Dialogic Ethics

Edited by

Ronald C. Arnett and François Cooren

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Dialogic Ethics

Dialogue Studies (DS)

Dialogue Studies takes the notion of dialogicity as central; it encompasses every type of language use, workaday, institutional and literary. By covering the whole range of language use, the growing field of dialogue studies comes close to pragmatics and studies in discourse or conversation. The concept of dialogicity, however, provides a clear methodological profile. The series aims to cross disciplinary boundaries and considers a genuinely inter-disciplinary approach necessary for addressing the complex phenomenon of dialogic language use. This peer reviewed series will include monographs, thematic collections of articles, and textbooks in the relevant areas.

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Table of contents

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François Cooren

Introduction

Ronald C. Arnett and François Cooren
Duquesne University / Université de Montréal

This volume on dialogic ethics offers an impressionistic picture of the diversity of perspectives on this topic. Daily we witness local, regional, national, and international disputes, each propelled by contention over what is and should be the good propelling communicative direction and action. Communication ethics understood as an answer to problems often creates them. If we understand communication ethics as a good protected and promoted by a given set of communicators, we can understand how acts of colonialism and totalitarianism could move forward, legitimized by the assumption that "I am right." This volume eschews such a presupposition, recognizing that we live in a time of narrative and virtue contention. We dwell in an era where the *one answer* is more often dangerous than correct.

Communication ethics is best understood as vitally important in understanding the Other. What is the good that propels another? What is the good or ground upon which I stand as I meet the Other? As we move communication ethics from the realm of an answer, it shifts into the heart of communication inquiry. Communication ethics is the engine, the meaning, the "why" that propels discourse and performative action. This volume does not assume a conclusion to the search for the good. Communication ethics is akin to a sign that must be read in order to comprehend what matters to another, to a group, to a people, to a nation, to a world.

The essays within this volume announce particular places and ideas housing a good protected and promoted in a given context. From the standpoint of the editors, our readings of the following essays center on a communication ethic that is social and responsive to others. The editors point to the responsive nature of the good protected and promoted by each of the following authors.

Edda Weigand's "Ethics in dialogue: Ideals and reality" places performance as a central good for dialogic ethics in this historical moment. Weigand asserts that through the lens of performance, ethics necessarily has to consider notions of practicability, culture, and interests with each encounter, speaking to a multiplicity of narratives. She protects this idea through providing an overview of the

history of ethical studies, beginning with the Platonic forms and exploring how they considered ethical philosophy, continuing through contemporary scholars like Habermas, Harris, and Lanigan, who acknowledge the importance of considering communicative praxis in ethics. Weigand promotes the importance of performance in dialogic ethics by stating: "Ethics does not evolve from constructing terms and values and putting them into context. The 'phenomenon' ethics is a matter of practice, a matter of dialogue in life, which is more than a pair of terms such as the self and the other." Weigand places ethics within human action tied to human nature without a single blueprint for what is good. She leaves us with an urgency to understand the dark side of humanity in order to shape our response to the world as we negotiate "between ideals and reality."

Andrew R. Smith's "Impassible peace: Enmity and the frozen figures of intractability" explicates how defining an Other as enemy depersonalizes and delegitimizes him or her. Smith posits that enemy-Othering creates enmity that invites a coercive space for a politics of disrespect. In this enmity both parties become co-dependent, "developing closeness while simultaneously engaging in dehumanizing rhetoric and polarizing actions," which cultivates a space for intractable conflict. Smith begins to turn enmity on its head through the use of post-Freudian dreamwork as explicated in Jean-François Lyotard's work on figure. Smith asks: "How can an ethics of enmity be reconfigured such that the abyss of Otherness… does not include the slaughter of innocent people, the wholesale destruction of communities, and the horrific disruption of entire societies?…Can enmity be made to dream?" Smith, in order to promote enmity's ability to dream, considers Levinas's notion of the abyss of Otherness that allows for an ethics of amity to form alongside enmity, opening intractable conflict to discourse. He asserts that unless we "thaw" these conflicts with an ethics of amity, peace cannot be achieved.

Lise Higham's central good in "Proposal for a typology of listening markers and listening request markers: The case of a public consultation" uplifts the importance of engaged listening in public spaces. Higham asserts that engaged listening creates a space for co-creation of meaning. She protects engaged listening with an explication of literature on the subject, moving through cross-disciplinary research such as psychology and philosophy. Higham finds a gap in this literature that creates a need to understand "the mechanics of listening." Using Lipari's (2014) definition of listening, which involves a hearing/listening/hearing span of attention, Higham promotes a typology of various listening markers that highlight a tension between negotiation and recognition. Higham finds that people negotiate meaning when listening at varying levels: the more engaged a listener is, the more negotiation occurs. Higham asserts that the typology created in her article can help to understand human interaction with the Other and discover where it is lacking.

Urszula Okulska's "The ethics of intercultural dialogue: Reconciliation discourse in John Paul II's pontifical correspondence" identifies the transformative approach to conflict as a central good for Pope John Paul II's discursive action towards peace-building for marginalized groups across the globe. Okulska protects John Paul II's dialogic approach to conflict by highlighting the importance of intercultural dialogue in peace-making, especially when the past between two groups has been tumultuous. She also addresses the importance of recontextualizing an event in order to understand varying perspectives of a "difficult past." Okulska promotes these notions through Habermas, Buber, and Arnett, concluding that "the communicative practice of negotiating dynamically (historical) consensus about the (structure of the) world (from the past) leads to the *simultaneous disclosure of the truth of this world,* with the parallel 'appearance' of human *reality* underlying it." She then moves into an explication of John Paul II's reconciliation letters, noting that they mediate mutual facilitation among the groups involved in conflict in order to cultivate a bridge of "human togetherness." What emerges from these letters, according to Okulska, is personhood that is "jointly narrat[ed]" by all parties, representing dialogic action that includes the Other.

In "Differing versions of dialogic aptitude: Bakhtin, Dewey and Habermas," Alain Létourneau brings dialogic ethics into the interpersonal, organizational, and social aspects of the public realm. In order to do this, Létourneau provides a theoretical framework informed by Bakhtin, Habermas, and Dewey that allows the three aspects of social life to flow into one another "without demanding too much from dialogue." He first underlines a model of a network participatory governance perspective in response to climate change as a case study. Next, Létourneau brings forth Dewey's theory of valuation to explore the values at play in environmental issues. He couples this with Habermas's notion of communicative action, which places mutual understanding as a result of "language action." Towards the end of the essay, Létourneau explicates the connection of Bakhtin's heteroglossia with dialogue, supporting the idea that social action requires an understanding of the Other.

Martine Batt and Alain Trognon identify patients' choices to get tested for Huntington's disease as the central good in their essay "An interlocutory logic approach of a case of professional ethics." The authors explore the medical relationship between doctor and patient for pre-symptomatic testing for Huntington's disease, noting the discursive benefits to consultation for disease intervention. Next, Batt and Trognon explicate interlocutory logic, applying it to a particular case of someone requesting testing for the Huntington's disease gene and learning that they are responsible for passing it onto their son. Interlocutory logic works to define and shape a rhetorical encounter, allowing the researcher to understand how the utterances of a situation mobilize persons to act or respond. Batt and Trognon

end their essay with a revelation about communicative praxis in modernity, stating that it "operate[s] at the confines of the psychic apparatus."

The central good identified in Susan Mancino's essay, "Dialogue and ethics in the library: Transformative encounters," outlines the importance of this public place for the invitation of dialogic ethics. Mancino positions the library as a transformative space throughout time, noting the differences between the Library of Alexandria, San Antonio's bookless library, and the New York Public Library's Fifth Avenue research branch. In this historical moment, the library is transformed into a place of technology where Internet materials reign over physical manuscripts, enraging some while enthralling others. Mancino inquires how, in this technological era, the library can maintain its sense of place for dialogic ethics. Mancino asserts that no matter how libraries have changed in regards to layout, organization, or technology, they "[remain] a place for cultural creativity, community and civic engagement, and most importantly possibilities for dialogic encounters that promote new insights and knowledge." In protecting and promoting this perception of the library, Mancino calls upon Gary P. Radford, who defines the library as a discursive formation. Radford utilizes Foucault's work to bolster Umberto Eco's notion of the library as labyrinth, creating a transformative dimension of the library that allows for discursive exchange to occur.

In "Agents of awakening: Ventriloquism, nature, and the cultural practice of dialogue," Inci Ozum Ucok-Sayrak engages François Cooren's ventriloquism as protecting and promoting "dialogic practices that integrate culture and nature [and] human and non-human agents." Ucok-Sayrak seeks to use Cooren's "ventriloquial framework" to understand how various agencies "facilitate our understanding of human experience in the world." Cooren posits that we ventriloquize non-human agents and they ventriloquize back in our experience with the world; Ucok-Sayrak takes Cooren's ventriloquism and applies it to non-human agents like animals, mountains, and trees as seen in Zen dialogues to promote an idea of plurality in human experience that brings forth non-human others into the realm of agency. This plurality encourages listening to non-human agents with an attentiveness that generates a phenomenon of togetherness with nature, as "distinguished notions of self/other get blurry."

Richard L. Lanigan's "The rhetoric of discourse: Chiasm and dialogue in communicology" uses chiasm logic to protect and promote human communicology. First, Lanigan attends to axiology to understand value-judgments that are made in dialogue with regard to morality, ethics, politics, aesthetics, and rhetoric. Next, he explains chiasm as "the idea that every perception is doubled with a counter-perception…[A]s an act with two faces, one no longer knows who speaks and who listens." Lanigan takes chiasm and applies it to axiology, cultivating a value system for dialogue, which creates motion "from: (1) *morality* as the *caring voice*

of concern in the Self; to (2) *ethics* as the *voice of regard* and respect for the Other; to (3) *politics* as the Same *voice of interest* engagement; and, to (4) *aesthetics* as the Different *voice of discerning* appreciation." Overall, Lanigan promotes a logical system in order to explicate the ethical underpinnings of dialogue.

In "Fragments, limbs, and dreadful accidents: The burden of an ecological education in a 'World of Wounds,'" Melba Vélez-Ortiz identifies the water pollution crisis concerning the North Dakota Access Pipeline (DAPL) as a place to protect and promote Aldo Leopold's language of biotic communities. Vélez-Ortiz asserts that Leopold's work acts to remove individualism from dialogue in order to understand such an environmental crisis. She begins with a discussion of the #NoDAPL movement to situate the notion of a biotic community. Vélez-Ortiz then moves into a discussion of the fragmented discourse surrounding environmental issues, noting the various exigencies that different groups bring into the discussion. Next, Vélez-Ortiz brings Nietzsche's theory of subjectivity into the conversation, which understands individuals' perceptions of the world as formulated by their social experiences. In conjunction with Nietzsche, Vélez-Ortiz also takes Freud's notions of sublimation into account in order to explicate why education about environmental issues is pertinent for ethical discourse surrounding ecological crises to occur. Finally, she promotes these ideas with a model for ecological dialogue based on a therapist-patient psychoanalytic relationship that uncovers a richer understanding of environmental issues.

Concluding the volume, Ronald C. Arnett's "Dialogic ethics: A pragmatic hope for this hour" situates dialogic ethics as "communicative hope" in dark times, moments defined by "ethical contention and conflict." This postmodern historical moment calls for a negotiation of varying narratives with dialogic ethics acting as a "communicative third." First, Arnett attends to a history of ethical conflict, understanding that prior to postmodernity there was a common central macro good that communities protected and promoted; in our contemporary era, these goods "exist side-by-side without resolution or universal privilege." Next, Arnett brings forth insights from Caputo about the various competing goods in this historical moment. Finally, Arnett leaves us with an understanding of Buber's philosophy, which calls for a multiplicity of goods while working with a unity of contraries and negotiating goods via a given historical context. Arnett promotes a dialogic ethic that is transformative and responsive to this historical moment and attentive to narrative ground.

This volume, *Dialogic Ethics*, is a creative scholarly reminder of the linkage between and among dialogue and various communication ethics. Dialogue dwells within the heart of the revelatory and hope rests in the recognition of difference, whereas fear centers on singular answers. Indeed, the hope for this hour is perhaps for each hour in the human community – a willingness to protect and promote

the ground upon which I and we stand and the courage to assist the Other to do the same and the pragmatic wisdom to recognize that human insight is seldom advanced by me alone but by the ongoing thoughtful tension created by differing worldviews – dialogic ethics is the beginning of human hope.

Ethics in dialogue

Ideals and reality

Edda Weigand

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Ethics is considered to be rooted in human nature. Human beings as dialogic individuals have to balance their self-interests and social concerns. In performance, there is no ethical codex that determines once for all what is 'good' and 'right.' We have, in any historical moment, to decide how we want to mediate between ethical ideals and reality. Variables of use, such as practicability, culture, and interest, shape the decision in complex action games. After a brief survey of the history of studies on ethics, the article outlines the basic points of a holistic theory of dialogue in performance, and analyses a few authentic examples, which demonstrate that ethical ideals have to be adapted to conditions of reality.

Keywords: human nature, adaptation, ethical codex, ethics in performance, practicability, culture, interests

1. Introduction

The question of what ethics is about reminds me of the question of what language is about. Decades ago linguists delved into this question when they changed their object-of-study from an abstract concept of language as a system of signs to the concept of language-use. That shift constituted the pragmatic turn that transformed the object of an ideal competence to a new object of performance. Regarding ethics, our challenge is how to bring about a similar shift from ethics as an artificial system of values to ethics in dialogue. Both shifts start from a change in the object-of-study, which requires a change in methodology from reductionism to holism, or from Cartesian linguistics to post-Cartesian thought (Weigand 2011). The question we have to ask ourselves is whether we wish to continue playing artificial games in the ivory tower, or whether we should feel responsible for helping people clarify important issues in their lives.

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The issue of ethics is how to make the transition from thinking seemingly independent ideas to facing conditions of reality. Reality does not mean putting the construct of a value system into context. The reality of life means accepting the conditions of performance, conditions that can be traced back to human nature and the real world of an existing society. Human beings are individuals and, at the same time, social beings. It is their double nature as dialogic individuals that determines their life. Human beings have to adapt to changing action conditions and to take a position in the balancing self-interests and social concerns. They orient themselves according to regularities as far as they go and have to rely on principles of probability in order to come to grips with individual cases.

Ethics as a component of the complex whole of human beings' actions and behaviors cannot simply be added to a model of communication. What does 'communication' really mean? Considering communication as an exchange of information does not equate to what happens in language use. We communicate with our fellow beings in order to come to some mutual understanding. In 'exchanging information,' we act with various purposes, not only the purpose of forwarding information. Ethics is integrated into human action and behavior from the very outset; ethics is a dialogic matter in nature.

Pragmatics, as the study of language use, comprises linguistic and communication studies. The actual state of the art is characterized by a *plurality of models*. Arbitrarity and eclecticism have been the response to the challenge of addressing complexity (Frawley 1987). However, we cannot start by arbitrarily picking out items that are not autonomous. Their meaning can only be analyzed by taking account of their role in the complex whole. Our object needs to be the *minimal autonomous object* from which the components are to be derived, according to premises such as

The whole is more than the sum of parts.
Integration is the name of the game.

Such premises characterize the methodology of a *holistic approach* that starts from the complex whole and derives the components by specialization. Fortunately, we no longer need to start from scratch. We can rely on fundamental studies, such as the general study by Simon (1962) on "the architecture of complexity," or the more specific study by Weigand (2010) on "Dialogue: The mixed game."

From the point of view of performance, *ethical ideals are not of our world*. In performance, we have to take account of variables of use, such as *practicability, culture, and interests*. In this essay, after a brief survey of the history of studies on ethics, I will start with a sketch of a holistic theory of dialogue and will then illustrate essential conditions of performance that ethical practice must meet by analyzing a few authentic examples.

2.   A brief survey of the history of ethical studies

Before focusing on how ethics can be described as a component of human action and behavior in performance, let us take a brief look at how ethics has been described in the past. It goes without saying that I cannot give a detailed survey of the various currents and publications on ethics that have characterized the state of the art since antiquity. To my mind, we can identify some crucial points that structure the sequence of models as an ongoing process from the simple to the complex. The history of ethical approaches started with the idea of *constructing value systems*, such as *Plato's theory of 'ideas,'* which were considered to be eternal, objective 'ideas.' Such independent value concepts were *then embedded in ideal, rational systems of communication ethics*, and finally addressed in the performance of *ethical practice* by transforming them into relative concepts. The history of ethics thus resembles the history of linguistics; both are characterized by a crucial change in the object, 'language' or 'ethics' respectively, which resulted in a complete change of methodology.

Plato's theory of ideas fundamentally influenced philosophy in the following centuries until the present day. Systems of ideal values have been created and addressed from a phenomenological point of view. The question was: what is 'good' and 'right,' what is 'beautiful' or 'brave,' what is 'justice,' 'liberty,' and the like. Socrates already questioned these values in his famous dialogues. Going around in the 'agora,' he addressed people who believed they knew what these values meant. In our times, we know that such values in performance cannot be set up as fixed or independent. They change depending on periods of time and culture and are dependent on individual use. Nonetheless, they were expressed in normative statements and claimed general validity. Saying 'this is right' is however not only a statement, but also an evaluation. *Evaluations* are, in the end, individual speech acts that have to take account of action conditions of performance.

It is hardly believable that scientists ignored the principal difference between word meaning and utterance meaning. A whole debate arose from the view that the use of an adjective such as *good* is linked to a speech act of recommendation (cf. Weigand 1993). The speech act of recommendation considers something as 'good,' but this does not mean that any utterance containing the adjective *good* expresses a recommendation. The same is true of adjectives like *right*, which can be used in various ways. The meaning of adjectives cannot be described by artificial decomposition into a set of features. The meaning of words, including adjectives, is their use in language and is dependent on the user's interests (see below). It is embarrassing that philosophers, such as Edward Harcourt, in an article in "The International Encyclopedia of Ethics" (2013), construct a level of 'meta-ethics' and, without any critical comment, analyze moral terms such as *good* and *right*

and even so-called "thicker" moral terms such as *tactful* or *obsequious* by isolating them as independent items and describing their meaning by means of a set of artificial features. This is all the more unbelievable in an article on Wittgenstein, an article that mainly refers to Wittgenstein's "Tractatus," leaving aside the later Wittgenstein (1958), who is famous for his definition of meaning as use.

Such a view of hypothesizing artificial structures and ignoring the reality of performance is characteristic of *Cartesian linguistics*, which constructs the object language as ideal competence, completely governed by rules, and considers performance as something that must be put into the wastepaper basket. This view completely changed when scientific interest turned away from artificial constructions and began to focus on what can be observed under existing action conditions. The object is no longer isolated words or artificial concepts but human action and behavior in performance. Assumptions need to be verified either by anthropological observations or by the experimental results of neuroscience. The philosophical pseudo-verification of statements by calling them *a priori* can no longer count. Neuroscience nowadays allows for insights into our brain, which was a black box in the past.

In contrast to reducing complexity to the purely rational at an artificial level, we should dare to accept the adventure in going from the simple to the complex. Life is performance and poses action conditions that require adaptation to real circumstances. Post-Cartesian thought represents an enormous challenge to science, a challenge that Wittgenstein (1974, 6.421) was obviously aware of when speaking of ethics as something which "cannot be put into words." We do not find ethical ideals in life.

The next step taken away from dividing language into separate items towards communication and behavior meant considering communication as an ideal, normative system. Such a system, for instance, was constructed by Habermas in his theory of communicative action (1981), which represents a milestone in communicative research by emphasizing that communication and dialogue not only mean establishing relationships, but represent *action*. With his interactive speech act theory, he contradicted Searle and explained the difference between initiative and reactive speech acts by introducing the concept of so-called 'validity claims' (Geltungsansprüchen) (1991). He did not, however, take the step beyond Cartesian thought to the complexity of performance, but remained within the conditions of an ideal sociological, normative world. His object is the '*rational discourse*,' which is still an artificial object restricted to the level of ideal construction. What is 'right and wrong, good or bad,' is determined at the level of a rational '*communicative ethics*' (Habermas 1996). However, in life, even rationality is not a fixed value, but is dependent on culture and conditions of performance (Weigand 2014). Ethics in a rational communication theory is therefore restricted to *being truthful and giving*

the other person the same rights as we require for ourselves, which, unfortunately, cannot be taken for granted in performance.

Contrary to the rational constructions of an ideal world, linguists, in the last decades of the past century, turned their interest away from a concept of language as ideal competence to the concept of language-in-use, which constituted the pragmatic turn. Language use was mostly considered to be oral language use. Ethics as a matter of meaning, however, does not exist at a level that is programmatically restricted to empirical means.

Contrary to pragmatics, the approach of *semiotics* did not really focus on finding out what the new *object* 'language use' is about, but kept to adjusting an orthodox *methodology* to it. Methodology became a system of 'boxes,' including the user's 'box', which were added to the system of signs according to Cartesian principles of rule-governed construction. Semiotics, therefore, never really left the point where modern linguistics had started (Chandler 2007) and remained in the ivory tower of science. Reality was obviously not conceived of as being a scientific object worth studying. Even if scholars following Harris's 'integrationalist linguistics' approach emphasize that there are no 'signs' of the original structural definition at all in language use, they stuck to this term and continued to consider themselves semioticians. Instead of posing crucial underlying questions about their object-of-study, they feel entitled to change the meaning of the term 'sign' in a way that it no longer denotes 'signs' at all, but various empirical and non-empirical means of dialogic language use in performance (Harris 1996; Pablé and Hutton 2015).

The question is whether the scientific "pleasure of finding things out" (Feynman 2001) can be the pleasure of juggling with terms. The level of terms and artificial constructs also represents the level where the new discipline of "*communicology*" was founded. Lanigan (in this volume) defines communicology as the 'phenomenological study of axiology,' which he, according to "the classic Greek conception," explains as "the study of values or decisions displayed in behavior." Behavior is, however, not addressed in performance, but again at the artificial level of constructs and logic, a level that ends up in a methodological puzzle of terms. We are referred to antiquity and to the state of the art in linguistics set up by Roman Jakobson (1971). The phenomenological question of what language is only makes sense if the purpose of language use is included. What language is becomes evident in use. The question needs to be reshaped: *why* do we use language? Language is used for communication, and communication is always dialogic. Constructing a 'phenomenology of axiology' remains closed within the restrictions of semiotics. We cannot ignore the important developments made in linguistics after Roman Jakobson and Eco (1976). Ethics does not evolve from constructing terms and values and putting them into context. The 'phenomenon' ethics is a matter of practice,

a matter of dialogue in life, which is much more than a pair of terms such as the self and the other.

Despite methodological restrictions, the insight gained ground that meaning in communication is much more than what results from artificial constructions. Semiotics developed into *semioethics*, which has gone beyond strictly thinking in terms of 'boxes' and now addresses the complexity of ethical behavior (Arnett 2017a). The methodology, however, mainly consists of 'talking about' the ethical positions of outstanding figures such as Emmanuel Levinas or Hannah Arendt (Arnett 2013 and 2017c). Even if Arnett underlines the tenet of ethics as a response (Arnett 2017b), the basic underlying question of the 'architecture of complexity' is not really dealt with. That is the point where a genuinely holistic theory has to start. Communication traces back to human nature and to dialogic interaction as the ability that makes us human beings. We should not expect answers from free creations of philosophy, for instance, by poststructuralism, but, rather, we should rely on our own reasoning about the preconditions of human life and seek confirmation from sociobiological findings.

Finally, we have to include a completely different type of approach, *hermeneutics*, which, in some respects, represents a holistic approach on its own. It considers terms and artificial constructions insufficient in order to arrive at the meaning of utterances and, thus, represents a counter-movement to semiotic attempts. It focuses on ways of understanding the meaning of utterances and texts and can be characterized as a movement that comes close to Wittgenstein's "ethics cannot be put into words." Understanding is never complete (Gadamer 1960). Hermeneutics thus goes beyond rule-governed attempts and approaches performance from the reader's perspective. Dialogue, however, means not only understanding and interpretation, but also response and interaction, i.e. negotiating our mutual views and purposes in sequences of action and reaction. Purposes cannot be any purposes, for instance, taking one's term, but have to be constitutive functional components of interaction (see below). Purposes are not autonomous yet. It is human beings who have purposes and goals and try to achieve them by taking account of their double nature as dialogic individuals, which includes ethics from the very outset.

Ethics is not only a crucial issue of science but also a theme in art and in literary texts, which confirms that it is a central issue of human life. We might have a desire for ethical ideals, but life is performance and poses action conditions that require adaptation to real circumstances. Literary stories create utopian descriptions of a peaceful and happy life in an ideal world, for instance, James Hilton's "Lost Horizon," but also point to the dangers hidden in the dark side of human nature, for instance, George Orwell's "1984." The problem is to get control of opposing human interests, individual and social. We should not accept that dialogue gets distorted. The risk is eminent as we can see in hate comments on Facebook

and other social networks, which can degenerate to conspiracy groups. Let us hope that living together in a humane way will not remain a utopia. We should feel responsible for keeping humanity alive.

3. The universal basis: Ethics as an inborn property of human *nature*

The issue where competence and performance meet cannot be solved at the level of terms and models by the addition of a rule-governed approach and an approach that takes account of individual use. The issue can only be solved by clarifying the basic underlying question: how can human beings succeed in tackling the vicissitudes of their lives? Human beings settle the issues in their minds. They have an extraordinary ability, which I have called '*competence-in-performance*' (e.g., Weigand 2010, 4). We orient ourselves according to rules as far as they go and proceed by adaption to particularities of individual cases. Fortunately, we can refer to evidence from sociobiology, which complies with modern post-Cartesian thoughts. A holistic theory of performance should be capable of dealing with possible conflicts between ideal values and restrictions of performance.

The term '*holistic*' has recently been used more frequently in the literature on communication. However, it mostly represents a catchword. A genuinely holistic theory has to start from the complex whole object and derive methodology from it. The complex whole should be *nearly autonomous*. Authentic texts are obviously dependent on their users; but not even the users are autonomous. They are dependent on the action conditions of language use, i.e., on the circumstances they live in and on the reach of their abilities. In this way, we arrive at the *dialogic action game*, which is a mixed game insofar as the components are integrated and interact with each other. It is not a chess game because it is not completely governed by rules. Nonetheless, it is a game that requires two players and has a goal, the goal of coming to an understanding. The key question of opening up the complex game is why we are using language. In performance, there is no language as such that might be defined phenomenologically, there is only language-in-use that is defined by the purpose of use. At the universal level, the purpose of use is determined by human beings' goal-oriented nature. There is a broad discussion about what constitutes the human species. If we are not biased by some authoritative assertions, we can observe ourselves and see that we are dialogic individuals who have to mediate between our individual interests and social concerns. It is this *double nature* that determines our actions and behavior. Any position we take will be both a dialogic position and an ethical position. At the universal level, ethics is shaped as a balance between opposing interests of human nature. Ideally, this balance calls us to "apply to ourselves the same standards we do to others" (see

also Chomsky 2016b, 60). This *ideal ethical norm* means promoting 'justice' and human rights. However, what 'justice' means cannot be decided once and for all. How this ideal principle of humane behavior is conceived of is different in various cultures. Particular ethical conventions can be derived from it according to different cultural evaluations (see below).

Human beings as goal-oriented beings have to try to come to some mutual understanding as dialogic individuals by action and reaction. Using language does not only mean speaking, i.e., issuing authentic texts, but also acting in dialogue. The essential question to be posed is: what is *action*? Action is *more than the use of specific words and more or something else than turn taking*. Levinson (2006) considers human beings as "interaction engines." According to him, "interaction is characterized by the 'reciprocity of roles [...] yielding a turn-taking structure'" (46). Actions cannot, however, be defined by roles. Turn-taking in the sense of taking one's role as speaker-addressee is an empirical feature of conversation, which is a prerequisite for carrying on conversation. Adjacency pairs, for instance, question-answer sequences, or greetings, are identified by frequency of use and intuitively classified by what might, at first glance, seem to be speech act purposes. However, what can count as the purpose of a speech act has to be functionally defined in a speech act taxonomy and cannot be equated with speech act verbs (e.g., Weigand 2010, 132ff.). Turn-taking might, of course, serve a purpose that goes beyond taking the turn, such as, for instance, the purpose of interrupting the interlocutor, or of demonstrating some power in the community. Purposes of this kind are not purposes of speech acts, but can be described as strategies in order to achieve our interests (see below).

'Actions' are also different from 'activities.' Activities can relate to practical actions such as doing sport. They can also mean movements such as walking in the sense of putting one foot before the other, or movements of our mouth when we are speaking. Movements of the mouth in this sense are not actions, but a prerequisite in order to speak. Actions, initiative as well as reactive, are primarily functional concepts that pave the way towards achieving the purpose of dialogue.

Let me now briefly outline the crucial components of the universal basis in the model of 'dialogue as a mixed game,' which is based on a concept of 'language as dialogue' (for details see Weigand 2009; 2010). The complex whole of the mixed game also includes ethical behavior as an inborn property of human beings. In performance, we orient ourselves according to rules as far as they go and adapt to particularities by principles of probability, i.e. by reflecting upon what might probably be the case. In this way we first try to identify *standard cases and proceed to particular cases* if by standard cases understanding cannot yet be achieved.

In describing dialogic interaction, we can distinguish *constitutive principles, regulative principles, and strategic or executive principles*. Constitutive principles are

the Action Principle, the Dialogic Principle proper, and the Coherence Principle. *Action* is defined by the correlation of purposes and means. There are verbal actions, practical actions, and mental actions. To give one example: the purpose of the practical action of felling a tree can be the intention to fell the tree because it disturbs the view; the means by which this action is carried out includes some appropriate tool, such as a saw. Verbal actions or speech acts are, according to Searle (1969), defined by their purpose, which relates to a proposition consisting of reference and predication. Such a definition, however, does not yet fit performance. Behind openly expressed purposes there are often INTERESTS which influence the sequence of speech acts and the way the purposes are expressed. I have therefore *extended Searle's formula* F(p) by considering interests to be a superordinate predicate:

Interest [dialogic purpose (reference + predication)] ↔ communicative means

Figure 1. Action Principle

Due to human beings' nature as dialogic individuals, there is no speech act autonomous on its own. Any speech act is directed either initiatively or reactively, which is not only a formal difference of the position in the sequence, but a functional difference that needs to be clarified. In his ideal approach, Habermas speaks of 'validity claims' shaped by ideal conditions. In my dialogic speech act theory, the difference is due to different 'dialogic claims' (see, e.g., Weigand 1991). *Initiative actions make a dialogic claim, reactive actions fulfil this very claim*, either positively or negatively, or postponing the decision:

coming to an understanding

action   ↔   reaction
MAKING A CLAIM   FULFILLING THIS VERY CLAIM

Figure 2. The Dialogic Principle proper

The *Dialogic Principle proper* is based on this fundamental correlation of action and reaction which can be extended to longer sequences (Weigand 2010, 113):

action ↔ reaction
action ↔ reaction
action ↔ reaction

Figure 3. Extending the Dialogic Principle proper

In this way, the two-part sequence is the basic structural principle of any dialogic sequence. In the literature, especially in applied linguistics, we also find a three-

part sequence of elicit/reply/evaluate, which, however, can be restructured as two two-part sequences (Weigand 2010, 114).

Utterances are not only means of speaking. According to human beings' nature, various abilities, speaking, thinking, perceiving, evaluating and having emotions, are integrated and interact with each other. The way they interact has to fulfil the condition of *coherence* in order to allow for understanding. Coherence relates to the interplay of dialogic means and represents the central principle of an utterance grammar (Weigand 2017). Dialogue not only consists of speech acts, i.e., of acts that at least in part are based on speaking, there are also perceptual actions, e.g., closing the door, and mental actions integrated in dialogue. Coherence, originally defined as coherence between verbal means, is in a model of performance established in the human mind.

Besides these Constitutive Principles, there are *Regulative Principles and Executive Principles.* Due to human beings' double nature, we always have to mediate between our self-interests and social concerns. This is precisely the place where *ethics* is situated from the very outset. Regulative principles also mediate between *emotion and reason* and this has been confirmed by neurological experiments; it is called "Descartes' error" (Damasio 1994). Executive principles relate to our *strategic interests*, which are mostly not explicitly expressed, but determine the way we express our purposes in the sequence, directly or indirectly, cooperatively or confrontationally (see below).

What conclusions can we draw for the concept of ethics? Any species that lives in communities has to balance individual and social interests. In this sense, ethics is an inborn feature of human action and behavior, a feature that can be described by Regulative and Executive Principles. However, accepting any position whatsoever in the conflict of individual and social interests means considering ethics as a value-free concept. When establishing a *universal basis*, we might consider it as proceeding from evolution and assume a form of ethics for it as an unbiased ideal way of behavior that gives every human being the same opportunities and equal rights. *Evolution*, however, proceeds according to the biological law of the survival of the fittest. To strengthen a humane way of living together, ethics has to be introduced in a normative way which is different from biological law. Norms depend on *evaluation*. This is the point where different cultures emerge and shape different ways of living together. Setting up the *norm of civilized and humane behavior* is a necessary consequence of overcoming the biological law of the survival of the fittest. We can find such norms of behavior in literature since antiquity, for example, the Ten Commandments in the Old Testament, human rights in the Magna Carta, or the values of liberty, justice, and solidarity proclaimed in the French Revolution. Contrary to such an ideal view of 'how we should act,' at the level of 'how we act,' i.e., in performance, norms might hang in the air but can be

disregarded. Performance is, in the end, a matter of individuality and probability. We must pay attention so that those in positions of power, imperial power as well as financial power, will not gain the upper hand.

4. From the universal to the particular: Specialization of ethics by *culture*

Ethics, in its unbiased ideal form, becomes specialized in different cultures. Culture cannot be added to the use of language; culture is there from the very beginning. The question is: *what is culture?* Culture can be empirically perceived, for instance, in specific customs. However, it is basically integrated in human nature by the 'co-evolution of genes, mind, and culture,' as has been confirmed by sociobiology (Lumsden and Wilson 2005). The complex whole is from the very outset determined by human nature, which is shaped by culture.

Different cultures proceed by differently evaluating the role of the individual with respect to the community they live in. Roughly speaking, *Western cultures* very much emphasize individual freedom, whereas *Eastern cultures* evaluate the individual according to their role in the community. In Eastern cultures, as far as I know, the group determines the value of the self; in Western cultures, the reverse influence can be observed insofar as the self tries to maintain their position and to dominate others. It is this selfish drive for personal freedom that sets limits to the degree to which the other is respected in Western cultures, whereas in Eastern cultures it is the respect for the other human being that aims at reconciliation and harmony and sets limits to the individual's freedom. We have to be cautious, though, because such a rough-and-ready distinction will have to be more clearly differentiated by future studies. Human beings' nature as social individuals will inevitably imply both cooperative, as well as confrontational strategies.

[universal]   achieving acceptance

individual ↔   community
the self   ↔   the other

[culture]   biased evaluation

West   East

the self → the other   the self ← the other
bias on self-interest   bias on respect

confrontation   harmony

Figure 4. The balance of self-interest and respect

Comparative studies (e.g., Cho 2005, Premawardhena 2007, Grein 2007, Grein and Weigand 2007) have differentiated subfunctions of *respect or politeness* resulting from differences in cultural evaluation. If there is a bias towards the community, and the individual's value is seen in its role for the community, respect includes consideration for others, modesty, solidarity, avoiding conflicts, and striving for harmony. If the individual strives for personal freedom, then respect will either mean sincere consideration, or will become a formal concept that is functionally rather empty, or masks distance and even manipulation.

East	West
modesty	reverence
solidarity	formal/polite phrases
attention	distance
avoiding conflicts	manipulation
harmony	confrontation

Figure 5. RESPECT/POLITENESS

5.   Ideals and *practicability*

In performance, we not only have to take account of the different cultural conventions of ethics, but we also have to tackle the problem of practicability when we stand up for ideals in difficult situations of our society. In the refugee crisis, Angela Merkel clearly expressed her position by what has become a catchword:

(1)   Wir schaffen das. 'We can handle this.'

Time Magazine chose Angela Merkel as Person of the Year 2015, and justified this decision by her "steadfast moral leadership in a world where it is in short supply." Barack Obama also congratulated her for her "moral leadership" as expressed by utterances like (1). What does 'moral' mean in these phrases? Angela Merkel's phrase and its evaluation as 'moral leadership' point to the heart of the problem. *Ethics is a matter of evaluation*. Evaluation is an action carried out by human beings, a mental, as well as dialogic action. It is based on a benchmark, which in the case of ethics is, to my mind, 'good versus evil.' However, who decides? Action is good action if it respects our fellow beings. The benchmark is often considered to be 'right versus wrong.' *Right* and *wrong* are words, and the meaning of words is, according to Wittgenstein (1958), their use. *Right* and *wrong* can be used in various ways, in the ethical sense of 'good and evil,' in the practical sense of 'useful,' and also in the sense of 'being right.' If Merkel is right when saying *we can handle this*, then it means 'we have the possibilities to handle this.' Simultaneously, it is used in an ethical sense, recommending such an action as good and indirectly encouraging the citizens to join her position. However, what is good and what is evil in our complex world? *Ideals may exist in our minds, reality reduces them to what is possible in our world.*

Merkel's utterance is not a monologic utterance, but it is dialogically oriented towards the public. In principle, language is used for communication, and communication is a dialogic matter. Merkel's attitude of standing up for a general welcome culture is not shared by all Germans – not only not by her political opponents but also not by some representatives of her own party, and it is not shared worldwide. Striking opponents are, for instance, Donald Trump in the US, and Horst Seehofer, Merkel's coalition partner in Bavaria. They demonstrate that Merkel's utterance has caused a protracted public debate. In the same way that Trump threatened not to let Muslims into the United States, the Bavarian government threatened to go to the German Constitutional Court to compel the federal government to impose a cap on asylum seekers. In a news conference, Seehofer contradicted Merkel's utterance and took the opposite position:

(2)   We need to restrict immigration in order to maintain the public's solidarity with those in need of protection.

Even if it is interesting to note that he speaks of immigrants, not of asylum seekers or refugees, in the end he means

(3)   A cap on the numbers is necessary to guarantee domestic security.

How can a theory of dialogue deal with such a debate? The debate is an action game of argumentation that can precisely be described at the level of a dialogic speech act theory. As just mentioned, each speech act is dialogically oriented, either as

an initiative or reactive speech act. Merkel's *we can handle this* and Seehofer's *we need a cap on the numbers* are assertive speech acts which aim at acceptance. They represent thesis and antithesis in a game of argumentation as their claims to truth contradict each other. At the same time, they are indirectly directive speech acts expressing a claim to volition that refers to practical action and aims at consent. In this sense, Merkel also intends to encourage the Germans to tackle the challenging situation.

THESIS	↔	ANTITHESIS
we can handle this		*we need a cap on the numbers*
assertive, claim to truth		non-acceptance, contradictory claim to truth
indirectly directive, claim to volition:		indirectly directive, claim to volition:
'let's welcome the refugees'		'let's impose a cap'

Figure 6. Thesis and antithesis as starting point of argumentation

Thesis and antithesis manifest the starting point of a debate on a controversial social issue that obviously represents an ethical issue. Ethical principles relate to the balance between self-interest and social concerns. Any principle affecting that balance can be considered an ethical principle. Moreover, these ethical principles are often culture-specific, such as principles of politeness or respect.

The issue in our case is how to behave towards refugees; this is clearly an ethical issue that may be discussed at the level of arguments and be decided by some sort of power at the political level. Merkel refers to the fundamental right of asylum, which has constitutional status in the Federal Republic of Germany and prohibits the limitation of the number of refugees. Seehofer opposes this ethical ideal with the practical argument that it is not possible to manage an unlimited number of refugees. Both positions need to be negotiated. Insofar as both are intransigent, the issue can only be settled by a compromise backed by governmental power: there will be no cap on the numbers, but permission to enter will be restricted by other measures. Negotiation thus proceeded in a way that can be clearly described in a dialogic action theory. There are specific moves of rejecting an argument, among them the move that refers to its practicability:

THESIS	↔	ANTITHESIS
we can handle this		*we need a cap on the numbers*

↓
negotiation

ETHICAL ARGUMENT	↔	PRACTICAL ARGUMENT
no limit to asylum seekers legally guaranteed		not manageable

↓
COMPROMISE
no cap but restrictive entry
backed by governmental power

Figure 7. Argumentation in a political debate on ethical questions

There is another utterance by Angela Merkel that points to the same problem, that is, a conflict between ideals and reality. When it became clear that the CIA had hacked her private mobile phone, she got very angry and reacted:

(4)   Ausspähen unter Freunden, das geht gar nicht.
       'Spying on friends, that's not the done thing.'

She had to realize that her ideal assumptions about people and friends are not valid in our world. As became clear some time later, the German intelligence service had operated in the same way. There remains nothing other than to adapt to this sad story of performance in reality.

6.   *Interests* of the masters of mankind

With these examples we have already entered the field of interests behind literal meaning, which are mostly not openly expressed. In principle, there is the divide between our self-interests and social concerns. This does not imply that self-interests are always in opposition to the interests of society. For instance, our self-interest may be to live in a clean environment, which can also be the interest of the actual government. The position we take is dependent on our individual nature and on conventions of the group to which we belong, which is not only a cultural group, but can also be the social group or some ideological or institutional group.

Specializing does not mean making any individual position special, but means making types of positions special according to our goals and interests, and according to the strategy taken, cooperation or power. Different types of ethical positions evolve from political parties or from groups in the economic system, for instance, democrats, liberals, conservatives, workers, intellectuals, or capitalists

versus communists. Their ideologies might be studied as ideologies of the mind, for instance, by Lakoff (2002), and remain in this sense assertions by scholars who describe them and generalize about them. In performance, they can only be deduced as types of behavior from the way their representatives present themselves in public.

Unfortunately, in our globalized society, interests are mostly shaped as the interests of the 'masters of mankind,' to use an expression coined by Adam Smith (2003: 96) and Chomsky (2016a: 239), masters who strive for money and power. The communicative means by which these interests are expressed, mostly indirectly, cover a wide range of different techniques, from the power of words and specific syntactic structures to the power of cognitive strategies and perceptual means of representation. "Masters of mankind" in our day are "multinational conglomerates, huge financial institutions, retail empires, and the like," which are, according to Chomsky's political writings (2016a, 239) dedicated to the "vile maxim": "All for ourselves and nothing for other people." Obviously, this comes very close to the actual slogan "America first."

It is obvious that the interests of the 'masters of mankind' perfectly fit the bias towards the self-interest of cultures of the West and their striving for power, imperial power as well as power in the financial markets. Due to these interests, the people of Third World countries can be regarded as 'saleable exotic objects,' which serve to fulfill the desires of the rich and mighty. The magical word 'exotic' represents a powerful device that can be used in a positive as well as negative sense, either appreciating the wonders of foreign cultures or disparaging their people as objects.

Advertising in the free market economy is dominated by a type of persuasion that exploits underlying cultural desires, as Rapaille (2007) has brilliantly demonstrated in his book on "the culture code." Unfortunately, our world, not only in the West, has become, to a great extent, a world of the selfish interests of the rich and mighty. Language is used in a way that aims at winning over the other party. Evaluation plays a major role in the interplay of components and also shapes our view of the 'exotic.' Putting a premium on our selfish interests will also affect our perception. Fortunately, countermeasures such as 'fair trade' have been introduced but have not yet been able to gain the ground they deserve. Fairness can even be misused as publicity in business culture instead of becoming a matter of course, as a natural guideline of respect everywhere in any dialogic interaction.

The interests of the masters of mankind can be clearly observed in the divide between the industrialized countries and the countries of the Third World, which was the general theme of the XXVII UNESCO FILLM Congress in Delhi 2017. Thinking about "the familiar and the exotic" means thinking about the adjective *exotic* and the way it is used, i.e., in the politics of perception and representation.

Human beings, as well as groups and institutions, *perceive the world differently* according to their ideology and this influences their way of politics and presentation. We might consider *exotic* as a single lexical unit and describe its etymological meaning in ancient Greek as 'outside.' 'Outside' means 'outside of home,' which, if it is distant, can mean 'foreign.' Language use, however, does not mean putting signs with a defined, fixed meaning into use. In language use there are no signs at all, there are words-in-use, among them 'magical words' like *exotic*, which can have different meanings dependent on the user's interests. The meanings we can assign to the adjective *exotic* in present-day use all depend on the opposition to 'at home' or 'familiar,' and can range from 'foreign' to 'strange,' 'striking' and 'attractive,' or can even allude to the phonetically similar adjective *erotic*. A dictionary restricted to single words will therefore be deficient and only demonstrates that the meaning of a word is – according to Wittgenstein (1958) – its use.

The crucial question, therefore, is how we use words like *exotic*. We not only use them in speech acts of description, but primarily in speech acts of evaluation. Evaluations are not something marginal in language use but central to human action and behavior insofar as we not only perceive or listen, but cannot do other than evaluate what we have perceived or heard and take a position with regard to it. What is most important is the fact that language use means action, and action means intentional action affected by interests. Representation is dependent on our interests. The question, therefore, is why and with which interests we use the adjective *exotic*. This is a question that depends on the individual speaker, the culture they come from, and their individual interests.

Let me illustrate the issue by an example. I take the phrase "*the incredible India*," which the Government of India used in 2002 to start an international marketing campaign to promote tourism. The interests seem to be clear: the adjective *incredible* is used to link up with 'the wonderful exotic.' Its meaning was deliberately left vague and could be filled out by the pictures connected to the phrase. For Western perceivers, these pictures of astounding colors, crowds of people, magical palaces, wild animals, and tropical vegetation, aroused the desire to visit a world unfamiliar to them, a foreign, beautiful and different cultural environment. They were addressed to the person as '*rerum novarum cupidus*' who is keen to discover something new.

In the same way, Thailand appeals to people's curiosity on the internet and in tourism brochures by using the phrase "*the amazing Thailand*," which *is a kingdom of wonder, filled with spectacular natural, cultural, and historical attractions*. Such a view of the wonderful 'exotic' can suddenly shift to the negative, alluding to the dark side of erotic attractions and 'fantasies' by reference to *the world's most sensual women*.

We can see that the power of such words as *familiar* versus *exotic* results from the fact that meaning changes depending on the user's interests. Reference to the attraction of 'exotic objects,' in the positive as well as negative sense, is not restricted to countries of the far east; European cities are also described as exotic in tourism brochures – capitals of eastern European countries, for instance. It would be interesting to investigate travel narratives and to see how these touristic promotions coincide with travelers' actual experiences. Behind such phrases and images there are the legitimate interests of the governments of Third World countries. However, they can also be used to mask the masters of mankind's interests. Money and imperial power are all that counts. It would also be interesting to study how travelers from the far east perceive Western countries, which are perhaps equally foreign and exotic to them.

Interests are a crucial but often ignored variable of language use. They affect not only the basic speech act structure but also the components of utterance grammar, among them the meaning of words. With its Principle of Coherence, one of the Constitutive Principles (see above), the Mixed Game Model includes the issue of the structure of an utterance grammar (Weigand 2017). The lexicon seems to play a key role in the intricate interplay of different communicative means. There are no words, no signs as such which carry meaning on their own and are put together compositionally, but speakers who use communicative means of different kinds in their ethical interest.

7.   Strategies of cooperation versus confrontation

Let us finally look at an essential technique in dialogue, which is itself an ethical technique, the technique of strategies, which are crucial for our selection of speech acts and their sequencing. Our self-interest and our individual disposition determine how we proceed in order to achieve our goals. We might use strategies of cooperation or power in directive action games or strategies of deceiving by concealing and suppressing what is the case in representative games. Strategies are dependent on the action conditions, but in the end, are decided by the individual speaker. In the Mixed Game Model, strategies are dealt with as Executive Principles. Let us first analyze two authentic examples which clearly demonstrate totally different strategies of cooperation versus confrontation and their resulting effects on the dialogue (Weigand 2016).

The first example is a dialogue between a girl and her mother. The girl tries to persuade her mother to allow her to take part in a very attractive but also expensive school exchange programme with America. The mother has not decided yet and is more inclined to decide on the cheaper programme.

(5) Girl   We have to talk about America. I thought I could save, I could earn money by giving lessons and I would contribute the money which I have in my account.

Mother Well, I'll think about it. Be quiet, I tend to agree.

The girl's strategy of cooperation is successful. It is just the appropriate way of persuading her mother in the particular action game.

The other example can, if at all, be considered as a counter-example of failed persuasion because it uses the strategy of confrontation and power:

(6) A   We have asked you to present a joint working plan.
     B   Here it is.
     A (angry)   This won't do. You cannot start with your position only.
     B   But I expressed it as you wanted it, some time ago.
     A (very angry) We won't discuss with you.
     B   Ok, then I might as well go.

In this specific action game, power is the wrong means to use because it is vacuous, only simulated. Interlocutor A, who uses it, does not really possess it. A and B are colleagues, both university professors engaged in the same project. Even if A is the leader of the project, he does not really have the power to reject discussion. His claim to volition, intransigently expressed by *We won't discuss with you*, and even strengthened by putting his foot down, must therefore fail. The strategy of power might have been successful with a shy and timid interlocutor, but in the actual action game it leads to the dialogue breaking off.

These examples demonstrate the trivial fact that any action game is an action game with individual interlocutors in a specific situation. The situation is an inherent component of the game. It represents an artificial maneuver, far from performance, to create a new term 'pragmeme' as central concept of pragmatics, which aims at the addition of context to Searle's abstract concept of the speech act (Mey 2001). Human competence-in-performance does not work by means of the addition of constructs but by adaptation to the ever-changing environment. Dialogue is the key to pragmatics, not vice versa, insofar as it offers a clear methodological device to structure the otherwise uncircumscribed field of pragmatics. Communication is inherently dialogic, and dialogue requires taking a position in the balance between our own interests and the interests of our fellow beings.

In reality the choice between cooperation and confrontation is a difficult one and depends on the historical moment. I only want to point to cases in which power or even war might seem to be the only way to achieve an ethically justified outcome. We are currently confronted with such a case, the need to combat terrorism.

We not only use arguments to persuade our fellow beings, as in Example (5), but can also use some sophisticated power, for instance, by the use of specific 'magical' words. Magical words appeal to our *emotions*. As mentioned above, the meaning of words is not described in an abstract semiotic system; the meaning of words is their use. In use, words display their argumentative and persuasive power (see also Burke 1950). Famous utterances can serve as examples – the use of the word *evil* by George Bush, for instance:

(7)   If this is not evil, evil has no name.

Evil here is not used as a sign with encoded meaning. It is a magical word that can be used as a means of the strategy of persuasion. It is predicated on Saddam Hussein's actions and has the magical power of deterrence. This magical word is thus used as an effective means to trigger off the quasi-inevitable inference that a pre-emptive war should be accepted.

In contrast to strategies of persuasion that aim at achieving one's claim to volition, there are strategies of deception that aim at concealing what really happened. Strategies of deception are veiled as claims to truth, which are, however, only individual claims and do not express any 'truth' at all. What is expressed can be blunt lies, distorting existing facts, or pure speculations. We are confronted with various types of deception in performance, which are at odds with ideal Cooperative Principles of 'being truthful' or 'telling precisely what happened' that constitute the basis of Gricean approaches (Grice 1975).

8.   Outlook

To sum up: as we have seen, ethical considerations are integrated in almost all our actions and behavior. Insofar as human beings are dialogic individuals, ethics is rooted in human nature. We have to deal with the balance between our self-interests and social concerns. Recent insights in anthropology and neurobiology can fortunately confirm the "indissoluble relation" between our genes, minds, and culture (Marchand 2010; Wilson 1975). The human ability of evaluating and taking an ethical position represents an integrated component of human beings' competence-in-performance, a component that relates to balancing the double nature of human beings as dialogic individuals.

We all live together in one world of globalized societies and should negotiate our mutual interests in an ethically justifiable way. But what does 'ethically justifiable' mean? Ethical principles of human behavior are not universal principles. I could think of some modified chart of human rights, which takes account of cultural differences but, on the whole, is oriented towards the fundamental ethical

principle that we should treat our fellow beings with the same respect we expect for ourselves.

The question is how to justify what is considered ethical. That is the big issue in our terrorist times. There is no ethical codex that determines once for all what is 'good' and 'right'. Humanity must not remain a utopia. We should make efforts to get control of the dark side of human beings' nature. Ethics in this sense is our response to the world, nature, and the human species, to protect the preconditions of living together in a humane way (Arnett 2017b). Appeals to make a difference alone will not help. Change has to take place by actions in our attempt to mediate between ideals and reality.

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Impassible peace

Enmity and the frozen figures of intractability

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This essay investigates the construction of enemy-Others through a post-Freudian notion of dreamwork, as developed in Jean-François Lyotard's philosophy of the figure. Of critical interest is Lacan's contention that the unconscious is structured like a language. A fragment of a dream is presented and analyzed as a way to reveal how figuration functions in dreams as images and forms related to enemy-Others and how engagement of the figure-matrix can loosen intractability and engage dialogue, albeit in agony. The essay takes up enmity's destablizing consequences for innocent others, which in turn leads to a critical discussion of Emmanuel Levinas' notion of the abyss of otherness out of which the ethical injunction arises, and concludes by considering implications for dialogic ethics.

Keywords: dreamwork, figural, discourse, ethical injunction, otherness

I shall endeavor to elucidate the processes to which the strangeness and obscurity of dreams are due and to deduce from those processes the nature of the psychical forces by whose concurrent or mutually opposing action dreams are generated.

Sigmund Freud (1953, 1)[1]

What I want to show is this: that the matrix is not a language, not a linguistic structure [*une structure de langue*], not a tree of discourses. Of all the figural orders it is the most remote from communicability, the most withdrawn. It harbors the incommunicable.   Jean-François Lyotard (2011, 327)[2]

We like to think of ourselves as pluralistic, secular, and welcoming, but all of those attributes are fragile at the moment, under attack from our fear of the stranger, our suspicion of the unfamiliar, and our haste in constructing the enemy.

Rajini Srikanth (2012, 170)

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1. Subsequent references to *Selected Writings IV* will be cited as SW IV.

2. Subsequent references to *Discourse, Figure* will be cited as DF.

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1.   Introduction

Enemy-Others mark the limit of communication, with adversaries defying and reacting vehemently against any dialogic engagement that might advance peace, civility, decency, or tolerance. As Daniel Bar-Tal (2013) puts it, enemies become "frozen within the evolved socio-psychological repertoire" that has been constructed dynamically through past engagements and interactions (49). The use of the label 'enemy' in itself expresses a delegitimizing belief that often justifies some form of violence against those who are characterized criminally and facelessly in "depersonalized abstract terms as torturer, rapist, desecrator, beast, reptile, insect, germ, or devil" (Bar-Tal 2013, 182). Such a fixed disposition reflects how witnessing or experiencing violence, whether objective or subjective (see Žižek 2008; Smith 2008a), *constitutes* enemies not only through physical acts, but also discourse about them. The enemy becomes figured symbolically, schematically, psychically as a threat for individuals in everyday talk, and for collectivities through news accounts, mass media productions, popular stories, historical narratives, and mytho-political characterizations. Individual and collective memories inscribed through these and other forms of discourse index fears, desires, and actual or potential horrors, which persons and assemblages of various kind use in turn to justify reciprocal inhumane acts that perpetuate intractable conflict.

As Bar-Tal (2013) puts it, enemies are value-laden beings whose presence is felt even in their absence, inscribed iconically in the psyche such that mere mention of them creates a visceral reaction, the threat embodied that legitimizes refusal of dialogue (Smith 2008b). Enemies are not simply antagonists, nor mere opponents in a game, as even their *absent* presence arouses deep-seated emotions and affective intensities linked to survival. In some instances, the mere postulation of the enemy based on spurious evidence serves as a warrant for pre-emptive attack, as history has shown repeatedly through adventurous wars promulgated by ideologically entrenched or opportunistic leaders. In other instances, victimization through sustained structural and/or symbolic violence serves as the basis for enmity, as in the Arab Spring uprisings and other national revolts against oppression and subjugation. In still other instances, the socio-political construction of the enemy or enemies serves as a way to maintain political legitimacy and deflect from issues of incompetence, corruption, or criminal activity (Tidwell 1998, 129).

Enmity is commonly associated with coercive politics and therefore is *contingent*, but there is also compelling evidence that deeper psycho-biological processes make enmity and violence *inherent* in human sociality that manifests aggression. Indeed, Volkan's (1985) seminal research argues in part that there exists in humans a deep-seated psychological need for enemies as well as allies (Holmes 1940; Konner 1993). There is both a binding to the enemy and a rejection of him/her/

them – aggression binds the aggressor to the enemy-Other and comes to partially construct the aggressor's own identity, while also rejecting the enemy as radically Other, a threat that must be diminished, defeated, eliminated or possibly colluded with in order to sustain political legitimacy (Northrup 1989; Kristeva 1984). Through this binding and rejection process, enemies become preoccupied with and dependent on one another, developing closeness while simultaneously engaging in dehumanizing rhetoric and polarizing actions. Hatred and violence go hand in glove with dehumanization and polarization as an ethos of enmity manifests with social-psychological symptoms at all levels of communication, such as selective attention, biased perception, reinforcing information, memorialization, moral amplification and entitlement, reactive devaluation of others, and so on (Bar-Tal 2013, 306–315; Northrup 1989; Tidwell 1998).

Although intractable conflicts seem interminable as persons, groups, and collectivities preserve historical enemies and polarized relations, some adversaries find the capacity and volition to transform perceptions, attitudes and beliefs, de-intensify negative valuations, work through discourse and engage in mediation practices that make conflict tractable. Such an agonistic dialogical repertoire is what we seek in mediating intractability. Yet the sheer force of the intractable, the histories of conflict that have warranted it, the ongoing imprinting of the enemy as other-than-human, the preference for public discourse *about* rather than agonistic dialogue *with*, generate drives and intensities that serve as the dynamic ground from which distortions, rigidification and "differends" arise (Lyotard 1984). An ethics of enmity captures persons in interpersonal relations (*echthra*), socio-cultural groups, and collectivities (*polemios*) (see Žižek 2008). Moreover, the construction of the enemy-Other and attendant threats of violence overwhelm and often subsume persons and groups who are associated with enemies in some way, linking them with perceived or real atrocities suffered. Such images and forms rationalize expendability through association and thus perpetuate drives for revenge among victims and nightmarish cycles of horror and terror.

How can an ethics of peace intervene in such an impossible context that militates against rational discourse and communicative action? How can an ethics of peace that advances dialogical encounters, however excruciating, even be conceived without first probing the ethics of enmity? Given the intensities of the enemy-Other in the hearts and minds of those who have witnessed and/or suffered horrific events, and the associated blockages of volition, capacity, and opportunities for thinking and feeling otherwise, this essay inquires into how enmity might be engaged in experimental ways through a post-Freudian account of three dimensions of dreamwork – the figure-image, the figure-form, and finally the elusive figure-matrix as developed through Jean-François Lyotard's critique of Jacques Lacan's notion of the repressive unconscious.

How might the enemy image and form be loosened, unfrozen sufficiently within existential, social, and cultural imaginaries to at least mitigate unrestrained retributive violence and advance nascent practices of peace? How can an ethics of enmity be reconfigured such that the abyss of Otherness, in Levinasian terms, does not include the slaughter of innocent people, the wholesale destruction of communities, and the horrific disruption of entire societies? What role can a com-municological perspective play in such deep-seated psycho-dynamic reconfigura-tions if, indeed, the figure-matrix of intractability, as Lyotard argues, is constituted "outside" of language and speech? How might dreamwork and its interpretations provide a frame for considering possible thawing, even as wounds fester? Can the dynamic images and ideas associated with dreaming help to melt the frozen fig-ures of the enemy-Other? Can enmity be made to dream?

2.   Dreaming the enemy

Oneiros is the ancient Greek god of dreams, the psychic force that catches the resi-dues of waking life, and, following Freud's characterization, configures affective images and intensities through primary processes of condensation and displace-ment. Lyotard argues that the dream itself leaves traces of intensity manifest from the oneiric figure-matrix, which resides in the unconscious and is beyond the reach of language and logic, even though it compels narrative accounts. Oneiros is a god to reckon with, yet the terms of the reckoning are problematical since, according to Lyotard, the figure-matrix "occupies a space that remains on the far side of the intelligible, that is diametrically opposed to the rule of *opposition* and completely under the control of *difference*" (DF, 339). Although Freud sought to explicate the nature of the psychic forces, he acknowledged a certain futility in that effort, a futility that Lyotard has taken up in his argument *against* the Lacanian idea that the unconscious is structured like a language (DF 252–259). In talking or writing about dreams or reveries, one actually conceals the operative primary forces of dreamwork. The only access to this play appears to be through a trans-gression of the language of communication, which makes doubtful the idea of a dream ever being known scientifically, understood essentially, or rescued from its marginal and fleeting presence. Nevertheless, Freud pointed a way toward such insight and understanding, one that might be used to rattle and loosen the uncon-scious images and intensities associated with enmity.

Think of a tragic event of horror and terror – if you [the reader] has not lived it, can you imagine what it is like? Can the affective intensities so deeply inculcated be rationally conjured, represented adequately in signs? Can one untouched by it imagine such suffering, of living with these intensities emblazoned in memory

and one's very being? Life, what is left of it, exists in a border-zone within which the normative structures and functions of a socio-cultural and politico-economic order are brought radically into question, if not pulverized. If the reader has lived through such horror, witnessed the violent deaths of loved ones, comrades, friends, or others unknown; or been tortured, wounded, threatened, developed stress-disorders, then you know at the most primordial level of being what it is like to be subjected involuntarily to the images and feelings associated with an enemy – consciously in everyday life, and unconsciously in dreams.

The oneiric images emerge and cohere because they are registered iconically through lived experience and felt as real in dreams, then suffered again viscerally through indices such as the sound of a horn, fireworks, a doorbell or ringing phone, a shout, a creak in the stairway, or even the beep of a text message. The involuntary visceral reactions overwhelm. It is terrifying in some instances to hold onto these images and intensities when they emerge, to bring them into some form of expression that makes sense, forcing them to remain in conscious experience while preparing defenses against them. Like a nightmare suddenly come to life, a living condensation of a single disruptive instant of embodied memory displaces and throws one out of context, leaving a shattered and hyper-anxious internal self. The images and intensities capture in an instant the one affected, then dissipate and *refuse address in turn*; they resist dialogic engagement, while splitting the self in two. In this sense, then, the residues of atrocity so deeply inculcated in one's psyche make one radically Other to self in the aftermath of their re-emergence; one's very existence becomes a traumatized remnant. The enemy perseveres as an embodied part of the self, a palpable enemy that ambushes within oneself as a *response to intensities grounded in actual events*.

The other of the normative interpersonal relation where a dialogical rapport is presumed is always already perceived according to the differentiations of a particular social world; otherness is a necessary condition for sociality (see Luhmann 1982). A radical enemy-Other cannot be designated through such normative differentiations as a reflection (mimesis) of some intrinsic property of self. Every act or appearance of an enemy undermines normative differentiated modes of productive, agreeable, and rewarding being-in-the-world with others. Enemy-Otherness threatens or violates identity and legitimacy, with anticipation that actual engagement will result in further damages and wrongs (psychically, emotionally, physically, socially, structurally, symbolically). Damages are felt and wrongs remembered or anticipated by the very arrival of the enemy-Other, as evident in the streets of the USA with confrontations between fascist and anarchist groups, African-American men and police, rival gangs, Native Americans and state agents, undocumented immigrants and ICE, and so on. Within pockets of the dominant culture radical Others may, of course, create distinct social worlds, but this too

labels them as invaders, strangers, aliens, illegals, and potential enemies. Such signific	nification is integral to the enmification process, which suggests that there are different *valences* of enemy-Otherness dynamically constructed in association with adverse elements and contingencies, rather than a single phenomenon that meets conceptual criteria. In short, not all enemies are the same, every enemy is constructed differently, but, as I hope to show, the underlying, unconscious workings of this production function in similar ways.

Volition conditions conflict – some *will or set of wills* drives intractability and militates against peace, but the wills of what or whom? Even if we think of enemy-construction as a language game that uses enemy-Others to justify and sustain dominant players' images, interests, and access to resources, there are motivating forces contingently and historically that take on lives of their own and drive conflict beyond the capacity of a single person, group, or other entity to control, and far beyond an inaugural event. Such willful destruction reflects the death-drive as Freud conceived it, and it functions not just within an individual psyche, but collectively as well (see Macke 2015, 188). Intractability is thus motivated, not arbitrary, and events and circumstances that tie the Gordian knot do not take place all at once. They have histories and intensities embodied by agents whose agency is corrupted by those very intensities and histories, which emerge unexpectedly, unpredictably, like the images in dreams that take hold and force people to live them unconsciously and sort them out later. Intractability is sustained by centripetal forces on each side of a radical conflict that draw in multiple historicities and abide by oracular identities, and by centrifugal forces that spin conflicts out of any one person's or group's control, making the aftermath of events unpredictable and re-figuring lived experiences (see Smith 2016; Evans 2011). It is important to keep these dynamic forces in mind as we question how enmity functions psychically. It is also important to recognize with Freud that "[i]n the technique of psycho-analysis, there is no need for any special synthetic work of synthesis; the individual does that for himself [sic] better than we can" (Lyotard 2011, 390; see also Freud 1953, 1).

2.1 Dreamwork that does not speak

Freud's purpose in *The Interpretation of Dreams* was, quite plainly, to challenge received theories of dreams and offer a new way of analyzing dreamwork. Freud presents a critique of ancient and modern theories and methods of analysis (SE IV, 1–6). He discounts the merely symbolic analysis in which the meaning of any particular image is *given* or assumed (e.g., dreams about falling that suggest death, and so on), whereby the analyst constructs a mythos of significant symbolic material by simply linking the connotations of images (SE IV, 339 passim). He also

counsels against reflective thinking to the extent that it valorizes a critical attitude and hence censors lines of thought about the dream that might otherwise be productive. And he eschews, though in some ways transforms, a topographical approach to analysis, in which the schematic – or gestalt – dimensions of the content are prioritized.

Given the problems of received theories that are compelling, though not productive medically, Freud proposed a method for a suspension of judgment about the manifest dream content which echoes, in many respects, the Husserlian *epoché*. That is, through a process of imaginative free variation similar to the experience one has in falling asleep, judgments about the dream-content are put in abeyance, and one is thus able to allow the free play of latent images and ideas into waking or quasi-waking consciousness (SE IV, 311–14). Primordial drives for "wish-fulfillment" mobilize this free play of the dream-thoughts and yet they are ordinarily resisted or censored by the internalization of social and sexual prohibitions (SE IV, 122–33). Although one may be able to describe the images of a dream (the manifest content), it is arduous and often unbearable psychologically to articulate the excessive forms that structure the dream (latent content), and it remains an open question whether one can express the unconscious dynamics that produce the dreams (SE IV, 277).

Freud's hypothesis is, essentially, that a double censoring takes place (SE IV, 142–45). On one hand, while dreaming, the latent content – the prohibitive material – is not represented or signified in the images; the unconscious mind linked to the stresses and tensions of everyday bodily existence produces this latent content but it is censored preconsciously. What we see in the dream often bears little resemblance to the essence of the latent content. On the other hand, during analysis, as one passes from the conscious experience of the manifest content to the latent content, one again encounters the censor. If, for example, you describe a dream to a friend in daily life, chances are that the *phrasing* of the dream will touch upon ideas and phrases that you will *not* express openly, that produce anxiety, embarrassment and even fear. Thus, censoring takes place on both sides of the manifest content – in its initial pre-reflective expression and in the attempt at reflective perception.

