Figurative Thought and Language

3

The Poetics of Time – Metaphors and Blends in Language and Literature

Anna Piata

John Benjamins Publishing Company

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Metaphors and Blends in Language and Literature

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Volume 3

The Poetics of Time – Metaphors and Blends in Language and Literature
by Anna Piata

The Poetics of Time –
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in Language and Literature

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John Benjamins Publishing Company

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To my parents, Lela and Dimitris,
and to my sister, Ioanna,
for *our* time

The timelessness of time takes form in rhyme
Conrad Aiken

On dit tout. Tout ce qu' on peut. Et pas un mot de vrai nulle part.
Samuel Beckett

Table of contents

List of diagrams

List of figures

List of tables

Acknowledgements

This book, as its title already suggests, is concerned with time in its various linguistic manifestations in poetry; expressions that are more or less creative, albeit always figurative, in which the human experience of time is *compressed*. However, this book is a time compression in itself; it is the output of my long and ongoing research on time in language and thought, a landmark (yet not an endpoint, I hope) in this venture that spans over the years, crosses different academic institutions and countries, and, not least, voices my long-standing interactions with various authors, teachers and colleagues. Yet, there are some people that enabled the preparation of this book and made its completion possible. I would like to take this chance and acknowledge their contribution here.

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I owe many thanks to all the Greek publishers, as well as to the poets Nikos Sideris and Maria Daskalaki, who granted me permission for reprinting the poems analyzed in this book. I am especially indebted to Daniel Mendelsohn for generously allowing me to use his translations of Cavafy's poems. I would also like to thank the two anonymous reviewers for taking the time to read an earlier version of my manuscript and providing me with comments and suggestions for improvement. This book has also benefited from the feedback provided by the book series editors, Angeliki Athanasiadou and Herb Colston. I thank them for that but also for their patience and support while I was working on the manuscript. Needless to say, I am the only one responsible for any shortcomings, errors and omissions contained in the final outcome.

Time, cognition, and poetics

1.1   Time and space

This book is a linguistic study of time conceptualization in Modern Greek (hereafter MG). Specifically, I investigate linguistic expressions that provide evidence for the conceptualization of time, with particular emphasis on expressions of time in poetry. The aim is to provide an integrated account of time conceptualization as evidenced in everyday and poetic discourse, while at the same time addressing a number of theoretical issues such as the relationship between different approaches to metaphor and meaning construction, and the distinction between conventionality and creativity. Time conceptualization seems to be a cutting-edge issue in the cognitive linguistic agenda, especially in relation to its theoretical modelling and its implications for identifying the mental representations of time. By taking linguistic meaning to its extreme, verbal creativity, I argue, can shed some new light on both aspects of time conceptualization. Finally, although widely discussed in the relevant literature, creativity has not been clearly delineated so far. In the present work, issues related to creativity in poetic discourse will be initially approached pre-theoretically, but some parameters of creativity will also be empirically explored.

This research project is initiated by the hypothesis that the conceptualization of time is largely metaphorical, thereby motivating conventional metaphorical expressions in everyday discourse, while in poetry it is mainly manifested in creative, non-conventional metaphorical expressions; the latter are either also motivated by conventional metaphorical structure, or associated with (non-)conventional, *ad hoc*, conceptual structure, which is, as I will show, psychologically and culturally constrained. This hypothesis will be modified, though, on the basis of linguistic evidence from poetic discourse indicating that non-metaphorical conceptualizations of time, similarly constrained, often lead to entirely novel and creative construals of time.

Time has a central position in human experience, thought and social interaction in that it functions "as the horizon of every understanding and interpretation of being" (Heidegger, 1996, p. 17). Its physical, metaphysical and social nature has been the object of thorough inquiry across various disciplines.[1] A complex notion,

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1.   Such disciplines include physics (see Hawking, 1988; Isham & Savvidou, 2002); theology (see Lucas, 2002); philosophy (see Kant, 1838; Heidegger, 1996; Husserl, 1928/1999; Bergson, 1960; Bachelard, 1932/1994, 1936/1993; Merleau-Ponty, 1962; for an overview see Turetzky, 1998); social

time, according to Traugott (1978, p. 371), encompasses a number of different facets such as (a) *physical* time (i.e., a thermodynamic principle of entropy); (b) *psychic* time (i.e., the time that we perceive); (c) *calendric* time (i.e., time measurement in terms of seconds, minutes, etc.); and (d) *linguistic* time that locates events and situations talked about to reference points in the form of tense (on tense see Traugott, 1978; Comrie, 1985; on tense in MG see Moser, 1994). This book is concerned with the conceptualization of time and, in this sense, in Traugott's terminology, it relates to psychic and calendric time.

In Cognitive Linguistics, in particular, it is generally assumed that time is metaphorically structured in terms of space[2] and motion (see, e.g., Clark, 1973; Lakoff & Johnson, 1980, 1999; Núñez & Sweetser, 2006; Moore, 2006, 2014, Fauconnier & Turner, 2008).[3] The idea that time is structured in spatial terms is not new in the philosophy of time (see, e.g., Guyau, 1890/1988, p. 124; Smart, 1949, p. 483), while Traugott (1978) has shown that temporal relations have a locative grounding and that tense and aspect select primary spatial features such as location ('here-there', 'from-to') and plane, or dimension ('front-back', 'up-down', 'at-in'). The correlation between space and time is clearly evidenced in that we conceive of our 'psychological' or 'conscious' present (Block, 1990, p. 5) on the basis of situating ourselves in a spatio-temporal ('here-and-now') setting that thereby functions as our deictic

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theory (Durkheim, 1912/1915; Elias 1993); cultural anthropology (Munn, 1992; Gell, 1992); the philosophical inquiry of language and time (see, e.g., McTaggart, 1908; Ludlow, 1999; Jaszczolt, 2009); and neuroscience (see Indefrey & Gullberg, 2008).

2.   On spatial language and cognition see indicatively Aurnage, Hickmann & Vieu (2007), Bloom, Peterson, Nadel & Garrett (1996), Bowerman (1996), Bowerman & Choi (2001), Herskovits (1986), Hickmann & Robert (2006), Levinson (2003), Casasanto (2005), Levinson & Wilkins (2006), Pederson et al. (1998), Svorou (1994), Talmy (2000), Tyler & Evans (2003), Georgakopoulos (2011) and Evans & Chilton (2010).

3.   A different approach to the semantic structure of time has been proposed by Evans (2004a, 2004b, 2005, 2013) in the context of his theory of Lexical Concepts and Cognitive Models. Evans examines the semantics of *time* in English and argues that it is a polysemous lexeme, organized in a radial network of distinct but related senses (so-called 'lexical concepts'). At the conceptual level, two cognitive models for time are proposed, the Ego-based and the Time-based Model, which are considered non-metaphorical and are purported to render metaphors of time redundant. However, such a claim seems rather hard to sustain in that the various senses of *time* are typically manifested in expressions that either have an underlying spatial structure as in *The relationship lasted a long/ short time*, or make use of motional language as in *Time flows/ runs/ goes on forever*. It rather seems that Evans' account is complementary to the metaphorical structure of time widely assumed in Cognitive Linguistics. Evans' approach to time is beyond the scope of the present work (for an investigation of χρόνος 'time' along the lines of Evans' theory see Haralambopoulou, 2010).

centre. This amounts to the NOW IS HERE metaphor (Grady, 1997), which is viewed as a *primary metaphor* in that it is derived from basic physical perception or sensation, and serves to structure other metaphors that are more complex.

In experiential terms, the passage of time correlates with motion. On the one hand, our perception of time cognitively depends on awareness of change[4] (James, 1890/1950, p. 620). Motion, on the other hand, is primarily understood in terms of changes and it has been convincingly argued that time and movement are almost inseparable experientially (Svorou, 1994, p. 209), although they remain cognitively distinct (Grady, 1997, p. 118). This gives rise to the conceptualization of time passing in terms of motion in the form of the Moving-Ego and Moving-Time metaphors, which assign motion to the experiencer and time, respectively; under these conceptual patterns, either the experiencer is construed as moving along time (e.g., *We are approaching Christmas*) or time is construed as moving in relation to the experiencer, who thus functions as the deictic center (e.g., *Christmas is approaching*) (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980, p. 42; Lakoff & Johnson, 1999, pp. 139–161; Lakoff, 1993, pp. 213–215). A robust body of research has provided firm empirical evidence that motion expressions are used cross-linguistically in the lexicalization of time,[5] while experimental evidence corroborates the psychological reality of the conceptual mappings between space and time (see Gentner & Imai, 1992; Gibbs, 1994; Gibbs & Colston, 1995; Boroditsky, 2000; Boroditsky & Ramscar, 2002; Gentner, Imai, & Boroditsky, 2002; Casasanto, Fotakopoulou & Boroditsky, 2010).

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4.   However, it has been suggested that it is not time *per se* that can be perceived through change but rather a sequence of events from which the perception of time inferentially arises (Gibson 1975).

5.   For English see Clark (1973), Gentner (2001), Lakoff & Johnson (1999); for American Sign Language see Emmorey (2001); for Aymara see Núñez & Sweetser (2006); for Chagga see Emanatian (1992); for Chinese see Yu (1998); for Danish Sign Language, as well as other signed languages see Engberg-Pedersen (1999); for Japanese see Shinohara (1999); for Romance languages see Fleishman (1982); for Slavic languages see Janda (2002); for Turkish see Özcaliskan (2002); for Finnish see Fong (1998); for Zulu see Taylor (1987); for Toba see Klein (1987); for Malagasy see Dahl (1995); for Wolof see Moore (2000); for Tzeltal see Brown (2012); for Yupno see Núñez, Cooperrider, Doan & Wassmann (2012); on various languages from a typological perspective see Traugott (1978), Alverson (1994), Haspelmath (1997), Radden (2006, 2011) and Filipović & Jaszczolt (2012a, 2012b). For a non-spatial conceptualization of time in Amondawa see Sinha, Sinha, Zinken & Sampaio (2011).

1.2   Aims

In the light of this discussion, let us now look at a time metaphor in MG, derived from the Hellenic National Corpus (hereafter HNC),[6] whereby a verb that prototypically denotes motion, *περνάω* (pernáo)[7] 'to pass', applies to the passage of time:

(i) *Ελπίζω, όμως, ότι **όσο περνάει ο   χρόνος** και πλησιάζουμε*
         as   passes   the time[8]
   στην επίτευξη των στόχων, η εικόνα θα βελτιωθεί.   [HNC]
   'I hope, though, that **as time goes by** and we are getting closer to our goals the picture will get better'.[9]

In MG, the expression *περνάει ο χρόνος* 'as time goes by', contained in an utterance from journalistic discourse as in (i), is conventional and automatically understood; it belongs to everyday discourse and may occur in various communicative settings. In fact, its metaphorical structure, construing time as moving, would probably go unnoticed by language users of MG. Metaphor has long been viewed as a figure of speech that belongs to the realm of literature and rhetoric.[10] A question,

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6.   The HNC is a general corpus of MG. Constructed by the Institute for Language and Speech Processing (ILSP), the HNC currently contains more than 47.000.000 words of written texts in MG (but no spoken texts) and is constantly being updated (available at http://hnc.ilsp.gr/info.asp#info); see Chapter 2.

7.   For lexemes (but not for tokens) I provide their transliterated form the first time they appear.

8.   All temporal expressions I analyze (in bold) are glossed word-by-word. The following abbreviations are used:

NOM   nominative
GEN   genitive
ACC   accusative
SING   singular
PLU   plural
DIM   diminutive
PART   particle.

Nominative and accusative case are clarified only in ambiguous examples.

9.   For all the examples cited, I provide translations of the expression of time under examination (indicated in bold). The translations are mine, unless otherwise specified (e.g., some of Cavafy's poems). Needless to mention, my translations of the poetic expressions do not aspire to have literary qualities but, rather, to provide glosses of the poetic lines and thus encapsulate the meaning of the original expression.

10.   On metaphor and figurative language from Aristotle onwards see the collection of contributions in Hanks & Giora (2011).

however, arises as to how metaphorical expressions such as (i) above should be defined. Cognitive Linguistics has put forward a conception of metaphor as a *conceptual*, rather than a purely linguistic, phenomenon that pertains to thought and cognition.[11] Ubiquitous in everyday discourse, metaphor, along these lines, is manifested in fixed linguistic expressions, such as the temporal expression in (i), and serves to structure abstract domains of experience (like time) in terms of domains that can be directly perceived via our senses (like motion). Such a conceptual mapping across domains (the *source domain* of motion and the *target domain* of time) is deemed to play a constitutive role in human thought and abstract reasoning; the concept of time cannot be described *per se*, therefore conceptual structure from the domain of space and motion is recruited in order to organize temporal cognition and, not least, enable its linguistic encoding.

Although cognitive linguists would hardly disagree with the metaphorical account of time conceptualization sketched so far, the issue seems to be far more complicated; an on-going debate has emerged with respect to how the metaphorical structure of time should be modelled (cf. Lakoff & Johnson 1980, 1999; Fauconnier & Turner, 2002, 2008). The metaphorical structure of time was initially addressed in the context of Conceptual Metaphor Theory (hereafter CMT) as an instance of *conceptual metaphor*, i.e. as a two-space, uni-directional mapping from space and motion onto time (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980, p. 42; Lakoff & Johnson, 1999, pp. 139–161; Lakoff, 1993, pp. 213–215).[12] Conceptual metaphors are stable knowledge structures that are purported to organize the conceptualization of abstract entities and motivate conventional metaphorical expressions in everyday discourse while also underlying novel metaphors that creatively exploit entrenched conceptual patterns (Lakoff & Turner, 1989). Such a cross-domain mapping involves projection of conceptual and inferential structure from the domain of space and motion onto that of time, which is therefore metaphorically understood in terms of locations and

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11. A different approach is endorsed in pragmatics, whereby the role of metaphor in communication is emphasized (Grice, 1989; Searle, 1979; Carston, 2002; Wilson & Carston, 2006; Sperber & Wilson, 2008). More recently, an attempt has been made to reconcile cognitive linguistic and relevance-theoretic approaches to metaphor given that neither approach postulates special cognitive and pragmatic capacities in metaphor understanding and, moreover, metaphors seem to involve *both* entrenched mappings across conceptual domains and context-related, communicative parameters (Gibbs & Tendahl, 2006; Tendahl & Gibbs, 2008; Tendahl, 2009; Wilson, 2011; see also Vega Moreno, 2007). The gist of this approach is that a pragmatic theory such as Relevance Theory can account for the communicative dimension of metaphor, that is, how a hearer recovers the speaker's intended meaning of an uttered metaphor while, at the same time, providing contextual constraints on conceptual operations.

12. More recently, conceptual metaphor has been recast as a neural binding in the brain (Lakoff 2008), yet this approach will not concern me here.

moving entities. In the case of time, two conceptual metaphors have been proposed, namely TIME IS A LOCATION and TIME IS A MOVING ENTITY, which both construe the passage of time in the motion domain: the former in terms of Ego moving along time and the latter in terms of time moving past Ego.[13]

More recently, however, the account of time conceptualization in terms of conceptual metaphors has been heavily criticized in the context of Conceptual Integration Theory (hereafter CIT), also known as Blending Theory (Fauconnier & Turner, 1998, 2002). In a paper exploring the metaphorical structure of time, Fauconnier & Turner (2008) have proposed an alternative analysis of the conceptual structure of time as arising in a multiple-space network. The gist of their approach is that time does not derive its structure solely from space and motion but, rather, has its own understanding that is also imported to the metaphor; its passage is fleeting and non-reversible while its experience is psychologically real, especially when it is felt as passing slowly or quickly or as being frozen. In addition, our concept of time is also anchored in time telling devices; any account of time conceptualization, therefore, should also take this into consideration. This means that in the metaphor there is no one-to-one correspondence between the domains involved; instead, time conceptualization involves conceptual structure from the domain of space and motion, *and* our folk understanding of time. Following the overarching principles of CIT, conceptual elements from, on the one hand, space and motion, and, on the other hand, time are mapped and selectively projected onto a new space.

CIT is a development of mental space theory (Fauconnier, 1994), which assumes that linguistic structures are prompts for meaning construction in the mental representations that speakers build on-line as discourse unfolds (so-called *mental spaces*), thus aiming to explain various semantic and pragmatic phenomena (see Fauconnier, 1997; Fauconnier & Sweetser, 1996). The bulk of CIT is that meaning construction arises from blending conceptual elements that are contained in mental spaces functioning as *inputs* so that selected elements from each input are projected onto a new space, the *blend*. All spaces involved in the blending process (including a *generic space* that contains structure common to all inputs) constitute a *conceptual integration network*. Blending purports to be a pervasive mental operation that

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13.   Another metaphorical pattern of time conceptualization is commonly attested in the Western world, structuring time in terms of resources and, in particular, money: the so-called TIME IS RESOURCES AND/OR MONEY metaphor (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980, p. 66–68; Lakoff & Johnson, 1999, p. 161–166). In this scenario, time is conceptualized as a resource, an exemplar of which is money, and, accordingly, the experiencer of time as the user of the resource. Our understanding of resources as limited and valuable is also transferred onto time, which is finite, at least for humans, and therefore valuable. Concepts such as expenditure, scarcity, efficiency, waste, cost, worthiness, which are typically associated with the domain of resources, also extend to the conceptualization of time. In this book I will not be concerned with this metaphorical pattern.

accounts not only for metaphor but for overall meaning construction in language,[14] while it is also applicable to non-linguistic phenomena.[15]

The account of metaphor put forward in CIT is significantly different from the standard approach in CMT; mappings arise from mental spaces, rather than from whole domains of experience and knowledge, and are not necessarily uni-directional; instead, both input spaces can contribute conceptual elements to the blend while it is possible that conceptual elements from one input be projected to the blend without having a counterpart in the other input. In this way, CIT aims to account for linguistic expressions that manifest *emergent structure*, that is, meaning that is not directly derived from either of the inputs. In light of this, it has been suggested that CIT serves to better explain the mechanisms that are used to manipulate stable knowledge structures, such as conceptual metaphors, in on-line discourse (Coulson, 2006), while it lends itself to the analysis of novel metaphors that often involve complex mappings and instantiate emergent structure (Grady, Oakley & Coulson, 1999).

With respect to time, in particular, Fauconnier & Turner (2008) have argued that spatio-temporal mappings manifested in conventional linguistic expressions also involve emergent structure. As already mentioned, the concept of time is not entirely structured by spatial and motional features; rather, it is grounded in our folk understanding of time as a fleeting, non-reversible and psychologically real experience. Contained in a *generalized conceptual integration network* (i.e., a stable knowledge structure that arises from the overarching principles of blending), time conceptualization is thus recast in the CIT framework, thereby positing a challenge to conceptual metaphors of time. However, the relevant discussion remains largely theoretical, with linguistic evidence needed to empirically test different accounts of time conceptualization. This gives rise to the first research question to be addressed in this book, cited below:

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14. Linguistic phenomena other than metaphor that have been analyzed in conceptual integration terms include frames (Turner, 2008), metonymy (Fauconnier & Turner, 1999; Turner & Fauconnier, 2000), polysemy (Fauconnier & Turner, 2003), narrative discourse (Oakley, 1998), compositionality (Sweetser, 1999), performative speech and action (Sweetser, 2000), the caused motion construction (Goldberg, 1995, Fauconnier & Turner, 1996), syntactic and morphological constructions (Mandelblit, 1997, 2000), counterfactuals (Turner, 1996; Turner & Fauconnier, 1998; Dancygier & Sweetser, 2005), relative clauses (Nikiforidou, 2005), the role of rhyme in meaning construction (D. Freeman, 1999; Sweetser, 2006), semantic change (Grygiel, 2004), multimodality (Forceville, 2001), fictive interaction (Pascual, 2002), language variation (Desaguiler, 2005), literary prose (Semino, 2006; Tobin, 2006; Dancygier, 2012), discourse and interaction (Oakley & Hougaard, 2008), and viewpoint (Dancygier & Sweetser, 2012).

15. Such applications of CIT concern social sciences (Turner, 2001), neuroscience (Coulson, 2001), performance studies (A. Cook, 2010), mathematics (Robert, 1998; Goguen, 1999; Lakoff & Núñez, 2000; Núñez, 2008), gesture studies (Liddell, 1998, 2003), music (Zbikowski, 2001), computational modelling and artificial intelligence (Veale, 1999; Pereira, 2007), and psychiatry (Kiang, 2005).

Research question 1

How can the conceptual structure of time be best accounted for in theoretical terms?

This book provides both theoretical and empirical arguments in favor of a conceptual integration analysis of time (to be discussed in Chapter 2) and, in so doing, it aims to complement and refine Fauconnier & Turner's account (2008). Specifically, I offer a detailed analysis of the conceptual structure of time in MG while, at the same time, I address aspects of time conceptualization not previsously analyzed in CIT terms such as the Time-flowing construal (traditionally viewed as a variant of the Moving-Time conceptual metaphor) and the conceptualization of the past and the future.

Comparing the two theories, CMT and CIT, with regard to time conceptualization in everyday discourse brings about another question that refers to how the theories relate to each other. If the analysis of time conceptualization put forward by Fauconnier & Turner (2008) takes over what is traditionally viewed as the realm of CMT, namely the conceptual structure of time as evidenced in everyday discourse, then is CMT made redundant? Looking at conventional metaphors of time, however, can only partially address this question. An analysis that aims at a comprehensive comparison of the two theories needs to tackle metaphor in a holistic way: that is, in *both* its conventional and non-conventional manifestations. Non-conventional metaphors are commonly found in literary genres such as poetry. Aspiring at such a comprehensive comparison of the two theories, this book will embark on investigating conventional and non-conventional expressions of time alike. In response to this task, this study delves into exploring linguistic expressions of time in poetry, a discourse domain whereby time is expected to be lexicalized, and conceptualized, in ways that deviate from everyday metaphors and the conceptualization afforded therein. The following research question has thus been formulated:

Research question 2

What is the relationship between the two cognitive approaches to metaphor and meaning construction, namely CMT and CIT, on the grounds of both conventional and non-conventional expressions of time in MG?

Although the relationship between CMT and CIT has only recently been addressed vis-à-vis the conceptual structure of time, it has long been viewed as a contentious matter in Cognitive Linguistics (cf. Coulson, 1996; Grady et al., 1999; Coulson & Pagán Cánovas, 2013), with scholars hardly agreeing on how the two frameworks should be treated: as competing or as complementary? And if the latter is the case, in what sense are they completing each other? While major differences between

them, such as the nature of directionality, have led to treating them as competing paradigms (Coulson, 1996), usually CIT and CMT are viewed as converging on the assumption that the former draws heavily on the methods and findings of the latter (Oakley & Coulson, 2008). The most comprehensive attempt to compare the two frameworks so far has been offered, to the best of my knowledge, by Grady et al. (1999). Their conclusion is that the two frameworks should be viewed as complementary; CMT deals with conventional, everyday metaphors that reflect conceptual patterns entrenched in the cognitive system and stored in long-term memory, while CIT can model all other instances of metaphor, such as complex metaphorical mappings and novel metaphors that arise in communicative settings to serve particular rhetorical goals. The gist of this account is that metaphor theory should benefit from a merger of techniques from CMT and CIT in that the former can highlight the conceptual patterns motivating everyday metaphors while the latter can explain the interpretation of more complex and context-induced novel metaphorical expressions. Such an approach essentially assumes two parallel lines of research while drawing a dividing line between the two frameworks: conventionality vs. non-conventionality.

However, researchers from various standpoints generally agree that a clear-cut dichotomy between conventionality and non-conventionality is both theoretically and empirically unwarranted (see, e.g., Lakoff & Turner, 1989; Sperber & Wilson, 1995; Fauconnier, 1997; Turner, 1998; Gibbs, 1994; Carter, 2004; Deignan, 2005; Semino, 2011; cf. Cameron, 2011). Specifically, it has been proposed that (non-)conventionality forms a *continuum* of scalar degrees with fully entrenched expressions being on the one extreme of the continuum and completely original and innovative expressions being on the other (see Lakoff & Turner, 1989; Svanlund, 2007; Müller, 2008). Within Cognitive Linguistics, in particular, conventional and non-conventional expressions are considered to be alike with respect to the conceptual structure that motivates them (see Lakoff & Johnson, 1980, 1999; Lakoff & Turner, 1989; Coulson & Oakley, 2005). In Fauconnier's words (1997, p. 8), "[t]here is … no formal difference between the lexically entrenched (opaque) cases and the ones that are perceived as innovative". Along these lines, both poetic and everyday discourse make use of the same conceptual and linguistic resources.

Cognitive linguists have focused on everyday, conventional metaphors that are part of our conceptual system (so-called "metaphorical creativity"; Johnson, 1987, p. 98), as well as on those expressions that deviate from pre-existing patterns of conceptualization (so-called "figurative creativity"; Kövecses, 2005, p. 259).[16] As

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16. This is in contrast with pragmatic views on metaphor. Consider, e.g., Black (1962, 1979) who distinguishes between extinct, dormant and active metaphors but considers only active metaphors as vital and hence as the object of scientific study. On non-cognitive approaches to literary metaphor see the contributions in Fludernik (2011).

Lakoff & Turner (1989, p. 67) argue, "[p]oetic thought uses the mechanisms of everyday thought, but it extends them, elaborates them, and combines them in ways that go beyond the ordinary". In an attempt to draw a distinction between conventional and non-conventional metaphors, it has been proposed that corpus frequencies can serve as an indicator in this respect, with the latter being less frequent in general corpora (Deignan, 2005, p. 40). At the same time, experimental evidence suggests that conventional utterances are processed more easily and effortlessly than non-conventional ones (cf. Giora, 2003; Bowdle & Gentner, 2005). However, research so far has been concerned with distinguishing between conventional vs. non-conventional metaphors, the latter being largely treated as a rather unified category. To the best of my knowledge, different degrees of non-conventionality have not been explored, much less defined. In dealing with linguistic expressions of time in MG poetry, the present book aims to address anew the distinction between various degrees of (non-)conventionality on the basis of specific linguistic criteria. Such a research endeavor is encapsulated in the following research question:

Research question 3

How are figurative expressions of time related to conventional ones? On the basis of which criteria can we distinguish between various degrees of (non-)conventionality in the conceptualization of time?

Indeed, a closer examination in MG poetry reveals that non-conventional metaphors may radically differ from one another, as shown below:

   (ii)   *o   χρόνος   προχωρεί   ποδοπατώντας*
          the time   advances   trampling
          'time moves on by trampling'

   (iii) *καινούργιο   φέρετρο   η   καινούργια   μέρα*
          new   coffin   the new   day
          'a new coffin the new day'

Both expressions are clearly metaphorical, the former construing time passing as a forceful advent and the latter representing every new day as a new coffin that takes humans a step closer to death. In Cognitive Linguistics, it is acknowledged that (ii) results from an extension of the TIME IS A MOVING ENTITY conceptual metaphor, while (iii) would be presumably subsumed under the category of image metaphors, which map imagistic structure from the source domain onto the target (although one needs to bear in mind that time lacks any imagistic structure). In this work, I aim to show that the distinction between degrees of non-conventionality

should be revisited in terms of the *frames* involved in the metaphorical mapping. I will thus propose a classification of non-conventional metaphors of time either as motion-based or as non-motional;[17] the former will be referred to as *creative metaphors of time* while the term *highly creative metaphors of time* will be reserved for the latter, discussed in Chapters 3 and 4, respectively. The use of the particular terms suggests a commitment to different degrees of non-conventionality, which, at this stage, should be pre-theoretical to be confirmed by extensive corpus research and psycholinguistic experiments in the future.

However, there is an additional issue in how non-conventional metaphors are usually viewed within the paradigm of CMT. While cases like (iii) are acknowledged as truly novel metaphors in that they blatantly deviate from everyday discourse and do not rely on any entrenched pattern for time conceptualization, expressions like (ii) are treated as offshoots of conventional metaphors in that they creatively exploit the same conceptual patterns: time and motion. Although such an account is definitely on the right track, it is confronted with a problem; it does not do full justice to the ways in which non-conventional metaphors differ from conventional ones in terms of the particular meanings they give rise to. Consider again the example in (ii) *ο χρόνος προχωρεί ποδοπατώντας* 'time moves on by trampling'; although it is contiguous with the conceptualization of moving time, it yields a novel, *ad hoc* construal of time as an enemy. This construal is enacted by virtue of the TRAMPLING frame that is imported in the metaphor and specifies motion as being forceful and threatening as in a battlefield. In other words, metaphors can convey unique meanings notwithstanding their conceptual salience to entrenched conceptualizations. Therefore, reducing metaphors to some underlying conceptual pattern falls short of explaining their actual meaning. In view of this, an issue arises as to how such figurative expressions of time should be best treated in theoretical terms, as stated in the research question below:

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17.   I draw a distinction between degrees of metaphorical (non-)conventionality on the grounds of motional/non-motional structure. However, as already mentioned, there is yet another conventional pattern for conceptualizing time that is not motion-based, namely the TIME AS RESOURCES AND/OR MONEY metaphor. In this study, I take the motion-based pattern of time conceptualization to be the primary one given that it relies on a cognitive universal, rather than culture-specific social practices (as is the case with resources and money). Not least, this pattern applies to the conceptualization of the passage of time, which, as will be shown throughout the analysis, seems to be the main temporal construal in MG poetry, whether expressed in terms of motion or not.

Research question 4

How can figurative expressions of time be best analyzed? What are the theoretical implications of their analysis for theories of metaphor and meaning construction and also for the relationship between them, addressed in Research question 2?

In response to this question, I will advocate that figurative expressions of time can be best explained in conceptual integration terms. The proposed analysis can thus complement previous insights on non-conventional metaphors within CMT, as is the case with non-conventional metaphors that are congruent with entrenched conceptual patterns (i.e., *creative metaphors of time*) and personification metaphors, but will also fill a gap in CMT vis-à-vis those non-conventional metaphors that defy the conventional conceptual structure of time (i.e., *highly creative metaphors of time*).[18] The gist of this approach is that conceptual integration networks can accommodate *frame structure* that is imported to the metaphor (whether building on existing conceptual patterns or not) while it can also explain metaphors whose meaning is not derived directly from either of the inputs: namely, metaphors that manifest emergent structure. Finally, as a theory of on-line meaning construction CIT can finely account for metaphorical uses that are sensitive to contextual cues, such as iconic links between form and meaning that are particularly relevant to poetic discourse.

The discussion so far has been concerned with the hypothesis that initiated this research endeavor; that time conceptualization is expected to be manifested in metaphorical expressions that will vary in their degrees of (non-)conventionality, depending on contextual factors, such as the discourse domain in which they appear and the producer's particular rhetorical goals. However, contrary to our initial hypothesis, and unlike the dominant view in Cognitive Linguistics that time conceptualization is metaphorical in nature, empirical evidence from MG poetry brings to the fore a non-metaphorical pattern for conceptualizing time, exemplified in (iv) below:

(iv) *ίσως   ο   Χρόνος όλος είναι μόνο μια νύχτα*
     maybe the Time   all   is   only one night
     'maybe all Time is only one night'

The expression in (iv) equates an unbounded interval (here Time in its entirety, as suggested by the initial capital letter) in terms of another interval that is bounded and blatantly shorter: a night. One particular night is thus compared to eternal

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18. Throughout the book I will use the term 'non-conventional metaphor' as an umbrella term for all metaphors that are not conventional, whether creative or highly creative.

time, suggesting that it was experienced in a way that is unevenly different from its objective duration, presumably because of the great importance it has for the experiencer. Temporal construals like (iv) seem to arise from mappings between intervals of asymmetrical duration rather than from different experiential domains that would yield a metaphorical conceptualization of time. Hence, the mapping cannot be considered metaphorical. The result is a construal of time in subjective terms, that is, in a way that diverges from the clock-based measurement of the conceptualized event. Here by representing a night in terms of unbounded time the emergent meaning is that of *protracted duration* (Flaherty 1999), that is, time felt as lasting longer than the counting of temporal units by the clock. Needless to mention, although not metaphorical, the expression in (iv) is nevertheless figurative; it could be viewed as a simile ('maybe all Time is *like* only one night') while hyperbole seems also to be at work. In view of the above, I will refer to them as *non-metaphorical, figurative expressions of time*. Evidenced only in the corpus of poetry, this pattern extends creativity in time conceptualization to non-metaphorical expressions. In light of this, I further argue that the continuum of (non-)conventionality needs to be revised so as to apply to figurative (rather than solely metaphorical) creativity.

On the grounds of empirical evidence from MG poetry, in Chapter 5, I will argue that such temporal construals make a case for conceptual integration. As a cognitive operation that is applicable to meaning construction beyond metaphor, conceptual integration can account for both the conceptual structure and the intended meaning of non-metaphorical expressions of time. Essentially, their meaning arises from blending incompatible temporal information (such as a bounded and an unbounded interval) and, in this sense, it is emergent; it does not rely exclusively on one of the inputs. This book, therefore, puts forward CIT as an integrated platform for explaining time conceptualization. In view of this, I will show that the relationship between CMT and CIT is a complementary one but not in the form of two parallel lines of research in the sense of Grady et al. (1999). I will suggest, instead, that CIT can deepen our understanding of both the conceptual structure of time and its creative exploitation in poetry, thus refining the tenets of CMT. At the same time, it also accounts for linguistic phenomena that were partially, if at all, explained in the CMT framework and in this respect the former complements the latter.

Having identified a novel way of creatively expressing the passage of time, a last, but not, least issue arises related to the motivations that trigger the emergence of figurative expressions of time, as well as the constraints that restrain them. No matter how linguistically, conceptually and aesthetically creative they may be, figurative expressions of time are expected to be grounded in, and constrained by, experiential, psychological, cultural, and discursive parameters. This is summarized in the last research question I will address in this book:

Research question 5

What are the motivations underlying figurative expressions of time? Are such expressions subject to some general constraints and/or to time-specific ones?

Typically, metaphors are analyzed as arising from correlations in experience (as in MORE IS UP) or perceived similarities (as in *A woman's waist is an hourglass*; Grady, 1997). As far as metaphors of time are concerned, conventional metaphors that reflect entrenched conceptualizations result from experiential correlations, which are culturally filtered through, and grounded in, anchors of temporality such as the timeline (see Coulson & Pagán Cánovas, 2013).[19] Although established patterns of time conceptualization certainly motivate the emergence of creative metaphors of time, still, though, this is not the whole story; for example, the conceptualization of time as trampling enacts an enemy construal related to the association between time passing and loss and/or death.

In this study, I will propose that our folk understanding of time, based on psychological and cultural experience, is at the core of all figurative expressions of time, whether metaphorical or not, and motivates, but also constrains, their emergence. Our everyday experience of time involves time bringing about irreversible changes to humans (including the human body); passing by and not coming back; leading to ageing and death and hence being perceived as threatening; passing quickly or slowly depending on affective factors, etc. Poetry seems to creatively exploit the understanding of time as an overarching power that guides human life and over which humans have no control. However unexpected and novel a conceptual mapping may be, it creatively reframes our folk understanding of time, thus enabling the reader to reach a plausible interpretation.

In sum, by shifting the focus to linguistic expressions of time in poetic discourse this book shows how verbal creativity enables addressing anew core questions in the cognitive linguistic agenda, such as distinguishing between degrees of figurative creativity; revising the relationship between different theories of metaphor and meaning construction; and exploring the manipulation of mental representations of

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19. This issue brings about the debate on the priority of conceptual structure or cultural understanding in the conceptualization of socio-cultural phenomena (cf. Kövesces, 1999; Quinn, 1991). It has been proposed that, rather being grounded in experiential motivations, metaphors actually rely on cultural models, that is, "presupposed, taken-for-granted models of the world that are widely shared (although not necessarily to the exclusion of other, alternative models) by the members of a society and that play an enormous role in the understanding of that world and their behavior in it" (Quinn & Holland, 1987, p. 4). Yet, as Yu (1998, p. 43) arguably points out, "bodily experience can only tell what possible metaphors are. Whether these potential metaphors are actually selected in a given culture is largely dependent upon the cultural models shared by individuals living in this culture". In the same spirit, Marmaridou (2006, 2010) has suggested that cultural models and conceptual metaphors interact in motivating lexical and constructional meaning.

time. Especially with regard to the latter there is an ongoing debate as to how they should be inferred, with gestural data refuting what has long been assumed on the grounds of linguistic evidence (Casasanto 2016; see the discussion in Chapter 6). By taking language to its creative limits, poetry can contribute important insights in this respect too; when challenging underlying patterns of conceptualization, figurative expressions of time (whether metaphorical or non-metaphorical) enact *ad hoc* mental representations of time, which are nevertheless psychologically and culturally constrained just like generic mental representations. The *poetics of time*, therefore, seems to be at the core of temporal cognition, figurative creativity, and meaning construction.

1.3 Linguistic meaning and verbal creativity: Cognitive Linguistics vs. Cognitive Poetics?

"Why poetry?" one might arguably ask. This book is underpinned by the idea that poetry provides a suitable and fruitful field of research on time and metaphor. On the one hand, poetry takes full advantage of the creative potential of language (unlike, e.g., newspaper articles that are expected to keep track of the linguistic norm) and, especially with respect to metaphor, it is *par excellence* conducive to the emergence of non-conventional metaphorical expressions. On the other hand, time is central to the experience of life while still being elusive and unconceivable for the human mind; in this sense it provides a fertile ground for poets to ponder in an aesthetically powerful way (as is the case, for example, with the agony and frustration humans are confronted with upon ageing and facing death). Consider the following poetic extract, which illustrates the association between time and poetry by metaphorically representing the poet's pen as a tool for measuring the time of the soul:

(v) *Η πέννα όπου βρέχεις, ωσάν δείκτης μοιάζει*
που στο ρολόγι της ψυχής γυρίζει.
Των αισθημάτων τα λεπτά μετρά κι ορίζει,
ταις ώραις της ψυχής μετρά κι αλλάζει. [Κ. Π. Καβάφης]

'The pen that you dip looks like a clock hand
moving around the clock of the soul.
It signals the minutes of our feelings and defines them,
it counts the hours of the soul and changes them.'

At the same time, as already mentioned, poetry offers an appropriate and promising testing bed for theories of metaphor and, more generally, meaning construction in Cognitive Linguistics. More recently, however, the reverse has happened; insights from Cognitive Linguistics have been applied to the study of literature, thus giving rise to a new discipline, so-called *Cognitive Poetics* (for an overview see Stockwell,

2002).[20,21] Rather than being a fully fleshed out literary theory, Cognitive Poetics is better considered a research agenda that views literature as a form of cognition and communication. Dubbed under various labels, such as *Cognitive Rhetoric* (Turner, 1987, 1991, 1998), *Cognitive Stylistics* (Semino & Culpeper, 2002) and *Cognitive Semiotics* (P. A. Brandt, 2004a; Brandt & Brandt, 2005), Cognitive Poetics, as it is usually termed (see Tsur, 1992; Stockwell, 2002; Gavins & Steen, 2003; Brône & Vandaele, 2009), sustains that literary and non-literary discourse are continuous and therefore no sharp boundaries can be drawn between them; rather, their differences are a matter of degree.[22] Yet, Cognitive Poetics still proves hard to grasp as a clear-cut framework. As Stockwell (2002, p. 6) aptly puts it, Cognitive Poetics should be viewed as "a way of thinking about literature rather than a framework in itself". Vague as it is, given that it oscillates between literary studies and Cognitive Linguistics, Cognitive Poetics escapes a definition of general consent for an additional reason; the term 'Cognitive Poetics' is used in quite different and often contradictory senses by different scholars (cf. Tsur; 1992; Stockwell, 2002), thus further pointing to lack of homogeneity. In this section, I set out to sketch the field of Cognitive Poetics with reference to Cognitive Linguistics and then contextualize the present study in the relevant research agenda.

However diverse they are in scope and methods, all approaches in the context of Cognitive Poetics share a perspective on literature that is both cognitively informed and empirically grounded. Two points of convergence can be identified between the different approaches (Stockwell, 2002). Firstly, it is agreed that Cognitive Poetics cannot be defined merely on the grounds of using literary data as its object of investigation. Treating literature as a source of data in order to empirically test theories of human cognition and language should be better considered Cognitive Linguistics

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20. Linguistic approaches to literary discourse and, in particular, poetry have traditionally stressed its differences from everyday discourse in that in poetry language is deemed to be foregrounded (Mukarovský, 1932/1964; Jakobson, 1960); to deviate from the linguistic norm and thus defamiliarize the reader (Leech, 1969); to lack the illocutionary forces that everyday discourse normally has (Ohmann, 1971); or to be historically and culturally variable (Petterson, 1990). Although such approaches capture aspects of poetic discourse to a greater or lesser extent, they all share a view of poetry (and literary discourse in general) as a concrete category to be clearly distinguished from everyday, ordinary discourse.

21. Related to Cognitive Poetics are also the fields of *Empirical Poetics*, which applies psycholinguistic methods to the study of literature (see Steen, 1994; Schram & Steen, 2001), and *Corpus Stylistics*, which implements a corpus-based methodology (see Semino & Short, 2004; Wynne, 2005). Another promising field of research refers to *Pedagogical Stylistics* that applies findings from Cognitive Poetics to the teaching of literature (see Burke, 2004, 2010 and references therein).

22. This view is also corroborated by research findings in discourse analysis suggesting that creativity pervades everyday discourse in advertisements, informal conversations, psychotherapeutic discourse, etc. and therefore it can hardly be considered an exclusive property of literature (Carter, 1999, 2004; see also the contributions in Swann, Pope & Carter, 2011).

rather than Cognitive Poetics. In fact, in all aspects of Cognitive Poetics the reverse is the case; cognitive theories (including cognitive linguistic ones) are employed to shed some light on the study of literature. Secondly, all approaches within Cognitive Poetics share the assumption that literature is best approached on the grounds of the cognitive mechanisms that underpin language production and comprehension and, more generally, human cognition through an interdisciplinary perspective (see Semino & Steen, 2008). As Tsur (1992, p. 4) claims, "poetry exploits, for aesthetic purposes, cognitive (including linguistic) processes that were initially evolved for non-aesthetic purposes". Thus, a description of Cognitive Poetics that would be of general acclaim posits that "readings may be explained with reference to general human principles of linguistic and cognitive processing, which ties the study of literature with linguistics, psychology, and cognitive science in general" (Gavins & Steen, 2003, p. 2). In doing so, Cognitive Poetics aims to combine detailed textual analysis (as implemented within Stylistics) with the investigation of cognitive structures and processes that underlie language production and comprehension.

However, the available approaches to literature subsumed under Cognitive Poetics differ radically as to what they mean by 'cognitive', thereby giving rise to two main paradigms, or traditions, that run in parallel. The main point of divergence between the two lines of research concerns the relationship they purport to have with Cognitive Linguistics; the former is diametrically opposed to the scope of Cognitive Linguistics, whereas the latter, having spawned from Cognitive Linguistics, views itself as a branch of it. In what follows, I will briefly describe the two traditions of Cognitive Poetics and relate the discussion to the scope of the present work.

The former view, represented in the work of Reuven Tsur (1992, 1998, 2003), is an interdisciplinary approach to the study of literature that employs the tools of cognitive science, broadly defined so as to encompass findings in cognitive psychology, artificial intelligence, certain branches of linguistics, and philosophy of science. Literary theory has traditionally focused on either the formal structure of literature (i.e., Russian Formalism) or the perceived poetic effects that literary texts have on their readers (i.e., New Criticism). With the aim to bridge the gap between a formalist and a reader-oriented analysis of literature, Cognitive Poetics, in Tsur's account, envisages to explain "the relationship between the structure of the literary texts and their perceived effects in a principled and systematic way" (Tsur, 1992, p. 2). With regard to metaphor, in particular, Cognitive Poetics and Cognitive Linguistics differ in their aims and scope, and therefore should be considered as opposing to one another (Tsur, 2000, 2002). Cognitive Linguistics views poetic metaphors as continuous with everyday metaphors in that they both share the same underlying conceptual patterns (as in CMT), or emerge from the same cognitive mechanisms (as in CIT), whereas this line of research stresses the discontinuity between metaphor in everyday discourse and poetry. By treating poetic metaphor as intentionally deviant and presumably superior to the mundane metaphors in everyday discourse,

Tsur's Cognitive Poetics focuses on the differences between seemingly similar expressions in order to emphasize the uniqueness of each metaphor.

By contrast, another line of research views Cognitive Poetics as "a comparable offshoot" of Cognitive Linguistics (Steen, 2002, p. 185). Under this view, Cognitive Poetics is most directly grounded in Cognitive Linguistics with scholars applying theoretical notions and methodological tools derived from Cognitive Linguistics to the study of literature (see, e.g., Stockwell, 2002; Gavins & Steen, 2003; Brône & Vandaele, 2009). Such devices include the distinction between figure and ground, prototype theory and categorization, deixis, cognitive grammar, scripts and schemas, discourse worlds and mental spaces, conceptual metaphor, and corpus methods. This approach generated an explosion of interest in the study of literary metaphor in relation to more general patterns underlying cognition (including conceptual metaphors and blending operations), visual and auditory iconicity, a writer's worldview and writing style, diachronic patterns in metaphor, etc.[23] Following what is traditionally assumed in Cognitive Linguistics, this line of research treats metaphor in literary discourse as systematically related to non-literary metaphor at the conceptual level, thereby stressing the continuity between the two.

Given the above discussion, a question arises as to where the present book should be situated in the interface between Cognitive Linguistics and Cognitive Poetics. As already mentioned, the present study resides in Cognitive Linguistics both in its theoretical and methodological considerations. At the same time, however, employing insights from Cognitive Linguistics to analyze data from poetic discourse directly alludes to Cognitive Poetics as conceived by scholars in the tradition that is informed by Cognitive Linguistics. This study is primarily concerned with the implications that figurative expressions of time raise for theories of metaphor and meaning construction; in this sense, it is readily subsumed into the cognitive linguistic agenda. Nevertheless, in doing so, it seeks to offer an account of such expressions that will do justice to both their conceptual structure and their emergent meaning. To this end, features typical of poetry and their role in meaning construction (such as, e.g., iconicity) will be integrated in the analysis whenever necessary; in this sense, this study also relates to Cognitive Poetics. Essentially, what I hope to demonstrate is that the boundaries between linguistics and poetics are rather blurred; Cognitive Poetics can inform research in cognitive theories of metaphor while Cognitive Linguistics is at the core of any endeavor in Cognitive

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23. See, e.g., the work of Margaret Freeman on Emily Dickinson (1995, 1997, 2000, 2002) and Sylvia Plath (2005), Hamilton (1996) on W. H. Auden, Barcelona (1995) on love metaphors in *Romeo and Juliet*, D. Freeman (1993, 1998, 1999) on various Shakespearean tragedies, Hiraga (1999) on haiku, Steen (1999) on Wordsworth and Steen (2002) on Bob Dylan's song-writing, and Pagán Cánovas (2010, 2011) on Greek love poetry. On iconicity in language and literature see the contributions in Nänny & Fischer (2003).

Poetics. This book therefore advocates an interdisciplinary approach to metaphor that combines both Cognitive Linguistics and Cognitive Poetics.

A last, but not least, issue that needs to be addressed relates to how poetic metaphor is viewed in this book: as continuous *or* discontinuous with everyday metaphor, as different schools of thought in Cognitive Poetics suggest. As will be shown in the data analysis, poetic metaphor is both continuous *and* unique, thereby suggesting that this is a pseudo-problem. It is continuous in that (a) a considerable proportion of non-conventional metaphors of time in MG is conceptually associated with everyday metaphors (e.g., time as trampling) in the sense that the former exploit underlying conceptual patterns that are found in the latter, albeit in novel ways (i.e., creative metaphors of time; see Chapter 3); and (b) both conventional metaphorical expressions in everyday discourse and non-conventional ones in poetry will be demonstrated to result from the same cognitive operation, namely blending, or conceptual integration. At the same time, poetic metaphor is also unique in two respects: (a) some non-conventional metaphors involve frames (such as, e.g., coffins) that are not conventionally used with respect to time (i.e., highly creative metaphors of time), thus clearly deviating from the conceptualization of time in everyday discourse (see Chapter 4); and (b) all non-conventional metaphors of time appear to yield emergent meanings that are unique at the level of interpretation, even if they are grounded in already available conceptual patterns. In sum, the two approaches that stress either the continuity or the discontinuity of metaphors in literary and non-literary discourse are not mutually exclusive as generally assumed in the literature. As the data analysis will show, once empirically tested such seemingly opposing views prove to offer complementary insights on metaphor.

This section has presented diverging approaches within Cognitive Poetics that vary in their theoretical orientation with respect to Cognitive Linguistics and has contextualized the present study in this debate. In the following section, I present the source of the data on which the analysis is based: the corpus of MG poetry.

1.4   The corpus of MG poetry

Nowadays, the linguistic investigation of metaphor often makes use of corpus methods (see, e.g., Deignan, 1999; Deignan, 2005; Stefanowitsch & Gries, 2006), aiming to either empirically test a theoretically informed hypothesis on metaphor (in corpus-based studies) or to make *post hoc* theoretical generalizations on metaphor (in corpus-driven studies; Deignan, 2008). In the present work, as already mentioned, everyday metaphors of time are investigated through a general corpus of MG, namely HNC, which contains a large amount of linguistic data from written discourse (especially newspapers and journals), thereby qualifying for such a research goal (see Chapter 2). However, poetry is not sufficiently or appropriately documented in the

two general corpora of MG: HNC and the Corpus of Greek Texts.[24] To remedy this and in view of the goals of the present study, a specialized corpus was compiled, comprising poetic texts from online anthologies and literary e-journals: *the corpus of MG poetry*. In this sense, it also fills a gap in the existing general corpora of MG.

