

WESTERN CAPITALISM IN TRANSITION

GLOBAL PROCESSES, LOCAL CHALLENGES



**EDITED BY
ALBERTA ANDREOTTI
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Alberta Andreotti, David Benassi and Yuri Kazepov

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To Enzo, mentor and friend
A Enzo, maestro e amico

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Preface

This book is a tribute to Enzo Mingione and his contribution to the fields of sociology and urban studies on the occasion of his retirement. During his more than forty-year-long career, Enzo has taught and done research on several topics: from the processes of transformation of cities to the informal economy, from the Fordist crisis to the rediscovery of poverty, from the welfare state and welfare policies to migration and the transformation of work. These themes constitute the analytical building blocks of this book on the transitions that Western capitalist societies are undergoing.

The importance of Enzo's contribution lies in his ability to combine a passionate and original theoretical way of framing changing societies with a strong commitment to empirical research, a passion that he has transmitted to many of his students. His intellectual journey was influenced by the specificities of Italian society in the late 1960s, with its transformations and conflicts. At that time, the Italian academic community was increasingly interested in understanding and explaining the *social* and *local* determinants of economic development. This interest was motivated by the extraordinary success of small and family-owned firms in the central and north-eastern part of the country. This success was based on traditions of entrepreneurship, on dense networks of relationships among local actors and forms of self-exploitation within the family. Such phenomena challenged mainstream economics and theories of economic development. Questions about the role of non-economic factors emerged as relevant for understanding both the social and territorial roots of economic processes. Why was economic development taking place in some areas and not in others? Why were apparently pre-modern factors like small family firms so incredibly successful?

The academic contribution of Italian scholars to the understanding of local development received great attention in international academia. Enzo was able to connect these developments with what was going on outside Italy. His residencies abroad and the comparative approach he always

insisted upon shaped his interest in the explanation of social change and the understanding of the social foundations of economic processes, with a special interest in the transformations of capitalism. His use and application of Polanyi's institutional approach to current changes raised tremendous interest internationally, and is the *fil rouge* that links the chapters of this book.

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This book has been made possible thanks to the help of many people, including all the contributors who committed themselves to write their chapters in a rather short period of time. Two years ago, when we started to plan this book, we were uncertain about the possibility of enlisting to this project (some of) the scholars whom Enzo Mingione had met during the last forty years, and who had shared important intellectual experiences with him. However, all the scholars accepted with enthusiasm, highlighting the importance of Enzo's legacy from both the intellectual and the human point of view.

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FRAMING THE ISSUES AT STAKE

Western capitalism in transition: global processes, local challenges

Capitalism is not merely a way of organising production and consumption based on the private ownership of the means of production, driven by alleged natural human behaviour (selfishness, self-interest) and aimed at maximising profit. The sociological understanding of capitalism defines it as a model for the structure of the whole of society, where economic *momentum* is ‘only’ one of the aspects of such a structure.

In this introduction we draw an interpretative framework of the dynamic of capitalism based on Karl Polanyi’s theory of the embeddedness of the ‘economic’ in the ‘social’.¹ As Polanyi maintains, economic processes (i.e. the production of what is necessary for the subsistence of human beings) are made possible by a specific combination of political, cultural and economic institutions. This combination is always in a dynamic equilibrium as societies go through a constant and restless process of change during which social institutions are recombined into novel forms and constellations. This process, however, is neither homogeneous nor linear, and is very much influenced by the role the different institutions play, their complementarities and their synergistic effects. Indeed, this mix affects the direction and speed of change; the winners and losers and the overall patterns of inequality that stratify different societies (Milanovic 2016).

Following Polanyi, and the use that Enzo Mingione has made of Polanyi’s work in recent decades (1991, 1997 and in this volume), we argue that changes in capitalist societies are characterised by a dynamic *double movement*. During periods of predominance for market-driven mechanisms in the allocation of resources, economic relations tend to dis-embed from their social foundations, meaning that the logic of economic behaviour is separated from its roots. This separation is not sustainable in the long run, and in causing various negative consequences, it triggers a counter-movement that gives *momentum* to a phase of re-embeddedness of economic activities into a stronger societal steering framework. It is within this double movement

that we think we can understand how socio-economic tensions arise, how capitalism is transformed, and how social change is produced.

This introductory chapter is organised into four parts. The first part illustrates the social foundations of capitalism and puts forward the argument that there is a constant tension between dis-embedding and re-embedding mechanisms of economic activity into a less commodified society. The second part deals with the transformations that Western capitalist societies are undergoing, and how the double movement operates. We highlight how the socio-economic and institutional complementarities that characterised post-war capitalism created relatively integrated socio-economic regimes, which have been inherently challenged since the 1970s. The third part addresses the relevant role played by the increased mobility of capital, labour and goods in this process, underlining their crucial destabilising impact on contemporary fragmented capitalism. We will not make predictions about the directions of change or even the end of capitalism. Capitalism has proved to be very flexible and adaptable to the most diverse situations (Peck and Theodore 2007; Wallerstein et al. 2013; Calhoun et al. 2016). We interpret the double movement that is occurring in contemporary Western capitalisms as a framework for understanding and reading the essays included in this book. The fourth part addresses the structure of this volume, and explains how the different chapters are related and how they can be framed in the Polanyian double movement.

The social foundations of capitalism and the double movement

The radical innovation of modern capitalism lies in the fact that – for the first time in history – the ‘social’ is subjected to the logic of the ‘economic’, both ideally and empirically. Polanyi framed this issue in a very clear way, building a complete theoretical explanation of the exceptionality of eighteenth-century English capitalism. According to Polanyi, in western Europe the previous economic systems were organised either on the principle of reciprocity or redistribution, or on a combination of the two. In this framework, the production and distribution of goods was secured through social and/or political arrangements (e.g. habits, rituals, law, religion and family), and gain was not prominent. The economy was embedded in social relations and markets were not self-regulating. With modern capitalism,

Instead of the economy being embedded in social relations, social relations are embedded in the economic system [...] society must be shaped in such a manner as to allow that system to function according to its own laws. This is the meaning of the familiar assertion that a market economy can function only in a market society. (Polanyi 2001: 60)

Like any other socio-economic system, capitalism – as a specific solution to the problem of the subsistence and reproduction of human beings – needs specific institutions to work, from a legal system that enforces private property, to a monetary system, to norms that regulate markets where goods can be traded and prices fixed following the mechanisms of demand and supply. Capitalism must be supported by, and integrated with, organised behaviours, that is, institutions that frame almost all aspects of society and of its actors (Fligstein 2001; Block and Somers 2014: ch. 4). Since the establishment of the rule of law (Costa and Zolo 2007), these institutions have been a prerogative of nation-states.

Even though some forms of market exchange can be traced back in every stage of history and in every kind of economic system, as Polanyi and his colleagues show (Polanyi et al. 1957; also Neal and Williamson 2014: vol. 1), it is only from the mid-eighteenth century onwards that the market system becomes a form of social organisation. Since then the history of Europe, and then of the Western world, has been punctuated by the double movement, that is, by processes of innovation and adaptation of social institutions in reaction to the spread of the market economy and to its destructive consequences on social and political life. Polanyi interprets this reaction as a defensive practice by social and political institutions. Political parties, trade unions, religious and secular organisations and citizens' associations all aim at steering, guiding and correcting market forces and re-embedding economic activity in an attempt to make commodification sustainable.

From the second half of the eighteenth century to the end of the nineteenth century, the spread of the market principle as a regulatory mechanism required the complete abandonment of the 'old' societies' legacies based on individuals' membership of various social formations. Whether the guild, the village, or even specific family arrangements, the abandonment of the moral and legal obligation of the 'community' to take care of its members characterised this process. This shift has often been described through the history of enclosures (Marx 1887: ch. 27; Polanyi 2001; McCloskey 1972; Thompson 1991), a process that between 1760 and 1820 abolished the system of open fields that was crucial for the subsistence of people in pre-industrial society. The right to exploit natural resources owned by the community was based on membership of that community (Hall 2014). The transition to industrial capitalism required the overcoming of these traditional rights, the mobility of individuals, and their 'liberation' from traditional bonds and transformation into salaried workers (Thompson 1991). It is through this process that the atomised social actor, functional to the logic of capitalism, was created, and the whole society was subjected to the market principle.

Yet this is not enough to create a market society; to put it in Polanyi's words:

The free market needs an enormous increase in continuous, centrally organized and controlled interventionism, free markets could never have come into being merely by allowing things to take their course. Laissez-faire itself was enforced by the state. The thirties and forties of the XIX Century saw not only an outburst of legislation repealing restrictive regulations, but also an enormous increase in the administrative functions of the state, which was now being endowed with a central bureaucracy able to fulfill the tasks set by the adherents of liberalism. Liberalism meant the replacing of parliamentary action by action through administrative organs. (Polanyi 2001: 145)

According to Polanyi, the complete supremacy of the market principle was a *unicum* in human history, and created such vast and profound problems that 'society' – mainly through social mobilisation and political class action – had to react in order literally to survive. A counter-movement emerged in a spontaneous way, from the grassroots, to react against the market principle (2001: 147). Polanyi does not refer so much to how this counter-movement is formed or to how social and political mobilisation varies in different contexts and with different cultural, political and economic 'resources' (Burawoy 2003: 221). He defines the double movement in general terms as

the action of two organizing principles in society, each of them setting itself specific institutional aims, having the support of definite social forces and using its own distinctive methods. The one was the principle of economic liberalism, aiming at the establishment of a self-regulating market, using largely laissez-faire and free trade as its methods; the other was the principle of social protection aiming at the conservation of man and nature [...] using protective legislation, restrictive associations, and other instruments of intervention as its methods. (Polanyi 2001: 138–9)

It is in the second stage of the double movement that laws protecting salaried workers and other welfare policies were introduced, re-embedding the economy into society, that is, into redistribution and reciprocity as principles that organise society. This process was not isolated from more general social changes that shaped society during the spread of capitalism – such as the development of the nuclear family based on the male breadwinner, or the culture of consumerism – which supported the capitalist expansion (Mingione 1991).

If we look at capitalism as a social system adopting a long-term perspective, the double movement is the result of the constant tension between pressures of the dis-embedding of economic relations on one side, and attempts to re-embed them into social arrangements on the other. All social

systems go through complex dynamics of change; with the advent of the market society these pressures emerge out of the intrinsic logic of capitalism and how it works, in particular the process of commodification that it entails. Commodification tends to dis-embed economic activities from their social foundations, and economic behaviour is supposed simply to follow the logic of maximum profit as the outcome of the sale of commodities. Every element that plays a role in the production process must be commodified, therefore labour, land and money must be considered as commodities. However, as Polanyi maintains:

labor, land and money are obviously not commodities; the postulate that anything that is bought and sold must have been produced for sale is emphatically untrue in regard to them. [...] Labor is only another name for a human activity which goes with life itself, which in its turn is not produced for sale but for entirely different reasons, nor can that activity be detached from the rest of life, be stored or mobilized; land is only another name for nature, which is not produced by man; actual money, finally, is merely a token of purchasing power which, as a rule, is not produced at all, but comes into being through the mechanism of banking or state finance. None of them is produced for sale. The commodity description of labor, land and money is entirely fictitious. (Polanyi 2001: 75–6)

A pure, self-regulated, market society is a myth or a ‘stark utopia’ (Polanyi 2001: 73). The preconditions according to which the self-regulated market should work in order to keep up its promises of the best possible allocation of resources are not provided in human societies. It is the ideological argument in favour of weak, or even absent, public intervention in the economy that paves the way for its destructive effects on society. Polanyi himself clearly states that the market is a very efficient solution for the production and distribution of goods essential for human subsistence (Block and Somers 2014: 8–9). The point is that the market must be regulated through social and political institutions that coordinate the behaviour of individuals acting as economic actors. In fact, all social scientists maintain that human beings are not rational atomised actors; their actions are often oriented by non-economic motives such as values, prestige and habit. The economic value of their actions is often tightly intertwined with cultural or political purposes. The huge scientific literature on the *varieties of capitalism* (Hall and Soskice 2001), based on the comparative political economy approach, is one of the best examples in contemporary research of the importance of institutions in shaping the conditions for the economic action of social actors.

The transformations of Western capitalism

In its long history modern capitalism has changed form several times. The ‘putting-out system’ (Kriedte et al. 1977) in the English countryside of the eighteenth century was very different from the Fordist industries based on huge plants with thousands of workers living in industrial cities of the twentieth century (Germani 1973; Castells 1970). Contemporary globalised financial capitalism is radically different again, dematerialising the production of wealth in today’s economic arrangements. The social institutions and their combinations (Hall and Soskice 2001; Granovetter 2017; Amable 2016), as well as the patterns of behaviour supporting the different models of capitalism and their socio-economic outcomes, have changed over time. These transformations were the result of a combination of changes in technology, forms of collective behaviour or forms of regulation/limitation of the pursuit of self-interest, the extension of markets both in terms of value chains and modes of consumption, social protection legislation (including regulation of labour) and family models (both structures and kinds of relations), beliefs and value systems. What we stress is that the functioning of capitalism triggers a societal reaction to its disruptive consequences that kicks off a double movement in order to make the overall system sustainable, both from an economic and a social point of view.

After the Second World War, with the dramatic experience of fascism and Nazism and the political challenge of communist countries, western European countries built a regulatory system aimed at making capitalism socially viable, politically stable and economically profitable. Indeed, it resulted in a unique equilibrium based on the combination of 1) a democratic political system for the regulation of social conflicts produced by class division (Dahrendorf 1959), including the legitimization of trade unions; 2) a Keynesian approach to the public regulation of the economy, compensating for economic cycles; 3) a welfare state able to protect citizens from standard social risks (old age, unemployment, sickness); and 4) the ‘male breadwinner regime’ based on the gender division of care work and stable family wages (Lewis 1992; see also Mingione in this volume).² This arrangement – based both on macro and micro factors – has been called ‘welfare capitalism’ by T. H. Marshall (1972), who also propounds its highly unstable character (see also Mingione in this volume). On the macro side we refer to well-known factors such as the unprecedented post-war economic growth driven by mass production and mass consumption, a very favourable demographic dynamic characterised by relatively high fertility and a smaller proportion of old people to young people, and a political and ideological climate that favoured state intervention in the economic and social domains (Flora 1986). On the micro side, that is, factors directly pertaining to the life of

individuals, we refer to increasing family income based on stable jobs, life patterns characterised by relatively stable and highly predictable transitions (e.g. to adulthood, to employment, etc.; see, for instance, Bruckner and Mayer 2005), and family roles based on the ‘male breadwinner–woman caregiver’ household model. The synergistic effect of these characteristics heightened the standard of living of large segments of the population in all western countries. Of course, social inequalities did not fade away; rather they were hidden by a growth that favoured all social classes, but the lowest comparatively more, as witnessed by the reduction of income inequality in every western country during this period (Piketty 2014). Poverty began to follow the same path of fragmentation of society, affecting specific social groups characterised by different forms of disadvantage, such as ethnic minorities (e.g. Roma people), non-standard families (e.g. lone mothers), migrants from developing countries, atypical or low-wage workers and marginalised individuals (Castel 1995; Cantillon et al. 2017).

After the mid-1970s – with the oil crises, the emergence of new economies and the rise of the neoliberal ideology – capitalism started to undergo a radical process of transformation (Amin 1994). The rearrangement or the adaptation – in some cases the evanescence – of the social institutions that had emerged during the great transformation, and had been consolidated in the post-war *trente glorieuses* (Rosanvallon 2000), can be interpreted in Polanyian terms as the beginning of a phase of increased dis-embedding of the economy. Indeed, the unique combination of factors that had produced stable economic growth and great improvements in the standard of living across all of western Europe came under increasing pressure because of both exogenous and endogenous factors. In other words, given those changes, the ‘Fordist social model’ (Gramsci 1978; Jessop 1992) was revealed to be increasingly unable to feed economic growth and protect people against changing social risks. In Polanyian terms, in the second half of the 1970s the capacity of social and political institutions to regulate the commodification of fictitious goods decreased. This meant that the principle of market exchange gained centrality as the prevailing mechanism of economic regulation at the expense of reciprocity and, above all, redistribution. Its prominence translated into a process of re-commodification of labour, land and money that reached its peak probably with the 2008 economic and financial crisis. The living conditions of a growing part of the population began to worsen again (Cantillon et al. 2017), though with important differences among countries and affecting different social groups unequally (Atkinson et al. 2011; Milanovic 2016).

The great financial crisis of 2008 can be considered the breakdown of this long phase of dominance of the market principle, and of the neoliberal rhetoric regarding it, that had begun in the mid-1970s. Enzo Mingione, in

his seminal work *Fragmented Societies* (1991), considered the oil shocks of 1973 and 1979 not only as the end of the Fordist period but also as the beginning of a new ‘fragmented’ phase in capitalism. He identified the ‘negative signals’ of the dis-embedding processes that bring about a fragmented capitalism in the synergistic effect of globalisation, the crisis of politics, the contradiction between mass production and new models of consumption, producing new segmentations in society, and the precarisation of working careers. After twenty-five years we can acknowledge that his analysis was correct.

Globalisation is the concept that was most widely employed to describe what was happening during this unstable phase. Few doubt that globalisation is among the major drivers of change, but we have to acknowledge that it is a sort of catch-all concept used to encompass a number of different processes and transformations. Streeck (Calhoun et al. 2016) defines globalisation as the expansion of market relations beyond the reach of government, and Mingione (in this volume) specifies that the process is accompanied by increased competition.³

At the very basis of globalisation trends lies the dramatic increase in the mobility of money, goods (including land) and people (labour), which has expanded market opportunities and created more interdependence – and conflict – between actors, whether states, companies or organisations, as well as populations and, of course, individuals. These processes of change detach economic relations from regulatory social and political relations, bound predominantly to the nation-state, allegedly dis-embedding them. During the previous period, social relations were able to contribute more directly to the redistributive outcome of the working of the economy, for example through policies aimed at steering the economic process itself in specific directions, through taxes on specific activities that were used conversely to finance policies to ameliorate economic disadvantage, or the strict regulation of job contracts. By contrast, in the second period the redistributive outcome has been primarily left to the working of market mechanisms. In this case – despite social relations playing an important role in establishing the global market through specific agreements – it is an intrinsic quality of market mechanisms and the basic law of demand and supply which brings about the distributive outcome. The economy is thus conceived as dis-embedded from social relations and is allegedly working in accordance with its own rules, actually favouring those with more power to influence distributive processes (see, for instance, Sassen 2014). It is worth underlining that this whole process was strongly supported by a discourse of the superiority of the market as a mechanism for the allocation of resources, and by a rhetoric of the failure of the state as a regulator that in many cases is not supported by empirical evidence (Storper 2016).

The increased mobility of money, goods and people

Freedom of movement has been an important and long-lasting feature of capitalism from its very beginning. In *The Great Transformation*, Polanyi considers the abolition of the Speenhamland law in 1834 as the beginning of market society, when the mobility of labour in the United Kingdom was finally unleashed and became a commodity, like land and money (for a critical assessment, see Block and Somers 2003; 2014). The contemporary increased mobility of these three fictitious commodities is again one of the major drivers of transformation in the shift from industrial to financial capitalism (Epstein 2005; Dore 2008).

The dramatic increase in the mobility of capital and its free circulation started in the mid-1970s and gained serious momentum from the 1980s onwards, paving the way for the process of the financialisation of the economy (see, for instance, Krippner 2011; Dore 2008). This process is the outcome of a combination of factors both deliberately pursued and context-related: from strong deregulation and the spread of market-oriented policies to important technological innovations, from ever more sophisticated financial engineering (e.g. through derivatives, credit deposit swaps or collateralised debt obligations) that is beyond the control of national or supra-national institutions, to changes in monetary exchange systems (Krippner 2011). Often, financialisation is seen as one of the processes that subsumes the concept of globalisation (Dore 2008), which all scholars – including those in this volume – take as a paramount shift in the capitalist system.

Without entering into the complex and elusive mechanisms of financialisation, we can say that the main novelty is that profit-making occurs mainly through financial transactions and related speculations (Calhoun 2013) rather than from trade or the production of commodities: no goods or services to be consumed are produced through those new financial tools or products. Financial actors are very capable of exploiting the immaterial nature of financial transactions and of taking advantage of different national regulations to operate substantially beyond any public control (Sklair 2001).

According to Calhoun (2013), this financialisation process has also had a strong impact at the micro level, on citizens' everyday lives, for instance by encouraging consumption through indebtedness and providing the financial instruments to achieve this. This impact became evident with the housing bubble and the sub-prime system (Aalbers 2016). Such financial loan mechanisms do not create new (productive) value for society, but merely benefits and profits for those within the financial system, and they do so mainly in the short term (Wallerstein et al. 2013). This had severe negative

consequences not only for a large number of citizens in Western countries, but also for people around the world, for instance the Chinese and the ‘forced’ urbanisation process that they are undergoing (see Harvey’s chapter in this volume).

The financialisation process has also had a relevant impact on the industrial system. Firms and companies increasingly privilege financial instruments to increase or maintain their profits. As a consequence, their timeframe has changed: they invest less in medium- to long-term product innovation and research and are more inclined to direct investment towards short-term performance and profits, thereby undermining long-term and more stable growth (Dobbin and Zorn 2005; Tomaskovic-Devey and Lin 2011; Krippner 2005; Dore 2008; Calhoun et al. 2016). This reduces the benefits for consumers because innovation is weakened, and for society as a whole because the distance between those with financial revenues and those without increases. Increasing mobility also creates opportunities for exit strategies and the relocation of (large) Western firms escaping (or threatening to do so) national regulation (taxation) to reduce labour costs and salaries (Crouch 2013). These tendencies also pave the way for the flexibilisation of labour market conditions in terms of the precarisation of jobs, which is described in the chapters by Sassen, Garcia and Oberti and Prêteceille in this volume. These processes are context-sensitive and take place at different rates in different countries according to their socio-economic and institutional structure. Even in those contexts where firms are strongly embedded in the local socio-economic systems, such as in the Italian industrial districts, processes of flexibilisation and precarisation are present (see Ghezzi in this volume). This decreased protection exposes salaried workers to the effects of commodification as Polanyi described for the nineteenth century. These are the ‘negative signals’ that Mingione refers to when describing the dis-embedding tendencies of contemporary Western capitalism.

Some authors, however, point out that in many non-Western countries (for instance China and South America) new forms of protection are emerging, and collective action in defence of salaried workers and disadvantaged people is taking place (for Latin America, see, for instance, Barrientos and Santibañez 2009; for the renowned *Bolsa Familia* programme in Brazil, see Soares et al. 2010). This parallel process of ongoing adjustment highlights that the dis-embedding process can affect some countries more than others and can even have positive consequences. In fact, we have to bear in mind that the spread of market society, that is, the dis-embedding of economic activities from strong, direct, social bonds, can also be a process that frees people from ‘traditional’ ties that negatively shape their life. For instance, in many ‘traditional’ societies, even today, slavery was an embedded social institution (Patterson 1982).

Besides the mobility of money, companies and organisations, the mobility of people also challenges the concept of citizenship (see, for instance, the chapters by Morris and Garcia in this volume). We do not refer here only to migrants coming from economically disadvantaged countries or refugees coming from geopolitical crisis areas, but also to the population as a whole which – for reasons ranging from work to leisure, from healthcare to personal relations – is becoming increasingly mobile (Urry 2007; Grieco and Urry 2011; Amelina 2017; Favell 2008). This type of mobility is still relatively limited. Its prevalence, however, is increasing⁴ and adds to the challenges that globalisation poses to Western capitalist societies that are still mainly organised around the nation-state (Amelina 2017). Indeed, despite the fact that citizens' rights and regulatory institutions remain to a large extent national, international agreements on mobility of people, goods, services and capital contribute to reframe mobility strategies.

Marshall (1950) showed that public welfare programmes were crucial to the construction of the nation-state and to the modern understanding of social citizenship, based on national, comprehensive and standardised systems of social protection (Briggs 1961), as imagined by Beveridge at the height of the Second World War (Benassi 2010). These mechanisms have been put under great pressure by globalisation and all it entails, including the multiple mobilities mentioned above, paving the way for reforms aimed at reducing the pervasive role of the state. In fact, nowadays it is more difficult for states to regulate the access of people and companies to territories under their jurisdiction, making the management of costs and revenues for policies, including social security, more complex. This process contributes to the weakening of the social and political basis of Fordist citizenship, with implications for the legitimisation of political elites (Bartolini 2005; Wodak et al. 2013).

Within this framework, the state and its capacity for regulation have been partly weakened in some domains, partly rearranged and reorganised in others (King and Le Galès 2017). Some authors have put forward the idea of the 'powerless state', given the constraints of financial markets and international organisations, and the strategy of large firms and corporations (Streeck 2011) with post-democratic tendencies (Crouch 2004). Other scholars have pointed out that state operations and public policies are expanding into new spheres, for instance securitisation, auditing and the environment, and that public expenditure has continued to grow despite austerity measures (Levy 2006; Storper 2016; Le Galès 2016), becoming more intrusive in the individual sphere. Furthermore, the 2008 financial and economic crisis brought to the forefront once more the role of the central state in its strong intervention to rescue national banks, and a process of recentralisation of functions that had been decentralised during previous decades.

These processes of change – which the contributors to this volume address specifically in their chapters – can also be framed within the Polanyian double movement analytical framework, and the ways through which the constant tension between the opposing forces of commodification and de-commodification becomes concrete through specific policy instruments. What we might consider, however, is the fact that there are a variety of processes of re-embeddedness, which can travel in completely different directions.

In different sections of *The Great Transformation* Polanyi himself stressed that the double movement can take many forms to secure the primacy of society over the market system:

The great variety of forms in which the ‘collectivist’ countermovement appeared was not due to any preference for socialism or nationalism on the part of concerted interests, but exclusively to the broad range of the vital social interests affected by the expanding market mechanism. (Polanyi 2001: 151)

And again:

This may happen in a great variety of ways, democratic and aristocratic, constitutionalist and authoritarian, perhaps even in a fashion yet utterly unforeseen. The future in some countries may be already the present in others, while some may still embody the past of the rest. (Polanyi 2001: 259)

On one side we have Trump’s ‘Making America Great Again’ or May’s ‘Taking Back Control’, supposedly aimed at protecting national citizens against global competitiveness and migration. On the other side, as Mingione states in his chapter, we have the ‘development of movements of emancipation and democratisation’, with innovative experiments aimed at protecting citizens, for instance the movement against foreclosures after the 2008 economic and financial crisis in Spain (De Weerd and Garcia 2016). These experiments are taking place mainly in new, complex, multi-level governance arrangements (Kazepov 2010), where the local level plays an increasingly crucial role, involving both public and private actors through redistributive and socially inclusive activities (ranging from sharing economy experiments to co-housing or innovative care arrangements). It is here that such attempts have been most visible and where signs of re-embeddedness are more evident, although fragmented, and this is likely to reproduce or further exacerbate territorial inequalities (Andreotti and Mingione 2014) if they are not accompanied by strong national regulatory frameworks that guarantee social rights.

The structure of this book

This book is organised around five thematic sections reflecting five areas of capitalism which are the main research interests of Enzo Mingione: 1) the transformations of global capitalism; 2) welfare capitalism and rights; 3) citizenship and migration; 4) cities and urban transformation; and 5) segregation and the spatial dimension of poverty. A chapter by Enzo Mingione on future perspectives on Western capitalism closes the volume.

These five sections are preceded by a chapter by Michael Harloe, who frames the importance of these themes historically within urban studies, and reconstructs the debate about capitalism and its transformations within the urban tradition. In particular, Harloe shows how Marxism provided the new urban sociology by the end of the 1960s, a theoretical key for understanding the relationship between urbanisation, social conflict and capitalist development. This, however, did not provide a uniform interpretation of the processes of change but included a wide array of views of the ongoing processes. Among them were important works by Enzo Mingione and other Italian scholars, who had a more complex view of capitalism characterised not only by processes of urbanisation and industrialisation based on large-scale industries, but also on small-scale commodity production based on the persistence of informal and family arrangements. Fragile production systems, poverty and self-exploitation were in their view not just a relic of the past but rather an integral part of Italian capitalist development.

This sensitivity to diversified and more complex forms of capitalism has been taken up in the last few decades in understanding how capitalism changed with globalisation. Chapters in this book engage with different aspects connected to these changes, highlighting their uneven effects and the manifold social conflicts accompanying them. Although not every chapter makes explicit reference to a Polanyian perspective, considering the complex interplay of macro, meso and micro processes and their inherent tensions and contradictions, they look at processes through which social and economic relations are dis-embedded and re-embedded. They highlight the role of different institutional settings in slowing down or speeding up the processes of change as well as the concrete effects such changes have at the micro level, specifically on individuals' lives. Each part of the book addresses some of the most relevant changes, offering not a historical account but an insight into crucial issues at stake in the process of change, to lay the ground for our understanding of the potential future of Western capitalism.

The transformations of global capitalism

The first section addresses how capitalism works and how it changes, its intimate mechanisms and the way in which dis-embedding processes unfold.

David Harvey uses the unprecedented consumption of cement in China in recent years to show how the 2007/08 crisis could be seen as an expression of the speculating tendencies of financialised capitalism and of its global reach. Western capitalism is indeed not western any more: globalisation linked markets and laid the ground for worldwide domino effects. The collapse of the US consumer market brought a drop in Chinese exports by more than 20 per cent and an increase in unemployment of more than 20 million people. In order to re-absorb these people, China launched a huge wave of urbanisation and infrastructure development. 'Building houses and filling them with things' was the strategy to exit the crisis. And it worked up to 2013 when slackening demand from China started to have negative effects elsewhere, namely in Latin America. The need for growth inherent in capitalism's dynamic and the consequent over-accumulation crisis is solved only by shifting costs on to new spatial fixes. The solution to this state of affairs is – according to Harvey – to understand and reconfigure discontent towards new political efforts aimed at stopping capitalism spiralling out of control. In Polanyian terms this might mean re-embedding the economy into society, aiming for what Harvey calls – borrowing the term from Hegel and Marx – a good infinity, which in his view means creating cities that are fit for people to live in.

The way in which the processes of embeddedness, dis-embeddedness and re-embeddedness take place is very much related to the way in which the social reproduction of capitalism occurs, that is, the ways in which the contextual conditions that allow capitalism to unfold are provided. In his chapter, Gavin Smith aims at understanding the implications of changing kinds of capitalism under these conditions, considering how they intersect with ongoing processes of commodification. These processes unfold differently when we consider formal and informal activities and tend not only to fragment the population, but also to kick off processes of 'circular transmission of the crisis from the productive to the reproductive system [...] and back to the productive system' (Smith quoting Mingione 1985: 29). This perspective overcomes the clear-cut distinction between sites of production and sites of reproduction by showing how the shift from an embedded to a dis-embedded economy takes place. Financial instruments, for instance, have penetrated domestic relations, giving rise to boundary struggles and tensions between instrumental calculation and associative features. Through the use of care as an example, Smith shows the complexity of the process and how disruptive the commodification of informal activities is.

In a similar vein, Simone Ghezzi makes a plea for a reconceptualisation of the term embeddedness and aims at deconstructing the influential idea of the market as a separate system from its social constituencies. With examples from his fieldwork on micro-entrepreneurial settings and informal

work, Ghezzi provides insights into the fact that the market, constrained by its own logic of competitiveness, cannot endure in self-regulating, atomised individuals without causing social tensions. His thick descriptions show how the current dis-embedding processes unfold and produce chronically unstable arrangements. In the past, paternalistic exploitation was accompanied by informal protection. Now, weakening reciprocity and the underlying social bond vis-à-vis the lack of institutional safety nets clearly shows the direction of change.

Welfare capitalism and rights

The second section provides insights into the mechanisms of re-embedding, in particular how welfare policies are part of a societal reaction to capitalism's disruptive dynamic. The chapters in this section also show how in the last few decades social policies have undergone important reforms, partly undermining their sheltering capacities.

Jean-Claude Barbier shows how – in order to understand the contextual specificities of these processes – concepts such as the 'underclass', 'poverty' and 'social exclusion' need to be culturally embedded. In a multilingual *tour de force*, Barbier illustrates how travelling concepts allow transnational comparisons through broader conceptual hybridisations, providing useful insights into the study of welfare capitalism. However, he maintains that they should be handled with care, with an awareness of their contextual meaning both in geographical as well as historical terms. This applies in particular to social protection institutions, which – despite some important universalising elements – retain important contextual specificities. The chapter highlights these differences and reconstructs how they shape actual policies and the different outcomes.

Struggles of inclusion and exclusion are a concern also for Lydia Morris, who brings forward in her chapter a reflection on the relationship between domestic welfare and migration using a common analytical frame. Using Britain as an example of a more general trend, she shows that the rise of a conditional, contractarian model of social rights for the domestic population has echoed a drive for enhanced control over conditions of entry and residence for transnational migrants. Applying the concept of civic stratification, Morris shows how rights inherently produce a system of structured inequality that might change through austerity-driven welfare reforms that differentiate migrants and citizens' rights. This formal dimension, which relates to the statuses of inclusion or exclusion from specific provisions by law, is accompanied by discourses on the moral standing of particular groups, usually connoting them negatively. These developments mutually reinforce each other and marked a significant reconfiguration of rights in Britain.

An ideal-typical example of the importance of contextual arrangements in defining citizenship are the southern European Mediterranean welfare states. Nicola Negri and Chiara Saraceno provide a clear account of how contextual specificities – even within the same welfare regime type – play a substantive role not only in shaping the tensions these countries are undergoing because of changing capitalist arrangements but also in influencing the directions of reform kicked off by the crises. The trends might be common, but the impact of the crisis and the ways in which it has been dealt with differ as a result of the interplay between these countries' economic position in the international scheme and the categorical, fragmentary and often clientelistic and familial character of social policies. As Negri and Saraceno note, this has favoured a generalised mistrust in politics and a shift in the public discourse from issues of social justice and universalism towards a more neoliberal agenda accompanied by the spread of populism.

Citizenship and migration

The third section addresses some of the main challenges that citizenship systems established in the post-war period have had to face in the last few decades, from the spread of new employment regimes to new migratory flows. Calling for new participatory practices and new citizenship claims, in particular in southern European countries, is an attempt to re-embed these processes into a wider societal frame.

More specifically, in her chapter Saskia Sassen focuses on the growth of employment-centred insecurity and poverty that emerged from the 1980s onwards, when the restructuring of labour markets in advanced service economies took off. The growth of new sectors – primarily specialised services and finance – and important changes in the organisation of firms allowed on the one side super-profits, and fostered, on the other, the development of labour-intensive and low-wage sectors. Both brought about a sharp increase in socio-economic and spatial inequalities. Sassen relates these tendencies to the mutually reinforcing dynamic emerging from the decline of citizenship systems which had developed in the Fordist age. The new sectors are characterised by greater earnings and occupational dispersion, weak unions and a growing share of unsheltered jobs. Sassen maintains – as do all the authors in this book – that these are not 'Third World' imported conditions, but rather an inherent part of contemporary financial capitalism.

The increased mobility of people under late capitalism is one of the key challenges addressed in Enrico Pugliese's chapter. By focusing on the Mediterranean geopolitical space, Pugliese shows how after 1989, and later following the Arab Springs (2010–12), migration flows increased in complexity, both in terms of drivers and of (more restrictive) policies aimed at

tackling the issue. These trends rendered concepts and policies inadequate to grasp the interplay of different dimensions and how they change over time, influencing the origins and destinations of flows. The specificities of migration flows crossing the Mediterranean highlight – in the *longue durée* – the tensions accompanying the changing fragmented configurations of capitalism, from the incorporation of migrants in specific segments of the labour market (e.g. care work) to their precarious, often illegal juridical status. As Sassen has already noted, these are not epiphenomena at the periphery of capitalism, but a constituent part of the dynamics it gives rise to. Pugliese, however, shows how regulations have changed over the last few decades and how this has affected the Mediterranean countries, in particular because of increased attention to security and border control.

These tendencies have challenged people's living conditions, in particular after the 2008 financial crisis and subsequent austerity measures. In her chapter, Marisol Garcia shows how these measures contributed to the development of a counter-movement which manifested in protest and claims for citizens' democratic participation, most prominently in southern European cities. Here, civil society organisations and social movements have acted on two fronts. On the one hand, they have provided community solidarity in situations of economic hardship. On the other, they have questioned – through civic and political alliances – the political legitimacy of pro-austerity governments, bringing about a process of political change as well. According to Garcia, this resurgence in citizenship claims is confronted by some important challenges such as the necessity to upscale urban citizenship practices and local policies to the level of effective national coordination, overcoming the fragmentation and diversification of interests and claims.

Cities and urban transformation

The fourth part addresses cities and their transformation. The chapters cover a wide range of changes, from a lack of engagement due to the structural constraints of the built environment and timid reactions to issues of fear and insecurity, cities' disruptive implications and the window of opportunity for renewed participation that they provide, or their resilience vis-à-vis global processes of neoliberal transformation.

Making fascinating analogies to playing the cello, Richard Sennett highlights the increasing detachment and lack of focus that planning 'user-friendly' buildings/cities might induce. Aiming at reducing struggle and difficulty, this could restrain usage to just a limited number of options, which conversely might imply a loss of physical connection to other people and engagement. The resulting passivity could be seen as a socially imposed condition serving the purposes of owners and ruling powers – for example through control and regulation – rather than those of users (or

citizens). Sennett underlines the importance of engaging people in planning buildings and cities and sees first signs of engagement in the arts and also in the work of young architects, who increasingly experiment with user-engaging buildings and materials. He considers these new developments as a first sign of 'getting in touch' again. Perhaps a form of re-embedding in Polanyian terms?

The entry point of Sophie Body-Gendrot's chapter on urban transformations is different: increased insecurity and vulnerability and the – potential – disorder emerging out of the joint effect of complex global, national and local dynamics of change. The reactions might be similar – disengagement – but in most cases they can be understood only by considering contextual specificities. To show these differences, she contrasts the crisis that cities have undergone from the 1960s to today in the USA and France. In the USA the crisis was not properly addressed due to a lack of pro-social government interventions, which brought about the growth of unrest and violence. The gradual loss of democratic public space that this entailed was accompanied by the development of a culture of control, bringing about more surveillance and more punishment. In France, despite similar trends, state welfarism generated mobility and change, which was positive for those who were able to move out of problematic neighbourhoods, and negative for those – mostly immigrants – who took their place. Globalisation changed this scenario and Body-Gendrot's assumption is that some current forms of public disorder are not just a repetition of past forms, but are rather new configurations in which disorder becomes a strategic resource for citizenship claims. This offers a window of opportunity in which cities might play the role of social laboratories for innovation, transforming people into citizens through participatory settings. Another way of connecting again, as Sennett maintains in his chapter, or kicking off the process of re-embedding.

The trends seem similar, but the impacts and reactions differ. In his chapter, Patrick Le Galès discusses the transformation that European cities have undergone influenced by neoliberalism and globalising capitalism. His analysis, relying on the *State of European Cities* report (European Commission 2016), suggests that the European urban system proved to be remarkably robust vis-à-vis the different crises. This does not mean that European cities converge; on the contrary, we can identify differentiation processes at work. Even though medium-sized cities – which constitute the backbone of European urbanisation – appear to have grown, eastern European metro regions suffered from demographic decline, as did some western European peripheral metro regions and southern former industrial cities. Interpretations are disputed but – according to Le Galès – the changes did not undermine the capacity of local bodies to govern the process, as rising shares of public investment by local authorities should confirm. The

financial crisis, however, might have reduced the room for manoeuvre of European cities and increased their differentiation.

Segregation and the spatial dimension of poverty

The fifth section addresses poverty and its spatial dimension as a crucial lens through which to understand the differentiated impact of the processes of change in Western capitalist societies, both in socio-economic and spatial terms. In their chapter, Susan and Norman Fainstein deconstruct analytically how sociological and political narratives have differed sharply on whether space is a cause or an expression of poverty, as well as the extent to which space is a source of exploitation or a foundation for group solidarity and political mobilisation. By comparing the United States and Singapore and considering cultural, political, economic and institutional perspectives, they disentangle the different meanings of space and their implications, considering the interaction of class, ethnicity and race in the context of varying political arrangements and the evolving dynamics of capitalism. The resulting spatial bases of integration and exclusion are strongly influenced by political steering, but do changing spatial relations equate to overcoming structural economic inequality? The cases presented by the authors do not support this view, even though better spatial relations improve poor people's lives, mitigating other deprivations attributable to low income.

The patterns of segregation emerging out of the process of neoliberalisation are the focus of Marco Oberti and Edmond Préteceille, who contend in their chapter that urban segregation shapes spatial inequalities and transforms them into urban social inequalities. Their attention focuses on how this transformation takes place and how access to key resources has become essential in the definition of living conditions in spatial terms. In European cities, analysis of urban segregation and inequalities inevitably interacts with that of local welfare arrangements. For this reason, neoliberal reforms might have a severe impact also in spatial terms. Oberti and Préteceille analyse specifically the fragmentation of social class and issues of educational inequalities linked to segregation. By describing changing occupational structures and residential patterns, they show that the emerging urban social structures and practices are not the mere outcomes of neoliberalisation. They might even challenge it, either with constructive new forms of social mobilisation and solidarity, or with disruptive outbursts of violence.

The focus of Enrica Morlicchio's chapter is complementary to that of the others in this section. It shows first the historical transformation of poor and/or segregated districts from the industrial to the post-industrial and 'fragmented' regime that emerged from the crisis of the 1970s in Western capitalist countries. It focuses then on the peculiarities of the Neapolitan case, and of southern European cities in general, characterised by low

levels of segregation and high poverty and unemployment rates. A peculiar trait that Morlicchio describes are informal interactions and how they allow the most disadvantaged to develop survival strategies and to cooperate, in the absence of shared cultural models. Despite a general decrease in their influence, these activities still play an important role in the reproduction of the urban social structure, with migrants constituting the main element of the new urban informal sector. The complexity of the Neapolitan case shows how urban marginality and poverty can coexist with the practice of 'togetherness' in places where people can meet and promote new negotiation practices. As the author notes, it is a precarious balance that cannot compensate for the many challenges the city has to face, including an extremely high unemployment rate.

Perspectives on the future of Western capitalism

The five sections of this volume provide an overview of how capitalism has changed in the last few decades, the challenges that these changes pose and the resulting fragmented and increasingly unequal scenario emerging in Western capitalist countries. The last chapter by Enzo Mingione – written without him knowing it would be the concluding chapter of a book dedicated to him – allows us to close the loop. Indeed, in this introduction we have tried to frame the overall theme of the book by being inspired by a Polanyian approach that Mingione introduced us to. Polanyi's thought, its strengths and weaknesses, the double movement and the shifting dynamics between embeddedness and dis-embeddedness provide a fruitful frame through which readers might look at the different chapters of this volume. Mingione himself uses Polanyi's framework in his chapter to go beyond mainstream social science paradigms in interpreting contemporary social change. The double movement and the dialectic between the destruction of social relations by the dis-embedding forces of the market and the creation of new social relations (and institutions) through re-embedding processes are at the core of his analysis. Mingione, however, complements Polanyi with Marshall and the precarious equilibrium of the complex relationship between democracy, welfare and capitalism he identifies. Capitalism produces unsustainable and disruptive results, and re-embedding processes and democracy cannot control it under conditions of (economic, but not exclusively) globalisation. The 2008 crisis worsened this scenario as it exacerbated the erosion of protective institutions, undermining their ability to challenge the dis-embedding tendency of the market. The mobilisation of different agencies, associations and social movements which partly combat this tendency might not be sufficient. Mingione's analysis – despite the emancipatory tendencies he identifies – is rather pessimistic and sees capitalism as leading to conflict-ridden, unequal and exclusionary socie-

ties. The hope is that the numerous innovative and inclusive initiatives can contribute to overcoming this pessimism by constructing new forms of solidarity and protection in an increasingly heterogeneous, de-standardised and unstable society.

Notes

- 1 See Dale (2011; 2016), Hodgson (2017), Block and Sommers (2014), Cangiani (2011), Laidi (2007) and Palumbo and Scott (2017).
- 2 These are the broad social institutions common to all Western countries. Each country, however, is characterised by specific factors, for instance the north–south divide or *familialism* in the Italian case (see e.g. Saraceno and Negri in this volume).
- 3 For an overview of definitions of globalisation, see Robertson and White (2006).
- 4 As an example of increased physical mobility, consider that the number of passengers carried by air transport has increased from slightly more than 300 million in 1970 to 3.5 billion in 2015 (ICAO data), doubling in the last ten years.

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A child of its times: the ‘new urban sociology’ in context and its legacy

In 1955 Ruth Glass, chair of the International Sociological Association’s (ISA) Research Committee on Urban Sociology, published a Trend Report on current developments (Glass 1955). She wrote, ‘the faces of cities have been lined by competitive economic interests, by social and ideological cleavages’. Dismissively, she then added, ‘[b]ut this can be taken for granted’ (Glass 1955: 49). And so it remained, with few exceptions, until the late 1960s. Then a remarkable renaissance occurred. This ‘new urban sociology’ (NUS) was just part of, though a key agent in, a wider emergence of critical urban and regional studies.¹ There are many critical accounts of NUS (for example Savage, Warde and Ward 2002; Harding and Blokland 2014). But with a few exceptions (Milicevic 2001; Topalov 1989) there has been less attention to the context in which this radical renewal occurred, why Glass’s insight finally began to be taken seriously and how the history of these times and circumstances facilitated, shaped and limited the new theory and research. Now, forty years later in a radically changed world, this context is clearer than it then seemed, showing how NUS was a child of its times and to an extent a captive of them too. In this chapter I explore this context, not adding to the critical exegesis of NUS, which is now more the subject for teaching texts than the cutting edge of a field of study which has moved on profoundly. It is written from the perspective of someone who contributed to these developments (as a researcher and organisationally).² NUS emerged, jointly and severally, from many places, notably France, Italy and the UK, and this chapter attempts to engage with this cross-national heritage.

The reasons why NUS emerged in the late 1960s relate to the revival and growth of Western ‘advanced industrial’ economies and societies in the 1950s and 1960s and the centrality of urbanisation and hence urban problems to these developments, to the rising waves of protest and conflict towards the latter half of this period, and to developments within sociology, both theoretically and as a profession. Why it survived in the longer

run owes much to how NUS grew organisationally as an international network of researchers, principally through the foundation of ISA Research Committee 21 on the Sociology of Urban and Regional Development (RC21) in the early 1970s and the *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research* (IJURR) a few years later. In this chapter I also consider some of the limitations of what was achieved, how NUS was a child of times that were even then in transformation, and how Enzo Mingione's work was notable for posing some lastingly relevant research issues and questions. Finally, I take a brief look at IJURR and RC21 today; both continue to evolve in an academic universe and real world which were unimaginable when these institutions began.

Economic 'modernisation', urbanisation and the growth of urban research

The economic transformation of western Europe after 1945 and the rapid growth of the US economy were unprecedented. In Europe GDP per capita doubled from 1950 to 1970 and in the USA it increased (from a much higher base) by over 50 per cent.³ Eichengreen (2008) has some useful insights into this much-analysed 'economic miracle'. It was, he suggests, the product of 'coordinated capitalism' facilitated by compliant trade unions, cohesive employers' associations and growth-minded governments working together to mobilise savings, invest and keep wages in check at a level consistent with full employment. Two historically transitory conditions facilitated this growth: the importation of large-scale (Fordist) mass-production innovations from the USA and the availability of a surplus, low-wage labour force from agriculture, former colonies and in Germany especially displaced persons and *Gastarbeiter*.

This 'modernisation' entailed a period of intense urban growth in western Europe (and also in the state socialist countries). For example, in the USA the urban population, fed by immigration and the movement of black people from the South, continued to grow with two notable developments, suburbanisation and the rapid expansion of the 'Sun Belt'. Overall, the population of metropolitan areas grew by 50 million, accounting statistically for the entire national population growth in this period (US Bureau of the Census 1975). In 1950, 56 per cent of the population lived in metropolitan areas; by 1970 it was over 80 per cent. In France the population, static for generations, rose from around 40 million in 1946 to over 50 million by 1970, and the urban population in the larger towns rose from about 10 million to 24 million, from a quarter of the total urban population to about half (Fohlen 1976). In Italy mass migration of the rural population from the Mezzogiorno long predated 1945, but this trend accelerated during the

years of the 'economic miracle', with massive growth in the northern industrial centres in particular (Mingione 1981: 112–23).

All governments intervened and invested in economic growth and its consequences. In the 1950s, wages were suppressed (on the promise of full employment) and investment in housing and what Castells later called 'collective consumption' was less prioritised than industrial and related infrastructural development. But by the 1960s the pressure to respond to the consequences of urbanisation, which frequently involved newer migrants to the city and the wider urban population suffering low wages, poor housing and inadequate education and other social provision, became intense. Programmes of subsidised housing,⁴ investment in transport, in education (including higher education) and in other welfare provision occurred under governments of the left (and more commonly) the centre-right. In the UK the pressure for change contributed to the return to power of the Labour Party in 1964; in Italy the ruling Christian Democrats entered an alliance with the Socialists from 1962; the Gaullist French state shifted from basic industrial investment to massive investment in housing and urban infrastructure; and in the USA, the urban programmes of the Kennedy/Johnson administrations were enacted. However, this large-scale, state-sponsored modernisation of cities created rising conflict where, for example, inner city urban renewal led to the destruction of communities and the removal of their residents to the periphery. And, on the periphery, large public housing estates, with poor facilities and limited access to employment, were another source of urban struggles.⁵

The new significance of urban issues to policies and politics and the growth of urban struggles formed an essential backdrop to the emergence of NUS. Importantly, it led governments to look to the social sciences to understand urban conditions and to help formulate and evaluate urban policies. For example, in the UK the Labour government and the Ford Foundation established the Centre for Environmental Studies in 1967 to research into urban problems and fund work in the universities; this followed the establishment of the Social Science Research Council in 1965 to fund academic, policy-oriented social research. In France the most significant funder was the state directly, through the Ministère de l'équipement which financed a wide range of urban research, much of it carried out by young graduates in research institutes outside the universities (Topalov 1989; Castells 1994). In Italy there was a significant development of similar research institutes from the 1950s especially those supported by Adriano Olivetti, a progressive industrialist who engaged young sociologists in the planning for Ivrea, his company town (Pinto 1981; Gasparini 2000). A number of leading Italian sociologists such as Pizzorno, Ferrarotti and the urban sociologist Guido Martinotti emerged from this milieu which was centred on Milan and Turin.

Their work focused on the impact of the rapid changes in social structures and relations in this region caused by mass migration and industrial urbanisation. The theme of modernisation (and an interest in related American social theory) became central to Italian sociology in the 1960s.

Such funding supported a wide range of work including, from the later 1960s, the more radical perspectives that were emerging from a young generation of social scientists, many of whom worked in these 'soft money' research institutes rather than in traditional university departments. Innovation and interdisciplinarity were much more common in the former than the latter institutions. So NUS emerged from a situation where there was a demand from the state for urban research, with funding to support it, a growing institutional infrastructure, and later a demand for staff in rapidly expanding university social science departments. The young social scientists who took advantage of this situation were shaped by developments within sociology and by their own experience as university students and activists.

From 'administrative' to critical sociology (via the student movement)

Until the 1960s sociology had a marginal existence in higher education, except in the USA and to some extent the UK and France. Elsewhere sociology was usually a minor element in other social science degrees, and departments of sociology were largely absent (see, for example, Pinto 1981; Lepsius and Vale 1983; Rex 1983; Gasparini 2000).⁶ One factor which changed this was the enormous expansion of university education from the 1950s onwards, increasingly seen as essential to the development of skills and innovation-based economies. The number of university students in France, Italy, Germany, the UK and the USA grew by 200–300 per cent in the twenty years after 1950 (Mitchell 1975: Table J2; Snyder 1993). Much growth occurred in traditional academic and professional disciplines, but there was an even faster growth in the social sciences, which entailed the expansion and institutionalisation of sociology in universities. In fact, many of the NUS pioneers started as graduates of other disciplines (for example, Castells's first degree was in law and economics, Mingione's in law, and Pahl had been a geographer). But they turned to sociology after or during undergraduate work in other disciplines, as a consequence of their engagement with student activism, the search for a critical analysis of society and how it might be transformed. I return to the sociology they encountered and its inadequacies below, but first the historical if transient significance of this radicalisation needs to be noted.

According to Barker (2008), a new wave of student activism began in the early 1960s with student involvement in American civil rights protests. This

was followed by the Free Speech Movement at Berkeley and other universities from 1964 and a critique of the universities themselves as bureaucratic degree factories. From the mid-decade, protest over Vietnam and inner city conflict added to the mixture. Similar concerns about the institutions in which they studied and what they studied, together with external issues, free speech, Vietnam, the repressive state and so on, underpinned the student movement in France, Germany, Italy, the UK and elsewhere. The movement peaked in 1968 but then declined for a variety of reasons, as Barker describes (less so in Italy where conflict continued into the 1970s). Many of those who were radicalised in the student movement became involved in community-based politics and urban struggles. Such activism was common to many of those who developed NUS.

These students were expected to develop critical faculties and looked to the university as a liberal institution promoting freedom of thought and expression. They were disappointed and alienated by what they experienced. Barker quotes from the Marxist (then urban) historian Gareth Stedman Jones, who in 1969 noted that students who were being expected to be critical and creative were confronted by 'deadening conformist syllabuses and [...] segregated departments of knowledge'. In the search for answers, Marxism had the most to offer, especially those variants that had developed outside the sterile orthodoxies of communism among those who had left the Communist Party after the Hungarian repression in 1956 and formed the basis of the New Left, and from the work of others who had never shared this orthodoxy such as the Frankfurt School and a new appreciation of the early Marx and his historico-political writings.

In sociology the dominant paradigm was structural functionalism, developed by Talcott Parsons and his colleagues in the USA and imported, like US mass production, into Europe and elsewhere (in the communist bloc a similarly inadequate 'Marxist' functionalism held sway). The theoretical defects and ideological biases of structural functionalism are too well known to require repeating here, but as one critic later noted it was an 'administrative sociology reflecting and sustaining a bourgeois praxis' (Scholte 1971). For the new radicalised sociologists, it was part of the problem, not the solution. While not all mainstream sociologists accepted the Parsonian system (notably C. Wright Mills), it was not until the 1960s that sociologists such as Dahrendorf, Rex and Lockwood (none of them Marxists) began to crack the edifice and place class and class conflict at the centre of social theory.

For those involved in urban sociology, these new currents in sociology, and above all a Marxism liberated from official communist orthodoxies, offered the possibility of transcending a sub-discipline which, as Castells (1968; 1972) so brilliantly showed, had more to do with sustaining and facilitating capitalist urbanisation than critically understanding its develop-

ment or supporting its transcendence. As Zukin (1980) later commented, ‘for most of their history, urban sociologists seemed to serve the needs of the state [...] the process of urbanization and the pattern of urbanism were considered universal, inexorable characteristics’. Marxism offered a means of understanding the relationships between urbanisation, social conflict and capitalist development and in so doing, it was hoped, would contribute to a socialist alternative. Some critical work already existed – for example by Gans in the USA, and Rex and Pahl (who drew on Weber rather than Marx) in the UK (see Pahl 1968 for key papers by these authors) and others, notably Lefebvre in France – but it was the coincidence of the new demand by the state for urban research and the availability of a young generation of radical social scientists that enabled the rapid emergence of NUS (and critical urban and regional studies generally) from the late 1960s.

From its outset NUS was theoretically pluralistic, with not just one Marxist version but several.⁷ Thus, for example, Castells was criticised by Lojkin (1977) who retained a more orthodox position from within the PCF (Parti communiste français) (Topalov 1989: 636–9). And, as I discuss below, Mingione and his Italian colleagues developed a distinctively different Marxist analysis of how capitalism shaped territory. For a time, principally through Pahl’s (1975) work on ‘urban managers’, Weberian perspectives were also important. But it was Castells’s *La Question urbaine*, published in French in 1972, that made the biggest impact.⁸ Ironically, by the time the English translation was published in 1977 Castells had abandoned the book’s Althusserian structuralist framework. But in many ways the more serious limitation of his work was its narrow, ahistorical picture of an urbanisation process dominated by the needs of large-scale, ‘monopoly’ capital, and the inevitably growing role of the state in ensuring (for such capital) the reproduction of the labour force through ‘collective consumption’, with the ensuing development of urban contradictions and ‘urban social movements’, the latter seen as a potential basis for radical social change.

To a large and not, at the time, well-recognised extent, this theory was shaped by the French experience of state-directed urban projects in alliance with large-scale capital. It assumed the continued centrality to economic development of Fordist mass production and its social relations and of an industrial working class. It drew on debates from the French left and elsewhere on ‘monopoly capital’ and on the ‘fiscal crisis of the state’. Much was assumed and simplified and little attempt was made to research and understand the real and varied contemporary evolution of the organisation of capitalist production and its differential impact on cities and regions, including the fragmentation of a previously relatively solidaristic urban working class under these new conditions. It saw the state as the handmaiden of

advanced capital and placed too much faith in the potential of urban social movements to bring about social change by replacing or supplementing work-based struggles. In retrospect, it was the work of Mingione and his colleagues in Italy which offered a more enduringly useful approach.

Social Conflict and the City

In the collection of papers, *Social Conflict and the City*, based on work from the 1970s, Mingione (1981) set out a radically different Marxist analysis of urban and regional development, drawing on the Italian experience and the work of his colleagues.⁹ As already noted, there was considerable urban research in Italy from the 1950s. Those involved looked to the centre-left governments of the 1960s to implement reform, for example in housing and education; to their disappointment this did not happen. The influence of American social theories of modernisation was strong. In urban sociology, considerable attention was paid, for example, to testing the Burgess (ring) and Hoyt (sector) theories in Milan, and several studies and textbooks in this vein were published (Martinotti 1968).

This work was focused on the northern industrial cities; the very different patterns of urbanisation and regional development in the Mezzogiorno were ignored, as well as those of the 'Third Italy', the central and north-eastern regions. As Pinto notes, this changed in the 1970s when attention turned to taking 'non-Northern sectors of society into account, no longer as backward relics which the forces of modernisation would slowly make disappear but as a sociological presence in their own right' (1981: 690). By the 1970s when Mingione took up a position at the University of Messina, there was an emerging sociological interest in the Mezzogiorno. Notable, for example, was Ferrarotti's book on Rome's shanty towns (1970) and the work of Pugliese and his colleagues at the University of Naples (see Pinnarò and Pugliese 1979). Bagnasco's *Le Tre Italie* (1977) exposed another distinctively different pattern of regional economic production and social reproduction in the centre of the country.

In drawing on such work, and his own and colleagues' research at Messina, Mingione applied Marxist theory not in the rigidly mechanical and quasi-functional manner of *La Question urbaine* but as a means of analysing the historical evolution of Italian urbanisation, hyper-urbanisation in the industrial cities of the north and a form of non-industrial urbanism, based on building speculation and state employment, with poverty marginality and underemployment in the south, while in the Third Italy forms of small-scale, technologically advanced but fragile production of commodities such as textiles and shoes employed workers in informal or unregulated work, semi industrial/semi-rural work and so on. The picture was of an urban

working class divided into three sectors: stable workers in large manufacturing, marginal workers in smaller enterprises and non-manual workers in public and private services (some in relatively secure employment and some not). Poverty and marginality were not the relics of disappearing systems of production but were being reproduced in the course of contemporary capitalist development. There were far more complex patterns of capitalist production and urban/regional development than much work elsewhere assumed. Emergent developments such as the growth of service employment and the declining importance of manufacturing, missing from the scope of attention elsewhere, were also important. Mingione stressed the need to avoid functionalist assumptions that state policies directly reflect capitalist interests and, drawing on Gramsci, discussed the role of hegemony in understanding how the dominant social classes rule.

In retrospect this distinctively Italian version of NUS, with its emphasis on understanding the range and variety of capitalist development and its impact on cities and regions, and its emphasis on class fragmentation, poverty, marginality and other forms of work on the fringes of the organised economy or outside it altogether, prefigured themes that were taken up more widely by critical urban and regional studies in the subsequent decades and set a more useful basis for understanding the changes brought about by globalisation and neoliberalism, changes that were unimaginable in the early 1970s. Ironically, it was just when NUS emerged that the conditions under which it was born began to disintegrate, as ‘coordinated capitalism’ and state engagement became seen as a fetter rather than an aid to economic growth and profitability. That critical urban studies continued to develop nonetheless owes a good deal to its success not just as an intellectual project (if not as a political project) but as a project to create an international network to support and sustain continued research and debate.

Building the network: RC21 and IJURR

Over the past thirty years there has been a more rapid and radical change in some basic aspects of academic work and exchange than at any time in the past. Some of these changes have been for the worse but innovations such as the web, email, social networking and online access to libraries have been transformative, enormously facilitating research, its dissemination and critical discussion on a global basis.

None of this existed in the late 1960s when a small group began to work together on the common project that became NUS and to build an international network of researchers. There were basically only two ways of doing this, via conferences and publications. Both had their drawbacks – conferences were costly to attend and books and journals largely accessible

through physical access to libraries, which was limited to the university staff where they were located. However, it was through these traditional means that the network was built. But there were many cultural, linguistic and other barriers too. For example, knowledge of and communication with work in the USA or Latin America was relatively limited in Europe (and vice versa), even less was known about other parts of the world, and while there was contact with a few who were beginning to study the distinctive inequalities of state socialist urbanisation in eastern Europe, their freedom to work and travel was very restricted.

Interestingly though, the origins of RC21, which became the main vehicle alongside IJURR in building the new network, lay in two small meetings in eastern Europe in 1968–69 (Szelenyi 2012). The participants issued a call for a ‘new urban sociology’ (the origins of the term) and for NUS to critically analyse cities rather than acting as a handmaiden to planning and urban policy (i.e. to abandon ‘administrative sociology’). The 1970 ISA World Congress bought this group, which included Pahl, Szelenyi and Musil, together with some of the young radical researchers from France, Italy and elsewhere such as Castells, Mingione and Préteceille. From this meeting the proposal for RC21 emerged, at first with some involvement from those outside the NUS group (Milicevic 2001).¹⁰ One reason for establishing RC21 was that the ISA already had a (fairly moribund) RC on urban sociology chaired by Ruth Glass, who was hostile to the new work in the field and excluded it from her RCs’ programmes. But it undoubtedly helped to oil the wheels of ISA decision making that Guido Martinotti was executive secretary of the association and Enzo Mingione his deputy.¹¹ And founding a new RC meant that there was a complete break with the past. In 1972 the RC issued a position paper. It noted

urban sociologists have been too frequently turned into the handmaidens of those practical professions concerned with making physical changes to the built environment, urban sociology cannot advance when it has abandoned the central issues [...] [i]t is our task to study society – its distribution of power and other resources, the structural limitations on life chances and the patterns and processes of conflict inherent in the nature of society. (Harloe 1976: 2)

This Weberian language shows the influence of Pahl on the paper’s drafting but it set out a new perspective which could encompass a broad spectrum of work. From the outset the RC was not sectarian in disciplinary orientation. The founders of the RC were sociologists, but in practice the RC, and later even more IJURR, supported critical urban and regional research from whatever disciplinary background it came. Unlike the more mainstream ISA RCs, which tended to be bounded by the discipline, RC21 had no such inhibitions. What helped was that many of its founders were outside the

mainstream of academic sociology and its institutions. So the aim of building an international and broad network was intended from the outset, and helps to account for its subsequent growth and vitality.

Very rapidly the RC organised an intensive series of meetings; there were 11 between 1972 and 1980 (Milicevic 2001) but there were as well nationally organised meetings such as the Urban Change and Conflict conferences in the UK, biannually from 1975, which also built the network.¹² In addition, two collections of papers delivered at RC meetings were published (Harloe 1976; Harloe and Lebas 1981) and Pickvance's (1976) translated collection of key papers by Castells and others made a considerable impact.