The double negation of latent content reflects a primary repression that produces pathological conditions, and so Freud proposed that dream-thoughts *reproduced through analysis* would relieve neurotic and somatic symptoms.[3] Even though psychoanalysis could not necessarily reproduce and represent in language all dream-thoughts hidden in the manifest dream content (the latent, and

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3. Freud did not argue that psychoanalysis could cure psychosis or schizophrenia, only neuroses and somatic symptoms.

the operations of condensation and displacement that work it), the opening of discourse onto this realm of unconscious experience was revolutionary. Freud's methods of investigating the processes of dream formation were successful to the extent that they assuaged patients' symptoms in ways that had never been seen before. There were empirical results to a radical methodology that could not be ignored by the medical community – the talking cure was born(e). Although his methods and results have been superseded and discounted by contemporary psychiatric theories, neuroscience, pharmacological advances, and even meditation techniques, Freud's work on dreams created an order of analysis based on an order of experience common to all human beings that has influenced a century of theory and criticism in the arts and sciences. As previously suggested, however, to think of the "language" of the dream as a language, or to think that the dreamwork can be represented in language, is problematical despite Lacan's (1977) later pioneering work, especially that related to Schema L (193).[4]

Lacan developed Schema L out of Freud's early work as a way to formulate a treatment for psychosis. The simplified version of this schema is a zig-zag, as in the letter Z, whereby the Subject S is located at the upper left point of the Z, and the "Other O" that represents the dynamics of the unconscious is located at the bottom right point of the Z. From a Lacanian view, the blockage concerning what is unfolding in the unconscious with respect to the enemy-Other, for example, functions as a condition of the Subject (S) and is articulated "like a discourse (the unconscious is the discourse of the Other), whose syntax Freud first sought to define for those bits that come to us in certain privileged moments, in dreams, in slips of the tongue or pen, in flashes of wit" (Lacan 1977, 193). The imagined relation signified by the diagonal line between the object of desire *o* (upper right point of the Schema) and the Ego *o'* (bottom left point of the Schema), cuts between the Subject (S) and the unconscious (O) inhibiting full expression. The analyst's job is to reveal to the patient that he or she is the one taking part in the discourse, even though he/she imagines that it resides outside the Self. Anxiety and fear arise not from the Ego, but from the blockage between the Subject and the Unconscious as the object (*objet petit a*) is engaged. That blockage, for Freud and Lacan, can be both understood and loosened by and through signs, and the *modus operandi* for such loosening is semiotic analysis.

Given this analytical backdrop, whose success hinges on the dialogic relation between analyst and analysand that enables signs to emerge in meaningful form from the unconscious, Lyotard (2011) argues that the problematic relation between dreamwork and language can be addressed through a discussion of three of

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4. Thanks to Richard L. Lanigan for pointing out this lacuna in my argument. See http://lacan.com/seminars1.htm.

the most often invoked concepts in Freud's theory: condensation (SE IV, 279–81) displacement (SE IV, 305–9) and overdetermination (SE IV, 307). Definitions of these terms are scattered throughout *The Interpretation of Dreams*, but there is sufficient equivocation to allow for competing interpretations. This equivocation, then, is the opening for Lyotard's case against Lacan, who he alleges misapplied Freud's theory and misappropriated Roman Jakobson's insights on language and aphasiac disorders (see Lyotard 2011, 252–256; cf. Lacan 1977, 156–157). A full explication of these concepts is beyond the scope of this essay; we will focus first and foremost on condensation, as displacement, Lyotard argues, is preparatory to condensation, reinforcing certain aspects of the dream-thoughts, concealing others and thus creating new visible forms. Overdetermination is driven by desire as both a "mobile element" and a "fixative that keeps certain parts of [the dream] readable" (DF, 245). I will return to this latter figuration as it opens onto the elusive and dynamic work of the matrix.

Lyotard argues that the process of condensation in dreamwork is more radical than the process of metaphor development in the domain of language. Condensation presupposes a change of state, e.g. from liquid to a gas, that is primarily spatial in form and not simply a transference of sense from one domain to the next. In terms of communicology, condensation implies a change of reference or context as well as a change of sense, and, as Lyotard notes, when "applied to a text, it has the effect of telescoping either the signifiers (the Norekdal dream, etc.), or the signifieds (dream of the botanical monograph), or both, into 'objects' which, in any case, are no longer specifically linguistic, and are even specifically non-linguistic" (DF, 238).[5] He goes further:

> Condensation comes under an energetics that plays 'freely' with the units of the initial text, freely, that is, relative to the constraints peculiar to the message, to any linguistic message. Hence condensation is a transgression of the rules of discourse. In what does this transgression consist? In condensation itself! To squeeze signifiers and signifieds together, mixing them up, is to neglect the stable distance separating the letters and words of a text, to scorn the distinctive, invariable graphemes of which they are composed, not to recognize, in a word, the space of discourse. This space, neutral and empty, plane of pure oppositions, does not appear by itself. It is invisible, but all the elements of language (or of writing) attain specificity in it, and it is thanks to this that we are able to 'hear' (or 'read'). (DF, 238)

Dreamwork is produced through drives and forces that cannot be reduced to language; it produces opaque moving images and ideas that are configured in ways

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5. See *The Interpretation of Dreams* for a discussion of the Norekdal dream (SE IV, 296) and the dream of the botanical monograph (SE IV, 281).

much stranger than linguistic operations, *even though those operations reveal traces of condensation, displacement, and overdetermination in themselves.* Freud emphasizes in his discussion of displacement that "The dream is, as it were, differently centred from the dream-thoughts – its content has different elements as its central point" (SE IV, 305). We should keep in mind that, for Freud, the "dream-thoughts" constitute the intricate mix of ideas, memories, and feelings whose associations in waking life get jumbled and scattered by the dreamwork. The dream itself does not represent the logical relations within this mix, however, and interpretation attempts to restore some sense of coherence through secondary revision and the censor.

The metaphor "telescoping" is interesting since its use implies a view from a distance, on one hand, that focuses on one aspect or another and intensifies these aspects to the exclusion of others (the work of metaphor in condensation, according to Lacan); and, on the other hand, the idea that an image is linked to some other image or idea in the dream, albeit in distorted form (the work of metonym in displacement, according to Lacan). In analyzing such processes and offering interpretations along Lacanian lines, the tendency, according to Lyotard, is to concentrate on those selected features embedded in the particular metaphorical or metonymic use, which is evident *only in the discourse about the dream, but not in the dreamwork itself.* There is an equivocation, then, between how one phrases the dream and how the dreamwork operates. The former involves an imputation of logical relation to the latter, which actually operates in a more illogical, asymmetrical, and non-representative manner. Even to think about that which is absent or silent, according to a tropological model, would be to remain in semiotic discourse. To think the *other* of dreams requires that we scramble the logic of semiotic (signifier-signified; sense-reference) discourse itself.

In sum, Lyotard argues that the figure-matrix of dreamwork selects random images that have no logical connection to each other, to the dream-thoughts that produce it, or even to the narrative of the dream as one interprets it. Figures that can be thought about metaphorically and metonymically are, of course, produced through dreamwork, but it is fallacious to use them to represent the unconscious of dreamwork, which involves kinesis and metamorphoses that link the figural with desire.

2.2 A figural analysis

Consider the following segment from a dream I had many years ago, which I wrote down at the time and recently rediscovered in a crumpled notebook. The dream occurred at a time when a particular group of people, whose identities will remain anonymous, had vilified me. They were not mere antagonists or opponents in an

institutional game; they were seeking my destruction. I had allies in my battles with them but the conflict that had been launched and become intractable targeted only me. At the height of the conflict, the following dream manifested.

> I was standing in a field, a familiar place, a field I knew near my childhood home; the house was behind me, obscured by lines of fir trees planted as a wind break along the fence of the field. In the distance, across the open field at the edge of the woods that bordered the field, a pack of wolves appeared. The wolves' teeth were bared, they were growling, ready to race across the field and attack me but remaining still, not moving. Suddenly, a single wolf emerged from the woods, not part of the menacing pack; it came from a different direction, diagonal to the pack, and trotted toward me, not attacking. I stood still, and as this lone wolf approached me, it transformed into a dog that I knew. I felt great relief, and as it drew closer, the menacing wolves abruptly turned and ran into the opaque woods behind them. The dog had two pockets on each side of its coat, into which I put my feet while sitting in a chair and reading securely in my room.

The images in the dream are vivid, the wolves are the dreamer's enemies, the lone wolf an ally, but to concentrate on the images as metaphors of everyday life and to identify who they represent is to ignore the metamorphic workings of desire and difference that construct it. The *signifiance*[6] of the images and forms lie elsewhere, even though the signfications are the place to *begin* the figural analysis.

Lyotard suggests a threefold movement of the dreamwork, which helps to grasp the non-linguistic, surrealistic nature and function of dreams; and, I will argue, is useful for further situating the intractability problematic associated with the configuration(s) of enemy-Others. The operative assumption here is that the aggressors *desire* the enemy, who is con-figured in an originary sense according to a temporal and spatial immobility in the figure-image, but manifest pre-consciously in the figure-form, mobilized in the discourse by virtue of the figure-matrix.

> The figure enjoys a radical complicity with desire. This complicity is the hypothesis that guides Freud in his exploration of the operations of the dream. It allows for a strong articulation between the order of desire and that of the figural through the category of transgression: the 'text' of the preconscious (day's residues, memories) undergoes shocks that render it unrecognizable and illegible. In the illegibility,

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6. The French term *signifiance* refers, as Julia Kristeva (1984) puts it, to the "unlimited and unbounded generating process, this unceasing operation of the drives toward, in, and through language; toward, in, and through the exchange system and its protagonists – the subject and his (*sic*) institutions. This heterogeneous process, neither anarchic, fragmented foundation nor schizophrenic blockage, is a structuring and de-structuring *practice*, a passage to the outer boundaries of the subject and society. Then – and only then – can it be jouissance and revolution" (17; emphasis in original).

> the deep matrix in which desire is caught finds satisfaction, expressing itself in disorganized forms and hallucinatory images.
>
> <div align="right">(Lyotard 2011, 268; see also Lyotard 1984, 57)</div>

The way to grasp the workings of the matrix, to speculate on the forces of difference and results that it mobilizes, is to describe in reverse order the figure-form and figure-image.

The figure-image, then, is that which the inner eye sees in the dream, "an object placed at a distance, a theme. It belongs to the order of the visible, as outline [*tracé révélateur*]" (DF 2011, 268). As a revealing trace that is visible, the figure-image(s) are already synthesized in the narrative of the dream. The pack of wolves and the wolf/dog certainly constitute "object[s] set at a distance," which are thematic. We are at the content level of analysis, with focus not on the field or frame in which the dream operates, but on the specific focal images – a pack of wolves threatening to attack are metamorphoses of the enemy-Others, the wolf separate from the pack that reveals itself is an ally linked to the pack but independent, transforming into a "pocketed dog" that provides comfort. The dreamer escapes the dire circumstances in the field, rescued through the mediation of wolf-turned-dog, transported to a place of safety. If we remain at the level of the symbolic, dreaming the enemy would be limited to the metaphorical and metonymical play of these appositions – the threat of enemies now receding opposed to the protection of one who comes to provide security and comfort. The images are telescopic condensations and displacements of a threat/security reality [the 'Real' in Lacanian terms] that the dreamer has lived and repressed. It is this play of negative force that introduces the complicity of desire with the figural. However, we must move toward a realm of feeling and force that signals something more, which can only be partially expressed in language, and thus transgresses even the transferences so cogently revealed through meanings and speculative identities disclosed in tropes (see Macke 2015).

The analysis moves to that which might be visualized but tends to remain peripheral. Lyotard argues that the figure-form "is present in the visible, and may even be visible, but in general remains unseen," just as the choreography of a dance, or the "sceneography" of a play, "the architecture of a picture" is not typically seen when watching the performance or viewing the painting, although with a trained eye figure-form can be recognized; the scene, or schema, serves as a context, a "Gestalt of a configuration" and to identify it requires seeing beyond the telescopic images and ideas and their representational values to residues of daily life (DF 2011, 268). Here Lyotard makes reference to the regulatory trace [*tracé régulateur*] put forth by Lhote – an expressive sign that obeys laws of knowledge and production such as rhythmic organization, apposition of images, geometric forms

and other invariants (2011, 216) where "drawing" [for Lhote] enables "sensory space" to "speak" (2011, 218).

How does this synesthetic speaking play out in the analysis of the dream? The initial scene described above is outside in an open space (a field felt to be familiar) bordered by a more opaque area (the woods) with a house not far behind but otherwise no domicile in sight. Several objects stand in relation to one another: (1) a pack of wolves that initially faces the dreamer then moves away in proportion to the lone wolf approaching; (2) an image of self standing and looking back and forth between the pack and the lone wolf, a feeling first of fear and then relief, a recognition that the wolf/dog is familiar, that it has pockets; (3) the dreamer who is displaced to a location completely removed from the field, a room where he is reading, warming his feet in the pockets of the dog. The pocketed dog serves as the force that connects the two vectors of precarity and security. The scene involves intensities between images in one space and a relationship with one of the images in another space, both of which can be considered objects of desire (*objet a*) in the Lacanian sense. The dreamer is drawn between enemy/friend with contrasting affects – situated in a dramatic field of tension and feeling bordered on a contoured horizon of woods that frame but also conceal the forces that first produce and then swallow the pack. Although the visible pack of wolves frightens, the dreamer image of self in the dream does not move; he does not run from the wolves nor does he attempt to scare them off. Rather he observes them at a distance, baring their teeth but not attacking for the kill. Fear does not subside because the enemy moves away, they move away *as fear subsides in the approach of the friendly wolf/dog*, and with recognition that the approaching "wolf" is not an enemy but a friendly dog. The dog does not come out of the pack of wolves, but from a direction diagonal to them, from a peripheral portion of the first space. So again, the "I" that is the principal subject of the dream is positioned not merely between random or arbitrary objects, but in motivated relation to contrasting figures of desire, rejecting one that retreats to the woods surrounding the field, and bound to another that emerges in the same form as those in the enemy pack and from a different location in the woods, and who arrives transformed – a metamorphosis.

The wolf that is re-figured as a dog becomes disfigured as it moves into a different space, but serves as a primal transformative figure in each space. This redundancy is the only link between the two spatial trajectories of the dream (the field initially and the room subsequently). The dreamer is displaced through this transformed object, transferred to another space, as he becomes detached from the pack of wolves that faded back into the abyss. The generative force (*significance*) of the drives in the figure-form hinges on the schematic, or choreographic, positioning of a transformative image-figure that mobilizes the enemy to retreat even though that figure does not address them – the mere presence and movement

toward the subject forces a retreat of the enemy. Without wolf/dog's appearance, there would be chaos or even death.

This interpretation, which arguably coheres with the Lacanian schema, does not reach or in any way disclose the figure-matrix, the unconscious rhythmic intensities that work their way through the form and the images, yet are invisible and impossible to represent in image or form, because, for Lyotard, the matrix is tied to "originary repression" even while it is "laced with discourse:"

> Nonetheless the figure-matrix is figure, not structure, because it is, from the outset, violation of the discursive order. By replacing it with a schema of intelligibility, one would render unintelligible its immersion in the unconscious. This immersion is proof, however, that what is at stake is indeed the other of discourse and intelligibility. To establish this matrix in textual space, all the more so if the latter is systematic, would be to imagine it as an [*archè*], to entertain a double phantasy in relation to it: first, that of an origin; second, that of an utterable origin. Yet the phantasmatic matrix, far from being an origin, testifies to the contrary that our origin is an absence of origin, and that everything that presents itself as object of an originary discourse is a halllucinatory figure-image, placed precisely in this initial non-site.   (DF, 268–269; see also 1984, 57–58)

Why should we attempt to discuss it then? Because recognition of the dynamics of the figure-matrix lends credence to the idea that there are realms of feeling, piercings of affect, pulsations and inhibitions of a productive unconscious that remain repressed but can still inform and *alter the trajectory* of an ethics of enmity as evidenced through the images and forms of the dream.

This much we know: A desire seeks to be fulfilled (a positive charge) and its clash (a negative energy) with prohibitions (another negative charge) generates a negativity that cannot be visualized or made legible, but mobilizes energy nonetheless; as Lyotard emphasizes:

> It belongs to neither plastic nor textual space. It is difference itself, and as such does not suffer that minimum of oppositionality that its spoken expression requires, of image- or form-conditioning that its plastic expression entails. Discourse, image, and form: all equally pass over the figure-matrix, for it resides in all three of all spaces   (DF 275–76; see also 1984, 65).

Difference understood as negativity or energetics works over and formulates the images of the dream just as it works over discourse while being neither discourse nor dream. The figure-matrix constitutes and is constituted by a free *radical* energy that seeks fulfillment through various random and, at times, frightening appearances.

The notion of the figure-matrix can be thought as that which produces anomalous events, those that cannot be explained or otherwise placed according to the

dominant modes of discourse. Enmity persists as a mobilizing *event in itself beyond the wills or intentions of those engaged, just as the events of the dream develop despite the conscious will of the dreamer*. In both instances they operate due to unconsciousness – sleep in the latter instance, oblivion in the former. The figure-matrix, the dynamic energetic force of difference itself, is not nothingness despite human obliviousness to its existence, but neither is it structured like a language. As negativity, it formulates persistent paratactical linkages seeking figuration, however reactive, poetic, non-normative, or odd the phrasing of those figures might appear. Oddities and paratactical linkages are the stuff of dreams, and also insight, invention, innovation, experimentation, and alteration. If the dream analyzed above can possibly serve any revelatory purpose, it is through the paradoxical dynamic stillness where the enemy recedes, the stranger appears, and the dreamer welcomes. It is this tripartite mobilization within the abyss of Otherness that the Enemy and the Stranger weave into the Self; it is here where both an ethics of peace that seeks to forgive and be forgiven, and an ethics of enmity that militates against forgiveness, that a common energetics of binding and rejection resonates for the possibility of agonistic dialogue (see Derrida 2001; Kristeva 1984; Smith 2008b).

3.   Implications for dialogical ethics

To begin to end the dreamwork of this essay, I will take account, one more time, of the relation between the dream and the enemy-Other. I will then draw on critical concerns about the Levinasian notion of the abyss of Otherness as it relates to the ethical injunction. My interest, in the end, is to suggest a new way of thinking about the frozen figures of intractability that might encourage agonistic dialogue.

According to Freud, the unconscious is just as dynamic as physicists have shown the universe to be. When we dream, this dynamism becomes focused on residue from the day mixed with past experiences and intensities that serve as a magnet for dream formation. The manifest content of the dream is created telescopically by focusing the mind and mirroring, reflexively, the depth of the unconscious dynamic negativity related to residual memory. The images and ideas created are condensed, displaced, and overdetermined; they are not expressly linguistic transformations through which meaning becomes transparent, but opaque, dense, bordering on the abyss. Unpacking this dreamwork through discourse is the stuff of analysis, as I have attempted to show, but discourse can only go so far. For Lyotard, to the extent that the dream cannot be made to speak, we can instead work to *make discourse dream*, as, he argues "the figure dwells in discourse like a phantasm while discourse dwells in the figure like a dream. The only thing is that it must be agreed that the 'language' of the unconscious is not modeled on

articulated discourse" (DF, 249). It is, rather, the apogee of the inarticulate; the dream, he insists, is "deconstructed discourse from which no language, even normal, is entirely free" (DF, 249). I have attempted to show here, however fallibly, how discourse can be mobilized like a dream in finding terms for the intractable confrontation with enemies.

How might the figurations of dreamwork, then, serve as a model that enables productive and potentially conciliatory writing and speaking about disastrous enemy-Others and those who are associated with them? (see Derrida 1978). Of particular concern are violent actions against those who are not the enemy per se, but associated with them through kinship, communal affiliation, or proximity. Wanton violence against them suggests not only a blind lack of empathy for the humanity of anonymous other(s), but a lack of transparency to oneself as constituted relationally through others. Enmity does not allow associated others to become *other than* complicit with the enemies, freezing them in time and space, reducing them to less-than-human status, and raising critical questions about the Levinasian notion of the "abyss of otherness from which the ethical injunction emanates" (Žižek 2008, 55).

We must hold onto the question concerning how leaders of civilized nations tolerate, excuse or condone the "abstract-anonymous killing of thousands" of innocent people under the guise of the good fight or just war (Žižek 2008, 44). Such action, and the impunity of those who order and carry it out, is sustained as normative due to an ethical illusion, Žižek argues. In a post-political world where the rhetoric of fear and the logic of pre-emption have become normative means of controlling the unknown and reducing uncertainty, the anonymous abject subject is "no longer a Neighbour, but an object whose pain is neutralized, reduced to a property that has to be dealt with in a rational utilitarian calculus […] What disappears here is the abyss of the infinity that pertains to a subject" (Žižek, 45).

But the question remains: How does gratuitous violence against those configured to be enemy-Others, and especially those associated with them, come to be normalized without recognition of its pragmatic contradictions, given that it "violates the ethical norms which sustain [one's own] speech community?" (Žižek, 48) It seems we can only answer that it involves "brutal repression and self-denial," an obliviousness to that which links all innocent life (48). Events of mass violence, killing, maiming, the actual horrors and sufferings of concrete persons, are not the Real event for those who launch it and others who witness it from afar, but framed in discourse as necessities for promoting an abstract Good. We are faced with a paradoxical form of enactment and response associated with an ethics of "fetishist disavowal," whereby "even the most universal ethics [is] obliged to draw a line and ignore some sort of suffering" (Žižek, 53).

Certainly if we witness torture, killing, and mutilation first-hand, it is very difficult to avoid the consequences of allowing or resisting it. But this witnessing from below typically does not serve as the ground of any universal ethics of peace, which instead emanates from a conception of some Good that, through fetishistic disavowal, becomes more Real than the actual disaster on the ground or any potential justice for those who are wronged. And so we live out inconsistencies, and fail to "draw all the consequences from [our] ethical attitudes" – this failure suggests that "exclusion of some form of otherness from the scope of our ethical concerns is consubstantial with the very founding gesture of ethical universality;" in short, "the more universal our explicit ethics is, the more brutal the underlying exclusion" (Žižek, 54).

Levinas addresses this conundrum of ethics by replacing the drive for universality with a respect for otherness, whereby the ethical injunction transposes or displaces one from the position of addressor to that of addressee – the transposition takes place proximately, "prior to any intellection, it resides in the 'welcoming of the stranger' […] which institutes a new universe" (Lyotard 1988, 111; see also Arnett 2017). The emphasis on the asymmetrical relation destabilizes the self according to the workings of the figure-matrix precisely because the I/you positions are *not* reversible. For Levinas, "ethical transcendence does not take place in [the field of speculative knowledge]. It does not take place at all, because the other of the ethical relation is not localizable …" (Lyotard 1988, § 112). Does such a view warrant an ethics of enmity that rationalizes killing even of innocents? Shlomo Malka pressed Levinas on this very point in an interview conducted in the aftermath of the Sabra and Chatilla massacres in Lebanon [when IDF forces allowed Phlangists to enter the refugee camps to root out *fedayeen*]:

> Emmanuel Levinas, [Malka asks] you are the philosopher of the 'other'. Isn't history, isn't politics the very site of encounter with the 'other', and for the Israeli, isn't the 'other' above all the Palestinian? [To which Levinas responds]: My definition of the other is completely different. The other is the neighbour, who is not necessarily kin, but who can be. And in that sense, if you're for the other, you're for the neighbour. But if your neighbour attacks another neighbour or treats him unjustly, what can you do? Then alterity takes on another character, in alterity we can find the enemy, or at least then we are faced with the problem of knowing who is right and who is wrong, who is just and who is unjust. There are people who are wrong. (Levinas 1989, 294)

This assessment is absolutely correct, in my view – there are people and groups who are wrong, who seek the destruction or marginalization of innocent others and advance fascistic ideas and practices. But the question then becomes: How does enmity fit with the conception of the neighbor, or the stranger, or any other

who approaches in friendship or who attacks others in one's name? Clearly Žižek correctly suggests that enmity arises from the abyss of Otherness just as much as obligation and responsibility for the neighbor. For him, the figure of the Neighbour is not the only figure that deserves unconditional respect, but also the "imponderable Other as enemy, the enemy who is the absolute Other and no longer the 'honourable enemy,' but someone whose very reasoning is foreign to us, so that no authentic encounter with him in battle is possible" (Žižek 2008, 55). For Levinas of *Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence*, enmity arises when the "said" takes hold of the "saying," instantiating an "oracle in which the said is immobilized," producing a "bankruptcy of transcendence […] that thematizes the transcending in the logos, assigns a term […] congeals it into a 'world behind the scenes,' and installs what it says in war and in matter, which are the inevitable modalities of the fate woven by being in its interest" (Levinas 1991, 5).

This is not to say that an oracular freezing of the "said" necessarily dominates a "saying" that is antecedent to language, or that any correlation of saying and the said manifests a betrayal in which a hardening or thematization [of saying within the said] occludes the possibility for recognition, forgiveness, or reconciliation. It is to say, rather, that once an oracular frame is frozen and the dynamic energetics of the figure-matrix closed off, the other who is neither neighbor nor stranger, but a known enemy-Other, becomes conceived as a pure exteriority that obliges in the negative sense toward destruction. In response to the question on the "temptation of innocence" in the face of atrocity, Levinas responds:

> Innocence is not the zero degree of conscience, but merely an exalted state of responsibility […] the more innocent we are, the more we are responsible […] But I should also say that all those who attack us with such venom have no right to do so, and that consequently, along with this feeling of the unbounded responsibility, there is certainly a place for defence […] I'd call such a defence a politics, but a politics that is ethically necessary. Alongside ethics, there is a place for politics.
> (Levinas 1989, 291–92)

Politics presumes agonistic dialogue; it is the apolitical violent response that undermines communicability and perpetuates disasters. Further in this interview, Levinas (1989) acknowledges that there is a limit to "ethically necessary political existence," but he refuses to define such a limit. Rather, he states that what is happening in the Middle East marks "the place where ethics and politics come into confrontation and where their limits will be sought […] contradictions can only be resolved through events, human lived experience […] light will be shed on the matter, in the concrete consciousness of those who suffer and struggle" (293). Levinas made this statement in 1982. Since then, innumerable disasters of lived experience have taken place in the Middle East and beyond, further hardening

the figures of intractability. A disaster, as John Caputo (1993) puts it, is actually an economic notion. It refers to "unrecoverable loss. Disasters are events of surpassing or irretrievable loss [...] a wasting of life [...] that cannot be incorporated into a 'result,' that cannot be led back into a gain. You cannot grow another body; you cannot regain wasted years" (29)

Perhaps humans do need enemies, and the drive to create disasters that feed further disasters is a concession that should be made, recognizing with Levinas that defense of self, family, community, and society in the face of life-threatening attacks requires a violent response in turn. We also need friendship, neighborliness. If an ethics of enmity arises from the abyss of otherness where an ethics of amity also forms, then a recognition and engagement of that heterogeneity must also be, paradoxically, open to condensation and displacement, overdetermination, poetic transformation, imaginative free variation, experimental ways to modulate the incessant forces of the death-drive. Perhaps this too is where dialogue in agony must be born(e), where the frozen figures of intractable conflict might be thawed sufficiently for the menace to retreat and the stranger to be welcomed. We should work collectively to make discourse dream. Only then will peace be passible.

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Proposal for a typology of listening markers and listening request markers

The case of a public consultation

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Public hearings allow individuals to disseminate their opinions but also to hear the views of others. While citizens find themselves invested with more opportunity to engage in public conversation, are they in possession of the tools to effectively accomplish their objective? Listening stands out as one of these under-considered tools. This study focuses on "listening" in a public consultation process and seeks to understand its mechanisms. By unpacking the listening process, it proposes a typology of signs indicating listening, and solicitations to listen and reveals that 'attentive listening' can turn into 'engaged listening' as listening priorities are negotiated and established. Engaged listening favours sharing authority and authorship among stakeholders.

Keywords: public consultation, listening, typology, negotiation

Unlike voting, public hearings allow individuals to express and disseminate their opinions and points of view as well as to hear and consider the views of others. While citizens find themselves invested with more opportunity to engage in public conversation, are they in possession of the tools to reach their objective effectively? Listening stands out as one of these under-considered tools. But what is listening, exactly? How do people express or mark it? How can we identify it in interaction, knowing that listening seems, by definition, unobservable given its apparent invisibility? These are the questions I tried to address by analyzing the details of a particular listening setting: a public consultation set in Montreal, Canada.

By delving into the literature on listening, while attempting to define it, I first propose to establish what I call the "hearing/listening/hearing span," which then leads me to present a typology of listening, based on the identification of *listening markers* and *listening requests markers*. This typology emerged, as we will see, from a first analysis of the public consultation, which I studied analyzed using

a methodology inspired by conversation analysis (Pomerantz and Fehr 2011). Following an overview of the extant literature, an outline of the hearing/listening/ hearing span, and a brief description of the methodology and fieldwork, I explain how the typology was thought out and designed. The typology served as a toolbox when I returned to the transcription and further analyzed the participants' turns. Two intertwined tensions emerge – negotiation and recognition – as we will see in the subsequent discussion this analysis generates.

1.   Literature review

Listening tends to be approached from two different perspectives: either in a psychological and behavioral fashion, or following a philosophical course. The first of the two approaches is usually concerned with issues centered on listening competencies, types and styles (Watson, Barker, Weaver 1995). More recently, the interpersonal dimension has become an integral part of the reflection of listening (Pecchioni and Halone 2000; Halone and Pecchioni 2001). Modeling the listening process is also a matter of concern (Bodie, Worthington, Imhof and Cooper 2008). This type of approach has produced theories, as well as a vast body of empirical studies that are, however, grounded essentially in very controlled settings (laboratories) and examining a narrow range of populations (usually university students).

In contrast to this psychological and behavioral approach, a philosophical current has developed that defines listening with a more holistic perspective. One of its preoccupations is to lift listening out of oblivion in the study of interactive processes and allot it a more preeminent place. For instance, Dobson (2012) suggests that a possible reason for disinterest in studying listening in politics stems from the notion that listening tends to be viewed as a feminine act arising from a desire to please (Quintilian), while talking appears manlier, and linked to a desire to conquer (Levin 1989). Listening thus tends to be neglected in favor of speaking as a research subject, the former being associated with passivity and uneventfulness, while the latter is linked to action and transformation.

In her work on listening, Corradi Fiumara (1990) quotes Lao Tze to contrast silence and speech. This quote reads just as well in attributing the complementary functions of speaking (vessel) and listening (nothing):

> We turn clay to make a vessel:
> But it is the space where there is nothing that
> The utility of the vessel depends
> Therefore, just as we take advantage of what is
> We should recognize the utility of what is not.   (102)

This allegory repositions listening and speech on equal footing, which is one of Lipari's (2014) objectives. She invites us to consider interaction and dialogue in a more holistic way, interweaving listening, thinking, speaking, and being, with the intention of "listening others to speech" (199). This ontological dimension of listening (Hyde 1994) brings forth ethical considerations. In this context, interpersonal listening is understood as a way of being with others; with it arises the idea of authenticity to oneself and the others.

The emphasis here is on and around constitutive aspects of listening rather than on transmission of communicative information. Central subjects of inquiry for a philosophical branch of listening studies include the ambiguities of language, misunderstandings, as well as the ever-remaining mystery of the utterances presented to a listener. The dark side of listening is, however, too often downplayed, as listening may be also employed to collect information to be used against a person. Eavesdropping stands as a particular example of this phenomenon. It can cause much harm, or, conversely, save lives. Lipari illustrates the opposing possibilities embedded in listening. She reminds us, echoing Derrida (1981, in Lipari 2014), that just as the Greek word "*pharmakon*" may designate both a poison and a remedy, listening can serve both a noble and a malicious design.

The ambivalence of words, their interpretation through listening, and the authenticity of the listener's intent (Hyde 1994) thus are reflected upon theoretically. However, very few empirical studies investigate these questions from an analytical perspective. To examine the mechanics of listening, it first appears necessary to delineate the hearing/listening span, which is what I now propose to do.

2.   The hearing/listening/hearing span

How can the concept of listening be defined? As we know, the very notion of hearing tends to be linked to that of understanding ("I hear you"), but what about listening? Lipari (2014) ties in various etymological aspects of listening:

> Webster defines "to hear" as "1: to perceive or apprehend by the ear" and "2: to gain knowledge of by hearing." Similarly, the *Oxford English Dictionary* (OED) defines "to hear" as "To perceive, or have the sensation of, sound; to possess or exercise the faculty of audition, of which the specific organ is the ear." The verb "to listen," in contrast, is derived from the Middle English *listnen* and is defined by the idea of attention to sound. Harper traces the word "listen" to the Sanskrit *srosati* "hears, obeys," and derives the word "obey" from the Latin *obedire*, to "give ear, literally 'listen to,' from *ob* 'to'+ *audire* 'listen, hear.'   (p. 50)

Listening is translated in Latin by "audire," as well as by "auscultare," ("aus" meaning "ear"). "Auscultare" also signifies obeying (Gaffiot 1934). The term resonates with different nuances of meaning. For instance, the injunction "Listen to me!" refers to the (aural) obedience we are requesting from our audience. An audit is an examination of income and expenses, in an accounting perspective. In this case, we listen to accounting records. In French, a doctor "auscultates" a patient when she examines her. She thus listens to the patient's body.

We can therefore understand listening as a manner of putting oneself at the other's disposal, convening the listener's particular frame of mind toward the speaker. Alterity in listening may take on an authoritative glint (insofar as it implies a request for attention), while with the idea of hearing ('I hear you'), alterity feels more appeased, almost disinterested. It transcends the listener's personal sphere and sets her in a shared context. When I hear you, I understand you, or what you are saying. This does not mean that I agree though, but rather that I claim to have understood what you meant to say. Hearing in this context is in some way the successful conclusion of listening.

Let us now look at the other end of the listening spectrum, where the word "hearing" is also present. In this case though, hearing, is to be understood as a physiological phenomenon. It is the necessary but insufficient condition for listening. Indeed, it is impossible to listen without hearing, while the opposite is possible. The equivalent for a deaf person would be not to see her interlocutor's lips or hands.

At the two extremes of this continuum are the two understandings of the word hearing, whilst in the middle, we find the word listening. What is it in listening that does not happen in hearing (in the physiological sense)? Physiologically, hearing refers to the reception and translation of a soundwave to the eardrum, and then its interpretation in the brain. It is only through listening that the soundwave is brought to one's attention and interpreted, so that one may react to it. Therefore, listening starts with *attention*. Listening commits the listener, awakens her to her own surroundings. Of course, above and beyond attention, the listener must be capable of interpreting the incoming soundwave. Listening to someone talking in a language we do not understand makes it difficult, if not impossible, to interpret his or her discourse.

In summary, listening is the area in the span that advantages the attention given to the other, without going so far as to agree with him or her. The minimal double condition for listening is the perception of a sound and the attention (variable) the listener will bring to it. As the attention intensifies, attentive listening merges into involved listening, which implies the active search for understanding, without committing to it. Listening becomes an unavoidable passage toward hearing/understanding. In French, "entendre" literally signifies "reaching out to" the other (see Table 1).

Table 1. Listening/hearing span

Hearing	Listening	Hearing
Physiological: reception of sounds to the eardrum	Minimum: attention to the reception of a sound	Minimum: attempting to understand the other's utterance
	Maximum: acknowledgment and reaction to the reception of a sound. Involved listening	Maximum: attunement

While the general hearing/listening/hearing span is now established, a finer version of it emerges from analyzing listening in the context of a public consultation.

3. Fieldwork

Of many possible conversation settings, including public, private and more or less formal situations, I decided to focus specifically on formal settings in the public sphere. Public consultations are forums designed to allow stakeholders in a cause to express their points of view before a decision is reached. This appeared to be an ideal context for teasing out the listening process that arises in the course of interactions. The purpose of public consultations is to *hear out* any citizen willing to express himself or herself on a given topic. These voices are transcribed and organized into a report that is then submitted to the elected officials of the city, or to an institution, to help in the decision-making process.

The public consultation on which this study was carried out focused on the building of a green composting station in a Montreal neighborhood. The city owns the lot on which the construction is planned. During an information session organized prior to the consultation itself, a team from the city presented the project to a group of concerned citizens and covered different topics before the floor was open and the citizens could ask for additional information. Following this information session, anyone who wished to do so could request to intervene during the consultation session. The request had to be formally addressed to the Office of Public Consultation and the participant could submit a written document detailing what he or she would discuss. Two evening consultation sessions took place three weeks later.

Three categories of members could be identified for this consultation:

1. Six members of the city team in charge of developing the project. Mostly engineers and managers, they were requested to intervene when necessary to bring additional information.

2. The commission, represented by a President and her colleague. The city's Office of Public Consultation hired both women exclusively for the Consultation.
3. The members of the public. Citizens who had congregated there to listen, get informed and, for some of them, deliver a speech and be questioned.

As for the format, the consultation unfolded over two evening sessions, each lasting about three hours. The order of the participants' presentations was announced at the beginning of each session. The President of the Commission opened each session by recalling the rules and regulations for public consultations, specifying that each participant was allotted ten minutes to make a presentation and ten more minutes to be questioned by the commission, should they require precisions or further information in order to write their report. The public consultation worked somewhat like a desynchronized conversation. The information session was followed by three weeks during which participants could submit documents to the Commission. The Commissioners could then read these documents in preparation to the public consultation per se. During this consultation, the two parties then had a chance to meet face-to-face; each participant who had submitted a document had the opportunity to make a ten-minute presentation to the commission and to the public. Following this presentation, the participant could then be questioned on his or her presentation. Other people who had not submitted documents were also allowed to make presentations.

This was neither a conversation nor an interrogation, but rather a hybrid mode of exchange within a large place dedicated to listening. The context was more formal than a mere conversation or discussion as the President of the Commission led the entire process. Discussions were not systematic, as participants were, in some cases, not questioned. Silence itself could serve as a marker of how the presentation had been received (Corradi-Fiumara 1990). The arena of this of public consultation thus provided an opportunity to observe and analyze how participants perceived listening, how they went about how they went about being heard, as well as how they handled listening in general. Given the nature of the collected data, a qualitative approach seemed ideal as it allowed a bypass of the impalpability of listening, its daunting imperceptibility. In the case of this study and given the nature of the context, in which the bulk of the activities unfold through collecting points of view and explanations, a conversation analysis-inspired perspective seemed most appropriate. The consultation could indeed be translated as an interactive performance operating within a formal setting.

In keeping with conversation analysis (Sacks, Jefferson and Schegloff 1995; Silverman 1998; Jefferson 2004; Sidnell and Stivers 2013), I thus started by video-recording the interactional details of each session. With two video cameras, I simultaneously filmed the participants and the commissioners and then edited the

two images side by side. I then transcribed the interactions that had been recorded using the Jefferson transcript symbols (2004). This allowed for meticulous observation of the interactions that took place, focusing on both speakers and listeners. This led me to the following research question: How does listening manifest itself in a public consultation context?

4.   Designing a typology

As I was collecting my data, I realized that this analysis called for an analytical framework, which I had to build. Drawing on this observation and various researchers' works, I developed what I call a listening typology, with, on one side, *listening markers*, and on the other, *listening requests markers*. Following this first "layer of differentiation," a second round of analyses led me to detail further each of the two primary categories, then to apply fully this newly revised grid to the collected data. A detailed description of the typology is therefore necessary to understand the subsequent data analysis, knowing that this typology emerged from the analyses themselves. One of the means to investigate listening consisted in observing the reactions that utterances produced in the listener as they were pronounced. Some of these reactions are what I name *listening markers*. I take for granted that the listener does not systematically manifest his or her listening. I will thus focus on the ones that I deemed as noticeable. The objective here is to establish a registry or typology of these markers.

Listening markers consist in listening manifestations that are physically (through body movement, use of objects) and verbally or paraverbally identifiable (through the listener's reactions). Among the verbal markers, some are vocal ("aha," "mmmm," for example), while others are verbal (any type of utterance). Listening markers also reflect a more or less attentive listening. This variable determined the classification axis of my markers. At one end of this axis are "non-listening" markers, indicating the listener's absence of listening. This position may be deliberate (refusal to listen) or not (the listener is not paying attention). Neighboring this type of marker is that of misunderstanding, when the listener appears not to understand what is being said or asked from her, when the listening is upset (warped) for one reason or another (overlapping utterances, external noise, mispronunciation and so on).

Next comes a listening, of which the perceptible markers testify more or less deliberately to the listener's intention. The "attentive listening marker" designates the trace, proof or clue the listener may send back (consciously or not) to the speaker to signify that she is following what her interlocutor has apparently uttered. This kind of marker is used to reassure or encourage the speaker (Bavelas

et al. 2002; Stivers 2008; Lindstrom & Sorjonen in Sidnell and Stivers 2013). A third category regroups listening markers that embody the listener's state of involvement in the interaction (Bavelas et al. 2000; Hyde 1994; Stewart 1983). We will see that the speaker is equipped with a set of *requesting* tools. Their purpose is to solicit, to reinforce, or to refresh the interlocutor's listening. There exists a range of solicitations to listening, from a delicate invitation, to inciting, right up to the injunction to listen. These vary according to the listeners and to the different moments during the interaction.

5.   Data analysis

The established frame allows for a precise analysis of the interactions through the video and transcriptions that have been collected. I will now detail the three *listening marker* categories before looking into the *listening requests markers*.

5.1 Listening markers

Listening markers range from the ones attesting attentive listening to those testifying involved listening, ending with markers of poor or non-listening, identifiable through verbal and non-verbal markers.

5.1.1   *Attentive listening markers*
They represent a first category of listening in the public consultation. Most of these markers are non-verbal and have been listed as: the gaze, reading documents, taking notes, nodding, emotional reactions, imposed listening and reiteration. I shall be presenting them in this order with increasing sophistication in listening manifestation, from a simple bodily gesture to a verbal sign.

5.1.1.1   *The gaze.*   It is probably the listener's most immediate marker of listening vis-à-vis the speaker. In the present case, it is only mildly acceptable as most participants were illustrating their presentation with a PowerPoint. As a result, the listener's gaze had a tendency to bounce from the presentation to its presenter. Therefore, I broadened the observation concerning the listener's gaze, not only on the speaker but also on the accompanying PowerPoint presentation. The commissioners were equipped with a screen that was placed in front of them, half way between the participant and their desk. I took note of the moments when their gaze fled this direction and set these markers in the third category (poor and non-listening markers).

5.1.1.2   *Reading the participant's PowerPoint or paper presentation while the participant is pronouncing her speech.*   In the following example, the president is clearly following (a participant) Josée's paper presentation while listening to her oral one.

```
1 Pdt What has changed, is the second page where (0.5) ((Pdt turns the
2     page in front of her, it is highlighted in blue)) I worry about the
3     fact the- there isn't, if I have understood correctly, a study on the
4     impact of the noise that can affect Sherbrooke East. (2; 936)
```

This marker reveals the listener's effort to follow the elements of the speaker's discourse. The commissioners implicitly position the written or projected presentation as tools that enhances their listening capacity. When these tools are absent, they explain that they cannot "hear" as well, as with what happens here:

```
 1 Pdt   (…). I think that it was really interesting to hear you. It's more,
 2        it's always more difficult for us commissioners when we receive
 3        a- how can I explain, hmm
 4 Stan   [live
 5 Pdt    [an oral presentation, or the information on the spot, because, as
 6        you have seen, we had the opportunity to read the other
 7        presentation before, we analyze them and even discuss them
 8        between ourselves before meeting you.
 9 Stan   I agree. It's- it's [I'm really sorry,
10 Pdt                       [So, no no
11 Stan   [It's not the right way, but I was a little pressed for time.
12 Pdt    [That's why we are (1.0) a little surprised, here. (hhh) Very well.
13        I think that I will thank you and hmm. (1; 1595)
```

From this interaction, we can thus speculate that the commissioners find it difficult to engage in an involved listening fashion without these listening supports (written text or PowerPoint presentation).

Direct, live listening is perhaps too immediate for them, making it difficult to find questions that would be relevant and precise. The lack of material support thus tends to impoverish the listening potential. And so the commissioners simply cancel the Q&R session with this participant. Although listening markers are noticeable during Stan's presentation (the president utters "hmm" and "yes" twice, and she takes notes), the listening capacity seems to be considered inadequate without support. The listening style remains attentive but fails to enter the *involved listening* category, thus disabling any further investigation that a Q&R session could provide.

It is important to note a second point, this time concerning the PowerPoint presentations and written documents, and their link to the previous marker, the gaze. The listener's gaze bounces between the speaker and the screening of the

document. These objects externalize the speaker's words, extending or doubling up the emitter's message. The speaker is simultaneously (re)presented in the material form of the paper-on-screen projection, as well as in the form of a person. Everything happens as though the person who makes a presentation leaves her words hanging on the screen so others may listen to them. The listener thus shares her attention between the voice and the written and projected words, photos and graphs, thereby deepening her listening. The message is echoed from the person who is making the presentation to the written text and back, like a sounding board. These objects are supposed to catch the listener's attention in addition to what the speaker says.

Later, another participant will use a PowerPoint presentation to make sure the listeners grasp a particular geographical location she is referring to, thereby insuring a common understanding of her words.

```
1 Marie (…) So here you have the prop- the project that had been
2       proposed. So, you can see, hmm, the connection that had been
3       made between Francois Bricault Street, hmm, and then went in
4       toward St Jean Baptiste Boulevard on the West (.) with the
5       emplacement of the various commercial buildings still concerned
6       about the project on the West side of (.) like a phase two, with
7       the project which was on the West of the Groupe Gabriel. (2;
8       485)
```

As the word *proposed* is uttered, we see the commissioners staring at the screen and one of them raising an eyebrow. They have been trying to understand this geographical detail since the first session. As the second italicized word is pronounced – *Groupe Gabriel* – we see them frowning, as they seem not to understand. Later during the Q&A session with Marie, they will come back on these points and thank Marie for clarifying these geographical details (2; 516). Between these two moments, Marie has provided additional information, allowing the commissioners to understand her point. We can clearly see a progression in the commissioners' understanding of the neighborhood's layout between the first and second sessions. The commissioners' comprehension becomes clear as we follow the listening markers' trajectory over the sessions.

5.1.1.3   *Note-taking as listening markers.*   The commissioners are the only members who took notes during the sessions. Since I could not read what the commissioners were noting down, I have taken into account their physical gestures. Here is an example of the president taking notes (written in italics).

```
1 Stan (…) but these would be interesting to look into more, especially
2       given that we know that the second biomethanization center, it
```

```
 3       will be necessary to include some of their intake, because as we
 4       do only residential, it won't be enough.  The city of Montreal's
 5       official position, the famous bio methane that could represent up
 6       to 20 to 25% hmm, of our- our consumption in natural gas, hmm
 7       well, the simplest solution is to send all that to Gaz Metro and to
 8       credit our invoice. However, from an environmental and an
 9       educational standpoint, I think it would be interesting to close the
10       loop. (…) (1;1471)
```

Note taking seems all the more important since the participant has not provided a written or projected document. This is a fragmented way for the commissioners to identify Stan's information. Later, they will be able to cross their notes with the session's written transcription.

The oratory quality of the participant's delivery enables the commissioners to highlight certain points that are noted as remarkable in written form (when the written form is available). The clarity of elocution, the flow of words, the inflexion of the voice, and the manner in which certain words are emphasized, make a difference in the way the listener receives the message. We will look into this aspect further with Marc's elocution. Note taking does not prove listening unless one can read what is being noted. However, in this context, we can genuinely presume that the notes are related to the topic addressed in the talk.

5.1.1.4   *Nodding and "hmm".*   Nodding and 'hmms,' as well as the gaze, are the most prevalent listening markers identified. They are, for the most part, produced by the commissioners during the participants' presentations. Nodding and 'hmms' hold two possible and non-exclusive meanings. Let us take for example a moment when the commissioner nods as Luc speaks (nodding is signaled by italics)

```
1 Luc (…) there ((extending his arms)) 75 meters from my door, the
2     composting center is there. And it's not an office building, it's-
3     fermentation is there. ((waving his arm around in the air)). This
4     means that I think I'm entitled to- to- to ask to try to find an
5     alternative solution somewhere else. (1;630)
```

Nodding may be read as a sign of encouragement directed to the speaker, encouraging her to go ahead with her speech. It can also be read as a manifestation of approval regarding the content of what is being said. Nodding thus translates a sign of interest for what is put forward or the act being produced (or both simultaneously). By observing the words uttered as the commissioner nods, we note that she may be encouraging the participant to continue his speech as much as she may be approving what is claimed. Nodding is a marker of validation or an indication that one is following the speaker's words; in both cases, it manifests listening.

5.1.1.5   *Emotional reactions.*   Among the gestures marking listening, many tend to express emotions, such as surprise, for instance. Here, the president opens her eyes wide as she hears this (eye widened where there are italics):

```
1 Stan And one must know that trucks that transport regular trash (.)
2      use a lot of gas= We're talking about 80 liters of diesel for 100
3      kilometers. (1; 1484)
```

The president looks surprised upon hearing Stan's claim. This seems to be a spontaneous, almost unintentional marker, not even necessarily addressed to the speaker, and yet we cannot but note her raising brow. Similar emotional listening markers expressing anger, impatience, or humor are visible throughout the sessions. They all implicitly function as markers of listening as they presuppose that the person was minimally paying attention to what was being said, enough at least to provoke a reaction to what the speaker had just said.

5.1.1.6   *Imposed listening.*   Although more difficult to identify, this non-verbal listening marker is noticeable. Imposed listening is a sensitive issue as the commissioners' role is precisely to listen. While most of the participants are highly sensitive to the efforts such a disposition requires (as we shall discuss later), others seem to impose their speech, thrusting the listener into a contradictory and uncomfortable situation. The generosity and restraint listening implies (Corradi-Fiumara 1990) seems flouted here. In a way, the speaker appears to openly disavow the listener's effort. He infringes upon the members' tacit rules, while being under the impression that he is the victim.

```
1 Marc It's the first time that I come to the OCPM, and that I'm being
2      told to- to hurry up. I'm sorry, but I'll pursue my presentation
3      to the end. (1; 195)
```

A few lines later, Marc gets carried away and suggests that the commissioners might decide to have him expelled by force from the room. As Marc pursues his list of grievances, we can see the president biting and pressing her lips together, looking toward the speaker with a side glance, in an effort to remain composed. Although this is the sole moment of 'forced' listening I have found in my data, its intensity and particularity brings me to list it separately. At times, listening requires what some authors have coined "courageous listening" (Husband 2009; Thill 2009). The listener must overcome the disparaging utterances coming at her, together with the speaker's refusal to abide with the rules of interactions. The listener needs to overcome a natural movement of withdrawal or indignation as she must confront the speaker's lack of respect.

The listening trajectory Marc has forced upon his audience will backfire on him precisely because he (ironically) does not seem to listen to them (see later). We can already point out that *listening appears to be a negotiated resource*.

5.1.1.7   *Markers of reiteration.*   Some listening markers remain in the attentive listening category as they are not "creative" per se. The listener merely repeats what she has heard, as in the following example:

```
1 Paul   […] take into account what is around.
2 Pdt    Around (1; 1777)
```

The president is the only person who produces this type of marker. In this case, she strictly repeats the speaker's last word, like an echo. She resorts to this ten times with the thirteen participants with which she interacts. This marker (like nodding and "hmm") functions as a testimony or proof of listening that induces an impression that the listener is aligned with the speaker. The listener would not indeed repeat the speaker's words should the latter seem false to her. In this reiteration, an implicit hint of approval is therefore discernable.

Before moving on to the next category, it is important to note that markers of *attentive listening* are often coupled with listening solicitations, the object of which is to engage the listener's attention. These couples of listening markers and listening solicitation markers will be discussed further.

5.1.2   *Involved listening markers*

They can be identified by the listener's verbal reaction to the speaker. The degree of the listener's involvement transpires through a word, more often a question, a comment or even a series of questions and comments. Members resort to three types of involvement according to their needs and intentions. Through these markers, the listener indicates either her understanding of what was said, or her lack of comprehension. In this case, the listener's reaction will invite the speaker to react to this incomprehension. Listening is no longer a simple testimony and display to encourage the speaker to follow through with what he means to say: the listener's involvement is here supposed to *orient* the speaker.

5.1.2.1   *Listening marker testifying support to the speaker.*   At the junction between attentive and involved listening markers, I previously identified listening markers of reiteration, where the listener repeats the speaker's last word. In the involved listening marker category, the president *interprets* or *translates* what the speaker apparently means to say.

```
1 Simon The field is consolidating, petro chemistry isn't dead, but then
2       again, people think that petrol is only at the gas station. It's
3       much more than that. Everything that is around us.
4       (.)
5 Pdt   °Plastic, yes° (2; 296)
```

As we see here, the president expresses her understanding by interpreting what the participant just said. She indeed offers an example of a petrochemical derivative that exemplifies what the speaker means by saying, "Everything that is around us." In this case and others, she speaks softly, *sotto voce*, and quickly, in a manner that does not interrupt the flow of the conversation that is taking place. This type of interjection is explanatory rather than exclamatory. It appears to facilitate the delivery while also serving as a proof of listening (and reflecting). The president clearly takes a co-constructive stance, enriching the participant's utterance.

At other moments, the intervention takes on an anticipatory coloration:

```
1 Josée […] that there may be a crack or potholes on the road, which
2       are the only=
3 Pdt   =the sole cause.
4 Josée The sole cause. We have these huge trucks with Jacob brakes
5       and motors struggling. ((Josée mimics the motor's noise)) (2;
6       1080)
```

In this case, we observe a narrative co-construction (Bavelas et al. 2000). Without aligning herself, the president offers a precise word to the participant who takes it up mechanically. She thus assimilates the president's proposition into her discourse as she has received some sort of official validation.

This section also includes indirect listening makers. In order to legitimate her position, the speaker mentions what she heard other participants saying. This tactic appears like a hybrid mode engaging both a listening marker and a listening solicitation marker. Here is an example:

```
1 Simon […] So, that's why, normally, I find that (.) especially with Mr.
2       Luc's testimony, Luc that I know very well because I was the
3       mayor of the [city], when he talks about generations of Luc's
4       family. (2; 326)
```

Simon is talking about Luc's presentation held the day before. A few lines further in his speech, Simon also refers to an earlier consultation, in which the president was involved and gave recommendations (he refers to these recommendations). This shows that Simon has listened to previous presentations and can therefore take previous speakers' interventions into account. The previous listening turns into a listening solicitation (which I will discuss in the next section): Simon usefully "recycles" his (past) listening (and understanding). This diachronic

co-construction of meaning, as the past is referred to in order to reinforce a present statement, artfully manifests the open-ended nature of the conversation on the composting plant.

5.1.2.2 *Involved listening markers of directive or maieutic types: Listening to speech (Lipari 2014).* Until now I have listed markers that are either behavioral or mildly verbal (a few words at the very most). This section opens listening markers that are at the core of the conversation, at times even instigators, and are eminently verbal. They fuel the conversation and orient it, as we will see. Two types are to be noted: what I propose to call directive-involved listening markers (DILM) and maieutic-involved listening markers (MILM).

a.   Directive-involved listening makers (DILM)

DILMs can be identified during Q&A sessions when the commissioners attempt to have participants confirm or infirm something.

```
 1 Pdt  Ehm, I would have a question concerning, among others
 2      (1.5) the rule nine ninety that you mentioned in your
 3      presentation↓. You say- indicate among other things that
 4      hmm (0.5) that in (.) the East of the island (.) hmm, of
 5      Montreal, hmm (.) the hmm, the polluting agents, the
 6      ambient air is fourteen to fifteen times more polluted […]
 7      That information, do yo::::u have in mind its source?
 8 Marc Well, the source, I can't say the name=
 9 Pdt  Yes
10 Marc But it's an engineer, retired today (0.5) who- who told me
11      that. Not publicly of course=.
12 Pdt  =No ((shakes her head looking at her papers))
13 Marc Hmm, from the environment services, hmm, of the (.)
14      CMM, or that is on Jarry Street, hmm and ((waves his
15      hands indicating a direction))
16 Pdt  Ok
17 Marc Saint-Denis Street, I think
18 Pdt  Perfect: hhh (1; 305)
```

As we see, the commissioners systematically contextualize the questions they are asking. In this case, the president mentions what she heard Marc saying (at other times, she also quotes a sentence taken from the documents he submitted). She wants to know the name of the person Marc quotes in order to evaluate the legitimacy of Marc's alarming data. At each turn, Marc's credibility appears to be shrinking. He starts by inferring that the source is confidential, attempting to reestablish credibility by mentioning that the person is an "engineer" and then appears to demolish his credibility as he tries to explain where the person works, getting confused in his explanations, and ending his direction with "I think."

This dissipates whatever credibility was left. The president punctuates her enquiry with one word – "perfect" – followed by a sigh. As she listens to Marc unveiling the weakness of his sources, she utters only four words. From the beginning, she has been attempting to understand the validity of his claims. She initiated this inquiry with a seemingly harmless question: "That information, do yo::::u have in mind its source?" The president appears to be looking for information that could render Marc's statement more credible in her report. She thus selects information that she heard in his presentation.

b.   Maieutic involved listening markers (MILM).

With the MILM, listening becomes more co-constructed, with the listener not realizing precisely what she is looking for. She will help the speaker "give birth" to an idea, based on a hunch that she has of the speaker's intention, but that has not been verbalized yet. While with DILM, the listener is rooting for precise information, with MILM the listener notices the speaker might have something to say (of which he might not even be aware) and moves on to help him present his point.

```
 1 Pdt  Yes, hmm, I'd like to hear more about, hmm, your first
 2      recommendation, regarding th:::e  lot in the East End. That
 3      question, I don't recall if it was you or another who had
 4      mentioned it during the project's [presentation
 5 Jean                                  [That was me
 6 Pdt  it was you then who presented it. I think that you were giv:::en
 7      for reason that it was difficult t:::o find a lot, hmm, [on the
 8      present site.
 9 Jean                                                        [I reread, I
10      reread the
11 Pdt  Yes
12 Jean the answer
13 Pdt  Yes
14 Jean that was given to me, because it's on your website.
15 Pdt  Yes, yes.
16 Jean And the answer says:". It's because there isn't enough space.
17      We wanted to, we tried"
18 Pdt  Yes
19 Jean there isn't enough space on the D quarry site.
20 Pdt  but you=
21 Jean =They don't tell me, and I didn't have the reflex to ask, yes,
22      but can't you just go beside, on another lot? I didn't have the
23      reflex to ask the question, but the answer is "We don't own the
24      D quarry"
25 Pdt  Yeah
26 Jean The city of Montreal owns D and on this lot, of which we are
27      the owners, there isn't enough space. The following day, I
28      went to see, and there I saw large 'For sale' signs just beside,
```

```
29        and behind, and then I thought that probably (.). Then all of a
30        sudden, I realized I was in East Montreal, so I thought to
31        myself that the jurisdiction might be influencing, hmm, that
32        they don't want…hmm, because logically, and the civil servant
33        told me, logically, it would make sense that we- we- we
34        compost the digestate on the location. It would be normal; it
35        would be cheaper.
36 Pdt   Yes
37 Jean  So I don't know, the::re. He gave me that answer: "We don't
38        have the space." It's true ((laughing)), if he said there wasn't
39        space, there wasn't space, I believe him. But I wonder why not
40        just beside there?
41 Pdt   Ok, that's the object of your- (.) It's the fact, it expl- ((she puts
42        her hand in front of her mouth)) Excuse me. That explains that
43        you come back on this question adding 'Look just beside if, in
44        the present perimeter, there isn't [enough space'
45 Jean                                    [Listen, I didn't bring the
46        pictures, but there are very very large « For sale » signs right
47        beside. Hmmm, but I'm not selling lots, I mean
48        ((Audience laughs))
49 Jean  It's just that there isn't much to justify build one at 1.4
50        kilometers from there. There isn't much to justify. It's going to
51        imply more transportation, and transportation will entail
52        delays. Hmm, at least they can install a conveyor between
53        both, like in mines, for transportation.
54 Pdt   Ok. (1;1071)
```

Here the president is familiar with the depicted situation, as Jean had asked a question on this topic during the previous information sessions. She asks Jean to expand on this question as she understands that he investigated it between the last information session and the present meeting. She directs the question, tying together the recommendation Jean has suggested in his written document and the question raised during the information session. Once she has asked the question, she limits her utterances to attentive listening markers, ("Yes") thereby encouraging her interlocutor to develop his idea. As a result, Jean mentions his doubts regarding the transparency of the city's proceedings. The audience listens in the wake of the president, receiving with humor Jean's ironic comments (on the city's shady maneuvers) (line 38–39).

Once the president appears to have obtained what she was looking for, she closes the interrogation by saying, "Ok" (line 54). Listening here is open and participatory, as the entire audience appears to support Jean through laughter. There is a double listening level here: attentive listening from the audience and involved listening (MILM) from the president, almost like an orchestra where the chef listener directs the speaker while the chorus is following the narration.

5.1.2.3   *Interpretive-involved listening markers (IILM).*   The last involved listening marker is the interpretive one. In this listening configuration, the speaker is invited to express his point of view, his vision. The listener, who initiates the discussion, is presented with ideas. The (president) listener then offers her involved listening to the speaker as she solicits the speaker's help to construct meaning. This time, the speaker's point of view is solicited and is not asking to be listened to. In the following example, the president has listened to participants and noticed a disparity in their answers concerning the same question. She thus questions the participant about this disparity. Her speech is the result of putting together two moments of listening.

```
 1 Pdt Thank you, Mr. Pierre for your presentation, and the PowerPoint
 2     that also facilitated the presentation (.) I would have a::: first
 3     question in relation to you:::::r position of- that privileges the the
 4     public management of the-the the future composting plant, ↑ hmm,
 5     well, you attended the first meeting during which the city, among
 6     others, has indicated its intention to hmm, entrust the construction,
 7     the operating and maintenance [of the plant] to a private company
 8     for a period of seven years, possibly- and I wish to put this in
 9     relation to Mr. Luc's intervention who preceded you- to make  in a
10     certain way, the builder accountable by making him responsible
11     for the operating and maintenance that would follow :hhh. […] I
12     would like to hear you on this question↑ because there is a stake
13     that the city has has has mentioned, during its presentation at any
14     ratehhhh, concerning, among other things the builder's
15     accountability (1; 766)
```

This question covers other participants' points of view as well as some points mentioned during the information session. It appears as a sort of *listening synthesis* designed to produce more listening ("I would like to hear you on this question"). The question is convoluted, which confuses Pierre; he might have some difficulty gauging the opportunity the president gives him to develop his own idea. The president's listening intentions are clear and bear no conditions. Her question is open.

Here, more than in any other situation, the speaker is invited to produce his own interpretation. This stands as the most generous form of listening possible in this public consultation context. This type of listening is close to what Stewart (1983) would define as interpretive listening.

5.1.3   *Poor and non-listening markers*

At the opposite end of the spectrum, the collected data reveals instances of failing, poor, and even non-listening during the consultation.

5.1.3.1 *Poor listening.* Non-listening instances are rare and it is challenging to label them as such. However, the range of poor listening is varied and rich in meanings. Lack of attention, overlapping conversations, and poor understanding are other manifestations of poor listening found in the data. These instances can be the cause or consequence of poor listening.

a. Misunderstanding

Cases of misunderstanding are rare and not systematically problematic in the present consultation. The sole instance noted in the data has no outcome and is rapidly straightened out as many conversation analysts have already noticed (e.g., Schegloff 1977, 1992). Here, the misunderstanding appears to trouble the participant and disempower him even more from his already challenged interaction capacities.

```
 1 Pdt  hhh, but hmm, you, hmm on that very topic, I would like to ask
 2      you, hmm, in composting plants, hmm, you can among others,
 3      hmm, the ones that can be found in the neighborhoods (0.5),
 4      hmm, the green remains, the green waste, the organic waste hhh
 5      that are to be assimilated I think among others to- to another
 6      type of waste, hmm that would be difficult to- to find in
 7      composting centers because of their foul smell. What would
 8      you do with that waste?
 9      […]
10 Marc =I'm against the burying=
11 Pdt  Hmm
12 Marc And hmm, yeah, you were mentioning, hmm pieces of glass
13      that would be mixed
14 Pdt  No I wa-I was talking about green waste, green residue=
15 Marc Oh, green residue (1; 368)
```

On line 4, the president asks a question by using the term "green waste," an expression that Marc understands on line 10 as "pieces of glass" (in French, glass (verre) and green (vert) are homonyms). On line 12, misunderstanding appears to be resolved, but this shows a lack of attention on Marc's behalf.

b. Overlapping

A very common feature in everyday conversation, overlapping in this context is more surprising as the context is more formal and the parties are not familiar with each other's behavior and ways of speaking (inflection of the voice, etc.). Losing elements in a turn of talk in such a formal situation may lead to "losing face" (Goffman 1967) and a mediocre defense of one's arguments. And yet, the commissioners rarely manage to ask their question in one turn, as they tend to be often interrupted, leading to words overlap. This slows down the flow of ideas, and reveals a trouble in the listening dynamic, lacking in rhythm.

```
 1 Com  So, hmm sir, thank you very much for your presentation. So
 2       we'll have a few little questions, ehm. A topic we feel close to
 3       as wel::::l ↑, and that you have described, is the state of
 4       health=
 5 Marc  Hmm
 6 Com   Of that area's population. You mentioned the rate of
 7       respiratory illnesses which was superior to that of Montrea:::l.
 8       You mentioned      [chr-
 9 Marc                     [chronic diseases.
10 Com   Chronic diseases=
11 Marc  =40% of the citizens have at least one chronic disease.
12 Com   And (0.5) and you mentioned that life, eh, expectancy was
13       lower
14 Marc  Yes, yes
15 Com   by three years
16 Marc  =That's in the (0.5) public health file, fi-
17 Com   So, right. I understand that you have just submitted a
18       document to that effect.
19 Marc  Hmm
20 Com   We, we wish to go a little further.
21 Marc  [Yeah, ok
22 Com   [We wanted to be sure we understood correctly [your
23       references.
24 Marc                                       [Yeah, ok
25 Com   This is the object of my question↑. When you mention the
26       TOPO study, you're talking about a study by the Center of
27       health and social services↑, is that it, in 2012?
28 Marc  No, no, no. TOPO is (.)[I'm going to tell you, it is- it is-
28       TOPO is…
30 Com                         [Or is it the Public health Office?
31 Marc  Yes, yes yes=
32 Com   =You are the one [who submitted it.
33 Marc                   [Yes, yes, Public Health, that's it, yes, yes
34       (1; 297)
```

The conversation is choppy, at times almost leading to misunderstanding and con-
tradictions on lines 27 and 30. TOPO could be the Office of Public Health or not.
Marc does not allow the commissioner to complete her question, and ends up not
being able to answer properly. Apparently, he has not been listening carefully, as
the overlaps testify, which contributes to undermining his credibility once more.

c.   Inattention

A few moments of inattention are discernable among listeners, especially on the
commissioners' part as their role and mandate is to listen to what is being said.
Inattention, unlike non-listening, manifests itself when the listener has appar-
ently listened, while aspects of the message have escaped her attention. This poor

listening marker can be identified when the listener asks a question that betrays her lack of attention. In the following case, Yves starts his presentation by introducing himself:

```
1 Yves I'm Yves, urban planner; I represent GPA Inc, the car company,
2      better known as Groupe Gabriel, biggest car dealer in Montreal.
3      (2: 816)
```

Further on, during the conversation, the commissioner apparently forgot or did not pay attention to Yves' opening utterances. She indeed asks him:

```
1 Com <Can you inform us on wha :::t the projects are ?> You, you
2      mention this project, are there other projec :::ts that were under
3      way with the different promoters who you work with?
4 Yves In in the mandate, [it was just Groupe Gabriel
5 Com                    [That one.
6 Yves Yes
7 Com  Ok thanks (2; 894)
```

Yves has introduced himself at the beginning of the discussion as representing a particular organization. Everything indicates that the commissioner did not pay sufficient attention to Yves words. Here again, poor listening slows down interactions and roughens the flow of ideas, and might chip the commissioners' credibility.

d. Poor understanding

If utter incomprehension is rare, there are many instances when the speaker appears to err in his own question. In some other cases, the utterance does not seem to be listened to up to its closure, which leads afterwards to a shift in meaning or to a clumsy reply.

```
 1 Com So thank you for your presentation. Thank you fo:::r
 2      presenting your apprehensions on heal:::th, on the impacts on
 3      heal:::th, on peo::::ple, companies, on yours, and hhh its
 4       increase, the impact of this increase. You suggest a
 5      strate:::gy that you na:::me respons:::ible and responsible and
 6      durable, equitable development↓ and hmm, you suggest a
 7      series of ways in that  context and more precisely an
 8      accountability from the city, the neighborhood, the builder,
 9      the operat:::or concerning (.) the (.) financial dimensions, or
10      the financial consequences, therefore the legal accountability.
11      Hmm; we are concerned- The question is, what do you know
12      of past agreements, of this type of strategy? Are you familiar
13      with locations, with with- with situations=
14 Luc =I- Mrs. commissioner
15 Com Which have resulted in the implementations of these
16      measures?
```

```
17     (0.5)
18 Luc Mrs. commissioner, I- I don't suggest anything. I'm being
19     imposed a situation. If I'm being imposed a situation.
20     (0.5)
21 Com Yes
22 Luc I'd like to be able to just live [in that sense, Ok?
23 Com                                   [Yes; Yes, yes, I understand that
24     [as well.
25 Luc [But I'm not going to suggest. I'm against the composting
26     center, but I'm under the impression that it is going to be
27     imposed on me. And=
28 Com =And if it is imposed on you? =
29 Luc = And if it is imposed on me, [I say that
30 Com                               [You say. Yes […] (1; 562)
```

At the beginning, Luc does not appear to be answering the question at all. He remains attached to the opening of the commissioner's turn of talk, during which she mentions Luc's "suggested strategy" and then does not seem to listen beyond that. He actually seems upset that she is suggesting that he might be helping in the project's implementation. He gets stuck on this idea and loses his listening capacities when she finally asks him the question on lines 11 to 13. He does not seem to understand to where the commissioner is trying to bring the conversation, which leads her, in turn, to reformulate her question, in a very direct way "and if it is imposed on you?" (line 28).