Typically, metaphor researchers use either large, ready-made corpora for general purposes, which can be searched using computerized techniques, such as concordances and automatically generated frequency lists (see, e.g., Deignan, 1999; Koller, 2002), or small corpora that are constructed by the researcher for the needs of a specific study and can be searched by hand (see, e.g., Cameron, 2003; Santa Ana, 1999). In order to account for both everyday and novel metaphorical expressions, a small, specialized, hand-sorted corpus of MG poetry was compiled and used, in combination with a general, computer-sorted corpus of MG. As Deignan points out (2008, p. 282), "small corpora can allow for an in-depth analysis of metaphor in its discoursal and social contexts. This is in contrast to, and sometimes complementing, the overview of linguistic patterns of metaphor afforded by large ready-made corpora". Furthermore, specialized corpora favour qualitative-based analyses (as is the one proposed in this study) since their size and composition validate them as more suitable for this purpose (Flowerdew, 2005). Incorporating insights from both a general corpus of MG and a specialized corpus of poetic texts, this study adopts a mixed methodology (see Cameron & Deignan, 2003).

Following a set of classification criteria (McEnery & Wilson, 1996), the corpus at hand is:

– *specialized*; it is genre-specific and targeted at serving the needs of the present study (cf. Santa Ana's corpus of anti-immigrant discourse (1999) and Cameron's corpus of metaphors in spoken classroom discourse (2003));
– *monolingual*; it contains only texts originally written in Greek (translations were excluded);
– *synchronic*; the documented poems belong to the literary production of the 20th century, spanning from the dawn of the century up to the contemporary era.

For the corpus to be balanced, homogeneous and representative of poetic discourse, a set of explicit design criteria was established (see Atkins, Clear & Ostler, 1992). As Sinclair (2005) points out, selection criteria in corpus design have to be small in number, clearly separate from each other and efficient as a group. They

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24. The HNC does not contain data from poetry. By contrast, the Corpus of Greek Texts contains literary texts (approximately 5 million words), from which poetry counts 410,400 words (Goutsos, 2003). Although poetry is adequately documented in the corpus, a problem arises in that it is not technically possible to scan exclusively poetic texts; the search engine applies to literature as a whole, under which poetry is subsumed indiscriminately.

are distinguished between external and internal criteria, which refer to the communicative function and the linguistic features of the text, respectively. According to Sinclair (2005), corpora should be designed and constructed exclusively on the basis of external criteria. For the compilation of the corpus of poetic texts in MG the following external criteria were implemented:[25]

Table 1. Design criteria for the corpus of MG poetry

Genre	Poetry
Mode	Written
Text origin	Web
Language	MG (no translations)
Medium	Electronic
Topic	Time
Time	Contemporary

While looking for time expressions, the search focused on lexemes that belong to the semantic field of time. To this end, the following vocabulary served as a linguistic criterion for expressions of time to be detected:

The semantic field of time		
χρόνος	khrónos	'time'
χρονικό διάστημα	khronikó djástima	'timespan'
στιγμή	stiɣmí	'moment'
λεπτό	leptó	'minute'
δευτερόλεπτο	defterólepto	'second'
ώρα	óra	'hour'
μέρα	méra	'day'
εβδομάδα	evdomáda	'week'
μήνας	mínas	'month'
χρονιά	khronjá	'year'
αιώνας	aiónas	'century'
αιωνιότητα	aioniótita	'eternity'
παρελθόν	parelthón	'past'
παρόν	parón	'present'
μέλλον	méllon	'future'
σήμερα	símera	'today'
χτες	khtes	'yesterday'
αύριο	ávrio	'tomorrow'
ρολόι	rolói	'clock'

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25. Criteria concerning literary periods, artistic movements, etc. were not considered in the corpus design since they do not relate to the aims and the scope of the present study.

An issue relates to the selection of the Web as a source of corpus data, which is justified for a number of reasons. Firstly, data derived from the Web are easier to handle since they are already in digital form and their collection is therefore significantly less time-consuming, unlike printed resources that would require scanning or typing. Moreover, the digital search was based on a webpage of the Portal for the Greek Language,[26] called "Modern Greek Literature on the Web" (Η νεοελληνική λογοτεχνία στο διαδίκτυο),[27] which lists the available resources of MG literature on the Web and thus serves as a field guide that facilitates the research and ensures the reliability of the sources. Such sources include on-line anthologies of MG poetry such as those of the Center of Neo-Hellenic studies (Σπουδαστήριο Νέου Ελληνισμού), the National Book Centre of Greece (Εθνικό Κέντρο Βιβλίου), the Portal for the Greek Language (Πύλη για την ελληνική γλώσσα) etc.), and literary e-journals (such as http://www.poema.gr, http://poeticanet.com/en/index.php, http://www.poiein.gr/, etc.).

The search aimed at poems that contained at least one figurative expression of time. The findings are mainly derived from 20th century poetry, especially of the post-war era, which seems to be conducive to the emergence of expressions of time; the experience of war, death and pain was still within living memory while, at the same time, the prevalence of free verse and the influence of innovative artistic movements (such as modernism, surrealism, etc.) favoured creativity in expression. This issue is amenable to further investigation in the realm of literary studies, therefore it goes beyond the scope of this book.

In sum, a small, genre-specific corpus was constructed specifically for the investigation of figurative expressions of time pursued in this book, thus complementing the existing large corpora of general use in MG. Although constructed for the purposes of the present study, it is a versatile corpus that can be used in various areas of linguistic investigation such as lexicography, translation and language teaching, as well as in literary analysis. It aspires to be balanced, representative of poetic discourse and appropriate for the purposes for which it was constructed, yet, like all corpora, it is partial and therefore it can be further enriched with more texts in the future.

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26. The Portal for the Greek Language (Πύλη για την ελληνική γλώσσα) is an electronic platform designed by the Centre for the Greek Language (Κέντρο Ελληνικής Γλώσσας) with the aim to support the study and teaching of Greek. It attempts to cover the Greek language both diachronically and synchronically (Ancient, Medieval, and Modern Greek) and is addressed to researchers, university students, teachers, pupils, and everyone interested in the history and structure of the Greek language (see http://www.greek-language.gr/greekLang/portal/about_us/index.html).

27. Available at the following link:
http://www.greek-language.gr/greekLang/literature/guides/net/greek/index.html.

The book is structured as follows: in Chapter 2, I examine the conceptual structure of time as conventionally expressed in MG and address similarities and differences between CMT and CIT. The analysis of time conceptualization in MG poetry follows in the subsequent chapters: in Chapter 3, I deal with creative metaphors of time, which make use of motional frames to yield conceptualizations of time that are consistent with its conceptual structure in everyday discourse; in Chapter 4 I consider non-motional metaphors of time conceptualization, which I dub 'highly creative metaphors of time'; and, in Chapter 5, I analyze non-metaphorical expressions of time, which, nevertheless, yield figurative construals of time as a compressed or protracted interval. Chapter 6, finally, summarizes the findings of the book and discusses some implications for future research.

The conceptual structure of time in MG

2.1   Introduction

This chapter deals with time conceptualization as evidenced in conventional metaphorical expressions in MG. Although this book is primarily concerned with time conceptualization in poetic discourse, such an endeavor is necessitated in that, as already mentioned in the Introduction, non-conventional metaphors are assumed to exploit the conceptual structure of time in everyday discourse and extend it in novel, non-conventional ways. Therefore, exploring time conceptualization as manifested in conventional metaphorical expressions is a prerequisite for the investigation of time conceptualization in poetic discourse. Besides, no theoretical consensus has been reached so far concerning how the conceptual structure of time should be modelled, with conceptual integration theorists revoking the standard analysis in terms of conceptual metaphors.

In view of this, this chapter aims (a) to present the two theories that purport to account for the metaphorical structure of time (cf. CMT and CIT); and (b) to sketch the conceptual structure of time in the context of MG. Specifically, it will be shown that time is metaphorically structured in terms of locations and moving entities as predicted by CMT. Nevertheless, it will be suggested that time conceptualization can be better accommodated within a generalized integration network following Fauconnier & Turner (2008). In other words, the standard conceptual metaphors of time as space will be reanalyzed in terms of CIT. The main argument in favour of CIT is that time has structure of its own and thus its metaphorical conceptualization in terms of space and motion cannot be derived from a one-to-one conceptual mapping but is rather emergent in a new space other than the source and the target domain. Such an approach refines, rather than contradicts, the tenets of CMT, which set the ground for exploring metaphorical patterns for time conceptualization.

As already mentioned, the description of the conceptual structure of time in MG needs to rely on conventional metaphorical expressions. In order to elicit authentic linguistic data, this study implements a large, general corpus of MG, namely HNC. Since conventional language is reasonably expected to appear in texts that are of an informative and/ or argumentative type and therefore abide by the linguistic norm, for the purposes of the present study the search has been limited to texts that are published in newspapers and magazines, including opinion articles, news

reports, interviews, scientific, educational and legal texts published in the Press, etc. that cover a number of different thematic subjects (economy, society, arts, health, etc.). In the process of data collection, the vocabulary of the semantic field of time (e.g., *χρόνος* 'time', *ώρα* 'hour', *μέλλον* 'future') served as the node word (i.e., the search item) in the concordancer of the corpus. As expected, the corpus data cue to a "semantic preference" (Sinclair, 1996) between node words denoting time and a set of lexical items derived from frames of (linear) motion (on frames see Fillmore, 1975, 1977, 1978, 1982, 1985). This enabled tracing a number of fixed collocations that appeared on the screen in the form of numbered concordances with the possibility to access, whenever necessary, the source and the context of their occurrence.

Finally, along with the HNC, two major dictionaries of MG were used as additional resources: the Dictionary of the Modern Greek Language (1999) and the Dictionary of Standard Modern Greek (2003). Given that they are corpus-based, contemporary dictionaries register distinct senses for each lemma as these emerge in the context of real communicative settings and various genres. Apart from etymological and grammatical information, each entry contains illustrative examples and prototypical collocations in which the lemma at hand occurs. By capturing the language norm dictionaries can therefore offer complementary insights on time conceptualization in everyday discourse.

The structure of the chapter is as follows: Section 2.2 is concerned with the definition of conventional metaphors of time. Section 2.3 discusses the two theoretical approaches to time conceptualization, namely CMT (2.3.1) and CIT (2.3.2), and sketches the generalized integration network of time (2.3.3). In Section 2.4, I describe the conceptual structure of time on the grounds of conventional metaphors in MG, including the Ego-moving construal of time (2.4.1); the Time-moving construal (2.4.2); the Time-flowing construal (2.4.3); the conceptualization of subjective time (2.4.4); the conceptualization of time in memory (2.4.5); and the conceptualization of the past and the future (2.4.6). The chapter closes with a summary and some concluding remarks in Section 2.5.

2.2   Conventionality and metaphor

In this section, I will address the issue of conventionality in metaphor use. In doing so, I aim to elucidate the term *conventional metaphors of time* as it is implemented in this book.

As already mentioned in the Introduction, metaphors are generally assumed to form a continuum extending from mundane, everyday metaphorical expressions to non-conventional and innovative ones. Although the boundaries between what is conventional and what is non-conventional can hardly be delineated, it is agreed

that a conventional expression refers to a generally established way of expression that is shared by the members of a speech community.[28] In metaphor theory, it is suggested that conventionality refers to both the conceptual and the linguistic level, that is to how *deeply* rooted the linguistic expression is in the speakers' minds and how *widely* used it is among language users (Svanlund, 2007). According to Lakoff & Turner (1989, p. 55), conventionality at the conceptual level can be measured depending on the extent to which a conceptual mapping is "automatic, effortless and generally established as a mode of thought among members of a linguistic community". Conceptual mappings motivate a great many everyday metaphors, thus bridging the linguistic level with the conceptual. If uniquely instantiated, a metaphor is deemed unsystematic and cannot be viewed as a manifestation of conceptual metaphor nor can it be considered conventional. As Cameron puts it (2003, p. 110), "[c]onventionalized metaphors are expressions that have become part of people's language resources, run-of-the-mill ways of talking about things". Conventionalization occurs through use in a linguistic community and leads to shared ways of talking to the effect that conventional metaphors may go unnoticed in the flow of discourse. Although dormant, however, the metaphoricity of such expressions can be activated in specific contexts, as also shown in the next chapter.

This book endorses a view of conventionality in terms of linguistic *entrenchment.* Following Langacker (1987, p. 57), I take entrenchment to relate to how deeply rooted linguistic structures are in the minds of individual speakers, thus determining how effortlessly they will be processed and understood. The degree of entrenchment of a cognitive or linguistic unit (i.e., concept or construction) correlates with its frequency of use; when units become entrenched their activation is automatic to the effect that they have been used before.[29] In Langacker's words (1987, p. 59), "[w]ith repeated use, a novel structure becomes progressively entrenched, to the point of becoming a unit; moreover, units are variably entrenched depending on the frequency of their occurrence". Such a procedure is independent of the degree of complexity any cognitive or linguistic unit has but, rather, results from "some kind of collective automatization effect" (Schmid, 2007, p. 119). In

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28. However, Croft (2000) argues that there is no sharp distinction between conservative (i.e., conventional) and innovative language use in the sense that all language use is innovative to some degree (considering that there cannot be a word or phrase to describe every experience people intend to communicate), while most innovative use of language is also partly conventional since it is based on the recombination of words and constructions that are readily available. Convention, in his account, is inherently fluid to some degree.

29. Geeraerts, Grondelaers & Bakema (1994) have argued for a more refined version of this idea. On their account, it is not frequency of use as such that determines entrenchment but, rather, frequency of use with regard to a specific meaning, or function, in comparison with alternative expressions of the same meaning, or function.

short, the notion of entrenchment, as it is used in Cognitive Linguistics, refers to the extent to which the formation and activation of a cognitive or linguistic unit is routinized and automated among the members of a speech community.

As far as conventional metaphors of time are concerned, an initial search in the HNC has identified a semantic preference between time and motion. This means that conventional metaphors of time comprise (a) a lexical item denoting time (e.g., *χρόνος* 'time', *καιρός* 'time', *ώρα* 'hour', *αιωνιότητα* 'eternity', *παρελθόν* 'past', etc.), and (b) a lexical item derived from the domain of motion. The findings of the corpus search yield a set of fixed linguistic expressions that amount to prototypical word combinations of time and motion. With prototypes being the most salient members of a conceptual category,[30] prototypical word combinations are the most typical instances of semantic preference between time and motion. Prototypicality refers, first and firemost, to the centrality, or salience of the collocates of time (more precisely, of the vocabulary that belongs to the semantic field of time) in the motional domain. Thus, prototypical collocates of time include verbs that are central in the motional domain, denoting linear motion of either an animate or inanimate entity: e.g., *περνάω* (pernáo) 'to pass', *κυλάω* (kiláo) 'to flow', *έρχομαι* (érkhomai) 'to come', *πηγαίνω* (piyaíno) 'to go', *προχωρώ* (prokhoró) 'to advance, to move on', *πλησιάζω* (plisiázo) 'to approach' and *φτάνω* (phtáno) 'to arrive'. By contrast, less prototypical verbs of motion such as *περπατώ* (perpató) 'to walk' and *έρπω* (érpo) 'to crawl' do not appear as collocates of time; the former is a prototypical verb of motion but applies exclusively to humans, whereas the latter applies exclusively to animals and is not a prototypical verb of motion.

However, not all motion verbs that collocate with time are prototypical. As suggested by corpus data, the prototypicality of the word combination in the metaphorical conceptualization of time does not necessarily correlate with the prototypicality of the collocate of time in the motional domain; rather, it seems that non-prototypical verbs of motion may yield prototypical word combinations of time. A case in point is the motion verb *οδεύω* (odévo) 'to move forward'. In MG, *οδεύω* is restricted to high register and therefore can hardly be considered a prototypical verb of motion, however, it typically collocates with *μέλλον* 'future', thus forming a prototypical word combination (e.g., *οδεύουμε προς ένα άγνωστο μέλλον* 'we are moving toward an unknown future'). Similarly, another verb historically derived from the domain of motion, *ανατρέχω* (anatrékho) 'to go back', is no longer used to denote physical motion (cf. *ανατρέχω σ' ένα βιβλίο/ στις πηγές/ σε αρχαία κείμενα* 'I go back to a book/ to sources/ to ancient texts'), yet it commonly applies

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30. On prototypes in linguistic theory see Aitchison (1987), Geeraerts (1989), Wierzbicka (1989, 1990), Lakoff (1987), Taylor (1989) and Geeraerts (1997); on prototypes and categorization see Rosch (1973, 1975, 1978).

to the conceptualization of the past (e.g., *ανατρέχουμε στο παρελθόν* 'we go back to the past'). Finally, it is also possible that motional frames prototypically associated with time conceptualization are used in specific grammatical forms; for example, while it is common to say *ταξίδι στον χρόνο* 'a journey in time' and *ταξιδεύω στον χρόνο* 'to travel in time', it is not natural to refer to a traveler in time (?*ταξιδιώτης στον χρόνο*). However, as it will be shown in the next chapter, poetry is conducive to such non-prototypical word combinations of time and motion (that apparently lack linguistic entrenchment).

In sum, in the present work conventional metaphors of time are defined on the grounds of linguistic entrenchment that is manifested through prototypical word combinations of time with motion. Such a working definition is expected to enable the analysis of the conceptual structure of time in MG and also the account of time conceptualization in poetic discourse put forward in this book. Having discussed how conventional metaphors of time are defined in the context of the present work, let us now turn to the theories under examination, namely CMT and CIT.

2.3 Conceptual metaphors vs. generalized integration networks: The case of time

In this section, I present the basic tenets of CMT and CIT with reference to time conceptualization and meaning construction. In particular, I aim to show that the concept of time overrides a two-space spatio-temporal mapping, as is generally assumed by conceptual metaphor theorists, thereby calling for a novel account in terms of conceptual integration.

2.3.1 Time in CMT

Consider the following metaphorical expression of time, cited in (2.1):

(2.1)   … **ο   χρόνος   φεύγει   γρήγορα,** κι ο κόσμος θα λαχταρά να ριχτεί
         the   time   goes away   quickly
         αμέσως στο τραγούδι, στο χορό μες στους δρόμους, καρναβάλι απέραντο για το βραχνά που θα 'χει τελειώσει.   [HNC]
         '… **time goes away quickly** and the people will burst into singing and dancing in the streets in a vast celebration when the pain will be over.'

Derived from the HNC, the temporal expression in (2.1) evidences a metaphor of time, which is conventional and effortlessly understood: *ο χρόνος φεύγει γρήγορα* 'time goes away quickly'. The metaphor amounts to a word combination of *χρόνος* 'time' with a verb that prototypically denotes motion, namely *φεύγω* (phévgo) 'to

go away, to leave'. In terms of CMT, (2.1) is an instance of the TIME IS A MOVING ENTITY conceptual metaphor, which structures our understanding of time in terms of an indefinitely long sequence of objects moving past a stationary observer (Lakoff & Johnson, 1999, p. 141; see Section 2.4.2).[31] Stored as a knowledge structure in long-term memory, the TIME IS A MOVING ENTITY conceptual metaphor maps the conceptual structure contained in the source domain of motion onto the target domain of time. According to Lakoff (1993, p. 218), our metaphorical understanding of time in terms of motion is biologically determined: "In our visual systems, we have detectors for motion and detectors for objects/locations. We do not have detectors for time (whatever that could mean).[32] Thus, it makes good biological sense that time should be understood in terms of things and motion." Given that the experience of motion (which is fundamental in the human make-up) necessarily involves time, motion and time can be naturally mapped.[33]

However, it is not the case that just any kind of motion is metaphorically transferred onto time; rather, it is linear motion (that is, one-dimensional motion along the horizontal axis) that serves as the source domain for the conceptualization of time.[34] Thus, the passage of time is construed as locomotion along a linear path,

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31. A robust body of experimental evidence corroborates the psychological reality of the conceptual mappings between time and space, which is also found to be asymmetric, that is, uni-directional from space to time (see Gentner & Imai, 1992; Gibbs, 1994; Gibbs & Colston, 1995; Boroditsky, 2000; Boroditsky & Ramscar, 2002; Gentner, Imai, & Boroditsky, 2002; Casasanto, Fotakopoulou & Boroditsky, 2010).

32. However, as will be shown extensively in this book on both theoretical and empirical grounds, time is an experientially real phenomenon, notwithstanding its ontological abstractness, while the psychology of time is very different from the psychology of space (Miller & Johnson-Laird, 1976, p. 456).

33. Consider, however, that time is used to measure motion; in other words, it is already contained in the source domain and therefore the metaphorical mapping is doomed to imminent circularity. In order to resolve the problem of circularity, Moore (2006, p. 201) suggested that "an understanding of motion metaphors of time lies not in abstract concepts such as MOTION and TIME, but in the interplay of spatial and temporal aspects of specific scenarios of motion", that is, in a holistic frame (or ICM) of motion and time. However, even in this account, the emergent structure of time is still left unexplained, as it will be argued in the remainder of this section.

34. Note that other spatial features, especially multi-dimensional features such as shape (round, square etc.) or the lateral axis (left-right), do not seem to be used in expressing time through language, as argued by Traugott with respect to tense (1978, p. 371). Nevertheless, evidence from gesture studies suggests that the lateral axis is commonly used with reference to the past and the future, unlike their corresponding linguistic manifestations (see Cooperrider & Núñez, 2009; Cooperrider, Núñez & Sweetser, 2014), thus pointing to a discrepancy between language and gesture as far as the mental representations of time are concerned (Casasanto & Jasmin, 2012).

starting from a point A and ending at another point B ahead of point A. Moreover, motion in the case of time has a certain directionality while extension in space amounts to the duration of an interval. In addition, all conceptual elements of motion, such as a path, a starting point and a destination, distance, linearity, and speed, are mapped onto time. Along these lines, therefore, the conventional expression in (1) is explainable as derived from the TIME IS A MOVING ENTITY conceptual metaphor in that a motion verb such as *φεύγω* 'to go away, to leave' is used to express the passage of time. One of the key features of motion, speed, is also mapped onto time by virtue of *γρήγορα* (γρίγορα) 'quickly', thus construing the passage of time as quick.

Although it would be hard to contest the conceptual mapping between time and motion in (2.1), the above analysis does not do full justice to the meaning conveyed by the metaphor. Consider that the construal of time as going away bears a strong connotation of loss, namely that, once gone, time is irreversible and non-retrievable (cf. *φεύγει ο χρόνος και πίσω δεν γυρνά/ χάνεται* 'time goes away and doesn't come back/ it gets lost'). In evoking the frame of DEPARTURE, *φεύγω* 'to go away, to leave' typically implies that the moving entity can come back to the point of departure; this is evidenced both in the literal sense of the verb (e.g., *το πλοίο έφυγε πριν από μια ώρα* 'the boat left an hour ago' [Dictionary of Standard Modern Greek]) and in its metaphorical uses (cf. *του 'φυγε ο πόνος/ η όρεξη/ ο βήχας* 'his pain/ appetite/ cough went away').[35] It thus transpires that when motion is ascribed to time by virtue of *φεύγω* 'to go away, to leave', it is not the semantics of *φεύγω* 'to go away, to leave' that predicts non-reversibility in the metaphor but, rather, our background knowledge about time. In our everyday experience of time we know that events can only happen once, and once they happen they cannot be reversed or experienced again (cf. *το ρολόι του χρόνου δεν μπορεί να γυρίσει πίσω* 'the clock of time cannot go back' [HNC]; *το παρελθόν έχει περάσει ανεπιστρεπτί* 'the past is gone with no return' [HNC]). In other words, motion in the case of time is non-reversible and this seems to be a cross-linguistic and perhaps universal pattern (Radden, 2011). Findings in knowledge representation also show that the fleetingness and transience of time are features that are purely temporal in nature and hence cannot be attributed to space (Galton, 2011). It transpires from this discussion that the concept of time is not derived solely from the domain of space; that is to say, it has *emergent structure*. In cognitive linguistic terms, this means that both the domains of time and motion contribute conceptual structure to the metaphorical

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35. The only metaphorical extension of *φεύγω* 'to go away, to leave' that also evokes irreversible departure is when it applies to death by means of the DEATH IS DEPARTURE conceptual metaphor (cf. *Έφυγε από τη ζωή* 'he passed away' (lit. 'he went away from life') [Dictionary of Standard MG]). Apparently, as in the case of time, it is the domain of death, rather than that of departure, that explains non-reversibility in the metaphor.

conceptualization of time, unlike what is generally assumed by conceptual metaphor theorists. This observation essentially calls for a refinement in the standard analysis of the conceptual structure of time.[36]

However, this is not the whole story. There is an additional feature in the conventional metaphor of time in (2.1) that is not adequately addressed in the CMT framework, and this relates to time being construed as passing quickly (*γρήγορα*). Along the lines of CMT, metaphorical mappings are uni-directional (in this case, from motion to time), therefore speed in the passage of time is viewed as a carry-over from the domain of motion (which intrinsically contains speed) onto the domain of time. Nevertheless, consider that in everyday life time is more often than not experienced in a varied way, namely as dragging, as flying or, alternatively, as coming to a halt. This suggests that, although inaccessible via our perceptual apparatus (as claimed by CMT), time is actually perceived in experiential terms; the passage of time is a psychologically real phenomenon. This is particularly evident when time is felt in *subjective* terms as passing slowly or quickly or as being frozen. Such temporal variation seems to apply to duration,[37] either when experienced in passing or when judged in retrospect, corresponding to *experienced* and *remembered duration*,

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36. A possible way to account for this in the context would be through the so-called Invariance Principle, which, according to Lakoff (1993, p. 215), predicts that "[m]etaphorical mappings preserve the cognitive topology (that is, the image-schema structure) of the source domain, in a way consistent with the inherent structure of the target domain." However, even in its extended form so as to also apply to frame structure (Sullivan, 2013, p. 37), the Invariance Principle would attribute irreversibility to constraints imposed by the target domain of time rather than to projection of our psychologically real understanding of time to the metaphor.

37. With respect to time perception, cognitive psychology has assigned a prominent position to duration (cf. Michon, 1990), which seems to apply also to the experience of the present although the latter is not bounded in a strictly delineated way (Fraisse, 1963, pp. 71–76, pp. 84–85; Gibson, 1966, 1975; Geissler, Schebera & Kompass, 1999, p. 707; Ornstein, 1969/1997). Within cognitive psychology, psychological time has been modelled along three major dimensions: succession, duration and temporal perspective (for a comprehensive overview see Block 1990: 1–36) while Pöppel (1997) presumes a longer list of elementary temporal experiences, including simultanity, successiveness, temporal order, subjective present, temporal continuity and subjective duration, hierarchically related to each other (see also Pöppel, 1978). Succession applies to the sequential occurrence of events from which humans infer temporal order, whereas duration refers to bounded intervals of time, i.e. to events perceived and/ or remembered as having an onset and an offset. By contrast, temporal perspective amounts to a set of individual experiences and conceptions with respect to past, present and future time. In linguistic terms, it has been suggested that duration is the prototypical (so-called 'sanctioning') sense of the lexeme *time* both synchronically and diachronically (on English see Evans, 2004a, 2004b, 2005, 2013; on MG see Marmaridou, 2008; Haralambopoulou, 2010; on Classical Greek see Georgakopoulos & Piata, 2012). Finally, from the vantage point of philosophy Bergson (1960) has argued that the essence of time lies in the notion of duration ('durée' in his terminology).

respectively (Block, 1990, p. 10). In social psychology, the passage of time that is felt as slow or as quick is referred to as *protracted duration* and *temporal compression* (Flaherty, 1999, p. 34). To return to Example (2.1), *γρήγορα* 'quickly' seems to encode the subjective experience of time and, in particular, temporal compression. In this sense, *γρήγορα* 'quickly' is not a projection of the domain of motion onto the domain of time but, rather, the metaphorical mapping serves to model, structure, and express the subjective experience of which we are consciously aware.

Nevertheless, for the passage of time to be construed as quick, our felt experience of time has to be judged against a reference point that serves as a backdrop. This refers to the uniform measurement of time provided by devices for time telling, the most salient being the clock. To return again to the metaphor in (2.1), *ο χρόνος φεύγει γρήγορα* 'time goes away quickly', the passage of time is felt as quicker than the movement of the rotating rods on the clock face. In this sense, time is *materially anchored* to cognitive and cultural artefacts for time telling such as clocks, calendars and sundials (Williams, 2004).[38] As such a material anchor of temporality, the clock is a device from which meaning (in this case, time telling) is *constructed* through (and not simply derived from) a shift from the physical elements and relationships of the anchor to conceptual elements and relationships; therefore, how much of the path remains on the screen before the trajector reaches its goal translates in conceptual terms into how much time is left up to a certain temporal point (Williams, 2004, p. 107). As Williams has shown in an empirical investigation of the acquisition of clock reading strategies, "learning to tell time is about more than reading the clock" (Williams, 2004, p. 85). The clock does not merely express temporality but, rather, plays a constitutive role in the conceptualization of time in that our experience of time is translated into standard temporal units. This finding has important

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38. In theoretical terms, this entails that cognition should be better viewed as *distributed* (Hutchins, 1995, 2005). In this view, the unit of analysis is the overall cognitive system in which the mind operates (e.g., a cockpit, a courtroom, a social group) rather than the individual's mind alone. Cognition is regarded as distributed across: (i) material structure (e.g., clocks, calendars, calculators); (ii) social structure (e.g., a co-worker, a team, an adversary); and (iii) cultural time (i.e., embodiments of cultural models in social and material structure; e.g. maps and navigation techniques). Distributed cognition is particularly relevant to meaning construction through conceptual integration, especially in relation to time conceptualization (for points of convergence between distributed cognition and CIT see Fauconnier & Turner, 2002, p. 195–216). However, it needs to be stressed out that, although material anchors facilitate running a conceptual blend and may even be indispensable for it, they do not constitute the blend in and of itself (Williams, 2004). If this were so, changing the degrees in a digital thermometer would affect the external weather, or manipulating time in a watch would change real universal time. Note, however, that in the context of poetry the latter is also possible as suggested in the following poetic lines: *Τεράστια χρονόμετρα μεγεθύνουν/ σε σκοτεινούς θαλάμους τα δευτερόλεπτα* 'Huge chronometers magnify/ the seconds in darkrooms' [Νίκος Καρούζος].

implications for the conceptual structure of time, suggesting that the clock-based representation of time also needs to be integrated into our analytical framework.

In sum, the discussion of the metaphor *ο χρόνος φεύγει γρήγορα* 'time goes away quickly' suggests that (a) time has conceptual structure that cannot be derived solely from the domain of motion in the form of a uni-directional projection onto time (i.e., irreversible motion, and varied speed in the subjective experience of time), and (b) the concept of time is also grounded in the mechanical device used to measure its passage, namely the clock. In Fauconnier & Turner's words (2008, p. 61), "the ultimate conceptual correspondence between time (itself emergent) and physical space is real and especially visible, but it is a final product of emergent structure in the elaborate integration network, not something to postulate as a basic primitive of human understanding". In other words, in order to account for the emergent structure of time, a multiple-space model is called for along the lines of conceptual integration, or blending. Such a conceptual integration network of time needs to integrate both the psychologically real experience of time, and the socio-cultural dependence of temporality on material anchors.

So far, I have attempted to show that the conceptual structure of time cannot be reduced to a uni-directional spatio-temporal mapping, thus arguing for an alternative multiple-space account of time conceptualization along the lines of CIT. However, Fauconnier & Turner (2008, p. 56), in their criticism of CMT, rather focus on the inconsistencies between time and space, which, in their view, posit a challenge to conceptual metaphors of time.[39] In what follows, I will summarize their points, suggesting, however, that such criticism is not always on the right track. Nevertheless, it is not incompatible with the approach I advocate here that stresses the emergent structure of time as the main argument for a conceptual integration account.

To begin with, Fauconnier & Turner (2008) point out that temporal units are construed as moving entities, unlike spatial units of measurement which cannot be said to move; while it is natural to say *Five minutes passed*, this is does not hold

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39. Apart from the analysis in Fauconnier & Turner (2008), much research has been done on the inconsistencies between the conceptualization of time and space. Tenbrink (2007), for example, discusses the inconsistencies between spatial and temporal expressions in English and German with respect to their applicability conditions (i.e., the linguistic patterns and contextual environments in which they occur in natural discourse). Under her analysis, spatial and temporal expressions appear to be essentially independent of each other (though in some ways parallel), in spite of their high degree of similarity. Moreover, psycholinguistic evidence suggests that, although historically derived from spatial language, temporal language is separately stored in the lexicon and also processed in language use, thus making the link between spatial and temporal language less transparent (see, e.g., Sandra & Rice, 1995; Rice, Dominiek & Vanrespaille, 1999; Boroditsky, 2000; Kemmerer, 2005). Finally, spatial and temporal concepts seem to be independent in terms of language acquisition (Akhundov, 1986).

equally for spatial units (?*Five meters passed*). However, consider, e.g., the expression *The first five miles went by quickly*, in which spatial units such as miles are construed as moving. This example is an instantiation of so-called *fictive motion* (Talmy, 2000; Matlock, 2001),[40] which refers to the conceptualized motion of a static referent (cf. *The road goes by from the village to the sea shore*; Fauconnier & Turner, 2008, p. 60). In fictive motion, therefore, the conceptualizer projects motion onto a stationary scene, while in the above example the conceptualization of miles as moving implies that actually *time* went by quickly while covering this particular distance.

In a similar vein, it is argued that temporal relations are inconsistent with spatial ones also with respect to distance. Within the domain of time distance between temporal units and/ or events can be relative irrespective of their actual location in the timeline (e.g., *The day of my wedding was thirty years ago but seems like yesterday*), whereas entities in physical space, Fauconnier & Turner (2008) sustain, are located in specific points and are typically perceived in a way that is consistent with real distance. However, it seems that a subjective experience of spatial distance is also possible, as suggested by the following example from the British National Corpus: *The distance seemed less than twenty miles, but our guide explained that we had traveled more than three hundred*.[41] Here distance between locative points is relative, yet one may argue that it is implicitly related to the experience of duration (that is, it is the duration of the journey, rather than the distance itself, that is felt to be short). This criticism, however, is not applicable to distance between humans as in, e.g., *Although he's far away, it feels as if he were here*. Such an utterance can apply to someone living far away but it may also refer to someone deceased, suggesting that the perception of distance is not necessarily aligned with geographical coordinates.

This point relates to another argument put forward by Fauconnier & Turner, namely that the perception of time is deeply influenced by cognitive and affective factors. As already mentioned, temporal units can be construed as speeding up or slowing down while past events can be located at a relative distance from the experiencer's present. In such cases, the perception of time depends on attention, memory, and affect (see Droit-Volet & Gil, 2009; Droit-Volet & Meck, 2007). Fauconnier

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40. Fictive motion is also known under the labels *virtual motion* (Langacker, 1999); *abstract motion* (Langacker, 1987, 1991); *subjective motion* (Matsumoto, 1996a, 1996b); and *relative motion* (Fauconnier & Turner, 2008, p. 60). In the relative motion scene, although we are indeed moving, we take ourselves as the stationary point of reference and therefore we perceive other enitities as moving (e.g., a tree, a road, a set of spatial units of measurement, such as kilometers, and so on).

41. Consider also the following poetic lines instantiating a subjective measurement of space: *Αν με μετρήσεις με φωνές και πεταλούδες/ Θα μ' έβρεις πιο μεγάλο απ' το κλουβί μου/ Κι ωστόσο, πες μου, πώς χωρώ εδώ μέσα;* 'If you measure me in sounds and butterflies/ you'll find me bigger than my cage/ yet, tell me, how do I fit in here?' [Ορέστης Αλεξάκης].

& Turner claim that in the domain of physical space the perception of motion is rather uniform and does not rely on the cognitive or affective status of the observer. However, as the above example suggests (*Although he's far away, it feels as if he were here*), the experience of spatial distance can also be affected by the experiencer's emotional involvement.

Finally, Fauconnier & Turner are right in pointing out that observers within physical space are not necessarily at the same location and do not look in the same direction, unlike the case of time whereby observers share the same location from which they look at the same moving objects, namely events and temporal units. Along these lines, temporal units are located along the same path and move in an ordered sequence, whereas objects moving in space do not have to be in the same trajectory or to be aligned in a specific, well-ordered manner. While it is possible for the same temporal units to be perceived as moving at different speeds (e.g., *The hours of the lecture passed quickly for the students but slowly for the lecturer*), such a divergence in the estimation of speed, according to Fauconnier & Turner, does not hold equally for objects moving in space. However, this seems to be an overgeneralization in that observers in the domain of space may also diverge in their estimation of speed (e.g., if asked to compare the velocity of entities moving at slightly different speeds) while cognitive and affective factors (such as attention focus and memory limitations) may also be at play.

In the following section, the metaphor *ο χρόνος φεύγει γρήγορα* 'time goes away quickly' will be reanalyzed in terms of CIT, thus introducing the basic principles of conceptual integration and, in particular, its application to time conceptualization.

2.3.2 From conceptual metaphors to conceptual integration networks

Having shown that the conceptualization of time has emergent structure that goes beyond a two-space mapping, I aim to argue that the conceptual structure of time can be neatly accommodated within a conceptual integration network. But, first, I need to sketch the tenets of CIT in relation to time conceptualization and meaning construction (for an overview of CIT see Oakley & Coulson, 2000).

In the CIT framework, the basic unit of cognitive organization is not that of domains, as is the case in CMT, but *mental spaces* (Fauconnier, 1985/1994). Mental spaces (also called 'spaces', for short) are partial and temporary representational structures that speakers construct when thinking or talking about a situation, whether real or imagined. Mental spaces are not equivalent to domains but, rather, depend on them; constructed as discourse unfolds by virtue of lexical and grammatical cues, mental spaces represent particular scenarios that recruit conceptual structure from domains. They are internally structured by *frames* (also called *organizing frames*) and *cognitive models*, both obtained from background information.

Inferencing and reasoning processes are also involved in space-construction, and the configuration of spaces is dynamically updated in the on-going discourse. Externally mental spaces are linked by connectors that, in conceptual integration terminology, are referred to as *vital relations*. Vital relations are conceptual links that relate elements across mental spaces and include, among others, Identity, Analogy, Cause-Effect, Uniqueness, Change, Time and Space (Fauconnier & Turner, 2002, p. 92–102). Those vital relations that pertain to time conceptualization will be discussed in detail in the analysis to follow.

As already suggested with respect to the example *ο χρόνος φεύγει γρήγορα* 'time goes away quickly', the conceptualization of time does not evoke the whole domain of physical motion but, rather, a specific kind of motion, namely one-dimensional, horizontal and non-reversible motion. Moreover, given that speed may be perceived as quick for one experiencer but not for another motion in the conceptual structure of time is experienced rather than technical. In other words, the recruited structure is only a small subset of our knowledge of motion: a mental space. Mental spaces are short-term constructs informed by our more general and stable knowledge structures associated with a particular domain. In this sense, they evoke a central feature of metaphorical mappings in CMT, namely that they are partial; that is, only certain aspects of the source and the target domain are activated in the metaphor. Their function is to serve as inputs to metaphorical mappings and, more generally, to meaning construction, while blending processes can involve more than two inputs, unlike what is the case in CMT. In the case of time, as the discussion of the metaphor in (2.1) indicates, its conceptual structure is expected to involve (a) a mental space of time as it is experienced, which can account for the conceptualization of time as linear and non-reversible motion and, moreover, as quick, slow, etc., and (b) a mental space that contains time as measured by the clock, i.e. clock time.

As already argued, the conceptualization of time manifests structure that cannot be derived from the projection of one input space (in this case, motion) onto time. To put it another way, it cannot be reduced to a two-space mapping. Rather, *both* inputs contribute conceptual structure, which is projected onto a new space: the *blended space* or, for short, the *blend*. The blend is the outcome of conceptual integration; it inherits conceptual elements from both inputs and fuses them to yield *emergent structure*, that is, structure that is not part of either of the inputs. Conceptual structure is *selectively* projected from the inputs onto the blend. This suggests that elements in one input space that have no counterparts in the other input space can also be projected onto the blend. The conceptual structure that is shared by both input spaces is represented in an additional mental space, called the *generic space* (consider, however, that the generic space is typically omitted in conceptual integration diagrams). The input spaces, the generic space and the blend constitute a *conceptual integration network*.

As this sketchy description shows, CIT is a four-space model or, more accurately, a multiple-space model, since more than two inputs may be involved in a conceptual integration network. It is also possible that a blend serves as input to a new blending process, thus triggering a cascade of multiple integrations. The conceptual mappings across inputs and the selective projection of elements from the inputs onto the blend constitute the *composition* of the conceptual integration network. Once the conceptual integration network is composed, it may be completed with information from long-term memory that matches the blended conceptual material and thus further inferences may arise in the blend. This process is usually referred to as *completion* and can be followed by so-called *elaboration*, that is, a mental (or even physical) simulation of the conceptualized situation (e.g., simulating the experience of time as passing quickly when reading or hearing a relevant metaphorical expression). Finally, a central feature of integration networks is their ability to compress diffuse conceptual structure into intelligible and manipulable human-scale knowledge structures in a blended space. Usually referred to as *compression* (Fauconnier & Turner, 2000; Fauconnier, 2005), this phenomenon gives rise to memorable representational structures that can be flexibly expanded in integration networks. To illustrate this, consider the example of a United States citizen living in the present and saying *We won the War of 1812*. The corporate use of *we* involves compression in that the speaker identifies himself/herself with non-existing citizens; a population linked by political institutions becomes a compressed group in the blend, although it is temporally dispersed and contains both alive and deceased members (Fauconnier & Turner, 2000).

Given their multiple-space structure, blends (unlike conceptual metaphors) can account for complex metaphorical mappings. To illustrate this, consider the metaphor *My surgeon is a butcher* (see Grady et al., 1999; for a cognitive semiotic analysis see Brandt & Brandt, 2005). The meaning conveyed by the metaphor is that the surgeon at hand is considered by the patient to be incompetent. However, no butcher is by definition incompetent. For this meaning to arise the surgeon performs surgery in a way similar to a butcher cutting meat; that is to say, for the goal of performing surgery on the operating table (i.e., healing the patient) the surgeon implements the technique commonly used by butchers (i.e., cutting meat with a cleaver), contrary to what would be expected in such a medical procedure. The apparent clash between the goal of surgery and the technique used for that purpose is what gives rise to the meaning of the metaphor. In conceptual terms, this means that there is no one-to-one correspondence between the two domains so that the goals and tools of surgeons would be mapped onto their counterpart in the domain of butchers. Rather, elements from both organizing frames are integrated and, although they may clash in the corresponding frames, they are resolved in the blend.

Now consider another metaphorical expression which builds on the NATION AS SHIP metaphor, a pattern that is commonly used in politics: *With Trent Lott as Senate Majority Leader, and Gingrich at the helm in the House, the list to the Right could destabilize the entire Ship of State.* In the source domain of ships, the presence of two individuals is quite unlikely to cause a ship to list dangerously to one side. Here, it seems that the two officers (the Senate Majority Leader and the Speaker of the House) have considerable influence on national policies in the target domain of state, thus explaining how political instability may arise in the metaphor (see Grady et al., 1999). In this example, again, the meaning of the metaphor is emergent in the sense that both the source and the target project conceptual structure onto the blend. It transpires from the above discussion that CIT can explain metaphorical meanings that override a uni-directional, two-space mapping (see, e.g., Coulson, 1996, 2001; Fauconnier & Turner, 1994, 1998, 2002), this is why it is considered to be particularly suitable for analyzing novel metaphors (Grady et al., 1999).

Finally, a last remark relates to the type of the conceptual integration network that affords the metaphorical mapping. Blends in which inputs have clashing organizing frames exemplify so-called *double scope* networks. Typically found in scientific, artistic and literary creativity (e.g., on mathematics Lakoff & Núñez, 2000; on music Zbikowski, 2001), double scope integration networks constitute the high end in the continuum of blending complexity. By contrast, when conceptual elements and inferences are projected from one input onto another (as in CMT), the emergent network is a *single scope* network. Single scope integration networks arise from integrating input spaces with different, yet compatible organizing frames, one of which is projected to organize the blend; e.g., in the LIFE IS A JOURNEY conceptual metaphor the metaphorical conceptualization of life in the blend inherits the conceptual structure of journeys (for an overview see Fauconnier & Turner, 2002, p. 120–135).[42] Since the boundaries between the two types of networks are not always clear, for the purposes of this study the distinction between single and double scope networks will not concern me.

Having sketched the bulk of CIT, next I proceed to describing the conceptual integration network of time in MG on the basis of corpus-derived examples.

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42. Other types of conceptual integration networks include *simplex* and *mirror* networks. Simplex networks, which constitute the simplest kind of conceptual integration, involve role-to-values mappings as in *Paul is the father of Sally*. In mirror networks, on the other hand, all spaces (i.e., inputs, generic space and the blend) share the same organizing frame (consider, for example, the integration of a 'nineteenth-century clipper on a freight run' with a 'twentieth-century exotic catamaran on a speed run' that both inhere in the frame of sailboats racing along an ocean course).

2.3.3   Time in CIT: The generalized integration network of time

In this section, the generalized integration network of time will be introduced, thus proposing a novel account of time conceptualization in MG in terms of CIT.

For the sake of convenience, metaphor (2.1) is repeated below:

(2.1)   … **ο χρόνος φεύγει   γρήγορα,** κι ο κόσμος θα λαχταρά να ριχτεί
        the   time   goes away   quickly
        αμέσως στο τραγούδι, στο χορό μες στους δρόμους, καρναβάλι απέραντο για το
        βραχνά που θα 'χει τελειώσει.   [HNC]
        '… **time goes away quickly** and the people will burst into singing and dancing
        in the streets in a vast celebration when the pain will be over.'

As already mentioned, the conceptual structure of time instantiated in the metaphor involves motion that is linear, non-reversible and quick (that is to say, *experienced* rather than technical), and clock time (which is measured in temporal units). However, it is not experienced motion itself that is integrated with clock time. Such an integration would yield a conceptualization of the temporal units contained in the clock, rather than a conceptualization of the *events* to which the temporal units correspond in reality; in saying, for example, that *the hours passed pleasantly* one means that the events contained in the hours passed pleasantly, not the hours themselves. Temporal units serve to calculate events, locate them in the timeline, measure their duration, etc., therefore without their association to experienced events temporal units are nothing but void units of measurement. As argued by Fauconnier & Turner (2008, pp. 56–57), it is a blend of compressed events and experienced motion that is integrated with clock time for time conceptualization to arise.

2.3.3.1   *The blend of events and experienced motion E/X*
In conceptual integration terms, all experienced events amount to the integration of two inputs, namely (a) a compressed blend of events E, and (b) a mental space that contains the experienced motion of an observer through physical space X. Humans tend to parse the world into events and, moreover, they have the ability to order them in a sequential manner and categorize them as belonging to the same type or to different types. Consider, however, that the same event may be experienced in different ways by the experiencers involved in it; an event, say a lecture, may be difficult for the lecturer, pleasant for some students but boring for some others, etc. Compressed into a single unit, all events form a blend E. A prominent event type for humans is motion through physical space (say X), which constitutes a subset of E. It is noteworthy that motion from point A to point B in X refers not to its technical sense in physics but to its experience by humans. Thus, going from A to B may be faster than going from C to D, even if distance is the same in both trajectories. Events and experienced motion through physical space are naturally integrated into a new space, the blend E/X, as shown in Diagram 1:

Events
(E)

experience
of events

experience
of motion

Experienced
motion (X)

experiencer
of the event

experiencer
of the motion

extent of the event

distance covered

starting point
of the event

starting point
of motion

endpoint
of the event

destination
of motion

experience of events as experience of motion

experiencer of the event as experiencer of motion

Events as
experienced motion
(E/X)

extent of the event as distance covered

starting point of the event as point of departure

endpoint of the event as destination

Diagram 1. The conceptual integration of events E and experienced motion X.[43]

More specifically, the experiencer in the input of events E has a counterpart in the in-
put of experienced motion X, namely the experiencer of motion in space. The expe-
riencer of events and the moving observer are linked by an identity connector, which
in conceptual integration terms amounts to the vital relation of *Identity*. Identity is
routinely compressed into *Uniqueness*, another vital relation, which fuses two dif-
ferent conceptual elements into a single unit (Fauconnier & Turner, 2002, p. 101).
This is the case here in that, when projected into the blended space, the experiencer
of events and the moving observer become one and the same person. Similarly, the
event in E is integrated with the event of traversing a path, as well as with the path
itself, in X. The conceptual link between the two elements (i.e., an event and travers-
ing a path) is that of the vital relation of Analogy in that events have an onset and an
offset similar to the starting point and the destination in a path. Thus, any event in E
and the event of traversing a path in X are integrated in the blend in terms of Identity
and therefore the former is construed in terms of the latter. To illustrate this, consider
a student who just had a university lecture and utters: *We went through the lecture*

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43. All diagrams in this work are constructed following the conventions put forward by
Fauconnier & Turner (2002). However, it needs to be pointed out that the diagrams do not con-
stitute a formalism of any sort but, rather, skeletal representations of spaces and their integration.

quickly. As suggested by such an utterance, the lecture is construed as a path that the experiencer goes through but also as the event of traversing the path. In other words, in E/X an event becomes a path, and experiencing the event is traversing the path.[44]

In sum, within the blend of events and experienced motion, experiencing an event amounts to moving from a point A (i.e., the onset) to a point B (i.e., the destination). Therefore, the experienced event has extension, which corresponds to its duration. Crucially, as already mentioned, X contains a particular kind of experienced motion: linear and non-reversible.[45] The conceptualization of time as moving linearly is explicitly evoked in the following poetic lines:

(2.2) **Ίσια   ναι πάει ο   χρόνος αλλ' ο έρωτας κάθετα**
       Straight yes goes the time
       και ή κόβονται στα δύο ή που δεν απαντήθηκαν ποτέ   [Οδυσσέας Ελύτης]
       '**Time moves horizontally** but love (moves) vertically and they either cross each other or they have never met'

The preference for linear and non-reversible motion has a strong experiential grounding in that for humans motion *par excellence* takes place in the horizontal axis.[46] This also relates to the human visual apparatus that motivates one-dimensional spatial

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44. In light of this, the blend of events and experienced motion equates with the so-called *Event Structure Metaphor* (cf. Lakoff & Johnson, 1999, p. 179–195), which metaphorically structures the conceptualization of events in terms of motion.

