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Tim P. Vos (Ed.)

JOURNALISM

HANDBOOKS OF
COMMUNICATION SCIENCE

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
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Peter J. Schulz and Paul Cobley

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Preface to *Handbooks of Communication Science* series

This volume is part of the series *Handbooks of Communication Science*, published from 2012 onwards by de Gruyter Mouton. When our generation of scholars was in their undergraduate years, and one happened to be studying communication, a series like this one was hard to imagine. There was, in fact, such a dearth of basic and reference literature that trying to make one's way in communication studies as our generation did would be unimaginable to today's undergraduates in the field. In truth, there was simply nothing much to turn to when you needed to cast a first glance at the key objects in the field of communication. The situation in the United States was slightly different; nevertheless, it is only within the last generation that the basic literature has really proliferated there.

What one did when looking for an overview or just a quick reference was to turn to social science books in general, or to the handbooks or textbooks from the neighbouring disciplines such as psychology, sociology, political science, linguistics, and probably other fields. That situation has changed dramatically. There are more textbooks available on some subjects than even the most industrious undergraduate can read. The representative key multi-volume *International Encyclopedia of Communication* has now been available for some years. Overviews of subfields of communication exist in abundance. There is no longer a dearth for the curious undergraduate, who might nevertheless overlook the abundance of printed material and Google whatever he or she wants to know, to find a suitable Wikipedia entry within seconds.

'Overview literature' in an academic discipline serves to draw a balance. There has been a demand and a necessity to draw that balance in the field of communication and it is an indicator of the maturing of the discipline. Our project of a multi-volume series of *Handbooks of Communication Science* is a part of this coming-of-age movement of the field. It is certainly one of the largest endeavours of its kind within communication sciences, with almost two dozen volumes already planned. But it is also unique in its combination of several things.

The series is a major publishing venture which aims to offer a portrait of the current state of the art in the study of communication. But it seeks to do more than just assemble our knowledge of communication structures and processes; it seeks to *integrate* this knowledge. It does so by offering comprehensive articles in all the volumes instead of small entries in the style of an encyclopedia. An extensive index in each *Handbook* in the series, serves the encyclopedic task of finding relevant specific pieces of information. There are already several handbooks in sub-disciplines of communication sciences such as political communication, methodology, organisational communication – but none so far has tried to comprehensively cover the discipline as a whole.

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For all that it is maturing, communication as a discipline is still young and one of its benefits is that it derives its theories and methods from a great variety of work in other, and often older, disciplines. One consequence of this is that there is a variety of approaches and traditions in the field. For the *Handbooks* in this series, this has created two necessities: commitment to a pluralism of approaches, and a commitment to honour the scholarly traditions of current work and its intellectual roots in the knowledge in earlier times.

There is really no single object of communication sciences. However, if one were to posit one possible object it might be the human communicative act – often conceived as “someone communicates something to someone else.” This is the departure point for much study of communication and, in consonance with such study, it is also the departure point for this series of *Handbooks*. As such, the series does not attempt to adopt the untenable position of understanding communication sciences as the study of everything that can be conceived as communicating. Rather, while acknowledging that the study of communication must be multifaceted or fragmented, it also recognizes two very general approaches to communication which can be distinguished as: a) the semiotic or linguistic approach associated particularly with the humanities and developed especially where the Romance languages have been dominant and b) a quantitative approach associated with the hard and the social sciences and developed, especially, within an Anglo-German tradition. Although the relationship between these two approaches and between theory and research has not always been straightforward, the series does not privilege one above the other. In being committed to a plurality of approaches it assumes that different camps have something to tell each other. In this way, the *Handbooks* aspire to be relevant for all approaches to communication. The specific designation “communication science” for the *Handbooks* should be taken to indicate this commitment to plurality; like “the study of communication”, it merely designates the disciplined, methodologically informed, institutionalized study of (human) communication.

On an operational level, the series aims at meeting the needs of undergraduates, postgraduates, academics and researchers across the area of communication studies. Integrating knowledge of communication structures and processes, it is dedicated to cultural and epistemological diversity, covering work originating from around the globe and applying very different scholarly approaches. To this end, the series is divided into 6 sections: “Theories and Models of Communication”, “Messages, Codes and Channels”, “Mode of Address, Communicative Situations and Contexts”, “Methodologies”, “Application areas” and “Futures”. As readers will see, the first four sections are fixed; yet it is in the nature of our field that the “Application areas” will expand. It is inevitable that the futures for the field promise to be intriguing with their proximity to the key concerns of human existence on this planet (and even beyond), with the continuing prospect in communication sciences that that future is increasingly susceptible of prediction.

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Peter J. Schulz, Università della Svizzera italiana, Lugano
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This volume could not have happened without the leadership and support of the series editors of the Handbooks of Communication Science, Peter J. Schulz and Paul Coble. Likewise, the able and determined work of Barbara Karlson at De Gruyter Mouton has kept this handbook on track. This handbook represents a mountain of work.

Tatsiana Karaliova, now at Butler University, largely managed the day-to-day duties on this volume. Her hard work, eye for detail, and passion for the project has made this a far better volume than it otherwise would have been. Others at the University of Missouri School of Journalism have aided in the book, notably Joseph Moore and Carlos A. Cortés-Martínez. Meanwhile, Liz Nichols performed excellent copy editing services.

The 37 authors who have had a hand in writing the chapters of this volume are truly exceptional scholars. They have produced intellectual work that is creative, thought provoking, and forward looking. They value the practice of journalism and care about the field of journalism studies. This comes through in the careful scholarship we see in this volume. A few of the authors ended up writing their chapters on very short notice after colleagues needed to step back from the project. The quality of work certainly did not suffer. Likewise, this handbook has been much improved by the thorough and insightful work of more than two-dozen anonymous reviewers. Reviewers provided probing questions and well considered suggestions. As is often the case in academia, it takes much selfless work to create collective success.

All of which is to say, many have had a hand to producing this handbook and making sure it is a valuable contribution to the field of journalism studies. During this work, I have been inspired by my colleagues, both at Missouri and in the broader community of journalism studies, who maintain a passion for theoretically rich and compelling scholarship. I have also been inspired by the men and women who practice journalism in the face of difficult circumstances. Reporting, writing, editing, and other forms of journalistic labor are far too often under appreciated. My inspiration was to produce a handbook that did justice to the passion and professionalism of journalists and journalism scholars around the world.

Finally, my family is an unending source of inspiration. I have been blessed to be close to intelligent and creative family members. Suzette, Trevor, and Ethan Vos have both literally and figuratively cajoled me up mountains. A mountain of work, it turns out, can also be a labor of love.

Columbia, Missouri, December 2017

Tim P. Vos

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Tim P. Vos

1 Journalism

Abstract: This chapter works through a broad and a theoretical definition of journalism. The broad definition centers on journalism as a kind of work. The theoretical definition focuses on the cultural, institutional, and material dimensions of journalism. The exercise highlights the complexities and controversies that accompany efforts to define and delimit the field. These complexities and controversies run through the various chapters of the book, which are contextualized in this introductory chapter.

Keywords: definition of journalism, theoretical definition, conceptualization, journalistic labor

Journalism is an amazingly rich field of study, generating interest from a variety of perspectives and disciplines. Much of this interest is owed to the vital role journalism plays in the life of a society. A variety of social actors – from policymakers to scientists to captains of industry to ordinary citizens – are invested in how journalism is constituted and performed. It has historically held significant consequences for how any collective behavior is negotiated and perceived and hence for the kind of social and physical world individuals inhabit. Journalism is significant simply because, like a mountain to be climbed, it's there. "Journalism, in all its varieties, is the constant background and accompaniment to everyday life" (McNair 2005: 25).

But, for reasons that have little to do with journalism's social importance, the field has been facing something of a crisis (Ryfe 2012). Economic and technological changes have been met with changes to how journalism is performed and by whom (Witschge et al. 2016). Newspapers have struggled, losing readers and shedding workers; broadcast news outlets have faced similar, albeit less severe, retrenchment; and online outlets have asserted themselves as new players in the field, shifting some traditional journalistic commitments. However, the work of journalism is no less vital and hence no less a source of constant fascination. Indeed, the seeming upheaval in journalism has made its attention and study even more compelling. We are fascinated with rethinking (Peters & Broersma 2016, 2013), reinventing (Waisbord 2013), reconsidering (Alexander, Breese & Luengo 2016), revising (Allan 2013), and reforming (Heinderyckx & Vos 2016) the field.

Some would no doubt quibble with the assertion that journalism is no less vital now than in the past. They can point to "random acts of journalism" (Holt & Karlsson 2014: 1795) that transcend the industrial forms of journalism that are lately in crisis. This is a legitimate point. But it also raises a fundamental question: what is journalism? Journalists and the field of journalism studies have already confronted the question of "who is a journalist?" (Black 2010; Ugland & Henderson 2007;

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Weaver 2005). It now too is confronting the question of “what is journalism?” (Deuze 2005; McNair 2005).

This chapter sets out to define journalism and, in the process, aims to highlight the various ways in which journalism can be examined and studied. Indeed, this volume is a demonstration of the many ways journalism can be conceptualized and explored. The chapter concludes by laying out the plan of the volume, highlighting the continued vitality of journalism as a field of practice and study.

1 Defining journalism

Defining any concept comes with inherent tensions. One tension is between the specific and the general. The more elaborate the definition the more specific it can be. But in defining a concept in terms of the trees, one can lose sight of the forest. The conceptual properties are lost. Closely related to this issue is the tension between the particular and the universal. In defining a concept in particular terms, it can become too situated in the present, foreclosing the possibility of studying a concept over time. Similarly, the definition, when too specific and too particular, can also be too local, preventing us from a global view of the concept. And while definitions generally focus on the empirical manifestations of a concept, there is a tension here with the normative. Value choices are inevitably made when delimiting a concept. The definition of journalism offered in this chapter hopefully negotiates these tensions satisfactorily. However, it will start with a broad definition of journalism as a way of highlighting some of the key debates in the field.

Defining journalism is a daunting task, partly because it is a mega-concept – a conceptual conglomerate “entangled with a number of often unspecified concepts” (McLeod & Pan 2004: 17) – and partly because the empirical referent that journalism signifies keeps shifting (Schudson 2013). This makes definition of journalism something of a fool’s errand. But, the task also seems unavoidable. There are a number of important reasons to define it, ranging from the theoretical to the pedagogical to the legal. I touch on only a few of the reasons here.

First, a reason to define journalism is because concepts are central to theory building and hence central to the theoretical work that is at the heart of the academic enterprise (Shoemaker, Tankard & Lasorsa 2004). In addition to being a mega-concept, journalism also functions as a class concept (McLeod & Pan 2004); that is, we explore a set of messages that we associate with journalism as distinct, for example, from a class of messages that we associate with public relations, which also produces things that appear to be acts of journalism. Research that compared the framing of climate change from journalism and public relations messages would need to begin by making a distinction between what is journalism and what is not. Likewise, if citizens are unable to make the conceptual distinction

between these two phenomena, there are consequences for the formation – or malformation – of public opinion (Vaughn 1980).

Second, defining journalism serves a pedagogical purpose, socializing new entrants into the journalistic field. Whether the definition comes from a textbook or from an editor or news director, the effect is much the same. Those new to the endeavor are led to attend to certain features of journalism. Definitions – by definition – are exclusive, limiting what factors are and are not constitutive of a concept (Shapiro 2014). The utility of this exclusion is to focus our attention to a parsimonious set of characteristics that can guide meaningful action and reflection.

Third, there are legal – and subsequent ethical or moral – reasons for defining journalism, and who is a journalist. Who is and who is not afforded legal protections and privileges afforded to journalists is important to those who find themselves on the wrong side of disputes with government and other authorities (Peters & Tandoc Jr 2013). Shield laws, for example, legally define who is a journalist so as to specify who can claim the privilege of not testifying in court about the identity of a source of information. Here, the broader the definition, the greater the number of those protected. The way journalism is defined can be, in certain times and certain places, a matter of freedom and incarceration or even life and death.

So, fool's errand or not, a definition of journalism cannot really be avoided. The only foolishness is in believing a once-and-for-all definition is possible. The definition offered here is partly theoretical and partly pedagogical. The goal is to flush out the debates about the field that are often implicit – and sometimes explicit – in any definition.

1.1 A broad definition

I do not dwell on how others have defined journalism. Each attempt has its merits. For example, Schudson (2012: 3) offers a broad definition that touches on many of the same themes as the definitions put forward in this chapter:

Journalism is the business or practice of regularly producing and disseminating information about contemporary affairs of public interest and importance. It is a set of institutions that publicizes periodically (usually daily but now with online updates continuously) information and commentary on contemporary affairs, normally presented as true and sincere, to a dispersed and usually anonymous audience so as to publicly include that audience in a discourse taken to be publicly important.

Craft and Davis's (2016: 34) definition is thoughtful and concise: "Journalism is a set of transparent, independent procedures aimed at gathering, verifying and reporting truthful information of consequence to citizens in a democracy." The chief merits of this pedagogical definition are that it enumerates both the values and practices that constitute journalism. Shapiro (2014: 555) offers a functional definition of journalism, meaning that his definition focuses on practices: "Journalism

comprises the activities involved in an independent pursuit of accurate information about current or recent events and its original presentation for public edification.”

Here, I offer an initial broad definition and unpack the issues implicit in the definition, before returning to offer a theoretical definition more suited to guiding empirical inquiry. *Journalism is the socially valued and structured work of crafting and distributing socially significant news and discussion.*

The first initial component to consider here is defining journalism as *work*. This underscores that journalism is a kind of labor (Örnebring 2010). By defining it as work, a number of things are excluded from the definition – one exclusion is noted here: Journalism is distinct from the texts (broadly defined; see McKee 2003) that journalism produces. In common expression one might see a compelling news story and say, ‘that’s good journalism’. But, the definition proffered here would interpret such an observation to be about the work that went into creating the text and not the text itself. Even with this exclusion, the focus on ‘work’ leaves for a broad definition.

The broadness of the definition sidesteps a few ongoing debates that would seek to bake in or “smuggle” in (Schudson 2003: 14) particular perspectives to the definition of journalism. For example, Zelizer (2004) has noted that definitions of journalism can be arranged under at least five groupings. One of those groupings – already noted – is conceptualizing journalism as a text. She also points to journalism as a profession, as an institution, as people, and as practices. The broadness of the definition above is meant to avoid picking one of these approaches.

Thus, this focus on “work” avoids the debate about the professional nature of work. Some journalists and journalism studies scholars have embraced the idea of journalism being a profession. It not only ennobles the work, it speaks to its social purpose. A profession’s obligation is to the public, not to the self or to the financial or political ends of publishers (Davis 2010). That obligation is expressed in formal codes of ethics, creating a socially respected identity for the field (Ward 2004). A profession has authority and autonomy in regulating itself, which speaks to a normative desire to define journalism in terms of press freedom and freedom of speech (Craft 2010). Meanwhile, some practitioners and scholars have chafed at the notion of journalism as a profession. They question whether journalism can really be a profession if its membership is not controlled, if it has no monopoly on specialized knowledge, and so forth. Some have even questioned whether professionalism, which involves some level of self-regulation, might be its own form of limiting press freedom (Merrill 1990). However, work is described in this definition as socially valued, which highlights some of the same goods that professionalism promises. Journalistic work is rooted in an informal social contract: providing public service in exchange for some degree of press freedom.

Some who have rejected the idea of journalism being a profession have opted for journalism being understood as a craft (Adam & Clark 2006). This still conveys the occupational nature of the work of journalism. The notion of craft also under-

scores the artistry involved in crafting compelling narratives, or other forms of presentation (Adam 1993). With this conceptualization, the skillfulness of the work is what separates it from the quasi-journalistic attempts of social media posts or other interlopers. But, “craft” fails to convey the social import, its significance beyond the here and now. Carey (2007: 4) indicates as much in an essay on the craft of journalism: “(J)ournalism is a craft of place; it works by the light of local knowledge. What journalists know and how they know it, what journalists write and how they write it, what stories interest journalists and the form that interest takes, is pretty much governed by the here and now.” The definition offered above does indeed stipulate that journalism is the work of “crafting”. However, while this choice of words communicates something of the skill involved in producing news, it is not posited as the central, defining feature of journalism.

Meanwhile, by noting that the work is “structured” the definition identifies that journalistic work is not simply unorganized labor (see also, Örnebring 2010). It may or may not be a profession or a craft, but the work is guided by principles and routines. This definition does not use the term institution to describe journalism, but it just as well could have. That’s if we define institutions as “social patterns of behavior identifiable across organizations that extend over space and endure over time” (Hanitzsch & Vos 2017: 5) or as “shared norms and informal rules” (Sparrow 2006: 155). The work-based definition is not limited to simple practice, in other words; it is practice shaped by social values. In fact, I do not mean to exclude via this definition the notion that journalism is a set of ideas – an “ism” (Nerone 2013). Indeed, this is central to what journalism is. But, norms and rules only become empirical indicators of journalism when they are expressed – verbally, but also through action; that is, through work.

The work-based definition sidesteps another debate in that it avoids defining the work as explicitly human labor. With the advent of machine-written news, the question arises whether this “work” counts as journalism (van Dalen 2012). Or, put another way, is robot journalism still journalism? This definition leaves open that possibility – since the computation work performed by computers creates (or, in a broad sense, crafts) news. Journalistic labor has almost always meant a combination of machine labor and human labor – a combination that accelerated in the late 20th century as computers became commonplace in newsrooms (Örnebring 2010). Thus, “work” here need not preclude nonhuman forms of labor.

I want to return to the adjectives used to describe journalism as work: *socially valued and structured*. As already noted, structured work refers to the fact that journalistic work manifests principles and routines. This distinguishes journalism from “random acts of journalism” or one-time occurrences that may look like journalism but are not disciplined by underlying principles and routines. Indeed, the reference to work – which by definition refers to a sustained effort – is meant to suggest that journalism is an ongoing, purpose-driven labor. The reference to socially valued work indicates that the purpose is fundamentally a public good. This

distinguishes the work of journalism from work that primarily serves private ends, such as advertising and many forms of public relations. This emphasis touches again on the institutional nature of journalism – a social institution, if it is legitimate, is rooted in broad social values (Vos 2016).

Neither of these adjectives indicates the way in which the work is valued or structured. That is, it does not list or describe particular structures (for example, interviewing or observing public figures, verifying information as accurate, or writing news in an inverted pyramid format) or values (for example, the values of honesty, independence, or democratic self-governance). While this lack of detail might be a weakness in terms of the concreteness of the definition, nevertheless this does serve a purpose. The fact is that the values and structures of journalism have shifted over time and vary by place. A more concrete definition can capture the here and now but make it very difficult to make cross cultural or historical comparison. Note that the Craft and Davis (2016) definition ties the meaning of journalism to its democratic value. This makes sense given their focus on American journalism. However, others and I (Hanitzsch & Vos 2016; Zelizer 2013; Josephi 2013) have argued that journalism can and does exist in places with minimal democracy. This is not to say that honesty, independence or contribution to democracy is unimportant. There is no doubt great normative worth in such values. However, journalism as a form of work need not be defined in these terms, lest we write off non-Western and non-modern forms of journalism entirely.

Likewise, the definition avoids making the economic value of journalistic work a defining feature of the field. One can certainly argue that economic value is a form of social value. Schudson's (2012: 3) definition of journalism begins by labeling it as a "business or practice". Bourdieu (2005) has conceptualized journalism as having an economic pole – a pole that explains much of why journalism functions the way it does. While it is certainly justifiable to define journalism as a business, it has not always been so, nor has it been so in all places. Again, this unnecessarily limits comparisons across time and place. (Granted, Schudson defines journalism as a business "or" practice.)

One might object that defining journalism as socially valued makes the work too dependent on the public's opinion about journalism at a particular moment. The institution of journalism is not roundly loved, or even appreciated (Kovach & Rosenstiel 2014). However, to say that work is socially valued is not to tie it to public opinion, particularly if public opinion is defined by what a poll measures at a moment in time (Herbst 1993). However, critics of the news media do not really aim to redefine or delimit journalism – they typically just want the news media to live up to the social values usually associated with journalism, such as honesty, independence, and serving self-governance (Vos, Craft & Ashley 2012; Craft, Vos & Wolfgang 2016).

The definition of journalism offered here does identify two forms of work that constitute journalism: *crafting and distributing*. Crafting, in addition to connota-

tions of artistry, refers to the work of gathering, culling, and forging. Information is collected, evaluated, and separated. Then, news and discussion are formulated and presented (Shoemaker & Vos 2009). This is sometimes referred to as news work (Hardt & Brennen 1995; Deuze 2008). Some have pointed out that we live an information economy (Frenkel 1999) or information society (Beniger 1986). However, journalism is distinct from these broader endeavors in as much as journalism involves crafting or forging information into something else, that is, news and discussion. This definition also serves as an antidote to ideas that news can simply be gathered like a crop from a field (Vos & Finneman 2017) or that it mirrors some external reality (Zelizer 2005) – ideas meant to convey that news workers are objective conduits of news.

The work of distributing should not be short-changed in this definition. Distribution is not simply a matter of sending or posting news, something anyone with access to the mail or to social media can do. Distribution implies apportioning or spreading out in a systematic way. In other words, journalism produces a public good and thus must be distributed to the public, or some portion of it. Distribution is an essential institutional feature, built into the purpose of doing news work. Including the work of distribution in this definition also serves as a reminder that journalism is not reducible to reporting. Indeed, the work of crafting is also broader than reporting – it includes editing, illustrating, data visualization, and designing. Journalism, then, involves both crafting and distributing. One without the other would not be a complete definition.

The final part of the definition offered here is perhaps the most important. It involves the crafting and distributing of *news and discussion*. Defining news presents its own set of challenges. Stephens (1996: 9) offers a definition that seeks to span different times and places: “(N)ew information about a subject of some public interest that is shared with some portion of the public.” Stephens argues that this definition distinguishes news from historical data, art, government intelligence, and chitchat. Definitions of news come with strong normative impulses (Stephens 1996; Schudson 1978). Some have sought to exclude forms of so-called soft news that are deemed of little social value. Nevertheless, defined in this way a definition of journalism would have little need to qualify news as socially significant, since this is built into the definition of news. “Socially significant” is part of this chapter’s definition of journalism more as a modifier of discussion than of news.

News, in the modern context, is mostly about recent events or occurrences. However, journalism has not always been so event driven; it has also been driven by ideas (Dicken-Garcia 1989). Discussion is included in this definition to capture something of idea-driven journalistic discourse. Thus, discussion is meant to be a broad term, capturing commentary, editorials, advice, and other forms of idea-based discourse. Some journalists have complained that discussion – particularly when it comes from bloggers, citizens, or others who are at the boundaries of jour-

nalism – is simply derivative of true journalism. But this complaint unnecessarily devalues the kind of reflexive discourse common in journalistic work, particularly in different times and places where news and discussion have been blended rather than distinct forms. Journalism includes a place for discussion, even when that work is not done by professional journalists. Op-eds, letters to the editor, and reader comments should rightly be considered within journalism’s purview rather than as an unwelcome incursion. Journalistic work gives structure to discussion, the lifeblood of the public sphere.

News and discussion are described here as *socially significant*. This again underscores that we are talking about a public good and service. News, in a narrow sense, might be the telling of any new occurrence. And discussion happens in almost any setting where two or more persons are present. Journalism, however, offers news and discussion that serve a social purpose, connecting people to events and discussions that shape the world we share. There is a danger here if we conceive of social significance as so-called hard news about the affairs of the public sphere. News and discussion can deal with the affairs of “everyday life”, provided those affairs deal with issues significant to social coexistence (Hanitzsch & Vos 2016).

Some definitions of journalism add adjectives to describe news, or in the case of the Schudson (2012), Craft and Davis (2016) and Shapiro (2014) definitions to describe information, as true, truthful, sincere, or accurate. However, this ultimately leads to additional definitional problems if applied to news. News, by definition, is generally truthful and accurate. To suggest otherwise is to be pulled into a no-win situation of acknowledging the validity of constructs like “fake news” (Peters 2017). Fake news, for purposes of clarity and honesty, should probably be called lies, scams, or propaganda. Adding adjectives such as truthful and accurate also raises an epistemological issue – any account of an event is inevitably unable to fully capture the reality of the event (hence the use of “generally” above). Documentary filmmakers and scholars have been clearer eyed in confronting this issue than most journalists or journalism educators (Rosenthal & Corner 2005). The definition of journalism offered here sidesteps these issues by skipping qualifiers such as accurate and truthful.

This definition can be faulted for any number of reasons, depending on where the reader comes down on the underlying tensions of definition: the specific versus the general, the particular versus the universal, the local versus the global, and the empirical versus the normative. The utility of this exercise has been in opening up these tensions and highlighting some of the conceptual issues facing the field of journalism studies. However, if the purpose of definition is to arrive at a theoretical construct that can lead to operationalization, then the above definition is a mixed bag. Thus, I next offer a revised definition that is more conducive to theory building.

1.2 A theoretical definition

A theoretical definition “conveys the meaning we attach to the concept and generally suggests indicators of it” (Shoemaker, Tankard & Lasorsa 2004: 26). Hence, a theoretical or conceptual definition hints at the empirical referents of the concept in ways that a broader definition might not. Much of the above definition still works as a theoretical definition. However, while the definition above defines journalism as socially valued and structured work, the theoretical definition would seek to specify the range of observable phenomena that constitutes journalism. This is still a broad definition, but also one that directs scholarly attention to distinct dimensions of the concept.

The working theoretical definition of journalism offered here seeks to theoretically unpack the structures that guide journalistic work: *Journalism is a set of beliefs, forms, and practices involved in the crafting and distributing of socially significant news and discussion.* This is a starting point for working toward a more concrete definition. It does not define the particular beliefs, forms, or practices that constitute journalism, in no small part because these will shift or have shifted – probably only slightly – across time and place.

The inclusion of *beliefs* taps into a cultural and institutional dimension of journalism. Or, put another way, the work of journalism reflects cultural values, attitudes, and ideas and reflects institutional roles, rules, and scripts. All of these beliefs are expressed most explicitly in journalistic discourse about journalism: “Journalism and journalistic roles have no ‘true’ essence; they exist because and as we talk about them” (Hanitzsch & Vos 2017: 130). These beliefs are also expressed implicitly – and hence less empirically ascertainably – in journalism practice. One approach to journalism as beliefs is proposed by Deuze (2005), who conceptualizes journalism as an occupational ideology. The chief precepts of that ideology speak to values of public service, objectivity, autonomy, immediacy, and ethics. This speaks directly to the notion that journalism is an “ism” – a theory, doctrine, cause, or a “belief system” (Nerone 2013: 447).

The addition of *forms* to the definition reflects the material dimensions of journalism. Thus, journalism can be studied by attending to technological, geographical, and economic manifestations. While journalism may be less identified in terms of its technological features than in the past (Deuze 2005), it has nevertheless always involved some material elements (Winston 1998). A glance at a newspaper page, newscast, or news website provides powerful clues that the contents are the result of journalistic work. While the forms can be copied or coopted for advertising or propaganda purposes, the forms are particularly suited to journalistic purposes. As Barnhurst and Nerone (2001: 3) have argued, “form embodies the imagined relationship of a medium to its society and polity”. Likewise, journalism is work done in a physical, geographical space – a space designed to suit a journalistic purpose – and it is done as part of an economic relationship in which journalistic

work involves an exchange of goods and services. All of which is to say that journalism takes on material forms and in turn is shaped by its material forms.

The inclusion of *practices* in the definition of journalism elicits something of the institutional nature of the work. Journalism can be studied by observing what journalists and others do. As highlighted in the discussion above, work and practices are not arbitrary, but instead are structured by generally agreed upon roles and rules, which, if not unique to journalism, are very close to it. These practices also manifest as organizational forms – arrangements for the coordination of human and machine labor. These organizational manifestations would be another site of study. Divisions of labor involving editors, reporters, and designers, for instance, are an expression of the coordinated, collective action that organizations facilitate. Organizational forms have certainly changed in recent years (Vos & Singer 2016; Mitchelstein & Boczkowski 2009). And organizations may vary in terms of their size, hierarchical orientation, and profit orientation (Shoemaker & Vos 2009). Yet journalism has traditionally been practiced in a structured setting.

We should not overlook the use of *set* in the definition of journalism. Any particular empirical expression of journalism may not be unique to journalism. Public relations practitioners use some similar practices, for example. However, the indicators posited here hold together in a plausible – if not entirely rational – way as an expression of journalism.

The rest of the definition is largely the same offered above. However, here too, news would need to be defined in more theoretical terms, pointing to empirical referents for the concept. For example, Shoemaker and Cohen (2006) have defined news in terms of social significance and deviance. Social significance is simply a matter of what has relevance to a society. They identify four kinds of social significance: political, economic, cultural, and public significance. Deviance gets at the concept of newness. It is “a characteristic of people, ideas, or events that sets them aside as different apart from others in the region, community, neighborhood, family, and so on” (Shoemaker & Cohen 2006: 7). They parse three forms of deviance: statistical, social change, and normative deviance. Each of these concepts is operationalized to study news content, thus demonstrating the way in which operational definitions can be derived from theoretical definitions.

The point, however, is not to define each and every word. This pulls us down the path of infinite regress – defining the terms we use to define the terms we use in our definition. However, this overview provides a sense of journalism’s overall meaning.

The point of this exercise was not only to define this book’s object of study, but also to underscore the complex array of dimensions and perspectives that journalism evokes. Journalism is a global phenomenon with a suitably long history. It is indeed a fool’s errand to proffer a definitive delineation of the concept. What is offered here is an entry into the complicated debates about journalism’s nature. It also serves as a jumping off point for the varied ways in which this volume explores this thing we call journalism.

2 The contribution to journalism studies

This book demonstrates the vast variety of ways in which journalism can be examined. This, of course, is not the first volume that attempts to examine the varied meanings, consequences, and elements of journalism. However, this book provides fresh perspectives in two broad ways. First, rather than a safe recitation of accepted maxims of the field, it attempts to portray the variety and complexity of journalism today, while also providing innovative conceptual, disciplinary, and international lenses for examining the field. Second, the economic and technological foundations of the journalism profession have shifted dramatically in recent years, such that research and theory about the empirical realities of journalism are necessarily in flux as well. This volume seeks to capture the ferment in the professional and academic fields.

However, to frame that ferment, the volume opens with this chapter, which seeks to capture something of the enduring nature of journalism, and a chapter that explores the history of the field. The chapter by John Nerone pulls together those historical threads that have constituted journalism as a (sometimes troubled) social institution with those threads that portend the destabilization of journalism. The chapter highlights the path dependent processes that have brought disruption and vibrancy to the field, and therein, the chapter foretells many of the themes the handbook explores.

The next section expounds on *The Foundations of the Field*, delving into the features of journalism largely sidestepped in the opening chapter. These foundations are conceived in terms of the roles, epistemologies, and ethics of journalism, an approach laid out by Thomas Hanitzsh (2007), who authors the chapter on journalistic roles. Hanitzsch's chapter on roles examines the ways journalists have conceived their roles in the West and elsewhere. This approach explores normative theories of the press and highlights the relationship between social systems and media actors within those systems. The chapter on epistemologies, by Stephen J. A. Ward, while connected in various ways to media roles, explores the various truth-telling approaches and strategies that journalists use or have used. Notions of objectivity play a central role, but the chapter explores alternatives and highlights emerging areas, such as digital epistemologies. Ethics is the third topic in this section of the handbook. The chapter by Patrick Plaisance explores the ethical boundaries that have guided actors in the field. While conceptual in focus – the chapter explores ethics as a branch of moral philosophy – Plaisance also highlights specific ethical challenges of journalism, such as conflicts of interest, minimization of harm, and respect for audiences, all made more urgent in a digital environment. Hence, all three chapters broach the historical foundations that have helped constitute journalism as an autonomous field, while also exploring the ways in which these foundations may be shifting in the present. These three foundational concepts are also addressed in subsequent chapters of the volume. The overview of

the operative issues related to roles, epistemologies, and ethics provides a map for the debates raised in later chapters.

The next section of this handbook offers four ways of *Conceptualizing the Field*. This section of the handbook is also foundational to subsequent chapters since it brings conceptual clarity to the issues related to journalism. Tamara Witschge and Frank Harbers' chapter conceptualizes journalism as practice; the chapter by Wilson Lowrey explores the ways in which journalism can be conceived as an institution; Brian McNair's chapter conceives of journalism as public sphere; and the chapter by Carolyn Kitch lays out the provocative idea of journalism as memory. Of course, journalism can be all of these things. However, when talking about the history of journalism, the foundations of journalism, and the problems or issues of journalism, it is incumbent on scholars to proceed with conceptual clarity about what they mean by "journalism".

The section on *Theorizing the Field* revisits three classic theories that have defined journalism studies: agenda setting, framing, and gatekeeping. Each is native to journalism studies, as opposed to countless theories that have been imported to the field. Each has developed over decades and has been used to explore a broad array of phenomena. And each corresponds to one of the three sites of study in our field: news effects, news texts, and news production. These chapters spotlight the ways all three of these traditions are being revitalized given the rapidly shifting empirical realities of the journalism field. The proliferation of digital media, for example, has been the occasion for a new wave of scholarship in all three of these traditions. The chapter by Wayne Wanta and Mariam Alkazemi argues for the continued relevance of agenda setting scholarship, pointing to no less than six branches of the theory in contemporary journalism scholarship. Paul D'Angelo and Donna Shaw's chapter offers an overview of framing research, highlighting the "thriving and healthy intellectual" debates that make the theory as vital as ever. And the chapter by Edson C. Tandoc, Jr offers fresh insights into gatekeeping in a digital age.

The section on *Journalism Via the Disciplines* demonstrates the profound ways in which journalism studies has been and might still be shaped by cross-disciplinary examination. Some of these disciplinary approaches are well established in journalism studies, others are less so. The chapter by Valerie Belair-Gagnon and Mattias Revers lays out the sociology of journalism; the chapter by Robert G. Picard examines the economics of journalism; next, Anthony Mills and Katharine Sarikakis explore the politics and policy of journalism; Angela Phillips' chapter delves into the technology of journalism; and finally Robert E. Gutsche, Jr and Alina Rafikova examine the implications of the geography of journalism. Each of these chapters explores a range of theoretical and empirical concerns that face the field. For example, the chapter on journalism and geography addresses two important phenomena – the growth of hyperlocal journalism and the continued emergence of transnational journalism. The chapter on the psychology of journalism explores earlier

efforts to theorize about journalism, particularly news, through the lens of evolutionary psychology, while ultimately focusing on the psychophysiology of news construction and news processing. Taken together, the chapters point the way to a broad interdisciplinary agenda for journalism research, underscoring the cultural, institutional, and material dimensions of the field.

The book's next section, *The Journalism Ecology*, also provides an opportunity for examining some of the new or emerging forms of journalism that depart in some fashion from legacy or so-called mainstream journalism. The function of the section is to contextualize the long tradition of mainstream journalistic research by pointing to the ways in which journalism is produced or performed outside the usual confines of institutionalized journalism. This section addresses, more directly than other sections, the matter of the seeming re-institutionalization of journalism.

Each chapter considers what each form of journalism or quasi-journalism contributes to the news and information ecosystem. The chapter on entrepreneurial journalism by Jane Singer draws attention to the alternative organizational structures of new types of newsrooms. The chapter by An Nguyen and Salvatore Scifo critically interrogates the phenomenon of citizen journalism, offering a typology for three forms of citizen journalism. Ryan J. Thomas' chapter confronts the issues also raised in this opening chapter – what is journalism? – in an effort to position advocacy journalism as a legitimate contribution to the journalism ecology. Both citizen journalism and advocacy journalism have faced critics who would just as soon reject the notion that these efforts are legitimate journalism. The chapter by Stephanie Craft maps the place of documentary journalism within the journalism ecology. As Craft points out, documentary film and journalism, for all their past differences, are seemingly intersecting as documentary production is increasingly populated by former journalists. Again, attention is brought around to the similarities and differences with so-called mainstream journalism. Finally, the chapter by Folker Hanusch addresses the place of lifestyle journalism. Lifestyle journalism has long had a place in legacy news media, however its standing has often been marginalized. Hanusch navigates lifestyle journalism toward a more suitable position in the field. Overall, this section moves the research agenda in journalism studies beyond journalism's traditional institutional forms and brings to the fore practices at the periphery of journalism.

The section on *The Issues of Journalism* addresses both enduring and newly emergent concerns facing the field. The chapters raise defining issues: the role of journalistic autonomy in an environment where web analytics and social media have made the audience ever more present in the construction of news, the threat to human self-expression and the free flow of information in a world of censorship and propaganda, the prospects for changing the barriers to entrance into a marketplace of ideas, journalism's impact on the prospects of war and peace, and the reproduction of cultural hierarchies based on race and gender.

The chapter by Beverly Horvit, Carlos A. Cortés-Martínez, and Kimberly Kelling lays out the issues that emerge when journalists cover – or do not cover – wars and conflicts. The chapter by Cherian George explores the issue of censorship and the seemingly never-ending threats to press freedom in the world today. Kari Karpinen’s chapter deals with the issues of pluralism and diversity. In the next chapter, Cristina Mislán tackles the matters of race and gender. And the chapter by Annika Sehl examines how journalism is dealing with audiences and community engagement. This section addresses the “so what?” issues of journalism studies while engaging in a kind of press criticism that reinforces the vitality and potency of journalism scholarship and theory.

The two concluding chapters provide symmetry with the two introductory chapters. The chapter on journalism and change by Henrik Örnebring brings attention to those factors that bring about the kinds of change that have been highlighted in the volume. We see how temporality has been and can be built into theorizing about journalism practice. The final chapter by François Heinderyckx looks ahead more directly to the future of journalism as a scholarly discipline, pointing to the importance of journalism scholarship that should sit at the heart of the academy. While rapid technological and economic changes have rightly consumed the discipline, this chapter points the way to new and enduring concerns that bear deeper scrutiny.

This volume confronts a world of journalism that simply does not “hold still” (Schudson 2013: 191). For all the talk about the decline of journalism, it remains a vital field of work and of study, always moving, always evolving, and always in need of scrutiny.

Further reading

Scholarly efforts to define journalism have been highlighted in this chapter. Schudson’s (2003, 2012) *The Sociology of News* elaborates on his initial definition, demonstrating journalism’s deep connections to its cultural and historical contexts. As the title suggests, Craft and Davis’s (2016) text, *Principles of American Journalism*, delves into the specific beliefs, forms, and practices that constitute journalism. Likewise, Deuze’s (2005) article focuses on the beliefs or ideology that constitute journalism. Shapiro’s (2014) article lays out the issues involved in defining journalism and raises many thoughtful questions about the evolving field. Some readers will likely want to move from defining journalism to defining journalists. The article by Peters and Tandoc (2013) is a good place to start.

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John Nerone

2 Journalism history

Abstract: A quick survey of the history of scholarly work on journalism history underscores the difference between the history of news – which is a long history, in which every human society can claim some part – and the history of journalism, which is a much shorter and more defined history. News acquired a normative role in democracies, first as a factor in the operation of public spheres, then as a resource for partisan competition in mass electoral democracies. The development of news technologies interacted with market factors to advance the commoditization and then mass production of news. Journalism, understood as a set of professional standards and practices, was produced at a moment during the industrialization of news systems, and might be seen originally as an explanation and legitimation of the business of news in modern capitalist societies, an ideology that spread globally along with western military power, commerce, wire services, and news organizations. But western professional journalism has long been challenged by other journalisms, including the journalisms of local, religious, social, and political movements and counterhegemonic journalisms associated with developing countries and the socialist bloc. By the late 20th century, journalism was also challenged by the postmodern moment and the rise of competition in media channels, intensified by the emergence of digital media.

Keywords: Democracy, digital media, industrialization, news, professionalism, public sphere, telegraph, wire services

Work on the history of news media and news organizations has two genealogies, an internal one and an external one. The first histories were written by people who worked in the news – printers, reporters, and correspondents, who told their own stories and recounted the ways the business operated in their times. These “original histories” formed the raw material of the first scholarly histories, which were usually written as teaching instruments for courses in journalism in colleges and universities, which had been established as components of professionalization projects in various countries dating from the late 19th and early 20th centuries (Joseph 2009). At around the same time, sociologists began to examine the press as a political institution, developing a critical history that looked at news as an element in the formation of parties, crowds, or publics (Hardt 2001).

Both of these genealogies emphasized the place of the press in the life of the polity, and downplayed its more demotic aspects. At the same time, both realized the importance of the business models that supported news organizations. Both saw a natural evolution of the press from a dependent arm of organized politics to

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a market-based agency of relatively autonomous information gathering and dissemination.

It is only in retrospect that early histories can be called “journalism histories”. Until the 20th century, these histories usually referred to their subject as “the press” or “newspapers” and not “journalism”, and the protagonists of these accounts were “reporters” or “correspondents” or “editors” and not “journalists”. Writing on the history of news began to refer specifically to the history of journalism in the last quarter of the 19th century, and the term “journalism history” was applied to the field sometime after 1920. The first really scholarly journalism histories in the US were written partly as textbooks for journalism curricula (Bleyer 1927; Mott 1941). These accounts emphasized the emergence of journalism as an independent profession, and seemed to later, more critical scholars in the 1970s and beyond as “whiggish” or “progressive”, and perhaps too congratulatory (Carey 1974; McKerns 1977). Subsequent scholarship interrogated the social history of journalism (Schudson 1978) and critiqued its relationship to markets and capital (Chalaby 1998).

Changes in nomenclature signify institutional changes in the news environment. “Journalism” is a term that carries a normative charge that “news” or “press” lacks. Journalism is an ism, like liberalism or Catholicism, in that it defines itself according to a set of standards and ideals. News is something every society produces, but only some of it can be called journalism; furthermore, within journalism, distinctions are constantly being made between better and worse practices.

Before people talked about “journalism”, there were people who were identified as “journalists”. A journalist was originally someone who worked on a journal, and usually that meant he (for the most part) wrote argumentative pieces about the affairs of the day. Only in the second half of the 19th century did it also become common to refer to journalism as a set of news practices governed by professional standards and ideals. The invention of journalism came about because of the confluence of industrial and market conditions, on the one hand, and broadly shared anxieties about the political effects of the news business on the other (Nerone 2015). Together these factors provided the capacity for the regulation of the news and an urgency about assembling standards and ideals.

1 The long history of news

Any organization at any point in human history has had a system for distributing news. Organizations in general like to keep the circulation of news internal, limited to the members who need to know. But organizations with public activities – governments, for instance – also need a system for external news distribution. The publicity that governments generate changed over time as modes of legitimation and media technologies changed.

Modern news culture appeared when new ideas about government encountered new media technologies. Governments began to claim legitimacy through the consent of the people in early modern Europe at about the same time as news began to be written and then printed on paper and transmitted through postal systems. Under these circumstances, news appeared as a relatively autonomous public enterprise.

Printed news was an important source of revenue for early print shops (Pettegree 2014). Much of it appeared in pamphlet form, offering often sensational accounts of dramatic events: “faits divers”, as the French called it (Stephens 2007). The format was also used by people with a political or religious cause to advance. Martin Luther and his colleagues were extraordinary pamphleteers, and the Reformation produced a vibrant news culture that followed conflicts between Catholic and Protestant powers. Indeed, anywhere power was contested, activists were likely to take recourse to print, partly to inform the people, but more importantly to represent the public as monitoring affairs of state, thereby exerting pressure on governing elites (Baron & Dooley 2005).

By the beginning of the 17th century, printed news had begun to appear in regular editions, on a monthly or a weekly basis. Periodical publication had characterized earlier handwritten newsletters, like the well-known *Avvisi* of Venice (Infelise 2007), commonly exchanged among merchants, and flowing through the newly developing postal networks of the 16th century. This sort of news was more powerful if fewer people knew it, unlike the more public news that conflicts produced.

So news culture grew through the interaction of these two polarities: the transmission of privileged information to elites in commerce and government, and the dissemination of news as an instrument of representing public opinion in religious and political conflicts. Over the course of the 17th and 18th centuries, some print shops developed operations for producing news content as a significant part of their business models, and cultivated a regular clientele, usually among social elites. The printers who ran these shops also developed networking practices, sharing their productions with fellow printers, who provided regular sources of additional content as well as like-minded ideological material (Raymond 2013). By the end of the 18th century, a toolkit of print tactics, including networked newspapers, was available for political and religious movements in the European world.

Techniques of regulation accompanied the growth of print culture. Because governing elites in church and state recognized the power of print, they instituted laws and offices for directing and in some cases monopolizing it. Techniques included licensing printers, requiring prepublication approval for individual works, establishing copyright, punishing transgressions as libellous and in extreme cases treasonous, and imposing taxes on publications and raw materials like paper and ink.

These techniques had significant impact everywhere, but also had limits. Print shops tended to overproduce skilled workers, and printing equipment could be

portable and easily concealed, so that activists with resources could usually find a way to circumvent strict regulation. The greatest fallibility of regulation occurred when governing elites divided into competing parties. The system of press regulation in Britain failed when civil war broke out in the 1640s, and again when party conflict climaxed in the 1690s (Siebert 1952). French regulation, centred around royal grants of monopoly, failed as the Revolution approached in the 1780s (Gough 2016).

2 The public sphere

The concept of the public sphere, especially as formulated by Jürgen Habermas (1989), has influenced a generation of histories of the media. In Habermas's account, the emergence of bourgeois capitalism in western Europe featured the development of "civil society", which included markets, independent churches, and the domestic life of sentimental families. Civil society came to see itself as a realm of freedom, as opposed to the realm of compulsion associated with increasingly bureaucratic states. Civil society barricaded itself away from the state by erecting barriers made of rights – for instance, the rights to life, liberty, and estate found in John Locke's treatises on government. As civil society separated from the state, the space left in between formed a public sphere.

As an abstract space between civil society and the state, the public sphere stipulated a particular kind of discourse. Citizens were authorized to address each other, and the state, in the public sphere, but were supposed to honour the nature of the space by bracketing off their private interests and validating their arguments on the basis of the common good. They were supposed to assume that their audience consisted of the entire body politic. In other words, they were supposed to speak as if they were nobody addressing everybody. These rules of discourse were repeatedly expressed by publicists as "impersonality" and "impartiality", and by printers as being "open to all parties but influenced by none", which would lead to republics governed by "rational liberty". The cultural expectations of publicity in this bourgeois formation of the public sphere led to a flourishing of printed political discourse, often written over pseudonyms meant to convey a "republican" sensibility, like John Trenchard and Thomas Gordon's "Cato", or Alexander Hamilton's and James Madison's "Publius". Meanwhile, in Britain, a popular literature had appeared outlining the etiquette of the public sphere. The most influential publications were Joseph Addison and Richard Steele's *Tatler* and *Spectator*, which featured frequent essays on the manners of coffeehouse denizens and other "news-mongers".

By the time of the French Revolution, the term "journalist" had begun to refer to someone whose profession was engaging in public debate in print about the affairs of the day. This usage did not emphasize the newsgathering function of the

journalist. Instead, a journalist was a controversialist, engaged in what had become a perpetual battle over the formation and representation of public opinion.

3 The news and mass democracy

It is a commonplace that democracy requires an informed citizenry, and that therefore a free and vibrant press is essential. Historically, the development of press freedom was more complicated. There is now a canon of texts in political theory that seems to provide a consistent and noble genealogy of thinking about the relationship between a free press and progressive governance. This genealogy was constructed after the fact, and on closer examination the texts in it have interesting and often troubling wrinkles (Peters 2005).

The first ancestor in this genealogy is usually John Milton, whose *Areopagitica* (1644) is remembered as the first mature argument for freedom of the press. Critics have pointed out that he excluded large areas of discourse from his arena of freedom, including “Popery, and open superstition”, or in other words those opposed to his own political movement. He wanted a clash of ideas, but among a convivial circle that included only “neighboring differences, or indifferences”. Although he professed that Truth will always defeat falsehood in a “free and open encounter”, it appears that his criteria for a “free and open encounter” were expansive: among other things, he expected a well educated citizenry already unified by civil and religious values.

Thomas Jefferson, another of the canonized thinkers, also shows important nuances on closer examination. He famously preferred “newspapers without government” to “government without newspapers”, but qualified that position by stipulating that the press must actually be read by everyone, and everyone must be capable of critically understanding it. His attitude toward the actually existing press was often hostile, and in his second inaugural address he explicitly encouraged his allies to prosecute printers under state laws against seditious libel.

Neither Milton nor Jefferson imagined the press as an industry, described freedom of expression with the metaphor of a “marketplace of ideas”, or used the term “journalism”. Instead, press commentary into the 19th century retained a vocabulary rooted in a demure model of public discourse, contrasting true liberty with “licentiousness” (Levy 1985).

In the United States, the normative impulse of public sphere discourse prompted significant investment in press infrastructure. This investment took a number of forms. One was the postal system, the largest initiative of the national government, which subsidized newspapers with reduced postage and free exchange among printer/editors, promoting the formation of open-ended networks, national in scope, often with a partisan or reformist identity (John 1995; McChesney &

Nichols 2010). State and federal governments also subsidized newspapers by printing laws and official actions at advertising rates.

Public subsidy let the press expand more rapidly and universally than markets would have allowed. By the second decade of the 19th century, most localities had at least one newspaper, and many had two or more. The abundance of newspapers invited party alignments. A younger generation of printers had become politicized following the contested Presidential election of 1800 (Pasley 2002), and over the next two decades a mature system of permanent mass electoral party competition appeared. To an older generation, this seemed “licentious”, but partisans argued that organized competition was healthy.

Acceptance of mass electoral democracy was slower elsewhere. In Britain, although most forms of censorship had been abandoned by the 18th century, a series of taxes on paper and advertising raised the price of newspapers, making it very difficult to publish for a popular audience. Radical activists found ways to dodge these stamp taxes, but found themselves always vulnerable to arrest and prosecution (Hampton 2004). At the same time, Britain retained property requirements for voting longer than the US. As a result, the struggle for the franchise intersected with campaigns against “taxes on knowledge” to produce a more class-conscious popular politics than in the US.

Western countries seem to have had a common history of evolving relations between the press and politics. Countries experienced different paths to a partisan press, but almost all have experienced a period of partisan newspapering, and many continue to host media overtly or implicitly aligned with parties (Hallin & Mancini 2004). Likewise, all experience in some fashion a tension between commercialization and politicization.

The US is unusual among western countries in the weakness of its public media sector. Although it initially invested heavily in press development (McChesney & Nichols 2010), it failed to impose national control on the telegraph system, unlike most countries, in which the telegraph was assimilated into the postal system. And it also turned away from state development of broadcasting. The lack of a national radio/television authority has had a significant impact on the direction of professional journalism.

4 Commercialism, the telegraph, and news as a commodity

Printing in western countries was market-oriented, in part, from its origin. But market concerns were always balanced by other sources of support – patronage from church and state, support from parties and wealthy sponsors, and service to a community of readers. This array of support, coupled with technological limits to the

scale of production, meant that printers could meaningfully claim some independence from market forces. Beginning in Britain, then accelerating in the US, commercialization began to exert more pull over the craft. This is most evident in the rise of advertising as a source of revenue.

Advertising affected every aspect of the typical newspaper. Visual innovations – headlines, white space, illustration – appeared in advertising matter first and then were adopted by other content areas. Perhaps the most important effect of advertising was in introducing economies of scale in newspaper production. These came in several forms. One was in circulation. Subscription revenue increased arithmetically with circulation, but the increase in advertising revenue could be geometrical: doubling circulation could quadruple advertising income, especially in markets with more than two competing newspapers. The pursuit of advertising revenue therefore encouraged the adoption of new tools of production: steam- and then electric-powered presses, new graphic tools like lithography and photoengraving, colour printing. The mounting expense of the equipment introduced another economy of scale, and eventually a pull toward monopoly in local markets.

An entirely different sort of commercialization appeared in the commoditization of news. Initially, news was gathered from written and printed sources delivered by post or by personal contact. Once printed, such news was public, and was freely copied by other newspapers. Because a newspaper's political significance was measured by the frequency with which other newspapers copied its material, printers made every effort to share their copy. Only after advertising revenue came to dominate the business model did newspapers try to assert copyright in their content (Brauneis 2009). Copyright claims depended on an assertion of enterprise in newsgathering. This became credible only when newspapers began to systematically invest in reporting staffs, which occurred in the middle third of the 19th century in the US and Britain. Still, it was difficult to maintain ownership over news once published.

The most important tool for asserting ownership in news was the telegraph. Historians of news usually understand the telegraph as accelerating the flow of news. This is certainly true, although telegraphy did not achieve the “annihilation of space and time” that its boosters envisioned. It also allowed for news flow to be controlled. Telegraphy led directly to the rise of news agencies as wholesalers, and a handful of them became national and regional monopolies, especially Reuters, Havas, and the Associated Press. The rise of the Associated Press is especially instructive, as it leveraged control over telegraphic transmission of European news into a collusive arrangement with Western Union, the company that dominated ownership of telegraph wires, and a monopolistic position in the transmission of national news. Telegraphic infrastructure also served to regularize flows of information from sources such as stock markets, governments, and sports leagues, with important consequences for the structure of investing, for instance (Carey 1983; Blondheim 1994).

Commoditizing news shifted the balance among the various roles of the press and also encouraged market concentration. The core of a newspaper had become discussions of national politics. With increasing investment in news, this element came to occupy a smaller, though still central, piece of real estate, sandwiched between telegraphic news and the items produced by reporters in the city room. As wholesale news from wire services and reported items from the newspaper's own staff became more important, an outsized competitive advantage accrued to the newspaper with the most resources; this competitive advantage was then multiplied in advertising revenue. Newspapers became big business.

Commercialization led directly to industrialization, then. The news industry took its place among other manufacturing industries. It also fell subject to the criticisms directed at, say, the railroad industry – of using monopoly power to exploit ordinary people and wield undue influence over the government and its personnel. Critics also saw similarities to the abuses of the meatpacking industry, and warned that news might be morally unfit for human consumption.

5 Private power, public criticism, and the birth of journalism

Industrializing newspapers developed a complex and efficient division of labour. On the most basic level, they divided content production from mechanical production (typesetting, presswork, delivery) and management (circulation and advertising sales). As news organizations grew in scale, they also divided content production into different editorial stools and repertorial beats. One editor handled general telegraphic news, for instance, while another handled business news, especially market reports. A city editor ran the main newsroom, directing reporters out into the world to scavenge for information from sources routine (criminal courts, City Hall) and extraordinary, while correspondents positioned abroad sent copy (first by mail, then by telegraph) to other editors. And a desk filled with copy editors interfaced between the newsroom and the composing room, where a foreman directed a crew of typesetters.

Among the many occupations involved, three would come to be called journalists: editors, reporters, and correspondents. These occupations had different genealogies and standards. Editors descended in a fairly direct line from the party editors of earlier newspapers, and were held to a standard of manly independence. Reporters were fact gatherers and stenographers – a common task was to transcribe important speeches and sermons – and were held to a standard of accuracy. Correspondents were, as the name implies, letter writers from abroad, and were expected to provide vivid accounts of exotic or dramatic scenes. Reporters were supposed to be terse; correspondents and editors were allowed to be colourful,

fulsome, and even verbose. Each occupation had its own grievances. Reporters were especially aggrieved, many of them being paid by the line or the column inch, and thus in constant peril of having their income edited below subsistence (Smythe 1980; Solomon 1995). Reporters also aspired to having the kind of voice that correspondents and some editors enjoyed.

One kind of news that merged the voice of the correspondent with the fact gathering practices of the reporter was illustrated news. Around the middle of the 19th century, illustrated newspapers, usually weekly and usually national in circulation, appeared in all the western countries. They shared similar tools and techniques, and their personnel also moved from country to country (Brown 2002; Martin 2006). The history of modern news is always transnational, but the lines of influence are most visible in the case of illustrated news. In terms of philosophy, illustrated news differed strikingly from verbal reporting, which aimed for stenographic accuracy. Instead, a news illustration was supposed to be a kind of prosthetic memory (Lury 1998) of a public event. In terms of process, the published images were collaborations, crafted by master illustrators out of details drawn by sketch artists on the scene, and then carved into woodblocks by teams of engravers. The great innovator Frank Leslie explained that his paper's illustrations were the mental image one would have retained had one actually witnessed the event (Barnhurst & Nerone 2001, ch. 4). This philosophy seems to anticipate the mid-20th-century notion of objectivity, which also might be thought of as a synthesis of reporting and correspondence.

The occupational frustrations and ambitions of reporters intersected with public criticism of the moral quality and political power of the press. Criticism of the moral quality of the press had much to do with the ways in which reporters invaded private life to produce compelling stories. Crime, sex, and sexual crimes were reliable news topics, dating from the earliest forms of printed news. Industrializing newspapers produced more of this news, and worse yet, more of it was true. To the guardians of public morality, this steady flow of turpitude threatened the general culture. Ironically, the flood of so-called "yellow journalism" in the closing decades of the 19th century was itself hyper-moralistic. In Britain, the most famous example was William T. Stead's exposé of child prostitution in his sensational series "The Maiden Tribute of Modern Babylon", which ran in the *Pall Mall Gazette* in 1885 and was then copied throughout the English-speaking world (Brake, King & Mussell 2012). Stead was in turn inspired by the "new journalism" of Pulitzer and Hearst in the US. Their circulation war in New York in the 1890s would mark the climax of yellow journalism (Campbell 2001). The upper classes especially complained; the right of privacy was invented in response to intrusions by newsmonsters (Warren & Brandeis 1890; Gajda 2009).

If privacy concerns were upscale, they were balanced by a more populist critique of the power of news barons. In the US, Gilded Age politics produced a rush of controversies over corruption. Jay Gould, a railroad financier and one of the

most notorious of the era's "robber barons", also bought newspapers like the *New York World* and at one point gained ownership of Western Union (John 2010); William Randolph Hearst, whose family's fortune came from mining, built a chain of creatively financed newspapers with its own wire service and features syndicate, and mobilized it to promote his own political ambitions, winning a seat in the House of Representatives and coming close to securing the Democratic nomination for the Presidency. The term Press Baron is more properly associated with British newspaper magnates, who became literal barons, most famously Alfred Harmsworth, who became Viscount Northcliffe, and his younger brother Harold, who became Viscount Rothermere. Suspicions of the motives and power of the press barons came to a head in the years bracketing the First World War. In the US, anxieties about secret ownership of newspapers climaxed with the passage of the federal Truth in Publishing Act of 1912 (Lawson 1993) and the publication of muckraking exposés of the news business by Will Irwin (1911) and Upton Sinclair (1920).

The initial response to the combination of upscale and populist press criticism was for news personnel to try to elevate the moral quality of "journalism", which came to be used as a covering term for editors, reporters, and correspondents. Journalism remained vague as a term. Commentators tended to agree that it required a "nose for news" (Vos & Finneman 2016), though they were not in agreement on whether that skill was innate or teachable. Most commentators also agreed that good journalists behaved like gentlemen, though the boundaries of gentlemanly behavior were also ill-defined, other than the fact that gentlemen were men. Even though women had established themselves as competent newsgatherers, editors, and typographers, most of the occupations in the news business remained gendered male (Tusan 2005).

Press clubs constituted one battleground for the attempt to enforce genteel behavior. Most significant cities had a press club by the end of the 19th century. These mostly male preserves fostered a sense of community, not just among journalists but also between journalists and newsmakers, who often became members. Over the next generation, these organizations began to police behaviour, determined to elevate the profession by eliminating drunkenness and brawling and by limiting opportunities for the politically connected to compromise the integrity of newsmen.

A more public tactic was education. College courses and then degree programmes in journalism appeared in the various western countries in the final third of the 19th century. At the beginning of the 20th century, the first schools of journalism in universities appeared, with the University of Missouri's J-school claiming to have been the first, established in 1908. In the US, journalism schools were established mostly in the large land-grant institutions of the midwest, south, and west; Joseph Pulitzer's attempts to endow a school of journalism in Ivy-League Columbia University, though ultimately successful, were met with scorn and resistance at first (Boylan 2005). In many cases, including the founding of the college

of journalism at the University of Illinois, the state publishers' association was a key instigator, recognizing the importance of higher education in enhancing the respectability of the news industry (Carey 1978).

Journalism education required formulating some teachable core of practices and standards. This necessarily entailed marginalizing the importance of the “nose for news”, which was minimally teachable, in favour of a more formalized set of criteria, often organized around the “five w’s” (Folkerts 2014). Early textbooks emphasized terms like accuracy and neutrality, though the more sophisticated “objectivity” was more a creature of a second generation. Early J-schools also emphasized the importance of gentlemanly behaviour, even though women were present as both students and teachers.

J-schools were part of a more general professionalization project. By World War I, news organizations had begun crafting formal codes of ethics (Wilkins & Brennen 2004), which were meant both to regulate conduct and to announce to the public that journalists cared about correct behaviour. Rectitude was also important on the agenda of new professional organizations, which ranged from unions to more management-oriented groups, like the American Society of Newspaper Editors, or ASNE (Pratte 1995).

In the US, professionalization marked a turn away from other ways of elevating the occupation, especially organizing as a craft union. The mechanical workforce of US newspapers, especially the typographers, had been pioneers in labour organization, and would retain powerful unions until computerization fundamentally altered the nature of their work. Their International Typographical Union periodically tried to organize “news writers”, something that was considered important at a time when many of the editorial workers had enough experience in typesetting to scab during work actions. The professionalization project narrowed the path from the composing room to the newsroom, breaking the common culture between mechanical and editorial workers, and invited reporters and correspondents to think of their work as intellectual or knowledge-based, like medicine or law. When the depression of the 1930s imposed such hardship on US journalists that they formed the American Newspaper Guild (Leab 1970), a rift still remained with the ITU and other newspaper unions, so that publishers were able to play them off against each other in contract negotiations.

There was nothing inherent in journalism that retarded unionization. In other countries, particularly Italy and the Nordic countries, professionalization and unionization worked together. The variation in these histories testifies to the artificiality of journalism's professional status. Any profession requires a monopoly on practice, often (as in the case of medicine) enforced by state licensing. Such a monopoly usually draws legitimacy from an arcane body of theoretical knowledge, like medical science. Journalism has never had such a science, and in most countries lacks a strict licensing process as well. But the occupation did come to exercise something like a monopoly over news production, not because of science but

because of bottlenecks, like wires services and dominant local newspapers and later broadcasting.

As a result, the structure of journalism as a profession developed before its content, which was cobbled together after the fact. This isn't unusual. Medicine professionalized before physicians knew much about germs, nutrition, and pharmaceuticals – in other words, well before it was a good idea to see a doctor if you were seriously ill.

What is more unusual about journalism as a profession is its lack of independence. In theory, practitioners in the classic professions, like medicine or the clergy, contain the means of production in their heads and hands, and therefore do not have to work for a company or an employer. They can draw their income directly from their clients or patients. Because the professionals hold knowledge, moreover, their clients are dependent on them. Journalists hold knowledge, but it is not theoretical in nature; one might argue that the public depends on journalists in the same way that patients depend on doctors, but in practice a journalist can serve the public usually only by working for a news organization, which can fire her or him at will. Journalists' income depends not on the public, but on the employing news organization, which often derives the large majority of its revenue from advertisers.

But it became useful, even necessary, for publishers to cede more independence to news workers as a way of deflecting criticism of their increasing power. The professionalization project took off as a negotiated settlement between publishers and their workforce in the interest of staving off a public demanding more fundamental reform. Publishers announced that a “Chinese wall” separated the newsroom from the business offices of news organizations, while journalists came to embrace objectivity as a way of separating their professional work from their personal values and preferences (Schudson 1978).

6 Journalism, World Wars, and the globe

In addition to being teachable, professional journalism is exportable. In the 20th century, a hegemonic version of western journalism spread to much of the world, augmenting or displacing other news practices.

The printing press had followed the path of European empires. Print in general and newspapers in particular appeared first as tools of the colonizers. Later, local nationalist elites adopted western newspaper formats, drawing symbolic power from their appropriation of the colonizers' practices, but at the same time introducing variations (Judge 1996; Mittler 2004). Often these postcolonial newspapers would draw inspiration from counterhegemonic movements and ideas. The strategies of abolitionists or socialists often seem to have been more important to these creole newspapers than the practices of commercial newspapers.

At the same time, newsgathering enterprises from the European world extended outward. The wire services stretched into every corner of the globe, partly in service to colonial administration, and partly as a nervous system for globalizing capital. The wire services in particular carried outward the highly formalized style of western hegemonic journalism (Winseck & Pike 2007; Silberstein-Loeb 2014).

Often postcolonial newswriters considered the adoption of Anglo-American styles of commercial journalism an important support for national advancement and modernization. Some made the pilgrimage to western J-schools. The University of Missouri's Walter Williams was especially dedicated to J-school diplomacy (Farar 1998). Students and visiting professionals from East Asia "seeded" J-schools in Japan and Hong Kong.

The globalization of western journalism ebbed and flowed with the world wars. News enterprises thrive on wars, which often spur infrastructural development (like extending telegraph wires), encourage technological development (like radio), and stimulate formal innovation (like illustrated news). The Crimean War is often credited with spurring the development of British news, as is the Civil War for the US. The 20th-century world wars were bigger and bloodier.

World War I produced the first really global propaganda war. The major powers involved all policed their own national media, controlling the information diet of their publics, and at the same time produced news designed to persuade world opinion and demoralize the enemies' publics. This media warfare was made more compelling and alarming by the availability of visual media like photography and film, which were thought to have a more directly emotional impact than verbal texts. The effectiveness of propaganda challenged the model of a free press informing an intelligent citizenry that had become conventional in western democracies (Auerbach 2015). The most famous response in English was Walter Lippmann's *Public Opinion* (1922), which examined the "pictures in our heads" as a "pseudo-environment" that intervenes between actors and the real environment. The media necessarily add an element of distortion to the pictures in our heads, especially in commercial systems. Lippmann saw the need for expert intelligence bureaus to rectify the knowledge that would inform decision-making. He was sure that the press itself did not have the capacity to supply accurate knowledge.

The doubts voiced by Lippmann and others prompted a reformulation of US journalism by suggesting a content for the professionalization project. Journalists came to assume responsibility for explaining the world to readers who lacked the capacity to sort through the bombardment of conflicting images and ideas that modern means of mass communications produced. A long process of advancing expertise followed, with news content increasingly presenting fewer names, places, dates, and stories, while offering longer articles processing news into contextualized explanations (Barnhurst & Nerone 2001; Barnhurst 2016). Journalists gained an authoritative voice, represented by the byline, a feature adopted from "soft news" sections like arts coverage and syndicated columns, and which simulta-

neously announced authorship and promised that what was reported in the piece was what any other professional journalist would have reported. The term “objectivity” replaced older terms like “independence” and “neutrality”, signifying that the professional journalist was aware of one’s own subjectivity (Schudson 1978), and had undertaken to police it in the interest of pursuing an inter-subjectively verifiable truth. The journalist signalled objectivity by textual devices like attribution and balancing (Tuchman 1978). Professional journalism thus claimed an ethical mission of service to public intelligence.

This reformulation made a virtue out of bigness. Industrialization had shown that advancing production would lead to increasing scale in business, and muckrakers like Ida Tarbell and Lincoln Steffens had shown that big business could not be trusted. Big business required big government as a countervailing power. But World War I and its aftermath showed that big government was willing to build a massive apparatus to distort public information and manipulate public opinion. So big government and big business both required big media as an additional countervailing power. This conclusion is evident in the nomenclature of the media sphere in the interwar years, which featured the term “objectivity”, and also the terms “mass media”, “mass communications”, and “marketplace of ideas” (Nerone 2015). Because mass media threatened competition in the media marketplace, it became necessary for objective journalism to create a virtual marketplace in which ideas could compete.

The rise of broadcasting after World War I might be seen as finalizing the notion of the politically independent professional journalist. Whether in the dominant national broadcast authorities that appeared in most countries – like RAI or the BBC – or in the commercial networks that appeared in the US, on-air journalism was under tremendous pressure to represent a consensus and to avoid political attachments. Partisanship would appear in broadcast news only after radio and then television overcame the scarcities that demanded impartiality. Meanwhile, broadcast journalists had acquired a distinctive aura. Ordinary people could identify on-air anchors and reporters for national and commercial networks, who became icons of news professionalism.

Hegemonic journalism was not unchallenged. Throughout its process of assembly, within any national news system, journalism was critiqued by class, ideological, gender, and racial outsiders, who developed alternative practices and standards. In the years between the world wars, similar geopolitical divisions appeared. The Bolshevik revolution of 1917 brought the Communist Party to power in Russia, and in the following decades a Soviet style of vanguardist professional journalism was adopted by the socialist bloc and by some nationalist and revolutionary movements. In the midst of World War II, the Chinese Communist Party formulated principles for the operation of a revolutionary media system that continues to inform state practices (Huang 2016).

World War II saw a refinement of journalistic standards. The scepticism produced by World War I and the economic collapse of the 1930s encouraged move-

ments in many western countries to impose responsibilities on news media. The fascist countries effectively controlled their media systems and demonstrated the usefulness of authoritarian direction in achieving political stability, economic growth, and social control. The war effort enticed experiments in media control among the anti-fascist bloc, and the alliance between the West and the USSR encouraged a relaxation of criticism of state-run journalism. But the media themselves insisted on their autonomy, and honed legal and theoretical arguments justifying private ownership without formal responsibilities. In the US, the publishing magnate Henry Luce funded a group of academics, chaired by University of Chicago President Robert Hutchins, to examine the issue of freedom of the press. The resulting report (Commission on Freedom of the Press 1947) and accompanying documents outlined a liberal consensus that simultaneously pointed out the dangers of excessive power in private hands, enumerated the responsibilities of the media system to complex modern societies, and insisted that government interference in private media properties and markets be kept to a minimum. In essence, the Hutchins Commission endorsed the position of the dominant news organizations, that freedom of the press not only did not contradict private ownership but in fact required it. Similar reformulations occurred in other countries around the same time, the most prominent being the British Royal Commission on the Press (Curran & Seaton 2009).

This assertion of a necessary link between free-market capitalism and democratic freedom of expression seemed forced to much of the world and ridiculous to many. But the US and its allies, along with the world's most powerful international news companies, such as the Associated Press, campaigned to make it the preferred reading of the right to press freedom that appeared in the evolving regime of international human rights (Blanchard 1986). The key document in this process was the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which enshrined the right to "freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive, and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers". The precise meaning of this language was open for debate. Its vagueness delayed the formulation of enforceable conventions (Lebovic 2016) and invited a continuing global debate over specifics.

This debate took especially vivid form in the 1970s, in a campaign for a New World Information and Communication Order (NWICO). A coalition of countries from the socialist bloc and the global south argued, among other things, that the Declaration endorsed a "right to communicate", which went beyond the right to free expression recognized by liberalism, and included a right of access to the media system and a right to recognition by the world (MacBride 1980). Although this argument mirrored some of the abstract arguments of the Hutchins Commission, western countries and especially news organizations saw in it a spectre of censorship and restrictions on media businesses. A forceful response led to the withdrawal of Reagan's US and Thatcher's Britain from UNESCO, the organization in which

the debate centred. Muzzling UNESCO ushered the NWICO debate into economic fora, particularly the GATT and then the WTO, where interpretations of freedom of expression became entangled with intellectual property issues and proposals for tariffs on “cultural goods”. The debate was off stage for a decade or two but then returned in the form of standards and procedures for global internet governance (Powers & Jablonski 2015).

7 From “high modern” to “postmodern”

Dan Hallin (1992) has named the post-World War II era journalism’s “high modernism”. In most developed countries, a few national news organizations, staffed by professionalized journalists who were accorded significant autonomy, were able to assemble an authoritative account of the “news of the day” that stood in for informed public opinion. High modern journalism had the capacity to represent the public in two senses: standing in for the public in confrontations with the powerful, and depicting the public’s concerns and values by constructing a news agenda. In the US, the national media consisted of three broadcast networks, two or three news magazines, two wire services, and a handful of metropolitan daily newspapers. All were for-profit private companies. In most western countries, a similar array of national newspapers and magazines accompanied a dominant national broadcast authority.

High modern journalism exercised considerable power. One can cite many examples of enterprise journalism exposing corruption or injustice and sparking significant social and political change, like the “*mani pulite*” scandal in Italy, or revelations about birth defects resulting from thalidomide in Britain, or Watergate in the US. In most cases, heroic journalists depended on allies in parallel government investigations, but it is fair to argue that media exposure was crucial. High modern journalism might usefully be looked upon as an institution and part of the apparatus of governing (Cook 1998). In its everyday sorting of events into news and non-news, and its sorting of news into the spheres of deviance, consensus, and legitimate controversy (Hallin 1986), it enacted a powerful cultural consensus supporting the social and political order.

Even in the high modern moment, journalism had limits and vulnerabilities. Its attachment to political neutrality, or objectivity, or expertise, and its codependence with officialdom made it “hackable” by people like US Senator Joseph McCarthy (Bayley 1981; Alwood 2007). Its dependence on advertising for revenue, in most western countries, and the power of its ownership, which always had interests of their own, sometimes set boundaries to coverage and eroded public trust.

A gang of developments promised the end of the high modern moment by the 1990s. The cultural consensus that had informed and been enacted by journalism unravelled, beginning with the turbulence of the 1960s and accelerating with the

rise of competing counterpublics (Warner 2002; Squires 2002) with incommensurable agendas and realities. Globalization hastened the proliferation of competing groups. It also exacerbated problems with the structure of media systems, promoting a wave of privatization and commercialization that undermined the national broadcast authorities and systems of public support that had been key parts of journalism's infrastructure in most parts of the world. In the already commercialized US, the revocation of the Fairness Doctrine led to the rise of politicized talk radio, while supportive regulation nurtured cable television systems with 24-hour news channels, all of which seemed to old hands like a barbarian invasion. All of these trends accelerated with the rise of digital communications, allowing increased audience participation and offering individuals the capacity to construct their own "public sphericules" (Gitlin 2002).

Journalism tried in various ways to shore up its infrastructure. One set of initiatives involved public outreach, either in the form of "public journalism", in which journalists invited citizens to help set the news agenda, or in public education campaigns, like the (largely ineffective) efforts of the Freedom Forum. In the US and elsewhere, public regard for journalists and journalism did not register these efforts, and fell to the point where political figures such as George W. Bush could comfortably dismiss the press as just another special interest. A different set of initiatives involved finding new business models. These have met with varying success. Some elite news media, like the *New York Times*, have found ways to monetize digital news, for instance, but the primary beneficiaries of the digital news market have been social media networks like Facebook and de-professionalized news organizations like *Breitbart*. The most successful prestige journalism organizations have been those supported by dedicated public funding, like the BBC, or hybrid subsidized/commercial ventures like *Al Jazeera*.

The success of *Al Jazeera* signalled a turn in the long road to a New World Information and Communication Order. Funded by Qatari royals, *Al Jazeera* has been one of the most successful and respected of the new global media. Its adoption of western professional standards has matched its aggressive move into the market of English-language news, and seemed to portend an end to the hegemony of the global north in the realm of information (Davis 2013). Its expansion from TV to the internet promised to blaze a trail for other media voices to reach a global audience, ranging from Russia's quasi-governmental news channel RT and China's CCTV to the left populist media supported by Latin American governments. None of these new voices has managed to join the ranks of Disney and Newscorp, however.

The internet, meanwhile, has become a new arena for hegemonic struggle as well as a new location of infrastructure bottlenecks. The US government took the initiative in creating a global system of internet governance, which happened to favour US companies, English-language content, and commercial development generally (DeNardis 2014; Powers & Jablonski 2015). Other parts of the world, especially China, which now has the world's largest bloc of internet users, have pushed

back. The next decade may witness a struggle in international arenas much like the NWICO campaign of the 1970s and 1980s. So far, the control of bottlenecks like software, search, and service by companies like Apple, Microsoft, and Google has been maintained through a combination of network externalities, regulatory favour, and massive capitalization (McChesney 2013).

The hegemony of global internet giants cuts two ways for the history of journalism. On the one hand, the rise of Google and Facebook has meant the siphoning off of advertising revenue from news organizations like the *New York Times*. On the other hand, the internet giants may themselves adopt the responsibilities of journalistic gatekeepers. The aftermath of 2016's Brexit and US Presidential campaigns, which spotlighted the dangers of de-professionalized news, prompted Google and Facebook to launch initiatives to limit the flow of "fake news".

The 21 century, from 9/11 and the Iraq War to the election of President Trump, shows that the weakening of high modern journalism weakens in turn the ability of public opinion to operate as a regulative fiction (Nerone 2015). Journalism has been expected to represent the public as a universal supervising intelligence; the people who run things have been expected to behave as if the public was watching, and would punish them if they behaved dishonestly and corruptly. The confidence these expectations instilled allowed the west to deride the "banana republics" of the global south and the party-states of the socialist bloc, where the lack of an effective fourth estate allowed autocrats and kleptocrats to abuse their people with impunity. The power of the press as a fourth estate was always a fiction – it was a bad referee – but the belief in it did discourage misbehaviour. Now, sensing that there is no referee at all, the people who run things tell outright lies with no expectation of punishment. History suggests that a renovated journalism will find new supporting infrastructures with the sponsorship of the powers that control the bottlenecks.

Further reading

On printed news in the early modern era, Pettegree (2014) presents a broad and rich account. Raymond (2013) is especially good for tracing networks of transmission. On the history of the public sphere, Habermas (1989) remains indispensable. McChesney and Nichols (2010) offer a strong analysis of how norms later generations might think of as Habermasian drove government support for newspaper development in the US. On the similarities and differences among western media systems, Hallin and Mancini (2004) inspired considerable discussion and research. Blondheim (1994) and John (2010) cover the growth of telegraphic news in the US, and Silberstein-Loeb (2014) deals with the 20th-century wire services. On the formal aspects of news, see Barnhurst and Nerone (2001) and Barnhurst (2016). For differing arguments on the history of journalism as a set of norms and practices, see Schudson (1978), Chalaby (1998), and Nerone (2015). Folkerts (2014) and Josephi (2009) present histories of journalism education. Powers and Jablonski (2015) provide a critical account of contemporary struggles over global internet governance.

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I Foundations of the Field

Thomas Hanitzsch

3 Roles of Journalists

Abstract: The study of journalistic roles is central to our understanding of journalism's identity and place in society in a time when journalistic ideals have become more ambivalent and liquid after the turn of the century. The chapter conceptualizes journalistic roles as discursively constituted. As structures of meaning, they set the parameters of what is desirable in the institutional context of journalism. In such a perspective, journalistic roles reflect and articulate journalism's identity and locus in society on analytically distinct levels: normative and cognitive role orientations, and practiced and narrated role performance. These four categories correspond to conceptually distinct ideas: what journalists ought to do, what they want to do, what journalists really do in practice, and what they think they do. Normative roles encompass generalized and aggregate expectations that are deemed desirable in society; cognitive roles are defined as the institutional values, attitudes and beliefs individual journalists embrace as a result of their occupational socialization. Practiced roles capture the roles of journalists as they are executed in practice, while narrated roles denominate. In these four modes, journalists serve their audiences in two important social domains: political life and everyday life.

Keywords: journalism, roles of journalists, norms

Research into the roles of journalists is central to the understanding of journalism's identity and place in society. Journalists define their service to society in various ways, which helps them give meaning to their work (Aldridge & Evetts 2003). Today, the study of journalistic roles is more relevant than ever: We live in a time when journalism's identity is existentially shaken and journalistic ideals have become more ambivalent and liquid after the turn of the century (Koljonen 2013).

Despite a long tradition of studying journalistic roles, there is still quite a bit of variation in terminology. Researchers refer to a wide range of concepts, such as "press functions", "media roles", "role perceptions", "role conceptions", or "journalistic paradigms". An array of seeming synonyms, such as "ideology", "perspectives", "philosophy", or "school", add to a lack of conceptual clarity. Perhaps as a consequence, scholars until recently tend to conflate the attitudinal and performative aspects of journalists' roles, as well as their normative and empirical dimensions. Not only are these dimensions often confused in much of present scholarly work, journalists also find it difficult to respond to survey questions when it is not entirely clear to them whether they are asked to report on professional norms, attitudes, or practices. The following section therefore tries to clarify the relevant concepts and establish a consistent terminology for subsequent sections.

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1 A discursive understanding of journalistic roles

Journalistic roles have no true “essence”; they exist because and as we talk about them. In order to be intelligible, they exist as part of a wider framework of meaning – of a discourse. In other words, journalistic roles – and professional identity by extension – is discursively constituted (Hanitzsch & Vos 2017). As structures of meaning, they set the parameters of what is desirable in the institutional context of journalism. Understood from within a discursive perspective, journalistic roles are never static; they are subject to discursive (re)creation, (re)interpretation, appropriation, and contestation. As expressive value set, journalistic roles are indicative of a certain journalism culture (Hanitzsch 2007).

At the core of this discourse is journalism’s identity and locus in society. Here, journalistic roles represent and articulate discursive positions that compete in a relational structure – the discursive field. This field is the site where journalistic actors struggle over discursive authority in conversations about the meaning and role of journalism in society. In other words, the discourse of journalistic roles is the central arena where journalistic culture and identity is reproduced and contested; it is the place where the struggle over the preservation or transformation of journalism’s identity takes place. As a result of this contest, dominant positions in the discourse crystallize as institutional norms and practices. The institution of journalism as it exists today therefore represents the “state of play” in an ongoing struggle over discursive authority.

Ultimately, the discourse of journalistic roles legitimizes certain norms, ideas, and practices, while it delegitimizes others. Journalists are the central discursive agents in the articulation of roles (Zelizer 1993); they do so in an exchange with interlocutors in the broader society and by using a discursive toolkit that the broader society recognizes as legitimate (Carlson 2016). The discourse of journalistic roles therefore extends well beyond the boundaries of journalism as a field of practice and field of studies. In this sense, journalistic roles perform a double duty – they act as a source of institutional legitimacy relative to the broader society and, through a process of socialization, they inform the cognitive toolkit that journalists use to think about their work.

Journalists constitute their work as meaningful to themselves and others in a discursive construction. As Christians et al. (2009) note, journalistic roles are widely recognizable and often have a fairly stable and enduring form. They most generally allude to a set of normative and cognitive beliefs as well as real-world and perceived practices of journalists situated and understood within the institutional framework of journalism. Journalists articulate and enact journalistic roles on two analytically distinct levels: normative and cognitive *role orientations*, and practised and narrated *role performance* (Hanitzsch & Vos 2017).

Role orientations refer to discursive constructions of the institutional values, attitudes, and beliefs with regard to the position of journalism in society and, con-

sequently, to the communicative ideals journalists are embracing in their work. These orientations can be normative and cognitive. Despite sharing attitudinal features, normative and cognitive roles differ in important respects. Normative roles indicate what is generally desirable to think or do in a given context, while cognitive ideas provide the recipes, guidelines, and maps for concrete action (Schmidt 2008).

Practised and imagined roles belong to the level of role performance (Mellado 2015); they capture the behavioural dimension of journalists' roles. Role performance refers to the roles of journalists as executed in practice, or to practise as observed and imagined by the journalists. The performative properties of journalists' roles may thus be analytically extracted from direct observation of their work, from news content, or from self-reports of journalists. The two types of role performance, practised and narrated roles, need to be distinguished simply, and importantly, because what journalists do and what they think they do are not necessarily the same thing.

Hence, all four categories of journalistic roles – normative, cognitive, practised, and narrated roles – correspond to conceptually distinct ideas: what journalists *ought to do*, what they *want to do*, what journalists *really do* in practice, and what they *think they do*. The four categories of roles, and the analytical distinction between orientations and performance, are connected through the processes of internalization, enactment, reflection, normalization, and negotiation in what Hantzsch and Vos (2017) proposed as the “process model” of journalistic roles.

2 Normative role orientations

Norms are commonly defined as the “rules and standards that are understood by members of a group, and that guide and/or constrain social behavior without the force of laws” (Cialdini & Trost 1998: 152). Normative role orientations appear external to individual journalists; they encompass generalized and aggregate expectations that are deemed desirable in society (Donsbach 2012). They speak to how journalists are expected to meet the aspirations and ideals of the general public.

Normative roles of journalists are socially negotiated and sensitive to context; they are in a constant flux. Being confronted with journalists' actual performance, these roles are subject to discursive reproduction and conservation, as well as to contestation and struggle. We can distinguish between “injunctive” and “descriptive norms” (Lapinski & Rimal 2005: 130): Injunctive norms refer to journalists' beliefs about desirable practice in a given context, while descriptive norms refer to their beliefs about what is actually done by most other journalists. As journalism is often characterized by strong peer orientation, injunctive norms are constantly pushed toward descriptive norms.

The context-sensitive nature of norms also explains why some journalistic roles (e.g., the watchdog or “Fourth Estate” roles) are socially desirable in some contexts (e.g., in most developed democracies) more than in others (e.g., in authoritarian societies). Most normative roles of journalists are derived from a view that emphasizes journalism’s (potential) contribution to the proper workings of democracy. It comes as no surprise, then, that most of the roles advocated in the literature bear a close connection to citizenship and democratic participation. The news media is expected to provide surveillance of and information about potentially relevant events and their contexts, to provide commentary, guidance, and advice, to provide the means for access, expression, and political participation, to contribute to shared consciousness, and to act as critic or watchdog to hold the government to account (Christians et al. 2009; McQuail 2000).

In communication research, normative perspectives gained momentum shortly after World War II, when politicians and academics began to recognize the power of the media to shape public conversation. In the United States, it was the Commission on Freedom of the Press that pointed out – in its 1947 report – that democracy essentially depends on a free flow of information and a diversity of viewpoints. Siebert, Peterson, and Schramm’s (1956) influential book *Four Theories of the Press* set a landmark in the discourse of normative theories of the media. Based on the premise that “the press always takes on the form and coloration of the social and political structures within which it operates” (1), the authors identified four models of the press – authoritarian, libertarian, communist, and the social responsibility model. In all these models, journalists were expected to act in different capacities and embrace different normative ideals. Despite its fairly ethnocentric appeal, Siebert et al.’s premise still finds traction today: Journalism’s role needs to be understood within the constraints of the relevant political, economic, and social-cultural contexts.

Seven decades of studying journalistic roles have produced a remarkable normative consensus about the essential tasks of journalism in society. The following social functions made it most prominently into the commonly accepted canon of roles: observation and information; participation in public life through commentary, advice, and advocacy; as well as the provision of access for a diversity of voices. According to Christians et al. (2009), journalists are charged with acting in four principal roles:

- The *monitorial* role entails the collection, publication, and distribution of information of interest to audiences.
- The *facilitative* role promotes dialogue between different stakeholders in society and inspires the public to actively participate in political life.
- The *radical* role is about providing a platform for views and voices critical of authority with the aim to support change and reform.
- The *collaborative* role calls on journalists to support authorities in defence of the social order against threats of crime, conflict, and natural emergencies.

These roles, however, with the possible exception of the collaborative role, were all articulated from within western perspectives and western notions of democracy. Such a view emphasizes individual liberties and freedom, while other societies may prioritize collective needs and social harmony. Traditional western accounts of media functions in political life do therefore not sufficiently account for the variation in political cultures and socio-cultural value systems around the world. Distinct sets of normative ideas may be at work in many non-western contexts. As developing and transitional societies are facing a number of unique challenges with regard to political, economic, and social development, journalists are often expected to act in the capacity of nation builders, partners of the government, and agents of empowerment (Romano 2005). Development journalism as a normative approach calls for a more collaborative and constructive role of journalists in the public domain, and it places greater emphasis on the idea of social responsibility.

By acknowledging a revolutionary and developmental role for journalists, Hachten (1981) was one of the first to recognize the need for alternative concepts that are better suited to many countries in the non-western world. Several scholars from Asia, for instance, link the media's responsibility to the preservation of social harmony and respect for leadership, which urges journalists to restrain from coverage that could potentially disrupt social order (Masterton 1996; Xiaoge 2005). The discomfort that many scholars in the global South felt with the uncritical adoption of western normative ideas was perhaps best articulated by Mehra (1989: 3), who argued that “unlike the individualistic, democratic, egalitarian and liberal tradition of Western political theory, some societies value their consensual and communal traditions with their emphasis on duties and obligations to the collective and social harmony”.

3 Cognitive role orientations

Cognitive roles can be defined as the institutional values, attitudes, and beliefs individual journalists embrace as a result of their occupational socialization. While normative roles are in many ways imposed on journalists, cognitive roles capture their individual aspirations and ambitions, and the communicative goals they want to achieve through their work. These ambitions mostly work in the subconscious and largely emerge from journalists' internalization of normative expectations. Cognitive role orientations, therefore, tend to appear as evident, natural, and self-explaining to the journalists (Schultz 2007). A discourse shared by journalists as discursive community, these roles belong to a collective repertoire that is selectively activated by journalists, both in context-specific situations and as a marker of their professional identity (Aldridge & Evetts 2003).

Cohen (1963) is usually credited with having proposed the first systematic classification of roles by distinguishing between a “neutral” and a “participant” role.

Janowitz (1975) later identified two similar role concepts, the “gatekeeper” and the “advocate”. The first large-scale empirical study was undertaken by Johnstone, Slawski, and Bowman (1972), who surveyed 1313 journalists in the United States. According to the results, journalists tended to embrace a participant role more than a neutral role. However, despite the antithetical nature of the two value sets, most journalists also held patterns of beliefs that combined elements from each of the two perspectives.

Johnstone, Slawski, and Bowman’s pioneering work was later continued by Weaver and Wilhoit (1986, 1996; Weaver et al. 2007). In their first study, Weaver and Wilhoit (1986) identified three, rather than two, distinct sets of journalists’ professional attitudes: “disseminator”, “interpreter”, and “adversarial” roles. Ten years later, they added another role, the “populist mobilizer” (Weaver & Wilhoit 1996). In the US, the interpretive function remained the strongest perception among American journalists after the millennium, while the importance of the disseminator function had dramatically declined over time. The adversarial function remains a minority attitude among American journalists, whereas the populist mobilizer role seems to have increased its appeal (Weaver et al. 2007).

The work of Weaver and Wilhoit has notably become a blueprint for a great number of studies outside the United States that largely followed their original questionnaire. Many of these surveys culminated in two collections edited by Weaver (1998a), and Weaver and Willnat (2012). The first book, *The Global Journalist*, has become a milestone in the comparative analysis of journalists’ roles, as the volume documents survey evidence about 20,280 journalists from 21 countries. In a comparative assessment, Weaver found a remarkable consensus among journalists regarding the importance of reporting the news quickly, and some agreement on the importance of providing access for the people to express their views. There was much less support, however, for providing analysis and being a watchdog of the government. Journalists largely disagreed over the importance of providing entertainment, as well as accurate and objective reporting. Overall, he concluded that strong national differences clearly override any universal professional values of journalism around the world. Much of this variation seems to reflect societal influences, especially differences in political systems, more than influences of media organizations, journalism education, and professional norms.

The second volume, edited by Weaver and Willnat (2012), largely echoes these conclusions. More often than not, journalists disagreed over the relative importance of journalistic roles across societies, which seems to speak against the idea of a universal set of occupational standards institutionalized in journalism globally. Useful as these two collections of country surveys have proven to be, it is hard to say to what extent the survey results actually reflect real-world differences between national journalistic cultures. The surveys reported in both books were not based on a common methodological framework. Rather, substantive variation in interview methods, sampling strategies, questionnaire wordings and research periods

makes this kind of comparison a “game of guesswork at best”, as Weaver (1998b: 455) himself admitted.

Many of these methodological issues were addressed in a large, and growing, number of comparative studies, notably driven by European scholars. Donsbach (1981) and Köcher (1986) were among the first to look into the cognitive roles of journalists on a considerably large and cross-national scale. Based on a survey of 450 German and 405 British journalists, their findings confirmed the initial expectation that German and British journalists differed substantially with regards to their professional roles. German journalists were more in favour of an active role of advocacy, whereas their British counterparts embraced a more neutral reporter role. These findings led Köcher (1986: 63) to conclude that British journalists resembled more the ideal type of a “bloodhound” or “hunter of news”, while their German colleagues perceived themselves in terms of “missionaries” acting on behalf of certain ideological positions in the political spectrum. Patterson and Donsbach (1996) came to similar conclusions, comparing journalists from Germany, Great Britain, Italy, Sweden, and the United States. Based on interviews with 1,361 working journalists, they found, for instance, Germans and Italians to be keenest to champion values and ideas in their reporting. Journalists’ partisanship was most strongly related to their news decisions in Germany and the lowest in the United States and Sweden.

In the largest concerted research effort of journalism researchers to date, the *Worlds of Journalism Study* looked into journalists’ cognitive roles on a global scale. The collaborative study administered identical survey questionnaires to 2,100 journalists in 21 countries. The project identified a number of traits that seemed to have universal appeal around the world, including detachment and non-involvement as well as the watchdog role and the delivery of political information (Hanitzsch et al. 2011). At the same time, the study established interventionism – that is, journalists’ willingness to actively involve themselves in social development (see below) – as a main denominator of cross-national differences in journalists’ professional views. Western journalists were generally less supportive of any active promotion of particular values, ideas, and social change, while their colleagues from non-Western countries tended to be more interventionist in their professional views. On a global level, the surveyed journalists were classified into four global professional milieus: populist disseminators, detached watchdogs, critical change agents, and opportunist facilitators (Hanitzsch 2011).

For the Pan-European context, comparative research yielded rather inconclusive results. Based on qualitative interviews with senior journalists in 12 European countries, Preston (2009: 165) found journalists embrace a “strikingly similar set of professional values” across the continent. Likewise, Statham (2008: 418) concluded from a comparison of European newspaper journalists that “journalism over Europe is emerging as a common transnational experience and practice”. Heikkilä and Kunelius (2006: 63), on the other hand, did not find “much ground to assume that a European public sphere would emerge out of national journalistic cultures”.

A growing number of studies also looked at journalists' roles beyond the western world. Arab journalists, for instance, conceive of their mission as that of driving political and social reform, thus acting as "change agents" in the political arena (Pintak 2014: 494). Pakistani journalists found it most important to defend national sovereignty, preserve national unity, and foster societal development (Pintak & Nazir 2013) – a trait that was also pronounced among Indonesian journalists (Romano 2003). These values correspond to the idea of "development journalism" identified in several countries that broadly belong to the "global South," including Bangladesh, Nepal, and Nigeria (Edeani 1993; Ramaprasad & Kelly 2003; Ramaprasad & Rahman 2006).

A considerable number of studies point to remarkable similarities between journalists from western countries and their "counterparts" in other world regions (e.g., Mwesige 2004; Ramaprasad 2001; Zhu et al. 1997). One might take this as evidence for a growing global professional awareness, or – understood from within a political economy tradition – as proof of a transfer of occupational ideology from the West to countries in the global South (Golding 1977). At the same time, however, these similarities may well be an academic artifact, especially when the normative expectations of the western model mould the questionnaires and in turn shape the journalists' answers (Joseph 2005). In some parts of the non-western world, the idea of what western journalism represents may even undermine the cultural code of the profession, as it has been demonstrated for Russian journalists (Lowrey & Erzikova 2013).

The study of cognitive roles of journalists has been relatively thin on theory for a long time. One of the first attempts to extract a theoretical classification of roles from the literature and empirical work was undertaken by Donsbach and Patterson (2004), who identified two major dimensions of roles for western democracies: passive vs. active roles and neutral vs. advocate roles. A globally more inclusive approach was suggested by Hanitzsch (2007), who distinguishes between three major dimensions:

- *Interventionism* reflects the extent to which journalists pursue a particular mission and promote certain values. The distinction tracks along a divide between two types of journalist, the one involved, socially committed, assertive, and motivated, the other detached and uninvolved, dedicated to objectivity, neutrality, and impartiality.
- *Power distance* denominates the journalist's position towards loci of power in society. One pole of the continuum captures classic "watchdog" journalism that holds the powers to account, while "loyal" or opportunist journalists, on the other hand, tend to see themselves more as collaborators, or "partners", of the ruling elites.
- *Market orientation* refers to the extent to which members of the audience are addressed primarily in their role as citizens or as consumers. Here, the division falls between journalistic cultures that subordinate their goals to the logic of

the market and those that emphasize political information and mobilization, and the creation of an informed citizenry.

4 Practised role performance

As mentioned above, most of the studies looking at the roles of journalists have focused on normative and cognitive aspects. Recently, researchers are starting to pay more attention to the way these roles are enacted in practice (e.g., Carpenter, Boehmer & Fico 2016; Mellado & Van Dalen 2014; Tandoc, Hellmueller & Vos 2013). Practised role performance as analytical concept captures the roles of journalists as they are executed in practice. They are indicated through the tangible behaviour and performance of journalists when doing their work.

Practised roles of journalists can be most meaningfully studied through means of observation and ethnography. Most of the times, however, these roles are extracted from news content – an approach that gained popularity in recent years (Mellado & Van Dalen 2014; Skovsgaard et al. 2013; van Dalen, de Vreese, and Albæk 2012). Cognitive roles of journalists – and normative roles by extension – translate into practised roles through a process commonly referred to as role enactment. Individuals tend to seek consistency between role orientations and role performance, which is why journalists are likely to enact roles that are in line with the cognitive roles they embrace (Tandoc, Hellmueller & Vos 2013). However, the process of role enactment is highly contingent on the contextual conditions of news work. Journalists are not always – or perhaps even rarely – able to fully enact their occupational ideas when external constraints impose limits on their editorial autonomy (Reich & Hanitzsch 2013; Shoemaker & Reese 2013). Little surprisingly, a number of studies do indeed point to a “gap” between the roles journalists aspire to and the roles they execute in practice (Mellado & Van Dalen 2014; Tandoc, Hellmueller & Vos 2013).

The most common approach to the study of role performance is by extracting it from news content. Early research discovered that journalism students included more analysis and interpretation in their articles when they believed that journalism should play an active role (Starck & Soloski 1977). In the US, journalists’ self-reported roles correlated only modestly with the roles present in what they considered their best works (Weaver et al. 2007). In a comparison of five Western countries, journalists’ partisanship was found to be significantly – but weakly – related to their practice when the journalists’ survey responses were confronted with their news decisions in four hypothetical situations (Patterson & Donsbach 1996).

Recent studies do not seem to bring much clarity to this issue: Surveys of journalists in Denmark, Germany, Spain, and the UK point to a robust relationship between journalists’ cognitive roles and journalist’s reporting styles (van Dalen, de Vreese, and Albæk 2012), while studies in Chile and the US point to a differ-

ence between role orientations and role enactment (Tandoc, Hellmueller & Vos 2013) – or as Mellado and van Dalen (2014) put it, to a gap between journalists’ “rhetoric and practice”. However, as I have discussed above, an inconsistency between occupational aspirations and professional practice is not surprising at all. The practice of journalists is likely to deviate from their occupational attitudes given the many constraints on their work, but there is little doubt that professional orientations substantively correlate with performance. Consistent with evidence from social psychology research (e.g., Bardi & Schwartz 2003), the relationship between professional orientations and performance should be construed as one of correlation rather than correspondence. Future empirical research should focus on the strength of this relationship in a variety of situations and contexts. Van Dalen, de Vreese, and Albæk (2017) provide a comprehensive overview of the various techniques of studying the nexus between professional attitudes and practices of journalists.

Recently, researchers have started theorizing the roles of journalists as they materialize in news content. Esser (2008) has identified “journalistic intervention” – here understood as the extent to which journalists report in their own words, scenarios, assessments – as major denominator of cross-national differences. Mellado (2015) suggested distinguishing between three dimensions of journalistic performance: presence of the journalistic voice, power relations, and audience approach. These concepts nicely reproduce the three dimensions – interventionism, power distance, and market orientation – Hanitzsch (2007) had identified earlier (see above).

5 Narrated role performance

Narrated roles also belong to the domain of role performance; they denominate subjective perceptions of and reflections on the roles that journalists carry out in practice. Narrated roles differ from practised roles because the latter refers to the real practices of journalists, while the former focuses on journalists’ recollections and imagination of their own performance in retrospect. Narrated roles are filtered through journalists’ cognitive apparatuses and are ultimately reinterpreted against normative expectations and cognitive aspirations. In many western societies, the omnipresent occupational ideology of objectivity, detachment and neutrality, for instance, makes it hard for journalists to admit that they are actually unable, or unwilling, to cater to what they conceive of being the highest professional standards. In this sense, it is helpful to think of narrated role performance in terms of a discursive relationship between journalists, sources, and their audiences. Paradigm repair is a classic example of this, since it suggests that journalists reimagine their work based on how their role performance is perceived by the interlocutor-public (Berkowitz 2000).

One common research strategy to get hold of imagined roles is by asking journalists about the extent to which they think they are able to enact their cognitive roles in practice. Culbertson (1983) was one of the first scholars to look into the self-reported role performance of journalists. He found journalists' roles to be correlated with perceived practice. Also, from a survey of Danish journalists, Skovsgaard et al. (2013) concluded that journalists' cognitive roles have substantial explanatory power in regard to how journalists implement the objectivity norm. Ramaprasad and Rahman (2006), however, discovered a substantial gap between perceived importance and performance for some roles. German journalists found it particularly difficult to enact a critical and monitorial role (Weischenberg, Löffelholz & Scholl 1998).

As journalists reflect on their practice in retrospect, they tend to reinterpret their performance so that it neatly maps onto a standard set of journalistic roles provided by an orthodox repertoire of collectively shared exemplars. Nowhere does this become more evident than in interviews with journalists, when researchers find, sometimes to their great surprise, that people in the news business more or less resort to the same categories when interviewers ask for role orientations and professional performance, no matter how they actually practise the trade.

The journalists' imagery of their professional practice also feeds back into discourses on normative and cognitive role orientations. In a routine setting, perceptions of journalistic practice serve to consolidate and reinforce established norms. Beliefs about what is actually done by most other journalists, which Lapinski and Rimal (2005) referred to as descriptive norms, work toward the normalization – or legitimation – of certain professional standards and ultimately lead to the preservation of journalistic cultures in which professional values are constituted as compelling objects of belief (Bogaerts 2011). At the same time, certain roles practised by journalists may also challenge – or delegitimize – the tacit professional consensus in the journalists' community of practice and, therefore, contribute to the destabilization of hegemonic journalistic norms. A popular example is the idea of “peace journalism”, which former BBC reporter Annabel McGoldrick (2000: 20) advocates as a new form of journalism that looks “at how journalists could be part of the solution rather than part of the problem”. This and other discourses are continuously trying to destabilize predominant newsroom cultures by challenging the normative core of journalism.

Furthermore, the way journalists perceive and frame their own practice may also have consequences for the cognitive roles they embrace. Narrated roles may assimilate journalists into newsroom culture, or journalism culture more generally; they make journalists to become members of a social group with shared ideas about what it takes to be good journalists (Tandoc & Takahashi 2014). Especially young journalists feel a strong push toward streamlining their practices to presumed expectations of their seniors (“the-way-we-do-things”) in order to become fully accepted members of a professional community. This way, journalists develop

a professional identity that gives them a sense of self that is constantly reiterated and reinforced by the professional community (Aldridge & Evetts 2003).

At the same time, journalists may, at some point, realize that their practice does not live up to the standards of desirability set by the cognitive roles they embrace. Young reporters might enthusiastically support the watchdog role when they graduate from a journalism school, but once confronted with the realities on the ground, they might realize that various constraints do not allow them to carry out this role in a way consistent with their aspirations. One way to resolve this dissonance is by appropriation; i.e. by adjusting their professional aspirations and bringing them in line with – actual or narrated – practice. Exit is just another option to resolve this conflict: Journalists may come to conclude that their professional aspirations are fundamentally incompatible with real-existing practice and, thus, decide to leave the occupation of journalism.

6 Toward a universal catalogue of journalistic roles

The above discussed strands of research resulted in a notable variety of, partly overlapping and often very disparate, catalogues of journalistic roles. An attempt to systematize these roles across national contexts and journalistic beats has been recently proposed by Hanitzsch and Vos (2018). They organize roles of journalists into two major domains of people's lives: *political life* and *everyday life*. For the purpose of this essay, I will treat these two domains as analytically distinct, although in reality, the news often caters to the needs of audiences in both the political and everyday life simultaneously.

In the first domain, political life, journalism addresses the audience in its capacity as citizenry. Here, the social contribution of journalism lies in providing citizens with the information they need to act and participate in political life and, if given a chance, to be free and self-governing. The universe of politically-oriented roles of journalists can be further organized into 18 specific roles that map onto a higher-order structure of six elementary functions of journalism, each addressing specific needs of political life (see Fig. 3.1):

- The *informational-instructive* function pertains to the idea that citizens need to have the relevant information at hand to act and participate in political life. Central to this function is the understanding of journalism as an exercise of information transmission, information (re-)packaging, and storytelling.
- The *analytical-deliberative* dimension encompasses journalistic roles that are politically more active and assertive either by making a direct intervention in a political discourse (e.g., by news commentary), by empowering citizens and by engaging the audience in public conversation, or by providing means for political participation.



Fig. 3.1: Roles of journalists in political life (Hanitzsch & Vos 2018: 8).

- The *critical-monitorial* function, sitting at the heart of journalism’s normative core in developed democracies, is grounded in the ideal of journalism acting as “Fourth Estate”, with journalists voicing criticism, holding powers to account and, in so doing, creating a critically minded citizenry.
- Roles that belong to the *advocative-radical* function compel journalists to conceive of themselves as “participants” in political life rather than as objective bystanders. Participation, however, is limited to the discursive realm, with journalists acting as missionaries of values and ideologies, as advocates of groups and causes, and as adversaries of the powerful.
- The *developmental-educative* takes the above intervention beyond political discourse into the real world, with journalists actively contributing to public education, enlightenment, social change, and social harmony.
- The *collaborative-facilitative* dimension entails an understanding of journalists acting as partners of the government and supporting it in its efforts to bring about development and social well-being. In this capacity, journalists may serve as facilitators, collaborators or mouthpiece of the government.

Hanitzsch and Vos (2018) further suggested a separate set of journalistic roles that serve the public’s needs in the domain of everyday life (see Fig. 3.2). In a time and in places where traditional social institutions cease to provide a normative framework people can hold on to, the media have to some extent taken over this




Fig. 3.2: Roles of journalists in everyday life (Hanitzsch & Vos 2018: 13).

role, filling the void through providing collective orientation in an increasingly multi-optional society (Hanusch & Hanitzsch 2013). It is for this reason that journalism has, already for a long time, provided help, advice, guidance, and information about the management of self and everyday life through consumer news and “news-you-can-use” content (Eide & Knight 1999; Underwood 2001). The seven additional roles map onto three interrelated spaces of everyday needs:

- In the area of *consumption*, journalists are addressing audience members in their capacity as consumers through featuring various kinds of purchasable products and patterns of leisure-time activities, thus contributing to the construction of consumer lifestyles.
- In the area of *identity*, journalists are providing orientation for the management of self and everyday life, and for developing a sense of identification and belonging. The relevance of this role has dramatically grown in a society, in which identity work is increasingly an individual exercise.
- In the area of *emotion*, journalism can contribute to affect regulation by helping audience members to regulate mood and arousal, and it can stimulate rewarding social and cognitive experiences that contribute to emotional well-being in more complex and sustainable ways (e.g., by fostering a sense of insight, meaning, and social connectedness).

7 Conclusions: issues and challenges

Research on journalistic roles has always been at the heart of journalism scholarship. In fact, the roles of journalists is one of the most passionately studied subjects in the field. Comparative research has become a principal avenue of studying journalistic roles, as a growing body of literature indicates. Especially the past decade has seen a significant upsurge of studies using a large-scale collaborative ap-

proach. One example is the *Worlds of Journalism Study*, which, at the time this essay is written, has completed a survey of more than 27,500 journalists in 67 countries (see www.worldsofjournalism.org).

Another important development is the shift from the analysis of role orientations to the assessment of role performance. Many studies of role orientations simply presume that journalists' professional views have some impact on their practice. Obviously, this assumption can easily be challenged arguing that what journalists tell the researcher in the interview is not necessarily what they do in practice. And indeed, as mentioned above, there is some evidence pointing to a gap between orientations and performance. Several recent studies have compared journalists' survey responses to the content they produced or to journalists' self-assessments of their enacted roles (Tandoc, Hellmueller & Vos 2013; Weaver et al. 2007). As role performance is often extracted from news content (Mellado & Van Dalen 2014; Skovsgaard et al. 2013; van Dalen, de Vreese and Albæk 2012), however, this strategy is not without problems. As collective authorship and news editing has become a common feature of news production, content may not necessarily be attributable to a single, identifiable journalist. Likewise, self-reports of journalists' performance can only be an approximation to journalistic practice at best. Journalists' recollections of their practice may not always be accurate and might well be overshadowed by normative assumptions of desirable practice.

On the conceptual level, journalism scholarship has been preoccupied for decades with studying the roles of journalists in the political context almost exclusively. Other forms of journalism, such as service or lifestyle news, have been marginalized in scholarly discourse and occasionally discredited as the unworthy other. In a world, however, where working on one's identity is increasingly an individual exercise (Bauman 2000), journalism is not just about providing orientation in the political arena. As discussed above, journalists are also expected to perform in the domain of everyday life by providing help, advice, guidance, and information about the management of self and everyday life.

Finally, the focus on journalists' roles in democratic contexts, together with a concentration of scholarly resources in the northern hemisphere, has produced a western bias that tends to pin journalism to the idea of democracy – despite overwhelming evidence for alternative roles exercised by journalists in non-western contexts (Pintak 2014; Romano 2005). To be sure, few would deny journalism's centrality to democratic processes, but democracy is arguably not necessarily a prerequisite for journalism (Joseph 2013). The global political economy of research, however, contributed to a normalization of western ideals and practices of journalism as the “professional” standard against which journalism in the non-western world is often compared. Consequently, journalism research has privileged a “journalistic world” that is narrower than that which resides in practice. The centrality of democracy has generated undemocratic journalism scholarship, by which variants of journalisms most germane to the core of democratic theory have

been privileged over those that are not (Zelizer 2013). Recent developments on the conceptual and empirical levels, however, have widened our horizon and contributed to a growing appreciation of journalism's cultural diversity.

Further reading

A brief introduction to the idea of journalistic roles and the state of research can be found in Donsbach's (2012) entry in the *International Encyclopedia of Communication*. Theoretical accounts on normative roles of journalists are provided in Christians et al. (2009), and Hanitzsch and Vos (2018). Cross-nationally comparative evidence is reported in both editions of *The Global Journalist* (Weaver 1998a; Weaver and Willnat (2012), as well as in an article reporting findings from the *Worlds of Journalism Study* (Hanitzsch et al. 2011). A good summary of research on the differences between professional orientations and practices is presented in Tandoc, Hellmueller, and Vos (2013) and Mellado and Van Dalen (2014).

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4 Epistemologies of Journalism

Abstract: This chapter takes the pulse of contemporary journalism epistemology in light of a fundamental shift from realist to social constructivist epistemologies in the mid-20th century. The first section sketches, historically, how journalists have tended to adopt a common sense realism and empiricism, consistent with realist epistemology. In the early 1900s, this informal approach evolved into a formal, dominant doctrine – professional news objectivity. This flawed epistemology became a doctrine to be overcome. The second section outlines the emergence of several kinds of constructivist epistemologies for journalism, as alternatives to news objectivity. The final and third section re-imagines the idea of epistemology of journalism by incorporating insights from both the realist and constructionist models.

Keywords: epistemology, realism, empiricism, constructionism, social constructionism, globalism, digital epistemologies, truth, fact, knowledge

1 Introduction

This chapter takes the pulse of contemporary journalism epistemology in light of a fundamental shift from realist to social constructivist epistemologies in the mid-20th century.

Realists stress how knowledge is a strict correspondence of belief to objective facts, or what is real. Facts are worldly states of affairs that exist apart from human conceptions and interpretations, the way that water is made of hydrogen and oxygen, and Mount Everest is so many meters high. Truth and knowledge amount to knowing these facts, knowing the way the world is apart from how humans think of it. Constructivists view knowledge and truth as a human construction using concepts, beliefs, perspectives, values, and socially approved methods. In this view, we never get beyond our ways of viewing the world to grasp the world as it is.

The chapter proceeds as follows:

The first section sketches, historically, how journalists have tended to adopt a specific form of realism – a common sense realism and empiricism, consistent with realist epistemology. In the early 1900s, this informal approach evolved into a formal, dominant doctrine: professional news objectivity. This flawed epistemology became a doctrine to be overcome. The second section outlines the emergence, in the middle of the 20th century, of several kinds of constructivist epistemologies for journalism, as alternatives to news objectivity. The third section surveys the options for future development of journalism epistemology.

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The chapter argues that one lesson from this historical study is that an epistemology of journalism today should be a nuanced, theory-informed conception of how journalists obtain and justify their claims to knowledge. The conception should incorporate notions from general epistemology, the psychology of cognition, and cultural studies of knowledge formation in social practices. This complexity should be included in the teaching of journalism.

Another lesson is that, at present, both common sense realism and social constructionism, as competing approaches, are incomplete and inadequate. We should construct an epistemology of journalism that incorporates insights from both the realism and constructionist models. Both approaches have valid insights that need to be worked into a new theoretical synthesis. There is a need, then, for a holistic approach that shows how construction and truth, invention and knowledge, can co-exist in one and the same epistemology.

1.1 What is epistemology?

Epistemology, traditionally defined, is philosophy of human knowledge, as a whole and in its many kinds – empirical, scientific, mathematical, ethical, religious, and humanistic. As a leading reference has stated, it is “that branch of philosophy concerned with the nature of knowledge, its possibility, scope and general basis” (Honderich 2005: 260).

Epistemology has both a theoretical and a practical component. Theoretically, epistemology studies how humans seek knowledge and justify their claims to knowledge. Practically, epistemology refers to the norms that people actually use to evaluate beliefs and methods of inquiry for truth and evidence.

Originally, epistemology was a concern of philosophers seeking knowledge of reality. In Plato’s *Dialogues*, Socrates goes about Athens asking people for the grounds of their firm beliefs about piety, justice, the soul and the good republic. Knowledge was usually defined as true and justified belief. Therefore, since Socrates, philosophers have constructed many theories of truth and theories of justification or *how* we reach knowledge and truth. Theories of truth include realism, with its idea of correspondence of thought to object; pragmatism, with its stress on ideas that “work” and have good consequences; and coherentism – the notion that truth is the coherence of a belief system as a whole (Kunne 2005). Theories of justification include notions of rationality (Rescher 1988), rationally acceptable or “warranted” belief, rigorous methods of inquiry, notions of proper evidence and criteria for the justification of belief. In addition, philosophers and scientists have argued over the best sources of knowledge. Empiricists, like John Locke, claimed knowledge was based on the senses. Rationalists, such as Descartes, stressed the role of reason and innate ideas in the mind. Others, like Galileo, argued that science was a combination of rational, mathematical understanding and empirical experiment.

Across the history of philosophy, we can divide theorists of truth and knowledge as realists or constructivists. Realist epistemology runs from Plato, René Descartes and John Locke to Bertrand Russell and, most recently, William Alston (1996). Realists think the goal of inquiry, and methods of inquiry, is to arrive at truth about what is real. Realist epistemology sees knowledge as knowledge of reality as true propositions correctly describing an external world as it is – a correspondence of belief and world, apart from human bias and perspectives. Epistemic standards help us discover (not construct) how that world is. The world makes beliefs true, not human constructions. Realists, therefore, make truth their primary concept, and separate it from theories of how truth is constructed by humans. Realists can endorse a variety of “source of knowledge” positions such as empiricism or rationalism, and they can differ on what they think the real is, e.g., a world that is entirely material and described by science, or a world that is divinely and spiritually created and directed.

Constructivists are interested in the human construction of knowledge and truth claims. There is no way to say what truth is other than to state the findings of our best methods and forms of inquiry. We only know the world via our conceptual schemes and standards of evidence. Justification and rationality are more primary than a philosophical search for absolute truth of reality. For some constructionists, truth is defined (or reduced) to rational justification. That is, to say a belief is true is to say it is the result of a rational and reliable method of construction. Putnam (1981) argued against realists by defining truth as rationally acceptable belief. Many constructivists stress the role of society in the acceptance of norms of belief. For example, the sophists in ancient Athens claimed that moral and social norms were constructed by, and therefore relative to, particular societies. Realists reply that justification is not truth. There are many truths that humans may never know, and justified beliefs can turn out to be false. To reduce truth to accepted norms is to fall into an unacceptable relativism – that truth is only what some group of people say it is.

All forms of philosophical epistemology, realist or constructivist, is normative in seeking to identify those beliefs we *ought* to affirm. But constructivist epistemologies tend to be more empirical and “position-relative” than realistic epistemologies because they focus on how people actually form and apply epistemic norms in different situations. Realist epistemology, for much of its history, has been universalist (or “non-positional”) since it presumes that there *are* general correct norms for rational inquiry not relative to the inquirer’s gender, nationality, or situation in life. Descartes’s method of doubt was a universal method for acquiring knowledge. Locke’s empirical psychology formulated principles of inquiry in general.

This tension between realism and constructivism has largely defined the history of epistemology in philosophy and journalism. Recently, epistemology has taken on a strong constructivist meaning in the social sciences, in cultural studies, and

in media epistemology. It views epistemology as a social construction where people make claims to knowledge while pursuing various practices and goals. Here, researchers talk of “epistemologies” that prompt people to make claims to knowledge in different “knowledge production” areas, from the laboratory to the newsroom. In focus are the practices, routines, social values, political aims, and institutional structures that shape such claims. This approach does not seek a logic of inquiry that discerns ultimate reality or applies to all rational beings. Social constructivism places epistemic questions about journalism in a broad, cultural context. It calls attention to ethnic, gender, and power relations, as well as differences among media cultures.

2 Realist epistemology and journalism

2.1 Common sense

Early journalism epistemology was a common sense approach. Yet “common sense” is a term that needs to be used with caution. It does not imply that common sense beliefs are true, even if widely accepted. Common sense is often false or lags behind the leading edges of science. Nor is common sense limited to ordinary experience and observation. In any era, common sense includes religious, theoretical, and scientific beliefs that have made their way into popular culture.¹ Furthermore, common sense simplifies theoretical beliefs for handy reference – the way people refer to Einstein’s theory of relativity but lack knowledge of its physics. Therefore, “common sense” refers to beliefs held by many people in a culture, and expressed in a non-theoretical manner. Philosophical principles operate as implicit premises.

To say that journalists use common sense in epistemology means they adopt epistemic beliefs generally held to be plausible and expressed plainly, avoiding complexities. Such beliefs may be based, implicitly, on philosophical assumptions and scientific beliefs. For centuries, journalism epistemology did not consist of theoretical treatises or the application of social science methods, such as content analysis and ethnographic studies. It consisted in informal, practical discussions of good practice and how to use norms to make newsroom decisions. The norms evolved as journalism took on new forms and new social roles. The serious, theoretical study of journalism did not get much traction until the growth of schools of journalism and communication at universities in the previous century.

¹ Common sense can conflict with scientific and other theoretical views, usually at a general level, e.g., scientific determinism questions belief in a free will; materialism or evolutionary theory threatens religious belief.

2.2 Realism and empiricism

From the rise of the modern press in the 17th century to the mid-1900s, journalists followed an epistemology that was a common sense realism about truth and a common sense empiricism of method. They believed, like most people, that there was a real, external world that journalists could report on truthfully. They described the world as it is. They believed that empirical observation and the facts of experience justified reports and underwrote journalists' claims to knowledge. A journalist's main path to truth is through the senses. Empiricism was a natural method for journalists since they chronicle the observable world about us.

The common sense approach presumed that journalism was a very practical, skills-based craft that did not require nuanced theories to support its self-understanding or its practice. Journalism, it was believed, did not need a formal epistemology any more than the craft of glass blowing needs a formal epistemology. For most of its history, Western journalism has explained itself to others (and to journalism students) by using a narrative that helps itself to a minimum of theory and philosophical complexity. In essence, the narrative appeals to our common sense, not to philosophy. Ideally, journalists go out into the world, they observe events, conduct interviews with eye-witnesses, and verify claims by checking facts in official documents. Then, they factually report, without bias, what they experienced in an objective news story. This view is plausible to the extent that it appeals to common sense's confidence in the non-complicated nature of observation, the direct manner in which we apparently know facts (and separate them from non-facts), and our ordinary empirical ways of belief formation. Journalism epistemology was a naïve and robust empiricism, or positivism of fact.

Over the centuries, this realist-empiricist attitude developed an epistemology that consisted of two kinds of norms for evaluating two kinds of journalism: a) norms of reportage for chronicling events objectively, with a minimum of interpretation. This is the objectivist strain in journalism. The norms included careful observations, eye-witness accounts, the testimony of unbiased and informed sources, official documentation, scientific matters of fact and so on; b) norms of opinion journalism for discussing public affairs and pushing for reform. This is the reformist strain in journalism. For objectivism, the journalist is (or should be) an impartial observer of the world and a fact-based reporter. For reformism, the journalist is (or should be) an interpreter and actor in the world. Although applying to different journalistic functions, the two sets of norms are not unrelated. One and the same journalist (and newsroom) can report and opine; and an epistemically sound opinion is based on facts. As the social role of journalism evolved, so did the two sets of norms, becoming more sophisticated in concept and re-defined by new tools of investigation.

Before we begin our history, one thing to note: Journalism epistemology is a rich debate among many types of thinkers and practitioners on many levels of thought.

Epistemology is so closely associated with intellectual disciplines such as science, philosophy, and social science methodology, that it might be presumed the history of journalism epistemology is an academic argument among theorists, a contest among abstract theories. But journalism's public role does not allow the confinement of journalism's methods to a purely intellectual level. Journalists, from the 17th century onward, have had to engage in discussions with a skeptical public and critics about the verification and justification of their stories. These debates raise larger questions of epistemology – of *how* journalists in general can claim to know things. For example, at the turn of the 20th century, journalists engaged in epistemic questions when they began to write codes of ethics. Code writings required some treatment, no matter how rudimentary, of the epistemic notions of truth, accuracy, verification, and justified belief. Moreover, there have been theoretically inclined journalists, such as Walter Lippmann, who felt compelled to construct theories of the press and theories of journalistic knowledge.

Meanwhile, historically, theorists in other disciplines have played an important part in journalism epistemology. Leading thinkers, from Milton and Locke to John Stuart Mill and John Rawls, have developed ideas that have influenced journalism ethics, from freedom of expression and notions of justice to the public use of reason. Intellectual movements have provided models of justification and knowledge. For instance, scientific positivists in the 19th century and beyond argued for a conception of knowledge as “just the facts”, a view that journalists used to develop their ideal of objective reporting.

2.3 Five eras

The history of journalism epistemology, from the 1600s to the present, can be understood as the development of these two sets of norms over five eras. This chapter does not have space for a full examination. I highlight the norms in each era and provide a few examples.² The five eras are:

Era 1: 17th Century: Epistemology of Partisan “Truth” and Matters of Fact

Era 2: 18th century: Epistemology for Public Enlightenment

Era 3: 19th Century: Libertarian epistemology and News as Fact

Era 4: 20th Century (1900–1960): Epistemology of News Objectivity

Era 5: 20th century (1960–present): Alternate Epistemologies

Era 1: Partisan “Truth” and Matters of Fact: The first era is the emergence of the modern news press in the 16th and 17th centuries. Publishers of “newsbooks” and “broadsheets” in Western Europe sought to interest readers with primitive compila-

² For detailed history of the development of these norms, see Ward 2005a. Quotes from journalists in the first three eras are cited in this work, chapters 4–6.

tions of news and political opinion. Working under censors, editors defended their reports and opinions by claiming impartial truth. But, in such partisan times, their editorials were partisan “truths” to support the king or his opponents. When the first newsbooks appeared on the streets of London between the 1620s and 1640s, they were called *A True and Perfect Informer*, or the *Impartial Intelligencer* or the *Faithful Scout*, *Impartially Communicating*. Daniel Border opened the *Faithful Scout* in 1651 with a flourish: “Having put on the Armour of Resolution, I intend ... to encounter falsehood with the sword of truth.” In 1643, Henry Walley, editor of the *True Informer*, said: “Truth is the daughter of time ... the truth doth not so conspicuously appear till a second or third relation.” Compare Walley’s view with a passage from a popular book by Kovach and Rosenstiel (2007: 41–42) on today’s journalism: “The individual reporter may not be able to move much beyond a surface level of accuracy in a first story. But the first story builds to a second ... and ... to a third story. This practical truth is a protean thing that, like learning, grows like a stalactite in a cave, drop by drop, over time.”