These publications bought the RC's work to a wider audience. But it remained a small and fragile organisation. It had around 30 members in 1972, rising to 50 in 1976 and just over 100 by 1977 (Milicevic 2001). However, it soon seemed that there might be enough support for a new journal.¹³ The first proposal was made to the RC by Castells and a key role was played by John Davey, who for many years was David Harvey's editor. Davey persuaded his company Edward Arnold to publish IJURR and to fund the regular meetings of its international Editorial Board.¹⁴ These face-to-face meetings were an essential part of building IJURR as an intellectual project, not just a repository for publishable papers, and hence for building the research network.

One impetus for founding IJURR was the realisation that the RC remained largely limited to Europe. Greater contact with new American work emerging in the mid-1970s (see, for example, Tabb and Sawyers 1978) was something that a new journal might encourage, as well as spreading the reach of critical urban and regional research more widely. Despite this, the first Editorial Board largely consisted of sociologists – Castells, Pahl, Pickvance, Mingione, Préteceille, with Harloe as editor. There were also two US members, Frances Fox Piven and S. M. Miller. Both were radical (non-Marxist) social scientists and contributed key papers to the early IJURR (Miller 1978; Friedland et al. 1977) but neither were in the mainstream of critical urban and regional research. However, from the first issue IJURR began to publish American authors, who were thus contributing to achieving one of the initial aims.

In various ways, some already indicated, the new network and its output was limited. Here a brief analysis of some aspects of the first decade of IJURR is illuminating. Positively, it had a wider reach than the RC, with a circulation by the mid-1980s of about 1,000 and, through university libraries, many more readers than that. However, the geographical range was still limited. Evidence for this is the preponderance of papers relating to the UK and the USA; there were far fewer relating to France and Italy, a small number from eastern Europe and Latin America, but virtually nothing from

beyond, from China or Africa for example.¹⁵ And in its first decade IJURR published under 200 papers; today IJURR publishes around that number in a third of the time. The journal published many papers which focused on urban policy and urban movements, reflecting the origins of NUS. There was relatively little on social divisions in the city, some pioneering papers on women and the city, but nothing on race and ethnicity or migration, let alone work on many other aspects of the urban experience. All that came later.

However, in its first decade IJURR did publish seminal papers on some of the emergent features of 'the urban question', for example on deindustrialisation, regional underdevelopment and restructuring, on world cities, on urbanisation in eastern Europe and Latin America, on the informal economy and survival strategies, on employment, work and the domestic division of labour and on early aspects of the globalisation of production and the neoliberal project.

A child of its times that grew up?

In 2001 Milicevic published an account of NUS, RC21 and IJURR which contains much useful detail. But she focuses on the supposed rise and fall in the radical pretensions of the founding group, not the wider issue of how a global research network was created that encompassed an ever-more extensive and varied corpus of research and theory. A more interesting analysis was provided by Topalov (1989). Describing the end of a 'golden age' for French urban research, he noted that the focus of this research now belonged to the past; from the mid-1970s growth was replaced by recession, the planning system and the welfare state began to collapse and urban social movements became weaker. The state funding which underpinned French work had dried up, its theoretical models were in question and critical thought was under attack.

Topalov's detailed account of the French experience, of the scope and weaknesses of the new urban research and its fragile institutional basis, contains much that is congruent with the wider experience that I have discussed in this chapter. But Topalov also refers to some of the themes that were emerging from subsequent research, for example work relating to a 'mutation in the accumulation system, above all a change in the forms of the social and spatial division of labour', a new focus on actual work processes, on the concept of regulation and the crisis of Fordism, and the study of urban lifestyles based on the realities of work. Also, Topalov noted that in the 1970s research focused on policies, not politics, with a simplistic view of the state and no understanding of the real relations between the state and society and the construction of hegemonic control. Now there was a wider

focus on sources of power, urban policies as instruments of normalisation and of grassroots resistance to this.

Topalov foresaw some possibilities for the transcendence of the work of the golden age (but also the return of ‘multiple variants of positivism’). As he noted, urban research in the 1970s ignored the actual diversity of practices and the plurality of social situations which determine ways of life. Now the need was to go beyond the economism and functionalism which marked much of this work.

This chapter is not the place to judge the balance in contemporary urban research as a whole between multiple forms of positivism or a renewed, more diverse but still critical approach to its subject matter. But IJURR continues to grow, publishing a much wider diversity of critical work than it started with, theoretically, methodologically, substantively, geographically and culturally.¹⁶ One indicator of this diversity is the stated disciplinary focus of the journal – alongside sociology, economics, geography, political science and so on, there is now anthropology, architecture, cultural studies, environment, and science and technology studies. And IJURR reaches a much wider readership through licensing, electronic publishing and online access than was possible at its foundation. For example, between 2002 and 2012 full text downloads of papers grew from a few thousand to over a quarter of a million per year. RC21 is highly active; for example, its 2016 conference in Mexico City had 21 streams and saw over 200 papers presented and its Facebook page had over 5,000 followers.¹⁷ RC21 and IJURR, through their websites, use of social media and activities such as lectures and urban research training schools, the publication of monographs and so on, sustain a dynamic academic network which is larger and more geographically diverse than ever before. In addition, the Foundation for Urban and Regional Studies, financed by income from IJURR, provides financial support to young researchers.

In summary, yesterday’s child has come of age, sometimes in ways which its parents could not have imagined. In reality, critical urban and regional research has become part of mainstream social sciences and has been institutionalised. For all its diversity and sophistication, it may have lost some of the sheer intellectual excitement of its early days, but that is perhaps inevitable. More importantly, the political promise of a critical understanding of urban and regional problems was not realised. But that is due to wider forces than discussed here, affecting the social sciences and their role in society.

Notes

- 1 The somewhat separate developments in radical urban geography, which this chapter does not consider, were also very important. The single most-cited work is Harvey (1973), but Peet (1998) contains a wide review of the field.
- 2 I was the first editor of IJURR from 1977–97 and on the board of RC21 1974–98.
- 3 Angus Maddison Statistics on World Population, GDP and Per Capita GDP, 1–2008 AD Table 5: www.ggdc.net/maddison/Historical_Statistics/horizontal-file_02–2010.xls (accessed 6 October 2016).
- 4 See Harloe (1995) for a detailed survey of post-war social housing in the USA and Europe and its economic, social and political context.
- 5 Castells (1983) surveyed the development of urban social movements in several countries; see also Lowe (1986) and Mayer (2000).
- 6 For example, the first Italian Chair in Sociology was awarded to Franco Ferrarotti in the Faculty of Education at Rome in the early 1960s, followed by the formation of sociological institute at Trento.
- 7 Still the most useful and comprehensive annotated bibliography of this work is contained in Lebas (1982).
- 8 The other canonical text was Harvey's *Social Justice and the City* (1973), but this had less direct influence on early NUS than on radical urban geography.
- 9 It also reflected the wider directions taken by Italian sociology at the time; see Pinto (1981).
- 10 This slightly hybrid origin led to the first RC president not coming from the emerging NUS, but for the next twenty years all the presidents came from the founders of NUS – Pahl, Castells, Mingione, Préteceille and Pickvance. John Logan became the first president from the USA in 1994 (Milicevic 2001: 777).
- 11 Martinotti, a lifelong friend and colleague of Mingione, was, like many more senior Italian sociologists, quite supportive of the younger more radical generation (Pinto 1981: 688–9); that was mainly the case in the UK too. In the USA the new urban research faced a more hostile climate in many mainstream social science departments.
- 12 I organised these conferences funded by the Centre for Environmental Studies. They provided the first opportunities for many British researchers to debate with (to take the example of the first conference) Castells, Harvey, Mingione and Préteceille.
- 13 IJURR was not the first critical urban journal to be published; for example, the radical geography journal *Antipode* began in 1969 and *Espaces et Sociétés* in 1970, but neither had the scope and reach of IJURR.
- 14 It was critically important that the Editorial Board owned the journal's title. This eventually enabled it to receive a substantial share of the journal's profits. In the 1990s the Foundation for Urban and Regional Research (FURS) was founded to use this money to support young scholars and to substantially support RC21.

- 15 Volume 10 of IJURR (1986) contains a 10-year index prepared by Murdoch and Pickvance from which these details are taken.
- 16 For recent attempts to survey the diversity of current work, see Harding and Blokland (2014), Storper and Scott (2015).
- 17 I am grateful to Andrea Andreotti and Yuri Kazepov for providing this recent data on IJURR/RC21.

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Part I

THE TRANSFORMATIONS OF GLOBAL CAPITALISM

Abstract from the concrete: capitalism spiralling out of control

Astonishingly, between 1900 and 1999 the United States consumed, according to a US Geological Survey, 4,500 million tons of cement (USGS 2012). In 2011 and 2013, China consumed around 4,250 million tons of cement (USGS 2013). So in just two years, the Chinese consumed the same amount of cement as the United States had consumed in the whole of the preceding century. That scale of magnitude of spreading cement around is unprecedented. Those living in the United States have seen plenty of cement used over the years. But what has happened in China is extraordinary in terms of its environmental, political and social consequences. So the question I want to ask is: *Why did this happen?* However, less and less do researchers ask ‘why?’. Since the 1970s, there has been a gradual shift of emphasis, and instead they ask ‘how?’ and ‘where?’.

Concentrating on the ‘how and where’ leaves us much better equipped to unravel the intricacies of how things happen. It frees us from the chains of dogmatic assertions. Instead we describe in detail how it is that, say, developers get together with lawyers and construction companies, with financiers, landowners and state officials, to launch fantastic megaprojects that require masses of cement even as they spark protests from evicted homeowners and tenants from this or that space in the city, as well as from citizens in general. We pay far closer attention to local conditions. We are much more sensitive to cultural and environmental differences. The ‘where’ matters, but it also has some perverse consequences. It introduces national character into the debate in ways that can mask what the underlying dynamic of endless capital accumulation is about and the social consequences it produces.

Concentrating on the ‘how and where’ might bring us to the point where we forget entirely to ask ‘why?’. We ignore the power of metatheory on principle rather than as a convenient practice in certain research situations.

The concrete crisis

Why has all of that cement been spread around in China? Cement is used in construction. This obviously suggests a massive investment in the creation of built environments, in urbanisation and the construction of physical infrastructures. Recently, there has been an immense amount of that investment in construction worldwide, but China stands out in the data as by far the most spectacular example (Agence Presse Français 2016; Reuters 2016). And this concerns other raw materials such as steel, iron, copper, sand and minerals of all sorts.

Raw material prices have, until recently, tended to soar. Mining activity has been accelerating everywhere. The terms of trade for raw material producers have tended to turn positive in the last twenty years or so. From India to Latin America to Australia, whole mountains are being moved in the search for minerals, with all sorts of political, economic and environmental consequences. The question of why China has been involved in such a huge expansion of its urbanisation and infrastructural investment has global ramifications. And I argue that it is undoubtedly one of the reasons that a troubled global capitalism has survived in the last few years. More by consequence than design, the leadership in Beijing effectively saved global capitalism from a great depression – particularly since 2008, when the global economy went into a tailspin.

First, the ‘how and where’ of what happened. In 2007–08 a financial crisis arose out of the United States, and merely for this reason it was defined as a global crisis. Other crises occurred in South-East Asia in 1997–98; they were defined as regional crises. There is also considerable evidence that, faced with crisis conditions, US institutions and policy-makers actively sought to disperse their effects around the world by globalising them. In so doing they used many multilateral financial institutions and financial interrelations to do their bidding (Hudson 2015).

The crisis of 2007–08 was at first instance quite localised. It originated particularly in the southern and south-western United States, and arose largely out of intense speculation in housing and property markets in those regions. Speculative money poured into US property markets (as it did in Ireland and Spain, among other places) when the stock market crashed in 2001. The world was awash with surplus liquidity at that time and much of it was absorbed in property markets, forcing prices up and up. When the speculative housing bubble burst, there was a foreclosure crisis on housing loans. A ‘fictitious demand’ had been created when sub-prime mortgage financing was offered to people who had very little creditworthiness. In 2007, property values collapsed in these regions and many people lost their homes (Harvey 2010).

People who have been foreclosed upon and who are unemployed consume less. So the consumer market in the United States collapsed and many people lost their jobs. But the primary supplier to that consumer market was China. This was one link whereby the local crisis went global. The other link was through the financial system. Financial institutions had structured mortgage debt on housing so as to be able to pass it on to others as an investment yielding good returns that were supposedly 'as safe as houses'. But many of the mortgages were not secured by an ability to pay. Anyone who had been gulled into investing in the new financial instruments lost money. The banks that held that debt were threatened and tightened credit, including credit to consumers. The weakness in the US consumer goods market spread and deepened. The downward spiral threatened to engulf the whole world in depression.

In 2008, China suddenly found its export industries contracting if not collapsing. A 20 per cent or more drop in exports occurred in a matter of months (Jing 2011). Chinese statistics are notoriously unreliable as to what is real and what is not, but by some accounts, something like 20 million jobs were lost in China through the collapse of export markets (UN 2011). That is a huge job loss. The Chinese government has traditionally been very nervous about potential social unrest. And 20 million unemployed workers presented a rather dangerous situation. I believe the Chinese government did what it did mainly to avert that obvious danger.

By the end of 2009, a joint report from the International Monetary Fund and the International Labour Organization tallied up estimates of the global net job loss from the crisis (ILO-IMF 2010). The United States had the largest loss, while China's net job loss was only about three million (IMF 2010). Somehow, China had managed to absorb 17 million people back into the labour market in the space of about one year. This is an astounding and totally unprecedented performance.

How did China absorb such vast amounts of surplus labour so fast? It seems the central government told everybody to create as many projects and megaprojects as possible. The banks were told to lend without restraint. In the United States, when the Federal Reserve and the US Treasury gave money to the banks to lend, the banks ignored their instruction. The US banks used much of the money they were given to retire their bad debts and even buy back their own stock. The Chinese banking system does not work that way. In China, if bankers are told by the central government to lend, they lend. And they evidently did, incidentally making a lot of people ultra-wealthy in the process.

China absorbed a massive amount of labour by launching a huge urbanisation and infrastructure development programme, building whole new cities, integrating the space economy of the nation with highways and

high-speed rail networks, more strongly connecting southern and northern markets, developing the interior so that it was much better linked to the coast. While clearly the central government had wanted to do something like this for some time (plans were laid for the high-speed rail network during the 1990s), it now mobilised everything it could to absorb the surplus and potentially restive labour force. In 2007 there were zero miles of high-speed rail in China, but by 2015 there were nearly 12,000 miles linking all the major cities. This is phenomenal by any standard (Shepard 2015).

At the end of the Second World War, the US economy needed to absorb the huge increase in productive capacity created during the war and create well-paying jobs for a large number of returning veterans. If veterans were to be faced with unemployment on the scale of the 1930s, then there would surely be serious political and economic consequences. The problem for the US capitalist state and class was: How do we not go back into depression? How do we absorb all of that productive capacity in ways that are going to be profitable and satisfy the wants and needs of a vast army of demobilised military? What would happen if the returning veterans faced a return to depression conditions, when the war against fascism had been fought in alliance with the Soviet Union?

One answer was the repression of all left-wing thinking through a fierce anti-communist movement known as McCarthyism. But that in itself could not have succeeded were it not for initiatives to solve economic problems. The US economy had to expand rapidly enough to absorb the surpluses of capital and labour. In part this was done through US imperialism, the Cold War (also anti-communist) and a vast expansion of militarism. These operations certainly played a role in boosting the economy, but were not enough to prevent another depression. The United States was a largely self-contained economy – not so dependent on foreign trade. Economic expansion had to be internal to the United States itself.

The big thing accomplished after 1945 in the United States was a huge wave of investment in the built environment, in urbanisation, and in physical and to some extent social infrastructures such as the higher education system. The interstate highway system pulled together the West Coast and the South, and spatially integrated the US economy in new ways. Los Angeles was an ordinary-sized city in 1945, but by 1970 it had become a megalopolis. Metropolitan areas were totally re-engineered with transport and highways and automobiles and suburbs and the development of a whole new suburban lifestyle. Well-paid jobs were required to support the effective demand for a suburban lifestyle. Labour and capital came to an uneasy compromise at the urging of the state apparatus in which a white working class made economic gains, while minorities were left out. As a result, the 1950s and 1960s were, in many respects, the golden years of

capital accumulation in the United States: very high rates of growth, a satisfactory situation for a white working class, even as a powerful civil rights movement and uprisings in central cities showed that all was not well for the African-American and immigrant populations. But the aggregate effect was to solve the over-accumulation problem through urbanisation and investments in the built environment. As a Federal Reserve report later put it, the United States has the habit of 'getting out of crises by building houses and filling them with things' (Applebaum 2011). However, this is also how capital gets into crises.

In response to the employment crisis in 2008, the Chinese in effect did much the same as the United States had done after the Second World War, but they did it much more quickly and at a far higher rate. Although the strategy of solving economic and political problems through urbanisation is not new, this change of scale is very important. Following the economic crisis of 1848, which prompted working-class and bourgeois revolutions in Paris, the French economy flourished again on the back of Napoleon's public works projects and Haussmann's new plan for Paris, funded by associated capital. Capital and labour were fully and profitably employed, creating new boulevards, department stores and the like. Daily life was transformed into the consumerism of the city of light. The crisis of over-accumulation of both capital and labour in the period after 1848 was solved by transformations in lifestyle as well as transformations in the built environment. We still see the consequences of this effort when we walk Haussmann's boulevards today (Harvey 2003). But the scale of these changes is nowhere near that of the changes in the United States after 1945, which in turn is nowhere near the scale and speed of transformation that has recently occurred in China.

But in each of these cases, there was an underlying problem. The construction had to be debt-financed. New institutions and methods of financing had to be created to sustain building efforts. A new kind of credit-driven banking became more prominent in Paris. But at a certain point, debt creation and scepticism as to the value that stood behind the debt came to the fore. Paris's debt crisis of 1867–68 engulfed not only the speculative financial institutions but also the finances of the city. Paris was mired in debt and close to bankruptcy. Haussmann was ultimately forced to resign.

Unemployment and unrest ensued in Paris. It eventually resulted in the Paris Commune of 1871 – one of the greatest urban uprisings in human history. The people took back 'their' city from the bourgeoisie and the capitalists who had plundered it (Marx and Lenin 1940).

Solving the over-accumulation problem through rapid urbanisation comes at a certain cost. In the cases of both Paris and the United States, it meant relying heavily upon debt finance and the deployment of fictitious

capital. In the United States, new mortgage finance and other institutions had been put in place in the 1930s, but even greater levels of state intervention occurred after 1945. The system worked well for a time, but stresses were evident as early as 1967. The whole process came to a crashing halt with the property market collapse and the technical bankruptcy of New York City in 1973–75 (one of the largest public budgets in the capitalist world at that time) (Tabb 1982). This initiated a period of serious recession and capitalist restructuring in the United States that also affected the United Kingdom, Europe and the rest of North America, as well as many other countries and regions such as Australia and Latin America. In a somewhat similar fashion, the crash of the US stock market in 2001 led money to flee the stock market and produced the property market boom that helped sustain global capitalism up until the Lehmann Brothers collapse of 2008. And the impact of the Lehman Brothers collapse was felt throughout the global financial system.

China likewise debt-financed its way out of its difficulties in 2008. But unlike Greece and other places, China didn't debt-finance using dollars or euros. It had enough foreign exchange surplus from the United States to be insulated from foreign pressures. So China could borrow in its own currency. The great advantage of borrowing in your own currency is that you can always issue more money and if necessary inflate away the debt and recapitalise the banking system (as happened at the end of the 1990s). By 2015, China had moved from a fairly low debt-to-GDP ratio to one of the highest in the world. A hidden banking system came into being to cover over many of the gaps in finance and hide a lot of the debt obligations. China doubled its debt-to-GDP ratio in about six years through huge urbanisation and infrastructural investment surges. Reports circulated suggesting that many municipal and local governments were effectively bankrupt by 2013 and the condition of some lending institutions was dire (Shen 2015). Nevertheless, about a quarter of the Chinese GDP was taken up by housing construction alone, and when all of the other investments in the built environment were added in, it turned out that about half of Chinese economic activity and growth was arising out of reshaping the built environment – hence all that production and consumption of cement and steel. China, like the United States before it, was avoiding recession and a potential depression along with the political threat of widespread unemployment by 'building houses and filling them with things'.

This was the Chinese answer to what might have been a very serious depression in 2008. This answer, however, was not unique to China. There were attempts to emulate it elsewhere. Turkey, for example, which went through a crisis in 2001, got out of the problems of 2007–08 through the same kind of expansion in its urbanisation: a new airport, a third bridge

over the Bosphorus, the urbanisation of the northern part of the Bosphorus to create a city of some 45 million people. Every city in Turkey showed evidence of a building boom. Largely as a result of this boom, Turkey was hardly affected by the crash of 2008 (although it, too, saw its export industries suffer). Turkey had the second highest growth rate after China in the post-2008 period. Spectacular urbanisation in the Gulf states also absorbed a lot of surplus capital. In major urban centres, property markets quickly revived for the upper income brackets after 2009. New York City and London were soon experiencing property revivals in high-end construction even in the absence of any investment in affordable housing for the less well-off.

Anybody who supplied China with the necessary raw materials, such as copper or iron ore, came out of the crisis of 2008 pretty well. Most of Latin America, which was full of raw materials, recovered relatively quickly. In addition, Latin America turned itself into one vast soybean plantation, basically for Chinese trade. It switched its allegiances in terms of global trade to the Pacific and to Asia. The depression, which affected the United States and elsewhere, didn't really affect Latin America to the same degree. It was relatively mild. Mineral-rich Australia likewise thrived.

When we step back and look at the world in aggregate during this period, a strange dichotomy becomes apparent. There is this vast urban and infrastructural expansion going on in China, with outliers in other countries (such as Turkey) or in other sectors (such as high-end condo construction for the rich in major urban centres around the world). These strategies enabled many countries to recover quickly from the effects of the crisis of 2007–08. In the United States and Europe, however, we find a commitment to the politics of austerity, which locked their economies into no growth. In these parts of the world, the politics of neoliberal orthodoxy and austerity were – largely for ideological reasons – tightened. The world effectively divided into two camps: the Chinese expanded through broadly Keynesian practices, which depended upon demand creation led by the state; the West, on the other hand, contracted through its dedication to supply-side management that focused on fiscal practices of debt reduction. Public policies and politics were shaped accordingly. The Chinese camp effectively rescued capitalism from a threat of deep depression through massive urbanisation and investment in infrastructure.

But as happened to Haussmann in 1867, and as happened to the grand suburbanisation spree at the end of the 1960s in the United States, all good things come to an end. In the years since 2013, China has been increasingly exhibiting signs that its solution is running out of steam, that there is chronic over-production and over-accumulation in the built environment, that its economy is burdened by vast holdings of non-earning assets, and

that the returns from the undoubted improvements in productivity are just not there. It may no longer be possible to continue down the path of endless expansion of investments in housing and other physical infrastructures.

Ventures of this sort elsewhere have also run into difficulties. Dubai World went bankrupt and had to be bailed out. The Turkish boom has been cut short; foreign investors are bailing out and empty apartment blocks litter the land.

As the construction boom recedes, surplus productive capacity in, for example, cement and steel production becomes a problem. The global demand for raw materials slackens and the terms of trade for raw material producers turn unfavourable. Two or three years ago, Brazil was flush with money. Now it is in recession and politically in turmoil. Since 2014 most of Latin America has seen deepening economic distress. And a substantial part of the reason is that the Chinese market is not so vigorous any more. The slackening of demand from China has had negative effects elsewhere. Even Germany, which exports high-tech machine tools and equipment to China, has felt the drought.

The crisis tendencies of capital have been moving around. But crises are embedded in the very structures of what capital accumulation is about. Marx is interested not only in value, but in anti-value (Harvey 2017). The idea of anti-value is simple. A capitalist invests in producing a commodity and the commodity has a potential value. But if nobody wants, needs or desires the commodity, then it has no value. The history of capital is, therefore, about the production of new wants, needs and desires. And this is what the transformation of Paris and the building of the suburbs in the United States entailed. And it is what is happening so dramatically in contemporary China. The cultural and psychological jump from peasant life in a village without any mobility to whizzing around the country in high-speed trains is huge. Without this, what seemed like socially necessary labour-time becomes socially unnecessary labour-time. A theory of devaluation of capital as an answer to over-accumulation also derives from this. Surplus capital and labour may be absorbed by investments in infrastructures and the built environment but the result is often the creation of excess productive capacity. The result is devaluation. This is the threat that is haunting China. Anti-value is everywhere. If it cannot be redeemed by new value production, the result is a crisis of devaluation.

Capital systematically creates anti-value in the form of debt that can be redeemed only through future value production. This aspect of Marx's theory has not been looked at closely enough. Anti-value is fundamental to value. You cannot do without it. Recent events illustrate the relations involved. The crisis of 2007–08, for example, had its roots in the way that the earlier crisis of 2001, which was focused on the US stock market, was

resolved. When the dotcom economy crashed, money rushed out of the stock markets. The world was awash with surplus liquidity, as the IMF repeatedly complained. But where was this money to go? Alan Greenspan, head of the Federal Reserve, dropped interest rates. Property investments looked attractive. Money was lent to producers of housing at the same time that it was lent to consumers, on easy terms. Finance supported both the supply and, even more importantly, the burgeoning demand for housing. Prices of property assets rose rapidly. Investing in property looked even more attractive. But debt requires the creation of value to redeem it. If this new value does not materialise, then you go bust. In this way, credit and debt dictate future value production. Either that or devaluation or even destruction of capital ensues.

This disciplining effect of debt encumbrance is important. Debt means we are no longer 'free to choose', as Milton Friedman (1990) in his paean to capitalism supposes. Capital does not forgive us our debts, as the Bible asks, but insists we redeem them through future value production. Debt imprisons us within certain structures of future value production.

From the 1930s suburbanisation contributed enormously to social stability in the US and fostered certain mental conceptions of the world and political subjectivities to support rather than challenge the status quo of a rampant capitalism. The World Bank and the IMF promote individual home ownership worldwide because, they say, it assures social stability. But this does not solve the over-accumulation problem, which has produced the foreclosure wave, which has in turn destabilised whole populations and communities. What has traditionally been a solution becomes the problem. Saddling whole populations with massive debts they cannot possibly repay – as in the case of Greece and to some extent the case of student debt in the United States – is a contradictory recipe for social stability.

The foreclosure wave recreated social instability with asset-value losses concentrated in marginalised minority populations. The difficulty is to figure out a response that avoids the obvious risk of repeating such disasters.

What options exist for China, given its grumbling over-capacity? Here the concept of the 'spatial fix' is useful. When there are surpluses of capital and labour in a particular territory, and when prospects for profitable use are negligible because the market is saturated, then capitalists start to export their surplus capital (and sometimes surplus labour) to build elsewhere. This was what economic imperialism was about from the mid-nineteenth century onward. Surplus capital and labour from Britain came to the United States or went to Australia, South Africa and Argentina. But where did these places get their money to buy up the surplus capital in commodity form? Surplus money capital was lent to those countries so they could build their railways and infrastructures, which created a demand for British surplus capacity

in steel and locomotive production. This ultimately led to the creation of new and dynamic capitalist economies elsewhere, particularly in the United States. This was the creative economic side of British imperialism.

The other strategy was more negative. Britain tried, for example, to keep India as a captive market to which it could send its surplus product after destroying indigenous productive capacity. But this did not help resolve Britain's problems of over-accumulation of capital and surplus labour because the demand from India was not very strong or expansive over time. Indians were therefore forced to produce all kinds of things – including opium to sell to China in return for silver, which was then shipped back to Britain. Britain drained wealth from India and China but did not help create much wealth. This was a non-dynamic form of imperialism.

Britain could not suppress industrial development in the United States the way it had done in India. The United States grew to generate surplus capital, and in turn had to figure out what to do with it. It too began to export capital and to develop imperialist-style practices.

This process of creating spatial fixes to deal with the tendency towards over-accumulation is apparent everywhere. The Japanese turned towards the export of surplus capital at the end of the 1960s; South Korea followed suit in the late 1970s; and Taiwan in the early 1980s (Dicken 2015). Flows of surplus capital from these territories went all over the world but were particularly important in building productive capacity in China. Now it is China's turn.

China has a lot of over-capacity in sectors such as cement and steel production. How is this over-capacity to be absorbed? The state is attempting to reduce capacity in these sectors through plant closures. But China is also looking for opportunities to spread this surplus cement and steel around. This is what is scary. They have come up with a number of answers. One of them is internal. The Chinese are proposing to create a city of something like 130 million people centring on Beijing – equivalent to the population of the United Kingdom and France combined. Investments will be focused on high-speed transport and communications (Ridge 2014). This new city will absorb huge amounts of steel and concrete. But what kind of daily life would be possible in such a city?

In fact what is being proposed is not a city in the conventional sense. It is the rationalisation of not one but three major urban regions: one centred on Beijing, the second on Shanghai, and the third in Guangdong Province. Several multimillion-inhabitant cities already exist in each of these regions. The plan seems to be to seek a higher order rationalisation of relations between these rapidly expanding cities so that they knit together more efficiently. Planners will doubtless mine large datasets on, for example, existing movement patterns, and put the concept of 'smart cities' into overdrive in

the cause of this hyper-rationalisation of space relations. These rationalisations will surely entail the use of surplus cement and steel.

But that will not be enough to absorb all the surplus capacity. China is attempting to dispose of its surplus cement and steel by exporting as much as it can at low cost. This means that higher-cost steel plants elsewhere (in Britain, for example) are being forced to close. China is being challenged by the United States and others before the World Trade Organization for dumping subsidised steel on the world market and may be obliged to stop this trade. But Chinese corporations are also building railways, highways and physical infrastructures in East Africa using Chinese cement and steel as well as surplus Chinese labour, even though there is plenty of local surplus labour. The same is happening in Latin America (Romero 2015).

Other business press reports show how China is rebuilding the Silk Road route from Shanghai to Istanbul (and into Europe) via Tehran. A fast, high-capacity rail network (using a lot of cement and steel) is planned through Central Asia into Europe. Central Asian cities along the route are already experiencing building booms. This is a programme that would probably not occur were it not for the fact that the Chinese have all of this surplus capacity in cement and steel production. This is one of the ways in which they hope to stabilise what might otherwise be a 'rough landing' in a Chinese economy suffering from over-capacity. The surplus capital over-accumulation problem can be resolved, for a time, by resorting to a spatial fix (Krauss and Bradsher 2015; Clover and Hornby 2015).

This has happened many times before – but there is something different this time around. If you look at the scale of Haussmann's project in Paris, it was about the city. If you look at what went on in the United States after the Second World War, it was at the level of the metropolitan region across the whole nation. Robert Moses was the iconic figure. You move from Haussmann to Moses, from city to nation. But the figures of China's cement use are indicative of another dramatic change of scale that appears global in reach.

In search of an alternative to compounding growth

Why this dramatic change of scale? Is this really necessary? If capital is about freedom of choice, why is it that this future is foretold?

Capital accumulation is, of course, about growth. When we look at the history of capital accumulation, we see that it has been growing at a compound rate. Compound growth rates produce exponential curves. And exponential curves dawdle along and then suddenly take off and sweep upward at an alarming rate. There is an inflection point in exponential curves where the upward sweep starts. It's like the famous story of the

person who invented chess and asked the king to give him a reward. He asked the king to put one grain of rice on the first square and double it for every square. By the time you get to about the 46th square, all the rice in the world is used up. And how you get to the 64th square, nobody knows. This is the nature of compound growth.

But why do we want growth? Why in particular do we want compounding growth when we know it will probably spiral out of control and become impossible?

We have to think about how to organise an economy in a way that is not dedicated solely to economic growth. There are hints of this in many places. Ecuadorians and others have enshrined the objective of *Buen Vivir* into their constitutions. The UN Human Development Reports try to separate economic growth from the development of human capacities and powers and seem to focus policies on the latter. There are all sorts of initiatives to promote social entrepreneurialism and the sharing economy in conventional circles, and more far-reaching pushes on the left to foster cooperatives and solidarity economies. In practice, most of these initiatives turn out to be either mere rhetoric or masks for the continuation of capital accumulation by other means. There is widespread recognition of the need to reorganise and re-orchestrate the use of the world's resources. But here too the realities are vastly different from the rhetoric. Ecuador enshrines the indigenous idea of the rights of Mother Nature into its constitution. But as China pursues its own spatial-fix spending spree on a global basis, it needs, as we have seen, enormous quantities of mineral resources. So when Ecuador borrows from China, in return the Chinese want open access to all the mineral resources of southern Ecuador, which happen to be where a lot of indigenous populations are. And those indigenous populations are not liking what's happening. A political struggle ensues. Indigenous leaders are being killed. This is an all-too-familiar story. You have heard it often in the past and you will hear more of it in due course.

Within the urban process, something else is going on that requires careful attention. Urban growth is increasingly about creating possibilities for the investment of surplus capital and surplus savings. We are less and less interested in creating cities for people to live in. Instead, we are creating cities for people to invest in.

Notwithstanding the awareness that the housing and property market in 2007–08 went through a crash in many parts of the world after nearly a decade of speculative activity, nevertheless people are again investing in property and land. The reason is that this seems a safer choice to preserve and enhance value in a generally weak and insecure investment climate. Land and property are now much more favoured as destinations for absorbing surplus liquidity and protecting savings.

Recently, China loosened its regulations over the export of private capital for a brief period. Chinese investors became some of the primary buyers of property in New York, Vancouver, London and San Francisco. During the Irish boom investment came from Ireland into the New York property market (Wildau 2017). And it's not only the billionaires who are doing it. It's actually upper-middle-class people who are engaging in the equivalent of a property and land grab wherever they can. Likewise, most pension funds are increasingly investing in this direction.

Since 2008 we have been seeing a redirection of capital flow away from creating livable environments for the masses towards creating investment opportunities for individuals who want to store their money and keep their wealth in some form that they feel is fairly safe. Property markets are becoming a target also for hedge funds, which are buying up foreclosed houses and speculating on a revival of values.

But it is at this point that we have to think more carefully about the 'why'. In essence, the 'why' is very simple. Accumulation for accumulation's sake, as Marx points out, is the centre of what capital is about. And that translates to production for production's sake – which either means pouring more and more cement everywhere until we are up to our necks in the stuff, or saying we have had enough of this and need to do something different. We should at least consider getting off the capitalist treadmill of limitless and endless accumulation and think about ways to organise our economy along totally different lines. But it seems that capitalism is not by and large considered an acceptable perspective from which to work.

And that is one of the more horrific things about our current situation. The problems and processes described here are not debated and discussed in the way they should be debated and discussed in the institutions that should be discussing them. Universities in the United States and elsewhere have been corporatised. They have become neoliberalised. They have become bastions of knowledge dedicated to the perpetuation of endless capital accumulation, capitalist growth without limits, even as they channel innovation into supposedly solving the problems of, for example, social inequality and environmental degradation. It could be reversed, of course, but at this time the political prospects for such a shift are rather bleak.

At the same time, the political base for radical movements and social change has also shifted. Contemporary discontent in many parts of the world now emanates from a rather different class configuration from that which the left has traditionally favoured. This question of class configuration to political struggle must be approached from a different direction. These reconfigurations have much to do with the paths of contemporary urbanisation.

Wealth is being extracted by what Marx called the 'realisation process'. And much of that wealth extraction occurs in the course of daily life on the

streets of the city. It is therefore no accident that most of the uprisings we have seen in recent times, such as those in Brazil and in Turkey in 2013, were more about the politics of realisation than they were about the politics of production. Discontent with the qualities of urban life have brooked large in such struggles (see, for example, Keller 2013; Ozturkmen 2014; Carvalho et al. 2016). This is where much of contemporary politics now lie. We need to pay attention to it both theoretically and practically as well as politically.

We've got to understand why and how discontent with daily life in the city is escalating, and why and how it might be reconfigured around a political movement dedicated to the idea that we need and want to create cities that are fit for people to live in. In practice, as we have seen, we are more likely to be creating cities that are fit for people to invest in. This has to be reversed. We want not only to create cities that are about non-growth, but cities that address social needs, reduce inequalities and improve environmental qualities.

Marx deploys an interesting idea, which comes from Hegel. Hegel talked about the difference between what he called a 'bad infinity' and a 'good infinity'. A good infinity is something that continues to reproduce itself over time forever. A circle is a mathematical depiction of the good infinity.

It's when the circle becomes a spiral that problems start. Things spiral out of control. Capital is spiralling out of control. And that spiralling out of control is represented by the fact that the infinity is not contained in any way. It just goes further and further and further. The number system is a bad infinity. For every big number you can make, there's always one more you can add to it. It goes on and on and on and there is no telling where it will go because it will never come to a close. It's like pi in the other direction. How many decimal places do you write for pi?

We have to get back to a good infinity. Marx understood that very well. He is very strong on the nature of reproduction – reproduction of the social order and how we can think about reproduction. In both *Volume 1* and *Volume 2* of *Capital* he describes in detail the virtuous infinity of simple reproduction. It is with reproduction on an expanded scale that the problems really start. The metaphor of spiralling out of control is something that is very meaningful to what is happening globally and locally. Until we can find means to control endless accumulation for accumulation's sake, no amount of tinkering and doing good things on the edges will make much of a difference to a huge macroeconomic problem.

This is why the anti-capitalist perspective is so crucial to defining the nature of the problem of contemporary urbanisation and changing capitalism phenomenology.

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Rethinking social reproduction in an era of the dominance of finance capital

Social reproduction is a very vague and undefined concept; it includes directly or indirectly every social event so that it becomes impossible to analyse it separately from the accumulation/development process. (Mingione 1983: 312)

With the rise of neoliberal regimes in both the global North and South, the *social* dimension of capitalist reproduction has come under severe attack.¹ Various reasons for this have been put forward, from the increased demands of unionised labour, to the crisis of ‘stagflation’ in the early 1970s, to simply a shift in prevailing economic fashions from fiscal to monetary policies or from demand-side to supply-side stimuli, all of which affected conservative and social democratic governments alike (see, among others, Brenner 2006; Davis 2010; Jessop 2006; Harvey 2005; Lapavistas 2014; Panitch and Gindin 2012; Streeck 2014). The result has been an increase in the number of people in precarious work compared to those in formal employment, a multi-front attack on the commons both as the spaces of the city and as the provision of public care in health and upbringing plus widespread increases in family indebtedness and attacks on the spaces of livelihood for ‘surplus’ populations. As a result the questions about the importance of ‘social reproduction’ that commanded such attention in the 1970s and 1980s appear to be applicable to ever larger proportions of the population today. In that earlier period it was Marxist feminists who argued for the importance of unpaid domestic labour in the reproduction of capitalism in the global North (Edholm et al. 1978; Vogel 2008); and those working on simple or petty commodity production largely in agriculture (Friedmann 1980) and mostly in the global South (Bernstein 1979; Smith 1985) who made similar claims about the role of unrecognised labour ‘beyond employment’. And yet, while precarity, attacks on the commons and the crisis of care each in their different ways have revived interest in social reproduction among sociologists and social theorists, the very empirical increase in these phenomena

surely requires us to explore what we mean when we speak of a distinct sphere of social reproduction in contemporary society.²

The purpose of this chapter then is to set out some of the steps in such a task. I do this by seeking to understand the implications of changing kinds of capitalism for social reproduction understood here in the sense of ‘the provision of food, clothing, shelter, basic safety and health care, along with development and transmission of knowledge, social values and cultural practices, and the construction of individual and collective values’ (Bezanson and Luxton 2006: 3; see also Katz 2001). While the normal use of the expression ‘social reproduction’ appears useful insofar as it serves to refer to a *metaphorical space* (Katz and Smith 1993; Bourdieu 1998: 1–11) or *the kinds of activities* that are essential to but distinct from the capitalist economy, such a distinction can be confusing. This is so because the alignment of spaces with activities would then suggest that the capitalist economy occurs in other places with distinct kinds of activities: the home and the hearth on the one side and ‘work’ in the office or factory on the other. Yet today we only have to turn to the hazardous livelihoods of a single-parent family in Athens or an extended family in a São Paulo slum to see that the two are intertwined in complex ways. Moreover if we insist on reserving the notion of society’s reproduction to just one sphere, we run the risk of failing to attend to other (essential) elements of capitalist reproduction such as the capitalist’s need to maintain and renew machinery or the need for the state to maintain material infrastructure.

But these easily observed empirical facts about the characteristics of impoverished households³ on the one side and the concerns of a capitalist enterprise on the other conceal the fact that there is a crucial distinguishing feature between the one and the other, that is, the *simple* reproduction of the former (Marx 1976: 711–25) and the *expanded* reproduction that is essential to the latter. Indeed it is the viciousness of this latter logic that accounts for the conditions faced in the Athens household or in the São Paulo slum. This is not to say that distinctions among kinds of social relations are too muddled to be made – merely assemblages or untidy contingencies. It is rather to suggest that we need to make the right kinds of distinctions, ones that might profoundly disturb simplistic usages of the notion of ‘social reproduction’.

We can learn a great deal from the writers of the 1970s and 1980s such as those cited above, because they understood this and were challenged by it, both intellectually and politically. Slipshod current usages that take authority from these works while failing to grasp the dynamic tensions produced by the various forms that capital takes avoid these challenges. So we need to untie the exclusively ‘social’ from reproduction and ask questions instead about how current society is to be understood in terms of

the features necessary for its overall reproduction and, of course, possible *transformation*.

I am suggesting, then, that the current conjuncture demonstrates the proposal that we should employ the term ‘social reproduction’ to refer to the *entirety* of the kinds of societies in which we live today. To do so I will use Enzo Mingione’s seminal work in *Fragmented Societies* (1991) (alongside contemporary articles: 1983; 1985) as a means for setting out this agenda. I will make my argument by beginning with a recent article by Nancy Fraser that deals specifically with social reproduction. I will then explore Mingione’s key work through that lens, showing that the understanding of social reproduction (and incidentally ‘surplus population’) is a great deal more complex than Fraser’s, especially as we move beyond capitalism’s core. Finally, I will try to address the problematic issue of the articulated scales of socio-economic reproduction under current conditions.

The formation and deformation of a concept

Let me begin by using a recent article by Nancy Fraser (2016a) to explore some of the difficulties that result from making ‘social reproduction’ too qualitatively distinct from other elements of production and reproduction. ‘In general’, Fraser notes, ‘capitalist societies separate social reproduction from economic production’ (2016a: 102). Yet, for her, ‘This “critical separatism” is problematic’, not because it doesn’t exist (Fraser uses the distinction throughout her text), but because ‘the social strand is so central to the broader crisis that none of the others [economic, ecological, political] can be understood in abstraction from it’ (2016a: 99). The disavowal of the role that social reproduction plays for capitalism, she suggests, produces a deep contradiction on a par with, if not greater than, those to be found at the heart of the economy.

Like the economic contradictions that Marxists have stressed, this one, too, grounds a crisis tendency. In this case, however, the contradiction is not located ‘inside’ the capitalist economy but at the border that simultaneously separates and connects production and reproduction (Fraser 2016a: 103). And yet such clear spatial metaphors can only be retained by using an extremely restricted version of what ‘social reproduction’ means:

Social reproduction is about the creation and maintenance of social bonds. One part of this has to do with the ties between the generations – so, birthing and raising children and caring for the elderly. Another part is about sustaining horizontal ties among friends, family, neighbourhoods, and community [...] In capitalist societies, the capacities available for social reproduction are accorded no monetized value. They are taken for granted, treated as free and infinitely available ‘gifts,’ which require no attention or replenishment. (Fraser 2016b)

Although Fraser suggests that she takes this meaning from an earlier wave of feminism, it is Polanyi's dual movement between 'economy' and 'society' that most closely matches her terms. To his 'double movement' Fraser adds a third – emancipation – suggesting that this struggle has given rise to retrogressive results. For a time emancipation had the effect of attacking the disavowal of the role of social-reproduction caregiving characteristic of historical capitalisms. But with the increasing disinvestments from social welfare in the twilight years of the last century, 'carework' was externalised on to families and communities.

The result is a new dualised organisation of social reproduction, commodified for those who can pay for it and privatised for those who cannot, as some in the second category provide carework in return for (low) wages for those in the first – the inadequacy of these wages having the effect of extending the unpaid care functions from the immediately exploited to what would otherwise be an entirely surplus population of kin and such like. (Fraser 2016a: 112)

Feminist movements for emancipation that led to the *recognition* of the value of unpaid labour now provide the basis for financial capitalism to take advantage of those forms of work that are replacing such institutions as state-supported daycare for children and other care for the sick and elderly.⁴ As a result, 'Boundary struggles over social reproduction are as central to the present conjuncture as are class struggles over economic production' (Fraser 2016a: 116).

This is very neat, but the reader is left uncertain whether the duality discussed is an etic or emic one. Is an etic category being used critically to reveal what is normatively hidden in (late twentieth-century) capitalism? Or is the emic category used by ordinary people – capitalists and workers alike – present in society itself? For it is only if we use it in the latter sense that we can understand how it might become the basis of 'boundary struggles' between the two, struggles apparently quite distinct from 'class struggles' that only occur within the realm of 'economic production'.

It is extremely hard to get a grasp on what characterises our society as specifically a society of capital if we do not attend to what Lévi-Strauss might call its elementary structures: how relations are *reproduced*.⁵ We can speak of markets, profits, rational choices among scarce resources and so on ad infinitum – and much of this helps us get on with the everyday business of life in a capitalist society (Marx 1976: 280) – but this does not address the *historical* question of how all this keeps on happening; or possibly, in going through the motions of continuity, cannot help but change. This process is both structural and agential, both determinant and contingent. Put another way, some people invest a great deal of wealth, power and intelligence to ensure that the kind of capital from which they draw surplus value is

ensured a future history. The way they do this is a matter of politics. And the contingencies of politics, as they do so, effectively reproduce various kinds of societies, all of which are dominated by the requirements for reproducing capital *in general*. There are, of course, those who may be opposed to this kind of society and find ways of diverting it or obstructing it, and this also makes for the contingencies of politics.

But once we commit to seeing society in this way, then we have to acknowledge that the realm of reproduction is a vastly extensive one. It is hopelessly distracting, even disingenuous, to carve out one part of society, the economy or the market, and attend to how it gets to be reproduced, and then turn to another and ask how *it* is reproduced. As Fraser herself has said, capitalism is not a kind of economy so much as it is a kind of society. If this is so, then how do we achieve greater clarity by speaking of something called ‘social reproduction’ and wish it to refer to something distinct from or, to use her spatial metaphor, *on the borders of* capitalism? And this is the more so when we depart from capitalism *qua* market economy and recognise that, with the leading role played by financial rents and oligopolistic super-profits, dominant classes achieve the reproduction of capital with very little dependence on ‘market forces’, these supposedly Darwinian forces being reserved for small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). This makes it only the more confusing to use ‘market relations’ à la Polanyi to stand in for ‘the economy’ against which we are meant to juxtapose ‘the social’.

By reference to *the precariat* Guy Standing (2011) has drawn attention to the crises faced by a multitude of ordinary people as the state out-sources to them (or to the private sector) the responsibilities for their social reproduction. Yet the rather broad sweep of a generic precariat does not help us to see the *specifics* of the way different kinds of unstable livelihoods are secured. Then, in a recent book (2016), he suggests that the draconian lives of these people are the result of rentier capitalism alone. But this obscures the ways in which people’s livelihood practices entangle them in multiple ways with *different forms* of capital.

In *Fragmented Societies*, Mingione attends to the relationship between ‘specific patterns of capitalist development and State intervention, and the various complex practices to achieve reproduction among the different forms of surplus population that result’ (1991: 234). Consequently, rather than working with the problematic relation between an apparently clearly identified sphere of labour tied directly into formal economic production and another sphere of ‘social reproduction’, he is concerned with the *processual* changes that occur in the latter under different regional and historical conditions. This leads him towards a complex set of theoretico-empirical ‘strategic hypotheses’ (Bensaid 2011) that provide us with an extremely useful way of exploring variations in the reproductive strategies

of 'surplus' populations and thereby deconstructing the various elements of 'social reproduction'.

One among the many variables that affect the shape of a livelihood-seeking unit is the degree to which one or more of its occupants is temporarily or relatively surplus to the directly capitalist labour force as opposed to perpetually or absolutely so. Thus, well before it became fashionable to note that Marx's 'primitive accumulation' was not confined to some originary moment in the formation of capital, we find Mingione remarking that

Today Marx's theory of relative surplus population is for the most part inadequate since the emphasis has necessarily shifted on to the 'absolute' nature of the phenomenon, its existence over a long period and, therefore, the ways in which it persists; the latter [would be] difficult to locate [if we were to confine ourselves to] the socio-economic processes that may explain their origins. (1991: 234)

So while he does refer to distinct periods in the relationship between forms of capitalist employment and the changing forms of the household much as does Fraser (though his periods don't quite match), what for him makes the late twentieth-century period distinct is the growing importance of what he glosses as *informal activities* for social reproduction in the global North and their extension in the South. He is then enquiring into how this particular form of the society of capital, with its regional variations, relates its overall reproduction to the subcategory of how the 'social reproduction' sphere is itself reproduced.

What makes Mingione's explorations so fruitful is contained in the title of his book: that the effect of a kind of capitalism that gives rise to long-term or permanent surplus populations left to secure the reproduction of their own livelihoods is to *fragment* the population.⁶ The heterogeneity of these pursuits involve

the development of accentuated and diversified tendencies towards social fragmentation which derive from the schizophrenic nature of the relationship between the increasingly complex structure of social reproduction [among the surplus population], the process of public intervention [i.e. the State], and the cycle of formal capitalist accumulation [i.e. dominant capitals]. (Mingione 1985: 31)

In fact what arises is not a distinct sphere of 'social reproduction' in terms of elderly care and childcare, food preparation, etc. within a domestic unit extending outward towards reciprocal arrangements beyond it ('the community', 'civil society', a neighbourhood), but a multiple set of activities that combine various forms of monetary income – from the formal wage to secondary jobs, contractual and non-contractual work and so on; the result being an array of forms that certainly include social-reproduction-

as-unpaid-care but are by no means confined to it, since many of these activities are complexly embroiled in capital's various surplus-extracting relationships. What Fraser calls 'boundary struggles over social reproduction' Mingione (1985: 29) speaks of in terms of the 'process of circular transmission of the crisis, from the productive to the reproductive system [...] and back to the productive system', in a context of the lowering of the quantity and quality of public services. The combination of state withdrawal of services and widespread un- or under-employment means that the problem of reproduction *overall* is shifted to the working population.

The various units, in the various socio-economic ambits, must seek to rebalance reproduction by means of various combinations of two possible solutions:⁷ 'an absolute increase in work for self-consumption, including that exchanged with neighbours, friends and relations; and various forms of [monetary] informal activities (or occasional formal activities providing a low income)' (Mingione 1985: 30).

Let us take a family with two adults bringing in cash that suddenly finds one of them being made redundant. They may now face a problem in reproducing their livelihood, but how they handle this will depend on the local opportunities and limitations in which they are embedded. One might shift household activities towards albeit unstable niches in the informal economy, then, finding none, seek to increase the arena of self-provisioning (gardening, clothes repairs, small-livestock husbandry and so on: what is traditionally called the sphere of social reproduction). For another the journey may be in the opposite direction, at first trying to expand existing household activities – more chickens, more homecare etc. But then, as the absolute limits of these expanded non-monetary activities are reached, pressures increase to find sources of monetary income, however menial: so menial in fact that the return on labour output expended, even when compared to the alternate work that might have been done for self-provisioning were it available, has less value. People *are* driven to 'self-exploitation' in these complex ways and we need a version of social reproduction that can expose these tensions in *all* the sites where they occur.

Seen processually in this way, such predicaments illustrate that Fraser's social reproduction and various forms of informalised income-seeking that are indeed tied to the surplus-value-extracting 'economy' are now so intertwined in multiple ways that the reproduction of this sphere *as a whole* (as the package that makes up livelihood) becomes the major concern of participants – but perforce in highly contradictory ways. As a result, working people are not just the victims of exploitation by others but find themselves thrown in and out of conflicts with those otherwise close to them.

A point I have made in the past (Smith 2016) is that there are instruments and relations needed for the reproduction of livelihood that people wish

to defend. Yet Mingione's work suggests that the forces of defence may be directed towards different threats – illicit market activities directing them against the state, the need for reliable affectual ties directing them against the temptations of cash alternatives and so on. Thus the reproduction of a more monetised element of this 'mixed economy' may come into conflict with other elements, producing a deeply schizophrenic sphere, be it a household unit or a wider set of relations. For example, as household activities become more 'entrepreneurial' (as opposed to using affectual ties for survival), viable activities set participants against the state (rather than capital) – 'evasion of certain obligations of a fiscal, social and contributory nature, and even those of a legal nature (employment of minors, illegal immigrants etc.)' (Mingione 1985: 31). On the other hand, elements of a unit relying for reproduction on solidarity networks that defend the sphere of materials and relations *qualitatively evaluated* are predisposed to resist the 'disenchanting' effects of quantitative calculation that is the capitalist norm. Hence the 'deeply schizophrenic' character of the pursuit of livelihood to which Mingione refers.

We see an echo of this complexity at one point in Nancy Fraser's discussion when she speaks of poorer women who perform carework for middle-class households for a wage. But she does not speak of what the homes of those women might look like, nor of 'people whose homes do not fit into the Western, heteropatriarchal normative assumptions of "home"' (Hall 2016: 93). This, of course, means that we miss the double exploitation of such people, but it might also mean that we fail to handle properly the mixed nature of the economies we are speaking of, and the degree to which the *maintenance* of multiple sources of livelihood and the qualitatively different relations thus involved can be the basis for a distinct kind of politics.

We see one instance of this if we move to India and the provocative work of the late Kalyan Sanyal (2007) in his *Rethinking Capitalist Development: Primitive Accumulation, Governmentality and Post-colonial Capitalism*. There he argues that, faced with global competition, Indian capital is now limited in its ability to extract relatively surplus value in the direct capital–labour relationship. Instead capital employs 'external coercive laws' to secure surpluses primitively through plundering the spaces and materials of those reduced to what he calls a 'needs economy' that doesn't look unlike the kinds of livelihood scenarios Mingione describes. This in turn gives rise to a distinct kind of politics. The struggle to protect those essential resources, he argues, gives rise to kinds of relationship which, perforce, must attend to the reproduction of collective institutions (guilds, families, neighbours and so on) which, while not lacking the profit motive, must prioritise the socially necessary reproduction of members.

The politics of exclusion aims to resist the invasion of the accumulation economy into the parallel needs economy and to assert the latter's demand for resources to create the conditions for expanded reproduction. At the same time, it strives to extricate the implicated part of the needs economy from capital's circuit, to liberate these activities from the grasp of the systemic logic of capitalist accumulation, and unite them with the parallel part of the needs economy to constitute a unified space where production is grounded in the logic of need (Sanyal 2007: 256–7).

In casting the points of tension in this light, Sanyal shows us a more socio-economically grounded and thus more sophisticated picture of what 'boundary struggles' might look like. Yet the framework is again too neatly manichean: the instrumental calculation of the accumulation economy on the one hand and the associative features of the needs economy on the other. The effects on the subaltern world of the forms in which capital secures surplus value through plunder can be somewhat more complex – not *just* a 'needs economy' but more realistically a mixed one. So, while we find similar circumstances in Canada's North West Territories – 'non-capitalist subsistence labour is labour that is performed in the mixed economy for the purpose of meeting the social needs of a household or community. [And] unlike capitalist labour, non-capitalist subsistence labour is based on social need, rather than individual accumulation' (Hall 2016: 100) – even so, as Rebecca Jane Hall argues, the overlaps in what she refers to as a 'mixed economy' are crucial for understanding social reproduction *in its totality*.

For her, there is a close overlap between the caring work of social reproduction and that done by women for subsistence:

[L]ike reproductive work – that can be at once labouring and emotive, exhausting of labour-power and interpersonally enriching – subsistence labour is understood as much more than a necessary activity for biological or economic sustenance. [Abele 2009: 187] writes, "Going on the land" is physically arduous and sometimes risky, but it is not typically understood as "work". Rather it is recognized as an activity that contributes a great deal to physical, emotional and mental well-being.' (Hall 2016: 101)

Yet the wages made through a short-term contract from a local mine can be used to acquire and maintain equipment needed for the making of clothing or for hunting. Taken together then:

The labour of northern Indigenous people [...] in the mixed economy points to the importance of theorizing the shifting, mutable relationship between social reproduction, non-capitalist subsistence production and capitalist production. [...] Rather than avoiding [the overlaps] between these categories, I argue that these are rich spaces of contradiction [...] (Hall 2016: 102)

With these cases we begin to enter the quagmire of a thoroughly sophisticated understanding of social reproduction, at least as it affects these very different subaltern peoples, and in doing so we are obliged to think the distinct nature and varied possibilities of their political praxis. In both Sanyal's and Hall's work we are especially exposed to the coevalness of place and practice, of the integrity of the site of work and the practices and relations therein.⁸ This means that the characterisation of dispossession uniquely in terms of space obscures the relationships within them that have a contradictory position vis-à-vis capital. 'I call this place-based foundation of indigenous decolonial thought and practice *grounded normativity*, by which I mean the modalities of Indigenous land-connected practices and longstanding experiential knowledge that inform and structure our ethical engagements with the world' (Coulthard 2014: 13).

We are now familiar with spatial dispossession, be it in terms of slum clearance or the taking back of the commons, but in the context of the way in which the sites of work are now to be found beyond the conventional image of the factory floor, we need to build into our understanding the fact that the kinds of spatial dispossession alluded to by both Sanyal and Hall here are not just about physical space but about the spaces that make possible the social reproduction of people's livelihoods through the multiple relations necessary. If this is so, and if we are to agree that capital depends as much on the labour power it recognises as on that which it doesn't, then incursions into social reproduction understood in this way are a fundamental contradiction for capital's ongoing reproduction – and hence the site of crucial political struggle.

We know of the struggles when unionised wage labour fought over the conditions of their work and the proportion of profits that should be paid to them by capital as their wage. Yet the space of the factory and care of the tools within it remained the responsibility of the capitalist. What we are seeing nearer the core of large-scale capital is outsourcing, and on its periphery so-called surplus populations getting by in households-cum-workshops. As a result responsibility for the reproduction of both the spaces and the tools of production – or more broadly put, *livelihood* – now have to be defended *as well as* the daily conditions of work and the price paid for labour. This means the defence both of the physical spaces of livelihood – home and workshop – and the defence and perpetual activation of the metaphorical spaces of social reproduction as we have seen them here in all their complexity.

Reflections on social reproduction today

Whether we are speaking of people getting by in the informal economies of Indian cities (Sanyal 2007; Whitehead 2014) or their rural equivalents

(Breman 1996), the slums and shanty towns of South American cities (Smith 2015), or the internal colonies of indigenous North Americans (Coulthard 2014), it is evident that terms such as precarity, marginality and so on are not sufficiently rigorous to capture the realities of their lives. Rather we need to work simultaneously at the level of their actual livelihood practices and the complex forms by which they are entwined with the society and economy within which they find themselves. For this reason we need to employ immediate, long-term, multi-scaler ethnographic evidence in such a way that it can be useful for comparative purposes through a proper understanding of social reproduction.

Yet, as we have seen, the extent to which capital is or is not reliant on a relation of dependence/conflict with social labour – in other words a class relation – has never been a neat one of expanded reproduction on the one hand and social reproduction on the other. Rather the *overall* reproduction of the society of capital *always relies on* both the direct relations of exploitation, conventionally (but not necessarily) through the wage, plus heterogeneous sets of relations for the appropriation of devalued or unpaid work.⁹ What questions of social reproduction have to handle today is the fact that, as the requirements for the reproduction of finance capital have come to reconfigure the reproductive goals of other forms of capital, so the intricacy of these entanglements has become more widespread.

There is no space here to discuss the various reasons for the shift from the relative dominance of manufacturing or industrial capital in the global North to the current dominance of finance. But I especially wish to stress that the dominance of finance does not mean the disappearance of other forms of capital, but rather modifications in the way in which they seek to garner surplus value. For example, declines in the productivity of national industry reduced states' tax income from both corporations and workers, inclining them to delay imbalances by turning to international bond markets (Smith 2014; Streeck 2014). Meanwhile, attacks by the state on collective labour allowed corporations, faced with declining productivity, to put pressure on wages. These two factors alone rebalanced the power relations, allowing finance capital to oblige states to make political and juridical adjustments in its favour. The effect was to rework the settings of states, industrial firms and workers respectively. The free movement of capital so crucial to finance reduced the protection of national industries while pushing the state to favour monetary policies favourable to finance over distributive fiscal programmes. This then opened up the demand for credit from the population while also shifting pensions and (social) insurance schemes towards the control of finance. This in turn transferred the returns made by industrial capital from investment in the greater productivity of machinery and labour to the enhancement of the value of their shares held

by institutional investors (pension schemes and insurance companies) and managed by finance. One response was outsourcing, since it displaced the costs of (the maintenance and renewal of) capital equipment from larger oligopolistic capitals to increasingly informalised subcontractors. And as the scale of these operations came down to the household level, so the distinction between domestic and entrepreneurial credit dissolved.

This is just one (albeit simplified) scenario, but it does serve the purpose of alerting us to ways in which the dominance of finance actually calls into play a vast array of capitals differing in form and size and giving rise to a panoply of overlapping and yet often contradictory social relations. In a household, an indigenous community, or an urban neighbourhood rents are to be found, obligatory debts paid, necessary urban or rural spaces protected for living and working, a wage secured, or a one-off cash opportunity grabbed – and in each case a capital relationship is being reproduced. As a result, from one place to another, each form of capital relates to the livelihood practices of ordinary people in its distinctive way – wage, contract, rent, dispossession and so on. And yet because in any given livelihood site the particularity of one kind of relation overlaps with others, we seek in vain for a distinct ‘culture’, be it that of the entrepreneurial worker, the affectual domestic realm, or the autonomous community.

As with any capital–labour situation, alongside the relation of interdependence there is *always* also a relation of conflict: of capital dependent on and yet set against labour, and of labour dependent on and yet set against capital. As a result, besides these heterogeneous and uneven relations dependent on capital, there are equally indispensable relations along a different plane. Here we find ourselves attending to the, albeit volatile, ‘horizontal’ entanglements whose resilience and extent provide the conditions of possibility for ongoing survival *in the face of* capital. These relations, sometimes extensive, sometimes less so and almost always precarious, are so crucial because, unlike the orthodox case of the mass-production factory worker, besides the length and quality of ‘the working day’ to which Marx devoted so much attention, these kinds of workers have to ensure the continuance of the sites and practices that ensure reproduction into the future. So, the struggles required for the daily business of securing a living and the longer-term struggles to protect the conditions that make the reproduction of those livings possible are perpetually, though unevenly, entwined.

In terms of Fraser’s vocabulary, responsibility for economic production and social reproduction are combined for ever larger proportions of the population. For them, livelihood must be achieved through controlling both the means as well as the practices of production. Thus, the social relations of capitalist production are simultaneously a necessity (in the form of occasional wages, possible contracts and so on) and a threat to what little

texture they can weave together through the uncertainty of their lives and those of their children. In such a world we have to accept that neither for the purposes of analytic precision nor from the perspective of everyday practical sense can ‘social reproduction’ be disentangled from the multiple and complex practices and relations that constitute the entire process of reproduction across its various scales.

This complicates the political work of the engaged intellectual. The history of labour has always revealed the interplay between collective struggles to improve the *conditions of work* and the texture of life in the *community setting* where workers live. Because the scale at which this combination occurred had been reduced – often to the narrow sphere of the household – and had already become so uneven at the time he wrote, Mingione anticipated that we would witness increasing social fragmentation. Comparing the southern Europe of today with that of the 1980s, it is hard to disagree. As many have argued (for example, Endnotes 2015; Narotzky 2016) there is certainly a problem of fragmentation evidenced in today’s multiple political movements directed towards diverse and unsynchronised ends, and many of the people engaged in the kinds of livelihoods discussed here are attracted to one or another of these. But the intellectual challenge – which is also necessarily a political challenge – is to identify precisely the points of tension for each of the relations to which these kinds of livelihoods connect so as to enhance the leverage of people’s political agency in the balance of power of *each such relation* – be it the putting-out contract of a household member, the debt relation of another, or the carework done by a third for a middle-class family.