45. This pattern is in contrast with the conceptualization of motional time in East Asian languages such as Mandarin Chinese, Japanese, Southern Min and Korean (but not Vietnamese), which map time onto the vertical axis. These languages have been shown to use the spatial notions of UP and DOWN in order to construe the past and the future respectively (Radden, 2011), possibly motivated by a kind of downward motion such as rolling on a slope (Evans, 2004a, p. 235f) or crawling (Yu, 1998, p. 111). Downward motion is also used in English as in the example cited by Traugott (1975, p. 222): *This is a legacy that has come down to us from the past*. However, unlike East Asian languages, in English the vertical axis is used necessarily with respect to a deictic centre and can also be bi-directional (cf. *My birthday is coming up*). Consider also the conceptualization of kinship along the vertical axis in English as in *ascendants* and *descendants*.

46. Although the grounding of time conceptualization in the horizontal axis is hard to contest, it has been proposed that it predominated in the Western conceptualization of time for cultural reasons and especially under the influence of Christianity (see, e.g., Balslev, 1986; Slife, 1993; Raju, 2003). Christianity prompts a linear conceptualization of time because it designates a starting point for the *ex nihilo* 'genesis of cosmos' (i.e., the creation of the world) by an eternal and timeless God and an endpoint of anticipated salvation, which would be rendered meaningless in the context of a cyclic temporal pattern. This observation presumes that a cultural motivation may be at work, thus filtering the experiential grounding of time and ruling out alternative experiential correlations as, for instance, between time and motion along the vertical axis (as is the case in Eastern cultures), or time and cyclic motion in recurrent natural phenomena as, e.g., in Amondawa (see Sinha et al., 2011).

features (front/back) in the conceptualization of events and time; humans typically assign primacy to what is directly perceived, which is therefore endowed with positive value and lends itself as an input for metaphorical conceptualization (Clark, 1973). Last, but not least, since events cannot be experienced again, when serving as an input for the conceptualization of events linear motion is non-reversible.

An important feature of E/X is that, although events in E/X have a bounded extent from a point A to a point B, different travellers may traverse different paths or move at different speeds. In this way, the conceptual integration between events and motion allows for conceptualizing the experience of a single event as varying across experiencers. This also relates to the subjective experience of events (quite common in everyday life), illustrated in the example: *We went through the lecture quickly*. For the person uttering the expression (e.g., a student) the experience of the lecture seems to have passed quickly. Consider, however, that another student who is not particularly interested in this class may have a different conceptualization of the same event: *We went through the lecture so slowly*. Although the lecture is a bounded interval with a starting point and an endpoint, its experience may vary among experiencers. In conceptual terms, this amounts to construing the conceptualized event at a different speed. Such varied construals of the same event arise in different blends of events and experienced motion, each one designating speed in a different way.

Consider, finally, that it is also possible for a student to utter *The lecture went by quickly* instead of *We went through the lecture quickly.* In this case, we have a different construal of the same event conceptualization in that it is the event of the lecture (rather than its experiencer) that appears to move. This is emergent in the so-called *relative motion scene* (Fauconnier & Turner, 2008, p. 60), whereby motion is assigned to static referents; taking ourselves as the stationary points of reference, although we are indeed moving, we may perceive other entities that are static in nature as moving (e.g., a tree, a road, kilometres, etc.; see also the discussion on fictive motion above). This also applies to events and time, and corresponds to the dual of (E/X), namely (E/X)'. The latter arises from integrating the input space of events E with the dual of the input space of experienced motion (X)', in which the cognizer projects motion onto static referents. Similarly to (E/X), in (E/X)' motion is also linear and non-reversible. In this construal, events and times are conceptualized as moving along a path past a stationary observer, who therefore functions as the reference point relative to which the path and the motion are construed. In short, the conceptualization of events in the motion scene instantiates two complementary patterns, each one assigning motion either to the experiencer of the event or to the event itself.

So far it has been proposed that events are routinely conceptualized in terms of experienced motion. Such events are different for different experiencers and thus constitute *local* events. In order to be measured with temporal units such as days, hours, years, etc. and thus have a numeric duration, they need to be integrated with a mental space of clock time, as will be shown next.

2.3.3.2   *Clock time*

So far, we have seen how the conceptualization of events is metaphorically structured in terms of motion in E/X. However, events are typically measured in temporal units such as days, hours, etc. This means that the conceptualization of time is dependent on time telling devices such as the clock, the hourglass, and the sundial. In the example previously discussed (*ο χρόνος φεύγει γρήγορα* 'time goes away quickly'), the passage of time that is construed as quick and non-reversible is nonetheless measured in a uniform way by the clock, what is usually referred to as *clock time* (for an overview of the history of clock time see Levine (1997, p. 51–80) and Williams (2004, p. 33–39)).

Clock time is experientially grounded in perceived regularities over the passage of time that include, on the one hand, cyclic natural phenomena such as the lunar cycle, the solar year, animal migration, river floods, etc., and, on the other hand, the rhythmic heartbeats in the human body. The role of the latter in the perception of time is illustrated in a creative way in the following poem:

(2.3)   *Μη ζητάτε ρολόι, δεν υπάρχει, γιατί όπως σας εξήγησα βρισκόμαστε σε μια βαθιά σπηλιά. Υπάρχει όμως το μεγάλο εκείνο μάτι μέσα στο πλεχτό κλουβί, υπάρχει και η καρδιά μου που σημαίνει τις ώρες και σας οδηγεί ανάμεσα στο σκοτάδι.*
[Επαμεινώνδας Γονατάς]
'Don't ask for a clock, there isn't any, because, as I explained to you, we are in a deep cave. There is, however, this big eye in the string cage, there's also my heart that signals the hours and guides you through the dark.'

In cognitive psychology, it has been suggested that humans are endowed with so-called *internal clocks*, which allegedly yield a direct sense of time (Friedman, 1990, p. 10–19). Internal clocks amount to repetitive physiological events of the human body, such as the beatings of the heart, respiration, cycles of brain electrical activity and, most notably, circadian clocks, that is, adaptations to the 24-hour cycles of light and temperature found in animals and plants (for an overview see Kyriacou, 2002) and also assumed for humans (Campbell, 1990). However, none of the proposed internal timers has been conclusively established as the perceptual clock of humans, and their involvement in human temporal cognition still remains obscure and debated.

On the other hand, recurrent phenomena that are observable in nature constitute *natural time* (Barnett, 1998) and seem to underpin the emergence of clock time. Among the natural events that carry information about the passage of time, the rise and fall of the sun is probably the most salient; this is why, in the early stages of time telling the sunrise and the sunset functioned as boundaries separating the temporary hours of the day from the temporary hours of night (Williams, 2004, p. 42).[47] The

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47. On the role of the cyclic day in the cognitive construction of clock time see also Fauconnier & Turner (2002, pp. 195–198).

system of calculating the passage of time in terms of the position of the sun in the sky has the day as its fundamental unit and constitutes *solar,* or *sun-based*, *time*, in Williams' terminology. Consider the following poetic extract whereby the absence of daylight does not allow separating days and measuring time:

(2.4) *διατί στον Άδην τον πικρόν ήλιος ουκ ανατέλλει*
      ουδέ το φέγγος του ουρανού το ξέλαμπρόν του στέλλει.
      Χρόνος εδώ ου γίνεται, ημέρα ου χωρίζει,
      αλλά το σκότος τ' άμετρον τρέχει και ομπρός τανύζει.　　　[Μπεργαδής]

      'because in the cruel Hades the sun does not rise
      neither does the sky shed its bright light.
      There is no Time here, days are not separated,
      instead the infinite darkness spreads and stretches ahead.'

Such natural phenomena that point to the passage of time are recurrent; in other words, they are *cyclic*. This enables the metaphorical conceptualization of time as a wheel, cited in (2.5) below, which is grounded in the succession of the seasons and the corresponding rhythms of agricultural activities:

(2.5) *ανθεί, καρπίζει, γεωργά, φυτρώνει και μυρίζει,*
      χρόνος ο δωδεκάπλοκος ωσάν τροχός γυρίζει.　　　[Μπεργαδής]

      'it blossoms, seeds, harvests, grows and smells,
      time with its twelve limbs goes round like a wheel.'

In conceptual integration terms, natural phenomena that indicate the passage of time are compressed into a blend that is called the *cyclic day* C (Fauconnier & Turner, 2008, p. 57). Along these lines, successively recurrent days and nights are blended together into a single unit through compression (in the above poem, e.g., the successive phenomena involved in a seed growing into a plant are compressed into a unit that amounts to the circularity of time in nature). Nowadays, however, we no longer rely on a sun-based system of time measurement; this has been replaced by the mechanical clock, a technological and material artefact that developed more recently in industrialized societies.[48] Consider (2.6) whereby the rhythmic sounds of the clock (expressed through onomatopoeia and repetition) signal the hours:

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48. According to Levine (1997), though, between sun-based and clock-based time ('nature time' and 'clock time' in his terms), there is an intermediary level of time keeping which is grounded in particular events shared among individuals (consider, e.g., two people arranging to meet as soon as the cows come home). This so-called *event time* constitutes a transition from the concrete natural time to the abstract formal time of the clocks and purports to be still in use in more traditional cultures.

(2.6) *Τικ   τακ τικ τακ*   [Αλέξανδρος Ίσαρης]
       Σημαίνει μία δύο δώδεκα
       'Tick tock tick tock
       signalling one two twelve o'clock'

The product of this historical process was the current globalized system of time measurement that involves time zones, two forms of material artefacts, namely (a) analog clocks with two to three rotating indicators, and (b) digital clocks with numeric readouts, and a number of related conceptual models, particularly the standard division of the day into hours, minutes, and seconds (Williams, 2004, p. 48).[49]

In fact, however, what the historically emergent clock-based time did was to recreate and regularize natural rhythms, which are now symbolically instantiated in the rotating rods of the analog clock. In conceptual terms, this amounts to a conceptual integration between the cyclic day C with a mental space of temporal units measured by time telling devices, say A (Fauconnier & Turner, 2008, p. 57). The blend of natural and mechanical time is represented in the diagram below:

Diagram 2. The blend of natural and mechanical time M (Fauconnier & Turner, 2008, p. 57).

The emergent product in the blend, say M, is a formal system of representing the cyclicity of natural time and divides time into minutes, hours, days, weeks, months, etc. The two inputs, namely solar time and mechanical time, are integrated by virtue

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49. Research in the cultural anthropology of time has shown that systems of time telling are extremely varied from culture to culture from a synchronic, ethnographic perspective (Munn, 1992, p. 108). In more traditional cultures, such as Inuit (MacDonald, 1999) and Amondawa (Sinha et al., 2011), units of temporal measurement are more closely connected to observable natural phenomena. By contrast, the Western formal system of hours, minutes, etc. has dissociated time from happenings in the natural environment. It is in this sense that the Western time seems more abstract compared to non-Western time, which is more closely associated with solar time (see Friedman, 1990, pp. 108–109).

of Identity via Analogy; the circular repetitiveness of the temporal units in the clock in A is analogous to the cyclicity of natural phenomena in C. To illustrate this, consider that the zenith of the sun in the sky is technically represented as the two rotating rods coinciding in vertical position and pointing to twelve on the face of the analog clock. Moreover, both inputs involve physical motion in space, namely the sun and the moon moving across the sky in the natural realm, and the rotating rods in the analog clock, the sand in the hourglass, etc. in the technological domain. Given that, the temporal units that emerge from the mapping of natural phenomena onto the slots of the clock (years, days, hours, minutes, etc.) also purport to move. However, they differ from the motion of events in that the distance covered within M is delineated and homogeneous. To put it simply, in the case of hours, days, etc. the starting and the terminal point of the distance covered is one and the same across experiencers and latitudes, whereas it is also independent of the form in which it is indicated, whether this is a couple of rotating rods in the case of the analog clock or a set of flashing numbers on a screen in the case of the digital clock. In addition, motion in natural phenomena and subsequently in the mechanics of the clock essentially follows a periodical rhythm. It thus transpires that motion in the blend will also be invariant. In a rather creative way, the uniform repetition featured by the clock is illustrated in the poem below, with the personified clock addressing the following lines:

(2.7) *Είπε το Ωρολόγιον· «Είν' η ζωή μου κρύα*
        και άχρους, και σκληρά.
        Είναι ομοία δι' εμέ πάσα της γης ημέρα.
        Παρασκευή και Σάββατον, Κυριακή, Δευτέρα,
        δεν έχουσι διαφοράν. Ζω – χωρίς να ελπίζω.
        Η μόνη διασκέδασις, η μόνη ποικιλία
        είναι, εν τη μοιραία μου, πικρά μονοτονία,
        του κόσμου η φθορά.   [Κ. Π. Καβάφης]

        'The Clock said: "My life is cold
        and colorless and dull."
        Every single day is the same for me.
        Friday and Saturday, Sunday, Monday,
        make no difference. I live – but with no hope.
        My only pleasure, the only diversity
        in this bitter monotonous destiny of mine
        is the world's decay.'

In other words, the events contained in M (i.e., temporal units) are *universal* and are strictly bounded between a point of onset and a point of termination, while their passage follows a stable rhythm, which corresponds to a specific set of standard temporal units (e.g., an hour consists of 60 minutes, a week of 7 days). It needs to

be pointed out, however, that M has emergent structure not derived from the input of natural time. Unlike solar time in C, within M, every category of universal events consists of a specific set of temporal units, which are all of smaller size but, crucially, of the same kind. In this way, an accumulation of a set of smaller temporal units yields a new, super-ordinate category of temporal units.

In sum, the shift from a natural to a more formal system of time measurement has shaped a new cognitive ecology that has pushed time telling toward standardization. In doing so, it has provided a uniform, culturally available backdrop against which social activities conform, thus regulating social life (Malinowski, 1927, p. 203). Like all cognitive and cultural artefacts viewed in the context of distributed cognition (see Hutchins, 1995, 2005), the clock is an invented device that embodies intentionality and facilitates existing practices, or enacts new ones. Situated in material and symbolic culture, the clock is both world-directed and mind-directed in that it affords, on the one hand, a number of social practices and, on the other, a set of shared conceptualizations (Williams, 2004). However, as Guyau has pointed out (1890/1988, p. 145), "time is not intrinsic to an hourglass". In other words, clock time needs to be combined with our experience of events for the concept of time to arise. This will be discussed in the following section.

2.3.3.3 *The concept of time as a blend of experienced events and clock time*
In the previous sections, it was suggested that experienced events are metaphorically structured in terms of motion whereas clock time is a technologically induced development of a solar-based system of time reckoning. However, neither experienced events nor clock time alone carry temporal information; rather, in our conceptualization of time, experienced events *correspond* to temporal units. In what follows, it will be proposed that the conceptual structure of time is organized in terms of motion, as argued by Lakoff & Johnson (1980, 1999), yet not in the form of a two-space, uni-directional mapping, as assumed in CMT, but in a conceptual integration network of experienced events and clock time (Fauconnier & Turner, 2008). Specifically, it will be shown that such a network is *generalized* in the sense that it is established in the cognitive system and is linguistically manifested in conventional, linguistically entrenched expressions like those found in everyday discourse.[50]

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50. According to Fauconnier (2009, p. 159), in order to construct and manipulate generalized integration networks, the following capacities are required, not attested to date in any species other than humans: (a) the cognitive operation of conceptual integration; (b) the cultural elaboration of integration networks over historical time (e.g., metaphorical networks for concepts such as time, anger, death, etc.); (c) templates for specific types of integration such as counterfactuals; (d) the capacity to learn entrenched networks and transmit them over generations; and (e) the capacity to construct material anchors that reify conceptual networks and enable or facilitate their transfer and diffusion.

As already mentioned, for the concept of time to emerge, experienced events are measured in temporal units. Itself a result of conceptual integration, clock time M serves as the second input to the conceptual structure of time, as shown in the following diagram:

Experienced events
(E/X)   Clock time (M)

experienced
events   temporal units

experienced   uniform and
motion   homogeneous
                                          motion

experienced time   clock time

experienced events measured   The generalized integration
in temporal units   network of time
                                          (E/X/M)
experienced motion as uniform
motion

experienced time as clock time

Diagram 3. The generalized integration network of time E/X/M, according to Fauconnier & Turner (2008).

Since both input spaces contain events (E/X contains experienced events and M temporal units that are universal events), the two inputs are naturally fused in a new, blended space, represented as E/X/M. Within the blend of time, local events in E/X are mapped onto universal events in M and hence the notion of temporal measurement arises. By being fused with a temporal unit in E/X/M, any local event becomes numerically measured in a way parallel to spatial measurement. As a result, every event can have not only extension but also a numerically measured duration and, thus, in linguistic terms, we may speak of a three-minute long interval or an event that lasted for two hours. The conceptualization of time that is emergent in the blend inherits conceptual elements from both inputs, namely linear and non-reversible motion and sequential order from E/X and a numeric system of measurement from M.

Crucially, the integration of experienced events and clock time exploits both variants of the blend of events and experienced motion already discussed in Section 2.3.3.1, namely (E/X), in which Ego moves, and (E/X)', in which events move. The input of clock time M remains invariant in all versions of the blend of time. In the former case, the emergent conceptualization is that of Ego moving in time and will be dubbed here the *Ego-moving construal of time* (cf. the TIME IS A LANDSCAPE conceptual metaphor, also known as the Moving-Ego Metaphor; Lakoff & Johnson, 1999, p. 145–147; e.g., *We are approaching Christmas*). By contrast, the integration of events in the relative motion scene (E/X)' with clock time yields a conceptualization of motional time that will be referred here as the *Time-moving construal* (cf. the TIME IS A MOVING OBJECT conceptual metaphor, also known as the Moving-Time Metaphor; Lakoff & Johnson, 1999, p. 141–144; e.g., *Christmas is approaching).* In terms of notation, the two versions of the generalized integration network of time are represented as (E/X/M) and (E/X/M)', the former corresponding to the Ego-moving construal of time and the latter to the Time-moving construal. In essence, the two construals that arise in the generalized integration network of time recast the conceptual metaphors of time proposed in CMT,[51] which are shown below:

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51. A more fine-grained classification of spatio-temporal metaphors has been proposed according to the reference point in relation to which motion is construed (Núñez & Sweetser, 2006; see also Clark, 1973; Núñez, 1999; Moore, 2011, 2014; Zinken, 2009; on temporal frames of reference see Kranjec, 2006; Tenbrink, 2011; Evans, 2013). Given that time can also be construed independently of Ego (as in, e.g., *Tuesday follows Monday* and *February comes before March*), spatio-temporal mappings are distinguished into Time-Reference-Point (Time-RP) and Ego-Reference-Point (Ego-RP) metaphors. In the Ego-RP model, on the one hand, it is an observer that serves as the landmark relative to which motion is construed, whether it is Ego or time that is moving. In the Time-RP pattern, by contrast, there is a motionless sequence that has a front/back orientation irrespective of Ego's location and therefore there is no specification of the present time "now" (on the psychological reality of the Time-RP metaphor see Núñez, Motz & Teuscher, 2006). This metaphor thus distinguishes posteriority (reference to a temporal unit as being later than another in a sequence) from future (reference to times later than 'now'), and anteriority (reference to a temporal unit as earlier than another in a sequence) from past (reference to times as earlier than 'now') (on anteriority and posteriority from a cognitive linguistic perspective see Athanasiadou, 2007). As expected, this pattern holds also for the conceptualization of events as in *The lecture will be followed by a reception* (Fauconnier & Turner, 2008, p. 61). In more general terms, the distinction between Ego-RP and Time-RP metaphors relates to the A-series and the B-series of time proposed in the philosophy of time (McTaggart 1908), which refer to a dynamic conceptualization of time in deictic terms and a static, motionless ordering of events, respectively. The former amounts to a "tenserist", deictic account of time while the latter to a "detenserist" account of anteriority and posteriority (Sattig, 2006, p. 2).

TIME IS A LANDSCAPE (the Moving-Ego Metaphor)

Locations on the observer's path of motion	→ Times
The motion of the observer	→ The 'passage' of time
The distance covered	→ The amount of time 'passed'

TIME IS A MOVING OBJECT (the Moving-Time Metaphor)

Objects	→ Times
The motion of objects	→ The 'passage' of time
The distance moved	→ The amount of time 'passed'

In the remainder of this chapter, I aim to sketch the conceptual structure of time in MG as manifested in conventional metaphorical expressions found in the HNC. This description will include, as already mentioned, the Ego-moving construal of time and the Time-moving construal but it will also extend to other patterns of time conceptualization such as the Time-flowing construal; the conceptualization of subjective time; the conceptualization of time in memory; and the conceptualization of the past and the future. In doing so, I will demonstrate that all construals arise naturally in the generalized integration network of time.

2.4   The conceptual structure of time in MG

2.4.1   The Ego-moving construal of time

As expected, the Ego-moving construal of time is evidenced in word combinations of the lexeme *χρόνος* 'time' and other lexical units in the semantic field of time with verbs that denote motion. The most prototypical collocation of time under the Ego-moving construal is that with the motion verb *περνάω* 'to pass'. This collocation is the most productive in the selected text types in the HNC (71.7%) and is evidenced in the following examples:

(2.8)   *Πρόσφατη έρευνα έδειξε ότι μόλις το 4% των Ελλήνων ανδρών*
     περνούν   χρόνο   με το παιδί τους το σαββατοκύριακο,
     pass-they   time-ACC
     έναντι 40% των Δανών.   [HNC]
     'A recent study shows that only 4% of the Greek men **spend time** with their children during the weekend, instead of 40% of the Danish men.'

(2.9)   *Από τα εφηβικά του χρόνια στρατευμένος στο προοδευτικό και*
     αντιφασιστικό κίνημα,
     πέρασε   χρόνια   ατελείωτα   σε φυλακές και εξορίες.   [HNC]
     passed-he years-ACC endless
     'Having been engaged in the progressive, anti-fascist movement since his adolescence, **he spent endless years** in prison and in exile.'

The above linguistic expressions of time constitute prototypical word combinations in MG and construe an interval designated by a temporal lexeme (*χρόνος* 'time' or specific temporal units such as *χρόνια* 'years') as a path along which the experiencer is moving. Alternatively, times may be construed as a point the moving observer reaches in the trajectory, as suggested by the following temporal expressions:

(2.10) *Οι γυναίκες μιας ηλικίας* **πλησιάζουν** **στα** **τελευταία** **χρόνια**
                                  approach-they **to-the** **last**   **years**
        της αναπαραγωγικής τους ζωής.   [HNC]
        'Women at this age **approach the last years** of their reproductive life.'

(2.11) *"Μας γυρίζει χρόνια πίσω"* λέει για το σχολικό σύμβουλο
        Us   **returns-it** **years** **back**
        ο πρόεδρος της ΕΛΜΕ Λάρισας Γιάννης Μπέφας.   [HNC]
        '"**This takes us years back**", says the president of ELME Giannis Mpefas with regards to the school advisor.'

Here the motion verbs *πλησιάζω* (plisiázo) 'to approach' and *γυρίζω* (γirízo) 'to return', denoting forward and backward motion respectively, collocate with *χρόνια* 'years'. Although both collocations involve linear, directed motion, directionality is derived from the frame structure of each motion verb (*πλησιάζω* 'to approach' and *γυρίζω* 'to return'), contained in the mental space of experienced motion X and then projected onto the blend (E/X/M). Therefore, in the Ego-moving construal of time, motion is not committed to a specific directionality while, as suggested by (2.11), the observer may be caused by an external force, thus suggesting that motion is not necessarily self-propelled.

    Similarly, Ego moving in time can be expressed through another prototypical deictic motion verb, namely *πηγαίνω* 'to go', as shown below:

(2.12) ***Πηγαίνουμε πολλά χρόνια πίσω*** *με την πρακτική που*
        Go-we   **many** **years**   **back**
        ακολουθήθηκε στο συγκεκριμένο νομοσχέδιο.   [HNC]
        'With the practice that was implemented after this particular bill **we go many years back**.'

(2.13) *Έτσι* **πηγαίνουμε στο** **μέλλον,** *με σχέδιο, πρόγραμμα και*
                go-we   **to-the** **future**
        σοβαρότητα για ανάπτυξη και κοινωνική δικαιοσύνη.   [HNC]
        'In this way **we move toward the future** having a serious plan and an open agenda for development and social justice.'

Unlike the previous examples, consider that the semantics of *πηγαίνω* 'to go' does not predict the direction of motion (see Antonopoulou & Nikiforidou, 2002). As

suggested by the above linguistic expressions, direction can be explicitly specified, as is the case of *πίσω* (píso) 'back'[52] in (2.12), in accordance with our cultural understanding of the future being ahead and the past behind, or implicitly inferred, as is the case of (2.13) (on the conceptualization of the past and the future see Section 2.4.6).

Finally, the Ego-moving construal of time is instantiated in expressions in which the passage of time amounts to a journey of the experiencer along the timeline. An inference typically associated with a journey in time is that this amounts to going back to past events. This is illustrated in the following prototypical word combinations, cited in (2.14) and (2.15):

(2.14)   *πριν προχωρήσουμε* **το   ταξίδι   μας στο   χρόνο**
                              the   journey   our in-the time
         και τη διερεύνηση των ασθενειών που βασάνιζαν και ταλαιπωρούν ακόμη και
         σήμερα την ανθρωπότητα, είναι απαραίτητο να δώσουμε ένα διαχρονικό ορισμό
         της ασθένειας.   [HNC]
         '… before we move further in this **journey in time**, exploring the diseases that
         have been torturing humanity, it is essential to provide a diachronic definition
         of disease.'

(2.15)   *Οι επισκέπτες της Βουλής, μέσα από τα έργα τέχνης της συλλογής της, έχουν*
         την ευκαιρία να περιπλανηθούν στο τοπίο, στον πολιτισμό και στην ιστορία της
         πατρίδας μας …
         να ταξιδέψουν στον   χώρο και τον χρόνο.   [HNC]
         to   travel-they in-the space and the time
         'Through the works of art in the Parliament's collection the visitors have a chance
         to wander in the landscapes, the culture and the history of our country … **to
         travel in space and time**.'

Both (2.14) and (2.15) evoke a conceptualization of time as a journey, yet through different linguistic expressions, namely a noun and a verb phrase, respectively (note that in the latter the journey is said to take place both in space and time). Although, in this construal, the experiencer of time corresponds to a traveller, there is no such linguistic evidence in the corpus.

In sum, in MG, the Ego-moving construal of time is manifested in collocations of the semantic field of time with motion verbs, thus forming prototypical word combinations. It is not without significance that the motion verbs that are used in the lexicalization of the Ego-moving construal of time recruit their frame organization (e.g., direction of motion) and import it to the conceptual structure of time.

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52. On the semantics of *μπροστά* 'ahead' and *πίσω* 'back' see Haralambopoulou (2010).

Finally, as the search in the HNC suggests, it is worth noting that other prototypical motion verbs such as *έρχομαι* 'to come', *τρέχω* (trékho) 'to run', etc. are not used in relation to the Ego-moving construal of time. Such motion verbs, though, apply to the lexicalization of the Time-moving construal, as will be shown next.

2.4.2 The Time-moving construal

In this section, the Time-moving construal will be discussed in the light of conventional expressions in MG. In this scenario, a stationary observer is facing toward a fixed direction while an indefinitely long sequence of objects is moving by, usually from front to back. Similarly to the Ego-moving construal of time, the most prototypical word combination in the Time-moving construal also involves *περνάω* 'to pass' (collocating with either *χρόνος* 'time' or temporal units), but also extends to the noun and the participle derived from it: *πέρασμα* (pérasma) 'passage' and *περασμένος, -η, -o* (perasménos,-i,-o) 'passed' (61.3% of its occurrences in the HNC). Such collocations are exemplified below:

(2.16) *Ελπίζω, όμως, ότι **όσο περνάει ο   χρόνος***
                         as   passes   the   time-NOM
        και πλησιάζουμε στην επίτευξη των στόχων, η εικόνα θα βελτιωθεί.   [HNC]
        'I hope, though, that **as time goes by** and we are getting closer to our goals the picture will get better.'

(2.17) ***Πέρασαν χρόνια   και απαιτήθηκαν πολλοί αγώνες***
        Passed   years-NOM
        και προσπάθειες.   [HNC]
        '**Many years have passed** and many efforts and struggles have been required.'

(2.18) *ο Γκρέκο διαμόρφωσε **με   το   πέρασμα του   χρόνου***
                         with the   passage of-the time
        ένα δικό του, πολύ προσωπικό εικαστικό ιδίωμα.   [HNC]
        '**Over the passage of time** Greco formed his own idiosyncratic visual language.'

(2.19) *… οφείλεται στην απογοήτευση που προκάλεσε η πορεία ανάπτυξης της*
        *οικονομίας της Ευρωζώνης **την περασμένη χρονιά**.*   [HNC]
                         the passed   year
        'this is due to the disappointment that ensued from the progression of the eurozone's finances **last year**.'

A typical implicature when construing time as passing is that it will not come back, as already mentioned with respect to *φεύγω* 'to go away, to leave' in (1). This is also the case with *περνάω* 'to pass', as shown in the following poem:

(2.20) *Η μητέρα μου πέθανε*
       η αγαπημένη μου έφυγε
       οι σύντροφοι με προδώσανε
       τα   χρόνια   περάσανε
       the years-NOM passed
       'the years passed'

       τώρα μπορώ να κοιμάμαι ήσυχος.
       Όλα έγιναν.   [Τάσος Λειβαδίτης]

       'My mother died
       my beloved left
       my comrades betrayed me
       the years passed
       now I can sleep calm.
       All has happened'.

Here the connotation of loss (already derived from our folk understanding of time as fleeting and irreversible) is contextually enhanced by virtue of parallelism, a rhetorical figure in which a syntactic construction is repeated in successive sentences. In (2.20), parallelism amounts to a set of successive clauses that contain a noun phrase denoting a beloved person (*η μητέρα μου* 'my mother', *η αγαπημένη μου* 'my beloved', *οι σύντροφοι* 'my comrades') collocating with a verb in a past tense denoting loss, physical or other (*πέθανε* 'died', *έφυγε* 'left', *προδώσανε* 'betrayed'). Instantiating a similar grammatical construction and referring to different experiences of loss, these clauses trigger an iconic interpretation of *τα χρόνια περάσανε* 'the years passed', so that the concept of loss is not only activated but is further specified as irreversible and painful. Such an interpretation clearly departs from the coded meaning of *περνάω* 'to pass'.[53]

    The construal of time as a moving entity is instantiated in conventional expressions in which time collocates with other prototypical verbs of motion such as *προχωρώ* 'to advance, to move on', *πηγαίνω* 'to go', *έρχομαι* 'to come', *πλησιάζω* 'to approach', *φτάνω* 'to arrive' and *τρέχω* 'to run'. All these verbs construe motion as linear, yet each one has its own frame structure, contained in (X)' and ascribed to time in the blend of events and clock time (E/X/M)'. Consider, for example, the motion verb *προχωρώ* 'to advance, to move on' which profiles motion in forward direction, as evidenced below:

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53. This observation is in line with Coulson & Oakley (2005), who argue that coded meaning guides the construction of blended spaces and thus plays a major role in structuring the blend, yet it may play a minor role in interpreting it due to contextual cues.

(2.21) ***Καθώς ο χρόνος προχωρεί**, προβλήματα που άλλοτε*
     As   the   time   advances
     δεν υπήρχαν στον κυπριακό αθλητισμό τώρα αποτελούν μια πιεστική
     πραγματικότητα.   [HNC]
     '**As time goes by**, problems that once were absent in Cypriot sports have now
     become a painful reality.'

In the next examples, the deictic motion verbs *πηγαίνω* 'to go' and *έρχομαι* 'to come' are metaphorically ascribed to time:

(2.22) ***Πάνε χρόνια**   από τότε που κατέβηκε τελευταία φορά*
     Go   years-NOM
     σε διαδήλωση.   [HNC]
     '**It's been a long time** since he last joined a protest.'

(2.23) *Όμως τώρα **έρχεται η ώρα των πράξεων**.*   [HNC]
     comes   the hour of-the actions
     'But now **the time for action has come**.'

As suggested by the metaphor in (2.22), *πηγαίνω* 'to go' construes an interval as extending from the deictic centre of the speaker to a point in the past, which here is explicitly designated (*από τότε που* … 'since …'). The reverse pattern is enacted by *έρχομαι* 'to come', prompting a construal of time as coming from ahead toward Ego.

    When moving from ahead toward Ego, time can therefore be construed as approaching, or reaching, its destination. Such construals are evoked through the motion verbs *πλησιάζω* 'to approach' and *φτάνω* 'to arrive', which are illustrated in the following temporal expressions:

(2.24) *Μετά από ένα χρονικό σημείο και κυρίως*
     ***όσο θα πλησιάζει ο χρόνος των εκλογών**,*
     as   will approach the time-NOM of-the elections
     θα αρχίσει να ενεργοποιείται η έλξη που ασκεί η μελλοντική εξουσία.   [HNC]
     'After a certain point and **as the elections will be approaching** power will become more and more attractive.'

(2.25) ***Έφτασε η μέρα** που τόσοι Έλληνες περιμένουν!*   [HNC]
     Arrived the day-NOM
     '**The day** that so many Greeks have been longing for **has arrived**!'

Finally, *τρέχω* 'to run' differs from the motion verbs previously mentioned in that it profiles the manner of motion, namely moving fast. When assigned to time, as in (2.26) below, it naturally gives rise to an implication of time as racing:

(2.26)   *Αποτέλεσμα είναι* **να τρέχει ο χρόνος**
                          to   runs   the time-NOM
         σε βάρος της υποψηφιότητας αυτής.   [HNC]
         'The result is that **time runs** against this candidacy.'

Interestingly, as the search in the HNC suggests, *τρέχω* 'to run' seems to collocate only with *χρόνος* 'time' rather than with lexemes denoting temporal units (cf. ?*οι ώρες/ οι μέρες τρέχουν* ?'hours/ days run'), unlike the motion verbs previously analyzed under the Time-moving construal.

So far, I offered a sketchy description of the two versions of the generalized integration network of time in MG, the former construing the passage of time as motion of Ego in the timeline and the latter as events moving past Ego. In the following section, I move to the conceptualization of motional time as a flowing substance.

2.4.3 The Time-flowing construal

Consider now the following instances of motional time, derived from the HNC:

(2.27)   **Όσο κυλάει ο χρόνος,**   *ο καθένας πιστεύει ότι θα είναι*
         As flows   the time-NOM
         ο πρώτος που θα νικήσει την ασθένεια.   [HNC]
         '**As time goes by**, everyone believes that they will be the first to defeat the disease.'

(2.28)   **Οι εβδομάδες κυλούσαν**   *και η μέρα του μοιραίου*
         The weeks   were-flowing
         ραντεβού με τον Θανάση πλησίαζε.   [HNC]
         '**Weeks were passing by** and the day of the critical meeting with Thanasis was getting closer.'

The passage of time in (2.27) and of weeks in (2.28) is evoked through the motion verb *κυλάω* 'to flow' that pertains to a particular kind of motion, that of flowing. In other words, time passing is metaphorically represented as a flowing liquid, thus manifesting what has traditionally been viewed a variant of the Time-moving metaphor: the *Time-flowing construal*. Referred to as the Time-Substance Variation (Lakoff & Johnson, 1999, p. 144–145), this metaphor has long been discussed in the context of CMT as comprising the following mappings:

The Time-Substance Variation

Substance	→ Time
Amount of substance	→ Duration of time
The size of the amount	→ The extent of duration
Motion of substance past the observer	→ The 'passage' of time

The association between the passage of time and the flowing of water is highly motivated in experiential terms. Given that the flowing of the water is inherently linear, continuous and non-reversible, it can be naturally mapped onto the passage of time, which is typically perceived, as already mentioned, as an ordered sequence of non-reversible events (e.g., *ο χρόνος/ η ζωή δεν γυρνάει πίσω* 'time/ life doesn't come back' [Dictionary of Standard Modern Greek]). However, under the Time-flowing construal, unlike the Time-moving construal described in the previous section, motion is not self-propelled, it lacks a point of departure and arrival, it has a specific directionality, and Ego has no agency. Such motional properties relate to the frame of FLOWING, which is thus metaphorically imported to time. Any attempt to account for this conceptual pattern, therefore, needs to take into consideration frame structure related to flowing but also our folk understanding of time that tallies with the act of flowing: linearity, continuity, and non-reversibility. This motivates an integration of experienced events with flowing in (E/X)'. When the latter are integrated with clock time M, the construal of time as a flowing substance arises in (E/X/M)'. Although not previously analyzed in the blending literature, the Time-flowing construal can be finely accommodated within the generalized integration network of time. With its ability to integrate frame structure from both inputs blending hones our analytic tools in explaining the conceptual structure of time.

In MG, there is yet another verb that prototypically denotes flowing and applies to time: *ρέω* (réo) also means 'to flow', yet it is confined to high register. This appears in verb phrases with *χρόνος* 'time' as the subject, as in (2.29) below, while the derived noun is commonly used in the collocation *η ροή του χρόνου* 'the flow of time':[54]

(2.29) **Ο   χρόνος ρέει   αργά** (…) *μέσα στην αιωνιότητα των σχέσεων*
         The time   flows
         και τη χαλαρότητα των υποχρεώσεων.   [HNC]
         '**Time goes by slowly** with relationships promising to be eternal and obligations that are loose and relaxed.'

Finally, a last issue to be addressed concerns the conceptualization of the amount of time passed or passing, namely duration. Two distinct patterns have been proposed for the conceptualization of duration, namely as a linear distance (i.e., along the horizontal axis) or in terms of quantity (i.e., in the three-dimensional, vertical axis).[55] In general, languages make use of both patterns, however in every language

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54. Interestingly, a search in the Perseus corpus has demonstrated that *ρέω* 'to flow' was used to denote the passage of time already in Classical Greek: *ούπιρρέων γὰρ τιμιώτερος χρόνος/ ἔσται πολίταις τοῖσδε* 'for time, flowing on, will bring greater honour to these citizens' [Aesch. *Eum.* 853].

55. This should not be confused, though, with the vertical, *one-dimensional* axis of up/down in which the conceptualization of time is grounded in East Asian languages (see Yu, 1998).

one pattern typically prevails over the other, thus prompting distinct pre-linguistic mental representations of time (Casasanto et al., 2004). In experiential terms, the two patterns are independently motivated by correlations that are probably established pre-linguistically in primary interactions with the physical world (see Clark, 1973); humans may associate time either with linear space by observing that more time passes as moving objects travel farther, or with amounts of substances accumulating in three-dimensional space by observing that more time passes as substances increase in quantity. When one pattern prevails over the other in a language, it seems that this language opts for a "differential experiential focus" (Kövesces, 2005, p. 246), which amounts to a dominant mental representation of time in the conceptual system (Casasanto, 2008).

In MG, in particular, a search in the HNC suggests that, although both patterns are instantiated in conventional expressions, the quantity-based pattern clearly prevails over the distance-based one (72.3% vs. 27.7%).[56] The quantity-based lexicalization of duration in MG amounts to the collocation *πολύς/ λίγος χρόνος* 'much/ little time'. However, it is also possible to lexicalize an interval through the expression *χρονικό διάστημα* 'timespan' (lit. 'temporal space'), whereby *διάστημα* 'space' clearly evokes linear distance and, moreover, is usually accompanied by an adjective that denotes length: *μεγάλο/ μικρό χρονικό διάστημα* 'long/ short interval' (lit. 'big/ small temporal space'). When time is talked about in terms of volume, the mental representation of time corresponds to the vertical axis and is constituted by the CONTAINMENT image schema. By contrast, when construed as a linear distance, time evokes a mental representation along the horizontal axis constituted by the PATH image schema.[57]

Having examined the different construals of time in the generalized integration network, in the following section I will discuss time as passing slowly or quickly or as coming to a halt: so-called subjective time.

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56. Note that, by contrast, in English the distance-based pattern is the dominant one with the quantity-based one being more marginal (cf. *a long/ short time*, *much/ little time*). As suggested by Casasanto et al. (2004), some languages show a preference for distance metaphors (e.g., English, Indonesian) while others for quantity metaphors (e.g., Greek, Spanish).

57. An interesting finding relates to the historical origins of the lexicalization of duration in Greek. A study by Georgakopoulos & Piata (2012) has shown that in Classical Greek both patterns are available and while the meaning of volume is expressed through one single, albeit prototypical, modifier (*πολύς* 'much'), time as linear distance appears in a constellation of different constructions (*δηρός/ μακρύς/ συχνός/ δολιχός χρόνος* 'long time'). However, in later stages their co-occurrence shifts to a progressive fading of the distance-based pattern in favour of the quantity-based one.

2.4.4 The conceptualization of subjective time

It has already been mentioned that, in everyday discourse, time can be construed as passing quickly: *ο χρόνος φεύγει γρήγορα* 'time goes away quickly'. Next, consider the following examples from the HNC, all of them manifesting some variation in the speed of motion:

(2.30) *Τοίχοι διαλυμένοι, στέγες γκρεμισμένες, η πισίνα κατεστραμμένη γεμάτη άμμο*
         και ψάρια και, το κυριότερο, άνθρωποι στα όρια του πανικού με τον φόβο και την
         απορία ζωγραφισμένα στα πρόσωπά τους τριγυρίζουν αλλόφρονες, προσπαθώντας
         να συλλέξουν όσα από τα υπάρχοντά τους σώθηκαν από τη μανία του κύματος.
         Οι επόμενες ώρες κυλούν βασανιστικά αργά.   [HNC]
         The next   hours flow   painfully   slowly
         'Cracked walls, falling roofs, a ruined swimming pool full of sand and fish, and,
         above all, people on the verge of panic attack with fear and agony on their face,
         frantically wandering around and trying to collect whatever has remained after
         the forceful waves. **The next hours flowed painfully slowly**.'

(2.31) *Αφήνουμε τη Βυτίνα.*
         Τι   γρήγορα που περνάει ο   καιρός στην εξοχή! Ούτε που το
         How quickly   that passes   the time
         καταλάβαμε πότε διαβήκαν κιόλας πέντε μέρες. Σήμερα φεύγουμε.   [HNC]
         'We are leaving Vytina behind. **How quickly time passes** in the countryside!
         We hardly realized how the five days passed. Today we are departing.'

(2.32) *«Δεν το αντέχω εγώ το μπάσκετ, παραείναι ψυχοφθόρο (…) Όταν χάνεις*
         δεν κυλάει ο   χρόνος, δεν περνούν τα δευτερόλεπτα …»   [HNC]
         not flows   the time   not pass   the seconds-NOM
         'Personally I can't cope with basketball games, they are way too stressful …
         When you lose you feel **as if time doesn't flow, as if the seconds don't pass**.'

In (2.30) and (2.31), the adjectives *αργά* (argá) 'slowly' and *γρήγορα* 'quickly' accompany the motion verbs *κυλάω* 'to flow' and *περνάω* 'to pass' respectively, thus construing time as passing at a varied speed. By contrast, in (2.32), the passage of time is explicitly negated (*δεν κυλάει ο χρόνος* … 'time doesn't flow'). Such construals essentially give rise to a conceptualization of time in subjective terms, that is, as its passage is felt by the experiencer against clock time, which remains stable and invariant for all experiencers.[58]

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58. It is worth pointing out that, in corpus data, the conceptualization of subjective time appears only under the Time-moving and the Time-flowing construals. It seems that the Ego-moving construal of time does not allow for a conceptualization of subjective time (consider that an expression like ?*Πέρασα γρήγορα τις ώρες της ανάπαυλας* ?'I passed quickly the hours of relaxation' does not sound natural in MG, unlike *Πέρασαν γρήγορα οι ώρες της ανάπαυλας* 'The hours of relaxation passed quickly').

In more general terms, such linguistic evidence from everyday discourse attests to so-called *subjective time* (Flaherty, 1999), also referred to as *psychological time* (Fraisse, 1963; Block, 1990), *lived time* (Minkowski, 1970) and *psychic time* (Traugott, 1978).[59] In this book, I opt for the term *subjective time* to refer to the experience of time (in particular, of the passage of time) that does not coincide with its clock-based measurement, which thus constitutes *objective time*. Initially traced as anomaly in various forms of psychopathology (Minkowski, 1970), or viewed as resulting from mental disorders (such as schizophrenia and depression) and drug consumption (Friedman, 1990, pp. 117–120), variation in the perception of time is in fact a frequent and regular phenomenon in everyday life. Essentially, it suggests that our everyday experience of time is a psychologically real phenomenon that can hardly be deemed unified. Consider the following poetic extracts indicating that our experience of time may diverge from its manipulation in terms of clocks and calendars:

(2.33) *Διαδέχονται οι μέρες μου γρήγορα η μια τους την άλλη,*
        (…)
        γίνονται ένα σώμα οι μέρες μου. Σφηνώνονται μες
        στις Κυριακές οι Δευτέρες, μπλέκονται οι μήνες
        καθώς τα χαρτιά της τράπουλας: Μάρτης
        κι αμέσως Δεκέμβρης, Αύγουστος έπειτα,
        παγώνουν οι άκρες των χεριών μου καθώς
        ψηλαφώ τον λαβύρινθο, προσπαθώντας να βάλω μετά
        την Κυριακή τη Δευτέρα, ή τον Απρίλη
        πριν απ' το Μάη. Να χωρίσω ξανά
        τη βδομάδα σε εικοσιτετράωρα.   [Νικηφόρος Βρεττάκος]

        'My days move quickly one after the other
        (…)
        they become one body. Monday wedges into
        Sunday, months get mixed up
        like a deck of cards: it's March,
        then December, August next,
        my fingertips freeze as I fumble through the labyrinth,
        as I try to locate Monday
        after Sunday, or April before May.
        As I try to sort out the week into days again.'

As already mentioned, in terms of CMT, variation in the experience of time is treated as a metaphorical entailment; a central feature of the source domain of motion, speed

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59. Variation in the experience of time has long been discussed in the philosophical and psychological literature (cf. James, 1890/1950; Guyau, 1890/1988). For an overview of the psychology of time in cognitive psychology see Friedman (1990, pp. 19–26) and for an overview of subjective time in philosophy, psychology and neuroscience see Arstilla & Loyd (2014).

is also metaphorically transferred to time. However, such an account does not do full justice to the *felt* experience of time; time is *per se* experienced as slow, quick or still, rather than being construed as such by virtue of a projection from the domain of motion. In CIT, it is argued that experienced events are construed in terms of motion in E/X independently of their measurement in temporal units, which are contained in M. Thus, events may be passing slowly or quickly or as coming to a halt in E/X, while they correspond to a specific and invariant set of temporal units in M. According to Fauconnier & Turner (2008, pp. 59–61), in the case of subjective time the topology of experienced events, rather than that of clock time, is projected onto the blend and structures it. The result is a generalized integration network of subjective time, represented as ($\underline{E}$/X/M) or ($\underline{E}$/X/M)' in the Ego- and the Time-moving construals, respectively. Alternatively, when the generalized integration network of time is consistent with objective reality (e.g., *πέρασαν δύο εβδομάδες από την τελευταία μας συνάντηση* 'two weeks have passed since our last encounter'), the topology of clock time is preserved within the blend of time, which is thereby represented as (E/X/$\underline{M}$).

