On the assumption that greater international cooperation is attainable, functionalism presents arguments that collaboration on the basis of function can be increased in steps, covering an increasing number of fields and activities. As an alternative to federalism and **collective security**, functionalism challenges the principle of the **sovereignty** of **states**. The process would begin with economic and welfare functions and spread to others. **David Mitrany** and other functionalists called for the development of a network of specialized functional **international institutions**. Some of these institutions would be regional while others would be of a worldwide scope. This would depend on the nature of the field and activities. Functions would be managed at the most efficient level. By means of these institutions, the habits of cooperation would be fostered. In addition to the great efficiency of such a growing network, it was argued, there would be benefits in terms of conditions of **peace**, as disputes that would otherwise be likely to lead to conflict and **war** would be moderated.

Mitrany and **Harold Laski** began to present proposals for functional **international organizations** in the 1920s and 1930s, arguing without success that the **League of Nations** should adopt and encourage some functionalist procedures. It was not until the 1940s, however, that functionalism

achieved prominence as a theory in the work of Mitrany. Laski continued to offer similar ideas, and **E. H. Carr** also began to argue for functionalist international procedures to be adopted in that decade.

Among Mitrany's many functionalist writings was the pamphlet *A Working Peace System: An Argument for the Functional Development of International Organization* (1943). Although his ideas initially had some influence in the new **United Nations** (UN) organization, their impact on UN practices was only very marginal. The functionalists hoped that as an increasing range of activities came to be organized on the basis of function, sovereignty would gradually diminish. The principle of sovereignty, nevertheless, proved to be more durable than the functionalists expected, especially as states were reluctant to relinquish the **power** that sovereignty helped to underpin. **Realism**, rather than functionalism, thus became the most influential theoretical approach in International Relations after **World War II**.

Although the influence and prominence of realism continued into and beyond the 1950s, functionalist ideas were revived during that decade as schemes for integration in Western Europe were developed. In addition to functionalism, federalism was considered, as was a United States of Europe. Instead, however, broadly confederal arrangements were favored and thus the European Coal and Steel Community was formed in 1952 and the European Atomic Energy Community and the European Economic Community in 1957. These international organizations came to be parts of the European Community, which itself was transformed into the **European Union** (EU) in the early 1990s. Although functionalism had proved to be an overly optimistic theory, at least in the short term, Mitrany continued to show commitment to the theory, eventually publishing *The Functional Theory of Politics* in 1975. Meanwhile some theorists began to devise a related theory that came to be known as neofunctionalism. Although this newer theory was never applied fully to the European communities or the EU, some of its component ideas have been tried in various forms.

Neofunctionalism combines elements of functionalism and federalism. Like the latter, neofunctionalism saw a European continental union and indeed a superstate as both desirable and feasible. This union or state would develop its own **foreign policy** and defense policy. There would not, however, be a conscious effort to introduce a federal constitution. The new central authority would, instead, be likely to emerge as an unintended consequence of the process of integration. The process would take place gradually as, guided by creative policy making by bureaucrats and politicians, the existing levels of integration would facilitate and determine later levels. Spillover would take place; in other words, the functional arrangements in one field would spill into others. The central authority would emerge as the functional spillover from one activity to the next would be accompanied by political spillover, by which formal political control is transferred from the national or

state level to the supranational level (in other words, to a centralized authority that operates above the state level). The leading theorist of neofunctionalism was **Ernst Haas** in his books *The Uniting of Europe* (1958) and *Beyond the Nation-State* (1964).

See also INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY.

G

GALTUNG, JOHAN (1930–). Johan Galtung was born in Oslo. At the age of 12, he witnessed the arrest of his father, who was a physician, under the Nazi occupation of Norway. Galtung was jailed in 1954, at the age of 24, for being a conscientious objector, insisting that part of the social service he did instead of joining the Norwegian military be spent in the cause of **peace**. He was released after six months. Thereafter, he went to the University of Oslo, where he gained the equivalent of a PhD in mathematics in 1956 and a similar qualification in sociology the following year. He became a conflict mediator, working to bring an end to more than 100 conflicts between states, nations, religions, civilizations, communities, and individuals. He also became one of the foremost theorists of peace and conflict resolution, writing and publishing more than 160 books and hundreds of articles on peace, **war**, and related topics. Furthermore, he has been involved in education and journalism in the cause of peace. He has held professorships in a range of universities including those in Oslo, Kuala Lumpur, and Hawai'i.

As the pioneer of **peace studies**, Galtung founded the International Peace Research Institute in Oslo in 1959. This was the first of many peace centers in which he was involved in a number of countries. He also founded the *Journal of Peace Research* in 1964. In 1993, he was the cofounder of TRANSCEND: A Network for Peace, Development and Environment. He also pioneered the notion of peace building. This was linked to his work on conflict resolution, arguing that the root causes of conflict needed to be addressed in order for peace building to have lasting success. Those causes included the actual or perceived incompatibility of goals between parties, as well as the perceptions, misperceptions, attitudes, and behavior of those parties. One of his books that present this theory is *Peace by Peaceful Means: Peace and Conflict Development and Civilization* (1996).

See also AGGRESSION; ARMED CONFLICT; FORCE.

GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE (GATT). *See* WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION (WTO).

GENEVA CONVENTIONS. The Geneva Conventions are key treaties in **international humanitarian law** and seek to protect civilians in **war**. They are premised on a basic distinction between combatants and civilians. Attacks on civilians (innocents or noncombatants) are prohibited as are attacks on military targets that are likely to result in a disproportionate number of civilian deaths. Once captured or wounded, because they are no longer engaged in the fighting, soldiers lose their status as combatants. They are therefore protected against the possibility of being legitimately killed and gain rights as a noncombatant. However, at the same time, they lose their right to kill enemy combatants. A prisoner of war who kills a prison guard, for example, is guilty of murder.

The first Geneva Convention was adopted in 1864 on the treatment of the sick and wounded in war. The convention followed the foundation of the **International Committee of the Red Cross** (ICRC), and this private organization remains the key mechanism by which humanitarian law is monitored. The Red Crescent was adopted as an alternative emblem by mainly Muslim populations in 1876. Further conventions were agreed upon in 1949. Each Geneva Convention deals with the specific protection of a particular category of people who are not (or no longer) involved in hostilities. Convention 1 deals with the treatment of the wounded and sick members of the armed forces on land, Convention 2 deals with the treatment of the wounded and sick members of the armed forces at sea, Convention 3 deals with the treatment of prisoners of war, and Convention 4 deals with citizens or noncombatants.

There are two additional protocols to the conventions. The first protocol increased the humanitarian regulation of international armed conflict, and the second considered the protection of victims in civil wars. There is a further Geneva Convention of 1980 on the prohibition or restrictions on the use of certain conventional weapons that may be deemed to be excessively injurious or to have indiscriminate effects, and a further one in 2005 that recognized the red crystal as an alternative official symbol for both protective and indicative uses.

The Geneva Conventions have been ratified by most **states** and have significant moral and normative weight. Indeed, they have become part of customary **international law** and have been interpreted as obligating all parties to a conflict. Furthermore, parties to the Geneva Conventions are "required to search for persons alleged to have committed grave breaches and, upon arresting such persons, either to try them criminally (no matter what their nationality or the nationality of the victims or where the acts causing injury occurred) or extradite them." The Geneva Conventions therefore establish a **universal jurisdiction**.

See also AGGRESSION; ARMED CONFLICT; FORCE; PEACE.

GENOCIDE. The term *genocide* literally means the killing of peoples. In the wake of the Jewish Holocaust in **World War II**, the Genocide Convention of 1948 was agreed upon to protect minorities from targeted destruction. The convention defines genocide as one of five specific acts "committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group." The five acts are: killing members of the group; causing serious harm, either bodily or mentally, to members of the group; deliberately inflicting conditions of life onto the group that are calculated to do harm; preventing births within the group; and removing children from the group. This definition is repeated almost unchanged in the Rome Statute of the **International Criminal Court** (ICC). The important difference between genocide and **crimes against humanity** is that genocide can take place both in time of **peace** or in time of **war**. The purpose of the Genocide Convention was primarily prevention, and it places a responsibility on **states** to prevent genocide in all cases. For this reason the international community is often slow to describe acts of killing as genocide to avoid their obligations under **international law**. The convention also established that anyone accused of genocide could be tried anywhere in the world, regardless of nationality or where the genocide took place, under the principle of **universal jurisdiction**.

Despite the convention, genocide persists as a periodic outrage in international relations. In 2013, former president of Guatemala Efraín Ríos Montt became the first head of state to be tried for genocide by his own state. He was convicted of the killing and disappearances of more than 1,700 indigenous Mayan Indians between 1982 and 1983. Although the original ruling was overturned on a technicality, in August 2015 a court ruled that Montt could face trial again, but will not be sentenced due to his dementia. The genocide of the Mayans went largely unnoticed in the wider world. In 1994, the genocide of the Tutsi people in Rwanda shocked the international community but its response was slow and inadequate. An estimated 800,000 people were slaughtered in 100 days. Some perpetrators have been held to account both by the **United Nations War Crimes Tribunal** for Rwanda and by states such as Sweden, where cases have been brought against perpetrators of the genocide under the principle of universal jurisdiction. Victims of what the United States has declared to be genocide in Darfur have yet to receive justice. Although the ICC has issued a warrant for the arrest of the president of Sudan, Omar Hassan Ahmad al-Bashir, on charges of genocide, he has yet to be arrested to face trial and continues to travel freely across Africa.

Islamic State's campaign of murder, violence, and repression against Christians and the Yazidi ethnic and religious minority in the territory it has seized in northern Iraq and Syria has also been declared to be genocide by the U.S. Congress, the U.S. administration, the **European Union**, and the Parlia-

ment of Great Britain. However, as of August 2016 the case had yet to be referred to the **United Nations Security Council**. The world is still failing to prevent and is still slow to respond to acts of genocide.

See also AGGRESSION; ARMED CONFLICT; FORCE; HUMAN RIGHTS; HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION; INTERNATIONAL HU-MANITARIAN LAW; INTERNATIONALLY PROTECTED HUMAN RIGHTS; RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT.

GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS. The issue of the environment has steadily risen up the international agenda since the first **United Nations** (UN) Conference on the Human Environment in Stockholm, Sweden, in 1972, which aimed "to focus governments' attention and public opinion on the importance and urgency of the question." It has since been the focus of much multilateral **diplomacy** among the world's **states**. There has been some success. The Montreal Protocol of 1987 gradually phased out the production and trading of chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs), widely used in refrigeration, which had been discovered to be responsible for a hole in the ozone layer. Other environmental damage has proved to be less easily dealt with; negotiations on climate change, which has been the focus of global environmental politics for many decades, have proven particularly difficult.

There is widespread scientific consensus that climate change is human induced and caused by greenhouse gas emissions (in particular, carbon dioxide). Climate change is a genuinely global issue that will have an impact on every region of the world. Scientists warn of rising sea levels leading to serious flooding and the displacement of millions of people; droughts that may lead to huge numbers of climate change refugees; melting glaciers leading to water shortages; mass extinction of species; and a shrinking of the global economy. Climate change is an issue that is beyond the capacity of any one state to resolve; it requires a global solution and strong **global governance**. Yet, the world is still divided into states and attempts to negotiate an effective climate change regime have been beset with collective action problems. Serious rifts have appeared in international relations between those countries that industrialized first and are historically responsible for emissions of greenhouse gases, notably those in Western Europe and the United States, and those developing states who bear little responsibility for the current situation but are likely to suffer the most devastating consequences, in particular those with extensive low-lying coastal areas, such as Bangladesh and the microstates of the Pacific. Negotiations have also stalled on the responsibilities of states such as China, which do not have historical responsibility but currently have the highest rate of harmful emissions.

The centerpiece of global efforts to negotiate an effective climate change **international regime** has been the Kyoto Protocol, adopted in December 1997. This treaty established the principle of "common but differentiated

responsibilities." The lack of firm commitment by developing economies such as China and India to reduce their emissions led the United States under the administration of President **George W. Bush** to withdraw its support. This undermined the treaty, though it nevertheless had some success and demonstrated the ability of the **European Union** to take an active role in ensuring its members at least met their Kyoto commitments. Some of these commitments were met by emissions **trading**, whereby carbon emissions can be considered as commodities to be traded in the market. Developed states could also offset their omissions targets by funding emissions-reductions projects in the developing world. Reductions were also achieved because of the **financial crisis of 2008** and the ensuring economic slowdown.

The Kyoto treaty expired in 2012, leading to intense efforts to negotiate a successor. The issue of inequalities and "differentiated responsibilities" continued to dog negotiations. In November 2014, the announcement of joint action on climate change by President of the United States Barack Obama and President Xi Jinping of China injected renewed vigor into a process that had been flagging. At the United Nations Climate Change Conference in Paris in December 2015, 186 countries agreed to climate actions and approved the Framework Convention on Climate Change. On 22 April 2016, the United States and China signed the Paris Agreement together and encouraged other parties to do the same with a view to bringing that agreement into force as early as possible. This indicated recognition of the need for strong global leadership on climate change. However, although the Paris Agreement was heralded as "historic" and "ambitious," the commitments were a lot less than many scientists believed were required to prevent the dangerous warming of the planet.

See also BRUNDTLAND, GRO HARLEM (1939–); ECONOMIC GLOBALIZATION; GREEN THEORY; SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT; UNITED NATIONS ENVIRONMENT PROGRAMME (UNEP).

GLOBAL GOVERNANCE. The totality of ways in which the world is governed is known as global governance. **James Rosenau** described global governance as "government without Government," that is, without the backing of the formal authority of a **state**. In an era of **economic globalization**, states and other actors have an interest in cooperation on a large array of issues, from global **security** actions to international accountancy standards. The latter is an example of private-sector standard setting contributing to the global system of rules, while security measures tend to be the preserve of states. Governance is performed by various different types of actors in the international system; states in cooperative agreements such as the Group of Eight (G-8), **international organizations**, and nonstate actors all have a role in governance. The **United Nations** is frequently found at the heart of global governance and has taken the lead role on the governance of many issues that

transcend state borders. For example, the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (2000) and its Protocols to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, and against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air attempt to get to grips with serious global problems such as the **trade** in drugs and people that has such a detrimental effect on **human rights** and security. In the foreword to the convention, Kofi A. Annan, **United Nations secretary-general** at the time, wrote that through the convention "the international community demonstrated the political will to answer a global challenge with a global response." Such collective efforts lead to global governance.

Global governance measures are often supported and strengthened by regional organizations. In November 2015, for example, the leaders of the **Association of Southeast Asian Nations** (ASEAN) signed the ASEAN Convention against Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children. The increasingly important role in international relations of such organizations and also the many nonstate actors that operate in areas such as trafficking, raises the questions of whether the key **global power shift** is not from one group of states to another but from the state to nonstate actors, and whether global governance is evidence of the gradual demise of the **Westphalian state system**. However, the successful implementation and enforcement of international conventions requires concerted action on the part of states. In the case of human trafficking, it is the states that must prosecute traffickers, protect victims, and design preventive measures. Unfortunately, there are sometimes shortcomings in state implementation and enforcement, and this demonstrates the limits of global governance, not just in this issue area but across the board of problems facing the people of the world.

See also DIPLOMACY; ECONOMIC GLOBALIZATION; FOREIGN POLICY; GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS; INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS; INTERNATIONAL REGIMES; MIGRATION; SUMMIT.

GLOBAL POWER SHIFTS. The rise of China and other economic powers has raised the question of whether the period of **American primacy** is coming to an end. Although the 19th century was the British century and the 20th century was the American century, many expect the 21st century to be dominated by Asia, and more particularly, by China. Whether in the foreseeable future China will become a credible rival to U.S. global dominance is a key question of the age, and the answer to it will define the nature of international relations into the future. The question is multifaceted. On the one hand, there is the question of whether the United States is declining in real terms. The huge budget deficit, the failure of U.S. institutions to deal with key economic issues, poor leadership, declining education standards, and so on are all cited as evidence that the superpower is destroying itself internally. There are

strong arguments on both sides, but what is a known fact is that the United States' share of the global economy is declining due to the rise of other powers.

In 2002, a Goldman Sachs economist predicted that by 2035 the BRIC countries, as he termed them, would overtake and completely eclipse the United States and EU economically. The BRIC countries are Brazil, Russia, India, and China, and these states are currently the main centers of economic growth in the world: Brazil because of the richness of its natural resources and the high demand for them from China; Russia because it holds the world's largest reserves of fossil fuels; India because of its very successful information technology and outsourcing industries; and China for its sheer size and very high growth rates. South Africa has now been added to the list, and the acronym has thus been extended to **BRICS**. There are some smaller countries beyond Europe, such as South Korea and Singapore, that are also economically very successful, but it is the sheer size of the BRICS states and their economies that makes them so significant in global terms. Among them, they amount to a quarter of the world's landmass and nearly half of the world's population.

China, which is by far the most powerful of the BRICS, now has the world's second-biggest economy and is expected to overtake the United States as the world's largest economy by the third decade of the 21st century. The emergence of China as a regional superpower and major world economic power is therefore beyond doubt. The key questions are the extent to which the rise of China challenges U.S. dominance, not only in Asia but the world more widely, and whether its rise is likely to remain peaceful. The rise of China is raising concern in the United States and beyond, and has spawned a large and growing literature in the academic discipline of International Relations. Key writers such as **John J. Mearsheimer** have considered the implications of China's growing power. China is now in a position to make the United States uncomfortable for various reasons. First, the United States has a huge **trade** deficit with China. Second, the United States is heavily in **debt**, and China holds the largest share of that debt. In May 2016, China held U.S. Treasury bonds to the value of $1.244 trillion, reducing the ability of the United States to influence China or to confront China strongly over other issues of contention. Third, the spread of Chinese influence in Africa and South America is beginning to undermine the ability of both the United States and European countries to affect outcomes in their traditional spheres of influence. Fourth, China is increasingly competing for geopolitical influence in Asia, a key area of U.S. influence since the end of the **Cold War**. Fifth, China is showing signs of wanting to behave like a great power—for example, its investment in the human exploration of space. It is also integrating more comprehensive military capabilities and developing new and sophisticated weapons. Finally, China offers an alternative to the **hegemony** of

the liberal form of **democracy** as the most influential model of politics. The rise of China, therefore, has the potential to change the very nature of international relations, and in particular to end the post–**World War II** liberal consensus that underpins much **global governance** in areas such as the global economy and **human rights**.

The growing power of BRICS states also might change the structure of international relations in future decades. Power is likely to be more dispersed, and the unipolarity of the U.S.-dominated system since 1991 is likely to be replaced with multipolarity and an end to the period of hegemonic U.S. **power**. How well the United States adjusts to the changing realities of global power will in large measure determine whether the process of global power shifts remains peaceful.

See also ARMED CONFLICT; BRITISH HEGEMONY; ECONOMIC GLOBALIZATION; FORCE; WAR; WEST, THE.

GLOBALIZATION. *See* ECONOMIC GLOBALIZATION.

GORBACHEV, MIKHAIL SEGEYEVICH (1931–). Mikhail Gorbachev was born in Stravropol Krai, southern Russia, which was then in the Soviet Union. His parents were peasant farmers. He left his job driving combine harvesters on the collective farms that **Josef Stalin** had introduced to study law at Moscow State University. Having joined the Communist Party before graduating in 1955, he rose through its ranks, first in the Stavropol region and then centrally. He completed a second degree in agriculture in 1978 and was appointed to the agriculture central committee in Moscow; by the early 1980s, he had been promoted to the executive (Politburo) of the central committee. In 1985, he became general secretary and thus head of the Soviet Union.

Gorbachev was widely seen as the sort of modernizer desperately needed for restructuring (perestroika) of the economic system of the country. He also saw the need for political reform, which would involve far greater openness (glasnost). By means of perestroika and glasnost, he hoped to transform communism into social **democracy**. As part of perestroika, he began to cut the spending on the military, which, in the effort to preserve Soviet **power** and to maintain the bipolar **balance of power** with the United States, was draining the economy. In awareness that a new **foreign policy** was required in order to end the **arms race**, he engaged in **diplomacy** to build better relations with **the West**. British prime minister **Margaret Thatcher** commented that he was a man she could do business with, and this helped smooth the path to negotiations with President of the United States **Ronald Reagan**. This resulted in a series of **summits** and **arms control and disarmament** agreements, including the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty. In 1989, he

withdrew Soviet forces from the **war in Afghanistan** and made it known that he would not apply the use of **force** to prevent reforms in the countries of the Warsaw Pact in Eastern Europe. This led to the collapse of communism in those countries. **Nationalism** was stirred in the republics that comprised the Soviet Union, and Gorbachev did not intervene to prevent activity in movements for autonomy or independence.

Gorbachev won the **Nobel Peace Prize** in 1990 for his leading role in the international **peace** process. The following year an attempt was made from within the Communist Party to remove him from power. The coup failed but Gorbachev recognized that Boris Yeltsin had huge support for his plans to abolish the Soviet Union and give power to Russia and the other republics. Gorbachev subsequently resigned. These events brought about the end of the **Cold War**.

See also LENIN, VLADIMIR ILYICH (1870–1924); MARX, KARL HEINRICH (1818–1883); MARXISM.

GREAT DEPRESSION. A worldwide economic crisis, the Great Depression lasted through most of the 1930s. International **trade** fell by 30 percent and the Great Depression revealed serious failures of international financial management due to a shift in the center of economic **power**. British power had underpinned the global economy in the 19th century; however, after **World War I**, even though Great Britain once again took up the mantle of global economic and financial leadership, it was seriously weakened and impoverished by the **war** and was no longer economically or politically strong enough to be effective in that leadership role. The natural **hegemon** was then the United States, which had the world's strongest economy and by far the largest portion of the world's gold supply, 40 percent. However, the U.S. retreat to isolationism after the war left it unwilling to take up the role, which it would not do until **World War II**. Faced with serious economic contraction, the United States had little experience or insight as to how to deal with the Great Depression. There was, therefore, a serious lack of economic leadership at a time when it was sorely needed. As a consequence, the global economy fragmented into trade and currency blocs with high levels of protectionism; "beggar thy neighbor" policies resulted. The world of international politics also rapidly turned to **aggression** with the rise of fascism in Italy, National Socialism in Germany, and militarism in Japan. The Great Depression is therefore seen as one of the causes of World War II. The harsh lessons of the Great Depression led to a willingness of the United States to take a very significant leadership role after that war. A new managed system was set up at **Bretton Woods** designed to intervene to manage economic **interdependence** to avoid any repeat of the devastation of the Great Depression.

See also BRITISH HEGEMONY; MARSHALL PLAN.

GREEN THEORY. Necessarily international in scope, Green theory seeks to account for some of the great environmental problems that face the Earth and to offer solutions to them. The problems include global warming and the melting ice caps of the **Arctic** and **Antarctic**, the growing hole in the ozone layer and the thinning thereof, the destruction of the rain forests in pursuit of profit, and the depletion more generally of the Earth's natural resources. A problem is that economic growth and the accumulation of wealth often take precedence over the need to address these problems. Particularly crucial to Green thinking and the growth of the Green movement is the awareness that many contemporary environmental problems are not just local; some of these problems are also global. The growth of such awareness since the 1970s has meant that Green theory in now recognized as a particular strand of **International Relations theory**. Green theory criticizes the state-centric approaches that have traditionally dominated the discipline of International Relations (IR), including **neorealism** and **neoliberalism**.

The solutions to the problems are also international and global. **Interdependence** ensures that even if such a problem emanates from a particular part of the world, its effects will be far more extensive. Green theory thus stresses the importance of changing the ways people live and **states** operate, given the growing awareness of environmental problems today. Green theory, which is sometimes known as ecologism, revolves around the belief that the ecosphere is an interrelated system. This system includes all living things, and also the air, water, and soil in which those things live. Ecologism needs to be seen in the context of the wider environmental thinking that has mushroomed in recent decades, which has led to increased activity in **global environmental politics** and its associated **international regime**. One way to do this is to say that environmentalism seeks to deal with the *symptoms* of the ecological crisis, while ecologism seeks to deal with the *causes* of that crisis. Environmentalist solutions, such as **sustainable development** as advocated in the report entitled *Our Common Future* by the United Nations World Commission on Environment and Development, are considered by ecologists as inadequate.

Some early Green thinkers such as William Ophuls in the 1970s offered authoritarian solutions whereby a world state would impose ecological constraint. In 1968, Garret Hardin presented a less extreme argument along such lines in his discussion of what he called the tragedy of the commons. This meant that if open-access resources are available but limited, then the people will try to gain more at the expense of others. This put the **security** of the environment at risk. Enhancements in technology would simply accelerate the tragedy of the commons, by which he meant ultimately destruction of resources, degradation of the environment, and thus common ruin for humanity. He called for a change in human values of morality. The human society

would need to agree that some actions are not allowed because they would not be morally acceptable. It would be agreed that failure to accept restrictions would result in punishment. He called this solution "mutual coercion."

More recently, Green thinkers such as John Dryzeck in the 1980s argued that the way forward should involve the development of smaller-scale political communities with self-reliant economies. Many critics, including Robyn Eckersley, criticized such schemes for radical decentralization as unrealistic. A more recent argument for decentralization was presented at the turn of the century by Matthew Paterson, who examined the roots of the present environmentalism, tracing them to the **Westphalian system of states**, capitalism, managerialism, and patriarchy. He proposed an egalitarian version of decentralization that would involve smaller communities working within egalitarian state economies. He had no illusion that the system could be built rapidly but argued for steps to be taken in that direction. In her book *The Green State: Rethinking Democracy and Sovereignty*, published in 2004, Eckersley presented an influential argument for the development of the Green state and state system. This would involve extensive, but democratically controlled, state regulation. **Democracy** would be transnational, and the state would thus relinquish traditional **sovereignty** and take the role of ecological steward. Obviously, this could not be achieved quickly, but Eckersley argued that steps toward this new situation need to be taken.

See also BRUNDTLAND, GRO HARLEM (1939–); ECONOMIC GLOBALIZATION; GLOBAL GOVERNANCE; UNITED NATIONS ENVIRONMENT PROGRAMME (UNEP).

GROTIUS, HUGO (1583–1645). Hugo Grotius was born in Delft, the Netherlands, where his father was a chief local magistrate. Pressed by his father, Grotius studied from an early age. His good education enabled him to enter the University of Leiden at the age of 11, and to be chosen in 1598 for a significant diplomatic role at the age of 15, accompanying the important Dutch politician Johan van Oldenbarnevelt at their embassy in France. Grotius's talents were recognized by the French king, Henry IV. While in France Grotius gained a degree in law from the University of Orléans. On his return to the Netherlands, he started a law firm at The Hague and worked for some important clients, including the Dutch East India Company and Prince Maurice of Nassau. In 1607, Prince Maurice chose him as attorney-general of Holland, Zeeland, and West Friesland (predecessor of the Supreme Court of the Netherlands). In 1613, he was appointed to a governing role in the Dutch city of Rotterdam. That year, when a dispute arose between the English and the Dutch over the freedom of the seas, he led a delegation to England in protest, arguing that all countries were allowed access to the high seas. England's **power** ensured that his protest was in vain. Nevertheless, access of all to the high seas eventually became part of **international law**.

As a result of a coup d'état in the Netherlands in 1618, Grotius was sentenced to life imprisonment. In 1621, he escaped and was allowed to settle in Paris. While there, he wrote his important book, *On the Law of War and Peace* (*De Jure Belli ac Pacis*), which was published in 1625. He argued that there was a common law among nations that was valid both for **war** and in war—in other words, regarding the circumstances in which war is justified and the conduct of belligerents at war with one another—even though some nations did not abide by this and entered into barbarous conduct. War was thus a legitimate means of responding, where judicial settlement failed, to wrongdoing by other nations. Rightful wars needed, however, to be conducted for just causes (*jus ad bellum*) and to be conducted according to rules (*jus in bello*). This book established him as the pioneer of **just war** theory and international law more broadly. He revised the book several times, the final version being published in 1646.

In 1634, after attempting unsuccessfully to return to the Netherlands three years earlier, Grotius renewed his career in **diplomacy** and was employed by Sweden as ambassador to the German city of Hamburg. He played a minor role in negotiations that led to the end of the Thirty Years' War and thus, years later, to the establishment of the **Westphalian state system** after his death. In 1644, Queen Christina of Sweden moved him to another role but on the way to that country the following year he was shipwrecked. Although he survived, the exhaustion caused by the experience probably contributed to his death.

See also BULL, HEDLEY (1932–1985); STATE.

GROUP OF 77 (G77). *See* UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT (UNCTAD).

GUEVARA, ERNESTO "CHE" (1928–1967). Born in Rosariao, Argentina, to a middle-class family, Ernesto Guevara grew up in Alta Gracia until the age of 11, when he remained in Argentina to attend high school in Córdoba and then to study medicine at Buenos Aires University. He was given the name "Che" in Guatemala during his motorcycle tour of South and Central American countries beginning in 1951, during which his revolutionary ideas developed as he witnessed **poverty**, exploitation, and oppression. In 1954, he met Fidel Castro in Mexico. He joined Castro's revolutionary movement and was prominent in the guerilla **war** in Cuba that brought down the dictatorship of Fulgencio Batista in 1959 and replaced it with Castro's revolutionary government. The influence of **Marxism** upon Guevara and Castro grew stronger, and the Soviet Union developed good relations with Cuba, which became a communist state in the early 1960s. Guevara served political and **diplomatic** roles in Castro's government in that period and also

became a sophisticated theorist of Cuban socialism and guerilla warfare. In 1965, he resigned from government and became an international revolutionary activist and developed the theory of the guerilla nucleus (*foco*). He became critical of the **foreign policy** of the Soviet Union and wrote his *Message to the Tricontinental* (referring to the exploited continents of South America, Africa, and Asia) in 1967, criticizing **imperialism** and arguing that both the United States and Soviet Union in the northern hemisphere exploited the peoples of the southern hemisphere. He suggested that the **United Nations** had been discredited for supporting the United States in the Korean War. With reference to the **Vietnam War**, he called on revolutionaries throughout South America to set up *foci* throughout the continent and create many Vietnams. He was killed by government forces during an operation in Bolivia.

See also AGGRESSION; ARMED CONFLICT; COLONIALISM; MARX, KARL HEINRICH (1818–1883); THIRD WORLD.

H

HAAS, ERNST BERNARD (1924–2003). Ernst Haas was born in Frankfurt, Germany, to a Jewish family. In 1938, having faced danger since **Adolf Hitler** and his Nazi dictatorship took **power** five years earlier, Haas and his family immigrated to the United States, where he enrolled at the University of Chicago. During **World War II**, he worked for the U.S. Army Military Intelligence Service. He left the army in 1946 and studied in public law and governance at Columbia University, gaining his PhD in 1952. The previous year he had been appointed to the academic staff at the University of California, Berkeley, where he became a professor. He remained there for his entire career.

Haas became a leading authority on the European Communities (EC) and, after the EC were transformed in 1993, the **European Union**. His influential book *The Uniting of Europe* (1958) is recognized as the book that led to the creation of EU studies as a field within International Relations (IR). Influenced by the work of **David Mitrany**, in that book and several others, notably *Beyond the Nation-State* (1964), he made important contributions to **functionalism** and **neofunctionalism**. Indeed, he was the pioneer of neofunctionalist theory, which he presented as an alternative position to the **realist** and **liberal internationalist** theories that dominated IR in the 1950s and beyond. His final academic project was a study of the history of **nationalism**, culminating in the two volumes of *Nationalism, Liberalism, and Progress* (1997, 2000).

See also INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY; LASKI, HAROLD JOSEPH (1893–1950).

HARD POWER. *See* POWER.

HEGEMONIC STABILITY THEORY. International economic openness and stability among capitalist states is, according to hegemonic stability theory, most likely at times when only one dominant **state** exists in the international system and thus achieves **hegemony**. An **international regime** develops on the basis of the norms, values, practices, and goals of the hegemon.

The theory is based on the assumption that the distribution of **power** among states is the main factor that determines the character of the international economic system at any particular time. Versions of the theory were prominent in the **International Relations theory** and **international political economy** theory of the 1970s and 1980s, notably in the broadly **neoliberal institutionalist** writings of **Robert Keohane** and Charles Kindleberger, and the **neorealist** work of Robert Gilpin and Stephen Krasner.

Kindleberger and Keohane argued that international economic stability is a collective good that benefits all countries, whether or not they make significant contributions to it. Because the weaker countries will not want to use their own resources when others do not, and may decide to free-ride the system, the most stable situation will be one in which a dominant power recognizes that stability is in its interest and thus has the motivation to provide for the public good. Gilpin and Krasner each discussed the implications of international economic relations for national stability from neorealist perspectives. Their versions of the theory do not rest on the assumption that states have a collective interest in economic liberalization. Even though it is possible (although there is no certainty) that the absolute level of welfare of all states will be raised, some will achieve higher relative gains. If the most powerful states perceive that their **security** is threatened by the continuation of the open international economic liberalization in a way that means they do not achieve relative gains, they will act to restrict it.

Arguing that the capacity to achieve dominance in these ways constitutes hegemony, the hegemonic stability theorists considered Great Britain in the 19th century to be a hegemon that provided stability, which in turn provided the grounds for liberalization of the international economy of the period. They also considered the United States to be such a hegemon during the first few decades after **World War II**, providing for a renewal of the international economic liberalization. The United States was able to perform this role even when in the early 1960s the power of the military and economic power of the Soviet Union meant that there was a bipolar **balance of power** in the world. The United States was still the hegemon within the capitalist bloc, although it did allow some deviations from its preferred pattern of the liberal international economy by Japan and some of the more powerful states of the **European Community** in the 1970s to ensure they remained within the American sphere of interest. Although there was some instability, the United States did not enter into as serious a decline as some people expected. After the **Cold War**, the United States was once again considered by some to have unipolar hegemony. In the early 21st century, the economic liberalization and subsequent rapid rise of China led some commentators to argue that the stability provided by U.S. hegemony might decline.

See also AMERICAN PRIMACY; BRITISH HEGEMONY; ECONOMIC GLOBALIZATION; GLOBAL POWER SHIFTS.

HEGEMONY. There are two main uses of the term *hegemony* in **International Relations theory**. The first, often but not exclusively found in **realism**, considers hegemony to occur when a **state**, known as a hegemon, dominates the international system. Such dominance is achieved by means of military and economic **power**. Hegemony could theoretically be either regional or global. **Neorealist** theorist **John J. Mearsheimer** argues that it can only be regional in the contemporary world system. The second usage is in the strand of **critical theory** that also fits into some theories of **international political economy**. Inspired by the work of Italian **Marxist** Antonio Gramsci, this usage refers to situations in which the ideas of socially dominant groups and classes permeate thinking and **culture** to such a degree that they are able to gain subconscious acceptance among other, subordinate groups of their ideology, norms, and values. The hegemonic groups thus gain perceived legitimacy for their dominance in the international system. The most prominent theorist of such hegemony is **Robert W. Cox**. He and other Gramscian theorists have discussed the possibility of the development of a counterhegemon, although they recognize that the power of the existing hegemon make this an immense task.

See also AMERICAN PRIMACY; BRITISH HEGEMONY; FORCE; GLOBAL POWER SHIFTS; HEGEMONIC STABILITY THEORY.

HITLER, ADOLF (1889–1945). Adolf Hitler was born in Braunau am Inn, Austria, near the German border. His mother came from a poor peasant family and his father was a customs official. Hitler left school at the age of 16 without qualifications. Although his application to study at the Vienna Academy of Fine Arts was rejected in 1907, he nevertheless earned a living as an artist, while in his considerable spare time he dreamed of a united Austria and Germany. He disliked the multiethnic composition of the Austro-Hungarian Empire and during this period was exposed to anti-Semitic views that influenced his own thinking profoundly. At the outbreak of **World War I** in 1914, he enlisted in the German army. During the **war**, he was wounded and decorated for bravery. He opposed the surrender of Germany in 1918, blaming Jews and socialists for what he considered to be betrayal.

Following the **Paris Peace Conference** and Treaty of Versailles of 1919, Hitler's anger at humiliation intensified and he joined the extreme **nationalist**, anti-Semitic German Workers' Party, which would later become the National Socialist (Nazi) Party ("socialist" was a misnomer). In the 1920s, he defeated some important rivals in the party, some of whom wished to take it in a socialist direction. He organized paramilitaries and attempted a revolution in Germany in 1923 but was arrested and imprisoned for treason. While in prison, he wrote *Mein Kampf,* which recorded his ideas for rule by a pure Aryan race and the elimination of impure races and the Jews. His party contested elections in 1928 but achieved only 2.6 percent of the vote. Sup-

port for the Nazis grew during the international crisis of 1929. In the early 1930s, he capitalized on this, eventually taking **power** and total control in 1933, banning opposition parties, eliminating the remaining opponents in his party, oppressing Jews and other minorities, rearming for war, uniting Germany and Austria, and expanding German territory. **E. H. Carr**, in his groundbreaking **realist** book *The Twenty Years' Crisis*, considered Nazi Germany as one of the "have-nots" that challenged the power and supremacy of the established "haves" among the **states** of the world. Carr controversially suggested that Hitler's refusal to accept there was a community of interests between the haves and have-nots was an echo in a different context of the **Marxist** denial of such community.

In 1939, Hitler signed a nonaggression pact with **Josef Stalin** to avoid war with the Soviet Union. In **alliance** with Japan and Italy, Hitler's actions led Great Britain and France to declare war on Germany and so **World War II** began that year. France surrendered in 1940 and Hitler broke the pact with Stalin and invaded the Soviet Union in 1941. Also that year Hitler declared war on the United States. Under Hitler's leadership the Nazis committed **genocide** against the Jews during the war. The Allies, led by the United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union, defeated Germany in 1945 after Hitler committed suicide in April that year. Japan was also defeated later that year.

See also AGGRESSION; ARMED CONFLICT; CHURCHILL, WINSTON LEONARD (1874–1965); CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY; FORCE; LEAGUE OF NATIONS; ROOSEVELT, FRANKLIN DELANO (1882–1945); TOTAL WAR.

HOBBES, THOMAS (1588–1679). Thomas Hobbes's mother gave birth to him prematurely in Malmesbury, England, when she heard that invasion by the Spanish Armada was imminent. He later said she gave birth to twins: he and fear. His father was a vicar who, fleeing punishment for fighting with another clergyman, abandoned the family. Hobbes was educated at the grammar school of his hometown and then at Magdalen Hall in Oxford University. Thereafter he was employed by the Earl of Devonshire as a tutor and a secretary. He achieved fame for a number of books for which he is widely considered one of the greatest British political philosophers. The most well known of those books is *Leviathan*, published in 1651, shortly after the English Civil War. The violent nature of England in the **war**—and of mainland Europe, which also endured much war during the first half of the 17th century—influenced his theory of the need for strong, undivided government where the **sovereignty** of the **state** is not challenged. The alternative would be chaos in society, which he portrayed with his notion of a hypothetical state of nature where life would be "solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short." Human nature was the source of the problem. Human beings were driven

largely by the desire for **power** as a means to acquire what they need for contentment in life. Once the authority of the state was challenged, then humans would be at war with one another, and society would begin to slip into what in his view was the natural situation of people in their relations with one another—which, based on his view of human nature, he believed would be a situation in which self-interested people would be in permanent conflict in the absence of a state to govern them. He hoped that this could be avoided, and that war would give way to **peace**.

Although Hobbes was mainly concerned with what was needed for peace within societies, he was clearly drawing analogies with international relations. In turn, many International Relations (IR) scholars have suggested that his theories also apply internationally. Because there is no international equivalent of the sovereign state with absolute authority over a particular territory, international relations are characterized by an **anarchical** state of nature. Hobbes's ideas have been applied in IR by thinkers of the realist tradition. He is, along with several other pre-20th century thinkers, including **Niccolò Machiavelli** and **Thucydides**, known as an early theorist of **classical realism**.

See also CARR, EDWARD HALLETT (1892–1982); MORGENTHAU, HANS JOACHIM (1904–1980); NIEBUHR, REINHOLD (1892–1971); WALTZ, KENNETH NEAL (1924–2013); WESTPHALIAN SYSTEM OF STATES.

HO CHI MINH (1890–1969). Ho Chi Minh was the pseudonym of Nguyen That Than, who was born in Kim lien Annam in Vietnam, which was part of the French **colonial** territory known as French Indochina. His father worked at the **imperial** court before being pressured into resigning after criticizing the French colonial **power**. After attending school in Hue, Vietnam, Ho worked briefly as a teacher before going to work as a cook on a ship. He then had low-paid jobs in the United States, Great Britain, and France. By this time, he was participating in radical activity. In 1919, inspired by President of the United States **Thomas Woodrow Wilson**'s principle of national self-determination, he campaigned at the **Paris Peace Conference** for self-determination to be granted to the Vietnamese people. He was ignored, leading him to become more radical. He was involved in the formation of the French Communist Party in 1920 and went to Moscow in 1923 to receive training by the Comintern, which Soviet leader **V. I. Lenin** had formed in order to promote international revolution. The following year, he was sent to Canton, China, to organize a revolutionary movement among Vietnamese exiles. By this time, his Paris campaign had earned him recognition from radical **nationalists** in Vietnam. In 1930, he formed the Indochinese Communist Party in China.

After imprisonment by British police in Hong Kong from 1931 to 1933, he returned to Moscow and China before forming the Viet Minh—a communist independence movement—to fight against Japanese occupying forces in the 1940s. He became known as Ho Chi Minh during this period. Upon the defeat of Japan in 1945, he proclaimed the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, but the French refused to grant independence. Ho led the Vietnamese in the **war** of independence, which ended with victory in 1954. Negotiations in Geneva assigned the north of Vietnam to the Viet Minh, under the presidency of Ho, who formed the new country into a communist **state**. When the **Vietnam War** began in the 1960s between South Vietnam and the United States against communist rebels supported by North Vietnam, Ho was in poor health and his role had become ceremonial. Nevertheless, he remained an inspirational figure until and beyond his death from heart failure.

See also AGGRESSION; ARMED CONFLICT; EMPIRE; FORCE; MARXISM.

HUMAN DEVELOPMENT INDEX. *See* UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME (UNDP).

HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION. The principle of humanitarian intervention holds that the international community and its constituent units, including **states** and **international organizations**, have a right and duty to intervene militarily in states where there has been **genocide** or large-scale loss of life because of deliberate government action or collapse of authority. The principle also holds that the objectives of such intervention must be humanitarian rather than strategic. The principle became very prominent in both practical and academic debates in international relations during the 1990s, when in the early post–**Cold War** era a number of human crises erupted. Governments of the states in which these crises happened did not intervene to protect the people who suffered.

There was intense debate regarding the legitimacy of humanitarian intervention in terms of the **United Nations** (UN) Charter. Article 1(3) of the charter identifies promotion and encouragement of respect for **human rights** as a principle purpose of the UN. Moreover, Chapter VII of the charter gives the UN the right to take action involving military and nonmilitary measures. Opponents of humanitarian intervention cited Article 2(4) of the charter, which prohibits the use of **force** against the political independence or territorial integrity of states. There have also been suggestions of inconsistency between (a) the principle of nonintervention and (b) **international law** forbidding genocide and some other violations of human rights. During the Cold War, humanitarian intervention was not considered legitimate. Strategic, rather than humanitarian, concerns often prevailed. Also, as the membership

of the **United Nations General Assembly** grew, many of the new states opposed intervention because they saw it as a way for the powerful states to dominate the weaker ones.

Humanitarian intervention differs from peacekeeping. In classical **peacekeeping** operations, the UN intervenes at the invitation of all parties to the conflict; the UN remains strictly neutral; and the role is limited to stabilizing the situation on the ground or monitoring a ceasefire. Humanitarian intervention involves action without agreement of all the parties to the conflict. The UN-authorized forces might not remain neutral and may become a party to the conflict (for example, in Somalia in the 1990s). Also, mandates on the use of force allow for force to be used to protect civilians.

The term "international community" tends to be interpreted as the UN. On this basis it is often argued that intervention can only be classified as humanitarian intervention if it is UN sanctioned. In the 1990s, several such interventions took place. After the **first Gulf War** of 1991, military forces from the United States, Great Britain, France, and the Netherlands intervened in Iraq to create and protect safe havens for Iraqi Kurds. Iraq's leader, Saddam Hussein, was oppressing Kurds, leading to a refugee crisis. In 1992, Somalia descended into chaos. People suffered as factions fought. A U.S.-led intervention was authorized by the UN (Operation Restore Hope). In Rwanda in 1994, 800,000 people from the Tutsi ethnic group were killed by members of the Hutu ethnic group, encouraged by the state. France did not intervene in Rwanda until the later stages of the crisis. Allegations were made that France was not willing to sacrifice troops until it was in the French **national interest** to intervene to maintain French influence in Rwanda.

Later in the 1990s, there was a humanitarian intervention without explicit UN authorization in response to the Kosovo crisis in the **wars of the former Yugoslavia**. After Yugoslavia broke up, Kosovo remained part of a smaller Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. The Kosovan Liberation Army campaigned for independence using violence. The Yugoslav response included violence against Kosovan civilians. Following reported massacres by Serb police units, the **North Atlantic Treaty Organization** (NATO) was asked to prepare for possible intervention while a **diplomatic** process began to try to resolve the crisis. Serbia did not comply with the eventual draft agreement, and NATO attacked Serbia's military forces in 1999. Although NATO did not get explicit authorization from the **United Nations Security Council** (UNSC) for this intervention, the UNSC did not condemn it.

By the end of the 20th century, there was much confusion, dissatisfaction, and disagreement about the nature of humanitarian intervention, the legality of it, and the motives of states that intervened. There was debate whether the doctrine of humanitarian intervention allows intervention unauthorized by the UN. Some say it is justified on grounds of moral duty. Hence, there is some disagreement on whether some cases should qualify as humanitarian

intervention. Furthermore, states sometimes differ on what are to be regarded as extreme violations. Selectivity was also cited as a problem when trying to justify humanitarian intervention. For example, NATO intervened in Kosovo but did not address the larger humanitarian problems in Rwanda in 1994 and Darfur, Sudan, in the 21st century. Furthermore, humanitarian relief organizations, including the **International Committee of the Red Cross**, did not like the association of the concept of humanitarianism with that of military force.

In 1999, **United Nations secretary-general** Kofi Annan said an international norm to forcibly protect citizens from genocide and mass killing was developing. This was a weak norm with few cases of intervention. He stressed, however, that state **sovereignty** was being redefined by the forces of **globalization**, international cooperation, and stronger demands for human rights to be respected. In response, the Canadian government sponsored the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, which presented a report entitled *The Responsibility to Protect* to Annan at the end of 2001. Thereafter, arguments for humanitarian intervention tended to be replaced by ones for the **responsibility to protect**.

See also CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY; PEACE ENFORCEMENT; RAWLS, JOHN BORDLEY (1921–2002).

HUMAN RIGHTS. The basic idea of a right is that every individual has some legitimate claim, either to be allowed to act in a particular way or to be left alone or protected; rights are entitlements. Rights assign each person a moral status that cannot be legitimately violated and provide a moral framework within which relationships can be justly conducted. Rights provide individuals with moral protection and individual dignity.

A right defines an obligation. In rights theories of politics, the concept of rights is used to describe and explain political arrangements—the correlative duty, in this case, is the duty of the **state**. Rights describe and explain the legitimate claims that an individual has upon his or her society. Indeed, rights theory evolved within the Western **liberal** tradition exactly as a device for limiting the **power** of government. By assuming that individuals had rights as human beings, theorists such as John Locke (1632–1704) could define the limits of state power. Arbitrary, authoritarian power, under which subjects are at the mercy of the whims of their all-powerful sovereigns, is not considered legitimate within the liberal rights-based approach to politics.

For liberals such as Locke, rights exist prior to and independently of the state: they are universal and all people have them regardless of their nationality. This is how human rights differ from civil rights; civil rights are granted by a state (and can be removed by a state). In states with **democratic** institutions and the rule of law, civil rights will be largely congruent with human rights, though this will not be the case in all states. The fundamental differ-

ence is that human rights are not constituted by state law; they come from somewhere else. The question of where they come from is a key philosophical debate and answers vary. In the original idea of rights, which developed out of natural law, rights were granted by God. With the secularization of thought, theorists sought alternative sources such as human reason. In key international instruments such as the **United Nations** Charter, rights are simply assumed to exist.

If human rights are not granted by any civil power, they also cannot be taken away by any civil power. Civil law can override them but not with moral justification. In this sense, human rights are inalienable. Perhaps the most famous articulation of the theory of natural rights is the United States' Declaration of Independence, which declares that "We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by the Creator with certain inalienable rights, that among these are life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness." More recent statements of such ideas can also be found. The Vienna Declaration on Human Rights, for example, issued by the 1993 World Conference on Human Rights, recognizes "that all human rights derive from the dignity and worth inherent in the human person, and that the human person is the central subject of human rights." This liberal assumption of universal, inalienable human rights is the starting point for the project of **internationally protected human rights** that began in 1945 with the UN Charter and included the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

The concept of human rights is both complex and controversial in international relations because it has evolved within a particular tradition of thought and presupposes all sorts of assumptions that themselves are not universally accepted. Although the language of rights has proved fairly easy to transfer to other traditions, this hasn't necessarily meant that it means the same thing across the globe. Furthermore, even though the basic concept of human rights is one that is widely accepted in the modern world, the issue of what actually constitutes a human right is one on which it is much harder to reach agreement. The issue of **culture** and whether traditional cultural practices, such as female genital mutilation, should trump human rights poses all sorts of difficult moral dilemmas. Moral relativism and the charge that human rights are a form of cultural **neocolonialism** also raise important issues about the power relations behind the extension of rights discourse across the globe. Nevertheless, human rights have been accepted and adopted by individuals and **nongovernmental organizations** from very many different cultures and used, often in courageous opposition, in an attempt to hold to account repressive regimes.

See also CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY; GENEVA CONVENTIONS; HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION; INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS (ICRC); INTERNATIONAL LAW; NORMATIVE THEORY; POSTCOLONIALISM; SLAVERY; TORTURE; WAR CRIMES TRIBUNALS.

HUNTINGTON, SAMUEL PHILLIPS (1927–2008). Born in New York City to a mother who was a short-story writer and a father who published journals, Samuel Huntington attended Stuyvesant High School in his home city. He then went to Yale University early, at the age of 16, and graduated aged 18. He joined the U.S. Army in 1946, before going to the University of Chicago for his master's degree, which he was awarded in 1948. He began to teach at Harvard University in 1950, where he also gained his PhD. In 1957, his first book, *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations*, was published. It discussed relations between the military and political realms. In 1959, he left Harvard and was appointed associate director of the Institute of War and Peace Studies at Columbia University. He returned to Harvard in 1962 as a tenured professor, and remained there until the end of his career in 2007. In 1964, his book, coauthored with Zbigniew Brzezinski, *Political Power: USA–USSR*, focused on the dynamics of the **Cold War** characterized by opposition between two rival ideologies. In 1968, while retaining his academic post, he served as **foreign policy** advisor to the unsuccessful Democratic candidate Hubert Humphrey. The following year his book *Political Order in Changing Societies* was published (1969). As a study of political and **economic development**, the book argued that the lack of sufficient political order and authority was the main factor holding back development in countries of the **third world**. In 1977 and 1978, he served in the administration of President of the United States James (Jimmy) Carter, as coordinator of security planning for the National Security Council. Although he was always a Democrat, his controversial conservative views ensured that by the 1980s he was the most cited American political scientist on International Relations. In 1991, his book *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century* was published. It focused on a wave of **democratization** from the mid-1970s to the early 1990s that involved the overthrow of right-wing and communist dictatorships.

Huntington's most well-known and controversial work concerned what he called a clash of civilizations. He first voiced this concern in an article in *Foreign Affairs* in 1993 and extended the argument in his book *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* of 1996. He argued that, in the post–Cold War era, the patterns of cooperation and conflict in the world were being shaped increasingly on the basis of **culture**. He claimed to identify seven culture clusters and possibly an eighth in the world, suggesting that many of them were hostile to culture in **the West**, which, partly due to the

impact of **globalization**, was in relative decline. Asian culture was becoming more pronounced and prominent as the economy of the region was developing rapidly. One feature of this process was the rise of China, which, he predicted, would become the world's most powerful country. The resurgence of Islam was, in his view, also very significant, especially as the Muslim population was becoming more numerous. The book provoked criticism that he was overestimating the significance of cultural revivalism, neglecting the interactions and synergies between cultures in general, and in particular miscalculating homogeneity among Muslims.

In his last book, *Who Are We: The Challenges to America's National Identity* (2004), Huntington turned his attention from international cultural issues to the cultural divide within the United States. The identity that revolved around features such as English language, Protestant values, individualism, religious commitment, and respect for law was being eroded because of the growing number of Hispanic immigrants. *Who Are We* ensured that he remained a hugely controversial author.

See also GLOBAL POWER SHIFTS.

I

IDEALISM. *See* LIBERAL INTERNATIONALISM.

IMPERIALISM. *See* COLONIALISM.

INTERDEPENDENCE. A situation in which there is mutual dependence of **states**, **international organizations** (IOs), and/or other nonstate actors upon the political, social, and economic decisions and actions of one another is known as interdependence. Although states formally have **sovereignty**, they have to negotiate with one another and with the other IOs and actors. The activities, interests, and benefits of them all are interlinked. In the 1970s, **Robert Keohane** and **Joseph Nye** coined the term "complex interdependence" to describe the intensification of the links, the growth of multiple channels of interaction, the diminishment of the hierarchy whereby **security** was traditionally considered a higher level of concern than economic affairs, and the apparently decreasing role of military **force** as a means of resolving issues. Influenced by the work of Keohane and Nye, theorists of **neoliberal institutionalism** perceive interdependence in positive terms, as a condition that fosters cooperation and **peace**.

Although interdependence can be asymmetric (where the impact is unequal), it is in other cases symmetric. Even when it is symmetric, interdependence can also lead to unintended situations that none of the states, IOs, or other actors consider desirable. Hence, since the late 1970s, **neorealists** such as **Kenneth Waltz** have argued that it can be equated with vulnerability. Furthermore, while some theorists argue that interdependence is intensified by **globalization**, neorealists also argue that the extent of interdependence in contemporary international relations is exaggerated and that **war** continues to be likely in situations where there is not a **balance of power** at global and regional levels.

See also INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS; INTERNATIONAL REGIMES; POWER.

INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE. *See* UNITED NATIONS ENVIRONMENT PROGRAMME (UNEP).

INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS (ICRC). An independent humanitarian organization, the objective of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) is to ensure the observation of principles of **international humanitarian law** in conflict situations. It is governed by seven principles: humanity, impartiality, neutrality, independence, voluntary service, unity, and universality. The organization was founded in Switzerland by Henry Dunant in 1864, with the Red Crescent being used as an alternative emblem by mainly Muslim populations since 1876. Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies have since grown up across the world and now constitute the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies. Since 2005, an additional emblem, the Red Crystal, has also been adopted, which can be used by national societies of the Red Cross movement along with the cross itself and the crescent. If those national societies choose to use their own unique symbol, it must be incorporated into the red crystal. The adoption of the red crystal by Israel's Magen David Adom society (MDA) cleared the way for its recognition by ICRC. The MDA can continue to use its symbol of the red Star of David incorporated into the red crystal within Israel and within those countries that permit it. Otherwise it uses the red crystal symbol on its own.

See also GENEVA CONVENTIONS; INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS; INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS; WORLD FOOD PROGRAMME (WFP).

INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE (ICJ). Created along with the **United Nations** in 1945, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) is its main judicial organ. It is the successor to the Permanent Court of International Justice, which was the court of the **League of Nations** from 1922 to 1946 and is located in the Netherlands, in the Peace Palace in The Hague. Its primary function is to arbitrate disputes between **states** such as the one brought to the ICJ in 2016 by Nicaragua and Columbia over alleged violations of sovereign rights and maritime spaces in the Caribbean Sea. Fifteen judges are elected jointly by the **United Nations Security Council** (UNSC) and **United Nations General Assembly** (UNGA) from across the world, and the judges represent the international community rather than their own countries. The ICJ is therefore an important symbol of a rule-governed **international society**. Nevertheless, the judicial element in **international law** is severely limited, and the ICJ is restricted in key ways. First, the ICJ's jurisdiction is limited to those cases in which both parties to a dispute agree to seek judicial advice; many conflicts have not been brought before the Court.

Second, the Court's competence is limited to relations between states, yet a range of nonstate actors are increasingly important in international relations. Third, the Court's jurisdiction is not compulsory so, although some states commit to treating the Court's decisions as binding, other states do not. Finally, the ICJ has very limited enforcement power. In a well-known case, Nicaragua versus the United States (1986), the ICJ was asked to rule on a dispute that had arisen from the mining of Nicaraguan ports by the United States. The ICJ ruled in favor of Nicaragua and awarded it compensation from the United States. This was never paid and the Court had no means of enforcing its ruling. Furthermore, the United States withdrew its recognition of the compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ. Great Britain is the only permanent member of the UNSC now to recognize the Court, and this undermines the authority and effectiveness of the Court.

Despite its limitations, however, the ICJ is not irrelevant. Although it is unlikely to ever settle entrenched and long-standing territorial disputes such as that at the root of the **Arab–Israeli conflict**, it has successfully arbitrated in some instances such as a border dispute between Nigeria and Cameroon in 2003. The ICJ can also be an arbiter of world opinion. It can offer an advisory judgment on any legal question at the request of an authorized body. In 2003, the UNGA asked for a ruling on the legal consequences arising from the construction of the wall being built by Israel on its border with the Occupied Palestinian Territory. The judges' opinion was that the wall construction contravened international law, which was an authoritative statement of global opinion. Nevertheless, in light of its findings, all it could do was to recommend that the UN consider further what action might be taken to prevent the illegal construction. Such limits of the ICJ are consistent both with the voluntary nature of international law and with the decentralized **Westphalian system of states** in which it is the state, not a world court, that has **sovereignty** and that therefore is the highest legal authority over its population and territory.

See also INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT (ICC); PERMANENT COURT OF ARBITRATION (PCA).

INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT (ICC). The **United Nations (UN)** pursued the goal of an international criminal court after it was officially formed in October 1945 just under a month before the first of the Nuremberg trials, which tried those accused of war crimes and **crimes against humanity** during **World War II**. Until that time, **international law** had only regulated the actions of **states**; for the first time, it was recognized that it had a role to play in regulating individuals as well. The changed international environment after the end of the **Cold War** enabled the **United Nations Security Council** (UNSC) to set up the first of several ad hoc **international criminal tribunals** to hold to account those who had violated **international humani-**

tarian law and committed crimes against humanity in the **wars of the former Yugoslavia**. The success of the ad hoc tribunals led in 2002 to the establishment of the permanent International Criminal Court (ICC) in The Hague. In the long delay between the formation of the UN and the establishment of the ICC, some of the worst **human rights** atrocities of the 20th century were committed, such as those by the regimes of Idi Amin in Uganda (1971–1979) and Pol Pot as leader of the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia (1975–1979). Pol Pot's regime is estimated to have killed 25 percent of Cambodia's total population. Some senior members of the Khmer Rouge, however, have faced justice in the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC), a hybrid UN–Cambodian court.

The ICC has the jurisdiction to consider crimes of **genocide**, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and **aggression**. The Rome Statute of the ICC was drafted and agreed upon in 1998 and adopted by a clear majority of **states**, not including the United States. The Court is not part of the UN System so is not subject to the UNSC veto, and the United States was concerned about its own citizens having to appear before the Court. In August 2016, however, 139 states had signed the Rome Treaty and there were 124 ratifications. The Court operates on the principle of complementarity, which means that it only considers a case if a national court is unable or unwilling to do so. It does not have **universal jurisdiction** and can only exercise jurisdiction if the accused is a national of a state party or if the crime took place on the territory of a state party. Its objective is to try the leaders or instigators of major crimes. In order to be considered by the ICC, the crimes of genocide or crimes against humanity have to have taken place on a large scale or to have been part of a specific policy and must have taken place since 1 July 2002.

A case at the ICC is known as a "situation," and these come before the ICC in three ways: a situation can be referred by a government that has ratified the Rome Statute, as happened in the ICC's first situation in Uganda; it can be referred by the UNSC, which can refer situations in states that have not ratified the Rome Statute, such as Sudan; or it can be investigated by the prosecutor relying on his/her own powers, as happened in the early stages of the Libya situation. By July 2016, the ICC had considered 23 cases and convicted three individuals all from the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). In March 2012, Thomas Lubanga Dyilo was found guilty of abducting children and forcing them to fight; in March 2014, Germain Katanga was convicted on counts of both war crimes and crimes against humanity; and in March 2016, Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo was convicted on the same grounds. In August 2016, Ahmad al-Mahdi was the first Islamic extremist to be tried by the Court. He was also the first defendant to plead guilty and the first to be

tried for the demolition of important **cultural** monuments. He admitted to ordering the destruction in 2012 in the ancient city of Timbuktu in Mali. At the time, the city was controlled by rebels and members of **al-Qaeda**.

To hold such perpetrators to account is the central purpose of the Court and it is hoped that, over time, convictions will become a **deterrent**. However, there is concern that most of the Court's focus so far has been on Africa. All but one of the ten situations under investigation in 2016, for example, were African: Uganda, DRC, Central African Republic, Darfur in Sudan, Kenya, Libya, Côte d'Ivoire, Mali, Central African Republic II, and Georgia. This means that the Court is vulnerable to the charge that it is a tool of **the West**, an example of **neocolonialism**. Nevertheless, by 2016, 43 African states had signed the Rome Statute, making Africa the best represented region at the Court. The ICC also has six field offices in Africa: one each in Uganda, Central African Republic, Kenya, and Côte d'Ivoire, and two in DRC. In 2012, Fatou B. Bensouda, a Gambian lawyer, was appointed the Court's chief prosecutor.

See also GENEVA CONVENTIONS.

INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW. Some of the very worst **human rights** abuses take place in times of **war** and conflict, yet it is an accepted international principle that even in the midst of conflict certain minimum standards of human dignity, or certain rights, must be upheld. This principle is very long standing and has evolved out of the **just war** tradition, which has ancient roots. This tradition, in all its variations, represents the principle that war needs to be constrained; war does not relieve anyone of the responsibility to avoid inflicting unnecessary harm on others. International humanitarian law is the body of law that grants protection to people and property in time of armed conflict. It restricts what might rightfully be done under **international law**, and in particular establishes the distinction between combatants and noncombatants, between those engaged in the fighting and so-called innocents or civilians. In short, it ensures that the legal and moral prohibition against killing remains in force even in armed conflict other than between legal combatants.

International humanitarian law is also known as the Law of International Armed Conflict and it prescribes laws governing the use of **force**. It is the international law that regulates both the conduct *of* a war and conduct *in* a war. The Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907 are the leading instruments that regulate the conduct of both land and naval warfare, and still form the basis of existing laws in the contemporary era. The **Geneva Conventions** set out what might rightfully be done in war, and the **International Committee of the Red Cross** has taken on the key role in monitoring observance of international humanitarian law. Violations of the law constitute war crimes and these crimes can be tried in national military tribunals, ad hoc **war**

crimes tribunals such as those for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, and since 2002, in the **International Criminal Court**. War crimes include the willful targeting and killing of civilians, the killing of prisoners of war, extensive destruction of property, and the taking of hostages.

See also AGGRESSION; INTERNATIONALLY PROTECTED HUMAN RIGHTS.

INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS. As defined by **Robert Keohane**, institutions are "persistent and connected sets of rules (formal and informal) that prescribe behavioral roles, constrain activity and shape expectations." According to **neoliberal institutionalism**, the increasing institutionalization of international relations indicates that cooperation between **states** is becoming regularized. Institutions shape and constrain state behavior in a process of **international organization** and deepening **global governance**. A key question in International Relations relates to how **power** is embedded in international institutions and considers whether the creation and operation of international institutions supports and perpetuates the dominance of the most powerful **states**. This is one of the issues of contention in the debate between neoliberal institutionalists and **neorealists**.

International institutions can be divided into three different types. Firstly, there can be customary practices or norms that form conventions. Conventions play an important role in relations between states, and much of **international law** codifies these conventions. Reciprocity is an example of a convention and is an expectation that affects the way states behave. Secondly, there are also institutions that cluster around specific issue areas, and these are known as **international regimes**, such as the **trade**, the environment, or the **human rights** regime. Finally, institutions can be formalized into an international organization. International organizations are therefore also international institutions; however, not all institutions are organizations. The **Concert of Europe**, for example, was an international institution but not an organization: it had no physical headquarters or secretariat.

INTERNATIONAL LABOUR ORGANIZATION (ILO). The aim of the International Labour Organization (ILO) is to promote workers' **rights** and decent employment practices. It was established by the Treaty of Versailles in 1919 and was part of the attempt to secure lasting **peace** after **World War I**. The preamble to its charter states that "universal and lasting peace can be established only if based on social justice." The ILO recognized the urgent need to improve working conditions, and early conventions sought to tackle issues such as the hours of work, protection of children and young people, the provision of insurance for old age, and maternity protection. The ILO became the first of the **United Nations** specialized agencies in 1946. It is

headquartered in Geneva and is a tripartite organization that brings together governments, employers, and workers. It has played a key role in supporting attempts to achieve the Millennium Development Goals, particularly the first goal on **poverty** reduction. The ILO recognizes that good employment opportunities are the best way out of poverty and has worked with countries to help them provide those opportunities and to strengthen the safety net of social security systems for those unable to work.

See also INTERNATIONALLY PROTECTED HUMAN RIGHTS; LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

INTERNATIONAL LAW. A law that exists between states is known as an international law. International law provides the basis for the maintenance of international order—the **state**, territoriality, **sovereignty**, and nationality are all legal concepts underpinning the **Westphalian system of states**. International law also sets out the process by which relations between states are conducted through the laws governing **diplomacy** and the conduct of relations between states. Finally, the principle of *pacta sunt servanda*—the principle that treaties are binding—creates the conditions for international relations. It allows for not only the regulation of routine but also essential transactional activities in **trade**, commerce, travel, and communications, and covers relations between states in all their myriad forms, from postal services to **war**.

Areas governed by international law began to increase exponentially during the 20th century. Technological change necessitated new laws, such as those regulating **weapons of mass destruction**, the exploration of space, the division of the ocean floor, and biotechnology. The developing institutionalization of international relations has also led to the growth of international law. **International organizations** such as the **United Nations** and the **European Union** are constituted by rules and charters, all of which add to the sum of international law. International organizations, furthermore, have now been accepted as possessing rights and duties of their own and are seen as subjects of international law. In very limited ways, even individuals are inching into the jurisdiction of international law and can now be held to account for certain crimes in the **International Criminal Court** or in ad hoc **war crimes tribunals**.

International law is constituted by agreements made by states themselves and in this sense it is voluntary; there is no world government to impose law on states or indeed to act as an enforcement **power**. Nevertheless, states do tend to observe international law in the interests of reciprocity and stability, and every day most states adhere to numerous international agreements. Violations do occur, however, and are often well publicized. Violations threaten to undermine the rule-based system of contemporary **international society**

and raise the thorny question of how international law can be enforced. Sanctions are available within a decentralized system, but these are not easily imposed on more powerful states.

See also ENGLISH SCHOOL OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS; GENEVA CONVENTIONS; GROTIUS, HUGO (1583–1645); INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE (ICJ); INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW; INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS; INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY; LAUTERPACHT, HERSCH (1897–1960); PERMANENT COURT OF ARBITRATION (PCA).

INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND (IMF). Established in Washington, D.C., in 1946, in the aftermath of **World War II**, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) is one of the **international organizations** set up at the **Bretton Woods Conference**. Its primary purpose is to provide monetary stability to the global economy by stabilizing exchange rates and lending money to those **states** experiencing balance of payment difficulties. Those loans are funded by contributions from member-states that are determined by their relative economic strength—the larger the contribution, the larger the quota and the more voting **power** a state has, and the more money it can borrow from the IMF. States with the most economic power therefore have the most power within the IMF, which since 1945 has meant that the United States has dominated the organization. In 2008, however, reforms to the quota gave greater representation to emerging economies. Additional reforms in 2010 further shifted the **balance of power** in the IMF, with China becoming the third-largest member. The IMF has traditionally been headed by a European; since July 2011 its managing director has been **Christine Lagarde**, a former French economic minister.

IMF loans are made on the principle of conditionality, meaning that those states that borrow from the IMF must agree to adopt economic policies that will correct their balance of payments problems, enabling them to repay their IMF loan. IMF conditions have been heavily influenced by neoliberal economic policy, such as a reduction in the size of the state sector, privatization, and liberalized **trade** and finance. The imposition of stringent economic discipline onto struggling states and their populations has meant that the IMF has sometimes been an unpopular actor in international relations. Many developing states, and states such as Ireland and Greece whose economies have been badly hit by a **financial crisis**, rely on IMF money, yet the conditions the IMF imposes on governments can be very bitter medicine. IMF conditions have led to large protests against austerity, as in Greece from 2012 onward. The IMF therefore remains at the heart of **international political economy** and plays a key role in helping states in serious economic difficulties but remains a controversial organization.

See also ECONOMIC GLOBALIZATION; INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS; POVERTY; WORLD BANK; WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION (WTO).

INTERNATIONAL NONGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS. Civil society organizations that have an international membership of individuals, known as international nongovernmental organizations (INGOs), are playing an increasingly important role in international relations. As with **international organizations** more generally, there has been marked increase in the number of INGOs since 1945. Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) have a formal relationship with the **United Nations** (UN) with Article 71 of the UN Charter providing the **United Nations Economic and Social Council** (ECOSOC) with the power "to make suitable arrangements for consultation with nongovernmental organizations." Thousands of NGOs from across the world now have consultative status with ECOSOC. Both domestic and international NGOs work together in transnational advocacy networks that can have significant influence. In areas such as **human rights**, **arms control**, and **global environmental politics**, they have taken a leading role in working toward stronger **global governance**. With both extensive expertise and resources, large NGOs participate in track-two **diplomacy**, negotiations involving nonstate actors. In human rights, for example, nongovernmental groups played an important part in achieving the inclusion of human rights standards into the UN Charter in the first place, and have been instrumental in setting standards, lobbying for the enforcement of human rights instruments, researching violations, and educating the public on human rights issues ever since. Large INGOs like Amnesty International have many more staff working on human rights than even the United Nations. INGOs can also help individuals seek justice. Human Rights Watch, for example, has played an essential role in bringing the former president of Chad, Hissèin Habré, whose regime used **torture** systematically, to trial in Senegal in 2015–2016. In the area of **arms control**, a coalition of INGOs takes much of the credit for achieving the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction, and the UN Arms Trade Treaty. It is unlikely that global governance in such areas would have advanced as it has without the efforts of INGOs.

See also ECONOMIC GLOBALIZATION; INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS; INTERNATIONAL REGIMES; UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION.

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS. Formal international bureaucracies are known as international organizations (IOs). In regular discourse, the term *international institution* is often used interchangeably with the term *international organization*, though in International Relations the terms are connected but distinct. An IO has a physical manifestation in terms of a building, a staff, and an executive head, as well as legal standing. An international institution is a broader concept and covers informal as well as formal patterns of regularized behavior.

Although **international nongovernmental organizations** (INGOs) or transnational corporations might technically be international organizations, the term *international organization* is usually used to denote intergovernmental organizations whose members are **states**; the **African Union** and **North Atlantic Treaty Organization** are just two examples. There are various different ways of categorizing IOs. It can be done by purpose: some organizations have a specific purpose, the regulation of international whaling, for example, in the case of the International Whaling Commission, or **trade** in the case of the **World Trade Organization**. Alternatively, organizations can have a more general purpose, such as the **United Nations**. They can also be categorized by membership, in particular whether it is universal or limited. Membership might be limited to states in a particular geographical region, such as the **Organization of American States** and **Association of Southeast Asian Nations**; by religion, such as the **Organization of Islamic Cooperation**; or by history. The Commonwealth, for example, is a collection of fairly disparate states, the majority of whom share a history of British **colonialism**.

IOs multiplied in the latter half of the 20th century. Although a few did exist prior to 1945, they were limited in scope with a particular functional purpose such as the International Telegraph Union and the Universal Postal Union, which were created to develop and promote standards and procedures in these areas. At the end of **World War II**, IOs were seen by the United States and its allies as a good way to promote stability, **security**, and economic growth. In 1945, therefore, there was an energetic period of IO creation. Since then, the international system has become more and more institutionalized, with hundreds of IOs being created as modern life becomes more complex and as states increasingly recognize the need to cooperate in order to achieve key goals. IOs have been the subject of much research in International Relations, particularly within **neoliberal institutionalism**. It can be argued that the key **global power shift** is not from **the West** to the East but from the state to international organizations and other nonstate actors.

See also ARAB LEAGUE; ASIA–PACIFIC ECONOMIC COOPERATION FORUM (APEC); ECONOMIC COMMUNITY OF WEST AFRICAN STATES (ECOWAS); EUROPEAN UNION (EU); INTERNATIONAL REGIMES; ORGANIZATION OF PETROLEUM EXPORTING

COUNTRIES (OPEC); POSTCOLONIAL RELATIONS; REGIONAL INTEGRATION; WORLD BANK; WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION (WHO).

INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY (IPE). A subfield of International Relations (IR), international political economy (IPE) analyzes the relationship between the economic and political spheres and considers how the one has an impact on and shapes the other. It recognizes, for example, that the economic worth assigned to resources, goods, and services is determined politically. It points out also that politics, including international relations, is strongly influenced by what is economically viable; indeed, economic considerations are increasingly the key factor in political decisions. The traditional focus of the academic discipline of IR was on issues of **war** and **peace**. For a classical theorist such as **Hans J. Morgenthau**, politics and economics were distinct spheres. This meant that in a world of growing economic **interdependence**, in which economic actors were growing in **power** and in which key **security** threats such as the 1973 oil crisis were economic in nature, the complex relationship between economics and politics remained undertheorized and, for some, international relations were being essentially misunderstood. The work of leading IPE theorists such as **Susan Strange**, who argued that it was impossible to separate the political from the economic, therefore broke new ground and led to a reassessment of the importance of economic factors in international relations.

IPE attempts to make sense of a complex system of relationships between a whole range of actors, processes, and issues. Although a relatively new discipline, IPE has important antecedents in the work of classical theorists such as **Adam Smith**, **Karl Marx**, and Antonio Gramsci. Offering different explanations of the world, the work of these theorists feeds into contemporary debates in IPE between liberals, **Marxists**, and **critical theorists**. **Green theory**, **feminist theory**, and **poststructuralism** also make contributions to IPE theory. Its focus is on issues such as economic governance, world **trade**, the global financial system, **economic development**, processes of production and their environmental impact, and the role of changing technologies. Key questions relate to the possibilities and limits of economic cooperation in the international domain.

See also COX, ROBERT W. (1926–); DEPENDENCY; ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT; ECONOMIC GLOBALIZATION; FRANK, ANDRÉ GUNDER (1929–2005); GLOBAL GOVERNANCE; INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND (IMF); INTERNATIONAL REGIMES; INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY; LIBERAL INTERNATIONALISM; NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT (NAM); ORGANIZATION FOR ECO-

NOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT (OECD); SUSTAIN-
ABLE DEVELOPMENT; TRADE; WORLD BANK; WORLD TRADE
ORGANIZATION (WTO).

INTERNATIONAL REGIMES. The standard definition of an international
regime was formulated by Stephen Krasner in his edited book *International
Regimes* (1983). There are four elements of an international regime: princi-
ples, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures. **States** and other organ-
izations in particular fields of international relations have expectations that,
either implicitly or explicitly, converge around these four elements. **Interde-
pendence** increases the likelihood that this will happen, and **globalization**
widens both the scope of regimes and the geographic extent of their exis-
tence. Some regimes are so embedded and institutionalized in the interna-
tional system that they are barely noticed by most people even though they
affect their lives significantly. For example, there are regimes that regulate
arms control, air travel, international **trade**, and international mail, to take
just four examples.

Regimes can be loose or very tightly organized. In some cases, for exam-
ple, a regime may come into existence without any formal agreements being
in place. A regime has, for example, developed in **global environmental
politics**. In other cases, the regime may eventually be highly formalized,
even leading to the formation of an **international organization**. An example
of the latter is the **World Trade Organization**, which was eventually
formed in 1995 to take the place of the General Agreements on Tariffs and
Trade, which had existed since 1947 as a less-formal arrangement that was a
key feature of the international trade regime.

Neorealists such as Krasner and **neoliberal institutionalists** have differ-
ent views on the nature of international regimes. According to neorealists,
regimes bring about relative gains, in that some states benefit more than
others from them. This is a result of **power** on the basis of capabilities
constituting the central feature of regime formation. Regimes thus allow
some states to coordinate international relations to their own advantage. Neo-
liberal institutionalists perceive a far greater likelihood that regimes will
enable states to collaborate for the common good, resulting in absolute gains.
That some states may have global or regional **hegemony** does not, they
argue, preclude such an outcome if the most powerful state involved in the
regime is a benign hegemon.

See also GREEN THEORY; HEGEMONIC STABILITY THEORY;
INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS.

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY. The purpose of International Relations (IR) theory has traditionally been to help students of the subject to organize the known facts of the world and to enhance understanding. Theory looks for generalizations and patterns, similarities, relationships, and differences; it provides a framework by which it can be determined which facts are relevant and useful, which are more important, and why. Theory helps the researcher to decide where the investigative net should be cast, which facts should be uncovered and analyzed, and of all the billions of international interactions going on at any one time, to determine which are significant. Theory is a simplifying device that helps to make sense of the very complex world of international relations.

There is a long tradition of thinking about international relations that stretches back to **Thucydides** in the fourth century BCE, although contributors to this tradition come from a variety of fields—in particular, history, **international law**, political thought, and economics. In the view of Martin Wight, an early and important thinker in the **English School of International Relations**, prior to the founding of the academic discipline of International Relations, thinking on the subject was "scattered and unsystematic." Since 1919 when the **first chair of International Politics** was founded, the development of theory has been an important priority for the discipline. The history of that development starts with **liberal internationalism** after **World War I** and from then on is marked by a series of great debates both on the nature of international relationships and on appropriate methodologies. The first great debate was between liberal internationalism and **realism** in the period leading up to **World War II**, and this was followed by a second in the 1950s between **behavioralism** and approaches more in the historical tradition. With the development of **interdependence** and economic structuralism in the 1960s and 1970s, the discipline entered the phase of the interparadigm debate. The term *paradigm* was widely used in the 1980s to mean the fundamental worldview that underpins theories. It derived from the work of the philosopher of science Thomas Kuhn and his argument that the development of science is marked by periodic scientific revolutions that fundamentally alter understanding and perception. The Copernican revolution, for example, profoundly changed the way people understood the nature of the cosmos. Dutch political scientist Arend Lijphart argued that the development of IR theory was similarly marked, and the term entered into common usage within the discipline. For Kuhn, paradigms were incommensurate with each other (it is not possible to believe both that the sun revolves around the Earth and that the Earth revolves around the sun, for example); in IR the term was rather diluted to denote simply different traditions of thought that may or may not be incommensurable. The three paradigms in the interparadigm debate of the 1980s were political realism, interdependence or pluralism, and neo-**Marxism**.

In the 1990s, International Relations was dominated by a debate between **neorealism** and **neoliberal institutionalism** (neoliberalism), known as the neo-neo debate. Neorealism was an attempt, in the first instance by **Kenneth Waltz**, to update realism in light of criticisms that had been effectively made against it by liberal writers such as **Joseph Keohane** and **Robert Nye**. Neo-liberalism, in turn, was a response to neorealism. The debate was one about what the world was like, with each side offering alternative versions. What each side in the debate shared, however, in addition to some agreed-upon assumptions, was a belief that facts could be objectively discovered about international relations through empirical research. In other words, each competing tradition was positivist. Positivism assumes that the task of the scholar is to discover facts or the truth about the world. It seeks causal relationships between events; in other words, it looks for scientific generalizations that can link one event with another in a causal relationship. The role model is explanation in the natural sciences.

The limits of the neo-neo debate made space for different, more critical voices to be heard more strongly within the discipline, many of which were postpositivist. Another debate, therefore, is the debate between positivist and postpositivist theory. The task of the latter was not to objectively identify facts about the world but to challenge the very way in which knowledge was gained, and the nature and purpose of IR theory changed profoundly. Although there are important differences between critical theories such as **critical theory**, **postmodernism**, **feminism**, and **social constructivism**, they are united in challenging the ontology, methodology, and epistemology of IR. They do not uncritically view the purpose of research as the advancement of knowledge; rather, they ask, "What is knowledge?" They do not assume observable facts to be true in some absolute sense, but ask, "What is truth?" Theory became metatheory and was no longer about organizing the facts of the world but about how we can actually know the world.

Much research in the discipline was, however, carried on in the positivist tradition despite the fact that empirical methods had been thrown into some doubt. There is a divide in the discipline, therefore, between those who continue to seek to discover "the truth" about the world, whether they are studying **arms control**, **economic development**, **human rights**, or something else, and those who seek to subvert the apparent "truths" this work reveals, through metatheoretical critique. Dialogue between the two camps is not common, though there have been some direct confrontations with leading names in the field accusing postpositivist writers of privileging epistemological and methodological issues over an analysis of important issues, and of failing to address the question of how people should act or what should be done about the numerous global problems. Keohane, for example, famously called on postpositivist theorists to "get a research program." The divide, however, has been bridged to some extent by social constructivism (some-

times shortened to constructivism), which has directed itself toward the study of key concepts such as **anarchy**, **sovereignty**, and **international society**. Although recognizing these as "global ideational structures" constituted by language, ideas, and concepts, constructivism nevertheless recognizes the impact they have on the determination of interests and on political action. Constructivism is now the dominant theoretical approach to International Relations.

See also CONFLICT ANALYSIS; FOREIGN POLICY; FUNCTIONAL-ISM; INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY (IPE); NORMATIVE THEORY; PEACE STUDIES; POSTCOLONIALISM.

INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY. The international society approach sets out to demonstrate that the collectivity of world **states** constitutes a society rather than a mere system. International relations is seen as a social activity governed by a complex system of rules, norms, and institutions that maintain a high degree of predictability and order in relations between states. The international society approach seeks to chart the evolution of international society to demonstrate where that order comes from. It is most closely associated with the **English School**. It has been developed by key theorists within that school such as Adam Watson, **Hedley Bull**, John Vincent, and Barry Buzan.

Although political **realists** assume that state interests necessarily conflict and that international relations is a zero-sum game, theorists of international society believe that common interests can be identified. At the most fundamental level, states share a common interest in both their own survival and also the survival of the international society of states itself that grants them their sovereign rights. States might also share an interest in peaceful coexistence, in **trade**, and in international regulation of shared activities. The rules of the society impose a limit on what states might legitimately do. They were established by the Treaty of Westphalia and reaffirmed in the charter of the **United Nations**. **International law** is an essential component of international society and indeed sets out the rules and principles of the society itself, such as **sovereignty**, nonintervention, and humanitarian law, as well as governing functional activities. **Diplomacy** is also fundamental to the international society, as it is the means by which states communicate with one another and is symbolic of their mutual recognition and formal equality. Bull outlines three further institutions of the society of states: **balance of power**, **war**, and great power management.

The international society developed in Europe during the 17th and 18th centuries. It was underpinned by shared values, **culture**, and interests among the ruling monarchs. The society expanded out of **the West** and across the globe through **colonialism**. Contemporary international society, therefore, contains members who do not share the same Western values and interests.

The **Westphalian system of states** is a pluralist system, however, and in theory at least, only requires states to accept and uphold the rules and norms essential for coexistence; it does not require them to agree on more substantive values. As long as they respect each other's sovereignty, states with different cultural, religious, or political traditions are therefore able to coexist together within the international society and international order is maintained. However, increasingly there is an expectation on states to conform to global standards of **human rights** and to **democratic** forms of government. The extent to which the international society can uphold justice as well as order is a key debate within the approach. Solidarists such as Nicholas Wheeler argue that states should not enjoy unconditional sovereignty and should forfeit their right to nonintervention if they commit crimes against their own citizens. For pluralists such as Robert Jackson, sovereignty must remain absolute if the international society is to maintain its legitimacy; **humanitarian intervention** in the name of human rights can too easily disguise other **national interests**.

The constitutive units of international society are states, and the relevance of statist theory is increasingly being questioned in contemporary international relations. As the world becomes linked in new ways and international interaction becomes a complex mass of linkages between individuals and groups as well as states, the question is raised as to whether the international society is slowly being replaced by a world society—that is, a society of individuals, **international nongovernmental organizations**, and **transnational corporations**, in which the state is just one actor out of many. The issue of how the international society will interact with an emerging world society as a consequence of **globalization** is one of the key questions to be considered in the future evolution of international society.

See also ECONOMIC GLOBALIZATION; GLOBAL GOVERNANCE; NORMATIVE THEORY; POWER.

INTERNATIONALLY PROTECTED HUMAN RIGHTS. Prior to 1945, **international law** defined the rights that **states** had in relation to each other but said very little about rights of individuals. There was international law concerning the abolition of **slavery**, which was an important antecedent to the human rights **international regime**, though this was not drafted using the language of rights. The establishment of the **Committee of the Red Cross** in 1863 and the **International Labour Organization** in 1919 demonstrated a growing concern for the welfare of individuals; nevertheless, it was not until 1945 that the **United Nations** (UN) Charter became the first piece of international law to mention **human rights** explicitly and to assert them as universal. The establishment of the UN, therefore, marks the beginning of the project of internationally protected human rights, and the UN and its various agencies are at the very heart of the development of internationally protected

human rights. The impetus was revulsion at the atrocities committed by the Nazi regime of **Adolf Hitler**. In light of the extent and horror of these atrocities, it was no longer thought acceptable that a state could dismiss international outrage by arguing that, given its **sovereignty**, the way it treated its own citizens was simply a matter for domestic jurisdiction.

Although the charter asserts the UN's commitment to human rights, it does not set out what those rights are. In 1948, therefore, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights was adopted by the **United Nations General Assembly** and was a clear statement of the rights held by all individuals across the globe. The declaration has 30 principles covering political, civil, economic, social, and cultural rights. However, it contained no mechanism for ensuring that rights were observed. Eleanor Roosevelt, who was president of the Human Rights Commission that drafted the declaration, described it as "a statement of aspiration." In 1966, most of the rights in the declaration passed into international law in two international covenants, giving them full legal force; nevertheless, they lack strong enforcement machinery. In particular, there is no UN human rights court to enforce the covenants, though each covenant has a committee to supervise its implementation. States that sign and ratify the covenants obligate themselves to pass all the rights in the covenants into their domestic law. The covenants therefore provide a normative framework within which governments should act. As of May 2016, 168 states had ratified the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, not including China and many Middle Eastern states. By that date, 164 states had ratified the Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, not including the United States.

In addition to the two covenants, there is a range of other UN human rights treaties that add detail and complexity to international human rights standards. The key ones are the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of **Genocide**, the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, the 1954 Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons, the 1956 Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the 1965 Convention on Racial Discrimination, the 1973 Convention against Apartheid, the 1979 Convention on General Discrimination against Women, the 1984 Convention against **Torture**, the 1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child, and the 2008 Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities.

Different UN bodies are responsible for promoting and enforcing the human rights set out in these treaties. State parties have a responsibility to report their progress on implementing measures necessary to ensure that their domestic law is consistent with their international obligations. Key treaties have a committee that oversees enforcement. Furthermore, within the UN system, there is a framework designed to encourage compliance. At the heart of the system is the Human Rights Council, which is responsible for "strengthening the promotion and protection of human rights around the

globe and for addressing situations of human rights violations." The principal human rights official of the UN is the high commissioner for human rights, though other commissioners and agencies who work for the protection of refugees, for example, also have a significant human rights function. These offices and officials perform an important role in monitoring, negotiating, encouraging, and shaming states into complying with their obligations. However, it is only the **United Nations Security Council** (UNSC) who can take coercive action to protect human rights when they are violated on a large scale, either through the imposition of **economic sanctions** or ultimately through the use of military **force** in a **humanitarian intervention**. Since the end of the **Cold War**, the UNSC has increasingly defined **security** to include the security and rights of individuals inside states. When the UNSC has the will to act decisively to protect this security, it can be a powerful institution in the protection of human rights; however, political and strategic interests frequently stand in the way of concerted action, as demonstrated by the failure to protect the fundamental rights of civilians during the war in Syria in the second decade of the 21st century.

Parallel to the global project to protect human rights, there are three regional mechanisms in the Americas, Africa, and Europe, each with a regional human rights court. Human rights are more institutionalized in Europe than in the other regions and far more so than in the UN system. The European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms was drawn up by the Council of Europe in 1950. The European Court of Human Rights is not a **European Union** organization and has a much wider membership. All European states with the exception of Belarus are members of the Council of Europe, and all their citizens can hold their states to account at the European Court of Human Rights. Individuals in the American and African systems do not have such direct access to the Court but nevertheless have a layer of human rights protection not available to individuals outside those regions. Other regional organizations such as the **Association of Southeast Asian Nations** have committed themselves to a human rights charter.

The regional mechanisms are designed to complement global standards and to implement them at a regional level. They allow for some variation, with the African charter in particular adopting a more communitarian approach with a stress on duties as well as rights, which is seen as more consistent with African values. A new African Court is currently in the process of being designed in order to enhance further human rights protection across the continent. The commitment of many African states to human rights protection challenges the conception of human rights as intrinsically Western.

See also INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT (ICC); INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS; INTERNATIONAL NONGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS; INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS; NORMATIVE THEORY; RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT; UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION; WAR CRIMES TRIBUNALS.

IRAN–IRAQ WAR (1980–1988). Iraq under Saddam Hussein attacked Iran the year after the Iranian Revolution brought an Islamic fundamentalist regime to power in Iran, concerned that that revolution might radicalize its own Shia majority population. The **war** was the longest interstate war of the 20th century. Over half a million people are estimated to have died in the war, though clear figures are not available. It virtually destroyed Iran financially. In its turn, Iraq became increasingly reliant on loans from other Arab **states** that supported Iraq's action against Iran. These loans included $15 billion from Kuwait. Disagreement on whether or not the money should be repaid was one of the causes of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and what became the **first Gulf War**.
    See also IRAQ WAR (2003–2010).

IRAQ DISARMAMENT CRISIS. At the time of the **first Gulf War**, Iraq was known to possess **weapons of mass destruction** (WMDs) and it was a condition of the **peace** settlement at the end of that **war** that Iraq destroy all its WMDs and WMD programs. **United Nations Security Council** Resolution 687 set up a special commission called the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) with a mandate to oversee and verify this destruction, alongside the International Atomic Energy Agency. Its work was impeded by Iraq's intermittent refusal to allow inspectors unfettered access, and the years following the first Gulf War saw constant clashes between Iraq and the international community over weapons inspection and violations of the no-fly zone over northern Iraq. President of Iraq Saddam Hussein defied a series of **United Nations** (UN) resolutions and resisted U.S. bombing. He accused the weapons inspectors of being spies and, indeed, the United States finally admitted that information was being passed to the State Department. UNSCOM was therefore replaced by the UN Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) headed by Hans Blix. On 8 November 2002, UN Security Council Resolution 1441, which was passed unanimously, demanded that UN inspectors be let back into Iraq. According to Blix, Saddam was cooperating with the inspections at the time of the U.S. invasion of Iraq, though the U.S. and British governments insisted Saddam Hussein remained in violation of Resolution 1441. This period provides a good case

study both of the limitations of the threat and use of **force** as a means of getting a state to comply with international demands, and the limitations of the UN. It also provides good background to the U.S. invasion of Iraq.

See also IRAQ WAR (2003–2010).

IRAQ WAR (2003–2010). The U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003 followed more than a decade of hostility between the United States and Iraq since the **first Gulf War** (1990–1991), which was sparked when Iraq, under the presidency of Saddam Hussein, invaded Kuwait. President of the United States George H. W. Bush declared that the principle that guided his decision to take military action against Iraq in 1991 was that appeasement does not work and that **aggression** must be punished. Critics have argued that another reason for the intervention was to hold down the price of oil. After the war Saddam brutally put down uprisings by Iraqi citizens against his regime. The United States and its allies responded by imposing an Iraqi no-fly zone in the north of Iraq. The hostilities continued after President of the United States William J. (Bill) Clinton took office in 1993 and were a feature of his two terms of office, which ended in 2001. Saddam violated the no-fly zone on a number of occasions, impeded weapons inspections, and defied **United Nations** (UN) resolutions in a decade-long period known as the **Iraq disarmament crisis**. He rebuilt Iraq's military significantly after the **war**, and many in the United States and other countries considered that his regime posed a threat to international **peace** and stability.

In the late 1990s, during Clinton's presidency, Saddam's activities led some influential American neoconservative commentators such as Robert Kagan and William Kristol to press for regime change in Iraq. There were four main tenets of neoconservative thinking on **foreign policy**: moral clarity in foreign affairs, preserving American preeminence, willingness to use military **force** to achieve U.S. goals, and distrust of **international law** and **international institutions**. When President of the United States **George W. Bush** took office in January 2001, he included some neoconservatives in his administration, including Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz. The administration also included traditional conservatives such as Vice President of the United States Richard Bruce (Dick) Cheney and Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, who were sympathetic to calls for regime change. In February 2001, Bush ordered an air attack on Iraq, justifying this as a routine enforcement of the no-fly zone.

Although the roots of Bush's decision to launch the invasion of Iraq in 2003 stretch back to the early 1990s, the **attacks of 9/11**, carried out by **al-Qaeda**, were crucial. The Bush administration felt that the United States was now vulnerable. Cheney voiced the "1 percent doctrine"—if there was a 1 percent chance of a grave threat to the United States materializing, then this threat should be eliminated. Iraq was seen by the most influential figures in

the Bush administration as such a threat, even though Saddam actually had no links with al-Qaeda, had nothing to do with 9/11, and presided over a secular **state** with similar aims in the Middle East to those of the United States—namely, to contain Iran and to prevent the spread of radical Islamic regimes in the region. Notwithstanding these features of Saddam's Iraq, the action taken against the country in 2003 came to be widely regarded as an episode in the **war on terror**.

Tony Blair, who had been British prime minister since 1997, also stressed the importance of dealing with potential threats before they became actual ones. Blair, however, tried to convince Bush that the invasion of Iraq should be under the auspices of the UN. Bush preferred to take the advice of Cheney and Rumsfeld, and believed that the United States should take unilateral action. Bush consulted the UN but was determined to take unilateral action if necessary. Blair insisted that Saddam had developed **weapons of mass destruction** (WMDs). Blair supported Bush in the invasion of Iraq even though there was no new resolution from the UN.

Great Britain was one of very few countries to give unconditional support to the United States. Europe was divided regarding support for the invasion of Iraq. Like Blair, the leaders of Spain and Italy supported Bush's action. Most other leaders of European states favored a **diplomatic** approach, believing that military action and destruction of WMDs should be a last resort, sanctioned by the UN. Nevertheless, the invasion went ahead in 2003. The war subsequently consisted of two phases. The conventional war was short, lasting only from March to April, during which time the United States, Great Britain, and the other allies defeated the Iraqi military and paramilitary forces. Thereafter, a controversial decision was taken to disband the Iraqi army. With hindsight this was widely considered to have been a costly mistake, as many former officers and soldiers joined the insurgency against the occupation of Iraq, which constituted the second, far longer, phase of the war.

No WMDs were found in Iraq. When it became known there were no such weapons in Iraq, Bush's reputation suffered as his second (constitutionally final) term in office came to end in January 2009, even though the violent insurgency had begun to decline in 2007 following a massive increase of U.S. troops, known as the surge, earlier that year. The Democratic candidate in the 2008 presidential elections, Barack Obama, had been consistently against the war in Iraq. Obama won with a high turnout and took office in January 2009. In August 2010, on schedule, the U.S. combat mission in Iraq ended. Although 50,000 American troops remained until December 2011, the majority of U.S. forces had been withdrawn. More than 3,000 U.S. troops were killed in the war, along with hundreds of military personnel from the allied countries. Iraqi casualties were high, the estimates of those killed in the conflict ranging from tens of thousands to hundreds of thousands.

See also AIRPOWER; ENLOE, CYNTHIA HOLDEN (1938–); FEMI-NISM; PUTIN, VLADIMIR VLADIMIROVICH (1952–).

ISLAMIC STATE (IS). Previously known as the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) or Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), the Islamic State (IS) is a militant Sunni jihadist group that aims for a worldwide caliphate. By 2014, it had eclipsed **al-Qaeda** as the most prominent such group, and there is a lot of antipathy between them. Some prefer not to equate IS with state-hood, believing it grants the organization legitimacy, and call it *Daesh*, an adapted acronym of their Arabic name, which is similar to the Arabic word for "to crush." IS came to the world's attention in 2013 when it began to occupy large areas of territory in northern Iraq, even though its origins go back at least another decade to the **Iraq War** (2003–2010). The disruption caused by the **war** and U.S. failure to construct a stable Iraqi **state** facilitated the emergence of IS. In 2014, IS exploited the collapse of Syria, involving itself in the civil war in that country and joining the insurgency against the regime of President Bashar al-Assad. IS quickly succeeded in occupying large areas of territory in northern Syria, including many of the country's oil and natural gas fields. Although it is highly ideological, IS also has a willing-ness to subordinate its principles to strategic goals, which has enabled it to be highly effective; its rapid advance has shocked the world. The millions of dollars a day it earns from oil sales, including, pragmatically to the Assad regime, as well as its use of social media, have enabled it to recruit foreign fighters, including thousands from **the West**.

Islamic State is known for its brutality, particularly against Christians and other religious minorities such as the Yazidi. IS has become notorious for public beheadings, including those of Western hostages, crucifixions, sexual **slavery**, mass killings, and the destruction of ancient cultural artifacts. Strict Islamic law and taxation are imposed on the people whose land it occupies, but IS offers basic state services such as health care and law and order. The caliphate challenges the principles of the **Westphalian system of states** and nation-state identities, and calls for a new **nationalism**, one of Muslim unity under its leadership. In its **foreign policy**, it challenges the existing order and intimidates its neighbors, stirring up dissent and fomenting regional insecur-ity, hoping to consolidate its statehood through conflict and war. The IS threat is therefore most serious at the local and regional levels. However, IS operatives have also carried out high-profile acts of international **terrorism**. In November 2015, IS operatives killed 130 people in a series of attacks in Paris. In another of many examples, in March 2016, IS claimed responsibility for an attack on Brussels airport, killing 32 people. Nevertheless, fearful of getting embroiled in the war in Syria, the international community was slow to react to the expansion of IS. Since August 2014, however, the United States and its allies have used **airpower** in support of Syrian and Iraqi Kurd-

ish fighters, the moderate Syrian opposition and Iraqi government forces on the ground. These forces, however, have had their weaknesses, and some influential analysts argue that a force of the quality of the **North Atlantic Treaty Organization** is required if IS is to be defeated militarily.

Although the contemporary great powers could feasibly defeat IS militarily, by 2016, there was still no political will to deploy a large-scale military use of force on the ground in the Middle East. Some headway was nevertheless made. In August 2016, for example, IS acknowledged that its chief strategist, Abu Muhammad al-Adnani, had that month been killed in an air strike in Syria. Russia and the United States each claimed to have carried out the strike.

See also AGGRESSION; ARAB UPRISINGS; GENOCIDE; WAR CRIME; WAR ON TERROR.

J

JUST WAR. The regulation of the use of **force** is an important aspect of **international law**. The just war tradition has accordingly developed over several centuries by international thinkers who have sought to ensure that **war** is conducted according to ethical guidelines. A major and influential thinker within the tradition was **Hugo Grotius** who, in the 17th century, wrote a three-volume study *The Laws of War* (*De Jure Belli ac Pacis*). Grotius distinguished between two types of law, which, in Latin, are *jus ad bellum* and *jus in bello*: justice of war and justice in war. The Latin terms are still used today in discussions of the regulation of war. They are employed as means of judging whether **states** may have recourse to war and how they and their armed forces are allowed to fight wars once engaged in them.

The *jus ad bellum* strand of the just war tradition seeks to specify and codify the circumstances in which states should be allowed to initiate the use of force or respond to attacks upon them or their citizens. This strand specifies a range of conditions that should be satisfied before embarking on war: just cause, right authority, right intention, last resort, reasonable hope of success, commitment to the restoration of **peace**, and the proportionality of means to ends. The defense of individual state **sovereignty** has traditionally been considered a just cause and this is specified in the charter of the **United Nations** (UN). Largely in response to the many millions of deaths in **World War I** and **World War II** and the **genocide** of the latter, the UN sought to place tight limitations on the right of states to wage war. The UN Charter also legitimates collective defense against another UN member-state. More controversially, war in defense of the **international society** of states has also sometimes been considered justifiable. Since the 1990s, the question of the legality of **humanitarian intervention** to protect citizens from harm by their own states has also been a matter of significant debate. In 2005, the UN accepted the principle of the **responsibility to protect**.

The *jus in bello* strand of the just war tradition is concerned with what might be done by the states and their armed forces, including individuals within those forces, once engaged in war. Proportionality of means to ends is a feature of this strand too. Another feature of *jus in bello* is the insistence on

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noncombatant immunity, which means noncombatants should not be targeted. This outlaws the deliberate killing of noncombatants and other mistreatment of them, such as rape. Nevertheless, unintended consequences for noncombatants are not outlawed, even if they are foreseeable. This is an issue of great controversy as critics have questioned whether deaths that are foreseeable can genuinely be considered as unintended. *Jus in bello* also refers to treatment of combatants. The **Geneva Conventions** of 1864, 1906, 1929, and 1949, along with two additional protocols in 1977 and a third in 2005, are significant in this respect.

In the 1990s, the disintegration of Yugoslavia, which involved the practice of "ethnic cleansing" and other **crimes against humanity**, led to the establishment of a **war crime tribunal**, as did the genocide and war crimes such as rape in the civil war in Rwanda. More broadly, in international terms, in 1998 the **International Criminal Court** was established, coming into force in 2002. The responses of President of the United States **George W. Bush** to the **attacks on 9/11** of 2001 have led to disputes over the legality of some of the actions taken in the **war on terror** in terms of the just war tradition.

See also AGGRESSION; FEMINISM; FORMER YUGOSLAVIA, WARS OF; INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW; NORMATIVE THEORY; RAWLS, JOHN BORDLEY (1921–2002); TORTURE; WALZER, MICHAEL LABAN (1935–).

K

KANT, IMMANUEL (1724–1804). Born in Königsberg, Prussia (now Kaliningrad, Russia), Immanuel Kant, whose father was a harness maker, was brought up by parents who were active in the Pietist branch of Protestantism. Kant was educated at schools of his family's faith. He went to the University of Königsberg and for much of his life made a living as a private tutor, often for the university at which he was educated, before receiving tenure at that institution in 1770. He was one of the major thinkers of the Enlightenment—sometimes called the Age of Reason. He is also considered to be an early **liberal internationalist**.

The Enlightenment was an attempt to break from classical and medieval orders and belief systems. Kant said the Enlightenment involved mankind's emergence from self-incurred immaturity and that people should have the courage to use their own understanding. Kant believed that, in choosing principles of action, humans could employ reason reflecting the duty of moral action. What Kant called the "categorical imperative" was a moral law that helped in this respect by demanding that people act on a maxim that could at the same time be made a universal law. This meant that humans should be treated not simply as means but also as ends.

Kant was a **cosmopolitan** thinker who argued in his essay *Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Intent* (1784) that progress was being made toward an international system of republican governments, and that this gave rise to the hope that there would eventually be a universal cosmopolitan **state** in which the capacities of all humans would be developed. He also considered what could be achieved before this long-term objective could be realized.

A problem was that people were not all of good will and did not all follow the categorical imperative. Hence, a public legal order was required. Political order should be based on the rule of law. Morals provided the basis for the political and legal order. A constitution should allow the greatest human freedom possible in coexistence with freedom of all others. The law should treat citizens equally. There was also, however, an international problem: what if the rule of law does not prevail in international relations? The lawful

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state that Kant deemed necessary would be threatened by the actions of other states. One solution would be to abolish individual states and set up a cosmopolitan state with world government. Although he hoped this would eventually be achieved, he rejected this solution as impractical in his essay *To Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch* (1795) for two main reasons. First, laws would lose their impact as they would apply to such a huge range. Second, the world-state could only be achieved through conquest. Eventually, this would descend into despotism and subsequently anarchy.

In *To Perpetual Peace*, Kant outlined an alternative solution. First he drew up a set of preliminary articles of a perpetual **peace** between states. This was a set of rules that should be set up *before* perpetual peace is achievable: (i) no conclusion of peace would be valid if materiel for future **war** was secretly reserved; (ii) states would not be able to acquire other independent states by inheritance, exchange, purchase, or gift; (iii) standing armies would be abolished; (iv) the state would not be allowed to contract national debt in connection with its external affairs; (v) states would not be allowed to forcibly interfere in the constitutions or governments of other states; and (vi) states at war would not be allowed to permit acts of hostility that would make mutual confidence impossible during future peacetime.

Kant believed that for a full system of peace to be established, states would need to develop a constitutional relationship with one another. For Kant, peace is not just the absence of war, as a condition of peace is not natural and needs to be formally instituted. He devised three definitive articles of peace: (i) the civil constitution of every nation should be republican, not only because republicanism was desirable for its own sake but also because it required consent of citizens to decide whether war should be declared; (ii) because a world republic was an impractical goal, the rights that nations held would be based on a federation of free states; and (iii) cosmopolitan rights and thus the law of world citizenship would be limited to what was required for universal hospitality, meaning that foreigners in another country should be treated with universal respect and should not be treated with hostility. Kant's work influenced many 20th- and 21st-century liberals who believed that states could collaborate to overcome what realists consider to be the security dilemma.

See also CRITICAL THEORY; LINKLATER, ANDREW (1949–).

KELLOGG–BRIAND PACT. Officially called the General Treaty for Renunciation of War as an Instrument of National Policy, the Kellogg–Briand Pact was signed in 1928 by 44 countries, committing them to renounce **war** and to seek the settlement of conflicts by peaceful means. It is also known as the Pact of Paris. It was primarily the work of French foreign minister Aristide Briand and U.S. secretary of state Frank B. Kellogg. The Kellogg–Briand Pact has come to epitomize the "peace through law" approach

associated with early **liberal internationalists** such as **Sir Alfred Zimmern**. Criticism of the idea that war could be eliminated by **international law** alone was at the heart of the **classical realist** critique of liberal institutionalism by writers such as **Hans J. Morgenthau** and **E. H. Carr**.

KEOHANE, ROBERT OWEN (1941–). Born in Chicago, Robert Keohane grew up in the city and in western Illinois. His parents were teachers in colleges and high schools. In 1961, after graduating from Shimer College, which was the branch of the University of Chicago in Mount Carroll, Illinois, he went on to Harvard University where he gained his MA in 1964 and his PhD in 1966. The previous year he had begun his academic career in International Relations (IR) at Swarthmore College. He moved to Stanford University in 1973, Brandeis University in 1981, Harvard University in 1985, Duke University in 1996, and then to Princeton University in 2005 to become a professor of international affairs.

In the 1970s, along with **Joseph Nye**, Keohane began to envisage problems with **classical realism**, which was dominant in the academic discipline of IR. Perceiving political economy to be equally as important as **security**, they argued that **international organizations** (IOs) and **transnational corporations** (TNCs) were far more significant in international relations than was appreciated by the realists. There was, they insisted, no hierarchy of issues in IR, and **force** was of far less salience than the realists suggested. Furthermore, according to Keohane and Nye, multiple channels operated in international relations, including transnational ones in which at least one party was not a **state**. They used the term "complex interdependence" to describe this situation in which states saw that considerable benefit was to be achieved by cooperating and allowing some decisions to be taken by IOs, into which **international institutions** were sometimes formalized. Realism could not account for the **interdependence** of states with not only other states but also with actors such as the IOs and TNCs. Keohane and Nye published these views in their 1977 book, *Power and Interdependence*. Keohane's work was also a source for the development of **international political economy** as a discipline.

The work of Keohane and Nye became an influential source on which **neoliberal institutionalism** (neoliberalism) drew in the debate between it and **neorealism**. The emergence of neorealism, especially in the work of **Kenneth Waltz** at the end of that decade, focused on the structure of the **Westphalian system of states**. Keohane argued that Waltz had clarified realism significantly and that a consequence of this was that the omission of IOs and international institutions was now in turn far clearer. Keohane, furthermore, accepted the neorealist premise that rational egoism was a characteristic of states. This, however, he stressed, did not mean that states failed to recognize that their interests could often best be served by means of coopera-

tion. Moreover, dominant powers sometimes recognize that stability is in their interest and thus have the motivation to provide for the public good, especially if they could influence the **international regimes** that develop around norms, institutions, and decision-making procedures. Keohane expressed these themes in his 1984 book, *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in World Political Economy*. His later books include *International Institutions and State Power* (1989), which was a selection of his previously published academic papers, and *Power and Governance in a Partially Globalized World* (2002).