The commissioner thus repeats Luc's words. The term "impose," which is expected from the participant, takes on a sharper tone when it comes from the commissioner. And yet, through this utterance, the commissioner will manage to reengage in the desired direction (an elegant example of directed listening). At the beginning, Luc will focus on reframing his position and point of view, and does not understand the commissioner's query. The conversation is slowed down, just like misunderstandings. Misunderstandings are incomprehension focused on one term, or a specific sentence. The listener fails to understand the speaker's point.

5.1.3.2   *Non-Listening.*   Although it is difficult to identify complete non-listening instances, we can imagine that the president comes close to it as she reaches out for her cellphone and taps on its screen (as one can see on the video) while a participant is talking (2; 207). This happens only once during the sessions. She might be hearing what is being said but is clearly distracted and thus not listening (attentively). During the consultation, members of the audience and participants were constantly on their phones. A member of the city commission even closed his eyes for a very long time, which leads me to think that he might have fallen asleep and was thus no longer listening. However, people who were called to speak in front of the commissioners never showed any signs of overt non-listening.

Table 2 offers a synthetic view of the listening markers detailed in the section.

Table 2. Listening markers

Non-listening and poor listening	Attentive listening	Involved listening
⮞ Poor listening – Misunderstanding – Inter-lapping utterances – Poor attention – Poor understanding ⮞ Non-listening	– Gaze – Following the presentation on PowerPoint or text – Taking notes – Nodding – Emotional reaction – Imposing listening – Repeating speaker's words	– Support and or usefulness – Directive types of involved listening markers – Maieutic types of involved listening markers – Interpretive types of involved listening markers

Listening markers often, yet not systematically, function together with listening requests markers. Listening requests have also been listed and categorized as detailed in the following section.

5.2 Listening requests

Listening request markers often precede listening markers, when they are not simultaneous. There are pairs of listening markers and listening request markers throughout the sessions that seem to work together.

5.2.1 *Listening solicitation markers*
Some members place greater emphasis than others on acknowledging the listening effort (to listen); others take it for granted. It is, however, usual and "polite" to recognize the listening effort. In this case, the generosity involved in listening is verbalized, and expressed through deference. The speaker hereby openly negotiates (communication) with the listener.

5.2.1.1 *The gaze.*   Through the gaze, the speaker request and secure the listener's attention. In Marc's case, we see him lifting his eyes off the paper he is reading four times in 15 minutes. He is bent over his paper, which he has apparently difficulty reading, and looks at the commissioners only when mentioning difficult topics when he mentions a personal experience or respiratory problems in the neighborhood.

```
Marc The rate of respiratory diseases in [the city] is the highest of all the
     neighborhoods in Montreal. In fact, life expectancy is lower by
     three years here than in Pierrefonds. (1:154)
```

Marc emerges out of his monologue and looks at the commissioners (italics), soliciting a moment of co-presence with his interlocutors for the first time in his speech (we are ten minutes into his discourse).

Luc, the following participant, will choose the reverse strategy. His gaze bounces regularly from his listeners to the words he is reading. He builds his discourse on nostalgia and his emotional attachment to the neighborhood tied to personal, professional, and patrimonial reasons. Both parties' gaze is fundamental to interaction, and yet, here, because of the video screens involved in the conversation, it is rather challenging to differentiate when the person is looking at the screen or at the interlocutor, as they share the same axis.

5.2.1.2   *Acknowledging effort and deference.*   It is current practice to remind one's interlocutor of one's presence in order to be heard. Recognizing the listener verbally may contribute to one's feeling of being more involved in the interaction. Recognizing the listener's effort, by paying tribute to the listener's generosity and the invitation to "co-construct." The speaker recognizes the listener by staying on the same standing. Here, the interlocutors are conversation colleagues, while in the case of deference, the listener is placed on a sort of pedestal. Here, Simon recognizes the listener's generosity:

```
1 Com    Thank you sir
2 Pdt    Sir, your comments are enlightening
3 Simon  I thank you for your tolerance over the time you have given me.
4 Pdt    5 minutes
5        (1.0)
6 Pdt    Thank you very much. (2; 439)
```

Simon is familiar with the intervention protocol and pays tribute to the fact that the commissioners accepted that he exceeded the ten minutes allotted time. His avowal stands as recognition of the rules, but also of the commissioners' authority in their granting him extra time to listen to his ideas. This generosity is rewarded by an official comment attesting the listeners' authority.

a.   Deference

If most participants have shown signs of deference to the commissioners, inversely, others test the tacit boundaries of these conventions. Such interventions border with rudeness, while others multiply markers of recognition, as is the case with Josée:

```
1 Josée  So, first I'm sorry because on the address on my folder I only
2        wrote "madame" (Mrs in French) and not "mesdames" (plural
3        in French). It might not seem like much, but it bothers me.
```

```
 4 Com    And you have written "messieurs" (sir in the plural in French)
 5 Josée  Sorry?
 6 Com    And you have written "messieurs" (sir in the plural in French)
 7 Josée  I wrote "messieurs" because I was referring to those men who
 8         had been spokespersons and presenters of the project from the
 9         time I had come here. Hmm, so, they are the people I had in
10         mind and Mrs. president. So, my apologies.
11 Pdt    No worries. (2; 914)
```

Deference becomes the topic of conversation, which distracts the attention from the initial purpose: recognizing the listener. The commissioner chooses to engage in this "meta" conversation, which leads Josée to justify her purpose and renders the moment embarrassing. Politeness apparently needs to remain somewhat discreet. The waste of time and attention seems manifest here. This example shows how listening solicitations can backfire on the speaker, when they are handled awkwardly. This particular example is all the more unfortunate, as a moment before the president suggested not to take a break in the session so it could end earlier.

5.2.2   *Markers of inducing to listen*
Inducing to listen is more engaging than simply inviting to listen. Two general categories came forth; humor and strategy (and influence).

5.2.2.1   *The speaker's laughter and humor.*   Laughter and humor function as spontaneous listening catalysts, as illustrated by Jean's intervention. His pleasantness comes across at various points through his own high spirits, and engages the audience in partaking in this good humor… and following his speech.

```
1 Jean […] Organic matter, organic matter, is a matter that could be
2       very very (.) easy to work on with a train, because it isn't
3       perishable, it's not fragile, it's not dangerous, it's not
4       inflammable, it's easy to transport, and no one wants to steal it.
5       So, it's easy to (0.5)
6 Com   ((laughs))
7       ((Laughter in the audience))
8 Jean No, but it- it ((laughs)) (1.0) so as we can see on the map, it
9       looks like this. (1; 986)
```

Jean's straightforward tone and observations brings merriness to the commissioner and the audience, and Jean himself laughs at what he has just said. His "laughter message" is brief, and he swiftly moves back to the purpose of his talk. He has created a reaction, proof of an unexpected level of attention, which he will ride on to continue his discourse with strength and conviction. Jean's good nature can be understood as a type of charisma, a natural talent for soliciting listening. His contagious good humor is as remarkable as his talent to make it profitable. The

depth of listening is noticeable across the room; the entire consultation dynamic has gained depth. The commission, the participant, and the rest of the audience have increased the level of interaction: a communion of the spirits has taken place around Jean's suggestions.

5.2.2.2 *Strategy and influence.*   Speakers operate with varying degrees of influence and strategy. They use influence more or less intuitively, while strategy is experience-based. In both cases, the speaker maneuvers to solicit listening, less in language itself than in the way of speaking or in the choice of elements the speaker chooses to engage, or even in the order of presenting issues.

a.   Influences

Each member of the consultation – audience, presenter and commissioners – chooses to speak in his or her name or in the name of someone, or an institution. Depending on the topic, the speaker will invite a particular type of listening and take on a precise type of authority, which invites a listening that is more or less attentive. Simon offers an example of this switch. He first describes himself as representing a group called "East Montreal Citizens' Initiatives in Civil Security" and then moves on to declare himself as "the past mayor of [the city]."

```
 1 Simon So, >"East Montreal citizens' initiatives in civil Security"<
 2        was created in 2013 (hhh) and hmm, brings together many
 3        citizens who are militants in and active and not necessarily
 4        activists in the areas of civil security, prevention or industrial
 5        risk accidents. We work in collaboration with businesses in
 6        the field of social acceptability (2; 76)
 7        (…)
 8 Simon So that why, I normally, I- for one, I find (.) especially with
 9        Mr. Luc's testimony, whom I happen to know very well
10        because I was once mayor of [the city], when he mentioned
11        generations of the Luc family who worked in the food
12        business, when you look at it, when he can to demand, and I
13        think that from my own legal experience, he would be right to
14        demand an injunction at the Superior Court against this
15        project, all the costs involved could lead to a contest […] (2;
16        327)
```

The italicized section refers to the commissioners' nodding. They are nodding at Simon who has summoned mayoral authority to explicate his acquaintance with issues concerning the citizens. By doing so, he is also conferring legitimacy to Luc's testimony. At this stage in his discourse, Simon sets aside his involvement in the "East Montreal Citizens' Initiatives in Civil Security" to adopt his mayoral role, which tends to attribute a non-partisan and "reasonable" weight to his words, as

illustrated by the commissioners' reactions. He is supposed to be familiar with the laws, but also with the citizens and their interests. Simon actually encourages Luc to file a complaint against the city. We can imagine that Simon realizes that his audience will listen more attentively if he brings forth his mayoral position. By connecting his various functions (mayor, landlord, lawyer, citizen), the speaker tied them to his speech, and this emphasis is a manner of soliciting his audience's listening.

b.   Strategy

Certain experienced orators know how to present their ideas to draw more listeners. Jean organizes his sentences and sets a tone that encourages his audience to pay attention.

```
 1 Jean He showed me earlier (.) ((the technician sets the computer)) Ok
 2      ↑, it's ok ((setting his papers)) thank you for allowing the citizens
 3      the opportunity to express themselves on this project. Municipal
 4      composting has interested me for a long time, so I'm glad to
 5      bring a constructive contribution. I do not represent a group of
 6      company. The project, in my opinion, is promising. I can see
 7      some risks but I especially notice an extraordinary opportunity
 8      for Montreal to innovate in organic waste management. My
 9      presentation is organized in six modest proposals and as I have
10      warned you, I have no great mastery of PowerPoint, I'll try to
11      make it work.(1; 199)*
```

Jean thanks and recognizes the public consultation initiative. His positive words appear to "surprise the audience into listening" (italicized is the moment when the president lifts her eyebrows and takes notes). He brings forth a caveat under the guise of "six modest proposals" that appear to place the listener in the appropriate mode (open, not defensive) for listening. Incidentally, the interpretive and maieutic listening examples above were taken from Jean's intervention. The listener follows Jean's reasoning with no resistance. Jean makes his speech with marks of deference, acknowledging the listener's effort ("six modest proposals," "I have warned you I have no great mastery of PowerPoint, I'll try to make it work").

I have listed listening requests tied to inviting and inducing listening that do not result directly from emotions. Listening injunctions, on the other hand, bring forth the speaker's emotions.

5.2.3   *Injunctions to listen*
In this case, listening demands are compelling and the speaker summons the listener often by their name (Mr. X, Mrs. Y) to act (listen, look, understand) or react. The injunction process can be broken down in two moments: (1) an injunction followed by (2) information or by silence.

(Italicized are the word said with force, in bold are the injunctions)

```
1 Luc […] Listen, I was brought up at [city], East Montreal. All my
2     life, I counted today, I even took my car, I have lived in a seven-
3     kilometer radius, professionally for 45 years. And today, it's like
4     I I'm facing risks, the unknown↑.
5 Com Yeah.
6 Luc You're gonna say, "Luc, you worry for nothing." It's my
7     business. It's my money. I might lose everything. Understand
8     that if there is a product recall, and that I'm forced to take back
9     products because of an odor that has infiltrated inside them or
10     whatever, that could cost me 10, 12, 13 millions. I could never
11     bounce back. The end. From one day to the next, a- a recall, a
12     product recall, I get 10 million, and the next week, no more sales,
13     my clients won't buy my products anymore, they will not trust
14     anymore. The end, Kaput! ((he snaps his fingers)) (1; 164)
```

Luc builds a web of listening solicitations. He weaves the injunctions, staging himself "Luc, you worry for nothing." He merges with his business; the survival of the one depends on the other. Luc opens with an explicit, rather confrontational injunction: "Listen." He then creates an imaginary dialogue with the listener: "*You're gonna say, 'Luc, you worry for nothing.'*" In this dialogue, the speaker uses the "tu" form (in French, "tu" is less formal and said instead of "vous," which is more official or polite), which tends to reinforce the injunction in the public consultation context. Luc then brings in "Understand," which functions as a substitution for "listen." Luc thus is requesting that his audience listen and empathize with him, share his concerns. We are at the end of the listening spectrum, where listening means understanding.

Luc describes his probable loss if the project is accepted "The end, Kaput! ((he snaps his fingers))". The listener cannot help but comply with Luc's solicitations, and by now with his disarray. Luc has broken down the listening process within one single paragraph: he demands attention ("listen") then understanding ("Understand") and ends with "The end, Kaput! ((he snaps his fingers))." Just before this excerpt, Luc had dismissed the person he had hired to represent him and to present his position. Luc delivered a performance no one else but him could have done, as he refers to his own life delivering to the audience his emotional reaction to the project.

Table 3 provides a review of the study's listening request markers.

Table 3. Degrees of listening requests

Invitation to listen	Inducing to listen	Injunction to listen
➤ Gaze	➤ Laughter and humor	➤ Verbal command
➤ Recognizing effort of listening and deference	➤ Influence and strategy	➤ Making noise

6. Discussion

We believe that the above typology, which partially emerged from our data analysis, provides a toolbox for analyzing entire exchanges between the commissioners and a speaker. So far, only elemental tools have been presented. When they appear together in a conversation, they can uncover the listening mechanism embedded in the interactions that take place during the consultation. As I examined the data again, this time with the above typology, I realized that mobilizing it brought forth two intertwined tensions between interlocutors: negotiation and recognition.

Most of the participants negotiate listening with their audience in a more or less conscious manner. When they refuse to negotiate, listening does not appear to take place fully. Attentive listening is an ongoing negotiation process in public consultation, in which listening markers and listening request markers act as negotiation tools. Well employed, they allow for rich moments of "deep disagreement" (Dobson 2012, Bickford 1996) during which the interactions are not oriented toward consensus but rather expressing and understanding each other's opinions on a question (critical maieutic interpretive listening).

When it remains within certain boundaries, negotiation can lead to an involved form of listening. As we observed through the various markers identified in this chapter, negotiation remains mostly in the background of the interaction. As soon as it enters the foreground, it appears to threaten the listening balance, especially if it persists. By bringing the negotiated dimension of interaction to the foreground, listening injunctions tend, paradoxically, to weaken listening itself as well as the audience's listening capacities.

As soon as the speaker neglects the form or content of her presentation, the constructive atmosphere tends to dissipate. This was apparent with one of the participants, Guy, who tended to emphasize form over content as he over-solicited the audience and overturned the procedure. He asked questions rather than answering them and fell into long moments of silence. One can notice a profusion of listening requests markers while simultaneously noticing a total lack of listening markers. Guy polishes the form in which he speaks and ignores the content.

The opposite situation sets in as Marc, another participant, reads a text with great difficulty: in this case, there seems to be an over presence of content and no form. In both extreme cases, interaction fails to reach a certain level of listening. We can only talk about Guy's performance, and are hard pressed to recall anything from Marc's intervention. It thus seems that good listening also depends greatly on the speaker's performance. Lest he is aware of his audience, he hinders the interactive potential, and ultimately "auto-mutes" himself. Listening appears to call for a certain balance and measure in order to reach the *involved* level.

The results tend to link a lack of listening to an unclear understanding of the public consultation process, and to a limited awareness and acknowledgement of the others, but also to a great inexperience in public speaking. Framing interaction within a listening perspective brings forth the missed opportunities between participants. It also contributes to understanding the limits the very members of a conversation set, most often, unconsciously. It is essential to point out these missed opportunities, in order to understand each other; equally important, however, is to identify the successful listening moments that allow for strengthening and multiplying fruitful interactions.

The listening typology is designed as a tool to be used in studying human interactions and more specifically challenging ones, situated in decision-making, negotiation, or conflict ridden organizational contexts. It begs to be applied and streamlined in other contexts. It serves as a basic template to be adapted and readjusted according to the situation it is set in. As it stands currently, it functions as an instrument to accomplish a first level of groundwork in analyzing human interactions, and uncovering how individuals fail to listen to each other. Conversations are not only about talking, but also, and yet more invisibly, about listening, and acknowledging the other.

While many empirical studies have been conducted on listening, the vast majority have been completed in controlled situations with a very precise population (students in the university context, or laboratory research). Further studies in natural settings are necessary and useful to understanding interaction and the performativity of listening.

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The ethics of intercultural dialogue

Reconciliation discourse in John Paul II's pontifical correspondence

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This chapter focuses on the discourse of peace-building and reconciliation in John Paul II's correspondence to marginalized groups and communities worldwide. The letters, addressed to war victims, refugees and prisoners, aimed to draw public attention to ongoing problems of injustice, violence and imbalance in different life domains. It will be shown, with the help of the Transformative Approach to Conflict, how the actors in John Paul II's dialogic endeavours perform their self-/other-transformation via qualitative remodellings of their social and personal identities. By decomposing agonistic discourse practices, the interactants run dialogic strategies of respect to, solidarity and involvement with the discriminated parties. The lived human reciprocity, complementarity and uniqueness that is thereby construed generates the real 'ethical spirit' of linguistic communication.

Keywords: dialogue, reconciliation, participation, integration, subjectivity

1. Introduction

This chapter discusses the language-mediated process of coming to terms with the difficult past in Pope John Paul II's pontifical correspondence. The letters selected for research were directed to victims of wars and prosecutions from different historical times, as well as to contemporary prisoners, as those who in our times experience suffering in detention for wronging others in their individual histories. The texts aimed to draw public attention to ongoing problems of injustice, violence, and imbalance that have their sources in various conflicts from the past. They were intended to encourage broad social action towards changing the negative attitudes toward the difficult lot of the oppressed. It will be shown, with the help of the Transformative Approach to Conflict (Bush and Folger 2005) and

concepts of Narrative Mediation (Winslade and Monk 2000, 2008) – both inscribing in the Dialogic Model of Discourse (Grillo ed. 2005) – how the actors in John Paul II's dialogic endeavours perform their self-/other-transformation via qualitative remodellings of their social and personal identities. By decomposing their agonistic discourse practices, which underlie the cases of cultural segregation and exclusion under scrutiny, the interactants are able to run dialogic strategies of respect to, solidarity with, and inclusion of the discriminated parties. The latter are discursively 'empowered' in the newly structured 'collaborative narratives,' where all the partners in the exchange are additionally 'recognised' as equals, who can peacefully coexist with each other in harmony and cooperation.

The study accentuates the anthropological value of intercultural dialogue as a process of 'participation.' In linguistic terms, it consists in interactants' deliberate choices of 'communicative action,' *vis-à-vis* 'instrumental action' (Habermas 1984), which contributes to the qualitative development of the speakers' *ipseity* ('selfhood'), as the strong/stable aspect of their personal identity (Ricoeur 1992a). Its growth is indicative of *ethical change* towards the constitution of the agents' *Personhood*, reflecting the people's authentic 'Subjectivity' and – by the same token – the essence of their humanity. It is attained through both the Subjects' inward (reflective) 'self-integration,' as well as their outward (reflexive) 'integration with others' in dialogue (cf. Gold 1993, Umbreit 1997, Grillo 2005a, b, c). The (inter) personal equilibrium thus established also leads to *cultural change* that breaks the conflict spiral in a twofold way. While dissolving acts of verbal aggression, which exert force, violence and dominance OVER others, this equilibrium simultaneously transforms such acts into strategies of dialogue-mediated 'human action.' The latter is responsible for building inter-Subjective trust, solidarity and 'power in concert' WITH others (Arendt 1972, 1998). The full discursive reciprocity that is thereby construed generates the living 'ethical spirit' of communication (see also Arnett 1986; Tannen 1998; Arnett and Arneson 1999; Cloke 2001; Ingarden 2009, etc.). It is a source of genuine human togetherness, actualised in the dialogic experience of relational uniqueness, plurality and freedom.

2.   Intercultural dialogue as a discursive way of coming to terms with the 'difficult past'

As truth-seeking and conciliatory discourse, intercultural dialogue has played an important role in processes of peace-making, peace-keeping, and peace-building in diverse social contexts. A relevant aspect of this communication involves coming to grips with the 'difficult past' in human relations. It can turn unresolved problems from individual and collective histories into constructive bonds that

transform the formerly divisive interpersonal walls into mutually connective bridges. Linguistic evidence of dialogic practices that have aimed to manage unresolved conflicts from the past relates to different periods of human civilisation and to different world regions. It illustrates contemporary interactive attempts to confront negative consequences of historically oppressive acts resulting in present cases of cross-cultural asymmetry, injustice and exclusion. Their roots can be found, for instance, in the distant times of colonisation, as well as in 20th-century turmoil of World War II, and more recent totalitarianisms. They are approached from micro- and macro-scale perspectives through discourse strategies that aim to dismantle the historically conditioned social cracks at the substantial, relational, and ethical levels.

Dialogic endeavours in the form of reconciliation discourse have been undertaken in various contexts of post-colonial relations where historically oppressive social contacts have led to the degeneration of interpersonal ties and deprivation of human dignity. This concerns practically all the continents whose histories have been hurt by negative effects of the European colonisation movement. In the case of Australia, to start with, language-mediated dialogue has been transmitted by, *inter alia*, narratives of the 1996 walk-off by Gurindji stockmen at Wave Hill in the Northern Territory, policy documents regulating the rights and status of Aboriginal people, and Prime Minister Paul Keating's speech at Redfern Park (10 December 1992). The first set of accounts generally inscribe in the discourse order of the Aboriginal land rights movement, and as Martin (2003, 2004a, 2004b) demonstrates, these narratives unleash the hidden histories of the Indigenous peoples. The latter are voiced in the discourse of some modern history books that articulate faithfully what happened to the Indigenous Australians. The rhetorical strategies used include telling real stories in the people's authentic words (often in their own vernaculars), speaking on behalf of the powerless in reported speech, or alternatively compiling representative multimodal archives of everything that has been said about the Indigenous country (esp. Martin 2003, 200–14). Such discourse empowers the Indigenous by projecting in more or less direct ways to non-indigenous Australians the life experience of their neighbours. In this way, it not only gives readers ready-made abstract interpretations of the past events, but additionally dramatises these events, thereby constructing informational substance for these interpretations that function textually as the latter's evidence (see also Martin 2004b, 92–100). The combination of image and verbiage in the multimodal representation of the same topic goes even beyond this in that it motivates its recipients to hear, decode, and enact those problems reflexively as part of their own experience. This is how the retrieved voice of the Indigenous peoples can be said to elicit simultaneously the relational voice from their former invaders (Martin 2003, 214–16). In learning from, empathising with, and respecting their local partners,

white Australians strive to bridge the 'other' culture, whereby they can subjectify both themselves and those whom they once perpetrated, thus reinforcing the reconciliation process in the Australian context.

Aside reconciliation-focused history books, the discourse order of the intercultural dialogue in Australia is also structured by various prescription documents that formulate government policies against discrimination of Aboriginal communities (Martin 2004b). Similar to the material discussed above, such policy instruments textualise more or less explicitly subject positions of the Indigenous. With general summaries that encapsulate thematically Aboriginal people's social conditions (as in the body of the 1991 *National Report of the Royal Commission into Aboriginal Deaths in Custody*; Martin 2004b, 100–101), and with members of the Indigenous groups taking the floor to speak for themselves (as in the Appendix *Too Much Sorry Business* of the aforementioned volume or the 1997 report of the National Inquiry into the Separation of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Children from their Families: *Bringing them Home* [BTH]; Martin 2004a, 185–190, 2004b, 101–110), the texts show a growing potential (in their use of dialogic activities, such as paraphrase, report, quote, metadiscourse, elaboration, extension and multimodal extension, etc.) to empower the Indigenous Australians, and legitimise their full ethical standing in the community. As Martin (2004a) argues, "[t]his foregrounding has the effect of establishing the stance from which the bureaucratese is read, a strategy aligning readers with the victims of this genocide" (188). An important aspect of this rhetoric is discursive representations of human feelings and emotions, which are publically expressed and received especially through the BTH text. Constructing speaking positions that invite thematisation and redefinition of things that previously functioned as a social taboo, and were, hence, linguistically muted, this discourse channels a dialogic wake-up call for migrant Australians. Also recontextualised musically to the lyrical genre of community anthems (Martin 2004a, 190, 194–197), the call actualises in its multiple discursive performances an ethically motivated entreatment for the migrants to self-reflect and to take responsibility for the pain and suffering afflicted in the past. It simultaneously elicits positive reactions from both its senders and recipients, who generate the dialogic rhetoric of solidarity and reconciliation in speech acts of sympathy, sadness, apology, and partnership (Martin 2004a, 190–191, 196–197).[1]

Many recontextualisations of the call have carried messages previously communicated in the political domain by Australian Prime Ministers, who in their programmes accentuated the idea of human rights (see Martin 2002, 196–200; 2004a, 191–193). It is especially Paul Keating's "Redfern Park Speech," which he

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1. On the conciliatory role of apologies and its abuse in journalistic mediation, see esp. Kampf (2013).

gave in a well-known Aboriginal settlement in Sydney at the Australian Launch of the International Year of the World's Indigenous People in November 1992, that became famous for its symbolic value of Australia's ethical move towards reconciliation. In his 2002 paper, Martin demonstrates (through his model of linguistic appraisal; see also Martin and White 2005) how the Australian PM develops the rhetoric of dialogic alliance through the textual drift from identity-constitutive discourse of attitude to relation-constitutive discourse of community. The shift operates linguistically through the progressive application of attitudinal devices, such as expressions of affect, judgment, and appreciation. These are subsequently reinterpreted as language-mediated relational activities, respectively, of empathy, humanity, and reconciliation. They all constitute the ethically grounded dialogic bond of partnership and togetherness between Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal Australians (Martin 2002, 199). As Martin further concludes, "[t]his takes us once again to the heart of the matter," which is "the aesthetics of diplomacy as it were" (2004a, 192). By complementing political values with concrete dialogic practice, such aesthetics creates the human potential in public life to synchronise intercultural ties in the Australian context, whereby it works towards reconciling difference in the postcolonial world.

When it comes to African history, in turn, one of the most renowned cases of language-mediated dialogue at the global scale, directed at reconciling the colonised African peoples with their Afrikaan oppressors, are proceedings of the famous Truth and Reconciliation Commission from 1996–1998 (TRC; e.g., Martin 2002; Verdoolaege 2008; Duffy 2009, etc.). The Commission was convened in South Africa to heal its nation after the trauma of the apartheid regime, and it has provided an example for many other post-conflict countries (including Sierra Leone, Liberia or Indonesia) of how to overcome problems with the difficult past. As Verdoolaege (2008) has it, "[o]ne of the main tasks of the Commission was to uncover as far as possible the truth about past gross violations of human rights; it was believed that this task would be necessary for the promotion of reconciliation and national unity" (9). Aside some points where the TRC proceedings show the infringement of genuine dialogue (see Verdoolaege 2008: esp. 19–21, 59ff), the discourse of the Human Rights Violations Committee (appointed within the TRC by President Nelson Mandela and chaired by Archbishop Desmond Tutu) is generally oriented towards reconciliation, forgiveness, compassion, and sympathy. The hearings arranged by the Committee form a combination of psychotherapeutic, religious, and to a lesser extent also courtroom discourse (Verdoolaege 2008, 27–28). Treated from the critical perspective (Verdoolaege 2008, 53ff), this discourse rests on several rhetorical tropes that shape its ideological, historical, and identity layering. The first of these layers is linguistically structured by thematic references to national (comm)unity spirit, respect for testifiers, and to human emotions. The

second is structured by explicit verbalisations of apartheid talk, and continuity between the past and the present, as well as the advantage of public space provided by the TRC. The third, in turn, is structured by discursive struggling with an Afrikaner/white, victim – perpetrator, as well as the pro – con ANC identities. Treated from the complementary ethico-moral perspective (Duffy 2009), the same discourse represents the dialogic action of 'narrating,' in Paul Ricoeur's terms (for the concept of 'narrative,' as a medium of dialogic civility, or common ground in public communicative space, see esp. Arnett and Arneson 1999). It embodies the pedagogical praxis of memory, suffering, pardon, and forgiveness, all purging disordered identities, relations, and cognitions from the past with an aim to restore intra-/interhuman connection and integrity in the future.

Finally, it is also the discourse of Desmond Tutu himself, in his own book *No Future without Forgiveness* (1999) and public messages from across the 1990s and 2000 (see Martin 2002, 200–217), that additionally contributes to the post-apartheid reconciliation rhetoric in South Africa. With the use of attitudinal expressions of affect, judgment, and appreciation, Tutu styles, in an emotional story told by a white South African woman about her personal experience of human rights violations, an ethically disintegrated picture of the characters' personalities and lives. Such contrasting rhetoric communicates the state of the parties' emotional impasse, where the circular dialectic of affect and judgment catches them in a debilitating trap without discursive resources to transcend (Martin 2002, 206). The rhetoric of transcendence, by contrast, is conveyed in Tutu's own expositions of the concept of restorative justice, in the spirit of *ubuntu* (characteristic of traditional African jurisprudence), which he provides in the same 1999 book as well as in his message during a visit to Sydney in 2000 (Martin 2002, 206–214). The same rhetoric is also used in the TRC formation act from 1995 (Martin 2002, 214–217). Textually structured by expressions of institutional judgment and appreciation, the idea of *ubuntu* is positively framed by terms invoking harmonious social relations and rehabilitation of both the victim and the perpetrator. These are performed through the ethical praxis of healing, forgiveness, and reconciliation, as a way to the actors' return to and integration with the community. In all these examples, the Afro-Christian dimension of transcendence involves the spiritual values of disinterested peace and harmony. It thus goes far beyond strictly agonistic tradition of retributive justice, prevalent in modern culture of the West.

As far as the American continent is concerned, the cross-cultural gap resulting from the difficult past between Native and non-Native Americans is now being patched up by some recent initiatives of social dialogue in the public sphere. One example of such undertakings is a communication project of local eco-tourism linking two communities in New Mexico: Gallup and Navaho (LaFever 2011). According to LaFever (2011), thanks to some intergovernmental and interagency

activities, the former group "embarked on an effort to change the local culture of exploitation" (128). The project involved expanding an existing hiking trail, Pyramid Peak (PP), into a loop trail that would popularise Navaho culture by connecting to its land and providing terrain suitable for running, a traditional Navaho athletic and spiritual practice. The idea behind this enterprise was to increase representation of marginalised ethnic groups in public dialogue about community planning, decision-making, and development. The analysis of the communication process from the perspective of three dimensions of dialogic praxis: communicative action, insurgent historiography and spatial production, indicates that discourse strategies from each of these planes are complementary in empowering Native Americans to participate in community life.

Firstly, the pronouncement of communicative action in the planning opened the floor to a wide audience, who could freely contribute to the discussions, and take equal power positions. This symmetry of power additionally consisted in (re)defining explicitly the roles of antagonists and protagonists in local tensions, which facilitated directness of linguistic expression in the cross-cultural contacts. Secondly, viewing the PP project through the lens of insurgent historiography helped to uncover traces of exploitation and commodification of Indian culture in the context of treating it exclusively as an attractive product of eco-tourism. At the same time, it also enabled to foreground attempts by Native Americans to empower themselves ethically in open discussions about their new entrepreneurship initiatives. By providing communicative space for open critique of objectifying marketisation activities and for resistance against pressures to silence Indian oppression from the past, the insurgent historiographical stance was an instance of post-colonial dialogue that contested attitudes of neocolonialism and its impact on the marginalised groups' identity. Thirdly, in terms of the conceptualisation of physical space, the project revealed the inability of dominant culture to understand or consider the difference between its own and Indian conception of identity tied to the land. As LaFever (2011) conveys,

> [l]and tenure, as practiced traditionally in Native American societies, designates individuals, based on birthright and inheritance, as caretakers of the land with obligations in order to sustain the community. Land use, on the other hand, [as practiced by dominant culture – UO] views land and everything connected to it as a commodity for producing material goods and profits.   (139)

The preservation of land integrity for the Navaho and other tribes is thus indispensable for their continued growth in the struggle to produce their own cultural space. Against this backdrop, the process of structuring decision-making space in the PP planning gave a warning that if the local discourse of land tenure was marginalised in favour of the global discourse of land use (the latter including

dominant practices of majority rule, adversarial positioning, and time constraints), members of aboriginal groups in America might withdraw from participation in such forums (on more dialogic initiatives to involve Native Americans in public life and community development, see also Rahder 1999; Freedman 2007; LaFever 2008, etc.).

The above-mentioned explicit narratives that provide dialogic re-readings of problems from the past are complemented by tacit realisations of intercultural dialogue in the form of counter-censorship discourse. Its exemplary cases come from the context of 19th- and 20th-century journalistic writings across Europe and Africa. For instance, in her analysis of figurative language in tsarist Russia, Savinitch (2005) demonstrates how the authors of Russian public media used selected rhetorical devices from various strata of the linguistic system to communicate hidden messages that opposed the official state policies and ideologies. More specifically, by means of sound ellipsis at the phonetic level, it was possible to articulate names of forbidden writers. Contextual synonyms, periphrastic designations, word substitutions, and conventional semantic changes at the lexical level enabled the construction of discursively new cognitive schemata for social movements and activities that were banned from public life by the dominant regime. The application of periphrasis, in turn, with indirect, circumlocutory, and descriptive designations of objects, phenomena, and people at the syntactic level was an efficient way to prevent censors' restrictions. By avoiding formal mentions of such items in 19th-century journalistic writings, it was possible to set new semantic combinations in the figurative language, which prevented forbidden notions from being detected by the state authorities. Finally, at the stylistic level, the use by opposition writers of irony, empty text elements (*lacunae*), and open lists, as well as a wide range of rhetorical tropes, enabled, respectively, to assign opposite meanings to political facts, strengthen the illocutionary force of omitted text passages, construct logical continuations of possible elements in sequentially ordered groups, and transfer direct meanings to implied ones that were of higher importance to the readers. The role of this 'Aesopian language,' as Savinitch (2005) calls it, was – on the ethical plane – to empower both excluded authors and their recipients in situations of political oppression (cf. 111). Furthermore, on the substantial plane, this language contributed to structuring a new shared knowledge of Russian society in opposition to the worship of state power and absolute monarchy in the country (112). On the relational plane, in turn, it bound the society into a community of people who, in their struggle with the problematic political conditions, strove to regain their human freedom and national dignity (cf. esp. 112–120).

A similar anti-censorship textual challenge can be illustrated in the example of discourse representations of 20th-century liberation movement in South Africa. In her discussion of news reports published shortly after the State of Emergency

and the announcement of media restrictions in 1986, Anthonissen (2003) shows how South African news reporters attempted to defy official censorship of information. With the use of multi-modal devices, the media texts go far beyond informing their audience on limited public issues. More importantly, they

> provide information on how censorship infringes on the right to free expression, the right to unthreatened exchange of views, and the right to be sufficiently informed. Additionally, such reports function as public protest against the violation of acknowledged human rights, and as an encouragement to intensify protest against the invasive system. (99–100)

The above-mentioned communicative effects are attained through, *inter alia*, visual traces in print of removed original verbiage and pictures; lists of forbidden topics and of references to stories for which permission to publish was refused; potentially offensive stories that carry the outline, but remove details that might cause retribution; statements rephrased into suggestions that carry potentially offensive but cancellable propositions; comments on practical implications of restrictive regulations and on contradictions between government's regulations and its own representations; assumptions of readers' interests in and commitment to a free press, as well as of their mature judgments without authority intervention; and, finally, speech acts encouraging readers to go beyond passive protest with indications of ways in which protesters could voice their opposition with minimum threat to them (Anthonissen 2003, 109–110). In foregrounding the mystifying effect of censorship, all these rhetorical devices tie both their authors and readers into an ethico-relational community of human Subjects. In communicating the substantive truth about South African public matters, they transmit journalistically channelled dialogue in the media domain.

The above picture of dialogic sense-making of various historical problems can be further complemented by narratives re-reading discourses of some 20th-century perturbations, including the Second World War and more recent totalitarianisms. In terms of the former, Heer et al. eds. (2008), for example, demonstrate how the oppressive discourse of the Wehrmacht's War of Annihilation can be challenged and dismantled dialogically through the multimodal texture of an historical exhibition. The multidirectional narratives of muted facts from Wehrmacht's history, as well as silenced voices of WWII witnesses and victims presented at the touring exhibition "War of Annihilation: Crimes of the Wehrmaht, 1941 to 1944" in Austria and Germany (1995–1999) show how different societies inflicted with the horrors of WWII confront and struggle with traumatic experiences from their past. According to Wodak (2008), the exhibition

> should be seen as a powerful social intervention in respect of the national historical narratives persisting in Austria and Germany since the end of the Second

> World War in 1945. Through its principled challenge to, and critique of, the widely accepted portrayal of an apolitical Wehrmacht, untainted by involvement in war crimes, and the collective innocence of the Wehrmacht's soldiers, the exhibition cast lasting doubt on what, for many people in Austria and Germany, had been a basic matter of consensus about the Nazi past.   (xiii)

In narrating new evidence, and emphasising its weight for the participation of Wehrmacht in the War of Annihilation (see, e.g., Manoschek 2008a), the exhibition prompted a series of public debates that undermined the prevalent, ideologically biased stories about the Wehrmacht legend (e.g., Heer 2008; Loitfellner 2008; Manoschek 2008b, 2008c; Pollak 2008a, 2008b; Sandner and Manoschek 2008). The new knowledge thus constructed contributed to the rise of social consciousness and rational approach to the historical events recounted. This, in turn, allowed for the redefinition of Wehrmacht's previously established positive conduct in WWII in substantial terms (Uhl 2008, esp. 259–262). Moreover, the open discussion of questions related to blame, guilt, and responsibility for the crimes committed (e.g., Wodak 2008, xv) generated the adoption of the ethical stance in the data interpretation. Finally, the framing of the exhibition through the concept of inter-generational reconciliation (Uhl 2008, 258–259) underlined its relational dimension. Together with the remaining aspects, it located this narration in the broad discourse order of intercultural dialogue (on an attempt at trans-ethnic reconciliation through the multimodal discourse of a historical exhibition in the post-colonial context of New Zealand, see Martin and Stenglin 2006).

Another example of a multimodal text that undertakes the issue of post-WWII reconciliation in a pedagogical way is a children's picture book by Diane Wolfer and Brian Harrison-Lever – *Photographs in the Mud* (Martin 2008). Focusing on Australian – Japanese warfare on the Kokoda Trail in New Guinea (1942), the book mobilises both verbal and visual resources to foster an ongoing healing process in Japanese – Australian relations following WWII. On the informational and relational planes, the narrative alternates systematically between Australian and Japanese themes. In this way, it gives a balanced perspective to both parties, thus building their equal positions as partners. The focalisation and ambience devices that are applied to the book illustrations align the two main characters as soldiers of the opposed armies. They also extend the ties from the soldiers themselves to their family circles and readers. In the first case, the bonds between the soldiers are structured semiotically as the men are both shown to pine for their loved ones. In the second case, the wider bonds grow when the characters' family members from photographs embedded in the book's main pictures are positioned in eye contact with readers. This is how the narrative invokes empathy for what is going on in its plot, and especially for the mothers, wives, daughters, and sisters who vicariously

engage in the events, as well as for their sons, husbands, fathers, and brothers who directly slaughter each other in battle. On the ethical plane, the text constructs grammatical distance between the agents of war and their harmful dealings. The middle voice used for such purposes opens dialogic space for the fighters from both sides, where they may consider and objectify their activities, and simultaneously make room in their identities for the actualisation of human(e) selves. The reconciliation process culminates with the mutual rejection by the two soldiers of their antagonistic judgments of and negative feelings to each other. The dropping of the vilifying attitudes emerges as a constitutive factor of dialogic transformation. As a basic trigger of peace-making, this process empowers all the parties involved to convert the 'vicious circle' of conflict into the 'virtuous circle' of its resolution (cf. Cloke 2001; Bush and Folger 2005; Umbreit 2006, etc.).

The sense-making discourse of the Second World War is further extended by dialogic commemorations of the WWII-specific events. As Ensink and Sauer eds. (2003) show in relation to the 50th anniversary of one of such events, the Warsaw Uprising from 1944 against enemy forces occupying Poland during the war, language-mediated ceremonies of commemorating do the double work: both forgetting and remembering.

> To be remembered are *results* of historical developments, in particular certain phases of the Second World War, like the beginning of the war, its end as well as some remarkable moments of bravery or even defeat. It is not only victories that have to be commemorated. Even defeats – normally dealt with as temporary setbacks – might be considered part of the road to the final victory and thus worth commemorating. These results are normally treated as grounds for reflecting the positive or negative significance of the war.   (…)

> To be forgotten are details and coincidental events. To be forgotten in particular are the *then-feelings* of hatred, resentment, insult, triumph or revenge that tend to fill up individual and collective memories with strong emotions and thus to leave no room for other relevant memory topics – but that are not useful anymore in the present time.   (7)

Importantly, historical forgetting may take place if commemoration responds primarily to the moral criterion, by establishing unequivocal answers to the questions:

> *who is guilty, or what is the balance of debts and credits among the participants?* [emphasis added] Only when this balance is zero, oblivion may take over. But when the balance is unequal, a discussion between creditors and debtors is unavoidable. (…) The commemoration is to be assessed as successful when the participants, debtors and creditors, agree on a new balance closer to zero.
>
>   (Ensink and Sauer 2003, 13)

Although the political speeches from the 1994 commemoration did not meet, in the vast majority, the qualitative standards of authentic rehabilitation of historical ties between the countries invited to the event (see the specific chapters in the volume), according to Ensink and Sauer (2003, 14–15), the anniversary discourse pointed substantially to the participants' greater knowledge of the war itself, its aftermath, and the liberation of Middle and Eastern Europe from communism in 1989. Moreover, for the Polish identification and ethical standing specifically, the Warsaw commemoration was a dialogic effort towards getting international recognition in the new, post-war reality of recent political and economic transformations. At the core of this recognition lay Poland's successful resistance to the communist regime, upon which resistance the country could re-establish her novel national identity without reference to the communist past. The actualisation of the recognition by the invited audience was a reflexive marker of cross-national support for the ongoing Polish aspirations. In relational terms, it provided a source of new enthusiasm towards freedom and democracy, validated dialogically by internationally proven language.

In light of the evidence for the dialogic role of reconciliation discourse, the present chapter discusses the language-mediated process of coming to terms with the difficult past in Pope John Paul II's (henceforth JPII) pontifical correspondence. The Pope's contribution to intercultural dialogue and world peace has been widely recognised and covered in relation to a broad range of historical and contemporary contexts. For example, Accattoli (1997) discusses, on the example of various genres of pontifical documentation, main acts of JPII's apologies for the Catholic Church's wrongdoings from the past.[2] Moreover, in reference to the Second World War, Steinke (2003) uncovers the dialogic side of the Pope's letter commemorating the afore-mentioned Warsaw Uprising (1944). The reconciliation aspect of this message lies in the complex ideational perspective that it unfolds thematically to present this event as significant to both Poland and Europe in the deeper sense of its ethical, moral and religious dimensions. The problems of social divisions, conflicts, and their resolution are additionally undertaken in the Pope's apostolic adhortation *Reconciliatio et paenitentia* (1984). The relevance of this text for the peace process at large is thoroughly discussed by Gawkowska (2015, 36–42), who analyses it with the focus on reasons for social divides, on personal healing, the human search for truth, as well as responsibility for individual and collective ties. The author also foregrounds the Pope's personal engagement in reconciliation initiatives from the perspective of both global and

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2. See also *Memory and Reconciliation: The Church and the Faults of the Past*, International Theological Commission 1999, available at: http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/congregations/cfaith/cti_documents/rc_con_cfaith_doc_20000307_memory-reconc-itc_en.html

local affairs. The former are illustrated by instances of, *inter alia*, JPII's ecumenical dialogue with the Jews (2015, 56–60; see also Chrostowski and Rubinkiewicz eds. 1990; Chrostowski ed. 2005) and other religions (2015, 64, 102, 129, 133; see also Borowik 2014; Chlebowski 2014, etc.), cross-cultural dialogue with(in) the European, African, Asian and American communities (2015, 60–64, 130–131; see also Sowiński and Zenderowski 2003; Dudziak and Żejmo eds. 2014, etc.), as well as inter-group dialogue between young and old people (2015: 102–103; see also Miszewska 2009; Tomaszewska 2009; Okulska 2011, etc.), or between men and women (2015, 101, 166ff).[3] When it comes to the local dimension of JPII's dialogue with others, it is actualised in his private conversation with the assassin Mehmet Ali Ağca (Gawkowska 2015, 101, 128; also Okulska 2011, 142), as well as in his personal mediation in the 1978 conflict between Chile and Argentina (Gawkowska 2015, 127–128; see also Olechnowicz 2010). The latter domain of international relations constitutes an important dimension of the Pope's dialogic communication. In this respect, JPII's realisation of intercultural dialogue is generally conceived of as his (discoursal) search for international peace, order, and understanding (e.g., Casaroli 1987; Góra-Szopiński 2009; Kulska 2014, etc.).

3.   Research perspective and scope

As has been signalled in the Introduction, JPII's pontifical letters selected for this research were directed to victims of wars and prosecutions, as well as to prisoners. They aimed to draw public attention to ongoing problems of injustice, violence, and imbalance that have their roots in conflicts from the past. The messages were intended to encourage broad social action towards changing the negative attitudes to and the difficult lot of the oppressed. Departing from the Dialogic Model of Discourse (esp. Grillo ed. 2005), this study shows the process of language-mediated reconciliation as *dialogic action* (Okulska forthc.), defined as a discursive rendition of human action (Arendt 1998) in its communicative disclosure (Habermas 1984). It operates through mechanisms of 'reaching understanding,' which takes place when "a speaker selects a comprehensible linguistic expression only in order to come to an understanding with a hearer about something and thereby to make himself understandable" (Habermas 1984, 307). In fully reciprocal exchange (see esp. Ricoeur 1992a, 180–194), the interactants do it through coordinating (at least) three types of 'criticisable validity claims' (VC), to use the Habermasian idea. These include the claims for *truthfulness*, *rightness*, and *truth*, which allow speakers

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3. On JPII's idea of 'new feminism', as a Christian form of male – female reconciliation explored by Gawkowska (2015), see also Schumacher ed. (2003).

to include, respectively, *themselves*, *each other*, and their (shared) *subject matter(s)* rhetorically in discourse. The harmonisation of these claims leads to a situation when "at least two speaking and acting Subjects understand a linguistic expression in the same way." This establishes communicative agreement between the parties in three dimensions of dialogic action (cf. also Habermas 1984, 327–328). On the expressive plane ('dramaturgical action' – henceforth *E dimension*), the agreement denotes mutual trust in Subjective sincerity, produced by the VC for the truthfulness of the speakers' beliefs, intentions, feelings, desires, etc. On the regulative plane ('normative action' – *R dimension*), it denotes normative accord, produced by the VC for the rightness/legitimacy of inter Subjective relations. Finally, on the substantial/epistemic plane ('cognitive action' – *C dimension*), it denotes correctness and acceptance of shared propositional knowledge, produced by the VC for the truth of statements and presuppositions made (Habermas 1984, 307–308). By securing and accepting all these claims simultaneously in a single speech act, its sender and recipient together recognise, correlatively, (1) "a [S]ubjective experience that is manifested and ascribed to the *internal world* of the speaker," (2) "an action that is [regarded] as legitimate in the *social world*," and (3) the *existence* of a state of affairs in the *objective world* [emphasis by the Author & UO] (1984, 309).

The three dimensions of action oriented to reaching understanding are responsible for establishing a wide-ranging consensus between the three world spheres (cf. Grillo 2005b, 19). Aside characteristic manifestations of this consensus in vast contemporary social practice (see esp. Rogers 1961; Duffy 2009; Sharaby 2013; Graf and Pawelczyk 2014; Feder Kittay 2014; Muntigl, Knight and Watkins 2014; etc.), it has a special function also in discursive sense-making of the past. All such peace-building exchanges confirm inherent affinity, or *integration* (cf. Gold 1993; Umbreit 1997; Grillo 2005a, b, c), between the world's 'objective' (substantial) domain as well as the world's 'inter-Subjective' (ethico-relational) domain. Whereas the former activates speakers' rational approaches to confronted issues, the latter complements it by initiating the participants' genuine *experiences* of 'themselves and/as others' in the mutual 'presence' of authentic Subjects, as (human) *Persons* (cf. Ricoeur 1992a, b). More specifically, to describe the realisation of this consensus in any form of intercultural dialogue, explanations provided there "must fit with phenomena, even if, as a result, the previously agreed beliefs have to be ruled out. It follows that (…) in [such a] case ['Truth'] is defined more in terms of some kind of homology between our conceptual artifacts and (observable and measurable) phenomena" (Grillo 2005b, 19). For the quality of language-mediated reconciliation, this further means that

> the possible lack of any given previous consensus will not suffice to rule out an explanation, provided that it fits with the relevant phenomena; then, if a consensus

> is to be achieved here, it will result only from the fulfilment of the varied proce-
> dures by which the given explanation at issue will have to be challenged and criti-
> cised in order to be (possibly) validated. To that extent, it would be mistaken to
> hold that 'Truth' always depends on consensus; in such cases, it is *the consensus it-*
> *self which depends on truth*, provided that the relevant validation procedures have
> been correctly and overtly applied. As a result, in such cases *the consensus will only*
> *result from* the varied discursive processes by which the explaining statement will
> have to exhibit simultaneously its *soundness*, its *relevance*, and its *trustworthiness*
> [emphasis added]. (Grillo 2005b, 19)

It can thus be argued that the communicative practice of negotiating dynamically
(historical) consensus about the (structure of the) world (from the past) leads to
the *simultaneous disclosure of the truth of this world*, with the parallel 'appearance'
of human *reality* underlying it (see esp. Buber 1937, 59, 63; Arnett 1986, 135–138;
Arendt 1998, 208; Węgrzecki 2014, 25–38, 91, 144ff; etc.). As Grillo (2005b, 21–22)
observes, such a participatory context provides room for the production of 'genu-
ine knowledge,' whose true novelty and sharedness are able to terminate old (often
mechanical) beliefs, opinions, ideologies, and prejudices. This knowledge arises
from the common control of communicating partners over processes of validating
semantic innovations, which allows the parties "to overcome the inter-personal
as well as the inter-institutional conflicts they are facing; provided, of course, that
they want to" (Grillo 2005a, xi).

    The indicator of the worldly provenance of the 'new shared knowledge' is that
it cannot be equalled with "a subset of social beliefs which, for social reasons (cul-
tural, political, etc.) have acquired a particular status in social cognition, a status
which warrants them the widest possible agreement on the one hand, and allows
them to play a prominent role in legitimation strategies of different kinds on the
other" (Grillo 2005c, 234–235). What precisely distinguishes such 'worldly (or
truth-bound) knowledge' from mere (often insubstantial or truth-detached) 'in-
terpretations,' 'beliefs,' or 'ideologies' (also in the historical domain) is that

> the sharing of mere beliefs relies on a kind of agreement which is only subjectively
> grounded, in so far as it requires no more than personal trustworthiness, while the
> sharing of knowledge requires an *objectively grounded agreement*, requiring *mu-*
> *tual criticism*, *common control*, and systematic *relation to facts* [emphasis added].
> (Grillo 2005c, 235)

This further emphasises that carrying out processes of 'humane' sense-making of
the past requires "*the collaboration of the communicating partners*, who in such
practices must be *on an equal footing* when sharing the semantic initiative and ex-
erting a common control over the overall communicative process [emphasis add-
ed]" (Grillo 2005b, 19–20). The knowledge thus obtained acquires its *qualitative*

status through the fact that it satisfies "validation procedure[s] which must be both *public* and *reiterative*, such a requirement being useless in the case of belief, which may be agreed upon on the basis of mere subjective preference" (Grillo 2005c, 235). This is to say that

> the act of criticising a given ideology cannot necessarily be reduced to the mere construction of a counter ideology: it may result in the overcoming of the previous ideological cleavages, and the sharing of new knowledge which has been produced in the very course of the interaction itself. If communicative interaction is to be thought of as a process, and as a process which, moreover, allows for belief change, then we must consider that in the course of the interaction, we move from an initial state (often characterised by ideological cleavages) to a terminal state which does not necessarily reproduce them.   (Grillo 2005c, 235)

The stage of terminating previous (in our case: past-derived agonistic) beliefs/ideologies comes precisely with the moment of launching new qualitative and dialogically verified procedures of world (objective) examination, self-reflection, and other-reflexivity. Their sound unfolding, measured by 'ethically creative' development of, simultaneously, shared knowledge, participatory relations, and human *ipseity* (or 'selfhood') – the latter representing the strong, stable and unique, i.e. *personal* aspect of one's identity (Ricoeur 1992a, esp. 113–139; see also Tischner 1990, 43–44, Węgrzecki 2014, 80–89, etc.) – is possible only through the world revival in the synergy between narratives reconciling different versions of the past and the tripartite dialogic action. In Habermasian (1984) terms, this takes place when communicators on all sides embed their utterances equally in the three harmonised world relations: cognitive (C), regulative (R), and expressive (E). These are orchestrated precisely through the three VCs secured in the participants' "coming to an understanding about *something* with *one another* and thus making *themselves* understandable [emphasis added]" (308). The communicative synchronisation of both the claims and the ensuing relations is the speakers' guarantee of their world's validity. It also materialises the dialogic presence (or 'integration') in (reconciliation) discourse of, respectively, substantial thematic content (C), which is deliberated by an authentic participatory community (R) of living personal Subjects (E). By the same token, it discloses the 'integrating' human condition (Okulska forthc.; cf. Arendt 1998) in the inherent equilibrium of the constitutively 'integrating' world (Okulska forthc.; cf. also Habermas 1984, esp. 98–100; Ricoeur 1992a; Gold 1993; Umbreit 1997; Grillo 2005a, b, c; Cloke 2001, Bush and Folger 2005, etc.).

In the present research, the three types of VCs will be presented as semanto-pragmatic markers of conclusions ending at different levels of institutional ex/implicitness (cf. *higher-level validity claims*; Habermas 1984, 40) the arguments raised in the texts studied. Together with related grounds, warrants, and backing,

the claims realise simultaneously the *process*, *procedure*, and *product* aspects of argumentative speech. The first consists in satisfying conditions of interactive symmetry that must be presupposed by every competent speaker the moment they enter an argumentative situation. As Habermas (1984) has it,

> [p]articipants in argumentation have to presuppose in general that the structure of their communication, by virtue of features that can be described in purely formal terms, excludes all force – whether it arises from within the process of reaching understanding itself or influences it from the outside – except the force of the better argument (and thus that it also excludes, on their part, all motives except that of a cooperative search for the truth). (25)

In this light, argumentation functions as "*a reflective continuation, with different means, of action oriented to reaching understanding*" [emphasis by the Author] (1984, 25). Its second, 'procedural' aspect, in turn, emphasises the interactive form of argumentation, which is "*subject to special rules.*" The cooperative division of labour underlying the discursive process of reaching understanding between the participants is normatively arranged in such a way that they "thematise a problematic validity claim and, relieved of the pressure of action and experience, in a hypothetical attitude, test with reasons, and only with reasons, whether the claim defended by the proponents rightfully stands or not" (Habermas 1984, 25). Such 'reasoned examination' uncovers the third, 'product' layer of argumentation, which brings forth *cogent arguments*, as the procedure's ultimate results. Their intrinsic properties equip the arguments with their invaluable force of convincing that can either redeem or reject the particular VCs. The participatory recognition in dialogically processed argumentation of a proponent's hypothetically raised VC is a moment when their voice thus far argued is publically acknowledged as genuine 'inter-Subjective knowledge' (cf. Habermas 1984, 25; Grillo 2005b, c).

The extent to which the three levels of argumentation are interrelated indicates that truly dialogic action, aimed at reaching understanding and, consequently, at inter-Subjective and worldly integration, is best characterised by a balanced merger of the three argument dimensions. Generally, it jointly includes:

> from the process perspective (…) the intention of convincing a *universal audience* and gaining general assent for an utterance; from the procedural perspective, (…) the intention of ending a dispute about hypothetical validity claims with a *rationally motivated agreement;* and from the product perspective (…) the intention of grounding or *redeeming* a validity claim with arguments. (Habermas 1984, 26)

In the following parts of this chapter, it will be shown how these three argumentation aspects altogether texture the different *topoi* of the correspondence studied. How Pope JPII built the argumentative structure of his reconciliation letters will

be discussed from the perspective of two phases that shaped the intercultural dialogue that the author carried out with various conflicted communities during his pontificate. It will be demonstrated, according to premises of the *Transformative Approach to Conflict* (Bush and Folger 2005; see also Cloke 2001, etc.), how this dialogue, in its (afore-mentioned) cognitive, regulative, and expressive dimensions, proceeds through the complex rhetorical moves of *empowerment* and *recognition*, to lead its participants gradually towards inter-Subjective and worldly integration. In Bush and Folger's (2005) words, the discourse activities of empowerment "help disputing parties activate their inherent capacity for deliberation and decision making in adverse circumstances." As a result, the participants gain "a greater sense of strength of self, including self-respect, self-reliance, and self-confidence" (13). The discourse activities of recognition "help individuals activate their inherent capacity for understanding the problems of others." They thus engender "acknowledgment and concern for each other as fellow human beings" (14). Both groups of the speech activities "allow parties to define problems and goals in their own terms, thus validating the importance of those problems and goals in the parties' lives." They moreover "support the parties' exercise of self-determination in deciding how, or even whether, to settle a dispute, and (…) help the parties mobilise their own resources to address problems and achieve their goals" (13).

Observed from a broader socio-ethical perspective, the two genres realise in a nonlinear way the process of discursive *transformation*, viewed as "a [radical] change in the quality of conflict interaction" (Bush and Folger 2005, 18). To make it clear, in the sense advocated here, transformation does *not* mean (only) "the restructuring of social institutions in a way that redistributes power and eliminates class privilege" (2005, 17). As Bush and Folger (2005) stress, "[w]hen the term is used to mean institutional restructuring, it does not carry any necessary implication of qualitatively different social interaction, but rather connotes a reallocation of material benefits and burdens among individuals and groups." For this reason, transformation, as understood here, "connotes [first of all] change in the quality [i.e. means] of social interaction, in and beyond conflict." Although "this kind of change will very likely lead to changes in social institutions as well," they represent a natural *consequence* of this process, rather than its main *priority* (18; see also Okulska forthc.). Framed in socio-historical terms, dialogic transformation embodies, then, the shift from *agonistic (discourse) culture* to *participatory (discourse) culture* (cf. Tannen 1998, esp. 237–290, Bush and Folger 2005, 14). It also actualises in narrators of the past their 'human spirit' cf. Arendt 1998, 95; 2003, 49; Tannen 1998, 147–150; Cloke 2001, 108–125; Ingarden 2009, esp. 29–48), which parallels the enactment in their identities of true 'Subjectivity' and 'Personhood' (Ricoeur 1992a, b). These all bring witnesses of the past, both former victims and perpetrators, back to the living world, and generate prospective integration, consolidation,

and revival of their shared 'human(e) reality' (cf. Bush and Folger 2005, 23–26, 34–39, 53–62).

The research is based on a sample of seven diplomatic letters that JPII sent to different world communities and social groups with an aim to re-establish connection and participatory bonds within/between these groups. Additionally, some of the messages were intended to rehabilitate the specific ties of the Catholic Church to people who were in different times wronged by the Church representatives. In particular, the sample studied includes epistolary texts where the Pope addresses problems related to the Inquisition (letter VIN 2004),[4] WWII events (holocaust – letter RSH 1998, Warsaw Uprising – letter WUA 2004), Catholic – Jewish relations (letter EJC 2002), and European integration (letters TFE 2004, SWF 2004), as well as social exclusion and personal renewal of (contemporary) prisoners, as those who once wronged others by crimes committed in their individual histories (letter WYD 1997). All the letters selected for research are authorised English language versions of the papal correspondence published at the official web site of the Holy See: http://w2.vatican.va/ content/john-paul-ii/en.html.

4.   The discourse of JPII's reconciliation letters

As has been signalled above, the major textual moves of empowerment and recognition that structure the Pope's letters of reconciliation consist of complex speech activities that mediate the two genres discursively. Their aim is to carry out the process of *mutual facilitation* (e.g., Greatbatch and Dingwall 1999; Winslade and Monk 2000, 2008; Kovach 2004; Muntigl 2004; Bush and Folger 2005; Rycielski and Żylicz 2007; Gmurzyńska 2009; Waszkiewicz 2009; Pawelczyk 2011, etc.), whereby all the parties concerned, i.e. the author himself, (direct) recipients of his correspondence as well as other (third) parties assumed, can (re)gain 'human togetherness' in the relational experience of inter-Subjective presence, solidarity, complementariness, and freedom. The stage of empowerment is rhetorically channelled by three groups of arguments whose VCs jointly aim to (re)establish the human world in conflictual situations through the disclosure of its three inherent aspects. The first group includes references to (inter-)Subjective uniqueness, respect, interconnectedness, and gratitude within and beyond the addressed communities. All such speech acts articulate claims for the validity of the expressive (E) dimension of the human world. The second group includes factual expressions that build *topoi* of past events and their present consequences, all articulating claims for the validity of the cognitive (C) dimension of the human world. The third group

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4. For full references to this and the following letters, see the Appendix at the end of his chapter.

includes discussions of il/legitimacy of specific social behaviours in the different cultural settings discussed, all articulating claims for the validity of the regulative (R) dimension of the human world. When it comes to the stage of recognition, in turn, it is rhetorically rendered through combined arguments that merge all the three types of VCs together. They jointly underline the respective truthfulness, truth, and rightness of the three world dimensions acknowledged in empowerment. Moreover, they reveal the latter's mutual correlation, synergy, interdependence, and harmony in the thus 'integrating world,' which emerges from 'humane' narrations of the past in the dialogue-driven correspondence under scrutiny.

4.1 The discourse of empowerment in JPII's reconciliation letters: E dimension

In narrative terms (cf. Winslade and Monk 2000, 2008), the stage of empowerment involves a wide range of speech acts realised from different dialogic perspectives. In the sample of JPII's correspondence researched here these practices consist, generally, in (1) strengthening the interlocutors' sense of 'selfhood' and (2) extending the view of the situation, mainly by isolating problematic issues for discussion (objectification). Such turns are all taken to create options for (3) alternative (participatory) standards of social (linguistic) behaviour. The first type is verbalised by strategies of discursive identification, responsible for constructing positions of Subjective integrity, authenticity, self-constancy, and uniqueness. They are facilitated by expressions of mutual partnership, openness, interdependence and respect. The second type follows rhetorical moves that detach problems from parties so as to open communicative space for inter/intra-Subjective transformation. The third type, in turn, groups utterances that call the Subjects for participation, entreating them to set unprecedented examples of broadly 'ethical' behaviour. All the above tropes constitute, respectively, the E, C and R aspects of dialogic action in its empowerment mode.

When it comes to the E dimension of empowerment, rhetorical strategies on this communicative plane collect expressions that rebuild the speakers' ethical status by generating their full presence and inclusion in discourse. In his letter written on the occasion of the presentation of the volume on the Inquisition (VIN 2004), published as proceedings of the International Symposium on the Inquisition (Vatican, 29–31 October 1998; see Borromeo ed. 2003), the Pope empathises with the victims of this institution, including also subsequent generations who have suffered indirectly its results. He does it through nominalisations that allude to personal and collective traumas of the oppressed, such as *the tragedies associated with the Inquisition* and *the injuries to memory that result from it*. At the same time, the author expresses his own grief, which also flows from the whole Catholic

community, for the past *intolerance and even the use of violence in the service of truth*. In reference to the act of forgiveness that was asked on the Day of Pardon (12 March 2000), JPII maintains the stance of humility on behalf of the Catholic Church for, as he confesses, *errors committed in the service of the truth by recourse to methods not in keeping with the Gospel*. Such speech acts of solidarity verbalise claims for ethical symmetry and reciprocity between the interactants, whereby the latter can show to each other mutual respect, and all can regain personal dignity.