And then there is the task of taking the, albeit uneven, package of these various relations and understanding the implications of their combination. In their spontaneous form they may *look* fragmenting but need not be so. So, alongside these analytic and critical tasks, there is also the organic one of stimulating the kind of dialogical engagement that cultivates the broader coherence on which a subaltern hegemony might be built. ‘Creating a new culture [...] means diffusing critically [one’s discoveries], to “socialise” them [...] and even to make them become the basis of vital actions’ (Gramsci 1971: 325).

Faced with the apparent incoherence of social phenomena, then, the intellectual is given the task of producing coherence: in the academy as ‘theory’ and in programmes of rule as effective policy. But Gramsci helps us to recognise another challenge. Faced with the fragmented societies of the subaltern, the task of the intellectual is to work towards a more practical coherence – among the people themselves, one aimed at building a hegemonic force that through position and manoeuvre might shift the balance of power in their favour.

Notes

- 1 I am grateful to Jaume Franquesa, Sharryn Kasmir, Tania Li and the editors of this volume for their help with this chapter, responsibility for which remains mine alone.
- 2 For an excellent review of this revived interest, see Viewpoint Magazine (2015). See also Federici (2012).
- 3 While attempting to make this discussion useful for a broad array of social formations, I nonetheless use terms such as 'household' to stand for analogous kinds of spaces and practices of livelihood.
- 4 Elsewhere Fraser (2016b) elaborates: 'In another world, feminism and shifts in industry might not have reinforced one another, but in this world they did. As a result, even though feminist movements did not in any way cause that economic shift, we ended up unwittingly supplying some legitimation for it. We provided some charisma, some ideological ballast to others' agendas.' As I hope my argument makes clear, this suggestion relies on an overly restricted understanding of Marxist feminists' use of 'social reproduction'. See for example, Edholm et al. (1978).
- 5 I use the expression 'society of capital' here to avoid confusion. A more usual term would be simply 'capitalism' or 'capitalist society', but capitalist society includes social relations and associated values and ideas that may not themselves be capitalist. So capitalist society may exhibit and provide opportunities for politics expressed in terms other than those of capital. The term 'society of capital' refers to a society whose reproduction serves the purpose of reproducing capital in its various forms. Nevertheless the term serves to remind us that we live in a society which, despite its richness and variety, is ultimately dominated by the dictates of one or another form of capital and the need for its reproduction (Smith 2014; 2015; see also Brown 2002).
- 6 Cf. Fraser's 'Social reproduction is about the creation and maintenance of social bonds' cited above.
- 7 Mingione actually produces a kind of spectrum of elements of reproduction. In his terminology, these are formal – mixed formal/informal – pure informal (second jobs, no-contract work, informal self-employment) – illegal – non-monetary reciprocal work – extraordinary work for self-consumption – normal domestic work (1991: 83–6).
- 8 We should also be aware of the coevalness of the different cycles of temporal reproduction and the tensions and contradictions contained therein. See Lem (2016).
- 9 Respectively the so-called 'formal economy' and 'informal economy'.

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On the social (dis-)embedding of the economy in a local context: where anthropology and sociology share metaphors as analytical tools

The reconceptualisation of the Polanyian term embeddedness since the 1980s has revived an attentive analysis of deconstructing the influential idea of the market as a separate system from social conditioning, as well as an encompassing and dominant structuring force in social life. The market paradigm, it is argued, is not only an ethnocentric conception widely accepted in sociological tradition, but also a fictitious one. To begin with, the market, constrained by its own logic of competitiveness, is a disorganiser of social life: it cannot endure self-regulating patterns and atomised individuals without causing social tensions. Moreover, within alleged competitive social relations we continually observe the formation of market exchange relations that conceal non-economic behaviour (friendship, affinity, reciprocity and so forth), which contradicts both the idea of competitiveness and that of atomised decision making. This theoretical debate about the abstractedness of the economy fits perfectly with the anthropological inclination to call into question the reification of the market through empirical research.

Polanyi's perspective was influential in shaping anthropological economic thinking several decades ago (i.e. the substantive and formalist debate), but most of the research was carried out in marginal or non-Western societies. By contrast, Mingione drew on the methodological compatibility between sociology and anthropology to develop his own theoretical base for a critical sociology of Western (post-)Fordist societies. By revisiting the Polanyian analytical approach, various forms of economic activities, previously overlooked or ignored in sociology – but quite familiar among anthropologists – have been reconsidered and looked at in a new perspective. The informal economy, household labour and strategies of survival in the face of the retrenchment of the welfare state were all being analysed through empirical research as institutionalised manifestations of reciprocal and associative mechanisms. Mingione proposed seeing them

not as necessary epiphenomena of the market, but as institutionalisations of pre-existing forms of sociality: reciprocity and redistribution, whose relevance explains the forms of embeddedness of the market (Mingione 1991: 24). This renewed interest in the concept of embeddedness among current economic sociologists – Zelizer, Laville, Swedberg, Frazer to name but a few – has thus contributed to reviving anthropological economic analysis with reference to global capitalism and post-Fordist societies, overcoming the exoticism that, rightly or wrongly, had been attached to the discipline. This is the main point to be discussed in the first part of this chapter. My argument is that the sociological interest in anthropological concepts and the renewed interest of anthropology in Western economies through ethnographic investigation may generate a terrain upon which further and fruitful collaboration can be established. As for anthropology, its emphasis on ethnographic research in micro settings is particularly apt to provide a ‘thick’ description of the social embeddedness of the economy in areas that sociology normally cannot reach. It does so by bringing into the analytical framework the importance of culture and meanings produced within a society, so that to term it a *market society* would be a gross over-simplification. The same argument can be applied to tackle the dominance of *market behaviour* observed through the magnifying lenses of ethnography. Such behaviour, indeed a specific kind of *economic behaviour*, is per se non-social and, albeit dominant as a public discourse, illusory. It is illusory because the utility-maximising individual who embodies such behaviour is inevitably engulfed by intervening relational aspects, contrasting and yet equally important, such as power struggles and the apparent sharing of a common value system. The latter of these aspects will be the central point of my discussion in the second part of this chapter. In this regard, I will mainly draw upon ethnographic data from my ongoing fieldwork research on small and micro enterprises¹ in a small area in the region of Lombardy (Italy), the Brianza.

When I started doing research in this area about twenty years ago, I found a system of organised capitalism in which ‘embeddedness’ was noticeable in virtually every aspect of the local economy. The time that has lapsed has not subverted the overall structure, yet something has intervened to undermine it. To understand what that ‘something’ is, I will provide insights as to how shifting values and new social arrangements may have initiated ‘dis-embedding’ processes from which ‘re-embedding’ mechanisms are yet to be seen in their entirety. Ultimately, behind my intent of taking embeddedness as the core concept lie some wider collaborative goals: to establish a common ground and a dialogue between anthropology and sociology in the study of capitalism, and to lessen the gap between the micro/meso level and the macro level of analysis.

Transcending the dichotomies

Anthropologists have always considered economic life in terms of social embedding; however, because this claim was always directed to non-Western and non-capitalist societies, the interdisciplinary conversation between the two disciplines never took off. The anthropological debate in the 1960s between formalists advocating the principles of neoclassical economics, and substantivists who had in Polanyi a pivotal intellectual figure, was confined to anthropologists and only marginally involved development economists. The core of the debate can be synthesised by quoting two well-known assertions that express contrasting views to explain human behaviour:

Practically every economic mechanism and institution known to us is found somewhere in the nonliterate world. [...] The distinctions to be drawn between literate and nonliterate economies are consequently those of degree rather than of kind. (Herskovits 1952: 487–8)

The assertion on the opposite side was:

[There are] important differences between primitive market economy and Western market industrialism which makes formal economic theory incapable of yielding analytical insights when applied to primitive structures [...] Primitive economy is different from market industrialism not in degree but in kind. (Dalton 1961: 19–20)

According to the formalists, the total acceptance of the cross-cultural applicability of formal economic theory was a standpoint from which we could explain economic behaviour as a unifying element of any culture in any epoch. For the substantivists, if a unifying cultural theme really existed, it was to be found, as suggested by Polanyi, in the ways economic systems would variably institutionalise the three forms of integration that have been observed in human economies: reciprocity, redistribution and exchange. To quote Gudeman, ‘the formalists in anthropology took the position of economists; the substantivists were like sociologists’ (2009: 6); the former gave predominance to the decision-making behaviour of the calculating individual; the latter were more concerned about people within their social context. Within the conceptual framework of this debate, however, the ethnographies that ensued produced much research that aimed at finding out whether economic laws observed in market society were or were not applicable in other types of society. By essentialising the market, both approaches were oblivious to its articulation. Thus, a binary opposition was uncritically assumed by both sides: by contrasting ‘the West and the rest’ the primacy of the market exchange in the West was assumed, and the pervasive role of other institutions based on reciprocity and redistribution was overlooked or even dismissed.

Towards the end of the twentieth century, scholars of capitalism began to acknowledge that market economies needed a conceptual vocabulary that transcended that delivered by neoclassical economics or Marxist materialism, and found in Polanyi's work proper analytical tools without nevertheless dismissing Marxism entirely (Halperin 1984). The so-called New Economic Sociology (NES) that consolidated in the late 1980s made extensive use of this approach and put the binary dichotomy, a legacy of the old anthropological debate, under severe scrutiny. The irony is that by the 1980s the Polanyi school in anthropology had dissolved; 'economic anthropologists have largely dropped the causal links postulated by Marxists; they have abandoned the toolkits of both formalists and substantivists; and they have practically ceased to exist as an intellectual community' (Hann and Hart 2011: 98). Hence, when some anthropologists began studying 'their own backyard' more consistently, superseding the division between 'us' and 'the Others', and others began to recognise the effects of capitalism in former socialist countries and of expanding markets in areas previously only marginally touched by the Western economy, no prominent theoretical approach would emerge.

As other anthropologists have recently argued, the approach that the NES proposed looked promising from an anthropological perspective because it helped to rethink and redress the split between economy and society (Bråten 2013: 2). Indeed, the argument was reminiscent of the old debate between substantivists and formalists which had faded away without resolving any of the moot points they had raised; yet, in retrospect, the NES's renewed interest in Polanyi's categories proved with hindsight that substantivists and the economic sociologists of the new generation had methodological and theoretical affinities. Abstract theoretical tools were turned into methodological concepts to reveal the extent of the embeddedness of the economy in contemporary societies.

The notion of 'embeddedness' is customarily ascribed to Polanyi, who used it as 'a metaphor denoting a state of dependence upon or subordination to' (Dale 2011: 198) with reference to economic and social systems. Since, in his view, the economy is a social process that organises the provisioning of material goods, he proposed to analyse it not as an autonomous entity, as economic theory does, but rather as dependent, that is embedded, on social relations, politics, religion and culture. Although traces of this can be found in the German historical school, especially in Weber, Tönnies and Bücher (see Dale 2011), the conceptualisation of embeddedness was derived from Polanyi's anthropological theory based on his reading of Malinowski (1922; 1935), Mead (1932), Firth (1929) and Thurnwald (1932) in particular, from whom he might have borrowed the term (*eingebettet*), according to Firth (1972: 474).² In these ethnographic accounts he found the empirical

sources for his nascent idea of embeddedness: ‘The outstanding discovery of recent historical and anthropological research is that man’s economy, as a rule, is submerged in his social relationships’ (Polanyi 1944: 48). Hence, he developed the idea of economic systems embedded in social systems. An important anthropological implication of Polanyi’s notion of embeddedness is that the individual is a social actor whose actions are mediated by his or her own institutional framework, that is, the norms of the cultural setting. This was a sharp departure from the abstractedness of the *homo oeconomicus* imagined by classical economics who was focused exclusively on economic gains.

The self-regulating market is another singular idea that has emerged from classical economics and expresses the extreme artificiality of the market economy as a system populated by *homines oeconomici*. As Polanyi contended, ‘the idea of a self-adjusting market implied a stark utopia’ (1944: 3); eventually governments’ reiterated attempts to implement the utopian structure theorised by liberal economists turned market society into a dystopian reality. In a well-known passage in *The Great Transformation*, Polanyi describes the paradox of treating society as an ‘adjunct’ to the market: ‘instead of the economy being embedded in social relations, social relations are embedded in the economic system’ (1944: 57). The notion of embeddedness served Polanyi as a metaphor to juxtapose capitalism to the economic systems as described by Thurnwald, Malinowsky and other anthropologists. The former requires ongoing regulation in order for society to take measures to protect itself against the collapse of the system; whereas the latter are lacking any of these preoccupations precisely because they approach economic issues with non-economic forms of integration, that is reciprocity and redistribution, and avoid subordinating labour and land to the market. Polanyi’s argument drew the attention of the anthropologists who were typically studying pre-capitalist ‘embedded’ economies, and eventually sparked the aforementioned debate between formalists and substantivists. He probably exaggerated the dichotomy between utilitarian market societies and non-utilitarian primitive economic systems due to the limited amount of ethnographic evidence available at that time. Nevertheless, his analytical approach has been useful both for anthropologists and sociologists to call into question the behavioural assumptions of economic models and consider a plurality of motives, cultural, moral and so forth.

More accurate and sound, however, are Polanyi’s considerations regarding the regulatory measures implemented to control the action of the market as labour, land and money are transformed into fictitious commodities. The institutionalisation of the labour market, the extinguishing of the commons to the advantage of private property, and the expansion of all-purpose money all brought about social tensions that called for the intervention

of ‘powerful institutions’ designed to curb the disruptive actions of these special commodities (1944: 79).

The problematic compatibility between commodified markets and society – an issue foreign to the social systems studied by the early anthropologists simply because they failed to consider the colonial impact on local cultures – resulted in dynamic and chronically unstable arrangements as documented by Polanyi in *The Great Transformation*. Extending the metaphor of embeddedness, Polanyi theorised that the dis-embedding effects of alleged self-regulating markets are to be countered by the re-embedding interposition of redistributive and reciprocity-based institutions, to avoid the potential disruption of the economic system. This process was called ‘the double movement’ by Polanyi. He strongly believed that the market of fictitious commodities lies at the root of these tensions, and that the double movement is the most effective way to theorise the continuity of capitalism (and its inner transformation) through the temporary overcoming of such tensions. It is another powerful metaphor that has since been taken up by social scientists to explain the emergence of institutions and socially diversified counter-movements towards deregulating markets and extending commodification; to identify the policies implemented by the state to correct market distortions, or to comply with the constraining exigencies of the market. Resistance and dissent could have revolutionary or reactionary outcomes, as well as being variable in scope, in so far as they could be targeting national or supranational institutions to press their corrective intervention *pro et contra* market. The dis-embedding/embedding mechanism of the double movement operates at different levels: it can make sense of both a large-scale event, as well as the dynamics in small-scale settings. Versatility makes this analytical tool adaptable both in sociology and anthropology.

In the next section I will show how these Polanyian metaphors shed new light on work-related social practices and their meaning in an Italian setting, the Brianza. The area is well known for the presence of a large number of small manufacturing firms (including numerous family businesses) enmeshed in organised networks of production, typical of industrial districts, and by a high rate of employment in the metal, furniture and plastic-moulding sectors which constitute the main chains of production.

Small-scale (dis-)embedding processes

As stated earlier, when I started doing research in the mid-1990s, ‘embeddedness’ was noticeable in virtually every aspect of the local economy. My initial focus on nascent entrepreneurship – an autochthonous phenomenon – had already revealed the thick relatedness of the locale. Knowledge and

capital are historically deeply embedded in the area, and have constituted a competitive advantage that has contributed to the growing economic welfare of the region. The supportive role of the entrepreneurs' families was key for the survival of the firms as well as for their continuity as family businesses (Ghezzi 2015; 2016). Entrepreneurs, workers, bankers, local politicians, Catholic associations and local institutions were all bound in relational spheres of residential proximity, informality and reciprocity (Ghezzi 2007). It would take too long to illustrate this comprehensively; therefore, to develop the thread of my argument, I will provide a cursory description of the embedding economy in the sphere of work and offer a glimpse of the changing sociality of today's labour arrangements.

The majority of the first-generation entrepreneurs who became my informants started off as young workers either in large factories (long vanished after years of restructuring and downsizing) or in small artisan workshops in the 1960s and 1970s. For some, the big leap into entrepreneurship took place during the 1970s Fordist crisis, for others in the following decade. Either way, one of the most significant work experiences they have in common is the early socialisation to waged work through apprenticeship that contributed to shaping their ideas about work. Accounts of this period are replete with examples of the hardship and at times even the physical abuse they endured as young apprentices. In recollecting this experience, they assert the contrast between their total lack of protection and the 'over-regulation' of the workplace nowadays. Yet in retrospect they do not display regret, because through the harshness of the workplace they toughened themselves up and learned how to 'make sacrifices' (*fare sacrifici* is a very common expression among this generation of entrepreneurs). In the end, those efforts paid off, as they were promoted into the ranks of skilled workers prior to becoming entrepreneurs.

Apprenticeships were rarely rewarded with a salary. In the workshops it was customary for the apprentices' parents to pay a fee, or to deliver their children to work without a salary, as compensation for the cost of their training. The long formative years, way beyond the legal apprenticeship period, would eventually contribute to perfecting their knowledge and gaining sufficient self-confidence to start up a business on their own. Such knowledge became their source of mastery, which, in turn, gave them the prospect of acquiring more responsibilities than their factory workmates, and the opportunity to perform basic managerial tasks, presaging one of their entrepreneurial tasks. As foremen, their attitude towards work was praised by the firm through promotion and increased salary; as would-be entrepreneurs, their skill was subsequently used to get recognition in society, to build up the reputation necessary to find business partners, procure customers, get help from the former boss and secure bank loans. In other terms,

these asset-like virtues were used to activate reciprocity mechanisms that had huge economic benefits.

Upward mobility did not always characterise the route towards skill acquisition. Working on the Fordist assembly line, for example, or performing a limited number of tasks within the firm was viewed as a dead-end activity, a job without a future, for it did not offer any chance of gaining the familiarity with a sufficiently wide range of machines that is the basis of the acquisition of expertise. Not settling for unskilled jobs, ambitious workers did more such as overtime, bringing home extra work or moonlighting in other firms. This attitude towards labour, featuring a socially accepted coalescence of formal and informal arrangements, to which I add workaholism, a strong sense of pragmatism, anti-intellectualism, aversion to job regulation in general and towards trade unions, became the founding components of their work ethics, which they carried over as entrepreneurs. Originated in the Fordist era, this social construction of work has shaped their identity and behaviour.

In the family firms these connotations became more accentuated once the young adult children began to assist their fathers – the founding entrepreneurs – in the running of the business. While the ‘working-class’ bosses often worked shoulder to shoulder with their employees and were, therefore, completely focused on the process of production, the children, coming from a school-oriented upbringing and having accumulated fewer work experiences, challenged their fathers about those issues that they seemed to shrug off. Here is an example taken from a conversation I had with the daughter of Carlo, a former worker (welder) who set up a welding firm in the early 1990s:

Between us [my brother and I] and our father there's a different mentality. My father is used to working like people were used to thirty years ago. He is truly an excellent worker, the only thing is, he's a bit unrealistic when it comes to set prices. He always sets a lower price than that suggested by my brother and me. We are more exacting, more calculating. He just wants to get on with the work, but he doesn't realise that what is most important for the firm unfolds in the office. He sets low prices because he's afraid of losing work orders and clients. Then, when he realises that his price is too low, he asks the client to renegotiate and, of course, arguments arise. Now my father and my brother set prices together to avoid problems with clients.

We notice not only disagreement regarding her father's approximations on setting the price of work orders, because he is ill-suited as *homo oeconomicus*, but also the implicit divide on the notion of work between generations. His outlook is centred on production and conducive to informal deals which require dense sociality, that is, more intense social relationships, which are at times conflictual; theirs is cast in a more formalised set of relations to minimise potential disagreements and conflictual social relationships.

The crisis that apprenticeship is undergoing in many artisanal occupations in the region has something to do with this cultural divide between the generations. For the workers of Carlo's generation, apprenticeship was essentially the most effective way to pull themselves up by their own bootstraps, as mentioned earlier. It involved three parties: principally the master and the parents, and subordinately the apprentice. The informality of the agreement, which included duration, content of training, obligations and responsibilities, although strictly unlawful from a legal perspective, was embedded in the local arrangements of the community and, as such, accepted as a customary (i.e. cultural) norm. Indeed, poverty and the non-implementation of existing institutional regulations to protect the young apprentice and prevent child labour exploitation limited the agency of the parents, hoping above all to secure a job for their children. Ultimately, however, the shared notion of work in the terms that I have described was the element that would affirm informality as the customary practice.

Nowadays, apprenticeship is no longer a private affair between the household and the master; moreover, social conditions have incomparably improved within and beyond the factory since Carlo's time. The introduction of new bureaucratic procedures that strictly regulate both the employment and tasks of the apprentice, and the novelty of a new institutional party – the professional school in which the young person must be enrolled – have removed any trace of informality in the relation as well as debasing the master's power and function. Regulation has indisputably improved the working conditions of the apprentices a great deal; however, by introducing a standardised model of apprenticeship and not acknowledging the diversities among each trade (for example, the variable timespan required to master it), it has undermined the very notion of work that the artisan entrepreneurs identify with. As a result, apprenticeship is being devalued precisely by those who should impart the teaching and safeguarding of the craft. This is becoming a major issue specifically in the artisan sector, where activities require a long process of practical training to achieve a good level of craftsmanship. It is these artisan activities – still considered a truly exceptional characteristic of the region – which are the most affected by this, and face a relentless decline.

Hiring labour³ is also undergoing major transformations, and to understand them I turn again to the Polanyian metaphors of the double movement and embeddedness. Polanyi reminds us that labour is a fictitious commodity; as such it is subjected both to the self-regulating market and to the institutional regulations of the state which ultimately chooses where to set the temporary equilibrium (Keynesian or neoliberal, for example), bearing in mind that it is in any case an unstable form of rule. Yet the ethnographic approach applied to the reduced-scale setting of small and micro-enterprises

provides further insights by identifying forms of sociality that would have remained overlooked otherwise. When I did my first fieldwork in the mid-1990s, the dominant pattern of recruitment was neither the labour market nor the state. In other words, instead of relying entirely on impersonal relations with strangers, or on the local employment bureau, the labour force was normally selected and recruited on the basis of existing social networks, including kinship, friendship and acquaintance. This *modus operandi* of the artisan entrepreneur was of great importance for the management of the personnel in the workshop. It essentially established bonds of mutual obligation between the employer and the employee that were enacted on a daily basis. To explain this point and its implications, it is necessary to make a short normative digression on the different labour regulations implemented in the firms prior to the recent labour reforms.

The Workers' Statute, introduced in Italy in 1970 after years of mass demonstrations and general strikes, was the first structural regulatory tool of the workplace. It instituted a series of rights for employees to contrast years of authoritarian management. It allowed trade union representatives with considerable legal rights in the firm; it provided legal protection against discriminatory lay-offs, and introduced redundancy pay in case of economic recession. The job was retained by the worker in the company, while the state paid his temporary redundancy through the government's temporary lay-offs indemnity. However, this charter of rights was only implemented in firms with fifteen or more employees. It left out a great number of workers in small and micro firms and produced a dual system in which, interestingly enough, those included in the scheme continued to experience high levels of conflict unheard of among those excluded from it.

It is quite obvious that the strong unionisation among workers vis-à-vis the firm's management and ownership fuelled the strife. How then did employees in small firms counteract the authoritarianism of the entrepreneur without trade union representatives? How do we account for the low staff turnover in the small and micro firms, where jobs were not protected by the Workers' Statute? One way to answer these questions within a neo-Polanyian approach is to take Mingione's argument on the concept of reciprocity and its applicability to post-Fordist organisations.⁴ In small and micro firms, personal contacts, residential proximity and kinship ties reinforce mutual obligations, and contribute to controlling conflict and dealing with controversies informally and personally without the institutional mediation of the union. The reciprocity of social obligations in particular may work in this way: the newly hired employee shows gratitude by 'behaving' and 'working hard', hence complying with the entrepreneur's notion of work ethics; the employer responds with empathy by setting up a 'family-like' working environment, more so when family members are involved in

the firm. His way of controlling labour has nothing to do with the power exerted by the factory management. The legitimacy of his power stems from his reputation and skill and from his working shoulder to shoulder with his employees. Moreover, in this way the worker is constantly under watch.

This 'thick' sociality cements relations in the workplace and in essence works as an effective form of regulation of labour. First, to paraphrase Narotzky, the sociality of reciprocity is incorporated in the value of commodities without being commoditised in market exchange (2015: 184); secondly, it may deter the raising of demands from workers who would rather not personally deal with their boss, or, ideally, it may ease controversies precisely because they are dealt with face to face; thirdly, it works to protect jobs in the case of economic fluctuations in the market. The implications of these points are explained in the following excerpts. In the first, Carla, the business partner of her husband in a high-precision lathing firm which employs only a male workforce, explains their internal rules in the event that their workload declines.

First the boys, we leave home [i.e. lay off] the boys. Those who have a family – and we know who has a family to support and who hasn't – come after. Those who have a family with kids and are also the only ones with an income come after [...] We would be very sorry for everyone, for the boys too, but it's a temporary measure. As soon as the work comes back, we will call them in again.

In this second and longer excerpt, the interviewee is Davide, the son and business partner of an entrepreneur (a former woodworker). He explains what had happened in his firm in the past.

So far, no one has ever been fired. I remember that in 1993 the work dropped a lot, but lay-offs were not in my father's mentality. I don't think he has ever fired anyone, except maybe someone who had exasperated him [...] There was another guy I had an argument with, a week later he resigned. We were so happy when he left! So anyways ... what did we do during that crisis? We started renovating the place, painting, cleaning, repairing, taking care of the garden. In July we fixed the fence and repainted the gate. We received some orders and fulfilled them, but in the spare time, we did these kind of jobs [...] Workers had to be paid, didn't they? We are not like Fiat that can get the government temporary lay-offs indemnity. At any rate even if we had had one extra employee, I am sure he wouldn't have been sacked. It's not our way of doing things. We don't make extra money at the expense of a worker. The savings you can make with one less salary are not a big deal [...] I am like my father: I can't accept the idea of sending someone home. They are all breadwinners, they all have a family to support.

Given that small and micro factories were not eligible for unemployment compensation until very recently,⁵ the decision to 'leave someone home'

was perceived as the last resort and thus would have been pondered seriously. When small workshops faced sporadic periods of crisis, family values defined the hierarchical sequence of worker dismissal; but at the same time, they acted as a deterrent and a factor of solidarity. As the worker's family situation was well known to the entrepreneur, the decision regarding who should be laid off first was predetermined by the informal regulation in the firm, which happened to be shared by many in the area. A gendered view is noticeable, because protection from lay-offs was first of all granted to male workers with families. Married women seemed to be excluded from this kind of informal protection. Marriage and motherhood are rites of passage that carry new responsibilities, but they were not per se sufficient to benefit from these informal arrangements. What lies behind this is the paternalistic assumption that women, unlike men, are not ultimately responsible for the economic welfare of their households. In this view, welfare still enters the household through the husband's pockets.

The workplaces of small and micro firms did not appear to be handled by the market, nor by the formal regulation of the state, but rather by an organisational context in which thick sociality plays an economically relevant role. Family values, for example, in defining the hierarchical sequence of lay-offs, act as institutions resting on areas of sociality and kinship that are neither economic nor political.

Embeddedness must not be associated with a sort of moral economy where righteous behaviour and social solidarity prevail over personal interest in the firm. Exploitative relations and strict control are intrinsic in production; moreover, conflicts without the mediation of a third party may leave the worker without any choice other than to quit; nonetheless, sometimes it becomes a bulwark against exclusive personal economic profit.

Having illustrated the embeddedness of labour, now it is time to go back to the issue of dis-embeddedness. Similar to what has happened to apprenticeships, in recent years labour recruitment has experienced significant change among small and micro firms which are reducing the space for reciprocity and informality, at least in the manner I have known so far. The various state reforms of the labour market have introduced forms of temporary, flexible and precarious work that have been incorporated in the hiring practices of small manufacturing firms. The second-generation entrepreneurs, the children of the 'working-class' bosses described earlier, have quickly embraced these new forms of employment that bypass the thick sociality their fathers were immersed in. New workers are frequently sought through temping agencies, avoiding the hassle of searching through their informal network and trying workers out for a trial period. The agency searches for the profile requested by the entrepreneur; it takes care of the paperwork and pays the salary; effectively, the worker is actually an employee of the temping agency.

If, after a few days' work, the worker is judged unfit for the job he or she is immediately replaced. This arrangement may last up to 36 months, with optional renewals. In the meantime, if the entrepreneur is convinced that he or she is a good worker, and if the workload remains steady, then the entrepreneur may decide to hire the worker on a permanent contract. As is evident from the increasing number of skilled workers employed in temping agencies since the recent recession, permanent contracts are losing ground with respect to temporary ones. Regardless of the nature of the contract, the choice made by the entrepreneurs is increasingly based on impersonal relationships, through a private employment service.

A different work arrangement became noticeable in a furniture workshop run by two brothers and business partners after their father's retirement. Of a dozen or so people working on the factory floor, only 'four' had been hired; the remaining workers were self-employed artisans who were filling in to help out. In other words, at any time there is a work order with a tight deadline or requiring a specific skill not available in the firm, these self-employed artisans are called in and paid for their professional services. This practice of short-term hiring, lasting no longer than a few days, is gradually expanding with the growing availability of jobless, highly skilled workers who are turning themselves into self-employed artisans. They are not independent contractors by choice, but workers who have lost their jobs during the economic recession. They work on demand as freelancers and eke out a living doing jobs consistent with their skill wherever they can. This way of working, unprecedented among the skilled workers in this area, bears some resemblances to the so-called gig economy (Cockayne 2016), though without the digital platforms that are devised to connect consumers (here entrepreneurs) to providers (here skilled workers turned self-employed artisans). Information about the 'gig' available in the firm still circulates through word of mouth via mobile phones. Hence, personal relations are still important, but the entrepreneurs do not develop any moral obligation and responsibility towards the workers, given that they are not their employees, but rather, freelancers shared with other workshops. In this kind of firm the workplace has been entirely transformed by arrangements that are increasingly *dis-embedded*. Under the same factory 'roof', precarious and permanent workers toil together in a newly established dual system and in a different kind of sociality.

Conclusion

Polanyi's line of argument on embeddedness and the double movement has provided the lens to observe sociality, customary rules, values and informality between the alleged self-regulated market and institutional-political

regulation in a small-scale setting. As I have argued, I find Mingione's reformulation, through a reappraisal of reciprocity as an analytical concept, useful to illustrate the intricacy of the local setting in the Brianza, which is still characterised by a high number of small manufacturing firms combining market and non-market institutions. The pervasiveness of the embeddedness that I documented when I started my fieldwork in the mid-1990s is still a trait connoting the sociality of the locale. Yet the interdependency between the economy and the social context has been visibly altered.

At least three concurrent elements are of particular relevance to explain this alteration. The first is the transformation of work ethics brought by a new generation of post-Fordist workers, matched by the second-generation entrepreneurs who have created a new capitalist work relationship where market exchange seems to prevail over reciprocity. The second is the neoliberal regulation of the labour market, which has set the rules for that work relationship. The third is the long economic crisis that, despite the buffering measures of state intervention, has caused the shutdown of a few enterprises and a rise in unemployment, which the neoliberal regulation of the labour market has quickly transformed into a pool of precarious labour. In contrast to what had always happened during past crises in the Brianza, when the local economy was able to gradually absorb the workforce, this time, or at least for the time being, the manufacturing firms are still cutting back on hiring new employees, or freezing hiring entirely. Without the recent reforms of the labour market the unemployed would have probably swollen the ranks of informal labourers; instead, with the implementation of new regulations they have become precarious workers.

From my ethnographic perspective, the workplace is an apt point from which to investigate the embedding/dis-embedding dialectic. The complex dynamics of apprenticeship is a case in point. Embedded in customary practice, it has been challenged by the regulatory system recently introduced to protect young workers during training. The artisans respond to the challenge of the regulatory system by feeling victimised and by downplaying the apprenticeship's current configuration, lamenting its ineffectiveness. Finally, despite institutional protection, the prospective apprentices do not seem to be particularly attracted by the kind of career that their (grand-)parents pursued out of necessity. Dis-embedding processes of apprenticeship were already in progress with the mismatch of work ethics between generations, and yet the state intervention through its regulatory power does not seem to have produced positive effects so far.

Another dis-embedding process refers to the sociality of reciprocity in the workplace being challenged by the introduction of new legislation regulating hiring and lay-offs. In this case the outcomes seem more ambivalent. The formalisation of recruitment through intermediaries has been conveni-

ently adopted by the second-generation entrepreneurs more frequently than formerly. The recourse to the sharing economy and temping agencies allows the optimisation of recruitment and limits personal commitment towards the worker. A context arises in which lay-offs can occur with greater ease. In fact these lay-offs are more troublesome when permanent contracts are concerned. The pervasive embedding of family values acts as a moral obligation and restores to the workplace the responsibility of mutual obligation as well as anxiety about the decision. But, again, the extension of the temporary lay-offs indemnity down to the micro firms will encroach on this sociality. In this sense it is a dis-embedding process, for embeddedness may also imply not being able to escape from moral obligations.

Notes

- 1 According to Eurostat, firms with less than 10 employees are micro firms, and firms with 10–49 employees are small firms. The Italian Statistics Bureau (ISTAT) only adopted the Eurostat definition after 2005. Before that all enterprises with 20 or fewer employees were grouped under a single category: small firms. The majority of the firms I contacted in my research had less than 20 employees. I use the terms ‘small firm’, ‘small enterprise’, ‘artisan firm’ and ‘artisan workshop’ interchangeably. However, a clarification of the attribute ‘artisan’ is needed. In Italy ‘artisan firm’ is a legal classification (as stated by Law n. 443/1985) which encompasses a wide range of activities. In the case of manufacturing enterprises, Law n. 443/1985 may apply to plants with: 1) a maximum of 10 employees, when the work involves mass assembly, namely standardised production, provided that this is not completely automated; 2) a maximum of 18 employees in firms not involving mass assembly; 3) a maximum of 32 employees in workshops of traditional production such as tailoring, artistic productions and so forth. The recruitment of apprentices may raise the number of employees up to 12, 22 and 40, respectively. The term artisan in Italy encompasses a wide range of activities; most professions fall into such a category: a baker, a barber, a truck driver, an electrician, a mason, if self-employed, are artisans and have to register to the Chamber of Commerce, Industry, Artisan and Agriculture (CCIAA).
- 2 For a different explanation of the origin of this word. see Block (2001: xxiv) in his introduction to *The Great Transformation*.
- 3 Apprenticeship is also a form of hiring, albeit special in so far as it has been placed under institutional ‘custody’, protected from customary practice as well as from market exchange. It is only for analytical purposes that it has been discussed separately.
- 4 Reciprocity has similarly been examined by the anthropologist Susana Narotzky who links it to a political economy framework, while retaining its moral economic aspects. In a decentralised and partially informalised system of production, reciprocity becomes an asset for accumulation (Narotzky 2015).
- 5 In the last economic crisis, forms of solidarity between workers and entrepreneurs were not uncommon and resembled those illustrated by Davide; however,

the unprecedented timespan of the recession would have made these forms of sociality ineffective and, eventually, incapable of coping with the gravity of the crisis. The extension of the government temporary lay-offs indemnity to the small firms as an exceptional measure was key for their survival. This form of institutional aid came to an end in 2016, but immediately afterwards was replaced by a new solidarity fund for artisan firms. The impact of this new regulation is yet to be seen, but it will inevitably relieve the entrepreneur in the small firm from taking decisions based on the informal regulations I have described.

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Part II

WELFARE CAPITALISM AND RIGHTS

The underclass and international comparison, variety and universalism

That national traditions exist in sociology is an empirical fact, not even disputed by those who contend that sociology is, in principle, universal. Bourdieu, who is one of those, wrote his famous paper about the ‘international circulation of ideas’ in 2002. In it he only gave scarce empirical and mostly anecdotal evidence, mainly drawn from his own experience as a dominant scholar in the international sociology ‘field’; on the other hand, he stated unequivocally the importance of national traditions, and even ‘national thought types’ (‘catégories nationales de pensée’, Bourdieu 2002: 7). He noted with reason that there was a time when ‘European scholars communicated only with each other via America’ (2002: 7). This is probably less the case in 2017 than it was thirty years ago, and the European Union has largely replaced America. Abundant social science research is now available on the functioning of ‘scientific forums’ that shows the complexity of the process of interaction and exchange, and debate regarding concepts and ideas between academics of different traditions across Europe, the US and the world. The difficulty lies not only in ‘national traditions’, but in transnational forums that help in crafting *political notions* that circulate in some form of international English (Barbier 2014). On the other hand, national traditions are rooted in long-term, nineteenth-century history, as D. N. Levine (1995) shows. The French and Italian traditions, for instance, differ in many respects. This explains some of the differences that scholars experience in both contexts. Apart from the intellectual roots, one must also take into account the international networks that universities are inserted into. In this regard, from the late 1970s and into the early 1990s, what is striking is that Italian academics’ relationship with American universities was very different from the relationship that the majority of French scholars had. Of course, the individual qualities and strategies of these academics, and the context of the institutions in which they operated, played an essential role in their careers and the thematic and empirical issues they

eventually addressed, but it is obvious that French institutions were less open to exchange, and this is explained at least in part by a sort of (relative, of course) ‘closure’ of the French sociological milieu. This is also explained by the fact that dominant intellectual traditions tend to consider themselves as ‘universalisms’, whereas they are in fact particularisms of some sort. Richard Hyman aptly coined the idea of ‘particularistic universalism’ for this situation, which fully applies to the American and the French traditions. He opposed this to ‘universalist particularism’ (Barbier 2013a: 14–15). It is possible to develop the latter attitude through a conscious effort – which has to be made explicitly – to eliminate national bias and modestly aim for an authentic universalist understanding, while remaining fully aware of the particularistic determinations inherent in research. Starting from Enzo Mingione’s work, I will illustrate the complex task of social science in dealing with the construction of concepts for comparing social situations cross-nationally and transnationally, in the domain of social policy and poverty, because of national traditions. I will then stress the very special role played by the European Union in this process of comparison and circulation of concepts (Barbier 2014). Finally the complex task of the social scientist is illustrated by a case study of the use of the terms ‘underclass’, ‘exclusion/esclusione’ and ‘marginalizzazione/marginalità’. In order to understand this difficult process we need to resort not only to English, but also to Italian and French. This brings us to the very core of the practice of sociology between its conceptual universalism and its radical embeddedness in an empirical practice marked by various national languages.

National traditions

In 1986 Mingione published an important paper in *International Sociology* in which he took stock of the various developments in urban sociology and the evolution of its paradigms. A central aspect of his study concerned the contemporary American sociology that inspired him. Three conclusions stand out for our present reflection: one is the assessment of the limits of the sub-discipline; the second regards the numerous links and encounters of the sub-discipline with other fields of research that were to prove more resilient (welfare states, labour market, etc.; Mingione 1986: 150); the third is even more important, because it relates to the diversity of empirical developments across various countries and the diverse social constructions of urban sociology which the researcher discovers despite his firm intention to research universal objects, such as urban life and industrialisation (Mingione 1986: 147–8). In 1993–94, Mingione was visiting professor at the University of California in Los Angeles and he published his important book *Urban Poverty and the Underclass, A Reader* in 1996. This book refers extensively

to the French and European situation and, contrary to mainstream English-language books, one is refreshingly surprised to find German, Italian and French references among its contents. Two of the contributors (Hilary Silver and Antonio Tosi) deal extensively with what one could superficially see as ‘functional equivalents’ in France and Europe of the problems studied by Mingione in the United States. These are not ‘equivalents’, however, as one learns in reading the book. One notion used at the time was ‘new poverty’ and this seemed to fit into various national or sub-national situations. *Urban Sociology and the Underclass*, along with a detailed discussion of the American concept of the *underclass*, deals with poverty in general and national ‘cultures’ of poverty, a rarely used reference to ‘political culture’, which, as Silver explained, had a crucial influence in how ‘urban sociology’ is constructed. This was an essential way of approaching the diversity of poverty and of social policies across nations.

It is now well known that national approaches to urban sociology were also different across countries and traditions. For instance, in France, *politique de la ville*, gradually developed in the 1980s, had very specific features that greatly influenced the way researchers constructed their objects. As Remy and Voye showed, the ‘spatial transcription of social problems is the starting point of transposing social problems into sociological problems’ with a link to ‘public policy and management of territorial social problems’ (1997: 433). Except for the common reference to the Chicago School, national histories nevertheless essentially diverged (Topalov 2013). Topalov also noted the important influence of the notion of ‘exclusion’ and the *exclus* in the French context, which replaced (or complemented) the notion of poverty: these concepts, he stated, were eventually in opposition to the Marxist concepts of class and state power (Topalov 2013: 7–8), but the demise of urban sociology encompassed both its Marxist components and their academic adversaries, because *planificateurs* in France had to yield to conservative, neoliberal ideas. Topalov stressed that this development was specifically French. In reference to the 1980s and the various stages of the *politique de la ville*, Grafmeyer noted that:

de très larges pans des politiques sociales [...] ont été ainsi reformulés autour de la notion de ‘politique de la ville’ [...] Cette dernière repose sur une association forte entre le traitement des problèmes sociaux et l’intervention sur des territoires en crise, tout en s’efforçant aussi, depuis une quinzaine d’années, d’organiser simultanément à l’échelle des agglomérations la lutte contre l’exclusion et les perturbations du lien social. (2012: 8)

In other words, the two domains of urban sociology and poverty (and welfare studies) did not differ so radically that they could not be dealt with together. But in the French case, the period that spans the years 1975–2000

saw entirely renewed worldviews created and institutionalised. *Exclusion sociale*, later to be used in an absolute way as *exclusion*, was invented in France. This was documented in detail by Silver (1996; see also 1994). She clearly established that the ‘Republican’ French element was essential in the coining of the French word *exclusion*. Much as with other French phrases (for instance *insertion* or *question sociale*) the words travelled easily from French to Latin languages, and they later travelled to English. Hence, in France, mainstream phenomena relevant to urban sociology tended to be appraised as part of the wider ‘exclusion–insertion’ framework, including spatial segregation and the *banlieues* (Paugam 2000: 163–5). *Exclusion*, as Paugam has it, was a ‘paradigm’ in itself, a ‘concept-horizon’ (2000: 160–1). In this regard, I would tend to think that Mingione underestimated this French input because he was probably too familiar with it. ‘Social exclusion’ was later used in European Union discourse, during the first poverty programmes of the Commission, and actively disseminated by French scholars and officials. Social exclusion was to be transmogrified under the Blairite spin-doctoring mania into ‘social inclusion’. When Tony Blair created a ‘Social Exclusion Unit’ in 1997, its meaning was indeed extremely different from the substance of the term in France. The Blairite unit was concerned with teenage pregnancy, truancy and petty crime, as well as disciplining local communities. One of the reasons why ‘exclusion’ was a success at the EU level was because of its under-specification (Paugam 2000). It could function as a European English idiom parallel to the other national languages (Barbier 2014). Whereas Mingione managed to straddle the two different approaches of urban sociology and exclusion, the mainstream situation was different in France. What we were witnessing – and involved in at the same time – was the firm establishment of the pairing ‘*insertion*’ and ‘*exclusion*’. In some chapters of Mingione’s 1996 urban sociology book, *insertion* is used without translation and for a good reason: it is not really translatable. The Italian term *inserimento* is certainly a translation and the English ‘insertion’ can also be a candidate, but both are inadequate, despite the fact that to emulate France, Italy had a very short introduction of a *Reddito minimo di inserimento* (a minimum income aimed at social and economic integration) in the late 1990s under the Prodi government, a form of experimental *ammortizzatore sociale* (social assistance) in certain cities that was swiftly cancelled by Berlusconi.

The French ‘picture’ was defined by the necessary ‘insertion’ of various sorts of ‘personnes exclues’ and the fight was not only against poverty but ‘contre la pauvreté et l’exclusion’. This was, moreover, extremely well linked to the way French society saw itself more and more as being subjected to *précarité*, a word that British scholars (notably Gallie, working with Paugam) reinvented in English as ‘precarity’ (Barbier 2013b). This extremely domi-

nant and effective centralisation of discourses and conceptions left limited room for the partisans of urban sociology in its French variant. Later on Castel published his influential book and to these two terms added a third, *la question sociale*, which I showed was a misuse of the historical term (Barbier 2013a: 16). In his remarkable but often historically shaky panorama, he described it as a ‘fundamentally insoluble contradiction involving society experimenting with the mystery of cohesiveness and attempting to ward off the danger of its breaking apart’. Castel thus gave the expression a generic meaning, which he tended to conceive of as almost immemorial: his overview begins in the Middle Ages. When the Abbey of Cluny gave stipends to the poor, was it already dealing with the ‘social question’? It would seem doubtful. It is also too sweeping to say, even taking inspiration from Karl Polanyi, that Western countries ‘responded to the common challenge of industrialisation and the factors of social dissociation it entailed, but they obviously did so at different paces’. Surely the diverse forms of social protection did not arise solely from the ‘pace’ at which societies coped with industrialisation (Barbier 2013a: 16)? But one knows that Castel tended to overestimate the role of the French type of social protection. Nevertheless, at about the same time that Mingione published his 1996 comparative book, Castel produced *Les métamorphoses de la question sociale* (1995). It was certainly significant that his book’s index mixed ‘territorial policies’ (as well as *politique de la ville*) and *insertion*. ‘Insertion and exclusion were dominating the scene without serious competition’ (Castel 1995: 423–6). In the following years, despite many controversies about the use of the term *question sociale*, a vague English ‘social question’ also entered the international vocabulary; it was much more imprecise than it was in France. In the mid-1990s, with the European English term ‘social exclusion’, a whole language was invented. The intervention of the European Union was essential. After that, all EU countries imported the expression and used it on their own terms.

When the EU framed an overall discourse as a general blanket for persisting diversity

Interestingly, this discourse was cut off from any necessary empirical referents, once there was, as is the case in linguistics, a signifier (social exclusion in (European) English) and a vague signified (some sort of ill-defined situation affecting the poor and other groups). If social exclusion was rather easily adopted in Brussels’s English, the idea of *insertion* has remained, until now, radically untranslatable. Why was this so?

French *insertion* policies displayed specific characteristics, which could not be honestly accounted for by reducing them to ‘workfare’ or universal

‘active labour market policies’, and the notion remained untranslated. Eme (1997) described its historical genesis and gradual construction. He stressed that, as a particular sector of social policy, *insertion* originated jointly in non-profit activities during the 1970s, and the public policy innovation that built on them. The joint process eventually resulted in a new separate sector of public intervention, which gradually emerged as an ‘intermediate’ area between traditional social policy and traditional labour market programmes. It is not easy to detach the term from its numerous normative connotations, one of which derives from the decisive institutional push it received from the passing of the Revenu minimum d’insertion (RMI) Act. This 1988 legislation introduced a universal (and differential) benefit devised to complement the existing set of categorical minimum incomes. At the same time, it created a new universal entitlement to state provision of services and activities (*droit d’insertion*), designed to help individuals to integrate into society and actually enjoy fully fledged citizenship, as opposed to remaining excluded from society and from employment. That was another feature of the French *insertion*: an additional right was being adopted for the poor and the excluded, that of being ‘integrated’ into all parts of society. Although normatively universal in principle (the benefit and the right to activities and services), RMI in reality catered for the poor and the ‘socially excluded’, once eligibility to any other benefits was exhausted. This entailed that *insertion*’s actual rationale was not seen as universal, but ‘targeted’. However, the right drew explicitly on the legacy of the French Revolution in the first articles of the 1988 Act. Nonetheless, experts have described RMI’s rationale as ambiguous by nature from its inception, between on the one hand refusing merely to grant people the benefit without caring for other service provision, and on the other implementing a de facto ‘conditional’ logic that would entail mandatory participation in work-related activities. These specific characteristics of *insertion* nevertheless precluded any analysis in terms of ‘workfare’ in the French case, contrary to what Rosanvallon (1995) stated when he erroneously conflated the French and the American situations.

While *insertion* could not simply be dismissed as workfare, it came to be seen as one among many strategies that were soon characterised as ‘activation programmes’ (Barbier 2002). In a way, *insertion* strategies came to represent a polar example against American workfare, but both were innovative social strategies that started in the late 1980s, whereas all other countries, including the often lauded Scandinavian countries, introduced such ‘activation’ much later, while the British laggards embarked on ‘welfare-to-work’ only ten years after the USA and France. Comparatively, workfare schemes were first introduced in the US in the 1970s. Ever since they have borne one constant characteristic, the demand imposed on individuals claiming assistance benefits to perform some type of ‘work counterpart’ (under various

forms but always mandatory). Workfare, however, became particularly fashionable in the late 1990s. It was especially encapsulated in Clinton's 1996 'welfare reform', with the passing of the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWOA) and the transformation of the long-existing AFDC (Aid for Families with Dependent Children) into the new TANF (Temporary Assistance for Needy Families).

Classic conservative literature (e.g. Murray 1984) advocated the necessity of imposing work obligations on individuals claiming 'welfare', and this stance later became dominant before spilling over outside the USA, where it gained success as a 'catchword'. It has gradually emerged as a no less ideological term, for instance in French sociological literature. This radical literature assumes that 'workfare' has come to be a structural feature of the 'post-welfare state' period. 'Workfare' here functions as a half-baked notion to describe a generalised downgrading of welfare services and benefits almost akin to imposing forced labour on the poor, when it is not seen as a penal strategy (Wacquant 1999). Alternatively, it was used to point to a functionalist and inevitable adaptation of social states to current socio-economic circumstances (see, among others, Rosanvallon 1995: 166). Unorthodox economic literature also used 'workfare' as a totemic notion. Jessop (1996), for instance, has used it in a typically universalistic perspective as a new principle of 'regulation regimes' ('Schumpeterian workfare'), where the workfare element was ideal-typically supposed to describe the subordination of current social policies to the labour market's flexibility requirements in the age of globalisation. At the time, however, especially because of the hegemony of English, the Blair government stole the term 'social exclusion' and with the help of Giddens, Blair's guru, transformed it into 'social inclusion'. During this period, the Blair government briefly contemplated the idea of implementing 'intermediate labour markets' in special zones, and using wage-based programmes, but this was short lived. Nevertheless the British were adamant that their concept was not workfare but welfare-to-work, another signifying distinction.

In French, many meanings were incorporated in *insertion*. The notion – never really developed into a proper concept, just as *exclusion* never was (Paugam 2000) – came to mean many things that structured the activities of social policies, social workers and the eligible persons themselves. *Insertion* in the French context came to mean, first, a distinct occupational sphere of practice of social workers and their institutions directed towards specific target groups (roughly the 'socially excluded' or those in danger of being so, and not only those excluded from the labour market); services were delivered in order to *insérer* ('integrate') these groups through the mediation of various types of services; secondly, *insertion professionnelle* (or *insertion économique*), which came to be but one segment of a broader *insertion*

sector, namely the segment specifically linked to the labour market. In the 1960s *insertion professionnelle* was also used in a more limited sense to name the transition process from school to work. These notions are still part of the basic lexicon of social work in France in 2017. Finally, far from being an example of a universal tendency to restrict entitlement to benefits to those recipients who engage in compulsory work or training, French *politiques d'insertion* were based on the principle that *insertion* was also an individual and global process. This process, it was contended, should be tailored to the individual's needs, whether for socialisation, better housing, better access to civil rights or health, etc.; in this third respect *insertion* is a complex social process eventually leading to social integration. It was the state's duty to interfere when necessary in this process, as was stated in the 1988 RMI law. This intervention appeared all the more necessary when one of the crucial aspects of the economy was that 'integration, namely, no longer happened spontaneously' (Castel 1995: 435). This is what analysts of social policies as universal punitive devices, such as Wacquant (1999), have always failed to understand. Whatever the limits of French policies and politics, and their inability to solve the unemployment question forty years after their first tentative designs concerning the young and the disabled, the *insertion* 'sector' still manifests a potential for the effective designing of 'employment' services as a mainstream objective in countries marked by high levels of unemployment. The 2016 radical opposition to the British reform dubbed 'universal credit' that is reminiscent of the Poor Laws of previous centuries is illustrated by another French word now used in social policy: the unemployed need *accompagnement*, a word that in British terms could easily be dismissed as a manifestation of the 'nanny state' (Barbier 2013a).

This remark brings to the fore the difficulties of international and transnational comparison. In fact, at a certain level of abstraction, all things are the same: as the great comparatist Sartori once wrote, the world will be populated with 'vacche grigie' (grey cows) (Sartori 1991: 35). Such an assessment may apply to 'welfare' programmes and systems, employment contracts, their qualities, and the normative frameworks into which they are embedded. These have been increasingly and extensively compared across Europe for the last twenty years, especially in the wake of the politics of 'European Employment Strategy' since 1997. Functional comparisons abound. At the same time, European political discourses, finely worded in European English, travel transnationally all the time. However, the norms of employment, the industrial relations systems by which they are determined, as well as the social protection systems they are intrinsically associated with have remained extremely diverse across the countries of Europe. It is difficult to know whether all these fuzzy international English notions have an actual influence on developments at the national level. To say the least,

the dissemination of an international discourse by European organisations is not enough to document a common trend of evolution (Barbier 2013b).

The debate about the underclass in English, Italian and French

Taking a more detailed comparative example, I will now concentrate on the Mingione chapter, which explicitly deals with definitions. This chapter was published at about the same time when debates in France were framed in *exclusion* and *insertion* terms, an expression which, by the way, does not appear in his discussion (he uses *inserimento sociale*, Mingione 1994: 73). He is travelling between languages (Italian is the actual language used, but international/American English is also present), between sociological traditions and between empirical experiences; he negotiates notions and terms between the various worlds he inhabits, one at a time. He goes from the particular to the universal, and back to specifics, after acknowledging that universalisation is sometimes impossible and sometimes at too general a level of abstraction. He proceeds in four steps in a discussion that he frames in terms of the ‘underclass negli USA e in Europa’ [underclass in the USA and Europe].

It is notable that ‘la collocazione spaziale nelle città’ did not emerge in the discussion, which is rather marked by two phenomena and their associated discourses, ‘homelessness and the underclass’ (Mingione 1994: 71), as typical of large cities. These two phenomena he first linked to an ‘emphasis’ on the potential of ‘diversità/devianza dei comportamenti’ and the associated possible destabilisation of the existing order.

His main concern then is precisely the ambiguity ‘che accompagna la duplice enfasi su delle forme croniche di marginalità sociale, geograficamente o socialmente concentrate, e, allo stesso tempo, sulla devianza di strategie e comportamenti degli esclusi’. Although his empirical reference is at the same time to the USA, he uses the term ‘excluded’ in association with ‘marginalità sociale’. But the debate on the underclass is firmly identified with the USA, after a term introduced by Myrdal in 1962: ‘an unprivileged class of unemployed, unemployables and underemployed’, more or less ‘set apart from the nation at large’ (Mingione 1994: 72). With the link to the ‘sistema occupazionale delle economie avanzate che già allora facevano intravedere delle forti prospettive di esclusione, senza speranza a carico di gruppi meno scolarizzati e professionalmente più deboli’, Mingione makes a tentative move to universalisation. According to Myrdal, however, two components exist: ‘una più specificamente americana, e una più generale’. Deindustrialisation and competition in the labour market is the second. This ‘exclusion’ ‘apart from the nation’ is constructed by the institutions, including the ‘sistemi di welfare’ (Mingione 1994: 72); but the first component is

specifically American, that is, the over-exposure of African Americans and, in part, those of Puerto Rican origin. Mingione notes the 'racial association' of the term 'underclass'. The underclass discourse points to the exclusion of low-qualified workers as a result of post-industrial labour market reforms, and this is the universal content; but the racial dimension is American, as well as the link to 'inner city' segregation. Nevertheless, back to Italian, these groups are affected by 'marginalizzazione' (Mingione 1994: 74). Here Mingione introduces a link to Lewis (1968) and the 'culture of poverty' and 'welfare dependency'. He introduces the latter term in Italian: 'individui che volontariamente approfittano della generosità pubblica per non lavorare piuttosto come persone sfortunate e bisognose'. Adding the reference to Murray (1984) as a 'caratterizzazione comportamentista' (deviant behaviour, refusal to work), we travel far from Italy, where, at the time, there was no equivalent of public assistance, so no 'benefits' for the poor to depend on. This raises the question whether the 'behavioural' dimension can be universalised. Can the underclass be retained then as a concept for France and Italy? Mingione seems to think not, and he (implicitly) concurs with Fassin (1996), who compared three 'figures contemporaines de la pauvreté urbaine'. But he keeps the term 'underclass' nevertheless.

Continuing his travels through American sociology, we are presented with William Julius Wilson's work, which, according to him, brings up 'potenziali interessanti di analisi comparative internazionali' (Mingione 1994: 75). Wilson concentrates on the part of the Afro-American community 'sempre più omogeneamente confinata nei ghetti centrali', 'un circuito vizioso cumulativo [a vicious circuit of cumulative poverty] a danno di quella parte della comunità che non riesce ad essere coinvolta nei processi di mobilità sociale'. To what are 'ghetto centrali' comparable in France or Italy? The difficulties of the ghetto population (Mingione 1994: 75) bear on family and demographic strategies: 'diminuisce la quota delle convivenze matrimoniali e cresce il numero dei bambini nati al di fuori dal matrimonio' [extramarital births]. This factor was very centrally present in Clinton's TANF reform, and evaluation studies even monitored the marriage rate of black citizens, as an 'impact' of the reform. The author does not seem to stress that this is a specifically American feature, and a limit to the possible universalisation of objects and analyses.

Back again to universalisation, Mingione concludes in terms of 'circuiti viziosi cumulativi di pauperizzazione', and this plays down the dimension of 'caratteri comportamentali' (Mingione 1994: 78–9) of the underclass approach. (He notes the controversial use of 'underclass' that Wilson suggested to name the 'ghetto poor'.) Mingione stresses that the existence of vicious circles 'e multifattoriali che finiscono per rivolgersi in forme drastiche e persistenti di esclusione dalle opportunità e dagli orizzonti del resto

della società' [that result in forms of exclusion from social opportunities], using the term 'exclusion' with a complement (*dalle opportunità*) to differentiate from the absolute *exclusion sociale à la française*. At this point he comments on the use of exclusion in the vocabulary of the European Union, quoting 'la narrativa della "esclusione sociale"' that he dates to the beginning of the 1990s, and compares this with a 'two-tier society' approach, commenting on the processes of *emarginazione*, using the untranslatable Italian word, and commenting also on the 'nuovi poveri' and the 'definitiva superfluità che assumono i nuovi poveri' [eventual inutility of the new poor]. The 'new poor' was also an expression in the French debate (Paugam 2000), which he does note. In their *superfluità* one finds an echo of Castel's 'surnuméraires' (1995: 399), but are the poor also *surnuméraires* in the American context? Was there a link to the possible 'ghettoisation' ('ghettizzare i nuovi poveri') which was not the case in countries like France and perhaps Italy?

Finally, Mingione's discussion is akin to a tentative universalisation of the urban poverty problem and an acknowledgement of the limits to its analysis. He endeavours to use the *universal* value of the effects of cumulative processes, as drawn from Wilson, independently of the role of race (Mingione 1994: 81): 'una cumulatività forte e crescente di svantaggi, ulteriormente incrementate dalla ghettizzazione'. In doing this, he means to give a universal value to the 'underclass' discourse ('la narrativa sulla underclass diventa una parte integrante del dibattito sulle nuove povertà e sulla esclusione nelle grandi città dei paesi industrializzati proprio perché la connotazione etnica particolare non costituisce l'elemento centrale chiave del discorso') [the underclass approach tends to be universalised and cut off from its specific ethnic content]. But one can differentiate in the case of France, for example, where the 'underclass' discourse never fitted in because it clashed with the *exclusion* and *insertion* narrative, as Fassin (1996) showed, for reasons of political culture and existing institutions. Similarly, also in France, a discourse about *la dépendance de l'assistance* (echoes of welfare dependency), although articulated by some social actors, never really took hold; one had to wait for the promotion of the *assistanat* controversy by Sarkozy in the second part of the 2000s. As for the American case, there are also other minorities including the 'Chicanos' and the poor whites ('bianchi poveri di origine non ispanica'), as Mingione notes, but here the factor of spatial concentration is lacking. Nevertheless, it could mean a 'melting pot della povertà che coinvolge un po' tutte le componenti etniche dove neri e portoricani sono altamente sovrarappresentati' (Mingione 1994: 83). Despite American influence in the social construction of European problems, the European approach remains comparable only in the universal dimension of the cumulation of vicious circles: 'esclusioni dal lavoro e dagli orizzonti

sociali del resto della società' (Mingione 1994: 84). This is especially why the explicit comparison and assimilation of French social problems (and *insertion*) with American ones that Rosanvallon (1995) had analysed in America never really convinced in France, and the 'workfare' he was heralding never really materialised, despite repeated attempts, ever more specific and more and more punitive, in the Sarkozy years. And the author rightly stresses European diversity:

le condizionale europee di pauperizzazione cronica sono differenti, sia perché non raggiungono mai le punte di accumulazione di svantaggi, vittimizzazione, discriminazione e violenza che si registrano nei ghetti neri americani, sia perché tra i fattori di impoverimento non vi è l'isolamento e l'indifferenza istituzionale che caratterizzano le grandi città americane. [European ways of becoming poor are different, either because they do not match the cumulative circles documented in American ghettos or the institutional neglect that characterises institutional care in the big cities.] (Mingione 1994: 84–5)

Wacquant, whom Mingione quotes at this point, is also well known for overestimating the commonalities because of his Bourdieusian interpretation of the strict 'symbolic violence' analysis. Is there not some contradiction, then, when Mingione states that the European lines 'rispecchiano appunto le linee fondamentali della narrativa della underclass' (Mingione 1994: 85). The examples he gives of cases in Europe do not really serve to illustrate the whole picture, and were limited to immigrants' communities.

Conclusion

Mingione went so far as to envisage, as a possibility, an extension of this polarisation, which can echo today's discourse of dualisation. For him, the question of the day was

se e come la maggiore attenzione istituzionale nei confronti di questa problematica [esclusione cronica] e la minore segregazione e isolamento sociale dei soggetti poveri possono arrestare la progressione cronica del circuito vizioso e quindi impedire che si costituisca una underclass [would appropriate policies function as counterbalance to the vicious circles of poverty]. (Mingione 1994: 89)

His more encompassing conclusion is undoubtedly influenced by the role of social protection institutions: despite interesting elements of universalisation, conditions in Europe remain 'fortemente differenziate a seconda delle varianti di contesto sociale che si sono cristallizzati in diversi sistemi nazionali e locali'. More generally, the social scientist is caught between two demands: on the one hand, he or she must speak a general and common language with his or her peers, and unfortunately this is usually English. The

use of English thus leads him or her towards the universalisation of concepts and theories. On the other hand, the only sensible way of illustrating the radical variety of practices and policies is by resorting to languages actually spoken in the countries where the research is carried out. Here the fact that conditions in Europe are 'strongly differentiated' is particularly linked to the crystallisation of practices into 'diverse local and national systems', that is, social protection institutions.

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Welfare migration and civic stratification: Britain's emergent rights regime

Over many years I have shared with Enzo Mingione a dual interest in welfare and migration, two fields of enquiry that the intellectual division of labour has traditionally treated separately, in so far as each pursues its own distinctive theoretical and substantive agenda. However, political and economic factors have conspired in Britain (and elsewhere) to bring the substantive and intellectual foci of these two fields much closer together. Indeed, domestic welfare reform and the management of international migration have been described by David Cameron as 'two sides of the same coin' (Cameron 2011). In practice, heightened conditions and sanctions for the benefit-dependent domestic population, both in and out of work, have been harnessed by claims of promoting labour market change and reducing demand for low-skilled migrant workers, often EU citizens, whose own access to benefit is being curtailed. Policy in both areas has engaged a moral message of earned entitlement, and as implied in Mingione's chapter in this volume, this requires a sociological approach that examines such policies together, by means of a unified frame of analysis (see Morris 2016b).