See also HEGEMONIC STABILITY THEORY; HEGEMONY; INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY.

KISSINGER, HENRY ALFRED (1923–). Henry Kissinger was born as Heinz Kissinger in the Bavarian city of Fürth in southern Germany, to an orthodox Jewish family. He went to a local Jewish school and in 1938, having faced danger since **Adolf Hitler** and his Nazi dictatorship took power five years earlier, he and his family immigrated to the United States and he changed his first name to Henry. The family settled in New York, where he went to high school and college. As the family lived in **poverty**, he also had to do unskilled and then clerical work at night. In 1943, he gained U.S. citizenship and was drafted into the army, eventually becoming a sergeant in the counterintelligence corps. In 1946, he left the army but continued to work as a teacher at the European Command Intelligence School in Germany. He became a consultant to the Operations Research Office for the army in 1951. In the early 1950s, he gained his BA and MA at Harvard before receiving his PhD in International Relations (IR) from the same university in 1954. He then began his dual career as both an academic and a practitioner of international relations.

In 1954, Kissinger joined the academic staff at Harvard. He published two books in 1957: *The World Restored: Castlereagh and the Problems of Peace* and *Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy*. He cofounded the Center for International Affairs at Harvard the following year. During the 1960s, he continued with his academic role at Harvard and was a consultant to government agencies and think tanks, including the **Arms Control and Disarmament** Agency, the Department of State, and the Rand Corporation. During that decade, he published books on U.S. **foreign policy** and the relationship between the United States and Great Britain. In January 1969, President of the United States Richard M. Nixon appointed him as national security advisor. In this role, he visited China where, with **Zhou Enlai**, he prepared the way for Nixon's talks with **Mao Zedong** that formalized relations between the two countries for the first time since the communists took power in China in 1949. He retained the post of national security advisor when, in September 1973, Nixon also appointed him as the 56th U.S. secretary of state. Since

1969, he had engaged in **diplomacy** with the North Vietnamese chief negotiator Le Duc Tho to try to end the **Vietnam War**. In 1973, they were awarded the **Nobel Peace Prize** jointly for their efforts. Le Duc Tho refused to accept the award, arguing that Kissinger had violated the truce they had negotiated. Controversy continued, especially given that the **war** did not actually end until 1975. Also in 1973, Israel was attacked by Egypt and Syria, and Kissinger ensured that Israel, under the leadership of **Golda Meir**, was well supplied by the United States to gain the advantage. He embarked on a period of shuttle diplomacy traveling around the Middle East **states**, which led to agreements between Israel, on the one hand, and Egypt and Syria on the other hand in 1974. When Nixon resigned in August that year, Kissinger retained both his posts under the new president of the United States, Gerald Ford, holding the national **security** post until November 1975 and remaining as secretary of state until the end of Ford's presidency in January 1977. Kissinger's diplomatic efforts also helped maintain the détente between the United States and the Soviet Union that characterized relations between the two countries for much of the 1970s.

In the 1980s, President of the United States **Ronald Reagan** appointed Kissinger to several posts: chair of the National Bipartisan Commission on Central America from July 1983 until it ceased operation in January 1985, member of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board from 1988 to 1990 (the last year under President of the United States George H. W. Bush), and member of the Commission on Integrated Long-Term Strategy of the National Security Council and Defense Department from 1986 to 1988. In 1994, he published his book *Diplomacy*. In 2001, President of the United States **George W. Bush** appointed him a member of the Defense Policy Board. His book *World Order* was published in 2014.

See also ARAB–ISRAELI CONFLICT; CHOMSKY, AVRAM NOAM (1928–).

KYOTO TREATY. *See* GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS.

L

LAGARDE, CHRISTINE MADELEINE ODETTE (1956–). Christine Lagarde was born in Paris. Her mother was a language teacher and her father a professor of English. She went to school in Le Havre in France and in Maryland in the United States. After serving briefly as a political intern in the U.S. Congress, she returned to France to go to Nanterre University in Paris, where she gained postgraduate qualifications in labor law and English. In 1981, she became a lawyer for the Paris branch of the Chicago-based Baker & Mackenzie firm. She later became a partner, became the first woman to chair the firm in 1999, and was reelected as chair in 2002.

Politically liberal/conservative, Lagarde joined the center-right French party the Union for a Popular Movement (Union pour un mouvement populaire, UMP), which later became known as the Republicans (les Républicains). She became a key member of the UMP governments led by Dominique de Villepi and François Fillon during the presidencies of Jacques Chirac and Nicolas Sarkozy from 2005 to 2011. She was minister for commerce and industry, minister of agriculture, and finally France's first female finance minister. In this role, she helped French exports reach record levels, and she was prominent in the work of the Group of Eight during the global **financial crisis of 2008**. Also that year she chaired the Economic and Financial Affairs Council of the **European Union** (EU). In 2010, she played an important role in approving a mechanism to help those member-**states** of the EU single-currency zone that were struggling economically. She also gained master's degrees at the Aix-en-Provence Institute of Political Studies, where in 2010 she became president of the board of directors.

In June 2011, the board of the **International Monetary Fund** (IMF) elected Lagarde as managing director and chairperson. She thus left the French government to become the first woman to head the IMF. The global financial crisis had continued and one of her major tasks was to lead the IMF's role in conjunction with the EU to help deal with the problems of the Greek economy. In February 2016, the IMF appointed her to a second five-year term in office. As the only candidate, she received support from France, Great Britain, Germany, and China.

See also BRETTON WOODS CONFERENCE; ECONOMIC GLOBAL-IZATION; MERKEL, ANGELA DOROTHEA (1954–).

LASKI, HAROLD JOSEPH (1893–1950). Born in Manchester, England, to a prominent Jewish family, Harold Laski was educated at Oxford, abandoned religion, and began his academic career at McGill University, Montreal, in 1914 before moving to Harvard in 1916. In his early socialist pluralist theory, he argued that functional associations should largely control their own affairs, integrated by the **state** for a common purpose. State **sovereignty** was a fiction that upheld vested interests, giving the impression of social unity. In 1921, he moved to the London School of Economic (LSE) and joined the British Labour Party. Having published widely he was appointed to the chair in government at the LSE in 1925. That year he published *A Grammar of Politics*, in which pluralism was combined with social **democracy**. He still advocated widespread political participation through functional organizations but saw a larger role for the state. He saw sovereignty as masked **power**, used at the international level to serve vested interests disguised by **nationalism**. To undermine sovereignty, the purpose of the **League of Nations** needed to be further developed. The League would need to defy the great powers whenever necessary. He criticized **imperialism**, arguing for rigorous control of the mandates system to eliminate exploitation. Competition between sovereign states in areas and issues of common interest made conflict sooner or later inevitable. Hence, **cosmopolitan** thinking was necessary. He presented an international **functionalist** approach that recognized the growing intensity and complexity of human relations.

In the 1930s Laski developed a distinctive position combining **Marxism** with pluralist and social democratic elements. His critique of sovereignty now stressed that the state was an instrument of class dominance. In 1938, he published a fourth edition of *A Grammar of Politics* that explained his change to the more radical position. In the 1940s, he became a prominent figure in the Labour Party and also continued to publish widely. He served as an advisor on a committee that prepared the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. He was still politically and academically active when he developed bronchitis and died of a collapsed and infected lung.

See also BRAILSFORD, HENRY NOEL (1873–1958); HUMAN RIGHTS; INTERNATIONALLY PROTECTED HUMAN RIGHTS; MITRANY, DAVID (1888–1975).

LAUTERPACHT, HERSCH (1897–1960). Hersch Lauterpacht was born to a middle-class Jewish family in Zolkiew, which was then in Austria-Hungary but is now in Ukraine. At an early age, his family moved to nearby Lemberg, where he went to school and then to university. In 1919, he trans-

ferred to the University of Vienna, where he gained degrees in law and political science. He moved to England in 1923 to be a research student at the London School of Economics (LSE). His doctoral thesis on the **League of Nations** served as the basis for his first book, *Private Law Sources and Analogies of International Law*, in 1927. He thereafter became one of the most important theorists and practitioners of **international law**, criticizing the use of the notion of **sovereignty** to defend against the introduction of international legislation. He also criticized the use of superior orders to defend against such legislation.

In 1929, Lauterpacht was one of the founders of the Annual Digest of International Law, which was later renamed International Law Reports. His most widely acclaimed book, *The Function of Law in the International Community*, was published in 1933. In 1935, he qualified as a barrister and went to serve at the Gray's Inn court of law in London. In 1937, he moved from the LSE to take a chair in international law at the University of Cambridge. While retaining this position, he worked for the British Foreign Office during **World War II**, helping build relations with the United States and advising the U.S. administration. He helped prepare the **war crimes** trials and, subsequently, was a member of the British team at the Nuremburg tribunals of 1945–1946, inserting the notion of **crimes against humanity** into the London charter that outlined the terms and procedures to be followed there. In 1954, he was appointed as a judge on the **International Court of Justice** (the primary judicial branch of the **United Nations**). His later influential books included *An International Bill of the Rights of Man* (1945), *Recognition in International Law* (1947), *International Law and Human Rights* (1950), and *The Development of International Law by the International Court* (1958). He continued to teach at Cambridge until 1955 and was knighted the following year.

See also GROTIUS, HUGO (1583–1645).

LAW OF INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT. *See* INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW.

LEAGUE OF NATIONS. Based on the principle of **collective security** as an alternative to **balance of power** and the **Concert of Europe**, the League of Nations was established as an organization intended to implement key rules and norms as the foundation for **international society**. The League was intended to be a center of **diplomacy** to help prevent **war**. Several earlier schemes for such an **international organization** had been presented during **World War I** (WWI), including notably a substantial one by **Henry Noel Brailsford**. It was, however, President of the United States **Thomas Woodrow Wilson** who was the key figure in the establishment of the League,

which was actually established with broadly **liberal internationalist** aims following the end of WWI—a war that had broken out as the balance of power had collapsed.

Ten months before the end of WWI, in a speech to both houses of the U.S. Congress in January 1918, Wilson announced 14 points by means of which world **peace** should be established after the war. The last of these points called for covenants that would guarantee the independence and territorial integrity of all nations of every size equally. These covenants should form a general association of nations. At the **Paris Peace Conference** of January 1919, a proposal to create a league of nations was accepted and a committee was elected to draft a covenant. In April, Wilson's motion to adopt the covenant was adopted unanimously and in June the Secretariat, which was designed to serve the needs of the League's two other main organs, the Council and the Assembly, was set up in London. Notwithstanding Wilson's role in founding the League, the United States did not join; the Treaty of Versailles, which included the covenant, was rejected in Congress in March 1921. In November that year, the headquarters of the League was transferred from London to Geneva.

In January 1921, Warren Harding, who was opposed to the League, became president of the United States, having been elected on that basis two months earlier. The United States remained outside the League. Hence, the Council consisted of only eight members. These were the four remaining great powers—Great Britain, France, Italy, and Japan—and four small powers. In 1922, the Assembly voted to add two additional small states to the Council, bringing its size to 10. In 1926, the Assembly voted to increase to the Council to 14 members, largely because of Germany's controversial admission that year. The Council served as an executive body of the League, being empowered by the Council to deal with matters within the sphere of action of the League, including importantly those that affected peace between states. The Assembly was important in that every member of the League was represented in it.

In its early years, the League was able to achieve some successes to maintain a viable system of collective security and arbitration. In 1920, the Council worked to resolve the Aaland Islands dispute between Sweden and Finland without the parties resorting to violence. The Council also settled a dispute between Germany and Poland over Upper Silesia in 1921. A border conflict between Greece and Bulgaria in 1925 was also avoided by means of Council intervention.

The absence of the United States was and remained a fundamental weakness of the League. The absence of other powerful **states** throughout the existence of the League also contributed to its weakness. Having been allowed to join in 1926, Germany left in 1933 following the establishment of the Nazi regime led by **Adolf Hitler**. Japan withdrew in 1933 after a dispute

following its military action in Manchuria the previous year. The Soviet Union did not become a member until 1934. Italy, which had taken military action in Abyssinia in 1934 and invaded that country the following year, faced complaints but no action from the other members of the League before withdrawing in 1937.

By the late 1930s, the League was discredited as an instrument of collective security and its demise was rapid. After the outbreak of **World War II** in September 1939, the League's operations in Geneva were suspended. The League continued to exist in the United States and Canada but without a significant role in international relations. Plans began to be made toward the end of the war for a new, stronger international organization to replace it. This was the **United Nations**. The members of the League gathered for a final meeting in April 1946 at which they voted the organization out of existence.

See also CARR, EDWARD HALLETT (1892–1982); LAUTERPACHT, HERSCH (1897–1960).

LENIN, VLADIMIR ILYICH (1870–1924). Vladimir Ilyich Ulyanov was born in Simbirsk (later renamed Ulyanovsk), Russia, into an educated middle-class family. His father was an inspector of schools. In 1887, his elder brother was hanged for conspiracy to kill the czar. He became committed to revolution and in 1901 adopted the pseudonym "Lenin."

By 1890, Lenin had become familiar with the works of **Karl Marx**. Lenin studied law at the Universities of Kazan and St. Petersburg and practiced law between 1891 and 1894. Thereafter, he was a full-time revolutionary. He was exiled to Siberia between 1896 and 1899 and forced to spend most of the next 17 years in exile in Western Europe. With Leon Trotsky, he organized the coup in October 1917 that began the Russian Revolution and established the Soviet Union. Lenin believed that revolutions would soon occur in some European countries where capitalism was at an advanced stage of development. Instead, the Soviet Union faced civil **war** against counterrevolutionaries supported by the capitalist **states**. The Soviet Union was almost isolated. Lenin's leadership of the Soviet Union was notable not only for the establishment of communism but also the repression of opponents, the formation of an efficient authoritarian regime, the suppression of religion, and plans to collectivize agriculture that were further developed and implemented by his totalitarian successor, **Josef Stalin**.

As a **Marxist** intellectual, Lenin's most significant contribution to **International Relations theory** was *Imperialism: The Highest Stage of Capitalism* (1917). Lenin said monopoly was now replacing competition and that **imperialism** would be the final stage of capitalism. The period 1860–1870 had been the highest stage of development of free competition. From the economic crisis of 1873, cartels began to develop but were still the excep-

tion. After the international economic crisis of 1900–1903, the **power** of cartels increased. Competition was transformed into monopoly; banks were concentrated and helped transform old capitalism into imperialism. Banks, industry, and government worked in close union and the new capitalism was dominated by finance capital. This concentration of capital and class divisions in society had become extreme, and production was concentrated in trusts and cartels. Capital was thus concentrated in banks. The export of capital had begun to replace the export of goods, and the interests of finance capital dominated states and society. The most powerful capitalist states were therefore exploiting the rest of the world. Lenin listed five characteristics of imperialism: (1) the export of commodities continues and the export of capital becomes most important; (2) production and distribution are centralized in huge cartels or trusts; (3) banking and industrial capital are merged; (4) the capitalist powers divide the world into spheres of influence; (5) this distribution is nearing completion, meaning that the capitalist powers now have to fight one another for redivision. He said parasites who invested but played no part in enterprise drew huge profits from this last stage of capitalism.

Lenin argued that imperialism allowed capitalists to avoid revolution as the working class in the major capitalist countries could be bought off by providing them with a small part of the profits made in the **colonized** parts of the world. Another problem was that imperialism would lead to wars. In 1920, he said that **World War I** had been an imperialistic conflict over the division of the world and the partition and repartition of colonies according to spheres of influence of finance capital and related forces. Imperialism was likely to lead to movements for emancipation that could only be contained by **force**. European capitalism could be undermined in its own colonies. The concentration of production and capital had simplified the task of bringing the whole economy under social control and ownership. The material basis for socialism was thus in place; worldwide revolution was needed to achieve socialism.

Lenin saw imperialism as an inevitable stage in the history of capitalism. He did not take into account the ability of capitalism and capitalist states to undergo reform, especially when they realized the problems that he had recognized. Furthermore, he did not seem to recognize that in his own time U.S. imperialism involved the export of capital but did not involve annexation. He failed to see that capitalism was not in a terminal condition.

See also BRAILSFORD, HENRY NOEL (1873–1958); DEPENDENCY; ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT; FRANK, ANDRÉ GUNDER (1929–2005); GORBACHEV, MIKHAIL SEGEYEVICH (1931–); HO CHI MINH (1890–1969); MAO ZEDONG (1893–1976); NEOCOLONIALISM; WALLERSTEIN, IMMANUEL (1930–).

LIBERAL INTERNATIONALISM. In the aftermath of **World War I**, the desire for **peace** found expression in liberal internationalism, an approach that dominated the early years of the academic discipline of International Relations. Evolving as it did from the broader liberal tradition of political thought, liberal internationalism had begun to be developed several years before the outbreak of **war** by **Norman Angell** and during the conflict by President of the United States **Thomas Woodrow Wilson**. Angell became one of the prominent liberal internationalist thinkers alongside others such as **Alfred Zimmern** and **Philip Noel-Baker**, who in the interwar years sought to formulate a program of reform. Liberal internationalism assumed that through the application of reason, solutions could be found to human problems. War, as one of the greatest of those problems, was not beyond the possibility of rational resolution. What was needed was a recipe for peace, and that is what liberal internationalism in the postwar period sought to develop. The ending of war was its primary focus because other liberal goals, such as freedom, equality, **human rights**, and prosperity, were seen as incompatible with war preparation and war fighting. War, it was argued, subverts and distorts the liberal political process and undermines the ability of people to achieve their particular ends. Humans therefore share an interest in peace and will cooperate to achieve it. These ideas were dismissed by the political realists, such as **Reinhold Niebuhr** and **E. H. Carr**, as utopian and idealist, and liberal internationalism is frequently referred to in the literature of **international relations theory** as utopianism or idealism.

Liberal internationalism is heavily influenced by the writings of **Immanuel Kant**. Kant argued that humans learn the hard way that they have to cooperate: it is only when conditions become unbearable that they find a way to improve their lot through cooperation, not only at the individual and **state** levels but at the international level as well. Given the horrors of World War I, the postwar period was seen therefore to offer the opportunity for the development of a new form of international relations, one no longer driven by **raison d'état** but by a shared interest in peaceful cooperation and harmonious coexistence. Central to the project was to be the regulation of world affairs by **international law** and the setting up of **international institutions**. Indeed, international law was so central to liberal internationalist thought that it is also sometimes known as "the peace through law approach." From this perspective, war and violence appear to be endemic in the system because of a lack of strong international laws. Indeed, the key proposal of the "peace through law approach" was that the legal right of states to go to war must be restricted—and, indeed, in 1928 the **Kellogg–Briand Pact** did outlaw war.

Liberal internationalists recognized that a legal restriction requires some sort of enforcement mechanism. In the context of international **anarchy**, therefore, international law would need to be supported by the setting up of strong **international organizations** with the **power** to impose sanctions,

both economic and military. In the absence of world government, international law would be enforced through collective use of sanctions. The **League of Nations** can be seen as the embodiment of liberal internationalist ideas; as an organization, it made serious attempts to put into practice some of its fundamental principles, though often without success. In particular, the League was based on the principle of **collective security** in an attempt to change the dynamic from a self-help system, in which states had to continually prepare for war, to a system in which states could feel more confident of their **security** and invest instead in peace. This in turn would enable disarmament, ending the continuous production of arms that for the liberal internationalists was a source of insecurity because it gave powerful arms industries an economic interest in the use of violence and war.

Supporting the collective security system was the principle of the peaceful resolution of international disputes through **diplomacy** and arbitration. The Permanent Court of International Justice (forerunner of the **International Court of Justice)** was set up as the court of the League, charged with providing a dispute resolution service to states. The idea that a court could resolve international disputes was a central plank of liberal internationalism and a key target for its critics. From the perspective of political **realism**, the liberal internationalist faith in law, institutions, and collective action was naïve because it misunderstood both the nature of power and of politics, and was therefore potentially dangerous because it left states ill prepared to defend themselves against an abuse of power. Its assumption that all people have a common interest in peace was also seen as fatally flawed. Although states in a position of dominance in the international system might indeed have an interest in the peaceful continuation of the status quo, revisionist powers might well see it in their interest to fight to enhance their international standing; the political will and economic commitment required of states in an effective collective security action might not be forthcoming.

The dominance of idealist thinking began to be replaced in the early 1930s onward as the League of Nations manifestly failed to prevent international **aggression**. The outbreak of **World War II** confirmed the end of liberal internationalist optimism. Influential critiques from realist writers further sealed the fate of liberal internationalism as its ideas became more and more marginalized. There was a brief moment at the end of World War II where liberal internationalist ideals led to a wave of institution building, but the **Cold War** quickly reasserted realism's influence. Liberal thought has since contributed to International Relations in different forms such as complex **interdependence** and **neoliberal institutionalism**. Moreover, liberal internationalism has itself gained in influence in the post–Cold War period and is seen in the literature on democratic or **liberal peace**; it is also possible to see a direct line of connection from the liberal internationalists of the interwar

years to contemporary theorists of **global governance**. The prescriptive nature of liberal internationalism and its quest to find solutions to the world's problems is also evident in **normative theory**.

See also ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT; BRAILSFORD, HENRY NOEL (1873–1958); CLASSICAL REALISM; DEMOCRACY; ECONOMIC SANCTIONS; PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE.

LIBERAL PEACE. Two main strands of liberal **international relations theory** have something to say on how to secure **peace**. The first set of theories look to **trade**, commerce, and economic **interdependence** as the key to peaceful relations between **states** and is known as commercial pacifism. The second is the democratic peace hypothesis, which looks to the internal constitutions of states. The two are as closely connected as liberalism and **democracy**, and each has a long history.

It is a long-standing liberal notion that the benefits of trade can only be enjoyed under conditions of peace. Commerce therefore also promotes peace because for commercial manufacturing societies **war** simply does not pay. In *Rights of Man* (1791), Thomas Paine wrote, "If commerce were permitted to act to the universal extent it is capable, it would extirpate the system of war." Paine saw war as a socially produced phenomenon undertaken only after a rational calculation of its advantages and disadvantages. Rational, commercial human beings would make that calculation and recognize that the costs of war outweigh its advantages. It is in this way that war is eliminated from human relations. **Norman Angell** in his most famous work, *The Great Illusion*, similarly made the argument that no state gains commercial advantage from the use of military **power** in its international relations, or enriches itself by subjugating other countries. Furthermore, war disrupts trade and diverts finances, which could be better invested elsewhere, to armaments. The assumption of commercial pacifism can also be seen in the setting up of the post–**World War II** liberal economic order at **Bretton Woods** and also in the integration of Europe's economies, which sought to lock Germany into a system of tight economic relationships to ensure against future war. It is also evident in **Karl Deutsche**'s idea of a security community and in more contemporary liberal theory. **Robert Keohane** and **Joseph Nye** in *Power and Interdependence* (1977), for example, demonstrate that in a situation of complex interdependence, the use of military **force** is no longer a viable instrument of state policy.

The argument that a world of democratic states would be one in which war could be eliminated is articulated by **Immanuel Kant** in *Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch* (1795). Kant saw peace as vital to human progress because without it, any moral progress we make as individuals or as members of a state will be incomplete. Perpetual peace, however, can only be achieved between states that are republican, or roughly equivalent to a mod-

ern democracy. Citizens must be free and independent within their states if permanent peace is to be achieved between states, because if citizens are directly involved in the decision making of the state, then they have the opportunity to reject war. On the option of declaring of war, Kant wrote, "it is very natural that they will have great hesitation in embarking on so dangerous an enterprise. For this would mean calling down on themselves all the miseries of war." Kant's ideas reflected a strong strain of thought of his time, which saw feudalism and autocratic government as the cause of war, and a future of democratic participation as a guarantor of peace. Such ideas influenced President of the United States **Thomas Woodrow Wilson** and his proposals for a new order in the aftermath of **World War I**, which included the promotion of democracy as a guarantor of peace. Although such ideas were strongly criticized by **classical realists** and marginalized during the **Cold War** years of realist dominance of the academic discipline of International Relations, there was a resurgence of interest in the idea of democratic peace in the 1990s. Studies were undertaken by scholars such as Bruce Russett and Michael Doyle to demonstrate that democratic states do not go to war with each other although they do go to war against nondemocratic states. Democracies can be keen and ready to fight wars, and there is little difference between the war-proneness of democracies and other types of states.

It follows from commercial pacifism and the democratic peace hypothesis that the best way to eliminate war and to ensure world peace is to encourage the spread of liberal-democratic governments across the globe. Ironically, however, as was demonstrated in both **Afghan** and **Iraq Wars** of the early 21st century, the spread of liberal democratic governments in itself can result in long-term conflict and war. This is the paradox of liberal internationalist thought.

See also ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT; LIBERAL INTERNATIONALISM; NEOLIBERAL INSTITUTIONALISM.

LINKLATER, ANDREW (1949–). Born in Aberdeen, Scotland, Andrew Linklater later remarked that at school in his home city he benefited from the Presbyterian emphasis on self-improvement, leading him to become the first member of his family to go to university. At the University of Aberdeen, he studied International Relations (IR) and politics from 1967 to 1971. He then went to the University of Oxford, where he gained his MA in political theory. From there, he went to the London School of Economics (LSE) to study for his PhD. His successful doctoral thesis was published as his first book, *Men and Citizens* (1982). After graduating from the LSE, he taught at the University of Tasmania from 1976 until five years later he moved on to another post in Australia, at Monash University in Melbourne. In 1993, he left Australia to become a professor of IR at Keele University in England, and in 2000 he took a post at the University of Wales, Aberystwyth, where he has remained.

Linklater is one of the most prominent and influential contributors to the **critical theory** tradition of IR. His work draws on the ideas of **Karl Marx** and **Immanuel Kant**, particularly on universalism and emancipation. For Linklater, however, Marx's focus on the need for emancipation of the working class was too narrow to achieve an international society in which all people universally are treated as ends rather than means. The **sovereignty** of the **state** creates rigid boundaries between citizens and outsiders, thus limiting moral community, the consequences of which included exclusion and conflict. His **cosmopolitanism** illustrates how critical theory can overlap with **normative theory**.

In *Men and Citizens* (1982), Linklater traced the handling of the conflict between obligations to fellow citizens, on the one hand, and humanity universally, on the other hand, in the history of political thought, starting with natural law thinkers, moving on through a range of thinkers that includes Kant, and ending with Marx. Modern political theorists had, with a few exceptions such as Kant and Marx, constantly resolved the conflict in favor of the co-citizens, thus devaluating the suffering of distant strangers, **war**, and exclusion. He argued that Marx, who discussed global capitalism and the need for revolution by the international proletariat, provided resources for **Marxism** to critique particularism. It was in the theories of Kant and Marx that the best case for a properly international community could be found.

In *Beyond Realism and Marxism* (1990), Linklater presented a case for critical theory in IR by trying to absorb the strengths of **realism** and Marxism and jettisoning some of the weaknesses in an attempt to try and provide a unified theory that transcends both. He concluded that, just as neither **classical realism** nor the **neorealism** of **Kenneth Waltz** could show how moral communities can be extended from those with which citizens presently identified, Marxism was similarly unsuccessful. He argued, nevertheless, that Marxism foreshadowed such a project. He indicated that the possibilities for moving beyond these theories needed to be explored in future research. This is indeed what he sought to do in *The Transformation of Political Community* (1998).

In *The Transformation of Political Community*, Linklater identified three evolving domains of critical theory in IR: normative (focusing on the dialogical ethics of world citizenship), praxeological (concerned with actions and tasks needed to implement and enforce principles of justice, freedom, and equality), and sociological (encompassing the social determinants of international structures). Influenced by Jürgen Habermas, he focused on the normative domain and applied dialogue and discursive ethics to IR. If governed by dialogue rather than **power** and **force**, human relations could probe the origins of laws and norms that furthered particularism, exclusion, and transnational harm, and bring about the extension and transformation of community on an international scale.

After the publication of *The Transformation of Political Community*, Linklater considered it necessary to develop the points that had been made about transnational harm. In *The Problem of Harm in World Politics* (2011), he sought to understand whether, or how far, international progress had been made in making harm a key moral and political question for humanity as a whole. He considered a range of sorts of harm, from violent harm through to the harm of indifference to suffering, and forms of humiliation, forms of exploitation, and structural harm. In his view, a cosmopolitan project concerned with reducing human suffering would need to work across all these types of harm.

See also INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY.

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MACHIAVELLI, NICCOLÒ (1469–1527). Niccolò Machiavelli was born in Florence, which was then independent but is now in Italy. His father was a lawyer who ensured that he was brought up with a humanist education rather than a traditional Christian one. He became a senior diplomat for Florence and the author of *The Prince* (1513) as a handbook for rulers to teach them how to maintain power. This means that he has dual significance for International Relations (IR): he participated in an important Italian period in the history of **diplomacy**, and his work was influential on the development of **realism** in the IR theory of the 20th century.

Florence was for much of the 15th century ruled as an oligarchy by the Medici family but became a republic in 1498. Machiavelli that year began his career as a bureaucrat and diplomat. He witnessed the actions of Cesare Borgia (Duke Valentino), son of Pope Alexander VI, who set about conquering several parts of Italy. Borgia used cunning and ruthlessness, employing **terror** imaginatively. Machiavelli began to consider that this might be an important lesson for rulers in his time.

Machiavelli's experiences as a diplomat led him to the view that a common trait shared by rulers in his time was inflexibility in changing circumstances. His own circumstances changed when the weak republic collapsed in 1512. The Medici regained power; Machiavelli lost his job, was wrongly accused of taking part in an anti-Medici plot, and was imprisoned. He initially wrote *The Prince* for the Medici in 1513, in the hope that he might thereby gain employment. He was eventually given an administrative post in 1526, but the following year the Medici collapsed and a new republic took **power**. Machiavelli had always favored republican government but believed republics could only be successful in very favorable circumstances. He considered republicanism inappropriate in the violent circumstances of his time on the Italian peninsula. He was ignored by the new government and died that year.

Machiavelli wrote *The Prince* on the basis of the circumstances as he had seen them in his own diplomatic career. There was little room for morality if a ruler wanted to succeed. In order to achieve **security** for the **state**, it was important to maintain power. *The Prince* discusses examples of the forma-

tion of **alliances** and what later became known as the **balance of power** in order to keep the state secure. He considered himself a realist, and his method was to draw on experience and ancient history.

Machiavelli argued that the firm foundations of a state will be good laws and good arms: one could not have good laws without good armies. The ruler should thus build a citizen army rather than rely on professional mercenary armies, who would betray you. The ruler should show the character of a military leader. The ruler should do what is necessary to maintain power and achieve glory—the noblest aim of a prudent *virtuoso* prince. Rulers must learn how *not* to be good. A ruler should not worry about being deceitful, hypocritical, and so on. The ruler should always strive to appear to be virtuous, merciful, faithful, humane, trustworthy, and religious—but be prepared to vary his conduct if circumstances deem deviation from this path necessary.

For Machiavelli, the successful leader would have the quality of *virtù*. Reflecting his upbringing, this was not virtue in the traditional Christian, moral sense (generosity, compassion, and honesty). The princely qualities of *virtù* include boldness, decisiveness, cunning resourcefulness, and ruthlessness. In a good ruler, *virtù* is highly developed. Even a good man without *virtù* would be a bad political leader. Machiavelli justified his advice by necessity: do what is necessary.

See also INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY.

MAO ZEDONG (1893–1976). Born in Hunan province, China, Mao Zedong attended Hunan Teachers College from 1913 to 1918. After working in Beijing University library, then becoming head of a school, he attended the first congress of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in 1921. He was elected to the Central Committee of the CCP at its third congress in 1923. Since the establishment of the Republic of China in 1912, no single party had **power** and control over the whole country. The **nationalist** Guomindang party was the most powerful and the CCP very small. In 1923, the Moscow-led Communist International organization (Comintern) persuaded the CCP to participate in a United Front with the Guomindang, which Mao was instructed to join while retaining membership of the CCP. In 1926, this proved to be an error when the anticommunist Chiang Kai Shek became the leader of the Guomindang, arrested many CCP members, and halted dual membership. The Guomindang went on to massacre trade unionists and CCP members in Shanghai. The CCP went underground in the cities. Mao drew his famous lesson that power is obtained by the barrel of a gun, and that the CCP must command the gun.

By this time, Mao had begun to perceive the revolutionary potential of the peasants. This view clashed with that of the Comintern, which stressed that the revolution should be led by the industrial working class. Mao declared in 1927 that all other revolutionaries should follow the peasants.

Mao went into the mountains to begin to develop the Red Army as well as his military strategy of drawing the enemy deep into his territory before engaging them. He also began to clamp down ruthlessly against his opponents in the communist movement. The policy led to the execution of between 2,000 and 3,000 opponents in late 1930. From 1931 to 1934, he helped establish the Chinese Soviet Republic in southeast China. The Guomindang repression intensified and Mao took part in the Long March, which was a retreat to northwest China from 1934 to 1935. Only one tenth of the 100,000 marchers arrived at the destination. Mao's reputation had meanwhile grown and he became a leading figure in the CCP in 1935.

In 1937, Japan started a **war** against China. With the encouragement of the leader of the Soviet Union, **Josef Stalin**, Mao's communists allied with the Guomindang again. By late 1937, Mao had become de facto leader of the CCP and was recognized as such by Stalin. Mao's military writings of the 1930s advocated a long war, involving guerrilla tactics and limitations on cooperation with the Guomindang, in order to ensure the CCP maintained capacity to control the gun. His famous strategies for guerrilla warfare later became hugely influential in many other countries. From 1941 to 1944, Mao required communists to read and digest his growing portfolio of writings expressing his variant of **Marxist** theory, which stressed that the theories of **Karl Marx**, Friedrich Engels, **V. I. Lenin**, and Stalin should not be studied in the abstract but rather with a view to their application and revision in the conditions of China. Communists who dissented were treated harshly with long sentences of imprisonment and hard labor. Mao's control of the party grew and he became chairman of the CCP in 1943.

Mao was an influential theorist as well as a communist activist and leader. His most significant work on international relations was his *On New Democracy* of 1940. He argued that because of exploitation by a range of external powers China was a semi-colonial country. Like other **colonial** and semi-colonial countries, China was on the periphery of the global capitalist system. People in the countries on the periphery were able to see clearly the problems of capitalism and to develop alternatives to challenge the international system. Socialist revolutions in colonial or semi-colonial countries, he argued, had a dual task. First, they should secure independence of their nation-state and achieve goals associated with the bourgeoisie, such as industrialization and **democracy**. This would be a step on the way to a second task, which was to overcome global capitalism and achieve a new socialist society.

In 1944, Japan was defeated in **World War II**. A civil war between the CCP and Guomindang began, against Stalin's wishes. The CCP had the support of the peasant majority and in 1949 defeated the Guomindang and embarked on the revolution that established the People's Republic of China, the chairmanship of which Mao added to that of the CCP. In the 1950s, a vast

redistribution of land took place and between one million and two million landlords were executed. In 1958, Mao led China into the Great Leap Forward, which attempted rapid industrialization even in very backward, rural areas and social revolution involving communal living and extreme egalitarianism. The initiative had failed by the end of 1959, resulting in famine in which 20 million to 30 million people are estimated to have died by the early 1960s.

In the late 1950s, relations between the communist leaderships of China and the Soviet Union deteriorated, leading to the Sino–Soviet split, which in turn made the **Cold War** more complicated. After Stalin's death in 1953, Mao saw himself as the leader of international communism, a view that the Soviet party did not accept. China and the Soviet Union disagreed on a number of strategies, including those regarding **nuclear weapons**. The two countries almost went to war with each other in 1968 over a border dispute.

From 1966 to 1969, Mao implemented the Cultural Revolution in order to renew the revolutionary nature of Chinese communism and to maintain his supremacy in the CCP. He retained supreme power in China until his death. Rivalries between China and the Soviet Union continued until the collapse of the latter in the early 1990s.

See also DENG XIAOPING (1904–1997); HO CHI MINH (1890–1969); ZHOU ENLAI (1898–1976).

MARSHALL PLAN. Europe was devastated by **World War II**; the Marshall Plan was the means through which the United States aided Europe's reconstruction. George C. Marshall, U.S. secretary of state, made a speech at Harvard University in 1947 where he proposed his plan to provide stability in Europe. He emphasized the importance of a return to "normal economic health in the world, without which there can be no political stability and no assured **peace**." The United States was to assist Europe, demonstrating its leadership in the creation of the postwar liberal order. The Marshall Plan was part of U.S. policy to restrict the spread of communism. By strengthening its allies in Europe, the United States hoped to contain the emerging communist threat from the Soviet Union. The U.S. government therefore provided $11.8 billion in grants and $1.5 billion in loans to assist in the rebuilding of European economies and national infrastructure between 1948 and 1952. It was available to all European **states**, including the Soviet Union and Eastern European states. However, conditions attached to the **aid**—such as the liberalization of economies and free **trade**—meant that the Eastern bloc could not accept the offer. The Soviet Union considered the United States' decision to implement the plan despite objections from the East as evidence of its willingness to divide Europe. The Marshall Plan therefore contributed to the drawing of what British prime minister **Winston Churchill** had described as the "iron curtain" descending across Europe. The strong leadership of the

United States in aiding the reconstruction of Europe strengthened its relations with Western European states, facilitated the creation of the **North Atlantic Treaty Organization**, and identified the United States as the leader of the Western **alliance** with **hegemonic power** within the western hemisphere throughout the ensuing **Cold War**.

See also AMERICAN PRIMACY; BRETTON WOODS CONFERENCE; INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY (IPE); LIBERAL INTER-NATIONALISM; UNITED NATIONS (UN).

MARX, KARL HEINRICH (1818–1883). Karl Marx wrote little that focused directly on international topics. Nevertheless, his writings led to a Marxist tradition of **International Relations theory** and influenced **critical theory**. His political activities included work in a body resembling later **international nongovernmental organizations** (INGOs).

Born in Trier, Germany, Marx was descended from a Jewish family but baptized a Protestant. He gained a doctorate in philosophy from the University of Berlin in 1841. In 1842, he became editor of the radical *Rhine Newspaper* (*Rheinische Zeitung*) and wrote articles on **poverty**, published in January 1843. Two months later, the paper was shut down by the authorities. Hoping to be able to express his views more freely, he moved to Paris and met Friedrich Engels, leading to their lifelong collaboration. Writing in the short-lived *German-French Annals* (*Deutsch-Französische Jahrbücher*) in 1844 Marx argued that in Germany, where capitalism was relatively undeveloped, the proletariat could be emancipated as part of an international revolution. This became an important point in the *Communist Manifesto* four years later. In January 1845, he was expelled from France for his radical writings. He moved to Belgium and with Engels helped build an international communist movement. As part of the movement, the Communist League in London commissioned Marx and Engels to write the *Communist Manifesto*, which appeared in February 1848. This brief work included his most direct thought on international issues.

The *Manifesto* discussed how the economic and political **power** of the bourgeoisie had grown rapidly as the Industrial Revolution progressed. He recognized developments that would feature in discussions of **globalization** toward the end of the 20th century. The discovery of America had paved the way for modern industry to establish the world market. This market had brought about great developments in international commerce, navigation, and communications. These developments provided the conditions for the expansion of industry and the rapid and extensive geographical growth of the railways. In order to find new markets and thus continue its operations and very existence, the bourgeois system spread around the world. The bourgeoisie thus increased its own capital while all other classes were weakened and pushed into the background. Marx suggested that the economic and social

conditions of the proletariat would continue to deteriorate as the bourgeoisie responded to the crisis by increasing the exploitation on which their power and wealth rested.

Marx commented in the *Manifesto* that new wants had been encouraged that could only be satisfied by products from such distant parts of the globe. This had brought about a system of international **interdependence** involving not just material production but also the production and propagation of ideas. With this in mind, Marx stressed, metaphorically, that the proletarians had nothing to lose but their chains. He went on to say, however, that the proletariat did have a world to win. In other words, as the revolutionary struggle was an international one, the proletariat would upon their victory gain what he had earlier in the pamphlet referred to as political sway over a society that had, in the epoch of the bourgeoisie, become a global one. It was from this internationalist position that Marx famously called at the end of the *Manifesto* for workingmen of all countries to unite.

Marx was expelled from Germany in 1849 and moved to Paris and then London, where he remained for the rest of his life. He was the European correspondent for the *New York Tribune* between 1851 and 1862 and wrote articles on **war**, specifically the Crimean War and the American Civil War. In 1852, he formally dissolved the Communist League. In September 1864, he was invited to attend the inaugural meeting of an organization entitled the International Workingmen's Association (IWMA). Anarchists were bitter opponents of Marx during the 1860s and 1870s. Once the IWMA was established, Marx and Engels took the leading role in its affairs. The IWMA was mainly composed of the leaders of English organized labor and political émigrés from continental Europe. A split developed between these two groups, particularly after 1867 when the better-off English urban working class was given the vote; they tended to support reformist solutions for labor's problems, whereas continental European members tended to support revolution. These tensions eventually proved fatal to the IWMA. It broke up in 1872, and Marx moved it to New York to avoid it coming under anarchist control. It was formally wound up in Philadelphia in 1876. In the meantime, Marx had published *Capital, Volume I* in 1867, the final chapter of which discussed briefly some issues of **colonialism** in international capitalism.

Although Marx never used the terms "historical materialism" or "the materialist conception of history," these terms are useful to describe his interpretation of history, which saw history as broadly a predictable, dialectical process reflecting changes in the nature of the means of production, which themselves reflected the development of productive forces (such as technology and developing human capabilities) in society. Planning for a communist society would presuppose that capitalism was collapsing through its own internal contradictions or through violent revolution. Private property would be abolished as would the social division of labor based on social class and

its economic exploitation. Communism would enable a wealthier, better-educated society to develop, in which each individual would be able to achieve his or her full potential, and want would be eliminated.

Marx left a vast and complex legacy that gave rise to **Marxism**. He had little direct influence in his lifetime, but the rise of communism gave his ideas, or at least his ideas as interpreted by **V. I. Lenin**, a worldwide prominence that they probably would not otherwise have had.

See also COX, ROBERT W. (1926–); GUEVARA, ERNESTO "CHE" (1928–1967); HO CHI MINH (1890–1969); KANT, IMMANUEL (1724–1804); LINKLATER, ANDREW (1949–); MAO ZEDONG (1893–1976); STALIN, JOSEF (1878–1953).

MARXISM. Although the contributions to **International Relations theory** that one finds in the writings of **Karl Marx** are brief, his discussion in the *Communist Manifesto* of 1848 of the rise of capitalism and its spread around the world has been hugely influential. It has sometimes been interpreted as an early anticipation of **globalization**. Marxists argue that the **state**, which is considered by mainstream International Relations (IR) theory as the key unit and actor, in fact operates in the interests of capitalism.

Marx and Marxists argue that history can be seen in terms of a series of periods, or epochs, in which within each society, and also internationally, one class dominates others. The **power** of the dominant class is derived from its ability to harness productive forces and control the economy. This enables it to exploit the other classes in a process that involves great injustice. Marxists argue that the capitalist class is the dominant one in modern industrial societies and that capitalism needs the states over which it holds sway to find new markets and sources of materials, thus extending exploitation around the world. Marxism also has a theory of emancipation that suggests that the working class will lead a revolution that will overthrow capitalism and eventually bring about communism.

Marxism has been a consistently resonant current in IR theory. Variations of Marxism, some of which it is highly debatable whether Marx would have sanctioned, have furthermore driven some major developments in international relations in practice. Perhaps the most influential variant of Marxist international theory was that of **V. I. Lenin**, in particular his book *Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism* (1917). Lenin offered a concise argument that the capitalism that Marx had discussed had been replaced by monopoly capitalism. Lenin not only persuaded many readers that capitalism and **colonialism** would collapse but also identified developments that indicate why the demise of the international capitalist system has not been as swift as many predicted. Lenin also led the Russian Revolution of 1917 that transformed Russia into the communist Soviet Union.

A power struggle in the Soviet Union after the death of Lenin was won by **Josef Stalin**, whose totalitarian state was ostensibly Marxist but in reality bore little resemblance to anything that Marx argued for. In China, **Mao Zedong** developed a version of Marxism that was suitable for the undeveloped, largely agricultural, economy of the country. The People's Republic of China, which was formed in 1949 after the communists had won the civil **war**, also bore little resemblance to what Marx had argued for. Marxism became the ideology of many states around the world after **World War II**, and although many of these states rejected communism in the 1990s, those in China, Vietnam, Laos, and Cuba remain ostensibly Marxist. The most innovative and influential theorist of Cuban Marxism was **Ernesto (Che) Guevara**. Among many European thinkers who have been influenced by Marxism, **Harold Laski** is significant for his argument that state **sovereignty** is but a mask to conceal and legitimate class dominance of the capitalists over the working class.

Marxism was also a major influence on the **dependency theories** that sought to explain the reasons for the exploitation of the **third-world** countries by those of the global North. Significant in this strand of international theory were **Raúl Prebisch**, **André Gunder Frank**, and **Immanuel Wallerstein**. Marxism was also the main intellectual source of **critical theory**. Some critical theorists are also recognized as major contributors to **international political economy** theory. **Robert Cox** is the most well known of such thinkers. He declared that, although he was not actually a Marxist, Marxism was a major influence on his work. He adapted the **hegemony** theory of the Italian Marxist Antonio Gramsci to international relations. The other main strand of critical theory is inspired by the Marxist philosophy of the Frankfurt School, especially the work of Jürgen Habermas. The leading theorist of this strand is **Andrew Linklater**. He and others in the strand are concerned with international ethics, the extension of community into the international arena, and emancipation. Linklater's approach has key features of **cosmopolitanism** and thus overlaps with **normative theory**.

MEARSHEIMER, JOHN J. (1947–). John Mearsheimer was born in New York City to traditional Christian parents who instilled in him the values of hard work and honesty. In his childhood, the family moved to Westchester County, New York state. In 1965, at the age of 18, he went into the U.S. Army and after two years, strongly encouraged by his father, accepted a place at West Point. He graduated in 1970 and went into the U.S. Air Force until 1975, by which time he had also gained an MA in International Relations from the University of Southern California. He gained a second MA, in governance, at Cornell University, in 1978. He was a research fellow at Brookings Institution from 1979 to 1980 and in 1981 gained his PhD from Cornell. From 1980 to 1982, he was a research associate at Harvard Univer-

sity. In 1982, he moved to the University of Chicago, where he became a professor in 1984 and since 1996 has held the Harrison Chair. His first book, *Conventional Deterrence*, was published in 1983. His other books are *Liddell Hart and the Weight of History* (1988), *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics* (2001), *The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy* (with Stephen M. Walt, 2007), and *Why Leaders Lie: The Truth about Lying in International Politics* (2011). He has published many articles in prestigious academic journals.

Mearsheimer is a realist theorist. His **realism** is in the category of **neorealism**. Unlike the **classical realism** of thinkers such as **Hans J. Morgenthau**, which locates the roots of the pursuit of **power** by **states** in human nature, neorealism sees the structure of the international system as the driving force. States need power because the international system is characterized by **anarchy**, with no world government to defend them. He distinguishes his offensive neorealism from the defensive realism of theorists such as **Kenneth Waltz**. According to defensive realism, states will not seek too much power because to do so may bring about a **war** that may be lost because other states would form **alliances** to alter the **balance of power**. Mearsheimer argues that states will seek as much power as they can, in pursuit of **hegemony**, because dominance of the international system would bring the greatest **security**. He stresses, however, that because global hegemony is impossible, states seek regional hegemony while attempting to prevent other powerful states from gaining similar hegemony in another region. He has argued that China is seeking regional hegemony and that there is a distinct possibility that this will lead to conflict with the United States and even the use of **force**.

See also GLOBAL POWER SHIFTS; INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY.

MEIR, GOLDA (1898–1978). Born in Kiev, Russia, in 1898, Golda Mabovitch would later (as Golda Meir) become Israel's first female prime minister and an important figure in the international relations of the Middle East. Her independently minded mother, who broke with Russian Jewish tradition to choose her husband, influenced her thinking. Jews faced economic hardship and persecution in Russia. Hence, her father, who was a carpenter, moved to Milwaukee in the United States in 1903, followed by Golda and her mother and siblings in 1906.

In her childhood, Meir became interested in socialist Zionism and the case for women's suffrage. She graduated from high school in 1915, and in her youth joined the Young Poale Zion socialist movement and subsequently served on its executive committee. A supporter of the cause for a Jewish homeland in Palestine, she moved to Palestine in 1921 with Morris Myerson, whom she had married, to work on a kibbutz with the aim of building a socialist society. She became a representative to the General Federation of Labor (Histadrut). In 1924, she left the kibbutz to live in Jerusalem and Tel

Aviv. She became secretary of the Working Woman's Council in 1928 and went to the United States as its emissary. In 1934, she returned to Palestine and became head of the political department of the Histadrut. Later in that decade, as Europe faced the expansion of Nazi occupation, she voiced disappointment that more was not done internationally in the 1930s to help Jews emigrate.

Meir was one of the 24 signatories of the Israeli Declaration of Independence in 1948, and that year she became Israel's ambassador to the Soviet Union, which at that time supported the new Israeli **state**. The following year she was elected to the Israeli parliament (Knesset) as a representative of the Workers' Party (Mapai). From 1948 to 1956, she was minister for labor. She also encouraged Arab villages to become self-sufficient. With this in mind, she launched schemes to pipe water to the villages and helped them to set up institutions for education and training. From 1956 until 1966, she was foreign minister in the governments of prime ministers David Ben-Gurion and Levi Eshkol. This was a time of increasing tensions between Israel and the predominantly Arab states of the Middle East, and in Meir's first year she played a prominent role in the Suez crisis, which involved an invasion of Egypt by Israel, France, and Great Britain. After strong pressure from the **United Nations**, the United States, and the Soviet Union, Israel and the other two invading states withdrew. Furthermore, the **Cold War** extended into the region as the United States supported Israel and the conservative states and the Soviet Union supported the more radical states. Diagnosed with lymphoma by 1965, she resigned due to ill health. In 1969, she returned to politics to become leader of the Israeli Labor Party Ha'Avoda (with which Mapai had merged). She became prime minister that year at the age of 70. In her period in government that lasted until her resignation in 1974, Israel responded to the massacre of Israeli athletes at the Olympic Games in Munich, Germany, in 1972 by hunting down the **terrorists** and fighting the Yom Kippur **War** of 1973.

See also ARAB–ISRAELI CONFLICT; KISSINGER, HENRY ALFRED (1923–).

MERKEL, ANGELA DOROTHEA (1954–). Born in Hamburg, West Germany, Angela Merkel, whose mother was a teacher and her father a Lutheran preacher, moved with her family to Quitzow in communist East Germany before she was one year old. Her father had accepted a parish there. She went to school in nearby Templin, before going to study physics at Leipzig University in 1973. After graduating in 1977, she went to Berlin to work as a researcher at the Central Institute for Physical Chemistry at the Academy of Sciences. She gained her doctorate from the academy in 1986.

After the peaceful revolution of 1989 in East Germany, Merkel joined an opposition political movement called Democratic Awakening (Demokratischer Aufbruch). The movement became a political party the following year, and she was its press spokesperson until it merged with the conservative Christian Democratic Union (Christlich Demokratische Union, CDU), which formed a government in East Germany. She became the CDU's deputy spokesperson. After East and West Germany were reunified in 1990, she won a seat in the German assembly (Bundestag). The following year, she was appointed federal minister for women and youth, and the government passed the Equal Opportunities Act. Also in 1991 she became deputy party leader of the CDU. She was appointed federal environment minister in 1994 and participated in the **United Nations** climate conference in Berlin in November. In 2000, she was elected secretary-general of her party, which was then in opposition, while retaining the post of deputy party leader. After the elections of September 2005, she became chancellor as head of a coalition government between the CDU and the Social Democratic Party. Two years later, she hosted the World Economic **Summit** in Germany. In 2008 and 2013, she was reelected chancellor of Germany.

In her role as German chancellor, Merkel was prominent in international relations. After reelection in 2008, she played an important role in responding to the **debt** crisis of some of the **European Union** (EU) member-**states**. She organized bailout plans, of which Germany was the principle funder. In the Russia–Ukraine crisis that began in 2014, she engaged in shuttle **diplomacy** in the attempt to broker a **peace** deal with Russian president **Vladimir Putin**. Along with the EU and the **International Monetary Fund**, headed by **Christine Lagarde**, in 2015 Merkel was prominent in renewed efforts to resolve the Eurozone debt crisis. She also played a key role in reaching a compromise with the Greek government, which was compelled to impose austerity measures on its country in order for it to remain in the European single-currency (euro) zone. Also that year, she attempted to resolve the **migration** crisis in Europe by agreeing to take many of the people who had fled from the Middle East and Africa into Germany. She faced significant opposition from within Germany for making this commitment.

See also GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS.

MIGRATION. The movement of people is known as migration. People have moved throughout history, but in the era of **economic globalization**, movement has been facilitated by easy access to information, improved transport, and instant communications. The constructed borders of the **Westphalian system of states**, however, place a limit on that movement, with the borders of **states** often being impenetrable barriers to free movement (although the boundaries within the **European Union** are notable exceptions). People can move within states (interstate migration) or between them (inter-

national migration). Uneven levels of **economic development** and a growing awareness of the improved life opportunities elsewhere has led to high levels of voluntary migration for economic reasons. Migration can also be involuntary, with people forced to leave their homes due to **war**, persecution, or natural disasters. Forced migrants are known as refugees. Refugees are people who cannot avail themselves of the help and protection of their own state and therefore have to seek refuge in another state. Under **international law**, specifically the 1951 Convention on the Status of Refugees, refugees are granted certain rights of asylum. In the European migration crisis that reached a peak in 2016, the two types of migrants were frequently confused. Large numbers of people fleeing the war in Syria were joined by many economic migrants in a desperate bid to cross the Mediterranean and make it to Europe.

According to the **United Nations Refugee Agency**, at the end of 2015 there were an estimated 65.3 million displaced people in the world who were either refugees, asylum seekers, or internally displaced. This was an increase of 5 million over 2014, due in large measure to conflict and insecurity in Syria, Afghanistan, and Somalia, which together accounted for over half of all newly displaced people. Despite the focus of the European media on the refugee crisis in Europe, the majority of refugees are hosted by middle- to low-income countries. According to the same report, the three biggest host countries in 2015 were Turkey, Pakistan, and Lebanon. The lack of support from richer countries, and their unwillingness to open their borders to ease the pressure on these borderline states, is causing division and resentment within the international community but is unlikely to go away. As long as divisions exist in the world between zones of **peace**, **security**, and **democracy**, and zones of conflict, insecurity, and repression, movement of people on a large scale will continue. The problem of migration, according to some predictions, is also likely to be exacerbated by global climate change, as rising sea levels, water shortages, desertification, or extreme weather force people from their homes. Migration is therefore likely to continue to be a key issue in international relations in the 21st century.