A similar theme of reconciliation with neighbour in the context of Jewish – Catholic relations is undertaken by the Pope in his letter on improving relations between Jews and Catholics in Europe (EJC 2002), written for the European Jewish Congress in Paris (28–29 January 2002). This theme additionally recurs in a letter on the occasion of the publication of the document "We remember: A reflection on the Shoah" (RSH 1998). In the former text, personal Subjectivity and ethical presence of the two parties involved, i.e. Jews and Catholics, are dialogically empowered through the metonymic index of the *wounds* that both communities experienced due to *past misunderstandings and injustices*. Moreover, the Pope includes Jewish people explicitly in his own human experience by recalling *with a sense of deep sorrow the[ir] sufferings during the Second World War*. The second of the texts, in turn, directly addressed to Cardinal Walter Kasper, President of the Commission for Religious Relations with the Jews, complements Jews' and Christians' Subject positions reflexively by emphasising *a special relationship that they have*. As Examples (1) and (2) illustrate, the Pope accentuates the uniqueness of this connection by constructing in the letter discursive representations of common Jewish – Christian heritage and tradition: religious, historical, philosophical.

(1)   *The message that comes to us from the God of the Covenant with Moses, the patriarchs and the prophets*, is part of our *common heritage* and invites us to collaborate in the life of the world, for the Most High is calling us to be holy as He is holy, and at the same time, *to love our neighbour as ourselves*.
(EJC 2002)

(2)   *Jews and Christians are bound to one another because of their respective identity* and should pursue that *culture of dialogue that Martin Buber envisaged. It is our task to pass on to the new generations the treasures and values we have in common…*   (EJC 2002)

In Example (1), this is verbalised especially through the reference to *the message that comes to us from the God of the Covenant with Moses, the patriarchs and the prophets*, as well as through the paraphrase of God's call to both parties for collaboration *in the life of this world* and in *love [for] our neighbour as ourselves*. Example (2), in turn, develops the *topos* of Jewish and Christian ethical bonds,

and by recontextualising the common *culture of dialogue that Martin Buber envisaged*, it formulates the VC for the shared Jewish – Christian *identity*, legacies (*the treasures and values we have in common*) and responsibilities (*It is our task to pass on to the new generations…*).

The question of human subjectification in the context of reestablishing inter-/intra-personal ties after painful events from the past is also undertaken in the letter on the occasion of the 60th anniversary of the Warsaw Uprising (WUA 2004). In contrast to the international scope of the parallel text written ten years before, for the celebrations of the Uprising's 50th Anniversary (see Steinke 2003), the present text concentrates mainly on the aspect of national healing after the trauma of Polish occupation by Nazi Germany during WWII. Among the voices of Polish people who suffered the military attack, and undertook *unequal fight for the cause of their Homeland*, JPII revives several groups of the Uprising's participants: *the insurgents who spared neither their blood nor their lives*; *the soldiers of the Home Army (Armia Krajowa) and the other military formations*; *the civilians of Warsaw who died in tens of thousands on the battlefield*; *the priests, chaplains of the Uprising who helped the combatants to the very end*; *the heroic women-doctors and the nurses who tended the combatants*; as well as *all those who lived through those days*. The Author honors both those who fell and those who survived by naming them *heroes of that August insurrection*, and by praising their patriotic gestures. The latter are uplifted in JPII's discourse to the *love for the Homeland [that] those young people must have cherished*, to a *[climb to] the barricades in the name of freedom, their own and that of the whole community*, or to *disinterested service to those in need*. At the same time, the Pope identifies himself with the victims personally by expressing his *wholehearted[ness in] join[ing] the inhabitants of Warsaw and all [his] compatriots in the solemn commemoration*, by sharing his pain with those who *were massacred with the injured*, and by underlining his belonging *as a son [to the Polish] Nation*. In this way, he equalises his own position both as man and a Pole with all those whom he thematises in his epistle. They are given back their human dignity especially in discursive elevations of their self-defence struggles to the status of *the climax of the entire Nation's resistance* and of *their moral victory*, which *as such (…) will stand forever*. All the above rhetorical moves, together with speech acts of the highest respect that the Pope pays for the witnesses of the historical time (in phrases, such as, e.g., *I would like to pay homage to the heroes…*; *I bow to…*; *In remembering them, I put my admiration into words…*), allow the author to make an expressive VC for the uniqueness, inter-connectedness, and Personhood of all the actors included in his epistolary narrative.

A similar discursive process of integrating human identities on a larger, international scale through expressive dialogic means can be observed in two JPII's letters that deal with (problematic) cross-cultural relations in the history of

(uniting) Europe at the turn of the third millennium. In discussing the importance of Christian tradition and heritage for the European continent, the Pope actualises contemporary 'European selfhood' – a strong, stable, and consistent aspect of European identity (viz. *ipseitas*; cf. Tischner 1990; Ricoeur 1992a; Węgrzecki 2014, etc.), by invoking in discourse more distant and more recent founders of European culture.

(3) The centenary of the *Social Weeks* is an opportunity to rediscover the long tradition of the Church's social Magisterium and *the many saints who have left their mark on the European Continent since the early centuries*: Benedict, Cyril and Methodius, Boniface, Thomas More, the Martyrs of the Pontons de Rochefort, Edith Stein, Maximilian Kolbe, Bridget of Sweden; they all showed that the Gospel and Christian values are fertile soil, both for the lives of persons and peoples, and for building society.
(…)
The past 60 years [after the Liberation of Paris] have brought hope. They have been distinguished by many gestures of reconciliation and the desire to make Europe a Continent of brothers and sisters; this desire was first postulated by *Christian statesmen whose names live on in everyone's memory, such as Robert Schuman, Konrad Adenauer and Alcide De Gasperi*.
(SWF 2004)

(4) … *the "fathers" of European unity*, the majority of whom identified with the Christian faith, started the unification process whose fruits we are gathering today. Europe began to bring *reconciliation and peace to nations that had unfortunately fought one another for centuries.*
(…)
The multitude of *witnesses to the faith who died, victims of the bloody and distressing persecutions in European history in the 20th century*, constitute a *common heritage for the Christian denominations.*   (TFE 2004)

As Example (3) above shows, an important part of European self is textually scripted by nominals referring to *the many saints who have left their mark on the European Continent since the early centuries*. More recently, this group has also been extended by *the "fathers" of European unity* (Example 4) or *Christian statesmen*, including *Robert Schuman, Konrad Adenauer and Alcide De Gasperi, whose names live on in everyone's memory* (Example 3). As letter TFE 2004 additionally indicates, the notion of European identity involves *victims of the bloody and distressing persecutions in European history in the 20th century*, including also – what we can read in SWF 2004 – *peoples who were for so long under the yoke of Communism*. As JPII has it (in 4), many of them represent *witnesses to the faith*, whose life sacrifice has contributed to the *common heritage for the Christian denominations*. They are

all said to have actively initiated, and continuously inspired, the European process of *reconciliation and peace*, also among *nations that had unfortunately fought one another for centuries* (4). By giving voice to both the Christian politicians who have laid the foundations of integrating Europe, as well as to (common) people of the Church who actively fought for freedom against 20th-century totalitarianisms, the Pope validates all these individuals' discursive positions equally as persons of great merit to united Europe. At the same time, his rhetorical enumerations of their democratic and liberation achievements in public discourse realise ethical VCs for their full acceptance as legitimate builders of authentic (viz. participatory) European community.

Finally, the sample of JPII's correspondence dealing with problems of the difficult past contains a projection of the large-scale dialogue, operating at the (inter) national level, onto its small-scale rendition, operating at the individual level. In the WYD 1997 letter, which the Pope sent on the occasion of his apostolic journey to the 12th World Youth Day in Paris, the topic of sense-making of the difficult past is recontextualised in life stories of young prisoners from France. On the text's expressive plane, the addressees are assured that they are not forgotten by society: they are in the Pope's mind (which also means the closeness of the whole Church), and surrounded by their relatives and friends: *I am thinking of you who are in prison at the present time*; *The Church is close to you*; *With the help of your families, your friends and the Church…* These solidarity markers play the role of making those who 'suffer' in prison (*You carry deep in your hearts the suffering…*) – due to their own social alienation (caused by, what JPII calls, *reasons for your current detention*) – an inseparable part of the human community. The last sentence of the letter's initial paragraph quoted here, suggests that the above propositions are formulated with the intention to empower each young prisoner in terms of *dignity that is [theirs] as a child of God*. It can be argued that through such individual claims for the prisoners' esteem and humanity, the Pope initiates ethically driven intercultural dialogue with each of them personally. The purpose is, first, to indicate to them the historically detached path in their 'personal selves' where they are missed by another. Second, this dialogue entreats them, on the basis of this route's identification 'with another' (e.g., *Let Christ dwell in your hearts! Entrust your ordeal to him! He will help you bear it. In secret and in silence, you can be united with the other young people who are meeting in Paris.*), to return to the shared 'human(e) world,' which they can build 'with others' in common.

All the expressive moves of reconciliation discourse discussed above lead to the integration of the 'human/personal identity,' which fulfils the ethical dimension of intercultural dialogue. The substantial correlate of this dimension is simultaneously established at the dialogue's cognitive level (C), responsible for the further revival and consolidation of 'human reality.'

4.2 The discourse of empowerment in JPII's reconciliation letters: C dimension

In terms of its substantial content, JPII's dialogue with different cultural groups on themes related to the difficult past relies linguistically on more or less overt verbalisations of conflicts separating the parties mentioned in the papal correspondence. This variation in stylistic ex/implicitness is generally conditioned by the particular stage of the whole reconciliation process. It generally results from differences in the interactants' awareness of the problems raised and in the time distance isolating the disputants from the events discussed. Accordingly, the denotation and predication formulae that the Pope applies to naming and defining historical problems under discussion tend to be adjusted to the degrees of speakers' knowledge of the topics analysed and their levels of problem understanding, internalisation, and acceptance.[5] Moreover, the perspectives adopted in the presentation of the factual material are reflexive of the historical moments of the pontifical exchange, as well as of the needs of the wider contemporary audience, to whom this exchange is addressed. What Ensink and Sauer (2003, 10–11) suggest in their analysis of WWII commemorative discourse is that elliptical style in conciliatory contexts functions well for the maintenance of collective memory, provided that discursive omissions are communicated to a generation of direct witnesses of a historical event, or to those who can reconstruct the topic without a considerable loss of information. This is because the meanings that this style generates can be completed by these speakers on their own. But operating on ellipses and euphemisms in dialogue, which are its characteristic features (see esp. Abrantes 2005), also has side effects. In particular, these devices may bring the impression of (over)wording texts with hollow phrases, empty formulations and vague expressions. However, according to Ensink and Sauer (2003), such a ritual of discursive commemoration seems to suffice "when it confirms the existing values of a represented community" (11). Additionally, it may serve as an efficient reconciliation means to avoid repeated accusation of former oppressors who have before pled guilty for crimes committed in the past (cf. van Vree 2003, 224–225).

Most of these factors influence the way JPII frames substantial matters in his reconciliation discourse. For instance, in the letter on the Inquisition (VIN 2004), written in the spirit of repentance, previously signalled by the Pope especially in his Apostolic Letter *Tertio Millennium Adveniente* (1994), and preparing the Church for acts requesting forgiveness for errors from the past, JPII develops the

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5. For communicative mechanisms of problem acceptance and repression in dialogue, see esp. Rogers (1961).

topic from the so-then underrepresented perspective of the Church moral (self) examination and (self)evaluation:

> (5)   The institution of the Inquisition has been abolished. As I had an opportunity to say to the participants in the Symposium, the children of the Church cannot but return with a spirit of repentance to *"the acquiescence given, especially in certain centuries, **to intolerance and even the use of violence*** [emphasis in the original] *in the service of the truth"* (*Address to the International Symposium on the Inquisition Organized by the Central Committee for the Great Jubilee of the Year 2000,* 31 October 1998, n. 4; *L'Osservatore Romano* English edition, *[ORE],* 11 November 1998, p. 3).   (VIN 2004)

Example (5) shows that what the Pope once called (in the 1998 *Address to the International Symposium on the Inquisition*) *the acquiescence given, especially in certain centuries, to intolerance and even the use of violence in the service of the truth*, is in letter VIN 2004 repeated in a verbatim quote, whose role is to maintain the validity of the original truth claim. The same thought is further recontextualised in this epistle in the broad concept of *the sinfulness of her [the Church's] children* (see 6 below). It unfolds in the following part of the same sentence into its more detailed reformulations, such as *depart[ures] from the spirit of Christ and his Gospel* and *indulge[nce] in ways of thinking and acting which were truly forms of counter-witness and scandal.*

> (6)   This Symposium answered the desire I expressed in the Apostolic Letter <u>*Tertio Millennium Adveniente*</u>: "…it is appropriate that… the Church should become more fully conscious of *the sinfulness of her children*, recalling all those times in history when they *departed from the spirit of Christ and his Gospel* and, instead of offering to the world the witness of a life inspired by the values of faith, *indulged in ways of thinking and acting which were <u>truly</u> **forms of counter-witness and scandal**"* [emphasis in the original] (n. 33).   (VIN 2004)

It is noteworthy that the perseverance with which JPII reiterates in the intertextual links to his previous messages the founding tenets of his pontificate (see Examples 5 and 6 above and also some examples below) may confirm his own self-constancy and *ipseity* as Person (cf. Ricoeur 1992a, b), who is faithful in life to his guiding ethical values and ideals.

   All the above-mentioned problem-defining nominations and predicates are negatively assessed and recapitulated in the letter's final section as *errors committed in the service of the truth by recourse to methods not in keeping with the Gospel*. The critical stance that the author takes to these practices is visible in his open truth claim for the validity of their *counter-witness and scandal forms*, intensified by the pragmatic booster *truly*. In support of this position, the text embeds interdiscursive

links to scientific domains, especially history and theology, which have helped to reframe the *public opinion of the Inquisition* (see 7 below) into the *exact knowledge* of this institution. Example (7) illustrates how the discourse of scholarly explanation allows to rationalise the agonistic historical pattern under discussion:

(7)   *In public opinion, the image of the Inquisition* is as it were the symbol of such counter-witness and scandal. How *faithful to reality* is this image? Before asking for forgiveness it is necessary *to have exact knowledge of the facts* and *to put shortcomings with regard to what the Gospel requires in the context where they are effectively found.* This is the reason why *the Committee has consulted historians whose scientific competence is universally recognized.*

(VIN 2004)

The linguistic markers of discursive rationalisation in this context include expressions, such as: *faithful to reality; to put shortcomings … in the context where they are effectively found; the Committee has consulted historians whose scientific competence is universally recognized.* Similar experiential phrases can also be found in Example (6) above: *[t]his Symposium answered…; the Church should become more fully conscious…; recalling all those times in history…* They all serve to externalise the problem under scrutiny, which can thereby become discursively objectified, publically admitted, dialogically judged, and, finally, consciously tackled (on similar generic moves of cognising subject matters in reconciliation discourse, see esp. Winslade and Monk 2000, 2008; Cloke 2001; Bush and Folger 2005; etc). Such language-mediated cognitive operations make the problem interpretation acceptable for the parties concerned, whereby the latter become discursively involved in the issue's substantial exploration and constructive management.

Similar dialogic mechanisms integrate the Christian – Jewish world as established in the C dimension of the Pope's correspondence on the Shoah (RSH 1998) and on Jewish – Catholic relations in Europe (EJC 2002). In the context of WWII, which JPII presents in the first letter as a reason for requests for forgiveness and reconciliation with God and neighbour, the Shoah is conceptualised and outspokenly condemned as *[t]he crime which … remains an indelible stain on the history of the century that is coming to a close.* Moreover, this condemnation is further reproduced into negative labels that frame violence against Jewish people as *sins, past errors and infidelities, the evils of our time,* or *unspeakable iniquity.* On the one hand, they transmit the lack of the author's acceptance for such practices, and on the other hand, they carry the intention to eradicate them definitively from human culture. This can be inferred from the expressive/regulative modifiers *indelible* and *unspeakable*, which communicate simultaneously the writer's distancing stance as well as his value judgment of the unacceptability of such behaviours (for an extended discussion of such regulative speech activities, see Section 4.3 below). In

accompanying the knowledge claims, these devices work here as dialogic mergers consolidating the C aspects of the world with its two remaining dimensions: E and R, respectively. The positive semantic bridge that they jointly construct is a communicative signal of an upcoming completion of dialogic integration, which finds its way out in the next stage of dialogic recognition (see Section 4.4 below). The same can be said about the attitudinal expressions *sorrowful* and *scarred* from the second letter (EJC 2002), which modify the experiential phrase *events that scarred Europe's history, especially in the 20th century*. By touching the difficult points in the Jewish and Catholic recent past, the latter formulation distances these points from the interactants' selves, thus subjectifying the speakers on the one hand, and preparing the matter for substantial dialogic study on the other.

The objectifying approach to 20th-century destructive events of WWII is continued by the Pope in the letter on the Warsaw Uprising (WUA 2004). The text accentuates mainly defensive operations arranged by Polish people against the military aggression by the Nazis in August 1944. The rhetoric adds to the public discussion of WWII a factual narrative of the historical time complemented by themes of the time's ethical perception and consequences. Linguistically, this is rendered by discursive operations similar to those observed in the preceding examples, where the C dimension of dialogue merges with its E dimension to integrate the two spheres of the human world. For that matter, the *August insurrection* from JPII's discourse is additionally cognised and lexicalised as *dramatic days, resistance to the Nazi occupation, military action, unequal fight*. The visible effects of the aggression are framed as *military defeat, tens of thousands [dead civilians] on the battlefield, massacre [of many insurgents] with the injured, ruins [of Warsaw]*. Such textual material serves as concrete data for the writer to formulate his knowledge claim for the relevance of Warsaw Uprising in Polish history. More importantly, this validation is critical especially in the context of broader national history, when in the post-war period the communist authorities in Poland made, what the Pope says, *attempts to cancel those events from the national memory*. The intention to revive this memory through the recollection of Polish people's heroic deeds from WWII is to empower the nation by extending their view of the difficult experience, and by unveiling to them its constructive side. Additionally, it subjectifies the community by reinforcing in dialogue the complexity of the historical time, and by raising the collectivity's self-consciousness in making this complexity an integral part of their national selfhood.

The problem of the two wars in 20th-century world history and of the complicated situation in the post-war period is further recontextualised by the Pope to a more global level in his two additional letters that deal with recent European relations. In the message to the 79th session of the Social Weeks of France (Lille, 23–26 September 2004), JPII calls the preceding time of 100 years *a turbulent*

political period marked by many changes (SWF 2004). At the same time, in the letter to the Ecumenical Meeting "Together for Europe" (Stuttgard, 8 May 2004), he emphasises the fact the *[t]he process of European unification* is an *outcome of the bitter defeat the Second World War represented for humanity* (TFE 2004). These two experiential claims, which at the C level actualise the validity of the events projected, additionally appraise the latter negatively at the E and R levels. By expressing the author's distance (E), the evaluations *turbulent* and *bitter* express his deprecation (R) for, as he writes in SWF 2004, *the shameful wars that are fratricidal conflicts*. The same applies to another example from TFE 2004, such as *the bloody and distressing persecutions in European history in the 20th century*. Through the E/R modifiers *bloody* and *distressing* it condemns in the C dimension of dialogic empowerment all acts of violence committed against humanity at that time. What the Pope additionally stresses in the context of Europe's *historical experiences* is that they not only *constitute a common heritage for the Christian denominations*, but they inscribe in the Continent's cognitive *rich[ness]*, in the sense of *knowledge that tomorrow's Europe needs in order to participate in the great events to which history calls it* (TFE 2004).

For the E and C claims of empowerment to reach fully the stage of recognition, they must integrate with the last, regulative level (R) of social dialogue. This is a site where specific dialogic means harmonise discursively inter-/intracultural relations, and – through these relations – enact participatory standards of human (linguistic) interaction.

4.3 The discourse of empowerment in JPII's reconciliation letters: R dimension

Before the final macro-genre of recognition is attained, the two preceding aspects of dialogue (E-C) must be supported in the stage of empowerment by the last, regulative (R) aspect of conciliatory discourse. The R dimension of empowerment in JPII's epistolary dialogue with others is linguistically structured by a diversity of reciprocal moves that aim to (re)establish inter-Subjective ties between speakers. Such R practices are based on communicative processes that generally put to the test the il/legitimacy of specific social behaviours. In their search for alternative, participatory, standards of (linguistic) interaction, they call the parties for unprecedented, novel, examples of broadly 'ethical' action. As has been signalled above, they generally switch the characters' alienating (verbal) conduct into the participatory route of their mutual exchange. In the textual material studied, the rhetoric of the R empowerment heavily rests on, *inter alia*, more or less overt articulations of value judgments (Fairclough 2003, 57; Martin and White 2005, esp. 52–56), as well as deontic modality, in its 'normatively authorised' version (Habermas 1984,

301–302). According to Martin and White (2005, 52), the former render meanings that construct people's attitudes to others and their conduct, especially in propositions of what is desirable or undesirable for them (see Fairclough 2003, 57). These fall into the group of judgments producing the effect of social esteem, on the one hand, and the group of judgments producing the effect of social sanction, on the other. The first generates sub-types of meaning linked to 'normality' (how unusual someone is), 'capacity' (how capable they are), and 'tenacity' (how resolute they are). The second, in turn, orients to sub-types of meaning linked to 'veracity' (how truthful someone is) and 'propriety' (how ethical someone is). Both categories are critical to the formation of communal bonds, and they underpin the consolidation of duties and observances within these bonds.

When it comes to dialogue-driven modality, on the other hand, its purpose is, as Habermas has it (1984, 301), to claim the validity of 'normatively authorised' imperatives. Importantly, their conditions of sanction spring not from outside (i.e. from the speaker's contingent will), as in arbitrarily driven 'simple' (pure) imperatives, but from the speech act itself. In this last case, the potential for sanctions argued is grounded either in commonly established facts (events) or rules (law), which provide reasons for conventional restrictions that register corresponding VCs. According to Habermas (1984), such claims

> can be rejected only by way of criticism and can be defended against a criticism only by refuting it. One who opposes directions is referred to existing [*geltende*] regulations and not to the mere fact of penalties that can be expected if they are not followed. And one who doubts the validity of the underlying norms has to give *reasons* – whether against the legality of the regulations – that is, against the lawfulness of its social force [*Geltung*] – or against the legitimacy of the regulation – that is, against its claim to be right or justified in a moral practical sense.   (301)

This is how, Habermas (1984) says, all kinds of VCs (in opposition to instrumental 'power claims') are 'internally' linked to reasons and grounds, and in this sense the conditions for their acceptability lie in the illocutionary meaning of the speech act itself. What follows is that R claims that can secure the validity of norms underlying them fulfil, or 'redeem,' arguments that they themselves carry, and for this reason "they do not need to be completed by *additional* conditions of sanction" (301–302). In the case when an offer of an imperative speech act combines the *validity* of norms underlying it, the *claim* that the conditions for its validity are satisfied, and the *redemption* (or grounding) of the VC raised, it produces a warranty for the hearer of convincing reasons that will be able, if necessary, to challenge his/her criticism of the VC issued. In this way, surface textual imperatives that base their illocutionary role on VCs, rather than on typical power claims, turn the agonistic force of empirical sanctions, which the latter externally produce, into

the cooperative Power of accepting a speaker's guarantee for the rational saving of claims to validity. As a result, what the interlocutors have thereby at their disposal is *choice*, which they are free to (voluntarily/optionally) make (cf. Habermas 1984, 296, 299; Ricoeur 1992a, 89–93; Grillo 2005b, 24–37, 2005c, 231, 234), instead of social pressure, which is imposed on them 'from outside.'

As far as JPII's dialogic application of value judgment is concerned, apart from its parallel occurrences in empowerment's C dimension (illustrated partly in Section 4.2 above), it can also be traced in evaluations that accompany positioning formulae at empowerment's E level (see Section 4.1). For instance, when the Pope speaks in SWF 2004 about *peoples who were for so long under the yoke of Communism*, he not only 'ventriloquates' voices of the oppressed (E) by this totalitarian regime, and underlines expressively (in the pragmatic booster *for so long* and the metaphoric *the yoke of*) these people's suffering (*under the yoke*) as victims (E) of this regime. What the author additionally does here is condemn (through the negative judgment of propriety: *were for so long under the yoke of Communism*) the political system itself (C), which is denounced normatively (R) as pernicious to the overall human condition (cf. esp. Arendt 1972). However, not only does dialogic regulation of social norms orient retrospectively to the past, as in the examples mentioned so far, but it much as often looks prospectively to the future. This can be observed, for instance, in Example (3) above, where the positive attitude to European collaboration, in *the desire to make Europe a Continent of brothers and sisters; this desire was first postulated by Christian statesmen whose names live on in everyone's memory* (SWF 2004), conveys a positive value assumption of European integration as a process desirable (i.e. good and worth maintaining/continuing – R) for the European future (cf. Fairclough 2003, 57). Additional rhetorical constructions of VCs for similar prospective regulations of social bonds through dialogic means can be found in the letter on the Warsaw Uprising (WUA 2004). In praising heroic deeds of the Polish insurgents during WWII, the Pope concludes the defining *who*-clauses that specify particular 'gestures' of the military defence (for illustrations, see Section 4.1) with an explicit desire to retain these deeds in the national memory: *their gesture will live on for ever* [sic] *in the memory of the Nation as the loftiest expression of patriotism; I hope that the memory of these heroic girls and women will live for ever* [sic]. When actualised in practice, all such reinforcements of dialogic remembering on the one hand, and commencements of intergenerational cooperation on the other hand, mark the onset of the ethical transformation of human identity towards Personhood. Taking place in dialogic (speech) acts of purging the self and another from agonistic schemata, the latter sets 'novel' and 'creative' (viz. participatory) standards of (inter)personal behaviour at both individual and collective levels (cf. Arendt 1998, 141, 259; also Grillo 2005c, 230–231).

The group of past- and future-directed value judgments in JPII's reconciliation letters are additionally represented by the already mentioned (esp. in the discussion of letter VIN 2004, see Sections 4.1. and 4.2) speech acts of repentance and forgiveness. As has been signalled before, they regulate human behaviour in a twofold way. On the one hand, they efface the sense of grief and resentment for errors from the past, and on the other hand, they prepare memory for keeping these errors in mind, so as to take responsibility for one's actions, and warn against making the same mistakes in the future. In the (same) letter on the Inquisition (VIN 2004), the Pope continues his dialogic disassociation from the Church's past 'departures from the Gospel' through the semantic extension of the aforementioned *spirit of repentance* into *a firm determination to seek in the future ways to bear witness to the truth that are in keeping with the Gospel*. When it comes to *a request for forgiveness* in this context, it accommodates, in turn, historical reasons, such as, *inter alia*, (the already mentioned) *tragedies associated with the Inquisition* and *injuries to memory that result from it*. The suggestion that JPII adds here that *[t]he Church must carry out this service in imitation of her Lord, meek and humble of heart* indicates the author's strong commitment (*must*) to shaping the course of future activities according to this resolution. In the same vein, the participatory norm of repentance is textually developed in the letter on the Shoah (RSH 1998). In this text, the author encourages his readers *to purify their hearts [from] past errors and infidelities*, and in the name of the Church *calls them to (…) examine themselves on the responsibility which they too have for the evils of our time*. All the standardising VCs presented above play a double role in the discourse of R empowerment. First, they purify one's 'inward' contact with self, thus establishing *intra*personal integration. Second, they project this revived self-connection 'outward' onto one's own contact with another, thus establishing integrated human ties at the *inter*personal level.

The last examples of value judgments from the corpus that are worth mentioning include purely future-oriented expressions that appear textually to inspire alternative ways of social interaction. They also open new, inclusive perspectives on the world, which (despite negative experiences from history) encourage readers to take the participatory course of linguistic exchange. Such regulative VCs are structured by positive propriety judgments *it is right…, disinterested(ly), the vocation is….*, illustrated in (8–10) below:

(8) After the sorrowful events that scarred Europe's history, especially in the 20th century, *it is right* to give fresh energy to our relations, so that the religious tradition that inspired the culture and life of the continent may continue to be part of its soul and thus enable it to serve the growth of the whole human person and the whole of mankind.   (EJC 2002)

(9)   I hope that the memory of these heroic girls and women will live for ever
      [sic], *encouraging disinterested* service to those in need.   (WUA 2004)

(10)   *The vocation* of the Christian faithful is to serve their brethren *disinterestedly*,
       for "a civilisation ever more worthy of man" (<u>*Ecclesia in Europa*</u>, n. 105),
       especially with a view to an international cooperation that is more and more
       closely knit, in which partnership and solidarity get the upper hand over the
       quest for benefits and profit.   (SWF 2004)

The encouragements to perform the novel, dialogic, action *disinterestedly* (as in 9
and 10) highlight the 'logic of gift/charity,' which underlies any participatory ex-
change (esp. Ricoeur 1996, 10; Arendt 1998, 211; Cloke 2001, 94–95; Gawkowska
2015, 139–144; cf. also Kohn 2003, xxxiii, Węgrzecki 2014, 28, 148; for a detailed
discussion of this position, see also Kearney ed. 1996). Additionally, such speech
acts allow to draw conclusions from the past, and learn the lesson of history, *so
that* – as the author stresses (in EJC 2002) – *never again will man despise his own
brother in humanity and never again will conflicts or wars be unleashed in the name
of an ideology that despises a culture or religion.*

Apart from the above-mentioned propriety claims that set norms of participa-
tory communication, the R stage of empowerment is also discursively channelled
by, as has already been signalled above, normatively grounded modality. Rooted in
inter-Subjective consent, it departs from simple power claims in its potential to au-
thorise the issues argued on the basis of factual statements or conduct regulations
deliberated in common. In other words, the validity of such R modals is supported
by solid reasons, which are provided in, or are derived from, the argument itself. In
the textual material studied here, the modal VCs that shape the R mode of dialogic
empowerment in JPII's correspondence heavily rest on, and normatively extend,
the two preceding types of validity (E and C). In the texts' rhetorical layer they
construct *non-imposive* (viz. dialogic) 'entreatment' concerning the parties' ethical
(linguistic) behaviour in both their present and future lives. Among the normative
modal expressions that project the E claims onto their R realisations, there are, for
instance, the Pope's invitations to and calls for mutual cooperation, love, and care
between Jews and Christians, demonstrated in (1) and (2) above (on the discourse
of interpersonal 'care' as dialogue, see esp. Feder Kittay 2014). Moreover, there are
wishes of a better future addressed to the two communities, as in (11) below. They
invite them to choose the positive option of *work[ing] together for a world of true
respect for the life and dignity of every human being*, as an (R) alternative to, and a
way of healing, the (E) wounds from the difficult past.

(11)   … to heal the wounds of past misunderstandings and injustices [E]. *May it enable memory to play its necessary part in the process of shaping a future* [R] in which the unspeakable iniquity of the *Shoah* will never again be possible. *May the Lord of history guide the efforts of Catholics and Jews and all men and women of goodwill as they work together for a world of true respect for the life and dignity of every human being* [R], for all have been created in the image and likeness of God.   (RSH 1998)

The structure of the above argument shows how normatively rooted 'surface' imperatives, which are non-directive in nature, can provide further grounds for the previous E themes to authorise their validity.

The same mechanism is also observed in (12) below, where the surface R imperatives *insisting that…; it is necessary…; may this…; we must not…, Europe needs the commitment…; the necessity of (…) is urgently required; an important role is entrusted…* all develop (in TFE 2004) the E theme of European unity:

(12)   The Holy See supported *European integration* [E] from the outset, while *insisting* [R], as I recently recalled, that for "such a union to be valid and lasting, *it is necessary* [R] first of all to go back to Christianity as a factor that creates identity and unity" (<u>*Address for the Conferral on the Holy Father of the International Charlemagne Prize of the City of Aachen*</u>, *Germany,* 24 March 2004, n. 4: *L'Osservatore Romano* English Edition *[ORE],* 14 April 2004, p. 9). (…)

May this heritage strengthen the desire [R] for unity among European Christians and *their commitment* [R] to further the task of evangelization! <u>*To create*</u> [R] a more human society, lovingly open in solidarity to others, *we must not* [R] tire of opening our hearts to the Gospel. (…)

Europe needs the commitment [R] and enthusiasm of Christians, especially the youngest, <u>*if it is to receive*</u> [R] the Good News of the Gospel of Jesus Christ. Indeed, "at the beginning of a new millennium, *the necessity of* [R] a renewed effort on the part of believers to respond to the challenge of the new evangelization *is urgently required* [R]. In this vision *an important role is entrusted* [R] to Ecclesial Movements" (<u>*Message to Chiara Lubich for the 60th Anniversary of the Focolare Movement*</u>, 4 December 2003; *ORE,* 7 January 2004, 2).   (TFE 2004)

The above cases of modality are complemented by additional non-imposive R cues that the Pope sends to Europeans also in SWF 2004. As Example (13) shows, the verb phrase *are suggesting…* conveys an alternative that the Pope (on behalf of the Church) *identif[ies]* as *a new approach* (R) to the development of European community after 20th-century political perturbations. The option recommended for

choice here consists in promoting *society* (E) based on respect for *the freedom and dignity of [all] individuals and peoples.* The *topos* of 'civic society,' which the values of respect, freedom, and dignity rhetorically construct, legitimizes the status of the latter as *indispensable foundations* on which a true 'community of participation' (Wojtyła 1979; Okulska forthc.) should be built (see also Okulska 2011, 2016).

(13)   Today, *the Gospel and the Church's social teaching are suggesting a new approach* [R]. If they do not *give direct instructions*, as this pertains to freedom and responsibility of the people and the Authorities who govern them, they nonetheless *identify the indispensable foundations on which to build society* [E], *so that individuals and peoples may be increasingly respected and the freedom and dignity of every being promoted.*   (SWF 2004)

The non-coercive stance that JPII holds in his 'pedagogy of peace'[6] exemplified above is overtly justified by the author in the assertion that *giv[ing] direct instructions* on practical realizations of peaceful society *pertains [more] to freedom and responsibility of the people and the Authorities who govern them* than to *the Gospel [or] the Church's social teaching*, which both play only a guiding role in such cases (on the dialogic use of justifications in claims for the propriety of speaker's stance, see esp. Habermas 1984, 294–295).

Finally, apart from purpose and conditional clauses, which additionally carry R claims in JPII's conciliatory letters (see the underlined phrases *to create…; if it is to receive…* in 12 above, *so that…* in 13, 14, 18 and *in order to…* in 18 below), the R modals that accompany the E level of empowerment in the Pope's correspondence are also represented by expressions, such as *it is important/essential…; expect…; our goal is to…; let…; entrust…* (14, 15).

(14)   *It is particularly important* [R] to pay special attention to *young people* [E]. *It is essential* [R] not only to guarantee them knowledge, but also to pass on to them values and hope to combat certain types of behaviour, such as suicide and drug abuse, which are increasingly observed among the young. Young people *expect* [R] adults to be supportive *so that* [R] they may look with serenity to the future, and *our goal is* [R] to bequeath to them a spiritual and moral heritage (cf. *Ecclesia in Europa*, n. 14).   (SWF 2004)

(15)   *Let* Christ dwell in your hearts! *Entrust* your ordeal to him! He will help you bear it. In secret and in silence, you *can be united* with the *other young people* [E] who are meeting in Paris.   (WYD 1997)

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6. For a parallel, dialogue-mediated 'pedagogy of pardon' in the discourse of cross-cultural reconciliation at the global level, in the workings of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in South Africa, see esp. Duffy (2009).

In both these excerpts the R claims are written from the perspective of parental care (cf. Feder Kittay 2014), which the Pope directs (mainly) at, or on behalf of, young people in general (14) and young prisoners in particular (15). In the first case, the value judgments of normality, *[i]t is particularly important* and *[i]t is essential*, pass the dialogic recommendation (R) for all adults of the world to equip the young people with assets that can protect them against various self- and other-alienating (disintegrating) behaviours (*suicide and drug abuse*). At the same time, the predicate *expect* and the preface *our goal is* from the last sentence convey (in the purpose clause *so that*) a parallel suggestion (R) for adults to support the young. The dialogic rendition of this support is shown as indispensable to secure the 'serene future' and *a spiritual and moral heritage* of younger generations. In the same vein, also the two imperatives in (15), *let* and *entrust*, provide a non-imposive request (R) for young prisoners to join their community of *other young people*. These addressees are claimed (through the value judgment of capacity: *can be united*) to be able to achieve it by reconciling their bonds, and sharing their 'solicitude' with another (here: *Christ*). This is how they can invite others to shape their respective identities in community, as a combined, relational, and complementary whole (on the dynamics of mutual solicitude in dialogue, see esp. Ricoeur 1992a, 188–192; Kłoczowski 2005, 64–67, 119–121; Węgrzecki 2014, 168–173).

When it comes to the R modals that continue C claims of dialogic empowerment in JPII's reconciliation discourse, they are verbalized (as Examples 6 above and 16 below show) in contrast clauses (*instead of…; on the contrary,…*), which present constructive alternatives for otherwise exclusionary courses of events. Moreover, the texts studied contain diverse speech acts entreating the letters' recipients to take principled normative action with a view to shaping the world in a dialogic way. These discourse practices rely mainly on surface directives that ask the parties involved (through calls, needs and commitments – as in 16, or requests for support – as in 17) to disclose their human reality through participatory exchange.

(16)   On the contrary, the different religious traditions *are called* together to put their patrimony at the service of all, in the hope of building the common European home together, united in justice, peace, equity and solidarity. Then will begin to be realised the word of God announced by the prophet (cf. Is 11,6–9). Youth *need* our witness and our joint *commitment* if they are to believe, to sanctify God's name by their lives and to hope in a future for the world that will be rich in promise. In this way, they will be determined to affirm the ties of brotherhood to establish a renewed humanity.   (EJC 2002)

(17)   I *ask* God with his grace to make the hearts of all Poles more and more
        noble, so that the memory of their forebears' heroic deeds may be not only
        a return to remote history but also a stimulating example of patriotic love
        which, even in peacetime, is expressed by putting the common good before
        personal concerns.   (WUA 2004)

In addition to the above examples, the passage from SWF 2004 (18) shows that
the dialogic responses to the (already mentioned) 'turbulence' of 20th-century po-
litical history, with *divisions and (…) antagonism[s]* created by *the two (shameful)
World Wars* (C), are offers and invitations (R), formulated also in the rhetorical
question *how can we fail to…*, for *people of good will* to build, generally, *a rap-
prochement between nations*.

(18)   … the Social Weeks of France came into being to *offer* [R] Christians and
        more generally people of good will the opportunity to think about social
        issues, while honouring the fundamental human and spiritual values.
        (…)
        Reinterpreting our Continent's past [C] *invites* [R] a constant search for
        new ways of collaboration, brotherhood and peace. (…) *how can we fail
        to* [R] (…) work for a **rapprochement** [emphasis in the original] between
        nations *so that* [R] each one may say: "War never again. Every person is my
        brother or sister".
        (…)
        The two World Wars created divisions and forms of antagonism [C] that the
        construction of Europe will help gradually to overcome, *in order to* [R] build
        a Europe of the peoples, a Europe of solidarity, in brief, a Europe made for
        the well-being and happiness of all its citizens.   (SWF 2004)

From the more contemporary perspective, the same letter complements the C
claims for the ongoing *ills of poverty, pandemics, and conflicts of all kinds* (see 20
below), conceptualized in (19) as *urgent needs* (C), by the call (R) to the modern
world for *international cooperation, founded on partnership and solidarity*. In the
value judgment of normality, *is vital* (R), the text additionally emphasizes the im-
portance of human *[c]oncern to preserve the earth's riches and to enable all peoples
to benefit from the planet's resources*.

(19)   In the face of these urgent needs [C], *we are all called* [R] to take part in a
        true and lasting development that passes through international cooperation,
        founded on partnership and solidarity. *Concern to preserve the earth's riches
        and to enable all peoples to benefit from the planet's resources* in just and
        equitable sharing *is vital* [R].
        (…)

> The involvement of Christians in politics [C] *is important* [R]. I *invite*
> [R] them not to shirk from their mission in this area and always to seek
> coherence between the Gospel, the divine and apostolic Tradition, the
> Magisterium of the Church and the options and decisions they are required
> to take.   (SWF 2004)

The same type of value judgment of normality, *is important* (R), complements in
(19) the claim for *[t]he involvement of Christians in politics* (C). In this context, the
Pope sends to his addressees the non-coercive invitation (R) *not to shirk from their
mission in this area and always to seek coherence between (…) the Magisterium of
the Church and the options and decisions they are required to take*.

On top of all the above realizations of empowerment's R dimension in the
papal correspondence, JPII uses R claims to present the issue (C) of historically
rooted European integration and reconciliation (for an illustration, see esp. TFE
2004 in Section 4.2 above) on a larger scale, with other macro-regions of the world
(E). The positive appraisal (R) of the idea (C) of Europe's 'horizontal' broadening
to central-east countries (tackled in both SWF 2004 and TFE 2004, see 4.2) trig-
gers by extension additional R claims (see 20) for the relevance (R) of Europe's
global opening to the South.

> (20)   [t]he opening [C] between East and West also *invites* [R] *Europeans to
>   strengthen relations of cooperation between North and South* [E], to keep in
>   check the ills of poverty, pandemics and conflicts of all kinds.   (SWF 2004)

The need to work by Europe on the (neglected) *opening* (C) *between North and
South* (E) is textually emphasised in the *invit[ation]* (R) *to strengthen [European]
relations* with partners from the southern hemisphere. This invocation in discourse
of (so far) marginalised parties from distant parts of the world equalises agentive
positions of both participant groups, thus empowering the actors for mutual inter-
Subjective exchange. From JPII''s perspective, the idea of European integration,
both with others and with(in) itself, carries an exemplar of dialogic pedagogy for
the rest of the world, conveyed in (21) below:

> (21)   Its [Europe's] example can open the way to other forms of integration for
>   countries on other continents, such as, for instance, Africa. **True integration**,
>   if it is to preserve its full riches, must preserve *national cultures and identities
>   that can form part of* the common heritage and contribute to the growth of the
>   entire Continent.   (SWF 2004; emphasis added)

In the combined E-C-R claim for *national cultures and identities* functioning syn-
ergistically as complementary *part[s] of the common heritage, contribut[ing] to the
growth of the entire Continent*, the Pope formulates his own ideal of 'participatory
human culture' (cf. Wojtyła 1979; for an overview of this approach, see esp. Mejos

2007). It rests on the Subjective *uniplurality* of actors, who constitute an authentic 'community of solidarity' (esp. Tischner 1990, 2005), or a true 'human(e) community' (esp. Arnett 1986), based on ethical foundations of genuine dialogue between 'living' Persons (cf. Arendt 1998, 95, 206–207, 2003: 49; Ingarden 2009: esp. 29–48).

In the same vein, the second of the letters (TFE 2004) also develops the theme (C) of ongoing European integration, which is generally predicated as Europe's reconciliation and cooperation (R) with others outside the Continent (E):

(22)   Yet *a united Europe* cannot think only of itself and withdraw into its own boundaries and well-being. *Europe is called to serve the world*, especially its *poorest and most forgotten regions*, such as Africa in particular, which is *scarred by so many serious problems*. It is impossible to build a common European house without concern for the general good of humanity: "One could say that the condition for building Europe's future is to be *capable of looking beyond its boundaries, especially towards the immense southern hemisphere*, which for centuries has been the area where the most *numerous conflicts have arisen* and where *injustice weighs in a manner that can no longer be borne*" (*Message to Cardinal Edward Cassidy on the Occasion of the "Prayer Meeting for Peace" in the World Held in Brussels, Belgium, 13–15 September,* 10 September 1992; *ORE,* 23 September 1992, p. 1).

                                                                    (TFE 2004; emphasis added)

Similar to the preceding examples, (22) makes several C claims for the validity of current boundaries and walls separating people in different parts of the world. These barriers include regional poverty and discrimination/exclusion (*poorest and most forgotten regions*), danger of conflicts and serious problems (*many serious problems, numerous conflicts*), as well as widespread *injustice*, which *weighs in a manner that can no longer be borne*. The agentive role of these burdens is emphasised in the predicates *scarred, have arisen, weighs*, most of which appear in the active voice. The semantic construction of 'problem agency,' instead of 'actor agency' at this point of empowerment (for the relevance of such mechanisms in conflict resolution, see esp. Muntigl 2004) has a double function in the discourse of reconciliation. Firstly, it isolates subject matters (e.g., attributes or deeds) from people, and secondly, it indicates areas where the people's burdens/traits, while representing their possessors' attributes or their executors' activities, deprive (as agents) their carriers of 'selfhood' (*ipseity*). Since the source of these traits lies in 'external pressures,' such as socio-cultural, physical, psychological forces, etc. – all working 'from outside' Person as it were – these forces come from, and locate their 'products' (effects) in the 'sameness' (*idem*) aspect of the human identity (see Ricoeur 1992a: esp. 56–87).

Linguistically speaking, this translates directly into situations of broad interactive agonism (for an extended discussion, see esp. Tannen 1998), when the Subjectivity (in ethical terms) of overt grammatical subjects, defined as "the grammatical position of being a moral agent in one's own life, is not taken for granted" (Winslade and Monk 2000, 130). The emphasis laid on the burden agentive side has in this case an externalising function, whereby the parties separated by the problem can objectify it substantially in discourse, so as to regain personal Subjectivity, and take things in their own hands (esp. Winslade and Monk 2000, 6–10, 143–157; Cloke 2001, 156–163; see also Muntigl 2004, 179–232, Okulska 2016, 86–95; etc.). Similar to Example (21) above, the fragment in (22) also develops, through the combining E-C-R claims, the author's own participatory stance towards the matters discussed. It involves JPII's ethical self-constancy (E), in the recurrent theme of peace-building, which he continues in the intertextual recontextualisation of his previous address: *Message on the Occasion of the "Prayer Meeting for Peace" in the World* (10 September 1992). Additionally, this stance constructs the participatory vision (C) of *a united Europe* (and, by extension, of the whole globe) as 'uniplurality' of Subjects (E), who are *capable* (R) *of looking beyond its boundaries, especially towards the immense southern hemisphere*, and are at the same time *called* (R) *to serve [and unite with] the world* (TFE 2004). In its drive towards integrating the three aspects of the world, this formulation signals the second, final, macro-genre of intercultural dialogue, namely recognition.

4.4 The discourse of recognition in JPII's reconciliation letters: The integration of the E-C-R dimensions of the human world

The stage of recognition is a moment when the three moves of empowerment integrate in a single, complex, and internally orchestrated whole. It is composed of synergistically working dialogic elements that combine in reconciliation to form a communicatively harmonised world. At the level of human identity, the same mechanisms translate into the actualisation of personal Subjectivity (esp. Ricoeur 1992a, b), understood as human 'sameness' (*idem*) dialogically transformed (cf. Bush and Folger 2005) according to consistent and ethically inclusive patterns into stable and integral 'selfhood' (*ipseity*). Its discourse can be traced in the characters' positive orientation to and reflexive affirmation of constructively shared present 'reality.' This confirms the practical enactment by the parties of their changed, novel and inter-Subjectively 'creative' discourse praxis (dialogic action). In narrative terms, these 'qualitative' changes in the participants' communication function as *unique outcomes* (Winslade and Monk 2000, 2008), establishing dialogic partnership, complementariness, and understanding between speakers. The ethical alignment that is thus applied rehabilitates interpersonal bonds, and builds common

ground for conflict resolution and effacement. In its reconciling Power, it also fosters the actualisation of genuine human inter-connectedness within authentic communities of participation (Okulska forthc.; cf. esp. Wojtyła 1979; Arnett 1986; Tischner 2005, etc.).

In the context of the Church's historical relations with other cultures studied here, unique outcomes in the genre of dialogic recognition in JPII's conciliatory letters are rendered in authorial references to concrete realisations by the Church of acts of principled inclusion of other parties in its discourse. Such inclusions can be found in all the letters analysed, and they establish the social fact of the Church's changing attitude to formerly excluded actors, which also confirms this institution's own qualitative self-transformation. In the letter on the Inquisition (VIN 2004), to begin with, an example of the unique outcome is produced in the Pope's official statement about the release in print by the Holy See the *Proceedings of the International Symposium on the Inquisition* (C). JPII's discursive recognition of the Church's own Subjective integrity in this case is visible in the assertion of the Church's self-reflective and self-corrective insight: *with the passage of time the Church, guided by the Holy Spirit, perceives with ever clearer awareness* (E) *what she needs* (R) *in order to conform to her Bridegroom*. In a similar way, the letter on the Shoah (RSH 1998) also explicitly points to the document "*We Remember: A Reflection on the Shoah*," *which the Commission for Religious Relations with the Jews has prepared under [Cardinal Edward Idris Cassidy's] direction* (C). As a concrete act of the Church's change towards its openness to and inclusion of other cultures, this text constitutes a practical instantiation of a unique outcome in Catholic – Jewish relations. JPII's clear will to build constructive ties with the Jews is articulated in his hope (R) that the document *will indeed help to heal the wounds of past misunderstandings and injustices [and] (…) enable memory to play its necessary part in the process of shaping a future (…)*. Another enactment of healing the Jewish – Christian relations through dialogic means is the Pope's acknowledgment (in EJC 2002) of the initiative to organize by the European Jewish Congress a meeting (C) on *Improving Relations between Jews and Catholics in Europe in the Pontificate of His Holiness John Paul II* (Paris, 28–29 January 2002). The delight (E) that the Pope expresses in this fact (*I am delighted by…*) and his wish (R) to join this event both imply the author's active engagement in and support of this undertaking. The Pope's final declaration that *[a] text of this kind* (C) *constitutes a starting point, an anchor and a compass* (R) *for future relations* (E) indicates a new quality of cross-cultural contacts with the Jews that the Catholic Church under JPII's guidance decides to implement.

The same mechanisms of dialogic recognition can be traced in the remaining letters from the material scrutinized. When it comes to the letter addressed to Polish people in the post-war context (WUA 2004), JPII accentuates the modern

renewal of the Polish nation inspired historically by *the greatness of the human spirit* (E), *capable of* (R) *building the common good upon the highest values of individuals*. In viewing this spirit as *an eloquent monument* (C) *to their moral victory*, the author recognizes the nation's fully-fledged Subjectivity, whose self-constancy and stability are confirmed in this spirit's reliability and permanence (*it will stand for ever*). Moreover, concrete effects of dialogic encounter and inter Subjective integration are narrated by JPII in his letters to the European community. For instance, in the TFE 2004 reference to the celebration of *a European Day of Encounter and Dialogue* (Stuttgard, 8 May 2004), the Pope recognizes in *[t]he Christian members of numerous religious movements that have gathered in Stuttgart witness[es]* (E) *to the fact that the Gospel has led them to overcome* (R) *selfish nationalism and see Europe as a family of peoples* (E). Additionally, in the ethical tone of the meeting, the author sees the actualization of the 'European soul,' which *helps* (R) *the Continent* (E) *no longer to live for itself and within its own boundaries, but to build a more humane humanity, respectful of life, and to be a generous presence on the world scene* (C). The same integrative perspective is maintained in the recognition phase of the second letter on European relations, SWF 2004. In his emphasis on the importance of the theme *Europe, party to the building of a society to be created*, undertaken in the Social Weeks of France (2004), JPII acknowledges *the contribution Christians make* (E) *to the reflection on the complex current economic, political and social problems* (C) *in order to* (R) *promote the renewal of our society*. In this way, JPII asserts, the participants of this event additionally establish participatory values of *citizens* (E) *who, each in his or her own capacity, are called* (R) *to take part in civil life* (C).

In sum, the common linguistic features that recur in the genre of recognition in JPII reconciliation letters include active voice, present tense and positive present/future-orientation of the messages conveyed. They are used in the above examples to construct the participants' agentive roles, representing in discourse the actors' personal and communal 'uniplurality.' Together with the observed merger of all the three types of dialogic layers (E-C-R), these verbal elements actualize the internal integration of the discourse, paralleled with the disclosure by the living Persons of their shared human(e) world.

5. Conclusions

The dialogic vision and praxis of Personhood that emerges from JPII's reconciliation correspondence demonstrates options that people can jointly narrate when they take an unbiased and constructive approach to historically rooted divisions. As the examples covered have shown, these alternatives *do* emerge when speakers

undertake the cooperative process of mutual support, facilitation, and care in the joint analysis, interpretation, and sense-making of their difficult past. The latter require symmetrical relations, interlocutors' willingness, as well as openness to, and trust in, the other party. They all represent components of dialogic action, which aside from producing social change, as dropping exclusionary patterns, positively affects human identity, in the experience of ethical growth at both micro- and macro-levels. The results of this dialogic enrichment are traced in the development of genuine communal bonds that construct authentic human(e) communities through participatory standards of (linguistic) exchange. It is through such ethically driven values that principled conflict management, resolution, and effacement can be followed. These values also inspire and mediate the discourse of historical remembering, forgiveness, forgetting, and reconciliation. The implementation of such mechanisms in everyday practice is an extremely difficult task, demanding effort, selflessness, and plurality. But as the examples above indicate, this task *can* be pursued and attained through the Subjective disposition and readiness to seek connection with another, both making the essence of human action and speech.

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Appendix

The letters studied (source: http://w2.vatican.va/content/john-paul-ii/en.html):

Letter of John Paul II to cardinal roger etchegaray on the occasion of the presentation of the volume "L'inquisizione", 15 June 2004   **(VIN 2004)**

Letter of his Holiness Pope John Paul II on the occasion of the publication of the document "we remember: a reflection on the Shoah", 12 March 1998   **(RSH 1998)**

Letter of John Paul II to cardinal walter kasper, 25 January 2002   **(EJC 2002)**

Message of John Paul II to the president of the city of warsaw on the occasion of the 60th anniversary of the warsaw uprising, 27 July 2004   **(WUA 2004)**

Letter of John Paul II on the occasion of the ecumenical meeting "together for europe" held in stuttgart (Germany), 6 May 2004   **(TFE 2004)**

Letter of John Paul II to cardinal roger etchegaray special envoy to the social weeks of france, 20 September 2004   **(SWF 2004)**

Apostolic journey of his Holiness John Paul II to Paris, on the occasion of the 12th world youth day (August 21–24, 1997): Message of Pope John Paul II for young prisoners, 22 August 1997
(WYD 1997)

Differing versions of dialogic aptitude

Bakhtin, Dewey and Habermas

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Discussing dialogical ethics implies that people have the aptitude to participate in dialogue. We also surmise that a dialogical ethic would co-construct meaning on moral, ethical and normative issues. Can we make sense of a dialogical ethic at all the relevant levels of our social life, which includes the interpersonal, organizational and social contexts? We need a theoretical frame that will permit circulation between these levels without demanding too much from dialogue. Bakhtin, one of the main theoreticians of dialogue, will be discussed along with Habermas and Dewey (Bakhtin 1981; Dewey 1925; Habermas 1981). To test the idea that they might also have value for guiding social practices, I discuss them while examining the typical preoccupations of water basin governance.

Keywords: dialogical ethics, dialogical aptitude, Bakhtin, Habermas, Dewey

1. Introduction

Discussing dialogical ethics implies that people have the ability, aptitude, or competence to enter into, and participate in, dialogue. Let us also surmise that a dialogical ethic would somehow co-construct meaning in dialogue especially on moral, ethical, and other normative issues (Létourneau 2005). Of course, some people do understand the expression "dialogical ethics" otherwise; but I think it is useful to clarify one definite meaning and work within those limits. Even if we accept this definition for the time being, these axiological and normative questions are multilevel and not limited to one specific field of interaction – and the different fields of interaction come with their special constraints and demands. Can we make sense of a dialogical ethic at all the relevant levels of our social life, which includes the interpersonal, organizational, and social contexts? Of course, one option would be to limit dialogue at the interpersonal or small group communication level. That would not be completely satisfactory because that would imply that a dialogical

point of view is irrelevant for social and political orientation – for instance, by abandoning the "systemic" logic to some determinative forces. At the same time, it is not an option to simply suppose that dialogue specific to the interpersonal level can also apply at the social and political levels: that is obviously not the case. What is needed is to construct a theoretical frame that will permit circulation between these different levels without demanding too much from dialogue. For me, one thing to leave behind is an idealistic demand towards dialogue. We need an approach to dialogue that is both realistic, possible and practical; otherwise the project is not worth our effort.

This piece is part of a larger endeavor, the development of a critical dialogical perspective for treating normative/axiological issues, seen as characterizing ethical thinking in its specificity.[1] This starts with this element of common knowledge: dialogic aptitude or ability is affected and can be put forward differently in differing action contexts. I will try to show that to integrate to it a Bakhtinian component amounts to taking in charge the agonistic and pluralistic dimensions of all dialogues. This is a relevant point for ethics since value conflicts have an agonistic characteristic from the start.

Abilities to have dialogues do exist in socially functional people, but it can vary greatly from one person to the next. To characterize dialogical aptitude in all its details in general would require not only a discussion of physiology for taking into account head nods and the like, and language abilities including grammar usage, but also socialization theory and interaction theory, including the capacity to listen, which is of the foremost importance in all dialogical processes (Lipari 2012).[2] Of course, it would also require to discuss and describe spoken interventions in groups that are always responding to some people who already spoke, while talking at the same time to a larger group, which is quite a complex aptitude. It is present in many different forms – in general assemblies, for instance, or public gatherings with the possibility to speak in turn. In group meetings inside organizations, this phenomenon also occurs while sometimes having much more common ground than in an open gathering like the general assembly of a union. Instead of trying to develop a global theory of dialogical aptitude, then, what might be more

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1. This started with an epistemological-logical-hermeneutical-social concept drawn in Blondel under the light of both Gadamer and Habermas (partially reassessed in Létourneau 1999). Then I discussed Habermas (notably with Létourneau 2002), continued with Jacques and Legault (Létourneau 2006). The discussion was afterwards pursued in discussing Legault in contrast with Isaacs (Létourneau 2007, 2012).

2. If we were to see it as a competence, it is certainly not to be understood only as a set of rules to be followed or applied (Weigand 2009). Most recently, I tried to overcome the tension between the descriptive and the normative in dialogical studies inspired by Bakhtin.

interesting is to consider how dialogical aptitude or capacity will be understood differently if placed under the light of two types of variations: varying types of situations and a variety of theoretical frames of reference. This strategy will hopefully shed light on some theories' relevance, and some limits of these theories as well.

Practical philosophy includes the study of the characteristics of human action, taking into account the norms and values that might guide it. We consider goals of different kinds and means of different genres, along with conditions of exercise involving in many cases co-actors in society, whether at the organizational or the inter-individual level. It is my contention that practical philosophy, in which is situated a dialogical ethic, can be inspired, among other elements, by pragmatism. In a famous article followed by other writings, Peirce explained that the meaning of a theory is best understood if we characterize what actions and consequences should follow if we adopt this or that theory. He meant two main elements with this; the actions required from us, and the expected ways by which the object-domain under study is supposed or expected to behave as predicted by the theory (Peirce 1878, 1955). This means that to theorize something is always to expect some actions, to do something, and/or to prepare some kind of action. Therefore, if we are to understand the meaning of a given theory, practical bearings are of the utmost importance. Hinting the direction followed here, we should understand that there are different visions of what it is to do "ethics." According to one view, the "ethicist" adopts the required dialogical aptitude in the process of trying to help people make a decision.

The person does that by clarifying the components of the situation including value conflicts (Legault 1998; Létourneau 2001). An example of a conflict of values will surface in front of a given question: for instance, should the police officer inspect or not inspect a person's garbage bin placed by a resident on the sidewalk in front of the house of the person in question (Legault 1998)? Values in conflict here are between upholding the law, and preserving the general security of a neighborhood versus respecting the privacy of a citizen. After having tried to clarify what the law says (and it might not be the same answer everywhere, one difficult issue being the definition of borders between private property and the public domain), the dialogue attempts to establish a priority in that case, and to help come to a decision in one sense or the other. A sensible dialogical attitude would be to treat the relevant sides of the issue with the decision makers. The situation is completely different if we posit a shared substantial value with people involved in preserving it. Let us say we have a group of people, and each person or unit has private property, but they share a given socialized bit of the natural world in proximity to them, for instance, residents living around a lake. Let us also assume that these people care for the health of their environment and for their quality of life. What you have is a long-term process including, over time, a series of decisions to make,

some at the collective level, some at the individual level; and issues of protecting the common good might in some cases conflict with what is understood as their private domain.

Here you will also have the dialectic between the long term and the short term, for the land and for the private residents also, with costs on both sides having to be evaluated and understood in a given way. If they share some common institution to take care of their common good, then we can speak of governance. These governance actors are then trying to do their part in a constructive way with a number of other actors having their own views of the situation and of the priorities. The same kind of structure can also exist at a regional or state level; for instance, they might be trying to develop a public policy for an environmental issue (Weidner and Jänicke 2002). Policies can be developed both at the local, at the regional, or at the superior levels, provided they respect jurisdiction limits. In the first case, ethics is seen as a kind of mediation process between different values; in the second, ethics has to do with the common involvement in a shared substantial value that is presupposed and also presented and discussed/reframed by a group of people. Some elements are probably common among these types of action programs, but specificities are also to be expected.

Theories can be seen as structured conceptions that are supposed to give us knowledge about elements' behaviors and help us to interact with them. In turn, these theories permit, structure, and help us grasp and enact different practices – for me, practices are sets of actions organized around a given goal and particular values and norms. Because they precede us, we can assume that we are somehow enacted by practices and theories, not only their active proponents or fabricators. For one, most of the times, practices and theories have not been created by us. And secondly, the distance we have with the practices and theories we adopt has to be relative; they frame our way of acting, and our thinking also about them as practices and theories. This correlates with F. Cooren's pragmatic reflections that show how humans themselves become media of other elements, figures of different kinds among which discourse plays a central role (Cooren 2015). Under a Bakhtinian conception of heteroglossia, human actors are themselves at the crossroads of a multiplicity of discourses, theories being just one specific, and perhaps more elaborated, kind of discourse among others, while practices are also very much structured and expressed in discourse.

According to this reading, dialogism is a social range of possibilities and not only a normative or descriptive enterprise. Different theories account for it, for instance Bakhtin and Dewey. Therefore, it is interesting to put these differing theories in dialogue, which means confronting them and debating their interest and respective limits, which is to express the theories in their dia-logic context (Létourneau 1994).

Debating is required not only to render explicit a dialogue between the theories, but also to discuss the relationships of these theories between them and with practices: our ways of understanding situations and structure purposive action in different action domains, e.g. settling a dispute, managing a common lake. This, hopefully, will clarify their meaning and help situate and limit their scope and particular relevance. Furthermore, theories are somehow culturally and socially given; they contribute to the thickness of our being in the world, permitting us to interpret realities and give them some meaning, sometimes before we even reflexively consider their actual content. If we are educated (educating ourselves) into a theory or a set of these, we discover their meaning progressively while not grasping automatically, and at first sight, their whole meaning. In some cases, the absence of knowledge of other theories about the same object domain might prevent us from seeing the limits of a given theoretical frame. There is a kind of "givenness" of theories, and distance in front of these different approaches has to be obtained and constructed. A Gadamerian hermeneutic would say that we "belong" to a given theory or way of seeing specific things before being in a position to exert criticism; but this is nothing more than historicity. It so happens that inside the timeframe of any individual a multiplicity of theories might be successively learned, and somehow cumulated. A set of theories can overlap if none of them has succeeded in eliminating a part of the set. This is another reason why it is both useful and necessary to take these theories reflectively in consideration and put them in a dia-logical exchange one with the other, and in a relationship with some common object-domain to which they are supposed to apply.

Here are the reflection strands that need to be linked closely, with respect to what has already been explained. (1) I will recall and briefly situate the model of a network participatory governance perspective as applied to environmental issues, which is a recurrent frame of action in many research programs, including mine. It can be applied in many different domains: it can work at a community lake level, in watershed basin management, in forest governance, or in the process of helping cities and urban communities in planning their adaptation to climate change. It is to clarify the request of such a frame of action (and of thinking) that the elements that I will mention afterwards come into play. This governance frame will serve as a typical situation of reference for the discussion. (2) To understand the concrete values involved in environmental issues better, and that shift on values that is particularly noticeable in applied ethics, I will reprise some key points of Dewey's theory of valuation and central elements of his theory of communication. Despite their obvious differences, both Dewey and Habermas develop a democratic conception of social life that is quite relevant if we want to discuss an issue like governance; some overlapping and distinctive elements will be developed. (3) I will then recall the Habermasian conception of communicative action, as it can be seen

somehow after taking Dewey's contributions into account (Habermas does not really treat them). The reason for this is the place Habermas recognized for communication on many different levels, in particular the role played by expectations of common understanding in social practices, even though mistakes and abuses might often be made. By situating mutual understanding as a kind of ideal that is based on acts of language, he allowed us to understand necessary conditions of social life better, and placed communication at the center of social life. I will look in particular at discursive ethics and its links to a universal pragmatic. (4) The recent Francophone tradition in Applied Ethics as it developed in the late 1990s, first in Québec, also in Belgium, and more recently in France, will also be briefly reviewed. It permits us to reconsider the place of values in tension in any process of decision-making, even though typical cases in ethics are quite different than what we find in environmental governance settings. (5) To this day, these different conceptions have not sufficiently taken into account the multiple languages that play a part in social life. If we are to face socially complex issues fruitfully, like the ones with which we are confronted in situated environmental governance issues, as elsewhere, dialogicity should be reinforced while considering the multiplicity of discourses that animate our social life. This would involve acknowledging the value tensions that are an inherent part of these discourses and their relationships. In the environmental governance domain, the most obvious value tensions we will find will often touch business developments and some environmental protection. This is where Mikhaïl Bakhtin's theory of heteroglossia in its connectedness with dialogue will support the hypothesis, according to which his theory has a larger social significance than what is already recognized for analyzing novels and literature. For this to be understood, it needs to be more explicitly adjoined with other strands of dialogic thinking.

2.   Network participatory governance

A network participatory governance perspective aims at involving interested people (stakeholders) in assessing problems and finding solutions or arrangements to specific problems or sets of problems (Agrawal & Gibson 1999). It can be instantiated at many different levels in society, and for a plurality of issues. It can be seen as complementary to a democratic representative system that in many cases encounters serious difficulties. If we admit that knowledge, or information and power, for some issues, are largely distributed, then there is a place for a governance approach, since many partners will in any case have a say and contribution on the matter at hand (Paquet 2001). Typically, it will put together people to represent categories of stakeholders of systems. Their contribution is required

with the aim of collectively taking into account the different uses that are possible, and most of the time effective, of a resource. For instance, cities and communities use water for drinking and other day to day needs like washing, but there are also agricultural needs, sometimes involving irrigation; industrial needs, energy provision with dams and hydroelectric infrastructure, fishing and recreational needs, transportation, etc. Clearly, the different actors involved in these different uses of water, enact numerous values and their say is valuable in such a participatory governance perspective. Even if people are there to represent the values going with their specific use of the resource, typically they also recognize, at least on a basic level, the values represented by other uses plus the whole of the system considered at a more global level.

Of course, the degree of that recognition varies greatly among them; empirical inquiries are needed to assess this more precisely. If we were to interrogate participants for instance in a watershed committee, they would probably recognize the value of the environment as such, but it would take very different forms depending on philosophies, priorities, etc. (Manning and Minteer 1992.) Of course, things are sometimes complicated when uses are going in opposite directions; for instance, upstream/downstream uses are of the utmost importance in all water conflicts. This is especially true in water-poor countries and neighborhoods of the world (Solomon 2010, for instance, on Turkey and Israel) – but issues of availability and quality are present everywhere, if only for the fact that most of the time, water-rich countries are used to taking that resource for granted and have a tendency to neglect its protection.

In some cases, but not all of them, partners accepting participation in such an enterprise would agree on the value of participation in decision-making; but some others might feel they are better suited to decide compared with others. Expertise issues are certainly important for discussing in a governance approach based on stakeholder participation. But if actors can admit that they do not want an authoritarian figure dominating the whole of society including themselves, then they would probably agree on some balanced approach that would take every party to the situation into account. Some would then argue that the relevant persons to represent their own issues in that participatory governance scheme would be the actors themselves; some could say that experts might have a better view and have a better knowledge of the situation in all its complexities. Getting some backing in Callon, Lascoumes and Barthe's (2001) book *Acting in an Uncertain World*, I would argue for a plurality of required expertises, including what I call experts of

practice (Létourneau 2015).[3] Power issues linked to resource access and management on specific parts of territories are of crucial importance here.