The norms of reportage incorporated the emerging idea of a matter of fact. Every editor said their correspondents reported only matters of fact. As Shapiro (2000) showed, journalism was part of a growing “culture of fact” in Europe that began with the practices of law, with its need to determine unbiased fact; travel literature, stimulated by the age of discovery; and an experimental empirical science that sought the facts of nature.

Era 2: Epistemology for Public Enlightenment: The norms of opinion and reportage journalism evolved as newspapers grew in number and power during the 18th-century Enlightenment (Briggs & Burke 2002: 74–105). Newspapers became the communication channels of the public sphere. Philosopher Jeremy Bentham (1983) argued that representative government depended on this “publicity” from the press. The press espoused a “public ethics” (Ward 2015a: 153–196) that redefined the 17th-century norm of partisan truths in terms of truths for a public. The press was to inform and represent a public through informed opinion based on scientific fact and public-based reasoning. In the 1720s, London editor Nathaniel Mist portrayed his *Weekly Journal* as a moral educator. It is a “History of the present Times” guided by “a love of truth”. Pierre-Louis Roederer, French revolutionary politician and journalist, said in 1796 that newspapers reached more readers than books and taught the same truth “every day, at the same time ... in all public places.” By the end of the century, Edmund Burke called the press a Fourth Estate, one of the governing institutions of society (Ward 2015a: 193).

Meanwhile, many newspapers made money by providing facts to a news-hungry public. Not surprisingly, they embraced factual reporting and dismissed the opinion journals. England’s first daily paper, London’s *Daily Courant* promised “to give news, give it daily and impartially”. The *Daily Courant* said it would not comment on news “but will relate only Matter of Fact, supposing other people to have Sense enough to make *reflections for themselves*.” In 1785, John Walters I said the

Times of London would be a “faithful recorder of every species of intelligence” (Ward 2015a: 174). The paper was a great “register” of events, and the reporter its recording instrument.

Era 3: Market Place of Opinion and News as Fact: The third era, the 19th century, developed the public ethic into a libertarian theory of the press (Siebert 1956: 39–71) for opinion journalism, and an active empiricism for a popular press devoted to news. In the first half of the century, journalism was led by an elite, liberal, opinion press such as the *Times of London*. The libertarian theory was expressed by John Stuart Mill and journalists such as Walter Bagehot, and it developed from the earlier writings of John Milton, John Locke, and Thomas Paine. Libertarianism meant society should allow a maximally free marketplace of ideas, similar to a free marketplace for goods. The marketplace metaphor presumed that public deliberation would consist mainly in a clash or competition of ideas. In the long run, true reports and correct views would win out (Ward 2014a).

The second half of the century saw the emergence of a liberal popular press or “news for all” – from the penny presses of America to the tabloids of London. By the late 1800s, the popular press was the first mass medium – an inexpensive commercial press based on circulation and advertisements and owned by press barons such as Randolph Hearst and Joseph Pulitzer. Journalism was now the business of news. Reporters were sent out to gather news, to interview people, and to use new technology, such as the telegraph, to transmit and circulate news.

The norms of reportage for the commercial press were: 1. factuality: the impartial reporting of facts through a concise writing style suitable for timely publication and transmission over the telegraph; 2. political independence: newspapers, less dependent on political patronage, began calling themselves “independent” in their reporting and in their editorial opinions. In 1866, Lawrence Gobrecht of the Associated Press in Washington, DC, explained his factual style: “My business is merely to communicate facts. My instructions do not allow me to make any comments upon the facts which I communicate. ... My dispatches are merely dry matters of fact and detail” (Mindich 1998: 109). Meanwhile, editors claimed that the advent of news photography proved that reporting represented the world as it was. Charles Dana claimed that the *New York Sun* would offer a “daily photograph of the whole world’s doings”.

The new neutral reporting had its critics. W. T. Stead, editor of London’s *Pall Mall Gazette*, railed against it: “An extraordinary idea seems to prevail with the eunuchs of the craft, that leadership, guidance, governance, are alien to the calling of a journalist ... Their ideal is to grind out a column of more or less well-balanced sentences ... Before I was an editor and a journalist I was a citizen and a man.” Theodore Dreiser, author and realist, recalled learning the style at the *Chicago Globe* in 1892. “News is information,” explained his copy editor. “People want it quick, sharp, clear – do you hear?” But in England, C. P. Scott asserted, “comment is free but facts are sacred”. Mass journalism, with its “veneration of the fact”

(Stephens 1977: 244) was a rough-and-ready, active empiricism. But in explaining its approach, editors chose to use metaphors which implied that reporters were passive stenographers of fact. One reason was that editors borrowed ideas from the prevailing philosophy of science – a positivism that explained scientific objectivity as generalizing only over facts (Passmore 1966: 15–17).

Era 4: Traditional News Objectivity: By the early 20th century, the epistemology of journalism came to be dominated by an epistemology of news objectivity. Journalists transformed their informal 19th-century empiricism of fact into a strict methodological empiricism based on dualisms of fact and value, fact and interpretation. News objectivity was an explicit, rule-bound, and firmly enforced ideal and method of story construction. It was developed by American print journalists (Ward 2015a) followed by broadcast journalists. Associations, local and national, developed codes of ethics which stated that journalists serve the public by following the principles of truth-telling, objectivity, and editorial independence. Journalists drew up the codes to reassure the public that they put the public interest first, ahead of their own self-interest.

News objectivity demanded much more from reporters than an informal, active empiricism. It was a disciplined empiricism, objectivity with a capital O, calling for the elimination of the reporter's interpretation and perspective. Objective reporters were *completely* detached; eliminated *all* of their opinion; reported *just* the facts. Objectivity was a policing action against reformist values – the desire to interpret or campaign. Objectivity was operationalized in newsrooms through rules of story construction such as carefully attributing all opinion and giving equal weight or “balance” to rival views. Some news outlets would not use reporter bylines since a byline suggested the report came from a point of view.

News objectivity was never without its dissenters and rival frameworks, such as the interpretative journalism of *Time* magazine, or the guerrilla journalism of Hunter S. Thompson. Muckraker Lincoln Steffens complained about the objective reporting style of Godkin's *New York Evening Post*: “Reporters were to report the news as it happened, like machines, without prejudice, color, and without style; all alike.” Traditional objectivity had its heyday from the 1920s to 1960s and then gradually fell out of favor. Notions of impartiality and sticking to the facts continue to influence public debate on news media, and influence practice. In a recent study of how journalists and academics define objectivity, Post (2015) found that journalists and academics define objectivity in different terms. Journalists think objectivity demands “trying to let the facts speak for themselves”, and academics think it requires systematic methods and transparent accounts. We can hear the lingering echo of common sense empiricism in journalism.

Objectivity, as a neutrality of opinion and an empiricism of fact, bequeathed to journalism epistemology the problem of how to develop an alternative model for reportage. The positivism that grounded news objectivity came and went. Philosophers and others argued that our facts, values, and perspectives travel togeth-

er, influencing the facts we choose and the frame we bring to events. The reporter as a passive stenographer of fact was false to a practice that was increasingly active and purposive. At the same time, post-modern constructivism questioned objectivity *tout court*. In practice, a more interpretive and avocational journalism emerged online. Traditional new objectivity had little to say about such journalism other than it was subjective, and advocacy was not the job of professional journalists. News objectivity was now outdated, philosophically discredited, and unhelpful as a guide for new journalism. The door was open to new and alternate approaches to epistemology. The fifth era of journalism epistemology was underway.

3 Alternate epistemologies

3.1 The shift to social constructivism

The fifth era consists of constructionist, context-specific epistemologies, as described earlier. Realist and common sense notions of truth continued to exist and to be defended but they had to contend with a growing number of explicitly constructivist views about epistemology. Although constructivist epistemologies are of ancient origin, this new wave of constructionism was prompted by the growth of social and cultural sciences. They were, and are, a part of a broader post-modern (and post-colonial) movement of thought that gathered critical mass in the mid-1900s (Connor 1989). The movement challenged two things: One, writers questioned what they saw as Western-centric Enlightenment ideas about uniquely correct and universal standards of reason, truth, and objectivity, despite a pluralism of ways of knowing globally. But worse, they claimed the West (mainly the United States and Western Europe) used such notions to engage in cultural imperialism for political purposes, imposing Western values on non-Western cultures. Moreover, they claimed that this Western epistemology supported unethical practices and dubious structures, from the subjection of women to male-dominated science. Two, the writers objected to the fact that epistemology was identified with the methods of the presumed “hard” and objective natural sciences. Epistemology thereby became political and entangled in reform movements. The point of calling something a construct, whether it be gender or science, was to question prevailing ideas about the phenomenon and to suggest a better conception. To say x is a social construction is to say that our way of thinking about it was not inevitable (Hacking 2000: 6). And, the point of a different conception was to reform social attitudes and practices.

To undermine this dominant epistemology, writers asserted that all knowledge, even science, was theory-laden and redolent with values; all knowledge, socially constructed and historical. Forms of thinking, including the standards of objectivity, were valid only in specific contexts and disciplines. Epistemology did not give

you a uniquely correct insight into reality; rather it supported some view of the world or society, supported some practice.

Postmodernists such as Lyotard (2013) and Baudrillard (1981) questioned the ideas of detached truth and philosophical “metanarratives” – large historical narratives that make sense of human experience. The Frankfurt school of sociology decried the influence of both Enlightenment ideas and mass culture (Horkheimer & Adorno 1992). In history, constructionists pointed to historians, such as Thomas Kuhn, as showing that scientific change was a non-rational “conversion” to a new set of beliefs (Kuhn 1962).

In the late 1970s, leading sociologists put forward a relativistic sociology of knowledge that explained claims to knowledge by reference to social causes (Barnes & Bloor 1982). In science, social constructionism became, by the 1980s, the discipline of social epistemology as developed by Steve Fuller (1988). These varying perspectives were called “epistemic cultures” (Cetina 1999). Meanwhile, philosopher Richard Rorty attacked a “Platonism” that believed in absolute, transcendent truth and saw objective knowledge as a “mirror” of nature (Rorty 1979). Rorty thought that what was rationally acceptable was what we, as a culture, said it was and what solved our problems. Questions about logic and evidence gave way to political questions about who controls science and who defines truth, rationality, and objectivity.

In summary, the epistemologies were “naturalized” and empirical in spirit. They studied the norms that people affirm and use, as a natural, social process. They were pluralistic in not being motivated to develop one, uniquely correct epistemology. They were positional in being more interested in the norms of localized practices, situated inquirers, and specific disciplines, than in developing universal, philosophical precepts for rationality. They were constructionist. They studied the psychological and sociological processes by which people construct and defend beliefs. They did not share the realist’s concern for knowledge in some absolute sense. Their unit of analysis was the psycho-sociological category of “claims to knowledge” (or claims to justified belief) as affirmed by a group or practice.

Since this approach begs philosophical questions, such as whether these epistemologies imply a relativist view of truth, it prompted three responses from philosophers. Some philosophers, like Rorty, were sympathetic to the approach’s anti-realism and anti-universalism. Some philosophers who were constructivists, like Putnam (1981), criticized post-modernists such as Foucault for endorsing a self-refuting, extreme relativism. Other philosophers (Lynch 1998) defined a pluralist epistemology that was both realist in truth and constructivist in recognizing the existence of plural conceptual schemes.

3.2 Six kinds of theory

Theorists applied constructionism to journalism epistemology. For example, Ekstrom (2002) sketched a constructionist framework for the study of television news.

He said epistemology, in his writing, did not refer to philosophical inquiries into the nature of true knowledge but to the study of knowledge-producing practices and the communication of knowledge claims. Lazaroiu (2012) talked about constructing an epistemology for the online “mediascape”. Recently, Karin Wahl-Jorgensen (2015: 170) distinguished her constructivist approach from the more traditional approach of Ettema and Glasser (1985) when the latter developed the epistemology of investigative journalism. They asked how journalists know what they know (e.g., what counts as empirical evidence). In contrast, Wahl-Jorgensen defined epistemology “more broadly” as the rules, routines, and institutional procedures in a social setting that decides what form of knowledge is produced and what knowledge claims are to be expressed or implied. Knowledge claims, she added, are shaped by ideological, sociological forces, and power relations. Journalists’ processes of justification involve a construction of narratives that operate within conventions established by institutional forms of knowledge.

Six kinds of constructionist theories were developed: 1. Political economy critiques; 2. Dissenting epistemologies; 3. Conceptual scheme models; 4. Knowledge-infusion models; 5. Digital epistemologies for new media and new methods; and 6. Global epistemologies. I briefly note their main features.

Political economy theories: These theories explain how journalists’ claims to knowledge are shaped (and sometimes discredited or biased) by the political and economic forces that control mainstream news media. Among the chief concerns is the influence of media ownership on what journalists report and how they report, bias in reporting due to commercial pressures to attract large audiences, and the editorial influence of advertisers and political elites. Much of the theorizing came from the left wing of the political spectrum. Noted linguist Noam Chomsky (1989) has argued that mainstream news coverage, especially in the United States, is not objective and independent but propaganda for the political agendas and interests of large corporations and government. The notion that the press is objective and fact-based is an “illusion”. In a similar vein, media scholar Robert McChesney (1999) has argued that democracy is being undermined by a global concentration of media corporations.

Dissenting epistemologies: A dissenting epistemology is an epistemology that dissents from a realist Western approach to epistemology, characterized above. This dissent is usually motivated by a desire for social, institutional, or political reform of practices and attitudes. One major example comes from feminist discourse – feminist media epistemologies and feminist media ethics. Feminists have constructed several “waves” of feminist thinking. Today, feminist theory is a vast and rich domain of contending theories that cannot be adequately described here. However, it is important to note, for our purposes, that the feminists of the mid-1900s were among the first to effectively employ the social constructivist idea. The central target was dominant male-defined concepts of gender and male–female hierarchies in society. As noted above, calling gender a social construct was a first

step to reforming attitudes and power structures. Hawkesworth (1994), for example, argued that the scientific construct of objectivity led to objectification. Women were treated as objects, not as persons. Some theorists advance standpoint epistemology (Harding 2004) which began from women's absence from, or marginalized position in, social science. It argued that female experience was distinct and crucial.

When feminists theorized about journalism they noted male bias in news coverage, especially of issues surrounding women and gender. But their thinking went deeper than that. Feminist media scholars argued that the epistemology of news objectivity supported macho notions of individualism that privileged individual rights over communal values. Journalism epistemology supported an uncaring, socially divisive journalism that reflected the male-centric cultures of the West and of the newsroom. One result was the construction of a feminist ethics of care (Koehn 1998) that preferred a communitarian approach to journalism (Keeble 2005). Feminists thought journalism should promote caring human relationships. An ethics of care would restrain a news media that is often insensitive to story subjects and sources. Some studies contended that a non-feminist approach to crime treats crime as an individual matter, downplaying systemic causes, and treating alleged criminals as inhuman.

After feminism, other types of dissenting journalistic epistemologies appeared, such as epistemologies that took into account the influence of race and racism in journalism, or examined how journalists treated citizens in foreign cultures as an "Other" that could be demonized.

Conceptual scheme models: Other epistemologies arose that were not motivated by social reform and political causes but by a practical desire to develop a more self-conscious approach to constructing stories. They made explicit the influence of our conceptual schemes and perspectives. The models corrected the simplistic, common sense notion, evident in news objectivity, that journalists can construct adequate reports simply by making observations and reporting uninterpreted, individual facts.

Conceptual scheme models hold that when journalists report, what they observe and decide to report is influenced by their conceptual schemes. A conceptual scheme is a set of concepts we use to understand the world we live in, or some part of it. We make sense of any particular fact by interpreting it through a conceptual scheme, e.g., a conceptual scheme for interpreting political events, for understanding crime, and so on. The reporter's mind is not a passive blank slate or *tabula rasa* upon which objects in the world imprint their image. Rather the mind is an active, organizing entity that tries to fit what it experiences into a coherent grid of concepts (Pinker 2003). Frame theory has explored how journalists frame stories, where a frame is an organizing perspective on some topic. Journalists may frame a drug addiction as a criminal story rather than a health issue, or frame a war as a noble fight for freedom rather than a war for economic supremacy in a region

(Entman, Matthes & Pellicano 2009). Other studies show how the way that journalists define news – their news values – influences story selection (O’Neill & Harcup 2009). Also, epistemological studies have delved into how ideology affects journalists’ approach to war and other stories, and how the phenomenon needs to be studied as “socially situated text or talk” (van Dijk 2009: 191). Also, how journalists build a news agenda is another factor in shaping and selecting reports (Coleman et al. 2009).

For epistemology, the lesson is that journalists need to be aware of, and sensitive to, conceptual and interpretive factors as they attempt to construct justified and reasonably complete stories. The message is: Journalists should realize that such factors are operating even where they think they are sticking to “just the facts”.

Knowledge-infusion models: Another non-dissenting form of journalism epistemology is the effort to improve the knowledge and critical skills of journalists so they avoid manipulation and report more deeply about complex events. I call this area “knowledge infusion” since its promoters want to infuse content and skills into the work of journalists. One promoter is Thomas Patterson whose *Informing the News* stressed the need for “knowledge-based journalism”. Journalists cannot properly seek the truth or serve democracy unless they become knowledge professionals (Patterson 2013: xv). Journalism needs to develop a body of knowledge, or a knowledge base, from which it makes sense of a complex world. Journalists need knowledge to create accurate interpretations of what is observed or factually recorded. Patterson uses “knowledge” in the conceptual scheme sense explained above. Knowledge, he says, is systematic. It is “established patterns and regularities organized around conceptual frameworks and theories” (Patterson 2013: 65).

Knowledge infusion is an aim of journalism education. Many schools of journalism, especially at the graduate level, organize much of their program around creating journalists with high-level knowledge and expertise in such areas as environmental science and health issues.

With regard to skills, journalism educators recognize that reporters are not just fact recorders but also active, critical analyzers of sources of information and political statements. For example, the School of Journalism at Stony Brook University in New York State has pioneered the idea of teaching “news literacy” as a set of skills for determining the reliability of sources of information (<http://www.centerfornewsliteracy.org/what-is-news-literacy-2/>). The notion of critical skills can be extended to include media literacy as a whole, logical skills for analyzing argumentation in the public sphere, and scientific literacy.

Digital epistemologies: Digital media has created new forms of journalism created by new participants using new media platforms. As noted, much of online journalism is personal, interpretive, and advocational. It revives the reformist strain in journalists, after decades of dominance by new objectivity. Moreover, journalism is now participatory (Singer & Domingo 2011) as journalists and citizens

work together to gather information and construct reports. These trends raise new issues for journalism epistemology and ethics (Ward 2014b). Conceptually, old distinctions and boundaries blur (Carlson & Lewis 2015). Definitions of who is a journalist and what is journalism are contested. Hardly a principle or concept, from objectivity to verification, goes unchallenged.

Yet amid this disorientating media revolution, new epistemic standards and methods are beginning to develop, forming an interdisciplinary digital epistemology (Zion & Craig 2015). Many news organizations, such as the BBC in Britain and the Society of Professional Journalists in the United States, are revising their codes of ethics. The new standards guide journalists in the use of information from social media, in partnering with community groups, in opining on their social media accounts, and in verifying information – text or image – provided by citizens and alleged eye-witnesses to events.

Journalists and ethicists are even making progress on what seemed to be an insoluble problem: how to maintain the central ideals of verification and accuracy (Hermida 2015) in an age of instant updates, live blogging of events, and the swift moving conversation on social media? The traditional notion of verification insisted on time-consuming checks prior to publication. New works in journalistic epistemology explain how to verify after posting by using the knowledge of the “crowd” online. Researchers (Silverman 2014) have begun to develop methods of verification for online images and other materials. For instance, sophisticated software can discern if an image was altered and where the image was taken.

Similar creative work is being done to explain how to use powerful new research tools and story-telling technology, such as software that analyses “big data” – finding interesting stories in large data bases. Other work shows how to adapt virtual reality to a truth-seeking journalism and how to employ drones for covering breaking news.

Journalism epistemology in this new media age is participatory in who makes the journalism, conceptually radical in rethinking the principles of journalism (Ward 2015b), and anticipatory in looking ahead to ever new forms of journalism innovation.

Global theories: The globalization of news media has stimulated epistemological and ethical thinking about how journalism norms should change to guide a journalism that is global in reach and impact. Scholars and journalists have begun to construct a global media ethics with implications for epistemology (Ward 2013). This global movement regards existing journalism standards and aims as too parochial for a global media world. Historically, codes of ethics considered journalistic duties to be owed to citizens within the boundary of a nation. In a global, Internet world, any story can cross borders and spark violence. How should journalists assess these transnational effects?

Globalists typically take universal principles as their starting point, e.g., human rights principles. They make a cosmopolitan commitment to a global humani-

ty their moral priority and then seek to incorporate parochial values, such as patriotism, into their global system. Their theories have implications for how journalists should cover global issues and important areas of journalism. For example, Tumber (2013) has argued that the basic norm for war reporters today is not a neutral objectivity but a “responsible engagement” with events and issues. Dunwoody and Konieczna (2013) recommended that journalists covering climate change and other scientific issues should use the “weight of evidence” principle to decide how much emphasis sources should be given in stories. The news objectivity notion of an equal balancing of viewpoints is incorrect or of limited value. Also, Wahl-Jorgensen and Pantti (2013) have promoted a cosmopolitan approach to the coverage of natural disasters, which includes journalists showing empathy and compassion for victims. This epistemology dissents from news objectivity which insists that reporters should be detached observers.

Finally, a global approach has led scholars, especially from the Global South, to call for a “de-Westernization” of journalism studies and theories of journalism epistemology (and ethics). Wasserman and de Beer (2009), for example, call for the inclusion of non-Western values, into textbooks, teaching, and theory. One question is the appropriateness of the Western model of an aggressive free press which treats government with suspicion for struggling, transitional democracies such as South Africa. Perhaps a better model is that of journalists as partners with government.

4 Conclusion: re-imagining journalism epistemology

We have sought an overview of journalism epistemology by following the realist-constructivist shift. We charted the path of journalism epistemology beginning with common sense versions of realism and empiricism. As we moved along the five eras of journalism epistemology, we saw how two sets of norms from the objectivist and reformist traditions – norms of reportage and opinion in journalism – took on new meanings and new standards. The apex of realist-empiricist journalism epistemology was the doctrine of news objectivity in the early 1900s. But conceptual and practical difficulties with the doctrine and emergent post-modern attitudes combined to undermine its plausibility. In response, six kinds of constructivist epistemologies arose.

Where does this leave the future of journalism epistemology? From one perspective, the constructivist theories have enriched journalism epistemology with concrete and diverse studies. The studies took account of political, social, conceptual, technological, and cultural factors that needed to be incorporated into journalism epistemology. It undermined the implausible view of journalistic claims to

knowledge as based on simply reporting the facts. It brought journalism epistemology into the 21st century and aligned it with developments in the humanities and sciences.

From another perspective, these developments have created problems. The theorizing makes journalism epistemology, theoretically and practically, more complicated and difficult. The notions of good method and a justified story now include an awareness of conceptual schemes and concerns about biasing factors.

Also, the multiplicity of epistemologies can leave the impression that epistemology of journalism is a fragmented field of rival views – or views that don't easily fit together into a coherent philosophy. Nor have the insights from the theories been brought together and translated into clear and practical norms for doing good journalism. The relevancy to practice varies with the type of theory. In some areas, such as digital epistemology, practitioners can see clear applications for the new guidelines about verification and other practices. But, in other areas, such as theories of press propaganda, it is not clear what if any practical implications follow, other than to wait for (or work toward) a political revolution.

Moreover, the movement of alternate theories still lacks a sound philosophical foundation which shows that locating epistemology in specific cultures and practices is *not* a form of relativism about truth and knowledge. Or, if it is a form of relativism, how does this view fit with the fundamental principle of truth-seeking in journalism? Often, it is not clear how the theories are using the words “knowledge” and “truth” when they speak of “knowledge production” and “claims to truth”? Do they mean that such practices actually *do* reach knowledge and truth (or come close to it)? Or, do they mean that people only like to “claim” they have knowledge of truth for various social and political reasons but, in actual fact, there is no such thing as knowledge and truth? If the latter, then they should talk instead, and with more modesty, about “belief production” and claims to have reliable opinions. Such frank questions cannot be avoided, especially if such theories are going to help themselves to the central and difficult epistemic terms of truth, rationality, objectivity, and knowledge. The current state of journalism epistemology needs a new philosophical epistemology.

My own view is that neo-pragmatic philosophy is an approach to inquiry that could help journalists articulate these philosophical foundations, bringing together realist and constructivist notions into a hybrid theory of journalistic truth-seeking. I have used the notion of pragmatic inquiry as a basis for redefining objectivity as “pragmatic objectivity” (Ward 2015b). Objectivity becomes a complex testing of journalists' stories – all of which are regarded as interpretations – by a holistic set of norms from factuality to coherence. The aim of pragmatic objectivity is not, as news objectivity demanded, to eliminate all interpretation from stories. The goal is to find ways to test journalistic interpretations.

The goal of a future journalism epistemology is to create journalists who are sophisticated knowledge workers and sense makers. Ideally, they would be aware

of their craft's complex role in society, and they would be aware of the political, social and other factors that influence their conceptual schemes. To enrich their work, they would incorporate insights from a wide range of epistemological theory. Also, these journalists would have knowledge and critical skills that allow for rigorous interpretations of events. And, they would be busy developing epistemic guidelines for an era of innovative, engaged, and digital journalism.

Finally, they would regard their epistemic norms as part of a broader new ethics for global journalism, where epistemology serves the moral aims of journalism and of humanity.

Further reading

To grasp the historical development of journalism, and its epistemology, a good place to start is Briggs and Burke's accessible *A social history of the media* (2002), Stephens' *A history of the news* (1977) and Chapters 4–6 of my *The invention of journalism ethics*, 2nd edn. (2015a). Allan Megill's *Re-thinking objectivity* (1994) is an excellent selection of articles on key issues. For the history of news objectivity, read Mindich's *Just the facts* (1998) and Chapters 7–8 of *The invention of journalism ethics*.

A formulation of realism is Alston's *A realist theory of truth* (1996). An example of philosophical constructionism is Putnam's *Reason, truth and history* (1981). The best analysis of social constructionism is Hacking's *The social construction of what?* Zion and Craig's *Ethics for digital journalists: Emerging best practices* (2015) is a good introduction to the issues of digital journalism, while my *Global media ethics* (2013) explores the issues of global models.

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Patrick Lee Plaisance

5 Journalism Ethics

Abstract: Normative questions concerning journalistic behaviors, moral and social obligations, decision-making, and news content effects comprise the growing and critical field of journalism ethics. This chapter provides an overview of the most widely used philosophical frameworks as well as discussions of some central ethical issues of journalism practice, including conflict of interest, minimizing harm, and respecting audiences. It concludes with a consideration of likely future trends in journalism ethics research, such as theorizing on pluralistic global journalism systems and more inductive, empirical scholarship that explores the moral psychology of media workers.

Keywords: credibility, deontology, harm, virtue ethics

The field of journalism ethics scholarship is a vibrant, maturing one in which long-standing principles and frameworks are brought to bear on difficult questions of journalistic practice. It features both deductive and inductive approaches; much scholarship examines and promotes abstract claims of deontology, virtue ethics, and consequentialism as normative frameworks to guide behavior, while other work provides a more hermeneutic or interpretive approach by examining the dynamics of moral reasoning and decision-making within media environments. Scholarship that brings the philosophy of ethics to bear on journalistic practices explores the efficacy of organizational ethics codes, the nature of moral decision-making in newsrooms, the nature of journalistic duty when it comes to graphic images or unpopular views, the concept of harm posed by journalistic content, and many other issues that regularly raise questions about what responsible journalists should or should not do. With the news industry of many nations in a state of flux as economic and technological forces reshape business models and journalistic workflows, scholars have examined the ethical questions raised by these forces. In most cases, the evolution of a digitally based, collaborative journalism doesn't raise fundamentally new ethical questions so much as provide iterations of long-standing ethical concerns such as privacy, autonomous agency, and harm. As one ethics scholar noted, "The speed of digital communication does not create new forms of immorality, but makes it possible to commit immoral acts so fast one hardly notices." (Hamelink 2000: 34–35) As news organizations continue to search for successful business models to support journalistic work, ethical questions regarding conflicts of interest and content transparency have gained prominence. Media technology platforms that have served to democratize and decentralize the dissemination of news have underscored the debate about who, or what type of content, should be subjected to journalism ethics standards. Media ethics scholars

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also are attempting to articulate the features of a “global” journalism ethics framework that emphasizes broad internationalist ideals yet accommodates culturally diverse values and practices. Other work in the field explores factors on the individual, organizational and societal levels that help or hinder journalists who want to ensure that their work is defined by widely accepted ethical principles.

It must be emphasized that substantive work in ethics moves quite beyond simplistic claims about “right” choices or descriptions of best practices in a particular line of work. Hence, this chapter first presents an overview of the most widely used philosophical frameworks that ought to be applied to more specific questions. Then these questions – such as conflict of interest, minimizing harm, and respecting audiences – are discussed. The chapter concludes with a review of several prominent lines of theorizing in journalism ethics that suggest the future of the field depends simultaneously on work on the abstract level focused on what a pluralistic global journalism ethics would look like, as well as more inductive, empirical scholarship that documents and interprets the moral psychology of media workers.

As a branch of moral philosophy, ethics as a discipline is concerned with the process of finding rational justifications for decisions in cases that feature conflicting values. Often, ethics is understood in everyday conversation to refer to claims about right and wrong, and thus is often conflated with epistemology, metaphysics, and other branches of moral philosophy. All these are linked, of course – it is difficult to advocate for a particular course of action favoring one value over another without to some extent examining the nature of the “good” promoted by that value – but ethics is less concerned with seeking epistemological answers than it is with the quality of deliberative efforts to harness the power of moral philosophy in the service of a defensible argument. Moral philosopher Margaret Walker defined ethics as “pursuing an understanding of morality, which provides understandings of ourselves as bearers of responsibilities in the service of values” (2000: 89). The predominant focus of ethics is on the *rightness* of a given action: How can we say this particular action would be the right thing to do? Dilemmas posing this question, according to philosopher Philippa Foot, comprise “a special case of the dilemma that exists wherever there is evidence for and evidence against a certain conclusion. What is special is that the conclusion is about what the agent ought to do” (2001: 177). Moral philosopher Robert Audi (2004) called these the twin goals of “normative” and “epistemic” completeness. Through solid and careful deliberation, Audi said we should be able to explain the *normative* duties that we have, and we ought to be able to explain *why* these claims should motivate us in certain ways – what he refers to as having an *epistemic* understanding of why such claims should be accepted as valid:

We want knowledge both of what we should do and of why we should do it. Epistemic completeness is needed for a theory to give us the comprehensive moral guidance we seek as moral agents; normative completeness is needed to enable us to explain – and, correspondingly,

justify – the moral judgments we arrive at on the basis of the facts that indicate our obligations. (Audi 2004: 86)

The three main frameworks offered by the philosophy of ethics are virtue ethics, deontology (or duty ethics), and consequentialism. Each has a rich literature that spans thinkers through the centuries – and in the case of virtue ethics, with roots in the work of Aristotle, through millennia. Each is routinely drawn upon, explicitly and otherwise, in applied ethics throughout the Western world. And each provides compelling, and often competing, ways to articulate questions of duty, value, and effect for a given dilemma. The chapter then provides an overview of the key issues and practices that have preoccupied journalism ethics theorists. Lastly, it discusses some notable lines of ethics research that are important as the field of journalism ethics continues to mature.

1 Key frameworks in ethics

1.1 Virtue ethics

What does it mean to be a virtuous person, why should we aspire to be one, and how should we go about it? These questions can be considered as central to the work of Aristotle and of a host of neo-Aristotelian ethicists. Virtue ethics was originally articulated in the works of Socrates and Plato, and later was refined by Aristotle. Rather than dwelling on how we know goodness, Aristotle's writings are focused on identifying and articulating the *highest* good, which he says has specific characteristics: It is innately valuable; that is, we desire it for its own sake and not for what it allows us to accomplish, and all other goods are desirable because they help us attain this highest good. In his *Nicomachean Ethics*, Aristotle provided a meditation on the nature of the virtues, such as courage, temperance, and charity, arguing that the highest aspiration of human life should be the contemplation (and internalization) of the virtues. By doing so, he said, each of one of us becomes a valued participant of the *polis*. Aristotle argues that highest good is the state of “living well”, translated from the Greek word *eudaimonia*. Philosopher Richard Kraut describes Aristotle's general call:

What we need, in order to live well, is a proper appreciation of the way in which such goods as friendship, pleasure, virtue, honour and wealth fit together as a whole. In order to apply that general understanding to particular cases, we must acquire, through proper upbringing and habits, the ability to see, on each occasion, which course of action is best supported by reasons. Therefore practical wisdom, as he conceives it, cannot be acquired solely by learning general rules. We must also acquire, through practice, those deliberative, emotional, and social skills that enable us to put our general understanding of well-being into practice in ways that are suitable to each occasion. (2010: 1)

Aristotle argues that we do not want to “live well” so that we can accomplish other goals. Any other goals we might have – prosperity, health, other resources – we value because they promote well-being. Virtuous activity enables us to live well by serving as the reason we pursue “lesser” goods. Since our capacity for reason is what distinguishes us from other animals, Aristotle argues that using our reason effectively is what happiness, or living well, consists in. Just as in everything else, reasoning well implies a sense of excellence, and so we must pursue virtuous action. Doing so often involves taking to heart three concepts for which Aristotle is widely known: aspiring to live by what’s called the “doctrine of the mean”, to strive for what has come to be known as excellence in practice, and to ensure that everything we do will somehow promote the value of human “flourishing”.

1.1.1 Doctrine of the mean

Just as a skilled craftsman inherently avoids doing too much or too little of something to ensure a job well done, we all must strive to see what behavior might constitute an excess or a deficiency of a given virtue. Since courage is one such virtue, Aristotle says. Truly courageous people understand that some dangers are worth facing and others are not. They do not shrink from every challenge, for that would be cowardly. But they also do not rashly attack all threats without any sense of fear, for that would represent foolhardiness or recklessness. The same sense of ideal behavior holds for every other virtue that Aristotle discusses. Finding the perfect point of moderation between excess and deficiency, or the “sweet spot” of virtuous behavior, is not a matter of mathematical calculation, but of an ability to fully understand the situation one finds oneself in. Aristotle’s argument that every virtue is a state of behavior that lies between two “vices”, one of excess and the other of deficiency, is known as his “doctrine of the mean”. Critics have suggested that this doctrine is not very helpful in many types of dilemmas, and Aristotle himself stopped short of suggesting that we might compose a kind of ethical decision manual with this approach. He and his neo-Aristotelian predecessors understood that life is too varied and complex for a series of rules to be useful. This does not mean that we are then free to individually decide what is good; just because unique situational circumstances may determine what it means to act virtuously, that is not the same as saying good behavior is *relative* only to our own beliefs and values. A life in the pursuit of the notion of virtue, he suggested, would result precisely in the kind of wisdom needed to discern the sense of moderation he advocated.

1.1.2 Virtuous practice

While much of Aristotle’s *Ethics* centered on the cultivation of individual character, contemporary philosophers have worked to show how his system is useful in argu-

ing what we should do on a social level. The virtues, as Aristotle articulated them, have implicit, and critical, *social* dimensions. In both Aristotle's work and in the Homeric tradition more generally, virtues are presented as qualities crucial for effectively performing certain social roles. The virtues as he often describes them are not ends in themselves, but are instrumental in the broader aim of achieving *eudaimonia*. Today's virtue ethicists, such as Alisdair MacIntyre, argue that idea of the value of virtuous behavior applies both to the individual and to society as a whole. "[T]his notion of a particular type of practice as providing the arena in which the virtues are exhibited ... is crucial to the whole enterprise of identifying a core concept of virtues", MacIntyre argues (2007: 187). He makes the distinction between what he calls *external* goods – things or acts that benefit single individuals – and the social benefits resulting from some work as *internal* goods. For example, the medical profession's importance to general public health, as opposed to single patients, is an example of an internal good. The kinds of work that we value primarily for the internal goods they provide, MacIntyre argues, constitute the basis for virtue in professional behavior. We must understand this work as a "practice" that is distinct from other work focused on delivering strictly external goods (e.g., factory work, retail transactions, etc.):

By 'practice' I ... mean any coherent and complex form of socially established cooperative human activity through which goods internal to that form of activity are realized in the course of trying to achieve those standards of excellence which are appropriate to, and partially definitive of, that form of activity, with the result that human powers to achieve excellence, and human conceptions of the end and good involved, are systematically extended. (MacIntyre 2007: 187)

Practices involve "standards of excellence and obedience to rules" and are aimed at helping to deliver internal goods or things that contribute to the common good regardless of whom actually receives them. For example, journalists, when deliberately informing their work with the "standards of excellence" that are attached to their "practices", are able to deliver internal goods such as providing information and analysis that enables the public to participate in a vigorous democratic life. This application of the notion of virtuous work to specific occupations is one feature that makes virtue ethics attractive in media ethics theorizing. This also lends great flexibility to such theorizing, as it allows that being virtuous can depend largely on the personal and professional situations in which we find ourselves. Media ethicist Sandra Borden neatly summarizes this in her book on virtue ethics and journalism:

An occupation's purpose provides it with moral justification ... if it can be integrated into a broader conception of what is good for humans. ... Thus, the theory can explain why members of some groups have rights and responsibilities that do not apply to outsiders (such as cutting someone's chest open with a surgical instrument or going into a war zone to take photographs). It also can explain why it may be morally desirable to prefer one person over another when faced with conflicting interests (the way a professional prioritizes her clients). Virtue

theory's emphasis on the habitual disposition to do the right thing ... takes morality out of the realm of calculations and into the realm of moral responsiveness. (2007: 16, 17)

1.1.3 Human 'flourishing'

By flourishing, most philosophers mean what we all deserve to enjoy the fruits of our labor, to reap the benefits of cooperation and community engagement, and to have the means and resources to enable us to strive toward and reach our individual potential. So for us to flourish, we would need, among other things, a social system that is just and that maximizes liberties; encourages engagement, cooperation, and generosity; and frowns on more selfish impulses that can threaten to undermine these. "Men and women need to be industrious and tenacious of purpose not only to be able to house, clothe, and feed themselves," philosopher Philippa Foot argued, "but also to pursue human needs having to do with love and friendship. They need the ability to form family ties, friendships, and special relations with neighbours. They also need codes of conduct. And how could they have all these things without virtues such as loyalty, fairness, kindness, and in certain circumstances obedience?" (2001: 44–45). Just the Aristotelian virtues are social by nature, so is the notion of *eudaimonia*: it cannot be concerned only with the good life of individual people; a life well lived must encompass one's social roles and responsibilities. Human flourishing must refer to virtuous behavior that cultivates and protects a vibrant society. Theorist Nick Couldry describes it this way: "Virtues' are the means by which stable dispositions to act are well specified, but the reference point by which virtues are specified are not particular 'values,' but precisely those facts about shared human life on which potentially we can come to agree" (2010: 66). Foot has done more than most to help make Aristotle's writings about virtue relevant to our contemporary world. In her 2001 landmark work on virtue ethics, *Natural Goodness*, she argued that acting morally stems naturally from our ability to apply our reasoning skills to situations. "[T]he fact that a human action or disposition is good of its kind will be taken to be simply a fact about a given nature of a certain kind of living thing," she argued (2001: 3). By concentrating on traditional virtues and vices such as temperance and avarice, she said that we can see connections between the conditions of human life as well as *objective* reasons for acting morally. Vice, she argued, is a defect in humans the same way that poor roots are a defect in an oak tree or poor vision a defect in an owl; the two assessments have clear normative implications, yet are also entirely factual:

[V]irtues play a necessary part in the life of human beings as do stings in the life of bees. ... In spite of the diversity of human goods – the elements that can make up good human lives – it is therefore possible that the concept of a good human life plays the same part in determining goodness of human characteristics and operations that the concept of flourishing plays in the determination of goodness in plants and animals. (2001: 35, 44)

1.2 Duty ethics

As moral agents, what are our moral obligations in the world, how can we properly discern them, and how should those duties guide our behavior? These questions illustrate the focus of *deontology*, or the branch of philosophy known as duty ethics. Here, the foremost concern is having a proper understanding of one's moral duty, and acting accordingly – regardless of the possible consequences of doing so. The theories of 18th-century German philosopher Immanuel Kant represent a classic example of a deontological approach: An act cannot be judged as right or wrong based on its consequences, but only on whether the person performing the act understood the obligations as a moral agent. He forcefully argues that since these moral “duties” define what action is right, our moral judgments cannot rest on the outcomes, or consequences, of those acts. Some choices, deontologists argue, simply cannot be justified by their effects: No matter how much they might result in some “benefit”, some choices are simply morally wrong because they fail to reflect our duty to behave in a certain way. This is why deontologists, in contrast to virtue ethicists, often state that the “right” takes priority over the “good”. The notion of “intent”, then, is critical, and has been extensively parsed since the time of Aquinas. For example, deontologists have argued over how exactly we should define *causing* evil and how that might be different from *allowing* evil. “For example, we can intend to kill and even try to kill someone without killing him; and we can kill him without intending or trying to kill him, as when we kill accidentally,” philosophers Larry Alexander and Michael Moore (2012) write. “Intending thus does not collapse into risking, causing, or predicting ... [I]t is intending alone that marks the involvement of our agency in a way so as to bring obligations and permissions into play.” (p. 6) Key elements of many journalistic codes of ethics are Kantian in nature: they provide directives of the duties that journalists, as responsible professionals, must carry out. These include the duty to seek the truth and inform the public, the duty to be accountable for their work, and the duty to minimize harm as much as possible without compromising the first two directives.

As much as duty-ethics philosophers emphasize the role of our motivation in making moral judgments, they also are concerned with the *rights* of individuals whose fates are determined by what we do. As moral agents, we all have the right, they say, not to be used only as a means by others to promote their own interests. People cannot use our bodies, our labor, or our abilities without our consent. Yet our intents and our rights are not always compatible, and, thus, duty-ethicists continue to debate about the exact nature of our moral duties. Should one person in a lifeboat be killed and eaten so that all the others can survive? Should Siamese twins who are likely to die soon be separated by doctors to harvest the organs of the first to die to give to the second? Should villagers follow the orders of a tyrant to select one among them to be shot to avoid all of them being killed? Our answers to these will differ depending on whether we place a premium on our moral duty

to prevent wider harm or whether we emphasize the right of individuals not to be used against their will (Alexander & Moore, 2012).

1.2.1 The categorical imperative

Kant is arguably the foremost architect of duty-based ethics. In his extensive writings, he sets forth the nature and role of rationality. With an inexorable logic, Kant argues that what makes us special as beings is our God-given capacity for reason, and with the proper use of that reason, we can fully discern ways in which we are morally obligated to respect and honor that reasoning capacity – in every case, for everyone. Thus, the fundamental principle of our moral duties, he says, is the “categorical imperative”: We are to “act only in accordance with that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it become a universal law” (1797/1991: 395). It is an *imperative* in that it commands us to do something – Kant does not order that we perform specific actions to be “moral”; instead, he commands us to exercise our *wills* in a particular way. And it is *categorical* – that is, it applies to all of us unconditionally, simply because we possess rational wills, without reference to any of our personal goals or interests. For Kant, this categorical imperative calls on all of us to think more deeply about doing or not doing something. Philosopher Robert Johnson (2012) summarizes how the categorical imperative calls on us to consider the morality of an action:

First, formulate a maxim that enshrines your reason for acting as you propose. Second, recast that maxim as a universal law of nature governing all rational agents, and so as holding that all must, by natural law, act as you yourself propose to act in these circumstances. Third, consider whether your maxim is even conceivable in a world governed by this law of nature. If it is, then, fourth, ask yourself whether you would, or could, rationally *will* to act on your maxim in such a world. If you could, then your action is morally permissible. (2012: 10–11)

But saying we all must act only if the action can be defended as a universal standard of action for everyone does not mean duty ethicists think we all must act in lockstep, with no consideration for the unique differences in our lives. Context matters. So in many cases, the moral obligations we have can be “agent-relative” – that is, they may apply just to us because of our relation to the individuals impacted by our actions. One person may feel obligated to act a certain way with family members to avoid moral failure, but that feeling of duty may not apply in the company of strangers:

The idea is that morality is intensely personal, in the sense that we are each enjoined to keep our own moral house in order. ... Agent-centered theories and agent-relative reasons on which they are based not only enjoin each of us to do or not to do certain things; they also instruct me to treat *my* friends, *my* family, *my* promises in certain ways because they are *mine*, even if by neglecting them I could do more for others’ friends, families, and promises. [emphasis added] (Alexander & Moore 2012: 5–6)

1.2.2 Conflicting duties

Having a set of “duties” to guide our behavior in the world may sound compelling at first. But it quickly becomes obvious that life is full of moments and choices in which morally relevant duties come into conflict. Kant boldly claimed that “a conflict of duties is inconceivable” (1780: 25), but this has struck many as dubious. Philosopher W. D. Ross laid bare the doubtfulness of Kant’s claim, saying even our most careful deliberations can involve what he called “moral risk”:

We come ... after consideration to think one duty more pressing than the other, but we do not feel certain that it is so. ... For, to go no further in the analysis, it is enough to point out that any particular act will in all probability in the course of time contribute to the bringing about of good or evil for many human beings, and thus have a *prima facie* rightness or wrongness of which we know nothing. (1930: 30–31)

Still, we do have a set of moral obligations. But Ross sought to articulate how we might think about them more usefully. Ross said we are bound by several of what he called *prima facie* duties – obligations that should be self-evident to any reasoning individual. Like the categorical imperative, his list of duties binds all people in all situations. But he acknowledged that we are routinely called to weigh them against each other, and to prioritize them in various contexts. We have a duty to honor the notion of honesty. We must keep the promises we make (fidelity). We have a duty to right the wrongs we have committed (reparation). We have a duty to express gratitude and return favors to those who have helped us. We have a duty to promote general welfare and justice for all. We have a duty to avoid harming others (nonmaleficence). And finally, we have a duty to constantly strive for self-improvement. There should be little argument over whether these duties are real and objectively true; they are “a hard-wired and evolutionarily advantageous set of rules that any morally mature human” should understand, philosopher Christopher Meyers argued (2011: 317). But Ross said we need to make reasoned arguments for placing greater moral weight on some over others in given situations. For example, in a case that may pose serious harm to someone, our duty to minimize or avoid harm may well take precedence over a promise we made. While such an open-ended theory may be perceived as daunting, its embrace of moral uncertainty in our daily lives should actually be seen as a strength of this approach, Meyers argues. Ross’s efforts to set forth universal duties yet acknowledge the contextual basis for how we apply them “is a far more accurate reflection of humans’ moral reasoning, both in fact and in capability”, Meyers writes (2003: 93):

Persons can, I think, grasp universal moral truth at the abstract level, but our moral decision making in actual cases is fraught with uncertainty and ambiguity. Ross, better than any other theorist, captured this tension. ... Even the most duty-bound most morally committed person will make mistakes because of inadequate information, but such a person should not be held morally accountable for those mistakes. (2003: 93, 94)

1.3 Consequentialist ethics

What policies should we follow that are most likely to result in the greatest benefit for the majority of people affected? This is the focus of the predominant strain of consequentialist ethics commonly known as rule utilitarianism, attributed to 19th-century theorist John Stuart Mill. In contrast to the two previously discussed frameworks, the moral weight, as it were, lies squarely on the assessed or predicted outcome of a decision. The key here is to recognize the limitations of our abilities to foresee all possible outcomes of a decision. We are far from omniscient. But theorists argue we should be held responsible for our *intended* consequences, and for possible negative outcomes that might be foreseeable. Rather than fixate on weighing all possible outcomes of a specific action or on aggregate goods benefiting specific groups (often referred to as act utilitarianism), theorists argue it is more useful to think generally about promoting things that benefit society. This would help, for example, account for cases when “pain” is perceived as somehow valuable. One contemporary philosopher argued, “[E]ven if punishment of a criminal causes pain, a consequentialist can hold that a world with both the crime and the punishment is better than a world with the crime but not the punishment, perhaps because the former contains more justice” (Sinnott-Armstrong 2011: 8). So instead of narrowly having to determine whether a single act would produce specific benefit or pleasure, this “holistic” utilitarianism compares “the whole world (or total set of consequences) that results from an action with the whole world that results from not doing that action”, he argues. “If the former is better, then the action is morally right” (Sinnott-Armstrong 2011: 8). This is the difference between using utility as a “standard” with which to judge the rightness of an act, and using it as a “decision procedure”. The latter is virtually impossible since we are not omniscient and cannot possibly anticipate every outcome of our actions. So most consequentialists argue for the former, as Sinnott-Armstrong explains: “Just as the laws of physics govern golf ball flight, but golfers need not calculate physical forces while planning shots; so overall utility can determine which decisions are morally right, even if agents need not calculate utilities while making decisions” (2011: 10).

Consequentialist ethics is often the most familiar approach in Western cultures, as the theory of utility from which it stems has served as the basis for most democratic legislative systems. As our predominant political philosophy, it is generally how we make laws, though of course with policy exceptions that are intended to protect vulnerable or disadvantaged populations. And it is built into most professional codes of ethics in the form of directives that call for mindfulness of the effects that practices might have on others. The common directive to “minimize harm” is one such example. While such a call has a deontological dimension, as discussed earlier, it also suggests that the moral weight lies as much on the resultant harm (or harm avoidance) of a decision as it does on the degree to which one is carrying out a stated *duty*. The focus here is on one’s *intended* consequence.

1.3.1 Rawls and the veil of ignorance

One useful variety of rule utilitarianism was developed by political theorist John Rawls in the 1970s. His “theory of justice” argues that the promotion of social justice, rather than “happiness” or other vague good, should be the primary aim of all public policy, and he sets forth a novel way to think about making decisions that do so (1999). He poses a provocative mental exercise: Imagine that a group of individuals had gathered to determine the best social policies to adopt, but that they existed in a peculiar mental state: all of them had *general* knowledge about the world – physics, human psychology, geometry, chemistry – but they also suffered from *particular* ignorance. That is, they had no awareness of any features that distinguished one from another. They had no knowledge of their gender, their talents, their disabilities, etc. Rawls called this state the “veil of ignorance”. What kind of policies would people in such a state agree on? Behind the veil, he argued, the group would reject conventional utilitarian thinking, because all would be concerned about ending up in the minority once the veil was lifted and thus be possibly subjected to systematic discrimination. Ultimately, Rawls said, the group would agree on two key principles. First, every decision would be required to maximize the liberty of all to the extent possible. Behind the veil, aware that we could end up destitute and disabled or wealthy and successful once the veil is lifted, we would all make liberty a priority. Second, he said we would agree that in dealing with scarcity in the world, all “goods” would be “distributed” in ways that benefited the least advantaged in society (since all in the group would be keenly aware that anyone might end up as such once the veil is lifted). Since under his theory all actions are judged according to a certain standard – in his case, whether they promote justice – it can be considered an example of rule utilitarianism. We can see many examples of a Rawlsian approach to policy making. The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 is one such example; it requires that all buildings, both public and private, be designed to accommodate wheelchair-bound and other similarly disabled citizens. Similar policies can be pointed to in media ethics. Various industries, such as breakfast cereal manufacturers, have voluntarily agreed to scale back their use of media advertising that targets children with ads touting sugary products in recent years, since doing so can be considered exploitative of one of the most vulnerable segments of the population. Another example of a media ethics policy driven largely by Rawls’ framework is the journalistic practice of protecting the identity of rape victims in the coverage of criminal cases.

2 Journalism ethics dilemmas

Several specific types of ethical questions and controversies regularly surface in journalism. Yet it should be clear from the preceding discussion that ethics theory

provides no clear-cut solution to cases of the same type; indeed, ethicists often argue for very different resolutions among similar cases, depending on context and factors that may carry different weight according to different situations. It nonetheless is valuable to note several broad types of journalism ethics questions:

2.1 Conflict of interest

Corporate and political conflicts of interest commonly raise questions of journalistic autonomy and adherence to ideals of public service. Such structural conflicts of commercial and journalistic interests have long been the subject of political economy, journalism studies, and other realms of scholarship as well (e.g., Herman & Chomsky 1988; Mellado et al. 2012). Conflicts of interest can also occur at the individual level, where the interests or values of a single journalist might tempt him or her to compromise his or her news judgments. Most journalistic policies require news workers to treat potential *appearances* of conflict of interest as just as much a threat to credibility as *actual* conflicts, and, in cases of the latter, to take explicit steps to acknowledge the conflict and to either minimize or eliminate it. In most cases, journalists are expected to recuse themselves from activities that might pose a journalistic conflict, since this maximizes their ability to carry out their Kantian duties to serve the public by being independent of other interests that might shape the news.

2.2 Minimizing harm

The concept of harm can take many different forms, and journalists are regularly called upon to justify their decisions that arguably cause harm to individuals or groups. It is worth noting that there is a wide recognition that some amount of harm is inevitable in the course of journalistic public service. The ethics code adopted by the Society of Professional Journalists in the US, for instance, deliberately lists the directive of “minimizing harm” second to “seek the truth and report it”. The code does not call for journalists to “prevent” or “avoid” harm. There has been extensive work among media ethicists to conceptualize various dimensions of harm (e.g., Plaisance & Deppa 2009), including the dangers involved in covering tragedies and disasters (Amend, Kay & Reilly 2012), and how harm might be understood and addressed in virtual-reality situations (Vanacker & Heider 2011). Journalists in war zones and those covering sites of humanitarian tragedy have been challenged, for example, for their decisions to maintain their role as dispassionate witnesses to scenes of human suffering, rather than setting down their cameras and helping those in need. News organizations also have drawn criticism when disclosing secret or classified information that, in the course of informing the public, may arguably harm or undermine national interests.

2.3 Privacy

There is wide agreement among sociologists and philosophers that everyone requires a degree of privacy to allow for self-development and to enable individuals to manage their multiple social roles. But even so, the ethical value of privacy is often misunderstood, and its social component ignored in many journalism controversies regarding privacy (Plaisance 2014). With the value of privacy regularly being contested, particularly in the era of Big Data (Robinson 2015) and in the face of growing potential of drones for newsgathering purposes (Culver 2014), journalists confront the dilemma of the extent to which respect for individual privacy should determine news coverage. While some scholars have argued that protecting privacy should never be considered the job of the journalist due to myriad and shifting definitions (Allen 2003), others emphasize that journalism that respects privacy can encourage civic participation and engagement. Ethics arguments frequently flare over when disclosure of personal information is merited as well as when story subjects arguably seek to dodge accountability by invoking questionable or ill-informed privacy claims.

2.4 News frame effects

News content that may have negative effects on society frequently raise ethics questions. For example, psychologists have long warned of the “contagion” effect of coverage of suicide that focuses on the method of death and emotional state of the subject, which may prompt others in a similar emotional state to “copy” the story (Romer, Jamieson & Jamieson 2006). Journalists have embraced media guidelines for responsible coverage of suicide as a social-health issue rather than as spectacle. The way an issue in the news is “framed” by story narratives, using factors such as sourcing, point of view, emphasis, and description, can leave audiences with a particular understanding of that issue (Tewksbury & Scheufele 2009). Framing of hot-button topics such as gun violence, gender roles, or obesity can serve to emphasize or favor one perspective over another and thus raise ethical questions.

2.5 Stereotypes

Relying on or perpetuating gender, racial, or ethnic stereotypes in news stories also can be considered a framing issue, and journalists must be mindful of inadvertent stereotyping (de Vreese 2004; Entman 1993). Expediency, narrative brevity, and the press of deadlines often discourage thoughtful considerations of the descriptions used for story subjects, be they local celebrities or police suspects. Research has suggested a consistent gender bias in news descriptions of physicality, emphasizing

ing clothing items for women but not men, for example. Also, consistent focus on race often leaves skewed perceptions of crime patterns in the mind of the public (e.g., Iyengar 1991; Iyengar & Kidder 1987).

2.6 Newsgathering techniques

What methods are justifiable in the collection of information valuable to the public? Classic what-ends-justify-the-means questions regularly confront journalists. While absolutist policies are rare, many news organizations refuse to pay for news or interviews, though tabloid outlets commonly do so. The primary ethical concern, of course, is that sources with a financial incentive may be tempted to embellish, alter, or even fabricate facts and events, thereby undermining the journalistic enterprise. In some developing countries such as Kenya, China, and India, money is regularly passed to individual journalists to curry favor and secure positive treatment. Such practices have cultural roots in the notion of community engagement and the value of cultivating communal indebtedness, and hence result in variations of journalists' "ethical ideologies" within different cultures (Plaisance, Hanitzsch & Skewes 2012). With celebrity periodicals, where exposure has created its own competitive market among a finite pool of public figures, payment for attention has become more removed from objective newsworthiness standards. The use of deceptive tactics, such as hidden cameras, also raises ethical questions. Several journalistic organizations have adopted policies stating hidden cameras should be used only as a last resort and only when the information sought has high potential value for the public. Similar policies apply to journalists misrepresenting themselves to access information.

2.7 Graphic images

The publication of photos that depict gore, violence, and suffering regularly raises ethical questions for news journalists. Such questions become particularly heated during times of war or conflict, and when patriotic sentiments may bring added pressure to bear on journalists to depict the "right" story and avoid using images that audiences might perceive to be demoralizing. Theorists such as Susan Sontag (2003) and Barbie Zelizer (2010) also explore more fundamental issues regarding the very nature of the image to enhance or undermine cognition and issue comprehension. Claims that graphic images can be offensive, harmful, or unnecessary clash with concerns that avoiding such images risks sanitizing or propagandizing the news, which can easily undermine journalistic credibility. As with other journalistic ethics issues, the controversies over the publication of graphic images reflect diametric approaches within ethics itself: A utilitarian concern focused on minimizing harmful *consequences* of a decision versus a *deontological* ethos that

calls for depicting the news with courage and relying on audiences to make their own decisions about the value of such images.

3 Prominent lines of theorizing

As all the above suggests, scholarship in journalism ethics is quite active on a wide range of issues and concepts. However, several prominent bodies of work have emerged that have attempted to serve as comprehensive framing of these issues and to advocate for specific types of scholarship to move the field forward. Four such prominent lines of theorizing are briefly summarized here.

3.1 Philosophical anthropology

Calling for a “universalism from the ground up” (2013: 281), pioneering media ethics scholar Clifford Christians has indelibly shaped the field over the last three decades by insisting that media theorizing must resist and refute relativistic thinking. He has urged a universal ethic based on what he calls the *protonorm* of the sacredness of human life. Recognition and embrace of this “pretheoretical” value of human community, he writes, is the first critical step in constructing an ethic of being that simultaneously prioritizes central ethical concepts of respect, minimizing harm, and ensuring human flourishing, yet also accommodates a plurality of cultural expressions of those values. “Reverence for life on earth establishes a level playing field for cross-collaboration on the ethical foundations of a responsible press”, Christians writes (2013: 281). His anthropological agenda also rejects any moral absolutism approach, and Christians draws extensively on the works of a diverse cast of thinkers through history, including Georg Gadamer, Martha Nussbaum, Emmanuel Levinas, and Hans Jonas (Christians 2011; Christians & Traber 1997).

3.2 Neo-Aristotelian naturalism

Other media ethics theorists have coalesced around a neo-Aristotelian virtue ethics framework that, much like the anthropological approach, focuses on a telos of human flourishing, yet does so by drawing on the ethical naturalism of philosophers such as Philippa Foot, Rosalind Hursthouse, and Alasdair MacIntyre. This naturalism frames moral and normative claims as straightforward matters of natural fact and grounds ethics in human nature and in what is involved in being a good human being. Stephen Klaidman and Tom Beauchamp (1987) first articulated how virtue ethics should inform journalistic professional norms and behavior.

Aaron Quinn echoed this effort, arguing journalists' cultivation of "internal" values was an essential complement to external ethical standards (2007). In her landmark work published that same year, Sandra Borden elegantly argued for a conceptualization of journalism as a virtue-based *practice* in MacIntyre's sense of that term. Other advocates of a virtue ethics approach in journalism ethics include Nick Couldry (2013) and Patrick Plaisance (2013).

3.3 Post-Enlightenment contractualism

In another approach that rejects moral absolutism and seeks to ground journalism ethics in lived experience, the work of Stephen Ward has advocated for a contractualist view, claiming that "ethical principles are humanly constructed restraints on social behavior" (2005: 6). These principles, he suggests, cannot always be reduced to simple universally applicable truths. One such principle is the notion of journalistic objectivity, which he argues is a "spent ethical force" (2004: 261) and should be replaced by what he calls a "pragmatic objectivity" that frames truth as "a goal of inquiry and redefines truth in a modest, realist manner" (2004: 271). Ward's framework clearly draws from some neo-Aristotelian concepts such as flourishing, and it seeks to articulate the possibility of a robust "global" ethics that recognizes pluralistic cultural values yet also insists that all societies have an interest in cultivating journalism structures that value fair and rational deliberation as a social good.

3.4 Moral psychology

Finally, in contrast with the abstract thrust of these three bodies of work, other scholars have called for a more systematic application of moral psychology theories and methodologies to build a more complete picture of journalistic moral decision-making. Such research arguably provides a necessary opportunity to develop an *interpretive* ethic that incorporates knowledge from moral psychology and neuroethics to better understand environmental-, organizational-, and individual-level factors that help or hinder virtuous work in journalism. This approach is central to the work of Plaisance (2015), as well as that of Lee Wilkins and Renita Coleman (2005), and elements of moral psychology also have informed international journalism studies projects (Plaisance, Hanitzsch & Skewes 2012). It draws on theories of self-identity, moral motivation, and moral development, and harnesses the power of empirical instruments to measure moral reasoning skills, ethical ideology, personality traits, and the ethical "climate" of organizations, and a range of other factors. Also located at the intersection of moral philosophy and behavioural science is the field of neuroethics, where theorists are exploring the connections between brain biology and the "moral mind" (Wilkins 2010).

Further reading

For evolutionary perspectives on the emergence and development of journalistic norms and standards, a good place to start is the landmark work by Dicken-Garcia (1989). Schudson (1978) and Ward (2004) provide competing perspectives on the evolution of Western journalistic standards. Valuable commentary on journalism ethical standards across the globe are provided in collections edited by Ward (2013), Ward and Wasserman (2010), and Couldry, Madianou and Pinchevski (2013). For a more empirical comparison of intercultural journalism standards, see Plaisance, Hanitzsch, and Skewes (2012). The work of Fullerton and Patterson (2015, 2016) offer a detailed intercultural comparison of journalism norms and assumptions.

Several scholars present helpful explorations of questions of journalistic duty. In a pair of essays, Christopher Meyers (2003, 2011) lays out how the deontological work of W. D. Ross provides a helpful framework for mediating among conflicting duties. Works that provide philosophical examinations of more specific duties include Gauthier (2010) on privacy and Plaisance (2007) on transparency. Turning to virtue ethics, Borden provides a definitive account of its application to journalism practices. Christians, Fackler and Ferré (2012) provide a collection of case studies from media around the world to illustrate communitarianism in action. And there are several valuable collections of journalism ethics case studies that provide both critiques of behavior and guidelines for decision-making, including Boeyink and Borden (2010), Zion and Craig (2015), and Peck and Reel (2017).

Looking toward the future journalism ethics theorizing, Christians (2013) provides a useful overview of what he suggests are the most promising lines of inquiry. These include applications of developments in neuroscience (Wilkins, 2010, 2011), the contractualist framework promoted by Ward (2010), and the moral psychology approach by Plaisance (2015).

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II Conceptualizing the Field

Tamara Witschge and Frank Harbers

6 Journalism as Practice

Abstract: In this chapter we propose to adopt a practice theory approach to theorize and examine journalism as an open, diverse and dynamic practice. We first highlight how the ways in which journalism is defined and how the journalistic profession is conceptualised are in flux, and journalistic norms, work routines and audience interactions are changing. We propose practice theory as it allows us to provide a bottom-up theorisation of journalism practices, avoiding the pitfalls that come with *a priori* definitions of what journalism and its societal function are. We address the issues currently prevalent in the field of journalism studies: a) the normative approach to journalism; b) the fixed definition of journalism; c) newsroom-centricity; d) human- and technocentrism. We then provide a general introduction to practice theory, highlighting some of its main features. Third, we illustrate how practice theory allows us insight into key tensions: The question of who is a journalist; the relation between normative ideals of journalism and the everyday practices; how to locate and study the site of journalism, if not focusing on the newsroom; and how to include materiality in journalism studies.

Keywords: discourse, journalism, practice, practice theory, self-conceptualization

1 Introduction

In this chapter we explore how applying practice theory helps us to theorize and examine the way journalism is developing. Traditional news journalists have long been the ones who decide on the news of the day, but in the current digital age their monopoly on publishing information is challenged fundamentally. With information abundant, and many new providers of news and information, there is not only increased competition for audiences, but also for the understanding of journalism as cultural practice. The ways in which journalism is defined and how the journalistic profession is conceptualized are in flux, and journalistic norms, work routines, and audience interactions are changing fundamentally.

To make sense of these developments, and to understand what journalism is, we argue we can no longer employ research approaches that use *a priori* definitions of what journalism or its societal function should be. This is not to say that these normative conceptions no longer influence the way journalism is perceived. However, to take such a normative perspective as a point of departure puts blinders on journalism scholarship, privileging journalism practice within established organizations. Furthermore, traditional approaches to researching journalism generally regard journalism from a top-down perspective as a coherent set of practices, in

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which norms govern routines and routines direct the characteristics of the output. This fails to acknowledge the non-coherent and at times arbitrary nature of practices, in which strategic claims and everyday practices interact with each other more equally and are not necessarily aligned as lofty ideals clash with commercial and practical constraints.

We propose a practice theory approach (Schatzki 2001a) to study journalism bottom-up as an open practice, acknowledging the increasingly diverse range of actors with differing ideas and approaches to journalism. This does not mean that everything is journalism. The development of journalism practice – and any practice for that matter – is shaped by the past, its prior enactments and understandings. The approach proposed here allows us to do justice to the dynamic nature of journalism practice and moves away from approaches that use *a priori* definitions that may privilege certain practices and exclude others.

In the chapter we first discuss the issues that journalism scholars are faced with in the current journalistic field, and explore how these ask for a new theoretical and methodological approach (Section 2). There has already been a range of answers to highlight and do justice to the complexity of the field, including viewing journalism as network (Domingo & Wiard 2016), ecology (Anderson 2016), or (Bourdieuian) field – which also has a practice theory foundation (Vos 2016). We here propose the perspective of journalism as “practice”, as an inclusive and complementary way of viewing journalism. A practice approach allows us to understand journalism as the ongoing and reciprocal exchange between the activities involved in doing journalism and the discourses on it. In the third section we provide an overview of the main features of practice theory and in section four we explore how this approach allows us to deal with a number of issues that journalism and journalism scholars are faced with currently. We highlight four areas where this approach can help break open the current understanding. In the concluding section, we reflect on the methodological implications.

2 Challenging journalism research

This chapter theorizes the shared practice as it is constituted by the many different activities, understandings and material contexts of existing and emerging forms of journalism. Conceptualizing journalism as an open practice in which many actors and many activities are involved, we seek an alternative for the conventional institutional, newsroom and genre-based understandings of journalism. As such, we aim to address the need in media and journalism studies to include both a detailed analysis of the everyday activities constituting the practice, and the many competing definitions and categorizations as made by the practicing actors themselves (Couldry 2004). Proposing this approach we address the following issues: a) the

normative approach to journalism; b) the fixed definition of journalism; c) news-room-centricity; d) human- and technocentrism.

2.1 Normative approaches to journalism

Over time, a stable disciplinary understanding of what journalism is and does developed both in journalism practice (Hallin 1992) and in journalism studies (Turner 2005), which, as we detail below, is grounded in a thorough knowledge of the people, their work routines, and textual output within newsrooms and institutional media. The perspectives on journalism that developed are rooted in a particular predefined normative conception, emphasizing journalism's democratic function.

As Barbie Zelizer (2013) points out, the predominant starting point of journalism studies is journalism's deemed necessity for the maintenance of democracy. Journalists have long had a monopoly on publishing information in the public domain (Hansen 2012), and their ways of selecting, making and distributing this information affect what we deem as authoritative accounts of what is going on, how we perceive societal problems, and in part determines the priority we give to issues. The central role that journalists have been attributed in society, has greatly affected the way in which journalism has been researched, and understood. Whilst by no means uncontested in practice (Nerone 2013), in theory and research on journalism, the relation between news and democracy has become naturalized (Josephi 2013).

We do not suggest that journalism is irrelevant for democracy, or that we should ignore journalism's societal role altogether. However, a more open-minded approach to journalism that extends our vision beyond its importance for democracy is called for. The field of journalism studies has become invested with such strong normative expectations, in particular journalism's pivotal importance for democracy (Peters & Witschge 2014; Zelizer 2013), that new scholarly understandings of journalism's role for society have been slow to develop (Josephi 2013). This limited approach goes hand-in-hand with two issues we discuss next: a limited definition of what journalism is and the privileging of certain practices over others. As a result, we do not capture the full breadth of journalism and its many relevancies for society.

2.2 Fixed definition of journalism

Much like a coherent normative approach has developed over time, a rather coherent and homogenous understanding of journalism has become dominant (Deuze & Witschge 2018). This conceptualization fails to account for the myriad of practices, understandings and forms of output that together form "journalism". Some of the most prevalent ways of defining journalism is either by way of the genre, the pro-

duction space or the professional status of the journalist. These ways of defining and approaching journalism have always had their limitations: The professional status of journalists has always been contested (Schudson & Anderson 2009); the blurring of genres was highlighted decades ago (for instance, Brants 1998), and journalism has always been produced in many places beyond the newsroom (see Section 4.3).

Currently, the ways of delimiting our object of study in journalism studies have become even more inadequate (see also, Witschge et al. 2016). With the blurring of genres disrupting the traditional assumption of quality journalism, new entrants to the field challenging traditional outlets that struggle to keep afloat, and a rapid multiplication of production spaces, the status quo in both journalism and journalism studies is obviously challenged. It is thus not so much relevant to “arrive at the ‘proper’ definition, production or interpretation” (Erjavec & Poler Kovacic 2009: 149). Rather, we need to give insight into and theorize the different practices, definitions, and interpretations that are put forward by the multitude of actors competing to inform the dominant delineation of journalism. Recognizing that “abstract social categories and practices exist to the extent that they are called upon by people for particular interactional purposes” (Matheson 2004: 35), we need to pay attention to who is engaged in this definitional struggle of the genre, rather than adopt certain definitions *a priori*.

2.3 Newsroom-centricity

A prevalent way of defining journalism has been through the institutions deemed at the center: the newsroom and traditional media institutions (Wahl-Jorgensen 2009; Anderson 2011). With newsroom ethnography as main method of data analysis, this approach has provided many valuable insights into how journalists work and how journalism has been produced (see for instance the seminal work by Tuchman (1978), or more recently: Usher 2014). However, viewing the newsroom as *the* center of journalistic production provides an overly limited perspective of where journalism is produced: traditional journalistic institutions cannot be presumed to be the exclusive center of journalistic production. We should not take for granted that the activities in these spaces continue to determine what journalism entails, as they have long done. Such a narrow approach to journalism conceals the existence of alternative sites and forms of journalism. As Nick Couldry (2004: 125) puts it, we need to “resist the temptation to see the actual institutional centres of media (and political) culture as ‘all there is’.” Such a view “distorts the breadth of the actual field of media (and political) practice beyond these claimed ‘centres’” (ibid.).

With the rapid changes in work cultures of established journalists as well as the entry of new producers of journalism, not traditionally labeled as journalists, we need to broaden our view beyond the newsroom. This is not to say that the

newsroom no longer remains an important anchor point for news and journalism: Much of what is considered news and journalism still comes through the newsroom. Yet, these practices are not necessarily captured by being in the newsroom. Traditional media have become institutions populated by an increasingly fluctuating, precarious body of contracted and subcontracted reporters and editors, freelancers, temp agency workers, interns, and independent entrepreneurs (Deuze & Witschge 2016). We need new, more inclusive ways of locating and defining journalists, focusing not just on what happens in the center of the newsroom, but also in the margins and outside of the newsroom.

2.4 Human- and technocentrism

Within journalism studies, we need to not only be wary of the newsroom-centric approaches as discussed above, but also avoid other existing types of narrow focus on journalism, such as human-centrism and technocentrism, which devote too much attention on certain actors in the production process that determines what journalism looks like – in this case, respectively, journalists as makers or technology as structure. Journalism studies has long focused almost exclusively on the *people* involved in making the news. However, we need to consider also the material conditions (to put it simply, everything non-human) under which such production processes take place (see for instance Boczkowski (2015); De Maeyer 2016) – whether that pertains to the role of (mobile) phones, desks, content management systems, computers or other non-human (f)actors.

At the same time, it is important that a reevaluation of the material in journalism is not simply equated with more attention to technology. Such an interpretation could easily lead to the trap of *technocentrism*, where the focus is on the effect of individual technologies, rather than resulting in a more complex understanding of the role of technology in news production. Such a deterministic and narrow view on technology is dominant in certain journalistic practices, where the focus on technology shrouds the role of economic, social and cultural changes (Witschge 2012). In journalism studies, the danger exists of a similarly deterministic focus on technology: “[The] obsession with what is new and next disarticulates technology and journalistic routines from both their material and economic contexts and their alignment with journalism’s normative functions” (Siegelbaum & Thomas 2016: 387).

3 Practice theory

The above-mentioned limitations to the prevalent ways of researching journalism have become particularly pressing with the current changes of the field. As a re-

sponse different scholars have called for ways in which we can do justice to the new, still rapidly developing situation: New theoretical approaches have developed (see for instance: Anderson 2016; Domingo & Wiard 2016; Vos 2016) and methodological implications considered (see for instance Karlsson and Sjøvaag 2016). Indeed, there is much attention for rethinking and re-theorizing journalism considering the many changes in the field (see, for instance, Peters & Broersma 2013; 2016; Boczkowski & Anderson 2016). Introducing a practice theory approach to journalism, we aim to contribute to this debate and answer the call to introduce practice theory in media studies (Couldry 2004; Bräuchler & Postill 2010).

Practice theory includes a diverse set of theories and approaches, some that have become relatively prominent in media and journalism studies, such as Bourdieu's field theory (2005; for a discussion of its value for journalism studies, see Benson & Neveu 2005), Boltanski and Thévenot's moral sociology (1999; for an application in media studies, see, for instance, Barron 2013), or Latour's actor-network theory (2005; for an application in journalism studies, see, for instance, Domingo, Masip & Costera Meijer 2015). It has been applied to understand audience participation in journalism (Ahva 2017) and ethics (Borden 2007). All in all, we may be experiencing a "practice turn" in journalism studies as other fields have recently experienced (Schatzki, Knorr Cetina & von Savigni 2001).

Practice theory brings together a wide range of approaches that have as their central focus the "practice," though there are disagreements on what constitutes a practice (Gherardi 2009b). What most approaches have in common is that they are concerned with the "collective, situated and provisional nature of knowledge and a sense of shared materiality" (ibid.: 535). What is central is that practices are not only conceptualized as: "embodied, materially arrays of human activity", but more importantly that these are "centrally organized around shared practical understanding" (Schatzki 2001a: 11). For our purposes, we can view the practice of journalism as the shared set of activities and understandings of what is "journalism". As such, it is not one or the other, but rather both the understandings and the activities that are constitutive and it is precisely in the interaction that the shared practice emerges. Indeed, practice theory's attention for the intricate relation between these two fundamentally intertwined levels of practice – as Schatzki (2001b: 56) puts it, the "sayings" and the "doings" – is an elementary reason for us to propose this approach to journalism.

In response to the challenges in journalism studies, there are a number of features of practice theory that, as we argue, render it a valuable approach. Practice theory (i) includes both the interrelated sayings and doings that constitute a practice; (ii) asks for a bottom-up definition of what the practice entails, based on how actors categorize, understand, and enact the practice; (iii) acknowledges the dynamic nature of practices where sayings and doings impact one another; (iv) introduces a nuanced and holistic view on the role of materiality. We discuss these key features of practice theory before discussing more concretely how applying this

practice theory approach to the field of journalism allows us to address the challenges that the field faces (Section 4).

First, and centrally, one of the main features of practice theory is the interaction between the activity and the understanding of the activity – the sayings and doings. Practices are seen as a set of activities that simultaneously structure and are structured by collective understandings of the activities in question (Schatzki 2001b). Practices are not simply the “‘routine’, ‘competitive advantage’, ‘embodied skills’, or (...) ‘what people do’” (Gherardi 2009b: 536). Rather, practice theory allows for complex and critical understanding of the social order as made up of both the activities (in particular routine activities) and discourses surrounding these (Couldry 2004: 121). It is here that we can also understand continuity in practices: the activities as become standard over time inform the understandings, and vice versa. At the same time, this is also how we can understand change: if either the understandings or the activities of journalism change, then over time, these can set new standards, and structure the practice of journalism. Notions such as “‘structuration”, “discipline” or “habitus”, theorizing the way people come to internalize established understandings and routines of a practice, can offer a helpful perspective on the way established understandings and patterns of action and individual deviation and innovation of practices interact. As such these concepts elucidate the dynamic of continuity and change of a practice (for a concise discussion of these concepts and their theoretical context, see Postill 2010: 6–12).

Second, the entwinement of the sayings and doings also shows that rather than conceptualizing a practice as a top-down rational and systematic phenomenon, it can better be considered as an ongoing process of bottom-up, collective negotiation of practitioners (both through the performance of an activity and the discourse on it) that is not only determined by abstract rational ideas and goals, but also by specific contextual and material conditions, normative preferences, habitualized routines, and subjective experiences (Schatzki 2005). Practices are not the logical result of a coherent top-down process in which rational knowledge and goals are translated into clearly delineated activities (Gherardi 2009b). Rather, practice theory focuses our attention to the inherently provisional nature of the practice and how it is shaped and reshaped by the understanding of that practice. As such, the question of how a practice is shaped is complex: “actions are linked into a practice not just by explicit understandings, but also by being governed by common rules and by sharing the common reference-point of certain ends, projects and beliefs” (Couldry 2004: 121). Therefore, bottom-up does not imply that there are no structuring elements, but rather that there is no such thing as “the” practice of journalism, as this is permanently constituted, rather than fixed, even at specific points in time.

This brings us to the third feature of practice theory that we highlight here: the dynamic nature of practices. Practice theory allows us to understand how shared and collective understandings and sets of activities develop. Practices are regular

patterns of action that embody and reiterate shared conceptions of that activity thereby sustaining these practices (Gherardi 2009b: 536): “what makes possible the competent reproduction of a practice over and over again and its refinement while being practiced (or its abandonment) is the constant negotiation of what is thought to be a correct or incorrect way of practicing within the community of practitioners”. Within this “constant negotiation”, the emergence of a shared vocabulary for appraisal becomes an important part of the practice (*ibid.*). Mastering a certain activity means also mastering the vocabulary of appraisal: the ability to meaningfully discriminate between the different aspects of an activity, knowing how to categorize and evaluate the different aspects, ultimately facilitating the performance of an activity in line with the collective understanding of a practice (*ibid.*).

Practices are enacted and evaluated in light of a shared image of what it means to perform a practice in the “right” manner. Although shared understandings are at the heart of a practice, what is considered the ideal way of enacting it can differ between (groups of) practitioners – especially within a period of rapid change (Gherardi 2009b) like the journalistic field is in. The open approach of practice theory is particularly apt to explore the different ways in which a practice is conceived and how practitioners contest and negotiate the different takes on a practice through their sayings and doings. In addition, even when practitioners agree on the right way to perform a practice, the interaction between sayings and doings makes a practice inherently dynamic. As Gherardi (2009b) argues, every enactment of a practice not only reiterates, but also inevitably slightly reshapes a practice (also see Ahva 2017: 1528). A practice thus develops from the complex interaction of a web of enactments and discourses, past and present, by a myriad of actors, not only journalists, but also those surrounding it (whether they are publishers, web developers or marketers).

Fourth, practice theory focuses on the material context of the practice that is being researched. While the shared practical understandings that organize human activity are core in the understanding of practices, these arrays of understandings are understood as “embodied” and “materially mediated” (Schatzki 2001a: 11). Practice theory “joins a variety of ‘materialist’ approaches in highlighting how bundled activities interweave with ordered constellations of nonhuman entities” (*ibid.*: 12). For our purposes, the value of practice theory also lies in its holistic approach vis-à-vis its view on the role of the material in practices. It does not isolate it, but rather views it as integrally connected to the practice, the material arrangements – the “set-ups of material objects” (Schatzki 2005: 472) form the context of practices and need to be considered when analyzing the practice: “Whenever someone acts and therewith carries on a practice, she does so in a setting that is composed of material entities. The material arrangements amid which humans carry on embrace four types of entity: human beings, artefacts, other organisms, and things” (*ibid.*). In the next section we discuss the specific value of this and the other features of practice theory and then also consider why we prefer this approach to materiality over others when analyzing journalism.

4 Addressing key tensions in journalism through practice theory

We argue that practice theory allows us insight into some of the most prevalent issues present in journalism studies, and we will illustrate this by focusing on the following challenges that journalism scholars are faced with: The question of who is a journalist; the relation between normative ideals of journalism and the everyday practices; how to locate and study the site of journalism, if not focusing on the newsroom; how to include materiality in journalism studies.

4.1 Who is a journalist?

One of the most pressing questions is the question who is a journalist. Digital media technologies have considerably lowered the entry costs to the field, and the profession of the journalist (which was never protected as a formal profession) is open to many new entrants (Singer 2003; Chadwick 2013). The hybrid and fluid nature of the roles in journalism are identified by terms such as “citizen journalist”, the “produser”, and “semi-professional amateurs” (Nicey 2016). With new entrants to the field, the focus both in practice and in theory has been on the boundary work done to protect and gauge the conceptualization of who is a journalist (see, for instance, Carlson & Lewis 2015). The research on the question of who is a journalist shows how difficult it is to provide an inclusive alternative to the existing definitions that focused on either the genre or the newsroom.

The question of how to locate the different actors is addressed in Section 4.3 below. Here we address the more fundamental definitional issue: how do we define *journalism*? We have already indicated in the above that the definition of what is journalism and thus who is a journalist is not fixed. Moreover, the research on boundary work in journalism shows that there are a lot of different interests involved in conceptualizing what journalism is and what it is not (see for instance Fenton and Witschge (2010) on the nature of such definitional struggle). As such, we should not just aim for a “neutral” and inclusive definition for our research purposes, but rather also do justice to journalism as a practice that is constituted by actual activities and the accompanying (self) understandings (and the interaction between them).

Practice theory enables us to gain insight in the way journalism is delineated in a collective negotiation between a variety of actors, in which both the sayings and the doings of journalism play an equally important role. Moreover, by not defining journalism *a priori*, it allows us to adopt a bottom-up perspective that elucidates how the practice of journalism is the inherently provisional result of the ongoing collective negotiation of the activities, rules, routines, as well as defini-

tions and emotions involved in doing journalism. Who is a journalist or what is journalism is a result of the research rather than the starting point.

This does not mean that everything is deemed journalism or that the term loses its distinctive value. However, to arrive at a definition the net is initially cast much wider than is common in current scholarship. Including anyone who considers themselves or is considered a journalist by others in the research and carefully examining these practices in close relation to the way they are understood and evaluated by the different actors involved, allows us to include a much larger variety of practices that are actually associated with journalism. Such an approach also provides us insight into the tension present in the field. For instance, by examining practices that present themselves as a form of journalism, but are not univocally accepted as such, it is possible to examine how the boundaries of journalism are negotiated – much like “tracing the network”, in ANT terms (Latour 2005), which proposes a similarly bottom-up way of identifying those actors who are relevant in the object of study (see, for instance, Anderson (2013) and Domingo, Masisip & Costera Meijer (2015) for a fruitful application of this approach in journalism).

With the blurring of roles in journalism, the combining of professions (such as journalistic and marketing work, for instance), and range of actors that work outside of the traditional journalistic institutions (as freelancers, in start-ups, or non-paid workers), it becomes increasingly important to look at how the “professional identity of journalists is discursively constructed” (Olausson 2017: 81) and how the activities and self-understanding (or ideology) inform one another. Caroline Fisher (2015: 376) looked at how journalists “*perceived* [sayings] and *managed* [doings] issues of conflict of interest when they entered journalism after working as a political media adviser” (our emphasis). Similarly, Lia-Paschalia Spyridou et al. (2013: 79), quoting Thomas Hanitzsch’s definition of who is a journalist highlights that journalistic culture “becomes manifest in the way journalists *think* and *act*”. Such a perspective shows how journalistic self-understanding and practice are intricately related and mutually constitutive.

Practice theory allows us to understand these elements – the way journalists do journalism and the way they talk about what they do – as mutually constituting the practice. These elements inform one another, even though activities and discourse do not always match; particularly in times of high commercial pressures, journalists cannot always perform journalism in the way that they think is “proper” (see for instance Witschge & Nygren 2009). It is important to highlight, as practice theory allows us to do, that journalists’ discourse on what they deem as “proper” journalism is not simply a neutral definition. Rather it conveys a normative stance and functions as important boundary work, determining who is considered a (good) journalist. At times it can even become an important marketing tool as well: The cases of French journalism start-up *Mediapart* and Dutch start-up *De Correspondent* show how their strong ideological positioning on what journalism should look like (and their aversion to mainstream journalism) has become an important

part of their success. In this way, their (constructed) ideology is employed to position themselves among existing players (Wagemans, Witschge & Deuze 2016; Harbers 2016).

We see that the professional status of journalism, which has been a longstanding issue, and the questions of what is “proper” journalism and what sets journalists apart, have become ever more pressing with the entry of many new producers to the field (be they semi-professional amateurs (Nicey 2016), activist (Breindl 2016), sources (Carlson 2016), or citizen witnesses (Allan 2016)). Moreover, the many different work settings, and the ever more “liquid” nature of work practices (Deuze 2008) also pose challenges for the conceptualization of what is journalistic work, not just for who is a journalist. At the same time, we see that journalists self-identify strongly with the “profession”, referring to journalism as their “calling”, “duty” or “moral obligation” (Witschge 2013).

Practice theory helps us consider this attachment to the object of work, which is clearly present within journalism, as an integral part of the practice: it is this collective attachment “that sustains working practices and makes them change over time” (Gherardi 2009b: 537). Understanding research on journalism as a “theoretical and empirical inquiry on the attachment of subjects to the objects of their passion” would focus our attention on how journalists “put their passions into practice” (Gherardi 2009b: 537). Particularly in a time of precarious labor with less than ideal work conditions (with reorganization of newsrooms, layoffs and an increase of freelance or temporary contracts and unpaid work), viewing the practice of journalism through the lens of the passion driving the journalists (see Deuze & Witschge 2018), can further our understanding of the practice.

4.2 The complex relation between normative ideals and everyday practices

Viewing journalism as practice – constituted both by the activities and the discourse on the activities – allows us to address the important question of how journalistic output comes into being, in such a way that we do not oversimplify or reduce the production process to a linear, rational, necessarily coherent or consistent set of actions. Despite – or maybe because – the influential understanding of journalism that developed over time (Hallin 1992), both in practice and theory, we emphasize the need to pay attention to the incongruences, tensions, and contradictions that are (also) part of the practice of journalism. Employing the lens of practice theory, in which practice is considered as “an array of understandings, rules, ends, projects, and even emotions” (Schatzki 2005: 481), we become more aware of the complex way in which the sayings and doings relate to each other and appreciate that this relation is not necessarily consistent.

We can come to understand, for instance, how implicit norms and routines, and even explicit rules that are in place in journalistic practice do not necessarily

or entirely determine the outcome. As noted by David Ryfe (2006: 203), “something about the way news production is learned and enforced gives reporters a great deal of autonomy in choosing which rules to apply and when and how to apply them”. And indeed, as he points out, this raises the question “how do we conceptualize a rule such that it allows for both great consistency and great variability?” (ibid.). We would argue that this is where understanding journalism as practice constituted by a variety of elements and set in a specific context helps. This approach is particularly apt in paying the necessary “attention to the microstructure of news rules, and reporters’ negotiation of them in the act of producing the news” (ibid.: 204), thus providing insight into how rules and routines work as part of a broader ensemble that is journalism.

Such an approach allows us to view rules as only part of the elements that constitute and inform journalistic practices. Routines, definitions, emotions, and other elements of what is considered “proper” all are part of the practice that is journalism, and they can be contradictory, clashing or in sync. Viewing journalism as a practice, an ensemble of all these elements, gives us richer insight into whether, and if so, how abstract norms like factuality, impartiality, and engagement shape the activity of journalists and how, subsequently, the activity is translated into specific textual characteristics (Carpenter, Boehmer & Fico 2016).

4.3 The site of journalism

Where journalism scholars have long looked for journalists within the newsroom, the newsroom no longer suffices as the sole place to define and locate journalism. Rather, we need new ways of understanding both traditional news organizations (with an increasingly networked nature, rather than a physical location where news work takes place (Deuze & Witschge 2018), as well as the startup culture that is becoming increasingly prevalent in the field of journalism (Bruno & Kleis Nielsen 2012), with the rise of the idea of the journalist as entrepreneur. Practice theory can help us in two ways here: it can provide a way to both *understand* and *expand* the concept of news organizations in such a way that it does justice to the emerging, evolving nature.

Rather than suggesting that we no longer need to pay attention to the news organizations in journalism, we suggest, without privileging the traditional newsroom to explore how different organizational formats help stabilize, form, or challenge journalistic practice: “social life (...) is inherently tied to a kind of context in which it transpires” (Schatzki 2005: 467). This context, the “site” of a practice, as Schatzki puts it, cannot simply be equated with a place, or a location, but should be regarded rather as encompassing the “arenas or broader sets of phenomena as part of which something – a building, an institution, an event – exists or occurs” (ibid.: 467–468). The changing nature of the newsroom, and rise of new organizational formats including start-up organizations, flex-working spaces, and home

working, does not diminish the importance of the site of the practice. Rather, it asks of us to expand our traditional understanding of what constitutes the site or the context of journalism. Even though these spaces are less easily identified, they are crucial in understanding how the new activities and definitions of what is journalism and news work are taking shape.

In locating the site we need to not only consider the physical space in which journalism is produced, and pay attention to the way in which new activities and understandings are connected to new organizational structures. What forms, activities, rules, routines, emotions are emerging in the new spaces of journalism; how do they differ from those in traditional newsrooms, which parts of the practice are sustained, and which parts are altered and how, can all be considered through this practice lens.

4.4 The role of materiality in the newsroom

As we highlighted in Section 2 of this chapter, one of the challenges in journalism studies is how to do justice to the material context of the production of journalism. The material context is always an important constituting part of any practice, but in particular with the recent and manifold changes to the material contexts in which journalism is produced it becomes even more pertinent to provide ample attention to this: Think of the new spaces of news production, whether the home, shared flex office spaces, cafés, or the converged and reorganized newsroom; the rise of digital technologies, including mobile devices, publishing platforms, or content management systems. As noted by De Maeyer (2016), there has been what we could call the “material turn” in journalism. She discusses how Actor Network Theory in particular has become an increasingly popular approach in Journalism Studies. This approach demands ample consideration for the role of non-human actors, and focuses researchers’ attention on the materiality in news production. While we embrace the call to pay attention to the material context of journalism, we propose that Schatzki’s humanists’ view on the ontology of the material context of journalism, including technologies, physical settings, and other material aspects.

As Schatzki (2001a: 20) highlights, practices “are generally construed as materially mediated nexuses of activity” and for most practice theorists the focus continues to lie with the human. The application of ANT in journalism studies has led to many important insights and rightly points our focus to consider the material dimension of journalistic practice (see, for instance, Hemmingway (2008) for a very detailed, micro-level analysis of journalistic practices and the role played by technology). However, we follow Schatzki (2001a: 20) in attributing a different role to the material level, and thus move away from one of the main principles that constitute the post-humanist understanding of the status of the material, namely

the principle of symmetry. This principle posits that “concepts hitherto reserved for humans – agency, intention, purpose, knowledge, voice, etc. – also apply to nonhumans” (ibid.).

In the practice theory approach put forward here, it is acknowledged that “human agency both arises from bodily systems and is tied to ‘external’ arrangements of humans and nonhumans” but still places agency mainly with humans (ibid.). This means that materiality is not researched separately, but is rather considered as a constitutive element and integral part of practice, and as such needs to be considered in conjunction with the other aspects of practice – the two cannot be separated. Rather than privileging one or the other, we need to find ways in which both social and material factors are considered in an integrated manner, which again comes down to viewing the practice at different levels, both the micro and the macro level (see also Leonardi & Barley 2010). In the last section we will consider the methodological implications more in-depth.

5 Concluding remarks: A note on method

In this chapter, we began with highlighting the challenges that journalism studies faces and argued we need an approach to studying journalism that views the practice as both a discursive endeavor and one constituted by activities, as such paying attention to the many elements that constitute the journalistic practice, including the “array of understandings, rules, ends, projects, and even emotions” (Schatzki 2005: 481). We have given an overview of what a practice theory approach entails, and discussed a number of key issues existing in the field that such an approach would help address. We would like to conclude here with some reflections on the methodological implications of adopting a practice theory approach. Though practice theory is not a method, nor comes with a specific set of methodological tools attached to it, adopting this approach does have implications for the empirical research done in journalism studies.

As we noted in the above, by focusing on the activities and definitions that interact and together shape the shared practices, practice theory allows for an important connection between the micro and macro levels of analysis. Though the focus is on the *human* activities and understandings of journalists, practice theory is a *social* rather than individualist approach. To ultimately transcend the individual level by identifying the shared nature of activities and discourses, we need a thorough understanding of the micro-level activities. In line with the argument of Davide Nicolini (2009: 1392), we argue that to understand journalism as a practice we need to “zoom in” by mapping the variety of activities, experiences, conceptions, and material tools that journalists employ. This is needed for a “detailed study of its discursive and material accomplishment”, which can explain the preference for ethnomethodology of practice-based studies (Gherardi 2009a: 118).

Indeed, gaining a thorough understanding of the everyday activities (which for journalism would also include the journalistic output produced), the discourses (including writings on the journalistic profession), and the material context constituting a practice, “requires considerable ‘participant observation’: watching participants’ activities, interacting with them (e.g., asking questions), and – at least ideally – attempting to learn their practices” (Schatzki 2005: 476). Moreover, we need to gain insight into the “names participants use for their activities [which] are an important clue for identifying existing practices” (ibid.) –, in terms of Gherardi (2009b: 537), we need to learn the shared “vocabulary for appraisal”. To gain the detailed knowledge of the “subjects’ lives and worlds,” Schatzki (2012: 24) argues, “the investigator has no choice but to do ethnography, that is, to practice interaction-observation”. Or, put differently: “There is no alternative to hanging out with, joining in with, talking to and watching, and getting together the people concerned” (ibid.: 25). It goes beyond the scope of this chapter to address the specific issues involved in applying ethnography in journalism, identifying the sites for ethnography with the multitude of spaces where journalism is made, but Robinson and Metzler (2016) provide a very helpful consideration of this.

Gaining a detailed understanding of the individual activities and discourses through ethnography is only the first step in getting to the practice. The next step is to identify the shared or collective part of the practice, which Nicolini (2009: 1392) calls “zooming out”, the switching of “theoretical lenses and following, or trailing, the connections between practices”. As such we need concepts that help us understand the way activities and understandings emerge within a particular setting and time-frame, and even more so, how they become “translocal phenomena” (ibid.): How does the “here-and-now of the situated practising and the elsewhere-and-then of other practices” interrelate (ibid.)? How do observed activities and definitions relate to each other and how are they impacted by already established understandings and performances of journalism?

To help gain such broader insight into the structuring and governing processes and elements, and gain insight into the shared nature of practices, it is helpful to include not only ethnographic approaches looking at the details at particular sites, but also include quantitative methods to gain an overview of the “quantifiable features of large classes of phenomena” (Schatzki 2012: 25). Such a call for statistics is not aimed at “mathematical modelling and computer simulations”, but to gain “overviews of social affairs” by mapping how prevalent the practices identified through in-depth qualitative research are on a larger scale (ibid.).

As our concluding remark, we would like to highlight our own role as researchers in the “forming” of practices. Our study of practices is not disconnected from the way a practice is constituted and sustained (Gherardi 2009a). We do not only describe but also inscribe the practice; we take part in the discursive process that constitutes and shapes a practice. Examining a practice means identifying it as such and therefore, like “genres only exist in so far as a social group declares and

enforces the rules that constitute them” (Hodge & Kress quoted in Chandler 1997: 3), researchers contribute to and sustain the way a practice is understood and enacted (Gherardi 2009a). We hope that by calling for this bottom-up practice theory approach, we can help push the agenda for more awareness of the boundary work that is being done in the field, not the least by academics (Witschge et al. 2016). Giving ample attention to both the activities and the discursive work that constitute the journalistic practice, we can start to acknowledge the varied and dynamic nature that journalism is.

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Further reading

Insightful introductions to and accounts of practice theory can be found in the edited collection ‘The practice turn in contemporary theory’ (edited by Schatzki, Knorr Cetina and von Savigni, 2001). For a specific focus on what practice theory has to offer for media and journalism studies, Couldry (2004) and Postill (2010), and Ahva (2017) respectively provide helpful entry points. Edited books by Peters and Broersma (2013, 2016), Boczkowski and Anderson (2016), and Witschge et al. (2016) provide important theoretical perspectives on the transformation and changes journalism is experiencing. Zelizer (2013) offers an insightful exploration of the limitations of normative approaches linking democracy and journalism, and Deuze and Witschge (2018) discuss the limitations of a fixed definition of journalism. Wahl-Jorgensen (2009) and Anderson (2011) provide a critical perspective on the traditional newsroom-centric approach of journalism scholarship. A useful introduction into materiality and why it matters for journalism can be found in De Maeyer (2016).

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Wilson Lowrey

7 Journalism as Institution

Abstract: Journalism has been theorized as an institution in multiple ways. Two prominent conceptualizations include journalism as an organizationally bound enterprise with routinized practices, subject to varying factors and forces in the environment; and journalism as a meso-level collective field, shaped by external forces but also capable of agency within a collective space that has negotiated boundaries, legitimacy, and an internal logic. Both represent attempts to accommodate agency and structure, and autonomy and constraint, in our explanations of news production. This chapter examines these perspectives and the literature in each area, exploring key concepts such as routines, agency and structure, bounded rationality, isomorphism, path dependence and loose coupling. The chapter also examines the role of power and social control in journalism's institutional situation, as well as the argument that journalism is now post-institutional, particularly in an era of open and flexible digital networks. Finally the chapter takes up a third approach to conceptualizing institutions, one rooted in anthropological research – that institutions are grounded in a society's foundational beliefs. According to this approach, a society's meaningful “big thinking” must take place at the institutional level, for better or for worse. Thus, working on our institutions may be preferable to overturning them.

Keywords: field theory, institution, new institutionalism, path dependence, routines

In “The Nature of News” Walter Lippmann cited Ralph Waldo Emerson's observation that people tend to categorize each new experience as “a new version of our familiar experience” and translate it “at once into our parallel facts” (1922: 221). A concerned Lippmann thought this was how journalists behaved, falling back on routines and conventions to interpret events as they tried to accomplish work within challenging environments. He again cited Emerson, about the human tendency “to make facts and men [sic] obey our present humor or belief” (Emerson 1904). If facts can be made to obey, then news must be a constructed product and not a mirror on reality. Here is the start of an important thread in our thinking about journalism as an institution.

The idea of a constructed news concerned Lippmann, an objectivist, but he mainly worried that journalism was failing in its higher calling to inform democratic society accurately. Journalism was “too frail to carry the whole burden of popular sovereignty” (1922: 228). However, if we turn the prism, we may see that journalism offers a less reckonable service: The mere presence of journalism at an institutional level reinforces a society's collective faith in its institutions, regardless of journal-

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ism's day-to-day inaccuracies, missteps and shallowness. This latent purpose differs from the manifest and popularly embraced mandate that journalists accurately and meaningfully represent the world out there, helping people as they govern themselves, or as they seek inspiration and understanding.

Communication scholar James Carey recognized journalism's role in reinforcing this faith, viewing news as ritual through which a society reaffirms and repositions shared beliefs and norms. Carey influenced other scholars, some of whom applied his ideas to the political-economic realm and emphasized journalism's support of shared consensus about national systems, for better and for worse (Cohen & Young 1973; Elliott 1980; Lule 2001). In democracies with liberal media systems, this is consensus about the viability of democratic governance; in authoritarian regimes it is consensus about the viability of rule by a wise monarch; in democratic corporatist systems, it is consensus about the viability of governance through interest-group negotiation (Hallin & Mancini 2004). Journalism's accord with higher-order, widely legitimated institutions would not be possible if news washed up from some "ocean of possible truth" (Lippmann 1922: 215), reflecting only the minute-to-minute happenings of the world out there. It is possible if news is a social construction.

Lippmann perceived that news is found in those places "where people's affairs touch public authority" (1922: 215). From an institutional perspective, the machinery of officialdom, with its widely recognized phases and events, provides journalists with a framework for decision-making about news coverage, one that tends to be unquestioned and taken for granted. Further, news and journalistic practice are shaped by path-dependent assumptions born of past institutional contexts that also go unquestioned (Lowrey 2012, 2015; Ryfe & Kimmelmeier 2011). This institutional machinery can have dysfunctional consequences, rendering news surprisingly unsurprising and homogeneous (Boczkowski 2010; Lowrey 2015; Ryfe 2006), and frequently supportive of the status quo and society's elites (Gitlin 2003 [1980]; Golding & Murdock 2005).

Despite journalism's institutional grounding, the literature offers no generally accepted definition of "institutions", though several prevalent definitions portray them as widely legitimated, governing, and enduring. Cook (2005) calls institutions "social patterns of behavior identifiable across the organizations that are generally seen within a society to preside over a particular social sphere" (p. 70). For Sparrow (1999), institutions provide "a regular and persisting framework by which and within which other political actors operate" (p. 10) and are guided and limited. Clemens and Cook's (1999) definition from political sociology transcends politics and power: Institutions are enduring, taken-for-granted models of "relations and exchanges [that] are reliably reproduced through the actions of individuals and groups without requiring either repeated authoritative intervention or collective mobilization" (pp. 444–445). Within this view, a political system is an institution, but so is marriage. "Taken-for-grantedness" is a key component in defining institu-

tions, suggesting that value derives more from widespread legitimacy and shared understanding than from instrumental benefit (Selznick 1992). Finally, journalism researchers often conflate institutions with organizations, but they are conceptually distinct: Organizations, by one common definition, are social entities with authoritatively enforced rules, role assignments, and defined boundaries (Tolbert & Hall 2009). In fact, the similarity of practices, norms, and content across news organizations suggests the need for a distinct, higher-order institutional level of analysis, as discussed later (see, e.g., Ryfe 2006).

Institutional approaches have been criticized for overemphasizing structure, stasis, and functionalist assumptions (e.g., Greenwood et al. 2008; Thornton et al. 2012). Increasingly institutional scholars are recognizing agency, change, and dysfunction. An institutional field such as journalism is not a collection of “cultural dopes”, who merely reflect the times they live in or reproduce “the stable features of society by acting in compliance with pre-established and legitimate alternatives of action” (Garfinkel 1967: 68). “Actual social actors” are involved in historical processes (Vos 2013: 38). Outcomes of institutional decisions are not “fore-ordained,” (Pickard 2010: 392) and they often result from political wrangling among real people. To varying degrees across political-economic systems, actors within journalism have carved out spaces with negotiable boundaries that allow for some agency and autonomy. These actors can construct their own shared meaning as they struggle for agreement about how to reposition their practices, their roles, and their field in response to uncertain environments. Sometimes they do this with success, and sometimes they don’t.

Looking across past and current media sociology scholarship, journalism has been conceptualized as an institution in multiple ways: 1. as an organizationally bound enterprise with routinized practices, subject to an environment of varying factors and forces; and 2. as a meso-level collective field, shaped by external factors and forces but shaped too within its own bounded and somewhat autonomous and legitimated space, and guided by its own negotiated logic. The first perspective emerged from early case studies of news production within organizations, and evolved in later decades in systematic studies of news production’s variable political, economic, and social environments (e.g., Bennett 1990; Lacy, Coulson & Martin 2004; Jeffres, Atkin & Neuendorf 2002; Shoemaker et al. 2001). The second perspective is found in meso-level theories adopted by news production scholars in recent years, as well as scholarship on journalism as a profession. These represent attempts to accommodate both agency and structure, as well as autonomy and constraint, in our explanations of news production.

An additional institutional perspective will also be discussed. This perspective, from anthropology, is consistent with the view of communication as ritual and ceremony (Carey 1975; Dewey 1916), and with Emil Durkheim’s ideas about ritual and collective consciousness. Durkheimian Mary Douglas (1986) holds that legitimacy based only on “common interest in there being a rule to insure coordination”

is not sufficient for the establishment of an institution. Rather, true institutions must be grounded in a society's foundational beliefs, resting "claims to legitimacy on fit with the nature of the universe" (p. 46):

In reply to the question "Why do you do it like this?" although the first answer may be framed in terms of mutual convenience, in response to further questioning, the final answer refers to the way the planets are fixed in the sky ... (p. 47).

Allegorically, journalism's "fixed planets" would seem to be the dominant political-economic system and ideology. To the degree that journalism is an institution, it is a player with other institutions at this fundamental level, where, Douglas says, a society's truly important and lasting decisions are made.

This chapter details the first two perspectives on journalism as an institution – as an organizational entity in a wider field of forces, and as a meso-level collective field – and discusses literature in each area. The chapter also explores the role of power and social control, as well as the argument that in an era of open and flexible digital networks, our society is post-institutional. Finally, Douglas' argument – that a society's meaningful "big thinking" takes place at the institutional level – is explored. From this perspective, a journalism that matters must interact meaningfully at the institutional level, and each society must cultivate and develop its institutions.

1 Early conceptualizations: news organizations within a field of forces

Some of the earliest scholarship on journalism as an institution assumed an ecological context. Lippmann observed that news was created within a field of exogenous forces, subject to "the working of [other] institutions" (p. 228). University of Chicago sociologist Robert Park's work on the symbiosis between news and urban environments (e.g., 1922, 1940) would help lay a foundation for later studies of the ecology of news production and consumption, especially at the community level (e.g., Janowitz 1967; Jeffres et al. 2002; Stamm 1985; Tichenor, Donohue & Olien 1980). Social scientist Kurt Lewin's (1947) gatekeeping research provided another ecological approach. Lewin's spatial metaphor of the "field" afforded the interconnection of human behavior and human environment as "one constellation of interdependent factors" (p. 338). His gatekeeping approach provided a broad framework for many of the multivariate, large-sample studies of news and editorial selection that emerged in the 1980s and 1990s, and are common today. In these studies, news practices, and content are dependent variables, situated within a field of potentially influential forces organized along hierarchical levels of analysis (e.g., Dimmick & Coit 1982; McQuail 2011; Preston 2009; Shoemaker & Reese 1996; Shoemaker & Vos 2009).

Apart from this ecological research, much early study of news production conceptualized journalism's institutional environment as a mostly contained system, with the news organization as the primary level of analysis. News was viewed as a product rather than a mirror on reality, and the most relevant factors shaping this product were internal – for example, organizational rules and norms, and workers' perceptions (e.g., Bantz, McCorkle & Baade 1981; Breed 1955; Epstein 1973; Gieber 1960; Roshco 1975; White 1950). David Manning White (1950) portrayed the news gatekeeping process as largely internal, a consequence of editors' personal preconceptions. In his 1956 gatekeeping study, Gieber found key causal factors to be the “goals of production, bureaucratic routine and interpersonal relations within the newsroom” (Gieber 1964: 175). A later study by Whitney and Becker (1982) would reveal subtler influences: Wire editors uncritically selected news according to systematically predetermined categories.

Whitney and Becker's findings are not inconsistent with phenomenological assumptions in studies by sociologists Gaye Tuchman and Harvey Molotch, who proposed that journalists typified events as news. Tuchman and Molotch were among a group of young sociologists who came of age during the 1960s and '70s, a time of disillusionment with news and its relationship with powerful political and economic institutions. Motivated by a “quasi-revolt in sociology against the cult of value-free social science” and perceived reinforcement of the status quo (Zelizer 2004: 60), these scholars questioned journalism's claims of authority and objectivity. A potent brew of emerging approaches informed their brand of social constructivism: the phenomenology of Alfred Schutz and his students Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann (1967), Harold Garfinkel's ethnomethodology (in which “there is no such thing as news – only events constructed as news” [Pascal 2011: 123]), and Erving Goffman's framing research (Tuchman 2014). An indirect influence was research in the sociology of work, organizations, and occupations, which examined the ways workers make meaning of, and craft status from, everyday tasks (e.g., the interactionist perspective of Everett Hughes [1958] and other Chicago School scholars) and investigated latent functions within organizations and institutions (March & Simon 1958; Selznick 1949).

Scholars deriving from these traditions focused on news as an organizationally generated product, while accounting for journalists' demanding environment. Like Lippmann, they saw that news workers faced the task of representing an impossibly complex reality within severe time and resource constraints (Epstein 1973; Fishman 1982), amid internal political wrangling (Sigal 1973) – all while they worked within operations that sought profits and acceptance by political and economic elite (Gitlin 2003 [1980]; Sigal 1973), and avoidance of external criticism (Tuchman 1978). Also like Lippmann, these scholars drew normative implications of these conditions for news and for society. However, they were also interested in how and why journalists socially constructed reality within these conditions – a constructed reality that was so often homogeneous and consistent with the status quo.

1.1 Routines, organizations and institutions

A growing number of scholars embraced the perspective that journalists typified events as news, managed typifications strategically, and that news selection and production are shaped by taken-for-granted rules and conventions (Epstein 1973; Gans 1979; Tuchman 1978). Journalists tend to follow *routines* – “patterned, routinized, repeated practices and forms that media workers use to do their jobs” (Shoemaker & Reese 1996: 105). Important to the institutional view of journalism, these routinized decision patterns are similar across news outlets (Gitlin 2003 [1980]; Ryfe 2006). In much of the news construction literature, routines are viewed as functional for the news organization, industry, and profession, and dysfunctional for news quality and society (e.g., Bantz, McCorkle & Baade 1981; Epstein 1973), as they may discourage plurality of viewpoints and help prop up the status quo, and thereby support elites (e.g., Fishman 1982; Gitlin 2003 [1980]).

The organization studies literature also views routines as double-edged, though from the standpoint of the organization’s well-being. On one hand, routines buffer organizations from disruptive environments that can destroy new organizations, and they reduce uncertainty that can paralyze decision-making (Baum 2001: 100). On the other hand, organizations may blindly routinize practices that just happened to correlate with – but not necessarily contribute to – success at the organization’s birth, becoming “imprinted” by their original environment, and growing dysfunctionally irrelevant over time (Aldrich & Ruef 2007; Stinchcombe 1965). Ryfe (2006) notes this potential dysfunction in journalism, at the institutional level:

[I]t is perfectly possible for an inefficient set of routines to take hold very early on in an institutional order. Over time, these routines generate identities, behaviors, roles and values that are seen as appropriate. These norms may crowd out alternative ways of practicing journalism – even if these alternatives might respond more efficiently to exogenous pressures. (p. 140)

Routines tend to be similar across news outlets, and researchers attribute this similarity to a variety of causes. Both classical and political economy researchers argue that making safe decisions that are consistent with industry and professional norms reduces financial risk for the news organization, owners, and investors, even as it impoverishes the public sphere (Picard 2011; Hardy 2010). News outlets and journalists that go their own way when selecting news can appear professionally incompetent, as “pack journalism” research has found (Crouse 2003 [1972]; Dunwoody 1997). Boczkowski (2010) found that technology can encourage homogeneity, as the Internet may serve as a “scopic” device that affords mimicry across news outlets. However, he pointed to journalists’ need for public and professional legitimacy as a deeper motivation for this behavior. Cook (2005) argues that the similarity of journalism practices across news outlets requires a trans-organizational explanation: Journalists behave collectively and in sync with political institutions. They display an “inter-institutional news coherence” (Schudson 2003: 109).

Routinization and institutionalization tend to go hand in hand, but they are not the same things. Berger and Luckmann, in their influential *The Social Construction of Reality* (1967), distinguish the two. Routines emerge at the interpersonal level, as interacting individuals “typify” one another’s actions in a reciprocal way, and then fall into habitualized roles vis-à-vis one another. It isn’t until third parties observe this routine interaction that routines gain an institutional aura of objectivity and inevitability: “Since [the third parties] had no part in shaping it, it confronts them as a given reality that, like nature, is opaque” (1967: 59). Again, we see the importance of “taken-for-grantedness” as a characteristic of institutions.

The idea that institutions *emerge* suggests they are not static: Institutions emerge and erode and re-emerge, if only slowly. This informs our understanding of organizational and institutional journalism in an unpredictable environment. Independent online operations (like blogs) that gain popularity and legitimacy may take on organizational attributes, as well as growth in size and revenue, and may then produce less personal, more formalized news (Lowrey, Parrott & Meade 2011). Huffington Post, Bleacher Report and Politico.com are examples. Also, best practices for starting new journalism ventures emerge, spread, and may eventually routinize and institutionalize, with later entrepreneurs – as Berger and Luckmann’s “third parties” – perceiving these practices as a given, objective reality (Lowrey 2012, 2015). From this perspective, future taken-for-granted practices are breeding now, and the field’s new ventures are currently being imprinted with tomorrow’s anachronisms.

1.2 News and higher-order institutions

In searching for explanations for routinization and homogeneity, journalism scholars continued to “broaden their analytical locus” to the wider institutional environment (Zelizer 2004: 70). Political economists and political communication researchers (e.g., Golding & Murdock 2005; Hardy 2010) have always been at home on the institutional level, and this literature offered new approaches. Political economy scholarship focuses on the interplay between economic organization and political and social life, and its impact “on the range and diversity of public cultural expression, and on its availability to different social groups”. From this viewpoint, news producers have the agency to choose, but choices are restricted within “limits set by wider structures” (Golding & Murdock 2005: 62).

Political communication scholars have prioritized the institutional level, finding that official sources lend legitimacy to stories (McLeod & Hertog 1999), use of official sources saves reporters’ time, and straying from official sources jeopardizes the journalist–official relationship (Hickerson, Moy & Dunsmore 2011). A primary interest in political communication scholarship is the relationship between institutional/official control and journalistic autonomy. Conflict among the elite is a common explanation for varying autonomy. Bennett’s indexing hypothesis predicts

that disagreement among elites will correspond with greater diversity of viewpoints, though “news coverage will fall more or less within the contours of their disagreement” (Lawrence 2012). According to Entman’s (2008, 2003) cascading network activation model, journalists, elites, and publics unify behind a common interpretation when the facts of an event are culturally consonant; however, conflict is likely when multiple interpretations of an issue resonate culturally. Scholars examining community “structural pluralism” have found that in pluralistic communities with more institutions, power is diffuse, news is more diverse, and journalists are more likely to “watchdog” the powerful (e.g., Dunwoody & Griffin 1999; Tichenor, Donohue & Olien 1980).

What influence is our pluralistic, digital, social-media environment having on journalists’ institutionalized practices? Are source selection and news content becoming more varied and egalitarian, and are journalism’s traditional relationships and practices eroding? Research findings are mixed. According to recent studies of news in a social media context, sourcing is more diverse during politically contentious events such as protests (e.g., Bastos, Raimundo & Travitzki 2013; Hermida, Lewis & Zamith 2014; Meraz & Papacharissi 2013). Also, during political unrest, individual journalists from news outlets make greater use of non-elite sources (Hermida, Lewis & Zamith 2014; Harlow & Johnson 2011), and politically active individuals serve as key gatekeepers (Bastos, Raimundo & Travitzki 2013). However, during relatively stable times, mainstream media have continued to adopt institutional controls over the gatekeeping of information (Coddington & Holton 2014; Sherwood & Nicholson 2013), and at the organizational level, traditional news outlets have continued to rely, uncritically, on official sources (Knight 2012; Livingston & Bennett 2003). Some research finds that user-generated content is rarely used, journalists follow traditional/mainstream norms and routines, and audiences lack interest in participatory journalism (e.g., Ali & Fahmy 2013; Karlsson et al. 2015). Some change is evident, but it is not at all clear that the digital era is post-institutional.

2 News and collective fields

2.1 New institutionalism

Persistence of journalistic routines in the face of digital disruption is consistent with “new institutional theory”. The new institutional approach assumes that under certain conditions, organizations will pursue public legitimacy via accord with their wider institutional environment (e.g., government, big business) more than they will instrumentally analyze changes in their immediate environments and optimize their behavior. In recent years, a handful of journalism scholars have adopted this approach to explain routinization, homogeneity, and stasis in the news

industry (Cook 2005; Kaplan 2006; Lowrey 2011, 2012; Ryfe 2006; Sparrow 1999). According to this perspective, if similar news routines are found across news organizations, then logically, the explanation must lie at a higher-order institutional level. Organizations exist within a common field, and so they respond similarly to wider governmental and political institutions. Scholars take different perspectives on the strength of the field's boundaries and the degree of journalistic autonomy relative to institutional environments. For Kaplan (2006), the news media are minimally autonomous, "thoroughly embedded in political culture (Ryfe 2006: 139). Alternatively, for Cook, the news is a "coproduction of sources [usually officials] and journalists", and officials must "anticipate the needs of the news in designing what they will say and do" (Cook 2005: 114).

New institutional theory takes varying forms across a number of scholarly disciplines, including political science, organization studies, and economics. The approach has roots in Max Weber's observations about the importance of legitimacy for social control, as well as neo-Weberian findings that organizational actors behave with limited, or bounded, rationality. They follow well-worn paths, take cognitive shortcuts (MacCrimmon & Taylor 1976), follow prevailing models or mimic other organizations (Mintzberg & Waters 1985), and they settle for "good enough" decisions and after-the-fact rationalizations (March & Simon 1958; Weick 1976). The new institutional approach suggests that, contrary to rational-choice assumptions, organizational actors often fall in line with their field's legitimated, safe, institutionalized structures and processes, even when they face disruptive environments. They may not respond to disruption by seeking information, pursuing cost-benefit calculus, and responding instrumentally. Immediate external pressures are buffered from organizational decisions, allowing organizational actors to maintain a preferred, legitimated public image. Behavior may be more ceremonial than instrumentally functional (Meyer & Rowan 1977).

To explain this less-than-rational behavior, new institutionalists point to latent functions that institutional organizations serve for other institutions and for society. Schools are an example: Though schools' overt function is to educate, they also provide a conventional, widely agreed-upon means for stratifying society. This latent purpose is not dependent on teaching quality, which helps explain lack of rigor in monitoring teachers (Meyer, Scott & Deal 1983). Journalism in a democracy serves latent functions of its own. Without an institution that informs citizens about public issues, decisions, and events, the idea that a nation is a democracy cannot be taken seriously, at least from the perspective of "information-based citizenship", which has become a dominant perspective (there are others) (Schudson 1998). Ultimately, the institution must exist, regardless of the quality of its performance (Lowrey 2009). Alexander (1981) proposed journalism's latent function as the legitimating of a wide range of normative perspectives, thereby giving an unpredictable democratic society the flexibility needed to accommodate change and pluralism.

There are a number of common conceptual components in new institutional research, including isomorphism, loose coupling (or decoupling), and path dependence, each of which is consistent with the idea of a “field” of entities that “in the aggregate, constitute a recognized area of institutional life” (DiMaggio & Powell 1983: 148). These are detailed below.

2.2 Isomorphism

Scholars debate the key causes of isomorphism, the process by which organizations or other social entities become similar to one another over time. Two motivations are commonly cited: 1. Organizations seek optimal fit with a common field for the sake of efficiency, and 2. Organizations mirror dominant practices and forms within a common field to avoid charges of negligence and gain public legitimacy (Boxenbaum & Jonsson 2008). The first suggests cost-benefit calculus, and instrumental response. The second – “institutional isomorphism” – assumes conformity to societal expectations in order to achieve legitimacy. Legitimacy, in turn, “is fundamentally homogenizing, producing herd-like conformity” (Deephouse & Suchman 2008: 61). Institutional isomorphism takes three forms: 1. normative isomorphism, which derives from transfer of knowledge among fellow professionals (e.g., at conventions, via job transfers); 2. mimetic isomorphism, which derives from mimicry of similar organizations; and 3. coercive isomorphism, resulting from government or corporate policies (DiMaggio & Powell 1983).

A handful of studies have examined mimetic isomorphism in journalism, finding evidence that it corresponds with efforts to increase legitimacy. Isomorphic mimicry has been found in newspaper–TV partnerships (Lowrey & Woo 2010), the practices and forms among emerging media forms (Lowrey 2012, 2015), the choice of photos in the Trayvon Martin story (McLemore 2015), and the use of QR codes (Roberts & Saint 2015).

2.3 Loose coupling

Loose coupling, or decoupling, allows an organization to achieve institutional accord and legitimacy by enacting superficial action or change while continuing to pursue core practices. Loose coupling may be adopted in response to a challenging environment (e.g., market or government pressure) when a core practice is inconsistent with political-economic needs, but is socially legitimated (e.g., investigative news). It may also be adopted in the case of dueling institutional environments, such as the desire to be seen as in accord with digital progressives while still maintaining traditional journalistic norms (Lowrey 2012, 2015). Loosely coupled systems tend to avoid or control scrutiny and evaluation (Boxenbaum & Jonsson 2008).

In the journalism literature, Tweissi et al. (2015) found a gap between Jordanian journalists' professionalism standards and news institutions' applications of those standards. A perceived solution was to decouple editorial practice from ownership. Lowrey and Erzikova (2010) found that local Russian news outlets, which still embraced a (partly) legitimated Western journalism logic, conducted superficial news investigations even as they accepted local government subsidies.

2.4 Path dependence

A tenet of institutional theory is that decisions made early on in a process govern the path of later choices and events, as investments in this process accrue. Processes become taken-for-granted, and change becomes unimaginable. Paul Starr discusses path dependence in media history:

Initial choices in design ... develop into more elaborate systems as individuals and firms pursue complementary innovations. Things that work satisfactorily come to be thought of as right: Laws, methods and systems that appear to be successful become the basis of standards, often gradually appearing to be natural and inevitable, as if there could be no other way. (Starr 2004: 5).

Both Ryfe and Kimmelmeier (2011) and Vos (2013) argue for careful tracing of the timing and sequence of historical events in the study of journalism, as the course of previous events narrows possibilities for future decisions. According to Örnebring, journalists' roles and routines emerge and persist in response to "historical inertia": The "'reporter' ideal remains strong in Britain, whereas Germany has a more 'editorial' journalistic ideal" (2013: 404).

Consistent with the idea of path dependence, organizational scholars conceptualize routines as DNA "code", passed down from organization to organization, as employees leave and start new ventures, and companies merge with others. In this view, routines not only shape present decisions, but they become institutionalized and shape future decisions, even across different organizations (Aldrich & Ruef 2007; Baum & Singh 1994).