See also AFGHAN WARS; ARAB UPRISINGS; GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS; HUMAN RIGHTS; NATIONAL INTEREST; POVERTY; RAISON D'ÉTAT.

MITRANY, DAVID (1888–1975). David Mitrany was born into a Jewish family in Bucharest, Romania. After his compulsory military service he traveled to Germany, where he was an office worker and also took evening classes at the Kolonial Institut in Hamburg from 1908 to 1911. In 1912, he moved to Great Britain and enrolled to study sociology at the London School of Economics (LSE). When **World War I** (WWI) broke out in 1914, he worked for the Romanian Legation in London, before moving on to intelli-

gence work for the Foreign Office and War Office for the remainder of the **war**. He finished his BSc at the LSE in 1918 and campaigned actively for the formation of the **League of Nations**. He joined the editorial staff of the *Manchester Guardian* from 1919 to 1922, focusing on foreign affairs. In 1922, he started work for the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace as assistant European editor on a series of publications about the economic and social history of WWI. Concerned with the effects of **economic sanctions**, his book *The Problem of International Sanctions* was published in 1925. By this time, he had become committed to the cause of international **peace** and was opposed to **nationalism** and Zionism. He continued to study at the LSE, gaining his PhD in 1920 and his DSc in economics in 1931.

From 1924 to 1933, Mitrany embarked on several lectureships in the United States. He published a number of his lectures in *The Progress of International Government* in 1933. From that year until 1939, he was a professor in the School of Economics and Politics at the Institute of Advanced Study at Princeton University. During this period, he pioneered **functionalism** as a theory of international relations—a tradition to which a number of thinkers (including **Harold Laski**, **E. H. Carr**, and **Ernst B. Haas**) also contributed. Mitrany considered the Tennessee Valley Authority a good example of organization on the basis of function. From the Munich Crisis of 1938 until 1942, he worked for the British Foreign Office with the aim of finding solutions to the political, economic, and social problems that seemed likely to appear after **World War II**. He continued to propose functional solutions in a series of papers until 1942. Free of the restrictions of the Foreign Office, he could thereafter express his views more clearly, as in his hugely influential pamphlet *A Working Peace System: An Argument for the Functional Development of International Organization* in 1943. He sought functional alternatives to state **sovereignty** and federalism. When proposals were made for the **United Nations** (UN) organization, he was optimistic that it would involve some functional arrangements, especially when his ideas influenced plans for the specialized agencies of the new **international organization**. After the war, he combined his renewed academic role at Princeton with that of advisor on international affairs for the **transnational corporation** Unilever Ltd. in Great Britain. He continued this dual role in various forms until the early 1960s. He continued to publish widely and in 1975, shortly before his death, some of his lectures were published in his book *The Functional Theory of Politics*, which also included his personal memoir.

See also INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS; INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY.

MODERNIZATION THEORY. *See* ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT.

MORGENTHAU, HANS JOACHIM (1904–1980). Hans J. Morgenthau was born into a Jewish family in Coburg, Germany. His father, who was a doctor, subjected him to an authoritarian upbringing. He went to school in his hometown before going to three German universities—in Berlin, Frankfurt, and Munich—where he studied history, law, economics, and philosophy. After working briefly for the Graduate Institute for International Studies in Geneva, he entered the legal profession in Frankfurt in 1927, and soon became acting president of the labor law court in that city. In 1932, he again went to Geneva, this time to teach law, with the intention of returning to Germany after one year. Because of the rise of **Adolf Hitler** to power in 1933, he remained in Geneva until 1935. As the **League of Nations** was located in that city, he witnessed its demise. This influenced his thought, on the basis of which he later became a key figure in **International Relations theory**. Hitler's consolidation of power in Germany meant that Morgenthau went to teach in Madrid from 1935 to 1936 rather than return home. He immigrated to the United States the following year and taught at Brooklyn College, New York, until 1939, when he went to teach at the University of Missouri in Kansas City. He became a naturalized U.S. citizen in 1943 and that year he moved to the University of Chicago, where he taught until 1971. He then moved to the City University of New York to take a professorial chair until 1974. For the remaining six year of his life, he taught at the New School for Social Research in New York.

Although he practiced and taught law during the early period of his academic career, Morgenthau's doctoral dissertation on the international judicial function had already indicated that he considered international politics to be far more significant than **international law**. In his book *The Concept of the Political*, published in French in 1933 (but not in English until 2012), he argued that international law must serve a political purpose, and this was to maintain justice and **peace**. Over the decade that followed, he began to formulate an argument that law was of no value without **power**. Politics was needed to help establish the power of a **state**. He was also influenced by the view of **Reinhold Niebuhr** that human nature had sinful, acquisitive, and **aggressive** drives.

Morgenthau began to argue that politics was governed by objective laws that have their roots in human nature. This became the basis of his 1948 book, *Politics among Nations*, which established him as the leading theorist of **realism**. His argument was based on the belief that the objective laws were derived from the biological drives of human beings. People were power seeking, and this was reflected in the behavior of states, which were in competition with one another because of their concern with defending their interests defined in terms of power. He saw this as the central feature of international relations. He argued that states would need to pursue power if they were to succeed in international relations. Nevertheless, he also warned

that history showed that the way to contain the struggle between states and limit the use of **force** was by means of **diplomacy** in order to establish a **balance of power**. States should follow this lesson. There was thus a normative element to his thought.

This normative element in his thought meant that Morgenthau opposed the rise of **behavioralism** in the discipline of International Relations. His earlier book *Scientific Man versus Power Politics* (1946) had indeed argued against attempts to apply scientific methods to political and social problems. The normative element was also in evidence in his book *In Defense of the National Interest*, published in 1951. His thought and theory placed him in the tradition of **classical realism**, along with **Thucydides**, **Niccolò Machiavelli**, and **Thomas Hobbes** from earlier centuries, and also **E. H. Carr** and Niebuhr from his own century. He opposed the U.S. **war** in **Vietnam** as he considered it was the result of poor statecraft and **foreign policy**.

See also MEARSHEIMER, JOHN J. (1947–); NORMATIVE THEORY; TICKNER, JUDITH ANN (1937–); WALTZ, KENNETH NEAL (1924–2013).

MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS. *See* TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATION.

N

NATIONAL INTEREST. The end for which a nation acts has traditionally been termed its *national interest*. The term is semantically problematic because a **nation** in most cases is not coterminous with a **state**; nevertheless, the word is usually used in relation to states. The term is generally applied to certain key long-term and continuing interests such as the maintenance of a state's territorial integrity; the protection of its political **culture** and institutions; the safeguarding of its **sovereignty**; its economic prosperity; and the enhancement of its prestige, reputation, and influence. In **International Relations (IR) theory**, **classical realist** writers such as **Hans J. Morgenthau** attached particular significance to the idea that states have interests. For Morgenthau, interest was defined in terms of **power** and was the key driving force of international politics. From a realist perspective, states act in accordance with their interests and it is this that determines policy decisions, rather than a commitment to a set of values or principles such as **human rights**. The term is also particularly associated with the decision-making approach in **foreign policy** analysis; the national interest is a yardstick by which a foreign policy action can be evaluated.

The term *national interest* is complex and essentially contested. Although it is something of a truism that decision makers must serve the national interest, it is not at all clear what the national interest is in a particular situation. The prosperity of a nation-state might be a shared and uncontroversial end, for example, but how that prosperity might best be achieved will be the subject of wide-ranging debate; there might also be a conflict between long- and short-term interests. Similarly, **security** is a key national interest, but how that security can be realized is hotly disputed. During the referendum campaign in Great Britain in 2016 on its continued membership of the **European Union**, those campaigning for Britain to leave did so on the assumption that this would make the country more secure; those campaigning for a remain vote argued that Britain was more secure inside the union. While some might argue that there is an objective interest and one side in the debate is simply wrong, there is no neutral viewpoint from which to settle the matter. Given the complexities and ambiguities of the term, the term *national*

interest is no longer as frequently found in contemporary IR theory. It is, however, still used regularly by politicians to justify or denounce a particular policy.

See also RAISON D'ÉTAT.

NATIONALISM. Nationalism emerged as an influential ideology and movement in the 18th century, and has been prominent in **International Relations (IR) theory** in two main ways. First, nationalism describes the world in terms of a division into nation-states. Second, it offers a **normative theory** that the world ought to be divided into nations because they provide identity, loyalty, and the basis for a **state** with national self-determination. The nation is considered to form a community with common interests. Hence, nations, according to nationalism, should be self-governing in accordance with the **national interest**, the nation-state being, and ultimately, the only legitimate form of government, notwithstanding cleavages of class, religion, race, and so on within a nation.

Nationalism considers the nation-state in theory to be the only stable and cohesive form of government because of political and cultural unity. Nationalists thus ultimately seek to create or maintain a state with **sovereignty**. In practice, groups of people who identify themselves as being part of a nation sometimes accept some degree of autonomy—for example, in a federal state. Nation-states sometimes combine together in regional **international organization** such as the **European Union** and the **African Union**, voluntarily allowing these organizations to take over some functions of governance. Some forms of nationalism are civic, in that the nation-state does not exclude people on the basis of race or ethnicity. Ethnic nationalism, on the other hand, considers the relevant group to consist of people of supposed common descent. Ethnic nationalism can lead to discrimination, racism, and even **war**.

As the European **empires** began to break down in the 20th century, groups within them subscribed to nationalism, each seeking its own sovereign nation-state. The number of states that realistically held such status grew from 30 in 1900 to 45 member-states of the **League of Nations** in 1923, and then to 51 states that established the **United Nations** (UN) in 1945. In 2016, the UN declared 203 member-states, the last to join being South Sudan in 2011. Groups of people who identify themselves in terms of nations but do not have a state to represent them independently include the Kurds and Palestinians.

Some IR theorists such as **Harold Laski** and **David Mitrany** have criticized nationalism because it encourages conflict, discourages cooperation, or disguises exploitation. **Cosmopolitanism** is an IR theory that argues that, in terms of morality, national borders are irrelevant. Nationalism should thus, according to cosmopolitans, give way to a moral concern for humanity.

See also ARAB LEAGUE; ARAB–ISRAELI CONFLICT; GORBA-CHEV, MIKHAIL SEGEYEVICH (1931–); HAAS, ERNST BERNARD (1924–2003); NKRUMAH, KWAME (1909–1972); STALIN, JOSEF (1878–1953); WORLD WAR I; WORLD WAR II.

NEOCOLONIALISM. Referring disapprovingly to the largely informal processes that keep economically weaker countries under the **power** and economic dominance of the former **colonial** powers and other advanced industrial **states**, the term "neocolonialism" was used by **Marxists** and other radicals, especially in the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s. States and **international organizations** such as the **International Monetary Fund** and **World Bank** were, it was argued, able to maintain such dominance in order to sustain the power of the capitalist class. This class was able to operate by means of **transnational corporations**. In Africa, Ghanaian independence leader, prime minister, and president **Kwame Nkrumah** was particularly influential in his use of the term *neocolonialism*. The cultural aspect of neocolonialism is highlighted by **postcolonialism**.

See also BRETTON WOODS CONFERENCE; DEBT; ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT; INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY (IPE); WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION (WTO).

NEOFUNCTIONALISM. *See* FUNCTIONALISM.

NEOLIBERAL INSTITUTIONALISM. Sometimes referred to as neoliberalism, neoliberal institutionalism in **International Relations theory** should not be confused with neoliberal economic doctrine. The latter promoted privatization, free **trade**, free markets, deregulation, and reductions in government spending. From the mid-1980s, neoliberal institutionalism (hereafter neoliberalism) has presented an alternative to **neorealism** as a theory of international relations. The debate between theorists on each side has become known as the neo-neo debate. Nevertheless, there are certain similarities between the two alternatives, so much so that a consensus developed on the view that there is significant overlap between them, and that which of the two has the greatest explanatory value depends on the issue at stake. Indeed, neoliberalism focuses on **international political economy**, **global environmental politics**, and **human rights**, while neorealism focuses on **security** and military issues. It is sometimes argued that the two types of theory work better in their respective areas of focus.

The roots of neoliberalism can be traced to the **liberal internationalism** of the first four decades of the 20th century. Other theories that helped shape neoliberalism were **functionalism** and **neofunctionalism**, offered by **David Mitrany** and **Ernst Haas** respectively, and by others in the 1950s, 1960s,

and 1970s. Furthermore, the complex **interdependence** writings of **Robert Keohane** and **Joseph Nye** in the 1970s and 1980s were hugely influential. Keohane was an important pioneering theorist of neoliberalism, especially in his seminal book *After Hegemony*, published in 1984.

Although they consider the roles of actors other than **states** to be far more significant than is appreciated by neorealism, neoliberals share with neorealists the view that states are unitary actors that seek to protect and promote their own interests. They also concur with neorealists that the organizing principle of the **Westphalian system of states** is **anarchy**, in the sense that there is no overarching authority to enforce rules or laws among those states. Neoliberals, however, consider that the opportunities for cooperation that will facilitate promotion of the interests of each state that is involved are far greater than the neorealists recognize. Neorealism, indeed, considers that states tend and need to pursue relative gains, while neoliberalism believes that often states pursue absolute gains and that it is possible for them to do so more often because it is in their best interests to do so. Furthermore, while neorealists consider that the main factor in the relative strengths of states is that of capabilities, neoliberals argue that intentions and preferences are far more significant. Neoliberalism considers that **international organizations**, including intergovernmental organizations, have an important role to play. These organizations are created by the states, which remain the key units in the system. The organizations contribute to institutions, which in turn, with various degrees of conscious instigation, help form **international regimes**. As they make **foreign policy**, states are thus enabled to take opportunities for cooperation that mitigate the effects of anarchy and manage the processes of **globalization**. Neorealists argue that neoliberals exaggerate the impact of institutions and regimes.

See also HEGEMONIC STABILITY THEORY; INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS.

NEOREALISM. From the 1970s until the present day, some of the most prominent **International Relations (IR) theories** have been those in the category of neorealism, which is sometimes known as structural realism. Neorealism is the response of a number of influential IR scholars to the critique of **realism**, especially **classical realism**, which was presented by equally influential liberal theorists in the 1960s and 1970s. Stung by the challenge mounted by the likes of **Robert Keohane** and **Joseph Nye** and the effectiveness of some of their arguments, **Kenneth Waltz** led the neorealist response. This was based on a reconceptualization of realism of such significance that soon the label "neorealism" was being applied widely to arguments inspired by, or bearing similarities to, those of Waltz.

Neorealism transposes realism to the level of the system. It is an attempt to transform realism into scientific theory; the result is a theory at a high level of abstraction, focusing on the nature of the international system and on the way that **states** pursue **power** within that system. It is therefore concerned with structures (hence the term "structural realism") and removes all forms of human agency from its analyses. For example, the classical realist emphasis on human nature is not considered relevant. A structural approach is based on the idea that the behavior of units within a system or structure cannot be understood independently of the structure. The interaction of states creates an international system or structure that has definite and enduring characteristics independent of the states that created it. Neorealists say that this system has **anarchy** as an ordering principle. This is not to suggest that the system is in chaos. It means, rather, that there is no centralized or ultimate arbiter standing above the states, which are the key units of the system.

Waltz and other neorealists argue that very different states behave in similar ways because their behavior is determined by the structure. Nevertheless, the argument continues, the international political system is formed by the actions of states, directed at various ends. States, it is argued, cannot know for sure the intentions of the other states, and thus, as rational actors, states will have some offensive military capability, even if only for self-defense in this environment of uncertainty. It is recognized that this capability is not equal: some states will be more successful than others in achieving those ends. Crucial to success are their capabilities.

As was the case in classical realism, the **balance of power** is a key concern for neorealism. Whether the balance in question is regional or global, neorealists believe that states do not want that balance to swing out of their favor. This might require states to ally together to enhance their power in order to balance an existing or emerging "great power," as very powerful states are known. The distribution of capabilities is thus crucial to a state's place in the system and balance. Because of the need to maintain the balance and swing the balance in their favor either marginally or radically, states, according to neorealism, will tend to seek relative gains rather than absolute gains. **Neoliberal institutionalism**, by way of contrast, assumes that, especially in contemporary conditions of **interdependence**, states are more likely to seek absolute gains, or in other words gains that improve their position irrespective of gains of other states.

Some significant variations of the broader neorealist approach emerged. The question whether states will seek to swing the balance of power marginally in their favor or, if they have the capabilities, radically, is crucial to a distinction that **John J. Mearsheimer** draws between two such variants. These variants are, he suggests, defensive realism and offensive realism. Neorealists all assume that all states want to survive and will act accordingly. Defensive and offensive realism hold different views on what those actions

will tend to be. As the names of these variants indicate, offensive realism considers that states will tend to be more forceful and attempt to achieve **hegemony** if they consider they have the capabilities to do so. Discussing the merits of these two conflicting variants, Mearsheimer argues that offensive realism is the more persuasive. Defensive neorealists, of course, recognize that some states engage in offensive activity. Offensive realists likewise understand that some states act defensively. Their disagreement concerns whether offensive action or defensive action is most likely in the long run to preserve power and ensure survival.

See also GLOBAL POWER SHIFTS; HEGEMONIC STABILITY THEORY.

NEW INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER. Demands from the **third world** for a New International Economic Order (NIEO) were an attempt to end the marginalization of developing **states** within the global economy. This marginalization had led to the growth of solidarity among third-world states demonstrated by the establishment of the **Non-Aligned Movement** (NAM) and the **United Nations Conference on Trade and Development** (UNCTAD). The callers for an NIEO had a goal of building upon this solidarity and of changing the rules of the game. Informed by key thinkers such as **Raúl Prebisch** and **André Gunder Frank**, the demand for a program of change was made in **United Nations** (UN) Resolution 3201 on 1 May 1974 and sought to challenge the existing system, which advantaged those states that had economic **power**. The program had 10 sections that dealt with various aspects of raw materials, technology, and the control of **transnational corporations**. **Trade** reform was the top priority, with Section I addressing the "fundamental problems of raw materials and primary commodities" as related to trade and **economic development**. Demands were made for price stability for commodities, the creation of buffer stocks, access to markets in developed countries, and protection for infant industries and markets in the developing world. The demands challenged the principles on which the **Bretton Woods** system was based, as did the demands on the financing of development and on the international monetary system. The demand for an increased role for the UN, an institution within which developing states have a majority, sought to **balance the power** of the United States and Europe within the **World Bank** and **International Monetary Fund** (IMF).

Although the passing of the NIEO resolutions reflected the relative strength of developing states within the UN, enhanced by the successful use of commodity power by the **Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries**, the attempt was not a success. Concrete concessions were not won and the **debt** crisis that engulfed the developing world in the 1980s further weakened poorer states. The crisis also gave an enlarged role to the Bretton

Woods institutions within the global economy, compounding the problem of the lack of third-world power. Furthermore, the reality of debt servicing and the austerity programs imposed by the World Bank and IMF as conditions of new loans limited the very economic development that the NIEO had set out to achieve.

See also ECONOMIC GLOBALIZATION; INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS; NEOCOLONIALISM.

NIEBUHR, REINHOLD (1892–1971). Reinhold Niebuhr was born in Wright City, Missouri, as the son of a pastor who was a German immigrant. Niebuhr, whose mother was likewise deeply religious, trained to be a minister, graduating from Yale Divinity School in 1914 before gaining his MA from Yale University the following year. He immediately took a post as a minister in Detroit. He also became a socialist and used his position in the church to speak out on social issues. In 1928, he became a professor at Union Theological Seminary in New York City, a post he held until his retirement in 1960. This background as an active and committed Christian underpinned his work in International Relations.

Along with **E. H. Carr**, who quoted his work in support of his own argument in *The Twenty Years' Crisis* (1939), Niebuhr was one of the **classical realist** theorists of the period between **World War I** and **World War II** (WWII). Niebuhr's **realism** was expressed in his book *Moral Man and Immoral Society* of 1932. He argued that **liberal internationalism** (or idealism as it is sometimes known) had exaggerated the capacity of groups of human beings to engage in genuinely moral behavior. Although there was some such capacity, human nature had sinful, acquisitive, and **aggressive** drives with which that capacity was in conflict. The consequence was that it was unlikely that lasting international **peace** would endure. **International organizations** such as the **League of Nations** were thus unlikely to be successful.

Although he believed that humans had a Christian moral duty to avoid violence if possible and was thus a pacifist in the 1930s, Niebuhr advocated American entry into WWII against **Adolf Hitler**'s Nazism. He went on to support the case for violence against totalitarianism in general. After the **war**, he spoke out against the communist totalitarianism of **Josef Stalin**. Niebuhr's socialism gave way to support for **democratic** capitalism as the way to defend **human rights**. Nevertheless, he continued to criticize the irresponsible use of **power**, and toward the end of his life argued against American involvement in the **Vietnam War**.

See also INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY; MORGENTHAU, HANS JOACHIM (1904–1980).

NKRUMAH, KWAME (1909–1972). Kwame Nkrumah was born in Nkroful to a family of the Nzeme ethnic group in the Gold Coast, which was a British colony. In his late teenage years, he worked as a teacher while also still a pupil in his local district of Jomoro, before going on to train as a teacher in the city of Accra from 1926 to 1930. After graduation he taught until 1935 when he traveled to London and then to New York before going on to study at Lincoln University (formed in 1854 mainly for students of African descent), working unskilled jobs out of term time. He graduated with a BA in economics and sociology in 1939, and gained his MA degrees in education in 1942 and philosophy in 1943 from the University of Pennsylvania. He read **Karl Marx** and **V. I. Lenin** and became influenced by **Marxism**. This and his interest in **nationalism** led to his commitment to the anticolonial struggle.

Nkrumah became active in organizing anticolonial activities when he returned to London in 1945. Two years later, he returned to the Gold Coast to become general secretary of the United Gold Coast Convention, which campaigned for independence and an end to **colonialism**. In 1949, he left to form the Convention People's Party (CPP), which was a socialist party that sought independence for the Gold Coast, of which he became prime minister in 1952 after a period of imprisonment. Nkrumah achieved his goal in 1957 when the Gold Coast became the first black African country to break from colonial rule, becoming independent Ghana in the Commonwealth. In 1960, Ghana became a republic with Nkrumah as president. In 1964, Nkrumah and his CCP began to govern Ghana as a one-party **state**. Among his many books, his *Neocolonialism: The Last Stage of Imperialism* was published in 1965. In it, he criticized the nature and activity of **transnational corporations** and argued that **overseas aid** and **debt** were entrenching African **poverty** and **dependency**. This amounted to **neocolonialism**. A key part of the problem that enabled this to happen, in his view, was that the continent had failed to achieve political and economic integration.

Nkrumah's **foreign policy** involved pan-Africanism. He helped create the Union of African States that linked Ghana with Guinea in 1958 and also Mali in 1960. This regional **international organization** existed until 1963. That year, Nkrumah helped form the Organization of African Unity, which would be replaced by the **African Union** in 2002. As a communist, he proclaimed solidarity with the Soviet Union and China. He organized the Pan-African Congress in Manchester in 1965. After a coup that brought Nkrumah down in 1966, the CCP was banned. Nkrumah was granted asylum in Guinea, where he resided for the remainder of his life until his death from cancer.

See also MAO ZEDONG (1893–1976).

NOBEL PEACE PRIZE. The Nobel Peace Prize is one of five prizes—the others are in physics, chemistry, physiology or medicine, and literature—established by Alfred Nobel in his will and commenced after his death in 1896. Nobel was a Swedish chemist, entrepreneur, businessman, and the inventor of dynamite; he was also a pacifist. The prize is awarded to those who have made a substantial contribution to issues such as international reconciliation, peace building, human **security**, social and **economic development**, humanitarianism, the promotion of **human rights**, **democracy**, and conflict resolution. For example, in 2011, the prize was awarded to Ellen Johnson Sirleaf, Leymah Gbowee, and Tawakkol Karman "for their non-violent struggle for the safety of women and for women's rights to full participation in peace-building work."

The list of Peace Prize laureates includes many notable individuals in the history of international relations of the 20th and 21st centuries. The first prize in 1901 was awarded jointly to Jean Henry Dunant, founder of the **International Committee of the Red Cross** (ICRC), and Frédéric Passy, a French economist. Other recipients include President of the United States **Thomas Woodrow Wilson** (1919); the campaigner for disarmament Jane Addams (1931); U.S. civil rights leader Martin Luther King (1964); **Willy Brandt** (1971); Lech Walesa, head of the trade union Solidarity and key figure in Poland's anti-Soviet struggle (1983); former political prisoner and first black president of South Africa Nelson Mandela (1993), who shared the honor with former white South African president F. W. de Klerk; Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat, who won the award in 1994 alongside Israeli leaders Shimon Peres and Yitzhak Rabin; and **Mikhail Gorbachev** (1999). By 2016, the award had been won by 16 women, including Malala Yousafzai (2014), who won the prize for her struggle to assert the right of all children to an education. She shared her prize with Kailash Satyarthi, an Indian activist against child labor.

The prize is also awarded to **international organizations**. The **United Nations**, its specialized agencies, related agencies, funds, programs, and staff had won the peace prize 11 times prior to 2016. The **United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees** (UNHCR) alone had received it twice, in 1954 and 1981. Two **United Nations Secretaries-General** have also been recipients. Dag Hammarskjöld was awarded the prize posthumously in 1961 and in 2001 the prize was awarded jointly to the United Nations itself and to Kofi Annan, then its secretary-general. The **European Union** is a Nobel laureate, having been awarded the prize in 2012 for advancing the causes of **peace**, reconciliation, democracy, and human rights in Europe over six decades. The Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons won the prize in 2013 for its work in the Syrian civil **war**. The International Atomic Energy Agen-

cy (IAEA) is another recipient, as is Médecins sans Frontières "in recognition of the organization's pioneering humanitarian work on several continents" (1999). The ICRC has won the prize twice, in 1944 and 1963.

The Nobel Peace Prize has at times been controversial. In 2009, it was awarded to President of the United States Barrack Obama "for his extraordinary efforts to strengthen international **diplomacy** and cooperation between peoples" just a few months into his presidency. In June 2016, the former chairman of the Nobel Committee, Thorbjørn Jagland, commented that Barrack Obama ought to consider giving the prize back, clearly considering that Obama had not been the force for peace in the world that the committee had anticipated. The most controversial recipient to date, however, is widely considered to have been **Henry Kissinger**, whom some consider a war criminal for U.S. actions in the **Vietnam War**. The prize can also get entangled in **foreign policy**. In 2010, the prize was awarded to Liu Xiaobo, a Chinese dissident for "his long and non-violent struggle for fundamental human rights in China." Like Burma's opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi, who won the prize in 1991, Liu Xiaobo was in prison at the time of the award, but unlike Suu Kyi he was not allowed to appoint a representative to collect the prize. He was represented by an empty chair at the ceremony. China showed its disapproval of this prize by putting pressure on key trading partners not to attend the ceremony, walking away from talks on a free **trade** agreement with Norway, imposing restrictions on imports of Norwegian salmon, and refusing to offer Norwegians visa-free travel to China. The fact that the prize was award to Liu Xiaobo despite the anticipated backlash is indicative of the panel's political independence and autonomy. With the replacement of Thorbjørn Jagland, concerns were raised about the continued independence of the Nobel Peace Prize and there is a fear that the impact on international relations will in future be more of a consideration in the minds of the panel members who select the winners.

See also ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT; NOEL-BAKER, PHILIP (1889–1982).

NOEL-BAKER, PHILIP (1889–1982). Philip Baker was born in London to a Quaker family. His Canadian father had moved to England to set up a successful business manufacturing baking machinery. Baker adopted his father's faith and would remain an active opponent of **war** and campaigner for **peace**. He attended Quaker schools in York, England, and Pennsylvania before returning to England to study history and economics at Cambridge University, where he graduated in 1912. In 1914, he became vice-principal at Ruskin College, Oxford, but left to serve in ambulance units during **World War I**. He was decorated for bravery in this work. He married fellow ambulance worker Irene Noel in 1915 and thus changed his name to Philip Noel-Baker.

In 1918–1919, Noel-Baker was principal assistant to Sir Robert Cecil on the committee that drafted the covenant of the **League of Nations**. He attended the **Paris Peace Conference** in this role. From 1920 to 1931 he held administrative positions for the League, including briefly on the disarmament committee. He was an advocate of disarmament and **peace** through **international law** in the 1920s and 1930s, and much of his published work was on these topics. He was a professor of international law at the London School of Economics from 1924 to 1929, publishing the books *The Geneva Protocol for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes* (1925), *The League of Nations at Work* (1926), *Disarmament* (1926), and *Disarmament and the Coolidge Conference* (1927). As a member of the Labour Party, the **foreign policy** of which he helped develop, he was elected to the British Parliament in 1929, holding his seat until the collapse of the Labour government in 1931. He returned to the United States to lecture at Yale University before returning to England, where he was again elected to Parliament in 1936. He remained as a member of Parliament until 1950. In 1937, he was elected to the National Executive Committee (NEC) of the Labour Party.

After **World War II** broke out, Noel-Baker's party entered a wartime coalition led by the Conservative Party. In 1942, he accepted an invitation from Prime Minister **Winston Churchill** to serve as joint parliamentary secretary to the minister of war transport. In 1944, he was placed in charge of preparatory work for the establishment of the **United Nations**, the charter of which he helped draft. In the postwar Labour governments from 1945 to 1950, he held several cabinet posts. He also succeeded **Harold Laski** as chairman of the NEC from 1946 to 1947. In 1958, he published his influential book *The Arms Race: A Programme for World Disarmament*, for which he won the **Nobel Peace Prize**. In 1979, he was cofounder of the World Disarmament Campaign, in which he was active until his death.

See also ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT; LAUTERPACHT, HERSCH (1897–1960).

NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT (NAM). In 1955, the leaders of five developing **states**—Egypt, Indonesia, Ghana, India, and Yugoslavia—called a summit in Bandung, Indonesia, to inaugurate a Non-Aligned Movement (NAM). In the context of the **Cold War** bipolar world, the leaders saw the need for a third, independent bloc to protect the **sovereignty** and integrity of new states emerging from **colonialism**. In a world dominated by superpower confrontation, their vision was for a neutral space in which new states could stand together and resist the bids for influence of the United States and Soviet Union. The NAM was formally established at its first **summit** meeting held in Belgrade in 1961 with 25 states attending. It became central to the development of a **third-world** identity and was a collective challenge to an order based on the **hegemonic** interests of Western states. It was also an

important way that developing states could articulate demands, such as that for a **New International Economic Order**, and mobilize collective action. The NAM's primary purpose in a world dominated by the superpowers was to support the self-determination and national independence of the weaker states. It also took a stand against racism, all forms of foreign domination, the use of **force**, and all forms of **neocolonialism**. It sought to work collectively toward the restructuring of the **global economy**, the **democratization** of the international system, the promotion of **human rights**, the strengthening of the **United Nations**, and a reduction in big power dominance and interference.

The NAM has struggled to remain relevant since the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the bipolar system. Although many of its key objectives remain important, the changed international environment makes the necessity of the NAM less obvious. More importantly, the collective interests of the developing world have been fragmented. The processes of **globalization** and the rapid development of states such as South Korea, China, and India have challenged the assumption that all developing states share the same essential economic needs and interests. Opposition to continued Western dominance of both international political and economic spaces, however, remains a uniting factor.

See also AMERICAN PRIMACY; ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT; INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS; INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS.

NORMATIVE THEORY. A norm is a standard or a value that defines what is normal, acceptable, and good. Normative theory seeks to reveal, evaluate, or establish norms of behavior and to offer analytical defense of its suggestions. It is both critical and prescriptive and has a clear political project. According to the traditional narrative in **International Relations (IR) theory**, normative theory seeks to change the world, while scientific theory, which adopts a behavioral approach, seeks to explain it; the former is concerned with values and the latter with facts. In the traditional oppositional structuring of fact and value, fact has tended to be privileged over value. During the long years in which **behavioralism** dominated the academic discipline of IR, therefore, normative theory was sidelined and largely restricted to questions of the ethics of **war** and nuclear **deterrence**.

Postpositivist theory of IR challenges the fact/value distinction. **Marxism**, **critical theory**, **feminism**, **Green theory**, **postcolonialism**, and **poststructuralism** are all intrinsically normative. They also reveal the normative assumptions that are implicit in the more mainstream theories. **Robert W. Cox** wrote that all theory is for someone and for some purpose. Theory that supports hegemonic forces or the status quo and that masquerades as "common sense" might be less apparently normative than counterhegemonic theo-

ry, which reveals the injustice of current practice and looks toward transformation—but in its support of current practice and the promotion of certain norms and standards of behavior, it is normative. Neoliberalism, for example, can be seen to support U.S. economic **hegemony**; in so doing, it promotes certain institutions and policies and marginalizes counterhegemonic concerns. It reflects certain values, and makes assumptions about what is good or useful; it cannot be understood as a simple, value-free explanation of a world out there.

The term "normative theory" is therefore not satisfactory, but it is commonly used within IR nonetheless and certain distinctive themes enable one to judge whether a theory is likely to be placed in the normative theory category. These themes are morality, justice, and **human rights**, and normative theory is sometimes known as "international ethics." These themes can relate directly to issues of practical policy such as the project of **internationally protected human rights**, or can identify those existing practices that are harmful and that need to be stopped, such as **genocide**, **torture**, **slavery**, human trafficking, economic exploitation, the **arms trade**, and environmental degradation. Certain normative theorists set out very specific proposals for global transformation, such as Hillel Steiner's global taxation, but others are concerned with ethical issues in a more theoretical way—how, for example, to establish global principles of justice or how to validate or justify a commitment to human rights for all.

At the heart of normative theory is the cosmopolitan/communitarian debate. This is the debate between the universal and the particular. The root issue of the debate is whether the moral status of human beings derives from their humanity or from their membership of a community. Cosmopolitan writers tend to draw on liberal theories though not exclusively; Marxism, for example, is also cosmopolitan in outlook. The attraction of liberalism is that it seeks objective justification for political principles that can therefore stand as the foundation for universal ethical prescriptions. Because liberals assume that individuals have a value and rights prior to and independent of society, the foundation of morality predates society, and liberalism therefore provides a moral criteria by which the actions of **states** can be judged. If a state is mistreating its citizens, then those citizens, in demanding change, can advocate for their human rights, and international critics can do likewise.

As **cosmopolitanism** is founded on liberal assumptions, it is vulnerable to the criticism levied by communitarians against liberal individualists in political theory. Communitarians argue that individuals are constituted by the communities in which they live. For communitarians, the moral starting points are the ties, relationships, and obligations that arise from one's social identity—there are no preexisting natural rights. Communitarianism therefore denies the existence of universal values; values are local and develop within communities in response to their particular **culture** and needs. As the

world is full of different communities and different cultures, it is also full of different moralities. According to communitarians, morality is therefore relative.

The cosmopolitan/communitarian debate is central to the issue of the moral obligations of states for it determines where the moral boundary is drawn. From a cosmopolitan perspective, the boundary embraces all mankind. This is not to say that a cosmopolitan position necessarily implies world government; indeed, it usually does not. Most cosmopolitans accept the pragmatic need for states but deny that the borders of the state define the extent of moral responsibility. If one considers international justice, for example, cosmopolitans adopt an inclusive approach. When considering issues of justice, they argue that everyone in the whole world should be considered. This raises the question of how justice should be achieved, and different cosmopolitans propose different answers to this question; but they all agree that there should be considerable redistribution to alleviate **poverty** in accordance with global principles of justice.

Cosmopolitanism has enjoyed a resurgence in recent decades in part because of the influence of **John Rawls**'s *A Theory of Justice*, which stimulated an interest in these issues. Writers such as Thomas Pogge and Charles Beitz began to apply Rawls's theory internationally. Rawls himself extended his theory to international relations in his *The Law of Peoples* in the early 1990s. By this time the influence of normative theory had begun to grow in IR, thereby fostering the communitarianism versus cosmopolitanism debate. **Economic globalization** also played its part. Globalization is seen by many normative theorists to be altering the relationships among humankind in certain fundamental ways. Firstly, growing **interdependence** within a global economy creates relationships between people who are geographically and culturally far apart and between whom in previous times there would have been no connection. Secondly, the widening of access to new technologies has made people more aware of global inequalities and human suffering. It has also created the capability to act effectively. Normative theorists who have developed international schemes of justice on the basis of globalization include Beitz, Peter Singer, and Onora O'Neill. Finally, in the contemporary world, the question is raised as to whether globalization allows for the possibility of a new identity as global citizen. Theorists such as David Held and **Andrew Linklater** argue that globalization contains within itself the possibility of a moral transformation of international relations.

By contrast, from a communitarian perspective, the state is not only ethical as the source of identity and social good, but its boundaries define the limits of moral responsibility. In other words, the state has obligations toward its citizens but not to outsiders. On the issue of redistributive justice, therefore, communitarians adopt an exclusive approach, one that is limited to the citizens of a state, for the state marks the limits of the sphere of justice and of

mutual responsibility. Communitarianism, however, does not imply that states are necessarily amoral or immoral in their dealings with other states because they are restrained by the values of the community they represent. Communitarianism does, nevertheless, imply that states should not have to accept constraints that have not grown out of the community. This has implications for the international protection of human rights, which emerged in the **West** yet which defines global standards. It also has an impact on thinking on policies such as **humanitarian intervention**, **overseas aid**, the **arms trade**, and environmental protection.

IR theory has traditionally been communitarian. **Hans J. Morgenthau** stated that realism "refuses to identify the moral aspiration of a particular nation with the moral laws that govern the universe." All moralities adopt the mantle of universalism, but this does not alter their contingent status. This communitarianism has led to a widely held acceptance that international politics is amoral and that in the absence of universals by which state action can be judged to be right or wrong, good or bad, international politics should be driven by consideration of interest alone. Political acts at an international level that are motivated by ethical concerns are likely to jeopardize state interests and lead to hypocrisy and inconsistency as well as a sort of moral **imperialism**.

The logic of communitarianism, however, is moral relativism, and many communitarians are uncomfortable about the relativism of their position, not wanting to accept, for example, that a society based on slavery or genocide is acceptable. Some, such as **Michael Walzer**, therefore accept the existence of a "thin" universal moral code that would eliminate such possibilities, indicating at least some sense of common humanity. Similarly, most cosmopolitans would accept some privileging of local priorities. Most participants in the debate, therefore, hold views that are mildly on one or the other side of the conceptual dichotomy. Nevertheless, although there might be agreement at the extremes, the real debates between cosmopolitans and communitarians occur in the middle where there is as yet no convergence.

Another distinctive dichotomy in normative theory is the debate between advocates of deontology and consequentialism as appropriate types of ethical reasoning. Deontology (a term deriving from the Greek "*deon*," meaning duty) holds that some acts in international relations—such as the killing of innocent civilians, torture, or other abuses of human rights—are wrong, whatever may be the benefits that result in consequence. A strict consequentialist position would hold that some acts are justifiable because of their projected consequences, even if they may harm some people or abuse their rights in order to make this possible. Decisions that are made in actual international relations hardly ever are made on the basis of an explicit and overt

deontologist or consequentialist argument. Deontology and consequentialism are, rather, analytical concepts that are used in order to evaluate decisions or actions.

Normative theory is complex and the issue of the extent of moral obligations of individuals, groups, states, and the international community is strongly contested. The difficulties of implementing policies that seek to protect or provide, even once an obligation has been accepted, adds a further layer of complexity. This is perhaps why **E. H. Carr** described the issue of morality as the most difficult in international relations.

See also GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS; GLOBAL GOVERNANCE; LIBERAL INTERNATIONALISM; NEOLIBERAL IN-STITUTIONALISM; NEOREALISM; RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT.

NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION (NATO). Formed in 1949 to contain and counter the threat from the Soviet Union during the **Cold War**, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is an example of a military **alliance**. Its members are the United States, Canada, and a significant number of European states, including Turkey. Its Eastern bloc equivalent was the Warsaw Pact, established in 1955. NATO is a mutual defense agreement, which means that an attack on one member-**state** is considered an attack on all. It also provides a nuclear umbrella to nonnuclear states

NATO is a highly organized alliance with a permanent structure and a headquarters, bureaucracy, continuous political and military consultation, and an integrated military and command structure; it is an **international organization**. The threat that NATO originally countered disappeared when the Cold War ended and the Soviet Union dissolved. Realists such as **Kenneth Waltz** and **John J. Mearsheimer** wrote at the time that in the absence of a compelling threat NATO would fall apart. Although the Warsaw Pact was disbanded in 1991, NATO has proved adaptable to the new **security** environment in the post–Cold War era; it has doubled in size and has used its institutional assets to achieve new objectives and counter new threats. Its first military action was undertaken in Bosnia during the **wars** of the **former Yugoslavia**. NATO also undertook a **humanitarian intervention** in Kosovo and action under the **responsibility to protect** in Libya. NATO has played a key role in **Afghanistan** since the **attacks of 9/11** and is now trying to counter the threat from an increasingly aggressive Russia. NATO's continued relevance can therefore be explained by the continuing existence of shared threats, and by the remarkable adaptability of its institutional assets. NATO has become an increasingly important global actor, acting as an enforcement arm of the **United Nations Security Council** (UNSC), far beyond the geographical boundaries of its members.

See also AMERICAN PRIMACY; FORCE; GLOBAL GOVERNANCE; INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS.

NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION. Nuclear weapons are **weapons of mass destruction** and, since their first devastating use by the United States against the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki at the end of **World War II**, the international community has sought to prevent their proliferation and further use. Resolution 1 of the **United Nations General Assembly** set up the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission and tasked it with limiting the use of nuclear technology to peaceful purposes; eliminating all nuclear weapons from national armaments; and setting up effective safeguards of protection against future development of weapons. In 1946, the United States put forward the Baruch plan by which it would destroy its nuclear arsenals on condition that the **United Nations** (UN) imposed controls on the future development of nuclear weapons that would not be subject to a veto by one of the five permanent members of the **United Nations Security Council** (UNSC). The Soviet Union abstained on the vote in the UNSC and without its vote the plan could not be agreed upon. Early attempts, therefore, to prevent any further development of nuclear weapons failed. In 1949, the Soviet Union exploded its first nuclear device, followed by Great Britain in 1952, France in 1960, and China in 1964. From that point on, all permanent members of the UNSC have remained nuclear weapons **states**. The destructive power of nuclear weapons also increased substantially, with the largest U.S. nuclear test being approximately a thousand times more powerful than the "Little Boy" bomb dropped on Hiroshima. The development of multiple warhead delivery systems increased the destructive capability of a single nuclear strike even further.

Attempts to control proliferation continued, however. In 1963, the Partial Test Ban Treaty was signed by the United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union, for example. The period of détente during the **Cold War** saw further important **arms control** agreements. In 1971, the Seabed Arms Control Treaty banned the placement of nuclear weapons on the seabed beyond the 12 miles of territorial waters. Landmark treaties were also signed between the two key protagonists, such as the Strategic Arms Limitations Talks (1972) and the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (1972). These treaties related to vertical proliferation and to the increase in the number and range of weapons held by the nuclear weapons states. More importantly for the major powers, however, were attempts to prevent proliferation of weapons to previously nonnuclear states. In the tense Cold War environment, horizontal proliferation had the potential to upset the complex dynamics of **deterrence** and its prevention was seen as essential to nuclear stability. The cornerstone of efforts to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons was the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), which was signed in 1968 and came into force in 1970.

The preamble to the NPT recognizes "The devastation that would be visited on all of mankind by a nuclear **war**." Its key aims are therefore to commit nuclear weapons states (NWSs) to work toward nuclear disarmament; to

prevent nonnuclear weapons states (NNWSs) from developing a nuclear capability, thus restricting the number of nuclear weapons states; and to promote the development of nuclear technology for peaceful use so that all states could benefit from nuclear energy programs, thus enhancing **energy security**. These NWSs committed themselves never to threaten any NNWSs with nuclear weapons and to desist from the transfer of nuclear weapons technology. The NNWSs committed themselves not to pursue nuclear weapons technology. The treaty also established a monitoring and verification organization, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). There are 191 states that are party to the treaty, representing an almost universal commitment to the norm of nonproliferation.

Fears in the 1960s that 15–20 states might acquire nuclear weapons during that decade proved to be unfounded, and compared to that expectation the nonproliferation regime with the NPT at its center can be seen as a success. However, there are some notable nonmembers of the NPT. Israel, India, and Pakistan are not members and each has developed a nuclear capability, although Israel neither confirms nor denies its nuclear status. North Korea withdrew from the treaty in 2003 and continues to advance its nuclear program despite wide-ranging **economic sanctions**. Given the voluntary nature of **international law**, the IAEA cannot scrutinize the programs of nonsignatories. It has, however, played an important role in revealing the clandestine nuclear weapons programs of signatory states, notably Iraq and Iran. Iraq's program was set back by Israeli **airpower** in 1985 when Israel used **force** to destroy the Iraqi nuclear plant at Osirak. Nevertheless, although there is some dispute over the question of how advanced Iraq's weapons program was, evidence suggests that by the early 1990s Iraq was not far off achieving a viable nuclear weapon. The program, along with that of Iraq's other weapons of mass destruction, was dismantled as part of the terms of the **peace** agreement at the end of the **first Gulf War**. A historic deal was reached on Iran's nuclear program in 2016. Iran agreed to subject its nuclear program to enhanced scrutiny in exchange for the lifting of economic sanctions.

Current difficulties in managing nuclear risk are mostly to do with proliferation. Proliferation of nuclear weapons can be seen as a threat for a range of reasons. First, the more states that have nuclear weapons, the more likely it is that they will be used or that some sort of terrible accident involving them will occur. Second, the acquisition of nuclear weapons by one state has a knock-on effect and can lead to nuclear arms races. One fear about the Iranian capability was that it was likely to lead to Saudi Arabia also developing nuclear weapons with a potential for a nuclear arms race in the Middle East. Third, from the perspective of the United States and its Western **allies**, nuclear proliferation reduces its ability to coerce, apply pressure to, or interfere with a state that has a nuclear capability; great power management of the system is thereby undermined. Fourth, there are doubts as to whether deter-

rence can work against certain states, particularly ideological states that might have priorities other than the nonuse of nuclear weapons. This is a particular fear in relation to the regime of Kim Jong-un in North Korea. Finally, it is feared that certain regimes might give the technology and materials to terrorist groups, leading to nuclear **terrorism**. Although there is an alternative view, expressed by **Kenneth Waltz**, among others, that nuclear weapons can encourage restraint and caution in **foreign policy** decision-making, the more common view is that nuclear proliferation remains a key threat to international **security**.

See also AGGRESSION; AMERICAN PRIMACY.

NUCLEAR WEAPONS. *See* ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT; DETERRENCE; NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION; WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION.

NUREMBERG TRIBUNAL. *See* INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW.

NYE, JOSEPH SAMUEL (1937–). Originating from Morris County, New Jersey, Joseph Nye went to Morristown School. After graduating in 1954, he went to Princeton University, where he received his bachelor's degree summa cum laude (highest honor), and in 1958 won a Rhodes scholarship to Oxford University, where he studied philosophy, politics, and economics. He then studied at Harvard for a PhD in political science, which he gained in 1964. He was immediately recruited to the academic staff at Harvard, where he became dean of the John F. Kennedy School of Government and then University Distinguished Service Professor.

With coauthor **Robert Keohane**, Nye pioneered the theory of complex **interdependence**, which offered an alternative to the realist view of international **anarchy**. In their book *Power and Interdependence*, published in 1977, Keohane and Nye discussed areas where **realism**, based on **security** and threats of **force**, was the most useful **International Relations theory**. In other areas where international relations were becoming more complex, not least because of the growing significance of transnational actors, complex interdependence was the more applicable theory as it stressed that security is less dominant a concern than it once was, and force less useful as an instrument. Nye later suggested that when he was working in the State Department he was able to find both realism and the notion of complex interdependence being used to try to explain the practice of international relations and to influence **foreign policy**.

Nye combined his academic career with a series of roles in government. The first, from 1977 to 1979, was in the U.S. State Department as deputy to the undersecretary of state for security assistance, science, and technology, for President of the United States James (Jimmy) Carter. During this period he also chaired the National Security Council Group on Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons. After this period, during the administration of President of the United States **Ronald Reagan**, Nye published three books on the topic of **nuclear weapons**: *Living with Nuclear Weapons* (1983); with coeditors **Graham Allison** and Albert Carnsale, *Hawks, Doves and Owls: An Agenda for Avoiding Nuclear War (*1985); and *Nuclear Ethics* (1986).

In his 1990 book *Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power*, Nye challenged the view of many that the United States was a declining **power**, as Great Britain had been earlier in the century. The analogy to Britain was, he stressed, mistaken and the United States was likely to continue to be powerful in terms of both military and economic strength (sometimes called "**hard power**") and the cultural, ideological appeal that a country could have on other **states**. In the 1990s, he worked for President of the United States William J. (Bill) Clinton as chair of the National Intelligence Council in 1993 and 1994 and as assistant secretary of defense for international security affairs in 1994 and 1995.

In the 21st century, Nye published a range of books. In *The Paradox of American Power: Why the World's Only Superpower Can't Go It Alone* (2002), he emphasized the need for the United States to redefine the **national interest** in the era of **globalization** and the information revolution. He argued that the new conditions of global interdependence placed a greater stress on multilateral cooperation. Nye has been particularly associated with the idea of "**soft power**," which is a term he coined to describe the ability to attract and persuade. This contrasts with hard power, which is the term he coined to describe the ability to compel. He published *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics* in 2004. He also later introduced the notion of "smart power," a blend of "soft" and "hard" power. His other major works include *Power in the Global Information Age: From Realism to Globalization* (2004), *Understanding International Conflict* (2008), *The Powers to Lead* (2008), *The Future of Power* (2011), and *Presidential Leadership and the Creation of the American Era* (2013). He returned to a role in government under President of the United States Barack Obama in October 2014, when he was appointed to Secretary of State John Kerry's Foreign Affairs Policy Board. In his 2015 book *Is the American Century Over?* Nye challenged the hypothesis that the world is currently witnessing a significant **global power shift**.

See also AMERICAN PRIMACY; BRITISH HEGEMONY; NEOLIBERAL INSTITUTIONALISM; NEOREALISM; NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION.

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
ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT (OECD). Dedicated to **economic development**, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) was established in Paris in 1961 by the United States, Canada, and 18 European **states**. The OECD is an **international organization** that conducts policy studies on economic, social, and environmental issues. It provides a forum in which its members can work together to achieve common objectives, and its mission is "to promote policies that will improve the economic and social well-being of people around the world." It now has 34 members, including not only the world's most advanced states but also emerging economies such as Mexico, Chile, and Turkey. The OECD is a very important source for economic and statistical information on a wide range of issues, including **overseas aid** and **debt**.

   See also ECONOMIC GLOBALIZATION; GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS; INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS.

ORGANIZATION FOR THE PROHIBITION OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS (OPCW). *See* NOBEL PEACE PRIZE; WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION.

ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY. *See* AFRICAN UNION (AU).

ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES (OAS). Established in 1948 in Bogotá, Colombia, the Organization of American States (OAS) was the first post–**World War II** regional **international organization**. Its history, however, extends back further to the First International Conference of American States, held in Washington, D.C., in 1889–1890, which agreed upon the International Union of American Republics. This was the starting point of what became known as the inter-American system and it is the world's oldest **international institutional** framework. According to Article 1 of its charter, the aim of the organization is to establish "an order of **peace** and justice" among its members and "to promote their solidarity, to strength-

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en their collaboration, and to defend their **sovereignty**, their territorial integrity, and their independence." The OAS, therefore, upholds the principles of the **Westphalian system of states**. The OAS's **human rights** instrument, the American Declaration on the Rights and Duties of Man, is also the oldest such instrument, predating both the **United Nations** (UN) Declaration of Human Rights and the European Convention on Human Rights. It paved the way for adoption of the American Convention on Human Rights in 1969. However, the OAS's commitment to **state** sovereignty has undermined the effectiveness of its human rights mechanisms despite the existence of a human rights court.

In 2016, the OAS had 35 member-states from across the Americas. It is composed of a range of councils, committees, and other organs, though there are three primary bodies responsible for setting and carrying out the goals of the OAS: the General Assembly, the Permanent Council, and the General Secretariat. The General Assembly is where policy is formed, the Permanent Council runs the day-to-day business of the OAS, and the General Secretariat, headed by the general secretary, is responsible for the implementation of policies and goals. Those goals are to promote **economic development**, human rights, **democracy**, and peace across the western hemisphere, and the various organs of the OAS perform a range of activities designed to advance those priorities. For example, the OAS has promoted democracy through electoral observation missions, legitimizing electoral processes across the Americas. Furthermore, it has acted against election failures in the Dominican Republic (1994), Peru (2000), and Haiti (2001). The OAS has the right to suspend a member whose democratically elected government is overthrown in a military coup. Given the region's recent history, this is an important provision. The OAS's defense of democracy, however, has not been consistent.

The OAS also provides policy guidance and technical assistance to member-states on a range of other issues. In order to strengthen its human rights protection, 10 *rapporteurships* have been created that focus on freedom of expression; human rights defenders; economic, social, and cultural rights; and the rights of women, children, indigenous peoples, afro-descendants, prisoners, migrants, and lesbian, gay, trans, bisexual, and intersex persons. These *rapporteurships* have proved quite effective at drawing attention to abuses within states. The OAS is also a United Nations (UN) regional agency and as such has participated in activities related to peace and security in the region. The OAS played a key role in resolving border conflicts between Costa Rica and Nicaragua in 1948 and 1978; Peru and Ecuador in 1981; and Honduras and El Salvador in 1969, 1970, and 1976. In 1964, the OAS imposed sanctions against Cuba for fomenting revolutionary activity in Venezuela; and in 1965 it sent an inter-American **peacekeeping** force to the Dominican Republic. The OAS has also taken on a peacekeeping role in

naval disputes between Colombia and Venezuela in 1988 and Trinidad and Venezuela in 1989. Furthermore, the OAS acted as a forum in which Manuel Noriega's drug trafficking in Panama could be denounced (1989). It has also been involved in a number of peacekeeping initiatives such as the training of Argentine and Uruguayan peacekeeping forces to be deployed in the prevention of human trafficking. It is currently involved in the UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH). The OAS also provides a forum for **diplomacy** among the American states, notably **summits** of the heads of state and of government of the Americas, which issue decisions and recommendations for action by the inter-American system, including the OAS. In addition, the OAS acts as the secretariat for various ministerial meetings.