Such a problem setting implies a level of complexity that is highly specific and it needs resources and abilities. Dialogical interactions will include many different genres: face-to-face meetings, telephone or videoconferencing, exchange of emails, etc.; but also different purposive actions like lobbying, planning with close colleagues and partners, coordinating, enacting inquiry capacities, asking for such inquiries, etc. In interaction with others, diplomacy, capacity of synthesizing information, negotiation abilities will be required. The capacity to understand complex data must combine here with the ability to intervene at different levels of the social complexity. The particular social and organizational setting into which people are involved will have to give all credible appearances of legitimacy – for instance, by being officially mandated.[4] Leaders will need to be able to formulate common objectives, sub-objectives, priorities, and plan a set of actions in such a way as to take into account the complex situations of their constituent territories and typical uses. They will need to obtain useful knowledge about it if they are to keep their assembly of constituents together. Parties may not satisfy themselves with blunt affirmation of their needs, except, of course, in cases of conflict where explicit formulations would be required. Listening capacities will also be an important component of their ability to enter into dialogue in a fruitful way.

The best and easiest example of this, of which I can think about, is what we call in Québec "Organismes de bassins versants" (OBV), Watershed Basin Committees; many different versions of these kinds of organizations exist elsewhere. For instance, in the Canadian province of Alberta, and the North-West Territories, the Slave Watershed is implementing a two-eyed system of monitoring with better involvement from the First Nations in assessing problems, with the aim of informing decision makers.[5] In Québec's case, the OBV structure was developed

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3. For environmental issues in general, I would suggest to consider carefully the value of conserving and defending the continuance of a sustainable relationship between (socially organized) humans and their bio-geo-physical environment, though others could have more specific value involvements. Even if I manage to explain this value and give all the reasons I can muster to back it up, I might not obtain a consensus on that issue – if only because people have already ideas and formulations, not even considering more specific interests to preserve.

4. Which is the case in the example given below, the OBV network in Québec. Same goes in other jurisdictions – for instance, Conservation Authorities in Ontario Province, etc.

5. See the description of a research project involving investigators from the Canadian Water Network: http://www.cwn-rce.ca/focus-areas/canadian-watershed-research-consortium/slave-river-and-slave-river-delta-node/. This document gives details on the number, diversity and relative importance of the involved parties.

and tried in the field, then it was refined through a number of years and defined by law in 2002.[6] They have a small but existing budget, specific mandates, and can complement their budgets with adjacent sources. They have to develop what is called a Plan directeur de l'eau (Water Plan), followed by Basin Contracts that will see to realizing the different aims prioritized at the analytical level that led to the Plan directeur. This is a Master Water Plan that gathers all the relevant data on the watershed, including details about water quality, availability, systems of collection and treatment, and pollution levels that take into account, of course, a plurality of indicators, all in close connection with the cities and relevant organizations. In that case, the OBV is not the decision maker; actual decisions have to be made by the cities or municipalities; but these are represented inside the watershed basin committees. In the case of Québec's OBVs, voting rights on the board of administrators are allocated to a specified number of representatives of four groups: the municipal level, the First Nations present on the territory, the economic sector, the community including the environmental sector; other members are allowed to express themselves, but without the right to vote.[7] After the Plan has been approved, it is followed by a phase of establishing Basin Contracts with partners that can implement required actions on the territory.[8] It is thought of as a process that is constantly reprised, as a cycle of steps that will be retaken once the first and successive ones are completed.

What emerges from this arrangement is a group of people giving voice to concerns from different, and sometimes competing, uses of the water resource. It is one thing to be a fisherman, another to exploit a marina. To have to navigate the watercourse for transportation purposes is not the same as having to provide water for consumption and day to day uses in the cities and towns. Let us also think about agricultural needs, the different kinds of engineers that are involved with

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6. The test case was the COBARIC experiment on the river Chaudière, which was implemented on the basis of a pre-existing structure. A synthesis of the Report of the experiment and its conclusions is available; http://cobaric.qc.ca/wp-content/uploads/2013/11/SDE-Volume-1.pdf. The document was produced in 2000. A chronology of the main steps of Québec's IWRM development is available here (in French): https://robvq.qc.ca/eau/giebv

7. http://www.mddelcc.gouv.qc.ca/eau/bassinversant/GIRE-cadre-reference.pdf; see p. 10. There is a flexibility here depending of the regional characteristics; the idea is to have a balance with no one side having the upper hand on the others. See also the list at the bottom of this document, for more detail: https://robvq.qc.ca/eau/giebv

8. Starting here, some information is available on the Website of the Québec Ministère de l'environnement; http://www.mddelcc.gouv.qc.ca/eau/bassinversant/index_en.htm. The approach is IWRM (or Integrated Watershed Resource Management). These organizations are grouped under ROBVQ; here is a link to a page explaining elements and furnishing annual reports; https://robvq.qc.ca/robvq..

water treatment, as well as the electricity generation, dams, etc. The watershed basin is a complex system of rivers and lakes in a given territory; it can be shared as a common value, provided that leaders and partners construct it in such a perspective. But most people will see it through the lenses of their specific uses and needs. Even though some internal expertise is available in some cases, the participants in the OBV leadership have in some situations to mandate external experts for giving accurate assessments, then follow through with the results of analytic processes. This aims at establishing the main challenges of water uses in a given territory: for instance, these watercourses are flushed with blue algae; this other set of rivers has a tendency to pass through more extremes that before in tides and lows; this lake is rapidly becoming a swamp, etc. A number of dialogic exchanges will take place in subgroups in the general Council meeting and with particular users, all along a process that extends for a number of years, and is iterative since it has to start again when it is completed with the Direction plan to be adopted and the contracts attributed. Here also, priorities have to be given on the basis of the best knowledge available. On what basis is it possible to establish priorities? One thing is certain, an action plan requires that some things are done before some other things.

In such a case, we do have a network of actors that participate in the environmental governance of their region. As things are set in the Québec case, cities have the relevant decision powers at the local level (elsewhere, the governance system has been set differently). Cities are represented in the OBV and the law specifies that they have to take into account the OBV's report and recommendations. The legislative power did not decide to make their prescriptions mandatory; we have here a case of "soft law": a normative frame that allows some maneuvering space for decision makers. It is of the utmost importance for a dialogical ethic, because here values easily find reference to the material conditions and needs of the populations. Since water is necessary for life and is irreplaceable, value attributions have in that case an indisputable basis, even though in this or that situation, the evaluation of the water situation might be discussed, and its place in a set of values in conflict might not be so obvious.

3. Dewey's pragmatism

One of Dewey's decisive theoretical contributions is to consider values as acts of valuation; therefore, values are kinds of actions, not some ontological characteristic that stand by themselves. To give value is the basis upon which all life choices proceed, and for which we require reflexivity, since spontaneous valuations can be erroneous (Dewey 1939; Schön 1986). In his *Theory of Valuation*, while characterizing value attributions under the term "valuation," Dewey (1939) distinguished

two important levels: one that is supposed to be based on inherited preferences, or unreflected choices, the other being the result of a thorough evaluation of the values themselves, considered inside situations; he named these two levels prizing and appraisal, respectively. This focus on the valuation is quite helpful; first, people can attribute value in different ways, though these attributions might be revised under reflection. Second, it gives an alternative to a focus on norms, which is currently prevalent in many fields, especially in ethics. Norms are obviously very useful in many ways, giving us some standard of action in terms of actions permitted, forbidden, or mandatory, with varying degrees of coercion attached to them (for instance, with an "or else" clause or without; see Von Wright 1967; Ostrom 2005; Létourneau 2012). But they are a means to an end, with, most of the time, the end being the realization of a value (or sets of values) understood to be required in the situation. An obvious example would be the interdiction to pass on a red light as having a value and end permitting safe circulation in cities by ordering traffic.

Even though the term "dialogue" as such is not frequent in his writings, Dewey contributes something essential about communication. The close connection between communication and having concrete exchanges is quite clear. If we are to have things in common, we need communication, the link between common and communication is more than happenstance; communication is interaction, production of meaning, movement from one to the other and vice-versa. This is quite clearly put at the foreground of *Democracy and Education*; society is enacted by communication. Another essential element is the deep interconnection between misunderstandings happening between people and their diverging action orientations, all this on the basis of an understanding of communication as cooperation. If we admit that to co-operate means that partners contribute together, then something dialogic is implied. Dewey clarifies his point thusly:

> The heart of language is not "expression" of something antecedent, much less expression of antecedent thought. It is communication; the establishment of cooperation in an activity in which there are partners, and in which the activity of each is modified and regulated by partnership. To fail to understand is to fail to come into agreement in action; to misunderstand is to set up action at cross purposes.
> (Dewey 1925, 141.)

Here, Dewey clearly brings the reader to reflect on social processes, which includes the microsocial level without being limited to it. To define communication as cooperation is already clarified at the end of the quote, by saying that to disagree implies not only a semantic misunderstanding, but a divergence of the ends pursued. Understanding implies communication, which implies working together in cooperation. This in turn implies that each one of the participants pursues that perspective.

Dewey is also well-known for the focus he places on public debate as an essential element of democratic life (Dewey 1927). On this topic, he directly touches the relationship between public opinion construction and politics. Dewey is almost never discussing the specifics of democratic institutions, like the roles of the Constitution or of the Bill of Rights, and other arrangements for preserving independence and division of powers. But democracy represents for him a shared, substantial value as a way of life, which is more obvious than with Habermas. It is clear that democratic life is precisely this life of debate, exchange, cooperation, and dialogue that was just described. Dewey did not reflect on the link of values and norms with speech acts, since his contribution precedes Wittgenstein and happens before the development of speech act theory, mostly by Austin and Searle. But the link still plays an important part; as an example, see the policeman's whistle, which is clearly a communicative act intended to have effect:

> A traffic policeman holds up his hand or blows a whistle. His act operates as a signal to direct movements. But it is more than an episodic stimulus. It embodies a rule of social action. Its proximate meaning is its nearby consequences in coordination of movements of persons and vehicles; its ulterior and permanent meaning – essence – is its consequence in the way of security of social movements.
>
> (Dewey 1925, 149)

The signal is a rule; the rule has coordination for a first level of meaning and the value of security as a second level of meaning. In the preceding quote, we had cooperation in a common, implied purpose; here, we have coordination by a signal enacting laws implemented to provide security. In both cases, the social is taken into account much more than the interpersonal as such.

4.   Reading Habermas with Dewey in mind

If we admit that elements of common ground and discourse will have to be built between action partners in governance settings, among partners that might need some coming together in shared understanding, then a reference to Habermas can seem required. After all, he did define communicative action as the pursuit of *Einverstandnis*, which means coming together in a common understanding, being in accord. We know that tensions and struggles are not really treated by Habermas, even though he does not deny that they exist. We should recall that Habermas, in his different writings touching communicative action, stressed the fact that this research of mutual understanding has something universal (Habermas 2001), which means it is required for all participants, provided they situate themselves in "communicative action" as defined. According to him, communication understood as

this request of mutual understanding furnishes the basis of a democratic life – it is a condition for any agreement on specific norms (Habermas 1997). Again, he simply does not examine phenomena like propaganda and spin doctors, and he is not (to my knowledge) aware of data mining procedures with key diffusion strategies in mind. For him, all this is not defined as communicative action – it is seen as strategic-instrumental action, end of story.

As we might recall, expectations of mutual understanding are posited as required by any communication whatsoever, since even lies cannot function as such without a basic and universal expectation of truthfulness by the partners. The same goes for abusing people with fake news: some might be amused, but when they work as lies, people do attribute to it some "possible" truth-value.

Of course, Habermas discusses something other than *willingness* to understand, which is a completely different issue. He explains that we need to presuppose some openness between partners to be able to communicate, but does not explain how we can *reinforce* that openness. In his theory, moral issues are concerned with norms that can be a basis for mutual agreement, whereas ethics has to do with values, based on *Lebenswelt* envisioned as grounded in specific traditions (Habermas 1981). Values being traditional, they are communitarian and historically based; they cannot be a *locus* for common agreement. This prevents us from looking for agreement on values. By contrast, the expectation of mutual understanding has the advantage of being requested by anyone, independently of their specific culture or upbringing – it has a counterfactual character, meaning that its very failure in practice still gives testimony to the request (Habermas 1984, 1987). The independence of these suppositions towards specific value involvement is why he often emphasizes the "formal" character of a Discussion ethics, and the same will apply later to the Discussion Principle to which he refers in *Between Facts and Norms* (Habermas 1996, p. 287f). Therefore, procedure and universalizability go hand in hand, whereas substantial values and historical particularity are closely linked and left on the side. Proceduralism will then follow on the deliberative discussion about norms.

What Habermas offers is a communicational variation on Kant's strategy of grounding norms on their universalizability, adding the necessity of passing through discussion and the acceptance of the consequences of the application of norms by all concerned – for a law or norm is supposed to have been built with the interest of everyone in perspective (Habermas 1990, 103–104). These are very strong demands placed on political and social actors, especially in situations of substantial conflict. Nonetheless, what is less obvious to different commentators on Habermas is that his theory presupposes a number of substantial values that are closely related to a democratic life, and they are not discussed as such by him. Discussion is supposed to be held with the very aim of mutual understanding; in a

democracy, it would need to be deliberative. Let us recall the formulation for the D principle (D): "Every valid norm would meet with the approval of all concerned if they could take part in a practical discourse" (Habermas 1991, 121). "Practical discourse" might well be "a procedure for testing the validity of hypothetical norms," while prohibiting us from "singling out with philosophical authority any specific normative contents" (Habermas 1991, 122). But there is still the claim that all concerned should have a say. That claim in itself is not procedurally tested. Simply put, the value of equality, which has a history dating to the time of Locke, Rousseau and the democratic revolutions, is simply assumed – while not admitting their link to a diverse but still specific tradition.[9]

Most of the time, commentators will stress the "procedural" character of Habermas's discussion ethics (Edgar 2005; Ingram 2010). An egalitarian involvement is supposed when he gives us, as a test of the validity of norms, the requirement that they should be acceptable for all concerned (see U and D). He suggests following a procedure of universalization (and, in the case of D, of actual discussion, without providing any concrete detail on how to do it), but does not procedurally justify this decision in favor of universal acceptability. This requirement is quite unrealistic when we think, for instance, of people with vested interest that will fight against valid policies. Let us recall the tobacco industries' long-standing battle against rules and regulations, or, more recently, resistance in many places of the Oil industry against anything resembling a radical phasing out of the fossil fuel dependencies in which societies are engaged.

Stressing the independence of the Discussion principle from actual democratic institutions seems to be a rhetorical move, along with distinguishing Discussion from substantial values issued from the lived world as it is experienced in Western Democracies. Based on that rhetorical speech act, it becomes possible to include a critique of the Western models of democracy that might not be universally applicable everywhere in their concrete forms. But there is no denying the fact that all this emphasis on discussion and deliberation comes from a plurality of traditions dating back to the Greek cities that are the documented historical basis for democratic deliberation. We can see this in his work on *The Public Sphere*, where the link between critical discussion in public and democratic Enlightenment institutions is clearly established. Requests of mutual understanding can be honored by listening and asking questions of clarification in a formal way and according to a procedure of discussion suggested by Habermas in the form of principles U and

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9. We can recognize differences between national cultures, and a number of liberal and-or republican currents. We can also add to this the linguistic characteristics involved. But there is still something of a shared heritage here, with all these differences being part of the tradition of debate and "agreeing to disagree" that is a democratic perspective.

D. It is interesting to note that Habermas, who used speech act theory as a basis to justify his key ideas of validity claims, did not make any link with an explicit value theory in that context. He pursued his foundational enterprise from the perspective that norms were the element upon which agreement would be possible, because once again he explicitly links values to culture, community traditions, and lived experience of the world, or *Lebenswelt*. But what are validity claims if not values: truth, authenticity or veridicity, rightfulness. The same goes for the egalitarian values that are tacitly presupposed when U and D require that all agree on norms, either in a thought experiment (for U) or in a concrete discussion (for D). The difference between these values and the other ones (deemed communitarian and historical) is the level on which they function, a level that qualifies for the former as quasi-transcendental.

5.   A dialogical applied ethics

Instead of focusing on communicative action, the recent tradition of applied ethics gave to dialogue a practical turn, while putting, as did Habermas, a focus on speech acts as an important component of social actions. The Habermasian input has been important to applied ethics, with significant differences. But applied ethics can help to criticize Habermas while at the same time interpreting some of its basic concepts in a new way, in a general shift from universal communication to particular claims enacted in dialogue. Without the foundational twist that characterizes the Habermasian enterprise, in the much less well-known French-speaking literature in applied ethics since the 1990s (see the writings of authors like Legault, Patenaude, Maesschalck, Bégin, etc.), an ongoing discussion continues about competence in ethics understood as the ability to treat ethical issues or questions in a dialogical manner.

On top of being discussed in some universities, this discourse on dialogue as competence is also closely related to public policy, adopted by the provincial government, which posited dialogue as a required ability for treating both ethical and religious questions at the primary and secondary school level, even though their difference and independence from one another is recognized.[10] For more

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10. That independence is alleged as possible, even though in some cases, specific persons can link values to their religious beliefs. This document presents the program at the primary level.   http://www.education.gouv.qc.ca/fileadmin/site_web/documents/dpse/formation_jeunes/ EthiqueCultRel_Primaire.pdf. A description of the whole curriculum is given here in English: http://www.education.gouv.qc.ca/en/contenus-communs/education/ethics-and-religious-culture-program/ At the secondary level, the third competency is "to engage in dialogue": http://www. education.gouv.qc.ca/en/contenus-communs/education/ethics-and-religious-culture-program/

than 25 years, teachings in applied ethics have stressed the usefulness of a dialogic perspective for treating ethical questions. People then consider ethics as a species of reflection (and as a disciplinary domain).

It is also seen as a field of practices and intervention (cf. Bégin 2011), and not foremost as an integrated moral behavior, even though it is understood as having to arrive at decision-making (Legault 1998). Such a discussion, and this is where a similarity exists with Habermas, presupposes that ethics will be differentiated from substantial positions taken in favor of moral principles; it cannot be equated with a normative stance dedicated to telling people how to act according to a set of norms supposedly available, what we call a normative ethic. But since what counts is what people actually will do on the basis of their motivations, values are taken into account, because they are seen as the main motivational element that plays a part in decision-making. In practical life, rules do not solve everything; some questions lack clear rules, while others have too much of them. The situation under consideration, as it is going to be analyzed in the applied ethics perspective, is expected to show some tension between values – in some cases in the form of dilemmas. And if people are willing to strive for a solution together, dialogue can occur and be the crucial element through which to ordain the elements of the situation, the given norms, the values involved, and expected consequences, in such a way as to validate a choice. Then we can best define ethics as the reflective consideration of all the factors involved with the aim to aid at decision-making. This will include evaluation about the values and norms that actually guide action.

One difficulty is that ethical dialogue is contrasted with negotiation, and mediation; relationships between actors could be taken better into account by also including these phenomena (see Létourneau 2012). In this new species of formalism, the involvement of actors on specific substantial values might be seen as problematic and end up being ignored in the process. These authors seem to forget that oppositional discourses are also dialogically related to the positions to which they react or that they contradict.

6.   Bakhtin's contribution

A basic theory of dialogical aptitude in a network of actors will certainly benefit from introducing heteroglossia in its set of tools (Bakhtin 1981). Many words are sometimes used to render the Russian word *razoreče*: the English translation,

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program-secondary-level/competency-3-engages-in-dialogue/. Many professors who teach in applied ethics have also served as experts to define or explain the policy in question, even though some of them are of a more classical tradition.

depending on contexts, will be heteroglossia, but sometimes it is also translated as diversity of speech types (Bakhtin 1981, 263). In contrast with Holquist, the French translator Olivier will put "plurilinguisme," "plurivocalité" to express the same word of *razoreče* (Bakhtin 1975, 88–89). Tension is given an important place when Bakhtin shows how ideological forces contribute to pushing this plurality of forms towards unity (Bakhtin 1981, 271).

Forcibly, the very fact that the Bakhtinian discussion shifts from talking about the plurality of genres in the novel and its submission to centripetal and centrifugal forces shows that his theorization is not limited to the novel but is also concerned with society. The novel is presented as the paramount example and expression of this tension affecting all human languages. This acknowledgement of tensions in plurality comes at the same time as the recognition that dialogicity occurs in between the different social forms of discourse. When he characterizes the "dialogic orientation of discourse," Bakhtin describes what he calls a "property of any discourse." He discusses the following phenomenon: "On all its various routes toward the object, in all its directions, the word encounters an alien word and cannot help encounter it in a living, tension-filled interaction" (Bakhtin 1981, 279). He recognizes completely that a voice cannot be perceived, let alone understood, without other voices: they are the necessary background (Bakhtin 1981, 278). The place of values is clearly indicated by him: speaking of any concrete discourse, "The word, directed toward its object, enters a dialogically agitated and tension-filled environment of alien words, value judgments and accents…" (Bakhtin 1981, 276); all this may complicate and influence its expression. Clearly, values are associated with tensions in dialogue and forcibly so, since we have a plurality of discourses. According to him, any actor involved in discussions with other actors in a social setting is a nexus of such tensions, as is the social group. This enlarges the breadth of the dialogical perspective to social settings, while including reflective human capacity and recognizing potentially a multiplicity of agencies and discourses at play.

7.   Discussing this theoretical ensemble in relationship with the situational case

Let me get back to the previously given example, a concrete social setting involving network governance. In those settings, value attributions by a variety of actors will be present, and can be documented on the basis of recognizable speech acts. For instance, a speaker intervenes to put into perspective the necessity to protect this particular wetland. This other replies by recalling the need for creating new and rewarding construction jobs in the same particular region. Those tensions might arise if people have the opportunity to talk, but the formal setting of the

governance framework incites these actors to find some common ground or some perspective into which these diverging views might find some resolution. There is one level of dialogicity involved in this reciprocal positioning in terms of value tension, and another one in terms of a discourse inciting to common understanding, which is present in the organizations' setting, pursued ends, discourse, and procedures. This corresponds to the centrifugal and the centripetal forces discussed by Bakhtin, providing us with a portrait which is probably closer to what is given than the Habermasian claims to validity, which may be useful if we couple them with Honneth's struggle for recognition. If actors move towards a common goal, that common goal might come to play as a mediating force between them by introducing a rejoining element; but some people will have to hold that discourse, in the name of the whole action set that is concerned. At that point, the role of a publicly validated, mandated authority having to serve the common heritage, seems incontrovertible (Halley & Sotousek 2012). But discourse by the OBV as a gathering force will then have to put ahead a concrete recognition of these different discourses. I would surmise that an organizing communication that is clearly aware of those tensions would be much more efficient and beneficial. As a result of such an instance's recommendations, the decision makers, at City Hall for example, might have to settle in one direction; but since the OBV itself is not the decision maker, the burden of conciliation is relatively low for them.

In such a setting, much is required in terms of mutual confidence between actors, as well as an excellent level of transparency. It does not have to be total and complete; leadership might imply centrifugal tensions. But speech acts manifesting this forwarding of special values in discourse can hardly be kept silent; we can surmise that on a whole set of observations and recordings they would surface frequently enough. Specialists of emergency preparedness will value the ability to intervene speedily and to have the right resources at their disposal – and this will appear in discourse. Mutual confidence there will also be of the foremost importance; you need to know circumstances and relevant data, and that you can trust the people with whom you are working.

In Watershed basin committees, discourses from situated actors will, for instance, include affirmation of priorities, putting in the forefront of the discussion some means deemed necessary to realize those priorities, also with interventions to diminish the relative importance of other issues. Value attributions do not necessarily imply the greatest clarity in the definition of values; their understanding might be supposed clear and obvious even though they are, as anything, also subject to interpretation. Assuming that valuation acts are the basis upon which convergence and divergence can actually occur between actors, they became an important object of investigation for an applied ethics perspective. The ideal representation that has been offered by many, including Marie-Hélène Parizeau, of

the ethicist as a dialogue practitioner that does not choose among values, but that can mediate among them, is based on the idea of a plurality of valid possibilities in terms of value choice and orientation. It is in the continuity of a representation of science as being detached from specific values and able to function in pure objectivity. But as we saw with Dewey and Habermas, even though they were both cautious about too specific involvement on material issues, their orientation towards the specific value of democratic life is clear and uncontroversial; they are not relativistic about it.

8.   Conclusion

Maybe we must acknowledge here that any ethics, including a dialogical ethic, has a hermeneutic dimension, supposing both critique and belonging, as Gadamer would have said (Gadamer 1960). We might debate about the way we are going to discuss and deliberate, and it certainly can evolve in time, but we can hardly renounce some form of deliberative discussion involving the people if the frame is still a democracy. Let us then posit that ethics can be both reflective and critical while being, at least on a number of issues, substantially involved in the process of inquiry and discussion. The ability to identify values and norms in the enactment of discourse is not enough: consequences of different choices also have to be considered, and values will have to be ordered (Létourneau 1997, 2014). An agreement on these elements might or might not always be realizable, if we recall the notion of intractable conflicts often encountered in resource-based discussions (Lewicki, Gray and Eliot 2003). According to one famous definition, governance situations occur when multiple actors have some power and knowledge distributed among them on a given issue (Paquet 2011). This kind of network requires many aptitudes, but is by definition open only to those who have some power and some information on an issue. It should also be open to those affected by an issue or question, even if they do not know much and do not have much power about it! The crucial ethical question then goes further in discussing who should be invited to join the discussion.

   We have all the reasons to think that a focus on value involvement as they surface in communication might also be a relevant focus in network participative governance contexts. To limit the perspective on value to the Habermasian and Rawlsian perspectives grounding them in community life is clearly insufficient.

   A part of this can be understood as a kind of dialogical aptitude (Johannesen 1996), including the capacity to stimulate and produce reflective processes among different actors: it would include such a capacity to identify and discuss value and normative orientations. This already requires a conception of communication

implying more than just the orientation towards common understanding – *Einverständnis* (Habermas 1984, 1987) – it would especially mean the integration of negotiation abilities into the recognition of the other (Honneth 1996; Létourneau 2012). Value involvement might be plural, but we can hardly renounce the possibility of having them and expressing them; discussion can then occur not only about their formal acceptability, but also about how to organize and make them compatible, if and when possible. Evaluating values with others supposes already to identify them in a discursive process, and the result of such an exchange cannot be anticipated in one sense or the other.

Seen in terms of adaptive management (Norton 2015), planning requires the ability to take into account not only the strategy, but also the value involvement of other actors, without a reductionist perspective focusing only on strategy. Expanding recognition and knowledge of the others becomes an essential component of the characteristics forcibly required inside dialogic capacity, especially if we understand social action in the polycentric dimension indicated in environmental governance contexts (Ostrom 2001).

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An interlocutory logic approach
of a case of professional ethics

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In this paper, we present some parts of a corpus taken from recordings of a pre-dictive medicine consultation for the test of Huntington's disease (Batt 2003; Batt & Trognon 2010; Sarangi, Bennert & al. 2004). By mobilizing an "Interlocutory Analysis" (Trognon & Batt 2010; Batt, Trognon & al. 2014), the authors analyze how a patient presents her states of mind (goals, beliefs, desires, trust, hesita-tions, rejection, etc.) as well as the responses given by the professionals with whom she is speaking. They also analyze the consequences of these relationships on the interactive process. The authors then outline some key ethical constraints specifically imposed by this kind of consultation, which can be compared with some sort of deliberation game.

Keywords: interaction (- professional), dialogue (- deliberation; decision), genetic counseling, intersubjectivity, ethics, mental states, denegation, interlocutory analysis, Huntington's disease

1.   Introduction

The events reported in the present work are part of a discipline that appeared in the last quarter of the twentieth century. It is called "Applied Ethics," as per the Anglo-Saxon philosophers who 'invented' it, which is a rather unfortunate expres-sion insofar as **applied ethics** is "the direct opposite of the application of a theory" (Auroux 1990: 870).

Theoretical ethics is the branch of ethics defined by Lalande in his famous dictionary as the "[s]cience that takes as its object [the nature of] *judgments* of appreciation with regard to acts [such that they are qualified] as good or bad" (1968: 306, our translation). These judgments can be addressed for themselves in that, "whatever hypothesis is adopted on the origin and nature of the principles of morality, there can be no doubt that value judgments pertaining to conduct are

genuine facts, the characteristics of which must be determined, and that the study of conduct cannot be substituted for the direct study of these judgments, since man's conduct is not always in conformity with his own judgments on the value of acts" (1968: 306, our translation).

In opposition to theoretical ethics, applied ethics (or "substantive ethics", according to the Anglo-Saxon philosophers), does not seek foundations. According to Auroux (1990: 871), by inverting the "relationship of the general to the particular, from principles to consequences, which one encounters in traditional ethics," applied ethics is akin to a "modern casuistry." Indeed, "What applied ethics addresses is not to know whether the foundation of the morality of my action is based on what rule ought to universally guide my action [Kant's rule], but whether to kill the ill-formed fetus of Mrs. X, whether Mr. Y is to be condemned because his daughter died as a result of a ritual clitoridectomy in a suburban housing project, whether a physician committed a wrongful act by grafting an organ without the authorization of the parents of the deceased from whom it was procured, and so on. Concrete ethical issues are abound, linked to the evolution of modern civilization. They are unavoidable and require solutions that are not obvious" (Auroux 1990: 871, our translation). These problems emerge within the fields of *practices* that are differentially *homogeneous*, involving *agents* stemming from *diverse*, even antagonistic, trades, traditions and training, but these problems must be addressed in a coordinated manner and require effective *communication*. Applied ethics is therefore necessary since the evolution of the world today requires more than a common, individually shared morality. Hence the recent multiplication of specialized ethics and their more recent regrouping into a relatively autonomous field of research (i.e., theses (Patenaude 1996), specialized scientific journals (*The Journal of Clinical Ethic*; *Journal of Medical Ethics*), training (Patenaude 2013) and teachings (Thiel & Thévenot 1999), in which objects are selected (*case work*) and methods are favored (the dialogue).

This evolution has inexorably revived traditional ethics. If one believes Toulmin (1982), medicine has even saved the life of ethics. In any event, within this evolution, traditional ethics will have acquired an empirical dimension: "rather than the general principle evaluating the particular case, one could consider, according to RM Hare, that it is the manner in which the particular case is solved which allows testing the validity of ethical theories" (Auroux 1990: 872, our translation).

Bioethics, born of medical ethics, which is the study of moral decision in the field of health and whose domain is continually expanding, represents an excellent illustration of the birth and evolution of applied ethics. In this sense, the advent of pre-symptomatic tests in late-diagnosed diseases (without possibility of therapeutic or preventive management) and the announcement of the diagnosis they

allow making, constitutes a case that is both very specific and very general of the problems raised by the most recent medical advances.

It is this type of problem that we will illustrate herein by the study of a particular case: the preventive medicine consultation for Huntington's disease of Mrs. P. Accompanied throughout (by one of us), exhaustively recorded in its communicational process, and analyzed under various formal aspects,[1] the consultation of Mrs. P. has not yet been approached as a case of applied ethics. Nor will it be exactly approached as such in this chapter, in which, more modestly, we will only attempt to prepare the verbatim **in view** of an ethical approach.

The aim we are pursuing, albeit modest, nonetheless requires that the communicational events potentially warranting an ethical approach be described accurately from an empirical point of view, i.e., in their "semiotic materiality."

Hence our recourse to Interlocutory Logic, a methodology that attempts to grasp the semiotic events of natural dialogue as points of accumulation achieving at a local level, a semio-genesis that is historically momentary and dynamically constituted, nevertheless retrospectively identifiable.

2. From predictive medicine consultation to predictive genetic consultation for HD

2.1 Predictive medicine consultation

The situation that will be analyzed herein stems from this wide range of dialogical practices still poorly understood and that have empirically emerged in recent years in order to meet technological and social developments. This particular instance involves a predictive medicine consultation for the test of Huntington's disease (Batt 2003).

The 'medical relationship' has undergone profound changes over the last fifteen years in France (and elsewhere). A certain number of regulatory provisions have marked both the before and after in this evolution. Such is the case of Law 2002–303 relative to the rights of the sick and the quality of the healthcare system (published on March 5, 2002, in the Official Journal) and in particular the so-called bioethics laws of July 29, 1994, and the ensuing decrees of the year 2000. These legislative decisions together with the evolution of medical practices (increasing litigious nature, concurrent appearance, with "classical" care medicine, of a predictive

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1. For example, as a conversational history of dialogical emergence and treatment of a "natural" bias (i.e. produced in everyday life, not as part of a psychological experiment) of deductive reasoning. *Cf.* Batt, Trognon & al. 2014.

medicine), are now profoundly transforming the "singular dialogue" that the physician traditionally maintains with the patient. These profound transformations have a dual origin; they stem either from the historical-cultural context in which medical practices are expressed or from the specific evolution of these practices. For the former, the fact that the act of informing is not limited to the dissemination of informational content, on which Bakthin (1929) a half century ago and, more recently, Sperber and Wilson (1986) insisted upon, has necessarily become part of real life and precisely where the ideology of scientific knowledge strongly dominates. Then, for the latter, the referent of the medical intervention is no longer only the declared disease in a real world, it is also the possible disease in a possible world (probabilistic diagnosis in oncogenetics) or the definite disease in a future world (predictive diagnosis of diseases before the expression of their symptoms which sometimes, cannot be followed by a medical proposal for therapeutic use). At the same time, the implemented dialogical practices change. Hence, for example, we will journey: (1) from a dialogue to a polylogue involving several "specialists" in a multidisciplinary approach, (2) from a strict division of work where the patient brings his symptoms while the physician brings his or her reasoning and his or her therapeutic decision, to a distributed activity in which both interlocutors or more numerous interlocutors reflect together on the foundations and consequences of the request of a predictive diagnostic test (*cf.* Batt, Luporsi & al. 2006).

Empirically speaking, a predictive medicine consultation is a consultation that accompanies a person who has submitted a request for genetic testing. It most often involves a healthy individual who wishes to know his or her genetic status in relation to a sometimes serious illness that he or she is susceptible to develop. Revealing to an asymptomatic individual his or her genetic status is an extremely delicate interaction. The law therefore provides that a predictive counseling be organized around a multidisciplinary team encompassing clinical and genetic expertise and which can accompany the person at risk before, during, and after the test.

At the center of the relationship that is established between the health professionals and the patient resides the decision-making by the patient of the act of screening for a genetic mutation responsible for the disease (Gargiulo 1999; Batt 2003). Decision-making in itself condenses, in an evolving interlocutory framework, multiple dimensions, all of which are illustrated in the case reported herein. These include (i) cognitive dimensions: simple or complex representations; immediate and/or derived from various processes of memory, inferences, and reasonings; (ii) affective dimensions: both thought representations and thought processes are diversely invested and undergo defense mechanisms (cleavage, negations, denial) classically described in psychopathology; (iii) group dimensions: the disease necessarily affects the family group, and even the social group to which the person requesting the test belongs to; and lastly (iv) organizational dimensions:

the institutionalization of predictive medicine consultation for genetic testing of-
ten differs in the countries in which it is proposed (Batt 2003; Sarangi 2010).

One of the pursued aims during the predictive medicine consultation being
to enlighten the person at risk during the pre-decisional period (Gargiulo 1999;
Batt 2003), it is thus an original and dynamic system resulting from all of these
dimensions that the interlocutors contend with. In particular, it is fundamental
that, before deciding to undergo the test, the person making the request fully un-
derstands the subjective and intersubjective consequences that may result from
the revelation, and that thereafter, he or she appropriates this established result.

The predictive medicine consultation comprises three phases, as represented
in Figure 1; the first phase, that which precedes the decision, combining several
dialogues.

Decision Making: To do or not to do the test	The test	Appropriation of the test result
T_1	T_2	T_3

Figure 1. The processes involved during the performing of a predictive test

2.2 The predictive genetic consultation of Huntington's disease

As opposed to an ordinary consultation (Bange and Kayser 1987), predictive con-
sultation provides for multi-step protocols that allow for reflection and iterative
discussions with professionals from various disciplines. This multidisciplinary
consultation (Figure 2) provides a theoretical and technical framework highlight-
ing the issues raised by the disease in question. Huntington's disease (HD) is a
neurodegenerative disorder associated with a high-penetrance gene that is trans-
mitted according to a dominant autosomal mode, meaning that each child (boy
or girl) of a person with the gene has a 50% chance of being a carrier of the gene.
If a person is a carrier of the defective gene, he or she will inescapably be afflicted
during his or her lifetime. The age of onset of the disease varies, most often af-
fecting adults after midlife. A predictive genetic consultation of HD hence brings
together a geneticist, a neurologist, a psychiatrist, or a psychologist. In this group,
according to Gargiulo (1999), the first two professionals are the "guarantors of
the objectivity of the problem while the psychologist, informed of the dominant
autosomal transmission, is the guarantor of the expression of the […] subjectivity."

In reference to Sarangi et al., whose seminal works in this field have been au-
thoritative for almost 20 years, we can technically define "genetic counseling […]
as a hybrid activity type" (Sarangi 2010: 180). As per Levinson (1979), Sarangi

Step A			Step B	Step C	Step D	
Asking for a genetic diagnosis Time devoted to reflection before free and informed consent is signed Making a decision: having or not having the test.			Blood test Free and informed consent signed Decision: the test	Notification of genetic status	Dealing with the psychological impact of the revelation. Accepting the result.	
A1	A2	A3	Interview	Interview	D1	Dn
Interview Patient-Psychologist	Interview Patient-Psychologist	Interview Patient-Psychologist	Patient Geneticist, Psychologist	Patient Geneticist, Psychologist	Interviews Patient-Psychologist	

Figure 2. Organization of the multidisciplinary predictive genetic consultation for HD.

characterizes the consultation as "an interplay of institutional, professional and personal-experiential modes of talk" (Sarangi 2010: 178). We could add that genetic counseling deploys, both simultaneously and successively, various forms of discursive interaction: research and transfer of information, persuasion, debate, deliberation, negotiation, even bargaining; at the intersection of which the dialogued argument plays an eminent role (Trognon, Batt et al. 2011).

We will now reconstruct the strong moments of this consultation, taking care to report them according to their order of appearance, but only after recalling the epistemological, theoretical, and methodological framework of our approach to dialogue.

3.   Interlocutory logic

Interlocutory logic is a theory about the psychosociocognitive structures of interlocutory events produced when a natural language is used in interaction. As a formal theory, it is a system of logical methods selected for their ability to reflect the phenomenal properties of interlocution. Two properties are particularly important: sequentiality and distributivity. Sequentiality is the fact that the interlocutory productions occur in succession. Distributivity is the fact that the productions are distributed across the agents contributing to the interlocution. The logical methods utilized in interlocutory logic must exhibit these two properties, which is why natural deduction methods and dialogical methods respectively are so often used.

Analyzing an interlocutory fragment in interlocutory logic thus amounts to breaking the fragment down into a sequence of utterances. Each utterance is represented by an expression $< \{M_{i-k}\}, \{M_{i-k} \vdash M_i\}, DR, DG >$, M_i is the conversational move accomplished by the utterance in question (such as provide an answer to a question or grant a position taken). $\{M_{i-k}\}$ is the union of all moves that precede move M_i, and to which it is chained. The pair $\{M_{i-k} \vdash M_i\}$ expresses what we call "a dialogue sequent" in interlocutory logic (see Trognon, Batt, et al. 2006) of a given dialogue (DG). To spell out the reasoning which, between $\{M_{i-k}\}$to M_i, builds the *dialogue sequent* $\{M_{i-k}\} \vdash M_i$, interlocutory logic based on dialogic logic is used. The advantage of this method is that it reconstructs the logical form of interlocutory events as they occur phenomenally, since it follows the sequential chain of conversation moves in the interaction.

Any move M_i is an expression in the system <F(P>, insofar as one of the primitive components of interlocutory logic is general semantics (Searle & Vanderveken 1985; Vanderveken 1990). <F(P> can be represented in an extended form, <α1β1F (α2β2 P)>, where α (which is a connector) connects the force (α1) or the propositional content (α2) from one utterance to another and where β (which is a modality) shapes the force (β1) or the propositional content (β2) of an utterance.

We retain the essential modalities (Gardies 1979): ontic; deontic; epistemic; temporal (indicative, conditional, subjunctive, past, present, future); subjective (for example, the 'psychological' verbs *x desires p, x fears p, x perceives p, x remembers that p,* etc. which, combined with temporal modalities, portrays the real, virtual, and desire worlds. We also encode interactive (argumentative, counter-argumentative, consecutive, re-evaluative, etc.) and logical (and, or, but, do…not, thus, then, etc.) connectives as well as the structuring markers of conversation (well, uh, etc.).

F is the force of the speech act accomplished by uttering the utterance. $F = <f_1, f_2, f_3, f_4, f_5>$, where f_1, is the force expressed literally, f_2 the indirect force of the act (if any), f_3 the implicatures of the act (if any), f_4 some consequences deduced by the interlocutor, even if the enunciator has no conscious of it, f_5 the conversational function of the act. Note that f_1-f_5 are not necessarily given simultaneously in the discourse. They may result from an intercomprehension-sharing process that transforms the "speaker's meaning" into the "meaning of the interlocutors" (Clark 1996), in accordance to a process described in Trognon (2002), Trognon & Batt (2010),[2] etc. P is the propositional content of the speech act accomplished by move M_i. This propositional content is described by expressions in first-order, quantified modal predicate logic, amended as suggested by Hintikka & Kulas

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2. We do not refer here to our publications in French.

(1983) and Carlson (1983) in order to adapt it to the "natural logic of discourse." So, even before the Dialogue Games, Semantic Games play a seminal role in interlocutory logic because they spell out the primitive semantic operations implied by the natural logic underlying the use of natural language during interaction.

To complete the analysis of an utterance as a point of accumulation of a dialogical process, it is necessary to position the latter in the architecture (intervention/exchange/etc.) of the discursive set in which it is contained as a superior or subordinate component. This is achieved through the theory of hierarchical structures of conversation developed at the University of Geneva by the team of Eddy Roulet & al. in Geneva (1985). We must lastly recognize the source of the utterance. The source of the utterance is, *materially* speaking, the speaker who enunciates the utterance. However, as we know, natural language has various means of representing the interlocution within a phrase. These are the processes of reported speech: direct style, indirect style, free indirect style, etc., which generate the various forms of polyphony observed in normal and pathological dialogues.[3] These processes will constitute a prominent database in our interpretation of the consultation of Mrs. P., which we name an "interlocutory analysis table". Table 1 page 162 and Table 2 page 168 *infra* are examples.

An interlocutory analysis table need not be exhaustive (assuming it is possible, or even desirable) to be useful and exploitable. Indeed, the informations contained therein are relatively independent of each other. However, it is important to be very mindful that adding or subtracting information from the interlocutory analysis table changes the interpretations that we allow ourselves to make from the data. The corpus that we report will illustrate this point concretely since *an utterance initially interpreted as an assertion will become during the course of the analysis a hypothesis*. From a practical standpoint, we will attempt to confine all of our data to those directly relevant to the interactions that we describe herein.

All of the aforementioned properties will be mobilized to account for the *appropriation that the consulter makes* of the contextual and co-textual environment that led her to a genetic consultation of HD. We will see that the interlocutory analysis allows deploying different dimensions from an ambiguous initial illocution[4] that is *reminiscent of a 'Freudian' condensation of the utterances* mobilized by the consultation.

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3. See Batt, Trognon & al. 2014, where we describe the role played by the connective *puisque*, in a discussion between the team's neurologist and Mrs. P.

4. Our thanks to François Cooren for bringing this aspect to our attention.

4.   The process that leads Mrs. P. to request the test

We are at step A1 (in Figure 1) of a request for an HD predictive test. Concretely, this interview, which brings together the patient, Mrs. P. (or P), and the geneticist, G, represents Mrs. P.'s first contact with the multidisciplinary team. The letter from Mrs. P.'s general practitioner addressed to the consultation indicates that the patient belongs to a family decimated by HD. Mrs. P., in her sixties, is visibly in good health, has 5 children and many apparently healthy grandchildren. Here are the first exchanges of the interview (G/P):

```
G1:    So, your doctor tells me that he is refereeing you here for a genetic
       workup, well, because, in fact in, on your mom's side,
P1:    yes
G2:    well there's, there's a disease called Huntington's chorea, is that
       correct?
P2:    yes doctor
G3:    good. So, you have information, in fact?
P3:    so yes, listen, there's people who have died, I made, I made a letter
G4:    you made a letter. It's a family tree, correct?
P4:    here
G5:    ah OK, you have everything
P5:    I guarantee you, uh, it's a catastrophe!
G6:    it's a catastrophe?
P6:    there's more than me in the family
G7:    ok then, let's see (looks at the tree drawn by the patient)
```

Let us represent the family tree drawn by Mrs. P. and reproduced by M (Figure 3).

Male Person with HD: ■   Female Person with HD: ●

Asymptomatic Male Person: ■   Asymptomatic Female Person: ●

P = Mrs. P., s = Denise, j = Jules, e = Ernest, ge = Germaine, r = Robert, al = Alex,

do = Dominique, n = Noelle, pa = Patrick, he = Henry, a = Anne, b = Brigitte,

c = Corinne, d = Dorothée, g = Ghislain, h = Hervé, t = Thierry.

Figure 3. Part of Mrs. P.'s family tree[5]

4.1 The triggering event of Mrs. P.'s decision

While running through Mrs. P.'s family tree with her, the geneticist arrives at the descendants of the latter. He pursues:

```
G24:    that makes three children, Dominique, she's a girl, is that right?
P24:    see… a boy
G25:    a boy, sorry
P25:    and he, he's already starting to have some gestures, uh
G26:    so, he's a boy
P26:    I'm not saying that it's the disease, but we're always afraid it might
        be
G27:    he's how old Dominique?
P27:    42, uh, yes, he's already starting to have a little
G28:    Alex, how old is he?
P28:    46
G29:    OK.
```

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5. To camouflage Mrs. P.'s identity as much as possible, the family configuration was modified while being careful not to hinder the reader's understanding of the case.

We are clearly witnessing a "dialogue of the deaf" in this short excerpt. Twice, in P25 and P27, P tries to provide information regarding Dominique while G takes no account of this information in the development of his current activity, which appears to consist simply of completing the items of a questionnaire rather than listening to Mrs. P. However, P has pertinently pursued the contributions of G. However, in the sequence, everything happens as if the interlocutors did not pursue the same dialogue game, such that they only meet occasionally. The geneticist appears to go through the different stages of a medical interrogation, while Mrs. P. seems rather eager to talk about her son Dominique. During his *interrogation* regarding the consulter's offspring, the physician *does not hear* the information she is trying to convey to him about Dominique. G26 must thus be understood as the signal of a transition, the physician breaking the thread of the conversation. By performing what Trognon (1984) called a *saltatory connection*, the physician signifies that the goal he is pursuing is the completion of an interrogation and not of an interview. This does not prevent Mrs. P. from expanding into the subject she initiated in P25, by shifting from the description of her relationship with what she observes from Dominique. This new attempt is hardly more fruitful. G27 falls below P26. This question regarding Dominique's age could, perhaps, be relevant to Mrs. P. Since the disease affects mostly adults after midlife, the question of the geneticist could indeed constitute an entry on the interrogation of Mrs. P. such that Madame P's response, which associates the assertion of Dominique's age with the repeated assertion of his symptom, could have linked the dialogue games played independently by the physician and by Mrs. P. up to that point, thus allowing the shift of an interrogation to a more open interview. Weary, by pursuing with a question on the age of Mrs. P.'s *second son*, hence ceasing to refer his discourse at Dominique, the physician shows that it is indeed an interrogation on the "family tree" that he is pursuing and not an interview on what is problematic to Mrs. P. and what she was possibly trying to say.

What is ultimately lost in this sort of competition between two dialogue games is what we will call the denegation of Mrs. P.

In psychoanalytic theory, denegation (*Verneinung* in German) denotes "a process by which the subject, even while formulating one of his desires, thoughts, or feelings, heretofore repressed, continues to defend himself against it by denying that it belongs to him" (Laplanche & Pontalis 1967: 112). It is the "refusal of an affirmation that I have stated or that is imputed to me, for example: no, I did not say that, I did not think that" (ibid, 113). For Freud, revisited by Laplanche and Pontalis, "Negation is a way of taking cognizance of what is repressed […]. [But] what is suppressed is only one consequence of the process of repression – the fact, namely, of the ideational content of what is repressed not reaching consciousness. The outcome of this is a kind of intellectual acceptance of the repressed, while at

the same time what is essential to the repression persists. [Thus] with the help of (de)negation, the intellectual function is separated from the affective process" (Freud 1925: 5b).

In the theory of speech acts (Searle & Vanderveken 1985, Vanderveken 1990), an illocutionary denegation is an act in which it expresses that the speaker is not performing a particular illocutionary act. *I do not promise to come* is the illocutionary denegation of a promise. The illocutionary denegation formalized by the formula ¬F (p) must not be confused with the negation of the propositional content of a language act (F (¬p)). *I do not promise to come* does not have the same conditions for success and satisfaction that *I promise not to come*. Similarly *I do not say that the sun revolves around the earth* does not mean the same as *I say that the sun does not revolve around the earth.* All illocutionary acts are relatively incompatible with their illocutionary denegations. For example, a speaker cannot simultaneously assert and denegate a certain proposition.

Utterance P25 (where "and he" denotes that the continuation of the utterance constitutes a complement to G25), *and he, he's already starting to have some gestures, uh* describes Dominique as manifesting symptoms of the disease. Let us call 'Mrs. P.'s proposal,' the propositional content of P25. The meaning of this proposal *taken* **in isolation** *could* be that Dominique has Huntington's disease. Several linguistic mechanisms could contribute to the production of this meaning. First, *beginning* is analyzed as a positive implicative verb (Karttunen 1971, 1973). A positive implicative verb is a verb whose use in an affirmative form leads to the truth of the complement sentence and whose use in a negative form leads to the truth of the negation of the complement sentence. For example (Zuber 1989: 81), *to succeed* is a positive implicative verb because *Albert managed to close the door* implies *Albert closed the door* and that *Albert was not able to close the door* implies *Albert did not close the door.* Likewise, *Dominique is starting to have some gestures* implies *Dominique has gestures* (one cannot start to have gestures and not have gestures) and *Dominique is not starting to have gestures* implies *Dominique does not have gestures* (if one does not begin to have a certain behavior, one does not have this behavior). Secondly, in the linguistic-cultural community to which Mrs. P. belongs, along with the sociolect that this community employs and that Mrs. P. practices, *having* gestures is synonymous of *having* HD. Therefore, for this disease and in this family context, we have either (1) never any gesture and we are free from HD, or (2) at least one day one gesture[6] and we have HD. Thus the proposition contained in the assertion made by Mrs. P. could imply that *Dominique is afflicted with HD*. Moreover, the fact of uttering the previous proposition could illocutionarily commit Mrs. P. *in the assertion* that her son Dominique is afflicted with

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6. A choreic movement

HD. This analysis, which is formalized with Axy: x asserts y; G(x): x is starting to have gestures; HD(x): x has Huntington's disease; f=Dominique (son of Mrs. P.), d=already, u=some, leads to the following logical formula:

Ap {G(f,d,u)} ≡ Ap {HD(f, d, u)}

However, in P26, Mrs. P. performs an illocutionary denegation (*I'm not saying that* – = Ap {I do not say [HD (f)]}) of the illocution to which she has just been committed. Thus, everything happens as if *she did not take charge of the assertion* that her son is afflicted with Huntington's disease. The accomplishment of this denegation is formalized by the following natural deduction:

1	Ap {G(f, d, u}	P25
2	Ap {G(f, d, u)} ⊃ commitment of p {Dp [HD(f)]}	⊃I- law of illocutionary logic +sociolect
3	Commitment of p {Dp [HD(f)]}	⊃E-1, 2
4	Ap {¬ Dp [HD(f)]}	P26 (*Verneinung*)
5	∅	∅I-3, 4 (Self-defective)

With: Axy: x asserts y; Dxy: x says y; G(x): x is starting to have gestures; HD(x): x has Huntington's disease; f: Dominique (son of Mrs. P.); d: already; u: some.

This twist of Mrs. P.'s discourse, at the limit of an illocutionary self-defective act, can be explained by examining Mrs. P.'s interpersonal situation, that is, by analyzing the relationships that Mrs. P. maintains with her family group and more generally with her community.

Mrs. P. clarifies these relationships rather beforehand in the consultation, already in her interview with the geneticist and then, at the end of the first phase of the consultation, during the interview with the psychologist. We thus observe that **the "proposition of Mrs. P." (a proposition that we unduly attributed to P) in fact represents polyphonic discourse**, against which she has been fighting since her daughter-in-law informed her, following the shared viewing of a television program devoted to Alzheimer's disease, that her son Dominique 'was agitated'. *P25-P26 would hence be the contested argument of an assertion of the daughter-in-law of Mrs. P., which the latter takes as hypothesis (P25) in order to eliminate it (P26a) definitively (P26b).*

Table 1. Dialogic table: P24…P26b

Legend: Axy: x asserts y; G(x): x starting to have some gesture; HD(x): x has Huntington's disease; f: Dominique (son of Mrs. P.); d: already; u: some

	Requestor of the test: Mrs. P. (P)			Physician (G)
Sequential	Illocutionary commitment	Logical formalization		Sequential
				G24: that makes five children, Dominique, she's a girl, is that right?
P24: see, a boy				
				G25: a boy, sorry
P25: and he, he's already starting to have some gestures, uh	and he, he's already starting to have some gestures ⇓	Assertion of P {Starting to have some gestures (he, already, some)}: Ap {G(f,d,u)} With ∀(x) G(x) ≡ HD(x) ⇓		
	he's already starting to have the disease ⇓	Assertion of P {Starting to have the disease (he, already, some))} : Ap {HD(f,d,u)} ⇓		
	I'm saying he has the disease	Commitment of P to the assertion {Starting to have the disease (he)} Commitment Ap {HD(f)}		
				G26: so, he's a boy
P26a: I'm not saying that it's the disease	I'm not saying that it's the disease ⇓	Assertion of P {Non-assertion of P [starting to have gestures (he, already, some) = having the disease (he)]}		
	c′ = (he's already starting to have some gestures) ⇓	Ap {¬Ap [G(f,d,u) = HD(f)]} With ∀(x) G(x) ≡ HD(x)		
	c′ = (he's already starting to have the disease) ⇓	⇓ Ap {¬Ap [HD(f,d,u) = HD(f,d,u)]}		
P26b : but we're always afraid it might be	c′ = (he has the disease) ⇓ I'm not saying that (he has the disease) is the disease	⇓ Ap {¬Ap [HD(f) = HD(f)]}		

4.1.1   *The status of P25-P27 in the continuation of the interview with the geneticist*

```
M152:   (…) and so you came to see me because in fact, it is your doctor
        who referred you or because you saw, there was a program on
        TV?
P152:   no, I saw the program on TV
M153:   ah! that program, personally I find that, still, she did
P153:   ah yes
M154:   she did a lot of rigmarole as they say
P154:   yes, she did some rigmarole, we saw the program and then we
        said "well that's what we have, oh really that! It's really the
        disease we have!"
M155:   in your family,
P155:   oh yes, that's it!
M156:   you recognized completely
P156:   then, my daughter-in-law called me, she lives in the village, she
        came to see me
M157:   yes
P157:   because "I think that your son is agitated." Now everyone sees
        themselves as agitated, you understand?
M158:   mmh
P158:   so that's why I came to see you, because, even for me, I told you,
        uh, no, I was ready uh
M159:   mmh
P159:   one year ago I was a cancer, so I was not too well, but now I'm
        well, I'm ready, I'm healed, I can do this for them, there, it will
        be a gift to them
```

By stating that her daughter-in-law lives in the village, in P156 (the use of the contracted article "in" suggests that it is the village of P), P provides a fundamental revelation on the sense that she gives to the information delivered. She insinuates that her daughter-in-law is not able to declare that her son is agitated, even if she saw the description of HD during a television program. Indeed, in families affected by HD, obsessed with the fear of having inherited the disease or of having transmitted it, there is a tendency to interpret the slightest false-movement (dropping an object for example) as a symptom. The television program only reinforced this state of permanent vigilance, creating a kind of psychosis of HD for which Mrs. P.'s daughter-in-law is herself victim: *now everyone sees themselves as agitated.* Unlike the subject in whom the disease comes as a surprise, the subject at risk and his or her closest entourage are observers, who, alerted, must make a rational effort not to impute innocuous behaviors to the disease; in these families, spying or feeling spied upon is a way of life, as P in P157 explains, and again little further: "*in the village, everyone sees themselves as agitated, they check, they watch, the gestures.*" Conversely, it is important not to take a fortuitous event for a symptom.

We can surmise the deductive reasoning triggered by P which led her to question her genetic status, since by saying that P's son is agitated, P's daughter-in-law illocutionarily commits, in this context of enunciation, to asserting that P transmitted to her son the mutation responsible for HD, and therefore that P is carrier of the mutation. While well hidden in Mrs. P's case, the family gene would appear in her son, "*she passed it on to him*," according to the expression often heard in consultation. This deduction is indisputable in the epistemic world of P and of her family.

4.1.2 *The status of P25-P27 in the interview with the psychologist*
To the psychologist (step A3 of Figure 2), P explained a little later that in order to respond to her daughter-in-law, she put in place a dual approach. This is what the following sequence recreates: (psy = psychologist)

```
Psy2:    yes, but, what prompted you to have that test, to make an
         appointment by phone?
P2:      well, it's my daughter-in-law, uh, who lives in the village. She told
         me that my son was beginning to get a little agitated, so the others
         said "It's not normal." Well, they can't ask us because we, we're
         used to it, it's our illness, so we've always lived with this. My mom
         died of it. So, I asked some of my friends if they saw some jerky
         movements, because we're used to it, we've always lived with it /…/
         and if my son is agitated, it comes from me; it's
         my duty to do it, it's my disease, I have to do it.
         (…)
P18:     (…) anyways, it's not easy huh! like I tell you, since, as soon as we
         make a gesture, we have the disease! and my son, if it happens he
         does not have it, then there! It's my daughter-in-law who said that,
         you understand?
Psy19:   yes
P19:     "yes, he gets upset, and he is agitated!" yes sure, but everybody is
         agitated! uh, if it happens it's something else, so me I'm cunning, I
         made a meal because, we're in it, so, we had a meal for my birthday,
         I asked my friends, no family eh! I invited my boys, all of them, I
         asked them to watch if he was agitated, my children were there, but
         there were also other people and then I told them "there you go"
         there was everyone uh, well then, no one saw anything!
```

In the course of this interview, we understand, right from P2 (P's second speaking round), that the step of P's approach was aimed to examine the credibility of her daughter-in-law's assertion, more technically, to examine the preparatory conditions of the assertion that she carried out. The second step, expressed in P19, sought to ensure herself of the truth of her daughter-in-law's statement,

and more technically it was an opportunity for her to prove the truth value of the propositional content of the assertion.

Thus, on the basis of her own inability to detect choreic movements (P2: *well, they can't ask us because we, we're used to it, it's our illness,*), P demonstrated that we cannot conclude that her son is sick simply because her daughter-in-law says so. Considering that she and her family, pervaded by the disease, are not able to distinguish normal from pathological movements, she explains to the psychologist, in P19, that in reaction "*so me I'm cunning*," she carried out a hypothesis test by asking friends outside the family and outside the village, to disprove, confirm, or not confirm that her son is agitated.

5.   The decision-making of Mrs. P.

5.1 The decision tree of Mrs. P.

P's reflection could be described as the development of a tree (Figure 4) on which nurtures her persistence to prove that her son is not ill. This tenacity almost invariably leads to a final decisional node whose branches are "do the test" or "not do the test." Indeed, the credibility test is hardly reliable: given the norms which govern public interactions (Goffman 1974), there is very little chance that, in the context set in place by P, the assertion of the daughter-in-law would be ratified or contradicted. The best that can be obtained is non-confirmation; however, not confirming does not imply invalidating an utterance (Searle & Vanderveken 1985).

Figure 4. Decision tree of Mrs. P.

Consequently, one can recognize that the alternative to the test presents itself to P in an obvious manner, at least if she feels responsible, which is indeed the case, as shown by the type of practical syllogism that she expresses in the normative mode in P2 "*if my son is agitated, it comes from me; it's my duty to do it, it's my disease, I have to do it.*" We can observe that this deduction is based on a good knowledge of the rudimentary genetic laws relating to the mode of transmission of HD.

Yet, as G explained to her during the first interview (sequence below), P should know that, even though Science can infallibly reveal her genetic status, Science cannot however answer her essential question in all instances: P's genetic test will not be able in all instances to provide a diagnosis on the "gestures" that her daughter-in-law stated having spotted in P's son. Indeed, M explained to her that (i) if the result is favorable, P brings definite proof that the risk that she may have passed on the family mutation to her son is nil; (ii) if the result is unfavorable, then the risk that her son has inherited the family mutation is 50%, hence doubt subsists, nothing changes.

Since family perception is biased, on the one hand by the *habitus* of affected families, and on the other by the sort of psychosis of the gestures induced by the television program, the first step to contradict the implication (gestures >> HD) which 'spawns' the notion that Dominique is afflicted is to put in place a situation in which neutral individuals do not notice the gestures. This is the purpose of the meal organized by Mrs. P.

This experiment being conclusive, it is still necessary to contradict *the idea that it is objectively possible* to notice the gestures of P as symptoms of the disease. The consultation, experiment of material truth, is meant to settle the alternative "it is possible/impossible that D is afflicted," thus definitively putting an end to the fear mentioned by Mrs. P.: P26: (…) "*but we're always afraid it might be.*"

Hence:

```
P97:    and doctor, please
G98:    yes
P98:    if I do not have it, they don't have it?
G99:    absolutely!
P99:    OK, good
G100:   when one doesn't have something, one cannot transmit it
P100:   OK, that's good!
G101:   OK?
P101:   OK
G102:   but before, before all that in fact, do you also know that if we
        should find something wrong with you, it would mean that we
        couldn't reassure them, that there would be a risk for them
P102:   Yes, I know, I know that doctor, it will be difficult if I have it
G103:   sorry?
P103:   I know it won't be, it will be hard if I have it, for the children
```

It is not possible for D to exhibit symptoms if Mrs. P.'s test is negative. On the other hand, nothing changes, in fact, if the test is revealed positive. However, a radical cancellation test of the possibility that D carries the HD gene will have at least been

attempted. And it will have been by the person who considers herself responsible for the health of her son: his mother.

We can now understand the considerable unease experienced by the team as a whole throughout her consultation. The analysis of Mrs. P.'s request (see Batt 2003, Batt, Trognon & Vernant 2004) revealed that the basis for her decision-making was to prove that her son Dominique was not affected. It is in this manner Mrs. P. revealed herself to be a formidable tactician in her desire to demonstrate that, herself not being a carrier, she could not have transmitted the gene. For the professionals, the impression which dominated the exchanges was one of an *active will of blindness*. Yet, this persistence of Mrs. P. only transpired in a somewhat blurred manner, never, obviously, was it explicitly stated, since, clearly, Mrs. P. does not believe herself to be afflicted. She indeed explains to the geneticist that:

```
(…)
P162:   well, I'm ready, I can do this to them, there, it will be a gift for
        them
G163:   and
P163:   it will be a gift
G164a:  it will be a gift
G164b:  yes but if
P164:   well we'll see, everything in its own time
G165:   yes but
P165:   besides, I'm a believer
```

In P162, Mrs. P. implicitly expresses the content of her thinking. She appears to say that the test, and in particular its result, will be necessarily favorable since it represents a gift that she wishes to offer to her children and grandchildren: test = gift = *non-carrier*. The physician appears to hear this quite subjective appropriation of the possibility of obtaining a favorable result. This cognitive process, widespread in predictive counseling, is subversive to all rationality and thus renders the invaluable anticipation work on the impact of genetic revelation difficult.

By reiterating the consulter's message, in G124a, the physician invites the consulter to reassess her judgment and thus, indirectly, to appropriate an objective assessment of the probability of being a carrier of the genetic mutation. In G124b, he relies on Mrs. P.'s utterance "yes" before marking his opposition "but." The consulter, on the other hand, indirectly declines the invitation of her interlocutor (P164), rejecting in the future the thinking that she could be a carrier. Thus the two interlocutors appear to understand each other on the motive for their opposition. We do not observe a readjustment of the thinking of the consulter by the physician, nor the thinking of the physician by the consulter. A divergence in point of view separates the two interlocutors. This analysis is shown in Table 2 of Interlocutory Logic.

Table 2. Interlocutory analysis of an interactional judgment of probabilities between Mrs. P. and the geneticist
(I: intervention; E: exchange; in italics: the implicated speech acts)

Transaction	Séquentiality	Conversationnal			
		Illocutionary	**Cognitif**		
The judgment management of the probabilities			Shared Thinking	P'Thinking	G Thinking
	P163: it will be a gift	– Assertion	*Gift* = No Carrier	Révélation = Gift I'm not carrier Case carrier: **anticipation declined Probability depended on belief**	*Probability gift* = 50%
	G164a: yes G164 : but if	– Validation – Opposition – *Request for anticipation*			
	P164: well we'll see, everything in its own time	– Evaluation			
	G165a: yes G165b: but	– Validation – Opposition			
	P165 : besides, I'm a believer	– No validation of the opposition			

5.2 The refusal to hear

One can thus hypothesize a significant discrepancy between the "scholarly" or "scientific" discourse proposed throughout the consultation and the "realistic" or "subjective" discourse of the consulter. This shift is subsequently observed when the predictive diagnosis (unfavorable) is announced as shown in the following excerpt.

Extract from the notification of genetic status interview

```
G17:    that show uh, that you have inherited the family mutation, (3
        seconds), OK, so uh, 2 seconds do you know what this means in
        fact? That you have the mutation, in fact, that the test is positive
P17:    ah OK
G18:    Ok then
P18:    so I have nothing
G19:    pardon? That the test is positive
P19:    so that means that
G20:    we conducted a test to search for the mutation
P20:    yes, yes
```

```
G21:   to see if you had inherited the mutation
P21:   the mutation, yes yes
G22:   OK, yes?
P22:   yes
G23:   so we saw that you had inherited the mutation
P23:   oh okay. 2 seconds.
G24:   therefore
P24:   therefore, I have, I have the disease, that's it uh?
G25:   you have inherited the gene that is responsible for the disease
       4 seconds
```

After very explicitly announcing to Mrs. P. that she inherited the family muta-
tion, and following a silence as in any manifestation of the consulter, the physi-
cian reiterates the diagnosis and clarifies his speech using the term "*positive*" to
describe the result of the test. This in turn results, in P18, to "*so, I have nothing*,"
the well-known phenomenon of confusion of languages (Batt 2003). According to
the meaning attributed to the word "positive," the physician's utterance refers to
two different realities that bear two opposite meanings. This extract shows that at
the time of the disclosure of the diagnosis, Mrs. P. deduced one of the two possible
universes containing the object "positive test" and leading to two distinct conclu-
sions: positivity of the future *versus* positivity of the test (having discovered the
mutation). Yet the context could not *objectively* leave room for this disjunction of
meaning. Indeed, it is to rephrase what he had just stated explicitly that the physi-
cian uses the term "positive." There is thus a kind of *refusal* to hear the diagnosis on
the part of Mrs. P., a phenomenon of deafness to an undesirable reality.

