RISING POWERS AND THE ARAB–ISRAELI CONFLICT SINCE 1947

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Acknowledgments

I arrived to work at the Center for Development Studies (CDS) in Birzeit University on a gloomy wet day in February 2010. A few weeks later, Brazil's President Lula made his last tour of the region and was mobbed while visiting Palestine. In commemoration of Brazil's growing Middle East presence, a road near to the Muqata'a in Ramallah was named after the country.

Having previously worked on Latin American and especially Brazilian politics, I was fascinated by the collision between these two worlds. Over the next couple of years I began thinking about some of the subjects in this book and, when I could get away from my other commitments at the CDS, began studying them in more detail. It wasn't easy to find the time, so Samia Al-Botmeh deserves appreciation for enabling me to do so during her stewardship of the CDS.

However, it wasn't until I was at the University of Kurdistan-Hewler (UKH) where the first fruits of that labor began to emerge. I am thankful that UKH also provided financial support for me to present that work at the Latin American Studies Association conference in Washington in 2013.

Later, when I moved to the University of Nottingham, Malaysia Campus (UNMC), the project really got going. My colleagues, Michael Connors, Sumit Mandal, Trevor Parfitt, Amedeo Policante, Linda Quayle, Francesco Stolfi, and Josh Snider all provided useful feedback and comments to an early version of a paper where some of the ideas in this book were presented at our departmental seminar. I must also thank Michael for approving my research leave to carry out the fieldwork necessary for the project during the summer of 2015. As department head, Michael offered much support by listening to me talk about the project, usually when he gave me a lift back to Kuala Lumpur from the campus at Semenyih.

I must also thank UNMC for providing financial support for me to travel and present papers associated with the project at: the International Political Science Association Research Committee on Geopolitics in Jerusalem in 2013; the China and the Middle East conference at Peking University in 2015; and the 2016 Midwest Political Science Association (MPSA) conference in Chicago.

The following colleagues were generous in inviting me to present my work: Aharon Kliemann at the Hebrew University in Jerusalem; Tugrul Keskin, Peking University and Indiana University China Office; Anoushiravan Ehteshami and Niv Horesh of Durham University; and Tony Rivera of Duke University for including me on his MPSA panel. Niv invited me to present a paper in the China Policy Institute's One Belt, One Road, AIIB Vision: Implications for the Middle East workshop at the University of Nottingham, UK Campus's (UNUK) in 2016. UNUK also funded my travel to the workshop.

Andrew W. Mellon Foundation and the American Political Science Association also provided financial support for me to travel to Israel and the West Bank between June and August 2015, where I carried out the interviews in this book and where I visited the Hebrew University and Birzeit University libraries.

Hind Husseini at the Palestinian Academic Society for the Study of International Affairs (PASSIA) gave me permission to use the organization's maps that appear in the book. In addition to the interviewees, Samir Awad and Murad Shaheen at Birzeit University also took the time to meet with me and discuss some of the ideas within this book.

At Lexington Books, I appreciate Joseph Parry for taking the time to consider and accept the idea of the book, as well as the administrative support provided by Emily Roderick and Madhu Koduvalli. I am also grateful to the anonymous reviewer who provided very useful comments and feedback to the first draft of the whole manuscript and which prompted rework. I hope it is better for it.

Finally, I would like to dedicate this book to three people. My parents, Maureen and Christopher, have provided me with unconditional love and support, even when I made what must have seemed to them a strange decision to leave London for Ramallah. I have many fond memories of the city, not least because it was there that Christina and I first crossed paths. Even as the journey of writing this book comes to an end, I hope that there will be many more such journeys for us to take in the future.

Introduction

What has been the role of rising powers and the Arab-Israeli conflict? What does this tell us about conflict management more generally, and by rising powers (as opposed to great or super powers) more specifically? And what can their approaches to conflict management tell us about rising powers' foreign policy orientations and relationship to the international system?

The subject has gained much interest over the past decade, especially with the emergence of states like the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa). At the same time, the experience of the Arab-Israeli conflict—and that between Israel and the Palestinians in particular—arguably requires fresh thinking. This is not least because of the failure of other powers, including Britain before 1947 and the US as the principal sponsor of the Oslo process since 1993. The book contrasts with much of the contemporary analysis which assumes that such states are *spoilers* of the current international system and instead are concerned with maintaining and reforming it, thereby presenting themselves as internationally concerned *citizens*. With this in mind, the main arguments of the book are set out below.

Rising powers are aspiring global powers who have yet to be admitted to the top international table. That access is influenced by the state of the global system and rising powers may use different types of behavior to achieve this, from presenting themselves as *good international citizens* to acting as *spoilers*, both of which make use of *status seeking* activities.

Rising powers will present themselves as good international citizens to demonstrate their support and reliability for the established global order. By contrast they will act as spoilers if they feel that the international system is designed to constrain them. They will therefore try and challenge and transform the international system in order to change it to be closer to their preferences. Rising powers who pursue either objective are acting out of self-

interest. They are status seekers who want others to acknowledge and recognize their demands and interests. That recognition provides them with the legitimacy and authority to advance toward their aim of rising to the top of the global system.

Conflict and conflict management can be a tool toward rising powers' pursuit of greater international stature and prestige. Conflict management is broadly of two types. *Passive conflict management* involves measures that seek to diminish conflict, most notably its visible and most violent manifestations. However, it does not resolve the causes of conflict. Passive conflict management is therefore synonymous with a negative, or conservative, peace. The types of measures associated with it focus on the proximate symptoms of conflict: limited diplomacy, negotiation, mediation and peacekeeping for example.

Active conflict management aims to tackle the causes of conflict and resolve them. It is more substantive than passive conflict management, since it is engaged in positive, or liberal, peace. In short, it is peacebuilding. The measures that are associated with it are more wide-ranging than in passive conflict management. As well as more expansive diplomacy, negotiation, mediation, and peacekeeping, they can include policies that contribute to social and economic wellbeing and development.

Rising powers' choice of active or passive conflict management reflects its view both of the conflict itself and the wider context, including the regional and global context in which it takes place. Rising powers will use active conflict management when they see an opportunity both to resolve a conflict and to advance its position in the international system. They will employ passive conflict management when they do not see a prospect for conflict resolution, or do not see the conflict as central to their wider goal of improving their global prospects.

In the case of the Arab-Israeli conflict, rising powers have fluctuated in the use of conflict management approaches and tools. Both active and passive conflict management were evident between the 1950s and mid-1970s, which demonstrated both international citizenship and spoiling behavior. On the active side were efforts to find a solution to the problems between Jews and Arabs, resulting in votes for partition in 1947 and the land for peace formula for negotiations between Israel and the Arabs in 1967. The Soviet Union and China also provided assistance to its allies among the Arab states and to the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) in order to transform the balance of power in the region. By contrast, Brazil and India adopted a more passive approach to the conflict. Both provided troops to the UN peacekeeping operations in the region between 1956 and 1967. But rather than contributing to resolve the conflict, their involvement sought to avoid violent conflict between Israel and Egypt. In each case the powers' actions were efforts to use the conflict to enhance their international position: the Soviet

Union in its rivalry with the other superpower, the US; China in its rivalry with Moscow to be the principal communist and Third World leader; India and Brazil in their search for a leading role in the Third World.

From the 1980s passive conflict management became the main feature of these rising powers' approach to the conflict. This reflected a view that their involvement in the conflict would not affect or improve their position in the global order. Increasingly, they began to separate the conflict from the conflict parties, and began to cultivate diplomatic, strategic, and economic ties both sides, but especially with Israel. The separation of the conflict from rising powers' relations with the conflict parties was influenced by several factors, including the end of the Cold War, the establishment of a unipolar world under US hegemony, economic decline, and the Oslo process as the main mechanism for the conflict's management.

Since 2000 circumstances have changed. The Oslo process that began in 1993 remains the main conflict resolution/management tool between Israel and the Palestinians, despite having failed to achieve its objectives. Globally, economic growth contributed to rising powers' increased international influence as well as their self-organization as a club at the end of the decade. US hegemony was in relative decline which also helped their cause. Yet rising powers' improved status was not complete. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict was therefore once again a tool that could be used to help further their goals.

But instead of pursuing active conflict management, rising powers (like Brazil, Russia, and China) continued to pursue passive conflict management by calling for multilateral talks and offering to mediate—measures they did not follow through on. Their room for maneuver was constrained by their previous commitment to Oslo and the separation of the conflict from the conflict parties. At the same time though, a conflict management approach that was inspired by the anti-apartheid campaign in South Africa and represented an alternative to Oslo emerged: the Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions (BDS) movement. Rather than state-to-state relations, the BDS offered state-to-civil society relations. At the time of writing in mid-2017, the impact of this approach remains uncertain and whether rising powers which engage with the BDS movement are engaging in citizenship-oriented or spoiling behavior, the latter through its challenge to the prevailing means of doing business.

Why does the book use the five BRICS countries and the specific case of the Arab-Israeli conflict to examine the opportunities and constraints faced by rising powers in relation to conflict management? There are several reasons for this. First, the Arab-Israeli conflict is one of the longest running and most international conflicts in the world. Since 1947, when the Question of Palestine was referred to the newly formed United Nations for a recommendation on what to do, the international community has had a claim on the subject.

Second, the long running nature of the conflict makes it possible to examine how states—especially rising powers—have dealt with the conflict over time and in relation to both the conflict parties as well as other, hegemonic powers. Moreover, the long term nature of the conflict—70 years and counting—means that it is possible to evaluate rising powers' approaches to conflict management and the wider regional and international systems during different configurations of global power over time: during the Cold War between 1945 and 1989/1991, under a unipolar US hegemony during the 1990s, and in the emerging multipolar moment after 2000. There was also a shift from international relations being primarily between state actors (as was the case in 1947 and the first decades after) toward one which is compositionally more diverse and includes other actors. Since the 1970s and 1980s this has resulted in the rise of transnational and inter-governmental organizations to non-state actors, such as transnational corporations, international NGOs, and social and political groups and movements. In the case of the Arab-Israeli conflict this was evident in its shift from a primarily state-to-state conflict until 1967 followed by the emergence of an aspiring (non-state) state actor, the Palestinian Liberation Organization, in the 1970s, and the Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions (BDS) movement since 2005.

Third, the five rising powers chosen offer a variety of actors drawn from different geographies and regime types, including democracies and non-democracies, capitalist and socialist governments, and different levels of development (i.e., West/East, North/South). Some of the countries constitute only one type of regime throughout (e.g., communist China) while others have undergone change and transformation (e.g., apartheid to post-racial South Africa, military to democratic government in Brazil, communism to capitalism in Russia).

The wide variation between the regime types of the rising powers themselves and the different global and regional configurations in which they have operated toward the conflict means that a wide range of analyses may be performed, including the *most similar* and *most different* methods. In terms of the most similar method, this is evident in the common unit of analysis. The constant variables are the five BRICS countries which are all deemed to be rising powers and the sole case of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Therefore, any differences in terms of conflict management approach, tools, and outcomes must tell us something about the conditions in which the rising powers and the conflict operated. At the same time, in order to complement this, the most different method is also employed. This makes use of differences among the variables investigated. As noted above, rising powers vary, including in the composition of the leadership regime (democracy/authoritarian, communist/capitalist) and their development context (North/South, West/East). Similarly too, the Arab-Israeli conflict has gone through different phases internally, from a state-to-state conflict (1947–1967) to a more

ethno-nationalist conflict within a particular territory (since 1967). Because of these differences, any similarities in terms of conflict management should provide insight into commonalities in the behavior of rising powers.

Much of the material used to undertake this study has drawn extensively on the scholarly literature related to the Arab-Israeli conflict. One of the great advantages of the conflict is that it has attracted a great deal of attention since the start, resulting in it being well documented and written about in great detail. However, against that is one of that literature's key disadvantages: much of it has tended to be written from the point of view of the great and super powers. To complement the review of these materials—some of which offer a contemporary perspective of the conflict at earlier periods—the study also made use of the insights and observations regarding the BRICS countries from a largely scholarly group of Israeli and Palestinian analysts during the summer of 2015. These perspectives arguably offer a grassroots perspective of how informed Israeli and Palestinian opinion formers perceived the role of the countries under consideration in this study. In-text citations are similar to other bibliographic references: they include their surname and the year in which the interview took place (2015). [1]

It is therefore with these themes in mind that the chapters which follow examine the concept, definition, and role of rising powers as characterized by the BRICS group, along with the themes and measures associated with active and passive conflict management. Attention is paid to the international context in which the rising powers operated after 1947 and the impact this had on their use of conflict management, using the Arab-Israeli conflict as the primary means of doing so.

Finally, and before continuing further with the empirical chapters of BRICS engagement with Israel and the Arab states and Palestinians, a note on the term *conflict* is perhaps in order. As Rifat Odeh Kassis has observed

> Conflict may seem like a simple noun, empty of motive or ideology. But the reality is subtly different: the phrase "Palestinian-Israeli conflict," for instance, leads its readers to think of an equal dispute between two equal parties. (Kassis 2013, 79)

I do not hold this assumption. The term *conflict* masks a disparity of power between Israel and the Palestinians, the former a state with wide-ranging resources including statehood, a strong and relatively stable economy and access to substantial military hardware and firepower. This has enabled it to pursue both a military occupation of the West Bank and (since 2005) a siege of Gaza, where the majority of the population is Palestinian. By contrast the Palestinians living in the West Bank, Gaza, and Israel itself find themselves subject to various forms of Israeli discrimination and marginalization. In the occupied West Bank this has meant Palestinians living under military law

while in the same territory Israelis enjoy full citizenship and civil law. Inside Israel public spending on Palestinians and Palestinian towns is proportionally lower, while Palestinians are subject to a greater number of restrictions on house building and house demolitions, for example. My position reflects the analysis of Jeff Halper (2008) and Menachem Klein (2010), who have defined the relationship as one in which Israel holds a *matrix of control* through the presence of settlements and their construction, bypass roads between them and Israel, control of land sea and airspace, and restrictions on Palestinians' rights. It is important to recognize this disparity, since the failure to do so has implicitly influenced how states, from the US as the primary sponsor of third party mediation between Israel and the Palestinians through to the BRICS, relate to the main protagonists in the conflict. Simply put, their actions tend toward a preference for state actors over non-state ones. This has meant that despite rhetoric to the contrary, in practice they have accommodated Israeli preferences (most notably acceptance of the status quo) over Palestinian demands for change.

NOTE

1. The interviewees, their positions, and the dates of the interviews are as follows: Omar Barghouti, Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions movement co-founder (September 29, 2015); Gershon Baskin, Israel/Palestine Center for Research and Information founder and co-chair (July 5, 2015); Yoram Evron, Assistant Professor, Department of Asian Studies, University of Haifa (June 28, 2015); Arie Kacowicz, Professor of International Relations, Hebrew University (June 22, 2015); Ashraf Khatib, Palestinian Negotiations Unit spokesperson (June 23, 2015); Rania Madi, Palestinian lawyer and UN lobbyist (July 10, 2015); Meron Medzini, Professor, Department of Asia Studies, Hebrew University (June 22, 2015); Omar Shaban, Palthink (Gaza-based think tank) director (July 1, 2015); Yitzhak Shichor, Professor Emeritus, University of Haifa and Hebrew University (June 25, 2015); Khalil Shikaki, Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research director (July 28, 2015); and Yaacov Vertzberger, Professor of International Relations, Hebrew University (July 29, 2015).

Chapter One

Framing Rising Powers and Conflict Management

On May 1, 2017, an official event marking Israel's independence took place on Mount Herzl in Jerusalem. It gave way to celebrations that took place across the country, including in Tel Aviv's Yitzhak Rabin Square where children wore inflatable blue and white headbands that echoed the national flag and sprayed each other with foam cannisters marked with the Jewish Star of David. Two weeks later, in the West Bank, groups of young Palestinians met together to march on May 15. Many of them confronted Israeli security forces at checkpoints where they threw rocks to protest, 11 being injured in the melees that followed. They were marking the Nakba, the "Day of Catastrophe," the start of a conflict that began on that day 70 years previously when the British mandate over Palestine expired and a new Israeli state went to war to secure its independence against several Arab armies. At that war's end in March 1949, Israel celebrated its survival while around 700,000 Palestinians now found themselves displaced, most of whom now lived under Israeli, Egyptian, or Jordanian rule.

Historic Palestine in 1949 was now partitioned, much as the international community had proposed that it be nearly 18 months earlier, when the question of what to do with it had been referred by the British mandatory power to the recently formed established United Nations (UN). Several of the BRICS countries were involved in that decision. The Soviet Union and Brazil voted for partition while a Brazilian had overseen the debates within the UN before the vote. India, wary of what partition had meant for itself some months earlier, had voted against. South Africa gave tacit support to the new Israeli state while China remained outside of the process, embroiled in a civil war. The presence of the international community at the dawn of the Arab-

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Israeli conflict ensured that its prominence as an issue on which most states would return to over and over again was assured.

In the decades since the Arab-Israeli conflict became an international issue, the international system that the BRICS countries found themselves in has changed, however. The debate over partition in historic Palestine took place in a globe divided in two, between two superpowers, the US and the Soviet Union which led the capitalist and communist worlds respectively. This remained the dominant theme of international relations until the end of the Cold War and Soviet collapse, in 1989–1991. During the four decades in which global and regional conflict was mediated through the Cold war, US-Soviet relations underwent change, ranging from deeply held suspicion and distrust to efforts to try and live together through coexistence and détente, before returning to coldness once again. With the end of the Cold War the world found itself dominated by the sole US superpower, a state of affairs that at the beginning of the twenty-first century appeared under challenge, as new, rising powers from outside Europe and the Americas, including the developing world, came to the fore.

This book is concerned with the role of some of those rising powers, the BRICS, which despite not becoming a collective group until recently, offers a fascinating insight into the way that different states other than global powers have dealt with this internationalized conflict. Therefore, in this book I offer a broad historical view of the Arab-Israeli conflict as it has been seen by these rising powers (and until 1991, a junior superpower in the case of Russia's predecessor state, the Soviet Union) since its beginning and how they have dealt with it.

While the book focuses on the case of rising powers and the Arab-Israeli conflict, the ambitions for it stretch further. In addition to the specific cases examined, it considers the notions of conflict and conflict management, especially the two main approaches that can be used in relation to it: active and passive measures. It also examines under what circumstances a rising power will choose to adopt an active or a passive conflict management approach. Much of that choice is ultimately based in how a rising power perceive the international system and whether it is conducive for them to undertake one approach or the other.

As rising powers, they aspire toward gaining greater international status and prestige from other states. To achieve that end depends on whether the right environment exists for them to do so. I therefore argue that *if the international system is perceived as open for them to rise up, they will take a more active role in conflict management. If they believe that the international system does not offer much space for them to rise, they will instead opt for a more passive approach to conflicts and their management*.

Among the points made in this book is that conflict management is active if the end goal is the resolution of conflict, by tackling its causes and trans-

forming it into a situation which is beneficial to all the sides involved in a conflict. The type of peace associated with this is known as positive, or liberal peace. By contrast, where the main goal is to prevent the physical manifestation of conflict, to contain it, then the resulting peace is negative or conservative. The conflict management approach associated within this is passive, since it does not make any significant change to the underlying dynamics of a conflict.

If active and passive conflict management have different goals, the methods they use to realize those ends are broadly the same. They include the use of political and diplomatic activity (negotiations, mediation), strategic objectives (e.g., peacekeeping or military intervention), social and economic tools, and the use of (international) law/judicial decisions.

Conflict and its management by rising powers are the central themes of the book. But complementing this focus are additional observations made about rising power behavior toward the international system more generally. Depending on how they perceive themselves and the global order—especially if they see it as either accommodating or constraining themselves—they may adopt one of two orientations: as *good international citizens* (reflecting their desire to be seen as responsible stakeholders through support for the dominant global and regional configuration and a desire to end tensions since conflict threatens that arrangement) or as *spoilers* (who have less sympathy for the existing system and see conflict as a means to transform it). Regardless of whether a state exercises international citizenship or behaves as a spoiler, all states, including rising powers, are *status seekers*: they are aware that the actions are a type of performance which they use as a means of drawing attention to themselves and acquiring acceptance for their wish to be accepted as influential regional and global players.

In order to situate the study of the BRICS and the Arab-Israeli conflict, this introductory chapter reviews the literature on rising powers and their approach to conflict management. First, it examines the idea of *middle* and *rising power* and the characteristics and historical development associated with them. Historically, the term *middle power* was often used, to account for those which were situated between the great/superpowers at the apex of the global state system and smaller states lower down. In particular it draws attention to three approaches that explain middle powers: in quantifiable/ objective (i.e., measurable) terms; in subjective/perception-based terms; and in terms of behavior. These factors condition how such powers engage with other actors in the international system and how they perceive the global order and the norms of the institutions which make it up. Are powers supportive of the system or opposed to it? What may influence such views depends on whether they are established or "traditional" middle powers with a stake in the existing international system, or "new" ones, who are more inclined to challenge and seek transformation of the system. The BRICS countries are

different from "traditional" middle powers and should be categorized as rising powers. However, contrary to the expected view of such "new" powers, their attitude appears more ambiguous. In some instances they appear supportive of the international system and aspire to obtain leadership positions within it. At the same time they also seek to change it (Kahler 2013, Breslin 2013, Vezirgiannidou 2013). Indeed, they have been developing their own institutions, like the New Development Bank and the Contingency Reserve Arrangement, which offer an alternative to present system. The section also engages with what is an emerging normative debate concerning rising powers like the BRICS: are they a force for good?

The chapter then examines the concepts of conflict and conflict management. It identifies the themes and features associated with conflict management, including the use of political activity, diplomacy, international law, strategic and military measures. It notes the extent to which conflict management can be coercive or non-coercive, interventionist or non-interventionist, infringing on another's autonomy or not. With these themes in mind the section then offers a broad overview of the different types of conflict that have occurred since 1945 and the types of conflict management that have been undertaken, including by BRICS countries. From this survey it becomes evident that there are other conflict management methods alongside those identified in the literature, including the use of economic incentives and/or sanctions. When the concepts of negative/conservative and positive/liberal peace are also considered, it becomes apparent that conflict management is far more extensive than the methods initially outlined. While negative/conservative peace is primarily concerned with containing conflict and especially violence, positive/liberal peace is broader, since it includes activities that may be closer to development thinking. The section concludes by summarizing these various elements into a typology, against which rising powers' use of conflict management can be evaluated.

The next section then provides a more substantive justification for the case selection used in this book. It builds on the previous observations of the BRICS as a representative sample of rising powers which offer diversity and the Arab-Israeli conflict as an internationalized one since its commencement. Following this summary, the chapter ends with a brief overview of the chapters which make up the remainder of the book.

FROM MIDDLE TO RISING POWERS

Much attention in the discipline of International Relations (IR) has been given over to those states which occupy the apex of the global hierarchy. In the past they were *great powers*, then subsequently *superpowers* such as the US and Soviet Union after 1945. The rivalry between these two superpowers

represented capitalist and communist interests and dominated global politics for 40 years. During their Cold War, there was much suspicion and tension between the US and Soviet Union, although direct and violent conflict between them was prevented. Instead, it spilled over elsewhere, usually in the form of proxy conflicts at a regional level (e.g., the Arab-Israeli conflict, Vietnam, Korea). With the Cold War's end a new global configuration emerged in the 1990s that was economically and politically liberal in its norms and institutions, reflecting those of the hegemonic power, the US. But US dominance was short lived; by the beginning of the twenty-first century US hegemony was in relative decline and being replaced by a more multipolar world. Rising powers, especially those from the developing world, had become more prominent, alongside a rejuvenated Russia.

Below the apex of hegemonic powers are what scholars have called middle powers. For several decades this term was used to describe a number of states, all of which were on different trajectories. Some of them were great powers in decline (e.g., Britain, France) while others were emerging within their region or became new players following decolonization across Africa and Asia in the 1950s and 1960s.

The variety of different kinds of middle powers meant that it was difficult to ascribe any clear definition to them and their behavior (Holbraad 1984, Hurrell 2000). In the early post-1945 period identifying middle powers was based largely on their contribution to the issue of collective security. This reflected the primacy of realism in international politics at the time and states' search for survival. Gareth Evans (2011) noted that much of this could be attributed to the actions of countries like Canada and Australia who contributed to the building of international institutions in the decades following 1945. They were seen as sources of stability during the Cold War by providing mediation and interacting between the two superpowers (Stephen 2013). This meant that there was some room for maneuver for middle power states, although this was limited owing to the relatively small number of independent states at the time.

Beginning in the 1950s—but especially in the 1960s—that began to change. Decolonization took place and led to an explosion in the number of new states in the international system and the emergence of a North-South divide in addition to the existing East-West one. In the academy, this invited more attention on the concept and practice of middle powers (Holbraad 1984).

Mostly based in Africa and Asia, many of these new states which attained the status of middle powers represented anti-colonial movements and were more confrontational toward the bipolar division of the world. At the same time they exploited the system, by playing the superpowers off each other to improve their relative position by gaining much needed financial assistance and funds. Seeing themselves as distinct from the superpowers, they iden-

tified themselves as *Third World*; that is, neither in the capitalist camp of the West nor in the socialist bloc dominated by the Soviet Union (and challenged by China). The first sign of this new Third World bloc took place with the creation of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) at Bandung in 1955.

And yet, like other, earlier middle powers, their scope for complete independence from the prevailing system was not possible. Manipulation of the superpowers meant leaning toward one or the other (e.g., India and Egypt toward the Soviet Union). This echoed the observation made by realists that where a hierarchy exists, states will bandwagon behind a more powerful state. Because of their limited global influence, attention was increasingly paid to the regional dimension and the extent to which a middle power could impact its immediate neighborhood.

How this was to be measured presented a challenge. Different researchers had different approaches, resulting in a lack of consistency and consensus (Keohane 1969). One way was to seek more quantifiable, objectively measurable methods. Researchers like Eric Hanson and John Burton opted for the use of economic weight and military capacity respectively (Holbraad 1984, 73–74). The preference for the economic was also shared by Holbraad (1984), who added to it by including population size and ranking countries in separate regions. This enabled him to distinguish between great powers and small states across regions, thereby identifying middle powers as well. But there was considerable variation in GNP and population across regions, meaning that some states which were bigger than others were left out of his classification while others that were bigger in their home region were smaller when compared globally. Using data from 1975, Holbraad identified the following as middle powers: South Africa and Nigeria in Africa, India and Iran in Asia (China being treated as a potential great power owing to its population size), West Germany, France, UK, Italy, Spain, and Poland in Europe, Canada and Mexico in North America, and Brazil and Argentina in South America. Already then, a generation before the BRIC concept was coined, four of what would become today's BRICS were perceived to be significant powers, at least at the regional level.

During the 1960s, the superpowers found it harder to control their respective camps. Both the US and Soviet Union experienced economic downturns, weakening their relative influence on the international system and their own allies and proxies; from the early 1970s a coordinated Arab oil boycott pushed energy prices up, contributing to growing economic difficulties. The changing environment provided greater latitude for other states to pursue more independent political and economic action. Many middle powers in the Third World took advantage of their own relatively fast growing economies to take out private loans to finance their development, including rising energy prices. The US faced a challenge in the west from Brazil and France while

the Soviets faced difficulties from Yugoslavia under Tito to its schism with Beijing.

By the mid-1980s though, it was the turn of the middle powers to see a downturn. Many Third World economies were contracting which had an impact on their ability to act. Slower economic growth and the rising burden of debt forced many governments to retrench. For many states in Latin America, Africa, and Asia the International Monetary Fund (IMF) became a visible presence, offering financial packages but in exchange for strong conditions to restructure their economies, cutting spending in the economic and social spheres. Recovery eventually took place, but mainly during the 1990s, which also coincided with the end of the Cold War and which also undermined non-capitalist models of development. The promotion of market capitalism and liberal democracy across the developed and developing worlds prompted wider consideration about factors that complemented the two, such as good governance, which found their way into middle power analysis. One relatively recent such effort at classifying middle powers was undertaken by Rocha and Morales (2010), who expanded Holbraad's earlier categorization to establish three indices. The first was an Index of World Power, based on tangible factors like GDP, territorial size, population size, defense, and trade levels. The second, Institutional Quality, involved more intangible aspects, like their influence in the World Bank, political and press freedom, perception of corruption, economic freedom. The third was an Index of Globalization: economic, political, and social. In addition they calculated the number of transnational corporations based in countries as a way of identifying a state's international projection.

The updated analysis distinguished between three types of powers: global, middle, and regional. The global powers had a high degree of development and were deeply integrated into the global capitalist system. They had large power resources, both tangible and intangible, which could be employed as both hard and soft power. Such states dominated the primary international institutions like the UN Security Council (UNSC), the Bretton Woods system, and the G7. Notable examples included the major European states, along with Canada, Japan, and the US. Middle powers were those which were also "central" states and plugged into the international system, but which occupied space behind those in the G7: Austria, Denmark, Sweden, Holland, Norway, Israel, Spain, and South Korea. Regional—or rather regional-global—powers were those who could be labeled as semi-peripheral and half-developed. Their main focus is at the regional level, even though they are broadly supportive of multilateral cooperation and reform of existing institutions. Among the countries included in this groups were Poland, Saudi Arabia, Argentina, Turkey, and the BRICS—in other words, the countries which made up the G20. Of these countries, the most likely to eventually rise to the top of this international hierarchy would be China (Moloeznik 2012).

The distinction between "central" middle powers and regional/global powers would become significant for distinguishing BRICS and their behavior toward the international system.

Beyond efforts to "measure" middle powers have been other, recent attempts to distinguish them by perceptions and behavior. This leads toward a more subjective and relative view of such powers, which is closer to the constructivist end of IR literature. Evans (2011) noted that in addition to the variation involved in defining a middle power based on the different forms of measurement used, the use of subjective notions like "perceived" views of such middle powers and the "respect" accorded to them by others were also important. In particular, respect is an unspoken assumption, that within all powers whether great, middle, or small desire to improve their status. This emphasis on the subjective dimension of middle powers was echoed by Eytan Gilboa (2009): since power is by its nature both relative and perceived, it is possible for a middle power to be "greater" in relation to some states and "weaker" to others; for example, Greece may be stronger than Cyprus but weaker than Germany. This heralded a shift in thinking from middle power attributes being based on material qualities like economic or military strength (features associated with both realist and liberal theories of IR) to ones that were bound up in less material notions such as self-constructed identity being accepted or rejected by others (i.e., the constructivist interpretation of IR). Andrew Hurrell (2000, 2–3) captured this change when he wrote that:

> You can claim Great Power status but membership of the club of Great Powers is a social category that depends on recognition by others—by your peers in the club, but also by smaller and weaker states willing to accept the legitimacy and authority of those at the top of the international hierarchy.

The previous approaches have stressed middle powers as quantifiable (and objectively measurable) and qualitative in terms of perception, both by themselves and others. A third way to think of middle powers is behavioral: this seems evident in Eduard Jordaan's (2003) study of what middle powers are and their behavior. He claimed that middle powers share a common behavioral trait, namely support and legitimacy for the global order and international institutions, encouraging cooperation and multilateralism. At the same time he observed two distinct groups of middle powers. On one side there were those which are "traditional," that is, rich, politically stable, and egalitarian but not regionally significant. On the other, there were others which are emerging, recently democratized, internally unequal and regionally important (see also Narlikar 2013a). According to Gilboa (2009), countries like Canada, Norway, Sweden, the Netherlands, and Japan constituted Jordaan's first group while Brazil, South Africa, and India made up the second group. The latter group may also be classified as *rising powers*, since their relative

position in the international system appears to be on an upward trajectory, in contrast to the first group's relatively static, or in some cases, declining, position. But another way to differentiate between the two groups is also possible: between the first group which has a deeper stake in the architecture of the international system, having contributed to its formation; and the latter group, which arriving late, has less of a stake in it and is therefore more ambivalent. Notwithstanding this difference, there do seem to be some common features when it comes to both "traditional" and "rising" middle power diplomacy and their foreign policy behavior. In the post–Cold War era, middle powers are perceived as committed to compromise and mediation between North (i.e., US, Europe) and South (i.e., developing countries). Their behavior points to the notion of middle powers as those whose behavior therefore emphasizes good international citizenship through the use of multi-lateralism to solve common problems (Evans 2011, Stephen 2013). Such diplomacy stresses these states' relative autonomy: they are not big or strong enough to impose their preferences unilaterally, and so must work with others to tackle international issues. Although they have global weight, they are unlike great powers (Flemes 2007). As Hugh White (2010) argues:

> Middle powers have enough weight to influence what happens around them so as to protect their interests. They can negotiate with great powers, not simply obey them. Small powers just take what happens. . . . Being a middle power means being able to do things that a great power doesn't agree with, or even opposes, without the backing of another great power. (pp. 67–68)

A middle power's influence was relative though. Recognizing the difference between such powers (including their interests and capacity) and their behavior is relevant when considering the scope of middle power influence, especially when global issues were largely focused on collective security. In the modern period this suggests that middle powers were not in a position to intervene in conflicts and so tended to contribute by defusing political tensions or contributing toward peacekeeping (Cooper, Higgot, and Nossal 1993).

Following the end of the Cold War and the expansion of broader "security" issues, this has now meant an expanded variety of activities that middle powers can engage in with a clearer delineation of global responsibility. Whereas the great powers tended to focus on primary concerns like security issues, middle powers had more scope to address more secondary issues like economic development, foreign aid, human rights, human security, environmental protection, and public health (Gilboa 2009, Cooper, Higgot, and Nossal 1993).

How they do this can vary widely, by covering a wide range of issues or concentrating on a few key ones, and through action which is extremely

visible or discrete—although arguably there is a clear distinction between the types of activities that middle powers concern themselves with compared to other, great powers. To achieve their goals they are likely to build coalitions with like-minded states. In the past this may have been based on shared cultural (e.g., religious, political ideology) or ethnic lines; today it will cover similar views on common concerns such as climate change, health pandemics and terrorism (Evans 2011).

In pursuing these goals, middle powers will act as status-seekers (Flemes 2007). They are more concerned with signaling to others in the international system of their relative importance and weight. In their study of states' pursuit of status, Larson, Paul, and Wohlforth (2014) point to its collective, subjective, and relative dimensions. For a state to achieve higher status, it requires that other states (i.e., collective) recognize it (i.e., subjective) as such, placing it higher up the global hierarchy (i.e., relative). But it cannot be forced; rather a state's status is the result of the "voluntary deference" of others. While this means that status-seeking states are not the masters of their own fate, they can help themselves toward others' recognition and acknowledgment through the use of "status signaling" or "status-seeking behavior." This is a visible and symbolic activity, often directed toward the greater powers at the top of the global hierarchy who will recognize their demands. Examples of the way that rising powers may try to acquire status is varied: it may include seeking or reiterating their membership of more elite parts of the state system, such as being a permanent member of the UNSC, the G8, or G20 or acquiring leadership in international organizations. They may try to acquire high tech weaponry or hosting international events and summits. And perhaps most pertinently for the purposes of this book, it may mean pursuing diplomatic initiatives, by seeking a resolution to a long-standing conflict. At the same time, it is also important to search for the motivations behind an activity undertaken by a status-seeking power; they may be read in more than one way. Indeed, it may be the case that status-seeking powers pursue conflict management as a way to acquire international acceptance of their status and which they may leverage in other settings. At the same time, because status is depending on others' recognition, a status-seeking state's pursuit of an activity may be miscommunicated or misinterpreted (Larson, Paul, and Wohlforth 2014, 22).

At the same time, status-seeking states need legitimacy beyond the great powers in order to acquire authority in the eyes of others (Clunan 2014, 275–77, Neumann 2014, 88). Therefore, they seek broader international acceptance of their international position. How they do this may vary though. Both agency and structural opportunities and constraints within the international system matter. For example, where two or more great powers are in broad concert, there is relatively little scope for middle powers to make their mark. By contrast, where there is greater distance between the great powers,

middle powers are arguably in a stronger position to pursue their own inter-ests at the sub-systemic level, whether in alignment or non-alignment with great powers (Holbraad 1984, 212–13).

Viewing how middle and rising powers pursue status can be observed dispassionately and normatively, the latter perceived in either positive or negative terms. Stephen (2013) sets this out in two ways: for more critical observers who hold a skeptical view of rising powers and their ambitions, they may be portrayed as spoilers; this is evident in their desire to break down the established order like the WTO, IMF, and World Bank since they do not believe it represents them. By contrast, another, more positive and optimistic perspective assumes that status-seeking behavior constitutes re-form rather than revolution: rather than break the system they want to join it. This is considered further in the next section.

THE BRICS AS *RISING POWERS*

So where do the BRICS fit into the range of middle powers as laid out above? Are they international citizens who support the global system or spoilers who reject it? As was noted, there are several kinds of middle pow-ers that have been identified in the literature. The group of countries which has become known as the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) constitute those which are "rising" and which are at odds with the more central, "traditional" powers like the European states. Their historical trajectory is contrary to that of the Western rising powers: situated in the global South and from the developing world, they include relatively new arrivals (like India) or older, more established states (like China and Brazil). Similarly, Russia may be considered in this group since its rising status reflects a recovery of influence after a decade of stagnation following the collapse of the Soviet Union. They also constitute a subset of the broader category of rising powers, with which other countries like Indonesia, Turkey, and Mexico, for example, have also been identified.

If the BRICS are but a part of this broader group of status-seeking states, why choose them instead of others to examine the role of rising powers? In part this is because they have been previously identified as significant re-gional and aspiring global players in the literature; Holbraad (1984) had them listed as far back as the mid-1970s. In addition and more recently, they have been identified as a group just as the changes in the international system were becoming apparent after 2000. As a collective, they have not only arranged regular summits, but also generated joint declarations and proposed shared initiatives, especially in international finance through their Contingent Re-serve Arrangement (CRA) and New Development Bank (NDB). This has raised questions regarding their overall objective in relation to the global

system. While they have been critical of the current international arrange-
ments, they also seek to reform and transform them. Examining their ap-
proach to other aspects of global politics, including their response—individu-
al and collective—to conflicts like the one between Israel and the Arabs, can
offer a wider insight in this regard.

The BRICS' rise has been synonymous with a more multipolar world that
seemed to be emerging into view as a result of supposed economic and
military decline of the US and the West. Since 2000 the global environment
was one in which power distributions were in flux and therefore more condu-
cive to governments seeking to acquire a more prominent role in the global
hierarchy of state (Larson and Shevchenko 2014, 56).

The BRICS began not as a self-identified group of countries which sought
to challenge the global system. Rather they were a neat acronym for a group
of emerging markets which was popularized by economic and financial ana-
lysts, most especially Jim O'Neil at Goldman Sachs who coined the term in
2001. As these countries grew economically over the course of the 2000s
they began to take ownership of the label. This occurred through increased
dialogue between the countries' leaderships at international meetings, and
which ultimately culminated in the formal establishment of annual summits.
The leaders of the four BRIC countries met for the first time on the side of
the G8 summit in Japan in 2008. In 2009 the leaders met again in Russia in
what would become annual summits, South Africa being invited to join in
2011 and providing a complete geographical spread of the global South
(South America, Africa, and Asia). South Africa's acceptance was eased by
its previous involvement with other BRICS partners, especially Brazil, India,
and China in the IBSA group after 2003 and the BASIC grouping which
emerged during the climate change talks in 2007. There was therefore al-
ready a degree of prior trust and understanding, along with a desire to ensure
geographic representation across the world by including an African partner
(Stuenkel 2013).

Initially the BRICS concerns revolved around coordination on economic
and financial matters where they had common interests (BRIC 2008). In
2009 they set out a broader agenda, including reform of international finan-
cial institutions as was previously noted with the NDB and CRA. In addition,
they offered joint support to keep the multilateral trading system open and
cooperation in those sectors of common concern, such as sustainable devel-
opment, food security, investment in the energy sector, and humanitarian
assistance. At the first summit in 2009, the BRIC countries stated their com-
mitment to a democratic and multipolar world with a prominent position for
the UN and multilateral diplomacy based on international law (BRIC 2009).
Several years later though, the BRICS leaders were becoming frustrated with
the relatively slow pace of reform, especially in relation to the IMF. At the
2014 summit the BRICS launched their most tangible outputs through the

NDB and CRA, which was seen by some as a challenge to the Bretton Woods institutions—but by others (including the BRICS themselves) as a complement.

Set against this reformist version, Patrick Bond and Ana García (2015) have argued that the BRICS are rapacious and potentially malign. Constituting a form of "sub-imperialism," their argument is that the BRICS use globalization and capitalism to advance their own regional and global positions at the expense of poorer countries. This is reflected in their approach that BRICS countries take in the developing world: James Parisot (2015) observes that BRICS companies' involvement in regions like Africa has been less about offering an alternative to the Washington Consensus and more about acquiring access to the region's resources, usually at the expense of human rights. An example of this would be Brazil's Companhia Vale do Rio Doce, which was criticized for pursuing lower standards abroad than at home, by pressing for weaker union rights in Canada and gaining President Lula's support in pressuring the Mozambique government to give way on rules requiring the hiring of local workers (Proyect 2015). The performance of Brazilian companies like this echoed similar criticisms against China's growing presence in Africa during the 2000s.

These observations demonstrate the difficulty in normative labeling of these states as either "positive" or "negative" in relation to the global order. The results so far suggest that they have been willing to work with existing institutions, by seeking their reform. They have not challenged the prevailing norms and principles of these institutions, which are based on the liberal order put in place at Bretton Woods in 1944. Rather their main concern seems to be their exclusion from leadership roles. That consideration and the engagement of these rising powers to date reflects some of the insight derived from studying states' desire for greater recognition by other states—great and small—within the international system. Clunan (2014, 291–92) observes that rising powers' decision to support or reject the status quo is due in large part to whether they perceive other states to be a primary threat. Their search for status—and through it the legitimacy and authority to pursue their particular objectives—is not directed solely at the global hegemon, but at other rising powers in the global hierarchy as well. The need to consider others makes for more dense interactions between rising powers and the international system, thereby diminishing the risk of zero-sum calculations between two parties. Furthermore, it means that confrontation is not the only option; collaboration is possible as well as means of enhancing their position. So far, this has been evident in the approach pursued by the BRICS rising powers, with traditional rivals like Russia and China, China and India, finding ways to work together.

Yet even as the BRICS work together, whether on joint objectives or in the same manner, they have maintained their independence as separate states.

They have not sought to integrate their efforts politically or economically, to establish inter-governmental institutions like ASEAN or the EU. In addition, the absence of three of the BRICS as permanent members from the UNSC (Brazil, India, and South Africa) means that it is relatively harder for the group to act as a bloc.

Despite the logic of collective action, the BRICS countries have also shown an aversion to external intervention and prioritized the primacy of the state in international diplomacy. This was most notably tested in the period following the 2011 Arab Uprising and especially in the Libyan civil war. The debate about foreign intervention raged, leading to a UNSC resolution (1973) to allow intervention. The debate and resolution was also significant because four of the five BRICS states (Brazil, Russia, India, and China) were on the UNSC at the time, and all abstained in the vote—although generally the sentiment was moderately supportive of the resolution (Stuenkel 2013). Yet this masked significant differences among the BRICS themselves. On one hand, all five were in broad support of the need to prevent civilian populations being subjected to violence by states and armed opposition groups and favored political solutions prior to any military intervention (Stuenkel 2015). On the other hand, the BRICS abstentions on UNSC resolutions in relation to Libya and Syria (notwithstanding South Africa's vote for the resolution on Libya) masked important differences: Russia and China were more reluctant to condone military intervention while Brazil was keen to debate its parameters.

CONFLICT AND CONFLICT MANAGEMENT

The case of Libya and the BRICS response to it was telling, since it offered a contemporary and regional insight into these countries' approach to conflict. But where do the BRICS sit more generally in relation to conflict and its management?

Of the conflicts that have taken place between 1945 and 2003, around two-thirds have been between states (Bercovitch and Fretter 2004, 8, 9). The Middle East made up nearly 20 percent of those conflicts. What drove conflict between these dates were both old and new challenges (Crocker, Hampson, and Aall 2007), reasons including state failure, uncertain transitions, security dilemmas, economic disparities, religious/cultural factors, political instability, unsecured democratization, and regionally intractable divisions.

Despite changes and persistence in conflict, the general trend has been a decline since the end of the Cold War. This is explained in several ways. One was the end of bipolar superpower rivalry between the US and Soviet Union which meant that there was less demand for third party proxies alongside less US interest in some conflicts. A second is that many of the conflicts which

remained were long-lasting and impossible to win by one side or the other, thereby making the parties more open to the notion of external mediation. A third was a greater acceptance concerning the role of external involvement in conflict management, especially in contrast to perceived failure in previous interventions (Crocker, Hampson, and Aall 2007, 7).