The OAS incorporates a region that is crucial to U.S. political, economic, and security interests. The OAS has its headquarters in the U.S. capital, Washington, D.C., and for much of its history the United States has dominated the organization, using it to pursue its particular interests. U.S. influence was at its peak during the **Cold War** when the United States was able to secure OAS support even for controversial initiatives such as the 1962 exclusion of Cuba as part of its key goal of preventing the spread of communism in the region. The United States was also given OAS support for its response to the **Cuban missile crisis**. However, U.S. **foreign policy** has also been at odds with the OAS. In 1978, for example, the United States was unable to secure OAS support for its attempts to block the Sandinistas, a left-wing party, from gaining power in Nicaragua. Relations were strained in 1983 when President of the United States **Ronald Reagan** did not seek OAS support prior to the U.S. invasion of Grenada, and in 1995 the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights declared the United States to be in violation of OAS principles concerning the embargo of food and medicine to Cuba. In 2009, Cuba's exclusion from participation was lifted. In recent decades, the relationship between the United States and the region has become even more complex. The region is now more ideologically diverse, it has grown in confidence as it has developed economically, and many American and Caribbean states now conduct foreign policy that is more independent of the United States. Some U.S. commentators and politicians now claim that the OAS promotes policies that run counter to U.S. interests. Others disagree, arguing that the OAS still pursues goals that are in line with U.S. priorities and it remains vital to the security not just of the United States but of the whole region.

See also AMERICAN PRIMACY; INTERNATIONALLY PROTECTED HUMAN RIGHTS.

ORGANIZATION OF ISLAMIC COOPERATION (OIC). Established in 1969 with 25 members, the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) is a global, multipurpose **international organization**. In 2016, it had 57 mem-

ber-**states** across four continents and is the second-largest intergovernmental organization after the **United Nations** (UN). The OIC is a loose organization committed to the principles of the **Westphalian system of states**: **sovereignty**, noninterference, and territorial integrity of each member-state. It was formerly known as the Organization of the Islamic Conference and describes itself as "the collective voice of the Islamic World." The OIC has a permanent secretariat in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, headed by the organization's secretary-general. It works toward the elimination of all forms of discrimination against Muslims, to promote the vital interests of Muslims across the world, and to settle disputes between Muslim states. In 1990, the 19th Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers, held in Egypt, issued the Cairo Declaration on **Human Rights** in Islam "to serve as a guide for Member states in all aspects of life."

In 2005, the OIC adopted a 10-year plan to address issues most affecting Muslims including **terrorism**, Islamophobia, poor governance, and economic inequality. It has consultative status at the UN, and each member-state commits itself to the values of the UN, particularly the promotion of international **peace** and **security**. It sought a conflict resolution role, for example, prior to the **first Gulf War**, as well as in Bosnia (one of the **wars** of the **former Yugoslavia**) and Chechnya, and it continues to promote a resolution to the **Arab–Israeli conflict**. The OIC has also become active in humanitarian affairs, and the Islamic Cooperation Humanitarian Affairs Department (ICHAD) was established in 2008 to coordinate the activities of the humanitarian organizations of its member-states. During a famine in Somalia in 2011, for example, it coordinated the responses of more than 40 Islamic aid organizations and other **nongovernmental organizations** providing relief supplies. The OIC also has long-term development projects in areas including health, education, and agriculture.

Since the **attacks of 9/11** and the subsequent **war on terror**, the OIC has been propelled onto the center stage in international relations. It has expressed concern at the damage done to relations with **the West** due to the rise of radical Islam, and during its **summit** in 2005 condemned all acts of terrorism, rejecting any claimed justification within Islam for the killing of innocent civilians. It has been further challenged by the rise of the **Islamic State** and the regional instability to which the latter has given rise. The OIC condemns extremism and has called for the strengthening of the values of tolerance and pluralism within education. Its very existence is an example of tolerance in international relations, including as it does members who have fought wars against each other, such as the **Iran–Iraq war** and Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, and those who are intense rivals, notably Saudi Arabia and Iran. Divisions, however, have restricted its significance as an actor in international relations and have impeded its key goal of enhancing the global position of Muslims.

See also INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS.

ORGANIZATION OF PETROLEUM EXPORTING COUNTRIES (OPEC). Formed in 1960 by Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Venezuela, the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) is an intergovernmental organization that governs part of the international oil sector. It was established at a time when major Western oil companies controlled the production, sale, and price of oil, forming an oligopoly that could act independently of the producer **states**, to whom they paid a fixed royalty. The initial purpose of OPEC was, through collective action, to influence the oil companies and gain some control over their own oil production. In 1968, OPEC adopted a Declaratory Statement of Petroleum, which emphasized "the inalienable right of all countries to exercise permanent **sovereignty** over their natural resources in the interest of their national development." Gradually the oil-exporting states managed to secure more control over their domestic oil production, gained significant control over the world oil price, and in the 1970s rose to prominence in international relations. In 1973, Arab states placed an oil embargo on the United States and other industrialized states that had supported Israel in the Yom Kippur War (5–12 October 1973). This led to a rapid and significant rise in the price of oil with long-term consequences for the global economy. The ability of the oil-producing states to form what amounted to a cartel and to use their producer power against Western states reversed the expectations of **dependency** theory. The oil crisis was seen as threatening the **energy security** of northern industrialized states that had largely been able to take for granted until that point that a global economy based on the principles of free **trade** would work in their favor and continue to supply their needs.

OPEC supported the calls for a **New International Economic Order**, and its success encouraged the formation of other producer cartels in an attempt to control and increase the price of commodities on the global market. Oil, however, is an essential commodity; others, such as sugar, are more easily replaced by substitutions. These other producers were therefore unable to match the power of OPEC. Despite early optimism, the oil crisis of 1973–1974 did not promote **third-world** interests; indeed, it led to turbulence in the world economy and ultimately the 1980s **debt** crisis that reversed many of the developmental gains achieved across the third world in the 1970s.

OPEC now has a membership of 13, with Algeria, Angola, Ecuador, Indonesia, Libya, Nigeria, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia having joined the original five members. Gabon joined OPEC in 1975 but suspended its membership in 1994. OPEC members only produce about one third of global oil production and this has undermined OPEC's ability to act as a cartel and to stabilize and control the world's oil price. Key energy suppliers such as Russia, for exam-

ple, are not members of OPEC. If OPEC states cut back on their production, then other oil producers can increase theirs to maintain supply. OPEC states have also been disunified, and there has been a tendency to ignore OPEC production quotas. OPEC's significance in **international political economy** has therefore declined.

See also ECONOMIC GLOBALIZATION; INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS; INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS.

OVERSEAS AID. Development assistance targeted at reducing **poverty** and stimulating growth is often known as overseas or development aid. Aid is comprised of grants, technical assistance, and soft loans, which have a lower interest rate than commercial loans. The largest donor of development aid is the **United Nations** and its various specialized agencies. Other international intergovernmental organizations such as the **World Bank**, **International Monetary Fund**, and the **European Union** are also significant donors. In addition, **states** give aid, as do private foundations such as the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation. The ostensible purpose of giving overseas aid is to promote socioeconomic and political development. In 1970, countries of the **Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development** (OECD) agreed at the United Nations to give 0.7 percent of their gross national product as aid to the developing countries for long-term development. According to the OECD, by 2014 only five states had achieved that target: Norway, Sweden, Luxembourg, Denmark, and Great Britain. Although it is the largest donor of aid in absolute terms, the United States has not reached the 0.7 percent target. The failure of most rich states to do so has led to a large accumulated shortfall in aid since the target was set. In 2014, the OECD estimated the shortfall to be $4.98 trillion, which is more than the aid that has been given.

Aid can save lives; however, several factors undermine the effectiveness of aid. First, aid is not motivated by humanitarian concerns alone. Commercial interests also motivate aid, much of which is tied to the purchase of specific products or to contracts for particular companies from the donor state. Second, aid is used as a policy tool. During the **Cold War**, foreign aid was a tool used by both superpowers to win influence in the developing world; in most recent times, it has been an important tool in the **war on terror**. U.S. aid to Pakistan, for example, increased significantly between 2000 and 2001 when Pakistan became a key ally in U.S. operations in the **war in Afghanistan**. The securitization and politicization of aid can result in a lessening of support for development priorities and explains why only about 25 percent of OECD development aid is given to the world's poorest people.

In the post–Cold War era, aid is also used to promote good governance and **democracy**. The threat or actual suspension of aid can be a way for a donor to express displeasure or to put pressure on a recipient state. Similarly, the promise of an increase in aid or the renewal of an aid program can be used to induce a state to change its behavior and to hold democratic elections, for example, or to improve the protection of **human rights**. Although good governance is seen as essential to **economic development**, conditionality is controversial when used against poor states as it exacerbates the problems faced by the ordinary people who live there, people with no control over the way that their governments behave. States on the receiving end of conditionality often see it as unjustified meddling in their internal affairs. For this reason, Chinese aid, which is growing rapidly in Africa and elsewhere, is popular with recipient countries as it is given without conditionality clauses. On the other hand, good governance is necessary to prevent aid money being expropriated by corrupt officials and politicians, and to ensure that it achieves its developmental targets.

See also ECONOMIC SANCTIONS; FORCE; MARSHALL PLAN; NKRUMAH, KWAME (1909–1972); NORMATIVE THEORY; ORGANIZATION OF ISLAMIC COOPERATION (OIC); PIRACY; POSTCOLONIALISM; SEA POWER; THIRD WORLD; UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT (UNCTAD).

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PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE. In January 1919, following the end of **World War I** three months earlier, a conference began in Paris to formalize the international settlement. The intention was for the heads of government and foreign ministers of Great Britain, France, the United States, and Italy, along with representatives of Japan, to form a council that would dominate the proceedings. Prince Saionji Kimmochi of Japan withdrew, however, meaning that the conference would be controlled by a smaller council comprising President of the United States **Thomas Woodrow Wilson** and Prime Ministers David Lloyd George of Great Britain, Georges Clemenceau of France, and Vittorio Orlando of Italy. Japan's foreign minister remained at the conference and participated with those of the United States, Great Britain, France, and Italy to control the Supreme Economic Council, which was created to advise the conference on economic measures to be taken. The Soviet Union, led by **V. I. Lenin** following the communist revolution that overthrew the Russian czar and took Russia out of the **war**, was not invited to participate in the conference.

Specialized commissions were appointed at the conference to study the formation of the **League of Nations**; issues including the determination of responsibility for the war; and measures to maintain international **peace**. The Covenant of the League of Nations was approved in April 1919 and the League was formed as a new **international organization** in January the following year. Meanwhile, disagreements continued between Lloyd George and Clemenceau. Clemenceau took the **realist** view that it was necessary to ensure that Germany would not be able to upset the **balance of power** again, and demanded far more severe terms than Lloyd George. Lloyd George feared that Germany would not be able to meet the harsher demands and that peace would eventually be undermined again. Although pressure from Lloyd George softened them to some degree, the measures demanded of Germany were still severely punitive. The Treaty of Versailles was presented to the German delegation, which protested against the terms in May 1919 but signed under duress the following month. This was shortly before the deadline, thus avoiding further use of **force** by the allies against Germany. Trea-

ties were also signed with the other defeated states: Austria, Bulgaria, Hungary, and the Ottoman Empire (the latter was transformed into the Republic of Turkey, with which a further treaty was signed in 1923).

As a leading advocate of views that would become known as **liberal internationalism**, Wilson considered British, French, and Italian demands on Germany to be too severe. Nevertheless, he played a significant role in the discussions leading to the formation of the League but could not secure acceptance by Congress for U.S. membership. The formal inauguration of the League in January 1920 brought the Paris Peace Conference to an end.

See also INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS.

PEACE. There are two main interpretations of peace. The first is negative peace, involving pacification and the prevention of violence. Negative peace involves the resolution of **war** and conflict or the implementation of measures by which violence or hostilities between two or more entities can be halted or avoided. These entities can be **states** and it may involve **diplomacy** or a **peacekeeping** operation, or even a **peace enforcement** operation. On the other hand, one or more of the entities may be **terrorist** groups, making diplomacy even more difficult than is normally the case. Alternatively, there might be a prevention or cessation of violence between two groups within a state; in other words, there is prevention or cessation of civil war. Negative peace can be achieved if immediate demands are served and antagonists are pacified. The Middle East peace process is an example of a long-term attempt to achieve this aim.

The second interpretation is that of positive peace, which involves the creation of systems that make violence unlikely to arise. Pacifism is usually associated with this interpretation. Positive peace can only be achieved by means of eliminating violence, or putting in place arrangements that make the states or other entities see conflict as a situation that should be avoided at all costs. The **League of Nations** was set up in 1920 with such a goal, but by the mid-1930s it was seen to have been overly optimistic in this respect. Advocates of positive peace recognize that this is likely to require a radical restructuring of the international **Westphalian system of states**, whereby the potential of violence would be eliminated as far as possible.

See also AGGRESSION; ARAB–ISRAELI CONFLICT; ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT; DETERRENCE; GALTUNG, JOHAN (1930–); NOBEL PEACE PRIZE; PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE; PEACE STUDIES.

PEACE ENFORCEMENT. The use of military force to uphold international **peace** is known as peace enforcement. **The United Nations** (UN) has a mandate to carry out peace enforcement operations under Chapter VII of its

charter. The use of **force** has to be authorized by the **United Nations Security Council** (UNSC), which means that all five permanent members need to approve the action. Given that each of the five has different or possibly competing interests, this approval is difficult to secure. This was a particular problem during the **Cold War**, and there are therefore only two examples of peace enforcement from that period: Korea in 1950 and Congo 1960–1966, when a **peacekeeping** operation turned into a peace enforcement operation. The post–Cold War era provided a more conducive context, and the UN mounted a successful action in support of the **sovereignty** of Kuwait after it was invaded by Iraq in what is known as the **first Gulf War**. The interests of the permanent members meant that political considerations prevented consistent UN action, however, and there was no enforcement action in the Russian state of Chechnya, for example, and it was the **North Atlantic Treaty Organization** (NATO) that carried out the enforcement actions during the **wars** of the **former Yugoslavia**. Although traditionally peacekeeping and peace enforcement have been distinct, in the era of more complex peacekeeping there has been a blurring of the lines between the two activities.

See also HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION; NATIONAL INTEREST; RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT.

PEACE STUDIES. There is a long history of thinkers who have grappled with the question of how to secure **peace**. **Immanuel Kant**, is one of the best known in the academic discipline of International Relations (IR). However, as a recognized field of scholarship, the field of peace studies is relatively recent, coming into being with the establishment of the International Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO) in Norway in 1959. It was motivated by the dangers and instability of the nuclearized superpower conflict during the **Cold War**. Five years later, the Stockholm Institute for Peace Research (SIPRI) was established. PRIO and SIPRI are key sources of information on **security** issues. Peace studies attempt to fully understand peace, in particular to understand peace not in negative terms as the absence of violence and **war** but in positive terms as a condition that promotes human security. Peace research is multidisciplinary and is motivated by a strong **normative** commitment to peace and to the elimination of all forms of violence. It seeks peaceful processes that can bring about change. During the Cold War, peace studies were considered to be at the radical end of the academic spectrum and were widely marginalized within the discipline of IR. More critical and **social constructivist** approaches to security that have developed since the end of the Cold War have meant that peace studies are now more in tune with other academic work being carried out in this area. Peace researchers, however, aim to be more than academics. **Johan Galtung**, for example, a key figure in the peace movement, has been involved in a significant range of

peacemaking activities. Peace studies are therefore concerned with policy; whether it can find ways to create conditions of genuine peace is ultimately its criterion for success.

See also AGGRESSION; FORCE; PEACE ENFORCEMENT; PEACE-KEEPING.

PEACEKEEPING. The concept of peacekeeping is not written into the Charter of the **United Nations** (UN) but developed during the **Cold War** when the very limited opportunities for **collective security** or **peace enforcement** meant that more practical ways of promoting international **peace** and **security** were required. Peacekeeping has a history that extends back to 1948 when the UN Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) was formed to supervise the truce in the former British mandate of Palestine. The UN's first emergency force was set up to supervise troop withdrawals at the end of the Suez crisis in 1956. The principles of the Emergency Force were about noncoercion in support of the reestablishment of peaceful international dialogue.

Peacekeeping takes a variety of forms in the many different circumstances in which it has been applied. As there is no charter provision, UN peacekeeping activity has developed in an ad hoc manner and there is no easy definition of the term. However, the *Review of UN Peacekeeping*, published by the UN, defines a peacekeeping operation as "an operation involving military personnel, but without enforcement powers, undertaken by the UN to help maintain or restore international peace and security in areas of conflict. These operations are voluntary and are based on consent and cooperation. Whilst they involve the use of military personnel, they achieve their objectives not by force of arms, thus contrasting them with the 'enforcement action' of the UN under Article 42."

There were 13 peacekeeping operations during the Cold War. These missions were carried out at the end of a conflict, with the consent of the parties to that conflict. The missions were small and the peacekeepers, who tended to be supplied by **nonaligned** states, were lightly armed and had no mandate to use **force** other than in self-defense. The tasks of this traditional form of peacekeeping tended to be the monitoring of ceasefires or the supervision of troop withdrawal. In the post–Cold War period, as the focus of conflict turned from the threat of nuclear war to ethnic conflict in the developing world and in Eastern Europe, the UN became increasingly involved in peacekeeping as well as elections monitoring and **human rights** monitoring. These activities become known as second generation or complex peacekeeping, and the UN was regarded as successful in Cambodia, Mozambique, El Salvador, and Haiti. There were also some notable failures, however, in Somalia, Rwanda, and the **former Yugoslavia**, which demonstrated that

there was a lack of clarity over aims, confusion over the use of force, poor administration and implementation, and a lack of political will and the necessary funds.

The development of UN peacekeeping in the post–Cold War era has not been simply a matter of scale. Perhaps the key development was that the distinction between peacekeeping and humanitarian relief started to break down. In the 1990s, the key activity of UN peacekeepers was for humanitarian purposes, protecting humanitarian relief workers, delivering relief supplies, maintaining essential services, and establishing designated areas as safe havens. For the UN personnel in conflicts such as Somalia with the UN Operation in Somalia I (UNOSOM I) in 1992–1993, and Bosnia with the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in 1992–1995, these functions almost entirely replaced the traditional ones, for there was no ceasefire line to monitor, and no peace to keep. Furthermore, unlike in traditional peacekeeping where the personnel were military, complex peacekeeping involved civilian as well as military personnel all representing different UN agencies and carrying out different functions. Furthermore, peacekeeping became a far more dangerous activity than in previous decades as forces attempted humanitarian functions in the midst of ongoing **wars**, not all parties to which had given their consent to the UN presence.

In conflict situations, the limited mandate on the use of force was shown to be inadequate, with UN peacekeepers unable to protect civilians being killed even in close proximity to UN personnel, notably in Rwanda but also in the wars of the former Yugoslavia. This led to a heated debate about whether peacekeepers could be more forceful in the protection of civilians. In 1999, the mandate for the mission in Sierra Leone was the first to include the protection of civilians. The requirements for the protection of civilians were further elaborated in 2005 at the World **Summit** when the UN members adopted the **responsibility to protect**.

More peacekeepers are now deployed than ever before, many of them still in situations of active conflict. There are long-standing UN missions in Cyprus, Lebanon, and Kosovo and a mission in Haiti. The majority of UN missions are, however, in Africa: Mali, Western Sahara, South Sudan, Democratic Republic of Congo, Darfur, Liberia, Ivory Coast, Sierra Leone, Chad, and the Central African Republic (CAR). The mandate of an existing UN mission gives the clearest indication of the tasks and aims of contemporary peacekeeping. In April 2014, the UNSC approved a UN peacekeeping operation for the CAR. The United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the CAR (MINUSCA) has the protection of civilians as its utmost priority. Its other initial tasks include "support for the transition process [to a new stable government]; facilitating humanitarian assistance; promotion and protection of human rights; support for justice and the rule of law; and disarmament, demobilization, reintegration and repatriation pro-

cesses." MINUSCA replaced the African Union Mission in the CAR (Mission Internationale de Soutien à la Centrafrique sous Conduite Africaine, MISCA). The trend toward the regionalization of peace operations that MISCA represented has had mixed success. There has been a diversification of actors involved in peacekeeping, with regional organizations such as the **Economic Community of West African States** (ECOWAS) and the **African Union** (AU) as well as the **European Union** (EU) providing peacekeepers in Africa. These **international organizations** have not always received the necessary support from Western powers and their record has been mixed. The UN's record, however, is also far from perfect, with the mission in the CAR, for example, being rocked by allegations of sexual abuse by peacekeepers against the very people, including children, whom they were supposed to be protecting. Overall, however, research indicates that peacekeeping can contribute to stability. Where a ceasefire agreement is backed up by peacekeeping, for instance, it tends to last longer. Peacekeeping is also a way in which small states such as Fiji or the Republic of Ireland can make a contribution to international peace and security.

See also ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT; HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION; NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION; NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

PERMANENT COURT OF ARBITRATION (PCA). Formed in 1899 at the first Hague **peace** conference, the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) is a framework to resolve disputes between **states**. It is thus not a traditional court. The PCA was created in order to arbitrate in cases that **diplomacy** had been unable to settle. Judges who were known for competence in **international law** were selected by the disputed states to arbitrate between them. The outbreak of **World War I** in 1914 fostered the view that an international court with greater authority than that of the PCA was needed. Hence, the **Paris Peace Conference** of 1919 established the Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ), attached to the **League of Nations**, with which the PCA coexisted at The Hague in the Netherlands from 1922 until 1946 when the PCIJ was replaced by the **International Court of Justice** (ICJ). Thereafter, the PCA and ICJ remained at The Hague and by 2016 the PCA had 121 member-states.

The PCA has arbitrated many disputes. One of the most prominent cases was that of the Iran–United States Claims Tribunal in the early 1980s. This tribunal was created by the Algiers Accords of 1981, which resolved the hostage crisis that had begun after the Iranian revolution of 1979 when radical Iranian students entered the U.S. embassy in Tehran and took dozens of American staff hostage. The tribunal led the United States to terminate litigation against Iran in American courts and to release Iranian assets that had

been frozen after the revolution. The tribunal also resolved a number of U.S. claims against the Iranian government, leading to payments by Iran to American people and companies.

In July 2013, the PCA was appointed by a tribunal of the **United Nations** Convention on the Law of the Sea to arbitrate between the Philippines and China. China had begun to make a claim, disputed by the Philippines and several other countries of the region, to historic rights to much of the South China Sea. China had begun to occupy islands, rocks, and other land in the sea, in some cases building military bases and runways. In 2014, China argued that the PCA lacked jurisdiction on the matter. In July 2016, the PCA judged in favor of the Philippines. China announced that it would ignore the findings of the tribunal.

See also INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS.

PIRACY. Piracy is any illegal act of violence under international law against crew or passengers of private ships or aircraft, including illegal detention. Piracy has a long history but has become an increasingly high-profile issue in international relations in the 21st century as attacks against international shipping have multiplied. The problem has been most severe off the coast of Somalia, with piracy being fueled both by conflict in Somalia and illegal fishing off its coast.

Piracy wreaks economic and political damage. It undermines the stability of crucial waterways through which most of world **trade** travels and is seen as a common threat. It is also a nontraditional threat, meaning that it is carried out by a nonstate group and is therefore largely unresponsive to **diplomacy**. Suppressing piracy has become a key priority in international relations, and many **United Nations Security Council** (UNSC) resolutions have been passed mandating various antipiracy actions by military forces. **The North Atlantic Treaty Organization** (NATO) has run an antipiracy operation called Ocean Shield since 2008. Its mission is "to deter and disrupt" pirate attacks while protecting ships and generally helping to increase levels of **security** in the area. The **European Union**, under its common security and defense policy, also has a naval force called Atalanta that is trying to minimize disruption to shipping and to protect humanitarian **aid**. In May 2016, for example, with Chinese cooperation, Atalanta ensured the safe arrival of a ship to Somalia carrying food aid from the United Nations **World Food Programme**. China has made a significant contribution to antipiracy measures, though it has tended to act independently rather than in a multilateral force. Other **states** such as India, Iran, Japan, and Russia have also participated in the antipiracy effort, both acting independently and cooperating with other forces. Overall, more than 20 **states** have been involved in the antipiracy action, and the international antipiracy effort has seen a high degree of unity and coordination among participating states. Indeed, the mili-

tary response to piracy threat is the first time since **World War II** that all permanent members of the UNSC have deployed their forces on the same side.

See also FORCE.

POSTCOLONIAL RELATIONS. Not all colonies became independent in the mass **decolonization** of the 20th century. Even among those that did, there are varying degrees of autonomy, both symbolic and actual, from their former parent country. Some **states** are still under colonial rule, for which there are many names: external/overseas territory, autonomous collectivity, or dependency. This represents the many different constitutional statuses of these territories, even among those with the same parent country.

Among those states that did opt for independence, many still maintain colonial links. For example, the final court of appeal for many Caribbean states is in Great Britain. The CFA franc is a currency used by 14 western and central African states that is pegged to the euro, the currency of the **European Union**, and controlled by the French and European central banks. The Commonwealth of Nations is a voluntary union of 53 states built out of the former British **Empire**, and the 15 Commonwealth realms still recognize the English crown, which appoints governor-generals to each of them. The monarch's power is ceremonial, however, and the Commonwealth countries are **sovereign** states.

Great Britain possesses 14 overseas territories and three crown dependencies over which it has real **power**, as do France and Australia over theirs. Both the Danish and Dutch crowns have overseas possessions, but these are administered as "constituent countries," within each respective kingdom, in much the same way England, Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland make up the United Kingdom. The territories of the United States contain the greatest population, with the largest, Puerto Rico, containing more people than every European territory combined. Furthermore, although European dependencies are almost completely self-governing, American territories experience much greater control from Washington, despite the United States being a strong proponent of decolonization.

Where there are no permanent imperial institutions, colonial ties are still visible; this is particularly true in Africa and at times of crisis. For example, during the 2014 Ebola outbreak in Sierra Leone, Great Britain, the former colonial power, donated £427 million and sent a naval hospital ship (the only state to do so), National Health Service and military personnel, and equipment such as helicopters and trucks. Even entire hospitals were sent flat-packed from Britain. Its response was many times greater than other countries of similar position and wealth, such as France. In 2000, Great Britain had also come to Sierra Leone's aid during a civil **war**, deploying military **force** in a **humanitarian intervention** that returned stability to the country.

Like Great Britain, France has retained deep **security**, political, economic, and **cultural** ties with its former colonies, particularly in Africa. The French retain a key security role, as demonstrated during their intervention in Mali in 2013, and more recent engagement in **peacekeeping** in the Central African Republic. Colonial ties are still evident in **trade** and in the cultural legacy of **colonialism**, as examined by **postcolonialism**. **Neocolonialism** goes so far as to argue that decolonization restructured rather than ended the colonial relationship. Nevertheless, in an era of significant **global power shifts**, ties are beginning to weaken as China develops closer and closer relations with many African states, and as the **African Union** and other regional **organizations** take a greater responsibility for the security of their regions.

See also INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS; OVERSEAS AID.

POSTCOLONIALISM. Although it began to emerge as a body of writing in the early 1980s, postcolonialism draws on ideas older than this. It presents an argument that the ways Western people view non-Western people are shaped by established assumptions. Supposedly commonsense understandings of the social and political world are firmly grounded in a particularly Western perspective. These assumptions have often either consciously or subconsciously been ones of superiority. Postcolonialism challenges the established assumptions and views.

Postcolonialism seeks to describe, explain, resist, and disrupt dominance. Its theorists explore ways to transform the postcolonial condition, which is considered oppressive. The oppressive aspects of society arose in the context of modern European **colonialism** and **empire** building. These aspects have often been sustained after **decolonization**. Postcolonialists challenge the accepted Eurocentric assumptions that underpin the study and practice of international relations. By the early 21st century, postcolonialism had become recognized as a strand of **International Relations theory**.

Postcolonialism places the global South, the subaltern, and the marginalized at the center of analysis. It attempts to uncover and change the complex **power** relationships that help sustain dominance in the existing world order. "Post" signifies the end of colonialism as direct domination. It does not imply that imperialism as a system of power has ended. Homi K. Bhabha argued that postcolonialism focuses on persistent **neocolonial** relations and division of labor. He and other postcolonialists say colonial structures and relations of power are still relevant.

Among the most prominent anticolonial figures who influenced postcolonialism was Mohandas Gandhi. In the early to mid 20th century, he argued that *satyāgraha* (soul force) could activate the soul and set up dialogue with opponents. A sense of humanity was needed to recognize the indivisibility of human well-being. He led the independence movement in India, advocating and practicing civil disobedience. Another influential activist and theorist

was **Frantz Fanon**, who published the books *Black Skin, White Masks* (1952) and *The Wretched of the Earth* (1961). He insisted that the colonized people must resist colonial authority through localized cultural and political practices aimed at national liberation. In his view, total revolution was needed for a new world. The peasants would need to be at the vanguard, using violence if necessary.

A key concept in postcolonial theory is that of the subaltern. This term was adopted from the work of Italian **Marxist** Antonio Gramsci. Postcolonialists used "subalternity" to mean diminished political voice, organization, and representation of social groups dominated by elites. These groups are barely visible in historical documents. Postcolonial writers say a problem is that elites assert power over the subaltern. Ranajit Guha, for example, takes the subaltern to include all subordinated groups in South Asia, including those subordinated according to class, caste, age, gender, and office. For another writer, Gayatri Spivak, a key example of the subaltern people is that of women and oppressed peoples in subproletarian classes of the global division of labor. According to postcolonialists, history has essentially been the story of the powerful in the world. Many postcolonialists attempt to offer an alternative history based on the experiences of the colonized peoples who became the subaltern. Postcolonialists also present history in terms of resistance by the colonized and subaltern.

One of the most influential postcolonial writers was **Edward Said**, whose works included *Orientalism* (1978) and *Culture and Imperialism* (1993). He was concerned with the power of colonialism as it is practiced through the manipulation of **culture**. Cultural forms sometimes portrayed colonized people as exotic, uncivilized, and inferior in relation to the colonizers. This was relevant to colonial power in general.

Bearing affinities with **poststructuralism**, postcolonial theory suggests that knowledge in the service of the powerful creates regimes of truth. Other knowledge and practices are marginalized. **Third-world** countries are established as places where it is considered normal and legitimate to intervene and control. Rich industrialized countries have become able to set standards for what constitutes development. This conditions choices and identities of people in poor countries. Hence, **economic development** and **overseas aid** are forms of power. According to postcolonialism, power relations produce certain identities. Ideas were influenced and reshaped by colonial relations. These identities did not disappear after the colonial era.

Another key concept in postcolonial theory is hybridity. This involves processes of interaction that create new social situations to which new meanings are given. Hybridity shows that colonialism did not involve total domination. It indicates there is resilience and ability to resist. Even in cases of severe domination, subaltern people have found ways of resisting.

See also POSTCOLONIAL RELATIONS.

POSTMODERNISM. *See* POSTSTRUCTURALISM.

POSTSTRUCTURALISM. Reflecting a wider usage in the social sciences, the terms *poststructuralism* and *postmodernism* tend to be used interchangeably to describe the work of a particular category of thinkers within **International Relations (IR) theory**. These thinkers contribute to a body of thought that is not specific to a particular period in history. Hence, they usually refer to themselves as poststructuralists, rather than postmodernists, as postmodernism implies a period of postmodernity. In this period, certain trends not only in political writing but also in art, literature, and architecture took a radical direction that challenged boundaries that had, conventionally, been set in the modern era. Poststructuralism similarly challenges conventions, often in ways that are related to the challenges of postmodernism—hence, the interchangeable usage.

In IR, as in other disciplines, poststructuralism suggests that there are links between systems of knowledge, their constituent theories and practices, and certain sorts of social and political **power**. Poststructuralists challenge conceptualizations of the world that are assumed to represent a single, immutable reality. **Realism** is thus an obvious target, but **liberal internationalism**, including **neoliberal institutionalism**, is similarly criticized.

Poststructuralism is sometimes considered to belong to a generic category of **critical theory**. Nevertheless, the particular body of thought that is more usually described as critical theory, influenced by **Karl Marx** and **Immanuel Kant**, is challenged by poststructuralism for having foundations, like the other IR theories, that are a consensus on the problems to be overcome in order to achieve the particular goal of emancipation. Poststructuralism is antifoundationalist, thus calling into question the existing epistemologies in which assumptions are considered to be truths. Truths and facts are, poststructuralists argue, constitutive of one another rather than natural and unquestionable.

Poststructuralists argue that the dominant IR theories, which help support the status quo by making the international **Westphalian system of states** seem natural, thereby exclude and marginalize alternatives. The **sovereignty** of **states** is, according to poststructuralism, contingent upon the existing structure, which has been socially constructed. The existing ontology, which is taken for granted, is thus challenged. Drawing on the philosophy of Michel Foucault, poststructuralists in IR argue that sovereignty and other terms are not used neutrally but, rather, politically to justify certain actions and **foreign policies**. In all such cases, representations of particular events are always made according to particular interpretations. The terms in use together constitute discourses that legitimate particular power relationships and particular understandings. For example, some states are considered the enemies of

one's own state (this being an example of a situation assumed as fact and truth) in international relations and some such states are deemed to be civilized and others barbaric.

Poststructuralist theorist Richard Ashley argues that the theory and practice of the state in international relations is conditioned by what is assumed to be a pregiven knowledge of man. This knowledge leads to the particular knowledge of sovereignty, which in turn produces knowledge of international relations. Poststructuralists argue that, in such cases and others, genealogies (or in other words, histories of the present) can be traced in order to determine how particular understandings of what is going on in the world have arisen and become dominant. Drawing on the work of the philosopher Jacques Derrida, poststructuralists use the term "deconstruction" to show that the dichotomies, or binary oppositions, that make up discourses involve assumptions of hierarchy, with one term being considered superior to the other. Another strategy employed by poststructuralist writers, which likewise draws on the work of Derrida, is known as double reading. One example of the application of this strategy to IR is that of Ashley, who suggests that while **anarchy** in the international system (in other words, the absence of a central authority) is conventionally considered to equate to power politics and the use of **force**, a second reading—which questions the evidence—reveals that this equation is based on the assumption that sovereignty and anarchy are mutually exclusive. This in turn rests on a valorization of sovereignty, which is assumed to be a regulative ideal and normal condition in international relations.

R. B. J. Walker is another poststructuralist thinker who considers the concept of sovereignty to be a problem in IR. He argues that the relationship between self and others is traditionally resolved by the binary opposition of insiders and outsiders, and that sovereignty is an example of this in international relations. Although a system of sovereign states is traditionally assumed to be the normal condition, he questions whether this binary opposition is useful to solve international problems, as there may be other ways to organize political life among the people of the world.

POVERTY. One of the most notable features of the contemporary world is the disparity in wealth between rich and poor and the persistence of poverty. The **United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization** (UNESCO) defines poverty "as a human condition characterized by sustained or chronic deprivations of the resources, capabilities, choices, security and power necessary for the enjoyment of an adequate standard of living and other civil, cultural, economic, political and social rights." It estimates that one in three of the world's children is born into poverty. At the same time, global wealth continues to move away from the poorest and to become more and more concentrated in the ownership of a small elite.

Poverty is about more than lack of money and impacts on all aspects of a person's life. People who live in poverty are disempowered, threatened by lack of food and clean drinking water, in greater risk of disease without adequate access to health care or drugs, more vulnerable to violence (including gender-specific violence), suffer social and educational discrimination, and often cannot participate meaningfully in the political process. There are two categories of poverty. Relative poverty is found in all societies, but the poor in developed societies are poor relative to the affluence of their societies. Absolute poverty is about the lack of basic needs required for subsistence. Most absolutely poor people live in the **third world**. The enormity of the challenges facing the world in terms of eliminating poverty was recognized by the **United Nations** in 2000 with the acceptance of the Millennium Development Goals and some significant progress has been made. According to the United Nations Millennium Development Goals Report 2014, extreme poverty has been halved since 1990, and 700 million people have been lifted out of extreme poverty. A person is deemed to be in extreme poverty if he or she earns less than one U.S. dollar a day. This is largely due to rapid **economic development** in China, India, Brazil, and other emerging economies. However, over 45 percent of people living in extreme poverty still live in China and India, with India accounting for more than 30 percent. Sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia also continue to lag behind. The improvements have therefore been unequally distributed across regions, and one in five people in the world still lives on less than $1.25 a day. Overall, poverty alleviation commands inadequate resources. The hundreds of billions of dollars spent in the **war on terror** are in stark contrast to the sums spent on poverty alleviation, although poverty kills many times more people than **terrorism**.

There are two key types of explanations for continued poverty. The first set of explanations looks to external or structural factors related to the nature and historical development of the capitalist **global economy**, particularly **colonialism**. Developing states are seen to be structurally disadvantaged in a system that operates in the interest of the most rich and powerful states. Poorer people are similarly disadvantaged within states. Factors that are internal to states themselves are also a cause of poverty. Corruption, **war**, urbanization, environmental degradation, disease, and the "brain drain" are all contributing factors.

See also ECONOMIC GLOBALIZATION; FRANK, ANDRÉ GUNDER (1929–2005); PREBISCH, RAÚL FEDERICO (1901–1986); SEN, AMARTYA KUMAR (1933–); SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT; WALLERSTEIN, IMMANUEL (1930–); WORLD FOOD PROGRAMME (WFP).

POWER. Referring as it does to an important feature in the interactions of people, **states**, **international organizations**, and other groups, "power" is one of the key concepts of International Relations (IR). Power is sometimes considered to be the ability to control or influence the actions of other states or groups. In such terms, power is an attribute. Linked to this conception is that of power as a relationship, in that power is considered to determine outcomes of interactions between people, states, and groups.

Power is the central feature of **classical realism** and **neorealism**. All realists see power in terms of the resources—such as leaders, armed forces, economic strength, territory, and population—that enable a state to control and influence others. On the face of it, an example of states in a relationship such as that of the **Vietnam War** may seem to undermine such an understanding of power, as the United States with all its resources could not achieve its desired outcome. Nevertheless, one could explain the outcome by analyzing the resources such as population in terms of morale, determination, and cause; territory in terms of suitability for the Vietnamese forces rather than the Americans; and leadership in terms of the abilities and the tactics, strategies, and policies devised by the leaders. Furthermore, the American resources such as **nuclear weapons** were not deemed usable in this **war**, whether for moral or strategic reasons. The context is important in this respect, as this was an episode during the **Cold War**, and the use of such **weapons of mass destruction** by the United States might have led to a similar response from the Soviet Union. Some theorists such as **Kenneth Waltz** have argued that the bipolar **balance of power** was conducive to **peace** between the two superpowers (as they were sometimes described) even though other wars did take place. Waltz's view was part of an ongoing debate among IR theorists who have debated whether a bipolar or multipolar balance of power is the more likely to prevent war from breaking out between the great powers.

Neorealists such as Waltz, who envisage a structural element of power, argue that resources give states the capabilities and relative capabilities that are determinants of power within the structural conditions that the international **Westphalian system of states** imposes on the individual states. Theorists of **neoliberal institutionalism** argue that structural power does not push states into the endeavor for relative gains to the degree supposed by neorealists. This is because neoliberal institutionalists consider intentions to be more significant than capabilities, arguing that states with the intentions to cooperate will do so within international organizations and **international institutions**. Structural power is also discussed by **Susan Strange** in her theoretical work on **international political economy**. **Marxists** and **critical theorists** such as **Robert W. Cox** see the structure of the capitalist international economy as a fundamental factor in the relations between states.

Some relatively recent contributions to **International Relations theory** stress that the traditional theories have neglected significant aspects of power. **Feminists**, for example, argue that the relations between sexes have been ignored as international relations have been theorized in masculine terms. **Poststructuralists** and **postcolonialists** stress that knowledge and power are interrelated as the prevalent ideas help underpin particular power relationships.

Power is sometimes divided into the three categories of hard, soft, and smart. Hard power is military and economic strength. Soft power is the ability to attract and persuade. Smart power is an appropriate blend of soft and hard power, depending on the circumstances.

See also ANARCHY; BULL, HEDLEY (1932–1985); HEGEMONY; MORGENTHAU, HANS JOACHIM (1904–1980); NATIONAL INTEREST; NYE, JOSEPH SAMUEL (1937–); SECURITY; SOVEREIGNTY.

PREBISCH, RAÚL FEDERICO (1901–1986). Raúl Prebisch was born in Tucumán, Argentina. His mother was from an aristocratic family of Spanish descent that was no longer wealthy, and his father was a first-generation German immigrant who had become a self-made middle-class businessman. Prebisch grew up to dislike the Argentinean oligarchy. He also disobeyed orders from his family not to play with poor, oppressed Native American children, thus developing his future ethical views. He was educated at a local Jesuit college before going for his secondary education at the Colegio Nacional. In 1918, at the age of 17, he went to the University of Buenos Aires to study economics. He graduated in 1920 and worked as a teaching assistant before securing an academic post at the national University of La Plata. By this time, he had read works by **Karl Marx** and **V. I. Lenin** and was developing a radical and distinctive **Marxist** viewpoint. He became a professor of economic policy in 1923, a post he occupied until 1948.

In addition to his academic work, Prebisch was deputy director of the Argentine Department of Statistics from 1925 to 1927, director of economic research for the National Bank of Argentina from 1927 to 1930, undersecretary of finance in the government from 1930 to 1932, and first director-general of the Argentine Central Bank from 1935 to 1948. In the 1930s, he was also a **diplomat** for Argentina in economic negotiations with Great Britain. He helped draft the International Monetary Charter in 1946. Furthermore, he became an important figure in the **United Nations** (UN), becoming executive secretary of the UN Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean from 1950 to 1963 and secretary-general of the **United Nations Conference on Trade and Development** from 1964 to 1969.

Prebisch became a pioneer of theories of **economic development** and **dependency**. He argued that development was a problem between the dominant North (center) and the dependent South (periphery) of the globe. He

argued in his 1950 book, *The Economic Development of Latin America and Its Principal Problems*, that there was a tendency for greater decline in prices of primary products than in those of manufactured goods. The industrialized countries of the center thus derived more benefit from **trade** than did developing ones of the periphery. To overcome this problem, he argued for structural change and industrialization in the latter, especially the Latin American countries. This was also the view of British economist Hans Singer, and it became known as the "Prebisch–Singer thesis." The flaws in the solution element of the thesis became apparent by the 1950s. Prebisch conceded that, because of the focus on import substitution, Latin American countries were neglecting exports. By the early 1970s, he was expressing concern at the region's growing foreign **debt**, which led to defaults in 1982, and the subsequent replacement of import substitution with free market reforms. His views had by this time influenced later dependency and development theorists such as **André Gunder Frank** and **Immanuel Wallerstein**.

See also INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND (IMF); POVERTY; THIRD WORLD.

PUTIN, VLADIMIR VLADIMIROVICH (1952–). The son of a housewife and a metalworker who had served in **World War II**, Vladimir Putin was born in Leningrad. He attended school locally before going to study law at Leningrad University. After graduating in 1975, he became an intelligence officer in the Committee for State Security (Komitet gosudarstvennoy bezopasnosti, KGB) of the communist Soviet Union. Shortly before the collapse of the Soviet Union in the broader environment of communist decline that ended the **Cold War**, he retired from the KGB and also resigned from the Communist Party. He returned to St. Petersburg, as Leningrad was renamed following the collapse of communism, and became an advisor to the mayor of the city, before becoming deputy mayor in 1994. In 1996, he was appointed to the presidential staff of the Russian president, Boris Yeltsin. He served in a range of positions in the administration before Yeltsin appointed him as prime minister in 1999. His first major achievement that year was to organize a military operation against rebel forces that sought the secession of Chechnya from Russia.

When Yeltsin resigned in December that year, he appointed Putin as president until the elections to that office in 2000. Putin won the elections and began to make major changes to regional political institutions and also to close media outlets critical of his politics, thus increasing his **power** and control within Russia. He continued the campaign against Chechan rebels, declaring the **war** against them over in 2002. By this time he had also begun his efforts to build Russian influence and power internationally. He opposed the decision of President of the United States **George W. Bush** to abandon the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty of 1972, which had been part of efforts at

arms control and disarmament. Although he pledged his support for Bush in the **war on terror** after the **attacks of 9/11** carried out by **al-Qaeda** in 2001, Putin opposed the use of **force** against Iraq by countries led by the United States in 2003. In 2004, he was reelected president but in 2008 constitutional rules barred him from another term. His successor in the role, Dmitry Medvedev, appointed him prime minister. In 2008, Putin was allowed constitutionally to become president again and won the election of March 2012.

In 2013, after chemical attacks attributed to the forces of Syrian president Bashar al-Assad in the civil war against rebels and the **Islamic State** in Iraq and Syria, Putin opposed military action that was being considered by the United States. He arranged a deal that aimed to destroy these **weapons of mass destruction**. Nevertheless, in September 2015, concerned with maintaining Syria as a traditional Russian (and previously Soviet) ally in the Middle East, he launched attacks against the opponents of Assad. Earlier that month, in an address before the **United Nations General Assembly**, he had criticized the United States and the **North Atlantic Treaty Organization** (NATO) as threats to global **security** and stated that Russia had a role as a world power. NATO had for several years been increasing its influence and activities in **states** in close proximity to Russia.

Meanwhile, Putin had been active in building Russian power and influence in Europe. In 2013, President Viktor Yanukovych of Ukraine had abandoned an agreement with the **European Union** on closer **trade** ties and sought closer cooperation with Russia. Protests escalated against Yanukovych, who was overthrown in February the following year. Putin refused to recognize the new Ukrainian government and promised to safeguard Russian interests, as well as those of the Russian-speaking regions of eastern Ukraine and the Crimea region in the south of the country, where a major Russian fleet was based. Russia took control and annexed the Crimea, which had once been part of Russia. Russian paramilitary forces and troops armed with Russian equipment engaged in a civil war with Ukrainian forces. In February 2015, Putin approved an international **peace** plan that aimed at ending the conflict. Nevertheless, in 2016 the hostilities continued, as did Russian military intervention in Syria.

See also AIRPOWER; ARAB UPRISINGS; ARMS RACE; BIN LADEN, OSAMA BIN MOHAMMED BIN AWAD (1957–2011); FOREIGN POLICY; IRAQ WAR (2003–2010); NATIONAL INTEREST; NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION.

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RAISON D'ÉTAT. The idea that rulers and diplomats should work for the interests of their state is known by the French term *raison d'état*, meaning reason of **state**, or **national interest**. An acceptance of the norm of raison d'état in the 17th century was indicative of a shift in Europe from a universal system based under the authority of the Catholic Church in Rome to a more secular and decentralized system. **Foreign policy** conducted to the good of God was replaced by foreign policy that, according to the norm of raison d'état, ought to be conducted in the interest of the state free from religious, moral, or other restraints. Individual state interest was seen by idealists such as President of the United States **Woodrow Wilson** to be responsible for the outbreak of **World War I**, and a key goal in the new order was the replacement of the pursuit of common interests rather than individual state interest as the key driving force of international relations. The failure of the interwar project of **liberal internationalism** propelled raison d'état back to the forefront of thought about international relations, with writers in the school of **classical realism** such as **Hans J. Morgenthau** arguing not just that it was prudent for states to pursue their own specific national interests but that to do so was both moral and likely to lead to the best outcomes in international relations.

RAWLS, JOHN BORDLEY (1921–2002). John Rawls was born in Baltimore, Maryland. His mother was a senior official in the League of Women Voters and his father was a lawyer. Rawls went to junior schools in Baltimore and then the Kent Episcopal High School in western Connecticut. In 1939, he went to Princeton University to study philosophy. Upon graduating in 1943, he immediately enlisted in the U.S. Army, fighting in the Pacific for the remainder of **World War II** (WWII). He then served in occupied Japan before leaving the army in 1946. He went back to Princeton where he received his PhD in 1950 and became an instructor in philosophy for the next two years. After taking a fellowship to study at Oxford from 1952 to 1953, he was an assistant professor, then associate professor at Cornell University from 1953 to 1959, after which he taught at Harvard for a year before becom-

ing a professor of philosophy at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology until 1952, when he returned to Harvard where he was a professor of philosophy for the remainder of his career.

Rawls is widely considered one of the most important political philosophers of the 20th century. His work focused on justice—in particular, how the benefits and burdens of living in social cooperation under the authority of the **state** should be distributed. His 1971 book, *A Theory of Justice*, revived the normative form of political philosophy that had become unfashionable after WWII, discussing in detail the principles necessary to govern society in a way that would ensure a fair distribution. The focus is on the basic structure of society, consisting of the social and political institutions that have fundamental effects on the life chances of citizens. He devised a left-leaning **liberal** theory that blended equality and freedom, giving priority to basic liberties. He revised his theory of justice in his 1993 book, *Political Liberalism*, largely to make it suitable for a contemporary multicultural society.

Some scholars, notably Charles Beitz and Thomas Pogge, extended Rawls's principles into the international sphere. Rawls, however, paid little attention to international relations until 1999. In *The Law of Peoples* that year, he considered what a just **foreign policy** for a liberal society would involve, including intervention in another state. This policy would be internationalist, rather than **cosmopolitan**. Stressing that liberal societies respect **human rights** and the conventions of **war**, he distinguished them from three other sorts of societies. First, decent nonliberal societies might not be **democratic**, nor would they consider humans to be autonomous beings or grant citizens the basic liberties, but they would respect human rights and allow some dissent, decent consultation, and emigration. According to the law of peoples, liberal and nonliberal decent societies would respect the **sovereignty** and independence of one another. In turn, societies of these two sorts have the right of self-defense. The second of the other types of societies is the outlaw state that violates the law of peoples—for example, by waging **aggressive** war on another society or abusing the human rights of people within its own borders. Liberal societies, according to Rawls, have the right and duty to undertake a **humanitarian intervention**, as long as care is taken not to harm civilians and the rules of war are respected, in order to bring the society into the realm of the law of peoples. If these conditions are followed, this will be a **just war**. In the case of the third of the other sorts of societies—burdened societies where social and economic conditions make it difficult to maintain liberal or decent institutions—liberal states have a right and duty to intervene uninvited by the state to assist with distribution to develop the society into a liberal or decent one. He considered his theory realistically utopian, in that the international situation it envisages is a long-term goal to which actual societies should work toward.

See also HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION; INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY; NORMATIVE THEORY.

REAGAN, RONALD WILSON (1911–2004). Ronald Reagan was born in Tampico, Illinois, to Democratic parents who, as his father was a salesman, traveled before settling in Dixon, Illinois, where Reagan went to high school. Graduating in 1928, he then went to Eureka College, Illinois, funding his education and sending money home to his mother by working a series of unskilled jobs. Although not good academically, he excelled at sports and enjoyed dramatics in his spare time. After graduation, he found employment as a radio sports annoucer. He then became an actor, appearing in 52 films from 1937 to 1957.

Having first adopted his parents' political allegiance, Reagan grew to be more conservative and, in 1962, changed his registration to the Republican Party. He had become concerned that U.S. **foreign policy** had become weak in facing the **power** of the Soviet Union, which, in his view, was trying to achieve world domination. Backed by big business, he was elected governor of California in 1966 and again in 1970. In 1968 and 1976, he ran unsuccessfully to be the Republican candidate for the U.S. presidential elections. In 1980, he was successful and was elected president.

As president, Reagan was virulently opposed to communism and changed U.S. foreign policy in order to challenge Soviet power, thus escalating the new phase of the **Cold War** that had begun with the Soviet invasion of **Afghanistan**. Involving increased military spending on conventional and nuclear forces, Reagan's stance initially led to a renewal of the **arms race** and deteriorating relations with the Soviet Union. There was also a more **aggressive** stance against left-wing governments in Central America and the Caribbean, including funding of the Contra rebels in Nicaragua and the invasion of Grenada. Grenada was a British Commonwealth country and the invasion brought about the displeasure of Prime Minister **Margaret Thatcher**, who was otherwise a staunch ally of Reagan. Thatcher allowed Reagan to implement the decision of the previous president of the United States, James (Jimmy) Carter, supported by the **North Atlantic Treaty Organization**, to place cruise missiles in bases in Great Britain. This led the Soviet Union to discontinue **arms control** negotiations. In the early 1980s, Reagan and his secretary of state, George Shultz, perceived Soviet ambitions in the Middle East and encouraged Israel to take a strong stance against its enemies there to deter communist expansion. This involved the unsuccessful and costly (not least in terms of casualties) dispatch of U.S. marines to Lebanon, supported by the navy and by **airpower**, in an attempt to end the **war** in that country.

Reagan was reelected to the presidency in 1984. The friendly relationship with Thatcher continued and in 1985 she allowed Reagan to launch attacks on Libya, which Reagan considered responsible for **terrorist** attacks. While

continuing high military spending on weapons to prevent communist expansion, he also encouraged the sale of grain and the supply of American oil pipeline technology to the Soviet Union. The reason for this paradoxical situation was that the United States had a budget deficit and a surplus of grain that the Soviets needed. The complexity of U.S.–Soviet relations took another turn when **Mikhail Gorbachev** became the new Soviet leader in 1985. Reagan developed friendly relations with him while still maintaining the confrontational foreign policy. Successful **diplomacy** led to moves to bring an end to **nuclear proliferation** on each side, including the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty of 1987.

In 1986, the Iran-Contra affair became known to the public. Members of Reagan's National Security Council staff arranged an arms sale to Iran, which was at war with Iraq. One aim was to secure the release of American hostages in Lebanon. Another aim was to use some of the proceeds to fund the Contras in Nicaragua. The affair was detrimental to Reagan's reputation. Nevertheless, an independent investigation later concluded that there was no evidence Reagan knew about the diversion of some of the proceeds to the Contras.

Reagan's defense policy involved the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI). If implemented, this would have involved a defense system capable of destroying incoming Soviet missiles in space. The Soviet Union protested initially that it would have violated the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, which was linked to the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks 1 (SALT I) nuclear arms control treaty and signed in 1972. This opposition was withdrawn when the Soviets decided it could never work. Research on the program was started but would have been hugely expensive and was scaled back and eventually cut several years after Reagan's presidency had ended.

See also AFGHAN WARS; ARAB–ISRAELI CONFLICT; NUCLEAR WEAPONS; WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION.

REALISM. *See* CLASSICAL REALISM; NEOREALISM.

REDISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE. *See* NORMATIVE THEORY.

REFUGEES. *See* MIGRATION.

REGIONAL INTEGRATION. An intensification of linkages between **states** within a particular geographical area is known as regional integration or regionalization. The key elements of regional integration are proximity and intensity of relationships, though the term normally also implies some sort of formal agreement or institution. Regionalization began immediately after **World War II** with the formation of the **Organization of American**

States (OAS) in 1948. Since then, there have been two main waves of regionalization, the first during the late 1950s and 1960s starting with the formation of the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1957. Regionalism spread to Africa and Asia in the 1960s with the **Organization of African Unity**, established in 1960, and the **Association of South East Asian Nations** (ASEAN), formed in 1967. By the 1970s, it was clear, however, that only European regionalism had progressed. This was in part due to the fact that the United States had a policy of promoting multilateralism rather than regional integration. It made an exception in the case of the EEC, however, because it saw the region as an important **security** element in the **Cold War**.

The second wave of regionalization began in the 1980s and has continued since. Regionalization in this second wave has been both more widespread and more effective than in the earlier period. As part of this trend, the **European Union** (EU) broadened and deepened its integration project; the **African Union** was formed; and Southeast Asian integration was strengthened. Even the United States changed its policy on supporting and joining regional organizations, and in 1994 the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) was negotiated. Numerous other arrangements deepened or were established, leading to a marked increase in the extent of regional integration in the 1990s and the upward trend has continued. Regional integration is no longer only a European issue, it is a global issue. Levels of regional integration, however, remain varied and uneven, with Europe achieving the deepest levels of integration. Such integration is also highly complex. Regional organizations, institutions, and agreements do not neatly conform to geographical regions, and most states are members of a variety of different regional organizations with overlapping boundaries.

The two key patterns of regionalism are economic integration and regional **security**. Although some regional organizations such as the **Asia–Pacific Economic Cooperation Forum** (APEC) have been driven by the goal of economic integration, others such as ASEAN were originally conceived primarily as security organizations. The distinction is not clear cut, however, and organizations tend to develop beyond their original remits. In the integration literature, this is known as "spillover." APEC, for example, is beginning to develop a sense of shared security interests while ASEAN has formed a free trade area and is an important economic as well as security actor. The Economic Community of West African States, founded in 1975 for economic reasons, now has a "mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security" and conducted its first intervention to end the **war** in Liberia.

Regional integration takes place at different levels. The move down an integration ladder from surface to deeper forms of cooperation is explained by integration theorists such as **David Mitrany** and other theorists within the fields of **functionalism** and **neofunctionalism**. At the top of the ladder is a

free **trade** area; this is considered surface level. A free trade area requires the removal of all tariffs, taxes, and other barriers to trade between the member-states. Each member-state, however, can have its own trade policies with nonmember states. Free trade agreements are by far the most common form of regional integration. NAFTA is an example of a free trade area. Even though NAFTA exists within a clearly defined region, free trade areas are not necessarily regionally based. The EU has bilateral agreements with Mexico, Chile, South Africa, and some Middle Eastern states; the United States has bilateral agreements with Singapore, Chile, Israel, and Jordan, and so on. However, the **World Trade Organization** uses the term "regional trade agreements" to describe these free trade arrangements whether or not they are regionally based.

The next step down is a customs union in which states also agree a common external tariff with some sort of formal organization to administer it. The EU started life as a customs union and is negotiating a free trade agreement with another customs union, Mercosur, the Economic Community of the Southern Cone, established in 1991 and comprised of Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay, and Venezuela. Customs unions are less common than free trade areas, and a common market, which is the next step down, is less common still. This has the same features as a customs union but with the important addition of the free movement of resources, labor, and capital. The EU is a common market. Deeper integration leads to economic and monetary union as in the Eurozone of the EU, which requires a common currency and a central bank. Although the project of monetary union in Europe has not been without its difficulties particularly since the **financial crisis of 2008**, this has not put off states in both East and West Africa, which are committed to new currency unions within the next few years. The very bottom rung of the ladder is political union, which requires the complete pooling of **sovereignty** within a new political entity.

In a globalizing world, membership of regional organizations is a key way in which states continue to compete in the global marketplace. The importance of regions is therefore growing and regions are increasingly becoming actors in international relations, raising the question of whether the **Westphalian system of states** is under threat. This question is of particular significance in Europe. Another key question that regionalism raises is whether it is a process that enhances or impedes **globalization** and the moves toward **global governance**.

See also ARAB LEAGUE; INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS; INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS; ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES (OAS).

RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT. At the end of the 20th century, intense debate about the problems and issues of **humanitarian intervention** led to concerted efforts to clarify the duties and responsibilities both of **states** within their own boundaries and of other states in cases where the former were not being fulfilled. Following a speech by **United Nations Secretary-General** Kofi Annan to the **United Nations General Assembly** (UNGA) in 2000 on those responsibilities, and on the changing nature of **sovereignty** in an era of **globalization** and international cooperation, the Canadian government sponsored the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS), which presented its report entitled *The Responsibility to Protect* to Annan late in 2001. The ICISS made an influential contribution to international policy debates. Responsibility to protect came largely to take the place of the notion of humanitarian intervention in such debates

The first achievement of the ICISS was to invent a new vocabulary for the discussion of humanitarian intervention. The emphasis on the right to intervene was relegated beneath a responsibility to protect people at grave risk and thus needing support. The ICISS intended to introduce this change of emphasis in order that opponents in the debates about humanitarian intervention would find new ground on which to engage more constructive discussion. Although unintended initially by the ICISS, the new vocabulary came to include the acronym RtoP (sometimes written as R2P). The second achievement was to introduce a new interpretation of sovereignty more suitable to the contemporary world. Actual state practices had evolved considerably since the **United Nations** (UN) Charter was signed in 1945. **Human rights** and human **security** had become far more prominent in debates, and this indicated that sovereignty must have limits. In the ICISS report, therefore, responsibility took the place of control as the key point of sovereignty. For a state to be recognized as sovereign, it should be responsible to its citizens and also to the wider international community. Importantly, the ICISS also stressed that where the state fails to fulfill its responsibility, through either incapacity or ill will, the responsibility to protect is transferred to the international community, acting primarily through the UN. The third achievement was to make clear that responsibility was not restricted to intervention. It also involved (a) the responsibility to prevent harm by addressing the causes of internal conflict and crises; (b) the responsibility to react and respond to situations by using appropriate measures, including **economic sanctions**, international prosecution, and in extreme cases, **force** by means of military intervention; and (c) the responsibility to rebuild by providing assistance with recovery, reconstruction, and reconciliation.

The ICISS aimed to resolve tension between sovereignty and human rights by building a new consensus on how to protect endangered peoples. This involves recommending five guidelines to determine when military action by other states would be appropriate. These conditions had previously been

expressed in **just war** theory: just cause in terms of harm to human beings (thus disallowing **genocide**, ethnic cleansing, **crimes against humanity**, and **war crimes**); right intention; last resort; proportional means; and reasonable prospects of success in terms of whether the situation would be worsened for the human beings in question. The ICISS wanted to make it more difficult for calls to intervene to be blocked. Therefore, they recommended that, although there should always be an attempt to get the approval of the **United Nations Security Council** (UNSC), if one of the permanent five member-states used its veto, a mandate should be sought from the UNGA and, failing that, from regional organizations. The ICISS hoped that the UNSC would be careful not to damage its own credibility by rejecting cases that might be accepted by the other channels. At the 2005 United Nations World **Summit**, responsibility to protect was adopted in a formal declaration. However, military intervention would require UNSC authorization. This provoked criticism that the principles of responsibility to protect had been watered down. Furthermore, those principles have provoked disagreement and controversy that it was hoped would be avoided when they were proposed to replace the notion of humanitarian intervention.

In March 2011, the UNSC authorized all necessary means to protect the Libyan people from the actions of the regime of their president, Muammar Gaddafi. These means included military action, which took the form of the use of **airpower**, led by the **North Atlantic Treaty Organization** (NATO). This prompted the just war theorist **Michael Walzer** to argue that this action was not justified in terms of humanitarian intervention as Gaddafi was not going to commit **genocide** or the level of slaughter usually required to trigger such intervention. However, in terms of the responsibility to protect, it may be justifiable as the threshold is so high and prevention is cited as a reason to intervene. A problem was that, other than airpower, only very limited intervention on the ground took place. Hence, once Gaddafi's regime had been removed and Gaddafi killed, there was insufficient military action on the ground to prevent civilians in Libya from suffering equally or more than had been the case before intervention, as Libya descended into the chaos of a complex civil **war** among various groups. Another problem was that it caused controversy because of a lack of support among some important quarters. There were several abstentions in the UNSC, and although the **Arab League** requested and supported the intervention, the **African Union** condemned both Gaddafi's violence and the use of NATO-led airpower. There was also concern at the UNSC that the intervention had transformed into one of regime change rather than protection.

The principle of responsibility to protect also lost some credibility when the UNSC could not agree to intervention in the civil war in Syria that began in 2011. Inspired by the other **Arab uprisings** that began the previous year, demonstrators in Syria took to the streets but the Syrian regime of President

Bashar al-Assad responded with violence. The civil war that escalated as a result involved the **Islamic State** (Daesh) **terrorist** organization, which sought to build an international caliphate. When states including Russia, the United States, and Great Britain did intervene militarily through the use of airpower, this was for reasons other than responsibility to protect the civilians of Syria.

See also INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS; INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS.

ROOSEVELT, FRANKLIN DELANO (1882–1945). Born in Hyde Park, New York, to parents who had each become wealthy by means of several generations of successful business interests, Franklin D. Roosevelt was educated privately in childhood on the family estate. In 1896, his education continued at the prestigious Groton School in Massachusetts and from there he went to Harvard University in 1900. Three years later, after graduating with a BA degree in history, he began to study law at Columbia University, New York. After passing his bar examination in 1907, he left the university but remained in New York to practice law. He joined the Democratic Party, was elected to the U.S. Senate in 1910, and was reelected in 1912, which was also the year that, with his support, **Thomas Woodrow Wilson** was elected president of the United States. From 1913 to 1920, Roosevelt was assistant secretary of the navy. Roosevelt was thus in Wilson's administration during **World War I**. In 1920, the Democratic candidate for the presidency, James M. Cox, nominated Roosevelt for the role of vice president. However, the Democrats had by 1920 lost popularity in part because of Wilson's unsuccessful attempt to take the United States into the **League of Nations**.

While temporarily out of political office, Roosevelt contracted polio in 1921, resulting in the permanent loss of the use of his legs. Nevertheless, he continued to be active in the Democratic Party. He was elected governor of New York State in 1928 and reelected in 1930. By 1932, the Republican administration had lost considerable support in the American Depression and Roosevelt was elected president of the United States that year, taking office in 1933. As the Great Depression continued, however, domestic recovery had to take priority over **foreign policy**. Nevertheless, he did achieve a number of bilateral **trade** deals that, he hoped, would help stimulate world recovery and thus maintain **peace**. To achieve domestic recovery, his New Deal program, which included extensive governmental intervention, attracted huge support, notwithstanding criticism from businessmen and bankers. He was thus reelected president in 1936 and began a successful challenge to the declaration of the Supreme Court that some aspects of the New Deal legislation were unconstitutional.

In 1940, Roosevelt was again reelected president of the United States, thus becoming the first person to serve a third term in this office. **World War II** (WWII) had broken out in Europe in 1939 after the German dictator **Adolf Hitler** had sent his armies to use **force** to defeat and occupy Poland. In March 1941, as the **war** in Europe worsened, Roosevelt was able to get his lend-lease bill through Congress, thus enabling the United States to send aid to Great Britain, which had become the main opponent of Germany in the conflict until Hitler broke a nonaggression pact to invade the Soviet Union in June that year. Roosevelt had also begun to build up the U.S. armed forces, even though there was significant opposition to this from those who wanted the period of American isolationism to continue. The British prime minister, **Winston Churchill**, urged Roosevelt to attempt to bring the United States into WWII. In August 1941, Roosevelt and Churchill issued the **Atlantic Charter** as a declaration of joint principles for a better world. Nevertheless the United States did not enter WWII until December 1941, when Germany's ally Japan launched an attack using massive **airpower** on the U.S. Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii. The fleet sustained substantial damage and more than 2,000 people were killed. The following day Roosevelt asked Congress for a formal declaration of war against Japan. Three days later, the other two Axis powers, Germany and Italy, declared war on the United States. Roosevelt took the United States into the war against the three Axis powers with huge support among Americans.

In January 1942, Roosevelt signed the Declaration of the United Nations, which created a grand **alliance** against the Axis powers. This also was the first step toward the formation of the **United Nations** (UN) organization. Roosevelt continued to contribute to plans for the UN, as he considered an **international organization** to be the best means to prevent wars in the future. In 1942, he and Churchill agreed to begin the Manhattan Project to cooperate in building atomic bombs, in the fear that Hitler might produce them first. The cooperation was confirmed by the Quebec agreement of August 1943. The Hyde Park agreement of September the following year ensured the research would be secret and planned to extend the cooperation on the development of **nuclear weapons** after the war. Roosevelt was re-elected president for a fourth term in 1944. In February 1945, along with Churchill and Soviet leader **Josef Stalin**, he attended the **Yalta** conference, where these three leaders planned for the completion of the war and the settlement thereafter. However he died two weeks before the start of the San Francisco conference at which the UN Charter was signed two months later. Harry S. Truman became president of the United States and oversaw the last stages of WWII. Roosevelt's wife, Eleanor Roosevelt, who had already been active in **diplomacy**, became a spokeswoman for the UN and the chair of the commission that drew up the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

See also INTERNATIONALLY PROTECTED HUMAN RIGHTS; TO-TAL WAR.

ROSENAU, JAMES N. (1924–2011). Born in Philadelphia as the son of a Wall Street broker, Rosenau became one of the pioneering scholars of the **foreign policy** analysis (FPA) subdiscipline of International Relations (IR). In 1929, he and his family moved to New York City. During **World War II**, he started to study at the University of Wisconsin, but he was drafted into the army. In 1946, he entered higher education again, this time at Bard College in Annandale-on-Hudson, New York. He subsequently gained his MA from the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, and his PhD from Princeton University. His academic career was mainly at the University of Southern California and the George Washington University, where he was the university professor of IR until his death.

Rosenau authored more than 40 books and over 140 articles in IR. The books included *Turbulence in World Politics: A Theory of Change and Continuity* (1990) and the two-volume *The Study of World Politics* (2006). He was also the editor of *Comparing Foreign Policies* (1974). One of his early articles is widely recognized as one of the most important works in the development of FPA. This was "Pre-theories and Theories of Foreign Policy," in R. B. Farrell (ed.), *Approaches to Comparative and International Politics* (1966). Rosenau sought to provide a general testable theory of foreign policy, and he produced a pretheory consisting of a matrix of variables applied to different types of countries. The intention was to encourage scholars to find observations about **state** behavior that could be applied widely in generalizable propositions. This involved multiple levels of analysis, including the actions of individual leaders and events in the international system. This middle-range theory sought to mediate between grand principles and actual events and processes.

See also ALLISON, GRAHAM TILLET (1940–).

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SAID, EDWARD WADIE (1935–2003). Born in Jerusalem to Christian parents, Edward Said, whose father was a wealthy businessman, had an affluent but strict upbringing. After attending the British-style Victoria College in Cairo, he was sent by his father to the private Mount Hermon School in Massachusetts, where he developed an antiestablishment outlook. He studied English literature at Princeton University, where he graduated in 1957 and then went to Harvard graduate school, where he gained his MA in 1960 and his PhD in 1964. Meanwhile, in 1963 he had begun his academic career as a lecturer in English at Columbia University. He was promoted to assistant professor in 1967, then full professor two years later. He developed a humanist, secular outlook.

After the Arab defeat in the Six-Day **War** against Israel, Said became critical of U.S. and Israeli **foreign policy** in the Middle East, wrote widely in support of the rights of the Palestinians, but expressed recognition that the Jews had historic claims on Palestine. He advocated a two-**state** solution and supported a peaceful resolution of the **Arab–Israeli conflict**. In 1977, he was elected to the Palestine National Council (PNC), which was at that time in exile in various countries of the Middle East and North Africa. The PNC adopted the two-state solution in 1988. He resigned from the PNC in 1991 because of the weak stance it took in negotiations toward a solution. He criticized the Oslo peace process between the Palestine Liberation Organization and Israel in the early to mid 1990s because, in his view, it was weighted unfairly in favor of Israel.

Said's highly influential book *Orientalism* was published in 1978. In it, he stressed the connections between **power** and knowledge, arguing that an objective academic standpoint was thus impossible. The Orient was a political vision produced in Western culture. It relied on a binary opposition between the familiar West and the strange East, thereby cultivating an us/them mentality that served from the Western perspective to legitimate colonial power. *Orientalism* became one of the key texts of **postcolonialism**, which became prominent in **International Relations theory** in the 21st century.

Said's many other books included *Culture and Imperialism* (1993) and *Peace and Its Discontents: Essays on Palestine in the Middle East Peace Process* (1995). In his final years, he refrained from political comment. He focused instead on classical music, being the joint founder of the West-Eastern Divan Orchestra.

See also COLONIALISM; FANON, FRANTZ (1925–1961); POSTCO-LONIAL RELATIONS.

SEA POWER. From the 16th century onward, sea power was instrumental in the establishment and maintenance of European **colonialism**. In particular, the prominence of the Royal Navy allowed Great Britain to offer unassailable protection to its **trade** routes and colonies during the period of its **empire**, enhancing its global wealth and **hegemonic** position. **World War I** saw the Royal Navy blockade the German north coast for the entire **war**, proving its immense strategic value, and contributing to the Allied victory. During **World War II**, however, the traditional battleship became increasingly vulnerable to air attacks and was gradually replaced as an instrument of power projection by the aircraft carrier, as was demonstrated at Pearl Harbor, a devastating attack on the U.S. fleet launched from six Japanese aircraft carriers. As a result, naval strategy changed during the 20th century, from ship-to-ship combat to the use of naval resources as a platform from which to deploy air and ground forces. In other words, ships have gone from being weapons in their own right to being platforms from which strategic strikes can be launched, whether by amphibious assault, aircraft, or missiles. This was epitomized in the Falklands War between Argentina and Great Britain in 1982, when just two Royal Navy carriers managed to defeat the Argentine air force and secure victory. During the **first Gulf War**, Royal Navy helicopters, flying from carriers, destroyed most of the Iraqi navy, and the conflict saw the last ever use of battleships in war, with two U.S. Navy ships bombarding Iraqi positions. Sea power is therefore an important aspect of military **power** and instrumental in all recent military interventions, as it is the main way of transporting an expeditionary force from the country of origin to the battlefield. With the development of the submarine-launched intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), navies of nuclear powers such as Great Britain and the United States are also the main operators of nuclear arsenals. Sea power has therefore become an important aspect of a nuclear deterrent capability. In peacetime, navies are involved in other operations such as that against **piracy**, illegal fishing, and narcotics, and in the provision of **overseas aid**. British naval resources, for example, gave it the capacity to deliver vital resources and medical care during the Ebola crisis in West Africa in 2015.

Currently, the largest overseas naval deployment is that of the United States in Japan. With the rise of China, this has begun to cause tension and has brought a return to the concept of ship-to-ship fighting. Tensions in the

South China Sea, therefore, are likely to place renewed emphasis on the importance and necessity of sea power, though the way that power is deployed might change. With the invention of nuclear-tipped cruise missiles and with its ICBMs, for example, it is possible that China would be able to destroy a U.S. battle group before it could launch its aircraft, meaning that aircraft carriers may soon become less useful, although steps are being taken to fit destroyers with antiballistic missile weapons that may help protect the increasingly vulnerable carriers. Nevertheless, to some extent, U.S. carrier strike groups are a remnant of the **Cold War** and, although still useful for power projection, they might be less useful as a tactical weapon in a full-scale war.

See also AIRPOWER; AMERICAN PRIMACY; BRITISH HEGEMONY; FORCE; GLOBAL POWER SHIFTS; PEACE; POSTCOLONIAL RELATIONS.

SECURITY. To be secure is to be free from a threat to cherished values, particularly survival. For much of the 20th century, the concept of security in International Relations was underpinned by the assumptions of **realism**. Security was about protecting the **state** from external threats; the state was the referent of security. Citizens were assumed to be secure when their state was secure from invasion or coercion. The biggest threat to security was considered to be the nature of the **Westphalian system of states**, which was one of **anarchy**. The international environment was therefore assumed to be one in which conflict, **war**, and insecurity were ever-present possibilities. Security was thus seen to reside in military **power**, and the security agenda was dominated by the question of how best to deploy military **force**. At the heart of security concerns was how to avoid the security dilemma: the danger that investment in defensive military technologies might be misconstrued as a buildup of offensive capabilities, destabilizing relationships with potential adversaries, and conceivably leading to an **arms race** and even war. Although there were dissenters from the realist view, notably those working within **peace studies**, mainstream **strategic studies** were dominated by security issues.

The realist conception of security, however, was increasingly challenged after the end of the **Cold War** by new ways of thinking, epitomized by Barry Buzan's work *People, States and Fear*, published in 1983. When asking who or what needed to be secured, theorists began to consider answers other than "the state." If the individual is made the referent of security, then a whole range of new issues is brought onto the security agenda. The individual might need security from the state itself—indeed, states are the key violators of **human rights**—turning realist assumptions on their head. Individuals also require security from want. Issues such as human rights, **poverty**, and **economic development** began to be seen as security issues and the notion of

human security was developed. Communities can also be the referents of security, in which case issues such as identity and **culture** can be viewed through a security lens. Finally, in the face of possible irreversible environmental degradation, humankind needs to be secured and thus sustainability issues widened the focus of security even further and far beyond traditional concerns. Almost any possible threat to human well-being can be considered a security threat, and for some this has rendered the concept analytically weak. The concept of security therefore remains essentially contested within the academic discipline of International Relations.

See also CONFLICT ANALYSIS; ENERGY SECURITY; GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS; GREEN THEORY; INTERNATIONALLY PROTECTED HUMAN RIGHTS; SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT.

SEN, AMARTYA KUMAR (1933–). Born in Santiniketan, West Bengal, India, Amartya Sen spent his early childhood in Mandalay, Burma, as his father, who was a chemistry professor, held a university post there. From there Sen went to school in Dhaka, Bangladesh. He witnessed the Bengal famine of 1943, an event that influenced his thinking all his life. He then moved back to Santiniketan with his family, before going to study at Presidency College in Calcutta and then Trinity College in Cambridge. Thereafter, he began his long career as an academic, mainly in economics but also philosophy. He taught at the Universities of Jadavpur, Calcutta, from 1956 to 1958, Delhi from 1963 to 1971, the London School of Economics from 1971 to 1977, and Oxford from 1977 to 1988. He then became a professor at Harvard University from 1988 to 1998, master of Trinity College, Cambridge, from 1998 to 2004, and thereafter a professor again at Harvard. He was also a visiting lecturer at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, at California State University in Stanford and Berkeley, and at Cornell University.

Sen's work in welfare economics and social choice theory included many books and articles. These included the book *Poverty and Famines: An Essay in Entitlement and Deprivation*, written for the World Employment Programme of the **International Labour Organization** and published in 1981. He argued that the traditional view of famines, which concentrates on food supply, was fundamentally defective in theory and dangerous in terms of policy. Famines had often occurred in the absence of significant reductions in per capita availability of food. They sometimes occurred when people did not have enough money to buy sufficient food as a result of inequality or poor distribution. He offered his entitlement approach, which criticized existing patterns of legal entitlements and focused on ownership and exchange. He challenged the influential view of **Adam Smith** and other classical economists that the international market mechanism was the best means to cure famines. He identified major cases in which food was being exported from

famine-stricken counties or regions, and stressed that in the market system traders often have little incentive to import goods to poor areas where they cannot sell them. His theory influenced the thinking of senior figures at the **World Bank**. For his academic work and determination to contribute to the reduction of **poverty** in the world, he was awarded the 1998 Nobel Prize in Economic Sciences.

See also ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT.

SINGER, J. DAVID (1925–2009). J. David Singer was born in New York. Influenced by his father who had served in **World War I**, he grew up with an interest in military affairs and in how **war** could be prevented. Singer gained his BA from Duke University in 1946. He became an officer in the U.S. Navy at the end of **World War II** before returning to academic study, gaining his PhD from New York University in 1956. He taught at a range of universities and colleges, before settling in 1964 at the University of Michigan, where he became professor and then emeritus professor of political science. He also held a range of consultancies including with the U.S. Departments of State, Defense, and Navy. He published many books and articles on a range of aspects of International Relations. This included his extensive *Correlates of War* project, which he founded in 1964 and which is still in operation today. Using carefully constructed data sets, its purpose was and is the systematic accumulation of scientific knowledge about war. Singer also hoped that a longer-term result of the use of the findings would be the elimination of war. The project involved many distinguished academics and has led to a range of publications by them, including the books *The Correlates of War I: Research Origins and Rationale* (1979) and *The Correlates of War II: Testing Some Realpolitik Models* (1980), each edited by Singer. He continued to write and publish extensively in retirement.

See also CONFLICT ANALYSIS.

SLAVERY. The **United Nations** (UN) affirms that freedom is the birthright of every human being. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights states in Article 4 that "no one should be held in slavery or servitude, slavery in all of its forms should be eliminated." Yet throughout history, slavery has often been an accepted part of human society. For example, slavery was commonplace in Ancient Greece—the birthplace of civilization in the **West**; indeed, the economy relied on slaves. Slaves were predominantly captured prisoners of **war**. **Thucydides** in his *History of the Peloponnesian War* tells in the famous dialogue between the Melians and the Athenians how the Athenians ignored the Melian plea for justice and "put to death all the grown men whom they took, and sold the women and children for slaves." Slavery was also institutionalized in the **Roman Empire**, and throughout the Arab world.

In more recent times, slaves were widely used as forced labor during **World War II** in **Adolf Hitler**'s Germany and by the Japanese, most notoriously on the Burmese railway. Even in the contemporary world, many people live in a situation of servitude, owned or controlled by others, in relationships of fear.

It is, however, the Atlantic slave **trade** between Africa and the European colonies in the Americas that the term *slavery* tends to bring to mind. Slavery in Africa predates European involvement, but under European control the slave trade was far larger and more systematic. It was started by the Portuguese in the 15th century with the first slaves arriving in the American colonies in 1510. Other European countries later followed suit. The first slaving expedition from Great Britain, which went on to dominate this highly lucrative trade, was undertaken in 1562. The trade reached its peak in the 1780s. Estimates for the total number of slaves transported from Africa vary but are normally in the range of around 6 million to 12 million. Slaves were captured in raids, **force**-marched over long distances to the coast, packed in appalling conditions on slave ships, and taken to the new world where those who survived were sold mainly to the owners of plantations. Slaves were used in the Americas to grow sugar, cotton, tobacco, and indigo during the period of European **colonialism** up until the 19th century. Slaves in the colonies were chattel slaves, the most extreme form of slavery. Chattel slaves were the legal property of their owners forever, unless the owner chose to dispose of them. The children of female slaves were born into slavery (the status of the father was not considered relevant, so female slaves were frequently raped by overseers and owners) and could be bought and sold as chattels also. Chattel slaves did not have the status of personhood nor were their **human rights** recognized.

The life of a plantation slave was a life of endless, grueling labor and life expectancy was short. Although they were controlled by terrible violence, there were rebellions, most notably in the French colony of Saint-Domingue, which on independence became Haiti. The "rights of man" demanded by the people of France during the French Revolution were not extended to the slaves on French plantations, yet the ideas of liberty, equality, and fraternity inspired revolutionary movements there, and in 1791 rebels on Saint-Domingue initiated a rebellion of slaves that overthrew the institution of slavery on the island. It also led to the National Convention in France in February 1794 voting to end slavery in all of France's colonies. The economic value of the colonies collapsed, however, leading to Napoleon Bonaparte's decision to reinstate slavery. However, in 1803, with the help of the Spanish and British, the Saint-Domingue rebels resisted the French naval force and ended French control over the colony. Although the Haitian Revolution was rather more complex than that in reality, the slave revolt was nevertheless an important and influential point of resistance to slavery.

The impact of slavery on individual slaves, their families, and communities was appalling but slavery also had a terrible impact on the social, political, and **economic development** of Africa itself and is seen as one of the long-term causes of **poverty** and underdevelopment in parts of the continent. Two African states, Sierra Leone and Liberia, were founded as colonies for freed slaves, the former by Great Britain in 1787 and the latter by the United States in 1847. The return of slaves was a utopian dream for some abolitionists and a convenient and cynical way of removing unwanted former slaves for apologists of slavery. For those who returned, both the journey and the resettlement were further terrible hardships.

In 1807, the British Parliament passed the Slave Trade Act and the U.S. Congress passed an act to "prohibit the importation of slaves." Slavery itself, however, was not outlawed in Great Britain until 1833 when the Slavery Abolition Act abolished it throughout the British Empire. Even then there were exceptions but these were finally removed in 1843. Slave owners were compensated for their loss; the slaves received no monetary compensation. Slavery was not finally abolished in the United States until the Emancipation Proclamation of 1863, during the U.S. Civil War, in which slavery was a defining issue.

During the period of **British hegemony**, Great Britain used its **sea power** to stop slave ships (the same **power** that it had previously used to protect its slave trade). It had a naval squadron based in Sierra Leone from which it patrolled the Atlantic slave route, capturing significant numbers of slave ships and freeing the slaves they contained. Britain also used its power to encourage other **states** to outlaw slavery, and states such as Spain, Sweden, and Portugal followed its example shortly afterward. France, the second-biggest imperial power during the 19th century, did not effectively end slavery until 1826. British civil society organizations, notably first the Anti-Slavery Society and, after 1839, the British and Foreign Anti-Slavery Society (BFASS), campaigned to outlaw slavery across the globe. In 1840, the BFASS held the first world antislavery convention in London, an important event in the history of international civil society action. More than 500 delegates attended from a wide array of countries.

The first international convention of states to outlaw slavery was held under the auspices of the **League of Nations** in 1926. In 1957, a supplementary convention came into force. This supplementary convention covers not just chattel slavery but adopts a wider definition covering those situations where a person is forced to work, such as forms of debt bondage, serfdom, or marital servitude. The Forced Labour Convention of 1930 and the subsequent efforts by the **International Labour Organization** to end forced labor were also significant. Slavery has been further outlawed by other human rights instruments, such as the Covenant of Civil and Political Rights, and regional mechanisms, such as the European Convention on Civil and Politi-

cal Rights. Articles relating to specific aspects of slavery can be found in other international treaties as well. The Optional Protocol to the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, for example, relates to the sale of children and child prostitutes.

Slavery has therefore been outlawed by any number of international and state domestic instruments, yet it has not disappeared, it has simply adapted to the changed circumstances. Modern forms of slavery are no longer about legal ownership, but they are still about control and they are still based on violence and fear. Modern-day slaves are now part of the criminal economy and much less visible, though they can be found in most parts of world, particularly the **third world**. Modern-day slavery traps some of the world's poorest and most vulnerable people into situations of fear where they have no power to change their situation. They might be illegal immigrants in virtual domestic servitude, unable to go to the authorities for help due to their illegal status; illegally trafficked prostitutes totally under the control of a violent pimp; child laborers in sweatshops; or child soldiers, snatched from their families and forced into a life of violence. There are many forms of modern slavery, but the shared feature is that in none of the cases can the victims simply walk away to a better life. Modern slaves are also very cheap.

Slavery is the subject of much activity and campaigning by **international nongovernmental organizations** such as Anti-Slavery International, the successor organization to BFASS, which has played a crucial role in the collection of facts and evidence about slavery around the world, raising global consciousness about the issue of modern slavery. Nevertheless, a growing global population, high levels of displacement, and continuing high levels of absolute poverty all contribute to the ongoing global crime of slavery.

See also INTERNATIONALLY PROTECTED HUMAN RIGHTS; MIGRATION.

SMART POWER. *See* POWER.

SMITH, ADAM (1723–1790). Born in Kirkcaldy, Scotland, Adam Smith was brought up by his widowed mother, who had been born into a substantial landowning family. His father, a customs officer, had died when Smith was still a young child. At the age of 14, after attending the Burgh School of his hometown, he went to study at Glasgow University and Balliol College, Oxford. In 1748, he gave a series of public lectures at Edinburgh University and in 1751 returned to Glasgow University to become professor of both logic and moral philosophy. He left Glasgow to travel around Europe as a tutor for the Duke of Buccleuch in 1864 before settling in London in 1776.

In 1776, Smith's book *Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations* was published. As a classic work of **international political economy**, it became known simply as *The Wealth of Nations*. In the book, he made the case for free **trade** on the basis of rational self-interest, arguing that this was the international economic arrangement that would most likely bring universal prosperity. He thus argued against mercantilism and regulation by the **state** in commerce and trade, even defending smuggling (ironically, he later enforced the law against smuggling after becoming a commissioner of customs in 1778). For him, natural self-interest was the best motivation in economic relations. Self-interest could reduce or even eliminate **poverty**, in his view, because sympathy was another feature of human nature. This was a view he had presented in his earlier book, *The Theory of Moral Sentiments* (1759).

Written in the same year as the American Declaration of Independence, *Wealth of Nations* presented a case against **colonialism**. Smith argued that Great Britain should relinquish its colonies. Maintaining them was against the **national interest**, as the cost of this colonialism outweighed the benefits. Self-interest and sympathy could, instead, be the basis of cooperation in international relations and **peace** among **sovereign** states. This was a view that influenced later theories of **liberal internationalism** and **neoliberal institutionalism**.

See also SEN, AMARTYA KUMAR (1933–).

SOCIAL CONSTRUCTIVISM. Sometimes known simply as constructivism, as an approach to International Relations (IR) social constructivism focuses on the interaction between the structure of world politics and the agents, or actors, within. These agents include **states**, individuals, and other nonstate actors. Social constructivism is concerned, on the one hand, with the ways in which that structure constructs, organizes, and constrains the identities and interests of the actors. It is concerned, on the other hand, with the ways in which, through the interactions, agents either reproduce or transform that structure. Social constructivists argue that norms and identities are hugely significant in the interactions between the agency and structure, and that those interactions can thus produce different sorts of **anarchy** in the international system. Constructivists thereby seek to bring human consciousness and ideas into an understanding of global politics. They argue that the social world is constructed by shared ideas, or intersubjective understandings. Social constructivism attempts to understand how these collective understandings emerge as social or institutional facts that then constrain human action. Similarities and connections are often drawn between social constructivism and the work of the **English School of International Relations** theory.

Social constructivism emerged into the discipline of IR in the late 1980s out of the recognition that, contrary to the beliefs of both **classical realism** and **neorealism**, the pursuit of **power** cannot explain everything in international politics. Although it does not consider the pursuit of power to be as prevalent as neorealists assumed, even **neoliberal institutionalism** considered states to have innate and permanent interests in power and wealth, even though they had the capacity to cooperate to achieve shared interests and absolute gains. The pioneers of the alternative constructivist approach included Friedrich Kratochwil with his book *Rules, Norms, and Decisions* (1989); Nicholas Onuf, who coined the term "constructivism" in his book *World of Our Making* (1989); Michael Barnett and Martha Finnemore with their book *Rules for the World: International Organizations in Global Politics* (2004); and, most influential of all, **Alexander Wendt**, who published a range of papers and the book *Social Theory of International Politics* (1999). They drew a distinction between, on the one hand, facts about the world that are independent of human action and, on the other hand, social facts that exist purely because of established human conventions such as that of **state sovereignty**.

Constructivists argue that the fundamental error of perceiving social facts as though they were independent of human conventions leads one to consider those social facts as natural. The openness of those facts to change is thus overlooked. The collapse of the Eastern European communist states in the revolutions of 1989–1990 and the implosion of the Soviet Union the following year were events that few people predicted, in part, according to constructivists, because social facts were misunderstood. The consequences for international relations were in turn unexpected. Many analysts now argue that the new world order that some observers believed may be emerging following these events never actually materialized. Nevertheless, the potential for fundamental international change that **critical theorists** had insisted was immanent in the existing order is now more widely considered. Social constructivists have theorized such prospects.

SOFT POWER. *See* POWER.

SOVEREIGNTY. The sovereignty of the **state** is a key concept of International Relations (IR). Technically, it means absolute and unlimited power. It has internal and external aspects, the former referring to the source of supreme **power** within states, while external sovereignty is a statement of the state's independence in relation to other states and the entitlement to operate as such. Nevertheless, this is a principle of domestic and **international law**

rather than an empirical description of the power of any state in reality. As it involves a denial of any other authority above the state, a corollary of the principle of sovereignty is international **anarchy**.

Traditionally, since the **Westphalian system of states** began to develop in the 17th century, sovereignty has been considered a fundamental principle for international political organization and administration. It was based on the theories of political thinkers that include Jean Bodin, **Hugo Grotius**, and **Thomas Hobbes**. The principle was widely considered to be reflected more closely in reality with the collapse and decline of the European and Ottoman Empires after **World War I** and **World War II** (WWII). Although at the end of WWII the **United Nations** set limits on sovereignty by recognizing **human rights**, states themselves have tended to insist on their sovereign rights to nonintervention by others. This, indeed, has made **humanitarian intervention** very difficult to undertake. Furthermore, some states that have become members of the **European Union** have been wary of losing their sovereignty or even pooling it with that of the other member-states. This tendency to guard sovereignty has been reflected in the various strands of **realism**. Since WWII, **classical realists** and **neorealists** have continued to consider the sovereign state to be the principal actor in international relations.

Nevertheless, **International Relations theory** has often called the principle of sovereignty into question. **Harold Laski**, for example, argued that the state used sovereignty theory to mask class dominance both within its borders and on the international stage. In the 1920s, Laski discussed ways in which a **functionalist** and democratic international system might be introduced in which state sovereignty would diminish. Others who have argued that sovereignty could be diluted by introducing elements of functional organization include **David Mitrany**, **E. H. Carr**, and **Ernst Haas**. In the 1930s and 1940s, Laski contributed to **Marxism** by arguing that the abolition of the external aspects of sovereignty would require capitalism to be replaced by a new, egalitarian, social and economic system. In the 1960s and 1970s, **Harold Sprout** and **Margaret Sprout** argued that **interdependence** was making sovereignty not only obsolete but also an obstacle to the solving of problems in international relations. In the 1980s, Alan James of the **English School** acknowledged that states are influenced by one another in an **international society**. Hence, states cannot do whatever they want to do. Sovereignty, he argued, is a purely legal term that is applicable to states that have constitutional independence. He stressed that this does not mean legally sovereign states have political independence or, in other words, separateness. If other states challenged a state's claim to constitutional independence, ultimately what is relevant is the effectiveness of that state. A state had sovereignty if it could plausibly claim to exercise a monopoly of legitimate **force**. More recently **poststructuralism** in IR has stressed that, as a concept that

legitimates certain structures of power, sovereignty has been erroneously taken for granted. **Social constructivism** has, as the term suggests, drawn attention to the social construction of the sovereign state.

See also RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT.

SPROUT, HAROLD H. (1901–1980). Harold Sprout was born in Benzonia, Michigan. He earned his BA in political science from Oberlin College, Ohio, in 1924, the same year in which he married Margaret Tuttle. She went on as **Margaret Sprout** to become his academic colleague. After gaining his PhD in Wisconsin in 1929, he taught for a short period at Stanford University before moving to Princeton University, where he remained for the rest of his career.

Together, Harold and Margaret Sprout wrote some important articles and books in various topics in International Relations (IR), most notably on **foreign policy** and international environmental problems. Sprout and Sprout argued that **states** had become interdependent and that the symbol of **sovereignty** served as a barrier to the discovery of solutions to the problems of international relations in the 20th century. They stressed that there is a distinction between the psychological and operational milieux. The decisions of people involved in the making of foreign policy and the process leading to those decisions is determined by the psychological milieu. In other words, the decision is determined by the way those people define the situation, including **power** capabilities, in which it is made. The success or failure of the foreign policy made by means of the decision, however, they argued, is determined by the operational milieu, or in other words by objective reality. Incongruities between the perceived and operational milieux lead to foreign policy choices that with hindsight can be seen to be unsatisfactory.

The work of the Sprouts linked foreign policy with environmental issues. They stressed that the **interdependence** of humans and their environment intensifies with population growth and the increased urbanization of human societies. The increased interdependence and the resultant policies, they reasoned, thus had ecological consequences. Their books included *The Ecological Perspective on Human Affairs, with Special Reference to International Politics* (1965) and *The Context of Environmental Politics: Unfinished Business for America's Third Century* (1979).

See also GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS; GREEN THEORY.

SPROUT, MARGARET A. (1903–2004). Margaret A. Tuttle attended Oberlin College in Ohio, where she met **Harold Sprout**, whom she married in 1924 to become Margaret Sprout. Harold Sprout became a distinguished

academic at Princeton University. Margaret Sprout became an important partner with her husband, working as a research associate at Princeton, where she was also a senior figure in the League of Women Voters.

Margaret Sprout was a coauthor with Harold Sprout of many books and articles in International Relations. Although she is sometimes known as the "silent" partner, her research and editing was crucial to their joint publications. Since 1972, the International Studies Association has presented the annual Harold and Margaret Sprout Award for the book that makes the most significant contribution to the interdisciplinary study of environmental policymaking.

See also GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS; GREEN THEORY.

STALIN, JOSEF (1878–1953). Josef Vissarionovich Dzhugashvili was born to a poor family in Gori, Georgia, which was part of czarist Russia. His father, who was a cobbler, regularly beat him; his religious mother sent him to study theology at a seminary. He did not complete his studies. Having joined the Russian Social Democratic Party (Marxist) in 1898, he left the seminary in 1899 to take part in the revolutionary movement that was growing in Russia. He adopted the name Stalin, which meant "man of steel." He associated himself with **V. I. Lenin** and Bolshevism in 1904 and was frequently arrested for his revolutionary activities. In 1912–1913, he wrote an acclaimed work on **nationalism**, *Marxism and the National Question*, which steered a path between those **Marxists** who argued that there was no place for nationalism in international socialism and those who saw that socialism needed to be tied to particular nationalities. Stalin argued that a centralized party should represent all the nationalities of the Russian **empire**.

In 1913, Stalin was exiled to Siberia until 1917—the year of the Russian Revolution. Having great organizational skills, Stalin worked his way through the ranks of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, and became general secretary in 1922. From 1924, he formulated and implemented the doctrine of "socialism in one country." Immediate revolution was thereby no longer considered necessary for the survival of the Soviet Union, and international revolution was postponed to a long-term goal. After a **power** struggle in the 1920s, in which he defeated opponents such as Leon Trotsky, he became supreme leader of the Soviet Union in 1929. He devised and implemented a system of communist central planning in order to collectivize and modernize agriculture and industry. This project involved brutal suppression and elimination of opponents and the loss of millions of lives. Trotsky argued that the Soviet Union became a degenerate socialist **state** and he was assassinated by Stalin's agents.

In 1939, Stalin signed a nonaggression pact with **Adolf Hitler** and they agreed to divide Eastern Europe between Germany and the Soviet Union. Hitler's forces broke the pact and invaded the Soviet Union in 1941. Stalin

had ignored advisors who warned that this might happen. Under Stalin's leadership, the Soviet Union went on to play a crucial role alongside the United States, Great Britain, and other allies to defeat Hitler in **World War II**. In 1946, concerned about Stalin's expansionary policies since the end of the **war** the previous year, **Winston Churchill**, who had been the wartime prime minister of Great Britain, declared that an "iron curtain" was falling over Europe. A number of Eastern European countries were turning to communism under pressure from Stalin. The **Cold War** began and was intensified in 1949 when the Soviet Union, still under Stalin's dominant leadership, tested its first atomic bomb. Stalin maintained and dominated his system of totalitarian control and suppression until his death.

See also AGGRESSION; MARX, KARL HEINRICH (1818–1883); NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION (NATO); NUCLEAR WEAPONS; ROOSEVELT, FRANKLIN DELANO (1882–1945).

STATE. The state is the main unit of political and social organization in the contemporary world. Indeed, with the exception of **Antarctica**, the whole world is divided into states. States hold **sovereignty** and are thus traditionally considered to be the most fundamental entities of international relations. The discipline of International Relations (IR) developed around the study of the interactions of such states. The concept of state thus became the key concept of **International Relations theory** and of **foreign policy** analysis.

In order to qualify as a state, the unit usually requires recognition by other states as a legal entity with a territory, a populace, a central administration or government, and a means of enforcing its own laws. The formal rules of conduct that states agree to and acknowledge are codified in **international law**. Such rules are established by means of **diplomacy** between states, the settlement of **wars**, or through **international institutions** and **international organizations**. The **Westphalian system of states** developed as a result of these means. A state is also usually expected to provide some level of **security** for the populace within its territory. This sometimes requires the use of **force**.

States are involved in a range of activities, such as in the **global economy** and **arms control**. The precise nature of these activities is changing in the era of **globalization**. In recent decades, states have also been expected to pay more attention to duties beyond their own borders, especially if **human rights** are being violated or threatened. They sometimes impose **economic sanctions** or withdraw **overseas aid** in such cases. In exceptional cases, some states engage in **humanitarian intervention** when other states violate human rights in their own territory or are unable to prevent such violations. Such intervention is usually expected to have the approval or acquiescence of the **United Nations Security Council**. States are also increasingly expected to be involved in **global environmental politics**.

In both IR theory and foreign policy analysis, **realism** (in its various forms such as **classical realism** and **neorealism**) is the IR theory that places most emphasis on the state. Realism is, indeed, a state-centric theory. It considers international relations to consist primarily of relations of **power** between states. Classical realists argue that in pursuing and hopefully using power, states promote the **national interest**. Liberals, including **liberal internationalists** and **neoliberal institutionalists**, argue that the state has a key role in enabling individual people to cooperate to some degree to enable them to achieve their individual interests. Liberals consider that there is a greater likelihood than realists recognize of states cooperating with one another to facilitate this achievement of individual interests.

In opposition to the mainstream realist and liberal IR theories, Marxists and critical theorists argue that the state pursues particular class interests rather than acting neutrally in terms of individual people. Feminists say that the interests that are pursued by the state are patriarchal ones. According to **feminism**, **Marxism**, and **critical theory**, the state is considered to disguise its bias by portraying its activities in terms of **nationalism**, representing all the people of a nation-state. **Poststructuralism** holds that what are considered to be the roles of states reflect the power and dominance of some people and groups and the marginalization of others as knowledge itself is shaped in the interests of the former. **Social constructivism** suggests that the roles of states are constructed by shared ideas or intersubjective understandings that emerge as social or institutional facts.

See also ALLIANCES; ANARCHY; ARCTIC; ARMS EMBARGO; COLD WAR; CONCERT OF EUROPE; COSMOPOLITANISM; DEBT; ECONOMIC COMMUNITY OF WEST AFRICAN STATES (ECOWAS); ENERGY SECURITY; EUROPEAN UNION (EU); FUNCTIONALISM; GENEVA CONVENTIONS; GREEN THEORY; HEGEMONY; INTERDEPENDENCE; JUST WAR; LEAGUE OF NATIONS; NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION (NATO); ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES (OAS); ORGANIZATION OF PETROLEUM EXPORTING COUNTRIES (OPEC); PEACE; PEACE ENFORCEMENT; PEACEKEEPING; RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT; TOTAL WAR.

STRANGE, SUSAN (1923–1998). Susan Strange was born in Aylesbury, England. Her father was a **World War I** fighter pilot. After graduating with a first-class degree in economics at the London School of Economics (LSE), she worked as a journalist, becoming the youngest ever White House correspondent for the *Observer*. In 1949, she combined her career in journalism with an academic one at University College London. She married but retained the name Strange in professional life. In 1965, she became a research fellow at the Royal Institute of International Affairs, Chatham House, England. The following year she took a research post at the LSE and was pro-

moted to professor of International Relations (IR) in 1978. In 1989, she moved to a professorship in IR at the European University Institute in Florence, and then to one in IR at the University of Warwick from 1993.

Strange pioneered the study of **international political economy** (IPE) in debates at British and American universities. She went on to present one of the most influential and distinctive contributions to IPE, describing this contribution as "new realism." She discussed the sources of **power**, such as those in mainstream **realism**. With her identification of four key structures of power, her work has affinities with **neorealism**, but she also focused on other units in addition to the **state**. According to her, structural power shapes the framework of the global economy within which states and other actors operate and employ that power. In her book *Casino Capitalism* (1986), she argued that in trying to strengthen American capitalism, the United States, which had great structural power, failed to use it and allowed too much power to pass from states to market forces, leading to a lack of order in the financial structure and the inability of states to maintain control. In her book *States and Markets* (1988), she discussed the four key structures. These were: the knowledge structure, which concerns the ability and channels to communicate and influence beliefs; the financial structure, concerned with how credit is created, distributed, and managed or mismanaged; the production structure, which concerns the sources of wealth creation including technologies; and the **security** structure, which is the structure with which conventional realism is also concerned. She argued that through these structures a dangerous gap was opening between the power of the state and that of the market. She wrote three more books before her death by cancer: *Rival States, Rival Firms* (1991); *The Retreat of the State* (1996); and *Mad Money* (1998).

See also COX, ROBERT W. (1926–); ECONOMIC GLOBALIZATION.

STRATEGIC STUDIES. Strategy is about the application of military capability for political ends. Throughout the **Cold War**, strategic studies were a major subfield in the academic discipline of International Relations (IR), particularly in the United States. With its focus on **war**, military **power**, and **state** strategies, it was closely associated with **realism**, and it drew on the work of key military strategists from history such as **Carl von Clausewitz**. Its influence, and indeed the influence of realism more generally, was such that some **critical theorists**, such as those in **peace studies**, argued that strategic studies not only colored the way that decision makers saw the world but also legitimized the use and threat of military **force**. Strategic studies became less prevalent in the post–Cold War era. There has been something of a resurgence, however, in more recent times, particularly since the **attacks on 9/11** and the **wars in Afghanistan** and **Iraq**.

See also CONFLICT ANALYSIS; FEMINISM; NEOREALISM; SECURITY.

SUMMIT. The term *summit* was coined by **Winston Churchill** in 1950 to mean a meeting between the leaders of great powers such as that at **Yalta**—the wartime conference of the Big Three allies, **Franklin Delano Roosevelt**, Churchill, and **Josef Stalin**. Although direct **diplomacy** between such leaders has a long history—the **Concert of Europe** is a 19th-century example—it is only with the ease and speed of travel in the 20th century that it has been feasible for summits to take place with any degree of regularity. During the **Cold War**, the danger of **nuclear proliferation** meant that summitry became a key way to manage the nuclear relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union, and examples include the Geneva Summit in 1955 between President of the United States Dwight D. Eisenhower and Premier of the Soviet Union Nikita Khrushchev. The creation of many new independent **states** as a result of **decolonization**, without the resources required for extensive diplomatic services, further extended the use of diplomacy in summits, both in **regional** organizations and at the **United Nations**. In the contemporary world, much multilateral diplomacy now takes place at a high level of political authority. The original meaning of the term is therefore being eroded to mean any high-level meeting between heads of state, either in a serial forum such as the Commonwealth heads of government meetings, or in ad hoc events such as United Nations environment conferences. Such summits are expensive to hold and police and not necessarily suited to serious negotiation. The evidence of the effectiveness of summitry is mixed and is largely determined by the nature of the summit and the personalities involved. However, summits have symbolic significance and are a way that states can signal their commitment to cooperation on an issue.

See also GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS.

SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT. The standard definition of sustainable development has become that of the United Nations World Commission on Environment and Development, which, in its report *Our Common Future* (1987), stated that it was **economic development** that meets the needs of present generations without sacrificing the ability of future generations to meet their own needs. The commission insisted that humanity had the ability to achieve such development. The commission also stressed that although the concept of sustainable development did imply limits, these were not absolute limits but, rather, linked to environmental resources, which were conditioned by the existing levels of technology and social organization. Those limits were also linked to the ability of the global combination of ecosystems (known as the biosphere) to absorb the effects of human activities. Environmental protection and economic growth did not necessarily rule each other out. Through careful management, economic growth could bring about sustainable development that would meet the needs of all, overcome world **poverty**, and enable humans to have better lives.

In 1992, at its conference on environment and development (known as the Earth Summit) in Rio de Janeiro, the **United Nations** gave its official endorsement to a strategy of sustainable development. It is not, however, implemented forcibly. The concept of sustainable development is criticized by ecologist **Green theory**, which holds that the limits to growth need to be far more restrictive than advocates of such development recognize. The concept is also contested in **global environmental politics** because of differing assumptions of what should be sustained, by whom, and by what methods, procedures, and policies. The **United Nations Environment Programme** seeks to resolve the disagreements and promote implementation.

See also BRUNDTLAND, GRO HARLEM (1939–); SPROUT, HAROLD H. (1901–1980); SPROUT, MARGARET A. (1903–2004).

SYSTEM OF STATES. *See* WESTPHALIAN SYSTEM OF STATES.

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TERRORISM. Examples of terrorist activity can be found very far back in history. In the first century, for example, the Zealots-Sicarii stabbed people in crowds at random in an attempt to destabilize the Roman occupation of Judea. Modern terrorism is seen to start with the invention of dynamite and gelignite toward the end of the 19th century, when terrorist groups could then use explosives to kill indiscriminately. The end of the 19th century saw a spate of terrorist bombings across Europe. Although the term "terrorism" is problematic because its use can be highly subjective, there are certain essential features that link ancient and modern terrorism. Terrorism involves the use of indiscriminate violence to create fear: no one knows who might be the next target and all are left insecure. Terrorism also has a political motive and this distinguishes terrorism from other forms of criminal violence. A simple definition of terrorism, therefore, is the indiscriminate use of terror for political ends.

Terrorism as indiscriminate terror takes place outside the conventional norms of human society. In particular, it violates moral and legal norms long established in **international humanitarian law** that seek to protect noncombatants. Normal moral conduct is therefore given up in pursuit of a political goal, and the ends are seen to justify the means. For the terrorist, indiscriminate acts of violence are justified if they put right a previously done wrong, whether that be the treatment of Arabs by the Jewish **state**, the partition of Ireland, or the stationing of Western troops in Saudi Arabia. This is frequently the way terrorism is justified by its proponents.

Terrorism is played out before an audience whose reaction of fear and terror is the desired result; it is not a coincidence that modern terrorism is seen to start with the mass circulation of newspapers toward the end of the 19th century, which enabled terrorists to reach a large audience. Groups who adopt terrorist tactics use them to gain as much publicity as possible in order to create a climate of fear and insecurity. The **attacks on 9/11** were highly successful in this regard, creating powerful images that changed peoples' perception of the world and instilled a sense of ongoing insecurity.