6.   Conclusion

What does this interlocution, examined by means of Interlocutory Logic, tell us
about the ethical issues raised by the complexity of revealing to a healthy person a
disease that he or she will inexorably develop?

6.1 What type of dialogue?

6.1.1   *A dialogal-dialogic interaction oriented towards intercomprehension*
The design of the Genetic Council is imperatively interactional. The relationship is
the basis on which the request for predictive testing is constructed. It is therefore
built within an interaction of which we have already highlighted the polyphonic
nature, namely dialogic, since it occurs *in presentia* (see Roulet & al. 1985, Grossen
& Salazar-Orvig 2011, Salazar & Grossen 2010), as well as dialogal (*ibid*), since
it involves many absentees, that professionals encourage the consulter to reflect

on the meaning of his/her approach. The fact that the consultation consists of a series of dialogues is an additional reason for taking into account the dialogical aspect of the interactions. The institutional setting in itself imposes a sequence of dialogues in which the contributions of the professionals, who co-construct the elaboration of the request with the consuler, is articulated in a joint coordination. In the course of the consultation, the relationships are hence woven with the enunciations of all the gathered professionals. Thus the universe of discourse is comprised of utterances that are arranged in a remote dialogism, even if the discourse of the consuler does not necessarily call upon these exchanges held elsewhere at the dialogical level. The following example (Table 3) illustrates this phenomenon. It involves three interactions from the same consuler (Mrs. P) with three different professionals in subsequent interviews as part of the iterative pre-symptomatic consultation for Huntington's disease. We can observe that knowledge acquired during the first interview is systematically repeated in the ensuing two interviews:

Table 3. The dialogism of predictive counseling

1st interview Mrs. P.-Geneticist	2nd interview Mrs. P.-Neurologist	3rd interview Mrs. P.-Psychologist
P97: and doctor, please G98: yes P98: if I do not have it, they don't have it? G99: absolutely! P99: OK, good G100: when one doesn't have something, one cannot transmit it P100: OK, that's good!	P39: uh, if anyway, huh, if, well, we always have a doubt doctor, we know it anyway but, if it happens I don't have it, **if I don't have it my kids won't have it.** N43: mmh	P43: and if I don't have it, my children don't have it Psy40: yes, that's correct P44: neither the children, nor anybody will have it at home

Hence, as we have already demonstrated (Batt & Trognon 2007, 2009, 2010b), speech, *in absentia*, formed by the entanglement of one another's utterances, is a fundamental dimension of the dynamics of dialogue.

This conception of the dialogue which merges in the reflections that the consulter puts into play has important consequences for the understanding of the interactional games that occur: dialogue to elaborate, dialogue to deliberate.

Globally, the consultation mechanism is based on the primacy of the interlocutory relationship (Trognon 1990) of two instances in reference to a world to be said, thus defining a dialogue which precisely fulfills the requirements of its definition according to F. Jacques (1979, 1986, 1988). More precisely, our studies establish that the type of relationships involved in this consultation is of the Habermasian type, for at least two reasons (see *l'Agir Communicationnel*, volume

1, pages 295 and thereafter): a structural reason and a praxeological reason. First and foremost, by the very fact of their missions, all discursive actions of the professionals are coordinated by acts of intercomprehension. The interlocutory processes that appear locally at the level of the exchange (see Trognon 2002), and more generally at the level of the transaction bear witness to such acts (Batt 2003; Batt & Trognon 2012; Trognon & Batt 2010); secondly, because these actions are strategically oriented towards the search of influences on the decision of the consulter, i.e. decision to undergo the test, decision to communicate its results and the multiplication of the interlocutors to whom they are addressed (children, spouse, the family, etc.), subsequent decisions in the aftermath. However, the above pragmatics of intercomprehension (Trognon 2002), is previously contingent on a rationally-motivated agreement, a Habermasian agreement on the definition of risk. To grasp the interplay at work in predictive counseling, it is essential to prioritize the search for a *dialogical intercomprehension of risk*. Indeed, even if the interlocutors can freely express their point of view, under no circumstances can scientific fact be negotiated.

6.1.2   *A practical deliberation*
The reason the definition of risk is so important is because it is necessary for the interlocutors to be able to refer to the latter for the discourse to make sense regarding access to the test, its consequences, not only for the requestor but also for his/her family. Indeed, as pointed out by F. Quinche (2005), a discourse that refers to nothing (no entity, even imaginary), cannot make sense. This, according to the philosopher, is the condition of reference which is part of the three principles that a "good dialogue" must integrate. The other two being the conditions of difference and significance, which assume that the interlocutors know the semantic value of the words that are used in the interlocutory context of their enunciation. Hence the concern of the professionals to perceive and to translate the words of everyone so as to represent the degree of comprehension and to adapt, step by step, a scientific discourse in order to be readily understood.

The fact that the dialogue is based on the asymptomatic consulter's intention to know her genetic status, which all ignore, implies an original communication relationship. The consulter is neither a symptom, nor the disease. It is a probability of carrying a gene that, under certain conditions, can lead to disease. In this respect, the relationship created between the interlocutors is different from that between a doctor and a patient (Batt, Luporsi et al. 2006, Sarangi 2010). Whereas in the latter case, a bilateral contribution of information contributes to the construction of new knowledge, in predictive consultation on the other hand, only the enquiry conducted by the professionals through the testimonials of the consulter can lead to affirm the existence of a possibility, but in no instance to a new

knowledge. It is only if the probability is considered sufficient by the scientists, that the test can take place.

In this context, in which the assurance of the validity of the test rests on the quality of the investigation in/through dialogue, maximum cooperation is imperative. Dialogue must thus address both the referential and the relational dimensions, through deliberation based on an ethics of discussion. For if the aim of the "dialogue" of consultation is, as we have shown, to deliberate on the basis of assumptions whose meaning has been commonly established beforehand, then the developed discursive strategies cannot result from either a purely theoretical and disinterested dialogue, or from a negotiative discourse based on compromise. Nevertheless, the ethics of the relationship requires avoiding tensions and sorting out conflicts. Professionals, in the performance of their mission, must spare the consulters while bringing them to admit possible changes in position or reasoning. Indeed, the psychological conditions of the disclosure of the test result are dependent on this relationship.

The dialogue thus resembles an ethical deliberation leading to choices in future action. For all actors involved in the consultation, this consists in engaging in dialogue, asking "*how to properly act in this situation*." In this sense, similarly to Quinche (*op. cit.*), we have slightly modified the model of discursive strategies of F. Jacques (1988) to insert a branch for bivocal dialogue, with a common objective and an external teleological-argumentative function of practical importance (Figure 5). This new category corresponds to ethical deliberation; this is where we place predictive consultation, the true ethical deliberation on actions carried out in a practical setting.

	Bivocal given recipient								
	Unilateral objective			**Common Objective** *Interview*					
	External argumentative function *Altercation*			Internal phatic function *Conversation*		External teleological argumentative function **Exchanges of** *views*			
	Without common argumentative code	With common argumentative code		**Practical scope**			Theoretical or meta-theoretical scope *Dialogue*		
Internal autistic function	agonistic D°	eristic D°	polemic D°	utilitarian D°		**ethics** D°	semantic D°	thetic D°	
				Community affiliation			Determination		
				simple	dual			predicative	referential
	Disagreement	Dispute	Contradictory discussion	Interview directed	Negotiation	**Deliberation**	Debate	Controversy	Confrontation

Figure 5. Dialogue typology from Jacques (1988) and Quinche (2005). With D° for dimension

6.1.3   *A verbal argumentative interaction*

The systematic dialogical approach that we have implemented enabled us to observe pragmatic variations within the overall interactional play of the consultation. A dialectical mixture was noted, of which the essential component is argumentation, an observation also reported by Sarangi (*op. cit.*). This is not very surprising if the consultation is considered as a form of deliberation (Moscovici and Doise 1992). A. Gottman (1979) had already identified this form of verbal interaction in a number of deliberations. However, its role in the relationships between the interlocutors of the consultation was still poorly defined until very recently. While we had begun to understand, from the onset of our work, how the interlocutors use this approach in this setting, it was only recently that we succeeded in clarifying the status of the argumentation of the consultation. In this next paragraph, we will describe, in general terms, the contribution of argumentation in its surface discursive form, and in the subsequent paragraph, in its logical forms in more specific terms, using an illustration.

As an act of discourse of superior level (Vanderveken 1997), argumentation is a complex intervention (Trognon, Batt, Saint-Dizier, Sorsana 2011) which amalgamates several utterances and leads to a conclusion carried by a proposition from one or other of the enunciators (a thought, a belief, a knowledge). The relationship between auxiliary exchanges is defined according to the conversational demands of the moment (see Dascal 1989), although limited by the dialogue game in which they are produced. Thus, the speakers of the consultation argue in favor of a point of view, because at some point the focus of the conversation requires as much, however they can only perform discursive acts in accordance with the ethical rules dictated by the framework of the practical deliberation, as seen previously.

It is the arrangement of these movements that gives the argumentative dialogue of the consultation its typical appearance. It is also the absence, imposed by the context, of the evaluation of the proof that governs its structure, *a priori* formal (Trognon, Batt, Saint-Dizier & Sorsana 2011). As a result, some proof-derived argumentative forms are proscribed (see Walton & Krabbe 1995) in favor of models that integrate "elements" of each interlocutor, in the elaboration of a demonstration based on his or her own assumption. Values, knowledge, beliefs, desires, fears, hesitations, communicated by those present have argumentative value, which each interlocutor decodes by assessing its relevance. Thus, the argument becomes the product of cooperation between professionals and consulters, driven by a collective intentionality (see Searle 1991).

6.2 What is the outcome in the case of Mrs. P.?

In the consultation studied herein, the attitude that Mrs. P. entertains with the idea that her son might be ill has seriously hampered the smooth conduct of the deliberations. The test will reveal that Mrs. P. carries the genetic mutation, her liminal belief will have "shattered in pieces" and she will furthermore not have an answer to the question at the origin of her request (has my son inherited the disease?) Yet an interlocutory work was nonetheless achieved. Arranged in a polylogue, itself contained in a generalized "Bakthin-type" dialogue with the group, the family, the daughter-in-law, this work puts into play scientific utterances and socially overdetermined and subjectively overinvested cognitions. The stopper of the affect operated and prevented the anticipation ordeal of a painful but possible reality. The consequences were difficult, depressive phase and breakdown of relationships within the family in particular. Communicative practices arising from modernity operate at the confines of the psychic apparatus.

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Dialogue and ethics in the library

Transformative encounters

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This essay frames the library as a site for dialogic and ethical engagement. As libraries have adapted to cultural and technological shifts, our understanding of the meaning and purpose of libraries also has changed. The role of the library sparks public deliberation, controversy, and at times even legal action. This essay considers the library's recent commitment to electronic holdings and its implications for the transformative nature of libraries as a site for dialogic ethics. The essay turns to Ronald C. Arnett's (1981) understanding of phenomenological dialogue, Gary P. Radford's (1992) framing of the library as a discursive formation, and Umberto Eco's (2013) library as labyrinth metaphor. Through these works, this essay highlights transformative possibilities for dialogic ethics in the library.

Keywords: library, Umberto Eco, dialogic ethics, discursive formations

1. Introduction

This essay examines the library as a site for dialogue and ethical encounter. The presupposition is that the library offers a place for discovery, transformation, and renewal. The library is central to community life and educational encounters in the Western World with a long history dating to the Ancient Library of Alexandria (Crawford 2015; Weigand 2015). Technological advances present opportunities to reconsider the purpose of the library space and determine value judgments about its resources and holdings. In an era attempting to replace electronic resources with material acquisitions, the function, purpose, and environment of the library changes. Amidst such change, this essay considers ways to protect and promote the ongoing relevance of the library as a site for dialogic and ethical inquiry.

This essay explores the role of the library in four sections. The first section discusses the changing scene of the library throughout history, seeking common characteristics within three library settings: (1) the Library of Alexandria; (2) San

Antonio's bookless library; and (3) the New York Public Library's Fifth Avenue research branch. The second section turns to philosophy of communication to understand the dialogic "why" behind library practices and its role in the public domain. Particularly, Radford and his various collaborators follow Michel Foucault to present a philosophical perspective of the library as a discursive formation. Radford points to Italian semiotician and novelist Eco for his performative depictions of the library. Eco becomes the focus of the third section of this paper. Drawing upon Eco's library as labyrinth metaphor, this essay concludes with the cultural significance of the library, securing its dialogic and ethical possibilities.

Since antiquity, the library, in its varied forms from a reading room to a community landmark or media center, acts as a place for cultural rejuvenation and creativity (Crawford 2015, xvi). Libraries are among the earliest sites for (re)inventing and (re)ordering knowledge (McNeely and Wolverton 2008), and libraries act as "learning communities" essential to the neighborhoods they serve (Eicher-Catt and Mina Edmondson 2016). Historically, as a site for knowledge and discovery, the library falls victim to physical attacks on its material holdings and other forms of censorship such as burning and/or banning books (Polastron 2004). However, the library and its collection offer opportunities for dialogic engagement across space and time. Library holdings contain past messages for present and future dialogic engagement and ethical insight as one accepts responsibility to read, learn, and respond to the questions that shape historical moments. Mina Edmondson and Deborah Eicher-Catt (2016) announce the transformative quality of libraries as spaces for sharing stories of ideas and visions for communities. These cultural and creative possibilities emerge in the library as a site for phenomenological dialogue (Arnett 1981).

Ronald C. Arnett (1981) articulates phenomenological dialogue working from the insights of Martin Buber. This description places dialogue within the revelatory – unable and resistant to imposition or demanded emergence. Dialogue happens between people, between texts, and can span across space and time. Phenomenological dialogue depicts the persistent power of dialogic remnants, or what Eco (2013) terms "bookish echoes," preserved in the scrolls, codices, books, serials, microfilm, and electronic holdings of the library. The task of this essay is to understand how to maintain and preserve bookish echoes and dialogic possibilities within the changing scene of the library.

2. The library's evolving landscape

The library emerged as a byproduct of the proliferation of the written word, advancing library studies as a means for civic and political life (Casson 2001). Beginning

in the ancient world, institutions called libraries emerged with the Library of Alexandria as, perhaps, the most well known. The Library of Alexandria acted as a model of institutional collection, accumulating products of its people and language rooted in its Greek history (Olesen-Bagneux 2014, 4). As we turn to depictions of ancient libraries, the differences between the library's origins and present manifestation are astounding and indicate the resilience of the library as an adaptable and responsive place for dialogic engagement with ethical consequences. This section portrays the ancient library in contrast to contemporary institutions and attends to public deliberation about its evolving form. Lionel Casson (2001), in *Libraries in the Ancient World*, locates libraries throughout antiquity from Egypt and Classical Greece to the Roman Republic and Empire. Our limited knowledge of ancient libraries in the Western World relies upon archaeological discoveries (Casson 2001, ix) that resist conforming to modern conceptions of the library (Olesen-Bagneux 2014) – we must approach the ancient library free from the constraints of modern assumptions.

Casson's history begins in the ancient Near East shortly after the invention of Sumerian cuneiform, prompting early bookkeeping records (2) housed within the palace archives alongside the king's private collection (11). Beyond the king, access was limited to scribes and personal secretaries (12). Casson understands these Near Eastern libraries as responsive to historical needs, reactive to the written word, and fundamental to the conceptual basis of continuing library procedures into the Classical Greek era with its increased literacy levels, expanded library access, and intensified impulse that written knowledge required preservation of its material form (17, 19). Knowledge became precarious with the move away from the memory practices of oral cultures to its written counterparts. By the second half of the fourth century BC, the cultural prerequisites for libraries were well secured in Greece. Aristotle had become the first known book collector with a large personal library that introduced a system of organization influential to Greeks and Egyptians (28–29).

The Library of Alexandria, founded around 300 B.C. in Alexandria, Egypt, offered a comprehensive repository of Greek writings (Casson 2001, 31–35). Estimated to have held somewhere between 40,000 and 700,000 scrolls, the library was part of the Mouseion, a religious institution that held scholars as their captives (Olesen-Bagneux 2014, 3). Modern scholars dispute the daily workings of the library with organization and arrangement as central questions. For instance, Zenodotus of Ephesus (330–260 BC), speculated to be the first director of the library, utilized Greek alphabetical order, but there is debate over whether its implementation matches modern conceptions. Furthermore, Callimachus of Cyrene (305–240 BC) introduced the *Pinakes*, record-keeping lists containing information about all authors and their works; this device sparks debate about cataloging

and bibliographic systems organized into classes and subclasses (Olesen-Bagneux 2014, 5). Additionally, Aristophanes from Byzantium (260–185 BC) contributed the stichometric note that referenced text location by line numbers that emphasized the "living library," or scholar who combined memory of text and physical location (Olesen-Bagneux 2014, 6–7). The librarians included sorters, checkers, clerks, pages, copyists, and repairers (Casson 2001, 37–38). The library operations reflected the interplay between the scholarly and physical memory (Olesen-Bagneux 2014, 12) as the Library of Alexandria became a center for intellectual enterprises during the Hellenistic era and a landmark for future libraries.

Cicero's writings indicate that in the Roman world we find the shift from libraries as public institutions for widespread literacy and scholarship to private collections of wealthy individuals who commissioned scribes to reproduce writings for private use (Casson 2001, 70–78). Julius Caesar promised to create two great Roman libraries – one committed to Greek writings and another committed to Roman writings – a promised disrupted by his assassination but later fulfilled by Asinius Pollio (Casson 2001, 79). During this era, the library faced considerable change. While Greek libraries privileged storage capacity, Roman libraries provided a place for public reading (Casson 2001, 88). Library holdings also moved from the scroll to the codex, a form reflective of the modern-day book (Casson 2001, 124–129). Christian texts, in particular, followed the codex form, which continued to influence the construction of the library into the medieval world (Casson 2001, 130–136).

Keeping in mind this portrayal of the world's earliest libraries, the essay now jumps ahead more than two thousand years to the United States' first all-digital bookless library, San Antonio's BiblioTech. In the juxtaposition between ancient libraries and the self-proclaimed "library of the future" (0:15), the essay offers comparative insight about the library's evolving landscape. Opening in 2013, the BiblioTech redefines the conventions of the library by rearranging its physical and material space. The BiblioTech embraces the modern-day library's commitment to electronic holdings and fulfills the potential of the complete digital turn in the library. The BiblioTech offers a glimpse of the bookless library in its native form.

The library website offers a four-minute introductory video that explains how the BiblioTech "capitalizes on technology" (0:15–0:19), transforming the way that users connect to the library space and its holdings. The video argues that its digital form improves the library's ability to serve patrons of all ages, patrons with disabilities or mobility limitations, and those who would otherwise remain disconnected (0:20–0:30). They frame the BiblioTech as liberating information from physical confines and as redefining the "dimensions" of the library and librarian – the library is no longer a "storehouse" and the librarian no longer a "custodian" (0:50–1:07). The BiblioTech transforms the library from the "keeper of information" to the

"giver of information to all" (0:50–0:59) and positions the librarian as "a facilitator" who guides the patron among "a vast sea of information" helping to "discern[] what is valuable to *you*" (1:11–1:19). The video announces the library's decreased size from 15,000 square feet to 4,000 square feet while maintaining meeting space for community gatherings. Despite the reduced size, the library claims to accomplish "ten times as much" due to its "worldwide" reach and 24/7 access (1:23–1:33). Extended reach and access better facilitate the library's use in schools, hospitals, detention centers, and even for military personnel stationed abroad (2:00–2:12). The video celebrates the all-digital library's embrace of "efficiency" in an economy of limited and competitive resources (2:14–2:22). The video boasts its ability to "accelerate graduation rates and test scores" and ultimately to shape those "more likely to become good citizens as adults" (2:44–3:03). Visually the introductory video portrays diversity among library patrons and electronic devices from computers and tablets to smart phones. These patrons not only scroll through ebooks but also design presentations, play video games, read the news, watch videos, and learn to read with computerized games.

The BiblioTech, dedicated "to bridge literacy and technology gaps," is free to all residents of Texas's Bexar County. The library's stated mission is to "provide all Bexar County residents technology access to enhance education and literacy, promote reading as recreation, and equip all members of our community with necessary tools to thrive as citizens of the digital age" ("About BiblioTech"). The BiblioTech's three physical branches (BiblioTech South, BiblioTech West, and BiblioTech Central Jury Room) offer classes, instruction on technology use, technological devices from e-readers to computers, which are available for borrowing, study and meetings rooms, printing, facility tours, free WiFi connection, and administrative tasks for paying overdue fees (for e-readers) and registering library cards. The digital collections contain 35,000 audio and e-reader titles available for fourteen days use with a maximum of five rentals at a time. Compatible devices to the cloudLibrary app include iOS, Android, Kindle Fire, Nook HD, and PCs. Additionally, the BiblioTech offers BiblioBoard (over 10,000 public domain holdings including historical documents, self-published works, Spanish language content, movie clips, pamphlets, etc.), a self-publishing platform, Hoopla (access to movies, television, and music), news outlet databases, Zinio (magazine collection database), foreign language courses, and online courses for creative and business skills ("About Our Digital Collections").

BiblioTech's all-digital holdings, however, do not represent the traditional local public library. This essay offers the New York Public Library (NYPL) as an embodiment of the assumptions and expectations that Americans hold for contemporary libraries. The NYPL is the largest public library system in the United States, containing 92 branch sites – with 88 neighborhood libraries and four scholarly

research centers. The NYPL president, Tony Marx, commits the library system to serving all New Yorkers through its physical and online collections ("About NYPL"). The NYPL serves 17 million patrons with its 51 million holdings with an explicit commitment to erasing the digital divide by serving the one-third of New Yorkers who do not have Internet access at home. Branch libraries offer homework assistance for public school students, English as Second Language classes, literacy classes, and employment resources. In sum, the NYPL offers 67,000 free programs each year to New York City residents of all ages ("About NYPL"). Specifically, this essay considers the Fifth Avenue research space, which is often considered "the main branch" of the NYPL ("About the Stephen A. Schwarzman Building").

Housed within a landmark building over 100 years old, now named the Stephen A. Schwarzman Building, the Fifth Avenue research library is a non-circulating branch of the NYPL that acts as a university-level academic research facility. Within its collection, one finds "priceless medieval manuscripts, ancient Japanese scrolls, contemporary novels and poetry, as well as baseball cards, dime novels, and comic books" – all available free of charge to all people ("About the Stephen A. Schwarzman Building"). As the first NYPL branch, this library opened in 1911, after the combination of New York's already existing Astor and Lenox libraries alongside a $2.4 million trust from previous governor, Samuel J. Tilden. Andrew Carnegie, steel tycoon and philanthropist who directed much of his fortune toward funding libraries with the agreement that the community would maintain responsibility for sustaining the site, provided $5.2 million to expand the branch system of the NYPL ("About the Stephen A. Schwarzman Building"). This branch is a historic site for the NYPL and for American libraries committed to open access.

A proposal to renovate this research space into a lending library that would displace over one million books to an offsite warehouse in New Jersey sparked international controversy. While Marx, speaking as the library's chief executive officer, insisted that the plan would "replace books with people," Jason Farago (2012, 2014), an American art critic and journalist for *The Guardian*, offered a different perspective. In 2012, early in the discussions of the proposed renovation, Farago reported that the renovation would reduce a world-class research center on par with the Library of Congress and ivy league academic institutions, such as Harvard and Yale, to a glorified café filled with computer terminals and lounges, which would make "a beautiful place to update your Facebook status" (paras. 5–8). Farago opposed the proposal's effort to displace sixty percent of the library's holdings as a disruption to the ease and ability for research (paras. 6–10). Proponents of the renovation promised next-day access to offsite materials and argued that since much of the collection is "'never' or 'rarely' called up…no one will miss them when they're gone" (para. 10). Farago and others were not convinced.

The proposal prompted public outcry – opponents argued that state-of-the-art technology would soon be outdated. They claimed that the library relies upon its material collections, not upon electronic or technological holdings (para. 11). The move toward displacing physical holdings for digitalized resources, according to Farago, is "premature" (para. 14). He explains that digitization is in its "teething stage" with analog materials long outliving their digital counterparts. He notes, "The Gutenberg Bible is holding up a lot better than your VHS collection" (para. 11).

The central obstacle with digitization remains copyright law (para. 12). By 2014, planners revoked the proposal after indicating concerns for endangering the purpose of the research institution and potential damage to the landmark's architectural integrity (para. 2, 4). Opposition parties, including Junot Diaz, Lydia Davis, Art Spiegelman, and even then-city mayor Bill de Blasio, who campaigned against the renovation before his election, were successful (para. 3).

When comparing the earliest libraries discussed at the beginning of this section with the BiblioTech and NYPL, one notes numerous similarities and distinctions. Throughout history, libraries situated in various historical moments offered different responses to questions about format and content, size and storage, reach and accessibility, classification and arrangement, etc. However, the library has remained a place for cultural creativity, community and civic engagement, and most importantly possibilities for dialogic encounters that prompt new insights and knowledge. This essay considers a defining feature of the library its spirit for discovery, knowledge, and dialogic engagement across time and space. To texture this dialogic engagement, the essay turns to the philosophy of communication to understand the why behind the how of library and information science (LIS).

3. Philosophy of communication perspective

Within the field of communication, philosophy of communication addresses "the why" as a "carrier of meaning" for speech and practice (Arnett and Holba 2012). This section relies upon Radford's (2005) connection between philosophy of communication and LIS to announce insights for dialogic ethics. Radford's *On the Philosophy of Communication* counters the assumption that communication begins in the mind. He turns to philosophers such as Eco, Husserl, Dilthey, and Gadamer for alternative insights rooted in history, culture, society, and bias that form interpretation and meaning. This material becomes central to his ongoing work connected to LIS.

In connection to LIS, Radford and John M. Budd (1997) call for confusion in the library to interrupt the clarity of daily action and practices, what forms the

"invisible epistemological structures and paradigms" (320). They argue, "library practitioners and scholars operate within the field as a ready-made and given entity where confusion is minimized by an underlying ideology" (320). For Radford and Budd, the philosophical considerations of Michel Foucault and Eco disrupt ideological assumptions about the library space and experience with constructive confusion and resistance. Radford and his colleagues announce avenues for preserving the cultural need and defining characteristics of the library as a space for (re)ordering knowledge claims and understanding.

Radford (1992) positions the modern understanding of libraries within positivist perspectives of knowledge and turns to Foucault for an alternative twofold interpretation of the library as a source for new knowledge and a "passive storehouse" for existing knowledge (408). Radford considers conventional assumptions of information as commodity and librarian as guardian of knowledge within a positivist orientation (410). Foucault, contrarily, replaces knowledge with the notion of *knowledge claims* that gain "force and meaning by virtue of particular discursive and social contexts" (416–417). For Radford, arrangement creates an opening for rearrangement, which embraces new texts and knowledge claims (419). Unlike the positivist position that assumes the knowledge lies in the text, Radford argues that knowledge claims become meaningful in what lies beyond the text (418).

Radford aligns his position with Eco's description of the library as "labyrinth" where "'every point can be connected with every other point, and, where the connections are not yet designed, they are, however, conceivable and designable…'" (as cited by Radford 1992, 419). Each text finds meaning as it connects, intersects, and positions itself with and against others within "a multitude of networks" (419). This "unstructured" depiction announces the limits of existing library arrangement, with the "intervals" between and among texts offering "infinite" possibilities for new insights (419). Radford aligns Eco's work with Foucault's fantasia:

> The practices of the library institutionalize particular arrangements of texts, but Foucault argues that one can work within this to create new labyrinths, new perspectives, and ultimately, new worlds. The library becomes an instrument of possibility rather than a place where possibility seems exhausted. The image of the library as an impersonal collection of silent and dusty texts containing the sum total of the knowledge of the world is challenged by a more dynamic image, in which users immerse themselves within the crevices and spaces between texts, forming connections and making discoveries far more profound than simply collecting specific facts. (420)

For Radford, the library is a significant source for the proliferation of new knowledge claims under Eco's and Foucault's restructuring of positivist assumptions

in the library. Radford repeatedly returns to these thinkers to understand the importance and possibilities of the library.

Radford and Marie L. Radford collaborate on a series of essays exploring the intersections of librarian stereotypes and Foucault's philosophy (Radford and Radford 1997, 2001, 2003). Radford and Radford (1997) work from a "Foucauldian/ feminist" approach to examine the image of the female librarian as a representation of "a wider cultural text," reflecting assumptions of the library space itself (254). They identify the stereotypical assumption that an ideal library pursues order as its desired end (256). While they clarify that this depiction often does not mirror the day-to-day workings of the modern library, late fees and circulation restrictions reinforce such beliefs (257). They announce Foucault's argument that the library is an institution of knowledge, truth, and "the management of 'fear'" (257–258), a theme they continue in a 2001 essay.

Radford and Radford (2001) argue that popular culture representations of libraries and librarians reflect these deeply rooted structures of Foucault's discourse of fear. The essay alludes to Eco's *The Name of the Rose*, which paints the library as "a place of fear, and a place to be feared" (300). While acknowledging Foucault's resistance to a single definition of discourse, Radford and Radford describe discourse as "what speech is used for, what it does, what it enables, and what it excludes" (302). They emphasize a discourse of power that instills "awe and fear" not because of the library holdings, but due to its institutionalized Discourse (303). The library becomes "a visible monument" instilled with a discourse of fear, concentrated on order and control (305–307). The discourse of fear urges perceptions of the library as a "cathedral," the library user as a threat, the librarian as a police officer, and meaning as dependent upon inclusion (307–308). These perceptions shape societal opinions on the authority of the library and its control over cultural knowledge.

Radford (1998) problematizes the positivist model of knowledge inherent within the discourse of fear as contrary to the potential to reconsider the modern library experience through a postmodern epistemology (616). Radford approaches LIS from the perspective of literary criticism, using Foucault's notion of the fantasia in juxtaposition to the ideal library's commitment to order. Within Radford's postmodern epistemology, the librarian acts as a guide who not only assists the user through catalogs and indexes but also inspires new capabilities for the user to understand the discursive formation of the library.

In response to Wayne A. Wiegand's call for historical examination of American librarianship, Radford (2003b) articulates Foucault's description of discursive formations as requiring an archaeology rather than historical examination (17). Radford summarizes Foucault's discursive formation as "refer[ring] to the ways in which a collection of texts are organized with respect to each other" (2). The

discursive formation involves material objects and thus has material effects; the arrangement and categorization of books on a library shelf is relevant and meaningful in discursively forming the knowledge one finds in the library.

According to Radford, Foucault's "archaeology of knowledge" frames discursive formations as "traps to speaking and thinking" and announces "ways in which scholars might escape from these traps" (4). With Foucault's archaeology, discursive formations become valid for historic inquiry and offer opportunities for the profession to reconsider itself (4). Radford's argument extends beyond Weigand's focus on historical examination by relying on Foucault's understanding of statements. Statements consist of historical documents rather than records of objective history. Foucault emphasizes that statements at one time "materially *appeared*" and that something was "*done*" with them – they were used to form discursive understandings of knowledge and thus become relevant to Foucault's archeology (13). For Radford, Foucault's archaeology offers renewed insights in achieving the goals and aims articulated by Wiegand.

Radford and Radford (2005) continue to explore the library as a discursive formation within the distinction of structuralism and post-structuralism. Ferdinand de Saussure (1857–1913), recognized as the founder of structural linguistics, understands language as "a system in which all the elements fit together" (as cited by Radford and Radford 2005). Radford and Radford frame Saussure's project as a "closed system of elements and rules that could be described quite independently from the psychological subjectivity of any particular user of that language" (61). Post-structuralism, contrarily, questions and counters structuralism within the recognition that language is "always highly contextual" (61). Radford and Radford discuss these philosophical positions in action in the library.

Structuralism relies upon combinations and patterns. Radford and Radford offer interpreting a text as an example. Understanding a text does not occur in recognizing each term separately but rather but in their combinatory nature; the text is understood as "a coherent whole" (66). Our ability to understand information from the text involves constructing relationships between and among the words. Within structuralism, one makes sense of the library in its combinatory patterns. In the shift from structuralism to poststructuralism, Radford and Radford emphasize the ability for symbols to combine "in a potentially infinite number of ways…according to the internal logics of particular language systems" (68). Post-structuralism counters the assumed clarity of "enduring truths" and releases the library to infinite (re)arrangements (69). For guiding insight, Radford and Radford again turn to Foucault's discursive formations as a contrast to Saussure's structuralism.

Radford and Radford emphasize the material nature of discursive formations as opposed to the idealized nature of structuralism. This material nature places

libraries within Foucault's archaeology of knowledge containing statements in the form of books, journals, and other library holdings (70–71). As a statement, the conditions of the text displace a focus on accuracy or objectivity; rather than "contain[ing] knowledge," statements create knowledge claims (71–72). The library as a discursive formation materially arranges its holdings (statements) to achieve particular knowledge claims, but reordering these statements manifests novel meaning (72). The library discursively offers possibilities for new knowledge with an infinite number of "paths that link one statement with others in substantial ways" (72). Like Eco's description of the labyrinth, the library as a discursive formation positions the library user to actively engage the library system. The library experience replaces the tasks of "simply locating discrete pieces of information" with deciphering a labyrinth of infinite connections (73).

Radford, Radford, and Lingel (2012) announce deaccession libraries, or what they term "alternative libraries," as exemplifying these possibilities. They begin by recognizing the librarian's "privilege and responsibility" in the "profound decision" of determining "worth" within holdings (254). They summarize numerous reasons for library deaccession including condition, outdated information, and new editions. Deaccessioned items without any observed "intrinsic value" leave the library "without an official category" taking on the identity of what Radford, Radford, and Lingel term "textual outsiders" or "textual others" (255). Alternative libraries become a home to such texts.

Alternative libraries hold three functions: (1) reutilizing and reframing holdings in unconventional ways; (2) resisting the institutionalized Discourse of library authority; and (3) offering expansive services that extend library function (255). Alternative libraries fight against the conventional and traditional assumptions of worth and value governed by cultural and historical discourses; alternative libraries become "a mechanism of rebellion, resistance, and play" by recognizing the "potential pluralities of social spaces" (255). Alternative libraries acknowledge the material and discursive form of discarded items that offer possibilities to re-arrange, re-interpret, and re-discover knowledge. By accepting discarded and deaccessioned items in its holdings, the alternative library operates as "a new discursive formation" where holdings find meaning and value in their "discarded status" (258). Alternative libraries renew opportunities to rethink and discover new connections between texts; they exemplify the "transformative" capability of the library (265). The alternative library and deaccessioned holdings emphasize that, like Foucault indicates, knowledge is not found in the collection itself but rather in how we connect texts to construct discursive formations. The authors continue to stress the transformative insight of discursive formations in an essay published three years later on libraries as heterotopia.

In 2015, Radford, Radford, and Lingel framed the library as heterotopia, a term Foucault introduced in a 1967 lecture delivered to a group of architects (735). A heterotopia addresses sites in existence rather than in the non-place of utopias. The distinctions between physical spaces constructed by similar materials, containing similar contents, and measured by similar dimensions are "bound" to particular spaces that provide clarity of situatedness and determination of one's role (735). The "defining feature" of the heterotopia, for Foucault, is its ability to manifest an experience outside the confines of one space or another and instead locate us within "multiple places at once" without transference from one location to another (736). Examples of heterotopias include the cemetery (embracing life and death), the church (transcending humanity and deity), the museum (bridging past and present),[1] and the motel (combining home and travel) (737–738). For Radford, Radford, and Lingel, the library is a heterotopia, joining the known and unknown.

As an example, they cite Eco's personal library of 50,000 books; within his collection, Eco celebrated the many unread volumes that announce "the joy and delight of the library experience" (742). The "unexpected discovery" is central to the library as heterotopia where one might be fortunate enough to discover something unexpected (742–743). The "accidental encounter" is pertinent to the library experience for both Foucault and Eco where the library space and its holdings act "as a portal to a surprising elsewhere-than expected" (743). With the unexpected, the unanticipated, and surprising encounter, the library becomes a site for play.

Play is a central aspect for the heterotopias of Foucault. Just as childhood make-believe transforms one space to another, the library becomes a place for playful transformation (745). This transformative quality resists permanence in the library (746). The library as a heterotopia contains "continual change, excitement, surprise, and discovery" – a space in which "one never knows what experience is going to come next, and revels in the excitement of moving from one extreme experience to another" (746). This transformative aspect of the library attends to the possibilities of new knowledge that is inherent in the library as a labyrinth of possibilities. Radford's work connecting LIS to philosophy of communication insights announces the "why" of library experiences and points toward possibilities for new and transformative encounters in the library space. While relying primarily on Foucault, Radford repeatedly announced the relevance of Eco's metaphor

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1. Richard L. Lanigan (1996) expresses the simultaneous importance of the museum and the library within Foucault's rhetoric. Lanigan writes, "Foucault (1972) intends that we understand the metaphor of the Library as a 'documentary field' (51) of spatial location exemplified by inscription/writing in contrast to the Museum with its monumental field of temporal transposition illustrated by description/speaking" (197–198). History, for Foucault, requires both the metaphors of library and museum as does his rhetoric.

of the library as labyrinth. Radford (2003a) offers extensive and significant insight into the interpretive possibilities of Eco's work. This essay continues Radford's lead by turning to Eco to better understand the dialogic encounters within the library's labyrinth and considers Eco's insights on technological implementation.

4.   Umberto Eco: Library as dialogic sites for cultural engagement

Eco's project bridges semiotic theory and cultural studies. The library, for Eco, becomes a representation and reflection of culture and, likewise, a host for new cultural insights. The library appears most notably as the setting for *The Name of the Rose*, but elsewhere in his scholarly corpus, Eco addresses the library as an important and relevant institution. This section offers an interpretive summary of Eco's 1981 "De Bibliotheca" and a lecture delivered at Yale University. Both of these texts draw upon the library as labyrinth metaphor utilized throughout Radford's work and extend the cultural work of the library, yielding implications for dialogic ethics.

Michael F. Winter (1994) offers interpretive engagement with Eco's "De Bibliotheca," originally delivered as a lecture for the 25th anniversary of the Milan Public Library. The lecture appeared as an Italian essay focusing on the cultural value of the library. Winter describes Eco's account of the library as "scholarly and yet somewhat whimsical, mixing fantasy, satire, and reflective analysis" as he moves us in the direction of understanding the "library as a locus of creative work" (117). Eco frames libraries in three ways: "as places where scholarly work is done, as centers of applied technological innovation, and as key sites in the creation and transmission of knowledge" (118). While one could read *The Name of the Rose* as library criticism portraying librarians as gatekeepers operating *sub rosā* ("under the rose," or in secret), "De Bibliotheca" presents an alternative view.

"De Bibliotheca" opens with a quote from Jorge Luis Borges to set a "quasi-religious" and ceremonial tone, which Eco recognizes as the primary "functional" aspect of the library (118). For Eco, the library is, first and foremost, a sacred cultural space that secondarily serves seven functions: "collecting," "hoarding," "transcribing," "encourage[ing] … reading," "providing public access to materials," "concealing or not providing access to materials," and "providing the opportunity for discovery or retrieval of materials" (119–120). These seven tasks represent the historical functions of the library from antiquity to today. In the ancient world, libraries accumulated materials and connected unrelated texts ordering an "uncontrolled" or disordered atmosphere (120). In Eco's work, Winter finds the library positioned as a massive text of infinite subtexts, embracing a vast range of possible new discoveries (120). Eco comments on the consistency of this theme

despite technological shifts from scrolls to books and eventually electronic media, changes that reflected "historical and socioeconomic phenomenon" as well as questions of practicality (121).

In library evolution, "industrial democracies" emphasized education and access (122). Yet, Eco recognizes the double function of the library, where materials are both made available and hidden (122). Winter describes this dual function of accessibility and concealment as "a natural complement" emerging from the library as a "labyrinth" where information hides in a mazelike structure (122). Within the labyrinth, "cataloging and classification systems" offer navigation "rules" (123). Library holdings become both an object for retrieval and "a piece of a puzzle" of the library as a whole (123). Cataloging and classification systems keep the institution from becoming "a bad library" or "an immense nightmare" of confused lunacy (124). Instead of offering a description of the good library, Eco comments on two of his "favorites": the academic libraries found at Yale and the University of Toronto (124).

Eco appreciates the valuable access to library stacks found in these spaces and their ability to prompt the library's creative function. Eco explains, "the principal function of the library…is to discover items whose existence we hadn't even suspected and yet which turn out to be of extraordinary importance to us' (4, p. 244)" (as cited by Winter 1994, 125). Eco notes that free access for the user to browse the collection freely is "the most striking thing about the large North American research library" (126). Eco explains that such access differentiates his discovery-centered description from the library used "as a setting for verification of what is already known" (126). Additionally, Eco argues that the position of free access is based upon the assumption of "replaceab[ility]" governed by "American mass culture" (126).

Eco also addresses the implications of photocopying technology. For Eco, the photocopier offers a twofold task of fragmentation and "unanticipated unity" (127). The photocopier prompts "reallocation or redistribution of power in the traditional relationships that have existed for centuries between writers and readers" (127). The photocopier offers the reader the ability to redefine the context of content as liberated from authorial intent (127). The photocopier, while offering opportunities for the library user to redefine encounters with texts, also presents threats of automated machines removing the labor of research, reading, and writing. Eco places the responsibility for resistance partly upon librarians to educate users and fight against "the enchanting spell of technology" (128). This initial response to libraries from Eco recognized the cultural power of these institutions and the risks that emerge with the newly introduced electronic technologies.

Eco continues his response to the cultural importance of the library in a lecture delivered on October 18, 2013, in commemoration of the 50th anniversary

of Yale University's Beinecke Library, which he recognized as among his favorites in "De Bibliotheca." The title of the 2013 lecture, "The Library as a Model for Culture: Preserving, Filtering, Deleting, and Recovering," indicates the functions of the library as a representation of culture itself. The lecture begins with a personal anecdote from Eco – this library, in a secluded section set far off from elevator access, inspired Eco with the setting for *The Name of the Rose*. He notes that the experience came with recognition that this place might be a good location to hide a corpse – a place where it would take time for anyone to uncover (1:10). This experience prompted Eco's library as labyrinth metaphor, with attentiveness to the medieval understanding of the labyrinth as a model for the world (1:30–1:33). He then makes use of a "transitive property" to argue that the library, then too, is a model for the world (1:40–1:42).

Eco understands culture as "a system of ideas, data, values, habits, and traditions that all the members of a given group are sharing" (2:05–2:17), with the library atmosphere surrounded by "bookish echoes of your previous cultural experience" (2:30). Eco then offers a performative list, approximately a minute and a half long, that exemplifies the *bookish echoes* of cultural experiences, ending with "that is all you know on earth and all we need to know" (2:36–4:01). The list includes several languages and rearranges cultural experiences in order to uncover new knowledge. With this list, Eco points toward the possibilities available when rearranging the bookish echoes or dialogic remnants within the library.

The library as a model for culture, however, offers ability to "store" memories and a way to "filter" them (8:29) in the interplay of a standard encyclopedia, a specialized encyclopedia, and a maximal encyclopedia. The standard encyclopedia contains shared understandings that allow both an elementary student and a paleontologist to recognize a dinosaur. However, the paleontologist will have access to expert information from a specialized encyclopedia, which will only remain a subset of the possibilities of information available in a maximal encyclopedia.

A "cultivated person," for Eco, may not have access to specialized knowledge but does have knowledge about how to access this information. For instance, culture continues not by knowing when Napoleon died, or the duration of the Seven Years' War, but instead by knowing how to access the information quickly (12:10–12:25). The library becomes a model for such a task as the "parody" of the maximal encyclopedia with knowledge that extends the capacity of any one person (13:21). The library operates within a continuum of memory and forgetfulness or, in Eco's words, "the vertigo of the labyrinth" (13:37–13:44). The library can assist cultural forgetting understood both as an art and, described in Cicero's *De Oratore*, as a valuable task to learn (16:52–17:30). Eco associates forgetting with sending information to "oblivion" and with the "dread of excess" inherent in print (24:00–24:02). For Eco, print gathers summaries of "indispensable" information

with "marginal" information left to be forgotten (24:45–24:50). The cultural system of handing information from one generation to the next leaves the information in the margins unactivated (29:00–29:03). The task of culture becomes the "limiting of information" (29:23–29:27). Cultural identity forms from memory and successful forgetting (31:58–32:04).

Culture is the result of gathering and "percolation" of accumulated data (29:30–29:37). The percolation process involves discarding the information we determine to be of lesser use. Discarded information can take centuries to uncover, such as how the Greeks forgot Egyptian mathematics, the medieval world forgot Greek science, and today we forget the meaning of the statues on Easter Island (29:50–30:19). He describes the information from these "undesirable accidents" as "buried" (29:55–30:30). Possibilities for forgetting occur within both standard and specialized encyclopedias (34:40–34:44). The standard encyclopedia maintains information considered essential at the expense of repressed data; for example, the standard encyclopedia provides information about Caesar's death but does not tell us how his widow handled the news of the assassination – such information was determined culturally and collectively un-useful (35:10–35:40). In fact, forgetting the information becomes culturally useful by not placing an excess of memory beyond what a culture can bear (36:20–36:27). At other times, specialized encyclopedias conceal this data through what Eco terms "filtering" (36:55–37:07). Culture selectively filters what information becomes active within its memory (39:05–39:08); culture is the ongoing rewriting and reselecting of information (39:40–39:46). We cannot assume that culture selects the best data to remember without asking, by what criteria (40:50–40:57).

He then considers how we can recover the information lost in "unfortunate accidents" (40:59–41:21). He explains that culture places some of this information frozen in places for specialists to uncover and decipher – to "microwave" for modern interpretation (41:30–42:15). The frozen state places forgotten knowledge within libraries, which serve as "indispensible containers of wisdom that can be revisited" decades, centuries, or millennia later (42:20–42:35). Recovery requires cultural rewriting (43:10–43:14). With such discoveries we are able to move information from an inaccessible maximal encyclopedia to a "hyperspecialized" one, and, perhaps in time, to a standard encyclopedia (44:00–44:05). The power of the library shapes culture today and "embrac[es]…the wisdom of tomorrow" (45:55–45:59). This lecture, in conjunction with Eco's earlier writings, announces four dialogic tasks within the library: recovering, deleting, filtering, and preserving. The next section sketches these dialogic tasks as informative to the phenomenological dialogic ethics of the library.

5.   Implications for dialogic ethics

The library houses the bookish echoes, or dialogic remnants, discussed in this essay. Eco announces the longstanding position of the library as a dialogic space engaged in four tasks for shaping and forming culture and knowledge: recovering, deleting, filtering, and preserving. Consistently throughout the Western World since ancient times, the library has been a site that activates these dialogic tasks. Cultural processes of determining and preserving essential information filtered into either standard or specialized encyclopedias of knowledge construct the background of dialogic possibilities. The cultural practice of forgetting discounts particular data and limits the burden of collective cultural memory. As cultures filter and negotiate determinations of value, worth, and usefulness, they establish criteria that privilege some information at the expense of marginalizing and displacing other data. In the filtering process, cultural identity and knowledge permeates, penetrates, and constructs cultural conventions of authority and structure. Cultural recovery, however, maintains opportunities for restructuring and rewriting cultural knowledge. The library becomes a host that can conceal and preserve such information for later uncovering. The dialogic aspect of the library occurs in each task described by Eco.

Together, these four dialogic tasks frame the active engagement of the library user who navigates the library's mazelike structure as a labyrinth and discursive formation. Walking among the stacks of holdings, users begin to hear phenomenologically and engage bookish echoes, encountering ideas and insights often unknown, unexpected, and, perhaps, even forgotten by culture. With openness to these dialogic opportunities, the library is the site for dialogic encounter across time and space, joining those who may not share historical setting, cultural background, philosophical perspective, or language to engage in a revelatory and emergent dialogue.

Eco (2012) understands ethics as contextualized by encountering the other. This encounter, however, may not occur in direct interaction. He articulates how people and civilizations leave behind "messages in bottles" left for later generations (Eco [2004] 2006, 361). The library becomes the home to these messages and the site for ethical encounter through the embrace of dialogic remnants. This embrace becomes the unifying and defining characteristic of the library throughout its long and evolving history. In the face of a newly changing landscape, governed by the onset of electronic holdings that disrupt and perhaps at times displace traditional library holdings, Eco reminds us of the four dialogic tasks that the library must continue in order to nourish culture.

In response to technological advances, long before the capabilities of the Internet's ability to collect seemingly unlimited amounts of data, Eco expressed

both enthusiasm and concern at the consequences of electronic technology in the library. Technology's ability to assist in cultural preservation, deletion, filtration, and recovery further the dialogic possibilities of the library space – it embraces and offers new insights as library users embark on a journey through digital and electronic holdings. However, Eco warns that electronic technology bargains "an enchanting spell" for unreflective automation at the expense of the labor that yields new insight. When we neglect the responsibility to preserve, delete, filter, and recover the dialogic remnants of the library, placing this task to technological devices alone, the opportunities for dialogic ethics in the library and for culture diminish. Eco reminds us that electronic technology in the library presents the Faustian bargain where we simultaneously gain all and lose all. At the brink of displacing the dialogic remnants from the library to offsite storage facilities, the labyrinth narrows and the user's ability to navigate its mazelike structure flattens, minimizing dialogic encounters that offer opportunities to engage others and rewrite our cultural knowledge. However, when incorporated with careful reflection and critical thought, digital holdings and technological devices can foster possibilities for the library to maintain ethical relevance in cultural creativity, transformation, and dialogic encounter.

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Agents of awakening

Ventriloquism, nature, and the cultural practice of dialogue

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This chapter explores dialogic practices that integrate culture and nature, human and non-human agents, pointing to a form of participation in the world that engages various communicative practices such as listening, gazing, and drawing as much as speaking. Based on Cooren's (2012) ventriloquial framework that is attentive to the ways in which interactants invite, mobilize, and stage various figures / entities in conversation, this study explores the dialogic interplay of multiple forms of agency including human and non-human actors that facilitate our understanding of human experience in the world. Specifically, I examine "nature's agents" such as rivers and trees as they are ventriloquized in Zen dialogues, Hesse's novel *Siddhartha*, and in a poetic autoethnography by Speedy (2016), *Staring at the Park*.

Keywords: ventriloquism, agency, dialogue, non-human agents, awakening

1. Introduction

This study joins Cooren's (2010) discussion and critique of "bifurcation of nature" (Whitehead 1920), which is a separation/division of the physical parts of the world from the experience of human beings that limits our view of the world and the ways in which we reconfigure it through dialogue. Cooren (2010) highlights that humans are *not* the only beings in the construction site (of meaning and of the world), but that "we constantly ventriloquize (and are ventriloquized by) beings that participate and contribute to this construction/production" (171). This chapter participates in this conversation by illustrating how what is commonly referred as insentient or inanimate, and therefore separate from the human world, act as agents of awakening for humans, and participate in our efforts to (re-)configure our world and ourselves through ventriloquial practices.

First, I offer a discussion of dialogue that integrates natural environments and non-human agents (such as the wind, the stream, an eagle, the mountains etc.) to the cultural practice of dialogue based on Carbaugh's (1999, 2013) work. Next, I introduce Cooren's (2004, 2010, 2012, 2015) discussion of ventriloquism in relation to the question of agency that problematizes and expands the human-centered notion of agency to a broader, plural, and shared form of agency that considers other entities along with humans that "make a difference in a given situation" (Cooren 2012, 477). Finally, I examine Zen dialogues between masters and students, excerpts from Hesse's novel *Siddhartha* (Lee et al. 2014), and Speedy's (2016) *Staring at the Park*, to show the ways in which rivers and trees are attended to and ventriloquized as agents of awakening as part of the human experience of the world.

2.   The cultural practice of dialogue

In *On Dialogue Studies*, Donal Carbaugh (2013) highlights dialogue as "culturally distinctive forms of communication" (11) that involve messages about communication, personhood, and sociality (14). He reminds us that as practitioners of dialogue we act in specific social cultural spaces with specific cultural traditions, and that "the dialogic game we presume may not be the one being played by others" (Carbaugh 2013, 11). The following Zen dialogue between a Zen master and his student from the Zen koan case titled *The Sound of Rain* (Loori and Maezumi 1998, 69) is illustrative (I present the case in dialogue format below with line numbers for analytical purposes):

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    (1)
K: Kyosei (Zen master)
M: Monk (student)

1  K:  What is that sound outside the gate?
2  M:  The sound of raindrops.
3  K:  Sentient beings are inverted, they lose themselves and
       follow after things.
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What is going on in this dialogue? Based on the Zen master's (K) response on line 3, it is clear that the "dialogic game" that the Zen master (K) presumes and displays is not the one the monk (M) is engaged in. It becomes obvious on line 3 that K is not engaging in small talk about the weather with M when he starts his inquiry about the sound outside the gate on line 1. K does not respond to M by saying something like "Oh, again!?" or "Oh, well it has been a rainy season," for instance. K's response on line 3 does not align with M's prior utterance but interrupts it by offering a remark on the (inverted) condition of sentient beings. Thus, what could have been potentially small talk is transformed into a different "action

game" (Weigand 2016, 353) through K's response. We are yet to see what M makes of the "action game" K enacts in M's next turn, however, for our purposes I will continue to build on the introductory discussion above on dialogue as a culturally distinctive form of communication (Carbaugh 2013).

In *On Dialogue Studies,* Carbaugh (2013) extends our conventional understanding of dialogue that focuses on humans only, and highlights a perspective that integrates natural environments and non-human agents (such as the wind, the stream, an eagle, the mountains etc.) to the cultural practice of dialogue. "Through this sort of dialogue, not only human, but the world speaks, making itself expressively available to us, if we 'just listen' (Carbaugh 1999)" (Carbaugh 2013, 22).

Carbaugh's (1999) study of the Blackfeet people in northern Montana in the U.S. illustrates a form of dialogic participation in the world that is focused more on listening and less on speaking, and attentiveness to non-human agents along with other humans and the larger world for insight and guidance. Not attending to this dialogic form carries the risk of losing a communicative potential that "cultivates our deep abilities to be vigilantly observant of the world around us, to what it is saying to us, a wise sort of attentiveness which may help address problems and difficulties in ways we cannot without it. It reminds us that we share a world and need its air, water, soil, and so on to survive together" (Carbaugh 2013, 23–24).

Acknowledging and exploring our dialogic participation with the larger world beyond just humans is essential to learning about our place in the world as human beings among other living and non-living things, as well as our relation to them. Engaging this possibility in the first place could be a first step. And, a question to ponder along these lines: Could it be that the Zen master's interruption of his student in the excerpt on the prior page pointing to this attentiveness (or its lack) upon his student's automatic labeling of the sound as "raindrops" (and conveniently distancing himself from any further exploration?)

3.   Ventriloquism and the question of agency

In *Action and Agency in Dialogue: Passion, Incarnation and Ventriloquism*, Cooren (2010) problematizes the human-centered notion of agency in the studies on language and communication that have traditionally attributed agency – the capacity to act or to do something – only to human interactants. Cooren (2010) reconceptualizes agency through a "plurified view of the dialogic or interactional scene, a view that takes into account all the various agents or figures that potentially compose the scene" (5). Arguing that human beings are "not the only beings who do things with or without words" (Cooren 2015, 475), Cooren distinguishes between the forms of agency that humans and other beings or things display.

An example Cooren (2004) offers to illustrate the discussion above is a hospital director invoking a protocol to back up his claim that he is entitled to review applicants for a position. Invoking the protocol is a way to increase his authority, showing that he is not the only one saying what he is saying, but the protocol says the same thing. Cooren explains that the hospital director positions the protocol as a *co-author* of his speech that authorizes and supports him in saying and doing things. In this sense, the protocol can make a difference as a "textual agent" (Cooren 2004).

Studying communication from a ventriloquial perspective consists of an understanding of communication as disjointed, dislocal, and plural where "humans share agency with other entities, whether these entities are man-made or natural" (Cooren 2012, 159). Through the notion of ventriloquism, Cooren discusses how studying agency from a ventriloquial perspective enables a broader understanding of agency through an examination of

> what appears to make a difference in a given situation and how this difference is made. The advantage of adopting a ventriloqual vantage point is that we can observe how people implicitly or explicitly keep invoking, evoking, and convoking various forms of agency in their conversations.   (Cooren 2015, 477)

Ventriloquism as making other beings say or do things through what we say or do (Cooren 2010; 2012; 2015) enables them to animate and express themselves through us, and implies that "all the beings that we (re)produce in our conversations and discourses also participate in what defines or identifies us" (Cooren 2012, 6). Cooren alerts us to the mutual, reciprocal constitutive process that takes place between us and the things that we make speak and act through ourselves. As much as we ventriloquize any thing, it also ventriloquizes us. Languages, ideologies, policies, principles, cultural realities all materialize themselves in and through our interaction, as forms of agency. This is at the center of Cooren's (2012) communicational/constitutive ontology.

4.   Nature's agents of awakening in Zen and beyond

Zen dialogic encounters do not engage in a conventional sense of language use due to their acknowledgment of language as an obstacle for enlightenment. Thus, Zen masters use language in very deliberate ways, if they use it at all, as a means to point to, challenge, or break the discursive obstacles. Heine (1994) states, "Zen dialogic encounters often mark or even demand the end of dialoguing in the customary sense of an ongoing conversation" (200). It is through this disruption of the taken-for-granted ways of speaking and relating that Zen teachers point to a way of seeing and being beyond the conditioned and the habitual ways of making sense.

Multiple forms of agency including human and non-human actors have long been part of Zen stories and koans that explore the experience of being human and of spiritual realization (awakening). A few common Zen stories include a monk sweeping the path where a pebble flies up and hits the bamboo, and upon hearing this sound the monk awakens; another monk, after years of Zen practice, awakens upon seeing the peach blossoms in one spring day; a lay Zen practitioner when cooking curry in the kitchen awakens upon hearing the crackling of the food that catches fire (Loori 2011). As part of their function as a "vehicle for spiritual realization" in Zen training, koan stories or cases are rich resources reflecting and exploring philosophical themes such as the relation of language, reality, and selfhood.

The rest of this chapter is organized under two sections: (1) Streams and rivers, and (2) Trees. Each section starts with a Zen dialogue in which Zen masters point to nature's beings as agents of awakening for humans, followed by excerpts from a novel that expand the Zen dialogues further. In the first section, I analyze excerpts from Hesse's *Siddhartha* (Lee 2004) and show how the river is ventriloquized as a nature's agent in co-constituting the emerging spiritual identity of Siddhartha. In the second section, I analyze excerpts from an autoethnographic novel, *Staring at the Park* (Speedy 2016), and illustrate that ventriloquizing the tree allowed for the reciprocal construction of a companionship between a human and a tree beyond a dualistic subject-object interaction.

4.1   Streams and rivers

In the following Zen story (Adams 2014, 65) a monk (M) who has just entered the monastery encounters the teacher and asks "Please show me how to enter the Way." Zen master (Z) responds with a question "Do you hear the sound of the valley stream?" The monk answers "yes," to which the Zen master responds "Enter there!" Upon the monk's question inquiring the path towards awakening, the master brings to attention a resource from the immediate, natural environment, the sound of the valley stream. "Enter there!" instructs the monk to attend to the sound of the stream as a means to enter the Way. What might be taken as the ordinary sound of a stream is framed here as a means to the path of enlightenment. The stream is made relevant to the practice of awakening, something to learn from – in a way, a teacher.

Hesse's inspiring novel *Siddhartha* skillfully illustrates the monk's instruction above to enter the path of awakening through the sound of the valley stream. Siddhartha is the son of a wealthy family who is smart, handsome, and loved by his parents, siblings, and friends. Yet, his soul is not at rest and his spirit is not content. He leaves his home to search for spiritual fulfillment, and after many years of various endeavors and struggles, he becomes the apprentice of a ferryman,

Vasudeva, who lives a simple, humble life by the river. Vasudeva is a wise man who has learned to listen deeply to the river and its teachings. When Siddhartha meets Vasudeva and tells him about his life and his search, Vasudeva listens deeply and carefully. Siddhartha is grateful; he thanks Vasudeva and tells him that he will learn how to listen like this from him. Vasudeva responds "You will learn it…"

> …but not from me. The river has taught me to listen, from it you will learn it as well. It knows everything, the river, everything can be learned from it. See, you've already learned this from the water too, that it is good to strive downwards, to sink, to seek depth. The rich and elegant Siddhartha is becoming an oarsman's servant, the learned *Brahman* Siddhartha becomes a ferryman: this has also been told to you by the river. You'll learn that other thing from it as well.
>
> (Lee 2004, 94)

Vasudeva refers to the river as a wise, all-knowing source that taught him how to listen, and from which Siddhartha will also learn how to listen. He offers examples of what Siddhartha already learned from the river, about seeking depth, and deciding to become a ferryman. He adds one more thing to the list at the end but does not explain; it is something Siddhartha will have to learn directly from the river. In this story, the river is constructed as an active agent with wisdom from which one can learn many things if s/he listens deeply, attentively. The river does not speak as humans do, yet it teaches through its being.

In the prior section, I have highlighted ventriloquism as making other beings say or do things through what we say or do (Cooren 2010; 2012; 2015) that enables them to animate and express themselves through us. In the excerpt above, Vasudeva gives voice to the river, saying that it has taught Siddartha to seek depth, to sink downwards into his being. He constructs the river as a credible, all-knowing teacher who has the power to guide. In time, Siddhartha learns from the river "to pay close attention with a quiet heart, with a waiting, opened soul, without passion, without a wish, without judgment, without an opinion" (Lee 2004, 96). Furthermore, he learns how the river "was always at all times the same and yet new in every moment" (Lee 2004, 92), and "that the river is everywhere at once, at the source and at the mouth, at the waterfall, at the ferry, at the rapids, in the sea, in the mountains, everywhere at once… " (Lee 2004, 96).

By listening to the river, Siddhartha realizes that it belongs to many places and exists in the present moment not burdened by the past or the future. Siddhartha says "I looked at my life, and it was also a river…" (Lee 2004, 96–97). Just like the river, he realizes that his life exists in the present, which includes his past as a boy, and his future as an old man, and that they are not separate. Cooren alerts us to the mutual, reciprocal constitutive process that takes place between humans and other beings, and the things that we make speak and act through ourselves. He states

that "all the beings that we (re)produce in our conversations and discourses also participate in what defines or identifies us" (Cooren 2012, 6). In giving voice to the river, Siddhartha reflects on his life and himself. Through this reflective process, he constitutes himself through attending to the river as an active agent of nature, powerful in shaping who he is becoming. Siddhartha realizes that, just like the river, parts of his life all exist in the present moment as part who he is now; they are not separate or distant, the past and the future are part of his present existence.

Finally, Siddhartha learns that the river does not just have one voice, but as we see from the passage below, it carries plurality of voices that are reflected in the river's voice depending on the seasons.

> And once again, when the river had just increased its flow in the rainy season and made a powerful noise, then said Siddhartha: 'Isn't it so, oh friend, the river has many voices, very many voices? Hasn't it the voice of a king, and of a warrior, and of a bull, and of a bird of the night, and of a woman giving birth, and of a sighing man, and a thousand other voices more?' 'So it is,' Vasudeva nodded, 'all voices of the creatures are in its voice.'
> (Lee 2004, 97)

The river does not speak in one voice or tone; sometimes it makes powerful noises during the rainy season that allows Siddhartha to characterize it as having multiple voices, including multiple identities. Vasudeva confirms this portrayal stating that the river's voice is all-inclusive. Learning to discern the diverse voices of the river, Siddhartha characterizes it as an expansive being that expresses many creatures, human and non-human. Although the author did not make this specific connection in the novel, based on Siddhartha's prior reflection "I looked at my life, and it was also a river…" (Lee 2004, 96–97), one might suggest that Siddhartha not only recognizes the many voices in the river but also in himself. Thus, ventriloquizing the river allows Siddhartha to learn about and co-constitute who he is along with the river. The river acts as an agent of awakening for Siddhartha in listening to and exploring who he is. The next section explores trees as nature's agents of awakening, starting with the examination of a Zen dialogue.

4.2 Trees

The following Zen dialogue is from *The True Dharma Eye: Zen Master Dogen's Three Hundred Koans*, Case 119, titled Zhaozhou's Cypress Tree" (Loori 2011, 162):

> A monastic asked Zhaozhou, "What's the meaning of the Ancestor's [Boddhidharma's] coming from India?"
> Zhaozhou said "The cypress tree in the garden."
> The monastic said, "Master, please don't teach using an object."
> Zhaozhou said, "I am not showing an object to you."

> The monastic said, "What's the meaning of the Ancestor's [Boddhidharma's] coming from India?"
> Zhaozhou said "The cypress tree in the garden."

The question that the monastic (M) asks is commonly found in the exchanges between Zen masters and students. It is also posed as "What is the meaning of Zen?" in some encounters. Rather than offer an explanation to M's inquiry – which would not be helpful anyway since the meaning of Zen cannot be explained as such – Zhaozhou (Z) responds by pointing to the cypress tree in the garden (in some versions, it is the oak tree). Similar to the Zen dialogue in the prior section where the monk asks for an entry point to the path and the teacher points to the sound of the stream, in this case the teacher points to another nature's agent from the immediate surroundings, the cypress tree in the garden. His response suggests that the tree has significance regarding the meaning of the Ancestor's bringing the Zen teachings from India. The monastic is left to contemplate on this. Yet, M is not content with Z's response; he resists his teacher's teaching style characterizing it as "teaching using an object," which frames the tree as an object. Z opposes M, stating that he is not showing an object. This is an important moment in this dialogue where M could have stopped for reflection on Z's response. He could have considered what Z might be doing/teaching by stating that he is not pointing to the tree as an object. Yet, he repeats his initial question from the first line, only to receive the same answer from Z, "The cypress tree in the garden." Repeating the same answer to the same question, Z keeps pointing back to the tree in the garden after having stated that he is not showing an object. The tree has a significance regarding the meaning of Zen, yet M still needs to contemplate this.

In *The Insentient Express the Way*, Zen Master Daido Loori offers commentary on Master Dogen's 'Teachings of the Insentient." Loori (2015) states:

> Our usual way of understanding the insentient is that they are objects that make up the physical world, objects that are non-living, lacking consciousness or perception. They are stones, starts, atoms, mountains and rivers – the inanimate. On the other hand, we understand the sentient as the direct antithesis of the insentient; namely, as conscious, aware beings capable of responding to feeling and perception. Master Dogen's view is nondual. He sees that sentient and insentient as two parts of the same reality. He regards them as inseparable, as he does with all dualities.

Daido Loori brings attention to the dualistic way of seeing the insentient and the insentient as separate from each other, which results in the common understanding of the insentient as an object. This resonates with the Zen dialogue between the monastic (M) and Zhaozhou (Z) examined right before this quote. M framed the tree as an object that Z uses as part of his teaching, and Z opposed this

characterization saying that he is not showing an object to M. Similarly, in the Zen dialogue in the prior section on streams and rivers, the teacher instructs the monk to enter the path through the sounds of the valley stream upon the monk's inquiry asking the teacher to show him the path. The stream is made relevant to the path of awakening as an entry point rather than an object. Along these lines, in the dialogue between Zhaozhou and the monastic about the meaning of the Ancestors coming from India, Z points to the oak tree in the garden, stating that he is not showing M an object in his next utterance. The tree, just like the stream, is staged as having an active role in the search for the meaning of Zen.