The last points to the subject of conflict management, which has received considerable attention among scholars and practitioners, especially to analyze which ones work. Viewed broadly, conflict management ranges across a spectrum from a "hard"/coercive pole to an opposite "soft"/non-coercive/persuasive end (Crocker, Hampson, and Aall 2007, 8, Butler 2009, 14). A variety of different methods, tools and fields are covered in relation to these two approaches, much of which stems from the extent to which conflict management efforts are committed to conditions relating to the use of external force and state sovereignty. More specifically, Michael Butler (2009, 3) draws attention to four main ways in which conflict management has been perceived: peacekeeping, mediation, peace enforcement, and adjudication. William Dixon (1996) notes at least seven types of conflict management. They include: public appeals (the most minimal form of conflict management) to communication, observation, intervention (such as peacekeeping or sanctions), humanitarian aid and adjudication (usually by international judicial bodies), and mediation. Joseph Lepgold (2003, 10), meanwhile, suggests three broad types of activities associated with conflict management: prevention (which can be diplomatic or military), peacekeeping, or enforcement. Diehl (2003, 273–79) distinguishes between alliances, regional collective security, peacemaking, and diplomacy (including coercive methods like sanctions and military action) as ways that states have responded. Ho-Won Jeong (2010, 27) considers strategies to conflict that a party can take which can range from "standing firm, negotiation, and disengagement, to submission." Bercovitch and Fretter (2004) point to the use of international law and organizations as well as diplomacy as a means to manage conflict, thereby summarizing conflict management tools as three-fold: state-based (diplomatic), legal (international law), and political (international and regional organizations).

In all these instances, conflict management may be coercive, in that it seeks to constrain or limit conflict, either with the aim of preventing violence or toward building peace. At the other end are measures which are not as confrontational, even though they look the same as "harder" versions. Examples of this might be mediation or peacekeeping. A soft version of mediation is "facilitative," where a third party offers to sit in between the conflict parties and provide a space for dialogue. A harder version—"manipulative" mediation—would involve them drafting an agenda in partnership with one or more of the conflict parties and putting pressure on the others to accept it. Similarly, "soft" peacekeeping would not transform the conflict's dynamics;

the example of Srebrenica in 1995, where Dutch solders stood by while Serbs attacked the local Muslim population was especially egregious. By contrast, a more coercive form of peacekeeping took place in Sierra Leone between 1999 and 2005 and has been generally deemed a success, through disarming militias and destroying weapons and munitions.

PREVIOUS CONFLICT MANAGEMENT BY BRICS RISING POWERS

Conflict management consists of a variety of different tools and techniques. There are coercive and non-coercive approaches, measures which express an actor's capacity to intervene and which correspondingly result in a constraint on another's autonomy/sovereignty. Summarizing them, conflict management may involve military intervention, or it may be diplomatic/political in scope, ranging from multilateral negotiations to bilateral talks, from mediation to shuttle diplomacy and from individual states to international and regional organizations and the use of law.

Given the variety of such methods, how have rising powers made use of them? Are some more common than others? Are there others which are overlooked in the list above which are also pertinent?

First, when examining conflict management it is important to note that it is a phenomenon which has been mostly dominated by traditional powers, whether great powers like the Europeans or superpowers like the US and Soviet Union during the Cold War. In their survey of all mediation efforts worldwide since 1945, Greig and Diehl (2012) note that states have been more likely to pursue third party mediation than international organizations and NGOs. Of state-sponsored mediation, most of the effort has been made by five major powers: the US, Soviet Union/Russia, France, Britain, and China (Greig and Diehl 2012, Regan 1996, Frazier and Dixon 2006). Since the end of the Cold War most third party states have been less inclined to use military intervention (Russia is the exception, see below). This is in marked contrast to the longer period since 1945.

Second, in terms of mediation by third party states, the US has been the most active and globally involved of the powers, being involved in 12 percent of mediation efforts since 1945. The Soviet Union accounted for less, at around 4 percent and concentrated in the Middle East, Cambodia, and Cyprus during the 1970s and 1980s. With the end of the Cold War, it focused more on the "near abroad" in the Caucasus (Greig and Diehl 2012). China, while intervening considerably less compared to these other powers, has still involved in such activity, but mainly at a regional level. This included Indochina and the Cambodian civil war, and in the 1990s between India and Pakistan. During the decades after 1945 much of its intervention took the

form of providing military support to opposition forces, but almost all of which failed to achieve the objectives of its protégés (Regan 1996).

Third, more than 90 percent of conflict management efforts between 1945 and 2003 were eventually subjected to mediation and negotiation (i.e., through diplomatic methods and which emphasize the role of states) rather than international law or organizations (Bercovitch and Fretter 2004, 29). However, it is notable that despite the preference for diplomacy, it is not significantly better at delivering results, since there is little correlation between the type of method used and resulting success or failure.

Fourth, when considering whether to intervene in a civil war or not, Greig and Rost's (2013) post–Cold War study hypothesized that mediation or peacekeeping was likely to occur if a number of conditions were met. One, if the third party had a historic or strategic association in the place where the conflict took place (e.g., in a former colony). Two, if neighboring states had a vested interest to intervene. Three, if they were especially violent owing to ethnic conflict or genocide. And four, if they were perceived as relatively simple to resolve (i.e., fewer factions, multiple conflicts, etc.). Empirically though, they found that third parties were not bound by past connections and the extent to which genocide may take place—but that they would be more likely to send peacekeepers where there were refugees and mediators to where there is a powerful government army or a long running conflict.

Some of these conditions satisfy rising powers, especially the historic and regional association. At the same time such states may be inclined to intervene in order to raise their international profile and acquire recognition from their peers that they are worthy of higher status (Larson, Paul, and Wohlforth 2014, Clunan 2014).

When intervening, invariably such powers express a desire to end or prevent conflict, by pursuing measures which defuse tensions and hostilities and has been reflected in the use of both non-coercive and coercive measures. The latter has been evident in a number of cases, principally through direct intervention into conflicts, whether on the side of the government or opposition and using either military or economic strategies, or a combination of the two (Regan 1996). Of the five, the Soviet Union/Russia has had the most global reach in this regard, which would make sense given its superpower status before 1990. With military and economic options on the table, Moscow tended toward the use of military means most often during the Cold War, with economic and mixed strategies (political, sanctions, etc.) used less often. The range of its interventions was broad and coercive, from Budapest in 1956 to Laos, Eritrea, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Angola, Ethiopia, Afghanistan, Mozambique, and Nicaragua. Following the end of the Cold War, Moscow found its scope more limited, dealing with conflict in Georgia, Moldova, and Tajikistan during the early 1990s. The success of these interventions varied, some more successful than others (Regan 1996), success usually

defined as reduction in violence—even if peace and justice were more ephemeral.

Since the end of the Cold War Moscow's international influence has waned, with the bulk of its interventions concentrated in the former Soviet Union. The dissolution of the Soviet Union coincided with more conflict on its periphery, including in Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Moldova during the 1990s. Being part of Russia's "near abroad," Moscow took an active part in peacekeeping and mediating the conflicts, often doing so on a unilateral basis. Such actions received international legitimacy from the US and Europe through the presence of Western-oriented international organizations like the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. Moscow's physical presence included both direct and indirect assistance to the separatist forces, which it claimed was to protect a threatened minority against the nationalist majority. Generally the West accepted Moscow's approach, although this began to change toward the end of the 1990s and the early 2000s as Russian and Western interests diverged over Kosovo, Chechnya, and the Ukraine. At the same time, Moscow was becoming increasingly suspicious of Western intentions and its growing presence in what it saw as its sphere of influence following NATO expansion to Eastern Europe and its physical presence in the region (e.g., US troops in Georgia, European embassies, and participation in former Warsaw Pact countries) (Hill 2012, 29–47).

After Moscow, China has the second most involvement of third party interventions among the BRICS, although on a much smaller scale. Its more limited involvement and focus on military intervention perhaps reflected its "outsider" status in the international community after 1949 and until its entry into the UN in 1971. In addition, limited intervention reflected its earlier lack of global influence, absence of colonies and past opposition to external intervention (Greig and Diehl 2012). This was echoed in its statements against the principal peacekeeping organization, the UN, during the years it was not a member; it equated the UN with being a tool of US imperialism and contributing toward a more hands-off and less coercive approach—one that was quite passive, especially outside of its home region of East Asia. This changed after it joined the UN and has become more committed to its role (Evron 2015). Indeed, as China continues to acquire a greater role in the international arena, it may take on more peacekeeping responsibilities (Greig and Diehl 2012), including outside its home region.

One such early example of Chinese involvement outside its home region is that of Africa. Since the 2000s the rise of China in Africa for economic resources and markets has not gone unnoticed in relation to conflict management. However, what has been notable is China's tendency to avoid direct engagement in countries' domestic politics (Large 2009, Shichor 2014), usually limiting itself to providing assistance and support through established governing circles. The case of Sudan, China's third largest trading party in

Africa, is instructive in this regard. Since 2004 and despite the conflict in that country, China has focused on providing humanitarian and development assistance in Darfur, with increasing support for the African Union's peace-keeping force. In terms of mediation, Beijing largely opted for an informal, ad hoc approach between government and rebels, while also urging other powers to put pressure on the rebels as well.

India has been an active participant in UN peacekeeping since the organization was established. This has included involvement in the Arab world, as is noted in the next chapter. But more of its most involved and sustained conflict management has been in its neighborhood, most notably with military involvement during the partition of Pakistan in 1971 when it supported the opposition and the Sri Lankan government during insurgencies in the early 1970s and in relation to the Tamils after 1982 (Regan 1996). However, its record has been relatively unsuccessful. The Sri Lankan case is perhaps the most recent example of mediation in its home region. Simply, the Sri Lankan population is divided between a Sinhalese majority and Tamil minority. Language policy, public sector employment, and access to public services contributed to ethnic differences and eventually resulting in a Tamil separatist movement during the 1970s. India initially became involved following Tamil separatist activity in the southern Indian state of Tamil Nadu and with the connivance of both the state and national governments (de Silva 1995, 7, Bercovitch and Simpson 2010). Anti-Tamil rioting prompted India ever deeper into the conflict, this time as a mediator. However, India behaved as more than a mediator by offering a more coercive approach to the management of the conflict. While the positions of the Sri Lankan government and the Tamil minority were set out through proximity talks under India, the two sides did not directly meet each other and instead relied on their contacts with India to advance their goals. But India ended up siding with the government at the expense of the Tamil minority (Swamy 2007, 53).

In 1987 India and Sri Lanka signed an agreement. On the Sri Lankan side the government would introduce reforms for regional autonomy while the Tamils would end their secessionist insurgency. The Indians would provide a peacekeeping force. However, the agreement ultimately failed owing to Sri Lankan intransigence and Tamil disillusion. Although the Tamils had been confident that India would be an active supporter of Tamil interests, this changed with India's decision to halt assistance for the Tamils on its territory. At the same time the Tamils noted that they had not been involved in the final drafting of the agreement, so they felt less bound by it (Bhasin 2004, 53). Meanwhile Sinhalese public opinion grew against the agreement and strengthened the Sri Lankan government to forgo its obligations (Swamy 2007, 53). The result was that the peace agreement and its provisions failed and India's peacekeeping force was eventually withdrawn in 1990. All this reflected a "softer," less coercive approach by India. Yet even after this date

India continued to lay claim to external mediation in the conflict, despite the loss of confidence by both the Sri Lankan and Tamil parties in it. That India did so owed much to concern about its regional power status and less to resolving the problem (Bhasin 2004, 299).

South Africa has similarly focused intervention in its home region, including the use of military coercion in southern Africa, in Rhodesia/Zimbabwe, Mozambique, and Angola. It has supported both government and opposition forces at different times, but in all cases has failed to realize the goals of its target groups (Regan 1996). These interventions occurred under the apartheid regime. After 1994, although the post-apartheid government sought to play a greater regional role, it was both reticent in doing so and faced challenges from its neighbors. During the 1990s it was more inclined to employ diplomacy through multilateral organizations, including in relation to nonproliferation and disarmament (Schoeman 2000). Even where it did seek to mediate, in DR Congo and Angola during the 1990s, it failed. This was largely due to South African diplomats employing their own transitional experience from apartheid, involving compromise on both sides, in contexts which were fundamentally different: in both cases the conflicts came to an end because of the military defeat of one force by the other. In the one case most applicable to South Africa, that of Zimbabwe, South African leaders supported the status quo and the human rights violations carried out by Harare. Non-coercion, indeed, a largely passive approach to the conflict, seemed evident. Similarly, Nelson Mandela's one-man campaign to support the Ogoni protestors following Ken Saro-Wiwa's execution in Nigeria fell on deaf ears and gained regional ostracism (Solomon 2010).

After 2000 South African governments became more active in the region and especially under Thabo Mbeki. This owed much to his role in reshaping African diplomacy and intervention through the African Union and his personal involvement (Shillinger 2009). They supported state building in DR Congo, South Sudan, and a more assertive role in relation to Zimbabwe (Alden and Schoeman 2013). In some instances, this called for measures that might be labeled coercive by infringing on these states' sovereignty, albeit through non-military means. At the same time, there were limits. As in the earlier period, the South African government adopted an ambiguous stance on human rights abuses, including in Sudan before partition (Solomon 2010). Daniela Kroslak (2009, 43) attributes this to a tension at work in South African peacekeeping. On one hand it is driven by a "humanistic" desire to end suffering which requires long term involvement and development to build peace. On the other hand Pretoria believes that such investment must also benefit South Africa politically and economically following a peace settlement. A result of this is that South Africa has been seen more recently to side with state parties in a conflict, as its involvement in DR Congo, Cote d'Ivoire, Burundi, and Sudan attest (Aning 2009, Shillinger 2009). To this

may also be added internal concerns within Pretoria over how to maximize its influence, given uncertainty about South Africa's domestic institutional and economic weaknesses and wider regional concern at it becoming a more dominant power (Alden and Schoeman 2013).

Finally, Brazil's conflict management efforts have ranged from non-coercive to coercive. As with India and South Africa, much of its focus has been regional. And like India, it has also participated in UN peacekeeping (including leading the UN forces in Haiti during the 2000s) and outside of South America, including in the Middle East in earlier decades (see next chapter). It has been an active participant in peacekeeping missions around the world, although the general tendency was that such involvement was primarily seen as a means of projecting the country's state globally. In this sense then, Brazilian objectives were more "realist" than "idealist" (where they would be concerned with protecting international peace and norms). As a result, its earliest peacekeeping efforts between 1957 and 1967 were seen as largely symbolic and becoming more substantive after 1989 (Cavalcante 2010, Hirst and Nasser 2014).

In terms of mediation, Brazil has been involved in ad hoc efforts within Venezuela, Paraguay, and Honduras over the past decade. But in none of these cases had there been violence in the form of war or in conflict between state actors. In that regard, Brazil's response and engagement with the Cenepas War between Ecuador and Peru in Brasilia in early 1995 is instructive. Brazil's involvement was multilateral, reflecting its status as one of the four guarantors of the 1942 Rio Protocol, including Argentina, Chile, and the US, which sought to address the territorial dispute between the two countries during the 1930s. The guarantors' involvement was meant to be short term, but was extended following Ecuador's suspension of the protocol between 1948 and 1950 and subsequent unilateral declaration that it was "null" in 1960 (Mares and Palmer 2012, 103).

In January 1995 war broke out between Ecuador and Peru over the border. In mid-February the two sides agreed to a ceasefire and a return to the Rio Protocol. The guarantors acted swiftly and in a cohesive manner, introducing a multilateral peacekeeping mission with representatives from all countries and under a Brazilian general as its coordinator. This was followed by guarantor-sponsored ministerial level discussions between the two conflict parties to identify the main points of disagreements and finally substantive negotiations on discrete aspects of the conflict in the capital cities of the guarantor states: on border integration and external financing in Washington, DC, the Treaty of Commerce and Navigation in Buenos Aires, confidence building measures in Santiago, and border demarcation in Brasilia. Along with the expert advice provided, the guarantors' peacekeeping mission was beefed up in August 1998 when Ecuadorian and Peruvian troops were sent into the region and averting a resumption of conflict. The seriousness of the

guarantors' involvement was also reflected in the high status of its mediating teams, Brasilia's active coordination of more than 20 guarantor meetings and multitrack diplomacy which brought together civil society, academics, and military and civilian leaders from Ecuador and Peru together (Mares and Palmer 2012, 112–13). All this contributed to a final agreement over the territorial delineation being signed in Brasilia in 1998.

Extra-regionally, Brazil's most notable and recent mediation effort (in the Middle East) was in 2010 between it, Iran, and Turkey. Turkey and Iran aimed to swap Tehran's uranium and enable it to come under a more controlled nuclear program. However, the agreement proved to be a dead letter as it was almost immediately superseded by a US-led proposal to impose sanctions on Iran, which passed through the UNSC and without obstruction from permanent members such as Russia and China (Amorim 2011, Zakaria 2010, Cervo 2010).

In sum then, the experience of the BRICS conflict management has been wide ranging, from economic to military sanctions, from peacekeeping to mediation. But that mediation has not always been even-handed: even when engaging two conflict parties (usually in their home region) BRICS governments have more often than not reflected a preference in favor of the state party. Indeed, when looking at the case of Israel and the conflict with its Arab neighbors and the Palestinians, the tendency has been toward BRICS privileging the state party in the form of Israel as well.

FRAMING CONFLICT MANAGEMENT IN RELATION TO CONSERVATIVE AND LIBERAL PEACE

The previous sections have set out some of the ways in which conflict management has been carried out, along with the way that rising powers like the BRICS have pursued them in the past, usually in their home region. The literature drew attention to some of the features associated with them, from coercion to non-coercion, from external intervention and projection to internal infringements of autonomy and sovereignty. It has highlighted the use of military measures as well as diplomacy, whether unilateral or multilateral, from the use of international organizations through an appeal to international law. Examples of this across the BRICS cases cited above are visible. However, at the same time this literature has overlooked some of the other ways that (rising) powers have pursued conflict management that are short of the most overtly military or even political. This can include the use of more indirect methods, like Russia's military assistance to its allies, or China's use of economic incentives and sanctions in the case of Sudan. In sum then, the tools that are available to state actors when it comes to conflict management are wide-ranging, extensive even. They therefore cover a variety of different

dimensions, from the political and strategic, through to the use of economic activity, humanitarian assistance, and judicial/legal based measures. At the same time they may occupy opposite ends of a spectrum that is coercive and non-coercive at the poles, direct or indirect, active or passive.

But to what end do these tools serve? At a broad level, third parties to a conflict claim their participation is designed to end the conflict. But as Bercovitch and Gartner (2009) point out, there are three main types of literature relating to conflict management: one is to prevent physical manifestations of conflict, a second aims to manage or contain it, while a third is to resolve (the causes of) conflict (Bercovitch and Gartner 2009). These distinctions map on to scholarly understanding about peace: Bercovitch and Gartner's first two types equate broadly with efforts to contain conflict by pursuing an absence of violence (negative or conservative peace); their third kind relates well to the efforts made to tackle the root causes of a conflict—and by doing so to transform and end it (positive or liberal peace).

Negative or conservative peace does not deal with the causes of conflict, so the grievances of different parties are not wholly addressed. Of the forms of conflict management, negative peace is usually associated with peace-keeping and mediation that is surface, being limited to offering a presence and little else. By contrast, positive/liberal peace is more often associated with tackling the structural factors and different actors which caused the conflict. To resolve them more expansive measures are usually undertaken, including coercive peacekeeping to keep two sides apart or carrying out forms of mediation where the third party is involved in the process of seeking change. Beyond these measures, third parties may also try to reform political institutions, rectifying social and economic disparities, improving development opportunities, and providing public goods and services (Galtung, Jacobsen, and Brand-Jacobsen 2002, Barash and Webel 2009, Hauss 2001, Richmond 2006).

While liberal peace may be more progressive than conservative peace, it may be harder to achieve. Because of this, it can sometimes inadvertently lead conflict and third parties to settle on "easier" issues, like ending the violence. The result is that only the proximate causes of conflict are dealt with rather than structural ones and ending up with a more negative/conservative form of peace (Richmond 2002, MacGinty 2008, 2010, Pugh and Cooper 2004, Duffield 1997, 1998, 2007). Whether negative/conservative or positive/liberal peace is adopted, when it comes to the actual practice of managing conflict the same tools may be used—just to different effect. The difference between liberal and conservative peace, coercive and non-coercive methods of conflict management and the different ways this may be carried out can be presented visually, in terms of strategic, political, diplomatic, economic and legal approaches. This is shown in table 1.1. This typology provides a lens through which a state actor's approach to conflict manage-

ment can be studied, compared, and evaluated. Indeed, in the chapters which follow, the themes associated with active and passive conflict management by each of the BRICS countries are drawn out to illustrate the extent to which they lean toward one side or the other.

It is important to stress that while the material is presented in tabular form this does not mean that conflict management methods belong only on one side or the other. It is possible for the same conflict management tool to be used for different ends, the extent to which that is achieved depending on variations in relation to their intensity, range, or impact. In short then, conflict management tool has gradations, resulting in differences within and between them that are relative. This means that conflict management is really a spectrum with active methods and tools at one end and passive ones at the opposite pole. For example, the use of mediation ranges from versions where the third party may adopt a hand-off and non-confrontational stance (i.e., facilitative) to versions where they press one or more of the conflict parties toward an agreement, using the threat of sanctions of offers of inducements (i.e., manipulative). Similarly, the use of economic activity can be used in different ways: a state can impose sanctions or promise inducements as a means to transform a conflict, or engage in economic activity with little or no regard for the consequences of what this may mean for a conflict's dynamics. An international court may make a ruling but without its enforcement it will not make a difference to the state of a conflict. In much the same way, the use of strategic/military and diplomatic activity can also be a force for change, if focused and targeted with the goal of conflict resolution, or serve as a token gesture and not challenge a conflict.

Table 1.1.   Conflict Management under Conservative and Liberal Peace

	Conservative peace ⇔	**Liberal peace**
	Passive conflict management	*Active conflict management*
Political/ Diplomatic	"Normal" relationships/ diplomacy with conflict parties, rhetoric (statements, declarations), facilitative mediation, state-to-state relationships	Engaged relationships/diplomacy with conflict parties, actions that back up statements, manipulative mediation, state-to-state and state-to-civil society relationships
Strategic	Non-coercive peacekeeping, military intervention	Coercive peacekeeping, military intervention
Legal	Unenforced judicial decisions	Enforced judicial decisions
Social/ Economic	Normal economic activity, marginal development assistance	Economic incentives/sanctions, targeted development assistance

BRICS RISING POWERS AND THE
ARAB/PALESTINIAN-ISRAELI CONFLICT

Having considered conflict management and its resolution, why study the BRICS and their interaction with the Arab/Palestinian-Israeli conflict? Does it make sense to look at this conflict when it seems evident that the bulk of BRICS attention has been on managing or resolving conflict usually within their home regions and neighborhood?

Simply put, there is a case to be made. First, the Arab-Israeli conflict is one of the longest running international conflicts. It has been at the center of international debate since the British mandate power referred what was then known as the Palestine Question to the recently formed UN in 1947. Every country represented at the UN has therefore taken a position on the conflict and returned to it on a regular basis. Invariably they call for a peaceful resolution to the conflict. But what they meant by that has varied over time—which provides a justification for the historical survey of these countries' responses to the conflict since 1948.

In addition, not only does the UNSC maintain a regular update on the Palestine Question, the international community remains deeply involved in the consequences of the conflict, including the presence of the UN Relief and Works Agency (to which UN member states contribute). In addition, foreign donors' financial and other contributions to the peace process between Israel, its Arab neighbors, and the Palestinians are also provided.

Second, the character of the Arab-Israeli conflict has changed over time. Post-1945 activity tended to focus on state-to-state relations; in the case of the conflict this was most evident in the character of the belligerents being states: Israel and the Arab states. In addition, after 1967 this changed as the non-state Palestinians became the primary Arab antagonist (despite their up-grading to member state status at the UN in 2012). At the same time, it is a conflict which has shifted from symmetry (between states in 1948–1967) to asymmetry (between a state and non-state actor since 1967). Since the 1990s other elements have become increasingly important in international relations, including the role of civil society—and the arena of the conflict is no different. Both domestic and international civil society has become a space for interaction, especially through the efforts of social movements like the Boycott, Divestment, and Sanctions (BDS) movement to pressure governments to act against Israel's occupation and human rights abuses. The BDS has attracted growing public and academic attention, but much of the focus has been on the building of ties in Western societies like the US and Europe. There has been less attention given to its impact beyond the West, including in the societies and on the governments of rising powers—an oversight redressed in this book. Of particular relevance here is the political character of

the BRICS states, whether they are democratic (Brazil, India, South Africa) or authoritarian (Russia, China).

Third, the use of the BRICS countries offers a range of different types of rising powers that can be observed in relation to the international system. I previously noted BRICS' "positive" and "negative" associations toward international institutions and global order, their commitment to existing ones while also pursuing change where it is in their interest to do so. A long-term survey of these countries' engagement with a long-running conflict helps show how rising powers have developed in terms of their attitude toward conflict management and the tools associated with it over time. This is especially useful given the fact that the recent interest in rising powers is not unique. The 1960s and 1970s was another moment of high interest in such states; therefore studying these countries and their engagement then therefore provides some useful comparison with today. As representatives of rising powers they offer perspectives drawn from different geographical locations and associated with different types. These include Western/non-Western (Brazil, apartheid South Africa, Soviet Union/China, India), democratic/authoritarian (Brazil, India, post-apartheid South Africa/Russia, China, apartheid South Africa), capitalist/communist (Brazil, South Africa, India, Russia/Soviet Union, China) and North/South (Soviet Union/the rest).

With these aims in mind, the book tackles the following themes and issues:

1. It provides a narrative account of rising powers and the Arab-Israeli conflict since 1947.
2. It sets out the various conflict management methods (i.e., active and passive) used by the rising powers in relation to the Arab-Israeli conflict.
3. It relates the use of active and passive conflict management methods to foreign policy behavior (i.e., good international citizenship, status seeking, and spoiling) by rising powers.
4. It examines why rising powers chose to use active or passive methods of conflict management.
5. It evaluates rising powers' use of conflict management methods in relation to the Arab-Israeli conflict and the implications for their status as aspiring global powers.

CHAPTER TOPICS

While the focus is on the case and practice of the five BRICS countries, the ultimate goal of this study is to build a broader understanding of middle and rising powers and their interaction in the international system generally as

well as specifically in relation to conflict management and resolution. Therefore, an expectation is that these findings will be of relevance beyond the case of these five countries, Israel, and Palestine.

The book considers these themes from a long-term perspective, from the beginning of the inter-state conflict between Israel and the Arabs in 1948 up to the present. To this end, five empirical chapters are presented which correspond with the different dynamics and principal actors of the conflict. The chronological approach is used in order to illustrate the different phases of the conflict itself as well as the wider international system in which the conflict took place. This provides a narrative from which the different conflict management approaches were pursued by individual BRICS countries and collectively. Because the BRICS acquired self-identity and collective identity only after 2001 the chapters offer accounts of each individual BRICS state's approach to the conflict from 1947; observations on their joint statements and declarations are made in the concluding chapter.

While the chapters cover each BRICS state's relationship to the conflict and the conflict parties, including the various diplomatic, political, strategic, and economic developments which took place between them, each chapter includes a review of the main features and internal dynamics of the conflict before doing so. The reasons for doing so are two-fold: one is to provide the reader with an introductory account of the conflict over the course of its 70 years; the other is to provide context of domestic and regional developments between Israel and the Arabs upon which BRICS governments found themselves called upon to act (or not).

In broad terms, the interaction between rising powers' approach to the conflict and the conflict management tools which it used were influenced in large part by the wider regional and global system in which they found themselves. In the first part of the conflict and especially from the 1950s to the mid-1970s these rising powers saw the conflict as an opportunity to enhance their relative position in the international system. The Soviet Union used the conflict as a proxy in its rivalry with the US, China in its struggle for communist hegemony with Moscow, and Brazil and India in their search for Third World leadership. The Chinese and Soviet approaches were more active in scope, since they sought to resolve the conflict by providing assistance to their allies to challenge the prevailing order. This was evident in the provision of arms which they made available to the Arab states and the Palestinians. By contrast, the Indian and Brazilian peacekeeping efforts constituted more passive forms of conflict management: by itself the peacekeeping force could not resolve the conflict, at least not without negotiations between the conflict parties to address the causes. It is ironic then that this approach to uphold international peace and norms could be associated with international citizenship while that taken by the Soviets and Chinese was arguably more spoiling. But most significant in terms of active conflict man-

agement were efforts to engage with the conflict's causes, whether through rising powers' support for partition in 1947 or in devising the land for peace formula in 1967—and which has formed the basis of all efforts at peace talks since.

By the 1980s the international context was less propitious for the rising powers: ideological and economic decline with the end of the Cold War, international opposition to apartheid, economic recession meant the Soviet, Brazilian, Indian, and South African regimes were weakened. They were therefore less able to influence the international system or the conflict and so adopted a more passive approach to conflict management. This continued into the 1990s when the Oslo process became the main mechanism for conflict management and thereby freeing rising powers to separate their relationship with the conflict parties—Israel and the Palestinians—from the conflict itself. From this period on, rising powers built diplomatic, strategic, and economic ties, especially with Israel.

After 2000 the international context changed once again. US hegemony was in relative decline and economic growth had enhanced the position of rising powers. But their status while improved was incomplete. They wanted to claim a more prominent position and the conflict offered a means to that end. Increasingly, powers like Russia, China, and Brazil made statements calling for multilateral talks or offered to mediate between Israel and the Palestinians. However, those calls were constrained by the continuing existence of the Oslo process, now battered by its failure to deliver its original goals or prevent the Second Intifada. In addition, the separation of rising powers' relations with Israel and the Palestinians from the conflict and Oslo made it harder for them to pursue more active conflict management. Their calls therefore became a form of status signaling, to demonstrate to others their perception of themselves as global players.

Perhaps the exception to these approaches was one form of active conflict management which sought to use economic incentives and sanctions as a means to transform the conflict, by shifting it away from the parameters set out by Oslo. The formation of the Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions (BDS) movement not only drew on the anti-apartheid campaign in South Africa as inspiration, it also offered a break with the past in the way that conflict management had been done. Instead of rising powers engaging with state actors in the conflict—Israel and the (quasi-state) Palestinian Authority—it introduced civil society as a conflict participant.

That is the general narrative presented in the book. More specifically, in terms of the chapters which follow, the following more detailed account and observations are made:

Chapter 2 constitutes arguably the most diverse range of conflict management techniques by the BRICS states: several of the countries adopted active approaches to the conflict, from rising powers' support for partition and land

for peace, as a way of dealing with the differences between Jews and Arabs in 1947 and Israel and the Arabs in 1967. There was also active (and spoiling) conflict management by the Soviets and Chinese in relation to the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) and the Arab states. Against this was a more passive approach to military engagement through Indian and Brazilian peacekeeping.

These different approaches were possible due to the nature of the period between Israel's formation in 1948 and 1967 conflict between Israel and the Arabs was at its most visceral. At the same time, the nature of the conflict was largely state-based: Israel and its Arab neighbors (the Palestinians arguably receiving less attention in diplomatic deliberations, especially over Resolution 242 and the principle of land for peace). The Cold War, which had not initially affected the conflict at the beginning, became a central component by 1967 with the two sides serving as proxies in the larger superpower rivalry between the US and Soviet Union.

Chapter 3 demonstrates much status seeking behavior by rising powers. Self-interest was at the heart of their calculations, although the reasons for doing so varied: Brazil faced economic problems; India was hemmed in by structural constraints; China was gravitating away from being an international outsider while apartheid South Africa was increasingly becoming one; and the Soviet Union was confronted with its Arab allies' weakness following the 1967 and 1973 wars and the pressure to achieve détente with the US. These changes at the international level coincided with a shift in the nature of the conflict, which moved away from being primarily between states and instead took an ethno-nationalist conflict within the borders of historic Palestine, between Israel and the Palestinians, the latter organized as a national liberation movement in the form of the PLO. This stage of the conflict wound down with the Oslo process that began in 1993 and which was mediated by a small state: Norway.

Chapter 4 considers the period from 1993 to 2000 and the breakdown of the Oslo process and the Second Intifada. The end of the Cold War meant considerable upheaval and uncertainty for many in the international system, at the same time that the US became the sole global hegemon. The states which would become the rising powers after 2000 were therefore constrained and adopted a more passive approach to the conflict, stepping back from any direct involvement in conflict management and instead focusing on normalization of ties with the conflict parties through the use of greater bilateral diplomatic and economic links.

Chapter 5 covers the most recent period. The Second Intifada and events since have coincided with the emergence of the BRICS, followed some years later by their self-organization into a club. There was continuity in the approach that the rising powers took to the previous period: they focused on building bilateral ties with Israel and the Palestinians separate from the con-

flict itself; India, especially, developed strategic ties with Israel. At the same time, BRICS' growing economic and diplomatic influence during the first decade of the twenty-first century meant that they were more confident to promote themselves as mediators: Brazil (at least until the economic downturn of the 2010s), China, and Russia all ventured forth on this. But relations in the period were not only played out at the state level; the experience of the fight against apartheid in South Africa provided the basis for a change in the nature of the conflict, bringing the role of civil society into the mix. This became especially relevant after 2005 and the formation of the BDS movement; civil society became a growing factor in the politics and international relations of the conflict. It demanded a response from governments regarding their relationships with Israel. Although targeted more organized and active in relation to North America and Europe, the BRICS countries were not overlooked, resulting in varying degrees of involvement.

The conclusion pulls together the different experiences and approaches taken by the BRICS countries over these decades, both individually and collectively. It does so to summarize the themes associated both with conflict management and rising powers' foreign policy orientations respectively. First, in relation to conflict management, the examples drawn from the 70 years of the Arab-Israeli conflict and the subset of representative rising powers under different global contexts (i.e., Cold War bipolarity, 1990s unipolarity, post-2000 multipolarity) provide insight into active and passive modes of conflict management. The former would be associated with measures to resolve conflict and the causes that lead to it (i.e., liberal peace), the latter with conflict's amelioration and preference for preventing visible (especially physical) forms of violence (i.e., conservative peace).

Second, these different conflict management approaches arguably reflect rising powers' broader perspectives of the international system and influence their behavior accordingly. Where conflict is perceived as a threat to the global order—an order in which rising powers feel secure of their position—they are more inclined to pursue active conflict management as a way of reducing that risk; such behavior reflects good international citizenship. On the other hand, a rising power may believe that they are being shut out of leading positions in the international system. They may therefore be more inclined to pursue policies that challenge and transform international institutions. Conflict may therefore be a tool to that end, prompting them to make use of active conflict management tools to achieve that goal. In between is status-seeking behavior. As powers are rising it is not certain whether they will be accepted and admitted to occupy the top table that they believe they deserve; for that reason their position toward the international system and conflict which happens within it may be more ambiguous. This may be reflected then in their approach to conflict management, utilizing both active and passive approaches.

Rising Powers and the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1947–1967

The first period of the Arab-Israeli conflict, between 1947 and 1967, spanned the establishment of Israel and the dispersal of the Palestinian refugees. The primary parties to the conflict were Israel and its Arab neighbors. The period was not one where the five BRICS states could be labeled rising powers. Of the five only one, the Soviet Union, had global status as one of two superpowers. Yet of the two superpowers, it was arguably the more junior, almost never a full equal of the US. During these decades Moscow found its influence in the Middle East to be limited, depending more on the actions of its Arab allies as a proxy in its wider Cold War with the US. Two of the other countries, Brazil and South Africa, were regional powers, but to a large part geographically isolated from the emerging centers of the Cold War, in Europe and Northeast Asia. Of the remaining two, India and China were potential powers. Having just gained independence in 1947, India was in the process of a painful partition with Pakistan, which saw millions displaced along religious lines. Mainland China, much of which had been subject to Japanese occupation during the Second World War, was in the final throes of civil war. That would come to an end in 1949 when the Communists defeated the Nationalists, who fled to Taiwan.

The question of Palestine attained international status when it came before the UN for consideration in 1947. For the first 20 years of the conflict, it was one which was dominated by the newly created state of Israel (after May 1948) and the neighboring Arab states. The conflict was therefore largely perceived by the parties and the wider international community as a state-oriented one (Klein 2010). In this period the voices of the Palestinian people were largely subsumed by other Arab leaders, especially Gamal Nasser in Egypt and the Hashemite kings of Jordan, who claimed to speak on their

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behalf. Certainly, in the early period this was exacerbated by historic Palestine's separation between Israel, the West Bank (controlled by Jordan), and Gaza (controlled by Egypt). Additionally, there was no internationally recognized Palestinian entity, an element that was redressed toward the end of the period, with the Arab League-supported Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) in 1964.

The five countries which would one day make up the BRICS had only limited contact with the region and the parties to it. With the exception of the Soviets from the 1950s on, none of them were deeply integrated into the region's politics, societies, or economies in the early period. However, this did not mean that they were isolationist. All sought a greater role in the global order, and involvement in the region was one way to advance that goal.

The Cold War dominated the period after 1945. By the 1960s it had expanded to the Third World and resulted in growing competition at both the global and regional levels. Globally, the US and Soviet Union were locked in a struggle to gain influence from many of the newly independent states. At the same time, these states themselves were seeking allies to assist their own societal and economic development (Westad 2010, 10). That meant that even if rising powers were unable to overcome the constraints of the bipolar rivalry between the two superpowers, there was space for them within that world. This was exemplified by the emergence of the non-aligned movement, which had been the principal goal at the Bandung conference in 1955 (Bradley 2010). And this certainly influenced their perception of the international system and their behavior accordingly.

However, at the same time rising powers had to acknowledge confrontation as much as opportunity. They had rivals, either from other powers or among themselves. For the Soviet Union it faced the challenge of being the junior superpower; indeed, the US had been aware of the Soviets' relative military weakness since 1947 and recognized that their principal threat was more political and ideological than economic or military (Leffler 2010, 77–78). In the Middle East the Soviets made alliances with various regimes, several of which were themselves rivals to Israel. The regional conflict between Israel and the Arabs was increasingly seen as a proxy by Washington and Moscow alike, especially when the US became Israel's chief sponsor. As a result, Moscow played an active role during the period to provide support to its Arab allies as a means of challenging the US position.

China similarly provided assistance to Arabs hostile to Israel, although in Beijing's case this was to the PLO. Like the Soviets, this constituted an active form of conflict management, albeit one that not only challenged the regional balance of power, but also sought to enhance their global status. Their approach perhaps reflected the outsider status that Beijing held in the global system at the time, since it was not a member of the UN and other

international institutions. At the same time its support to the PLO was conducted with an eye to Moscow; under Chairman Mao's leadership, Beijing was locked in a struggle with the Soviet Union to present itself as the leader of the communist world as well as the Third World of developing countries.

Third World leadership was arguably also at the forefront of Brazilian and Indian calculations. While India may have appeared to be more invested, having attended the Bandung conference in 1955, Brazil sent only an observer team. Yet in giving attention to the matter, they recognized its importance in raising their international profile. Presumably toward that end then, both countries were prominent in portraying themselves as good international citizens through their active participation in the peacekeeping force within the region after 1956 as well as in drafting Resolution 242 at the UN Security Council (UNSC) following the 1967 war.

Perhaps least significant in terms of rising power conflict management (in relation to the case of the Arab-Israeli conflict) in this period was South Africa. Instead of taking an active approach to conflict management, the apartheid regime spent the decades building diplomatic and economic ties with Israel (notwithstanding a slight blip after 1961). The reasons for both sides to do so was to become more evident in the following decade when South Africa became an international pariah and Israel's international status was in similar relative decline; then both would make full use of their ties with the other. But during the 1950s and 1960s the two sides prioritized the building of ties without regard for the conflict. This therefore suggested a more passive approach to conflict management by South Africa.

INTERNAL FEATURES AND DYNAMICS OF THE CONFLICT DURING THE PERIOD

Before examining the nature of individual rising power relations with the conflict and the parties to it, it is worth setting out the details of the conflict itself. Much of the cause and development of the conflict owed greatly to internal factors. Great and rising powers could have some impact over parts of it, but not completely.

If rising powers were to engage with the conflict, they needed to understand its underlying causes. Although most rising powers largely dated their involvement with the conflict from the time of partition, in 1947, the origins of the Arab-Israeli conflict were older. Prior to 1939 the dominant international actors in the region had been the European powers, Britain and France. In historic Palestine, Britain held the mandate as two distinct communities—the Jews and the Arabs—developed independently of each other. The relationship was one of ambivalence at best, but more commonly hostility, which exacerbated after 1945 as Britain faced growing pressure to allow Jewish

refugees from Europe into the territory, and against local Arab opposition. Although victorious, Britain was a weakened power and faced growing pressure to allow more Jews for the US and Soviet Union. Both were on the road to superpower status and would eventually replace London as the primary external actor in the region. Kaufman et al. (1979, 1–2) note that whereas 1945–1948 was a period of transition with Britain a "quasi-superpower" in the Middle East, between 1948 and 1956 bipolarity was tight, with little choice beyond alignment with one superpower or the other and in which competition between the two veered toward crisis.

Britain not only faced pressure from without, but within as well. In addition to the Jews' and Arabs' mutual antipathy, both sides directed their rage at the British. The growing insurgency prompted the British to clamp down harshly, even as the new Labour government in London began to reassess its imperial commitments. In 1947 Britain put the issue of what was to be done about Palestine to the recently established United Nations.

In November 1947 the UN voted for partition and against Arab opposition; the Zionists expressed support for the plan. Britain declared its evacuation from Palestine to take place six months later. With the departure of the mandate power in May 1948 the Zionists declared independence and the state of Israel. This was followed swiftly by war between the new state and the neighboring Arab states of Egypt, Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, and Iraq. It ended with a ceasefire in 1949. Historic Palestine was divided on a map, with Israel, the West Bank and Gaza being delineated along the "Green Line," the lines of ceasefire marked out in green marker pen on a map (see figure 2.1).

The ceasefire did not reduce tensions, which remained high between Israel and its neighbors during the later 1950s and into the 1960s. Mutual suspicion coincided with increased superpower assistance to their respective blocs, the US replacing France in terms of financial and military assistance toward Israel while the Soviet Union cultivated its links to "Arab socialism" in Nasser's Egypt and the Baathist regimes of Syria and Iraq. The Western camp included Brazil and South Africa, whose governments had an aversion to communism, while India faced challenges in pursuing an independent and non-aligned path.

The 1967 war marked the end of this first period of the conflict. It was significant on several grounds. First, it established Israel as a regional hegemon. Its victory effectively removed the prospect of it being defeated militarily. Moreover, it highlighted the level of US commitment toward Israel and ensured that Washington would be a prominent participant in the future of the region. But even if the US was more visible, it did not have things entirely its own way. At the international level and until the late 1970s, a divergence emerged in the region, between military bipolarity at the level of the superpowers alongside political multipolarity at the regional level. This was evident in a number of ways, as shown below.

United Nations Partition Plan
UN Resolution 181

1947

PASSIA

Acre
Haifa
Nazareth
Jenin
Nablus

*Mediterranean
Sea*

Tel Aviv
Jaffa
Ramallah
Jericho
Jerusalem
Bethlehem
Gaza
Hebron
Khan Yunis
Beersheba

Dead Sea

Negev

■	Proposed Jewish State
■	Proposed Arab State
■	Internationally administered 'Corpus Separatum' of Jerusalem

Rhodes Armistice Line

1949

PASSIA

Acre
Haifa
Nazareth
Jenin
Nablus

*Mediterranean
Sea*

Tel Aviv
Jaffa
Ramallah
Jericho
Jerusalem
Bethlehem
Gaza
Hebron
Khan Yunis
Beersheba

Dead Sea

Negev

■	Proposed Jewish State
■	Arab territory
■	Territories seized by Israel beyond the area for the proposed Jewish State

Figure 2.1.   Historic Palestine, 1947–1949

Second, it heralded a major defeat for the Arab states and their brand of Arab socialism. The Soviet Union was criticized by its Arab allies who believed that Moscow had failed to respond sufficiently and quickly enough to the crisis and the subsequent conflict. In addition, the credibility of Arab socialist leaders took a knock, with Nasser's status somewhat diminished. This enabled his successor, Anwar Sadat, to reach beyond the Soviets and

toward the US. It also began a process where secular nationalism was increasingly challenged by an alternative: political Islam.

Third, the conflict effectively removed the Arab states as the principal advocates for the Palestinian people and cause. Israel's occupation of the West Bank and Gaza meant the removal of Jordanian and Egyptian authority in those areas. Now the entire Palestinian population within historic Palestine came under the authority of Israel, whether as marginalized, discriminated second-class citizens in Israel, or as residents subject to an occupying military force in the West Bank and Gaza. In addition, the PLO came to occupy a more prominent role in Palestinian politics and the wider region, being based in Jordan, then during the 1970s in Lebanon and subsequently in Tunis after 1982.

The 1967 conflict also brought into being the basic principle on which much effort has been spent since to bring about peace to the region: land for peace. This was articulated in Resolution 242 which was accepted at the UNSC in November 1967 after several months of negotiations between different groups of countries and following the ceasefire earlier in the year. Land for peace has been the framework for negotiations between Israel and the Arabs—whether Egypt in 1977–1978, the failed Syrian bid in 2000 or the Palestinians under Oslo.

Despite its enduring quality, Resolution 242 was framed ambiguously by not specifying if one of these principles should come before the other. In a 1976 interview, the resolution's architect, Lord Caradon, said that his and others' main concern was to establish the principle. He explained that withdrawal did not mean that Israel and the Arab states should return to the lines on June 4. He saw the 1967 border as flawed, a chance result based on where troops were following the 1949 ceasefire. The result was that some villages, like Tayyibe and Qalqilya, found themselves on opposite sides of the border, while in some instances the lines ran through villages and fields. Instead he saw Resolution 242 as establishing the principle of negotiations, with Israel and Arab interlocutors working out a more suitable border, including land swaps in exchange for peace and security at a later date (*Journal of Palestine Studies* 1976).