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Terrorism is often associated with nonstate actors. It is a tactic that has particular appeal to such groups because terrorism is not reliant on large and expensive military resources. Terrorism is therefore an instrument for the use of **force** that is available to the weak for whom conventional **war** is not a viable option. However, to assume that all terrorism is carried out by non-state actors is to disallow, erroneously, the possibility that **states** can also perform terrorist atrocities. Acts of indiscriminate violence for political ends can be perpetrated against innocent people by states also; indeed, states kill far more people than terrorist groups or individuals.

There are various ways in which states are linked with terrorism. Firstly, there are historical examples of states as regimes of terror. The term *terrorism* was originally coined to describe state terror during the revolutionary Jacobin regime in France, which became known as the reign of terror. **Josef Stalin**'s Soviet Union is another example of a terrorist state in which rule was by indiscriminate terror. Secondly, states might also adopt terrorist tactics in their international relations, using indiscriminate terror through air raids or blanket bombing. Some thinkers such as **Michael Walzer**, in his classic book *Just and Unjust Wars*: *A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations*, argue that even acts in war, such as the Allied bombing of Dresden, or the dropping of the atomic bombs are acts of terror because they are indiscriminate and designed to break the will of the people to resist. Finally, states might sponsor terrorist organizations. Iran, for example, supports a range of Palestinian terrorist organizations among others and Libya used to give support to the Irish Republican Army.

Terrorism can be an internal **security** issue. However, since the 1960s, terrorism has become increasingly transnational in nature. Terrorist groups have increasingly worked in transnational networks with terrorist acts being carried out abroad and with terrorist demands involving negotiation with foreign governments. Contemporary forms of International terrorism are seen to have grown out of the movement for Palestinian liberation. Groups such as the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), founded by George Habbash, a Christian Palestinian, wanted not only a Palestinian state but also a **Marxist**-style international revolution in which the new Palestine would be part of the new world order. The Palestinians determined on a tactic that would bring their cause to the world's attention—airplane hijacking—and this particular act has come to epitomize international terrorism; it enabled the Palestinians to carry on their struggle with Israel in the glare of global publicity.

Since the attacks on 9/11, international terrorism has become almost synonymous with Islamic terrorism and in particular with **al-Qaeda**, its affiliated groups, and now also the **Islamic State**. Although Palestinian terrorism had very clear and limited aims, the aims of al-Qaeda are less clear, though they involve the destruction of modern Western civilization and its worship

of false idols, and the imposition of a "pure" Islam and sharia law. Such aims are almost limitless and are matched by a willingness to kill large numbers of innocents. After the 9/11 attacks, the **United Nations Security Council** (UNSC) acted quickly to ensure that all states had an obligation to refrain from providing material support to terrorists. A Counter-Terrorism Committee was set up to ensure compliance with a range of measures around the financing of terrorism, and to encourage the sharing of information and coordination in the counterterrorism effort. Yet despite measures taken not only by the **United Nations** but also a range of other organizations such as the **European Union**, and despite the **war on terror**, which involved sustained international efforts to curb acts of terrorism, terrorism remains very high up the international security agenda. By far the greatest number of victims of contemporary terrorism are innocent civilians living in Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, or other areas of civil conflict. A suicide bombing in Baghdad in July 2016 killed more than 200 people but barely registered in the global media. Terrorist attacks against Westerners by Islamic extremists, in contrast, attract a great deal of attention and sympathy, as witnessed by the attacks in both France and Germany during 2015 and 2016.

See also ARAB–ISRAELI CONFLICT; BIN LADEN, OSAMA BIN MOHAMMED BIN AWAD (1957–2011).

THATCHER, MARGARET HILDA (1925–2013). Margaret Thatcher was born in Grantham, England, to Methodist parents, Alfred and Beatrice Roberts, who ran a grocery business and were active in local politics. She attended a state school before studying chemistry at Somerville College, Oxford University, from 1943 to 1947. She was elected president of the university's Conservative Association. In 1950 and 1951, she ran unsuccessfully in the British parliamentary elections and in 1951 married a businessman, taking the name Thatcher. She trained as a lawyer before winning a seat in Parliament in 1959. She held posts for the Conservative Party in government and opposition, and was promoted to education secretary in the government of 1970–1974. In 1975, she was elected leader of her party, which won the parliamentary elections of 1979, becoming the first woman to be British prime minister. She won two more general elections before resigning as prime minister in 1990, then leaving her parliamentary seat to enter the House of Lords in 1992.

As prime minister, Thatcher sought to restore her country's prominent role in world politics, which had waned since **World War II**. She formed a strong working relationship with President of the United States **Ronald Reagan** in the final decade of the **Cold War** in the 1980s. She supported Reagan's increased expenditure on defense in order to assert U.S. **power** and demonstrate to the Soviet Union the extent of this power. Meanwhile British **sovereignty** over the Falklands Islands was challenged when Argentinean

forces invaded in 1982. Thatcher responded by sending a British task force that defeated the Argentineans. The friendly relationship with the United States that Thatcher was cultivating bore fruit when Reagan declared that Argentina was the **aggressor**. The relationship frosted temporarily in 1983 as U.S. marines invaded Grenada after a coup brought in a new regime that, Reagan believed, could lead to regional instability. Grenada was in the British Commonwealth but the United States acted without British consent. Thatcher opposed the action but was ignored.

Thatcher allowed the United States to station cruise missiles in British bases from 1983 to 1988. In 1986, she allowed the United States to bomb Muammar Gaddafi's Libya using aircraft stationed in Britain. This caused tension with some European leaders who hoped to develop Europe as a counterweight to U.S. power.

Thatcher worried that Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) program, which aimed to make the United States impregnable to nuclear attack by repelling missiles in space, might have meant a reduced U.S. commitment to the **North Atlantic Treaty Organization** (NATO). In 1984, Thatcher argued that SDI should operate alongside nuclear **deterrence**, not as a replacement for it. She gained Reagan's agreement to this and ensured that British firms were the first in NATO to participate in SDI research and development contracts. The project was not implemented.

After meeting the new leader of the Soviet Union **Mikhail Gorbachev** in 1984, Thatcher described him as a man she could do business with. Gorbachev was actively seeking to reform his country both in domestic terms and in **foreign policy**. While still taking a hostile stance against communism, she helped Reagan in the **diplomacy** that led to his **summits** with Gorbachev, which in turn led to substantial deals to prevent further nuclear proliferation and also the Soviet withdrawal from its **war** in **Afghanistan**.

Thatcher was skeptical about increasing European integration in the European Communities. This led to bitter disagreements with senior members of her government and the resignation of the foreign secretary, Sir Geoffrey Howe, in November 1990. This brought about a challenge to her leadership, which led to her resignation as prime minister later that month.

See also ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT; BRITISH HEGEMONY; EUROPEAN UNION (EU); NUCLEAR WEAPONS; WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION.

THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS. *See* INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY.

THIRD WORLD. The term *third world* was coined in the **Cold War** when there was a clearer division of the world into three distinct blocs. The first world was the **liberal democratic** states of **the West**; the second world was the Soviet Union and its allies, which constituted the socialist, or Eastern bloc; and the third world comprised those **states** that were neither in the East nor the West. With a few exceptions such as Thailand and Ethiopia, third-world states were former colonies, and during the Cold War were emerging out of **empire**. In a world dominated by East–West confrontation, third-world states organized themselves as a means to protect their political independence and **sovereignty**. Indeed, the period of the Cold War is one of third-world organization and the development of a third-world identity, essential to which was the setting up of a collective voice in the **Non-Aligned Movement**. Third-world states also effectively used the **United Nations** (UN) and its specialist agencies to promote their interests and to challenge the dominance of Western powers, particularly in the **United Nations Conference on Trade and Development** (UNCTAD).

In the post–Cold War world, the term *third world* has taken on economic connotations and is now understood as meaning those parts of the world still struggling with **poverty**, tyranny, and **war**. The term, however, is problematic because of the **economic development** of the oil-rich states of the Middle East, the newly industrializing countries of East Asia, and more recently of the BRICS countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa), which has diminished the coherence of the third world. For this reason, the terms "developing world" or "the South" are now more commonly used, though these two are not without their difficulties. It is not clear, for example, when a state ceases to be "developing," not least because all states seek continual growth and development. Australia, furthermore, is geographically in the south but not generally included in the term. Despite the huge disparities in wealth, most developing world states share the experience of **colonialism** and some residual, shared, third-world identity and sense of common interest still remains.

See also DEBT; DEPENDENCY; ECONOMIC GLOBALIZATION; NEW INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER.

THUCYDIDES (c. 460–400 BCE). Thucydides was born into an important aristocratic family in fifth-century BCE Athens. His exact dates of birth and death are disputed and little is known for certain of his life other than that he was a military general who was exiled for 20 years because of a failed campaign that he led, that he was influential in Athenian politics, and that he held rights to gold mines. He is significant in modern and contemporary International Relations (IR) because his analysis of relations between city-**states** bears significant affinities to 20th-century **realism**. Hence, realists are able to claim historical evidence for their theories.

Thucydides's analysis is to be found in his *History of the Peloponnesian War*, which he began to write in 431 BCE but did not finish. The **war**, waged between Athens and its **empire** on one side and the Peloponnesian League lead by Sparta on the other side, began in 431 BCE and ended in 404 BCE, a few years before Thucydides's death. He considered self-interest and fear as driving forces in war and politics, and argued that this extended into relations between city-states, making war inevitable. It was, he wrote in an often-quoted sentence, "the rise of Athens and the fear that this inspired in Sparta that made war inevitable." In reference to this explanation, IR scholars and strategists today sometimes use the term "Thucydides trap" to describe cases in which a rising powerful state provokes sufficient fear in an existing **hegemonic** state to lead to war between them. When the **balance of power** shifted, he argued, the states that previously held **power** sought new allies, leading the opposing states to in turn seek to enhance their power.

Thucydides noted that **arms races** sometimes developed, leading to what are now known as **security** dilemmas. History showed that war was always likely to break out as **diplomacy** failed. "The Melian Dialogue" is a classic example in the book. In negotiations with the leaders of Melos, the Athenians demanded surrender, warned that this was the only way the Melians could save themselves, and made clear they were not interested in justice. He saw the rule of the strong over the weak as natural: "The strong do what they have the power to do, and the weak accept what they have to accept." The Melians did not surrender and were crushed by Athens.

See also ALLIANCES; GLOBAL POWER SHIFTS; MACHIAVELLI, NICCOLÒ (1469–1527); MORGENTHAU, HANS JOACHIM (1904–1980).

TICKNER, JUDITH ANN (1937–). J. Ann Tickner was born in London. In childhood during **World War II**, she gained firsthand experience of the effects of **war** on ordinary people's lives, which are among the key concerns of **feminist** studies of war and conflict. In 1951, her father was invited to work for the secretariat of the **United Nations**, and so her parents went to live in the United States. By this time, she had begun her education at an English boarding school, which she continued. She took her BA in history at the University of London, graduating in 1959, and gained her MA in International Relations (IR) at Yale University in 1960. In the 1960s and 1970s, she held research posts at Yale and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology before taking her PhD in political science at Brandeis University, which she gained in 1983. She taught at the College of the Holy Cross in Worcester, Massachusetts, before becoming an associate professor, then professor, then emeritus professor at the University of Southern California.

During her academic career, Tickner became one of the pioneers, along with several others including **Cynthia Enloe**, of feminist studies in IR. Tickner is widely considered one of the key thinkers of contemporary IR. Her book *Gendering World Politics: Issues and Approaches in the Post–Cold War Era* (2001) was particularly well acclaimed, and her other books include *Gender in International Relations: Feminist Perspectives on Achieving Global Security* (1992). A number of her articles in academic journals are also considered to be important contributions to IR. Her analysis of the thought of **Hans J. Morgenthau** in "Hans Morgenthau's Principles of Political Realism: A Feminist Reformulation" (1988), showed how the concept of **power** that is central to **realism** is based on masculine norms. By shaping the ways in which IR was taught, she insisted, authors such as Morgenthau contributed to the problem of exclusion and restriction of women from important roles in international politics, **diplomacy**, and **security**. This article was included in a collection of her writings that she published in the book *A Feminist Voyage through International Relations* in 2014.

See also INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY.

TORTURE. Torture is seen as a crime against human dignity and autonomy; it is a violation against the human person. Protection against torture is therefore a key **human right**. Human rights protect individuals from the argument that an immoral act is justified against a person or group of persons if it serves a greater good such as national **security**. This absolutist position on torture is written into **international law** and the prohibition against torture is one of the strongest and most widely asserted norms in international relations. It is outlawed many times over by a range of international instruments on human rights, including the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights; the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT); and all the regional instruments. It is also prohibited by the **Geneva Convention** of 1949 for use against any party to an armed conflict. None of the treaties that prohibit torture allow for any exceptions, even in times of **war** or when the very life of the **state** is at stake.

In the CAT, torture is defined as "any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining from him or a third person information or a confession, punishing him for an act he or a third person has committed or is suspected of having committed, or intimidating or coercing him or a third person, or for any reason based on discrimination of any kind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity." The lack of clarity on what is meant by "severe pain or suffering" has left room for disagreement over whether practices such as waterboarding and other "en-

hanced interrogation techniques" actually constitute torture. The question has arisen in the context of the **war on terror** and relates specifically to the question of whether the United States was in violation of global norms in its treatment of prisoners held in Guantanamo Bay.

The CAT creates a universal jurisdiction. This has been reinforced by Article 7 of the **International Criminal Court**, which makes torture an international crime. This means that a state that is party to the convention has an obligation to either extradite or try a person who is accused of torture whatever their nationality might be and wherever the torture was supposed to have taken place. There have been a few cases conducted on the authority of the CAT, including that of the former president of Chile, Augusto Pinochet. During his regime, terrible acts of torture, murder, and disappearance were committed against the people of Chile. In 1993, a Spanish judge ordered Pinochet's arrest for crimes committed mostly in Chile and mostly against Chileans. The Spanish judge used the principle of **universal jurisdiction**. Pinochet, who was in London at the time, was arrested by Scotland Yard on a Spanish warrant. Great Britain's highest court at the time, the House of Lords, ruled that under the convention Pinochet could be extradited to Spain, though his poor health prevented the extradition being carried out. In 2008, Charles "Chuckie" Taylor, the son of Charles Taylor, president of Liberia from 1997 to 2003, was convicted in the United States for torture carried out in Liberia. In 2016, the former president of Chad, Hissène Habré, was tried for his crimes under the convention in a special court in Senegal and found guilty. Such cases are seen as major steps forward in **international law** against torture and in the development of an international criminal law. They set a precedent that many former victims of torture and **international non-governmental organizations** are keen to use, threatening the inviolability that those committing torture have so often enjoyed.

See also INTERNATIONALLY PROTECTED HUMAN RIGHTS.

TOTAL WAR. A **war** is considered to be total when it is unrestricted according to one or more of the following criteria: the weapons used, the territory on which it takes place, the people who become combatants, and the objectives that are sought. The latter criterion is often considered to mean that total victory is required, whatever the means or costs. The term "total war" is also used to refer to wars that require significant commitment and loss of life by a civilian populace. The more of these criteria that are satisfied, the more appropriate is the use of the term "total war." The major industrialized wars of the 20th century, especially **World War I** (WWI) and **World War II**, are usually considered as prime examples as they fulfill all the ways in which war is considered total. Entire populations and economies were mobilized in the world wars and the numbers of civilian casualties were huge.

Early 19th-century military strategist **Carl von Clausewitz** rejected the limited objectives of wars of the previous century. He argued in *On War* (*Vom Kriege*) (1832) that an opponent's forces should be fully crushed, which can be seen as an argument that victory should be total. The German general Erich Ludendorff, who was his country's foremost strategist in WWI, wrote the book *The "Total" War* (*Der totale Krieg*) (1935), the title referring to his country's effort in that war. The political and military leaders of North Vietnam considered the **Vietnam War** against the United States in the 1960s and 1970s as total war. Indeed, the whole populace was mobilized and total victory was the goal at any cost, leading to huge sacrifice of civilian life. Total war can be contrasted with limited war, which was far more common before and after the 20th century. In such wars, goals are limited, as are the combatants, and there is a significant effort to limit civilian casualties.

See also AGGRESSION; FORCE.

TRADE. States in the contemporary world are increasingly interlinked through trade in what is now a truly global trading system. Trade is the key way in which the people of the world are also interconnected. A close examination of the contents of an average supermarket shopping cart, for example, will reveal the extent and complexity of the trading relations that enable a varied diet and substantial consumer choice. Most domestic items—cars, computers, mobile phones, and textiles—will similarly reveal the extent to which modern lifestyles are dependent on global trade. Yet in the early history of the **system of states** starting with the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648, European monarchs tried to protect themselves from what they saw as the harmful effects of trade. Political **power** was believed to be directly proportional to economic wealth in a zero-sum world: any increase in a monarch's wealth was therefore assumed to mean a corresponding decrease in the power of another. This mercantilist view led to a policy of exporting more and importing less in an attempt to accumulate wealth that could then fund national armies and overseas conquest. Mercantilism is particularly associated with the absolute monarchs of 18th-century Europe and with the consolidation of the modern state. The practice and beliefs that underpinned it, however, were challenged by early **liberal** writers such as **Adam Smith**. In *The Wealth of Nations* (1776), Smith mounted a robust critique of mercantilism, arguing that policies of protectionism and intervention were actually undermining the interests of the state. He set out to develop an entirely new approach to political economy, showing that the wealth of a nation lies not in its reserves of gold and silver but in its production and economic growth. This growth was best achieved through the operation of a free market with as little intervention from the state as possible; free trade could enhance the wealth of all nations in a system of mutual gain. By the latter half of the 19th century, those same European states who had previously shunned trade were

now trading more and more intensely with each other as well as connecting with other parts of the world, largely through imperial trade in the period of European **empire**.

A policy of free trade underpinned British **power** during the 19th century but this first great era of global trade was brought to a halt by **World War I**. The return to economic prosperity after the war was aborted by the **Great Depression** of 1929–1933, during which major economies adopted protectionist policies and there was a sharp and sustained contraction of global trade. After **World War II**, hopes for an open, liberal trading regime were institutionalized at **Bretton Woods** and a global system was achieved at the end of the **Cold War**. Free trade remains a fundamental principle of the global economy to this day. The **World Trade Organization** has the primary global responsibility for promoting free trade, though there has also been a proliferation of free trade agreements (FTAs) between two or more states, all serving to reduce tariffs, taxes, and other barriers to trade. A bilateral FTA, such as the one between the United States and Jordan, can increase trade significantly between the two states and can also serve other political or strategic interests. Regional FTAs, such as the **North American Free Trade Agreement** or the European Free Trade Agreement, also create preferential treatment for member-states. This, however, is at the expense of nonmember states and possibly also an impediment to global free trade. Nevertheless, global trade has grown rapidly over the past few decades and all states now engage in trade to one extent or another. The most rapid rise in trade has not been between the traditional triad of dominant markets in North America, Western Europe, and Japan/Australia but in emerging markets, particularly China. China now has the second-largest levels of trade in the world. "Made in China" is a familiar label on clothes and toys and China has moved into more high-technology industries as well. China's trade with developing states such as Brazil has led to important levels of growth.

There are different theoretical traditions of trade. For liberals, trade is a human good that is essential for economic development and prosperity. Trade is mutually beneficial and the cooperation required for successful trade relations enhances stable and cooperative international relations more generally. Trade, indeed, can be a **force** for **peace**, as the disruption of trade relationships and the prosperity they produce is a disincentive for **war**. Liberalism is embedded in the contemporary trade system. Structuralists, however, are more conscious of trade relations as unequal and as promoting **hegemonic** interests. They point out that structures of global trade were put in place in the era of **colonialism** and still operate to the advantage of the former colonial powers. Less-developed states tend to export raw materials or low-technology manufactured goods, while more-advanced economies export higher-value goods and services. By so doing, advanced states continuously have a trade surplus with their poorer partners, leading, according to structuralists

such as **Immanuel Wallerstein** and **André Gunder Frank**, to the underdevelopment of the **third world**. The differences between liberal and structuralist views is also well illustrated by the debate on **transnational corporations** through which around 50 percent of the global trade in the modern world is conducted.

See also ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT; ECONOMIC GLOBALIZATION; LIBERAL PEACE; POSTCOLONIAL RELATIONS.

TRANSNATIONAL ADVOCACY NETWORKS. *See* INTERNATIONAL NONGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS.

TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATION. Also known as a multinational corporation, a transnational corporation (TNC) is an enterprise that owns production, distribution, and marketing facilities in at least two countries. TNCs are one of the main drivers of **globalization** because they manufacture and distribute products across **state** borders. They also spread tastes and ideas around the world, bringing about change in **cultures**. TNCs from the United States such as Coca-Cola, McDonald's, and Microsoft have been important agents of the Americanization of global culture and U.S. **soft power**. As such, TNCs provoke strong reactions both positive and negative. On the positive side, **liberal** economists see TNCs, along with international banks, as key engines of growth in the global economy, stimulating employment, skills, technology, capital, and competition. Critics, by contrast, view TNCS as exploitative, creating relationships of **dependency**. In the 1970s, developing countries pressured the **United Nations** (UN) in 1974 to set up a Commission on Transnational Corporations with a mandate to develop a code of conduct to regulate their behavior. The fact that developed states would not support this initiative reinforced the idea that TNCs supported the interests of a northern capitalist elite. In 2014, the 25 biggest nonfinancial TNCs in terms of their foreign assets were all from Europe, the United States, or Japan.

With many TNCs being richer even than some medium-sized states and wielding huge economic power, TNCs are increasingly important actors in international relations. Concerns about their power, particularly over less-developed states, and the difficulties with holding them to account for their actions persist. This is particularly the case on issues such as the environment and **human rights**. In a world in which these corporations can have a serious impact on the ability of people across the globe to realize their rights, it is a cause for concern that TNCs are not restrained by international human rights law; for example, the only human rights instrument that explicitly addresses TNCs is the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW). Furthermore, concerns are raised when TNCs

operate within the borders of repressive states in case they become complicit in supporting regimes that violate rights. **Global governance**, however, is emerging in this area as a result of civil society pressure and the leadership of the United Nations. In June 2011, the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights were proposed by UN special representative on business and human rights John Ruggie, and endorsed by the UN Human Rights Council (UNHRC). In the same resolution, the UNHRC established the UN Working Group on Business and Human Rights.

See also ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT; GLOBAL ENVIRONMEN-TAL POLITICS; INTERNATIONALLY PROTECTED HUMAN RIGHTS; NEW INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER; SUSTAINABLE DE-VELOPMENT; TRADE; UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT (UNCTAD).

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UNITED NATIONS (UN). The United Nations (UN) was established on 24 October 1945. Its headquarters have been in New York since October 1949. The UN is an **international organization**. More specifically, it is an intergovernmental organization (IGO). As it is not restricted to a region or type of **state**, it is sometimes known as a universal IGO. It was formed with the aim of correcting and avoiding the problems of the **League of Nations**, which had failed to prevent **World War II**.

The planning process leading to the founding of the UN began during that war with a primary purpose: to promote **peace** and international **security**. In August 1941, on a ship somewhere in the Atlantic Ocean, President of the United States **Franklin Delano Roosevelt** and the prime minister of Great Britain, **Winston Churchill**, signed the **Atlantic Charter**, which proposed a set of principles for international cooperation with the aim of maintaining peace and security. The Dumbarton Oaks Proposals (named after the mansion in Washington, D.C., where the proposals were debated and agreed upon) were published in 1944 by representatives of the United States, Great Britain, the Soviet Union, and the Republic of China, setting the groundwork for the UN. Roosevelt met with Churchill and Soviet leader **Josef Stalin** at Yalta in the Crimea and subsequently declared that they would work to establish "a general international organization to maintain peace and security." The UN Charter was drawn up at the San Francisco Conference of April 1945 attended by delegates from 50 states. The charter was signed and ratified in 1945. Each state that joins the UN must agree to accept the obligations of its charter, which sets out the basic principles for international relations. In its attempt to maintain peace and security and foster cooperation in solving international problems, the UN Charter includes an uneasy combination of respecting state **sovereignty** while also promoting **human rights**.

The original UN Charter was signed by 51 states: the 50 represented at San Francisco plus Poland. After the Chinese revolution that brought **Mao Zedong** and the Communist Party to power on the mainland in 1949, the Chinese seat at the UN was held by the Republic of China, which was restricted to Taiwan until 1971 when it was taken by the People's Republic of China.

Membership of the UN grew quickly in the late 1950s and early 1960s as a result of **decolonization** as newly independent states joined (including 23 in 1960). Another wave joined after the **Cold War** (including 12 in 1992). There are now 193 member-states, the last to join being South Sudan in 2011.

The UN is a system comprising a complex set of parts. There are interactions between the parts, including the member-states, and rules and decisions emerge from them. The UN system involves a network of overlapping institutions in the UN that includes six principle organs. These are the **United Nations General Assembly**, the **United Nations Security Council**, the **International Court of Justice**, the **United Nations Economic and Social Council**, and the **United Nations Trusteeship Council**, all of which are supported by the sixth organ, the Secretariat. The Secretariat does substantive research and administrative work. Led by the **United Nations secretary-general**, it is directed by the Security Council, General Assembly, and other organs. The UN system also includes specialized agencies and trusts, and funds programs such as the **United Nations Development Programme** (UNDP) and the **United Nations Children's Fund** (UNICEF).

The cornerstone of the UN's policy is the maintenance of peace and security. Under the principle of **collective security**, the UN asks that each state take responsibility for the security of all other states. In other words, an attack against one is an attack against all and joint action is to be taken against all aggressors. The only two examples of the UN providing a military force (consisting of forces from member countries) in a **peace enforcement** action were the Korean War that began in 1950 and the **first Gulf War** (1990–1991) to remove Iraq from Kuwait.

Peacekeeping operations are not in the UN charter but became a practical way of promoting international peace and security. The principles are different from those of collective security, which was the aim of the League of Nations. Peacekeeping is not about checking **aggression** through collective enforcement but about noncoercion in support of the reestablishment of peaceful international dialogue. The first UN peacekeeping mission began in the Middle East in 1948 and is still ongoing. By October 2014, there had been 69 missions. In October 2014, there were 122,729 personnel, including 103,661 uniformed personnel from 128 countries in 16 ongoing peacekeeping operations. There has also been a new type of mission: **humanitarian intervention**. The UN adopted a new interpretation of sovereignty in 2005 based on the doctrine of the **responsibility to protect** but has been criticized for diluting that principle.

Although Palestine is not recognized internationally as a state, in September 2011 Palestinian president Mahmoud Abbas applied for full UN membership. UN structures and processes presented problems for this application

and the bid eventually failed due to lack of support in the Security Council. In November 2012, the General Assembly voted to give the Palestinians the status of nonmember observer state.

See also ARAB–ISRAELI CONFLICT; NOBEL PEACE PRIZE; UNITED NATIONS SECRETARIES-GENERAL; WORLD FOOD PROGRAMME (WFP).

UNITED NATIONS CHILDREN'S FUND (UNICEF). Established by the **United Nations General Assembly** (UNGA) in 1946, UNICEF is a **United Nations** (UN) fund, located within the **United Nations Economic and Social Council** (ECOSOC) and designed to give humanitarian and developmental assistance to children and mothers. Its headquarters are in New York and its original name was the United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund, but this was shortened in 1953 to United Nations Children's Fund though the original acronym was maintained. Since the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child came into force on 2 September 1990, UNICEF has worked toward the universal realization of the rights of children as set out in the convention and has also focused on the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals. UNICEF has programs in over 190 countries and aims to ensure that all children can get the best start in life despite the obstacles of **poverty**, **war**, disease, and discrimination. It was awarded the **Nobel Peace Prize** in 1965. UNICEF's logo has become well known around the world since it has been worn on the shirts of FC Barcelona players in a sponsorship deal worth €1.5 million a year to UNICEF for a five-year period.

See also INTERNATIONALLY PROTECTED HUMAN RIGHTS.

UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT (UNCTAD). The **United Nations** (UN) body that is responsible for dealing with issues of **economic development**, particularly in relation to international **trade**, is the UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). Concerns in the 1960s about unequal relations of trade and the applicability of Western liberal economic thinking to **third-world** countries, led to calls for a conference on trade and **economic development**. The first conference was held in Geneva in 1964 and the process was subsequently institutionalized. **Raúl Prebisch**, a leading advocate of major reform of the international trading system, was UNCTAD's first secretary-general. A few months later, a group of 77 newly independent states formed the Group of 77 (G-77). The group's key aim was to draw on the unity of the South to challenge a global economy seen to serve the interests of developed **states**. UNCTAD was a key forum for this challenge during the 1970s. The G-77, for example, was able to use UNCTAD to secure the Declaration for a **New International Economic Order** (NIEO). This was a demand for reform of

the international economic system. It sought reform of international trade—in particular, the stabilization of commodity prices, the regulation of **transnational corporations**, better technology transfer from developed to developing areas, and an increase in the amount and effectiveness of **aid**. Some concessions were won. It was within UNCTAD, for example, that the target was set of 0.7 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) to be given as official foreign aid by developed countries to the poorest countries, though this remains largely unfulfilled. On many other issues, developed states refused to negotiate. Disunity within the South, the **debt** crisis of the 1980s, and the emergence of neoliberal economic policies with the election of President **Ronald Reagan** in the United States and Prime Minister **Margaret Thatcher** in Great Britain undermined the South's influence and signaled a failure of G-77's challenge to Western liberal ideology. The failure indicated that even working together, developing states could not match the power of the developed states.

UNCTAD's role is now largely to assist developing countries in their efforts to integrate more successfully into the system of global trade. UNCTAD has also turned its attention to the dangers for developing countries of financial crises and has promoted a more development-oriented international financial architecture. In 2000, it adopted "The Spirit of Bangkok" declaration, which sets out UNCTAD's strategy to address the development agenda in the era of **globalization**. It calls for a differentiated approach to development that links trade, investment, technology, and enterprise development. UNCTAD continues its work assisting developing countries in trade negotiations, on investment issues, debt management, entrepreneurship, and a range of other issues essential to the integration of developing countries into a complex international economic environment. The membership of the G-77 has grown to over 130 states who work together in a loose coalition to secure their collective economic interests.

UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME (UNDP). Established in 1965 within the **United Nations Economic and Social Council** (ECOSOC), the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) is the United Nations' (UN) **economic development** network. It has offices in 177 countries and works with governments and local communities to promote human development. It has a focus on five key developmental challenges: **democratic** governance, **poverty** reduction, crisis prevention and reduction, environment and **energy security**, and HIV/AIDS. Since 1990, it has produced Human Development Reports for individual countries and regions as well as an annual Human Development Report that includes the Human Development Index. This index was designed to move the focus of development away from national income to a people-centered approach that measures well-being. It was based on a composite statistic of life expectancy,

education, and income indexes used to rank countries and devised by two economists, **Amartya Sen** from India and Mahbub ul Haq from Pakistan. Since 2010, a new method has been used that combines the three dimensions of life expectancy, expected years of schooling, and gross national income per capita.

See also UNITED NATIONS (UN).

UNITED NATIONS ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COUNCIL (ECO-SOC). The Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) is the principle organ of the **United Nations** (UN) charged with addressing international social and economic issues. Its purposes are wide ranging and complex, and it accounts for about 70 percent of UN budget and personnel. It works under authority of the **UN General Assembly** (UNGA) and consults with **international non-governmental organizations** (INGOs). Indeed, the term *NGO* was first formalized within the UN Charter, which provides ECOSOC with the **power** to "make suitable arrangements for consultation with non-governmental organizations which are concerned with matters within its competence."

Along with the UNGA, the ECOSOC also oversees activities of specialized agencies, programs, and funds. The **United Nations Development Programme** and the **United Nations Children's Fund**, for example, report to both the UNGA and to ECOSOC. The coordination of activities between all these various groupings has proved difficult, and its joint responsibilities with UNGA have added to the complexity. ECOSOC's largest area of responsibility is **economic development**, though the environment is increasingly important, and ECOSOC has played a historically significant role in the establishment of **internationally protected human rights**. ECOSOC was the key agency due to its authority over the Human Rights Commission, which drew up the UN Declaration on Human Rights under the leadership of Eleanor Roosevelt.

See also GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS.

UNITED NATIONS EDUCATIONAL, SCIENTIFIC AND CULTURAL ORGANIZATION (UNESCO). As a specialized agency of the **United Nations** (UN), the aim of the UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) is to promote **peace** "on the basis of humanity's moral and intellectual solidarity." It was established in 1945 with the aim of promoting education, intercultural understanding, scientific cooperation, and freedom of expression as a necessary condition for **democracy**. These principles are still essential to its mission and to its overall goal of supporting **sustainable development** through the **power** of human intelligence and "building peace in the minds of men and women." It is known as the intellectual agency of the United Nations and is the coordinating agency for the

World Education Forum, which is committed to education for all. UNESCO also plays a key role in the preservation of the world's heritage and in the **global governance** of climate change. Irina Bokova, the director-general of UNESCO, rose to global prominence in 2015 with her strong condemnation of the destruction of cultural and heritage sites by the **Islamic State** (IS). She has described their acts of destruction as attempts "to erase cultural identities." IS's destruction of parts of Palmyra in Syria, a UNESCO World Heritage site, prompted international outrage. In February 2016, the **United Nations Security Council** passed a resolution that introduced measures to curb the trafficking of cultural objects from Iraq and Syria, the sale of which contributes to the funding of IS operations.

   See also CULTURE; GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS.

UNITED NATIONS ENVIRONMENT PROGRAMME (UNEP). Established in 1972 the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) is an agency of the **United Nations** (UN). It was set up as a result of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment and is headquartered in Nairobi, Kenya. Its role is to set the global environmental agenda and coordinate the UN's environmental activities. UNEP has played an important role in promoting environmental governance with its most notable success being the 1987 Montreal Protocol to protect the ozone layer. In 1988, it set up the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) that brings together climate scientists from around the world in three working groups on climate change: climate science, impact, and economic and social dimensions. Reports of the IPCC are considered by many to be authoritative scientific assessments on climate change. The IPCC has so far produced five assessment reports. The fourth (AR4), published in 2007, warned that "warming of the climate system is unequivocal" and "is very likely due to the observed increase in anthropogenic greenhouse gas concentrations," with "very likely" meaning with more than 90 percent certainty. Alongside the **United Nations Development Programme** and the **World Bank** the UNEP set up the Global Environmental Facility (GEF) in 1991 to fund environmental programs in the developing world.

   See also GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS; GLOBAL GOVERNANCE; GREEN THEORY.

UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY (UNGA). One of the five principle organs of the **United Nations** (UN), the General Assembly (UNGA) includes all UN member-**states**. This assembly sets standards, codifies **international law**, and meets to consider pressing problems in the world. Each member-state has one vote. A two-thirds majority is required on issues of international **peace** and **security**, admission of new members, and

the UN budget. A simple majority is required on other issues for a resolution to pass. Decisions are only recommendations except on the budget and therefore do not have the status of international law. A UNGA resolution can, however, have significant moral weight. The first resolution of the UNGA came in 1946, with the aims of eliminating **nuclear weapons** and other **weapons of mass destruction**. These aims were not achieved. In December 1948, the General Assembly adopted the **Universal Declaration of Human Rights**. In 1971, the communist People's Republic of China had gained sufficient international support for the General Assembly to vote for it to take Taiwan's place as the Chinese state in the United Nations. Taiwan was expelled.

Much of the UNGA's work is done in six committees of the whole membership with responsibilities for disarmament; economic affairs; social, humanitarian, and cultural affairs; political affairs and **decolonization**; administrative and budgetary issues; and legal affairs. There is also a large number of ad hoc and standing committees, so what takes place in the formal plenary sessions of the UNGA is only the tip of the iceberg of a much larger and more complex set of negotiations and activities. A coalition of **third-world** states holds a majority in the UNGA and has successfully used that majority to control it. It is valued by those states as the most genuinely inclusive intergovernmental forum, and many would like to see the UNGA gain more power relative to the **United Nations Security Council** so that it can better perform its key role as the primary global deliberative body. Some would also like UNGA resolutions to be legally binding. This would represent a significant **global power shift** and so it is unlikely to be agreed upon.

Although the UNGA is primarily a deliberative body, it does also have a role in the management of operational activities. It is, for example, responsible for the supervision of the UN's specialized agencies. Examples are **World Health Organization** (WHO) and **International Labour Organization** (ILO). Programs and funds are also subject to UNGA supervision. Examples are the **United Nations Children's Fund** (UNICEF) and **United Nations Development Programme** (UNDP).

See also INTERNATIONALLY PROTECTED HUMAN RIGHTS.

UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES (UNHCR). *See* UNITED NATIONS REFUGEE AGENCY.

UNITED NATIONS REFUGEE AGENCY. Set up in 1950 by the General Assembly of the **United Nations** (UN), the United Nations Refugee Agency, headed by the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), leads and coordinates efforts to protect refugees. It had an original mandate of just three years to help those displaced by **World War II**, but that work was

never completed because new crises displaced more people around the world. Its aim is to ensure that the right to asylum is granted to those who seek it and that help is available for refugees who want to return home. The office is estimated to have helped tens of millions of refugees rebuild their lives around the world. It also has a responsibility to help stateless people. It has won the **Nobel Peace Prize** twice, in 1954 and 1981. Most recently, it has played an essential role helping millions of people displaced by the Syrian civil **war** and is also dealing with emergencies in South Sudan, the Central African Republic, and Iraq.

See also GLOBAL GOVERNANCE; MIGRATION.

UNITED NATIONS SECRETARIES-GENERAL. Under the **United Nations (UN)** Charter, the **United Nations General Assembly** appoints a secretary-general as the chief administrator and **diplomat**, upon the recommendation of the **United Nations Security Council**. The first secretary-general was Trygve Lie of Norway, who took office in February 1946 and resigned in 1952. Since then the secretaries-general have been Dag Hammarskjöld of Sweden (1953–1961), U Thant of Myanmar (Burma) (1961–1971), Kurt Waldheim of Austria (1972–1981), Javier Perez de Cuellar of Peru (1982–1991), Boutros Boutros-Ghali of Egypt (1992–1996), Kofi A. Annan of Ghana (1997–2006), and Ban Ki-moon of South Korea (2007–2016). The secretary-general is an important world figure. Since 1945 successive UN secretaries-general have developed a more political role, pushing the boundaries of their office, initiating key policies such as United Nations **peacekeeping**, as well as acting as a neutral channel of communication in international **diplomacy**. The activism of Kofi Annan won him the **Nobel Peace Prize** in 2001. He played a key role in the initiative to secure the Millennium Development Goals, for example.

UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL (UNSC). One of the five principle organs of the **United Nations** (UN), the UN Security Council (UNSC) has primary responsibility for promoting international **peace** and **security**. It has 15 members including the permanent five (P5). The P5 are the United States, Russia, France, Britain, and China, the key powers at the end of **World War II** when the UN was established. Taiwan held the Chinese seat until 1971 when it was replaced by the People's Republic of China. Ten nonpermanent members are elected by the **General Assembly** and serve for two years. A decision of the UNSC requires a majority of nine, including all five permanent members. The P5 therefore have the power of veto over all UN actions, reflecting the reality that the UN cannot take enforcement action against its most powerful members. Concern over the outdated composition of the UNSC is at the heart of calls for reform of the UN.

The UNSC is at the heart of the global security system and is authorized by the UN Charter to take enforcement measures to uphold peace and security. During the period of the **Cold War**, the UNSC was hampered by the superpower veto and the only **peace enforcement** action taken was in Korea starting in 1950. This was only possible due to a Soviet boycott of the UNSC. Since the end of the Cold War, the UNSC has taken on a much more active role, with the **first Gulf War** (1990–1991) seen as an indication of a reinvigorated organization. It also took the key initiative of first establishing ad hoc **war crimes tribunals** in the **former Yugoslavia**, Rwanda, and Sierra Leone, and then setting up the **International Criminal Court** to which the UNSC can refer cases. The veto, however, has remained an obstacle to decisive UNSC action; on key issues such as Kosovo and Darfur, the veto has impeded UN action. The UN's ability to respond to crises is also affected by the lack of its own military **force** and long-standing proposals for a UN rapid reaction force have not yet been agreed upon. Consequently, it is increasingly regional organizations that take a security lead, in particular, the **North Atlantic Treaty Organization** (NATO).

UNITED NATIONS TRUSTEESHIP COUNCIL. One of the principle organs of the **United Nations** (UN), the Trusteeship Council was set up to oversee the transition of trust territories to independence. The trusteeship system was similar to the mandate system of the **League of Nations**: both were premised on the principle that after a **war** the colonies of defeated **states** should not be claimed by the victors but should be administered by a trust country under the supervision of the international community, until independence. Former colonies therefore became trust territories. In 1945, all the League of Nations mandates became trust territories except South West Africa (now Namibia). The operations of the council were suspended in 1984 on the independence of Palau, as its work was then complete. It can be reconvened, however, and it has been proposed that the council take on new responsibilities such as the oversight of the global commons.

UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS. *See* INTERNATIONALLY PROTECTED HUMAN RIGHTS.

UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION. Under universal jurisdiction all states have the jurisdiction to try particular offenses. **Piracy**, for example, has been subject to universal jurisdiction for many centuries. Universal jurisdiction is established in certain international treaties, including the **Geneva Conventions**, the **Genocide** Convention, and the Convention against **Torture**. **State** parties to these treaties have an obligation to either extradite or try a person who is accused of violations of these conventions whatever his/her national-

ity might be and wherever the crime took place. Perhaps the most famous **war crimes** trial prosecuted within a state on the basis of universal jurisdiction was the trial in 1961 of Adolf Eichmann. Eichmann had been head of the Jewish Office of the German Gestapo during **World War II** and was tried in Israel after he had been seized in Argentina by Israeli **security** forces for his part in transporting Jews to Nazi concentration camps. He was found guilty and hanged. In recent cases, such as that of General Pinochet, former president of Chile, and Hissène Habré, former president of Chad, universal jurisdiction has been established on the basis of ratification of the **United Nations** Convention against Torture, which imposes on signatory states the obligation to either try or extradite for trial a person accused of torture. A case in France, started in 2014, is trying to hold French companies to account for aiding and abetting crimes of torture in the Syrian civil **war**. Developments elsewhere have seen universal jurisdiction cases brought on the basis of the Genocide Convention of 1948. In Sweden, people accused of participation in the 1994 **genocide** in Rwanda have been found guilty. These cases, and others, indicate that a practice is developing in international relations in which victims of terrible violations of their **human rights**, aided by **international nongovernmental organizations** and/or lawyers, are seeking justice using the principle of universal jurisdiction, and by so doing are bringing about a transformation of **international law** and in the nature of international relations.

See also CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY; INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT (ICC); INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW.

V

VIETNAM WAR. As part of Indochina, Vietnam was occupied and controlled by France as the colonial power from the late 19th century until **World War II** when, in 1940, Japan took control and started its own period of occupation. The Viet Minh, which comprised **nationalists** and communist groups led by the communist **Ho Chi Minh**, resisted and in 1945 declared independence in the north of Vietnam, forming the Democratic Republic of Vietnam in Hanoi. Great Britain temporarily occupied the south and allowed French **colonialism** to continue. The United States recognized the nominally independent (but French-dominated) state. In the 1940s and 1950s, France attacked the Viet Minh. The French suffered some heavy defeats. The United States began to provide military assistance to France. The Viet Minh used guerrilla warfare tactics influenced by the writings of the Chinese leader **Mao Zedong**. In the 1950s, Presidents of the United States Harry S. Truman and Dwight D. Eisenhower characterized the **war** in Vietnam as one of communist **aggression**. They saw Ho as a communist agent of the Soviet Union and China. The conflict thus became part of the **Cold War**. The French withdrew from Vietnam in 1954 and the country became divided into North and South. U.S. aid to South Vietnam grew in the late 1950s and early 1960s. The Soviet Union and China assisted North Vietnam.

In 1964, it was alleged that the North Vietnamese had attacked U.S. naval ships in the Gulf of Tonkin, which is off the east coast of Vietnam. As a result of the incident, President Lyndon B. Johnson put the Tonkin Gulf resolution into Congress, asking for open-ended authorization for the use of **force** in Vietnam in defense of the United States. Congress passed the resolution with only two votes against in the Senate. Johnson thus avoided having to ask Congress to formally declare war. The fighting escalated, as did the number of U.S. troops in Vietnam. The war was unpopular among many U.S. citizens and Johnson did not run for the Democratic nomination to contest the presidential elections of November 1968. In an attempt to employ **diplomacy** to end the conflict, he organized a conference with American and Vietnamese delegates to a **peace** conference in Paris that year.

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The Republican Richard M. Nixon won the U.S. presidential elections of 1968, thus taking office in January the following year. Like Johnson, he justified U.S. military action on the basis of the Gulf of Tonkin resolution, which gave open-ended authorization for military force. The fighting continued to escalate and by 1969 there were 542,000 U.S. troops in Vietnam. Nixon was staunchly anticommunist but wanted the South Vietnamese to fight the war so that the United States could withdraw. He appointed **Henry Kissinger** as national security advisor. Kissinger sought a diplomatic solution to the conflict. In 1969, Nixon called for "Vietnamization," which meant the gradual strengthening of South Vietnamese military forces so the United States could gradually relinquish its activity. U.S. military forces were reduced to 139,000 by the end of 1971 and 25,000 by end of 1972. During this period, the United States increased its use of **airpower** to bomb North Vietnam. North Vietnamese forces crossed into the south. A ceasefire was agreed upon with North Vietnam in 1973, but the United States had failed to get agreement for complete withdrawal of North Vietnamese forces from the south. The United States withdrew from the south. In 1975, the South Vietnamese government in Saigon fell to North Vietnamese forces.

In the Vietnam War, there were more than 200,000 U.S. casualties, including almost 58,000 deaths; also there were hundreds of thousands of Vietnamese casualties, including many civilians. Furthermore, while Johnson and Nixon each believed that it was necessary to demonstrate the credibility of U.S. claims to be able to defend "free" nations against communism, U.S. **foreign policy** in the Vietnam War damaged the perception of U.S. **power**. The war was very expensive in economic terms; the federal budget deficit grew; there was simultaneous high unemployment and high inflation (stagflation); and the **trade** balance went into deficit. Nevertheless, while U.S. **hegemony** was dented, it did not suffer permanent decline.

See also TOTAL WAR.

W

WALLERSTEIN, IMMANUEL (1930–). Immanuel Wallerstein was born in New York City into a politically conscious family. As a teenager, he thus became interested in world affairs, with a particular interest in the movement against **colonialism** in India. In the late 1940s, he went to Columbia University, where he graduated with a BA in 1951. He remained at Columbia University throughout the 1950s, earning his MA in 1954 and his PhD in 1959. He had also begun his academic career at the same university in 1958, where he remained until 1971 when he took a professorship in sociology at McGill University, Montreal, until 1976. He was the emeritus Distinguished Professor of Sociology at the State University of New York from 1976 until 1999, and then a senior research scholar at Yale University from 2000 until the present day.

Wallerstein wrote prolifically, his work being published in many books and papers in academic journals. His most influential writings have pioneered world systems theory, most importantly the four volumes of *The Modern World System* (1974, 1980, 1989, and 2011). The theory was also discussed in *World Systems Analysis: Theory and Methodology* (1982). The influences on this work included **Karl Marx**, **André Gunder Frank**, and **Frantz Fanon**. Wallerstein's view of history is that of the rise and demise of world systems. **Marxism** can be seen to be influential in his theory that the modern world system, driven by capitalism, began at around 1500 and replaced the older system of **empires** gradually over the next few centuries. **International institutions** were constantly created and recreated in order to maintain the world system. In their structuralist, **dependency** theories, Frank and **Raúl Prebisch** identified core and periphery **states**. Wallerstein argued that there was also a semiperiphery containing features of both core and periphery. This semiperiphery consisted of states that functioned simultaneously as both exploited and exploiter, and that served as a bridge between the core and periphery. The semiperiphery is thus crucial to the smooth running of the world system, in which the state loses much of its significance as a unit

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of analysis. States could rise from the periphery into the semiperiphery. The so-called Asian Tiger economies of Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea, and Taiwan could also be accounted for according to this analysis.

See also ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT.

WALTZ, KENNETH NEAL (1924–2013). Born in Ann Arbor, Michigan, Kenneth Waltz went to high school in his home city. He later recalled that his mother did not graduate from, and his father never started, high school. Neither parent was interested in politics. This did not prevent him from becoming one of the most influential theorists of International Relations (IR). After serving in the U.S. Army during **World War II** and the Korean War, he became an undergraduate at Oberlin College, Ohio, where he studied mathematics before switching to economics, in which he graduated in 1948. He went to graduate school at Columbia University, New York City, to continue his study of economics but became more interested in political philosophy, to which he switched. He gained his PhD in political science from Columbia in 1957. During his postgraduate years, he had taught political science at Oberlin from 1950 to 1953 and at Columbia from 1953 to 1957. For several years in the 1950s, beginning in 1954, he was secretary of the American Rockefeller Committee for the Study of the Theory of International Relations, the orientation of which was that of **classical realism**. Having gained his PhD, he taught at Swarthmore College, Pennsylvania (1957–1966), Brandeis University, Massachusetts (1966–1971), and Berkeley, California, from 1971, where he became a professor and then, after retirement, emeritus professor until 1994. During retirement, he went back to Columbia to be a senior research scholar in the Institute of War and Peace Studies.

Waltz published several important books in the field of IR, including on **foreign policy** and **nuclear weapons**. He also published many articles in scholarly academic journals. Two of his books have become classic texts in IR. The first was *Man, the State, and War: A Theoretical Analysis*, published in 1959, which applied political philosophy to IR. It became a hugely influential work in **International Relations theory**. In it, Waltz examined the causes of **war**, identifying three images that can help provide explanations. He considered that the first two images identified immediate causes and that the third image identified the underlying cause. The first image concerned human nature, thus reflecting the classical realist perspective he held in the 1950s. According to this image (which is based on a highly controversial view of human nature), humans are fundamentally flawed and thus prone to violence. The second image focuses on a different level of analysis—that of societies. Some societies are more prone to war than others. These two images are, however, reductionist, in that by focusing on some factors that lead to war, they neglect the broader and more fundamental cause. The third

image, according to Waltz, does identify the essential cause of war. This image is of the international system, the nature of which is anarchical in the sense that there is no body or organization that controls the **states** of which it is comprised. The states have interests that sometimes clash. Because of this **anarchy**, however much they seek to avoid it, states will sometimes go to war with one another to resolve their disputes.

The international **Westphalian system of states** was the main concern of Waltz's second great book on IR. Published in 1979, this book was *Theory of International Politics*, which was the first major statement of **neorealism**. In it, he stressed that study at the individual and societal levels was irrelevant to the understanding of the relations between the states. It was, rather, the structure of the system that was key to the understanding of those relations. Theories that focused on the attributes or features of the system were reductionist, in that they neglected the patterns that recur even though in each case the attributes and features at the individual and social levels differ from one another. The states in the self-help system would be looking for **security**. The **power** of each of these states was determined by its capabilities. As they assessed their own power and that of the other states, the result of the endeavors would tend to be a **balance of power**. Without such a balance, war would break out. This sometimes happened when states overestimated their own power, leading either in the short or long term to their downfall. A feature of each balance of power was polarity. Writing during the **Cold War** characterized by a bipolar balance of two superpowers—the United States and the Soviet Union—Waltz argued that bipolarity was the type of balance most conducive to the maintenance of **peace**. Later theorists, including **John J. Mearsheimer**, offered a range of variations of neorealism. After the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, Waltz argued that a unipolar balance had emerged and that this was a very unstable situation, as one powerful state would be able to act unchecked.

Waltz presented this neorealist theory in different ways in a number of articles after *Theory of International Politics*. Some of these articles were published as a collection in his book *Realism and International Politics* in 2008. He received some of the most prestigious academic awards for his work.

See also AGGRESSION.

WALZER, MICHAEL LABAN (1935–). Michael Walzer was born to American-born Jewish parents in New York City. His parents mixed only with other Jews, but his own generation was far more integrationist. He was educated at Brandeis University, Massachusetts, and Cambridge University, England, before completing his PhD at Harvard University in 1961. He taught at Princeton University, then Harvard, and then Princeton once again. He is usually described as a communitarian (a label he does not like) socialist

political philosopher. He also edits the socialist journal *Dissent*, thus conforming to his belief that social criticism is the business of every citizen. He sought to identify the institutions and political arrangements suitable for each society, arguing that principles of justice must be derived from the ways people understand the goods of their society within a web of social relations. This view informs his book *Spheres of Justice* (1983), in which he argues that principles of justice are pluralistic. Different social goods should be distributed for different reasons. What is unjust is domination, in which a monopoly in one type of good gives the holder **power** to command a wide range of other goods in other spheres. This political philosophy is extended to his major contribution to **just war** theory, which he formulated on reflection upon his opposition to American conduct in the **Vietnam War**. In his book *Just and Unjust Wars* (1977), he argued that the boundaries of the nation-**state** are crucial to issues such as the extent to which external intervention in civil wars is permissible. He argued that the justification of armed **force** for self-defense and the restoration of **peace** and justice were based on the right of the state to political **sovereignty** and territorial integrity. He drew an analogy to the **human rights** of personal independence and bodily integrity. This does not, as some critics suggest, effectively put **foreign policy** beyond moral criticism, as autonomy entails choice, not immunity from criticism. The human rights element also underpins his defense of noncombatant immunity. He conceded that the **cosmopolitan** nature of the latter point is in tension with the communitarian nature of his just **war** theory in general.

See also HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION; INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS; INTERNATIONAL LAW; NORMATIVE THEORY.

WAR. Organized political violence on a large scale is known as war. Wars change the course of history and are a key way that transformations come about in the international system, including the consolidation of political authority and **sovereignty** into the **state**. In the words of Charles Tilly, "War made the state and the state made war." War brings about the collapse of **empires**, alters the **balance of power**, can result in societal change, and leads to the redrawing of maps and the rewriting of rules. War is enormously costly in human suffering. In the history of international relations, major strides in collective governance have therefore been achieved at the end of wars in the attempt to secure lasting **peace**: the Treaty of Westphalia, the **Concert of Europe**, the **League of Nations**, and the **United Nations** all came about as a consequence of major war. In the nuclear age, global annihilation could be the ultimate cost of war between great powers.