Certainly, a number of scholars have recognised the scope for a link between domestic welfare and the management of migration (e.g. Bommes and Geddes 2000; Sainsbury 2012; Duevell and Jordan 2002), but have not so far produced a fully integrated analysis of this kind, though there is good reason to do so. In Britain, the rise of a conditional, contractarian model of social rights for the domestic population has echoed a drive for enhanced control over conditions of entry and residence for transnational migrants (among whom we can include asylum seekers). Indeed, it no longer seems adequate to assess migrant rights against a normative model of citizenship as the yardstick of guaranteed social inclusion, without some recognition of the way that citizenship itself increasingly falls short of this promise. Such questions necessarily move us on to the terrain of rights, understood not

simply as formal legal protections or entitlements, but as a social and political construction in a field of contestation.

Citizenship and rights

This approach to rights as a constructed terrain can be found in one of the earliest sociological approaches to the study of citizenship, Marshall's famous 1950 essay on citizenship and social class. Marshall's account of the sequential unfolding of three sets of rights – civil, political and social – offers an account of the formation of British citizenship that has commonly been deemed evolutionary. However, alongside his focus on the progressive unfolding of rights we also find an account of rights as emerging from struggle, such that increased material wealth from the end of the nineteenth century meant that 'the diminution of inequality increased the demand for its abolition' (Marshall 1992: 28). Thereafter, 'the preservation of economic inequalities [was] made more difficult by the enrichment of the status of citizenship' (1992: 45). Highlighting the importance of social rights, Marshall saw this 'modern drive towards social equality' (1992: 7) as the latest phase in the unfolding of citizenship, though his essay was, of course, set in the context of rights delivered by virtue of membership of a national community. The expansion of international migration and the gradual elaboration of universal human rights has led some to see his tripartite model as requiring a fourth phase of rights – the universal, or post-national (Turner 1993; Bottomore 1992), which might offer a basis for the re-embedding of new social bonds and institutions that Mingione's concluding chapter speaks of.

This has pushed theorising about rights beyond the boundaries of the nation-state, and related argument (Beck 2006) has called for a cosmopolitan outlook in both empirical and theoretical work, launching speculation and debate about the scope and significance of an emergent cosmopolitan society, supported by universalist principles. However, when Hannah Arendt in 1948 adopted the now famous phrase 'the right to have rights', she was reflecting on the problematic relationship between citizenship and human rights, especially as illuminated by the position of transnational migrants and asylum seekers. Writing around the time of the formulation of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, but looking back to the stateless persons generated in the fallout from the First World War, Arendt noted the following paradox: 'We became aware of the existence of a right to have rights and a right to belong to some kind of organised community only when millions of people had emerged who had lost and could not regain those rights' (Arendt 1979: 296–7). In her account, a meaningful claim to rights rested upon a recognised relationship with a body that held the duty and capacity to honour those rights. The situation is somewhat changed

since Arendt's time of writing, and while her paradox turned on the fact that people without full membership of a national polity *via* citizenship had no means of claiming their 'inalienable' human rights, subsequent writing reversed the problematic to question how national membership can coexist with the presence of non-citizens who have a significant array of rights. Hence the view that 'A new and more universal concept of citizenship has unfolded in the post-war era, one whose organising and legitimating principles are based on universal personhood rather than national belonging' (Soysal 1994: 1).

Despite a strong element of truth in this claim, and even given the global dynamics detailed by Mingione, the nation-state remains the principal mediating agent governing access to and delivery of even universal human rights. Academic debate on the position and significance of transnational migrants and asylum seekers on a national territory has generated two potentially polarised positions (see Joppke 1999). While one position sees the presence of transnational migrants with a legitimate claim to rights to be the expression of an emergent 'post-national' society, the other has emphasised the continuing power of the nation-state as manifest through its control over the conditions of entry and residence on its territory, and the continuing symbolic and material significance of national citizenship (see Brubaker 1989). Related debate has tended to take citizenship as the yardstick of full membership and rights (e.g. Brysk and Shafr 2004), against which we can measure the purchase of universal guarantees. However, we are now seeing another reversal of the national/post-national question as attention turns to the erosion of citizenship rights, which can no longer be thought to function as a taken-for-granted source of social inclusion, hence the demise of the 'golden period' Mingione refers to.

While the core of Marshall's argument anticipated more recent theoretical developments that see the granting of rights as a form of recognition and reward, and even contains some potential grounds for expansion, he also observed that a 'stratified status system is creeping into citizenship' and that 'conflicts within our social system are becoming too sharp' (Marshall 1992: 40, 49). This rarely mentioned apprehension foreshadowed a situation that appears as the converse of his more optimistic orientation, such that rights function less as a guarantee of inclusion, and more as a tool of governance that derives its force from an associated system of conditionality and constraint. In fact, the Marshallian conception of citizenship as full membership was approximated but never completely achieved in Britain's post-war welfare state. The setting of the benefit rate by Beveridge fell significantly short of the subsistence levels recommended by Rowntree, and has always been bedevilled by a concern to maintain the work incentive. Furthermore, benefits conferred through the system of National Insurance had always to

be supplemented by National Assistance, this latter being conditional on the indignities of means testing. By the 1970s the system was heavily dependent on discretionary and exceptional needs payments, and a requirement for the unemployed to be actively seeking work was fully established by the late 1980s (Harris 2008). Since then, the promise of guaranteed social inclusion has been all but eliminated with the financial crisis of 2008 and the dominance (since 2010) of a drive to shrink the state in the name of deficit reduction (see Morris 2016a).

Sociology has therefore seen two challenges to Marshall's model of citizenship – one from the inside with increasing cuts, conditionality and surveillance in domestic welfare provision, and the other from the outside, with the argument that (in Europe at least) we have been witness to the development of a post-national society (Soysal 1994: 1). Actual realisation of both the Marshallian model and the cosmopolitan model fall far short of their espoused ideals, but their future prospects are now simultaneously under threat. Citizenship rights have long since been disaggregated, with civil rights universally applied, and social rights extending to long-term residents, while the normative ideal of citizenship is further eroded when devices of management and control in the granting and delivery of rights are increasingly applied to both migrants and citizens (Morris 2016b). The system may operate in different ways and to different effect for the two groups, which are themselves sub-divided, but there are some significant overlaps, while the idea of citizenship as 'hard on the outside and soft on the inside' (Bosniak 2006: 4) is ever more tenuous.

The reduction of welfare dependency within the domestic population, and a drive to limit transnational migration and asylum, have been at the forefront of political concerns in the UK for at least the last two decades (see Morris 1994; 2002b; 2007; 2010). Successive governments have overseen the erosion of domestic welfare in Britain, with enhanced conditionality, discipline and control, alongside related efforts to monitor and limit the presence and rights of transnational migrants. This brings the experience of citizens and migrants closer together, though not necessarily in the sense espoused by cosmopolitan writing (e.g. Beck 2006). Furthermore, while the two groups are often pitted against each other, the treatment of each has commonly prompted court action (see Morris 2016b) through recourse to domestic, universal and/or EU guarantees, all now themselves under challenge. These developments have marked a significant reconfiguration of rights in Britain and the nature of the changes entailed can best be understood within the broader context of an evolving debate about the role of rights in shaping social life.

Civic stratification

My own work in this area has increasingly drawn on the idea of civic stratification (Lockwood 1996), a concept that still retains enormous untapped potential. ‘Civic stratification’ refers to a system of inequality by virtue of the rights that are granted or denied by the state, and Lockwood’s analysis turns on two axes; the presence or absence of rights, and the possession of moral or material resources. The former denotes the granting or denial of formal entitlement to yield patterns of inclusion or exclusion with respect to rights; the latter refers to informal advantage or discrimination in the delivery of a right, yielding patterns of gain or deficit in its enjoyment. This framework is an advance on Marshall in showing how inequality can be built into entitlement – as with the stratified conditions attached to different groups of benefit claimants, and in more fully conceptualising how deficit can interfere with the delivery of a right, whether by a stigma associated with its receipt, or by an informal impediment to its access. Indeed, far from rights guaranteeing equal standing, as Marshall hoped, they can be one basis for its erosion, as with attacks on an alleged dependency culture and the punitive use of sanctions in relation to benefits.

Furthermore, while the principal focus of Lockwood’s framework was the internal functioning of citizenship and its related rights, the model has the potential to go much further and to provide a means of analysing transnational migrant rights – as outlined in my own work (Morris 2002a). The formal dimension is apparent in the varying legal statuses that a transnational migrant might occupy; the informal dimension again becomes apparent where a stigma attaches to claiming a right (as with allegedly ‘bogus’ asylum seekers, or EU migrant workers), or where there is an informal impediment to its access or enjoyment. Finally, Lockwood’s model offers the possibility of building change into a system of rights, most notably through his concept of civic expansion, and in this argument the accrual of moral resources – perhaps with the support of civic activists – can provide the basis for a claim to improved rights. However, he neglects to consider the converse possibility of contraction, which has been apparent in recent years in Britain in relation to both migrant rights and the welfare rights of citizens.

Civic stratification and domestic welfare

Many of these developments take on an added significance when viewed against the dramatic scaling back of the welfare system for the domestic population in the name of a declared ‘moral mission’ to reduce welfare dependency and increase conditionality (Cameron 2012). This mission has been

underpinned by expressions of concern for the position of ‘hard-working families’, ‘the hard-working taxpayer’ or the ‘abused taxpayer’, and political speeches have been peppered with references of this kind. The related policy programme promised to replace a ‘culture of dependency’ with a ‘culture of responsibility’ (Department of Work and Pensions 2010) and rests on a heightened, incremental system of conditionality and sanctions, which have seen the numbers of people in Britain dependent on food banks rise to over one million.¹

Lockwood’s original article addressed the issue of civic integration as a mediating factor in class formation, understood as the emergence of class groupings that stood as collective agents of social change. His analysis had a particular focus on welfare because, as he put it, ‘the endemic contradiction between citizenship and capital had so far been managed by the fine-tuning of social rights’ (Lockwood 1996: 535). This configuration then links to his central question of under what circumstances conditions of inequality are tolerated or rejected, thus according welfare provision its classic role of ameliorating class difference. However, he goes some way beyond this formulation to explore the ways in which the institutionalisation of citizenship is both embedded in and contributes towards the structure of social inequality, and in so doing he recognises the role played by judgements of merit and desert in establishing the legitimacy or otherwise of economic and social relations in capitalist democracy. His analysis of civic stratification in relation to welfare therefore places great weight on the deficit experienced by its recipients, by virtue of the way the system is administered, the reconstitution of recipients as second-class citizens, the demeaning requirements often attached to receipt, and being ‘publicly singled out as lacking in civic virtue’ (Lockwood 1996: 539). The capacity of welfare dependents to form a collective consciousness and pursue concerted action is in turn undermined by the particularisation of their treatment within the system as failing individuals, and by the ‘vertical divisions’ among them, yielding a degree of internal fragmentation.

All elements of this analysis are apparent and have been exacerbated in recent policy developments, and the deservingness or otherwise of state dependents has been a prime site of rhetorical intervention by Conservative Party politicians – first by the coalition government with the Liberal Democrats (2010–15) and then by its Conservative successor. In this rhetoric the claim for social justice is made not on behalf of the disadvantaged, but in the name of ‘fairness’ for the hard-working taxpayer, and the ensuing welfare policy is designed to correct behavioural choices which have allegedly been ‘skewed’ by the welfare system. The underlying intent is to meet the needs of a ‘modern flexible economy’, unimpeded by the functioning of the welfare system (Duncan-Smith 2014).

Welfare thus becomes a tool for the refashioning of economic and social relations, and its stratifying features take a number of forms. These have included an across-the-board freeze on the level of working-age benefits for a four-year period, a cap on the weekly amount of benefit an individual household can receive, and heightened job search requirements for all relevant groups – which include claimants of Job Seekers Allowance, the chronically sick or disabled deemed ‘fit for work’, and single parents whose youngest child is aged three or over. The sanctions (temporary loss of benefit) that are imposed for a failure to meet requirements have been ratcheted up according to the severity or frequency of such failure, and are now being extended to those in receipt of in-work benefit – low-waged workers who receive tax credits as a supplement to their wages.

One stratifying effect of the changes therefore amounts to heightened condemnation of the whole benefit-dependent population (with the exception of pensioners), along with an extension of this category to include the working poor – an expanding population affected by the non-standard and unstable conditions noted by Mingione. The working-age dependent population also suffers collectively from the current freeze in uprating benefits levels, and from the targeting of those most precariously placed in the labour market, developments that each act as multipliers of class disadvantage. However, the welfare system itself is internally stratified – not simply in protecting the retired population from the impact of ‘reforms’, but in the subdivisions which classify groups according to both the nature of their need, and the intensity of intervention deemed to be warranted. This can include either voluntary or compulsory participation on the various ‘Work Programmes’ in operation, repeated assessments of the sick and disabled to judge their capacity for work, and the requirement on lone mothers to demonstrate work-readiness.

A further stratifying element in operation can be seen through the gendered impact of many of the welfare reforms – this may happen through the formal fashioning of policy in relation to a gender-specific group, as with the heightened job search requirements for single parents (the vast majority of whom are women). It may also occur indirectly, through the way in which the benefit cuts fall, thus constituting a deficit – hence an upper limit (or cap) on total household benefit has a disproportionate effect on single parents, who made up 64 per cent of those affected (from April 2013 to May 2015).² Uneven impact also flows from the effect of the cuts on children, which places the caring parent under increased pressure in meeting their children’s needs – 83 per cent of the households affected by post-2015 cuts contained dependent children. There is an extensive associated literature to demonstrate that where household income is inadequate, the task of making ends meet will often fall on women, involving both additional labour, personal

deprivation and increased anxiety (see Morris 1984). Finally, women are disproportionate users of public services (Elson 2012), and their whittling away in the name of deficit reduction amounts to a further gendered aspect of civic stratification in the unequal impact of welfare cuts.

Stratified rights and migration

Although Lockwood's model was originally based on the inequalities which emerge in the functioning of citizenship, the elaboration of a system of stratified rights is also readily illustrated by the position of transnational migrants. It has long been recognised that there are different legal statuses which govern the terms of presence and residence on a national territory, as set out in Hammar's (1990) tripartite distinction between citizens, denizens and aliens, to which EU citizenship adds a further dimension. In fact, the reality is much more complex than Hammar's model suggests, and increasingly so, for in the field of immigration we have seen an ever-expanding hierarchy of legal statuses, each with a different set of rights attached. Much of the differentiation in relation to rights turns on rights to work, welfare and residence, in a manner that echoes the principles underpinning domestic welfare reform. Welfare rights are commonly denied in the early stages of residence and immigration checks may be built into the delivery of welfare (see Morris 1998; Sainsbury 2012), while self-sufficiency is a key issue in applications for permanent residence. There may be preferential access to the labour market and to residence for certain categories of worker, while restrictions on access to rights may be harnessed as a means of deterrence. We see this with asylum seekers and restrictions on the right to work, the erosion of their welfare support, and reporting conditions imposed on their entitlement to receipt. Qualifying conditions for family unification, such as the ability to house and maintain an incoming spouse, can be used to limit access, while family unification rights may be withheld from certain categories of migrant. Indeed, the structures of civil society are permeated by forms of regulatory oversight which extend from the macro to the micro level, harnessing techniques and procedures of control in what Foucault (1991) has termed a process of governmentality.

Many aspects of the management of non-EEA migration in Britain have seen recent contractions, with the terms governing entry for employment narrowed – as with the removal of a tier 1 visa to search for work, and the capping of numbers entering under various categories of worker. There have also been new thresholds imposed, as with the minimum income required for permanent settlement, and for family unification, the latter being set at an amount considerably above earnings from full-time employment at the minimum wage. This has been the subject of judicial criticism in a human

rights challenge. There has also been an erosion of the level of maintenance provided to asylum seekers, and a radical restriction of the support available for failed asylum seekers or others trapped without a legal status. Another dimension of recent developments has been the explicit intent to create a 'hostile environment' for undocumented migrants, with the denial of a right to rent property, and the criminalisation of various other activities. These include renting to someone without legal residence, employing someone who does not have the right to work, working without permission, driving without legal residence and renting property to someone without legal residence, accompanied by a huge extension in the powers of immigration officers to search and seize property.

Of course, within the EU the rights of EU citizenship have to date overridden some of the constraints built into the immigration system, by virtue of the terms of free movement between the member states, but even here there has been scope for differentiation – as with phased access to the labour market and welfare rights for newer member states. There has also been a contraction of rights, and following an orchestrated moral panic about 'benefit tourism'³ prior to the referendum on EU membership we saw various measures introduced to scale back the welfare rights of workers from other EU member states, with statutory time limits placed on the duration of benefits for the unemployed (Job Seekers Allowance) and tighter conditions of access. The measures are legitimate under EU law⁴ though some authors argue that the changes were pushing at the boundaries of what is consistent with a commitment to the principle of free movement (see O'Brien 2016). Negotiations within the EU also delivered an agreement to limit access to in-work benefits for EU migrants, and child benefits paid on behalf of children resident in another member state, though the success of the Leave campaign has rendered this agreement redundant.

We can again ask how far position within the system is affected by gender, and here we must look at the distinctive ways in which women migrate and the effect this has in shaping their experience, and especially their access to rights. There is a disproportionate concentration of women migrants in the roles of domestic workers, care workers, sex workers and incoming spouses (Kofman et al. 2000), all shaped by women's particular association with the private sphere. Domestic workers and care workers who are employed in private homes may experience loss of privacy and difficulty in establishing their rights as employees, while their very presence in a country can be dependent on maintaining good relations with their employer. Protections for this group of workers have been significantly reduced by a recent bar on changing employer, and the removal of the possibility of permanent settlement, increasing the level of dependency on the household head. Similarly, incoming spouses (who are disproportionately women) are in a position of

dependency in the early years of their stay. Their lawful presence rests on maintenance of the marital relationship and the probationary period for this group was extended in 2012 from two years to five, a period during which they are denied access to public funds and have no right to be in the country independently of their marriage. Undocumented sex workers face a more extreme vulnerability, often held in virtual captivity and denied any formal status in the public sphere.

The moral dimension of rights

One interesting aspect of developments outlined above is the reliance of associated political discourse on notions of 'morality' and 'fairness', as in Cameron's moral mission of reform and fairness to the hard-working taxpayer. The concept of a 'moral economy' was adopted by E. P. Thompson (1971) to analyse crowd reaction to eighteenth-century food shortages in England, in which a legitimising notion was at work, based on custom and belief. The argument is closely associated with Polanyi's (1957) notion of embeddedness, whereby economic functions are rooted in broader social relations and supported by an underpinning value system. However, recent literature has extended the application of Thompson's concept through the argument that all economies are moral economies (Booth 1994), in that all will rest upon a particular moral form (see also Fassin 2009; Sayer 2007; Morris 2016a). Attention has therefore turned to the process of embedding market principles into social relations, through the rhetorical assertion of a set of associated 'moral' claims. In both domestic welfare and immigration policy in Britain we find a new 'moral economy' in operation, not in Thompson's sense of contestation from below, but rather as a discourse embedded from above, which ushers in shrinking repertoires of desert through tighter conditions of eligibility, often with popular support. This raises the question of whether the re-embedding referred to by Mingione will necessarily be emancipatory, an issue he himself recognises.

We have seen a set of parallel manoeuvres which harness access to rights as a means for governance, and which operate by building constraints and controls into the form of administration and delivery. Following Lockwood's model, we see that civic stratification can involve differential formal entitlements, closely linked to differing formal conditions of access – hence the system of welfare conditions and sanctions, and the terms of entry and residence on national territory. It is in this sense that citizens and migrants are increasingly exposed to similar techniques of discipline and surveillance, through various modes of conditionality built into the administration of rights. Both are also subject to informal impediments or discriminations that prevent the full enjoyment of rights by a particular group, and

this informal dimension repays closer consideration. Its functioning is captured by notions of gain and deficit, and driven by what we might loosely term standing in society, as shaped by elements of wealth, influence and prestige, and defined by Lockwood (1996: 536) as ‘advantages conferred by social standing and social networks, command of information, and general know-how, including the ability to attain one’s ends through the activation of shared moral sentiment’. Thus, while the formal dimension of civic stratification is apparent in the varying statuses of migrants, or categories of benefit claimant, as delineated earlier in this chapter, the informal dimension pertains wherever there is a prestige gain leading to preferential treatment, or conversely an indirect impediment to claiming a right which is formally held. This may take the form of a discrimination built into the practical operation of a right, or a stigma which prevents the full enjoyment of such a right. Examples of the first would be the requirement that a migrant must show an ability to house and maintain incoming family members – a condition which may be difficult to meet for those disadvantaged in the labour market;⁵ an example of the second would be the disproportionate impact of the household benefit cap on single parents⁶ or suspicion and mistrust of migrant workers, which may be reinforced by sanctions on employers of undocumented labour.⁷ An example of stigma which affects the enjoyment of a right is the use of ‘asylum seeker’ or even ‘illegal asylum seeker’ as a negative term reflecting the growing assumption that a majority of claims to asylum are in fact ‘bogus’.⁸ A similar example in relation to domestic welfare is found where political discourse claims an association between benefit dependency and fraud.⁹

Of particular interest, however, is the way in which the informal aspect of civic stratification introduces a dynamic element to the model, and in Lockwood’s account particular significance attaches to the possession or accrual of moral resources in supporting expansionary claims to rights. His discussion of this possibility focuses on the ‘inner logic’ of citizenship, which he argues will always reach beyond its limits, engendering expectations in excess of current achievements, and the same may be argued of rights more generally. In examining this expansionary potential, Lockwood looks to the role of what he terms ‘civic activists’ in mobilising demand for a fuller array of rights, not least through their growing recourse to legal challenge. Indeed, we can link this possibility to Alexander’s (2006) observation that the law has not only the capacity to divide and exclude, but also offers the possibility of ‘civil repair’. The consolidation of universal human rights and their incorporation into domestic regimes has been one focus for such activity, especially in relation to legal recourse where a country has enshrined human rights law in domestic legislation, as in Britain’s Human Rights Act (see Morris 2010). Furthermore, the idea of expansion is applicable not only to a

whole regime of rights, but to the experience of particular groups within that regime, who may accrue improved standing or ‘moral resources’ – perhaps with the support of civic activists (e.g. Morris 2010), and hence improve their formal position. Recognition within the immigration rules of same-sex relationships for the purposes of family unification are one example, though expansions in the field of domestic welfare are harder to find.

Much contestation has, however, focused on the non-discrimination requirement under the International Convention on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (see Elson 2012 on gender; Butterworth and Burton 2013 on disability). This issue better serves as an example of deficit, which in Lockwood’s schema operates as the converse of gain, and though in his account the term applies to the experience of particular groups or individuals in accessing a right, we can further elaborate its dynamic function within a regime of rights. In the discussion of gender, we saw that women’s association with the domestic sphere can translate into a deficit with respect to their access to rights in the public sphere, and I have cited other examples relating to the indirect effect of some control practices. The significance of moral resources, however, merits particular attention, and one instance of deficit occurs where the receipt of a right itself creates what Lockwood terms ‘an incipient status group of a negatively privileged kind’ (1996: 538). This he sees as likely to occur in relation to dependent statuses – those in receipt of state benefits, and the unemployed, disabled or asylum seekers furnish examples. Recent panic in Britain with respect to EU migrants from Romania and Bulgaria, allegedly attracted by the benefits system (Travis and Malik 2013), provides another instance – a forerunner of the concerns that fuelled the Brexit vote. Public perceptions of this group mean that they lack ‘moral leverage’ in Lockwood’s terms because of their assumed motivation for migration, while the associated lack of esteem is also likely to be bound up with cultural or racial prejudice.

While Lockwood’s schema sees a potential for civic gain to fuel expansion in a whole regime of rights, there is no corresponding discussion of deficit, and this is arguably because his framework is set up in terms of two oppositions, in neglect of a third. By combining his two axes of inequality Lockwood derives a fourfold typology, comprising civic exclusion and civic expansion, civic gain and civic deficit, which are in fact two paired oppositions. However, the opposite of civic exclusion is civic *inclusion* (not expansion), which then leaves scope for the consideration of a third opposition – civic expansion and civic contraction, which would refer to the shifting character of a whole regime of rights, or a particular area within its ambit. In other words, if rights can expand they can surely also contract, and we are now drawn to consider the relationship between the formal and informal elements of civic stratification with reference to both public policy

and public opinion. In particular, we must look more closely at the dynamic whereby a group may accrue moral standing in society or may suffer its erosion, and at the relationship between this process and the current political climate.

The social and political dynamic of moral standing

A number of interesting insights emerge if we combine the formal and informal aspects of civic stratification, and apply the resultant dynamic to an understanding of welfare provision and immigration law. Questions of desert and the elaboration of conditionality and surveillance have for some time been expanding in relation to domestic welfare. Viewed alongside the explication of different migrant statuses, and the related alliance between rights and controls, this suggests that the whole complex of civic stratification is amenable to manipulation by the state in relation to its own policy goals. Though (at present) constrained to a degree by EU law and human rights obligations, social rights are the least justiciable of recognised universal rights, while control over access to national territory remains a fiercely protected sovereign privilege. Contractions of the kind documented above have the potential to rebound on the informal dimension of rights, and in so doing to shape the public understanding of given categories, such that the granting of rights may confer or acknowledge public standing, while their denial may undermine it. We have seen one instance of this in the increase in hate crimes against East European migrants in the aftermath of the Brexit vote.¹⁰

We can thus begin to see the dynamic nature of the relationship between the formal and informal dimension of rights. In Lockwood's schema the building of public understanding and sympathy may heighten a group's access to moral resources which can then be deployed in the process of civic expansion. While a claim to rights is thus in some sense a claim to public standing, the conferral of a right can then act to confirm or to bolster a group in the eyes of the public, as in Honneth's (1995) argument that rights represent a form of 'recognition'. Where a group is subject to a deterioration in their public standing or their moral resources, claims-making not only becomes more difficult, but that group may become vulnerable to an active erosion of their rights. Similarly, a group denied rights may in consequence suffer a diminution of public standing, and a dynamic of this kind arguably underpins the muted public response to welfare cuts. Furthermore, the linkage between domestic welfare and migration as 'two sides of the same coin' in political discourse sets two target populations in opposition to each other, and in different ways has diminished public perceptions of the legitimacy of both.

An appeal has been made in this chapter for closer integration of the fields of welfare and international migration, and to this end the chapter proposes a unified framework for analysis. This framework is derived from Lockwood's concept of civic stratification, which facilitates analysis of the relationship between rights and controls, and is applicable both to the operation of rights internal to citizenship, and to the rights that are granted to non-citizen populations. In addressing contemporary developments in British welfare and immigration policy, the chapter shows how an ever more refined system of civic stratification has been used to constrain the rights of both domestic welfare claimants and international migrants, while setting them against each other. In this process a related political discourse has worked to undermine the moral resources and claims to legitimacy of both groups in the name of a 'moral economy' driven from above by resource constraint, conditionality and control.

Notes

- 1 <http://www.trusselltrust.org/stats> (accessed 6 March 2017).
- 2 <https://goo.gl/s9wSsI> (accessed 6 March 2017).
- 3 See for discussion, <https://goo.gl/Hg6aDG> (accessed 6 March 2017).
- 4 <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-eu-referendum-36449974> (accessed 6 March 2017).
- 5 For an example, see the judgment on *MM and Ors v SSHD* [2013] EWHC 1900 (Admin).
- 6 For discussion and elaboration, see Morris (2016a).
- 7 <https://goo.gl/Y2kAYo> (accessed 6 March 2017).
- 8 The Press Complaints Commission, in October 2003, issued a guidance note which states: 'As an asylum seeker is someone currently seeking refugee status or humanitarian protection, there can be no such thing in law as an "illegal asylum seeker".'
- 9 As in <https://goo.gl/ZBx4oq> (accessed 6 March 2017).
- 10 <https://goo.gl/5B0u9Q> (accessed 6 March 2017).

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The Mediterranean welfare states between recalibration and change in the cultural paradigm

Whether there is a specific Mediterranean welfare regime is an open debate. There is, however, consensus on the existence of what is known as a ‘Mediterranean welfare-state syndrome’ shared by all four southern European countries: Greece, Italy, Spain and Portugal. In this chapter, after having synthetically recalled the main features of this syndrome, we will describe how, and within which economic, cultural and political constraints, each of the four countries began to redefine it at the turn of the century – in an effort towards both modernisation and dealing with the new international landscape, which indicated an emerging differentiation in the policy outlook across the four countries. We will then discuss whether the economic crisis accelerated or, on the contrary, slowed down this differentiation. Finally, we will look at the Italian case as being particularly exemplary of unresolved choices in the policy paradigm. The analysis of this case, also in comparison with that of Spain, shows that, in order to understand the different paths that Mediterranean welfare states have taken in recent years, in addition to the economic circumstances and international position, the nation-specific political tensions should also be taken into account.

Characteristics of the southern welfare-state syndrome

According to Ferrera (1996), all the southern European welfare states long shared, and partly still share, a ‘sociopolitical etiquette’ that distinguishes them from other corporatist European countries such as Germany, France or Austria, based on ‘status-differentiating’ welfare programmes that are strongly related to employment and family status. In these countries, the highly fragmented and ‘corporatist’ income-maintenance system was further characterised by dualism and polarisation in terms of income maintenance and pensions, which were strongly skewed in favour of (male) core workers and privileged groups of the elderly (see also Castles and Ferrera

1996; Moreno 2006). Extensive clientelism and ‘patronage machines’ that distributed cash subsidies to political client groups played an important role, particularly so in Italy and Greece. Furthermore, notwithstanding a preference for cash transfers over services, both social assistance (i.e., income support for the poor) and income support for families with children were minimal and/or strongly categorical. In Portugal and Spain, child benefits were, and still are, reserved for the very poor. In Italy, they were, and still are, reserved for the households of low-income employees. In Greece, they were reserved for different categories of workers (with a great degree of difference in generosity across employment sectors) and for large families. None of these countries had minimum income provision for the poor in the early 1990s (except for the old and the severely disabled), nor a substantial social housing programme (Castles and Ferrera 1996; Flaquer 2000; Scanlon et al. 2014). On the contrary, in all these countries there was, and still is, a strong reliance on family solidarity (and on its internal gender division of labour) to meet the financial and caring needs of family members, even beyond the boundaries of the nuclear household. This reliance is supported not only by cultural but also by legal norms to a greater degree than in the so-called continental countries (Saraceno 1994; Naldini 2003; Moreno 2006; Morgan 2006; and, for a critical view, Calzada and Brooks 2013). This results in what Saraceno (2010; Saraceno and Keck 2010) has defined as a high degree of ‘familialism by default’ (or unsupported, but also partly legally prescribed, familialism), together with a large space left for charities and church organisations (also see Pereirinha 1996; Mingione and Oberti 2003). With regard to care needs and obligations, this familialism by default both presupposed and enforced a strongly asymmetrical gender contract, restricting the possibilities for women to enter and remain in the labour market in the presence of caring demands within the household and the extended family. Consequently, all these countries had until the 1990s a comparatively low rate of women’s participation in the labour force, with a longer prevalence of the male breadwinner model than in other European countries and lengthy dependency by the young on their parents for housing and financial support (see also Mingione 2001). The partial exception was Portugal, with its traditionally higher women’s labour force participation.

All four countries eventually departed from this fragmented and categorical approach only with regard to healthcare. All four, in fact, introduced a national health service during the 1970s and 1980s.

The comparatively large irregular and informal economy in all these countries played an ambivalent role in the development of this ‘etiquette’. While it provided and still provides earning opportunities for marginal workers, it has weakened the legitimisation of any demand for systematic

anti-poverty measures, while also reducing the tax base out of which such measures might be funded.

Overall, according to Mari-Klose and Moreno-Fuentes (2013), these countries for a long time shared a clearly distinctive feature: a sharp polarisation between well-protected beneficiaries and a large group of under/unprotected workers and citizens, which also resulted in higher poverty rates than in other western European countries and in a strongly age-biased orientation of social policies, with younger workers and families remaining largely outside of the safety net. These similarities began to weaken in the 1990s because of the different paths that the welfare modernisation process took in each country. The economic crisis that began in 2007 both exposed the weaknesses of the Mediterranean 'sociopolitical etiquette' and also further highlighted the partially divergent paths the four countries had taken.

The 'recalibration' of the 1990s and early 2000s: transnational differentiation and emerging new policy paradigms

The economic and political changes of the 1990s both compelled and made it more difficult for these countries to reform their welfare states in the direction of less fragmentation and greater inclusion of marginalised social groups and dimensions. As Ferrera (2010) points out, in 1993, when the Maastricht Treaty requirement of a maximum 3 per cent GDP deficit ratio by 1998 came into force, all four countries had a deficit well above the EU average of 6 per cent – Portugal 7.1 per cent; Spain 7.3 per cent; Italy 9.5 per cent; Greece 16.3 per cent. The four countries, therefore, entered into a new phase in which their already fragile welfare equilibria became increasingly destabilised, faced as they were with internal demands for welfare-state expansion and (ever stronger) external demands for financial restructuring. They were also confronted by the competition coming from the emerging countries, with their lower labour costs and weaker (or non-existent) trade unions.

In the view of Ferrera, Hemerijck and Rhodes (2000; see also Guillén and Matsaganis 2000), these external and internal pressures brought about a process of 'recalibration' in all four countries, which consisted in efforts both to 'catch up' with the most developed European welfare states and to achieve internal rebalancing. The recalibration agenda (ideally) included, on the one hand, the expansion of family policies (with attention to gender equality and support for women's employment) and a strengthening of the basic safety net; and, on the other, a reduction of the most generous guarantees offered to some groups – core workers and pensioners.

Alongside this process in all these countries, political-institutional changes increased the role of regions and local governments in policy design

and implementation, as well as the involvement of non-governmental institutions (Rhodes 2003; Guillén and Petmesidou 2008). The catching-up and rebalancing mix, however, as well as their actual degree, varied across the four countries (Saraceno 2017). Moreover, the partial devolution of responsibilities to local and non-governmental actors introduced a new cause of intra-country diversification and fragmentation (e.g. in the quality and coverage of care services and in the functioning of the health service), which thwarted efforts towards defragmentation (see, for example, for Italy, Fargion and Gualmini 2013; Albertini and Pavolini 2015). As a matter of fact, in all these countries, but particularly in Italy, regional differentiation was and continues to be strong.

One of the drivers of ‘recalibration in order to catch up’ were changes occurring in family arrangements that weakened the assumptions underlying familism by default with regard both to demography and to the gender division of labour. Population and kinship ageing put pressure on both the health and pension systems and on the caring resources of families. Increasing women’s labour force participation, which reduced women’s availability for caring, began to weaken one of the basic assumptions of the familistic welfare states, although to a different degree both at the inter and intra-country level (see Karamessini 2008).

The four countries, however, showed different capabilities and willingness to meet the new demands created by the dwindling population of full-time ‘homemakers’ and mothers. And in all four, a large proportion of caring needs was still left to families and to the women within them (Saraceno and Keck 2010). Italy was the country, among the four, that in the 1990s had the most developed system of maternity and parental leave and childcare services, particularly for children aged three to school age. It was, however, soon matched and even largely surpassed by Spain with regard to childcare services for the under-threes (Moreno 2004; León and Migliavacca 2013; Naldini and Jurado 2013). Portugal and Greece lagged behind. Around the turn of the century, Spain and (to a lesser degree) Portugal also introduced reforms that included the provision of a mixture of services and payments for care that in principle should grant universal access to (non-health) care for the frail elderly, based on degree of need. Greece and Italy did not make significant inroads in this sector of the welfare state, leaving these needs mostly to family and individual resources (for an overview, see Saraceno 2014a). At the same time, the new phenomenon of immigration in all these countries, and particularly in Italy, Portugal and Spain (which had traditionally been emigration countries), enabled the development of the caring pattern defined by Bettio, Simonazzi and Villa (2006) as ‘migrant in the family’: a sort of defamilialisation of caregiving through the, often informal, market of so-called *badanti*, rather than through public services (Moreno

2006; Naldini and Saraceno 2008). This development was de facto supported and legalised by migration laws and successive migrant regularisations that identified *badanti* as worthy and 'good' migrants.

Differences emerged also in the way the weakest area of the southern European welfare states – social assistance – was tackled. Only Portugal, following the impulse of the EU 1992 recommendation on a minimum resources guarantee, introduced a minimum income provision at the national level for individuals and families in severe poverty. In Spain, all regions initiated a process towards this end. However, cross-regional differences not only in regulations and entitlements, but also in generosity, remained and remain high. Neither Italy nor Greece introduced national minimum income provisions for the non-elderly or severely disabled poor. The able-bodied poor remained only partially supported by very scattered local initiatives (Matsaganis et al. 2003; Ferrera 2005).

Similar transnational trends occurred with changes in labour market regulation, with an increasing flexibilisation of labour contracts, particularly for new entrants, supported by some strengthening of social protection for the more marginal workers. Spain has been at the forefront of this process, followed by Portugal (Marí-Klose and Moreno-Fuentes 2013). Flexibilisation, however, mostly concerned the young and women of all ages, thus creating, particularly in Italy, but also in Spain, a new generational divide while not reducing the gender divide.

All four countries introduced restrictive reforms in their pension systems (Natali and Stamati 2014). The most radical changes occurred in Italy with the 1995 Dini reform, which changed the pension formula from earnings-related to a defined contributory calculation and sought to harmonise the diverse systems in operation (Jessoula 2011). The result was a partial levelling of social rights and obligations in this field, with some improvement for previously uncovered workers. In general, and in perspective, however, pension benefits for the younger cohorts worsened in a period when it was becoming clear that the young would experience greater discontinuity in the labour market, and therefore in their contributory records, compared to those of the older cohorts, who remained in the old system. At the same time, risks increased for older workers, for whom early retirement became more difficult and more costly. Spain and Portugal also introduced restrictive rules into their pension system, without, however, radically changing the relevant calculation formula. Changes in Greece, by contrast, were minimal and difficult to implement, given the highly fragmented character of Greek society and its mechanisms of interest representation (Guillén and Petmesidou 2008; Matsaganis 2008).

On balance, one might argue that the recalibration process in these countries stopped short of an actual reform of the existing policy

paradigm towards greater universalism and/or social investment (Palier 2013). Following a neoliberal approach, policies privileged the reduction of social protection and the liberalisation of labour contracts (see also Gualmini and Rizza 2011), with little or no investment in human capital (early childcare and education, work-family reconciliation, lifelong learning and so forth). Already before the onset of the financial crisis in 2007, all four southern European welfare states might have been defined as cases of more or less marked ‘incomplete reformism’ (Burroni 2016) with neoliberal influences.

But significant transnational differences and trends had also started to be delineated. Particularly under the socialist government, piecemeal but steady reforms in Spain had started to shift the policy etiquette of that country in the direction of greater universalism, individualisation of rights and defamilialisation, in a context of highly flexibilised labour contracts (Guillén 2010), although Spanish social expenditure remained well below the EU average. At the opposite pole, Greece had failed to deal with its major dysfunctions and imbalances in social protection or with the fragmented and conflictual industrial relations that contributed to policy stalemates (Petmesidou and Mossialos 2006; Petmesidou 2013). In Italy, rationalisation towards greater universalism in traditional policy fields (such as pensions), which had been supported by negotiations and social pacts between various social actors, had lost momentum by the beginning of the 2000s, also because of changes in the political climate and balances (Ascoli 2011). In Portugal, the policy reform momentum, spurred on first by accession to the EU and then by joining the EMU, waned after the latter goal was achieved.

The impact of the financial crisis

The southern European economies have been hit by the financial crisis mainly through public indebtedness (Petmesidou and Guillén 2014), although their levels of public debt differed at the onset of the crisis, as did their interplay with other factors. Spain had a comparatively low public deficit and public debt, but it had massive private indebtedness, mostly due to the construction bubble, which had already started to burst prior to the financial crisis. The credit crunch following the international crisis therefore intensified an economic contraction that was already in progress, putting an end to the economic and employment growth of the 2000s. In Italy and Portugal, private indebtedness was low, but the financial crisis precipitated an economic decline that had already begun and triggered the explosion of the public debt and deficit. In Greece, excessive borrowing in order to fund both private and public debt, together with weak revenue collection and the weak competitiveness of Greek enterprises, heightened

vulnerability to the international financial turmoil. Although to different degrees, all four countries were forced by international bodies, and particularly by the EU, to accept harsh restrictions on their social expenditure (Zartaloudis 2014).

Retrenchment has been most severe in Greece and Portugal (Royo 2013; Zartaloudis 2014), which not only had the weakest welfare states to begin with, but also suffered the severest bailout deals. In all four countries, the incidence of poverty increased (European Commission 2014; Matsaganis and Leventi 2014), while the already fragmented and inadequate safety net shrank. The availability and quality of services also deteriorated, hitting the lower and middle classes in particular. All four countries once again reformed their pension systems, either raising retirement age (as in Italy and Spain) or changing the formula (as in Greece and Portugal). In all four countries, but particularly in Italy, employment protection was also reduced for core workers, which was only partly compensated (in Italy) by a broadening of eligibility for protection (Marí-Klose and Moreno-Fuentes 2013; Sacchi 2013; Petmesidou and Guillén 2014).

In the face of rising poverty among children, Greece did, in 2013, introduce a new child benefit based on a household means test, which replaced the previous highly fragmented and categorical system and expanded the coverage to a large section of previously uncovered children (Matsaganis 2014). In 2014, with IMF funding, it also introduced a pilot minimum income scheme in 13 municipalities. Discontinued the following year, it was experimentally introduced at the national level in 2017. Italy introduced a pilot scheme in 12 cities in 2015, but its translation into a generalised scheme across the country occurred only in the second half of 2017, with insufficient funds and a restricted target, privileging families with older unemployed and/or underage children in extreme poverty (Saraceno 2015a; 2016). Overall, trends towards universalism remained very weak in Italy in the face of persistent unsupported but expected familialism, coupled with a neoliberal approach in labour relations, as we will discuss at more length in the following section.

Spain further differentiated itself from the other three countries. The crisis and the austerity measures have strained the new institutional welfare framework that had been developing in the decades preceding the crisis. Nonetheless, although with delays, some restrictions (Marí-Klose and Moreno-Fuentes 2013) and some risk of reverting to familialism (León and Pavolini 2014), the trend towards greater universalism and inclusion has remained in place. But inter-regional and centre-periphery conflicts over the redistribution of resources risk undermining both national solidarity and national unity.

Italy: familialism, neoliberalism and residual social assistance

Italy is an exemplary case of ‘incomplete reformism’. As we have shown above, welfare-state recalibration was limited to only a few dimensions: the pension system and, since 2014, unemployment insurance. Rebalancing measures, such as an extension of child allowances and work–family conciliating instruments, have been mostly short-lived, as well as categorical and fragmentary, although a minimum income provision is slowly being implemented. Even more than in Spain, the Italian model of labour market reform has followed the Anglo-Saxon approach of ‘activation without active policies’ (Burroni 2016), according to the neoliberal rule that ‘any job is better than no job’ (Gualmini and Rizza 2011). Work–family reconciliation policies remained marginal as did investment in education and lifelong learning, while the growing number of the working poor was systematically under-evaluated.

Studies on the Italian case suggest that the ‘incompleteness’ of the welfare and labour market reforms was an outcome of (or a response to) political tensions at various levels (Ascoli and Pavolini 2015; Ascoli and Sgritta 2014). Some of these tensions, already described in the previous paragraphs, were common to various degrees and with different timing to all the Mediterranean capitalisms. There are, however, other tensions that are specific to Italy. First of all, an important role was played by the end, in 2001, of the long series of centre-left governments. This interruption stalled the embryonic process of reform towards greater universalism while rationalising social expenditure that had been envisaged by the Onofri Commission (the expert commission that went by its chair’s name) instituted by the first Prodi government (see Commissione per l’analisi delle compatibilità macroeconomiche della spesa sociale 1997). An important role was also played by the transformation and fragmentation of political parties that took place in the ‘second republic’, following the political crisis spurred in the mid-1990s by the uncovering of widespread corruption in the main traditional parties. In this fragmentary and dynamic situation, where political constituencies could no longer be taken as given, it was difficult for political leaders to define long-term agendas involving specific visions of social justice and requiring complex and explicit negotiations between conflicting interests (Bobbio, Pomatto and Seddone 2015). In this perspective, duelling over issues at the core of the neoliberal approach, such as public debt (more taxation or cuts?) and labour market flexibilisation (protection or efficiency?) was in the short term politically more efficacious for national leaders than debating about the recalibration of social policies or even the reform of the public administration that would be necessary towards this end.

Tensions that were endogenous to the political context have thus interacted with the shrinking of resources, favouring the country’s alignment

with the controversial revision of the Lisbon strategy initiated in 2005, with its downplaying in the EU arena of the social cohesion objective (Saraceno 2014b; 2015b). The result was a strong legitimisation of the ‘tasks ahead’ that, after the revision of the Lisbon strategy, have constituted the EU consensus: reduction of the deficit/GDP ratio and labour market flexibilisation.

Neoliberal theses that favoured cuts in public expenditure, outsourcing of social services and labour market deregulation have become prevalent in political narratives. Under the catchword of welfare-state modernisation, *de facto* there was no trade-off between social protection reduction and social investment. Rather, the former prevailed. Certainly the social investment approach was debated in the Italian epistemic community (Ferrera 2013; Ascoli and Sgritta 2014; Biorcio and Vitale 2014; Kazepov and Ranci 2016), and its vocabulary might even be used instrumentally by policy-makers to frame their deregulatory choices. A systematic consideration of all the complex and intertwined components of the social investment approach and of the conditions for its implementation, however, never quite gained ground in Italy at the policy-making level. Neoliberalism in Italy influenced not only the right, but also the centre-left coalition that in 2000 had approved the reform of social services oriented towards both universalism and social investment and therefore potentially coherent with the original ‘Lisbon spirit’. At the same time, neoliberal theses have rarely been acknowledged as such; rather, they are presented as ‘technical’ and ‘realistic’ arguments. Leaders and opinion-makers on the left might even support them with reference to the New Labour discourse, which also included many neoliberal ingredients (Biorcio and Vitale 2014; Barbera et al. 2016).

Neoliberalism also prevailed in other countries, of course. But in Italy it gained cultural and political prominence in a context where extended family solidarity prevails over individualism (Bagnasco 2012) and ‘unsupported familialism’ or ‘familialism by default’ is an underlying feature of the welfare-state approach (Saraceno and Keck 2010). The Italian case, therefore, is exemplary for how neoliberalism and familialism may go hand in hand rather than being at odds, forming a cultural complex that may constrain a policy recalibration towards greater universalism. It is not surprising that neoliberal concepts can be used to legitimise political compromises in countries where family obligations are strong and institutionalised. In these contexts, in fact, both the investment in human capital and the protection of individual and social risks, from unemployment to fragility in old age, may be framed mainly as a family responsibility, and social inequalities be interpreted as the consequence of a different capacity of families to produce human capital. The neoliberal approach could also find some convergence with another trait of the Italian cultural political context that complements familialism in contrasting universalistic approaches in the provision of

social rights: the strong role and advocacy of the Catholic Church in favour of private schools on the one hand, and charity and philanthropy rather than rights-based social assistance on the other. The former supports the idea that families (parents) should be free to choose the cultural framework they wish for the education their children and therefore the state, also in funding, should not privilege public schools. The latter supports a ‘good Samaritan’ approach to social assistance, based on altruistic and paternalistic values, rather than on solidaristic and citizenship ones, defining the ‘assisted’ as ‘incapable individuals’ (or families) who are unable to support themselves and therefore are intrinsically disqualified (Morlicchio 2012; Paugam 2005). Only in recent years has this approach been partially modified by most important Catholic associations with regard to income support for the poor, with Caritas among the prominent members of the *Alleanza contro la povertà*, a network of associations that pushes for the introduction of an universalistic minimum income provision for the poor (Gori et al. 2016; Granaglia and Bolzoni 2016).

Neoliberalism, more or less compulsory family solidarity, charity and traditional social assistance, although deriving from different traditional cultures, interlink in the Italian familialistic welfare-state narrative, integrating traditionalism with appeals for efficiency.

Conclusion

The analysis of the Italian case indicates that welfare-state recalibration has to deal not only with the economic constraints of the weak Mediterranean capitalisms. Endogenous characteristics originating in political tensions also play a role. In the Italian case, the dramatic change that occurred in the political parties and their constituencies, and the ensuing further fragmentation, have favoured a shift in the public discourse from issues of social justice and universalism to the typical topics of the neoliberal agenda: labour market deregulation and reducing social expenditure.

Let us now to return briefly to our comparative exercise. The different ways in which the four countries recalibrated their welfare states before and during the crisis are the result of the interplay between their economic position at the international, and particularly EU, level and their internal political developments and tensions (Burrioni 2016). This is particularly highlighted when the comparison is restricted to Italy and Spain, the two largest Mediterranean economies and welfare states, which faced austerity requirements under less strict conditions than Portugal and Greece. Compared to Italy, in Spain a faster and more radical ‘liberalisation’ of the labour market, which increased both job demand and job insecurity, under the socialist government was accompanied by an increasing universalisation

of social rights and a partial de-familialisation, supported also by important changes towards greater individualisation in civil rights. From this perspective, one might say that Spain moved in the direction of what, following Ferrera (2013), might be defined as ‘neoliberal welfarism’, striking a new balance between equality and liberty, and between individual responsibility and collective solidarity. This outcome was the result of the political context. Until the very recent past, centre-right and centre-left coalitions had alternated in government for longer stretches of time than in Italy, and the political party system remained fairly unchanged, granting greater political stability to the country.

In Italy, concertation with trade unions has declined since the end of the 1990s, whereas in Spain it remained in place from the second half of the 1990s until the onset of the crisis. Furthermore, the Spanish socialist government of 2008–11 did not abandon economic neoliberalism; rather it integrated it with a ‘citizens’ socialism’ that caused, in addition to the expansion of civil rights, a partial recalibration of welfare, particularly in the area of work–family conciliating policies (Ferrera 2010; Naldini and Jurado 2013).

The different ways in which Italy and Spain approached welfare-state recalibration, therefore, to some degree reflect differences in the two political contexts and the political discourses that have been developed to justify political choices, confirming that any reform is a complex social construction. From an analytical point of view, this suggests that, in studying processes of welfare restructuring, one should take more careful account of the role played, within each national context, by the characteristics of the actors involved, by the structure of political communities and by the forms of discursive legitimisation that are hegemonic within them (Barbier 2003; Biorcio and Vitale 2014). Only thus is it possible to understand under which conditions the persistence and, even more, the aggravation of austerity requests by the EU might weaken, or even reverse, the comparatively more advanced modernisation/recalibration process in Spain, while putting a full stop to modernisation in those other Mediterranean countries where – as in Italy – welfare-state recalibration has been more limited.

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Part III

CITIZENSHIP AND MIGRATION

Deconstructing labour demand: implications for low-wage employment

To what extent are employment-based economic insecurity and poverty intrinsic to advanced economies rather than a deviation, as so much policy discussion seems to suggest? Here I examine major changes in the organisation of economic activity over the last twenty or more years. These changes (see Mingione 1991; Andreotti and Mingione 2014; Mingione and Oberti 2003; Sassen 2014) have emerged as a source of 1) general economic insecurity, 2) low-wage jobs, and 3) new forms of employment-centred poverty. In his work, Mingione and his collaborators showed us how the family and larger networks of trust could make up for some of the failures or absences of state support (e.g. Facchini and Mingione 2011; Mingione 2009). Today we have reached such an erosion of the incomes of modest households and of government benefits that this is sometimes the only way in which the younger generations survive. These types of extreme conditions clearly show us the extent to which poverty and economic insecurity are not simply functions of an individual's failings. This includes, for example, the extent to which many low-wage workers in dead-end jobs take their jobs seriously, learn and develop skills, and are ready to move up the work ladder only to find that there is no such ladder because the new economy has eliminated it.

This is a broad subject. Here I will confine myself to three processes that are constitutive of or contributing to new, and possibly accentuating older, forms of inequality/distance between firms and workers. Some of these workers can prosper and others, a growing majority, get stuck at the bottom of the economic system. While not necessarily mutually exclusive, it is helpful to distinguish them analytically. These forms of inequality/distance include: 1) the *growing* inequality in the profit-making capacities of different economic sectors and in the earnings capacities of different types of workers and households; 2) socio-economic polarisation tendencies resulting from the organisation of service industries and from the casualisation of the employment relation; and 3) the production of urban marginality,

particularly as a result of new structural processes of economic growth rather than those producing marginality through abandonment.

Employment regimes

The employment regimes that have emerged in highly developed countries over the last three decades have reconfigured not only the job supply but also employment relations (Andreotti and Mingione 2016; Mingione 2009; Ghezzi and Mingione 2003; Kazepov 2005). Much analysis of post-industrial society and advanced economies generally posits a massive growth in the need for highly educated workers and little need for the types of jobs that low-income workers are likely to hold. This suggests sharply reduced employment opportunities for these workers. Yet detailed empirical studies, especially of major cities in highly developed countries, show ongoing demand for low-wage workers and a significant supply of old and new jobs requiring little education and paying low wages. Wages in these jobs have often long been below minimum subsistence standards.

One issue that poses challenges of interpretation is that we need to understand whether this low-wage job supply 1) is merely or largely a residual partly inflated by the large supply of low-wage workers with little if any human capital, or 2) is mostly part of the reconfiguration of the job supply and employment relations that are in fact a feature of *advanced* service economies (Sassen 2010; 2014). In this second case, the existence of a vast supply of jobs often paying below subsistence levels would then be a systemic development that is an integral part of advanced economies rather than a function of the existence of a large supply of workers with inadequate human capital and an inadequate work ethic – typically the more common interpretation. One interesting option that is more common in Italy than in other Western developed economies is young adults living with, and supported by, their families. This process started decades ago in Italy, while it has only recently become evident in other Western economies.

There are no precise measures of these diverse conditions increasingly common in our advanced societies. The available evidence tends to consist of standardised measures of the characteristics of the jobs (wage level and temporal features, such as full-time vs. part-time) and of the workers (level of formal education, race, gender, age, immigrant status). There has probably been an unduly strong tendency to read more into these two kinds of evidence than is warranted. One influential interpretation long invoked in general commentaries and among policy-makers is to assume that workers' characteristics are a key variable explaining employment outcomes. This has frequently been taken a step further and interpreted in the case of low-income workers and workers with frequent unemployment periods as a

lack of the will to learn, of ambition, of the proper work ethic, and so on. The policy implication is that better workers will reduce the supply of low-wage jobs; while this might have held for some periods in our Western-style economies, it is not quite the case today given the surplus of workers with a good education but no jobs.

What much of the evidence fails to provide is information about the interaction effects between workers and jobs, or workers and workplaces, and how these interaction effects shape employment outcomes. One type of interesting interaction effect is what the workers actually bring to these jobs. Some evidence suggests that more often than one might expect from prevailing understandings, these workers bring skills, the will to learn, aspirations and eagerness to advance. Further, the nature of these workplaces and labour markets is such that this will to be a good worker and to learn more skills is not likely to be measured either by employers or by the standard measures of the job supply and workers characteristics. Understanding these often unexpected combinations underlines the importance of detailed and in-depth ethnographic research (see Kazepov 2008; Mingione and Oberti 2003; Mingione and Pugliese 2000).

To extract the full benefits that ethnographies can produce, we also need to understand some of the broader contextual variables. These include a focus on major policies that have affected the condition of low-wage workers, and the growth dynamics in advanced service economies, especially the systemic outcomes concerning labour demand.

Growth dynamics in advanced service economies

I see three processes of economic and spatial organisation as central to the questions addressed in this chapter. One is the expansion and consolidation of the producer services and corporate headquarters sector into the economic core of major cities in highly developed countries. While this sector may not account for the majority of jobs, it establishes a new regime of economic activity and associated spatial and social transformations, particularly evident in major cities.

A second process is the downgrading of a broad range of manufacturing sectors, even as some are sharply upgraded, notably the high-tech sector. I use the notion of downgrading to describe a mode of political and technical reorganisation of manufacturing that is to be distinguished from the decline and obsolescence of manufacturing activities. The downgraded manufacturing sector (with sweatshops the extreme case) represents a mode of incorporation into the so-called 'post-industrial' economy rather than a form of obsolescence. Downgrading becomes a form of adaptation to a situation where 1) a growing number of manufacturing firms need to compete with

cheap imports and 2) the profit-making capacities of manufacturing overall are modest compared with those of leading sectors such as telecommunications or finance and its sister industries.

The third process is the informalisation of an expanding array of economic activities. This encompasses certain components of the downgraded manufacturing sector and components of service sectors. In both cases, it includes low-end and high-end products and services, especially in major cities (Sassen 2014: ch. 1; 2010). In this context, informalisation emerges as a mode of reorganising the production and distribution of goods and services for firms that 1) have an effective local demand for their goods and services but 2) cannot compete with cheap imports or cannot compete for space and other business needs with the new, high-profit firms engendered by the advanced corporate service economy. Escaping the regulatory apparatus of the formal economy enhances the economic opportunities of such firms.

Whether articulation and feedback effects exist among these different sectors is of importance to the questions in this chapter. If there is articulation among the different economies and the labour markets embedded in them, it could be argued that we need to rethink some of the basic propositions about the post-industrial economy. Among these propositions there is, for instance, the notion that our economies need mostly highly educated workers. There is also the notion that informalisation and downgrading are just a 'Third World' import through immigration or an anachronistic remnant of an earlier era. On the contrary, new employment regimes in these services-dominated urban economies create low-wage jobs and do not require particularly high levels of education (Kazepov 2005; Andreotti and Mingione 2016; Mingione and Pratschke 2011). Politically and theoretically this points to an employment context that is larger than that of low-wage, immigrant-related jobs. It is, in fact, a systemic development of the *advanced* urban economy.

High-level business services, from accounting to decision-making expertise, are not usually analysed as production or as a work process; I have spent much time researching the extent to which the expansion of these high-level specialised business services is a key marker of our current economy, and the fact that the sector includes not only an increase of very highly paid jobs, but also the expansion of very lowly paid jobs, though the two are rarely brought together in the expert scholarship. One simple example is that the vast increase in high-level office jobs has brought with it a proliferation of luxury office towers, and these need to be maintained and cleaned; additionally, the new type of office requires a vast array of diverse supplies, which means trucks and handlers, and so on. Finally, these high-end services are usually seen as a type of output, that is, high-level technical

knowledge, accounting expertise, etc. Thus insufficient attention has been paid to the actual array of jobs, from high-paying to low-paying, involved in the production of these services.

In short, a focus on the actual work process in advanced service industries brings to the fore the labour question. Information outputs need to be produced, and the buildings which hold the workers need to be built and cleaned. The rapid growth of the financial industry and of highly specialised services generates not only high-level, technical and administrative jobs but also low-wage, unskilled jobs. (For a full development of these issues see Sassen 2016; 2014.)

Low-wage jobs as a function of economic growth

The more common mode in the post-war decades in Western economies until the 1980s was for growth to reduce the supply of low-wage jobs. To understand today's opposite trend, it is important to distinguish the characteristics of jobs from their sectoral location. As I argued earlier in this chapter, highly dynamic, technologically advanced growth sectors today are increasingly likely also to contain low-wage, dead-end jobs. In the US this is evident even in such high-tech, cutting-edge districts as Silicon Valley or the Princeton corridor and in the financial sector. Furthermore, the distinction between sectoral characteristics and sectoral growth patterns becomes crucial to understanding these trends: as already discussed, backward sectors such as downgraded manufacturing or low-wage service occupations can be part of major growth trends in a highly developed economy. It is often assumed that backward sectors express decline trends, but in today's economy this may well be a function of growth in some of our leading economic sectors – which is, clearly, highly problematic. Similarly, there is a tendency to assume that advanced industries, such as finance, have mostly good, white-collar jobs. In fact they contain a good number of low-paying jobs, from cleaners to stock clerks.

In my research I have developed a notion of circuits for the distribution and installation of economic operations (Sassen 2002). This functions as an analytic device to follow economic activities into terrains that escape the increasingly narrow borders of mainstream representations of 'the' economy and of particular sectors within 'the' economy. A focus on the circuits present in our economies enables the researcher to negotiate the crossing of discontinuous spaces (Sassen 2010; 2016). It allows me to capture the variety of economic activities, work cultures and urban residential areas that are part of, for instance, the financial industry in New York City, but are not typically associated with that industry: for example, the truckers who deliver the software and the cleaners have work cultures, engage in

activities and reside in neighbourhoods that diverge drastically from those of financial experts, yet they are part of the industry. These circuits are also mechanisms to resist the *analytic* confinement, or representation, of the low-wage, immigrant workforce as operating in 'backward' industries just because the jobs appear as such.

As discussed earlier, the presence of a highly dynamic sector with a polarised income distribution has its own impact on the creation of low-wage jobs through the sphere of consumption (or, more generally, social reproduction). The rapid growth of industries with strong concentrations of high- and low-income jobs has assumed distinct forms in the consumption structure, which in turn has a feedback effect on the organisation of work and the types of jobs being created. The expansion of the high-income workforce in conjunction with the emergence of new cultural forms have led to a process of high-income gentrification that rests, in the last analysis, on the availability of a vast supply of low-wage workers. High-end restaurants, luxury housing, luxury hotels, gourmet shops, boutiques, French hand laundries and special cleaning services are all more labour-intensive than their lower-price equivalents. This has reintroduced – to an extent not seen in a very long time – the whole notion of the 'serving classes' in contemporary high-income households. The immigrant woman serving the white, middle-class, professional woman has replaced the traditional image of the black female servant serving the white master. In the cities where these trends are at their sharpest we also see an increasingly sharp tendency towards contestation and social polarisation.

The informalisation of work

One of the most extreme forms of the casualisation of the employment relation, and of the changes in economic organisation generally, is the informalisation of a growing array of activities, a development evident in cities as diverse as New York, Amsterdam, Buenos Aires, Johannesburg and Shanghai. But among experts in the 1980s and into the 1990s, the informal economy was generally seen as not pertinent to advanced economies.

At the time US scholars working on labour did not recognise informalisation as an issue. They saw it as a subject grounded in the incapacities of less developed economies: the inability of those countries to attain full modernisation of the economy and stop excess migration to the cities; and if there were elements of an informal economy in highly developed countries, it was seen as an import through 'Third World' immigrants and their propensity to replicate survival strategies typical of their home countries. Related to this view is the notion that 'backward' sectors of the economy are kept backward, or even alive, because of the availability of a large supply of cheap,

immigrant workers. These views posit or imply that if there is an informal economy in highly developed countries, the sources are to be found in 'Third World' immigration and in backward sectors of the economy.

Rather than assume that 'Third World' immigration is causing informalisation, the critical scholarship began to change the focus, also in the US; and here Mingione's (e.g. 1991) work was critical. Immigrants, in so far as they tend to form communities due to discrimination against them regarding housing and such, were and are in a favourable position to seize the opportunities represented by informalisation. But the opportunities are not necessarily created by immigrants. They are a structured outcome of current trends in advanced economies, as I discussed in earlier sections of this chapter.

A central hypothesis organising much of my past and current research on the informal economy is strongly shaped by the work of Mingione and his colleagues. That hypothesis is that the processes of economic restructuring that have contributed to the decline of the manufacturing-dominated industrial complex of the post-war era and the rise of the new, service-dominated economic complex, provide the general context within which we need to place informalisation if we are to go beyond a mere description of instances of informal work. The specific set of mediating processes I have found to promote informalisation of work are 1) increased earnings inequality and the associated restructuring of consumption in high-income strata and in very low-income strata, and 2) the inability of the providers of many of the goods and services that are part of the new consumption to compete for the necessary resources in urban contexts where leading sectors have sharply bid up the prices of commercial space, labour, auxiliary services and other basic business inputs (Sassen 2014: ch. 1).