3 Meso-level institutional approaches

The notion that journalists inhabit a bounded collective space has gained traction. This may be a field, order, sphere, jurisdictional area, or population that allows journalists to develop a shared logic, to maintain some measure of independence, and to negotiate boundaries. Within such a space, journalists and their organizations are still influenced by external factors and forces, and they seek accord with society's other dominant institutions. But they also have agency and can

enact change. They have autonomy to reposition themselves, and to reach shared agreement and meaning about acceptable ways forward (Fligstein & McAdam 2012). A meso-level collective tends toward an “internal homogeneity” that “cannot be understood by looking only at external factors” (Bourdieu 1998: 39). It “refracts, much like a prism, external determinants in terms of its own logic” (Johnson 1993: 14), and it mediates “macro-level forces on the behavior of individual journalists” (Ryfe 2006: 138).

The idea that journalists have both structure and agency within a collective, bounded space is not new. Alexander (1981) saw journalists as inhabiting a fairly autonomous space within which they legitimated a normative spectrum for a volatile society. He also said journalists may be pushed beyond their boundaries into less familiar areas, which suggests a systemic model with multiple collective spaces – consistent with other meso-level institutional approaches, discussed below. These approaches derive from sociology but each makes inroads into, and holds promise for, journalism scholarship. Collectives in each approach have an internal logic that shapes the impact of external forces. With a partly buffered internal logic, there are tendencies toward isomorphism, loose coupling and path dependence; however, there are also the possibilities of agency, repositioning, change, and difference, all of which are increasingly important in a digital era.

3.1 Institutional logics

The institutional logics approach is a theoretical response to a concern that institutional scholarship has over-emphasized stability and homogeneity and lost sight of agency and diversity (Greenwood et al. 2008). Plurality is central to the institutional logics approach, which embraces the idea of multiple institutions or “institutional orders”. Examples of orders include the state, religion, the market, but also occupational fields such as journalism. Each order possesses an institutional logic: a “socially constructed, historical pattern of cultural symbols and material practices ... by which individuals and organizations provide meaning to their daily activity, organize time and space, and reproduce their lives and experiences” (Thornton, Ocasio & Lounsbury 2012: 2). In short, institutional logics serve as sense-making frameworks for daily activity.

The institutional logics perspective accounts for both agency and structure, and therefore accounts for change in an institutional context (Reay & Hinings 2005). Turbulence in the environment can result in conflict across institutional orders, encouraging individuals and organizations within these orders to shift logics. This creates ambiguity and uncertainty for agents, who need their practices, assumptions, values, and beliefs to be grounded in some widely legitimated institutional order. It also creates opportunity for agency. Hughes discusses modern Mexico as an example, in which conflicting institutional logics opened up avenues for journalists as “change agents” (2006: 19) to practice civic journalism within a tradi-

tionally authoritarian environment. Such changes are negotiated by journalists and managers as they try to make sense of wider conflict and change (Thornton, Ocasio & Lounsbury 2012). While stability and isomorphism tend to re-emerge, this is not inevitable (Greenwood et al. 2008; Reay & Hinings 2005).

However, loose coupling rather than actual change may result from these institution-level clashes. For example, in journalism, managers may deal with clashing traditional logic and digital logics by making only skin-deep changes: Efforts to track online audiences may shape conversations in meetings, but then have a limited impact on daily decision-making (Lowrey & Woo 2010).

3.2 System of Professions

Andrew Abbott's System of Professions approach incorporates both structure and agency in the analysis of professional institutions. Within this approach, professionals inhabit meso-level "jurisdictional" spaces, and while they are shaped by these spaces, they also struggle to adapt to external environments. A profession such as journalism changes not only because it is shaped by external constraints and changes, but because decision-makers within journalism's professional jurisdiction negotiate these exogenous factors and reposition in the face of them.

According to Abbott, the links between tasks to be performed on behalf of others and the professions that claim these tasks ("jurisdictional claims", 1988: 2) are pressured, reshaped, strengthened and sometimes broken by both "objective" qualities of the environment and "subjective" qualities of the professional process. Objective qualities are external to the profession. They include changes in technology, market fluctuation, characteristics of the community, government regulations, and encroachment efforts by rival occupations. Subjective qualities are internal to the profession, and they reflect the internal logic of the profession's claim of jurisdiction. Examples include the ways occupations define problems and client needs, and claims of efficacy of solutions. In the face of objective changes, occupational members may adjust subjective qualities in order to maintain jurisdiction over areas of work (Abbott 1988; Adams 2007; Kellogg 2014; Lowrey 2006; van Dalen 2012).

Abbott's jurisdictional approach has been used with some frequency by journalism scholars in recent years to explore boundaries of journalistic autonomy in challenging political and economic climates across a wide variety of national contexts (e.g., Morieson 2012; Erzikova & Lowrey 2010; Sjovaag 2013). Waisbord's definition of professional journalism is consistent with this systems approach: "the ability of journalism to define boundaries in relation to other professions and social fields, and to the strategies, practices and norms used to define those boundaries" (p. 222). Scholars have also applied the systems approach to journalism's response to the challenges of emerging media (e.g., Lewis & Usher 2016; Lowrey 2006).

3.3 Field theory

Within Bourdieu's "field", individuals have agency but are constrained by the "habitus" or "rules of the game" to which they have been socialized throughout their life trajectories. The "habitus," or "set of dispositions which generates practices and perceptions" (Johnson 1993: 5), accounts for similarity in the decisions and practices of individuals within the same field. Agents also alter structural conditions, even as these altered structural conditions – new normative environments, new distribution of resources, and new power arrangements – shape and reshape agents. As with the other institutional approaches, it is not assumed that individuals always calculate costs and benefits and seek to optimize, though they certainly can, depending on context. Rather, individuals' reality is "relational", and they position and reposition with an eye on their environment, seeking to appear proper, legitimate, and non-negligent, guided by a second sense of conditions to which they have been socialized (Benson & Neveu 2005; Johnson 1993).

Fields themselves are comparatively stable, but they can be reshaped by the relative positions of agents and organizations within them, as individuals reposition themselves to gain cultural and economic capital, and to adapt to external changes. External changes are "refracted" at the field's boundaries, as the logic of the field constitutes "an internal law through which the law of external necessities ... is constantly exerted" (Johnson 1993: 6). Bourdieu (2005) defined journalism as a relatively weak field, caught between the external forces of politics and the market. Still, journalism obeys "its own laws, its own nomos" (Bourdieu 2005: 32) and possesses some autonomy. Bourdieu's landscape of multiple, malleable, overlapping, and constraining fields lends itself to explanation of journalistic change amid both disruptive environments and restrictive institutional orders. Accordingly, journalism scholars have used field theory to explain shifts in journalistic practices, norms, and discourse (e.g., Helmueller, Vos & Poepsel 2013; Moller Hartley 2013; Wahl-Jorgensen 2013). Benson (2013) altered and further specified Bourdieu's field into three components: *position*, or the relationship to external logics in the "broader field of power", mainly market and civic (nonmarket); and two components internal to the journalism field – the internal *logic*, or the field's historical trajectories and the way the field internally "refracts" its societal position; and *structure*, or class hierarchies that shape relations between journalists and sources, and between and within news organizations. Through this nuanced approach, Benson seeks "new ways of thinking about journalistic practices as they relate to diverse democratic aspirations", which could change "the rules of the game" (p. 213).

In addition to these three, other meso-level collective approaches have made their way into the literature. Population ecology (Lowrey 2012) helps explain the emergence and institutionalization of media entities over time, as they coalesce into "populations" of similar entities with similar practices that seek endogenous and exogenous legitimacy. The "repertoires" approach assumes social groups collect common repertoires or "tool kits" of behaviors, which are "both enabling and

constraining” (Silber 2003: 431). Repertoires can be switched in order to reposition for changing environments.

4 Are we now post-institutional?

Scholarship exploring journalism’s digital network context has questioned the relevance of institutionalized journalism as an idea. In an era in which all individuals can easily produce and share commentary and information, with unlimited space to do so, do the old socially constructed and institutionalized definitions of news matter? According to Actor Network Theory, a strongly instrumental and agency-oriented approach that has gained recent popularity among journalism scholars, higher-order structures such as institutions and organizations are irrelevant, and may even obscure our understanding of social behavior. For ANT theorists, the meaningful phenomenon is the “actor-network”: the process of connection-making, of a network being redefined and “translated” by its actors. Abstract concepts like “power” and “institution” exist and have meaning only through ongoing interaction, negotiation, and translation. Once such interaction ceases or changes, so do these phenomena (Law 1992).

ANT theorists don’t deny the existence of institutions, organizations, or routines as much as they challenge the notion that they have stability or singularity. An organization or a routine is a “punctualized” or black boxed” network within another network, and punctualized networks are precarious. They must be continuously performed by actors in order to have a relevant existence (Law 1992). Recently, ANT has gained a following among researchers who study emerging forms of journalism, largely due to the proposition by ANT scholars that material objects, such as artifacts of digital technology, “act” within networks.

ANT’s unique linkage of agency and structure is helpful, as is its attention to the role of mundane materiality in social life and the need to study it (Kreiss 2015). But ANT scholars have been criticized for ignoring the importance of social construction in the way we conceive of, and attend to, our relevant reality, thereby offering an impoverished view of social behavior (Radder 1992). The agency of material shapes journalists’ norms, but “normativities shape these actions the moment that actors invoke them to justify ... their practices” (Domingo 2015: 72). There’s merit to this critique. Also, socially constructed phenomena such as routines and organizations can live on long after any technical purpose is served (if it was ever served), and long after anyone has instrumentally worked to maintain them (Selznick 1949). As Schudson (2015) and Kreiss (2015) note, what’s most helpful is to examine the conditions within which material objects matter, more or less.

Both the instrumental and the institutional, agency and structure, activity and stability, rational and non-rational, have their place in the study of society. Media sociologists understand this. But too often, questions asked about the structure/

agency dichotomy are purely descriptive: Is journalism a profession of practice or an institution? Is journalism's institutional or professional status eroding? What matters more – hands-on practice and materiality, or institutionalized categories? These questions don't really move us forward. As with the question of the relevance of objects, it's more helpful to ask about underlying mechanisms: Under what conditions are journalism and news production more or less routinized, institutional, or taken for granted? Why, and with what impact? Conversely, under what conditions are journalism and news production more or less instrumental, open to change, transactional, or entrepreneurial? Why and with what impact?

5 Power, institutions and meso-levels

We need to bring in power when discussing institutions and institutional tendencies. Political economy and other neo-Marxist approaches assume the presence of mechanisms that rob human labor of its intrinsic worth, commodify production, and deskill labor, and delimit occupational autonomy, prop up economic and political elites, and blind us to alternative processes and practices. The routinized, path dependent processes of institutions seem consistent with these mechanisms, as routinized behavior based on taken-for-granted premises tends to support the status quo, hold change at bay, and benefit the powerful. However, meso-level collectives – fields, orders, jurisdictions, repertoires – nurture autonomy and allow for negotiation among actors. This space is variably buffered from exogenous influences from the powerful and variably subject to its own endogenous influences. It has its own unique history, its own internal logic and assumptions, imprinted long ago – its own “universe of ... tacit presuppositions”, in the terminology of Bourdieu's field theory (Bourdieu 2005: 37).

This is not to imply that agents within a collective are impervious to outside power. According to Bourdieu, actors strive for economic capital, which is linked to wider markets and is strongly influenced by exogenous power. But journalists do have autonomy to rethink and reposition themselves and their fields in the face of exogenous influences, particularly when such influences are pluralistic and/or not clearly distinct, as noted in political communication literature, and as suggested in Benson's (2013) recent field-level analysis of immigration news. This rethinking and repositioning may reflect innovation born of active cognition at the individual level. Or, it may reflect practices, norms, and historical trajectories that are unique to journalism's meso-level collective, and which challenge the tendencies of the economically and politically powerful. Schudson points to these possibilities, noting that news outlets may maintain a measure of autonomy by educating audiences about the worth of quality journalism, by confronting corporate owners with the journalistic tradition of independent investigation, and by diversifying revenue sources and offerings for audiences: “None of these strategies separately

or together will end the threat that dollars pose to news, but the evidence shows that they have helped, even in recent years, to contain it” (2003: 133).

6 Fearing and nurturing institutions

Three different cognitive levels are relevant to the meso-level collective space. One is the internal cognition of individual actors; a second is social cognition enacted and maintained through shared interaction, which may become routinized. A third is “institutional thinking”. Rarely discussed, this cognition lies at the institutional level, having grown “past the initial difficulties of collective action.” As Douglas puts it: “For better or worse, individuals ... to some extent harmonize their preferences, and they have no other way to make the big decisions except within the scope of institutions they build” (1986: 128). The implication is that we need to do more than fear and check the power of our institutions. Our institutions require rethinking and cultivation:

Preaching against wife battering and child abuse is not more likely to be effective than preaching against alcohol and drug abuse, racism or sexism. Only changing institutions can help. We should address them, not individuals, and address them continuously, not only in crises (Douglas 1986: 126).

Douglas urges attention to our institutions, but she also recognizes that institutional change is inherently difficult. Institutions are taken for granted, and so they persist. They are consonant with an unquestioned view of the world – “the way the planets are fixed” (Douglas 1986: 47). They serve fundamental, often latent, functions for society and other institutions (e.g., Alexander 1981), and in the case of journalism (or other public institutions like schools), they are consistent with the culture of public life (e.g., Carey 1975).

Some who worry about journalism’s ongoing troubles have called for journalists to remake themselves institutionally – to “burn the boats and commit” to sweeping, egalitarian change that would be consistent with the ethic of a new networked, interactive world. But journalists – restless searchlights of the day-to-day, as Lippmann said (1922: 229) – seem unlikely to plan so far ahead. Likewise, meso-level approaches suggest journalists, buffered by their own internal, collective logic, may decouple their decision-making from their disruptive environment. They may choose to follow the planets they understand, and continue doing things as they’ve always done them.

Douglas’ perspective suggests that other institutional entities also play an important role in journalism’s institutional endurance. Government, political parties, the military, sports leagues, religious institutions, the medical profession, etc. – these all account, predict and plan for journalism in its current form, despite journalism’s ongoing troubles. The taken-for-granted, institutional-level “big ideas” of

journalism – that there is a public agenda of news issues, that there is a legitimated system by which leaders convey messages to the public, and that there is a legitimate entity out there with the clout to hold the powerful accountable – these structure public conversation and shape the actions of other institutions, and vice versa.

Despite all of these obstacles to change, change does happen. Institutions are created and sustained by people, who have agency. But institutional-level change does require more than just shared interest in a set of new rules (Douglas 1986). It requires a careful reordering of the way things are “fixed in the sky”, and therefore a new basis for legitimacy.

Digital progressives might argue that such a new order is emerging, one in which enormous amounts of data may be obtained, processed, and shared instantly; anyone may provide these data; and algorithmic analysis shapes or determines news selection. The completeness, scope, speed, density, inclusiveness, and personal interconnectivity afforded by network structures may provide new bases for legitimacy. These “big ideas” stand in contrast to the traditional big ideas of journalism. But whatever ideas emerge and are embraced, to be meaningful and lasting, they must be grounded in “institutional thinking” – i.e. they must be based on exogenous realities, and emerge from meaningful, thorough negotiation with other institutions and within the journalism field (or order, sphere or jurisdiction).

We also need to keep meso-level models in mind: A society’s journalism has a collective structure that refracts rather than merely reflects the culture of public life. This means institutional change will not be seamless. In times of institutional disruption, journalistic practices may be decoupled with external imperatives, allowing only partial conformity to a new institutional order. We see evidence of this today, in the limited ways many news outlets adopt digital online technologies and practices.

Ultimately, however, a society’s journalism will be consistent with its wider culture and also be guided by built-in premises and conventions. This is the way new institutions emerge and develop, and we need to be aware that journalism’s changing field is even now being imprinted with new assumptions, based on new latent functions. Cutting-edge thinking today becomes sacrosanct tomorrow, and then our new institutions will keep doing the big thinking for us.

Further reading

Cook’s (2005) *Governing with the News* and two special journal issues – a 2006 issue of *Political Communication* (Ryfe, ed.) and a 2011 issue of *Journalism Studies* (Ryfe & Orenbring, eds.) – offer helpful overviews of the application of institutional theory to journalism. Ryfe’s (2017) recent *Journalism and the Public* revisits this application and its relationship to Bourdieu’s field theory. More general overviews of institutional theory can be found in Powell and DiMaggio’s foundational edited volume *The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis*, Scott’s *Institutions and Organizations* (2013), and the *SAGE Handbook of Organizational Institutionalism* (2008), which

emphasizes the recent turn toward agency and change in institutional theory. Douglas' *How Institutions Think* (1986) offers a thought-provoking anthropological perspective on the study of institutions. A comparative overview of meso-level field approaches is found in Fligstein and McAdam's (2012) *A Theory of Fields*, while Liu and Emirbayer (2016) provide a broader look, comparing various meso-level spatial approaches in research on both fields and ecologies.

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8 Journalism as Public Sphere

Abstract: This article describes the origins of the concept of the public sphere, and its relationship both to democratic theory and to the normative expectations of liberal pluralist journalism. It then considers the revisions to the concept which have been necessitated by trends in the wider political culture, the political economy of the capitalist media and, most recently and still ongoing, the impact of digital technology and the internet

Keywords: journalism, public sphere, political communication, media, democracy

1 Introduction

The concept of the public sphere is one of the most important and influential in the sociology of media and culture. For the study of journalism in particular, it provides a key framework within which the role of news media are understood and evaluated. If journalism's social and democratic functions are to be realized, the public sphere is where journalistic content is located and, in theory, made accessible to citizens (or publics, who then engage with that content in various ways up to and including the participatory, user-generated content modes of the digital era). This article describes the origins of the concept of the public sphere and its relationship both to democratic theory and to the normative expectations of liberal pluralist journalism (that is, the practice, roles, and functions of journalism characteristic of liberal democratic societies). It then considers revisions to the concept which have been necessitated by trends towards greater public participation in media culture, the political economy of the capitalist media and, most recently and still ongoing, the impact of digital technology and the internet on the capacity for user engagement and interactivity. As we will see, while the public sphere remains a valuable concept for the study of journalism, the ways in which it operates, the manner in which it is used by today's publics, and the forms of content it delivers, have and are being transformed in the 21st century. The article draws on research undertaken by the author and funded by the Australian Research Council (Discovery Project number DP130100705).

2 The concept of the public sphere

It is principally because of his work on the conceptualization of the public sphere that German sociologist Jurgen Habermas has become one of the most cited schol-

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ars in the world. It is difficult to find any scholarly book or article dealing with journalism and related topics such as political communication that does not cite him. Habermas' key work is *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere*, published in German in 1968, and in English for the first time in 1989. Subsequent essays and books by Habermas have refined and revised the concept (1974 (with Lennox & Lennox); 2006), and a vast literature of scholarship has grown up around it.

For Habermas, the public sphere refers in its simplest form to the *communal communicative space* within which a society organizes the distribution and discussion of the information required for deliberative democracy to function; information, that is, about matters of public, political concern, around which public debate and political processes flow, parties rise and fall, and governments win or lose elections. It is the sphere of *publicly accessible knowledge*, usually (but not always) produced in the form of journalism and various kinds of response to journalistic texts such as readers' letters and, in the present day, blogs, tweets, and other forms of online user commentary. The public sphere is a virtual structure, not physically defined by the particular media platforms which give it concrete form such as newspapers, but a cultural imaginary comprising the content of all media which produce this publicly useful information. Newspapers and other media have existed in authoritarian societies, but they do not comprise a public sphere. Only in the presence of empowered publics can we speak of a *public* sphere.

We cannot "see" the public sphere, then, which is typically invoked as a boundary separating forms of information useful to democratic processes from others deemed less so. But virtual or imagined as it is, the functionality and performance of the public sphere has real consequences for and connections with the political and material realities within which our societies exist. For that reason, the various criticisms of the concept set out below, and criticism of how it has been realized in practice, are of more than merely academic interest, but go to the essence of democratic culture.

3 The emergence of the public sphere

Habermas sees the public sphere as emerging alongside bourgeois democracy in the early modern period in Europe. Before then, in the era of feudalism and absolutist monarchy, there were no publics, and no citizens. People were the subjects of their feudal lords, popes, kings, queens, and emperors. There was no right to vote, and no such thing as *public opinion* driving politics. Absolute rulers ruled absolutely, though not of course without constant challenge and conflict. Power and authority were derived from divine ordinance and heredity rather than democratic debate and elections. Wars were frequent and bloody, and there was no concept of "civil society" for use in peaceful conflict resolution. The early media outlets which

existed in those times did not produce critical, scrutinizing journalism as we know it, or participate in public and political debate as champions and enablers of the people, but delivered only what the ruling authority decreed permissible. Dissent from this requirement could lead to imprisonment or death for publishers and authors.

To understand what this pre-democratic world looked like, one can observe contemporary authoritarian states such as North Korea and Saudi Arabia, where dynastic rulers continue to exercise absolute authority over both the people and the media. In these societies, like those of the feudal era, there are prohibitions on any media content which is critical of ruling elites, and of internet and social media platforms which enable ordinary people to communicate with each other in ways that bypass state censors. Some societies, such as Russia and China, show evidence of embryonic public spheres but continually suppress them, as in Hong Kong where dissident journalists and publishers have been attacked, kidnapped and “disappeared” with some regularity. Increasingly however, authoritarian states are unable to maintain the degree of control over media which was possible in the pre-digital age, facing instead what I have characterized elsewhere as a *chaotic* communication environment (McNair 2006, 2016).

The transition to bourgeois democracy which accompanied the rise of capitalism altered the relationship between power, the people and the media fundamentally. With each revolutionary phase (the English, French and American revolutions being key milestones) democracy expanded to encompass more and more of the people as citizens with voting rights (although universal suffrage did not arrive anywhere in the world until the 20th century, and remains elusive for large swathes of the global population). In Europe and north America bourgeois publics emerged, with democratic rights and thus the need for information which allowed them to choose between competing political forces, as well as for a space in which debate and discussion of public affairs could take place, safely and without state censorship. Thus emerged the concept of freedom of ideas and of the press as articulated in the English poet John Milton’s 1644 pamphlet *Aeropagitica*, and the growth of a “coffee house culture” in Europe. This term refers to the network of coffee houses, bars, and salons which developed in the capital cities of Europe and where emerging bourgeois publics would meet to read newspapers and periodicals, discuss their contents, and deliberate on their significance and meaning. This communicative and deliberative practice, integrally linked to the formation of public opinion (where to be “public” is defined by access to citizenship rights) formed a central foundation for the spread of democratic polities thereafter. They can also be viewed as the building blocks of what would become the Habermasian public sphere. As Habermas puts it:

By the public sphere we mean a realm of our social life in which something approaching public opinion can be formed. ... Citizens behave as a public body when they confer in an unrestricted fashion – that is, within the guarantee of freedom of assembly and association and the freedom to express and publish their opinions. (Quoted in Pusey 1978: 89)

Democracy requires these freedoms in order to make political “choice” and pluralism meaningful concepts. We have seen societies which may have multiple political parties, but where only one is ever likely to win power, because there is no public sphere to facilitate objective or fair discussion of the options. Competing claims to power should, in a democracy, be tested as part of the deliberative process leading to electoral contests (Aalberg & Curran 2011; Chambers & Costain 2000; Coleman et al. 2015), and the public sphere is where this discursive work happens. It comprises “the communicative institutions of a society, through which facts and opinions circulate, and by means of which a common stock of knowledge is built up as the basis for collective political action”(McNair 2017: 18).

The key democratic distinction between the feudal political environment and that of liberal capitalism is that where in the former, “the people” confront power as something which stands *over* them and against which they have no civil rights, in the latter, power must come *before* the people and be legitimized *by* them through elections and other modes of collective expression. The role of journalism and the public sphere in making this relationship meaningful are central.

4 Journalism and the public sphere

Journalism has existed as a cultural form for five centuries or so. For much of that time, as noted above, journalists and their publications performed largely administrative and propagandistic functions, communicating news and correspondence deemed important for the pursuit of trade, diplomacy and other spheres reliant on timely and accurate information, but prevented from criticizing absolute rulers and feudal elites. Penalties for dissent were brutal, as they remain in contemporary authoritarian societies such as Saudi Arabia (exemplified by the sentence of 100 lashes given to a young blogger in 2015 who had made some online remarks critical of the Saudi ruling elite).

Change in the role of journalism began with the English Civil War, in which for the first time newspapers and pamphlets took sides as between the reforming roundheads and conservative royalists (Raymond 1996; Conboy 2004). In addition to reporting news, these early newspapers began to engage in political debate, and to scrutinize the performance of political elites. Some journalists supported one side in the partisan struggle, others followed the opposition. Journalists became active participants in political processes, in other words, as opposed to passive reporters of it. Thus began the era of journalism which we today refer to as “the Fourth Estate”, in which journalists have a “watchdog role”, monitoring the exercise of political power on behalf of the people, or public, who make up their readerships – what Habermas terms *critical scrutiny*.

In those days, of course, the democratically empowered public comprised only a small minority of wealthy and educated men, but over time, with successive mile-

stones such as the American War of Independence of 1776, and the French Revolution of 1789, then into the 19th century of steady democratic reform and mass media expansion in the form of cheap, popular newspapers and pamphlets, the composition of the public broadened and became more representative. By the mid-20th century, most capitalist societies, if not all – in the United States some states still excluded black Americans from democratic processes in the 1960s (to this day voting rights are still a political battleground in the US); South Africa deprived its black population of the vote until the 1990s – allowed nearly all adults to vote, and supported numerous journalistic outlets of various kinds. These media – collectively forming the public sphere – targeted different sectors of the population. “Red top” tabloids, for example, such as the UK *Sun*, engaged primarily with the lesser educated working class sectors; broadsheets such as *The Times* spoke to wealthier, more educated readers.

Public service broadcast media developed, serving nations as a whole, alongside commercial audiovisual media. Where corporate media were driven by profit, public service media were financed from taxation and freed from the pursuit of proprietorial interest. All provided journalism at the heart of their schedules, in the public service case ostensibly impartially, while commercial providers had more leeway to express opinions, or editorialize about politics. While there were and remain many criticisms of the commercial media’s capacity and readiness to contribute to the public sphere – proprietorial influence from barons such as Murdoch and Berlusconi, for example, has long been seen to work against the provision of useful information for publics in democracies – it is fair to observe that most commercial media of “quality”, competing in tight markets where the perception of political independence and journalistic reliability are marketable assets, have played their part. The *Washington Post*’s exposure of the Watergate scandal in the 1970s is an exemplary case, as would be the mainstream US media’s coverage of Donald Trump in 2016/17.

With the exception of media legally mandated not to be politically biased – the BBC, for example, and its public service equivalents in other countries (NHK in Japan, ABC in Australia) – journalism performed a number of democratic functions in the context of editorial partisanship of varying degrees. Newspapers informed their readers about politics, and also served as champions or advocates, representing the views of the readers to political elites. Editorials in a UK tabloid such as *The Sun*, for example, would call for action on this or that issue, on the basis that this is what its readers wanted. In doing so, they also pursued a persuasive function, seeking to build support for competing ideological positions. Rupert Murdoch’s *Sun* tended to promote his right-of-centre worldview on political matters such as Britain’s relationship to the European Union. Murdoch’s *Times*, by contrast, while still broadly right-of-centre, adopted a more nuanced line on the EU and other matters. Indeed, in the “Brexit” referendum of June 23 2016 the *Times* advocated “Remain”. Left-of-centre newspapers such as, in the UK context, the

Mirror and the *Guardian*, served correspondingly leftish readers, and editorialized accordingly.

Media took sides, then, as part of their public sphere function. They also sought to hold power to account through critical scrutiny of elite performance and conduct, thus enabling readers to make informed judgments on their electoral options. Unsurprisingly, the editorial biases of the press were reflected in the content and style of this scrutiny, as in their political coverage overall. A *Guardian* reader would thus find the *Sun*'s political journalism to be outrageously tendentious, while the *Sun* readers (and *Sun* journalists) might regard the *Guardian* as "elite liberal" nonsense. The important point to note here is that editorial partisanship coexists with the reportage function of the media, at least in the private sectors of the public sphere. This is consistent with the democratic role of journalism, assuming that the structure of journalistic bias broadly reflects the diversity of viewpoints to be found amongst a population. When it does not, as in the UK during the Thatcher era, the criticism that the public sphere has become dysfunctional is valid. Then, although only about 25% of the British people voted for the Conservatives, only two daily newspapers supported the Labour Party. All the rest backed the Tories or remained neutral (McNair 2009).

The public service media, on the other hand, supported by taxpayers' money, were from their beginnings in the early to mid-20th century required to refrain from editorializing and to concentrate on the work of reportage and analysis of politics. Many commercial broadcast media adopted a similarly "objective" stance, avoiding the overt partisanship of the press and speaking to the public in general. Rupert Murdoch's Sky News, for example, in both the UK and Australia where strong public service media existed, approached politics in most of their content from a non-partisan standpoint. Although they also made space in some of the schedule for opinionated punditry of the type familiar in the press these organizations, and other private providers such as ITV in the UK, sought to avoid identification with one party or another. Fox News in the US, however, where there is no substantial public service media to maintain standards of objectivity, adopted a highly partisan approach to American politics, and nearly always on the Republican side. Fox News was a cheerleader for the successful Donald Trump campaign, as it had been for GOP candidates before him, and a constant critic of the presidency of Barack Obama.

5 Journalism in the public sphere – five functions

To summarize the public sphere role of journalism we can identify five functions (McNair 2000).

Information – required for citizens to make meaningful choices about the political options available to them in a democracy. This incorporates the adversarial

function of critical scrutiny, pursued through such means as investigative journalism, and interviews with politicians conducted by journalists. Critical scrutiny will often generate information which is negative for the political actor in question, by exposing their flaws and failures. This is the “watchdog” role of journalism in action, accessed by publics every day on TV and radio as well as the press in democratic societies. The controversial campaign of Donald Trump for the US presidency included many such interviews, of varying degrees of toughness, which probed his long history of contentious statements about women and other topics. His Democratic rival Hillary Clinton received the same kinds of critical scrutiny, and it is integral to the public sphere role of journalists that they have the freedoms and the resources to carry out that function. One of the most eye-catching aspects of the Trump campaign was his habit of banning media he judged to be critical – such as the *New York Times* and *Slate* – from attending and reporting his campaign events. This attempt to deflect critical scrutiny alarmed many observers as to the likely style of a Trump presidency, and its tolerance (or lack of) for the freedom of the media which is integral to the US Constitution. At his first press conference after winning the election, in January 2017, Trump refused to answer a question from CNN reporter Daniel Acosta, shouting, “you’re fake news” (Acosta had dared to ask a question about the damaging dossier on Trump’s links with Russia then in the news).

Interpretation – required for citizens to make sense of the complex realities around them. Where information can be viewed as the delivery of facts about politics, interpretation tells us what those facts mean, in circumstances where political actors may be using public relations and other techniques to massage their messages and (they hope) manipulate and persuade publics towards support for their policies. In their sense-making role journalists become pundits (“wise men” in Sanskrit), their authority as experts generating audience trust in their interpretations. Journalistic authority has to be worked for, and maintained, and one of the challenges of the public sphere in the digital age is to command the public’s trust in what journalism says. The proliferation of journalistic, or quasi-journalistic outlets in the digital environment, accompanied by exposure of some of the flaws of media outlets traditionally seen as authoritative and reliable – the case of Stephen Glass and the *New Republic* for example, or Jayson Blair and the *New York Times* (the first faked dozens of feature articles; the second plagiarized other journalists’ content) – has generated what some observers describe as a “crisis” of public trust in journalism (see below), and of the concept of objectivity itself. The rise of Donald Trump, and of populist politicians in Europe such as Nigel Farage, has been associated with the onset of “post-factual democracy” – i.e. a public sphere in which truth is highly relative and either contradictory of the known facts, or ignorant of them. This same trend has seen the emergence of a category of “fake news”, deployed by scholars, journalists, politicians (see above), and publics to describe journalistic information which is perceived to be false or fabricated in some way.

Interrogation – this relates to the adversarial or watchdog function of journalism, through which critical scrutiny of power is exercised. When a journalist interviews a politician, or an investigative journalist exposes political corruption, he or she is interrogating power, subjecting it to scrutiny on behalf of the public as a whole. Through the mediating presence of the journalist the politician is held accountable before the people. Clearly, a precondition of the effective performance of this function is that the journalistic media should be free and independent of power, be it governmental, state-based or economic. Journalists in Saudi Arabia or China are not free to scrutinize and interrogate the political elites of those countries, and thus one can state that they can support no public sphere as we are using the term in this article.

The interrogative function of journalism is not conducted without resistance, however, even in the most democratic of societies. Politicians frequently complain about what they perceive to be overly aggressive, or just plain rude journalists who, they say, hinder rather than help the deliberative process. Sometimes political leaders, such as Tony Abbott when prime minister of Australia, “boycott” media organizations which they judge to be “biased” against them – in his case, the public service ABC (Neil Kinnock when leader of the British Labour party boycotted News International titles). The competition between media and political elites is a constant of democratic political culture, and as long as journalists have their rights to report, interrogate, and interpret protected in law, such competition is compatible with a healthy democracy. Without it, indeed, any democratic system would be weakened. Neither the political elite, nor the media tasked with holding it to account, can be free of scrutiny in a democratic system.

Representation – this function demands that the media represent the views of their publics before power, holding elites to account on behalf of the citizenry. This function can be realized through readers’ letters, online comment, and other forms of user-generated content. It may take the form of public access to the media in such modes as talk radio, live studio debates such as those hosted by the BBC’s *Question Time* in the UK, and other events in which political leaders are confronted by citizens, with journalists chairing or facilitating the exchanges. The Australian public participation format, *Q&A*, is promoted to the people who might take part in or simply watch it, as “Democracy in action”. Such formats deliberately symbolize the representative function of the media. As noted below, digitalization has generated new modes of public representation, participation, and interactivity in and with the public sphere and political elites.

Advocacy – finally, as noted above, journalists in the public sphere have a right to take sides in political debates, to be *partisan*. With the important exception of public service media, journalistic organizations are participants in, as well as reporters of the democratic process. Journalists are themselves political actors, with the power to shape public opinion in significant ways. Journalists who engage in this role are known variously as pundits, commentators, columnists. They take

sides in political debates, often quite aggressively (journalists of this type may be described as “controversialists”). The effectiveness of this function relates back to the issue of trust, since only those journalists or outlets which are seen to be authoritative and trustworthy will be able to exercise the influence on which effective advocacy depends. In Australia, the radio presenter Alan Jones is widely perceived as being an important player in this respect, and in the general election campaign of 2016 the incumbent Malcolm Turnbull, who had boycotted Jones’ radio show because of previous criticisms which he (Turnbull) regarded as unacceptable, repaired his relationship with the “shock jock” and appeared on the latter’s show several times (McNair et al. 2017).

With that summary we can visualize the Habermasian public sphere as a centralized, vertically-oriented structure, in which a few media organizations deliver journalism downward to mass publics – audiences of millions have been common for the most popular newspapers and broadcast outlets in democratic capitalist societies through the 20th century and into the 21st. These inform, interpret, represent, and advocate to their various audiences, forming a cultural bridge between the masses and the political elites which govern them, or who compete to do so by campaigning in elections and other democratic activities. The public sphere must be accessible, in the sense that there must be both freedom of speech so that citizens are exposed to diverse viewpoints; accessible too, in that citizens can freely receive content, by purchase or some other mechanism. Public service media, for example, are required to be accessible to all taxpayers, technology allowing. Newspapers have typically been relatively inexpensive commodities, enabling a title such as the UK *Sun* to sell four million copies a day at its circulation peak in the 1980s. Denser, lower circulation titles such as *The Guardian* have typically been more expensive, and periodicals more expensive still, but still sell at prices which allow them to be accessible to all but the very poorest in a society (less than a pint of beer, for example). The ideal public sphere is premised on freedom of access to political media, which implies affordability.

6 The normative critique of the public sphere

The origins of the public sphere in early modern Europe determined its formation as an elitist communicative space. In those days, for example, and indeed until very recently, women were excluded from positions of wealth, influence, and power in capitalist societies. Women were largely excluded, too, from formal education. The rare exception was precisely that – an anomaly in an otherwise clearly male dominated social structure, which we call *patriarchy*. The coffee houses of London and Paris were largely male spaces, as were the pages of newspapers and pamphlets. Politicians, entrepreneurs, and others of influence such as clergy were almost exclusively male.

The early public sphere also reflected the social stratification system in other ways – it was not only male-dominated, but until universal suffrage became a reality in the 20th century, excluded sectors of the population who did not have the right to vote, such as ordinary working people and ethnic minorities. For these reasons, a critical approach to the public sphere emerged after Habermas' work had become well known and influential. This critique noted that if the public sphere was intended as a “communal” communicative space, it did not serve all, or even the majority of a population. It was in fact a *restricted* space, which from the normative perspective had to be expanded to reflect the needs and interests of the people as a whole if it was to genuinely serve the democratic process (Fraser 1990).

7 The political economy of the public sphere

A further criticism of the Habermasian ideal, and one which he himself has frequently made, relates to the fact that most if not all of the media outlets which supply the journalism within it are privately owned and run on commercial lines. Journalism does not serve the public in a purely disinterested way, but in many cases – such as the Murdoch-owned News Corporation – editorial policies and journalistic content are moulded so as to reinforce a particular viewpoint, that of the proprietor. Not all private media are guilty of this flaw, and even News Corporation may permit individual titles and outlets to adopt different ideological stances, but in general we can say that news media organizations are businesses, and journalism is a commodity as well as a public good. This fundamentally restricts its value as a source of information in a deliberative democracy, in so far as private interests come to bear on the public sphere functions of journalism as we have set them out above.

On the other hand, as noted above, the information marketplace is competitive, and users require certain qualities such as reliability, accuracy, and insightfulness in their information. For that reason, which is itself a commercial logic, quality newspapers all over the world present themselves as trustworthy news brands, rather than propaganda outlets for a particular corporation or baron. News Corporation must compete with the BBC and CNN, as well as the *Guardian* and the *Telegraph*. Notwithstanding the possibility of proprietorial bias (and there is a vast literature on this in relation to Rupert Murdoch's empire – see McKnight 2012 for an account of Murdoch's political role), the workings of the media marketplace militate against outlets becoming so tendentious that they no longer have value as “news”.

8 The degradation of the public sphere

A third criticism concerns the influence of public relations and other forms of persuasive communication on the public sphere. Again, Habermas identified this concern, noting that the public sphere was subject to pressure from motivated communicators who wished their messages to penetrate the mass. There is an entire literature devoted to the ethics and impacts of public relations in the economic, military, political, and other spheres (such as celebrity culture) (Davis 2002). This literature frequently argues that public relations distorts the public sphere by filling it with “spin”, leaving publics vulnerable to being deceived or misled by political actors.

Each of the above critical approaches has merit, and much of the media and communication studies literature has adopted them in analyses of the public sphere as a flawed, distorted, restricted space, with limited value as a democratic resource (Blumler & Gurevitch 1995). Recent developments, however, arising from advances in communication technology, have impacted upon the structure and functioning of the public sphere, and in doing so addressed each of the above sets of criticisms, at least in part. We will turn now to tracing these developments and their impact on Habermas’ model.

9 The digitized public sphere

Although the potential for differential decoding of messages, and oppositional readings of journalistic texts – that is, an *active* audience – has always been part of the communicative process, publics are relatively passive in the analogue era of the public sphere, with few opportunities to feedback and contribute content of their own. Until quite recently, indeed, the reader’s letter was the main form in which members of the public could gain access to the media and make political statements. Important as this form of access has been (and remains – newspapers still feature the readers’ letters prominently in their layout), the limitations of space characteristic of news print allowed only a very small number of citizens to gain entry to the public sphere. Editors necessarily selected only the best, in their judgement, based on such criteria as ideological affiliation to the editorial line, the quality of a writer’s prose style, the incisiveness of a reader’s insight on the issues of the day, and so on. Some TV programmes also utilized readers’ letters as a form of audience feedback (and an inexpensive thirty minutes or so of broadcast time).

The development of radio phone-in shows, or “talkback” radio as the Australians call it, provided a further channel for feedback and public participation. Phone-in radio has tended to be the domain of the “shock jock”, however – overtly opinionated, provocative anchors who cultivated angry debate and controversy as a way to boost ratings. TV day-time talk shows have also provided space for publics

to engage in debate about issues of the day, as well as opine on more sensational topics of the type addressed by Jerry Springer and his equivalents.

There have been two key impacts of digital technology on this model. First, has been the dramatic expansion of the size or volume of the public sphere accessible to the average citizen in the average capitalist society. A country such as the UK, as recently as thirty years ago, supported only four broadcast free-to-air TV channels, and four national radio networks (all BBC). The UK had 22 daily and Sunday national newspapers, supplemented by local and regional titles (McNair 2009). The onset of digital TV and radio transformed this environment, making channels such as Sky and CNN more accessible to cable and satellite subscribers.

Then, from the mid-1990s, came the internet, and the explosion of online journalism outlets, including web editions of established analogue news brands (the *Guardian* pioneered online journalism in the UK; the BBC launched iPlayer with access to live streaming of its news and entertainment programming for internet users in the UK – overseas users could access iPlayer content by using a VPN). The online environment also allowed a host of digital start-up journalism sites, from the *Drudge Report* which broke the Clinton-Lewinsky scandal in 1998 to *Slate*, *Huffington Post*, *Gawker* (which was closed by legal action in 2016) and many others. By these means the quantity of information available to the net-enabled citizen in advanced capitalist societies came to surpass that which any individual could possibly consume in a waking day. Where the analogue public sphere was characterized by information scarcity and access to a finite quantity of content from the viewpoint of the individual, the digitized public sphere was, in practical terms, infinite. There was information surplus to a degree unprecedented in human cultural history.

Moreover, much of the information disseminated in the digitized public sphere was free at the point of access. The news commodity of the print era was replaced by freely downloadable content from high quality providers such as the BBC and the *Guardian*. This development ushered in what many refer to as the “crisis of journalism” which has been a feature of the internet age – the crisis of the analogue business model, that is, in which the production of journalistic content was funded by subscription and advertising revenues (a crisis which continues to elude resolution). But it has also had the effect of making a vast sphere of journalistic content accessible to unprecedentedly large publics. Some organizations, notably News Corporation and the *New York Times*, have set up “pay walls” which require subscriptions to enter, but these experiments remain unproven as sustainable business models. Digital advertising revenues are increasing steadily as more and more users move to online platforms for their consumption of journalism, and some outlets – notably those specializing in particular high-value types of information, such as the *Financial Times* and *Bloomberg* – are making profits from subscriptions, but overall, online news media continue to struggle to find sustainable revenue streams. Thus, while there is more journalistic information available to more people

from more sources than at any time in human history – on the face of it, an enhancement of the Habermasian public sphere – the sustainability of “quality” journalistic production in the digital environment is far from certain.

10 The networked public sphere

A second key impact of digitization has been the expanded capacity of users to interact with and participate in the public sphere through social networks and social media. We noted above the limited modes of media feedback available to citizens in the pre-digital age. In the era of the internet and social media, the possibilities for access not only to consumption but to production of information are vastly enhanced. Online news pieces and commentaries may receive hundreds, even thousands of readers’ comments, as opposed to the handful of readers’ letters which a traditional newspaper article might once have attracted. And these comments appear to public view within minutes of an article being posted. Commenters may challenge the journalist’s argument, or praise it. They may engage in debate with other readers, often aggressively. As a result the issue of how to maximize civility in public discourse has become a prominent element of internet ethics debates, as “trolls’ attack “shills” and “haters” vent their anger in the online comments sections now maintained by nearly all journalistic outlets. Political actors, most notoriously Donald Trump, are increasingly using Twitter or other social media platforms to “tell it like it is”, generating controversy and media attention as they do so.

Citizens have the capacity to produce their own podcasts, blogs, and video channels on YouTube. They can tweet to their “followers” on Twitter, and post about politics on Facebook. Surveys by the Reuters Institute, Pew, and others suggest that more and more people, particularly amongst the young, access their news from social media sources such as Facebook Feeds. Through online sharing news and commentary spread virally through social networks, often bypassing the traditional editorial pathways of established public sphere media. For this reason we can refer not only to a *digitized* public sphere in contemporary conditions, but a *networked* sphere. While the “Big”, “legacy”, or just plain “old” media still exist, and indeed will retain their pre-eminence as information sources for at least some time to come, their hierarchical, top-down, industrially-organized mode of information dissemination is being replaced by more complex, horizontally structured networks of users organized around social media and other online platforms. Journalism and journalists are themselves part of these networks, of course, their relationship with what used to be relatively passive consumers of content transformed into one of routine engagement with active, digitally empowered users (or, as Bruns terms them in recognition of their capacity to input into the digitized, networked public sphere with unprecedented ease, *producers* [2008]).

This trend has been disruptive of established media, which continue to seek to adapt to the digital environment. Cohen-Almagor observes that digital technologies have created a “macrosystem of interconnected private and public spheres” (2015: 1), with associated costs and benefits. “The mix of open standards and diverse networks and the growing ubiquity of digital devices makes the Internet a revolutionary force that undermines traditional media, such as newspapers, broadcasting, and telephone systems, and that challenges existing regulatory institutions based on national boundaries” (ibid.). Former *Guardian* Media editor Emily Bell, in a speech to the Reuters Institute in 2014, noted that “we have reached a point of transition where news spaces are no longer owned by newsmakers. The press is no longer in charge of the free press and has lost control of the main conduits through which stories reach audiences. The public sphere is now operated by a small number of private companies, based in Silicon Valley”. This is an exaggeration, to be sure, and many of the big news brands of the analogue era remain powerful in the digital arena (the BBC, CNN, News Corporation, etc.). But Bell is correct to note that the balance of cultural power has shifted away from “legacy” journalism towards a host of new providers, and digitally-enabled global publics who engage and interact with professional journalistic content in ways which traditional gatekeepers and editorial processes struggle to contain.

11 The globalized public sphere

The classic Habermasian model of the public sphere necessarily focused on the nation state. Newspapers and broadcast media have until recently served national and local publics, situated within the geographical territory of the state. Where newspapers and broadcast journalism were exported overseas, it was in a temporally limited form. Copies of the *Wall Street Journal*, for example, might be available in Paris one week after publication in New York. Copies of the UK *Sun* and *Mail* would be on sale to British tourists in Spanish holiday resorts a day or more after publication in the UK, delivered by air across the English Channel.

Broadcast media, too, were largely confined within the national networks made possible by analogue technology. Reception of BBC news would be available only within the United Kingdom, and also the Republic of Ireland because of its proximity across the Irish Sea. The same was true of national broadcast networks in every country. Early live transmissions by satellite allowed some rare events to have an extraterritorial audience – Olympic Games, for example, or royal coronations and weddings. Only with the arrival of Cable Network News in 1980, however, did broadcast journalism begin to be routinely transnational in its reach. The growing capacity of satellite technology to cross national borders enabled the possibility of real time transnational news services such as Sky News, Al Jazeera, and BBC World. Now, the provision of access to news services could reach beyond the physi-

cal location of their production base, be that in Dallas (CNN), London (Sky News, BBC World), or Qatar (Al Jazeera).

The arrival of digital technology and the massification of the internet in the late 1990s intensified this trend, and made it possible to speak for the first time of truly *global* media, and a *globalized* public sphere within which boundaries of space and time cease to be constraints on the delivery of content. Cable and satellite technology allowed for the emergence of transnational 24-hour or real time news channels from the 1990s. A brand such as CNN would have a US version of its service, tailored to that particular environment, and a European service. BBC World and Sky would have similarly editionized services, available within set satellite footprints in Asia, or Europe, or Africa. With the internet, however, all online content, no matter where it was produced or for whom, became available to everyone, anywhere on the planet with a networked device. Thus this author, resident in Australia as of this writing, could read at his convenience *The Scotsman*, the *Guardian*, the *Times* and any other publication produced in the UK, or indeed any other country, alongside the local Australian media. Several global news brands – the UK *Mail*, *Huffington Post* and *Guardian*, for example – editionized for the Australian market, but one could just as easily go to the US or UK editions of these titles, accessing the political agendas and debates of those countries in precisely the same way as local residents would. In this way, billions of internet users across the world are literally plugged into a globalized public sphere (or *GPS*) of a depth and diversity which could never have been imagined in the analogue era.

Many of the political issues raised as matters of news coverage and debate in this GPS are global in character – that is, they are global problems which require global solutions, such as anthropogenic climate change, Islamic jihad, and internet security. The latter issue arises from the fact that the internet is uniquely hard to control or censor, and some of the information disseminated around the world has challenged the authority of both democratic and authoritarian states. WikiLeaks and Edward Snowden have exposed secret information affecting the big western powers – most notoriously in recent times, WikiLeaks' release of hacked Democratic National Party emails believed by many to have come from Russian sources, and then to have influenced the 2016 election in favour of Donald Trump – while the Committee for Investigative Journalism has, through global stories such as the Panama Papers, exposed corruption in Russia, China, and other states hitherto governed by secrecy. The Panama Papers also forced the resignation of a senior Icelandic politician, and severely embarrassed then-UK prime minister David Cameron. Elements of the internet have been “banned” in Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Russia, and other countries where the free flow of information it allows has been deemed to threaten local elites.

From the point of the view of the globalized public sphere as an agent of democratic development and change, such strategies have had limited success. The 700 million Chinese internet users, for example, despite the Party's efforts to

control them, find access to external sources of news and journalism relatively easy. Which is not to say that states do not and will not continue to seek to impose limits on the internet and the GPS it enables. Some in both democratic and authoritarian governments would greatly prefer a less open system of global communication, and the future of internet governance and regulation has become a genuinely global topic, pursued by global publics by means of their access to, and capacity for participation in global media.

12 The postmodern public sphere

A further, and final dimension of evolution in the structure and functioning of the public sphere relates to its form and content. The foundation of the public sphere, as we have seen, is the cultural form we have called for four centuries and more *journalism*. Journalism reports (informs), analyses and makes sense of complex reality (interprets), interrogates power, comments on and participates in public debate (advocates), and “speaks” for the citizenry before power (represents). It does so in the form of “straight” news and analysis, investigative journalism, commentary (punditry), and editorial. Its political subject matter is understood to be the stuff of public affairs – traditionally focused on formal politics, economic policy, foreign affairs, and international conflict; important matters around which political actors compete for the right to govern and make decisions affecting the citizenry as a whole. Given the historically patriarchal nature of liberal democratic polities, the journalism which mediates it in the public sphere has also been produced within a patriarchal context. Men still dominate political journalism in most capitalist societies, especially at the more senior levels of the profession. The public sphere, as we noted above is, even in these post-feminist times, largely populated by what are sometimes caricatured as “middle-aged white men in suits”, who define their subject matter as serious and worthy, and oppose it to the dumbed down, trash culture found in some other forms of journalism, such as celebrity, lifestyle, and human interest coverage. This public sphere is defined, then, both by its focus on a certain type of content, and its coverage through a certain set of formal journalistic genres, and by terms such as “hard news” (often favourably contrasted with “soft news” in this context).

These binaries and expectations have increasingly been challenged, however (Temple 2006; McNair et al. 2017). On the one hand, the definition of what counts as “political” has expanded, under the influence of feminist and other formerly marginal discourses, to include topics which were once excluded from the public sphere. The personal is now accepted as being political, and issues such as same sex marriage, domestic violence, and abortion rights have become prominent within the policy debates of many democratic societies. The range of what is seen as political, and therefore the appropriate province of the public sphere, has expand-

ed as a direct consequence of the campaigns and interventions of social movements and identity-based groups which often straddle party political boundaries.

And the number of modes by which these issues are presented within the public sphere has expanded also, incorporating genres which frequently diverge from journalism as narrowly defined. The day-time talk show, discussing domestic violence before a studio full of women, to a national audience of those interested in the issue, can be regarded as part of an *expanded public sphere*. Its deliberations may well impact on the political sphere – as the domestic violence debate has in Australia, the UK, and other societies in recent times. At another level – and hence my use of the term “postmodern” here (see Brants and Voltmer (eds.) 2011 on the postmodern public sphere) – these and other formats blur the boundaries of journalism and not-journalism, creating hybrid forms which may be both entertaining and informative as they engage with previously marginalized issues, before previously marginalized sections of the public. The unfolding global scandal of child sexual abuse within the churches and other institutions has been similarly mediated within the globalized public sphere – made the subject of day-time talk shows and self-help columns as well as “hard” investigative journalism of the type depicted in the Oscar-winning film *Spotlight* (McCarthy 2015).

As the personal has been politicised, so the private has become increasingly the legitimate subject of the public sphere. In Australia, the public service ABC in 2012 developed a programme called *Kitchen Cabinet*, in which senior politicians were interviewed in their domestic environments, over food and drink, about their personal motivations and histories. Capturing the global trend for reality-style cooking shows (such as *Masterchef*), presenter Annabel Crabb set out to cover aspects of the political which normatively approved journalistic formats rarely address (and when they do, usually in the context of political scandals). *Kitchen Cabinet* was a hybrid form, deliberately “human interest”, unashamedly “infotainment” as well as informative; an interview-based format, but not adversarial; about politicians and what makes them tick, rather than the policies they are advocating; and incorporating the domestic environment in its treatment of politicians rarely seen in public without a prepared speech and a spin doctor to keep them “on message”. The programme has been highly successful in ratings terms, and also well-reviewed in Australia, even by those “middle-aged white men in suits” who dominate the public sphere as more conventionally defined (McNair et al. 2017).

Other hybrid political media formats in the Australian context include *The Project*, which mixes light entertainment and satire about politicians with “serious” political coverage, in a blend which seeks to engage younger audiences in particular – relatively disengaged from the political process as they are assumed to be, in Australia as elsewhere. In the United States *Saturday Night Live* mercilessly satirized Donald Trump, as did Jon Stewart’s *Daily Show*, which ran from 1999 to 2015 and combined political satire with journalism and political interviews. Such formats can all be regarded as part of the expanded, postmodern public sphere of the 21st century.

13 Conclusion

The concept of the public sphere remains a valuable tool for analysing the political communication system in the digital age. Habermas' original notion of a communal communicative space remains applicable to the networked, globalized, public sphere of the digital era. This system is indeed closer to the Habermasian ideal in many respects than was the pre-digital public sphere of centralized, top-down media platforms addressing largely passive mass audiences with information to which the latter could not easily respond to or interact (although they could and did disagree). The emerging public sphere is accessible, information rich, diverse, and decentralized to a degree unknown in the analogue era. There is more information available to more people, in more places around the world, than ever before, and they can do more with it, including contribute directly to the public debate through digital channels such as online comments and social media.

In this respect the public sphere has expanded. It has expanded too, in the range of content forms which it includes. Journalists are joined by content-generating users on Twitter, Facebook, blogs, and online reader commentaries, making public citizens' responses to what journalists write. Traditional definitions of political journalism have also been tested, as hybrid forms – often condemned in the literature as dumbed down infotainment – have emerged. In Australia, formats such as *Kitchen Cabinet* combine elements of the global fashion for cooking-based reality TV shows in order to cover the more personal, private aspects of the political actors which are its subjects.

Journalism remains at the core of the public sphere, however, acting as sense-maker of complex reality, advocate for and representative of the people, scrutineer of the powerful. Journalism's role in this regard requires that journalists retain their authority as sources of information and analysis. And as of this writing, the majority of people still trusted the mainstream journalistic media, and used it as their main news source (Newman, Levy & Nielsen 2015). Research also shows a shift away from legacy media, particularly amongst younger demographics, and it seems likely that generational transition will continue that trend. As it does so, politicians such as President Trump increasingly communicate and govern online, bypassing the more traditional sectors of the public sphere. Digital and social media are now part of the mainstream, interlocked with it, and increasingly, media organizations and journalists understand this. Concerns about the future capacity of digitized cultures to sustain quality journalism are real, however, and the challenges are many. The public demand for journalism has never been higher. It remains unclear who will pay for it going forward, and how.

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Carolyn Kitch

9 Journalism as Memory

Abstract: This chapter considers journalism as an agent and a product of public memory – a social understanding of history that is communicated among members of a community united by identity or experience. After surveying the theoretical and disciplinary emergence of academic research on news and memory, it offers a series of definitions of journalism that illuminate the symbiotic relationship between journalism and memory. This discussion explores how historical consciousness and references to the past serve the needs of journalism, and in turn how journalism serves broader societal needs for shared memory, identity, and history. The essay closes with a consideration of how these definitions may be impacted by new technologies and with a call for greater convergence of memory theory and journalism theory.

Keywords: memory, journalism, commemoration, narrative, witnessing, history, remediation

This chapter considers journalism as a constructor and a product of public memory – a social understanding of history that is communicated among members of a community united by identity or experience. It assesses how journalism functions as an active agent in historical documentation, in social and political change, and in debates about national and transnational identities. It also explores the ways in which news organizations use references to history in order to make sense of disturbing events and to affirm their own corporate status in the 21st century. This essay, like memory itself, is about the present more than the past: it is an exploration not of journalism history but of historical consciousness in journalism.

The chapter begins with an overview of the theoretical and disciplinary emergence of academic research on news and memory, along with a brief discussion of terminology. The next two sections offer a series of definitions of journalism through which we might understand aspects of the symbiotic relationship between journalism and memory. The final section discusses some current trends in both journalistic and academic work that may suggest future directions for scholarship.

1 Theoretical premises, themes, and terms

Whether geographic, familial, or “imagined” (Anderson 1983), a “mnemonic community” (Zerubavel 1996) interprets its present based on shared beliefs about its past. Those beliefs are communicated and enacted over time through narrative and

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ritual. While this general idea was advanced more than a century ago by sociologist Emile Durkheim ([1915] 1973), his student Maurice Halbwachs (1950) more often is credited with defining “collective memory”. In their collection of key texts, *The Collective Memory Reader*, Jeffrey Olick, Vered Vinitzky-Seroussi, and Daniel Levy (2011) make the point that there were many possible “fathers” of memory studies among 19th- and early 20th-century thinkers. Nevertheless, in just a handful of essays, Halbwachs articulated definitions of social memory that remain especially useful to scholars today.

Social memory’s central premise – that our understandings of the past are constructed through social interaction – was reinforced by mid-20th-century developments in sociology and social history, as scholars grappled with global events of the modern world. The circumstances and consequences of the World Wars produced calls not only for deeper understandings of social and political identity but also for a new kind of historical thinking. Yet the word “memory” was not widely used in academic work until the 1980s and 1990s, when the growing field of Holocaust studies reinvigorated interest in memory and when cultural-studies scholars began to apply Halbwachs’s ideas to new concerns such as globalization, postmodernity, and the heritage industries (for a fuller explanation of this “memory boom”, see Huyssen 2003).

Since its emergence as a significant area of scholarship some three decades ago, this type of inquiry has spread rapidly across disciplines. Initially based in sociology, memory studies now occur in fields ranging from art history and performance studies to cultural geography and urban planning. Some critics claim that this broad conceptual embrace of memory has diluted the term’s meaning and that the field has become a loosely organized enterprise without a center. An alternative view is that the factor of memory, once a seemingly novel concept of phenomenology, has become widely accepted as an important theme of research across disciplines. Astrid Erll takes this more optimistic stance, writing that “the most promising and challenging fact about memory studies is that it is developing steadily into a true convergence field. Memory research has not only inspired new alliances between the humanities, social, sciences, and natural sciences. Slowly but palpably, it is also bringing together the knowledge and approaches of scholars from very different parts of the world” (2011a: 175).

As Erll and others have noted, mediation is essential to the formation and communication of memory, and since the early 1990s, memory has steadily attracted the interest of researchers in media and communication studies (for a summary, see Hume 2010). While much of that work has focused on film and popular culture, a growing subfield of interdisciplinary and increasingly international research has more closely investigated the distinct functions of journalism in the creation and cultivation of ideas about the past. That scholarship tends to share several assumptions stemming from Halbwachs’s original premises. One is that there can be no shared memory without language (communication), and therefore that communi-

cation researchers have much to contribute to memory studies. Another is that memories take the mental shape of narratives. Whether or not explicitly about memory, a large body of cultural research on journalism has explored the narrative nature of news (for instance, Bird & Dardenne 1997; Carey 1989; Eason 1981; Fisher 1985) and the routine recurrence of such structural frameworks, a practice historian and former *New York Times* journalist Robert Darnton described as “making cookies from an antique cookie-cutter” (1975: 189). Memory scholars have built on this premise, tracing the repetition and reinforcement of those journalistic narratives over time.

A third common assumption is that social memory is closely related, theoretically and logistically, to social identity, and that shared memory is an expression of shared identity. Therefore, much scholarship on journalism and memory has considered the role of news media in constructing various types of social identity. That identity may be intentional (e.g., among fans of certain celebrities or sports teams) or circumstantial (e.g., among victims of war, disaster, or persecution), but in either case it is socially constructed through narratives that define experience as a shared foundation for future memory.

Although of course memory also is studied as a cognitive phenomenon in individuals, “memory studies” scholars, including those who study journalism, are most interested in how human interaction and social structures shape memory. It is to this social phenomenon that the word “memory” refers in the discussion that follows, and for the most part, the word memory is used alone, without a modifier. Yet it is worth briefly acknowledging that scholars preface the word “memory” with a variety of adjectives. Most common are “collective”, “social”, “cultural”, and “public”. Some writers use particular modifiers – “cultural” vs. “communicative” (Assmann 2010) or “strong” vs. “distributed” (Wertsch 2002) – in order to differentiate between memory’s formal narratives and its dissemination through people’s behavior. Others (for instance, Landsberg 2009; Sturken 1997) use the word “cultural” to refer to communication that includes but can transcend direct social interaction. More recently, the term “connected memory” has become a way to describe “the radical networking and diffusion of memory ushered in with the advent of digital technologies” (Hoskins 2011: 23, 24; also Garde-Hansen 2011). Journalism scholars (such as Volkmer 2006) often use the word “public” in describing memories that are acquired and shared through news media. It is the public nature of news media that most interests these researchers: after all, journalism is an act of publication in a public forum meant to serve the public interest.

Memory-studies research has emerged as a field of scholarship during a period of global proliferation of mass media and the emergence of new kinds of technological mediation. Media texts are commonly used as evidence in memory research. Yet too often such research addresses a memory issue – a *theme* of public memory – while ignoring the process of its mediation. This is especially true when the media in question are journalistic ones, regarded as merely a “window on” or a

“mirror of” reality, as a “container” but not a constructor of the news (Zelizer 2004: 30–31). Journalists themselves tend to encourage this view, which is baked into normative professional beliefs that, due to their objectivity, reporters merely reveal or convey the outside world. Journalism is seen as simply a delivery vehicle for the subject that is of interest.

The vehicular metaphor hints at a contradiction, however: if journalists “bring us” the world, then they must be in it, not outside it; they are its translators and our active conduits to the events of both the present and the past. Indeed, it is within its avowed role of “bringing” the world to “us” that journalism makes its grandest claims to history.

2 How journalism makes use of history and memory

History and memory appear within journalism in a number of ways. This section considers how the past is employed to enrich news content, bolster the authority of journalists, lengthen the lifetime of news products, and extend the brands of news institutions.

2.1 Journalism as familiar explanation

Because historical precedent for an event is a factor in its newsworthiness, reporters routinely make references to the past in order to “intensify the importance of [a] story”, notes Michael Schudson (2014: 88). Yet history is most helpful in covering truly unexpected events, shocking or chaotic occurrences that at first seem inexplicable. To make sense of such events, journalists, along with other kinds of cultural leaders, search for historical analogies (Edy 1999) and “frame images” (Schwartz 1988) in which current narratives and images recall earlier ones. One example is *Bergen (NJ) Record* photojournalist Thomas Franklin’s photograph of three firemen raising the American flag on the site of the rubble of the World Trade Center on September 11, 2001; while Franklin presumably did not intend to replicate Joe Rosenthal’s iconic 1945 photograph of American soldiers raising the flag on Iwo Jima, photo editors and news audiences quickly recognized the reference and understood its meaning.

Something similar happens with the words of news articles, with journalists’ choices of recognizable narrative frameworks for explanation, especially in cases of morally disturbing news. Sometimes, as Dan Berkowitz (2010) found in his analysis of coverage of the Virginia Tech shootings, these references are mythic in nature. Studying a wide variety of types of major news stories, from natural disaster to celebrity scandal, journalism scholar and former *Philadelphia Inquirer* reporter Jack

Lule (2001) identified seven mythical “archetypes” through which such events are culturally explained. In providing narrative templates for the unexpected present, historical references may also anticipate the telling of future news, “premediating” explanation of events that have not yet occurred – a process that Keren Tenenboim-Weinblatt (2013) calls “prospective memory” (also Erll 2011a: 142).

2.2 Journalism as historian

References to the past also create an opportunity for journalists to narratively insert themselves into the historic moment at hand, making future memory in which their own coverage will be conflated with the event itself. This is especially true of television news, which often becomes a text of public history. Historical explanation enhances the cultural authority of journalism as those events are revisited on anniversaries and in coverage of subsequent similar events. In those retellings, journalists are transformed into historical actors who “were there” as “eyewitnesses to history”.

The advantage of hindsight further strengthens journalists’ historical authority over time, as they recall their younger selves’ prescience and intent. Through multiple retellings, a chaotic episode is narratively transformed into an inevitable chapter in a larger story of progress. Eventually, certain journalists may become the preferred (or only) tellers of the historical tale, rather than just one of many, as they were when the event took place (Zelizer 1992). Recalled retrospectively, eyewitness status endows journalists themselves with a kind of artifactual status, as if the past remains within them. Some figures, such as Walter Cronkite, become strongly associated with the reporting of particular events (Carlson 2012); others, such as Tom Brokaw, take on a broader mantle of cultural historian, speaking for generations and for a nation.

Sometimes a particular journalist actually was *there* on the scene of “history unfolding”. More often, however, the journalist who gains the status of the chief “eyewitness” of a historic event was not in fact at the site of the event – yet was “there” *with us* in the moment of its public perception. Memory scholars who research audiences repeatedly find that most people’s “experience” of an event is the experience of having heard about it from a particular journalist or within a particular media context. Although the news coverage is not the event itself, the news coverage is the main public memory of the event, affectively and sensorially embedded in audiences’ perceptions years later. These are what Roger Brown and James Kulik (1977) call “flashbulb memory” moments, in which what is illuminated is not the event but its conveyance. Such journalism becomes a memory text in the moment of its unexpected creation.

2.3 Journalism as keepsake

Other journalistic memory texts are planned, containing overt references to their own historic function. Newspapers and magazines long have published “special” or “commemorative” issues after major events, and not always disastrous ones: on happy occasions, too, such as the local team’s World Series win, commemorative journalism generates material keepsakes that connect the news institution to its community’s identity and memory. Like other types of material culture, news media can become memory objects, touchstones to past experience and feeling. Just as eyewitness reporting confirms that journalists “were there”, keepsake media products attest that *we* were there.

Keepsake journalism is routinely created on ceremonial occasions such as inaugurations, coronations, anniversaries, and memorials. These media products tell definitive stories that situate both the journalists and their audiences within future memory of the special event. Some scholarship has explored this ceremonial dimension of journalism – building on and extending Daniel Dayan and Elihu Katz’s (1992) concept of “media events” – by examining news coverage of, for instance, Queen Elizabeth II’s Golden Jubilee (Wardle & West 2004) and the inauguration of Barack Obama. The election of the first African-American US President inspired a large number of keepsake news-media products, some of which made sweeping statements about “the American dream” and the culmination of the American Civil Rights movement (Stiles & Kitch 2011). Broadcast television networks (and some newspapers) produced keepsake DVDs, while *The New York Times* repackaged its campaign coverage in a four-pound coffee-table book titled *The Historic Journey*.

The day after Obama’s election, *The Washington Post* announced that it had sold out in record time, and, thus, that print journalism still mattered to people. In fact, this special event was not any real indication of the health of the newspaper business. Some keepsake journalism is a gesture of farewell. When newspapers close, they publish ritually designed final editions that tell their institutional histories as part of community history and that reflect on the meaning of journalism within those communities, offering “intriguing examples of metajournalistic discourse”, writes Nicholas Gilewicz (2015: 685).

Keepsake journalism was plentiful at the end of the 20th century, as newspapers and television-news networks produced century-summary “specials”. Anniversaries of major events also are triggers for the production of keepsake journalism, as are the deaths of prominent figures; both types of events allow journalists to speak on behalf of not only history but also the social group (however that is defined) – to assess what the moment says about “us” – in rhetoric that unites journalists and audiences in one mnemonic community (Kitch 2005).

2.4 Journalism as brand

Repackaging news coverage, whether as memory objects or as “historic” documents, has become a cottage industry for legacy media companies. This practice literally brands the news institution onto the memory and while reminding us of the brand’s own historical status. The online *New York Times* Store sells historic photos and customized reprints (which for several years they also offered as part of a “keepsake legacy” package using Ellis Island records). *Life* magazine, which now provides free online access to thousands of its photographic images, exists *only* as a brand; its archival photos, rearranged thematically, draw audiences to an advertising-supported web site that also promotes the *Time* brand. Indeed, beginning with its 1930s newsreel and radio productions called “The March of Time”, magazine publisher Time Inc. pioneered branding convergence and has been perhaps the most active corporate packager of memory (Kitch 2006).

Some memory-making projects that start in journalism turn out to be businesses with lives of their own, even while reflecting status back onto the news brand. One example was television-news anchor Tom Brokaw’s celebration of the “Greatest Generation” who fought in World War II, a series of tributes that took shape in television specials, books, and events and that conferred upon Brokaw the status of cultural historian. Most scholarship on that particular media project has focused on its ideological messages (for instance, Biesecker 2002), yet it also is noteworthy for the way in which it embedded the NBC News brand into American popular memory of “the good war”. The same branding marked Brokaw’s subsequent book-length and television-program tributes to the Baby Boom generation, coinciding with 40th anniversaries milestone events of the 1960s.

3 How journalism extends or denies history and memory

In its most basic definition – as a record of occurrences – journalism is inherently historical in content and function. That record is preserved and publicly available, and in these senses journalism has a preservative and didactic role similar to those of archives, libraries, and museums. That record also is communicable and useful, and in these senses journalism can be an active political and social force in an increasingly networked world. This section considers various ways in which journalism serves the purposes of history and memory.

3.1 Journalism as library and museum

When media-memory products are saved and used years after their production, they can become a form of public history and education. Such status shifts are

solidified, literally, when the physical form of the media-memory object changes – for instance, from newspaper or magazine or television program to hardcover book, as happened with many of the century summaries, or from a television program to DVD, as happened with some of Brokaw’s memory projects. What began as journalism enters a collection, a library or an archive, in homes or in schools and universities. It is ironic that historians, who take such a dim view of the authority and intent of present-day journalism, so often rely on news content as factual primary-source material ... once it has reached a certain age.

Just as saved journalism products can become personal or educational resources, they are common kinds of historical evidence within museums. Old newspaper front-pages and newsreel or television-news footage are privileged forms of documentary truth in museums, especially those that retell dramatic events of the 20th-century decades that coincided with the heyday of mainstream news media. A striking example can be seen in museums about the American Civil Rights movement, in which news photos and news film have a double function: they document the scenes of violence and protest, while also reminding us how we came to “see” those events in the first place (through media), confirming the historical importance of news coverage itself in this chapter of American history. These news artifacts often are narratively and technologically “remediated” (Bolter & Grusin 1999; van Dijck 2007), shown within and repurposed by digital representations in ways that bring the old images newly alive without diminishing their status as authentic proof.

3.2 Journalism as archive

Digital storage capabilities have greatly enhanced journalism’s archival function, transforming media education and media research. The digitization of print and broadcast journalism has lessened the problems of its physical decay and its loss as companies fold. Digitization also has revolutionized accessibility, which no longer is limited by geography or institutional access. In these ways, digital archives faithfully preserve the content of historic news media while radically changing the potential circulation of that content.

Photojournalism is of particular interest in this regard. Photographs are, in one sense, memory objects, thought, by some, even to contain the past moment, having frozen it in time (for instance, Hirsch 2001; Sturken 1997). That quality makes them a powerful medium for documentary truth. Yet they also are a powerful medium for persuasion. Photographs combine information and emotion: they are “representations of important historical events” while also “evok[ing] strong emotional and symbolic connections” (Hariman & Lucaites 2014: 132). Because of their affective power, many news photographs have been repackaged in books and shown in museum exhibits, becoming art and history as well as journalism. On one hand, the recirculation of photographs across cultural forms can enhance their power,

their reach, and their memorability; on the other hand, certain images may be recycled to the extent that either they lose their original meaning (Zelizer 1998) or they come to dominate media memory and thus exclude other images from the visual narrative.

While some scholars are concerned about the promiscuous and theoretically endless recirculation of images, other see possibilities for writing a new kind of history. When digital photographs are freely available to the public, they can enable scholars (and others) to reclaim lost historical details and weave them into new memory narratives (Fabos 2014).

3.3 Journalism as national identity

The global circulation of media images, especially those depicting crisis and atrocity, is one factor in the growing interest in international, “transnational”, “transcultural”, and “multidirectional” memory studies (see, respectively, Volkmer 2006; Erll 2011a; De Cesari & Rigney 2014; Rothberg 2009). Following a call to abandon “methodological nationalism” (Erll 2011a: 62; Levy & Sznajder 2002: 103), such work explores both the continuity and the hybridity of memory narratives and their complex circulation within and across national borders.

At the same time, however, there has been a resurgence of nationalism in journalistic memory narratives, especially in postcolonial, post-Communist, and post-conflict societies. Some recent examples illustrate not only the staying power of this traditional theme in memory research but also its nature and range: Julia Sonnevend (2013) studied how Communist newspapers in Hungary later reconstructed national memory of that country’s failed 1956 revolution; Zala Volcic and Karmen Erjavec (2012) interviewed journalists about their own memories of the wars in Bosnia and Herzegovina; Alina Hogeia (2010) analyzed two decades of post-Communist political rhetoric in Romanian newspapers; Charles Villa-Vicencio (2012) and Susana Kaiser (2014) explored the role of print and broadcast news media in publicly disseminating victim testimony to truth commissions in, respectively, South Africa and Argentina; Chiaoning Su (2012) assessed definitions of Taiwanese national values in news coverage of natural disasters over time; and Andrew McNeill, Evanthis Lyons, and Samuel Pehrson (2014) analyzed press discourse about the British government’s apology nearly four decades after the events of “Bloody Sunday” in Northern Ireland. In certain countries, collective remembering is a central aspect of citizenship, expressed across media platforms in ritual ways; Oren Meyers, Motti Neiger and Eyal Zandberg (2014), for instance, have comprehensively examined the key role of media in Holocaust Commemoration in Israel.

3.4 Journalism as social justice

In some places, the resurgence of nationalist concerns is linked to a social and political need for restoration of previously silenced histories. In post-Communist

and post-dictatorship countries, the recent democratization and proliferation of news media have positioned journalists as central tellers of these new stories about the past. Susana Kaiser notes the importance of “activist journalists” who, “as professional witnesses, amplify” (2014: 255) the accounts of survivors by interviewing them, investigating their experiences, and printing official victim testimony. In gathering and publicizing victims’ stories, these journalists are building “collected” (rather than “collective”) memory, which Jeffrey Olick defines as “the aggregated individual memories of members of a group” (2007: 23). Through such reporting, some journalism has become a forum for achieving reparative justice for victims of past oppression or abuse.

This new role for news media builds on the concept of “peace journalism” (Lynch & McGoldrick 2005), and its study aligns journalism scholarship with trends in other fields such as development communication and social justice. Public conveyances of memory are understood as a form of justice because reparative narratives are meant to restore lost voices and experiences to the historical record, as well as to affirm the legitimacy of survivors’ stories. In this view, journalists can be key actors within “an ethics of public memory” (Lee & Thomas 2012: 205).

Academic inquiry into this phenomenon, too, can be seen as a form of activism, illustrating the way in which memory studies can provide a “rare combination of social relevance and intellectual challenge” (Kansteiner 2002: 180). Such work may be the kind of transcriptional amplification described above, or it can resurrect perspectives that challenge the conventional historical wisdom constructed by mainstream news media. Suhi Choi (2008), for instance, interviewed elderly Korean survivors who had been attacked by American soldiers during the Korean War, an event that was either denied or forgotten in American journalism for half a century. As a topic of research, the relationship between newswork and “the right to memory” (Reading 2011: 380) is a fertile area for future scholarship that could dovetail with researchers’ growing interest in journalists’ own experiences with trauma (for instance, Rentschler 2010).

3.5 Journalism as moral witness

While the “right to memory” debate is relatively new, the idea of journalism as a moral witness is not. Documenting injustice is a long-held value of mainstream as well as alternative news media. News images of atrocities have an especially high truth status – creating a system of “truths” in which moral truth sometimes eclipses factual truth (Zelizer 1998) – and their public dissemination invokes the witnessing obligation of audiences.

Moral witnessing in journalism is more than documentation; it is testimony. It is a translation of the event and a statement about the event’s significance. In those senses, then, it is a form of memory from the start: as John Durham Peters explains, “the curious thing about witnessing is its retroactive character” (2009: 39). Journal-

ism, and especially photojournalism, long has facilitated moral judgment by audiences (for instance, Maurantonio 2014; Zelizer 1998), but new technologies have revived academic interest in this phenomenon and inspired new theorizing. Updating literature on the ceremonial and pastoral role of television during major news events, Paul Frosh and Amit Pinchevski describe present-day “media witnessing” as a multimediated process involving audiences as well as journalists within a society “testifying to its own historical reality as it unfolds” (2009: 12).

Moral witnessing requires audiences’ and journalists’ affective engagement with the subjects of news, creating a sense of “responsibility” and “an awareness of ourselves as historical actors”, writes John Ellis (2009: 86). Journalistic and scholarly debates about memory rights and ethics are linked to ideas about cross-cultural empathy, or cosmopolitanism, of which journalism can be an important conveyor. Alison Landsberg’s concept of “prosthetic memory” – in which, through media, we can “feel” what we ourselves did not experience directly – involves this kind of empathy, a form of “ethical thinking” and “an intellectual engagement with the plight of the other ... others who have no relation to us, who resemble us not [at] all, whose circumstances lie far outside of our own experiences” (2009: 223).

3.6 Journalism as historical denial or revision

Conversely, journalism has the power to ignore or deny events or social conditions. Judgments about what constitutes newsworthiness (or is “tellable”) affect the creation and survival of cultural knowledge. Journalistic “gatekeeping” thus shapes not only our perceptions of present reality but also the record that will, in time, be the material of memory and history. For these reasons, the news-selection process has been a central critical concern in the literature on framing and newsroom sociology, inquiry that considers not only what “makes” the news but what does not. That process has historical consequences. Although it is not the only institution that shapes public memory, journalism is an influential force in what Peter Burke calls “the social organization of forgetting, the rules of exclusion, suppression or repression, and the question of who wants whom to forget what, and why” (1989: 191).

Of course the very process of remembering requires decision-making; we cannot remember everything. In order to be comprehensible, news explanations of events must be structured and simplified in a way that the events themselves are not, a reduction exacerbated by further “loss of detail” over time (Schudson 1995: 348). Even later, summary (or retrospective) journalism narrates only those memories that make positive sense together, resulting in what Paul Connerton calls “structural amnesia” (2008: 64; also Davis 1984; Kitch 2005). On an operational level, “forgetting” is an inevitable aspect of journalism.

Some journalistic forgetting occurs through the process of news reporting of strategic communication with an agenda. One example is political candidates’ inaccurate characterizations of the past in ways that position themselves as the natu-

ral outcome of historical change (Kammen 1995), rhetoric that is routinely repeated in news coverage of their campaigns. Other forgetting is more of a choice, a refusal or reluctance to “see” certain disturbing occurrences or non-normative identities, resulting in what Gaye Tuchman calls “symbolic annihilation” in news media (Tuchman 1978: 7). Such memory distortion, in which the past is cherry-picked to serve powerful people or institutions (including news institutions) of the present, has received a great deal of scholarly attention.

Yet, as Connerton notes, “forgetting is not always a failure” (2008: 59), especially in populations that must look forward rather than backward in order to survive or heal past traumas or divisions; indeed, what he calls “prescriptive forgetting” (2008: 61) may be an explicit goal of journalism that promotes conflict resolution among previous enemies who must now co-exist. Such a strategy is not necessarily permanent. Forgetting, like memory, is a fluid process, and what is “forgotten” at any point in time may be retrieved and brought back into “working memory” (Rigney 2005) when it again serves the needs of a future present.

4 New directions: Memory and journalism on a post-scarcity media landscape

Scholarship on the relationship between journalism and memory began in earnest during the 1980s and 1990s, a time when both cultural meanings of news and definitions of social memory tended to focus on particular media platforms (especially television) and on the construction of national identity. Since then, several factors – chiefly, globalization, the emergence of digital technologies, and the economic and professional erosion of mainstream journalism – have refocused much inquiry in this area.

Current scholars of journalism and memory must understand “new connectivities and assemblages of memories” (Reading 2011: 380) within a “new transnational public sphere” of “networked” memory (Volkmer & Lee 2014: 50). Social media have been key to these shifts, enabling the crowdsourcing of memory construction within a “new circulatory memory-scape” (Andén-Papadopoulos 2014: 150) in which journalism is not only connected to but also transformed by other sources of memory as it “travels” in sometimes unpredictable ways (Erl 2011b; also see Hajek, Lohmeier & Pentzold 2016; van Dijck 2007).

Many scholars are optimistic about the expanded reach and interactivity afforded by globalization and digital technologies, which have transformed “long-held ideas about what constitutes community” so that the concept is no longer “limited by geographic, religious, or ethnic borders,” writes Janice Hume (2010: 192). The “connective turn” of memory construction (Hoskins 2011) has greatly expanded the range of memory constructors, made historical resources more accessible, and fostered dialogue between previously unconnected audiences.

Other scholars predict negative memory consequences of new media technologies and trends. Jill Edy warns that the proliferation of specialized news in a “post-broadcast world” has the potential to create “memory silos generated by selective exposure” (2014: 76). Conversely, predicts Andrew Hoskins, the vast distribution of information within a “post-scarcity” media ecology threatens to eviscerate its impact, resulting in “a new careless memory” (2011: 19). In somewhat more positive terms, Joanne Garde-Hansen writes that YouTube “offers viewers an ongoing transformation of collective memory as a mosaic of media” in which “alternative versions of history connect and disconnect” (2011: 107, 108). These words appear in Garde-Hansen’s study of video remediation of war, a topic that once was the purview of only the largest, mainstream news organizations.

Today, the technological capability of ordinary people to produce and circulate information, especially in video form, parallels the traditional witnessing function of news media. When such material is incorporated into journalism, it may bolster the authority, authenticity, and “moralizing force” of journalism, thus enriching the historical record that journalism creates, “expand[ing] journalism’s power to relay the human drama that enhances our understanding of and engagement with the past” (Andén-Papadopoulos 2014: 149). In other cases, however, citizen video *replaces* the work of professional journalists as “the first draft of history”. This is true of breaking-news events as well as the more systematic watchdog function of groups that organize to document injustice and to hold powerful people and institutions accountable on an ongoing basis. The words in the previous sentence used to be shorthand for journalism; now they apply equally to media-producing groups such as Witness, which verifies and curates citizen videos for the Human Rights Channel on YouTube, as well as the growing number of “cop-watching” organizations that publish citizen reports online and organize the physical monitoring and filming of police in public space (Bock 2016).

Whether used within or existing externally to the content produced by traditional news organizations, journalistic reports made by non-journalists using YouTube, Twitter, Facebook, and other social-media platforms now circulate widely and unceasingly. Both this content and its circulation do more than merely challenge journalistic authority: they raise questions about what (and who and where) “journalism” actually is.

That is a central question in current journalism scholarship, against the backdrop of profound shifts in the profession’s structure, products, and audiences. This chapter has explored the intersections of journalism and memory construction, assessing how each serves the other. A similar meeting of scholarship may be profitable.

As many critics have noted (though chiefly Zelizer 2008), there is a large body of academic literature about journalism and there is a large body of academic literature about memory, and the two rarely meet, at least in any sustained analytical way. So far, the main question has been why memory scholars don’t take journal-

ism seriously enough. At a time when journalism theory is in flux and researchers seek new models for understanding the forms and functions of news media in the 21st century, perhaps it makes sense to pose the question the other way around, asking why journalism scholars don't engage more often with the factor of memory. Many key concerns of memory scholarship – explanation of disturbing events, witnessing of injustice, preservation of multiple accounts of important events, articulation of national identity and international connections – are also key concerns of journalism and journalism scholarship. As this chapter has sought to illustrate, studying journalism's uses of the past may help us to think in new ways about the field's future.

Further reading

No one has written more about journalism and memory than Barbie Zelizer, and her recent book *Journalism and Memory*, co-edited with Keren Tenenboim-Weinblatt (2014) offers a thematically wide-ranging discussion among scholars who are actively involved in this field.

The Collective Memory Reader (2011) provides a broad and historical view of the theoretical foundations of memory scholarship, along with a comprehensive introductory essay by editors Jeffrey K. Olick, Vered Vinitzky-Seroussi, and Daniel Levy. In Astrid Erll and Ansgar Nünning's *A Companion to Cultural Memory Studies* (2010), the editors' analytical overview of cultural-memory studies is followed by essays in which contemporary scholars offer various disciplinary perspectives. A third valuable edited collection is *On Media Memory: Collective Memory in a New Media Age*, edited by Motti Neiger, Oren Meyers and Eyal Zandberg (2011), which elaborates on several of the themes discussed in this chapter, including national memory, technological "connectivity", and transcultural or globalized memory.

Those three scholars' own study of Israeli national memory of the Holocaust – *Communicating Awe: Media Memory and Holocaust Commemoration* (Meyers, Neiger & Zandberg 2014) – is a rare example of work that examines how the same memory goals are accomplished across different media platforms, while reminding us that certain types of media have special communicative properties. Another innovative work, considering the interplay of news content, media technologies, and national and generational memory, is *News in Public Memory: An International Study of Media Memories across Generations*, Ingrid Volkmer's (2006) edited collection of interviews with news audience members in nine countries.

Finally, several individually-authored books, while not explicitly about journalism, offer thoughtful, forward-looking views of memory studies. Astrid Erll's *Memory in Culture* (2011a) is an intensely rich theoretical overview of the landscape of memory studies, embracing media as cultural forms that are connected with other ways of remembering. Joanne Garde-Hansen's *Media and Memory* (2011) supplements a theoretical discussion of the field's main debates with engaging case studies on fresh themes (ranging from YouTube mashups to the affective power of ambient sound). In *Mediated Memories in the Digital Age*, José van Dijck (2007) explores the ways in which digital mediation and remediation are woven into everyday, "personal" culture such as family photo albums, diaries, and music collections, blurring the analytical distinctions between public and private, and making us all constructors of media memory.

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III Theorizing the Field

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10 Journalism as Agenda Setting

Abstract: The concept of agenda setting has received extensive attention from researchers through the past five decades. While early studies found strong support for the influence of the news media on the perceived importance of issues held by the public, researchers have examined several aspects of the concept, including investigations of the source of the media agenda and the possible outcomes of the agenda setting process. Agenda setting continues to be studied through the internet and social media, demonstrating its flexibility as a mass communication theory. It also has evolved from an original conceptualization as a cognitive effect to include attitudinal and behavioral influences.

Keywords: Media Effects, Agenda Setting, Political Communication

The agenda setting function of the press has been documented in hundreds of studies. Research has consistently found that the frequency of issues covered in the news can have a profound effect on the issue priorities held by the public. In this way, the news media highlight important issues of the day, and the news consumers process these salience cues in determining what they perceive to be the most important issues within a society.

This media effect can have significant consequences. Agenda setting suggests that media coverage influences discussion among members of the public and governmental legislators. This process can ultimately lead to policy directed to correct the issue/problem.

An example can illustrate this process. A newspaper could publish a series of stories dealing with why we need strict gun control laws. Members of the public would be exposed to these stories either through direct exposure or through indirect interpersonal communication with individuals who have seen the stories. The effect on individuals would not be a change in attitudes – people would not be convinced that we need strict gun control laws. Instead, the effect would cause individuals to think that gun control must be an important issue.

1 Branches of agenda-setting research

Since the seminal study by McCombs and Shaw (1972) during the 1968 US presidential election, hundreds of studies have made many refinements to agenda setting. The refinements can be placed into several categories. While almost all previous agenda-setting research has begun with the idea proposed in the initial agenda

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setting hypothesis – that news media coverage influences the perceived importance of issues held by the public – studies have diverged into six branches.

1.1 Branch 1: Contingent conditions

Early agenda-setting studies suggested the media had a societal effect. Research looked at a range of issues mentioned by survey respondents in response to the question “What is the number one problem facing our country today?” These studies used aggregated data with the analysis centered on issues rather than on respondents. This allowed researchers to generalize to individuals within a society, thus testing agenda setting as a societal effect.

But even the early researchers admitted that the agenda-setting effect would not influence all individuals to the same degree. The magnitude of the agenda-setting effect could be impacted by many factors. These factors could be found both within individuals and within issues.

First, the agenda-setting effect can manifest in individuals to different extents. For example, interest in a given topic can influence the magnitude to which salience of an issue is transferred from the media to the public agenda. While some individuals who are more interested in political issues can actually demonstrate a high agenda-setting effect, others can have more developed defense mechanisms that moderate it (Wanta 1997). These individuals can be more critical of the priorities of the political issues in the media, regardless of their level of media exposure (Wanta 1997). Therefore, varying levels of interest in a topic covered by the media can explain varying strength of the agenda-setting effect.

Individuals can also vary in their need for orientation, which describes the degree to which an individual requires background information about a topic covered by the media (Weeks & Southwell 2010). Individuals often turn to the media to satisfy this need for orientation, thus strengthening the agenda setting effect among those with a strong need for orientation (Wanta & Wu 1992). In fact, the agenda-setting effect can be strengthened when interpersonal communication about a topic discussed in the media occurs (Wanta & Wu 1992). In this case, the interpersonal communication acts as a reinforcement of the media agenda, allowing individuals to be exposed to the media agenda twice.

Second, the transfer of issue salience varies in magnitude depending on the issue. For example, Yagade and Dozier (1990) found that some issues, such as nuclear arms, can be too abstract for individuals to visualize due to the complexity of information – especially when compared to concrete issues, like drug abuse. The magnitude of abstract issue salience does not transfer from the media to the public agenda as effectively as concrete issues. Individuals are less affected by media coverage if they cannot picture the issue in their heads.

Similarly, some issues affect individuals regardless of the media coverage. These obtrusive issues can be contrasted to unobtrusive issues, which are more

likely to be learned from the mass media than experienced first-hand. For example, Craft and Wanta (2004) found that some obtrusive issues that individuals can personally experience are higher on the public agenda than the media agenda. Further, their findings reveal that the Middle East conflict was higher on the media agenda than on the public agenda – likely because the news coverage involved an issue that most US news consumers are less likely to experience. Therefore, the less obtrusive an issue is, the greater the magnitude of the transfer of its salience from the media to the public agenda.

Broadly, therefore, some characteristics of individuals and issues influence the magnitude of the agenda-setting effect. The agenda-setting effect is stronger among individuals with a high need for orientation but lower for people with high levels of interest. Some of the key mechanisms underlying the contingent conditions of the agenda-setting effect include characteristics of people and issues. Demographic variables, including level of education, age, and income, can explain the strength of the agenda-setting effect. Moreover, issues that are less abstract and less obtrusive are more likely to strengthen the agenda-setting effect.

1.2 Branch 2: Sources of the media agenda

Early research has shown that the agenda of issues covered in the media can impact public perceptions. The second branch of research extends the original agenda-setting hypothesis by asking the question: “Where does the media agenda come from?” In other words, research in this category takes a step back in the communication process to examine influences on the news media before the media agenda is created and transmitted to the public. This area of research also has been referred to as “agenda building” (Lang & Lang 1983) in which the news media, public, and public officials form a three-way relationship, building issue salience between the three actors.

A series of studies examined whether US presidents could influence the news agenda through their State of the Union addresses. Indeed, if the news media are influenced by anyone, the US president would logically be one source given his stature as the nation’s number one newsmaker (Wanta et al. 1989). Findings were mixed, however. President Nixon appeared to have influenced media coverage after his State of the Union speech. President Carter reacted to news coverage prior to his speech. President Reagan led coverage by newspapers but reacted to coverage on network newscasts. The findings suggest other factors at play in the president–press relationship. The media may subsequently cover the main issue priorities of a president but ignore issues lower on the presidential agenda. Personalities of the presidents also could have impacted their relationships with the news media.

Of course, the US president isn’t the only potential source of the media agenda. A study conducted in Denmark (Hopmann et al. 2012) found evidence that political parties can impact media coverage. Relevance of party was a key factor in the

agenda-building process, but the study also found a negative interaction between different parties' press releases, suggesting that parties attempted to claim ownership on certain issues.

Party politics and the great number of legislators in the US Congress also can be a source for the media agenda – depending on the issue (Iyengar 2011). In an examination of the influence between the US congressional agenda and the media agenda, Tan and Weaver (2007) found that there is no relationship between congressional communication and the media agenda on obtrusive issues, such as crime. However, there tends to be a correlation between the congressional and media agenda when it comes to international issues. Therefore, the nature of issues can make Congress unlikely to set the media agenda in some cases.

Werder (2002) also found support for the influence of public officials on news coverage. In his comparison of news coverage of the introduction of the Euro in the UK and Germany, he found a relationship between a medium's position, sources' positions, story subissues, and effects. He attributed these differences to newspapers in the two countries having different worldviews.

Moreover, nations around the world do not have equal levels of media freedoms. In nations with limited press freedoms, governments exert a great deal of control over the media agendas. However, some political issues can slip past governmental filters. Political cartoons, for example, can lift controversial issues on the media agenda. Political cartoons can be ambiguous and humorous nature, thus escaping the scrutiny of the government (Alkazemi & Wanta 2015). Further, social media have been utilized to circumvent the government restrictions in these cases (Jacobson 2013).

However, even the media in nations with more press freedoms can rely on social media as a source of the media agenda. For example, Jacobson (2013) found that *The Rachel Maddow Show* used its Facebook page to request audience feedback about topics, and then most of these topics appeared in the broadcasted episode. By reinforcing the topics online and in broadcast, Jacobson (2013) argues that the media agenda and the public agenda of viewers of *The Rachel Maddow Show* are developed.

Many studies examine the perceived credibility of media among different audiences. In the 1980s, Rimmer and Weaver (1987) found that the perceived credibility of a medium is unrelated to its circulation or reach. Approximately two decades later, Claussen (2004) explained a decline in television news credibility in comparison to newspapers. In other words, studies investigating factors pertaining to media credibility can compare different media formats.

The construction of the media agenda could be either a positive outcome or a negative outcome. If we assume that the media agenda is built through proper journalistic standards and thus the news media are objectively reporting on the real world, agenda setting would be a positive influence: People are learning about the issues that are important to society. On the other hand, if the media agenda is

manipulated to unscrupulous editors or deceptive public officials, agenda setting would be negative. Individuals would be learning only about the priorities of an editor or official, which could be starkly different from what is happening in the real world.

Thus, the sources of the media agenda can affect the transfer of salience to the public agenda. The credibility of the media, different types of news media, the amount of power assigned to the actor – such as public officials, and the subissues presented by the media source can influence the strength of the agenda-setting effect. These are important mechanisms that can impact the branch of agenda-setting research which deals with sources of the media agenda

1.3 Branch 3: Policy agenda

Research has shown that public officials can have an impact on the media's agenda. Public officials are important sources for news information and are used extensively by the media, and thus the agenda-setting process begins during the news gathering stage. Research also has shown that the media can influence the perceived importance of issues held by public. This is the basis of traditional agenda setting. But what happens after the transferal of salience cues from the media to the public? A third branch of agenda-setting research examines this question. What are the consequences of the agenda-setting process? The final stage of agenda setting thus could involve a legislative process in which lawmakers react to public concern and media coverage. Legislative action has been called the Policy Agenda.

Wanta and Kalyango (2007) demonstrate one example of research examining the policy agenda in their analysis of US funding for anti-terrorism programs within 20 nations in Africa. The study compared real world events (terrorist attacks within individual African nations), statements made by President Bush about the African nations, media coverage of the African nations and whether these “agendas” were related to the amount of money the US Congress allocated to individual countries. The results show that real world events did not influence President Bush's statements, media coverage, or the amount of money a nation received. However, President Bush's statements about nations led to media coverage of nations – a clear example of agenda building. An important factor in their agenda-setting model was whether the countries were framed involving terrorism. If framing was taken into consideration, the policy agenda-setting model worked perfectly: The number of deaths within a country attributed to terrorism influenced the frequency of the country being mentioned in President Bush's statements, the amount of media coverage dealing with terrorism that a country received, and the amount of money the country was allocated. President Bush's speeches on terrorism also influenced the media and policy agendas dealing with terrorism. Finally, media coverage of terrorism within a country influenced the amount of money a country received to fight terrorism.

A number of other researchers similarly found evidence of policy agenda setting. In his study of education coverage, Zibluk (1999) found that school officials actively sought to use local newspapers to build support for their policies. Journalists relied heavily on quotes from school officials while providing less space to opponents to a tax levy. Thus, the normal reporting routines resulted in a heavy reliance on public officials for information, which in turn worked to the advantage of the public officials.

A study of news coverage of conflicts within the automobile industry by punitive tariffs on Japanese automobile manufacturers found that news stories, unlike editorials, were more likely to present the policy issue as corrective action to ensure fair trade (Chang 1999). On the other hand, editorials presented the issue as a free trade policy issue when it comes to international trade. This finding was one way Chang's (1999) study demonstrated layered effects which exist in a hierarchy, from the president, to government sources and the elites of the automobile industry.

In his study of Congressional debates, Keefer (1993) argues that the established routines of news reporting often deter citizen participation in the policy-making process. Taha (1999) also found passive reporting in coverage of Somalia. Results show that reporters who work near policy makers are less critical than reporters far removed from the policy makers. Because of this tendency, the *New York Times* played a minimal role in setting the policy agenda on Somalia.

These conclusions are in conflict with the findings of Linsky et al. (1986). According to their research, policy makers believe that the news media play an integral part in both agenda setting and policy evaluation. In fact, Weaver (1991) showed that salience of an issue on the media agenda increased the level of knowledge demonstrated by the public, influenced the strength and direction of their opinion, and led to a greater likelihood of civic action than inaction. In his study, Weaver (1991) found respondents to be less likely to have a neutral stance on the issue of the budget deficit, and they were more likely to sign a petition, vote, attend a meeting, or write a letter. Thus, political action is a documented consequence of the agenda-setting process.

To summarize, the key mechanisms of the agenda-setting effect as applied to the policy agenda include knowledge acquisition, public opinion formation, and civic action related to public policy.

1.4 Branch 4: Second level agenda setting

For the first three decades of research, agenda setting had always involved issues. Media provide coverage of the important issues of the day. The public learns the relative importance of issues from the frequency of coverage. However, there are many agendas in the news.

McCombs, Escobar-Lopez, and Lamas (2000) developed what they called the second level of agenda setting. They posited the idea that besides an agenda of

issues, the media also provide the public with an agenda of attributes that they link to objects in the news. In their examination of an election in Spain, they found that the media described certain characteristics of political candidates in their reports of the election campaign. The public mentally linked these characteristics to the candidates to a similar degree as the media coverage. Thus, if the media emphasized an attribute for one candidate, the public would link that same attribute to the same candidate. In other words, just as an issue gaining heavy coverage gave salience cues to the public that the issue was important, so too did attributes gaining heavy coverage in describing a candidate give salience cues to the public that the attribute was important.

Attributes have mainly been placed into two categories. Cognitive attributes deal with factual information about an object's background or personality while affective attributes refer to positive, neutral, or negative depictions of the object.

Many studies have found support for second-level agenda setting. Golan and Wanta (2001) found a second-level agenda-setting effect during the Republican New Hampshire presidential primary in 2000. They found stronger support for cognitive attributes – such as most likely to win or strong moral character – than for affective attributes. Thus, the findings indicate a stronger cognitive effect – respondents learned about a candidate's background or issue stances – than an affective effect – respondents forming a positive or negative opinion about a candidate.

Notably, second-level agenda setting research does not have to examine only people, such as political candidates. The media cover many different types of objects: people, places, and things. Wanta, Golan, and Lee (2004) used countries as objects. They found both a first-level agenda-setting effect (the more media coverage a country received in the news, the more respondents thought the country was of “vital importance to the US”) as well as a second-level affective influence (the more negative coverage a country received, the more negative respondents viewed the country).

Carroll and McCombs (2003) used businesses in their examination of corporate images. They argue that agenda setting can occur with media coverage of businesses in a similar fashion to media coverage of political communication. The object in this case becomes a corporation, with attributes linked to corporations in media coverage influencing perceptions of the corporations held by the public.

Therefore, the key mechanisms of the second level of agenda setting involve attributes, both cognitive and affective, associated with the objects on the media agenda, the most salient of which are transferred to the public agenda.

1.5 Branch 5: Third level agenda setting

The third level of agenda setting can be understood in terms of networks both theoretically and methodologically. The human memory stores information in

a non-linear manner that is often described as cognitive networks (Guo, Vu & McCombs 2012). While the links between various thoughts can be unconscious, studies using social network analysis have demonstrated a statistically significant correlation between the content of mass media messages and salient topics among the public (Guo, Vu & McCombs 2012).

Social network analysis is a robust methodological tool, which allows researchers to understand how actors relate to one another (Wasserman & Faust 1994). Communication researchers have employed it to examine the third level of agenda setting by exploring the dyads of ideas, which can be described as the connection between two issues. For example, Guo, Vu, and McCombs (2012) found that there is a transfer of salience in the connection between issues from the mass media to the public. By calculating the correlation between matrices that describe the relationships between two issues, called QAP correlations, Guo, Vu, and McCombs (2012) contributed to the methodological advancement of the agenda-setting effect in order to show that the salience of the relationship between issues presented by the mass media is also transferred to the public, where it is stored in cognitive networks.

Replications of such findings have confirmed the third level of the agenda-setting effect on local and national levels (Vu, Guo & McCombs 2014). Further, the effect has been confirmed with data analyzed from short periods of time as well as studies with data gathered over a period of five years (Vu, Guo & McCombs 2014). These replications demonstrate that the agenda-setting effect is theoretically valid, but the third level offers a more holistic approach to understanding how perceptions of objects in the media are connected together in the human brain (Vu, Guo & McCombs 2014). The third level of agenda setting explains the relationships between the various components of the media and public agenda (McCombs, Shaw & Weaver 2014). The key mechanism underlying the third level of agenda setting is the network of issues that are associated with one another in the media and public agenda.

1.6 Branch 6: The role of the Internet

Recently, agenda-setting researchers have attempted to incorporate content from the Internet in their studies. A major methodological hurdle faces these researchers: Since the Internet has unlimited information on endless topics, an Internet agenda would be impossible to calculate. Thus, researchers must take a different approach in utilizing the Internet.

First, if the Internet is used as the independent variable replacing traditional media as the cause of the agenda-setting effect, researchers must narrow the content by purposely selecting only a small section of the Internet. Most news media outlets provide all of the locally generated news stories on their websites. Many reporters tweet about news stories on their Twitter accounts. Political candidates,

public officials, and many other people have websites that can be used to construct an issue agenda. All of these Internet sources could be used in creating an agenda-setting study.

Second, the Internet can also be used as a surrogate for public opinion. Many news media allow for comments on news stories on their websites. Twitter tweets from the general public and posts on forums also can give a rough estimate regarding important issues of the day. Again, these content sources can be used to create a public agenda or a measure of concern with individual issues.

Finally, Internet use can be used as an intervening variable, influencing the traditional agenda-setting relationship between the media and public. The Internet could give individuals information on issues that go beyond those issues covered in the news media. Thus, Internet use can lead individuals to exposure of issues not covered in the traditional news media, interfering with the media–public relationship.

Each of these approaches poses validity problems. The Internet as the independent variable assumes that Internet content will be processed in a similar manner to traditional news content. It also assumes that the Internet is an accurate measure of the media agenda. It may or may not be. There are clear differences in coverage patterns for different media. Using a limited number of Internet news sites would not capture the wide range of news coverage of all news media.

The Internet as the dependent variable assumes that an accurate measure of public opinion can be calculated from postings on social media or in forums. Postings on the Internet, however, may only demonstrate high levels of engagement with issues, a different concept than perceived salience. People may be interested in an issue and post something on the Internet with regard to the issue, but this does not necessarily mean they are concerned with an issue.

The Internet as intervening variable assumes that variance in the relationship between the news media and public is due mainly to Internet exposure and not due to other factors. In reality, non-Internet users are very different from Internet users on many demographic variables, such as age and education level. Is Internet exposure leading to low agenda-setting effects, or are low agenda-setting effects caused by the trend of younger and highly educated individuals having different issue priorities than other people?

2 Agenda setting in the age of rapidly advancing technologies

In agenda setting, salience is often measured by counting the frequency of an issue's appearance in a medium as well as through a survey component to determine whether the public attitudes match cognitive and attitudinal messages dissemi-

nated by the mass media. In the age of social media, there are ways for actors to influence the Twitter messages that appear as well as their frequency.

For instance, a single user can create multiple identities from which the user will post messages on social media (Cook et al. 2014). Especially in circumstances where there are only two dominant parties, these practices can be used to alter the perception of support a party has (Cook et al. 2014). This practice has been further evolved into the creation of robots – sometimes referred to as bots – to post automated messages. Cook et al. (2014) emphasize the importance of distinguishing between authentic and inauthentic Twitter accounts, citing studies where individuals who retweet posts are separated from other users.

While this solution may seem easy, there is a hybrid social media user type – a cyborg – in which a human assists a bot or a bot assists a human (Cook et al. 2014). A cyborg interacts with other social media accounts and provides narrative that mimics human friendship and communication. Although it seems quite human, the cyborg consists of a human posting from an automated feed or human-assisted bots (Cook et al. 2014). While the term ‘slacktivism’ has been coined to denote a lack of reliability in measuring social media frequencies due to its inauthentic use, fewer studies have examined the role of false identities, bots, and cyborgs on the agenda setting process.

One study that does address social media in the agenda-setting process distinguishes between top-down and bottom-up agenda setting. In an examination of the use of social media in Russia, Alexanyan et al. (2012) revealed that evidence of the ability of ordinary citizens to set the national agenda on social media faced resistance due to the use of bots to promote pro-government positions and protests on platforms such as Twitter. Further, Alexanyan et al. (2012) suggest that physical intimidation of journalists can discourage dissent as well as cyberattacks, which can be more difficult to attribute to an attacker. Despite such limitations, the authors suggest that social media provide a bottom-up agenda-setting effect in which ordinary citizens can decide which issues are salient as opposed to a top-down agenda-setting effect in which the political and media elite control the media agenda.

In the United States, similar studies have been conducted to examine the effect of online search engines on the agenda setting process. The findings of Ragas, Tran, and Martin (2014) demonstrate that agenda setting online is a bidirectional effect, depending on the issue. When consumers demanded information by inputting keywords in a search engine, this market-driven approach was referred to as reverse agenda setting (Ragas, Tran & Martin 2014). Put simply, this distinction refers to the trend in which the media are more able to set the agenda with regards to some issues than others. As technological innovation is diffused throughout society, it is necessary to conduct studies examining their impact on the mainstream media.

3 Modifications to agenda setting: Cognitive to attitudinal effects

The new levels of agenda-setting research have been accompanied by a reconceptualization of the theory. While the original hypothesis posited a cognitive effect – learning about the important issues of the day – the second and third levels go beyond this media influence. These levels assume that the news media not only influence the cognitive/issue agenda of the public but also an attribute agenda – an effect on how the public views actors in the news. Thus, evolving from a theory dealing with frequencies of issue coverage, the new levels of agenda setting deal with the type of coverage the issues receive. In other words, research is now examining an effect that is more attitudinal, influencing perceptions of newsmakers held by members of the public.

The second and third levels have thus opened new avenues for research. Tests for the original hypothesis typically used the story as the unit of analysis. A story dealing with air pollution, for example, would be categorized as an environment issue. The more media coverage pollution received in the media, the more people would think that the environment was an important issue.

However, agenda-setting researchers are now looking at not just issues but also attributes linked to objects in the news. A story on air pollution could concentrate on the economic impact that new restrictions on businesses might entail. On the other hand, a story on air pollution could deal with the adverse effects on the quality of life. Thus, the “object” of air pollution could have vastly different attributes linked to it through the media and therefore likely would have vastly different effects on news consumers.

The conceptualization of agenda setting as an attitudinal effect has led to significant changes in methods employed by researchers. The unit of analysis has shifted from the story to the paragraph, since a typical news story could contain a wide range of attributes but a limited number of issues. With this change, researchers have also linked other theoretical frameworks to agenda setting. The news coverage activates certain previously held information that individuals use to judge objects in the news – much as priming research would argue. The attributes also portray the objects in the news in a certain way, while ignoring other attributes – as framing research would suggest. A news frame is thus a dominant attribute.

4 Modifications to agenda setting: Cognitive to behavioral effects

Another reconceptualization of agenda setting has occurred because of the Internet. The main dependent variable in agenda-setting research has traditionally been

salience – the perceived importance of issues (first level) and attributes (second level). Salience is transferred from the news media to the public through news coverage. The ultimate effect of the news media at the first level thus is a cognitive influence: People learn about society. This cognitive influence is starkly different from earlier studies that typically failed to find much of an influence of the news media on voting behavior – a behavioral effect.

Recent research, however, has attempted to use content from the Internet to measure the public's perceptions. Research has used online forums (Roberts, Wanta & Dzwo 2002) and Twitter, for example, as a surrogate for public opinion. The dependent variable in these studies, it should be noted, differs significantly from the original agenda-setting studies.

Similar to the original hypotheses, research online proposes a cognitive effect: Individuals learn about important issues of the day. Individuals, however, notably take this issue salience one step further: They not only become concerned with issues in the news, but they do something with this knowledge, namely they go to the Internet and voice an opinion.

Thus, online agenda-setting research now examines a behavioral effect. News coverage motivates individuals into action by posting messages online. This agenda-setting behavioral effect would appear to be much more powerful than the original agenda-setting effect.

In addition, the reason individuals are motivated to post messages online is unclear. On the one hand, the motivation could come from the transferal of salience, as suggested in the sense of the traditional agenda-setting research. Exposure to news coverage could increase the level of concern individuals have with certain issues. On the other hand, the motivation could come from interest in a news story. News consumers could see a story that increases interest, but doesn't increase concern.

An example may illustrate the difference. Several years ago, a newspaper ran a news story about an area high school in which female students were chewing tobacco on school grounds. This was a story that could have created a great deal of interest among readers because of its unusual nature. Individuals may have talked about the issue with others and may have posted comments on the newspaper's website. The online postings were the result of interest in the topic. The story, however, was unlikely to increase the perceived importance of an issue. The online discussion thus was due to interest ("Those crazy high school students ...") not salience ("High school girls chewing tobacco is the number one problem facing our country today.").

5 Conclusion

Agenda-setting research has demonstrated remarkable resiliency through nearly 50 years of study. Conceptual and methodological changes have led to new and

intriguing research approaches. Individuals continue to learn the relative importance of issues from news content. The platforms, however, have changed.

Agenda-setting research has been applied to many different topics, and there are five focal points, or branches, for this type of research. The first branch pertains to contingent conditions, and it involves examining characteristics of people, such as demographics, as well as messages in the media agenda, such as degree of abstractness. Second, the sources of the media agenda can be examined for perceived credibility of the media. Third, the policy agenda examines civic action as a result of knowledge acquisition and opinion formation. Fourth, the second level of agenda setting deals with the transfer of the salient affective and cognitive attributes associated with objects that appear in the media to the public agenda. Finally, the third level of agenda setting involves the transfer of salient networks of associated issues from the media to the public agenda.

Agenda setting continues its evolution. With the advent of the Internet and social media, people have many more potential sources for information. The additional news sources hold great potential in ensuring a well-informed, engaged citizenry. The additional sources also provide mass communication researchers with endless possibilities for future fruitful research.

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11 Journalism as Framing

Abstract: This chapter discusses journalism as framing from two standpoints: the scholarly perspective, which describes how elements of a real-world process are investigated via conceptual definitions and theory integration, and the professional perspective, which describes how the frame concept is relegated in newsroom discourse to technical aspects of structuring and visualizing stories but nonetheless is utilized by industry observers to critique journalism's social roles and functions. Based on these discussions, the chapter lays out five ways that journalism practices can inform the academic study of journalism as framing.

Keywords: journalism practice, news framing, framing theory

1 Introduction

When media researchers refer to framing, by and large they are talking about analyzing journalism. The concepts “frame” and “framing” were first applied to journalism forty years ago in two studies of US print and broadcast newsrooms: Gaye Tuchman's (1978) *Making News* and Todd Gitlin's (1980) *The Whole World is Watching*. At the same time, “framing” supported *Bad News*, a project in which the Glasgow Media Group (1976) investigated British television news. Since then, the number of empirical studies on journalism as framing has burgeoned. A host of overview essays and book chapters has kept pace by discussing and reviewing the conceptual definitions, theoretical frameworks, and methodological approaches used in empirical research. A few of these articles advocate a theoretical framework deemed to best capture what news framing is all about.¹ For example, Carra-gee and Roefs (2004) admonished researchers for neglecting power dynamics in newsgathering and called for integrating framing research with the hegemony thesis (see Vleigenthart and Zoonen 2011). Mostly, however, overview essays and book chapters synthesize a patch of the empirical literature or review and critique aspects of news framing. For example, whereas Aalberg, Strömbäck, and de Vreese (2012) concentrated on strategy and game framing of politics, de Vreese and Lecheler (2012) inspected a range of established research areas, discussed

¹ In our usage, the term “news framing” is synonymous with “journalism as framing”. Sometimes news framing is referred to as media framing (D. Scheufele 1999; B. Scheufele 2004). However, news framing is the more accurate term (see D'Angelo 2017).

recent work on the role of emotion in news framing, and reviewed methodological developments.

Stemming from Robert Entman's (1993) important and often-cited essay, the wide application of framing to journalism studies is counterbalanced by the notion that this concept is freighted with psychological and sociological meanings, making it impossible to develop a single theoretical approach. For example, the literature reviews of empirical articles commonly refer to the "fragmentation" theme in a rhetorical effort to propound their purpose. Within edited volumes and journals, essays dedicated to clarifying the richness of news framing analysis become prone to demonstrating its apparent fragmentation. For example, in the prologue to *Framing Public Life*, Reese (2001) propounded a conceptual definition that he articulated both before (Reese & Buckelew 1995) and after (Reese 2010) the publication of that landmark book. Frames are "organizing principles ... that work symbolically to meaningfully structure the social world" (p. 11), making them themes, motifs, and stereotypes that journalists use even when covering day-to-day events in spot news. Yet this culture-based thesis hardly unified the volume's chapters. Furthermore, in the concluding chapter of *Doing News Framing Analysis*, D'Angelo (2010) argued, as he did before (D'Angelo 2002), that discoveries about the real-world process of news framing depend on an approach based on theoretical and methodological diversity. Not surprisingly, the chapters in that volume, like those in *Framing Public Life*, elucidated various ways researchers define framing, theorize it, and conduct news framing analysis.

In our view, the full news framing literature displays a thriving and healthy intellectual enterprise rather than one run aground by fragmentation. The reason why speaks to the first goal of this chapter, which is to remind scholars that a communication approach to news framing analysis relies on theory integration, not on testing a unified set of propositions of something called framing theory. In communication, an intrinsically practical discipline (Craig 1999), researchers are uniquely tasked with attaining systematic understandings of message-based processes by borrowing constructs from other disciplines and crafting them into coherent theoretical frameworks capable of productively guiding empirical inquiry. Knowledge grows when theoretical frameworks and conceptual definitions of key terms are examined, extended, and challenged in research conducted within the discipline's existing and emerging specializations (Babrow 1993). Formal models are integral to these efforts. However, as Rosengren (1993) explained, "Formal models are empty, since they are expressed in terms of logical, mathematical, or statistical language"; thus, "it is very important to let substantive theory, formal models, and empirical data interact in a cumulative, spiraling process of knowledge building" (p. 9). In the discipline as a whole, no single theoretical framework – i.e. model plus conceptual definitions – can map all of the interlocking parts or satisfy all of the theoretical concerns that would derive a universalistic understanding of communication (Craig 1999). Nor do researchers who work within

communication's fields and sub-fields need to whittle the number of theoretical frameworks for knowledge in those specializations to grow.

Accordingly, as a communication perspective on journalism analysis, framing does not presuppose a universal theoretical framework or a single conceptual definition. It is imprudent to take strong steps in those directions, too, as Matthes and Kohring (2008) do in calling for a standardized operational definition at the expense of using conceptual definitions altogether, or as Cacciatore, Scheufele, and Iyengar (2016) do when they call for focusing on a strict definition of framing in terms of equivalency. These stances undermine the conditions for cumulativeness that allow knowledge to grow (Rosengren 1993). One of the main arguments of this chapter, therefore, is that specific conceptual definitions of "frame" and "framing" productively guide empirical research precisely because they heuristically represent elements of the full news framing process (D'Angelo 2012).

As its second goal, this chapter aims to show that building solid theoretical frameworks and constructing competent conceptual definitions depend on how well framing researchers keep pace with journalism. Today, established newsroom routines and professional norms are evolving as a result of challenges and opportunities posed by technological convergence. In response to the steady migration of news outlets to online platforms there has been a concerted effort by academic researchers and industry observers to figure out where journalism's standards and practices are headed (Lasorsa, Lewis & Holton 2012; Peer & Ksiazek 2011; Picard 2014). They give special attention to credentialed journalists, who gravitate to online sources in order to cull information into news. They also focus on audiences, who seek information in an environment where news is abundant, ambient, and participatory (Deuze, Bruns & Neuberger 2007; Hermida 2010, Singer et al. 2011), and in which getting informed depends largely on their perceptions of the technological affordances of news sites and devices (Schröder 2015; Papacharissi 2015; Tewksbury & Rittenberg 2012). Daunting and consequential, these developments beckon news framing researchers to re-envision and adjust theoretical frameworks based on changing conditions.

Based on its two aims, this chapter is divided into two sections. The first section takes an analytical look at journalism as framing, beginning with the vital role that Erving Goffman's work played in connecting micro-sociological conceptions of framing to journalism studies. The section then draws on existing models of news framing in order to define the four main interacting elements of the news framing process. In defense of the proposition that news framing analysis works best via theoretical and methodological diversity, the section goes on to explain how three seminal conceptual definitions of news framing, expansive yet inherently selective, are derived from the elements of this typology.

The second section undertakes something rarely done in overview articles: an extended discussion of analytical elements of news framing from the standpoint of journalism practice. What is immediately apparent in this discussion is that jour-

nalism textbooks and journalists talk about “frame” and “framing” only informally, if at all. Yet these perspectives illuminate fresh opportunities for news framing analysis in light of contemporary conditions and practices.²

2 Journalism as framing: the analytical perspective

The frame concept took root in communication when theorists and researchers in the discipline's fields dipped into intellectual streams within anthropology, sociology, psychology, and rhetoric, in order to understand the structuring power of context in human interactions. Whereas contexts govern situational communication within interpersonal, group, organizational, and cultural settings, contexts also enable messages meant to influence how other people, groups, and organizations think about and act towards people, topics, and issues within those situations. A review of the *Encyclopedia of Communication Theory* (Littlejohn & Foss 2009) indicates how deeply these notions are rooted within the discipline's fields. In interpersonal communication, for example, “frame” supports Tracy's construct *practice* in Action-Implicative Discourse Analysis (pp. 10–11) and Taylor's construct *conversation* in Conversation and Text Theory (pp. 178–179). It also braces Anxiety/Uncertainty Management Theory (pp. 336–338), Conflict Management Theory (p. 167), Communicative Constitution of Organizations (pp. 177–178), Coordinated Management of Meaning (pp. 201–202), and Face Negotiation Theory (pp. 371–374).

Arguably, there was no greater influence on the adaptation of the frame concept to journalism studies than Erving Goffman's (1974) *Frame Analysis*. In this landmark book, Goffman showed how small units of social structure cohered. For this he devised an approach to analyzing “strips” of behavior within social situations at the core of which was the *frame*.

Goffman (1974) defined frames as having two reciprocal dimensions. First, *primary frameworks* are socially sustained classification systems that “vary in their degree of organization” (p. 21). Upon cognitively locating and, at times, mentioning or considering a situation's primary social framework, individuals commit to governing their communication behaviors, verbal and nonverbal, by its rules and norms. A primary social framework “subject[s] the doer to ‘standards,’ to social appraisal of his action based on its honesty, efficiency, economy, safety, elegance, tactfulness, good taste, and so forth” (p. 22).

Second, frames are verbal and nonverbal messages in which a person interprets a situation's primary social framework. Goffman (1974) argued that everyday

² This chapter reviews journalism textbooks but offers no independent data from journalists themselves. Instead, it draws on the newsroom expertise of the second author. Also, we acknowledge the contribution of Emilie Lounsberry, a colleague in the Journalism and Professional Writing department at The College of New Jersey.

life is structured not only when a person follows a situation's primary framework, but also when he or she puts features of it into a particular light, thereby *framing it for others*. To illustrate this process, he described mechanisms, such as keying and fabrication, by which people use messages instrumentally in order to influence how others interpret the situation and behave within it.

Goffman's *Frame Analysis* is regularly cited as a progenitor of the sociological basis of news framing (Borah 2011; Pan & Kosicki 1993; Scheufele 1999). Because Tuchman's framing research in the seminal book, *Making News*, was directly based on Goffman's thesis that interpersonal situations are socially constructed, and because empirical studies occasionally cite Goffman's notion of primary frameworks (Matthes 2009), *Frame Analysis* has an enduring place in the study of journalism as framing. Yet, as Gamson (1985) noted, while Goffman often clipped newspaper and magazine stories for clues about framing in everyday life, he "paid little attention to the framing involved in the reporting of news" (p. 617). Even Tuchman cautioned against applying Goffman's ideas wholesale to news framing analysis, noting that he "explicitly rejects a concern for social organization per se" (pp. 194–195). Hence, she argued, his analytical technique cannot fully illuminate how journalists are constrained by, and actively invoke and interpret, newsroom norms in the course of "transform[ing] everyday occurrences into events" (p. 184).

Ever since Entman (1993) observed that frames are located in communicators, texts, receivers, and culture, a host of overview articles and book chapters, and even a handful of empirical articles, have endeavored to show the analytical components of the news framing process. Formal models include the process models of D'Angelo (2002: 880) and D. Scheufele (1999: 115), along with the modular model of B. Scheufele (2004: 402), all of which use graphical notation to show the interlocking elements and mechanisms of news framing. Sans graphical notation, Nelson and Willey's (2001) list of the "species" of frames (pp. 246–247) is another good example.

Drawing from these models, this section discusses four frames – journalist, audience, issue, and news [content] – that, along with other subordinate frame types, constitute the main elements of the news framing process. Each frame is rooted in the two conceptual dimensions of frames. This makes each one a primary framework for other frames and a setting for instrumental and often strategic message framing by individuals and organizations. Like other model explications, we stress relationships among elements of the process in order to explicate its mechanisms. However, we also discuss specific conceptual definitions of these mechanisms, emphasizing how each one is *not* charged with articulating a single unified theory of news framing. As Reese (2007) stated, "Framing's value does not hinge on its potential as a unified research domain but ... as a provocative model that bridges parts of the field that need to be in touch with each other ..." (p. 148).³ In

³ In this light, news framing analysis can be viewed as a microcosm of the communication discipline's borrowing nature. Indeed, Goffman's *Frame Analysis* is a nonpareil achievement in theory

our view, knowledge of news framing has advanced in what only appears to be a fragmented fashion because the bridging model encourages scholars to draw on diverse theoretical perspectives and build conceptual definitions of “frame” and “framing” tailored to specific elements and mechanisms of the news framing process.