Looking back from a distance of four decades, Omar Dajani (2008) has noted Resolution 242's ambiguity on four main grounds. First, it was unclear the extent to which Israeli withdrawal was required; whether Israel necessarily had to give up all the territory it had taken in the 1967 war. Second was the type of peace which would follow: did it simply mean an absence of hostilities or full diplomatic relations? Third, the lack of a sequence or timetable meant that each side demanded that the other begin the process. Fourth, it was not apparent what a "just settlement" of the refugee problem meant. Did it entail a right of return or compensation? In contrast, Michael Oren (2002) notes the necessity of crafting a resolution which was ambiguous since any-

thing more specific would have been rejected by the two sides and their allies. Israel did not see that it needed to give up all the territory it occupied, while the most the Arabs would offer would be non-belligerency and not recognition. The resolution therefore established a principle that was indeterminate in order to appeal as widely as possible. The result was "constructive ambiguity" that enabled different interpretations for different audiences, even as all agreed on the overarching principle of land for peace.

Laboring the themes in Resolution 242 is also pertinent for the role of rising powers. It was a principle established by the international community and included at least three of the future BRICS countries in its design. These three—the Soviet Union, Brazil, and India—therefore had a significant role in framing the conflict's possible resolution in the decades that followed.

Having outlined the developments which took place in the region before and after partition and the shift in the character of the conflict between 1948 and 1967, how did the rising powers respond? Arguably, their individual relations toward the conflict and its parties reflected their broader positions in relation to the wider Cold War that was unfolding: Brazil and apartheid South Africa both identified with the West and were broadly sympathetic to Israel while China (and the Soviet Union) took up a contrary position in support of their Arab socialist allies (although not before initial support for the Israeli state). Meanwhile, India wavered between the two camps at the international level, reflecting its commitment toward non-alignment while at the same time leaning more toward the Arabs.

BRAZIL AND LATIN AMERICA

Latin American involvement and attitudes toward the Middle East and the Arab-Israeli conflict were historically limited. In this regard Brazil was no different to the rest of its region. As William Perry (1976) pointed out, Brazilian policy was relatively infrequent with the developing world. Although decolonization during the 1950s and 1960s made Afro-Asian countries more important, Brazilian policymakers saw them as of secondary importance to the global centers in the North. The Arab-Israeli conflict which emerged was seen as geographically distant and of relatively limited significance or impact for Latin Americans generally and Brazil specifically (Grossman 2012). It is striking that although Latin American leaders claimed equidistance on the issue of the Arab-Israeli conflict, between 1947 and 1967 their sympathies lay broadly more with Israel than the Arabs. This was due for a number of reasons, according to Cecilia Baeza (2012): the context of the Cold War and Latin American governments' tendency toward the US and the West, the historical experience of the Holocaust and the radical tone of the Arab cause. As a result, Brazilian foreign policy toward Israel and the

Arabs was largely shaped by its relationship between the US: whether it is in alignment or striving for autonomy (Casarões and Vigevani 2014).

Latin American states had few political or economic ties with the region. In 1948 there was a total of five Arab missions in three countries: Brazil, Argentina, and Mexico (Kaufman et al. 1979, 17). Immigrant Arab populations were relatively unorganized, which was telling during lobbying efforts in 1947 (Abugattas 1982). What sympathy existed was broadly sympathetic to the Jewish cause. In the immediate aftermath of the Second World War this was reflected through collective horror of the Holocaust as well as the Jewish military struggle against the British authority. Added to this was a historic antipathy to anything "Arabic" or "Moorish" among the elite classes of the continent and a closer identification with the West, of which Zionists took advantage (Abugattas 1982).

For Zionists, there was a quick recognition that the UN would be an important factor in determining the future of Palestine, especially since Latin American states made up a third of the UN membership in the late 1940s (Glick 1958, Kaufman et al. 1985, Baeza 2012). As a result various efforts were made to influence Latin American elite and public opinion, through the use of Jewish Latin Americans and by the Jewish Agency, the forerunner of the Israeli government. This included the creation of Zionist pro-Palestine committees in the various Latin American countries by the end of 1946, Spanish-language pamphlets, Jewish telegraphic news services and information bureaus to disseminate favorable material related to the Zionist cause and the installation of Jewish Agency representatives in Latin American capitals (Glick 1958). Yet despite Zionist activism in Latin America, there was no regional consensus on what policy toward the conflict should be.

When the Palestine Question came before the UN it was clear that Latin Americans were divided. Thirteen of the Latin American countries voted in favor, Cuba voted against and Mexico, Colombia, Argentina, El Salvador, Honduras, and Chile abstained. The diversity in Latin American opinion owed much to a range of factors, both external (e.g., weak US pressure on Latin American governments) and internal (e.g., limited governmental instructions to UN representatives, representatives' own sympathy for the Zionist cause, and Jewish resistance against British colonialism in the Mandate). For those countries which abstained, the presence of an Arab lobby at home was significant while in Mexico and Colombia, their own experience of partition by the US during the nineteenth century loomed prominently (Glick 1958).

Brazil was one of the supporters of the partition plan. There was Jewish pressure and lobbying for the government to support the plan, but the foreign ministry establishment, Itamaraty, was wary of antagonizing the Arab community in Brazil. That its representative voted for partition was due largely to a lack of clear instruction from Brasília (Grossman 2012, Breda 2000). This

presaged the Brazilian approach to the region over the next two decades, which was for some, a form of equidistance. At the same time, such thinking was not strategic; Breda (2000) points out that much of Brazil's Israel and Middle East policy in this period was short term and ad hoc.

This was evident in Brazilian diplomacy surrounding partition. Following Britain's request for a UN Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP), the Brazilian chief of mission, Oswaldo Aranha, steered its terms of reference, away from the Arab request for an immediate vote on Palestinian independence and instead toward the terms of the British proposal. By late September UNSCOP had completed its work, with a majority in favor of partition and a minority report advocating a federal state with Arab and Jewish subunits. With insufficient votes—which would require a two-thirds majority to pass—Aranha suspended the session until a later date, in November. By then the Zionists had conducted sufficient lobbying for the majority partition plan to pass (Feldberg 2014, 189). Although Aranha is today feted in Israel, it is believed his motives were pragmatic: his actions were targeted not at the Zionists but at Washington, to retain its goodwill, and so help Brazilian wishes for a larger international role (Feldberg 2014, 190).

Following its creation, the new Israeli government continued to cultivate Latin American support through the creation of a Latin American department within the foreign ministry and inside the Israeli delegation to the UN (Glick 1958). At the same time both the US and Soviet Union moved to recognize Israel; this removed the issue of the new state as a Cold War issue and Latin American governments soon followed suit, with 18 states voting to support Israeli admission to the UN against two abstentions (Kaufman et al. 1979, 4). On the other side, Arab lobbying of Latin American representatives took place at the UN against Israel, with claims that it was a fictitious state, persecuted Christians and was both imperialist and colonial (the latter directed toward those who were sympathetic to the Left) (Kaufman et al. 1979, 18).

Although Brazil recognized Israel in 1948, it chose to abstain on Israel's entry into the UN. It also voted for the creation of a UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestinian Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA). Brazil shared Vatican dissatisfaction with Israel's occupation of west Jerusalem and non-respect of the partition plan's recommendation to make Jerusalem an international city (Grossman 2012, Baeza 2012, Feldberg 2014). Notwithstanding this matter, full diplomatic relations were completed between the two countries in 1951.

Despite Arab pressure, general Latin American sentiment was broadly favorable of the new state, which was perceived as isolated and extremely vulnerable in a broadly hostile region which sought its elimination. This may be reflected in part by the shared Western identity that both Israeli and Latin American leaderships held. This was especially evident as the Cold War

began to permeate the Middle East, especially after 1956. There was strong support for Israel in the Latin American left, intellectual circles, and the middle class who saw Israel as a progressive force from afar (Yaniv 1988).

However, Latin American sympathy for the Israeli cause was not unquestioning. Latin American condemnation of the joint Israeli-British-French invasion of Egypt in the 1956 war was sharp, echoing that of the two superpowers as well (Kaufman et al. 1979, 4). Suez was also significant for bringing Brazilian presence into the region. Between 1957 and 1967 Brazil contributed 6,300 troops to the first United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) and took charge of it in 1964–1966. However, Brazil's involvement in this peacekeeping force was broadly in line with others that it took in this early period: it was largely symbolic and was used by the country's leadership as a tool to project the country internationally (Cavalcante 2010, Hirst and Nasser 2014). It was therefore neither designed nor capable of resolving tensions between Israel and Egypt. At the same time, Brazil used its involvement in peacekeeping in the region to maintain support for the international consensus, including UN resolutions that gained majorities in favor of Palestinian refugees (Grossman 2012).

That this happened was due neither to Arab pressure nor internal developments. Throughout the 1950s and 1960s Arab relations, whether diplomatic, economic, or cultural, remained marginal in Latin America. Diplomatically, what relations existed were based mainly on whether they were "big" (for which Brazil qualified) and whether there was a significant Arab population present. Economically, efforts by the Arab League to encourage boycotts of Israel failed because of the relatively limited trade between it and Latin America. Meanwhile, beyond the Arab diasporas themselves, other points of contact were limited, with few Latin American politicians being invited to Arab countries (Kaufman et al. 1979, 18, 22, 24–25). Yet Brazil's approach to the Middle East as measured in UN votes—that is, support with the majority for peacekeeping and assistance for Palestinian refugees along with initiatives to bring Arabs and Israel together—remained consistent despite the change toward a more independent foreign policy (to the US) by the left wing Quadros and Goulart governments in the early 1960s (Grossman 2012).

The 1967 war and its aftermath was a seminal moment for Latin American political opinion regarding the Arab-Israel conflict. Initially, most sympathy lay with Israel rather than the Soviet-backed Arabs. But this soon shifted: following the war's end on June 30, 18 Latin American states sponsored a draft resolution on the conflict at the UN General Assembly (UNGA) which echoed Arab sentiment. Brazil played a prominent role in drafting the resolution along with Argentina, both of whom were sitting on the UNSC at the time. It called on Israel to withdraw from the occupied territories and all parties to end their belligerency and guarantee territorial integrity, including the use of demilitarized zones, along with a resolution of the refugee problem

and internationalizing Jerusalem (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1967). In short, it offered UN mediation both to realize the return of occupied territory and to achieve recognition of all states in the area to achieve peace and security (Oren 2002, 324–25). However, the resolution did not pass. Although it gained a majority, receiving 57 votes and 43 against (with 20 abstentions), it failed to reach the two-thirds requirement to make it binding (Baeza 2012).

Despite the draft's failure, both it and the proposal suggested by non-aligned countries like India and others (more of which is summarized below), shared common features. It therefore provided the basis for a subsequent draft proposed by the British toward the end of the year. Brazil's representative, Mr. De Carvalho Silos, stated that although the British draft did not meet all the requirements laid out in the Latin American draft, it did meet most of them. Most importantly, the draft was viable since it had broad support. With those reservations in mind, Brazil voted for what became Resolution 242 (UNSC 1967, Louis 2012, 240).

SOVIET UNION

Of the five countries examined, the Soviet Union is unique. Unlike the other four, which have been rising powers, the Soviet Union was a superpower and therefore one of the pivots of the international system, especially in the period between 1945 and 1991. And yet it was arguably the junior of the two leading states in the world during that time, never able to match the economic and military power and scope of the US. This was especially the case toward the end of the Cold War, even if it had started from a relative position of strength. In this respect then, Moscow could be seen as punching above its weight. This became more visible in 1967 when it seemed less able to influence or support its Arab proxies in their confrontation with Israel. But like the other states studied here, self-interest and status signaling were at the center of Moscow's thinking regarding the conflict. It initially saw the Palestine question and the developments resulting from it during the 1940s as a means of enhancing its international position and influence both regionally and globally. In addition, it shared with South Africa in having a significant Jewish population, which could occasionally influence its foreign policy.

During the Soviet Union's early years in the 1920s and 1930s the leadership had strongly opposed to Zionism and paid little attention to the Middle East. As well as identifying Zionism with capitalism and imperialism, Moscow saw it as a threat since it attracted potential Jewish workers away from the country (Freedman 2014). In 1920 the Soviet-led communist international organization, the Comintern, passed a resolution against the Zionists' activities in Palestine (Dannreuther 1998, 13). During the decade Soviet attention focused on the consolidation of its regime at home and developing a

socialist alternative. At the same time, Palestine, along with the rest of the Levant, were incorporated into the British and French spheres of influence and therefore beyond any means for direct influence. When the Soviet leadership considered the Middle East in this period, it was usually in relation to its neighbors: Turkey, Afghanistan, and Persia (Laquer 1959).

At the end of the 1920s two factors contributed to a brief flurry of interest in Palestine and the Arab world. Within the Comintern a more radical direction began to emerge and direct its activities. Meanwhile, in Palestine a grassroots insurrection broke out against Jewish migration and Zionist activities. Arab protests caught the Comintern's attention and it reiterated its opposition to Zionism while initiating a debate on whether the protests reflected a largely agrarian movement or represented an emerging class struggle (Laquer 1959).

But almost as soon as the Comintern began paying attention to the Palestinian question, interest quickly subsided. The Communist Party in Palestine was an active branch of the Comintern, but rather than seeking a leading role in the protests, it called for peace. Meanwhile, during the early 1930s Stalin had begun a series of purges, which had an impact on the Comintern at home. When the Great Arab Revolt took place between 1936 and 1938 there were few "Arabists" in Moscow to make a sufficient and thorough analysis of the situation. In any case, Arab nationalists were looking not to Moscow for support, but increasingly the Axis powers. As a consequence, between the mid-1930s and 1945 the Middle East did not figure significantly in Soviet strategic thinking, with the exception of Persia, because of its strategic location and growing importance as an energy producer. Criticism of Zionism became muted during the Second World War as a Jewish Anti-Fascist Solidarity Movement emerged in Moscow to support the war effort (Laquer 1959).

After 1945 the absence of sufficient attention to Palestine and the Arab world was reflected in the Soviet press. Laquer (1959) notes that Soviet criticism of Zionists persisted and was based on the assumption that they wanted the continuation of the mandate rather than independence. At the same time, despite their reactionary natures, Arab leaders were categorized as "progressive." Given this perception, it was therefore a surprise when Moscow endorsed the 1947 partition plan and Israel following its creation.

The reasons for the Soviet volte-face had little to do with developments on the ground and more with the international system. The Middle East remained a secondary consideration in the early part of the Cold War; influence in Europe was the primary concern. But the Middle East offered short-term opportunities, including disrupting US-British ties and weakening British influence in the region (Freedman 2014, 126). In addition, there was a reassertion of earlier opinion: the Arab leadership was not as "progressive" as initially thought; not only had it supported the Axis during the war, it was

perceived as sympathetic to the British. By contrast, along with the legacy of the Holocaust, the Zionists were clearly involved in an armed struggle against the British. Supporting the Zionists might also yield Moscow benefits in other ways, including Zionist support toward Moscow as well as using it to build links with Jewish and liberal intellectual contacts in the US. Finally, because of the issue's relative lack of strategic importance, it may also have been possible that the decision to support partition and Israel was taken at a lower level than the Politburo (Voth 1980, Laquer 1959, 146–47, Dannreuther 1998, 16–17).

Moscow was left disappointed, however. Its pro-Israel stance did not draw Israel away from its orientation toward the West (Nizameddin 1999, 22). Indeed, the new Israeli government concluded a relatively quick normalization in its relations with Britain. The hoped for links to American Jews and intellectuals also floundered while the creation of Israel did little to stop Zionist lobbying for Jewish immigration and causing internal disruption. Worse still, Israel backed the US position in relation to the Korean War. In 1952 Moscow cut ties with Israel, although they were restored following Stalin's death. But as the Cold War expanded beyond Europe, the Soviets began looking for alternative partners. In the mid-1950s they found one in Egypt's Gamal Nasser.

A champion for the Arabs in both Egypt and the region, Nasser posed a threat to the West. Seen as unreliable and unwilling to provide finance for his projects, Nasser turned to the communist bloc for assistance. Moscow offered an attractive alternative in the form of development assistance—and subsequently military resources, initially through Czechoslovakia as the middleman. Moscow and Cairo became closer in the wake of the Suez conflict in 1956, during which the Soviet leadership roundly condemned the British, French, and the Israelis for their invasion of Egypt (Freedman 2014, 126). The period was also marked by a greater Soviet presence in the region. Whereas before 1955 the main arms supplier in the region was Britain, by the mid-1960s the two superpowers had replaced it, with Algeria, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Israel, and Pakistan among the largest recipients (Kemp 1969). Meanwhile the West sought to build alliances to contain both the Soviet threat and its regional satellites, with the US cultivating links with Turkey, Iran, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia, and the creation of the Baghdad Pact against Egypt (Voth 1980).

The Soviet approach to Egypt had coincided with a change in its leadership. Stalin had passed away in 1953 and with him his confrontationalist view of the world. In his place was Nikita Khrushchev, who advocated a more collaborative and activist relationship between East and West, the developed and the developing world, by supporting nationalist leaders in Egypt and later, Syria and Iraq (Dannreuther 1998, Niameddin 1999, Barghoorn 1969).

Soviet influence and prestige was enhanced as a result of the 1956 Suez conflict. Nasser's decision to nationalize the Suez Canal not only echoed the statist approach to development promoted by the Soviet camp, it also challenged established powers such as Britain and France. Their invasion of Egypt, along with Israel, in October seemed to doom the Nasser regime and embarrass Moscow. But the US decision to oppose the invasion enabled Moscow to adopt a more confrontational stance, including the threat of nuclear weapons in the conflict. The effect was to magnify the Soviets' influence in bringing the conflict to an end and making the US look as if it had played a part with the western powers (Dannreuther 1998, 22).

Over the following decade the Soviet presence expanded beyond the Arab-Israel conflict and across the region. This included developing alliances with states such as Egypt, Syria, and Iraq, all of which espoused a form of "Arab socialism" where powerful nationalists built up the state and used it to plan and manage the economy. Within the conflict though, the initial establishment of the PLO in 1964 (and the nationalist movement, Fatah, under the leadership of Yasser Arafat) was not greeted favorably, mainly because it did not follow the Soviet line to seek a political solution to the conflict. Indeed, the PLO rejected the very principle of Israel (Dannreuther 1998, 30). Moscow's oversight of the PLO prompted it to seek alternative ties; Beijing offered such an opportunity, which is discussed later in this chapter.

Prior to 1967 Moscow contributed toward growing regional tensions (Dannreuther 1998, 34–35). One was as a result of its support for Syria, which itself was providing assistance to the PLO and its cross-border raids against Israel. Another was that the Arab actors were becoming more radical in their stance, including over borders and whether they and Israel should be bound by the 1947 partition plan or the 1949 ceasefire lines. Perhaps Moscow wanted to influence the balance of power in the region to encourage Israel toward the 1947 borders. Whether this was the case, there was little to suggest that Moscow had deviated from its general stance toward the Arab-Israeli conflict. Unlike the Arabs it accepted the right of Israel to exist and did not call for the complete liberation of Palestine; and its support for Palestinian refugees was based on their "legal" rights rather than any national claim.

The result was that before the 1967 war, Soviet attitudes toward the region were relatively complacent. Uri Bar-Noi (2011) shares the view of Soviet underestimation of tensions in the region. He also notes that Moscow was unprepared for actual conflict and had no intention of becoming involved once it began. In this regard, Moscow shared the same sentiment as the US; both superpowers had been opposed to war, its outbreak demonstrating the extent to which both had failed to control their clients (Hurewitz 1969). The Soviet preference was for a diplomatic resolution, but it was unable to exert sufficient influence over its allies prior to the war. When it

began Moscow saw Israel as a proxy for Western interests, despite Western claims that the roots of the conflict were local. Shocked by the outbreak of hostilities, the Soviets pushed for a ceasefire through several draft resolutions at the UNSC but these were ignored by Israel. On June 10 the Soviets broke relations with Israel, as did other East European states. Moscow also sent an ultimatum to Washington complaining about Israel's violations of ceasefire demands and persuading the US to pressure Israel to halt its offensive, which the latter did. The Soviet stance, rather than supporting their Arab allies, undermined them, and which in turn affected their confidence in Moscow. They had expected Moscow to stand by them but it took six days before the Soviet leadership intervened in the conflict and by which time Israel had completed its objectives. In addition, Moscow had proved unable to halt the conflict once it broke out; only the US was able to rein in Israel. The Arab world took note of this; a decade later Egypt had abandoned its alliance with Moscow in favor of the US and an eventual peace agreement with Israel.

The Arabs' defeat was a profound shock. It encouraged a reappraisal among Soviet analysts both of Israeli preparedness as well as their own strategy in the region. One example of this was that it opened space for the PLO to become a significant actor in the Arab-Israeli conflict. From 1968 Moscow began talking to the PLO, leading to its first official visit to the Soviet Union in February 1970 (Dannreuther 1998).

In addition to moving the Soviets away from Arab endorsement, it opened the door to superpower collaboration, especially on the UNSC. US-Soviet interaction which began during the 1967 war continued after. From this point on, Moscow sought to coordinate with Washington over the conflict and its attendant peace process, emphasizing that a solution had to be political and not military (Nizameddin 1999, 29). At the time it was noted that the two superpowers could potentially enforce a settlement through demilitarization, adjudication of border areas, and a resolution of the refugee crisis, but they not only lacked the will but also a consensus over what the essence of such a deal should look like (Kerr 1969). At the UN the Soviet representative Kuznetsov proposed a complete and immediate withdrawal by Israel and an end to its aggression (Louis 2012, 240). However, the Soviets gained little support for it, leading to Moscow supporting the British draft resolution in November 1967, which was "ambiguously balanced" and offering to the Arabs "a positive statement on the commitment on Israel to withdraw" from occupied territory and to Israel "a clear declaration in favor of a permanent peace and security within recognized boundaries" (Louis 2012, 235).

INDIA

To understand India's approach to the Arab-Israeli conflict it is necessary to make sense of both domestic and external factors which weighed upon it. Three main factors contributed to Indian foreign policy after 1947: anti-colonialism, non-alignment, and a weak economic position (Ward 1970). The last factor arguably kept it from taking an active role in the late 1940s, but as the 1950s unfolded it sought a greater global role. This reflected its leadership's aspirations to eventual great power status, owing to its geographic and demographic size, its geostrategic location between the Persian Gulf and the Straits of Malacca, and its conscious desire to modernize (Nayar 1979). However, the context was not propitious, given that the world was divided in two. India's response was therefore toward non-alignment, which sought to maintain foreign policy autonomy while keeping its options open.

From Washington's perspective, India's non-alignment was problematic. Indeed, as India criticized what it saw as imperialist actions in Korea, Indo-china, and Southeast Asia, the US concluded it was falling into the Soviet orbit and opted for its containment, including through arms transfers to India's rival, Pakistan (Nayar 1979). So began what Ogden (2014) identifies as the first phase of Indian foreign policy, which lasted until the 1962 war with China. The period was the highpoint of "idealism" in Indian foreign policy, which also reflected the dominance of Nehru in government until his death in 1964. From the mid-1960s India fell under the sway of Nehru's daughter, Indira Gandhi, who dominated the political system until her assassination in 1984. During this second phase, Indian foreign policy became more "pragmatic." Military defeat to China in 1962 and violent conflict with Pakistan in 1965 exposed the weakness of the Indian state and the necessity to develop its economic base to enhance its military potential. These years were a low point for India, which also faced the increasing encroachment of the Cold War into South Asia, reducing its freedom of maneuver (Nayar 1979, Ogden 2014). Increasingly, India was obliged to choose between the two superpowers; by the early 1970s it would sign a treaty of friendship with the Soviet Union.

The shift from Nehru to Gandhi demonstrated the extent to which Indian foreign policy was largely confined to the figure of the prime minister and his or her immediate associates—a characteristic which has persisted into the present (Ogden 2014). Prime ministers were strong figures who shaped the direction of their governments. At the same time, the governments they led came from the same pool, the Indian National Congress.

The Indian National Congress party emerged as a multi-ethnic and multi-religious movement during and against British rule. It was a broad ideological church which managed to include all classes and ideologies, from the merchants to the peasants and from conservatives to socialists. Holding much

of the movement together had been the charisma and example of the Mahatma, Mohandas Gandhi, during the 1930s. But Gandhi was finding it harder to hold Congress together during and after partition in 1947. It took his assassination in January 1948 to keep the movement from fraying. Gandhi's death left Congress divided between Sardas Patel, the first deputy prime minister, who represented the ideologically more conservative wing, and Nehru, who identified more with the "have nots." In 1950 Patel died, meaning that there was effectively no longer a restraining force on Nehru, who led India until the end of his life (Moraes 1960).

Congress's anti-imperialist stance meant that it largely saw Jewish nationalism—Zionism—as a tool of the British. For Congress leaders like Nehru and Gandhi during the 1930s, Palestine was an Arab country whose inhabitants were being displaced by Zionist settlers with British support (Ward 1970, Kumaraswamy 2004, 2014). At the same time, Congress attitudes did not develop in isolation; prior to 1947, Zionist leaders in Palestine had been wary of supporting the nationalist movement in India, lest it undermine their own position at home (Kumaraswamy 2004).

Following the British decision to refer the Palestinian question to the UN, UNSCOP was established in May 1947 with 11 members, including India. The Indian representative, Sir Abdul Rahman, rejected partition, claiming the population was too mixed and the territory too small for two separate states. In September UNSCOP published its final report, recommending partition into Arab and Jewish states, but within an economic union and with Jerusalem an internationalized city. Three members—India, Iran, and Yugoslavia—rejected the majority report and proposed a minority proposal for a federal state instead (although there is some indication that the Indian representation personally favored a form of unitary government) (Ward 1970). Both Arabs and Zionists opposed this federal plan: the former because it gave the Jews more than they felt they should have, the latter because it would have resulted in limited civil rights and less fulfilment of both political rights and sovereignty (Kumaraswamy 2014, 94). When the partition plan was eventually put to the vote in November 1947, India and eight of the other Asian countries in the UN, voted against (Philippines voting in favor and Nationalist China abstaining). When it looked like the partition plan would succeed, Arab states started lobbying for the federal proposal, but as Nehru later said, by then it was too late (Kumaraswamy 2014, 94). Despite India's stance, when an All-Palestine government was declared in September 1948, India opted against formal recognition (Kumawarsamy 2004).

Following the ceasefire at the end of the first Arab-Israeli war in 1949, Israel applied for membership to the UN. Again India voted against. Indian concerns had begun to shift and emphasized self-interest. Nehru's government wanted to build support both among the Arabs and Muslims, both domestically and internationally. Domestically, despite the painful effects of

mass displacement following its own partition in August 1947, India was still home to a vast population of Muslims. Congress was in competition with the Muslim League for political support and wanted to demonstrate that its more secular government could protect their rights and thereby reduce any support for Pakistan. Externally, the Nehru government wanted to win Arab support in its dispute with Pakistan over Kashmir. Additionally, the Indian economy depended greatly on trade and especially secure access between the Suez Canal and the Persian Gulf. Later, as the 1950s unfolded and Indian non-alignment took shape, Nehru reached out to similarly "progressive" leaders in the Third World like Gamal Nasser in Egypt (Ward 1970, Hargreave 1984, Kumawarsamy 2004).

Although India had opposed its UN membership, in 1950 New Delhi recognized Israel. Extending recognition to Israel was acknowledgment that the wider international community had already done so (Ward 1970, Kumawarsamy 2004). However, it did not herald any significant shift in relations between the two states. Israel did not figure greatly in Indian strategic thinking and no effort was made to upgrade the level of diplomatic ties beyond Israel's consular representation in Bombay. On the Indian side this may also be partially explained by the relatively limited finances, size, and scope of its diplomatic corps in the late 1940s and early 1950s as well (Kumaraswamy 2014, 95).

During the 1950s and 1960s India's position was strongly identified with the Arab cause. Matters were crystallized in the 1956 Suez conflict, where India was strongly critical of Israel's involvement in invading Egypt, by then an ally (Kumaraswamy 2014, 96). It therefore supported and contributed toward the UN Emergency Force (UNEF) peacekeeping operation in the region on the condition that Egypt agree with the UN. This therefore constrained the scope of the peacekeeping effort. At the same time, India's government was prepared to accept such limits since it was concerned that Pakistan might pursue a similar option of troops in Kashmir. Requiring that the UN reach agreement with Egypt would dilute such a threat (Ward 1970). Indian troops subsequently became part of the force in Suez, along with those of Brazil. An Indian commander was in charge between 1959–1964 and 1966–1967. In addition, during this period India approved of the PLO's creation in 1964 although it would not extend recognition for another decade. In 1966 when India suffered drought, its leaders rejected Israeli offers of food aid (Ward 1970). Yet Kumaraswamy (2014, 96) has noted that India did turn to Israel at particular moments, including for military assistance in its wars with China in 1962 and Pakistan in 1965; there was also some intelligence sharing in this early period. However, these links did little to defuse India's political coldness toward Israel.

With India and Brazil contributing troops to the UNEF in the Sinai after 1956, both countries were caught in the middle of the 1967 war when it broke

out and Indian and Brazilian soldiers were killed. In addition, both states were temporary members of the UNSC in the period and therefore had a prominent role in global discussions regarding the conflict in subsequent months. Mrs. Gandhi accused Israel of escalating the crisis and demanded a ceasefire. In the immediate aftermath of the war, India voted for an Argentine resolution for humanitarian relief. Over the following months, the three non-aligned countries on the UNSC—India, Mali, and Nigeria—produced a joint draft resolution which demanded an immediate and unconditional withdrawal by Israel, after which all states in the conflict would cease their belligerency (Oren 2002, 325). According to Louis (2012, 240) the draft had gained considerable support in the months following the war as a result of rising antipathy toward Israel and was perceived as "more Arab than the Arabs" had put forward. Only at the last minute, on November 22 following lobbying by the British prime minister, Harold Wilson, who wrote to Mrs. Gandhi, was the Indian draft withdrawn and support given to the British proposal. The Indian representative, Mr. Parthasarthi declared his country's late change by stating that,

> [I]t is our understanding that the draft resolution, if approved by the Council, will commit it to the application of the principle of total withdrawal of Israel forces from all the territories—I repeat, all the territories occupied by Israel as a result of the conflict. (UNSC 1967)

Although India remained in the Arab camp after the 1967 war, there were already slight indications that this stance was not monolithic. Although foreign policy was an elite preoccupation and largely concentrated in the hands of national entities like Congress, Ward (1970, 142) noted that there were elements both within Congress and the opposition Jan Sangh party which were critical of the pro-Arab policy. They noted that despite staunch Indian support for the Arab world, this had generated few substantive benefits in India's own struggles closer to home, whether in its wars against China in 1962 and Pakistan in 1965 or in competition with Syria for a seat on the UNSC in 1966. Furthermore, the pro-Arab stance contradicted government claims to non-alignment by being one-sided and inconsistent. The more educated part of the population also questioned the government's supposed even-handedness; in a 1967 survey a slight majority of 52 percent favored a more equal relationship with Israel and the Arabs over a pro-Arab position. This attitude would begin to permeate official thinking over the following decade, as support for the Arabs became less robust and emotive and questions were asked about the relative merits of the pro-Arab policy.

CHINA

During the first half of the twentieth century there was Chinese awareness of Jewish persecution and Zionism as a political, nationalist response. Some Chinese intellectuals saw similarities between persecution of Jews by Europeans and Chinese by the Japanese. Jewish communities had been established in Harbin, Shanghai, and Hong Kong and Zionist organizations set up. Nationalist and communist leaders Sun Yatsen and Mao Zedong had expressed sympathy for the Zionists, the latter even intending to include them in a book he planned to write on national liberation movements and their struggles—although it was never completed. During the 1920s and 1930s Chinese analysts were aware of the conflict in Palestine, but were less familiar with the domestic reasons for it, focusing on the great power dynamics, and especially the impact on British control (Shichor 2014, 108–9).

Israel and the People's Republic of China (PRC) were established within 18 months of each other, in May 1948 and October 1949 respectively. The PRC defeated the Nationalists, who fled to Taiwan, but they continued to hold China's permanent UNSC seat until 1971. In the 1950s the new communist leadership's focus was on consolidating power at home and foreign policy was used to this end. In the 1960s and 1970s it shifted toward a more "revolutionary diplomacy" which reflected the domestic politics of the Cultural Revolution (Dillon 2004, 45). Israel was the first country in the Middle East to recognize communist China, in January 1950 (Shichor 2014). Israel approached the PRC through the two countries' embassies in Moscow, but diplomatic recognition did not follow (Chen 2012), in part because of the Korean War which soon broke out. China's involvement meant it was pitted against the US (Pan 1997, Lanteigne 2009, 3) and, although Israel was not yet a US ally, Washington put formal and informal pressure on Israeli officials not to press for diplomatic recognition (Shichor 1994). The resulting divisions inside the Israeli foreign ministry led to delay. By the time that Israel had resolved these internal differences and made a formal request in 1955, the opportunity had passed. Indeed, in 1954 China's foreign minister, Zhou Enlai, had previously hinted that Beijing was ready to realize full diplomatic relations with Israel, but Israel's response was equivocal, sending a low level delegation to Beijing in January 1955 (Medzini 2015).

Sino-Israeli ties subsequently underwent a deep freeze. From the mid-1950s Beijing was exploring closer ties with Arab and Muslim states which could provide support in its anti-imperialist struggle against the West (Shichor 2010). Beijing's pursuit of relations with the Arab and Muslim world coincided with the Bandung Conference in 1955 and China's goal of Third World leadership (Dillon 2004, 44). The effect of these developments was "non-relations" between Israel and China between the 1950s and 1980s (Shichor 2014). Despite Israel's desire to establish diplomatic relations from at

least the 1970s, this was prevented from happening by Beijing's more skepti-
cal position. Where China's stance was relatively passive in relation to Israel
during the 1950s, it became more confrontational between 1964 and 1971
(Shichor 1994). Much of this had to do with its ties to the PLO, its growing
rivalry with the Soviets for dominance of the communist world, and domestic
agitation as a result of the Cultural Revolution.

To explain China's relationship with the Palestinians, they must be set
into the wider context of relations with the Arab world more generally (Shi-
chor 1977). Raphael Israeli (1989) has noted that although the ties were
never all-consuming, the Palestinians represented a means to promote its
commitment to national liberation struggles in the Third World and in the
Arab context specifically. At the same time though, having positive relations
with the Palestinians could also cause tensions with Arab allies; China's
decision to provide arms to the Palestinians in 1965 was met with Egyptian
anger (Harris 1994, Dillon 2004).

Before 1964 though, the absence of a Palestinian movement meant there
were few opportunities for Beijing. Arab regimes were generally conserva-
tive and anti-communist, and therefore hostile to Beijing during the 1950s. In
1950 the Arab League had adopted a resolution which opposed recognition
of the PRC (Israeli 1989, 140). But following the overthrow of these regimes
and the establishment of new, anti-imperialist and "Arab socialist" govern-
ments under Gamal Nasser in Egypt and the Baathist party in Syria and Iraq,
the prospect for closer ties became possible.

Egypt was the priority given its population, the largest in the Arab world.
The two signed a bilateral trade agreement in August 1955 and China pur-
chased cotton from Egypt following the West's withdrawal from the deal.
China was also considered to have helped Egypt buy arms from Czechoslo-
vakia. But Nasser would prioritize Egypt's relations with the Soviets, which
meant that ties with Beijing became strained during the Sino-Soviet split
(Harris 1994, 331, Dillon 2004, 46).

At the 1955 Bandung conference China supported the Arabs' pro-Pales-
tinian resolution, although arguably the Beijing still saw the Palestinian ques-
tion as one mainly concerned with refugees, to be resolved through a peace-
ful settlement. There was no suggestion yet that China favored the establish-
ment of a Palestinian state (Israeli 1989, 140–41, 143, 144).

China's relationship with the Palestinians reflected the realities of the
period. Following the ceasefire at the end of the first Israeli-Arab war in
1949, historic Palestine and its Arab population was now fragmented be-
tween Israel, Gaza, and the West Bank (the latter two under the control of
Egypt and Jordan respectively). Cairo and Amman claimed to speak on be-
half of the Palestinian Arab populations in Gaza and the West Bank until the
formation of a representative Palestinian entity, the PLO in 1964. The PLO
was politically conservative in outlook, owing to its leadership's ties to the

Arab League and its base among the historically dominant "notables," in-
cluding the landed classes. As the decade wore on the character of the PLO
changed. It became increasingly radical and revolutionary as nationalist
movements and political parties, including more explicitly socialist-oriented
ones, gained influence. The shift was complete by 1969 following Fatah's
victory in the PLO's internal elections.

The PLO's emergence received early support from China, which was the
first non-Arab state to extend diplomatic recognition and provide arms, doing
so in 1965. High-level meetings between senior Chinese officials and PLO
representatives followed, including directly with Mao Zedong. The PLO es-
tablished a representative office in Beijing while the latter sought to move
the Palestinians away from the Soviets, owing to their diplomatic recognition
of Israel (Israeli 1989, 145). This push occurred despite the PLO's initially
conservative character: Beijing saw revolutionary potential and began pro-
viding both arms and military assistance to the Palestinians from 1965 (Har-
ris 1977). That assistance was important to the PLO, since it did not start to
receive significant aid from the Soviets until after 1973 (Harris 1994, 334).
Israeli (1989, 146) has also noted that in its eagerness, Beijing overlooked
Fatah's non-Marxist orientation and the much smaller status of the commu-
nist-oriented factions within the PLO. Yet it is important not to overstate the
Chinese role (Cooley 1972); although the PLO leadership benefited from the
material support provided, Beijing remained a secondary partner to that of
Moscow.

Chinese material support to the Palestinians occurred during the latter
half of the 1960s and at a time of elite power struggles within the Communist
Party; this was manifested throughout the country through ideological radi-
calization and polarization associated with the Cultural Revolution. As the
Cultural Revolution wound down, so did Beijing's active military support for
the Palestinians. Chinese officials expressed concern at both the lack of unity
between the different factions within the PLO as well as its use of interna-
tional terrorism (Harris 1977, Israeli 1989).

Although China was building ties with the Arabs and the PLO, Beijing's
influence was limited. Owing to Cold War bipolarity, the Arabs' and Pales-
tinians' primary alliance was with Moscow rather than China, even though
Beijing sought to make common cause with them as a fellow member—and
aspiring leader—of the Third World at the 1955 Bandung Conference. Arab
regimes were sympathetic toward Beijing, seeing it as different from the
Soviet Union in a number of ways: namely, as an Asian, non-imperialist
country whose government was believed to be popular; but perhaps most
importantly, it was attractive because it was seen to be distant, lacking any
direct regional presence and, therefore, risk (Laquer 1959).

At the global level, China's peripheral status was exacerbated by the
architecture of the international system. It sat outside the UN, which it saw as

a body of US imperialism. It therefore persistently opposed its efforts at international mediation, seeing them as measures designed to advance US influence (Shichor 1991). Under Mao Zedong's leadership, the PRC identified with those movements pursuing national liberation and opposed to the bourgeois and imperialist world powers; Israel and the Arabs (and later the Palestinians) represented the two sides (Israeli 1989, 140, Shichor 2014).

Chinese ambivalence was also present for its supposed Soviet ally. By the early 1960s a split had emerged between the two, owing to personal and ideological differences. Along with the antipathy that the Beijing leadership felt for the Khrushchev government in Moscow, the Chinese believed that the Soviets had become a conservative or status quo power. They believed Moscow was determined to prevent Beijing from claiming a leading role for itself in the communist world. The resulting rivalry manifested itself in the search for influence, including in the Middle East. However, in this instance China faced a disadvantage: Moscow had a head start through its superpower status and cultivation of alliances with key Arab socialist regimes like Egypt, Iraq, and Syria (Shichor 2006a). Moreover, having undergone an earlier industrialization process, the Soviet Union arguably offered more in the way of military, economic, technological, and financial assistance. By contrast, China was a less attractive prospect by the early 1960s: it was coming out of an extreme and failed industrialization process, the Great Leap Forward, which had resulted in famine.

Because Beijing was unable to compete on the same field as Moscow, it cultivated ties with national liberation movements in Palestine, Yemen, and Algeria (Cooley 1972, Harris 1977, Shichor 1977, 2014). This provided the backdrop for Beijing's official engagement with the PLO and the material assistance it provided from the late 1960s.

In the 1967 war China condemned Israel and the US as well as the Soviets, the latter for their failure to support the Arabs. Beijing's response had grown more radical, owing to convulsions from the Cultural Revolution. Domestic radicalization manifested itself in a more confrontational and revolutionary foreign policy, including recommendations for a "people's war," which was treated with skepticism by Egypt and other Arab states (Dillon 2004, 46–47).

China's appeal found an audience with the PLO. After 1967, the role of the Arab states was replaced by the PLO in the struggle against Israel (Israeli 1989, 143). Chinese's more confrontational stance was at odds with the international community, however. International efforts to mediate between Israel and the Arab states following the 1967 and 1973 wars were sharply condemned by Beijing, which saw the US and Soviet Union's joint endorsement of UN resolutions as evidence of a shared conservatism and imperialist tendencies (Shichor 1991). In contrast to the other BRICS countries of the period, by not being a member of the UN, Beijing opposed Resolution 242.

In so doing, it echoed the sentiments of the PLO and other rejectionist elements in the Arab world such as Algeria, Syria, and Libya (Israeli 1989, 147).

SOUTH AFRICA

Compared to distant China, India, and Brazil, South Africa's connections to historic Palestine were relatively deeper and more intimate, principally between the South African and Zionist leaderships, and subsequently that of Israel. Indeed, Stevens and Elmessiri (1977) have noted the features associated with studying Israeli–South African relations. At one level, a narrow focus provides a clearer account of the relationship between two states (Israel, apartheid South Africa) and two liberation movements (the PLO and the anti-apartheid ANC). While this is useful for those concerned with state and non-state activism, it fails to provide the broader historical context between the two states and societies. This wider perspective would bring into focus the diverse points of contact between leaderships with a common legacy of (Zionist and Afrikaner) settler colonialism, with similar roots in Western culture and nationalist identity and its impact on the "other" (i.e., the Palestinians and black majority), whether in Asia (Zionists and Israel) or Africa (the whites and South Africa).

There were various points of contact between the South African leadership and Zionists before 1948 and a high degree of empathy at the elite level. The two principal leaders for their societies before the Second World War, the Zionist Chaim Weizmann and the South African Jan Smuts, first met each other in Britain in 1917. Weizmann was already a Zionist leader; Smuts was a member of the Imperial War Cabinet and would later become South Africa's second prime minister, between 1939 and 1948.

Over the next 30 years the two men would forge a strong friendship and sympathy for each other's goals. Each of them saw the other engaged in a similar undertaking, a colonial project being carried out under the auspices of the British. Smuts saw the Zionists' "return" to Palestine as religiously justified, having echoes in the Boers' sense of themselves as a unique people destined to settle South Africa. Smuts' own United Party also included important members of the South African Jewish community, such as mineworkers, bankers, and industrialists, who played a significant role within it. Meanwhile, South African Jews were among the largest fundraisers for the Zionist cause. From 1926 they became the largest Jewish diaspora, second only to that in the US. In time, South African Jews also contributed as migrants to Israel, although never in substantial numbers. Yet they became a presence in Zionist and later Israeli society, volunteering to fight in 1948, 1956, and 1967 (Stevens 1977a, Elmessiri 1977, Osia 1981).

This did not mean that South Africa was necessarily a favorable environment for Jews. There was a strong streak of anti-Semitism in the country's elite, especially in the Afrikaner community. During the 1930s this was also felt in restrictive immigration policies targeted against Jews, especially those from Eastern Europe. Anti-Jewish prejudice was relative compared to that faced by blacks and Indians in South Africa though. As European colonialism took hold in South Africa during the nineteenth century, it marginalized and excluded the majority of the people. By the time South Africa became self-governing in 1931 it was already pursuing racial segregation. In 1945 the Indian representative at the UN expressed criticism of the country's increasingly racist policies, but the new international body deemed this to be a domestic issue and therefore outside of its competence.

In 1947 the partition plan for Palestine was put before the UN. With Smuts an active supporter of Zionism, South Africa voted in favor. Yet when Zionist leaders declared independence in May 1948, Smuts held back, only offering de facto recognition. Richard Stevens (1977b) explains that this was mainly due to domestic reasons: Smuts was concerned not to offend Britain (the mandate power) and Anglo-South African sensibilities while also wanting to prevent the opposition Nationalist Party from gaining any advantage—a national election was scheduled to take place weeks later. While both parties drew their support from across the white population, the Smuts' United Party had a slight edge on the Nationalist Party in terms of its Jewish support. However, during the 1940s the Nationalists were beginning to reevaluate their attitude toward the Jewish community. Although not economically dominant, the Jewish community was important; discriminating against them would make little economic sense. In addition, the Nationalists wanted to secure white supremacy against the black majority; consequently, it needed to reach out as widely as possible among the white population. This prompted Afrikaner media to highlight the similarities and common cause between the Afrikaner cause in South Africa and the Zionists in Palestine (Stevens 1977b, Polakow-Suransky 2014, 204).