One major trend is that the division of the middle class into an increasingly rich and an increasingly impoverished sector, the growth of a high-income professional class and the expansion of the low-income population have all had a pronounced impact on the structure of consumption, which has in turn had an impact on the organisation of work to meet the new consumption demand. Part of the demand for goods and services feeding the expansion of the informal economy comes from the mainstream economy and the fragmentation of what were once mostly homogeneous middle-class markets (see also Mingione 1991; 1995). And another part of this demand comes from the internal needs of low-income communities increasingly incapable of buying goods and services in the mainstream economy.

The recomposition of household consumption patterns particularly evident in large cities contributes to a different organisation of work from that prevalent in large, standardised establishments. This difference in the organisation of work is evident both in the retail and in the production

phase. High-income gentrification generates a demand for goods and services that are frequently not mass-produced or sold through mass outlets. Customised production, small runs, speciality items and fine food dishes are generally produced through labour-intensive methods and sold through small, full-service outlets – though the sharp growth of franchising in the last decade has cut into this. Subcontracting part of this production to low-cost operations, and also sweatshops or households, is common.

The overall outcome for the job supply and the range of firms involved in this production and delivery is rather different from that characterising the large department stores and supermarkets, where standardised products and services are prevalent and hence acquisition from large, standardised factories located outside the city or the region is the norm. Proximity to stores is of far greater importance with customised producers. Further, unlike customised production and delivery, mass production and mass distribution outlets facilitate unionising.

In any large city, there also tends to be a proliferation of small, low-cost service operations made possible by the massive concentration of people in such cities and the daily inflow of commuters and tourists. This will tend to create intense inducements to open up such operations as well as intense competition and very marginal returns. Under such conditions the cost of labour is crucial and contributes to the likelihood of a high concentration of low-wage jobs.

It is then the combination of growing inequality in earnings and growing inequality in the profit-making capabilities of different sectors in the urban economy which has promoted the informalisation of a growing array of economic activities. These are integral conditions in the current phase of advanced capitalism as it materialises in major cities dominated by the new advanced services complex typically geared to world markets and characterised by extremely high profit-making capabilities. These are not conditions imported from the 'Third World'. There is the broader fact in advanced economies of a growing tension in the relation between new economic trends that promote inequality in profit-making capacities and old regulatory frameworks that do not compensate for this new sharpening in inequality.

Conclusion

This chapter has focused particularly on the growth of employment-centred insecurity and poverty. Insecurity and poverty per se have long been present in developed economies and have often been seen as equivalent to unemployment. My concern here was to understand the ways in which the new terms of employment that have come about since the 1980s may also be

contributing to insecurity and poverty. A key factor is the restructuring of labour markets that is part of deeply embedded features of advanced service economies.

We are seeing a whole series of new dynamics of inequality. The new growth sectors – specialised services and finance – contain capabilities for profit making vastly superior to those of more traditional economic sectors. While many of the traditional sectors are essential to the operation of the economy and the daily needs of households, their survival is made precarious in a situation where finance and specialised services can earn super-profits and command growing amounts of space in major cities.

There are sharp increases in socio-economic and spatial inequalities, particularly visible in major cities. This can be interpreted as merely a quantitative increase in the degree of inequality. But it can also be interpreted as social and economic restructuring, and the emergence of new social forms and class alignments in highly developed countries. These include, among others, the growth of an informal economy, high-income commercial and residential gentrification, and the significant impoverishment of the lower echelons of the middle classes, even as the richer middle-class sectors have become even richer.

The observed changes in the occupational and earnings distribution are outcomes not only of industrial shifts but also of changes in the organisation of firms and their labour markets. There has been a strengthening of differences within major sectors, notably within services. One set of service industries tends towards growing capital–labour ratios, growing productivity and intensive use of the most advanced technologies, and the other towards continued labour intensity and low wages. Median earnings and median educational levels are also increasingly diverging for each of these sub-sectors. These characteristics in each set of industries contribute to a type of cumulative causation within each set: the first group of industries experiences pressures towards even higher capital/labour ratios and productivity levels given high wages, while in the second group of industries, low wages are a deterrent towards greater use of capital-intensive technologies and low productivity leads to even more demand for very low-wage workers. These conditions in turn contribute to reproduce the difference in profit-making capacities embedded in each of these sub-sectors.

A combination of economic, political and technical forces has contributed to the decline of mass production as the central driving element in the economy. This has brought about a decline in a broader institutional framework that shaped the employment relation. The group of service industries that became the driving economic force in the 1980s and into the current period is characterised by greater earnings and occupational dispersion, weak unions, and a growing share of unsheltered jobs in the lower-paying

echelons along with a growing share of high-income jobs. The associated institutional framework shaping the employment relation is very different from the earlier one. This contributes to a reshaping of the sphere of social reproduction and consumption, which in turn has a feedback effect on economic organisation and earnings. Whereas in the earlier period this feedback effect contributed to the reproduction and expansion of the middle class, currently it reproduces growing earnings disparity, informalisation and labour market casualisation. The overall result is a tendency towards increased economic polarisation. Economic insecurity is increasingly built into these economies. And so is a growth of low-wage jobs.

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International migrations and the Mediterranean

Introduction: the Mediterranean migration scene and its evolution

In recent decades the Mediterranean has witnessed an expansion of the migration routes and exchanges taking place within its shores and a parallel modification of the actors involved, of the areas where the most relevant processes occur, and of the economic, political and military drivers that activate the movements and determine the direction of travel. Within this frame migrations are at the same time the effects of events that concern, directly or indirectly, the countries facing the Mediterranean Sea, but are also the cause of social transformations in these countries and the drivers of material and cultural exchanges.

With regard to these last aspects, the new role of southern Europe as an immigration region in the last part of the twentieth century has 'shortened the distance' between the two shores of the Mediterranean that in previous decades had been increasingly separated, with relations, traffic and exchanges rather rarified. The new migration movements have brought about social and cultural changes that can be observed both in the receiving countries – which appear more and more as multicultural societies – and in the sending areas involved in fast processes of modernisation.

There are complex factors at the origin of the various migration routes that start in near or distant countries and end in the Mediterranean. Traditional migration pressures caused by imbalances between population and resources as well as social and economic disasters caused by wars and political turmoil are important reasons why people move. But it is necessary also to investigate the historical and contingent factors that explain why the routes they follow lead to the Mediterranean, and to specific locations in the region.

Traditionally there has been, and still is, in international literature on migrations a tendency to subdivide them into two general categories: political and economic migrations. This holds true also in national and

international legislation. The first category usually refers to asylum seekers and refugees, the second to people in search of work and better living conditions. This distinction has been considered schematic in the past by many critics, as the two groups have always been somewhat interwoven (Wihtol de Wenden 1990; King et al. 2003). But there is more. The events of the last decades suggest the need for a more complex subdivision that goes beyond the traditional alternatives. Experts and policy-makers talk now of forced migrations caused by ecological disaster or military events, of movements of people compelled to migrate even if they are not victims of persecution at the personal or group level. This is what one can observe now in the Mediterranean and comes under the label of 'refugee crisis'. It is enough to consider that the route from Eritrea or Afghanistan leads to the northern European countries across the Mediterranean, whereby Italy is the first point of entry (and often the final stop).

Even though it is a very recent phenomenon, immigration to southern Europe has gone through several stages as far as the national composition is concerned. In the beginning and for a long period the prevailing immigrant groups came from Latin America and other Catholic countries (mostly women employed as housekeepers) and from Islamic countries (in particular from the Maghreb), mostly men with various occupations. But a change took place in the last decade of the century after the fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of the socialist regimes in eastern European countries. A new – unprecedented as well as previously unpredictable – flow began between the two shores of the Adriatic Sea, in the first place from Albania to Italy. The case of Albanian immigration, soon after the collapse of the socialist regime, brings into question the adequacy of the Geneva Convention on refugees because of the emerging types of migrants and refugees do not fit with the categories set out in the Convention.¹

The Albanian immigrants were not the largest group reaching the Mediterranean countries from eastern Europe. Immigrants of various nationalities started moving soon after, legally or illegally, towards the countries of southern Europe. These were the main, silent actors in the Mediterranean migration scene around the year 2000. They did not follow the sea routes and so did not experience the opportunities and risks of the sea. Little attention was paid to them, although they became in a short time the most important contributor to the immigration flow towards the European Mediterranean countries.

Finally and more recently, a new east–west flow across the Aegean Sea represents a dramatic change in the origins, direction and composition of Mediterranean migration. It is a flow made up – although not completely – of asylum seekers. Hundreds of thousands of people fleeing civil war in Syria have landed in Greece via the Turkish route with the desire of seeking

asylum in northern and central Europe. And with them other migrants, from many places – escaping war, persecution or simply hunger – have joined the wave in search of better life chances.

The Mediterranean is thus a crossroads as far as immigration and reception are concerned. But a final aspect of this crossroads deserves to be mentioned. It concerns the southern European countries and the mobility of their citizens. After decades of expanding immigration, a new, and in some respects unexpected, trend is emerging: a resumption of emigration towards northern Europe and other destinations. Still underestimated by institutional statistics in the sending countries, this new emigration appears as a mass phenomenon according to data provided by the receiving countries, chiefly Germany and the United Kingdom. After fifty years Italy, Spain, Greece and Portugal have become emigration countries again.

Migrations, the Mediterranean and the *longue durée*

The continuous transformation of the migration scene in the Mediterranean – with the changing character and direction of the mobility of people, the evolution of the traffic in commodities and of relations among countries – is not a not a feature exclusively of our times. ‘Migrations’, writes Maurice Aymard, ‘in the past have followed the most various internal (from east to west, from south to north) as well as external routes (outwards from the Mediterranean countries towards America, Australia and north-western Europe and now inwards with the arrival of Asian and African immigrants)’ (2003: 20). The migration space generating the present immigration flows towards the southern European countries is much larger than the countries on the Mediterranean shore. But this has also been true in the past (Calvanese 1992).

The origins and destinations of flows change over time. In modern times within Europe, migrations and the mobility of populations for a long time flowed from the Mediterranean to the more developed and industrialised countries of central and northern Europe. Intra-European migrations were already important at the time of the ‘Great Migration’ at the turn of the twentieth century, when the Americas were the most important destination. But they became central in the post-war years at the time of the industrial migration of the Fordist age. First Italians, followed by Spanish and then Greeks and Portuguese entered a European labour market driven by industrial development, which offered jobs in all productive branches.

The southern shore was very ‘distant’ at that time. From the perspective of space and borders up until forty or fifty years ago – according to Aymard – there was a *limes* (a symbolic border) within Europe crossed by

the migrants between south and north that almost cut Italy in half (Aymard 2003: 13). And it was very difficult to imagine a different border at that time. In more recent times the *limes* has moved south and the new border is the sea, 'a dangerous border to cross, as those coming from the southern shore (or from countries even more to the south) have experienced in attempting to enter Europe seeking work' (Aymard 2003: 13).

When studying Mediterranean migrations it is important to take into account the Braudelian conception (Braudel 1967) which involves, among other things, seeing the Mediterranean not as a simple geographical space but also as a peculiar subject: a complex of phenomena and processes, with tensions that, on a spatial level, continue to shift borders and the central gravity point, and at the same time, with an impressive continuity that can be explained only through the *longue durée* approach.

The Braudelian view offers us an easy and useful starting point because it suggests giving as large a spatial and temporal dimension as possible to our representation of the Mediterranean. On the one side, the Mediterranean is an autonomous and almost self-sufficient world; at the same time it is a world whose borders are open both in the direction of Europe and in the direction of Central Asia and sub-Saharan Africa. On the other hand, the Mediterranean is an historical reality of *longue durée*. (Aymard 2003: 19)

The persistence – or the reappearance – of social, economic and cultural aspects, the way in which phenomena take place, enlightens the sense of this 'historical reality of *longue durée*'. The common elements can be found not only among the southern European countries or among the countries of the southern rim, but also between the northern and the southern or eastern shores. A Mediterranean anthropology, common cultural elements persisting through centuries, explains social and political processes. The long periods of separation, with radically different political and religious regimes, have not been able to cancel out strong, original cultural traits. Even at the demographic level the situation in the countries of the two (or rather the three) shores presents similar trends. The *longue durée* approach, according to Braudel, does not exclude by any means the relevance of other historical approaches: there is a dialectic between the 'momentary' and the history of the *longue durée*. Events such as those we are discussing in this essay (the new east–west flows or the refugee crisis) are the realm of the 'quick' or 'small history' (*la petite histoire* in the words of Braudel). Family patterns, demographic aspects and behaviour in everyday life are some indicators of persistence through long periods of time.

All this is very important for international migrations. If one observes the way in which immigrants to southern Europe coming from the most disparate areas of the world are incorporated in the local society, there are

surprising similarities between the four countries. This is a reflection of deeper and more rooted structural aspects of these societies, of common elements such as patterns of land tenure, agrarian regimes and general aspects of economic history that are at the basis of the structure of the labour market and activate the demand for immigrant labour, and also of some basic aspects of immigration policies.

At the beginning of the current Mediterranean migrations, international literature on migration described the Mediterranean as a space of south–north migration. For example, Baldwin-Edwards (1994) follows this interpretation, providing also an empirical basis by using data available in the 1980s and illustrating the impact that immigration from the Maghreb had on each southern European country. Baldwin-Edwards’s analysis was not incorrect for that period and his data presented the situation as it actually was at the time. What was missing was the fact that the situation was soon to be changed by the reduction in incidence of the Maghreb component, as proven later by Mattia Vitiello using the same statistical sources (Vitiello 2010). This reduction accelerated with new arrivals from eastern countries. In effect, what was missing from the Baldwin-Edwards analysis (and other similar ones) was the fact that the presence and the escalation of the intra-Mediterranean flows were the product of a temporary situation. In other words, such studies did not consider the continuities and discontinuities that suddenly take place in the Mediterranean migratory space, amplifying it and making it more complex.

Immigrants in the labour market in the Mediterranean immigration model

Some fundamental aspects of the incorporation process of immigrants in the countries of the northern shore can hence be traced back to the ‘Mediterranean’ character of their history, culture and institutions. On the basis of these considerations, this chapter puts forward the thesis that it is possible to claim the existence of a Mediterranean immigration model. This is justified by the possibility of singling out aspects and characteristics of immigration that can be found in all the countries of the northern shore: aspects that are specific to those countries and that do not undergo any meaningful changes over time. Not all the variables that are taken into consideration to define the model must be exclusive. Neither are they all present in the same way in all the countries. What is important is that they are predominantly present and that they tend to characterise the model in a rather stable manner. And this appears to be the case for Mediterranean immigration today.

The dimensions that shape this model are various. First of all, there is the time factor. Immigration to these countries started in the same

years and after a period in which they had experienced emigration on a mass scale, and occurred during a period when borders were closed and legal, large-scale immigration was limited. This has significant implications both for the conditions of the immigrants (often irregular) and for the way in which migration policies are developed and applied. Finally, immigration took place in the post-Fordist age and after processes of 'tertiarisation' of the economy and social fragmentation. Countries with an historic immigration tradition (such as in central and northern Europe) were involved in these same processes. But while Mediterranean Europe has witnessed only the new post-industrial immigration, other countries have also experienced intra-European migrations furthered by industrial development.

The labour demand explains the main aspects of the model in particular as far as the occupational location and the conditions of immigrants are concerned. Contrary to what happened at the time of the intra-European migrations of the 1950s, industry is no longer the sector that activates the pull factors. On the contrary, in all Mediterranean countries, an important employment opportunity for immigrants is represented by seasonal agricultural labour. Agriculture in the traditional immigration countries had not been affected, or only marginally so, by immigration during the great inter-European migrations of the preceding decades. The opportunities offered by seasonal work, with frequent returns to their homelands, was initially favoured through lax control of borders and, in general, by more permissive admission policies. This changed in the course of time, but seasonal agricultural employment persisted, with a concentration of non-regular or illegal immigrants in various regions in Spain, Italy and other countries. The same holds true for the construction sector, another typical occupational landing ground for male immigrants, but which tends more and more to become a definitive location (Pugliese 2010; Strozza and De Santis 2017).

On the other hand, the situation in manufacturing industry is quite different. Labour demand in this sector is no longer the key driver, and this has strong implications for the occupational and social conditions of the immigrants. At the time of the Fordist migrations of the *trente glorieuses*, international migrations were encouraged by industrial development, which was in general characterised by steady and long-term employment contracts (often in large enterprises) for immigrants also. These are characteristics that are seldom encountered in the Mediterranean immigration model (Vitiello 2010).

Another very typical aspect of the model is its gender composition. The presence of women in some of the principal immigrant groups (in the sphere of domestic work or linked to similar activities) is very peculiar and

sometimes predominant. The phenomenon began with the arrival of immigrant women to work as cleaners and domestic helpers. Now this presence has become far more evident and on a mass level in the realm of elderly care. This sort of care drain (Bettio et al. 2006) is one of the principal novelties of Mediterranean immigration, starting from the second half of the last decade. It is a novelty that reflects relevant social and demographic transformations within southern European societies. The presence and development of such immigration must be understood within the framework of the transformation and crisis of the Mediterranean family and the difficulties of caring for the elderly by the family itself. This does not mean the overcoming of traditional Mediterranean familism. The family pays for this labour, but the resources are provided indirectly by the state. The contradiction is 'overcome' by a changing role of the family, which does not provide any direct care for the elderly through non-commodified family work, but organises it using labour purchased on the international labour market or in part through pensions and various types of subsidies: a very interesting aspect of the Mediterranean welfare mix.

The concentration of immigrants in the tertiary sector is a common pattern of international migrations today. But their presence on a mass scale (particularly in domestic work but also, and above all, in care for the elderly and personal services of various kinds) is especially a characteristic of the Mediterranean. This means that the immigrant workforce in the Mediterranean countries also fills deficiencies in their welfare systems and fulfils needs and a demand for services that would be elsewhere be met by the welfare state, especially in the realm of childcare and, increasingly so, in caring for the elderly.²

Finally – and this is another characteristic of the Mediterranean model – the presence of immigrants is particularly noticeable in regions characterised by a low rate of unemployment and a strong labour demand, and in regions with high unemployment rates related to a weak local economic structure. The poor quality of the work supply and the processes of labour market segmentation explain the paradox of the coexistence of unemployment and immigration.

Irregular working conditions, at least in the initial phase, are strictly although not exclusively linked to the status of illegality imposed on immigrants. The issue of the high incidence of illegal workers must be linked to the initial absence of rules regulating immigration and the more recent enactment of rather restrictive laws concerning immigration and admission policies: restrictive norms followed by amnesty laws allowing regularisation. This is another similarity in the migratory experience of European Mediterranean countries: they have all experienced a shift in border policy (or rather, a non-policy), which was very lax at the beginning and then

more aligned with the European Union orientation of closed borders which we will discuss later. But the so-called current ‘refugee crisis’ complicates matters further.

‘Economic migration’, ‘political migration’ and the ‘refugee crisis’

The stability of the Mediterranean immigration model has persisted notwithstanding the succession of nationalities and ethnic groups composing the main inflows at various times. The flow originating in eastern Europe and made up of EU and non-EU citizens – the most important at the turn of the millennium – did not modify the process of incorporation of immigrants in Mediterranean societies (Vitiello 2015). For some years before the admission of several countries into the European Union, the experience of the eastern European immigrants was in no way different from that of the nationalities who arrived earlier: generally having illegal or irregular status at the beginning, and then achieving a more or less successful position in the secondary labour market after regularisation. After the accession, the change of status of these new EU citizens affected their general conditions in a positive way, but did not greatly affect their position in the labour market and within their occupations (Vitiello 2015; Bonifazi et al. 2016).

Furthermore, the presence of asylum seekers, traditionally rather numerically modest in the Mediterranean immigrations when compared with countries such as Germany, did not change either in quantitative or in qualitative terms. And the prevalence of labour immigrants – men and women, occupied in the most various activities from eastern Europe – is an aspect consistent with the model.

Only after the first ‘quiet’ (in this area of the world) decade of the century did a new and quite different flow begin as an effect of the economic crisis and of political processes on the southern and eastern shores of the Mediterranean (the Arab Spring) or in more distant places such as Eritrea. This flow, with relevant implications at the political and at the analytical level, was not the immediate effect of the radical political upheavals in the Arab countries but of the subsequent explosion of internal military conflicts in some of them, first of all Libya and Syria. The involvement of European and non-European powers, driven by their geopolitical and economic interests, fostered the conflicts, with results that can now be observed not only in terms of migration. The expected invasion from the countries of the southern shore in 2011 – announced by some media and even by representatives of some institutions – did not take place. This expectation proved to be the effect of an alarmist policy: only a few tens of thousands of immigrants arrived at the time of the Arab Spring from Egypt or Tunisia. The massive flight of migrants leaving the southern shores

and other critical areas started reaching the northern coasts in 2012, and escalated during the following years. The analysis of the social and national composition of this movement – made up of men and women of different social classes, families and minors (some unaccompanied) – shows how it is different from traditional labour migration and that it originates mostly in areas of political and military conflict. For some, the voyage across the Mediterranean was only a segment of their journey, as was the case of those coming from countries such as Syria or Eritrea. And this was not even the final destination in their expectations.

The worsening of the situation in Syria and the surrounding region aggravated the migration pressure and new routes were sought to escape bombing, persecution or simply the distressing economic situation. A massive flight, reaching its apex in the summer of 2015, represented the most dramatic moment of the ‘refugee crisis’: hundreds of thousands of people attempted to enter Europe, heading for Germany, Austria and other destinations in north or western Europe across the Aegean Sea or by land. For a couple of years this flight was the object of attention of policy-makers and of the general public. The media also dedicated significant coverage to this impressive ‘biblical’ phenomenon, denouncing the conditions of these people on the move. The xenophobic reaction of some eastern European regimes, with walls and repression, had a partially deterrent effect. But only the involvement of the Turkish government, with armed rejection at the eastern border and the dreadful conditions of the immigrants trapped in camps, almost stopped the flow completely.

The main flow reached Greece as the first point of entry into Europe, after passing through Turkey and crossing the Aegean Sea. Turkey at the beginning played the role of stepping stone for a longer journey towards the countries of the EU, a journey that is no longer possible because of the agreements between the EU and the Erdogan regime (European Commission 2016). Consequently, the south–north route to the Italian coast again became the main route: an average of 160,000 migrants, mostly rescued by the Italian Marine Corps or by other ships, landed annually between 2015 and 2017, with a moderate increase in 2016. It is difficult to envisage a future development of the situation.

As Giuseppe Cataldi points out, the east–west and south–north routes (and other minor ones) have made up in the present decade ‘a massive phenomenon of unauthorized migrations, in respect of which we can make a general distinction between forced migration, determined by the need to escape political persecutions, contingent events (war, revolutions, environmental disasters) and migrations for economic reasons, the result of widespread and endemic poverty’ (2016: 9). Cataldi underlines that the relevance of this phenomenon is not related to its numerical dimension but to the

conditions under which these flights take place, and he writes 'The transit of these migrants through the Mediterranean is dramatic for, although migration by sea is a minority percentage of the whole, it involves serious risks to human life because of the means of transportation used' (2016: 9).

Two important points are suggested by these quotations. The first is that migration by sea is only a rather small percentage of the movements in the Mediterranean region. The majority of migrants arriving in Europe, including to the southern countries, follow other routes (often legal). Besides that, according to the most recent data, labour immigration is declining in southern Europe. This is often forgotten or overlooked by national migration policies that are often influenced by the widespread invasion syndrome. The second point is the use of the encompassing concept of unauthorised migration to include both those escaping persecution, war or environmental disaster and those considered strictly 'economic migrants'. Cataldi is aware of the simplistic distinction between the two. The various components of the flow travel together, run the same risks and often have the same destination. All of them arrive without previous agreements and in an autonomous way. They all move as unauthorised migrants (according to Cataldi's definition). The dominating view in the institutional and political discourse is that some of these human beings escaping from hunger, war or persecution should be accepted, and others should be deported to the distressed countries from which they came, or to 'safe' countries' such as Libya (the last port before entering the EU). This is what happened in the past and what is planned in countries such as Italy from now on.

In the vast spectrum of migration typologies a very peculiar case is represented by the immigrant workers present in countries involved in the mobilisations of the Arab Spring and in the subsequent instability. When the mobilisations developed into military conflicts, hundreds of thousands of foreign workers with legal status, generally from other Arab or African countries, found themselves trapped in Libya in conflict areas with no possibility of returning home or finding safe work elsewhere. Their case is evidence of the way in which economic and political migration are interwoven. Natalia Ribas-Mateo, in her recent book *Migrations, Mobility and the Arab Spring*, locates these workers in the category of 'displaced migrants' and underlines that they have been forced to further migration: to a second, more difficult and less safe, migration step (Ribas-Mateo 2016: 14). She puts forward a distinction between voluntary and forced migration, and includes in the second group categories such as refugees, persons of concern to UNHCR, asylum seekers, internally displaced persons and victims of human trafficking. These constitute the largest majority of those arriving via the sea route. They are all beneficiaries of or eligible for some kind of international protection in the present fragmented system.

The prerequisites necessary to apply for and obtain full refugee status (international protection) on the basis of the Geneva Convention of 1951 (the main instrument regulating this matter) are very restrictive. Only an average of 10 per cent of applicants achieve this status. But given the mass inflow arriving in the Mediterranean (as well as in other areas of the world) in the past decades, another solution had to be found to address the situation of the new arrivals. Many ad hoc solutions – on the basis of less strict conditions and providing much lesser benefits and more limited rights – have been adopted by various countries, and other forms of protection have been designed on the basis of international agreements. Today the two main forms are *subsidiary* and *humanitarian* protection, both conceived as temporary.

Danièle Joly, analysing the main aspects of the Geneva Convention and its development, underlines that ‘One key characteristic is that it offers a universal definition not tied to time or place: the convention replaced the nationality or group-based criteria which had been in force before the Second World War’. Another central feature of the Convention is that ‘it is a binding instrument: states signatory to the Convention are bound to grant refugee status to persons who come under its remit’. Finally she adds that ‘although a long-term permanent authorization to stay was not stipulated by the Convention it became the practice in Europe’ (Joly 2003: 130). These and other guarantees provided a solid frame of protection to those in danger of personal or group persecution and seeking refugee status at the time of the Convention. But things have changed over the course of time.

According to Joly, two different paradigms – resulting in two different asylum regimes – have been at the basis of international refugee policy in Europe since the Second World War. The first lasted from the enactment of the Convention until the early 1980s, when it was replaced by the second, which is still incumbent. The first regime implemented ‘selective but inclusive policies’ with complete social rights; the second ‘maximizes exclusion on entry and undermines status and rights for refugees’ (Joly 2003: 129). Both regimes reflect the situation of the labour market, the characteristics of people’s mobility but also the political values and fears prevailing at their time. After the passing of the Convention, a period of dynamic labour demand and a tendency towards full employment attracted a labour force so that refugees were willingly accepted. An ‘inclusive policy’ meant inclusion in the labour market, in the welfare system and in the civic stratification in the countries of reception. But at the end of the *trente glorieuses* the changes in the labour market through deindustrialisation and a less dynamic and more segmented labour demand created quite a new picture. The first immediate effect on immigration policies was the German *Anwerbestop* (the end of labour recruitment abroad) that initiated restrictive entry policies that

were soon followed by all countries of the EEC. But the most important changes concerned the supply – the migrants – because new people and new countries of the ‘Third World’ entered the migration scene as labour immigrants, refugees, etc., some of them following the Mediterranean routes.

The question of refugees exploded – in its present terms – after the events of 1989 with a massive migration potential from eastern Europe, while the new and more restrictive asylum regime was already operating. After the abovementioned case of Albanians arriving in Italy, events related to the wars in the former Yugoslavia in the 1990s caused a mass movement of people seeking temporary protection or asylum also in Mediterranean countries. Finally, the role of the Mediterranean has become central in the present decade for the forced migrations of people aiming to reach Europe from African and Asian countries.

Fortress Europe and the Mediterranean crossroads

Aspects of the ‘refugee crisis’ show the way in which migration affects the Mediterranean. The first point is that migration routes that cross this sea reflect processes activated in very distant areas. The second is the continuous change in the direction of the main routes and the activation of new flows. The third is the varying and increasingly complex composition of these flows.

The Mediterranean countries are the main points of entry into Europe and the Mediterranean Sea constitutes the *limes* to be crossed for those attempting to reach European countries from Africa and in a more limited way from Asia. This leads us to a last point that deserves attention: the management of immigration (including, but not limited to, asylum seekers and refugees) and the main objectives, values and interests underlying it (Morris 2002).

While elaborating in detail the basic features of the present asylum regime, Joly singles out several concepts that define it in Europe in our time. These include *restriction*, *non-integration*, *selective harmonisation* and the role of governmental actors. The *restriction* on legal economic immigration since the 1970s has been accompanied by measures aimed at reducing the number of asylum seekers, making physical access to reception countries more difficult originally through the introduction of the transit visa and now through more severe methods. *Non-integration* is expressed by measures aimed at deterring arrivals or applications such as limitation of movement in the country of reception, reduced or no welfare benefits, limited rights to education or work. Finally, coming to *selective harmonisation*, ‘paradoxically, whereas it is the fashionable term nowadays [...] the asylum institution in Europe has become more and more uneven’ (Joly

2003: 136). In the present regime, while the number of those requesting protection increases, national governments tend to keep a greater degree of autonomy in granting (or rejecting) forms of protection and related benefits. This autonomy is declined in different ways in various countries, all with the intention of restricting reception (Joly 2003; Cataldi 2016; Danaro 2016).

There is a strong connection between restrictive measures and increasing risks incurred by people crossing the sea in an attempt to enter Europe. And – although it may seem surprising – there is evidence that these migrants have a clear awareness of the risks they face on the journey, including violence by traffickers, the possibility of being rejected and even loss of life. ‘The hope to migrate’, writes Tullio Scovazzi, ‘is the reason why the waters of some seas, such as the Mediterranean, have become the graveyards of thousands of human beings, who are moving from a number of Asian or African countries [...] This is a great tragedy which is not completely understood by the states of destination’ (2016: 43).

It is commonly agreed that people should have the right to migrate, as stated in official documents of international bodies. But, as many law scholars point out, international laws concerning migrants and refugees tend to ignore a corresponding human aspiration: that of immigration (Wihtol de Wenden 2011). ‘Looking at the question from the point of view of migrants one may ask what is the meaning of a right to emigrate without a corresponding right to immigrate. Where are migrants entitled to settle if they are rejected by the state of destination?’ (Scovazzi 2016). This contradiction is expressed by the category of ‘unauthorised migrations’ concerning the main flows crossing the Mediterranean today. In this context, states and international organisations discuss the most effective ways to discourage migration or encourage voluntary repatriation and, while an enormous amount of resources are spent on policing and patrolling, much less attention has been devoted to the issue of saving lives and rescuing.

With reference to this last point, only one relevant initiative that gives priority to saving lives over exerting control has been taken by a single state: Italy. In 2014, after a shipwreck that resulted in the death of several hundred migrants, the Italian government, on the basis of the positive emotional reaction of the Italian people and with a widespread sense of compassion and solidarity, launched the ‘Mare Nostrum’ operation aimed at rescuing migrants in difficulties. Mare Nostrum saved thousands of lives but lasted only one year, being cancelled by the Renzi government under pressure from the Ministry of the Interior. High costs paid only by the Italian state and actively xenophobic propaganda caused its elimination and its substitution by the Triton operation which follows the rules of Frontex.³

There was also in many official circles a widespread critique of the Mare Nostrum operation based on its supposed ‘calling effect’, that is, the fact

that the safer travel conditions made possible by the Italian rescue operation would attract new economic migrants and asylum seekers. This thesis, and related propaganda, did not take into serious consideration the drivers of the new inflows and the fact that people escaping from wars and persecution do not have the possibility of choosing which path they should follow. The activation of the south–north Mediterranean path was not caused by the existence of Mare Nostrum but by the war in Syria, the persecutions in Eritrea or the crisis in Libya. The flows started before the existence of Mare Nostrum and continued after it was cancelled. Now part of its activity is continued by voluntary organisations (*Médecins sans frontières* 2016).

In any case the journeys have become more and more dangerous. The reduced humanitarian rescue activity and the fostering of border controls through the Triton operation (on the northern side) and the new Sophia operation managed by the Libyan and Italian governments on the southern side have not lessened the pressure of people from Africa and Asia trying to cross the European border through Italy. With regard to this, a final remark may be made concerning the effects of a seemingly minor point in the European policy on refugees within the present regime. On the basis of an agreement at the European level signed at a Dublin meeting, and reiterated subsequently (Dublin 1, Dublin 2 and Dublin 3), people applying for refugee status are obliged to receive protection in the first safe country of arrival (which in turn is bound to accept them). The consequence of this is an excess of asylum seekers in two single Mediterranean countries – Greece and Italy – and an additional hardship to migrants who may desire to reach a different destination. The original idea of the EU of relocating the migrants failed because of the refusal of many states to accept them, with the result that the so-called ‘hot spots’, originally meant to host people temporarily, pending relocation, have become prisons for people in despair who are waiting to be deported.

The main European concern is the avoidance of new arrivals and border control, but this has not stopped the flows. What happens today is consistent with the history of the Mediterranean and its migrations. To quote Aymard again:

The past of the Mediterranean is here to remind us that everything is possible: war as well as peace, refusal as well as acceptance of the other and the search for dialogue, the crusade as well as coexistence, the closure of borders as well as the valorisation of the role played by the various networks in helping the various colonies or minorities. (2003: 21)

This claim of Aymard leads to more general considerations concerning the simultaneous character of the Polanyian double movement as described by Mingione in this volume. The presence on the Mediterranean migration

scene of attitudes and practices of an opposing nature, expressing on one side refusal and on the other acceptance of the other and the search for dialogue, is a clear expression of 'a double movement constituted simultaneously by two parts: the dis-embedding motion activated by the competitive market and the re-embedding motion activated by the necessity to create new social bonds and social protections in order to keep societies alive'. These contrasting and often simultaneous drives do not have always the same strength and at some moments, such the present one, tendencies towards dis-embeddedness dominate over the re-embeddedness that creates 'new social bonds'. And since these 'people on the move' heading towards the European shores cannot be stopped, the Mediterranean today is a place where dramatic – and not infrequently tragic – experiences as well as forms of solidarity for 'the stranger' (including his rescue after a shipwreck) take place, notwithstanding an institutional framework that is basically hostile towards the incomers.

Notes

- 1 This was not the first case in Europe where movements of people seeking protection were taking place, but it was the first to take place in the Mediterranean and to involve crossing the sea. Two massive waves of immigrants reached Italy (on the Apulian coast) from Albania, where a new government had been recently elected. It would have been impossible to grant refugee status according to the Convention to those people escaping a catastrophic economic situation and finally able to leave their country without any control at the port of exit.
- 2 For greater details on the functioning of the welfare states in Mediterranean Europe during the crisis, see Andreotti and Mingione (2015). See also, with special reference to the labour market and the employment structure, Mingione and Pugliese (2010).
- 3 'Frontex' (European Agency to Coordinate Cooperation along the External Borders of Member States of the European Union) is an agency of the European Union whose task is the coordination of border patrol along air, maritime and land borders of all member states of the EU. It also implements agreements with non-member states of the EU for the readmission of migrants who have been denied entry to EU states (Cataldi 2016: 11).

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Cities under economic austerity: the return of citizenship claims

Citizenship is the engine for the creation of spaces for collective action when people's life chances have been undermined and urban societies experience social and political tensions. Low wages and unemployment challenge social citizenship and so do the diminishing economic and social entitlements of workers. Historically the first two – wages and unemployment benefits – were the battlefield of industrial and social citizenship. But the other two gradually became incorporated as citizens' social rights that, if necessary, had to be defended through social action. The 2008 crisis brought further challenges: the deterioration of living conditions and problems of housing affordability for sectors of the middle classes (Vaughan-Whitehead 2016; García and Vicari-Haddock 2016). Even before that European cities had seen an increase in social inequality with a polarisation pattern in employment, particularly in peripheral societies. New labour market regulations and flexibilisation, introduced well before the Great Recession, affected mainly young cohorts not only in peripheral countries, but also in countries such as Germany (Fernández Macías 2015). The 2008 economic crisis brought large job losses in mid-level occupations causing middle-class unemployment and impoverishment, particularly in southern European societies where austerity policies have destroyed job opportunities (see Negri and Saraceno in this volume). Two related factors constitute a further concern for life chances: the difficulty for young people to leave their parental homes and become autonomous citizens; and the absence of comprehensive, up-to-date protection systems to serve employees on part-time and short-term contracts. Both factors threaten social citizenship (ILO 2015; Atkinson 2015).

Furthermore, demographic changes have increased the numbers of citizens in need of attention. Ageing populations with their increasing need for care are creating a larger demand for health and social care, particularly when individuals become physically dependent. Other demographic transformations, such as increasing divorce rates and single-person and

single-parent households, have eroded the ideology and role of the family as a consistent support group for the elderly and the dependent, particularly in southern Europe. Diversifying social needs are not always met by welfare institutions that cope with restricted budgets. Financial constraints have brought about the externalisation of care from the public sector to civil-society groups or to privately provided care (Martinelli et al. 2017). In many European societies, there is an increasing demand for care workers, who tend to be immigrants from third countries (non-EU) and who constitute cheap labour. These workers, mostly women, have often left their own family members behind in their societies of origin, but cherish the hope of family reunification in the host country. This human desire (and right) meets with increasing resistance in many countries, with the constant presence of 'nationalist' political parties and organised movements in the public sphere calling for barriers to the entrance of foreigners or even for their expulsion. Therefore, cities face a double challenge: to meet social needs and to integrate immigrant care workers. This double challenge has increasingly been met by strictly local welfare systems that have been forced to innovate in order to cope with social cohesion issues in a context of austerity (Andreotti et al. 2012).

The housing crisis in many cities deserves a special mention. In most large European cities, a crisis of housing affordability and accessibility has been the experience not only of the most vulnerable sectors of society, but also of sectors of the middle classes – particularly the young and the elderly – not previously regarded as vulnerable. The balance between private and public housing has shifted considerably in a majority of European cities. Easy access to mortgage financing has greatly encouraged ownership. A further impact has resulted from less social housing or publicly protected housing following reductions in public investment in housing programmes (CECODHAS 2012 in García and Vicari-Haddock 2016: 398) leading to sharp divisions in housing accessibility. Large numbers of citizens affected by the housing crisis have had to rely on family and community solidarity. Housing accessibility problems have burdened local social services called upon to give more support to families evicted from their homes. In southern European cities, especially, social services have been overwhelmed by the numbers of citizens needing support. To complement the social services, and local welfare in general, bottom-up socially innovative practices have emerged in cities to provide amenities, offer networks and restore some dignity. These citizen practices have contributed to maintain social cohesion. In some cases citizens' groups have contributed to change the discourse on the housing crisis from an individual problem into a collective issue (Brokking et al. 2017; García and Vicari-Haddock 2016). In Spanish cities, a nationwide organisation, the Platform of Mortgage Victims (PAH),¹

campaigned hard and publicised the abusive practices of the financial sector, pointing out the sharp social inequalities in access to housing and proclaiming housing as a social right. The high visibility of this social movement that supported the evicted gave it wide recognition and stimulated citizens' indignation at seeing the dignity of their fellow citizens undermined (De Weerd and García 2016).

One outcome of these processes has been the disaffection of citizens with their national (and to a lesser extent local) governments, elites and institutions. Constitutional changes were introduced in some European Union member states to impose austerity in response to the crisis of public debt. These top-down changes were considered necessary by governments to restore the confidence of international financial markets in these countries' economies. In some cases, these EU-imposed changes involved a comprehensive system of tutelage with pressure for expenditure cuts in exchange for access to finance. The Spanish government officially asked for a European 'bailout' for the Spanish banks and received it on the condition that the state would guarantee the repayment of the European loan. That is, the loan would directly increase Spanish government debt (Eurostat 2012). In other words, what was a private-sector debt became a public debt underwritten by Spanish taxpayers. The excuse was that the future sale of the government stake in a sanitised bank sector would make good the temporary debt increase, *quod non*: in January 2017 the Court of Auditors officially stated that the accumulated outstanding sum of public resources used in the process of bank restructuring was, at the end of 2015, over 60 billion euros.² This transfer from private to public debt was accompanied by a strict austerity programme, involving not only an internal devaluation of workers' wages and a further expansion of job destruction in the private and public sectors, but also cuts in welfare-state programmes and reductions in social rights and entitlements (De Weerd and García 2016). Spanish society was not alone in this: the Greek, Portuguese and Irish societies shared similar experiences in assuming the costs of public debt caused by speculative economic practices and failure by governments and central banks to supervise financial mismanagement.

Since the Great Recession, years of austerity and welfare-state retrenchment in Europe have reawakened claims for both social and political rights. As democratic decision making was damaged by austerity policy, the democratic participation of citizens in their public spheres and in collective action has re-emerged as a claim. Participation has also taken the shape of new urban practices of citizenship that are showing considerable creativity in designing and putting into effect horizontal solidarity projects (Moulaert et al. 2013). Cities have proved fertile ground for all this. In southern European cities, a politicisation of combined issues such as the new poverty,

the deteriorated working conditions of welfare-state professionals, and the frustration of sectors of the middle classes has often materialised as street demonstrations. Another, less evident manifestation has been the occupation of buildings, in response to housing needs or to claim cultural spaces for social participation. Participation in society, one of the main components of citizenship, has become a rallying cry for a young generation that has difficulties in entering the labour market and becoming autonomous, and that is seen as the new exploited class, *the precariat* (Standing 2011; Harvey 2012). In southern Europe, especially, changes in welfare regulation and diminishing income opportunities have led a whole generation of young people to perceive their career prospects as seriously compromised. Already bitter at the limited job opportunities, this young generation has also often shown, both locally and nationally, its disappointment with representative democracy or has refrained altogether from voting in electoral contests (OECD 2016: 129–31).

These precarious young workers and unemployed demonstrated in their thousands in streets and city squares all over the world in the aftermath of the 2008 crisis to show their anger and frustration at the ‘winners’ of the financial power plays (in global cities) and/or at governments for failing to regulate financial institutions. Social indignation waxed as acquired rights and entitlements were questioned, school and university grants were reduced or eliminated and hospital wings closed or privatised. Anger was directed at political leaders, not only those identified with neoliberal values, but also at those of social democratic parties that had ‘failed’ people. The question is how citizens’ claims reach beyond the local, to the level of national governments and parliaments where new social contracts have to be shaped. How are the new pro-citizenship movements forming in cities and forceful citizenship claims articulated?

This chapter revisits some debates on citizenship with special emphasis on the relation between national and urban citizenship. It then provides some examples in which citizenship claims are re-emerging through the active involvement of civil society through mobilisation around specific issues, such as supporting social housing. Here I cannot do justice to the rich body of research on the contributions of these civic groups and social movements (Moulaert et al. 2013; Della Porta 2015; Martinelli 2017). I propose an explanation of why social actors emerged outside traditional parties in southern European societies with the aim of restating rights, and shifting the discourse from austerity to social inequalities. The chapter concludes with a brief note on the challenges in scaling up from urban citizenship practices and local politics to the level of effective national coordination of progressive political actors and policies which could promote new social contracts.

Citizenship challenged by increasing social inequalities and austerity

Citizenship is understood as the combination of three constitutive elements: the possession of certain rights, the obligation to perform some duties in the related society and the capacity to contribute to public life through participation (Bulmer and Rees 1996; Dahrendorf 1996). Historically, each society has constructed its substantive citizenship through power struggles, the most significant of these being the class struggle. This and other conflicts have been about the redistribution of resources in society. The provision of social rights in societies through entitlements mediated by institutions has been the cornerstone of social contracts with relative success in most economically advanced societies. However, citizenship is also a process (García 1996; 2006) and as such requires constant vigilance. The more institutionally embedded the social contracts constructed by societies, the ‘thicker’ is the citizenship, as in the Scandinavian social democratic welfare societies, and the more consistent is the trust that citizens have in their institutions (OECD 2016). These, in turn, furnish the moral ground of citizenship by creating opportunities for human development through education, income and protection in response to social needs.

In the neoliberal programme some of the fundamental ideas about social contracts and citizenship as a method of social inclusion were challenged by the increase in social inequalities. In Europe, the welfare state grew through increasing wage share and the expansion of transfers. Also, wage dispersion was reduced with the pressure of collective bargaining that sustained social citizenship. The 1980s saw a break in this trend. ‘The main reason that equalisation came to an end appears to be that these factors have gone into reverse (welfare-state cutbacks, declining share of wages, and rising earnings dispersion) or come to an end (the redistribution of wealth)’ (Atkinson 2015: 75).

An important distinction should be made ‘between social inequality and sharp unequal distribution of life chances’ (Dahrendorf 1996: 27–9). Given that life chances are not distributed equally in any society, the difference lies in the distinction between ‘qualitative’ inequalities that drastically differentiate members of society, allowing civic and political rights to some sectors of society but not others (i.e. citizens vs denizens), and ‘quantitative’ inequalities, which are a matter of degree of redistribution. Marshall’s ‘qualitative’ inequalities affect the status of citizen. This classical distinction (Marshall 1950 in Dahrendorf 1996) serves today. As illustrated elsewhere (Standing 2011), the dramatic increase in unemployment and precarity, especially in some societies, has affected the condition of citizenship. This is a *frustration of opportunities* which eventually damages these groups. Citizens experience frustration when they and their family members are

unable to find employment over long periods. To the reality of individual unemployment (which can be compensated by other family members to counteract social exclusion), household concentration of unemployment has added further grounds for increasing social inequality – more so in southern European societies where income based on transfers is less significant. Some trajectories of diminished life chances for entire households can end in evictions. Frustration may also develop as the gap widens between households with several incomes and those without earnings, between the income of the professions and other sectors of the economy, or between job contracts with social and economic rights and those without. In the past the social fragmentation resulting from these social conditions did not lead in most societies of the economically developed world to the mobilisation of class interest (Mingione 1991: 467–72). However, over the last few years, social mobilisations have taken place in cities, bringing back a semblance of class conflict.

The role of frustration in class conflict was acknowledged by T. H. Marshall in his classical work on citizenship: ‘Frustration arises “wherever privilege creates inequality of opportunity”. The role of frustration in conflict, and more directly in intensifying class resentment, is that it imputes to the superior class responsibility for the injustice under which the inferior suffers’ (Marshall 1973: 168–9 in Barbalet 1993: 36–56). The resurgence of a feeling of injustice in the aftermath of 2008 was informed by the behaviour of financial institutions and the social class associated with them, and by the awareness of the socialisation of private debts into national debts. This has been particularly the case with the housing markets. As Crouch stated:

governments encouraged the growth [of home ownership] by relaxing the terms on which housing finance could be obtained, and by taking economic policy measures to ensure that house prices kept rising – essential to giving buyers confidence that they could take on the initially high loans involved in mortgages. Banks and other financial institutions could make these loans to customers who found it hard to afford them, because the rising value of property meant that, in the event of a need to repossess, the bank would acquire an asset that had grown in value. (2011: 109)

The bailout of banks and the socialisation of developers’ debts in countries that experienced housing bubbles has been a major source of frustration and indignation on the part of citizens.

It is in cities that the dynamic character of citizenship associated with the idea of progress (cf. the continuous immigration to large cities in search of a better life) clashes with the reality of increasing social inequalities, fragmentation of political participation and discrimination by origin, age or gender. European citizens perceive a deterioration of living conditions in their countries as the cost of living has increased in relation to earnings. A large major-

ity complains about the affordability of energy and housing (63 per cent and 62 per cent respectively) and about the national employment situation (60 per cent) (European Commission 2014: 80–1). Europeans hold a very negative view, in particular, about the way in which inequality and poverty are addressed in their countries. Europeans are proud of their welfare states and consider them necessary. But what are they doing to defend them? One author finds that the resilience of the redistributive capacity of the welfare state is closely related to the defence of it that citizens are ready to make in times of austerity (Taylor-Gooby 2011).

Employment and social fragmentation have had political consequences, especially for class politics and partisan political parties. While trade union organisations have lost relative power in most advanced democracies, attacks on social citizenship have occurred everywhere, although unevenly in European societies, as the methods of handling these general tendencies were mediated by the institutional responses of each society. Thus, disposable income inequality after redistribution varies considerably between Scandinavian countries on the one hand and southern and the majority of eastern European societies on the other, with intermediary levels in countries such as Germany, Austria, France and the Netherlands (Eurostat 2016). In fact, indicators show a general tendency, rather than striking changes. This continuity indicates a path dependency in the resilience of welfare institutions and their contribution to life chances in European societies. In this respect, social contracts have suffered to different degrees in the several welfare regimes (Body-Gendrot et al. 2012).

What was the impact on cities of increased social inequalities nationally and of the diminishing redistributive capacity of the welfare state, and how has this affected social cohesion? National regulatory structures (with the exception of financial markets) play a strong role in European cities (Le Galès 2002; Kazepov 2005) and central funding remains the main source of social cohesion policies implemented in cities. Neither are the many European regulations and financial programmes that channel resources to cities from European institutions to be neglected analytically (Kazepov 2010). Multi-level governance expresses the strong ties that connect state institutions and regulations to urban regulations and policies. The consistent investment in social cohesion policies in cities is a distinguishing feature of European cities. This has translated into the relatively high quality of local spaces. Even if social segregation has increased in large European cities, especially where young members of minorities have a strong presence, the indexes of segregation are consistently lower than in other regions of the world. This is because public policies have played an important role in finding ways to include these disadvantaged groups in urban societies (Préteceille 2006; Cucca and Ranci 2017). Therefore, it comes as no surprise

that a majority of European citizens, when asked, are satisfied about the quality of their local areas and see no deterioration in their immediate environment as a result of the economic crisis and anticipate no change in the near future (European Commission 2014: 58–76). This confidence concerning the quality of the immediate environment indicates the effectiveness of spatial policies and the resilience of social cohesion policies and local welfare systems (Andreotti et al. 2012; Cucca and Ranci 2017). But this overall picture hides the stresses that some local welfare agencies, governments and civil society organisations have been experiencing in keeping up with social needs (Brokking et al. 2017).

The argument put forward so far is this: erosion of social citizenship is happening not only because the welfare state has diminished its redistributive role, but also because the Great Recession and austerity policies have contributed to increase the large numbers of unemployed and underemployed (*the precariat*) in European societies. On the other hand, a visible concentration of wealth and the relative passivity of government in confronting increasing social inequalities have reawakened citizens' frustration and feelings of grievance.

Citizens fighting for more rather than less citizenship

European societies have failed to provide life chances that could allow millions of young people to become autonomous members of society. One political consequence is that a fair number of the young generation have chosen to exercise their voice rather than choosing loyalty or exit (Hirschman 1970), particularly in those cities that have distinctive civil societies with the capacity for organisation and which have developed organisational and institutional structures and practices.

Some authors see fragmentation of urban citizenship, affected by the variety of claims for the right to the city (Blokland et al. 2015) and by the diversification of interests and social agendas of actors involved in urban social movements (Mayer 2009). In southern European cities, I argue, the mobilisation of citizens has become somewhat less fragmented as a response to austerity. More coherent claims have been voiced by the young in defence of social rights in the public sphere, both in urban spaces and in the media. This may be seen, partly, as a substitute for the institutional integration of social actors in welfare and in the democratic governance process of redistribution. More so than in Scandinavian and Continental corporatist societies, southern European citizens have come together to defend social rights in the streets and squares, where they have also deliberated the quality of democracy. In many southern European cities, citizens, feeling the impact of austerity measures, have voiced social citizenship claims and new political options.

Urban citizenship politics prompted by the Great Recession took form in many cities of the world around 2011. In some cases civil society organisations, trade unions and grassroots campaigns shaped social movements that demonstrated in the streets, which then later morphed into local and national political parties and entered into alliances, contributing to changes in the governance of the city councils of large cities and in regional and national parliaments. This has been certainly the case in Greece, Portugal and Spain.³ Organised citizens have stirred debates on the quality of social citizenship, representative democracy and the necessity to open up spaces for more participatory democracy. Common issues voiced by these organisations and movements concern the increasing distance between national governments and the needs and aspirations of citizens, the absence of progressive policies and the European democratic deficit. Some parties and social movements also challenge the convenience of remaining in the EU or keeping the euro (e.g. Movimento 5 Stelle in Italy). In eastern European societies the nationalist narrative has gained popular support, blaming ‘outsiders’ (financial and EU institutions) for the deterioration of citizens’ life chances, which has benefited right-wing politics. In Greece, Portugal and Spain the narrative is closer to new varieties of class conflict, inspiring left-wing politics.

In early 2011 citizens took over city squares in New York, Madrid, Barcelona, Athens, Lisbon, Dublin and many other places. Although their grievances were often particular, one common cry was ‘they do not represent us’. By that time the Italian Movimento 5 Stelle already had representatives in more than twenty city councils, some of them in the largest cities (De Lucia 2012). Large sectors of the middle classes were taking to the streets as they saw themselves being pushed into the ranks of the poor. This was fertile space for the expansion of left-wing parties in some countries, SYRIZA in Greece, the emergence of new parties such as Podemos in Spain and new leaders within old parties, such as Bernie Sanders in the USA. Similarly inspired social protest movements appeared in cities, the ‘*indignez-vous*’ protests in France, Occupy Wall Street in New York and Wutbürger in Germany, to mention a few. In all these movements participants claim to be building a stronger and more vibrant democracy by involving more citizens and opening up decision-making structures. One year later

a Global Day of Action, 12th May 2012, was organized by *occupy social movements* around the world to rally against corporate greed, corruption, human rights violations [...] addressing the status of public education, migration, the housing crisis, the environment, unemployment, civil disobedience, feminism, youth, pensioners, and more. (Tejerina et al. 2013: 382)

The emergence of these movements and political parties on the political scene has not necessarily involved overcoming conservatives and social

democrats in governments and parliaments. But their presence and their discourse is consolidating.

A common element in the political agenda of each social movement and new political party was their stance against austerity as an expression of neoliberal capitalism which had inflicted damage on their social base (Della Porta 2015: 35). But some of these movements had specific grievances directed at the functioning of their local and national political cultures, particularly concerning redistributive policies. Given the multi-level governance of social policy in European cities, the use of urban public spaces to claim back social and political citizenship reflects wider debates in regional and national public spheres. These movements have demonstrated a capacity to move up from local (sometimes from neighbourhood) to national and European parliaments with agendas that not only aim at preserving and reconquering social protection but have also challenged the ways of operating of the established political class.⁴ To illustrate this point I will refer briefly to social and political movements in southern European cities, ending with the case of Barcelona.

Common characteristics of the southern European anti-austerity movements are the explicit rejection of inequalities, the defence of social rights and political transparency in cities. In terms of organisation they have held public demonstrations, occupied public spaces as well as empty buildings, and constituted assemblies as well as commissions and working groups that operate horizontally. These groups have generated communication in neighbourhoods, in central spaces and through digital networks. For the actors in these movements, urban public spaces are spaces of resistance and mutual support, where resolutions are adopted and the experience of 'real' democracy happens. Through the lens of Lefebvre, these movements have constituted the process of the production of social space (Dhaliwal 2012). In southern European cities, this social space has turned into political space. Street demonstrations in the main cities of Portugal with the strong presence of *Geração à Rasca*; *Movimiento 15M* in *Puerta del Sol* in Madrid, *Plaza Catalunya* in Barcelona and many other Spanish plazas; and *Sintagma Square* in Athens sustained assemblies from which agreement spread to support strikes or to take other collective action. In the years after 2011 members of these movements returned to their neighbourhoods to continue their activities. Their social network communications served to consolidate political spaces. Even so, some differences reflect divergent, path-dependent trajectories and require more nuanced analysis.

In Greece, SYRIZA developed as a political project of a coalition of left-wing parties and movements to form an electoral alliance. This was long before the 2008 crisis. The new party entered parliament in the elections of 2004 with an anti-neoliberal agenda. With the support of the student

movement, which demonstrated widely in the streets in the years 2006–08, and other social forces SYRIZA widened its political presence with increasing support from Greek citizens, mainly young people. The acute Greek crisis of 2009–10 provided the definite impulse to this political coalition, particularly as a result of the support the party gave to the movement of *aganaktismenoi* (*indignados*) during 2011. Since then SYRIZA has adopted a more social democratic agenda and eventually reached national office, focusing on the negative social consequences of the EU austerity agenda and promising a regeneration of democracy with fiscal justice and participatory democracy (Katsambekis 2015).

The Italian Movimento 5 Stelle emerged as a reaction to the successive Berlusconi governments. It portrayed the political class as a *casta* (self-serving and alienated from their voters), incapable of modernising Italy. The movement preferred to be ‘a free association of citizens’ rather than a political party. Still, the political strategy was to participate in local elections in 2010, one year after the movement’s foundation. The movement embraces some contradictions, such as being anti-EU and aspiring to be members of ALDE.⁵ The spirit of the movement is ecological and anti-establishment. The five stars in its name represent the policies that required transformation in Italy: public water, transport, development, connectivity and the environment. The movement gained significance through its electoral success in local and regional governments, particularly in the cities of northern and central Italy. Street demonstrations in cities have further increased their presence in the public sphere. Young, middle-class professionals predominate among the elected members of this movement; even so, a wider social base supports the movement in electoral contests, when many members of the working class vote for it. Its electorate reflects a technological much more than a generational divide. Those who vote for Movimento 5 Stelle are ‘Using the Internet as the main source of political information, having negative attitudes towards the Euro, rejecting the left–right dimension, and being open-minded with regard to moral topics’ (Maggini 2013: 27). In the legislative elections of 2013 this group obtained 91 out of 630 deputies.

In Portugal, over 200,000 people marched in the streets on behalf of Geração à Rasca (Desperate Generation) on 12 March 2011. Indignados Lisboa and Democracia Verdadeira Ja! both predate the Spanish movement. Over the next two years, systematic mobilisation of civil society groups and cooperation networks grew. These mobilisations preceded and followed the Portuguese bailout by the Troika (the IMF, EU and ECB). The new political activism followed a period of political disaffection and low levels of participation in legislative elections, especially among the young. The social base of this political action was, apart from students, young workers of the

'precariat' and public sector employees. Austerity stimulated cooperation between different sectors of the population and in this Portuguese case trade unions played a strong role. This circumstance favoured the coordination of modern mobilisation tactics (extensive use of ICT, cooperation between civil society groups) with the traditional working-class organisations using the streets to demonstrate, together with the instrument of the general strike (Ramos Pinto and Accornero 2013). This combination helps to explain the constitution of a left-wing coalition government in 2015.

Although in Spain the plazas of the main cities became the sites of *indignados* mobilisation on 15 May 2011, civic groups and youth organisations had been denouncing the jobs and housing shortage as well as precarious job conditions for years before (Asamblea Contra la Precariedad and Movimiento por la Vivienda Digna in 2006). But the horizontal assembly method of the anti-austerity *indignados* introduced some interesting changes, such as giving voice to non-activists in the plazas. The themes were the same as in the other southern European countries. In Barcelona, for example, the historical combination of austerity programmes – involving cuts in public services – with loss of employment and a market-oriented local government (2011–15) fuelled renewed interest in urban politics and social involvement, especially among the young. This created a new interest in political participation, illustrated by the emergence of a 'new political culture' from the meetings on 15 May 2011 in the central squares. Barcelona en Comú (Barcelona in Common) exemplifies the transformation of a locally based social movement in defence of social rights and of participatory democracy into a governing coalition. This new local government leadership is the result of a political confluence among social movements and parties. In fact, the new city mayor used to be the leader of the anti-evictions PAH movement. Similar coalitions have emerged in the larger cities of Spain. Like Barcelona en Comú, other coalitions have taken over city governments, making alliances with Podemos, a political party officially constituted in January 2014. Unlike in Greece and Portugal, this emerging left-wing party has not arrived so far at governing at the national level, although it is a partner in some city and regional governments. In the 2016 legislative elections Podemos and its associates obtained 67 out of 350 deputies.

Conclusion

I have highlighted an urgent issue experienced by European societies in general and southern European societies in particular after the 2008 financial and economic crisis: a threat to social citizenship for significant social groups. An example is the newly emerged and diverse *precariat* (Standing 2011), a sector of the population that shares with other vulnerable groups

(the unemployed and denizens) vulnerability and insecurity. Academics and social actors are thinking about alternative and innovative forms of economic organisation and wealth redistribution in order to protect human dignity and to provide income opportunities. Underlying this is the question of democracy (distribution of power) that has reappeared on the agenda (Atkinson 2015). Citizenship is not only about rights, but also about participating in society, having institutions that support social needs and where citizens feel represented, and about public spheres with recognition of diverse citizens' claims (Dahrendorf 1996; García 2006).

In a move to re-establish social citizenship, social movements and civil society organisations are creating their own innovative ways in cities to answer social needs that are unmet by the market and by the state (Moulaert et al. 2013). New communication technologies are helping to widen the public spheres of cities, where the participation and contestation of citizens occur in a variety of practices, reimagining political citizenship. Such reimagining has a trajectory: it appears to be new but, when studied closely, the movements reviewed here had their origin in pre-existing civil society groups and organisations. What unites these groups and fuels their social action and mobilisation is the redistributive issue of how to deal with sharply unequal opportunities and the deficits of democracy (not to mention corrupt practices). It took some time after the shock of the 2008 crisis for social protest to expand. It was around 2011 that central urban spaces became theatres of contestation, although we have seen that collective action already existed. It was in large cities as democratic spaces that social movements reinserted the issue of social and political citizenship.

Rather than following a single model of response to the crisis, the austerity doctrine in the countries of the European Union has been implemented unevenly. The debt crisis has had drastic consequences for the southern European countries, especially for those that experienced a bailout. In these societies, drastic measures of fiscal contraction and shrinking social rights are being opposed in the streets as well as in parliaments by large sectors of the population and by new political parties. But designing and implementing new and more just policies of redistribution to combat profound social inequalities is complicated when there is party fragmentation and where traditional social democratic parties are seen as part of the establishment to be removed. Progressive social movements, new political parties and traditional social democratic parties share the challenge of reinventing social contracts. Cooperation between them is happening in some cities and regions, but it is unlikely that new social contracts will be reached in southern European societies without more articulation between local and national actors and between traditionally and newly progressive social forces at the national level. Portugal seems to be the exception; it might show the way.

Notes

- 1 Plataforma de Afectados por la Hipoteca (PAH) was created in 2009 (with a core group of young activists) as a self-organising mechanism grouping owners who were unable to pay their mortgages and were being evicted from their homes, and low-income renters in danger of eviction. PAH's main activities have been collective actions to stop evictions, negotiation with banks and city councils to find allocation for people being evicted and the promotion of laws against housing evictions and energy poverty. See <http://afectadosporlahipoteca.com/>
- 2 <https://goo.gl/YWgJk6> (accessed 24 January 2017).
- 3 Italy did not have a bailout as was the case in the other three southern European countries; this may explain the absence of large demonstrations in which trade unions and the precariat mobilised together.
- 4 At the opposite side of the political spectrum, extreme right-wing nationalistic/populist movements and parties have also emerged in Europe with diverse mobilisation capacities. A fundamental distinction is that these movements do not defend citizenship or democracy. On the contrary, they are exclusionary, especially towards immigrants and cultural minorities. In southern Europe the influence of these movements/parties is considerably less significant than the movements considered in this chapter. In Portugal and Spain they are negligible (with less than 0.5% support). The two largest xenophobic anti-citizenship parties in southern Europe are Golden Dawn in Greece and Lega Norte in Italy, with, respectively, just 7% and 10% support in legislative elections as their best results. The Lega entered government in coalition with a strong presence of deputies and senators in the 1990s. Since then the party has remained circumscribed to the northern regions of the country.
- 5 Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe.

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Part IV

CITIES AND URBAN TRANSFORMATION

The sense of touch

For musicians, the sense of touch defines our physical experience of art: lips applied to reed, fingers pushing down keys or strings. It might seem that the more easily we touch, the better we play, but facility is only half the story. A pianist or violinist has constantly to explore resistance, either in the instrument or in the playing body. This effort, I want to suggest, says something also about 'being in touch' in everyday life.