What is not acknowledged in the cognitive linguistic literature, however, is that the idea that subjective time arises from an asymmetrical projection from the input of E/X is in line with research on the social psychology of time, the latter suggesting that subjective time arises from an *asymmetry* between time as it is felt and as it is measured by the clock (Flaherty, 1999). Along these lines, the volume of experienced time does not coincide with the temporal units to which it corresponds. More specifically, when the volume of experienced time is lower than the temporal units to which it amounts, time is felt as passing slowly. Accordingly, time is felt as passing quickly when the experiential volume of time is higher than its counterpart in objectively calculated temporal units. Following Flaherty (1999, pp. 34–35), time as passing slowly and quickly will be called here *protracted duration* and *temporal compression*, respectively.[60] In either case, temporal variation *necessarily* presupposes a temporal norm as a reference point with respect to which it emerges; the felt experience of time can be construed as quick or slow only against the backdrop of time telling devices that render temporality countable in a homogeneous manner. Therefore, social time is both experientially and logically warranted for construing the felt passage of time.

To return to the examples in the beginning of this section, a closer examination of the context reveals situations that raise the emotional involvement of the experiencer: a tsunami that brings about agony in (2.30); an enjoyable trip in the countryside in

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60. In Flaherty's account, time construed in objective terms is called *synchronicity*, i.e. the typical form of temporal experience in which the perceived passage of time is nearly synchronized with clock time and thus acts as a normative experience against which the experience of time can be judged as abnormal. A skill acquired in primary socialization, synchronicity naturally occurs in rather unproblematic situations and is based on the awareness of social expectations since, in everyday life, people need to keep track of clock time and thus conform to social norms.

(2.31) (here note *Ούτε που το καταλάβαμε πότε διαβήκαν κιόλας πέντε μέρες* 'We hardly realized how the five days passed'); and a defeat in a basketball game in (2.32). This observation is also consistent with findings in the psychology of time showing that both protracted and compressed time have a strong affective grounding that comprises both cognitive and emotional factors.[61] The so-called *time-emotion paradox*, as this phenomenon is usually referred to in the psychological literature (see Droit-Volet & Gil, 2009; Droit-Volet & Meck, 2007), suggests that subjective time is inextricably associated with the experiencer's emotional involvement. The gist of this approach is that temporal variation is not an objective property of events but a subjective response to them in that events do not last a long or short time *per se* but are rather experienced (and therefore construed) as such. I will come back to the issue of time and affect when I will be discussing construals of subjective time in the following chapters.

So far, it has been shown that subjective time is manifested through motion verbs and modifiers denoting speed of motion and that such construals can be neatly accommodated in a generalized integration network that is organized by the topology of experienced events. Consider, however, the following temporal expression, which evokes a construal of protracted duration in non-motional and non-metaphorical terms:

(2.34) *Πεζοδρόμια, πλατείες, πάρκα... γέμισαν ψυχές που μετρούσαν τους κόμπους μιας αγωνίας που*
       κάθε   στιγμή   της   θύμιζε   αιωνιότητα.   [HNC]
       every   moment   her   reminded   eternity
       'Pavements, squares, parks (...) full of people in agony **while every moment resembled eternity**.'

Here every single moment is equated with eternity, which is an unevenly longer interval. By virtue of this asymmetrical mapping time is construed as protracted. Uniquely instantiated in the corpus, this expression can hardly be deemed fixed and systematic, or conventional. However, similar expressions seem to be productive in poetry, as the analysis in Chapter 5 will show. More generally, in view of linguistic evidence from poetry, it will be shown that subjective time can be construed in creative ways in either motional or non-motional terms (see Chapters 3 and 4, respectively) but can also be manifested in non-metaphorical construals similar to (2.34).

In the next section, I move to yet another component in the conceptual structure of time in MG, namely the conceptualization of time in memory.

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61. Along with cognitive and affective factors, variation in the perception and, moreover, the manipulation of time has also been found to be dependent on geographical variables (Levine, 1997). Thus, people who live in the South (e.g., Greece) tend to have a rather loose conception of time, unlike people in the North (e.g., Switzerland) who have a more strictly delineated sense of time and punctuality. In Levine's words (1997, p. xi), "time talks with an accent".

2.4.5 The conceptualization of time in memory

In everyday life, past events can be embedded in memory and thus be retrieved *a posteriori*. To illustrate this, consider the following examples:

(2.35)   *Θυμόταν* **σαν   να   'ταν   χθες**
                      as if that was-it yesterday
          τη μέρα που έφτασε με το πλοίο στον Βόλο.   [HNC]
          'The day he arrived in Volos by ship he would remember it **as if it were yesterday**.'

(2.36)   *«Είναι απίστευτο ότι πέρασαν κιόλας 20 χρόνια –*
          μοιάζει   σαν   να   'ταν   χθες   *που ξεκινήσαμε όλοι*
          seems-it as if that was-it yesterday
          μαζί», λέει ο Κώστας Τσιάνος.   [HNC]
          'It's unbelievable that 20 years have already passed – **it feels like yesterday** when we all started together.'

Linguistic cues in both examples suggest that past time is recalled as having happened yesterday (*σαν να 'ταν χθες*), although in (2.36) it is explicitly stated that the real distance between the past event and the present is a much longer one: *20 χρόνια* '20 years'. In technical terms, this means that events are construed on the basis of relative, rather than real, distance. For CMT, the above examples instantiate the PROXIMITY IN TIME IS PROXIMITY IN SPACE conceptual metaphor, which extends the spatial conceptualization of time to memory. Such an account, therefore, explains the discrepancy between events as they are embedded in memory and as they were actually experienced in terms of a metaphorical entailment. However, when located as being close to the experiencer while in reality they occurred a long time ago, events are actually construed in *subjective* terms. Similarly to subjective time, the relative distance of events in memory evokes a psychologically real experience that cannot be captured by a uni-directional, two-space mapping.

In order to explain the emergent structure of events when embedded in memory, Fauconnier & Turner (2008, pp. 61–63) have proposed that the conceptual integration network of time is integrated with a blend of memory and physical space R/S (for Recall/Space), in which past events are construed in spatial terms. In Fauconnier and Turner's words (2008, p. 62), "when we blend E/X/M with R/S, we get a new integration E/X/M/R/S, which puts a metric on memory that uses the notion of time that is emergent in the E/X/M networks". In the above examples, the two events are located at their real distance in the timeline in E/X/M and at a relative distance ('yesterday') in R/S. The location of past events in the two inputs is integrated by means of Identity via Analogy; their location in memory is analogous to the subjective feeling about the events of yesterday and hence, in (E/X/M/R/S), remembered events are mapped onto yesterday. In technical terms, this means that the ordering topology of (R/S) dominates over the ordering topology in any

version of (E/X/M); subjective memory wins out over objective reality. However, the explicit assertion that the real distance between the past event and the present is 20 years in (2.36) suggests that the speaker is fully aware that the short distance of events is only a subjective feeling induced by memory.

Last, but not least, it is worth noting that the above expressions construe time as compressed. When viewed in retrospect, time can be perceived as having passed quickly (as shown in the previous section) or, alternatively, as being close to the present, as is the case in Examples (2.35) and (2.36). Referring to experienced and remembered duration respectively, these cases correspond to two different forms of temporal compression and are both related to retrospection given that events gradually fade out in memory over the passage of time (Friedman, 1990, p. 21; Flaherty, 1999, p. 110; Draaisma, 2004, p. 203). This does not mean, however, that past events cannot be recalled in memory in objective terms. In that case, there is no asymmetry between events in E/X/M and R/S but, rather, the location of events in both inputs is aligned.

So far, the generalized integration network of time has been described in its elaborate version that contains the conceptualization of past events in memory (see the diagram below). In the following section, I will conclude the description of the conceptual structure of time in MG with the discussion of the conceptualization of the past and the future.

Diagram 4. The complete conceptual integration network of time, including memory (Fauconnier & Turner, 2008, p. 65).

2.4.6 The conceptualization of the past and the future

In our experience of time, we distinguish between intervals that have already passed and precede our present, and intervals that will succeed the present. The past and the future, as these categories are dubbed, are thus designated with reference to our present, our 'here and now'. On experiential grounds, the boundaries between the present, the past and the future are far from being strictly delineated. What we experience as the present will shortly become past and what we anticipate as the future will soon be our present that will, in turn, become past. Nevertheless, the human mind is in need of constructing conceptual boundaries between the past and the future.

As aptly argued by Lakoff & Johnson (1999, p. 140), the present is perceived as co-located with the experiencer and thereby functions as the reference point according to which the past and the future are conceived of. In particular, the past is typically located behind Ego and, accordingly, the future is mapped onto the space ahead.[62] This conceptualization, traditionally referred to as the Time Orientation Metaphor, involves the following mappings and is represented in Diagram 5:

The Time Orientation Metaphor (Lakoff & Johnson, 1999, p. 140)

The location of the observer	→ The present
The space in front of the observer	→ The future
The space behind the observer	→ The past

In MG,[63] as expected according to the Time Orientation Metaphor, the conceptualization of the present, the past and the future is also located in the front/back axis. This is exemplified in the following corpus data:

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62. A different conceptualization of the past and the future in terms of allocentric topography (downhill/uphill) has been found in the language spoken by the Yupno at Papua New Guinea (see Núñez, Cooperrider, Doan & Wassmann, 2012). The Yupno conceptual pattern of time is not linear since it construes the past as downhill, the present as co-located with the speaker and the future as uphill. This type of construal seems to be motivated by the particular geometry of the local terrain.

63. Note, however, that in Classical Greek it has been proposed that the future is conceptualized as being located behind the observer (see Allan, 1995). An informal investigation in the Great Dictionary of the Greek Language shows that, indeed, a set of locative adverbs denoting behindness was used in Classical Greek to modify future time. In particular, εἰσόπιν χρόνου 'behind time' and εἰσοπίσω 'behind' are registered as having the meaning 'hereafter, in the time to come', although only very few instantiations are documented in the dictionary. By contrast, the lemma ὀπίσω 'behind' is more robustly attested under a temporal sense, which reads "of Time, hereafter" (on a similar pattern in Toba and Aymara see Klein, 1987; Núñez & Sweetser, 2006, respectively). However, the collocation ο ὄπιθεν χρόνος that would also be expected to refer to the future is analyzed as 'the earlier time', that is, as denoting posteriority in an Ego-neutral way. Finally, the antonym of ὀπίσω, namely πρόσ(σ)ω 'in front, ahead', does not prompt a temporal

A.

Future   *"Now"*   *Past*

B.

Future   *"Now"*   *Past*

Diagram 5. The conceptualization of the past and the future (Núñez, Motz & Teuscher, 2006, p. 134).

(2.37) *Βρισκόμαστε   όμως   στο   παρόν, πρέπει κανείς*
        Are-located-we however in-the present
        να κάνει το καλύτερο από εκεί που είναι.   [HNC]
        '**We are now in the present** and everyone should do their best from where they are.'

(2.38) *Έχουμε υποχρέωση ως πολιτεία αυτή την τεράστια εθνική δύναμη να τη διαχει-*
        ριστούμε σωστά τόσο εν όψει των επικείμενων Ολυμπιακών Αγώνων όσο και για
        το   μέλλον που έρχεται μπροστά μας.   [HNC]
        the future that comes ahead-of us
        'It's our duty as a state to manage this enormous national force properly not only in view of the Olympic Games but also for **the future that is coming ahead**.'

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meaning referring to the past, as one would symmetrically expect. Should the future be located behind, the past should be reversely located in front, which, though, does not seem to be the case. Certainly, the issue remains obscure and calls for further research.

(2.39)   «*Πάμε   πίσω   στο   παρελθόν,   όχι για να μείνουμε νοερά*
         Go-we   back   to-the   past
         εκεί αλλά για να πλουτίσουμε το παρόν με υλικό φυσικό, αυθεντικό και συχνά
         βιωματικά διαμορφωμένο».   [HNC]
         '**We go back to the past** but not with the intention to stick to it; rather, we wish to
         enrich our present with authentic material that is based in previous experience.'

Although no one would deny the locative organization of the past and the future in
the conceptual structure of time, in what follows I aim to show that the categories of
the past and the future are in fact emergent in the generalized integration network
of time. This means that the past and the future are not directly mapped onto the
space behind and in front of Ego respectively, as assumed by conceptual metaphor
theorists, but result from the integration of experienced events and clock time.

First of all, events are conceptualized as lying behind or in front of Ego in the
blend of events and experienced motion E/X, as suggested by examples such as
Συχνά γυρίζει ο νους μου πίσω στα περασμένα γεγονότα 'My mind often goes back
to past events' and *Έχει όλη τη ζωή μπροστά του* 'He has a whole life ahead of him'
[Dictionary of Standard Modern Greek]. In other words, the location of the past
and the future is initially emergent in the blend of events and experienced motion
E/X, as shown in the following diagram:

Diagram 6. Past and future events as behind and in front of Ego in (E/X).

More specifically, events contained in input space E are distinguished between those that Ego has already experienced (i.e., past events) and those that s/he is about to experience (i.e., future events). When events are integrated with events of experienced motion in X, past events are mapped onto the space behind the observer whereas future events onto the space in front. Thus, the conceptualization of past and future events arises in the blend of events and experienced motion E/X, with the former being located at the back of the observer and the latter ahead. Needless to mention, the conceptualization of past and future events in terms of the front/ back orientation arises naturally given that experienced motion in X is linear.

However, past and future events are routinely measured in temporal units. In technical terms, this means that they are integrated with their corresponding temporal units in the input space of clock time M, as illustrated in the following diagram:

Experienced events (E/X)

- past events behind the observer
- future events in front of the observer

Clock time (M)

- temporal units past in the clock
- temporal units upfront in the clock

- past events behind as past temporal units
- future events upfront as temporal units upfront

The past and the future in the generalized integration network of time (E/X/M)

Diagram 7. The conceptualization of the past and the future in terms of front/back orientation.

As shown in the diagram, past events in E/X are integrated with a set of temporal units that have already passed in M, while future events are blended with a set of temporal units that are about to pass.[64] As a result, within the blend E/X/M, past

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64. The mapping is also iconically reflected onto the motion of the rotating rods on the analog clock; the temporal units along which the rod has already passed correspond to the past, whereas the units that remain to be passed amount to the future.

and future events become measurable in terms of minutes, hours, years, etc. while they inherit the front/back orientation from E/X. Apparently, both variants of the input of experienced events may be exploited in the integration process, namely the construal of Ego moving along the events in (E/X) and the construal of events moving past Ego in (E/X)'. The former is illustrated in Examples (2.40) and (2.41):

(2.40) *Με την εμπειρία*
        οδεύουμε προς ένα καλύτερο μέλλον.
        move-we   to   a   better   future

                                  [Dictionary of Standard Modern Greek]
        'With our previous experience **we move forward toward a better future**.'

(2.41) *Ανατρέχει   στο   παρελθόν   που το συνδέει με το παρόν*
        Returns-he to-the   past
        και προχωράει στο μέλλον.   [HNC]
        '**He goes back to the past**, he connects it with the present and thus moves toward the future.'

These examples involve two motion verbs that are typically associated with the future and the past: *οδεύω* 'to move on' and *ανατρέχω* 'to go back'. Although historically denoting physical motion, however, in MG both verbs are rarely, if at all, used in literal terms. It thus transpires that the prototypicality of the word combination does not necessarily rely on the prototypicality of the collocate of the node word (i.e., the motion verb) but, rather, on the word combination as a whole.

In the above examples the future and the past are emergent in the Ego-moving construal of time (E/X/M). Next, consider (2.42) that instantiates a construal of the past as being gone (note here *ανεπιστρεπτί* 'with no return' explicly denoting the irreversibility of passing time), thus pointing to the Time-moving construal:

(2.42) *(…) οι κάτοικοι ψήφισαν τον Χαλίτ Μεχμέτ αναδεικνύοντας έτσι, όπως δήλωσαν*
        δημοτικοί σύμβουλοι, ότι
        το   παρελθόν   έχει περάσει   ανεπιστρεπτί».   [HNC]
        the past-NOM   has   passed   with no return
        '… the residents voted for Halit Mehmet, thus showing, in the words of the municipal advisors, that **"the past is now gone with no return"**'.

Given that they are designated in locative terms along the horizontal axis that represents the linear sequence of events, the past and the future can be naturally construed as being close to, or far from, the deictic centre of the speaker. This is evidenced in a number of collocations whereby locative adjectives modify the past and the future: *κοντινό/ μακρινό παρελθόν/ μέλλον* 'near/ far past/ future'. Finally, with respect to the future, another collocation is registered in MG: *ορατό μέλλον* 'near (lit. 'visible') future'. This collocation is experientially motivated by the association

between what lies ahead of the moving observer and what can be seen. Visibility probably emphasizes closeness to the observer; the future is near enough to see.

In this section, it has been demonstrated that the categories of the past and the future arise within the generalized integration network of time. In both variants of the network, (E/X/M) and (E/X/M)', the past amounts to a blend of past events and their corresponding temporal units, whereas the future to a blend of events and temporal units that are expected to come. The location of past and future events as behind and ahead with respect to the observer arises in E/X and is selectively projected into the blend so that the categories of the past and the future are accordingly located behind and ahead. In short, the proposed analysis recasts the Time Orientation Metaphor as a product of conceptual integration.

With the conceptualization of the past and the future the conceptual structure of time in MG is now complete, encompassing a set of different motion-based construals that arise naturally in a generalized integration network.

2.5 Summary and conclusions

This chapter has aimed at an account of the conceptual structure of time in MG. Specifically, it has proposed that time in MG is metaphorically structured in the motion scene in line with the claims made in the CMT framework, yet it manifests emergent structure that calls for a multiple-space model like CIT. Thus, the standard CMT account of time was reanalyzed in terms of a generalized integration network, the latter refining, rather than contradicting, the former. The conceptual structure of time in MG in the motion scene is summarized in the following diagram:

Diagram 8. The conceptual structure of time in MG.

In particular, both CMT and CIT share an approach to metaphor as a conceptual, rather than purely linguistic, phenomenon and presume systematic projection of language, conceptual structure, imagery and inferences across domains. However, they essentially differ in many respects. While CMT views metaphor as a conceptual mapping between two domains, CIT enables recruiting *ad hoc* conceptual structure contained in mental spaces and projecting it onto a new space, the blend; therefore, it gives rise to a multiple-space network. Moreover, for CMT, the mapping is uni-directional (from the source to the target domain), unlike CIT that does not presume specific directionality in the mapping. In this way, the latter can neatly account for the emergent structure that arises in many metaphorical expressions to the effect that conceptual structure is derived from both inputs, rather than solely from the source domain. This point constitutes a major difference between CMT and CIT and seems to apply to the conceptual structure of time that incorporates conceptual elements from both experienced events and clock time.

With respect to time, it has been suggested that its conceptual structure arises in a generalized integration network formed by integrating a mental space of events construed in terms of experienced motion with a mental space of clock time. The generalized integration network of time enables an account of time that is equally anchored in the individual experience of time passing and its social manipulation through cognitive and cultural artefacts of time telling. In this way, it can be explained how the conceptualization of time manifests features that are purely temporal in nature and relate to our folk understanding of time as a linear and non-reversible passage, or to our psychologically real experience of time as passing slowly, quickly, or as coming to a halt. In the proposed analysis, all construals of time that arise in the generalized integration network have been described in the light of conventional metaphorical expressions derived from a general corpus of MG, namely HNC.

In particular, I have reanalyzed the conceptual metaphors of time in terms of temporal construals that emerge in the generalized integration network of time: the Ego-moving construal of time; the Time-moving construal; and the Time-flowing construal. A conceptual integration account of such temporal construals does justice to the frame structure imported by the motional lexeme to the metaphor, contained in the blend of events and experienced motion. In this way, the generalized integration network of time can also accommodate construals of time as passing quickly, slowly, or as coming to a halt; speed is a property of motion in the input of experienced events and is selectively projected to the blend, dominating over the objective measurement of time in the input of the clock. This blend essentially accounts for subjective time not as a projection from the domain of motion but, rather, as a psychologically real phenomenon in the experience of events. Similarly, when embedded in memory, past events can be recalled in subjective terms as

being close while in reality they are located far away from the present. In this case, the generalized integration network of time is integrated with a mental space that construes remembered events in spatial terms. When the latter are construed at a relative, rather than real, distance from the present, it is the conceptual structure of remembered events that dominates over that of events in objective reality. Finally, I have also recast the conceptualization of the past and the future as lying behind and in front of Ego, respectively, by arguing that it is emergent in the generalized integration network of time rather than being a mere projection from the domain of space onto that of time.

Creative metaphors of time

3.1   Introduction

The aim of this chapter is to address our initial hypothesis, according to which non-conventional metaphors of time creatively exploit the conceptual structure of time. Such metaphors constitute the vast majority of the expressions of time found in the corpus of MG poetry, namely 65.7%.[65] It will be shown that such expressions in fact amount to metaphorical blends in that, although grounded in the underlying patterns of time conceptualization (sketched in Chapter 2), they manifest novel construals that cannot be simply reduced to the conceptual structure of time that underpins them. Instead, as I will show, such metaphors involve *frame structure* that pertains to the domain of motion, yet it is not used in conventional metaphors of time and thus they yield novel conceptualizations of time in the motion scene. In this way, the standard CMT approach to non-conventional metaphors in terms of mechanisms for exploiting conceptual metaphors and metaphorical entailments will be revisited and complemented in the framework of CIT. The analysis of non-conventional metaphors of time proposed in this chapter provides further support to the claim, initially argued for in the previous chapter, that CMT and CIT complement, rather than contradict, each other.

In the context of CMT, non-conventional metaphors that are grounded in entrenched conceptualizations have been analyzed as exploiting conceptual metaphors through a set of mechanisms of figurative creativity: so-called *extension*, *elaboration*, *composition* and *questioning* (Lakoff & Turner, 1989, pp. 67–72).[66] These

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65. Percentages refer to the poems in which the expressions of time under examination are contained, each expression instantiating an occurrence of a category of time conceptualization according to the criteria put forward here. Such a methodological choice is legitimate since each poem (cited as a whole or partly) is used once in the analysis. This does not mean that each poem contains only one expression of time; in fact, an expression may be repeated in the poem, either in an identical way (as in (3.7)), or paraphrased (as in (3.14)), while it is also possible that in a poem other expressions of time are also contained without being considered in the analysis. However, it is noteworthy that in the latter case the expressions of time do not belong to another category of time conceptualization but, rather, evoke the same category through different lexico-grammatical means (as in (3.15)).

66. More recently, Kövecses (2010) has proposed a novel account of creativity within CMT which attempts to integrate context as the driving force behind the emergence of non-conventional

mechanisms seek to explain novel conceptualizations of the target domain as a projection of inferences (Lakoff, 1993). In particular, extension and elaboration predict, respectively, that non-conventional metaphors activate typically inactive aspects of the source domain (e.g., *ν' ακούω τον χρόνο ατάραχος/ να ρέει* 'undistracted, I hear time/ flowing' [Ορέστης Αλεξάκης]) or fill in slots of the target domain in unusual ways (e.g., *Κι ο χρόνος προχωρεί ποδοπατώντας* 'time moves on by trampling' [Αλέξανδρος Ίσαρης]). In contrast, composition refers to the combination of two (or more) conceptual metaphors (e.g., *Κι έπειτα τι θα σήμαινε να 'χα/ κερδίσει είκοσι χρόνια,/ που μετακινούνται κάθε που κοι-/ τάζω προς τα πίσω.* 'And then what would it have meant/ had I gained twenty years/ that shift every time/ I look back' [Τίτος Πατρίκιος]), while questioning corresponds to a reversal of the conventional pattern predicted by a conceptual metaphor (e.g., *Πώς αναστρέφεται ο καιρός/ και προς το παρελθόν γυρνάει το μέλλον;* 'How can time be reversed/ and the future turns to the past?' [Ορέστης Αλεξάκης]). Such mechanisms explain how non-conventional metaphors are derived from the conceptual patterns afforded in everyday discourse and can thus capture the continuity between conventional and non-conventional metaphors (unlike image metaphors that are deemed truly novel; see Chapter 4). Indeed, the data under examination in this chapter appear to exploit all aspects of the conceptual structure of time in the motion scene. The following table summarizes the distribution of each motional pattern of time conceptualization in the corpus of MG poetry:

Table 1. Distribution of metaphorical patterns of time conceptualization in the corpus of MG poetry

The Ego-moving construal of time	21%
The Time-moving construal	27.4%
The Time-flowing construal	15.3%
The conceptualization of subjective time	15.3%
The conceptualization of time in memory	10.5%
The conceptualization of the past and the future	10.5%

metaphors. Kövesces distinguishes between different forms of context, including the immediate physical setting, our knowledge about the participants in the discourse, the immediate cultural context, the immediate social setting and the immediate linguistic context (on such a multi-faceted conception of context see also Duranti & Goodwin, 1993, following Ochs, 1979). Given that the context is variable, metaphors, along these lines, are also expected to be variable. Importantly, Kövesces takes context-induced creativity to apply equally to everyday and literary texts and in this sense his analysis aligns with the view on creativity put forward in discourse analysis (see Carter, 1999, 2004).

However, empirical evidence from the corpus of MG poetry suggests that such metaphors instantiate novel mappings that involve conceptual structure not previously available in the entrenched conceptualizations of time and, in doing so, they give rise to unique meanings. To illustrate this, consider that, in construing time as trampling in, e.g., *ο χρόνος προχωρεί ποδοπατώντας* 'time moves on by trampling', it is not simply the Time-moving metaphor that is creatively elaborated but, essentially, background knowledge about trampling as a forceful advent in a battlefield ending with a winner and victims is also involved to yield a novel conceptualization of time as an enemy. Although grounded in the conceptualization of time in everyday discourse, such non-conventional metaphors of time instantiate novel meanings that integrate conceptual structure derived from other frames, such as forcible movement in the above example.

In light of this, I wish to argue that the standard analysis of such metaphors in CMT needs to be revisited in order to account for the *ad hoc* conceptual mappings in creative metaphors of time. Besides that, such metaphors are also likely to involve more than two input spaces, which cannot be accommodated in a two-space mapping along the lines of CMT. I will therefore suggest that a conceptual integration analysis can finely account for such metaphors by enabling the integration of new frame structure (i.e., frame structure not available in the conceptual patterns of time in everyday discourse) in time conceptualization. The gist of the proposed analysis is that frame structure is evoked by the lexical items involved in the metaphor and is recruited in mental spaces, the latter being small conceptual packets constructed as we think and talk for purposes of local understanding and action. Mental spaces are internally organized by frames, but externally they are interconnected through vital relations such as Identity, Analogy, Cause-Effect, etc. Conceptual elements from mental spaces are integrated into the blended space to yield novel and often complex metaphorical meanings.

Moreover, as mentioned in the Introduction, in analyzing metaphors of time in poetry this book seeks to offer a principled, empirically based classification of non-conventional metaphors of time. To this end, I aim to show that non-conventional expressions that are congruent with the conceptual structure of time form a distinct category of figurative creativity in that they offer metaphorical, motion-based construals of time that lack linguistic entrenchment. In other words, the metaphors under examination do not instantiate prototypical word combinations (or, at least, they do so in non-conventional ways; see (3.14) in this chapter), yet they point to a semantic preference between time and motion, similarly to everyday metaphors of time. However, the motional elements that are used in these metaphorical mappings are not attested in everyday metaphors of time (e.g., *ταξιδιώτης* 'traveller', *επελαύνω* 'to charge, to attack in a battle', *ποδοπατώ* 'to trample', etc.). In the light of the data under examination, I will put forward a working definition of

such non-conventional metaphors of time as frame-compatible (i.e., motion-based) integrations and refer to them as *creative metaphors* (to be distinguished from highly creative metaphors that will be examined in the following chapter). In doing so, I aim to recast figurative creativity in terms of the frames used in non-conventional metaphors rather than, e.g., the type of the conceptual integration network involved in the metaphorical mapping (cf. single and double scope). In situating creative metaphors of time in the continuum of figurative creativity in time conceptualization, I wish to suggest that they form the *first degree of figurative creativity*.

A last issue that I aim to address in the analysis of so-called creative metaphors of time concerns the motivations behind their emergence. In particular, I will show that such metaphors are initiated, as expected, by the conceptual structure of time (as discussed in Chapter 2) but they are also motivated by the folk understanding of time as infinite, irreversible, inescapable, etc. At the same time, the proposed analysis takes into account also discursive motivations related to iconic links between form and meaning (i.e., onomatopoeia, repetition, parallelism), which are particularly relevant to poetry (see Examples (3.7) and (3.14)). Such contextual cues will be considered in the analysis, whenever necessary, in order to highlight the motivation behind, and the meaning conveyed by, each metaphorical expression.

In the remainder of this chapter, I analyze metaphors that creatively exploit the conceptual structure of time in the motion scene under its different manifestations: the Ego-moving construal of time (Section 3.2.1); the Time-moving construal (Section 3.2.2); the Time-flowing construal (Section 3.2.3); the conceptualization of subjective time (Section 3.2.4); the conceptualization of time in memory (Section 3.2.5); and the conceptualization of the past and the future (Section 3.2.6). A summary and some concluding remarks are found at the end of the chapter in Section 3.3.

3.2   Creative metaphors of time

This section deals with creative metaphors of time as these were defined in the Introduction of this chapter. Although their meanings are consistent with the conceptual structure of time in the generalized integration network, the emergent conceptualizations will be shown to arise from novel, *ad hoc* mappings and are therefore analyzed in terms of CIT rather than CMT.

3.2.1 Creative metaphors of the Ego-moving construal of time

As already shown in Chapter 2, the generalized integration network of time manifests a conceptualization of time as a bounded space in which a real or imagined observer moves. In this section, I will discuss instantiations of this pattern in poetry, namely creative metaphors under the Ego-moving construal of time.

The first metaphor to discuss prompts a novel conceptualization of time as an ocean (*ωκεανό*):

(3.1)　*Εδώ*
σ' ένα τοπίο χωρίς εικόνα
και μόνο φως
φαιό
που με τυφλώνει
και το λευκό της αμνησίας κενό
κ' οι φωτεινές σχισμές της μνήμης
Σουρουπώνει
θα πει βραδιάζει μέσα μου
πλησιάζουν
οι φίλοι με το νυχτωμένο στήθος
πυκνώνει πάλι γύρω η απουσία
πάλι και πάλι
κάποιος με πληγώνει
(…)

Μα ποιος εκείνος που/ σε　　κατοικεί
But who he　　that　you-ACC resides
'But who/ resides in you'
μοναχικός στον　　ωκεανό του　　χρόνου
lonely　　in-the ocean　of-the time
'lonely in the ocean of time'
σα　να　'σαι　　το έρημο νησί
as if that are-you-SING the desert island
'as if you were a desert island'
κι　αυτός/ ο　ναυαγός που εγώ δεν είμαι, σώμα;
and him/　the castaway that I　not am,　body?
'and him/ the castaway that I am not, body?'　　　　[Ορέστης Αλεξάκης]

'Here I am
in a landscape with no image
only light
gray light that blinds me
in the blank white of amnesia
and the lighting cracks of memory

> The night falls
> which means it's getting darker inside me
> friends with a hurt chest
> come closer
> absence is spreading throughout
> once again
> somebody is hurting me …
> **But who**
> **resides in you**
> **lonely in the ocean of time**
> **as if you were a desert island**
> **and him**
> **the castaway that I am not, body?'**

In representing time as an ocean, the metaphor in (3.1) evokes a construal of time as an unbounded space. Unlike rivers (in which the Time-flowing blend is grounded), oceans and seas are immense, rather unshaped expanses of water and do not flow. The conceptualization of time as an ocean is therefore associated with the unboundedness of fluids rather than with their property of flowing, thus giving rise to a construal of infinite time, in which Ego is contained. In order to uncover time conceptualization in (3.1), a multiple-space conceptual integration network is activated, which exceeds, as shown below, a two-space, unidirectional mapping as it would be assumed by conceptual metaphor theorists:

Figure 3.1 Time as an ocean.

The metaphor *στον ωκεανό του χρόνου* 'in the ocean of time' evokes two mental spaces that are integrated; a mental space of time (Input Space 3) and another one structured by the frame of OCEANS (Input Space 2). Time from Input Space 2 is fused with the ocean in Input Space 3 by means of Identity via Analogy; time is unbounded in the same sense that oceans are immense and lack clearly delineated boundaries. Thus, within the blend, time is construed as a huge, not strictly demarcated extent (that is, as infinite) in which Ego is contained, occupying only a small proportion of space (cf. *Είμαι στον τόπο και στον χρόνο/ δίχως τον τόπο και τον χρόνο/ να γνωρίζω* 'I am in space and time/ without knowing/ the space or the time' [Ορέστης Αλεξάκης]).

However, the conceptualization of Ego (identified as the poet himself) within the ocean of time is quite complicated. Echoing the so-called 'split of the self' metaphor (see Lakoff, 1996; Lakoff & Johnson, 1999, pp. 267–289), the poet's body is construed as a desert island in the ocean of time that is separate from the poet's self (*σα να 'σαι το έρημο νησί/ κι αυτός,/ ο ναυαγός που εγώ δεν είμαι,/ σώμα;* 'as if you were a desert island/ and him/ the castaway that I am not,/ body?'). Therefore, an additional input space is involved in the integration network, related to the poet's split self (Input Space 1). The Ego's body in the mental space of the split self is fused with an island naturally contained in the mental space of oceans. The vital relation that triggers this mapping is Identity via Analogy; humans are contained within infinite time similarly to an island located in an immense ocean, therefore the human body that metonymically stands for the human being can be metaphorically construed as an island.

The body-island is further specified as *έρημο* 'deserted', thereby suggesting that Ego is left alone (consider also *μοναχικός* 'lonely' in the previous line) presumably due to the absence of the missing or deceased beloved ones (*πυκνώνει πάλι γύρω η απουσία* 'absence is spreading throughout'). Nonetheless, the island is deserted for one more reason; unlike what is expected, it is not inhabited by the poet's self (*σα να 'σαι το έρημο νησί/ κι αυτός/ ο ναυαγός που εγώ δεν είμαι, σώμα;* 'as if you were a desert island/ and him/ the castaway that I am not,/ body?'). Although the castaway is contained in the mental space of oceans and is expected to be mapped onto the poet's self, such a possibility is explicitly negated; instead, someone else seems to reside in the island-body construed as a castaway in the blend[67] while the poet's self does not appear in it. Thus, a question naturally arises in the blend; if the poet does not reside in his body (construed as an island in the blend), then where

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67. The question as to who resides in the island seems to be rather rhetorical, thus suggesting that no one lives in the island, that is, in the poet's body.

does he live? No answer is offered, thus enhancing the sense of personal loss and loneliness that is expressed in the poem; the poet is detached from his own body, and his psyche is lost and suspended.

To conclude, the poem in (3.1) creatively exploits the conceptualization of time as a location (as assumed by conceptual metaphor theorists) in that it construes time as an ocean. However, in order to unravel the meaning of the temporal construal to its full extent, our background knowledge about oceans needs to be imported to the metaphor, which, apart from time, involves one more input space containing a narrative of the split self. In theoretical terms, this suggests that a multiple space model such as CIT is called for in order to integrate conceptual elements from various spaces. Certainly motivated by the entrenched conceptualization of TIME AS A LOCATION, the metaphorical construal of time as an ocean is also triggered by the folk understanding of time as an unbounded entity in which humans are contained. Crucially, the unboundedness of time is associated with lack of direction and frustration (cf. *πελάγωσα* 'I am lost in the sea'), thus further stressing the sense of loneliness and despair that pervades the poem: *σ' ένα τοπίο χωρίς εικόνα, και μόνο φως/ φαιό/ που με τυφλώνει* 'in a landspace with no image/ only light/ gray light that blinds me', *βραδιάζει μέσα μου* 'it's getting darker inside me', *πυκνώνει πάλι γύρω η απουσία* 'absence is spreading throughout', *κάποιος με πληγώνει* 'somebody is hurting me'.

Unlike the previous poem, which manifested a conceptualization of TIME AS A LOCATION with Ego being static, (3.2), cited below, prompts a conceptualization of Ego as moving in time:

(3.2)   *Το ποτάμι κυλάει πάνω στο νοτισμένο δέρμα της γης.*
        Τα ποτάμια κυλάνε μέσα μας φέρνοντας τροφή από ψηλά.
        Τα ποτάμια φωνάζουνε μέσα μας το πέρασμα του χρόνου.

        Πόσες ψυχές αχνίζουν στη σκοτεινιά της όχθης;
        Λαμπίτσες έγιναν κι αυτές.
        (…)
        Όσοι στέκονταν κάποτε στις όχθες φύγανε.
        Άλλοι έρχονται, θα φύγουν κι αυτοί,
        για τη θάλασσα της λησμονιάς.

        Ταξιδιώτες είμαστε όλοι του   άπειρου χρόνου.
        Travellers   are-we all   of-the infinite time.
        'We are all travellers in infinite time.'
        Ταξιδιώτες για λιμάνια-φαντάσματα.
        Travellers   to   ghost-harbours.
        'Travellers to ghost-harbours.'   [Γιάννης Παππάς]

'The river flows on the wet skin of the soil.
Rivers flow inside us bringing nourishment from above.
Rivers signal inside us the passage of time.

How many souls fade in the darkness of the banks?
They turned into small lights …
Those who used to stand in the banks are now gone.
Others come in, they will be gone too
in the sea of oblivion.

**We are all travellers in infinite time.
Travellers to ghost-harbours**.'

Here Ego is conceptualized as a traveller in time (*Ταξιδιώτες είμαστε όλοι του άπειρου χρόνου* 'We are all travellers in infinite time'), thereby evoking the Ego-moving construal of time and, in particular, the conceptualization of travelling in time.[68] As already mentioned in Section 2.4.1, travelling is a motional frame that is conventionally associated with time. However, as a search in the HNC reveals, travelling in time is typically instantiated either in the noun phrase *ταξίδι στον χρόνο* 'a journey in time' or in a verb phrase, e.g. *ταξιδεύω στον χρόνο* 'to travel in time'. It thus transpires that the metaphor in (3.2) diverges from the standard pattern of lexicalization in that the experiencer of time is explicitly construed as a traveller, emphatically repeated twice in the last lines of the poem: *ταξιδιώτες* … 'travellers', *ταξιδιώτες* … 'travellers'. Moreover, this example seems to elaborate the conceptualization of travelling in time in two respects. Firstly, travelling in time refers to infinite time (*του άπειρου χρόνου* 'in (lit. 'of') infinite time'), whereas a default inference (i.e., implicature) of a journey in time is that it takes place in the past of the experiencer. Secondly, as suggested by the immediate linguistic context of the metaphor, travelling in time in (3.2) concerns a particular kind of journey, namely a journey along a river (consider, e.g., *ποτάμια* 'rivers', *όχθες* 'banks', *λιμάνια-φαντάσματα* 'ghost-harbours'). In conceptualizing infinite time as a river journey the standard conceptualization of travelling in time is creatively elaborated, as predicted by CMT. Yet, for that purpose frame structure related to river journeys and also infinite time is recruited in the metaphor, as shown in the conceptual integration network in (3.2):

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68. A similar conceptualization is exemplified in yet another poem: *Καθώς σε βλέπω ακίνητο/ Με του Ακρίτα τ' άλογο και το κοντάρι του Άι-Γιωργιού/ να ταξιδεύεις στα χρόνια* [Νίκος Γκάτσος] 'As I see you standing still/ travelling along the years/ with Akrita's horse and the pole of Saint George'.

Figure 3.2 Ego as travelling in infinite time.

In conceptual integration terms, the metaphor *Ταξιδιώτες είμαστε όλοι του άπειρου χρόνου* 'We are all travellers in infinite time' emerges from integrating frame structure about a RIVER JOURNEY (contained in Input Space 1) with background knowledge about INFINITE TIME (contained in Input Space 2). The river from Input Space 1 is mapped onto infinite time in Input Space 2. Such a mapping is strongly motivated by the TIME AS A RIVER metaphor that arises in the Time-flowing blend and, as already mentioned in Chapter 2, is grounded in the perception of time in terms of a linear and irreversible flow (consider *Τα ποτάμια φωνάζουνε μέσα μας το πέρασμα του χρόνου* 'Rivers signal inside us the passage of time' in the poem). In the blend, infinite time is conceptualized as a river through the vital relation of Identity via Analogy. Given that, the traveller in the mental space of river journeys is naturally integrated with humans (*όλοι* 'all') in the mental space of infinite time. Thus, the experiencer becomes a traveller within the blend of life and time as a river journey. Although in accordance with the Ego-moving construal of time in the generalized integration network, the conceptualization of Ego as moving in time in (3.2) is emergent through a novel, *ad hoc* integration between infinite time and river journeys. Crucially, such a metaphorical mapping is grounded in the folk understanding of time as an infinite elapse along which human life occupies only a small portion.

However, consider that travelling in time is construed as leading to ghost-harbours: *λιμάνια-φαντάσματα* 'ghost-harbours'. Ghost-harbours may refer either to the lack of a final destination in the case of endless time or to death and non-existence that awaits humans at the end of lifetime. In either case, the destination (or whatever is contained in the destination) is non-existing and thus can be naturally construed as a ghost since, in our commonplace knowledge, ghosts do not exist. The emergent meaning is that there are no harbours along the river of time for humans to stop. Rather, humans travel in time leading their lifetime toward the endless ocean, namely eternity or death. This understanding is consistent with the conceptualization of those alive as standing at the banks of the river but going away when deceased and being replaced by others: *Όσοι στέκονταν κάποτε στις όχθες φύγανε/ Άλλοι έρχονται, θα φύγουν κι αυτοί* 'Those who used to stand in the banks are now gone/ Others come in, they will be gone too'. Once gone from the river of life, people end in the sea, whereby they will be forgotten sooner or later (*θάλασσα της λησμονιάς* 'sea of oblivion').

In the next poem, a motional frame that is not conventionally associated with time is evoked in the metaphor, namely driving:

(3.3)   *Λίγο αεράκι να μας χτυπά στο πρόσωπο*
       ενώ   οδηγούμε με   χαμηλή ταχύτητα μιας
       while drive-we with low   speed   of-a
       'while we slowly drive,'
       κρύας νύχτας από   το   σήμερα στο   αύριο
       cold   night from the today to-the tomorrow
       'on a cold night, from today to tomorrow.'

       (…)
       … στη διασταύ-
       ρωση Αστάθμητου και Απροσπέλαστου
       μετέωρα βήματα σιωπής παραμονεύουν
       (…)
       κάποιος ν' ανοίξει το μπροστινό παράθυρο
       να μας χτυπά στο πρόσωπο λίγο ατόφιο
       αεράκι πριν πάρει ο ύπνος το φεγγάρι   [Ντίνος Σιώτης]

       'Let the breeze touch our face
       while we slowly drive on a cold night
       from today to tomorrow.

       … at the intersection of the Unforeseen with the Unreachable
       silent uncertain steps are lurking …
       Someone should open the window
       to let a light breeze softly touch our face
       before the moon falls asleep'.

Here driving metaphorically represents leading a life, with the present (metonymically referred to as *σήμερα* 'today') being the point of departure and the future (metonymically referred to as *αύριο* 'tomorrow') the destination. Under this conceptualization, Ego moving in time is construed as a car driver. In this way, the Ego-moving metaphor of time is extended (consistently with CMT), but its construal as a car driver is in fact emergent in a conceptual integration network in which driving is projected onto living and thus structures it in metaphorical terms. This is shown in Figure 3.3:

Figure 3.3 Passage of time as driving from today to tomorrow.

Driving in (3.3) evokes a mental space structured by the frame of car rides, which includes also other car-related features such as a driver, a point of departure and a destination, speed of driving, etc. Such conceptual elements are mapped onto a mental space that contains background knowledge about time, activated by *σήμερα* 'today' and *αύριο* 'tomorrow' in the poem. In (3.3), driving from Input Space 1 is integrated with experiencing life across time from Input Space 2 by means of Identity via Analogy. In the life is a journey conceptual metaphor, in which the mapping between driving and living is grounded, life involves a person leading a

life, a point of departure and a destination, difficulties along the way, etc. similarly to a journey. In conceptualizing life as a car ride, features that are central to journeys are evoked and thus experiencers are mapped onto car drivers, the starting point of the journey onto the present and the destination onto the future. This is motivated by our folk understanding of days (or any other temporal unit) as points that bound an interval (e.g., *Το φεστιβάλ θα διαρκέσει από σήμερα το πρωί μέχρι αύριο το βράδυ* 'The festival will last from today until tomorrow evening' [HNC]). Finally, an additional feature that is closely associated with a car ride is activated, namely speed, which here appears to be slow: *με χαμηλή ταχύτητα* 'slowly' (lit. 'at a slow speed'). One possible (and plausible) interpretation is that slow speed metaphorically corresponds to the difficulties one encounters across life, which are responsible for slowing down the passage of time[69] (consider that the car ride appears to take place during a cold night that may also point to rather difficult circumstances).

As already mentioned, the metaphor in (3.3) prompts a conceptualization of life as a car ride that extends from today to tomorrow. Although motional, and hence compatible with the conceptual structure of time, driving essentially involves mechanical motion and thus significantly departs from experienced physical motion that is typically associated with time conceptualization in the motion scene. A theory of on-line meaning construction like CIT is thus required in order to account for the emergent conceptualization of time in (3.3); CMT would simply capture the mechanism (i.e., elaboration) that explains the relation of the metaphor in (3.3) to the conceptual structure of time but not its emergent meaning. Novel and original as it is, the temporal construal in (3.3) relates to the conceptualization of LIFE AS A JOURNEY (more accurately, as a road trip) that structures the whole poem. In this respect, other elements from the frame of CAR RIDES are also activated in the poem such as an intersection (*στη διασταύ-/ ρωση Αστάθμητου και Απροσπέλαστου* 'at the intersection of the Unforeseen with the Unreachable'), metaphorically representing a critical point in life. It would not be far fetched to suggest that probably the poem is an allegory on the experience of life. A transition from present time to the future, life is conceptualized as a slow overnight ride that is full of difficulties with the anticipation of a light breeze (*λίγο ατόφιο/ αεράκι*).

A last, also creative instantiation of time as a location, finally, is found in the following poem:

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69. Here time as slowing down emerges in a creative way from mapping 'slow speed in a car ride' onto 'difficulties across life'. The conceptualization of so-called protracted time is conventionally expressed in motional terms as time passing slowly (see Section 3.3.4).

(3.4)   *Σε φωνάζω*
         μ' όλη μου την ψυχή
         μα δεν μ' ακούς.
         Να ξεπηδήσεις μέσ' από τα κύματα
         όπως εκείνος ξετινάχτηκε
         απ' τις φλόγες.
         Κι εκείνη ύστερα πώς αφουγκράστηκε
         μίλια χιλιάδες πέρα
         το δικό του κάλεσμα!

         Κι   εσύ μονάχα πέντε χρόνια μακριά
         And you only   five   years   away
         'You're only five years away'
         κι   ούτε μου   γνέφεις.
         and nor   me-GEN   nod-you.
         'yet you don't even nod to me.'

         Τυφλός αργότερα
         και την αισθάνθηκε στο πλάι.
         Τζέην! ψιθύρισε
         όπως κι εσύ στα όνειρά μου με καλείς
         όμως δεν έχω σαν εκείνη
         όνομα εύηχο κι ελκυστικό
         Ντρέπομαι και τινάζομαι.
         Ανάβω το δικό σου πορτατίφ.
         Σε λίγο, το ξέρω, κι ας λείπεις
         θ' αλλάξεις πλευρό:
         "Κοιμήσου!" θα μου πεις
         η ώρα πέρασε
         και θα το σβήσεις.   [Αγγελική Σιδηρά]

         'I call you
         with all my heart
         but you can't hear me.
         So that you would pop up through the waves
         just like he poped up
         through the flames.
         And then, amazingly, she could hear
         his call
         so many miles far away!
         You're only five years away
         yet you don't even nod to me.
         Although blind,
         he could feel her presence next to him
         Jane! he whispered

just like you when you call me in my dreams,
although I don't have such a nice-sounding, pretty name.
I feel embarrassed and jump up.
I lit your lamp.
Even if you're away,
in a while, I know, you will turn side:
"Go to sleep!" you'll tell me,
time has passed,
and you'll turn off the lamp.'

Here the poet is desperately calling her love partner but he cannot hear her (*Σε φωνάζω/ μ' όλη μου την ψυχή/ μα δεν μ' ακούς* 'I call you/ with all my heart/ but you can't hear me'). The reason for that is that the distance between them is impossible to overcome; distance, in their case, is not spatial but temporal, as suggested by the metaphor *πέντε χρόνια μακριά* 'five years away'. Although 'five' does not evoke a huge amount (note also the modifier *μονάχα* 'only'), distance, because of its very nature, cannot be bridged. The temporal expression in (3.4) seems to exploit a collocation denoting (spatial) distance (e.g., *πέντε μέτρα μακριά* 'five meters away') with a temporal unit (such as years) in lieu of the spatial unit of measurement. Although duration is commonly conceptualized as spatial extent (cf. *μικρό/ μεγάλο/ μακρύ χρονικό διάστημα* 'small/ big/ long timespan' (lit. 'time space'), *a long/ short time*), a search in the HNC suggests that *μακριά* 'far away' does not apply to temporal units.[70] In addition, it seems that in (3.4) it is not an interval that is metaphorically construed in terms of distance (as in, e.g., *μας χωρίζει ένα διάστημα 5 ετών από τότε* 'a timespan of 5 years separates us from that time' [HNC]), but, instead, the distance between the partners is temporal, not spatial as expected. For this meaning to arise frame structure related both to physical distance and the elapse of time is recruited in a conceptual integration network. This is depicted in Figure 3.4.