2.1 Elements and mechanisms of news framing

Journalist frames. *Journalist frames* are located within journalists’ thoughts about an issue, person, or event. Brüggemann (2014) defined journalist frames as “cognitive patterns of individual journalists” (p. 63), which is consistent with B. Scheufele (2004), who defined them as “consistent patterns of expectations” (p. 404) and a “consistent bundle of schemata” (p. 405). Functionally, a journalist frame forms a context for understanding, interpreting, and ultimately, expressing the facts of an issue, making it similar to the *issue frames* of sources who associate with journalists because they wish to use news stories as a technological platform for social advocacy and public persuasion. In practice, therefore, a journalist frame is an issue-specific position based on contextual orientations, such as values or belief systems (Nelson & Willey 2001), making it similar to an *audience frame*, another frame type in the news framing process.

In part, what distinguishes journalist frames from issue frames and audience frames, as B. Scheufele (2006) suggested, is that journalistic frames “are not idiosyncratic, but rather [are] established in newsroom discourse” (p. 66). This does not mean that audience frames are unpredictable unless one knows the news diet to which an individual is exposed. Indeed, much research shows that audience frames are a product of individuals’ selectivity of news and interpretation of frames in the news they select (e.g., Baden and de Vreese 2008; Gamson 1992). Rather, unlike audience frames and issue frames, the frame held by a journalist, particularly those who *report news* rather than editorialists and news hosts who are supposed to offer opinions, is not as important in processes of social influence as the conditions in which a journalist’s frame is formed. One reason for this is practical, for the norm of objectivity (discussed later) holds that journalists who report news are supposed to mute their own frames in the texts of stories. This norm, however, masks mechanisms of *frame building* that move the study of news framing beyond bias (i.e. journalism in which journalist frames infuse news), urging analysts instead to study it in terms of news cultures (Schudson 2011).

Frame building refers to the mechanisms through which journalists process information from various sources and transform that information into news

integration, having derived the frame construct from Gregory Bateson’s (1972) work on applied cybernetics and merging it with propositions from micro-level theories of social structure, including strands of phenomenology and symbolic interactionism.

(Scheufele 1999). Frame building has received more scholarly attention recently, though, as we discuss later, work on it still lags behind other areas of news framing analysis. B. Scheufele (2004) suggests that frame building is interactional in nature, forged in organizational settings. Here, what he calls *newsroom frames* develop out of formal and informal communication, creating a culture in which journalists are prone to discuss and evaluate a) organizational structures, such as news beats, b) norms and ideals, such as objectivity and autonomy, and c) journalists' roles, such as information conduit, analyst, and advocate (see Weaver & Wilhoit 1991). Newsroom frames are contexts in which journalists' frames are formed and expressed.

Frame building has also been conceived in macro-level terms as the societal, political, and economic conditions that shape newsroom culture of newsroom frames and journalist frames, which, ultimately, are the mechanisms that shape patterns of content (discussed later) called *news frames* (e.g., D'Angelo et al. 2013; Dunaway & Lawrence 2015; Strömbäck & Dimitrova 2006). Complementing this work are efforts that aim to learn about frame building ethnographically, irrespective of the direct influence of macro-level antecedents. For example, some research has used interview techniques to learn about journalist frames (e.g., Lewis & Reese 2009). Other times, researchers have accessed newsrooms to observe interactions between reporters and editors (e.g., Boesman et al. 2017; Van Hout & Macgilchrist 2010), tested theoretical propositions about how journalists process information they gather from sources (e.g., Brüggemann 2014; Scheufele 2006), and deduced mechanisms by which journalists transform source material into news (Tenenboim-Weinblatt & Baden 2016).

What some scholars refer to as *cultural frames* composed of themes, motifs, and stereotypes are also an important part of frame building research, for they make up the political and social environment surrounding newsrooms (Reese 2010). Although these frames could be considered a category all of their own, they can also be seen as primary frameworks for journalist- and newsroom frames. As Reese (2010) stated, "I regard frames as embedded within a web of culture, an image that naturally draws attention to the surrounding cultural context and the threads that connect them" (p. 18).

Issue frames. *Issue frames* (Nelson & Willey 2001; Sniderman & Theriault 2004) and their kin, *advocacy frames* (Entman 2004; Entman, Matthes & Pellicano 2009), are held and expressed by individuals who construct an argument from *considerations*, which are reasons for favoring one side of an issue over another (Zaller & Feldman 1992). Oftentimes expressed as an *equivalency frame* based on attributes (e.g., frame a positive or negative evaluation of a topic in terms of success/failure) or on goals (e.g., frame the desirability of a goal based on obtaining a gain or suffering a loss) rather than as strict choice-reversed risk options, issue frames come across as opinions or policy statements from individuals, groups, or organizations about a specific issue.

Even though issue frames normally encode valence, they are generally observed and tested as if they were *frames of emphasis*. As Sniderman and Theriault (2004) pointed out, all equivalency frames are “semantically distinct conceptions of exactly the same content” (p. 135). However, in most public affairs contexts, they state, “[I]t is difficult to satisfy this requirement of interchangeability of alternatives outside a narrow range of choices” (p. 135). This point alludes to the fact that not all equivalency frames are the same (Levin, Schneider & Gaeth 1998) – that, in fact, some issue frames encode valence in terms of goals and attributes, which operate differently than choice-reversed risk options commonly studied in work based on prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky 1979).⁴

Issue frames can make strong, *compelling arguments* or weak, ineffectual arguments (Chong & Druckman 2007a). The term “compelling arguments” is often used by researchers who investigate *second-level agenda-setting*, which holds that news framing is a stage of the agenda-setting process (McCombs & Ghanem 2001). There are cogent repudiations to this approach on a theoretical level (Scheufele 2000), one of which questions the proposition that arguments are compelling when they are salient in news coverage. To Chong and Druckman (2007a), for example, a strong frame is not one that “makes the most noise”; rather, “a frame’s strength increases with its perceived persuasiveness” (p. 638). A focus on subtler discursive characteristics, such as emotional content and specific considerations, shifts the focus away from defining frames as “efficient bundling devices of [a topic’s] micro-attributes” (McCombs & Ghanem 2001: 74) toward one that stresses how issue-related arguments hinge on values, belief systems, and other means with which to contextualize facts that stem from naming the issue, making causal assertions about it, and suggesting remedies for social problems it entails (Nelson & Willey 1991). In this vein, strong frames are akin to *strategic frames* (Entman, Matthes & Pellicano 2009), although that term risks confusing strong frames with *strategy frames*, a type of *generic news frame* (discussed later) first observed in political campaign news (Cappella & Jamieson 1997).

Issue frames are seen as being the province of news sources. These are individuals and organizations who: a) wish to persuade others, such as constituents, of the merits of their viewpoint; b) may be part of an organization that itself requires *collective action frames* in order to mobilize and cohere; and c) oftentimes seek the service of para-journalists, such as media consultants and public relations firms, in order to procure the publicizing power of news stories. Although they are frequently “toted” by news stories (Nelson & Willey 2001: 174), issue frames must be

⁴ This is where Cacciatore, Scheufele, and Iyengar (2016) are off the mark. In stating that media framing researchers should focus only on format-based variations of the same topic, they adumbrate that the only purview of framing analysis is *risky choice* valence frames. Thus, they choose the type of equivalency frame that has *the least* to do with journalism, which renders the frame construct largely inapplicable to journalism studies.

distinguished from *news frames* (discussed later) for two reasons. First, issue frames originate from organizations outside of the news media and often work in conjunction with collective action frames to achieve internal goals (e.g., Benford & Snow 2000; Noakes & Johnston 2005). Second, issue frames are often significantly altered after being processed by journalists via newsroom frames (Miller, Andsager & Riechert 1998; Tewksbury et al. 2000).

Audience frames. *Audience frames* and their kin, *cognitive frames* (Scheufele 2004) and *individual frames* (Scheufele 1999) are rooted in a person's mental associations of words and ideas about a topic. According to Druckman (2001), audience frames are *frames in thought*, a term which distinguishes them from *frames in communication* entailed in news frames and issue frames. Typically, audience frames are conceived as being held by receivers of news, or news audiences, rather than by journalists or their sources (Entman 1993).

The terms "thought" vs. "communication", along with the entailment that audience frames are neatly located within the minds of news receivers, present somewhat arbitrary analytical distinctions. "Frame in thought" is a misnomer in the sense that the content of audience frames depends not merely on internal cognitive mechanisms, but rather on social interactions between people who consume news, as well as interactions between those who receive news and those who make it. Frames in thought are expressed in conversations, discussions, and arguments (Price, Nir & Cappella 2005); furthermore, they are shaped, reinforced, and revised as part of one's political socialization (Baden & de Vreese 2008; Gamson 1992; Neuman, Just & Crigler 1992). Nowadays, too, the distinction between those who make news and those who consume it has blurred. Web-based media platforms facilitate public expression of audience frames, allowing erstwhile receivers of news to assume a journalistic role by making their observations available to wider publics, further obscuring the boundaries between "the people formerly known as the audience" and journalists (Rosen 2006).

Nonetheless, there are good reasons to distinguish audience frames from the other three frame types, for while everyone – journalists, sources, and audiences – can be a news consumer in the ecology of news framing, not everyone is beholden to the same framing mechanisms in the course of making and distributing news. For example, although this is still an empirical question, erstwhile audience members who become journalists (e.g., by using social media platforms to report news) are not influenced to the same degree by newsroom frames as professional journalists are. Moreover, whereas issue frames are typically studied in terms of the strategic construction and expression of advocacy viewpoints, audience frames are typically studied in terms of memory and storage (Chong & Druckman 2007a). For these reasons, the study of audience framing is centrally concerned with understanding cognitive mechanisms within individuals exposed to news stories, and ultimately, to news frames.⁵

⁵ Some observers argue that news framing analysis is fixated on cognition, which leads to a narrow interpretation of media effects because it shortchanges notions of media power presumably demon-

Just as not all words or visuals in a news story contribute to a news frame (Entman 1991), not all mental associations constitute an audience frame. Regarding strong frames, for example, one's mental associations become more coherent by virtue of how well they are organized within cognitive nodes, which, as noted before from the standpoint of issue advocates, makes values (Nelson & Willey 2001; Shah, Domke & Wackman 1997) and moral and religious beliefs (Dardis et al. 2008; Domke & Shah 1995) important in determining whether an individual's mental associations rise to the level of a strong frame.

In survey and experimental designs, researchers typically investigate audience frames as learning and opinion outcomes shaped by exposure to news frames. Yet, while news coverage of a topic may *activate* the cognitive nodes that house an audience frame, an individual will not deeply process that information or use it to express an opinion unless s/he deems it to be *applicable* to their own frame (Nelson, Oxley & Clawson 1997; Price, Tewksbury & Powers 1997). Thus, shaped by news coverage and by conversation with others, audience frames are expressed, often with persuasive intent, within deliberative settings that may be interpersonal, technologically mediated, or a combination of the two (Gamson 1992; Neuman, Just & Crigler 1992).

News frames. *News frames* or *media frames*, terms which some scholars distinguish (Brüggemann 2014; D'Angelo 2010) and others do not (D. Scheufele 1999; B. Scheufele 2004), refer to written, spoken, graphical, and visual message modalities that journalists use to contextualize an event, issue, and/or person within one or more stories. In practice, news stories in all media – print, broadcast, and online – routinely blend these modalities together. Yet news framing researchers identify *visual frames* as a special type of modality-based news frame (Coleman 2010). Visual frames lack an explicit propositional syntax (Messaris & Abraham 2001). Hence, articulating their meaning is dependent to one degree or another on spoken and written language. Significant strides have been made to understand the syncretic unit of *visual frames* – e.g., see Graber's (1994) early gestalt coding technique; Choi and Lee's (2006) comparison of scene- and story-level frames; Parry's (2010) analysis of visuals and captions in British news coverage of the 2006 Israeli-Lebanon conflict; and Grabe and Bucy's (2009) analysis of image-bites in political campaign news. Also, researchers continue to figure out how visual frames affect audiences (Arpan et al. 2006; Geise & Baden 2015).

Like issue frames, news frames are *frames in communication* and are typically conceptualized as being *frames of emphasis*. Researchers distinguish between *generic news frames* and *topic-specific news frames*, which they mainly study on word-based modalities of news.

strated when news organizations cover – and frame – events (e.g., Carragee and Roefs 2004; Vliegenthart & van Zoonen 2011).

As the name implies, generic news frames, also called *formal frames* (Scheufele 2004), are generalizable across the myriad events (or “pegs”) journalists use to cover different issues in spot news, sometimes using many “angles” for complicated, contentious, and ongoing issues. Taking into consideration the integral role issue frames play in the news framing process, scholars usually define generic news frames in connection to how sources frame issues.

Specifically, generic news frames contextualize issue frames by virtue of the information-processing mechanisms of journalist frames and the organizational procedures of newsroom frames. Thus, those frames are the analytical basis for understanding a generic frame, not a consideration and related values a source uses when talking about an issue a journalist may cover. Put another way, generic frames are what journalists *do to* issue frames. Iyengar (1991) laid the groundwork for analysis of generic news frames in experiments in which he explored how presentational formats common within journalism, called *episodic vs. thematic news frames* used for spot news and backgrounders, respectively, affect audience attributions of responsibility for causing and fixing social problems. *Strategy* and *issue frames* are another type of generic news frame. First observed by Patterson (1993) and experimentally examined by Cappella and Jamieson (1997), these frames stem from journalist- and newsroom frames that devalue the importance of candidates’ issue positions in their political discourse and instead contextualize campaign events in terms of character, political motivation, and campaign tactics. Other generic news frames are based on time and locality (Muschert & Carr 2006) and on news values, such as conflict and consequences (Price & Tewksbury 1997).

Topic-specific news frames, also called *issue-specific frames* (de Vreese 2005) and *content-related frames* (Scheufele 2004) are similar to generic news frames in they also emerge from journalist frames and newsroom frames. Unlike generic frames, however, they are the journalistic counterpart to sources’ issue frames. Therefore, topic-specific news frames are defined in relation to something journalists do – re: cover issues via “angles” – rather than something sources do, and they are typically observed as facets of a topic or as themes extrapolated from attributes of the topic. For example, in Nisbet’s (2010) typology of eight news frames that often appear in science policy debates, there is an economic-development frame (re: facet of topic) and a conflict/strategy frame (re: theme extrapolated from a topic). This overarching difference masks a common research strategy, however. For both frame types, generic and topic-specific, researchers employ quantitative and qualitative content analytical techniques that rely upon sets of keywords or phrases as the *framing devices* to identify the news frame (D’Angelo 2017).

Researchers preponderantly content analyze and experimentally test topic-specific news frames over generic frames (Borah 2011). Via content analysis, framing researchers observe topic-specific news frames in four main sites: a) within topic domains – e.g., Nisbet’s (2010) science news typology or McLeod and Detenber’s (1999) protest paradigm, b) for key events bounded by start and end dates deter-

mined by real-world circumstances and/or a methodology-based decision (Bennett, Lawrence & Livingston 2006; Watkins 2001), c) for individual issues in which time, key events, or both in *attention cycles*, are built into the design (Nisbet, Brossard & Kroepsch 2003), and d) for individual issues where time and key events are not built into the design, but other external variables are (D'Angelo et al. 2013; Reis 2008). Researchers use both inductive and deductive approaches in this work.⁶

At bottom, the analytical difference between topic-specific and generic news frames is more subtle than stark. Reese (2007) argues that topic-specific news frames lack the organizing and structuring properties evident in generic news frames, making them an artifact of subjective observational techniques. However, because they stem from journalist frames and newsroom frames, topic-specific news frames also signify the structuring capacity of a journalist's own thoughts and of newsroom norms. For example, Reese's own work on the "militaristic" frame in US war coverage (Reese & Buckalew 1995) illustrated how a thematic topic-specific frame germinated in coverage of a specific event. Similarly, Gitlin (1980) showed how journalists "ideologically domesticated" (p. 13) the New Left movement of the 1960s via the specific framing devices of trivialization, marginalization, and polarization.

News framing researchers commonly conceive of generic news frames and topic-specific news frames as being latent structures of meaning. As a result, these frames have been variously characterized as a central organizing idea (Gamson & Modigliani 1989), an organizing principle (Gitlin 1980; Reese 2001), a narrative (Bennett & Edelman 1985; Entman 1991), a macro-attribute (McCombs & Ghanem 2001), an ideology (Hackett 1984), or a story theme (Pan & Kosicki 1993). Photographs and moving scenes, easy to spot in news stories, can also be hard to analyze for their framing functions (Coleman 2010). Thus, *visual icons* that frame an object by virtue of cultural associations are also latent structures of meaning (Aday, Cluverius & Livingston 2005).

2.2 Conceptual definitions of news framing

Conceptual definitions explicate the relationship between two or more types of frames. Many studies adapt existing conceptual definitions of "frame" and "framing", the best of which are expansive and integrative: they bring different frames together and employ other constructs to explain how these frames relate to one another. But even the best conceptual definitions are oriented toward specific types

⁶ These approaches are defined in different ways in the framing overview literature. One key distinction is that, for the inductive approach, researchers do not use a sure-footed theoretical framework to guide the identification of frames, whereas for the deductive approach they do (D'Angelo 2017; de Vreese & Lecheler 2012).

of frames and toward specific ways of defining those frames. Also, the normative purview of a conceptual definition – how journalists should behave professionally, how news should cover topics, and how journalism should treat other institutions – is another source of contingency. Empirical research on news framing cannot proceed without conceptual definitions, even as each one offers a selective portrayal of the full process and purveys a particular normative agenda.

For example, in proposing that news framing operates through a process of cascading network activation, Entman (2003) defined framing as “the central process by which government officials and journalists exercise political influence over each other and over the public” (p. 417; see also, Entman 2004). Illustrated in a formal model, (2003: 419; 2004: 10), cascading activation shows that actors on each level, including political elites, media organizations, and the public, make their contribution to the mix and flow of ideas.

Entman used *networks*, a concept borrowed from social psychology, to refer not only to the composition of audience frames, but also to coherent patterns of public opinion, issue frames, and news frames. Although these applications stretch the conceptual boundary of networks, Entman’s framework coheres because it brings to bear the framing functions he had previously articulated. For each level of cascading network activation, Entman (2003) stated, “Framing entails selecting and highlighting some facets of events or issues, and making connections among them so as to promote a particular interpretation, evaluation, or solution” (p. 417).

Useful and insightful, cascading network activation nonetheless offers a selective theoretical framework of the news framing process, for it glosses over cognitive subroutines of attitude formation (see Chong & Druckman 2007a). Also, it hardly recognizes the role of values in issue framing (Nelson & Willey 2001) and it overlooks some of the newsroom frames that shape how journalists process information from sources (see, e.g., Brüggemann 2014).

Two important studies by Gamson and Modigliani (1987, 1989) also promulgate a conceptual definition of “framing” that is simultaneously encompassing and selective. They locate news framing within “interpretive packages” that compete within an “issue culture” comprised of sponsor activities, news media coverage, and public opinion. Their definition bridges journalist frames, advocacy frames, and news frames: “At [the core of a media package] is a central organizing idea, or *frame*, for making sense of relevant events, suggesting what is at issue” (1989: 3, emphasis in original). Here, “frame” is defined from a *constructionist* standpoint, which stipulates that no single actor commands the frame idea even as all of them struggle to define it (D’Angelo 2002). Journalists, issue advocates, and audiences interpret issues – and articulate frames – by using *framing devices*, such as metaphors and catchphrases, and *reasoning devices*, such as statements about the cause and consequences of the issue.⁷

7 Evidently, these reasoning devices percolated into Entman’s (1993) four functions of frames, illustrating that theoretical integration works through cross-pollination between research agendas.

Gamson and Modigliani's conceptual definition of a media package is often cited in content analyses of news frames (Matthes 2009). Yet it has also been singled out as being too vague to guide empirical inquiry (Entman, Matthes & Pellicano 2009; Matthes & Kohring 2008). This chapter repudiates that argument on grounds that it undermines the vital role theoretical frameworks play in parsing the news framing process into manageable, researchable pieces. Media packages hinge on *interpretation* and *symbolic contests*, constructs that focus theory and research on specific normative concerns, such as why some political elites more than others are able to successfully propound "contestable categories", garner press coverage, and shape public opinion (Edelman 1993).

In a different vein, two important articles by Price and colleagues (Price, Tewksbury & Powers 1997; Price & Tewksbury 1997) tie together journalistic frames, news frames, and audience frames into a single formal model. The model binds journalistic frames to news frames with *news values*. This construct is familiar to most journalists, who learn that conflict, consequences, and human interest make for good story telling. Additionally, the model uses two other constructs, *activation* and *applicability*, to bind audience frames to journalistic and news frames. As discussed under *audience frames*, these constructs refer to a sub-process that begins when an individual's exposure to a news story or series of stories brings to mind topic-based thoughts that include how the topic is being contextualized by news frames. But because individuals "do not slavishly follow the framing of issues in the mass media" (Neuman, Just & Crigler 1992: 77), how they process the news frame depends on the extent to which they judge that their own audience frame is applicable, or relevant to, the framed topic.

Political scientists interested in news framing have expanded the activation-applicability framework of news framing over the past twenty years (see Shah et al. 2009, for a useful summary and formal model). In one major development, issue frames are tied to news frames via *competitive issue framing* (Chong & Druckman 2007a, 2007b; Sniderman & Theriault 2004). This framework references the journalistic norm of *balancing* issue frames in spot news, or coverage of events of the day, and in coverage of ongoing issues or events. Strong issue frames in particular induce predictable patterns of opinion expression. Based on this development, journalism as framing has been defined as the process in which some of a person's prior beliefs about an issue are re-weighted upon exposure to news that purveys "both sides" of an issue in sourced or paraphrased arguments of varying strength (Chong & Druckman 2007a, 2007b). This conceptual definition of framing, useful as it is, is still provisional in light of the fact that it perfunctorily deals with journalist- and newsroom frames.

In sum, conceptual definitions of news framing are rigorous, expansive, and selective guideposts for empirical inquiry. However, as noted, that is not all they are. Conceptual definitions are also bound to normative issues and concerns. For example, whereas Entman's conceptual definition of news framing is motivated by

a concern that framing by political elites tends to abrogate press independence, the definition of Price and colleagues, along with subsequent articulations, deals with a particular democratic assumption – that news must cover public issues fully and accurately for democracy to thrive. Framing researchers are thus concerned with “the perils and possibilities of the news media’s role as a political actor in the deliberative settings of policy making, political and social activism, and campaigns” (D’Angelo 2010: 357). This makes articulating clear theoretical frameworks important.

3 Journalism as framing: the professional perspective

At the core of the news framing process lie journalism, journalists, and news. According to Schudson (2011), *journalism* is “the business or practice of regularly producing and disseminating information about contemporary affairs of public interest and importance” (p. 3). Suitable for our purposes, this definition readily applies to today’s fragmented, high-choice media environment consisting of newspapers and broadcast news, their websites and mobile apps, and online-only news organizations. *Journalists* are the reporters and correspondents, editors and producers, who gather and process information from documents and other people. Produced in story formats and distributed via technological mediation, *news* is “information which is transmitted from sources to audiences, with journalists – who are both employees of bureaucratic commercial organizations and members of a profession – summarizing, refining, and altering what becomes available to them from sources in order to make the information suitable for their audiences” (Gans 1979: 80).

The news framing process pivots around the information-processing behaviors of journalists, the information-dissemination needs of news sources, message patterns in news items, and journalism’s systemic integration into other institutions within society. Most of these elements of news framing are ably illustrated in the theoretical models mentioned earlier. However, the burgeoning scholarly news framing literature consistently points out that work on *frame building* lags behind work in other areas. Research “has not determined how media frames are formed or the types of frames that result from this process”, Scheufele (1999) asserted. More recently, de Vreese and Lecheler (2012) stated, “[T]here is only little systematic information available on how news frames actually emerge” (p. 298). Borah (2011) corroborated these assertions empirically in a content analysis of 379 framing articles published in 93 peer-reviewed communication journals, in which she found that only 2.3% studied frame production directly.

The subtext of the call for more work on frame building is that news framing researchers somehow give short shrift to *journalism*,⁸ even as they are good at a) observing textual and/or visual news frames in coverage of topics, b) testing the direct effects of news frames on audience frames (the *frame setting* phase in D. Scheufele's [1999] model), and c) determining the factors *within* audience frames that moderate and mediate direct effects of news frames (the *individual-level effects* phase in D. Scheufele's [1999] model). Accordingly, one place to look for guidance about how to advance news framing analysis is the journalism profession itself. Admittedly, this is an unlikely source because the framing concept plays a muted role in journalism education, in the work routines of most journalists, and in regulating how journalists interpret newsroom norms when doing their job. However, in this changing and challenging news environment, where established practices and norms meet technological convergence, are avenues for moving news framing research forward.

3.1 News framing in the newsroom

Writing and reporting are a print journalist's core skills. In today's newspaper industry, editors demand flexibility in adapting their stories to online platforms. At a minimum, the Missouri Group (2014) stated, journalists at a growing number of newspapers "are being asked to turn in two versions of their stories, one for the newspaper and one for the paper's website" (p. 243). This illustrates the trend in most newspapers to abandon a once-exclusive dependency on "shovelware", or republishing what will appear in print. Instead, most newspapers have implemented a Web-first (or digital-first) approach that relies upon a still-evolving set of storytelling techniques. Combining "a broadcaster's sense of urgency and immediacy [with] a print reporter's in-depth, detailed approach" (Stovall 2015: 125), reporting for the Web mandates a hybrid approach favoring immediacy (e.g., shorter stories with easy to scan headlines), interactivity (e.g., clickable links to other stories and source documents), and innovative use of multimedia (e.g., clickable audio, graphics, and video packages) (The Missouri Group 2014, ch. 12). As Rich (2016) summarized, "There is no single way to write for the Web" (p. 236).

Openness to experimentation pertains not only to newspaper websites, but also to Web-only sites that have arisen in the beat-oriented tradition of newspapers

8 Borah's (2011) content analysis of framing studies, for example, rarely mentions *journalism*, nor does it explicitly measure whether a study focuses on frames in news stories as opposed to media frames generally (see D'Angelo 2017). The latter, for example, could be examined in health communication research that looks at the content and/or effects of a valence-based frame about a medical procedure published on a medical website. Thus, it appears that, for this content analyses of news framing studies, journalism is a subtext, even though many of the measured variables (e.g., unique vs. consistent/generic frames) are routinely studied in relation to journalism.

(see www.mic.com, www.huffingtonpost.com, www.thedailybeast.com) and in the recent blogging tradition (see www.theconversation.com). It also goes for print-originated Web-only news sites (e.g., Atlantic Media's Quartz at www.qz.com; "The Upshot" at www.nytimes.com/theupshot), for print or broadcast news organizations with separate Web operations (see www.vice.com or www.politico.com), and for online sites with a niche orientation akin to magazine publishing (e.g., www.mic.com and www.alldigitocracy.com). Micro-blogging the news via Twitter feeds from reporters, analysts, and commentators has engendered even more kinds of experimentation. All of these news sources vie for readers accustomed to searching for information on computers and mobile devices, many of whom are "accidental news junkies" who reach news sites through social media feeds on Facebook and Twitter (Thompson 2015).

Online news sources stretch the professional boundaries of journalism yet maintain a connection to journalistic norms. Whether an online site covers news already published in print or aired on broadcast or cable (e.g., www.mediaite.com), publishes original reporting (www.ajplus.net), or does some combination of the two (e.g., www.vox.com), it still falls somewhere within the journalistic tradition based on objectivity, verification, and truth (Kovach & Rosenstiel 2001).⁹ Thus, even after acknowledging the different techniques and aims of web-based reporting, Rich (2016) reminds us that, "Good reporting is similar in any medium" (p. 234). And so, we speculate, are journalists' views about framing across different media.

If asked directly about framing, journalists who work for newspapers, their website counterparts, and most online-only publications would most likely respond that they think of it in terms of structure, as in, "how am I going to frame this story?" Here, the term "framing" loosely refers to the practical matter of constructing a solid lead (or "lede") and appropriate nut paragraph (or "nut graph") for an event, series of events, or issue pegged to an event, any one of which is a typical news topic. Together, the lead provides an angle that hooks the reader's interest, while the nut graph fills in explanatory details related to the 5 W's and one H – who, what, when, where, why, and how – that are meant to hold the reader's interest.

⁹ While we cannot give it full treatment here, the objectivity norm by the mid-20th century had become what Schudson (1978) characterized as "the emblem of American journalism, an improvement over a past of 'sensationalism' and a contrast to the party papers of Europe" (pp. 9–10). However, in light of reporting contentious events, such as the Vietnam War, which were rife with political cross-pressures, what began as a set of procedures for factual, value-free reporting was reconceived within journalism's interpretive community, giving reporters "more discretion in providing background information that assessed the accuracy and implications of the assertions they reported" (Roscho 1976: 51). Operationally, then, the enlarged objectivity norm allowed reporters leeway to incorporate deeper background, context, analysis, and interpretation into "hard" news stories. This laid the groundwork for news to be seen as a means to establish what Kovach and Rosenstiel (2001) call a "practical or functional form of truth" (p. 42).

Pushed to consider how composing a solid lead and nut graph slaps an interpretive frame on occurrences, however, most journalists would be reluctant to see this process in the conceptual terms academics use. Even the thorniest narrative ingredients, the “why” and “how”, while set up in the nut graph, are fleshed out with source’s views and other physical records, journalists would argue. And, “make no mistake about it”, wrote The Missouri Group (2014), “there are hundreds of places to find information” (p. 112). Still, to journalists, stories convey facts not frames. An academic might counter that these source-based facts are seeded with issue frames – and many journalists would concede that they *do* look to sources for purposes of framing, either to suggest one or tell them that their approach to the story in the lead and nut graph is correct. But at this point, the objectivity norm kicks in: Finding and reporting facts becomes a practical matter of judging the expertise of sources and then comparing that expertise against their own evolving knowledge, which is where journalist frames take shape, according to academics. This process reassures journalists that their own views (or frames) do not overtake the writing and the story. It also reproves bad decisions, such as being locked into a position or handling information unfairly.

Interpreting the objectivity norm permits journalists to scrutinize what sources say. This newsroom frame protects them from the perception that they are advocating a source’s ideological commitment to a particular set of facts about an issue. In turn, this frame inoculates reporters from political bias. In fact, to many journalists, the frame concept evokes bias. Reporters who adhere to the norm of independence strive neither to reveal their own political leanings nor to become indoctrinated by their sources.¹⁰ Thus, although academics have long distanced the framing concept from political bias (Entman 1991; Hackett 1984; Schudson 2011), journalists concerned about being politically biased avoid thinking about writing news in terms of framing.

Even when they do not discuss framing, industry observers note how difficult it is for journalists to avoid the appearance of framing in the course of covering and contextualizing issue frames. Take hashtags, which are labels or metadata tags used on social networking and microblogging services. Hashtags designated as event-oriented, humorous, and breaking-news have become an important information source for journalists who work in legacy and online news organizations (Buttry 2012). Meredith Clark, a regular columnist for the Poynter Institute, a non-profit school for journalism, claims that all news organizations should use Twitter and other social media services in order to identify diverse voices, particularly for issues in which hashtags serve an activist role. Hinting at the academic’s contention that news organizations cannot not frame events when they select and cover activ-

¹⁰ Some academics argue that independence encompasses objectivity. “Independence is the core value of journalism – the value from which all of the other values that form journalism’s core functions come to life,” noted Craft and Davis (2016: 214).

ist hashtags (Qin 2015), Friedman (2014) noted, “As activists have clamored to create and promote hashtags to draw attention to their issues – so-called ‘hashtag activism’ – journalists have had to figure out when a Twitter trend merits coverage” (para. 2). In this and other circumstances, treating hashtags as sources lends to the perception that journalists and news organizations are themselves framing an event as a result of inserting them into stories. As Shadi Rahimi (2015), deputy producer for AJ+, a “global news community for the connected generation” (www.ajplus.net), pointed out, “Using either ‘uprising’ or ‘riots’ as a media organization [in our coverage of the Baltimore protests] meant we appeared to be aligning ourselves with a viewpoint” (para. 18).

Regarding photojournalism, the technical connection between framing and photography makes it reasonable to think that photojournalists might consider analytical aspects of framing. Photographs require solid composition and they need to convey meaning. So, photo editors and staff crop still images, caption them with a “cutline”, and place them near stories published in print and online. Yet journalism textbooks merely hint at the role of framing in photojournalism. Stovall (2015) stated, “Composition can be used to arrange the elements so that what is important about the picture – or what the photo[journalist] wants to tell the viewers – is emphasized” (p. 174). Yet the message a photograph is meant to communicate, which is itself a potential news frame, is subsumed by the newsroom norm that photographs are merely meant to contextualize words – to “give life and form to the words journalists use”, as Stovall put it (p. 173).

Framing also has a non-analytical connection to story production with regard to visuals and video in broadcast or streamed news. “The concept of framing simply means understanding what will look good when you turn the camera on”, instructs Stovall (2015: 157). Like print reporting, this nod to framing indicates that visuals play a supportive role in contextualizing spoken words. “Good pictures ... do not need a lot of words – just good ones”, Barnas and White (2013) said, adding, “Fill in the blank, but do not overpower the video” (p. 231).

Moving up the organizational ladder in the television newsroom, the director leading the production crew is the “alter ego and partner in crime” of the producer (Tuggle, Carr & Huffman 2014: 194), who “frames the entire newscast” (Barnas & White 2013: 251, emphasis added). Yet broadcast news textbooks rarely if ever discuss framing with regard to the producer’s tasks, which include setting up a newscast’s rundown and segment blocks, maintaining story flow (re: “peaks and valleys”), pacing anchor voice-overs and reporter “packages”, and keying graphics and other visual production elements.

In sum, journalists in different media and on different rungs of the organizational ladder are comfortable with “framing” as long as it pertains to techniques for structuring and visualizing stories. But they have a hard time with analytical distinctions and theoretical frameworks. Pushed to think about journalism as an exercise in framing, some journalists might concede that stock narrative templates

like conflict and human interest are framing devices. Or, some might agree that framing is involved in the practical matters of recognizing good quotes, constructing a solid lead for a story, or composing a still photograph. Interestingly, some observers feel that framing in the analytical sense could be a prime asset for printed newspapers in the contemporary hyper-competitive news industry. As Meyer (2008) argued, "... the information age has created a demand for processed information. We need [newspapers] to put it in context, give it theoretical framing and suggest ways to act on it" (para. 27). Yet from directors and editors to analysts and contributors to reporters and correspondents, most journalists who think their job is to report facts, curate information, inform audiences, monitor the powerful, sustain communities, find truth, and set the record straight (Kovach & Rosenstiel 2001; The Missouri Group 2014, ch. 1) – that is, journalists whose professional culture and newsroom norms oblige them to value objectivity, skepticism, accountability, and autonomy – would question and even reject the notion that, fundamentally, producing news is an exercise in framing.

3.2 Journalism practice as a context for framing research

Researchers routinely take cues from newsroom norms, routines, and story formats. Yet the admitted blind spot of frame building beckons scholars to re-calibrate how we look *to* journalism – not simply how we look *at* journalism – for ideas going forward.

The logical place to look to for ideas about frame building is at the primary frameworks that journalists in different organizational roles interpret when doing their job. Thus, research should focus on journalist frames and the newsroom frames that surround them. News framing researchers already well aware of this point use methodologies such as newsroom observations and reconstruction interviews to get close to the news production process (e.g., Van Hout & Macgilchrist 2010). Concerted efforts to study journalism as framing ethnographically provide an indispensable complement to findings from surveys, content analyses, and experiments.

Accordingly, we will sketch five ways that journalism practices can inform the study of news framing. First, pay attention to *beats* in order to plan and execute integrative news framing analysis. A beat is essentially a station, often a physical one, such as City Hall, a police precinct, or a sports locker room, where reporters talk to sources and gather news. Beats are more prevalent in newspaper reporting than in local television news, where general assignment reporting mostly occurs. "Covering beats is among the most important work in journalism", wrote The Missouri Group (2014), adding, "... today's reporters are trying to do more, on several platforms, in less time" (p. 287). Even academic studies that focus on frame building tend to ignore how the title of a beat frames the questions reporters ask, the information they solicit, and the generic news frames they use – points that under-

wrote Tuchman's (1978) seminal study. Paying attention to beats could help researchers explore journalist frames in terms of expertise they acquire from interpreting sources' issue frames. Interviews and observational studies could be devised to see how beats invoke newsroom frames, too, because the way a journalist interprets norms like objectivity could shape generic- and topic-specific news frames they use.

Second, pay attention to story *formats* and the *ordering* of stories in order to identify generic news frames and refine methodological designs for studying their effects on audiences. To be sure, significant theoretical advancements have been made along these lines. For example, Shah et al. (2004) clarified framing effects via the "inherently intersecting context" (p. 103) of thematic/episodic frames and other generic frames; Gross (2008) found that framing effects of thematic/episodic frames were mediated by the emotions they engendered within individuals. However, content analysts and experimentalists tend to lose track of conventions born from journalistic frames and newsroom frames that give rise to patterns of generic news frames within print, television, and online news. For example, newspapers commonly layer a story (on the same page or within the same section) about the details of an episode alongside one that covers its historical background and/or its sociological trends. Online story links work this way as well. In television news, a reporter's package, or set-up story, will cover an event, followed by a segment in which a panel of experts, including analysts and contributors who work for the network, discuss issues related to the event. Important advancements in news framing analysis lie in mapping the format landscape of generic frames, linking formatting principles to newsroom frames, and examining effects of these frames on audience frames.

Third, pay attention to ways that television news producers and reporters blend spoken content with still photographs and moving images in the course of making anchor voice-overs (some with SOT's, or sound bites) and reporter packages. As noted, textbooks teach that matching words and visuals relies on the deft art of burnishing what is seen with what is said. In some respects, this practice dovetails with scholars' conceptions of visual framing. Yet researchers overlook much of what actually happens in the visual-rich environments of network, cable, and online news. For example, journalist- and newsroom frames could be evident in conventions by which on-air interviewers use video segments as the basis for questions to sources. Also, the technique of continuously looping video during breaking news (re: "wallpapering") requires more attention insofar as the words often will not directly refer to the visuals.

Fourth, pay attention to *frame distribution* in today's media-rich, high-choice news environment. Frame distribution starts when stories originating in newspapers and on television news are put on company websites and then grabbed by an aggregator and/or covered by an online site. This process brings the audience squarely into play, for just as in days past when people physically shared a news-

paper, in the contemporary news environment of search engines and social media, people can now easily access and share news items (Tewksbury & Rittenberg 2012). Frame distribution opens up many possibilities for work on frame building. For example, it is important to examine whether news frames change in form and/or intensity when print and TV journalists, along with Web technicians, reconfigure stories for company websites in the mode of “digital-first” (e.g., Keith, Schwalbe & Silcock 2009). Also, since “most readers want stories tailored to take advantage of the Web’s considerable power” (The Missouri Group 2014: 244), it is important to understand how leads, nut graphs, and storyboards – places where news frames reside – are fleshed out with links, multi-media, and social media markers, all in order to create “the mosaic [that will] attract readers” (p. 248) used to valuing interactivity and innovation when consuming news on mobile devices. Finally, because frame distribution allows the audience to participate in news production (Singer et al. 2011), it is important to investigate not only how people make news via blogs, Twitter, and other social media, but also how they are influenced by messages that introduce, link to, or accompany news that otherwise frames topics, events, and issues (Scholl et al. 2016).

Fifth, pay attention to *metacoverage* for clues about ways that legacy and online news sites inspect *how* journalists cover events and issues. Research has already shown that the framing concept applies to news in which aspects of news organizations and patterns of news coverage are themselves part of the story (e.g., Esser and D’Angelo 2003). And, while a cottage industry of work within the framing approach (e.g., Wise & Brewer 2010; de Vreese & Elenbaas 2008) and outside of it (e.g., Berkowitz 1992) has explored news about journalism, scholars should take heed of its accelerated pace in today’s crowded news environment. Metacoverage extends and interprets journalistic objectivity. It is a sign that accountability and transparency are at a premium when news organizations proliferate and journalistic standards quiver as a result. A good place to look for relevant news items is online news sites, some of which actively purvey the view that news media ignore certain stories and story angles (e.g., www.rawstory.com). This makes metacoverage a regular feature on them – e.g., www.fusion.net’s remarkable coverage of the Orlando shootings (e.g., Wile 2016). Much can be learned about journalist frames, newsroom frames, cultural frames, issue frames, and audience frames by looking to the very sources that provide the texts for analysis.

4 Conclusion

“Framing is as central a concept as there is in the study of news”, Schudson (2011) summarized. “[T]o acknowledge that news stories frame reality is also to acknowledge that it would be humanly impossible to avoid framing” (p. 29). This chapter contributes to the lively overview literature that reflects on the body of empirical

literature and on the body of overview articles. One aim of this chapter was to elucidate the elements of the news framing process, thereby encouraging researchers to analyze those pieces with integrative theoretical frameworks. Here, we agree with Shah et al. (2009: 93–94) that standardizing conceptual and operational definitions can be a good idea – but only under conditions that encourage the accumulation of knowledge. These conditions are maintained and strengthened when theoretical frameworks generate research on facets of the news framing process, all while competing with one another in light of empirical findings.

This chapter also provided scholars with a direct perspective on journalism as framing from the standpoint of the news profession. It might seem odd to think that such a perspective is even necessary, for all news framing studies say something about journalism in their literature review, methodology, results, and interpretation of results. However, just as journalists shy away from analytical perspectives on frame and framing, scholars tend to lose track of the myriad ways that journalistic practices could inform the research process. We do not need to impute our analytical frameworks on the people and organizations we study in order to learn something from them about the processes our frameworks bring to light.

Further reading

Two edited volumes provide a solid foundation on journalism as framing: *Framing Public Life: Perspectives on Media and our Understanding of the Social World* (2001, edited by Stephen D. Reese, Oscar H. Gandy, Jr., and August Grant), and *Doing News Framing Analysis: Empirical and Theoretical Perspectives* (2010, edited by Paul D’Angelo and Jim A. Kuypers). Other excellent books include those by Robert Entman, *Projections of Power: Framing News, Public Opinion, and U. S. Foreign Policy* (2004, University of Chicago Press), and Douglas M. McLeod and Dhavan V. Shah, *News Frames and National Security: Covering Big Brother* (2015, Cambridge University Press).

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Edson C. Tandoc Jr.

12 Journalism as Gatekeeping

Abstract: Gatekeeping is a popular and enduring metaphor in journalism studies. It has been conceptualized as a journalistic role, a model that describes the flow of news, and a theory that explains the process of news selection. Gatekeeping refers to the process of how bits of information pass through a series of gates and end up in the news. But aside from describing the complex process of news construction, gatekeeping is also a concept imbued with normative assumptions. Coined at a time when news audiences had a limited choice of news sources and journalists had limited space for their news outputs, gatekeeping had important implications and consequences on what pieces of information ultimately reached the public. However, the digitization of news has weakened, if not eradicated, such constraints. News audiences now actively take part in news construction and distribution, breaking journalists' monopoly over news. Information about newsworthy events now flow through *both* journalists' and audiences' channels. This has important implications on how we understand and value gatekeeping.

Keywords: field theory, gatekeeping, journalism, news, news construction, social media

The news construction process has been described using a number of metaphors (Mindich 1998). News has been described as a mirror of society (Vos 2011); news work has been described as a filter (Herman & Chomsky 2002); news gathering has been said to function as a net (Tuchman 1978). A popular and enduring metaphor that both journalism scholars and practitioners use is *gatekeeping* (Shoemaker & Vos 2009). The gatekeeping metaphor has been used in a number of ways. It has been used to refer to a journalistic role (Janowitz 1975), to a model that illustrates the flow of news (Bennett 2004), and to a theory that explains the process of news selection (Shoemaker 1991). Since it was first used to describe journalism (White 1950), gatekeeping has spawned a significant amount of research, and even in a period when its relevance, or even appropriateness, is being challenged (Bruns 2005), gatekeeping remains a popular metaphor employed to understand and study journalism (Vos & Heinderyckx 2015).

The concept of gatekeeping “seems to have become so much a part of the definition of journalism” (Singer 1997: 73). It describes “the process of culling and crafting countless bits of information into the limited number of messages that reach people each day” (Shoemaker & Vos 2009: 1). The first study to use the term gatekeeping in a journalism context focused on Mr. Gates, a wire editor, who selected and discarded news items supplied by wire services, thereby controlling which foreign news stories ended up in his newspaper (White 1950). But journalism has

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changed so much since then. When police officers finally arrested the second suspect in the Boston Marathon terror attack in April 2013, it was the Boston Police's Twitter account that broke the news first, ahead of any journalist or news organization in the United States (Keller 2013). This newsworthy information bypassed the news gates that used to be under the sole control of journalists. In a period when news sources and audiences can directly communicate with one another through digital platforms such as social media, journalists' relationship with their sources and audiences is also shifting (Hermida 2011; Tandoc & Vos 2015). If journalism practice is changing, should the metaphors used to describe it change as well? This chapter provides an overview of gatekeeping research in journalism studies and examines its relevance and appropriateness to describe and explain a news construction process that is constantly evolving. It traces the origin of gatekeeping as a concept in journalism studies, proposes a mechanism to explain how gatekeepers become susceptible to influences, and provides a framework to understand gatekeeping through both journalist and audience channels.

1 Opening the gates

Scholars use metaphors to explain what they study. Journalists themselves use metaphors even in ordinary conversations to describe what they do (Mindich 1998). The use of these metaphors is influenced – and at the same time can also influence – journalistic norms and practices (Vos 2011). For example, the mirror metaphor – that news is a mirror of society – was initially construed as referring to news as a means of self-reflection for society, but it was later used to refer to the long-discarded assumption of news passively reflecting social events (Vos 2011). Thus, how the mirror metaphor came to be widely understood reinforced the norm of objectivity (Mindich 1998). Others also described news work as a filtering process. The filter metaphor refers to how raw materials for news pass through a series of filters until only the cleansed residue remains (Herman & Chomsky 2002). News gathering has also been described as a net, explaining how journalists retain some information and let go of others (Tuchman 1978).

Kurt Lewin, a psychologist, is considered the first to use the metaphor of gatekeeping. Lewin initially used it to describe how food ends up on the dining table (Shoemaker & Vos 2009). In his original model, Lewin argued that food items pass through either the buying channel or the gardening channel before ending up on the dining table. These channels are each divided into sections where food items enter (Shoemaker & Vos 2009). For example, food passing through the buying channel will have to be discovered in a grocery store, bought, and transported home. Some items will have to be stored in the fridge, others in the cupboard. Food items enter through each section via gates. These gates are governed by a gatekeeper, such as a housewife deciding which dish to prepare, or by a set of

impartial rules (Shoemaker & Vos 2009). The cook ultimately decides, based on a variety of factors, what to prepare, what items to include, and how to present these items. Therefore, “gatekeeping involves not only the selection or rejection of items, but also the process of changing them in ways to make them more appealing to the final consumer” (Shoemaker & Vos 2009: 12–13). In a manuscript prepared before he passed away, Lewin applied the metaphor of gatekeeping to the movement of news items through communication channels (Shoemaker & Vos 2009; White 1950).

David Manning White, who had worked as Lewin’s research assistant at the University of Iowa, built on this conceptualization. In the first empirical study to use the concept of gatekeeping in a journalism context, White (1950) asked a wire editor, whom he referred to as Mr. Gates, to keep all wire news stories he decided not to publish, and write an explanation for each rejection. White (1950: 384) considered Mr. Gates as the final “gate keeper” in his local paper who was “faced with an extremely complicated set of decisions to make regarding the limited number of stories he can use.” Based on his analysis of Mr. Gates’ reasons for rejecting wire copies, White (1950: 390) pointed out “how highly subjective, how based on the ‘gatekeeper’s’ own set of expectations the communication of ‘news’ really is.” White’s (1950) work would ultimately be considered pioneering in news production studies, introducing gatekeeping into journalism research’s lexicon. Snider (1967: 419) replicated the study by asking the same Mr. Gates to do the same thing 17 years later, finding that “Mr. Gates still picks the stories he likes and believes his readers want.” A similar study was conducted involving a female wire editor and found that Ms. Gates’ decision-making pattern was very similar to Mr. Gates (Bleske 1991).

But questions on the original gatekeeping study’s methodology and conclusions were raised early on. Gieber (1956) expanded White’s (1950) study by focusing on the work of 16 wire editors, concluding that wire editors were passive gatekeepers. Instead: “The press association has become the recommender of news to the wire editor and thus the real selector of telegraph news” (Gieber 1956: 432). McNelly (1959) also argued for a focus on news correspondents, whom he considered as among the “intermediaries” between events and readers. “The most important gatekeeping,” McNelly (1959: 24) argued, “is done before the news reaches the wire editor of a newspaper.” In pointing out the limitations of the original gatekeeping research, these studies also identified other gatekeepers in other sections of the news construction process.

White (1950) referred to the process of how news ended up on the newspaper when he applied Lewin’s gatekeeping concept to journalism. But Bass (1969) argued that the gatekeeping of news should refer to how news reading and viewing gets decided at home. Specifically, he argued that a “true transfer” of Lewin’s gatekeeping metaphor in food flow to news flow would have been in explaining “the family news obtaining pattern” (Bass 1969: 71). Brown (1979: 595) also argued that

since White's (1950) use of Lewin's gatekeeping metaphor, "elements of the original concept have been ignored or interpreted in a manner which renders some of the findings questionable." These critiques added to a more nuanced understanding of gatekeeping. For example, Bass (1969) argued that news processing should be differentiated from news gathering while Brown (1979) proposed a segmentation of news production into extraction, concentration, purification, and product formulation. In doing so, these studies helped further clarify what constituted gates in the news construction process by identifying specific sections into which pieces of information flow (Brown 1979).

2 From role to theory

Notwithstanding the early critiques, White's (1950) seminal gatekeeping study successfully introduced the gatekeeping metaphor to journalism studies. In one of the early studies on journalistic roles, Janowitz (1975) referred to a dichotomy between gatekeeper and advocate roles. "The gatekeeper orientation emphasized the search for objectivity and the sharp separation of reporting fact from disseminating opinion" (Janowitz 1975: 618). In contrast, the advocate role, which arose out of criticisms of the gatekeeper role in the 1960s, referred to journalists participating in the advocacy process (Janowitz 1975). This work, to a large extent, equated gatekeeping to exercising the norm of objectivity. Such a link was consistent with the normative assumption that efficient gatekeeping results in unbiased news, an assumption that would shape subsequent conceptualizations of gatekeeping.

Conceptualizing a gatekeeping role was also consistent with White's (1950) focus on an individual wire editor as a gatekeeper. However, gatekeepers operate within a more complicated communication process. Westley and MacLean (1957) offered a communication model that incorporated Lewin's gatekeeper. They argued that gatekeepers "serve as agents" of message receivers or the public "in selecting and transmitting non-purposively the information [they] require, especially when the information is beyond [their] reach" (Westley & MacLean 1957: 38). They also highlighted the role of feedback from message receivers in influencing both message senders and gatekeepers (Westley & MacLean 1957).

Shoemaker (1991) expanded Westley and MacLean's (1957) model by focusing not only on gatekeepers and feedback, but also on internal and external influences on the news construction process. She "returned to Lewin's holistic approach" by introducing levels of analysis of gatekeeping (Shoemaker & Vos 2009: 113). These levels range from the individual journalist to larger social systems (Shoemaker & Reese 1996). Shoemaker's (1991) book renewed interest in gatekeeping that culminated in the publication of an updated version (Shoemaker & Vos 2009) that stabilized gatekeeping's place in journalism research. The updated version also finally referred to gatekeeping as a *theory* (Shoemaker & Vos 2009).

3 Levels of analysis

Gatekeeping is originally a theory of news selection. It describes the process of how bits of information about issues and events pass through a series of gates, get transformed in the process, and end up in the news (Shoemaker & Vos 2009). Gates refer to “decision or action points” (Shoemaker & Vos 2009: 15). For example, a reporter decides whether to cover a particular event or not. If the reporter decides not to attend the event, then it is less likely that any information from that event will enter the news process, at least for the news organization that the reporter is part of. This process, which occurs prior to reporters making a formal pitch to their assignment desks, is an action point and represents a gate. The reporter functions as the gatekeeper of this particular section.

Gatekeepers can close or open the gates, thereby constraining or facilitating the flow of information. They operate under several layers of influences that might affect their intention and capacity to close or open the gate. For example, Gans (1979) classified seven considerations that affected news selection: source, substantive, product, value, political, commercial, and audience considerations. Gatekeeping theory identifies five levels of analysis. These levels are parallel to what Shoemaker and Reese (1996) had classified as the five levels of influences on news: from the micro to the macro level, ranging from the individual, to the routine, organizational, extra-media, and social system levels. Influences on gatekeepers are supposed to operate in a hierarchy. A hierarchical structure argues that “these forces operate simultaneously at different levels of strength in any shaping of media content” (Reese 2001: 179). Many studies using gatekeeping theory actually focus mostly on its classification of five levels of analysis. Thus, gatekeeping theory has been used in many studies that did not explain or predict news selection. Instead, these studies explored influences on journalists’ beliefs, attitudes, role conceptions, and news practices (e.g., Agarwal & Barthel 2015; Canter 2013; Cassidy 2006; Tandoc, Hellmueller & Vos 2012).

3.1 Individual level

The individual level looks at “how the characteristics, knowledge, attitudes, and behaviors of individual people affect the gatekeeping process” (Shoemaker & Vos 2009: 33). For example, the Mr. Gates studies found that an editor’s personal preferences, such as his dislike for the Catholic Church, influenced his news selection (Snider 1967; White 1950). Gender also influences editorial decisions: Female editors tend to encourage positive news reporting and do not differentiate between male and female reporters when assigning beats, unlike in male-dominated newsrooms (Craft & Wanta 2004). Male journalists in Iraq reported higher levels of perceived danger than did females (Kim 2010). A survey of journalists in Iraq also

found that younger journalists and those who have higher educational attainment levels tend to have stronger attitudes about access to government meetings than their older and less educated counterparts (Relly, Zanger & Fahmy 2015).

3.2 Routines level

The second level focuses on routines, defined as the “patterned, repeated practices and forms media workers use to do their jobs” (Shoemaker & Reese 1996: 105). Fishman (1988: 14) described routines as the “crucial factor which determines how newswriters construe the world of activities they confront.” For journalists who are confronted with an overload of expected and unexpected events and pieces of information, routines make their jobs more manageable (Tuchman 1972). News values, or elements that supposedly guide journalists in deciding what counts as newsworthy, such as timeliness and prominence (Harcup & O’Neill 2001; Shoemaker & Vos 2009), also operate at the level of journalistic routines. News principles, such as adhering to the norm of objectivity, also form part of journalistic routines, enabling journalists to make their jobs easier and avoid legal complications, such as facing libel suits (Tuchman 1972). Shoemaker and colleagues (2001) did a content analysis of news articles about bills filed in the United States Congress and conducted surveys of the reporters who wrote those news articles and the news editors of the organizations that published the articles about those bills. They found that editorial level preferences – and not individual characteristics of reporters who wrote about the bills – were correlated with the amount of coverage each bill got (Shoemaker et al. 2001). They concluded that routine level influence exerted a stronger effect on news selection than did individual level influences (Shoemaker et al. 2001). Cassidy (2006) also argued that perceived routine level forces, such as the influence of peers and supervisors, exerted more influence than individual-level forces on the professional role conceptions of online and newspaper journalists.

3.3 Organizational level

The third level refers to the influence exerted by the organization, referring to factors such as an organization’s size, structure, or orientation. Breed (1955) argued that journalists get socialized into the news organizations they belong to. This happens through organizational policy, which can either be explicit or covert (Breed 1955). Berkowitz (1990) advocated a move away from the individual-level focus of earlier gatekeeping studies to focus more on editorial decision-making as a “group process” constrained by organizational factors, such as an organization’s newscast format. For example, Beam (2003) found that newspapers with high market orientation tend to publish more lifestyle and sports stories, and fewer news items on

government and public affairs, than newspapers with low market orientation. Medium was also found to be related to content decisions (Maier 2010) and even to journalists' role conceptions (Tandoc & Takahashi 2013).

3.4 Extra-media level

The fourth level refers to “influences on content from outside of media organizations” (Shoemaker & Reese 1996: 175). Shoemaker and Vos (2009) called this the social-institutional level of analysis, referring to factors such as the degree of market competition; pressure from sources, interest groups, public relations people, advertisers, and the government; and influence of the audience. For example, Yoon (2005) found that how journalists perceived the legitimacy of public relations organizations influenced coverage of those firms. Where news organizations are located can also influence news content. McCluskey and colleagues (2009) found that newspapers in less pluralistic communities tend to be more critical of protests than newspapers in high pluralistic communities. Newspapers in high pluralistic communities tend to quote protesters more frequently than do newspapers in low pluralistic communities (McCluskey et al. 2009). Newspapers in communities that support the current President also tend to cover that President frequently (Eshbaugh-Soha 2008). While characteristics of communities can be considered as extra-media influences, especially when it comes to studying journalism markets, patterns that cut across communities, such as pluralism, can be considered as social system level influences.

3.5 Social system level

The fifth level refers to the social system. In the original hierarchy of influences model, Shoemaker and Reese (1996) identified the fifth level as ideology. For example, one of the filters that raw materials of news must pass through, according to Herman and Chomsky's (2002) propaganda model of news, is the anti-communism ideology prevalent in the United States before the collapse of the Soviet Union. But Shoemaker and Vos (2009) argued that the social system level of analysis involves more than the influence of ideology. They argued that this level refers to “society-level influences on news media content – those influences include social structure, ideology, and culture” (Shoemaker & Vos 2009: 105). For example, Hanitzsch and Mellado (2011) compared survey responses of journalists in 18 countries and found that journalists in less democratic countries perceived stronger political influences on their news work than did journalists in democratic countries. A survey of Washington correspondents also found that journalists working for organizations based in the United States tend to enact the disseminator role while correspondents reporting for news organizations outside the United States tend to enact the mobilizer

and adversarial roles (Tandoc, Hellmueller & Vos 2012). But while social systems have been traditionally defined as countries with specific boundaries, they can be smaller or bigger than nation-states, as long as scholars can argue how a specific social system is being studied holistically (Shoemaker & Vos 2009).

The hierarchy of influences model is both parsimonious and elegant but it is constrained by lack of empirical support. There is an issue on how the different levels relate to one another. For example, Shoemaker and Reese (1996) arranged the chapters of their book on influences on media messages from the individual level to the ideology level. But in the third edition of their book, they reversed the order of how they presented the five levels of influences, acknowledging that “the sequence of these levels can be approached in different directions, and we don’t mean to single out any one level as more powerful than another” (Shoemaker & Reese 2013: 8). Furthermore, only a few studies sought to test the hierarchical relationship among influences. Studies have explored one or two levels at a time, limited by the challenges of empirical observation at multiple levels, only arguing which level exerted stronger influences and not exploring if these levels interact or mediate each other’s effects.

There is also disagreement on which level exerts the most influence. Gans (1979) had argued that source considerations influence journalists the most. Bissell (2000) argued that routine forces were most influential in the selection of local photos to publish. Shoemaker and colleagues (2001) found that editors’ preferences, not individual characteristics of reporters, were related to coverage of congressional bills. Cassidy (2006) also found that perceived routine level influences strongly predicted the role conceptions of American newspaper and online journalists. However, Kim (2010) found that individual level factors were the most salient in explaining the perceptions of danger among Iraqi journalists.

4 A mechanism of influence

The “purpose of a theory is to explain or predict” (Shoemaker, Tankard & Lasorsa 2004: 112). Gatekeeping theory offers a simple prediction: Bits of information that successfully pass through all the gates become part of the news. But gatekeeping theory also offers a complex explanation to how news gets selected: Bits of information pass through a series of gates controlled by gatekeepers who operate under several layers of influences. Gatekeeping studies have identified various influences on gatekeepers’ attitudes, beliefs, and decisions. However, theorizing on the *mechanism* with which this influence on gatekeepers comes about remains scarce. “Because of this, a general impression from previous theorizing is that the media are always susceptible to influences, but journalists are also capable of resisting them” (Tandoc 2014: 561). Specifying the mechanism of how journalists get influenced will lead to a more realistic representation of the gatekeeping process.

Specifying mechanisms increases a theory's "suppleness, precision, complexity, elegance, or believability" (Stinchcombe 1991: 367). This is an alternative to the so-called "black-box" explanation, where a particular variable is said to exert an effect on an outcome variable without explaining *how* and *why* the effect comes about (Hedström & Swedberg 1998). Theorizing and even empirical studies in gatekeeping have suffered from this omission. Studies would identify a level of influence as exerting effects on news content, but they would not identify *how* the influence comes about. Thus, a study that sought to explain how journalists integrated web analytics in their news work proposed a "mechanism of influence" based on concepts borrowed from field theory (Tandoc 2014: 562).

Shoemaker and Vos (2009) had earlier pointed out the link between field theory and gatekeeping. Lewin himself had referred to field theory in some of his work, conceptualizing the "field" as the "complex environment in which a phenomenon occurs" (Shoemaker & Vos 2009: 112). This is demonstrated in his food gatekeeping model, which accounts for the different channels and sections of how food gets to the dining table. Lewin, considered a father of social psychology, argued that behavior was the function of *both* the person and the environment (Martin 2003). This holistic approach is retained as field theory reached journalism studies through the work of several other sociologists, such as Pierre Bourdieu (Benson & Neveu 2005; Neveu 2007). Bourdieu (1998: 39) described the journalistic field as a "microcosm with its own laws, defined by its own position in the world at large and by the attractions and repulsions to which it is subject from other such microcosms." A field is a site of struggle, as agents compete to either preserve or transform it.

The concept of capital is central to field theory. It refers to "the specific forms of agency and prestige within a given field" (Sterne 2003: 375). These forms of capital enable agents to participate in the struggle (Handley & Rutigliano 2012), differentiating one agent from the other in terms of relative power. Field theory refers to two main forms of capital: economic and cultural (Benson 2006; Benson & Neveu 2005). Economic capital refers to money or assets transformable into money (Benson 2006) and is considered as the dominant capital in most fields. In journalism studies, it has been operationalized in terms of advertising revenues, circulation rates, television ratings, and audience size (Benson 2006; Benson & Neveu 2005; Siapera & Spyridou 2012). Cultural capital refers to possession of competence in a socially valued area (Sallaz & Zavisca 2007), often operationalized as possession of journalistic excellence or quality as conferred by professional or academic groups, such as the Pulitzer Prize in the United States (Benson 2006; Benson & Neveu 2005). However, other scholars have defined it in terms of accumulated knowledge that can come in embodied, objectified, or institutionalized forms (Bourdieu 1986; Siapera & Spyridou 2012). Skills and educational credentials of online journalists, for example, have been used to assess the cultural capital of the online journalistic field (Siapera & Spyridou 2012). Thus, cultural capital refers to "such things as educational credentials, technical expertise, general knowledge, verbal abilities, and artistic sensibilities" (Benson 2006: 190).

These different forms of capital are also used to amass more capital, which can elevate one's position in the field. News organizations, for example, would call attention to the journalism awards they win, a form of cultural capital, to bolster their reputation, attract more readers, increase circulation, and generate more advertising revenues, which are forms of economic capital. Benson and Neveu (2005: 4) argued that "organizations who dominate the field are those successful in converting one form of capital into the other." Since journalists are rational agents (Fengler & Russ-Mohl 2008), they have perceptions of how much capital they need to dominate in the struggle within the field. Therefore, journalists "become susceptible to influences from various levels when they experience or perceive some form of instability in their capital accumulation" (Tandoc 2014: 562).

Instability can refer to either a perceived increase or decrease in capital. For example, a journalist wanting an exclusive story – a form of increasing one's cultural capital – might be more susceptible to the influence of a particular source. A journalist who does not earn enough from journalistic work might also be more susceptible to accepting bribes. This explication of the mechanism of influence into perception of capital instability also allows the study of how influences from different levels interact. For example, resisting pressure from an advertiser who wants an unfavorable story removed might result in a decrease in economic capital if the advertiser eventually stops buying ad space, but it might also result in an increase in cultural capital since upholding editorial autonomy can boost a news organization's credibility among its audiences and peers. Thus, news organizations and journalists have to weigh how influences at various levels affect the overall stability of their accumulated capital.

Studies focusing on gatekeeping influences can build on this mechanism of influence in explaining and even testing the relative impact of different forces influencing the news construction process. Of course, not every single decision a journalist makes is based on an objective determination and prioritization of increase or decrease in one's capital. Indeed, journalists are socialized in their newsrooms, and part of that socialization process is the valorization of particular forms of capital. For example, the normative divide between editorial and advertising prioritizes cultural capital over economic capital, at least for journalists. Such norms in the field, along with the peculiar contexts where gatekeeping decisions have to be made, affect the way journalists perceive capital instability, which then affects how susceptible they become to particular influences.

5 Gatekeeping in transition

The original gatekeeping study was conducted in a period when the newspaper was still the dominant news source. News selection then was crucial, for the newspaper had a limited number of pages. That meant editors, such as Mr. Gates, had

to reject some news stories. The number of news outlets was also limited. Thus, news gatekeeping practices largely determined the range of news articles that had the opportunity to reach the public. Gatekeeping had to be studied and examined: “Channel scarcity not only justifies gatekeeping practices themselves, but also demands particular scrutiny of these practices: the power and influence of editors over the news agenda is inversely proportional to the number of available news channels” (Bruns 2011: 119). But the journalistic field has changed so much since then (Vos & Heinderyckx 2015). Some scholars argued, “it is high time to reassess, rethink and remodel the concept of gatekeeping at a moment in history where the empirical basis on which the original study was made has vanished” (Bro & Wallberg 2015: 102).

News websites and even round-the-clock cable news channels are now seldom confronted by the space constraints that limited newspapers. Instead, the problem now for many of these news organizations is filling web pages or airtime with enough news stories. The number of news sources has also increased dramatically. Outlets that do not produce original news articles but instead just aggregate what others have produced have successfully emerged (Bruns 2005). Some members of the public also take part in controlling news dissemination by becoming “active recipients” (Hermida 2011: 179), recommending articles to their friends by sending emails or sharing them on social media. Bruns (2005) referred to these practices as *gatewatching*, or the “observation of the output gates of news publications and other sources, in order to identify important material as it becomes available” (Bruns 2005: 17). News audiences also now engage in news production by sharing information about events they witness first-hand. They have become “producers” (Bruns 2005: 2), being consumers and producers of news at the same time.

Shoemaker and Vos (2009: 125) proposed a revision to gatekeeping theory to add what they called the “audience channel”. They argued that “we must conceptualize readers as having their own gate, and they send news items to others in the audience when the interaction between newsworthiness and personal relevance is strong enough” (Shoemaker & Vos 2009: 124). Bro and Wallberg (2015) proposed three models to represent how gatekeeping had changed. The first model puts journalists between decision-makers and citizens in a linear communication process. In this model, journalists deliver news from decision-makers to citizens. The second model is a non-linear process, where journalists connect decision-makers to citizens and vice versa. The third model links decision-makers and citizens directly. Such a link is facilitated by the affordances of new technologies, such as social media. Furthermore, the third model considers that “the traditional news media might be gradually eliminated as the prime intermediary between private citizens and authoritative decision-makers” (Bro & Wallberg 2015: 99). Does this point to an elimination of gatekeeping?

Gatekeeping is in transition, but “transition is not termination” (Vos 2015: 11). For example, many legacy news organizations are holding on. News producers

have moved to social media, but news organizations are also increasingly becoming present in those spaces. Some broadcast news networks engage audiences by asking them to participate in social media discussions and then reporting about those discussions, thereby also exercising “second-screen gatekeeping” (Jensen 2016: 326). The overflow of information online also remains unmatched by equal attention from audiences. The virtual space for news might seem unlimited, but audience attention is not. For example, to keep their homepages fresh, online news organizations engage in a constant *deselection* of news articles that had been previously selected to give way to more recent – or more popular – articles (Tandoc 2014). This is because online readers are not expected to return to a website with static content. Gatekeeping now has to also account for this deselection process that was not practiced before.

6 Amplified gatekeeping

The discourse around how gatekeeping is changing brings up the question of whether it is a normative or a descriptive metaphor. Gatekeeping in the context of journalism seems to have started as a descriptive concept. It aptly described what Mr. Gates was doing – opening the gates to some wire stories, closing them to others (White 1950). However, conceptualized as a journalistic role, gatekeeping also gained normative implications (Janowitz 1975). Vos (2015: 9) argued, “gatekeeping is not simply something that journalists and others do – it is often seen as a public and moral responsibility.” For others, the abundance of information easily and directly accessible to audiences online has turned gatekeeping into a metaphor that no longer accurately captures information flow (Bruns 2005). However, the same information context, where information of varying quality is overflowing, “reinforces the need for someone to sort it out as well as to lend it credibility and, ideally, utility” (Singer 2006: 265).

The arguments about the relevance of gatekeeping theory in a journalistic field that is evolving also outline how the understanding of the culmination of gatekeeping has changed. White (1950) considered news selection as the culmination of gatekeeping. What ended up on the newspaper is what came out of the gatekeeping process. The focus was on “what is allowed to emerge from the production processes in print and broadcast media” (Bruns 2005: 11). And yet, in the first page of the book *Gatekeeping Theory*, Shoemaker and Vos (2009) defined gatekeeping as “the process of culling and crafting countless bits of information into the limited number of messages *that reach people each day.*” The initial conceptualization of gatekeeping might have assumed that what ended up in the newspaper – what emerged from the traditional gatekeeping process – ultimately reached the public. But in today’s information-saturated media environment, not all news stories that emerge from all media gates will reach an audience.

Bruns (2005) divided the traditional gatekeeping process into three stages: input, output, and response. These stages were controlled by journalists, so that the “newshole is almost entirely closed to direct audience participation and contribution” (Bruns 2011: 119). But audiences now take part in each of these stages by communicating their instantaneous feedback through web analytics (Tandoc 2014) as well as through their news dissemination practices (Thorson 2008) and even reporting via social media (Hermida 2011), functioning as another gatekeeping channel that determines what messages ultimately reach other audiences (Shoemaker & Vos 2009) who no longer depend on traditional news sources for news. This focus on the audience channel seems to be consistent with what Bass (1969) had argued decades ago, that the proper transfer of Lewin’s gatekeeping metaphor to understanding news flow was to understand how news enters the home. Such a conceptualization is more focused on the audience channel. For example: How do parents control what types of news their children get to read? In contrast, White’s (1950) original study was concerned with how news articles ended up in the newspaper, focusing mainly on the journalist channel. This might have worked in the past, given the dominance of traditional news media. But the increased power of the audience has shifted attention to the audience channel. The overflow in information supply and suppliers has also made it both a practical and a theoretical imperative to focus beyond publication of news to actual consumption of it by an increasingly impatient and platform-agnostic audience.

However, focusing only on the audience channel will miss the complexity of the current news media environment, where news can travel in *both* journalist and audience channels either sequentially or simultaneously. For example, information about the shooting of 18-year-old Michael Brown in Ferguson, Missouri, which later sparked massive and violent protests across the United States, first reached the public through Twitter, passing through the audience channel first (Desmond-Harris 2015). Legacy news organizations later reported about the incident following the outrage that swept social media, allowing the news to reach more people through the journalist channel. Thus, while audiences can influence the dissemination of news articles that flow from the journalist channel by what they share on their social media accounts (Hermida 2011), journalists can also amplify what audiences are disseminating on social media by reporting about it through their own channels.

The audience channel does not necessarily render the journalist channel obsolete. “That the audience is more active or more present in the construction of news in the age of digital media is not so much a change to gatekeeping theory as it is support of the theory” (Vos 2015: 11). Gatekeeping might no longer be exclusively controlled by journalists. But the process still exists, now increasingly participated in by audiences. The question now should be: What happens when news flows in *both* channels? The argument that gatekeeping culminates in messages ultimately reaching the public has normative implications, for it accords journalists – and




Fig. 12.1: While gatekeeping traditionally focused on how bits of information pass through a series of gates controlled by journalists to reach audiences, it also now accounts for how bits of information pass through gates controlled by other members of the news audience. But the same pieces of information can travel through both channels sequentially or simultaneously, a process that can be referred to as amplified gatekeeping.

now, also audiences – social responsibility. The presence of numerous gates, ideally, should ensure that only quality information passes through. The journalist channel, for example, is marked by the presence of numerous gates (Shoemaker & Vos 2009). But while the audience channel was initially believed to represent a more direct pathway for newsworthy information to flow to the public by bypassing gates controlled by journalists, a growing number of studies find that numerous factors also affect how likely users are to share information on their social media (e.g., Baños, Borge-Holthoefer & Moreno 2013; Cui et al. 2013; Hui et al. 2012). Scholars have found that only “a small number of retweeted messages are passed on to a large audience” (Hui et al. 2012: 656). This supports the assumption that information still has to pass through gates even in the audience channel. When bits of information pass through the journalist channel and then through the audience channel, they are able to reach more people. When bits of information pass through the audience channel and then through the journalist channel, they are conferred with more legitimacy. When bits of information pass through *both* journalist and audience channels before reaching the public, gatekeeping becomes amplified.

Ideally, amplified gatekeeping should result in quality news reaching the public. When bits of information pass through both journalist and audience channels, they should ideally be subjected to more gates of verification, fact-checking, editing, and critique. But bits of misinformation have also passed through amplified channels. For example, Reddit users who engaged in a virtual manhunt for the perpetrators of the Boston Marathon bombing in April 2013 wrongly identified a missing Brown University student as a suspect (Kang 2013). This misinformation also found its way through the journalist channel after some journalists, who were

watching the gates of Reddit users, tweeted about it (Kang 2013). A plausible explanation is that legacy news organizations, competing with a much faster audience channel, seem to be decreasing their traditional gatekeeping processes, prioritizing speed over accuracy. Future gatekeeping studies should continue to explore the effects of this emerging gatekeeping model not only on the quality of news, but also on how the public processes information that travels through both channels.

7 Conclusion

A basic assumption of gatekeeping theory is that news, before it reaches the public, begins with bits of information. Some of these pass through the gates of either journalist or audience channels and reach the public. Others do not. The bits that successfully pass through gates are assembled and reshaped into news. But changes in information and communication technologies are changing not only the conceptualization of what constitutes gates and who qualify as gatekeepers; they are also changing what constitutes information and what can be defined as news. Some information about newsworthy events reach some members of the audience through other audiences' social media posts – but are these still bits of information or are these already outputs of a gatekeeping, albeit audience-led, process and therefore should be considered news? Some of these bits of information eventually enter the journalist channel and end up in what are traditionally considered to be news stories through journalists who are now also closely gatewatching the audience channel. Thus, future gatekeeping studies should also explicate what can be considered outputs of gatekeeping processes, whether through the audience channel, the journalist channel, or both.

Further reading

A comprehensive explication of gatekeeping can be found in Shoemaker and Vos' (2009) - *Gatekeeping Theory* book, which updated Shoemaker's (1991) earlier book titled *Gatekeeping*. Vos and Heinderyckx's (2015) edited book, *Gatekeeping in Transition*, also presents a collection of chapters arguing for gatekeeping's continued relevance in understanding news construction in the digital age. White's (1950) gatekeeping study, which introduced the concept to journalism studies, provides an example of how gatekeeping theory is applied to the study of news construction.

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IV Journalism via the Disciplines

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13 The Sociology of Journalism

Abstract: Sociological inquiries into journalism have considered journalism as the product of cultural, economic, political, and technological forces in different times and spaces. As part of (and like) the field of media sociology, the sociology of journalism is an interdisciplinary subfield. It has several objectives of inquiry: examining situational and larger cultural differences of journalisms; analyzing systemic complexities in which journalism arises (i.e. technological formats and change, events, normative crises or organizational structures); illuminating intended and unintended consequences of practical routines of journalism; and exploring long-term patterns of professional, institutional, and organizational changes in journalism. Analyzing journalism through the sociological prism is central for understanding its larger societal implications and a continuous reminder that journalism studies is not an end in itself. Starting in the late 1950s, the gradual relocation of sociology of journalism from sociology to communication coincided with the establishment and professionalization of the two social science disciplines in US academia. Even as communication science has now produced generations of graduates in its own doctoral programs, the intellectual centrality of the sociology of journalism continues and has been recently confirmed through post-financial crisis academic hires. This paper introduces some of the major strands of the sociology of journalism research from the beginning of the 20th century to today. It also argues that the sociology of journalism took on a new ideational and professional significance within the field.

Keywords: journalism studies, media sociology, news production, sociology of news

1 Introduction

1.1 The early beginnings of a field

As a contested and constantly evolving field of study, since the 1970s, the sociology of journalism has gradually moved to communication and media studies and has been less populated by scholars employed by sociology departments. Today, the field is constituted of scholars who were trained as sociologists or were trained by sociologists and who draw mostly from sociological theory to frame research questions and explains empirical findings (Pooley & Katz 2008). Yet the study of the press as a central agent of social organization in modern societies can be traced back to one of the founding fathers of sociology: Max Weber. In 1910, at the first

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meeting of the German Sociological Society in Frankfurt, driven by his concern for the institutional character and role of the press in society, Weber proposed a large-scale study of the press, titled *Soziologie des Zeitungswesens* (Sociology of the Press). In this proposal, which was published in English translation more than half a decade later (Weber 1976), Weber asked his colleagues to collaboratively study the social position of the press and its role in the formation of public opinion. To study these social phenomena, Weber suggested a longitudinal content analysis of newspapers to measure the quantitative impact of advertising or editorials on news coverage. This study would have been accompanied by a qualitative analysis of stylistic approaches and the ways in which similar issues are discussed within and outside of newspapers. Meanwhile, Ferdinand Tönnies (1922 [1981]) in the book *Kritik der öffentlichen Meinung* (Critique of Public Opinion), Ludwig Salomon (1900–1906) in the four-volume work *Geschichte des deutschen Zeitungswesens* (History of the German Press), and Emil Löbl (1903) in *Kultur und Presse* (Culture and the Press) discussed the role of the press in shaping public discourse in Germany (cited in Lang 1996).

In the United States, the sociology of journalism has its earliest roots in urban sociology. In the early 1900s, Robert E. Park, a former reporter and central figure of the Chicago School of Sociology, advanced several works on the sociology of news (Park 1922, 1923, 1938, 1940, 1941). Park's interest in this field was based on recognizing the foreign language press as a key factor of integration of immigrant groups and Americanization (Park 1922). Other representatives of the Chicago School also published influential early works in media sociology, like Helen MacGill Hughes (1940) who considered the human interest story as a source of public education and self-understanding. She traced the rise of the human interest story journalistic form against the backdrop of broader social changes between the 19th and 20th centuries and conceived this journalistic form as a socially integrative force in the modern American city. Kurt and Gladys Engel Lang (1953) became known for their early study of television which found significant differences between mediated representations and 31 witness accounts of the 1951 MacArthur Parade in Chicago. Despite the co-emergence of the Chicago School and these important works of its second generation of scholars, on the one hand, and the professionalization of journalism in the Progressive Era in the US on the other, the sociology of journalism would really come to its own in the 1970s.

1.2 The postwar period

After World War II, important precursors of the sociology of journalism were the studies on mass communication and public opinion formation at the Bureau of Applied Social Research at Columbia University. These studies changed the conception of media effects by emphasizing the power of social networks (Katz & Lazarsfeld 1955; Lazarsfeld & Berelson 1944; Merton 1996). The way scholars received this

work generated a theory of “limited effects” of mass media which characterized empirical research until the 1970s. Because this theory implied that mass media had only a subsidiary role in public opinion formation, it was held responsible for sociology turning its focus away from mass media. This happened despite the fact that *Personal Influence* (Katz & Lazarsfeld 1955) found that half of observed opinion changes were direct media effects, even though the study mostly focused on social network effects. Todd Gitlin later criticized the limited effects hypothesis by arguing that this “dominant paradigm” in media sociology confirmed the institutional order and failed to ask important questions about the power of mass media in society (Gitlin 1978).

In 1962, building on the fundamental criticism of the *culture industry* by the founders of the Frankfurt School (Adorno & Horkheimer [1944] 1997), Jürgen Habermas published *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere* (1962). Critical debates in the US ensued after the delayed English translation of the book in 1989 (e.g., Calhoun 1992; see Fraser 1995; Cohen 1995 for feminist critique of Habermas). The concept of the public sphere serves as a normative reference point to evaluate the performance of journalism in Western democracies (cf. Dahlgren 2005; Ferree et al. 2002) as well as beyond. Focusing on India, Robin Jeffrey (1999) took it as a point of departure to explore how the Indian newspaper industry transformed and enlarged public participation since the 1970s with increasing literacy and improved printing and communication technologies. Recently, scholars have argued that in India, while communication technologies such as social networking sites, may have enhanced the participatory nature of journalistic storytelling, this inclusiveness has remained exclusive to the urban, educated, connected middle, and upper classes (cf. Ninan 2007; Belair-Gagnon, Mishra & Agur 2014).

1.3 The golden era

In the UK, sociological inquiries into journalism arrived in the mid-1950s in a few sociology departments. Jeremy Tunstall led this effort by conducting the first ethnographic study of British journalists (Tunstall 1970, 1971, 1977; Tunstall & Palmer 1991). *Journalists at Work* (1971) helped paved the way for the development of the sociology of journalism in the UK at a time when only a handful of social science studies of British journalism existed. Others, such as Denis McQuail (1969) and Philip Schlesinger (1978), led and followed a similar path. Tom Burns (1977) published an organizational analysis of the replacement of an ethos of professionalism with the public service ideal in the 1960s. In 1974, Brian Winston, Greg Philo, and John Eldridge formed the Glasgow University Media Group. The group published a series of studies on television news bias (Glasgow Media Group 1976, 1980, 1982) by conducting an empirical and semiotic news analysis of news bulletins to explore systematic class bias. Peter Golding and Philip Elliott (1979) conducted a comparative exploration of television newsrooms, which resulted in the book *Making the*

News. Golding and Elliott's book laid the groundwork for further analysis of the process of news making in terms of planning, gathering, selection, and production. They argued that journalists use news values in two ways: criteria of selection of available newsworthy material and guidelines for presentation of items, suggesting what material to prioritize in news production. This perspective on the news contrasts with the way reporters viewed the news, who characterized journalistic work as reporting on real-life events. Sociologists of news contributed to the idea that journalists make the news in accordance with a set of professional values as well as organizational routines and structures that journalists hardly articulated explicitly. For example, in Spain, sociologists adopted this social constructivist view of news production and audience perceptions (e.g., Villafañe, Busamente & Prado 1987; Alsina 1989; Fontcuberta 1993). In other regions of the world, sociological inquiries into journalism took different shape, borrowing more from cultural studies, semiotics, and structuralism.

As the sociology of journalism gradually established itself in the second half of the 20th century, particularly in Europe and North America, various approaches and perspectives crystallized, focusing on different levels of analysis: the political economy of news, cultural logics of news making, gatekeeping, organizational studies of news, technologies of news production, occupational values, roles, and ethics, and media effects. The following sections will explore these major strands of research in the sociology of journalism.

2 Journalism as social institution

2.1 Gatekeeping, social control, and news selectivity

In the postwar era, gatekeeping research was one of the earliest strands of sociological studies of journalism. It was first established by journalism scholar and reporter David Manning White (1950) in a seminal study of newswire editors' selection process in news production where he found that in routine processes, gatekeepers choose which stories "makes it" in the newspaper based on their experiences, attitudes, and expectations of what news is. Decades later, Pamela Shoemaker (1991) argued for the continuing relevance of gatekeeping theory and distinguished between "knowledge control" and "information control" to further deconstruct the multiple influences of gatekeepers in the news production process. Shoemaker understood gatekeeping more broadly, as concerned with how, where, and when gatekeeping occurs, and what are its consequences. When the internet and social networking sites emerged as modes of communication, scholars increasingly explored the implications of the proliferation of gatekeepers (cf. Shoemaker 1991; Shoemaker & Vos 2009; Shoemaker & Reese 2013; Vos 2015).

Following White's account of news production, a number of scholars took interest in social control and selectivity of news. Warren Breed (1955), a former

journalist trained in sociology at Columbia University by Robert Merton and Paul Lazarsfeld, demonstrated that the way news organizations socialize journalists conditions their understanding of policy. Following a functionalist perspective, Breed argued that several factors like institutional authority and sanctions, aspirations of mobility, and absence of group allegiance, kept news staffers from deviating from organizational norms. Breed argued that cultural practices in newsrooms harm democracy and that changes towards a more “free and responsible press” must start with pressure on publishers who have policy-making authority in newsrooms.

Breed’s work is significant for the sociology of journalism as it emphasizes the relations between the various components of social systems and ties between systems and everyday interactions in newsrooms (cf., Reese & Ballinger 2001). Lee Sigelman (1973) also emphasized the role of social control as a way to understand media bias as a consequence of the news production process rather than newsroom policy imposition. Sigelman conceived recruitment, socialization, and control as structured in a way that the “institutional mythology” of objective reporting remains intact (cf., Selznick 1957 on the connection between administrative leadership and institutional mythology). For Sigelman, these organizational mechanisms mediated the potential for conflict and its actualization. Borrowing from the symbolic interactionist tradition in sociology, Canadian sociologists Richard Ericson, Patricia Baranek, and Janet Chan (1989) similarly understood social control as a determinant of news production. However, Ericson and colleagues’ work also acknowledged the relative autonomy of journalists in the production of individual news items.

Scholars also insisted that journalism does not simply reflect the world out there. Journalism rather reveals the practices of the people who have the power to decide upon the experience of others. In defining journalism as “purposive behavior”, Harvey Molotch and Marilyn Lester (1974) argued that news represents a constructed reality, based on certain typifications of news events journalists continuously work with – routine, accidents, scandals, and serendipitous events. This work connects to research focusing on the wider socio-political system in which reporters produce news and strategies that influence them, including analyses of reporting on war, conflict, and terrorism (Schlesinger, Murdock & Elliott 1983; Morrison & Tumber 1988) as well as foreign correspondence more generally (Batscha 1975; Pedelty 1995).

Journalism studies scholars have additionally produced numerous studies in interinstitutional settings which shed light on the power relations that shape news production. Stephen Hess’s (1981) study on Washington reporters showed how news information often originates from the legislative branch of the government, although there are a greater number of news stories on the presidency which tend to dominate the news across the US. In his later work, Herbert Gans (2003) corroborated this finding by arguing that journalists suffer from assembly-line modes of

production that, above all, value the US president and other top political officials, which implies that journalists cannot be trusted from the public's point of view.

Other research addressed international news starting with Johan Galtung and Mari Ruge's work (1965) which identified twelve news values influencing the way journalists select news items in this context. These values include reference to elite nations, elite people, personality, negativity, and consonance. Tony Harcup and Diedre O'Neil (2001) emphasized that Galtung and Ruge's work remained relevant, as it opened the field for the study of journalistic values beyond national borders. Following Galtung and Ruge, scholars have added alternative news values, such as numbers (Gans 1979) and continuing stories (Harcup & O'Neil 2001). Overall, gatekeeping theory enabled scholars to understand how news workers deal with and push back against external and internal pressures that undermine their professional autonomy.

2.2 Professional norms, ethics, and knowledge

Much of the early sociological research considered journalism as a set of social interactions and ritual behaviors. Most of these works built on phenomenological sociology and the sociology of knowledge, including symbolic interactionism (associated with Erving Goffman and Herbert Blumer among others) and social constructivism (Alfred Schütz, Peter Berger, and Thomas Luckmann). David Altheide (1976) analyzed the structure of television production, arguing that organizational and practical factors in news production (e.g., organizational setting, news format, audience, scheduling, and newsgathering technology) foster a certain way of understanding events. Altheide and Robert Snow (1979, 1991) subsequently developed the concept of *media logic* which shed light on how technology, formats, actors, organizational structures, and communication processes pervade other areas of social life and generate biases of public perception.

Occupational analyses also shed light on values, ethics, and journalistic roles and ranged from analyses of journalistic behaviors in specific social settings to the development of global ethical standards of journalism. Scholars analyzed sociologically how ethical values take shape in newsrooms, as in John C. Merrill's (1974) philosophy of journalistic autonomy. Other studies analyzed the responses of editors, publishers, and journalists to ethical dilemmas (Meyer 1983) and explored how journalists compromised their ethics to shape the news (Goldstein 1986). Clifford Christians (2009) looked at media ethics and moral reasoning and Theodore Glasser and James Ettema (1998) considered investigative reporting as a form of social and moral inquiry using the ethical standard of vice and virtue to establish journalism as custodian of conscience and moral order. The anthropologist Ulf Hannerz (2004) followed foreign correspondents for ten years, whose work he considered as turning local knowledge into global imaginations.

Many scholars explored the role of ethical standards around the world, like John Hurst and Sally White (1994) studied ethics in Australian journalism, and Andrew Belsey and Ruth Chadwick (1992) in Britain. Christians and Traber (1997) edited a collection about occupational values in different regions of the world. The authors came to an understanding that some of these values are universal across nations, including justice, reciprocity, and human dignity. They also found that ethical standards evolved in similar ways. Other scholars argued that journalistic values are not absolute as roles and perceptions vary (cf., Roshco 1975). Internationally comparative survey of journalism students (Splichal & Sparks 1994) and practicing journalists (Weaver & Willnat 2012; Hanitzsch et al. 2011) also found significant variation of how pertinent different occupational values are in different journalism cultures. Silvio Waisbord (2013) argued that what becomes globalized is the professional logic of journalism, its unique epistemology and form of producing knowledge rather than the ethics of objectivity, independence, and fairness (cf., Weaver & Willnat 2012; Berglez 2015; Cottle 2003).

As the central occupational norm of journalism, objectivity (or impartiality) has received much scholarly attention, particularly in the US and UK (cf., Chalaby 1998). Michael Schudson (1978) took objectivity as the starting point for examining the professionalization of US journalism since the early 19th century. His historical analysis demonstrates that objectivity served as a polysemous point of reference and counterpoint for various emerging journalistic forms throughout the 20th century. Schudson showed that the ambiguity of the objectivity norm makes not less but even more of a central symbolic and discursive point of reference in journalism. Gaye Tuchman (1972) conceived objectivity as a strategic ritual. Tuchman argued that journalistic practices and norms, such as verification and objectivity, accommodate organizational constraints. Tuchman posited that different types of information have certain routines attached to them. In Tuchman's words: "individuals, groups, and organizations not only react to and characterize events by typifying *what* has happened, but also they may typify events by stressing the *way* 'things' happen" (Tuchman 1973: 129; cf., Schudson 1978). From news workers' point of view, typifications are means to control the objects of their work.

When serious violations of professional norms are committed by journalists, Stephen Reese (1990: 390) revealed three ways in which news organizations engage in *news paradigm repair*: "(a) disengaging and distancing the threatening values from the reporter's work, (b) reasserting the ability of journalistic routines to prevent threatening values from 'distorting' the news, and (c) marginalizing the man and his message, making both appear ineffective."

2.3 Newsroom ethnographies

Many 1970s' sociology of journalism scholars increasingly employed ethnography as a way to understand journalistic routines and norms (cf., Tunstall 1971). Al-

though newsroom ethnographies, based on participant observation, can be found in the academic literature of the UK, the list of US studies in this line of research is more exhaustive. Using observation and interviews with journalists at the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), Philip Schlesinger (1978) examined organizational conditioning of television news production by emphasizing the news workers' obsession with duration and sequence as key features of journalistic work. Consistent with Altheide (1976), Schlesinger argued that meanings change when formats and journalistic routines are altered (cf., Belair-Gagnon 2015). Philip Elliott's four months of observation of BBC News supports Schlesinger's work and raises concerns about the autonomy (and as a consequence "neutrality") of public service media. David Morrison and Howard Tumber (1988) interviewed more than 30 journalists on personal, situational, and organizational news definitions to understand how war reports reflect contexts. They found that negotiating definitions and dimensions of information and facts are key tasks for reporters. In the US, the first notable scholar to take on the ethnographic study of news was Edward Epstein. In his seminal book which was the upshot of his doctoral dissertation in political science, *News From Nowhere* (1973), Epstein argued that what we know as news and news norms is the product of routines, which are conditioned by organizational structures and technical constraints. Epstein found that journalists managed the unexpected by covering routinized events such as press conferences.

The cultural historian and academic librarian Robert Darnton (1975) reflected on his brief career as a journalist for *The New York Times* and the *Newark Star Ledger*. Not intended to be a formal sociological study, "Writing the news and telling stories" eloquently summarized some of the objects of study that newsroom ethnographers have explored since the early 1970s. Intellectually indebted to Robert Merton, Elihu Katz, and Gabriel Tarde, "rather than the more vogueish theories of Jürgen Habermas", as he later remarked (Darnton 2000), Darnton suggested that journalists' function as communicators depended on the structure of their milieu, their relation to their primary reference groups (e.g., editors or sources), their occupational socialization, and how standardized techniques of "telling" stories influenced "writing" the news (Darnton 1975, 176).

Substantively (see above) and methodologically, newsroom ethnographies lead back to the Chicago School of Sociology, which introduced the anthropological method in sociology in the 1920s and became known for workplace ethnographies of occupations in its second generation. This generation is mainly associated with Everett Hughes, Howard Becker, and Anselm Strauss. Following this rich sociological tradition, US sociologists Herbert Gans, Gaye Tuchman, and Mark Fishman published three seminal newsroom ethnographies, which Barbie Zelizer (2004) described as "realist tales". After ten years of research in newsrooms and two influential articles (1972, 1973), Tuchman published *Making News* (1978) which helped establish the idea that news is a social construction, based on typifications rooted in organizational routines and claiming objectivity for mere performative purposes.

In *Deciding What's News*, Gans (1979) explored the role of news values in news production at CBS Evening News, NBC Nightly News, *Newsweek*, and *TIME*. Gans looked at the organization of news stories, the relationship between journalists and sources, the concepts of values and ideology, the link between profits and audiences, and political censorship. Gans argued that in making news journalists draw on news values which not only originate from within journalism. In *Manufacturing the News*, Fishman (1980) focused on beat reporting. Based on two years of ethnography at a small California newspaper's crime beat, Fishman emphasized how the bureaucratic organization of activities on a newsbeat shapes newsgathering structures. In other words: the beat, which might be confined by a particular location, institution, or subject matter, fosters a certain kind of reporting. With some important exceptions (e.g., Ericson, Baranek & Chan 1989; Jacobs 1996b), in the 1980s and 1990s, newsroom ethnographies became rare. However, this research tradition experienced a revival in the early 21st century.

2.4 The second wave of newsroom observation

In response to this shortage in the late 1990s and early days of the Internet, British sociologist Simon Cottle (2000) argued that a second wave of news ethnographies was needed. For Cottle, building on knowledge acquired in 1970s and early 1980s ethnographic work, such work would allow to map theoretically and explore empirically the fast-changing and differentiated news ecology. Following this call for newsroom ethnographies, ensuing studies took a different hold in the early 2000s. In contrast to the earlier generation, most of these scholars are employed at media studies, journalism, and communication departments. They generated a wealth of scholarship on how the internet and digital technologies affect the organization, norms, and practices of journalism as well as its position and role in democratic societies.

One of the seminal works is Pablo Boczkowski's (2004) book *Digitizing the News*. In this book, which is influenced by science and technology studies (STS), Boczkowski explored how daily newspapers developed electronic publishing ventures. The particular shape of these ventures is contingent and influenced by various organizational "cultures of innovation." Adding to this blooming literature, C. W. Anderson (2013) set the stage for studies on the changing media landscape by analyzing how emerging news networks (bloggers, so-called citizen journalists, and social networks) have been involved in changes in the business and ecology of news. Anderson encouraged news ethnographers to move away from a narrow focus on the newsroom as a bounded place and to look at the more sprawling network of news that defines the Internet age. In *Can Journalism Survive?*, David Ryfe (2012) suggested that processes of innovation in US-American newsrooms are inhibited by the resistance of established practices and norms. In her study of BBC News, Valerie Belair-Gagnon (2013, 2015) described how the BBC has normalized

social media into journalistic norms and practices in its crisis reporting and how the emergence of social media has led to changes in power relations in the newsroom.

Caitlin Petre (2015) focused on the production, interpretation, and uses of audience metrics on news sites (e.g., page views or unique visitors) as a way to explore how new forms of quantitative data interact with the traditional journalistic sense of professional authority. Matthias Revers' ethnographic work on political reporters examined how the ethic of transparency that ascended on Twitter intersected with traditional norms of professionalism and reshaped the spatial and temporal structures of news making in the US (Revers 2014, 2015). Revers' (2016) comparative research explored change and stability of US and German professional cultures of journalism in the digital era. In her ethnographic research at the *New York Times*, Nikki Usher analyzed how emergent news values are reordering the fundamental processes of news production, and how immediacy, interactivity, and participation play a unique role in creating tensions between old and new practices and norms (Usher 2014). Together with Seth Lewis, Usher (2013) examined the conditions of innovation and collaboration between journalists and programmers which involves deviating from established journalistic norms.

2.5 News as institution

Several scholars explored how different social institutions and the news media mutually shape each other. Colin Seymour-Ure (1974) wrote on the relation between British government circles and Fleet Street and the impact of mass media on the changes in the nature of the political system and political communication. This approach laid the foundation for the study of the effects of media in politics, later termed *mediatization of politics* (Mazzoleni & Schulz 1999). This research agenda, which is pronouncedly European, explored political imperatives of journalism in Latin America (Mattelart 1980; Mattelart & Schmucler 1985; Serrano 2012). In a study of international news flows, Stig Hjarvard (2008) deployed the concept of mediatization in a broader sense to explore how media become intertwined with religion and family. Sociological inquiries of mediatization help unpack how media transform cultures and create alternative symbolic environments (cf., Eskjær, Hjarvard & Mortensen 2015).

Pierre Bourdieu's critique of television (1998), a posthumously published lecture on the intersection of journalism, politics, and social science (2005), and his theory of fields of cultural production (Bourdieu 1993; Bourdieu, Passeron and Saint Martin 1996) spurred works that conceived media and journalism as a field (e.g., Benson 1999; Benson & Neveu 2005; Couldry 2003; Hesmondhalgh 2006). Also building on Bourdieu's work, Jean Chalaby (1998) examined the development of discursive norms, practices, and strategies that are characteristic of journalism and journalistic discourse since the second half of the 19th century in Europe. Rod-

ney Benson's (2013) work on immigration news in France and the US has been particularly influential in establishing a theory and comparative research agenda of journalistic fields. This perspective accounts for macro-forces while acknowledging variation and complexity between different news organizations.

A particularly influential work, not only for comparative media research but especially for institutional theorizing of journalism, is the book *Comparing Media Systems* (Hallin & Mancini 2004). This work conceived news media as subjected to competing influences of the economy, politics, and the state and as going through different paths of professionalization of journalism. Hallin and Mancini analytically construct three principal models of media system – liberal, democratic-corporatist, and polarized-pluralist – which they take to explain some fundamental differences between Anglo-American, Northern European, and Southern European democracies. Despite the fact that these institutional arrangements still produce distinctive kinds of journalism in different countries, Hallin and Mancini argued that media systems gradually homogenize over time and converge towards the liberal model. In 2012, Hallin and Mancini followed up in an effort to de-Westernize this approach by expanding media systems research beyond Europe and the US (Hallin & Mancini 2012).

The new institutionalist works by Timothy Cook (1998) and Bartholomew Sparrow (1999) linked the lack of diversity of news in the US to institutional forces that solidify in stable routines and practices that operate across organizations. While Cook conceived of media not only as entangled with politics but as a “governing institution,” Sparrow emphasized the role of economic forces shaping the media (cf., Ryfe 2006). Paul Starr (2004) depicted the history of mass media primarily as an institutional rather than technological transformation. He showed how a series of political decisions led to a state-run post office and private monopolies on the telegraph and telephone systems in the US. He argued that these choices had lasting effects not only on how the country evolved socially, economically, and militarily but also in terms of its leading position as a world economy in the information age. In contrast to political economic approaches to the media, which have ignored politics as an independent influence, Starr insisted that political and economic efficacies shaping news media have to be treated separately (cf., Schudson 2010). Though in his later work Bourdieu treated politics and the economy as separate forces, in his work on television (1998) he did not make this distinction. Rodney Benson carried the development of Bourdieu's theory forward to journalism in a conceptual and empirical sense.

Another problem highlighted by journalism research today is how various factors (e.g., economic and political pressures, changes in newsgathering and production technology, and the role of sources and “source strategies”) shape the form, content, and style of journalism which are thus considered as more contingent than ever and subject to less professional and organizational control. British sociologist Brian McNair (1998, 2006) suggested a shift towards a “chaotic flow” model

of journalism production rather than “control,” which “preserved recognition of the existence of social inequality as a key feature of contemporary capitalism while incorporating the possibility, the self-evident fact, of constant challenge to, event subversion of, established power through the routine work of journalists in mainstream capitalist media” (McNair 1998: 162). This analytical approach provides a way to explore the changing relationship between journalism and power in a globalized news culture.

3 Audience studies

The purpose of journalism scholarship is to better understand how institutional, technological, and cultural conditions of news production and the information and meanings journalism generates affect the public. Early work emphasized *media effects* while later research stressed the importance of active engagement and assignment of meaning by the audience to mediated communication. Concurrently, there was a major push for developing scientific methods of empirical social research during the postwar era in the US. In emphasizing the power of social networks, Lazarsfeld and his colleagues at the Bureau of Applied Social Research explored the role of mass communications in making decisions on how to vote and which commercial and cultural products to consume, and in changing opinions. They argued that the “effects of the media are mitigated by the processes of selectivity in attention, perception, and recall, and that these, in turn, are a function of pre-dispositional and situational variables such as age, family history, political affiliation, and so on” (Katz 1987: 26).

In contrast, emphasizing human agency does not mean denying media effects. Rather, human agency shifts the attention to how audiences manage this influence, or what Roger Silverstone (1994) called the embeddedness of television in everyday life and relationships. This insight relates to *uses and gratifications* theory (Katz, Blumler & Gurevitch 1973), which argues that people use media differently to fulfill various needs, and *cultivation theory* (Gerbner & Gross 1976), which conceived media as socializing agents. Scholars have more recently explored how changes in technologies enable geographic mobility (cf., Lull 1990) and diasporic publics, as defined by David Morley, people who “belong to more than one world, speak more than one language (literally and metaphorically), inhabit more than one identity, have more than one home and have learned to negotiate and translate between cultures” (Morley 2000: 207).

Within audience studies, political economy scholars pointed to the changes and power relations which construct ideas of publics and audience. In exploring the US cultural and political history of audiences from the nineteenth century to the present, Richard Butsch (2007) demonstrated that, while mass media attitudes toward audiences have shifted over time, US-Americans writ large have judged

audiences consistently against standards of good citizenship. Paddy Scannell (1991, 1996; Scannell, Schlesinger & Sparks 1992) shed light on the interactions between viewers/listeners, the intentions of broadcaster, and the understanding of those intentions by the audience. Toby Miller (1998, 2007) developed a theory *cultural citizenship*, looking at the coverage of September 11th, the Iraq invasion, and infotainment (such as Food and Weather channels) to see how citizens become part of “the global commodity chain” through television. With more and more people seeking to belong but not considered as belonging, Miller (1998, 2007) argued that cultural citizenship is a web of practices of government, consumption, risk, and moral panic in popular culture, which is particularly generated by television. Similarly, Timothy Havens (2006) envisioned television viewers’ choices of programs as outcomes of relationships between transnational conglomerates and the viewing pleasures of audiences in the international program market (cf., Chalaby 2005, 2009, 2015).

Newsroom ethnographers were also concerned about the interaction between publics and media producers. Herbert Gans (1979) coined the term *imagined audience*, which denotes journalists’ mental constructs of people they are serving. He argued that, while journalists had little knowledge about their audience and dismissed its feedback in practice, they assumed they resembled themselves and their own topical interests. But the emergence of new spaces in which journalists and audiences interact (e.g., social media platforms) prompted new questions about this relationship (cf. Litt 2012). With site metrics allowing journalists to know more about who reads and listens to them than they could have in the past, C. W. Anderson (2011) posited that a fundamental transformation has occurred in journalists’ understanding in the form of an algorithmic conception of the audience. This journalistic responsiveness to the “agenda of the audience”, has multiple and contradictory meanings, which is prone to be viewed from a political economy perspective.

4 The political economy of journalism

As sociological studies of news organizations and occupations subsided in the 1980s, a body of work emerged which examined news media from a political economy perspective. This scholarship emphasized how market forces lead to media concentration and economic globalization which shape working conditions and, above all, compromise the independence of journalistic practice.

Thus, the underlying theme of this strand of research is the interrelation between market forces and journalism-enabled ideology. Robert McChesney (2008: 229) captured this common thread by arguing that a “political economic analysis stresses that the reasons for lousy journalism stem not from morally bankrupt or untalented journalists, but from a structure that makes such journalism the ration-

al result of its operations.” Jeremy Tunstall and Michael Palmer (1991) linked the control of large sections of mass communication industries by few powerful individuals with world-wide media de-regulation. Ben Bagdikian (1983) discussed the chilling effects of corporate ownership and mass advertising and Edward Herman and Noam Chomsky (1988) examined how the underlying economics of publishing distort the news (see also Herman & McChesney 1997). Armand Mattelart (1994) argued that modern media is the result of state control.

Regarding the influence of structure of media ownership, McChesney (2008) showed how organizations mobilize powers to consolidate private control of media and increase profits. Similarly, media economist Gillian Doyle (2002) explored how media companies have been shaping the transnational and competitive communications marketplace. For Doyle, this dynamic has been a challenge for regulators and state authorities in terms of the volume and scale of mergers and alliances involving media players (cf., Klinenberg 2007). A lack of diversity of organizational structures compromises the democratic responsibility of the media, C. Edwin Baker (2002) argued, which is to foster a variety of debates and public deliberation over issues of common concern. Along similar lines, political economy studies of journalism explored the nature of truth in the news (McManus 2009). While political economy research emphasized market and ownership forces impinging on news media, studies concerned with the cultural logics of journalism focused more on the symbolic structures driving journalism.

5 The cultural logics of journalism

In contrast to political economy approaches, cultural studies and cultural sociology stress that journalism is not only enabled and constrained by material conditions but also occupational traditions, civic virtues, and ideologies, which they take as more important to explain news outcomes. They argue that the occupation’s history solidifies in professional norms and values that guide journalistic practice. Scholars of this tradition also recognize that journalism – a source not only of information but imagination – is closely connected to popular culture. Jacobs (2009) claimed the work of Park as a classical foundation of this perspective at the intersection of media sociology and cultural sociology. Park’s early work on the *Immigrant Press* (1922) and subsequent articles on news media (1923, 1938, 1940, 1941) are often forgotten in light of his more prominent legacy in urban sociology, particularly on migration, race, and the social ecology of cities. In his work on print media, Park emphasized the distinctive epistemic quality of news, its role in public opinion formation, and the relationship between factual and fictional media.

On the other side of the pond, British sociologists developed a theory which emphasized the ideological character of public discourse. This ideology limits and

shapes social imaginations (Hall, Morley & Chen 1996). However, the public is not conceived as helplessly subjected to these imaginations in the research tradition of cultural studies, which formed around the Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies (CCCS) at the University of Birmingham, founded by Richard Hoggart in 1964. This school of thought is known for using participant observation to study how the British working class assigns meanings to the products of mass culture and how the media creates culture.

More recent work has explored the notion of media representation and journalistic authority. Barbie Zelizer explored the way audiences came to learn about the assassination of John F. Kennedy through journalistic representation of the events. She shows how journalists who have not seen the event live employed the news coverage to address issues they saw as central to their occupation and highlighted their cultural authority in collective interpretation (cf., Carlson 2011; Zelizer 1992). In a subsequent article, Zelizer (1993) argued that journalistic authority unfolds in double-time: between instantaneous, first-hand accounts and retrospective retelling and interpretation of these accounts. Around the same time, Daniel Dayan and Elihu Katz (1992) published *Media Events*, which focused on the ritual qualities of televised events that follow three basic templates: coronations (purely ceremonial rites of passage), contests (achievements in rule-governed games), and conquests (rare instances of giant leaps and radical transformations). It took two decades after this influential book was published and the “iconic turn” in social sciences to reconsider the cultural power of events which rests in news images (cf., Zelizer 2010; Sonnevend 2016). Interestingly these works focused on still rather than moving images.

Several scholars also suggested that the organizational structure of news organizations, routine framing of issues, and occurrences of particular stories direct media attention and resources to the places and institutions generating newsworthy events (Klinenberg 2002, 2007). Ellis Krauss (2000) argued that the Japanese Broadcasting Corporation (NHK) played a crucial role in the symbolic legitimation of Japan while remaining free from formal government intervention and regulation. Shani Orgad (2012) demonstrated that processes of representation in a global media environment consist of complex and contested power relations over storytelling. Focusing on the struggles around the cultural imperatives around gender, Deborah Chambers et al. (2004) explored the role, status, and experiences of women in journalism.

Narrative genres have different implications for public sentiment and collective action, Ronald Jacobs demonstrated. He took the Rodney King crisis as a casestudy to explore the influence of mass mediation on US race relations (1996a, 2000). With Eleanor Townsley, Jacobs analyzed opinion commentary in newspapers and on television, presenting a theoretical model of mediated deliberation that emphasizes the role of symbolic discourse and performance in the public sphere (Jacobs & Townsley 2011). Following this line of research, in a cross-national comparative

study Revers (2017) explored the cultural logic of US and German journalistic traditions on the level of performances and discourses of professionalism. Reconciling field theoretical and cultural sociological concerns, this work conceives journalism as institutionally situated and culturally driven to provide a more comprehensive sociological analysis of news.

Recent social movement scholarship showed how collective action has to be understood as the relation between framing processes, resource mobilization, and political opportunity structures. Within that sub-field, news media are seen as a major factor in shaping collective understandings. Myra Marx Ferree and colleagues (2002) conducted a comparative study of abortion discourse in US and Germany. Among other things, this study analyzed how social movements, political parties, churches, news media, and other social actors negotiate meaning (cf., Gamson 1998; Kielbowicz & Scherer 1986). Todd Gitlin (2003) discussed the role of media in shaping collective action and the trajectory of social movements and their leaders. Cultural sociologies and cultural studies of journalism explored how journalists produce and reproduce collective representations with important implications for understandings of our social world. In contrast to most other areas discussed in this chapter, many scholars in this field were able to secure positions in sociology departments.

6 Conclusion

Starting in the late 1950s, the relocation of the sociology of journalism's relocation to journalism schools and media and communication departments coincides with the establishment and professionalization of these academic disciplines. Media sociologists provided useful insights into journalism as a social institution, in relation to audience (e.g., media effects or active audience), the political economy of journalism (e.g., market or ownership influence on the media), and the cultural logic of journalism and media representations (e.g., occupational ideologies, framing, narrativity, and performativity of news). Though these subdivisions have continual value, not only for practical necessities (i.e., division of labor), the future of sociology of journalism consists in cross-linkage between the different approaches we have mapped out and in abandoning rigid theoretical and methodological approaches.

The notion of a crisis of journalism, which has been dominating many expert panels in the early 2000s, itself has become a subject of critical scrutiny (Alexander, Breese & Luengo 2016; Zelizer 2015). Theoretical frameworks such as mediation (Hepp 2013; Hepp & Krotz 2014), networked society (Castells 1996) or networked public sphere (Benkler 2006) have also recently influenced sociologists of journalism and led to the blurring of specialty areas. Reese (2016) pointed out that there is a new geography of journalism research and a rethinking of the still rele-

vant linear process of influence in favor of constantly changing interest clusters driven by information entrepreneurs (Anderson 2013; Chadwick 2011). Recent sociological inquiries have moved from a rationalized to a networked approach to study journalism (e.g., van de Haak, Parks & Castells 2012). Works by the younger generation of journalism scholars, such as Seth Lewis, Nikki Usher, C. W. Anderson, assigns more agency to journalists relative to the older generation of scholars in the 1970s and 1980s when organizational structures, routines, and hierarchies seemed much more firmly in place.

The sociology of journalism, like journalism itself, faces challenges of an ever-changing media ecology. Many edited collections, books, and papers have addressed these challenges and sorted debates in this field of inquiry (Anderson & Schudson 2008; Brienza & Revers 2016; Schudson 2011; Waisbord 2014; Zelizer 2004). The field needs to continuously adapt its analytical concepts and methods in order to capture their ever transforming object of study. If successful, it will continue to provide an integrated understanding of how institutional efficacies, power relationships, and social inequalities operate through journalism in shaping public discourse and public opinion.

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Further reading

A good overview of the field of media sociology can be found in *Media Sociology: A Reappraisal* by Silvio Waisbord (2014). In *Taking Journalism Seriously: News and the Academy* (2004), Barbie Zelizer positions the sociology of journalism relative to other fields (e.g., history, language studies, political science, and cultural analysis). In the edited volume, *Remaking the News: Essays on the Future of Journalism Scholarship in the Digital Age*, Pablo J. Boczkowski and C. W. Anderson explore the ways journalistic uses of digital technology has transformed the production, distribution, and reception of news. Roger Dickinson's article "Accomplishing Journalism: Towards a Revived Sociology of a Media Occupation" (2007) offers a call for a revised sociology of journalists rather than journalism that turns the focus back on news as the result of occupational practice. *The Sociology of News* by Michael Schudson (2011) and Brian McNair's book *The Sociology of Journalism* (1998) provide sociological analyses on the role of news making in democratic societies, focusing particularly on the US and Great Britain, respectively.

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Robert G. Picard

14 The Economics of Journalism and News Provision

Abstract: This chapter reveals how economic perspectives provide insights into journalism as a product, practice, and institution and how it is a factor in the changing environment of journalism. It reveals why the economics of journalism and news production are central to comprehending contemporary business and financial issues facing news organizations, developments of new forms of news provision, and what is happening to journalism in the twenty-first century. The chapter discusses how the characteristics of journalism and coverage choices affect economic value and consumer choice. It reveals how technologies and requirements for production and distribution are affected by economics and how these affect sustainability of journalism on different platforms. It explores how the business arrangements surrounding journalism are influenced by economic factors and how the development of new distribution methods alters competition and competitive positions of newspapers, news magazines, and television news. It shows how new economic factors in digital news operation make it challenging to construct economically feasible business arrangements. The chapter shows how insights from the economic perspective provide unique understanding of journalism, news enterprises, and the environment in which it takes place.

Keywords: choice, cost structures, demand, economics, value

Economic perspectives provide insights into journalism as a product, practice, and institution and into drivers of change to the ecology of journalism. Understanding the economics of journalism and news production is central to comprehending contemporary business and financial issues facing news organizations, developments of new forms of digital news provision, and what is happening to journalism in the twenty-first century.

At its core, economics is about how choices are made and the factors that influence those choices. The study of economics focuses on individual and collective motivations and choices, how decisions to organize and allocate available resources are made, and the distributions of power that influence choices and direct courses of action. Economic analysis considers factors such as markets, consumers and demand, institutional and regulatory factors such as capital and market structure, cost structures and economies and diseconomies of scale and scope, and government policy and regulation (Krugman & Wells 2012; McConnell, Brue & Flynn 2014).

Economics has a 300-year history as a discipline of study, but has been integrated into media and journalism research for only the past four decades

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(Cunningham, Flew & Swift 2015). This focus has helped to develop understanding of the kinds of media available in society, the way media behave and operate, the kinds of content produced, the implications of these factors on culture, politics, and society as a whole, and the role of media in economic and social development (Picard 2003a, 2003b, 2005, 2006; Wirtz, Pistoia & Mory 2013). It has also contributed to the understanding of economic fundamentals by media managers about their enterprises and how they can operate more effectively and connect better with the consumers that they serve. It has helped policymakers better understand media industries, their organization, and the economic factors influencing the behaviour of media companies (Doyle 2013).

When considered by economists and others with significant understanding of economics, most of what journalists and journalism scholars think they know about the economics of journalism and news provision is warped or erroneous. This is partly because few on the journalism side have formally studied economics; their understanding of journalism economics is anecdotal and often framed by those with narrow perspectives based on their own self-interests. This leads to significant misconceptions through what John Kenneth Galbraith called innocent fraud – the lies we tell ourselves that create a gap between conventional wisdom and reality, a fraud that is “innocent” because we feel no sense of guilt about it (Galbraith 2004).

Innocent fraud has surrounded discussions of the conditions of journalism and news production for a number of years. Employment changes and turmoil in news organizations in recent years have been caused by the effects of long- and short-term media trends and economic conditions, but fear, self-interest, and a paucity of learned analysis have skewed perceptions of what is fundamentally occurring (Siles & Boczkowski 2012; Chyi, Lewis & Zheng 2012). This chapter steps away from the myopic and panic-stricken rhetoric of many journalists and media scholars to take a more measured look at what is actually happening to journalism by employing economic perspectives.

Two notes of caution about dealing with economic issues: first, not all economic choices are rational and not all markets function efficiently; second, economic fundamentals should not be ignored when considering business challenges.

There is often misuse of the term “economics” when considering business and financial aspects of news. Economics influences business and financial aspects, but they are not synonymous. Part of the challenge is the etymology of the word, which derives from the ancient Greek *οἰκονομία* (*oikonomía*), a reference to the administration or management of a household. However, for more than three centuries, the term has been employed to specifically relate to factors underlying markets and choices therein.

Precision is also needed in discussing the topics of this chapter because the economics of journalism and the economics of news enterprises are not the same thing. Journalism is the particular practice of gathering and conveying news and

information. The economics of journalism is associated with issues of its supply and consumption and with issues inherent to the organizations involved in its production and distribution. When considering the economics of news enterprises, the economics of journalism is a factor, but many other issues of business economics and sustainability come into play, so they need to be considered separately.

This chapter will introduce some of the major economic influences on journalism and news businesses to give readers a better understanding of how they influence journalism, news organizations, and the public.

1 The economics of journalism

The economics of journalism are influenced by its nature, news selection choices made by journalists and editors, and issues of its consumption.

Journalism does not produce a physical good, but is an activity by which information is gathered and shaped. This activity is based on an accepted, loose body of practices and techniques founded on values such as the pursuit of truth, accuracy, and fairness. Some autonomy exists in the practice. No accepted body of fundamental knowledge exists, nor do unambiguous professional standards and professional discipline. Journalism thus falls somewhere between a trade and a profession.

In the contemporary digital environment, there are few barriers to individuals carrying out journalistic activities and calling themselves journalists. Individuals who post on social media networks and those who regularly write blogs now consider themselves journalists. This is significantly different from the situation during the twentieth century, when control over news production and distribution by news organizations created barriers based on employment (discussed later) that required evidence of journalistic skills, understanding, and education to be designated a journalist.

In economic terms, journalism is neither a primary industry activity, such as oil or coal extraction, nor a manufacturing industry in which physical goods are produced. It is closer to a service industry typified by tax preparation or consulting. It differs from most of the service sector, however, because much of its value is not produced primarily for individual consumers but for society as a whole, based on underlying norms and values about the roles of information in society.

The actual activity of journalism is to find or produce information and prepare it for presentation based on accepted practices. This produces a presentation of that information in a particular form, but it is nearly impossible to maintain exclusivity of the information because it is available to others at its original source. Once it has been distributed, it is also difficult to maintain exclusivity and to exclude others from receiving the information – a fundamental economic requirement if a market is to exist.

These challenges have kept journalism from ever being a commercially viable activity on its own. Financing journalism has always been a struggle, and the costs of undertaking the informational practices have been subsidized over the centuries by emperors, wealthy international merchants, and merchant classes and elites to serve their purposes (Picard 2013). In the recent past, advertising has been used to pay for journalism. Throughout modern history, journalism has been made possible because of patronage, subsidies, advertising, and contractual arrangements that provided funding and attempted to protect the economic value of news (Silberstein-Loeb 2014; John & Silberstein-Loeb 2015).

One of the fundamental economic challenges of journalism is that not everyone wants or needs the news and information produced, despite beliefs to the contrary by those engaged in journalism (Picard 2016b). Most people are not highly active in society and do not engage in the variety of activities that influence the structures and institutions of social, economic, and political life. The majority of people live their lives with minimal levels of engagement in politics and community life. They are content with a limited amount of news and information that has immediate impact on their lives, relying on others to provide leadership about what to do in terms of public affairs and community issues. Most of the public gets a quick general overview of major events or issues through limited exposure to news through free television, radio, and digital services. The consequence of this factor is that consumer desire for journalism is far lower than the total population size.

Journalists, of course, argue that their work has value to society as a whole by bearing witness to events and holding power to account, but these are externalities in economic terms that affect social well-being and are not factors that create a workable market.

1.1 Selection of news and its economic value

A fundamental economic choice in journalism takes place in the choice of what information, events, or issues will be addressed. A number of factors are involved. Decisions of whether to cover topics are made based on journalists' perceptions of the interests the audience, the cost involved in carrying out the journalistic practices required (personnel, travel, etc.), the perceived import of particular stories, the interests of advertisers, and whether it will produce professional rewards such as social impact and reputation enhancement (Hamilton 2004; Picard 2007).

When conceived as a service, the primary function of journalism is to search through all available information, package it into a story/report, and bring it to the attention of consumers. Consumers can theoretically do much of this on their own today because of the variety of sources they can access in the digital world. Thus, the primary economic contributions of journalism are to save consumers time, evaluate the import and veracity of information, and create an overview of what they perceive to be important and will be of interest to consumers.

This service is thus dependent upon matching information with consumers' needs and interests, and doing so in a way that is valuable to them. How this is done is crucial in economic terms because consumer perceptions of the value of a good or service determines its exchange value, that is, what they are willing to pay for it. News, unfortunately, presents a significant challenge in this regard because the value often cannot be established by individual consumers until after they have consumed the news or information, an economic arrangement called production of goods of uncertain quality. Thus consumers must buy a news magazine prior to determining if it was money well spent, or they must invest 30 minutes in watching a television newscast before being able to determine if their time was well spent. The value of journalism is also obscured because news is typically offered in bundles with multiple other news stories and information, thus further obscuring the value of individual journalistic pieces (Picard 2010). This bundling problem is why individual readers on average do not read 75 percent of the articles in a newspaper. They just don't find them valuable.

With most consumer goods, value is typically created by making a product better than others or by making it less expensive, or saving the consumer time. Journalists have traditionally relied upon increasing the amount of news and information provided, increasing the speed of news gathering and distribution, increasing the distance from which news is gathered, and providing exclusive and specialized news and information to create value. In recent years, there has been a focus on making news and information available across platforms and repurposing and reutilizing existing news and information. The value this produces, however, has been diminished by the loss of the near monopolies that news enterprises previously had on news and information and by the rise of heavy competition and the high-choice environment of the digital age (Picard 2010).

Unfortunately, most of the value-creating practices have tended to commoditize news and information, strip economic value from it, and decrease the willingness of consumers to pay for it. Unless the news and information presented is better than that provided by others and is unique, there is no reason for consumers to value it more than that available elsewhere. This challenge of demand is where the issues and interests of the economics of journalism and the economics of news enterprises converge.

2 The economics of news production

The economics of news production are dependent upon and highly influenced by the technologies employed, particularly the requirements for production and distribution, and how consumers obtain and use the journalism conveyed through media and communications systems.