Vibrato

Like every cellist, I learned about touch through mastering movements like vibrato. Vibrato is the rocking motion of the left hand on a string, which colours a note around its precise pitch; waves of sound spread out in vibrato like ripples from a pool into which one has thrown a stone. Vibrato does not start with the contact of the fingertip and the string; it begins further back at the elbow, the impulse to rock starting from that anchor, passing through the forearm into the palm of the hand and then through the finger.

There are many kinds of vibratos, some slow and liquid which colour long notes, some which last no more than an instant. These rocking movements of the left hand are also like fingerprints, giving every cellist his or her own distinctive sound. János Starker's vibrato is focused, the colouring of his notes is light, whereas Jacqueline du Pré often has a wide, wild vibrato. But even for her, vibrato is the result of discipline.

Freedom to rock requires that a cellist first master the capacity to play perfectly in tune. If a young cellist fails in that mastery, every time he or she vibrates the note will sound sour, accentuating the inaccuracy of pitch. At an advanced stage of our training, when we use vibrato to gain entry to the contemporary world of semi-tones, we must still aim at a precise tonal centre. There are acoustical reasons for this distinction between the sour and the vibrant, related to the overtones set going by a string. But the need for

mastery of pitch in order to vibrate well tells an elementary truth: freedom depends on control, whereas purely impulsive expression produces just mess – a piece of folk wisdom as true of the hand as of the heart.

When I began studying the cello at the age of eight, vibrato came easily to me, in part because I was blessed with a sense of perfect pitch. The Garden of Eden in which a child prodigy dwells is indeed the sheer ease of making sound. Exit from that musical garden came to me when I began to perform in public.

I have yet to meet the musician who walks on stage with the same insouciance that he or she might feel in walking to the bank or in practising in private – though it has been said of Fritz Kreisler that he barely noticed when he played in front of thousands of people. Usually stage-fright follows the outlines of a simple story. [Chapter 1](#) begins at the moment of anticipation: faced with performing the adrenalin flows, and the stomach tightens, which is why few musicians dare eat before performing. [Chapter 2](#) is the withdrawal before the event into a concentrated silence – again, a ‘natural’ like Arthur Rubinstein often entertained in his dressing room beforehand, but most musicians can barely manage the presence of their partners.

[Chapter 3](#) opens when we walk onstage, and is hard to describe; it’s like a trance in which we become hyper-alert. In this trance our bodies can betray us, and no more so than in the work of vibrato. The vibrating forearm suddenly promises to release the tensions built up in [Chapters 1](#) and [2](#), but it can be a false promise. Energy can flow away from the elbow; often the wrist begins to flex, further cutting off the secure transmission of energy from elbow to finger. The result of this short-circuit is that the weakened hand may then begin pushing too hard on the string in order to recover strength; the fingers may lock on to the fingerboard beneath the string; movement then will become jerky rather than fluid. These concrete events are what may make a musician sound ‘nervous’ to an audience, even when the cellist is in the midst of performing technical feats.

Since nerves have caused the loss of coherent vibrating touch, the experience of not playing easily may seem entirely negative. At least it seemed so to me, aged thirteen and fourteen, when I suddenly lost control of my vibrato in concerts. By fifteen, I had discovered one simple way to trick my nerves: reading non-stop during the hours before concerts; the murder mysteries of Agatha Christie seemed particularly calming, and usually, but not always, took me out of myself. Once I’d found a way to deal with my own stage-fright, I became more attuned to other dimensions of resistance, as part of the expressive process.

Most cellos are physically imperfect in sounding the E and F notes on the G string; even great Guarneri cellos, powerful and solid instruments, have a tendency to fracture these two tones into a kind of bleating noise like a

sheep singing. To vibrate under these conditions risks an even worse sound. Yet when the cellist squarely engages G-string bleats, vibrating forthrightly, the result can be an immense physical release and feeling of freedom. When I once performed the Schubert Cello Quintet with the great cellist Jacqueline du Pré – she was barely adolescent at the time – she was gripped by a crisis of nerves until the famous moment in the first movement when the second cello becomes mired in this danger zone. Her F bleated for a fraction of a second, but then she conquered it and began to make a richly vibrant, generous sound; her body relaxed.

In the performing trance, physical resistance often heightens the musician's awareness of the music itself. For instance, in the adagio of Beethoven's Sonata Opus 102 no. 1, the cellist is called on to play octaves in the zone of strings closest to the peg-box; it's a perilous procedure because the cut of the fingerboard on the instrument does not easily accommodate the stretched hand pushing down two strings at once. To vibrate the strings under these conditions is a challenge, but rising to that challenge often gives these octaves the urgency the score requires, while simultaneously calming down the nervous player.

What I'm describing is not a Romantic struggle with wood and gut impeding the soul, rather an experience of which musicians themselves are mostly unconscious. At best, we use the word 'focus' to describe it: loss of focus equals losing touch. The sense of control we have on stage is nothing like the freedom of the rehearsal studio, no return to the garden in which we play unselfconsciously without worrying about mistakes; now hundreds or thousands of people are listening. Indeed, making a mistake on stage can also be a signal to us to pay more bodily attention. There is a kind of dialogue between danger and freedom which constitutes focus on stage.

By the time I'd entered conservatory, I had learned one further and larger thing about what happens when resistance is not faced squarely. If the whole arm ceases to serve the cellist – breaking secure contact between flesh, string and wood – the cellist's perceptions of her or himself performing can split in two. In one domain there is the ideal of what the music should sound like, in the other domain an achieved expression, the music no more than its sound. This is just what Jacqueline du Pré remarked to me a few years later; she heard two musics, one in her head where everything is beautiful and just right, and the other in her ears, neither right nor beautiful. For her, the divide did not last long; in fact it can be only a matter of a few moments in which the artist is aware that the music doesn't sound as it should; then this divide can disappear as the body takes over, the artist's inner 'it should be other' fading away, and he or she again gets inside the sound.

Romanticism provided a misleading vocabulary for this divide; musical notations such as *innerlich* or *geistlich* suggest that the musician's soul

will at a particularly expressive moment withdraw to an immaterial, higher realm. Fingers remain, unfortunately, on strings. It's not intentions, desires and longings which matter on stage; only the concrete and objective counts, because only sound sounds. I don't know if there's a German word like *outerlichkeit*, but there should be. And paradoxically, it's just the physical fusion which courts danger, which is alive to resistance in performing, that rouses listeners to feel a musician to be 'in' the music, in contrast to the performer who seems disconnected, though he may have beautiful dreams.

When we are 'in touch', as American slang puts it, we do not dwell in the garden, conflict and danger-free. But no more is the performing stage a scene of exile; in the heightened trance-like state in which performing occurs, danger and being in touch become expressively inseparable. The resistance of physical objects and their sounds can challenge the body, yet, in the paradox I've described, relax it as well, as in a successful vibrato. When performing well, every musician feels the poet Wallace Stevens's famous declaration, 'no truth but in things'.

User-friendly

When I first started frequenting architects in their offices, I thought they worked like musicians, obsessing about details and materials in the way we obsess about notes, but in time I saw theirs was a different kind of obsession. With the exception of a few, they obsessed about what the building ought ideally to be rather than its evolution in use, its interaction with an audience. The great Italian architect Aldo Rossi was quite up-front about this: 'use leads to abuse' he succinctly informed me. He had an immensely tactile sense of materials; his sense of social *outerlichkeit* was weak.

His attitude isn't an inevitable necessity of practising architecture; it reflects something which has happened to our culture as a whole. The experience of touch is weak – at least in that testing, resistance-confronting sense a musician knows onstage. This loss of physical connection to other people can come, most elementally, from making machines, buildings and streets that are 'user friendly', that is, seemingly friendly objects.

Eighteenth-century London was hardly a user-friendly city. Its twisted streets moved people slowly, the streets stank, compressed crowds made physical touch oppressive and often dangerous. In a way, modern society greatly gained by relieving that pressure, in making the city easier to use. When Robert Moses erected the great highway system in New York City in the 1940s and 1950s, he explicitly sought to use the automobile as a tool to reduce physical contact between people, imagining the crowd as a nuclear reaction, sure to explode through its own density. The behaviour

of modern urban crowds is disciplined so that physical contact is repressed in elaborate ballets of bodily movement. Silence between strangers on the street enforces this discipline, as does avoidance of prolonged eye contact. The well-designed modern city is legible.

Its buildings are even more so. All buildings have programmes which define the particular uses of space. Modern buildings tend to have particularly definitive programmes. Every square metre has its allotted function, and functions in modern buildings, even in small structures, are tied tightly to physical properties such as energy consumption, plumbing, lighting or heating. The programme lays out what you should do, the coordination of function to properties and how it should occur. You know the object from the moment the doors of the building open. As in architecture, so in 'user-friendly' computers and other machines, which aim to diminish struggle and difficulty.

Of course practicality requires this: a computer with a dysfunctional programme like Windows 98 is of little value to anyone. But practicality comes at a price: loss of engagement with the object in a more testing, interrogatory form.

Highly defined buildings, for instance, tend to be rigid as habitations; the spaces can only be used in one way, unvarying in time. An eighteenth-century palace can be converted into a modern art museum, but Frank Gehry's Bilbao museum will never evolve into a palace, a hospital or a church. At a more mundane level, Georgian terraced architecture of two centuries ago fairly easily adapts to the shifting needs of offices, residential housing and commercial stores in the course of time; shopping malls are hard to put to any other use than as theatres of consumption.

These easy-to-use but rigidly fixed structures ask for submission in use rather than engagement. You are meant to do what the building tells you so clearly to do. Such determinate structures in turn induce apathy, since there is nothing to engage with, to put yourself into. The apathy induced by social housing is a well-known phenomenon, even though much of it in Britain is well-designed; clean and neat office spaces can be little more involving. The redesign of contemporary Berlin is a prime example of a regime of spatial power in which ease of use, definition of function, discipline of crowds, all dull physical arousal – a neutral city of the known and the safe.

The musical analogy to 'user-friendly' appears in one method for teaching beginning cellists to play in tune. It consists of plastering little bands of tape across the fingerboard, so that kids know exactly where to put their fingers. This, the foundation of the so-called 'Suzuki' method, seems to make fingering easy. But once the tape is removed, the kids are surprised and chagrined. They find they haven't really been making good contact between fingertip, string and wood; the tape weakened experimental learning at that

crucial intersection. Suddenly they discover they don't know how to play in tune by themselves.

It's the same with vibrato. Once the basic principle is established, the colouring of sound can be put to ever more diverse, demanding and difficult uses. There's the risk that these difficulties will implode in concert, but the musician has to accept that danger to get inside the music.

This was one way in which my old life spoke to me in my new life. There was in my generation of urbanists, among writers such as Jane Jacobs in her *The Death and Life of Great American Cities* (1961), or architects such as Colin Rowe in his *Collage City* (1983), a great desire to regain the tactile, arousing experience of physical contact, without imagining that cities should have to look like Hogarth's London. We had, and have, some good ideas about how to accomplish this, as in giving pedestrians greater privileges against the claims of motor traffic. But we have tended to our own kind of Romanticism: the unplanned street encounter, the scenery of pedlars, buskers and street politics – the spontaneous inner spirit set free of determined function.

What I cannot solve in my practical work as an urbanist is the practical imperative I knew as a musician: that of forging a balance between control and the risk of losing control, from which musicians learn to focus on stage. It might seem fanciful to imagine that there could be a design equivalent to Beethoven's challenging octaves, but it's a real issue.

We think, at one extreme, of chaos on the Tube, at the other of the relentless order of a highway. Outside this scheme lies entirely something else: an urban order which can be made to work, but only with the participant's engagement, effort and some risk. The focus of this effort is place-making, not the machinery of movement: how, for instance, to shape a street corner so that it serves a variety of uses, or create a building flexible enough that its form can take the impress of differences and needs in the course of time. If 'user-friendly' turns out to be socially unfriendly, then we need to find a rhythm between the open and the unplanned, between control and resistance. That's how connection publicly occurs in music, but not publicly in space.

The refusal of touch

It might be said that I've been looking in the wrong place for signs of physical arousal. Walk into any New York uptown gallery today and you are likely to see plaster vaginas or photographs of cocks – Brit-art's commercial legacy to us. Go anywhere to a movie and you are likely to watch bodies blasted to bits, blood and gore smearing the screen. The body on display, rather than constructs in steel and glass, seems the locus of the modern sense of touch.

Try taking one of those plaster vaginas off the wall to study it better, however, and guards in the gallery will immediately shout at you; try caressing a fashionably exposed crotch or breast on the street and, in America at least, you will be arrested for sexual harassment. The Free Body, the Transgressive Body is a modern icon, but it would be a mistake to confuse display with touch; a forbidden barrier separates image and object.

In America there has been a long and exhausting argument about that barrier, debate about whether the depiction of pornographic scenes in magazines like *Hustler* indeed encourages voyeurs to commit pornographic acts, or whether the pervasive entertainment-culture of violence encourages violence on the streets. Though it has perhaps uniquely American and puritanical overtones, this argument is important for what is not discussed: the very desire not to touch.

Although a very few of the millions who watch bloody war films may leave the cinema determined to become killers themselves, the mass of viewers emerging from these orgies of violence or sex most likely will revert to being law-abiding citizens and mild bed-mates. The desire for physical contact of the most violent kind, or for sexual touch, has been discharged into fantasy. The content of the fantasy remains compelling, however. As in the gallery, so on screen that inner state of arousal has been protected by being displayed in such a way that it cannot be interfered with by others. Fantasy is sheathed in a condom.

The command 'Do not touch' can thus be answered 'I don't want to', in order to preserve sensation as an inner feeling. Ghostly presences lurk in this withdrawal: desire and longing for what is absent, for what cannot be consummated. Proust, in *Albertine disparue*, shows again and again how his narrator's desire for Albertine grows strong when she is absent, and weakens when her own body lies in fact close to his – Lacan (1977) says the narrator's desire is the dreaming of absence. It is the domain of that ideal music, that *innerlichkeit*, which threatens the musician performing badly on stage.

Subjectivity of the longing sort is bound to remain unfocused. In one of his most moving letters, light in tone but rich in substance, Voltaire wrote to Madame de Pompadour that he was often amazed by his own behaviour but seldom surprised; 'I had a fair conception of who I was when I reached the age of reason, perhaps more talented than other men but like them; I had only to study their characters to know myself and read my own heart to find there the evidences of all humanity.' Which of us today would dare make a similar statement? I know I wouldn't dare. For us, to take a generic liberty, we spend our lives in trying to unravel what we desire, what we would want, what we are longing to be – an inwardness of becoming.

The writings of the psychoanalyst Heinz Kohut (1971) have much struck me in this regard; he is the father of narcissism studies, influencing

Christopher Lasch's *The Culture of Narcissism* (1991) and an entire genre of me-generation critiques. The analyst father was tougher than his journalist descendants: he argues that narcissistic subjectivity disposes people to imagine that reality is failing them, failing to measure up; or again, the actual self with its constraints and limits seems inferior to that idealised being whose existence is a wistful possibility. 'If only', 'I should have', 'I had hoped'. There's a social consequence to narcissistic longing: the desire subverts engagement with the world's difficulties, prevents these engagements from doing their work of freeing the self from the self; a door closes on the insistent, dissonant noises outside.

On stage, ideal music does not sound to others; the performer has to save him or herself from hearing it. So too, I think, does the audience out on the street or back home in bed. This regime of subjectivity is just the danger of a society which eschews the embrace of resistance. Difficulties which are 'taped over' hardly disappear; contradiction, ambivalence and confusion are the intractable ingredients of social life.

When I began exploring this psychology in relation to the conditions of dead streets, I realised that the accusing taint of self-indulgence would have to be removed from Kohut's writing. Passivity is a socially imposed condition, loss of contact with others serves the purposes of power. The directive building serves the purposes of its owner, not its users; the orderly street serves the purposes of planners and the ruling powers, not those of its inhabitants.

In a way this only makes the dilemma of physical disengagement greater. A simple desire to connect to others will not suffice; there is no established social stage on which people can take the risks of performing. This may sound wind-blown, but when I am in London now it seems quite palpable. Modern British town planning seems bent on massive control and regulation of the urban fabric; everything must have a reason, must be explainable and justifiable. If it's true that in our culture there is a desire to withdraw, the polity offers little occasion for people to take the risk of managing their relations with one another: the two halves of visceral disconnection.

There is of course something special about music which makes me argue this. The music I make comes from someone else; the cello I play is not my own invention. Were I a composer or an inventor perhaps the erotics of longing might be indeed a fruitful starting point. As a cellist, however, my problem is instead to make a world not of my own come to life.

That performance problem is much closer to the difficulty people face in the everyday world than is the composer's longing. Like me on stage, people in the street do not create the social roles of family, work and community in which they engage. Those roles are enshrined in social texts which may make vivid performance difficult, powerful texts like those encoded in

buildings and urban designs which repress engagement. In *The Paradox of Acting*, Diderot argued that the good performer, on stage or in the street, cannot be the simple servant of these texts; interpretation is always a process of translating the immaterial into the material. Within the confines of translation, though, enormous freedom is possible. It is a freedom ever available in art, but one we have, in society, yet fully to exploit.

At least in the arts, this is beginning to happen; at least in New York I'm beginning to see signs of change. Much of the art in New York galleries, made by very young people in their late teens and early twenties, has taken an encouraging direction; it emphasises craft-work and physical form. The same change is evident in the work of young architects who are experimenting with user-engaging rather than user-friendly buildings. Much of the new music by young composers is work designed to be played, rather than scores to be read abstractly. There seems in all a repudiation of theory-driven art, a repudiation which is not conservative, I think, but animated instead by connecting to others not by 'messages' but through engaging materials. Which is the work of touching which connects to others.

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Urban disorder and the transformation of global governance

Global processes take concrete and localised forms in large cities around the world. These localised forms represent what globalisation is about. 'Globalization does not operate simply in cyberspace; there are developments, correlated with globalizations, operating within cities, at the low end of the social scale' (Body-Gendrot et al. 2012: 360). At the beginning of the twenty-first century, metropolises, the recipients of flows of capital, people, innovations and ideas, are experiencing continuous mutations. New centralities and marginalities are produced outside and inside such cities which are multi-scalar, altogether activating global, national and local dimensions.

Global cities are characterised by extreme inequalities, generating the resentment of those confined to less hospitable urban areas at a time when information reaches the most distant points of the world and makes residents aware of their predicament. As Mingione (in this volume) observes, quoting T. H. Marshall, 'the logic of the market produces strong and cumulative inequalities that obstruct both the workings of democratic citizenship [...] and the protective capacity of welfare'.

If we consider that large cities concentrate a growing share of disadvantaged populations, it becomes obvious that 'cities have become a strategic terrain for a whole series of conflicts and contradictions' (Sassen 1999: 105). Global cities (to be understood as a concentration of strategic functions commanding far-flung economic and financial networks) have conflict wired into the urban space itself. They are a contested terrain. Global capital players and the new immigrant workforce are such instances of transnationalised actors, all claiming entitlements and a 'right to the city', but in an asymmetric way (Sassen 2017). Such cities provoke fascination and rejection among radical activists as well as antagonisms among groups moved by competition for survival.

In order to measure how much cities' crises have changed, in the first part of this chapter I reflect on the causes that generated them in the 1960s and

on the shape that they then took, taking the US and France as illustrations. In the second part, I take public space as a kind of laboratory for current claims, protests and cultural insubordination. Forms of resistance in public space are currently boosted by the use of social media. Yet public space remains determinant in the disorder process; it is a political resource (Body-Gendrot 2017a). In the last part, I argue, however, that horizontal protest movements are not enough to change the neoliberal system which has met little opposition in the last fifty years. A transformation of institutions is needed as well. Cities offer an alternative path for progressive change to take place.

Reflecting on cities and crises from the 1960s until now: the US¹

The growth of inequalities in American cities and the persistence of a discriminatory society were usually ignored in the 1950s by social sciences heavily influenced by a search for consensus and by the pluralism of Robert Dahl, who optimistically claimed that ‘in a pluralist, open system, any group could be heard at a crucial point in the decision-process’ (1956: 145). Few scholars took a critical stand against this position, despite some famous exceptions. For urban theory then to question the outcomes of liberal democracy and its philosophy of deregulation and open competition was unusual. The potential of cities to produce widespread revolts and protest was often not addressed. In the meantime, urban renewal policies destroyed the social fabric of numerous urban neighbourhoods and working-class communities. It seems surprising that neighbourhoods won so few victories. The reason for this poor record was that the groups that opposed renewal were small and often divided from one another on the basis of race and ethnicity. Neighbourhoods acted as interest groups protecting their own turf. The various neighbourhoods were so diverse that it was difficult for them to form stable alliances with one another. As a consequence, the renewal coalitions usually outlasted protest originating from a single neighbourhood. By ‘astutely selecting urban renewal and redevelopment sites, administrators could pursue a politics of divide and conquer’ (Judd and Swanstrom 2004: 138).

In the 1960s, urban protest and race riots vigorously denounced the fate of minorities segregated in inner-city public housing estates deprived of adequate public services. The pluralist vision, however, influenced by the ‘market model’, missed the dynamics of revolt in American cities, posing a political crisis for rulers who ‘perceived that the myth and reality of their authority were then under threat’ (Katznelson 1973: 467). The 1960s can be seen as a time of negotiations through which old and stubborn problems of racial discrimination, social exclusion and fear in cities seemed to have been

addressed. Serious problems, particularly concentrated in inner cities, were not alleviated, however, due to the lack of pro-social governmental interventions (Body-Gendrot 2017b). Weak or ill-adapted laws regarding the wide circulation of guns, drugs, domestic violence, the de-institutionalisation of the mentally ill (often with little or no community support systems), cuts in all kinds of public services along with states' and local governments' choices in favour of profitable privatisation: all compounded the socially regressive impact of these changes.

As unrest and urban violence grew, action had to be taken by the Democrats then in power and depending on urban votes – 'Each riot costs me 90,000 votes', President Johnson was heard saying. While he had an approval rating which was 62 per cent positive in December 1965, the rating was down 48 per cent a year later, and on the Great Society it was negative, reaching just 32 per cent (Barone 1990: 411–12). Progressive measures in favour of the poor and racial minorities in the 1960s, out of a background of summer riots in the inner cities of large and middle-size cities, created a backlash, alongside compassion fatigue among the majority of white voters and their elected representatives, hostile to forms of redistribution and affirmative action that might affect the merit principle. Due to the political instrumentalisation of fear in Americans' lives by conservative politicians like Barry Goldwater, American cities in the last quarter of the twentieth century became less democratic, more racially polarised and more uncertain (Simon 2007). Gradually, the optimism that had marked the beginning of the 1960s, when a man could walk on the moon and poverty was often seen as an 'anomaly' in America, was replaced by the 'twilight of common dreams' (Gitlin 1995).

Did the Democrats make a mistake in enforcing a pro-social vision? Rhetorically, mistakes were made, such as launching a War on Poverty that could never be won. The Economic Opportunity Act of 1964 stipulated: 'It is therefore the policy of the United States to eliminate the paradox of poverty in the midst of plenty in this nation.' The decision to support this policy had been taken only two days after President Johnson assumed office because he was eager to be perceived as a second Roosevelt. It explains why he declared an 'unconditional war on poverty in America' (Judd and Swanstrom 2004: 168–71). It was utopian to ask poor residents to produce ideal neighbourhoods when they lacked the resources, skills or willingness to do so, or deciding from Washington that states and local authorities would cooperate with progressive policies. It could not work this way. The war in Vietnam also took its toll and social policies – under the mantle of a War on Poverty – were never given enough funding, continuity and popular support to make a lasting difference to the neighbourhoods concerned and their recipients. Johnson could not choose between butter and guns while

refusing to increase taxes. Soon enough, inflation grew, creating a large discontent among Americans (Barone 1990).

Another critique should also be seriously considered. Saul Alinsky, a community organiser in Chicago after the Second War World, criticised the anti-poverty programmes of the Great Society as a top-down process, not allocating political power to the involved poor. Receiving subsidies and power from above was a poisonous gift, 'political pornography' he said, an expression that Hillary Clinton borrowed from him when she wrote her dissertation on Alinsky while a student at Wellesley (Sanders 1970; Clinton 1969). According to Alinsky, empowerment, a learning experience, could only be earned via strikes, protests, intimidation, conflicts and confrontations in the public space, even temporarily. Without a learning process for snatching power, there was no collective capacity for teaching people how to decide in the best of their interests after solving their conflicts (Body-Gendrot 2017b). 'Whose city was this?' Ray Pahl asked (1970). The mobilisations modelled after Alinsky responded: 'Ours', articulating that we, the people, fought for it during the American Revolution to obtain rights and empowerment. In this vision, the city belonged to all – we have as much a right to the city as mighty universities, financial institutions, real-estate owners, city hall or the affluent population. Alinsky was aware, however, that such micro-victories did not fundamentally change existing power structures.

The Great Society's programmes, the Model Cities, Head Start, Medicare, Medicaid and 1100 community action programmes in 1967 did make a difference (Judd and Swanstrom 2004; Barone 1990; Body-Gendrot 1997). Poverty rates fell in the 1970s, as more welfare was provided to dependent households. Furthermore, interestingly, through federal initiatives, discrete institutional structures were created outside of the usual political arrangements, involving minority militants as Model Cities directors or community action programme leaders. Later, these 'parallel political institutions for the discontented' (Katznelson 1973: 478) became trampolines that often temporarily enabled full position and patronage within the urban political system. Many of these former militants are currently still in positions of power in cities, states or nationally and make statements defending their vision on the media.

However, the end of the twentieth century in American cities was marked by an ongoing gradual loss of democratic public space. The consolidation of a post-war affluent society with more consumer goods that were left throughout homes across the US, without surveillance during work hours, triggered a rise in thefts and burglaries. According to David Garland,

late modernity's impact upon crime rates was a multi-dimensional one that involved (i) increased opportunities for crime, (ii) reduced situational controls,

(iii) an increase in populations ‘at risk’, and (iv) a reduction in the efficacy of social and self controls as a consequence of shifts in social ecology and changing cultural norms. (2001: 90)

In the early 1980s, the rate of crime was three times that of twenty years before, in all the main offence categories, he adds.

A new ‘culture of control’ translated into more surveillance, more punitiveness and more ‘defensible’ spaces endorsed by numerous local governments. Jane Jacobs (1961) denounced the triumph of a sterile urbanism and of sanitised spaces, with the disappearance of streets and democratic common grounds. Robert Putnam (1996) deplored the loss of civic capital associated with the war generation that was used to discussing community issues with neighbours over a cup of coffee. ‘Public space is increasingly empty of public issues. It fails to perform its past role of a meeting-and-dialogue place for private troubles and public issues’, Bauman regretted (2000: 40). While the rise of the internet and of mediated connections has been interpreted as an escape from emptied-out space, recreating virtual communities, one can add that the elites’ fear of downward mobility (Mayer 2017: 180) and their tendency to criminalise public gatherings also contributed to the destruction of a vibrant democratic space.

Reflecting on cities and crises from the 1960s until now: France

A rather similar evolution of space and social decline could be observed for France, starting in the 1950s and 1960s at a time when large-scale and high-rise public housing estates were hastily built to provide homes for workers recruited by large industrial firms. State technocrats never bothered to survey the wishes of the French, accustomed to a formerly rural society, aspiring to become small homeowners with possibly a patch of green space (Body-Gendrot 2017a; Body-Gendrot and de Wenden 2007). Actually, according to state rhetoric, these inhospitable architectural forms were a form of progress compared with working-class slums in city centres. This perception was partly true, yet it often failed to recognise the break-up of what were, in many cases, stable communities. At the end of the 1970s, a law provided an opportunity for home ownership. Many former working- or lower middle-class, white tenants who had improved their socio-economic status then moved out, improving their life chances, and were replaced by poorer immigrant households with large families. In no way was this ‘forced mobility’ as would later be the migrants’ situation (Body-Gendrot et al. 2012: 366).

Subsequently, researchers (Massey 2011; Gervais 2012; Body-Gendrot 2014) defended the idea that space is produced; it doesn’t just appear or develop ‘naturally’. Because it is a social product that calls for specific laws

such as zoning and serious financial subsidies from the state, and as it has the potential to move people around against their will (forced mobility), 'the production of space always represents forces of capital, always implicates political elites, and sometimes also provokes collective resistance' (Zukin 2011: 10). At the beginning of the 1980s, the boredom of life in those housing estates began to be documented (Delarue 1991), but there was no general awareness that they would become sources of trouble as social conditions became more strained. Neither had state technocrats anticipated the social pathologies that were to follow, namely ongoing 'riots' by French immigrant youths clashing with the national police who were accused of racism (Body-Gendrot 2010). The prevailing idea in French society then was that extra-European immigrant workers were 'guest-workers' who were not meant to stay; they were perceived as male workers without families, so the issue of social 'integration' was meaningless. As early as 1979, the president of France, Valéry Giscard d'Estaing, had secretly decided to send back 500,000 migrant workers to North Africa over five years (Weil 2015). It proved legally impossible to implement such a plan. As the successive oil shocks that hit France in the 1970s also impacted on state finances, the urban sites concentrating and isolating the working classes of French and immigrant origin from mainstream society never received the kind of amenities necessary to make urban life acceptable: decent schools, parks and playgrounds, appropriate transportation to workplaces, leisure and city centres, trained public employees, services and cultural mediators. Some protest movements, hunger strikes and demonstrations took place at the end of the 1970s (Body-Gendrot and de Wenden 2007) in the streets of concerned localities, but for lack of rights and of unity between the activists and the victims of urban neglect, following Marcuse's observation (2012), the 'discontented' did not join with the 'dispossessed'. Their networks were more heterogeneous than earlier urban alliances. Poor foreign migrants were not legally given the right to organise until 1981 in France, and they remained in inhospitable dwellings until they could gradually move into public housing units, as a result of better incomes and more vacancies.

Thirty years later, a significant disenchantment is now associated with the *politique de la ville* launched in 1981 as a form of territorial affirmative action (Zappi 2015: 11). In January 2015, after attacks on a satirical journal carried out by terrorists who had grown up in the *banlieues*, the prime minister of France, Manuel Valls, denounced a territorial, social and ethnic apartheid. In the subsidised zones 39 per cent of the residents have no upper secondary school diploma (vs. 21.2 per cent of those in other areas) (Zappi 2015: 11). Despite its utopian design, minor tools were used by the *politique de la ville* to address the major trauma caused by macro-economic changes, the growth of neoliberalisation and deep cultural transformations

brought on by individualisation and immigration from the former French colonies. Still, this form of preventative action was not entirely negative. It is difficult to estimate the number of crimes, suicides, divorces and disruptions that have been avoided through various forms of state and bureaucratic support. In 2004, an urban renewal policy started a massive programme of public housing destruction and reconstruction. 341,000 housing units have been renewed and 141,000 new ones were built all over the country (Zappi 2015: 11).

The urban renewal policy was seen as a tool for the transformation of public space intended to upgrade residents' status, while making them feel more secure at the same time. In the 1990s–2000s, in terms of safety, those neighbourhoods benefited from crime-prevention schemes favoured by mayors. CCTV cameras, electronic access control and better lighting contributed to an approach that replaced former social prevention schemes, without explicitly acknowledging this (Body-Gendrot and de Wenden 2007). Defining 'social mix' vaguely, those in charge of urban governance had hoped that this goal would be reached when those policies were locally implemented. It did not happen. Middle-class families did not move to the improved, renovated areas. But there were positive unintended effects. Ethnically homogeneous, the population was socially diverse.

What is frequently overlooked is indeed the fact that 'state welfarism' acted as a device that generated mobility and change, both positive and negative. For example, over ten years and until 2008, half the population of the urban zones labelled as *politique de la ville* moved out (Lelévrier 2008). Upwardly mobile households, frequently of immigrant background, moved into the better, detached homes, in renewed buildings of these estates or in nearby areas, while on older public housing estates, the households that had left were immediately replaced by poorer immigrant newcomers. Only residual tenants, unable to move due to personal handicaps, remained. Consequently, with continuous immigration flows and despite important social and urban transformations, the image of such areas was not transformed. Macro-social trends based on binary visions rewarding the established areas and their residents and neglecting marginal peripheries and their residents remained similar to those of other Western societies. The outcome of more individualisation, more pervasive social control, more fear of others fuelled by political ideologues, all combined to reduce democratic participation.

Since the oil crisis of the mid-1970s, in more 'individualised, de-standardised and fragmented' societies, individuals are 'increasingly isolated and vulnerable, and less protected by the welfare state, political representation, social bonds and community relations' (Mingione in this volume). To compare and contrast the meaning of 'whose city?' (Pahl 1970) then and now

leads to a critical reflection not only on the changes that neoliberalisation has wrought on urban landscapes and on other issues in the last decades, but also on changes in public space relative to these transformation processes. Processes vary in intensity, however, due to the historical and social struggles in each country. In that respect, French society, marked by a strong, interventionist, central state and both left and conservative ideologies, seems to have resisted the American pro-market pattern in its own ways.

Public disorder as a political resource

What is new in this research concerns the association of *public*, *disorder* and a third term, *globalisation*. Globalisation amplifies local disorder, it condenses time and space and it gives local events a world echo (Occupy movements, riots, terrorism, disasters). It also provides the context for contest, for change and for innovation.

Some disorder (i.e. civil disobedience) is a necessary step in the adjustment of change: the future order is inside the transitory disorder which acts as its envelope. The notion of intricacy linking the two terms is thus appropriate (Chevallier 1997). Such disorder can be interpreted as a healthy signal for democracies because protest and urban disorder refer to a hardly conceptualised 'newness', and to an inability to conceive of urban change in the long term. When people take to the streets, it reveals that other channels of expression are blocked or refused (such as voting, for many young people). Some people then need to 'act out' and even to resort to violence to become visible. In this 'acting out', how much is the impulse carried by cities' spaces themselves? And how much by external forces and events? There are no easy answers to such questions.

Urban space as a political resource

Urban space is a political resource for all kinds of grievances, given coverage by the media and the internet. Due to governments' unconvincing performances and failures, fear may change into indignation and outrage. For a majority of people (Egypt, Turkey, Tunisia, Brazil, Spain, etc.), such 'happenings' make sense.

Why does the global context make insecure people change into outraged participants in emancipatory mobilisations? There are numerous reasons. One explanation that comes to mind is the awareness that systemic logics of expulsion are at work (Sassen 2014), breaking up individual and collective certitude and solidarities and feeding uncertainty regarding present and future times. Some mobilisations denounce inequalities intensified by global forces and the elites' support of global financialisation, as in New York City

(Occupy Wall Street) in 2011; others the confiscation of democratic public space – Gezi Park – by Turkish elites eager to impose a religious conservative order, as in Istanbul in 2013; or disrespect for democratic rule by China in Hong Kong in 2014 (Body-Gendrot 2017a); while the experience of the Arab Spring points to all of the causes above.

The case of Occupy Central in Hong Kong is a fascinating illustration of what can be done. Leading what was called the Umbrella revolution, the Hong Kong occupiers challenged China's power of intimidation and its will to exert its domination on this semi-autonomous enclave moulded by 150 years of British rule. They occupied several commercial areas, disrupting trade and traffic to protest a violation by China of democratic rules regarding the election of Hong Kong's leader in the Legislative Council. China's use of violence against demonstrators via the local police helped by triads located in Mongkok, a neighbourhood of Hong Kong, eventually eroded the strength of the movement. The youth were begged by older leaders, fearing the police's lethal violence, to stop their protest. However, despite its physical disappearance, the Umbrella mobilisation keeps haunting people's imaginary, and recent votes in the Hong Kong legislature and claims for Hong Kong's autonomy show that the protest movement was not useless. Such mobilisations reveal something of the kind of leverage some groups have managed to achieve over their own governance institutions, at least temporarily. Demonstrators have had the courage to start something without knowing the end (Body-Gendrot 2017a: 149–50).

Protest is about rites and symbols; belonging and sharing an individual and a collective experience; becoming visible, being heard, taking responsibility. The way in which public disorder is perceived is diverse. Take May 1968 in France. Middle-class students blocking the streets, making barricades out of tipped-over cars, writing graffiti on the walls; all the more visible as their revolt was backed up by intellectual spokespersons, and by ten million workers and employees on strike: political decision-makers at the top were taken by surprise and paralysed. This type of large-scale public disorder was quite different from that of the 2005 so-called 'riots' in France, which spread throughout three hundred deprived neighbourhoods over three weeks (Body-Gendrot 2016). In no locality did the disorder last more than three evenings and there were no casualties. But after the tragic deaths of two youths chased by the police in a poor locality on the periphery of Paris, the youth revolt resorted to rites and symbols: vandalising buildings, setting cars on fire (a mode of action also used in Sweden but less so in Britain) and confronting the police with missiles and tear gas. Unlike in London in 2011, the French disorder was contained within the inner cities, making it less costly for society. This approach is characteristic of the way the French police control disorder.

In 2005, the young ‘rioters’ were accused – mainly by the May ’68 generation – of being ‘silent’ and more or less devoid of political expression. They were often depicted as leaderless and unorganised, almost nihilistic. But another interpretation is possible (Body-Gendrot 2016). To a certain extent, the silent disorder may appear as a healthy form of post-political empowerment, through opposition to social alienation. *Post* means that the ‘rioters’ did not need words for expression, since they did not negotiate with the power-holders from whom they expected nothing (Bertho 2016).

The motivations of protesters in each city are in many ways unique and locally grounded. They nevertheless express the strength and near universality of public discontent, which takes political elites by surprise. They display an outrage at ‘accumulation by dispossession’ occurring via household evictions and displacement (Mayer 2017).²

‘The global city is a strategic site for the enactment of the dynamics of disadvantaged groups with little power and little to lose when they exert an “intimidating” presence in the public space’ (Body-Gendrot et al. 2012: 371). The political power of physical space is too frequently ignored, perhaps particularly so in an information age when so much is relegated to the ephemeral zone of social media. The ‘sense of place empowers protests’ (Kimmelman 2011). It is important to remember how public space, buildings, monuments, bridges (at least in the Western world) mobilise both memories of past decades (or in Europe, of past centuries) and offer a site for dissent and expressivity. These spaces help create a political stimulus so that people feel they can exercise a right to ‘peaceably assemble, occupy public space, create a process to address problems’ and hopefully in doing so, generate embryos of solutions (Body-Gendrot 2017a).

Social networks as activators

Communication networks using smartphones, websites or social media mark a difference from previous decades when events were encapsulated in the local. ‘An act of protest being tweeted or sent on Facebook rapidly reaches a global audience to such an extent that was unimaginable a couple of decades ago’ (Atak and Della Porta 2016: 521). Social media link dispersed people, create visibility for local mobilisations and impact on the evolution of hyper-spatialised events. The communications revolution, ranging from satellite television to Twitter to camera telephones, makes it easier to organise protest, and to give visibility to people occupying space or taking to the streets. Local space can be reinterpreted via global networks and a global drama organised in contentious territories. It can thus be said that social media can be an activator of disorder at a distance. In other words, social networks can interpret local disturbances and ‘globalise’ them.

Yet they do not create a global public space, since people communicate from their own, local perspectives. As observed in Mathias's editorial (2016), interactions target some issues and restrict themselves to those issues. Our practices and expectations, our political representations are localised. They get their meaning from our habitus, our individual experience, and it is from that perspective that people think that they can make a difference. I personally think that the empowerment generated by social networks will never replace the act of assembling in a public space along with hundreds of other people to express solidarity or alternative views, but there are exceptions, as the Arab Spring illustrates, and the future is not written yet (Body-Gendrot 2017a).

The spontaneous mobilisation of millions of French people in city streets after the terrorist attacks of January 2015 and their visible presence in cafés and squares after the second round of attacks in November 2015 revealed unexpected forms of resistance and a watchful 'presence' from below to be reckoned with. The crowds were multicultural, all ages were represented and a deep empathy seemed to link the marchers. In such cases, public space reveals city users' social competence and their capacity for adaptation, mobilisation and resistance. The emancipation movements in defence of direct participation, empowerment and democracy reveal the 'unsustainable' character of 'capitalist development' (Mingione in this volume). Their actions are temporary, however, and will not bring a revolutionary change. Yet they do force power-holders to pay attention and they may become increasingly recognised over time.

Are massive occupations of space then useful? There may be more resilience in people than opinion polls or political commentary suggest. A recent study on what residents expected from the Greater Paris conducted by geographer Christophe Guilly (2016) revealed that many of them would like to control changes themselves and wished that, together with other Parisians, they could discuss the elites' proposals. Their formulations are different from what elected officials elaborate. For instance, many residents from public housing estates interpret social mix as cultural diversity, while for top decision-makers, it refers to income diversity.

Cities' windows of opportunity

It would then be an illusion to think that disorder and mobilisations are the privileged path to open the way to change. After the events in Ferguson, Missouri, in summer 2014, disorderly protest in large cities against American police officers' lethal shootings generated strong collective protest from indignant people. Movements such as Black Lives Matter gave the cause its visibility. It generated a public debate on institutional racism in

American society. Then what? No one knows the consequences of such mobilisations in the wake of President Donald Trump defending populist nationalism, except that, so far, protestors have not stood still and have made it known that they will keep organising, as was the case with the March of Women in large American cities on 21 January 2017, the day after Trump's inauguration.

Multifaceted, 'wicked' issues defy simple solutions and there is neither agreement on their nature nor on solutions. By its nature, the city is a frontier space between worlds that ignore each other. The thought of migrants settling in neighbourhoods where they are not welcome or landing on beaches where middle-class families take their vacations in Greece, France or Italy comes to mind. 'These mobile migrants with complex transnational identities are now facing political and cultural contexts in which social rights are weak and discriminatory and xenophobic practices are widespread' (Mingione in this volume). The capacity for not seeing them is limitless.

If one interprets social movements as a warning that capitalism is going too far in its excesses, one agrees as well that their capacity for changing it is minuscule. As I said earlier, in its impact on imaginaries, citizens' empowerment is not negligible, but many agree that the accumulation of dysfunctions in the way capitalism works is beyond repair. It would be hazardous to state that windows of opportunity will be found by those horizontal movements to generate any new order. Efforts of transition to a less brutal, more inclusive capitalism may take thirty years or more and may have to be done in another way.

It seems indeed that 'disorganized capitalism is disorganizing not only itself, but its opposition as well, depriving it of the capacity either to defeat capitalism or to rescue it' (Streeck 2014: 48). As mentioned above, after mass protest marked the 1960s in European and American cities, the corporate world and its established allies kept pushing the disadvantaged who were losing their 'right to the city' to the margins (Lefebvre 1996). Neo-capitalism did not become destabilised by the denunciations of the 'dispossessed', unable to ally with the 'discontented'. Societies remained fragmented (Mingione 1991). In the past fifty years, neoliberalism has reinforced itself; it has become anarchic, with no one at the helm under strong winds.

This disenchantment explains why we need to rely more on cities than on *indignados* and why we should not wait for the current system to perish before we act. Cities have the capacity to transform people into citizens. If they are more resilient than other systems, it is due as much to their capacity for adaptation and innovation as to their incomplete features (Sassen 2017). The more they are comfortable with uncertainty – allowing options to emerge – the less they feel threatened by it (Nowotny 2016). Currently they take the lead on global warming issues and on the migrant crisis.

The German pavilion at the Venice Biennale in 2016 – depicting *Heimat*, how German cities welcomed migrants, revealing the latter's trajectories on large, illustrated panels praising their initiatives – illustrates this point as well as the resistance offered by American sanctuary cities to federal injunctions. The latter protect undocumented migrants and do not cooperate with federal immigration officers eager to deport them. Mayor Eric Garcetti in Los Angeles, Mayor Bill de Blasio in New York City and Mayor Rahm Emmanuel in Chicago are willing to risk losing millions of dollars in federal assistance to their cities, money that runs homeless shelters or police services to protect immigrants (Medina and Bidgood 2016). Other liberal cities, Boston, Philadelphia, San Francisco and some five hundred counties also limit their cooperation with the immigration authorities, according to the Immigrant Legal Resource Centre, based in San Francisco and Washington. As observed by Body-Gendrot et al. (2012: 375), 'social problems are here to stay, but so are a renewed attractiveness and success of large cities throughout the world and different urban regimes'.

Conclusion

This research has shown how much cities' crises have changed, reflecting on the causes that generated them in the 1960s and on the shape that they took, taking the US and France as illustrations of the shortcomings of pro-social visions, which did not fundamentally change existing power structures. By the end of the twentieth century, American cities had revealed an ongoing gradual loss of democratic public space. French deprived areas retained negative images, with their discredited residents using them either as a first-entry point or as the only possible option. This chapter took public space as a kind of laboratory for current claims, protests and cultural insubordination. Imposing a massive presence in the public space via movements, destructions and confrontations and suspending public order is indeed a tool of resistance, a weapon of the weak. What is new, as shown by this research, is that public disorder, impacting on urban space and amplified by new modes of communication, makes highly visible precisely what is ignored by the elites' rhetoric: injustice and emotion. Disorder thus resonates with public emotion – urban sites of protest embody globalisation's social failures, they give it its confrontational dimension without immediately generating political claims. Protesters then have some possibility of influence and such disruptions cannot so easily be ignored. To prevent more polarisation, governing elites often feel the need to respond with concessions or repression, while limiting the cost of public welfare.

The forces defending order have powerful tools that they use successfully to halt public disorder. In Istanbul, the protesters at Gezi Park were

harshly beaten, wounded and imprisoned and the police hardly sanctioned (Body-Gendrot 2017a). In fact, the authoritarian trend of the political regime associated with Recep Tayyip Erdogan asserted itself even more in the years that followed the rebellion. Another example comes from Hong Kong. After the Hong Kong Umbrella Revolution in 2014, some of the demonstrators created political parties and ran for electoral positions. But the heavy hand of Chinese repression threatened them and limited their rights, in case they should openly challenge the status of Hong Kong under Chinese domination. In the US, oppositional organisations in defence of minorities' rights will need to confront the Attorney General at the Department of Justice, Jeff Sessions, who appears to support police forces more than activists. In Paris, the *banlieues* and other marginal areas did not appear as issues that interested political candidates running for the national elections in 2017. The list of limits and restraints to what oppositional movements can do is long.

This research has also pointed to a strong feeling in Europe that politics can no longer make a difference, as illustrated by declining electoral turnout combined with high voter volatility, the distortion of referendums as channels conveying anger and discontent or even more, and the support given to populist and extreme political parties.

What is needed is a re-examination of institutions and of capitalism itself. Capitalism is indeed in a critical condition, as stressed by Mingione (1991) and Streeck (2014) among others. The decline of economic growth, the rise of public indebtedness and the increasing inequality of income and wealth feed disenchantment. States are accused of being in the grip of money-making industries, with an increasing stake in runaway financialisation (Sassen 2014). The political sphere needs to be reframed so that a democratic Europe based on citizens' debates about the institutions that they want becomes possible (Mouffe 2016). All institutions are indeed instruments which have transformed people into citizens.

Cities have their part to play in this endeavour, a major one. The urban project is a long-term commitment. Successful cities listen to and incorporate their residents in the production of a sustainable environment. Mayors, planners, architects and their associates all contribute to a reassuring urban quality. For example, the Chilean architect, Alejandro Aroneva, the recipient of the Pritzker prize in 2016, designed a 'half good' home. He constructed the foundations of the house and let the future owners take hold of it and complete it according to their needs and dreams. He thus reduced the cost to public finances. Incompleteness was the key to this successful endeavour.

There are still numerous unknowns to be deciphered and we need to understand emerging situations while they are still in flux and subject to

influence. New patterns arise and so do pictures of acute uncertainty, but with new concepts and new tools, embryos of change that are already visible may be tracked and questioned.

Note

- 1 This section draws on Body-Gendrot (2017b).
- 2 Inequalities are on average less pronounced in Europe than in Britain or the US, due to policies of redistribution that characterise the ‘welfare state’. The unique French social model still allowed public expenditure to amount to 57 per cent of GDP in 2016, 35 per cent of which was devoted to social protection, a world record. But for how long? The deficit has reached 320 billion euros and the French social debt has never reached such magnitude in the past, as Olivier Beau, the director of European social space, remarks (Beau 2016: 81).

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Urban political economy beyond convergence: robust but differentiated unequal European cities

This chapter discusses the transformations of contemporary European cities and is intellectually influenced by the Italian political economy tradition (Andreotti and Benassi 2014; Tosi and Vitale 2016), which is particularly attentive to territories and cities. This tradition paved the way for sophisticated intellectual arguments about informality, social networks, labour markets, firms tradition, religion, locality, family, state failure, poverty, crime, clientelism, the role of the middle classes (shopkeepers, artisans but also lower middle classes from the public sector) articulated to different processes of economic and political transformation, non-economic factors of economic development, the welfare state (Saraceno 2002), relations of the labour market and poverty (Paci 1989; Burroni 2016).

The comparative political economy of territories of cities developed in Italy thanks to the great research programme of Bagnasco and Trigilia with their analysis of the third Italy (Bagnasco 1977), Turin and then the Mezzogiorno (Trigilia 1994). It also owes much to the work of Mingione who, in his book *Fragmented Societies* (1991), emphasised the diversity of labour markets, the importance of informal work and the diversity of local communities. Comparison was central to his research, between Italy and other European countries. Within Italy, he systematically compared experiences of poverty and urban development between northern and southern Italian cities. This tradition has had long-term influence on urban research and theory, in particular in southern Europe, in France and in Latin America. He contributed to an urban research line of enquiry which emphasises territories and cities both as part of networks, but also as places structured by social, economic and political formal and informal relations and investments, a sort of antidote to the 'urban age' syndrome. In that sense, the focus on cities and their internal regulations is an alternative to the sociology of urbanisation in Henri Lefebvre's vein. It is based upon rich, diverse and dense empirical surveys combining deep ethnographic research

into inequalities, segregation, network analysis, social capital, identification of regulations, mobilisation and conflicts. Italian scholars have therefore prominently figured in the debate about ‘embeddedness’ put forward by Polanyi¹ and have been influenced by Gramsci and Weber as well as historians and anthropologists.

This comparative Italian political economy of cities and urbanisation is central in the debate about the transformation of European cities, but has been largely marginalised in mainstream urban studies. First, cities are not significant in the brilliant Marx and Lefebvre inspired analyses of capitalist urbanisation processes, from David Harvey and Neil Brenner to Saskia Sassen or Neil Smith. Nowadays mainstream critical urban geography/urban planning authors have developed a stimulating search for ‘new concepts’ of the ‘new urban world’, but are often ignorant of social sciences history, and often characterised by weak empirical analysis. Secondly, many scholars have emphasised the role of neoliberalism as the main explanation for urban transformation in different parts of the world. In both cases, thinking about political economy emphasises urbanisation processes, and forms of convergence, however limited they might be. Cities and metropolises do not matter. By contrast, the Italian territorial political economy tradition tries to articulate both urbanisation processes related to capitalism and the trajectories and transformations of cities and metropolises beyond simple ideas of convergence.

The chapter reviews the ongoing dynamics of the bulk of European metropolises together with the differentiation processes taking place. It argues that both contemporary urbanisation processes and the transformation of cities in Europe might be fruitfully explained in relation to social and political transformations as articulated in the Italian tradition of political economy rather than in terms of neoliberalisation.

What happens to European cities?

Research about the European urban system, transformation of urbanisation processes and the evolution of European cities has been profoundly influenced by this tradition. Europe has a distinct urban system that was structured by the making of nation-states and war, the first capitalism of merchants and later, to a lesser extent except in the north-west (in the UK first all all), by the Industrial Revolution (Pinol 2003; Hohenberg and Lees 1995).

The neo-Weberian comparative model of the ‘European city’ was developed in the 1990s. It was imagined in relation to the long-term, relative macro-stability of the European urban system (Pinol 2003), the deep connections between cities and states (Tilly 1990), territorialised social relations

and the long-term legitimacy of municipalities (Bagnasco and Le Galès 2000). Cities were identified as distinctive features of European societies, but largely structured by political and social regulations (Kazepov 2005). At a time of the decreasing salience of war, of overlapping authorities (the EU) and the increasing role of circulation and market exchanges, the bulk of European cities were enjoying both economic growth and increased capacity for collective action. In contrast to Castells's claim about 'the fading charm of European cities' (1996), or the focus on global cities following Sassen's major book *The Global City* (2001), it appeared that the majority of European (i.e. western Europe at that time) middle-sized metropolises were characterised by limited inequalities, remarkable policy innovations, large investments in urban infrastructure and amenities, new opportunities arising from the apparently coming age of EU urban policy, and the making of some forms of governance (Le Galès 2002; Häussermann and Haila 2005; Giersig 2008). The political dimension is central, with a continuing representation of the city as a whole and the increased legitimacy of political elites in sustaining and reinventing this representation that was obvious in the revival of strategic projects and planning strategies from Barcelona, Budapest, Helsinki, Stuttgart and more recently Milan and Manchester (Pinson 2009). The emphasis on agency, collective action and governance had to take into account the fact that the process of governing a city is never fully complete, nor linear (Le Galès and Vitale 2013). Urban societies and urban economies are more or less governed and that may change from one city to the next, from one period to the next. There are also protests, policy failures, riots, social exclusion processes, the filtering of the population and also elections, political parties, democratic participation innovation, active interest groups and others who play a key part in shaping the implementation of policies (Seller 2002; Heinelt and Kübler 2004). This conceptualisation is focused on conflict, conflict-solving capacities (including public policies), political mechanisms and most importantly on the ongoing redistributive role of the state, and the welfare state in particular.

European cities were characterised by a mix of public services and private firms, including a robust body of middle-class and lower middle-class public-sector workers, who constitute a firm pillar of the social structure, and are mobilised for services and public investments in infrastructure. Urban local authorities were often characterised by the fight against clientelism, a focus on quality services and implemented policies, efforts to develop consultation with the citizenry and democratic initiatives; all with mixed results and many policy failures. The question of immigrants and the marginalisation of groups of poor migrants was becoming more salient, with intense conflicts and a wealth of experimentation in different European cities. Policy failures were also becoming obvious in the field of housing when Harloe wrote

about the 'residualisation of social housing' (1995). Congestion and lack of transport were also becoming obvious in a number of European cities, together with the privatisation of utilities. Several points were lacking in this analysis, including the increasing role of migration in different European cities, the impact of the ongoing integration of eastern European countries or the coming of age of environmental and sustainability concerns.

The point remained that despite increasing social tensions, social segregation, inequalities, even riots at times, European cities had resources, identities and political legitimacy, scores of new policies and public investment. It was not appropriate to describe them as dual cities. The prophets of urban convergence around the Los Angeles or Shanghai model were proven wrong during that period.

The conclusion of my *European Cities* book (which only dealt with western Europe) was slightly pessimistic, suggesting that the strengthening of the 'European city' model was in question, a point reinforced in the second edition (Le Galès 2002; 2009). Two scenarios were put forward: one suggested that the robustness of the European city model would allow European cities to adapt to economic and social transformations because of their resources, social and political capacities articulated in stronger modes of governance. The second, put forward by economists, economic geographers and neo-Marxist scholars, rather underlined the destabilising effects of the single market and trade, the dislocation of the European urban system because of changing forms of capitalism and inequalities, and the decline of European cities.

Economic development: robust European cities more differentiated within Europe

The liberal turn of the EU after 2000 and the large-scale ongoing economic crisis after 2008 were powerful factors bringing more weight to the second scenario. From time to time capitalism is marked either by a major crisis or by surge of innovations (possibly both) that reshuffle the deck, leading to major transformations of states, the relocalisation of wealth-creation centres and poor areas, and the structuring of inequalities. That was the case during the first medieval period of merchant capitalism, the Industrial Revolution and the Great Depression. There is now increasing evidence to suggest that financial capitalism and the surge of high-tech, globalised megafirms are leading to profound changing scales of social life and the relocalisation of economic activities.

Examining the empirical transformation of European cities over the last decade is therefore relevant to make sense of this tension between the inherited social structure and political dynamics of cities versus the capitalist-led restructuring. The *State of European Cities* (European Commission and


UN Habitat 2016) report brings to the fore some important evidence to show the impact of the economic crisis. The report uses the category of metro regions.²

The first set of results may be summed up as follows: the European urban system has proven remarkably robust despite the crisis. The European city model has been rather reinforced in most European metropolises. However, differentiation processes are taking place, with the increasing dynamics of high-income cities, including Paris and London. European cities or metropolises, that is, the bulk of small state capitals and regional capitals, are characterised by increasing economic productivity and demographic growth. Despite their limited size and the impact of the economic crisis, they are far from obsolete. They attract populations, jobs and migrants. In terms of population, the vast majority of metro regions are growing. So much for the obsolescence or the coming age of shrinking cities.

However, this pattern suffers from three important exceptions. First, the metro regions of eastern Europe outside the national capitals are suffering from strong demographic decline, less so in Poland but very sharply in Romania, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic and Slovakia, some cities in the former East Germany and the Baltic states. Secondly, within the EU in western Europe, some metro regions at the periphery are also losing residents. Finally, the violent economic crisis has accelerated the decline of metro regions in Greece, the Mezzogiorno and some smaller former industrial cities in Spain, France, Belgium and Italy.

The overall conclusion regarding the robustness of the European system of cities and the increasing differentiation process is also to be seen in the economic figures, despite the strong reservations associated with the use of GDP as an indicator for cities. The authors of the report provide ample evidence of the economic growth and success of European metro regions by contrast to the rest of the countries in terms of wealth production, employment and innovation.

Storper emphasises a differentiation process: beyond the general dynamics of European cities, and beyond national differences (some cities lose population, but less so than the whole country), there is an important dynamic at work based upon two criteria: size and income. At one end of the scale, the most dynamic eastern European cities, particularly national capitals, are enjoying strong growth and increasing GDP per inhabitant, in sharp contrast with the accelerated decline of other regions and smaller cities. Most significantly, the high-income, larger metropolises of Europe are becoming increasingly different compared with the remainder of European cities, for example Paris, London, Munich, Milan and Stockholm. Large metro regions with low incomes are by contrast in trouble, for example Rome. In other words, within a robust global situation, there is a 'club of



(*) Metropolitan regions in Belgium, Germany, Luxembourg, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Slovenia and Switzerland: breaks in series. Metropolitan regions in Ireland and France: provisional. Metropolitan regions in Portugal, Romania and the United Kingdom: estimates. Metropolitan regions in Denmark: 2007–14. Metropolitan regions in Norway: 2005–14.

Figure 14.1 Population change in the European Union, by metropolitan region, 2004–14 (%)

Sources: Eurostat 2016 (online data codes: *met_pjanaggr3* and *demo_pjan*)

metro regions', to use Storpers's language, that is increasing its economic dynamism. Large metropolises comprise the high end of the labour market, with skilled people (the young in particular) and investment.

The Italian and German cases, more balanced in urban terms than centralised countries, are very telling. In the German case, metro regions show strong dynamics but some in the eastern region are still facing shrinking dynamics and a loss of population. In Italy, after years of relative stagnation, Milan is joining the club of dynamic, high-income metro regions, and the gap with some other Italian cities is increasing. Some low-income metro regions, in particular national capitals in eastern Europe, have also benefited from strong growth. Storper points towards an increasing risk. Middle-income metro regions, that is, a large body of European cities, are facing slow growth (Storper 2016: 12). Storper argues that they may fall into the middle-income trap, that is, facing strong competition from lower-cost locations on the one hand, without the resources or capacity to compete for higher value-added economic activities (also see Vassilis et al. 2012).

Despite the liberal turn of the EU Commission in 2000 and a decade of economic crisis, there is no dislocation of the European urban system. European metro, that is, mid-size, cities have adapted in cooperation with their national states (or sometimes despite them). But this scenario is combined with some elements of metropolisation and differentiation, that is, the accelerated growth of high-income metro regions, including Paris and London. There is also now a periphery of Europe where cities are shrinking or facing more economic difficulties, in the north of England, the Mezzogiorno and eastern Europe outside the capitals.

Are cities more divided? More poverty but limited increase in inequalities

Cities within the EU (27 member states after Brexit) have faced considerable difficulties with the economic crisis and the migration crisis. This has created massive pressure on the social fabric of European cities, the rise of inequality and more poverty. Many authors mention massive inequalities, the rise of neoliberalism, the Americanisation of European cities and the death of the model. In order to develop a nuanced argument, several points have to be kept in mind:

1. A good indicator for analysing urban societies is to check the homicide rate. In European cities, the figures are very low except in the three Baltic states. At the national level the figures are 1 homicide per 100,000 inhabitants; the figure is 4.5 per 100,000 in the US (European Commission and UN Habitat 2016). The homicide rate has decreased by

45 per cent since 2002. According to recent EU figures published in the *State of European Cities* report, ‘In three out of four European capital cities, the average annual homicide rate in 2011–2013 was below 2 per 100,000 inhabitants. In 2014, no city in the USA with a population over 500,000 had a homicide rate below 2 per 100,000.’ More generally, as clearly shown by Jobard (2017), in terms of homicide, incarceration and punishment, the EU remains miles away from the US. There is limited evidence of the punitive turn announced by Wacquant and it has been counterbalanced by EU human rights influence. This remains mostly the same at the urban level (the UK is the exception).

- 2. Inequalities measured in terms of income have not increased in Europe at the national level. Between 2005 and 2014, the OECD provided precise figures about the evolution of the Gini coefficient, an imperfect but robust measure of inequalities.³ On average, there has been no increase of income inequality measured by this indicator. Some countries have faced strong increases in inequality, such as the Baltic states and the most crisis-hit countries like Spain and Greece, or small increases in Slovenia or Sweden. There has also been a strong or small decrease in Italy, Finland and the Czech Republic, in Portugal and in




Figure 14.2 Evolution of total general government expenditure, EU-28, 2006–15, cumulative percentage of GDP

Source: EUROSTAT 2017a

Poland, and stability or a small decrease in the Netherlands, Germany, France, Ireland, Belgium, Hungary and even the UK.

3. As Streeck has eloquently shown (2017), austerity has become the norm for many states in the EU, and most importantly in the UK and those most damaged by the crisis, Greece first of all but also Spain, Portugal and Italy.

Despite all the literature on financial cuts, within the EU general government expenditure as a percentage of GDP is still higher today than in 2007. After a big increase due to the crisis, figures are down to 47.3 per cent of GDP, with strong variations between Greece, Finland, France, Belgium and Denmark (over 54 per cent) and on the other hand Ireland (less than 30 per cent), Lithuania and Romania (35 per cent). Since the crisis, social protection expenditure has been relatively on the increase. European cities are embedded within national societies. Nation-states have not disappeared, nor have welfare states. A major factor of robustness in the past has been the redistribution, employment base and services that national welfare states (more or less territorialised or decentralised) have provided for the populations of European cities. This has not disappeared, despite strong pressures, in particular in the south of Europe.

Of course these three points do not suffice, far from it, but they contribute to the framing of the argument. They provide evidence that talk about the making of neoliberal, massively unequal cities losing the support of European welfare states because of massive cuts (see Cucca and Ranci 2017) is empirically wrong, except in a few cases such as Greece, the UK and the Baltic states.

But that is only one part of the story. The homicide rate might be low but surveys point to all sorts of pressures, tensions and violence in cities that make people feel fear and uneasiness. The Gini coefficient has not increased, but this only catches one part of inequality. First, as far as income is concerned, Godechot (2012) among others has shown the massive increase of income of the top 1 per cent in relation to finance. Secondly, beyond income, the status of the workforce has deteriorated, with more and more non-traditional jobs accentuating the vulnerability of different sections of the population, or processes of dualisation now at play in countries and cities (Emmeneger et al. 2012). The risk of poverty, as estimated by the EU, now concerns 17.3 per cent of the EU population, in particular in the Baltic states, Spain and Greece. According to Eurostat, the risk of poverty is lower in cities than in rural areas. The following table from Eurostat (Table 14.1) also shows the importance of social transfers to limit income inequalities.