Five years, in the metaphor, evoke an interval (probably between now and the couple's last encounter) that is contained in a mental space of time (Input Space 1). Such an interval is fused with physical distance contained in Input Space 2 by means of Identity via Analogy (consider that bounded intervals resemble bounded extents of space; cf. the DURATION IS SPATIAL EXTENT conceptual metaphor). Unlike the creative metaphorical blends analyzed so far, in the conceptualization of the interval of five years as physical distance time also contributes conceptual structure to the blend. Consider that in conceptualizing distance as temporal, rather than spatial, an inference arises that the distance between the lovers is unbridgeable; hence their reunion is impossible. This is derived from the mental space of time whereby time passing is irreversible and humans cannot overcome temporal distance (at least in

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70. However, *μακριά* 'far away' can be used with reference to past events that are embedded in memory (see Section 3.3.5).

objective reality). Bridging temporal distance could have been attained if motion was involved in the construal (through an imaginative scenario) and thus either the poet or her lover moved toward the other. However, this is not the case in (3.4). Notwithstanding her strong desire to meet her lover again (*Να ξεπηδήσεις μέσ' από τα κύματα* 'So that you would pop up through the waves', *όπως κι εσύ στα όνειρά μου με καλείς* 'just like you when you call me in my dreams'), it seems impossible for him to hear her call, let alone to come back; it is thus inferred that the poet's partner is presumably deceased. As already noted, five years is not a very long interval. Yet, it is impossible to overcome given that the lovers are located at different points in the motion scene of time and cannot move along it.

Figure 3.4 Years as physical distance.

Finally, a last remark needs to be made that concerns an intertextual reference contained in the poem, which further enhances the emergent inference of the lovers being doomed to be apart. The poet seems to make a parallelism with a fictitious couple that is apart but, unlike her, the woman achieves to hear her lover's call despite the long distance between them: *Κι εκείνη ύστερα πώς αφουγκράστηκε/ μίλια χιλιάδες πέρα/ το δικό του κάλεσμα!* 'And then, amazingly, she could hear/ his call/ so many miles far away!'. As suggested by *Τυφλός* 'blind' (referring to the man) and *Τζέην* (the first name of the woman), it seems that the imaginary scene comes from Charlotte Brontë's "Jane Eyre".[71] In the story of the novel, Rochester, now blind after

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71. See Stockwell (2002) on how a text may rely on another text either through direct citation or through the transposition of the plot into a different context.

his unsuccessful effort to save his mad wife from the fire she herself had caused, calls Jane's name when Jane, having long left him and living miles away, is about to marry her cousin. Jane can 'hear' his call, abandons marriage plans and visits him. He is able to sense her presence without seeing her or hearing her speak. Thus, when the poet hears her lover calling her in her dreams she expects him, similarly to Rochester, to feel her presence although he cannot see her and respond to her. Yet, in their case, this is in vain: *κι ούτε μου γνέφεις* 'yet you don't even nod to me'.

The creative metaphors of time analyzed so far instantiate a conceptualization of TIME AS A LOCATION with Ego either moving or being static. In the next section, I move to creative metaphors that cue to a conceptualization of TIME AS A MOVING ENTITY.

3.2.2 Creative metaphors of the Time-moving construal

The Time-moving construal yields the greatest majority of creative metaphors of time in the corpus of MG poetry, namely 27.4%.

First, consider the following instance of the Time-moving construal:

(3.5) *Όλοι μας έχουμε χαμένα χρόνια.*
Άλλοτε τρία, άλλοτε επτά, άλλο-
τε παραπάνω.
Όμως τα είκοσι κλείνουν ωραίο
κύκλο.
Μπορούνε γύρω του να νοσταλ-
γούνε,
χωρίς τον πανικό που φέρνουν
τα χαμένα χρόνια
μιας ολόκληρης ζωής.

Κι   έπειτα τι   θα   σήμαινε να 'χα
And then   what would   mean-it to   had-I
'And then what would it have meant'
κερδίσει είκοσι   χρόνια,
gained   twenty   years
'had I gained twenty years'
που   μετακινούνται κάθε   που κοι-
that   shift-they   every   that lo-/
'that shift every time'
τάζω προς   τα   πίσω.
ok-I   toward   the   back
'I look back …'

(…)
Λοιπόν· είκοσι χρόνια ανώφελα,
χαμένα,
που μόνο αυτά προσφέραν ευ-
καιρίες για ονειρικές ζωές,
γεμάτα δυνατότητες που δεν
πραγματώνονταν ποτέ.
(…)
Είκοσι χαμένα χρόνια πάντα
χρειάζονται για ένα φιλόδοξο
παρόν. [Τίτος Πατρίκιος]

'We all have some lost years,
whether three or seven or even more.
But twenty makes a nice circle.
Around it we can recall with nostalgia,
free of the panic that the lost years
of a whole lifetime would bring.
And then what would it have meant
had I gained twenty years
that shift every time
I look back …
Well, twenty years, pointless and lost,
that offered chances for a dreamy life,
full of potentials that
were never fulfilled …
Twenty years are always needed
for an aspiring present'.

In (3.5), years are said to shift as suggested by *μετακινούνται* 'shift'. Although the construal of years as moving entities is conventional, the metaphor in (3.5) is not conventional. First of all, in linguistic terms, *μετακινώ* (metakinó) 'to shift, to move something in space' is not a motion verb conventionally associated with the passage of time as a search in the HNC and the dictionaries of MG indicates. More importantly, however, *μετακινώ* evokes translocation from one point to another (cf. *Μετακινούν συχνά τα έπιπλά τους προκαλώντας έτσι ενοχλητικούς θορύβους* 'They often shift their furniture, thus making a disturbing noise' [Dictionary of Standard MG]). Construing past years as shifting implies that the years are moving across the timeline instead of being located at a fixed point, as it would be expected. Therefore, the interpretation of the metaphor requires recruiting our background knowledge about shifting. I suggest that this extension of the Time-moving construal in (3.5) amounts to a conceptual integration network, cited below.

The lexical items contained in the motion metaphor in (3.5) evoke structure from the frames of YEARS and SHIFTING, contained in respective mental spaces. As shown in Figure 3.5, in Input Space 1, past years are located, as expected, at a fixed

Figure 3.5 Past years as shifting.

point in the timeline. Input Space 2, on the other hand, contains frame structure about SHIFTING, namely a moving entity that shifts from one point to another. When judged in retrospect (*κάθε που κοι-/ τάζω προς τα πίσω* 'every time/ I look back'), past events in Input Space 1 are integrated with shifting entities in Input Space 2 by means of Identity via Analogy; for the poet past events lack a fixed point similarly to an entity that moves from one point to another. As a result, in the blend, past events change location every time the poet contemplates his past and thus these events may on occasion seem to the poet either close to or far away from his present.[72] It is not without significance that the shifting construal of past years refers to years in the poet's past that were full of potential (*γεμάτα δυνατότητες*), yet they were pointless and wasted (*ανώφελα,/ χαμένα*). In construing them as constantly changing location, the poet is thus consoled for wasting his past time; even if he had made the best of it, his years would still be bound to elude once they were gone: *τι θα σήμαινε να 'χα/ κερδίσει είκοσι χρόνια* 'what would it have meant/ had I gained twenty years' (note that here the TIME AS MONEY metaphor is also evoked).

Consider now (3.6), whereby the passage of time is construed in terms of a particular kind of motion, namely charging:

(3.6)   *Μέσα στο σκοτάδι δουλεύοντας επί επτά ημέρες ασταμάτητα*
με αίμα και λάσπη έκτισε ο Θεός τον κόσμο
ακατανόητες έγιναν από τότε οι ταλαντώσεις του εκκρεμούς
που προϋπήρχε της δημιουργίας, ανοιχτά απόμειναν
τα μάτια των νεκρών για πάντα και αλίμονο!

Ο   επελαύνων   χρόνος   δεν   συγκρατείται πια   από κανένα ανάχωμα
The   charging   time   not   is-impeded   anymore by   any   mound
'Charging time can no longer be impeded by any mound'

[Σταμάτης Πολενάκης]

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72. See Section 3.3.5 on the relative distance of past events in memory.

> 'In the dark, working restlessly for seven days,
> God created the cosmos with blood and mud,
> ever since the oscillations of the pendulum that preceded creation
> have become incomprehensible
> and the deads' eyes remain open thereafter – alas!
> **Charging time can no longer be impeded by any**
> **mound**'

A motion verb derived from the puristic variety of Greek, so-called 'katharévousa' (*καθαρεύουσα*), *επελαύνω* (epelávno) 'to charge, to attack in a battle' is not conventionally associated with time (no such collocation occurs in the HNC), thereby pointing to non-conventionality at the linguistic level. Especially the grammatical form in which the verb is used in the poem (the participle *επελαύνων* 'charging') further emphasizes linguistic non-conventionality. In modifying time, *επελαύνων* 'charging' prompts a conceptualization of time as advancing toward Ego in a forceful and threatening way; that is, as an enemy that cannot be hindered. This interpretation is contextually enhanced: *[ο χρόνος] δεν συγκρατείται πια από κανένα/ ανάχωμα* 'it [time] can no longer be impeded by any/ mound'. Grounded in the Time-moving metaphor, such a conceptualization involves our background knowledge about charging but also our folk understanding of time as an unstoppable advent. This is afforded in a conceptual integration network between time and charging, shown in Figure 3.6:

Figure 3.6 Time as charging.

Usually with reference to troops (especially horse troops) in a military enterprise or during a battle, the frame structure of CHARGING involves an agent moving against an enemy with great violence or intensity as in an attack. Conceptual elements related to a military attack (contained in Input Space 1) such as a battle, an enemy, mounds, etc. are used to metaphorically represent the advent of time in (3.6). Consider that this is a frame-compatible integration given that CHARGING is a motional frame, therefore it is consonant with the conceptual structure of time. In particular, the motion of time in Input Space 2 is integrated with motion in the battlefield, namely charging, in Input Space 1 and thus, in the blend, time is construed as charging. The vital relation triggering this conceptual mapping is Identity via Analogy in that the advent of future time is perceived as threatening and merciless and is thus compared to a troop charging in the battlefield. The emergent conceptualization of time in the blend is essentially that of an attacker and therefore an enemy.

In elaborating the conceptual integration network in (3.6), it is inferred that the attack is directed against humans; time (in Input Space 2) moves toward Ego, who corresponds to the goal of motion in Input Space 1 and is thus construed as the victim of time in the blend. Moreover, in the frame of CHARGING various means (including mounds) are typically used in the battlefield to impede onslaughts. Nevertheless, in the blend, nothing can stop the attack of time as suggested by *[ο χρόνος] δεν συγκρατείται πια από κανένα/ ανάχωμα* 'it [time] can no longer be impeded by any/ mound'. Mounds correspond to any attempt to fight off an attacker. In this case, though, impeding the attack seems impossible. This is not derived, however, from the frame of CHARGING but, instead, from our background knowledge about the passage of time; we all know that it is undefeatable and inescapable. Unlike the previous poem, here both inputs contribute conceptual elements to the blend.

In sum, the enemy construal of time that is emergent in the blend in (3.6) coheres with the folk understanding of time as threatening (in that it brings about deterioration and ultimately death) and inescapable (in that humans cannot resist it). This also relates to the LIFE IS WAR conceptual metaphor, yet in the case of time (a vital aspect in our understanding of life) the battle is, for all humans, doomed to defeat. It is interesting, however, that in the context of the poem this has not always been the case as suggested by *πια* 'no longer'; given the reference to the genesis of the world in the beginning of the poem (*έκτισε ο Θεός τον κόσμο* 'God created the cosmos'), it seems that the passage of time has been rendered merciless ever since, and it is thereafter that humans are helpless in dealing with it.

A similar construal of time as an enemy is also evoked in (3.7):

(3.7) *Τικ τακ τικ τακ*
  σημαίνει μία δύο δώδεκα
  όταν το βράδυ σχίζεται

> *κι   ο   χρόνος   προχωρεί   ποδοπατώντας.*
> and   the   time   moves   trampling
> 'and time moves on by trampling'
> (…)
> *Τικ τακ τικ τακ/   ο   χρόνος   προχωρεί   ποδοπατώντας.*
> Tick tock tick tock/ the   time   moves   trampling
> 'Tick tock tick tock/ time moves on by trampling'   [Αλέξανδρος Ίσαρης]

> 'Tick tock tick tock
> signalling one two midnight
> when the night is torn apart
> **and time moves on by trampling …**
> **Tick tock tick tock**
> **time moves on by trampling'**

Here time is construed as trampling (*ποδοπατώντας*), which encodes a forcible and violent manner of walking. Manner is sometimes evoked in conventional metaphors of time as in, e.g., *ο χρόνος τρέχει* 'time runs' [HNC] (yet, note that *τρέχω* 'to run' evokes both manner and speed, as noted in Chapter 2). However, *ποδοπατώ* (poðopató) 'to trample' is not typically associated with time since no such use is found in the HNC and the dictionaries and, therefore, the metaphor at hand involves an elaboration of the standard conceptualization of moving time. Interestingly, the temporal expression in (3.7) instantiates a conventional expression, namely *ο χρόνος προχωρεί* 'time moves on', which is, nevertheless, embedded in a novel context as suggested by *ποδοπατώντας* 'trampling', thus yielding a creative construal of moving time. This observation is in line with Grady et al. (1999), who argue that simple metaphors can occur as inputs for more elaborate conceptualizations that are emergent in a blend. This type of conceptual integration network is represented in the figure below.

   The conceptual scenario for the emergence of the TIME AS TRAMPLING metaphor involves a mental space containing motional time[73] integrated with a mental space structured by the frame of TRAMPLING, both of which are enacted by the relevant

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73. As shown in the figure, the mental space of motional time essentially amounts to the generalized integration network of time and, in particular, the Time-moving construal (E/X/M)'. Thus, whenever applicable, I will use Fauconnier & Turner's (2008) notation for the generalized integration network of time in the figures representing the metaphor. In terms of Mental Space Theory, the generalized integration network of time here functions as "the *discourse base* space" (Fauconnier, 1997, p. 42), that is, as a reality space according to the speaker, to be distinguished from a belief space, a counterfactual space, etc. Also referred to as the Base, the base space is defined as "a starting point for the construction to which it is always possible to return" (Fauconnier & Turner, 2002, p. 49). In Cognitive Poetics, the base space has been recast as the *grounded space* (M. Freeman, 1997), while more recently a semiotic approach to the base space has been put forward (see Brandt & Brandt, 2005; L. Brandt, 2008).

Figure 3.7 Time as trampling.

lexical items in the poem. More specifically, the motion of time in Input Space 1 is fused with trampling in Input Space 2 by means of Identity via Analogy; the threatening and frustrating sensation induced by the passage of time resembles a heavy pace such as trampling. Although not explicitly stated in the metaphor, the act of trampling needs to be directed against someone, as indicated by the transitivity of the verb (cf. *ποδοπάτησε την αξιοπρέπειά μου* 'he trampled on my dignity'). This is mapped naturally onto the stationary observer that time moves past in the mental space of moving time. In the blend, Ego is construed as the victim of the passage of time.

So far, it has been proposed that the integration between moving time and trampling is motivated by a perceived similarity between the passage of time (when felt as threatening) and treading heavily as in the battlefield. In what follows, I wish to suggest that an additional motivation, albeit of a different kind, is at work in the emergence of the above construal and contributes to its meaning. Consider that, at least in its prototypical manifestation, trampling involves steps that cause a rhythmic sound. Time, on the other hand, is prototypically measured in the form of rhythmic clock sounds, explicitly mentioned in the poem: *Τικ τακ τικ τακ* 'Tick tock tick tock'. This is a typical case of onomatopoeia, which belongs to so-called imagic auditory iconicity, the latter utilizing the inherent qualities of sound units. In the case of onomatopoeia, in particular, speech sounds mimetically represent physical sounds such as the rooster's crowing (e.g., *cock-a-doodle-doo*) or, as is the case here, the ticking clock sound that signals the passage of time (note also *σημαίνει μία δύο δώδεκα* 'signalling one two midnight' in the poem).

However, this is not the whole story. In its second occurrence, *Τικ τακ τικ τακ* 'Tick tock tick tock' is directly followed by *Ο χρόνος προχωρεί ποδοπατώντας* 'Time moves on by trampling'. The two lines are therefore connected through an iconic link of different nature, so-called diagrammatic iconicity, whereby the relationship between visual or auditory signs (here successive lines) mirrors a similar relation between them. This enables an iconic interpretation of time as passing in a way that is not only forcible (because of *ποδοπατώντας* 'trampling') but also rhythmic (because of *τικ τακ* 'tick tock'). Iconicity, therefore, points to a discursive motivation behind the metaphor in (3.7), which complements the experiential analogy between our threatening understanding of time and trampling. As shown in Figure 3.7, for this meaning to arise, rhythmic steps in Input Space 1 are integrated with clock sounds in Input Space 2.

The proposed analysis essentially suggests that iconicity plays a constitutive role in meaning construction, especially in the context of poetry where it seems to be particularly salient (see Hiraga, 2005). As shown in the above analysis, in (3.7) both types of iconicity are attested, establishing a link between the rhythmic sound of clocks and the threatening advent of time: imagic, representing the sound of the clock, and diagrammatic, in the form of successive verses. The poem, therefore, utilizes iconicity to the effect that the metaphor conveys a much more complex and aesthetically powerful meaning that cannot be captured by looking solely at the lexico-grammatical structure of the expression; instead, one can quite safely assume that iconicity builds on, and elaborates, the constituents of the metaphor. Thus, when a forceful advent parallels the sound of the clock, the emergent conceptualization of time is that of an enemy heading at a heavy, rhythmic pace in a merciless attack. In this way, the poem in (3.7), similarly to the previous one, expresses the agony of humans in the face of the inevitable passage of time.

The last poem in this section, cited in (3.8), manifests a novel conceptualization of time by using a motion verb conventionally associated with time, namely *κυλάω* 'to flow', in a non-conventional syntactic pattern:

(3.8) *Τι μένει τώρα να πούμε, τι μένει να κάνουμε.*
       Σ' αυτά τα άθλια σπίτια που
       κυλάμε τις μέρες μας.
       roll-we the days   our
       'we roll our days'

       Ξαναζώντας
       το ναυάγιο της φωτιάς. Ακούγοντας, πάλι, στις πλάκες
       τα προδομένα της βήματα.
       Μέρες και νύχτες
       αγρύπνιας και μοναξιάς.   [Θανάσης Κωσταβάρας]

> 'What remains for us to say now, what remains for us to do.
> In these miserable houses where **we roll our days**, living
> again the wreck of the fire,
> hearing again on the ground
> her betrayed steps.
> Days and nights
> of sleeplessness and solitude.'

As already mentioned in Chapter 2, in MG, lexemes denoting temporal units collocate with *κυλάω* to yield a flowing construal of time (cf. *οι μέρες κυλούσαν μονότονα* 'the days were flowing monotonously' [Dictionary of the Modern Greek Language]). This meaning arises in an intransitive construction whereby the temporal modifier is the subject; it is under this construction that the verb bears the meaning of flowing and is conventionally associated with time. However, *κυλάω* is also used in a transitive construction, in that case evoking a different meaning: 'to roll' (with the complement denoting the entity on which motion is exerted). In this poem, *κυλάω* is used in such a transitive construction with *μέρες* 'days' serving as the complement, thus giving rise to a rolling construal of the passing days. The cross-domain mapping between days and rolling, along with its subsequent inferences, arises in a conceptual integration network, shown in Figure 3.8:

Figure 3.8 Days as rolling.

In instantiating both an intransitive and a transitive construction, *κυλάω* evokes a frame with two different syntactic realizations of semantic roles. In the transitive construction, it encodes caused motion, with an agent causing an object (usually

of round shape such as a ball or a stone) to roll as in *Τα παιδιά κυλούσαν σιδερένια στεφάνια* 'The children were rolling iron hoops' [Dictionary of Standard MG]. As an intransitive verb, *κυλάω* can also evoke motion of round objects that is not necessarily caused, as suggested by the following examples: *Το νόμισμα κύλησε κάτω από το τραπέζι* 'A coin rolled under the table' and *Ένας βράχος κύλησε από την πλαγιά του βουνού* 'A rock rolled from the slope of the mountain' [Dictionary of Standard MG]. However, in this construction *κυλάω* is also used to denote the motion of fluids and, by metaphorical extension, of time (cf. *το νερό/ ο χρόνος κυλάει* 'water/ time flows'). In co-occurring with a lexical item denoting a temporal unit in complement position (here *τις μέρες μας* 'our days'), in (3.8), the frame of the transitive construction is evoked. Thus, although *prima facie* the metaphor may look like the dual of the Time-flowing construal (cf. *περνάει ο χρόνος* 'time passes' and *περνάω χρόνο* 'we pass time'), *κυλάμε τις μέρες μας* 'we roll our days' yields, instead, a construal of moving (rather than flowing) time, namely that the days roll as a result of human action so initiating the motion.

More specifically, the metaphor *κυλάμε τις μέρες μας* 'we roll our days' evokes frame structure related to ROLLING (contained in Input Space 2), as well as a mental space of motional time, similar to the generalized integration network of time. Should the two spaces be integrated, in the blend the passage of time is construed as the rolling of an object (presumably a heavy one). In particular, days in Input Space 1 are integrated with (heavy) objects in Input Space 2 by means of Identity via Analogy in that they are analogous to large and hard to move objects (consider also the EVENTS ARE OBJECTS mapping in the Event Structure Metaphor; Lakoff 1993). In the blend, days move in the manner of rolling. Moreover, rolling typically requires an agent who causes the motion. Contained in Input Space 2, the agent of rolling is fused with the experiencer of time, who thus causes the days to roll in the blend. The emergent meaning, therefore, is that the passage of time is not easy, regular and natural, but rather strenuous, requiring effort on the part of the agent/experiencer.

Finally, the understanding that rolling the days is difficult (as if days weigh a lot) is also contributed in the immediate linguistic context by way of inference; spending days in miserable houses (*Σ' αυτά τα άθλια σπίτια*) can only be unpleasant, if not tedious. It seems that the setting of misery, hopelessness and loneliness in which the poet is located presumably hinders the regular flow of time (consider also *Τι μένει τώρα να πούμε,/ τι μένει να κάνουμε* 'What remains for us to say now, what remains for us to do', *Μέρες και νύχτες/ αγρύπνιας και μοναξιάς* 'Days and nights/ of sleeplessness and solitude'). Heavy objects thus qualify as a source domain for the metaphorical representation of unhappy days since they are difficult to move and are often viewed as burdens not only literally but also metaphorically (cf. *σηκώνω τα οικογενειακά βάρη* 'I carry the family burdens', *μου έφυγε ένα βάρος από την ψυχή* 'a burden is gone from my soul', etc.).

The rolling construal of time that is emergent in (3.8) deviates from everyday discourse in both linguistic and conceptual terms. At the linguistic level, it reverses the standard, expected word combination of time and *κυλάω*, thus cuing to "discourse deviation" at the syntactic level (see Leech, 1969; G. Cook 1994). In doing so, however, it gives rise to a novel construal of time; as shown in Chapter 2, as well as in the poems that have been discussed so far, time is typically construed in terms of self-propelled motion, whether this is charging, trampling or stooping. Here, however, the passage of time is construed as the outcome of caused motion, thus suggesting that the experience of time that motivates its emergence is not regular and automatic but difficult and effortful for the subjects. Given that the frame used for this construal to arise coincides, in lexical terms, with another frame that is typically used with reference to time, it seems that (3.8) features a form of linguistic creativity that has not been attested in any of the other examples discussed so far.

In the next section, I move to creative metaphors that manifest the Time-flowing construal.

3.2.3 Creative metaphors of the Time-flowing construal

The Time-flowing construal, as already mentioned in Chapter 2, enacts a conceptualization of time as a flowing substance. Grounded in the linear and irreversible flow of water along a river, this construal is expected to be manifested also in poetry. Such a case is exemplified in (3.9):

(3.9) *Το σπίτι μου ρωγμές γεμάτο*
    Ποταμός του   Αχέροντα ο   χρόνος με διασχίζει
    River   of-the Acheron   the time   me crosses
    'time crosses me like river Acheron …'

    (…)
    Άι στα τσακίδια, λέω, η άνοιξη ξαπλωμένη ανάσκελα
    στο χορτάρι
    Με τις μνήμες μου όλες στην ποδιά της να φωσφορίζουν
    σαν άστρα
    Κι εγώ να τινάζω από πάνω μου τις δεκαετίες να τις καίω
    Γέμισε ο τόπος αποκαΐδια.   [Μαρία Λαμπαδαρίδου-Πόθου]

    'My house is full of cracks
    time crosses me like river Acheron …
    Go away, I say, while the spring lies with her back
    on the grass
    with all my memories sparkling on her feet like stars
    with me tossing decades away
    burning them
    the place is now full of ashes.'

Here the TIME AS A RIVER metaphor applies to a particular river, namely Acheron. As a result, the temporal expression in (3.9) extends the standard pattern of conceptualization by integrating our background knowledge about Acheron into the emergent construal of time. According to the Ancient Greek mythology, Acheron, a river in the Epirus region in the Northwest of Greece, served as the passage for the souls of the dead to reach the Underworld. The temporal construal in (3.9) extends the standard conceptual pattern in one more respect; the river of time is construed as flowing across Ego (i.e., the poet herself) identified as a land across which water flows as suggested by *με διασχίζει* '[the river] crosses me'. The emergent conceptualization of time is shown in Figure 3.9 below:

Figure 3.9 Time as river Acheron.

The conceptual integration network in (3.9) involves a mental space of time and another one structured by the frame of ACHERON. By means of Identity via Analogy, time (in particular, time across lifetime) from Input Space 1 is mapped onto river Acheron in Input Space 2 and thus, in the blend, time is identified with Acheron. Given that Acheron is the river that the dead would have to cross in the transition from physical existence to afterlife the choice of Acheron as a particular river onto which time is mapped is nothing but accidental; it can thus be easily paralleld to time that flows along one's lifetime and ultimately leads to death. In addition, the poet (i.e., the experiencer of time) is also evoked in the construal in that she is metaphorically construed as the landmark of motion: *με διασχίζει* '[the river] crosses me'. Just like Acheron crosses a piece of land, the river of time passes through/across the poet. This conceptualization, finally, invites the inference that the poet will sooner or later be confronted with death.

Although rivers typically run across a piece of land, this aspect of the frame of RIVER is not imported into the TIME AS A RIVER metaphor in the conceptual structure of time. In this poem, not only is it activated but it is also mapped onto the stationary experiencer of time, identified as the poet herself. Crossed by the river of time that eventually leads to death, the poet is actually confronted with the end of her own life. This understanding of the metaphor is contextually enhanced in that the poet resides in a house full of cracks (*ρωγμές γεμάτο*) while her past time is now a pile of ashes (*Γέμισε ο τόπος αποκαΐδια*).

Consider now another instance of the Time-flowing metaphor in poetry, cited in (3.10):

(3.10) *Σαν όστρακο σε υποθαλάσσιο βράχο*

που μές' απ' το κλεισμένο κέλυφός του
ακούει θρόους φυκιών νερών ψιθύρους

έτσι κι εγώ
κλεισμένος στο σαρκίο
ν' ακούω τον χρόνο ατάραχος/   να   ρέει
to hear-I the time   undistracted/ that flows
'undistracted, I hear time / flowing'   [Ορέστης Αλεξάκης]

'Like a shell in an underwater rock

that inside its sealed conch
hears the rustling of the seaweed and the whispering of the water

me too
contained in my body
undistracted
I hear time
flowing.'

Unlike the metaphorical expressions examined so far in this chapter, the poem in (3.10) involves frames conventionally associated with time conceptualization, evoked by *χρόνος* 'time' and *ρέω* 'to flow'. However, I wish to suggest that here the collocation of time with *ρέω* is endowed with a new, not previously available meaning by activating an aspect of the cognitive scenario of flowing that is not conventionally mapped onto time: a hearing event, as suggested by *ν' ακούω* 'I hear'. Even though the event of flowing is audible, when mapped onto time this element is not carried over since such a construal would be incompatible with our understanding of time. In prompting a hearing construal of time, the poem in (3.10) activates the frame of FLOWING, afforded in a conceptual integration network as shown in Figure 3.10:

Figure 3.10 The flow of time as being audible.

In terms of CMT, the flow of time as a hearing event is viewed as a metaphorical entailment; since the flowing of liquids can be heard, when time is construed as flowing it follows that it can also be audible. Here I aim to reanalyze this approach in conceptual integration terms. In this account, the hearing event evokes the frame of FLOWING, contained in a mental space that is a partial representation of the whole frame structured *ad hoc* to serve the rhetorical goals of the poem. In particular, the conceptual integration network of time in (3.10) consists of two mental spaces, each one corresponding to the inputs of the metaphor, namely (a) a mental space of motional time, consistent with the generalized integration network of time (Input Space 1), and (b) a mental space of flowing (Input Space 2). As expected, motional time in Input Space 1 is integrated with a flowing substance in Input Space 2 by means of Identity via Analogy. Therefore, in the blend, the passage of time corresponds to flowing. As already mentioned, the mental space of flowing evoked in the poem contains an additional conceptual element, namely hearing. By projecting hearing from Input Space 2 onto the blend, the flowing of time in the blend is also construed as being audible. Finally, the act of hearing also presupposes a hearer; in the metaphor this is the experiencer of time, identified as the poet himself.

Having analyzed the conceptual structure of the temporal expression in (3.10), let us now examine the meaning conveyed by the conceptualization of time as an audible flow of water. Impossible in objective reality, since time cannot be perceived via our senses, the temporal construal calls for a closer examination of the context of its occurrence. Indeed, in (3.10), the poet is construed as a conch that resides in an underwater rock (*σε υποθαλάσσιο βράχο*) from which he can hear the rustling of the seaweed and the whispering of the waters (*ακούει θρόους φυκιών νερών*

ψιθύρους). Just like water is the natural environment for a conch to live in, time is the vital constituent for human life to exist. This analogy between water for sea organisms and time for humans contextually enables mapping hearing from the flow of the waters onto the flow of time.

Additional inferences may arise in interpreting the metaphor in (3.10). The conch is contained in a shell that separates it from water and seaweeds (*μέσ' απ' το κλεισμένο κέλυφός του*). Accordingly, the poet's self is contained in his body: *κλεισμένος στο σαρκίο* (note that here *σαρκίο* refers, in a rather derogatory way, to the physical body as opposed to its mental and affective aspects). Construed as a shell, the body serves as a medium for the self to interact with the world (consider the narrative of the split self discussed in poem (3.1)), but also as a protective coating of the self in the face of any external threat. In view of this, the poet can perceive the flow of time undistracted (*ατάραχος*). Elaborating on that, one may infer that the poet observes the passage of time that takes place in objective reality rather than participates in, or enjoys, it. A sense of introversion and loneliness is thus emergent in the poem.

A last, but not least, remark needs to be made vis-à-vis an alternative account of time conceptualization in (3.10) in terms of CMT. Such an account, I suggest, is confronted with shortcomings. Although CMT is on the right track in identifying the extension of the Time-flowing construal, treating it as a metaphorical entailment is rather problematic. When carrying over the 'hearing' element of the flowing water into time, as shown in Figure 3.10, there is no slot in the input of time that metaphorically corresponds to hearing the flow of time. In other words, there is no one-to-one correspondence in the cross-domain mapping. At the same time, the so-called Invariance Principle (according to which the target domain imposes constraints on cross-domain correspondences) cannot be implemented either: along these lines, lack of hearing (as well as of any other sense-based perception) of time would disallow this particular mapping. Instead, I aimed to show that frame structure of asymmetrical and even incompatible nature is recruited in the metaphor, which can only be accommodated through the mental operation of blending.

In sum, although seemingly straightforward (given its relatedness to the conceptualization of time as a flowing substance), the poem in (3.10) in fact gives rise to an utterly novel construal of flowing time, which even contradicts our folk understanding of time. In theoretical terms, the proposed analysis corroborates the claim made by Coulson (2006, p. 187) that conceptual blending is used to mediate the exploitation of stable conventional mapping schemes in order to adapt them to the idiosyncratic needs of specific communicative events. Thus, in order to unveil the meaning of (3.10) to its full extent and, not least, to highlight the motivations underlying its emergence the analysis takes into account also contextual cues.

In this section, I have discussed the Time-flowing construal and its manifestation in creative metaphors of time in poetry. These metaphors extend the standard

conceptualization of flowing time in the form of motion-based integrations that either introduce background knowledge from motional frames not conventionally associated with time (like river Acheron) or unexpectedly activate usually inactive aspects of motional frames associated with time (like hearing the flow of time). In the following section, I will recast the conceptualization of subjective time in the light of empirical evidence from poetry.

3.2.4 The conceptualization of subjective time

As already discussed in Section 2.4.4, time in everyday discourse may be conceptualized as passing slowly or quickly or as coming to a halt, thereby giving rise to a construal of protracted, compressed or 'frozen' time, respectively (cf. *ο χρόνος περνά/ κυλάει αργά/ γρήγορα* 'time passes/ flows slowly/ quickly', *ο χρόνος σταμάτησε/ πάγωσε* 'time has stopped/ is frozen'). In all these cases, the emergent conceptualization is that of subjective time. In this section, I will explore how this standard pattern for conceptualizing subjective time is evidenced in poetry and, more specifically, in what ways it coheres with its manifestation in everyday discourse but also to what extent it diverges from it.

    First, consider (3.11) whereby the passing days are specified as moving slowly (*αργοκίνητες*), thus prompting a construal of protracted duration:

(3.11)   *Εδώ δεν είναι τόπος για περηφάνια.*
         Εδώ δεν είναι τόπος για έκσταση.
         Ένα μακρύ ποτάμι ημέρες αργοκίνητες.
         A   long   river   days   slowly-moving.
         'A long river of slowly moving days.'

         (…)
         στον τόπο τούτο με την παγωμένη φωτιά
         τι περιμένω;
         Τι περιμένω εδώ που ο πυρετός παροξύνεται;
         (…)
         εκεί που είμαι ακίνητος και κοιτάζω και περιμένω
         τι περιμένω;   [Τάκης Σινόπουλος]

         'This is not a place of pride.
         This is not a place of joy.
         A long river of slowly moving days.
         In this place of chilly fire
         What am I waiting for?
         What am I waiting for here where fever goes up? …
         There I stand still and look and wait
         What am I waiting for?'

The expression denoting the passage of time in (3.11) departs significantly from conventional discourse. Firstly, it evidences a non-conventional collocation of motional time since the adjective *αργοκίνητος* (aryokínitos) 'slowly moving' does not co-occur with lexical items denoting time or temporal units, as suggested by a search in the HNC and the dictionaries of MG (cf. *αργοκίνητο τρένο/ πλοίο* 'slowly moving train/ boat' [Dictionary of Standard MG]). Secondly, by virtue of *ποτάμι* 'river' the temporal expression in (3.11) evokes the Time-flowing blend. Nevertheless, here the river does not refer to time as is typically the case (cf. *το ποτάμι του χρόνου* 'the river of time') but to days (*ποτάμι ημέρες* 'a river of days'). Therefore, although the days metonymically stand for time through the PART FOR WHOLE metonymy, the linguistic expression diverges from the standard pattern of lexicalizing the TIME IS A RIVER metaphor. In particular, the metaphor in (3.11) exploits conceptual elements of the frame of RIVER such as length (*μακρύ* 'long') and speed of motion (*αργοκίνητες* 'slowly moving') to construe the passage of the days. Such a conceptualization of time is emergent in the conceptual integration network of time presented in Figure 3.11:

Figure 3.11 Days as a slowly flowing river.

As shown in the figure, a mental space containing days (Input Space 2) is integrated with a mental space structured by the frame of RIVER (Input Space 1), evoked by *μέρες* 'days' and *ποτάμι* 'river', respectively. The passage of days in Input Space 2 is blended with the flow of a river in Input Space 1 by virtue of Identity via Analogy;

as in the TIME IS A RIVER metaphor, the sequence of the days resembles the flow of a river in that it is linear and irreversible. Thus, in the blend, the sum of the days is conceptualized as a river and their passage as flowing. Given the mapping of days and river, further features of the flow of a river are mapped onto the passing days: extent and speed. In view of this, in the blend, days amount to a long river that flows at a slow pace, so that a long interval of protracted time is emergent.

In theoretical terms, the temporal construal in (3.11) instantiates a non-conventional way for protracted duration to arise. As argued in Section 2.4.4, protracted duration in everyday discourse (e.g., *ο χρόνος κυλάει αργά* 'time flows slowly') emerges in a blend of events and experienced motion E/X and it is this topology that dominates the conceptual integration network of experienced events and clock time. In (3.11), however, protracted duration emerges from an integration of days with a river and, more specifically, from a projection of the speed in the flow of the river onto the passage of days. It thus transpires that poetry allows for non-conventional integrations that yield novel metaphorical construals of protracted duration, which, however, are also motional and therefore they are congruent with the conceptual structure of time.

Finally, it is worth pointing out that, apart from its grounding in the TIME IS A RIVER metaphor, the protracted construal of time in (3.11) seems to be triggered also by affective factors in line with findings in social psychology (Flaherty, 1999). When looking more closely at the poem, it becomes evident that the temporal construal in (3.11) arises in an emotionally charged, negatively valenced context, featuring lack of happy feelings (*Εδώ δεν είναι τόπος για περηφάνια./ Εδώ δεν είναι τόπος για έκσταση* 'This is not a place of pride./ This not a place of joy') while evoking, in an imaginative way, distress in the form of a chilly fire (*παγωμένη φωτιά*) and ever growing fever (*ο πυρετός παροξύνεται*). This culminates in the poet's emotional state, related to a sense of wondering and waiting, which is emphatically repeated in the form of a question throughout: *τι περιμένω;* 'what am I waiting for?'. With the poet construed as standing still in the temporal motion scene (*εκεί που είμαι ακίνητος* 'there I stand still'), the protracted construal of time is further emphasized; it is likely that stillness and waiting (both of which evoke uneventfulness) jointly contribute to a sense of time as passing slowly.

The following poem, on the other hand, construes time as passing quickly, thereby evoking temporal compression:[74]

(3.12) *Δώδεκα και μισή. Γρήγορα πέρασεν η   ώρα*
         Twelve and half. Quickly passed-it the hour
         'Half past twelve. The time has quickly passed'

---

74. Translation by Daniel Mendelsohn (2012).

απ' τες εννιά που άναψα την λάμπα,
since the nine   that lit-I   the lamp
'since nine o'clock when I first turned up the lamp'
και κάθισα εδώ.   Κάθουμουν χωρίς να διαβάζω,
and sat-I   here.
'and sat down here.'

και χωρίς να μιλώ. Με ποιόνα να μιλήσω
κατάμονος μέσα στο σπίτι αυτό.

Το είδωλον του νέου σώματός μου,
απ' τες εννιά που άναψα την λάμπα,
ήλθε και με ηύρε και με θύμησε
κλειστές κάμαρες αρωματισμένες,
και περασμένην ηδονή – τι τολμηρή ηδονή!
Κ' επίσης μ' έφερε στα μάτια εμπρός,
δρόμους που τώρα έγιναν αγνώριστοι,
κέντρα γεμάτα κίνησι που τέλεψαν,
και θέατρα και καφενεία που ήσαν μια φορά.

Το είδωλον του νέου σώματός μου
ήλθε και μ' έφερε και τα λυπητερά·
πένθη της οικογένειας, χωρισμοί,
αισθήματα δικών μου, αισθήματα
των πεθαμένων τόσο λίγο εκτιμηθέντα.

Δώδεκα και μισή. Πώς πέρασεν η   ώρα.
Twelve   and half. How passed   the hour.
'Half past twelve. How the time has gone by.'
Δώδεκα και μισή. Πώς πέρασαν τα   χρόνια.
Twelve   and half. How passed   the years.
'Half past twelve. How the years have gone by.'   [Κ. Π. Καβάφης]

'Half past twelve. The time has quickly passed
since nine when I first turned up the lamp
and sat down here. I've been sitting without reading,
without speaking. With whom ought I to speak,
so utterly alone within this house?

The apparition of my youthful body,
since nine when I first turned up the lamp,
has come and found me and reminded me
of shuttered perfumed rooms
and of pleasure spent – what wanton pleasure!
And it also brought before my eyes
streets now made unrecognizable by time,

> bustling city centres that are no more,
> and theaters and coffeehouses that existed long ago.
>
> The apparition of my youthful body
> came and also brought me cause for pain:
> deaths in the family; … separations …;
> the feelings of my loved ones, the feelings of
> those long dead which I so little valued.
>
> **Half past twelve. How the time has passed.**
> **Half past twelve. How the years have passed**.'

The poem in (3.12) opens with an expression of time referring to the last few hours of the poet: *Δώδεκα και μισή. Γρήγορα πέρασεν η ώρα* 'Half past twelve. The time has quickly passed'. It also ends with another two temporal expressions, this time referring to the interval of the last few hours *and* to his whole past lifetime: *Πώς πέρασεν η ώρα* 'How the time has passed' and *Πώς πέρασαν τα χρόνια* 'How the years have passed'. In cognitive poetic terms, a metaphor that appears at the beginning of a poem and recurs at the end contributes to intratextual coherence (Semino, 2011, p. 91), while the repetition of a construction in two successive sentences for rhetoric effect, commonly referred to as parallelism, builds up a form-meaning relationship in which form iconically reflects, and constructs, meaning.[75] Here I wish to argue that the textual patterning of the metaphors in (3.12) enacts a complex conceptualization of time as passing quickly, which amounts to a retrospective construal of past life events as equal to an interval of a few hours in the poet's present. Such a conceptualization of time calls for a multiple-space conceptual integration network, whereby the two intervals (i.e., the interval of few hours in the present and the poet's past lifetime) arise, as expected, in a generalized integration network of time but are unexpectedly integrated, as shown in Figure 3.12:

In linguistic terms, the lexico-grammatical constructions used by the poet do not diverge from entrenched expressions in that the passage of time is evoked through the prototypical motion verb *περνάω* 'to pass',[76] with *γρήγορα* 'quickly'

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75. In more general terms, intratextual features such as the repetition of certain strings of words or phonemes (consider, e.g., alliteration, rhyme and meter) that are commonly attested in the context of poetic discourse are found to play a constitutive role in meaning construction. The role played by form in meaning construction in literature, acknowledged initially by Jakobson (1960, 1987) and Jakobson & Waugh (1979), has been investigated in a number of studies within Cognitive Poetics; see Tsur on Hebrew poetry (1992); M. Freeman on Dickinson (1995, 1997, 2002); P. A. Brandt on a Shakesperean sonnet (2004b); Hiraga on haiku (1998, 2005); and Sweetser on *Cyrano de Bergerac* (2006; cf. Tsur, 2008). Especially the studies by Hiraga and Sweetser implement a conceptual integration approach to the investigation of the form-meaning relationship.

76. Note, however, that the 3rd person singular form *πέρασεν* '[time] has passed' belongs to so-called *καθαρεύουσα* (i.e., the official language and the high register of Greek at the time).

Figure 3.12 Past lifetime compressed within a few hours in the present.

explicitly denoting temporal compression (consider also that *γρήγορα* 'quickly' is in focus position, thus stressing even further high speed in the passage of time). Even the expression *Πώς πέρασεν η ώρα* 'How the time has passed' with no adverbial modifier specifying speed typically bears the implicature of temporal compression (cf. «*Καλέ κοίτα το πώς μεγάλωσε… Κοπελάρα σωστή. Είδες πώς περνάν τα χρόνια;*» 'Well, look how she's grown… She has become a woman. It's amazing how the years passed!' [HNC]). In view of this, I wish to argue that the poem in (3.12) is an instance of so-called "revitalized" metaphors, i.e. conventional metaphorical expressions endowed with a novel meaning by virtue of the context in which they occur[77] (Goatly, 1997, pp. 276–277; Semino, 2008, pp. 222–225; Semino, 2011, p. 100). Here the context that cues to creativity in the metaphorical expressions relates to the textual patterns (*textual schemas* in cognitive poetic terms; see Semino 1995, 1997) that are evidenced in the poem and give rise to a novel meaning, although the individual words contributing to the patterns are used in fairly conventional metaphorical senses (Semino, 2011, p. 87; see also Carter, 2004, pp. 119–141; Müller, 2010; Semino, 2008, pp. 42–54).

In particular, in (3.12), the former temporal construal refers to the passage of time from the moment of lighting a lamp (*απ' τες εννιά που άναψα την λάμπα* 'since nine when I first turned up the lamp') up to the present (*Δώδεκα και μισή* 'Half

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77. This claim is in line with Pilkington (2000), who argues, from a relevance theoretic perspective, that a metaphor presented in isolation may not be perceived as poetic, yet it may be if embedded in a text.

past twelve'). Already in the first line, *Δώδεκα και μισή* 'Half past twelve' designates the present of the poet and, at the same time, the endpoint of the conceptualized interval. The same interval is also evoked at the end of the poem, as suggested by the repetition of *Δώδεκα και μισή* 'Half past twelve'. The conceptualization of this interval (from 9 o'clock until half past midnight) as quick is emergent in a conceptual integration network (E/X/M)'. The conceptualized interval is contained in M (i.e., the mental space of clock time) where it objectively lasts for three hours and a half. Yet, this same interval contains events that are experienced as quick in (E/X)'. When the experience- and the clock-based intervals are integrated, the topology of (E/X)' dominates in the blend and thus the interval is construed in subjective, rather than objective, terms. In short, a generalized network of time of subjective time (E/X/M)' arises (Space 3 in the figure), similarly to conventional metaphors of time as passing quickly.

However, this particular interval from 9 o'clock until half past midnight seems to be awash with memories. With the poet sitting alone and idle in an empty house (*Κάθουμουν χωρίς να διαβάζω,/ και χωρίς να μιλώ. Με ποιόνα να μιλήσω/ κατάμονος μέσα στο σπίτι αυτό* 'I've been sitting without reading,/ without speaking. With whom ought I to speak,/ so utterly alone within this house?'), the interval is rather empty and uneventful and thus quite naturally lends itself to retrospection,[78] namely going back to past events and recalling memories. In the case of Cavafy's poem, retrospection ends up with a deluge of happy and sad memories. The former include past hedonic pleasure (*κλειστές κάμαρες αρωματισμένες,/ και περασμένην ηδονή – τι τολμηρή ηδονή!* 'of shuttered perfumed rooms/ and of pleasure spent – what wanton pleasure!'), as well as places which have changed ever since or no longer exist (*δρόμους που τώρα έγιναν αγνώριστοι,/ κέντρα γεμάτα κίνησι που τέλεψαν,/ και θέατρα και καφενεία που ήσαν μια φορά* 'streets now made unrecognizable by time,/ bustling city centres that are no more,/ and theaters and coffeehouses that existed long ago'). Sad memories, on the other hand, refer to family grief, separations and frustrated feelings: *πένθη της οικογένειας, χωρισμοί,/ αισθήματα δικών μου, αισθήματα/ των πεθαμένων τόσο λίγο εκτιμηθέντα* 'deaths in

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78. The correlation between uneventful time and retrospection is clearly exemplified in another poem, cited below, in which boredom in a waiting room results in recollection and imaginary, irrational thoughts: *Όσοι προσμένουν σιωπηλοί στους προθαλάμους/ πλήττουν θανάσιμα, (…)/ Άλλοι θυμούνται περιστατικά ξεθωριασμένα από τον χρόνο/ κι άλλοι σκέπτονται πράγματα που μόνο μέσα/ στη νοσηρή τους φαντασία συμβαίνουν* [Ορέστης Αλεξάκης] 'those who silently wait in waiting rooms/ are bored to death…/ some recall incidents fading in time/ while others think of events that/ happen only in their morbid imagination'. It is noteworthy that uneventful situations are typically associated with protracted duration since in empty intervals attention is typically directed to the passage of time itself (James, 1890/1950, p. 626).

the family; … separations …;/ the feelings of my loved ones, the feelings of/ those long dead which I so little valued'. It is common knowledge that past events gradually fade away in memory. This is due to the loss of memory that is concomitant with the passage of time; details of experienced events fade out over time and thus remembered experiences are contracted. As a result, past events can be judged as having passed quickly although they may have been felt as canonical when they were experienced.[79] The correlation between recollection of the past and temporal compression is also corroborated by findings in social and cognitive psychology (Friedman, 1990, p. 21; Flaherty, 1999, p. 110; Draaisma, 2004, p. 203; see also Parker, Crawford & Harris, 2006).

Indeed, in (3.12), past years in the poet's life are compressed in that they are retrospectively perceived as having passed quickly: *Πώς πέρασαν τα χρόνια* 'How the years have passed'. Variable speed is a property of time only within (E/X/M)', namely the conceptualization of subjective time. Similarly to the former temporal construal, past life years that are measured in a uniform way in M are integrated with a blend of events and experienced motion (E/X)', whereby their passage is felt as quick. By construing retrospectively the years as having gone by fast, another network of subjective time (E/X/M)' is emergent (Space 6 in the figure) whereby, like in Space 3, the felt experience of time wins over its clock-based measurement. It is certainly not without significance that the compressed construal of past lifetime arises in a highly affective context of loneliness, nostalgia and regret over the passage of time.