Perhaps the most famous book about war is by **Carl von Clausewitz**, simply titled, *On War*. Clausewitz defined war as "an act of force to compel our enemy to do our will." He famously described war as "politics by other means." For Clausewitz, war can be a functional and rational way to secure

political objectives. Furthermore, although the form of war can change dramatically over time as technologies and contexts change, its political nature remains constant. Clausewitz has influenced scholars within the academic discipline of International Relations, particularly those within **classical realism** and the **English School** who view war as not only a rational instrument of state foreign policy but also a key mechanism for order within an **international society**. Liberal theorists have tended to take a different view, seeing war not as a function of the international system but as a breakdown in that system. **Liberal internationalism**, in particular, seeks to find a way to permanently eradicate war from human history.

War is complex and multifaceted. Scholars in the academic discipline of International Relations and the subfields of **strategic studies**, **conflict analysis**, and **peace studies** have studied war in many different ways. **Just war** theory has been an important element in studies of morality in international relations, for example. Within the school of **behaviorism**, in order to study war empirically, scholars have formulated measurable definitions of war. One such definition, used by **J. David Singer**'s Correlates of War project at the University of Michigan, sees war as consisting of at least 1,000 battle deaths per year. By using such precise definitions, war can be distinguished from other more minor forms of conflict. In a very different approach, postmodern theorists have examined ways in which war constitutes the state.

War has both immediate and underlying causes. From a structural perspective, the permissive cause is international **anarchy**: there is no overarching **power** to prevent a war. By contrast, explanations for war that are constructed at the level of the state look to the nature of the regime within the state or the personality of its leader; whether a state goes to war will depend on whether it has a militaristic government, is dissatisfied with the existing status quo, or has a settled and **democratic** government with no interest in fighting. A third set of explanations for war looks to a flawed, frustrated, and aggressive human nature. The classic work on the causes of war is by **Kenneth Waltz**, *Man, the State, and War* (1959). Whichever cause of war is found to be the most convincing—and for Waltz it was the structural explanation—underlying causes can only explain the existence of war as a phenomenon in the international system, they cannot explain the outbreak of a particular war. Immediate causes for war might be policy differences, disputes over economic resources or territory, issues of identity, or a combination of reasons. A full explanation of the causes of the wars of the **former Yugoslavia**, for example, is likely to include elements of each of those causes.

In recent decades, the changing nature of war has been the focus of much consideration. Major interstate wars are becoming less common; since 1945, there have been many more wars within states, known as intrastate wars, than between them, or interstate wars: the **Iran–Iraq War** remains a notable

exception to this trend. Intrastate wars are more commonly known as civil wars and they involve at least one actor that is not a state. In general, there are two main types of civil wars: ideological or ethnic. In an ethnic war, one group in the war wants to break out of the existing state. Ideological conflict is about competing views of how the country should be run. Either type of war can spill over or involve groups from outside the state. The distinction between an interstate and an intrastate war is not, therefore, always clear cut. Intrastate wars can have external as well as internal dimensions, as is demonstrated by the civil war in Syria. Although it is a war for the control and direction of the state, it has involved external actors, including **Islamic State** and powers such as Russia and the United States. The refugee crisis, which has arisen as millions of people have fled the fighting, has spilled over into neighboring states such as Jordan, Lebanon, and Turkey, and countries within the **European Union** and even across the world to Canada and the United States. It has also led to a more general **migration** crisis. The long-standing conflict between Turkey and the Kurds has also become an additional complexity in the war.

The war in Syria demonstrates the changed nature of war for Western states. Known sometimes as postmodern war, contemporary warfare has become something of a spectator sport for Western publics. When Great Britain or France engages in war, for example, it is no longer a struggle for national survival but a drama that plays out on nightly news broadcasts. Most men and women of France and Britain remain untouched by the war. The postmodern war thesis draws on the "Revolution in Military Affairs" debate, which notes the developments in technology, particularly precision-guided bombs, that has given Western states a huge military advantage over their adversaries. This advantage enables advanced states to fight wars, or at least to deploy **airpower**, despite a strong resistance to the taking of casualties. Unwillingness to deploy ground troops and to take higher casualties, however, indicates an unwillingness of states in **the West**, particularly given their experience in **Afghanistan** and **Iraq**, to get too embroiled in a war, beyond a limited use of **force**.

See also GLOBAL GOVERNANCE.

WAR CRIME. *See* WAR CRIMES TRIBUNALS.

WAR CRIMES TRIBUNALS. A war crime is a violation of **international humanitarian law**, which governs the actions of combatants in **war**. Service personnel charged with a war crime are usually tried by their **state** within a military tribunal. However, under the principle of complementarity, the international community can take the responsibility for prosecuting those accused of war crimes when a state is unable or unwilling to do so. At the end of

World War II, the victorious allies set up tribunals in both Nuremberg and Tokyo to try individuals from the losing side accused of war crimes and **crimes against humanity**. The decisions were accepted as laying down general principles of **international law** by a unanimous resolution of the **United Nations General Assembly** (UNGA) in 1946. These principles were later used as a precedent for the establishment of the International Criminal Tribunal for the **former Yugoslavia** (UN-ICTY) in 1993. Article 1 of the statute states that UN-ICTY has the power to prosecute individuals for serious violations of international humanitarian law and crimes against humanity. UN-ICTY was the first war crimes tribunal to be established by the international community rather than by the victors of a war. It was also the first tribunal to indict a sitting head of state for war crimes. Former president of Serbia Slobodan Milošević's trial started in 2002 and there were 66 charges against him, including **genocide**, crimes against humanity, and grave breaches of the **Geneva Conventions**. Milošević died in prison in The Hague before the trial was concluded. The next-highest ranked accused to be prosecuted by the tribunal were Radovan Karadžić, the Bosnian Serb leader who symbolized the Serb campaign of ethnic cleansing of Croats and Muslims, and Bosnian Serb General Ratko Mladić. Karadžić was found guilty in March 2016 and sentenced to 40 years in prison. A verdict in the Mladić trial is due in November 2017.

UN-ICTY had a list of 61 suspects it wanted to try and it achieved this goal. Suspects were tracked down and arrested by a coalition of different military and police personnel from a range of states, including France, Poland, Great Britain, and the United States. In 1994, the **United Nations (UN)** set up another tribunal to try persons involved in the genocide in Rwanda. The first case from the Rwanda tribunal, the Akayesu case (ICT-96-4-T, September 1998) was historically significant because it was the first time that an international war crimes trial convicted someone for genocide, and the first time that rape had been admitted as a crime against humanity. In 2002, the government of Sierra Leone requested a "special court" to address serious crimes against civilians that UN peacekeepers committed during the country's civil war (1991–2002). Furthermore, in 2003 in Cambodia, an international criminal tribunal, the so-called Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC), was established to try former Khmer Rouge leaders. A million people died under the Khmer Rouge's reign of terror between 1975 and 1979 and the tribunal ensures that those responsible do not escape justice.

See also INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT (ICC); INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW.

WAR ON TERROR. On 11 September 2001, **al-Qaeda**, directed by **Osama bin Laden** from his base in Afghanistan, attacked the United States using airplanes full of passengers as missiles. In response to these **attacks of 9/11**, the war on terror was declared by President of the United States **George W. Bush** later that month to a joint session of the U.S. Congress and the American people. The feeling that the world was at **war** against terror was further enhanced in the years that followed by further atrocities such as the Bali bombing in Indonesia in October 2002 in which 202 people were killed. In another prominent case, the Madrid train bombings in March 2004 killed 192 people. There was also a series of attacks on London on the morning of 7 July 2005 in which 56 people, including the bombers, died. The attacks gave U.S. **foreign policy** a focus that it had been lacking since the end of the **Cold War**, as it launched its war on terror.

The war on terror focused initially on Afghanistan, in pursuit of bin Laden and his al-Qaeda network. The Taliban, which were in power, were harboring bin Laden and had allowed him to operate military training camps for Islamic fundamentalists. Bush demanded that the Taliban hand over bin Laden and close the camps. These demands were not met and so the United States launched air strikes against Taliban positions in Afghanistan just three weeks after the attacks on 9/11. The Taliban was overthrown quickly but, in the years that followed, U.S. troops and those of some allies in the **North Atlantic Treaty Organization** (NATO) became embroiled in a **war in Afghanistan** against an increasingly strong Taliban insurgency.

The war on terror was not, however, confined to Afghanistan. Bush said the war on terror would eventually target all terrorist groups of global reach. In a speech at West Point in June 2002, Bush declared that, although the doctrines of **deterrence** and containment were sometimes still relevant to U.S. defense, in the case of new threats, new thinking was required. Deterrence and containment were irrelevant in cases of shadowy terrorist networks without particular **states**, or in cases of unbalanced dictators who possessed **weapons of mass destruction** (WMDs) and might use them or pass them to terrorist allies. Rather than wait to be attacked and retaliate, preemptive action was needed. In a speech from the White House in September that year he said the United States would act alone if necessary to exercise the right of self-defense by acting preemptively and he declared the formation of a national **security** strategy.

Bush's national security strategy announced four pillars that became known as the Bush doctrine. These were (a) maintenance of **American primacy** in military terms, (b) the embrace of preventative **war** as a supplement to traditional deterrence, (c) the war on **terrorism**, and (d) **democratization**. This was essentially a doctrine of preemption with two implications: first, the United States would intervene militarily if it had grounds for believing its national security was at risk were it not to act in advance of an attack;

second, his country would act with or without support of allied states or the **United Nations** (UN). Preemption came to be associated with unilateralism as the Bush administration did not want other states to constrain U.S. freedom of action. The willingness to take unilateral preemptive action represented a new development in U.S. **foreign policy**. In recent decades, the United States had not taken preemptive action without the support of a broad **alliance** of countries, usually acting under NATO or the UN.

The attacks of 9/11 were crucial to Bush's decision to invade Iraq, leading to the **Iraq War** (2003–2010), although Iraq had had nothing to do with the attacks of 9/11 and was ideologically opposed to al-Qaeda. Bush argued that there were actual or potential links between Iraq, under its **aggressive** president Saddam Hussein, and terrorist groups, and that Saddam might either use WMDs against the United States and its allies in acts of state terrorism, or supply such weapons to terrorist groups. The inference that the Iraq War was part of the war on terror made the invasion of Iraq politically possible. As the decade drew on, it increasingly became accepted that there were no longer WMDs in Iraq.

In the 2008 presidential elections, the Democratic candidate Barack Obama had been consistently against the war in Iraq. Obama won with a high turnout and took office in January 2009. In his early speeches as president, Obama sought to present a new image to the world. In particular, he wanted to make a good impression in the Arab and Muslim world, because the status of the United States had been damaged. Under his presidency the war on terror continued but in a very different way than had been the case during the Bush administration. Obama adopted a multilateral style of **diplomacy** and began to make plans to withdraw from the ground wars begun by the Bush administration. Hilary Clinton was Obama's secretary of state from 2009 to 2013. She said in 2009 that the United States must use **smart power**. This was a term that had earlier been used by **Joseph Nye** to refer to the full range of tools at the disposal of a state. As Clinton suggested, these included diplomatic, economic, military, political, legal, and cultural tools, the appropriate one or combination of which should be used according to each situation.

Obama continued to use U.S. military **power** to attack those considered to be hostile to the U.S. presence in the Middle East, southern Asia, and eastern Africa. He conducted the war on terror by using covert operations, targeting suspected militants and their associates. He expanded the national security operations of the state to gather intelligence and to carry out the attacks. This involved the U.S. military's Joint Special Operations Command. Obama argued that the focus of U.S. military efforts should be in Afghanistan rather than Iraq, especially given the resurgence of the Taliban. The situation in Iraq improved and the target date for ending U.S. combat operations there was approaching. In February 2009, Obama increased the U.S. military pres-

ence in Afghanistan. In August 2010, on schedule, the U.S. combat mission in Iraq ended. An estimated 50,000 American troops remained until the following year, but the majority of U.S. forces had been withdrawn.

The war on terror continued and, in May 2011, U.S. Navy SEALs stormed a compound near Abbottabad, Pakistan, after receiving intelligence that bin Laden was there. Bin Laden was killed. Obama said justice had been done. At the 2012 presidential elections, Obama drew attention to the killing of bin Laden and highlighted the successful removal of American forces from Iraq. He promised to remove U.S. troops from Afghanistan by 2014. In November 2012, Obama won reelection, starting his second term in January 2013.

In May 2013, Obama declared that the global war on terror was over. The U.S. military and intelligence agencies would instead focus on a specific group of networks determined to destroy the United States. In Iraq, the U.S.-supported regime was threatened by a rapidly spreading Sunni insurgency spearheaded by the **Islamic State** in Iraq and the Levant (Daesh). In August 2014, the United States began to launch air strikes against the Islamic State in Iraq. In September 2014, Obama escalated the campaign in Iraq and authorized air strikes against the Islamic State in Syria.

Obama asked Congress to approve funding to train and arm moderate Syrians. Obama began to form a coalition of countries in the fight against the Islamic State. By the end of September, 20 countries were contributing air support or military equipment to the coalition effort. The countries included France, Great Britain, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Jordan, Qatar, and Bahrain.

In October 2015, Obama shifted policy to confirm plans to extend the U.S. military presence in Afghanistan beyond 2016. He said the United States would keep 5,500 troops in the country when he left office in 2017. Originally all but a small embassy-based force was due to leave by the end of 2017. He said that as commander in chief he would not allow Afghanistan to be used as safe haven for terrorists to attack the United States again.

See also AFGHAN WARS; AIRPOWER; HUNTINGTON, SAMUEL PHILLIPS (1927–2008); PUTIN, VLADIMIR VLADIMIROVICH (1952–).

WARS IN AFGHANISTAN. *See* AFGHAN WARS.

WARS OF THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA. *See* FORMER YUGOSLAVIA, WARS OF.

WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION. Certain classes of weapons that have the capacity to kill very large numbers of people quickly are known as weapons of mass destruction (WMDs). The term "Chemical, Biological,

Radiological, and **Nuclear Weapons**" (CBRN) is also sometimes used, as these are the weapons that can kill on a large scale. WMDs have a particular psychological impact and, given this and the destructive capabilities of these weapons, their prohibition and control has been an important issue in international relations; there is a high degree of **global governance** on WMDs. The history of attempts to prohibit the use of chemical weapons, for example, begins with the first Hague Conferences of 1899, which declared that the use of asphyxiating poisonous gases was inhumane—though this did not stop chlorine gas being used in **World War I**, during the Russian Civil War, or possibly by the British against Iraqi rebels in Mesopotamia in the 1920s during the period of the British **League of Nations** mandate.

A second attempt to prevent the use of chemical weapons was the Geneva Chemical Weapons Protocol (1925), which was negotiated under the auspices of the League of Nations. Chemical weapons were nevertheless used against both troops and civilians by the Japanese in Manchuria after the invasion in 1931 and by Italy in Abyssinia after 1935. There was huge outrage at the Italian action, consolidating the developing norm against chemical weapons' use in warfare, particularly against civilians. No chemical weapons were used on the battlefield in **World War II**, although poison gas was used in the death camps to kill Jews on a mass scale in an act of **genocide**. During the **Cold War**, large quantities of chemical weapons were stockpiled by the United States and the Soviet Union, and 23 other countries were also known to be keeping chemical weapons in their arsenals. The United States finally signed the Geneva Protocol of 1925 in 1975 but reserved the right to use defoliants or riot control agents, which it did in the **Vietnam War**. Saddam Hussein of Iraq also used chemical weapons against Iranian troops in the **Iran–Iraq War** and against Iraqi Kurds, most notoriously in Halabja in 1988. Given his extensive stockpiles of chemical agents, it was also feared that he might use them against allied troops during the **first Gulf War**. Some analysts argue that he did not do so due to fear of a U.S. nuclear retaliatory strike, a possible example of effective nuclear **deterrence**. Nevertheless, it became a key international goal after the war to destroy Saddam Hussein's WMD programs under the supervision of international weapons inspectors. It was the possible existence, however, of some nerve gas, which remained unaccounted for, that was the cause of the division in the Western **alliance** prior to the **Iraq War**.

The Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) opened for signatures in 1993 and has been the cornerstone of the chemical weapons prohibition **international regime** since it came into force in 1997. The convention prohibits the whole class of chemical weapons. Its two main aims are, firstly, to verify the destruction of all the world's chemical weapons and, secondly, to prevent the reemergence of chemical weapons. The first of these goals has not yet been met and the second goal is an ongoing task; disposal is difficult and expen-

sive. The CWC is monitored by the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) and has a very high rate of ratification. All but six of the world's **states** are members of this convention. Israel, Myanmar, Egypt, North Korea, South Sudan, and Angola are the exceptions, and these states are not willing to subject themselves to international oversight of their chemical weapons facilities. Until 2013, Syria had not signed the convention either but did so to prevent international intervention in the Syrian civil war. The use of chemical weapons in Syria has propelled the issue of these weapons back up to the top of the international agenda.

The Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) of 1972 predates the CWC and indeed was the first multilateral disarmament treaty banning the development, production, and stockpiling of an entire category of WMDs. An attack using a pathogen or toxin such as smallpox, which is highly contagious, could have a devastating impact. After anthrax attacks in the United States in 2001, the United States increased its stocks of smallpox vaccine yet also pulled out of negotiations on the BWC. Biological weapons raise the question of whether states can best protect their citizens by prioritizing domestic measures or by increasing international cooperation.

International law on nuclear weapons is far more extensive than on the other WMDs, and concerted international efforts have been made to control **nuclear proliferation**. International regulation is agreed upon between states but the real threat of a WMD attack might come from nonstate groups. An act of **terrorism**, for example, could involve a radiological attack using a so-called dirty bomb. A dirty bomb uses high explosives to disperse radioactive material and does not require the same level of skill as the construction of a nuclear device. The question of whether WMDs are likely to be used in a large-scale terrorist attack, however, is one that elicits opposing views. On the one hand, the **attacks on 9/11** indicated to the world that certain types of terrorist organization are willing to kill on a mass scale. On the other hand, it also demonstrated that they could successfully do that armed only with knives. There have been numerous predictions over the past few decades that a terrorist attack using WMDs is likely yet so far the attack is not forthcoming. There was an attack on the Japanese underground using a biological agent, sarin, in 1995 but although this was designed to kill hundreds, the failure of the dispersal agent meant that only 12 were killed. Although this was a horrifying experience for the people involved and their families, it was not mass destruction. Terrorist groups would need to have significant resources, high levels of skill and equipment, and huge determination to carry out a WMD attack. The Aum Shinrikyo sect that carried out the attack had all those things yet still failed.

WENDT, ALEXANDER (1958–). Born in Mainz, Germany, to Hans and Martha Wendt, whose influence on his work he would later acknowledge, Alexander Wendt moved to the United States to study at the Macalester liberal arts college in Saint Paul, Minnesota. From there, he went on to take his doctoral studies at the University of Minnesota, where he began to consider himself a Marxist. Although he remained sympathetic to **Marxism**, he began to have philosophical issues with it as he explored the structure-agency issue. He earned his PhD in political science in 1989 and began his academic career that year at Yale University. In 1992, his hugely influential paper "Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics" was published in the *International Organization* journal. The paper was one of the pioneering works of **social constructivism**. In 1997, he moved to Dartmouth College, New Hampshire, where he wrote his book *Social Theory of International Politics* (1999), in which he expanded his constructivist **International Relations theory**. He moved to the University of Chicago in 1999 and published the article "Why a World State Is Inevitable" in the *European Journal of International Relations* in 2003. A world state was inevitable, he argued, because people are more concerned with recognition and respect for their **human rights** than in power or anything else. **International law** was the only means for such recognition and a world state would eventually be developed for this purpose. In 2004, he became professor of international **security** at Ohio State University.

Wendt argued as a constructivist that although international **anarchy** may be a structural fact, **states**, their politicians, and influential intellectuals determined the features of such anarchy. He criticized **neorealism** for taking for granted an immutable international system based on self-help. In fact, the system was socially constructed, its meaning itself being contingent upon relations between states. Although neorealists such as **Kenneth Waltz** saw the distribution of **power** as the key variable that determines the actions of states, Wendt argued, anarchy is not an immutable structure that determines states' behavior but, rather, a condition whose meaning is contingent upon state relations. Self-help in international relations was thus only one among many forms of state identity and interest. For Wendt, therefore, neorealists were mistaken in viewing the distribution of power between states as the key variable that determines the actions of states. The distribution of power is instead mediated by the ideas, norms, and practices that form the collective meanings from which the international structures are constituted. Those structures organize the actions of people and states. Hence, the way one state construes the power of another will depend on whether the latter is deemed a potential ally, competitor, or enemy. He argued that it was not a change in the **balance of power** between the United States and the Soviet Union that brought the **Cold War** to an end but, rather, that they simply no longer saw one another as enemies.

WEST, THE. North, south, east, and west are points on a compass and at its simplest the west therefore is a geographical term. Historically, the West is located in Europe. However, as Europeans settled across the globe, European culture, or Western civilization, spread through **colonialism** to the new world: Australia, New Zealand, the United States, Canada. The term "the West" therefore lost its geographical focus and became more complex and contested in its meaning. In its broader meaning, the term implies that the West is somehow distinct and different from the rest and that there is an identifiable Western civilization. In the pre-Reformation and pre-Enlightenment world, this civilization was defined by Western Christianity and was known as Christendom. With the loss of the one universal church, other influences became more central. Western civilization is now normally understood to be formed from three traditions: the classical culture of Greece and Rome, the Christian religion, and the Enlightenment of the modern era. It is defined in large part by certain ideas: liberty and individualism (rights), institutionalized in **liberal democracy**; free markets, constitutionalism, and the rule of law; and scientific rationalism and reason. The elements are contested and the term is most clearly understood in opposition to something else: the East or the Islamic tradition, for example.

A striking feature of international relations in the modern era is the extent to which it has been dominated by the West. Historians tend to date the modern era as beginning at the end of the 15th century. This is the period in which the Italian Renaissance and the exploration of the world by European explorers began to shape a new age in world history. The trend was strengthened by other developments such as the Reformation and the scientific revolution. Although the influence of Europe declined in the 20th century, the rise of the United States perpetuated the dominance of the West in international relations. The inherent superiority of its ideas, **culture**, and principles has been a long-standing assumption of many in the West and has underpinned key processes in international relations, such as European colonialism, arguably also the **human rights** regime, and certain Western **foreign policy** actions. The continued dominance of the West in international relations is now in some doubt with the rapid raise of non-Western powers, particularly China, as well as nonstate actors and transnational corporations.

See also AMERICAN PRIMACY; ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT; GLOBAL POWER SHIFTS.

WESTPHALIAN SYSTEM OF STATES. For nearly four centuries, the international order has been a system of **states**. Throughout that period other forms of political organization such as feudal fiefdoms, city-states, and **empires** have gradually been replaced by the dominant form of the state. Now,

with the exception of **Antarctica** and a few remaining city-states, the world is exclusively a world of states. The state is therefore the building block on which the current global order has been constructed.

The modern state system is seen to begin with the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648, which ended the Thirty Years' War in Europe and was the starting point for the international system of states, replacing the Holy Roman Empire with its ideal of a united Europe under the Roman Catholic Church. Universalism was replaced by a system of multiple, formally equal, sovereignties, each one holding certain key rights, in particular, the right to **sovereignty** over territory and population, the right to nonintervention, and formal equality.

The system of states developed and operated in the first instance in Europe and was globalized through **colonialism**. World history therefore sees the expansion from a European state system to a global state system. The Westphalian principles were turned against the colonial powers in struggles of national liberation. These conflicts were not fought in order to return to traditional, pre-empire modes of political organization but were a struggle for independent states in a system of states, with that independence protected through the principles of sovereign equality and nonintervention. Given the high degree of agreement and recognition of shared values among the world's states, they are also said to constitute an **international society**.

See also ANARCHY; ENGLISH SCHOOL OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS; RAISON D'ÉTAT.

WILSON, THOMAS WOODROW (1856–1924). Thomas Woodrow Wilson was born in Staunton, Virginia, to Joseph Ruggles Wilson, a Presbyterian minister, and Jessie Janet Woodrow. He attended Davidson College, West Virginia, then Princeton, the University of Virginia Law School, and finally Johns Hopkins University, where he earned his doctorate. He entered an academic career in political science at Princeton, where he became president of the university in 1902. He was a conservative and was selected on that basis to run for the governorship of New Jersey in 1910. He won the election but campaigned and governed as a progressive politician. Progressives did not adhere to the belief that government should be very limited; government should be used to address social problems. As a deeply religious Christian, he believed that he and his nation were destined to bring about great changes in the world.

Wilson was elected president for the Democratic Party in 1912 and was in office from 1913 to 1921. The pacifist William Jennings Bryan was Wilson's first secretary of state (1913–1915). Wilson believed providence determined that the United States and its citizens should take a leading position in world affairs. He and Bryan were among paternalists who considered Latin American nations as inferior. They believed the U.S. nation should teach

other peoples the path to their liberty. What he considered as help others saw as arrogance, interference, and coercion. The United States had vital economic and strategic interests in Central America. Wilson said that his nation was the guardian of order, justice, and decency in the region. Bryan called the Central American nations "our political children" who should be guided to freedom. Wilson and Bryan assumed that U.S. help would be welcomed but the United States sometimes resorted to **diplomatic** pressure and even military **force**. As well as intervening in Nicaragua, the Dominican Republic, and Haiti, Wilson became involved militarily in Mexico, where revolution had broken out in 1910. Wilson wanted the country to adopt the American way and withdrew diplomatic representation. Bryan resigned in 1915 when, following the sinking of the *Lusitania*, Wilson warned Germany that further attacks would be regarded as "deliberately unfriendly."

Wilson's second secretary of state was Robert Lansing, from 1915 to 1920. Wilson was content to follow the traditional line of U.S. **foreign policy** that the country should remain neutral in Europe's **wars**. Neutrality in **World War I** (WWI) would enable the United States to have influence through relief assistance to war-torn areas. German U-boat attacks gradually changed his mind. Nevertheless, Wilson was reelected in 1916 on the basis of his progressive legislation and on account of keeping the United States out of the world war. In 1916, Bryan's replacement, Secretary of State Lansing, demanded that Germany must stop U-boat attacks, otherwise the United States would break diplomatic relations—a preliminary to war. Germany continued with the attacks. From this time until the **World War II** attack on Pearl Harbor, a debate raged in the United States between internationalists and isolationists.

To take the United States into WWI, Wilson needed approval in Congress for a declaration of war, which he achieved in 1917. When he addressed Congress in 1918, Wilson said he had wanted the United States to enter the war to achieve **peace**, liberate the peoples of the world, and enable all nations to choose their own path. His intention was to make the world safe for **democracy**, stating that the United States was the champion of the right of mankind, having no selfish ends. He formulated this vision in a 14-point program in another address to Congress in 1918, again stating that he wanted to promote democracy and self-determination. He said liberal democracies did not go to war with one another. Liberal democracy should be encouraged in Europe and throughout the world.

In January 1919, Wilson presented his idea of creating an **international organization** to regulate relations between states in his call for a **League of Nations** to be set up at the **Paris Peace Conference**. He opposed the Russian Revolution of 1917 that brought communists to power who wanted to over-

come capitalism throughout the world. Wilson wanted to reform the world along liberal-capitalist lines. "Wilsonianism" became the basis of a body of thought known as **idealism**.

The Paris Peace Conference took place in May 1919 attended by world leaders, including Prime Minister David Lloyd George of Great Britain, Prime Minister Vittorio Emanuele Orlando of Italy, Prime Minister Georges Clemenceau of France, and President Wilson. Clemenceau opposed Wilson's 14-point plan and sought revenge against Germany, as France had suffered greatly. Lloyd George agreed with much of the plan but feared a political backlash at home if there were too lenient a settlement. Wilson refused to accept some of Orlando's demands, so Orlando left Paris. To win the support of Clemenceau and Lloyd George, Wilson agreed that Germany should pay extensive war reparations and proposed that German colonies be governed by mandates to prepare for independence. Wilson gained approval at Paris for a League of Nations that would have an assembly of all member-nations and a council made up of the five victorious powers (United States, Great Britain, France, Italy, and Japan) and four other nations elected by the assembly for three-year terms.

Although Wilson won the **Nobel Peace Prize** for his part in forming the League, many liberals throughout the world were disappointed that he watered down his plans in the effort to get them accepted. People in the colonies complained that the conference ignored their calls for self-determination. Wilson's ideas were unpopular in the United States, where the Republican Party, which made gains in Congress at the 1918 elections, wanted a hard line against Germany and where Republican Senator Cabot Lodge was determined that Wilson should not take the United States into the League of Nations on his own terms. Wilson presented the treaty to the Senate, where the Republicans had a majority of two. Lodge suggested a treaty with reservations. Some Democrats and some Republicans agreed. Wilson and his staunch allies refused. In March 1920, the treaty was rejected in the Senate by 49 votes to 35, so the League went ahead without the United States. Bainbridge Colby became his third secretary of state that year but Wilson suffered a stroke and was in ill health for the remainder of his presidency, which ended in January 1921 when Republican Warren Harding became president of the United States. Wilson never recovered from illness.

See also LIBERAL INTERNATIONALISM; ROOSEVELT, FRANKLIN DELANO (1882–1945).

WORLD BANK. The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, usually known as the World Bank, was established at the **Bretton Woods Conference** in 1944 and is located in Washington, D.C. Its initial purpose was to aid the recovery of war-torn European **states**, though its key role now is in financing infrastructure projects such as dams, roads, and

power plants in the developing world. In the 1980s and 1990s, World Bank policy was heavily influenced by the neoliberal economic policies of what is known as the Washington Consensus. This consensus was on policy reforms that were promoted by the World Bank and the other Washington-based financial organization, the **International Monetary Fund**, and supported by the U.S. government. They included tight fiscal discipline, liberalization of the financial and trading sectors, privatization, deregulation, and the shrinking of state provision. Continuing crises in the developing world, however, have made the bank more focused on **economic development** and less single-minded in its neoliberalism.

See also SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT.

WORLD FOOD PROGRAMME (WFP). The World Food Programme (WFP) was founded in 1961 as a part of the **United Nations** (UN) system. Its headquarters are in Rome. It is funded entirely by voluntary contributions. The largest proportion of this funding is from the governments of more than 60 **states**. Other sources of funding include intergovernmental organizations, **international nongovernmental organizations**, companies, financial organizations, and individual people. The funding finances the WFP's humanitarian and **development** projects. The main purpose of these projects is to deliver food to people who suffer due to **wars**, other conflicts, and natural disasters. It sometimes works with other UN agencies, humanitarian agencies such as the **International Committee of the Red Cross**, Red Crescent societies, and other nongovernmental organizations. Its work in 2016 includes projects in Syria, Afghanistan, North Korea, Sri Lanka, Ghana, Sierra Leone, Gaza, and the West Bank. The WFP sometimes, however, has problems in achieving its aims. It faced great difficulty, for example, in reaching parts of Syria during the civil war that broke out following the Syrian government's violent response to demonstrations that were part of the **Arab uprisings** of 2011. In August 2016, the WFP expressed concern that dwindling resources meant that its projects to provide food to a number of African countries were at risk.

See also INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS; INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS; PIRACY; POVERTY.

WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION (WHO). A specialized agency of the **United Nations**, the World Health Organization (WHO) came into existence on 7 April 1948 in order to coordinate international policy on health. Hence, 7 April is now designated as World Health Day. The WHO provides global leadership on health, conducts evidence-based research, and sets standards on a wide range of issues including prenatal care, food safety, disease prevention, and family planning. The WHO runs programs on issues from

accidents to zoonosis, and in establishing norms on health it promotes human **security**. The WHO has become an increasingly high-profile global actor in light of global health threats such as HIV/AIDS, bird flu, and Ebola. It plays a key role in coordinating the international response to such threats, and its goals are for equitable access to essential care for all and collective defense against transnational health threats. The elimination of smallpox, which was officially declared eradicated from the world in 1980 after a WHO campaign of immunization, is its most notable success. Smallpox is estimated to have killed between 300 million and 500 million people during the 20th century so its eradication is a positive success story for **global governance**. The WHO is a self-contained organization and not subject to management by the United Nations.

WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION (WTO). Failure at the **Bretton Woods Conference** to reach agreement on a **trade** organization meant that until 1995 international trade was governed by the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). The key purpose of the GATT was to reduce tariff and nontariff barriers to trade, and by the end of the 1960s these were no longer an impediment to trade, at least among advanced industrial **states**. Focus has since shifted to reductions in nontariff barriers such as health and safety rules, procurement procedures, and customs policies. Negotiations during the Uruguay Round (1986–1994) led to agreement on the World Trade Organization (WTO). In 2016, the WTO had 162 members with a further 22 states with observer status that had committed to starting accession talks. The WTO is therefore a genuinely global organization. It has the same essential purpose as the GATT so is dedicated to free and open trade, but it has greater enforcement mechanisms. The WTO has presided over successive rounds of trade liberalization, and its focus has also been expanded from the liberalization of the trade in goods to that of services as well such as banking, transport, and telecommunications. The latest round of negotiations, the Doha Round that started in 2001, aims to achieve major reform of the global trading system. One of its key objectives is to improve the trading prospects for developing countries. The round has stalled, however, and there is no immediate prospect of agreement being reached. One stumbling block is the issue of agriculture, an area that has not been fully liberalized. Although the developing world would benefit from full liberalization of the agricultural trade, strong domestic interests in Europe and the United States mean that agricultural subsidies remain in place in Europe and North America, giving farmers from those regions a competitive advantage over those in the **third world**.

The WTO also has procedures for settling trade disputes, and agreement on this dispute resolution function of the WTO is one of the key achievements of multilateral **diplomacy** in the area of trade. The Dispute Resolution

Function is essential for ensuring that world trade operates smoothly and that the rules on trade can be enforced. States in dispute are encouraged to resolve the problem between themselves but, if this is not possible, the dispute can be considered by an independent panel at the WTO. The panel considers the evidence and produces a report. There is a right of appeal, but once the process is exhausted the losing state is expected to change its trading practices or offer appropriate compensation. If neither is done, limited retaliatory sanctions can be imposed by the WTO against the offending member. The WTO hears disputes on a very wide range of issues; in recent times, these have included a dispute over tuna between the United States and Mexico, one about shrimp between the United States and Vietnam, on hot-rolled steel between the United States and Japan, and on large residential washers between the United States and Korea.

See also INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND (IMF); WORLD BANK.

WORLD WAR I. Although it is best known for the Western Front in Europe, characterized by trench warfare, World War I (WWI) was the first global conflict. Following the collapse of the **balance of power** in Europe, which had been the traditional means of maintaining **peace** between **states**, the conflict erupted in 1914 when Franz Ferdinand, heir to the Austro-Hungarian throne, was assassinated in Sarajevo, capital of the Austrian province of Bosnia. Franz Ferdinand's killer was backed by a Serbian terrorist group, and in response Austria-Hungary issued Serbia with a number of ultimatums and demands. Serbia complied with most but not all and so Austria-Hungary, with the support of Germany, declared **war** on Serbia. Serbia's ally, Russia, mobilized its army in response, leading Germany to declare war on Russia. In turn, France, as Russia's ally, prepared to engage in war. Germany attacked France through neutral Belgium, leading Great Britain to guarantee to protect the latter small country. The conflict spread to the rest of Europe, and then to Africa, the Middle East, and Asia. The United States initially remained neutral but in 1917 Congress, having been persuaded by President **Thomas Woodrow Wilson**, declared war on Germany, which had begun to sink commercial shipping and thereby killed many American citizens.

The war was fought by large armies that deployed new weapons that were used to devastating effect. The scale of the loss of human life was unprecedented. Approximately 9 million soldiers were killed, 22 million were wounded, and nearly 2 million went missing in action. An unknown number of civilians also died. Germany and its allies, including Austria-Hungary and the Ottoman **empire** of Turkey, were eventually defeated in 1918, the year after the revolution in Russia had led to the new communist leaders of that country, including **V. I. Lenin**, to withdraw from the war. The United States rose to become a dominant world power and traditional forms of **colonialism**

began to break down as the European empires collapsed. This began with the immediate end of the empires of Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Turkey. There were, however, wider implications. Asian, African, and Australasian troops from the British Commonwealth and the empires of other imperial nations like France had fought alongside working-class British and French men and experienced imperial vulnerability. They also saw that there were class divisions in the European states that ruled them and began to learn about the power and potential of **nationalism**. These lessons later informed the struggle for independence in Asia and Africa, especially after **World War II** (WWII).

The **Paris Peace Conference** took place in May 1919 and one month later the **League of Nations** was created by the signing of the Treaty of Versailles. This formally ended the war and set the terms of the reparation payments to be made by the defeated countries, most importantly Germany, to the victors, particularly France and Great Britain. The League was thus inextricably linked at inception with the Treaty of Versailles.

The conflict had created a strong desire that such a war should not ever be repeated, leading to intense discussion among both statesmen and intellectuals to try to find ways for international relations to be conducted more peacefully. A few pioneers such as **Norman Angell** and **Henry Noel Brailsford** had begun to discuss international relations systematically shortly before the outbreak of the war in 1914. Thinking and study within this field had, however, usually been conducted within the disciplines of politics or **diplomatic** histories. The creation of International Relations (IR) as an academic and intellectual discipline was closely associated with this war and its causes and consequences. This was marked in 1919 by the establishment of a professorship—the **first academic chair in IR**—at the University of Aberystwyth, Wales. Much of the academic work of the new discipline supported the League of Nations.

The League of Nations was designed in the effort to ensure that another war like WWI would never be allowed to happen again. There was a widely held belief that the international community needed to change the way in which international relations were conducted, in order to realize this goal. Idealism, as a form of **liberal internationalism**, began to gain support. Seemingly strong in the 1920s, the League and the aspirations of its supporters waned in the 1930s as Japan and Italy engaged in significant acts of **aggression**. A significant intellectual current began to grow that stressed that the League was naïve in its aspirations. This current led to the revival of **classical realism**, notably in the work of **E. H. Carr** and **Reinhold Niebuhr**. The realists warned that another major war was imminent, especially after Germany, under the Nazi dictatorship of **Adolf Hitler**, began to prepare for war to regain **power** in the international **Westphalian system of states**. German aggression led to the outbreak of WWII in 1939.

See also ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT; ARMS RACE; FORCE; INTERNATIONAL LABOUR ORGANIZATION (ILO); SECURITY; TOTAL WAR.

WORLD WAR II. Although there are disputes over the exact moment or event that marked the beginning of World War II (WWII), it is customary in the **West** to identify the German *Blitzkrieg* (lightning war) in Poland in 1939 as such. This came after the *Anschluss* (German annexation of Austria) and the German occupation of the Sudetenland region of Czechoslovakia. These two events of 1938 were barely challenged by the **League of Nations**, which had become ineffectual as had been predicted by thinkers such as **E. H. Carr** and **Reinhold Niebuhr**, who revived **classical realism** in response to the failure of idealism or **liberal internationalism** to account for international relations since the end of **World War I**. Carr and Niebuhr explored the flaws in the idealist reliance on unenforceable **international law**, disunited and ineffectual **international organizations**, and the fundamental belief in a harmony of interests between **states**.

The European great powers of the 1930s, notably Britain and France, sought to satisfy Germany's desire to increase its **power**. This involved the policy of appeasement, most famously illustrated by British prime minister Neville Chamberlain's meeting with German Nazi dictator **Adolf Hitler** in Munich in 1938. At the meeting, Chamberlain accepted the German occupation of Sudetenland, in the hope that Germany would cease its **aggression** thereafter. When, however, Germany occupied Poland, Britain fulfilled its pledge to defend the latter country and challenged Hitler's expansionism. Chamberlain declared **war** on Germany, but he resigned in September 1939, to be replaced as British prime minister by **Winston Churchill**, who led his country for the remainder of the war. **Sea power** became an important aspect of the conflict, including the battle of the Atlantic whereby Great Britain (and eventually also the United States) sought to secure shipping routes and blockade the ports of their enemies.

Germany and the Soviet Union signed a nonaggression pact in August 1939. Soviet leader **Joseph Stalin** had approached Great Britain and France with a view to an **alliance** against Germany to prevent Hitler from invading Poland. After Stalin's offer had been rejected, he entered the pact with Hitler. This was convenient for both, as each could take a half of Poland without fighting. Moreover, Stalin suspected that Germany would eventually invade the Soviet Union and entered the pact to buy time to prepare for it.

In 1939, the United States had a relatively small army and military budget. Nazi Germany did not seem to pose a threat. The Soviet Union was contained in Europe. In the Pacific, the United States was a major power, along with the British, French, and Dutch. Japan was tied down to war in China and also lacked natural resources such as oil. Politicians and **foreign policy** makers in

the United States, including President **Franklin D. Roosevelt**, felt no pressing need to enter the war. Hence, until 1941 the United States sold arms to the democracies but kept out of the conflict. Meanwhile, Hitler broke the pact with Stalin, and Germany invaded the Soviet Union in 1940, sooner than Stalin had reckoned.

Japan was seeking to be a major power in Asia and the Pacific and wanted to control China, Indonesia, Malaya, Burma, and the Philippines. Such control would secure access to raw materials, especially oil from Southeast Asia. The United States stood in Japan's way, especially in the Philippines. Japan entered a pact with Germany and Italy for mutual support. On 7 December 1941, Japan attacked the U.S. fleet in Pearl Harbor, Hawaii. The U.S. Pacific Fleet was paralyzed. The following day, Roosevelt gained approval from Congress to declare war on Japan. Three days later, Germany and its ally Italy also declared war on the United States. Later that month, Churchill addressed a joint session of the U.S. Congress. The alliance between the United States and Great Britain was forged and later extended to the Soviet Union.

In 1942, the United States defeated the Japanese navy at the Battle of Midway in the Pacific. Later that year, the British army won the battle of El Alamein in Egypt and linked up with U.S. forces. Churchill, Roosevelt, and some of their allies met at the Casablanca Conference in Morocco in January 1943 to plan strategy for the remainder of the war. Importantly, they decided that a key demand would be unconditional surrender from Germany, Japan, and Italy. Later that year, Germany and its allies were swept from the African continent and an attack on Italy was launched. Churchill, Roosevelt, and their military chiefs began to plan Operation Overlord. This led to the D-Day landings of British, American, and other Allied troops at a number of beaches in Normandy, France, in June 1944. They sustained heavy losses but D-Day was a success for them. Allied troops moved into Europe from both Italy and Normandy.

In February 1945, Roosevelt, Stalin, and Churchill met at the Yalta Conference in the Crimea to plan the final stages of the war in the Pacific and the arrangements for the occupation of Germany afterward. The Yalta agreements were signed to execute the plans. It was agreed that the Soviet Union would enter the war against Japan in return for a sphere of influence in Manchuria when hostilities had ceased. In Europe, France would be allowed a role in the postwar governing of Germany, and the countries bordering the Soviet Union would have governments that would be friendly to Stalin's communist regime in return for the right to hold free and fair elections. Finally, the plans that had begun for a **United Nations Security Council** would give a veto to the permanent member states—the United States, the Soviet Union, China, France, and Great Britain—on decisions emanating from this new body.

Meanwhile, Soviet troops had been moving toward Germany through Poland, Hungary, and Austria and captured Berlin in May 1945. With the defeat of Germany, the United States, Great Britain, the Soviet Union, and their allies were able to concentrate on the campaign against Japan. Instead of invading Japan, which would have cost an estimated 250,000 American lives, the United States dropped two atomic bombs on the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945. Japan declared unconditional surrender later that month and this was signed in September.

WWII ended with the defeat of Germany and Japan. In Europe, Allied armies from the east (the Soviets) and west (the Americans and British) occupied the defeated Germany. Before the end of the war, the **United Nations** was formed in 1945 as an **international organization** designed to overcome and avoid the problems that the League of Nations had experienced. Nevertheless, even before the final victory, the competition between the Allies for postwar influence in Europe was beginning to intensify. This competition rapidly evolved into a new kind of conflict—the **Cold War** between the United States and the Soviet Union.

See also AMERICAN PRIMACY; ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT; ATLANTIC CHARTER; FORCE; GENOCIDE; SECURITY; TOTAL WAR; WAR CRIME; WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION; WESTPHALIAN SYSTEM OF STATES.

Y

YALTA AGREEMENTS. *See* UNITED NATIONS (UN); WORLD WAR II.

Z

ZHOU ENLAI (1898–1976). Zhou Enlai was born in Huai'an province, China, to a family who traditionally worked in the Chinese civil service. After good performance at school, he went to Japan to further his studies in 1917 for two years, but disliked the elitist Japanese culture. He showed an interest in the Bolshevik revolution and began to participate in radical political activity in China. By 1921, he had become committed to communism. He joined the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in the early 1920s and began to make connections with the Comintern in Moscow. In 1921, he went to France and became the CCP's main organizer in Europe until he returned to China three years later. He supported the demand from Moscow that the CCP form an **alliance** with the **nationalist** Guomintang and was active in the alliance until the split following the Guomintang's massacre of communists in Shanghai. Zhou, who was recognized as the de facto leader of the CCP by the early 1930s, embarked on the famous Long March of the CCP in 1934–1935 from Jiangxi to Shaanxi to escape from the Guomintang. By the end of the march, **Mao Zedong** had become de facto leader and Zhou became vice chairman of the CCP—a position he would hold for the remainder of his life.

In 1937, the Sino–Japanese **war** broke out following the Japanese invasion of China. This war lasted until the end of **World War II**. It was followed by the civil war between the CCP and Guomintang in 1946. In 1949, the CCP won the conflict and proclaimed the People's Republic of China under Mao's leadership as chairman. Zhou became prime minister and foreign minister. In the latter role, his skill at **diplomacy** came to be recognized internationally. He continued with his high-level diplomatic activities after his spell as foreign minister ended in 1958. He was, however, unable to mend the rift that had appeared between the ruling communist parties of China and the Soviet Union. Zhou entered into negotiations with the U.S. envoy **Henry Kissinger** in 1971. Zhou arranged the meeting between Mao and President of the United States Richard M. Nixon in 1972, which led to the founding of full diplomatic relations between their two countries. That year, Zhou was diagnosed with cancer that spread and took his life four years later.

See also DENG XIAOPING (1904–1997); FOREIGN POLICY; STALIN, JOSEF (1878–1953).

ZIMMERN, ALFRED ECKHARD (1879–1957). Born in Surbiton, England, Alfred Zimmern was the son of upper-middle-class German Jewish parents. He was educated at Winchester School and Oxford University, gaining a first-class BA in classics in 1902. He was a fellow and tutor at Oxford from 1904 to 1909, before traveling to Greece to write his book *The Greek Commonwealth*, published in 1911. After lecturing for the London School of Economics and working for the Board of Education, Ministry of Reconstruction, and Political Intelligence Department of the Foreign Office, he became the first ever professor of International Relations (IR) at the University of Aberystwyth, Wales, in 1919. He advocated a league of nations and contributed to the doctrine of **liberal internationalism**, which would establish a framework of **international law**. He also, however, said that the British **Empire**, if transformed into a transnational commonwealth, could set international standards of civilization. When the **League of Nations** was formed in 1920, he said it could learn from Great Britain in this respect. Indeed, he was not the straightforward **idealist** or utopian depicted by some such as **E. H. Carr**.

Zimmern left Aberystwyth in 1921 and, after lecturing at Cornell University, became deputy director of the League of Nations Institute for Intellectual Cooperation in Paris. In 1930, he was appointed professor of IR at Oxford University and in 1936 published his best-known book, *The League of Nations and the Rule of Law*. When **World War II** broke out in 1939, his ideals regarding liberal internationalism were shattered. From 1943 until the end of the **war**, he worked in the research department of the British Foreign Office. He became the first secretary-general of the **United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization** (UNESCO) in 1945, was taken ill, and was replaced the following year, but in 1947 moved to the United States to be deputy director of UNESCO's Hertford Council in Connecticut. From 1950 until the end of his life, he also taught at the American International College in Springfield, Massachusetts.

See also ANGELL, RALPH NORMAN (1872–1967); BRAILSFORD, HENRY NOEL (1873–1958); WILSON, THOMAS WOODROW (1856–1924).

Bibliography

CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION

This bibliography is divided into sections in order to help readers find the sources they require for their particular purposes. It starts with a section of general texts on International Relations (IR), as this is where newcomers to the discipline of IR are likely to start. Next there is a section on general international history. The historical background is essential to a full understanding of international relations in theory and in practice. Hence, once readers have begun to get a grasp of that theory and practice from the general texts on IR, it may be useful to turn to one or more of these books on international history.

Once they have the broad grasp of IR and its historical context, many readers will want to begin to explore the classic texts in the study of IR. Hence, there is a section on some of these key works. At this point, readers may divide into, on the one hand, those who are more interested in the theory of IR and, on the other hand, those who want to explore particular topics, such as foreign policy, sovereignty, human rights, and diplomacy. There are sections on these and other important topics.

After the section on the topics, there is one on biographies and autobiographies. This will be useful to readers who become particularly interested in one or more of the women and men who have been prominent in IR. Readers might decide to turn to one of the biographies or autobiographies in the course of their study of the theory and/or topics.

General Texts on International Relations

Some of the textbooks are now well established, having been revised and updated in several editions. A very substantial and valuable one is John Baylis, Steve Smith, and Patricia Owens (eds.), *The Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations*, 6th ed. (2013). Its chapters on the main IR theories and on many different topics make it an excellent resource for readers who are new to the discipline. Another well-established general book is Robert Jackson and Georg Sørenson, *Introduction to International Relations*, 6th ed. (2016). A widely used book that many, including the authors of this dictionary, regard very highly is Chris Brown and Kirsten Ainley, *Understanding International Relations*, 4th ed. (2009). A fifth edition will be available soon after the publication of this dictionary.

Some other books in the list that have been published in their first editions look likely to become well established. For example, Joseph G. Grieco, John Ikenberry, and Michael Mastanduno, *Introduction to International Relations: Enduring Questions and Contemporary Perspectives* (2014) covers a range

of theories and issues concisely, with recent examples. Ken Booth, *International Relations: All that Matters* (2014) is an excellent short introduction that will be very useful for those entirely new to IR.

General International History

Some books in this category have long been established as excellent sources. An example is Peter Calvocoressi, *World Politics since 1945*, 9th ed. (2009). In its several updated editions, this book has been popular with students since the 1980s. More recent books that link international history and IR very well are Andrew J. Williams, Amelia Hadfield, and J. Simon Rofe, *International History and International Relations* (2012), and Howard Leroy Malchow, *History and International Relations: From the Ancient World to the 21st Century* (2016).

Classic Works in International Relations

This section includes a range of books that have been hugely influential on the study, and sometimes also the practice, of IR. Some were written and published in the 20th century. Some of those that stand out are Hedley Bull, *The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics*, 4th ed. (2012, first published in 1977); E. H. Carr, *The Twenty Years' Crisis: An Introduction to the Study of International Relations* (2001, first published in 1939 and 2nd edition in 1945); Susan Strange, *Casino Capitalism* (1986); Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Peace and Power*, 7th ed. (2005, first published in 1948); and Kenneth Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (2010, first published in 1979). Some others on the list were published in previous centuries and have remained influential and resonant ever since. These include Thucydides, *The History of the Peloponnesian War* (2000, written in the fifth century BCE); Niccolò Machiavelli, *The Prince* (2003, first published in 1532); and Immanuel Kant, *Towards Perpetual Peace and Other Writings on Politics, Peace, and History*, 2006, first published in 1795 and second in 1796). Some published in the 21st century are already becoming established as classics, such as J. Ann Tickner, *Gendering World Politics* (2001); Cynthia Enloe, *Bananas, Beaches and Bases: Making Feminist Sense of International Politics* (2014, first published in 2001); and John J. Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics* (2001).

International Relations Theory

The section on IR theory is divided into two. The first division lists general works. A good recent book that investigates the history of international theory before the establishment of the IR discipline and the theory produced from

within the discipline is Lucian M. Ashworth, *A History of International Thought: From the Origins of the Modern State to Academic International Relations* (2014). A popular book on contemporary theory is Tim Dunne, Milja Kurki, and Steve Smith (eds.), *International Relations Theory: Discipline and Diversity*, 4th ed. (2016).

The second division lists studies of particular theorists. Any student of IR theory should gain some awareness of the works of key theorists such as E. H. Carr and Hans Morgenthau. An excellent edited collection of articles on Carr is Michael Cox, *E. H. Carr: A Critical Appraisal* (2000). For Morgenthau, see William Scheuerman, *Morgenthau* (2009).

Specific Topics

The sections of this bibliography on specific topics include textbooks, monographs, and collections of shorter works. Very useful books on foreign policy include Christopher Hill, *Foreign Policy in the Twenty-First Century*, 2nd ed. (2015) and Steve Smith, Amelia Hadfield, and Tim Dunne (eds.), *Foreign Policy: Theories, Actors, Cases*, 3rd ed. (2016). On the state and sovereignty, Stephen Krasner, *Power, the State, and Sovereignty: Essays on International Relations* (2009) brings together a collection of his essays on these topics. For international political economy, the following are good and recent: Thomas Oatley, *International Political Economy*, 5th ed. (2016); and Robert O'Brien and Marc Williams, *Global Political Economy: Evolution and Dynamics*, 5th ed. (2016). An established book on international organizations is Clive Archer, *International Organizations*, 4th ed. (2015). For globalization, a good introductory text is George Ritzer and Paul Dean, *Globalization: A Basic Text*, 2nd ed. (2015).

The bibliography includes a number of introductory books in the Oxford University Press Very Short Introductions series. These include Andrew Clapham, *Human Rights: A Very Short Introduction* (2007); Christopher S. Browning, *International Security: A Very Short Introduction* (2013); John Pinder and Simon Underwood, *The European Union: A Very Short Introduction*, 3rd ed. (2013); Joseph M. Siracusa, *Diplomacy: A Very Short Introduction* (2010); Manfred Steger, *Globalization: A Very Short Introduction*, 3rd ed. (2013); and Richard English, *Modern War: A Very Short Introduction* (2013).

The section on biographies and autobiographies includes books on both practitioners and theorists of IR. Among those on practitioners is John Milton Cooper Jr., *Woodrow Wilson: A Biography* (2011). Those on theorists include Christoph Frei, *Hans J. Morgenthau: An Intellectual Biography* (2001).

There is a section on reference works. This includes a range of historical dictionaries on international topics. Readers of the present dictionary who decide to focus on specific issues may find valuable resources among them. Good recent examples are Finn Laursen, *Historical Dictionary of the European Union* (2015) and Jacques Fomerand, *Historical Dictionary of Human Rights* (2014). Finally, there is a list of academic and intellectual journals. Articles in the journals often focus very closely on particular topics and issues.

A. GENERAL TEXTS ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

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