Thirdly, again beyond income, inequalities within European cities have massively increased because of housing: the residualisation of social housing,

Table 14.1 At-risk-of-poverty rate before and after social transfers (for a single person), 2014 and 2015

	At-risk-of-poverty BEFORE social transfers (%)		At-risk-of-poverty AFTER social transfers (%)	
	2014	2015	2014	2015
EU-28 ¹	26.1	25.9	17.2	17.3
Belgium	27.5	26.7	15.5	14.9
Bulgaria	27.3	28.4	21.8	22.0
Czech Republic	17.2	16.8	9.7	9.7
Denmark	26.9	25.8	12.1	12.2
Germany	25.0	25.1	16.7	16.7
Estonia	28.4	27.8	21.8	21.6
Ireland	37.2	—	15.6	—
Greece	26.0	25.5	22.1	21.4
Spain	31.1	30.1	22.2	22.1
France	24.0	23.9	13.3	13.6
Croatia	29.9	31.0	19.4	20.0
Italy	24.7	25.4	19.4	19.9
Cyprus	24.6	25.4	14.4	16.2
Latvia	27.0	27.3	21.2	22.5
Lithuania	27.5	28.6	19.1	22.2
Luxembourg	27.6	27.2	16.4	15.3
Hungary	26.6	25.7	15.0	14.9
Malta	23.8	23.7	15.9	16.3
Netherlands	21.3	22.3	11.6	11.6
Austria	25.4	25.6	14.1	13.9
Poland	23.1	22.9	17.0	17.6
Portugal	26.7	26.4	19.5	19.5
Romania	28.8	29.3	25.1	25.4
Slovenia	25.1	24.8	14.5	14.3
Slovakia	19.6	19.0	12.6	12.3
Finland	27.6	26.8	12.8	12.4
Sweden	28.5	26.9	15.1	14.5
United Kingdom	29.4	29.2	16.8	16.7
Iceland	21.2	20.6	7.9	9.6
Norway	24.8	26.5	10.9	11.9
Switzerland	24.3	—	13.8	—
FYR of Macedonia	27.8	—	22.1	—
Serbia	32.6	37.2	25.4	25.4

Source: Eurostat [2017b](#)

1 Figures are not available for Ireland for 2015, so the EU figure for this year is an estimate.




Figure 14.3 Good housing at a reasonable price per city, 2015

Source: Quality of Life Survey, Eurobarometer 419

the lack of new construction for employees, workers and immigrants, and the massive increase in house prices since 1997 have often combined with decreasing inheritance tax. The more housing prices increase, the more so does inequality. As argued by Chauvel and Schröder (2014) employees, workers and the lower middle classes in many European cities are worried about the prospects of their children because of persistent high unemployment and the cost of housing, not to mention wages. There is also some evidence of negative evolution of social and ethnic segregation, eviction and the making of slums and squats (Aguilera and Vitale 2015).

There are strong logics of differentiation and segregation at the extremes: the top elites seem to segregate more and there is a bulk of strong urban poverty that is not dealt with. Sako Musterd and his colleagues (2016) provide evidence of increased segregation in European cities. In the case of Paris, the meticulous long-term research of Edmond Préteceille provides insightful results (2012; 2009). At the level of the Paris urban region, Préteceille has been able to show over two decades a decrease, on average, of social segregation, mostly due to the decline of the working class and an increase in various sections of the lower middle and middle classes. Over the last fifteen years in the Paris urban region, one may identify slow continuous *embourgeoisement* but a limited increase of spatial segregation or inequalities, except at the extreme. However, beyond average figures, he also points towards the increased ethnic and social segregation of the poorest

neighbourhoods (e.g. in Seine St Denis) and the increased self-segregation of the upper middle classes in the west suburbs of Paris. In other words, while most of the Paris urban region is becoming more mixed both in terms of income and ethnic groups, the extremes are more obvious: a concentration of poverty and migrants in some neighbourhoods, a concentration of private-sector, upper middle classes in others. If migrants or second-generation groups are making their way in more and more neighbourhoods, an increasing number of neighbourhoods are becoming more and more homogeneous from an income and ethnicity point of view. Similarly, in the Paris region most figures about migration indicate that migrants, even from poor backgrounds, are becoming integrated into the labour market within one, or more often two, generations (with the exception of the poorest males with the lowest levels of education). However, some groups are left out and forms of cultural discrimination may become more significant.

In terms of the two scenarios underlined in the introduction, do we see the impact of the crisis and forms of capitalism destroying the classic European urban fabric (in the example of Préteceille, the extremes becoming dominant over time); or, once the worse of the crisis is over, will European cities in relation to their states be able to deal with some of the most important issues of poverty, housing and social exclusion? The jury is still out.

Neoliberalism and convergence or capacity to govern

The interpretations of these transformations are disputed. Most urban scholars accept the idea that the restructuring of capitalism, the state and the economic crisis are playing an important part. Often in Europe, these processes of change are incremental, slow and long term. Some scholars are quick to see the convergence or end of the existing model. In their book *Unequal Cities: The Challenge of Post-Industrial Transition in Times of Austerity* (2017), Cucca and Ranci echo a particular strand of critical urban scholarship when they identify ‘the death of European cities’ and name several culprits, in particular neoliberalism and cuts to the welfare state. The book is particularly feeble when using neoliberalism (not defined) and, as often in urban studies, in specifying mechanisms leading to change beyond vague generalisation. The conclusion of a lack of capacity to govern from European urban elites and the analysis of welfare cuts also reveals a limited understanding of public policies and the governance capacity within cities, as shown, for example, by the lack of financial analysis.

The capacity to govern is related to a number of factors including legitimacy, the effectiveness of the administration, the capacity to give direction and to implement policy and, crucially, budgets. It happens that, in contrast to the hasty conclusions reached by these authors, the share of public




Figure 14.4 Local autonomy in the EU

Source: DG REGIO; Ladner et al. 2015.

investment made by local authorities has significantly increased since 1995, together with fiscal autonomy. In other words, and with nuances over the last three years, urban local governments have been more able to extract resources to develop urban projects and to invest in new amenities and infrastructures, one factor that has contributed to their economic growth. About 60 per cent of public investment (excluding the UK among the large countries) is controlled by local or urban government in the EU (European Union 2016). Also, on average, and with considerable variety, transfers account for about 50 per cent of local authorities' budget in the EU.

However, over the last three years or so two trends have reduced the financial room for manoeuvre of European local authorities, and in particular cities and metropolises. First, the financial crisis has placed nation-states heavily in debt (Streeck 2017). One solution has been to increase financial pressure on local authorities and even limit their capacity to extract resources. This has been a long-term and drastic trend in the UK since Margaret Thatcher. Now pressure is building in different EU countries. Public investment undertaken by local authorities (most importantly cities and metropolises) has plummeted since 2010 (European Commission and UN Habitat 2016) in order to cope with financial pressures from the centre. Secondly, the ongoing regionalisation or semi-federalisation of some EU countries is allowing regions, *Länder* or Autonomies in Spain to exert more financial pressure on cities.

The financial crisis and austerity have proved devastating for Mediterranean countries and Ireland, where the crisis was the most severe, and in the UK where the Conservative government has engaged in a drastic attempt to reduce public expenditure. In other cases, cuts related to the crisis have been dreadful in some cases, but they are otherwise likely to be temporary and have remained very limited in scale. Despite some short-term limits in terms of investment, many European metropolises are still in a relatively favourable fiscal position (with the two important exceptions mentioned), and reinforced by sustained economic growth.

Indeed, if cities are under financial pressure from the state, they are also more central and crucial to the economic development of the country. Beyond the welfare state and so-called urban policy, the economy is becoming more urban. Urban policy becomes a sort of ‘policy for national champions’ in order to foster economic growth in the most dynamic urban centres: national capitals and high-income regional metropolises (Crouch and Le Galès 2012). Milan is a good example in Italy, as are national capitals.

Finally, urban political elites all over Europe do not only have resources. They are actively engaged in the development of policies, often to foster economic development but also to remedy social problems. A number of European cities are governed from the left or the centre-left. Sometimes the radical left experiments with remarkable policies to limit inequalities, re-orientate housing policies and limit privatisation or the influence of private firms, for example regulating AirBnB in Barcelona or Madrid. In some cases, they use economic development to develop social experimentation and social services (in the case of Milan, Paris and Lyon). In many cities, urban elites are now aware and under pressure to do something about public transport and social housing and are actively engaged in this direction (Manchester, Helsinki, and London). The mobilisation of European urban governments on issues related to sustainable development or climate change is also becoming large scale (European Commission and UN Habitat 2016).

There is no empirical reason to disregard these policies as neoliberal technocracy, as in the literature on post-politics (Swyngedouw 2009). By contrast, there is an important mobilisation among urban elites to deal with these issues. However, some social and ethnic groups remain on the margins.

Liberal or neoliberal European cities?

In a number of important publications, Brenner, Peck and Theodore (2010) have developed a sophisticated framework to make sense of urban transformations in dialectic relation with the rise of neoliberalism. They have also warned against the risk of confusion. Together with Pinson and Morel Journel (2016) and Storper (2016), we have argued that neoliberalism has

been an overblown notion in urban studies, suggesting that there is a contradiction between an overwhelming, hyperconstructivist conceptualisation of neoliberalism (always changing, always in different forms, always hybrid), and a structural explanation (Le Galès 2016).

Neoliberalism is first and foremost about the enforcement of what Marx and Polanyi called a market society. Marx and his followers define a market society by stressing two elements – a society in which the ability to resist market mechanisms has been annihilated by constraining legislation and a society in which a neoliberal programme has become hegemonic in Gramsci's sense. Some elements should be added to these points, following Polanyi (Le Galès and Scott 2008). A market society could be defined as:

- a society within which the behaviour (not the culture or the values) of organisations and individuals is oriented, constrained, aligned or realigned towards the principle of the market economy (*homo oeconomicus*): maximising self-interest, rational calculating actors and the individual pursuit of self-interest;
- a society within which the resistance capacity against market mechanisms is destroyed;
- a society within which the idea of the superiority of benevolent, naturally self-regulated markets has become hegemonic;
- an unstable political order, because of inequalities and the domination of large firms, requiring a punitive or security state as suggested by Wacquant (2008).

Neoliberalism should be analytically distinct from liberalism. Storper (2016) argues that contemporary neoliberalism has eliminated most of the concerns with the efficiency–equity criteria that are at the core of liberalism – that is, there is no such thing as market failure (monopoly, corruption, failure to provide collective goods). Instead, neoliberalism has a bias in favour of private provision, and resists evidence about the limits of private market efficiency. It also has eliminated concerns with distributional effects in favour of a belief system in which concentrated wealth, concentrated scale and unequally distributed income are good for economic dynamism. This leads contemporary neoliberalism to favour deregulation even when efficiency justifications are lacking, and to ignore distributional effects as inherently illegitimate considerations. General competition is the norm and good riddance to the losers, regardless of inequalities.

From a political point of view, neoliberalism is profoundly illiberal, mobilising state capacity to discipline the population, to punish and imprison the poor, to enforce competition. The conception of freedom

has moved from autonomy to the disciplined, self-governed, calculating, entrepreneurial *homo oeconomicus* who may be incentivised by rules (Dardot and Laval 2009).

Following this line of analysis leads to a stricter version of neoliberalism and therefore a search for a precise neoliberal urban policy. Good examples are identified in London, for instance, because of the Public-Private Partnerships used to finance transport that marginalise the democratic process and give financial priority to the private sector. Massive cuts for local authorities oblige them to sell land and to make dodgy deals with private developers despite their wishes. Discipline and coercion are central to neoliberalism.

However, within European cities, in classically liberal cities, by and large, most urban policies are not characterised by neoliberalism, even if some clear pressure is building because of terrorism and the permanent state of insurgency, because of populism attacking foreigners, and also because of the financial crisis. In many ways, European metro regions are increasingly liberal cities with liberal policies attracting lower and upper middle classes of working age together with migrants and populations with degrees. This sort of liberalism is not progressive.

Conclusion

The European urban system is made of a large number of dense, mid-size metropolises from 200,000 to 3 million inhabitants (plus London and Paris) that has proved relatively stable over time. This model is an ideal type that was never fully relevant for all European cities (e.g. Brussels, Rome, Coventry). As with any conceptualisation there is always variation. This chapter started by mentioning two scenarios: the dislocation of the European urban system and the 'death' of the European city model or the adaptation of the model to current conditions of capitalism. European cities are mostly liberal cities (though that does not mean progressive, far from it) and neoliberalism has not played an important role in transforming these cities or their policies, despite some worrying exceptions, for instance in the UK and Greece. In relation to the two scenarios mentioned previously, the results are somewhat mixed, but announcing the death of European cities is, once again, premature.

On the one hand, European metro regions remain a robust group of cities that are still growing in demographic and economic terms. The European cities model has been reinforced during the crisis, including its capacity to adapt. But there is a big if, since the model seems to apply to a more limited number of what we called European metro regions. A number of metro regions on the periphery (northern England, the Mezzogiorno, southern

Europe) and in eastern Europe are facing acute difficulties. And middle-sized, middle-income metro regions are also struggling. By contrast, high-income metro regions are becoming more distinctive, in particular London and Paris, at least according to the measures that are available and in terms of the labour market.

So far, it looks as though elements of the two scenarios are blending. The evolution of Europe seems to reflect both some trends of metropolisation and increasing differentiation, but with a robust base of European cities that are adapting to the current era of capitalism together with more poverty and social exclusion. That does not mean the end of the ‘European city’ model, but its fruitfulness for analysing European cities is less accurate. Pressures on the welfare state are mounting, but the world of European cities is still very different from that of other parts of the world, in particular the US. European cities are still massively structured by the state. Other measures based upon housing market prices and the urban form also confirm this strong differentiation from the US (Cusin 2017).

The rise of the extreme right in many EU countries bears witness to social and political conflicts. But European cities are bastions of resistance against this influence. In France and in the Netherlands, the extreme right vote is at low ebb in the metropolises. The Brexit vote was also very strongly rural, while the Remain vote had a majority in London, Bristol, Newcastle, Liverpool, Manchester and other cities. With all the nuances mentioned before, European cities have resources and are doing relatively well, in sharp contrast with the rest of their countries (Dorling and Hennig 2016). But European states, not to mention the EU itself, seem to have lost their ‘unifying energy’ to deal with these inequalities (King and Le Galès 2017).

Notes

- 1 See Granovetter (1985); Mingione (1991); Beckert (1996).
- 2 ‘Metro regions are NUTS-3 regions or groupings of NUTS-3 regions representing all functional urban areas of more than 250,000 inhabitants. The typology distinguishes three types of metro regions: 1. Capital city regions; 2. Second-tier metro regions; and 3. Smaller metro regions. The capital city region is the metro region which includes the national capital. Second-tier metro regions are the group of largest cities in the country excluding the capital. For this purpose, a fixed population threshold could not be used. As a result, a natural break served the purpose of distinguishing the second tier from the smaller metro regions. Smaller metro regions are the remaining ones.’ The report was produced by the EU commission together with a group of leading urban scholars.
- 3 <https://data.oecd.org/inequality/income-inequality.htm> (accessed 6 March 2017).

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Part V

SEGREGATION AND THE SPATIAL DIMENSION OF POVERTY

The spatial dimension of poverty

Few would dispute that the spatial concentration of poverty reinforces constraints that keep people in deprivation. Furthermore, many analysts have determined that spatial segregation is increasing (see e.g. Musterd et al. 2016; Logan 2013). A debate, however, exists about its underlying causes. The Chicago School, which introduced spatial mechanisms into the explanation of social differentiation, identified cultural transmission within distinct parts of cities that affected the aspirations and behaviour of people residing in them. Critics of the Chicago School did not deny that social difference accompanied spatial markers, but contended that the spatially based behaviours associated with the Gold Coast and the ghetto were ultimately attributable to industrial capitalism, not location. In other words, even if individuals' prospects could be improved by escaping the boundaries of the ghetto, erasing segregation would not in itself produce greater social equality. Or, erasing spatial barriers could increase individual social mobility but would not get rid of class inequality.

The spatial determinants of wealth and poverty were analysed by Enzo Mingione in *Urban Poverty and the Underclass* (1996). The book's comparative approach reveals various geographical configurations of social exclusion within European and American cities, leading Mingione to conclude: 'Ghettoization, and even more so the hyperghettoization recorded in some American cities, tends to intensify and speed up [...] social exclusion even though the ghetto poor are still everywhere a minority of the poor' (Mingione 1996: 380). The conditions Mingione describes have persisted in the last twenty years within a context of growing income inequality around the world. Huge flows of workers and capital are superimposing new patterns of residence and production on older spatial arrangements. Thus, while, arguably, inequality among nations has diminished by some measures (Quah and Mahbubani 2016), the distributions of income and wealth within nations have grown more unequal. Piketty, Saez and Zucman

(2016) find levels of income concentration in the US at the top both before and after taxation that have not been reached since the late 1920s. Similarly, the European Union (2015) found evidence of increasing wage inequality within most member states and identified earnings from capital as a dominant source of income growth at the top.

Along with increasing personal and household inequality, spatial inequality has also increased significantly. Musterd et al. (2016: 1), while finding variation among European cities in its extent, show that intra-metropolitan spatial isolation by ethnicity and income increased in the decade between 2001 and 2011 (see also OECD 2016: ch. 4).

Within the United States not only has spatial income segregation increased for more than four decades, but the morphology of its metropolitan regions has evolved to superimpose on the concentric model of rich, white suburbs and poor, black 'inner cities' a complicated mix of income and ethnic groups that imposes new barriers to integration. Fainstein and Fainstein (2009), based on the 2000 Census, compiled evidence indicating a configuration in which peripheral jurisdictional boundaries became vehicles for encapsulating and reinforcing economic inequalities (see also Lichter et al. 2015: 869; Bischoff and Reardon 2013: 11). Older suburbs have become more different from one another over time, reflecting declines in manufacturing, new immigration, the extension of urban black neighbourhoods into adjacent municipalities, new exclusive housing developments in previously rural areas, and local governmental policies of steering and exclusion. Even though most black Americans no longer live in the central cities, racial segregation of blacks and Hispanics from whites has increased *between* governmental units. Since responsibility for financing social services and schools rests primarily on local government, the new sorting out of low-income and minority populations reinforces disadvantage, while higher-income populations further encapsulate their advantages.¹ The resulting picture is of a matrix with rich and poor places distributed over a large region, even if most central cities remain in the poorer category.²

In this chapter we explore the relationship between space and inequality at the level of the small area (i.e. town, suburb, urban neighbourhood) and discuss the extent to which spatial interventions can contribute to greater equity. In doing so, we specify a typology of perspectives on spatial causality that can be distilled from the current urban studies literature; these are cultural, political-economic and institutional. The three are not mutually exclusive, and all three show how segregation functions to maintain inequality. They differ, however, in their implications for policy aimed at increasing equity. We interrogate these three perspectives by analysing the two strikingly disparate cases of capitalist housing markets in the United States and public housing in Singapore. We use these extremely different examples as a

natural experiment to illustrate the equity implications of two dramatically different approaches to dealing with the issue of spatial inequality.

Three perspectives

Cultural

Sociologists and geographers have long concerned themselves with the social effects of spatial relations. The Chicago School of urban sociology went beyond the urban/rural distinction to investigate the internal differentiation of metropolitan areas, drawing an analogy with natural ecology's model of invasion and succession. Within this perspective, social groupings held together by common factors such as ethnicity, religion and economic circumstances took over neighbourhoods and then perpetuated their collective values. Essentially, neighbourhoods gave rise to cultures, which, once established, reproduced themselves.

Robert Sampson is the contemporary and much-cited exemplar of this view. Even while acknowledging his debt to the Chicago School's stress on the importance of place (Sampson 2012: 39), he avoids its attention to spatial change, instead dwelling on neighbourhood stability. His focus is on how neighbourhoods produce and maintain cultural characteristics: '[My] guiding thesis [...] is that differentiation by neighborhood is not only everywhere to be seen, but that it [...] has durable properties' (Sampson 2012: 6). Breaking with the economists' model embodied in the Tiebout (1956) hypothesis, which defines neighbourhoods as simply the aggregate of individual decisions regarding where to live, Sampson (2012: 327) argues that neighbourhoods choose people rather than vice versa. The policy implication of his thesis is that poverty can be reduced only if neighbourhood cultures that breed high crime, drug addiction, out-of-wedlock births, etc. – what Kenneth Clark (1965) termed the cycle of pathology – can somehow be transformed.

Sampson begins his book by repudiating a view of the world in which distance collapses as a consequence of globalisation. His reading of the globalisation literature, however, is based on a misapprehension, since no one to our knowledge has argued that the internal differentiation of metropolitan areas has vanished. Rather, to the extent that proponents of globalisation contend that every place resembles every other place, they would include internal segregation of urban agglomerations – that is, the physical distancing of social strata and ethnic groups within urbanised areas – as a common pattern repeated around the world (see, e.g., Scott 2012: 139, who considers that socio-spatial segmentation has strengthened along with globalisation). Sampson does refer briefly to the left political-economy understanding of urban form, calling it 'powerful' (2012: 41). Nonetheless,

while accepting that the particularities of neighbourhoods have external causes in the economy and government, he moves into a wholly culturalist explanation of social outcomes. In other words, outside forces may have created the differences among places, but once these differences are established, they become autonomous forces socialising residents into specific kinds of behaviour.³

Political-economic

Although analysts on both the left and the right identify globalisation as a defining force of the present epoch, they differ as to its causes. On the right and centre, globalisation is explained by education, free trade and technological change and is evaluated as largely positive. Theorists on the left attribute it to new modes of capital accumulation, particularly the dominance of financial capital. From this viewpoint, globalisation promotes uneven spatial development that benefits capital, and it increases the penetration of capital into all aspects of life. The interplay of capital, class and space determines neighbourhood character. Two separable analyses underlie this perspective: 1) *social reproduction*, rooted in the social-spatial dialectic (Soja 1980) and the capture of class-monopoly rent (Harvey 1985); and 2) *accumulation*, traced to the flows of capital in search of speculative profits and exploitable labour. These structuralist viewpoints derive from Marxian theory in which class structure determines social relations, but, building on the contributions of Henri Lefebvre, they interject space as a crucial element in the determination of social differentiation and profitability.

Lefebvre, in *The Production of Space* (1991), asserts that space is not simply territory but instead is a social product. It thus ceases to be a static concept demarcated by natural features such as mountains and rivers or by demographic measures such as density. Instead, space is a process characterised by creative destruction and by conflict resolved through politics. Edward Soja (2010: 104) elaborates on Lefebvre's approach: 'For Lefebvre [...] space not only mattered, it was a powerful shaping force in society and in politics at every scale and context.' Soja is emphatic in declaring that space is not simply an epiphenomenon. In this respect his viewpoint resembles Sampson's in identifying spatial relations as causal factors in creating social outcomes. He differs from Sampson, however, in stressing the economic basis of social division, attributing uneven spatial development to commercialism, commodification and the drive for profit rather than to cultural attributes (Soja 2010: 54–6; see also Smith 1979).

Within the same tradition David Harvey (1985) develops a Marxist understanding of spatial segregation in describing ghetto formation and the economic returns from class segregation. For Harvey, the price of land determined under conditions of market competition requires low-income

people to crowd together in order to afford housing at all. Poor neighbourhoods thus result from lack of purchasing power and are devalued. At the same time, the occupation of a territory by the relatively wealthy increases the market value of that territory by creating an artificial scarcity of socially desirable land. Rather than the price of a house being determined simply by the cost of producing the structure or its locational advantages, it gains value from the status it confers, which is itself a product of the social standing of its neighbours. An urban area thus consists of numerous sub-markets in which the price of housing results from the class of households within each. From this argument, one can infer that efforts by better-off residents to exclude socially disadvantaged, much less stigmatised, households from their vicinity is a rational response to market incentives. Furthermore, as Michael Storper (2013: 74) notes, middle-income households 'have a higher risk [than wealthy ones] that diversity will generate problems for them at home and school as well as during their leisure time'. It follows then that the only policy for eliminating ghettos would be 'a socially controlled urban land market and socialized control of the housing sector' (Harvey 1973: 137).

This analysis of residential social differentiation indicates how capital inexorably reproduces social hierarchy through the operation of land markets, that is, it is a discussion of social reproduction under capitalism. On the production side, depictions of uneven development show that capital achieves profitability through spatially differentiated markets in goods and services and in the price of labour. Harvey (2001) uses the term 'the spatial fix' to describe how capitalists respond to over-accumulation or high wages within established markets by shifting investment to other locales that offer expanding consumption markets or cheap labour. With technological advances in shipping and telecommunications, capital mobility becomes ever greater. As investors abandon one area, causing land devaluation and unemployment there, they move into another, with the promise of speculative profits in land and more exploitable labour.

Despite the different emphases of the cultural and political-economy perspectives, both viewpoints acknowledge the significance of disappearing jobs (see Wilson 1997; Duneier 2016: ch. 4; Sassen in this volume). Furthermore, regardless of their causal analysis, both viewpoints on poverty lead to a conclusion that communities of poor people reproduce themselves and are rooted in economic processes that produce wealth and poverty. They differ as to whether the negative manifestations of spatial difference inevitably flow from capitalist financial markets or whether they can be ameliorated without social control of land development. The third, institutional model, traces poverty and social dysfunction to governmental systems and public policy and implies that reform is possible within capitalist cities.

Institutional

A substantial literature exists within the fields of urban planning and public policy addressing how governmental form and actions set in motion the processes by which some municipalities or neighbourhoods enjoy high levels of service and are home to affluent residents while others reinforce deprivation. Privatisation of social housing and reduction of housing subsidies, racial discrimination in renting and sales practices, zoning that excludes multi-family dwellings, displacement through urban renewal programmes, support for gentrification, emphasis on aggregate economic growth and trickle-down, and encouragement of gated communities all play a role in the creation of affluent and impoverished areas. Within the United States, where each political jurisdiction depends on locally generated revenue, competition for investment through various incentives becomes a necessity.

Harvey (1985: 68) argues that governmental regulation and institutional supports for development are necessary bases for speculative profits in land markets. For Harvey, the local state governs for the benefit of speculator-developers and, given capitalist land markets, will inevitably do so. The issue for reformers is whether governmental instruments can lessen uneven development and prevent its invidious effects on poor people or whether Harvey's grim prognosis must hold. Culturalists like Sampson and Wilson think that public policy can overcome the barriers to improvement intrinsic to ghettoization. Sampson (2012: 426) thus declares that 'existing continuities are not inherent but are socially reproduced in multiple ways that can be acted upon'. Culture, despite its inertial aspects, can be changed. Consistent with his emphasis on the employment structure, William Julius Wilson calls for a whole array of policies, including improved education, suburban-urban integration, family support, a larger earned-income tax credit and higher minimum wage. Ultimately he concludes that 'the jobs problem for inner-city workers [i.e. ghetto residents] cannot be adequately addressed without considering a policy of public-sector employment of last resort' (Wilson 1997: 225).

Thus, neither the culturalists nor the political economists deny the key role of governmental institutions and public policy in creating spaces of poverty and affluence. The emphasis in both cases, however, is on the forces that maintain the present structure, and government is mostly relegated to a black box that simply reflects social dominance. In contrast, planners and policy analysts, although spending considerable time on critique, also devote themselves to finding policy solutions that address the persistence of poverty. Their approach assumes a flexibility in underlying structures that provides sufficient leeway for spatial barriers to be breached and for initial economic disadvantage to be mitigated (see, for example, Chapple 2015).

Two broad categories of institutional approaches aim at preventing the negative effects of spatial concentration: 1) deconcentrating poverty through regulation and incentives to the private sector and 2) addressing basic needs through direct public provision. Efforts at poverty deconcentration include subsidising individual geographic mobility; requiring affluent areas to accept low-income people in their midst; and ensuring that neighbourhoods consist of mixed-income households and are diverse in terms of race, ethnicity, religion, gender preference, etc. Direct public provision means that the government builds housing itself, loosens regulations that inhibit high-density development, or subsidises private or non-profit developers. Despite globalisation we can see considerable variation around the world in the extent to which low-income people or households identifiable by racial and ethnic attributes are denied opportunities because of where they live. We illustrate the differing impacts of these strategies by examining two extreme examples: American initiatives for poverty deconcentration and Singaporean direct provision of housing with comprehensive urban planning.

Spatial approaches to mitigating poverty in the US

In the United States, with few exceptions, land is privately owned *fee simple*; in other words, it is treated as a commodity bought and sold in markets. The value placed on owning rural land and the farm homestead predates the Republic, but the full glorification of urban and suburban home ownership came mainly after the Second World War (see Cohen 2003: ch. 5). America lacks a bourgeois urban tradition, so occupying the city centre has never been a defining characteristic of the better off. A highly decentralised governmental system has demarcated cities, towns and suburbs. The US has virtually no national land-use planning, and federally funded ‘public housing’, long attacked by the powerful real estate industry, is always locally controlled. Without any sustained political force of a social democratic character calling for it, the total public housing programme amounts to about 4.5 million units⁴ (Center on Budget and Policy Priorities 2015) out of a national housing stock of about 134 million units, or a little more than 3 per cent.

Policy responses to the spatialisation of poverty and race and its localisation in the cores of old cities have involved three major strategies (see Chapple 2015; Massey et al. 2013: ch. 1; Goetz 2003; 2013): 1) removal, sometimes forced, of neighbourhood residents, 2) investment in the neighbourhood, and 3) efforts to reduce racial discrimination and to provide affordable housing within desirable urban neighbourhoods and also in better-off suburbs. We limit ourselves here to discussing a few aspects and examples of each.

Removal

Slum clearance with some replacement by public housing was the time-worn answer to addressing urban poverty. But public housing projects, which accommodated only a fraction of those displaced, fell sharply out of favour among academics and policy-makers by the 1970s. In addition, the Supreme Court ruled (*Hills v. Gautreaux*, 425 US 284, 1976) that public housing could not reinforce racial segregation through its construction in minority areas, yet local resistance precluded its erection elsewhere. Where public housing projects did exist, they became stigmatised over the decades. Underfunding for maintenance, restriction of occupancy to the very poor, increasing dominance by racial minorities and undesirable locations all contributed to their being identified as a cause rather than a remedy for poverty. Many were demolished, including all the 'traditional' public housing of the city of Chicago.⁵ By the 1980s public discourse identified poor neighbourhoods themselves as the cause of poverty. Crime, drug abuse, broken family structures, school failures and unemployment all became geographically synonymous with the inner city. Conservatives blamed the culture of the poor reinforced by density and contagion, while liberals pointed to racial segregation, inadequate schools and services, and a mismatch with suburban job growth.⁶

Over the next decades, what Imbroscio (2008) calls the dispersal consensus (DC) brought together prominent academics with public officials to devise and evaluate programmes aimed at deconcentrating the poor and facilitating their social mobility with demand-side vouchers, allowing them to 'move to opportunity' (the title of a highly touted federal programme). Edward Goetz (2003: 250), a strong critic of DC, concludes a detailed study of housing mobility schemes in Minneapolis by questioning whether a 'concerted effort' to deconcentrate poverty is productive, since such approaches 'rarely deal with actual causes'. The 'solution' becomes to help people escape, in effect, to free the deserving poor from the bad influences of their (undeserving?) neighbours. Some of those who move from the worse places often do find themselves in safer neighbourhoods, but their school performance and workforce success on balance do not change very much (Chapple 2015: 238–40).

Investment in poor neighbourhoods

Federal subsidies to low-income neighbourhoods and organisations, funded directly by the federal government under President Lyndon Johnson's War on Poverty, were converted to block grants to state and local governments during the Nixon administration and have become ever more meagrely supported. For the last quarter-century, the principal federal place-directed programme has been Hope VI, which aims at diminishing concentrated

poverty by replacing decrepit and dangerous public housing with mixed-income developments.⁷ In practice, Hope VI has contributed to the demolition of more than 200,000 apartments and the construction in their stead of attractive, lower-density and mixed-income ‘new urbanist’ communities. The limited number of affordable units included and the income required to live even in subsidised units excludes many former public housing tenants, as does the time lag between destruction and re-occupancy. Hope VI developments are associated with lower neighbourhood crime, rising property values and gentrification. In fact, the public housing chosen to be redeveloped by Hope VI is usually located in areas ripe for gentrification (see Goetz 2013).

Efforts to change the terrain of opportunity

For decades opponents of racial residential segregation have sought to open up housing opportunities for lower-income people in prosperous city neighbourhoods and well-off suburbs. In general, such desegregation programmes require public-sector support and are organised under the rubrics of ‘fair share’ housing, inclusionary zoning and builders’ exactions. These programmes, of which there are now several hundred in the US, offer incentives to private developers to overcome communal resistance to low-income and minority residents (Calavita and Mallach 2010). Builders may construct at levels of density prohibited by local zoning restrictions or receive tax credits if they include a percentage (often 20 per cent) of affordable units in their projects.⁸ Without doubt, such programmes have contributed to spatial diversity, but their outcomes have been limited by insufficient demand for the market-rate units needed to cross-subsidise affordable ones and resistance resulting in political rebellion and endless litigation around the particularities of implementation. Thus, while Hananel (2014: 2488) counts 60,000 or so units built statewide in Massachusetts during forty-three years of inclusionary housing requirements allowing higher densities, she also notes that only 32,500 of these units were at the ‘affordable’ level. In 2014 Massachusetts had a total of 2.8 million housing units.

In a detailed case study of a well-planned and heavily subsidised new urbanist development aimed at diversifying an affluent white town, Massey et al. (2013: 196) find it supports ‘further development of affordable family housing, both as a social policy for promoting racial and class integration in metropolitan America and as a practical programme for achieving poverty amelioration and economic mobility in society at large’. Although low-income residents have not experienced much upward mobility as a result of their move, nor have their children advanced much in the good local schools, they live in nice houses, breathe clean air and do not worry about crime. These are no small accomplishments – good-quality residential life is

and should be an end in itself. Yet it took fifty years to finally complete this development, with costly litigation along the way, and the total number of low-income households who reside in the development numbers only 140 in a town with 19,000 housing units. Altogether, an estimated 80,000 units have been built since 1985 in New Jersey under the inclusionary housing mandate in a state with 3.6 million residences.⁹

The two approaches of dispersal of public housing residents and inclusion of affordable housing in new construction share the common problem of being unable to go to scale. In both instances, the resistance of receiving neighbourhoods or municipalities, already substantial, would probably increase exponentially under the threat of large numbers of impoverished in-movers. Moreover, whatever the advantages of living in a wealthier community with better schools and services, reaping those advantages depends precisely on a small number of new, poorer residents not substantially changing the opportunity structure of their destination. Ten or twenty disadvantaged children might benefit in a school of 500, but would 100 or 200? For these reasons, spatial mobility approaches to mitigating poverty may work to a greater or lesser degree in a marginal analysis but not at the aggregate level.

Singapore: spatial equality through strategically planned public housing

Singapore is a multi-ethnic, island city-state, a little smaller (720 sq. km) than New York City in area, with a total population of about 5.6 million, about 4 million of whom are what the government calls 'residents'. The remainder are foreign workers,¹⁰ comprising about 500,000 well-paid employees with their families and more than a million low- and very low-wage contract workers, who are not permitted to bring their families. The residents comprise an ethnically pluralist and multilingual society (76 per cent Chinese, 15 per cent Malay, 7 per cent Indian, and the remainder European); English is the dominant language, with Mandarin Chinese also widely spoken. Singapore is one of the ten wealthiest nations in the world as measured by aggregate GDP per resident.

But it also has high levels of economic inequality, with a Gini coefficient comparable to that of the US.¹¹ The resident population enjoys one of the world's best school systems, subsidised healthcare, an excellent, low-priced mass transit system, and high-quality public housing. There are no ghettos or slums on the island, and spatial access to services and amenities is readily available to residents wherever they live, the result of explicit public policy maintained since independence in 1965.

Singapore is the most planned of large capitalist cities, and in many respects, the best planned. A fundamental aspect of the planned environ-

ment, and a critical element of initial policy choices by the ruling People's Action Party (PAP), is state ownership of most land on the island. Public ownership was in part a legacy of the British colonial state, but it also resulted from substantial acquisition at below-market prices by an independent Singapore after 1965. Government ownership of land gives it control over the physical environment. The state prevents speculation by releasing land only as needed, and it has substantial leverage over private developers, who must conform to a stringent planning framework (Fainstein 2012). Most importantly, it has provided land at very low cost and thereby with little locational constraint to the largest public housing programme in any capitalist society. The Housing and Development Board (HDB) is the agency responsible for public housing construction, and its projects have become the central vehicle for land-use planning at every scale – from the siting of housing estates and new towns and their connection to road and mass-transit networks down to design choices at the township, precinct and building levels.

HDB can boast of remarkable physical and social accomplishments.¹² Since its inception in 1960, it has cleared the island of slums (often with the initial resistance of their occupants), and it has built and rebuilt one million units that now house 83 per cent of residents. The upper-income limit for public housing eligibility is at about the 85th percentile, so that a vast majority of residents are eligible for public housing. The system keeps housing affordable for the large majority of Singaporeans, with costs to residents well below market prices in comparable locations worldwide. To that end HDB heavily subsidises the initial price of new flats and also provides grants and a low-interest mortgage scheme to keep monthly housing outlays for first-time buyers below 25 per cent of household income. HDB occupants own 95 per cent of public housing flats in a condominium arrangement, with the remaining 5 per cent rented at low prices to households in poverty.

HDB communities are economically and ethnically diverse. Deputy Prime Minister Shanmugaratnam recently emphasised the spatial dimensions of the government's commitment to social equity:

The fact that over 85% [*sic*; actually 83%] of the population live in public housing has also meant it's not about just lower-income housing estates, as in many cities. Everyone from the low- to upper-middle income groups lives in the same neighborhood and often in the same, smaller precincts. There are no fences or gates, and the recreational spaces are for all. You eat at the same coffee-shops or hawker centres; use the same neighborhood clinics, the same playgrounds and parks. In fact, our urban planning model also insures that most public housing estates include a segment of private housing. (Centre for Liveable Cities 2014: 27–8)

Sustaining equity and diversity over time within HDB estates means that the agency must manage income composition and ethnic diversity. Since 1989 it has imposed an Ethnic Integration Policy (EIP) that requires ethnic composition matching that of the overall resident population of the nation down to the precinct level of a few hundred housing units. Residents can sell or sublet their apartments after five years of occupancy; in these cases, too, the EIP is applied, effectively compelling sellers to maintain within their neighbourhoods the overall ethnic composition of the island.

While well-planned public housing estates (mainly of towers in gardens surrounded by greenbelts) keep spatial inequality low for the resident population, the same cannot be said for the housing situation of foreigners. The million or so contract workers with low incomes are provided with housing by their employers, with the Singapore government remaining uninvolved. Their residential pattern is complicated: maids stay in the flats of their employers, usually without a bedroom of their own; construction workers live near their work sites in large trailers or in purpose-built dormitories of varying quality on the city fringe; service workers in food, hotel and health-care industries typically reside in private housing flats, usually in run-down central neighbourhoods, while others sublet HDB apartments dispersed around the island. These workers constitute the majority of the poor people in Singapore, but their poverty is officially made invisible by their temporary status. They are neither citizens nor immigrants on the path to citizenship; their ethnicity is low-status;¹³ residents mainly do not interact with them; and they use few Singapore amenities due to long working hours.

Well-off foreign households, comprising about 500,000 individuals, bring skills and capital investment to the island. Their spatial distribution is also complicated: some live in private condos or rental units integrated into HDB township developments; others live in former colonial areas where there is little public housing; a third concentrate in the downtown core. The latter concentration has become an issue from the perspective of ordinary Singaporeans, as for several decades planning authorities have allowed global market forces to define housing types and prices within the centre. With one exception, no new HDB apartments have been built within the core of Singapore since 1982, though thousands of older flats remain there. Only now is public discussion arising about the symbolic and practical significance of allowing 'real' Singaporeans (often called 'heartlanders') to visit and work in the central area but not to live there (Wu and Khoo 2016).

Thus, spatial isolation demarcates the residential situation of the foreign population at both the high and low ends. The nature of these groups, however, means that the principal issue raised by ghettoisation and privileged enclaves in the West does not arise: socialisation of the young is not conducted within the dormitories of foreign workers as they cannot bring

in their children, while the offspring of affluent foreigners usually attend private international schools. In contrast, spatial inequality is low for the resident population of 4 million, and the quality of residential life is good, even for those in the bottom quarter of the income distribution. For them, Singapore is actually the 'liveable' 'city in a garden' that the government claims it to be. And overall, Singapore is arguably the least spatially stratified large city in the world.

Conclusion

We turn now to a comparison of our two cases to discuss what they tell us of the effects of spatial segregation. Comparing the situations in the United States and Singapore, we can see that by the standard measure of income inequality, the Gini coefficient, Singapore's much greater spatial equity has not succeeded in reducing economic hierarchy to a significantly lower level than in the US. Moreover, since Singapore applies measures of inequality only to resident households, the high and low incomes of foreigners are excluded from the data, meaning that the Gini coefficient understates actual income inequality. Although we cannot know if Singapore's performance would be even worse if there were more spatial exclusion, we can say that among wealthy countries, it shares with the United States a very high level of economic differentiation by this criterion.

The prevention of ethnic enclaves in Singapore was carried out for significant political reasons. At the time of Singapore's breakaway from Malaysia, which was sparked by communal rioting between the economically dominant Chinese and Malaysia's much larger but economically weaker Malay population, the newly independent Singapore government feared that ethnic enclaves of Malays would precipitate more disorder. They also wished to foreclose the possibility of ethnic voting blocs deriving from common location. Thus, while the government is careful to recruit its membership from the three major population groups, it avoids party identification based on ethnicity. It has also succeeded in suppressing anti-immigrant populism of the sort now sweeping over the United States and Europe. The opposition Workers Party has attempted to capitalise on antagonism to foreign workers as part of a generally left-wing programme, but so far it has failed to upset the PAP – the governing party – except in a few districts. In contrast, most of the political strength of African Americans in US cities has derived from their domination of some urban areas and congressional districts. Thus, a policy of dispersal would probably reduce their political effectiveness.

We conclude then that there is a trade-off involved in policies to end ghettoisation. Members of disadvantaged minorities might gain better services and their young might be saved from socialisation into a dysfunctional

youth culture. But they would lose access to specialised social services that have developed to serve their particular needs; and their political power would be diminished. In terms of the relationship between spatial and economic equity, our two cases do not support the view that changing spatial relations will overcome structural economic inequality, although it might improve the quality of life of low-income households and give individuals prospects for improved social mobility. Thus, the answer to 'vertical' economic inequality does not lie in reduced 'horizontal' or spatial inequality. At the same time, reducing spatial inequality and providing for a universally decent built environment means that undesirable patterns of settlement and inadequate housing do not further burden the lives of the poor. On the contrary, they help mitigate the other deprivations attributable to low income.

Notes

- 1 It should be noted that racial separation of blacks from whites of similar income does not change with increasing income; the same is true to a somewhat lesser extent for Hispanics. Thus, middle- and even upper-class black households are far more likely to live near poorer black households than to live with whites of similar incomes in racially integrated neighbourhoods.
- 2 In 1970, 65 per cent of families lived in middle-income neighbourhoods; by 2009, only 42 per cent of families lived in such neighbourhoods. The proportion of families living in affluent neighbourhoods more than doubled from 7 per cent in 1970 to 15 per cent in 2009. Likewise, the proportion of families in poor neighbourhoods doubled from 8 per cent to 18 per cent over the same period. Thus, in 1970 only 15 per cent of families lived in one of the two extreme types of neighbourhoods; by 2009 that number had more than doubled to 33 per cent of families (Fainstein and Fainstein 2009: table 2).
- 3 The argument echoes Oscar Lewis's (1969) conception of a culture of poverty, whereby economic circumstances may have produced the original social formation, but the ensuing pathology results in behaviour that entrenches poverty and the incapacity to seize opportunities.
- 4 About 1.2 million households are in traditional public housing structures; the remaining receive vouchers that provide rent subsidies.
- 5 While New York City public housing is likewise underfunded, with a maintenance backlog of billions of dollars, only one project has ever been demolished. It today houses 500,000 residents officially and perhaps an additional 100,000 or more unofficially. The waiting list for public housing in NYC comprises more than 400,000 applicants (New York City Housing Authority 2016).
- 6 A critique of this kind of place-based explanation is provided in N. Fainstein (1986; 1993).
- 7 'The HOPE VI programme serves a vital role in the Department of Housing and Urban Development's efforts to transform Public Housing. The specific elements of public housing transformation that have proven key to HOPE VI

include: changing the physical shape of public housing. Establishing positive incentives for resident self-sufficiency and comprehensive services that empower residents. Lessening concentrations of poverty by placing public housing in non-poverty neighbourhoods and promoting mixed-income communities. Forging partnerships with other agencies, local governments, nonprofit organisations, and private businesses to leverage support and resources.’ <https://goo.gl/U6XFtj> (accessed 6 March 2017).

- 8 Usually, as in the cases of New Jersey (Mt. Laurel II Fair Housing dates from 1985) and Massachusetts (Section 40B of the 1969 Housing Act), municipalities must allow construction of such housing if some proportion (10 or 15 per cent) of their existing stock is not affordable by low-income households. In New York and other cities a variety of regulatory and tax relief programmes reward developers who include affordable units.
- 9 www.fairsharehousing.org (accessed 10 December 2016).
- 10 There are also thousands of foreign university students in the mix.
- 11 In 2014 Singapore officially had a pre-transfer Gini coefficient of .43, slightly lower than the American .46 (Singapore Ministry of Finance 2015: 9; US Bureau of the Census 2015: table 2). It is critical to recognise, however, that only resident households with at least one employed member count in the Singapore analysis. Since foreigners are almost entirely distributed at the low and high ends of the distribution, the real Gini for the entire 5.6 million population is probably around .50 or higher.
- 12 HDB housing is financed in part by a combination of land, construction and operating subsidies provided directly through government expenditures. Structures and grounds are publicly owned and managed. Flats are mainly condominiums purchased by eligible householders. (Ninety-five per cent of all HDB flats are ‘owned,’ with the remainder rented to low-income households.) Mortgages are drawn from individual Central Provident Fund accounts, which are in turn created through employer and employee earnings contributions. Flats may usually be resold in a private (but regulated) housing market after five years of residency. For more detail, see the annual reports of the Housing and Development Board, Singapore Ministry of National Development.
- 13 Mainly Filipinos, Malays, Indonesians, Bangladeshis and Tamils.

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Urban segregation, inequalities and local welfare: the challenges of neoliberalisation

The central argument of this chapter is twofold: the transformation of social structures and that of welfare-state regimes have to be considered together; urban inequalities and segregation are crucial in relating these two processes. The first part discusses the relevance of social class analysis in the face of the fragmentation produced by changing work relations, the growth of the service sector, the expansion of the middle classes, and changes in the gender and ethno-racial composition of the workforce. The second part discusses the effects of urban segregation first on the cohesion of social groups and the relations between them, secondly on urban inequalities. Particular attention is paid to issues of education inequalities linked to segregation. The third part debates the transformation of welfare regimes, showing that the analysis of the present movement of neoliberalisation has to take into consideration the complexity of scales and social forces beyond the different levels of government.

Social classes in fragmented societies?

From the 1970s to the 1990s, the issue of inequality was largely reduced to that of exclusion. The main social divide was seen between those who had access more or less permanently to a paid job, and those left out, the *surnuméraires* (Castel 1995), whose growing numbers were the result of a decreasing need for labour due to automation, information technologies, etc. In the social sciences as in the public debate, the social classes that had structured capitalist society since the nineteenth century were seen as fading away, a dissolution that was announced by André Gorz's 'farewell to the proletariat' (1980). Various alternative narratives were proposed to fill this sociological void, mostly insisting on individuality, fluidity and mobility, in parallel with theories of the disappearance of work. Ironically, it was in the same period that the pressure of work on people's lives increased

progressively, with new management techniques expanding the never ending demand for more productivity from the industrial sphere to all services, from unskilled workers to highly skilled professionals, systematising control, evaluation and competition.

The contrast between the explosion of conspicuous wealth and economic expansion paired with increased poverty and unemployment pushed the intensification of inequalities back into the public debate. The worldwide success of Piketty's 2013 book reveals how sensitive the issue is. Institutions such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, for long the fiercest promoters of deregulation and marketisation, have begun to recognise that extreme inequalities are a problem.

The great progress implied by addressing inequalities as a problem is that it makes a necessary connection between more poverty on one side and more wealth on the other, a connection that was lost in the fluid or individualistic narrative. More specifically, the data showing that increased inequalities are related to a shift in the distribution of the social product between capital and labour, in favour of capital, reintroduces the Marxian idea of exploitation as the source of accumulation, against the apologetic version that profit is the pure outcome of top managers' skills for innovation and organisation. In the same way, Piketty goes a step further than most mainstream economists by showing that people in the top 1 per cent of income and wealth are not randomly distributed individuals who could change from one survey to another, but a largely stable group where the advertised newcomers hide the forest of inheritors from one generation to the next. He also shows how important it is to take wealth and not only income into consideration; wealth, much of it inherited, having been an important factor in the intensification of inequalities during the last two decades.

There are many signs of the existence of a dominant capitalist class, in itself – income, wealth, power in the economy and in social institutions – and for itself – company boards, circles, clubs, networks, political parties, think tanks, etc. But detailed data (of top incomes and fortunes) is largely inaccessible; statistical occupation data is useless in most countries because it is not detailed enough for these groups, and because most of them are characterised by multi-positionality, not one single occupation; ethnography is difficult because those groups filter access to them and control their social representations (Pinçon and Pinçon-Charlot 1997). Sixty years after C. Wright Mills's *The Power Elite* (1956), investigating the structure and dynamics of this class is still difficult and is often dismissed as belonging to conspiracy visions of society. But we have much to learn about how the elite has changed in relation to the dominance of finance within the capital accumulation process, about the relations between the economic elite and the political elite, about their new forms of social reproduction through higher

education, and about the way they are affected by internationalisation. We also need to understand how united and divided is this dominant class in the face of the major issues confronting our societies, like the ecological crisis, the social crisis, migration crises and populist responses.

At the other end of the social spectrum, fragmentation is more evidently a major characteristic of the social structure of the most dominated categories (Mingione 1991), especially in the countries of the historical core of capitalism. That is where the working class had the greatest expansion and experienced the strongest movement of unification into a class for itself through unionisation, political mobilisation and the establishment of social rights through public policies. That is where in the last decades economic changes have produced the greatest fragmentation, with a widening distance between very skilled workers and unskilled labour; with the disappearance of the large Fordist factories, where tens of thousands of workers shared the same experience, replaced by smaller production units with an altogether different work organisation; with the decrease of the industrial workforce in those countries, and an increase in emerging countries where the 'making of [a] working class' is yet to happen. With the expansion of the service sector, whose workers are now more numerous than in industry, a proletarianisation has taken place in terms of working conditions, low wages, underemployment, precarious contracts and harsh hierarchical domination, bringing these workers much closer to the industrial working class than to the middle class with which they were often associated earlier (Mills 1951). As a consequence, we are in favour of using the category of 'popular classes' in order to recognise the persistence of a large part of the population experiencing economic domination and fragility, and cultural separation from dominant norms (Schwartz 2011), although recognising that such conditions are more relative today than one or two centuries ago and that the heterogeneity of the popular classes has to be analysed as well (Peugny 2015).

Political fragmentation has also been intense, and this is not merely a reflection of economic changes. The communist project, which was a major dimension of working-class political identity in many European countries, lost its appeal and credibility, because most communist parties remained frozen in a representation of societies dating from the 1930s, and because of the collapse of the Soviet Union. And social democracy has been subjugated by the 'modernity' of finance and the neoliberal market, progressively demoting the welfare state and its benefits and protection for the working class. The political forces which were factors of unification have succumbed to political forces of division – the strongest being the use of racism and xenophobia first by the extreme right, then the right, then even parts of the left, to frame scapegoats in the face of the increasing difficulties of life. The demise of the universalistic project of left-wing forces – proletarian

internationalism – leaves the way open to competition and stigmatisation – of the Polish plumber, the Mexican or Romanian autoworker, not to speak of the Chinese electronics worker, the Moroccan or Indian call centre worker, or the Bangladeshi textile worker. And the same movement leaves space for the influence of reactionary forces, religious fundamentalism and sometimes terrorist jihadism, in immigrant communities striving to reclaim dignity in the face of stigmatisation and discrimination (Kakpo 2007; Kepel 2012).

Other factors have also contributed to this fragmentation. The first is the historical focus of the organised working class on full-time, stable, salaried workers (male breadwinners) in large factories or firms. With the strong increase of both structural unemployment and precarious work, a large part of the workforce has been left out of the benefits of the historically established welfare state, and this imbalance explains why unions have little influence over many unemployed or precarious workers.

The same imbalance also creates inequality between generations, young people coming into the labour market taking the full force of precarisation whereas older generations still get some protection acquired through their work experience; this cumulates in inequality between generations due to the very different conditions and life chances for those entering the labour market now at a time of deep crisis, as compared to those who entered the labour market in the 1960s at a time of rapid economic growth (Chauvel 1998). Opportunities for upward mobility have decreased, and more and more people are experiencing downgrading (*déclassement*) (Peugny 2009) and a strong devaluation of their credentials. This creates a deep and dif-fused frustration that contributes to political rejection and to extreme political movements in many European countries.

The third dramatic change is a presence of women in the labour market that is now almost equal to that of men, and even represents a majority in various segments of the workforce. It has taken time for the working-class unions to recognise this transformation and adjust to its consequences, and their actions still leave aside a large number of working women, particularly those employed in personal services with little contact to more collective organisations.

The fourth change has to do with the increasing presence of immigrants. It has also taken time for trade unions and dominant political parties to completely recognise immigrants, and particularly from outside Europe, as part of the (inter)national working class. Even today, despite the fact that they have become the majority in many unskilled job sectors, they are seen as less eligible to participate in social movements and to claim rights.

The middle classes have for long been recognised as typically fragmented. This is due to the different economic positions and living conditions of the

various strata which are often grouped under that label, from the relatively unskilled but stable white-collar worker in the large firm or public sector to the highly skilled, highly paid professional. It is also due to the fact that the middle classes are the crossroads of social mobility (Goux and Maurin 2012), mixing people demoted from the upper class with people moving up from the popular classes, thanks to economic success or education and the welfare state.

During the post-war period of economic growth in capitalist countries, the middle classes expanded significantly and diversified, representing large parts of the new workforce in education, health and welfare services, as well as in the new business services. They had access in that period to relative economic well-being and positive expectations, to protection by the welfare system, increasing education levels and cultural capital (Bourdieu 1979; Mendras 1988). Some unification did take place, but the differences between public- and private-sector middle classes (for the French case, see Singly and Thélot 1988) intensified again after the 1970s with the rise of neoliberal policies and the concentration of very high profits and wages in some sectors of the economy, with more divergent cultural orientations, and probably also political ones. Contrary to predictions of their disappearance (Sassen 1991), the middle classes have continued to grow. Whether they ally politically (electorally but also in social movements, voluntary associations, etc.) either with the upper class, or with the popular classes, is a key political question.

We need more careful analyses of the changes, fragmentations and recompositions affecting the different sectors of the social classes, moving their borders, identities and relations with others. For that, the centrality of work has to be recognised, at a time when the pressure of work and the requirements of productivity and its ever increasing controls and evaluations, from the unskilled worker to the most skilled professional, are more intense than they ever were. But work has to be recognised in all its diversity and complexity. The use of detailed and adequate occupation categories is essential to perceive the changes that are dissolving the traditional aggregated categories and possibly producing emerging ones.

At the same time, analysis of class inequalities cannot be reduced to measurable inequalities and social relations at work. We have to give more attention to the 'class for itself', that is to the consciousness that individuals may have that social relations could be class relations. The main transformation in the last decades is not the advent of a society without social classes but the fact that people refer less and less to these categories to understand the social world and to give meaning to their own experience. This transformation is related to the transformation of work relations but also to the awareness that such inequalities are interweaving with other dimensions such as gender, generation, space, race and ethnicity.

Segregation, urban inequalities and educational inequalities

Urban inequalities have become more important because access to key resources, from facilities to public and private services, has become essential in the definition of living conditions. Urban segregation shapes spatial inequalities into urban social inequalities. Recent research has shown that segregation, and therefore urban inequalities, are more complex than the widespread dualist vision.

Urban segregation, defined as the unequal distribution in urban space of different social groups, has two types of effects tightly intertwined in practice, but which it is useful to separate analytically because they are related to different social processes. The first effect is the more or less intense social homogeneity of urban spaces where one particular group is more present, and the more or less intense exposure of that group, in those spaces, to other groups present in the city. The second effect is the translation of the residential location of each group and class into urban inequalities.

The media representation of urban segregation has tended to reduce the first effect to the dramatised image of the ghetto. Because the Chicago School of sociology was the first to explore this issue systematically, and had a long-lasting influence thereafter, and because racial conflict and ghetto riots were so dramatic in the USA, the racial divide and black ghettos of US cities have become the inevitable yardstick in the analysis of segregation. Although many studies have shown that the intensity and social definition of segregation is more relative and more complex in most European cities, much of the literature in Europe still equates segregation with poor/immigrant/ethnic minority ghettos. And even the case of US cities is more complex than the stereotype of racial division, as Logan and Zhang (2010) have shown. The variety of empirical methods and the improved access to detailed data at the scale of small urban areas/neighbourhoods (see Oberti and Préteceille 2016: [part I](#)) gives social research new possibilities for overcoming these over-simplifications. The focus on poor and stigmatised neighbourhoods leads on the one hand to the identification of poor people themselves as mainly responsible for their own segregation, and a search for its causes in those very neighbourhoods; and on the other hand to disconnecting this social reality from that of upper-class neighbourhood dynamics.

Regarding socio-economic segregation, there are remarkable and quasi-systematic results showing that, in most cities, upper-class groups are the most segregated – provided, evidently, that the data categories are detailed and adequate enough to identify those upper-class groups, and that they do not dilute them into larger groups with a different social and urban situation. The more precise the identification of the privileged groups, the more intensely their segregation is revealed, and the more specific their residential

location (Godechot 2013). Theirs is a self-segregation, a choice of residence among their peers, and a protection of their selected spaces against the presence of undesired groups, through diverse mechanisms from economic processes to public policies (Pinçon and Pinçon-Charlot 2007). Clearly spatial proximity and spatial isolation are major elements in socialisation, networks, accumulation of patrimony both material and symbolic, etc., all processes that make a social class for itself out of the different upper categories. There are differences between countries, the intensity of self-segregation usually being correlated to the degree of concentration of wealth and income in the upper class, and the spatial forms depending on the history of cities and the way it has defined the practical and symbolic qualities of urban spaces.

Blue-collar, working-class groups are the second most segregated ones in many cases. This is all the more remarkable since it characterises not only industrial cities but also the largest metropolises whose economies are dominated by services. This feature of capitalist cities reveals the historical inertia in the definition of socio-spatial structures, in the symbolic values attached to different spaces. In contrast with the previous groups, this is largely an imposed segregation, in which workers were forced to find their lodgings in the worst parts of the city. Similar and shared residential conditions have in various countries contributed to the making of a class in itself out of diverse working-class groups, at the same time as they shared similar experiences of work and exploitation in their factories. And in many European cities, the concentration in working-class neighbourhoods has also helped the political organisation of these groups into working-class unions and parties, contributing to the emergence of a class for itself, as has been thoroughly documented in the history of the 'red belts' in Paris and other cities. In Europe it allowed a century of experiences of municipal socialism, which have significantly contributed to shape the development of welfare-state regimes, as we will discuss later.

After the mid-1970s, the spatial structure of working-class residence in European cities changed: in Paris, part of the stable skilled working class began to have access to home ownership and moved from social housing to the outer suburbs where they could afford it. Others moved from inner-city slums to social housing now being built in the second ring of suburbs, much further out from the centre and the traditional industrial belt. Immigrant workers from the Maghreb or sub-Saharan Africa replaced them in those locations. All these movements have had a strong role in the process of fragmentation of the working class, lines of fracture having to do not only with economic circumstances but also with housing tenure, urban location, and, quite importantly, ethnicity.

Until now, the new places of working-class concentration do not seem to have produced a common perception of class identity nor to have stimu-

lated the emergence of new forms of working-class organisation (Masclat 2003). There are some signs of better political integration of persons of non-European immigrant descent at the local level, in some left-wing municipalities, but the trend is recent and limited, more so than in Britain (Garbaye 2005). The places of highest concentration of poverty and stigmatised ethnic minorities, in several European countries, are also places where criminal activities, drug dealing etc., have often taken a dominant position of power locally, which contributes to social disintegration and strong stigmatisation, as Wilson (1987) has analysed for the US ghettos in the 1980s. This reinforces barriers and is a handicap for social integration outside of the neighbourhood. We also see the emergence, often in the same neighbourhoods, of local social control over Muslims by small fundamentalist groups striving to impose their view of social life, and a split from non-Muslims. However, such neighbourhoods are only a minority of working-class ones in France (Préteceille 2009), and in the majority we still observe that the concentration of popular classes is favourable to solidarity and mutual help among inhabitants, overcoming their different origins and constituting crucial resources for people who cannot easily have access to the market or to public services.

The middle classes as a whole are, in most cities, the least segregated categories, contrary to the literature that sees them as the most active agents of segregation, be it through gentrification processes or suburbanisation. There is a classic Chicago School model associating upward social mobility and upward residential mobility that would lead to homogeneous, middle-class residential areas reinforcing a middle-class identity and consciousness, and should result in a high degree of segregation. Such processes do exist, but they concern only limited parts of the middle classes. Other parts are and remain more mixed with other social classes. Large parts of the middle classes are indeed the outcome of upward social mobility. In countries and cities where the working class is not stigmatised, where it has developed local political identities and substantially improved the city through public services, cultural facilities and activities, etc., a large part of the middle classes may keep a positive link to their class of origin, as well as to their neighbourhood (Clech 2015). When they have the possibility of staying close to their relatives living in public housing projects, they choose that option and they thus contribute to social mixing. This is particularly true for people from immigrant backgrounds, because of the importance of local mutual aid (Ichou and Oberti 2014). We can hypothesise that a symmetrical situation may exist for the part of the middle class that results from downward mobility, whose members would probably try to maintain a residential link to their class of origin, and accept mixing with working-class residents much less readily than the former group, perceiving such mixing as contributing to their own social downgrading.

Lower middle-class groups – office workers, workers in commerce, personal service workers – are the least segregated groups, together with the middle-middle classes of technicians, nurses, primary school teachers etc. (Préteceille 2006; 2015). Other parts of the middle classes are more segregated. In the Paris case for example, private-sector professionals and executives – a category which is on both sides of the border between the upper class and the middle classes – are among the most segregated occupation groups, with increasing segregation; whereas public-sector professionals (mainly academics, researchers, secondary school teachers – not many across the border in the upper class) have a lower and decreasing degree of segregation.

The more diffuse character of the middle classes' residence in many cities certainly goes against the emergence of a separate and unified middle-class identity. However, the fact that middle-class groups are mixed with popular classes represents for those cities a potential for solidarity and social alliances between those two groups – a potential alliance that is in tune with their increased similarity in exposure to precarity, pressure for productivity, competitive and punitive evaluation, but also with the fact that in the advanced service economies, more and more middle-class workers do not have a hierarchical role and are 'productive workers' in the sense that the service they produce is the commodity being sold by their employer, which objectively brings them closer to industrial workers. The same is true for middle-class workers in public services.

In both cases, however, the definition of the service provided may be shaped by the firm or the public authority to include elements of social domination or even punitive control. It is a very complex and contradictory process when we think of examples of social mix housing policies. Many critiques of social mix policies are based on the idea that this could be a way to better control and 'civilise' the working class and immigrants (Bacqué and Charmes 2016).

The other effect of urban segregation, which is often underestimated, particularly in France where much of the debate is polarised around the issues of 'social mix' vs 'communitarianism', is its impact in terms of urban inequalities. This is largely absent from the general debate on inequalities, which is focused mainly on income and wealth. This is partly due to the fact that, although some elements of urban quality of life can be related to income and wealth, such as housing, many others are difficult or impossible to monetise. Urban dwellers depend on the city for access to air, water, sewage, housing, food, transport to work, schools for their children, nurseries, health services, sports facilities, cultural facilities and entertainment, telecommunications networks etc. Some of these 'urban amenities' can be provided as commodities, relating back to income, but the majority are at

least partly public services and public goods, in such a way that we should think of the city first of all as an infrastructure of public goods and not as a market (Oberti and Préteceille 2016: 86–7).