The 1948 election was won by the Nationalist Party which had campaigned on a platform of strict segregation. Whereas the previous United Party-led government had also practiced racial segregation, the new regime made it official and formal, through a legalized apartheid (separateness) system based on racial identity; employment and education would be different for different racial groups, for example. The apartheid system, which claimed to offer "separate development" for South Africa's various peoples, was designed to ensure divide and rule by uniting the white population while fragmenting and separating the African population into "tribes" (Adam and Moodley 2005, 51–52). Meanwhile, despite the claim of unity among whites, anti-Semitism had not been completely eliminated in the party and the Afrikaner movement. Consequently, the new prime minister, D.F. Malan, sought

to dissuade Jewish fears, a process which would be drawn out into the 1950s (Shimoni 2003).

In 1949 the Malan government extended de jure recognition to Israel. Over the next decade both government and media would make visible their support for the new state, even as Israel sought to build commercial and diplomatic links in the rest of Africa. D.F. Malan visited Israel in 1953, the first head of any government to do so. Although ostensibly a private visit, he met with the Israeli prime minister, David Ben Gurion, and representatives of South African Zionists there.

Relations between Israel and South Africa were cordial during the 1950s, if low key. In 1961 though, the relationship became strained. According to Polakow-Suransky (2014, 201) this was a period of "opposing geopolitical interests and ideological hostility." During the 1960s, Israel's main concern was with building support in the UN; that included cultivating ties with newly independent states, such as those in Africa. In October 1961 African states at the UN objected to a statement made by South Africa's foreign minister Eric Leow, himself a strong anti-Semite before the Second World War. The African states sought to censure Leow and have his statement removed from the public record. Israel voted in support. A month later, Israel voted for a UNGA resolution which called apartheid "as being reprehensible and repugnant to the dignity and rights of peoples and individuals" (Stevens 1977b, 65). The reaction from South Africa was swift, with the prime minister criticizing Israel for its stance and claiming that its behavior was similar in form to apartheid. The government also introduced restrictions on currency transfers, which made South African financial support to Zionist organizations in Israel more problematic.

Why did Israel take the action it did? Aynor (1986) notes that the Israeli leadership faced a dilemma. If it voted for the resolution it risked upsetting the South African regime and Jewish community. If it voted against the resolution or abstained it would face broader opposition, especially among many of the newly independent African states. There was also a risk that voting against South Africa might open the door to future international criticism of itself, especially in the wake of the Suez conflict, where it had been reticent in removing itself from occupied territory.

Among Israel's leaders and delegation at the UN there was a moral objection to the racial discrimination associated with apartheid. In addition, Israel's prime minister, David Ben Gurion, argued after the event that the costs to South African Jews of Israel's actions would be marginal; they would not result in pogroms or adverse maltreatment. But perhaps more important were geopolitical considerations: surrounded by hostile Arab states who were increasingly supported by the Soviet Union, the Israeli leadership aimed to break out of its diplomatic isolation and cultivate African support, thereby

challenging the Afro-Asian bloc (Stevens 1977b, Shimoni 2003, 49, Polakow-Suransky 2014, 205).

Despite the Leow affair, Israeli-South African ties did not completely collapse. Economic relations remained largely unaffected. But what would change the dynamic significantly would be the 1967 war. Following its outbreak, the Vorster government turned a blind eye to around 1,000 South African volunteers joining Israeli civilian, paramilitary, and Zionist organizations as well as sending funds worth up to $20m. After 1967, Israel faced international criticism for its occupation of Arab territory. With the rise of the Palestinian nationalist struggle, Israel's treatment of the occupied West Bank and Gaza suggested parallels with apartheid. The correlation of these two states' respective regimes and regional isolation would lead to them forging a unique alliance which reflected their common interests and ideologies during the 1970s and 1980s.

Both Ben-Gurion's reassurance to South African Jews during the 1961 crisis and South African Jewish involvement in Israel's conflict revealed the transnational nature of the Jewish community. Within the South African Jewish community, the bulk was represented by the Jewish Board of Deputies since its formation in 1933. It was chiefly concerned with reaching an accommodation with the apartheid regime, largely because they felt fearful about their position in relation to Afrikaner nationalism. It therefore adopted a position of political non-involvement and discouraged any attempt for Jews to political organize or define themselves communally. That stance seemed to be well received; in the Afrikaner community, Malan's pursuit of a rapprochement increasingly won out, with government and media statements reassuring the Board (Shimoni 2003, 29–31).

If the Jewish Board tacitly accepted the apartheid regime, there were small communities of radical and liberal persuasion which opposed the apartheid regime (Shimoni 2003). Some of them were even associated with the African National Congress (ANC) which had been founded in 1910 and which sought to break down African tribalism and disunity. Although predominately a black African organization, it had support from both white and Indian liberals and communists, including Jews. It lobbied successive governments for recognition but was largely ignored. Civil disobedience was attempted against apartheid laws during the 1950s but the regime responded by imprisoning protestors. At Sharpeville in 1960, over 60 protestors were murdered by the security forces, prompting the movement to go underground and pursue acts of sabotage against installations, but not civilians (Adam and Moodley 2005, 55).

Meanwhile, as tensions emerged between Israel and the apartheid regime at the UN in 1961, the South African Jewish community's response was ambivalent. At one level there was no break between it and the government over the affair. Indeed, the Board advised overseas Jewish organizations not

to comment. At another level there was much mixed feeling. There was embarrassment at Israel's actions while also fear that this might stoke Afrikaner disaffection against Jews. The result was the Board's mild criticism of Israel, which it said should have supported the mainly Western countries who had opposed the resolution (Steven 1977b, Shimoni 2003, 46–47, Polakow-Suransky 2014, 205).

CONCLUSION

Although the five countries which would one day make up the BRICS grouping did not share a collective consciousness or organization in the period between 1947 and 1967, on two areas they shared similar experiences. First, all five countries found themselves "distant" from the conflict and the region. This was especially the case in relation to Brazil and India, whose governments had very limited influence on the antagonists in the Arab-Israeli conflict during this time.

Second, the countries showed an early interest in managing the conflict—although they approached this in different ways. This included the use of international institutions like Brazil's and India's support for UN peacekeeping while China and the Soviet Union provided assistance to their Arab and Palestinian allies. Following the 1967 war, at least three of these states played a prominent role in drafting Resolution 242 and setting out the principle of land for peace.

Conflict management consisted of both active and passive approaches in this period. Part of the reason for that could be found in the character of the overarching international system in which this phase of the Arab-Israeli conflict took place. By the 1960s the emergence of a Third World to counter the East-West split had taken place and that within the Third World competition was taking place between different state actors. That more fluid environment perhaps encouraged rising powers to see the Arab-Israeli conflict as an opportunity in which to promote themselves.

The result of the opportunity presented by the global structure meant that the three forms of rising power behavior were on show between 1947 and 1967: good international citizenship, status seeking, and spoiling behavior. Whether they identified with Israel (South Africa) or the Arabs (India, Soviet Union), all five made use of conflict management tools designed to enhance their own position in the international system. This included spoiling tactics by the Soviet Union and China while Brazil and India adopted an approach that despite their orientation toward one side or the other, was more inclined to support the international system through the use of peacekeeping.

The Soviet and Chinese approaches may be seen as disruptive, as they sought to insert arms into the conflict through their allies among the Arabs

and the PLO. While this did not cause regional instability and insecurity, it did contribute toward it. Yet at the same time, even if it was confrontational and challenging of the prevailing order, it was an active form of conflict management, since it sought to resolve the conflict, albeit in one particular direction.

By contrast the Indian and Brazilian peacekeeping effort displayed elements of international citizenship. Unlike the Soviet and Chinese efforts, they chose to pursue their goals through the architecture of the established international order of the UN and its institutions. Moreover, their commitment to an institution like the UN reflected the importance of that institution to the Arab-Israeli conflict, as it had been present at the beginning, through Britain's decision to refer the question of Palestine to it in 1947 and the subsequent partition vote.

However, Indian and Brazilian efforts were limited; they did little to remove the underlying causes of the conflict. Peacekeeping was a temporary and superficial measure, since tensions ratcheted up between Israel and its Arab neighbors prior to 1967 regardless of Brazilian and Indian troops' presence. Indeed, India had accepted Egyptian demands and constraints on the scope of the peacekeeping force for reasons of its own back in Kashmir. Brazil's involvement in peacekeeping was designed to draw international attention to itself. This self-interest somewhat undermined the public image that these countries sought to project, as good international citizens. At the same time, this public stance meant they were tied to a passive approach to conflict management and conservative peace outcome rather than the expectations more commonly associated with international citizenship, that is, active conflict management designed to achieve a liberal (and lasting) peace.

Beyond the military dimension, there was the more diplomatic effort, most especially the land for peace formula enshrined in Resolution 242. Soviet, Brazilian, and Indian all participated in its drafting in the UNSC. But the resolution could not resolve the conflict and its causes. Indeed, to assume that is to perhaps put too much on it. By itself the resolution could do no such thing, since it had been put together independently of the warring parties. And yet, in setting out the principles through which peace could be realized, it provided the basis for future conflict resolution between Israel and Egypt a decade later; and between Israel and Jordan in 1994. It also became the basis of the Oslo process, which when launched in late 1993, looked like it could provide a means to reaching a settlement between Israel and the Palestinians.

The use of peacekeeping, Resolution 242, and Soviet assistance to their allies emphasizes the primacy of states associated with the conflict in this period. Consequently, diplomacy and conflict management by these rising powers concentrated on official relations and responses. Of less significance were other, non-state actors—although this began to change with the emergence of the PLO after 1964 (and its growing independence after 1967).

Increasingly, states had to find a way of responding to an organization representing Palestinian national interests. This was dealt largely in the same way that states dealt with other states: either recognizing them as equals in the international arena (e.g., India's approval of the PLO's formation and China's extension of diplomatic status and military assistance) or not. Meanwhile in South Africa the size and strength of the Jewish community meant that it weighed on the minds of both the apartheid regime in South Africa and Israel. Both governments sought to engage the community, although at this stage (and in contrast to the Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions movement, the BDS, as we will see in a later chapter) civil society remained subordinate to governments, which dictated policy positions and actions.

Beyond the active conflict management that was pursued there was also a distinction between those who were "inside" and "outside" the system. Both the Soviet Union and China had adopted spoiling tactics in the region before 1967, in a bid to disrupt the existing order. But following the war's end the two pursued alternative paths. Moscow had seen the threat presented by regional instability and resorted to the use of established institutions as a means to resolve the conflict, most notably with its support for Resolution 242 (and in the decade that followed, its regular appeals for an international conference through the Geneva process). Moscow was able to do this in part because of its more elevated position when compared to the other four states, especially China. Beijing was hampered in the period (and would be until the early 1970s) through its isolation, indeed exclusion, from the international community. By not being a part of the UN or other international institutions, it had little incentive to support them. This arguably contributed toward its more confrontation approach, and inclination to play a spoiling role by supporting non-state actors like the PLO—and as a way of accessing influence beyond that presented by Moscow.

Rising Powers and the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1967–1993

The Cold War was the main global division in 1967. But a Third World, initially conceived as a political and ideological non-alignment between East and West, was coalescing into a more economically and socially oriented separation of the world, between developed and developing countries: the North and South. This offered prospects for state and non-state actors to gain greater international prominence, for rising powers to pursue an independent course.

However, this did not fully happen. First, the 1970s saw a change in superpower relations toward détente. Perhaps reduced tensions between the US and Soviet Union might offer space for rising powers to press their claims (Pradham 1982). But détente was not designed to end the Cold War, rather to contain and manage it. It therefore encouraged stability in the international system and thereby limited the space that was available to rising powers (Latham 2010). At the same time though, this did not mean that the superpowers acted in concert; détente did not dissuade the US from pursuing its interests unilaterally, including in the Middle East (see Gaddis 2010, Little 2010, Jervis 2010, 39). In the region, the US was actively seeking to reduce Soviet influence—and succeeded during the 1970s when its Egyptian ally abandoned it and sought American mediation in its rivalry with Israel at Camp David. One of the chief US architects of foreign policy in the period, Henry Kissinger, was reported to have said that "Our policy [was] to reduce and where possible eliminate Soviet influence in the Middle East . . . under the cover of détente . . . and we did it" (Little 2010, 319). If the US was able to achieve this against the other superpower of the day, then no other rising power could do more.

Second, there was a change in the global economy after the mid-1970s. Many states, especially those with more planned economies, faced downturns. Not only was trade sluggish, but perhaps more importantly, inputs like oil were becoming both scarce and costly. The oil embargo of the decade, imposed by Arab oil producers in retaliation for the 1973 war, had a deep impact on many of the countries in the developed and developing worlds. Faced with the need to obtain oil, several rising powers' foreign policies were strongly influenced by oil producers' demands. Rising powers from the Third Word, like Brazil and India, which had seen greater opportunities in the international arena a few years earlier, found their room for maneuver become more constrained.

The impact of these developments was to reduce opportunities for rising powers in the international system. The Arab-Israeli conflict therefore became a less useful tool through which rising powers could project themselves. One consequence of this was that conflict management was largely passive by the five states examined here. If they sought to play a role in the conflict it was largely limited to exhortations and the occasional declaration or statement. While Brazil (after 1975) and India became virtually silent, it was left to the Soviet Union during the 1970s and China from the 1980s to make appeals to hold an international conference to resolve the differences between Israel and its Arab and Palestinian rivals. In addition to these occasional demands, the five states were not involved in any activities in the economic, legal, or military sphere which might have contributed to change in the conflict's dynamics. This was in marked contrast to the earlier period where a range of different conflict management tools were experimented.

Beyond the constrained international environment, what was notable about the period was that in the first half Israel's trajectory was downward while that of the emerging Palestinian national movement was upward. This meant that rising powers like Brazil and India could indulge in status-seeking behavior by supporting the Anti-Zionist resolution at the UN in 1975. But this was the lowest point for Israel, and after 1975 relations began to normalize between it and several of these states. They included China, which looked toward Israel for arms and India, which developed ties under Indira and Rajiv Gandhi. The period also saw the beginning of a unique relationship between Israel and apartheid South Africa reflecting a mutual need for such ties based on South African need for arms and Israelis' willingness to supply them.

The Palestinians' greater prominence in the international community during the 1970s meant that attention on the conflict shifted toward them and away from the Arab states which had dominated the conflict before 1967. The Palestinians' representative body, the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) was the recipient of growing diplomatic recognition. Yet at the same time, this did not translate into any significant change in the nature of the conflict or its dynamics: for Moscow, Beijing and—to a lesser extent,

New Delhi—diplomatic recognition was cheap compared with any action which might challenge the position of the US as the self-appointed sponsor or talks between Israel and the Arabs.

INTERNAL FEATURES AND DYNAMICS OF THE CONFLICT DURING THE PERIOD

The 1967 war was a watershed moment. It marked a turning point in the character of the conflict and public perception of the parties to it. Until 1967 both Israelis themselves and the wider international community saw Israel as extremely vulnerable and facing an existential threat from supposedly more powerful Arab neighbors. Its annihilation of the Arab armies and territorial expansion through the occupation of the West Bank, Gaza, the Golan, and all of Sinai up to the Suez Canal within six days changed all that (see figure 3.1). Overnight Israel (with US support) became a regional power and a force to be reckoned with. In contrast, the Arabs (and their Soviet ally) were humiliated. The predominant Arab leader, Gamal Nasser, resigned as president of Egypt, only for orchestrated mass protests to reinstate him. His successor after 1970, Anwar Sadat, would join forces with Syria and go to war in an effort to reclaim the Sinai in 1973 before settling for a peace process to achieve the same end at Camp David in 1979. But this happened alongside another, arguably more significant narrative in relation to the conflict: its shift from one that was an externally oriented state-to-state Arab-Israeli one to one that was a more internally oriented nationalist struggle between Israel and the Palestinians inside historic Palestine (Klein 2010).

The Arab states' defeat opened the door to the Palestinians to become the primary Arab actor in the conflict. Israel's occupation of the West Bank and Gaza meant that nearly one million Palestinians who had previously been under Jordanian and Egyptian sovereignty between 1947 and 1967 now found themselves under Israeli occupation (the so-called "67 Palestinians")—and joining the nearly 400,000 Palestinian residents of Israel (also known as "48 Palestinians." The result was to internalize the conflict within the borders of historic Palestine and bring to the fore the struggle between Israelis and Palestinians. At the same time, the PLO broke free from its Arab League sponsor, becoming both a more autonomous and radical entity (especially following the rise of the nationalist Fatah movement under Yasser Arafat as its largest faction). As the Arab states retreated to the sidelines, the PLO became the primary Arab combatant in the conflict, waging guerrilla warfare and making use of international terrorism to both raise public awareness and advance their ends.

While the 1967 war began a change in the character of the conflict, the state-oriented perspective remained the dominant one at the international

The Near East after the 1967 June War

Figure 3.1.   Israel and Occupied Territory, 1967

level. This was reflected in the use of peacekeeping forces (in which Brazil and India had participated) and the drafting of Resolution 242 as a statement of principles—land for peace and security—upon which future conflict resolution might be framed. But what was notable about Resolution 242 was its implicit assumption of state parties seeking land in exchange for peace. As for efforts to reconcile the competing parties or to tackle the underlying

causes of the conflict through resolution, and attempts to do so were few. Moreover, mediation, insofar as it occurred, was limited to establishing ceasefires and achieving an absence of violence: in other words, negative (or conservative) peace. But during the 1970s that would change. A more proactive approach to tackle the grievances between Egypt and Israel would be attempted, led by the US, which served as a mediator at Camp David in 1978.

More broadly, 1967 to 1993 constituted the final decades of the Cold War. During this time China became more prominent. Washington cultivating closer ties with Beijing in an attempt to exacerbate the divisions which existed between it and the Soviet Union. That this happened coincided with Beijing's replacement of Nationalist China (Taiwan) on the UN Security Council.

Alongside shifts in US relations with Moscow and Beijing, a broader development was taking place in the Third World as well. When it had been originally conceived and in its first meeting at Bandung in 1955, the Third World constituted the Non-Aligned Movement which sought to chart a middle way between the capitalism of the US and the socialism of the Soviet Union. By the 1970s though it was beginning to take on an economic dimension as well, since many of the new independent states were relatively poor. This arguably contributed to a shift in international relations as economic development and access to resources to assist it assumed a more prominent role. Such concerns were especially pertinent given the strength of Arab oil producers in this period, including their capacity to organize and impose a boycott in the wake of the 1973 war on those presumed to have explicitly or tacitly supported Israel. Higher energy prices during the decade concentrated the minds of policymakers. The result was that many in the Third World accommodated Arab demands in the Arab-Israeli conflict, including support for the UN resolution condemning Zionism in 1975. Among those who supported this course was Brazil, which joined with India in its criticism of Israel.

Growing criticism of Israel coincided with a shift in the principal actors associated with the conflict. Following their defeat in 1967 and modest recovery in the 1973 war, the Arab states like Egypt, Jordan, and Syria played a declining role in the Arab-Israeli conflict. In their place emerged a more autonomous and publicly visible PLO. Its rise was due in part to its willingness to pursue a high profile guerrilla campaign against Israel, initially from Jordan (until 1970) followed by Lebanon (until 1982) and subsequently Tunis. In addition it carried out a number of actions which gained it terrorist status among some in the international community (most notably the US), while also encouraging others to pursue diplomatic engagement (like the European Economic Community in its Venice Declaration in 1980).

The PLO's rising profile entailed growing diplomatic recognition and acceptance internationally. Its president, Yasser Arafat, was invited to the

UN where he declared that "Today I have come bearing an olive branch and a freedom fighter's gun. Do not let the olive branch fall from my hand. I repeat: do not let the olive branch fall from my hand" (Arafat n.d.). Arafat's joint offer and threat coincided with a contrary trajectory for Israel. Prior to 1967 its claims of vulnerability had struck a chord with many in the international community and especially in the West. Its comprehensive victory and subsequent occupation of the rest of historic Palestine as well as Egyptian and Syrian territory transformed it into a regional hegemon. Increasingly, it was subject to international criticism. Israel acquired growing pariah status during the 1970s; this was exacerbated by its domestic stimulation and development of an expanding arms industry which resulted in surpluses that it was prepared to export. Among its customers included both established members of the international community, like Beijing, as well as those whose human rights records were more dubious, such as the military dictatorships in Latin America and apartheid South Africa.

The confrontational stance adopted by both Israel and the PLO continued through the 1970s and 1980s. However, it was not to last forever. Especially following Israel's invasion of Lebanon and defeat there of the PLO (and leading to its departure from Beirut in 1982), the Palestinian leadership moved from the military path and toward a diplomatic one. This was backed up by Arab states' growing refusal to confront Israel directly. In November 1988 the PLO declared its acceptance of Resolution 242 and, with it, recognition of Israel. At the same time it declared Palestinian independence, despite not controlling any of the territory associated with such a state. Regardless, by February 1989, 94 countries had recognized Palestine, most of them from communist and non-aligned countries in Africa and Asia.

Despite the shift, Israel maintained its occupation of the West Bank and Gaza and allowed the establishment of settlements in both. In December 1987 a grassroots uprising or *Intifada* began, first in Gaza and then spreading to the West Bank and parts of the Palestinian population in Israel. Nonviolent and direct action, including consumer, tax, and labor boycotts, occurred alongside demonstrations and protests. Israel's response was to clamp down on protestors while also replacing Palestinian labor with migrant labor, much of it arriving from the Soviet Union following that country's growing openness under the new Gorbachev leadership during the later 1980s.

The Intifada had not only caught Israel on the back foot initially, but also the PLO leadership in Tunis. Over the course of its first year the Tunis-based leadership was able to acquire influence and eventual control over the organization of the Intifada. Alongside, the financial costs of boycotting Israel began to take their toll on the Palestinian population. This was exacerbated after 1990 when many Palestinians were obliged to leave the countries in the Persian Gulf (such as Kuwait, the UAE, Bahrain) following Arafat's public support for Iraq's Saddam Hussein and leading to falling remittances. In

August 1990 Saddam Hussein had invaded Kuwait, bringing international opprobrium upon himself. In response Saddam sought to portray himself as an Arab nationalist by exploiting the Palestinian cause. The result was that by the end of the Cold War in the early 1990s the PLO was in a relatively weak position compared to Israel; this would have implications in the negotiations and accords that subsequently took place between them at Oslo and after.

BRAZIL AND LATIN AMERICA

Decolonization during the 1960s and 1970s meant an expansion of the UN's membership in Asia and Africa; along with their broader pro-Arab sentiment, this diluted what Latin American "voice" existed at the UN and presaged the region's broader shift toward greater criticism of Israel, especially after the 1967 war and its occupation of Arab territory (Kaufman et al. 1979, 4). Across the region US influence was also on the decline, partly as a result of its diverted attention toward the Vietnam War in Southeast Asia and the desire of Latin American states to pursue their own political interests beyond the traditional poles of the US and Europe. The non-aligned movement was growing in appeal and Brazil's diplomatic initiative to Africa and Cuba's support in the liberation struggles in western Africa were relevant in this regard (Sharif 1977, Abugattas 1982). Latin American interest in the Palestinian question was not long coming, crystallizing with the rising prominence of the PLO's liberation struggle after 1973 and Arafat's visit to the UN in 1974.

After the 1967 war Arab pressure increased. The Arab League stressed the commonalities that existed between the Arab and Latin American regions in terms of development, the presence of national liberation movements, and the important role that Latin American states had played in proposing a resolution at the UN (Kaufman et al. 1979, 21–22). Latin American states contributed by becoming more critical of the ongoing character of Israeli occupation. Yet as Regina Sharif (1977) noted, declining support for Israel was concentrated more in international forums like the UN and had less effect on Israel's bilateral relations with Latin American countries, including economic ties. Indeed, between 1973 and 1975 total Israeli exports to the region increased from $23.7m to $51.1m (and from $8.2m to $12.2m to Brazil).

Indeed, despite diplomatic criticism, an emerging part of the Israeli economy was benefiting from growing commercial ties with Latin America: the arms industry. After 1967 Israel had actively developed its own arms industry, investing significant amounts of public funds. Production costs were high per unit, so production runs were extended to bring down costs—and resulting in unit surpluses which required a market. Latin American militaries

expressed an interest in Israeli military technology and Israel was keen to supply them, including Brazil. As many of the region's governments fell under dictatorship during the 1970s, the new Carter administration in Washington took up a human rights discourse and actions, which limited arms sales to human rights violators. This benefited Israel, as it opened up more opportunities to supply arms.

However, Israeli arms sales affected the country's public image in several ways. One was that Israel's most enthusiastic arms purchasers had their own problems of poor public standing, including South Africa, Guatemala, Taiwan, Mobutu's Zaire and Pinochet's Chile (Hunter 1987). Another was that it weakened Israeli claims to speak on behalf of Jews everywhere. Because Latin American Jewish communities were split between supporters and opponents of the military regimes, Israel had removed itself from taking a public position (Yaniv 1988). Israel's absence from public discourse meant that it was perceived by Latin American societies as tacitly supportive of the regimes and identified as a "merchant of death" among those critical of its arms sales (Abugattas 1982). Jane Hunter (1987, 180) has similarly argued that Israel's investment in the arms trade arguably discouraged it from taking too strong a position in relation to the regional peace process led by Panama, Mexico, Venezuela, and Colombia in Central America: the mediators involved found it difficult to get a supportive statement from Israel in 1983.

Notwithstanding the growing Israeli presence, the region was also exposed to greater Arab engagement, and especially that of the Palestinians, after 1974. Robert Baratta (1989) has accounted for this through several different—and sometimes overlapping—factors and motivations. These included cultural affinity through significant Arab Christian and Muslim minorities in the region as well as more pragmatic concerns, such as the desire for preferential treatment on Arab oil supplies and investment. This was especially pertinent in the wake of the Arab and OPEC decision not to export oil to those states which had supported Israel in the 1973 war (Baeza 2012). In addition there were more strategic and political reasons, including a desire to seek alternative ties to balance the relative weight of the US in the hemisphere, along with support for revolutionary and national liberation movements (although this was limited more to leftist regimes like Cuba and Nicaragua in the period, which both provided training and material assistance to the PLO).

In the case of Brazil, the period after 1967 coincided with a military regime in Brasília that sought autonomy from Washington's orbit. Although the generals were conservative in their domestic politics and identified with the West, they placed more emphasis on the growing North-South divide and the Third World and sought a leading role for Brazil within it. What this meant was that the generals sought not to transform the international political and economic system, but to challenge it (Smith 2002), by developing more

extensive ties with other regions of the world. In the Middle East, Brazil shifted toward a pro-Arab position during the 1970s, a trend which reflected the country's broader economic needs. Since the 1950s Brazil had been on a process of national development and industrialization. This called for energy resources, much of which was sourced from the Persian Gulf. Following the Arab oil boycott after 1973 Brazil sought preferential oil imports and greater trade and investment from the Arab world. The issue had become more pressing following the 1973 war: in 1973 its oil import bill was $800m; by 1975 it had risen beyond $3.8bn and its foreign debt was worth $22bn, a significant amount for a country whose economic growth was dependent on exports. Consequently, Brazilian leaders made the calculation that diplomatic criticism of Israel was less costly when compared to losing access to oil (Sharif 1977). During the 1970s and 1980s Brazil imported most of its oil from Iraq. In the 1980s it began diversifying its energy sources, increasing purchases from Algeria as well as other parts of the world like Mexico, Venezuela and China. At the same time it was able to reduce dependence on the Middle East through the production of alternative domestic energy sources, including ethanol and falling oil prices. This became particularly evident by the end of the 1980s when it supported the US-led international coalition against Iraq in the first Gulf War in 1991, following its invasion of Kuwait (Fares 2007).

Brazil's more pro-Arab stance after 1973 was reflected at the UN in two main ways. One was in its condemnation of Israeli human rights abuses in the occupied territories. Between 1972 and 1974 it had largely abstained on resolution votes, but in 1975 and 1976 it turned against Israel. In 1975 Brazil voted for Resolution 3379 which defined Zionism as a form of racism and causing outrage among Israeli officials and media, the latter which accused Brazil of "wooing" Arab oil money (Sharif 1977). The vote surprised many in the international community (Baeza 2012), especially since the foreign minister had reiterated Brazil's support for Resolution 242 in January 1974 (Feldberg 2014, 193, Sharif 1977).

While Brazil's stance made a resolution of the Palestinian issue explicit— and distinguished it from the US at the time—there were limits. Although the regime would allow a PLO office to open, it was not prepared to extend full diplomatic recognition. Indeed, a decade later, when the PLO announced the Palestinian declaration of independence in November 1988 only two Latin American states formally recognized it: socialist Cuba and Nicaragua (in 1973 Cuba broke relations following Israel's occupation of the Sinai while in 1979 the left wing Sandinista regime came to power in Nicaragua; Baeza 2012). Although Brazil joined 10 of the 19 countries in the region in approving a UN General Assembly (UNGA) resolution which acknowledged the Palestinians' declaration of independence, that was the extent of its relationship. It would take another 20 years before a surge of Latin American states

began recognizing Palestinian statehood (this is examined in a later chapter). Similarly, when a UN resolution on the Palestinian right to a state was debated in November 1976, the Brazilian representative was absent (Baeza 2012, Casarões and Vigevani 2014). At the same time, if the PLO was not a priority to Brazilian policymakers, so too was Brazil and Latin America not a key concern to the PLO (Baratta 1989). Both were relatively marginal to each other, but provided each with diplomatic support and cover for its wider goals and policies.

Although the foreign policy turn had paid dividends during the 1970s by ensuring access to oil imports from the Arab world (despite the rising cost), by the early 1980s the Brazilian economy, like many in Latin America, was once again in trouble. This would have knock on effects in the foreign policy sphere, with Brazil becoming a less significant actor on the global stage.

In the early 1980s, many countries in Latin America had growing public debts, the result of governments having taken out extensive private loans to finance development. With the global economy entering into a recession, governments found themselves unable to make the repayments. In 1982 Mexico defaulted on its debt, Brazil was struggling with its own, contributing to political upheaval. During this "lost decade" the military regime ended and democracy returned, in 1985. The new Sarney government in Brazil did not differ substantively in its foreign policy orientation, including in relation to the Middle East and Israel and the Palestinians: in short, an independent Palestinian state, Israeli withdrawal from occupied territory, and peace and security for all countries in the region based on UN resolutions (Casarões and Vigevani 2014). In 1988 Brazil endorsed the UN resolution on Palestinian independence, although it did not change the character of existing relations.

Successive democratic presidents after 1985—José Sarney (1985–1990), Fernando Collor (1990–1992) and Itamar Franco (1992–1994)—were unable to make much change to the country's overall foreign policy, even as they each used different tools to try and acquire greater freedom of action in relation to the US (Vigevani and Cepaluni 2009). Arguably this had much to do with Brazil's weakened economic position, which made it harder to play an activist foreign policy. On the international stage this meant that Brazilian influence declined. The region became the focus for Brazilian diplomacy, most notably the decision to build trade with its neighbors through the South American common market (Mercosur) in 1991. Only once Brazil's chronic economic problems, including hyperinflation, was brought to an end and financial stability assured with the Real Plan in 1993–1994, was Brazil able to embark on a process of economic development—and with it, a more proactive foreign policy.

SOVIET UNION

Since the mid-1960s the US and Soviets had been moving toward détente. This had implications for the Middle East, where Soviet interest and alliances with the Arab states were deemed subordinate to improving relations with the US. Also, contrary to Western observers' belief that Moscow was satisfied with the "no war, no peace" situation between Israel and the Arabs, there was a shift toward a desire for a resolution. War would not solve the differences between them, but neither was the contemporary configuration feasible in the long term (Stephens 1973, Belyaev 1973).

Between 1967 and 1973 Moscow's main concern was over obtaining Israeli withdrawal from occupied territory. The Palestinian issue was therefore a secondary concern and primarily seen as a question concerning refugees (Dannreuther 1998, 48). Initially, the relationship was tactical, the Soviets using their public support for the PLO as a means to challenge any US or Israeli political developments if they disregarded their interests (Dannreuther 1998, 30–31).

Yet it was also assumed that the Soviets had pressed Nixon in their summit in June 1973 to acknowledge the "legitimate interests" of the Palestinians (Macintyre 1975). Moscow was opposed to Arab military action. When this failed and war broke out in 1973, the Soviets interjected to shore up their credibility and prestige. Following the end of the war Moscow pressed for a resolution to the conflict through an international peace process (Nizameddin 1999, 35), the so-called Geneva process.

For John Reppert (1989, 110), the 1973 war was a key moment in shaping the Soviet relationship toward the PLO. First, its primary ally, Egypt, was starting on a path which would see it move out of the Soviet orbit and into the US one by the end of the decade; in 1972 Sadat demanded the departure of 17,000 Soviet advisers. The second main event was the 1977 effort to revive the Geneva peace process with the Soviet Union and the US as co-sponsors and the PLO as a participant. The third event was the Lebanon war, and especially Israeli and Syrian intervention which affected the position of the PLO there.

The 1973 war had prompted a reappraisal of the Soviet stance in the region. Between 1972 and 1973 it had increased its military assistance to its allies from $970m to $2.655bn. Yet that assistance had generated little in terms of substantive advances for its camp (Reppert 1989, 113). After 1973, the Soviets began to reevaluate their position toward the PLO. In contrast to 1967, they had begun to come round to the idea of a Palestinian state as a central plank of any final resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict. The PLO could present its partnership with the Soviets as an example of Moscow sympathy toward the Arabs as well as giving Soviet leaders the opportunity to participate in the peace process (Reppert 1989, 114). While this heralded

closer ties with the PLO, the two sides remained apart over how this was to be resolved, with Moscow pressing the PLO to support the principle of a mini-state alongside Israel as a price of its involvement at the Geneva conference. This reflected consistency in Soviet thinking since 1948, that Israel had a right to exist and that any Palestinian state would be based on the West Bank and Gaza (Macintyre 1975).

For the moment the idea was a non-starter. The PLO was not prepared to accept this since it did not recognize Israel. The following year, in 1974, Moscow accepted the principle of a Palestinian state and recognized the PLO as the legitimate representative of the Palestinian people. Several factors contributed to this, from the failure of Geneva to push forward joint US-Soviet collaboration (indeed, Kissinger seemed more inclined toward bilateral agreements under US auspices) and the Arab League's Rabat summit in 1974, where a consensus was achieved over the status of the PLO and the Palestinian question which challenged the US and Israeli positions (Dannreuther 1998, 48–49).

If Rabat heralded a moment of Arab unity, the start of the Lebanese civil war in 1975 exposed its fragmentation. Moscow found itself caught in an intra-Arab conflict between the PLO and Syria in Lebanon where the two vied for influence among the Palestinian population. The PLO was disappointed that Moscow did not back it (Freedman 2014, Reppert 1989, McLaurin 1989). In January 1976 the Soviets called for the restart of the Geneva Conference and for the PLO to be involved. Despite their disunity, the Arabs were able to issue a collective demand for an international conference on the Palestine question. By the end of the year there was a new opportunity with a change of government in the US under the Carter administration. The Soviet demand for full PLO participation both challenged US thinking (which saw acceptance of Resolution 242 as a principle for involvement) and also placed Moscow as an important player in the peace process (Reppert 1989, 117).

The Soviet position appeared to be gaining ground. In October 1977 the US and Soviet Union issued a joint statement regarding resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict—but this turned out to be the highpoint of US-Soviet collaboration. The Soviets' partnership with the PLO was an important contribution to this moment, but the opportunity was soon lost. Washington insisted that the PLO accept Resolution 242 in order to participate; the Soviet counter-offer was to suggest the PLO enter the talks at a later stage (Reppert 1989, 117). But any prospect of the track being developed further was suddenly halted when Sadat made his dramatic visit to Jerusalem in November. Over the following year the US opted for the Sadat initiative as a means to realize peace, and dispensing with the international Geneva approach. The US position meant that it took a bilateral approach to peacemaking at Camp David, with the US mediating alone between Israel and Egypt (Dannreuther 1998, 90–91).

However, a key limitation in the Camp David accords was that it did not specify a date for Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank and Gaza or offer any statement on self-government in those areas. That was the price for Sadat to achieve peace between Egypt and Israel: to relinquish previous Egyptian claims to speak on behalf of the Palestinians. Both Soviets and the PLO were quick to denounce the accords, because they provided for no Palestinian state or involvement of the PLO as the representative of the Palestinian people (Reppert 1989, 118).

Developments in Lebanon also affected the Soviet relationship with the PLO. Having been driven out of Jordan, it decamped to Lebanon, a weak and socially homogenous state and where it soon established a "state within a state." However, that action proved costly and made its presence among the population in the south of the country precarious. A year after the outbreak of the Lebanese civil war in 1976 the Syrians invaded and undertook action against the PLO, ostensibly to assert influence over it and contain its freedom of action. The struggle between the two tested Moscow, which was allied to both. Although the Soviets had made it clear to the PLO that it would not intervene in the conflict, failure to do so weakened its prestige and credibility in the region. Matters were compounded further when Israel invaded Lebanon in 1982, limiting Syrian military capacity and pursuing the PLO from the south and into Beirut. Following a three month siege in Beirut, the PLO was eventually evacuated to Tunis. But the Soviets played no part in the process; the absence of diplomatic ties with Israel meant that the US took up the role (Reppert 1989, 122–23).

The Lebanese experience suggested to some in Moscow that the PLO was becoming an unreliable partner. This became more so when the PLO did not disregard a proposal by US president Ronald Reagan in September 1982, which would provide for a Palestinian state, albeit linked to Jordan. Moscow retorted that their approach differed from the US, offering space for the PLO as the sole legitimate representatives of the Palestinians and the Palestinians' right to an independent state without any preconditions. But the prospect of any further movement on the Reagan plan stopped in the wake of the massacres of the Palestinian camps at Sabra and Shatila by the Israel-backed Christian militias (Reppert 1989, 123, Dannreuther 1998, 114–15). That the PLO was willing to contemplate the US initiative caused Moscow to see its other main partner in the Arab-Israeli conflict, Syria, as a more reliable and progressive ally.

Détente between the US and the Soviet Union had come to an end with the Reagan presidency after 1980. During the first part of the 1980s Moscow adopted a more obstructionist approach to US peace initiatives. In July 1984 the new Chernenko administration presented a peace plan. Substantively it was not different from previous Soviet proposals, outlining an international conference under the UN and including the US and Soviets. It also called for

Israeli withdrawal, a Palestinian state, peace and security for all states in the region, and a Jordanian-Palestinian confederation, only after a Palestinian state was established and the West Bank and Gaza to be administered by the UN for a transitional period (Dannreuther 1998, 135).

Despite the proposal, Moscow did not have the influence to drive through the proposals (although there was lukewarm Egyptian and Jordanian interest, Syria was relatively uninterested). In addition, given previous obstruction, the US was less inclined to give Moscow space to act. More broadly, the Soviet Union was in a relatively vulnerable position at this point. It was a "hollow superpower" which was militarily powerful but economically weak—and this meant that it was unable to provide significant economic assistance to its Arab allies (Dannreuther 1998). Former British ambassador to the US and Iran and prime ministerial advisor, Sir Anthony Parsons, argued that:

> Arab countries . . . have, over the years, become disillusioned to some extent with the Soviet Union as an ally in the Palestine problem. They have realized that the Soviet Union ultimately determines its policy as a superpower in relation to the other superpower, and not in terms of its relationship with regional powers. . . . [A]s the tendency has grown since 1967 to seek a peaceful settlement of the Palestine problem, of the Arab-Israeli dispute, the Arab world has gradually realized that progress towards such a settlement is only likely to be delivered by an outside state with influence on both sides. And it is clear that the Soviet Union's influence with Israel is zero. (Sir Anthony Parsons 1985, 27)

The PLO was also in a difficult place. In 1984–1985 it had explored a Jordanian option, including willingness to accept "all" UN resolutions (Resolution 242 was not explicitly mentioned) and which would accept a confederation between a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Jordan—in other words, the PLO's stance was closer to the 1982 Reagan plan than the 1984 Soviet proposal (Reppert 1989, 128). Despite this, efforts with the US and Jordan yielded few tangible results. A period of shuttle diplomacy between Arab capitals to clarify the parameters during 1985 was weakened both by PLO unwillingness to abide by UN resolutions to achieve progress and several Palestinian terrorist acts. Arafat's desire to appear moderate was therefore undermined and led to Jordan's decision to forgo further efforts (Reppert 1989, 131–32).

Given the relatively weak position of both, there was a period of relative rapprochement between Moscow and the PLO, especially under the new Gorbachev government after 1985. The Soviets were important for the PLO in two main ways at the end of the 1980s. One was its support for the PLO's efforts at internal unity in 1987 following factional splits over the previous

decade. The other was in persuading the PLO to recognize Israel in 1988 (Dannreuther 1998, 144–45, Nizameddin 1999).

At the same time, the new Soviet leader, Mikhail Gorbachev, did not limit Soviet collaboration to the PLO. As part of his "New Thinking," Moscow sought to rebuild links with Israel. This initially included the reestablishment of consular relations leading to full diplomatic relations by 1991. It wanted to access Israeli agriculture, hi-tech products, and military know-how, as well as limit both US and Israeli demands for Jewish migration. For its part, Israel saw potential normalization of relations with the Soviet Union as a means to creating a wedge between it and the Arab world as well as being a source of Jewish migrants. Between 1988 and 1989 the number of Jews who left the Soviet Union for Israel rose from 20,000 to 70,000 (Nizameddin 1999).

Gorbachev's diplomacy yielded few results in relation to Israel and the US, however. Dannreuther (1998, 173) notes that Soviet objectives for an international conference which it would co-sponsor with the US was only realized in its last days, at the Madrid conference in 1991. Although this encouraged Moscow to discard some of its past, including rejection of the "Zionism is racism" UN resolution and re-establishing relations with Israel, its sponsorship represented a position of weakness rather than strength in relation to the US and the peace process.

INDIA

India's public relationship toward the Arab-Israeli conflict in the 1970s and 1980s remained much as it had been since the 1950s and 1960s: critical of Israel and supportive of the Arabs. In 1975 India voted for the UNGA resolution which equated Zionism with racism (Kumaraswamy 2014, 96). Many of the reasons remained largely the same in this period as in the earlier one. First, India was concerned with building support among the Arab and Muslim worlds as a means to provide protective cover for its own domestic political situation. With a vast Muslim population, Congress politicians wanted to demonstrate their commitment to secularism and the protection of minority rights. Standing up for Arab and Palestinian rights offered a way to show this. Second, from the 1950s to the 1970s there had been a surge of newly independent countries in Asia and Africa, who shared a common aversion to Western imperialism and colonialism, along with the superpower rivalry which divided the world into capitalist and communist blocs. India made common cause with them in the Non-Aligned Movement (Hargreave 1984, 170).

However, India was unable to avoid the wider structural constraints, both geopolitical and economic. Politically, India had sought to keep the superpowers out of South Asia but had been unable to do so. Indian non-alignment

was interpreted by the US as sympathy for the Soviet Union, especially in the wake of Moscow's economic assistance from 1962. Washington therefore sought to contain India, providing support to Pakistan. India's wars against China in 1962 and Pakistan in 1965 coincided with a period in which India's foreign policy reached a low point. Its autonomy of action and economic base to support its military action was limited. By the early 1970s superpower interaction, including Washington's overture to Beijing at the expense of the Soviets, meant that India was being increasingly drawn into their rivalry, regardless of its own preferences. As a result, the idealism of the Nehru period was jettisoned in favor of a more pragmatic and realpolitik-oriented foreign policy under Indira Gandhi, including a treaty with Moscow in 1971 (Nayar 1979).

Economically, India was also facing a difficult time during the 1970s. The Arab and OPEC oil boycott after 1973 and again in 1979 dramatically increased oil prices and exposed Indian vulnerability. This affected India significantly, since it imported around two-thirds of the oil it used from the region. In addition, the country also relied greatly on the remittances of $1.5bn generated by its 300,000 workers in the Gulf in the early 1980s. Both were affected further by the outbreak of war between Iran and Iraq in 1980 (Hargreave 1984).

Although geopolitical and economic factors served to constrain—or arguably maintain—Indian action in the Middle East, there was also an emerging actor in the Arab-Israeli conflict: the PLO. Following the Arab League's Rabat conference in 1974 where the PLO was identified as the representative of the Palestinian people, India extended recognition to the organization and allowed for the opening of a representative office. This would be followed by full diplomatic relations in 1980 and recognition of Palestinian independence after the PLO's declaration in Algiers in 1988 (Kumaraswamy 2004). In pursuing this course, India echoed its broader tendency toward the Arabs as well as within the Soviet orbit, Moscow being arguably the principal international advocate for the PLO in this period.

If Indian relations, both official and societal, were warm toward the PLO in the 1970s, the prospect of greater links with Israel was largely absent. Even though some elements of the political opposition criticized Congress, this led to no significant change in India's (non)relations with Israel. Even when Congress lost power and was replaced in in government by the opposition parties in 1977, the new foreign minister maintained the pro-Arab line that without withdrawal from occupied territory any change was impossible (Kumaraswamy 2004).