News production in newspapers and news magazines, for example, produces physical copies of news products, which require the use of printing presses to cre-

ate the copies and then their physical transport to locations where consumers may obtain them. Most newspapers invest in and operate their own presses and distribution systems. News magazines tend to use contract printing services and joint distribution systems with other magazines. Newspapers thus tend to have significant capital requirements and relatively highly fixed costs because of costs for presses and the buildings in which they are housed, and because of investments in bundling equipment, loading facilities, and vehicles.

The economics of printing is based in unit costs, that is, the expenses for producing individual copies. These expenses are highly influenced by economies of scale, because variable costs and thus marginal costs are not high and because there are rapidly declining average costs (Picard 2005, 2015a). This provides cost advantages to publishers that produce larger numbers of copies. This is a significant factor that contributes to keeping competition low and the newspaper industry relatively concentrated, because it makes production more expensive for smaller producers.

Distribution creates significant economic challenges for both newspaper and news magazine publishers because costs are affected by delivery distance, density of distribution, and time constraints on distribution (Picard 2011a). The farther a copy must be transported, the fewer copies that are delivered in an area and the need to deliver in a timely manner are all economic constraints that affect costs and pricing of news products and influence decisions of whether publishers will make their products available in some areas or to certain consumers.

Transaction costs created by dealing with intermediaries in the distribution chain can be significant, a critical factor for news magazines and newspapers that sell copies through retail outlets. These determine choices of how to set up distribution systems and the practices used within them. Transaction costs of dealing with individual consumers are also an issue, leading publishers to prefer subscribed to single-copy sales whenever possible.

The dependence of newspapers and news magazines on both circulation and advertising creates unique economic challenges because of the two-sided nature of the market in which circulation success influences advertising success. Both must be maximized for profitability and sustainability (Corden 1953; Reddaway 1963; Picard & Brody 1997). Advertising availability is also subject to economic forces, including the state of the general economy (Picard & Rimmer 1999; Picard 2001; van der Wurff, Bakker & Picard 2008), the size of the market (Picard 1998), and advertising choices that place a disproportionate amount of advertising into the largest newspaper and news magazine in a market. Because of the latter factor, even if 40 to 45% of consumers prefer another paper or news magazine, it may not be able to obtain sufficient advertising income to survive (Gustafsson 1978; Engwall 1981).

The economics of radio, television, and digital/mobile news differs from that of print because they do not produce material objects that must be delivered by

physical means. The economic effect of non-materiality is the historical impossibility of halting people from receiving a broadcast signal they do not pay for (excludability in economic terms), so no traditional market exists (Owen & Wildman 1992). Policy makers and broadcasters have pursued different methods for addressing this issue. In the US, advertising-funded broadcasting was created. In much of Europe, public service broadcasting funded by license fees was created. Both of these policies solved the issue of how to provide funding for broadcasters. The advertising-supported model is dependent upon maximizing audiences who do not pay and then concurrently maximizing revenue received from advertisers that want to reach those audiences (Mangani 2003). However, some audiences are more valuable to audiences than the others. This market arrangement creates incentives for broadcasters and publishers to pay more attention to the interests of advertisers than those of audiences in content decisions. This was especially true during most of the second half of the twentieth century, when the number of broadcasters was limited by available spectrum and consumer choice was limited (Coase 1966; Koschat & Putsis Jr. 2000; Napoli 2003).

The market limitations surrounding the economics of terrestrial broadcasting were altered by the development of cable, satellite, and digital television services that use signal encryption that require consumers to acquire a decoder and pay for services. This technology created excludability of those who do not pay for the decoder and creates the possibility for a market with paying consumers (Cave & Nakamura 2006; Seabright & von Hagen 2007; Barwise & Picard 2012; Picard & Barwise 2015).

Although pay-television services create opportunities for a more effective market, they tend to skew market power toward a few providers because of economies of scale in content acquisition and distribution (Wu 2010; Savage & Wirth 2005). This makes it more difficult for news providers to gain access to distribution systems unless carrying them aligns with the interests of the system providers.

In economic terms, non-material production also strips away market rivalry. Because a finite number of copies of newspapers and news magazines are produced, the consumption of each reduces the abilities of others to get copies, driving prices toward their optimal level. This economic influence does not exist in broadcasting, digital, or mobile distribution because use by some consumers does not preclude use by others, thus creating scarcity and its price effects.

Digital and mobile distribution create opportunities for many more news providers of all sizes to operate and removes or reduces many of the economic issues encountered in print and broadcasting. Most digital and mobile news provision today is linked to legacy news providers, but a growing number of news enterprises have developed that are digital natives. Digital/mobile operations provide significant cost and regulatory advantages that reduce barriers to entry and equalize costs for the basic necessities for operation (Picard 2011b), force companies to alter their strategies (Evans & Wurster 2000; Küng, Picard & Towse 2008), and create

significant network economic effects that make specialized and global operation possible (Shapiro & Varian 1999; Shy 2001). Digital/mobile operations support both free and paid services.

Nonetheless, the digital and mobile environment is not an efficient market, primarily because the gateways and infrastructures of Internet service and telephony, search, and social media networks are controlled by a few firms that are able to extract significant rent and abnormal profit from those who use them. Because of this systemic power, the Internet and its primary services are one of the most concentrated media and communications industries today (Noam 2015).

3 The contemporary economic and business environment of news provision

Many worry about the state of journalism in the contemporary media and communications environment, without identifying its fundamental economic cause: consumers now exist in a high-choice market in which it is difficult for journalists and news organizations to influence their consumption of news. The market has shifted from oligopoly and monopoly tendencies to high competition for consumers' time, attention, and expenditures. This is beneficial from an economic perspective because producers no longer have the primary influence in the market and must respond to consumers, a fundamental requirement for an efficient market. In this highly competitive environment, audiences now choose to get news and information differently than in the past (Napoli 2010). They can get it from many sources, in different formats, on different platforms, at times convenient to them, focusing on topics about which they most need or want to know, and they can do it without the traditional news bundle offered as a newspaper, magazine, or radio or television newscast. While this is good for consumers, it presents significant business challenges for news enterprises.

The levels of competition are uneven, however, and dependent upon the number of creators and providers of news at different levels of news production and distribution (Fig. 14.1). As one moves down the layers of news provision, competition diminishes because the number of providers declines. Those seeking international news can receive it from an enormous number of newspapers, broadcasters, and digital news sources worldwide. Those seeking national news can receive it from a large number of newspapers, broadcasters, and digital news providers in most countries. When one moves down to the regional/provincial or local levels however, the number of news producers and distributors drops significantly, and in many cases near monopolies on local news and information exist.

This issue of news production location is not new to the digital age. In the past, metropolitan, satellite city, suburban, and local weekly newspapers co-existed



Fig. 14.1: Competition diminishes at lower layers of news provision.

under what has been described the umbrella model. In that structure, smaller more local papers operated under the umbrella of the larger and more geographically diverse coverage area papers above them (Rosse 1975). In recent years, however, the ability of metropolitan papers to prosper has been significantly challenged.

There is also a fundamental shift in communications underway that must be recognized. Screens are now becoming the primary technologies for consumption of media content and communication. Established media platforms (print, broadcasting) are being supplanted by Internet-based connections, in which mobile devices have become the dominant means for personal and media communication. Media consumption and use have become more individualized and active. In this environment, actual time spent with media is growing. People are using more devices and all media brands are vying for attention and more frequent contact. However, the ability of firms to profitably connect audiences with content is diminishing. This is not merely a challenge for journalism and news enterprises, but all media and communications firms.

One particularly significant aspect of the new environment is that the connected nature of communication permits advertisers, marketers, and systems providers to more clearly identify and monitor the media and communications behaviour of individual consumers. They do so by employing a variety of tracking mechanisms that monitor both what content is selected and the engagement of consumers with that content. In this process, consumer privacy is appropriated, and many consumers are objecting to this loss of something valuable without what they perceive as informed approval or adequate compensation. Consequently, digital and mobile ad blocking is growing. About 20 percent of digital users employ ad blocking on computers and tablets (40 percent in the US) and blocking is now beginning on mobile platforms. A second reason for the resistance is that current ad systems interfere with user experience by slowing content delivery because tracking materials load first. This endangers the future of ad-supported free content, and news publishers are now working to take control of the processes and improve the experience (Ryan

2016). Some content firms are now trying to make the trade-off between privacy and free content more explicit. They are seeking ways to exclude content from those who do not permit monitoring or to reduce some forms of monitoring in exchange for payments. In this market form, privacy is exchanged for content and the provision of future access to the consumer for publishers and advertisers.

3.1 Contemporary business, financial, and labour challenges

In recent years, a large amount of attention has been focused on the challenges facing the news business, particularly difficulties facing newspapers. Many assume that newspapers are disappearing because the popular press and even scholarly journals speak of widespread shutdown. *The Economist* magazine ran a cover story “Who killed the newspaper?” (Economist 2006), Paul Gilin began a widely read Newspaper Death Watch Blog the following year (newspaperdeathwatch.com), and Steve Ballmer, CEO of Microsoft, predicted in 2008 that newspapers would be gone by 2018 (Whoriskey 2008).

To date, however, there has been no widespread closure of newspapers. In 2014, more than 18,000 newspapers worldwide served 686 million print readers and 11.8 million digital readers. They generated \$179 billion in circulation and advertising revenue. This includes \$90 billion print circulation revenue, \$77 billion print advertising revenue, \$2.5 billion digital circulation revenue, and \$9.5 billion digital advertising revenue (WAN-IFRA 2015). Newspapers in North America and Europe are indeed experiencing declining print revenues and slowly rising digital revenues, although there is growth in print in other parts of world, particularly Asia.

In the US, which has been the hardest hit by changing newspaper consumption and advertising revenue, the number of newspaper declined 8 percent between 2005 and 2014. Many assumed that this meant that 121 cities no longer had newspapers, but what was lost were primarily second (evening) editions of papers and secondary papers in joint operating agreements that previously had to prove they were failing to obtain the JOA antitrust exemption. In reality, fewer than five US communities lost daily newspapers and most of those papers shifted to weekly or 3 to 4 days per week publication, with digital publication 7 days per week.

There is no doubt that reductions in the number of journalists employed by newspapers have occurred, declining from 56,400 in 2000 to 36,700 in 2014 in the US, a 35 percent reduction (Pew Research Center 2015). This has reduced the overall amount of news and information produced by the individual newspapers. It is important to view employment in the longer term, however. Today’s employment is roughly at the level it was in newspapers four decades ago. What happened in the interim? Were the majority of the journalists hired after that time covering state houses, city halls, and schools? Hardly. Most of the additional journalists were hired because of the growth of revenue associated with the development and ex-

pansion of non-news sections, such as lifestyle, entertainment, food, and technology sections and the growth of Sunday papers with large amounts of non-news features during the 1980s and 1990s.

Journalists like to think that they spend their time investigating the intricacies of foreign policy, covering the inner workings of the economic system, and exposing abuses of political and economic power. Although many aspire to do so (and occasionally do with great effect), the reality is far from that imagined sense of self. Most journalists spend the majority of their time rewriting prepared statements or press releases, writing stories such as how parents can save money for university tuition, covering the release of the latest versions of popular electronic devices, or finding out if a sports figure's injury will affect performance in the next match. Most produce news in a fairly formulaic way, reformatting information released by others, resulting in standard stories that are merely aggregations of information supplied by others. This adds very little value and makes it difficult to convince consumers to pay for it. Arguments that the contemporary situation is creating gaps in coverage ignore the fact that there were large news deficits even during the financially rewarding 1990s and first half of the 2000s. High quality local news, neighbourhood news, specialty coverage, and careful analysis of government were the exception rather than the norm even in the best of financial times.

One thus needs to be careful not to equate the employment of journalists in news organizations with what is happening to the provision of journalism *per se*, because much of what has been lost in the reduction is general information and soft news that is available elsewhere. While it is understandable that journalists wanting continued employment or seeking employment tend to link their conditions to the fate of journalism, one must be careful in uncritically accepting that argument.

Despite perceptions otherwise, the general financial and business conditions of the news industry in the US are not dreadful. Newspapers produce combined revenues of \$ 37.6 billion (Newspaper Association of America 2014). Most are still producing operating profits 3 to 4 times larger than that of the average business and, if their balance sheets aren't cluttered with huge debts or the company isn't owned by hedge funds or venture capitalists, net profits still provide reasonable returns on equity and assets. Most news organizations, however, are not achieving growth in revenue or audience. This presents longer-term challenges that require building new capabilities to operate in the emerging digital and mobile environment.

This situation and its challenges, however, do not mean that news organizations are unable to finance the practice of journalism. Journalism is inexpensive, in fact, when compared to other expenses of news enterprises. The costs of journalism accounts for only 10 to 15 percent of the total costs of most newspapers and about 5 to 10 percent of total costs of most broadcasters. This occurs because journalists' salaries are relatively low, while the costs for production and distribution in news-

papers are high, and the costs for original entertainment programming, motion pictures, and sports rights are high for broadcasters. Median compensation for journalists in the US is about \$ 38,000 per year, for example, with new journalists and those in small markets making about \$ 24,000 per year.

New forms of news provision on digital and mobile platforms are appearing, both as commercial and not-for-profit start-ups. Many of these employ journalists who previously worked for legacy news providers, but many are being operated by others with special interest in and knowledge of topics of public importance. Digital and mobile news providers are struggling to generate income, however, because few – primarily large news organizations – are benefiting from advertising and there is little willingness to pay for information and news. Only about 10 to 15 percent of news consumers in most countries are willing to pay news enterprises for digital/mobile news (Reuters Institute 2016), and the remainder perceive little value in the news provided or can obtain news of similar quality elsewhere at no cost.

Those who are willing to pay for digital news through websites and mobile services are beginning to provide regular income for news enterprises, although the revenue remains significantly lower than that from print and broadcast operation (Picard 2014, 2016a). Social media increasingly provide additional mechanisms for distribution of individual news stories, but this disaggregation from a bundled newspaper, newscast, or website makes it difficult to recover costs of production through payments and revenue streams that existed to support the traditional bundled products. Financial arrangements of social media – primary based on advertising revenue – favour the operators of the networks to the detriment of news producers (Küng, Newman & Picard 2016). Nonetheless, social media provide some branding and news distribution benefits and publishers are working to use social media more effectively. News consumers are beginning to rely heavily on news distributed through social media and accessed via mobile service and appear to be moving away from digital access via personal computer and tablets and traditionally aggregated news (Reuters Institute 2016).

The digital environment is also producing significant changes in the work and labour arrangements surrounding journalism and news organizations. Journalistic work has been increasingly digitalized since the 1960s and 1970s, when equipment and production processes changed in both print and broadcasting. Many skills of the past have since been integrated into readily available software (photography editing, graphic design, recording and mixing, copy editing, layout and design), and the functions of content creators are now being taken up by large numbers of semi-professional amateurs who compete with professional production.

There is declining employment in newspapers, news magazines, and television news, all of which are increasingly relying on contingent employment involving outsourced workers, part-time workers, temporary employees, freelancers, and other contract employees. Although there is a rise in digital news, limited tradition-

al employment is being produced and piecework payment making a return. Overall, there is a de-skilling, de-autonomizing, and de-professionalization of journalistic work (Witschge & Nygren 2009; Rottwilm 2014; Picard 2015b).

4 Concluding remarks

As shown in this chapter, economic perspectives provide great explanatory power for the changes occurring in journalism and news provision. They help explain journalistic choices, the economic value of news, and consumer perspectives on news and information. They clarify fundamental differences among media and the implications of news provision through those media, elucidate changes in news enterprises and the news environment, and reveal how they affect journalists and journalistic labour.

Economic perspectives are thus vitally important in understanding journalism as a whole. They help analysis move past normative evaluation to examining causes of choices and changes that are affecting journalism and news provision. They provide perspectives not offered by sociology, psychology, political science, and other disciplines. They make it possible to consider whether strategies and policy suggestions regarding journalism and news provision will actually produce desired results. Economic perspectives are not the sole lens through which journalism and news industry developments should be viewed, and they are not inherently better than other perspectives when considering issues of journalism, but they are fundamentally important when considering the contemporary environment and what it means for the future of journalism.

Further reading

Excellent background about how news has historically been funded and organized is found in Richard John and Jonathan Silberstein-Loeb's *Making News* (2015). The importance of increasing the value of news and reducing commoditization is laid out in Robert G. Picard, *Value Creation and the Future of News Organisations* (2010). James Hamilton provides a fine exploration of the role of commerce and economics in news selection in *All the news that's fit to sell* (2004). Economics factors in news production and distribution are address in greater depth in *The Economics of Print Media* (Picard 2015a) and *The Economics of Television* (Picard & Barwise, 2015).

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Anthony Mills and Katharine Sarikakis

15 Politics and Policies of Journalism and Free Press

Abstract: Throughout history journalism has been perceived by society and the profession as a counterbalance to power abuse, the actor entrusted by the public with the willingness and ability to hold power and especially the State to account. A free public sphere requires free journalism if the principles of enlightenment are to flourish. A free press is incontrovertibly linked to the degree of freedom in a society and while one does not necessarily guarantee the other, the undermining of freedoms in social life is connected with the lack of freedom of expression. The concepts of free speech and the right to impart and access information constitute pillars of the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (United Nations 2016) & the 1950 European Convention on Human Rights (Council of Europe 2016) and of constitutions across the globe. The underlying understanding is that without the freedom to debate issues of public interest using the best and most accurate information available, democracy as a goal and lived political system is impeded. This chapter discusses the politics and policies that impact on journalism, with the starting point that normatively, journalists should seek to hold power accountable.

Keywords: journalism, journalists' safety, media policy, media politics, surveillance

1 Introduction

Journalism has historically been seen by society and by the profession as the anti-pode of power abuse, the actor entrusted by the public with being able to hold power and especially the State to account. A free public sphere requires free press, for the principles of enlightenment to flourish. A free press is inextricably associated with the degree of freedom in a society and while one does not necessarily guarantee the other, the undermining of freedoms in social life is connected with a lack of freedom of expression. The concepts of free speech and the freedom to impart and access information are cornerstones of the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (United Nations 2016), the 1950 European Convention on Human Rights (Council of Europe 2016) and constitutions around the world. The underlying understanding is that without the freedom to discuss issues of public interest, with the best and most accurate information available, democracy as a goal and lived political system is impeded.

Set against the complex shifting sands of globalization and of a media landscape faced with rapid and profound structural and economic change and challenges, a question arises: what is the place of the media of today in the context of

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communications and media policy interaction between nation states and the broad array of associated actors that make up the borderless globalized communications policy melting pot, from transnational entities like IGOs, such as the World Trade Organization and IMF, to Silicon Valley technology giants, to independent journalists working for new media platforms that no longer play by the old nation state interest rules. Shifting media landscapes, amid a rush to structurally, economically and ethically redefine the profession of journalism as traditional news platform models struggle financially, and perceptions of “borders” evolve, have dramatically altered the frames of reference for communications policy discourse. Multi-layered globalization, involving cross-border market, finance, and information integration, means that decision-making no longer occurs at a nation-state level alone but has diffused into a hybrid comprising a variety of supranational, transnational, regional, local, and translocal actors and entities. Networks and corporations, including the world’s leading media and news platforms, with communications policy-making influence, no longer think or operate predominantly within national borders, nor are their structural frameworks unchanged. Proponents of positive change for media in a democratized age of globalization note that “information is free” and borderless, but the flipside of the equation is that traditional news media platforms are still struggling to establish viable economic models in an age in which there is an expectation by consumers not only that information moves freely across the Internet and the world but that news can be consumed for free. Against this backdrop, policy, politics, and economics merge, maneuvering in a globally ambiguous way, at once inter- and trans-national, but also regional, translocal, or even hyper-local.

This chapter discusses the politics and policies that impact on journalism, with the starting point that normatively, journalism *should* aim to hold power accountable, whether this is power deriving from the State or exercised by private entities, and in the public interest. It can do so by providing accurate information and analysis, investigating deeply the workings of power in general and bringing to light information and multiple opinions, and by reflecting as broad a spectrum of social groups as possible. Journalism, especially in the digital age, is not always easy to define, especially in any form of universally-accepted context. The WikiLeaks and Snowden coverage in particular sparked debates about who is and isn’t a journalist (Franklin 2012). The four principal definers of journalism are international governmental organizations such as the United Nations, states, the journalism industry itself, and civil society NGOs such as the Committee to Protect Journalists and Reporters without Borders whose self-proclaimed mission it is to defend the rights of journalists as per their definition of journalism. Eldridge (2014) notes that traditional media are quick to defend their definition of journalism and enforce boundaries in the face of what they define as “interlopers” – whom they specifically and explicitly exclude. This dynamic was in evidence during coverage of the Wikileaks and Snowden topics. Some NGOs’ definition of journalism, for example,

probably includes many of those – citizen journalists, for example – whom traditional media see as interlopers.

The following discussion is not so much a survey of laws applied to journalism, as an attempt to provide a comprehensive, yet detailed account of emerging threats and challenges to the function and formats of journalism as a democracy-driven act. We explore therefore the factors of journalism governance, which is the process by which a combination of practices and institutional interactions result in a regulatory environment. This environment can be constituted by formally law-prescribed conditions, such as the national constitutional laws that provide for free press and the unionization of journalists, but also in more informal ways that nonetheless have a regulatory effect on the practice of journalism.

Journalism faces enormous challenges both from within and beyond the profession. Job security for reporters has become increasingly precarious in the context of financial crisis, but also in the context of media ownership concentration. The management of technological change has also contributed to greater precariousness for journalists, as demands on journalists' time and output (to produce rolling content not for one outlet but for many) rise while the resources provided shrink. Moreover, user-generated content and new forms of journalism, such as advocacy and civil journalism, have challenged the dominant paradigms of 'doing' journalism in many ways. This means that due to a combination of structural, technological, and political factors, public trust in the media and the integrity of journalism has eroded. A combination of these "corrosive" challenges, which are contributing to a "de-professionalization" of journalism, with the further erosion of trust, has raised the specter of the end of journalism as it has been known since its modern-day inception in the seventeenth century (Dahlgren & Splichal 2016: 11). One of the fundamental, immediate challenges for 'legacy' journalism is identifying as-yet elusive funding models that generate media outlet life-sustaining income in a digital age (Franklin 2012).

We are exploring these factors and focus more intensively on the new challenges they create and what it means for journalism and free press, but also, as a consequence, for society and the possibly the future of democratic polities. The chapter focuses on: media ownership concentration and lack of regulation impacting detrimentally on media diversity and pluralism as an 'old' challenge reasserting itself anew; the practices and emerging laws of surveillance and their effect on personal and professional dimensions of journalism; and the increasingly urgent issue of safety of journalists as a combination of lack of employment protection and impunity for the perpetrators of murder. In all these areas, regulation in the form of formal law and state intervention *for the protection* of journalists and media pluralism is weak. These three areas are emerging, we argue, as the terrain of struggle not only for press freedom, but also for freedom in the world. *Plurality, safety, and anonymity*, the three fundamental values undermined by ownership concentration, killings of journalists, and surveillance have long-scale and long-term effects for societies at the level of individual civil liberties.

2 Media ownership, political interests and corporate pressure

Press freedom, including the watchdog role of journalism in its democratic service to the public, can be threatened by interference with editorial independence by owners, politicians, and corporate powerbrokers. A result of this can be that certain journalists and media outlets shed adversarial journalism in favour of complicit coverage: this appeared to be true when Britain's *The Sunday Times* – just before the government released a draft of the controversial new Investigatory Powers Bill on surveillance – was granted exclusive access to the GCHQ spy agency and then ran in-depth non-critical features on the agency.¹ On the corporate front, there was the example of Britain's *Daily Telegraph* newspaper, which was accused by its former chief political commentator Peter Osborne of soft-peddling coverage of the HSBC banking tax avoidance scandal because HSBC was one of its prime advertising clients.² “A fraud on readers” is how he described the coverage, adding that it was “a most sinister development” that “goes to the heart of our democracy”.³ Meanwhile, *Financial Times* columnist Lucy Kellaway called the bluff of Hewlett-Packard by writing a brusque riposte – which the newspaper published – to alleged commercial pressure by its spokesperson, who was apparently unhappy with her coverage of the company.⁴ And then there's the boycott tactic, used by everyone from the former Manchester United football team manager Sir Alex Ferguson with the BBC,⁵ to US President Obama with Fox News,⁶ and presidential candidate Donald Trump, again with Fox News.⁷ In some instances, journalists have reacted by creating entities that do not depend for their funding on advertising from either private companies or the state, or on public funds. These models include news outlets fully owned by the journalists themselves, those dependent on a trust fund, and those supported by independent philanthropists, as well as crowd-sourced models.

The vital but rapidly evolving role in international communications and media policy-making of supranational institutions and actors with global reach and influence in media governance mean that any analysis of drivers, techniques, and areas

1 <http://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2015/oct/28/snowden-surveillance-and-public-relations>

2 <http://www.theguardian.com/media/2015/feb/17/peter-osborne-telegraph-hsbc-coverage-fraud-readers>

3 <http://www.theguardian.com/media/2015/feb/17/peter-osborne-telegraph-hsbc-coverage-fraud-readers>

4 <http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/2/b57fee24-cb3c-11e5-be0b-b7ece4e953a0.html>

5 <http://www.bbc.com/sport/football/14664803>

6 <http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=89984928>

7 <http://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2016/jan/26/donald-trump-boycott-fox-news-republican-debate>

of policymaking and policy processes may occur in de-nationalized spaces (Sarikakis 2012). Such spaces are occupied by a variety of actors and entities including large Western-dominated multinational media conglomerates such as Rupert Murdoch's News Corporation, or Time Warner. Today, the dual nature of media outlets as both political and economic entities is being consolidated (Napoli 1997), with non-public media driven primarily by the profit maximization imperative or, increasingly in the context of the global media crisis, the loss minimization perspective. Thus, while powerful actors and entities seek to shape government and other communications and media policy in a variety of ways, media entities and news outlets themselves can be useful tools in that quest. Something as simple as news story selection (Epstein 1974) can be performed in accordance with the economic and/or policy-influencing goals of the management of the media outlet, which may in turn be aligned with political and corporate elites. Media mogul Rupert Murdoch, whose British journalism assets include top-selling British tabloid *The Sun*, the national broadsheet *The Times* and audiovisual giant Sky Television, which part owns Sky News, was very close to former Prime Minister Tony Blair. Before that, *The Sun* famously ran the now notorious headline "It's the Sun wot won it" in reference to its campaigning against the Labour party candidate in the run-up to the 1992 British general election and the subsequent surprise victory by the Conservative party.

In a new geostrategic world marked by multipolar powers, the notion of freedom of expression and the media and policy 'promoting' it, are used to couch the promotion of sociocultural views that further national interests. A number of states have adopted policies promoting their interests in the world of globalized public opinion and competing news channels, in an information war of the airwaves. France set up France 24, publicly funded and broadcasting in a variety of languages including Spanish and English. Germany has expanded its international news channel Deutsche Welle. Russia has set up Russia Today as well as a 24-hour Arabic-language international news broadcaster. China has CCTV and Iran established Press TV to influence public opinion through the dissemination of information that reflects national and geostrategic goals and values. The most prominent example has been the rise of Qatar-based and -funded Al Jazeera, initially accused by many Western governments of being a platform for terrorist propaganda because it aired portions of interviews with Osama bin Laden. This in turn led to issues of democratization and access, with the US forbidding any US carriers from broadcasting Al Jazeera on US soil. Al Jazeera had to set up its own US affiliate, Al Jazeera America, to broadcast and operate there, but the channel is closing down after failing to capture enough market share at a time of declining oil revenue limiting Qatar's willingness to continue to bankroll it.

Despite the growing corporate and transnational political influence of post-colonial actors, the world still does not have a post-colonial global media platform capable of competing in terms of international reach with outlets like CNN, the

BBC, or Fox News. International Western broadcasters are still usually the platforms of choice for many international business and political elites seeking to transmit a strategic message [including through advertising] to the world or to specific policymaking counterparts. This reality is aggravated by the ‘digital divide’, and questions arise as to whether or not efforts should be made to promote a more equitable geographic distribution of technology as opposed to allowing market forces to rule.

Audiovisual journalism sector regulation should promote environments that do not tend towards a news flow and information monopoly, so that the public interest in having a diverse, pluralistic breadth of journalistic content is served. However, when media ownership is politically tied with government figures, there is a danger that the public interest dynamic can be skewed. For example, the rise of media mogul Rupert Murdoch to a media market position of unrivalled power in the UK was in great part due to his ability to cultivate interest-advancing political ties with more than one prime minister (D’Arma 2011). The media pluralism and media freedom goals that underpin European Union-wide regulatory policy as set out by the European Commission are understood to be vital ingredients for the continued functioning of healthy democracy (Brogi & Parcu 2014).

Political backing for moves by Rupert Murdoch to enhance media holdings in the UK illustrated the danger that when nebulous behind-the-scenes state-corporate deals get in the way of public-good-promoting communications and media policies journalism suffers because for one thing there is no guarantee of a plethora of different voices. Let us imagine if in the UK in the run-up to the 2003 Iraq war, all of the national broadsheet newspapers had been in the hands of corporate interests unwilling for corporate-political reasons to criticize the government. There would not have existed the situation in which *The Guardian* and *The Independent* – whose print edition has since been shuttered after three decades – stood against the war editorially, and the public would have been deprived of reporting highlighting the shortcomings in the British government’s approach to the invasion, and therefore of their right to accurate information. The government would in turn not have been held to account, at least in terms of public opinion, which informs opinions in elections.

At direct odds with the EU parliament’s urging of the European Commission to take steps to curb media diversity narrowing in the EU is a reluctance on the part of many EU member states to relinquish national media sovereignty, to EU-wide regulation. This is part of an array of practical and political impediments to any institutional EU effort to counter media concentration and promote diversity – essential ingredients for informed citizenries in healthy democracies (Doyle 2007). Despite the recognition of indicators, by monitoring bodies such as the Council of Europe and the European Audiovisual Observatory, pointing towards media concentration and media holdings enlargement, coupled with weak or ineffective domestic national regulation, efforts to counter this trend face numerous obstacles.

While one of the EU institutional policymaker concerns related to media concentration is the impact this may have on the financial and economic performance of a media sector, the second concern is the detrimental impact the absence of a diverse, pluralistic spectrum of information sources and content may have on democratic health. In the EU and elsewhere there is a strong documented precedent for industrialists' investment in media as a way of augmenting political influence and consolidating control over other business interests (Harcourt & Picard 2009). But impediments to media diversity can also stem from structural dynamics from within the media themselves. A (2015: 399) study by Bodinger-De Uriarte and Valgeirsson found that in the United States “meaningful diversification of staff and news coverage is impeded by established newsroom culture and by the lack of structural mechanisms to facilitate such change”. The findings indicated “serious ‘disconnects’ among the institutions of professional journalism, dissipating the ‘environmental pressure’ for diversification and mirroring contemporary US newsrooms in outmoded ‘monoculturalism’”.

3 Conditions of work and potential effect on democracy

Any public policy discourse in theory promotes quality journalism including diversity that fosters social equality, informs, and provides cultural variety. In reality, public policy discourse is infused strongly with the narratives of dominant stakeholders motivated by expansionary aspirations, in a stark illustration of the self-propelling dynamic of neo-liberal media and communications markets, complete with visions of Information Society liberation and democratization. The net outcome at a time of profit maximization priorities for private media and austerity for public media can be a diminution of the amount of quality journalism that fulfils public broadcasting prerogatives or satisfies the values that underpin quality journalism even in private media outlets.

Neoliberalist and other political powerbrokers seek to influence journalism policy with respect to public service broadcasting, ostensibly the purview of equitable access, quality, information diversity, and maximization of social equality. They are seeking to redefine the notion of public interest in as far as it relates to public broadcasters such as the BBC, a move already initiated under the UK's Labour government of Tony Blair (Freedman 2008) which set its sights on a laissez-faire deregulation of the market. In Hungary and Poland, where there have been trends towards illiberal democracy, new governments automatically set about ‘cleansing’ the public broadcasters and refashioning them more like state broadcasters. Much of current communications and media policy-making as it pertains to journalism is seen through the lens linking media to telecoms, and the governance of that

space, from notions involving net neutrality, online surveillance by authorities and corporate entities, licensing in the digital age, and supposedly independent regulatory authorities focused on digital contexts, to the evolution from public interest to profit maximization.

Among those actors at the core of amorphous trans-border communications policymaking influence in the twenty-first century are elite politicians whose spheres of influence are potent but nebulous, percolating through a commanding grey zone of governments, think tanks, telecommunications and news media interests, private corporations, public entities and so on. Because many of the strategies employed by these actors to influence communications and media policy are informal and opaque they can be difficult to trace and attempts to analyse and gauge their effectiveness can prove challenging. Also to be considered are the not-easily-definable publics who interact with policy outcomes in informal ways, including through the consumption of news media across a growing variety and number of platforms, with such interaction incorporating notions and expressions of dissent. A key question is: How is the public interest served in communications policy and the regulations that should stem from it?

There are, then, two sides to the communications policy coin: On the one hand, policy effectiveness can be measured in terms of outcome for private, economic actors, including the media industry, and other transnational actors and entities including politicians, governments, and nation states. On the other, outcome is in theory measurable in terms of the degree to which communications and media policies serve the public interest which in turn is inextricably bound up with levels of democratic participation (or not) in general, and in the policy-making process in particular, and with the promotion of equitable social developments and the fostering of cultural diversity and representation. From a public interest perspective, side two of the coin is the one that really matters, and yet it increasingly finds itself trapped in a face-off with hegemonic constructions bound up with the promotion of side one interests, i.e. those of private companies and political elites. We can therefore speak of “minoritized majorities” (Chakravartty & Sarikakis 2006).

Especially within the European Union, debate exists about whether or not the right model is so-called “dirigisme” – active state involvement in media policy making – vs. the “laissez-faire” approach (Collins 1994; Harcourt 2005; Moore 1997; etc.) favoured by neo-liberalists. Ironically, though, the promotion of the neoliberal framework for media and communications policy actually requires a significant degree of regulation too (Humphreys 1996), so that we may be talking about re-regulation as opposed to the absence of regulation. Active state efforts to shape media and communications policymaking, including public broadcasting, or guaranteeing a variety of broadcast platforms for journalistic output, are treated with disdain by neoliberal view-holders (e.g., Bandow 1994). In developing countries, they perceive such involvement as an invitation to the nefarious effects of corruption while in Western democracies it is seen as paternalistic meddling that runs

counter to intrinsic free market values and goals and therefore is a barrier to individual freedom too – which neoliberals see as an exportable product through global digital media platforms. This may explain Google’s plan to provide Internet access through Google balloons to remote areas of the planet.

In some ways the EU model – which allows for greater citizen input into policy-making than under the dominant, neoliberal-led US model – serves as a counterbalance or at least a pointer in terms of greater democratization of the communications and media policy debate. Generally speaking though there is a sense that even in Western democracies broad sections of the public or even the public as a whole are excluded from the media policy-making process, which is handled by an interconnected elite in what Freedman (2008) calls “inter elite communication”. These elites are political, financial, and ideological, spanning a full interconnected spectrum and highlighting, especially in the Information Age, the interconnectivity of politics and economics under the umbrella of information ideology.

At the heart of twenty-first-century communications and media policy-making lies the question of whether greater importance should be attributed to the economic, or the social-cultural, value of information, which in turn raises the issue of democratic legitimacy, i.e. the degree to which all stakeholders, including ordinary citizens, are involved in the policymaking process (Mansell 2014). On the economic vs. social-cultural spectrum it appears that the closer one approaches economic neoliberal values the less involved the citizenry is in policymaking. There is less room for divergent opinions, citizen feedback, and critical self-reflection. The one area in which a democratizing shift towards greater citizen involvement is apparent is the shift from public media- or corporate media-generated content to user-generated content (Mansell 2014), including in the form of citizen journalism. However, questions remain about impact and reliability, and therefore the degree to which such user-generated content contributes measurably to promoting the public interest.

Structural parameters affecting the politics and policy of journalism also include job uncertainty at a time of enduring crisis for many news media outlets, low pay and the effects of the financial and media crisis on management willingness and ability to commit to a policy of quality news-gathering and coverage. These increased uncertainties have also led to growing job security anxiety and cynicism vis-à-vis management in the newsroom (Ekdale et al. 2015). Dramatic and rapid technological change has compounded these developments. The expectation on the part of consumers that news must be available on a rolling virtually instantaneous basis has led the *New York Times*, for example, to do away with its evening deadline. It now has a series of rolling deadlines. Sky News and other media outlets have a policy of not allowing their journalists to “break news” on Twitter. Even public media are, in the age of austerity, driven by the need to shrink budgets, if not maximize profit. An example is the BBC closing down various stations and channels, including the broadcast version of BBC3, which is now available only

online. Ironically, the target audience of BBC3 is younger generations, up to late 20s, so the message is sent that it is the next generation that is being disadvantaged or indeed delivered into the arms of private media. Additionally, it is widely perceived that the quality of journalism on CNN has deteriorated since the glory days of founder Ted Turner, who subsequently sold CNN to Time Warner, and star reporters such as Peter Jennings who covered the 1991 Gulf War live from a Baghdad hotel roof – and yet the profit margin of CNN has never been healthier. It is argued that owners Time Warner are not primarily motivated by the pursuit of top quality journalism but by the maximization of profit including through advertising deals that critics have suggested impact on editorial decisions. McDowell (1997) argues that major cost-cutting is not a long-term solution for news brands as they seek to prop up underperforming profit margins amid twin challenges of consumer moves to commodified news on a variety of social media platforms and economic recession. He suggests that sustained deep cost-cutting does more damage than good to a major news outlet's brand reputation. It is only he argues through successful brand management, that the legacy media giants will be able to carve out their point of difference niche and hold on to it. If they don't, then the aggregators and amateurs win – and democracy loses.

Increasingly, such social media giants – with massive public valuations on Western stock exchanges fuelling the global market expansion in the Information Age – are also blurring the line between journalism and branded content that is far from balanced and is not really journalism. Private media and social media corporations have an interest in branding it as journalism, but it is in fact a non-journalistic media platform for narratives that promote certain communications policies and politics. Such media platforms can surreptitiously but significantly influence global communications and media policy debates. For example, there is no transparency about how Facebook News is filtered. Red Bull Media, a media content offshoot of the Red Bull corporate empire, with head offices in Salzburg, Austria and Southern California, espouses “journalism” that is in essence branded content pushing a Western-led narrative about brand energy in a high-velocity barrier-free global age of market driven expansion, with the ultimate goal of increasing Red Bull profit and promoting communications policies that facilitate this. Questions have also been raised about the proximity of the Vice News and Buzzfeed models to branded content.

4 Safety of journalists

Journalists' safety figures prominently among the structural parameters linked to the policy and politics of journalism. In the last 20 years it has become the policy of big media outlets, with the financial wherewithal, to pay greater attention to protecting their journalists, including through hostile environment training courses,

the provision of security personnel in the field, and ensuring that they have the proper equipment (Tait 2007). Journalist killings have become not just a matter of ‘collateral damage’ as in earlier times, but a strategic tool for combatants in armed conflict (Tait 2007). A total of 1,189 journalists have been killed since 1992 simply for doing their job, according to the Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ).⁸ Well over half of them were killed with complete impunity, CPJ reports. The United Nations Human Rights Council considers impunity to be the main reason why journalists continue to be killed in such high numbers. Across the world, journalists are confronted with a broad array of constant threats. Furthermore, women in journalism experience greater risks than their male colleagues. They are more likely to be affected by sexual abuse, violence, assaults, or online threats (cf. Parmar 2015: 42). That is why the UN Human Rights Council is urging a gender-sensitive approach to journalism safety by states. Most of the journalists were killed in their home country (88 percent) – only 12 percent were citizens of foreign countries. Murder accounted for more than 60 percent of all the cases; just over 20 percent of the journalists killed in that time frame were killed in crossfire in conflict zones. The most dangerous country in that time-frame was Iraq. The nine other most dangerous countries were: Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Brazil, Colombia, Mexico, Pakistan, Philippines, Russia, Somalia and Syria.

Journalists’ killings have risen up the policy agenda of nation states, in the context of international politics. UN resolutions have been passed enshrining the safety of journalists. And yet journalism is becoming more, not less, dangerous, according to statistics regularly published by NGOs and other organizations involved in promoting journalism safety. A broad array of NGOs such as the Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ), Reporters without Borders, Article 19, and the International Federation of Journalists (IFJ) promote journalists’ safety and freedom of expression as guarantors of democratic human rights more broadly. They have mobilized to ascertain why journalist killings are on the rise and to elucidate the conditions under which these killings take place. They note that under international human rights law states are obligated to protect the right to life and freedom of expression. Thus, they must also protect media workers, including against threats from non-state actors.

International Governmental Organizations (IGOs) such as the Council of Europe and the United Nations have in recent years passed resolutions, declarations, initiatives, and statements focused explicitly on the duty of states to protect journalists. In 2011, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe adopted a Resolution on the state of media freedom in Europe highlighting the duty of states to protect journalists against attacks on their lives and freedom of expression, as well as a recommendation on the protection of journalistic sources (Council of Europe 2011). In November 2013, the Council of Europe Conference of Ministers re-

⁸ <https://cpj.org/killed/>

sponsible for Media and Information Society passed a Resolution on the safety of journalists, and in April 2014 the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe adopted a declaration on “the protection of journalism and the safety of journalists and other media actors (Council of Europe Committee of Ministers 2013)”. In April 2015, the Council of Europe launched an online platform to promote the protection of journalism and safety of journalists after the Council’s Parliamentary Assembly adopted, in January 2015, Resolution 2035 (2015) on the “Protection of the safety of journalists and of media freedom in Europe” (Council of Europe 2015b), in the immediate aftermath of the attack on French magazine *Charlie Hebdo*. That resolution reiterated the importance of media freedom for democracy, noting that “any attack on the media and journalists is an attack on a democratic society”.

The United Nations has also focused on the topic of the protection of journalists’ safety in recent years. In May 2015, the UN Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 2222 on “protection of civilians in armed conflict”, expressing deep concern at the growing threat to journalists and associated media personnel, including killings, kidnapping, and hostage-taking by terrorist groups (United Nations 2015). The Security Council, echoing the Council of Europe, noted that it is the primary responsibility of states to protect journalists and safeguard the right of free expression (United Nations 2015). The UN Security Council had already adopted Resolution 1738 in 2006, condemning attacks against journalists – who should be treated as civilians under international law – in conflict situations (United Nations 2006) and highlighting the responsibility of states in this context, and their obligation to “end impunity and to prosecute those responsible for serious violations”. In September 2014, the United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC) adopted a resolution on the safety of journalists noting that journalists must be protected not only in conflict zones and condemning arbitrary or illegal communications surveillance of journalists. It too called on states to implement concrete measures to tackle impunity. The same UN body in September 2012 passed a resolution on the “Safety of journalists” (International Press Institute 2012) expressing “concern that violations of the right to freedom of opinion and expression continue to occur, including increased attacks against, and killings of, journalists and media workers”, and underscoring “the need to ensure greater protection for all media professionals and for journalistic sources”. This Resolution also identified as a growing threat to the safety of journalists non-state actors, including terrorist groups and criminal organizations. And like other resolutions it too noted that attacks against journalists often occur with impunity, and called upon states “to ensure accountability” and to “promote a safe and enabling environment for journalists to perform their work independently and without undue interference including through legislative measures”. In December 2013, the United Nations General Assembly adopted Resolution 68/163 on “The safety of journalists and the issue of impunity” (United Nations 2014). It also proclaimed 2 November as the International Day to End Impunity for Crimes against Journalists and urged Member States “to

do their utmost to prevent violence against journalists and media workers, to ensure accountability through the conduct of impartial, speedy and effective investigations into all alleged violence against journalists and media workers falling within their jurisdiction and to bring the perpetrators of such crimes to justice and ensure that victims have access to appropriate remedies". UNESCO, in 1997, passed Resolution 29 on the "Condemnation of violence against journalists", which underscored that that "the assassination of journalists goes beyond depriving people of their lives as it involves a curtailment of freedom of expression, with all that this implies as a limitation on the freedoms and rights of society as a whole" (UNESCO 2007).

Despite the solidifying international legislative framework for journalists, the risks are not decreasing in great part because of a failure to challenge impunity. The number of journalists killed between 1992 and 2016 covering conflict zones is lower [38 percent of the total] than the number killed covering politics [47 percent of the total], according to figures published by the Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ).⁹ A total of 21 percent were killed covering human rights, 20 percent reporting on corruption, and 15 percent covering crime. In total, 62 percent of journalists killed on the job died outside of conflict zones. A total of 782 were murdered, compared to 247 killed in combat or crossfire. Of the 1,182 journalists killed in that time-frame 686 were killed with impunity. This tells us that in many countries there must be a policy of allowing impunity to thrive, or at least the absence of a political will to bring perpetrators to justice. The consequence of this, in turn, is that even in countries with at least a degree of press freedom, purported policies of promoting the public interest through independent journalism of public value are undermined by the impunity with which those seeking to silence journalists holding public sector and private persons to account are able to do so. The continued killing and physical attacking of journalists promotes a culture of fear and self-censorship, especially when these violent acts go unpunished.

5 Surveillance: Another threat to journalism

The term "safety of journalists" generally connotes physical threats through crossfire in conflict zones or physical targeting in the field, as well as arbitrary arrest and harassment, unfair trial, imprisonment without trial, imprisonment in abusive conditions etc. But in recent years, rapidly advancing surveillance technologies coupled with a recognition of their usefulness in countering a free press by a variety of entities has emerged as a growing and major threat to press freedom and also the physical and psychological safety of journalists. The scope of the threat

⁹ <https://cpj.org/killed/>

became clearer after the revelations by Edward Snowden about mass metadata gathering and concerns began to snowball about the risk of surveillance, just like other threats and forms of intimidation, fuelling self-censorship which results in politicians not being held to account, and policies not being questioned. Together these threats also reinforce the notion that, on the political front, prominent among political and private elites' priorities is the reinforcement and retention of the "capacity to control the media to reinforce legitimacy or fortify a regime's hold on power" (Waisbord & Morris 2001: xi–xii). This involves controlling the flow and content of communication by journalists.

There are diverging views within the neoliberal approach of the degree to which surveillance of media and communications spaces is to be accepted, with some neoliberal political policymakers or influencers pushing back against increased surveillance after initially offering a degree of complicity in the provision of access. Technology giants such as Google, Facebook, and Yahoo subsequently publicly changed their tune to be in line with consumer frustration at apparent invasion of privacy in the post-Snowden world. Freedom for technology behemoths such as Facebook, Apple, and Google now means not just increased access and utility but also freedom from intrusion. Hence the whole debate about encryption for example, which also has repercussions for journalism in general and investigative journalism in particular. It may also explain the reasons why Apple refused to provide backdoor access, upon request by the FBI, to the iPhone of one of the perpetrators of the terrorist attack in December 2015, in the US city of San Bernardino. The dynamic applies also to consumer surveillance, for which technology companies that in many instances are increasingly creating a blend of advertising and branded-content 'news', often under the banner of 'journalism', seek to promote policies that reduce privacy and allow for the all-important consumer surveillance that allows them to serve the advertisers off whom they make their revenue. At a certain level, consumer surveillance and state surveillance can merge. For example, a private company handles vehicular licence plate recognition for a series of police departments in the US, and every year social media giants acquiesce to thousands of requests for individual account information from law enforcement, and intelligence agencies, many but not all of which may be legitimate.

The Snowden revelation, which showed a close acquiescent relationship between social media giants such as Facebook, Twitter, and Microsoft, and US and UK intelligence agencies obtaining big data has raised questions, in a techno-information capitalism age, about the communications policy influence information platform owners have acquired, from universities to think tanks to political forums and the corridors of government and military power. Apple CEO Tim Cook recently refused to allow the FBI backdoor access to the encrypted mobile phone of the alleged perpetrator of the 2015 terrorist attack in San Bernardino, California, not necessarily because he cares about the privacy of individuals – Apple was happy to cooperate with US investigating authorities in the past – but because in the post-

Snowden world, the perception by consumers, the drivers of revenue, that Apple does not care about privacy is bad for business.

Control of information content through intensified surveillance, including mass surveillance, of journalists and the media, occurs not just in undemocratic countries but in Western democracies too, where public sector whistle-blowers are also being targeted with increased zealotry. In fact, the Obama administration has gone after more whistle-blowers than all previous administrations combined¹⁰ and in one recent high-profile case sought to compel Pulitzer Prize-winning *New York Times* journalist James Risen to identify confidential sources in a CIA whistleblower trial.¹¹ Ostensibly, this is about a policy of getting the democratic balance right between security and freedom but critics suggest it is at times more about an entrenched policy of controlling information content. As Lyon (2015) notes, the notion of a balance or trade-off between privacy and security or liberty is “matched only by its hollowness”. Balance is actually a vacuous term that nonetheless speciously bolsters the suggestion that freedom of speech, of the media, of assembly, of expression must be limited in the pursuit of some ill-defined concept of national security. Following 11 September, then-US President George W. Bush permitted the US security services to flout standard judicial procedure in their quest for communications information that would “keep America safe” (Greenwald 2014). Since then, and in response to further attacks, Western democratic countries have pursued a policy of seeking to pass legislation that enshrines in law expanded surveillance powers that critics have warned threaten fundamental democratic rights, including freedom of expression, and also threaten watchdog, particularly investigative, journalism.

Even in Western democracies, such surveillance can promote a ‘Panopticon’ effect – in reference to a prison design conceived of by English philosopher and social theorist Jeremy Bentham in the late eighteenth century allowing for the constant [possibility of] surveillance of inmates (Bentham 1791). Just the perception of the possibility of surveillance, in the context of perceived ubiquitous surveillance, has a chilling effect, even if the surveillance is not continuous (Foucault 1977 & Bart 2005). For instance, Internet users in the US are wary of discussing Edward Snowden online (Lyon 2015). A Stanford University experiment by psychologists Gregory White and Philip Zimbardo entitled the “Chilling Effects of Surveillance” found that in the US the “threat or actuality of government surveillance may psychologically inhibit free speech” (Greenwald 2015: 180).

It is not just everyday citizens who are intimidated by this policy. The chilling effect affects investigative journalists and the confidential sources and whistle-

¹⁰ <http://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2015/mar/16/whistleblowers-double-standard-obama-david-petraeus-chelsea-manning>

¹¹ http://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/13/us/times-reporter-james-risen-will-not-be-called-to-testify-in-leak-case-lawyers-say.html?_r=0

blowers upon whom investigative watchdog journalism relies (Human Rights Watch, 2014). If sources are less willing to come forward, because they are afraid they can be identified by the state through surveillance, and if journalists are also intimidated, it is easy to see how the information flow narrative can be subtly ‘cleansed’, through a process of induced self-censorship, by states seeking to bring about the omission of content that holds public officials to account for wrongdoing.

Investigative journalists may not worry about being tortured in Western democracies, but the fear of possible surveillance, which can fuel a degree of paranoia about real and imagined risks of retribution, including arrest and imprisonment under anti-terror legislation, is enough to compel many journalists to ignore sensitive stories about the state in particular and therefore from holding state actors to account. Under such circumstances, especially in democracies that are already displaying political tendencies towards illiberalism, populism, nationalism etc., the threat of democratic erosion is very real. The Snowden leaks revealed that it has been the policy of Western intelligence agencies to promote “paranoia” among those challenging the system. And the Stanford psychologists White and Zimbardo noted: “The boundaries between paranoid delusions and justified cautions indeed become tenuous (Greenwald 2015).”

In the 1970s the *Washington Post* revealed that in the US the FBI had established domestic counterintelligence programme COINTELPRO, which monitored, and sought to discredit, a variety of domestic activists including those affiliated with the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People and the anti-war movement, socialists, Communists etc. (Greenwald 2015). The revelations, which the *New York Times* suppressed at the behest of the FBI, led to the creation of the Senate Church Committee which found: “[Over the course of 15 years] the Bureau conducted a sophisticated vigilante operation aimed squarely at preventing the exercise of First Amendment rights of speech and association, on the theory that preventing the growth of dangerous groups and the propagation of dangerous ideas would protect the national security and deter violence.” One of the COINTELPRO memos noted that “paranoia” could be engendered among anti-war activists by convincing them there “was an FBI agent behind every mailbox”.

More recently, in the UK, after *The Guardian* newspaper reported on the Snowden surveillance revelations, it was forced to smash up computer hard drives on which Snowden material had ostensibly been stored – even though copies of the material existed elsewhere – under the watchful eye of two GCHQ spy agency officers.¹² In the UK again, journalists who have reported on environmental activists opposed to fracking have been informed that they are under investigation but in a Kafkaesque paranoia-inducing twist are told nothing about the investigation.¹³

¹² <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/aug/20/nsa-snowden-files-drives-destroyed-london>

¹³ <http://www.lrb.co.uk/blog/2015/03/24/oscar-webb/am-i-on-the-domestic-extremist-database/>

In some instances, they have subsequently managed to find out that they have been under close secret surveillance. Also in the UK, in 2015, the Metropolitan Police allegedly abused anti-terror legislation to spy on journalists' phones, to identify a confidential source.¹⁴ This was after a year earlier it emerged that the police had routinely been spying on UK reporters who covered protests, for years.¹⁵ And Snowden documents released in 2015 indicated that journalists' emails from the BBC, Reuters, *The Guardian*, *The New York Times*, *Le Monde*, *The Sun*, NBC, and the *Washington Post* had been swept up by British spying agency GCHQ.¹⁶ In the US, in 2013, it emerged that the government, going after a leak, had secretly seized switchboard records for phones used by over 100 reporters for the US Associated Press news agency in Washington DC and elsewhere.¹⁷ Just weeks later came reports that the government had also secretly seized the phone and email records for Fox News chief Washington correspondent James Rosen, in an effort to obtain information about his interaction with a source they believed had violated the Espionage Act.¹⁸

It is not difficult to imagine that the paranoia of the sort apparently deliberately fuelled by the FBI, and described by White and Zimbardo, could lead to self-censorship on the part of journalists. In authoritarian countries such surveillance is combined with the very real risk of torture, unfair trial followed by lengthy imprisonment under abusive conditions, murder, physical attack, and a variety of other threats. And in the post-11 September age, increased surveillance has traditionally gone hand in hand with other anti-terrorism legislation such as France's prolonged state of emergency following the December 2015 attacks, which expands the powers of the police and other security services to search, censor, and detain. The Patriot Act had a similar effect in the US. The advent of the Internet of Things, meanwhile, in which a plethora of devices are digitally connected, means that even if journalists and whistle-blowers implement digital security when they are communicating online, intelligence services have a wealth of other sources from which to gather information – including, for example, audio devices from smart TVs which send unencrypted audio information to third-party servers. A broad array of personal data, including that of journalists, is held in various databases which are susceptible to intrusion not just by intelligence agencies but also criminals who may have a nefarious interest in placing information in the public domain, or may be working in the shadows on behalf of government security agencies.

14 <http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3170190/Met-used-terror-law-spy-reporters-phones-Plebgate-scandal-Three-journalists-launch-legal-action-claims-human-rights-violated.html>

15 <http://www.dailymail.co.uk/wires/ap/article-2843470/UK-police-spied-reporters-years-docs-show.html>

16 <http://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2015/jan/19/gchq-intercepted-emails-journalists-ny-times-bbc-guardian-le-monde-reuters-nbc-washington-post>

17 <https://cpj.org/reports/2013/10/obama-and-the-press-us-leaks-surveillance-post-911.php>

18 <https://cpj.org/reports/2013/10/obama-and-the-press-us-leaks-surveillance-post-911.php>

Even in democratic countries surveillance of journalists – either legal or illegal – can take a heavy toll and damage press freedom and therefore democratic health. Journalistic confidential sources – upon whom watchdog journalism is reliant – are increasingly fearful of being identified through surveillance, despite efforts by them, and the journalists, to protect their anonymity. Journalists, especially those reporting on sensitive topics such as national security, increasingly sense that confidential sources' willingness to speak up is being diminished by the threat of advanced surveillance and the willingness by a broad array of actors including government agencies to use it – sometimes illicitly – to identify confidential sources. Additionally, journalists who reported on the Wikileaks and Snowden stories recall being placed under surveillance, both electronic and physical. Many of them were subjected to harassment as they travelled through US and UK airports, and in at least one instance, an Italian airport, by border agents who subjected them to secondary screening or delayed them for unsubstantiated reasons. Some journalists say this has generated a sense of paranoia, which can be debilitating or at least prompt self-censorship. A prominent Russian journalist who is an expert on surveillance, said that the paranoia generated by surveillance can “destroy” journalists (Mills & Sarikakis 2016).

Journalists in both democratic and authoritarian countries are having to adapt to the Panoptic surveillance world, by becoming experts in digital security, educating and protecting sources digitally, and adopting media outlet models that are completely independent of any government influence, financing, or leverage. A form of subversive journalism, often making use of the skills of hacktivists, has been born from this surveillance and is involved in a tug of war with those carrying out the surveillance, while civil society groups play a linked role in seeking to counter increased surveillance

In addition, in the wake of 11 September and other terrorist attacks, and despite landmark court rulings in Europe underscoring the rights of EU citizens to privacy, such as the EU Court of Human Rights decision involving Austrian student Max Schrems, who challenged the right of Facebook to transfer his personal information to the US where there were no guarantees it would not fall prey to the type of mass surveillance revealed by Edward Snowden, there is now again a Western state policy of prioritizing security over privacy. This policy was compounded by the terror attacks in January & November 2015 in Paris, including on satirical newspaper *Charlie Hebdo*, the December 2015 terrorist attack in San Bernardino in the US, and the refugee crisis afflicting the European Union.

The knock-on effect of this is apparent in France where a state of emergency imposed after the December 2015 attacks, and curtailing basic freedoms, was extended by parliament till at least May 2016. Some political voices have even called for tougher EU-wide security legislation. Across the EU, national security legislation is prioritizing surveillance and other restrictive mechanisms over freedom of expression, privacy etc., and creating a chilling effect for journalists, especially the

watchdog investigative journalists who should be holding governments to account, and their whistleblower and other confidential sources. These developments roll back policies favouring privacy, such as the establishment and empowerment of national data protection agencies independent of the political decision-making processes. And at a time of increased importance attached to the bottom line, some private media outlets have sought to ratchet up internal surveillance in an apparent aim to increase productivity. For example, journalists at Britain's *The Daily Telegraph* showed up at work one morning to discover that management had installed monitors at their desks that recorded when they were away from their work stations. After an ensuing uproar the plan was cancelled.

6 Conclusions

Not merely the laws protecting free speech, but practices governing the practice of journalism regulate today the profession, and ultimately free speech. We see that even in mature democracies efforts are intensifying to reduce the free spaces for genuinely adversarial oversight journalism, especially on sensitive topics such as national security. Historically, unparalleled state and corporate surveillance technologies, coupled with a zealous willingness to use them, all too often outside the grey-zone parameters of the law, are fuelling self-censorship among journalists and ordinary citizens, with all the nefarious consequences this entails for democratic transparency and accountability. A surveillance-industrial complex, in which state intelligence agencies interact opaquely with usually acquiescent private companies engaged in corporate surveillance of citizens, including journalists, results in private-sphere information such as metadata, phone and email records being made available to government bodies whose number one priority is not press freedom and the enhancement of democracy. In democracies, this fuels a chilling effect. In repressive countries, it forms the basis for the killing, physical assault, arrest, torture, and imprisonment after unfair trials of scores of journalists.

The safety of journalists remains under intense threat across the globe. In conflict zones journalists continue to die in crossfire despite their protected status as civilians under international law. In and outside conflict zones, they continue to be deliberately targeted for harm because of their jobs. In many parts of the world there is no longer a distinction drawn by parties to a conflict between a journalist and combatant. Unchallenged impunity fuels the murder and assault of reporters covering everything from war to politics, crime [especially corruption] and human rights, despite an increasingly comprehensive international legislative framework on the safety of journalists including resolutions from the Council of Europe and the United Nations.

Journalism can play a vital role in the advancement of the public interest through communications policy, by affording parliamentarians and civil society

representatives greater space to express their views. Especially but not only in the form of public media, journalism is a crucial element in the communications policy discourse. At best it serves the public interest, satisfying the right to information, and bolstering democracy. At worst it operates as a lopsided or even dissent-extinguishing tool for the advancement of policy interests of the corporate and political elite at the expense of transparency, accountability, and democracy.

Those espousing the virtues of globalization have suggested that “technologies of freedom” are essentially democratizing and allow citizens to challenge state control (Pool 1983). It has further been argued that the figurative and literal disintegration of borders in a globalized world, coupled with the purported virtues of global capitalism, would facilitate this process (Ohmae 1990: 80). And it has been suggested that rapid technological diversification and evolution, hand in hand with a weakening of the ability and willingness of governments to regulate national broadcasting and telecommunications, sparks an “empowerment through expansion of choice of means of communication” for citizens. The increasing power of private international technology companies, as well as the rise and rapid development of new media, especially digital news media platforms available on mobile phones, so the logic goes, erodes state sovereignty as defined by state border spheres of influence and leads to greater transparency and accountability.

However, the digital Information Society market interests of Western corporate technology giants converge with those of Western governments and indeed their intelligence agencies, and this results in a desired global, cultural and technological dominance. One of the top-secret NSA slides revealed by whistleblower Edward Snowden stated categorically: “Let’s be blunt – the Western world (especially the US) gained influence and made a lot of money via the drafting of earlier [Internet] standards; the US was the major player in shaping today’s Internet. This resulted in pervasive exportation of American culture as well as technology. It also resulted in a lot of money being made by US entities” (Greenwald 2015).

Further reading

A comprehensive analysis of the challenges to media policy in a transnational interconnected context is offered by Chakravarty and Sarikakis (2006) in the book *Media Policy & Globalization*. Freedman (2008) offers another view in *The Politics of Media Policy*.

Bodinger-de-Uriarte & Valgeirsson (2015) ask what is holding back diversity in newsrooms, in their article “Institutional disconnects as obstacles to diversity in journalism in the United States”, while Doyle (2007) provides analysis of the challenge to media content diversity in Europe, in “Undermining media diversity: Inaction on media concentrations and pluralism in the EU”. Going back a little, Collins’ 1994 book *Broadcasting and audio-visual policy in the European single market* offers a useful platform from which to embark on an understanding of subsequent media policy developments in the EU. For an earlier look at the US TV news media landscape, Epstein’s 1973 book *News from nowhere: Television and the news* is extremely useful.

On the surveillance front, Bart (2005) provides a contemporary theoretical take on new forms of Panoptic surveillance in his article “Supervision, subjection and the new surveillance”, which can be rounded out with Greenwald’s 2015 book *No Place to Hide; Edward Snowden, the NSA & the Surveillance State*.

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Angela Phillips

16 The Technology of Journalism

Abstract: Journalism has always had a symbiotic relationship with technology. Any technologies that will provide greater spread or speed in communication have either been adopted by existing news organisations or have provided a platform for new competing market entrants. However, historically it has been the way these technologies have been monetised, and the intervention of Government via regulation, that has determined the way they are used and the form that journalism takes. We are now entering a new phase of disruption in both monetisation and reception. The time is ripe for new forms of social intervention to ensure that technology continues to work in the service of journalism and of the public.

Keywords: technology, technology of journalism, medium theory, journalism and medium theory

Journalism has always had a symbiotic relationship with technology. Any technologies that will provide greater spread or speed in communication have either been adopted by existing news organizations or have provided a platform for new competing market entrants. Usually the existing technologies are retained in some form and continue to be used alongside the newer ones (Bakker & Sabada 2008). The rise of the Internet and mobile digital technology has combined previous technologies on one platform and provided new ways of finding information and people and exciting possibilities for accessing data and holding governments and companies to account. It provides unprecedented access to people far away and a conduit for messages sent out by those trapped in war zones or by totalitarian regimes. And it has speeded up news delivery.

These are all important extensions of the existing technologies and they all contain within them the possibility of improving the depth and the breadth of journalism but, I will argue in this chapter, the particularities of the way in which the technology is operated, are not immanent in the machinery, they are the product of decisions, often made without clear understanding of the outcome and always subject to the institutional pressure of power in the journalistic field and from disruptive forces outside the field (Bourdieu 2005).

So, for example, as journalism spread from newspapers, into radio and television in the 20th century, there were casualties amongst the newspapers, but the survivors become bigger and richer through gobbling up the remains of the smaller news organizations (Lee-Wright, Phillips & Witschge 2011). This period of print consolidation and growing local monopolies in the 1990s meant that profits in the USA and the UK were high and there was plenty of money to experiment online (Phillips 2015: 31). Within five years of the advent of the World Wide Web, 175 American

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newspapers had launched their own websites. Ten years afterwards there were only two large American newspapers that did not yet have a web presence (Boczkowski 2005: 8). Indeed, so fast did the news organizations rush to embrace online working that few really stopped to consider what it might do to their business models.

As with every previous technological development, the delivery of news changed, though arguably the changes were less profound than those necessitated by previous revolutions. The introduction of the telegraph had brought with it an entirely new way of writing copy (Carey 1969); radio introduced the idea of speaking rather than writing news and required a very different approach to the delivery of information. Television news, even more than radio, required condensation of information into short bursts and the use of images changed the way in which news was prioritized. Stories with good pictures climbed up the news agenda, stories without pictures required simplification to avoid boring the viewers. The Internet brought all three media onto a single platform and introduced more informal ways of producing material. Much has been made of the new distributed nature of news and the changing role of the audience but the major changes for journalists have been two-fold: the speed with which information can now be researched, collected, and passed on and the changes in business practices that have damaged the funding basis on which they depend.

Journalists in each era have learned new skills and those who were unable to do so have been dropped by the wayside (Lee Wright, Phillips & Witzchge 2011). With each change there has been a period of experimentation and an exhilarating sense of freedom as new forms and possibilities for wider participation are explored and tested, followed by a period of consolidation and closure as new income streams are developed to support the technology and the new medium is brought under control (Wu 2010). We are now engaged in an inevitable battle between competing visions of the Internet as big business finds ways to control and monetize the flow of information. In this unwinding, the question of whether journalists use mobile phones to speak their news, or make use of hyper-real newsgathering techniques is merely the detail. The future is all about how journalism will be accessed, how that will impact on the democratic role of news and how it will all be paid for.

1 Is the medium the message?

For Medium theorists, led by Marshall McLuhan, the impetus behind this cycle from invention to adoption and consolidation lies in the technology itself. Once invented, these theorists suggest, media technologies trigger changes in society that dwarf the importance of the messages they carry and dramatically change what comes afterwards.

It is the medium that shapes and controls the scale and form of human association and action. The content or uses of such media are as diverse as they are ineffectual in shaping the form of human association. (McLuhan 1964: 16)

McLuhan saw the emergence of television – with its ability to connect people via all their faculties rather than merely via text (and eyes) – as a return to an earlier, and more benign moment of human communication, presaging a time when people across the globe, through knowing and seeing one another, would render the world a “global village”. He saw television as a liberating, participative medium that would introduce people to worlds beyond their own and link them in empathetic understanding. He argued that the new electronic forms of visual technology would introduce a new pattern of human behaviour, moving from individualism to collectivism and that the medium of television ushered in the end of the age of deference because of its capacity to allow ordinary people to see into the lives of the rich and famous. Meyrowitz, a follower of McLuhan, suggests (2008: 111) that the new transparency has changed power relationships because “the common person has less to lose from exposure and visibility” than the powerful who are dependent on their reputations.

These arguments appear at first glance compelling and they underlie much of the early optimism about the inevitably democratising impact of the Internet on journalism from writers including: Negroponte (1996), Shirky (2009), Beckett (2008) Gillmor (2006), and Jarvis (2009). But it is overly deterministic to attribute changes to the technologies themselves rather than to the social forces from which the technologies emerge. Technology both makes, and is made, by the era and circumstances of its use. Without this recognition, it is possible to profoundly misread the initial upheavals of new technologies and overlook the power that is required to shape them as they develop. Indeed it could be equally strongly argued that it was the messages circulating at the time that influenced McLuhan’s interpretation of the way this new medium would be used. His concept of a global village fitted in very snugly alongside other slogans of the 1960s: “flower power”, “make love not war”, and “turn on, tune in, drop out” which was allegedly uttered by Timothy Leary at the first “Be-in” at the Golden Gate Park, California in 1967.

McLuhan’s belief that television was inherently more participative (cool in his terminology) than radio or print seems strange to us now when we have got used to seeing it as a medium which facilitates, in Baudrillard’s words, “speech without response” (1981: 169). Television may have helped audiences to see what happens in countries far away, but just being able to see bombs dropping, or people starving, doesn’t by itself elicit the kind of humanitarian response that McLuhan conceptualized in his Global Village.

Indeed, looking back, television is probably the least participative technology available to us. A point made well by Robert Putnam, in his book *Bowling Alone* (2000). Putnam argues that, television, rather than liberating and fostering participation has had entirely the opposite effect. He argues that it has broken civic links

and turned Americans into a nation of disengaged loners. True, both Putnam and McLuhan see media technologies as the “deus ex machina” of civilization but the effects they predict are totally at odds with one another. If technology were the driver of change, it ought to be possible to read the direction of change from the technology itself. Not deterred by the failure of television to usher in a new, more participative world, his followers see in McLuhan’s writing a pre-imagining of the emergence of the Internet some thirty years later.

Indeed, these new technologies have been used, by sizable minorities at least, to organize resistance to dominant corporate and government power, thereby offering supporting examples of McLuhan’s notions of electronic media encouraging participation, decentralization, and a flattening of hierarchies. (Meyrowitz 2001: 10–11)

Such optimism is attractive but still flawed. The capacity of a medium is dependent on the circumstances of its use and the relative power of those who watch and those who are watched. The much-vaunted opening up of a two way relationship between audiences and journalists has been found to operate mainly in one direction: journalists use social media to search for private information about ordinary people who have been caught up in news events (Fitts 2015; Phillips 2010). Powerful people have learned to protect their information and use the courts to guard their privacy.

In the early period of a technical innovation there are often utopian dreams of democratization but they are then absorbed and consolidated by the forces of capital and power. As Evgeny Morozov points out in *The Net Delusion*, electronic media are not independently capable of encouraging any kind of activity and networks are as easily used for authoritarian purposes as for progressive ones. The question we need to ask is not so much how the technology works but who has the power to make use of it most effectively and to what end?

Iran’s Twitter Revolution did have global repercussions. Those were, however, extremely ambiguous and they often strengthened rather than undermined authoritarian rule. (Morozov 2012: 14).

Raymond Williams in his essay “The Technology and Society” (1974), argues that technologies are not separate from society. They don’t drive the social changes that flow from them. The process of technological development is an active one that moves with and for society as it is changing. We can see this when we consider journalism. The core purpose of journalism today is similar to that which emerged in the 17th century. The way it is produced and delivered has changed with every new technical invention but the form of change has never been inevitable. It has been a product of the movement of capital, processes of power, and the ingenuity of individuals and political organizations, taking advantage of momentary gaps that emerge in the flux.

As we shall see, with each change in technology the field of journalism has shifted, opened up and then consolidated. At each change there have been mo-

ments when the control of capital and of elites has slipped, allowing for a sudden flowering of new and often more radical ideas, but each time the needs of the power elite have moved back in, to consolidate the requirements of business, to underpin the needs of democracy, or to take direct control of the political narrative because power rests, not merely in the medium, as medium theorists postulate, but in the ability to shape the message.

2 Free markets, journalism and technology

Technology is initially open and allows for many possible uses until it can be monetized, at which point the number of options tend to close down. Those who invest in media technology, on the whole, do so for political advantage or for monetary gain. The product which then emerges will always bear the trace of its financing and the political struggles waged to control it. The eventual shape and use of the technology is then determined by the outcome of these struggles for control so while all communication technologies have emancipatory potential, that potential is only ever partially realized.

The very earliest communications technology was available to all – a sharp stone used to make a sign. By the time signs had developed into words, their circulation had already been restricted because only the elite were literate. As writing developed it became a luxury good, produced by skilled crafts people and consumed only by those with the necessary knowledge.

Printing extended the possibilities of writing but its use was limited partly by the relatively few people who could read and partly by the capital required to build presses and buy inks paper and trained assistants. Gutenberg, who built the first press in Europe, in the mid-15th century, lost his business to the man who initially financed it. Indeed every technical breakthrough has rested on a combination of technology, money, and opportunity. If the presses were to survive they needed a steady supply of customers and printed products with a long shelf life. News had a very short shelf life so demand would need to be very high indeed to offset the cost of printing – and at that time few people could read. Bibles were a better product: they had a steady market amongst the literate.

However, within fifty years of its invention, printing presses were being used to spread the message of church reformation – in direct opposition both to the established Catholic church and to the rulers who depended on the church for their legitimacy (Marshall & Ryrie 2002: 167). In those parts of Northern Europe where Protestantism was in the ascendency, Lutheran tracts and vernacular bibles were printed and exported carrying the first stirrings of opposition to the Catholic establishment and the kings who ruled in its name.

In Britain even strict state control failed to hold back the production of dissident literature so, in the mid-16th century, the control of the presses was devolved

to a newly formed printer's Guild. Thus the power of the state and the power of the newly emerging merchant classes were combined to try and control what could be produced and distributed. A form of licensing was established to deter or prosecute those people who used the printing press to produce literature that could be construed as anti-establishment (Conboy 2004: 13). The distribution of general news continued to rely mainly on a low tech, cheap solution – hand copying and word-of-mouth (Darnton, in Rantenen 2009) which was not covered by laws against printing (Conboy 2004: 10, 11).

In Britain, the tight control of the printing trade made it very difficult for printers and booksellers to make money out of periodical printing. Only material that was un-contentious and had a clear market value would be produced on legal presses. So the earliest recognizable form of printed news was business news. Traders could make money if they had information about prices and trading conditions. Early knowledge of a crop failure, for example, would allow one merchant to stock up his warehouse at lower prices and then sell on at a bigger profit. This kind of news had an audience prepared to pay both for printing and transport because the information supplied was potentially so valuable.

The political press could not demand high prices (Conboy 2004: 14) and the combination of restrictive libel laws and taxation of the legal (stamped) press increased its costs. But ironically, in Britain, the high cost of the legal press meant that illegal (unstamped) publications could be produced at lower prices and, although, those who circulated them did so at some risk, it meant that for a period in the late 17th and 18th centuries, as education and literacy spread, the radical press boomed, attracting circulations that were as high, or higher, than the commercial papers. (Curran & Seaton 2010: 7). In America, a similar blossoming of news periodicals was encouraged by a government keen to enable democratic debate and supported by cheap postage and direct subsidy (McChesney & Nichols: 2010). This was the period of freedom, described by Habermas in *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere* (1962), when people with anti-establishment views found themselves free to speak out. However this was not the exercise of a commercial market in ideas, but rather a momentary blossoming of voices before the full effects of marketization came into play.

It was the needs of commercial newspaper proprietors that drove the next major developments of the printing press. In 1814 the *Times* of London bought two of the very first steam-powered rotary presses allowing the paper to be mass-produced and ushering in the era of mass media, but it wasn't until the repeal of news licensing, in the middle of that century, that commercial news production, with the additional subsidy of advertising, really took off in Britain. As commercial news dropped in price, it undercut the radical press, which had to survive entirely on what its readers could afford to spend. "Market forces succeeded where legal repression had failed in conscripting the press to the social order in mid-Victorian Britain" (Curran & Seaton 2010: 5).

In America, where the press had never been taxed, a similar rise in advertising income, encouraged the phasing out of state subsidies. These developments ensured that, never again, were audiences expected to pay for the full cost of news production. Thus the idea that news was a cheap and disposable product took root. A more commercial press, dependent on higher circulation and advertising, gradually became less diverse because the largest advertising subsidy will always cling to the most popular product in any market allowing it to outpace and undercut its rivals (McChesney & Nichols 2010: 131). It is this factor rather than anything inherent in the technology that has determined the way in which print has developed and the messages it predominantly contains.

In every era emergent technologies have been heralded as the dawn of a new more democratic era: in the early period of radio, amateur radio enthusiasts established networks and provided content alongside professional journalists (Wu 2010: 36); with the introduction of cheap offset litho and computer typesetting in the 1970s there was a proliferation of counter-cultural print productions that were arguably more important in spreading new ideas than television, which required very high start-up costs and was never really an open medium (Phillips 2007: 47); in the late 1980s the emergence of direct input computers radically reduced the price of print production for small organizations. New newspapers emerged but most were quickly under-cut by larger organizations, with deeper pockets, whose costs were also reduced. In the UK, for example, News International was found guilty of deliberately selling the *Times* newspaper at a loss in order to maintain its market dominance (Harrison 1999).

The Internet, and in particular the World Wide Web, arrived during a period which has some similarities to the early 19th century. In the earlier period, capitalism was in the process of consolidating as a major alternative power to the established power of the state. In the early 1990s resurgent free market capitalism in the United States, provided an alternative narrative to the more collectivist governments of the mid-20th century. Just as the market crushed radical journalism and reduced diversity in the mid-Victorian era, so the market has taken what was seen as a similar era of liberation and driven the voice of dissent to the fringes while the centre stage is occupied by ever larger multi-national oligopolies, that increasingly control what we read and see. According to media consultant Matthew Goldstein, “Based on my calculations, by 2017 Facebook and Google will control 65 percent to 70 percent of digital media dollars” (Schiff 2016). What history tells us is that those who own the advertising revenue control the content.

The reality of the centralizing power of the Internet has been offset in the public consciousness by the decentralizing nature of its technology. In common with pen and paper, radio and telephony, the Internet incorporates within it the possibility of reciprocation. It is as easy for anyone to publish on the Internet as it is to write with a pen on paper. However, ease of participation has become fatally confused with ease of reception, just as it was in the very early days of radio when

amateur enthusiasts created networks on similar lines (Wu 2010: 39). They are in fact distinct processes. Just as, theoretically, anyone with access to pen and paper could have jumped on a horse and taken their message to the king in the 16th century, anyone with access to the Internet can today send a message to the president or the prime minister, but sending is not the same as receiving. The participative power of the Internet is built into its technology, but the information offered up requires organization and that is inevitably hierarchical (Hindman 2009) so only the most popular searches ever appear at the top of the search results. The biggest organizations, with the largest audiences, have a built in advantage and they are increasingly dependent on a tiny number of global companies that control search engines and social media platforms.

The power of the search companies as a gateway to information can be compared with rise of the news agencies in the 19th century. The news agencies making use of the speed of the newly invented electronic telegraph divided the world into sections in which each had a monopoly of news-gathering and distribution (Herman & McChesney 2001: 12). They fed reports to news organizations, which could then sell the information on to their local audiences. This reduced the cost of news gathering and made information widely available to audiences, but it also sharply reduced the diversity of voices and opinions that could be heard and dramatically changed the way in which news was gathered, and news reports were written. The monopoly status of the agencies in combination with the particular affordances of the technology, lent itself to a terse form of factual reporting, in which emphasis is provided by the ordering of the story rather than by the particular political position of the writer. If news was to be distributed to both sides in a dispute then the information needed to at least appear to be neutral. Thus telegraph and the agencies ushered in the era of faux objectivity (Carey 1969: 23–38). News organizations engaging in monopoly practices could defend the damage to plurality by invoking neutrality. If journalists were professionals and news could be seen to be “neutral” then diversity of opinion was no longer an issue (Emery, Emery & Roberts 1996).

However the news organizations still controlled the news product and delivered it to the consumer – either blandly neutral, or inflected to a particular editorial line, depending on the social environment and the delivery method. The Internet companies are changing that historic relationship by inserting themselves between the process of news-gathering and news reception and they are severely limiting the supply of money going back into journalism. A 2015 survey by the American Society of Newspaper Editors found a 42 percent decrease in journalists in newsrooms from the industry peak in 1990 (ASNE 2015) just before the launch of the Web. Thus a form of technology that was invented as a horizontally organized distributive and collaborative system, is now being organized around the needs of the big technology companies at the expense of the news companies and arguably, unless the starvation of news production is reversed, also at the expense of democracy.

3 Technology, monopoly and regulation

The communications market has always had a problem with monopolies (Murdoch 2000; Herman & McChesney 2001; Bourdieu 2005). When there are barriers to market entry because initial investment is high (as in the case of the printing press), or access to audiences is limited by technology or broadcast spectrum (as in the case of the electric telegraph, radio, and television) the right to communicate is restricted to those who have the money to pay for equipment or buy licences, or both.

As media moved towards greater concentration, democracies initiated ways of counteracting this tendency for the sake of democratic debate (Murdoch 2000, Hallin & Mancini 2004). In Europe the telegraph was nationalized to allow equal access to news organizations. In the USA a single company became a monopoly provider. In Northern Europe, forms of subsidy were introduced to encourage diversity of news ownership. In the USA and the UK anti-trust legislation was introduced to prevent consolidation of the press. Neither approach has been completely successful. In the USA for example, at the start of the 20th century, the majority of newspapers were privately owned but by the end of the century, 40 percent were owned by public corporations and most were part of chains. The same process has occurred in Europe (Phillips & Witschge 2012: 6). In the UK six companies own 80 percent of local newspapers and bring in 85 percent of revenue in the sector (Media Reform Coalition 2015).

The development of radio moved far faster from plenty to oligopoly. Radio in its early stages was largely financed by the British military (Flichy 1999: 78). During the First World War the British and American military took temporary control of broadcasting, but after the war, the door was opened to a period of unbridled experimentation in which anyone with a cheap crystal set could both hear and broadcast messages. In 1920 radios had not yet started to be produced on an industrial scale so audiences were limited, there was no means established for broadcasts to be paid for and, initially they were established as add-ons to the daily work of newspaper journalists or provided by amateur radio enthusiasts (Flichy 1999: 85). This early move into a new medium has echoes of the enthusiasm to embrace online news. In both cases the interest in the possibilities of the medium preceded any sense as to how it would be paid for.

It was clear from the start that access to the available airwaves would need to be shared out because a free-for-all meant that nobody could be heard. In the UK the problem of radio was solved by the introduction of licence fees for people buying radio sets and the organization of radio programming was handed over to a publicly owned monopoly: the BBC. The idea of public ownership became the dominant form in Europe and Canada. In pre-war Germany and the Soviet Union, radio was under state control. In the USA private licences were issued to two private companies (NBC and CBS) and content was paid for via advertising. Television

followed the same pattern and, as a result, news was dominated by monopoly, or near monopoly, providers across the world. In the UK and much of Northern Europe, news coverage was obliged to be politically balanced and available on all channels, at a variety of times every day. In the USA the “Fairness Doctrine” was established (1949) which also obliged commercial broadcasters to provide similarly politically neutral news.

As television became the most popular medium for receiving news across the developed world, those countries that maintained public broadcasting and regulation, also tended to maintain a higher level of news engagement and news knowledge. Research in Denmark found that the introduction of television coincided with a growth in civic involvement (Torpe 2003). In the United States, the Fairness Doctrine was repealed in 1987 during a period of de-regulation, after the introduction of cable television and the habit of watching television news began to decline. The decline was particularly steep among lower income and less educated communities (Esser et al. 2012; Aalberg & Curran 2012) and, as Putnam (2000) observed, civic involvement also declined. While it is hard to isolate specific reasons for the differences between Denmark and the USA, it would be perverse to ascribe it to the technology. Television was the most popular mass medium in both countries – it was the media context and the messages that differed.

The Internet and then the World Wide Web, arrived in the de-regulatory atmosphere of post-Reagan America, in which the concepts of press freedom and freedom of trade were already conflated, any attempt to restrain or regulate, anywhere in the world, was seen as evidence of egregious interference in the lives of free individuals. As with all the new media technologies described above, there was a period of experimentation, when the Internet seemed to promise a new and more democratic world, in which peer to peer communication would at last overturn the media monopolies that had developed in the previous era. But once again the search for a business model capable of monetizing the technology has ended up dominating the way in which it is used.

Into this unregulated arena we are now seeing the rise of social media platforms as the gateway to the news. Television was still (in 2016) the most important medium for accessing news across Europe, but Facebook is pulling ahead in the USA and in Europe it is fast catching up as the default platform for news, and news organizations are now competing for access to its users. But Facebook is a very unpredictable tap. According to *The Monday Note* (2016) only 6 percent of the news stories that could go to individual subscribers actually make it into their feed and it is the Facebook algorithm (and the influence of friends) that determines which stories are picked. The news that arrives this way has been sorted, filtered, and is then delivered to individual taste with a tendency to favour soft news stories over anything serious (Bocskowski, Mitchelstein & Walter 2011; Pariser 2011; Bell 2015; Phillips, Elvestad & Feuerstein 2015).

Meyrowitz’s hope that this medium would encourage “participation, decentralization, and a flattening of hierarchies” (2008), has happened – up to a point.

Everyone is now involved, via their data, in deciding which stories they will see but this method of news selection also divides and polarizes (Weeks & Holbert 2013) – and it shatters any notion of shared cultural knowledge. When news is chosen by personal selection, growing numbers cut themselves off from the broad normative news stream of the centralized news systems. The person sitting next to you on a train doesn't know what you know and you have no idea what your parents or your children know. We live atomized lives, fed happy stories (Newman 2013: 24), by a growing global media oligopoly that is being carved out from a technology that promised the opposite.

4 Money, technology and the future of news

The fact that the new technologies are global in their reach means that intervention by national government is far harder than it has been in the past. Those countries that have evolved a publicly accountable approach to broadcast media are dealing with (mostly) American companies that have largely left public accountability to the market. Any attempts to regulate are opposed on the grounds that they are an attack on market freedom. Journalism is caught in the middle. It has access to unrivalled opportunities for news-gathering and dissemination and new opportunities for collaborative working, due to advances in technology, but it is prevented from exploiting them properly because it is increasingly cut off from the life-blood that has sustained it for over two hundred years. It is also increasingly cut off from the audiences it seeks to collaborate with – forced into an indirect relationship via data feedback from social media companies.

When Google emerged in 1998, journalists greeted it with enthusiasm because at last they had a means by which they could search the mountains of dross that filled the Internet, for the gems that would be useful to their work. They did not imagine that within a very short time, Google would replace their home pages as the means by which their audiences found them and siphon off most of their advertising. Nor did they expect the subsequent attack from ad-blocking companies that, on the pretext of greater audience choice, allow people to access news, free from the last remaining scraps of advertising that they manage to attract online. And now the mobile telephone companies are waiting in the wings. It seems likely that, as mobile technology becomes the preferred access point for news, the nature and ownership of control may change again. Telephone companies are already using technology that blocks advertising (Cookson 2015). They are interested in a seamless experience for their users and control over any advertising on mobile screens. Whether they decide to establish their own news organizations, to replace those that will thus be starved of funds, remains to be seen.

The place of journalism as an independent voice monitoring the work of government and big business has always been compromised by the means of its sup-

port. If it is provided through public licensing, it tends to occupy a safe middle ground. If it is left to the market it is inclined to favour soft stories over hard-hitting investigations and if it is left to personal preference, it tends to polarize rather than producing consensus. None of these options has ever been perfect. All depend on a mixture of government action and commercial decision-making in addition to technical solutions.

In 1787 Jefferson wrote: “Were it left to me to decide whether we should have a government without newspapers or a newspapers without a government, I should not hesitate a moment to prefer the latter” (McChesney & Nichols 2010: 119). His intervention ensured that, in America, government subsidies were established to underwrite the existence of a free press. As general news journalism is gradually cut off from direct access to an independent income, sustaining news has once again become an issue of public concern. The solutions will not lie in technology alone. It is up to society to decide whether it values this profession highly enough to ensure that some form of serious, monitorial journalism, survives into the future.

Further reading

A discussion of the interconnection between technical and social change can be found in James Carey’s (1969) *Technology and Ideology: The Case of the Telegraph* and in Raymond Williams essay (1974), ‘The Technology and Society’. Martin Conboy’s (2004) *Journalism a Critical History* and Terhi Rantanen’s (2009), *When News Was New*, provide the historical context to the interconnection between journalism and technology and Matthew Hindman (2009) *The Myth of Digital Democracy* adds the more recent debate on the social function of algorithms. Eiri Elvestad and Angela Phillips (2018) will bring these debates together in *Misunderstanding the News Audience*, Routledge.

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17 Journalism and Geography

Abstract: This chapter examines place-making within journalism. We argue that ideological roles of mythical and archetypal elements of journalism as cultural storytelling allow journalists to characterize geographies and its people(s) within dominant interpretations and assignments of worth. We present notions of geography as holding particular types of meanings specific to journalists and audiences, which are increasingly problematized by global journalistic endeavors, the ability of the press to push content based upon geographic location, and the agency of audiences to pull information specific to their locations or interests. Overall, we highlight how geography in journalism – in practice and as discourse – should be seen as a combination of ideological and social acts influenced by proximity, technology, and news values and norms.

Keywords: geography, ideology, myth, news place-making, proximity, social control

1 Introduction: journalism, geography and locating power

Miami's predominantly black Liberty City neighborhood had become, in the words of the *Miami Herald*, "a killing place" (Grimm 2014). It was true that Liberty Square – one of the nation's largest housing projects also referred to locally as Pork 'n' Beans¹ – is said by local press to experience more than its share of death and killing. Specific and solid data about the neighborhood's crime and racial composition, however, have always been hard to come by, with journalists relying instead on public imaginations of what the black neighborhood *might be*, and why. In June 2014 when the *Herald* summed-up dominant interpretations of Liberty Square in simple language of hatred and dismissiveness, seven people had just suffered gunshot wounds and two teenagers were dead; the shots had been fired, police believed, from AK-47 and AR-15 military style assault rifles. Liberty City was once again a warzone in an urban jungle. To the *Herald* – and arguable to its audiences – this was, indeed, "a killing place".²

1 There are multiple histories of this place-name. Campbell (2015) states "white people" assigned the name "because they claimed that was the only food poor black people could afford." Other explanations include that the name emerged from residents to reflect how the buildings' colors represented pork and beans (Daddy & Bailey 2010).

2 While the column's author, Fred Grimm, was a news columnist, who frequently writes his opinion, we argue that even opinion news travels through a process of gatekeeping (Vos & Heinderyckx 2015) in ways that legitimize the opinions as acceptable and valid among audiences.

To make the space come alive for readers, the *Herald* described a specific scene to depict what life is like there, especially in times of normalized disaster:

At the base of the stairs, at the mother's feet, someone had thrown a rug over the dirt where Kevin Richardson and Nakeri Jackson bled out in the early morning hours Tuesday, where seven others were wounded. The rug wasn't enough to discourage the flies, still swarming in their blood frenzy, 16 hours after shots were fired.

For the *Herald*, this scene of despair was easily replicated throughout the housing project: “Directly across 12th Avenue, there’s another collection of stuffed animals, dirty and mildewed and sun-faded after two years in the South Florida weather.” Serving as “journalistic evidence” (Gutsche 2017: 248), *Herald* storytelling legitimized journalists’ interpolations of the geography throughout an article arguing that these scenes were “all too ordinary” enough to explain-away external social and cultural pressures that create and inform stereotypes – and realities – of racialized and economic segregation.

Armed with a cast of characters that represent dangerous and nefarious citizens – the newspaper even named people of this place as “gangbangers” and uncovered droves of “Welfare Queens” and ghettoized, urban (read, black) mothers (Meyers 2013). “Welfare Queens” – those said to have multiple children in order to access a multitude of social welfare awards (Omi & Winant 1994) – were reported as gathering in a crowd “mostly made up of women – mothers, many with small children hanging from their arms” with each “[knowing] that it could have been their kids reduced to collateral damage in a drive-by ambush”. In another case, a “stricken mother” is shown to have “collapsed into a heap of wailing grief on an apartment building stairway decorated with an impromptu memorial”. As a result, news explanations of the neighborhood’s perceived disorder and decline connected audiences to local dominant narratives of local place bred by tales of larger, urban topographies (Holloway 2003; Rosenblatt & Wallace 2005). In turn, meanings of the place and of the place’s people became shared; in other words, *people functioned as place*.

1.1 Identifying journalistic stories of place

This chapter discusses how journalistic storytelling of geography is rooted in spatial characterization and scene-setting designed to represent basic applications of journalistic literary devices commonly considered by US journalists and scholars to engage audiences with narratives of information (Jacobson, Marino & Gutsche 2016; Gutsche & Salkin 2016). In other words, journalism is seen as “story” that encompasses social and cultural explanations of events and shared memories (Berkowitz 1997; 2011; Schudson 2005). And in turn, these explanations work in times of cultural confusion and social crisis to maintain control and order among populations within particular geographies (Gutsche & Estrada, 2017). By presenting

Liberty Square as an uncontrolled urban space, the *Herald* and its audiences are released from addressing their own influences in the creation of what they consider the problems of racialized savagery (Ewen & Ewen 2008). Such blanket mediatizations of this “other world” (Lule 2001) that disconnects audiences from their roles in constructing social conditions allow outsiders to imagine a place they may have never “seen” and will likely choose to avoid while forming and enforcing rules of order (Soja 2010).

In this chapter, we relate issues of journalism and geography to the *Herald's* coverage of Liberty Square and to other processes of place-making in the news that explain the form and function of dominant power meanings, which appear in coverage of everyday events (Gutsche 2014b). We argue that the hegemonic act of place-making extends mythical and archetypal elements of journalism as cultural storytelling (Lule 2001; McGee 1980) to naturalize a geography and its people within dominant audience interpretations and assignments of worth. This chapter, then, examines intersections of journalism and geography in practice and ideology through an interdisciplinary narrative to present two main arguments: First, journalism provides cultural explanations rooted in dominant ideology through mythical characterizations and discussions of geography. Second, geography holds particular types of meanings specific to journalists and to audiences, which are increasingly problematized by global journalistic endeavors, the ability of the press to push content based upon geographic location, and the agency of audiences to pull information specific to their locations or interests.

As a whole, we argue that geography in journalism – in practice and as discourse – should be seen as a combination of ideological and social acts influenced by proximity, technology, and news values and norms (Castells 2011; Couldry & McCarthy 2004; Kalyango & Cruikshank 2013). Furthermore, we argue that in these discussions, myth does not refer to a “falsehood” but rather represents a method of delivering tales that resonate with a collective’s shared “common sense” that operate as cross-spatial communication (Chadha & Koliska 2016; Tong 2013) within a racialized, geographically-rich hegemon. Furthermore, amid changing media economies, new forms of user-engaged journalism, and the influence of subjective lived experiences of media creators, news that characterizes geography must be considered as a complex form with a rich history of practice and scholarship.

2 Mapping the ideological power of geography

That geography is both tangible and is a product of the imagination contributes to difficulties in bridging normative and cultural explanations of how journalists and audiences interact with location. Political borders, for instance, are intentional lines represented in cartography, formed by treaties and agreements, monitored by check-points and physical barriers, indicated by signposts. We know, of course, that these boundaries are no more than an imagined divide, though from police

jurisdiction and city limits to travel maps and demilitarized zones, boundaries are treated as authoritative and, in some cases, even natural (Cronon 1991). Indeed, there is no denying the intentionality of borders because of the physicality of topography and built environments; however, it is the authority and legitimacy of geographic elements such as place-names and economic structures that require imagination.

2.1 Dissecting “geography”

To examine the intersections of geography and ideology that create social conditions and landscapes, critical geographers note the influence and importance of “natural environment” and “built environment” to distinguish between the degree to which physical locations represent pre-human intervention and what is “man-made”. Two other approaches are even more instructive when discussing geography.

First, the term “space” represents the physicality of geography, in which locations can be identified and marked, touched and used, divided and owned (Harvey 2009). In this way, geography represents a commodity upon and with which everyday life operates, where people are influenced in their “wayfinding” (de Certeau 1984) in part due to their pathways, access and exit points to space, and a location’s social use. A public park, for example, can be welcoming or restricting. One’s perception of the park depends upon her experiences, “knowledge”, and intentions related to that or to another similar space. Much scholarship (and journalism) marks the intensity around contested spatial meanings and activities, such as news about memorialization via monumentation and scholarship about public space that is surveilled by private entities (Beckett & Herbert 2009; Neiger, Meyers & Zandberg 2011).

Unpacking the potential and contested meanings of space complicates otherwise simple and easily accessible shared meanings that are ripe for political and economic influences that shape meanings to benefit the few. Such complications of space can lead to a deeper interpretation of geography through the notion of “place”. Whereas “space” may be highly – but not fully – sociological in its meanings, place is highly cultural. In this view, a park or a monument can be interpreted as holding meanings of collective memory and histories of communities’ resistance or oppression. Established and managed by authorities within approved social structures, these spaces and place items exist to serve a larger ideological purpose of shaping cultural meanings of what occurs within a specific location and time.

2.2 Journalists in geography

Journalists deal in both space and place. For instance, news of a space’s social institutions, such as city governments and schools, construct dominant meanings

of and for communities, while coverage of parades, new businesses, and “crime” function to cast place meanings where social norms and values are reinforced. Journalists’ interactions with and coverage of space and place is complicated largely due to journalists’ own social and cultural power. Newswriters have for the longest time enjoyed wide and close access to the elite. While not necessarily sharing in the economic wealth of the rich and powerful, journalists widely cover these populations and, in turn, receive economic and ideological rewards for their work. Even in struggling economic conditions throughout history, media have maintained elevated levels of formal education and job security as compared to employment opportunities in other sectors of the economy that allow journalists to balance enhanced forms of social capital while arguing that journalism – to varying degrees globally – represents and fights for the less fortunate.

In the US, journalists’ economic success has maintained the ability of reporters to live outside of the geographies that they are “expected” to cover, frequently ignoring the perspectives and places between their suburban homes and centers of control located in cities (Avraham & Ketter 2008; *Washington Times* 2000). Even in rural areas, local journalists are drawn to sources and “news” in locations where power is concentrated; and, as a result find themselves conducting a form of arm-chair reporting of issues outside of that space. Journalists work in ideological and geographic “interpretive communities” in which social norms and ideological paradigms are shared and maintained, where news agendas are issued in a top-down manner, influenced to a large degree upon where news is “happening” (Berkowitz & TerKeurst 1999; Shumow & Gutsche 2016).

As news is formed and expressed, journalists must consider their own geographic awareness and the spatial span of audiences in order to shape information and to provide explanations that meet the needs of recognized collectives through discussions of connections to location (Chen et al. 2015). Yanich (2001), for instance, argues that metropolitan news outlets in the US shape news from the inner-city in ways that highlight the drama of crime and disorder to reify dominant approaches to punishment and control of city dwellers by outside observers. In other words, news outlets “know their audiences” and are able to cross geographies by assigning meanings to specific locations that blend information with mechanisms for instituting oppression upon “undesirable people” in “undesirable spaces” (Beckett & Herbert 2009).

Journalists found their established spatial dimensions disrupted in the beginning of the 21st century amid global economic booms and busts as news outlets began shedding their news spaces following massive layoffs in the 1990s. Emptying newsrooms then quickly moved from the downtowns of US cities and off of small town main streets as conglomerates merged with even competing sister outlets into massive communication campuses outside of city power cores (Usher 2015). For instance, *The Washington Post*, one of the most-prized US newsrooms of Watergate fame that was depicted in *All The President’s Men* (1976), in 2015 its digs and moved

to Washington, DC's K Street, known as the city's bastion of political lobbying and advocacy. The *Post's* connection to power circles in Washington, DC, have remained strong after the move, in part because of the city's socio-geographic identity – the “DC factor”, as Kim and McCluskey (2014) call it – a setting that provides journalists with ready access to world leaders, decision-makers, and insiders in ways that form (and inform) news agendas of the locally-based press that then spread across wide geographies.

That much of the news produced by Washington, DC journalists is rarely distributed locally but is immediately processed and shared outside of the region's borders to journalists and audiences only to be returned for reactions and response through media and socio-political influences to be covered and distributed outside of the space once again, reveals the power process of news-making (Tuchman 1973) – and of the importance and potential, of geographic influences upon journalism. Even after such complexities are unmasked, journalists' articulations of reality, including geographic realities, come with a naturalized sense of cultural legitimacy and authority.

In part because journalists' messages are steeped in official sources, “informative” visuals, approved and replicable maps, and dominant discourse of place, news characterizations of geography enforce “a quiet tyranny of orientation that erases the possibility of disoriented discovery”, a sense of surprise, distraction, and challenge that leads to new ideas and experience (Kurgan 2013: 17). In turn, geographic messages in journalism limit “all the other things that we ought to see” (p. 17) by orienting audiences to single power vantage points that make room for easily placed images that we imagine through ideology rather through interaction, confusion, and discourse.

3 “Communication geography” in a world of transnational media

Just as the telephone and transoceanic cables “unbundled” global news from geographic territoriality by transmitting news from “far-away lands” to “civilization” within packs of communication about foreign economies, war, and personalities (Brooker-Gross 1985), news today operates in a world of emerging geographic-awareness software and content (Akoh & Ahiabenu 2012). Mobile phones, smart watches, drones, and advanced satellite and telecommunication systems move digital communication to even the most distant locations in ways that continue to blur notions of time, proximity, and geography as users watch what is “afar” from “home” (der Derian 2009; Goggin, Martin & Dwyer 2015; Gutsche 2014a). This is not to suggest that today's processes of geographic mediatization occur alternatively to when places are formed among audiences as they were presented from the pulpit

or in the town square (Carey 2009). Just as then, through verisimilitude do producers and audiences today embed and decode cultural meanings about social conditions and characteristics in a quest to uncover personal relationships to both here and there (Bhabha 1990; Said 1979; Williams 1976).

3.1 Critiquing “communication geography” through a critical lens

Place-making must no longer be seen as a single act that operates only as a single effort to be explained through geographic studies. Nor can communication be viewed absent of its intersections of place power and social power of spaces from which and to which messages are formed and within which audiences interact. Rather, place is transmitted among “scraps of interwoven communication threads” (Adams & Jansson 2012: 308) within communication systems that are tied to geography and the imagination of place that enforces behaviors and norms of a given location. These communication threads are woven together in messages between people and place, *stitched by people and places themselves*, with locations serving as mediums of their own, sending and receiving information within particular times and institutional settings amid symbolic meaning (Falkheimer & Jansson 2006; Jansson & Lindell 2015).

“Communication geography” (Adams & Jansson 2012) has come to represent layered sets of complex influences of domestic-to-international-to-domestic communication that can be exemplified in a 2013 warning to international travelers by the French Consulate in Chicago, Illinois, that the French people should “avoid” visiting the West and South sides of the city because of an increase in reported crime (Skiba 2013).³ That the consulate issued such a warning to French travelers already in the US and French citizens who may be traveling elsewhere internationally – while still heading-off those remaining in France from leaving to specific areas – all from the very place diplomats suggested should be avoided highlights the interpretive, imaginary forces and power of place-meaning.

In fact, the Consulate’s message was not restricted solely to those of French descent or citizenry but functioned as yet another stitch into a communication flow of space and place that banks on dominant and culturally shared stereotypes of people and possible danger; in this case, stories of “black-on-black” street crime and murder in 2013 and 2014 in Chicago that contributed to the place-name (and 2016 Spike Lee film) “Chiraq” (Daly 2014). As Barthes (1972) indicates, verisimilitude related to cultural symbols (including names) relies upon manipulation of time. In this case, Chicago’s place-time was stood still to capture only the ap-

³ Diplomats also warned French tourists against visiting parts of Richmond, Virginia, Baltimore, Maryland, New York City, and Los Angeles for similar reasons.

proachable meanings of dark skin and its danger, feeding upon and placing into stories and language of global white supremacy that requires frozen moments in which evidence of deadly black Americans appears and the “inherent savagery” of the dark-skinned is highlighted as an enduring factor of black culture and geographies (Zuberi & Bonilla-Silva 2008).

Despite a seeming lack in critical analysis of place and power, dominant articulations of “communication geography” promote innovative inquiry by applying an interdisciplinary lens and mixed methods, including ethnography and qualitative, participatory approaches, to understand the degree to which moments of media production, consumption, interpretation, and distribution *in and across space* are products of more than just mere operations associated directly with what are considered traditional forms of communication (Hemment 2005; Jansson & Lindell 2015). Through a lens of “communication geography” journalistic reporting of the consulate’s message – and as an extension and alteration of the message(s) – functioned amid social and political positioning of diplomatic relations that grew beyond communication between audiences in two nations and spread into larger public and socio-political spheres stored in global collective memories and “common knowledges” of the world’s places and peoples.

Messages as seen through “communication geography” should also be interpreted for the ideological acts of place-making that allow for geographic meanings to operate amid collectives (also known as interpretive communities, as discussed above) that appear virtually, in locations great distances away, or in imagination. Though these collectives, however, hold in some cases no physical connection to geographies of yesterday and today, they carry temporal understandings that empower media systems to merge spatial power structures maintained at the core through ideas of a sovereign nation place (Bhabha 1990).

3.2 Articulating (today’s) transnational media

Globalized journalistic discourse of political and economic relationships between nations during times of friendship and dispute overshadow underlying power systems created through international journalistic collaboration and joint ownership. In what is considered a “transnational media” system of international hegemony within which journalists cover global – and global-local – news events, media and audiences relate through language and cultural values birthed from long-standing, well-known ties of collective power. Still, news is shaped by journalists’ perceptions of their own and their audiences’ “national origins” of meaning and the geographically aligned media system’s interpretation of audience interests and needs when presented with information that bridges global-local issues (Curran et al. 2015: 1).

Today’s transnational media system provides opportunities for power to operate through evident social structures that restrict some journalists from access to

particular sources and interpretations of information while providing free rein to journalists from nationstates grounded in their positions of elite message construction. Great financial expense of globalized news, which can include travel, lodging, technological and security support, and talent with vast language and cultural skills also contributes to the hegemonic profile of transnational media systems, leading to reductive coverage of issues from various geographies that are interpretations of those spaces and places and related issues that reflect the ideologies of international sources of power and specific voices of power at local levels of interpretation (Archetti 2014; Gasher 2007; Grimm 2015). What remains missing in these elements of transnational media messaging is the complication of interpretations from the middle-level power structures and the low-end power positions in both global and local collectives.

In this discussion of today's transnational media power, we emphasize *today* as a critique of prevailing nostalgic articulations of a less inclusive media system of before and of a more technologically advanced and inclusive mediated sphere of communication of modern day. Globalization, as it has been crafted since World War II, has consisted of building notions of media conglomeration, technological infrastructure, and the intersections of "nation" amid information power flows based in Western spheres of space and thought (Brüggemann & Wessler 2014). As a result, critical and cultural approaches to Media Studies dissects the "truths" of a widening and more inclusive media system, often through analyses of local-global ideological tensions. Zala Volčič (2005), for example, writes about the function of public broadcasting in Slovenia where broadcasters balance the influence of national elites operating on an international platform who work to shape messages of local imagined communities in ways that benefit power structures that build and maintain international spatial and ideological political boundaries, regional identities, and spatialized arguments of "ours" and "others" (see also, Volčič & Zajc 2013). In our next section, we provide a platform for approaching discussions of transnational media.

3.3 Approaching transnational media

Today's technological determinism that focuses on perceptions about an enhanced, inclusive international media is increasingly veiled by celebratory conversations related to social power of social media. Veiled in these conversations are three major ways scholars should consider examining meanings of geography as connected to transnational media systems and, therefore, to cross-spatial dynamics also at regional and local levels to that reveal of local-global dynamics of place. First, scholars should acknowledge and investigate influences of media ownership and governmental financial investment and regulation to interrogate how journalistic place characterizations reflect geographic power interests. In India, for instance, Chadha and Koliska (2016) argue that institutionalized journalistic practic-

es and norms are based upon regional cultural influences *as well as corporate ownership* in that corporate networks are frequently tied to regional market interests and interpretations. This line of inquiry should be included and expanded in media sphere research.

Second, scholars have much to consider related to what is called “cross-regional” reporting. In China, for example, Tong (2013) writes that investigative journalists there regularly move in and out of geographies that operate under shared, overarching national private and state bureaucracies, social norms, and cultural values. However, Tong argues, the degrees to which these larger pressures are applied at the local level vary. Journalists must then be aware of such differences and be open to adapting journalistic practices and interpretations to meet the requirements and needs of locally established social spaces. “Investigative journalism persists where it is appropriate and is abandoned as part of a compromise when inappropriate”, Tong writes. “This is a form of adjusting behaviour [*sic*] by news organizations and journalists that leads to the co-existence of both compromise and resistance” (p. 9). Mixed method approaches – and certainly participatory methods, such as mental mapping (Gutsche 2014a) can be meaningful means of exploring spheres of influence within journalistic place-making.

From a practical position, power is at the core of geographic alterations to journalistic work, where reporters’ information-gathering, shaping, and presentation of explanation of and for local events and events across the globe and are open to – and are part of – greater influences from outside the journalistic community. Journalism scholars, therefore, should consider a third vein for research by recognizing “transnational journalistic culture” (Curran et al. 2015). An “interplay of power in which the privileged access of governments to the media, the hegemony of market liberal thought, the dominance of a small number of news agencies and the legacy of the Cold War” (p. 14) is creating a participatory function in a global world vis-à-vis the Internet. Scholars can no longer dismiss, then, meanings of geography in socio-political relations; neither can they ignore the ideological power of storytelling of place and the intersections of a nation’s dominant marketing strategies, representations by one nation of another, and how these meanings are delivered to audiences (Rafikova 2013, 2015).

4 Future conceptualizations: journalism and geography of and for audience(s)

To look forward in conceptual ties between journalism and geography, it helps to examine previous movements of geo-centric journalism. Early efforts in journalism of the modern day integrated ideas and the physicality of geography into news products in ways that reveal our innate need to make meaning of space and place.

“Backpack journalism” of the early 2000s in which journalists would don knapsacks of digital cameras, phones, and video and audio recorders to cover news outside of the usual spaces led to the momentary rise of mobile journalists, or “mojos”, who worked from laptops, cell phones, and the front seat of their vehicles in geographies across the globe (Dunn 2008). In the US, specifically, mojo and backpack journalism complemented a movement for outlets to produce “hyper-local” news – reporting that focused on issues and communities within a particular geography as a means to encourage original and civically engaged journalism (Metzgar, Kurpius & Rowley 2011).

Hyperlocalism placed a focus on particular spaces, people, and issues and that were otherwise said to be absent in mainstream news; movements to localize news attempted to engage with the people and issues of those localities and harkened to the development of “citizen journalism” (Singer et al. 2011). However, whereas the mojo movement required journalists to *be in the spaces* in which they covered, the citizen journalist model allows the institution of professional journalism to span even greater senses of space and time by encouraging citizens to serve as “pseudo-journalists” to produce the news (Plantin 2015). Here, citizens report news from their own neighborhoods while professional journalists serve as aggregates of reported information. Such efforts are said to reveal potential not just for promoting journalism’s social roles in local geographies, but to also promote localism in terms of advertising.

Indeed, as a darling of the industry because of its supposed “empowerment” of publics through easy access to publishing, public-professional partnerships in reporting and editing, and the distribution of news to those marginalized by spatial segregation, citizen journalism is built on covering space and interpreting place. Ironically, recent journalistic movements to engage with audiences have journalists revealing the power of the industry to oppress, however. Industry calls to include underrepresented voices in the news by expanding coverage ideologically and spatially inadvertently revealed how geographically centralized power systems create a world within which journalists intentionally operate. In turn, we argue, efforts that overtly uncover journalism’s role in social-spatial problems are enacted to support the power positions of audiences outside of those directly being engaged and furthers the ability of the press to serve their targeted public (Chadha & Koliska 2016; Yanich 2001).

4.1 Place-making via audience interactivity

From a sociological position, audiences turn to the news for information that speaks as civic engagement to become educated about what is happening in spaces throughout their community. Whereas datelines, headlines, and political maps allow audiences to interact with geography in the news (Howe 2009; Monmonier 1989), today’s news users are inundated with interactive maps, geotagged news

items, and social media that place the person – and their location at the time – as part of the geographies to which they are exposed (Akoh & Ahiabenu 2012; Picard 2011). As worldwide economies struggled to support current media business models in the late 2000s and mobile technologies advanced in accessibility, news outlets were able to “push” both their journalism and advertising to users through alerts and text messages. Media users, no longer tied to a television set, radio signal, or Ethernet cable to get their news also push their own data (ie product and services reviews, answers to electronic polling, and purchasing information) and information (ie interpretations of a “news event” and eyewitness reports) in efforts that include users’ location, interests, and real-time activities that are tracked via geotechnology.

What Westlund (2013) refers to as media “omnipresence” – the everywhere/ everydayness of media interactions supplied by access to mobile media – has become naturalized among some audiences as a primary, legitimate source for exploring the world. In this way, user interactions with mobile technologies inform “common knowledge” of place meanings that are collected and distributed to masses. Mobile phones and location guidance systems connect audiences with physical location by way of the communicators’ own spatial orientation and perception at the time of communication. In other words, communicating with a family member while “away” from “home” can be a moment in which the traveler’s imagination and emotions of and toward that person and place are influenced by the geographic separation itself.

In this dynamic, geography itself is communication, and new technologies are increasingly creating mobile manifestations of geographic characterizations that influence wayfinding and ideas of place (Gordon & de Souza e Silva 2011). In 2012, for instance, Microsoft announced an app for users to be warned of “high-crime” neighborhoods as they made their way through city spaces. The app, which was not released following criticism that designers were creating what news stations and websites named “avoid ghetto” (Matyszczyk 2012), mapped crime statistics and tracked mobile users to recommend “ghetto-free” routes as users approached spaces where crime had been reported. In 2013, another app, initially called “Ghetto Tracker” used similar features to guide users to what the app called a “Good Part of Town” (O’Connor 2013). The degree to which the news business can adapt to mobile audiences – like others sectors that innovate by connecting audiences’ fears and concerns of urban people and places with consumer products such as “Ghetto Tracker” – remains a critical roadblock for media sustainability.

4.2 Complications of geographic narratives: concluding thoughts

Economies of the mobile marketplace aside, locative media beyond that which is device-specific, such as interactive web-based maps, intensifies and animates long-

standing social and cultural processes and practices of place-making discussed throughout this chapter, the study of which reveals patterns of press power and social control in spatial storytelling. When street riots erupted throughout the London (UK) area in 2011, for instance, *The Guardian* launched what turned out to be some of the most innovative and interactive coverage of social disruption in terms of explaining social conductions through journalism, technology, and scholarship. The newspaper provided an outlet for user comments and reporting that was mapped on the newspaper's website, as well as for visual communication of users' explanations for the violence. Additionally, *The Guardian* not only covered the news but later worked with the London School of Economics to research the causes and effects of social unrest (*Reading the Riots* 2011).

Findings from research and news reporting indicated that the violence that occurred following a police-involved shooting of a reportedly unarmed black man was heavily influenced by pathological racism and economic injustice throughout London, findings that mirror those that emerged after similar street violence in the city in the 1980s that was describe in racist and classist news coverage at the time as being merely a symptom of "The Inner City" (Burgess 1985). In that case, city cores were presented in the press as "alien" and of a racialized pathology of personal responsibility, laziness, and intentional contained violence. Journalistic and scholarly work following the violence of 2011 painted pictures of social and cultural oppression and repression, racialized policing tactics, and economic warfare against the poor and marginalized.

Most troubling, however, is the degree to which spatial segregation and dominant ideologies of race and place were represented in police action, violence, and public discourse and actions through policy. This chapter's final thoughts, then, focus on concerns of the power of news characterizations of geography to obfuscate power processes of the press and publics to control (Gutsche 2015a; Hess & Gutsche 2018). Moving forward, place-making in the press should be examined from perspectives of power to measure and critique three main ideological efforts to control: 1. the influence of dominant public mediated characterizations of geographies, communities, and nations upon explanations of individual and collective action and speech; 2. the construction of an elite "public sphere" by narrowing communication to specific geographic audiences, moving away from notions of a wider and inclusive collectives into a sphere constructed of a segmented public that is spread over wide virtual and physical spaces, 3. the function of surveillance and social control via the collection of geoinformation and observations of daily lives as journalism adopts new data-gathering processes such as drones and sensors to allow the press to tell stories spanning space and time from positions of omnipresence (Holton, Lawson & Love 2015).

Commitments to examining and resisting dominant ideologies of place and people through participatory and radical assessments of journalistic storytelling can heighten understandings of the meanings of local levels of interactions

between press and place to guide media users and creators into an unmarked future where they are even a bit more prepared to unpack power.

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Further reading

Those interested in intersections of geography, place-making, and the news would do well to visit a mix of theoretical discussions and applications, including Henri Lefebvre's (1991) *The Production of Space, The Country and the City* (1976) by Raymond Williams, J. Nicholas Entrikin's (1991) *The Characterization of Place*, and Katherine Fry's (2003) *Constructing the Heartland: Television News and Natural Disaster*. The 2017 article, 'Geographies of media and communication I: Metaphysics of encounter' in *Progress in Human Geography* by Paul C. Adams helps direct readers to an overview of how geography appears in and can be applied to media studies, while Sue Robinson's (2017), *Networked News, Racial Divides: How Power and Privilege Shape Public Discourse in Progressive Communities* and Stephen Reese's (2016) article, 'The new geography of journalism research', in *Digital Journalism* build upon the field via digital work. Still, much is left unanswered in complicating issues of place and the news – versus broad notions of “the media” – that move beyond discussions of “community” and “boundaries”, such as the edited volumes *Mediated Geographies and Geographies of Media* (2015) and *Communications/Media/Geographies* (2016) to examines place as a method of journalistic power, which is examined further in works such as *Media Control: News as an Institution of Power and Social Control* (2017) and in the forthcoming book, *Geographies of Journalism: The Imaginative Power of Place in Making Digital News*.

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V The Journalism Ecology

Jane B. Singer

18 Entrepreneurial Journalism

Abstract: The proliferation of entrepreneurial journalism initiatives over the past decade has been inherently disruptive to the media industry. For organizations and their employees, the launch of new journalistic enterprises extends the already-significant encroachments onto jurisdictional turf in a digital environment. For individual journalists, the shift to an explicitly business-oriented mind set challenges deeply rooted notions about professional norms and appropriate activities. This chapter explores both sets of challenges.

Keywords: audiences, digital media, entrepreneurial journalism, journalists, media organizations

For professional journalists, the hits just keep on coming. The economic hit. The time hit. The resource hit. But a growing number of journalists have begun hitting back. Of their own volition or because they are pushed, these journalists are leaving traditional newsrooms and either joining a news start-up or launching their own.

Over the past decade, new journalistic enterprises have proliferated in myriad shapes and sizes. The diversity and fluidity of these experiments make them impossible to count at any given point in time or space, and nearly as difficult to define. They range from investigative journalism consortia to hyperlocal websites to niche offerings of all sorts; some of the more well-established, such as BuzzFeed, have successfully attracted mass audiences. In contrast to “intrapreneurialism”, the creative initiatives that push existing organizations in new directions (Baruah & Ward 2015; Boyles 2016), the term “entrepreneurial journalism” is best understood as designating stand-alone enterprises that have a journalistic mission yet are dissociated from legacy media. With connotative links to business on the one hand and innovation on the other, entrepreneurialism can be seen as distinct from freelance and other piecemeal journalistic work whose providers typically lack comparable degrees of “independence, empowerment and self-direction” (Baines & Kennedy 2010: 103).

Entrepreneurial journalism is inherently disruptive to legacy organizations and practitioners. For news outlets, the launch of new journalistic enterprises extends challenges over jurisdictional turf that became evident in the early 2000s with the rise of blogs produced by independent bloggers (Lowrey 2006) – prototypical information entrepreneurs. For individual journalists, the shift to an explicitly business-oriented mind set challenges deeply rooted notions about professional norms and appropriate activities. This chapter explores both in turn.¹

1 Portions of this chapter overlap with material in two previously published book chapters: ‘The Journalist as Entrepreneur’, in *Rethinking Journalism II: The Society Role and Relevance of Journalism*

1 Entrepreneurial journalism: organizational challenges

Entrepreneurialism gave birth to Western journalism, from the earliest periodical printers to the 19th-century publishers who turned fledgling news initiatives into empires. But 20th-century expansion followed a different story line. Socially, the paradigmatic “power of the press” has been a collective force; the efforts of individuals may have been valued, even celebrated, but the power they wielded resided in the ability of institutional employers to convey information to large numbers of people and therefore command the attention of those whose attention mattered. Gaining and retaining that power required securing reliable and steadily rising profits. Particularly during the second half of the century, the trend toward consolidation under corporate ownership – mostly in publicly held companies with boards answerable to their stockholders (Bagdikian 2000) – was more likely to encourage conservative practices than risk-taking.

When the Internet emerged as a force to be reckoned with, many of the executives who had led the media for decades were unable to respond quickly or creatively. Few had an entrepreneurial outlook based on experiment and iteration (Babineaux & Krumboltz 2013; Polgreen 2014), and most additionally were bound by corporate mandates that forbade knowingly risking failure. For the past 100 years and more, then, “entrepreneurship of any sort is not a concept that has been closely identified with the media industry” (Compaine & Hoag 2012: 30). Yet the ongoing viability of the news media in a digital age arguably rests on multifaceted innovation (Pavlik 2013). This section sketches the world that 20th-century media executives knew, then explores some problems that have confronted them in the new and in many ways alien digital environment.

There have been innumerable depictions of a purported “golden age of journalism” (see Baughman 1981; Hallin 1992; Krause 2011), many acknowledging the rosy glow of hindsight. The distortion notwithstanding: Looking back from our own perspective in the new millennium, the 20th century looks like a period of remarkable growth and even more remarkable profit for what we now call the legacy media industry, along with expanding opportunities for people wanting to work within it. Profit margins among newspaper companies ranged as high as 30 percent and more; the operating margins of some US television stations topped 45 percent in the 1990s (Urenek 1999). In Western countries, a very small number of television networks commanded every viewer in virtually every home, while news magazines boasted millions of paying readers. Many factors made the media so extraordinarily

in a Digital Age (Chris Peters & Marcel Broersma, editors), Routledge, 2017; and ‘Journalism as an Entrepreneurial Enterprise: Normative Boundaries, Economic Imperatives, and Journalistic Roles’, in *Remaking the News* (Pablo Boczkowski & C. W. Anderson, editors), MIT Press, 2017.

prominent and profitable, from demographic trends, to favourable regulatory structures, to ongoing technological innovation in production and distribution of information. But what stands out in retrospect is the near-monopoly that media institutions collectively held on the supply of something for which there was steadily high demand: information. If you wanted to get a message out, you had two choices through most of the 20th century. You could stand on a street corner and way-lay passers-by. Or you could go through the media: buy an advertisement, send out a press release, stage a “pseudo-event” (Boorstin 2012) to attract news coverage – even, if you had the wherewithal, become a publisher or broadcaster yourself.

When the web browser emerged in the mid-1990s, it opened the doors of the Internet to a mass – and quite quickly massive – audience. The impact on the legacy media industry is exceedingly well-documented. In the United States, for instance, the audience share for the three broadcast networks’ evening newscast was halved between 1993, just before the first browser emerged from the labs, and 2013. By that year, barely 10 percent of the US population was buying a print newspaper, and print newspaper advertising revenue had fallen by more than 250 percent from 10 years earlier (Pew Research n.d.); in the UK, Audit Bureau of Circulations figures indicate most national newspapers have lost at least half their readers since 2000. Digital audiences and revenues make up some of the revenue gap for media outlets in these and other countries ... but only some.

It would be too deterministic a framing to say that the Internet “caused” this state of affairs (Örnebring 2010; Smith & Marx 1994), and too bleak a summation to ignore the fact that legacy media have been prominent information sources online from the start and retain (and profit from) that position today. Moreover, the money going to support new enterprises – from philanthropists, investors, donors, or other sources – still is far less than the revenue generated by advertising in traditional media. Yet undeniably, the challenges to legacy media are systemic, structural, and likely irreversible (Communications Management 2011): Their business models rest on “technical, economic, political and information environments that no longer exist” (Picard 2011: 8).