The novel *Staring at the Park: A Poetic Autoethnographic Inquiry* by Jane Speedy (2016) is a fragmented narrative of one woman's experience of suffering a stroke and her giving voice to the horse chestnut tree across the park from her house. It offers insight into the Zen dialogue above in terms of meeting the tree not as an object but as an agent of awakening to enter the path. Although Jane Speedy's experience of encountering the tree might not completely reflect what Zhaozhou is pointing to in the context of Zen, my analysis shows that ventriloquizing the tree allowed for the reciprocal construction of a companionship between a human and a tree beyond a dualistic subject-object interaction.

Speedy writes in a disjointed poetic form that visually and verbally illustrates her experience of having her life interrupted by a stroke. She had time after the stroke, extra time, to pay attention to the everyday and ordinary aspects of life. After coming out of the hospital, Speedy spent much time sitting and staring out of her bedroom window at the park with an iPad on her lap. As she looked out of her window, she recorded her lived experience in the form of images and poetic text. Speedy states that her writing came out in fragments and did not have narrative coherence, which best represented her experience. She acknowledges the "material efficacy of the environment that she was staring at" (Speedy 2016, 27) in inspiring, evoking, and drawing out the images she created. The trees in the park, and particularly the horse chestnut tree, played a significant role in Speedy's inquiry of the inner and outer landscapes that make up her world.

> This writing was inscribed on the park /great swathes of words tattooed across the ground/carved into tree trunks/littering the pathways/the drawings meanwhile were evoked by the trees/drawn out of the author through the material efficacy of the environment that she was staring at/the horse chestnut/ in particular/became starer to her staree /the agency of the horse chestnut, and of all the trees, in drawing out these images/was extraordinary at first/until this process of staring at/ drawing/ othering or writing into the park became a daily practice/It started with an Ipad and the drawing/ first up there was always a drawing/the park was drawing on the author/ she was writing then on the trees/   (Speedy 2016, 27)

The interaction between Speedy and the trees in the park reflects a deep, intense, and intimate mutuality enacted through the practices of "staring," drawing, and writing. It is not only the human counterpart that is engaged in these practices, but the park and the trees as well, and particularly the horse chestnut that stared back. The material presence of the trees and her new found practice of deep, participatory looking that Speedy refers as "staring," inspired and called for the making of the drawings. "Drawn out of the author" is the term Speedy uses in describing the process of creating images, highlighting the influence and agency of the trees and the horse chestnut over her. It implies a reaching out and a "touching" that blurs the boundary between subject-object where the trees reach out from the park into her bedroom and draw out the images.

In the last two lines of the quote, Speedy adds another term to describe this creative, interactive attentiveness: The park was not only "drawing out" the images of the author but also "drawing on" the author and she, in turn, was "writing on" the trees. The park "drawing on" the author, and the author "writing on" the trees suggest contact as part of the process of "staring." The trees not only inspire and evoke drawings for Speedy, they make their mark on her, and in turn, she makes a mark on them through writing on/about/through them. The way Speedy describes her engagement with the trees through her creative language use points to the dissolving of the distance between the trees and herself, and an intimacy cultivated beyond just looking. She cites Garland-Thompson, "Staring is a way of strongly reacting to another; it bespeaks involvement. It is the human response to novelty, to the unexpected (Garland-Thompson 2005, p. 1)" (Speedy 2016, 41). Thus, in this mutually involved looking Speedy becomes part of the trees as they become part of her. This engagement is dialogic as it is constitutive.

In the rest of this chapter, I will offer an analysis of the parts of Speedy's text that illustrate this constitutive aspect of her dialogic relation with the horse chestnut and the other trees in the park. Noticing the diseased horse chestnut tree for the first time is the beginning of a transformative encounter for Speedy:

```
THE             HORSE
CHESTNUT      STANDS
IN     THE    PARK
OUTSIDE         MY
WINDOW/
…
                only
this year/ when I had the
time/when I was spoilt for
time/ did I stop and look
closely at the tree and see
the dark dank patch in the
fork of her trunk/ canker/
Horse  Chestnut  canker/
the Oak tree behind has
a  kindred  woody  fun-
gus/ but not the bleeding
from the trunk/the horse
chestnut tree is weeping
shamelessly  and  I  have
never even noticed/ how
many years she has stood
there weeping darkly in
front of my window while
I  have  carried  on  with
life?/
```

(Speedy 2016, 69)

In her poetic reflection about noticing the horse chestnut tree in the park in front of her window, Speedy mentions a practice, of stopping and looking closely, that allowed her to see that the tree had a "dark dank patch in the fork of her trunk," which she refers as "canker." Due to her own stroke, Speedy has the time to practice stopping and looking closely, and she wonders about her lack of noticing this wounded tree that is "bleeding" and "weeping shamelessly." How many years, Speedy asks, "she has stood there weeping darkly in front of my window while I have carried on with life?" Having to slow down due to the stroke became her teacher, pointing to what is right in front of her that she has ignored before, in a way similar to the Zen masters in the dialogues discussed earlier who bring attention to the raindrops of the cypress tree in the backyard. This moment of noticing the horse chestnut is an important turning point for Speedy, carrying on with life without noticing the tree is a different way of being who she is. Speedy writes, "The horse chestnut tree is weeping shamelessly and I have never even noticed." She ventriloquizes the tree, gives her voice, stating that the tree is weeping. In response to this weeping, she is the one who "never even noticed." She did not hear the call. Now that she slowed down, something changed, she is able to hear the tree and

give voice to it as well. And, now that she is attending to the tree, she starts to real-
ize that she has a "vibrant" companion:

```
…/no one notices her weeping/ it is getting very cold and her twigs
and branches are covered in a film of frost every morning/not only am
I alongside the Horse Chestnut/ watching and
waiting and idling and staring/but she is
a
l
s
o

a
l
o
n
g
s
i
d
e

m
e

/
s
o

v
i
b
r
a
n
t
l
y

and materially and obviously alongside
that it is difficult to ascertain exactly
who had ignored whom for the past fif-
teen years of games with absence and
presence  /aspects were definitely and
reciprocally  turned  to  each  other/the
staring felt mutual/  although quite who
was starer and who was staree was diffi-
cult to ascertain/
```

<div align="right">(Speedy 2016, 75–77)</div>

Being alongside each other, there is a mutuality of attending to each other. It is not just that Speedy is staring at the tree but as she stands alongside it, the tree is alongside her, and Speedy is taking notice of its presence. Before this, for the past fifteen years, as Speedy ignored the tree, she did not even realize that it was there. Now, as she turns her attention to the tree, she starts to become aware of the mutuality of each other's presence that she reflects in the text above, in terms of staring, ignoring, and being alongside each other. The boundary of being the starer and the staree is a difficult one since it is not always clear who is staring at whom in this intimately reciprocal process. A striking aspect of the text is its visual quality illustrating being "alongside" through the thin vertical arrangement of the words. Compared to the prior excerpt where the text resembled the trunk of the tree, one might wonder about Speedy's choice of visually designing this part in a one-letter-per-line format as she writes about the tree also standing alongside her so vibrantly. Could it be to illustrate that it is a thin vertical line of being alongside each other? Subtle, delicate, yet "vibrant." As Derrida put, "Touching without touching" (Derrida 2005, 67).

From the excerpts analyzed above from Speedy's *Staring at the Park*, we come to see that as she works to make sense of her changed bodily being, as well as her changed relation to time and everyday engagements and practices, Speedy learns to see and relate to non-human agents, in this case trees, differently. Through the practices of drawing, and "staring," a deep, participatory looking that involves a being-with rather than just looking at something, Speedy attends to the horse chestnut tree not as an object but as a companion in illness. The horse chestnut is diseased and Speedy gives voice to it through ventriloquizing the tree that frames it as a non-human agent that goes unnoticed despite its shameless weeping. The horse chestnut calls but no one hears, except for its new companion who had to slow down due to her stroke. At the beginning sections of the book Speedy states, "The stories of my relationship with my newly broken body and with the diseased horse chestnut tree opposite my window in the park, unraveled together, after my stroke, aided and abetted by my new-found practices of staring and being stared at" (Speedy 2016, 31).

Through their mutual presence, Speedy and the horse chestnut tree's stories join and unfold together. Neither is alone anymore, nor are they the same. Ventriloquism as making other beings say or do things through what we say or do (Cooren 2010; 2012; 2015) enables them to animate and express themselves, and implies that "all the beings that we (re)produce in our conversations and discourses also participate in what defines or identifies us" (Cooren 2012, 6). Cooren alerts us to the mutual, reciprocal constitutive process that takes place between us and the things that we make speak. As much as we ventriloquize any thing, it also ventriloquizes us.

Speedy ends her book with this sentence: "Somewhere along the gossamer threads of entanglement, co-produced in this mutual gaze, my humanity is lost in a thicket of treeness, just as the treeness of the horse chestnut is lost in its humanity" (Speedy 2016, 176). Through the dialogic practices of attentiveneness including mutual gazing, writing and being written on, drawing and being drawn on, the duality of treeness and humanness dissolve. Speedy discovers treeness in her human existence as the horse chestnut becomes part of her existence, and she becomes part of the life of the tree as she gives voice to it. The neatly distinguished notions of self/other get blurry as Speedy and the horse chestnut come to realize that they, as the Buddhist Vietnamese monk Hanh put it, "inter-are" (Hanh 2010, 3).

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The rhetoric of discourse

Chiasm and dialogue in communicology

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In the classic Greek conception, *axiology* is the study of *values* or *decisions* displayed in behavior (ethics, aesthetics, politics, rhetoric). Whereas, *dialogue* is the study of *discourse* or *choices* displayed in judgement (dialectic, sophistic, rhetoric, maieutic). I examine, in a preliminary way, the dynamics of human communicology (decision choices) wherein the method of semiotic phenomenology accounts for Husserl's (1929; 1933) maxim that "subjectivity is intersubjectivity" (155). The primary methodology for this analysis is the *chiasm logic* of Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Michel Foucault, and Claude Lévi-Strauss, identifying *middle voice* [G. *gērys*] as the essence of the human.

Keywords: axiology, chiasm, discourse, rhetoric, voice

1. Introduction

Communication constitutes a human capacity for being-in-the-world (*être-au-monde*). People talk to themselves (realizing in thinking), they talk to each other (actualizing in speaking), and they talk to the unknown world (imagining in writing). These are the essential modalities of *voice*. This genus/species process of *rhetoric* is the Aristotelian definition of communication. The Platonic definition is different. Plato seeks the essence of such "talking" which he locates as a process similar to that of the midwife [G. *maieutic*], the *caring dialogue of concern*. In his *Sophist,* the Platonic genus/differentia process compares Philosophers (thinking) to Sophists (speaking) with apparent unsatisfactory results: Sophists make money by their teaching, but Philosophers do not (Lanigan 1988, 223); the philosopher/sophist dialogue teaches us to care about each other by understanding concern.

But recall, we are looking for the essence of the process, not the product. What do thinking and speaking have as the essence of their common combination? The answer is the very *chiasm* process itself: care is dialogue, dialogue is concern.

Speaking requires that thinking simultaneously distinguish *self* from *other* on the basis of *similarity* and *difference*. In French semiotic phenomenology (Lanigan 1992, 110–111; Gusdorf 1953; Descombes 1979; Group *Mu* 1970), this *tropic logic* (Merleau-Ponty's *chiasm*) is the double articulated aphorism/chiasm *le même et l'autre* that must be translated as the typology *logic* ratio of Self : Other : : Same : Different [: = "is to" and :: = "as"]and illustrated by the typology *rhetoric* ratio *Parole : Discours : : Langue : Langage* (Jakobson 1954; Holenstein 1974a,b).

By tradition, the French terms for linguistic registers are used for precision of reference. *Parole* means individual *speaking* and is generalized to the *spoken discourse* of a group as *Discours*. A more difficult distinction for English speakers is *Langue*, the language system as spoken (e.g., dialect of: English, French), in comparison to *Langage*, the human faculty or *cognitive capacity* for using the linguistic system as a semiotic ability (e.g., semantics, syntactics, pragmatics) (Hagège 1985, 7). In English, *langage* is often translated as "competence" [where "performance" is *langue*], "symbolic capacity", "symbology", and (as in Jacques Lacan's work) "the symbolic."

We shall be concerned with the *communicological hierarchy* (Figure 1) that Merleau-Ponty describes ontologically as the "tacit cogito and speaking subject… in a milieu of communication" (1964, 175; 1995). The *linear quadratic system* exists (1) at four levels of dialogue as *linguistics registers* that (2) are transformed into a *curvilinear tetradic system* of dialogue as *communication exchange* (Figure 2) as first outlined in Lanigan (1988, 184–193; see also Kopperschmidt 1973, 161; Watzlawick 1978, 73–77; White 1978). As context, I need to specify that I am dealing with a discourse-based *tropic logic* (semiotic/logic square; Norbert Wiener's communication theory; Ehring 2011), and not a mathematical algorithm ("quadratic equation; completing the square"; Claude Shannon's information theory), which in philosophy of language is known as the "theory of types/theory of descriptions" in the Russell-Whitehead *Principia Mathematica* (3 vols., 1910, 1912, 1913; see Lanigan 1972, 60–64).

2.   Axiology: Value categories

Our immediate concern with dialogue is to determine how to approach judgments made by people in the dialogic process of speaking and listening, i.e., the axiology of human communication. Axiology is the subdiscipline of philosophy that studies *values:* Choices or decisions displayed in practice as behavior (activity) and comportment (capacity). Value judgments manifest in dialogue constitute the social and cultural context of *communication as care* [G. *gērys*]: *to give voice.* All theories and models of axiology have four basic categories and one meta-category:

Categories:

1.   Morality:
Judgments, decisions about your *Self* where Consciousness (personal semiotic) is a sense of *conscience* and *responsibility* [*maieutic dialogue* as the voice of care with concern].

2.   Ethics:
Judgments, decisions about the *Other*(s) where Consciousness (social grammar) is a sense of *social norms* and the *common good* [*rhetoric dialogue* as the voice of regard with respect].

3.   Politics:
Judgments, decisions about both the *Self and Other* where Consciousness (social rhetoric) is a sense of *cultural mores* and *duty* [*dialectic dialogue* as the voice of interest with engagement].

4.   Aesthetics:
Judgments, decisions about *Events and Objects* where Consciousness (cultural logic) is a sense of cultural *beauty* and *taste* [*sophistic dialogue* as the voice of discernment with appreciation].

Metacategory:

5.   Rhetoric:
Judgments, decisions voiced as:

> **Both** (5a) *Speech* [*parole*] / *Discourse* [*discours*] meaning
> [Medieval Logos: *Tropes of Speaking*];
> **And** (5b) *Language* [*langage*] / *Dialect* [*langue*] signification
> [Medieval Lexis: *Figures of Writing*] where: Consciousness is a sense of *intentionality* for both *subjectivity* and *intersubjectivity.*

Husserl's explication of this consciousness is to find the *immanent* (object/*noema* of subjectivity) in the *transcendent* (subject/*noesis* of intersubjectivity). He is thinking of the essence of communication, i.e., the *chora* or moment/place of existential emergence of the referent in dialogue (Morot-Sir 1993/1995, 2, 21). This emergence of *voice* is the "revelatory phrase" or "slip of the tongue/slip of the pen" constituting the existential revelation Sigmund Freud called "the talking cure." An ironic contemporary example here is the "slip" created when the autocorrect speller on your computer or phone sends a message with an embarrassing word you did not write! This is an existential confrontation with the problematic of authorship made thematic.

DISCOURSE COMMUNICOLOGY MODEL
Embedded Hierarchy of Discourse moving from
Dynamic Meaning (Logos) up to Static Signification (Lexis)
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LANGUAGE UNIVERSALS

LANGAGE = Cultural LOGIC

Inter-Group Communication

English used in the World

A PARTICULAR LANGUAGE

LANGUE = Social GRAMMAR

Intra-Group Communication

English used in the USA

SOCIAL COMMUNICATION

DISCOURS = Social RHETORIC

Inter-Personal Communication

English used in a Peer Group

INDIVIDUAL SPEECH

PAROLE = Personal SEMIOTIC

Intra-Personal Communication

My Spontaneous English

*NONVERBAL CODE CONTEXT FOR ALL LEVELS
Proxemics, Chronemics, Ocularics, Kinesics,
Haptics, Vocalics, Olfactorics*

DENOTATION
Syntax Rules (Either/Or)
Writing {Lexis}
History: Public Narrative

DENOTATION
GRAMMAR: Figure of Language
Code: SIGNIFICATION Shift
"Intertextuality" as Translation

CONNOTATION
Semantic Rules (Both/And)
Speaking {Logos}
Story: Personal Narrative

CONNOTATION
RHETORIC: Trope of Speech
Message: MEANING Shift
"Transpositionality" as Translation

Figure 1. French discourse model derived from the scholastic *Trivium*

3. Discourse: Dialogue categories

Figure 2 offers a summary of the dynamic communicological relationships ana-
lyzed thus far. We are constructing an applied logic whereby we can analyze the
dialogic process that takes (1) typologies of speaking (*parole, discours, langue, lan-
gage*), wherein (2), we can recognize the axiological judgments made (morality,
ethics, politics, aesthetics) that (3) construct communication *behavior* (expression:

responsibility/common good/duty/beauty) and communication *comportment* (perception: conscience/social norms/cultural mores/ taste).

SELF	OTHER	RHETORIC		SAME	DIFFERENT
MORALITY	ETHIC			POLITICS	AESTHETICS
PAROLE	*LANGUE*	- - - - - - - - - - -		*DISCOURS*	*LANGAGE*
Greek MAIEUTIC (Questions give / take Answers)	*Greek RHETORIC (Answers give / take Questions)*	TROPIC LOGIC		*Greek DIALECTIC (Questions give / take Answers)*	*Greek SOPHISTIC (Answers give / take Questions)*
Both	(Both / And)	COMMUNICATION		And	(Either / Or)

Figure 2.   *Le même et l'autre* rhetoric model of apposition

Only one additional theoretical concept is required, i.e., the logic that operates within rhetoric. Recall our discussion of Aristotle, judgments are by genus/species which is a familiar logic of *distinction* by **opposition:** Either/Or choices where *two* things are negatively *contrasted* [**A** versus **B,** so **A contrasts with B**; a "window" metaphor for linear inside/outside]. What is less familiar is the Platonic genus/differentia logic of *combination* by **apposition:** Both/And choices where *three* things are positively *compared* [**A** versus **C** because **C** versus **B**, so **A compares to B**; a "mirror" metaphor for curvilinear reversibility of inside/outside]. We need to note that the trope of *chiasm* is the essence of *dialogue* where a value system creates a reversible discourse hierarchy of "double chiasm", i.e., the four parts of Being are reversible with the four parts of Speaking (Figure 2; Jakobson 1954; Holenstein 1974b). As Merleau-Ponty (1964, 215, 264–265; Watzlawick 1978, 73–77; Thomas-Fogiel 2014) writes about *le même et l'autre*, the *aphorism* as *chiasm* is an "intertwining," "a mediation through reversal" of "co-functioning" where:

> We function as one unique body. The chiasm is not only a me other exchange (the messages he receives reach me, the messages I receive reach him), it is also an exchange between me and the world, between the phenomenal body and the "objective" body, between the perceiving and the perceived: What begins as a thing ends as consciousness of the thing, what begins as a "state of consciousness" ends as a thing. One cannot account for this double "chiasm" by the cut of the For Itself and the cut of the In Itself. A relation of Being is needed that would form itself *within Being*.
>
> The chiasm, reversibility, is the idea that every perception is doubled with a counter-perception (Kant's real opposition) as act with two faces, one no longer knows who speaks and who listens. Speaking-listening, seeing-being seen, perceiving-being perceived circularity (it is because of it that it seems to us that perception forms itself *in the things themselves*).

Widely used in particular by Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1964, 1995) and Michel Foucault (1971), and in general by European theorists (Descombes 1979; Pelkey 2016; White 1978), the chiasm model of semiotic phenomenology was first formulated by Claude Lévi-Strauss (1958) based on Roman Jakobson's communicology application of Edmund Husserl's axiom that "Subjectivity is Intersubjectivity" (1929; 1933, 155; Jakobson 1954; Holenstein 1974a,b, 1975; Eco 1979, 165–168; Lanigan 2015a, b, c). Lévi-Strauss' model is summarized in Figures 3 and 4. And we should note that Eduardo Morot-Sir (1993/1995, 2, 11, 21) offers the quadratic formulation in terms of communicological *reference* as the *voice* synthesis of object-language and meta-language: Perception [Self] **:** Conception [Same] **: :** Memory [Other] **:** Judgment [Different]; specified as: Intuition **:** Subjectivation **: :** Objectivation **:** Reflection.

Figure 3. Lévi-Strauss' logic of dialogic exchange: The chiasm

Figure 4. Lévi-Strauss' logic formulation of dialogue: The double chiasm

Lanigan (2015a, b, c) details the history of the *chiasm model* as the human science logic structure for the analysis of interpersonal communication in its applied form as the Perspectives Model (variously known in psychology as the "Johari Window" and in semiotics as the "Semiotic Square"). Figure 5 offers a summary of the basic application of the model as a semiotic phenomenology that incorporates *tropic logics* (Fisher 2001, 2009; Ehring 2011) for discourse analysis that is commonly labeled as "General Rhetoric" (see Figure 2, 5 and 14). Also as a matter of historical insight, we need to acknowledge that the perspectives or "window pane" model [two by two matrix] derives from General Semantics research by Elwood Murray at the University of Denver (1937, Figure 1 : Four Types of Egocentric Speaking, 74; Brownell 2014; see Murray et al. 1953).

RHETORICAL LOGIC: Tropic Model of Perspectives			
RHETORIC CONTEXT © R. L. LANIGAN 2017	*DIRECT PERSPECTIVE* *ENCODE >>>* *Auto—Reference*	*META— PERSPECTIVE* *<<< DECODE* *Hetero—Reference*	*META—META— PERSPECTIVE* *CODE CHOICE* *Register*
Husserl	*NOESIS* *(Conisclousness)*	*NOEMA* *(Phenomena)*	*EGO* *(Memory)*
Merteau-Ponty *Rhétorique Générale*	*Reversibility* *(Signifying Signifier)* *Le Méme:* *Self / Same*	*Reflexivity* *(Signifying Signified)* *L'Autre:* *Other/ Different*	*Reflectivity* *(Signs)* *Être-au-monde:* *Being-in-the-world*
TROPIC LOGIC: Discourse Typologies **Tropes of Speaking (Meaning) & Figures of Writing (Signification)**			
Synecdoche	SELF (PART)	OTHER (WHOLE)	PAROLE
Metaphor	SAME (SUBSTANCE)	OTHER (WHOLE)	DISCOURS
Metonymy	SAME (SUBSTANCE)	DIFFERENT (ATTRIBUTE)	LANGUE
Simile (+ Positive)	SELF (PART)	DIFFERENT (ATTRIBUTE)	LANGAGE
Irony (– Negative)	DIFFERENT (ATTRIBUTE)	SELF (PART)	

Figure 5. Tropic logic as applied in the phenomenology of rhetoric

4. Dialogic axiology: A communicology

Dialogue in the tradition of semiotic phenomenology is a metaphysics constituted as an *ontology* of human being (self, other, same, different) articulated by an *ontic* rhetoric of human speaking (*parole, discours, langue, langage*). The result is a *deontic* axiology of human choice (morality, ethics, politics, aesthetics). In the analysis that follows, I shall graphically illustrate the existential (Being) with a parallel depiction of the embodiment (Speaking) of subjectivity as the *obligation* of intersubjectivity (care). Such an analysis requires an appreciation for curvilinear "complex systems" in which analysis and synthesis operate on three logical levels. Charles S. Peirce simplified the discussion by naming the levels: Firstness, Secondness, and Thirdness. Nonetheless, Peirce ended up with sixty-four applied categories. Let me hasten to say that I face the same problematic and must also employ Umberto Eco's (1976, viii) anti-Ockham principle *entia sunt multiplicanda propter necessitatem* [entities are multiplied by reason of necessity]. As suggested in the parenthetical lists above, I shall be considering three logic levels where four terms form a two-by-two matrix. The simplest and best known version of this approach is the Semiotic Square model of Greimas (1979, 308) that illustrates such a three generation (4 x 4 x 4) transformation of elements and isomorphisms.

My argument consists of four axioms which are drawn from my previous research (Lanigan 1972, 1977, 1984, 1988, 1992). Each axiom is written as *chiasm*, an ontological logic ratio of four parts usually expressed as a *communication comparison* [two individual parts as a first pair] versus an *information contrast* [two individual parts as a second pair]. Herein, there is a *message*, an *object discourse* [*ontic* Being: **A** relates to **B**] that is itself governed (reversibility, reflexivity, reflectivity) by a *code*, a *meta-discourse* [*deontic* Speaking: **a** relates to **b**]. The typical *message* formulation is written **A : B :: a : b.** (Arrows ⊠ showing *paired terms* in Figure 6; see Figure 3).A classical three level chiasm example is Robinson (1901, 27) and is the same *anaphoric deixis* used by Karl Bühler in his explication of Husserl's semiotic logic (Lanigan 2017b). By comparison and as a traditional one level chiasm, the *code* is written **A : B :: b : a.** (Square ▢ showing the *four term matrix* contextual to the term pairs in Figure 6).

I formulate all my arguments with the *code form* [*chiasm*] because that is the usual perception condition for readers, although the dialogic insight is discovered in the *combined form* of message and code [⊠ = *double chiasm = semiotic square*] of values. Keep in mind that the combined form illustrates three logic levels of perspective abstraction, often called "explanatory typologies" (1: *Elements* [Description/Reversibility], 2: *Isomorphisms* [Reduction/Reflexivity], 3: *Transformations* [Interpretation/Reflectivity]; see Holenstein 1974a, 7). The three

levels are best illustrated in the famous Semiotic Square (Greimas 1966, 1979; Lanigan 2015a). Thus, in the double-chiasm, there are four basic axioms:

1. *Le Même et L'Autre* Axiom: Self [**A**] **:** Other [**B**] **: :** Same [**a**] **:** Different [**b**]
    Lévi-Strauss Formula (Figure 3): Self [**A**] **:** Other [**B**] **: :** Same [**C**] **:** Different [**D**]
    Morot-Sir Formula: Perception **:** Conception **: :** Memory **:** Judgment; Intuition **:** Subjectivation **: :** Objectivation **:** Reflection
2. Discourse Axiom: Parole **:** Discours **: :** Langue **:** Langage
3. Greek *Chora* Axiom: Maieutic **:** Rhetoric **: :** Dialectic **:** Sophistic
4. Communicology Axiom: Both **:** (Both / And) **: :** And **:** (Either / \ Or)

Figure 6. Chiasm: Dialogic being and speaking

These formulations derive from classical Greek and Roman rhetoric and are usually depicted as the dynamic process in Figure 7 (see the static version in Figure 5 tropes) with a slight rotation to emphasize process (on the diagonal) in the three-order logic (an axonometric style introduced by Foucault; Lanigan 2015c). Also relevant to the logic process involved in the use of the chiasm mode, especially by Lévi-Strauss, Merleau-Ponty, and Foucault, are the ontological dynamics of rhetoric (presence/absence/analytic/synthetic). The symbolic process (conjunction/disjunction/convergence/divergence) must account for the ontological movement of discourse embodiment (linear culture logic from curvilinear discourse logic), commonly known as the "Whorf-Sapir Hypothesis" (Whorf 1952). The key point is that the *symbol* is an ontological source of constitution (Foucault's "birth" trope) called (1) the *chora* [logic level 1: Elements of description], in turn linking (2) the *ontic* ("is") [logic level 2: Isomorphisms of reduction], and, (3) the *deontic* ("ought") [logic level 3: Transformations of interpretation] in value choices (Figure 8). The associated methodological human science issues involved in applied communication research are detailed in Lanigan (2013).

Figure 7. Classical Greek discourse model of communicology (Lanigan 1992, 94)

Figure 8. The tropic logic of value choices in symbolic process

4.1 Value categories: Morality in the self

Morality is a neologism term invented by Cicero in order to distinguish the first level of value judgments as S*elf* referential, i.e., as existential. His view is that *altruism* as a second level value judgment applied to the Other [G. *ethos*] needs a counterpart referent back to a first level judgment about Self [L. *moralis*]. The Self speaking (*parole*) constitutes morality: The process of communication as a

maieutic dialogue of *Self conscience* with *responsibility* for the Other (Figure 9; see Figure 2 and 6 for context).

Figure 9. The maieutic morality value system

So, we begin with Cicero's view. *Morality is a judgment about the Self.* In the Greek world of other people, morality is constituted in *maieutic dialogue.* The *moral form* of dialogue between the Self and Other is an exchange of *questions, then answers.* Conjunction (Figure 8) embodied as Self establishes a similarity of perspective (caring of interpersonal communication) as a sameness of Self judgment (concern of intrapersonal communication). Dialogue, as a give and take activity, creates a *subjective/existential* consciousness (Questions concerning) in *two* persons that is the *same* condition for judgment as *embodied speaking* (caring Answers). We call the condition *conscience* (as a *subjective* criterion) and personal *responsibility* (as an *intersubjective* criterion). The standard general rhetoric formulation is:

Maieutic Dialogue: Questions gives / takes Answers = Same Value constituted.
Personal Ethics: Conscience with Responsibility.

In short, morality consists of existential choices and decisions communicated in practice as behavior (activity: "ask" question/"say" answer) and comportment (capacity: "can do" answer/"will do" question) by two persons in dialogue that define themselves and each other (**A : B :: b : a**). Alfred Schütz (Lanigan 1988, 215) called this dialogue a value choice between the "because motive" (pluperfect "what had been" caring) and the "in-order-to motive" (future perfect "what shall have been" concern). The chiasm example of *maieutic dialogue* consists of the *question* of *Self conscience* embodied in the *answer* of speaking (*parole*) with *responsibility*.

(Question: conscience)   *Ask **not** what **others can do** for you,*
(Answer: responsibility)   *Say what **you can do** for others.*

We can express the axiological logic as a metaphysical condition of the *same* (Figure 7) found in *discours* (Figure 8); i.e., the moral form of dialogue allows a similarity of value (concern) to emerge in discourse (care). There are four rules

that define this *maieutic dialogue* process experienced by both persons in the conversation. From each person's *existential perspective* (Self/*parole:* Figure 9) of *embodied speaking,* there is a *double chiasm*:

Morality:
1. An **Apposition Decision** about **Other** (Conjunction of *both* SAME *and* DIFFERENT) **allows**
2. An **Opposition Choice** about the **Self** (Disjunction of *either* SELF *or* OTHER).

Maieutic:
3. An **Apposition Decision** about **Langue** (Conjunction of *both* DISCOURS *and* LANGAGE) **allows**
4. An **Opposition Choic**e about the **Parole** (Disjunction of *either* PAROLE *or* LANGUE).

The evidence to be taken (*capta*) from a dialogue centered on *morality* depicts the *convergence of meaning* ("same value") that both speakers abstract from the *dialogue* they experience in everyday life [*Lebenswelt*]. Merleau-Ponty defines this moral value as *authenticity,* i.e., *meaning* (existential choice) as "Authentic Speaking" [*parole parlante;* speech speaking; *rhétorique générale*] in the process of communication with the other in a shared world (*être-au-monde*). This maieutic approach is better known as the "Socratic Method" of definition by *genus* and *differentia.*

4.2 Value categories: Ethics in the other

After judgments about the Self, human beings turn their attention to Other people. Those persons who fail at morality tend toward egotistical behavior and exhibit selfish comportment. Yet, moral persons tend toward altruism exhibiting a genuine *regard* for the well being and situated *respect* for the welfare of others, especially as a social group typified by the family unit. Here, we may begin with the Greek concept of *ethos* defined as a person's *character* displayed by embodied *habit* among others in the dyad or peer group. Heraclitus is often quoted to define ethical judgments: "A man's *ethos* [character] is his *daimon* [spirit]". Respect comes from regard. *Ethics is a judgment about the Other.* That judgment of regard derives from the observation of habitual behavior which comes to constitute an interpretation of character, the propensity for decisions valued as respect in an interpersonal and social manner of acting for good or ill.

In the modern sense, Pierre Bourdieu (1972, 1980) best explicates *ethos* by his definitions of (1) *habitus* as an *action* that is unconscious behavior as habit (a *practice* that is known, but not named *in praesentia*) and (2) *hexis* as a *disposition* that

is a preconscious habit as comportment (a *praxis* that is named, but not known *in absentia*). In Edmund Husserl's and Maurice Merleau-Ponty's semiotic phenomenology, (1) *habitus* is a present absence [in logic, the quantity symbolized as *0* or "zero"; in rhetoric, the trope *asyndeton* – nameless voice] and (2) *hexis* is an absent presence [in logic the quality symbolized as $\varnothing$ or "empty set"; in rhetoric, the trope *prosopopeia*͵ – voiceless name] (see Figures 8 and 13). This is the basis, for example, of Roland Barthes's definition for the ethics of authorship as the synthesis constituted by "writing degree zero" (asyndeton = metonymy + metaphor) and Jacques Derrida's counterpoint for initiating ethical analysis "under erasure" (prosopopeia = synecdoche + simile/irony). Of course, by combining synthesis and analysis, we get Merleau-Ponty's *chiasm* (see Figure 15). I should also note, as a matter of comparative theory construction, we have the well-known parallel distinction in General Semantics between the "un-speakable" (*asyndeton* – nameless voice) and the "speakable" (*prosopopeia*͵ – voiceless name) (Korzybski 1933, 445, 637; Berman 1989). This is, of course, some twenty years prior to the same distinction made by Ludwig Wittgenstein in his *Philosophical Investigations* (1953).

Figure 10. The rhetorical ethics value system

The *ethical form* of dialogue between the Self and Other is an exchange of *answers, then questions* to establish a *difference* of perspective (regard as intrapersonal communication), a difference to be found in an Other judgment (respect as interpersonal communication). Dialogue, as a give and take activity, creates a *subjective/ existential* consciousness (Answers regarding) in *two* persons that is a *different* condition for judgment for each one (Questions respecting). Your answer poses a question in me. We call the condition a situation in which *social norms* (as a *subjective* criterion) and the *common good* (as an *intersubjective* criterion) are compared and contrasted. The standard general rhetoric formulation is:

Rhetoric Dialogue: Answers gives / takes Questions = Different Value constituted.
Social Ethics: Social Norms as the Public Good.

To summarize, ethics consists of existential choices and decisions communicated in practice as behavior (activity: "ask"/"say") and comportment (capacity: "can

do"/"will do") by two persons in dialogue that define themselves and each other. The chiasm example of *rhetoric dialogue* consists of the *answer* of *social norms* (*langue*) that is embodied in the Other by the *question* of the *common good*.

| (Answer: social norms) | *Say what **you can do** for others,* |
| (Question: common good) | *Ask **not** what **others can do** for you.* |

The axiological logic expresses a metaphysical condition of the *Other* found in *langue,* i.e., the ethical form of dialogue allows a *difference of value* (regard) to emerge in the Self as the conversational dialect with the Other converges in signification, thus allowing divergence of compatible meaning (respect) as a sense of *community* [Gemeinschaft]. "The core of social process is not likeness, but the harmonizing of difference through interpenetration; the essential feature of common thought is not that it is held in common, but that it has been produced in common" (Follett 1918, 34). There are four steps to this *ethical dialogue* process, experienced by both persons in the conversation. From each person's *existential perspective* (Other/*langue:* Figure 10) of *embodied speaking,* there is a *double chiasm:*

Ethics:
1. An *Apposition Decision* about **Self** (Conjunction of *both* SAME *and* DIFFERENT) *allows*
2. An *Opposition Choice* about the **Other** (Disjunction of *either* SELF *or* OTHER).

Rhetoric:
3. An *Apposition Decision* about **Parole** (Conjunction of *both* DISCOURS *and* LANGAGE) *allows*
4. An *Opposition Choic*e about the **Langue** (Disjunction of *either* PAROLE *or* LANGUE).

The evidence to be taken (*capta*) from a dialogue centered on *ethics* describes the *divergence of signification* ("different value") that both speakers abstract from the *langue* [dialect] they experience in common social life [Cicero's *in proprium*]. Merleau-Ponty defines this ethical value as *inauthenticity* (lack of existential choice), i.e., *signification* as "Sedimented Speaking" [*parole parlée;* speech spoken; *grammaire générale*] in the process of communication with the other in a shared world (*être-au-monde*) (Jacques 1982, 159). The inauthenticity derives from a lack of prior morality (lack of care and concern). This rhetoric approach is better known as the "Aristotelian Method" of definition by *genus* and *species* wherein the species "morality" is distinguished from the species "ethics." The result is a value system distinction, "morality" searched for the "good," while "ethics" searches

for the "bad." Cicero corrects this problem by differentiating communicological morality and ethics (rhetorical ethics), rather than axiological good and bad (ethical rhetoric).

When ethics (one species) is not isolated from morality (another species), we have the aberrant condition where "ethical rhetoric" creates a *langue* (opposition taxonomy) that we recognize (regard), but one that has *no referent* in the Other (no respect). The demagogue (as presumed expert), always supplies that referent in the form of a scapegoat person (the alien) or event (the aberrant). The contemporary example is Donald Trump: "There is in the early writings [1890s accounts of public administration] a strong presumption that the businessman is an 'expert' who is entitled to rule. The businessman has built this civilization; so he is morally entitled and mentally equipped to run it" (Waldo 1948, 91). Of course, the *presumption* is maintained by the distraction of a scapegoat lie ("fake news") relentlessly presented against the Other. In short, "species" are endlessly multiplied until the "genus" (missing referent of "news") is completely forgotten. The alien and the aberrant become "normal." Michel Foucault calls this the "forgetfulness of rationality."

In traditional rhetoric studies, the morality/authenticity position I am asserting is called "rhetorical ethics" and is distinguished from the aberrant form "ethical rhetoric" which we know as presumption by ideology, doctrine, dogma, "public relations," "spin," slur, or, simply put, *invective*. The Greek name for this negative social norm is *bathos* (the counterpart to the positive *pathos*). Again, Donald Trump is the example. As I have previously summarized, *rhetorical ethics* is the basis of constructive human communication expressing the moral being [*esse intentionale*] that is signified as *humane – regard with respect* (Lanigan 1988, 4).

> In the present context, I take *rhetoric* to be a pragmatic discourse where a social value is ascribed to the explicit behavior of persons. In a specifically phenomenological sense, rhetoric is speaking that creates an *object of consciousness* that speaker and listener perceive. In parallel fashion, I view *ethic* as a value generated in discourse that is implicitly a condition of personal conscious experience. For the phenomenologist, an ethic is the authentic choice made by a person in a world of other persons. Speaking, here, is an *object of consciousness*. I do not, therefore, accept the often-popular notion that rhetoric is a value-free method (has no ethical content) nor that an ethic is factually indeterminate as method (has no rhetorical context).

4.3 Value categories: Politics between the self and other

The common understanding of politics as a value concept is that it accounts for the regulation and control of the *interests* of individual people [*Lebenswelt*] *engaged*

as a social group, usually referred to as "the State", the institution of government. Such a group is large and consists of a social stratification of smaller *communities* of interest like families [*Gemeinschaft*], the total of which are communities in a *society* [*Gesellschaft*]. Politics is the communal conjunctive synthesis, over time, of morality and ethics that creates the *duty* to affirm *cultural mores* [*Weltanschauung*]. *Politics is a judgment about the Self and Other.* One has a Self *interest* in the Many who *engage* Others (*e pluribus unum*). We usually summarize this consciousness of cultural mores (as an *intersubjective* interest) and duty (as a *subjective* engagement) as the role function of *citizenship* organized into the state political unit, the "body politic". So, how is the political value constituted as consciousness?

> Citizenship is not to be learned in good government classes or current events courses or lessons in civics. It is to be acquired only through those modes of living and acting which shall teach us how to grow the social consciousness. This should be the object of all day school education, of all night school education, of all our supervised recreation, of all our family life, of our club life, of our civic life (Follett 1918, 363).

Political judgment derives from the observation of habitual behavior (regard) which comes to constitute an interpretation of social obligation (engagement). A *social rhetoric* embodied as duty to Self and Other becomes the propensity for decisions valued in an interpersonal and social manner of acting for the common good or ill. A sense of *duty* is learned dialectically by embodied practice as "living and acting" with "social consciousness" (Figure 11).

Figure 11. The dialectical politics value system

The political form of *dialectic dialogue* between the Self and Other is an exchange of *questions* raising further *questions* to establish a *sameness* of perspective (interpersonal communication as engagement) contextualizing a *difference* abstracted from the *discours* containing an Other judgment (intrapersonal communication as interest). Dialogue, as a give and take activity, creates a *subjective/existential* consciousness (Questions of interest) in *two* persons that is a *same* condition for judgment for each one (Questions of engagement). Your question poses a question in me. We call the condition a dialectical situation in which *cultural mores* (as a

subjective engagement) and the need for *public duty* (as an *intersubjective* inter-est) are compared and contrasted by interrogation. The standard general rhetoric formulation is:

Dialectic Dialogue: Questions gives / takes Questions = Other Value constituted.
Public Ethics: Cultural Mores of Public Duty.

To summarize, politics consists of existential choices and decisions communicated in practice as behavior (activity: "ask") and comportment (capacity: "can do") by two persons in dialogue that define themselves and each other. The chiasm ex-ample of *dialectic dialogue* consists of the *question* of *cultural mores* (*discours*) that is embodied as the Same by the *question* of *duty*.

(Question: cultural mores)	*Ask what **you can do** for others,*
(Question: duty)	*Ask **not** what **others can do** for you.*

The dialectic logic expresses a metaphysical condition of the *Same* found in *dis-cours,* i.e., the ethical form of dialogue allows a *similarity of value* to emerge an *interest.* Interrogation by the Self as the conversational dialectic with interrogation of the Other converges in signification, thus allowing divergence of compatible *meaning* as a sense of *cultural mores* [*Weltanschauung*].

Each person in the dialogue comes to a sense of *duty* found in the mutual *engagement* of cultural obligation. There are four steps to this political *dialogue process,* experienced by both persons in the conversation. From each person's *existential perspective* (Same/*discours:* Figure 11) as *embodied speaking,* there is a *double chiasm:*

Politics:
1. An ***Apposition Decision*** about **Self** (Convergence of *both* OTHER *and* DIFFERENT) *allows*
2. An ***Opposition Choice*** about the **Same** (Divergence of *either* SAME *or* DIFFERENT)

Dialectic:
3. An ***Apposition Decision*** about **Parole** (Convergence of *both* LANGUE *and* LANGAGE) *allows*
4. An ***Opposition Choic*e** about the **Discours** (Divergence of *either* DISCOURS *or* LANGAGE)

The evidence to be taken (*capta*) from a *dialectic dialogue* centered on politics describes the convergence of *meaning* ("same value" interest) that both speakers abstract from the *discours.* They experience *cultural mores* held in common for

appropriate conduct and comportment (engagement) expressed as a *social rhetoric* [Cicero's *in communis*].

4.4 Value categories: Aesthetics in events and objects

John Dewey suggests that the search for a community of values in any political democracy has its foundation in our ability to *discern* aesthetic communication.

> The function of art has always been to break through the crust of conventionalization and routine consciousness [Foucault's *rupture*]. Common things, a flower, a glean of moonlight, the song of a bird, not things rare and remote, are means with which the deeper levels of life are touched so that they spring up as *desire* and thought [Foucault's *power*]. This is the process of art. Poetry, the drama, the novel, are proofs that the problem of presentation [communication] is insoluble. Artists have always been the real purveyors of *news*, for it is not the outward happening in itself which is new, but the kindling by it [Merleau-Ponty's *witness*] of emotion, perception and appreciation' (1927, 183–184; my inserts and emphasis).

We are immediately reminded of Merleau-Ponty's (1954) phenomenological method that allows us to *discern* (1) description as the "emotion" in morality where Self and Other are *reflexive* witnesses, (2) reduction as the "perception" of ethics wherein Self and Other are *reversible* witnesses, and (3) the interpretation of "appreciation" as politics where Self and Other are *reflective* witnesses. To be the witness to an *event,* to encounter an *object,* is to rupture the complacency of the Self in the contingency of the Other. *Aesthetics is a judgment about events and objects.* We must learn both (1) to *discern* the *Event of an object,* and (2), to *appreciate* the *Object of an event.*

> Thus, there is a good and a bad use of news items, perhaps even two kinds of news items [event; object], according to the type of revelation they bring [discern; appreciate]. What is hidden is first of all blood, the body, linen, the interiors of houses and lives; the canvas underneath the flaking painting, materials what once had form; contingency; and finally, death. The street accident (seen through a window), a glove on the sidewalk, a razor next to the eye, the pins and needles of desire and its paralysis. And we can always obtain the same dreamlike lucidity, the same stupefying emotion, each time we cut ourselves off from ourselves and make ourselves a stranger to ourselves. That air of derisory intelligence, those nuances in the absurd of a man talking on the telephone are, if I do not hear what he is saying, a fascinating spectacle – but after all they teach us only our bias of looking without understanding (1954, 312; my inserts).

Merleau-Ponty contrasts events and objects so that he can compare Self and Other perspectives. He is concerned with aesthetic values learned in social perception

by comparison of an initial embodied perception (to *witness*) and the later embodied expression (to *signature,* i.e., autobiographical impression). He helps us to *discern what* (intrapersonal *object*) we witness by pointing out *how we appreciate* our existential insertion in the moment (interpersonal *event*). *Taste* becomes the movement from *habitus* to *hexis* by discerning a *different langage* to signify *appreciation,* a cultural logic named as *Beauty* [G. *kallos*] or in later classical thought, the *sublime* [L. *sublimis*].

Recall that (1) *Objects* signify *habitus* as an action that is unconscious behavior as habit (a practice that is known, but not named *in praesentia*) and (2) *Events* signify *hexis* as a disposition that is a preconscious habit as comportment (a praxis that is named, but not known *in absentia*). We are Witness to Objects (Answers discern) because Events are our Signature (Answers appreciate); we witness *what* is absent from us (different), yet we signature *how* we live the event as present (*langage*). As Merleau-Ponty (1954, 311) suggests "Seeing is that strange way of rendering ourselves present while keeping our distance and, without participating, transforming others into visible things." The standard general rhetoric formulation is:

Sophistic Dialogue: Answers gives / takes Answers = Self Value constituted.
Cultural Ethics: Taste establishes Beauty.

To summarize, *aesthetics* consists of existential choices and decisions communicated in practice as behavior (activity: "say") and comportment (capacity: "can do") by two persons in dialogue that define themselves and each other. The chiasm example of *sophistic dialogue* consists of the *answer* of *taste* that is embodied as the Different by the *answer* of *beauty*.

(Answer: taste)   *Say what **you can do** for others,*
(Answer: beauty)   *Say what **others can do** for you.*

The sophistic logic of double answers expresses a positive conjunctive metaphysical condition of the *Different* found in *langage,* i.e., the aesthetic form of dialogue (*ontic*) allows a *difference of value* (*deontic*) to emerge. Merleau-Ponty specifies this sophistic logic as the contingency of *ambiguity.* Not dilemma (bad ambiguity) where each choice is bad, but good ambiguity where there are too many good answers (Eco's anti-Ockham principle).

> There is both a good ambiguity and a bad ambiguity. The philosopher is marked by the distinguishing trait that he possesses inseparably the taste for evidence and the feeling for ambiguity. When he limits himself to accepting ambiguity, it is called equivocation. But among the great it becomes a theme; it contributes to

establishing certitudes rather than menacing them. Therefore, it is necessary to distinguish good and bad ambiguity. Our relation with being involves a double sense, the first according to which we belong to it, the second according to which it belongs to us.

His dialectic, or his ambiguity, is only a way of putting into words what every man knows well – the value of those moments when his life renews itself and continues on, when he gets hold of himself again, and understands himself by passing beyond, when his private world becomes the common world.

(Merleau-Ponty 1953, 4–5, 63)

We must be careful to note that with aesthetics, there is (in the Answer/Answer sophistic dialogue form) the creation of an *analogue choice* (Both/And; moving from the *true* to the *more true;* Plato's maieutic philosopher). This analogue is itself a *context* for a secondary *digital choice* (Either/Or; the true or false; Plato's dialectic rhetorician). Thus, Merleau-Ponty's "feeling for ambiguity" is to adopt problematic contingency in *langage* as thematic, to adopt a *context* (both true and more true) for a (new, unexpected) *different* secondary *digital choice* (Either/Or; the true or the more true). This is the foundation of non-Aristotelian logics such as those detailed in General Semantics (Berman 1989) and is one explication of the Communicology Axiom [Both (Both/and) And (Either/Or)] (see Figure 2).

Note this logic is how rhetoric overtakes grammar to allow such Aristotelian grammatical "category mistake" value choices as "perfect" versus "more perfect." Simply put, an analogue deontic choice (*should be* more or less) is substituted for a *digital ontic choice* (*is* true or false). To get a practical sense of the aesthetic value system [good vs. more good; moral vs. more moral] at work here, just substitute, in "the context of eating," the terms "satisfied" for "good" and "gluttony" for "more good."

Returning to aesthetics, expression by the Self is the conversational dialectic wherein expression of the Other converges in a signification of *taste* (discernment) thus allowing divergence of compatible *significations* (appreciation) as a sense of beauty [*Weltanschauung*].

Figure 12. The sophistical aesthetics value system

There are four steps to this sophistic dialogue process, experienced positively by both persons in the conversation. From each person's *existential perspective* (Different/*langage:* Figure 12) as *embodied speaking,* there is a *double chiasm:*

Aesthetics:
1. An *Apposition Decision* about **Other** (Convergence of *both* SELF *and* SAME) *allows*
2. An *Opposition Choice* about the **Different** (Divergence of *either* SAME *or* DIFFERENT).

Sophistic:
3. An *Apposition Decision* about **Langue** (Convergence of *both* PAROLE *and* DISCOURS) *allows*
4. An *Opposition Choice* about the **Langage** (Divergence of *either* DISCOURS *or* LANGAGE).

Merleau-Ponty (1954) gives a sense of sophistic dialogue by suggesting that *taste* can be exemplified as an *object* in the guise of an *event:* the *news item* [*les faits divers,* literally "divergent facts"] in the daily newspaper. Whereas *beauty* will be found as a literary *event* in the guise of an object: the *novel.* On the existential side, news items are *glanced* (description), *gazed* (reduction), *witnessed* (appeal for interpretation): "True little incidents are not life's débris, but *signs, emblems,* and *appeals*" (313).

> Yet there is more and less in the novel than there is in true little incidents [news items]. It foreshadows momentary speech and gesture, and comments on them. The author lends herself to the character, makes us enter her inner monologue. The novel gives the *context.* The news item on the contrary strikes us because it is life's invasion of those who were unaware of it. The new item calls things by their name [*true*]; the novel names them only through what the characters perceive… The novel is *truer,* because it gives a totality, and because a lie can be created from details which are all *true.* The news item is *truer* because it wounds us [*glance* = signs] and is not pretty to look at [*gaze* = emblems]. They meet only in the greatest, who find [*witness* = appeal], as has been said, the 'poetry of truth'.
> (1954, 313; my emphasis and inserts)

Merleau-Ponty is reducing the *analogue object of taste* (from news item to novel, from story to history), while he is explicating the *digital event of beauty* (either true or truer; either narrate the public/inauthentic value, or, voice the authentic personal value). The news item begins with a *habitus* governed by *intuition* (the auto-reference of a *glance* at the unnamed object), or *subjectivation* (the *glimpse* of a stranger, in our prevue, taken as *true*). The item continues as a hereto-reference of *objectivation* (the objective *gaze,* with time, becoming subjective as familiar

and nameable – *more true*). The item comes to rest as a *hexis* governed by *reflection* (the object turned *event* in "public narrative" and finally *registered* in "personal narrative" as the *truer* event by the *witness*) (Morot-Sir 1993/1995, 2: 11, 21; see Figure 3).

The witness "personal narrative" always has the truer event account of the object of perception, just as the reader of the novel can witness himself or herself in the "public narrative" voice (a good novel) or not (a bad novel). A successful novel both tells a story (personal narrative/time) and offers a possible history (public narrative/space). Some novels are marginal, having only one narrative success in moment or place (Kristeva's *intertextuality*). Bad novels fail at narrative. The achievement of the *sublime* novel is the creation of a narrative voice that combines auto- and hetero-reference as *writer expressed* (Barthes' "modern scriptor") and *reader perceived* as *author* (Eco's *lector in fabula*; Kristeva's *transpositionality*) (Lanigan 2001).

The fundamental aesthetic criterion of *difference* in *langage* accounts for the constitution of *Self values* by finding answers (discernment) within answers (appreciation) as a standard sophistic logic (Figures 8 and 12). This approach to discourse analysis through a logic of values grounded in metaphysics is precisely why Immanuel Kant privileges *poetic* (as aesthetics) over *rhetoric* (as politics), and, *maieutic* (as ethics) over *sophistic* (negatively valued as immorality) as a manner of *taste* (Lanigan 2016, 2017a). Ironically, Kant's objection to sophistic oratory (versus appreciation for rhetoric as logical discernment) may be applied to modern analytic philosophy which takes "language use" and "speech acts" to be value free objects (ideal "objects") in epistemology. Here, Kant would call this absence of metaphysical commitment in logic and language to be immoral, unethical, impolitic, and ugly. Perhaps, Donald Trump is again a case in point.

4.5 Value categories: Summarizing chiasm values

By way of summary, let us recall that in the classic Greek conception, *axiology* is the study of *values* (ethics, aesthetics, politics, rhetoric) or *decisions* displayed in behavior. Whereas, *dialogue* is the study of *discourse* (dialectic, sophistic, rhetoric, maieutic,) or *choices* displayed in judgement. I examine, in a preliminary way, the dynamics of human communicology (decision choices) wherein the method of semiotic phenomenology accounts for Husserl's maxim that "subjectivity is intersubjectivity." The primary methodology for this analysis is the *chiasm logic* of Maurice Merleau-Ponty and Michel Foucault.

Figures 13 and 14 (see Figure 5) provide a summary depiction of the axiological system of semiotic phenomenology used by Merleau-Ponty as a tropic logic (*chiasm*) approach to communicology. By custom in Europe (*Port-Royal General*

Grammar of 1660; *Port-Royal General Logic* of 1662), the *tropic* logic thematic is called General Rhetoric, while the discourse problematic is termed General Grammar (in the tradition of the *Trivium*, Figure 15; Dominik and Hall 2007). This thematic and problematic serve (White 1978), in turn, as a rhetorical methodology for Michel Foucault's progressive program in the study of discourse as progressively archaeology (description), genealogy (reduction), and critical method (interpretation). The technical *abductive logic* derives from Louis Hjelmslev's (1943)

MERLEAU-PONTY'S CHIASM BARTHES-HJELMSLEV MODEL ©2017 R.L.LANIGAN			
Sign function phenomenology	**Sr: Rhetoric (Nameless Voice*)**		**Sd: Ideology (Voiceless Name**)**
Connotation (Reflexivity)	Sr **A** [Substance]	Sd # **a** [Attribute]	Sr # **B** [Whole]	Sd **b** [Part]
Step1: Description of the SIGN REGISTER	METONYMY		SYNECDOCHE	
Denotation (Reversibilty)	Sr **A** [Substance] *SELF* *Parole* *Énoncé*	Sd **B** [Whole] *OTHER* *Langue* *(Énociation)*	Sr **b** [Part] *SAME* *Discours* *(Savior)*	Sd **a** [Attribute] *DIFFERNT* *Langage* *(Connaissance)*
Step 2: Reduction of the SIGNIFIER AUTO—REFERENCE	METAPHOR *HEXIS*		SIMILE >> << IRONY HABITUS	
Le Méme et L' Autre	CHIASM *(the 4 term structure of contingency)*			
Real (Reflectivity)	Sr *{Signifying SignifieR}* **A [a+B]** [Substance = Attribute + Whole] "the Substance Attributes a Whole" [Quality constrains Quantity]		*{Signifying SignifieD}* Sd **B [b+a]** [Whole = part + attribute] "the Whole attributed by the part" [Quantity constrains Quality]	
Step 3: Interpretation of the SIGNIFIED HETERO—REFERENCE	ASYNDETON*		PROSOPOPOEIA**	

Legend: #signifies "Floating" Sd [signified] and Sr [signifying]

Figure 13. Merleau-Ponty's tropic logic communicology

account of communication (see Fig 2). This is the work on which Roland Barthes (1964, 1970) and Roman Jakobson (1954; Holenstein 1974a,b), subsequently Claude Lévi-Strauss (1958), also rely in their respective theory construction.

Let me conclude with an axiological discourse example. Wazlawick (1978, 76) attributes the example to Oscar Wilde: "The only difference between (1) a sinner and (2) a saint is that every saint has (3) a past and every sinner has (4) a future." While humorous, the example provides us with an explication of an *aphoristic chiasm*. It expresses the discourse movement from: (1) *morality* as the *caring voice* of concern in the Self; to (2) *ethics* as the *voice of regard* and respect for the Other; to (3) *politics* as the Same *voice of interest* engagement; and, to (4) *aesthetics* as the Different *voice of discerning* appreciation. As Merleau-Ponty (1953, 58) remarks, "Since philosophy is expression in act, it comes to itself only by ceasing to coincide with what is expressed, and by taking its distance in order to see meaning."

TRIVIUM — The Greek / Latin Model of French Discourse			Roman Jakobson ELEMENTS (Functions)
© 2017 Richard L Lanigan *adaequatio rei et intellectus* [agreement between things and mind]			
LOGOS Sēmeion [Sign EXPRESSION] Speaking = *Discours* [Inflection, Articulation, Meaning] Greek "Active Voice" Practices / Codes = *Parole*		Syncategorematic *(Semantic Meaning)* [*signans*] (Teleology: Coal-Intcndcd; *Absent Presence*)	[**Metaphor**] { Simile / Irony } *Prosopopoeia* [Nameless Voice] { Greek "Active Voice" }
TRIVIUM MAJORUM	Rhétorique Générale	How does the intellect use speech *(parole)* to translate reality?	Trope of Speaking Subject-Related Phenomena	AddresseR (Emotive / Expressive)
	Grammaire Générale	How does the intellect use *dialect (longue)* to translate reality?	Figure of Writing Independent of Subject Phenomena	AddresseE (Conative / Interpretive)
	Logique Générale	How does the intellect use *thought (mythos / logos)* to translate reality? Mode of Signifying [*modi significandi*]	*APPOSITION:* Binary Analogue [*Both/And*] Choice-OF-Context [for Choosing] {3 part Action}	Code (Metalinguistic / Glossing) [*Communication Theory*] { Greek "Middle Voice" }
TRIVIUM MINORUM	**LEXIS Symbolon [Symbol PERCEPTION]** Writing = *Langage* [Inscription, Punctuation, Signification] Greek "Passive Voice" Symbolizes /Signifies = *Langue*		Categorematic *(Syntactic Signification)* [*signatum*] (Telenomy: Goal-Directed; *Present Absence*)	[**Metonymy**] {Synecdoche} *Asyndeton* [Voiceless Name] { Greek "Passive Voice" }
	Rhétorique Spéciale	How does the intellect use *speech (parole)* to symbolize reality?	Mode of Event / Occurrence [*medium fluxus*]	Contact (Phatic / Punctuating)
	Grammaire Spéciale	How does the intellect use *dialect (langue)* to symbolize reality?	Mode of State / Existence [*medium permanentis*]	Context (Referential / Cognitive)
	Logique Spéciale	How does the intellect use *thought (mythos / logos)* to symbolize reality? Mode of Signifying [*modi significandi*]	*OPPOSITION:* Binary Digit [*Either / Or*] Choice-IN-Context [is choosing] {2 part Act}	Message (Poetic / Articulating) [Information Theory]

Figure 14. The tropic logic model of the *Trivium*

CHIASM DISCOURSE COMMUNICOLOGY			
MODAL *EXPRESSION AND PERCEPTION* ©2017 R.L.LANIGAN	***THINKING*** (WHORF-SAPIR HYPOTHESIS) Pragmatics / Symbolizing [*Tropic Logic*]	***SPEAKING*** (TROPE OF SPEECH) Semantics / Meaning [General Semantics 'ladder of abstraction']	***WRITING*** (FIGURE OF LANGUAGE Syntactics / Signification [*Narratology*]
TRIVIUM →	**LOGIC**	**RHETORIC**	**GRAMMAR**
APHORISM ↓	*LEXIS* [*Prosopopeia* = Voiceless Name]	Lecture ["Abstract Meaning" = "Speakable"]	Recitation (Public Narrative) [*L'histoire = History*]
a	*Langage* [Simile / Irony]	TYPOLOGY ["Animal"]	READER as Authority (*Lector in Fabula*) [Reader Response]
b	*Langage* [*Synecdoche*]	TYPE ["Dog"]	SELF WRITER as Authority (Memoir) ["Scriptor"]
B	*Discours* [*Metonomy*]	TOKEN ["Pet"]	WRITER Other as Authority (Biography)
A	*Parole* [*Metaphor*]	TONE ["Sport"]	AUTHOR Self as Authority (Auto-Biography)
↑ *CHIASM*	*LOGOS* [*Asyndeton* = Nameless Voice]	Oration ["Concrete Meaning" = "Un-Speakable"]	Declamation (Personal Narrative) [*L'histoire = Story*]

Figure 15. Communicology synthesis of aphorism and chiasm

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Fragments, limbs, and dreadful accidents

The burden of an ecological education in a
"World of Wounds"

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Conservation, as a uniquely human ethical practice is taught, understood, and managed through human dialogue. So, what would more apt dialogic principles look like if of our goal becomes aligned with the ideal of sustaining human life on this planet in perpetuity? This chapter contributes to the literature on dialogic ethics by examining our current water pollution crisis to argue for embracing Aldo Leopold's language of biotic communities as a way to decenter the human ego in dialogue and put a premium on our collective dependence on what the Sioux Nation have popularized in their struggle against the North Dakota Access Pipeline (DAPL) as a sacred resource.

Keywords: communication ethics, ecology, DAPL, conservation, water rights

And when one restores his eyes to the blind he sees too many wicked things on earth, and he will curse whoever healed him

> *Nietzsche*, Thus Spoke Zarathustra: A Book for None and All

1.   Introduction

In many ways, 2016 was a landmark year for water protection advocacy in the United States. In the midst of a bitter presidential election that led eight in ten American voters to feel "repulsed" by the state of American politics (Martin, Sussman, and Thee-Brenan 2016), voter discontent extended far beyond the presidential race. A growing national crisis of water pollution featured prominently in the minds of citizens and populated the headlines of local, national, and online news media outlets. A casual search of Google News for the term "pipeline" for the year 2016 will return around 2,500,000 results including news articles and blog posts, while an identical search for the year 2015 will return 890,000 and only 282,000 results for the year 2014.

Water pollution is a growing environmental problem in the US and globally. In the US, the ongoing water crisis in Flint, MI, which began in 2014 when the Flint River became the drinking water source for its residents, has resulted in a $722 million class action suit filed against the Environmental Protection Agency by more than 1,700 residents of Flint.[1] According to the suit filed January 30, 2017, the cost cutting measures that led to the contamination of the city's drinking water supply have resulted in impaired cognition in countless children exposed to lead, along with reduced fetal growth in pregnant women, and 87 cases of, and 10 deaths from, Legionnaire's disease. The situation in Flint is so dire that the World Health Organization called the health impacts of the Flint Water Crisis "untreatable and irreversible," pointing to a report the organization released in 2010 on the effects of childhood lead poisoning.[2]

The Flint water crisis captured the attention and heart of the American public for a relatively short period of time. In truth, the crisis still rages on with no resolution in sight, but the urgency of this topic has since taken the form of another ongoing water crisis, the fight against the North Dakota Access Pipeline (DAPL). In many ways, the #NoDAPL movement has galvanized the support of the American and global community in a way that the Flint water crisis never did. From the millions of dollars that have poured in from the public in support of the #NoDAPL protests, to the appearance of more than 2,000 American veterans in Standing Rock to put their own bodies in between the local police and the Standing Rock Sioux Tribe battered Water Protectors, the #NoDAPL movement has garnered the sympathy of the American public in a way that few other contemporary environmental struggles have.

And yet, this crisis, too, rages on with little hope for an ecologically-sound resolution. By all appearances, the Dakota Access Pipeline or Bakken oil pipeline will begin transporting 470,000 barrels of crude oil from North Dakota, through South Dakota and Iowa, into Illinois in the second quarter of 2017. Mainstream media coverage of the conflict largely portrays the conflict as a clash between economic progress and indigenous rights. A CNN article by Holly Yan (2016) portrays what is at stake in this controversy as "an economic boom that makes the country more self-sufficient or an environmental disaster that destroys sacred Native American sites."

To an extent, Ms. Yan is right. One of the contentions of the Sioux is that the water that flows through the Cannonball River is necessary for the sweat lodges at the center of Sioux worship. The Sioux also worry that an oil spill will permanently

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1. See, "Flint Water Crisis Fast Facts." *CNN.com*. Retrieved from http://www.cnn.com/2016/03/04/us/flint-water-crisis-fast-facts/

2. Word Health Organization Report on "Children and Lead Poisoning".

destroy sacred sites where many of their ancestors are buried. The issue of indige-
nous rights may even accurately describe the fact that the Sioux see the pipeline as
an infringement on a land that is rightfully theirs through the Fort Laramie Treaty
of 1851. What fits less neatly into the framing of indigenous rights is the fact that
the Sioux's call to "defend the sacred" along with their self-appointment as Water
Protectors has equally to do with the straightforward environmental harm that the
pipeline presents to tribal nations and the American public at large.

As Spotted Eagle, a Standing Rock Water Protector, explains in an article
published by Salon.com, "water is the best medicine, the sustainer of life" (Marty
2016). Thus, the concerns of the Sioux certainly go beyond the protection of cul-
tural and religious patrimony. The sacredness of this natural resource lies in the
role it plays in our ability to survive as a species.

The Water Protectors have good reasons to worry. According to the National
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration's Emergency Response Division, far
from being a rare occurrence, "thousands of oil spills occur in U.S. waters each
year" ("Largest oil spills" 2017). Furthermore, an article by Dan Zakowski (2016)
in ECOWATCH, the nation's leading environmental news site, confirms that 220
'significant' pipeline spills in 2016 alone expose a troubling safety record.

Oil spills do more than eat up billions of dollars in clean up costs. An in-depth
report from the Worcester Polytechnic Institute (2010) investigated the health ef-
fects of three major oil spills and found "increased incidences of cancer and di-
gestive problems in people who had ingested the oil directly (in drinking water)
or indirectly (through eating the meat of livestock exposed to the oil)" (Brodwin
2016). It is no wonder, then, that Water Protector Aries Yumul echoed Spotted
Eagle's proclamation of water as life-sustaining by referring to the pipeline as a
"death sentence" when reflecting on the many aquifers and rivers at risk of con-
tamination (Brodwin 2016). Schandorf and Karatzogianni (2017) argue the reason
for the popularity of the #NoDAPL movement lies, at least partially, in the growing
impact of digital activism in mobilizing social consciousness. This may be true,
but it appears that public interest in both the Flint water crisis and the #NoDAPL
movements is centered around concern for the communities victimized rather
than around the understanding that water is or should be sacred to us all. The
short-lived outrage over the Flint water crisis and fading news coverage of the very
much still embattled, Water Protectors, point to a lack of awareness of the ecologi-
cal significance of these events. Why is this the case? What gets in the way of the
public fully grasping the all-out assault on our most precious resource?

The remainder of this essay will explore the possibility of a fear among the
larger population of seeing these water crises as connected and catastrophic
on ecological terms. This apprehension will be investigated through Friedrich
Nietzsche's theories on subjectivity, along with relevant Freudian and Lacanian

insights, to get a better perspective on the sources and manifestations of this denial. Then, I will turn to a discussion of how we might use these frameworks to better promote an ecological education anchored in an ecological dialogic ethic.