During the 1980s, this began to change. Some steps began to take place that suggested possible future normalization in India's relations with Israel. Following Indira Gandhi's assassination in 1984, her son, Rajiv Gandhi, became prime minister. Rajiv Gandhi was not idealistic nor ideological in his

foreign policy. Like his mother, he sought to improve ties with the US during the 1980s. During a visit to Washington in 1984 he also found time to meet with Israeli officials. Israeli consular representation was restored in Mumbai following the consul's earlier expulsion after the 1975 UN resolution vote; visa restrictions were also reduced (Ogden 2014). Normalization of diplomatic relations got underway between the two countries, culminating in full diplomatic recognition in 1992. That it did not happen earlier may be attributed to a number of domestic factors as well as the wider international context.

First, the end of the 1980s saw growing political instability at home. In 1989 the largely dominant party since independence, Congress, had lost the election and a series of unstable minority governments took over. In the middle of this, Rajiv Gandhi was assassinated in 1991. Foreign policy—especially in relation to the Middle East—was not a priority. Second, the Cold War had meant that the Arab-Israeli conflict was separated between two camps: the US/Israel/Egypt and the Soviets/Arabs. But with its end many of the structural constraints on Indian ties to the region were removed. The collapse of the Soviet Union and the decline of Cold War rivalry in the region along with Iraq's invasion of Kuwait diminished the Arab-Israeli conflict in importance. After 1990 Indian foreign policy both generally and in relation to Israel and the Arabs became more open; old assumptions no longer applied.

For New Delhi, it was no longer a choice between supporting one side or the other; it was now possible to work with both Israel and the Palestinians at the same time (Kumaraswamy 2014, 98). Israel's presence at the Madrid conference in 1991 demonstrated the extent to which Israel was now part of the international community and no longer as diplomatically isolated as it had been during the 1970s (Kumarasway 2004, 2014). Indian officials realized that normalizing ties with Israel did not mean Palestinian and Arab links would be correspondingly weakened. Indeed, government officials continued to publically support the Palestinians' position on settlements, Jerusalem, refugees and borders, and in international organizations like the UN. At the same time, since the Palestinians now seemed prepared to recognize and negotiate with Israel, why should India not also do the same?

India's diplomatic recognition of Israel in 1992 meant it was the last major non-Arab, non-Muslim state to do so (Ogden 2014, Kumaraswamy 2004, 2014). At the same time, by recognizing Israel, Indian officials were sending a message that New Delhi saw itself as a key member of the international community, committed to playing a greater role. However, like the other countries which would form the BRICS grouping a decade later, the extent to which India would be able to offer tangible support to the peace process would be marginal.

CHINA

The early 1970s marked a change in China's international position and in relation to the Middle East (Lanteigne 2009, 5). The US sought to improve relations with Beijing and split the Moscow-Beijing alliance. At the same time Beijing joined the UN as a permanent member on the Security Council. Although historically opposed to international intervention, mediation, and peacekeeping by the UN, the Chinese leadership's stance began to change during the course of the decade, sometimes supporting such actions while abstaining on others (Shichor 1991, 2006a). By the 1980s though, such ambivalence was dispelled as China became increasingly supportive and active in UN peacekeeping and efforts at conflict resolution, including in the Middle East.

In the Arab-Israeli conflict, the first half of the 1970s were associated with ongoing Chinese opposition to any peaceful settlement. Beijing supported Egyptian president Anwar Sadat's decision to go to war in 1973 as a way of challenging the superpowers' dominance of the region, but also criticized him for seeking a ceasefire too soon after (Harris 1994, 331).

Beyond the conflict between Israel and the Arab states, there were other reasons for China's belligerence during the 1970s. One was the recognition of the PLO and its action as revolutionary, even if Beijing did shy away from the organization's subsequent use of terrorism in the 1970s and 1980s. The other—more important—reason was to distinguish itself from the world powers of the US and the Soviet Union which it saw as "colluding" with Israel and "undermining" the Palestinians. In so doing it sought to take a leading role for the rejectionist Arab camp, including the Palestinians; it hoped to pull support away from Moscow and toward Beijing. This was especially relevant in a period where the Soviets were pushing the reluctant Palestinians toward a peace settlement during the 1970s. But even though PLO-Soviet positions were at odds, there was no break between the two; the Palestinian leadership recognized that Moscow was stronger, wealthier, and more influential than Beijing (Israeli 1989, 147–48).

By the mid-1970s—and especially after Mao Zedong's death—the Chinese trend had been to move away from ideological commitment and toward pragmatism. The ideological phase of the Cultural Revolution had reached an end and a more pragmatic approach to foreign policy would emerge from this point on. In part this reflected realization that the pro-Arab and pro-Palestinian strategy had not yielded the results Beijing had hoped for; rather than abandoning the Soviet Union for China, most of the Arab state and non-state actors maintained their ties to Moscow (Shichor 1994). The change was also reflected in some of the statements that the Chinese made in relation to Israel and the Palestinians, distinguishing between Israel's "peace-loving people"

and its "aggressive government" (Shichor 2014, 111–12) and replacing an "armed struggle" for a "just struggle" for the Palestinians (Harris 1994, 334).

Although Beijing continued to criticize the Soviets as selling out the Palestinians, there were limits. In 1974 Moscow was pressing for the Geneva conference as a mean to reach a peace settlement. The PLO remained opposed to it and lobbied Beijing against that position, while also seeking to develop links between the more leftist factions within the PLO and China. But in August 1975 Beijing surprised the PLO by expressing support for Kissinger's attempts to reach an agreement over Sinai while criticizing the Soviets for hampering those efforts and failing the Arabs. Rafael Israeli (1989, 152) notes that not only did this herald a move away from Chinese support of armed struggle to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict, but also Beijing's acceptance of the superpowers' roles within the conflict. Additionally, it would not have gone unnoticed in Beijing that US involvement would also undermine Soviet influence. Indeed, the Chinese foreign minister at the time, Qiao Guanhua, was reported in a Hong Kong newspaper to be considering Chinese diplomatic relations with Israel as a way to achieve discord between the two superpowers.

Following the Camp David peace accords in October 1978, Arafat sought both Soviet and Chinese support against them: he traveled to Moscow and sent a delegation to Beijing. But the most it gained from the Chinese was a statement that the conflict could not be resolved without addressing Palestinian rights and Israeli withdrawal from occupied territory (Israeli 1989, 153–54). China's leaders approved of the development, mainly because it drew the Egyptians out of the Soviet orbit. In 1972 Sadat had expelled Soviet military advisers and then abrogated the Soviet-Egyptian treaty in 1976. Beijing saw the 1978 agreement as contributing toward regional stability, even though it undermined the Palestinians' position (Harris 1994, Shichor 1994). The development also marked a change in Israel's role: it was no longer outside the system, but seen as a legitimate partner for peace by Beijing. But at the same time the Chinese leadership sought to maintain ties with the wider Arab world, by reiterating demands for Israeli withdrawal from occupied territory and an end to aggression, along with the establishment of a Palestinian state (Shichor 1994). Camp David demonstrated the extent to which the Arab world was no longer a unified entity though (Evron 2015). That Egypt could find agreement with Israel while the Palestinians could not was not lost on the Chinese.

In the wider context of Sino-PLO relations, the end of the 1970s saw perhaps its lowest point. In addition to Chinese pragmatism toward the emerging US-Egyptian axis, matters closer to home served to create a wedge with the PLO. In early 1979 China and Vietnam began fighting each other. The PLO had sided with the latter, condemning "Chinese aggression." Relations nearly broke down but they recovered during the 1980s, once the PLO

accepted less Chinese commitment to their cause; there was no alternative other than to accept the "new open relationship" with both the PLO and Israel that was on offer (Israeli 1989, 155–56).

Throughout, the Chinese continued to provide the PLO with military assistance, although principally in the fields of small arms as opposed to heavy weaponry. At the same time, it took against PLO-sponsored terrorism, even as it defended the organization rhetorically against "Israeli aggression" during its anti-PLO invasion of Lebanon in 1982. Chinese support for the Palestinians also extended to urging Reagan to talk to the PLO during his visit to Beijing in 1984 as well as proposing a UN-sponsored international conference on the Middle East. This last was especially significant since it marked the shift in Beijing's position on the Arab-Israeli conflict from "armed struggle" during the 1960s and 1970s toward a more pragmatic one, which placed the Palestinian question within a wider regional context (Israeli 1989, 159–60). Despite low points between the PLO and Beijing, avoidance of a complete break was vital since the Palestinian question was one issue where there existed Arab unity and which enabled China to project itself as a leader of the Third World. The PLO's status as a national liberation and revolutionary movement also helped China's search for wider Arab support in the form of energy resources and investment and in maintaining its arms trade with Egypt, Jordan, Iraq and Iran (Israeli 1989, 161–62).

China's "new open relationship" with Israel began in the 1970s. The contact that took place between the two concerned mutual advantage, namely through the arms trade (Chen 2012, Shichor 1998). Beijing needed to modernize its weaponry and arms technology, especially following its military defeat in Vietnam. It had a considerable amount of Russian weaponry which it needed to upgrade, while Israel not only had a growing arms industry which required an export outlet, but also knowledge of Russian weapons, following their capture of Arab materiel during the 1967 and 1973 wars (Medzini 2015). This was a largely clandestine relationship with few and accurate data available. What is known is that the first secret Israeli delegation went to Beijing in 1979, followed by a series of arms agreements in the early 1980s. Those purchases reached a peak in the latter part of the decade (Shichor 1998, 2014).

The contact established over arms sales fed into wider trade of Israeli technology for agriculture and solar power, a toning down of critical rhetoric and eventually official contact, beginning in 1987 at the margins of the UN. The growing relationship was evident during the Chinese foreign minister's visit to the Middle East during 1985. He stressed the importance of all countries in the region living in peace—a tacit reference to Israel—while also denying any Sino-Israeli commercial and military deals (Israeli 1989, Chen 2012).

The change in Chinese policy toward Israel was significant enough that in 1984 the leadership proposed an international conference under the auspices of the UN Security Council (UNSC). This was a contrast from previous condemnation by Beijing of the international community and especially the superpowers for the involvement in the Arab-Israeli conflict during the 1960s and early 1970s. By 1984 it no longer saw the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians as determined by Western imperialism. While the leadership recommended a conference, it was flexible on the approach that might be taken, with few preconditions such as Israeli withdrawal from occupied territory and Jerusalem or an independent Palestinian state being explicit (Shichor 1994). The proposal was repeated again in 1989 when PLO chairman Yasser Arafat visited Beijing (Dillon 2004, 47). However, Israeli leaders were wary about Chinese involvement and unwilling to pursue the approach, preferring to limit dialogue with Beijing over cultural, economic and scientific contacts (Medzini 2015). Consequently, the 1984 and 1989 conference initiatives never resulted in anything substantive. But regardless of this, China was moving toward greater acceptance of the regional reality and recognition of Israel alongside the PLO. A number of factors were at work which contributed toward this state of affairs (Shichor 2014, 114–15).

First, Chinese politics and foreign policy had undergone a change in focus from the period of Maoist ideological purity to pragmatism under its post-1976 leader, Deng Xiaoping. In the context of the Middle East this meant a switch from supporting revolutionary and national liberation struggles and rejection of imperialism and its regional supporters—an "exclusive" strategy—in favor of one that was concerned with economic development and greater stability; this required an "inclusive" approach, reaching out to all states and societies which could provide it with the resources it needed. Israel was caught up in that shift.

Second, there was admiration in Beijing for what Israel had achieved in establishing and constructing the country. At the same time, there was a hope that better relations with Israel might pay off in better relations with its principal international supporter, the US—a key consideration in the context of the diplomatic isolation following 1989. The Tiananmen incident arguably enhanced the Sino-Israeli connection since it resulted in a Western-led trade embargo on arms and military technology, thereby increasing the importance of Israeli arms (Kumaraswamy 2005). At the same time, it is worth noting that Yitzhak Shichor (1998, 2006a), a long time observer of Sino-Israeli relations, suggests that Chinese reliance on Israeli arms was already in decline from the late 1980s.

Third, China wanted to play a greater role as a participant to the peace process following the 1991 Gulf War. In 1991 following a PLO delegation visit to Beijing, the Chinese foreign minister spelled out China's policy: "unity within the PLO, a Middle East settlement in the light of UN resolu-

tions, and recognition of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people"
(Dillon 2004, 47). As a permanent member of the UNSC, China could be
involved—but only if it recognized all the states diplomatically. Because it
did not, it was unable to join in the Madrid conference in October 1991.
However, after realizing full diplomatic relations with all the parties by Janu-
ary 1992, it was able to join the multilateral track talks that began later in the
month. But Chinese participation was largely symbolic: it did not lead to any
significant contribution or involvement to the Arab-Israeli conflict (Shichor
1994). Indeed, as subsequently occurred, the Madrid process wound down as
the secret Oslo channel became the key area of mediation. The result was that
while China had full diplomatic relations with both sides in 1992, it was
unable to offer an alternative solution to the conflict.

SOUTH AFRICA

In his study of Israel and apartheid South Africa, Polakow-Suransky (2014,
201–3) has noted how the relationship shifted and intensified between the
two countries after 1973. Initially it began with realpolitik, being based on
the common interest of Israel's search for arms markets and South Africa's
desire for them. From the late 1970s and until the mid-1980s the ties became
closer, with a convergence of economic interests and increased ideological
similarity, based on the idea of Israeli Jews and Afrikaners being outposts of
Western civilization who risked being overwhelmed by a hostile Arab and
black majority population respectively. It was also during this period that
Israel and South Africa stepped up their military alliance, with the Israeli
Defense Force (IDF) joining South African troops in Angola and South
African generals joining Israeli generals in Lebanon. Although relations re-
mained relatively solid until the early 1990s, from the mid-1980s there were
growing tensions within the Israeli foreign policy establishment concerning
the merits of the relationship. By the early 1990s Israeli officials were ex-
ploring connections with the non-racial African National Congress (ANC),
which would dominate the South African political system after 1994.

What helped bring Israel and South Africa together was their self-identifi-
cation as part of the West and opposition to the Soviet bloc during the Cold
War. Neither country had a defense pact with the US and both were also
wary of relying too much of Washington. For Israel, the US had been reticent
in providing military supplies in the early stages of the 1973 war. In the
aftermath it was apparent to Israeli decision makers that the country had
experienced a loss equivalent to a whole year's worth of GNP. These factors
had prompted the Israeli leadership to develop its arms industry, producing in
excess in order to keep costs down and seeking out foreign markets to im-

prove its balance of payments. Between 1973 and 1980 Israeli arms exports increased from $70m to over $1bn (Polakow-Suransky 2014, 208–9).

South Africa was an ideal customer for Israel. Its apartheid regime felt vulnerable and was becoming increasingly isolated on the world stage. Indeed, it had been thrown out of the UN General Assembly in 1974 (McTague 1985). It lacked enough qualified workers and factories that were sufficiently productive or advanced to supply it with the military materiel it required. In addition to conventional arms, South Africa also wanted to develop its nuclear potential, as a way of gaining the West's attention, and Israel was willing to support Pretoria. After the 1977 election in Israel brought the right-wing Likud party to government, the relationship became more intimate; the previous commercially oriented relationship between the Labor and Pretoria governments gave way to greater ideological affinity. It also ensured a greater role for the defense establishment within the Israeli government, which would manifest itself in relations with South Africa (Polakow-Suransky 2014, 215).

Israel's growing ties with South Africa appeared to be tacitly accepted by the West. In 1977 a resolution was passed before the UN to impose a mandatory arms embargo on South Africa. It would have been broader in scope but countries like the US, Britain (which had $7bn of investments in South Africa), France, Canada and West Germany voted together to prevent the proposal from being expanded to all commercial dealings. The resolution was also framed in a forward facing manner, ensuring that any current arms licensing and deals were exempt (Parker 1983, 131–32).

The developing relationship between Israel and South Africa had been aided by a broader international context which painted the two states as pariahs. The 1967 war had changed the global perception of Israel from being a vulnerable society surrounded by hostile forces into a conqueror and occupier of Arab land. Following the 1973 war, the Arab world organized a more effective boycott and lobbied African states with dollars and oil in returning for breaking diplomatic ties with Israel (Polakow-Suransky 2014, 206). Arye Oded (1982–1983) noted that this contributed to these states' calculations of the relative limited benefits of maintaining ties with Israel against the greater economic costs faced in losing access to more Arab resources and trade. Against this is another interpretation that what motivated African states to break diplomatic relations with Israel in this period was due less to pro-Arab sentiment and more for regional concerns, especially Israel's growing identification with South Africa (Clarke 1977).

If the 1970s constituted contrasting relations for Israel in its relationship to South Africa and the rest of the continent, this underwent change in the following decade, especially after 1986. At one level was an improvement in Israel's relations with other African states. Despite Arab condemnation of Israel and its oil embargo, some of these states had not been averse to devel-

oping links with South Africa. The Organization of African Unity had requested an oil embargo on South Africa, but Arab states ignored it: Bahrain, Dubai, and Abu Dhabi increased oil sales to the regime during the decade, attracted by South African willingness to pay for crude with gold (whose price was 60 percent higher than the official crude prices). Jordan, meanwhile, had signed an arms deal with Pretoria in 1974 (Osia 1981). African leaders wondered why they should isolate Israel if Arab states did not do the same to South Africa. African leaders therefore prioritized national interests over regional solidarity, which satisfied domestic security and developmental needs. There was also a view that through its Washington connection, Israel could provide indirect access to credit in the Bretton Woods institutions (Aynor 1990).

Although Israel and South Africa had experienced pariah status within the Third World before the mid-1980s, John McTague (1985) argued that there were significant distinctions between the two states at this point. One was the much stronger control and domination that the Afrikaner National Party had in South Africa, having won every election since 1948. By contrast, Labor's electoral dominance in Israel had been challenged in 1977 and demographic changes suggested the prospect of greater alternation in power between the two main parties, the Ashkenazi-dominated Labor and Sephardic Likud. Associated with this was a relatively more open and democratic political system in Israel, including a freer opposition press.

But in one important respect, South African and Israeli leaderships were similar in their attitudes toward subordinate groups. In Israel, although some Palestinians had Israeli citizenship and rights (unlike those in the occupied territories), they faced discrimination and marginalization. Annexing the West Bank and Gaza—which looked like a distinct prospect in the mid-1980s—would only push Israel farther down the road toward a South African model, McTague (1985) warned. These words would be prophetic in the light of the Zionist-apartheid analogy drawn and seized upon by pro-Palestinian activists two decades later and resulting in the organization and actions of the Boycott, Divestment and Sanction (BDS) movement.

As the 1980s progressed tensions emerged among Israeli policymakers over how to deal with South Africa. Israel's approach was split between its defense and security sector on one side and its diplomatic core on the other. The Israeli embassy in Pretoria was divided between the two (Polakow-Suransky 2010). Within the diplomatic community and elements in the Knesset a number of "progressives" expressed concern at Israel's international image through its association with South Africa, especially after the apartheid regime violently suppressed the Soweto uprising in 1985. With growing uncertainty of the long term viability of the apartheid regime, there was an attempt by the Israeli progressives to reach out to black leaders, even though they were aware of Pretoria's aversion to them speaking to the ANC. The

result was incoherence in Israeli policy during the latter part of the 1980s (Polakow-Suransky 2010).

That incoherence became apparent in 1986–1987. In August 1986 anti-apartheid legislation came before the US congress, what would subsequently be known as Section 508. It required the US government to report which countries were violating the arms embargo with South Africa and to sanction them by ending military assistance in 180 days. While the Jewish South African Board of Deputies was discouraging criticism of South Africa and urging American Jews not to comment, the major pro-Israel lobby in the US, the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC), was divided. On one side its officials recognized that Israel's military relationship with South Africa damaged its public image. On the other side, AIPAC donors were angry that the relationship was being criticized as it provided substantial economic benefits for Israel. Despite AIPAC's warnings to the Israeli leadership, there was little expectation that the legislation would pass. Although President Reagan vetoed the bill, congress overruled it and the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act came into effect. The result embarrassed the Israeli government and forced it to impose its own sanctions on South Africa in March 1987 (although not on any previously agreed deals). But this did not prevent it from escaping censure. The US government's report focused on Israel's arms trade and stated that it was "fully aware of most or all of the trade [to South Africa]." Israel's past arms trade and military relationship with South Africa was now in the spotlight and being criticized, including by its closest ally, the US (Polakow-Suransky 2010, 2014).

The end of the Cold War meant the absence of a socialist threat from Moscow and a reduced role for the Cubans in southern Africa. The changed environment removed any residual Western support for the apartheid regime. At the same time though, the US was fearful that a new ANC government in South Africa might pass on its nuclear technology and knowhow to allies like Muammar Gaddafi in Libya or Fidel Castro in Cuba. As a result, the outgoing apartheid regime dismantled its nuclear program and signed up to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1991. At the same time, Israel agreed to accept the conditions of the Missile Control Technology Regime (Polakow-Suransky 2010, 2014).

Meanwhile, Israeli diplomats began to reach out to the previously banned ANC and were reassured in its initial comments. Echoing his own position on reconciliation within South Africa, Mandela made it clear that the ANC was willing to forget Israel's past relationship with apartheid if it would end the occupation and establish a Palestinian state (Polakow-Suransky 2010). These principles became tied up in the Oslo process from 1993, providing an arguably more favorable context for official Israeli-South African relations to develop.

CONCLUSION

The period between 1967 and 1993 was notable for the main antagonists in the Arab-Israeli conflict. There was a shift away from direct and violent conflict between Israel and its Arab states, leading to a cold war with Syria and Jordan on the one side and a rapprochement and eventual peace agreement with Egypt at Camp David. After 1967 the Palestinians, through the PLO, became the principal Arab antagonist in the conflict and acquired growing diplomatic support during the 1970s and early 1980s. They were helped in part by a relatively organized boycott by Arab oil producers which led to rising energy prices and pressure on states to adopt a more conciliatory line. The Palestinians' advance was checked by the mid- to late-1980s, however. Locally, the Intifada failed to undermine Israeli occupation in the long run. Regionally, Arab support for the Palestinian cause became more rhetorical and less direct; indeed, the leadership in both Jordan and Lebanon were keen to see the PLO removed from their territory rather than see their domestic situation and population destabilized. Internationally, previous supporters like Beijing and New Delhi became less overt and more tacit in their criticism of Israel, especially as both states began to accommodate Israeli interests.

While the Palestinians' trajectory was upward before flattening out, Israel's had been downward, toward pariah status, before rising again. Although it faced international opprobrium through the anti-Zionist resolution at the UN in 1975, this was arguably the lowest point it faced. Increasingly, Israel began to cultivate ties beyond its previously close ones with Europe and the US. From the late 1970s it became an important arms supplier to Beijing, South Africa, and Latin America, including Brazil. Its willingness to sell arms regardless of these countries' political complexion was a precursor to later normalization of diplomatic relations with China (and subsequently India), even as it compromised its prospects with the anti-apartheid movement and leadership in South Africa.

What can be said of how the rising powers responded during this period? Primarily they did so through self-interest: Brazil's need for energy supplies, India's shift from idealism to pragmatism in its relations with Israel, China's acquisition of Israeli arms and Soviet sponsorship of the PLO as a bargaining chip for an international resolution to the conflict—all demonstrate similar self-interested concerns. Yet at the same time, to claim naked self-interest is to obscure the extent to which these aims overlapped with liberal internationalist assumptions of good citizenship. All of them were committed to compromise and a multilateral solution to the conflict. This was regularly repeated in their appeals through the 1970s and 1980s. The exception was South Africa, which remained outside the international community following its expulsion from the UN system.

Although a superpower, the Soviet Union demonstrated some of the attributes of a rising power during these years. Whereas a superpower was able to stand alone and impose its will, in reality Moscow faced considerable difficulty in achieving that. It consistently supported the Geneva process, which it saw as the means to achieve a resolution to the conflict during the 1970s and 1980s. In this sense, the Soviet proposal was one of the most active examples of conflict management by a rising power in the period, helped by its strong association with the Arabs and the PLO (even though those relationships were weaker in the 1970s than they had been in the 1960s). At the same time, Soviet efforts were constrained by Washington, which had effectively sidelined it through Kissinger's shuttle diplomacy and Carter's sponsorship of bilateral negotiations between Israel and Egypt at Camp David.

The Soviet Union clung to the idea of multilateral talks even as it withheld full diplomatic relations with Israel after the 1967 war. The 1991 Madrid talks, where it was a key international sponsor, was the culmination of its appeal for an international solution. But it arguably turned out to be a non-event, as it did not lead to any significant results in terms of conflict resolution.

The wish to participate in an international conference was a major motivation for both China and India to establish full diplomatic relations with Israel in 1992. By being involved they could signal their status to others as significant international actors. At the same time because the Madrid talks were held through the auspices of the UN, this would demonstrate each actor's commitment to the established order and its international institutions. In this way China had effectively traveled a great distance, from having been a spoiler to a more "responsible" stakeholder. The shift coincided with a change from international "outsider" status in 1972 to "insider" status when it not only joined the UN but acquired veto power as a permanent member of the Security Council. The shift was gradual but significant (and owed much to domestic developments as well), away from active support for PLO militancy decline during the 1960s and early 1970s and toward a greater commitment for a diplomatic resolution to the conflict rise, resulting in its 1984 peace plan proposal.

Yet in all cases, rising power support for a multilateral solution masked their relative weakness in directing and seeing through the means to end the conflict. Moscow's position was exposed by its former client Egypt's decision to abandon its alliance and seek a resolution with Israel with US support. Similarly, Washington gave short shrift to the Geneva process and threw its support for a multilateral conference in Madrid at a time when Soviet power was in significant—ultimately terminal—decline. China's support for Madrid and diplomatic relations with Israel came nearly a decade after its own 1984 proposal yielded no significant results, including in terms of details.

Brazil's international presence during the 1980s was virtually invisible, ow-ing in large part to its relatively weakened economic position. Similarly, India faced growing economic problems at home from the 1970s and which eventually culminated in structural reforms by 1991. Meanwhile, although it had maintained its pro-Arab stance during the period, it was not evident that it had generated much in the way of results, most especially in the form of more preferential treatment from the region. Indeed, it would not be unrea-sonable to suggest that the term *rising power* was arguably inappropriate in this period.

Absent in this consensus in favor of international cooperation and multi-lateralism in relation to the conflict was South Africa. Its silence on the conflict masked its growing alliance with Israel after 1967, especially in its active acquisition of the latest military technology which Israel could supply. This course was particularly relevant as the South African regime increasing-ly became a pariah, rejected by many of the newly independent states which contributed to its expulsion from the UN system. In this sense then, apartheid South Africa occupied the status of an international spoiler by operating outside the consensus in the international community regarding the conflict. Much of the regime's focus during these years became narrower as it sought to maintain contacts and ties with the West and emphasizing itself as a bulwark against Soviet subversion in its immediate neighborhood in southern Africa.

South Africa also provided the main example of civil society involvement regarding the conflict, although not in any manner which would resolve differences between Israel and the Arabs, Palestinian or otherwise. What civil society involvement took place was largely internal to Israel and the pro-Israel lobby. Specifically, Jewish and pro-Israel communities in both South Africa and the US took up positions in relation to the conflict while tending to follow the governments in their respective countries. The result was a relative lack of interaction and coordination between Jewish and pro-Israel pressure groups in each country and which contributed to the failure to block anti-apartheid legislation in 1986.

In sum then, even though self-interest and good citizenship appeared to be wrapped up together, that ambiguity was not fully tested. This was due to their appeals for conflict resolution being largely rhetorical devices, the So-viet appeal to the Geneva initiative notwithstanding. With the exception of the Soviets, the other rising powers' initiatives (e.g., China's 1984 and 1989 plans, Brazilian multilateralism), they were neither pushed into anything more substantive, nor were their demands and suggestions actively tested. When overtures did take place, it was from within the region and with the international sponsorship of Washington, most notably the Camp David ac-cords between Israel and Egypt. In sum then, there was less active conflict management by rising powers than in the previous period before 1967.

Peacekeeping—which India and Brazil had previously contributed toward—was not an important component of these two countries' respective policy toward the conflict and its parties. Indeed, Indian and Brazilian troops would not return to the region until 1998 and 2010 respectively, when both joined the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL).[1]

Instead, only on a few occasions did rising powers attempt an independent and direct intervention in the conflict, most notably the Soviet and Chinese proposals for an international conference. In part they were able to make these suggestions based on their long previous involvement with one of the conflict parties, namely the PLO. But these appeals never amounted to much, partly because they—unlike the US—could not deliver. At the same time, the PLO was on another trajectory as well: it was on the rise and acquiring diplomatic recognition globally. At one level, this acknowledged the changing nature of the conflict—from Arab-Israeli to Palestinian-Israeli—and made the PLO a legitimate international actor who would have to be accepted if meaningful conflict management and resolution was to eventually be attempted. At another level it complicated matters. Conflict resolution did take place during the period—but it was not between Israel and the PLO. Instead it was between Israel and Egypt. It was helped by third party US mediation which demonstrated two points. One was that the US was the main power broker in the region. The other was that conflict resolution was a lot easier when it was between states rather than between a state and non-state actor. That this was the case was reflected in Kissinger's shift away from a comprehensive agreement in the mid-1970s in favor of one that dealt with Egypt's grievances in the Sinai (and eventually leading to Camp David).

NOTE

1. UNIFIL was set up in 1978 to monitor Israel's withdrawal from Lebanon following its occupation of the south of the country. The force was also to ensure peace and stability in the region and support the Lebanese government in regaining authority. The UNIFIL mandate was adjusted several times as a result of the Lebanese civil war and Israel's subsequent invasions in 1982 and 2006.

Chapter Four

Rising Powers and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict during the Oslo Period, 1993–2000

From the 1970s space was becoming increasingly harder for rising powers to make a difference, both in the international system and in relation to the conflict. Détente, US unilateralism (e.g., the Camp David accords) and an economic downturn constrained these powers. Their interaction with the conflict had become more distant and largely focused on the occasional appeal for peace through statements and declarations. The most significant effort, the Geneva initiative proposed by the Soviet Union, had been undercut by the US. Later, some of these rising powers, like the Soviets, China, and India, sought access to the Madrid conference in 1991 as a way of getting involved in the conflict's resolution. But those talks did not lead to its resolution.

The end of the 1980s narrowed the scope for rising power activity at the global level even further. Internal and external factors contributed to the Cold War's demise, which included problems within the Soviet regime, a military arms race by the US during the 1980s, and demands for more autonomy by Moscow's satellites in Eastern Europe. Efforts to reform the Eastern European regimes soon became demands to transform the prevailing system as a whole, influenced as they were by demands for human rights, rising nationalism and a more stable international environment (Roberts 2010).

The Cold War's end meant that superpower bipolarity was no more. With the US the only superpower left standing, unipolarity was the order of the day; the liberal norms and institutions associated with it—economic free trade, deregulation, representative democracy—moved rapidly from "inside" the West to the "outside" and the wider world. During the 1990s this Wash-

ington Consensus became more prominent, along with US-oriented security through the expansion of NATO (Ikenberry 2010, 536).

Of the five rising powers, only the Soviet Union had offered a counterweight to the US globally and in the region. Yet even before the Cold War's end it had found it harder to have an impact, even as its influence was being undercut by the US after the 1970s. The successor state to the Soviet Union, Russia, therefore entered the 1990s at a comparative disadvantage. Similar weakness on the part of the other rising powers was also evident. The reduced space available to rising powers was felt not only globally but regionally as well. The Arab-Israeli conflict, now primarily between Israel and the Palestinians, had been subjected to a multilateral effort to achieve resolution at Madrid and Washington in 1991–1992. Both were largely unsuccessful. However, at the same time, other, secret talks were taking place in Oslo. This backchannel would eventually lead to the Declaration of Principles (DOP) between Israel and the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), setting in place a framework through which bilateral negotiations could happen: the Oslo process. The international community, including those who would later become known as the BRICS, supported the process. That they did so reflected the long-held principle of an internationally recognized and sanctioned process of partition, which had begun in 1947 and of which Oslo represented its most recent manifestation.

When the DOP was signed in September 1993 the future seemed optimistic. The conflict's resolution seemed within reach and with it, the local environment now seemed both stable and conducive to building peace. To that end the international community committed itself to provide financial support and help develop the Palestinian economy through foreign aid. The largest of these donors came from the US and Europe, although other states would make contributions as well.

The Oslo process had another, less foreseen result, but no less significant: it effectively delinked rising powers' engagement with the conflict from the conflict parties. Rising powers were now free to develop diplomatic, strategic, and economic ties with Israel and the Palestinians which were independent of their involvement with the peace process. In short this meant that individual BRICS governments could build those relationships on a bilateral basis and which served their own self-interest while offering lip service to the conflict's resolution. This meant that passive conflict management and its tools became the primary mode of operation among the five BRICS countries, a stance compounded by US domination of the Oslo process.

Rising powers' focus on diplomacy and economic incentives (especially with Israel, the more profitable conflict party) therefore meant other forms of conflict management fell out of favor, for example peacekeeping or judicial enforcement: The latter seemed pertinent given Israel's occupation of the West Bank and Gaza resulting in a growing number of Jewish settlements

after 1977. But little effort was put in place by the international community and the BRICS to tackle this, perhaps because it was assumed they would be all be resolved in the negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians set out through Oslo. However, this had not happened by 1999, the date when Oslo's provisions were expected to have been implemented. That failure reflected growing mistrust between Israelis and Palestinians during the 1990s and eventually broke down with the outbreak of violence associated with the Second Intifada from September 2000.

INTERNAL FEATURES AND DYNAMICS OF THE CONFLICT IN THE PERIOD

As noted above, the 1990s was a decade in which the conflict and the wider international system changed. In 1993 Israel and the PLO signed the DOP (also known as the Oslo accords or Oslo I). The accords were not a final agreement but instead the result of nine months of secret negotiations which committed the two sides to an ongoing and open process of talks which would result in a resolution of the conflict by 1999. Talks between the two sides would be overseen by the US as a third party mediator.

The two parties which had signed the Oslo accords were not equals, however. During the 1970s and 1980s Israel had become one of Washington's closest allies and one of its largest recipients of military and other aid. By contrast the PLO was relatively weak, financially and diplomatically. It lacked resources, a consequence of the fall in remittances from the Gulf during the 1990–1991 crisis (a collective punishment imposed by Gulf countries for Arafat's support of Iraq's Saddam Hussein following his invasion of Kuwait) and domestic income in the West Bank and Gaza. In December 1987 popular discontent at Israel's occupation had exploded in Gaza and spread rapidly to the West Bank. Initially grassroots in its mobilization and organization, it caught Israel and the PLO leadership in Tunis unawares, especially as it moved into a boycott of Israeli products and Palestinian labor in Israel. However, after the first year of the Intifada Israel managed to recover by replacing Palestinian labor with migrant labor, much of it from the Soviet Union, while the PLO managed to acquire some degree of control over the organization and activism of the Intifada. The imbalance between Israel and the Palestinians was made explicit at the Madrid conference in 1991, where Israel opposed a PLO presence; a compromise was effected where the PLO was only allowed to participate as part of the Jordanian delegation.

Following the scrapping of the Madrid effort in favor of Oslo, the international community has legitimized the process and in so doing, effectively acquired a blind spot regarding the unequal relationship between Israel and

the PLO. As a state, Israel has more attributes (e.g., military power and state legitimacy) than the PLO, which being the representative non-state body of a national group, lacks sovereignty either over its presumed territory or population. To address this in part, Oslo I offered the prospect of an eventual Palestinian state. During the transition, a Palestinian Authority (PA) would provide limited self-rule in the West Bank and Gaza. In 1995 Oslo II was signed between Israel and the PLO. It divided administrative control between Israeli and Palestinian rule in the West Bank during transition, into Areas A (full civil and security control by Palestinians), B (Palestinian civil control and joint Israeli-Palestinian security), and C (full Israeli civil and security control) (see figure 4.1). By the mid-2010s, however, Area C still accounted for nearly two-thirds of the West Bank.

During its first decade the PA was dominated by the majority Fatah party within the PLO. Over time it was challenged by political factions outside the PLO which opposed Oslo, the most notable of which was the Islamist party, Hamas. In Israel there was also no solid consensus in support of Oslo. Two years after signing the agreement, Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin was assassinated by a right wing opponent of the Oslo accords. A year later, in 1996 Benjamin Netanyahu, a politician who had explicitly stated his own opposition to Oslo, was elected to the premiership for the first time and slowed down Israeli withdrawal from occupied territory.

As the 1990s came to a close, both Israeli and Palestinian leaderships felt short changed by the peace process. On the Palestinian side, negotiations with Israel had yet to remove Israel's military presence in the occupied territories, thereby compromising Palestinian capacity for self-rule and self-determination. Moreover the construction of settlements in the occupied territories expanded during the decade, making a mockery of Palestinian self-determination. Meanwhile, Israeli leaders doubted the capacity of the PLO to deliver security and rein in terrorism from elements opposed to the peace process (Jeong 2010). In an effort to break the growing distrust on either side, US president Bill Clinton tried to recapture the earlier experience of the Camp David talks between Israel and Egypt by bringing the Israeli and PLO leaders to the talks in the summer of 2000. Despite this, the efforts failed and the peace process collapsed, leading to the second intifada and violent conflict which lasted until 2004–2005.

BRAZIL

Whereas the 1960s and 1970s had been an active period of Latin American—and Brazilian—engagement with the Arab-Israeli conflict and the role of the PLO, the 1980s was anything but. This stemmed in part from the economic weakness of many Latin American countries in the region and a retrenchment

Oslo II, 1995

0   20 km

PASSIA

Jenin
GANIM

Tulkarem

SHAVEI
SHOMRON

Nablus
ELON MOREH

Qalqilya

ALFEI
MENASHE

ARIEL

MA'ALE
EPHRAIM

RIMONIM

PSAGOT
Ramallah

GIV'AT
ZE'EV

Jericho

ISRAEL

Jerusalem

MA'ALE
ADUMIM
KALYA

Bethlehem

ETZION
BLOC

Green Line

KIRYAT ARBA

Hebron

Dead Sea

Area A - Palestinian cities
Area B - Palestinian villages
Area C - Israeli settlement,
military areas and state lands
▲ Main Israeli settlements

Figure 4.1.   Israeli and Palestinian Control of the West Bank, 1995

in foreign policy terms. But the optimism of the Oslo process and the establishment of the PA was strongly felt and contributed to the opening of Palestinian representative offices across the region, from Chile in 1992, followed

by Brazil a year later (and later upgraded to an embassy in 1998) (Baeza 2012).

However, the unchallenged hegemony of the US in the early 1990s meant that there were few alternative options open to Latin American governments on the Middle East. Consequently, most governments followed the US line. The stance of Argentina's Carlos Menem was broadly reflective of that stance: on the one hand he claimed to be committed to pursuing equidistance between Israel and the Palestinians and offering himself as a mediator in the Arab-Israeli conflict; on the other hand his government was building closer links with Israel (Baeza 2012). In Brazil presidents Fernando Collor (1990–1992), Itamar Franco (1992–1994), and Fernando Henrique Cardoso (1995–2002) all followed a similar course that was largely characterized as "disinterest[ed]."

Brazilian disinterest was undoubtedly influenced by economic and political crises in the early part of the decade, including inflation which at one point reached 2000 percent and Collor's impeachment in 1992. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict was not seen as a priority, nor as one which Brazil had a significant role to play (Casarões and Vigevani 2014). Indeed, Cardoso's foreign minister, Luiz Felipe Lampreia, claimed that,

> No, I don't think that anyone thinks that Brazil can play a direct and important contribution [in relation to Israel and the Palestinians]. Only support, political support in the United Nations [. . .] [but] play a role, I don't think so. Brazil can play a very small role, relatively. (Casarões and Vigevani 2014)

Lampreia's words dominated Brazilian policy during the 1990s and was evident in the attention that the Cardoso presidency gave to the subject. Indeed, his presidential statements offered little on the conflict and the parties. The most he did say was in 1998 when he proposed to deepen bilateral ties with both Israel and the Palestinians, following official visits from both. A year later, when Brazil rejoined the UN Security Council (UNSC) as a temporary member, the issue of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict did not come up. Instead, Brazilian diplomats prioritized Iraq's biological and chemical weapons program. In practical terms Brazil contributed technical assistance toward the UN's inspection team while its diplomats encouraged Iraq to cooperate while discouraging others (the US) from adopting more direct military sanctions.

International differences over Iraq dominated Cardoso's Middle East policy and between his government and the US in the lead up to the 2003 invasion—by which time the country had acquired a new president: Luis Inácio "Lula" da Silva of the leftwing Workers Party. It was under Lula that Brazil adopted a more robust stance in relation to the Middle East and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict specifically. However, this did not mean that the

Cardoso government offered little toward that process; some of the developments that led to Lula's proactive stance had begun during the 1990s.

Before becoming president or finance minister, Cardoso had been foreign minister briefly. He undertook a series of seminars during the early 1990s which assessed Brazil's position in the world. To a large extent, the opportunity for maneuver was constrained by economic weakness following the 1980s (Burges 2009). However, as the 1990s continued and Brazil's macroeconomic situation became more stable following the anti-inflation Real Plan in 1993–1994, Cardoso began to change Brazilian foreign policy.

One element of this was from a previously reactive approach during the 1980s toward one that was more proactive and open, especially in relation to the economy and markets (Cervo 2006). Broadly put, this meant a change from "autonomy through distance" to "autonomy through integration" (Vigevani and Fernandes de Oliveira 2007, Vigevani and Cepaluni 2009). Important to achieve this involved engagement with other states' interests and concerns, of which the Common Market of the South (Mercosur), which Brazil had established in 1991 with Argentina, Uruguay, and Paraguay was especially relevant. In the case of the Middle East, economic considerations were relatively remote; the region was perceived as distant. An exception to this was a 2000 recommendation within the Itamaraty (the foreign ministry) to cultivate closer ties with the Middle East following difficulties in achieving free trade with the US and EU (Messari 2006)—a development which would happen under Lula.

The role of the Itamaraty also pointed to another aspect of Cardoso's foreign policy, the significance of which was not felt as greatly until his successor, Lula, was in office. Although Cardoso was not the first president to pursue his own foreign policy, his involvement in it began to reduce Itamaraty's influence notably during the 1990s (Burges 2009, Cervo 2006). This may have been partly due to his own previous position and knowledge as foreign minister, but this trend was continued and accentuated under Lula after 2003, resulting in the greater presidentialization of foreign policy (Datz and Peters 2013, Casarões and Vigevani 2014).

RUSSIA

The influence and capacity of Russia in the Middle East and the Arab-Israeli conflict has been partial and secondary since the end of the Cold War. This has been a persistent theme, both during its pro-Western stance during the 1990s and under the more confrontational Putin period after 2000 (Bagno 2009). The end of the Cold War spelled the end of the Soviet Union. Its successor state, Russia, was relatively weak economically and globally. Economically, Russia struggled during the 1990s, with negative GDP (limited to

around 5 percent during the 2000s). Much of the Russian economy became dependent on the extraction and export of raw materials and energy prices. Elsewhere, Russian military spending dramatically declined, along with population growth (Bagno-Moldavsky 2013).

Politically, Russian policymakers became less concerned with ideology and more with pragmatic self-interest (Nizameddin 1999, 354, Bagno 2009). While the Middle East remained geopolitically and economically important, Moscow's primary concerns were relations with Turkey, Iran, and Iraq; Israel, Syria, and Saudi Arabia constituted a second tier of concern; and the Palestinians, Lebanon, and Jordan were of least concern.

Much of the reason for Russia's declining interest in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict was down to domestic considerations. The end of the Cold War opened the door to greater US-Russian collaboration, especially given the pro-Western sentiment of the new president, Boris Yeltsin. Washington had acquiesced to making the Soviet Union a co-sponsor of the Madrid conference, confident in the knowledge that this offered largely symbolic status and prestige to the Russians. In reality Moscow was not a key participant in the talks. What efforts were made by the Russians to be more pro-active were rebuffed by the US and Israel (Nizameddin 1999). Yet even though the US was the dominant actor in the peace process, Moscow supported the Oslo process. This was echoed in Yeltsin's 1993 Foreign Policy Concept, which advocated retrenchment and an avoidance of confrontation with states beyond the borders of the old Soviet Union. The Middle East was not mentioned in any great detail in this document, and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict alluded to only briefly in reference to the need for a settlement (Bagno-Moldavsky 2013). The Yeltsin government was therefore prepared to accept a secondary role, but as long as the image of being involved was maintained. As analyst Bobo Lo has observed:

> Membership of the Middle East Peace Process . . . was always a higher priority than bringing significant human and financial resources to bear in the search for solutions. This seemingly casual attitude was partly a response to the reality of Russia's limited influence on proceedings, partly a (justified) belief that too prominent a role in such matters would cause more trouble than it was worth. Rather than get embroiled in a thankless and costly exercise between irreconcilable parties, better to have the cachet of formal(istic) involvement while avoiding any responsibility for failure or lack of progress. (Lo 2002, 142)

In the absence of any active conflict management, Russia focused on building economic and cultural ties with Israel. This also included collaborative work to develop military aircraft and emigration of up to one million Russian speakers to Israel by 1991 (Freedman 2014, 128). At the same time, the cultivation of closer ties between Russia and Israel was motivated by exter-

nal concerns that Moscow hoped would be picked up on by Washington—thereby contributing to greater opportunities in the US-Russian relationship as well (Nizameddin 1999). This echoed Gorbachev's similar efforts during the 1980s.