So far, it has been shown how two construals of temporal compression emerge quite straightforwardly in two distinct integration networks of subjective time (Space 3 and 6 in the figure) by virtue of the metaphorical expressions that are used to denote them. In what follows, I wish to take the proposed analysis a step further by suggesting that the emergent meaning of the two metaphorical expressions is that one interval (namely, past life experiences) is construed in terms of the other (that is, the last few hours in the poet's present). To this end, let us have a closer look at the end of the poem, repeated here for convenience:

> *Δώδεκα και μισή. Πώς πέρασεν η ώρα.*
> *Δώδεκα και μισή. Πώς πέρασαν τα χρόνια.*
>
> 'Half past twelve. How the time has passed.
> Half past twelve. How the years have passed.'

---

79. Alternatively, past years could have been compressed in memory. In that case, they would have been conceptualized as being close to the present rather than as having passed quickly. Such a construal would evoke the conceptualization of time in subjective memory, which will be discussed in the following section.

Note that the two expressions of time are aligned in two successive lines and, more-over, instantiate a similar lexico-grammatical construction, differing only in their respective final lexemes: η ώρα 'the time' in the former and τα χρόνια 'the years' in the latter. This observation thus attests to an instance of parallelism in the last lines of the poem. A form of visual diagrammatic iconicity, parallelism is a feature that is prominent in poetic discourse, the latter exploiting the visual and auditory sub-stratum of language to its full extent. Here I wish to suggest that parallelism estab-lishes an iconic link between the two intervals contained in the above expressions (emergent in the two networks of subjective time in Spaces 3 and 6 in the figure), thus inviting an additional integration; the passage of the years is compressed into an interval of retrospection extending across a few hours in the present.

More specifically, as shown in Figure 3.12, the experienced interval in the po-et's present in Space 3 is integrated with the remembered interval of past lifetime in Space 6. As a result, in the blend, the poet's past lifetime is compressed into an interval of a few hours in his present. This integration is motivated by Identity via Analogy in that his past lifetime is currently felt as equal to such a short interval. This is certainly not accidental; the last few hours the poet has been concerned with recalling events from his past. However, it is a form-meaning relationship that unfolds through parallelism that enacts the conceptualization of compressed time that is conveyed in the poem. The association between the two intervals is, in fact, iconically reflected in their linguistic manifestation. Although conventional in lexical and syntactic terms, the expressions of time in (3.12) are textually linked with further consequences in meaning construction.

In more general terms, the proposed analysis in (3.12) suggests that conventional metaphors can endorse novel, enriched meanings depending on the textual schemas used to link them, at the same time corroborating the role played by iconicity in meaning construction (see Hiraga, 2005, Sweetser, 2006). As Steen (1994) points out, when engaged with literary texts readers pay equal attention to form as being complementary to content (what he dubs *form orientation*). This observation has important implications for the analysis of metaphor. A CMT account of the meta-phors in (3.12) cannot do justice to the meaning that is emergent by virtue of par-allelism; rather, it would be restricted to viewing them as instances of conventional metaphorical expressions that map a central feature of motion, namely speed, to the conceptualization of time. Instead, CIT allows for integrating iconicity, that is, structural correspondences between form and meaning, in the analysis of metaphor understanding. It thus enables not only unpacking metaphorical mappings but also explaining rich and complex meanings of the sort found abundantly in poetry.

So far, it has been shown that the conceptualization of subjective time in-volves explicit reference to speed in the passage of time in accordance with the pattern found in everyday discourse, although the lexical means may not always be

conventional (cf. *μέρες αργοκίνητες* 'slowly moving days'). However, the empirical evidence in the corpus of MG poetry brings to the fore another pattern for conceptualizing protracted and compressed time that is not metaphorical and has not received enough attention in the relevant literature. I will return to it in Chapter 5.

3.2.5 The conceptualization of time in memory

In this section, I will discuss the conceptualization of time in memory and its manifestation in poetry. To illustrate how time can be recalled by the experiencer, let us first consider the following poem:[80]

(3.13) **Θα   'θελα   αυτήν την μνήμη   να την πω…**
         Would   want-I   this   the memory   to it   say
         'I should like to tell you of this reminiscence…'
         Μα έτσι εσβύσθη πια… σαν τίποτε   δεν απομένει –
         But so   faded-it   now   as-if nothing not remains
         'But it has faded so… it is as though nothing now remained –'
         γιατί μακρυά στα   πρώτα εφηβικά μου χρόνια κείται.
         for   far   in-the first   teen   my   years   lies
         'because far back, in my first adolescent years it lies.'

         Δέρμα σαν καμωμένο από ιασεμί…
         Εκείνη του Αυγούστου – Αύγουστος ήταν; – η βραδυά…
         Μόλις θυμούμαι πια τα μάτια· ήσαν, θαρρώ, μαβιά…
         Α ναι, μαβιά· ένα σαπφείρινο μαβί.   [Κ. Π. Καβάφης]

         'I should like to tell you of this reminiscence…
         But it has faded so… it is as though nothing now remained –
         because far back, in my first adolescent years it lies.

         A skin that was suggestive of the jasmine…
         That August evening – Was it the month of August? –
         Hardly do I remember now the eyes; they were blue, I think…
         Ah, yes! I can recall their blue – a sapphire blue.'

The poem in (3.13) evokes a conceptualization of time in memory: *μακρυά, στα πρώτα εφηβικά μου χρόνια κείται* 'far back, in my first adolescent years it lies'. In particular, the metaphor in (3.13) locates a remembered event (*μνήμη* 'memory') at the time when it was experienced in reality, namely when the poet was an adolescent, and construes this temporal point in memory in spatial terms as suggested by the locative terms *μακρυά* 'far back' and *κείται* 'it lies'. In terms of CMT, this

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80. Translation by John Cavafy (2003).

metaphor evokes the PROXIMITY IN TIME IS PROXIMITY IN SPACE conceptual mapping. However, such an account falls short of acknowledging that here proximity applies to *remembered*, rather than experienced, events. In fact, the temporal construal in (3.13) offers a conceptualization of past events as recalled in memory and, in particular, in objective terms, that is, in a way that coincides with the location of events in reality (as it will be shown in the next poem, remembered events can also be conceptualized in subjective terms). Treating the metaphor in (3.13) as merely an instance of the PROXIMITY IN TIME IS PROXIMITY IN SPACE metaphor misses the conceptual link between how events are experienced in reality and how they are embedded in memory; the meaning conveyed by a metaphor locating remembered events at a real distance is thus overlooked. Instead, conceptual structure about past events in the timeline and in memory is imported to a metaphorical mapping within a conceptual integration network, depicted in the figure below:

Figure 3.13 Past events construed far away in objective memory.

According to Fauconnier & Turner (2008), any temporal expression that applies to remembered events involves (a) a conceptual integration network of time E/X/M, and (b) a conceptual integration network of remembered events in space R/S. This is also the case in (3.13), whereby Input Space 1 and Input Space 2 contain past events as they occurred in the timeline and as they are now embedded in his memory, respectively. In the former input, past events are located at the time the poet was an adolescent. Given that the poet is now old, it follows that, in E/X/M, a long time has passed since. When embedded in memory, such past events are integrated with remembered events in R/S by means of Identity. In the case at hand, past events in E/X/M are projected onto their counterparts in memory and thus, within the blend, remembered events are construed in a way that is congruent with past events in reality. In other words, remembered events are located in the poet's teen years; hence at

a long distance from the present. Given this distance, the poet finds it rather difficult to recall past events and is unsure about the exact time of his memory, as suggested by various contextual cues: *εσβύσθη πια* 'it has faded so', *Αύγουστος ήταν;* 'was it the month of August?', *μόλις θυμούμαι πια* 'hardly do I remember now'. As predicted by blending theorists, the analysis of the temporal construal in (3.13) shows that when past events are recalled as parts of objective reality it is their location in E/X/M that structures their conceptualization in the blend of time with memory.

Having seen how memories can be conceptualized in objective terms, let us now turn to (3.14), whereby an old man regretfully recalls his youth and in doing so he evokes a different conceptualization of past events in memory:[81]

(3.14) *Στου καφενείου του βοερού το μέσα μέρος*
σκυμένος στο τραπέζι κάθετ' ένας γέρος·
με μιαν εφημερίδα εμπρός του, χωρίς συντροφιά.

Και μες στων άθλιων γηρατειών την καταφρόνεια
σκέπτεται πόσο λίγο χάρηκε τα χρόνια
που είχε και δύναμι, και λόγο, κ' εμορφιά.

Ξέρει   που γέρασε πολύ· το νοιώθει, το κυττάζει.
Knows-he that aged-he much: it feels-he it sees-he.
'He knows he's aged a lot: he feels it, he sees it'
Κ'   εν τούτοις   ο   καιρός που ήταν   νέος   μοιάζει
And nevertheless the time   that was-he young seems
'Nevertheless, the time that he was young seems'
σαν χθες.   Τι   διάστημα μικρό, τι   διάστημα μικρό.
like yesterday. What interval   small   what interval   small
'like yesterday. What a short interval, what a short interval.'

Και συλλογιέται η Φρόνησις πώς τον εγέλα·
και πώς την εμπιστεύονταν πάντα – τι τρέλλα! –
την ψεύτρα που έλεγε· «Αύριο. Έχεις πολύν καιρό».

Θυμάται ορμές που βάσταγε· και πόση
χαρά θυσίαζε. Την άμυαλή του γνώσι
καθ' ευκαιρία χαμένη τώρα την εμπαίζει.

….Μα απ' το πολύ να σκέπτεται και να θυμάται
ο γέρος εζαλίσθηκε. Κι αποκοιμάται
στου καφενείου ακουμπισμένος το τραπέζι.   [Κ. Π. Καβάφης]

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81. The translation of the poem is by John Cavafy (2003). However, in the transliterated text below and in the analysis that follows I provide my own translation that is closer to the original text.

'Here in the noisy café, in the inner part of its
unrest, an old man, bending over a table, sits,
with the day's print before him, and companionless.

And in the misery of old age, with its deep void
around him, he reflects how little he enjoyed
the years when he had strength, and speech, and comeliness.

He is aware of his great age: the days are gray
and cheerless. Still it seems as though it were yesterday
that he was young. So fast have gone the years, so fast.

And he considers how he used to be deceived
by Prudence: how, alack! she lied and he believed her lie:
"Tomorrow. Ample time ere time be past."

He thinks of lusts curbed, and of joys that he denied
himself. All the lost opportunities now deride
his witless wisdom… But the old man cannot keep

his thoughts together; they disquiet and bedim
his brain; these memories ever vex and weary him:
and at the table where he sits he falls asleep.'

Unlike the previous poem, here there is a clash between the events as experienced in the past and as embedded in memory. The past, in particular the poet's youth, is construed as lying close to his present, namely yesterday: *Κ' εν τούτοις ο καιρός που ήταν νέος μοιάζει/ σαν χθες* 'Nevertheless, the time that he was young seems/ like yesterday'. At the same time, it is independently acknowledged that he is now old and therefore a long time has passed since his youth: *Ξέρει που γέρασε πολύ· το νοιώθει, το κυττάζει* 'He knows he's aged a lot: he sees it, he feels it'. Therefore, in (3.14), past events are remembered in subjective, rather than objective, terms. Similarly to the previous poem, CMT views the temporal expression in (3.14) merely as an instance of the PROXIMITY IN TIME IS PROXIMITY IN SPACE conceptual metaphor and thus does not do full justice to the emergent meaning of the metaphor, namely that past events are located close to the present because they are recalled in subjective memory. Since the emergent meaning of the metaphor in (3.14) cannot be accounted for by a direct mapping between time and space, a conceptual integration network of past events in reality and in memory with asymmetrical mappings and projections is exploited. This is represented in Figure 3.14.

As shown in the figure, the location of the poet in the present, as well as the location of his youth in the past, are contained in a generalized integration network of time E/X/M (Input Space 1). In this space, the distance between youth and the present is a long one given that the poet is now old. When recalled in retrospect, past events are integrated with a mental space of memory and physical distance

Figure 3.14 Youth in the far past construed as yesterday in memory.

R/S (Input Space 2). Since youth is located in the far past in E/X/M it will also be located a long time ago in the space of memory (consider that the poet seems to be aware of the real distance of his youth). However, his youth is subjectively felt as being close in memory. This entails that it is not the real distance between time and memory that is projected onto the blend but, rather, a relative (i.e., subjective) one. In particular, 'youth' from the input of time is integrated with 'yesterday' in the input of memory, instead of 'long ago' that would be expected in reality. In other words, youth is felt as recent and accessible and is thus located at a short distance in memory. In this way, within the blend, the time that intervenes between the time of youth and the poet's present is also compressed: *Τι διάστημα μικρό, τι διάστημα μικρό* 'What a short interval, what a short interval'.

   In the proposed analysis, the conceptualization of remembered events in relative, rather than real, distance emerges from selectively projecting the subjective feeling of past events in the mental space of memory R/S onto the blend. Construing the remote past as having happened yesterday gives rise to an instance of temporal compression. In this case, however, compressed time does not amount to an accelerated speed in the passage of time (as it was the case in poem (3.12)) but, instead, to locating events in memory at a shorter distance than in the timeline. As already mentioned, temporal compression in memory is due to the erosion of past events in memory, as well as to the emotional involvement of the experiencer in recalling the past (Flaherty, 1999). In this respect, it is not without significance that the above construal of time in subjective memory arises under the influence

of the poet's regret over ageing: *μες στων άθλιων γηρατειών την καταφρόνεια* 'in the misery of old age'. Apparently, recalling past memories of youth and joy makes it harder to come to grips with old age.

In this section, I showed that, in poetry, past events in memory may be construed either in objective or in subjective terms, that is, either as they occurred in reality or as they are subjectively recalled by the experiencer. In either case, a conceptual integration analysis was proposed for the emergent meaning of the relevant metaphors to be unpacked. In the last section of this chapter, next, I will discuss instances of the conceptualization of the past and the future in the corpus of MG poetry, thus completing the analysis of metaphors that creatively exploit the conceptual structure of time in the motion scene.

3.2.6 The conceptualization of the past and the future

Unlike the creative metaphors of time analyzed so far, the poems that exploit the conceptualization of the past and the future call into question the conceptual structure of time in MG and, in this sense, they disrupt our conceptual schemas of time. However paradoxical they may sound at first glance, such *reversed* construals of the past and the future will be shown to be motivated by the folk understanding of time and be quite readily understood in their context of occurrence.

First, consider (3.15) whereby the poet explicitly wonders how it is possible for time to be reversed (*αναστρέφεται ο καιρός*):

(3.15)   *Ό,τι πλησιάζει*
       απομακρύνεται συγχρόνως
       (…)
       Χάνονται στο απροσπέλαστο οι μορφές
       Τέφρας σωροί στη θέση των πραγμάτων
       Πώς ξάφνου καταρρέουν τα περιγράμματα
       και χύνονται στην άβυσσο οι ουσίες;

       Πώς αναστρέφεται ο καιρός
       How is-reversed the time
       'How can time be reversed'
       και προς το παρελθόν γυρνάει το μέλλον;
       and toward the past turns the future
       'and the future turns toward the past?'

       Κλείνουν οι κύκλοι
       Κλείνουν οι εποχές
       Φυσούν από τα βάθη πεπρωμένα   [Ορέστης Αλεξάκης]

'What comes closer
moves away at the same time…
Figures vanish in a no man's land
Objects give their place to piles of ashes
How can borders fade away all at once
and contents flow into the abyss?
How can time be reversed
and the future turns toward the past?
Circles closing in
Seasons closing in
Our destiny blows from deep down.'

In (3.15), the future is construed as turning toward the past (*προς το παρελθόν γυρνάει το μέλλον*); instead of moving forward, time appears to move backwards, thereby indicating a shift in the standard direction of time. A case of questioning in terms of CMT (i.e., a reversal of the pattern that is predicted by conceptual metaphors), the metaphor in (3.15) calls into question the standard direction of motional time and hence the location of the past and the future. Although on the right track, such an approach falls short of explaining how questioning actually gives rise to the emergent meaning of the metaphor. Here I wish to propose, instead, a conceptual integration analysis, suggesting that the metaphor in (3.15) arises from blending the regular flow of events along the timeline (i.e., from earlier to later) with a conceptual scenario of backward motion. Such a conceptual integration is novel in that it is not attested in everyday metaphors of time in the HNC. The full conceptual integration network of time activated in (3.15) is presented in the figure below:

Figure 3.15 Future as moving toward the past.

Specifically, the metaphor in (3.15) exploits our standard conceptualization of time in which events move forward toward the future while past events are located behind (contained in Input Space 1) and integrates it with a mental space of backward motion (corresponding to Input Space 2). In the former input space, future events look forward but, when they are integrated with the scenario of backward motion, contained in Input Space 2, this pattern is reversed: now events move backwards and the future is directed toward the past, which is always located behind. Since both inputs are organized in motional terms, integration arises naturally. Although emergent in the blend, for such a reversed construal of time to make sense one needs to be aware of what would count as the regular flow of time.

In order to unveil the meaning of this temporal construal, resort to context is required. In other words, in what ways can the passage of time be perceived as moving backwards? As suggested by *Κλείνουν οι κύκλοι/ Κλείνουν οι εποχές* 'Circles closing in/ Seasons closing in' at the end of the poem, it seems that the poet is confronted with the completion of circles, most probably the circle of his life. Being deprived of new experiences, his remaining time is directed toward the past, that is, to the reminiscence of past experiences. Given that it is articulated as a rhetorical question (*Πώς… γυρνάει το μέλλον;* 'How… the future turns to the past?') while it is also explicitly admitted that this is a reversal of the standard pattern (*αναστρέφεται* 'be reversed'), it can be quite safely assumed that the poet is aware of what would be the normal way for time to move. Perhaps not coincidentally, the construal of time moving in a reversed direction pattern arises in the context of a collapsing world that brings a distorted view of reality: *Ό,τι πλησιάζει/ απομακρύνεται συγχρόνως* 'What comes close/ moves away at the same time' and *Πώς ξάφνου καταρρέουν τα περιγράμματα/ και χύνονται στην άβυσσο οι ουσίες;* 'How can borders fade away all at once / and contents flow into the abyss?'.

Another instance of reversing the conceptualization of the past and the future is, finally, attested in (3.16) below:

(3.16)   *Οι λυπημένοι περπατούν στους δρόμους*
　　　　μ' ένα δικό τους οδηγό της πόλης
　　　　Προτιμούν τις παρόδους
　　　　τις μικρές
　　　　αθόρυβες στοές
　　　　τις παρακάμψεις
　　　　Δεν θα τους βρείτε στα μεγάλα πάρκα
　　　　μα στα κηπάρια των εκκλησιών
　　　　δίπλα σε γέρους και τυφλούς που αποξεχνιούνται
　　　　Μαζεύονται νωρίς
　　　　δεν έχουν φίλους
　　　　ζουν με κατάλοιπα εποχών

με λιγοστά χειρόγραφα
της νιότης
(…)

Κάποιοι στο   παρελθόν/ αναχωρούν
Some   to-the past/   depart
'Some set off/ toward the past'
Κάποιοι βαθιά στο   μέλλον/ επιστρέφουν
Some   deeply to-the future/   return
'others go far back/ into the future'   [Ορέστης Αλεξάκης]

'The sad people walk down the streets
following their own itinerary in the city
They prefer the side roads
the small and quiet galleries
the detours
You won't find them in big parks
but in a church yard
next to the old and the blind
They go back home early
Have no friends
And live on remnants of the past
With just a few manuscripts
of their youth…
Some set off
toward the past
others return deeply
into the future'

The conceptualization of time in (3.16) refers to the sad people (*Οι λυπημένοι*), who are construed as either departing toward the past or as returning to the future: *Κάποιοι στο παρελθόν/ αναχωρούν/ κάποιοι βαθιά στο μέλλον/ επιστρέφουν* 'Some set off/ toward the past/ others go far back/ into the future'. In doing so, (3.16) cues to a reversal in the standard location of the past and the future as lying behind and ahead of Ego, respectively. However, it differs from the previous poem in that here the reversal in the conceptualization of the past and the future evokes the Ego-moving construal of time.

More specifically, the verbs used to denote motion, namely *αναχωρώ* (anakhoró) 'to depart' and *επιστρέφω* (epistrépho) 'to return', are not conventionally associated with the past and the future, respectively. On the one hand, *αναχωρώ* denotes departing to a place at which one may or may not have been before, and, on the other hand, *επιστρέφω* evokes the frame of backward motion to a location

that the moving entity has already visited. Although departing toward the past can be congruent with the past being located behind Ego as predicted in the conceptual structure of time, here the use of *επιστρέφω* with reference to the future evokes a reversal in the location of the past and the future. The metaphor in (3.16), there-fore, locates the past in front of Ego (i.e., the sad people) and the future behind. Although available in other languages (cf. Aymara; see Núñez & Sweetser, 2006), for Greek speakers such a conceptualization of the past and the future calls for a radical refreshment of their understanding of time, which lends itself to a concep-tual integration analysis, illustrated in the figure below:

Figure 3.16 Ego moving forward to the past and backwards to the future.

In particular, the metaphor in (3.16) involves two mental spaces, namely (a) a mental space structured by motional frames, in which Ego moves forward and backwards (Input Space 1), and (b) a mental space of Ego moving toward the past and the fu-ture (Input Space 2), the latter comprising a standard conceptual scenario of time. Since they are both structured by motional frame structure, the two mental spaces can be naturally integrated. As expected, the moving observer in the two inputs corresponds to the experiencer of time in the blended space. The past and the future in Input Space 2 are mapped onto their corresponding directions in Input Space 1, namely back and ahead. Consider, however, that in the blend Ego appears to move forward to the past and backward to the future. This suggests that an asymmetrical projection is at work in (3.16); in the blend, forward is integrated with the past (instead of the future) and backward with the future (instead of the past). Thus, the categories of the past and the future that emerge in the blend are construed in reversed terms, contrary to the conventional pattern found in MG.

In prompting a conceptualization of time that radically deviates from the common understanding of the past and the future (at least in the context of the Greek culture), the metaphor in (3.16) raises a question with respect to the motivation behind its emergence. As suggested by the immediate linguistic context, the temporal construal relates to the sad people who seem to be lonely, opting for the road not taken by the majority: they follow unconventional pathways in the city (*Προτιμούν τις παρόδους/ τις μικρές/ αθόρυβες στοές/ τις παρακάμψεις* 'They prefer the side roads/ the small and quiet galleries/ the detours'); they avoid frequent places (*Δεν θα τους βρείτε στα μεγάλα πάρκα* 'You won't find them in big parks'); they avoid social interaction (*Μαζεύονται νωρίς/ δεν έχουν φίλους* 'They go back home early/ Have no friends'); and they live with ghosts from the past, recollecting their youth (*ζουν με κατάλοιπα εποχών/ με λιγοστά χειρόγραφα/ της νιότης* 'And live on remnants of the past/ With just a few manuscripts/ of their youth'). It seems that sad people are somehow unable to live in the present according to the social stream and thus are bound to live in the past or the future. The reversed conceptualization of the future, however, implies that for them the future has already happened; it holds no surprises or new events to experience.

3.3 Summary and conclusions

In this chapter, I have introduced the category of creative metaphors of time, defined here as non-conventional metaphors that evoke a conceptualization of time in motional terms. Such metaphors involve mappings between time and various frames denoting motion, the latter not being typically associated with time conceptualization (e.g., *ωκεανός* 'ocean', *επελαύνω* 'to charge, to attack in a battle'); therefore, these metaphors do not conform to the criterion of linguistic entrenchment, which would classify them as conventional. But even when they make use of motional frames that apply to time conceptualization in everyday discourse (e.g., travelling in time) they do so in non-conventional ways which also require the activation of motion-related frame structure. Given the attested semantic preference between time and motion similarly to everyday metaphors, creative metaphors of time appear to be continuous with the latter at the conceptual level, in accordance with our hypothesis. In light of this, I have argued that they form the first degree of figurative creativity, the latter being a distinct category of creative metaphors on the grounds of two motivating parameters, namely (a) lack of linguistic entrenchment, and (b) metaphorical structure in terms of motional frames. In this way, the continuum of figurative creativity is here established on empirical grounds.

However, by virtue of the new frame structure that is recruited in the conceptual mapping creative metaphors of time give rise to novel, unique meanings and,

in this way, they differ from the conventional, motion-based conceptualizations of time. In view of this, I have put forward a conceptual integration analysis that allows to account for both the conceptual structure and the emergent meanings of creative metaphors of time. The proposed analysis essentially complements and refines, rather than contradicts, the claims made by CMT with respect to creative metaphors in that (a) it integrates new frame structure that is imported to the metaphor through mechanisms of figurative creativity (elaboration, questioning, etc.); (b) it may account for the meaning derived from conventional metaphors that are revitalized through the various ways used to manipulate them in discourse; and (c) it may explain the meaning of metaphors that cannot be derived from a one-to-one conceptual correspondence (as is the case, e.g., in construals of time in subjective memory). In sum, this line of research enables to highlight both the similarities and the dissimilarities between creative and conventional metaphors of time while at the same time addressing the relationship between CMT and CIT, in accordance with the goals set up in this work.

According to the hypothesis that initiated this study, time conceptualization in poetic texts is expected to be manifested not only in metaphorical expressions that align with the conceptual structure of time but also in metaphorical expressions that go far beyond it. Such metaphors will be discussed in the following chapter.

Highly creative metaphors of time

4.1 Introduction

This chapter explores another category of metaphors of time that are attested in the corpus of MG poetry. Like the metaphors analyzed in the previous chapter, the expressions of time examined in this chapter lack linguistic entrenchment, which is a defining feature of conventional metaphors. In this sense, they belong to the realm of figurative creativity. However, they differ from the metaphors of time so far analyzed in that, unlike them, they prompt a metaphorical understanding of time that does not involve motion. In view of this observation, it will be proposed that a separate category needs to be postulated in the continuum of figurative creativity in time conceptualization. Such a category will be referred to as *highly creative metaphors of time*, to be distinguished from creative metaphors of time that rely on the conceptual structure of time in the motion scene. It is worth pointing out, however, that, as expected, highly creative metaphors of time constitute a smaller proportion in the corpus of MG poetry compared to that of creative metaphors, namely 15.6% of the sum of poetic texts.

The idea that highly creative metaphors form a distinct category in the continuum of figurative creativity in that they do not exploit already established conceptual mappings is not new. In CMT, such metaphors have been referred to as *image metaphors*, that is, 'one-shot' mappings of imagistic structure (Lakoff & Turner, 1989, pp. 89–96; on image schemas see Johnson, 1987). Image metaphors are thought of as creative metaphors *par excellence* given that (a) they appear almost exclusively in literature, rhetoric and, generally, in text types that are prototypically conducive to the creative use of language, and (b) they do not involve conceptual correspondences but, rather, concrete mental images are mapped onto a target domain (e.g., a horse mane metaphorically construed as a rainbow in that it resembles its shape, beauty, etc.) (see Gibbs & Bogdanovich, 1999). Along these lines, the image schematic structure of the source domain is mapped onto the image schematic structure of the target domain. This image schematic mapping may invite further inferences while it is also likely to activate a conceptual metaphor (consider a person imagistically construed as a tree, thereby evoking the PEOPLE ARE PLANTS conceptual metaphor; Lakoff & Turner, 1989, pp. 26–28). In sum, an image metaphor does not disallow mappings across domains and metaphorical entailments, yet the latter are induced by image schematic, rather than conceptual, structure.

However, time conceptualization posits a challenge; it does not involve any imagistic structure whatsoever. The non-motional metaphors of time that will be examined in this chapter do involve concrete mental images (such as coffins, shoulder blades, candles, etc.), in line with what is typically assumed by conceptual metaphor theorists. Nevertheless, their imagistic structure lacks a counterpart in the target domain of time onto which it can be mapped. At the same time, such metaphors seem to give rise to conceptually rich and aesthetically powerful meanings. It is, therefore, essential to revisit their analysis so as to account for the complexity of the metaphorical mapping they involve and, not least, for their emergent meanings. Finally, apart from image-based metaphors, there is yet another kind of metaphor of time that is not motional and evokes a concrete mental image, albeit in the form of a human: so-called *personification*. Personification metaphors assign human features or properties to inanimate or abstract domains of experience. Although time personification is commonly found in English poetry (Lakoff & Turner, 1989, p. 40), in the corpus of MG poetry it is uniquely instantiated.

In the remainder of this chapter, I will treat personification and image-based metaphors as a unified category of highly creative metaphors of time with the aim to explain them in an integrated way. Both personification and image-based metaphors lack motional structure. Instead, time is integrated with non-motional frames. Given that the conceptual structure of time is motion-based (as described in Chapter 2), I take frames compatible with time to be motional whereas I consider non-motional ones as incompatible with time. It is worth noting that frame incompatibility as conceived here does not refer to conceptual or cultural incongruity but is rather a matter of entrenchment.

In analyzing how non-motional frames are used to metaphorically represent time, I will argue that our background knowledge about time is involved in the metaphor along with conceptual structure carried over from a 'concrete' source domain (be it a human or an object). Therefore, such metaphors cannot be reduced to a two-space, uni-directional mapping but, rather, emerge in integration networks that can accommodate the complex mappings and the rich interpretations that truly novel metaphors afford, as also suggested by evidence in language processing (Giora, 2003). Such integration networks recruit, on the one hand, conceptual elements about time and, on the other, frame structure that is not consonant with the conceptual structure of time, related to a sculptor, a coffin, a line of candles, etc. This does not mean, however, that the emergent meaning of these metaphors cannot, on occasion, be in accordance with the conceptual structure of time, as is the case with construals of temporal compression (Examples (4.4) and (4.5) in this Chapter). In sum, the standard analysis of image-based and personification metaphors will be revisited and a novel, integrated account will be proposed, instead, along the lines of CIT.

As already mentioned, the emergent meaning of such metaphors is a novel conceptualization of time that defies the conceptual structure of time located in

the motion scene. A question therefore arises with respect to the motivations underlying such metaphors; if they are not grounded in the established conceptual patterns of time conceptualization, then what motivates their emergence? In the light of the corpus data, I will argue that the integration of time with conventionally incompatible frames (i.e., non-motional frames) is warranted by our commonplace knowledge about time (especially the passage of time) in terms of ageing, changes brought to humans by time, the fear of death, etc.; in other words, embodied cognition. Such metaphors, therefore, yield meanings that are congruous with the psychologically and culturally grounded understanding of the passage of time along lifetime and it is perhaps this grounding that enables reaching a plausible interpretation of the metaphor. At the same time, conceptual metaphors (e.g., TIME IS A CHANGER, LIFE IS A FLAME, etc.) also seem to be at work in offering a backdrop for non-motional mappings of time. Thus, insights from CMT enrich the conceptual integration analysis of highly creative metaphors of time, thereby pointing to yet another point of complementarity between the two theories.

In what follows, I will first discuss time personification (in Section 4.2.1) and then move to image-based metaphors (in Section 4.2.2).

4.2 Highly creative metaphors of time

Highly creative metaphors of time attested in the corpus of MG poetry include a case of personification and a number of so-called image metaphors. Although treated as different categories in the context of CMT, here it will be shown that both the personification of time and its image-based conceptualizations arise from integrating a mental space of time (or elements from the domain of time) with non-motional frames that bear both conceptual and image schematic structure.

4.2.1 The personification of time revisited

First, consider the personification of time evoked in the following extract from Elytis' well-known poem *Η Μαρίνα των βράχων* (Marina of the rocks):

(4.1) *Άκουσε ο λόγος είναι των στερνών η φρόνηση*
Κι   ο   χρόνος γλύπτης των   ανθρώπων παράφορος
And the   time   sculptor of-the men   passionate
'Time is a passionate sculptor of men'
Κι   ο   ήλιος στέκεται από   πάνω του θηρίο ελπίδας
And the   sun   stands   from above it   beast of-hope
'While the sun stands above like a beast of hope'

> *Κι εσύ πιο κοντά του σφίγγεις έναν έρωτα*
> *Έχοντας μια πικρή γεύση τρικυμίας στα χείλη.*   [Οδυσσέας Ελύτης]

'Listen, speech is the prudence of the aged
time is a passionate sculptor of men
while the sun stands above like a beast of hope
and you embrace a love close to it
With a bitter taste of tempest on your lips.'

The metaphorical expression in (4.1) enacts a conceptualization of time as a sculptor (*γλύπτης*). By assigning a human attribute such as sculpting to time, the metaphor in (4.1) constitutes an instance of personification. As Lakoff & Turner (1989, p. 72) claim, "[p]ersonification permits us to use our knowledge about ourselves to maximal effect, to use insights about ourselves to help us comprehend such things as forces of nature, common events, abstract concepts, and inanimate objects". Here I aim to refine the standard analysis of time personification by proposing an account in terms of a conceptual integration network, shown in Figure 4.1:

Figure 4.1 Time as a sculptor.

In the above example, the personification of time as a sculptor activates an understanding of time as transforming humans through its passage in a way that they can neither control nor impede. Such an interpretation of the metaphor in (4.1) is in line with Lakoff & Turner (1989, p. 86), who argue that all personifications of time are

derived from the basic metaphor TIME IS A CHANGER. In analyzing time personification in English poetry, Lakoff & Turner (1989, pp. 40–43) mention a number of metaphors including TIME AS A THIEF, TIME AS A REAPER, TIME AS A DEVOURER, TIME AS A DESTROYER, TIME AS AN EVALUATOR, and TIME AS A HEALER.[82] As Lakoff & Turner put it (1989, p. 40), "what kind of changer time is will depend on what is changing, how it is changing, and how we conceive of that change by still other metaphors". Along these lines, for all diverse instances of time personification to arise the TIME IS A CHANGER metaphor is enriched with commonplace knowledge from other domains of experience such as stealing, destroying, healing, etc. Here I wish to argue that when our folk understanding of time as a changing force is combined with background knowledge about other domains of experience, a blending operation is actually at work. Such a novel account of time personification will be put forward in view of the TIME AS A SCULPTOR metaphor in (4.1).

In our commonplace knowledge about sculpting, a sculptor is an artist that produces artworks made of hard materials like marble, stone or metal, or other raw material such as clay, wood, etc. In conceptual terms, the domain of sculpting seems to be incompatible with time, which is metaphorically structured in terms of motion in everyday discourse. The metaphorical mapping in (4.1) does not involve motion, hence it cannot be deemed continuous with the entrenched conceptualization of time in MG. Instead, the TIME AS A SCULPTOR metaphor coheres with the transforming power of time on humans. It thus transpires that the metaphorical mapping between time and sculptors is motivated by a perceived similarity and in this sense constitutes a *resemblance metaphor* (see Grady, 1997, 1999). On the one hand, a sculptor carves raw material and thus shapes it, while time, on the other hand, transforms our physical appearance by bringing about facial wrinkles, curving of the body, skin slackening, etc.; hence the perceived similarity between sculptors and time. All the changes made apparent in one's physical appearance as time goes by are imagistically parallelled to the carving of the raw material in sculpture, thus explaining why sculpting qualifies as a source domain for conceptualizing time.

Nevertheless, construing time as a sculptor involves more than an imagistic similarity between physical changes brought about by time and carved raw material. A set of conceptual correspondences is enacted between time and sculptors with the human body corresponding to the raw material that the sculptor shapes.

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82. It is worth noting that these instances of time personification are not attested in the corpus of MG poetry, although some of these patterns are not uncommon in MG (e.g., *ο χρόνος θα γιατρέψει τις πληγές του χωρισμού* 'time will heal the wounds of separation' [HNC]). On a cross-linguistic study of time personification see Piata & Pagán Cánovas (2017).

Consider, however, that a sculptor eventually gives a final shape to his/her material. In contrast, the passage of time never ceases to transform humans until the very end of life. This suggests that, when time is conceptualized as a sculptor, conceptual elements from the input of time are retained, thereby constraining the conceptual carry-overs from the frame of sculptors to that of time. At the same time, the mapping may invite further inferences, such as viewing the human body as a piece of art akin to a sculpture. In sum, I wish to suggest that the mapping in (4.1) is not only imagistic but also conceptual, recruiting commonplace knowledge from *both* inputs and giving rise to emergent structure. Such a mapping can be finely accommodated within a conceptual integration network, which essentially refines the composition of TIME IS A CHANGER with additional commonplace knowledge, as is generally assumed in CMT.

As shown in Figure 4.1, the conceptual integration network in the TIME AS A SCULPTOR metaphor involves two inputs, namely a mental space which contains time (metonymically standing for the passage of time) and a mental space structured by the frame of SCULPTOR. 'Time' from Input Space 1 is integrated with 'sculptor' from Input Space 2 for the TIME AS A SCULPTOR metaphor to arise. Given that, the transforming power of time[83] in Input Space 1 is blended with the property of shaping raw material in Input Space 2. Note, however, that time, construed as a sculptor, is modified as *παράφορος* 'vehement, passionate'. As a search in the HNC and in the dictionaries of MG reveals, *παράφορος* (paráphoros) is an adjective that typically applies to emotions (e.g., *παράφορος έρωτας/ ενθουσιασμός* 'passionate love/ vehement enthusiasm' [HNC], *ένιωσε γι' αυτήν (ένα) παράφορο πάθος* 'he had a vehement passion for her' [Dictionary of Standard MG]); it is not associated with time or sculpting. Therefore, its use here is non-conventional, thereby enhancing the creativity of the expression. In construing the time-sculptor as *παράφορος*, the emerging meaning is that of an extremely intense and powerful change to the effect that it cannot be controlled. Given the collocational meaning of *παράφορος έρωτας/ ενθουσιασμός* 'vehement love/ enthusiasm', it is possible that here *παράφορος* also evokes the uncontrollable powerfulness of an intense emotion and projects it onto the conceptualization of time as a sculptor; inasmuch as it is beyond our control to resist a strong feeling, similarly it is impossible to eschew the passage of time. This is

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83. The transforming power of time applies primarily to physical changes, nevertheless, given the MIND IS BODY conceptual metaphor, it may equally refer to the changes time brings to humans in terms of their worldviews, attitudes, mindset, etc. In that case, a different interpretation may arise from integrating time with sculpting, namely time as shaping our personality along its passage. Considering that CIT is a theory of on-line meaning construction, multiple readings of one and the same expression amount to different integration networks that emerge from activating different aspects in the frames that structure the inputs.

in line with our commonplace knowledge about time (contained in Input Space 1), according to which humans have no control over its passage and the effect it brings to their lives. Apparently, the metaphor in (4.1) rephrases the folk understanding of time as an all-encompassing power in a novel, creative way.

The conceptualization of time as an uncontrollable changer in the TIME IS A SCULPTOR metaphor is further enhanced in the following line of the poem whereby the sun is located above time and brings about hope (*Κι ο ήλιος στέκεται από πάνω του θηρίο ελπίδας* 'the sun stands above like a beast of hope'). Generally evaluated in a positive way as related to light, warmth, energy, etc., the sun here bears an additional positive connotation in that, unlike human beings, it cannot be affected by the passage of time. According to our commonplace knowledge, the rise and fall of the sun is repeated in an identical fashion, constantly and regularly, and remains intact from the changing effects of the passage of time (the changes brought by the passage of time in the case of the sun are recurrent and therefore do not instantiate a transforming power as is the case with humans). Such background knowledge about the sun is contained in an additional input space in the conceptual integration network in (4.1), which is structured by the frame of the SUN (Input Space 4). Projected onto the blend of time as a sculptor, this entails that the sun, which is not susceptible to change, is therefore superior to time, contrary to the mankind that cannot resist the power of passing time.[84] This is emergent in the full conceptual integration network of TIME AS A SCULPTOR, in which the mental space of the sun also contributes conceptual structure. For such conceptual complexity to be captured a multiple space model such as CIT is required.

It follows that the proposed analysis in (4.1) puts forward a novel understanding of time personification that accounts for the conceptual structure and the emergent meaning of the metaphor. Such an account refines the traditional view on time personification while at the same time acknowledging the contribution of CMT in highlighting an overarching pattern in time personification, namely TIME IS A CHANGER. In this way, the proposed analysis promises to also account for other instances of the TIME IS A CHANGER metaphor, such as TIME AS A THIEF, TIME AS A DESTROYER, TIME AS A HEALER, etc., abundantly found in English poetry. Featuring a non-motional, yet metaphorical conceptualization of time, the personification of time in (4.1) is considered a highly creative metaphor, as is also the case with image metaphors to be discussed next.

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84. Alternatively, one could argue that here the sun metonymically stands for the rise of the sun and hence the beginning of the day signalled by it. Considering that in an optimistic view every new day gives rise to new perspectives to pursue and new expectations to be fulfilled, it follows that the sun can evoke hope in this way too.

4.2.2 Image metaphors of time revisited

First, consider the following poem whereby the upcoming day is metaphorically conceptualized as a coffin:

(4.2) *Στα σπλάχνα του σκιρτούσε το αδιέξοδο.*
Δεν ένιωθε τις αποστάσεις περπατώντας.
Και τραγουδούσε ολομόναχο το στόμα του.
(…)
Ο θάνατος θέλει τα πουλιά και τα βαρίδια.
(…)
Υπάρχει αύριο
υπάρχει και μεθαύριο.

Καινούργιο φέρετρο η   καινούργια μέρα.
New   coffin   the new   day
'A new coffin the new day.'   [Νίκος Καρούζος]

'There was a dead-end shaking in his guts.
He was walking but could not feel the distance.
His mouth would sing all alone…
Death seeks the birds and the weights…
There is tomorrow
There is a day after tomorrow.
A new coffin the new day.'

The emergent meaning of the metaphor in (4.2) is that the new day that is about to come is a step closer to death. In terms of CMT, (4.2) is an instance of image metaphor in that a concrete mental image, a coffin, serves as the source domain that structures a unit of time measurement such as a day. Since days lack imagistic structure, according to Lakoff & Turner (1989, p. 94) the source domain purports to create an image for the target domain (as in "thoughts are summer lightning"). However, here it is not the day itself that is conceptualized as a coffin but rather the passage of time metonymically represented as a new day. At the same time, the metaphor does not merely evoke the image schematic structure of coffins. An oblong box, typically made of wood, in which a corpse is placed in order to be buried (or cremated), the coffin here metonymically stands for death (consider also the explicit reference to death in *Ο θάνατος θέλει τα πουλιά και τα βαρίδια* 'Death seeks the birds and the weights). Death correlates with the passage of time since, for humans, lifetime is finite and, in this sense, the metaphor in (4.2) is grounded in the experiential link between the passage of time (evoked by the coming of a new day) and death (implied by the coffin).

From this discussion it transpires that the metaphorical conceptualization of the new day as a new coffin involves conceptual structure, unlike what would be assumed by conceptual metaphor theorists. This can also explain how the metaphor enables carrying over our evaluation of the source domain onto the target, already acknowledged by Lakoff & Turner (1989, p. 92) in relation to image metaphors. Given that coffins are inextricably associated with death, a pessimistic, negative evaluation is imported to the conceptualization of the new day in the metaphor. In sum, the metaphorical mapping in (4.2) is richly conceptual rather than purely imagistic, as shown in Figure 4.2:

Figure 4.2 New day as a new coffin.

As shown in the conceptual integration network in the figure above, for the meaning of the metaphor to be unveiled the (finite) passage of time as experienced by humans needs to be integrated with the passage of time in the cyclic motion scene, that is, time in nature and in the calendar. While the former contains deterioration and death that time eventually brings to animate beings, the latter construes the passage of time in a repetitive, recurrent way whereby one day comes after the other. Thus, every stage in the experienced passage of time such as prime youth, middle age, old age and, finally, death (evoked by *φέρετρο* 'coffin') is integrated with days in the cyclic construal of time, namely day 1, day 2, day 3, day *n*, etc. In this way, the metaphorical understanding of the new day as a coffin is justified; every new day is a step toward

death.[85] It is not without significance that the coffin in the blend is modified as new (*καινούργιο φέρετρο* 'new coffin'). This is explainable in terms of the new, upcoming day to which it corresponds and can only be accounted for as emergent structure in the blend by virtue of every cyclic day ultimately leading to death.

When elaborating the conceptual integration network in (4.2), additional inferences may arise with respect to the experiencer of time that is implicitly evoked in the poem in the third person. Contained within the day-coffin, the experiencer may be further construed as being trapped in an inescapable and irreversible situation since, when in the coffin, there is neither return nor a way out of it. Such an inference is also in line with the folk undestanding of time as an interval bounded between birth and death and in which humans are contained, having no way to escape the end. This inference is contextually enhanced by the sense of hopelessness that permeates the poem, thus also prompting a morbid reading (*Στα σπλάχνα του σκιρτούσε το αδιέξοδο/ Δεν ένιωθε τις αποστάσεις περπατώντας./ Και τραγουδούσε ολομόναχο το στόμα του* 'There was a dead-end shaking in his guts./ He was walking but could not feel the distance./ His mouth would sing all alone'). In this sense, the line that precedes the metaphor whereby the upcoming future is deemed ample (*Υπάρχει αύριο/ υπάρχει και μεθαύριο* 'There is tomorrow/ There is a day after tomorrow) comes across as rather ironic; although the future is expected to come, every new day will take us a little closer to the final destination, when, inevitably, time will be up. It is essentially this painful realization that is metaphorically represented in the poem.

In viewing words as prompts for meaning construction, it can be explained how two conventionally incompatible frames, namely a day and a coffin, can be brought together to give rise to a highly creative metaphor that motivates an imaginative, yet tenable reading. A highly creative metaphor that cannot be accommodated by the motion-based conceptual structure of time, nor by an imagistic mapping between a day and a coffin, the metaphor in (4.2) calls for a conceptual integration network that is able to explain its emergent meaning. At the same time, conceptual integration can account for any other possible interpretation of the metaphor, e.g. as if every new day is felt as equal to death in that it leaves no room for change or improvement given the dead-end portrayed in the poem. Such a reading of time conceptualization in (4.2) would require a different conceptual integration network whereby every new day would correspond to death.

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85. Consider that, through meaning extension, a vehicle that causes death to its passengers is commonly represented as a coffin: *Το αεροπλάνο/ το αυτοκίνητο/ το πλοίο έγινε το φέρετρο των επιβατών του* 'the airplane/ the car/ the boat turned into a coffin for its passengers' [Dictionary of Standard MG]; consider also *πλωτό/ ιπτάμενο φέρετρο* 'sailing/ flying coffin' referring to a boat or an aircraft that is too old and therefore may put in danger the passengers' lives.

I will now turn to another highly creative metaphor of time, cited in (4.3):

(4.3) *Ξημέρωσε πάλι και μεγάλωσε*
  το λαρύγγι του κόκορα.
  Ο σκύλος άρχισε τα βήματα.
  Επίσης άρχισαν τα πρώτα λεωφορεία.

  Τον χρόνο πάντα τον αισθάνομαι στην   ωμοπλάτη.
  The time   always   it   feel-I   on-the   shoulder blades
  'I always feel time on my shoulder blades.'   [Νίκος Καρούζος]

  'It's dawning again, the rooster's
  throat grows bigger.
  The dog started to step.
  The first buses also started.

  I always feel time on my shoulder blades.'

Like in the previous poem, the passage of time underpins the conceptualization enacted by the metaphor in (4.3), but here is associated with a sensation in the shoulder blades (*Τον χρόνο πάντα τον αισθάνομαι στην ωμοπλάτη* 'I always feel time on my shoulder blades'). This is amenable to more than one interpretations in that time in the shoulder blades can be read as referring either to a physical sensation related to the passage of time, such as a bodily transformation felt in the back and the shoulder blades (i.e., stooping), or to a psychological burden provoked by past time and metaphorically carried in the shoulder blades. This is in line with Steen's (1994) claim that, when engaged in reading poetry, readers are allowed to have a multiplicity of possible interpretations without conflict at the social or interpersonal level (as it would be the case in a different genre, say a conversation). In theoretical terms, this entails that each interpretation is afforded in different conceptual integration networks, each one activating different aspects of the frame of SHOULDER BLADES. Such networks are represented in the figures below:

First of all, consider that in both readings *χρόνος* 'time' metonymically stands for the passage of time, which is contained in Input Space 1 in both networks. In the first network (Figure 4.3a), time from Input Space 1 is integrated with bodily changes such as stooping, pain and fatigue in the upper back by means of the Cause-Effect vital relation. Such a conceptual integration is in accordance with our knowledge that, as time goes by, and after a certain age in particular, the human body has the tendency to bend (cf. *Οι ώμοι του κύρτωσαν από τα χρόνια* 'His shoulders have bent over the years' [Dictionary of the Modern Greek Language]), while at the same time the passage of time brings about fatigue that is especially felt in the back. In the blended space, time passing is conceptualized as a physical sensation in the back. It is not without significance that this is presented as being *always* the case (*πάντα*), thereby suggesting that the more time passes for the poet, the more

Figure 4.3a Time as bringing about bodily changes.

In figure 4.3a, three ellipses are shown. Ellipse 1 contains "time passing". Ellipse 2 contains "body changes felt on the shoulder blades caused by fatigue, pain, age etc." Ellipse 3 contains "time as bringing about chances on the shoulder blades". Lines connect the ellipses.

Figure 4.3b Time as a burden.