2.   Fragments

Environmental change is often the product of paradoxical, complex, and intertwined political processes that by their very nature affect nations, eco-systems, and social groups in quite disproportionate and politically significant ways. These problems are made worse by the fact that we inhabit a society in which to question the value of economic expansion, technological progress or serious ecological concerns often renders one a do-gooder, kill-joy or worse, a misanthrope (i.e. putting trees before people). Once this occurs, one is alienated and unable to continue the kind of dialogue that leads to environmental change.

On the other hand, a successful ecological education is engendered through communication practices directed by ethical principles capable of confronting the environmental challenges to our species. So, what would more apt dialogic principles look like if of our goal is to confront the limits of human development responsibly and how should those principles guide human dialogue?

Widely regarded as the father of wildlife ecology, Aldo Leopold struggled to find answers to many of these questions. He mused not only about the role of public apathy and denial in relation to ecological issues, but also about its effects on ecologists and the environmentally minded. He states:

> One of the penalties of an ecological education is that one lives alone in a world of wounds. Much of the damage inflicted on land is quite invisible to laymen. An ecologist must either harden his shell and make believe that the consequences of science are none of his business, or he must be the doctor who sees the marks of death in a community that believes itself well and does not want to be told otherwise.   (Leopold 1993, 197)

An interesting feature of this quote is the role that self-deceit plays for both the ecologist, who is in possession of ecological knowledge, and the layman, who actively "does not want to believe" that there are dangers looming in the way of life in which a community is engaged. Furthermore, Leopold highlights the loneliness and alienation the ecologist feels faced with an incredulous or indifferent audience. Both of these elements of interaction restrict our collective ability to develop a true ecological dialogic.

Nietzsche's theories on the origins of language and subjectivity can be helpful in connecting self-deceit to our cultural (in)ability to accept that which is perceived

as a crisis and thus a burden of the past or out of our control. For this reason, the next section will offer a comparison of Nietzsche's theories to traditional metapsychologism and contemporary psychoanalytic theorists, to reveal their implications for more effective dialogue on ecological issues.

3.   Dreadful accidents

To understand how Nietzsche can inform the development of an ecological dialogic, it is important to get a sense for Nietzsche's general theory and history of human motivation. Central to Nietzsche's philosophical project is man's drive for self-preservation (Nietzsche 1974, 73). Simply put, from the onset of man's acquisition of language there has been no stronger, more encompassing, more powerful drive than that which compels human beings to stay alive. This claim has direct implications for Nietzsche's theory of subjectivity, since man's very subjectivity is a result of his incapacity to survive without the collaboration and assistance of others. In Book Five of the *Gay Science*, he lays out his theory of the origin of language and claims it is directly related to our survival instinct. He states, "As the most endangered animal, he (man) needed help and protection, he needed his peers, he had to learn to express his distress and to make himself understood" (1974, 298).

This event, for Nietzsche, not only marks the origins of language but the very birth of human consciousness and subjectivity. His theory proposes a scenario in which man's individual and social identity grows strictly out of his urgent need to communicate with others to ensure his survival. The process would have gone something like this: (1) man responds to threats to his survival by developing a consciousness that allows him to know "himself" and what distresses him, (2) he then comes to "know" how he "feels" and what he "thinks," finally, (3) he figures out a way to make himself understood by others. Nietzsche describes this process as a pivotal event in human development, while acknowledging that prior to this man may have had plenty of thoughts; yet in Nietzsche's view, there is no reason why we should believe that man was "conscious" of any of these thoughts, or that, previously to that point, man had any kind of need for the concept of "I" as he was roaming around the earth as a solitary beast of prey.[3] In this view, man comes to

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3. This idea of a split subject is something that Lacan incorporates into his own view of the subjectivity of man. Though for Lacan the "I" is more of misrecognition, a false sense of self, that comes about by the constant misrecognition of our desires by others even before we learn to speak. In this view, we are born into language and thereby into an alienated relationship to ourselves. Instead, the condition of our existence is premised on a split between this conscious "false sense of self" and the unconscious. In other words, the subjectivity of man is the split itself (Fink 1998, 48).

think of himself and speak of himself as an individual entity who shares something in common with other humans, (i.e. a need to endure).

Finally, from this event forward any kind of understanding of "I" that is not communicable or grounded in the social context becomes unthinkable, impossible. In sum, for Nietzsche, our individuality is always already grounded in the communicative and the social, and our individual selves are thought of and spoken through this collective language of generalities and commonalities without which the subject, as an individual, entity ceases to exist.

Nietzsche's (1974) theories of the origins of language and subjectivity serve as the foundation for his idea that "consciousness does not really belong to man's individual existence, but rather to his social or herd nature" (299). This is a key feature of the Nietzschean subject, since from this idea he concludes that collective language precedes and gives shape to both objects and human beings in the world, not the other way around. Therefore, having severed our experience of the world from any and all "things-in-themselves," any theory of correspondence of language is henceforth barred, as well as any conception of mind-independent, metaphysical truths. Furthermore, our very knowledge of ourselves through language forever alienates us from any possible understanding of ourselves that is not filtered through the social, the collective, what he considers "the superficial." Thus, one is compelled to ask, how can we continue to make normative distinctions when, according to this view, we know there are no metaphysical truths?

To begin to answer this question we have to take a closer look at Nietzsche's concept of becoming. It would be a mistake to assume that just because Nietzsche identifies self-preservation and social relations as the basis for human subjectivity, that this means that there exists any kind of natural law or special ordering to the world we live in. On the contrary, for Nietzsche, the world and human lives alike are devoid of purpose. On Book Three of the *Gay Science* he states, "let us beware of saying that there are laws in nature," by which he means in the teleological sense that one may associate more closely with Hegel and other figures of German romanticism. Simply put, for Nietzsche (1969), there is no doer behind the deed (43), there are only necessities (as in the case of constantly becoming): there is nobody who commands, nobody who obeys, nobody who trespasses. Once we realize there are no grand purposes, we also understand that there are no accidents, for it is only beside a world of purposes that the word "accident" has meaning" (Nietzsche 1974, 168). Moreover, not only is the world, according to Nietzsche, not pre-destined in any way, but human beings as part of that world are in a constant state of becoming. This idea may well have come from Nietzsche's fascination with Heraclitus, who also believed that the world and all things in it are in a constant state of flux and transformation.

The subject, then, for Nietzsche, is little more than a fiction that arises from language, and that is utilized and manipulated by those who want to deceive us into thinking that human beings enjoy a free will. In other words, even if one were to realize that the "I" is nothing but a fiction of language, one would still be unable to know oneself outside of language. Such a realization is not an easy remedy capable of setting us free once we uncover the proverbial "Truth." This is because, as has been established, Nietzsche has a somewhat peculiar view about the undesirability and social function of such truths.

The discussion of truths brings us to the role of self-deceit in Nietzsche's theory of the subject. For Nietzsche (1974), lies and self-deceit are as important to human survival and wellbeing as truths (small t) are. In Book I of the *Gay Science* he states that, "appearance is for me that which lives and is effective and goes so far in its self-mockery that it makes me feel that this is appearance … that among all these dreamers, I, too, who 'know,' am dancing my dance; that the knower is a means for prolonging the earthly dance"[4] (116).

This is but one example of how these so-called superficialities are quite useful and vital to human existence. Since our ability to "know better" is in fact blocked by our use of language, our interpretations become our only way to "know" and understand our selves and our world. For this reason, our questions and critical abilities are as important to human survival as these lies. Without them, we are prone to fool ourselves into embracing other more permanent and unchanging sorts of Truths, which, in fact, constitute an undesirable kind of lie.

There are many lies of this sort for Nietzsche. For example, slave morality, religion, socialism or any other doctrine that attempts to fixate value on objects or ideal are undesirable for Nietzsche because they restrict human potential and freedom. Similarly, one might be inclined to view the constraints of a single-minded, narcissistic, and oppressive view of progress that is based on technocratic values and an unquestionable demand to increase production and profit as undesirable in their rigidity and narrow focus.

We have seen the separate components of Nietzsche's view on the subject prescribe that humans go through life with a healthy dose of skepticism about language and values, our own as well as other's, in order to develop and maintain a proper critical relationship to absolute truths. However, achieving freedom is not as simple as having skepticism or adopting a relativist, attitude toward one another or the Other.[5] There is another layer to Nietzsche's concept of the truth/

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4. Here we have another allusion to the survival instinct in men.

5. Here I am invoking the distinction made by Tim Dean between what Lacan calls the Other which "is inhuman and uninhabitable" versus simply other people. Dean uses this distinction to argue that the psychoanalytic ethic consists of coming to terms with this inhospitability and

deceit relationship that deserves careful attention. Nietzsche insists that active and willful self-deceit is inseparable from our condition as subject; this is similar to the way in which Aldo Leopold describes the laymen's desire to view his community as doing well by actively refusing to believe otherwise, even when faced with hard-hitting facts. Or similar to the way Paulo Freire describes the oppressed embrace of a kind of blind optimism that in its anti-historicity allows disenfranchised groups to conform to dominant groups (Rossatto 2004, 50).

In the Second Essay of the *Genealogy of Morals*, Nietzsche (1969) reminds us that active forgetfulness, which is one example of what he calls deceit, has a very important task in psychological nourishment. He says that forgetting can help us "make room for new things, above all for the nobler functions and functionaries, for regulation, for foresight, premeditation … there could be no happiness, no cheerfulness, no hope, no pride, no present, without forgetfulness" (67). This quote encapsulates a crucial point for Nietzsche's definition of truth, which rests on the idea that, given that the world is only made up of possible interpretations, we have a need to engage in creative action by developing individually and collectively, every "truth". This, in turn, requires that we obscure, forget or ignore a number of other possible alternatives. This is an important point, since without this careful practice of attributing truth-value (though not Truth) to certain ideals, goals, or interpretations, we are at risk of nihilism, which would block any kind of desire on our part to improve our selves or our world.

To clarify a potential misreading, Nietzsche claims this active forgetting, however useful, does not achieve a total harmonizing of our drives. This would be impossible. For Nietzsche (1969), our inner selves are the battlegrounds of feuding and brutal drives that we must acknowledge if we stand any kind of a chance at having a healthy psyche. He writes, "to speak of just and unjust in itself is quite senseless; in itself, of course, no injury, assault, exploitation, destruction can be 'unjust' since (in the absence of governing natural laws) life operates essentially, that is, in its basic functions, through injury, assault, exploitation, destruction, and simply cannot be thought of at all without this character"[6] (76).

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with the Other's resistance to personification". He then moves to identify the unconscious as being the discourse of the Other for Lacan (Dean 1997, 97).

6. Perhaps many readers would be tempted to infer from this language that for Nietzsche, since pain, suffering, abuse and exploitation, and in general, things outside of our control are essential features of the human world, this means that everybody should fend for themselves and be for themselves. This interpretation is incorrect as Nietzsche very clearly endorses specific modicums of being over others. For example, his distinction between building one's character vs. others, undesirable v. desirable truths, good v. bad conscience, all point to a normative ethic that values certain behaviors over others and, in fact, presents them as the right way to be and be with others.

Moreover, to deny the existence of these drives, and give them an outlet on occasion (even the destructive, wicked ones), pathologizes them. He states, "all instincts that do not discharge themselves outwardly, turn inward" (Nietzsche 1969, 84). In short, although through socialization, moralization, and the use of language use our instinct for freedom is forcibly made latent, these drives still rage inside of us, exerting violence on our psyche and effectively producing one of human kind's greatest ills, what Nietzsche (1969) calls *bad conscience* (87).

All together, a Nietzschean morality is anchored by an ontology in which human beings are in a constant process of becoming that mirrors the very nature of the world. Furthermore, said morality is borne of multiple and feuding internal drives that rage war against one another. It is for this very reason that a Nietzschean (1979) morality points to a mistrust of thinking itself as our only hope to achieve freedom (65). For the only essence we might attribute to human beings under this view is that in their quest for survival, they will have to enter a social realm in which their radical individuality will be forfeited and in which their only chance to make themselves endure will be to accept the fluctuating and random nature of our world and the temporality of all that we once hold sacred. This calls for a radical contextualization of our values that recognizes our role in creating truth and therefore affording us a chance to revaluate them in a manner that can benefit the cause of transformation and evolution.

It is important to note that while Nietzsche appears to be describing here a concerted effort by a group of individuals to improve their species, one should not forget that Nietzsche (1990) is also quite vehemently trying to shatter the Hegelian, or more properly Romantic, ideal of a harmonious, unified subject. His attack focuses on the notion that human beings are internally torn by battling drives that we only come to misrecognize as a unity because of a grammatical, linguistic mistake (246), and the misleading preaching of those who want to make the case for a certain brand of moral responsibility. To conclude, the Nietzschean subject, far from only subjected to the deception of others who seek their own survival and domination, also develops its own regulative fictions that ensure its own survival through a measured approach to self-deception.

4. Limbs

Beyond Nietzsche, the idea of self-deception as a human regulative practice also shows up in the traditional meta-psychological literature. Freud's account of sublimation depicts its own psychological mechanisms in the service of preservation, but his discussion is based on his more biological view of the instincts. Freud (1960) distinguishes between two different types of instincts, the sexual instincts,

or Eros, and the self-preservation instincts (37). For Freud, the sexual instincts are more conspicuous and accessible to study, while the instincts for self-preservation, which are assigned to the ego, are far more elusive, although possibly represented by sadism. This is an interesting similarity to Nietzsche's description of the workings of the drives, in which the instinct for self-preservation, though superior to all other instincts, seems to be ontologically at odds with other forms or willing. In both accounts, thus, the individual is divided and in conflict with itself.

There are other significant ways in which the sublimating function of the ego, as described by Freud, approximates some of the features that Nietzsche considers basic to human life, including the idea that a little self-deception, a little re-directing of one's energies (i.e. some sublimation), is necessary to cope with the polarizing demands of our instincts. For Freud (1960), "the ego's work of sublimation results in a diffusion of the instincts and a liberation of the aggressive instincts of the super-ego." (59) But for Nietzsche, such an enterprise could not be successful for long, since the very nature of our world is for it to be in conflict with other parts of itself (albeit without regulating laws) and for our instincts to resurface in other ways if we try to repress or more generally ignore them. So while Eros seeks to unite and bind our drives in order to establish a potential unity, for Nietzsche the human subjectivity is irrevocably disjointed and any tendency toward a permanent harmonization and reconciliation of these should be considered fictional and suspect.

Still, in *Civilization and Its Discontents*, Freud (1961) describes the process of sublimation as "another technique for fending off suffering" (29) and as an "especially conspicuous feature of cultural development," a vicissitude that has been forced upon the instincts entirely by civilization (51). I believe this resonates, in part, with Nietzsche's idea that our struggles with the drives are only amplified by our necessary interaction in a larger social context. The main difference here is that, in Nietzsche's account, this process of sublimation does not necessarily have to articulate a "no," but it can also affirm a "yes" – a yes to change, a yes to becoming, a yes to freedom.

Of course, it is important to note that the process of sublimation for Freud is also based on the idea of an Eros that is a properly sexual drive. In Nietzsche's account of subjectivity this is not necessarily the case. Nietzsche's use of sublimation can be interpreted as either the instinct for freedom forcibly made latent or, more generally, the way in which truth (small t) always includes an element of purposeful concealment as it attempts to create. One cannot separate the one from the other. More importantly for Nietzsche, it is critical that these concealments remain temporary and fluid, since if we tried to sublimate or conceal some of these instincts in a permanent fashion, we may fall pray to what Freud would diagnose

as neurosis, and what Nietzsche would describe as the instincts turning back upon ourselves, *bad conscience.*

On the other hand, if we look at sublimation in terms of an instinct for freedom forcibly made latent, we would discover a similar scenario, with perhaps an unconscious element that does not seem so obvious in the more general example. This is perhaps the interpretation that fits best with the idea of Freud's egos interacting "behind the scenes" with the id. However, one major difference remains irreconcilable between the Freudian and Nietzschean versions of sublimation. Namely, that Freud attributes equal importance to two types of instincts: Eros, v. self-preservation instincts, whereas for Nietzsche, the self-preservation instinct, which can also be seen as the will to power, rules all others.

This section attempted to make the case that Nietzschean and traditional meta-psychological theories of self-preservation and the will to power can be helpful to reassess current dialogic principles that can help us better address the particular challenges posed by contemporary ecological crises. I have tried to show that an ecological education may require that we recognize the phenomena of denial, self-deception, and sublimation as intrinsic parts of our psyche, and by extension, of our dialogic practices. Additionally, I have tried to show that Nietzsche's account of the development of language is also an ontological account of the development of a cooperative, inter-dependent base to social relations, based on a primordial instinct for self-preservation.

The final section of this chapter will explore the viability of an ecological dialogic modeled after the classic therapist-patient relationship described in the psychoanalytic literature. The therapist-patient relationship is proposed as analogous to the ecologist-layman relationship that Leopold describes in the quote offered at the beginning of this chapter. After all, a proper psychoanalytic session is premised on communication and cooperation as resources for endurance and does not only have it as its goal to uncover a particular aspect of the patient's personality or true self (as Freud would have theorized with his concept of slips of the tongue, for example); it also claims to aid the patient figure out their own truths.

5. Groundwork for an ecological dialogic in a world of wounds

> An ethic, philosophically, is a differentiation of social from anti-social conduct. These are two definitions of one thing. The thing has its origin in the tendency of interdependent individuals or groups to evolve modes of cooperation."
>
> Aldo Leopold, Sand County Almanac

The concept and goals of an analytic situation might seem contradictory or counter-intuitive to dialogic communication at first, given the power imbalance perceived in the relationship between therapist and patient. This is a mistaken assumption that views the "expert" in an analytic situation as a neutral participant, unaffected by her interactions with her analysand. However, in truth, according to Adam Phillips (1996) in *Terrors and Experts*:

> Freud presented his patients – and his readers – with two useful paradoxes. Firstly, you can only tell yourself a secret by telling somebody else. And secondly, people are only ever as mad (unintelligible) as other people are deaf (unable or unwilling to listen). "It's not only beauty that is the beginning of terror, it's also listening.' (34)

In other words, insofar as the analysand is engaged in a quest for meaning, searching for truth with a small t, and finding ways to direct his or her actions in situations of perceived crisis, psychoanalysis helps turn panic into guided action, since "it is terror that traditionally drives us into the arms of experts" (Phillips 1996, xii). Thus, in Freud's framework, the analytic session is an example of a dialogic situation in which feelings of uncertainty, fear, and despair can be used as an opportunity to bring about a transvaluation, or the creation of new values via engagement in communication with an other.

Phillips (1998) continues:

> The psychoanalyst and her so called patient share a project. The psychoanalyst, that is to say, must ask herself not, am I being a good analyst (am I wild enough, am I orthodox enough, have I said the right thing?) But what kind of person do I want to be? There are plenty of people who will answer the first question for her. Faced with the second question, there maybe terror but there are no experts. (xvii)

Similarly, when it comes to the public, the laymen facing the burden of an ecological education, or a realization of the scale of ecological devastation that human beings have brought on our water resources, dialogue may be used at the service of averting despair, despondency or, indeed panic, by focusing on acceptance of the irreversible damage that has been done, its historicity, and also on the possibility of bringing about a more responsible ethic to life via future actions.

This view is not far from the educational psychology, liberation psychology, and most recently, ecopedagogy that has been steadily gaining ground in Latin America by combining Paulo Freire's dialogic pedagogy to psychoanalytic principles. Ecopedagogy was born in 1992 during the second Earth Summit, held in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil to address properly the historical need to integrate universal education and an environmental ethic, inspired by that fact that Paulo Freire was himself moving in this direction upon his death in 1997, while at work on a book of ecopedagogy.

While there is no telling how far Freire would have taken his ideas on ecopedagogy, we can continue his work by paying special attention to how dialogic principles can aid the public in dealing with environmental crises. This is why I think the Leopoldian land ethic can be uniquely suited as a guiding ecological dialogic principle. The land ethic is based upon the concept of a healthy land, which is already imbued with interpretation and human meaning, since the definition of the word "health" is almost always relative to its historical, political, and ecological contexts.

In other words, in so far as it falls squarely on the shoulders of human beings to negotiate and specify the specific meaning of a healthy land, human dialogue is a decidedly integral component of a land ethic. Indeed, human values and revaluation are essential components of a land ethic. Thus, the land ethic is not an environmental philosophy that puts human interests below non-human ones. In fact, the land ethic calls for the conceptualization of all species on the planet as part of biotic communities, or communities that engender and sustain some form of life in a particular landscape for a given period of time.

Another reason why it can be said that the notion of the health of the land is inclusive and mindful of human values is that when all is said and done, the earth, the land, does not have a consciousness, nor can it be said to care for the survival or flourishing of the human species. This should be reminiscent of the Nietzschean way to characterize the nature of our world as intrinsically in tension with human needs. Indeed, whether humans get to live on this planet for many more years or the advent of some catastrophic event ends human life as we know it sooner than later, it is human life that is at the risk of perishing. In other words, the earth, though not many of the species that currently inhabit the planet, might continue to exist, but human beings are at risk of extinction.

Moreover, the idea of a healthy land is already imbued with the concern for conserving the self-renewing capacities of the land so that it may sustain the greatest level of biodiversity and facilitate the survival of its citizens, including, of course, human beings. The end goal, then, of a proper land ethic is a "shared duty" that reflects "the existence of an ecological conscience, and this, in turn, re-

flects a conviction of individual responsibility for the health of the land" (Freyfogle 2006, 22).

This may sound like a difficult point to sell to the public at large, but in Leopold's (1968) words, "no change in ethics was ever accomplished without an internal change in our intellectual emphasis, loyalties, affections, and convictions" (210). Another way to put this is to borrow a phrase from Arnett and Arneson (1999) in their description of Freire's understanding of dialogue, an ecological education is "not for the fainthearted" (169). In other words, a Leopold's land ethics, too, calls for a revaluation of our values.

The ecological dialogic challenge is to transform our instrumental relationship to land by understanding ourselves as part of a greater community that depends on one another, as Nietzsche theorized of human individuals, for survival. To be sure, according to Wendy Brown's (1995) *Wounded Attachments*, the concept of interdependence flies in the face of our modern, popular, and particularly western, cultural worship of independence as an ideal, i.e. the self-reliant, self-made capacities of the liberal subject (67).

Americans today eagerly purchase the latest technology, support development, and desire progress for the sake of achieving independence. For example, a quick perusal of the stories behind the evergrowing number of pipeline and fracking projects propping up all over the nation cite "energy independence" as the benevolent goal behind these dangerous enterprises. Thus, in a society where no longer needing to rely on others to meet one's basic needs help up as the ideal, the land ethic's ecological foundation of inter-dependence will undoubtedly generate some cognitive dissonance.

What is at stake in our relationship to other biota, and resources like water and land, is precisely an acceptance of the relationship of interdependence with the land. Eric T. Freyfogle rightly contends that the reason why conservation is failing as an ethic, as an ideal, and social movement today is because the values that it purporting to the general public almost directly contradict the values that industrialism, market values, and a dominant liberal ideology have popularized in the west.

An important potential criticism of the land ethic as a dialogic tool is its focus on using the language of biotic communities to refer to landscapes inhabited by humans and non-humans alike. Brown (1995) critiques similar rhetorical moves by pointing out the colonialist effects "unifying discourses" can inject into communication and, by extension, advocacy efforts. Here, she follows Foucault in cautioning the reader about "the annexing, colonizing effects of invariable unifying discourses" that, in her view, do little more than erase important differences between groups (Brown 1995, 63). Interestingly, Brown (1995) singles out Nietzsche as falling pray to said colonizing rhetorical practice of decontextualizing

difference; she states: "Nietzsche ascribed to it: namely, an effect of domination that reiterates impotence, a substitute for action, for power, for self-affirmation that re-inscribes incapacity, powerlessness and rejection" (69).

My response to this line of criticism is to highlight the ecological, as opposed to merely environmental, approach of a land ethic. An ecological approach necessitates a valuation and understanding of the differences among members in a group, as these differences are immediately relevant to the healthy functioning of an eco-system. Nonetheless, her warning is a useful one, and it ultimately helps evaluate the merits of a land ethic to avoid simply endorsing yet another ethic that aims to wash out the differences and "otherness" embedded in our relationship to members of a group. Ultimately, the land ethic's ecological approach, helps us come to terms with the differences that exist between humans and other biotic communities.

Finally, the land ethic foregrounds the fundamental (non-negotiable) state of our interdependence with the earth and the limits of our freedom. By acknowledging this, individuals stand to liberate themselves by challenging the tyranny of the market and its demands for constant growth as it own end. To this extent, the land ethic can help us achieve the goal of coming to terms with an ecological education and develop a proper (non-linguistic) dialectic relationship with the land that can, in turn, help us transform our relationship to it and its inhabitants, including other human beings.

For Leopold, the idea of land health was meant to reflect the dynamic and broad (not fixed) set of contexts in which conservation can provide ethical norms in trying to adjudicate between the one-and-the-many.

Leopold described healthy land as "stable." Not to suggest that natural systems were static but in the more specific sense that land retained its ability to cycle nutrients effectively, and thus maintain its soil fertility. In order to do that, the land needed to have integrity, by which Leopold meant biotic parts necessary for this nutrient cycling to take place. Leopold use "stability" and "integrity" in tandem as a shorthand expression for land health (Freyfogle 2006, 23)

Of course, this Leopoldian ideal of land health depends on the knowledge that human beings can gather (and indeed articulate to one another through dialogue) in order to understand the various relationships of interdependence that are at play in any given eco-system. However, it is critical to make the distinction that while Leopold did not scoff at the insights provided by a scientific knowledge of the land, the type of knowledge that he is endorsing in the previous quote is more akin to Freire's in his insistence on a practical, hands-on kind of knowledge. Leopold referred to this type of knowledge simply as skill, and skill for Leopold came from:

a careful attentiveness to the land and from a readiness to respect nature's equal management role. Skill arose within a person possessed a lively and vital curiosity about the workings of the biological engine, a person inspired by "enthusiasm and affection." These were the human qualities requisite to better land use.

(Freyfogle 2006, 90)

In evaluating conservation, as expressed through the land ethic, we must properly appreciate the role of values such as enthusiasm, curiosity, affection, and knowledge as concepts, which not only seem applicable to our relations to other human beings, but seem to me desirable for an ecological dialogic as well. In addition to the values exalted by the land ethic that have already been identified, the previous quote also signals to a feature of the land ethic that is deeply concerned with individuals seeking a deep knowledge of self (and its relation to land) that does not shy away from recognizing our limitations.

For Leopold, rather than trying to get the land to fit the narrow criteria set by objectors to the conservation agenda, he builds his ethical framework by focusing on the relationships of interdependence that characterize the land and its inhabitants. In this way, Leopold is not bogged down by the idea that we have only moral duties toward moral agents that are language users, able to reciprocate our kindness in a way that mirrors our ethical good will toward that agent, and finally, to those that are able to articulate political demands. Instead, Leopold (1968) posits the role of ethics as a "community instinct in the making" and pushed forward with a symbiotic model of community that replaces free-for-all (bad Nietzscheanism) competition with cooperative mechanisms with an ethical content. He explains:

All ethics so far evolves rest upon a single premise: that the individual is a member of a community of interdependent parts. His instincts prompt him to compete for his place in that community, but his ethics prompt him also to cooperate (perhaps in order that there might be a place to compete for).   (204)

The type of ethical communication or ecological dialogic described here, then, is about environmental issues that teach us that we are born into a sociocultural universe where values, moral commitments, and existential meanings are both presumed and negotiated, as Nietzsche might agree. For Leopold, it is not enough to presume these relationships of interdependence in which the human being operates, but it has become necessary to create a new "community instinct" that very self-consciously works within the constraints of our interrelated nature to reach not just for the flourishing of one community within a given eco-system, but for the health of the land overall.

In other words, for Leopold, it is inconceivable to have a category called "the many" without the biotic community working in symbiosis, in cooperation. Our human livelihood is rooted in the principle that we have inescapable claims on not

just one another but on the land, which cannot be renounced except at the cost of our humanity.

This demands that we use our creative power to trace new goals and possible interpretations for ourselves, even those based on material realities such as the ones pertaining to escalating water pollution. Among the many wills we have feuding within us there is the will to truth; and just as it takes a certain level of strength to falsify, forget, and deceit ourselves in certain strategic ways that will keep us engaged, we must also find strength to accept and rejoice in the idea that our truth and freedom lies in our active, careful, and constant creation of values (Nietzsche 1979, p. 142). This will to truth, which is a part of our will to power, is not something that belongs to each of us uniquely, but a drive which is a part of the world we inhabit. Therefore, the will to truth has to war with all the other drives in nature, but it is up to us to cultivate it in order to protect all that is currently unintelligible, limiting, valuable, beneficial to us and for the sake of future generations. Nietzsche (1979) says, "for every elevated world has to be born or expressed more clearly, bred for it" (145) – a community-instinct in the making, if you wish, as Leopold put it.

Clearly then, any notion of progress for Nietzsche, for Leopold, and for Freire, while not teleological in the Hegelian sense, is possible through our active contribution as individuals, while accepting that our conception of individualism is flawed and fraught with the dangers and limitations that gave rise to it. This is an important point especially for Nietzsche (1976), because man is less of a finality than an ever-becoming spirit. He says, "what is great in man is that he is a bridge and not and end: what can be loved in man is that he is an overture and a going under" (127). Part of our job, then, is to unearth, to embrace an ecological dialogic of what Luc Ferry (1990) calls "hidden worlds" into light, so that future generations can enjoy a world that is much richer, comprehensive and, of course, concealed. (168) This can begin by embracing the language of biotic communities as a way to obscure totally the important differences that must be acknowledged and accepted between species.

Ultimately, for Nietzsche, as for Leopold in the context of a land ethic, these wounds that we have inflicted on ourselves and others must be recognized even at the cost of our own suffering. Suffering is an integral part of the process of acquiring an ecological education not only because we become aware of the gravity of our actions, but because learning to move beyond pain and suffering is one of the key features of becoming. Otherwise, the cost of not acquiring this education, of not seeing oneself as a bridge to the future, are too great. Nietzsche warns that we would be left with *ressentiment* and overwhelming feelings of impotence and despair otherwise. He says:

Willing liberates; but what is it that puts even the liberator in fetters? "It was – that is the will's gnashing of teeth and most secret melancholy. Powerless against what has been done, he is an angry spectator to all that is past. The will cannot will backwards, and that he cannot break time and time's covetousness, that is the will's loneliest melancholy.   (Nietzsche 1983, 139)

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Dialogic ethics

A pragmatic hope for this hour

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Communication ethics conventions commence with locality: historical, social, cultural, and psychological situatedness. Dialogic ethics, as instantiation of communication ethics, does not rest in provinciality alone; dialogic ethics incorporates Immanuel Kant's and Hannah Arendt's emphasis on enlarged mentality, which limits provinciality as one seeks a world greater than immediate proximity. Dialogic ethics invites revelatory possibilities of learning from difference, functioning as pragmatic resistance to imposed answers. Dialogic ethics is "hope for this hour" (Buber 1967/1952), in an era constituted by ethical conflict. Dialogic ethics demands an enlarged mentality that refuses to dismiss the unique characteristics of another's local home. This essay assumes a pragmatic conviction: dialogic ethics is the primary communicative hope in an era defined by ethical contention and conflict.

Keywords: dialogic ethics, conflict, communication ethics, enlarged mentality, hope

> …the order of justice of individuals responsible for one another does not arise in order to restore that reciprocity between the I and its other; it arises from the fact of the third who, next to the one who is an other to me, is 'another other' to me.
>
> (Levinas 2001, 205)

I contend that an era of narrative and virtue contention (Arnett, Fritz, & Bell 2009, 1) is currently a normative communicative reality marked by daily interplay between ethics and conflict. The hope of finding resolutions through imposition of one ethical stance or perspective has given way to a basic existential recognition: contrasting ethical orientations foment conflict. This essay contends that this historical moment necessitates dialogic ethics as a communicative antidote to an era defined by "perpetual peace" (Kant 1793/2006) between conflict and ethics. Dialogic ethics does not presuppose finding truth in *a priori* abstraction; it ventures into communication within the "mud of everyday life," the dwelling of ethics

and conflict in ongoing tension (Arnett, Fritz, & Bell 2009, 36). This historical instance requires learning about and negotiating with differences; dialogic ethics is the postmodern communicative third that carries hope for this hour.

1.   Introduction

This essay examines a historical moment of identity in which the clashing of ethical standpoints makes conflict a communicative expectation. Without clarity of an agreed upon outside ethical standard, only power seems capable of imposing an intervening solution. John D. Caputo (1993) argues this position in his classic work with a pejorative title, *Against Ethics: Contributions to a Poetics of Obligation with Constant Reference to Deconstruction*. Caputo's first chapter announces the importance of deprivileging ethics with a subtitle about the current fate of ethics, "Losing a Good Name." He contends that ethics has lost a good name with a basic consequence; it can no longer lessen disputes between and among persons. This moment testifies to a postmodern reckoning, with ethics morphing into conflict-generating realities. Dialogic ethics in a postmodern era acquires a new name – the communicative "not yet" of ethics co-constructed by persons in contention. The name is long and clunky, consistent with the laborious and demanding task of dialogic ethics in the co-discovery of revelatory insight aligned together in active opposition to singular imposition.

The first section of this essay, "Macro Advice from History," surveys the commonplace reality of ethics in conflict, examining shifts in what good(s) find protection and promotion in various historical moments (Arnett, Fritz, & Bell 2009).[1] Such an exploration offers insight into the changes from one macro good to another. This current historical moment gathers momentum around the good of difference with the reality that all previous goods linked to prior historical moments now exist side-by-side without resolution or universal privilege. This perspective of historical disagreement frames the second section of this essay, "A Good Name No More," which examines the philosophical "how" and "why" of ethical positions in contention. I rely on the insights of Caputo to explicate this case. Others have

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1. Scholars debate the specific dates of historical moments. For the purpose of this essay, the historical moments identified are classical/antiquity (middle of second millennium BCE–6th century AD), Middle Ages (600 AD–1350 AD), Renaissance (1350–1600), Enlightenment (18th century), modernity (1800s-mid 1900s), and postmodernity (latter part of the 20th century – present). For a detailed description or these moments and the debate regarding dates, see Chapter 3 of Arnett & Holba 2012.

made similar claims;[2] however, Caputo's work functions as a Rubicon upon which the further study of ethics in a postmodern context must cross/contend. Caputo's 1993 volume now describes contemporary life; his work displays the communicative reality of ethics in conflict. The final section, "A Pragmatic Turn to Hope," concludes with communicative coordinates for a dialogic ethic capable of addressing such a moment of ethical contention.

This essay is a thought piece on the human condition, articulating the communicative reality of ethics functioning as a background initiator of conflict. Such recognition trumpets a clarion call for education and learning about differences as the pragmatic heart of dialogic ethics. The communicative key to dialogic ethics finds clarity in Kant's (1781/1965) differentiation between imagination and fantasy. Fantasy lives within abstraction, attempting to reside above the mud of everyday life. Imagination, on the other hand, pushes off the real with conviction and hope for unexpected insights. Dialogic ethics dwells within the realistic halls of imagination, pushing off authentic issues and standpoints in order to invite the possibility of creative next steps for engaging difference in ethical positions. Changing historical eras and the philosophical story about the decline of ethics central to Caputo's account offer a matter-of-fact rationale for a dialogic ethic that pushes off this historical moment of glimpse ethics in contention. Pushing off the real opens the world to communicative imagination as the home of creative hope for this hour.

2.   Macro advice from history

Ethical centers of changing goods (what is protected and promoted) in differing historical eras within the West render insight into the reality of ethics in conflict. I limit my remarks about historical periods to the West, my scholarly home – announcing a basic reality of contrasts in ethical commonplaces. Each historical moment finds social distinctiveness through particular questions that necessitate answers responsive to a given time and locality. Hans-Georg Gadamer's emphasis on historicity suggests communicability across time through questions that emerge from real events within particular time periods with each requiring a kindred response (Warnke 1987, 75). The unity of questions and responses shapes a particular historical moment, and the communication between and among historical moments defines historicity. This postmodern era of narrative and virtue contention requires attending to questions that offer identity to a given historical moment that reveals particular good(s) protected and promoted. Answers to ethics in conflict

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2. See Alasdair MacIntyre's *After Virtue*.

do not emerge in the abstract, but within concrete ethical questions, as the following outline of historical alterations indicates.

Conflicts from differing ethical standpoints are commonplace, dominating both local and international news.[3] Accepting communication ethics as important obligates examination of its macro historical roots propelled by ethics in dispute. The distinctiveness of this historical moment – conflict defined by ethics in contention – announces one public point of agreement: difference matters. We live in a period of acknowledged ethical background loss: no longer can one place ultimate hope in Enlightenment claims of rationality and moral progress (Arnett & Holba 2012, 90). The failure of Enlightenment ideals registers confusion within a human community without an outside standard capable of guiding rational discernment.

The cliché of those not knowing history being bound to repeat similar problematic practices emerges anew in relationship to ethics – one must know the history of ethical goods protected and promoted by previous moments.[4] History changes with or without our approval; this particular historical moment of narrative and virtue contention is no exception. Differing historical standpoints protect and promote contrary conceptions of the good. At a macro level of analysis, one witnesses this phenomenon in the shift away from one major good constituted within macro questions that define a given historical era, as the following brief historical rendition indicates.

The classical age, centered on the *polis*, found definition through questions about implementation: How can public virtues assist the well being of the *polis* in daily communicative interaction? Medieval life focused on questions related to church authority: How can an individual follow the direction of the church and contribute to its well-being? The Renaissance engaged questions of creative tension between the authority of the church and emerging individual autonomy: How can an individual determine creative direction within a milieu of decreasing blind allegiance toward undisputed authority? Modernity, in recognition of creative differences, sought to routinize boundaries and responsibilities with questions about

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3. Examples include the Israel and Palestine conflict, the global warming debate, debates concerning gun control, and the conflict concerning ISIS and the War on Terror. See Gladstone, R. (2015, August 3). United Nations members establish 15-year global development agenda. Retrieved from http://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/04/world/united-nations-members-establish-15-year-global-development-agenda.html; Arango, T. (2015, July 21). ISIS transforming into functioning state that uses terror as tool. Retrieved from http://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/22/world/middleeast/isis-transforming-into-functioning-state-that-uses-terror-as-tool.html

4. George Santayana (1863–1952), philosopher and essayist, coined the phrase, "Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it" in his 1905 text *The Life of Reason or the Phases of Human Progress* (284). The phrase was adapted in many forms by speakers including Winston Churchill.

processes and procedures within organizations and nation states: How can those in control package boundaries and responsibilities with the hope of protecting the well-being of processes and procedures? Postmodernity then emerged with a question of difference, interrupting all previous historical moments: How can one learn from difference while avoiding the temptation of assimilation? Well-being aligns with the protection of difference, arguably the only sacred term in a postmodern culture. Postmodernity is a juncture, not an era, functioning as an acknowledging historical pause that announces contention. Postmodernity is often falsely understood as an era after modernity; more accurately, it is a moment of recognition that goods from previous eras co-exist in this current timeframe. Postmodernity, unlike the Renaissance rebellion against the church, contends against processes and procedures that advocate a uniform metanarrative of packaged truth. Postmodernity is a confession and admission: differences are not simply intercultural – they constitute the very fabric of everyday life.

Each historical era protects and promotes contrasting goods, with postmodernity housing the priority of difference, announcing publicly and openly that the protection and promotion of differing goods gives rise to ethical positions in conflict. This essay presupposes a pragmatic reality of this postmodern moment – we live in a period of publicly acknowledged narrative and virtue contentiousness. What makes this era demanding is the loss of defining ethical ground capable of functioning as a standard for dispute resolution. This loss of agreed-upon ethical standards is now absent in a postmodern conversation.

Postmodernity claims that that there is an absent third that trumps all other ethical standards and simultaneously acknowledges that previously reigning ethical thirds are still vying for allegiance. For instance, in a classical epoch, the third of the ethical well-being was the *polis*; the task was to curtail action harmful to the *polis*. In a medieval moment, the third that intervened in disputes was the church, which reminded persons that the well-being of the church must triumph. In the Renaissance, an ethical third dwelled between the creative interplay of church authority and individual autonomy, which protected the well-being of creative rebellion responsive to tradition. The shift in the Renaissance is of importance; the third of ethical well-being is then more abstract, no longer situated within an institution (*polis* or church). Modernity further sophisticates this ethical abstraction of the third with adherence to processes and procedures. The consequence of this move is that leaders within the *polis*, leaders within the church, and leaders within the arts arbitrate conflict; in modernity, the establishment of designated standards of process and procedure witnesses the rise of boundary setting in bureaucratic organizations and nation states. Postmodernity emerges in reaction to modernity's new god – process and procedure. In another work, *Communication Ethics in Dark Times: Hannah Arendt's Rhetoric of Warning and Hope*, I framed modernity's

identity with a secular trinity of efficiency, individual autonomy, and progress (Arnett 2013, 4). Each of the sacred parts of this trinity inevitably leads to conflict; they become ethics imposed upon others under the guise of universal truth.

Postmodernity is inclusive of the goods of all previous eras; we live in a moment defined by ethics in contention. In our contemporary human community, we witness fighting and dying for various versions of a *polis*. Arguably, disputes over church authority are as relevant today as the time of Crusades. Creative tensions between church authority and individual autonomy propel denominational fragmentation and conflict. Modernity's reliance on process and procedure has not ceased giving rise to corporatization and globalization efforts that sacrifice difference for consistency. Postmodernity is a moment of intellectual honesty, articulating the reality of differing stories, which makes a single ethical direction untenable. The postmodern mantra of difference acknowledges that no one good can or should dictate the human condition.

Postmodernity necessitates a dialogic ethic that acknowledges the reality of multiple ethical standpoints. Take, for example, the following dividing lines over ethical disputes: euthanasia (Hyde 2001), work/life balance (Holba 2007), corporate accountability (Christensen, Morsing, & Cheney 2008), and the rising reality of the precariat (Standing 2011). Differing understandings of the good manifest themselves in daily encounters. Such a reality is now normative in an era void of an agreed-upon ethical standard or third capable of curtailing ethics in conflict. This reality finds demonstration in daily events, including the following phone call from a major-city public school district official in the United States.

This official stated in the phone call that conflict was so rampant in the school system that learning was almost impossible. He asked me to assist with the conflict between and among the students. I followed with a basic question, "What do the students do that is so disruptive?" The answer centered on routine rudeness, demeaning and cruel psychological and physical actions. I then asked: "Do these students understand that their behavior is challenging for others and the learning environment?" The answer was a resounding, "Yes!" I concluded with the following: "The problem is not communication, but more fundamentally a lack of ethical concern for the Other – there is no sense of the 'why' of restraint on action." There was no third or standard of well-being capable of protecting others and the learning environment. The problem at the school was one of ethics in conflict in which there is no "common center" of ethical action (Buber 1949/1950) Without an ethical common center capable of gathering a temporally agreed upon set of guidelines, the students have little reason for protecting the well-being of others or their learning environment.

We live in an era where ethical common centers are generally absent. An answer to the previously mentioned school system requires defining macro characteristics

that protect and promote the well-being of multiple goods. One could suggest a *polis* solution, asking students to curtail disruptive behavior for the good of the school. One could use a revised medieval understanding of church authority and ask students to listen and obey those in charge. One could engage a Renaissance endorsement of the struggle between authority and individual autonomy, asking students and teachers to find ongoing creative responses to the disagreements. One could offer a modern solution of adhering to stated processes and procedures. Postmodernity assumes that all of these suggestions might be part of the school's efforts, propelled by a recognition that no one solution renders a final answer. Ethical common centers no longer guide – there is no agreement about a third or public standard that enhances the well-being of a given environment.

Postmodernity is a description of the architecture of a dwelling that houses one basic acknowledgement – the limits of ethics. Heidegger's (1959/1982) famous line of language as the house of Being becomes ethics as the house of conflict. I now frame the "why" of such an era by examining the case *Against Ethics* by Caputo. His work defines this moment of ethical contention; Caputo offered a now fulfilled ethics prophecy about the West – we are in a moment of clashing of goods, no longer able to be protected and promoted by the *polis*, the church, creativity, or procedure. We now abide in a reality of disputed ethical thirds or standards, no longer assured of an ethical common center.

3.   A good name no more

Caputo wrote his major proclamation, *Against Ethics,* outlining the rupture in ethics as a standard in 1993. His analysis takes the reader into the philosophical why of the dissolution of an ethical third. Caputo's interpretive project on the decline of ethics has verification in real life; the human community in the West is now an everyday laboratory of ethics in conflict. At a time when philosophy and the liberal arts embody public disregard (Ginsberg 2011), I am more inclined to believe Richard Bernstein (1983): we live in an era where the philosophical and the practical have crisscrossed. The former permits discernment of changes on the street where the meaning of ordinary activities shifts in signification.

Mark Dooley, in an edited work on Caputo titled *A Passion for the Impossible*, argues that "radical hermeneutics" guides Caputo's work, which follows Friedrich Nietzsche's (1844–1900) unmasking of the Western narrative as a depiction of ethics in strife to its practical conclusion (Dooley 2003, xiii–xx). The assumption that ethical systems provide little utility in an era of ethical contentiousness frames ethics as a "'sibling of the same dark night'" (Dooley 2003, xvii). Caputo is not a nihilist, according to Dooley; instead, Caputo's unmasking of ethics opens the

door to the voiceless and forgotten. As a scholar committed to medieval study and the Catholic intellectual tradition, Caputo also affirms the disruptive insights of Jacques Derrida (1930–2004). Caputo asserts that the "Secret" (Dooley 2003, xxi) of human life attends to a calling that seeks to answer a question. Purity is not the objective of philosophy or ethics; Caputo pursues concerns of the poor, widows, and orphans who call us into an ethics of responsibility. Dooley points to Caputo's sensitivity as suggestive of a postmodern saint. Within the fragmentation of the pure dwells the home of ethics situated with an era of narrative and virtue contention.

In Dooley's edited volume, Merold Westphal (2003) portrays "Postmodernism and Ethics: The Case of Caputo" as an answer to a basic question: Is ethics possible after Kant dismantled metaphysics and this historical moment recognizes no ethical system as primary? Caputo challenges ethics with rejection of a metaphysic of obligation. For Caputo, "obligation happens" (Westphal 2003, 158) without imposition from a metaphysical standard higher than the demands of everyday existence. Obligation is not a call of Being, but a local event, recognized after the fact of doing ethical action. A postmodern philosopher must avoid the model of the scientist and lean toward the journalist, the filmmaker, and the novelist – those that reflect on life without pretense of unmasking its ethical implications (Westphal 2003, 168).

Scholarly response to Caputo's *Against Ethics* announces the pivotal character of his project in a world propelled by the reality of difference. Michael E. Zimmerman (1998) suggests that the Puritan John Winthrop's famous phrase of a "city on a hill" falls considerably short of a contemporary ethical reality (210). There is no city or agreed-upon metaphysic; we are left with the doing of ethics within the temporal moment. The visibility of the good, for Caputo, registers height against injustice (Zimmerman 1998, 210). In alluding to Heidegger, Zimmerman (1998) states that Caputo had enough of the notion of Being, turning instead to unity of contraries, "laughing through my tears," which functions as a prophetic disruption of any hope to accumulate acts of justice (219–220). Caputo's *Against Ethics* offers a hermeneutic of hope for the reader interested in a dialogic ethic, which concludes this essay.

Westphal (1997), in a review of Caputo's work, provides a hermeneutic key of connecting a why of a dialogic ethic to Caputo's argument.

> No doubt Caputo, like the good Humean skeptic, does not live by the lights of his theoretical paralysis. Quite possibly he actually believes obligation to be more basic than *Against Ethics* permits. Perhaps that is why one feels a certain serenity where both anxiety and despair might be expected. (97)

A unity of contraries drives Caputo – a massive critique of the state of ethics and a lingering sense of hope that rests in the shadows. Caputo's work brings to life an image from Philip Slater (1970/1990), who suggested that genuine hope only manifests itself when hope seems eclipsed. Genuine hope is an awakening that commences with the acknowledgement of darkness; with such recognition one reopens the possibility of existential trust (Arnett 1986) that dwells within the unexpected that shelters hope – the unity of contraries shapes the pages of Caputo's project.

Caputo frames the heart of postmodern ethics, referencing Emmanuel Levinas (1989), known for his displacement of Being with ethics with his famous phrase, "ethics as first philosophy" (75–85). Levinas's (1961/1969) first major manuscript was *Totality and Infinity*, which situates the house of ethics in an infinity of unending obligation that is beyond and before a concrete encounter with another. Caputo (1993) counters Levinas's notion of infinite obligation with "partiality" and "resistance" (19). Caputo rejects the assumption that one can be a fool for the kingdom, living on the expectation and hope of a later reward. He understands the role of fool as emergent in given context and is resistive to a metaphysical certainty of assured direction. Caputo's contention is that we must act without teleological assurance; the postmodern fool, however, no longer assumes the reality of a future award. Obligation emerges, more akin to the doing acts of a poet than a legislator (Caputo 1993, 20). A postmodern good does not live within metaphysics or an "homologous standard of goodness"; it emerges in the performance of life. Acts within and in response to existence result in the continuous creation of temporal standards of action. Disasters may have a sameness of description; goodness, on the other hand, is temporally unique (Caputo 1993, 41). A postmodern understanding of the good refuses to manifest itself with sameness and expectation.

The distrust of a reified standard of ethics leads to a basic question, "How do I judge right from wrong without confidence in a standard or third that can offer guidance?" Caputo (1993) answers this question with another unity of contraries assertion, "principle without principle" (121). Caputo's implementation of such an orientation dwells in a basic existential conviction – events happen and people must respond. The process of judgment emerges in the stumbling and catching oneself in response to existence. Caputo differentiates this perspective from *phronesis* that presupposes a golden mean of too much and too little. Caputo's assertion that one must respond with one's whole person invites excess far afield from Aristotle's convention. Caputo contends that

> [J]udging is a much more slippery affair in jewgreek (quasi) philosophy, a more elastic, agile, flexible matter occurring in jewgreek time, and that is why you could talk about suspending the law, or lifting it, or finding ways to let incommensurable individuals slip past it. On the jewgreek paradigm, judging is constantly flirting with abysses, idiosyncrasies, proper names – and with fear and trembling.   (108)

For Caputo, events composed of ethical content happen; they invoke response.

Caputo's primary conversationalist in his ethics project is Levinas. He directly engages Levinas in a section entitled, "Levinas is No Fool," which renders clarity about fundamental differences in their projects. Caputo states his love of Levinas while contending with the linkage between ethics and infinity. Caputo states that one finds limits to Levinas's position on infinity when asked ethical questions about Palestinians. With the stress on infinity, Caputo asserts that ethics and difference begin to look like ethics and the same – "pure obligation is impossible" (124). Caputo rejects ethics that become an expectation of normative ground and action, which displaces ethics from its fundamental terrain of holiness. Caputo wants us to admit the reality of the human condition with us grappling with obligation on the inside, outside, and in the margins; at such moments one is on the "threshold of foolishness" (126). Yet as one pretends to be a fool, or to be held hostage to and for the Other, one also keeps an army, just in case (126).

Caputo underscores the complexity of the notion of fool in a postmodern context. Fools respond uniquely, giving of themselves to that which happens before them. Caputo summarizes the responsive nature of the fool:

> Fools make a gift of themselves. They enter themselves in an economy without reserve, where to expect a repetition is madness. They make mad investments, which guarantee no yield, which even promise a loss. They enter their lives into the history of another madness, turn themselves into a song in praise of another folly. Fools do what is unlikely, unreasonable, impossible, at least not very sensible. (127)

These fools, for Caputo, are not saints; fools do ethics in response to the call of the moment; they do not invoke a prescribed view of the world or an eschatological sense of the future. Caputo paints a stark picture of such persons who give of their lives without demand for public notice. The majority of those who give their lives away as fools fall into "utter obscurity and oblivion, quite forgotten both by the History of Being and the History of the Spirit" (128). They become part of a "cosmic oblivion" (128). Their lives flash, and they are gone; such is the manner of doing ethics in a postmodern culture where response to existence matters (128).

These fools are poets of obligation, giving themselves when events happen, and they respond without ever being prepared for the experience at hand. I disagree with Caputo's rendition of Levinas (1996) in that limits are central to the Levinasian project, with ethics disrupted by justice; ethics is tied to the proximate and justice to the unknown and distant neighbor (168). However, Caputo's point is that fools give away their lives as they meet the demands of the existential moment. Acts of heroism of a fool simply emerge; the postmodern fool responds

without concern for consequences. Such a person of ethical responsiveness lives a poetics of obligation within a frame of tragic-comic realities of obligation.

Caputo then disrupts the reader with a summary of postmodern obligation, which emerges in discourse and in response ever-resistant to predetermined actions. The happening of obligation is what propels responsibility in action. The risk of ethics in a postmodern context dwells in responsiveness and in the temporal doing of obligation. Ethics of immediate obligation is real; it does not remain in an abstract world. One is called forth to respond, giving temporal life to ethics. For Caputo, "phenomenology has a predilection for the reassuring world of ordinary perception and ordinary life. It moves in easy commerce with the well-clothed, well-fed, and well-housed bodies that make their way about in everyday life" (195). However, existence is more akin to disgrace, disease, and shocking empirical scenes of bodies buried alive; sometimes it seems that executions too often target the fair and the just. Such happenings of ethics reside in the disordered and the improper, demanding obligation without assurance.

Obligation, for Caputo, clings to the flesh and interrupts existential routine. Caputo states that flesh becomes flesh by the touch of the Other, and madness propels one to give oneself to another, extinguishing one's youth in service of another. He reminds us that those who extend themselves for Others are often forgotten, or perhaps a movie is made of their lives only to find an audience walking out of the theater, disappointed. Caputo's point is graphically grim – the poetry of obligation does not come with assurance or reward. One meets obligation with response; reward is an agent-driven demand that often goes unattained. Caputo offers a more constructive view of obligation than Ecclesiastes's 'vanity, all is vanity,' where the communicative agent falls in love with the assumption of reward and legacy. Caputo reminds us of ethics in action where one engages obligation that emerges in responsive demand to the temporal moment. Ethics in responsive action is a form of "postmodal logic" (219). Caputo introduces postmodal logic associated with jewgreek poetics as distinct from Greek logic and modal logic. He characterizes postmodal logic as "a paradox, *folie*, madness…it is foolish, a scandal, absurd" (127). Obligation's poets assume a logic that is beyond and before calculation. They do the necessary; such poets of obligation answer the happening of responsibility demanded by existence.

Throughout his book, Caputo minimizes references to metaphysics. The poet does not provide a theory; others may attempt to impose a theory upon the poetic product, but such action does not displace a basic fact – the poem does not tell; it happens on and off the page. This minimalism of structure supports Caputo's assumption that the poetics of obligation dwells within "anarchy," not structure (220). Obligations are fleeting; they are transient noises in the night that seldom mean a great deal to a larger community. Obligations temporally call us from

anonymity, with flesh sacrificing for flesh. Obligation breaks into a life-giving guidance and direction in a given glimpse of time. Obligation emerges in reaction to the emergent and on behalf of those calling for temporal action of responsibility. Caputo points to a poetic obligation of ethics that frames human meaning. Caputo reminds the reader of a painful fact; most of us vanish "without a trace" (247). Caputo concludes, stating that life finds justification not by its beauty, but by ethics in action that goes unscripted when the occasion demands.

Caputo leaves the reader with scattered touchstones of practices tied to "quasi-ethics" (248). Unlike earlier historical eras, there is no standard or third tied to the *polis*, church, creative resistance, or processes and procedures capable of articulating an ethical framework. In a postmodern era of ethical fragmentation, we grapple in the dark within small places, which demand that we stand upright for a brief moment. Caputo reminds us of proper names and one hand grasped by another, which find energy in partiality and responsiveness of a poet. The happening of obligation arises temporally in contrast to darkness, shadows, and uncertainty. These moments are unreliable blinking lights permitting the human to meet an obligation when called, most often as a fool without any hope of reward – just as a poet writes, not to be published, but to engage human reality with an ethical responsiveness that can only be described with the phrase, *I could not do otherwise*. The poet of obligation engages ethics in the demands and happenings of a life. No metaphysical suggestion guides; it is just "me" meeting a happening of obligation with fullness of response and my whole being.

The actual thesis of Caputo is not "against ethics"; he seeks to unmask the danger of imposed ethical *a priori* solutions in an era of fragmentation. As much as Caputo wants to assert independence of his project from Levinas, there is one major commonality – there is a call into an ethical obligation that consists of responsibility without a script or metaphysical mandate. In the words of a philosopher of communication whom I deeply admire, Michael Hyde, the human is ethically wired. Hyde, Levinas, and Caputo all seem to agree on this point of a basic ethical impulse.[5] The question is: What are the practices of such an impulse in era shaped by narrative and virtue contention? In answering this question, I wish to stress one major point Caputo used in his argument against Levinas. Caputo offered "partiality" as a substitute for Levinas's emphasis on "infinity." Caputo rests between Buber's and Levinas's arguments on the nature of reciprocity, with Levinas rejecting it and Buber claiming its necessity. Reciprocity enters conversation about limits and partiality once again. I consider Levinas the central ethicist of the 20th and 21st centuries, as *Levinas's Rhetorical Demand: The Unending Obligation of Communication Ethics*, my recently completed book on his project, attests. Yet,

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5. Also see Benhabib 1992; Lipari 2014; Arneson 2014; West 1993; Petrilli & Ponzio 2003.

I cannot shake Caputo's message about ethical limits, partiality, and temporal obligation; such insights enliven the work of Buber.

4.   A pragmatic turn to hope

I now turn to Buber for clarity on this historical moment of fragmentation. The events of World War II reified the reality of postmodern narrative and virtue contention. The false assumption within the West was that the struggle for ethical direction would dissipate after the war. As Caputo outlined, such disputes are now commonplace. Buber's insights assist navigation of such a moment. In 1952, Martin Buber delivered his address "Hope for this Hour" at Carnegie Hall; it was his final lecture in a series that coincided with a celebration in his honor.

We are now over sixty years from the moment during which Buber framed his dialogic plea. I contend that the world continues to be in need of his pragmatic wisdom, which differentiates between the genuinely concrete and the abstract. For Buber, the falsely concrete is that which one squeezes in one's own hand; the genuinely concrete is more akin to ungraspable sand that continues to slip through one's fingers. In that 1952 address, Buber stated that the world is composed of camps and ideologies that dismiss the ideas of the Other. I began my 1986 book on Buber, *Communication and Community: Implications of Martin Buber's Dialogue*, with reference to this polarizing emphasis in communication. That 1986 book could not have envisioned this communicative moment of continuing bleakness. Buber's camps linger within the daily fabric of our communicative lives. As Buber (1952/1967) stated:

> The hope for this hour depends upon the hopers themselves, upon ourselves. I mean by this: those among us who feel most deeply the sickness of the present-day man and who speak in his name the words without which no healing takes place: I will live.

> The hope for this hour depends upon the renewal of dialogical immediacy between men. But let us look beyond the pressing need, the anxiety and care of this hour. Let us see the need in connection with the great human way. Then we shall recognize that immediacy is injured not only between man and man, but also between the being called man and the source of his existence. At its core the conflict between mistrust and trust of man conceals the conflict between the mistrust and the trust of eternity. If our mouths succeed in genuinely saying 'thou,' then, after long silence and stammering, we shall have addressed our eternal 'Thou' anew. Reconciliation leads toward reconciliation. (312)

Separate camps refuse to listen to one another; Buber called for counters to mistrust and the necessity of reconciliation, dialogue, and the hopers themselves.

Buber's language provides a handle on this historical era of ethics in disruption outlined in this essay. In brief summary, I review intimate relationships between ethics and conflict in this time of narrative and virtue contention. First, movement from one historical era to another signals shifts in ethical goods defining a given era; postmodernity finds its identity in difference – the contending of ethical goods with one another. This postmodern recognition of difference is the existential key to this contemporary moment. Second, Caputo's diatribe against ethics thoroughly unmasks the assumption that one ethical position alone is capable of ameliorating all conflicts. His dispute centers on the effort to construct ethics as a metaphysical universal, which is a practical impossibility. Caputo leaves us with linguistic touchstones that align with Buber's address of limits, partiality, and temporal obligation. Like Buber, Caputo responds to an era of fragmentation, while recognizing a nagging push toward discerning the appropriate ethical response to an emerging situation. What is evident in Caputo beyond Buber is fatigue; Caputo reminds us that obligation comes with no guarantee of reward or success. Caputo (1993) underscores an existential human fact – "obligations happen" (246) – consistent with Levinas's (1981/1999) emphasis on an immemorial ethical echo that demands unending ethical responsiveness. For Levinas and, I think, for Caputo, the human is best defined as *homo ethicus*. This obligation is ongoing. The human community is still in trouble, and the call of obligation to respond remains ever important. The fragile nature of the human community endures, and the responsibility to respond remains.

With affirmation of the assertion about obligation as emergent and continuing, I turn to the framing of a dialogic ethic responsive to both Caputo and Buber. I offer my comments through a series of linguistic images within the language of gestalt, composed of background and foreground, where the whole is greater than the sum of the parts (Aristotle, trans. 1984).

4.1 Background: A unity of contraries

Through this discussion of the declining potency of ethics, one variable remains consistent: the human desire to attend to an ethical call. Returning to Hyde's suggestion that the human is ethically wired, one must determine what permits the wiring to come alive. For both Levinas and Caputo, ethics begins with optics. Levinas (1998) states that the face of the Other generates an ethical awakening. This position suggests that anything that eclipses the face of the Other cannot ignite ethical responsibility. One must attend to the face of another. Caputo (1993) enacts a similar story with his notion of "the happening of obligation" (212). If one fails to attend to the happening of obligation, then its call goes without response. These two background stories suggest that optics, recognition of the

face of the Other, and a happening of obligation awaken one's ethical sense of responsibility. The assertion of Caputo is that agreement about ethical implementation is no longer. Levinas and Caputo agree on a basic existential ethical fact: no metaphysical *a priori* template for ethical conduct is available in this historical moment. Whenever limited proposals of ethics gather public support, they often lead to imposition of a particular good contrary to the hopes and aspirations of another. Richard Johannesen, Kathleen S. Valde, and Karen E. Whedbee (2008) pointed to such a perspective as they differentiated between the golden rule of doing unto others as one would want done to oneself and a platinum rule of doing unto others as desired by them; the platinum rule rejects imposition of my good upon another (225).

The reality of ethics in dispute offers a background for dialogic ethics composed of two rudimentary assumptions: (1) in spite of such a moment, there is an acknowledged inclination toward ethics, and (2) this ethical urge lives within a moment of difficulty in the discernment of the correct course of action. This perspective is akin to the insights of Buber (1948) on the "unity of contraries" (17). Buber's understanding of dialogue eschews either/or propositions. Dialogue begins with an ethical inclination that turning to the Other is of vital importance, accompanied simultaneously with the assumption that the communicative outcome of the conversation is not scriptable.

4.2 Foreground: Proper names

Caputo's description of this era emphasizes proper names, the importance of one hand in another, partiality, the happening of obligation, and responsiveness of a poet. Proper names can move one's attention to an ethical happening. The first published rendition of *To Kill a Mockingbird* is a classic example of the power of proper names. The young girl, Scout, dispersed a lynch crowd as she called persons by their proper names (Lee 1960/2010, 253). Each one of us can attest to a moment of grief or despair in which the presence of another made a difference; the touch of another's presence, words without words, provided temporal support and a glimpse of hope. Partiality, for Caputo, indicates concern for another that emerges within embraced limits of that which matters to a given person and community. Caputo rejects connecting ethics with the call of a martyr. There are times when a happening of obligation calls for such sacrifice; however, such moments go unplanned and generally unrewarded. The happening of obligation carries with it an intensity that envelops a person within responsibility without clarity of appropriate response. Caputo's poet of obligation dances with the moment, responding to what is required and necessary. For Caputo, proper names, acknowledgement of partiality, recognizing a happening of obligation, and enactment of a poet's

response address the demands of a moment without a template for correct action in a postmodern dance of ethics. Changes in macro eras and Caputo's story point to a world of difference without clarity of single direction; we find temporal clarity in response to names, limits, and recognition of a given obligation. Caputo paints for us a poet's impressionistic picture of the unconventional responding to ethics in action. Caputo details an ethics without an ethical guide; ethics is the responsive turn to happenings of obligation.

4.3 Dialogic ethics: The language of responsive gestalt

Buber's practices for doing dialogue address Caputo's concerns about ethics in this moment of ethics in dispute. Buber's (1937/2000) stress on I-Thou embraces the vitality of proper names. His commitment to limits assumes dialogue that begins with ground of importance under the feet of the communicator. For Buber, dialogue requires putting what Caputo described as a ground of partiality to the test without putting it fundamentally at risk; there are limits in the exchange as one protects and promotes what matters. Additionally, one acknowledges that the Other brings limits and partiality to the other side of the communicative exchange. The happening of obligation arises within a revelatory space within which the "between" of communicants brings forth what matters to them. The responsiveness of a poet drives Buber's (1937/2000) dialogic insights, keenly exemplified in *I and Thou* and its poetic verse. Caputo and Buber, together, yield a dialogic ethic grounded in proper names, partiality, a temporal opening to obligation, and the responsive spirit of a poet attending to what emerges between and among persons.

The practicing of a dialogic ethic begins with acknowledgement that there is no template, but we do have three essential coordinates. First, a dialogic ethic must support and encourage the spirit of a poet or jazz musician as an ongoing necessity. At a time in which the liberal arts and the creative arts are increasingly at risk, we must resist attacks on the revelatory.[6] We need to alert persons to the importance of the *revelatory* that emerges from concentrated practice. Second, a dialogic ethic must support and encourage an emphasis on historicity, which Gadamer (1975/2004) defined as attending to questions that give identity to a given historical moment. Ignoring the study of history and questions that define a given moment puts *responsiveness* in peril. Third, a dialogic ethic must support and encourage *attentiveness* to proper names through the study of culture, language, and practices beyond our own. Dialogic ethics is a charge of responsibility for learning

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6. Many newspaper articles and editorials point to increasing threats to the liberal arts. For instance, see Joseph B. Treaster's July 31, 2015 article in the *New York Times*, "Liberal Arts, a Lost Cause?" or D. D. Guttenplan's May 14, 2013 article, "The New Case for Liberal Arts."

about difference, working with differences, and respecting those different from ourselves – protecting the differences of partiality that matter. The ethical prescription for today is tenacious hope, driven not by metaphysical ideology or strategic technique, but by honest admission of partiality and responsive attentiveness to the revelatory, the unexpected. The hope for this current hour resides in a dialogic ethic based on learning akin to a master of jazz who understands the confines of a given piece and then interacts creatively with what is present, transforming the given without dishonoring its proper importance and power.

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Subject index

Dialogic Ethics offers an impressionistic picture of the diversity of perspectives on this topic. Daily we witness local, regional, national, and international disputes, each propelled by contention over what is and should be the good propelling communicative direction and action. Communication ethics understood as an answer to problems often creates them. If we understand communication ethics as a good protected and promoted by a given set of communicators, we can understand how acts of colonialism and totalitarianism could move forward, legitimized by the assumption that "I am right." This volume eschews such a presupposition, recognizing that we live in a time of narrative and virtue contention. We dwell in an era where the *one answer* is more often dangerous than correct.

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