The Russian position remained relatively "centrist" throughout the first part of the 1990s. The relative absence of any confrontation or challenge by the Russians to the Oslo process as the principal means of managing the conflict during these years generated goodwill from Israel. Israeli leaders were encouraged and urged Moscow to use their leverage with the Syrians and Iranians to also support the process (Nizameddin 1999)—but to little effect.

The Western-led consensus between Israel, the US, and Russia came to an end in the mid-1990s. Following the 1996 Duma elections and the rise of the political right, Yeltsin appointed Yevgeny Primakov to the foreign ministry. Primakov was a more combative foreign minister, criticizing Israel and adopting a more pro-Arab stance. Around the same time, Israel became more critical of Russian policy, including its decision to help build a nuclear reactor in Iran. Israel's own more confrontational stance was arguably influenced by elections in 1996 which saw the pro-Oslo Labor party ousted by Netanyahu's more Oslo-skeptic Likud party.

Poorer relations did not lead to a complete breakdown, as had happened in the wake of the 1967 war. In part the links between Russia and Israel were more intertwined during the 1990s as result of recent waves of Russian immigration and developing economic links. In addition, for all of Primakov's bluster, there was an awareness of the depth of the US-Israeli "special relationship" which neither Russia nor any other state actor could disrupt. The capacity of Moscow to influence Israeli decisions was therefore limited (Nizameddin 1999, 140). Additionally, Russia remained committed to the Oslo process under Primakov, even as Netanyahu began unpicking it.

The deterioration of Russian-Israeli relations did not have a corresponding upswing for the Palestinians, however. The Soviet-Palestinian relationship had been important in the 1970s but had undergone change in the final Gorbachev years. The end of the Cold War did nothing to change that. Yeltsin did not actively take up the Palestinian cause. At his meeting with Arafat in 1994, he reiterated his support for the Oslo process and recognized Arafat as a political moderate (especially when compared to the political Islamist Hamas party). He extended sympathy over the issue of Israeli settlement construction in the Jerusalem region and offered to help train and supply the nascent Palestinian police force. But none of this pointed to a return of the earlier Palestinian-Soviet relationship. Indeed, following the 1996 change of direction, the Palestinians remained relatively peripheral in Moscow's calculations (Nizameddin 1999).

INDIA

The end of the Cold War, decline of the Soviet Union and pressure to liberalize its economy meant that Indian policy was in a state of flux in the early 1990s (Kumaraswamy 2004). The result was Indian foreign policy continued on a trajectory that began under Indira and Rajiv Gandhi and toward greater pragmatism in its energy, trade, and security sectors (Ogden 2014).

By the late 1990s India had moved beyond the insecurity that was present earlier in the decade. It had stabilized economically and was reasserting itself internationally. It was in this context that the new Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) government decided to restart India's nuclear program in 1998. With the aim of challenging the US-China-Pakistan balance of power, BJP governments undertook the following: one, to reduce criticism of Israel and downgrade support for the PLO; two, make use of Israeli counter-terrorism knowhow in Kashmir; three, share intelligence with Israel; and four, increase its arms purchases significantly (Kapur 2006).

Although Washington's initial reaction was angry, it forced the US to pay greater attention to tensions in South Asia. Moreover, the nuclear option reaped early dividends as well: in 1999 the US intervened during the Kargil crisis and pressured the Pakistanis to withdraw their troops to their initial positions. This was the first time that Washington had prioritized Indian concerns over its Pakistani ally (Ogden 2014). As the new century began, the elites in the US and India increasingly found that they shared common interests through its growing economic potential, middle class values, nuclear capability, stable democracy, and non-ideological stance. As a result, India was recognized as strategically relevant not only regionally, but globally as well (Ogden 2014). At the same time though, Narlikar (2013b) advises against analyzing India through the binary lens of whether it is a Western ally or an "unreformed and revisionist Third World power." Rather, to make sense of Indian foreign policy behavior it is necessary to consider who it interacts with, varying its approach between larger and smaller powers, state and non-state actors.

Here India's more global status in the Middle East is worth considering. During the 1990s, India stopped treating Israel as a pariah. The region had led the way when Arab officials had sat at the same table as Israelis during the 1991 Madrid conference. The development challenged India's pro-Arab stance: if Arabs were prepared to talk to Israel, then why not India (Kumaraswamy 2004)? The result was New Delhi's search for a more "balanced" approach to India's relations with West Asia (Ogden 2014). India stopped being actively critical of Israel and its policies. Until 1992 it was an active supporter of boycott proposals and critical resolutions at the UN. At the same time, India separated its bilateral relations with Israel from the wider Arab-Israeli conflict. While India has maintained support for many of the Palestin-

ian goals and shares a historic legacy with the Arab cause, this did not prevent it from developing economic and military relations with Israel and downplaying activist support of Palestinian rights and goals (Kumaraswamy 2014, 100–101, Pant 2008, 142). During the 1990s Indian criticism of Israel's treatment of the Palestinians became more muted while at the same time becoming more vocal about Palestinian suicide bombing, especially during the Second Intifada after 2000.

That India and Israel have found much to converge on does not mean that there now exists a complete overlap of interests between the two sides. Even during the 1990s and 2000s Indian policymakers were constrained to some degree by a large domestic Muslim population which broadly empathizes with the Palestinian cause. In addition, India and Israel have ties with several states who constitute a security risk to the other, for example, India with Iran and Israel's ties with China and Pakistan; and Israel's closer relationship with Washington compared to India's relative and historic wariness (Pant 2008).

India's growing closeness to India after the 1980s occurred under both catch-all Indian National Congress and Hindu nationalist BJP governments. During the 1990s Congress tended to play down those ties, claiming that the relationship was not a warm one, but rather of necessity (Vertzberger 2015). By contrast the relationship between India and Israel was more "emotional" under BJP governments, and especially when the BJP pursued the "Israeli option" after 1998.

CHINA

By the end of the Cold War China had become fully integrated into the international system and organizations like the UN (Shichor 1991). Whereas it had previously opposed efforts at international intervention, on those instances where it could not support such action it opted to abstain when such votes came before the UNSC. One such case was the Gulf crisis in 1990 following Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. At the same time, China's tacit acquiescence was aided by Western incentives to remove sanctions which had been imposed in the wake of the Tiananmen incident a year earlier.

Western rapprochement was short lived, however. The end of the Cold War had not only diminished the Soviet threat but also the need to maintain close ties with China (Shichor 2006a, 2014). Rather than improving Washington's relations with China, the 1990s instead saw their deterioration as the US began to see Beijing as a growing threat, especially in East Asia. The US pointed toward Israeli arms sales as a key concern. Public US condemnation was exaggerated, since the high point of the arms trade had been earlier, during the 1980s (Shichor 1998, Kumaraswamy 2005). US opposition culmi-

nated in the Phalcon dispute in 2000 and pressure on Israel not to sell China advanced technology which the US feared could be used against its navy in the East Asia region. Washington forced Israel to back out of the deal, paying Beijing $350m in compensation, which included $250m that China had paid in advance.

Although not a political or military power in the Middle East until recently, the region has been an important space for China. It has shifted away from the "black and white" world of political and ideological conflict with the Soviet Union under Mao Zedong and toward a more "gray" environment, chiefly concerned with improving economic development and increasing domestic demand and consumption. This also called for more energy inputs (Shichor 2014). Beijing was therefore interested in stable prices and regular exports of oil products which encouraged support for political stability and the status quo, along with the cultivation of ties with key oil-producing states (Pan 1997, 2008, Alterman and Garver 2008, Shichor 2006b).

Given these concerns, the question of conflict between Israel and the Palestinians generated less pull than relations with the oil-producing countries of the Gulf (Shichor 2014). While the early 1990s saw growing diplomatic and economic ties with Israel, much of this had to do with Beijing's wish to be a participant in the Madrid negotiations. It was unable to do so though until it had full diplomatic relations with Israel. That absence contributed to a relatively speedy resolution with Israel in January 1992. Yet even as Beijing sought full diplomatic relations, it saw the Arab-Israeli conflict as a secondary concern. The Madrid talks did not result in any tangible outcomes beyond the legitimization of Israel diplomatically and regionally. The international community, including China, lent its support to the Oslo process which emerged soon after, in September 1993, but took a backseat as the US became the principal mediator and the EU the main financier.

SOUTH AFRICA

The curtain was brought down on the apartheid regime following the Cold War. The writing was on the wall in the mid- to late-1980s for the regime and elements within the Israeli foreign policy establishment had sought to anticipate the likely switch in government to the opposition African National Congress (ANC) party. Israeli fears of a political change in South Africa were two-fold: they worried about potentially cooler relations with a future ANC government and less demand for its arms exports. In both instances those fears were borne out. Following the end of apartheid in 1994, South Africa, which had been one of Israel's largest arms customers, purchased less. But into its place stepped India and China. Meanwhile, although the new ANC government under Nelson Mandela maintained diplomatic relations with Is-

rael, it was not a warm relationship. Far closer to the new government in Pretoria were individuals and groups like Castro in Cuba, Gaddafi in Libya, and the PLO, all of which had provided solidarity and support to the ANC during the long years of apartheid (Polakow-Suransky 2010, Lifton 2013).

The ANC which took office in 1994 was a broad church. Founded in 1912, the ANC had historically seen itself as a "liberation movement" rather than as a party. Like the Indian National Congress it is a broad church, including within its ranks communists, conservatives, social democrats, Christian democrats, Christian socialists, liberals, Africanists, and traditionalists (Gumede 2007). Three main groups dominated the party in the early 1990s: those who had struggled within South Africa; others who had been exiled, mainly in the Soviet Union and identified with it; and those who had been imprisoned. Mandela came from the third group, but upon his release soon transcended that role: he "floated above politics" and dominated the reconciliation process and handover of power. However, his early influence over the new ANC government soon waned and was largely eclipsed after 1997 when the former exile group came to dominate the party and government (Johnson 2009).

Israel's concern reflected some of the comments made by Mandela following his release in 1990. He identified with Yasser Arafat as a "fellow freedom fighter" and accused Israel of being a "terrorist state" for its collaboration with the apartheid regime. Around the same time he argued that Israel should not incorporate the West Bank, Gaza, and the Golan Heights (Kelley and Williams 2013)—territory which was labeled as occupied under international law. Yet this did not mean that Mandela after 1990 nor his new ANC government after 1994 wanted to end diplomatic recognition of Israel or punish it (Pogrund 2014, Lifton 2013). He supported direct negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians and the Oslo process, while also extending full diplomatic relations to the Palestinian state in February 1995. In his first conversation with the new Israeli ambassador, he made it clear that "the new South Africa would look only forward in its relations with Israel," the implication being that to focus on Israel's past ties with the apartheid regime would make state-to-state relations problematic (Liel 2013).

And yet there was a palpable shift by the new South African government toward the Palestinians. Alongside upgraded diplomatic relations, South Africa offered greater technical assistance, although following through presented distinct problems and challenges. According to Kelley and Williams (2013) the PA's lack of sovereign power made it quite similar to the Bantustans or "black homelands" which the apartheid government had established in South Africa to create separation from the white population. This was an extremely uncomfortable position for Mandela's South African government to engage with, for two reasons. One, like the Bantustans, the PA had no control over its economy, security services, or borders—even though its

existence was the direct manifestation of the PLO's acceptance of the Oslo process. Second, Mandela's whole career had been against division; his goal in South Africa was never for separation but for a single democratic state regardless of race or religion. That understanding finds echoes today in some of the developments among both Palestinian and international solidarity activists through the "Israel as apartheid" parallel as well as in the one state vision by some of the leading advocates of the Boycott Divestment and Sanctions (BDS) movement (of which more is detailed in the following chapter). But at the same time of Mandela's presidency, such a vision was awkward, since Oslo in essence encouraged the principle of two distinct states and peoples.

Despite these difficulties, South African involvement with the Oslo process was limited, given the dominance of the US as mediator and the Europeans as the process's chief financier. On at least two occasions though, Mandela sought to challenge this. Initially he offered to mediate between Arafat and the Israeli president at his inauguration in 1994, although there was no follow-up from either side (Laub 2013). The second time occurred five years later. Following several invitations from Israel during the 1990s, he finally made a personal visit in late 1999, months after he stepped down from the presidency. During his meeting as a private citizen with the Israeli prime minister in Jerusalem, Mandela offered to act as a mediator between Israel and the Palestinians. However, Prime Minister Ehud Barak refused on the grounds that Mandela's historic association with the Palestinians would not make him an honest broker (Ahren 2013, Cohen 1999). Nearly a year later Mandela was approached by Arafat to intervene following the failure of the Camp David talks in August 2000 (Thomas 2000). But this did not change matters either. There was no follow-up, and nearly two months later the Second Intifada began.

CONCLUSION

Since the Oslo accords were signed in 1993, a framework of negotiations and land for peace between Israel and the Palestinians has been in place. In the early years there was some progress, but that came to a halt when the Second Intifada broke out in September 2000.

While all BRICS states accepted Palestinian aspirations for statehood, including recognizing a Palestinian state, they did little to pressure Israel to withdraw completely from the occupied territories on which such a state would be based during the 1990s. That they had done so was perhaps unintentional, yet it has had significant consequences. All BRICS states had (re)established full diplomatic relations with Israel by the early 1990s, paving the way toward greater economic interaction during the decade. That

development had effectively rehabilitated Israel from international pariah status during the 1970s and 1980s.

However, in developing these closer ties with Israel, rising powers had arguably and inadvertently weakened their own prospects toward the conflict's resolution. Indeed, it may be argued that China's and India's cultivation of links with Israel during the 1980s and 1990s undermined their historic ties and support for the Palestinians. Indeed, this development has been noted by Palestinian lobbyists like Rania Madi (2015), who monitor these states' votes on the Human Rights Council, and has noted that traditional Palestinian supporters like China and India have become less consistent in casting pro-Palestinian votes.

If India and China were moving away from the Palestinians in practice, one state showed its support. In 1994 South Africa had transitioned from apartheid to post-racial rule and was involved in searching for ways to achieve a peaceful transition alongside securing justice for victims of the previous regime. The new government was dominated by the ANC, which identified with the Palestinian cause. The new South African president, Nelson Mandela, offered his services twice as a mediator between Israel and the Palestinians, although in both instances he was rebuffed. We will never know what might have happened if Mandela's offer had been taken up, if it would have led to the conflict's resolution. What we do know from his previous efforts at mediation in Africa was that they were not especially successful. And even if Mandela had been able to mediate, he would probably have faced the same kinds of problems that American mediators have faced when dealing with Israel and the Palestinians: the imbalance between the two parties and Israel's preference for the status quo.

Was the South African offer an example of active conflict management? At least in its intent, perhaps it was, if not in outcome. Because it was not taken up and the South African government and its diplomats did not push the matter further, it arguably falls under the various proposals and initiatives offered by other rising powers over the decades. And yet the Mandela offers were notable given the period in which it happened: during the 1990s, the high point of the Oslo process. Moreover, it was arguably the only instance where a BRICS rising power offered to step outside the Oslo process in this period. By contrast, after 2000 and the Second Intifada, not only was the Oslo process treated with more suspicion, but other rising powers occupied a relatively stronger position than they did a decade earlier. It was then that others, like Russia, China, and Brazil, became more vocal in their calls to help mediate or establish multilateral talks.

That other rising powers saw greater opportunity to use the conflict as a means to promote themselves after 2000 illustrated the changing context around the Oslo process. The 1990s was the highpoint of US hegemony: the Cold War was over, the Soviet Union had collapsed and two superpowers

had become one. There was relatively limited space in the international arena for rising powers to stake out an alternative position. Given the presence of a sole global hegemon, the choice was either acceptance of the prevailing order or its rejection—which could incur Washington's wrath. The US dominated the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in its role as external mediator for the Oslo process. In such circumstances then, the conflict offered few opportunities for a rising power to promote itself. The costs of behaving as a spoiler—that is, challenging and seeking change of the prevailing order—during a period of US hegemony was high. The result then, was that rising powers like the BRICS tended toward acceptance of the dominant system, including regional conflict management measures like the Oslo process. In choosing to support the process the rising powers indicated support for what was a consensus among states within the international community, and which suggested a foreign policy behavior in line with international citizenship.

Chapter Five

Rising Powers and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict since the Second Intifada

The Second Intifada broke out in September 2000. It continued until the Sharm el-Sheikh conference that took place between the Israeli and Palestinian leaderships in February 2005. During these two dates around 1,000 Israelis and nearly 3,500 Palestinians were killed. However, the end of the Second Intifada did not bring a resolution of the conflict; many of the causes behind it remained and in some cases were exacerbated. The separation barrier that was first put up in 2002 was expanded, along with Israeli settlements in the West Bank. Even as Israel withdrew its settlers from Gaza in 2005, the territory was subjected to a land and sea siege and which has remained in place since. Violence has continued, although at a lower level and intensity than before.

During the first decade of the twenty-first century, US unipolarity was replaced by a more multipolar world. A number of factors contributed to this development. Strategically, the 9/11 attacks showed US vulnerability and Washington's inability to protect and support its citizens, an aspect compounded further by its failure to deal effectively with the damage after Hurricane Katrina in 2005. Abroad, US dominance was undermined by its military occupation of Iraq after 2003. Although it won the war it was unable to win the peace, as the collapse and the rise of insurgency in that country showed. The failure to build a stable and prosperous democracy had repercussions elsewhere, with the US unwilling to intervene in Syria's civil war after 2011. Economically, the US-led liberal order was undermined by the 2008–2009 financial crisis. A liberal financial regime of deregulation, free movement of capital, the creation of toxic financial instruments and an overleveraged

housing market led to the near-collapse of the international banking system. The US government led the way in response, providing massive bailouts for the banking sector which were financed through savings in public spending elsewhere. This led to economic slowdown and growing unemployment and poverty.

The contrast with the BRICS countries could not be more stark. The 2000s was a period of significant economic growth. In 2000 they made up 16 percent of global GDP. By 2011 they constituted a quarter of the world's GDP (Varma and Lucknow, n.d.). Much of that growth was down to China, which had embarked on a process of economic development, and especially infrastructure construction, since the 1980s. Chinese demand for commodities helped fuel trade and economic growth in the developing world, including from countries like Brazil and India. Even the global financial crisis did not dent these countries' prospects significantly; although growth slowed, it was not until the mid-2010s that there was a noticeable reversal of fortunes, most especially in Brazil and Russia.

Economic boom during the 2000s gave rising powers more influence. But whereas previously economic expansion usually led to the buildup of military power (Kennedy 1989), the experience since 2000 has (so far) been relatively less violent (excepting Russia's 2008 war in Georgia and 2014 intervention in Ukraine, perhaps). Instead, they demanded the reform of international institutions and that their position as rising powers be recognized as such. This was accepted in part by the US and other leading states while at the same time the rising powers participated in the creation of new institutions, like the G20, or established their own (Ikenberry 2010).

These various developments—US relative decline and rising powers' improved economic and strategic position—meant that the global context was more conducive for rising powers to assert themselves than previously. That meant that conflicts like that between Israelis and Palestinians, could potentially be exploited to that end. Rising powers might therefore pursue a more active approach to conflict management between the two sides for a number of reasons.

And yet, despite this prospect, the conflict's transformation and eventual resolution remained just that: a possibility. That it was not more was largely down to two main reasons. First, and most importantly, the Oslo process remained the principal mechanism through which the BRICS countries dealt with the conflict. Alternative approaches were therefore limited. Oslo became a constraint on conflict resolution because it prioritized bilateral ties with the conflict parties while failing to address the imbalance between the two sides—which, in the absence of any external force, was unlikely to change. Second, the US remained the primary interlocutor for Israel and the Palestinians. The BRICS never challenged this, even as they offered to medi-

ate and called for multilateral talks. The consequence, then, was that BRICS behavior remained largely passive in relation to the conflict's management.

However, against this passive conflict management has also been the stirrings of an alternative active conflict management tool to the Oslo process. Beyond global governance, non-state actors were also becoming more prominent at the international level, including conflict. A distinct space of associational life beyond political society (i.e., the institutions of the state and government, bureaucracy, political parties), civil society has served as check on government, holding them to account, promoting transparency in public affairs, advocating for different goals, and participating in measures for change (Democratic Progress Institute 2012).

A few months after the official end of the Second Intifada a grassroots Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions (BDS) movement organized itself within Palestinian civil society. Inspired by the anti-apartheid campaign against South Africa, it rejected the Oslo process, although owing to its diverse composition, it stopped short of either approving or rejecting the two-state solution.

The BDS movement opened up a new space through which rising powers could relate to the conflict: rather than through interaction with state actors (and quasi-state actors like the Palestinian Authority), it could also engage with civil society. But doing so was mainly through indirect interaction: the BDS built up transnational links between its Palestinian constituents and its supporters in other countries. The aim of these links was to pressure governments to withdraw support for any political, economic, cultural, and strategic ties which contributed to Israel's occupation and siege of the West Bank and Gaza. To date, however, the BDS has yet to make significant inroads into the policy orientations of any of the rising powers' governments regarding the conflict. Perhaps the closest it has come is in South Africa, where it has received support from the governing African National Congress (ANC) party, although this has yet to manifest itself in the government's foreign policy.

FEATURES AND DYNAMICS OF THE CONFLICT IN THE PERIOD

The imbalance which has always existed between Israel and the Palestinians was only accentuated by the Second Intifada and after. As a state actor, Israel deepened its occupation of the West Bank and (after 2005) its siege of Gaza, imposing more stringent conditions on the local population. This was evident even during the supposed highpoint of Israeli-Palestinian engagement of the Oslo years. Yet by the end of the transition period for Oslo in 1999, Palestinian self-rule seemed as remote as ever. Indeed, in the months preceding the breakdown of negotiations and the descent into the violence of the Second Intifada, territory assigned to the future Palestinian state was criss-crossed

with Israeli settlements, by-roads, and other construction work (see figure 5.1). And with the start of the Second Intifada, Israel clamped down on the West Bank and Gaza as well as Palestinian areas within Israel itself.

While there had been distrust and antagonism between the two sides even during the heyday of Oslo, any previous goodwill was largely extinguished by the Second Intifada. As the stronger party, Israel was unwilling to make significant concessions to satisfy Palestinian wishes. Yet for appearance's sake, the peace process was restarted. As the weaker party, there was little option for the Palestinians other than to accept this. Talks took place inter-

Figure 5.1.   The Occupied Palestinian Territory before the Second Intifada

mittently after 2005, but more than a decade after the end of the Second Intifada, the prospects for a final and just resolution seem as far away as ever.

Indeed, much of the disparity between the two sides, including Israel's preference for the status quo and Palestinian fragmentation, has remained in place. By 2016, Israel's closure of Gaza meant bans on imports and exports, constraints on its population to travel outside, limited electricity, regular power cuts, and a largely contaminated water supply. Between 2005 when it "disengaged" from Gaza until 2014 Israel undertook three military operations: Cast Lead (2008–2009), Pillar of Defense (2012), and Protective Edge (2014). In the West Bank, Israel controls all crossing points and roads leading into Areas A and B, thus enabling it to control what goods travel in and out. Palestinians are unable to travel internally without coming across Israeli soldiers and checkpoints and remain under ultimate Israeli control, the existence of the Palestinian Authority (PA) notwithstanding. In Area C between 200,000 and 300,000 Palestinians are subject to Israel's final say on the use of land, its development, and construction. Over half a million Israeli citizens live in around 200 settlements across the West Bank, being subject to civilian law while Palestinians living in nearby villages face military law. Meanwhile, in East Jerusalem, Palestinians are classified as residents rather than citizens, facing uncertain living and working conditions. The opportunity to build or expand homes is restricted while around them around 12 Israeli settlements have been built or expanded over the years (B'Tselem 2016).

In 2006 the political Islamist party, Hamas, broke the previously dominant Fatah party's monopoly on the PA when it won the PA legislative elections. After a year of uneasy national unity government, the Palestinian polity became split when Fatah and Hamas fought against each other and divided the occupied territories, with Fatah controlling the West Bank and Hamas in control of Gaza.

One challenge that the political elite in the Palestinian territories faced was a growing disconnect from civil society, which itself was becoming more autonomous and vibrant (Kienle 2011). In that respect, the Palestinian experience contrasted with civil society elsewhere in the Arab world, where strong and authoritarian states dominate public life. Part of the reason for Palestinian contrariness to other Arab societies was due to the Oslo process: as the occupying force in the West Bank and Gaza, Israel was spared the cost of providing public services. Instead, the international community took up the role, as donors of foreign aid. The principal donors, the US, the EU, and individual European states provided financial assistance to Palestinian civil society organizations to offer these services and develop the economy. Although this contributed to the emergence of NGOs and civil society groups, the majority of them and their workers were reliant on foreign aid to survive in what increasingly became a "bubble economy" (see, for example, Le More 2008, Challand 2009, Nagarajan 2015).

Less dependent on the political elite, much of this civil society had become frustrated with Oslo. Many Palestinians did not feel that the process was working nor that those charged with leading it were representative of their views (Tartir 2015, Cooch 2011). In July 2005, 170 Palestinian social movements, organizations, associations and groups in Israel, the occupied territory, and abroad came together and formed the BDS movement.

The BDS is notable for several reasons, including its demands, organization, and activism. In contrast to the focus on the two-state solution in the Oslo process, the BDS has concentrated on ending discrimination and marginalization of Palestinians in Israel and the right of return for all refugees. Indeed, former UN special rapporteur on Palestinian human rights, Richard Falk (2013, 94), argues that the BDS constitutes a key shift in the Palestinian struggle, from one based on territorial claims between an occupier and the occupied (i.e., Oslo) to a global struggle without borders. To achieve this, the BDS advocates boycotts, sanctions, and divestment from all illegal Israeli activities. Organizationally, the BDS is transnational, with its supporters pressuring states and their governments to live up to their legal obligations and respect international law by imposing sanctions on Israel.

The BDS's origins cannot only be related to Oslo's failure, however. Its antecedents stretch back to previous Arab-based struggles (including efforts against the British mandate during the 1930s and in the First Intifada between 1987 and 1991) as well as other international efforts to end discrimination, of which the anti-apartheid campaign inside and outside South Africa is central. More recently, BDS campaigners point to the 1973 UN International Convention for the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid and the definition of the crime of apartheid in the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court as providing legal substance to their claims of Israeli actions as cases of apartheid.

Although parallels between South African apartheid and Israeli discrimination of Palestinians had been previously observed (see earlier chapters), it was at the 2001 UN Durban conference on racism, racial intolerance, and xenophobia that the similarities between the two as cases of apartheid first reached a wider, international audience. That it should do so owed much to the location of the conference in South Africa and the efforts of civil society organizatons and activists at the global level. According to the former UN High Commission for Human Rights, Mary Robinson, in 1997 the UN had decided to return to the issue of racism in the wake of the genocide in Rwanda and failed conferences in 1978 and 1983 (Robinson 2013). In 1999 the UN settled on Durban as a venue and during late 2000 and early 2001 regional conferences were held to develop the language for the draft. It was at the Asian conference in Tehran in February 2001 that confrontational language accusing Israel of "racial superiority" and "ethnic cleansing of the Arab population" were proposed. With the words inserted in the draft text for

debate at the conference and along with demands for a US apology and reparations for slavery anticipated, there was consternation within US and Israeli circles. Washington downgraded its representation at the conference midway through the conference while Israel chose not to attend.

Although the offending language was struck out, the Syrian representative, supported by other Arab states, sought to have criticism of Israel's "foreign occupation" added to the draft. The Brazilian representative moved a procedural motion over its inclusion. The result was a vote to take no action (i.e., not to include the language) resulting in 50 votes in favor, 38 against, 11 abstentions, and 71 representatives not present (as many had departed the conference which had overrun by a day). Canada and several European countries had sided with the US, partly because they did not want to challenge Washington's position (Williams 2001). Of the BRICS countries present, Brazil and Russia voted for the motion (i.e., non-inclusion of the Syrian text) while India abstained and China and South Africa voted against (i.e., for inclusion).

The South African position was influenced by pressure from civil society. Running alongside the UN Conference had been the NGO Forum which included the strong involvement of South African social movements and groups. Among the 3,750 organizations which met in Durban was a large contingent from the host country, principally in the Network of South Africa NGOs (SANGOCO). A delegation had visited the occupied Palestinian territory and seen the impact of Israel's enforced closures and fragmentation of the territory and separation of the Palestinian population; their public observations echoed similar experiences under the apartheid regime in South Africa, which they also recalled, had been an ally of Israel (Hanafi 2004, Williams 2001).

The NGO Forum and SANGOCO involvement were significant in another way as well. Whereas northern NGOs like Amnesty and Human Rights Watch had tended to dominate the agenda, terms of reference, and moderation of debate at previous conferences, Durban was notable for the greater role and activism of southern NGOs. Hanafi (2004) called it a "turning point," since it heralded a shift in relations from diplomatic/state actors and NGOs on one side to greater activism by "victims" themselves. In contrast to the watered down UN declaration, the final NGO conference declaration not only made clear its criticism of colonialism and foreign occupation, but also:

> Call[ed] for the launch of an international anti Israeli Apartheid movement as implemented against South African Apartheid through a global solidarity campaign network of international civil society, UN bodies and agencies, business communities and to end the conspiracy of silence among states, particularly the European Union and the United States. (WCAR NGO Forum 2001)

With the NGO call against Israeli apartheid receiving international attention, over the next few years various individuals, groups, and activists began to meet and make similar calls and demands for action. These calls were exacerbated by the experience of the Second Intifada which was happening during these years.

Both Durban and the Second Intifada brought the Palestinian case to greater international attention. In 2002–2003 Palestinian and foreign intellectuals came together at Berkeley University, where the Students for Justice in Palestine group demanded that the university divest from Israel. In December 2004 a new academic boycott group, the Palestinian Campaign for the Academic and Cultural Boycott of Israel (PACBI), was formed and met in London, bringing together various like-minded groups.

With the formation of the BDS in mid-2005, Palestinian campaigners demanded that all states should treat Israel in the same way. One of the BDS's cofounders, Omar Barghouti, has said they should impose a military embargo of Israel (similar to that which was imposed by the UN on South Africa during apartheid), an end to free trade agreements with Israel, and a ban on the products of all Israeli and international companies which are complicit with the occupation and Israel's violation of international law (Barghouti 2015).

The rise and mobilization of the BDS has not gone unchallenged. Critics, especially on the Israeli side, claim that the BDS demands and actions do not distinguish between Israel's occupation of the West Bank and siege of Gaza and its existence within the Green Line (i.e., the borders established through the 1949 ceasefire). By not acknowledging this, they believe the BDS denies Israel's right to exist (Schenker 2012). At the same time, critics claim that the BDS is unlikely to realize its aims: a "silent majority" of Israelis continue to support the Oslo-associated idea of two states (one Israeli, one Palestinian) while the international community remains ambivalent toward the BDS and its aims (Schenker 2012).

In sum then, the nature of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict between the 1990s and after 2005 was notably different. Whereas the conflict had been primarily articulated through elite level actors on the Israeli and Palestinian sides, using the Oslo process as the framework through which negotiations took place, by the 2000s that mechanism was under challenge. The failure to resolve the conflict and mutual distrust on both sides meant that notwithstanding Oslo's legitimacy with the international community, an alternative perspective of the conflict and how to deal with it was emerging. Based on civil society organization and activism, the BDS offered a counterweight, by inviting its supporters to pressure their own governments to impose sanctions on one of the conflict parties. As a result, rising powers now had to contend with both states and non-state actors in their management of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

BRAZIL

Brazil's involvement in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict during the 2000s was in marked contrast to the 1990s. Under President Luis Inácio "Lula" da Silva, who took office in 2003, Brazil took a more active role globally and in relation to the Middle East. Globally, Lula was keen to reform international institutions like the UN Security Council (UNSC), International Monetary Fund, and World Bank and acquire a greater say over them. He therefore used foreign policy as one way to publicize Brazilian intent and demonstrate itself as a rising power. The Middle East was one arena which invited such action, given relatively limited Brazilian involvement prior to 2003.

However, it would be a mistake to assume that Brazil's emergence onto the global stage was solely down to the Lula presidency. Indeed, in the early days of the Second Intifada between 2000 and 2002, Lula's predecessor, Fernando Henrique Cardoso, had criticized Israeli military action and was prepared to send Brazilian troops to participate in a multilateral peacekeeping force in the West Bank if requested (Casarões and Vigevani 2014). Cardoso's more robust stance happened at a time when these countries were striving for greater autonomy from the US and its post-Cold War hegemony (Abdenur 2015, Baeza 2012). The country was helped by an economic boom after 2000, which itself was partly stimulated by rising Chinese demand for commodities. It had the additional effect of helping insulate Brazil from the worst excesses of the global financial crisis in 2008–2009 (Feldberg 2014). In some respects, Brazil during the 2000s echoed its earlier efforts at political and economic autonomy during the 1970s.

Much of the push for Brazil's involvement in the Middle East reflected the increasing presidentialization of Brazilian foreign policy and was the result of Lula's personal involvement. In 2003 Lula made his first trip to the Middle East and invited Arab leaders to Brasília for a South American-Arab summit. During Lula's visit to Egypt that year he met with Nabil Shaat, the PA foreign minister, and took the decision to open a Brazilian representative office in Ramallah in 2004. Brazil's office was the second Latin American office in Ramallah after Chile's in 1998 (Chile has the largest Palestinian population in South America, over 500,000). Brazil's action was followed by Mexico, Argentina, and Venezuela (Abdenur 2015, Baeza 2012). In 2005 Brazil hosted the first Arab-South America (APSA) summit in Brazil, with the Palestinians also in attendance. The resulting Brasília Declaration expressed its commitment to previous UNSC resolutions (242, 338) as well as Resolution 1515 which had been passed in November 2003 and supported the Arab League's Road Map. The declaration stated that a Palestinian state should be based on the 1967 lines and all settlements—including in East Jerusalem—being dismantled (Brasília Declaration 2015).

The Brazilian-led Latin American surge in the Middle East culminated in Brasília's recognition of a Palestinian state in 2010. This was symbolically important, coming from a group of leftist Latin American leaders who opposed (US) imperialism and expressed solidarity with Palestinian demands for self-determination. For some of these leaders, the Palestinian Liberation Organization's (PLO) revolutionary struggle echoed their own struggles against the dictatorships of the 1970s (Abdenur 2015). However, such sympathy had limits since Brazil reiterated its support for the Oslo process. That support ensured Brazil could present itself as a stakeholder to the present structure of the international system and the accepted framework for conflict management between Israelis and Palestinians. Brazil, along with India and South Africa, had been invited to participate in the Middle East peace conference at Annapolis in November 2007 by the Bush administration. Through its involvement, Brazil became a more active donor, especially for humanitarian relief in the wake of the 2008–2009 Gaza conflict. At the subsequent Sharm el-Sheikh reconstruction conference in 2009, Brazil pledged $10m, around the same amount as Russia. By the end of Lula's presidency, Palestine became Brazil's largest beneficiary of assistance, receiving around $20m toward infrastructure, public health and education in the West Bank and reconstruction in Gaza between 2007 and 2010 (Casarões and Vigevani 2014). Brazil signed a series of technical accords, the construction of a new medical center in Hebron (with Brazil contributing $800,000) and the construction of a multi-purpose sports facility in Ramallah along with funds for socioeconomic assistance in partnership with India and South Africa to be administered through the UN. Additional medical assistance was also promised for Nablus and Gaza as well. In 2010 Brazil's core contribution to the UNRWA had been $200,000 (with another $500,000 contributed to help refugee camp reconstruction in northern Lebanon). In 2011 Brazil's UNRWA contribution rose to nearly $1m and then to $7.5m in May 2012, making Brazil the largest donor among the BRICS countries (Baeza 2012, Datz and Peters 2013, Abdenur 2015). Brazilian leaders also accepted Palestine's demand to be recognized in the UN and supported both its accession to UNESCO in 2011 and its non-member state status at the UN General Assembly in 2012 (Datz and Peters 2013).

Although Brazil became a larger donor, it did not contribute to a change in Brazil's role regarding the conflict overall. Spending more has not increased its credibility as a player in the peace process. Despite Brazil's presence at Annapolis in 2007, the US was unwilling to open up the process to other third parties. Rather it viewed Brazil and the other rising powers who attended as observers (Baeza 2012, Casarões and Vigevani 2014), and providing legitimacy for its own management of the conflict.

Lula did not accept this. He argued that developing states like Brazil should play a greater role in the peace process. This perhaps reflected his

own past as a labor organizer and reputation as a negotiator during the democratic transition in Brazil. Similarly, it may have also reflected domestic considerations, of Brazil as a multicultural and ethnically mixed society, which might serve as a model to the Arab and Jewish communities within historic Palestine (Kacowicz 2015). But any substantial difference Brazil might bring to the conflict was undermined by its acceptance of the prevailing Oslo process, which pitted two unequal conflict parties against each other. That Brazil opted for this was reflected in the pragmatic words of Lula's foreign minister, Celso Amorim, that

> Keeping this balance [between Israel and the Palestinians] was important so that Brazil would not disqualify as an interlocutor for both sides, while not renouncing any of her principled positions. [. . .] We are convinced that enlarging the conversations to a broader group will allow the appearance of fresh ideas. In one way, the peace process so far has suffered from a kind of claustrophobia, without room for new solutions. Of course it is not necessary to reinvent the wheel. The main elements of a peace accord have long been on the table. But new actors can surely contribute some lateral thinking on ways of implementing them. (Amorim 2011)

In short, Brazil was not prepared to abandon the current structure of negotiations. Rather, it sought to increase the number of other parties as sponsors of the peace process. Visiting the Middle East in 2009, Lula outlined his proposal to open up negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians that would include other parties and be managed through the UN. He repeated the proposal again during his final regional trip in March 2010 (Baeza 2012, Datz and Peters 2013). Lula clearly saw a role for Brazil in those talks, claiming that the negotiations required "someone with neutrality to speak the truth to the Israelis, to tell the truth to the Palestinians, Iranians, Syrians, and whoever wanted to hear the truth" (Datz and Peters 2013).

Lula's words might also be seen as a way of exploiting the growing divergence between the US and Israel, especially following the election of Barack Obama who was noticeably cooler on Israel than Bush. But was this a challenge to the US position? Arguably not. There were no significant or strategic interests for Brazil in the Middle East or the conflict more particularly, suggesting Lula's purpose was to project Brazilian influence more broadly. Indeed, Lula's relatively non-confrontational stance was in stark contrast to other Latin American states: his language was relatively moderate and maintained equal relations with both Israel and the Palestinians. By contrast, Venezuela under Hugo Chavez and Bolivia under Evo Morales had cut ties with Israel in response to Operation Cast Lead in Gaza (Abdenur 2015).

Despite Lula's relative moderateness, it still did not chime well with Israeli policymakers, who refused to see Brazil as a suitable potential media-

tor for the peace process (Datz and Peters 2013). They did not perceive Brazil as serious, since in contrast to the US, it lacked significant leverage to push the process forward (Kacowicz 2015). Indeed, toward the tail end of the Lula presidency the Israeli ambassador to Brazil stated that only "direct negotiations would prove fruitful. Brazil could certainly contribute in making the rest of the world aware—and increase the pressure on Iran" (Feldberg 2014, 1999). In other words, Israeli leaders were prepared to have Brazil's involvement in the region, but only *outside* the conflict itself. Indeed, Lula's defense of Iran's nuclear program and his government's efforts to reach a deal with Turkey and Iran over the latter's uranium processing in 2010 (as noted in earlier chapters) had offended Israeli sensibilities (Casarões 2014), along with his and other Latin American states' decision to recognize Palestinian statehood in 2010 (Kacowicz 2015).

Broadly understood, Israel views Brazil and other Latin American states as being dismissive about their security concerns. This was evident in the critical positions taken by Latin American governments against Israel in Gaza in 2008–2009, 2012, and 2014. Indeed, Israeli antipathy was visible during the 2012 conflict when the Brazilian foreign minister sought to mediate alongside the Egyptians. His effort though, was disregarded (Casarões 2014). Similar sentiment was also present during the 2014 war when the leaders of Mercosur (Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay, Paraguay, and Venezuela) coordinated their demands for a ceasefire and to allow humanitarian relief while Bolivia and Cuba presented their "Defense Manifesto of Palestine" in association with prominent leftist leaders and intellectuals. The then Brazilian president, Dilma Rousseff (who as Lula's handpicked successor, had won the 2010 election), denounced the Israeli "massacre" and "disproportional use of force" (Abdenur 2015). Brazil also expressed its preparedness to refer Israeli action to the UN Human Rights Council. Hamas was not mentioned as culpable for the rockets fired into Israel. The Brazilian ambassador was withdrawn, prompting an Israeli foreign ministry official to call Brazil a "diplomatic dwarf." The spat resulted in divided media opinion regarding support and criticism for Israel in Brazil. Following the ceasefire in August 2014, the Israeli president moved quickly to apologize for the language used and return to diplomatic normality (Casarões 2014). In so doing ties were strained between Brazil and Israel, but they did not break (Kacowicz 2015).

According to Casarões (2014), the response demonstrated the extent of Brazilian influence in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict: on one hand, as the regional leader, Brazil's actions could not be ignored in the diplomatic sphere; on the other hand, political differences were subordinate to other, economic factors. Neither side wished to jeopardize those, and both recognized that Israel was more likely to pay attention to the US, Europe, Russia, or China on the matter of the conflict, since three of them hold veto power at the UN (Feldberg 2014).

Soon after the Israeli president's phone call to Rousseff in 2014, Israel and Brazil completed a commercial deal to sell Israeli airplanes to the Brazilian Air Force. That development reflects the broader, economic nature of the Israeli-Brazilian relationship which goes beyond the conflict itself. Brazil's economic boom offered opportunities for Israeli firms, including in the defense sector (Datz and Peters 2013). In 2003 the Brazilian air force established a liaison office in Israel and in January 2010 the defense minister, Nelson Jobim, signed several arms deals for Israel to supply Brazil advanced aviation and communication technology and for the Israeli company Elbit to upgrade Brazilian tanks and armored cars. This was followed by a $100m contract with the same company for remote controlled weapons stations (*plus55* 2017). Other forms of assistance included collaboration over a jointly produced rifle and the purchase of drone equipment for the 2014 World Cup and 2016 Rio Olympics. In addition, Brazil and other Mercosur countries signed a Free Trade Agreement with Israel in 2007, which came into effect in 2011 (followed by one with the PA a few months later) (Baeza 2012).

In October 2014, however, the Brazilian government canceled a $2.2bn contract with the Israeli firm International Security and Development Systems for equipment following pressure from BDS activists. Much of the BDS focus in Brazil has been on the state's purchase of Israeli weaponry and "homeland security products" (Barghouti 2015). This was largely due to Brazil having become the fifth largest importer of Israeli military products and services by the late 2000s (Barghouti 2011). During the 2010s the relationship deepened; by mid-2017 Brazil had become an arms exporter, when Israel announced the purchase of Brazilian refueling aircraft for the Israeli airforce (Israel21c Staff 2017, Ahronheim 2017a).

In recent years the BDS has worked with Brazilian social movements and trade unions to lobby both national and sub-national governments against this involvement. In April 2013 the Rio Grande do Sul state government signed an agreement to allow the Elbit military company access to state universities and technology to develop an aerospace hub, including development of a satellite worth $17m. Following pressure, in November 2014 the same state government canceled the project. Over a year later, in April 2016 the state of Bahia ended its cooperation with the Israeli water company Mekorot (Palestine News Network 2016).

The mixed results facing the BDS in Brazil demonstrate the "long time" it is taking for the BDS movement to put down roots and build ties with Brazilian civil society (Barghouti 2015). The first organized action took place around the proposed free trade agreement between Israel and the regional trade group, Mercosur (which includes Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay, Paraguay, and Venezuela). Because of Israel's war in Lebanon in 2006, efforts to ratify the agreement were delayed. Two years later, in 2011, a

coalition of different groups and social movements met in São Paulo to establish the BDS in Brazil (Misleh 2017). Over the past five years it has acquired support of mass organizations like the national trade union and landless peasant movements. With such public support, the prospect for more sustained and effective pressure on the left wing Workers Party government became possible (Barghouti 2015)—at least until the impeachment of Dilma Rousseff from the presidency in early 2016.

And yet despite the developing economic and arms related trade between Brazil and Israel which has challenged the BDS's efforts, political ambivalence still persists between the two countries. In December 2015 the Israeli ambassador left his post and Dani Dayan, an advocate of the settler movement, was proposed as a replacement. Rousseff's government refused to accept the appointment, being opposed to Israeli settlements in the occupied territories. The standoff continued even after Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu refused to offer an alternative. Diplomatic relations were not fully restored until January 2017 when Yossi Sheli, a former businessman with links to the ruling Likud party, was unveiled as the new Israeli ambassador (Moraes 2017, Beaumont 2016).