In figure 4.3b, three ellipses are shown. Ellipse 1 contains "time passing". Ellipse 2 contains "burden carried on the back" and "weighs down humans". Ellipse 3 contains "time felt as a burden on the shoulder blades" and "weighs down humans". Lines connect the ellipses.

intense its passage will be in his shoulder blades (consider that physical bending due to ageing can iconically reflect feeling psychologically depressed). Finally, it is worth noting that, when construing time as a sensation in the shoulder blades, the image of a bent figure comes to mind as the meaning of the expression unfolds. This corroborates the role of imagistic structure in the interpretation of novel metaphors, in line with Gibbs & Bogdanovich (1999), yet it can hardly be invoked as triggering the interpretation; it is rather emerging in it, especially since no reference to a bent body or fatigue is directly made in the metaphor.

Another reading of the metaphor is nevertheless available, construing time (especially past time) as a burden that the experiencer carries on his back.[86] The conceptualization of time as a load or burden is not novel in MG (e.g., *Παρά το βάρος των χρόνων, διατηρεί αξιοθαύμαστη διανοητική ικμάδα* 'His spirit remains admirable despite the weight of the years' [HNC]), while it is also consistent with the quantity-based construal of duration (cf. *πολύς/ λίγος χρόνος* 'much/ little time'). Moreover, it is conventional to locate past time on the back (cf. *Έχει πολλά χρόνια στην πλάτη του* 'He has many years on his back' [Dictionary of Standard Modern Greek), again consistently with the conceptualization of the past as lying behind Ego. As in the previous interpretation, *χρόνος* 'time' metonymically stands for the passage of time. However, when construing time as a burden, different features from the frame of SHOULDER BLADES are exploited in the conceptual integration network.

More specifically, here shoulder blades metonymically evoke a cognitive scenario of carrying a burden on the back. Such background knowledge is contained in a mental space structured *ad hoc* by the frame of SHOULDER BLADES (Input Space 2). Burden from Input Space 2 is integrated with the amount of time experienced so far in Input Space 1 by virtue of the vital relation of Cause-Effect. Consider that both time and burdens are measurable, yet in the blend time is also construed as carriable. However, unlike physical burdens that one carries and then unloads, time as a burden cannot be dispensed with; once lived, time is added to the accumulated mass of previous experiences and is necessarily carried thereafter, however heavy or unpleasant it may be. Moreover, burdens may invite an additional inference; since they typically weigh down whoever carries them, in the blend passing time can also be construed as weighing down the experiencer. It follows that the more time passes, the heavier the burden on the back, as also suggested by *πάντα* 'always'. The emergent meaning of the metaphor under this interpretation seems to be grounded in the experiential correlation between passing time and psychological discomfort that relates to the accumulation of experiences that are hard to cope with. It can thus be explained in what way *ωμοπλάτη* 'shoulder blade' qualifies as a source domain in this metaphorical conceptualization of time.

In sum, under both interpretations, our commonplace knowledge about both time and shoulder blades is activated for the meaning of the metaphor to be

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86. Such an interpretation may also be related to the conceptual metaphor DIFFICULTIES ARE BURDENS (Lakoff & Turner, 1989, p. 25): *Πες μου τι σε βαραίνει, να ξαλαφρώσεις* 'Tell me what burdens you, to let it go' [Dictionary of the Modern Greek Language]. Physical burdens are always difficult to cope with and hence difficulties can be understood as a heavy burden that requires more effort than usual. Conceived of as a constant and relentless difficulty, life can also be viewed as a burden, thereby yielding the LIFE IS A BURDEN metaphor. In the case of time, it is either the passage of time or the experiences contained in it that can be viewed as difficult to cope with, thus motivating the conceptualization of time as a burden.

uncovered. In other words, both readings of the metaphor in (4.3) arise in conceptual integration networks. Specifically, the frame of SHOULDER BLADES contains more than one features, physical and psychological, each one giving rise to a different understanding of time, namely (a) time (especially in old age) causing the individual to bend, and (b) (past) time as a burden to the experiencer.[87] The former interpretation is physical whereas the latter is emotional, while it is also possible that both readings may be activated at the same time since past time as a burden (usually manifested in older age rather than youth) is also experientially associated with physical ageing evidenced through pain and fatigue in the back and curving of the shoulder blades (cf. *Το βάρος των χρόνων κάνει την πλάτη μου να καμπουριάζει* 'The weight of the years bends my back over' [HNC]). Both readings prompt an understanding of time in terms of its passage (through metonymy) that is consonant with the experiential reality of passing time. In either case, however, the reading of the metaphor is highly likely to be negatively evaluated; either as bodily transformation or as a psychological burden time in the shoulder blades can hardly be considered pleasant or desirable. It is worth noting that such an evaluative connotation is not directly associated with either of the inputs but is rather emergent in the blend.

Last, but not least, a close examination of the whole poem indicates the beginning of a new day (*Ξημέρωσε πάλι* 'It's dawning again'). In this respect, the use of *πάντα* 'always' in the expression *τον χρόνο πάντα τον αισθάνομαι στην ωμοπλάτη* 'I always feel time on the shoulder blades' may be interpreted as ironic in that it contrasts the experience of the passage of time that is physically and/or psychologically felt with the passage of time in external reality, which is *always* manifested in the same way in terms of recurrent phenomena in nature and society. The lapse of time seems to be painful and burdening for the poet (hence hard to cope with) notwithstanding the emergence of a new day that could signal a new beginning.

Consider now another poem, cited in (4.4), referring to an ID inspection during which the poet addresses the inspector with the following lines:

(4.4) *Συντομεύετε κύριέ μου, συντομεύετε*
       όσο αργείτε τόσο χειροτερεύει
       το δύσβατο έργο της αναγνώρισης.

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87. Given the open-endness of meaning construction in poetry, it is possible that the temporal expression in (4.3) receives a multitude of imaginative interpretations that are not even committed to a pessimistic reading such as, e.g., time pushing the poet on his back and thus urging him to enjoy the new day, or time poking the poet on the back in a friendly manner, to mention only two. In theoretical terms, the different interpretations one may come up with while reading Karouzos' poem amount to running different conceptual integration networks.

Μην   ξεχνάτε   ότι   μετά το   μεσονύχτιο
Do-not forget-you that after the midnight
'Don't you forget that after midnight'
Πέφτει διπλή   ταρίφα ο   χρόνος στο   ρολόι
Falls   double fare   the   time   in-the clock
'time is counted double in the taximeter'
Διπλά   και τρίδιπλα κυλάνε τα   χιλιόμετρα/ Στο   πρόσωπο.
Double and triple   flow   the kilometers/ on-the face
'kilometers run double and triple/ on the face.'

Επιτέλους, πρώτη φορά σας είδατε νεότητα
να μην ομοιάζει διόλου με την απώλειά της;   [Κική Δημουλά]

'Be quick, sir,
the longer the wait, the harder the identification.
Don't you forget that after midnight
time is counted double in the taximeter (lit. 'clock')
kilometers run (lit. 'flow') double and triple
on the face.
Is this the first time you see youth
not resembling its loss whatsoever?'

Comparing her picture on the ID photo to her current image, the poet comments on a significant clash between her once youthful face and now aged look, thus triggering a completely novel and rather complex temporal construal (*Πέφτει διπλή ταρίφα ο χρόνος στο ρολόι* 'time is counted double in the taximeter (lit. 'clock')). Since the passage of time is construed as measured at a double speed, the emergent meaning of the metaphor is that of temporal compression. The fact that time measurement is performed by a taximeter points to a clear divergence from the standard way for expressing and conceptualizing compressed time (cf. *γρήγορα πέρασεν η ώρα* 'the time has quickly passed'). The meaning conveyed in (4.4) is that after middle age time passes more quickly and, moreover, the more time passes, the more wrinkles appear on the face, thereby calling for a price to pay for ageing (*Διπλά και τρίδιπλα κυλάνε τα χιλιόμετρα/ Στο πρόσωπο* 'kilometers run (lit. 'flow') double and triple/ on the face'). In what follows, I aim to explore the metaphorical structure of the temporal expression in (4.4) and show how its meaning unfolds building on commonplace knowledge about taxi rides and human life, depicted in the figure below.

From the vantage point of CMT, the metaphorical expression in (4.4) evokes a conceptualization of life as a taxi ride grounded in the LIFE IS A JOURNEY conceptual metaphor. Deeply entrenched in everyday discourse, the LIFE IS A JOURNEY metaphor is susceptible to creative exploitation. Specifically, in (4.4), the domain of JOURNEY takes the form of a taxi ride, as suggested by linguistic cues in the poem: *μετά το μεσονύχτιο* 'after midnight', *διπλή ταρίφα* 'at double rate', *ρολόι* 'taximeter'

Figure 4.4 Time as speeding up after middle age.

(lit. clock) and *χιλιόμετρα* 'kilometers'. The conceptual mapping between LIFE and a TAXI RIDE construes the experiencer of life as a passenger in a taxi ride. It is worth noting, however, that typical aspects in the frame of TAXI RIDE (i.e., a taxi driver, a starting point and a destination, impediments in the ride, etc.) are not activated in (4.4). Instead, the conceptual elements that are evoked in the metaphor pertain especially to the taximeter that measures the taxi ride (i.e., taxi fare calculator, double rate after midnight) and the measurement of this ride in terms of distance, in particular kilometers (*χιλιόμετρα*).

It is common knowledge that the duration of a taxi ride is measured by a taximeter, a mechanical or electronic device that calculates passenger fares according to the distance travelled and the time required to arrive at the destination. However, after midnight the taximeter speeds up in measuring the taxi ride and then the fare is doubled. In the metaphor, the taximeter appears to be used to measure the passage of time during lifetime (consider that in the poem the taximeter is referred to as *ρολόι* 'clock').[88] Since the taximeter measures the duration of the ride at a double rate, it

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88. Consider the following poetic extract that construes the clock as measuring deterioration and ageing rather than temporal units: *Το ρολόι που μας αφορά δεν είναι αυτό που καταμετρά τις ώρες αλλά που/ κατανέμει το μέρος της φθοράς και της αφθαρσίας των πραγμάτων όπου,/ έτσι κι αλλιώς, μετέχουμε, όπως μετέχουμε στη νεότητα ή στο γήρας* 'The clock that concerns us does

will measure the duration of lifetime at a double rate too. Such a conceptualization of time as speeding up after a certain age is emergent in the blend since, in human life, duration (including the duration of lifetime) is measured uniformly by the clock. However, such a conceptualization is in line with our experience of time that seems to pass more quickly after midlife, when youth is gone and the end of life seems to be closer (on time felt as speeding up as one gets older see Draaisma 2004). Therefore, although emergent in the blend, the temporal construal in (4.4) seems to be grounded in the experience of time passing and of ageing in real life.

More specifically, as shown in Figure 4.4, the temporal construal in the poem is emergent in a conceptual integration network that involves a mental space structured by the frame of TAXI RIDE and a mental space structured by the frame of LIFE, with the latter containing commonplace knowledge about ageing and the changes brought to humans by time. It is noteworthy that the two input spaces afford different, yet compatible organizing frames (as is the case with the LIFE IS JOURNEY metaphor) in that they both involve an experiencer, a starting point and a destination, a route with various stages, a purpose, difficulties along the way, etc. In the metaphor, frame structure about taxi rides is used to metaphorically represent life and the passage of time. As a result, a new blended space arises in which life is metaphorically structured as a taxi ride with subsequent emergent meanings such as life being measured by a taximeter rather than a clock. In sum, in (4.4), time conceptualization is emergent in a non-conventional, yet well-motivated blend.

First of all, by virtue of Identity via Analogy, the passenger in the taxi ride is mapped onto the person leading a life, while the duration of the ride is mapped onto the duration of life. However, the duration of life is measured uniformly by the clock for all experiencers, whereas the duration of a taxi ride is measured by a taximeter that serves to calculate the taxi fare, i.e. to compute the cost of the ride according to the distance covered and the time spent on the ride. Crucially, a taximeter doubles its speed after midnight and thus the fare is doubled. When the input space of life is integrated with that of a taxi ride, the duration of life is measured by a taximeter rather than by the clock and therefore counts as double. Just like the taximeter counts the ride as double even though the distance travelled is the same, similarly in the blend the clock counts duration as double even though the amount of time spent is the same.

Moreover, such a twist in measuring lifetime appears to happen after a certain point metaphorically represented as *μετά το μεσονύχτιο* 'after midnight'. A question then arises as to when the clock starts to speed up in the LIFE AS A TAXI RIDE

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not measure the hours but/ rather allocates what is perishable and what is not in all the things in which/ we somehow take part, as we take part in youth or old age' [Οδυσσέας Ελύτης]. The taximeter in (4.4) seems to have such a function.

metaphor, that is, what *μεσονύχτιο* 'midnight' metaphorically stands for. A rather literary alternative for *μεσάνυχτα* 'midnight', the word *μεσονύχτιο* (mesoníkhtio) refers to the middle of the night (12 o'clock at night), a convention agreed upon rather than a real time phenomenon (consider that a night can last for more or less time depending on the season). Although, strictly speaking, midnight and midlife are not in the middle of anything, in their folk understanding they both seem to evoke the half of a cyclic interval, namely the day and lifetime respectively; it thus becomes evident why *μεσονύχτιο* 'midnight' qualifies to metaphorically represent midlife. Besides, the lack of light and brightness at midnight alludes to darkness, which is commonly associated with feelings of depression and also death (i.e., DE-PRESSION IS DARK and DEATH IS DARK).

In the blend, it is after midlife that the clock starts to speed up in measuring time. As already mentioned, the conceptualization of time as passing more quickly after middle age is consonant with our psychologically real experience of the passage of time across lifetime. It is worth pointing out that time as passing more quickly than normal (i.e., temporal compression) is conventionally emergent in the generalized integration network of time E/X/M, as already shown in the previous chapters. Nevertheless, here temporal compression does not arise in motional terms (as in E/X/M); instead, time is construed as passing quickly in that its passage is measured by a taximeter. This can only be emergent in the LIFE AS A TAXI RIDE blend, which can also explain why this seems to be the case after middle age (met-aphorically construed as midnight).

So far, the LIFE AS A TAXI RIDE blend has given rise to a construal of time as speeding up after a certain age. However, the metaphor extends beyond that, as suggested by *Διπλά και τρίδιπλα κυλάνε τα χιλιόμετρα/ Στο πρόσωπο* 'Kilometers run (lit. 'flow') double and triple/ on the face'. In conceptual metaphor terms, the kilometers on the face evoke an image metaphor. Considering that the temporal construal in (4.4) is triggered by a clash between the poet's youthful physique and her aged face (*Πρώτη φορά σας είδατε νεότητα/ να μην ομοιάζει διόλου με την απώλειά της;* 'Is this the first time you see youth/ not resembling its loss whatso-ever?'), one may readily interpret the image metaphor as referring to wrinkles on the forehead and in the lateral eye (the so-called 'goose foot'). Here I wish to argue that this metaphorical construal results not only from a perceived, imagistic simi-larity between kilometers (prototypically structured by the PATH image schema) and wrinkles (typically having the shape of lines on the face) but also from the conceptualization of the wrinkles in terms of kilometers. In this sense, kilometers do not merely import mental imagery to the wrinkles on the face (as assumed by conceptual metaphor theorists) but, rather, contribute conceptual structure. Consider that kilometers referring to the distance travelled so far (in the frame of TAXI RIDES) metaphorically stand for the poet's lifetime up to now (in the frame

of LIFE); in other words, in the LIFE AS A TAXI RIDE metaphor the distance covered corresponds to the duration of life so far. However, in our commonplace knowledge about life, the more time passes, the more wrinkles appear. Thus, the duration of life lived so far is not merely iconically reflected on the face but, rather, *causes* the wrinkles to appear. Given that, when duration is measured at a double rate wrinkles will proliferate accordingly. An account of the metaphor solely in imagistic terms cannot capture the causal link between the passage of time and the appearance of wrinkles on the face.

More precisely, *χιλιόμετρα* 'kilometers' are situated in a fictive motion scene as suggested by *κυλάνε* 'run' (lit. 'flow') (cf. *τα χιλιόμετρα κυλάνε και είμαστε στα μισά της διαδρομής* 'the kilometres run (lit. 'flow') and we are still in the middle of the route' [HNC]). Within the input of taxi rides, *χιλιόμετρα* 'kilometers' are naturally construed as *διπλά και τρίδιπλα* 'double and triple' because of the taximeter that counts the distance travelled as double (note that *τρίδιπλα* 'triple' emphasizes the rapidity in travelling the distance in a hyperbolic way). Expectedly standing for the events experienced so far in life (as in the LIFE IS A JOURNEY metaphor), *χιλιόμετρα* 'kilometers' are mapped onto wrinkles on the face as suggested by *στο πρόσωπο* 'on the face'. In our commonplace knowledge about life contained in Input Space 2, wrinkles are concomitant with the passage of time; hence the longer the distance in Input Space 1, the more the wrinkles in Input Space 2. Moreover, since the distance covered in the input space of taxi ride counts at faster speed, when integrated with the wrinkles in the input space of life (via Cause-Effect), the latter will also multiply accordingly, thus representing the amount of time one has lived so far. Although the proliferation of the wrinkles after middle age is in accordance with human experience in everyday life, the iconic relationship between the passage of time and the appearance of the wrinkles is in fact emergent in the LIFE AS A TAXI RIDE blend; wrinkles increase after middle age at an exponential rate by virtue of the frame structure of taxi rides contained in Input Space 1. In essence, however, such an iconic relationship is two-fold in that wrinkles are caused by 'kilometers' (i.e., time passed) to appear on the face while at the same time resembling kilometers in terms of their imagistic structure.

Last, but not least, the metaphorical conceptualization of the wrinkles in terms of a linear, spatial representation of distance covered and time passing that is emergent in the LIFE AS A TAXI RIDE blend may invite an additional inference. Given that when the taximeter counts the ride at a faster rate the fare to pay for the distance travelled is accordingly higher, I suggest that, by means of inference, the wrinkles on face are construed as the price one has to pay for the passage of time. It follows that the quicker time passes, the quicker the wrinkles will proliferate and hence the price to pay will rise. Similarly to the fare a passenger in a taxi ride is charged, the experiencer of time is confronted with the appearance of wrinkles that is costly in

psychological terms. Essentially, this further suggests that wrinkles are not construed merely in imagistic terms as kilometres on the face but, rather, rich conceptual structure, embodiment, and affect contribute to the construal.

In sum, in (4.4), the clock, which tells the time in a standard uniform way, shifts to a quicker speed in measuring time after a certain point (i.e., middle age), thereby giving rise to a novel construal of time as passing quickly; what is referred to as temporal compression. Motivated by the poet's distress over ageing that has altered her physique, such a construal recasts our commonplace knowledge about time speeding up in old age and in the face of death.

Temporal compression is also attested in the last poem to be examined in this section, instantiating a metaphorical conceptualization of years as candles:[89]

(4.5)   *Του   μέλλοντος οι   μέρες στέκοντ' εμπροστά μας*
        Of-the future   the days lie   ahead-of us
        'The days of the future stand before us'
        σα   μια σειρά κεράκια   αναμμένα –
        like a   line   candles-DIM lit –
        'like a row of little lighted candles –'
        χρυσά, ζεστά, και ζωηρά κεράκια.
        golden warm and vivid   candles-DIM
        'golden, warm, and vibrant little candles.'
        Οι   περασμένες μέρες πίσω μένουν
        The past   days   back stay
        'The days that have gone by remain behind us'
        μια θλιβερή γραμμή κεριών   σβησμένων·
        a   sad   line   of-candles snuffed-out
        'a melancholy line of candles now snuffed out'
        τα   πιο   κοντά βγάζουν καπνόν ακόμη,
        the   most close release smoke   still
        'the closest still give off their smoke'
        κρύα κεριά, λιωμένα, και κυρτά.
        cold candles melted   and bent
        'cold candles, melted down, bent out of shape.'
        Δεν θέλω   να τα   βλέπω· με λυπεί   η   μορφή των,
        Not want-I to them see-I: me saddens the shape theirs
        'I don't want to look at them: their shape saddens me,'
        και με λυπεί   το πρώτο φως των   να θυμούμαι
        and me saddens the first   light theirs to remember-I
        'and I'm saddened, too, to recall their former light'

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89. Translation by Daniel Mendelsohn (2012).

Εμπρός   κυττάζω   τ'   αναμένα   μου   κεριά.
Ahead   see-I   the   lit   my   candles.
'I look in front of me, at my lighted candles'
Δεν θέλω   να γυρίσω να μη   διω   και φρίξω
Not want-I to turn-I to not see-I and get-terrified-I
'I don't want to turn around lest I see and tremble at'
τι   γρήγορα που η   σκοτεινή γραμμή μακραίνει,
how   quickly   that the dark   line   gets-longer
'how quickly the darkened line is growing longer'
τι   γρήγορα που τα σβυστά   κεριά   πληθαίνουν.
how   quickly   that the snuffed-out candles proliferate
'how quickly the snuffed-out candles multiply'

'The days of the future stand before us
like a row of little lighted candles –
golden, warm, and vibrant little candles.

The days that have gone by remain behind us,
a melancholy line of candles now snuffed out;
the closest still give off their smoke,
cold candles, melted down, bent out of shape.

I don't want to see them; their appearance saddens me,
and I'm saddened, too, to recall their former light.
I look in front of me, at my lighted candles.

I don't want to turn around lest I see and tremble at
how quickly the darkened line is growing longer,
how quickly the snuffed-out candles multiply.'

A close examination of (4.5) reveals that the metaphorical conceptualization of the years as candles structures the whole poem. Future years are construed as lit candles whereas past years as blown out candles with the latter proliferating quickly, thus suggesting that the end of life is about to come soon for the poet. Like in the previous poem, a novel construal of temporal compression arises in (4.5), which is emergent in a conceptual integration network shown in the following figure.

Although years and candles pertain to different, conventionally incompatible frames, the conceptualization of future years as lit candles and past years as blown out ones seems to be highly motivated in experiential and cultural terms. First of all, the metaphor in (4.5) evokes two basic conceptual metaphors, namely LIFE IS LIGHT and LIFE IS FLAME, both of which share a strong experiential grounding (Lakoff & Turner, 1989, pp. 86–88). According to the former, life is conceptualized as light whereas death as darkness (consider the expression *έσβησε το κερί του/ το καντήλι του* 'his candle/ his oil candle has blown out' for someone who passed away). A great many experiential correlations prompt this conceptual mapping to arise: people

Figure 4.5 Years as candles.

who are alive are able to see whereas dead people are doomed to darkness; people are typically active during daylight and inactive during darkness; plants derive life from daylight and die in the dark, etc. Given this metaphor, lit candles stand for life, or for the portion of time remaining to be lived (hence future years), whereas blown out candles represent absence of life (i.e., death), or the portion of life already lived and no longer available (hence past years).

Another way of explaining the conceptualization of years as candles would be on the grounds of the LIFE IS A FLAME conceptual metaphor. Like life that involves three stages forming a cycle (i.e., not alive-alive-dead), a flame also has a similar tripartite structure; first, it is not lit, then it is lit and goes out at the end.[90] Under this view, the lit candles are mapped onto the extents of time that remain to be lived (i.e., future years) and blown out candles onto the extents of time that have been lived and are now gone (i.e., past years). This conceptual metaphor can also explain why still smoking candles are mapped onto recent years (*τα πιο κοντά βγάζουν καπνόν ακόμη* 'the closest still give off their smoke'), unlike completely blown out ones that correspond to years in the far past. In sum, two different (although interrelated) conceptual metaphors yield the same end result, namely a conceptualization of future and past years as lit and blown out candles respectively.

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90. This metaphor is also underpinned by LIFE IS LIGHT in that the lit flame corresponds to life.

So far, it has been proposed that light and flame correlate with life and, conversely, the lack of them with the completion of events and death. However, another motivation may also be at work in that light also enables vision; since, in our cultural understanding of time, future years are located upfront and past years at the back in the timeline, the former are expected to be visible while the latter not. This provides an additional (and yet complementary) explanation why future years correspond to lit candles and past years to blown out ones. Moreover, since visibility depends on proximity, more recent events that are construed as closer to Ego are still relatively visible; therefore, they are metaphorically represented as candles whose flame is not entirely extinguished yet (*τα πιο κοντά βγάζουν καπνόν ακόμη* 'the closest still give off their smoke'). However, what is shared among all these different experiential correlations related to light and darkness is their evaluation. Whether it relates to life or vision, light bears a positive connotation, enriched with further positively valued attributes such as warmth but also happiness (consider the HAPPINESS IS LIGHT metaphor). In contrast, darkness is associated with features such as death and lack of vision, that are negatively evaluated while it also extends to negative emotional states like depression (i.e., DEPRESSION IS DARK). In sum, no matter which experiential correlation motivates the association between candles and years (in fact, all of them may be at work at the same time), the evaluative connotations intrinsically related to light and darkness are also imported to the metaphor; future years are therefore positively valued while past years are negatively valenced.

Finally, the frame of CANDLES is also associated with years by virtue of a culture-specific ritual according to which people on birthdays blow out candles on a birthday cake, thereby making the integration strongly motivated in cultural terms too. A common practice sanctified by tradition, at least in the context of the Greek culture, the candles one has to blow out on the birthday cake are as many as the years s/he has already lived, so the candles metonymically stand for the total of one's lived years. In sum, it is likely that the conceptualization of past years as blown out candles is also warranted by a common cultural ritual.

However, the experiential correlations between light, on the one hand, and the past and the future, on the other, can explain the motivation for this conceptualization but not the conceptual mapping itself. In what follows, I aim to propose a conceptual integration analysis of the metaphor in (4.5) in which conceptual structure from one input (structured by the frame of CANDLES) is combined with conceptual structure from another input (structured by the frame of YEARS) to yield a novel conceptualization of time in the blend. By suggesting that both inputs contribute conceptual elements to the blend, I will show that the emergent conceptualization of time in the YEARS AS CANDLES blend is consistent with the past and the future in the conceptual structure of time, although derived in a creative, original way. As Pagán Cánovas & Jensen (2013) have shown, the metaphorical conceptualization of

the years as a line of candles is deeply grounded in the timeline, which constitutes a material and symbolic anchor of temporality in the West.

As shown in Figure 4.5, the metaphor involves the integration of two inputs, namely a mental space of candles (Input Space 1) and a mental space of years (Input Space 2).[91] By virtue of the experiential and cultural motivations already discussed, 'lit candles' from the frame of CANDLES are fused with 'future years' by means of Identity via Analogy and, similarly, 'blown out candles' are blended with 'past years'. Other attributes of lit and blown out candles are also projected onto future and past years such as vividness and warmth for the former and meltability and coldness for the latter. Thus, in the blend, future years are construed as lit, vivid and warm candles (*χρυσά, ζεστά, και ζωηρά κεράκια* 'golden, warm, and vibrant little candles'), whereas past years correspond to blown out, melted and cold ones (*κρύα κεριά, λιωμένα, και κυρτά* 'cold candles, melted down, bent out of shape'[92]). Moreover, as predicted in the frame of CANDLES, as soon as a lit candle is blown out it emits smoke and then becomes cold. Such still smoking candles are mapped onto recent years (*τα πιο κοντά βγάζουν καπνόν ακόμη* 'the closest still give off their smoke') in that they have been recently blown out (i.e., their flame has just become extinct) in the same sense that recent years have just passed. Finally, it is noteworthy that, in conceptualizing future years as lit candles and past years as blown out ones, evaluative connotations from the input of candles are imported to the conceptualization of the years; future time is thus positively valued (like light) unlike past time which here bears a negative evaluation associated with darkness. In this respect, note also the diminutive *κεράκια* 'little candles' that applies to future years and bears positive affective meaning instead of *κεριά* in the case of past years (on diminutives in English and MG see Sifianou, 1992).

The candles that stand for the years within the blended space are spatially located along a line (*σειρά* 'row' and *γραμμή* 'line') with the lit candles being in front of the poet (*Εμπρός κυττάζω τ' αναμένα μου κεριά* 'I look in front of me, at my lighted candles') and the blown out ones behind him (*Δεν θέλω να γυρίσω να μη διω και φρίξω/ τι γρήγορα που η σκοτεινή γραμμή μακραίνει…* 'I don't want to turn around lest I see and tremble at/ how quickly the darkened line is growing longer…'). In accordance with the order of future and past events in the timeline (see Section 2.4.6), the spatial conceptualization of the candles is emergent in the blend as a result of selective projection

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91. Although conceptual structure from the frame of CANDLES is involved in the metaphor as the proposed analysis will show, it is not untenable that imagistic structure (especially with respect to light and lack of light) contributes to the understanding of the construal.

92. Here *κυρτά* 'bent' may also imagistically evoke the aged figure of the experiencer of time who is no longer upright but rather bowed.

from the input of years: *Του μέλλοντος οι μέρες στέκοντ’ εμπροστά μας* 'The days of the future stand before us' while *Οι περασμένες μέρες πίσω μένουν* 'The days that have gone by remain behind us'. In particular, life duration typically measured in years in Input Space 2 is integrated with a row of candles in Input Space 1 and therefore, in the YEARS AS CANDLES blend, both lit and blown out candles are conceptualized in a sequential order with *γραμμή* 'line' in the case of blown out candles explicitly evoking a well-ordered sequence.

Emergent in the blend, such a conceptualization of years along the horizontal axis is, nevertheless, congruent with time in the linear motion scene, which allows for locating past events behind and future events in front of Ego. In the same spirit, 'future years' in Input Space 2 that are integrated with a set of lit candles are located ahead, whereas 'past years' that are accordingly fused with a sum of blown out candles are located behind. Still smoking candles that stand for recent years are located behind like all past events, yet unlike older events they are construed as rather close to Ego: *τα πιο κοντά βγάζουν καπνόν ακόμη* 'the closest still give off their smoke'. As also predicted by the PROXIMITY IN TIME IS PROXIMITY IN SPACE conceptual metaphor, the more distant the past years in the timeline, the further the blown out candles in the row. In sum, conceptual elements that are central to time conceptualization such as the linear order of events and the location of the past and the future are projected in the blend, thus contributing to the conceptualization of YEARS AS CANDLES evoked in the network.

Finally, a novel, highly creative construal of temporal compression arises within the blend in that the line of the blown out candles that stands for the past years is construed as getting longer rapidly while the number of the candles that are contained in it is also construed as increasing quickly: *τι γρήγορα που η σκοτεινή γραμμή μακραίνει,/ τι γρήγορα που τα σβυστά κεριά πληθαίνουν* 'how quickly the darkened line is growing longer,/ how quickly the snuffed-out candles multiply'. Temporal compression is clearly evoked through the adverbial *γρήγορα* 'quickly' (emphatically repeated twice) and it is noteworthy that it is instantiated both in terms of space (as an ever growing line) and in terms of quantity (as a rapidly increasing number). Again, the construal of temporal compression in (4.5) is derived from our commonplace knowledge about time contained in Input Space 2. More specifically, the row of the candles in Input Space 1 is integrated with past years in Input Space 2, the latter proliferating quickly thus occupying a long, ever extending line. This explains why, in the blend, the sequence of the past years is metaphorically represented as a continuously lengthening dark line. Like in the previous poem, here temporal compression does not exploit the standard, motion-based pattern of time as passing quickly (cf. *γρήγορα πέρασεν η ώρα* 'the time has quickly passed') but is rather derived as emergent structure in a conceptual integration network,

while at the same time preserving some key temporal features such as the retrospective perception of time as having passed quickly, the conceptualization of time as a line, and the location of the future and the past ahead and behind, respectively.

In sum, featuring linguistic creativity and conceptual novelty alike, the poem in (4.5) gives rise to a temporal construal that uses candles as a metaphor for the passing years. Future years correspond to a set of lit candles lying in front of the poet whereas past years to a line of blown out candles located behind him. Given that, temporal compression is creatively evoked in terms of the line of blown out candles (i.e., past years) rapidly growing longer and, in doing so, it refreshes the standard conceptualization of temporal compression in a novel, unusual way. Finally, a last observation to be made in relation to (4.5) pertains to the emotionally charged stance of the poet that permeates the whole poem. This involves mainly sorrow at the sight of blown out candles and nostalgia for their formerly shining light (*Δεν θέλω να τα βλέπω· με λυπεί η μορφή των,/ και με λυπεί το πρώτο φως των να θυμούμαι* 'I don't want to see them; their appearance saddens me,/ and I'm saddened, too, to recall their former light'), as well as fear for the rapid extinction of the candles still lit (*Δεν θέλω να γυρίσω να μη διω και φρίξω/ τι γρήγορα που …* 'I don't want to turn around lest I see and tremble at/ how quickly …'). Apparently, those feelings do not arise as reactions over the candles themselves but rather over the candles as symbols of the years that go by and never come back. Therefore, the feelings of despair, regret and fear arise within the blend in response to the felt passage of time that is metaphorically construed as an exponentially growing line of blown out candles. A last, but not least, inference to arise in the end of the poem is that the gradual proliferation of the dark spots along the row of candles (i.e., the passage of the years along the timeline) will eventually bring about absolute darkness, i.e. death.

4.3   Summary and conclusions

Applying the criteria of (a) entrenchment, or lack thereof, and (b) motional or non-motional frame, the present chapter has introduced a new, distinct category in the metaphorical conceptualization of time as evidenced in MG poetry, which I have dubbed highly creative metaphors. Such metaphors were shown to lack not only entrenchment (similarly to creative metaphors of time), but also motional structure (unlike them), thus comprising a unified category of metaphor, formerly classified in different categories such as personification and image metaphors. This newly introduced category of highly creative metaphors of time is referred to in this book as the *high degree of figurative creativity*, to be distinguished from the first degree of figurative creativity afforded by creative (i.e., motional) metaphors.

An additional category was thus added in the continuum of figurative creativity according to the set of criteria specified in this study. Given the lack of motional frames, highly creative metaphors of time are deemed discontinuous with conventional and creative metaphors of time, as predicted in our hypothesis. Although it is possible that the emergent meanings of such metaphors be congruent with the conceptual structure of time in the motion scene (as in the last two poems instantiating temporal compression), it is not the latter that is exploited in the metaphor as is the case in creative metaphors of time. Instead, such meanings emerge from mappings between time and non-motional frames.

In theoretical terms, it has been shown that an account of highly creative metaphors of time in terms of conceptual metaphors and imagistic structure does not do justice to the construals evoked by such metaphorical expressions. In this respect, the relation between CMT and CIT was further explored with respect to non-conventional metaphors of time, in accordance with the research goals set up in the Introduction. In particular, a conceptual integration analysis has been proposed that takes insights from CMT a step further and thus complements it. It is worth noting that all construals of time examined in this chapter are grounded in our commonplace knowledge about time passing across lifetime, and especially ageing, while in all examples χρόνος 'time' metonymically stands for the passage of time. Our folk understanding of time as a transforming power and as ultimately leading to death seems to underpin all the metaphors under examination. As predicted by CMT, such metaphors are not used in everyday reasoning, yet the proposed analysis shows that they are congruent with, and motivated by, embodied cognition. In other words, in highly creative metaphors of time our folk understanding of time is articulated in terms of non-motional metaphorical representations that are, nevertheless, related to it in expreriential and cultural terms.

Our initial hypothesis that time is manifested in metaphorical expressions in both everyday and poetic discourse has so far been confirmed. However, evidence from the corpus of MG poetry suggests that time in poetry can also be construed in a non-metaphorical way, as will be shown in the next chapter.

CHAPTER 5

Non-metaphorical figurative expressions of time

5.1 Introduction

The data examined so far provide ample evidence for the metaphorical conceptualization of time in MG poetry, in accordance with our hypothesis. In this chapter, I aim to introduce a figurative pattern for the conceptualization of duration that is non-motional and non-metaphorical. Although mentioned in passing by Fauconnier & Turner as in *For me, the minutes were hours but, for her, the hours were minutes* (2008, p. 55), this pattern has not been previously discussed in the relevant literature. The expressions subsumed under this pattern do not involve cross-space mappings between time and other frames, as is the case in creative and highly creative metaphors of time (discussed in Chapter 3 and 4, respectively) but rather a mapping between two intervals, both of which evoke temporal frames that belong to the broader domain of time. Such an expression is uniquely instantiated in the HNC, repeated here for convenience:

(2.34) *Πεζοδρόμια, πλατείες, πάρκα... γέμισαν ψυχές που μετρούσαν τους κόμπους μιας αγωνίας που*
κάθε στιγμή της θύμιζε αιωνιότητα. [HNC]
every moment her reminded eternity
'Pavements, squares, parks... full of people in agony **while every moment resembled eternity**.'

Equated with eternity by virtue of *θύμιζε* 'reminded', every single moment (*κάθε στιγμή*) is construed as a much longer period than predicted by the clock. Although here there is no motional expression to indicate the passage of time, the emergent construal is that the conceptualized interval (every moment) is protracted, that is, it lasts much longer than is normally the case. The fact that moments are compared to eternity (a blatantly longer period of time) renders the construal hyperbolic, probably in an attempt to emphasize the distorted sense of time in the context of agony described in the passage. In short, the above example instantiates so-called subjective time, already discussed in terms of conventional metaphors (in Section 2.4.4); creative metaphors (in Section 3.2.4); and highly creative metaphors (in Section 4.2.2).

On the grounds of linguistic evidence from the corpus of MG poetry (18.7% of the poetic texts), I wish to argue that this way for conceptualizing the passage of time in subjective terms constitutes a distinct pattern, which, moreover, lends itself to a conceptual integration analysis. Given that these expressions do not involve a cross-domain mapping, they cannot be accommodated in terms of conceptual metaphors. Instead, they make a case, I argue, for conceptual integration. In particular, I will suggest that such construals arise from integrating mental spaces structured by frame structure about intervals of asymmetrical duration; by asymmetrical duration I mean that the two intervals that are imported to the mapping are unevenly long. Duration-related conceptual structure is projected from both inputs to the blend and gives rise to emergent structure. The integration process can thus resolve the clash between the asymmetrical intervals that structure the blend and yield a construal of duration as either protracted or compressed; that is, in terms of how the conceptualized interval is felt by the experiencer rather than as it is objectively measured by the clock.

The proposed analysis has also implications for the continuum of figurative creativity in the conceptualization of time. Given that the pattern for conceptualizing time introduced in this chapter is non-metaphorical (unlike all the categories analyzed so far), it follows that it constitutes a distinct category in the continuum of figurative creativity in time conceptualization; it lacks (a) linguistic entrenchment, (b) motional frames, and (c) metaphorical structure. In view of the above criteria, I wish to argue that non-metaphorical construals of time manifest the highest degree of creativity along the continuum of time conceptualization, namely the *maximum degree of figurative creativity*.

A question arises, however, with respect to the use of the term 'figurative' in relation to these expressions; the fact that they are not metaphorical does not automatically render them figurative. In what sense, therefore, is the term 'figurative' legitimate in the case of this non-metaphorical pattern for conceptualizing the amount of time passed? Figuration typically comprises metaphor and metonymy, but also extends to figures of speech (such as simile, oxymoron, hyperbole, etc.), as well as irony and humour. The non-metaphorical expressions of time identified in the corpus of MG poetry are certainly *non-literal*; they evoke a conceptualization of time in subjective terms, in a way that clearly diverges from the science of time reckoning. Moreover, in doing so, such expressions are related to, and complement, metaphorical patterns for conceptualizing subjective time, instantiated in conventional, creative or highly creative metaphors that either modify the speed of time passing or evoke speed by integrating time with a non-motional frame (such as an ever growing line of blown out candles). Since they do not involve motion or metaphor (in which the conceptualization of subjective time is typically grounded), such expressions disrupt our entrenched patterns for time conceptualization. Finally,

the fact that, as already mentioned, hyperbole is also involved in these temporal constuals further justifies their being classified as figurative.

A last, but not least, issue to be addressed in analyzing non-metaphorical expressions of time in this chapter refers to the motivations behind their emergence. Similarly to the metaphorical expressions of subjective time found in MG poetry, these will also be shown to relate to the experiential, emotional and affective content of the conceptualized interval, namely the experiencer's affect,[93] in line with findings in social psychology (Flaherty, 1999; see James 1890/1950; Guyau 1890/1888).[94] To this end, the analysis will take into account cues in the immediate linguistic context, which suggest a high degree of emotional involvement on the part of the experiencer and thus navigate inferences and plausible interpretations of the emergent temporal construal.

A final remark to be made before proceeding to the data analysis is that such non-metaphorical expressions of subjective time seem to arise in poetry (but not in everyday discourse, according to the data from the HNC). Presumably it is nothing but accidental that a figurative, non-metaphorical pattern for conceptualizing subjective time is traced in poetry, the latter being a discourse domain that is conducive to the expressive, the emotive and the aesthetic (M. Freeman, 2007). In this sense, it is not surprising that poets are concerned with how time is individually experienced, especially in emotionally charged situations (such as a romantic meeting or the fear of death in old age), rather than with its clock-based measurement and the social norms associated with it. As a result, construals of subjective time are productive (if not pervasive) in poetry, the latter also casting some new light on the motivations underlying their emergence.

The structure of the chapter is as follows; Section 5.2.1 is concerned with non-metaphorical expressions of protracted duration and Section 5.2.2 with non-metaphorical expressions of temporal compression; finally, in Section 5.2.3 I discuss mixed cases that instantiate both protracted and compressed time. The chapter closes with a summary of the findings and some concluding remarks in Section 5.3.

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93. This should not be confused with the reader's affect, which purports to play a dominant role in literary text processing (Burke, 2011).

94. Consider that subjective time is conceived of relatively to human consciousness in the phenomenological literature on time (cf. Husserl, 1928/1999; Bergson, 1960; Heidegger, 1996), as opposed to clock time with its mathematical nature of measuring time and its further implications for the make up of social life (see Durkheim, 1912/1915).

5.2 Non-metaphorical figurative expressions of time

Non-metaphorical expressions of time may construe an interval as either protracted or compressed, whereas a mixed case comprising both protracted and compressed time is also found in the corpus of MG poetry. All types of non-metaphorical expressions of time are addressed in the following sections.

5.2.1 Protracted duration

The first example from the corpus of MG poetry refers to the hours spent during a trip in Delphi, as the title of the poem suggests: *Επιστροφή από τους Δελφούς* (Return from Delphi). This is cited below:

(5.1) *Μέσα μας ζούσαμε ένα φόβο. Τούτο το ταξίδι*
    μπορεί σε λίγο να τελειώσει; Θεέ μου, θα τελειώσει;
    Και τι θα γίνει αυτό το φως όλο που αναδιπλώνεται
    και ξεχειλίζει και κυλάει παντού, σε μιαν αδιάκοπη
    άμπωτη, σα να μη χωράει; Τα πάντα έλαμπαν σάμπως
    να βγήκανε όλες οι άνοιξες των αιώνων στο στερέωμα
    και βάδιζαν σιγά σιγά, βαστάζοντας αστέρια
    και λουλούδια στα χέρια τους.

    (Και   για πρώτη φορά
    (And for first time
    '(And for the first time'
    νοιώθαμε   πως υπάρχουνε στον   κόσμο αυτόν
    were-feeling-we that there-are in-the world this
    'we felt that in this world there are'
    ώρες που είν' έξω από το   χρόνο. Που δεν ξέρεις
    hours that are out of   the time. That not know-you
    'hours that lie outside time. That you don't know'
    πόσο   διαρκούνε. Μήνες;   Χρόνια; Αιώνες;
    how-long last-they Months? Years? Centuries?
    'how long they last. Maybe months? Years? Centuries?'
    Που ισοζυγιάζουν όλη μας τη   ζωή).
    That equate-they all our the life
    'That they are equated with our whole life).'
    Ας μην τελειώσει!   [Νικηφόρος Βρεττάκος]

    'We could feel the fear. This trip
    would it end soon? Oh God, will it end?
    And what will happen to this light that unfolds
    and overflows and rolls, like in a restless

tide, as if it can't fit in? Everything would shine
as if all the springs of the centuries were out in the skies,
slowly stepping, holding stars
and flowers in their hands.

**(And for the first time
we felt that in this world there are
hours that lie outside time. That you don't know
how long they last. Maybe months? Years? Centuries?
That they are equated with our whole life).**
Let this not end!'

Located outside the boundaries of time, thereby explicitly pointing to a divergence from the clock (*έξω από το χρόνο* 'outside time'), the hours of the trip are felt as having a duration that is difficult to specify (*Που δεν ξέρεις/ πόσο διαρκούνε. Μήνες; Χρόνια; Αιώνες;* 'That you don't know/ how long they last. Maybe months? Years? Centuries?') and are finally equated with the travellers' whole lifetime (*Που ισοζυγιάζουν όλη μας τη ζωή* 'That they are equated with our whole life'). To put it simply, the duration of the trip as experienced by the travellers (note *νοιώθαμε* 'we felt') differs from its actual duration as measured by the clock. With no motion being involved in the linguistic expression in (5.1), such a conceptualization of the hours as equal to a much longer interval (like lifetime years) calls for a non-metaphorical conceptual integration network, presented in the figure below:

Figure 5.1 Hours lasting for lifetime.

Unlike the conceptual integration networks proposed so far, the network in (5.1) involves input spaces that both contain different intervals, measured in temporal units. In particular, the lexical item *ώρες* 'hours' evokes a temporal unit of particular duration; this is contained in a mental space of clock time along with other temporal units, such as months, years and centuries (Input Space 2). However, hours here correspond to an experienced event, namely a trip in Delphi, contained in a mental space of experienced events (Input Space 1). The experienced hours from Input Space 1 are mapped onto clock hours in Input Space 2. Motivated by Identity, such a conceptual link explains that the experienced time of the trip in reality lasts for only a couple of hours.

However, the duration of the trip as experienced by the travellers does not coincide with the duration of the trip in objective reality. As shown in Figure 5.1, Input Space 2 contains a set of temporal units, all of them denoting longer duration than clock hours (such as 'months', 'years', 'centuries' and 'years of a whole lifetime') and evoking possible mappings as suggested by the interrogative form: *Μήνες; Χρόνια; Αιώνες;* 'Maybe months? Years? Centuries?'. Yet, the hours of the trip are equated with the travellers' whole lifetime, which is typically measured in years, also contained in Input Space 2. For the conceptualization of 'hours lasting for lifetime years' to arise, 'hours' from Input Space 1 are integrated with 'lifetime years' from Input Space 2. In this way, within the blend the hours of the trip amount to the lifetime years of the travellers. Consider that if, instead, clock hours from Input Space 2 were projected onto the blend, then the experienced hours of the trip would be simply conceptualized in accordance with their measurement by the clock. Rather, the hours of the trip in (5.1) are conceptualized in subjective terms as a result of selective projection of 'hours' from Input Space 1 and 'years' from Input Space 2. Needless to mention, the time of the trip is not equal to the lifetime of the experiencers in reality but is rather *felt* as such.

In conceptualizing the hours of the trip as equal to lifetime years the emergent meaning is that of a protracted interval; the duration of hours that is emergent in the blend (i.e., hours as a lifetime) is longer than the duration of hours in objective reality (i.e., clock hours in Input Space 2). However, unlike the conceptualization of protracted duration that arises in the motion scene (e.g., *οι ώρες κυλούσαν αργά* 'the hours were flowing slowly') and can be accounted for in terms of a metaphorical mapping between time and motion within the generalized integration network of time, the emergence of protracted duration in (5.1) calls for the general cognitive operation of blending. In the context of the poem, in particular, the integration process seems to be motivated by the travellers' high level of emotional involvement. A relation of Analogy enables the conceptualization of a couple of hours in terms of the years contained in a lifetime in that the former seem to be analogous to the

latter in experiential terms. Linguistic cues in the context of the poem point to a strong affective component, comprising euphoria and joy during the trip (*Τα πάντα έλαμπαν σάμπως/ να βγήκανε όλες οι άνοιξες των αιώνων στο στερέωμα* 'Everything would shine/ as if all the springs of the centuries were out in the skies') but also regret for its upcoming end (*Μέσα μας ζούσαμε ένα φόβο. Τούτο το ταξίδι/ μπορεί σε λίγο να τελειώσει; Θεέ μου, θα τελειώσει;* 'We could feel the fear. This trip/ would it end soon? Oh God, will it end?'). These affective triggers explain the intensity of the experienced hours so that the latter can be paralleled, in an admittedly hyperbolic way, to what one experiences across a whole lifetime.

Another conceptualization of protracted time along the lines of this pattern is attested in the following poem:

(5.2) *Χωρίς πικρία, χωρίς ελπίδα, χωρίς φόβο*
  στη μέση του ταξιδιού,
  τριάντα χρόνια σκίζοντας
  τις σάρκες μου μ' αλύπητα μαχαίρια να σ' εξευμενίσω,
  στραγγίζοντας με λύσσα και την τελευταία
  σταγόνα του αίματός μου για να ξεδιψάσεις,
  τριάντα χρόνια-αιώνες, *κάθε μέρα*
  thirty   years-centuries
  '**thirty years-centuries**,'
  τη ζωή μου καταστρέφοντας για ν' αξιωθώ
  χαρούμενη επιτέλους να σε δω.   [Ανέστης Ευαγγέλου]

  'Now free from bitterness, hope and fear
  half the way through
  thirty years with me tearing
  my flesh apart with ruthless knives
  in order to appease you,
  draining in madness the last
  drip of my blood to quench your thirst,
  thirty years-centuries, every day
  ruining my life, aspiring to see you
  happy at last.'