A great many internal factors – reduced and/or reallocated newsroom resources and priorities (Gade 2004), the demand for multi-platform output (Fenton 2010), greater awareness of and interactions with news audiences (Singer et al. 2011; Witschge 2014) – contribute to that disruption, but external ones are arguably even more significant. In particular, the exponential increase in the number of entities providing something identifiable as “news” has eradicated the highly profitable lock on the information market (Grueskin, Seave & Graves 2011). Such entities range from individual observers with a Twitter account or video-streaming app on their phones to substantive businesses with hundreds of employees.

A digital environment that invites entry and facilitates experimentation (Briggs 2012) has enabled start-ups to attract audiences and thus to sap the strength of

legacy media outlets whose power rests on the attention of large numbers of readers, viewers, and listeners. Some start-up consumers are digital natives whose news diet has always been predominantly virtual (Poindexter 2012), but attention to “millennials” can mask the fact that most online news consumers are older and once were offline news consumers. Some still are (Thurman 2014), but many are not. Three kinds of legacy audiences are dissipating:

Mass, general-interest audiences have long been legacy media’s bread and butter, seeking out a known and relatively trusted brand name to provide them with a bundled package that fills a range of gratifications, from gaining knowledge to being entertained to enhancing social integration (Katz, Haas & Gurevitch 1973). True, many of these people are turning to the websites of the same legacy outlets, whose digital subscriber base is growing. But start-ups are making inroads in two significant ways, one related to existing audience habits and the other to new ones.

The journalists who create bundled packages of information invest considerable time and energy deciding what to place at the top of the pile: leading the newscast, on the magazine cover, “above the fold” on the newspaper front page. They do so because putting something there that people want to see means those people likely also will see some of the rest – including, for commercial media, the bits surrounded by the advertising that pays most of the freight. But online, what leads the home page is less influential for the simple reason that much of the audience will never see it, arriving instead through search engines, social media links and recommendations, ranking and aggregator sites, and other digital pointers that lead straight to an individual item. Digital start-ups generally have been faster to recognize this difference and to capitalize on it through such mechanisms as search engine optimization (or, more broadly if derisively, “clickbait”; Tandoc 2014) and savvy seeding of social media.

Larger digital media start-ups also are challenging legacy outlets for a mass audience through expansion into under-served markets around the world. BuzzFeed has offices in Brazil and Mexico (and elsewhere), as well as the UK and USA; Huffington Post is moving into Japan, Greece, and the Maghreb, among other locations. Still-newer entries such as Vox, Vice, and Quartz also are rapidly evolving into global enterprises. In short, media entrepreneurs have seized an opening created by closure: As most legacy print and broadcast outlets have tightened their belts and downsized or closed many of their expensive international bureaus, innovators seeking similarly large mass audiences are filling the gap.

Niche audiences also are being lured away by media start-ups. The rise of niche sites (Cook & Sirkkunen 2013) relates in an even more direct way to the decline in perceived value of a bundled general-interest information package. BuzzFeed and Huffington Post may succeed in attracting millions of users, but most entrepreneurial journalists focus on a market segment narrowly bounded either geographically or topically (Briggs 2012; Marsden 2017). They can leave legacy outlets bleeding from a thousand pinpricks, each a tiny hole left by a user who is spending time elsewhere in the online universe.

Community-level “hyperlocal” journalism has proved difficult to sustain (Krupius, Metzgar & Rowley 2010) despite support from philanthropic foundations, particularly in the United States, as well as the steep decline of legacy competitors’ staffing and thus reporting. In general, these start-ups have been characterized as imperfect, at best, information substitutes for newspaper coverage of local government (Fico et al. 2013). But some regional digital enterprises have been more durable, particularly those that have succeeded at obtaining and maintaining public trust (Konieczna & Robinson 2014). The Texas Tribune and MinnPost in Minnesota, for example, have both survived since the 2000s and continue to provide in-depth state coverage backed by donors large and small; in Scotland, a newer site called The Ferret, which relies heavily on users for its revenue, has twice been shortlisted for a British Journalism Award for digital innovation.

Topically oriented niche enterprises are even more numerous and diverse. Examples range from the very large – from investigative journalism site ProPublica in the non-profit sector to for-profit politics site Politico, now expanded into the European market – to the teeny-weeny, covering the narrowest of special interests. They are in many ways comparable to the newsletters and printed niche magazines that have been among the long-term success stories in the legacy media industry (Sumner 2010); the digital environment affords publishers comparable advantages of specificity, without the high costs of printing and distributing a physical product.

It is worth noting, as Jay Rosen does (2014), that digital start-ups also tend to be in closer contact with their audiences than are most legacy outlets. No new business gets off the ground without extensive research into its “customer segments” (Osterwalder & Pigneur 2010), yielding detailed knowledge about audience desires, interests, and habits. Those providing financial backing inevitably demand such information, along with information about competitors and *their* audiences. Moreover, because the people interested in a niche topic are apt to already be knowledgeable about it (and because start-ups rarely are flush with the resources needed to provide a continuous supply of fresh content by themselves) many entrepreneurial outlets solicit suggestions and even contributions from readers, as described further below. In short, those that succeed do so in part through personal connections, interactions, and information sharing that remain more difficult for larger outlets historically more distant from their audience.

Mobile audiences: General-interest and niche media websites, then, offer appealing alternatives to legacy outlets for today’s audiences. But tomorrow’s news audiences promise to be mobile-based (Westlund 2013). Legacy outlets that have taken two decades to make the transition to “digital-first” are now scrambling to become “mobile-first”. Here too, their nimbler, digital-only competitors – with their significantly smaller investment in infrastructure, significantly less embedded production routines, and significantly more nuanced insights about their audiences – seem to have an edge.

Compounding this challenge is the parallel trend toward personalization of online information, defined by Thurman and Schifferes (2012: 776) as “user-to-

system interactivity” that enables individuals to technically modify the content, delivery, and arrangement of a communication to their own “explicitly registered and/or implicitly determined preferences”. But traditional media outlets are not terribly good at personalization, pitched as most are at the mass-audience level. The migration of content to a screen that is very small and very individualized (as well as very intimate, with mobile users seeing their devices as extensions of themselves; Walsh & White 2007) further increases the difficulty of competing quickly and effectively for all but the most well-resourced and forward-thinking of traditional news outlets.

Although the discussion so far has highlighted the challenges that entrepreneurial enterprises pose for legacy outlets, this is not to suggest that start-ups do not also face significant challenges. Not least is their need to compete with entrenched, widely recognized, and relatively well-resourced companies and to change the habits of people who still gravitate to those companies in search of credible information of varying kinds. Start-ups inherently operate in highly uncertain circumstances, dependent on fickle users and investor whims; indeed, the elusiveness of sustainability has led one pair of researchers to conclude that “survival in itself must be recognised as a form of success” (Bruno & Nielsen 2012: 102).

Yet two related points stand out. One is that the newcomers that do succeed, even temporarily, are inherently disruptive to their legacy brethren. They are disruptive in terms of the information needs they fill, the audience attention they attract, and the money that flows to them one way or another. They are disruptive, as well, in the human resources they command: the reporters, editors, designers, and other journalists who provide them with creative energy and talent, as well as the programmers, marketing experts, business managers, and other personnel who fill additional vital roles. As discussed below, start-up employees frequently juggle multiple roles, but the issue remains: The people who might be helping move traditional media in new directions are helping someone else instead.

The second overall point is that entrepreneurial enterprises offer a valuable lesson for legacy media: Diversification of revenue models as well as closer connections with media audiences, in line with the nature of the digital platform, are all but mandatory for sustainability (Grueskin, Seave & Graves 2011; Kurpius, Metzgar & Rowley 2010; Sirkkunen & Cook 2012). In the 20th-century world described earlier, media organizations thrived by maximizing profits from audiences and advertisers, in varying combinations. From a business perspective, audiences were valued primarily because of their importance to advertisers, who sought to reach either large numbers of people (a broadcast news or general-interest print model) or people with a particular interest in what they had to sell (a special-interest magazine model).

Most legacy outlets carried a basket containing only those two eggs into the digital era. Indeed, the initial and all but universal decision to give away their content for free was based on the notion that the value of audiences is primarily

their ability to attract advertisers. In hindsight, charging nothing for something that is very expensive to produce in order to artificially inflate the audience may seem foolish. But that is only because in hindsight, we know more about what works online, as well as what does not work and what works differently. Many legacy outlets later responded by erecting “paywalls”, charging users a fee to read any, a few, or a lot of their stories (Pickard & Williams 2014; Williams 2016). Yet that may have been the wrong lesson; essentially, it is the old model in new clothes that are especially ill-fitting in a digital environment where so much is free. Moreover, a paywall model does not represent a diversification of revenue sources beyond audiences and advertisers. Successful entrepreneurs typically include advertising in their revenue mix but also draw on options that range from memberships to partnerships, consulting to crowd-funding – and more (Grueskin, Seave & Graves 2011; Kaye & Quinn 2010; Sirkunnen & Cook 2012).

All that said, legacy media have engaged in substantive economic innovation, from experiments with crowdsourcing of journalistic investigations to widespread event hosting. Some, such as the UK *Guardian*, are seeking to build a sense of community among “members”, emphasizing connection and conversation alongside news consumption. At the very least, such a strategy – essentially “join our club” rather than “read our paper” – suggests that even a 200-year-old newspaper can explore innovative routes to extended longevity by thinking creatively about the affordances of industry disruption. More news organizations need to do the same.

2 Entrepreneurial journalism: individual challenges

Individual journalists have naturally been affected by all these institutional changes. As countless academic studies and trade press reports have documented, news practitioners have had to modify their storytelling tools, their skills sets, their work practices, and their relationships with audiences. Indeed, the journalist’s job has been utterly transformed, and it is difficult to imagine that such dramatic upheaval would have occurred without those outside the newsroom so compellingly demonstrating the need for, and opportunities created by change.

Such is the situation for those still employed by legacy outlets as journalists. Many are not. Newspapers, historically the most well-staffed, have been especially hard hit, but other sectors also have suffered repeated rounds of cutbacks. Many journalists with long careers have found themselves suddenly on the street. College graduates have struggled to find jobs at all – or been disappointed by the ones they have found. In general, journalism has been described as an occupational field that is losing its traditional bearings, as journalistic work becomes more precarious and piecemeal (Cohen 2015; Deuze 2008; Deuze & Marjoribanks 2009).

Hitching their wagon to a journalism start-up – or even launching their own media enterprise – has become a more viable alternative for journalists over the past decade, perhaps particularly those motivated by a desire for independence or self-realization (Block & Landgraf 2016). This section outlines some of the challenges they face, which are related to those of media institutions yet of a different nature. They include normative concerns, particularly associated with traditional notions of professional autonomy, as well as the need to rapidly master unfamiliar business concepts and skills.

A brief outline of the normative framework that shapes journalists' self-perceptions can help put these challenges into context. Although many kinds of journalists cover many topics in many ways, their overarching role in democratic society has been succinctly and aptly summarized as providing the information that citizens need to be free and self-governing (Kovach & Rosenstiel 2007). Western journalists have tended to position near-absolute autonomy as a requisite condition to their ability to fulfill that role despite the multi-level influences under which they work (Shoemaker & Reese 2014).

The right to make independent decisions about work-related behavior and activities, and determinations about who is qualified to undertake those activities, is a hallmark of all professions (Larson 1977). Although there have been debates over the years about whether journalism qualifies or even whether journalists should want to claim such a badge (Deuze 2005; Merrill 1974), most journalists consider themselves to be professionals in the important sense that they feel loyalty to certain fundamental ideals and shared norms (Patterson & Wilkins 2013). In the Western tradition, prominent among these are truth-telling – courage and honesty in pursuing accurate and fair reporting (Society of Professional Journalists 2014) – and an almost radical form of independence from any outside influence in pursuing that truth. Although historically rooted in a safeguard against government infringement on press freedom, the norm has been widely invoked in defending the need for autonomy from two other influences more central to this consideration of entrepreneurial journalism: commercial entities and audiences.

The former have drawn more attention. The real or potential influence of advertisers on newsroom output and the decisions made in creating it, along with the possibility that audiences may not distinguish between commercial and editorial content, have been of significant concern to both practitioners and scholars for decades (Eckman & Lindlof 2003; Soley & Craig 1992; Upshaw, Chernov, and Koranda, 2007). The issues remain salient, reflected in controversy over such contemporary permutations as native advertising (Carlson 2015; Coddington 2015; Howe & Teufel 2014). Relationships with other revenue sources also have drawn critical attention, from the intricacies of sponsorship arrangements (Foreman 2011) to the connections between philanthropic organizations and the non-profit journalism they back (Ward 2014).

Historically, the interaction between journalists and news audiences has drawn less attention, perhaps because there was relatively little of it. Virtually all a jour-

nalist's relationships were with sources and colleagues; the newsroom walls, physical and metaphorical, created boundaries around the workspace that were hard to penetrate. As the effective squashing of fledgling "civic journalism" initiatives in the 1990s suggested (McDevitt 2003), journalists rather liked maintaining a safe distance from any actual reader or viewer. Many were discomfited a decade later when the rise of user comments, followed by the explosion in social media, eradicated such distance (Gulyas 2013; Hermida & Thurman 2008; Lewis 2012). The increasing reliance on web analytics – instantaneously available, excruciatingly detailed usage data – also has put audience interests and reading patterns front and center in newsroom decisions about what deserves good play or what even deserves coverage at all (Anderson 2011; Tandoc & Thomas 2015). Concerns arise about whether such close attention to audience behavior moves journalists away from their role of independent watchdog and toward a more overt (and less desirable) market orientation, associated with giving audiences what they want to know "at the expense of what they should know" (Hanitzsch 2007: 375).

Clearly, normative emphasis on journalistic autonomy from the influence of both advertisers and audiences served an important purpose in providing the freedom to report and write "without fear or favor", in the famous phrasing of 19th-century *New York Times* publisher Adolph Ochs (*The New York Times* 1996). But the nature of boundaries is to fence certain people (journalists, say) in as well as to keep others out. Maintaining autonomy from audiences has meant journalists knew little about them – their interests, their media habits, what angers them, and what they appreciate. And maintaining autonomy from commercial entities became a rationale for journalists to remain disconnected from, even ignorant about, the economics of the business that employed them, a stance not uncommonly intertwined with general concerns about the negative impact of a profit motive on the quality of journalism (Beam 2006).

A shift to entrepreneurialism therefore raises thorny issues for journalism practitioners around their interactions with both commercial entities and audiences. In management literature terms, these concerns are encompassed by considerations of value propositions, customer segments, customer relationships, and revenue streams (Osterwalder & Pigneur 2010). But because normative journalistic premises posit such a sharp divide between revenue sources and news production, the discussion that follows combines these discrete business-model components in ways that highlight the particular challenges facing news entrepreneurs.

2.1 News audiences (customer segments and customer relationships)

The traditional relationship between journalists and their readers, viewers, or listeners is a one-directional one: It consists mainly of journalists producing and disseminating information in the public interest, a term defined broadly, often vague-

ly, and almost entirely by journalists themselves. Despite the overarching goal of service to society, journalists only rarely have seen a need to engage directly with audiences to achieve that goal or even to identify what it should entail.

Moreover, the traditional news audience is a “mass” audience, a faceless public conceived as having individually diverse interests but collectively sharing a concern with matters judged (again, mostly by the journalist) to be of civic importance. The actual composition of this audience was largely unknown to journalists in a 20th-century newsroom except in the aggregate – and even then, mainly through the broad brush strokes of network ratings or circulation audits, or through the self-portraits provided by the relatively few, self-selecting souls who bothered to write a letter to the editor (Wahl-Jorgensen 2007). To journalists working at news outlets larger than the tiniest community-based ones, their audience was an undifferentiated and amorphous mass.

Entrepreneurs, in contrast, must know a great deal about their customers, and the more precise, concrete, and detailed that knowledge the better. Entrepreneurial journalists are no exception. To succeed, they must understand, among other things, how the people they hope to attract and retain currently get information, what kinds of information those people want and need, what delivery mechanisms they prefer, how much they are willing to spend for desired information, and in what way(s) they would like to pay. A vague conception of an amorphous public in need of something broadly defined as in their own interest is not nearly good enough.

The nature of the entrepreneurial audience also is likely to differ from the one for legacy news outlets. As already described, many start-ups will have a niche rather than a mass audience, for reasons related to logistics and available resources, as well as ones related to the nature of existing and emerging news markets. The mass market already is served by legacy outlets and others with strong brand name recognition; the emerging market clearly leans toward personalization (Thurman 2011). This is especially true for online news: Digital media in general are really good at niche, and mobile technologies in particular are really good at personal (Newman & Levy 2014). So journalists seeking to launch their own outlets – again, almost certainly through a digital medium, given market trends as well as the high infrastructure cost of traditional platforms – need skills in understanding and courting a narrowly defined audience quite different from the one they may be accustomed to serving.

And this niche audience must be actively wooed not only as readers but also as contributors. As briefly mentioned above, the people interested in a niche topic are apt to already know quite a bit about it, and a start-up enterprise is unlikely to have the resources for coverage thorough enough to engage such people over time without help ... their help. Despite their well-documented reluctance to engage with legacy audiences, journalists who become entrepreneurs unavoidably need to find “outsiders” who can contribute reliably, cogently, credibly, and regularly. Once

located, they must be engaged with and nurtured, requiring relationship skills that go well beyond what journalists may have developed with traditional sources whose only role was to provide information that was then routed through, and vetted by, the journalist. Legacy journalists have few partners in their core content production tasks. Entrepreneurial journalists must work collaboratively to survive.

2.2 Money matters (customer segments and revenue streams)

News audiences may be understood only hazily and engaged with only rarely, but journalists do believe their job is to serve them in some fashion. Not so with advertisers, who are seen as distinct from audiences and are kept well outside the newsroom purview lest they taint journalistic work and output. But the most likely advertisers or sponsors for a niche news start-up are commercial entities in the same market segment as the audience; they constitute not only part of that audience but also key word-of-mouth publicity channels. Even for enterprises with diversified revenue streams, advertising is typically still a key part of the mix (Sirkkunen & Cook 2012), and pursuing and securing advertisers often is at least as important as pursuing and securing audiences.

Some journalistic start-ups are large enough for that job to be delegated to someone not directly involved in content production, but many are not, at least in their crucial early stages. Indeed, many rely at least partially on crowdfunding, which seeks money from audiences for often quite specific purposes (Hunter 2015). Crowdfunding can create tangled relationships that raise ethical issues of accountability and transparency (Porlezza & Splendore 2016); at a practical level, it also can be so time-consuming that seeking such funding seems to some entrepreneurs like a second full-time job (Hunter 2016).

Another complicating factor is the likelihood of a personal stake in maintaining happiness among customer segments that include advertisers and audiences, separate or conflated. The journalist-as-owner-and-publisher typically has invested his or her own money, in the form of savings and loans, and that of friends and family (Briggs 2012), as well as (or instead of) that of outside backers and investors. While traditional journalists certainly have an investment in their careers, as well as a general interest in seeing an employer prosper, those are more attenuated concerns. Of course, all journalists are well aware that the content they produce is for sale, but their involvement with that transaction is quite deliberately nil. Figuring out where the money to support the journalism comes from and how to get more of it are the concerns of the publisher or owner or board of directors, not the journalist.

The learning curve for journalists starting their own business therefore tends to be steep and sharp. An entrepreneur needs to think hard about every cost: how big it is, what value it adds, how essential it is to success – and then whether to support it and if so, how. Evidence suggests that a common mistake made by

founders of news start-ups has been to put too much money into what they know best and love most: the journalism. Many have hired news staffs before securing their financial underpinnings or attending to other components of a successful enterprise, such as the creation of effective marketing channels and the forging of key partnerships. Naldi and Picard (2012) labeled such misplaced priorities “formational myopia”: unrealistic expectations about the demand for, and the economic value of, journalistic work that has contributed to a high rate of failure relative to success (Bruno & Nielsen 2012).

Beyond the normative concerns and the emotional ones, journalists typically lack the practical business skills needed to make good fiscal and management decisions. Successfully making the transition from employee of a news operation to its owner requires knowing about business plans, spreadsheets, profit and loss statements, accounting procedures, staffing, and partnerships. It requires understanding advertising structures plus a host of other potential revenue streams, as outlined already. There are bookkeeping practices to master, legal matters to consider, business plans to draw up – all that b-school stuff that journalists probably jeered at in college and beyond as they pursued their own higher and nobler calling.

And at the end of the day, journalists do still have that higher calling. They still have to maintain trust in the credibility of the information they provide, and they still have to do that in part by maintaining editorial integrity, a task that does demand a degree of autonomy from any unwelcome influence of outsiders on editorial and financial decisions. They have to keep a clear view, that is, of their own value proposition.

2.3 Value proposition

The value of individual journalists within a news organization rests on their professional expertise, defined through their contributions to an overall mission of informing the public. Again, of crucial importance here are normative principles exercised in maintaining credibility and in fostering trust that, in theory if not always in practice, attracts and retains audiences. That individual value is connected to an institutionally held value that incorporates brand reputation, reach, and long-term patterns of stakeholder interactions, often dating back decades if not centuries. At both the individual and the institutional level, then, the value proposition is based on delivery, over time, of an appealing information product to audiences that in turn creates an appealing proposition to advertisers seeking to reach them.

As already described, the Internet fundamentally challenges those institutional advantages, including the value of established brands and business models, which underpin the individual journalist’s ability to make a meaningful social contribution. More directly, individual journalists’ skills and norms in producing a credible story remain valuable in an entrepreneurial space ... but not necessarily as valuable

as those who possess the skills and norms tend to believe. Many information start-ups that have enjoyed big success have been less about serious reporting and close attention to professional ethics than about edginess and trend-riding and visuals and speed (plus the more-than-occasional kitten). Creation and delivery of credible information is surely valuable to democracy. But democracy is a big concept, while audiences consist of individuals seeking personal and ideally immediate gratifications, as clearly evidenced by contemporary demonstrations of political “filter bubbles” and “echo chambers” facilitated by social media. Journalists have little experience in and, again, often little appetite for relating to audiences at that level.

Moreover, of course, the same audiences who may be ambivalent about traditional news providers have become news providers themselves: As the ability to disseminate information has become widely shared, people have demonstrated themselves willing and able to rely on one another to stay in the know (Allan & Thorsen 2009). While the journalist-as-middleman may still be appreciated for purposes of verification or analysis, he or she is no longer necessary to make information available in the first place.

In summary, as journalists have sought to turn what they know and love into a going business enterprise, many have applied traditional views of what news is or should be, often along with misperceptions of the market for it (Naldi & Picard 2012). Most really do believe in the power of a free press and in the value of a well-informed public to civic and community life. And they believe that they know – know best – how to provide that value. Yet as entrepreneurs, journalists must dig deeper to figure out just what makes them special.

Life as an entrepreneur raises many intertwined questions familiar from other shocks to journalism as those over age 20 knew it. Who am I as a journalist? What value do I offer – to whom, how, and how much? What is my role in society, and how can I fulfill it? What hats can I not live without? What new ones do I need, and how do I get them to fit? Which relationships are the ones that matter? How can I nurture them? How can I safeguard them from corruption in various guises? If success isn’t leading the newscast, and maybe not even serving that nebulous thing called democratic society, then what exactly is it, and how do I attain it?

Can journalists turn themselves into publishers in more than the literal sense, and without losing their souls or their shirts? Yes, certainly. But many are ill-equipped to succeed. Although the numbers are growing, relatively few journalism schools or newsrooms are providing the skills or mind sets needed to be a profitable and effective innovator over the long haul. Journalism educators might play a particularly significant role in helping new practitioners make the leap. But with a number of exceptions (Casero-Ripollés, Izquierdo-Castillo & Doménech-Fabregat 2016; Ferrier 2013; Hunter & Nel 2011; Sparre & Færgemann 2016), the skills outlined in this chapter are largely missing from our classes. Business skills are especially notable for their absence, not least because many students as well as instructors tend to see them as irrelevant and distracting at best, and nefarious at worse

(Blom & Davenport 2012; Drok 2013). That is, of course, exactly the problem. Financial considerations are irrelevant – until all of a sudden, they’re the only relevant thing about your ability to be a journalist.

Further reading

Diverse issues related to entrepreneurial journalism are explored in a special issue of *Journalism Practice*, edited by Kevin Rafter and published in 2016; the table of contents is available from <http://www.tandfonline.com/toc/rjop20/10/2>, with articles accessible through most university library portals. Mark Briggs’ *Entrepreneurial Journalism* (2012) is a widely cited how-to book that goes beyond the basics to evoke many of the issues covered in this chapter. Briggs’ focus is almost entirely on US initiatives, while the emphasis of a 2017 book by the same title (Marsden 2017) focuses mainly on the UK. Both these can be nicely complemented with two more empirically oriented works with an international scope, both examining economic issues surrounding entrepreneurial journalism. “Survival Is Success” looks at European media entrepreneurs and can be downloaded from <http://reutersinstitute.politics.ox.ac.uk/publication/survival-success> (Bruno & Nielsen 2012); the business models of entrepreneurial journalism enterprises around the world are covered in a report accessible from <http://www.submojour.net> (Sirkkunen & Cook 2012).

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An Nguyen and Salvatore Scifo

19 Mapping the Citizen News Landscape: Blurring Boundaries, Promises, Perils, and Beyond

Abstract: This chapter offers a necessary critical overview of citizen journalism in its many forms and shapes, with a focus on its promises and perils and what it means for the future of news. We will start with a review of the concept of “citizen journalism” and its many alternative terms, then move to briefly note the long history of citizen journalism, which dates back to the early days of the printing press. This will be followed by our typology of three major forms of citizen journalism (CJ) – citizen witnessing, oppositional CJ, and expertise-based CJ – along with an assessment of each form’s primary actions, motives, functions, and influences. The penultimate part of the chapter will focus on CJ’s flaws and pitfalls – especially the mis/disinformation environment it fosters and the “dialogue of the deaf” it might engender – and place them in the context of the post-truth era to highlight the still critical need for professional journalists. The chapter concludes with a brief review of the understandably but unnecessarily uneasy relationship between citizen and professional journalism and calls for the latter to adopt a new attitude to work well with the former.

Keywords: citizen journalism, alternative journalism, citizen witnessing, social media, fake news, post-truth

1 One thing, many labels?

Within a short time, citizen journalism (CJ) went from something of a novelty to a naturalized part of the news ecosystem and entered the daily language of journalists, journalism educators, and a large segment of the global public. Yet its fluid, pluralistic nature makes it less than a straightforward task to pin down what exactly it is. Although the prolific body of empirical and theoretical research into CJ continues to expand, with some broad agreement on what it is about, it is far from a settled concept. This is perhaps in part because it “tries to capture in just two words a complex of shifting and developing capacities and expectations” (Meikle 2014: 174). As Stuart Allan (2013: 8) points out:

discourses of citizen journalism reveal an array of virtues in the opinion of advocates striving to transform journalism by improving its civic contribution to public life – and conceal a multitude of sins in the eyes of critics intent on preserving what they perceive to be the integrity of professional practice – in complex, occasionally contradictory ways.

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This manifests in the wide and rather “dizzy” range of labels that CJ has been given since the late 1990s and early 2000s, when it began to attract wide attention thanks to the rise of weblogs. Some of the labels are associated with the act of *publishing* (e.g., personal publishing, self-publishing, open publishing, collaborative publishing, participatory publishing, community publishing) while others with a non-mainstream *media form* (e.g., radical media, social movement media, emancipatory media, thin media, and we-media). Most labels, however, include a *journalism* component (e.g., do-it-yourself journalism, grassroots journalism, guerrilla journalism, ordinary journalism, hyperlocal journalism, deliberative journalism, distributed journalism, participatory journalism, open/open-source journalism). More recently, some scholars have confined CJ primarily to the act of *bearing witness*, using terms such as “citizen witnessing” or “eyewitness imagery” (Allan 2013; Mortensen 2014).

“Citizen journalism” as a term itself entered mainstream vocabulary after the Boxing Day tsunami in South Asia in 2004, when professional news outlets found themselves in “the awkward position” of having to rely, for the first time on a massive scale, on raw content contribution from eyewitnesses on the ground (Allan 2013: 9). This prompted the BBC to set up in April 2005 an entity called User-Generated Content Hub in its newsroom, which quickly gained popularity, expanded, won awards, and inspired a range of other similar initiatives, such as the CNN’s iReport and Al Jazeera’s Sharek. The increasing acceptance of the “citizen journalism” title thus paralleled that of “user-generated content” (UGC), which became an umbrella term to refer to all kind of content contributed by citizens to news production and dissemination. Although some use UGC and CJ interchangeably, it must be noted that much CJ is not UGC and much UGC (e.g., a tiny, often impulsive comment on a mainstream news story) can be hardly substantive enough to rub shoulders with things that we generally see as CJ – such as fully-fledged eyewitness accounts or blog posts.

Some observers attempt to define CJ by dissociating it from mainstream news media. One example is Jay Rosen’s oft-quoted definition – “when the people formerly known as the audience employ the press tools they have in their possession to inform one another, *that’s* citizen journalism”. Yet, as already seen, CJ can be done through or in collaboration with, rather than just outside, the mainstream media. Others (Atton 2003, 2009; Forde, Foxwell & Meadows 2009) subsume CJ under the umbrella of “alternative journalism”. For them, although it remains to be seen how online citizen platforms and their emerging journalistic styles would alter audience demands and expectations and the general news landscape, it is safe to place them under the overarching catch-all category of alternative journalism. Under this “infuriatingly vague” blanket term, CJ is seen in the same light as any type of news that falls outside or strays beyond and/or challenges the remits and practices of institutionalized media (Atton 2003). However, as we shall see, not all citizen journalism is “alternative” in that sense – and vice versa.

In sum, although the above plethora of terms reflects the rich, diverse, and rigorous nature of citizen news, it highlights at least some ambiguities over what does and does not count as CJ. Indeed, as CJ blurs the boundaries in numerous aspects of human communication, many fundamental questions remain open to wide interpretations. Is CJ simply an act of public participation, a cultural production process, a cultural product, or a combination of some/all of these? Where is the borderline between private information sharing and personal news publishing, between institutional and ordinary expertise in the news flow, between professionally constructed truth and ordinary consensus, et cetera? More fundamentally, what constitutes “citizen” and “journalism” in CJ? Is CJ just an extension of the old *journalism for citizenship* model (where citizens, although being active in contributing their own news and views, are at the mercy of professional journalism) or does it represent a new, more radical *journalism as citizenship* paradigm (journalism exercised by citizens to inform each other beyond the control of the professional media), or both?

2 A brief note on a long history

Although CJ is a term of the digital era, the sort of citizen participation that it refers to has a far longer history. For Correia (2012), CJ is the logical second phase of the “public journalism” movement in the US in the late 1980s and 1990s. This was a movement in which mainstream journalism – in attempts to bridge the widening gap between ordinary citizens and between them and governmental institutions – opened up some of its space for citizens to create their own news to inform each other, to share interests and concerns, and to reach common values. Barlow (2007: 180) contends that CJ is “simply public journalism removed from the journalism profession” (i.e. without the need for journalists to offer their space and moderation service). Even the idea of the news media creating news-sharing spaces for the ordinary folks is as old as the press. Boczkowski (2004: 141) noted that the first US newspaper, *Publick Occurrences, Both Foreign and Domestick*, published in only one unlicensed issue in 1690, had one “peculiar feature”: one of its four pages was left blank for readers to write their news before passing it on to others.

Independent citizen participation in the news flow had an even longer history, dating back to the 16th century, when the newly invented printing press fueled the rise of the pamphleteer journalist in England and France. In the early 1800s and then mid-to-late 19th century, a great deal of unpaid, non-professional, and voluntary journalistic work was done in the form of a radical-popular press. From the early 20th century, this radical press responded to the needs of the working class in socialist movements, a phase that ends with the start of World War II (Forde 2011). After a “lull” period, it “re-emerged, revitalized and took a new face” in the 1960s alongside the rise of counter subcultures (Forde 2011: 36). The 1970s started

to see cheaper and simpler broadcast production tools, coupled with growing interests in alternative media, arts, and politics, attracting an increasing number of practitioners to small-scale community media, prominently in Western contexts (Atton & Hamilton 2008; Harcup 2003).

Things, as we have known, took a dramatic turn in the late 1990s and early 2000s thanks to the intrusion of the web and subsequent cheap and easy-publishing tools such as chat rooms, forums, blogs, camcorders, and mobile phones with built-in cameras. These were joined in the mid-to-late 2000s by online social networks, such as Twitter and Facebook, the smart phone and their associated technologies. These tools and platforms turned creative publishing into a simple, user-friendly process and allowed everybody to easily become a “reporter”. As the means of production was now in the hands of ordinary folks, citizen news would sooner or later be part of public life. As Dan Gillmor, the first American professional journalist running a blog, puts it succinctly, “when anyone can be a writer, in the largest sense and for a global audience, many of us will be” (2006: 236). In other words, as Meikle (2014: 175) argues, “the news doesn’t just talk to us, but we can now talk back; and perhaps more importantly, we are also now all the more likely to talk to each other about what we’re hearing”.

Indeed, the new technologies did not have to wait long to show their power. Introduced into the news ecosystem at the time when the world started to face an unprecedented acceleration of terrorism and the war on terrorism as well as experienced an unusual number of human/natural disasters and crisis events, CJ tools quickly established their place in the news landscape thanks in a large part to their unprecedented power to provide witness accounts from the ground (more on this below). Today the output of citizen journalism can be seen everywhere on the Internet, with its use in mainstream news being “no longer an occasional exception to the general rule” (Allan & Peters 2015: 478) and, of course, not limited to crisis events. For the purpose of an overview, the next section will categorize CJ on the basis of functions and roles, motives and purposes, and contributions to the broader public sphere. From this functional perspective, we observe that CJ forms fall under three broad conceptually distinctive, although operationally overlapping, groups: citizen witnessing (CJ as accidental journalism), oppositional citizen journalism, and expertise-based citizen journalism.

3 Citizen witnessing

Bearing witness, as hinted above, is perhaps the most remarkable, most visible part of the citizen news landscape. Stuart Allan (2013: 9), who introduces the “citizen witnessing” concept, defines it as “first-person reportage in which ordinary individuals temporarily adapt the role of journalists to participate in newsmaking, often spontaneously during a time of crisis, accident, tragedy or disaster when they happen to be present on the scene”. At the center of citizen witnessing is the imper-

ative of eye witnesses to perform a random, spontaneous, journalism-like act. Witnessing encompasses two distinctive things: observation (the private, passive experience of seeing) and action (the public, active performance of saying) (Mortensen 2014). The main difference between digital and traditional witnessing is that both can now be done by the very same person, who would find it easy, and perhaps tempting at times, to cross the line between observation and action. “Compared to the traditional witness, testimonies have changed profoundly by this figure moving behind the camera and holding the option of uploading pictures almost instantaneously” (Mortensen 2014: 147). This spur-of-the-moment, often emotionally charged first-person reportage is the opposite of professional journalists’ dispassionate, impartial, trustworthy, and reliable witnessing and testimony service (Allan 2013).

The potential of citizen witnessing, or “accidental journalism”, was noted and heralded from the very early days of the web. Historically, journalists have long been bearing witness on behalf of the public as most people do not have access to – or the resources to access – events of importance to them. However, as John Hiler (2002) argued in the early days of blogging, the “traditional media food chain” has a limited number of participants “with only so many people available to do the original reporting and fact checking” and thus carries with it “consistent bias that fails to reflect the diversity of opinions and ideas”. With blogs and other media production tools in their hands, ordinary folk are now close to the event to pick up many things that journalists might miss, and thus can correct that bias. Although professional journalists as “narrators” are still valued, they “will never be as omnipresent as millions of people carrying a cell phone that can record video” (Naím 2007). Long before the arrival of smart phones and social platforms such as Twitter, Facebook and YouTube, Dan Gillmor had envisioned that fifty pictures of a news event could be posted before print or broadcast photographers arrive on the scene (Nguyen 2006).

Gillmor’s scenario, considered to be quite radical at the time, would soon turn out to be too modest during the Boxing Day tsunami in 2004 and the London bombings in July 2005. Within six hours of the London bombings, for example, the BBC received more than 1,000 photographs, 20 amateur videos, 4,000 text messages and 20,000 emails from people on the ground, and the next day’s main newscast started with an edited version of a user video. That led the BBC to the conclusion that, according to its then Director of News, Helen Boaden (2008), eyewitness accounts were not just “nice to have” but something that would change newsgathering “forever”. Such accounts, she said, open her journalists’ and viewers’ eyes to not only stories that “we would never have known” but also “a wider diversity of voices than we could otherwise deliver”. Since that watershed event, citizen witnessing has consolidated its place through many crises, disasters and unusual events, such as Mumbai terrorist attacks (2008), Iranian uprisings (2009), Arab Spring series (2010–2011), among many others.

Today, “citizen journalism, in all its different forms and guises, has become such a normalized component of today’s media landscape that it is almost a natu-

realised expectation” in news about any crisis/disaster event (Thorsen 2014: 141). Witnessing is not confined to relaying images and videos but also live-reporting and live-streaming events to audiences across a number of social and mainstream media platforms. In some cases, citizens lead the media in breaking the news: e.g., Twitter coverage of the airplane landing on the Hudson River in New York in 2009, or the live coverage on social media of street protests and rallies across the Middle East and North America region during the Arab Spring. In other cases, they add testimony materials, witness perspectives, and emotional responses to the news agenda and beyond. Often, as Thorsen (2014) observes from the live reporting of the deadly attacks in Oslo and Utoya by the right-wing Norwegian activist Anders Breivik in 2011, the impact of citizen witnessing is limited to the early hours of a crisis: once the crisis scenario had been established, citizen witnesses were gradually replaced by official sources. Mortensen (2014: 151) quoted Struk (2011) to argue that eyewitness images, because of their decontextualization, usually “prompt stories” rather than “tell stories”.

Witnessing accounts are often driven by the desire to share experience and to tell stories. In times of crisis, people flock to social media such as Facebook, Twitter, and Flickr both to bear witness and to engage with events (Ibrahim 2014). For many of CNN’s iReporters in the 2009 Iranian uprisings, the desire to voice competing interpretations of events – not money, much less fame (which was potentially dangerous) – was the main driver of their unpaid labor (Palmer 2014). For some, being attached to a global news organization was a source of additional strength as it assures that they were not alone in their hardship. Indeed, through engaging with “imagined communities” and materializing such communities with their own exchange of news and views, citizen witnesses constitute a vital part in the general account of what happens. In most cases, “witnessing becomes part of the event, which changes both the witness’s perceptions of the event, the retrospective reconstruction of the event, and at times, even the course of the event itself” (Mortensen 2014: 150). The material provided through the “civilian gaze” (Ibrahim 2014: 19) is especially precious in places where journalists are banned from or have limited access to events (Nguyen 2009; Palmer 2014).

Sometimes the motive is simply to seek or contribute to justice – and does not need to emerge right at the time of the crisis. At 11:30 pm on 1 April 2011, the London Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) announced that a Londoner, Ian Tomlinson, had died in the midst of large violence protests against the G20 Summit. As the MPS continued to paint the cause of his death as natural, eyewitnesses emerged, with images and testimony accounts, to suggest a completely different story. The decisive moment came when the *Guardian* posted on 7 April the video footage of Tomlinson’s last moment, which shows him as a carefree person treading his way home through the crowd and being suddenly struck down to the ground, then swiped with batons and pushed hard in the back by a police officer. The footage was supplied by an American fund manager, Christopher La Jaunie, who decided to hand

it the press simply because it was, from what he witnessed and filmed, “clear that the family were not getting any answers” (Greer & McLaughlin 2014: 43).

4 Oppositional citizen journalism

If citizen witnessing is about accidental reporting and has much to do with the desire to share experience from the ground, oppositional citizen journalism is practiced as a sustained, non-accidental activity to serve some ideological agendas and socio-political causes. Unlike witnessing, the collection and reporting of oppositional news can, and often does, operate on a semi-professional and more organized level that involves both amateurs and trained journalists. Such CJ can be seen as a form of alternative journalism, a concept emerging in the 1970s to refer to news that represents the opinions of small minorities – often with attitudes hostile to widely-held beliefs – and deals with subjects not given attention in the mainstream media. Oppositional CJ, like other forms of alternative journalism, is practiced from a position of citizenry, communities, and activists – with overt advocacy and oppositional practices (Atton 2003, 2009). Rather than serving as a contribution to mainstream media, oppositional CJ aims to present unspoken voices from below, privileging “the powerless and the marginal” rather than the powerful that define mainstream news (Harcup 2003: 371). As such, oppositional CJ can be seen as a mode of civic movement in which financial capital and skillsets are kept at minimal levels and reporting expertise is less important than activism.

Although oppositional CJ has been around for a long time, the Internet brought new energy for it to reach out and to become an increasingly indispensable news source (Atton 2013). Atton and Hamilton (2008: 79) see this as “the greatest expansion in alternative journalism”, celebrating the fact that “user-driven programmes enable the set-up of websites and discussion groups with minimal technical expertise”. Similarly, Forde (2011: 44) saw the Internet as “a site of democratic and socially empowering journalism” and “a key moment in the development of alternative journalism”. In continuity with the past, Forde argues, the Internet can help oppositional journalists, both amateurs and professionals, to “continue to do what their predecessors have always done – use information to challenge, analyse and mobilize” (2011: 176). Such news initiatives “are unquestionably fulfilling an educational and/or mobilizing function” with the broader aim to “transplant this function to a larger audience” (2011: 168). In some cases, they empower people to form a “fifth estate” to act as a watchdog of powerful forces in society, with a primary focus on voices against the cultural and political powers of the day.

An oft-touted example of oppositional CJ is the Korean OhmyNews venture, which was founded in 2002 out of its founder’s perception that the Korean media are too conservative to allow for any liberal, progressive politics. What seemed to be an absurd news venture at the time – which combines liberal grassroots report-

ing with light professional fact-checking, under the “Every citizen is a reporter” motto – quickly became an inspiring success for many around the world. Within less than four years, it built up an army of nearly 30,000 “news guerrillas” and was the country’s most influential news site and sixth most influential news outlet (Nguyen 2011). Its advocacy coverage and vital campaign amongst young voters for Roh Moo-Hyun, a little-known anti-establishment “political novice and maverick”, was credited as “a, if not *the*, decisive force” in bringing him to the presidency in the 2002 general election (Nguyen 2011: 199). It was the first news outlet given an interview by the president. Its heyday, however, seems to have been over: although OhmyNews still maintained a 100-strong staff with about 80,000 citizen reporters (as of 2015), it has struggled financially for some time as its once unique model is no longer a novelty and the initial enthusiasm of citizens has waned (Nguyen 2011; Kang 2016). Meanwhile, attempts to repeat its success elsewhere – e.g., OhmyNews Japan, NowPublic in Canada or Assignment Zero and Bayosphere in the US – have failed, and its own international English-language version did not survive, due to a rich range of socio-cultural facilitating factors that are specific to its original country.

Another oft-mentioned example of oppositional CJ is Indymedia. Starting with witness accounts from the street during anti-globalization protests in 1999 in Seattle, Indymedia quickly rose to become a global open-publishing platform where ordinary concerned citizens participate in all aspects of an online media project that campaigns and acts “against the bureaucratic-capitalist state” (Salter 2009: 179). Soon after Seattle, Independent Media Centers (IMCs) spread around the world, with 80 active by 2002 and 175 in 2010. The facility with which multimedia content could be uploaded gave a flexibility not seen in other media platforms, allowing both ordinary citizens and activists to present alternative perspectives to the mainstream press on the events that they covered. The number of IMCs, however, has declined particularly quickly since 2010, with only 66 being counted in 2014. Giraud (2014) attributed this to a long list of problems both internal (informational hierarchies, bureaucracy, inclusivity issues of the global networks) and external (e.g., the rise of social networking sites, the decline in global justice movements). The open-publishing format, with no editing before publication, paved the way for content to go too far from the progressive ideals of Indymedia activists. Indeed, Atton (2003: 70) asked if “(becoming) a contributor by clicking the ‘Publish’ button is actually harming its attempts at progressive social change”. Also, developing a model that could be financially viable proved to be an impossible task.

Despite the decline of large-scale ventures, oppositional CJ is still alive in the work of many smaller groups or individuals. It remains a vital part of the public sphere, especially in places where there is a perceived “democratic deficit” in mainstream media. Citizen journalists reporting from zones of political instability and warfare or operating under repressive regimes, for example, have risked their

lives for their determination to provide facts and truths. Ruqia Hassan Mohamed – who used her Facebook account under the pen name of Nisan Ibrahim to report on the “life for residents of Raqqa [Syria], ISIS’s Syrian stronghold, and the frequent coalition airstrikes against the group” (Gani & Shaheen 2016) – was killed by ISIS in September 2015. Citizen journalists operating in the 2010 Haiti earthquake and the 2013 Gezi Park demonstrations in Istanbul revealed that one main reason for them to engage in something that put them at risk (physical harm or prosecution) was to “challenge the monopoly that mainstream media institutions have over agenda setting” and “offer perspectives that often get filtered out in mainstream media (Baruh et al. 2014: 173–174). As Fisher concluded from reflecting on Al Jazeera’s interaction with citizen journalists during the Arab Spring, “the days have gone of governments believing that by closing off transmitters or taking over radio and TV stations, of blocking mobile phone signals and satellite TV signals, or shutting down the internet they will somehow win the propaganda battle” because “social media have clearly changed the media landscape – and is playing a part in changing the world” (2011: 158).

The impact of oppositional CJ should be considered beyond crisis and conflict situations. In places where authoritarian rules prevent the media from doing a proper job, disillusionment with official media has led to the birth of many influential alternative citizen news initiatives that keep a close eye on those in powers on a daily basis. In Vietnam, most recent political blockbuster stories – from senior politicians’ harrowing incompetence, irresponsibility, corruption, and other misdeeds to top-secret personnel information (e.g., who to leave and to stay in the Politburo of the ruling communist party at its latest national congresses in 2011 and 2016) – have been broken on blogs and Facebook, often many days before they are, if at all, mentioned in the official media. Its former PM, Nguyen Tan Dung, publicly conceded that “we can no longer prevent or ban information on social media”. Similar developments have been recorded under many other authoritarian regimes (see Allan & Thorsen 2009; Thorsen & Allan 2014).

5 Expertise-based citizen journalism

This category involves ordinary citizens researching, reporting, and writing in non-mainstream media about topics in which they possess some expertise. The public, as Kovach and Rosenstiel (2001) pointed out, is an interlocked body: one might be indifferent to or ignorant of most things but is likely to be passionate and/or knowledgeable about a particular area which they might be willing to take necessary actions to share, promote and/or protect. Expertise-based CJ can be provided by educated experts in some specific subject areas who come to the fore to exercise their “professional citizenship”. A scientist, for example, might blog about new research findings in their subject area, share their expert insights into something

with lay audiences, or voice concerns over professionally unhealthy or questionable issues (e.g., non-scientific motives and/or inadequate standards behind some research work that is in the public domain). Experts, however, do not always need to be people who acquire specialized knowledge/skills from prolonged professional education and experience. Expertise could well be “popular expertise” – i.e. built on experience of living and doing. A veteran resident of a local area might know much about its weather patterns and flower species and want to share that on a hyperlocal news site, a community forum or, more recently, “citizen science” projects initiated by scientific institutions.

Expertise-based CJ is much more prevalent than it might sound. In fact, much of the driving force of the rise of CJ in the 2000s was expertise-based. The early blogosphere was a place primarily for the tech-savvy to discuss new technology and web design, which did not substantially change until the aftermath of September 11 (Hiler 2002). Science topics were soon to join the arena, and, by early 2005, Technorati, a blog monitoring service, was tracking about 700,000 blog posts about science at any one time (cited in McIlwaine & Nguyen 2005). Meanwhile, Slashdot.org, an early CJ venture that recorded 10 million unique readers each month by its seventh birthday in 2003, is a cooperative “news for nerds” site, where users discuss every complicated topic from the latest software, new cancer treatments to global warming or political moves in space. Numerous concrete examples can be found to show how ordinary people, in developing and developed countries alike, have used the Internet to set up their own science forum, to expose “bad science”, to call government science-related responses and policies into question, and so on.

Expertise-based CJ, of course, is not confined to science topics. Early observers of blogs might recall that Dan Rather, the veteran US newscaster, fell from grace after the blogosphere proved wrong a document that he presented on CBS to accuse President George W. Bush, when he was younger, of skipping out on military service. Among their evidence was that the document possessed many typographical elements that a 1970 typewriter would not do, including the Times New Roman font style, proportional spacing, and the “th” superscript (Nguyen 2006, 2008). In Vietnam, within a few years of the country’s connection to the global network, a music fan conducted an online investigation to prove that one of its most famous pop composers plagiarized his top songs from a Japanese album (Nguyen 2009). A more recent example is the groundbreaking exposure of Syrian arms trafficking by Leicester-based Eliot Higgins who conducted a purely online investigation and “exposed Syrian arms trafficking from his front room” (Weaver 2013). Every evening, Higgins – an unemployed finance and admin worker who had no experience in a war zone or any specific media training – sifted through and examined meticulous details of about 450 YouTube channels that were uploaded from Syria by all sides of the conflict: activists, rebel brigades, Islamist groups, Assad supporters, and state TV. Under the pseudonym of Brown Moses, he discussed his findings in

chatroom discussions and was later picked up by the *Guardian's* Middle East live blog. This mix of citizen reporting from the ground and the self-trained analysis of an unpaid dedicated blogger was commended in the global media and by global agencies such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch.

Unfortunately, the potential of expertise-based CJ does not seem to have been appreciated by the mainstream media as fully as citizen witnessing. Knoblich (2013) found it “strange” that, despite initiatives like UGC Hub, iReport, and Sharek, professional journalism does not seem to make rigorous attempts to embrace and engage with CJ beyond crisis events. “Couldn’t citizens bring the same value – personal stories, local context, and even volumes of personal data – to nearly any news topic of interest?” he asked. This is, to say the least, a wasted opportunity because, as Gillmor (2006) puts in, “the people at the edges of the communications and social networks”, although acting sometimes as “a newsmaker’s harshest, most effective critics”, can also be “the most fervent and valuable allies, offering ideas to each other and to the newsmaker”. Blogs, for example, often take stories from the mainstream media, dig deeper to find alternative perspectives, challenge facts or enrich them with supplementary materials (Beckett 2008). Indeed, some critics contend that by just (re)broadcasting eye witnessing episodes as fodder content and place holders during crises – often while their crews or affiliates are still on the way to reach the location of an event – the mainstream media have misappropriated the “citizen journalism” label.

6 The perils of cit-j

Alongside its empowering potential and democratic promises, CJ has been a source of concerns for many. The citizen news environment, as Clay Shirky (2002) aptly calls it, is a “publish, then filter” – rather than “filter, then publish” – world. For advocates, this brave new world relies on its self-governing and self-righting process. Questions of integrity and truth can be offset by what Pierre Levy calls “collective intelligence” or by the fact that ordinary people often police each other, often with good and healthy motives (Beckett 2008). The blogosphere, for instance, has been defined and promoted as a hypertextual space in which electronic links between and among a wide range of texts and images will lead to a constant shift of networks and thus constant scrutiny of facts and perspectives. In such spaces, as millions of bloggers and social media users constantly monitor, fact check and expose mistakes, the wisdom of the crowd will work, sometimes at its best (Lowrey, Parrott & Meade 2011; Naim 2007). This is in essence a return to the core of the “freedom of expression” and “free marketplace of ideas” concepts that were the building blocks of the liberal press theory. Siebert, Peterson, and Schramm (1956: 45) summarized this as follows: “Let all with something to say be free to express themselves. The true and sound will survive; the false and unsound will be van-

quished”. The false, in this theory, might gain a temporary victory but the true has the unique power to survive because people, assumed to be rational, know how to reason.

For critics, however, the self-righting process through the wisdom of the crowd does not always work and could sometimes be harmful. The warnings of Rebecca Blood (2002), an early author on blogging – that “the weblog’s greatest strength, its uncensored, unmediated, uncontrolled voice, is also its greatest weakness” – can well be applied to the entire citizen news sphere. The case of the FindBostonBombers campaign on Reddit in the days after the Boston Marathon bombings in April 2013 – in which a man named Sunil Tripathi was wrongly identified as the perpetrator by a fellow High School classmate – shows how counterproductive CJ could be. As Reddit participants were trying to identify a potential killer, their research became part of the media story. But such research “just turned out to be hopeless, worthless and to some extent harmful” – particularly after images of potential suspects went viral and caused distress (Meikle 2014: 175). Citing Pierre Levy’s “collective intelligence” concept, which is built on the premise that “*no one knows everything, everyone knows something*”, Meikle contends that “*sometimes no one knows anything*” (2014: 172). The case displays two perennial headaches: a) the flood of false information that CJ fosters and b) the “dialogue of the deaf” that it engenders.

6.1 “Dialogue of the deaf” in the time of “filter bubbles”

As new “demotic voices” rise in news discourses, there is simultaneously the high risk of citizen news turning into a chaotic place. For one thing, as is often said, too many cooks can spoil the broth: too many voices can overload people with information and lead them to nowhere. In other words, to use another popular saying, when everyone has a megaphone, it is impossible for anyone to be heard. For another, people are not always rational human beings who use reasoning to work out the truth through a self-righting process. Online discussions can become shouting matches, where people do not work toward consensus and are often short-lived, with little impact on the outcome of public affairs. This was clear in the FindBostonBombers campaign, where Scifo and Baruh (2013: 8) observed that the spreading of misinformation and the rush to conclusion were due largely to the “excitement of Reddit users and social media enthusiasts, and the larger public, to find the perpetrators of the bombings”. In fact, emotion reigns in much of the digital public sphere where “people now have a shared space and probably some common relationship but there is nothing to guarantee shared values” (Nguyen 2006: 148). The ethics of participatory discourse – e.g., the acknowledgement and articulation of other feelings and values in seeking a universal agreement of moral standards – can all too often fall into oblivion. As Altheide (2014: 5) observes, “more information has produced little understanding” because “what governs our mediated exist-

tence are not facts, historical encounters with context, but rather emotional attachments, opportunities to express feelings, personal views and experiences that can be shared with friends”.

Over time, people retreat into their own small world with like-minded people, with the public sphere being fragmented into different “echo chambers”: people now have increasingly less chance to be exposed to differences, happily entertaining and indoctrinating themselves with only facts and ideas they agree with. Sadly, such echo chambers have been effectively fostered by Google and Facebook’s dominant personalization algorithm, which exposes people to only information relevant to and/or compatible with their personal background, use history, interests and/or values. Eli Pariser (2014) calls the product of such opaque algorithmic personalization “filter bubbles”. Like the deaf who cannot hear each other, these ideological and cultural bubbles rarely meet with each other. Their impact on democratic processes could be detrimental, as already seen in recent world-shaking events, such as the British vote to leave the EU and the election of Donald Trump to the US presidency in 2016.

6.2 Mis/disinformation and the rise of fake news

The “dialogue of the deaf” is worsened by the sheer volume of false information online. There have been numerous incidents in which citizen journalism goes utterly wrong because citizen journalists have too much autonomy in spreading misinformation (inadvertently false information) and disinformation (purposefully false information). Reviewing live reporting on mainstream and social media during the Mumbai attacks, for example, Ibrahim (2014) found that “valid and inaccurate accounts were ... strung into streams of conversation and information on the event mirroring both new forms of empowerment and vulnerabilities”. In fact, during times of crisis, a great deal of online materials and source claims are very complex and difficult for even respected and resourceful mainstream news outlets to verify, let alone citizen reporters (Thorsen 2014). Falsehood can be found not only in the “amateur web” but also on mainstream news sites that integrate UGC, even though the latter do set guidelines for their users and contributors to adhere to (Beckett 2008).

The threat of digital mis/disinformation has loomed larger since the British EU referendum and the US general election, both of which saw the spectacular rise of “fake news” on social media. As filter bubbles amplify political voices on Facebook and other platforms, social media became a breeding ground for large-scale election hoaxes. As an indicator of their sheer influence, the top 20 false US election stories generated nearly nine million Facebook shares, reactions, and comments, with one claiming that Pope Francis had endorsed Trump being shared nearly one million times (Silverman 2016). Some of these hoaxes are purely to make money through social media advertising, but others were for political gains, such as hyper-

partisan fake stories from the Breitbart News Network that targeted right-wing, nationalist, anti-migration, anti-globalisation segments of the public. In fact, orchestrated efforts to spread online disinformation for propaganda purposes have been around for a while. In Vietnam and China, for example, armies of trained and state-funded “public opinion agents” have used whatever necessary, including falsehood, to counter/debunk any “bad news” about the political system of the ruling parties. It was, however, shocking when it became a cancer in the most powerful democratic societies. The situation has led some countries to devising strict measures to punish social media for the fake news let through their platforms. In Germany, for every fake story they fail to remove within 24 hours, Facebook and the like could be fined up to 50 million euros.

What is concerning in that context is the disregard for even the basic standards in the citizen news sphere. Observers have long highlighted that many citizen journalists are unaware of – or even hold a contempt for – the fundamental ethics that govern the daily news that they receive from mainstream journalism. This takes many forms – e.g., the lack of ethical considerations in taking and circulating highly graphic and shocking images (Reading 2009) – but of more pertinent interest here is their disregard for fact-checking and source triangulation. Research with citizen journalists who posted during the Haiti earthquake and Gezi Park protests shows how some “might even consider not having to fact-check as an advantage they have over journalists reporting for the news media” (Baruh et al. 2014). Blood (2002) observed the same amongst early bloggers, who were proud of their “no stinkin’ fact checkers” attitude “as if inaccuracy were a virtue”. Allan (2013: 94) noted that many citizen witnesses are “unapologetically subjective”, seeing the rawness, low quality, and emotional charge of citizen witnessing as a virtue in its own right. For them, it offers a vivid, even “more real”, alternative to the standardized and packaged professional news coverage that is embedded with too many “bland ... even off-putting” elite notions such as fairness and balance.

To deal with the assault of mis/disinformation on democratic life, attempts have been made to provide citizen journalists with verification tools. As of writing, for example, Silverman’s open-access publication, *The Verification Handbook* (2015), has been translated into several languages for citizen journalists to improve their fact-checking skills and increase the reliability of their work. Given the attitudes discussed above, however, it remains to be seen how such initiatives will be received and used. There is, however, one thing for sure: the need for professional journalism, contrary to what many believe, is not eliminated but is all the more strengthened in the so-called post-truth time. As Alan Fisher (2011: 156) of Al-Jazeera argues, the material provided by citizen reporters “is simply a commodity” whose value is only gained when added with context. “Real journalism is committed when the facts are gathered, fashioned into a clear narrative and explained the proper contextual framework as part of a larger conversation,” he said. In the fight against mis/disinformation, professional journalism can work hand in hand with

CJ to bring the best of both worlds for the sake of an informed, self-governed citizenry. That is, however, more easily said than done.

7 Concluding notes

Many journalists are, understandably, uneasy about the CJ title. It, as Fisher (2011: 156) observes, “sits uncomfortably with some of my colleagues, inferring that somehow their efforts equate to those of trained, experienced journalists”. Photo-journalist Tlumacki of the *Boston Globe* is “sick of citizen journalism, which kind of dilutes the real professionals’ work” (quoted in Allan 2014: 164). He calls the world to realize that “it is haunting to be a journalist” and that “we are news photographers, not somebody out there with an iPhone and a camera, jumping over people to put images on YouTube” (Allan 2014). Karen Fratti (2013) of Adweek contends that “citizen journalism is a lofty little term thrown around by interweb idealists” whose values barely move past crisis reporting: “Let’s just stop using the term citizen journalist. Call them sources, or hire them as a stringer, and be done with it.” Even CNN executives and journalists, while coopting and exploiting the free creative labor poured into iReport, are anxious of their professional monopoly over meaning being hijacked and often use the professional twin concepts of credibility and validity to “simultaneously celebrate and denigrate” iReporters’ embodied experience and emotional authenticity (Palmer 2014: 31).

There are also concerns among journalists and scholars that as the news industry co-opts CJ to compensate for its declining resources, its speed and “crass style” presents an attack on professionalism. Shoemaker and Reese (2014) claim that “professional boundaries are special assault from technology-enabled citizen journalism”. Veteran *Guardian* investigative journalist David Leigh fears that the “proper reporter” is under threat in the age of the internet. Predicting that “a new model of journalistic production” will be underway in all British national newspapers within the year, he warned that the “patient assembler of facts” faces being replaced in the future with “hyper-active news bunnies”. From a historical perspective, however, one might wonder whether such worries are necessary or even helpful. Journalism and its standards have always evolved in the past and will continue to do so in the future – alongside social developments and technological advances. Rather than dismissing CJ or seeing it as a rival, as Singer (2015) argues, journalists have to “come out of their shell from behind the article” to engage with the public in genuine ways and to “redefine their own practices and processes”. Journalists need to wake up to the fact that journalism can no longer be an elite group of well-trained and educated professionals that stands apart from others, but is very much part of an interconnected world with interrelated practices. Conceiving journalism in the narrow context of the traditional newsroom is not a sustainable way into the future.

Further reading

For an authoritative account on citizen witnessing, see *Citizen Witnessing* (Allan 2013). To seek historical and critical perspectives as well as empirical studies on the rise of CJ around the world, *Citizen Journalism: Global Perspectives* (Allan and Thorsen 2009 and Thorsen and Allan 2014) would serve as excellent starting points. Susan Forde's *Challenging the News* (2011) provides much food for thoughts about the potential power of oppositional citizen journalism. Full details of these books can be found in the reference list.

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20 Advocacy Journalism

Abstract: This chapter reviews the under-studied genre of advocacy journalism. I begin by locating advocacy journalism spatially. To do this, I distinguish between what I call segmented and woven advocacy, a distinction born of the distinct role advocacy plays within different journalism systems. I then examine the producers of advocacy journalism, with a particular focus on the distinction between voices within journalism and voices outside of it. Simply put, who are the people doing the advocating? I then turn to an examination of what advocacy journalism does, working on the assumption that discourse is always in service of meaning (Richardson 2007). I identify four threads in the existing literature that situate advocacy journalism as: 1. Analysis and interpretation, something I refer to as “news plus”; 2. Critique and change agent; 3. Political intervention; and 4. Emblem of journalistic decline. I then briefly discuss the argument that the separation between fact and value is arbitrary before offering some concluding remarks and suggestions for future research.

Keywords: advocacy journalism, editorials, objectivity, opinion

1 Introduction

Commentators. Columnists. Editorialists. Analysts. Interpretive journalists. Pundits. Talking heads. These terms, ranging from the descriptive to the somewhat pejorative, and sometimes invoking a relationship with a particular media platform, are united in shared reference to a cadre of journalists whose role is defined by the provision of opinion, analysis, and perspective. They are members of a broad church, with unsteady walls, that can be called *advocacy journalism*. This genre is distinguished from (so-called) objective reporting by a willingness to offer a point of view on events, moving from a purely informational to an explicitly persuasive mode of address. What is the relationship between the two genres? Where does the border between them lie? How does advocacy journalism coalesce as a genre in its own right? And how does all of this fit into broader category of *journalism*? This chapter explores these questions (though it does not promise any answers; at least not straightforward ones).

Defining journalism and identifying its boundaries is a deceptively difficult task fraught with cultural, political, legal, and technological implications (Black 2010; Carlson 2015; Hindman & Thomas 2014; Zelizer 2004, 2005). Within the field of journalism studies, our understanding of our object of study is hindered by a narrowness of focus that often conflates “journalism” with “hard news reporting”,

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as though the former is wholly constituted by the latter (Zelizer 2004). Moreover, there is growing recognition within journalism studies of the need to internationalize the scope of our scholarship and move away from essentializing notions of what journalism is, recognizing that journalism is a complex phenomenon that developed differently across time, place, and medium (Hanitzsch 2009; Salgado & Strömbäck 2012). This comparative, global turn is a helpful reminder that any rigorous attempt to understand journalism must grapple with deep “epistemological and ontological questions” involving “different journalistic styles, norms, and values in different countries, and as journalism has changed over time” (Salgado & Strömbäck 2012: 145). This makes it important to avoid hasty generalizations on the basis of geography, history, or technology, given the variegated nature of the practice across place, time, and medium.

This is to say, first, that journalism is *geographically* situated. Journalistic objectivity in the United States emerged as a result of a specific set of contingencies, and the hegemony it maintains as a key criterion of journalistic quality and legitimacy distinguishes it from much European journalism (Schudson 2001; Waisbord 2008). This makes the invocation of an “Anglo-American” press tradition (Chalaby 1998), for example, something of a misnomer when one considers the open partisanship of British newspapers, especially the tabloid press (Hampton 2008; Sparks 2006). Furthermore, if we look to the global South, there are many countries where it is “unthinkable that journalism is anything *but* advocacy journalism” (Waisbord 2008: 374, emphasis in original).

Journalism’s development is also *historically* situated. US press history is instructive here. We cannot truly conceive of advocacy as an unpalatable “other” given the longstanding presence of opinion and advocacy in journalism, the proffering of which was once the *modus operandi* of American journalism, where newspapers were organs of opinion rather than unbiased reportage (Schudson 1978, 2001). Over time, as objective reporting became a journalistic protonorm, opinion was compartmentalized into sections of the newspaper, indicating clear division between news and advocacy (Bro 2012; Schudson 1978). In newspapers at least, advocacy remains, albeit in segmented form.

Finally, journalism’s development is *technologically* situated. This is to say that even in particular nations at particular periods in time, different media adopt different norms. Thus, while US newspapers maintain a strict division between reporting and advocacy, cable news networks are dominated by advocacy (Project for Excellence in Journalism 2013) and the boundaries between reporting and advocacy on these networks are diffuse, to put it mildly (Peters 2010). By comparison, while British broadcasting is bound to impartiality by law, the norm has never acquired much purchase with British newspapers, where values like truthfulness, fair play, and independence are more prized (Hampton 2008), and for whom a regulatory mandate would almost certainly be unpalatable (Thomas & Finneman 2014).

Journalism studies ought to be “attentive to the full range of journalistic specialisms” (Franklin et al. 2005: 128), yet the preponderance of scholarship on hard news means we know comparatively little about domains of journalism that do not fit into this rubric (Zelizer 2004). Advocacy journalism has been chronically understudied, despite its present popularity, global prominence, and historical resonance (Duff 2008; Jacobs & Townsley 2011, 2014; Thomas & Hindman 2015). Though the genre is not wholly without scholarship, the work that has been done is tenuously connected with only limited analytical thread tying its sub-genres together. The absence of sustained inquiry into advocacy *as a genre in its own right* leaves significant gaps in our understanding of its dimensions. Empirically, it means there remains much to ascertain about the norms, values, routines, and role conceptions of journalists operating within this genre or of the genre’s discursive properties. Normatively, it means we lack yardsticks for evaluating journalistic performance and for determining whether or not journalists within this genre meet these demands imposed upon them.

Part of the problem is that there is no single, agreed upon definition of advocacy journalism or what it constitutes (Fisher 2016). While we would likely spend little time arguing about whether newspaper editorials fit the genre, we would probably spend quite a bit more time on whether or not “interpretive journalism” joins them (Salgado & Strömbäck 2012). Political talk shows like *This Week* would be a safe bet, less so comedy shows like *The Daily Show*. This is to say that if drawing the exterior boundaries of journalism is a difficult task, it is no less difficult in drawing its interior boundaries. For Fisher (2016), “advocacy is about pleading another’s cause or arguing in support of an idea, event, or a person” (p. 712) which indicates that this is a form of journalism where the objectivity norm does not apply. Yet this broad container encompasses a large swathe of journalistic output across time, place, and medium, and hinges also on whether we regard objectivity as possible, desirable, both, or neither. In effort to account for the diversity of the genre, it is important to begin with a definition that is broad and adaptable. I therefore proceed with a preliminary, working definition of advocacy journalism as *journalism that takes a point of view*.

It would be impossible to provide a comprehensive history of the genre that honors its rich history and global permutations. My goal here, then, is to review and draw together the disparate existing literature in order to sketch out some basic propositions about advocacy journalism that can help make sense of this under-studied yet integral journalistic genre and provide a springboard for future research. This analysis draws on empirical and normative scholarship on advocacy journalism, in addition to a number of journalistic accounts of the genre, the better to understand the contours of the field. As a caveat, and following other works on journalistic performance (see, e.g., Christians et al. 2009; Strömbäck 2005), my concern is for multifaceted journalism in a multifaceted *democracy*. The boundaries of advocacy and propaganda are ripe for exploration, but not here. Drawing in the

vagaries of authoritarian regimes like, say, North Korea and Russia and their media agents would stretch the already elastic boundaries of this analysis too far.

The structure of this chapter is as follows. I begin by locating advocacy journalism *spatially*. To do this, I distinguish between what I call segmented and woven advocacy, a distinction born of the distinct role advocacy plays within different journalism systems. I then examine the *producers* of advocacy journalism, with a particular focus on the distinction between voices within journalism and voices outside of it. Simply put, who are the people doing the advocating? I then identify four *ways of conceiving* of advocacy journalism, based on a survey of the existing literature, which situates advocacy journalism as: 1. Analysis and interpretation, something I refer to as “news plus”; 2. Critique and change agent; 3. Political intervention; and 4. Emblem of journalistic decline. I then briefly discuss the argument that the separation between fact and value is arbitrary before offering some concluding remarks and suggestions for future research.

2 Locating the subject: segmented and woven advocacy

Recognizing that journalism emerges as a result of manifold external forces that shape its output over time (Bro 2012), it is important to distinguish between *segmented* and *woven* advocacy. By segmented advocacy, I refer to contexts where the delivery of opinion and advocacy is *literally* compartmentalized away from objective reporting and designated its own section, a process that *symbolically* represents its separation from objective reporting. Depending on one’s normative conceptions of journalism, perhaps, this may be seen as the marginalization of advocacy as a distinct and perhaps less “pure” form of journalism (Waisbord 2008).

A classic example of segmented advocacy is the opinion section of newspapers in the United States, which demarcates advocacy as something unique and distinct from the rest of the artifact (Bro 2012). This was not always so. The journalism of the colonial period and early republic was driven by advocacy; the newspaper was, functionally, an editorial with advertising and there was little to no variation of journalistic roles within newspaper operations (Alterman 1999; Schudson 1978, 2001). The shift to objective reporting as the 19th century gave way to the 20th was in part due to the embrace of scientific detachment and the separation of fact from value among “an aspiring occupational group at a moment when science was god, efficiency was cherished, and increasingly prominent elites judged partisanship a vestige of the tribal 19th century” (Schudson 2001: 162). The objectivity norm imagines the journalist of being capable of being “a neutral and detached recorder of ‘reality’ producing a fact-based, reliable account of events for the reader” (McQuail 2013: 210). Though a mythology was soon constructed around objectivity as eternal

and unproblematic (Vos 2012), the shift toward objectivity was described by Carey (1965) as journalism's "conversion downwards", transforming journalists from "independent interpreters of events" to "brokers in symbols" (p. 137). Advocacy remained in newspapers, of course, but was downsized and compartmentalized into specific sections of the newspaper, symbolically and literally separated from the sections reporting the news (Bro 2012). Segmentation, somewhat confusingly, suggests that strict separation of facts and values are possible (or desirable) in one section of the newspaper but not possible (or undesirable) in another.

By contrast, *woven* advocacy refers to contexts where advocacy comprises the identity of the journalistic artifact such that it requires no segmentation and does not derive its meaning from comparison to an external referent. Unlike segmented advocacy, woven advocacy suggests that the strict separation of facts is either impossible or undesirable. Moreover, advocacy is part of its essence such that to raise questions of objectivity would be nonsensical, at least from within its own terms of reference. In some Latin American countries, for example, advocacy has long been regarded as at the core of journalistic activity (Waisbord 2008, 2013). There, what Waisbord (2013) describes as "populist journalism" rejects the idea of "non-ideological" news and dismisses the professional journalism of the liberal ideal as an ideological construction. Advocacy, then, is woven into the fabric of journalistic identity.

However, it would be a mistake to assume that woven advocacy refers solely to the level of the nation-state. The United Kingdom is instructive here, for while one medium (broadcasting) is objective by mandate and convention, another (newspapers) is anything but. The British press is "habitually partisan" in news content (Sparks 2006: 121), with opinion woven throughout the newspaper rather than segmented into designated sections. The British tabloid press is notable for its longstanding hostility to the Labour Party (Franklin 2004; Greenslade 2003). An infamous example of this occurred on the day of the 1992 general election, when *The Sun* ran a picture of Labour leader Neil Kinnock's face inside a lightbulb on its front page, accompanied by the headline "If Kinnock wins today, will the last person to leave Britain please turn out the lights". This had followed a sustained period of vilification of the Labour leader, a process repeated for subsequent leaders (Gaber 2014). The tabloids' penchant for nationalism is also one of their defining characteristics (Conboy 2006), as notoriously demonstrated by *The Sun's* front page headline following the sinking of the Argentine vessel the *Belgrano* during the Falklands War, killing 368 men, which read: "GOTCHA. Our lads sink gunboat and hole cruiser". It is clear that advocacy for political party or homeland is part of the fabric of British tabloid newspapers.

Finally, woven advocacy can refer to a *genre within a medium*. For example, while US broadcast news adheres to the objectivity norm, with very limited overt editorializing,¹ there are formats on US broadcast stations where advocacy is nor-

¹ This is not to say that editorializing never occurs, but instances of it are increasingly rare at both local and network levels, chiefly due to scarcity of time (Rystrom 2004). However, there is a rich

malized. Political talk shows or “Sunday morning talk shows” such as NBC’s *Meet the Press*, CBS’s *Face the Nation*, and ABC’s *This Week* feature roundtable discussions among “a tiny group of highly visible political pontificators who make their living offering ‘inside political opinion and forecasts’ in the elite national media” (Alterman 1999: 4). While these programs can (and do) feature one-on-one interviews between a journalist and a leading political figure, much of the genre is built around the sharing of opinion and prognostication. A version of this that eliminated the one-on-one interviews altogether and is structured solely around panel discussion was PBS’s *The McLaughlin Group*, whose “panelists had political agendas and argued their positions as if they were the only plausible solution to the given problem” (Letukas 2014: 26–27).

The core distinction between segmented and woven advocacy lies in advocacy’s relationship with objectivity.² Where advocacy is segmented, it assumes a subordinate status to a conception of reporting grounded in the ability to provide truth through a process approximating the scientific method. Where advocacy is woven, it is part of the essence of the journalistic artifact and is central to its meaning. However, this distinction is far from immutable. The historical development of newspapers in the United States is an indication that a medium within a nation can move from one to the other. Vos (2013) has called for greater attention to how we explain journalistic change, given that change emerges through the convergence of particular historical contingencies. Historical studies might respond to this call by exploring the contingencies that have situated advocacy journalism in different nations, different media within nations, and different genres within media within nations.

3 Who are the advocates? Advocacy from inside and outside journalism

One of the purposes of journalism in a democracy is to provide a forum for the dissemination of diverse viewpoints, expanding the number and range of voices in

history of editorializing on broadcast news that ought not be neglected. Edward R. Murrow, widely regarded as an exemplary figure of journalistic virtue (see, e.g., Edwards 2004), frequently engaged in commentary and was notable for his vociferous opposition to McCarthyism (Jacobs & Townsley 2011). Similarly, Walter Cronkite, another highly regarded broadcast journalist, famously opposed the Vietnam War, announcing in an editorial that the war was unwinnable and the United States should negotiate a ceasefire (Carlson & Berkowitz 2011).

² It is interesting that a number of genres within the United States that are plainly within the advocacy journalism genre nonetheless draw on the discourse of objectivity. Political talk shows like CNN’s *Crossfire* emphasize the exchange of partisan viewpoints, but the framing of the show as right versus left signals an underlying conception of balance (Jacobs & Townsley 2014). Meanwhile, balance is also a consideration in the placement of political cartoons, as evidenced by newspapers

the public sphere, in order to stimulate conversation and debate about issues of public concern (Christians et al. 2009). This necessitates examination of those voices, with particular reference to whether those voices come from inside or outside journalism. Who is doing the advocating?

The newspaper editorial column is a space where the newspaper as an organization communicates its views to its readership. Though the column may be written by any number of individuals on the newspaper's editorial staff, the unsigned column functions "as close as is possible to being an institutional voice of [the] newspaper" (Hindman 2003: 671). Editorials have accordingly been described as a "barometer of a newspaper's position on political and social questions" and "the heart, soul, and conscience of the newspaper" (Santo 1994: 94).

Opinion columns, meanwhile, constitute the voices of the individual journalists who work for it or whose work appears through syndication. In the United States, for example, while larger newspapers often have a pool of "star" columnists, smaller newspapers generally lack the funds to afford salaried opinion writers and thus rely on a pool of syndicated columnists as a cost-effective way to "present different points of view on increasingly complicated issues", signaling a commitment to viewpoint diversity (Atwood 2014: 360). The downside of this is that it discourages the development of local talent addressing local issues (Stonecipher 1979).

The opinion section of newspapers in the United States is frequently referred to as the op-ed ("opposite-editorial") section. The *New York Times* was a pioneer here, introducing its op-ed section in 1970 (Socolow 2010). The section was a concerted effort to broaden the range of perspectives, issues, and voices in the newspaper. Their intent, as signaled in the first op-ed, was "providing greater opportunity for exploration of issues and presentation of new insights and new ideas by writers and thinkers who have no institutional connection" (quoted in Ciofalo & Traverso 1994: 53). To counteract the predominantly liberal viewpoints on the editorial section, the newspaper hired conservative columnist William Safire (Rosenfeld 2000), while the newspaper made a concerted effort to feature academics, diplomats, poets, playwrights, policymakers, and members of the public to create an op-ed section bustling with ideas and contrasting viewpoints (Socolow 2010). Their model was replicated at the *Washington Post*, *Chicago Tribune*, and *Los Angeles Times* and forged the template for the modern opinion section in US newspapers (Socolow 2010; Stonecipher 1979).

Today's *Times* op-ed section features columns from regular contributors such as Paul Krugman, Thomas Friedman, David Brooks, and Maureen Dowd, who operate with some degree of editorial freedom, in addition to contributions from outside experts drawn from academia, government, campaign organizations, and industry,

that run the right-leaning "Mallard Fillmore" alongside the left-leaning "Doonesbury" (Rystron 2004).

with knowledge of a particular subject or area (Golan & Wanta 2004). This division between regular columnists and guest contributors is the norm at elite US newspapers (Golan & Wanta 2004). For Rosenfeld (2000), “good op-ed pages now provide an entry into the debate for experts, dissenters, and survivors of earlier battles” (p. 7).

Drawing perspectives from outside journalism is the norm in other countries’ newspapers. The opinion sections of Danish newspapers are based on outside expertise, drawing on doctors, scientists, and engineers (Wahl-Jorgensen 2004). In the United Kingdom, while newspapers will have a staff of columnists from within journalism – many of them former reporters (Duff 2008) – they also have regular columns by non-journalists. The comedian Mark Steel writes a regular column for *The Independent*, while reality television star Katie Hopkins, famous for starring in the British version of *The Apprentice*, writes for *The Sun*. Elsewhere, radical and alternative journalism emphasizes the necessity of soliciting a broad range of voices in order to emphasize the intersectionality of different perspectives relative to the power structure (Downing 1984), while Waisbord (2008) writes of “civic advocacy journalism”, defined as “advocacy efforts by civic groups [outside journalism] that promote social change ... driven by the notion that the news media should be a tool of social change” (p. 375).

Normatively, the aggregate function of the opinion section of newspapers is to provide readers with a broad range of viewpoints and ideas to enhance their ability to make informed opinions and decisions (Ciofalo & Traverso 1994; Rosenfeld 2000; Socolow 2010). It serves as “an intellectual watering hole ... to accommodate a range of voices and interests that are allowed to speak richly and substantively” (Wahl-Jorgensen 1999: 34). Of course, the normative ideal may not necessarily be empirical reality. The opinion sections of US elite newspapers have been found to be dominated by elites, undermining the mission of the op-ed section as originally constituted (Day & Golan 2005). These pages can also serve as a public relations exercise by political elites “to articulate their governments’ position on salient issues to both domestic and foreign publics” (Golan 2013: 362).

Though not the work of journalists *per se*, letters to the editor have traditionally signaled a willingness within the organization to provide a forum for public participation and deliberation (Bromley 1998; Richardson & Franklin 2004; Wahl-Jorgensen 2001, 2002). Ideally, letters to the editor “allow for members of the public to introduce topics, and open them up to the critical scrutiny of public debate” (Wahl-Jorgensen 2002: 72). That debate is mediated by journalists applying selection criteria as to which letters run in the newspaper and which do not, editing for space and balance, and spatially arranging the letters on the printed page; the resulting debate is thus a journalistic construction (Bromley 1998; Richardson & Franklin 2004; Wahl-Jorgensen 2002). Furthermore, research has pointed to the cooption of British letters pages by political parties and their activists, squeezing the public out (Richardson & Franklin 2004). The spirit behind letters to the editor

continues with a broader range of means for the public to share their views, such as polls and discussion boards, but the most common is the ability to comment on articles online and interact with the journalist and other readers. The vogue of participatory journalism suggests that these are meaningful spaces where extra-media voices can be heard (Reich 2011) though questions have been raised about the efficacy of these platforms in creating the conditions for public deliberation (Richardson & Stanyer 2011).

4 Ways of thinking about advocacy journalism

Journalistic discourse is always active; it is always in the process of communicating something to some end (Richardson 2007). Bluntly distinguishing advocacy from reporting as the distinction between persuasion and information is inadequate as it glosses over the heterogeneity of either genre (Fisher 2016; Wahl-Jorgensen 2008) and is particularly inapt at a time when generic lines are increasingly blurred (Jacobs & Townsley 2011). This means we ought to look at the discursive properties of advocacy journalism – put plainly, its content – to ascertain what advocacy journalism *does* and what it is *for*. From an analytical perspective, this is addressing the relationship between text and function. The literature indicates that we can conceive of advocacy journalism in a number of ways.

4.1 Advocacy journalism as “news plus”: analysis and interpretation

Advocacy journalism is often discussed in terms of its capacity for going beyond traditional reporting to aid the reader in understanding the broader context surrounding a given issue. We could call this kind of advocacy “news plus”. For Hulteng (1973), the goal of the genre is to “explain the significance of the glut of events”, a process of “sorting out issues at stake” (p. 11). Stonecipher (1979) describes its function as making “the news more understandable” and bringing “the news into focus, to put it into a better frame of reference to show its significance” (p. 54). It is often defined as journalism that emphasizes the “Why” from the classic journalistic “5 W’s” (Barnhurst & Mutz 1997; Salgado & Strömbäck 2012). For former CBS and PBS correspondent Bill Moyers, the commentator states their perspective “not because you’re trying to tell people what to think, but because you hope the viewer will find a new way of framing his thoughts about a particular subject” (quoted in Hirsch 1991: 191).

A qualitative study of British newspaper columnists by Duff (2008) found that while columnists defined themselves as journalists, they saw their role as using fact and evidence to make an informed, persuasive analysis. Many of these colum-

nists stressed their backgrounds as reporters and saw fact and evidence as the bedrock of their activity. However, their *purpose* was not the dissemination of new information but a reasoned analysis of existing information. The veteran British journalist Andrew Marr (2004) echoes this sentiment: “Facts are the essence of a column, the fiber that makes the thing more than a dribble of opinion” (p. 370).

McNair (2008) distinguishes between “the reporting of events” and “making sense of them”, the second function of which is the preserve of the opinion section (p. 106). In plain terms: “Where the reporter says ‘this is what happened,’ the columnist says, ‘here is the news, as reported elsewhere. This is what I think about it’” (McNair 2008: 115). This delineation of duty marks advocacy journalists in segmented systems as fulfilling a niche function: “Reporters, from time to time, have opportunities to write interpretive articles that attempt to put news into perspective, but only editorial writers spend their entire working days trying to understand what’s happening in the world” (Rystrom 2004: 53). This view imagines advocacy journalists as “essential translators, enlightening an uninitiated public” (Bengtsson 2015: 5) and of advocacy journalism as a clearinghouse mediating between the citizen and society and helping audiences comprehend the complexities of the age.

The historical touchstone here is Walter Lippmann, whose vision was that journalism was “not just facts and bulletins, [that] journalism must explain things, journalism must embrace ideas” (Halberstam 1979: 370). Lippmann is a frequently-summoned reference point for the notion of columnist-as-expert, having cultivated a more explanatory style to counter the limitations of the objective method to explain the complexities of the age (see, e.g., Alterman 1999; Atwood 2014; Bro 2012; Duff 2013; Jacobs & Townsley 2011; Nimmo & Combs 1992; Rivers 1967; Stonecipher 1979). Lippmann himself made a distinction between the function of news, which is “to signal an event”, and the function of truth, which is “to bring to light the hidden facts, to set them in relation with each other, and make a picture of reality on which men can act” (Lippmann 1922: 358). Lippmann recognized the need for “expert analysts who could help point citizens to a deeper understanding of what was really important” (Jacobs & Townsley 2011: 24). From this perspective, the analysis and interpretation of news is the transfer of knowledge or “deeper understanding” from sender to receiver, which presumes an existing well of knowledge on the part of the sender. Writing about newspaper columnists, McNair (2008) writes that their cultural authority stems from their “reputation for knowing and understanding things” that audiences “do not, but should” (p. 107), with the aim of a column being to “persuade the reader that this particular commentator is someone whose views have weight and validity beyond those of the ordinary reader, someone whose views should be trusted” (p. 114). Here, the journalist is cast as a Platonic philosopher-king enlightening audiences on matters in which they have expertise (Bro 2012). A clear subset of this function is the use of specific expertise from outside journalism to communicate some insider knowledge to audiences. The column that Nobel prize-winning economist Paul Krugman writes for

the *New York Times* is a case-in-point, providing audiences with insight to better understand economic issues. Krugman's column, though, does not cast him as an innocent teacher but as an actor in the game: as a Keynesian economist, he has a particular set of policy objectives and prescriptions and seeks to influence his audience that this is the "correct" framework to respond to the challenges of modern political economy.

Political magazines also fulfill the analytical and interpretive function. Such US magazines as *The New Republic*, *The Nation*, *The Atlantic*, and *National Review* emerged in part as a response to the conversion of newspapers to the informational model, recognizing the need for a more interpretive journalism (Jacobs & Townsley 2011). Alterman (1999), for example, describes the *New Republic* as "the only regularly read Washington-based magazine in which ideas and policy problems could be fleshed out to a degree that even remotely reflected their contextual complexity, allowing for possible objections and meeting them with fully reasoned responses" (p. 179).

Interpretive journalism is often discussed as a *distinct* genre within journalism and its place relative to advocacy and reporting is unclear. Rivers (1967) dates interpretive journalism in the United States to the New Deal era, with the strictures of "straight reporting" being unable to encapsulate the fissures of the age. Influenced by foreign correspondents and opinion columnists, some journalists "began to emphasize *why* events occurred and what they *meant*" (p. 42, emphasis in original). This was controversial at the time, as many journalists felt it strayed too far from the rubric of objective reporting, though its defenders sought to create clear dividing lines between explanation (or "news analysis") and advocacy (Rivers 1967). Likewise, Benson and Hallin (2007) distinguish between interpretation and opinion, with the former "a kind of empirical discourse" that "goes beyond current facts, setting, or historical context to speculate on such things as significance, outcomes, and motives". On the other hand, opinion refers to the "exercise of judgment, either normative (what is good or bad) or empirical (what is true or false)" (p. 32). Similarly, Salgado and Strömbäck (2012) define interpretive journalism as a distinct genre "characterized by a prominent journalistic voice; and by journalistic explanations, evaluations, contextualizations, or speculations going beyond verifiable facts or statements by sources" (p. 154). Such journalism "may, *but does not have to*, also be characterized by a theme chosen by the journalist, use of value-laden terms, or overt commentary" (p. 154, emphasis added). Interpretive journalism, for these scholars, ought to be understood as a separate category to advocacy journalism given that it can function independent of position-taking.

However, this is deeply uncertain terrain. Djerf-Pierre and Weibull (2008), for example, define interpretive journalism as "characterized by four entwined features: critical expertise, speculation, advocacy, and metajournalism" (p. 209). This model, in contrast to those above, subsumes *advocacy* as a constituent element of interpretive journalism, which is the parent category. The general lack of clarity

over this role was illustrated in Thomas and Hindman's (2015) study of journalistic discourse in response to National Public Radio's decision to terminate the contract of analyst Juan Williams following controversial comments he made on Fox News, where he was also a commentator, about Muslims. NPR's Vivian Schiller, explaining her decision to fire Williams, talked of how "news analysts have a distinctive role and set of responsibilities", which precluded taking "personal public positions on controversial issues" as this would "undermine their credibility as analysts" (quoted in Thomas & Hindman 2015: 473–474). Schiller further pointed out that Williams was "a news analyst; he is not a commentator and he is not a columnist ... We have relied on him over the years to give us perspective on the news, not to talk about his opinions" (p. 480). What are perspectives, though, but opinions? The distinction between these roles that seemed so clear to Schiller was not mirrored in journalistic discourse, as journalists covering and commenting on NPR's decision expressed confusion over the role of analyst and therefore how role-related responsibilities could be ascribed. For Poynter News Institute's Kelly McBride, "the distinctions between reporter, analyst, commentator, columnist, are all very confusing for the public, and even confusing within newsrooms" (quoted in Thomas & Hindman 2015: 474). The confusion in the journalistic discourse led Thomas and Hindman (2015) to conclude that "the terrain between analysis and opinion" is "a journalistic gray area demonstrably lacking in definitional fixity" (p. 480).

4.2 Advocacy journalism as critique and change agent

Understanding advocacy journalism as a form of critique and an agent of change goes beyond a "truth behind the facts" analysis of issues and events to stake out a particular point of view, directing its ire toward individuals and institutions that are, from the journalists' perspective, doing ill. In doing so, it casts itself as the spokesperson of those who do not have a voice or who are perceived to be disadvantaged relative to systems of power, and seeks to redress these power imbalances (Janowitz 1975). Hindman (1998) writes of how the alternative press saw its role as "the instigation of political and cultural change", making the advocacy of change central to its reporting (p. 179). The "muckraking" genre of journalism was notable for advocating for issues such as workers' rights and women's suffrage, criticizing corruption in business and politics, and mobilizing people to achieve social change (Serrin & Serrin 2002; Waisbord 2008).

British newspapers are notable for championing particular causes and devoting significant space in their pages to them. "When a newspaper campaigns," writes Harrison (2008), "it is obvious: the cause is clearly and stridently announced, the newspaper seeks to actively elicit support, devotes prominent positions in the paper to its advocacy and opts for a didactic tone" (p. 44). *The Daily Mail* ran a lengthy campaign demanding charges be brought against the murderers of the black teenager Stephen Lawrence (Cottle 2004), going as far as identifying the perpetrators

on its front page by name and image, with the headline “MURDERERS: The *Mail* accuses these men of killing. If we are wrong, let them sue us”. Harrison (2008) uses the *News of the World*'s campaign to allow public access to the sex offenders register as an example of the unfortunate consequences of this kind of zealous campaigning, as many innocent individuals were victims of vigilante attacks as a result.

Comedy shows such as *The Daily Show*, while arguably existing at journalism's margins, nonetheless provide a searing critique of political corruption and ineptitude (Feldman 2007). Political cartoons – “editorials in pictures” (Seymour-Ure 2003: 230) – are an under-studied medium that encapsulate the ideal of advocacy as critique, and surveys of cartoonists report that their primary self-perception is as a critic, with one cartoonist describing his role as conveying an “opinion forcefully, graphically, and unapologetically” (quoted in Rystrom 2004: 294). Indeed, it is political cartoonists' capacity for critique that makes them feared by politicians and public figures (Danjoux 2007; Hulteng 1973; Seymour-Ure 2008).

Whatever the medium, the critique and change agent function of advocacy journalism seeks to alert the audience to wrongdoing and, possibly, offer a corrective. This is, in many ways, congruent with the ethos that positions investigative journalists as “custodians of conscience” (Ettema & Glasser 1998) inasmuch as it directs the public's attention toward problems in society, the people behind them, and the possible solutions to it. It casts journalists in a prosecutorial role, demanding that “something must be done” about a particular societal ailment.

4.3 Advocacy journalism as political intervention

James Carey (1997) observed that “journalism only makes sense in relation to the public and public life” (p. 4). We would probably take it as a given that journalism is addressed to the public, though we would be mistaken to assume that the public constitutes the entirety of its target audience. Indeed, the addition of *public life* is a reminder that journalism is an institution among institutions and how it conducts its affairs (and develops over time) can only be understood relative to other institutions that influence it, and that it seeks to exert influence over (Vos 2013). How journalism functions – or, rather, how it *ought* to function – is therefore a *political* question, as it concerns how journalism responds to other institutions and how those institutions respond to journalism. Any effort at understanding journalism must reconcile with the *politics* of journalism as an institution vying for influence (Glasser 2000). This means we cannot simply read advocacy journalism as an innocent analysis of events or the pursuit of social justice on behalf of readers. Rather, we must recognize that journalism has “skin in the game”, so to speak, and has a vested interest in driving public discourse and public policy toward specific ends. Advocacy journalism, then, is a political intervention, as institutions and the individuals within them jockey for influence, advantage, and change.

While “the editorial page is essentially a dialogue between the paper and its reader” (Ciofalo & Traverso 1994: 52), it would be naïve to assume that readers are the *only* audience. Though journalism certainly speaks *downward*, in terms of its address to its audience, it also speaks *upward*, in terms of its address to elites, policymakers, and figures of influence. For example, when the *New York Times*’ conservative columnist David Brooks bemoans the state of the modern US Republican Party, he is surely making an intervention in debates about the direction of the party among Republican elites in addition to enriching his audience with his distinctive conservative voice.

In upward advocacy, the journalist is speaking to elites (presumably *for* the audience), addressing “influential news actors by evaluating their actions and by suggesting different solutions” (Gajevic 2016: 871). McNair (1995) describes editorials as “political interventions, and often read as such by a government or party” (p. 13). Advocacy journalism aims to “raise awareness, generate public debate, influence public opinion and key decision-makers, and promote policy and programmatic changes around specific issues” (Waisbord 2008: 371) and this necessitates attention to multiple audiences, the better to mobilize toward change.

Scholars have identified the phenomena of “op-ed diplomacy” (Gilboa 2005; Golan 2013) where newspaper columnists put pressure on government or attempt to sway international public opinion on matters of conflict resolution. Examples of this, identified by Gilboa (2005), include Ted Koppel bringing representatives of Israel and Palestine together on *Nightline* for a dialogue on reconciliation, *New York Times* columnist Thomas Friedman’s plan for peace in the Middle East, and the *Wall Street Journal Europe*’s deputy opinion editor Michael Gonzalez writing a column urging European nations to support the United States of America in its war with Iraq. In these instances, journalists were not simply addressing audiences but engaging political elites. The potential agenda-setting capacity of elite advocacy journalism on other elites (Sommer & Maycroft 2008) makes this an area of particular concern.

Advocacy journalism is an exercise in discursive power, “establishing the dominant interpretive frameworks within which ongoing political events are made sense of” (McNair 2000: 30). For example, Thomas and Finneman’s (2014) analysis of British newspaper editorial comment on the Leveson Inquiry found broad-based hostility to the inquiry into their practices and ethics. The newspapers used strategies of exaggeration, minimization, self-affirmation, and localization to “structure public discussion around the legitimacy of the inquiry” (p. 174). These editorials cannot reasonably be read as solely analytical or even critical but as *political*, insofar as they clearly signaled journalism’s willingness to defend its turf from encroachment by the state, and thus spoke powerfully of the rights (and, conversely, unaccountability) that British newspaper journalism was afforded.

4.4 Advocacy journalism as emblem of journalistic decline

A theme running through much of the literature focusing on advocacy journalism in the context of US media is that the preponderance of advocacy journalism – particularly on the Internet and on cable news – is emblematic of journalism’s decline in standards. Advocacy journalism has been linked to greater public cynicism about politics and the prominence of “horse race” journalism preoccupied with process and personality at the expense of substance (Cappella & Jamieson 1997; Djerf-Pierre & Weibull 2008; Farnsworth & Lichter 2011; Hirsch 1991; Patterson 1993). Scholars have suggested that ideological media contributes to echo chambers and partisan division, as citizens limit the news and views they received to only those conforming to their existing political dispositions (Baum 2011; Jamieson and Cappella, 2008; Levendusky 2013). These views are mirrored by some of the journalistic accounts. Eleanor Clift, a regular panelist on *The McLaughlin Group*, described that same show as “the Super Bowl of bullshit” (quoted in Hirsch 1991: 64), while media reporter Howard Kurtz (1996) attributed the coarsening of public discourse to the dominance of advocacy journalism and criticized the genre for what he saw as its relentless negativity, depicting a country beset by problems. More recently, data journalist Nate Silver described “punditry” as “fundamentally useless” in its analytical and predictive capabilities (quoted in Byers 2012, para. 3).

However, perhaps instead of condemning a whole genre, we ought to look to other explanations for any perceived decline in journalistic quality. In an otherwise negative account of the emergence of media “talking heads”, Hirsch (1991) discusses how the political talk show format devolved from the high standards of *Firing Line*, which had the capacity for analytical, serious, and lengthy discussions on issues of import – to *The McLaughlin Group*’s “nasty, brutish, and short” partisan roundtable (p. 32). This indicates that it is not that the genre itself is of little journalistic utility but rather that wider structural forces both inside and outside of the media that could better account for the format’s devolution. The political-economic account of journalistic decline offered by McChesney (2003) argues partisan media ought not be critiqued simply because it is partisan but because of its quality and because of the limited range of views available. McChesney sees low-quality partisan media as a symptom of a larger problem grounded in the economics of news.

This is not to say that the scholarly account is wholly unfavorable. McNair (2000), for example, suggests that a move to a more interpretive, subjective style of journalism may be a necessary reaction to a political culture minded toward news management and spin. Advocating media pluralism in a “complex democracy,” Baker (2002) suggested “the press should be thoughtfully discursive, not merely factually informative” (p. 148). In a major work on opinion in journalism, Jacobs and Townsley (2011) discuss the potential role of the genre in fostering deliberation and mobilization in politics, while Schudson (2013) has argued that opinionated journalism ought to be defended on its merits on the grounds that pluralism is necessary in a media system.

5 Advocacy as journalism, journalism as advocacy

Are advocacy and journalism two words for the same thing? Such a perspective might hold that the ideal of objectivity is an illusion and the positivist assumption that fact and value can be separated is a farce. From this perspective, all journalism is advocacy because all journalism is persuasive. This perspective is prevalent in critiques of “mainstream” or “professional” journalism by journalists in populist countries (Waisbord 2013) and journalists at radical and alternative outlets in general (Atton 2009; Hindman 1998). This perspective also acknowledges that journalism is a construction born of choices. Fisher (2016) writes that advocacy can “appear in more subtle ways as a by-product of the selective nature of journalism, which leads to some voices and issues being included, ignored or promoted more strongly than others” (p. 2). Journalists select certain topics to place on the public’s agenda over others (McCombs & Shaw 1972), select certain individuals as sources over others (Berkowitz 2009), and select certain ways of framing stories over others (Entman 1993). Is *all* journalism advocacy journalism?

6 Conclusions and unanswered questions

In this chapter, I have tried to sketch out some preliminary propositions regarding advocacy journalism in an attempt to provide coherence to a disparate literature on an infrequently theorized realm. I do not claim that this discussion is historically or geographically definitive. Nor do I suggest that the range of sub-genres discussed here constitute the entirety of advocacy journalism. The goal is to sketch out some preliminaries rather than seal the genre’s boundaries in perpetuity.

Part of the challenge of understanding the boundaries around journalism is that the field is “an unstable referent, deployed differently by different actors” (Carlson 2015: 8). However, drawing boundary lines *within* it is an equally difficult task. This is fluid, contested, and uncertain terrain, and boundary-testing cases can be quickly located. When the newspaper columnist and panelist on ABC’s *This Week* George Will was criticized for coaching Ronald Reagan prior to a debate with President Jimmy Carter, he defended his conduct by explaining that he was a commentator, not a journalist. How do we make sense of this? Do we create a special category for George Will, or for whichever columnist comes along and seeks to defend what other journalists may find indefensible?³ If *This Week* or *The McLaughlin Group* are within journalism’s boundaries, do we extend that

³ Will also received criticism for his enthusiastic endorsement of Robert Bork for the Supreme Court that failed to mention that he had been an usher at Bork’s wedding. Reflecting on this, Hirsch (1991) comments on Will’s “shaky regard for journalistic ethics” (p. 143).

courtesy to *The View*, which also features discussion of issues of public concern? When the (now retired) veteran journalist Barbara Walters was the host, was her presence enough to elevate the show to journalistic status, in a manner that the presence of co-panelists Joy Behar or Whoopi Goldberg does not? What is the threshold for journalistic standing? These are not easy questions.

In their major work on the role of opinion in media, Jacobs and Townsley (2011) bemoan the lack of scholarship on “the different styles of opinion and news commentary, the different types of people who produce opinion and commentary, and the different relationships that opinion and commentary maintain with the worlds of fact and rational argument” (p. 10). This chapter has not resolved this absence but it has, hopefully, drawn together disparate strands of scholarship such that we may have greater capacity to do so. The problem advocacy journalism has faced, from a scholarly perspective, is that research done about it is infrequent and discrete, studied in terms of disaggregated elements rather than as a genre in its own right. However, its legitimacy as a genre in its own right is indeed unresolved; perhaps the big tent addressed here is simply too big and too disparate to possess generic coherence. This is certainly an issue for further reflection.

As for “the different types of people who produce opinion and commentary”, it would certainly be helpful to understand the socialization processes of advocacy journalists across a range of platforms and contexts, given the key role of newsroom socialization in other areas of journalism (Singer 2004). How are opinion writers socialized into their roles at news organizations where advocacy is segmented rather than woven? How do reporters who become columnists adapt to their new roles? What is the socialization process for organizations where woven advocacy is the norm? Perhaps equally important here may be the role of journalism education. What is the place of advocacy within journalism curricula, both historically and currently? A cursory, unscientific glance at the curricula of leading journalism programs in the United States indicates that opinion and advocacy is often relegated to an elective course or not offered at all. Is this as it should be?

Finally, what of the public? Within media ethics scholarship, advocacy journalism has been largely ignored. We ought to have more normative reflection on the informational needs of communities in a changing media environment. Empirically, research suggests that the trend toward opinion and advocacy in journalism may play a role in helping audiences make sense of events around them. Armstrong, McAdams, and Cain’s (2015) study of audience definitions of news found that audiences “may have come to expect – and even seek out – subjective, opinion-laden news to help them make sense of prominent, impactful, and controversial events and issues” (p. 95). There ought to be more research of this ilk, particularly as it meets the normative issue of the tension between audience wants and needs.

It should go without saying, but we should resist the tendency to eternalize journalism as though what is always was and always will be. This is particularly

true for advocacy journalism, which within the United States too often derives its meaning from objectivity, symbolically relegating it to second-tier status. An uncritical and ahistorical rendering of objectivity as the crux of journalistic identity, the proffering of which journalists are frequently prone to (see, e.g., Vos 2012), stricture our thinking about journalism and may ultimately inhibit the field's ability to be nimble to change. Traditions such as objectivity "are not an eternal law of journalism, much as they may sometimes seem to be" (Hindman 1998: 178). Processes of change are complex in nature (Vos 2013), and a more rounded account of advocacy journalism's past and present may help us understand its future.

Further reading

The literature on advocacy journalism (and, more generally, the place of opinion within journalism) is disparate but there are some important touchstones. Some early work on the "opinion function" of the news media (see, e.g., Hulteng 1973; Stonecipher 1979) remains useful. More recently, Jacobs and Townsley (2011) have advanced the argument for addressing the "space of opinion" within modern journalism. Important work on the discursive dimensions of advocacy and opinion has been undertaken by Fisher (2016) and Gajevic (2016) which will undoubtedly inform future research. Waisbord's (2008, 2013) work is an important reminder that in many contexts, advocacy journalism is the norm, advancing our understanding of its rhetorical features and normative aspirations in these contexts. Turning to specific sub-genres of advocacy journalism, the role of the opinion columnist and what they bring to journalism is discussed in Bro (2012), Duff (2008, 2013), and McNair (2008), while those interested in the distinct mission of the op-ed page as a journalistic genre should consult the work of Wahl-Jorgensen (2004, 2008). Seymour-Ure (2008) provides a comprehensive overview of political cartoons and the place of advocacy within them while Alterman's (1999) work on the growth of the "punditocracy" in US cable news remains seminal. Finally, excellent summaries of the centrality of advocacy to the mission of alternative and radical journalism can be found in Atton (2009) and Downing (1984).

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Stephanie Craft

21 Documentary Journalism

Abstract: In conversations at film festivals and universities, in journalism trade publications and film magazines, the relationship between journalism and documentary film has been considered time and again. Just why the conclusions to those arguments matter is not always made explicit – if journalism and documentary film intersect, so what? – but seems to be rooted in our expectations for, and therefore the bases of our evaluations of, documentary films and journalism. Locating and tracing journalism’s boundaries with documentary film will offer a way of (re)considering conceptualizations of journalism at a time when documentary seems to have taken over some of journalism’s traditional terrain and found success doing so.

Keywords: journalism, documentary film, advocacy, objectivity, professional values, ethics

1 Introduction

Public engagement with documentary film has, perhaps, never been greater, particularly when one considers the growing number and popularity of feature-length theatrical documentaries such as *Fahrenheit 9/11* (2004) and *Citizenfour* (2014). Indeed, those two films – both of which explore and critique US government action in the aftermath of the September 11 terrorist attacks – bracket a decade in which the film-going public embraced documentary films across a wide range of styles, approaches, and distribution platforms. Beyond the big screen, television, cable, and online venues such as ESPN’s “30 for 30”, *The New York Times’* “Op-Docs”, Netflix, and CNN Films, as well as established programs on PBS and HBO, have expanded opportunities for documentary filmmakers to find distribution for their films and to find work on new documentary platforms. Films that overtly advocate or pursue a particular agenda; films that incorporate aesthetics, techniques, and values more commonly associated with art and entertainment fare; and films tackling the kinds of investigations traditionally associated with investigative reporting or reinvigorating old story types are all part of an expanded documentary field. Or is it the journalistic field that has expanded?

Elsewhere in this volume, scholars have conceptualized journalism as a product, a practice, an institution, and a public sphere, and as a gatekeeper, agenda-setter, and framer of information and events. Those varied conceptualizations highlight different ways of understanding journalism’s purpose and power and, taken as a whole, argue against a too-narrow notion of it as something practiced only in

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a particular way, by certain people, in specific settings, resulting in something that goes by the name of “journalism”. Here, I build on those broader notions of journalism by examining a practice and product, documentary film, which is and isn’t journalism, but also is and isn’t art, is and isn’t advocacy. The focus here is on the distinct journalistic culture of the United States, though the issues likely resonate more widely.

In conversations at film festivals and universities, in journalism trade publications and film magazines, the relationship between journalism and documentary film has been considered time and again. Just why the conclusions to those arguments matter is not always made explicit – if journalism and documentary film do or don’t overlap, so what? – but seems to be rooted in our expectations for, and therefore the bases of our evaluations of, documentary and journalism. To offer one example: Filmmakers on a panel at the 2015 Sundance Film Festival described their work as a variant of journalism. Laura Poitras (*Citizenfour*, *The Oath*) characterized documentary as “journalism plus;” Alex Gibney (*Taxi to the Dark Side*, *Going Clear*) described himself as “a filmmaker with ‘journalistic baggage’”; and Marc Silver (*Who is Dayani Cristal?*, *3½ Minutes*) described “a journalistic layer at the base of documentary filmmaking” (Das 2015). Poitras, Gibney, and Silver saw these similarities to journalism as mostly beneficial to documentary, providing filmmakers with legal protections and status to the extent they pursue stories according to journalistic principles regarding truth telling, protecting sources, and maintaining independence. Where journalism and documentary film diverge, the panelists seemed to say, was more about form than function, more about differences in the storytelling techniques employed in truth telling than the notion of truth telling as the fundamental purpose itself.

Of course that is just one panel at one film festival, albeit a panel of highly acclaimed filmmakers at the premier US festival. There is good reason to think that the differences actually do go beyond techniques. What makes a documentary a documentary (or, for our purposes, makes journalism journalism) is located in neither aesthetics nor “closeness to actuality or truth”, but rather “resides somewhere else in the complex interaction between text, context, producer and spectator” (Ward 2005: 11). That complex interaction has become more complex in journalism, as the field now encompasses a wider range of producers, texts, and contexts, and a disappearing line between producers and spectators. These changes, by-products of change in the broader digital information landscape, are seen as posing threats to journalism’s autonomy to determine norms and standards (e.g., Deuze 2005; Vos & Craft 2016). An added layer of complexity is that definitions of journalism often include both normative and functional elements (see Shapiro 2014 for an overview of definitions). All of which is to say that journalists might have a stake in defining documentary as a variant of professional journalism as a way of asserting journalism’s control over a particular approach to truth- and storytelling. Documentary filmmakers, working out of different institutional, political,

and cultural contexts, have no such stake in bending journalism to fit documentary's norms; indeed, it's unclear how or why a diffuse field like documentary film could even attempt to do so.

Exactly who is operating within whose domain is, of course, a matter of perspective. One could easily make the argument that *journalism* exists in the periphery of documentary film, and not the other way around, or that both are roughly similar, minor players in the larger field of cultural production. I don't dispute that. Even so, given the current challenges to journalism and the fact that documentary seems to be occupying and flourishing in some of journalism's traditional terrain, it's worth considering the lessons journalism misses in its impulse toward defending certain boundaries and definitions, and, likewise, the advantages to be gained by taking a cue from documentary film. The main purpose of this chapter, then, is to map journalism and documentary's intersections and to consider whether and how documentary's success offers, in effect, a critique of journalism.

2 Definitions, fields, and boundaries

To say that the journalism field is changing assumes we have a somewhat fixed idea of what has constituted or defined the field in the past, including whatever place documentary film has had in it. In Bourdieu's field theory, fields are "semi-autonomous and increasingly specialized spheres of action" governed by shared rules "producing a certain degree of internal homogeneity" (Benson 2006: 188). Those rules, which include establishing who is or is not part of the field and the standards for evaluating quality and ethical performance, are the subject of ongoing tension and contestation. A question, then, is the extent of journalism and documentary film's homogeneity or, conversely, the extent to which they represent separate specialized spheres of action. Does documentary film share a border with journalism, or is it wholly within the journalistic field? Where are journalism's boundaries more or less well defended, and why are those defenses in place?

Starting with definitions is necessary, but will get us only part of the way. There is little consensus on the definition of journalism in either textbooks or the scholarly literature, as Shapiro (2014) observes in his very helpful overview. More to the current point, though, are his observations that such a lack of consensus underscores how "any attempt to define journalism might be seen as a hegemonic foray by one discipline against another" and how, in its necessarily exclusionary aspect, "the act of definition often gets confused with the act of evaluation" (Shapiro 2014: 555). Documentary filmmaker Robert Greene describes something akin to this hegemonic impulse in the critical backlash against Joshua Oppenheimer's Academy Award-nominated *The Act of Killing*, in which the filmmaker's relationship to the subject of the story and the use of dramatic recreations of killings perpetrated by that subject challenge a number of conventional nonfiction storytelling practices

and ethics. Greene argues that the “old idea that documentaries should behave like journalism”, specifically the “precious ideas of objectivity and subservience to journalism” are an awkward fit for a film that could not have accomplished its purpose if forced to follow those rules (Greene 2013).

In creating his “functional” definition of journalism, Shapiro notes he is employing just one of five possible ways of thinking about journalism that Zelizer (2004) identified: as a profession, an institution, people, text, or a set of practices. Taking that last, functional, approach yielded the following definition: “Journalism comprises the activities involved in an independent pursuit of accurate information about current or recent events and its original presentation for public edification” (Shapiro 2014: 561). This definition works well for Shapiro’s purpose – identifying practices deserving of legal protection – but not for distinguishing journalism and documentary film. One could, for example, substitute “documentary” for “journalism” and still have a sensible sentence. I do not consider this a fault in Shapiro’s definition; rather, it serves to highlight the power of the other approaches to journalism Zelizer identifies, particularly as a profession and as an institution, in shaping how journalists understand journalism and how they are likely to evaluate documentary film. That is, if journalism and documentary are functionally similar, then we might look to norms or purpose or something else to make distinctions. Even so, we need to be cautious about putting too much weight on the distinctions we find. In conceptualizing journalism as an ideology, Deuze (2005) said he “deliberately ignored real or perceived differences between mainstream and alternative news media, between serious and popular journalism or between hard and soft news” because those “binary oppositions [are] increasingly untenable in our liquid modern news times” (Deuze 2005: 458). I would argue that thinking of documentary and journalism as a binary opposition may likewise prove to be simplistic, as the criteria for making distinctions take on different meanings in different circumstances.

Documentary film also lacks a consensus definition; definitional difficulties have been compounded and made both more urgent and more exciting as new platforms and technologies for creating and distributing films force reconsideration of what “documentary” means (see Nash, Hight & Summerhayes 2014, for a discussion of the new documentary “ecology”). Starting with all film, then separating fiction from nonfiction film, and finally locating documentary within the nonfiction category is another approach to definition that may help us locate those boundaries. In his widely used text, Nichols (2010) takes this approach via the construction of two Venn diagrams: The first depicts fiction and nonfiction film as overlapping circles, where the shared space comprises forms that “borrow from both traditions” such as neo-realism, reenactments, mockumentaries, and docudramas. Documentary film along with such disparate forms as informational films and surveillance footage are located in the exclusively nonfiction part of the diagram. Most documentaries are identifiable by:

(1) their representations in sound and image of a preexisting, historical world, (2) their reliance on social actors who present themselves rather than take on assigned roles, and (3) the intricate relationship that may arise between the interaction of the filmmaker and the film's social actors who clearly co-exist in the same historical world. It is from this interaction that the film's story, proposal, or perspective frequently arises (Nichols 2010: 144).

Similarly, Smith and Rock (2014) argue that intent, not content, is the appropriate basis for distinguishing documentary from fictional film. A documentarian seeks to make a statement that is received as fact by the audience, while a fictional filmmaker is focused on the art of storytelling.

Nichols' second Venn diagram breaks the nonfiction category into documentary and non-documentary film, depicting their overlapping space as populated by mere footage, newsreels, television news reports, and industrial or sponsored films (Nichols 2010: 146). Whether a television news report belongs in the documentary or non-documentary circle depends on the purpose for making the categorization – perhaps, as Ward (2005) might see it, to highlight some aspect of the complex interaction among text, context, producer, and spectator.

Corner notes that documentary “intersects across the junction points of a number of media modes” and has resisted attempts to “find an adequately tight set of generic criteria” that might define it (Corner 2008: 15). Those attempts have centered on “matters of form, matters of subject and matters of purpose” (Corner 2008: 15) – a range of concerns similar to those attempts to define journalism have employed. In documentary, as Corner writes (and, arguably, in journalism), form varies too widely to be a useful criterion. Subject and purpose, however, can be markers of “documentary value” (Corner 2008: 17) such that documentaries meant to educate the public on serious topics related to social problems constitute a sort of ideal type.

In Bourdieu's terms we might say such documentaries are more closely connected to the cultural capital of the field than those aimed at less serious or entertainment-oriented subjects and purposes. In journalism, watchdog reporting (serious topics related to social problems) likewise represents a sort of ideal type closely tied to the field's cultural capital. These similarities, then, suggest that journalism and documentary share important values and rules such that they could be seen as part of the same field. Yet important differences with regard to other values, related to professional and institutional aspects of journalism, point to where other boundaries between these fields might lie.

3 Issues at the intersection(s) of documentary and journalism

The reactions to three true crime documentary series that debuted in 2014 and 2015 – *The Jinx: The Life and Deaths of Robert Durst*, *Making a Murderer*, and *Serial*

Season One (a podcast, not a film) – illustrate this tangle of expectations about nonfiction work as well as the very different forms contemporary documentary takes. For example, each of these series was described as “addictive”, the potential for binge watching or listening adding yet another new wrinkle to understanding the blurring of boundaries between entertainment and nonfiction stories. In addition, though each series dealt with past crimes, each also became part of the specifically journalistic arena of breaking news, whether coincidentally or as a direct result of the series. And, perhaps most telling, each series faced questions from journalists, reviewers, and audiences regarding how their stories were structured that suggest a mixture of journalistic and entertainment criteria being applied to evaluate the work: When do certain elements enter the narrative? Which elements are emphasized or left out? How do the series’ creators draw conclusions about their subjects’ guilt or innocence? *Serial* was criticized, for example, for not reaching a definitive conclusion about its subject’s guilt or innocence, while *Making a Murderer* was faulted for seeming to have started with the conclusion that its subject had been framed. *The Jinx* was accused of leaving the information most essential to drawing a conclusion – a recorded confession – to the very end to heighten the series’ drama, even at the expense of an ongoing police investigation (see, for example, Garner 2014; Uberti 2015; Schulz 2016). Because these series are all true crime stories, came out at roughly the same time, and because together they represent something “new” about the documentary distribution landscape, comparisons were bound to be made among them. But the specific points of comparison are fairly old. Similar questions, for example, were raised about another true crime documentary series, *Paradise Lost*. Over the course of completing this big screen trilogy (released in 1996, 2000, and 2011), filmmakers Joe Berlinger and Bruce Sinofsky were said to have demonstrated “partisanship” on behalf of the accused who they had come to believe were innocent (e.g., Itzkoff 2012; Hale 2012).

These critiques, then, point to violations of what are offered up as widely shared expectations of nonfiction storytelling: that storytellers must not have an agenda, must maintain a certain detachment from the subjects of their stories, must privilege information over drama. Indeed, a *New Yorker* article about these true crime series goes further in identifying violations of expectations, drawing an unflattering comparison between *Making a Murderer* filmmakers Laura Ricciardi and Moira Demos who are “dodging inconvenient facts”, and “good reporters” who “delineate facts rather than contribute to the confusion” (Schulz 2016). While reporters might appreciate that positive characterization of their work as thorough and ethical, of the six principal creators of these true crime documentaries, only *Serial* creator Sarah Koenig has a journalism background. Ricciardi, Demos, Berlinger, Sinofsky, and *The Jinx*’s Andrew Jarecki, have backgrounds in film, advertising, and law. And, also with the exception of *Serial*, these documentaries were produced outside the institutional structures of journalism. So if non-journalists are creating films outside of journalism, what does it mean to judge their work

according to journalistic criteria? To do so suggests the journalistic approach is (or ought to be) the default one.

On the whole, Schulz argues in the *New Yorker*, these documentaries might be dangerous *because of* their independence from such expectations: “Yet we still have not thought seriously about what it means when a private investigative project – bound by no rules of procedure, answerable to nothing but ratings, shaped only by the ethics and aptitude of its makers – comes to serve as our court of last resort” (Schulz 2016). That these are audience, and not only journalists’, expectations indicates how successful professional journalism has been in promoting its specific vision of what constitutes good nonfiction storytelling. It’s also worth noting that the tone of much of the critique of these documentaries suggests that to call something “not journalism” is to identify a fault, not merely to describe or categorize it. Of course in saying that these documentaries follow no rules and are beholden only to ratings and their makers’ own ethics, Schulz is not only painting with a rather broad brush but also, incidentally, highlighting critiques of the journalism to which she is comparing them. Berlinger, for one, has said he is mindful of journalistic principles in doing his work:

I consider myself a *verité* filmmaker, but I also philosophically believe I am a storyteller as well as a journalist ... It’s important to note I take the journalism responsibility very seriously. I don’t challenge obvious conventions of journalism – like, you would never put words in people’s mouths. We would never set up a situation that would never happen in real life. We would never so manipulate chronology that you’re totally changing the meaning of the event. However, I believe that any documentary maker who tells you they are presenting you with the objective truth of a situation is kidding themselves. (Quoted in Stubbs 2002: 144).

Of course ideas about whether documentaries ought to be judged by journalistic standards also vary across audiences. For example, two writers, one a non-journalist blogger, the other a pop culture writer with a journalism degree, offered their reaction to some of the criticism leveled at these series. The blogger made a simple distinction: “*Making a Murderer* isn’t a piece of journalism. It’s a documentary. It has a perspective ...” (Heisler 2016). The writer observed that all journalism – traditional and not – has a bias and welcomed the idea that “non-traditional journalism” like documentaries and podcasts “can go where ‘straight news’ can’t” (McDonnell-Parry 2016).

Certainly, defining journalism as a function of the institutional status of its site of production, the distribution channels in which it appears or the educational and occupational backgrounds of the people producing it, references important components of journalism’s cultural capital but not necessarily the components most integral to shaping the “rules” by which nonfiction storytelling in the journalistic field should operate. As this tale of these true crime documentaries suggests, norms regarding advocacy, detachment, and the balance of aesthetics and information are where we might find the most well defended boundaries.

4 Voice, viewpoint and argument

The place where one might look for blurred or porous boundaries is the television documentary, which unlike most theatrical documentary film, comes out of the broadcast journalism tradition. The history of the television documentary in the US illustrates not only its significant cultural capital but also the tensions among different ways of interpreting professional norms of practice that have renewed resonance in the current environment.

As Raphael (2005) notes, embarrassment at how an objective approach to reporting allowed McCarthyism to thrive in the 1950s spurred the expansion of investigative reporting in television in the 1960s, mostly in the form of documentaries. Even so, network executives could not really openly embrace this “muckraking” style and continued to use objective reporting as a sort of counterweight: “Objective reporting helped shield journalists and news organizations from political and regulatory attacks for bias and inaccuracy. Muckraking offered prestige value in the eyes of television’s cultural critics and some regulators, and allowed networks to claim they were good corporate citizens providing a public service by helping to address social problems” (Raphael 2005: 178).

Such disparate forces as the quiz show scandals and anti-communism also shaped the form and subject matter of broadcast documentaries in the 1960s (see Curtin 1995; Rosteck 1994). The former created a context in which television networks saw documentaries as providing a means to restore audience trust and promote television’s public service identity; the latter underscored a tension between the contradictory notions of documentary as an *unbiased* record of events and an *argument* about how to understand those events.

This struggle in in the “Golden Age” of television documentary to reconcile the demands of information dissemination and storytelling, of detachment and engagement was echoed in the negative reactions to “new” or literary journalism in the 1970s, which expanded the repertoire of techniques employed in the service of telling a “true” story and questioned the ability of objective journalism to represent reality (Prager 2015; Frus 1994). In the case of the television documentary, however, this struggle was (and still, perhaps, is) not just an internal one among players trying to assert their view of journalism’s norms as the correct one, but also a pitched battle between journalism’s cultural capital and exogenous (economic and regulatory) pressures. These internal and external battles continue to shape whether and how journalists see documentary film as part of the journalistic field.

Consider the discussion in journalistic circles when documentary began its most recent surge. A 2001 issue of *Nieman Reports*, a publication of the Nieman Foundation whose mission is “to promote and elevate the standards of journalism”, was largely devoted to examining where documentary and journalism “converge”. Articles cover a wide range of documentary and journalistic platforms (radio, photography, the Internet, television, and film) but taken as a whole reflect

a definition of – or at least a particular focus on – documentary as a kind of journalism, a descendent of broadcast pioneer Edward R. Murrow, who created a range of nonfiction work under the auspices of a professional, commercial news organization. Of course, working within those constraints was not sustainable even for Murrow, who helped bring an end to McCarthyism but whose sometimes-controversial work eventually fell victim to a lack of advertiser, and then institutional, support. One Nieman contributor, a veteran journalist, addressed a more contemporary version of the pressures Murrow faced. The rise of television news magazines, a “ratings fixation”, and related profitability pressures “combined to crush the documentary on commercial television” (Balboni 2001: 49). He observed the “near extinction” of documentary journalism on network and local television, though documentaries continued to find a home on public television and, to some extent, on cable television channels such as HBO. Now, 15 years later, documentarians have a much broader range of funding and distribution options outside of these traditional broadcast outlets, though public television continues to be an important venue.