The slowness of the appointment perhaps reflected the political instability in Brazil during 2016. In 2014 Brazil entered into a severe recession which has diminished its status as a rising power. The recession has both caused and contributed to wider political difficulties, including more public attention surrounding a corruption scandal, "Operation Carwash" that emerged at the state oil company, Petrobras. The scandal has brought down politicians from across the political spectrum. The most high profile of all was the president, Dilma Rousseff, who while not directly implicated in the scandal, was impeached over financial accounts following her re-election in 2014. Her vice-president and presidential replacement, Michel Temer, is also alleged to having being involved in Operation Carwash. Temer has proposed to cut back on public spending, leading to widespread public discontent. The expectation is that most political attention in Brazil is likely to be inward for the foreseeable future. Foreign policy and the Arab-Israeli conflict is therefore unlikely to occupy a central concern among key decision-makers, which suggests the prospect of foreign policy drift and default to acceptance of the status quo.

RUSSIA

In 1999 Vladimir Putin became Yeltsin's heir apparent, first as prime minister and then Acting President until his own election in 2000. Undertaking a reappraisal of Russian foreign policy, the new government adopted a new Foreign Policy Concept, Military Doctrine, and National Security Concept. It

concluded that Yeltsin's attempt to build parity with the US had failed and encouraged Eurasianism, whereby Russia employ the tactics of "pragmatic opportunism" to promote more multilateralism and enable it to act as a mediator between East and West (Bagno-Moldavsky 2013). This direction complemented the new Putin administration's foreign policy goals to restore Russian prestige and prevent US unipolarity, rebuild the Russian economy to great power status, and prevent Muslim (and Middle Eastern) aid and extremism in Chechnya (Freedman 2014, 129). In this sense, Russian policy after 2000 continued to be pragmatic and less ideological. In the case of the Middle East, policy was also less structured and centralized than it had been during the Soviet era (Dannreuther 2004, 34).

The importance of Islam demonstrated a change in the Middle East's regional importance to Russia: whereas it had been relatively "distant" during the Yeltsin years, under Putin the region offered additional global and regional concerns (Magen and Bagno-Moldavsky 2011). The need to develop ties with loyal "satellite" regimes on its borders and especially in the Caucasus region was seen as a buttress to prevent the disintegration of Russian influence.

Putin's pragmatism meant that when it came to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, he initially sought a centrist position between the US and EU positions during the Second Intifada. As time passed, he raised criticism of Israeli actions, in part perhaps because of their highly visible and coercive presence of Israeli forces in the West Bank and Gaza as well as the desire to boost ties with its older Arab allies (Dannreuther 2004, 32–33). Moscow's more critical foreign policy stance not only reflected a sense that it had been overlooked by the West during the 1990s, but also that it was neither willing to be a junior partner nor rely on economic and military assistance to build relations. In the Middle East Moscow approached policy as a way of challenging US global and regional dominance (Magen and Bagno-Moldavsky 2011, Bagno 2009). This involved support for forces opposed to the US and Israel—Iran, Hamas, Hezbollah, and Syria—as well as trying to build links with the other, Sunni Arab states in the region (Freedman 2014, 139), several of whom identified with the US.

And yet, like Yeltsin's presidency before it, Putin's policy was rhetorically more assertive and confrontational than substantive. Despite Russian criticism of Israel, the Palestinians did not receive substantial benefits. The PLO leadership had regular contact and meetings with Russian leaders and could count on Russia's support in UN votes, but that support was not unconditional (Magen, Fainberg, and Shklarsky 2015). For example, in August 2000, Arafat had traveled to Moscow and hoped for Russian support for a unilateral declaration of Palestinian statehood. But it was not to be (Dannreuther 2004, 33). Although the PLO had previously had close ties with Moscow, the Putin administration showed it was willing to review its position. Following the

end of the Second Intifada, Hamas won the 2006 PA elections. Moscow invited it to send a delegation to Moscow. This undermined the PLO's status as the representative of the Palestinian people since Hamas was not a part of the PLO. It also challenged the Quartet consensus against Hamas as a terrorist organization, since it was not considered as such by Moscow.[1]

Putin's invitation to Hamas was pragmatic and targeted beyond the Palestinians themselves. Moscow hoped the invitation would discourage Muslim support for Chechnya (where Russia was involved in an ongoing insurgency) and cultivate Arab support (Freedman 2014, 135–36). However, Moscow's overture to Hamas was undermined by the 2007 conflict between Fatah and Hamas. Putin responded by promoting an international conference for peace in the Middle East, to be hosted in Moscow and reiterating the 2002 Arab League's peace plan as the basis for talks (Freedman 2014, 138). However, Putin's proposal never came to fruition.

In 2009 the new Obama administration in the US sought to "reset" relations with Russia, the aim being to reduce tension between the two countries and realize opportunities for greater global and regional cooperation (Magen and Bagno-Moldavsky 2011). Although Moscow sought ways to challenge US hegemony, it was not actively seeking to replace it; it did not have the capacity to do so, even if it wanted. Especially in the Middle East, a region which Russia saw as a means of balancing the US position while increasing Russian influence, it recognized the advantages of Washington taking the lead while Moscow presented itself as a facilitator without being responsible for any outcomes (Bagno 2009).

Among the US reset proposals in 2009 were those especially concerned with the global level (e.g., dialogue on missiles, arms, role of NATO). When it came to the Middle East peace process though, there was no indication from Washington of any significant change beyond Russia's continuing and limited participation in the Quartet (Magen and Bagno-Moldavsky 2011).

The Russians repeated earlier calls for an international Moscow conference where all parties to the conflict (Israel, the Palestinians, Syria, and Lebanon) would participate, drawing on international resolutions and proposals by the UN and Quartet (Bagno 2009). However, it neither persuaded the conflict parties nor managed to convene a conference. Indeed, its limitations as a mediator were further exposed during Operation Pillar of Defense in Gaza in 2012, when Egypt was the principal actor in obtaining a ceasefire (Bagno-Moldavsky 2013).

Despite Putin's early criticism of Israel, relations between the two countries improved after 2009. This was due to several factors. One was the emphasis on cultural links, principally the one million Russian-speaking immigrants in Israel who constituted an important force for Russian influence. Another was Russian aims to use Israeli hi-tech knowledge, biotech, and nanotechnology to develop the Russian economy. A spin-off of this engage-

ment was increased trade links to around \$3bn each year (Freedman 2014, 141).

Moscow's changing view of Israel was a relatively even-handed response to the Goldstone Report which had criticized both Israel and Hamas during the 2008–2009 Gaza war. In the UN Human Rights Committee, Russia voted for the report but abstained from voting to send it to the UNSC. Perhaps in response, in May 2009 the Israeli foreign minister, Avigdor Lieberman, stated that Israel was prepared to participate in an international peace conference in Moscow. And in 2014, Russian criticism of Israel in its war in Gaza received relatively less criticism than in previous years; this may have been due to Israeli reticence regarding Russia's involvement in the Ukraine crisis (Magen, Fainberg, and Shklarsky 2015). For Israel, bilateral relations with Russia sought to discourage Moscow from supplying Iran and Syria with arms (Freedman 2014, 145). The extent to which this has been successful in debatable: during 2014 and 2015 there was the prospect of Russia selling S-300 missiles to Iran despite Israeli and US objections (Eran, Magen, and Stein 2015).

To date, the oft-touted Moscow international peace conference has not yet happened. Moreover, it is not evident that even if it were to take place that success would be assured given the intra-Palestinian split and Israeli intransigence. However, the outcome may be less important than the proposal; promoting an international conference and getting the two sides to support the principle is arguably more important in raising Putin's international profile (Freedman 2014, 150). For Olena Bagno-Moldavsky (2013), the conflict and Putin's diplomatic proposals offer a "low-cost opportunity for gaining international recognition" and cultivating improved ties with the Islamic world. Indeed she argues that Russia's offer to facilitate an Israeli-Palestinian conference is more important than it actually happening. At the same time, Moscow has indulged in low cost contributions including support to upgrade Palestinian status at the UN to that of a non-member observer state in 2012.

Following the failed attempt of US Secretary of State John Kerry to push through a final settlement between Israel and the Palestinians in 2014, Putin offered further proposals. Having pledged to "fight" for a Palestinian state in 2015, by early 2016 Putin was proposing an expanded BRICS initiative with China and India to find a solution to the conflict (Withnall 2015, Mitra 2016). Putin returned to the theme in August 2016 when he said he would be willing to mediate between Israel and the Palestinians and search for a "more peaceful" solution (Samuels 2016).

However, like the earlier proposals, the Russian offers have remained on paper. Several months later, in December 2016 Russia voted in favor of the resolution which declared Israeli settlements to be illegal and which resulted in public Israeli dissatisfaction. In an official statement, Moscow reported that the vote was "consistent" with Russia's policy toward the conflict along-

side the wider international community. However, it felt that more effort should have been put into seeking a broader "consensus" over the resolution and reiterated support for the two-state solution and an invitation to both Israel and the Palestinians to meet in Moscow (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation 2016). However, such support for an international solution did not extend to efforts by others, most notably the French initiative, which was conceived in 2015 and resulted in a one-day conference in January 2017. Along with the Israelis and Palestinians, the Russian foreign minister was not present. As of July 2017, with tensions rising between Israel and Palestinians over access to the Al Aqsa compound in Jerusalem, Russian officials expressed that they were "resolved" to supporting peace between the two sides (Guldogan 2017). But beyond these words, it was not clear what this might involve in practice.

Putin has operated with greater independence in the 2000s–2010s than did Yeltsin in the 1990s. Whereas Yeltsin's scope was largely limited to regional priorities, the past decade has seen Russia become more prominent abroad. But Russian influence is tempered by growing instability in the Middle East region. Indeed, Russia has faced considerable difficulty in relation to a key ally: the Assad regime in Syria. Despite providing considerable diplomatic and financial assistance since the start of the Syrian civil war, in 2015 Putin decided a more direct role was required, including the use of Russian airpower against Islamic militants and rebels. Although the Israeli leadership feared that Moscow's involvement in Syria would increase the influence of other pro-Assad supporters like Iran and Hezbollah, it sought to avoid any potential clash with the Russians; this was especially the case since Israel has carried out air raids across the border against Syrian air defenses and weapons systems. As a result, Putin and Netanyahu met several times in 2015 and 2016 and reached a tacit agreement to prevent any escalation of the conflict which might bring the two sides into conflict with each other (Ahronheim 2017b, Melman 2017, Sharon 2016).

Both Putin and Netanyahu have accepted the need for a wider view of the region in their dealings with each other; the conflict with the Palestinians therefore remains a second-order concern. Indeed, over the past two decades, Russia's relations with Israel and the Palestinians have been conducted largely at the level of elites; interaction between the Russian leadership and civil society, both on the Israeli and Palestinians sides, has been limited. While a number of leading Israeli politicians have Russian backgrounds, these contacts have not been paramount in Russian state behavior toward Israel. At the same time, there has also been little evidence or impact of lobbying by Palestinian civil society organizations (Madi 2015). The relative absence of a strong and effective civil society in Russia, along with an increasingly authoritarian regime in Moscow, may make it difficult for organizations like the BDS to operate. The mobilization of civil society has been relatively

limited, especially in relation to opinions that are critical or opposed to the government. Indeed, public actions against the Russian leadership in 2011–2012 and early 2017 were met with a strong government clampdown. The environment is therefore not especially conducive for efforts like the BDS movement which challenge government policy. Despite this though, there is awareness among Palestinian activists of the need to find ways to deal with the need for greater lobbying efforts in relation to Russia, not least given BDS founders' and members' view that Moscow can potentially wield in relation to the conflict (Barghouti 2015).

INDIA

Despite the thaw between India and Israel in the early 1990s, relations remained cool rather than warm. This meant that the nature of India's relationship with the conflict and its two parties remained broadly in line with the past. Publicly, India maintained its support for the Palestinians and a two-state solution. This continued after the Second Intifada broke out after September 2000. At the same time, Indian policymakers since the 1990s have largely moved away from the non-aligned movement and observed political Islam with some suspicion, especially under the Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) government since 2014 (Baskin 2015, Barghouti 2015).

It was not until 2004 that a significant shift occurred. It is from this date that India's relationship with the conflict arguably began to change. As P. R. Kumaraswamy (2013) has noted, although India's relationship with Israel had become more friendly in the 1990s, the period since 2004 has seen India delink its position on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict with its relationship with Israel:

> While disagreements with Israel over the peace process had earlier prevented full normalization of relations, New Delhi quietly began to pursue the peace process as if there were no bilateral relations with Israel and to pursue bilateral relations as if there were no differences with Israel over the peace process. (Kumaraswamy 2013)

The separation of the two issues meant that it was possible for India to develop more substantive strategic and economic ties. Israeli and Indian policymakers have found much in common in the fields of security and combatting terrorism alongside collaboration in the defense sector (Pant 2008). In 1999 India's national security advisor visited Israel for consultations followed by Israeli prime minister Ariel Sharon's visit to New Delhi in 2003. Of the BRICS countries, India has been the largest purchaser of Israeli weaponry. Based on publicly available figures, India has purchased $2.382bn compared to $1.421bn by South Africa over four decades (figure 5.2). Brok-

en down by decade, the known amount spent by India rose from $116m in 1990–1999 to $1.222bn in 2000–2009 and $1.016bn in the period 2010–2015. By comparison known Israeli arms sales to its previously most popular market among the BRICS—that is, apartheid South Africa—was $444m in 1980–89 and $625m in 1990–99. Both these countries contributed significantly to the known value of Israeli arms exports, ranging between just under 20 percent and 45 percent of sales value between 1965 and 2015 (figure 5.3). Much of the available data on those supplies points to Indian interest in Israeli hi-tech systems, including surface to air missile systems, air radar, guided bombs, drones, and control fire radar for its navy (SIPRI Arms Transfers Database).

Beyond the security and defense sector, there are also other links between India and Israel, including in the social, cultural, diplomatic, and economic spheres (Pant 2008). There was a desire by Indian policymakers to gain access to the Israeli economy, which required separation of economic and political concerns at the government level. Between 1992 and 2011 non-military trade grew from $0.2bn to $5.2bn (Ogden 2014).

The change in Israeli-Indian relations after 2004 has become pronounced by a joint perception among Indian and Israeli decision makers that their countries are surrounded by hostile states and face a common threat in "Islamic terrorism" (Sheppard 2004, 121). But there was also a difference in tone within the BJP governments themselves, between that headed by Atal

Figure 5.2.   Israeli Arms Sales to BRICS Countries, 1965–2015 (constant 1990 US$m). Data from SIPRI. Figure created by the author.

Figure 5.3.   Israeli Arms Sales to BRICS Countries by Decade, 1965–2015 (constant 1990 US$m). Data from SIPRI. Figure created by the author.

Bihari Vajpayee (1998–2004) and more recently, Narendra Modi (since 2014). For Vajpayee, realpolitik largely motivated the Israel connection. As prime minister, he was certainly more pro-Israel compared to his Congress predecessors and successors, but he did not command Parliament in the same manner that the current Indian prime minister, Modi, does (Vertzberger 2015). By contrast Modi's motivations arguably go beyond national self-interest and include a more skeptical view of Islam. He was chief minister of Gujarat state when an anti-Muslim massacre took place there in 2002 while more recently, he has praised the caliber of the Israeli armed forces (Swain 2017).

The shift toward Israel has also been felt further afield, including in India's UN votes. In the past it voted consistently in favor of the Palestinian position. That has begun to change. In 2012 it voted to upgrade Palestine's status as a non-voting member of the UN (Kumaraswamy 2013). But two years later, in 2014 it abstained when the UN Human Rights Council's report on the Gaza war was presented (Madi 2015, Shikaki 2015). This surprised many, not least the Palestinians, who had come to assume and expect Indian support (Vertzberger 2015, Madi 2015). The surprise was all the more palpable since India's voting pattern at the UN has been generally supportive of the Palestinians (Tower Magazine 2016). Such support though was arguably due in part to the relative inertia and insulation from politics of the Indian

foreign policy establishment and which Modi's prime ministership threatens to derail.

Although the Palestinians were surprised by India's abstention in 2014, this has not led to any lasting breakdown in ties between Indian and Palestinian leaderships. In response to Modi's historic visit to Israel in July 2017—the first time by an Indian prime minister—the PLO's representative in New Delhi was reported to accept India's development of relations with Israel "as long as India doesn't change its stand on Palestine" (Razdan 2017). At the same time, Modi's visit to Israel was not reciprocated with a visit to Ramallah, resulting in a small civil society protest outside the Indian representative office and criticism by the political left in India (Kalman 2017).

Perhaps because the Palestinian leadership realizes its limited influence with the current Indian government, pragmatism has been a growing determinant in its actions. Mitra (2016) has reported that the Palestinian leadership had asked the Indian external affairs minister, Shusma Swaraj, to inform the Israeli leadership that they were prepared to negotiate on the basis of the 1967 borders. According to an Indian foreign affairs spokesperson, this suggested that "The Palestinians have got over the UNHRC vote. Now, they would like to use our supposed closeness to Israel." Most recently, India was invited by Russia to constitute part of a proposal by BRICS countries to mediate between Israel and the Palestinians in early 2016. Beyond the suggestion though, there has been little in the way of substantive discussion or outcomes.

The prospects for the Palestinian cause also appear mixed at the level of civil society. Being a democracy, the government should be more responsive to civil society demands, some of which have shown interest in collaborating with the Palestinians (Baskin 2015). In addition, there has been a growing number of civil society movements and organizations which have been sympathetic to the Palestinian cause after 2010, and especially since the 2014 Gaza war (Sarkar 2015).

Of Indian political and civil society movements and groups which identify with the Palestinian cause and the BDS, there are three main networks. They include the Palestine Solidarity Committee, most closely associated with the communist parties in India; the India-Palestine People's Solidarity Forum which is more closely associated with Muslim groups and organizations; and independent civil society organizations like the Coalition for Nuclear Disarmament and Peace (CNDP) and civil liberties groups in Kerala, Andhra Pradesh, and Hyderabad (Bhattacharya and Mullen 2015). Many of these activists see the Indian government's desire to develop a military-industrial complex with participation from the domestic and foreign private sector as a reason for activism. They note the role of Israeli firms in this process and see the need to challenge the Indian government over developing a domestic military-industrial complex on the one hand and the more specific

BDS-related action against Israeli arms and firms on the other (Bhattacharya and Mullen 2015). During the Israeli president's visit to India in November 2016, 70 individuals and 30 organizations publicly condemned the Indian government's use of tax revenues to acquire Israeli arms and help finance oppression against the Palestinians (*Al Jazeera* 2016). Among Palestinian BDS activists (rather than Indian BDS activists) though, the priority is less about curtailing India's development of its own military-industrial complex, and more about discouraging the Indian state from purchasing Israeli arms (Barghouti 2015).

Despite this public sympathy for the Palestinian situation, there are limits to how far BDS activism can influence wider civil society and government in India. First, India's growing middle class is attracted to more markets, trade, and products. There have been growing numbers of Indian business and trade delegations visiting Israel (Vertzberger 2015). Second, compared to Israel's trade with Europe, Israel's trade with India in civilian products is relatively small. Consequently there is not much scope for BDS action beyond the current focus on arms sales (although the CNDP's opposition to a missile defense system and the Indian Campaign for the Academic and Cultural Boycott of Israel's [INCACBI] appeal to the Indian software firm, Infosys, not to collaborate with Israeli partners, have yielded results; Bhattacharya and Mullen 2015). Third, while there have been growing numbers of protests and solidarity events, particularly around the 2014 Gaza war, the level and range of activism is not as strong as in Europe or South Africa (Sarkar 2015). Fourth, there is relatively limited space for civil society organization and activism both generally and in relation to Palestine in particular. Achin Vanaik of the INCACBI claims that until 2000 solidarity activities were largely shaped and led by political parties, like Congress. In addition, the growth of the middle class and the political right (through the BJP) has constrained space available for activism, ensuring that the most critical voices against Israel were from the Muslim minority and the left (Bhattacharya and Mullen 2015).

CHINA

During the 2000s China's relationship to the Middle East underwent change. Beijing stopped being only an importer of energy supplies; increasingly, it became an investor and developer of oil fields within the region (Pan 2008). China had historically criticized the US (and Soviet Union) for imperialist tendencies in the Middle East, including their physical presence in the region. But its thirst for oil meant that Chinese attitudes toward Washington's economic and military presence in the Middle East became more ambivalent. The US military presence has provided space for Chinese commercial inter-

est to expand, as occurred in Iraq after 2003. More recently, US-led military action against Islamic State in Iraq provided greater security for Chinese investment in Iraqi oil fields in the south of the country. The effect of this mutual interest between the US and China has not gone unnoticed by policy-makers; China has been portrayed as a "free rider" because of its exploitation of economic and commercial opportunities interests under the shadow of the US-provided security umbrella (Alterman and Garver 2008, Shichor 2006a, 2006b).

China's growing economic concern with the Middle East has also meant change in the relationship between Beijing and Israel as well. Trade was relatively small between the two countries in 1990: Israeli exports to China were worth $7.8m and Chinese exports to Israel around $0.2m. After the two countries had established full diplomatic relations in 1992 there was an economic boon: in 2000 Israeli exports to China were worth $602.3m and Chinese exports to Israel $261.6m; by 2011 the values were $2.7bn and $5.45bn respectively, making China Israel's major Asian partner and its second largest importer after the US (8 percent to 11.3 percent from the US). But it is important to put this in context: despite the value of Chinese trade with Israel, it is about the same as the trade that China has with Egypt (Shichor 2014). In other words, the value of Sino-Israeli trade is of much greater importance to Israel. From China's perspective, Israel is a very small exporter, especially when compared to other comparably sized countries like Singapore and Norway—each of which export 12 and seven times as much as Israel respectively (Shichor 2014, 118–19).

However, this may be set to change as China embarks on its One Belt, One Road development program. The westward strategy will integrate China into the Central and West Asian economies through investment in trade routes and infrastructure. The announcement of the initiative's expansion to the Middle East in January 2016 was a key moment in China's recent relationship with the region. As part of the policy, Chinese finance is available to support infrastructure development. To that end $55bn had been allocated in the form of loans, aid, and investment in the Middle East. Israel is expected to be a key destination for much of these funds, alongside Egypt, the Gulf and Iran (LaRouche 2016).

For the One Belt, One Road initiative to work, China will require stability and security in the sites where its interests lie. At present, the main areas of instability and concern in the region are Syria, Iraq and Iran (Tiezzi 2016). This has meant that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is considered to be of a lesser order (Evron 2015). Moreover, it could be argued that when compared to these primary zones of concern, there appears to be stability and order of a kind—albeit one that is imposed through Israeli military occupation and coercion within the West Bank and Gaza.

Chinese concern with violence between Israelis and Palestinians encouraged it to take an interest in its management during the Second Intifada. A Middle East envoy was appointed in 2002, which provided Beijing with personal diplomacy between Israel and the Palestinians, but which has been described as being "mostly symbolic." The same year the Quartet was established but Beijing did not seek membership alongside the US, UN, Russia, and the EU. A year later Beijing endorsed the Quartet's Road Map, including an international conference to resolve the conflict. But the general consensus was that the Chinese statement had little effect (Evron 2017a).

Chinese leadership in resolving the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians since 2000 has therefore been largely absent. Beyond general statements and endorsements, often in favor of the Oslo paradigm, Beijing offered no significant contribution in terms of a radical rethinking of either the process or in finding a way to bring the two sides together. After 2010 it did make more audible noises about the need to resolve the conflict, including a four-point plan launched in May 2013 and which was relaunched again in July 2017. But in both cases there was much repeating of previous themes (Cohen 2013, Cole 2013, Vick 2013). Of the four points proposed, they included (1) an independent Palestinian state and co-existence between it and Israel; (2) negotiation as the means for resolving the conflict; (3) drawing on principles like "land for peace" (which are enshrined in past UN resolutions); and (4) support by the international community throughout the process of negotiation and its resolution (Xinhua 2013).

However, if the terms of the plan were little different from previous statements, the timing was striking since it coincided with a period of relative US absence from the conflict. China sought to project a more positive image owing to difficult relations with its neighbors in East Asia (Tobias 2013). Arguably, Beijing wanted international and symbolic recognition, in order to project itself internationally (Shichor 2014). That said, the Chinese initiative was quickly lost. Despite the presence of both the Israeli prime minister and Palestinian president in China at around the same time in May 2013, Beijing did not attempt to broker a meeting between the two (Shichor 2014). Two months after the announcement, the Chinese proposal was effectively buried when then US Secretary of State John Kerry began a year of (failed) shuttle diplomacy between July 2013 and April 2014 as he sought to push Israelis and Palestinians toward a final settlement.

Several months later, Beijing returned to the fray when it expressed concern at the war in Gaza and advocated a ceasefire, but beyond support for Egypt's efforts, offered no efforts in terms of manpower or schedule toward that end (Evron 2017a). As a donor, China's aid and humanitarian assistance in the wake of the conflict was modest, at around $1.5m in the wake of the 2014 Gaza war (Evron 2015, Evron 2017a). That same year the total Chinese contribution to UNRWA was $200,000, compared to the top two donors, the

US and EU, who pledged $409m and $139m respectively (UNRWA various years). And although China has offered a further $7.5m toward Palestinian economic development through the One Belt, One Road initiative, this amounts to 1.36 percent of the total $55bn which is expected to be made available (Xinhuanet 2016).

In sum then, Chinese involvement in the peace process and the most recent sequence of efforts suggests that it has been largely marginal till now. This position is echoed by various China watchers inside and outside Israel. Jonathan Schanzer (2016) claims that policymakers in Beijing recognize the importance of the conflict but do not think that it should challenge China's other, bilateral relationships in the region. Chen YiYi (2015) claims that there is internal interest in Beijing regarding the conflict and a willingness to act—although at present this is being subjected to the relative costs and benefits of doing so. Yitzhak Shichor (2014, 120) argues that Chinese diplomatic recognition of Israel enabled it to have a seat at the table, but that it has never sought to play an active role, preferring a "symbolic, official and passive" role. In part this reflects its wider Middle East policy approach, which is to maintain good relations with all sides (Shichor 2014). Yoram Evron (2017a) has echoed this, claiming that China's efforts have been mainly concerned with raising its public image and gaining regional approval, especially if it came at the expense of the US—while also making sure that Washington continued to contribute to regional security and stability. Meron Medzini (2015) has argued that Beijing has effectively "delinked" the Israeli-Palestinian conflict from its broader diplomatic and economic relations with the parties and the wider region. This is reflected in its tendency to abstain on UNSC votes regarding the Middle East, so as not to upset the regional players: Israel, Saudi Arabia, and Iran.

When the Chinese have proposed initiatives in the past, they have not acted on them, or threatened consequences to the parties for not following through. Indeed, when the Palestinians brought the issue of statehood to the UN in 2011, Beijing feared it might create tensions and discouraged them in private, even while they supported it in public. But because of China's long association with the Arabs and the Palestinians, Israeli decision makers do not see China as a reliable partner in the peace process, especially when compared to the US and Europe, which have much more involvement.

And yet it is possible that may change as the Chinese foreign policy establishment becomes more concerned with the conflict between Israel and its Arab neighbors. As previously noted, China needs regional stability of its One Belt, One Road initiative to develop (Evron 2017b). Perhaps for that reason, the Chinese leadership brought up its four-point plan again when Palestinian president Mahmoud Abbas visited Beijing in July 2017. The Chinese president Xi Jinping suggested both a "peace symposium" and a trilateral dialogue (AFP 2017). Initial comment was much the same as it had

been four years earlier: long time observer of Chinese-Middle East relations, Pan Guang said that "We don't even know if this will be an official dialogue or an unofficial one. . . . But so far, I doubt if Israel would want any official involvement" (Zhou 2017). Yoram Evron (2017b) has also called the proposal "more vague and less detailed than the last"; despite being less polemical. A couple of weeks later the Chinese ambassador to the UN offered some more details: Liu Jieyi said that the tripartite talks would be based on the four principles of the 2013 proposal. In addition, a seminar for Israeli and Palestinian "peace activists" would take place later in the year (Associated Press 2017).

Chinese commitment to resolve the conflict is not a given. But current circumstances make the prospect more possible than before. First, although the Palestinians cannot offer the same economic opportunities to China, Beijing recognizes that "lackluster" support could lead to wider Arab criticism and undermine its international image. This may have been behind Beijing's opposition to Chinese construction workers being based in Israeli settlements (Adl 2015).

Second, Beijing may be keen to "seek balance" in its relations with the US by exploring options in an area which has previously been dominant. Recent US failure at mediation may arguably make it possible for China to present itself as an alternative. This was most likely behind the Russian-Chinese-Indian proposal in January 2016 to develop a BRICS platform to mediate the conflict (Mitra 2016).

Third, China can present itself as an honest broker. Despite its past association with the Arabs and the Palestinians, today it is relatively immune from any lobbying by either Israelis or Palestinians. Unlike the US, there is no Israel lobby in Beijing. The same can be said on the Palestinian side. That may seem surprising given supposed Chinese acquiescence to a BDS demand in 2015, when Beijing opposed its 20,000 migrants from working in Israeli settlements. This was portrayed as Chinese concern that Israel would use these workers to build settlements in the occupied territory. However, Adl (2015) noted that Chinese officials mentioned that the decision had nothing to do with economic or cultural boycotts. Arlosoroff (2015) also downplayed the BDS connection, reporting that the statement was made on "safety" grounds rather than political concerns.

Indeed, it is very unlikely that the government in Beijing would ever support the BDS movement in a systematic fashion. For one reason, there is considerable and growing Chinese investment in Israel, especially its hi-tech sector (Shichor 2014). For another, China opposes external intervention in states' domestic affairs. Advocacy of boycotts and sanctions against Israeli firms and the state would be associated with this (Shichor 2014). Finally, the scope for grassroots and civil society activism in China is extremely limited (Barghouti 2015). Not only does this constrain opportunities for lobby

groups to represent elite actors like the Israeli and Palestinian leaderships, it also means that civil society groups like the BDS face obstacles to organize as well. Indeed, Rania Madi (2015), a spokesperson for several Palestinian civil society organizations in international institutions in Geneva, has observed the Chinese as being "far from these issues [about the Palestinians' plight]."

SOUTH AFRICA

Since 2000 South African foreign policy toward Israel and the Palestinians has been modest and lukewarm (Majavu 2015). On one hand, there is a broad sympathy for the Palestinian position and a commitment to a Palestinian state among South Africa's political parties. With the exception of some of the more radical political parties, the South African mainstream remains in favor of the peace process as a resolution to the conflict. That position is echoed by the government, which is dominated by the ANC party. On the other hand, it is not clear that the ANC is united in its position regarding Israel. Broadly, the ANC consists of those in government and those whose base is in the grassroots. The ANC in government has tended to avoid reference to Israeli apartheid and opposed the use of boycotts and sanctions while also discouraging its members from visiting Israel or having relations with the country (Daily Vox 2016). Meanwhile, within the party's grassroots there is a much more vocal and critical stance against Israel and its previous association with the apartheid regime. This was evident in its internal party committee which passed a resolution to downgrade official relations with Israel during its policy conference in July 2017 (Ahren 2017).

Despite the presence of grassroots and governing elements within the ANC, it is not clear that the former can or will impose its resolutions on the latter. Nevertheless, the fact that both exist indicates the presence of idealism and pragmatism inside the party, although South African initiatives at a proactive approach to resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict have been more modest since Mandela's offer to mediate in 2000. Since then successive South African governments have done little more than pay lip service toward the conflict and the peace process. In this respect then, South Africa does not constitute a significant party to the conflict and its management. Only on rare occasions has the South African government expressed its position, such as its condemnation of Israel's killing of nine peace activists aboard the 2010 Mavi Marmara flotilla to Gaza. In retaliation South Africa withdrew its ambassador. It also criticized Israel's prosecution of the 2014 war in Gaza (Majayu 2015).

If South Africa's diplomatic involvement has been limited, its influence and contribution to the conflict and its management has been of a different

order to that of other BRICS rising powers. In the decade following Oslo's failure after 2000, South Africa has provided the intellectual inspiration and influence to Palestinians and their international supporters in the BDS movement. The examples of the Network of South African NGOs and the UN Anti-Racism conference in Durban in 2001 were previously noted as contributing toward the formation of the BDS movement. Intellectually, South Africa's experience of apartheid has been relevant for two main reasons: one, to present the case of South Africa and its experience of apartheid as an example of a possible negotiated settlement in historic Palestine; and two, as another example of colonial settlerism (substituting the separateness of Afrikaner nationalism in South Africa for that of Zionism in Israel, alongside the use of official discrimination and marginalization against black South Africans and Palestinians respectively) to justify a similar response in the form of boycotts and sanctions. In short, the historical experience of South Africa offers a model for moral and political power which is different to the more official, diplomatic route.

That status has had an ongoing and residual effect on relations between the two countries. In early 2016 the South African ambassador to Israel, Sisa Ngombane, said to the *Jerusalem Post* that apartheid in South Africa, Israel's support for it, and today's references to Israel, have constrained the two countries' relationship:

> We have [a relationship] because we are not settling any scores with Israel. There is no attempt to come back and say you previously supported apartheid. . . . [But what] drag[s] us off into this part of the world is the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Whether we like it or not, we are brought into this matter, and strongly. . . . No matter how much we try and say forget the past, we find ourselves referenced. . . . People globally reference the South African experience, and so we have to deal with that. (Lazaroff 2016)

If apartheid has limited the South African-Israeli relationship, its substance has also come in for criticism as well, mainly because of different historical contexts in each case (Adam and Moodley 2005, 17). First, the comparison is quite strained. Economically, whereas all South Africans were connected to each other in industry and labor, Israeli society has been largely effectively in separating itself from any reliance on Palestinian labor and especially since the second intifada (e.g., no Gazan labor in Israel). Indeed, in international terms the Palestinian economy is extremely small in comparison to the South African one that existed under apartheid; this has limited Palestinian global influence and especially in the US. In terms of religion, while it offered a common bond in the anti-apartheid struggle in South Africa, it does not do so in Israel/Palestine where religious identity separates Jews from Palestinian Muslims and Christians. Meanwhile, in leadership terms, the ANC was cohesive and had credible leaders able to sell solutions to their public under

apartheid—in marked contrast to an increasingly weak and divided Palestin-
ian leadership, between Fatah and Hamas. Finally, there is a difference in the
two societies' political culture as well. In South Africa social structure
tended to the hierarchical, meaning that the examples of elites mattered. If
they questioned and challenged apartheid, this resulted in its moral erosion
across society. By contrast, in Israel/Palestine the two communities are large-
ly separate, with limited contact between them and each emphasizing their
own untranscendable victimhood (Adam and Moodley 2005, 165–66).

Second, the notion of "Israel as apartheid" rests on the idea that a cam-
paign of sanctions and boycotts and the identification of Israel as an interna-
tional pariah will contribute toward international pressure on Israel's dis-
crimination of Palestinians in Israel and its occupation of the West Bank and
Gaza. However, this adopts a very narrow view of apartheid's collapse.
While it is certainly true that the South African regime faced international
pressure, this did not happen before the 1970s. Before then, the only possible
pressure that could be exerted on South Africa was external and chiefly
through the US and Britain. But these foreign powers were not prepared to
act for two reasons. One was because it would have damaged their own
economic interests in the country. For example, on the eve of apartheid's
"collapse" in 1986, while Israeli trade with South Africa was worth between
$480m and $788m (of which arms accounted for between $272m and
$544m), US trade was worth $3.32bn, Britain $2.52bn, and Japan $3.27bn
(Pogrund 2014). Only after 1985 did many international banks began to call
in their loans. In the context of floating currencies, this resulted in a run on
the South African rand, capital flight and bankruptcies (Johnson and Schlem-
mer 1996). Internally, the country's growing population and stagnation in
investment contributed to growing social and political resentment, issues
which were exacerbated through rising economic hardship and agitation in
the labor movement (Johnson and Schlemmer 1996). Finally, the apartheid
regime had presented itself as a bulwark against communism from the So-
viets and the left leaning ANC (Johnson and Schlemmer 1996). Only when
that threat disappeared were Western governments inclined to reevaluate
their support for the regime.

And yet, despite the challenges, constraints, and limitations associated
with the notion of "Israel as apartheid," the BDS movement arguably enjoys
the strongest support in South Africa outside of North America, Europe, and
the other four BRICS countries. Close ties between campaigners in the PLO
and the ruling ANC party have contributed to this, along with civil society
organizations and activism (Barghouti 2015).

The strength of the relationship between South African and Palestinian
civil society may be seen in the actions undertaken by and on behalf of the
BDS. One prominent BDS campaign was targeted against G4S, one of the
largest security corporations in the world. The BDS drew attention to its

involvement with Israel's prison and checkpoint systems. BDS South Africa, the local version of the movement, took up the campaign and used the case to highlight the company's violation of human rights in South Africa as well, linking the campaign locally and internationally and providing the scope for coalition building across national borders. Similarly, a campaign led by BDS South Africa against Woolworths provided additional opportunities and media attention toward its engagement with the Israeli state and its actions (Barghouti 2015). That campaign ended in mid-2016 when Woolworths informed its AGM that it would not purchase any Israeli products from the occupied territories. In its place the campaign was replaced by a wider boycott of "all Israeli products in any store" (BDS South Africa 2016).

Within the ANC, its grassroots endorsed the BDS movement publically in December 2012 and voted to make it official party policy. The South African Jewish Board of Deputies and Christian organizations have appealed for "even-handedness" in the country's policy toward Israel, but were disregarded (Abunimah 2012). However, as previously noted, the ANC grassroots wing's influence over the ANC in government's wing have been partial. And, beyond the ANC, other political parties have observed a weakening in the consensus for boycott: for example, BDS South Africa was especially critical of the visit by Democratic Alliance opposition party leader Mmusi Maimane's visit to Israel (Daily Vox 2016, BDS South Africa 2017).

In sum then, while South Africa's ties to Israel and the conflict have been marginal in direct terms since 2000, its past has provided an important intellectual contribution to the conflict, both in its interpretation and how to respond. However, both the substance of Israeli-associated apartheid and the role and impact of the BDS movement remain contested; it remains uncertain what will be their eventual outcome.

CONCLUSION

Since 2000 the international system had become relatively more fluid and open to rising powers. At the global level the US entered into relative economic and military decline as a result of the global financial crisis and failure to secure Iraq (and Afghanistan). That this happened did not mean that it was removed from its position at the top of the international pecking order, but it was more vulnerable to pressure from others. Indeed, several of the rising powers studied here realized the changing circumstances and took advantage of it at the regional level. Brazil, Russia, and China all became more involved in the region: Brazil and China through trade brokered by the South America-Arab summits and the One Belt, One Road initiative respectively; Russia became an active participant on the side of its client regime in the growing Syrian conflict. These developments had repercussions within the Israeli-

Palestinian conflict as well, with all three rising powers cultivating closer strategic and economic ties with the Israeli leadership. Especially prominent in this field was India, who became a prominent buyer of Israeli weaponry.

It was notable that in developing these ties, rising powers tended to show little regard for what this was doing to the conflict and its dynamics. Indeed, these rising powers tended to make appeals for the conflict to be resolved, but these largely remained as statements; they were not backed up with any substantial action such as mediation or peacekeeping. Indeed, despite being part of the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) since 1998, Indian troops faced risk from Israeli military action during its 2006 invasion; three were injured as a result.

Throughout the 2000s and 2010s there were proposals and suggestions for multilateral talks and mediation by Brazil, Russia, and China. But in all these cases the offers were not taken up by the conflict parties and disregarded. In several instances, these rising powers proposed an international conference, which was in line with the liberal precepts of IR, emphasizing mutual dependence and cooperation—as well as inviting others to view the proposers as responsible stakeholders of the international community and therefore good citizens. Of the three though, arguably only China has really had the economic clout through trade and investment to make a difference; China's exports to Israel are extremely significant to Israel and count for more than its own exports to China. By contrast, in other BRICS countries, the economic outlook has been less positive: by the mid-2010s both Brazil and Russia faced economic downturns, which may potentially constrain future room for movement. Indeed, it may be that the 2000s comes to be seen as the high water mark for a country like Brazil, both in relation to the conflict and wider foreign policy.

Perhaps Russia did offer an alternative, albeit one which was more confrontational than the international system would condone. Putin's willingness to talk to the new Hamas government in 2006 was treated with suspicion by US and European leaders, who viewed the party as a terrorist organization. Yet at another level it demonstrated strong pragmatism by Moscow. Regardless of whether external actors approved or disapproved of particular parties, Hamas's presence on the Palestinian political stage was a reality which had to be dealt with. And demonstrating a willingness to engage did not mean endorsement of such groups, but might instead be a way to step forward. However, a decade later and following the political fracture of the Palestinian elite, Hamas looks less important, its influence limited to Gaza. Furthermore, Gaza remains isolated from much of the international community and rising powers, including in the form of foreign aid (Shaban 2015).

To some extent, rising powers' individual entreaties remained non-starters for one major reason: their ongoing commitment to Oslo. Despite the changing international environment, rising powers have forgone conflict

management in favor of cultivating bilateral ties with the conflict parties. In particular, those have been more substantive with Israel as the examples of India and China show. Moreover, by developing those ties, decision makers in rising powers have tended to overlook the disparity in material resources and impact; the result is that Israel is disproportionately strengthened through such bilateral ties, with any financial support or development assistance to the Palestinians being marginal at best. The effect of this has been less about tackling the causes of the conflict and more about (unintentionally) reinforcing them through economic investments, trade, and other opportunities. For example, Chinese trade with Israel is worth several billions a year and there is growing interest to invest in the country's high-tech sector. In contrast, China's contribution to Palestinian coffers through its One Belt, One Road initiative may be measured in millions.

While appeals for peace between Israelis and Palestinians may be well-intentioned, their public statements and behavior have largely been self-serving, through their status signaling as important actors in the international community. The direction that most rising powers have taken in relation to Israel and the Palestinians is that of passive conflict management. They have prioritized negative or conservative peace, by following measures that are designed to limit the prospect of physical violence without dealing with its root causes.

That passive conflict management was the order of the day after 2000 may seem odd, especially given the assumption that a more fluid international system may encourage rising powers to actively resolve a conflict as a way of gaining wider recognition and authority. However, along with the decision to legitimize the flawed Oslo process as the principal mechanism for achieving peace, there were other factors that may also have weighed against rising powers' more active conflict resolution. One was that they lacked sufficient leverage within the conflict. Unlike the US, the BRICS states were neither the main mediator or financier within the Oslo process. Even as Brazil has become a more visible donor to the conflict, that assistance is largely humanitarian and, therefore, ameliorative. It cannot challenge the underlying dynamics of the conflict, by addressing the imbalance between Israel and the Palestinians. Meanwhile, efforts by Brazil and others to push for more talks have been undercut by the US: in the case of Brazil in 2007 and China in 2013, Washington subsequently acted in ways that excluded their initiatives.

The one exception to this passive conflict management is that of the BDS, whose contribution toward active conflict management is not without controversy and contestation. Moreover, the BDS movement offers a different perspective of the conflict and what action might be taken in relation to it. While it is by no means certain that its organization and activism will lead to its desired outcome and deliver a just and lasting resolution to the conflict which can accommodate both Palestinian and Israeli interests and concerns, it cer-

tainly represents a break with the past. Moreover, it offers an alternative approach to conflict management which emphasizes the role of civil society rather than states as the driving force.

Especially pertinent to the case of the BDS is South Africa. Of all the BRICS states in the 1990s and 2000s it had perhaps the least direct points of contact or influence on the Oslo process. Yet its influence to the conflict in terms of its conceptualization and the type of action this called for has been outsized. The history of apartheid and the anti-apartheid campaign has provided the intellectual inspiration for the emergence of the BDS movement. It has also pointed toward another way of realizing conflict management and its resolution: through the use of civil society rather than through states.

So what impact has the BDS had in collaborating with civil societies in the BRICS countries? In short, the record is mixed. It depends largely on the state of civil society within each of the BRICS countries. Simply put, where civil society is strong and autonomous and the political context open and democratic, it is in a better position to lobby governments away from doing business with the Israeli state and firms. That has been the case in Brazil, India, and South Africa. By contrast, where civil society is weaker and the political system more authoritarian, its capacity to influence governments has been weak; Russia and China fit this bill (Khatib 2015, Barghouti 2015). But when viewed collectively, the results have been limited. This may be explained by rising powers' preference for state-based relations over relations with non-state actors, along with a general aversion toward encroachment on other states' sovereignty.

Looking beyond the BRICS themselves and at the global level, the BDS is strongest in Europe, South Africa, and, to a lesser extent, the US (Shikaki 2015, Barghouti 2015). This reflects in part the relative strength of the Palestinian solidarity movement internationally as well as the deeper roots that countries and corporations in the West (including in the US and Britain) have with Israel, as well as the more extensive BDS campaigning that has taken place there (Barghouti 2015). At the same time though, BDS activists believe that there are opportunities to build links and develop its campaigns: in the West support for Israel is bound up between ideology and guilt and repentance for the Holocaust. In the BRICS, there is less of an Israeli lobby and government ties with Israel are based more on economic self-interest. According to Barghouti (2015), this should theoretically make it easier for the BDS's lobbying activities to achieve sufficient leverage with decision makers.

The acknowledgment of BDS founders and activists that campaigning activities must change to take account of the global South and rising powers has acquired greater urgency owing to Israel's own "Asian option." Israeli elites look with increasing concern to the West and believe that support for their state is weakening. In response, they say Israel must look east, toward

Russia, India, and China, and strengthen economic and strategic ties with them (Caspit 2016). A similar existential fear influences elite Israeli attitudes toward the BDS, including legislative efforts in recent years to suppress or ban support for it.