Again in (5.2) two intervals are brought together to give rise to a construal of protracted time. While addressing his partner, the poet construes the thirty years of their relationship as having lasted for centuries: *τριάντα χρόνια-αιώνες* 'thirty years-centuries'. The two intervals both correspond to temporal units explicitly stated in the poem (years and centuries) and are connected via a hyphen (unlike *ισοζυγιάζουνε* 'they are equated with' in the previous poem). Yet, *αιώνες* 'centuries' in predicative position

guides the directionality of the mapping, suggesting that the conceptualized interval here is that of the thirty-year long relationship of the two partners. The conceptual integration network of the protracted construal is shown in Figure 5.2:

Figure 5.2 Thirty years lasting for thirty centuries.

Triggered by a strong affective component that relates to the rather stormy and turbulent relationship of the couple (*σκίζοντας τις σάρκες μου* 'tearing my flesh apart', *στραγγίζοντας… και την τελευταία σταγόνα του αίματός μου* 'draining … the last drip of my blood', *τη ζωή μου καταστρέφοντας* 'ruining my life'), the thirty years that the couple's relationship counts are conceptualized as equal to thirty centuries. In clock time *τριάντα χρόνια* 'thirty years' is a bounded interval of specific duration (contained in Input Space 2). However, thirty years is also the duration of the couple's relationship (contained in Input Space 1). These two intervals are linked via Identity so that the couple's relationship lasts for thirty years.

Nevertheless, the experience of thirty years overwhelms their measurement by the clock. Thus, it is not 'thirty years' in Input Space 2 that is projected onto the blend but, instead, another temporal unit denoting a much longer interval, namely 'thirty centuries'. As a result, the time of the relationship that in reality lasts for thirty years is conceptualized as equal to centuries. Such a conceptualization is emergent in the blend and evokes subjective time. With the time of the couple's relationship being conceptualized in the blend as an overly longer period of time, the meaning of the temporal construal in (5.2) is that of a protracted interval. It is worth noting that 'centuries' extend beyond the boundaries of human life and, in this respect, its use further stresses the hyperbole of the conceptualization. Finally, further inferences may arise in the conceptual integration network, namely that for the poet the years spent with his wife have been felt as impossible to suffer and

perhaps regrettable. Again, this cues to a strong affective grounding motivating the conceptualization. It seems that the experiential density contained in the thirty years of the couple's common life is disproportionate to the amount of time actually passed and hence requires an abnormally long period such as 'thirty centuries' to fit in. In other words, a relation of Analogy motivates the integration of 'thirty years' with 'thirty centuries'.

Next, consider (5.3) which also involves two asymmetrical intervals, namely Time and a night, thereby giving rise to a conceptualization of subjective time:

(5.3)   *Τη νύχτα της περασμένης Δευτέρας*
την είδε στ᾽ όνειρό του.
Βρέθηκαν λέει στο Ντελφτ
και ήταν ακόμη ωραία
και κάθισαν στην πλατεία
και θυμήθηκαν τα παλιά.
Το φως ήταν χρυσό
όπως στον Βερμέερ.
Της τηλεφώνησε στ᾽ όνειρό του

Κι εκείνη του είπε: Μα πώς ξεχνάς;
Πράγματι συναντηθήκαμε στο Ντελφτ
την περασμένη Δευτέρα
και καθίσαμε στην πλατεία
και ήθελες να περάσουμε μαζί τη νύχτα
και ήθελα
μα δεν μπορούσα και σου είπα
έχει χαθεί για μας ο χρόνος.

Κι εσύ τότε μου είπες:
Ας μείνουμε μέσα σ᾽ αυτό το φως.

Ίσως   όλος ο   Χρόνος είναι μόνο μια νύχτα
Maybe all   the Time   is   only one night
'Maybe all Time is only one night.'

Και δεν θα θυμηθούμε ποτέ
Αν τη ζήσαμε ή αν την είδαμε στ᾽ όνειρό μας.   [Γιώργης Παυλόπουλος]

'Last Monday night
he saw her in his dream.
They met in Delft
it was still lovely
they sat in the square
and recalled the past.
The light was golden
like in Vermeer.

> She called him in his dream
> and told him: did you forget?
> We met in Delft indeed
> last Monday
> we sat in the square
> and you wanted us to spend the night together
> I also wanted but I couldn't
> and I told you
> that time is up for us.
> And then you told me:
> Let's stay in this light.
> **Maybe all Time is only one night.**
> And we'll never remember
> if we lived it or we dreamed of it.'

In the context of a romantic interaction oscillating between the real and the imagined, a conceptualization of time arises in (5.3) whereby a night that the two lovers spent together is felt as equal to Time. The intervals involved in the temporal expression in (5.3) are definitely asymmetrical: time as an unbounded, eternal entity (as signified by the initial capital letter in *Χρόνος* 'Time' and the modifier *όλος* 'all') and a single night (*μια νύχτα*), with *μόνο* 'only' emphasizing the asymmetry between the two intervals. Interestingly, unlike the previous examples the conceptualization of time manifested in this poem involves a bounded and an unbounded interval. The conceptual integration network of the temporal expression in (5.3) is depicted in the figure below:

Figure 5.3 A night lasting eternally.

In conceptual integration terms, the night the two lovers spend together is contained in a mental space of experienced events (Input Space 1) and has a counterpart in terms of clock time in Input Space 2. Thus, the night the poem refers to has a bounded duration across a set of hours in objective reality. Yet, its experience seems to override such a short interval; it extends, instead, beyond the boundaries of a night in that for the lovers their night together is equated to eternal time. To explain such a conceptualization of a night as eternal time, the conceptual element from Input Space 2 that is fused with 'night' is that of 'eternity'. The emergent conceptualization is that of a protracted interval, which is further emphasized (if not exaggerated) by the unboundedness of eternal time. Thus, although lasting for a specific period of time in reality, the night the two lovers spend together seems to be fraught with such an emotional intensity that can only be compared to eternal time via Analogy. It is not without significance that this is presumably the last time the couple spends together as suggested by *έχει χαθεί για μας ο χρόνος* 'time is up for us'. Given that, in elaborating the emergent meaning of the blend, a plausible interpretation would be that the only time that counts is the moments the two lovers share and, although time is up for them, their last night together may compensate for the loss of time thereafter.

5.2.2 Temporal compression

Having examined non-metaphorical expressions manifesting a conceptualization of time as a protracted interval, let us now turn to a poem (the only one in the corpus of MG poetry) that exemplifies a conceptualization of compressed time, cited in (5.4):[95]

(5.4)   *Σαν το 'φεραν οι Χριστιανοί να το κρεμάσουν*
   το δεκαεφτά χρονώ αθώο παιδί,
   η μάνα του που στην κρεμάλα εκεί κοντά
   σέρνονταν και χτυπιούνταν μες στα χώματα
   κάτω απ' τον μεσημεριανό, τον άγριον ήλιο
   πότε ούρλιαζε, και κραύγαζε σα λύκος, σα θηρίο
   και πότε εξαντλημένη η μάρτυσσα μοιρολογούσε

   «Δεκαφτά χρόνια μοναχά με τα 'ζησες παιδί μου».
   Seventeen years only with the lived-you child my
   '"Seventeen years only you lived with me, my child."'

---

95. Translated by Daniel Mendelsohn (2012).

Κι όταν το ανέβασαν την σκάλα της κρεμάλας
Κ' επέρασάν το το σκοινί και το 'πνιξαν
το δεκαεφτά χρονώ αθώο παιδί,
κ' ελεεινά κρεμνιούνταν στο κενόν
με τους σπασμούς της μαύρης του αγωνίας
το εφηβικόν ωραία καμωμένο σώμα,
η μάνα η μάρτυσσα κυλιούντανε στα χώματα
και δεν μοιρολογούσε πια για χρόνια τώρα·

«*Δεκαφτά μέρες μοναχά*», *μοιρολογούσε,*
Seventeen days only   keened-she,
'"Seventeen years only you lived with me, my child."'
«*Δεκαφτά μέρες μοναχά*», *σε χάρηκα   παιδί μου*».
Seventeen days   only   you rejoiced-I child my
'"seventeen days only I had joy of you, my child."'   [Κ. Π. Καβάφης]

'When the Christians brought him to be hanged,
the innocent boy of seventeen,
his mother, who there beside the scaffold
had dragged herself and lay beaten on the ground
beneath the midday sun, the savage sun,
now would moan, and howl like a wolf, a beast,
and then the martyr, overcome, would keen
"Seventeen years only you lived with me, my child."
And when they took him up the scaffold's steps
and passed the rope around him and strangled him,
the innocent boy, seventeen years old,
and piteously it hung inside the void,
with the spasms of black agony –
The youthful body, beautifully wrought –
His mother, martyr, wallowed on the ground
and now she keened no more about his years:
"Seventeen days only," she keened,
"seventeen days only I had joy of you, my child."'

Inspired by a real incident during the British occupation of Egypt, namely the so-called Denshawai Incident that involved a dispute between British military forces (*Χριστιανοί* 'the Christians' in the poem) and Egyptian locals in 1906, the poem refers to the execution by hanging of a young boy, which is echoed in his mother's dramatic outburst upon his death. In this context, the boy's age (i.e., the duration of his life) is conceptualized in totally subjective terms; in reality the dead boy is seventeen years old (*το δεκαεφτά χρονώ αθώο παιδί* 'the innocent boy of seventeen'), yet for his mother the time of his life counts as equal to only seventeen days («*Δεκαφτά μέρες*

μοναχά», μοιρολογούσε,/ «δεκαφτά μέρες μοναχά σε χάρηκα παιδί μου» '"Seventeen days only," she keened,/ "seventeen days only I had joy of you, my child"'). Hence, the years of the boy's life are compressed onto days. Such a conceptualization of compressed time is emergent in a conceptual integration network of time, as shown in Figure 5.4:

Figure 5.4 Seventeen years lasting for seventeen days.

The conceptual integration network in (5.4) explains that for his mother the boy's life is conceptualized as seventeen days, although she is admittedly aware of his real age (*«Δεκαφτά χρόνια μοναχά με τα 'ζησες παιδί μου»* "Seventeen years only you lived with me, my child."). Connected via Identity, 'seventeen years' in Input Space 1 (i.e., the space of the mother's experienced events) and in Input Space 2 (i.e., the mental space of the clock) correspond to the duration of the boy's life in reality. However, for the mother of the dead boy the years of his life are felt as lasting for a significantly shorter time; for her, years correspond to days. For this conceptualization to arise, 'seventeen years' from Input Space 2 are not projected onto the blend but, instead, 'seventeen days' are integrated, by means of Analogy, with 'seventeen years' from Input Space 1. In this way, the conceptualization that is emergent in the blend is that the boy's life years are equal to days. Since the projected element from Input Space 2 is shorter in clock terms than what would be expected (i.e., 'seventeen days' instead of 'seventeen years'), it follows that the emergent meaning is that of compressed time. Finally, the conceptualization of the boy's lifetime as a compressed interval seems to be warranted by the mother's overwhelming sorrow over her son's death that is evoked in the epicedium she spells out throughout the poem. The mother's grief thus points to a strong affective background triggering the temporal expression in (5.4). Given that, the conceptual integration network in (5.4) is likely to invite more inferences, such as that for his mother the boy is too young to die and therefore his premature death is completely unfair.

5.2.3 Mixed cases

In this section, I discuss two cases that involve both compressed and protracted time in the form of integrating asymmetrical intervals; hence, I consider them to be *mixed cases*. I thus conclude the investigation of figurative creativity in the conceptualization of time.

First, consider (5.5):

(5.5)   *Κι έπειτα, φιλάς την παλάμη μου*
Κίνηση που κρατάει ακριβώς τρία δευτερόλεπτα
Κίνηση που αξίζει όσο χίλια «μου έλειψες»
κι άλλα τόσα «σ' έχω ανάγκη»
(…)
Ό,τι ζω μαζί σου μοιάζει να κρατάει μια στιγμή
και τι να προλάβεις να χωρέσεις μέσα σε μια στιγμή.

Στιγμή   **που**   **κρατάει**   **λιγότερο** **από** **μια** **στιγμή**
Moment that lasts   **less**   **than a**   **moment**
'Moment lasting less than a moment'
Στιγμή   **που**   **μακάρι** **να** **κρατούσε**   **αιώνες**
Moment that PART **to**   **would-last centuries**
'Moment lasting, I wish, forever.'

Μια στιγμή.
Μια μικρή φευγαλέα στιγμή.
Μια τόση δα χαμένη στιγμή.   [Μαρία Δασκαλάκη]

'And then you kiss my palm
A move that lasts three seconds sharply
A move that is equal to thousands "I miss you"
And thousands "I need you"…
What I live with you feels like a moment
And how much can you fit in a moment.
Moment lasting less than a moment
Moment lasting, I wish, forever.
A moment.
A small fleeting moment.
A small moment already gone.'

In (5.5), the poet addresses a romantic confession to her lover that sets the ground for a complex conceptualization of a moment in totally subjective terms. In particular, in an emotionally charged context a moment the poet shares with her lover is construed as lasting for less than a moment (*Στιγμή που κρατάει λιγότερο από μια στιγμή* 'A moment lasting less than a moment') but she wishes that it would be everlasting

(*Στιγμή που μακάρι να κρατούσε αιώνες* 'A moment lasting, I wish, forever'). It is worth noting that everything they live together is felt by the poet as equal to a moment, which is admittedly too short an interval to contain a dense experience (*Ό,τι ζω μαζί σου, μοιάζει να κρατάει μια στιγμή* 'What I live with you feels like a moment'). In view of this, I wish to suggest that the moment of the two lovers evokes both a compressed and a protracted conceptualization, each one arising in a multiple-space conceptual integration network of subjective time, as shown in Figure 5.5:

Figure 5.5 Moment experienced as lasting for less than a moment and desired to last forever.

As expected, the moment (*στιγμή*) the poet has experienced with her lover has a certain duration in objective reality that is represented in the figure by the conceptual mapping of her experienced moment in Input Space 1 onto its counterpart in clock time, contained in Input Space 2 (by virtue of Identity). However, for the poet *στιγμή* 'moment' is experienced as a shorter interval whose duration is left unspecified (*κρατάει λιγότερο από μια στιγμή* 'lasting less than a moment'; note that *κρατάει* (lit. 'holds') has also a temporal meaning, namely lasting, in colloquial MG). Therefore, it is not *στιγμή* in Input Space 2 that is integrated with *στιγμή* in Input Space 1 but, instead, any interval that lasts less than a moment. In other words, it is the experienced, rather than the real, duration of *στιγμή* that is projected onto the blend, thus giving rise to a conceptualization of subjective time. Essentially, such a conceptualization, contained in the blend (Space 3), manifests compressed time since the moment is construed in terms of an interval of shorter duration. It is worth noting, of course, that a moment is already a very short interval, therefore when being construed as

even shorter the emergent meaning is rather hyperbolic, suggesting that for the poet the moment is felt as passing overly quickly. This is presumably the case because the emotional intensity that is contained in it exceeds the boundaries of a moment (consider also *και τι να προλάβεις να χωρέσεις μέσα σε μια στιγμή* 'how much can you fit in a moment'). However, while construing the moment's duration in subjective terms the poet does not seem to have lost track of clock time (*Κίνηση που κρατάει ακριβώς τρία δευτερόλεπτα* 'A move that lasts three seconds sharply').

Given the emotional context of the temporal expression in (5.5), it is not surprising that the poet wishes that the moment would last forever (*μακάρι να κρατούσε αιώνες* 'lasting, I wish, forever'). By virtue of *μακάρι*, a particle used to introduce a wish in MG, a wish space is evoked (Input Space 4), which contains the desired duration of the moment, namely eternity. Thus, the blend that contains the experienced duration of the moment (which is too short an interval to afford the poet's emotional involvement) serves as an input (Input Space 3) that is mapped onto the desired duration of the moment as eternity in Input Space 4. As shown in the figure, the experienced moment in Input Space 3 is directly mapped onto 'eternity' in Input Space 4 and they are both fused into the blend.

In the new blended space that arises, a moment that is felt as lasting for a minute span of time is construed as lasting forever in the form of a wish. Lasting forever is an interval overly longer than a moment, let alone a moment felt as too short, therefore the emergent meaning of the temporal construal is that of protracted duration. It follows that the temporal expression in (5.5) evokes an interval that is both compressed (in terms of its felt experience) and protracted (in terms of wishful thinking). The conceptualization of time as both compressed and protracted in a non-metaphorical way in (5.5) involves a cascade of multiple mappings with asymmetrical projection of conceptual elements and emergent structure and therefore calls for an analysis in conceptual integration terms. Finally, the fact that the moment the couple shares is evanescent and doomed to get lost (as suggested by *μικρή φευγαλέα στιγμή* 'small fleeting moment' and *τόση δα χαμένη στιγμή* 'small moment already gone') further motivates the poet's desire to overcome the experience of the moment in objective reality.

Consider now the last poem of the analysis that instantiates another complex conceptualization of time:

(5.6) *Όταν   ο   χρόνος*
       When   the   time
       'When time'
       Γίνεται   στιγμή
       Becomes   moment
       'becomes a moment'

Ζεις   την αιωνιότητα.
Live-you   the   eternity
'you experience eternity'   [Νίκος Σιδέρης]

'When time
becomes a moment
you experience eternity'

In the context of a particular form of poetic expression, namely a haiku (see Hiraga, 2005), time is the theme that pervades the whole poem with an interval being evoked in every line of the poem: *χρόνος* 'time', *στιγμή* 'moment', *αιωνιότητα* 'eternity'. In this way, a complex conceptualization of time emerges, which instantiates both protracted duration and temporal compression. As in the previous poem, such a conceptualization requires a conceptual network of multiple integrations, represented in Figure 5.6:

Figure 5.6 Time compressed into a moment and experienced as eternity.

The first integration is invited by the expression *Όταν ο χρόνος/ Γίνεται στιγμή* 'When time/ becomes a moment'. The intervals involved in the expression are blatantly asymmetrical; while *στιγμή* 'moment' refers to a bounded interval of very short duration, *χρόνος* 'time' remains unspecified with respect to its duration; therefore, here it probably alludes to eternal, unbounded time. Thus, when *χρόνος* 'time' (from Input Space 1) is equated to *στιγμή* 'moment' (from Input Space 2), the interpretation of the utterance is that unbounded time becomes bounded and, more specifically,

it is compressed into a single moment. The emergent conceptualization is that of temporal compression in that an interval of unbounded duration is conceptualized in terms of a bounded interval. Essentially, such a conceptualization can only be emergent in the blended space (Space 3).

Nevertheless, by virtue of *όταν* 'when', the conceptualization of unbounded time as a moment initiates an additional integration, in which the blended space (Space 3) serves as an input. In particular, it is suggested that, when time is compressed into a moment, Ego experiences eternity as indicated by *Ζεις την αιωνιότητα* 'You experience eternity'. In conceptual integration terms, this means that 'time lasting for a moment' from Space 3 is fused with 'a moment lasting for eternity' in Input Space 4 and thus within the blend the compressed moment extends to eternity. In this integration, the compressed moment has no corresponding interval in objective reality and is therefore directly mapped onto an asymmetrical interval such as eternity. With *Ζεις* 'you experience' explicitly pointing to the felt experience of time, it becomes evident that the emergent conceptualization evokes subjective, rather than objective, time. Specifically, subjective time here refers to protracted duration in that a compressed interval (i.e., unbounded time condensed into a single moment) is conceptualized in terms of an overly longer interval such as eternity. A complex conceptualization of time is therefore attested in (5.6), which combines both compressed and protracted time. Similarly to the previous poem, the compressed interval serves as the input for protracted duration to arise. Such a complex conceptualization is reflected in the proposed conceptual integration network that involves multiple spaces and successive integrations with a blended space serving as input to a new integration.

In terms of the motivations underlying the emergence of time conceptualization in (5.6), it is worth noting that here, unlike all previous examples in this chapter, there is no indication for affective grounding. A haiku with a brief and concise writing style, the poem does not situate the emergence of such a conceptualization in a specific emotional context, as it was the case in the poems previously discussed. By not highlighting the specific emotional context in which it emerges, however, it allows the reader to come up with a personal reading of time conceptualization in (5.6). In other words, the poem may refer to any pivotal moment in life, which is felt as condensing fleeting time (by virtue of its experiential intensity) and thus a single moment simulates the experience of eternity, which would be impossible to experience in reality. Last, but not least, it is likely that the brevity of the poem (a typical feature of haikus) iconically reflects the shortness of *στιγμή* 'moment'. Despite its short length, a haiku such as (5.6) above can have a powerful poetic effect which may extend to eternity.

5.3   Summary and conclusions

Contrary to the hypothesis that initiated this project and unlike the expressions of time discussed in the previous chapters that are metaphorically structured, the linguistic evidence examined in this chapter brings to the fore a non-metaphorical, non-motional pattern for conceptualizing time. Lacking the features of linguistic entrenchment, motional frames, and metaphorical structure, these expressions, I argued, form a distinct category in the continuum of figurative creativity of time, constituting its maximum degree. An important implication of this is that the concept of creativity needs to be extended in order to encompass also non-metaphorical expressions of time conceptualization. Therefore, the continuum of figurative creativity of time ranges from metaphorical expressions (including conventional, creative and highly creative metaphors) to non-metaphorical ones that are located at the highest end of the spectrum.

Not formerly analyzed in the literature, non-metaphorical expressions of time make a case for conceptual integration in that they go beyond the cross-space mappings typically motivating time conceptualization and leading to metaphorical representations of time. As shown in the proposed analysis, recourse to the overarching principles of conceptual integration is necessitated in order to unveil the conceptual structure and the emergent meaning of non-metaphorical expressions of time. Unlike metaphors of time that arise from the integration of time with a mental space structured by another organizing frame, in non-metaphorical expressions the integration process involves mental spaces about intervals, all of them belonging to the overarching domain of time, yet each one evoking a different temporal frame. In all cases the frames that are involved in the integration process have asymmetrically different temporal information and, when fused together in the blend, they give rise to a conceptualization of time in subjective terms as either protracted or compressed (or both). In this sense, they form a continuum with metaphorical representations of time (e.g., time as passing quickly when recollecting past events or time as an ever growing line of blown out candles). Finally, in order to unveil the grounding of these expressions, the proposed analysis points to the role of affect, that is, the experiencer's emotional involvement manifested in the linguistic context in which each expression arises.

Time from metaphor and beyond?

This book embarked on investigating the conceptualization of time as manifested in everyday and novel linguistic expressions in MG in order to deepen our understanding of the conceptual structure of time, on the one hand, and its relation to figurative creativity, on the other. An attempt has thus been made to study conventional and non-conventional expressions of time in an integrated way, an endeavor that has not been undertaken hitherto in Cognitive Linguistics. To this end, the present work derived its data from a small, specialized corpus of MG poetry, compiled specifically for the purposes of this study, and brought together insights from Cognitive Linguistics and Cognitive Poetics. The findings of the study corroborate that time is metaphorically structured in terms of space and motion but also indicate that figurative creativity in time conceptualization comprises a broad spectrum of non-conventional expressions; not only metaphorical ones (as generally assumed in the cognitive linguistic literature) but also non-metaphorical ones. Challenging the dominant assumption in Cognitive Linguistics that time conceptualization is entirely metaphorical, this book brings to the fore empirical evidence from poetry vis-à-vis a non-metaphorical pattern for conceptualizing time. An important implication of this is that non-conventionality in the lexicalization of time needs to shift from the level of metaphorical creativity to that of figurative creativity. The diagram below summarizes the conceptualization of time in MG, as this emerges from the proposed analysis.

This book has essentially sought to make a contribution to theories of metaphor and meaning construction. It thus revises, on empirical grounds, the standard analysis of time and figurative creativity in terms of conceptual metaphors and puts forward, instead, an account along the lines of conceptual blending. Blending appears to explain both conventional and non-conventional expressions of time, whether the latter exploit entrenched metaphorical mappings (e.g., *ο χρόνος προχωρεί ποδοπατώντας* 'time moves on by trampling'); challenge them (e.g., *καινούργιο φέρετρο η καινούργια μέρα* 'a new coffin the new day'); or completely defy metaphor (e.g., *ίσως ο Χρόνος όλος είναι μια νύχτα* 'maybe all Time is only one night'). In this way, the proposed analysis recasts the complementary dichotomy between CMT and CIT that is commonly assumed in Cognitive Linguistics, according to which the former addresses conventional metaphors while the latter novel ones. It argues, instead, for an *integrated*, rather than simply complementary, relationship between

time conceptualization in everyday and poetic discourse in MG

metaphorical

non-metaphorical

mappings of asymmetrical intervals (e.g., *ισως ο χρόνος όλος είναι μια νύχτα* 'maybe all Time is one night')

motion-based

non-motional

entrenched mappings with motional frames; conventional metaphors (e.g., *ο χρόνος φεύγει γρήγορα* 'time goes away quickly')

ad hoc mappings with new motional frames; creative metaphors (e.g., *ο χρόνος προχωρεί ποδοπατώντας* 'time moves on by trampling')

ad hoc mappings with non-motional frames; highly creative metaphors (e.g., *καινούργιο φέρετρο η καινούργια μέρα* 'a new coffin the new day')

Diagram 9. Time conceptualization in everyday and poetic discourse.

the two theories, showing that CIT refines the tenets of CMT to better account for the conceptual structure of time but also for figurative creativity associated with time conceptualization, including both metaphorical and non-metaphorical expressions.

More specifically, in Chapter 2, I offered a description of time conceptualization on the basis of linguistic expressions from newspapers and magazines contained in a general corpus of MG, namely HNC. In accordance with the initial hypothesis, and in line with what is assumed by conceptual metaphor theorists, I showed that the conceptualization of time in MG is metaphorically structured in motional terms in that, in everyday discourse, a semantic preference is attested between motion and time. A number of conventional metaphorical expressions of time were identified, namely fixed collocations of lexical items from the semantic field of time with motional lexemes: either prototypical motion verbs (e.g., *πηγαίνω* 'to go') or motion verbs that are prototypically associated with particular aspects of time conceptualization (e.g., *οδεύω* 'to move forward' for future time). Such expressions, from a cognitive linguistic perspective, are constitutive of, and reflect, the conceptual structure of time in the motion scene.

Traditionally viewed in CMT as a uni-directional, two-space mapping between space/motion and time, conventional metaphors of time were recast here as emergent in a conceptual integration network that blends motional and temporal

information. Such a network affords the emergent properties of the concept of time, namely those temporal idiosyncratic features that cannot be reduced to a metaphorical transfer from space/motion. These features relate, on the one hand, to the irreversible nature of time and, on the other hand, to intervals felt as passing slowly, quickly or as coming to a standstill, thus attesting to *a psychologically real experience of events*. However, the experience of time is also shared and socially regulated in the form of time telling devices, which integrate recurrent natural phenomena (serving as indications of time passing) with mechanical tools for measuring the passage of time (at least in the urban world). Such devices, comprising so-called *clock time*, measure the passage of time in a homogeneous way across experiencers; in this way, the psychologically real experience of events (varied among experiencers) translates into a uniform backdrop for time conceptualization. In conceptual integration terms, this means that, for the concept of time to arise, an input space of events construed in terms of experienced motion is integrated with a mental space of clock time (Fauconnier & Turner, 2008). Time conceptualization as manifested in conventional metaphorical expressions in MG is thus accounted for by a multiple-space network structured by overarching principles of conceptual integration, such as multi-directional mappings between mental spaces, selective projection of conceptual elements, and emergent structure in the blend. Similarly to conceptual metaphors, this network is generalized in the conceptual system (as evidenced in everyday metaphors) but also conducive to creative exploitation (as suggested by figurative expressions).

On the grounds of empirical evidence from MG, I revised the Moving-Ego and the Moving-Time conceptual metaphors as two distinct construals of time conceptualization that emerge in a generalized integration network. In doing so, I showed that the emergent conceptualization in each metaphorical expression of time arises from the frame structure of the motion verb involved in the metaphor while being constrained by our folk understanding of time passing. This is clearly evidenced in the conceptualization of time as flowing, dubbed here the 'Time-flowing construal'. Formerly a variant of the Moving-Time conceptual pattern, this metaphor was shown to evoke a different conceptualization whereby motion is not self-propelled, lacks a point of departure and arrival, has a specific directionality and in which Ego lacks agency. Contributed by the semantics of the motion verbs that is recruited in the metaphor, this meaning is at the same time consistent with our understanding of time as fleeting and irreversible.

Such emergent conceptualizations relate also to another aspect of time conceptualization, so far overlooked in the literature: so-called subjective time, referring to the passage of time when being experienced differently from how it is measured by the clock. Previously analyzed as a metaphorical entailment from motion (a key feature of which is speed) to time, subjective time is now revisited in blending

terms so as to do full justice to the psychologically real experience of time passing. According to Fauconnier & Turner (2008), subjective time is contained in the input of experienced events and is selectively projected onto the blend, thus dominating over objective time. In order to refine the linguistic analysis of subjective time, I integrated insights from the social psychology of time, distinguishing between two different types of subjective time: protracted duration and temporal compression. Shedding some light on the affective grounding of subjective time proves to be essential when addressing such construals in poetry, a discourse domain whereby subjectivity and affect are typically foregrounded.

However, subjective time can also naturally arise with respect to events embedded in memory, the latter being felt close to the present while they actually occurred a long time ago. Alternatively, events can be recalled consistently with the time of their occurrence in the timeline. To account for time in objective and subjective memory, the generalized conceptual integration network of time is integrated with an additional mental space that contains remembered events, which are typically spatially construed in the timeline; as a result, in the blend, past events are conceptualized as being far away or close to Ego's present in a way that may coincide with, or diverge from, their actual distance in the timeline. Again, subjective memory points to the emergent structure of time that cannot be captured by a mere projection from space and motion onto time, as it would be predicted by conceptual metaphor theorists.

Finally, the last component in the conceptual structure of time in MG refers to the conceptualization of the past and the future, which are located behind and in front of Ego, respectively. A ubiquitous pattern in the West, the Time Orientation Metaphor, as it is usually called, was recast here in conceptual integration terms. Along the lines of the proposed analysis, past and future events are spatially located in the motion scene and are mapped onto past and future temporal units, also spatially represented in the analog clock. Such an account aptly captures the anchoring of the conceptualization of the past and the future not only in the motion scene (as predicted by experiential correlations already acknowledged by conceptual metaphor theorists) but also in the mechanical clock, which seems to play a constitutive role in temporal cognition but for many years has been overly neglected in the relevant literature.

Moving to the data from the corpus of MG poetry, in Chapter 3, I delved into the analysis of *creative metaphors of time*. Consistently with our hypothesis, creative metaphors of time exploit the conceptual structure of time (including all its construals in the motion scene, subjective time, time in memory, and the conceptualization of the past and the future), thus pointing to continuity with everyday metaphors. In particular, I showed that creative metaphors of time, just like everyday metaphors, are motion-based. Nevertheless, I proposed that these metaphors

form a distinct category in time conceptualization (constituting the *first degree of figurative creativity*) in that motional structure is manipulated in novel ways.

First of all, such metaphors often arise from *ad hoc* mappings of time with motional frames not associated with time in everyday discourse (e.g., when time is construed as trampling). When not recruiting new frame structure into the metaphorical mapping, as predicted by CMT creative metaphors of time can activate an aspect of the source domain that is not conventionally mapped to time (by way of metaphorical extension) or, alternatively, they can reverse our culturally entrenched conceptualizations as is the case with the location of the past and the future (by means of questioning). New frame structure enacts novel construals, while extension and questioning may be more complex than formerly assumed; for example, in extending a conceptual metaphor the new element that is activated in the source domain may in fact be incompatible with our understanding of time (as is the case in the hearing construal of time flowing), while for questioning contextual cues may be needed to unveil the meaning conveyed by the metaphor (e.g., when the reversal in the directionality of the past and the future relates to a rather unconventional way of living). Finally, creative metaphors of time can be linguistically identical with conventional metaphors. However, reducing these metaphors to some generic underlying patterns does not do full justice to their conceptual complexity while it also blatantly overlooks the rich meanings they may give rise to. A linguistically entrenched metaphor, therefore, may be endowed with a new, enriched interpretation by virtue of the rhetorical structure in which it is embedded (e.g., *Πώς πέρασεν η ώρα/ Πώς πέρασαν τα χρόνια* 'How the time has passed/ How the years have passed').

Such findings have important implications at the theoretical level, providing evidence that the standard CMT analysis of creative metaphors of time needs to be revised. By analyzing such metaphors in terms of mechanisms of figurative creativity (i.e., extension, elaboration, composition and questioning), CMT can aptly capture their relatedness with conventional metaphors but falls short of explaining their conceptual richness and emergent meanings. I therefore argued for a conceptual integration analysis of creative metaphors of time. In particular, I proposed that conceptual structure from other frames that belong to the domain of motion but are not conventionally associated with the conceptualization of time (such as, e.g., oceans, a type of forceful and threatening motion like trampling, etc.) is imported to the metaphor, thus structuring the mapping and navigating its interpretation. In analyzing such metaphors, I suggested that the emergent conceptualization of time naturally arises in a conceptual integration network, the latter blending new conceptual structure derived from motion-based frames with our background knowledge about time (e.g., *ο επελαύνων χρόνος/ δεν συγκρατείται πια από κανένα ανάχωμα* 'charging time/ can no longer be impeded by any mound').

Additionally, CIT can also explain metaphorical mappings that lack one-to-one correspondence (as is the case in, e.g., the hearing construal of time flowing). Be it a dynamic, on-line mental operation, conceptual integration, finally, can account for iconic links between form and content that often contribute to meaning making in poetry, even if the metaphor is deemed conventional in linguistic terms.

In sum, I have shown that, although conceptually grounded in entrenched conceptualizations (in line with claims made by conceptual metaphor theorists), creative metaphors of time give rise to unique meanings that arise on the fly as a function of specific linguistic contexts and rhetorical goals. The proposed analysis has aimed to account for the conceptual structure that creative metaphors share with conventional ones, as well as for the novel conceptualizations they give rise to that are not manifested in everyday discourse. In this sense, the present analysis complements and thus refines the account of creative metaphors of time within CMT and offers a new perspective on figurative creativity in general. Finally, a last, but not least, issue that was addressed in analyzing creative metaphors of time relates to the motivations underlying their emergence. The findings suggest that such metaphors are mainly motivated by our folk understanding of time as an over-arching power over which humans have no control; as an advent that is inescapable and ultimately leads to death; as a circular experience that holds no surprises for the future, etc. These metaphors may also reveal the emotional involvement of the experiencer, as in construals of subjective time or time in memory, or they can be context-induced and discursively motivated (e.g., when the poet appears to hear the flow of time while being metaphorically construed as a sea conch). The proposed analysis thus extends our understanding of motivations of figurative creativity beyond experiential correlations and perceived similarities (that are generally assumed in the conceptual metaphor literature) to also include affective and discursive motivations.

Figurative creativity, in the context of CMT, includes an additional category of non-conventional metaphors, so-called image metaphors, which map imagistic structure from domains that have a concrete mental image onto another domain that may or may not have imagistic structure (as is the case of time). On the basis of findings from the corpus of MG poetry, in Chapter 4, I showed that time in poetic texts is metaphorically construed in terms of concrete domains such as a coffin, candles, etc. akin to image metaphors. However, the proposed analysis goes a step further by suggesting that it is not (only) mental imagery that is transferred onto time in these metaphors, as assumed by conceptual metaphor theorists. Rather, conceptual structure derived from various non-motional frames and contained in *ad hoc* constructed mental spaces is imported into the metaphor, which, moreover, activates our background knowledge about time and especially about the passage of time and its impact on humans.

To substantiate this claim, I proposed a conceptual integration analysis of such metaphors, which are typically viewed as the realm of CIT (Grady et al., 1999), thus filling a gap in the analysis of figurative creativity in CMT. In particular, I showed that such metaphors arise from blending conceptually incompatible frames. Time is integrated with non-motional frames, which are not typically used vis-à-vis the conceptualization of time, yet the emergent conceptualization is, all at once, deeply associated with our folk understanding of time passing: every new day taking humans a step closer to death; time felt as passing more quickly while approaching the end of life; past time felt as a burden; and time transforming our physical appearance. In addition to image metaphors, non-motional metaphors of time include also the so-called personification of time, which assigns human features to time (e.g., *o χρόνος γλύπτης των ανθρώπων παράφορος* 'time is a passionate sculptor of men'). Uniquely instantiated in the corpus, time personification was revisited by showing that the metaphor integrates, on the one hand, the entrenched conceptualization of TIME AS A CHANGER and, on the other hand, commonplace knowledge about the frame that serves as the source domain (here the frame of SCULPTOR).

Importantly, I suggested that creative metaphors that employ non-motional domains of experience to structure the concept of time constitute a distinct category of non-conventionality, the latter being clearly distinguished from the conceptually entrenched motional construals of time: so-called *highly creative metaphors of time*. Even though psycholinguistic evidence is needed so that such a claim be made less tentative, I nevertheless argued that non-motional metaphors of time amount to the *high degree of creativity* in that they arise from the integration of frames that are deemed incompatible (on the assumption that no relevant conceptual mappings are found in everyday discourse). An important implication of this is that various degrees of creativity should best be associated with the frames recruited in the blending process, unlike previous attempts to delineate creativity on the basis of whether the conceptual network is single or double scope. It also transpires from the proposed analysis that the distinction between conceptual and imagistic metaphors is a rather unwarranted one, given that imagistic structure is necessarily activated along with non-imagistic (i.e., conceptual) structure.

In order to unveil the emergent conceptualization of time in highly creative metaphors, I showed that such frame-incompatible integrations are motivated by the folk understanding of time and, especially, of time passing (note that all cases under examination involve the word *χρόνος* 'time', standing metonymically for the passage of time). Essentially, highly creative metaphors build an analogy between the passage of time (perceived as bringing ageing and deterioration to humans and leading ultimately to death) and frames that are not salient to time conceptualization but are imagistically and conceptually related to human life and time passing (e.g., candles, coffins) and, in this sense, qualify for framing the concept of time.

Such an analogy (based on embodied cognition) may involve imagistic, apart from conceptual, structure as, e.g., in metaphorically representing wrinkles as kilometres on the face. I further argued that, although significantly departing from the pervasive conceptual patterns for time conceptualization, highly creative metaphors of time can naturally receive a tenable interpretation given their grounding in the folk understanding of the passage of time. The fact that they are likely to receive more than one plausible interpretations relates to the open-endedness of meaning construction that is inherent in poetry.

Challenging the dominant view that time conceptualization is entirely metaphorically structured, finally, I drew attention to a non-metaphorical pattern for conceptualizing time, analyzed in Chapter 5. Instantiated exclusively but quite productively in the corpus of poetry, this pattern amounts to construing an interval (that has a particular duration according to the clock) in terms of another interval of unevenly shorter or longer duration (e.g., a romantic night equated with eternal time). In other words, such construals involve the mapping of asymmetrical temporal frames. I argued that these expressions cannot be subsumed under metaphor since both frames imported to the mapping belong to the same overarching domain, namely time; therefore, there is no cross-domain correspondence to qualify the mapping as metaphorical. They are, nevertheless, figurative in the sense that they move away from literalness; they are not attested in everyday discourse; they construe time in subjective terms; and they also involve other tropes such as hyperbole.

Given the non-metaphorical structure motivating these expressions, I made a case for a conceptual integration analysis. A theory of on-line meaning construction that extends to linguistic phenomena beyond metaphor, CIT lends itself, I argued, to explaining the conceptualization of time and the emergent meaning of such expressions. Specifically, I proposed that in construing the conceptualized interval in terms of another interval of asymmetrically different duration such *non-metaphorical, figuratice expressions of time* manifest a conceptualization of subjective time (i.e. time as it is subjectively felt by the experiencer rather than as it is measured by the clock): prolonged or compressed. As is the case also in metaphorical expressions of subjective time (whether conventional or non-conventional), the experiencer is aware of the real duration of the conceptualized interval and it is against this backdrop that s/he construes duration in subjective terms. In order to account for this, I suggested that the conceptualized interval is mapped onto its counterpart in clock time but the latter is not projected onto the blend. What is projected instead is an interval that corresponds to the experienced duration of the conceptualized interval, thus structuring the emergent conceptualization of time in the blend. At this stage, and in the absence of psycholinguistic data, I have tentatively proposed that such instances point to the *maximum degree of creativity*;

they lack metaphoricity but involve the integration of frames that are temporal, yet conceptually contradictory. Last, but not least, in order to shed some light on the motivations underlying the emergence of such expressions the analysis draws on findings in the social psychology of time, which highlight the role of affective factors (Flaherty, 1999).

Finally, by bringing to the fore a non-metaphorical pattern for conceptualizing time, not addressed so far in the relevant literature, the present analysis of time conceptualization contributes new insights on figurative creativity. Typically viewed as ranging from everyday, mundane metaphors to novel metaphorical expressions, non-conventionality in time conceptualization was hitherto identified as a metaphorical continuum (Lakoff & Turner, 1989). However, in the light of the new empirical evidence provided in this work, I argued that the notion of figurative creativity needs to be revised in order to also accommodate non-metaphorical expressions of time conceptualization. As the proposed analysis shows, linguistic expressions that prompt a conceptualization of time exhibit different, but apparently contiguous, degrees of (non-)conventionality on the basis of at least three motivating parameters: (a) entrenchment, or lack thereof, (b) (non-)motional frames, and (c) (non-)metaphorical structure. The following table illustrates the proposed categorization:

Table 2. Degrees of figurative creativity in the expression of time in everyday and poetic discourse

	Conventionality	First degree of figurative creativity	High degree of figurative creativity	Maximum degree of figurative creativity
Linguistic entrenchment	+	−	−	−
Motional frame	+	+	−	−
Metaphorical structure	+	+	+	−
	Conventional metaphors of time	Creative metaphors of time	Highly creative metaphors of time	Non-metaphorical, figurative expressions

It is perhaps not without significance, finally, that most of the temporal construals attested across all categories are concerned with the conceptualization of the passage of time, which can furthermore be evoked in subjective terms.

On the whole, it emerges from this work that time conceptualization can be more fruitfully approached should linguistically entrenched and novel expressions of time be examined in parallel. This appears to be a promising endeavor in that it

enables both a holistic perspective on time conceptualization and a reassessment of current theories of metaphor and meaning construction. Poetry thus proves a valuable testing ground for hypotheses concerning Cognitive Linguistics and Cognitive Poetics, including also the association between everyday and poetic discourse; figurative creativity; and the distinction between various degrees of (non-)conventionality. The proposed analysis is not, of course, without limitations; being qualitative in nature and based on a small corpus, it is bound to be partial and not amenable to broader generalizations. In response to this, building large databases of poetic discourse (in MG, as well as in other languages) that will be electronically manipulated and will provide corpus frequencies and quantitative data promises to complement the present work and thus yield more established conclusions.

The present study has advocated an account of time conceptualization using the analytical tools of CIT and, in doing so, it has aimed to develop and complement, rather than refute, the position of CMT on this issue. Although insightful and promising, the CIT framework is, nevertheless, accused of being a non-falsifiable theory (Gibbs, 2000), confronted with a number of analytical problems that have been pointed out mostly by metaphor researchers. A major question (particularly pertinent to this study) is whether 'anything goes'. Be it a powerful, overarching mechanism that blends elements from conceptual domains, cultural artefacts and fictional worlds, and underpins a great many cognitive processes in language, science and the arts, is conceptual integration conducive to mappings of any sort? In other words, is it an unconstrained operation? To remedy this, Fauconnier & Turner (2002) have proposed a set of *optimality principles* (including, among others, Relevance and Recursion) with the aim to provide possible constraints in the blending process. However, it still remains open for investigation how such constraints actually work in specific linguistic examples and whether particular constraints may apply, such as constraints in the immediate linguistic context (Pagán Cánovas, 2012), or constraints that are specific to the concept at hand, such as time (as it is proposed here). In the present work I argued that the conceptualization of time, however linguistically creative, conceptually challenging and aesthetically powerful it may be, is constrained by our psychological and cultural experience of time; namely, embodiment. Although CIT promises to be a sound descriptive framework, as shown in many analyses and, hopefully, also in this book, it is still unclear to what extent it can offer some meaningful empirical predictions. A cross-linguistic and cross-cultural investigation of the issue can provide further insights in future research.

Another point of criticism levelled against CIT is that the analyses it provides are largely *ad hoc*, especially with respect to how the content of any given mental space is determined. The approach taken in the present work is frame-based, claiming that the mental spaces that are imported to blending processes are constituted by frames, activating corresponding scenes of experience and recruiting conceptual

elements in the respective inputs. The question, though, still remains as to whose blends are being represented in a given analysis: those of the speaker, those of the hearer, or simply those of the analyst (Cienki, 2008)? Or is the existence of an ideal speaker/hearer covertly assumed in the analysis as a possible carry-over from the tenets of generative grammar, against which Cognitive Linguistics largely arose? These questions are particularly relevant given that the proposed analysis concerns mainly poetic discourse, which, by definition, allows for a considerable degree of subjectivity at both ends of the communication chain. As already shown, a linguistic frame may activate a number of conceptual elements. The choice of different elements to structure a mental space may lead to different conceptualizations, but it would be surprising if such differences were not linguistically and culturally constrained. Capturing such constraints, a frame-based approach to blending lends itself to an account of the element of subjectivity, which is inherent in language use and poetic discourse in particular.

Despite weaknesses and shortcomings of CIT and, not least, of the proposed analysis, it is hoped that the present study has contributed significant insights to our understanding of time conceptualization. Although time conceptualization has attracted a lot of attention in Cognitive Linguistics, research has mainly sought to identify our underlying mental representations of time, either through psycholinguistic experiments or, more recently, by shifting the focus to temporal gestures (i.e., hand movements that co-occur with metaphorical expressions of time). While psycholinguistics has provided empirical support for the psychological reality of spatio-temporal mappings (thus reviving the so-called Whorfian hypothesis on the relationship between language and thought), gestural studies have challenged our assumptions, based on linguistic evidence, about the mental representations of time. English speakers seem to gesture about the past and the future mainly along the *lateral* (i.e., left/right) axis, although they speak about time using the *sagittal* (i.e., behind/ahead) axis; that is, they gesture leftward for earlier times and rightward for later times even when they use front/back metaphors in their speech (Casasanto & Jasmin, 2012). This finding suggests that speakers of English share an implicit spatial conceptualization of time that cannot be inferred from language (since no metaphors that make use of the lateral axis are attested in spoken languages; see Radden, 2006), yet it is part of temporal cognition (see Santiago, Lupiáñez, Pérez & Funes, 2007; Santiago, Román, Ouellet, Rodríguez & Pérez-Azor, 2008). Such evidence from temporal gestures therefore challenges what traditionally has been assumed in Cognitive Linguistics, namely that temporal thinking and temporal language go hand in hand (see Casasanto, 2016).

If, however, mental representations of time diverge from language, what happens when temporal language diverges from mental representations? This is a cutting-edge question that can be appropriately addressed in the light of evidence from verbal

creativity, and this is what the book at hand has aimed at. And although divergence in poetry is *ad hoc*, related to the poet's specific rhetorical goals and to overall generic genre expectations of "discourse deviation" (Leech, 1969; G. Cook, 1994), still, though, there is a common conclusion to draw: that temporal language and temporal cognition are intertwined but this does not mean that they are also aligned. They may actually diverge; nevertheless, such divergence is essentially underpinned (and probably constrained by) psychological, cultural and material facets of temporality in which temporal cognition is anchored, such as, e.g., the timeline or time's finite and irreversible nature. The fact that anchors of temporality are amenable to creative exploitation (to the effect that they can be utterly defied) corroborates, rather than refutes, their entrenchment and pervasiveness in temporal cognition. Further research on distorted temporal perception in various forms of psychopathology (see Friedman, 1990) can potentially contribute important insights on this issue.

It is hoped, therefore, that the present work will generate further discussion on the conceptualization of time across languages, genres and perhaps modalities. Especially the latter, comprising the already prolific realm of gesture studies and also the now emerging (vis-à-vis time) domain of the arts (especially films) promise to offer converging evidence on issues related to time, cognition and creativity. By endorsing an interdisciplinary approach that merges insights from Cognitive Linguistics, Cognitive Poetics, and the affective sciences, this book has sought to deepen our understanding of time conceptualization and meaning construction, while possibly charting new territories in the study of time.

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Index

How does the concept of time, elusive and inconceivable as it may be, lend itself to verbal creativity? Is it possible to trace something like a "poetics of time"? This book embarks on this endeavor initiated by the assumption that verbal creativity can shed some new light on our understanding of time, challenging everyday linguistic patterns and manipulating mental representations in unforeseen ways. Drawing on empirical evidence from Modern Greek poetry, the book offers a unified account of time conceptualization along a continuum of various degrees of non-conventionality. It also shows, unlike what has been traditionally assumed in the literature, that creativity in the expression of time is not limited to metaphor but extends to other figurative tropes that are perhaps specific to poetry. Poetry thus transpires as an ideal testing frame for exploring temporal cognition and meaning construction alike.

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