Segregation transforms spatial inequalities into urban (social) inequalities by distributing social groups between unequal spaces. If the link between segregation and urban inequalities is so strong, it is because of the unequal distribution through the housing market of social groups characterised by very unequal levels of economic, cultural and social resources. It is also due to strategies of locally dominant groups to protect their place of residence from undesirable groups and from amenities that could contribute to downgrading their neighbourhood, from their perspective. This is typically the case for public housing projects, social centres for the homeless, etc. The literature on NIMBY movements has mostly focused on middle-class areas, but the strongest and most efficient protests come from upper-class mobilisations in wealthy areas. This combines a rejection of popular classes and ethnic minorities, whose local presence is perceived as dangerous, and an economic consciousness that the value of a wealthy area is precisely linked to its social and urban homogeneity. The arguments used are often based on the defence of historical architectural patrimony, or on environmental issues, to maintain this *'entre-soi'* and to guarantee high real estate values (Tissot 2015).

Education is a key element of urban inequalities (Oberti 2007; van Zanten 2001; Logan et al. 2012; Hamnett and Butler 2013). According to the claimed values of many democratic and meritocratic European societies, education should be the most equal public good in order to guarantee equal opportunity and, at least in France, social cohesion and social integration. For many reasons, urban segregation has a strong impact on school segregation, in particular in countries and cities where schooling is based on families' place of residence. First of all, the school offer is not equally distributed in urban space. In many cities in developed countries, the most attractive, best-performing and best-equipped schools (public as well as private) are located in wealthy areas. The real and deep difference there is not in the number of schools per resident child – which is a major inequality in less developed countries – but in their precise characteristics in terms of curriculum, test scores, teacher profile, etc. School catchment area policies have a limited efficiency in producing social mix in schools, particularly in very segregated cities, and even more so when there is the possibility of choosing private schools. Research in different countries shows that parents' choice of a school takes into account the school's characteristics but also its social and ethnic/racial composition. Because of the democratisation of education and more intense competition, the upper class and part of the upper middle classes are less and less inclined to share the same school with the lower

middle class, popular classes and immigrants. Many studies show that upper middle-class parents continue to express the positive value of social mixing and equal opportunity at school, but that they develop in practice residential and school strategies to avoid urban and school environments that they perceive to be too diverse in terms of class and ethnicity.

The consequence in terms of educational policies is obvious. If you want to reduce school segregation, you have to act simultaneously on the school offer, in order to guarantee a similar curriculum in all public schools, and on social (and ethnic) composition, in order to reassure parents that there is no significant contrast between schools (Oberti 2007; van Zanten 2009). The implementation of affirmative action programmes may have perverse effects on schools that become stigmatised and perceived as specialised only for disadvantaged people. For this reason, it appears that mixed neighbourhoods are the best context in which to create equal educational opportunities both in terms of school aspects and social/ethnic/racial composition. Recent research shows that, everything being equal, pupils from all backgrounds benefit from attending a mixed school, compared to a disadvantaged segregated one; and those benefits are higher for male pupils from working-class backgrounds. Too often, there is a burden of expectation in school policies, when the source of the issues (school dropout, stigmatisation, etc.) actually lies in urban issues, and more precisely, in urban segregation (Duru-Bellat 2002; 2004).

The consequences of school segregation also have a strong impact on social relations and cohesion in the whole society. For example, in France, where reference to equal and 'republican' opportunities is so prevalent, the concrete daily experience of a significant proportion of people from popular classes and immigrant backgrounds is to be segregated and rejected in disadvantaged neighbourhoods and schools. This contrast between official values and discourses and concrete experience produces acute frustrations and resentment, inequalities being interpreted in terms of discrimination (i.e. as the result of intentional policies to separate people and maintain privileges for some categories), resulting in social tensions and unpredictable and sometimes extremist reactions.

Welfare regimes, local policies and neoliberalisation

The production of the public goods, services and infrastructures that make up the city is largely the outcome of public policies. Those policies may often be mainly focused on serving the capitalist interests vested in the city (Logan and Molotch 1987), but in many cases they are at least partly oriented by political objectives of reducing urban inequality and improving the living conditions of the popular classes.

Esping-Andersen's work (1990) was fundamental in showing the importance of not only taking into account the level of decommodification and the institutional forms of social protection, to characterise one specific welfare-state regime, but also understanding how this regulation interweaves with informal and local practices of solidarity and mutual help networks. Beyond the discussion of *the three worlds of welfare capitalism*, another debate deals with the national homogeneity of various welfare-state regimes. This has been particularly intense in Italy for two main reasons: first, because of national specificities that call for a distinction within the conservative model in order to acknowledge the characteristics of a lower level of public intervention and stronger family solidarities that are found in Italy as well as in several southern European countries (Ferrera 1996; Da Roit and Sabatinelli 2005); secondly, because of huge regional and local differences in terms of economic development, urbanisation and local welfare-state arrangements (Andreotti et al. 2012) – the classic Italian north–south divide being the most evident contrast but not the only one. Such differences are not only present in Italy, as European research on anti-poverty programmes has shown (Mingione and Oberti 2003).

In many countries the welfare state is the result of a complex interaction between political actors at different levels, with local actors possibly having different political orientations from the central government. This is particularly important when considering urban inequalities, since local governments have for a long time had a major role in the regulation of urban development and local service and infrastructure provision. Thus, dependent on the level of local public intervention in housing, education, culture, healthcare, etc., national trends may be partly reconfigured by more local arrangements. In France, communist municipalities were able to create for decades a local interpretation of the welfare state, a 'municipal socialism' oriented to meeting the needs of the working-class population, with a high level of public housing, cultural facilities, support for public schools, health services, etc. (Brunet 1981; Fourcaut 1986; Pinçon et al. 1986; Bacqué and Fol 1997).

Deindustrialisation has weakened the local fiscal resources that allowed such strong local public intervention, but there are still many ways through which municipalities shape urban inequalities and segregation. Housing provision and management is a key policy resource for this. We still find in France left-wing municipalities which strive to build public housing in order to maintain popular classes in well-serviced urban areas. We also find, symmetrically, right-wing municipalities which refuse to build public housing – although a 2000 national law, SRU ('solidarité et renouvellement urbain'), imposed a goal of 20 per cent public housing (increased to 25 per cent in 2013) – and which prefer to pay a penalty. There are also different interpretations of social housing, with categories focused on housing people

with very limited resources, up to categories open to middle-class groups. There are ways to manage the selection of beneficiaries in the allocation of public housing units to avoid 'undesirable' groups such as large, poor families, immigrants, etc. (Bourgeois 2013). There are subtle ways to filter out these undesirable groups by giving priority to local inhabitants in suburban areas (Desage 2016).

This complexity of interactions between levels of government with different political orientations has been destabilised in recent decades by the thrust of neoliberal policies (Brenner 2004a; Brenner et al. 2012). Conservative political parties throughout Europe, and European institutions dominated by neoliberals such as the European Commission, have imposed an interpretation of the consequences of the 2008 sub-prime crisis as a crisis of public debt, due to public overspending. The new political dogma, exposed day after day by the media, claims that the crisis can only be solved by 1) austerity measures that cut public spending for social policies, and 2) reduction of taxes on business, reduction of the 'cost of labour' and improved flexibility through deregulation of the labour market, in order to restore the competitiveness of private firms, which will eventually create jobs and bring new fiscal resources. Greece has paid the highest price for this policy.

The 2008 sub-prime crisis had some limited direct consequences on European cities. Although this was deliberately underestimated at the time, because European banks were supposedly more cautious, it was progressively discovered that a number of them had been active in the sub-prime and derivative markets whose collapse triggered the crisis; not only did they speculate on these markets for their own benefit (with the subsequent losses), but they also seduced their customers into buying avant-garde products with the best ratings from Standard and Poor's and others. These customers included a number of local governments and public institutions, which are now facing extreme financial difficulties through having to pay back absurdly huge sums.

In some countries, there were also direct consequences for the housing situation in cities. In Spain particularly, the bursting of the financial and real estate bubble has left hundreds of thousands of households without homes, since they are no longer able to pay their mortgages because of unemployment – which has risen to unprecedented levels due to the general economic crisis.

For many cities, the economic crisis has destabilised their strategies for economic development, and jeopardised the investments they had made in industrial zones and infrastructures, office buildings etc., in order to attract businesses that would create jobs and increase the tax base (Brenner 2004a). Cities have been affected, through their population, with rising unemploy-

ment and precarious jobs, and subsequently increasing demands on social welfare programmes to help the unemployed and the working poor. At the same time as these changes increased the burden on local budgets, their resources decreased because of the reduction of local tax revenues and the reduction in central state transfers as a consequence of austerity policies. Therefore, in spite of their theoretical autonomy in many countries, austerity is being imposed on local governments, with the only option being cutting social spending or raising local taxes – and often having to do both.

Austerity policies are also imposing or putting pressure in favour of the privatisation of public assets in cities: infrastructure, transport, utilities, land, etc. These are the same recipes that the IMF and the World Bank imposed on developing countries as part of their ‘structural adjustment’ packages, and that those same institutions had to criticise later for their dubious effects. Now the argument is no longer that this is the correct path to development, it is simply that there is no other way of balancing the books. And new forms of privatisation of public service provision are rapidly expanding, which enlarge the sphere of profitable operations as well as giving more guarantees of control of their profits to private operators: Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs) are expanding rapidly, and are being used for projects that would previously have been considered to be typically in the non-market sphere: public hospitals, university buildings, the Ministry of Defence’s new building in Paris and the construction and renovation of public schools in the former red belt.

This is a process of privatisation of public service provision that goes way beyond what had been possible until recently, with much longer-term contracts, tighter obligations on the public ‘partner’ to guarantee the private provider’s profitability, and more limited control over the service delivered. Private firms have been experimenting with PPPs for three decades now, the UK having been a major laboratory (Raco 2013). They have developed their expertise in financial set-ups able to attract investors, in juridical set-ups with sophisticated contracts designed by specialised law firms, and in the management of service delivery, with management techniques expanding the new models of labour exploitation (Boltanski and Chiappello 1999) to types of activities previously dominated by the public ethic of quality and care. We are thus entering a new era of private production and control of the city, with some private firms such as IBM already preparing complete, integrated, high-tech models of city production, provision and control, from police to transport to education to care for the elderly, to be sold as packages to urban authorities under the sexy brand of the ‘intelligent city’.

Privatisation of services goes along with a narrower focus of remaining public services – and of social policies more widely – on the most underprivileged groups. This goes against the universal character of social rights

established in previous decades, and contributes to greater social fragmentation and more difficult solidarities between the middle classes, who contribute to social policies as taxpayers but are more and more obliged to pay for their services, and the poorer popular classes, who are perceived as being assisted and not as exerting their citizens' social rights.

These trends of 'neoliberalisation' are seen by some as the main transformative force in public policies, urban structures and welfare regimes, changing the complex territorial welfare arrangements into relics of the past (Le Galès 2016). They undoubtedly oblige social scientists to integrate those paradigm changes into the way they analyse welfare regimes. But the pervasiveness of financial domination taking advantage of austerity policies does not erase, in our view, the reality of major national differences in welfare regimes, nor the complexity of interactions between different territorial levels and their links with changing social structures.

Conclusion

To understand the dynamic of social structures and urban inequalities beyond case studies that illustrate neoliberal trends, there is an intellectual, methodological and empirical challenge in being able to consider both the longer-term historical processes of class transformation, of accumulated public goods and policies, and the present-day struggles imposed by the new trends; to interconnect the different territorial levels, to take into consideration their interdependencies, to understand the shifting weights of power between them; to capture the political effects and forms of mobilisation of middle-class groups and popular classes, beyond the political fragmentation and disillusion with established parties and policies. The socio-territorial approach, sensitive to the interweaving of different levels of interaction (from the global to the small neighbourhood), seems to be pertinent in order to capture the complexity of our social world and intersectional processes. Changing occupation structures, immigration flows and residential patterns may produce urban social structures, representations and practices that are not mere outcomes of neoliberalisation and may challenge it, either with constructive new forms of social mobilisation and solidarity, or with disruptive outbursts of violence.

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Urban poverty and social cohesion: lessons from Naples

The relationship between disadvantaged populations and the urban space in which they are located has been the subject of empirical observation since the famous investigation conducted by Charles Booth in London at the turn of the twentieth century (Booth 1902). As is well known, Booth created a series of detailed maps of the streets of London, based on a cartographic method which was already in use at that time, but which had never been applied on such a broad scale.

Today, thanks to increasingly sophisticated statistical software, it is no longer necessary to possess the infinite patience of Booth and his collaborators in order to analyse the processes of spatial concentration and separation of particular social groups. If anything, the greatest difficulty arises from the need to manage the existing, rich literature on this particular topic and the wide range of different definitions in use. Also, it should be noted that while urban sociologists and geographers alike have looked at this issue predominantly in a comparative way, historians have generally preferred the analysis of single cases and their relationship with the formation of specific models of urban inequality. Drawing upon these different streams of literature, this chapter will try to look at the long-term evolution of diverse models of territorial marginalisation and social exclusion and to provide a general interpretative framework. We will also use this theoretical background against the case of Naples in order to test its application in the context of southern European countries. The chapter is structured as follows: it starts with a historical look at the broad patterns of ethnically and class-defined spatial concentrations of poverty. In doing this we have used the historical timescale described by Enzo Mingione in *Fragmented Societies* (1991) and revised in his subsequent works. This will be followed by a description of different combinations of social polarisation and residential isolation in different urban contexts and of how they could affect social cohesion. We shall also dwell on the case of Naples,

which both condenses aspects of other (south) European cities and is a rather peculiar case.

A historical overview

Mingione identifies three phases of historical development defined respectively as ‘extensive’, ‘intensive’ and ‘fragmented’. The ‘extensive’ phase is characterised by processes of proletarianisation, by a low level of state intervention and high commodification. The ‘intensive’ phase resulted from ever-increasing productivity, state intervention and the social regulation of wages. The ‘fragmented’ phase emerged from the crisis of the 1970s, marked by precarity, class decomposition and a state-supported neoliberalism or at least a retrenchment of the welfare state. Following Mingione’s timescale (1991) and taking the extensive regime as a starting point during the early industrial period, two main types of urban poverty and working-class pattern of concentration emerged, as shown in Fig 17.1.

On the one hand there were urban, traditional, working-class communities¹ and small one-company towns (like, for example, Marientahl, made




Figure 17.1 Socio-spatial evolution of poor neighbourhoods

famous by Lazarfeld, Jahoda and Zeisel in the 1930s, when it collapsed because of mass unemployment), and on the other there were settlements of newly arrived immigrants with a closed system of values and attitudes which gave rise later to several types of ethnic neighbourhoods. Except when production sites depended on the location of raw materials, as in mining or the early steel industry, traditional working-class communities sprang up in the historical, often centrally located areas of large industrial cities. The reason for this was the length and toughness of the working day, which did not allow for daily, long-distance commuting, thus giving rise to new districts (Kesteloot 2004: 126). As studied by Robert Castel, these working-class districts were ‘simultaneously a way of inhabiting a space and a set of common values based on a shared condition’ (Castel 2000: 530). With respect to this configuration we can also note that they acted not only as a places of collective political action concerning labour and housing conditions, but also as sites of new cultural experiences. A good example is the East End of London in the 1890s, where Charles Booth encountered poverty, squalor and extremely high levels of exploitation in the sweatshops. At the same time, as noted by Maffi, this area contained chapels and synagogues, public toilets, places of entertainment, Irish and Yiddish theatres, music hall shows at the Pavilion Theatre, the Standard Theatre and the Royal Theatre, great meeting places such as the People’s Palace, the Whitechapel Art Gallery, Toynbee Hall, the Alexandra Hall (where Lenin held frequent political meetings at the beginning of the twentieth century), a myriad of pubs with rooms at the back or on the first floor for conferences, meetings and discussions, anarchist and socialist clubs, and Yiddish newspapers such as the *Poilishe Yidl* and the *Arbeter Fraint* (Maffi 2000: 100).

As for the settlements of immigrants, they were at times temporary communities or concentrations of people that would eventually disappear, either because of assimilation or because their inhabitants would leave the country of first arrival. More frequently, we come across a process of expansion of the areas allocated for the residence of specific, newly settled groups and of their successive absorption/incorporation into the existing urban structure.

During the intensive regulation regime, five different types of socio-spatial configurations emerged: 1) working-class suburbs; 2) the Fordist social housing model; 3) the so-called ‘coree’ and other types of urban shanty towns; 4) the ethnic neighbourhoods and 5) the North American communal black ghetto. The first was partly a consequence of the displacement of low-paid, working-class households to the outskirts of the city, mainly to public housing estates, by increased rents or the fact that the houses they were renting were sold. In some cities the transformation of industrial inner cities into middle-/upper-class residential or/and financial and commercial

areas was supported by the intervention of the state, supposedly in the public interest (health and hygiene, modernisation or embellishment of the city, avoidance of political riots). This was not, however, a pattern common to all working-class neighbourhoods. As far as southern European cities are concerned, for example, Maloutas notes that ‘reduced residential mobility [...] has also contributed to the gradual improvement of traditional working class areas’ (Maloutas 2012: 23).

During the intensive regulation regime, another type of working-class neighbourhood emerged: the Fordist neighbourhoods. These, of course, were not the same in every European country and American city. There are substantial commonalities, but also differences between these types of settlements, reflecting the conditions of social reproduction of the workforce in areas where large companies were concentrated. They were, on the whole, large social housing estates, equipped with services and infrastructure, but in late-industrialised countries such as Spain, Italy and Portugal, spontaneous agglomerates emerged, built with recycled rubble and leftovers from building sites. These were very characteristic of large cities, as in the case of the so-called ‘coree’ in the city of Milan in the 1970s.²

The intensive phase was also characterised by ‘ethnic neighbourhoods’ or ‘enclaves’: these are areas freely inhabited by a relatively large number of people belonging to a group that defined itself according to some ethnic, religious or other characteristic. In the enclave, basic cultural traits, social cohesion, bonds of solidarity and networks of mutual support are preserved and promoted, as well as the economic and political development of the group. The ethnic neighbourhoods, therefore, implied a more permanent, voluntary, segregated ethnic community than the settlements of past new arrivals. However, unlike the ‘ghetto’, it was not an institutionalised form of segregation based on the subordination of one group to another (Marcuse 2001). Moreover, such immigrant or ethnic concentrations were far below the level of segregation of the ghetto: only a minority of members of a particular ethnic or immigrant group lived in the same area, and only a fraction of the residents in that space were part of the group (Barbagli and Pisati 2012).³ On the whole, the ethnic neighbourhoods were able to ensure a certain level of internal cohesion and incorporate new immigrants thanks to the existence of networks of mutual support on the dual basis of work relationships and membership of ethnic or religious groups. But, as noted by Musterd, they ‘may also be seen as proof that “integration” – in the meaning of assimilation – has failed’ (2011: 364).

In North American cities the ‘black communal ghetto’ of the mid-twentieth century was a segregated microcosm but with its own internal division of labour, social stratification, networks of reciprocity and social support and its own institutions of collective representation: a ‘city within

the city' (Wacquant 2008: 3). It was characterised by 1) a very high concentration of a specific social group (with almost all the Afro-American population living in the ghetto and most of the population of the ghetto being Afro-American); 2) the concentration being imposed and not chosen; and 3) a condition of subordination to other social groups on the basis of characteristics defined from outside ('biological' and 'racial' discourses). Another relevant aspect is that in the case of the ghetto, the concentration in space is neither arbitrary nor accidental but is based on procedures whose legitimacy is recognised and reinforced by the state. In this sense this represents a veritable 'normative code' (Castel 1996: 47). As Peter Marcuse pointed out, 'the black ghetto, properly so-called, was created, imposed from the outside and the instrument of the imposition was the state' (2001: 12). And, Marcuse continues, quoting Massey and Denton, 'while the practice of zoning using race as a formal criteria was finally ruled unconstitutional in *Buchanan vs. Warley* in 1917, the construction of the ghetto continued apace despite *Buchanan*, and levels of black-white segregation in U.S. cities rose steadily' (2001: 11–12).

Since the mid-1970s, when the city entered the fragmented regime, there has been a shift from the more traditional public housing areas inhabited by working-classes families towards the French *banlieues* and other distressed areas such as the deteriorating suburbs of the United Kingdom, Germany, Belgium and northern Italy. At least some parts of the 'zone of transition', which historically integrated newcomers into the city, have become *quartiers d'exil* [neighbourhoods of relegation], to borrow the title of the well-known study of France's declining working-class *banlieues* by Dubet and Lapeyronnie (1992). The poor from the *banlieues* do not have access to the inner city, its jobs and services and within the context of deindustrialisation they lose their role as a labour reserve army: they become 'supernumerary' (Castel 2000).

While the ethnic neighbourhoods became more and more the destination for new, incessant flows of migrants, this time from a large number of countries, there was a relevant shift from the 'communal ghetto' to what has been called the 'hyperghetto' (Wacquant and Wilson 1993). Although in both the communal ghetto and the hyperghetto life appears to be brutally oppressive, it is only in the latter that socio-spatial marginality takes on the traits of a 'novel, decentred, territorial and organisational configuration characterised by conjugated segregation on the basis of race *and* class' (Wacquant 2008: 3) and the lack of a shared collective identity.⁴

The sudden implosion of the communal ghetto of the post-war years, which led to the hyperghetto of the 1980s and 1990s, was the result of the interaction of three processes. The first was the decline in manufacturing and the consequent mismatch between the suburban location of jobs and that

of the less qualified workers in the inner city. This mismatch led to the out-migration of both middle-class and skilled working-class African-American households, leaving behind a destitute community lacking institutions (the local church, the local press, the local sports team and so on),⁵ resources and values (such as positive role models to identify with) to help people escape poverty and unemployment. William Julius Wilson called this new syndrome of deprivation 'effects of concentration' (1987). A second process entailed the long-term consequences of an institutionalised system of racial separation and inequality, an *American Apartheid*, to borrow the eloquent title of the classic study of Massey and Denton (1993), that by 1970 had exacerbated the concentration of black poor and welfare-dependent families in the inner cities. Finally, a third process was the development of 'an intrusive and omnipresent police and penal apparatus' (Wacquant 2008: 3) which replaced the protective institutions of the welfare state. These processes and their reciprocal relationships have been displayed at a much lower pace and extent in Europe as compared to the US. However, even in the US, this phenomenon has only affected some cities, such as those in the Frost Belt.

A typology of socio-spatial layouts

The analysis of interactions in specific contexts of time and space has rendered the diversity of conditions in which high poverty concentration and segregation are or are not produced more visible, highlighting how in a fragmented society a logic of separation, which has an important foundation in the socio-spatial organisation, becomes increasingly established. As has been noted by Robert Castel, there is

the risk of a connection between the disengagement of the State (while tendencies which are openly repressive appear within it) and the affirmation of a cultural identity constructed on the refusal to participate in the global society, which would legitimise the existence of urban blocks completely cut off from the common system of social exchanges. (1996: 49)

In order to analyse in what way this logic of separation operates, it may be useful to start from Chris Kesteloot's analysis of how the socio-spatial layouts of European cities mediate relations between different social classes. Kesteloot distinguishes between the 'topological city', the 'repressive city' and the 'negotiated city' (2004). Empirically we often find spatial patterns that share the characteristics of more than one of these 'cities' as so-defined; indeed they should be taken as ideal types. These three types of cities are represented in Figure 17.2 where two main dimensions are taken into consideration: residential isolation and social polarisation.




Figure 17.2 Patterns of residential isolation and social polarisation

The *repressive city* is part of the upper left quadrant, in which high residential isolation is associated with a high level of social polarisation. It emerges from the ‘rise of advanced marginality’ (Wacquant 1996), evidenced in the large social housing estate or in the inner cities, which generates a repressive reaction aimed at satisfying the widespread sentiment of social insecurity, with its mobilisation against ‘the other’ perceived as different or deviant. This is even more the case when it is associated with the presence of immigrant families. As already noted, it is not possible to establish a parallelism between the European ‘repressive city’, which is the result of the dissolution of working-class neighbourhoods, and the American ‘hyperghetto’, which is the result of the implosion of the communal ghettos. Even if the levels of poverty, isolation and distress may be the same as a result of state policies of social retrenchment and urban decay, as noted by Wacquant (1996), the levels of repression, of segregation and of cultural homogeneity are profoundly different.

Kesteloot uses the concept of the *topological city* to refer to the development of ‘spaces apart’.⁶ Fragmentation more than social polarisation is the distinctive characteristic of this model in which each social class is confined in small, closed and isolated worlds. There is no form of interaction between the different social groups and not even social conflict. As has been recently stressed by Ota de Leonardis,

between the small strongholds of privilege and the other places inhabited by deprived populations the social distance is not only unbridgeable (see the polarisation of inequalities) but is above all, immeasurable [...] the distance becomes an emptiness in which social ties disappear, the ties of mutual individuation between 'us and them', the very possibility of recognising and naming oneself, and of qualifying the contrast between us and them. The otherness thus constructed is made rather of absence, absence of names; it designates a situation of non-identification, of negated recognition. (2013: 366)

Examples of this kind of 'spaces apart' are, on the one hand, the gated community with the separation of upper-class families from dispossessed ones, and on the other hand the already mentioned *quartiers d'exile* (Dubet and Lapeyronnie 1992), the outcome of a process of social distancing and territorial stigmatisation which leads to the people who live in these areas being completely ignored rather than simply confined. In both of the examples provided, the social polarisation remains hidden by the territorial distancing of people in a different class position. As has been observed by Iris Marion Young, 'the every-day separation of the lives of the more and less privileged that is part of the process of residential segregation makes it unnecessary for the privileged to think about social injustice' (2001: 208). Sennett makes a similar point:

At the top of this new capitalist system, we can find a regime of differences that are non- interactive [...] you get a regime of geographical, educational and even to some extent leisure segregation in which class, race and ethnic differences are managed in the city by principles of non interaction [...] Difference produces indifference. (1998: 45–6)

Finally, the *negotiated city* implies the capacity of the city to acknowledge the existence of different socio-economic groups, their diverse and sometimes conflicting interests as well as the capacity of these groups to organise themselves, and for the city to create institutions in which these groups can meet, exchange and compare experiences and decide on the city's future. The negotiated city thus, having resulted from policies founded on a strong welfare state, 'involves a political integrative approach to social cohesion' (Cassiers and Kesteloot 2012: 1918). This model of city described by Kesteloot associates low residential isolation with low social polarisation.

There could also be one more model in addition to the three described. It is characterised by high social polarisation and low residential isolation. This model can be defined through using the often-used metaphor of the *porous city*. The term is derived from a very well-known essay that Walter Benjamin wrote with the Brechtian actress Asja Laciš in 1925, poignantly discussing the city of Naples and evoking the image of porosity based on the city's principal building material: the volcanic, grey-yellow, spongy bricks of 'tufo'. The authors use this metaphor to refer to a specific trait of the city: its

continuous transformation, the informal character of social and economic practices and its ‘fluid’ nature in general. In the porous city, ‘the stamp of the definitive is avoided. No situation appears intended forever, no figure asserts that it’s “thus and not otherwise”’ (Benjamin and Lacis 1985: 165–6). As Bianchini and Bloomfield note, the ‘porous city’ creates

what Ernst Bloch, writing in 1925, called ‘a multiverse’, which has no clear boundaries between public and private spheres. Bloch observed that in the way people interacted without inhibition or class barriers, or spontaneously joined in other peoples’ conversation in café or bars, or persisted in using their dialect and adapted it by absorbing new words and nuances. (2012: 13)⁷

Naples as a porous city: dynamism or stagnation?

The ‘porous’ character of Naples has been generally described as a positive trait, contributing to the development of strong social cohesion based on informal social relations and networks of mutual support. However, the informal and precarious nature of the city can also be seen as a negative component of social cohesion, in terms of its potentially disruptive effects on economic and social development. Consider the case of historically and territorially different forms of concentrations of low-income families in Naples. These have different implications in terms of social cohesion. The interest we take in the city of Naples lies precisely in the fact that one may find the simultaneous presence of traces of various types of low-income family settlements that we have examined. In the north-eastern suburb of the city, for example, even though the institutional discrimination and the residential concentration of poor families cannot be equated with that of the hyperghetto, there are many common traits such as high levels of youth unemployment and teenage pregnancy and reduced possibilities for social and territorial mobility.⁸ Given its characteristics, we have termed this part of the city the ‘Wilson city’ (Morlicchio and Pugliese 2006; see figure below). Naturally a number of differences can be found between the case of Chicago which is analysed by Wilson, and Naples, chiefly if we look at the role of racial segregation, both in terms of its extent and its impact on marginalisation processes. However, as Maloutas rightly notes with reference more generally to southern European cities,

if the low degree of spatial isolation is the bright side of class and ethno-racial segregation in Southern Europe, there is also a dark side in the fact that deprivation, especially for immigrant groups, may be quite significant even without the support of intense segregation. (2012: 25)

As [Figure 17.3](#) shows, we can contrast Wilson’s city with two other different socio-economic formations: the ‘Ford city’ and the ‘Allum city’.




Figure 17.3 Socio-economic clusters in Naples

The first includes both the declining eastern industrial areas (where port cranes, chimney stacks and gasometers are still part of the landscape) and the western neighbourhood of Bagnoli (characterised by the presence of the large, abandoned steelworks plant Italsider). The second, more traditional area, has been called the ‘Allum city’, after the English political analyst Percy Allum, who at the beginning of the 1970s in *Potere e società a Napoli nel dopoguerra* (1975) described the urban subsistence economy of the historical centre: the so-called ‘alley economy’ where the Ciccillo, the Luisella ladies and the Don Salvatore exchanged small, low-value services and goods within a subsistence micro-economy substantially closed to the outside and based on informal networks of mutual support.

Naples thus presents a kaleidoscope of socio-spatial formations that is very different from the polarisation between uniformly rich and uniformly poor areas (whether or not the latter are located in the centre or in the suburbs) that is found in many European cities. This complex socio-spatial organisation fosters the creation of informal fields of interaction – street markets, small squares, community centres, craft workshops at street level – where people may interact every day, on the basis of unplanned meetings, governed by relationships of friendship and kinship, but also by the simple sharing of living and working spaces (Dines 2012; Romano 2017). This same structure in the historical centre of the city, with its mixed social composition, enables the type of spontaneous learning to live together which Ash Amin has defined as ‘togetherness’ (Amin 2012). But also in the

Ford city and in the Wilson city, although to a less extent, one can find a variety of interstitial spaces, characterised by constant, spontaneous negotiation and efforts of survival, capable of generating social cohesion. In this way it is possible to keep under control the social conflicts that grow from substantial and persistent inequalities, starting with those that occur in the labour market, without having to resort to methods of separation or repression.⁹ What is generated is nevertheless a sort of ‘precarious balance’ loaded with ambivalence and increasingly uncertain for residents. The spontaneous togetherness generated by virtue of the peculiar socio-spatial structure of Naples and the development of a sort of ‘forced familism’ (Gambardella and Morlicchio 2005) cannot compensate for the many challenges of the city: first and foremost the high levels of unemployment, but also the scarce availability of social services and an inadequate infrastructure system.

Conclusions and outlook

The contradictory elements of living together and the potential spaces for migrants and the working poor in Naples are greater and more diverse compared to those of the hyper-regulated negotiated city or the exclusionary topological and repressive cities. As Maloutas notes with reference more generally to southern European cities,

the relative spatial fixity of the socially mobile – due primarily to the local social networks they depend upon – and the absence of a massive concentration of out-dated social housing projects has prevented most Southern European cities from developing marked pockets of segregation and deprivation. (2012: 23)

These elements give life to what we have defined as a form of precarious balance. Daily interactions allow poor families and newly arrived immigrants to find ways of survival in the low-scale, informal or shadow circuits. However, they are rarely capable of giving rise to forms of collective mobilisation. Apart from the unique Italian experience of the struggle of the organised unemployed in Naples (Boffo and Morlicchio 2015), one that has almost entirely disappeared, what should be considered among the factors supporting this capacity to resist adversity is the persistent role of the family, albeit burdened by growing expectations in view of increasingly scarce resources. Another distinctive element is the existence of a lively, although not widespread, network of large and small organisations in the non-profit sector that operate with those individuals who are most at risk of social exclusion. These are heterogeneous groups which are not always connected, but which are effective and accustomed not to depend on public financial support, even when obliged to, as often occurred in the past when

they continued to ensure essential services despite funds being distributed only after enormous delays.

Our final considerations bring us to two more general themes. The first is what we can define as the problem of the ‘varieties of forms of embeddedness’ (Mingione 2014). This line of research draws attention to specific local cultures, traditions of hospitality and mutual help, the capacity for communities and groups to resist and other relevant aspects of social life which are partly also the effect of the historical conditions of the socio-spatial organisation of cities even in a context of increasing globalisation.

The second theme is that of the representation of the unrepresented or the under-represented: in other words, of the working poor, the unemployed and underemployed who suffer from a lack of protection and representation, and for whom job insecurity and instability are often a long-term problem (Beccalli 2012). In the case of Naples, it is not only a low level of qualifications, gender discrimination or the condition of immigrants that generate a lack of social protection, but also the high level of competition in a labour market that is not dynamic and the profoundly informal character of economic activities in the city.¹⁰

Returning to our typology, one can therefore say that the ‘negotiated city’ implicitly recognises the importance of promoting situations in which people are able to mobilise themselves and participate critically, so that their ‘voice’ (according to the meaning given to it by Hirschman 1970) is recognised in the context of the construction of social cohesion. In contrast, people living in the ‘repressive’ or ‘topological’ city lack ‘a repertoire of shared representations and signs through which to conceive a collective destiny and to project a possible alternative future’ (Wacquant 1996: 128). The ‘porous city’ offers an example of innovative and spontaneous forms of solidarity and community alliances with subjects who on the outside do not share the same class condition, deeply rooted in daily material interaction and informal local social ties, which is very close to the Ash Amin idea of ‘togetherness’. But at the same time it shows the limits of this kind of building of social cohesion in the absence of a reduction of unemployment, youth outmigration flows, child poverty and of the general impoverishment of the social structure, with long-term implications also in terms of ‘capacity to aspire’ (Appadurai 2004) and political action.

Notes

- 1 The term community, as is well known, is highly controversial. Here I refer to the sense of belonging to a specific place, to common economic interests and a common political identity as its main and distinctive characteristics.
- 2 The term ‘corea’ derives from what the self-built areas of the industrial cities in northern Italy were disparagingly called, where the migrant southern farmers

lived in conditions of extreme deprivation in order to work on the assembly lines of the great factories. See Alasia and Montaldi (2010). The term makes reference to their first appearance in the era of the Korean war, at the beginning of the 1950s.

- 3 Even in the Chinatowns in some cities of the United States the presence of Chinese families is not as predominant as that of the Afro-American families in the ghettos.
- 4 Peter Marcuse (1997) has also pointed out that the 'traditional ghetto' lacked the exclusionary aspect of the 'outcast ghetto', the black ghetto of the post-Fordist cities.
- 5 According to Kusmer, 'church membership was perhaps the most important indicator of status in the black community' (1978: 929).
- 6 In urban studies the term topological has been used to stress the fact that 'some spatial problems do not depend on the exact shape of the objects involved, but on the ways that they are put together, on their continuities and cuts' (Secor 2013: 430). In this chapter, following Kesteloot's approach, the term is used in a negative sense, to indicate the absence of interactions.
- 7 This category has been recently applied by Secchi and Viganò (2011) to the case of Paris and its urban transformation.
- 8 Often young people from these districts lack the direct experience of the city and the surrounding areas. Andrea Morniroli, a social worker based in Naples, writes of having met children and adolescents who have grown up in the most northern districts who, when leaving their neighbourhood, 'don't know how to find their way around in the metro or are amazed to discover the sea next to the city; and who, in language which is itself revealing, when going to the centre say to their family: I'm going to Naples' (2016: x).
- 9 From a different perspective, Serge Paugam (2013) has defined as 'integrated' the forms of poverty that arise from the common condition of impoverishment, as opposed to the 'marginal' and 'disqualifying' ones in which the sense of individual failure and the stigmatising aspects of social intervention are more accentuated.
- 10 For example, many of the illegal parking stewards or unofficial street vendors of books to be seen in the historical centre of Naples come from small and very small shoe-making and glass-manufacturing companies which were entirely outside the mechanisms of blue-collar union representation.

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PERSPECTIVES ON THE FUTURE OF WESTERN CAPITALISM

The double movement and the perspectives of contemporary capitalism¹

The current financial and economic crisis of industrialised countries, which started in 2008, has made the interpretation of our societies more difficult. We are in an uncertain and dynamic phase, characterised by high rates of growth in some emerging large countries (China, India and Brazil, up to 2015), high levels of economic interdependence and competition on a global scale, strong de-standardisation trends, increasing social heterogeneity and instability and growing inequalities (Piketty 2013; Harvey 2014; Streeck 2016). On the one hand, the crisis of Western countries has confirmed the failure of market neoliberal strategies and policies but, on the other, it has also revealed the limits of nation-state regulation and the perverse effects of the expansion of bureaucratic oppression. The interpretation of contemporary social change by mainstream paradigms of the social sciences is not convincing, mainly for two reasons. First, these interpretations are centred on a different hypothesis of equilibrium and stability, while our societies can only be understood in terms of dynamism and tension. Secondly, they underestimate the importance of interdependence between different phenomena and processes in different parts of the world and, nearly always, end up in ethnocentric explanations that refer only to the reality of the global North and use biased methodologies that privilege the economic over the social.

In order to take into proper account the dynamism and complex interdependence of our societies, this chapter is divided into three parts. In the first, I shall put the contemporary tensions of social change into an interpretative frame freely inspired by the Polanyian concept of the double movement (Polanyi 1944). I shall interpret the double movement as a simultaneous combination of dis-embeddedness which destroys established social bonds and habits in order to accommodate new market opportunities (here the market is intended as a competitive force that destroys social relations), and re-embeddedness creating new social bonds and institutions. I shall also

maintain, again within a broad Polanyian theoretical frame, that variable mixes of the three pure logics of institutional social regulation – reciprocity, redistribution and the market intended as a cooperation logic (Polanyi 1957) – activate the processes of re-embeddedness through the creation of new social institutions. I shall complement this frame with attention to the role of organised agencies of social and political emancipatory movements, which I do not consider as a part of the double movement itself (Fraser 2011) but as a fundamental element of the comprehensive dynamic of modernity within capitalism.

In the second part, I shall locate the interpretative frame in a more precise historical and sociocultural context where the double movement happens within the present globalised and individualised processes of change in the industrially advanced countries. In particular, I will consider the European context, while not ignoring the impact of global interdependence. Here I shall refer also to an important contribution of T. H. Marshall (1972) on the precarious equilibrium of hyphenated societies (democratic-welfare-capitalism) in the ‘golden period’ after the Second World War. As we shall see, this contribution constitutes a precious tool to explain the uncertainty and instability of our present times. Both Polanyi and Marshall inspire the idea that capitalist development is unsustainable in the sense that the commodification process is always disruptive and creates social inequalities that neither the re-embeddedness process nor democracy can control at a global level. In this chapter, I shall not discuss the theoretical arguments in support of the hypothesis that capitalist development is unsustainable. However, it is worth mentioning that, according to Polanyi, the double movement is always out of control. The dis-embedding motion of commodification produces tensions that the re-embedding process cannot fully confront. This is particularly the case when the three fictitious commodities – labour, nature and money – are involved. On these grounds, capitalist development produces social, ecological and financial crises of increasing gravity. We shall return to this question in the conclusion, which discusses the current perspectives of contemporary societies and the possibility of capitalism ending (Streeck 2016).

Finally, in the third part, I shall elaborate the analysis in order to take into account the effects of the long-lasting economic and financial crisis. I shall focus on the fact that the current tensions between market and society, particularly in the industrialised countries, are producing an increasing level of social and territorial inequality and eroding the ideal of a standard of social protection – Marshall’s social rights of citizenship – offered with universal features to all citizens and residents (Evers and Guillemard 2013). In the conclusion, I shall make some preliminary considerations on the future of our capitalist societies.

The double movement as an interpretative frame for the dynamic of capitalism

From its very beginning the commodification process that is at the core of the development of modern industrial capitalist societies² can be viewed as a permanent, simultaneous double movement. It offers new opportunities to work and consume which are emancipating, freeing individuals from traditional, often oppressive, social conditions (rural communities and villages, clans, tribes, patriarchal families, etc.), but at the same time, commodification opens a deficit of social protection and obliges individuals to reconstruct social bonds consistent with current market opportunities and able to support the livelihood of the individuals themselves. The double movement constitutes the permanent dynamic of modern societies exposed to commodification processes within different historical and sociocultural conditions.

The double movement destroys old social bonds and necessarily creates new ones as social life cannot remain dis-embedded; but, at the same time, it activates the potential for the development of movements of emancipation and democratisation that assume a crucial importance in shaping our societies. Nancy Fraser has strongly asserted the importance of organised struggles for emancipation, proposing that the double movement should be revised as a triple movement to include the motion of emancipation. Fraser suggests that we

broaden Polanyi's problematic to encompass a third project that crosscuts his central conflict between marketization and social protection. This third project, which I call *emancipation*, aims to overcome forms of domination rooted in both economy and society. [...] struggles for emancipation constitute the missing third that mediates every conflict between marketization and social protection. The effect of introducing this missing third will be to transform the double movement into a *triple movement*. (Fraser 2011: 140)

I do not agree with this revision for both heuristic and methodological reasons. The double movement in fact makes sense as constituted simultaneously by two parts: the dis-embedding motion activated by the competitive market and the re-embedding motion activated by the necessity to create new social bonds and social protections in order to keep societies alive. The immediate and causally linked character of the two parts of the double movement is a key feature of the concept.

However, it is important to recognise that the double movement puts in motion the construction of individual identities and agencies that give a completely new life to the emancipation movements opposing traditional and new forms of oppression. The double movement originates the

processes of democratisation, liberation and emancipation, but these are not an instantaneous third part of the double movement itself. Emancipation movements vary across times and contexts, and oppose both traditional forms of oppression (for instance patriarchy, both in the reciprocity forms of organisation – in families and communities – and in market and state organisations) and new forms of oppression fuelled by capitalist development (such as pollution and environmental destruction or increasing bureaucratic and political burdens).

The emancipation content of commodification is an important theoretical tool as it explains the expansion of commodification trends beyond violence, imposition or individual economic advantages. In the conclusion, we shall argue that the progressive weakening of the emancipation push may be one of the main arguments in favour of the hypothesis of the end of capitalism. It is true, as argued by Fraser, that Polanyi himself has not noticed this option. ‘Associating change exclusively with decay and decline, it overlooks the possibility, noted by Marx, that marketization can generate emancipatory effects, by dissolving modes of domination external to the market and creating the basis for new, more inclusive and egalitarian solidarities’ (Fraser 2014: 547). Within our interpretative frame, the emancipation dynamic of market opportunities generates both an immediate reaction necessary in order to keep society alive and a chain of reactions, variously diluted in time and mediated by diversified and changing organisational forms, that is reflected in the mobilisation of social agencies into new movements confronting all forms of oppression. The features and perspectives of our societies exposed to commodification tensions depend both on how the re-embedding agency shapes new modes of social protection and on how the organised emancipation movements effectively contrast social oppression and discrimination within a more individualised society set into motion by ever-new market opportunities (Welzel 2013).

Within this interpretative frame, the necessity of reshaping social relations in order to produce a livelihood consistent with commodification constitutes the core of the process of change. It is the main concept necessary in order to understand individual and collective agency within both the immediate forms of re-embedding and the mobilisation of emancipation movements that emerge later on with the consolidation of individual identities within new political organisations.

The ‘eclipse’ of the double movement in welfare capitalist countries during the Golden Age

The explanatory power of the double movement paradigm makes sense if we put it in an accurate historical frame that also takes into account the cul-

tural and social diversity of societies across the world (Arrighi 1994; 2009). Here, in order to concentrate the discussion on the present situation in industrialised countries, I have to ignore the first phase of industrialisation (which was the focus of Polanyi's attention in *The Great Transformation*) and jump to the welfare capitalist societies that matured during the thirty 'glorious' years after the Second World War (also called the 'Golden Age').³ A brief remark on the experiences of welfare capitalism is a good introduction for the analysis of contemporary perspectives of capitalism, because these experiences seem to contradict the permanent tensions of the double movement and the unsustainability of capitalist development. Only in these countries and only during this period has economic growth been able, at least in part, to keep social conflicts and disruption under control through the expansion of redistributive policies and the welfare state. Let us start from the important contribution of Esping-Andersen (1990) on *The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism*.

Within a Polanyian frame – similar to the one adopted here but oriented to explain the diversity of the social protection mixes in capitalist industrialised societies rather than the dynamism of capitalism – Esping-Andersen explains the variety of the worlds of welfare capitalism using the concept of 'de-commodification'. According to his analysis, in welfare capitalist societies de-commodification (protection against commodification) occurs through a varied set of institutional combinations of protection derived from three different sources: family, kinship and communities; the market (meant as income or employment that allows for access to private protection resources and services); and the welfare state. It is easy to recognise here the 'pure forms of social integration' as mentioned by Polanyi (1957): reciprocity, redistribution and the market. The three worlds are different because in each of them an area of protection is relatively larger for social, political, economic and historically specific conditions.

The three different institutional mixes of protection and democratisation of welfare capitalism have developed through turbulent processes of change, reform and political confrontation in class, gender and ethnically divided societies. However, high growth rates, unlimited expansion of consumption, control of industrial technologies and, particularly, the conspicuous resources deriving from unequal global exchange allowed the expansion of welfare protection in all three welfare capitalist mixes. The dis-embedding impact of commodification did not look highly devastating when compensated by the re-embedding process centred on the expansion of welfare social protection and of standardised consumerism.

During the Golden Age social scientists, media and politicians based in Western countries in general ignored the Polanyian vision of the permanent tensions between market and society, even if there were clear signs that

commodification had a devastating impact on a global scale. Moreover, the welfare capitalist balances of the Western countries were fragile, as we shall see in briefly discussing the contribution of T. H. Marshall (1972). However, what is most important to underline is that the consolidation of the mixes of welfare capitalism in the countries of the global North was counterbalanced by the underdevelopment impact produced by commodification in the largest part of the world. Here the dis-embedding part of the double movement continued to destroy the traditional rural, tribal, village ways of social life while the re-embedding institutions had no means of developing forms of social protection with a stable emancipation content. Rural poverty, famine, tribal conflicts and war, the uncontrolled growth of informal and illegal activities and of shantytowns of the urban poor have been the main features of the other part of the story of the double movement at the time of welfare capitalism.

Welfare capitalism produced a high degree of individualisation and consequently favoured the development of large emancipation movements against imperialism, patriarchy, ecological destruction, new forms of discrimination and oppression. Towards the end of this period, in the late 1960s, these movements became important in accelerating the transition towards a new phase of unsustainable double movement. When globalisation (and a long wave of neoliberal policies to promote competitiveness against state expenditure and social protection), de-standardisation and individualisation processes, and mounting social movements eroded the institutional configurations of social protection in the welfare capitalist countries, the unsustainable tensions of the double movement again became evident.

Marshall's interpretation of the democratic-welfare-capitalist societies (the hyphenated societies) leads in the same direction as the double movement – the idea that capitalist development is 'normally' unsustainable – with particular attention to the importance of politics, bureaucracy and democracy and to the crucial role of social inequalities. Marshall points to the fact that the constitutive logics of capitalism, democracy and welfare are different and not compatible with one another. Marshall argues that:

The democratic and the economic process are alike in that they both take a mass of individuals, process them through institutions – the ballot and the market – which register and react to their desires, and produce a single body of answers [...] But, whereas the market gets its results by combination [...] the ballot reaches its conclusion by division, by sorting out the expressed wishes so as to identify the majority [...] The case of welfare is different again. Although it must take careful note of expressed desires, it does not simply react or obey to them. Its responsibility is to satisfy needs, which is a different undertaking. (Marshall 1972: 18)

The logic of the market produces strong and cumulative economic inequalities that obstruct both the working of democratic citizenship (because the unequal distribution of resources means unequal distribution of power and representation) and the protective capacity of welfare (as ‘the market value of an individual cannot be the measure of its right to welfare’; Marshall 1972: 18–19). Moreover, the egotistical character of representative democracy often obstructs the protective capacity of welfare because the majority of the population is not in favour of protecting groups of citizens considered undeserving. As we shall see later, on this ground Marshall anticipated events that occurred in the following decades, such as the attack on welfare policies by neoliberal governments with large public support and the increasing importance of xenophobic and anti-minority parties.

Marshall argues that in the capitalist industrialised countries the unbearable tensions between the three components of the hyphenated societies have been kept under temporary control through a precarious balance built around the legitimisation of inequalities, leaving open the controversial question of what are acceptable levels of inequality. In the welfare capitalist countries during the Golden Age after the Second World War, the balance was financed by high growth rates and global unequal exchange so that democratic and welfare policies were able to alleviate the impact of inequalities (legal protection of minorities, progressive taxation, action against poverty, increasing social spending, etc.). However, this same balance cannot go on in the successive phase of capitalist development, and as Marshall already signalled in the early 1970s:

This malfunctioning of the system of legitimate inequality is probably the most deeply-rooted threat to the viability of the hybrid or hyphenated social structure [...] The trouble is that no way has been found of equating a man's value in the market (capitalist value), his value as a citizen (democratic value) and his value for himself (welfare value) [...] The failure to solve economic inequality is evidence of the weakness of contemporary democracy. (Marshall 1972: 30)

The return of the double movement: globalisation, fragmentation and de-standardisation

The post-industrial social transformations since the oil crisis of the mid-1970s are again making visible the tensions of the double movement in advanced industrial societies which are more and more individualised, de-standardised and fragmented. Individuals are now less divided across class lines, have greater opportunities for self-realisation, are more individualised, more able to participate in emancipation movements and to communicate through high-tech devices but, at the same time, they are increasingly

isolated and vulnerable, and less protected by the welfare state, political representation, social bonds and community relations.

Global economic assets are changing. Competition with emerging countries is eroding the surplus of resources deriving from unequal exchange and exclusive control over technologies and knowledge that was used to balance high growth with expanding social protection in the previous phase. The rate of growth of industrialised countries has started to fall and the present economic dynamism shows a limited capacity to compensate for the impact of commodification with investments in welfare support. The difficulties of implementing support for social protection are magnified by financialisation that has constantly subtracted resources from social policies and redistributed them through the financial circuits to the very rich and to the bureaucratic and political elites. Within all of the industrialised countries, this process is favouring a dramatic new wave of increasing social inequalities and of concentration of power (Piketty 2013; Polanyi Levitt 2013). Piketty insists particularly on the vicious circle created by the fact that the enormous amount of resources appropriated by the financial circuit are then reinvested with huge gains in the financial circuit itself, creating a fictitious increase of financial wealth that is increasingly disproportionate in respect to the growth of the real economy.

Industrial restructuring and the expansion of service jobs have made working careers more heterogeneous and unstable. Workers in non-standard careers are on the increase, and, at the same time, they are under-represented by unions, political parties and professional associations. Even when they are not precarious or poorly paid, they suffer from a dangerous deficit of social rights to protect them from old and new risks.

The nuclear family, which is still the main social institution regulating private life, has a decreasing capacity to offer protection to its members, due to increased life expectancy, the drop in marriages and births and the spread of divorce, reconstituted families and people living alone. Moreover, the massive entry of women into the labour market has generated tensions in relation to family responsibilities and care work, implying a need to develop ways of reconciling paid employment and family-oriented activities.

In these same societies, a massive new wave of migration is taking place. These migration flows are characterised by a heightened potential for mobility (due to the growth of low-cost flights, for example) and communication (the Internet, mobile phones), on the one hand, but also by employment instability and heterogeneity, on the other. The diffusion of low-paid, unstable jobs in the service sector for migrants has given rise to a range of difficulties in relation to their occupational, social and residential inclusion. These mobile migrants with complex transnational identities are now facing politi-

cal and cultural contexts in which social rights are weak and discriminatory and xenophobic practices are widespread.

When seeking to tackle the demand for social protection generated by new risks, national welfare states can only draw on limited resources, due to globalisation and financialisation processes, heightened international economic competition and the growing costs of the political and bureaucratic apparatus. The expansion of social protection programmes now appears incompatible with the need to maintain high levels of economic efficiency. Public welfare, as well as being economically problematic, is also perceived as a costly intervention to support a restricted number of individuals, against the interests of the majority of the population (contributing to confirm Marshall's hypothesis of the contradictions between democracy and welfare). Moreover, everywhere in the industrialised countries efficient public intervention is increasingly hindered by the distortions produced by bureaucratisation and the influence of powerful political and economic lobbies. As Weber noticed nearly a hundred years ago, the growth of the bureaucratic and political machines fuelled by economic development and the necessity to expand social control and public policies increases the independent powers and interests of the machines themselves, in contrast to the goals of producing social protection and social inclusion for citizens. The abundant flow of resources during the Golden Age and the impact of financialisation more recently have made this process of accumulation of autonomous power by political and bureaucratic elites increasingly oppressive. Because of these processes of change, the tensions within the double movement have again become virulent and unpredictable, and emancipation movements are playing an increasingly important role.

As anticipated, the historical transition has been characterised also by an important wave of mobilisation of various emancipation movements that are now spreading everywhere in the world (Della Porta and Tarrow 2005; Tilly and Wood 2009; Welzel 2013; Della Porta 2015). In the welfare capitalist states, the increasing oppression of the growing bureaucratic and political machines has also favoured the mobilisation of movements outside the traditional political and union organisations. Furthermore, individualisation and social fragmentation are making the scenario of the contemporary tensions produced by the double movement extremely complicated. On the other hand, in general, new communication technologies have become powerful instruments of mobilisation and participation,⁴ but they have also shown clear limits when it comes to establishing permanent and solid forms of social and political solidarity bonds.

The traditional institutional assets of the worlds of welfare capitalism are less and less able to deal with the impact of global trends of commodification. Therefore it becomes crucial to take into consideration responses,

most often from below, which are more local, more focused on the active participation and obligations of those in need of support, and characterised often by the involvement of voluntary and non-profit agencies. As we shall see in the conclusion, the interpretation of this transition in term of a double movement is challenging.

Unsustainable development: the limits of commodification and individualisation

Everywhere in the industrialised countries, the double movement is creating tensions that are aggravated by the crisis that started in 2008. There are great difficulties in finding the means and resources to face the dis-embedding impact of global commodification and financialisation in societies characterised by high levels of de-standardised, individualised, unstable and fragmented social conditions. It may not be the end of society that Polanyi feared in *The Great Transformation*, but it does deserve a discussion on the double movement as greatly altered by the present transformations. I shall conclude here by raising some lines of inquiry that are only preliminary proposals for discussion and future research. I shall start from the difficulties faced by the advanced welfare systems in preserving universal levels of protection and in enforcing Marshallian social rights. As we shall see, it is on this ground that the current trends of capitalist development appear unsustainable, because the re-embedding process is unable to protect large and increasing groups of individuals and to confront social inequalities and exclusion as the emancipation force of capitalism becomes exhausted (Sassen 2014; Streeck 2016). New tensions towards decommodification are particularly visible in the expansion of various forms of social support and solidarity. Moreover, there is an evident contrast between the double movement which is less and less emancipatory, and the emancipation movements in defence of direct participation, empowerment and democracy.

The transformation of advanced welfare systems towards more localised, active, mixed and diversified social support is everywhere reflecting the growth of social and geographic inequalities and eroding the system of divided but standardised social rights of citizenship. In this sense, capitalist development today appears unsustainable. However, there are conditions that make the present transition less traumatic. These conditions are realised through the confrontation between the global dis-embeddedness attack, on the one side, and both re-embedded institutions and organised agencies to oppose oppression and discrimination, on the other. They are present in various and changing combinations in every local and national context. I list here conditions that appear to me most important now: 1) a strong institutional regulatory frame oriented to ensure socially acceptable

levels of livelihood for all groups of the population; 2) a viable system for the redistribution of resources and responsibilities from central authorities towards local bodies in order to grant support to disadvantaged groups; 3) the political determination to combat discrimination against minorities and other vulnerable groups;⁵ and 4) the diffusion of knowledge, professional capacities, solidarity, cooperation and intermediation between cultures.

The double movement opposes the capacity to protect common and public goods on two main grounds: the high level of social disruption imposed by global competition (think of austerity policies in Europe), on the side of dis-embeddedness, and the increasing particularistic distortions activated by political and bureaucratic elites, on the side of re-embeddedness. Both the political and bureaucratic machines, in fact, are exposed to the priority pressures of the powerful financial lobbies (for example, they save the banks before the people) and to the increasing influence of their particularistic interests (high income, promotion and persistence in power positions up to the diffusion of corrupt practices). Under these conditions, the political and bureaucratic elites are less and less responsive to democratic demands and to the need to protect vulnerable sectors of the population.

The mobilisation and participation of diverse agencies (local and national, public and private), associations and social movements is crucial in order to contrast, at least partially, the vicious circuit of decreasing protection and increasing discrimination. It is precisely through the empowerment of different actors that one can seek to develop effective and long-lasting forms of solidarity, inclusion and social support and, at the same time, avoid the increase of social and spatial inequalities. It is on this ground that the movements of emancipation play a crucial role in defending public goods and keeping the transformation of fragmented and individualised societies under control.

The crisis is heightening the tensions produced by the double movement because it makes it more difficult to preserve conditions favourable to counter discrimination and social exclusion,⁶ because of cuts in the social and regulatory resources of nation-states, but also because of the increasing competition and conflict among different social groups for the redistribution of limited resources. Even in areas considered more 'virtuous' in terms of universal public regulation – such as the Scandinavian countries – the combination of welfare reforms and difficulties imposed by the crisis are opening up problematic tensions. The growth of anti-immigration populist parties in Norway and Denmark and the violent clashes that took place between immigrants and police in 2013 in some large cities in Sweden are good examples of this change.

Standardised welfare capitalist assets are systems of social protection that are increasingly less effective in heterogeneous, unstable and individualised

social contexts. The forms of transition towards the 'new welfare' and, in particular, local welfare systems (Andreotti and Mingione 2014) tend to accentuate inequalities and discrimination against vulnerable groups that are under-represented in political terms. The ways in which the crisis has been managed in Europe, through austerity and cuts in public spending, have amplified the 'short circuit'. Given these conditions, some solidarity and protection initiatives may become the last resort for defending particular groups of citizens in competition with other groups from acute poverty. Alternatively, in a more subtle way, some social solidarity practices may become the excuse for dismantling public social institutions, because it is argued that citizens are perfectly able to 'do it themselves' (Muehlbach 2012). In any case the transformation of welfare in industrialised countries is increasingly a mix of trends towards commodification (privatisation of services and further defamiliarisation of care) necessarily opposed by counter-tendencies leading to various forms of de-commodification (re-familiarisation, direct exchanges, barter, community solidarity and various innovative forms of social and cooperative economies). The result of these opposed processes is increasing social inequalities and the expansion of social groups with serious deficits of protection.

There are no blueprints for mobilisation of the social economy and voluntary bodies, and 'activation' of service users, all of which may be effective enough to satisfy the growing demands for protection with sharply decreasing resources. Under the present conditions of persistent austerity and cuts in public expenditure, the current recession is not likely to have the regenerative impact on welfare that the great crisis of 1929 and the Second World War had, leading ultimately to the Golden Age of welfare capitalism. Capitalist development in the industrialised countries is also now unsustainable.

The double movement in the industrialised countries is less and less an emancipatory force and, at the same time, its 'natural' impact in terms of commodification is becoming controversial. Commodification or monetary growth is financed mainly by the dynamism of emerging economies of the Third World.⁷ The historical dualism is reversed: now it is in the old industrialised former colonial and imperialistic countries that commodification with little or no emancipation and limited capacity to re-embed social protection is taking place. However, is this reversal of the structure of the double movement effectively viable? The opposite situation was accompanied by an enormous degree of violence and oppression in both colonial and imperialistic commercial contexts. The possibility that the double movement in its new forms is not viable means the end of the double movement and of the historical dominance of the process of commodification. Within our approach, the diffusion of market habits (the dis-embedding process)

is unsustainable because it ravages social and ecological assets but, under some conditions, is supported by emancipation opportunities⁸ and by social protection and social bonds created by re-embedding institutions. New de-commodification trends may begin a completely different historical process of change with respect to the double movement. Michael Piore (2008), in a discussion of the theories of capitalism, signals how Polanyi's interpretation is open ended with respect to other teleological visions of modernity. However, as the idea of the double movement begins at a precise historical moment when industrialisation started to subvert the ways of life of peasant societies, we can assume that the process will arrive at an end when the subversion of commodification is no longer viable.

In a recent article, Wolfgang Streeck maintains that capitalism is ending as it has exhausted its historical mission; this will not be a sudden collapse, but rather a long, conflict-ridden and controversial process.

The demise of capitalism [...] is unlikely to follow anyone's blueprint. As the decay progresses, it is bound to provoke political protests and manifold attempts at collective intervention. But for a long time, these are likely to remain of the Luddite sort: local, dispersed, uncoordinated, 'primitive' – adding to the disorder while unable to create a new order, at best unintentionally helping it to come about. (Streeck 2014a: 48)

We shall analyse the features of this long transition to the end of capitalism (and the double movement) on a global scale (Harvey 2014; Arrighi 2009), paying attention to commodification trends in the emerging economies that generate massive re-embedding processes in order to create social protection for millions of new workers involved in expanding markets. In these same contexts, the rise of social movements of democratisation and emancipation, frequently based on a radical opposition to Western-style modernisation, assumes a crucial importance.

The social movements and agencies of industrialised countries will also play an important role. It is possible, as argued by Streeck, that within this chaotic process of demise even the opposition movements will be disorganised and weak. However, it is also possible to argue that the process of demise of the double movement will break the historical link between commodification and emancipation – and this has been evident in the Western industrialised countries in the last few decades. It is probably optimistic to maintain that emancipation and democratisation is an historical process that cannot be stopped (Welzel 2013). It is true that, at least on some grounds (such as, for example, gay and lesbian experiences), contemporary Western societies show levels of openness and tolerance that would have been difficult to imagine in the past. However, at the same time, it is also true that in these same societies there are increasing levels of conflict, social

discrimination, xenophobic intolerance and the diffusion of ever-new forms of social expulsion (Sassen 2014). Moreover, there are also signs of increasing disaffection with and scepticism of the democratic process as highly distorted by the strength of particularistic interests of the political and bureaucratic elites. It is on these grounds that the possible long period of demise of the double movement and capitalism will lead to varying degrees of conflict-ridden, unequal and exclusionary societies.

Notes

- 1 The first version of this chapter was presented at the 13th International Karl Polanyi conference 'The Enduring Legacy of Karl Polanyi', Concordia University, Montreal, 6–8 November 2014.
- 2 Today we can easily argue that the commodification process (and thus the double movement) is affecting nearly all societies in the world, albeit to a different extent and, particularly, with different re-embeddedness regulating responses.
- 3 This period was 'glorious' or 'golden' only for a small portion of the global population, while the rest of the world was hit by unequal exchange, underdevelopment, decolonisation struggles, diffused poverty and famine.
- 4 The Arab Spring movements or the experiences of Occupy Wall Street or of the Spanish *indignados* are good examples of the importance and the limits of communication technologies.
- 5 This condition is politically difficult to achieve as often the most vulnerable groups are also stigmatised and politically under-represented, which means that their defence may have serious electoral costs. For example, this has always been the case of inclusive policies in favour of the Roma populations.
- 6 Saskia Sassen (2014) uses the term 'expulsions' in order to emphasise the violent exclusionary character that current processes of transformation have on the victims of globalisation.
- 7 Growth based on knowledge, high-tech and luxury exports is limited and opens up fierce competition among industrialised countries. On the other hand, resources gained in the global financial markets increase inequalities and have a negative impact on sustainability and social protection and inclusion.
- 8 This is what Max Weber meant when he said 'the air of cities makes you free'.

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