NOTE

1. The Quartet was set up in 2002 by the UN and included the US, the EU, and Russia as members to oversee the peace process. Although Russia was formally part of the Quartet, in practice its influence was partial, owing to the US hold on the mediating role in bilateral talks between Israel and the Palestinians and the EU's financial assistance to the PA. Since the Quartet's creation, Russia has offered little in way of an alternative voice or financier.

Conclusion

Rising Powers and Conflict Management into the Future

How have rising powers approached the Arab-Israeli conflict? What does this tell us about their approach to conflict management and international relations more generally? In answering these questions, the book examined the experience of five rising powers, the BRICS group—Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa—and their responses to the Arab-Israeli conflict. The BRICS were chosen as a representative sample of rising powers which may be distinguished from other more established "traditional" powers, and because they are assumed to be among the states to watch in the twenty-first century. The Arab-Israeli conflict was chosen as it is one of the longest running and internationalized conflicts on the planet, having been in existence for 70 years.

The book identified two main approaches to conflict management. On one side of the spectrum is *active conflict management* which is associated with positive or liberal peace and aims to resolve the causes of a conflict and build a lasting peace which satisfies all sides. On the other side is *passive conflict management*. Associated more with negative or conservative peace, passive conflict management is limited to preventing overt manifestations of violence breaking out.

Through chapters which presented BRICS relations to Israel, the Palestinians, and the Arab states since 1947, a broad outline emerged of these rising powers using the conflict as a means of promoting themselves to other states, by publicizing their commitment to a peaceful resolution. This is in line with what would be expected by state actors, great or small. Indeed, the conflict provides a means to project a power as a significant in the global order, by making use of status signaling (Larson, Paul, and Wohlforth 2014). But

whether those measures were meaningful (i.e., active) or not (i.e., passive) depended in large part on the wider international context in which they found themselves. Broadly, where there was greater fluidity in the global system, rising powers might be bolder in pursuing measures that aim to resolve a conflict; in less conducive environments, where rising powers have less space to project themselves, they are more inclined to adopt passive conflict management measures.

Considered chronologically, it was apparent that rising powers like the BRICS undertook bolder measures toward the resolution of the conflict resolution during its earlier period, between 1947 until the early 1970s. This was followed by measures that were more modest and passive from the 1980s on (although passive efforts were also in evidence before the 1970s at times as well). The situation was compounded further in the 1990s when the Oslo process became the primary instrument through which conflict management was pursued, even as the region descended into violence through the Second Intifada after 2000.

In presenting the different approaches pursued by BRICS rising powers in previous chapters, the focus was largely on the individual countries. This was due to the fact that the BRICS as an entity was not identified until 2001 and did not begin to acquire self-consciousness or form as a group until later in the decade. By the latter part of the 2000s its leaders were meeting for annual summits and issuing declarations. This concluding chapter therefore provides an account of what those joint statements have said about the Arab-Israeli conflict and what this tells us about rising powers' perception of the conflict, its causes, and the possible solutions. It provides a summary of the different conflict management measures taken by the BRICS rising powers both individually and collectively over the decades, demonstrating that on balance, the focus has been more toward passive (rather than active) conflict management. That is especially the case in the recent past, which has meant that individually or collectively, none of the BRICS rising powers can be said to have played a significant role in transforming the conflict. Because of this, the chapter considers a further point: whether it matters that rising powers have been unable to manage the conflict toward a resolution. It suggests that it does, not least because the success of such an endeavor would not only bring an end to this ongoing conflict, but would also contribute to its international prestige and status as a significant world power: a goal that rising powers hold. By resolving a conflict like that between Israel and the Arabs would mark out a rising power as a global player whose influence can transcend its home region. With these thoughts in mind, the chapter ends with some suggestions for further work and future research in this field.

BRICS INVOLVEMENT IN THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT AND CONFLICT MANAGEMENT

The previous chapters provided a breakdown of how the five BRICS countries dealt with the Arab-Israeli and Israeli-Palestinian conflict across the phases associated with the conflict. This was done with reference to the stages that the conflict has undergone, from when the Arab states were Israel's main rivals (1947–1967) to when the Palestinians emerged as the primary Arab actor (after 1967), and when the expectations associated with the Oslo process to solve the conflict rose (1993–2000) and fell (after 2000).

In this section we examine the common themes from across these periods, drawing not only on how the individual BRICS countries dealt with the conflict, but also as a group, after 2000. Based on this, a summary of rising power behavior toward the management of the conflict is presented.

Collective BRICS Involvement in the Conflict

The BRIC group emerged as a concept in 2001, initially to denote a group of emerging markets. Although not a self-claimed or defined group, coordinated activity began to take place among the governments during the 2000s at the sidelines of the UN and eventually leading to regular summits (and to which South Africa was invited to join). While unwilling to pool sovereignty, their rhetoric has become more collective and resulted in the adoption of joint declarations and statements at those summits. Much of the starting point for this was in the wake of the global financial crisis in 2008–2009, when they made statements about the architecture of the global economic and financial order. In early 2011 the Arab Uprising broke out and BRICS governments felt compelled to issue a joint statement.[1] That November the BRICS foreign ministers' statement seemed to distinguish between the Arab-Israeli conflict and that between Israel and the Palestinians. On the Arab-Israeli conflict, the foreign ministers reaffirmed their commitment to past international efforts at resolution, including "relevant UN resolutions, the Madrid principles and the Arab Peace Initiative" (BRICS 2011). On the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the BRICS foreign ministers were more explicit. They urged a return to direct negotiations between the two sides, leading to "the establishment of an independent, viable and territorially contiguous Palestinian State with full sovereignty within the 1967 borders, with agreed-upon territorial swaps and with East Jerusalem as its capital" (BRICS 2011). The sentiment challenged prevailing Israeli opinion, including "support [for] Palestinian efforts to achieve UN membership" and "[avoidance of] unilateral steps, in particular settlement activity in the Occupied Palestinian Territories."

Individually, Brazil, Russia, and China had each previously proposed mediation in the latter part of the 2000s and early 2010s. However, they were

undercut by US Secretary of State John Kerry's initiative to expedite a final resolution of the conflict and peace agreement in 2013–2014. Rather than condemn the US, the BRICS foreign ministers welcomed the restart of dialogue in September 2013 and hoped "that this renewed effort will lead to a two-state solution" (BRICS 2013). At the same time, the statement expected that the Palestinian state be "economically viable." Finally, it appeared to acknowledge the disparity between the two sides to build trust together, by declaring their "concern about the construction of Israeli settlements in the Occupied Palestinian Territories, which constitutes a violation of international law and is harmful to the peace process."

The BRICS leaders widened their criticism of Israel's occupation at the July 2014 Fortaleza summit. Although no mention was made of Kerry's failure the previous April, the leaders made clear their concern: "We oppose the continuous construction and expansion of settlements in the Occupied Palestinian Territories by the Israeli Government, which violates international law, gravely undermines peace efforts and threatens the viability of the two-State solution" (BRICS 2014). At the same time they welcomed the recent Palestinian effort to form a national unity government between Hamas and Fatah while noting that this imposed international obligations on them owing to Palestine's statehood.

The Fortaleza statement also strengthened the principle of international involvement by declaring the need for the UN Security Council (UNSC) to "fully exercise its functions under the UN Charter with regard to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict." While this presented a consensus, it did little to establish what should happen afterwards, since the statement offered no further details on what particular actions should be taken. The declaration was also silent on the fate of Palestinian refugees, including on the issue of their right of return. Instead, there were broad comments supporting the UN General Assembly's (UNGA) decision to declare 2014 the International Year of Solidarity with the Palestinian People and the efforts of the UNRWA and its assistance for refugees.

Support for the two-state solution was repeated in the BRICS foreign ministers' joint communique in New York during the UNGA opening session in September 2014. Unlike the Fortaleza statement, the foreign ministers focused their attention on the recent conflict in Gaza, welcoming the efforts made by Egypt to achieve a ceasefire and urging Israel and the Palestinians to resume negotiations again, using international law and UN resolutions. They approved of a forthcoming donor conference for reconstruction but there was no mention either regarding the causes of the conflict nor Israeli or Palestinian conduct during it, beyond stating that Israel's blockade (of Gaza) be lifted.

Although some of the more recent BRICS statements appeared to be moving away from treatment of the conflict as between equals, such state-

ments have not been followed up with any discernable action. As the case of individual BRICS examples have shown, criticism of Israel has not resulted in any diplomatic or economic costs for Israel. Criticism is further circumscribed by limiting statements to Israel's occupation of the West Bank and siege of Gaza. The BRICS have said little about Palestinian refugees' right of return or the discrimination and marginalization faced by Palestinian citizens of Israel. This last point is one that has been taken up by some in the Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions (BDS) movement, which distinguishes it from the Oslo process's focus on the creation of two states.

Settlement building in the occupied territory continued to be a feature of the BRICS leaders' next joint declaration at the end of the Ufa summit in July 2015. At the same meeting the leaders also implicitly stated their support for Palestinian statehood by encouraging initiatives to "facilitate to full extent the implementation of the international obligations assumed by Palestine" (BRICS 2015). At the start of 2016 the Russians made a proposal which suggested that it, along with its BRICS partners India and China, would move the peace process forward. This seemed to offer a step forward from the joint communiques made with other BRICS leaders annually. But despite the offer, as the year progressed there was little to be seen in terms of the Russian initiative. By the middle of the year Russian president Vladimir Putin had reduced the number of international sponsors to Russia alone. And as with previous statements, Putin's words remained on paper, as did the BRICS leaders' declaration in Goa in October 2016, where similar language to that of previous statements was used (BRICS 2016).

In April 2017 the BRICS Middle East envoys met at Visakhapatnam in India where they issued a communique. If the positioning of conflicts in the final document constituted in what order they saw as priorities in the region, then Syria, Libya, and Yemen were seen as the main conflict areas, with the Israeli-Palestinian conflict the final (and of arguably least) concern. As well as reiterating previous support for a Palestinian State, they spelled out the need for both Israel and the Palestinians to take measures to rebuild trust with each other. They repeated the view taken at the UN in December 2016 to call Israeli settlements illegal (and voted on by China and Russia) while also pressing the Palestinians to overcome the factional differences between Fatah and Hamas, by making use of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) program and Arab peace initiative (BRICS 2017).

Individual Approaches to the Conflict

While BRICS collective efforts can only be documented since the turn of the century, the countries which make up the group have had an ongoing relationship with the Arab-Israeli conflict since it first became an international question before the UN in 1947.

In general, the five BRICS countries have approached the conflict much like the rest of the international community, through the prism of state-to-state relations. Three of them voted for partition in 1947 (Brazil, South Africa, and the Soviet Union), which proposed the creation of two states: one Jewish, one Arab. The BRICS countries have tended to endorse the international consensus regarding management of the conflict in the years since, from UN statements that support the principle of land in exchange for security and peace in 1967 (Resolution 242) and 1973 (Resolution 338) (which several of the BRICS states contributed to in their drafting) and contributions to peacekeeping efforts. These measures were state-oriented and reflected in several ways. One was in the land for peace strategy enshrined in Resolution 242, as a means to return lost land to Egypt and Syria, or as the basis for building a Palestinian state, in exchange for a peace agreement with Israel. The second was that peacekeeping in the conflict was perceived externally, that is between states rather than between competing groups within a contested territory. In this instance, troops from Brazil and India served as a buffer between Egypt and Israel between 1956 and 1967 and between Israel and Lebanon (India since 1998 and Brazil since 2010). Third, Soviet and Chinese military assistance was to Arab states and the PLO, an aspiring state actor.

The state-oriented approach has largely remained, even though the dynamics of the conflict changed. After 1967 the PLO became the primary Arab party to the conflict. While the PLO may have aspired to statehood, it lacked many of the attributes necessary for it. That, along with the Oslo process which was established as the means for channeling management of the conflict after 1993, meant that rising powers were free to establish "normal" state-oriented diplomatic relations with both the PLO and Israel. But building such ties disregarded the imbalance in power resources between Israel and the Palestinians.

Oslo failed to produce the final settlement that was expected of it and the Second Intifada that followed did little to challenge the conflict's dynamics. Indeed, it is partly a realization of this which underpinned the Palestinian leadership's decision from 2011 to pursue recognition as a state at the UN and through international law and the courts. The assumption was that through them Palestinians can gain leverage and prosecute Israel for its occupation, with rising powers and other states being obliged to respond to any judgments that may result.

Such an outcome could cause a conflict of interest for a rising power, especially given efforts like those of India and China in recent decades to develop closer economic and commercial ties with Israel. Legal obligations would collide with self-interest, the latter which has been the primary motivation for rising powers in relation to the conflict. Indeed, rising powers have been able to have the best of both worlds until now: on the one hand, they

have been regularly expressed concern at the ongoing nature of the conflict while supporting efforts like the Oslo process as a means to resolve it. In so doing they have been able to present themselves as responsible stakeholders of the international system. On the other hand, for several decades they have not been required to commit any substantial capital, whether moral, economic, or political, to achieve the resolution that they call for. As a result, they have avoided incurring any costs in terms of putting themselves forward and potentially failing.

On occasions, rising powers have made offers to mediate, including by South Africa in the 1990s, Russia, China, and Brazil since 2000. But none of those proposals appear to have been backed up with any efforts to make them actually happen; no invitations were sent out, dates set, agenda drafted, or resources allocated, for example. Invariably they remained as statements and declarations. However, it is not certain whether such mediation efforts—had they been worked up—would have resulted in a process or model of negotiations substantively different from that associated with Oslo. The reason for this is because Oslo essentially captures the framework that most efforts at conflict management/resolution have been pursued in the region since 1967: through the land for peace parameters set out in Resolution 242.

While the state-oriented approach to conflict management remains dominant, the past few decades have seen the role of civil society rise in the case of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. It was assumed that under the Oslo process, civil society would play a complementary and supportive role to the elites which negotiated on the Israeli and Palestinian sides. In some cases this did happen, with the emergence of organizations like Peace Now! in Israel and the emergence of NGOs associated with the Geneva Initiative on both sides of the Green Line. In the West Bank and Gaza the flow of foreign aid also helped create and finance NGOs that became an important part of the Palestinian "bubble economy" during the 1990s. However, after 2000 and the Second Intifada, civil society could not be relied upon to remain supportive of the Oslo negotiations. Especially on the Palestinian side the more skeptical BDS movement emerged that challenged the prevailing orthodoxy and invited new questions from the international community regarding the conflict and how to resolve it.

Summarizing BRICS Conflict Management in the Arab-Israeli Conflict

Broadly, state actors interested with halting conflict have had two broad approaches toward peace at their disposal: active or passive. While there is evidence that both have been pursued, much of the BRICS individual and collective efforts since 1947 have been largely passive in scope.

Attention in previous chapters was paid to the different forms of conflict management that can exist. They included distinctions between "hard"/coercive and "soft"/non-coercive, conservative and liberal, and negative and positive peace, in which the absence of overt political violence contrasts with the transformation of a conflict by tackling its root causes respectively. The emphasis on passive and active conflict management does not mean that notions of coercion ("hard") and non-coercion ("soft") go away. Elements of both may be found in each of the two approaches, although arguably the active pursuit of liberal peace combines both versions more than the conservative peace approach, which takes a more hands-off approach in general. For example, peacebuilding may require the use of a more active peacekeeping effort to curb the violence (indeed, it might be called peacemaking) as well as diplomatic pressure on conflict parties at the negotiating table or in mediation. However, in the case of the BRICS and the Arab-Israeli conflict, both individually and collectively, it is not evident that any of them have adopted an approach that would lead toward the transformation of the conflict and an eventual liberal peace.

When the global environment is considered, there was space for rising powers to try and carve out some autonomy for themselves—although the extent to which that was possible was relative. In the 1960s and 1970s it was within the context of a bipolar world while after the 1990s and 2000s it was in a unipolar and multipolar environment respectively. At the same time the parameters of the conflict and its management changed; following the Oslo accords the separation of the conflict from rising powers' opportunity to develop diplomatic, strategic and economic ties became possible. Furthermore, the conflict had changed internally: from a state-based one until 1967 to an ethno-nationalistic and territorial struggle within historic Palestine after.

The more open global environment has meant that conflict could be used by rising powers to advance their respective position in the international system. For that reason some efforts at active conflict management occurred in the first decades of the conflict, followed by a more passive approach which dominated from the 1980s and which, since 2000, has become mixed with active and passive directions being evident (see table 0.1).

Active and passive conflict management was apparent between the 1950s and mid-1970s. Both partition in 1947 and the land for peace strategy laid out in Resolution 242 in 1967 could be classified as active forms of conflict management. In this period the perception of the conflict as state-based meant that the rising powers (and the wider international community) believed that the conflict could be resolved through the satisfaction of self-determination. In 1947 this meant partitioning historic Palestine into a Jewish and an Arab state. In 1967 this meant satisfying Arab leaderships' lost territory in exchange for peace for Israel.

Table 5.1. Selected Conflict Management Methods by Rising Powers in the Arab-Israeli Conflict

Phases of the Arab-Israeli conflict	Features of the international system	Passive conflict management	Active conflict management
1947–1967	Bipolarity; Cold War; Third World emergence	Bilateral relations with Israel (South Africa); Peacekeeping (Brazil, India)	Partition (Brazil, South Africa, Soviet Union); Arms assistance (Soviet Union, China); UN Resolution 242 (Brazil, India, Soviet Union)
1967–1993	Bipolarity; Détente (1970s); New Cold War (1980s); Global South	Bilateral relations with Israel (South Africa, India, China); Anti-Zionist declaration (Brazil, India, China, Soviet Union)	Geneva process appeal (Soviet Union)
1993–2000	Unipolarity; Post-Cold War; US hegemony	Oslo process (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa); Bilateral ties with Israel (China, India); Mediation offer (South Africa)	
2000–	Multipolarity; Relative US hegemony; Rising powers	Multilateral negotiations (Brazil, Russia); Mediation offer (Russia, China); Joint statements, declarations (BRICS); Oslo process (BRICS); Bilateral ties with Israel (Brazil, Russia, India, China)	Civil society/BDS? (South Africa)

Peacekeeping, however, has been a largely passive method of conflict management. By supporting and contributing troops toward the effort before 1967, Brazil and India may be portrayed as showing themselves as good international citizens. However, India conceded to Egyptian demands made of the peacekeeping force, since it did not want a similarly intrusive force to be recommended and deployed to Kashmir. The effect of this was to limit the force's capacity to provide anything more than a buffer between Israel and Egypt. Brazil also joined peacekeeping missions, mainly with the intention of raising its international profile. Its contribution in Suez was largely symbolic while that in Lebanon after 2010 was also seen as a way of presenting the country's naval competence alongside its emerging power status (Hirst and Nasser 2014).

Soviet and Chinese military assistance to their Arab and Palestinian allies was arguably more confrontational and disruptive, contributing toward more regional instability in the region. It may therefore be construed as spoiling behavior (both in the eyes of the other superpower, the US, and in the challenge it presented to the regional balance of power between Israel and the Arabs).

Following Soviet loss of credibility after 1967, Moscow moved away from its confrontational approach and toward one that was more inclusive, being laid out in the Geneva process. Although this change in direction heralded commitment to the international system, it was largely ignored by US unilateralism. And yet compared to later rising power proposals to mediate (especially after 2000), the Geneva process could arguably be categorized as an active conflict management proposal: despite having lost influence in Egypt, Moscow was a key ally for Syria and the PLO during the 1970s. Even if its status was junior to the US, its influence would perhaps have been sufficient in this period to have brought those allies to the negotiating table. Indeed, as a counter to this argument, it is worth noting that by the time Moscow had become co-sponsor of international talks between Israel and its rivals in Madrid and Washington in 1991–1992, its regional influence had dissipated even further and it could no longer lean heavily on its allies.

The other notable feature of the post-1967 period and before the 1980s was the Anti-Zionist declaration at the UN. All four of the BRICS countries in the UN at the time (South Africa had been expelled) voted in favor of the resolution. But doing so was arguably a cheap gesture, since it did not cost any of these countries. Instead it bought them approval from the Arab world, but made no direct contribution toward resolving the conflict or its causes. For that reason, it may be classified as a passive conflict management tool, like that of other declarations and statements made in later years.

Indeed, from the 1980s conflict management by the rising powers had become much more passive. The international system was not conducive for them to realize a stronger stance. Several of the BRICS states suffered from

decline and crisis brought about through ideology (the end of the Cold War and its impact on the Soviet Union), weak economies (Brazil and India), and international pariah status (South Africa's apartheid regime). For that reason there was little effort by these state actors to press actively for a resolution to the conflict. That position persisted into the 1990s, but for different reasons. In addition to US preeminence in the global system, the conflict had been contained within the Oslo process and endorsed by the international community through the UN. This contributed toward more effort being put into the development of relations with Israel and the Palestinians independently of the conflict—and which therefore had little effect on the character of the conflict, especially the asymmetry between the two sides in economic and strategic terms. Perhaps the exception to this was Nelson Mandela's offers to mediate. While the offers were never taken up, and based on other South African initiatives in Africa at the time, they may not have delivered any substantive results had they happened. However, the offers were notable for two reasons: first, they constituted the only significant alternative to the Oslo process in this period; second, Mandela enjoyed significant international prestige at the time, having navigated South Africa's largely peaceful transition from apartheid to post-racial rule. This set Mandela's offers apart from Brazilian, Chinese, and Russian offers after 2000, whose leaders did not enjoy a similar status or experience.

A suggestion was made in the introduction that the more open the international system, the more likely it was that rising powers would pursue a more active approach to conflict management; the less open the global context, the less likely that would happen (and more likely that passive conflict management would ensue).

If that was the case then the experience after 2000 seems to run against this. With the US appearing to enter into relative hegemonic decline and unipolarity being replaced by greater multipolarity, the prospects for more active management of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict should have been good. Yet that did not happen. Why? A key reason seems to be that the rising powers remained constrained by their continuing commitment to Oslo and reliance on periodic appeals and (largely disregarded) offers to mediate. Having adopted the Oslo framework as the principal means to mediate the conflict, rising powers effectively took a step back from direct involvement while pursuing diplomatic and economic exchanges with Israel and the Palestinians.

Accepting Oslo and "normalizing" ties with the conflict parties has benefited rising powers' perception, both of themselves as well as by others. On the one hand, acceptance of Oslo portrays the rising power as supporting international norms and institutions, in this instance a process which has acquired international recognition and legitimacy by the international community of states and through it, reveals the rising power as a responsible

stakeholder; in other words, as a good international citizen. On the other hand, Oslo provides cover for rising powers to pursue their own self-interest by cultivating and developing links with the conflict parties that are independent of the conflict and the process. It has enabled India and China (and to a lesser extent, Brazil) to develop their weapons capability through arms purchases, China to expand its commercial reach into Israel's hi-tech sector, and Russia to pursue its objectives in Syria regardless of what happens next door.

In sum then, the experience of rising powers' involvement from 2000 until the present is that their use of conflict management efforts has continued to remain mostly passive and offering little prospect of its transformation or resolution—despite the changed international climate which might be more conducive for them to act.

The one exception to this came from civil society and through the BDS movement that emerged after 2005. Using the anti-apartheid campaign in South Africa—and indeed, building ties with key grassroots groups including in the governing ANC party there—the BDS perhaps offers the most recent alternative to conflict management. It challenged Oslo's precepts, by moving discourse away from the land for peace framework to the impact of Israel's occupation, discrimination, and marginalization of Palestinians inside and outside Israel. The BDS aims to transform the dynamics of the conflict by using international law in relation to this to help build transnational links between Palestinian civil society and civil societies in other states to demand government use boycotts, sanctions, and divestment to get Israel to desist from its present behavior. Indeed, it was this recourse to international law, which perhaps contributed toward the Palestinian leadership's strategy of statehood recognition.

Despite this vision, the results have so far been limited. While democratic civil societies like those in Brazil, India, and South Africa have been more receptive to building ties with the BDS movement compared to the narrower available space in authoritarian countries like Russia and China, this has not rearranged these governments' foreign policy objectives and actions. Indeed, in all five cases, the BRICS countries have not prioritized civil society involvement at the expense of state (or para-state) relations. This may be due to rising power leaderships' tendency to perceive the world largely as state-based and to work with actors they see like themselves. In the case of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict this has meant that Israel and the PLO (and the Palestinian Authority in the occupied territories) are viewed as state actors; the BDS as a civil society movement is overlooked. The challenge for the BDS is compounded further by the fact that some of the rising powers among the BRICS have claimed to be opposed to intervention and undermining other states' sovereignty. Indeed, this has been a feature of their public statements in relation to the Arab Spring, including the UNSC vote on whether to intervene in Libya.

Finally, assuming that one or more BRICS government were to develop links with the BDS movement and promote its goals, the costs of doing so within the international community would be significant. The BDS movement challenges the international consensus associated with Oslo and is therefore a disruptive influence to the global order; in other words, it is an international spoiler. A rising power that actively supported the BDS goals might therefore be perceived as the same. And yet against that is a counterargument: given that Oslo has failed to deliver a resolution to the conflict for more than 20 years, the BDS approach may be disruptive, but it might (possibly) lead to a settlement. If so then the fact that it resolved the conflict must surely demonstrate good international citizenship. And in lending support for such an outcome, so too would a rising power also portray itself as an international citizen.

DOES RISING POWER CONFLICT MANAGEMENT MATTER?

The previous section has summarized the different paths taken by rising powers in relation to the Arab-Israeli conflict and its management. It has noted the importance that both the conflict and the wider international system offers as a way of enhancing its position in the global hierarchy. In the first decades of the present century it does seem as if the global environment is conducive for such a change to occur: during the 2000s the US appeared to be in relative decline while economic growth was improving rising powers' relative global position. Russian, Brazilian, Chinese, and South African leaders have all counseled peace and at one time or another, offered to mediate or introduce multilateral negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians. At the same time, all five BRICS countries have seen business continue as usual since the 1990s when the Oslo process helped disconnect the conflict from these countries' separate development of relations with Israel and the Palestinians. The result then has been the use of the conflict as a form of foreign policy behavior, principally status signaling, whereby rising powers use the conflict as a way of demonstrating their growing global importance. In the past this included efforts to present themselves as either good citizens who are responsible stakeholders in the international system, or as spoilers, who have questioned and challenged the prevailing order and its norms and institutions.

Given previous rising power activity and behavior and the variety that has existed, does it matter that today's rising powers like the BRICS seem unable to pursue active measures to end the conflict? Yes it does, for two main reasons. One, because it means many of those living with the conflict will face limited opportunities and constraints in their lives; some may even find

them cut short. And two, because it undermines their claim to status as more than a rising power—a great power.

Andrew Hurrell (2000) suggested three main ways that middle (read rising) powers could make a difference. First, international institutions require some degree of independence if they are to be perceived as legitimate. Middle powers can therefore bestow or withhold such acceptance, contributing or not to negotiations and their credibility. Second, expectations of international society have expanded beyond collective security to include broader definitions (e.g., environmental sustainability, human rights). This provides space for state actors to become involved beyond the formulation and signing of peace agreements: they can provide humanitarian aid and assistance. Third, the expansion of the international system beyond states to include other actors from transnational business to civil society can present additional sites for engagement and interaction. More recently, Gareth Evans (2011) set out four criteria of his own against which middle power diplomacy might be evaluated. One, there must be an opportunity for effective action. If this is not present then arguably no amount of action will make a difference. Two, middle power must have the physical capacity (which may involve diplomatic resources on the ground) to be able to act and make a difference. Three, middle powers need to be creative and flexible, employing different ideas and tools to see through a problem to its resolution. In other words, what they may lack in substantive weight in power resources (e.g., military, economic) they can compensate for with new ideas and alternative ways of thinking. Four, credibility is key. In particular this emphasizes whether or not a middle power is perceived to be acting on its own and not on behalf of a great power. To this may also be added whether other parties see the middle power as being able to deliver what it has set out to achieve.

When applying these perspectives to the case of the BRICS and the conflict covered in this book, the results appear mixed. They suggest that these rising powers' influence in relation to the conflict, and through it the wider international system, may not be as strong as rising power leaderships think they are.

First, rising powers do not have as much scope to act, especially against more hegemonic powers. Notwithstanding its relative decline, more powerful states like the US can decide which issues should be negotiated, whether to use coercion or to walk away, what to put on or leave off the agenda, what rules will be followed and the values and norms associated with them. When applied to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, it seems clear that the Oslo process has arguably remained a largely closed shop in which the US is the dominant party. Similarly, the BRICS countries seem unable to compete with other influential third parties like the EU. While the US has been the primary sponsor of direct negotiations, the EU is a significant aid donor. While BRICS countries like Brazil have increased their involvement in the conflict

by becoming a larger donor to the Palestinians, this does not mean that all forms of activity are equal. Brazil's greater aid contribution has not contributed to a greater say in the peace process or increased leverage, especially over the stronger party, Israel. Indeed, despite Brazil's increased pledges to the UN Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) from $960,000 in 2011 to $7.5 million in 2012 and $8 million in 2014 (which slipped back to $3.8 million in 2015). By contrast, at the end of 2015, the UNRWA's two largest donors, the US and the EU, had each respectively pledged $380.6 million and $136.8 million (Abdenur 2015, UNRWA various years).

Second, the BRICS appear unwilling to challenge the US and EU. Arguably this may be due to BRICS states' assessment that such a challenge is not sufficiently worthwhile or of a high enough priority to jeopardize relations with Washington (Khatib 2015). Even countries like Russia and China, which hold permanent status on the UNSC and have growing economic and official ties with several of the conflict's parties, have limited their involvement to date. For example, Moscow made little use of its membership of the Quartet to drive the peace process forward. Neither did it build upon its outreach to Hamas after 2006. Despite having a Middle East envoy since 2002, China has not used the office holder to pursue an alternative approach to conflict resolution.

Third, the BRICS appear unable to offer an alternative to either Israel or the Palestinians that would invite them to actively participate in its initiatives. The reasons for this owe much to the Oslo process. On the one hand, bilateral talks suit Israel since it allows it to focus on one actor and not have to make wider concessions (Baruch 2014). On the other hand, the Palestinians, who might be expected to benefit from opening up the process to more third parties, seem to hope that the US will use its leverage to pressure Israel into making concessions (Baskin 2015, Shikaki 2015, Roundtable 2004). This has contributed to a lack of BRICS credibility on the part of Israelis and Palestinians alike.

At the same time, BRICS governments have undermined their ability to think imaginatively and creatively about the conflict because of their ongoing support for the Oslo process. That has weakened their credibility as an alternative mediator. Certainly, there are good reasons why this has happened. The reasons why they continue to support Oslo have been outlined above; chiefly, it provides the status of being good international citizens who support the international system and its norms and institutions. At the same time, it has also enabled them to pursue other, more self-interested activities to enhance their military capability and commercial opportunities with Israel, under cover of this public image.

The focus on Oslo has arguably meant that alternative approaches, like the BDS movement, which includes many individuals and groups who reject Oslo, have been largely overlooked. By stressing Oslo as the principal way

through which Israelis and Palestinians can resolve their differences, rising powers like the BRICS disregard the fact that peace talks have not reached their stated objective of a final agreement nearly two decades after they were expected. Instead of acknowledging the asymmetry that is present within the process between the two parties and exploring creative new ways to address this and move the process forward, they and others in the international community stick with established norms and practices. That support has persisted alongside other ways to challenge the conflict's dynamics, including by the Palestinians. Perhaps echoing developments in civil society which gave rise to the BDS movement and its demands that Israel live up to its international obligations, from 2011 the Palestinian leadership sought to gain diplomatic recognition as a state party to the UN and other international bodies. But while BRICS and other states have been willing to extend their support to this, they have not followed up on the second part of the Palestinian leadership's objective: that by recognizing Palestine as a peer, they have an obligation to sanction Israel for its transgressions.

Finally, as a collective, the BRICS have not been especially cohesive when it comes to conflict management. As their joint statements and declarations suggest, they have offered little more than a surface treatment of the conflict, reiterating support for previous resolutions and goals. Moreover, those statements have portrayed a resolution as one that requires negotiations between Israelis and Palestinians at the elite level. They do not consider other actors or actions—such as the BDS or the impact of the Palestinians acquiring recognition as a state—and what this might mean for the dynamics of the conflict, in particular in addressing the imbalance in the relationship between Israel and the Palestinians. Because of this, their statements on issues beyond their immediate scope are very general (Shikaki 2015) and—at least in relation to this conflict and others in the region, like Syria—have been limited. Where there has been direct involvement it has been largely at an individual level, most notable Russia's deepening engagement within the Syrian civil war on behalf of the Assad regime.

While there may be consensus among the BRICS governments that they want to see a resolution of the conflict, it is not clear how that can be made to happen. As a result, they have tended to side step the issue while concentrating on building relations with Israel and the Palestinians on a bilateral basis. This means that the character of the conflict and the asymmetry between the two conflicting parties remains unchanged.

The likely consequence of these factors is that without acknowledging this and undertaking efforts to address this, rising powers like the BRICS will neither be able to make a substantive difference to the conflict, either individually or collectively. The current situation of proposing initiatives to resolve the conflict but without taking concerted action to do so will likely flounder. Indeed, this has been the case with other powers, including the hegemonic

US power and a "traditional" power like France. John Kerry thought that by setting a short timeframe to reach a deal in 2013–2014, it would be possible to concentrate Israeli and Palestinian minds over what a final settlement might look like. However, the format turned out to be no different from before: Kerry's team accommodated Israeli concerns and spent more liaising with them than the Palestinians, yet was unable to persuade Israel's prime minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, to accept the final proposal and avoided using any leverage to force him to do so. Some months later, France proposed holding an international conference to resolve the conflict and held out recognition of a Palestinian state as an inducement for Israel to actively engage. But it did not follow through on its threat and eventually abandoned recognition and hosted a conference in January 2017 which neither Israeli nor Palestinian leaderships considered worth attending.

And yet it does not have to be this way. An initiative to resolve the conflict might be possible, but it would require its sponsor—a rising power like the BRICS or otherwise—to invest substantive resources; it would require them to go beyond words. If this seems unlikely, it is worth considering the Oslo process itself. Although its capacity to deliver a final and just settlement has been challenged throughout this book, it did produce a substantive change in the conflict, by bringing Israelis and Palestinians together to talk at an official level. This was significant, since it occurred at the same time that Israel was disputing the presence of Palestinians on the Jordanian delegation at the Madrid conference in 1996.

Oslo was not the product of hegemonic or "traditional" power intervention or mediation, but rather by another smaller, middling power: Norway. Like the BRICS, Norway had few links to either Israel or the Palestinians, beyond personal contacts which enabled informal dialogue to begin under the auspices. It helped that those talks happened in secret, away from the public glare of the Washington conference, which generated few results. While archival work by Henriksen Waage (2005) has suggested that Norway's position was not much different to the US (i.e., drawing more on Israeli interests to frame the talks and pressuring the Palestinian side to accept), Oslo's success in getting both sides to agree to talks and the Declaration of Principles raised its profile as an international mediator. This led to subsequent Norwegian involvement in negotiating peace in Guatemala and Colombia. Indeed, Charles Hauss (2001, 148) has described Norway's achievement and international credibility as a "virtual how to manual for third party led mediation." The result is that Norway's position in the international system is out of all proportion to its size; it has raised itself up through its association with "moral" capital.

Perhaps it is the case that for almost all rising powers, there is a lack of leverage which they may be able to use to persuade Israelis and Palestinians to accept their proposal of offers to mediate—or rather, over Israel, since it is

more disposed to keeping the status quo. In this case, in terms of sheer weight, it is possibly China which offers the greatest scope for leverage in economic or commercial terms, especially given its growing investment in the region through its One Belt, One Road initiative. The prospect of either losing or being shut out from Chinese investment and economic opportunities might prompt Israeli reappraisal. But at present that seems unlikely; indeed, its July 2017 proposal only offered a "façade of diplomatic activism while adhering to existing policies of minimal involvement" (Evron 2017b).

By contrast, an alternative, more confrontational and disruptive approach is presented by the BDS model. So far though, it is not clear that there is any appetite for a rising power government to support the objectives and actions associated with the BDS movement. And, in the case of the one rising power among the BRICS with the greatest economic interests with Israel—China— it seems highly unlikely at present that such alignment with the BDS movement would happen. There are a number of obstacles that would need to be overcome, including the BDS acquiring a receptive ear in Beijing and China overcoming its reticence toward actions that it may perceive as infringing on state autonomy.

Of the other rising powers although economic considerations do not weigh heavily on Israeli policymakers' minds, the example of Norway points toward other possible directions. The use of personal contacts to initiate engagement at the elite and mass level could be utilized. This might include links between government in the cases of India and Russia, or within society; the connections which exist between Israelis of Russian, South African, and Brazilian origin alongside Jewish diasporas in Russia, South Africa, and Brazil could be cultivated and activated. Of course, developing those connections presents challenges as well, especially the political outlooks of some of those groups (e.g., the generally more conservative position of Russian emigres in Israel). This may mean that creative and more imaginative methods of building those ties and developing appropriate and relevant positions to encourage conflict resolution may be required.

In summary then, rising powers can make a difference if they want to. But it would mean a break with the past and being prepared to go beyond paying lip service to a conflict. It will require both political will and a realistic assessment of their capabilities. Moreover, they can do so in parts of the world like the Middle East that may be less familiar and relatable to conflict management than their home regions, where they have tended to concentrate their activities and in which they occupy a hegemonic position. Being willing to carry out such action is perhaps necessary if they are to transition from a regional to a world power, as an important component of global leadership is the ability to influence and shape international affairs and events. Resolving conflict is one way to demonstrate that capacity and to be recognized by others as being able to do so. Furthermore, recognition provides legitimacy

and authority for a rising power to further its own goals and reduce the risk that other, more established powers might try to block them—a process which has more often than not tended toward greater international instability and violent confrontation (Goldstein and Pevehouse 2014, Claar and Ripsman 2016, Paul 2016). Indeed, as the historian Paul Kennedy (1989, xvi) observed when explaining the rise and fall of great powers: "It sounds crudely mercantilistic to express it this way, but wealth is usually needed to underpin military power, and military power is usually needed to acquire and protect wealth." Inherent in that analysis was instability, as new powers challenge older ones through their acquisition and use of such resources.

At present rising powers' position in the global hierarchy remains ambiguous. On the one hand, their economic development and growth has resulted in a rearrangement in the global financial and economic architecture: changes to IMF and World Bank voting have occurred alongside the emergence of new institutions like the G20 to accommodate them. On the other hand, accommodation has not been universal, which has led the BRICS to design and construct their own institutions like the Contingency Reserve Arrangement (CRA) and the New Development Bank (NDB) (see Kahler 2013, Breslin 2013, Vezirgiannidou 2013, Narlikar 2013a, 2013b). Rising powers' Janus-faced foreign policy therefore points toward them being both spoilers and good international citizens. But becoming agents for conflict resolution—and acquiring "moral" capital—would be one way of making clear where they stand to other states. More importantly, it would reassure others that they are indeed good citizens with a stake in the international system.

FUTURE RESEARCH DIRECTIONS AND FINAL THOUGHTS

This book set out to examine the role and behavior of rising powers like the BRICS in relation to conflict management, and used the Arab-Israeli and the Israeli-Palestinian conflicts as the means through which to demonstrate the range of options available. Attention was drawn to two main types of conflict management, active (which aims to resolve conflict and achieve positive/ liberal peace) or passive (which seeks only to limit physical violence through negative/conservative peace).

While studying rising powers' use of a conflict can be a useful way to examine foreign policy behavior and preferences, there are understandably some limitations with this work—but which can at least point toward future directions.

One limitation was the fact that it has focused solely on the case of the Arab-Israeli and subsequently the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. It therefore did not consider how rising powers have generally dealt with other conflicts, including in their own home regions. As was noted in the introduction, it is

within their home regions that rising powers tend to act—and where their capacity for influence is significantly greater. This could therefore raise questions about the distinct forms of conflict management which are drawn out in the book, between its active/liberal peace and passive/conservative peace forms. Perhaps this categorization has only worked with these rising powers in relation to this specific conflict? A response to that would be two-fold. First is the fact that the features of active and passive conflict management have been drawn from a long period of scrutiny: BRICS' individual and collective approaches to the Arab-Israeli conflict over nearly 70 years, which have involved at least three main types: political/diplomatic, military, and economic. Second, these types of active and passive conflict management could be applied to other conflict settings, within and outside the Middle East region. Doing so would demonstrate whether the distinction holds up or not.

A second concern with the book's focus is that it dealt with a particular sub-set of rising powers: the BRICS. It therefore did not consider the position of other, rising powers outside of this grouping, such as Indonesia, Mexico, or Turkey or how they compare to other, more traditional powers in the international system whose influence has declined, like Britain or France. It may be that examining the approach that these different powers have taken to the Arab-Israeli conflict as well as other conflicts may reveal the extent to which other rising and traditional powers are similar or different in their approaches to conflict management and foreign policy more generally. At the same time though, while it is certainly the case that the book has only dealt with a small group—the rising powers associated with the BRICS—it does offer a representative sample of such states from the global South (Russia excepted). They therefore speak to a broad historical experience faced by such states whose emergence in the Third World was an economic and political counterweight to the global North, both East and West, during the 1960s and 1970s.

A related consideration is the fact of variation among rising powers themselves. Some of them have held greater weight in the past as well as today. Indeed, this has been considered through an acknowledgment of Russia's predecessor, the Soviet Union, being a superpower and therefore having greater global scope than the other four countries which were examined. Today the parallel would probably be with China as the rising power with arguably the greatest global reach in terms of economic leverage and military potential—especially when compared with others like Brazil and Russia, which have experienced an economic downturn since the mid-2010s and which may reduce their relative influence in the coming years accordingly. Meanwhile, South Africa, one of the weaker rising powers studied here, offers a unique account owing to its experience of apartheid and the parallels which have been drawn in relation to Israel's occupation and treatment of the Palestinians. This makes it distinct from the other rising powers, by offering

an example which is arguably difficult to compare to other conflicts and their management. Further investigation of rising powers and their approach to conflict management would therefore need to consider the circumstances in which a rising power may or may not play a significant role. This may also include the extent to which some rising powers matter more than others when it comes to the choice to pursue an active or passive approach to conflict management.

A third concern is that of the relationship between the international environment and the use of conflict management. This book opened on the assumption that a rising power would want to resolve a conflict, or find that it is unable to do so and thereby adopt a tokenistic approach. Yet such statements should not be deemed as determined. It may be the case that a rising power chooses passive conflict management even when the environment is more open to it. Similarly, a rising power may pursue a quixotic attempt of conflict resolution through active means in less welcome global and regional circumstances. Or indeed, it may pursue both at the same time. How and why, under what conditions, would that happen?

Related to this point, but on a broader scale, is that of rising power motivations. Throughout the book it was assumed that rising powers aspire to increased status in the international system. Indeed, much of the framework surrounding the concept and behavior of middle and rising powers in earlier chapters implicitly suggested that this was the case. But is this always the case? Are rising powers always in pursuit of a position at the top? While it may seem unlikely to imagine a rising power that did not want this, the fact that a number of assumptions are made about such states and their leaderships invites further study. Certainly, there have been cases of great powers relinquishing space to rising powers, as happened between Britain and the US in the latter part of the nineteenth century and first half of the twentieth century, and which may be occurring between the US and China at present. But examples of rising powers who have given up voluntarily before realizing the prize, are sparse. Indeed, further research on the determinants for such action (whether leadership motivations, incentives or structural constraints) and the implications for conflict management would be relevant here.

Finally, the BDS movement requires further study, both in itself as well as what it can tell us about the role of civil society in conflict resolution. Although the BDS does constitute a break with the current conflict management associated with the Oslo process, it takes no position on what a final agreement and peace should look like, so as to accommodate as many people as possible. Further work that examines the role of such groups and movements in relation to other conflicts.

Such areas offer possible departures for future research, whether it is specific to the cases studied in this book as well as on the subject of rising

powers, conflict management, and international relations more generally. Certainly, the Arab-Israeli conflict, now primarily between Israel and the Palestinians, has provided a great deal of material for scholars to investigate. This owes much to it being one of the longest-running conflicts in the world today. What must not be forgotten in analysis such as the one set out in this book are the individual, personal tragedies associated with the conflict, the lives that it has blighted, and the prospects of those which have been diminished or lost along the way. It is my fervent hope that the leaders and societies on both sides of this conflict will realize a resolution—one that is just and lasting for all. And in so doing, making the need to study such topics like this one no longer necessary.

NOTE

1. It is notable that the number of issues on which the BRICS leaderships pronounced began to increase after this date. Until this point the bulk of its declarations had been relatively limited and slight, more often than not focused on critiques of the global economic order and demands for its reform. After 2011 BRICS declarations often included references to wider issues, which have included development, initiatives to assist the African continent, and references to other conflict hotspots, like the Syrian civil war.

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Guy Burton has held academic teaching and research positions at the Mohammed Bin Rashid School of Government in Dubai, the University of Nottingham's Malaysian campus, the University of Kurdistan-Hewler in Iraq, and Birzeit University in occupied Palestine. His research interests and past publications include comparative politics, international relations, public policy, and development studies.