Indeed *Frontline*, which airs on public television, is perhaps the most influential current outlet for television documentary in the US (Nisbet & Aufderheide 2009). However, the relative freedom of the public television environment does not necessarily translate into a reinterpretation of professional norms; rather, *Frontline* illustrates some of the tensions among those norms. For example, Michael Kirk, a prolific and award-winning *Frontline* producer, describes the program’s approach as “long-form, serious television that [is] also filmic and interesting to watch” (Idaho Public Television 2013). The filmic, or dramatic, aspects however, seem to have a lower priority than adherence to traditionally journalistic norms such as detachment. Kirk says “it’s not important that I inject myself” into the story but also describes the process of creating the archetypal *Frontline* documentary as one in which journalists construct the narrative and then “populate” it with “people in the story”, (PBS 2009) without acknowledging that the use of such a narrative formula is akin to “injecting” oneself into a story by fashioning an argument. The fact that many *Frontline* producers formerly worked in commercial television news may at least partly explain this privileging of journalistic (detachment) concerns while playing down their contradictions with documentary (filmic) concerns.

Documentary scholars point to a sense of voice as a significant, if not entirely straightforward, criterion of distinction between television news and documentary. As Nichols explains:

Documentaries are not documents. They may use documents and facts, but they always interpret them. They usually do so in an expressive, engaging way. This lends documentaries the strong sense of voice that nondocumentaries lack. This voice distinguishes documentary films. We sense a voice addressing us from a particular perspective about some aspect of the historical world. This perspective is more personal and sometimes more impassioned than that of standard news reports. Television news adheres to journalistic standards that have a strongly informational bias although they are far from free of qualities of voice. Bias, framing the con-

text within which to present information, assumptions about who counts as an expert or authority, and choices of words and tone can all push news reporting toward the documentary camp while journalistic standards of objectivity and accuracy pull in the direction of the informational film (Nichols 2010: 147).

Having a strong sense of voice – personal, impassioned, biased – is characterized as contrary to journalism standards. Put in the language of field theory, voice is an important component of cultural capital – but it points in different directions depending on whether one is talking about documentary or journalism. A detached, neutral voice is valued in journalism; an engaged, expressive voice is valued in documentary. Furthermore voice is not just how a story is told, but the purpose for which it is told. The neutral voice of journalism delivers information; the biased voice of documentary tells a story or makes an argument about that information. These differing values and purposes are not mere preferences but rather defining features that serve to mark documentary film and journalism as specialized spheres of action.

While voice offers one criterion for making distinctions, it's worth keeping in mind that Nichols employs overlapping circles and not bright lines to map the various categories and subcategories of film. Exploring how each form, beyond its distinctive voice, treats “information” in the “real world” may offer a clearer view of the terrain. What is useful for our mapping purposes is to consider the ways in which documentary film is described as inhabiting the space between fiction and journalism or, as Corner characterizes it, between drama/aesthetics and news/cognition (Corner 2008: 24).

Grierson, who first applied the term “documentary” to film some 90 years ago, called it the “creative treatment of actuality”, a description that suggests a documentarian does not attempt to convey “actuality” so much as deploy it for her own creative ends. As Winston, summarizing Grierson’s views, puts it: “Documentary was not journalism; rather it claimed all the artistic license of a fiction with the only constraints being that its images were not of actors and its stories were not the products of unfettered imagining” (Winston 2000: 20). In Grierson’s view “documentary encompassed the use of images of the real world for the purposes of *personal* expression” (Winston 2000: 20, emphasis added).

This notion of personal expression as the primary purpose of documentary, while certainly something with the potential to draw a bright line between documentary and journalism, varies in relevance across the many nonfiction models and cinematic modes documentary film can employ, in a listing constructed by Nichols. Models include investigation/report, advocacy, testimonial, first-person essay, and autobiography; modes include expository, observational, participatory, and performative (see Nichols 2010: 148–153 for the complete list). These categories are not mutually exclusive but do offer tools for making distinctions between documentaries and journalism based on the treatment of information and facts about the real world, the varied purposes for telling stories with those facts and informa-

tion, and the extent to which the filmmaker shapes the action. For example, a film like *Enron: The Smartest Guys in the Room* reflects aspects of the investigative (“assemble evidence, make a case or offer a perspective”) and testimonial (“assemble oral history or witnesses who recount their personal experience”) models as well as the participatory mode (“filmmaker interacts with his or her social actors, participates in shaping what happens before the camera”).

Nichols takes the view that documentary does not just use aspects of reality but rather seeks to represent that reality – typically, to make an argument about it. While this stance is much closer than Grierson’s to how contemporary journalism approaches the real world, the notion that an argument or explicit viewpoint regarding reality is the purpose of a documentary film marks a significant point of divergence. Moreover, non-documentary films have “a highly indexical relation” to the real world that contrasts with the ambiguity sometimes prized in documentary (Nichols 2010: 147). Journalism, like other types of non-documentary film in Nichols’ scheme, tends toward a straightforward, sometimes didactic presentation of the real world valued for how closely it corresponds to actual events. *Harvest of Shame*, perhaps the most famous American television documentary, appears on Nichols’ list under the investigation/report model told in the expository mode (“speak directly to view with voice over”). Significantly, given that it is typically lauded as a high point in broadcast journalism, *Harvest of Shame* is much more explicit in making an argument than its contemporary journalism descendants. Of course what Nichols calls journalism’s “informational bias”, which emphasizes accuracy and balance, constitutes its own kind of argument. Frus describes this unacknowledged argument in comparing literary journalism to its traditional, non-literary counterpart:

Because the goal of this dominant mode of journalism is to give a faithful picture of events and characters as they appear to the representative eye, rather than to acknowledge the existence of competing representations, journalists do not believe they are persuading readers and viewers to accept only one of many possible orientations toward the world; they regard themselves as neutral, rather than partisan (Frus 1994: 91).

Indeed it is journalism’s style of “argument” – the bias of its traditionally objective approach – that might at least partly explain the surge in documentary’s popularity over the last couple decades. Aufderheide (2011) argues that documentary’s late 1990s surge can be seen, at least in part, as a reaction to a formulaic television landscape. Specifically, the success of documentary as a “individually crafted, courageous, human-scale response against social injustice and the abuse of power” contrasts with the “factory values that reflected the TV industry’s vast need for programming” (Aufderheide 2011: 1). Moreover, this contrast has “raised questions about the social role of documentary, including the responsibility of filmmakers to serve the public’s informational needs and to honor traditional journalistic goals, such as accuracy” (p. 1). Similarly, Goldson (2015) points to decreased opportunities for “creative documentary” on television as a reason for the theatrical docu-

mentary surge. But the rise of reality television programming and of new documentary distribution platforms such as Amazon and Netflix, are also important factors in this surge, Goldson argues. As television audiences become bored or disillusioned with reality programming, and as mainstream news becomes ever more tabloid, documentary film has stepped into the gap, even taking on previously journalistic roles such as investigative reporting.

There is a certain irony to this recent history of conditions in commercial television sparking a surge in documentary. Winston argues that roughly the reverse occurred in the mid-20th century, when the arrival of television pushed documentary into a more journalistic mode. The impetus was less a matter of “factory values” than of technological and related economic factors. The invention of lightweight and portable equipment enhanced the ability for filmmakers to work in the distinctly observational mode of direct cinema, which had specific benefits: “Direct Cinema’s journalistic rhetoric of non-intervention and limited mediation allowed documentary to lay a stronger claim on the real than was possible previously” (Winston 2000: 22). But that greater ability came at a price. “Documentary was being limited by journalism. Its creativity was becoming increasingly suspect as the requirement for strict observation replaced it.” Documentaries became “extended journalistic reports” (Winston 2000: 23).

5 Categorizing and valorizing journalism and documentary

Given the “convergence” its title anticipates, it’s not surprising the *Nieman Reports* special issue in 2001 ends up identifying more similarities than differences between documentary film and journalism and that some of the differences, such as length, are mostly superficial. This latter point is reflected in the title of one article: “Long-Form Documentaries Serve a Vital Journalistic Role”. In other words, the positive light in which documentary as essentially a longer form of journalism is presented here directly contrasts with Winston’s negative characterization of documentary as an “extended journalistic report”. The distinguishing features of voice and viewpoint discussed above also get somewhat different treatment here. One *Nieman* contributor, a documentarian with a background at the BBC, even argues that, while similarities abound, many people consider documentary to be “more objective” than print journalism, its seeming impartiality a function of its observational style. While this sort of comparison affirms objectivity’s status as a key criterion of journalism, another article describes an independent filmmaker approaching her work “from a position of advocacy” while still maintaining that that work overlaps with journalism. It is telling that this filmmaker started her career in commercial television but she and her partner became frustrated because “there seemed too

wide of a chasm between what we saw going on around us and what was considered ‘acceptable’ television programming” (Lazarus 2001: 57). This advocacy approach had often limited their opportunities for distribution in mainstream journalism venues. “If objectivity and balance are the test of journalism, then our work doesn’t qualify. But if fairness and solid reporting are the benchmarks of journalists’ work, then our work as documentarians has a home in this community of those whose job it is to question what we see and hear around us” (Lazarus 2001: 58). One of the newer venues for documentary is the *New York Times*, which has approached the voice and viewpoint challenge by placing its Op-Docs forum for short documentaries that “present a unique point of view” in the opinion section of the newspaper. That some of the Op-Docs pieces have been excerpts or summaries of feature-length documentaries muddies these boundaries. A piece by Amir Bar-Lev called “We Are Penn State” is from his 2014 documentary *Happy Valley*, which received an Emmy in the News and Documentary category.

Perhaps some of the best evidence for the perceived affinity of documentary to journalism – from the perspective of broadcast journalism – is found in documentary’s inclusion in professional awards competitions. Such awards are important markers of journalism’s cultural capital, as they express and affirm how the field defines its members and standards. The National Academy of Television Arts & Sciences, which recognizes outstanding achievement in television programming via the Emmy awards, groups documentaries with news while noting that awards in the category “are intended as incentive for the continued pursuit of excellence for those working in the *broadcast journalism profession*” (emphasis added). While that characterization would appear to fit the makers of most of the nominated work, it’s worth noting that many of these films were produced and directed by people with no journalism background. Even some filmmakers with a journalism degree or professional experience on their resumes, do not produce exclusively journalistic work. For example, Columbia Graduate School of Journalism graduate Rachel Boynton, whose film *Big Men* was nominated in the “Best Documentary” category in 2015, does documentaries, reality television, and fiction features.

As we have seen in the Nieman report and elsewhere, length or running time is considered a key feature for distinguishing documentary from journalism. The term “long-form” is used to describe many of the subcategories in which Emmy awards are given, such as “Outstanding Business and Economic Reporting – Long-Form” and “Outstanding Investigative Journalism – Long-Form.” Other awards are given for achievement in “Coverage of a Current News Story – Long-Form” as well as “Best Documentary” and “New Approaches – Documentary”. The award guidelines also note that the maximum running time for work nominated in the long-form and documentary categories has been increased to 120 minutes this year, a nod, perhaps, to the increasing number of feature-length documentary films made with theatrical, and not only television, distribution in mind.

Technical aspects such as running time are admittedly superficial ways to differentiate documentary and journalism. Voice, viewpoint, and advocacy are cer-

tainly richer ways of considering what distinguishes the two, especially when considered in the context of the broad professional and ethical values – markers of cultural capital – that they reflect. In general terms, we might think of journalism’s primary ethical orientation to be to the public. While such an orientation certainly does not prohibit expressing a single, even personal viewpoint, offering many points of view might be considered more aligned with obligations of fairness to the public broadly speaking. In contrast, a filmmaker’s primary orientation might be considered to be the subject of her film such that whatever public good is served by telling the subject’s story could be trumped by the interests of the subject with whom the filmmaker has formed a bond. Nichols (2010) seems to say as much in pointing to the “intimate relationship” between filmmaker and subject as a defining feature of documentary. Likewise Winston claims “ethics in documentary has more to do with the treatment of participants than with media responsibilities to audiences” (Winston 2000: 132). A Center for Media & Social Impact study describes what I am calling different orientations or values as part of the differing “cultures” of journalism and documentary. Asked in the study to comment on widely accepted journalistic principles, “filmmakers sometimes found the journalists’ ubiquitous language about serving the public to be less familiar in their cultural context, [but] they understood their work as oriented generally to the public good” (Center for Media & Social Impact 2015: 6). Interviews with veteran documentary filmmakers revealed a sense that ethical responsibilities to subjects, viewers, and their own artistic vision are conflicting and subject to external economic pressures (Aufderheide, Jaszi & Chandra 2009). There, perhaps, the cultures of journalism and documentary share common ground.

6 A changing landscape

The seismic shifts in journalism have prompted questions and no small amount of hand wringing about the kind of information landscape we will be left with once the shaking stops. It is easy in this unsettled period for journalism to see theatrical documentary film as a sort of interloper, its popularity with audiences both a challenge to journalism’s role as primary information provider and a sort of rebuke to journalism values such as objectivity that are seen as central to fulfilling that informational role. This chapter has attempted to map the terrain journalism and documentary film share, or at least to identify significant markers along the way. Voice, viewpoint, professional and ethical values are among the distinguishing features, but are they distinguishing enough? That is, do they resolve questions about whether documentary and journalism “belong” in the same or separate fields? Not really. Both documentary and journalism seek to convey aspects of the real world; both seek to do so for the similar reason that those stories are important to tell. Just why or to whom they are important does not necessarily matter. And a little

ambiguity about the way they convey those stories might be preferable if the goal is to garner attention and engage audiences. As Frus observes: “Once the tension between nonfiction and fictional tendencies signaled by a given narrative has been resolved in favor of literature, the text becomes nonpropositional, and thus unlikely to be a factor in the politics of ordinary life, the domain of social experience and public expression where change is possible” (Frus 1994: x–xi).

Journalism might, in fact, have good reason to welcome documentary’s encroachment, if that is what it seems to be doing, as it may help to ensure that important stories will get told and will find an audience even if the institutions of journalism we once depended on to tell those stories do not survive the shaking.

Of course, whether documentary “belongs” in the journalistic field is not a determination to be made from the outside, by a disinterested party. Those with the lion’s share of cultural capital in a field decide who belongs in it. What, then, might the journalists who hold sway over the field learn from those who are pushing at the boundaries? One perhaps too-obvious lesson is how journalism’s norm of objectivity – poorly articulated by professionals and poorly understood by audiences – can limit, rather than aid, the practice of good journalism. Expanding what journalism is “allowed” to do, such as offering personal testimony or making an argument from the assembled facts as documentaries do, may serve the public’s need for truthful accounts of the world just as well if not better than the detached, objective approach. Obvious or not, there is a lot to untangle here: Audiences seem to expect objective journalism, if not necessarily objective documentary (and certainly less in film than television documentary). But the appetite for objectivity can be sporadic. The increasingly polarized American audience often favors partisan news outlets even while continuing to demand objectivity. Meanwhile, journalists often fail to acknowledge that the narratives they create are, in fact, arguments about the real world and not mere reflections of it.

In a political environment in which truth claims are increasingly challenged and an economic environment in which financial support for journalism is not assured it may be worth considering whether the cultural capital of the journalistic field could be bolstered by expanding it to include those with different norms of practice employed in the pursuit of truth. One answer to the “so what if journalism and documentary film intersect” question posed at the beginning of this chapter is that in their intersection we can find a space to reinforce and clarify important values in telling stories of public importance, thereby reshaping and strengthening the journalistic field.

Further reading

Nichols’ (2010) *Introduction to documentary* offers a comprehensive exploration of the form. A special issue of *Nieman Reports* (2001) devoted to documentary journalism includes a wide var-

iety of perspectives, from practitioners and scholars alike, on what was then perceived as a decline in documentary production, while Aufderheide's (2011) "Mainstream documentary since 1999" entry in *The Wiley-Blackwell History of American Film* provides an overview of US documentary's subsequent expansion. Useful historical accounts of documentary in journalism, particularly focused on the politics of early broadcast documentary, can be found in Rosteck's 'See It Now' *confronts McCarthyism* (1994), Curtin's *Redeeming the wasteland: Television documentary and Cold War politics*, and Raphael's *Investigated journalism: Muckrakers, regulators, and the struggle over television documentary* (2005).

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Folker Hanusch

22 Lifestyle Journalism

Abstract: Lifestyle journalism is a growing field of journalistic practice as well as scholarly analysis, at the heart of which is often the tension between citizen- and market orientations. Linked closely to the rise of consumption cultures in the second half of the 20th century, the field is still often viewed condescendingly by its critics, while others identify enormous potential in lifestyle journalism for producing information of public value. This chapter provides an in-depth analysis of lifestyle journalism, which details its relationship with other kinds of journalism, and investigates ways of conceptualizing a field that is often defined in varying ways. An historical overview demonstrates that lifestyle has been a part of journalism for considerable time, though events over the past five decades or so have accelerated this growth. An analysis of existing scholarly work on lifestyle journalism identifies four key themes of research: representations and notions of identity, political and critical dimensions, commercial and consumerist aspects, as well as democratizing elements of lifestyle journalism. Finally, the chapter offers five areas of the field which require scholars' urgent attention.

Keywords: consumption, journalism, lifestyle, market-oriented, soft news

1 Introduction

The enormous growth of lifestyle journalism over recent decades has been a remarkable development given the broader 'crisis' in traditional journalism. While traditional formats like political and foreign news appear to be shrinking, softer forms of news have experienced growing popularity, with lifestyle content – particularly in Western countries, but also increasingly in other societies – becoming ubiquitous through specially devoted newspaper sections and supplements, an exquisite variety of magazines, dedicated television channels, and a sheer endless assortment of websites. At the same time, lifestyle journalism is still often derided by the journalistic profession and an array of scholars, many of whom are critical of the field's proximity to commercial interests and accuse it of "dumbing down" journalism. Seen from a normative standpoint that privileges citizen- over consumer-oriented news, processes like tabloidization are seen with much skepticism. The shift towards consumer-oriented journalism has meant, according to one critic, that "the task of journalism has become merely to deliver and serve up what the customer wants; rather like a deep-pan pizza" (Franklin 1997: 5). Yet, others argue that instead of "dumbing down", the diversification of journalistic content is actually engendering a process of "braining up" (McNair 2009: 70). Such approaches

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generally critique the dumbing down thesis as being grounded in elitist and unrealistic views of the public sphere, and argue that less elite-driven news agendas can offer wider opportunities for political engagement across all sections of society (Temple 2006). McNair believes the growth of lifestyle journalism can actually be regarded as a positive move away from male-dominated news agendas to a more feminized and humanist kind of journalism, which is “less pompous, less pedagogic, less male; more human, more vivacious, more demotic” (2009: 74).

Despite the growing recognition of, and appreciation for non-news journalistic fields, lifestyle journalism has for a long time been starved of scholarly attention. However, recent years have seen considerable growth in the field, which has opened up promising lines of inquiry, making lifestyle journalism an immensely interesting and exciting field of study. To map out some of the emerging scholarly discourses, this chapter first provides an overview and definition of what can actually be regarded as lifestyle journalism. In a brief historical summary, it demonstrates that despite being considered a late 20th- and early 21st-century phenomenon, lifestyle journalism can actually be traced back to the very early days of news-making, thereby broadening our understanding of the term journalism itself. The chapter then provides a global overview of the kind of work that exists in the field. Finally, it outlines key areas for future scholarly exploration of what is undoubtedly one of journalism’s growth areas.

2 Lifestyle journalism and its various (dis)guises

To begin any analysis of a specialization such as lifestyle journalism, it is crucial to define the object of inquiry. This is not an easy task in our case, as the term encapsulates a large variety of journalistic fields. For example, it can include areas such as travel, fashion, style, health, fitness, wellness, entertainment, leisure, lifestyle, food, music, arts, gardening, and living (Hanusch 2012a). Others include any kind of human interest stories, children, parenting and partnership, career, personal technology, as well as celebrity journalism (Brunsdon et al. 2001; Hanusch & Hanitzsch 2013; Usher 2012). The definitional confusion continues, with little agreement on the term lifestyle journalism itself. Some have used “service journalism” to describe functions that are typically attributed to lifestyle journalism (Eide & Knight 1999) – not surprising given that one of the field’s key functions is to provide advice to audiences. Lifestyle journalism is also sometimes lumped in with the more general term of “infotainment”, as a key element is the provision of information in an entertaining way, consumed by audiences for pleasure (McNair 2006). As these differences in terminology suggest, boundaries are often blurred, with one further example the increasingly difficult distinction between cultural, consumer, and lifestyle journalism (Kristensen & From 2012).

Where to begin with a definition of lifestyle journalism, then? Kristensen and From (2012) suggest one way is to define what lifestyle journalism is not. Here, they refer to the distinction between hard and soft news raised earlier. These refer to the subject matter (whether the story is about issues of public relevance, or is focused on lighter issues related to the private sphere), as well as temporality (whether a story needs to be published immediately, or can be published at any time). Similarly, Hanusch (2012a) has argued that traditional definitions of journalism can help us better situate lifestyle journalism's location in the field, pointing to the numerous existing definitions of journalism as influenced by a citizen-orientation. The rise in non-traditional journalistic formats has prompted some to provide more neutral definitions, which focus on journalism's link to not much more than providing factual information about something previously not known to audiences, or what McNair (2006) has termed "factuality". Focusing on journalism as being about real events also helps in distinguishing lifestyle formats such as travel journalism from travel writing, with the latter allowing authors significantly more poetic license (Fürsich & Kavoori 2001).

A number of aspects have been identified which make lifestyle journalism stand out from other types of journalism. The field's focus on the private sphere, particularly in the provision of so-called "news-you-can-use" items that provide guidance or a service to individuals on how to live their lives has been a central feature (Eide & Knight 1999). Further, Hanusch (2012a: 2) reminds us of the field's strong market orientation and close links to consumerism, defining lifestyle journalism as "a distinct journalistic field that primarily addresses its audiences as consumers, providing them with factual information and advice, often in entertaining ways, about good and services they can use in their daily lives". Fürsich (2012) notes the term of non-fiction entertainment, but also warns that while "preferred by media industry executives [it] removes this content even further from the traditional realm of journalism". Thus, she notes three key dimensions deemed constitutive of lifestyle journalism: providing advice, a review function, and commercialization.

More recently, Hanusch and Hanitzsch's (2013; Hanusch et al. 2015) studies of Australian and German lifestyle journalists have provided an in-depth theoretical appraisal of lifestyle journalism and its functions, leading to an enhanced definition. Hanusch and Hanitzsch (2013) begin by defining what lifestyle actually means, noting that it is a contested term in itself with different interpretations. Marketing researchers, for example, view lifestyles as linked to consumption by seeing them as "patterns in which people live and spend their time and money" (Gunter & Furnham 1992: 70), while sociologists and cultural studies scholars tend to more dispassionately conceptualize lifestyle as "patterns of action that differentiate people" (Chaney 1996: 4). Featherstone (1987: 55) argues that lifestyle today is seen particularly in relation to consumption, connoting individuality, self-expression, and a stylistic self-consciousness: "One's body, clothes, speech, leisure pastimes, eating and drinking preferences, home, car, choice of holidays, etc. are

to be regarded as indicators of the individuality of taste and sense of style of the owner/consumer". A number of sociologists have argued that the importance of lifestyles is a phenomenon of the mid- to late 20th century, closely tied to the emergence of consumption cultures. However, Bell and Hollows (2006a) argue that these processes actually reach as far back as the 1800s, when non-work time became "leisure time". "The connections between consumer culture and rational recreation during this period gave birth to the very idea of lifestyle, in terms of ways of living that utilize the sign value of commodities and connect this with evaluative judgments of, or distinctions between, different socio-economic groups" (Bell & Hollows 2006a: 3). At the same time, Bell and Hollows argue that lifestyle is not wholly tied to consumerism, as there have been other sites, such as education, for the fostering of lifestyles. Indeed, Lonsdale (2015) has shown how lifestyle journalism during World War I, while undoubtedly lifestyle-oriented, did not promote consumption as most would understand it today. Rather, these stories offered "affluent middle-class readers the opportunity to 'makeover' their lives as thrifty, careful citizens patriotically doing without for the sake of the War effort" (Lonsdale 2015: 803).

Hanusch and Hanitzsch (2013) thus suggest that lifestyles have three dimensions. The formative dimension regards lifestyles as providing orientation for the management of self and everyday life, or guidance for behavior. The reflexive dimension relates to the performative aspects of lifestyle, which "engenders a great deal of consistency in individuals' behaviors" (Hanusch & Hanitzsch 2013: 945). Finally, in the articulate dimension lifestyles are seen as a form through which identity, a sense of "who we are", is articulated or expressed. They argue that any definition of lifestyle journalism should make reference to three key components: self-expression, the signification of identity, and consumption and everyday life. Their definition therefore sees lifestyle journalism as "the journalistic coverage of the expressive values and practices that help create and signify a specific identity within the realm of consumption and everyday life" (Hanusch & Hanitzsch 2013: 947).

While these definitions highlight how the field differs from traditional hard news journalism and place increased emphasis on the field's ties to consumption, it is also important that traditional conceptualizations of journalism's role – such as the watchdog role – are still relevant. In fact, as the discussion of recent literature on lifestyle journalism highlights throughout the remainder of this chapter, the tension between a consumer- and a citizen-orientation is very much visible in the field, and a recurring theme in scholarly debates.

3 Histories of lifestyle journalism

Lifestyle journalism is typically regarded as a phenomenon of the late 20th century, strongly linked to the rise of consumption cultures in industrialized societies, which has resulted in individuals relying on the media for guidance on how to lead

their lives and articulate their identities. Certainly, the term appears to have come into existence only relatively recently. If we examine the genre, however, and focus on the kinds of content its various constituents provide, we can see that aspects of lifestyle journalism have been around since the first news publications. Hanusch (2012a), for example, has pointed to the inclusion of human interest topics during the later years of the *Acta Diurnal Populi Romani*, hand-written newsheets which were displayed in public places across the Roman Empire more than 2000 years ago. Even then, these kinds of news were criticized by contemporaries, such as Cicero, as gossip.

Similarly, the first newspapers were published not merely out of a motivation to raise the level of discussion in the public sphere, but for purely commercial purposes (Weber 2006). Arguably, of course, the content of these early newspapers was still more hard-news driven than focusing on lifestyles, particular as Western societies at the time were still much more focused on survival than having any economic security to focus on self-expression. Nevertheless, journalism's commercial motivations have been here from the beginning, and as newspapers aimed to widen their audience base over the coming centuries, they would continue to drive innovations and new additions to the kinds of material they provided.

This was no less the case when in the early to mid-19th century newspaper editors identified women as a new target market, and began publishing more society news in their pages. This interest in women readers, Colbert (2009) points out, also had the effect that it opened journalism to an increasing number of women journalists. Over time, newspapers would devote more and more space to women-specific news, culminating in the establishment of dedicated pages around the country. While it is not entirely clear who published the first women's page, *New York World* publisher Joseph Pulitzer is generally credited with popularizing them when he devoted a page in the *Sunday World* in 1891 (Marzolf 1977). Whitt (2008) notes that these pages, which were later also called "home pages" tended to cover fashion, food, relationships, health, etiquette, homemaking, interior decorating, family issues, social news, and news of women's achievements. Sloan and Stovall (1999) argue that these pages played an important part in the doubling of newspaper readership in the US between 1892 and 1914. Rather than merely focusing on consumption issues, women's pages over time also included more and more critical stories. Mills (1988) shows that women's pages, run predominantly by women – who were left alone by the male newspaper editors who didn't regard their work as real journalism – in the 1950s and 1960s were increasingly able to discuss issues far ahead of their time and which were more and more political topics, such as birth control and abortion. This shows that what are often considered light and soft sections of the news media – whether they are called women's pages or lifestyle sections – can actually be quite political, a discussion we will return to later in this chapter.

By the 1960s and 1970s, women's pages were slowly on the wane, and being replaced with broader lifestyle sections, again with the aim to attract a wider var-

iety of audiences and advertisers. One example is the *Washington Post's* 1969 move to establish a “style” section in the place of a women’s page, with topics such as food, fashion, fun, and culture for all audience members, rather than predominantly women. As a result, the number of lifestyle-type editors in US newspapers grew from nine in 1976 to 221 in 2006, with much of the change coming around the turn of the century (Colbert 2009). Most major newspapers have dedicated lifestyle sections, and there are entire television channels dedicated to lifestyle content. In the United States, the Discovery Channel airs a variety of programs on health, cooking, travel, and related topics, while in Australia, pay TV offers four dedicated channels and a public broadcaster has recently dedicated one of its channels to food programming (Dabbagh 2015). In the UK, the BBC had already introduced lifestyle programming into its schedule in the 1990s (Brunsdon 2003), with similar developments in a range of Asian countries (Lewis, Martin & Sun 2012). In China, the rise of the middle-class and consumerism has also led to the establishment of a large range of lifestyle magazines which increasingly transmit values of self-fulfillment and hedonism (Chen & Machin 2013).

The growth of lifestyle content across the globe has been theorized by Hanusch and Hanitzsch (2013), who focus on three important societal developments that have influenced how lifestyle journalism operates today, and how we may be able to interpret it. The first development relates to processes of individualization, which they regard as “one of the most fundamental transformations of modern society” (Hanusch & Hanitzsch 2013: 945). According to this view, traditional social institutions no longer provide collective normative orientations, with individuals increasingly required to articulate their own identities, which are not predetermined, but which they are required to shape themselves. This speaks to Giddens’ (1991) notion of “detraditionalization”. Second, the past few decades have seen enormous changes particularly in industrial societies, which have resulted in a shift away from survival values, as economic resources are now mostly guaranteed. Instead, there has been a stronger emphasis on self-expression values, which focus on the subjective well-being and quality of life, rather than economic and physical security (Inglehart 1997). This shift has led to more options for shaping one’s own lifestyle, which is often exhibited through consumer products. Thus, lifestyles become “almost inextricably related to consumption” (Hanusch & Hanitzsch 2013: 946). Finally, processes of mediatization – the ubiquitous presence and relevance of the media in all kinds of social processes (Krotz 2008) – have meant that the media have replaced or subsumed established social institutions like the family, education systems, and religion as the “most important providers of information, tradition and moral orientation for individuals”, making identity work and the expression of lifestyles almost unthinkable without the media (Hanusch & Hanitzsch 2013: 946).

4 Relevance and importance of lifestyle journalism

We can see, then, that the rise of lifestyle journalism is closely tied to larger societal developments, and studying the production, dissemination, content, and reception of lifestyle journalism is crucial to arrive at a more comprehensive understanding of these larger developments, as the field is at the same time influenced by these developments as it in turn influences and reinforces them. Further, as news media move increasingly towards providing entertainment over information (Turner 2014), lifestyle journalism becomes a crucial and all-pervasive component of broader journalism cultures. Lifestyle content is being accessed by ever larger shares of audiences, and it is simply not enough anymore to focus solely on hard news or political journalism as the only form of journalism worth studying. In fact, as hard news reporting is declining, lifestyle journalism may also take on some of its functions, at least to some extent. Most famously, Hartley (2000) contends that soft news formats, including lifestyle journalism, can have a beneficial impact. He argues that such practices are “the ones who extend the reach of the media, who teach audiences the pleasures of staying tuned, who popularize knowledge” (Hartley 2000: 40). Hartley thus sees enormous potential for these more entertainment-focused types of journalism to make substantial contributions to the public sphere. Examples include that at a time of declining resources in foreign correspondence, travel journalists are becoming increasingly important mediators of foreign cultures to audiences and have a responsibility to portray them accurately and work against stereotyping – something that many travel journalists at least say they try to do (Hanusch 2010). Technology journalists also play a crucial role in identifying and recommending new tools which have an impact on consumption behaviors and therefore the economy more broadly (Usher 2012).

A particularly eloquent argument for the study of lifestyle journalism is Fürsich’s (2012) discussion of the concept of public quality, proposed by Costera Meijer (2001), who aimed to overcome the duality of “popular” and “quality” journalism. Fürsich believes the standard of ‘public quality’ could usefully be connected to lifestyle journalism to assess its value, arguing that there is a range of lifestyle content that would empower all audiences in a democracy. For example, she notes that many of Costera Meijer’s dimensions of public quality were already part of some lifestyle journalism, such as the use of ordinary people as sources or turning complex social discussions and issues into issues with clear options. Thus, she argues, the task for lifestyle journalism researchers will be “what concepts of ‘public life’ are established and positively sanctioned in the coverage and what aspects are left behind” (Fürsich 2012: 19). In this way, scholars could usefully “develop more complex models of how issues of public concern are established and negotiated in the media” (Fürsich 2012: 19).

5 Key themes in lifestyle journalism research

Factual lifestyle content has attracted considerable interest from media and cultural studies scholars over the past few decades. This has particularly been the case in relation to lifestyle programming on television, such as *Queer Eye for the Straight Guy* (Lewis 2007); programs on food (de Solier 2005); gardening shows (Taylor 2002); and home improvement programs (McElroy 2008). Brunson (2003) also examined the range of cooking, home decoration, fashion, and gardening shows screened in the 8–9pm slot on British television to examine lifestyle programming more comprehensively by focusing on the genre rather than just one particular type of show. Similarly, Bell and Hollows' (2005) collection presents analyses of a wide range of different formats in the area of factual lifestyle programming, while Ouellette and Hay (2008) have focused on the importance of reality television in providing lifestyle advice. In addition, Lewis' (2008) monograph examines the role of cultural expertise in lifestyle shows, focusing on presenters as key advice-givers. The global success of lifestyle programming is also paid tribute to through more recent studies focusing on the exploration of the role of lifestyle television in Asian countries like Taiwan and Singapore (Lewis & Martin 2010; Lewis, Martin & Sun 2012). Finally, the field has also been mapped through an historical approach in Bell and Hollows' (2006b) collection of essays on various lifestyle media during the 20th century. Another important area, which, as we have seen earlier, is included by some scholars as a part of lifestyle media but not necessarily by others, is the field of celebrity media. Predominantly explored by media and cultural studies scholars, but also by sociologists and increasingly journalism and communication scholars, this field has proven extremely fruitful in recent years, given the increasing predominance of celebrity-based entertainment and journalism, resulting in a number of important contributions (see, for example, Dubied & Hanitzsch 2014; Turner 2014).

While there exists a wide range of literature on lifestyle media more broadly, work that focuses specifically on lifestyle journalism is much rarer, at least if we employ the definitional criteria presented earlier. Only in the recent decade or so have journalism scholars engaged with this field in more comprehensive ways, making it a vibrant and fast-developing area of study. Most of the existing scholarship has tended to focus on various sub-fields, such as travel, food, fashion, or music journalism, to name just a few. These studies have all very usefully highlighted a variety of important issues within their domains, but, as a result, there is a lack of literature that offers a broader assessment across sub-fields to identify how lifestyle journalism may be homogenous or heterogeneous to varying extents.

Four key themes can be identified in the literature on lifestyle journalism: a) the ways in which lifestyle journalism employs strategies of representations and identity formation; b) lifestyle journalism's political and critical dimensions, highlighting ways in which the field can meet ideas of "public quality"; c) the commer-

cial and consumerist aspects of lifestyle journalism, in particular the extent to which commercial aspects influence the production of journalistic work; and d) studies which track the impact of new technologies on lifestyle journalism, identifying a resulting process of democratization of the field.

5.1 Representations and identity in lifestyle journalism

Much of the work that studies lifestyle journalism content approaches the topic from a cultural studies perspective, identifying the dominant discourses that are offered to audiences. For example, travel journalism studies have a relatively extensive tradition of examining the ways in which other cultures are presented. Cocking (2009) has identified a strong replication of orientalist discourses in British newspaper and TV travel journalism on the Middle East. Similarly, Hamid-Turksoy, Kuipers, and Van Zoonen's (2014) study of British newspaper travel sections' representations of Turkey found they created Turkey as an exotic and mysterious place with gorgeous beaches, and orientaling its population. In the process, they argued, "both the linguistic conventions and the representational politics of travel journalism are inclined to commodify countries with new practices of consumerism" (Hamid-Turksoy, Kuipers & Van Zoonen 2014: 743). A study of newspaper travel sections in Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom also found that the determinants for the selection of countries are quite similar to those in foreign news reporting (Hanusch 2014a). This role of cultural mediation is one that is taken seriously by practitioners, with a survey of Australian travel journalists finding that the portrayal of other cultures is a significant component of their role perceptions, even if it is not as important as the desire to provide entertaining and enthusiastic stories about travel. More than two-thirds of journalists, for example, wanted to dispel stereotypes about foreign cultures and explain these cultures to their audiences (Hanusch 2012b).

Notions of representation and especially identity also arise in other fields of lifestyle journalism. Fashion journalism, for example, has long been recognized as promoting certain models of identity to its audiences (Hanusch & Hanitzsch 2013; Rocamora 2012). An analysis of Norwegian women's magazines has similarly argued that their provision of therapeutic discourses has created an ideal of empowered women who take care of themselves, which serves as an identity template for audiences (Madsen & Ytre-Arne 2012). A similar case can be made in food journalism. Here, Johnston and Baumann (2007: 165) examined food writing's role in social status formation, arguing that food writers have significant power "to shape perceptions of food as high quality, fashionable, and worthy of attention from high status consumers". Appadurai's (1988) study of cookbooks, while perhaps not an example of food journalism in the narrowest sense, nevertheless found evidence that such writing contributes to national identity formation. Most recently, Duffy and Yang (2012) have explored the way in which the topic of food in food writing

and general reporting in Singapore contributes quite significantly to the formation and maintenance of a Singaporean national identity that is grounded in multiculturalism.

5.2 Political and critical dimensions of lifestyle journalism

Duffy and Yang's (2012) aforementioned study also ties into the second theme of lifestyle journalism studies, which is concerned with political and critical aspects. Their study of food writing's role in national identity also plays into important political processes, and may therefore serve as an example of Fürsich's argument that focusing on 'public quality' can be important for studying lifestyle journalism. In her studies (see, for example, Fürsich and Avant-Mier 2013; Fürsich 2002), she highlighted how travel and music journalism could and did contribute to public quality in quite important ways. A further case where there is such an opportunity is the fast-growing field of green lifestyle journalism, which has grown out of consumer concerns for the environment. This sub-field is complex in itself, as it is situated within the area of consumption, while at the same time concerned with practices that challenge exactly that order of consumption (Craig 2016). In his analysis of green lifestyle stories in British newspapers' online editions, Craig (2016) identifies two main types of green lifestyle journalism – one which focuses on the pleasures of a green lifestyle, while the other more explicitly links it to political participation and general environment reporting. The first is a "simple epiphenomenon of consumer culture", while the second structurally connects it to "broader political and economic manifestations of environmental change" (Craig 2016: 136).

Related to environmental aspects, McGaurr's work on travel journalism that deals with the Australian island state of Tasmania makes an important contribution to demonstrating how lifestyle journalism can contribute to public quality. In her interviews with foreign travel journalists visiting the state, she found a number of instances where these journalists subverted traditional conventions and engaged in reporting that was critical of environmental issues at the destination (McGaurr 2010, 2012). At the same time, an analysis of Australian travel journalists found that wanting to highlight social or political problems at travel destinations was the least supported role perception among these journalists, with merely one fifth saying it was very or extremely important. Only 45 percent saw it as their role to be critical observers of the tourism industry (Hanusch 2012b).

In terms of a broader view of lifestyle journalists, Hanusch and Hanitzsch's (2013) in-depth interviews with journalists working across a range of lifestyle beats in Australia and Germany revealed that while providing advice and entertainment were arguably most important to them, many at least aspired to traditional critical ideals of journalism. Hanusch and Hanitzsch noted the ways in which lifestyle journalists resented being seen as doing something less than journalism, arguing that they, too, provided an important contribution to society. Usher's (2012) inter-

views with personal technology journalists at *The New York Times* further demonstrated that these journalists see themselves as upholding traditional tenets of journalism, even if they are also providing advice to audiences.

5.3 Commercial and consumerist aspects of lifestyle journalism

These tensions around the provision of critical content in lifestyle journalism tie into another key area of existing work in the field. We have already seen the ways in which lifestyle journalism is closely linked to consumption cultures, making this link a natural entry point for many studies. A number of these analyses have been concerned with shifts over time, highlighting how lifestyle journalism is closely tied to more consumer-oriented content. In China, for example, Chen and Machin (2013) have argued that lifestyle magazines are driving a transition to identities suitable for consumer capitalism. Their analysis of the magazine *Rayli* shows that such magazines focus on consumerist symbols that are largely oriented towards trivial and petty concerns, arguing that this was “not a world of social responsibility or political agency, but a neo-liberal world of enterprising selfhood and consumer-based individualism” (Chen & Machin 2013: 83). Li’s (2012) interviews with Chinese lifestyle journalists suggest that while they could be described as profit- or market-driven, they also still try to provide a service to their audiences. At the same time, industry insiders claimed it was easy to succumb to advertisers’ demands. In Norway, Puijk’s (2012) analysis of the Norwegian public broadcaster NRK’s provision of lifestyle programs has shown that entertaining lifestyle content has increased on television over time, partly as the broadcasting environment became more competitive with the arrival of commercial channels. This has meant even public broadcasters need to submit to the commercial logic to some extent to tie audiences to their organizations. The distinctions between classic and more consumerist approaches can also be seen in the field of cultural journalism, which, as Kristensen and From (2012) argue, is increasingly difficult to discern from lifestyle journalism. In the case of Portugal, Torres da Silva and Santos Silva (2014) have noted different approaches to cultural journalism in a news magazine and its supplement, with the magazine more focused on a classical artistic approach, while the supplement approaches culture more as a service and consumer good. Similarly, an analysis of arts journalism in France, Germany, the Netherlands, and the United States between 1955 and 2005 has observed an increasingly commercial orientation in this field (Verboord & Janssen 2015).

For lifestyle journalists themselves, the tension between traditional ideals and commercial influences is a topic that is oft-debated. As we have seen, the increase in advertising related to lifestyle journalism’s development has undoubtedly created strong tensions, as have simultaneous pressures from public relations. While PR pressures have had a profound impact on journalism across the board, lifestyle journalists experience them even more acutely. For example, a study of German

journalists found that those working on soft news beats such as lifestyle were slightly more strongly influenced by PR in their news coverage, even though the effect size was not great (Obermaier, Koch & Riesmeyer 2015). Australian travel journalists surveyed by Hanusch (2012c) noted that PR professionals exerted significant pressure on their work, but many also saw the positives of this, in that PR material could often provide valuable ideas for their stories. Across lifestyle journalism, most practitioners report advertising and PR as key influences on their work, but some fields appear to be more vulnerable than others. It seems that those working in travel, personal technology, and fashion journalism are most heavily affected in particular by the provision of free products, while commercial influences are stronger in less financially secure organizations (Hanusch, Hanitzsch & Lauerer 2015.).

5.4 Democratizing elements in lifestyle journalism

Finally, a fourth area of study in research on lifestyle journalism relates to developments around new technologies, and the effects these have had, particularly in relation to a perceived democratization of the field. This approach is similar to wider developments in journalism studies, which have been concerned with the fact that new technologies have opened access to the media and enabled consumers to become media producers themselves (Bruns 2005). These trends, including the establishment of online blogs and dedicated specialist websites operated by digital entrepreneurs, have been ongoing in journalism for some time, and are increasingly observed in lifestyle journalism. The online developments have multiplied employment options for aspiring lifestyle journalists in a range of ways, enabling them to make a living online by finding their niche. In her study of online fashion blogs, for example, Rocamora (2012) has highlighted the ways in which this format is increasingly impacting established fashion journalism. She argues that the growing prevalence of such blogs has had a democratizing effect on fashion journalism, enabling a wider variety of labels to be presented and critiqued online. Large media organizations thus cannot dictate anymore which labels will be successful, with the online environment now making media access a lesser concern. In studying online and magazine fashion journalism, Boyd (2015) argues that the field's evolution towards the online environment is creating considerably more diversity in terms of representations as well, with online blogs tending to publish more images of different ethnicities, especially minority women, while also displaying more "curvy" or plus-sized models. Analyses of online developments in other fields come to similar conclusions. Raman and Choudary (2014), for example, note that travel blogs offer an unprecedented open-endedness, which has the potential to open up travel journalism to new and unique practices. They also build communities that are outside the commercialism of mainstream media, thus potentially working against too much of a consumerist approach. Further, a study of

travel bloggers and their audiences has shown that while authors lack traditional journalistic practices, they are still trusted and accepted by their audiences, who particularly value their personal and insider nature (Pirolli 2014).

6 Future directions

While still viewed condescendingly by some journalists and scholars alike, the field of lifestyle journalism is unlikely to disappear anytime soon. In fact, it appears to be a growing field of media work that is also experiencing increasing popularity among practitioners. Countless journalism students aspire to work in lifestyle beats, the number of specialized training courses and even university degrees is growing, and as the field matures, it is becoming increasingly specialized as well. Far from just publishing “fluff”, the scholarly analyses presented in this chapter show that lifestyle journalism certainly has the capacity to make important and even critical contributions to the public sphere. As we have seen, lifestyle journalism is very closely tied to aspects of consumption and identity, and as such can have significant impact on audiences’ lives. Thus, its role needs to be taken seriously; a fact that is increasingly being recognized by researchers. At the same time, the field remains understudied to some extent, with five key areas in need of further sustained scholarly attention.

1. As the literature reviewed in this chapter has shown, there is a shortage of work that conceptualizes lifestyle journalism as a broad field and analyzes it as such. Numerous studies focus on individual sub-fields, such as travel, food, fashion, or music. Future studies should, however, aim to take a more comprehensive approach by combining analyses of these different and at times divergent fields, in order to more deeply explore the differences and similarities among them. As recent work has demonstrated, there are important distinctions between sub-fields, yet our understanding of these is at a very early stage. This requires a comparative approach across sub-fields.
2. A comparative approach is also required on a broader level by comparing lifestyle journalism across different countries in order to better understand the political, economic, social, and cultural contexts in which it operates. Extremely little work exists to this extent, yet comparative studies can significantly enhance our understanding as to, for example, what the conditions best suited to producing lifestyle journalism of public quality are.
3. Much like journalism more generally, new technologies are impacting lifestyle journalism at an unprecedented rate, yet scholarly research on this aspect is at best in its infancy. This chapter has highlighted some studies that have engaged with the impact of the Internet on established practices of lifestyle journalism, in particular through studying blogs. Such studies are still few and far between, however, with the bulk of work focused on traditional media such as newspapers, magazines, and television. Future work needs to inquire more

comprehensively into the impact that the Internet at large, but also tools such as social media may be having on the production and dissemination of lifestyle journalism. A view that sees lifestyle journalism as exclusively the domain of traditional publishers would thus be excluding a significant segment of the field that is increasingly successful in attracting producers and audiences.

4. Longitudinal studies would help our understanding of various development stages of lifestyle journalism, and to what extent it may be entering the mainstream. Some scholars have noted that lifestyle and popular journalism is moving towards the news sections of newspapers (see, for example, Turner 2014), yet our understanding of the history of how and to what extent exactly this may be happening is still extremely limited. Such studies may also be useful to better comprehend the relationship between cultures of consumption and the development of lifestyle journalism.
5. The economic conditions of lifestyle journalism need to be better understood. While many studies are concerned with lifestyle journalism's relationship to larger economic aspects around consumption, there is still precious little work that examines the economic conditions of the field for its practitioners. The enormous economic shifts that have taken place in the media industries – to large extent the result of technological disruption – are having a significant impact on the economics of lifestyle journalism as well, with anecdotal evidence seeing huge increases in the number of freelancers in the field, as well as the importance for new entrants to the field to possess entrepreneurial skills in order to survive financially. These developments are ongoing, and questions need to be asked about the ways in which they are occurring, and what impact they may have on the production and content of lifestyle journalism. The increasingly precarious nature of work in a field that is already closely tied to advertisers' and public relations interests may have considerable impact on what kind of lifestyle journalism may even be capable of producing public quality.

Much remains to be explored, then, in the field of lifestyle journalism as it continues to grow and continues to have enormous impact on journalism at large. Closely tied to broader societal developments, a deeper and more comprehensive analysis of lifestyle journalism will not only allow us to comprehend the field, but, perhaps even more importantly, allow us to better reflect on the impact the field has on political, economic, social, and cultural processes at large.

Further reading

Bell and Hollows' (2005) collection *Ordinary Lifestyles: Popular Media, Consumption and Taste* offers a thorough introduction to the wider field of lifestyle media, while the book *Lifestyle Jour-*

nalism (Hanusch 2014b) contains a number of useful studies of examples of lifestyle journalism, including chapters which provide theoretical advancement for the field. Further, the first part of Hanusch and Hanitzsch's (2013) article "Mediating Orientation and Self-Expression in the World of Consumption" offers a useful theoretical discussion and definition of lifestyle journalism. For specialist analyses of different sub-fields, Bradford's (2015) *Fashion Journalism*, Voss's (2014) *The Food Section*, and Hanusch and Fürsich's (2014) *Travel Journalism* provide valuable starting points.

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VI The Issues of Journalism

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23 Journalism, War, and Peace

Abstract: Scholars have formulated theories about the possible relationships between news coverage and the likelihood of peace or war since at least 1964 with the founding of the *Journal of Peace Research*. The topic seems to have taken on new urgency since the United States invaded Iraq in 2003 and declared a de facto war on terror, and since the world witnessed the Arab Spring. As the technology for waging war has changed, so has the technology for reporting on war and governments' methods for attempting to influence the message. In addition, digital technologies and relatively new non-Western news outlets such as Al Jazeera have allowed more voices to be heard in the global village. But as wars and terrorism continue, some scholars have argued that how journalists cover war actually encourages violence, leading many researchers to seriously consider Johan Galtung's concept of peace journalism. His normative suggestions for journalists have since been debated, expanded, and studied empirically. The precepts of peace journalism include an emphasis on people- vs. elite-oriented reporting and reporting that encompasses explaining the root causes and long-term consequences of violence. They also offer a strong framework for organizing the vast body of research into how conflicts have been framed by elite news organizations within the same country, as well as cross-national comparisons.

Keywords: war journalism, peace journalism, foreign policy, framing analysis, terrorism

1 Introduction

Wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, the protests and revolutions of the Arab Spring, and the ongoing presence of groups such as al-Qaida, the Islamic State and al-Shabab have kept scholars focused on evaluating the news media's coverage of conflicts and factors that influence that coverage. Consider, for example, the introduction of the open access *Conflict & Communication Online* journal in 2002 and the new *Media, War and Conflict* journal in 2008. For its part, *Conflict & Communication Online* regularly publishes issues dedicated to the debate over how to enhance conflict coverage and to empirical evaluations of war and peace journalism. Although international relations scholars associated with the International Crisis Behavior Project (Brecher & Wilkenfeld 2000; Brecher et al. 2017) have taken great care to define various types of interstate crises, communication scholars have tended to be less precise. As a result, this chapter will address research on a range of conflicts, including one or more nation-states' military action against another

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nation-state or a nonstate actor, as well as political violence within a country, whether labeled as a revolution, civil war, or simply internal strife. In addition, although an earlier chapter in this handbook has focused on the rise of citizen journalism, this chapter will focus on the mass media and only address citizen journalism to the extent to which the work of citizen journalists has been promoted by the mass media.

Generally, scholars find that the media fall short of normative obligations to provide independent reporting on foreign policy crises, including the lead-up and execution of wars. In some cases, governments, ranging from the ostensibly democratic to authoritarian, employ direct means to shape news coverage. In other cases, government influences occur indirectly, seemingly by osmosis.

After examining the role of governments, this chapter will review scholars' efforts to evaluate media coverage of war, terrorism, and other violent crises. Research on the performance of elite Western news organizations, as well as numerous cross-national comparisons, will be reviewed. Typically, scholars have undertaken either framing analyses or critical discourse analysis such as that inspired by Said (1978) or Habermas (1979), and some have employed Herman and Chomsky's (2002) propaganda model and Bourdieu's (1998) field theory to explain media content.

Finally, this chapter will explore Johan Galtung's concept of peace journalism, tracing its evolution as a concept, as well as critics' concerns about its adoption. Numerous scholars have undertaken empirical studies to evaluate the presence of peace journalism framing in journalists' reporting, as well as its potential impact on audiences' and journalists' perceptions of its precepts. Those studies will be examined, and the section will conclude with an exploration of peace journalism's potential to serve as an organizational and heuristic framework for future research.

2 Factors that influence content during war and other crises

In normative democratic theory, a government's ability to wage war depends partly on public approval, based on independent, objective information provided by the news media. For many media scholars, the 2003 US-led war on Iraq serves as a prime example of media failing to uphold their professional values of independence and verification, facilitating a US administration determined to wage war on questionable pretenses (Entman 2004; Lynch & McGoldrick 2005; Tunstall 2009).

Scholars have developed numerous theories to explain the news media's limited ability to counter governmental narratives in foreign policy. Those theories include the indexing hypothesis (Bennett 1990) and all its iterations (see, for example, Althaus et al. 1996); the propaganda model (Herman & Chomsky 2002); the

spheres of consensus, legitimate controversy and deviance (Hallin 1986); and the cascading activation model (Entman 2004). These theories involve indirect means of governmental influence on news reporting. Once a military conflict begins, however, governments also use direct means to steer reporting, including embedding journalists with military units, holding numerous press briefings to capture the attention of the 24-hour news cycle and censoring news accounts (Hachten & Scotton 2016). Nonetheless, relatively young media such as Al Jazeera and other digital and social media have been able to counter governments' efforts in some cases.

This section will first examine the indirect and direct influence of government on media during foreign policy crises, then the impact of the changing nature of war combined with the economics of war coverage. Finally, this section will discuss how other digital and social media have been employed by the mass media during crises.

2.1 Indirect and direct governmental influences on foreign policy coverage

To make sense of the government's indirect involvement in foreign policy coverage, several scholars have developed theories that account for the relationship between government and journalism. Bennett (1990) argued that journalists tended to "index" their coverage to the public debates of US policymakers. In other words, the reports featured the main threads of those debates but offered little independent analysis. However, because of journalists' professional norms of objectivity, if US policymakers offered a unified response, then journalists sought contrary viewpoints from non-US officials. Althaus et al. (1996) referred to the phenomenon as "indexing to power", with US sources still dominating. Entman (2004) explained this phenomenon (and the impact on public opinion, which is beyond the scope of this chapter) with his model of cascading network activation. His model places a president and his administration at the top of the flow, giving them the most influence. He concluded that journalists tend to report more on procedural debates – for example, how much leeway a president has to wage war with or without Congress' blessing – than substantive debates, such as what's to be gained or lost by going to war and what other alternatives are available. Similarly, Hallin (1986) uses spheres to explain when journalists, who typically strive for objectivity, feel comfortable questioning foreign policy decisions. He posits three concentric spheres: consensus, legitimate controversy, and deviance. In the sphere of consensus, journalists take basic assumptions – for example, that the United States is a peace-loving, democratic country – for granted. In the sphere of legitimate controversy, much like the indexing hypothesis suggests, journalists report on disagreements between the two political parties. Finally, in the sphere of deviance, journalists feel free to dismiss outliers of public opinion.

Herman and Chomsky's propaganda model (2002) has also been used to explain the outsized influence of the executive branch in influencing the tone of war and conflict coverage. According to the model, both economic and governmental powers have tremendous influence in shaping news coverage due to five factors: the concentration of ownership and wealth in mass media; the media's dependency on advertising for revenue; the media's need for easily accessible expert sources; flak directed at news organizations and journalists who publish narratives that don't match the interests of those in power; and an abhorrence of communism that leads to avoiding coverage that could be perceived as sympathetic. Herman and Chomsky argue: "The elite domination of the media and marginalization of dissidents that results from the operation of these filters occurs so naturally that media news people, frequently operating with complete integrity and goodwill, are able to convince themselves that they choose and interpret the news 'objectively' and on the basis of professional news values" (Herman & Chomsky 2002: 2). In other words, the system of "manufacturing consent" works so well that government does not need to overtly censor or dictate coverage, but the result is the same.

All these theories of government's indirect influence successfully predict the predominant use of US administration sources in US news reporting on foreign-policy crises. One recent example includes elite press reporting on Syria (Cozma & Kozman 2015). In their analysis of conflict coverage in *The New York Times* and *Washington Post*, Cozma and Kozman (2015) found that the most cited sources used in the two newspapers were US officials, followed by international officials.

Of course, US journalists are not the only journalists susceptible to overvaluing their government's claims. Scholars documented the same phenomenon in other countries (see, for example, Al Nahed's (2016) analysis of BBC Arabic's coverage of the 2011 Libyan uprising). Unsurprisingly, news organizations in countries Freedom House says do not have a free press – China and Qatar (home of Al Jazeera), for example – also produce coverage that aligns with the foreign policy of their home country (see, for example, Al Nahed 2016; Abdul-Nabi 2015; Guo et al. 2015; Zhang 2015).

However, government efforts to tailor media coverage do not just occur through indirect channels. Numerous scholars (Seib 2004; Hachten & Scotton 2016) traced the US government's evolving methods of limiting coverage during war, whether by delaying when journalists were allowed access to a combat zone, restricting coverage to pools of reporters or by holding excessive news briefings to capture journalists' time and try to mislead the enemy. With the US invasion of Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq in 2003, the military formalized the practice of embedding journalists – from the US and other countries – with military units. This raised a host of ethical questions, including how journalists can be autonomous and whether they might feel compelled to play a role in combat (Seib 2004). If the practice was designed to create more favorable coverage for the US military, scholars have documented that, indeed, it did. Pfau et al. (2004) found that in major US newspapers,

the stories from embedded journalists were more positive toward the military than the reports from others. Pfau et al. (2005) found similar results when examining the reports of embedded vs. non-embedded broadcast journalists with the national networks. More recently, Chinese journalists embedded with the US military in Afghanistan complained to Zhang (2015) about pressure from US press officers to avoid certain topics and instead publicize stories of the military's choosing. Journalists who did not adhere risked removal.

2.2 Economic, technological, and other influences on war reporting

Changes in technology, as well as economic and safety concerns, have also affected how news organizations report on international crises and military conflict. Although it is beyond the scope of this chapter to address the changing landscape of global news flow, including the impact of the variously defined “CNN effect” (Robinson 2005; Livingston & Eachus 1995) and now the “Al Jazeera effect” (Seib 2008; Ricchiardi 2011), this section will examine how news organizations have responded to economic realities, safety concerns, the growing prevalence of social media, and the work of citizen journalists.

In the US, mainstream news organizations have needed to cover multiple wars, including the war on terror, while also facing declining revenues and increased costs of security. As a result, they have relied more heavily on freelancers instead of full-time employees (Palmer 2015). In 2014, Nieman Reports devoted almost an entire edition to the opportunities, challenges, and risks for freelancers – including a greater probability of being kidnapped and/or killed (see Dyer 2014; Hammer 2014). The greater risks stem partly from the fact that extremist groups no longer need journalists to disseminate their messages; those groups can now send messages directly to a mass audience using social media (Hammer 2014).

The working conditions of freelancers, and all international correspondents, can be better understood through the lens of sociologist Pierre Bourdieu (1998), whose field theory suggests every field needs three types of capital, or resources: cultural, economic, and social. Cultural capital in journalism refers to the accumulation of knowledge and experience that is unique to the field and “encompasses such things as educational credentials, technical expertise, general knowledge, verbal abilities, and artistic sensibilities” (Benson 2006: 189). Economic capital relates directly to financial resources, such as money or assets that have monetary value. Finally, social capital refers to the sum of one's personal network (Vandevordt 2017). In theory, the more capital agents obtain in the field, the more power they have in negotiating their autonomy from external and internal pressures (Schudson 2005). In analyzing Dutch and Flemish reporters covering Syria, Vandevordt (2017) concluded that more economic resources enabled journalists to capture alternative viewpoints and in-depth reports on people's lives. Journalists

with less economic capital were more likely to focus on official statements or breaking news. Vandevordt found that journalists with more social capital, that is, connections in the field, were better able to evaluate their sources' claims, while journalists with less social capital were forced to rely on fixers, local individuals who help negotiate the reporting process.

Vandevordt's findings mesh with the research of Palmer and Fontan (2007), who analyzed journalists' reliance on fixers in the second Iraq war. Few of the French and British journalists spoke Arabic and relied on their fixers for everything from arranging transportation to finding sources and conducting interviews. The fixers were unimpressed with their employers' level of cultural competence. Journalists have reported that the reliance on fixers was largely due to safety concerns (see Garrels 2003; Sites 2007). Although Plaut (2017) credits the BBC with providing its correspondents weeklong courses about staying safe in conflict zones, he notes that journalists covering conflicts in Africa, for example, are often at the mercy of international aid organizations or even rebel groups for information and access to sources.

In another example, Palmer (2015) does not cite Bourdieu directly, but her critical analysis fits nicely with concerns about economic and social capital. She argues that the digital era contributes to freelancers' expendability. With fewer full-time positions available, more journalists are competing for freelance jobs. One could argue that freelancers' social capital fits "somewhere in between the staff correspondent and the amateur 'citizen journalist' on the spectrum of journalistic authority" (Palmer 2015: 228). Because the freelancers are not full-time network employees, she argues, the networks can choose to distance themselves from the freelancers when a narrative becomes politically difficult – in a commercial media market, who wants to show US audiences a US soldier shooting a defenseless Iraqi? Nonetheless, Palmer found that freelancer Kevin Sites was able to use his own digital sphere – his personal blog – to successfully counter the narrative promulgated by NBC News.

When journalists have not had the economic, social, or cultural resources to obtain firsthand accounts from individuals affected by violence, they have often had to supplement their work with reports from citizen journalists. The Syrian conflict that started in 2011 is a perfect example and led to *The New York Times* posting citizen-produced clips on its website (Wall & El Zahed 2015). Ali and Fahmy (2013) argue that citizen journalism has the most impact when it is promulgated within mainstream media content. Although user-generated content could be seen as taking the place of a traditional interview, Ali and Fahmy suggest that media have maintained their gatekeeping roles. In analyzing protests after the Iranian elections in 2009, and repercussions of the Arab Spring in 2011, they concluded: "Social media might have created the opportunity for citizen journalists to get their voices heard, but it was the traditional media's practices of gatekeeping that selected the information that would reach the wider audience" (Ali & Fahmy 2013: 66).

In other contexts, the term "citizen journalist" is used to describe members of the public who have received training from the media and/or nongovernmental

organizations to provide reports on their experiences and/or communities. In the Democratic Republic of Congo, for example, the Association of Media Women of South Kivu trained more than 500 women in rural areas to collaborate with urban journalists to create hundreds of radio programs (García-Mingo 2017). The goal was for the women to be able to tell their own stories of survival.

3 Evaluating war reporting via framing and discourse analysis

3.1 What citizens can learn from elite news organizations

Scholars' conviction that news coverage shapes how citizens and policymakers respond to issues of war and peace has sparked thousands of framing analyses. Framing involves "selecting some aspects of a perceived reality and making them more salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation for the item described" (Entman 1993: 52). In many cases, frames are open-ended, with researchers examining news content about an event or issue for differences that might be predicted by Hallin's spheres model (1986) or Herman and Chomsky's propaganda model (2002). Conflict, human interest, economic impact, morality, and responsibility are common frames for international coverage (Semetko & Valkenburg 2000). Episodic vs. thematic distinctions (Iyengar 1994) and the differences between Eastern and Western framing (Mahony 2010) also have been investigated.

In examining the coverage of elite western news organizations, scholars typically find that the reporting lends itself to allowing citizens to not ask tough questions about official policy. Cozma and Kozman (2015), for example, found that *Washington Post* and *The New York Times* coverage of chemical attacks on Syrian citizens in August 2013 focused on a conflict frame, thereby limiting space for efforts to humanize the story or assess responsibility for the attacks. Although Cozma and Kozman praised the thematic nature of the elite US press coverage, they found that sourcing patterns heavily favored government officials. Syrians on the ground did not especially have their stories told to the American public. Graber (2017) was more critical in his assessment of large US newspapers' coverage of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict. Graber concluded that the largest US newspapers falsely accused Palestinian militants of using human shields. He found the newspapers' reporting "lacking", saying they had "done little to explain to the public the complexities of a highly destructive and deadly region of the world, nuance that could allow citizens to participate more fully in a democratic solution for peace" (Graber 2017: 303). Similarly, Boyd-Barrett (2017) argued that in coverage of the Ukrainian–Russian crisis of 2013–2015, reporters for mainstream Western media such as *The*

New York Times and *Washington Post* offered factually questionable coverage because, as predicted by Herman and Chomsky's propaganda model (2002), they privileged the US government's perspectives and interpretations.

Given the increased prominence of Galtung's concept of peace journalism, it will be discussed in the final section of this chapter. The next section will focus on cross-national research.

3.2 Cross-national comparisons: Are these the same wars?

The comparative literature identifies sourcing, as well as political and cultural context, as significant factors that shape coverage of war. Scholars have found that the news coverage from Western news organizations is more supportive of Western policies than the news coverage from Al Jazeera (Damanhoury & Saleh 2017), a relative newcomer to the international scene. Other researchers have found connections between countries' religious backgrounds and war coverage (Maslog et al. 2006), and significant differences in the language used to describe terrorists (Mahony 2010).

Damanhoury and Saleh (2017) offer a helpful meta-analysis of nine studies comparing Al Jazeera's coverage to that of Western news organizations. Their summary noted that Al Jazeera's coverage was more likely to use Palestinian sources, support Palestinian ideas, use a more critical tone when discussing the military actions of the US and its allies, and to focus more on protesters during the Arab Spring and on Iraqis during the United States' invasion of Iraq. The Western networks – NBC, ABC, CBS, and CNN – all relied more on US military sources during the invasion of Iraq. Similarly, when Al Nahed (2016) compared framing of the 2011 Libyan uprising by BBC Arabic and Al Jazeera Arabic, she concluded that the news coverage reflected their respective home country's national interests. That said, she found the BBC's coverage more balanced, using less emotive language than Al Jazeera.

Religion has also seemed to play a role in coverage. In examining Asian newspapers' coverage of the Iraq war, for example, Maslog et al. (2006) found that support for either the US or the Iraqis varied according to the religion of a newspaper's home country. With one exception, coverage in predominantly Muslim countries favored the Iraqis, while coverage in non-Muslim countries favored the US. The dominant religion in a country also appears to affect the language used to describe terrorists. Mahony (2010) chose theories of racism, Said's Orientalism, and cultural hegemony for her critical discourse analysis of Australian vs. Indonesian coverage of terror attacks in Indonesia to explain "the ways in which social hierarchies and power are naturalized and reproduced in discourse, through the Othering of particular social groups" (Mahony 2010: 741). She found that Australian coverage of the bombings contributed to negative stereotypes about Muslims, a group she argues is already the most marginalized in Australia. The Australian coverage omitted key

pieces of context and tended to add the words “Islamic” or “Muslim” to modify the words “extremists” or “radicals”. The Indonesian press did not use religion as an identifier for the perpetrators. Mahony discussed her findings in light of Galtung’s (2000) recommended practice of peace journalism, a model gaining scholarly attention in conflict and war reporting (for example, see Lee & Maslog 2005; Maslog et al. 2006; Lee et al. 2006).

4 Peace journalism

Johan Galtung’s basic premise is that journalists who use peace journalism framing increase the odds of peaceful resolutions, while journalists who employ war journalism framing do the opposite. Numerous scholars have raised ethical and practical concerns related to peace journalism, and others have used Galtung’s framework to evaluate conflict coverage. This section will explain and trace the history of the peace journalism concept, and then summarize scholars’ critiques of the concept, as well as provide examples of researchers’ efforts to analyze content, audience perceptions, and journalists’ perceptions. Finally, this chapter will show how peace journalism serves as an important heuristic device for organizing and understanding war coverage. Distinguishing between peace and war journalism, for example, requires scholars to scrutinize journalists’ use of sources and language, as well as their ability to objectively evaluate claims made by all sides in war.

Galtung has promoted the peace journalism concept since the 1960s (Youngblood 2017) and founded the *Journal of Peace Research* in 1964. Through his work, he has distinguished between peace and war journalism, arguing that the latter is the most prevalent type of conflict reporting. As a framework of conflict coverage, war journalism reflects the privileging of official sourcing, nationalism, and violence. Conversely, peace journalism reports on the root causes and long-term consequences of war, not just the episodic “here and now”; it reports on the impact on culture and society, not just the visible effects of death and destruction; it gives voice to the people, not just the powerful; it avoids dichotomizing between us vs. them or the good guys and bad guys; it tells the truth about all sides involved in the conflict; it uses language carefully to avoid taking sides, avoid exaggeration, and avoid victimization; it points to areas where the parties to a conflict agree, not just those areas where they disagree (Galtung & Vincent 1992). Proponents argue that peace journalism also contributes to avoiding direct violence by addressing two other types of violence – structural and cultural – before direct violence erupts. Structural violence emphasizes the consequences of power in society, showing the inequalities citizens face in terms of access to basic resources (Ho 2007). Cultural violence, on the other hand, manifests itself through religion, language, art, information, and entertainment, reinforcing power inequalities in society (Galtung 1990; Youngblood 2017).

Galtung's work has been championed and extended by journalists-turned-scholars Jake Lynch and Annabel McGoldrick, who published the book *Peace Journalism* (2005) to outline the main principles of the movement. In addition, the Center for Global Peace Journalism promotes the movement through seminars, lectures, and conferences, as well as *The Peace Journalist* magazine, launched in 2012. Although the basic tenets of peace journalism might sound, as McGoldrick and Lynch (2000) say, like journalism that is holistic, analytical, ethical, or constructive, several scholars have taken issue with the practice. Their concerns will be addressed next.

4.1 Critiques of peace journalism

Hanitzsch (2004) is one of the most prominent detractors of peace journalism. He questions the assumption that peace journalists would be more objective than war journalists, noting that no one person can report the one true version of reality as all reporting is based on selection. In addition, he argues that the advocates of peace journalism overstate journalism's potential impact on society and states that journalism's main duty is to inform, not to take responsibility for fixing the world's problems. However, peace journalism advocates argue that journalism perhaps unwittingly plays an active role in the creation, exacerbation, development, and maintenance of conflict – a role journalists could change. Peleg (2006), for instance, says journalism must serve as a mediator between parties in conflict.

Hanitzsch (2004) agrees that journalists should provide background and context; he considers that the job of all good journalism. In addition, he argues that journalists should report the news they have and not withhold information for fear of how the public might react. "If journalists do not report even on controversial issues, the subsequent information vacuum may be filled by other communicators such as PR people, politicians, military spokespersons, demagogues, radicals, fanatics and others who distribute information from a highly partial stance" (Hanitzsch 2004: 171–172). In response to this criticism, Lynch and McGoldrick (2005) argue that peace journalism does not call for withholding information but urges journalists to be reflective – that is, to consider why a source would want the information released – to confirm the information if possible, to explain to audiences if the information cannot be confirmed, and to report the actions of all sides in conflicts.

Another critic of peace journalism says that the news values of traditional journalism are incompatible with the news values of peace journalism. Wolfsfeld (1997) argues that the process of negotiating peace is too slow, too complex and too secretive to meet the needs of journalists who want to cover breaking news. Lynch and McGoldrick (2005) take issue, however, with assuming that officials negotiating behind closed doors will be able to secure peace. In the meantime, the peace journalism advocates would want journalists to keep reporting on people's lives.

Regardless of where one stands on peace journalism as a normative framework or media theory, scholars have invested considerable energy recently studying the approach. Empirical studies have primarily focused on analyzing content, both visual and textual, and a handful of studies have also investigated effects on audiences' and journalists' perceptions of the characteristics associated with peace and war journalism. These studies will be addressed in the next section.

4.2 Empirical analyses of peace journalism: news content, audience reactions and journalists' perceptions

Early studies on peace journalism focused on coding news stories and visual images for various characteristics of war vs. peace journalism framing suggested by Galtung. Important variables appear to be the proximity of a conflict, the degree of involvement of a news organization's home country; the type of content (news vs. editorial); and the type publication.

As for the proximity of a conflict, Lee and Maslog (2005) determined that war framing dominated Asian newspapers' coverage of conflicts in their region, while Maslog et al. (2006) found that Asian newspapers' coverage of the US war in Iraq tended slightly toward peace journalism. For Al Jazeera Arabic and Al Jazeera English, coverage of other Middle Eastern conflicts – those in Syria and Bahrain – showed war journalism framing (Abdul-Nabi 2015). Similarly, Turkish newspapers reporting on two jets, one Turkish and one Syrian, being shot down by the other country's army, used war journalism framing. The results suggest journalists find it difficult to avoid us vs. them framing, the more they or their news organizations identify with "us".

The type of news content also seems to affect the framing. When gatekeepers at the Asian newspapers selected hard news stories from wire services, those stories were more likely to have a war journalism frame (Lee & Maslog 2005), while feature/opinion pieces were more likely to display peace journalism framing (Lee et al. 2006). The feature and opinion pieces likely allowed more room for nuance and context. In examining visual images of the Syrian conflict from 2011–2012, Greenwood and Jenkins (2015) determined that public affairs magazines were more likely to show photographs related to peace framing.

In addition to analyzing how coverage is framed, some scholars have investigated the impact of peace vs. war journalism framing on audiences. In these studies, the researchers have manipulated content and measured audience reactions in controlled settings. Schaefer (2006) altered texts to promote either the escalation or de-escalation of conflict, and found that readers of the de-escalation-oriented texts were less likely to favor military responses. McGoldrick and Lynch (2016) conducted a similar study using video and found that stories with a strong protagonist – someone to humanize a particular issue – "prompted and equipped participants to engage with unfamiliar arguments; arguments that challenged

propaganda and dominant frames and narratives” (McGoldrick & Lynch 2016: 635). Of course, whether individuals – or policymakers – would seek out and pay attention to these type of news stories during the course of their everyday lives is another question.

Another important question is how those actually practicing journalism view the peace journalism movement and/or its basic principles. Neumann and Fahmy (2016) surveyed members of The Pulitzer Center on Crisis Reporting and found that the journalists found it equally important to report on the visible and invisible effects (including sociocultural damage and psychological harm) of conflict. Neumann and Fahmy did not explicitly tell the respondents they were studying attitudes toward peace vs. war journalism, so it remains unclear what percentage of journalists have heard about the peace journalism model. Overall, however, the journalists surveyed expressed higher agreement with the peace journalism traits presented. Interestingly, journalists with more experience covering conflict placed greater value on the peace journalism traits with one exception: They were more likely to report on differences than agreements. That said, Neumann and Fahmy found that journalists covering the Middle East put less value on explaining the root causes of a conflict and covering its aftermath.

While the journalists surveyed by Neumann and Fahmy generally reported for fairly large, mainstream Western news organizations, García-Mingo (2017) interviewed “mamas in the newsroom”, professional and citizen female journalists working for small radio stations in the Democratic Republic of Congo. These women had already explicitly signed on for stations with peace journalism missions, but García-Mingo wanted to see how they perceived their journalistic role. She concluded that they chose an activist role in seeking out and telling the stories of women affected by sexual violence during armed conflict. However, Frère’s research in neighboring Burundi illustrates the profound impact political context can have on journalists’ role perceptions. Frère notes: “Even though every single journalist was affected by the war in his personal life, professionalism [in January 2015] seemed to be about succeeding in overcoming one’s own story to be able to listen to and understand all the perspectives in the Burundian society” (Frère 2017: 11). After a coup attempt in May 2015 that resulted in about 80 journalists being kicked out of the country, the exiled journalists felt their task impossible.

4.3 Peace journalism as an organizational and heuristic framework

Unlike Bourdieu’s theory of capital specific to the journalistic field or Herman and Chomsky’s propaganda model, peace journalism is not a theory capable of explaining or predicting media content – the work journalists produce. Galtung’s model does, however, give a name to content Herman and Chomsky’s model predicts: war journalism. Whether the implementation of the peace journalism model can help

predict peace or violence likely depends on multiple factors, including the gravity of the conflict. Do journalists want that responsibility? Quite reasonably, Hanitzch (2004) argues no. Nevertheless, the peace journalism model presents a normative model for conflict coverage and important variables to consider in evaluating content. In that vein, the peace journalism model also serves as a heuristic device and organizing principle for exploring the work of journalists in combat zones, as well as in situations that involve structural or cultural violence. In particular, researchers can evaluate content based on the following: Does the reporting (or the research) elucidate the causes and consequences of war? Do journalists work to verify the claims of all sides, or have they fallen prey to propaganda? Have journalists carefully chosen their language so as to convey facts as neutrally as possible and avoid demonization of the “other”? Have journalists allowed citizens and their concerns to be heard in a meaningful way? Each of these questions highlights the need to continually evaluate coverage in the hopes of helping journalists raise their standards and counter propaganda.

For example, peace journalism’s emphasis on tracing the causes and consequences of conflict provides a helpful framework for evaluating war coverage. The precursors to war often get scant attention from news organizations, especially as legacy news media have closed many of their bureaus across the world. “Arriving late, journalists cover the aftermath of the explosion, not the causes leading to it and not in a timely way that might have alerted the world in time to snuff out the fuse”, states Seib (2004: 24). Of course, Lynch and McGoldrick (2005) acknowledge, how far back one would need to go for sufficient context is a debatable point for each crisis. They argue that the precursor of the US invasion of Iraq could be traced back to any number of dates, including 1096, the first crusade. When Abdul-Nabi (2015) analyzed 2011 events in Syria and Bahrain, she evaluated the coverage based on contextual factors dating from the 1920s in the case of Bahrain & from 1982 in the case of Syria. How often – and how deeply – do journalists provide or make available (via hyperlinks in digital stories, for example) the historical context necessary to make sense of a conflict? More important, could more explanation help nation-states avoid violent conflicts?

Just as researchers fault journalists sometimes for neglecting to provide adequate context leading up to a war, peace journalism also offers a reminder to hold news organizations accountable for “staying on” and reporting the long-term consequences of war. Bachman (2017) faults *The New York Times* and *Washington Post* for downplaying the impact of US drone strikes in Pakistan and Yemen, noting that the strikes have led to economic, psychological, and cultural damage that is under-covered as civilians are rarely mentioned compared to those targeted by a strike. Incidentally, when Bachman contacted the *Washington Post*, an editor justified not running a correction because the paper had relied on information provided by official sources and could not independently verify the information. The example supports Chomsky and Herman’s propaganda model, but also illustrates the value of researchers and journalists asking more questions to counter propaganda.

The peace journalism model also points to another important research area: the lingering consequences of war for journalists. Some research has documented post-traumatic stress syndrome among correspondents (McGoldrick 2011), and others suggest researchers take seriously the relationship between role perception and practice in a post-conflict society (Andresen, Hoxha & Godole 2017). In examining *Worlds of Journalism* survey data for journalists in the Western Balkans, they found that journalists believe they should play an expanded, more activist role in helping their countries transition into full democracies. In another study, Jungblut and Hoxha (2017) examined the growing acceptance of self-censorship in the post-conflict societies of Macedonia, Kosovo, and Serbia. In the Democratic Republic of Congo, where a peace treaty was signed in 2003, women have been “developing various and simultaneous roles as journalists, political actors, international human rights activists and mothers” (García-Mingo 2017: 217). Also in Africa, Frère (2017) has analyzed how journalists in the post-conflict country of Burundi have had to redefine their roles as the political climate in the country again deteriorates. During Burundi’s civil war from 1993 to 2003, the United Nations and other groups helped create radio stations at which Hutu and Tutsi journalists could work together on peace journalism efforts. After a 2015 coup attempt, Frère (2017) found that exiled journalists, worried about their personal and financial security, felt helpless, undermining “the psychological basis for joint actions around professional shared values” (Frère 2017: 20). More research is needed on how best to help journalists struggling under authoritarianism in a post-conflict society and to understand the impact of those struggles on their work – and their countries’ potential for long-term peace.

In addition to underscoring the need to continue reporting and researching about conflicts’ effects on society, the peace journalism model also calls for journalists to report truth, not propaganda. While Herman and Chomsky’s model explains how relatively easily propaganda can be spread even through a seemingly free and objective press, advocates of peace journalism emphatically ask journalists to be wary of propaganda. Although the numerous studies critical of journalists’ performance can be daunting – the wars and studies seem to keep coming – the critical analysis of journalists’ work must continue. Without those analyses, the propaganda could be spread that much more easily. The peace journalism model requires journalists to assess the claims of all sides in conflicts and not to give preferential treatment or deference to their own side. The work of Graber (2017), who used Habermasian discourse analysis to study coverage of the 2014 Gaza War, aligns nicely with that element of peace journalism, as do the studies on drone coverage (Bachman 2017; Ahmad 2016).

Countering propaganda also requires questioning assumptions. For his part, Seib (2004) asks that journalists take seriously their watchdog role and ask US officials tough questions: What’s an acceptable ratio of civilian to militant casualties? When officials cite national security when refusing to release information, are

they really worried more about their own political security? Seib (2004) argues that news organizations also have an obligation to question the legitimacy of tactics, such as torture and “targeted killings”, used to fight terrorism. For Bachman (2017) and Ahmad (2016), US journalists have not asked enough questions and have been too willing to accept US military statements about death tolls. As for international human rights and other legal issues related to the drone strikes, Bachman (2017) carefully documents the complex rules for engagement and legal debates regarding the strikes, then determines that only a handful of stories in two elite US newspapers ever mentioned human rights or human rights law. Acknowledging and pinpointing the deficiency is the first step to addressing it.

Another method for countering propaganda is through an increased reliance on unofficial sources to capture the nature of everyday life for those affected by conflict. Galtung (2000) and Lynch and McGoldrick (2005) draw on the literature of conflict resolution in their call for journalists to invest more time reporting the needs, wants, and daily lives of ordinary citizens and less time reporting what officials, the elite, say. The premise is that people on the ground know better what they need than do officials who might have a different agenda. Galtung’s call for people-oriented reporting comes as dozens of studies, if not more, have shown journalists’ tendency to rely heavily on official sources. This reliance has been called everything from indexing (Bennett 1990) to manufacturing consent (Herman & Chomsky 2002). The result is journalism that privileges – and helps preserve – those in power.

The mandate for truth telling extends beyond providing counter narratives of government propaganda. It also requires the journalist use precise language (Lynch & McGoldrick 2005). Again, the peace journalism framework serves as a strong heuristic by asking scholars and journalists to analyze and reflect more on the use of various words. Indeed, Boyd-Barrett (2017) calls out a *Washington Post* reporter for referring to protesters in eastern Ukraine as “terrorists” (Boyd-Barrett 2017: 1023). Al Nahed (2016) does not refer to peace journalism in her study of BBC Arabic and Al Jazeera’s framing of the Libyan uprising, but she does carefully notice the networks’ linguistic choices. A majority of Al Jazeera’s stories used the Arabic word for “revolutionaries” to refer to those trying to overthrow Moammar Gaddafi, while the BBC never used the word. Al Nahed states: “The significance of this explicit [revolutionary] framing is that it lends legitimacy to the movement, and its aims and demands” (Al Nahed 2016: 130). A BBC correspondent told her the BBC staff were told not to use the word “revolution” or “revolutionaries” “as doing so would indicate bias” (Al Nahed 2016: 130).

Proponents of peace journalism also call for nuanced reporting that captures the complexity of those involved in conflict, noting that news reports that demonize “the other” can contribute to fatal violence. Indeed, such was the case in the Rwandan genocide and in the former Yugoslavia. One way to avoid demonizing “the other” is to include their voices in reporting. Based on a content analysis

comparing professional and nonprofessional publications' coverage of the Northern Ireland conflict, Armoudian (2015) argued that the norms of professional journalism contribute to more tempered coverage. Again, although Al Nahed (2016) did not refer to peace journalism, her detailed framing analysis did capture the ways in which she believed Al Jazeera Arabic demonized Moammar Gaddafi in its coverage of the Libyan uprising by allowing guests on its shows to call Gaddafi a dictator, murderer, tyrant and the like, as well as comparing him to Israel, "an analogy that would be especially effective in demonizing the Libyan leader in the eyes of Arab audiences, due to widespread support for the Palestinian cause" (Armoudian 2015: 133).

5 Conclusion

Working to understand how journalists cover conflict and foreign policy is by no means a new undertaking for scholars, but even seemingly radical changes in technology, such as citizen and digital journalism, do not seem to have altered a basic premise: News media in stable countries tend to produce coverage that supports their own countries during crises, in part by relying on official sources. Herman and Chomsky would not be surprised. While their propaganda model successfully predicts the media's role in helping to manufacture consent, the peace journalism model suggests concrete ways for journalists to counter propaganda and numerous yardsticks by which scholars – and the public – can evaluate pre, during, and post-conflict news coverage. Have journalists tried to report the causes and consequences of violence, whether direct, structural, or cultural? Have journalists worked to ensure they are telling the stories of real people? Have they worked to verify officials' claims? Whether journalists have the resources to do this vital work is another question.

In many ways, Bourdieu's concept of economic, social, and cultural capital is helpful in identifying the type of resources needed. Limited economic resources help explain journalism's tendency toward war journalism. For example, with limited resources and their existing business models, news organizations cannot afford to permanently station as many correspondents in fixed locations across the globe. Instead, they reposition as necessary to respond when violent crises erupt. But journalists also need more cultural capital, both in terms of better understanding other cultures and in terms of learning to question assumptions made about their own. Future research into coverage of conflict and war could benefit from the partnership of field theory and peace journalism, especially as it compares the peace journalism framework to the cultural capital of the journalistic field. In other words, research could explore how peace journalism supports the presuppositions of the field.

Further reading

In *Peace Journalism*, Lynch and McGoldrick (2005) offer an in-depth explanation of how the principles of conflict analysis can be extended to reporting on war and other crises. Like Seib (2004), their primer provides a normative framework for evaluating journalists' work. Vandevordt (2017) draws on the ideas of sociologist Pierre Bourdieu (1998) to explain the impact of economic, cultural, and social capital in the field. The importance of such capital resonates in the heart-breaking analysis of journalists' perceptions of themselves in post-conflict Burundi (Frère 2017). From a peace journalism perspective, Ho (2007) and Youngblood (2017) illustrate how journalistic work could contribute to avoiding violent conflict by focusing on the structural and cultural conflict that precedes violence.

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24 Journalism, Censorship, and Press Freedom

Abstract: Press freedom and censorship demands new empirical as well as conceptual research that responds to the diversity of media systems that cannot be captured within binary free/unfree categories. This article surveys threats to press freedom emanating from the state, the market, and the people. Direct state censorship still exists, but most states rely increasingly on more subtle and indirect means of media control. Market forces, including media owners, are another source of restriction. The problem of self-censorship, usually operating through economic pressure, is widespread and pernicious, but inadequately theorized. Tensions between journalism and the public surface in populist opposition to the media's attempts to defend minority rights. In such cases, the press can find itself needing to resist the very people in whose name it exercises its democratic role. These complications require journalism scholars to rethink the normative frameworks and assumptions underlying studies of press freedom. This article argues for a rights-based approach that treats public discourse – and not media organizations or media workers – as the prime object of press freedom.

Keywords: freedom of expression, media control, populism, self-censorship

Journalism's role in providing people with the information and ideas they need for collective self-government could be said to have reached the status of a universally definitive norm. This is not to claim that everyone agrees that journalism should dedicate itself to empowering citizens. The official ideology of the People's Republic of China, to cite just one gargantuan exception, continues to hold that media should serve as the mouthpiece of the Communist Party. Nor is it the case that actually-existing journalism everywhere lives up to the standards that democratic norms prescribe. In all societies, it falls short, due to a mix of external and internal constraints. According to Freedom House (2016: 1), only 13 percent of the world's population live in societies where "coverage of political news is robust, the safety of journalists is guaranteed, state intrusion in media affairs is minimal, and the press is not subject to onerous legal or economic pressures". And even in supposedly free societies, it is hardly the case that journalism serves every class, colour, or creed with equal fidelity.

Nevertheless, in the same sense that Amartya Sen (1999) has described democracy as having arrived as a universal value – everyone everywhere has good reason to accept it – it would not be farfetched to claim that it can now be taken for granted that the democratic mission is a core, even definitive, value of journalism.

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We can think of journalism as an activity that generates information and ideas about current events; produced through observation, investigation, and analysis; in order to serve people's need to cope with change and engage in collective self-government. The normative tail end of this definition, addressing the "why" of journalism, is rooted in the democratic assumption that broad participation in public life and open discussion of matters of public interest is superior to autocratic forms of social organization.

This article considers the issue of press freedom from that democratic perspective. Journalism needs autonomy from government if it is to fulfil its duty to help citizens hold the government to account and to inform them about their political choices. Therefore, the human right to freedom of expression has special significance for journalism. That right – as enshrined in Article 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights as well as in regional human rights conventions and democracies' national constitutions – is not unlimited or absolute. But neither is its application left to the whims of those in power. Human rights norms require, first, that any restriction on free speech follows written laws that are clear to all and overseen by independent courts. Second, restrictions are only permissible on a narrow set of grounds. Article 19 specifies a closed-ended list of legitimate reasons: for "respect of the rights or reputations of others"; and for "the protection of national security or of public order (*ordre public*), or of public health or morals". Third, state actions must avoid overkill – the chosen restrictions must be necessary for achieving the stated goal, and proportionate to the task. Based on this three-part test, arbitrary arrests of journalists, forced closures of newspapers, and blocking of news sites would amount to violations of freedom of expression. Restrictions aimed at shielding government from insult or maintaining subjectively defined social harmony are almost always unwarranted as well. Defamation can be legitimately restricted, but the principle of necessity demands that it be treated as a civil matter and not subject to criminal prosecution (La Rue 2010; UN Human Rights Committee 2011).

There are other aspects of press freedom and censorship that are less obvious. A broad spectrum of media systems has been entering our consciousness since the post-1990s disintegration of the Cold War binary categorization of free and unfree systems (which was a caricature even at the time). Most countries are now democratic in the minimalist sense of conducting regular elections; but most of them cannot be described as liberal (Schedler 2006; Diamond 2015). Similarly, while the proportion of countries whose press systems were rated "not free" by Freedom House has fallen from more than half in the mid-1980s to around one-third since the 1990s, the rest of the countries do not all have "free" media environments (Dunham, Nelson & Aghekyan 2015). Instead, the largest single category since 2011 has been "partly free" (around 36 percent). The simultaneous proliferation of partly free media systems and semi-democratic (or electoral authoritarian) political regimes is more than coincidental. Both are the result of the same contradictory

pulls: the growing domestic and international demands for democratic concessions, and the perpetual desire of ruling elites to maintain their grip on power. On the one hand, states cannot deny the powerful legitimacy that public accountability provides; on the other, they are keen to reduce the uncertainty that follows freedom of choice (Schedler 2002).

In the field of comparative politics, there has been growing interest in the notion of authoritarian resilience, which treats as a serious analytical challenge the reality that many non-liberal regimes have been able to resist democratization or at least dampen its effects (Nathan 2003; Heydemann & Leenders 2011; Gallagher & Hanson 2013). The focus of such work is not on extreme cases such as North Korea, but on the much larger set of regimes that seem to be able to sustain their political systems without descending to pariah status. Such states have been able to draw on a wide “menu of manipulation” to reduce of the risk of losing power through the ballot box (Schedler 2002). Interfering with media freedom – without necessarily crushing it entirely – is part of that menu, as a way of suppressing both the demand and supply sides of democratic choice.

Scholars and media freedom defenders are still catching up with the task of documenting and analysing the many non-obvious ways in which powerful interests attempt to thwart journalism’s democratic mission. On top of this empirical challenge is a conceptual complication. There are different theories of democracy; each of these makes different demands of journalism. These, in turn, require different enabling environments and are sensitive to different threats. For example, in elite-pluralist views of democracy, the concentration of media power in large, establishment news corporations could be welcomed as a useful counterbalance to state power. In contrast, more deliberative and radical theories of democracy emphasize the need to widen and deepen citizen participation in public affairs, for which small, alternative media play a vital role. These divergent perspectives generate different ideas about what press freedom is for and what the main threats to it are.

This article tries to address such conceptual complexities. The first section looks at the state. It highlights how government restrictions on media have become subtler and less direct, posing a challenge for press freedom monitors. In the second section, I examine the threat posed by market forces, including media owners. I reflect on the problem of “self-censorship”, which many regard as widespread and pernicious, but which has been insufficiently theorized. The third section considers tensions between journalism and the public. In many contexts, populist pressures exert an anti-democratic force on the media, either in concert with or independent of states and markets. Ironically, the press can find itself needing to resist the very people in whose name it exercises its democratic role. I conclude by arguing that each of these complications and contradictions requires journalism scholars to be more explicit about the normative frameworks and assumptions underlying studies of press freedom.

1 Government: calibrated censorship and coercion

For centuries, press freedom has been defined in relation to the interventions by church and state against which the Enlightenment revolted in Europe and America. Among them were prior restraints on publishing, through the licensing of newspapers and the vetting of articles before printing. Other harsh measures included the use of sedition and blasphemy laws to jail, torture, or execute critics of the powerful, aided by courts that were strangers to the notion of individual human rights. Attuned to such threats, the classic liberal – and lay – perspective continues to view censorship as “external, coercive, and repressive”, notes Bunn (2015: 29). In this view, “Censors are authoritative social actors, extrinsic to the communicative process, who deploy coercive force to intervene in the free exchange of ideas to repressive effect.”

These types of state restriction are now virtually unheard of in liberal democracies. As a result, critical scholarship in the West since Marx has focused on more structural, internalized systems of ideological control (Foucault 1990; Bourdieu 1993). I’ll touch on these insights in later sections. But it is important not to lose sight of the fact that the state remains a major obstacle to press freedom for most of the world’s citizens. Arbitrary newspaper licensing systems remain in place in the electoral authoritarian regimes of Malaysia and Singapore, for example. Only in 2012 did Myanmar end its vetting system, under which newspapers had to fax its typeset pages to government censors before running their presses. The imprisonment of journalists is a regular occurrence in Egypt and Turkey.

Methods of censorship have evolved. The best publicized are those that are the most coercive and repressive. However, brutal and bloody censorship is not what most repressive governments do, most of the time. Spectacular repression may appeal to regimes that only know how to rule through fear and have zero tolerance for dissenting views. But most states, even more autocratic ones, exercise some discretion in their use of force, relying on a mix of methods to sustain their grip on power. This may be partly because they understand the practical futility of trying to engage in total information control. Besides, astute repressive governments recognize that indiscriminately stifling news media can hurt themselves, not least by denying their own officials valuable intelligence about prevailing public opinion and the state of affairs in the country. Furthermore, domination is more likely to endure when it is more hegemonic – such that violence, while underwriting power, is not routinely dispensed (Arendt 1970). Flagrant censorship can backfire by generating public outrage around which opponents can mobilize (Jansen & Martin 2003). Especially since the ascendance of democracy and press freedom as global norms in the late 20th century, engaging in obvious suppression of speech also incurs reputational costs for states.

Hegemonic repressive regimes therefore find it in their interest to engage in “calibrated coercion”, exercising just enough pressure to get the job done (George

2007). Just as they pick from a wide menu of manipulation to take the sting out of democratic choice, states are able to select various methods to limit the impact of the press. “Instead of relying on brute force and direct control, they use stealth, manipulations, and subterfuge,” notes Simon (2015: 32). These methods include:

Denial of public funds and facilities. Critical media in Argentina, Romania, and South Africa have been punished by being denied government advertising. Subsidies and access to state printers are other resources than can be withheld (Open Society Justice Initiative 2005; Podesta 2009).

Pressure on advertisers. Government can dissuade businesses from advertising in certain media outlets, choking their main source of revenue. Outspoken newspapers in Hong Kong’s otherwise free media system have suffered this fate (Ma 2007).

Harassment through regulation. The selective enforcement of tax rules, labour regulations and other laws is used to bully non-cooperative media outlets. Such abuses have been observed in Ukraine, for instance (Ryabinska 2011).

Silencing through surveillance. Wiretapping and other surveillance activities, ostensibly for anti-terrorism operations, can have a chilling effect on the press. This has discouraged independent reporting in Turkey, for example (Yesil 2014).

Governments’ censorship policies and practices in the 21st century can be understood as attempts to have their cake and eat it too, so to speak. They apply censorship as “a means that authorities use to authorize normative systems” (Jansen 2015: 57); at the same time, they want a reasonably free flow of information and ideas, to maintain their legitimacy and capacity to govern. The vast majority of today’s regimes cannot be described as totalitarian, either in intent or in effect. They do not aim to control the citizen’s every thought, word, and action. Instead, their calibrated coercion of media is targeted and selective, seemingly tolerant of some expression while controlling others. The pattern may seem internally contradictory, but it is precisely the freedoms conceded to media and society in *general* that allow the state to get away with the *particular* restrictions it places on expression that pose a political threat.

One of the analytical challenges facing scholars of censorship is to locate the logic that may lie behind governments’ seemingly arbitrary decisions. State censorship of journalism may discriminate by genre, audience, and geography, as well as the scope and potential impact of the journalists’ critiques.

Genre differentiation is fairly common. Tight control of news often coexists with liberalization of entertainment media. The neoliberal wave of the 1990s saw many states give up their monopolies over broadcasting and encourage a proliferation of commercial free-to-air and cable and satellite channels. In many cases, including China and Malaysia, the resulting pluralization was largely limited to entertainment programming. While this in itself certainly addressed a real market demand, it may have contributed to authoritarian resilience by distracting and depoliticizing the public.

An example of audience differentiation in censorship is when states grant significant autonomy to elite, urban newspapers and political websites, while tightly

controlling the radio and television outlets from which the majority of citizens get their information. The elite/mass distinction in media controls has been observed in Russia, for example (Simon 2015). Such segmentation is easier when it is reinforced by linguistic divides, like when English is used only by highly educated city-dwellers. In such situations, elite English-language newspapers may contain enough critical news coverage to satisfy cosmopolitan urbanites, the expatriate business community, and foreign journalists and diplomats. But these media operate in a bubble, with little influence on the regime's mass base in the heartlands, where tightly regulated media in local languages hold sway.

Similarly, many repressive governments allow more latitude to business news outlets than to general news media. The former have a smaller, more elite audience and are perceived not to have a major impact on broader public opinion. Such subject-matter differentiation helps to explain how regimes are able to sustain a vibrant business sector within a politically closed environment. Conventional wisdom suggests that businesses require a certain level of transparency, without which investments would go elsewhere. However, the kinds of transparency that commercial enterprises need are not the same as the openness required for political accountability (Kaufmann & Bellver 2005; Williams 2015). It is therefore possible for states to parse transparency, providing sufficient economic information to satisfy the corporate sector even as they continue to restrict the political transparency that would empower opposition to the regime (Rodan 2004).

Geographic differentiation in censorship policies is a feature of large countries with localized areas of conflict and political instability. The media may enjoy free rein in the capital and main population centres but be saddled with severe restrictions when trying to report on the troublespots that are most desperately in need of the independent scrutiny of journalists and human rights monitors. Journalists' routine newsgathering activities may be punished under anti-terrorism laws, or they may be denied access to these areas altogether (Simon 2015; Joshi 2004). At the time of writing, examples of these no-go areas included Kashmir in India, Rakhine state in Myanmar, Balochistan in Pakistan, and Russian-occupied Crimea.

Similarly, repressive regimes do not need to extinguish all watchdog journalism – the hallmark of a free press – if they can instead contain the media's exposés within politically safe bounds. Governments therefore engage in hierarchically differentiated censorship. For example, journalists in China are allowed to engage in episodic reportage of lower-level misdeeds while systemic critiques that implicate top leaders remain forbidden, especially during times of rising social tension (Lorentzen 2014). Indeed, investigative journalism that highlights corruption and other failures at lower levels of government can help the regime sustain itself (Egorov, Guriev & Sonin 2009), including by neutralizing opponents within the establishment.

Another common strategy is to discriminate between individual and organized communication, a distinction that the Internet has made especially germane. The

rollout of the Internet has required states to make significant concessions to free speech. States can no longer expect to suppress information and ideas as effectively as they did in the pre-digital age. But those that have no desire to transform themselves into liberal democracies have tried to mount a tactical retreat instead of declaring total surrender to the liberating force of the Internet. Since individual self-expression does not necessarily pose a threat until it is organized and mobilized, states can allow most critical comments on social media to go unpunished. They focus instead on the suppression of collective action, as scholars of China's censorship have found (King, Pan & Roberts 2013). A similar logic may apply to the regulation of critical journalism. Most individually-run blogs and other forms of citizen reporting, while certainly adding to media diversity, are not as impactful as more organized journalistic endeavours that are able to track issues over time, engage in in-depth investigations, and thus challenge the influence of establishment media. Singapore has opted for this two-tier approach (George 2012). It may be impractical for the state to monitor and discipline thousands of individual citizen reporters, but it is much less difficult to control the small number of potentially high-impact, professionally-run sites.

Attempting a total blackout of negative news about major local events is likely to create a vacuum that will be filled with rumour and gossip, undermining the government's credibility. Partly for this reason, Chinese propaganda authorities have reduced their use of outright bans on reporting. Instead, their directives focus increasingly on guiding public opinion, by instructing media outlets to soften certain details or emphasize desired talking points (Tai 2014). Such surgical and calibrated interventions reduce the risk of backfire. When the majority of people are able to enjoy freedom of expression in most aspects of their lives, they are less likely to oppose those instances when censorship does strike. And if that censorship is applied without excessive force, there is a lower probability of generating sufficient moral outrage to get the wider public to rise up in protest. To that end, probably the most effective strategy is to keep censorship at an arm's length by outsourcing the work to third-party, non-state actors. This is the main theme of the following section.

2 Self-censorship and journalistic independence

In 2015, the American branch of PEN, the free expression organization, released a report on the state of press freedom in Hong Kong, recognizing the city's unique status as a bastion of liberty within the People's Republic of China. The 44-page report documented physical attacks on journalists and other symptoms of China's pollutive impact on one of Asia's freest media environments. The PEN American Center's fourteen-point list of recommendations was, however, curiously silent about a problem that other monitors have called the biggest threat to media free-

dom in Hong Kong – self-censorship by news outlets whose owners are reluctant to jeopardize their business interests on the Mainland. The Hong Kong Journalists Association (2015: 2) describes the press as “caught between two fires” – not just external threats but also “internal pressure in the form of escalating self-censorship to comply with establishment viewpoints”. Explaining this lacuna in the American PEN report, a representative said at the launch event that they were reluctant to be seen as interfering with media owners’ rights.

To not address such trends, though, would generate a jarringly incomplete picture of press freedom and censorship. For reasons cited in the previous section, governments have a strong incentive to outsource their speech-suppressing interventions to private actors. This results in both *surrogate censorship* and *self-censorship*. Surrogate or proxy censorship is a term that was first associated with book publishing (Kuper 1975). Authors may find their work blocked by publishers who are under political pressure. Newspaper publishing is less exposed to proxy censorship because it tends to be vertically integrated, with all aspects of the business – editorial, printing, distribution, and marketing – being run in-house. However, as news publishers migrate to the Internet, they have found themselves much more dependent on intermediaries such as internet access providers, search engines, and social networking services. This has greatly expanded the opportunity for states to exercise proxy censorship (Kreimer 2006; MacKinnon et al. 2014). Laws that hold internet intermediaries liable for the content that they host put pressure on these companies to act as censors. When the laws are vague, private-sector intermediaries may exercise even stricter censorship than a government agency would. The problem is compounded by the fact that most intermediaries have little to lose by removing politically problematic content, since such material usually accounts for a negligible proportion of their business. The popularity and profitability of a video-sharing platform, for example, is unlikely to be hurt if it sieves out a handful of political videos from its ocean of music, celebrity stunts, and cute pet tricks.

Self-censorship can be said to occur when a decision to suppress information is made within the media organization, but as a result of pressure from the outside. Lee (1998: 57) has defined it more formally as “a set of editorial actions ranging from omission, dilution, distortion, and change of emphasis to choice of rhetorical devices by journalists, their organizations, and even the entire media community in anticipation of currying reward and avoiding punishments from the power structure”.

The concept has great utility but needs to be applied judiciously. Thanks to Foucault (1990) and Bourdieu (1993), one might be inclined to see self-censorship as all-pervasive, embedded in the norms and structures that constrict all communication. However, the concept of self-censorship should probably be distinguished from independent editorial judgment, whereby editors decide not to publish a reporter’s story because they believe it fails to meet the best professional standards of verifiability and fairness, or because the social costs of publication outweigh the

benefits of satisfying the audience's curiosity. In such cases, editors may err on the side of caution because they fear the harm that publication could cause to the publication's credibility or to members of the public affected by the story. But such voluntary, socially responsible self-restraint is what distinguishes journalism at its best from other forms of expression (White 2013), and would not deserve the pejorative label of "self-censorship". The term should be reserved for situations where independent professional judgment recommends publication, and what tips the balance in favour of restraint is the threat of punishment or the withholding of rewards.

To make matters more complicated, gatekeepers usually deny that they have self-censored, citing other reasons for non-publication. And such denials may not always be insincere. Habitual self-censorship can slip into "conformism", a mix of "opportunism and routinized willingness to accept unquestioningly the usual practices or standards, which were originally imposed through coercion", as observed in Russian broadcasting by Schimpfoss and Yablokov (2014: 297).

The boundary between direct censorship and self-censorship is fuzzy. If, for instance, exposure of high-level criminality and corruption would guarantee the banning of a news outlet and the arrest and exile – or worse – of the journalists, it is arguable whether the resulting suppression of such stories should be called self-censorship or just plain censorship. The label of self-censorship conveys the suggestion of a lack of moral courage on the part of those who succumb to it. That seems a harsh accusation to level at the victims of situations where the costs of non-compliance are definite and extreme. The term is better suited to contexts where the risks are not overwhelming – career-limiting or profit-diminishing more than life-threatening.

In media systems where self-censorship dominates, what can and cannot be said is never made totally clear, even to the media that are supposed to abide by the rules. Indeed, such uncertainty may be deliberately cultivated to keep journalists on their toes and to give the authorities maximum latitude to intervene whenever they want (Hassid 2008). Even after the fact, surrogate/self-censorship is difficult to pinpoint, because its handmaiden is *meta*-censorship – the wrapping in secrecy of the very practice of information suppression. Since the state opts for third-party censorship over more direct intervention mainly to keep its hand invisible, or at least to give it plausible deniability, it cannot permit its agents to reveal that they were responding to official pressures. Journalists who turn whistleblower are invariably punished, and may resign soon after rather than wait to be disciplined for their indiscretion.

Despite the fuzziness at its edges, self-censorship is a fertile concept for study. Bunn suggests that we should regard it as repressive states' preferred mode of control, while direct censorship is their back-up contingency plan. If government censors have to intervene directly to obstruct the flow of information and idea, that reflects a "failure to induce the kind of self-censorship that constitutes a more effective system" (2015: 38).

The self-censorship archetype uses mainly economic carrots and sticks. The market has undoubtedly facilitated the emergence of a free press, in line with liberal theory; but that support, as critical scholars have observed since Marx, is hardly complete or unconditional. Commercial forces themselves constitute a locus of power that constantly threatens to undermine the democratic purpose of the press. Thus, pro-market reforms in China and the emergence of large commercially-oriented news organizations have transformed but not erased censorship (Lee, He & Huang 2006). In Ukraine under Leonid Kuchma (1994–2005), private media were no more likely than state-owned media to protect free speech (Dyczok 2006). Hopes for independent journalism in Central Asia were similarly dashed by the propensity of private media to self-censor (Kenny & Gross 2008).

At the level of editors and journalists, self-censorship leverages on access to newsmakers, career advancement, and job security. In many countries, reporters are underpaid and susceptible to outright bribery, accepting cash in return for dropping a story or filing a puff piece (Arsan 2013; Elahi 2013). At the other extreme, a press corps whose bank accounts are more robust than its professional norms may come to identify with governing elites more than with the marginalized in their community (George 2012). As for media owners, they are exposed to the risk of losing advertising revenue from the government itself, from cronies, and from other corporations that are beholden to officials. Media owners with diversified holdings are especially vulnerable, since each of these business interests constitutes a potential pressure point. It does not help that in many of today's diversified conglomerates, the news units contribute only a small fraction to the group's bottom line. In such circumstances, it takes owners of firm principle to side with editorial integrity of barely quantifiable monetary value, when much larger entities in their portfolios are materially threatened. As with journalists, it is unclear whether deep pockets on their own make media owners more or less supportive of editorial integrity. In India, for instance, the scandalous practice of "private treaties" – providing preferential coverage for companies that have business links with the publisher – is associated with the highly profitable *Times of India*, which is hardly a newspaper on the brink of collapse (Saeed 2015).

The *Times of India's* treaties are a form of internal pressure on editorial decision-making that is entirely voluntary on the part of the media owner. There are many other cases of owners who are intent on using their media power to further their own economic or political interests; this may be the main reason why they got into the media business in the first place. In Indonesia, this is now the main form of media control. Since the democratic reforms of the early 1990s, journalists have had little reason to fear traditional government censorship, but most newsrooms are constrained by owners with private agendas (Tapsell 2012).

From a critical political economy standpoint, the fact that media owners prioritize their private interests over journalism's democratic mission is of course completely predictable. What is more contentious is whether a freely taken decision by

a publisher to obstruct his employees' journalistic work should be termed censorship. In a sense, we are dealing here with a unit-of-analysis problem: it depends on what we mean by the "press" in press freedom. If we apply the term to news organizations as corporate entities, we would have to regard any freely taken decision of a media owner as an exercise of his free speech rights, even if it results in silencing his employees. This is the dominant American perspective – as reflected in the PEN report on Hong Kong – which is influenced by a market doctrine that treats the property rights of media owners as sacrosanct. On the other hand, if by "press" we mean journalists directly engaged in newswork, we could deem their obstructionist employer to be a threat to press freedom.

One response to this definitional dispute is a terminological bypass. Rather than attempt the highly contentious step of broadening the concept of "press freedom" to include journalists' freedom from their employers, UNESCO, for example, adopts the term "independence" to refer to the professional autonomy that journalists need within their organizations in order to exercise their professional roles (Radsch 2014).

Alternatively, we can refer back to democratic theory as a touchstone. This encourages us to view the press as an institution that is more than the sum of organizations that make it up. Defined in reference to a set of democracy-enhancing practices, press freedom can be said to belong more to the public than to the individuals and institutions that make up the press. It is more about people's right to engage in public discourse that helps them in the process of collective self-determination, than about publishers' and editors' right to express themselves (Fiss 1996). The right of everyone to receive information and ideas is explicitly mentioned in Article 19 of the ICCPR. It is also seen by some jurists as being central to the First Amendment of the United States Constitution. They argue that by inscribing "freedom of speech, or of the press" into the Bill of Rights, the Founding Fathers were recognizing press freedom as a social right, distinct from the protection of individual self-expression (Baker 2007). Building from a rights-based approach, Oster (2013: 58) recommends a "functional, content-based" test instead of an identity-based one. We pay special attention to press freedom not "*because* a person or institution is to be categorised as 'journalist' or 'media'"; instead "*if* a person or institution contributes to matters of public interest in accordance with certain standards of conduct, then they are to be conceived of as media and should enjoy special privileges".

3 The people vs. press freedom

The trickiest aspect of press freedom and censorship is what to make of the role played by the public that Carey (1987: 5) calls "god term of journalism", its "totem and talisman". The naïve view of press freedom sees journalism lining up with

the people, protecting democracy from state oppression. In reality, journalism's democratic mission can be threatened by the dark side of people power. This threat could come in the form of deeply entrenched majority attitudes that resist alternative perspectives, or small but assertive groups that attempt to silence speech by mobilizing demonstrations and mob violence. Journalists may find their efforts to serve the public interest fiercely opposed by such forces.

Consider Indonesia, the world's third largest democracy. The political freedom that has opened up since the fall of the Suharto regime in 1998 has been exploited by hard-line groups to push an exclusivist and absolutist brand of Islam. Their oppression of religious minorities – especially the Ahmadiyah sect and Shia Muslims – has benefited from indifference or tacit support among the majority of Indonesians, who are mostly Sunni Muslims. Religious intolerance is now one of the main challenges facing the republic's emerging democracy (Hamayotsu 2013). Major news organizations such as *Kompas*, *Tempo*, and *Jakarta Post* share this concern. They track episodes of religious intolerance and editorialize in support of Indonesia's multi-religious, democratic constitution. Journalists acknowledge, however, that their criticism of hard-line groups is more toned down than they would like or than the facts merit. Their restraint has nothing to do with fear of the state (successive Indonesian governments have been trying to resist radical Islam) or of powerful business interests (a disproportionate slice of which is the hands of Chinese and Christian hands). Instead, they fear reactions from the ground. Hard-liners are adept at labelling opponents “anti-Islam” and thus exposing them to harassment. *Kompas*, the country's largest newspaper, is particularly sensitive to such name-calling because of its own Catholic roots (George 2016).

Majoritarian religious threats to press freedom are hardly unique to Indonesia, or to the Muslim world. In democratizing Myanmar, widespread anti-Muslim prejudice within the Buddhist majority, whipped up by radical monks and encouraged by shadowy elements within the state, has made it difficult for local journalists to defend the rights of the Rohingya minority, who are victims of a campaign that verges on genocide. India is culturally more diverse and has one of the world's deepest traditions of debate and dissent, but even there writers have had to exercise caution when dealing with subjects that could invite unwanted attention from militant Hindu nationalists. Meanwhile, xenophobia is a serious problem in societies as diverse as South Africa, Hungary, and Cambodia. Extreme nationalism afflicts China, creating the phenomenon of populist authoritarianism (Tang 2016). In such situations, journalists who speak up to urge empathy with oppressed groups or neighbouring countries can find themselves attacked by intolerant members of the public.

Sometimes, reactionary popular movements are merely a smokescreen for state power. South Asia provides examples. In 2012, Pakistan was one of more than a dozen countries that protested against the anti-Muslim YouTube video, *Innocence of Muslims*. YouTube's parent, Google, complied with government orders to block

the video from view in several countries where it had a legal presence. Pakistan, however, decided to block the entire YouTube platform. Its move was framed by media reports as another case of “Muslim Rage” (as a *Newsweek* cover put it). This was a pat explanation that seemed to satisfy most observers, since it conformed with prevailing stereotypes about Islamic radicalism. Human rights defenders on the ground in Pakistan, however, tell a very different story. Pakistan authorities had been itching to shut down YouTube much earlier, because citizen reporters were using it to expose human rights abuses in Balochistan as well as corruption in the ruling elite. The international protests against the American-made *Innocence of Muslims* was simply a convenient excuse to silence critics within Pakistan (George 2016).

It is not the case, though, that every instance of popular intolerance conceals the government’s hand behind it. The people are frequently an independent source of censorship pressures, targeting material that they claim has offended them. The motivations and objectives of such campaigns are not always what they seem to be. They are usually framed as spontaneous and natural reactions to provocative expression; and it is assumed that the sole aim of the protests is to remove that expression from view, and perhaps to punish those responsible. Often, though, the protests are more strategic and symbolic. The offending expression creates an opening for righteous indignation, which a community can use as a vehicle to assert its values. Leaders may employ this strategy to ensure that governing elites take the community more seriously, or to raise their personal visibility and status within the group. Such demands for censorship may make the state a target of claims that it would have preferred not to deal with.

Such “symbolic crusades” were observed in the United States in anti-pornography campaigns of the early 20th century (Zurcher et al. 1971). They were also a feature of the agitation in Denmark against the publication of the Prophet Mohammed cartoons by *Jyllands Posten* in 2005. The escalation of those protests is best explained by the competition for influence among community leaders who sought to use the cartoons as an “injustice symbol” (Olesen 2014). Campaigns of righteous indignation against perceived offence are a relatively easy way for political actors to win support – much easier than, say, proposing workable programmes that address economic problems. Once this expressive goal is achieved, community leaders may be relatively unconcerned about the actual enforcement of the ban they have strenuously – even violently – fought for. The strategic and symbolic character of many of these protests explains the jarring inconsistency in the protesters’ indignation. It is not unusual to find that material deemed an absolutely unconscionable outrage at the peak of a protest quietly resurfaces a year later without any opposition. In some countries that virulently condemned the *Jyllands Posten* cartoons as blasphemous, for example, the full page of cartoons is downloadable as a high-resolution image from the Wikipedia entry about the controversy.

Censorship pressures and other repressive tendencies that arise from the “people sector” – as opposed to the state or private sectors – can put media in a bind.

Since journalists owe their primary allegiance to the public, they may feel that it is not just expedient but also democratic to reflect the popular will when the people express intolerance toward minorities such as migrants. This, however, would be a misreading of what democracy requires of a free press. It erroneously reduces democracy to majority rule. Furthermore, it wrongly elevates the popular will to the public interest. Democratic theory has long been familiar with the dangers of the tyranny of the majority; protection of minorities' equal rights through the rule of law is therefore an integral component of democracy, alongside the preferences of the greatest number. The fact that the people may not use their democratic freedoms in ways that preserve or enhance democratic life is also why social theorists have long distinguished the "public" from the mere "crowd" (Muhlmann 2010). The public is more than the sum of its parts. That "more" is the result of deliberation; a dialogue in which all can participate as equals.

The deliberative standard, then, would treat the silencing of minority voices as problematic for freedom of expression, even if at the behest of the majority. Media that advocate or facilitate that silencing cannot hide behind a democratic fig leaf. While there is no denying the practical difficulty of standing up to one's own society's prejudices, the normative position should be clear: a democratic media system must protect spaces for minority voices against majority-sponsored censorship. Achieving this may require a redefinition of what many journalists consider their professional duty to be disinterested and objective.

4 Rights-based analysis

Dramatic changes in media and politics since the 1990s challenge classic paradigms for understanding press freedom and censorship. The *Four Theories of the Press* framework (Siebert, Peterson & Schramm 1956) – which despite being reduced to a "museum piece" in journalism studies (Nordenstreng 1997: 97) still resides on countless university reading lists – considers the authoritarian and communist systems of media control to be the antitheses of press freedom. These systems rely on state ownership of media, licensing of private media, and post-publication punishment of sedition and other offences. None of these instruments have disappeared. However, any audit of press freedom today must also include qualitatively distinct censorship threats. The proliferation of semi-democracies – as well as non-democracies' search for more sophisticated means of control – has resulted in more calibrated coercion. A global wave of neoliberal media privatization, especially in broadcasting, has made crony capitalism one of the main methods of media supervision around the world. As for the digital revolution, the Internet has been genuinely liberating, but its effects are more complex than simply pushing societies from the authoritarian to the liberal category.

I have suggested in this article that, in addition to the important task of empirically documenting these trends, journalism studies needs to revisit conceptual definitions and the normative issues relating to press freedom and censorship. “Legally speaking, censorship involves the attempts of government agencies to restrict public forms of communication,” states one recent encyclopedia entry (Ahmed 2015: 55). This is too narrow a view. Insights from democratic theory, comparative political science, and human rights law recommend a much broader conception of the threats to press freedom. I am not in favour of stretching this to extremes. The problem with the power-is-everywhere perspective informed by Foucault is that it is sometimes guilty of flattening all distinctions, as if there is no qualitative moral difference between, say, the kind of power that tortures journalists in detention and that which drags them down with the weight of social conventions.

Traditional censorship exercised by those that monopolize the means of legitimate violence remains a valid obsession of media freedom monitors and scholars. However, to this traditional subject of inquiry we need to add market censorship and populist pressures. The primary social value of press freedom is the enrichment of the public discourse that is central to democratic life, and there are multiple ways in which that potential is undermined by power. Discussions about press freedom ring hollow when they are not centred on people’s right to receive the information and ideas they need for collective self-determination. Frank La Rue, the former United Nations special rapporteur on freedom of expression, has noted:

The right to be informed and to receive information from various media is a key factor in the development of social groups. This right is a cornerstone of democracy and supports the construction of more democratic societies peopled by active citizens who hold informed opinions about the situation in their country and have the capacity and opportunity to propose and contribute to public policies and to demand transparency. (La Rue 2010: 16)

The 1947 Hutchins Commission put it elegantly: “Freedom of the press means freedom from and freedom for”. The press must be free “from the menace of external compulsions”, but not for its own sake, it said. Freedom is meant to allow the press to set its own course when contributing to the “maintenance and development of a free society”, and “maintaining the rights of citizens and the almost forgotten rights of speakers who have no press” (Commission on Freedom of the Press 1947: 18).

Seen in this light, the source of censorship is less important than its effects. Understandably, though, intra-organizational constraints are less talked about than traditional censorship. This is partly because the former’s victims are less visible. The most salient press freedom infringements – those that are publicized through alerts and petitions from organizations such as Reporters Without Borders and the Committee to Protect Journalists – invariably involve the violation of other rights in addition to freedom of expression. When a government throws bloggers into jail for criticizing officials, for example, this almost always entails transgressions against the integrity of the person, through arbitrary arrest and denial of a fair public trial. Raiding and closing a news organization usually involves the

abuse of criminal justice procedures, the right to work, and property rights. These multiple violations may not be explicitly cited in the reports of media freedom monitors, but they provoke an instinctive sense of indignation and outrage. In comparison, self-censorship is not only harder to document, but also relatively deficient in obvious injustice. The individuals whose expression is muted usually do not complain, and may even try to explain away the situation. Self-censorship can thus appear to be a victimless crime.

It is by focusing on the right to receive – and not just on the sending of information – that we see who really loses in self-censorship: the public that is short-changed of information and ideas. There may be a need for restrictions on public discourse, but these should be applied in ways that meet democratic standards that place the rights of the public at the centre. To satisfy this test, the system would have to be open and transparent about the existence of censorship, and what is being censored and why. It must also apply censorship narrowly to avoid collateral damage to legitimate communication. Finally, censors must be accountable to the public and citizens must be able to participate in making decisions about censorship. This is what Bambauer (2009: 386–387) calls a “process-based” perspective: “Legitimate censorship is open, transparent about banned content, effective yet narrowly targeted, and responsive to citizens’ preferences (but not overly so).” It is from this perspective that most surrogate censorship and self-censorship – as well as “prior restraints” on publication such as newspaper licensing systems – are especially pernicious, even if they are rarely brutal. They deny citizens the right to decide where the lines should be drawn in their society. As a result, they do not know what they do not know.

A rights-based approach also urges us to remember “the almost forgotten rights of speakers who have no press”, as the Hutchins Commission put it. Too often, the very communities that the media have pledged to serve are implicated in the silencing of unpopular minorities. Challenging dominant values and attitudes, overcoming the common sense of the times, and speaking truth to people power are tests of journalistic integrity that may be even more daunting than resisting the isolated dictator.

Further reading

Bunn’s 2015 article, “Reimagining Repression”, provides a concise review and synthesis of censorship theories, of which Jansen’s 1988 monograph is a classic. Of the many books dealing with press freedom, Oster’s *Media Freedom as a Fundamental Right* (2015) has the advantage of bringing together political theory with detailed and up-to-date legal analysis.

To keep track of current cases around the world, the best single source is the ifex.org, the web site of IFEX, a global network of more than 100 organizations that champion freedom of expression. The head of one such group, the Committee to Protect Journalists, has written one of the best global surveys of modern press censorship (Simon 2015).

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25 Journalism, Pluralism, and Diversity

Abstract: The ideal that journalism should reflect different interests and values in society, and provide access to the widest possible range of voices is broadly shared among journalists, researchers, and other media critics. Despite their prominence in debates on journalism, the exact meaning of pluralism and diversity as either analytical or normative concepts in media and journalism studies remains contested. This chapter argues that different interpretations of these notions are inevitably tied to different normative ideas about the role of media organizations and journalism in society. The chapter discusses different uses and definitions of pluralism and diversity in journalism and media studies, including the different normative frameworks and levels of analysis associated with the notions. The main argument put forward is that core concerns in debates on journalism, pluralism, and diversity concern the role of journalism in the distribution of communicative power and voice in the public sphere.

Keywords: journalism, democracy, diversity, pluralism

The ideal that journalism should reflect different interests and values in society, and provide access to the widest possible range of voices is broadly shared among journalists, researchers, and other media critics. The acknowledgement of pluralism and diversity, in different guises, can also be easily found in a variety of media policy declarations as well as ethical and professional guidelines of journalism.

Despite their prominence in debates on journalism, the exact meaning of pluralism and diversity as either analytical or normative concepts in media and journalism studies remains contested (see, e.g., Karppinen 2013; Napoli 1999; Raeijmaekers & Maesele 2015; Valcke, Sükösd & Picard 2015). Beyond general calls for plurality and diversity in journalism, the concepts can be used at a variety of levels, ranging from the structure and ownership of media, through the demographic diversity of the journalistic workforce, to the selection and framing of individual news stories. Pluralism and diversity are also attached with different meanings in different contexts: the notions can refer to the relationship of journalism to questions about cultural diversity and minority groups, political pluralism, or even broader questions about the distribution of power in journalism and society.

Even if pluralism and diversity are principles that few oppose in principle, there is no general agreement on what exactly makes journalism diverse and pluralistic, and what institutional preconditions these ideals entail. Diverse public speech can be seen as a central element of the freedom of speech – either as a corollary of a free media system or as a necessary precondition for citizens' effective use of their free speech. At the level of media policy and broader political

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debates on the role of media, however, there are enduring disagreements on whether free market competition between media outlets best satisfies the institutional preconditions for diverse journalism, or if a genuinely representative and pluralistic journalism also requires regulation or public support for certain types of media.

While media policy and regulation are usually concerned with structural questions about media markets and institutions, at the level of journalism practice, there are equally complex questions about what diverse journalism actually involves: Should journalism aim to mirror existing social and cultural differences in society as closely as possible? To what extent does journalism also construct these differences? Or should journalism aim for a more radical role of specifically promoting new viewpoints and perspectives that question existing truths and established structures of power? And what implications do these questions have for journalists' selection of sources, the framing of issues, and other practical decisions that have an impact on whose voices get access to the public sphere?

Furthermore, it can be asked if pluralism and diversity should even be concerns in the digital age, when journalism is allegedly losing its traditional gate-keeping role, and new digital platforms add new voices and information sources to the media landscape.

While pluralism and diversity are notions that almost anyone can embrace, on closer analysis it becomes clear that they are not neutral or unproblematic ideals in journalism. Invoking pluralism and diversity does not in itself provide any simple criteria for assessing the performance of journalism in society. Instead, I argue in this chapter that different interpretations of these notions are inevitably tied to different normative ideas about the role of media organizations and journalism in society.

The chapter begins with a brief introduction to the concepts of pluralism and diversity and their uses and definitions in journalism and media studies. After this, different normative frameworks and levels of analysis in debates on journalism, pluralism and diversity are reviewed. Finally, the chapter addresses some ways in which the Internet and the current digital transformations have challenged the thinking about pluralism, and diversity in journalism. The basic argument put forward is that if pluralism and diversity are to serve as meaningful concepts with critical force in the context of journalism, and not only as empty catchphrases, the discussion must go beyond counting the number of outlets or content choices available for consumers. Instead, critical research on pluralism and diversity must acknowledge the underlying fundamental questions about the role of journalism in the distribution of communicative power and voice in the public sphere.

1 Defining pluralism and diversity

The terms “pluralism” and “diversity” both have several different meanings in social sciences and philosophy. Often the notions tend to be used almost as synonyms, which raises questions about the relationship between the two concepts. In general terms, diversity can be understood as a descriptive term that refers to variety and heterogeneity in whatever field. This can involve cultural, demographic, religious, or political diversity, or in the field of journalism, the diversity of news outlets, content options, or people working within the media. In principle, such diversity can be seen as desirable or problematic, depending on the context.

Pluralism implies a general positive attitude towards diversity, but as an “ism”, it is a much more complex and politically loaded term. In political philosophy, for instance, pluralism can stand either for the empirical fact that different people hold different beliefs and values, or for the normative view that such diversity is desirable. As a philosophical principle, pluralism can also refer more broadly to “value pluralism” or “ethical pluralism”, the idea that values cannot be reduced to a single hierarchy, but are irreducibly multiple and often incommensurable (e.g., Crowder 1994).

Especially as a political value, different theorists emphasize different aspects and have diverging views on how pluralism is best realized. In political theory, the term “pluralism” has traditionally been associated with a specific school of political theory, developed by authors such as Robert Dahl (1956), that described and justified a political system where power is broadly dispersed and a wide array of groups compete over political influence. Similarly, “pluralist” views of media and journalism are often equated with perspectives that defend existing market-based media systems and policies as more or less functional for democracy, social stability, and consumer choice (Freedman 2008: 30–31). Among critical scholars, this liberal functionalist understanding of pluralism has been widely criticized for its naïve assumptions about political and media power, and for ignoring real, structural inequalities between social groups in terms of their access to the media and the public sphere (e.g., Curran 2002; Freedman 2014). However, over the past decades the concept of pluralism is said to have undergone a renaissance in political philosophy, so that it can be invoked widely and in a broadly positive manner by a variety of social and political theorists, liberal and radical alike (e.g., McLennan 1995).

As McLennan (1995) notes, pluralism is therefore best treated not as a proper “ism” or a distinctive school of thought, but as a concept in the social sciences that raises a series of problems that can apply to a range of different fields. Accordingly, in the context of journalism, these problems can relate to a wide range of issues, concerning the ethical principles used to assess journalism, the distribution of power in journalism, or the diversity of journalistic output. Some associate the terms pluralism and diversity above all with questions of cultural identities or mi-

norities, and ground their discussions in debates on multiculturalism and ethnic diversity (Glasser, Awad & Kim 2009). In journalism practice, “diversity” often functions as a catchword for issues related to race and ethnicity, either in news coverage or employment. Others who are more concerned with the range of political views and the conditions of public debate more broadly, instead ground their approaches in democratic theory and the metaphors of the free marketplace of ideas or the public sphere (Karppinen 2013).

While there are no generally agreed definitions of pluralism and diversity in journalism and media studies, in practice the concepts have gained different more or less established meanings in different political and academic contexts (see Karppinen 2013; Valcke, Sükösd & Picard 2015). In media policy debates, for example, the concept of “media diversity” is more prevalent in the United States, whereas “media pluralism” has become a central concept in European media policy debates.

Some scholars also make a distinction where media pluralism refers specifically to media ownership or market structures, while diversity is used in relation to media contents (Hitchens 2006). No clear definitions, however, have been firmly established, so both concepts thus continue to be used in different meanings, both descriptively and normatively, depending on the context.

In this chapter, I assume a rough conceptual hierarchy whereby diversity is understood in a more neutral, descriptive sense, as heterogeneity at the level of media contents, outlets, ownership, or any other aspect deemed relevant; whereas pluralism, as a broader socio-cultural and evaluative principle is understood as the acknowledgement and preference of such diversity, which also requires some schematization of its relationship to democracy or other societal values (Karppinen 2013). In other words, I use the concepts of diversity or plurality primarily in a more empirical sense, while pluralism, as an “ism”, refers more explicitly to a normative orientation that considers multiplicity and diversity in journalism a value (see also Raeijmaekers & Maesele 2015).

2 What kind of pluralism and why?

In line with the broader revival of pluralism in social and political theory, it can be argued that concepts and theories around journalism and society have taken a pluralist or anti-essentialist turn in recent decades. Besides philosophical currents, this prominence reflects real-world historical transformations, such as increased cultural diversity in many countries, as well as changes in the media environment, including the proliferation of journalistic platforms, genres, and styles. As normative judgments based on journalistic “quality”, “truth”, or “common good” have become increasingly problematic, definitions of public interest in the context of journalism have shifted even more towards emphasizing pluralism and diversity.

As John Keane (1999: 3) notes, normative questions about either the structure and organization of media or the quality of their contents, are hard to answer with anything but platitudes about the need for diversity and variety.

The wide and conflicting spectrum of available criteria for deciding what counts as quality pushes towards pluralist conclusions – towards a policy of ‘letting hundreds of flowers bloom’. This has the paradoxical effect of encouraging audience segmentation, still further growth in the quantity of media possibilities and outputs, and yet more disputes about whether the effects are more or less pluralistic, more or less in the public interest. (Keane 1999: 8–9)

This inherent ambiguity of the notions raises legitimate questions of whether media pluralism and diversity really amount to anything more than an empty catchphrase. As Denis McQuail (2007: 42) notes, arguments for pluralism or diversity “sound at times like arguments on behalf of virtue to which it is hard to object” – yet the inclusiveness and multiple meanings of the concepts also expose their limits, so “we should perhaps suspect that something that pleases everyone may not be as potent a value to aim for and as useful a guide to policy as it seems at first sight”. Similarly, Ræijmaekers and Maesele (2015: 1043) argue that “as a buzzword or as a decontextualized taken-for-granted concept [...] it is generally unclear what is meant by referring to pluralistic media content or how pluralistic media should operate within Western democratic societies”.

To a certain extent, the value of pluralistic journalism for democracy and the public sphere is self-evident. Beyond the general consensus that journalism should be inclusive of different voices, however, the implications of pluralism as a normative principle for journalism remain controversial.

While all agree in principle that a wide range of social, political, and cultural values, opinions, information, and interests should find expression through journalism, does that imply that all views are equal? Is more diversity always better? And are there perhaps limits to diversity? As McLennan (1995: 83–84) notes, it may seem that all things plural, diverse, and open ended are automatically to be regarded as good. But in deconstructing the value of pluralism, we are faced with questions of the following order: Is there not a point at which healthy diversity turns into unhealthy dissonance? Does pluralism mean that anything goes? And what exactly are the criteria for stopping the potentially endless multiplication of valid ideas?

Behind the conceptual ambiguity and different definitions, debates on journalism, pluralism, and diversity involve genuine normative and political contradictions that reflect different normative assumptions about the role of journalism in society.

One of the enduring questions is whether journalism should reflect the prevailing balance of views in society as neutral transmitters of existing identities and differences in society, or whether it is the task of journalism to question the existing socio-political order and introduce new perspectives that challenge the prevailing structures of power (Ræijmaekers & Maesele 2015: 1047).

Denis McQuail (2007: 49) has distinguished between four normative frameworks associated with diversity: 1. *reflection*, which means that journalism should reflect proportionately the existing political, cultural, and other social variations in society in a proportionate way; 2. *equality*, which means that journalism should strive to give equal access to any different points of view or any groups in society, regardless of their popularity; 3. *choice*, which equals diversity with the range of available choices (between outlets, programs, etc.) for individual consumers; and 4. *openness*, which places emphasis on innovation and difference, valuing new ideas and voices for their own sake.

Each framework implies a different interpretation of pluralism and different standards by which diversity should be assessed in journalism. With all of these perspectives, however, further problems arise from the question of how to identify relevant groups or perspectives that require representation, or how to make decisions on which groups or perspectives are considered innovative or under-represented.

Research on the connections between journalism and community characteristics or demographics has indicated that journalistic reporting tends to mirror, at least to some extent, existing societal variations and patterns in public opinion (e.g., Pollock 2013). The idea that individual media institutions or even the media systems could somehow proportionately, or objectively correspond to existing differences in society, however, is easy to denounce as naïve. From a critical and constructivist point of view, journalism never only mirrors features of reality, but also constructs and frames the issues that it covers (Raeijmaekers & Maesele 2016).

On the other hand, the alternative of conceptualizing pluralism in terms of openness to any and all ideas raises equally difficult questions about relativism and indifference to journalistic standards of truth, balance, and rationality. Especially in the context of an increasingly complex media landscape, where lines between journalism and other types of content are increasingly being blurred, the crucial question remains how pluralism should be conceptualized as a journalistic and political value without falling into an unquestioning acceptance of “anything goes”. As McQuail (2007: 43) puts it, “it is possible to have more diversity, without any more of what we really value”.

Different normative frameworks may often be in contradiction with one another (see van Cuilenburg 1998). Reflective diversity can mean less diversity in terms of equality or openness, since the idea of representation is usually based on the existing balance of forces in society, and thus tends to affirm existing power arrangements and reinforce the status quo in terms of marginalized and excluded voices. It is in that sense that mainstream journalism is often criticized for offering a plurality of views “within the box”, only within certain ideological limits that preserve the status quo of existing social consensus (e.g., Glasser, Awad & Kim 2009; Raeijmaekers & Maesele 2016). This mirrors a broader political philosophy criticism of conventional liberal pluralism, which, despite its emphasis on diversi-

ty, is seen to ignore structural inequalities between groups and individuals (Connolly 1995: xiv). In line with this criticism, journalism that aims to reflect existing political or social perspectives can be seen as giving too much priority to power relations already established, and systematically silencing or ignoring voices of difference and new forces of pluralization (Karppinen 2013).

Different frameworks for conceptualizing the relation between journalism and pluralism can also be paralleled with different views of democracy and different normative theories of journalism and society (see, e.g., Christians et al. 2009; Karppinen 2013; Raeijmaekers & Maesele 2015).

From the traditional liberal-individualist perspective, pluralism and diversity are often discussed from the perspective of the metaphor of “the free marketplace of ideas”, which assumes that through competition and free choice, journalism eventually responds to consumer demand and acts as a free and neutral transmitter of individuals’ and groups’ divergent needs and views (e.g., Napoli 1999; Raeijmaekers & Maesele 2015: 1044). Such assumptions of the “free information flow”, however, are often criticized by critical theorists and critical political economists for failing to account for the relations of power, unequal opportunities open to different social actors, and ways in which communication markets and journalistic practices themselves privilege some voices and exclude others (e.g., Baker 2007).

Instead of reducing questions about pluralism and diversity to satisfying individual consumers’ needs, much of the critical academic discussion on pluralistic journalism has been grounded in versions of deliberative democracy that draw on Jürgen Habermas’s (1989, 2006) notion of the public sphere. From this perspective, the role of journalism is not only to satisfy individual consumers but also to promote rational public debate and the formation of a reasoned public opinion. The deliberative model can be seen to relate to the “facilitative role” of media, which holds that journalism should not only report on issues, but also take a role in strengthening and stimulating public life and democratic deliberation (Christians et al. 2009: 158).

While this gives journalism a strong normative basis as a forum of rational public debate, the deliberative approach and its theoretical background have also attracted criticism in both political theory and media studies. Reflecting the renewed emphasis on pluralism and difference in social and political theory, deliberative models of democracy and the public sphere have been criticized for over-emphasizing social unity and rational consensus. The “radical-pluralist” or “agonistic” critics of the deliberative model argue that the emphasis on rational deliberation too ignores unequal relations of power, the depth of social pluralism, and fundamental value differences in society (e.g., Fraser 1992; Mouffe 2005; Wenman 2013).

Instead, radical-pluralists tend to emphasize the value of dissent and contestation, conceiving journalism as a site for political struggle and conflict instead of a site for the formation of common will or consensus (see Carpentier & Cammaerts

2006; Raeijmaekers & Maesele 2015; Karppinen 2013). Rather than idealizations of balance or representativeness, the primary value guiding the evaluation of journalism from this perspective would then be to challenge the boundaries of consensus and promote exposure to critical voices and views that otherwise might be silenced in public debates. It is much in this sense that James Curran (2002: 236–237) argues that rather than the traditional justifications of free competition of ideas or open rational-critical debate, pluralism in the media should be conceived from the viewpoint of contestation of power that different social groups can openly enter. As Christians et al (2009: 126) note, “the radical role” of journalism “focuses on exposing abuses of power and aims to raise popular consciousness of wrongdoing, inequality, and the potential for change”.

This is by no means an exhaustive list of different normative positions regarding the relationship between journalism and pluralism. Beyond democratic theory, diversity can also be valued for many other reasons, ranging from economic innovation to cultural toleration, or perhaps even as values in themselves. The point here is that the implications of pluralism as a value orientation for journalism are not as self-evident as one might assume, based on the frequent uses of the concept in professional and academic debates.

3 Levels of analyzing diversity

Given the ambiguity and many meanings of the concepts, how can we analyze existing plurality or diversity in journalism empirically? To serve as meaningful analytical notions, many scholars have argued that concepts of pluralism and diversity need to be infused with a more specific and concrete meaning (see Napoli 1999; Valcke, Sükösd & Picard 2015). As is the case with many other broad journalistic values, such as freedom, independence, or objectivity, attempt to transfer the debate from abstract ideals to the level of analyzing journalistic institutions or performance involves many contradictions.

As an empirical notion, diversity in media and journalism can be analyzed on several levels, ranging from the macro-level of media structure and ownership to the micro-level of individual news stories or editorial choices. Several scholars have attempted to break down the analytical levels at which diversity can be examined or empirically measured (see e.g., Napoli 1999; Sjøvaag 2016; Valcke, Sükösd & Picard 2015). In principle, these can be broken down to an almost endless number of different aspects and dimensions – from ideological, demographic, or geographic diversity to the diversity of news outlets, sources, viewpoints, genres, representations, opinions, languages, styles, formats, or issues covered.

In one of the most frequently cited classifications, Philip Napoli (1999) makes the basic distinction between source, content, and exposure diversity, with each having multiple subcomponents.

Source diversity reflects the established media policy goal of promoting a diverse range of information sources or content providers. Also called structural diversity, this includes questions of media ownership, number of outlets in the market, and various other dimensions of organizational or economic structures (e.g., public, private, non-profit media). Besides the general framework conditions of a pluralistic media system, a variety of organizational factors, such as editorial and management policies and newsroom cultures, also clearly impact diversity (Sjøvaag 2016). Structural diversity can be conceptualized, for example, in terms of recruitment and people working within media organizations. Furthermore, assuming that sources and experts who interpret issues and events for the public also enjoy considerable power in framing journalistic coverage, the selection of sources by news organizations is also one major structural component of diversity (e.g., Dimitrova & Strömbäck 2009).

Content diversity refers to another established ideal of journalism, namely the diversity of ideas, viewpoints, or content options in the actual output of either the media system or one outlet, which can again be measured on almost any criteria, such as issues, subjects, or viewpoints. Here a distinction is often made between external diversity, which refers to the diversity across media outlets, and internal diversity, which refers to the diversity of perspectives within one media organization. External diversity thus implies that number of media organizations that each represent a particular point of view, while internal diversity within one journalistic outlet relates more to the journalistic ideals of balance and fairness.

The problem, again, is that content diversity is difficult to measure in any straightforward manner. Analyzing the diversity of journalistic output can involve, for example, counting space given to different issues, political parties, or candidates, or the representation of gender, minorities, or any other aspect deemed interesting. The methods used to undertake analyses of content diversity often involve rough quantitative content analyses, such as counting heads or measuring the space dedicated to specific issues or positions. However, more elaborate and theoretically developed measures have also been developed that aim to evaluate, for instance, the ideological diversity of voices or news frames and the factors that contribute to make news more “multi-perspectival” (e.g., Benson 2013; Raeijmackers & Maesele 2015).

The third aspect identified by Napoli is exposure diversity, or diversity of use, which refers to the range of content that people actually consume. While much of the debate on pluralism and diversity has traditionally focused on questions of market structure, media ownership, or the contents of journalism, the contemporary media environment increasingly raises the question as to whether diversity should refer to the information that is potentially available or to the information that citizens actually access and use (Gibbons 2015; Helberger 2012; Napoli 2011).

From the perspective of the role of journalism in democracy, the point of diversity is not only to provide choice for consumers but also to promote exposure and

dialogue between conflicting viewpoints. Traditionally, the assumption has been that greater source diversity will lead to enhanced content diversity, which in turn is thought to promote diversity of exposure as audiences have a greater range of options to choose from. In the contemporary media environment, however, this assumption has increasingly been called into question. It has been suggested that greater choice, and the influence of selective exposure, personal recommendation systems, and “filter bubbles”, may actually narrow the range of sources and different viewpoints to which people are exposed. Even though users have an almost unlimited array of content at their fingertips, it has been feared that audiences are increasingly exposed only to a narrow spectrum of the subjects that interest them most, in effect reinforcing rather than challenging their own personal prejudices (Pariser 2011; Sunstein 2007).

From the perspective of citizens’ exposure to diverse perspectives and viewpoints, understanding the dynamics of how source and content diversity impact the diversity of exposure is clearly one crucial question for research. While no one can be forced to consume diverse content, it seems clear that with the continued growth of various social media platforms as sources of news, aspects of exposure diversity such as questions of user competences, the effect of algorithmic filtering of information, and the impact of global “superplayers” such as Google and Facebook will receive increasing emphasis in debates on journalism, pluralism, and diversity (see, e.g., Napoli 2015; Sjøvaag 2016).

In general, some of the most controversial aspects in the debates on pluralistic and diverse journalism concern the relationships between these different components and levels. Denis McQuail (2007: 52) notes that much of the research on pluralism and diversity in the media has been descriptive, with reference to either the content supplied by the media or the structure of ownership and markets, and as such it has not contributed greatly to explaining the causes or consequences of more or less diversity or the relationships between its different aspects.

Does diverse journalistic staff produce more diverse news? Or does ownership of a news outlet influence the daily editorial decisions? In media policy, for example, policies designed to enhance structural plurality, such as limits on media ownership concentration, are not implemented purely for the sake of themselves, but they usually assume that concentration limits the number of voices that have access to the media, and a plurality of sources leads to a greater diversity of media content, which in turn has been presumed to lead to greater exposure diversity (Napoli 1999: 14). This assumption makes it crucial to analyze how market structures and media ownership are related to the range of voices that have access to the public sphere and ultimately to what people actually see and hear. Despite all the discussion on whether and in what way changes in industry structure affect diversity, the problem is that it remains difficult to empirically establish any uncontested causal relationships between ownership and content, let alone other dimensions of diversity (Baker 2007; Picard & dal Zotto 2015).

As much as by lacking empirical evidence, however, the ambiguity is also explained by the confusion stemming from the use of different conceptual approaches and normative frameworks. Given the many dimensions of these concepts, it is difficult to design empirical studies that take into account all these aspects and demonstrate any universal causality between them (Karpainen 2015). Attempts at a systematic definition of pluralism and diversity are further complicated by the seemingly contradictory or even paradoxical relationship of its different aspects to one another. Attempts to promote one form of diversity may undermine other forms of diversity. An increase in the choices available to consumers does not necessarily mean that journalism serves minorities better or provides access for alternative and innovative voices. Increasing competition in the media market or new technological possibilities can lead to more diverse media content or further homogenization, depending on the perspective.

There are many questions concerning the influence of ownership, diversity of journalistic workforce, or journalistic routines and practices that all remain relevant objects of study in their own right. Undoubtedly, more research is also needed on the relationship between these aspects and the dynamics of different factors that contribute to a pluralistic and diverse journalism (see, e.g., Benson 2013; Pollock 2013; Sjøvaag 2016; De Vreese, Esser & Hopmann 2017). In the end, however, what constitutes pluralistic and diverse journalism is not only an empirical question. Understood as a broader normative and social value, pluralism can be seen as an example of an “essentially contested concept” (Karpainen 2015), whose interpretations also remain inherently political and dependent on different normative conceptions of the role of journalism and media in society.

4 The Internet and unlimited diversity?

Besides normative and philosophical problems associated with pluralism as a social value, the growth of digital media and the transformation of the technological and economic environment of journalism is obviously another key factor that has forced researchers to reconsider the meaning and relevance of diversity and pluralism in journalism. With the almost infinite range of information available online, it is often claimed that the Internet and new digital media are making the traditional analytic and normative perspectives to pluralism and diversity increasingly obsolete.

On the one hand, the eroding business models of traditional journalistic media organizations and the declining number of journalists have led to fears for the future of professional journalism, and its ability to provide diverse coverage (Boczkowski 2010; Curran et al. 2013; Fenton 2010). On the other hand, in both academic and popular discourse many have celebrated digital media as tools that will inevitably lead towards democratization and decentralization of the public sphere and to the emergence of new voices (e.g., McNair 2006; Castells 2009).

In the digital environment in which journalists now work, new facts are being unearthed daily; more audience feedback is being integrated; more voices are being heard; more diverse perspectives on the same news stories are being presented; more stories are available, archived and searchable for longer periods of time; more men and women of power are being watched more closely; and more people are engaged more actively with the changes in the world – by taking photos or making videos of key moments, by commenting on blogs, or by sharing the stories that matter to them. (Van der Haak, Parks & Castells 2012: 2923)

With more information available in public than ever before, concerns for media pluralism and diversity appear to have become not only increasingly contested, but for some, analytically obsolete or anachronistic. In what sense is it then meaningful to speak of pluralism when media systems in general are characterized more by abundance than scarcity?

The worries over pluralism and diversity in journalism largely stem from the assumed power of journalism as a powerful gatekeeping institution of public communication flows. It is this role that makes it crucial to interrogate the openness of journalism to different voices, ideas, and interests in society. Concerns over the concentration of media ownership or editorial balance or bias, only make sense if it is assumed that journalistic organizations hold meaningful power.

With the shift to a digital media environment, it is often assumed that the control over communication is shifting towards individual users, as audiences can increasingly filter and personalize information and choose how, when, and where information is received. Rather than meaning the end of powerful intermediaries and gatekeepers though, the new environment also presents new forms of scarcity and new ways in which the flows of information are being controlled and shaped (e.g., Napoli 2015; Vos & Heinderyckx 2015)

In some ways, the new forms of concentration, exclusion, and hierarchies online go even deeper than those in traditional media. According to many critical voices, the Internet and new forms of online journalism have done little to broaden political discourse or alleviate the concentration of media power in the hands of few actors that strongly shape the way that news online is presented and accessed (Curran, Fenton & Freedman 2013; Hindman 2009; McChesney 2013). Curran et al. (2013: 887), for instance, note that leading websites around the world largely reproduce the same kind of news as legacy media, favoring the voices of authority and expertise over those of campaigning organizations or ordinary citizens.

Some of the ways in which online information is filtered are familiar and due to the enduring presence of old media organizations online, while other aspects of online filtering, like the “algorithmic gatekeeping” conducted by search engines, social media platforms, and other recommendation systems, are new and less researched from the perspective of pluralism and diversity (Napoli 2015). In many ways, search and social media platforms perform a function comparable to that of traditional journalistic gatekeepers, by preselecting the information available to users based on their previous choices and friends’ recommendations. As a conse-

quence, journalism researchers now increasingly recognize also how algorithms – and the corporations that own and design them – shape also journalistic values and processes (e.g., Diakopoulos 2015; Napoli 2015).

Despite all the rhetoric of diversity, plenitude, and complexity, the concerns over the concentration of power and the homogenization of content have not disappeared in the digital age. Instead, concerns over pluralism and diversity have only acquired even more dimensions. What implications do automated journalism and robot reporters, for example, have for diverse journalism (Diakopoulos 2014)? Is there a need for “diversity sensitive design” of new journalistic platforms? How could algorithms and recommendations systems that increasingly shape exposure to news be designed to stimulate diverse exposure to different viewpoints and perspectives (Helberger 2011)?

All in all, it is clear that new technologies and their implications for diverse journalism can be interpreted in widely different ways, depending on the normative perspective from which one approaches pluralism and diversity.

From the perspective of journalism research and practice, it has been emphasized that instead of simply analyzing what is produced or what is available, a greater emphasis needs to be put on users’ engagement with different platforms and news sources and questions of who actually participates and in what ways (Aslama, Horowitz & Napoli 2014; Gibbons 2015). As the logic of exclusivity is shifting from production to the selection and filtering of information, it can be argued that researchers should also focus more on the ways in which citizens find and access news and information. On the other hand, the new environment also implies new demands on journalists. Instead of isolated gatekeepers, journalists can increasingly be seen as curators, or nodes in a network that collects, processes, and distributes, and seeks to make sense of the information abundance (e.g., Van der Haak, Parks & Castells 2012).

From the perspective of pluralism as a broader societal value, however, the emphasis on user competences and new journalistic tools and practices is not enough. If they are to serve as critical concepts, I argue that debates on pluralism and diversity must also acknowledge questions about the enduring role of journalism and other media with regard to the distribution of communicative power and influence in society. New technologies and communicative abundance has not diminished the fact that some actors and groups have more communicative power and political, economic, or symbolic resources to get their voices heard than others. From a broader normative perspective, the challenge is therefore to elaborate a conception of pluralism that helps us to perceive and evaluate these developments in contemporary journalism.

5 Conclusions

Despite all the promises, the Internet and other new technologies are not able to resolve once and for all the asymmetries of communicative power between different social actors or the worries over concentration of power in the hands of few actors. Instead, new forms of concentration, control, and gatekeeping have brought about new concerns, highlighting the nature of pluralism and diversity as values that do not have a final solution, but which constantly create new dilemmas and challenges for journalism.

Pluralization and homogenization are forces that simultaneously affect journalism, regardless of its technological form. Journalism can challenge existing truths and empowers new voices, but also homogenizes cultures, reinforces existing power relations, and generates social conformity. The balance of these forces varies in different contexts and setting, but these dynamics cannot be reduced to the effects of technological development, media ownership, or any other single determinant.

The concepts of pluralism and diversity in journalism do not have a universal meaning, nor do they provide a neutral yardstick for assessing journalistic performance across different cultural and institutional contexts. Instead, pluralism and diversity can signify radically different, often contradictory ideals. The ambiguity and contested nature, however, does not necessarily make these concepts irrelevant. Otherwise, we could argue that many other normative concepts, including media freedom and democracy, have also become irrelevant mantras.

As an open-ended aspirational ideal, the meaning of pluralistic and diverse journalism requires continued discussion and rethinking in the contemporary media environment. Despite the many dimensions and levels of analysis, I argue that the fundamental concern that remains at the core of these debates, even if it is not always recognized, is with the distribution of communicative power in society and the public sphere (see Baker 2007; Karppinen 2013).

Instead of consumer choice or celebration of new technologies, tools, or content options as such, concerns over pluralism and diversity in journalism are centrally about challenging existing structural asymmetries in communicative power and supporting journalistic institutions' and practices' openness to new voices and actors. If pluralism is to serve as a critical concept in the context of journalism, we must then be able to distinguish the sheer number of voices, differences between these voices, and above all their relationship with existing power structures in society. As a consequence, pluralism in journalism can be understood to be more about power relations and less about counting the number of content options or outlets.

Of course, the institutionalization and realization of "a fair distribution of communicative power" itself is inevitably a contested aim. Like many other normative ideals, it is not an ideal that can ever be finally achieved. Despite the new opportunities offered by new technologies, the public sphere continues to be characterized

by structural inequalities in the distribution of communicative power between individuals, social groups, corporations, and states. From this perspective, pluralism is best conceptualized in terms of the contestation of hegemonic discourses and structures rather than as an ultimate solution or a state of affairs.

The implication of this for journalism is that journalists and journalism researchers should above all seek to recognize, and challenge, the existing hierarchies of power and the variety of factors that influence the access and representation of different social actors. In more concrete terms, such concerns relate to a number of issues, ranging from media ownership and the algorithmic power of new intermediaries to everyday newsroom practices and routines, such as the selection of sources and the framing of individual issues.

All of these issues remain important in their own right. Yet, pluralism and diversity are hardly concepts that provide a neutral yardstick that could be used to measure the performance of journalistic institutions with common normative criteria. As an ideal that can never be finally and unambiguously achieved, I argue that the notion of pluralism in journalism best serves an open-ended ideal that raises a series of problems regarding the role of journalism in the distribution of power and voice in society.

Further reading

The collection *Media Pluralism and Diversity: Concepts, Risks and Global Trends* (Valcke, Sükösd & Picard 2015) gives a good overview of debates in different parts of the world as well as empirical indicators developed to assess pluralism and diversity. Karpinen's book *Rethinking Media Pluralism* (2014) analyzes the theoretical and normative underpinning of these notions and their varying uses in media policy. Different aspects of pluralism and diversity are also clarified in articles by Napoli (1999) and Raeijmaekers and Maesele (2015). Baker's (2007) *Media Concentration and Democracy* provides a thorough discussion of media ownership from the perspective of democratic and economic theory. The implications of new digital intermediaries for pluralism and diversity are discussed by Helberger (2012) and Sjøvaag (2016).

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Cristina Mislán

26 Journalism, Gender, and Race

Abstract: This chapter intersects various theoretical perspectives, including hegemony, racial formation, and feminist studies, with journalism studies on race and gender. Situating journalism studies within political, cultural, and sociological understandings reveals scholars' primary concerns. Scholarly conversations have primarily focused on the production of news, content, and audiences' perceptions. Within analyses about journalistic values, norms and routines, there are questions about the impact that practices have on representation and public perception, particularly in relation to crime and violence. Overall, this chapter seeks to underscore the theoretical underpinnings that reveal the role journalism plays in maintaining and reifying raced and gendered norms.

Keywords: race, gender, hegemony, racial formation, rape culture

1 Introduction

In 1947, the publication of the Hutchins Commission declared various concerns regarding freedom of the press. Included in this list of concerns were cautions about media ownership concentration and the effects of concentration on media content (Blanchard 1977). Almost two decades later, another report criticized the structure of media but focused on highlighting the role that media played in representing the country's civil rights struggles. The Kerner Commission, appointed by President Lyndon Johnson in 1967, was designed to explore the uprisings that emerged throughout United States' cities during the 1960s. In April 1968, the Commission assessed the coverage of the uprisings that emerged following the assassination of Martin Luther King, criticizing the media for presenting an "imbalance" of what actually happened in cities across the country.

Reflecting earlier concerns about sensationalism in the Hutchins Commission, the Kerner Commission's criticisms highlighted the sensationalist news coverage of the uprisings. The press's responsibility to both black and white viewers had failed to provide Americans an accurate description of the problems people faced. Included in its list of concerns was a survey that underscored the lack of black representation within newsrooms. The Kerner Report argued that the lack of diverse newsrooms allowed for these misrepresentations of race and racism. Both the Hutchins Commission and the Kerner Report, thus, highlighted 20th-century criticisms about media structures and their impact on news content. Such concerns have become central to the study of journalism and its relationship with issues of race and gender.

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This chapter provides an overview of the various bodies of scholarship related to the relationship between journalism, race, and gender. Journalism studies have addressed the relationship between the production of news, news discourse, and audience responses. Moreover, because of the United States' history with racism, sexism, and American exceptionalism, many scholars have raised questions about the relationships between production, discourse, and ideology. An overview of this scholarly area illustrates three general approaches to studying the relationship between journalism, race, and gender: 1. the demographics of the journalists working in newsrooms, and the norms and routines of those journalists; 2. the discourse of news (which journalists produce); and 3. readers' and viewers' responses to news discourses and ideologies.

In the first approach, scholarship about the relationship between journalists' demographics, and their norms and routines ask: What is the racial and gender makeup of newsrooms? How do homogenous newsrooms versus more diverse newsrooms influence the production and content of news? Do more diverse newsrooms produce more accurate and complex representations of non-white communities? How do homogenous newsrooms skew news reports about issues directly concerning non-white communities? How do journalists cover issues of race and gender in particular? More recently, scholarship also has explored how journalists cover specific issues (e.g., same-sex marriage) facing LGBTQIA communities.

Within the second general approach regarding news discourse, researchers have primarily asked: How do journalists' representations depict non-white populations living in the United States? How do these representations maintain and/or challenge stereotypes about race, gender, and sexuality? Furthermore, more critical scholars ask how does news discourse maintain white patriarchal heterosexual ideologies? How do these ideologies reinforce whiteness, patriarchy, and heterosexuality as the norm, thus continuing the marginalization of people who do not fit into what society has deemed "normal"? The third general approach includes the influence news content has on readers' and viewers' perceptions. These studies explore how news discourse informs readers and viewers about political, economic, and social issues. Furthermore, this body of work explores whether and how the public adopts and maintains particular stereotypes related to marginalized communities.

Antonio Gramsci's theory of hegemony is helpful for understanding how these three bodies of categories contribute to journalism studies and the role it plays in reinforcing social and political hierarchies. Defined as a process for maintaining power or dominance of one social group over another (Lull 1995), hegemony is a useful tool for examining how whiteness, patriarchy, and heterosexuality are perceived and maintained as the norm in journalism. The process of hegemony (i.e. gaining consent from the public through subtle forms of rule) helps highlight how and why scholars have conducted analyses on representation in newsrooms, misrepresentations of marginalized communities, and gendered norms in news-

making processes. Scholars have explored how racial hegemony (i.e. whiteness as the norm), gender hegemony (patriarchy and masculine narratives as the norm), and heteronormativity (heterosexuality as the norm) are prevalent in news coverage.

This chapter will provide an overview on how various scholars have addressed the ways *hegemonic ideologies*, dominant worldviews, have shaped journalism practices and content. It is important to note that this chapter treats the categories of race, gender, and sexuality as social constructions. Drawing from critical race theorists and sociologists, this chapter understands race to be a dynamic identity that constantly changes across political and national contexts, and throughout history. For instance, Michael Omi and Howard Winant (1994) illustrate how difficult it is to assign individuals and groups to racial categories, but how the state continues to organize and interpret race based on the historical legacy of slavery (Omi & Winant, 1994: 53). The “socio-historical process by which categories are created, inhabited, transformed, and destroyed” (p. 56) define the formations or developments of race. According to Omi and Winant, racial formation is directly linked to hegemony, where society is organized and ruled in ways that maintain the norm.

In its treatment of gender, this chapter draws from Judith Butler’s theory on gender performance, which problematizes sex as a biological category and opens up space for individuals to explore various gendered identities. Butler (1988) illustrates gender identity as performative, where acts are defined by sanction and taboo. Furthermore, Butler’s (1993) *Bodies that Matter* argues that gender performance is inextricably tied to normalizations of sex. This chapter will demonstrate that journalism plays a key role in normalizing gender through its reification of particular codes and expectations.

Together, Butler’s framework of gender performance and Omi and Winant’s racial formation theory illuminate how news media have played a crucial role in maintaining institutional structures that create, re-create, and maintain societal norms. Drawing from these theoretical frameworks, this chapter explores how scholars have studied the role of power relations in journalism by asking critical questions about the demographics of journalists, the norms and routines of those journalists, the role of news discourse, and audiences’ responses to news content. Existing literature will illustrate that news-making processes and structures have larger political implications about hegemonic ideologies that shape society’s understandings of race and gender. Thus, this chapter provides an overview of scholarship on the race and gender of news workers, the racial implications of news coverage, and the gendered biases found in news coverage. In an effort to address what some call moments of resistance, this chapter also traces moments in which journalism has been able to offer counter-narratives through the development of non-white media outlets and feminist media activism. The chapter ends with a discussion on where future research should go, with a particular focus on how questions about intersectionality and transnationalism should be a central theme in the future of journalism studies.

2 Race and gender of news workers

According to The Freedom Forum Board of Trustees, the gap between the racial and ethnic makeup of news workers and the larger public has not narrowed. During the late 1970s, newsrooms were 96 percent white and 4 percent people of color (19 percent of the US population). Since then, however, the percentage of journalists of color in newsroom staffs has increased to 12.76 percent. Simultaneously, the population of people of color made up more than 30 percent in 2014. Thus, as the American Society of News Editors (ASNE) census demonstrates, retention of journalists of color has remained a major problem. ASNE further indicates that covering communities “fully, to carry out their role in a democracy, and to succeed in the marketplace, the nation’s newsrooms must reflect the racial diversity of American society by 2025 or sooner” (McGill 1999: 6).

Current research suggests that people of color are either absent in mainstream news coverage or represented in stereotypical ways (Nishikawa et al. 2009). Such problems have led to widespread images of communities of color that depict individuals as unimportant or criminals. These simplistic narratives have often led to mistrust of the press in communities of color (Awad 2011). Scholars ask whether these representations are consequences of the lack of diversity in newsrooms. Adding to this lack of presence in newsrooms is the fact that even fewer own media platforms and gain access to power positions (Nishikawa et al. 2009).

In Don Heider’s (2013) *White News: Why Local News Programs Don’t Cover People of Color*, the relationship between hegemony and race is explored through an anthropological study on homogenous newsrooms. As Heider suggests, to understand the issues that pervade newsrooms regarding the coverage of communities of color, one must explore “how news decisions are made, how story ideas are selected, and how news is gathered and produced ...” (p. 9). In exploring news decision-making processes, scholars may gain insight into the ways news workers may incorporate marginal voices and whether these approaches continue to reinforce and reproduce ideas that “sustain the power structure, both culturally and economically” (p. 9). Thus, in turn, such a study may reveal how particular media practices in combination with the ownership of media may lead to everyday forms of racism. Heider argues that ownership and news practices “may work together to systematically exclude certain groups of people”, where “large scale economic discrimination and small scale daily coverage decisions are also ultimately contributing to similar ends ...” (p. 10). An anthropological study of newsrooms illustrates that a combination of homogeneity, ownership structures, and decision-making practices established by a few voices help to reify everyday racism in newsrooms and in news content. Everyday racism constitutes the rejection of complex and nuanced stories about the lived experiences of people of color.

While Heider illustrates how homogenous newsrooms operate daily regarding issues of race, evidence that would suggest diverse newsrooms function differently

is scarce. Some scholarship has argued that the presence of journalists of color does not lead to inevitable changes in news content (Nishikawa et al. 2009). Whether or not the presence of journalists of color impact news content, therefore, is of great concern within journalism studies. Some scholarship suggests that journalists of color are confounded by journalistic norms, which may limit their influence on content. Critical journalism studies scholars have defined and critiqued the practices that often influence the norms and routines of journalists (Bennett 1990). Arguments critiquing these everyday practices suggest that such constraints on journalists “limit what journalists deem as news and influence how that news is presented” (Nishikawa et al. 2009: 244). These everyday practices include reliance on what is considered objective reporting (e.g., “two sides” to every story) and the use of authoritative sources (e.g., political and government leaders). “Official” sources are often used over community members and dissident voices. Particular decisions on what constitutes news also may promote status quo news, according to Heider (2013).

Mainstream journalistic practices extend to journalists of color, who are requested to remain “objective” and follow rules set often by white editors. Thus, journalists of color are expected to “back away from their racial identity and lived experiences and conform to the professional norms and values of the organization and the individuals who hired them” (Nishikawa et al. 2009: 245). What this scholarship suggests is that diverse newsrooms may not inevitably lead to better coverage of communities of color nor do they necessarily lead to stronger readership from multicultural communities. Still, it is important to note that many scholars and media activists often argue newsroom diversity has greater democratic benefits.

Similar to race, gender representation in newsrooms has illustrated mixed results. A substantial amount of literature on gender and journalism has explored whether more female representation influences the news in ways that differ from male-dominated newsrooms. Craft and Wanta (2004) compared newspapers with high and low percentages of female editors. Their results suggested that newspapers’ websites showed little difference in issues covered. Yet, there were subtle differences. According to Craft and Wanta (2004), newspapers with a higher representation of female managers tended to cover news through a more positive lens. For instance, crime news was slightly more present at male-dominated newspapers. Furthermore, female and male reporters covered similar issues at newspapers with higher female managers. At male-dominated newspapers, male reporters tended to cover political beats while female reporters covered more stories about business and education.

Similar to the relationship between hegemony and race, scholarship also has highlighted the link between gender and hegemonic ideologies. This literature underscores the ways masculine values have shaped journalism culture, thus normalizing the masculine ideologies that pervade newsrooms. For instance, journalists often use male experts; such choices privilege a masculine order that finds its way

into news coverage. Research has found some differences in men's and women's source choices (Armstrong & Nelson 2005). Correa and Harp (2011) found that male journalists tended to use official sources while women used more citizen and private sources. A feminist perspective, therefore, deconstructs these news discourses to illustrate how mainstream news often neglects issues of importance to women. In addition to the issue of source, professional norms of objectivity, journalism training, routines, and patriarchal ideologies in newsrooms help to maintain this "masculine order". When female journalists and managers reach a critical mass, hold positions of authority, and identify with specific stories, they often counter this hegemonic masculine culture through decisions about space, prominence, and sourcing (Correa & Harp 2011).

What much of this literature demonstrates is that investigating whether diversity *actually* influences content is difficult to analyze. While much scholarly conversation has shown that differences do occur when female reporters cover particular news, it is critical to ask what is a female-oriented perspective? To suggest that female reporters, editors, and managers would influence the news differently from men is to suggest that gender is a biological, essential trait of human beings. But feminist studies illustrate that in fact gender is a social construction. How society defines male and female is directly related to human interactions. For instance, the normative cultural ideas that blue is associated with men and pink with women are social constructions with no basis in biology. Thus, to ask whether gender influences the news content assumes that gender identity is essential to a person's being.

Drawing from Simone de Beauvoir's 1949 statement in *The Second Sex* that one is not "born" a woman but "becomes" one, Butler (1988) conceptualizes gender as an unstable identity, one that is "instituted through the stylization of the body and, hence, must be understood as the mundane way in which bodily gestures, movements, and enactments of various kinds constitute the illusion of an abiding gendered self" (p. 519). Audiences and actors come to believe in their own performances that are "repeated", reified and naturalized. Sociologists like Omi and Winant (1994) also illustrate how race is an evolving concept that is socially constructed through human interaction. A hegemonic lens then illustrates how race and gender are constructions that are performed, reified, and naturalized. How these normative constructions are reproduced within newsrooms is a question that requires us to review the literature on representation in news content.

3 Journalism, representation, and race

Omi and Winant's (1994) theory of racial formation provides insight into the ways media have helped develop and sustain racial projects in the United States. If racial formation is the socio-historical process that helps maintain, create, destroy, and transform racial categories, then it is important to highlight the role journalism has

played in shaping such formations. Drawing from the vast scholarship available on racial representation and stereotypes in news, it can be argued that journalism has played a crucial role in shaping and reflecting racial formation processes. These processes link structure to representation. Racial projects do the “ideological work” in making these connections. They are “interpretations, representations, or explanations of racial dynamics” and help redistribute and reorganize resources according to racial lines (p. 56). Racial formations are prevalent at the macro and micro level via various racial projects. Race projects “connect what race means in a particular discursive practice and the ways in which both social structures and everyday experiences are racially organized, based upon that meaning” (p. 56).

Journalism plays a role in maintaining racial projects via particular discursive practices. While there is much to say about the reification of stereotypes in the media through scholarly conversations about media effects, it is critical to engage with larger political questions about the role of journalism in the United States’ evolution of racial formation. Scholarship on journalism and race suggests that everyday racism prevails in newsrooms and in news content. But these everyday, micro-level occurrences cannot be separated from the macro. The combination of misrepresentations of marginalized people with the structural treatment of those same communities helps to show how hegemonic racial formations are maintained via news stories. As Omi and Winant (1994) suggest, race is an unstable and evolving category that often is contested. For instance, Awad (2011) illustrates how news coverage of Latina/o people cannot be known or documented objectively, since the meaning of Latinidad can change historically and contextually.

Scholarship on the relationship between media and nation illustrate how journalism and its practices often are perceived as both reflections and creations of the larger society in which a specific media institution exists. Journalism, therefore, is part of larger racial projects that constitute the political/public sphere, everyday “common sense” practices, and historical processes. As such, this section traces two primary themes found in research on race in news. These themes include how the representations of non-white communities raise questions about the relationship between race, crime and gender in the news.

3.1 Race and crime in the news

Omi and Winant (1994) argue that racism is apparent when discourse and policies link to essentialist representations of race. In other words, policies may suggest that an individual’s or entire group of people’s behavior (or socio-economic and political status) is a natural or biological consequence of a particular racial category. Much of the literature on race in the news suggests that news content often directly and indirectly associates crime with non-white communities. One can argue that the implications of this linkage highlight how crime is perceived to be “naturally” linked to “otherness”. Additional stereotypes include portraying black

Americans as athletes or entertainers (Hoffman 1991). These discursive texts also imply that black individuals are often perceived as genetically advanced in entertainment careers, such as sport athletes and music artists, but not in other more “serious” careers like science, math, and politics. The absence of “serious” representations and the hypervisibility of entertainment also have shaped racial formations in media. How these representations are created result from a few different factors. These factors include journalists’ choice of sources, perceptions of credibility, reliance on conflict, and oversimplified narratives that privilege white voices, to name a few (Hoffman 1991).

What complicates the misrepresentations of marginalized voices is the notion of objectivity (Awad 2011). Anything outside of the “objective” norm is conceived as biased or disqualified as interesting. Critical news scholars highlight the relationship between hegemony and objectivity. Some scholars have noted that the goals of neutrality and objectivity help to maintain what appears to be “normal”, “natural”, and common sense, which, in turn, supports the values and norms of a ruling elite who hold social and political power. How neutrality works to maintain the status quo is through the “choice of words and use of language, delimiting of arguments so that truly oppositional positions are presented as legitimate considerations” (Meyers 2004: 96). For instance, Awad (2011) found that a latina/o community disagreed with their local newspaper San Jose *Mercury News*’ claims to impartiality. Some of these perceptions resulted from the newspaper’s publishing of news stories about crime and gangs. One particular story explicitly focused on the association of gangs with Latina/o youth.

Such hegemonic norms have led to the overwhelming representation of various communities as criminals. Journalism helps maintain and support social control and the construction of morality (Grabe et al. 2006). These questions about right and wrong, behavior and deviance have racial implications. Being constantly depicted as criminals and immoral, black Americans are less likely to be portrayed as victims (Dixon & Linz 2000). Entman and Rojecki (2000) also suggest that black criminals are portrayed as more threatening than white criminals. Gilliam et al. (1996) highlight that television news focuses on crime as being violent and associated with non-white people. Such links are critical when examining the public’s perceptions of punishment, punitive policies, and crime rate. Yet, some literature has suggested that both white and black people are more likely to be represented as perpetrators than victims; yet, black Americans still are underrepresented as victims, while white Americans are overrepresented (Dixon, Azocar & Casas 2003). In contrast, however, Bjornstrom et al. (2010) found no significance between the reporting of white and black perpetrators. Chiricos and Eschholz (2002) also found that Latina/os are overrepresented in crime news in comparison to their proportion in the population.

Why are these images not only damaging discursively but also within socio-historical processes? Literature suggests there is a positive correlation between the

overrepresentation of black individuals as criminals and viewers' perceptions of black people as violent (Dixon 2008). The association between non-white people and crime has raised concerns about the tendency for individuals of color to mistakenly be identified as criminals. For instance, some research demonstrates that white people report greater fear of crime in the presence of black individuals (Chiricos, Hogan & Gertz 1997).

What this literature suggests is that journalism plays a role in constructing and reifying hegemonic understandings about race. As such, media representations must be placed within the social, cultural, and political contexts in which those representations emerge (Spencer 2014). For instance, the significance of crime news and race representation must be contextualized within a conversation about structural policies, institutional systems (e.g., law), state violence (e.g., police brutality) and culture (everyday practices). The representations of “others”, of those who are not white and/or placed within a western geographical space, provide insight into the “ideological values implicit in our society” (p. 6). Thus, representation is the “thing” itself, but an interpretation of the “thing”. In addition, some research has found that representations significantly relate to public perceptions about the racial composition of crime suspects. Combining critical scholarship on news with cultural studies on representation and media effects reveals the media processes that may maintain the nation’s macro and micro-level racial projects.

3.2 Welfare queens and the culture of poverty

Similar to the issue of crime, the systemic association between race and poverty is another theme that often emerges from journalism studies on race and representation. Scholarly conversations on race and poverty have underscored how media have consistently relied on narratives that link black communities to poverty, but seldom do so with white people. Thus, in any conversations about poverty in the United States, what audiences often see are people of color living in poverty, particularly single black mothers with children. The media consensus (at least it seems so) is that men of color are missing from these families, because they occupy prisons instead of households. These types of stories further stigmatize both poverty and non-white communities by reinforcing the myth of the American Dream. The myths of personal responsibility and meritocracy continue to influence how the public perceives people living in poverty.

Such myths then help shape negative stereotypes like laziness, which becomes associated with people of color. People are blamed for their circumstances; thus, poverty becomes a non-white problem (Gilens 1996). Clawson and Trice (2000) examined a short time period during the Clinton administration when it implemented a structural transformation of the welfare system, which turned control of these programs to the state level. The authors found that black individuals were disproportionately portrayed as poor in magazine visual images. More specifically, black

individuals were overrepresented in negative stories about poverty in which stereotypes were prevalent. Drawing from Omi and Winant's (1994) racial formation theory, it can be argued that these associations between poverty and race (like crime and race) have essentialist implications. Such stereotypes imply that only non-white people are poor and there is something "natural" about latina/os and black individuals being perceptible to poverty. Of course, these are narratives, assumptions, and stereotypes (not realities). Yet, public perception illustrates that Americans greatly exaggerate the extent to which black people make up the population of those living in poverty. Thus, public misperceptions directly intertwine with media misrepresentations (Gilens 1996).

To further understand how these misperceptions are recreated and reified in media, it is important to contextualize such conversations within political and cultural understandings about poverty and policy. In *When Affirmative Action Was White: An Untold History of Racial Inequality in Twentieth-Century America*, Katznelson (2005) extends beyond conversations about affirmative action policies in the 1960s, when such policies were seen as "black". Instead, Katznelson chronicles affirmative action policies that developed in the decades before 1960, when those policies were "white". Katznelson highlights that while black Americans moved economically and socially upward in society during the postwar economic boom, by the time President Lyndon Johnson announced his "Great Society" effort to eliminate poverty it was a statement understood to address black poverty. But the elimination of black poverty would come with addressing the black family structure; thus, Johnson echoed the 1965 Moynihan Report "The Negro Family: The Case for National Action". Such discourse defined poverty as a "self-perpetuating 'tangle of pathology' marked by the 'deterioration of the Negro family'" (p. 16).

The arguments that helped solidify the culture of poverty ideology in Johnson's statements and the Moynihan report originated from cultural anthropologist Oscar Lewis' studies on Puerto Rican and Mexican communities. The term "subculture of poverty" appeared in Lewis' 1959 ethnography *Five Families: Mexican Case Studies in the Culture of Poverty*. The idea of the culture of poverty contended that people were socialized into behaviors and attitudes that shaped their inability to escape poverty. Such arguments, as indicated in the Moynihan Report, were not divorced from black Americans.

But as Katznelson (2005) highlights, these arguments were not only wrong but they also left out structural explanations. How affirmative action and welfare policies came to be associated with non-white poverty lies in understanding the history of President Theodore Roosevelt's New Deal program. The New Deal and Fair Deal era of the 1930s and 1940s was shaped and developed in a way that maintained discriminatory practices against people of color, particularly black Americans. According to Katznelson, the maintenance of discrimination in the New Deal was no accident; the southern wing of the Democratic Party dictated the details of Social Security, labor legislation, the GI Bill, and other "landmark laws that helped

create a modern white middle class in a manner that also protected what these legislators routinely called ‘the southern way of life’” (p. 17).

Despite many criticisms of the culture of poverty argument, it has maintained relevancy in the American imagination. Journalism plays a major role in reifying its main components by placing culture at the center of poverty and policy. For instance, Kelly (2010) illustrates how television news coverage of US welfare reform from 1992 to 2007 “controlled” the image of the welfare mother. The image was controlled through the depictions of women on public assistance as “childlike, hyperfertile, lazy, and bad mothers” (p. 76). Kelly argues that such stereotypes support policies intended to regulate women’s reproduction and mothering.

The representations of black women as bad mothers can be traced to slavery, according to Hancock (2004). The terms “jezebel” and “mammy” (Collins 2005) represented “oversexed and asexual women respectively who shared in common neglect of their own children, in favor of having sex (the ‘Jezebel’) or tending the master’s children (‘Mammy’)” (p. 27). These images have continued to pervade historical images of black women, “controlling” images that include the “welfare queen”. These controlling images constitute the stereotypes and moral judgments of the welfare queen’s public identity (p. 27). Once again, the New Deal program of the early to mid-20th century is important. These portrayals of bad mothers strongly influenced the state’s regulation of black women and poverty.

Despite political action during the 1960s to combat the silencing of black women living in poverty, the image of the welfare queen continued to influence public policy. Hancock argues that “woman-centered” welfare policies have meant “mother-centered” policies, which has relegated the state as an “agent regulating maternal behavior” (p. 27). Furthermore, just as Katznelson (2005) argues that welfare programs were not intended to benefit non-white communities, Hancock argues social welfare policies developed for working mothers did not include black mothers as beneficiaries. According to Hancock, black mothers were urged to use Victorian ideals of motherhood as a model to solve their issues. Yet, due to the structural barriers that restricted black women to domestic work and agriculture, the emphasis became individualized. Still, Victorian ideals combined with nationalism to prescribe mothers as the natural caretakers of American citizens. Black women, however, were not incorporated into these Victorian ideals, since slavery had relegated their bodies as lustful to justify white men’s sexual abuse. Thus, such prescriptions set the standard for “good” versus “bad” mothers, a highly racialized *and* gendered dichotomy.

Contextualizing journalistic representations within the history of social policy makes apparent the connections between structure and representation. News coverage of public policy, opinion, and culture cannot be divorced from histories of structures. Just as important is a conversation about the role journalism has played in providing social commentaries about the intersection between gender and race. Scholarly conversations on race and poverty must include the representations of

black women, where both racialized and gendered discourse continues to reify stereotypes like the jezebel and mammy in contemporary news (Meyers, 2004). In addition, intersecting poverty with crime also highlights the ways in which “jezebel” stereotypes are employed to justify victim-blaming narratives about victims of violence (explained more in the next section). These representations, policies, and histories, however, have not gone unchallenged.

4 Journalism, representation, and gender

Drawing from Judith Butler’s (1988) theory of gender performativity provides insight into the codes of gender present in media. Feminists have long separated sex from gender to illustrate that sex does not determine specific “social meanings for women’s experience” (p. 520). Biological distinctions of the body are not denied; rather they are perceived as separate from the process through which the body “comes to bear cultural meanings” (p. 520). Sut Jhally demonstrates in his documentary *Codes of Gender* that media teach and recreate society’s hegemonic norms of gender. Media essentially reify the norms of masculinity and femininity, which itself is created by the “idea of gender” (Butler 1988: 522). Furthermore, while there are individual ways of “doing” gender, “one does it in accord with certain sanctions and proscriptions” (p. 525). Much of the literature on feminism and popular culture demonstrates how media act as mediums that reproduce those “sanctions and proscriptions”.

As feminist scholars have suggested, femininity often itself is defined in opposition to masculinity (Butler 1988). Because masculinity is defined as strong, powerful, independent, holistic, and complex, femininity has been constructed as its opposite (e.g., weak, dependent, simplistic, hypersexualized, and infantilized). Yet, as feminist media studies scholar Susan Douglas (1995) suggests, women often see not images of their making, but “a culture that regards [women] as unknowable, mysterious, laughable, other” (p. 271). Simultaneously, according to Douglas, the media help create a culture of schizophrenia, where women rebel against and submit to prevailing images that construct what “desirable” women should be (p. 8). Much of these representations have engaged audiences on television shows, in films, and in music. But one must ask how journalism fits into this media picture. Previous research illustrates how female journalists are often subjected to similar hegemonic proscriptions and sanctions. In addition, this literature suggests that the coverage of women’s issues and rights suffer when male-dominated newsrooms continue to reify society’s gender codes.

4.1 The male gaze in journalism

Laura Mulvey’s (1975) *Screen* essay on the ways film reflects “erotic ways of looking and spectacle”, illustrates how patriarchy structures film. Drawing from psycho-

analytic theory, Mulvey demonstrates how the paradox of phallogentrism, which depends on the “image of the castrated woman to give order and meaning to its world”, manifests itself on screen, where women represent the “male other”. According to Mulvey, the male imposes his own desires upon this “male other”, the “silent image of woman” (p. 6). Such impositions render women the “bearer of meaning”, not the maker of meaning” (p. 6). Cinema is a prime media example that raises questions about the unconscious and hegemonic ways the dominant order have structured “ways of seeing and pleasure in looking” (p. 7). Mulvey, therefore, illustrates how visual pleasure has “coded the erotic into the language of the dominant patriarchal order” (p. 7).

Since Mulvey’s examination of the male gaze in cinema, many feminist media studies scholars have applied this framework to other forms of media. In particular, scholars have analyzed how female journalists on television news are subjected to the male gaze. In an analysis of Katie Couric’s debut as the first solo female anchor of evening news, Gibson (2009) demonstrates how sexualizing and personalizing frames in news articles reproduced hegemonic norms about femininity. As a result, these codes of femininity undermined her performance of authority. The trivialization of Couric can be traced to the historical presence of women in mass media. In 1978, Gaye Tuchman wrote that the trivialization and underrepresentation of women resulted in their symbolic annihilation. In 1979, Tuchman expanded upon the depiction of women in mass media, suggesting that media content be analyzed as a myth-making tool. According to Tuchman, these myths constituted “ways of seeing the world that resonate with the conscious mind and the unconscious passions ... that are embedded in, expressive of, and reproductive of social organization” (p. 541). The news and entertainment, therefore, generate myths, not images.

The male gaze has helped to reinforce the myths of gender in mass media. Rakow and Kranich (2000) argue that news media ignore or display women’s issues in a particular way that is a consequence of the gendering of news. The hard/soft news line is distinguished by the notion that serious news is masculine and human interest news is feminine. As a result, the dominant masculine narrative renders women “not as speaking subjects but as signs” (p. 164). The authors found that women were predominantly represented as private individuals affected by crime, public policy, or disasters. They were also represented primarily as victims (Grabe et al. 2006). These findings suggest that women appear in the news as anonymous examples of “uninformed public opinion, as housewife, consumer, neighbor, as mother, or as victim” (p. 169). Like Mulvey’s argument that women are the bearers of meaning (and not the creators), Rakow and Kranich found that women “as sources carry rather than create meaning” in the news in which they appear (p. 170). Furthermore, race also has implications, since only white women can signify, according to Rakow and Kranich. Signs are maintained through the homogeneity of appearance.

Yet, other research has illustrated that the gendering of news is more complicated than suggested in previous literature. Lundell and Ekstrom (2008) argue that

visual representations of women in politics invite viewers to see women as both an “other” and a “person with whom we ourselves can identify” (p. 892). Thus, the representation of female politicians aligned with conventional narratives of “immoral women politicians”, where women are often portrayed as too masculine and going against stereotypical feminine behavior. But a counter-narrative also invites the reader to identify and sympathize with female politicians. Thus, some research suggests that the news does not always present simplistic gender codes. Specifically, while the male gaze has a relevant presence in the visual images of female politicians (making them into the “immoral” and lonely “other”), they also invoke symbols that suggest a sympathetic reading via the “story-telling character of a princess” (p. 895). Still, previous literature suggests that the gendering of news has continued to produce hegemonic portrayals and myths of women in media and society. An area in which these portrayals play an especially important role is in a conversation about violence against women. The codes of femininity, which constitute descriptions like weakness, motherhood, and dependence are further highlighted in news about rape and assault.

4.2 Rape culture and victim-blaming

As the above sections have demonstrated, media help define gender, and produce myths and stereotypes associated with gender identity. News coverage similarly helps define understandings of rape and perpetrators (Kitzinger 2009: 74). Furthermore, news reports may influence perceptions about victims and the consequences of sexual violence. The literature on rape in news illustrates how media outlets also are influenced by dominant social attitudes, and legal practices and discourse. In addition, news discourse on rape is influenced by several other factors, including institutional racism and sexism within newsrooms, emphasis on sensational news, and journalist practices (Kitzinger 2009).

Some feminist media histories provide insight into the role that sexual violence against women has played in news media. This historiography illustrates how key newspaper figures have helped to further exploit the issue of sexual violence. For instance, in 1885, William Stead, the editor of the London newspaper *Pall Mall Gazette*, undertook a piece of investigative journalism in relation to a debate about child prostitution. According to historical accounts, Stead bought 13-year-old Eliza Armstrong and had her examined to confirm her virginity. He then sent her to Paris and wrote descriptions about his adventures. While newsagents banned the newspaper, it sold out on streets (Kitzinger 2009: 75). Of course, Stead’s series of articles provoked massive demonstrations and was credited for helping raise the age of consent for girls. Media interest once again developed with the story of “Jack the Ripper”. According to Kitzinger, the serial killer was the “perfect fodder for the 13 national dailies in hot competition” (p. 75). These stories were filled with gory details, “fallen women”, and reports of “foreign-looking” suspects or accusations

that targeted orthodox Jewish people. Centuries later sexual violence “still makes for ‘good copy’” (p. 75). This historical relationship between news and sexual violence illustrates how journalists participate in voyeurism and sensationalism, decontextualize abuse, encourage racism, blame victims, and excuse perpetrators.

A substantial amount of feminist scholarship has examined these journalistic practices associated with the reporting of rape. Previous literature has particularly demonstrated the prevalence of rape myths (O’Hara 2012; Bonnes 2013). According to Franiuk et al. (2008), rape myths are “generalized and widely held beliefs about sexual assault that serve to trivialize the sexual assault or suggest that a sexual assault did not actually occur” (p. 288). Myths about victims suggest the victim is lying and has ulterior motives, was “asking for it”, is promiscuous so cannot be raped, or “wanted it the entire time” (p. 288; O’Hara 2012).

Myths also exist in relation to perpetrators. These myths include excusing perpetrators and creating narrow depictions about people who commit sexual assault. In addition, myths about the nature of sexual violence include the “false belief that rape is trivial” and not harmful to victims (O’Hara 2012). This particular myth also includes the notion that rape is “natural” (men have a predisposition to getting sex through force) (p. 289). In a case where professional basketball athlete Kobe Bryant was charged with sexual assault, Franiuk et al. (2008) found that at least one rape myth was present in each article analyzed. Furthermore, they found that news articles about Bryant’s sexual assault case were more likely to endorse the myth that the victim lied. Other myths present in news articles included the notion that the victim “wanted it” and that Bryant was not a “typical” perpetrator.

Another way victims are often blamed and delegitimized is through stories’ emphasis on alcohol. In a study about the United Kingdom newspaper the *Daily Mail*, Meyer (2010) found that news discourse “refashions old rape myths” and “re-genders rape involving alcohol as a problem of female drinking rather than male sexual violence” (p. 19). The role that alcohol plays in conviction rates regarding rape is important to understand as context for examining the news coverage of sexual violence. When alcohol is involved in rape incidents, legal and cultural discourses make it more difficult to convict perpetrators (Meyer 2010). For instance, victims can be discredited when their memories are depicted as unreliable due to heavy intoxication. Because the burden of proof is on the victim, the prosecutor’s case can be further weakened. In addition, cultural discourses that see drinking (especially binge drinking) as unfeminine and inappropriate for women can influence the low conviction rates for rape involving alcohol, according to Meyer.

As this chapter has consistently illustrated, media play a key role in reifying societal understandings about race and gender categories. As such, the cultural and legal discourses that emerge within the public sphere are reified in news reports as well. Media discourse help to further reinforce cultural norms that insist on the trivialization of rape and acceptance of rape myths (Kahlor & Eastin 2011). The rape myth that victims are “asking for it” is one that continues to “reinforce

harmful attitudes and beliefs about women and violence towards women” (Kahlor & Eastin 2011: 214). Meyer (2010) found that much of the *Daily Mail*'s discourse on rape involving alcohol linked binge drinking to casual sexuality. Thus, opinion columnists suggested that victims were “asking for it” if they were intoxicated during the incident. This article links alcohol usage and gender codes to the discourse of rape culture, illustrating how myths are further perpetuated through societal and mediated constructions of femininity and masculinity.

Existing feminist scholarship on sexual violence in news illustrates how cultural and legal discourse serves to further blame victims and helps continue the trend of low convictions rates for perpetrators. Much like the scholarship on race and crime, these studies illustrate how public policy and news media are intricately linked. Examining these hegemonic norms about violence, particularly rape, helps reveal how gender codes play a key role in shaping news coverage. As the theory of hegemony suggests, news supports “the values, beliefs and norms of a ruling elite that wields social, economic and political power within a hierarchy of social formations” (Meyers 2004: 96). The process in which certain ideas become “natural” and “normal” is important for understanding how sexual violence is gendered and normalized (i.e. men being predisposed to violence) within media discourse. As part of this process, the norms of “neutrality” help to frame stories so “that they appear not to be ideological at all, but instead seem natural and grounded in everyday reality” (p. 67). Thus, it can be argued that the media help to institutionalize male supremacist ideologies in which masculine narratives prevail and dictate how women and women’s issues are covered.

Overall, feminist literature on gender and violence in the news has raised critical questions about the production and content of news media. The analyses of the gendering of news, the predominance of masculine narratives, and the prevalence of rape culture discourse suggest that improvements in the treatment of women in news may require more than increasing the amount of coverage and the presence of female journalists (Beam & Cicco 2010). Instead, a fundamental change in news narratives may be required to significantly change the coverage of women. The question as to whether the presence of more female journalists would present oppositional narratives about women and women’s issue continues to be raised. For instance, Durham (2013) suggests feminist readers and bloggers often participate in feminist praxis online to respond to newspaper’s exploitation of sexual violence. What feminist scholars may continue to ask is what other changes would help develop more complex understandings about gender in society.

5 Where do we go from here?

This chapter has provided an overview of the scholarship on journalism, gender, and race. Drawing from various bodies of literatures, it illustrates how cultural and

political analyses of mass media need to be situated within scholarly conversations about the evolutions, definitions, and understandings of race and gender in society. The studies highlighted in this chapter have underscored how the relationship between the production of news, content, and public perception provides a complex picture of race and gender in journalism. As the sections above demonstrate, the issue of violence is consistently central to any conversation about representation in news. In relation to both race and gender, journalism studies have primarily been concerned with the issue of crime and sexual violence. Overall, what this chapter has demonstrated is that the theoretical perspectives of racial formation, hegemony, gender performativity, the male gaze, and rape culture help to reveal how journalism continues to play a critical role in maintaining societal norms, inequalities, and the status quo.

Now that we have an understanding of the picture that existing literature paints for us, scholars must ask: where do we go from here? In which direction should the study of journalism, race, and gender move to paint a more nuanced picture of the issues that continue to face the professional and scholarly field? Much of the literature this chapter highlights has focused on one issue: race or gender representation. What the author of this chapter suggests is that scholars look to conducting analyses that intersect race and gender. Thus, more journalism studies need to draw from theoretical perspectives of intersectionality and critical race studies to better understand how women of color perceive, experience, and see themselves in mass media. For instance, Jackson (2013) found ideological differences in the constructions of rape and race, illustrating the racialized implications of gang rape. Similar to many other scholarly sources, Jackson found that sources and lack of marginalized voices contributed greatly to the news content. Thus, scholarship that intersects race and gender within journalism further reveals the hegemonic discourses of everyday racism and sexism. Furthermore, analysis that examines the role of journalism in shaping understandings about the intersections of race, gender, and sexuality is an area that needs much more exploration. With LGBTQIA rights, issues, and lived experiences increasingly entering mass mediated conversations, scholars will need to examine how communities and issues are portrayed. In addition, how media may play a role in shaping societal understandings about sexuality (as well as its evolution) deserves attention.

Within Western bodies of literature, there have been examinations of the “other”, non-western nations and cultures. Yet, much of this literature focuses on Western news coverage. As such, the future of journalism studies lies in de-centering a Eurocentric lens from media history; instead, what would provide journalism studies with a more robust and rigorous body of work is scholarship on non-white, non-European media that have helped shape the nation. Mainstream and traditional media outlets are but one picture of a much larger one, where non-white and feminist activists as well as transnational voices are speaking through their own separate channels. How do these voices contribute, challenge, and/or reify the na-

tion, its interests, and politics? A more global, non-western approach may offer scholars working within journalism studies more theoretical and practical understandings of journalistic practices, ideologies, and values.

Further reading

For a concise explanation of hegemony, see Lull's chapter "Hegemony" in *Media, Communication, Culture: A Global Approach*. There are a few key texts that offer insights into the relationship between production, representation and audiences. Entman and Rojecki's (2000) book *The Black Image in the White Mind* provides a complex model for understanding how white audiences perceive the images and stereotypes of black individuals. For ethnographic work on the diversity of broadcast newsrooms, see Heider's (2013) *White News: Why Local News Programs Don't Cover People of Color*. Key feminist analyses explore the relationship between gender and journalism, with a primary emphasis on newsroom cultures and content. Douglas' (1995) *Where the Girls Are: Growing Up Female with the Mass Media* explores the media representations, myths and politics of gender in the United States. Tuchman's (1978) article on symbolic annihilation remains relevant for current and future work. Furthermore, Durham's (2013) work on sexual assault and journalistic reporting is essential reading. For texts that incorporate an analysis of the intersectionality of race and gender, see Hancock's (2004) *The Politics of Disgust: The Public Identity of the Welfare Queen*.

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Annika Sehl

27 Journalism, Audiences and Community Engagement

Abstract: Recent technological, but also societal and organizational changes have significantly changed the relationship between journalism and its audience. In the digital space, news organizations are no longer the gatekeepers but share the space with others, such as bloggers or social media participants. This means a power shift away from a passive audience to a more actively engaged one in an environment where professionals and the audience interact in new ways. This chapter discusses how journalists are thinking about audience participation in journalism and the opportunities they are offering their audiences to participate in the news production process. This development has led to a number of publications suggesting that many journalists have concerns about opening up to the audience because of how they view their professional role. Nevertheless, audience participation in journalism has been widely taken up within the news media, even if it is usually limited and not all possible ways of participation are being used. In fact, studies on the audience perspective have indicated that only a small part of the audience is willing to participate. In the beginning, news organizations focused on their own websites and building up communities there, but today social networking sites, such as Facebook, are important platforms for the media to distribute their news and interact with their audience.

Keywords: audience participation, citizen journalism, participatory journalism, user-generated content

1 Introduction

The relationship between journalists and audience members has changed significantly in digital journalism. One major aspect is the existence of new opportunities for the audience to participate in the news production process. Technological innovations are facilitating exchange between media professionals and their audience. This is despite professional journalism only reluctantly introduced participatory features (Paulussen et al. 2007; Paulussen & Ugille 2008; Singer 2010) and, in general, only a limited number of audience members are playing an active role online (K. Heinonen 2011). This chapter outlines the power shift from a passive audience to a more actively engaged one in an environment where professionals and the audience interact in new ways. In this way, it focuses on the role of the audience in the news production process.

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While many different terms have been used in the literature (see, e.g., Deuze, Bruns & Neuberger 2007), this chapter will utilise the term “participatory journalism” to describe audience participation in the news production process. The term participatory journalism in contrast to, for example, citizen journalism highlights the focus on audience participation in news production within the institutional context of professional journalism. This is an important differentiation, since in participatory journalism, institutional journalism defines the frame and sets the rules.

Most research on audience participation in journalism focuses mainly on either the editorial or the audience perspective. For example, a number of studies have explored the participatory features of news websites (e.g., Domingo et al. 2008; Örnebring 2008; Thurman 2008; De Keyser & Sehl 2011; Lilienthal et al. 2014). Several others have dealt with the different aspects of the editorial process and how user-generated content (UGC) is managed (e.g., Harrison 2010; Singer 2010; Binns 2012). Research on the participating audience (in an editorial context and beyond) focuses mainly on the characteristics of users and the content they contribute (e.g., Fröhlich, Quiring & Engesser 2012; Kalogeropoulos et al. 2017). Only a few studies consider both perspectives in their theoretical and/or empirical conceptualization (e.g., Wardle & Williams 2008; Loosen & Schmidt 2012; Heise et al. 2014; Bergström & Wadbring 2015). While this chapter will include a few studies from the audience perspective, the focus will be placed on the editorial perspective.

The outline of the chapter is as follows. First, the chapter discusses the role of the audience as community members and the role journalism plays in the formation of those communities. Thus, it also goes back to the origins of the public journalism movement in the United States in the early 1990s. Following this, the concept of participatory journalism is demarcated in order to set the frame for the further analysis of audience participation in the news production process. Participation in journalism is then discussed from a historical perspective and is shown to have existed for much longer than is usually assumed. Studies of the participatory features on news websites are presented, and the use of these features by the audience is discussed. Following this are discussions of how newsrooms manage audience participation and the development of audience participation and the development of audience participation in recent years. The conclusion offers a summation of the key points uncovered.

2 Journalism and community

Even before the rise of digital journalism, in the early 1990s, a small number of US journalists and scholars considered reforming the relationship between the public and the press. The catalyst for this was a “widespread disgust with American politics and with the press itself” (Carey 1999: 60) following the 1988 election. The “movement” (Rosen 1994: 378) became known as public or civic journalism. It took

the perspective that, rather than being mere observers, journalists should act as advocates for public life by listening to people in the community and covering issues that concern that community (Glasser 1999; Rosen 1999). Rosen (1993: 3) summarized the aim as follows:

Taken together, these propositions amount to a revised public philosophy for daily journalism. Reporting fairly and accurately on the day's events, holding government accountable for its actions, analyzing and commenting on public affairs – to these traditional notions can be added a less familiar but equally important idea: that journalists must play an active role in supporting civic involvement, improving discourse and debate, and creating a climate in which the affairs of the community earn their claim on the citizen's time and attention.

The idea of journalists advocating community issues instigated concerns about the objectivity and neutrality of journalism (Lünenborg 2000: 71). However, Rosen, one of the founding fathers of the public or civic journalism movement, described the position of the journalist in public journalism as “proactive neutrality” (Rosen 1996: 13) in service of the community. Seen in this light public journalism is partly criticizing traditional journalism. This is because it does not understand itself as substitutive: “Public journalism is additive.” (Merritt 1995: 114)

Today, social media platforms such as Facebook and Twitter provide new ways for people to consume news, but also provide a forum for interaction and exchange between journalists and the audience. This development has been addressed, for example, in the text *Public Journalism 2.0: The Promise and Reality of a Citizen Engaged Press*, edited by Rosenberry and St John III (2010). A multinational interview study on journalists' relationships with users in the digital age shows three different professional assessments of users by journalists beyond those relating to participating in the news-making process. While the journalists' assessments recognized the potential of journalism in forming diverse communities, not all are civic-oriented viewpoints:

- “*Communities of costumers*”: This perception sees “audience members [...] as part of a revenue source whose loyalty is crucial for the success of the media enterprise. From this perspective, users belong to a costumer community, an essential collective that deserves to be acknowledged by the professionals.” (A. Heinson 2011: 45)
- “*Communities of peers*”: This conceptualization instead “relates to the users' roles as members of a peer community. In peer communities, users take on a collective role as people who engage with a particular media product, and participatory journalism provides a mechanism for enacting that role.” (A. Heinson 2011: 45)
- “*Civic communities*”: Related to the view that users are members of communities of peers is the perception of users as members of civic communities. In this category, “the news organization provides a ‘community center’ whose members are its users”. This is similar to the idea in public journalism that “[s]eeing their users as civic community members requires that journalists

accept the idea of socially involved journalistic enterprises.” (A. Heinonen 2011: 46)

Although only one of these three perceptions is clearly related to civic engagement, they all show the potential for community engagement in a digital media environment. Likewise, Napoli (2011: 95) argues, for journalism as well as more broadly with respect to business models, that “the concept of engagement has moved from the periphery to the center of how media organizations and advertisers are thinking about audiences”.

In theoretical terms, Lewis, Holton, and Coddington (2014) frame the stronger exchange between journalists and the audience and community-building in terms of a “reciprocal journalism”: “It situates journalists as community-builders who, particularly in online spaces, might more readily catalyze patterns of reciprocal exchange – directly with readers, indirectly among community members, and repeatedly over time – that, in turn, may contribute to the development of greater trust, connectedness, and social capital.” (Lewis, Holton & Coddington 2014: 229) However, the authors make very clear that such a reciprocal relationship between the journalists and the audience must grow over time and is different from much of what counts as audience participation in journalism on the surface today (Lewis, Holton & Coddington 2014: 232).

While community building does not necessarily depend on a social network infrastructure, they have facilitated exchange. In this respect, many news organizations try to connect with their users on social media platforms like Facebook and Twitter (Sehl, Cornia & Nielsen 2016). In fewer cases, the news outlets even seek to build online communities, based around the exchange of ideas, on their websites (Lilienthal et al. 2014).

3 Audience participation in journalism

3.1 Participatory journalism: a definition

While the previous chapter was concerned with journalism produced by journalists in the service of the community, this chapter focuses on content produced by audiences themselves. It initially defines participatory journalism in order to set the framework for further analysis of audience participation in the news production process. This seems necessary since many terms have been used to describe audience participation in journalism in recent years, such as “produsage” (Bruns 2005), “user-generated content” (Harrison 2010), or “citizen journalism” (Outing 2005). The term “participatory journalism” (Bowman & Willis 2003; Singer et al. 2011), used by other scholars, will also feature here.

Engesser states that participatory journalism integrates users in the process of content production and enables their active participation in the public sphere cre-

ated by news media (Engesser 2008: 66). Engesser's definition is relatively broad and so also includes what Nip (2006) understands to be web-based citizen journalism. Nip developed a typology of five models of audience connections and differentiates, among others, between participatory journalism and web-based citizen journalism. Following his typology, participatory journalism is defined as "user contribution [...] solicited within a frame designed by the professionals" (Nip 2006: 217). In contrast, web-based citizen journalism is characterized as when "the people are responsible for gathering content, visioning, producing and publishing the news product" (Nip 2006: 218); in this way, they can decide independently from a professional editorial office what is published.

The definitions given in the literature stress a further aspect of participatory journalism, namely, that readers can participate in a number of different media formats (Lasica 2003; Outing 2005). Lasica (2003) differentiates between six categories of audience participation in online journalism. Two of these describe formats that integrate professional and participatory formats. The category "audience participation in mainstream news outlets" includes "staff weblogs" that users can comment on. "Newsroom-sanctioned weblogs written by outsiders", "discussion forums", "articles written by readers", "photos, video and reports sent in by readers", and "other reader contributions" complete the six. The other relevant category is "full-fledged participatory news sites". Outing (2005) provides 11 "layers of citizen journalism", 10 of which are media formats at the cutting edge of professional and participatory online formats. These include: "opening up to public comments", "the citizen add-on reporter", "open-source reporting", "the citizen blog-house", "newsroom citizen 'transparency' blogs", "the stand-alone citizen-journalism site: edited version", "the stand-alone citizen-journalism site: unedited version", "add a print version", "the hybrid: pro + citizen journalism", and "integration of citizen- and pro journalism under one roof". These systematizations are already over 10 years old and therefore did not consider social networking sites that are relevant to today's understanding of user interactions (e.g., Hille & Bakker 2013; Neuberger, Langenohl & Nuernbergk 2014). In addition, Domingo et al. (2008) suggest to differentiate the news production process into stages in which the audience can be integrated: "[a]ccess and observation", "[s]election/[f]iltering", "[p]rocessing/[e]diting", and "[d]istribution" up to the "[i]nterpretation" of the news after it has been published (Domingo et al. 2008: 333).

For the purposes of this chapter, participatory journalism occurs when the audience is integrated into the production of content, or editorial processes, under the umbrella of a professional media institution. Professional journalists are still the ones who decide what to publish and who sets the rules for participation. This is an important differentiation to citizen journalism, as the audience is seen to only support, enhance, or comment on their work. In this respect, the applications of participatory journalism are many and diverse (see also Sehl 2013: 71–94).

3.2 The democratic potential of audience participation in journalism

Given such a definition, participatory journalism can be embedded into the theory of deliberative democracy (Habermas [1962] 1990, 1998) and to discursive journalism (Brosda 2008). Deliberative democracy rests on the core notion of citizens and their representatives deliberating on public problems. Journalistic mass media thereby has the function to provide an infrastructure that enables public deliberation in differentiated societies. From a normative point of view, participatory journalism seems to be particularly appropriate here as it opens up the discussion to audience members.

How the normative ideal is reflected in reality is not clearly evident from the literature. A study by Graham and Wright (2015) addressed the question of deliberation by exploring the actual use of the comment fields, by readers and journalists of *The Guardian*. Their content analysis of readers' comments from articles on the UN Climate Summit in Copenhagen was combined with interviews with the contributing journalists. The findings show that debates were often deliberate: "Discussions were typically rational, critical, coherent, reciprocal and civil." (Graham & Wright 2015: 332) While the authors did not collect data on the background and political views of the participating users, they conclude from the debate that the participants held a wide range of political views and brought them into the discussion. The authors see this as an important difference from many online political discussion spaces. For political discussion forums, Freelon (2010) found, in a systematic review of the literature, more empirical evidence for a monologist culture of discussion than for a deliberative one.

Ruiz et al. (2011) also explored the deliberative potential of audience participation in an professional institutional journalistic context. The sample consisted of more than 15,000 comments from online versions of five national newspapers from different political and journalistic contexts (*The Guardian*, *Le Monde*, *The New York Times*, *El País*, and *La Repubblica*). By analyzing their ethical guidelines and legal frameworks, as well as their moderation strategies, the authors identified two models of audience participation: One model is "where *communities* of debate are formed based on mostly respectful discussions between diverse points view". The other model is characterized by "*homogenous communities*, in which expressing feelings about current events dominates the contributions and there is less of an argumentative debate" (Ruiz et al. 2011: 463, emphasis in the original).

Finally, Rowe (2015) compared in a content analysis the discursive quality of user comments left on the website of the *Washington Post* with those users wrote on the organizations' Facebook page on the same political news. He found that comments written by users of the website were of greater deliberative quality than those left by Facebook users.

In sum, the findings of the studies suggest that the culture of discussion in online-comments on news websites is not random, but newsrooms have a certain

degree of influence on the quality of the discourse in the way they design and moderate it. Furthermore, there are hints that the quality of discussion differs between the websites and the social media pages of news organizations.

3.3 Early forms of audience participation in journalism

Audience participation in journalism has a much longer tradition than is generally recognized within discussions on developments of the social web. In England, for example, reader participation dates back to the 18th century when newspapers left unprinted space on the third page for readers to add comments before passing the newspaper on to someone else (Hermida 2011: 13). In Germany, early forays to enable readers to contribute to newspapers date back to the 19th century. Readers provided extracts on topical or ethical content to the local reporting of newspapers (Schönhagen 1995).

With the professionalization of journalism, these early attempts at audience participation came to an end. Newspapers were completed with content authored solely by professional journalists (Hermida 2011: 13–14). An exception is the traditional letter to the editor that also has a long history in many countries but is still alive today (Wahl-Jorgensen 2007). In radio, audience participation dates back to “radio town meetings” in the US in the 1930s (Sterling & Kittross 1978: 181). The first “phone-in” programs were broadcast in England (Burger 1991: 358–359).

Apart from these examples, audience participation also included formats completely produced by citizens such as community radios in the US (Lamberty 1988), open channels (e.g., Walendy 1993), or the underground press or alternative press (e.g., Bütetführ 1993). All of these examples had one element in common: their aim was always to fill the gaps left by professional reporting (e.g., where a wider array of topics, actors, or opinions were covered).

Although these examples show that audience participation in journalism has a long history, it has reached a new dimension in recent years. New communication technologies have enabled almost anybody to publish content on the web for a potentially global audience (e.g., in blogs or on social networking sites), though much of this content is not necessarily related to the news. Nevertheless, news content generated by the audience is being published also independent from legacy media, which has in effect lost its role as news gatekeepers on the Internet (Bruns 2005). As a response to this web-based citizen journalism, the professional media has reacted by offering similar tools through which their audiences can participate (Singer et al. 2011).

3.4 Motives and reservations of newsrooms in enabling audience participation

This section will describe the motives of editorial offices. It focuses on why these offices offer participatory features and enable user participation while reviewing their reservation and concerns. Paulussen et al. state in an article on four European countries that economic expectations are the main reasons why professional media organizations offer participatory features on their websites: “Marketing and business strategies somehow push for the exploration of such proposals.” (Paulussen et al. 2007: 131) A correlated study by Vujnovic et al. (2010) on eight European countries, the US, and Canada, found three branding and economic strategies seen around the world: strategies to build loyalty, to increase website traffic and, by media managers in smaller countries, to save costs.

Jönsson and Örnebring conducted a content analysis of 10 Swedish and British tabloid and broadsheet newspapers. Supporting the aforementioned findings, they come to the conclusion that participatory journalism is clearly driven by economic motives: “UGC provision in mainstream media to a great extent addresses users-as-consumers and is part of a context of consumption.” (Jönsson & Örnebring 2011: 127)

While these studies assert that economic expectations lead to integrate participatory features on news websites, Paulussen et al. (2007) found that the professional journalistic culture is a factor that slows down the process. In a further study, Paulussen and Ugille explored editorial context factors in depth. They conducted semi-structured interviews with editorial employees (editorial management, IT staff, editorial staff) of two Belgian newspapers and a citizen journalism website, observing the working processes. Their findings show that participatory features were not rapidly integrated into professional journalism: “This is because adoption processes in newsrooms are not just triggered by ‘technological’ developments (such as the innovations that enable users to produce content themselves), but they are also shaped by the broader professional, organisational, economic and social context of the news production process.” (Paulussen & Ugille 2008: 37) This study revealed the following hindering factors: a hierarchical structure in the newsrooms exists, a work division between print and online journalists, between technical and editorial staff, and between journalists and readers/users. “In such an environment, it is difficult to establish a culture of interactivity and participation.” (Paulussen & Ugille 2008: 37) Apart from this, Paulussen and Ugille identified skepticism on part of the journalists regarding newly introduced technological innovations. These results suggest that high work and time pressure led to work routines and encourage journalists to rely on traditional sources (such as news agencies), with which they were already familiar. All interviewed journalists emphasized that the moderation of the dialogue and the proper selection of contributions, are crucial to maintaining the quality of the publication because “concerns are raised about the low newsworthiness, the personal tone and the subjective bias of user contributions” (Paulussen & Ugille 2008: 38).

Consistent with these findings, Singer's (2010) survey of British local newspapers journalists found that many fear user-generated content could fall below professional norms in cases where a material is not controlled and selected properly. However, this was not seen as possible by the interviewed journalists from the background of their workload. "The number and nature of those contributions, coupled with what is universally seen as inadequate newsroom resources to handle them, is creating considerable anxiety." (Singer 2010: 138) Apart from that lack of resources, many of the journalists evaluated user contributions as an additional source of information and opinions, and not as a replacement for professional local journalism.

In a multi-method case study of the German television news bulletin *Tageschau* and its online presentation *tagesschau.de*, Heise et al. (2014) explored the motivation of the audience to participate. The study compared the assumed and actual motivations for audience participation by journalists and audience members. The difference between assumed and actual motivations is what was termed "inclusion distance" (Heise et al. 2014: 414). The empirical findings suggest some large differences between the motivations assumed by journalists and the audience members' actual motivations to participate. This however is not always the case. For instance, a survey and series of interviews in the same study show that the journalists assumed that their audience's main motivation for participation was "to state their opinion publicly". This was also an important motivation for the audience. Thus, here the inclusion distance between journalists and audience was comparatively small. It grew, however, with the presence of another important perceived motivation from the journalists' perspective: "to vent anger and frustration". In actuality, the audience largely rejected this motivation (as Heise et al. noted, possibly due to social desirability). Furthermore, journalists assumed that "to point out errors in news stories" is an important motivation of the participating audience. The respondents of the survey moderately agreed. However, the audience members also stated that "to expand their knowledge by interacting with journalists and other viewers/users" was also an important motive. The journalists did not assume this. Instead, "[t]o propose certain topics which are important to me" was a motivation for audience members that journalists also assumed this way (Heise et al. 2014: 419–422).

It must be noted that there is also a number of studies on motives for commenting on news websites and/or social media sites from the audience perspective only (e.g., Weber 2014; Springer, Engelmann & Pfaffinger 2015), commentators characteristics (e.g., Kalogeropoulos et al. 2017) or the dynamics of online news discussions (Ziegele et al. 2017) that are not in the focus of this chapter.

3.5 Features and forms of audience participation and how they are used

This section outlines the structural characteristics of audience participation on new media websites (over time). In fact, how the audience participates and to what extent it does is a decision by the institutional media. It also discusses how certain features are used by the audience.

One of the earliest studies on the participatory features on news media websites is that by Domingo et al. (2008). An international research team analyzed the status quo, as of 2007, among 16 leading news organizations in eight European countries (Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Spain, the UK, Croatia, and Slovenia) and in the US. In methodological terms, the team did so by using an analytical grid that follows the logic of news production stages from “[a]ccess and observation”, “[s]election/[f]iltering”, “[p]rocessing/[e]diting”, and “[d]istribution” up to the “[i]nterpretation” of the news after it has been published (Domingo et al. 2008: 333). The findings show that the news organizations at that time limited users to the role of commentators on professionally produced content: “[...] news organisations are interpreting online user participation mainly as an opportunity for their readers to debate current events, while other stages of the news production process are closed to citizen involvement or controlled by professional journalists when participation is allowed.” (Domingo et al. 2008: 326)

Several studies on Germany were found. Neuberger, Nuernbergk, and Rischke (2009) conducted a survey of 183 heads of online at print and broadcasting media as well as Internet-only media in the same year as the aforementioned study. They arrived at a similar result on the early phase of audience participation in news media websites. While three quarters offered their users at least one option to participate at that time, these were mostly features that limited the users to the role of commentator (Neuberger, Nuernbergk & Rischke 2009: 282–283). The limitation to feedback functions is also found in a content analysis of 129 German newspaper websites in 2008 (Sehl 2013: 195), as well as in a content analysis of 270 German media websites in 2013 (print, broadcasting, and Internet-only media) in 2013 (Lilienthal et al. 2014: 53–82).

A longitudinal content analysis of four major Swedish mainstream national news website between 2005 and 2009 found a similar result: Users were largely permitted only to comment on professionally produced and already-published content (Karlsson 2011).

More recently, Neuberger, Langenohl, and Nuernbergk (2014) published a survey on social media and journalism in Germany. They interviewed 105 editors of the news websites of legacy media and Internet-only media in 2014. They found that over half of the editorial offices had more than five Facebook accounts, a little more than one third had more than five Twitter accounts, and about one third operated more than five blogs. However, about one quarter of the editorial offices

had no blog and no presence on YouTube. Ninety-five percent had at least one Twitter account, and they all had a Facebook account (Neuberger, Langenohl & Nuernbergk 2014: 43–44).

Hille and Bakker (2013) examined closely how Dutch news media are using Facebook as a platform for distribution and user interaction. Referring to Nip's typology (2006) presented previously, the authors found that the use of Facebook did not correspond to the definition of participatory journalism nor citizen journalism but was "a hybrid format because part of the interaction takes place on the media website or the Facebook page of a medium, while another part is only visible on the Facebook profile page of the individual user and is shared with his or her Facebook friends" (Hille & Bakker 2013: 664). Hille and Bakker conducted quantitative and qualitative research in 2011–2012 to investigate 64 Dutch media, including all Dutch national and regional daily newspapers, news magazines, most of the national news (public television) programs, broadcasters, regional broadcasters, and the most important independent news site at that time. They coded in a content analysis as to whether these 64 news media used Facebook buttons on their website to invite users to like, share, or comment. Furthermore, Hille and Bakker examined the presence of these media on Facebook and the range of their activities. Ten of the 64 media were analyzed in depth, with a special focus on how users are interacting on the platform. The findings show that the offline and online presence of legacy media did not predict newsrooms' activities on Facebook. While almost all Dutch news websites analyzed had a Facebook fan page, and a large majority used the "like" and "share" buttons on their news website, the authors found no clear strategy of news media on using Facebook:

There are substantial differences in how basic Facebook features are used, even when media from the same publisher are compared, suggesting that there is no clear (company) strategy on using Facebook. Some media do have some features but do not seem to use them, another group hardly publishes updates, while some media use automated updating – in all of these cases there does not seem to be an active strategy in using Facebook. Also the fact that only two media (*Hart van Nederland* and *RTV Rijnmond*) take the effort to respond to the audience after they have made a comment and only a few media ask for interaction, suggests a rather passive strategy (Hille & Bakker 2013: 677).

The study suggests that news media at the time of the study underperformed on Facebook by only distributing content and ignoring possibilities for audience interaction. Therefore, Hille and Bakker conclude that "'audience distribution' would be a better term to describe these practices than 'audience participation'" (Hille & Bakker 2013: 663).

Further studies focused less on the actual features offered but more on the content produced. Harrison (2010) conducted an observational study of the way the BBC deals with user-generated content at its UGC hub (for UGC at the BBC see also Belair-Gagnon 2015). Harrison identified four types of audience participation at the BBC (Harrison 2010: 244–247, emphasis by A. S.):

1. “*UGC as a form of unsolicited news story*”: In this respect, UGC can break or extend a news story, e.g., with topic suggestions or witness material. The news story is then followed up by journalists.
2. “*UGC as a form of solicited content for specific extant news stories*”: This form of UGC is universally used by news journalists to enhance a news story, e.g., by finding additional contacts and sources for a story. For this purpose, the BBC also cultivates a database with relevant contacts from its viewers/listeners/online users by encouraging them to contact the BBC.
3. “*UGC as a form of expeditious content for specific items and features*”: Here, UGC is used as a forward-planning routine by the BBC to enhance stories in the future, e.g., by crowdsourcing for information or material.
4. “*UGC as a form of audience watchdog content*”: This form of audience participation means the audience reacts to a particular news story mostly by contacting the BBC to complain and influence the reporting.

Although the study describes how user-generated content was moderated by the BBC hub and how gatekeeping barriers have evolved to ensure BBC news values, it ends with a perspective that the use of user-generated content at the BBC could possibly lead to an increase of soft news.

A study on audience participation on British and Swedish news websites points to a similar direction. Jönsson and Örnebring (2011) examined the degree of participation and type of content produced by the audience. They conducted a content analysis of the online versions of major broadsheets and tabloids in the UK and Sweden, particularly three broadsheets and two tabloids in each country. All UGC features in the online versions of the newspapers were coded during one week in 2008. Concerning the degree of participation, Jönsson and Örnebring differentiated between three levels: a low level of participation, mainly addressing audience members as consumers (e.g., through RSS feed, grading, marking); a medium level of participation, which addresses audience members as consumers and producers (e.g., through comment functions, e-mail, solicited content); and a high level of participation, which addresses audience members as producers (e.g., through forums, blogs, and other non-solicited content). Regarding the type of content, the authors differentiated between three types of content that users can create: information-oriented content, entertainment/popular culture-oriented content, and personal/social/expressive-oriented content. Their findings show that users were mostly motivated to participate in creating popular culture-oriented content and personal/everyday life-oriented content rather than news/informational content. The authors conclude the following: “UGC in mainstream news media so far has only limited implications for the role of the citizen in the political public sphere. Participation and interaction are mainly going on in the cultural public sphere and the private sphere.” (Jönsson & Örnebring 2011: 140)

Consequently, they argue that audience participation in mainstream news media follows a logic of political economy. This finding addresses, to a great extent,

users-as-consumers and thereby refers more to consumption than to production: “[...] UGC often works as a self-legitimization tool for news organizations. To frame UGC as a democratic tool could be a branding strategy for creating and upholding a close relationship to the audience. Users are *identified* as consumers but *approached* as citizens.” (Jönsson & Örnebring 2011: 141, emphasis in the original)

Boczkowski and Mitchelstein (2012) examined the thematic composition of the most clicked, most e-mailed, and most commented stories during periods of heightened and routine political activity on three main US legacy media websites associated with news (CNN, *USA Today*, and *Washington Post*). Data were collected in two waves – during a period of heightened political activity in 2008 (68 days during 15 weeks) and during one period with normal political activity in 2009 (14 days). For each data collection day, the most clicked, most e-mailed, and most commented stories displayed on each of these sites were coded. A story was identified whether it was a public affairs story, meaning news about politics, government, economics, business, or international affairs, or whether it was a nonpublic affairs story, meaning news on sports, crime, entertainment, technology, or the weather. The findings show that the most commented stories were more likely to be focused on public affairs news than the most clicked and most e-mailed articles. Furthermore, the presence of public affairs stories in all three types of interactivities was also greater during the period of heightened political activity than during its routine counterpart. Finally, the thematic composition of the stories showed significant dynamism over the period of heightened political activity; the likelihood that users click on, e-mail, or comment on public affairs stories increased during this period.

To identify patterns and predict the use of audience participation in online newspapers was the aim of a study by Chung (2008). She conducted an online survey of 542 respondents in a medium-sized Midwestern city in the US. In a factor analysis, Chung identified the following four categories of interactive features: human/medium interactive features (e.g., “submit stories” function), medium/human interactive features (e.g., customized topics), human interactive features (e.g., chat functions), and medium interactive features (e.g., audio files). The findings point out that interactive features are generally used infrequently by users, especially human interactive features. Regression analyses show that different user characteristics and backgrounds predict the use of specific types of interactive features. Therefore, Chung concludes that no harm exists for new organizations to offer a wide variety of interactive features: “This study illustrates that news organizations need not worry about applying all types of interactive features to engage their readers as the features serve distinct functions. Instead, news organizations should focus on building credibility and may seek to identify their online news audiences and then subsequently provide interactive features accordingly.” (Chung 2008: 658)

The development of participatory features offered by news media and the audience’s willingness to participate over time are discussed below.

3.6 Managing audience participation

Audience participation has also challenged professional journalism to seek appropriate solutions to manage user contributions. Domingo (2011) identified two general approaches: “participatory journalism as playground” versus “participatory journalism as source” (Domingo 2011: 86).

The first strategy is characterized by media that create a separate section or even a website for audience participation, and such is clearly separated from professionally produced journalistic content and beyond just news story comments. Dedicated staff manage these sections or websites with little or no collaboration with the journalists producing the actual news.

The second strategy is integrating audience participation into existing newsroom practices. The aim of this approach is to use the material as a source for news production. In this approach, journalists themselves engage in the dialogue with users to gather information. By moderation and fact-checking, newsrooms try to maintain journalistic standards. Domingo further describes that in both strategies – playground and source – journalists are basically protected from most of the management of user contributions. In general, most newspapers that the author explored introduced specific participation units and limited the involvement of news journalists to specific tasks: “For instance, reporters might be urged to develop stories out of user tips but not asked to do the initial work of sorting the newsworthy tips from all those received every day.” (Domingo 2011: 89)

In general, two different approaches for moderation exist: pre- and post-moderation (e.g., Harrison 2010: 250; Domingo 2011: 83; Lilienthal et al. 2014: 213–214). Pre-moderation means that a material can only be seen by other users when the moderator of a website has seen it and decided that it is suitable for posting. This is often done for contentious issues. Post-moderation means that the moderation occurs only after a material has been posted, and other users have been able to see it. The moderator then decides if the material is suitable enough and can stay on the website. In this way, post-moderation is reactive and most suitable for groups and discussions that are not likely to fall into an aggressive tone. Beyond that, Robinson (2010) identified in ethnographic work in the US two approaches to comment moderation: the “traditionalist” and the “convergent” approach. The “traditionalists” try to maintain a hierarchical relationship between journalists and audiences (e.g. by applying pre- and postmoderation), while the “convergers” are more open to discursive forms of content moderation. In general, appropriate moderation is seen as necessary, especially as Prochazka, Weber and Schweiger (2018) found in an experiment that incivility in comments also had a negative effect on the perceived formal quality of an article. Instead, unreasoned comments decreased the perceived informational quality of an article only in cases where the news brand was unknown.

Apart from this routine moderation of user contributions, Domingo (2011: 89–91) highlights four best practices of news media in managing user-generated content:

1. *To highlight users' contributions:* Journalists select newsworthy and high-quality audience contributions for prominent publication in the website or the print product. This way, the newsroom aims to encourage audience participation and increase the quality of contributions.
2. *To curate and coach:* This approach to manage user-generated content focuses on highlighting the best instead of deleting the worst of users' contributions to enable effective management.
3. *To provide a systematic oversight and direct interaction:* To provide a systematic oversight of user contributions, newsrooms develop dedicated tools that deal with audience contributions. The aim is to manage and use a material efficiently. Another example found was the direct interaction of journalists with the audience in additional spaces.

Domingo also mentions the task of some audience participation managers to “evangelize the newsroom into a dialogical attitude towards users” (Domingo 2011: 91).

How user-generated content is managed at the BBC at its UGC hub is the focus of an observational study by Harrison (2010). In accordance with the research of Domingo, the study found that user contributions were routinely moderated by dedicated staff. Furthermore, it revealed that traditional gatekeeping has evolved over time for user-generated content used in journalistic articles to ensure that BBC news values are upheld. All materials, such as information and pictures, were carefully checked by a member of the UGC hub (Harrison 2010: 252).

In line with these findings is that of the aforementioned study by Singer (2010). She also found that journalists emphasize the necessity of gatekeeping. Through this process, they try to ensure journalistic norms and values. However, as mentioned previously, they worry that newsrooms do not have enough resources to control the quality of user-generated content.

Apart from the management of audience participation by dedicated persons or teams for this task, some media also rely on voting and/or moderation by users (Domingo 2011: 92; Lilienthal et al. 2014: 114, 117). In the first case, users can vote on the comments made by other users to highlight best-liked content. In the second case, users are allowed to post-moderate abuse of participation by other users.

3.7 Development of audience participation

The previous sections have shown that many news organizations are reluctant to allow audience participation (Domingo et al. 2008; Sehl 2013; Bergström & Wadbring 2015) because of concerns related to resources (Thurman 2008; Singer 2010) and the professional role of journalism (Hermida & Thurman 2008; Paulussen & Ugille 2008; Singer 2010).

However, most of the studies on participatory journalism are cross-sectional studies. Almost no longitudinal studies on how participatory journalism has devel-

oped have been conducted. An exception is that of Karlsson et al. (2015). Their study examined the long-term viability (2007–2013) of participatory journalism in Sweden in terms of the features offered and the users using them. Specifically, the authors analyzed to what extent news media allowed comments and blog links in news items, and they investigated the usage of these options from a user perspective. The quantitative content analysis included the four largest national news sites in Sweden (the news websites to national newspapers). Data were gathered during an eight-week period each year. News commenting and blog writing among the audience were captured for the same years from the Swedish national society, opinion, and media surveys. The findings show that the inclusion of comments and blog links on news sites increased from 2007 to 2010. After that, they decreased clearly. The results also indicate that posting user comments or writing blogs have never been widespread activities. Therefore, Karlsson et al. point to the reluctance of professional journalism to include the audience, as well as the lack of willingness to participate on the users' side:

Overall, we conclude that these data from Sweden indicate that participatory journalism, at least in terms of blog links and comments, is on the decline and, for that matter, has previously been given more value by editors and academics than by the citizens allegedly empowered by this phenomenon. Consequently, we see these results as an indicator that there is no major shift in how power is being distributed or how deliberation takes place in the context of news and journalism. This is not only a problem of producers letting go of control but also, more importantly, a lack of interest, for whatever reason, from users (Karlsson et al. 2015: 305).

However, the study is limited in that it only examined Sweden, and only two options of participation were included. For example, social networking sites, such as Facebook, as the authors themselves mentioned, were not a part of their study despite having become a popular channel for the dialogue between newsrooms and the audience in recent years (Hille & Bakker 2013).

4 Conclusion

The chapter has discussed how the borderline between professional journalists and their audiences has become blurred in digital journalism. It has shown that differentiating between audience participation within the frame of institutional journalism (participatory journalism) and outside of it (citizen journalism) is important because in participatory journalism, institutional journalism defines the frame and sets the rules. Apart from this, the defining section has shown that participatory journalism can take many forms and can take place on every stage of the news production process.

Participatory journalism has been widely discussed and researched in the context of digital journalism. However, this chapter has shown that audience partici-

pation has a much longer history and has existed in various forms long before the digital age. Also forms of community engagement like in public journalism have been practiced before. Nevertheless, audience participation in journalism has reached a new dimension in the digital age. Theoretically, audience participation offers opportunities for greater deliberation in public discourse. However, the few empirical studies concerning this aspect found different results. They partly suggest that the economy of audience participation is more important to news media than the deliberative potential. The economic perspective is also in line with the main motivation that several studies have identified for news media to open up to users and to try to build a community of loyal users. At the same time studies showed that many journalists had concerns about opening up to the audience because of the professional role of the media and limited resources.

Nevertheless, audience participation in journalism has been widely taken up by news media. The overview of studies on the participatory features offered has proved that audience participation is limited to a feedback function on already-published content, which is particularly the case in many Western countries. Other stages of the news production process are rarely open to user participation in content production. On the other hand, studies on the audience perspective have indicated that only a small part of the audience is willing to participate. Over time, newsrooms have developed strategies to manage the material they receive from users.

Today, social networking sites, such as Facebook, are important platforms for media to distribute their news and interact with users. These were not yet in the focus of many studies discussed in this chapter (for exception, see e.g., Hille & Bakker 2013; Rowe 2015). Such third-party platforms create a new environment for audience interaction that does not necessarily work the same way as audience participation on news website does. Further research on the similarities and differences between audience participation on media websites and on social media platforms is needed to understand the current development that Hille and Bakker call a “hybrid” (Hille & Bakker 2013: 664) between participatory and citizen journalism.

Further reading

Theoretical accounts on the relationship between journalism and the audience in networked digital media are provided in Bruns (2005) and Loosen and Schmidt (2012). In empirical research, the most comprehensive and cross-nationally comparative study on the topic is the book *Participatory Journalism: Guarding Open Gates at Online Newspapers* by a team of journalism scholars from Europe, North America, and Israel (Singer et al. 2011). A comparison between the attitudes and expectations of journalists and audience members towards audience participation in journalism can be found in Heise et al. (2014).

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VII Conclusion

Henrik Örnebring

28 Journalism and Change

Abstract: This chapter argues that even as studying change in journalism is the central concern of the contemporary field of journalism studies, change is itself under-theorized within the field. The chapter looks at research on three key aspects of change in journalism: professionalization, commercialization, and digitalization. The main finding is that while there is rich empirical, descriptive research on all these aspects of change in journalism, there is very little theorization on how to explain these changes. Research on change in journalism is also often unclear about how change on different analytical levels (micro, meso or macro) relate to each other. The chapter ends by proposing a typology for different aspects of change in journalism on different analytical levels.

Keywords: change, professionalization, commercialization, digitalization

1 Introduction: The more things change ...

The greatest truism of contemporary journalism studies is “Journalism is changing”. Change in journalism is contested, discussed, and critiqued, but rarely presented as anything but inescapable. As journalism studies has grown, “change” as the *raison d'être* of the field as a whole has become ever more central and now stands as the dominant way of framing research questions and interpreting research results within the field.

How did it come to be this way? Certainly the field of journalism studies was not always so obsessed with change. Walter Lippmann, writing in 1922, was less interested in studying how journalism itself was changing (if at all) and more in how news and journalism contributed to changing people’s minds. Thirty years later, scholars such as David Manning White (1950) and Warren Breed (1955) were more interested in the stability of different newsroom patterns than in any change to such patterns. Why did Mr Gates (White’s “gatekeeper”) consistently select certain types of wire stories for publication and not others? Why did journalists follow newsroom policies even when they contravened their professional norms? Thirtyish years after White and Breed, Gaye Tuchman studied a shared system of news-gathering that was remarkably stable, not than constantly changing (Tuchman 1978).

The question of why “change” shifted from being peripheral to central in the minds of journalism scholars is no great mystery: journalism studies did not focus on how journalism was changing because journalism did not change. This is a simplification, but we do know that for most of the 20th century (particularly the

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first two or three decades of the post-World War II period) the basic institutional framework of journalism in the Western world was exceptionally stable, not only in itself but also in comparison with other sectors of society (a similar argument can be found in Picard, in this volume, see also Lowery's notes on isomorphism as part of an institutional analysis of news, in this volume).

The journalism landscape was dominated by large and very profitable daily newspaper companies, complemented by likewise large and often well-resourced public service media organizations (at least in Europe). These organizations were populated by a well-organized professional collective with a strong claim to social and cultural legitimacy. This claim to legitimacy was furthermore sustained by the fact that the dominant form of employment was permanent, full-time contracts with these large and well-resourced organizations. The technological framework for journalistic production was complex but often separated from the editorial work, or at least the technological aspects of editorial work were supported by specialist staff (such as cameramen and film editors in the case of television news, for example).

As these aspects – technology, business, overall organization of labor – began to change from the 1970s and 1980s onwards (picking up speed after the creation of the World Wide Web in 1994), so too did journalism research become increasingly concerned with studying these changes, in part because of the close relationship between journalism and journalism scholarship (journalism scholars are also actors in processes of journalistic change and perform discursive work interpreting and framing change that reverberates within the news industry, see Borger et al. 2013; Curran 2010; Zelizer 2009). Journalism scholarship was not that interested in change because journalism did not change all that much for a long period of time, and as this stability was challenged by a confluence of factors, journalism studies did become more interested in describing, understanding, and explaining change.

However, this shift has by and large taken place without serious critical reflexivity and without much conceptual precision in the concept of “change” itself. Considering change in journalism – and indeed change in any societal phenomenon or institution – we need to answer at least five questions about the nature and character of change:

- Is change rapid and wholesale (*revolution*) or slow and incremental (*evolution*)?
- What is the *time scale* of change?
- What *causes* change?
- What *aspects* (of journalism, in this case) are changing?
- At what *level of analysis* is change studied?

Here are the stock answers to these questions: journalism has been, and still is, undergoing revolutionary change over a very short period of time. This short period began in 1994 and accelerated in the mid-to-late 2000s (with the introduction of social network sites like Facebook and YouTube, and with the transformation of

online advertising tools). The ongoing change in turn envelops all central aspects of journalism – its organization, its economic status, its cultural authority, its democratic role, its texts, and and its audience – and at the end of the day is largely perceived as caused by technological developments but also economic factors.

I write “stock answers” because journalism studies also feature counter-stories to the one just told, many of them present in this volume. I have already highlighted Robert Picard’s chapter on the business of journalism, and I will also mention Angela Phillips’ chapter on technology and journalism, the latter rejecting strong technological determinism in favor of more nuanced arguments acknowledging the social shaping of technology as well as the actual affordances of particular technologies. This chapter will continue and develop these counter-stories in a different way: by highlighting and then analyzing how journalism scholarship has conceptualized change in a more general sense across aspects of journalism and levels of analysis. I will begin with a brief historical excursion into how change was conceptualized in pre-Internet era journalism studies – to the extent that it was conceptualized at all – and then turn to what I consider to be the three major organizing concepts describing and analyzing change in journalism in the contemporary era: *professionalization*, *commercialization*, and *digitalization*. This section will address the first three questions about change presented previously, i.e. revolution vs evolution, the time scale of change, and the causes of change. Then follows a section presenting a tentative typology for how to place the various changes taking place in journalism along the axes of aspect of change and level of analysis, thus addressing the last two of the five questions about change I presented at the outset.

2 A brief (and selective) history of studying change of/in journalism

Studying change over time was not a central concern in the nascent field of news and journalism studies. There have been some exceptions. In studies of agenda-setting (which straddle the field of journalism/news studies and political communication studies), changes in media coverage and their effect on public and policy agendas were often studied in the short term (though not in McCombs’ and Shaw’s original agenda-setting study, which only measured content at a single point in time, see McCombs & Shaw 1972). Studying how media coverage and public opinion changed (or did not) during a two-month or four-month interval was typical (Chaffee 1972; Sohn 1978: 327). Similarly, early scholars of newspaper readership and media use in general were interested in how news consumption patterns were changing across time (Chaffee & Choe 1981; Tims & Chaffee 1983).

Studies of the *history* of news and journalism of course explicitly chart changes over time, though it is notable that much news/journalism history has a descriptive

bent, seldom offering explanatory accounts of why changes occur, and furthermore often adopts a progressivist perspective. For example, the titles of Harold Herd's classic works on the history of British Journalism, *The Making of Modern Journalism* and *The March of Journalism* (Herd 1927, 1952, respectively) are indicative of a historical narrative of progress towards the modern. Such a narrative can also be found in histories of the US press, e.g., Mott (1941) and Emery (1952). This so-called whig interpretation of history (a term originally coined by Butterfield (1965)) has of course been criticized, notably by Carey (1974), but long remained strong in historical accounts of how journalism had changed over time: becoming more modern, more free, in short better (though there were always critical counterpoints to this narrative, notably from Marxist media historians, e.g., Curran (1978)).

The introduction of new media has historically also created an interest in how the "new" medium is changing or affecting "old" media – the *locus classicus* here is of course Marshall McLuhan (1964), but his interest in how media-technological change could create societal change was surprisingly little reflected in the study of news and/or journalism of the 1960s and 1970s, with some exceptions (e.g., Bogart (1975) on how the introduction of TV affected newspaper profitability, and Robinson and Jeffers (1979) on how the introduction of TV affected newspaper readership patterns). McLuhanesque perspectives have in fact become more prevalent in journalism studies with the coming of the digital era, more common now than they were in the decades immediately following the publication of *Understanding Media*.

Overall, perspectives on change in news and journalism scholarship have historically either been *short-term* (as in the various studies of news audiences and agenda-setting cited previously) or confined to the study of *journalism history*, where the dominant narrative of change has been one of progress and gradual improvement in an implicit normative sense. Only very recently has there been an interest in more explicitly theorizing change in media studies as a whole and, by extension, journalism studies (Burgers 2016; Stanyer & Mihelj 2016; Ryfe 2017). Based on a review of articles dealing with change over time in some way in three media and communication journals over 15 years, Stanyer and Mihelj conclude that the media and communication field overall – i.e. not just journalism studies – has had an unreflective and under-theorized approach to change, particularly when it comes to explaining (rather than just describing) change (Stanyer & Mihelj 2016: 274). Ryfe comes to the same conclusion in his book about journalism and the public, and proposes a theoretical framework for explaining change in journalism that is rooted in institutionalist perspectives (an approach to studying change also advocated by Bannerman and Haggart (2015)) and relies on linking developments in journalism to developments in other fields and in society as a whole (Ryfe 2017: 137 ff, 156). These efforts are all recent, however, and do not historically reflect the analytical concerns of either communication studies in general or the specific sub-field of journalism studies.

3 Theoretical (?) perspectives on change in journalism

Scholarly interest in how journalism is changing has thus significantly expanded in the past decades. This is not least noticeable in the rise of a set of interrelated and oft-recurring concepts that, so to speak, have change built into them: these are, of course the numerous what we could call “-izations” of journalism scholarship. *Professionalization*, *commercialization*, and *digitalization* are probably the most common, though there are others, e.g., *hybridization*, *tabloidization*, *Americanization*, *homogenization*, etc. All these -izations have in common that they describe *longitudinal processes* whereby some aspect of journalism *increases* or *becomes more prominent* (often, it is viewed, at the expense of other aspects, which are *decreasing/become less prominent*). The rise in importance of these concepts captures well the increasing focus on change in journalism scholarship. These are all terms that explicitly refer to change over time, often combined with an implicit view that the change described by these concepts is still ongoing. In the following I will discuss these concepts and the epistemological underpinnings of the change they describe, focusing on the three most commonly-invoked -izations.

3.1 Professionalization

Professionalization is the oldest of the three concepts, originating as it does in the 1950s and 1960s sociology of the professions. The concept came into existence against a backdrop of more and more occupations requiring higher education for occupational entry, adopting formal codes of practice and codified professional values, and forming professional associations seeking to promote the autonomy and social legitimacy of the occupation (e.g., Greenwood 1957; Caplow 1966; Wilensky 1964). The concept was first applied to journalism by McLeod and Hawley (1964), whose opening words in their article succinctly encapsulates the concern that has been underlying discussions of journalistic professionalism ever since: “A recurrent journalistic controversy has involved the question whether journalism is a true profession or merely a craft. If any sort of agreement exists, it is probably that journalism is partly professionalized but lacks some important ingredients of a true profession” (McLeod & Hawley 1964: 529). It has proven difficult to fit journalism in alongside the traditional professions of medicine and law with their historically strong claims to unique expertise, need for formal qualification, and where professional entry has been highly regulated by the profession itself.

However, it is important to note that McLeod and Hawley did not actually study change over time. Their study was based on a sample of newspaper workers in

Milwaukee at a single point in time and in their article, “professionalization” rather refers to a continuum along which individual practitioners can be placed. The journalists in their study range from “Pros” (the most professionalized) to “Semi-Pros” (less professionalized), and a third category, “Employees”, consisting of people who worked on the advertising/circulation/clerical sides of the newspaper enterprise, was the least professionalized (McLeod & Hawley 1964: 531, 533 f).

Scholars following McLeod and Hawley have often held an implicit view of professionalization as evolutionary. Professionalization was understood as a process where the occupation became gradually *better*: more oriented towards universal professional values, more intellectual sophistication, rise of more efficient and fairer working practices (Markham, McLeod & Rush 1969; Nayman 1973; Osiel 1986; Windahl & Rosengren 1976), and so on. This notion of professionalization-as-progress was criticized early on (Wilensky 1964) and criticism increased with the rise of so-called critical professionalism research, where professionalization was said to rest on processes of occupational closure (Witz 1990), resistance to outside control and accountability mechanisms (Sarfatti Larson 1977), and in some cases outright group think (Largent 2008).

It was not until survey studies in the McLeod and Hawley mold started to accumulate time series that professionalization as a type of change across time came into scholarly focus, notably with the regular surveys of US journalists conducted by David Weaver, Cleveland Wilhoit, and associates (Weaver & Wilhoit 1986, 1996; Weaver et al. 2007; see also Brownlee & Beam 2012 for a summary of changes across all waves of this survey).

These studies actually confirm the onward march of professionalization. Over the 40-year period studied, the share of journalists with a university degree has continually increased, as has the share of journalists with a graduate education (Brownlee & Beam 2012: 351 f). Over time, journalists overall reported a stronger commitment to ethical practices and less acceptance of ethically dubious practices (Brownlee & Beam 2012: 358), and commitment to professional values remained strong, even though some changes in what is considered to be “professional” behavior could be observed: journalists’ emphasis on a disseminator role (i.e. providing citizens with factual information in a timely fashion) has decreased over time as the emphasis on a populist-mobilizer role has increased – though the watchdog and interpreter roles consistently are considered the most important over time (Brownlee & Beam 2012: 356 ff). Survey time series from other countries also report a general strengthening of various aspects of professionalism (in particular education and commitment to professional values) over time, at least up until the mid-2000s (e.g., Weischenberg, Malik & Scholl 2006: 97 ff; Wiik 2012: 34).

More recent studies, some of them survey-based but some also based on more qualitative data, suggest that this pattern is changing and has been replaced by one of rapid decline: a *de-professionalization* (Chang-de 2006; Witschge & Nygren 2009; Nygren 2012). The image of professional decline in journalism across a range

of aspects is pervasive in the literature – commercial values and imperatives of news organizations weakening professional values (McManus 2009); changing principles of work organization emphasizing outsourcing and contingent labor likewise weakening the basis of professionalism (Örnebring 2016); managerialism as a value system replacing a journalistic value system in news organizations (Andersson & Wiik 2014), and so on.

While at first the professionalization concept was not used to describe change but rather differentiation within the profession, the interest in tracking change over time soon became a primary concern of survey research on journalists, particularly aspects of professionalization such as education and commitment to ethics and professional values/roles. The results of these survey time series indicate that change has been evolutionary and that it largely fits the original progressivist account of professionalization, with some exceptions. As to time scale, these are changes that have taken place in the past four or five decades. More recent research (mostly from the most recent decade) indicates more revolutionary changes. Evidence is thus mixed and it is not clear how and at what pace different aspects of professionalism are changing. Educational demands seem to be, if anything, increasing, while it is simultaneously the case that the material base of professionalization (i.e. long-term or permanent employment within large, resource-rich, and stable news organizations) is eroding.

If the cause of professionalization in journalism was conceived to be the activities of professional organizations, employers, and educators acting in concert, then what is considered to be the cause of de-professionalization? The twin processes of *commercialization* and *digitalization* are frequently viewed as the independent variables to the dependent variable of professionalization.

3.2 Commercialization

Commercialization refers to a perceived process in which the work and texts of journalism become more and more subjected to commercial imperatives (e.g., Bagdikian 1983; Baldasty 1992; McManus 1994; Underwood 1993). This process is almost universally viewed as to the detriment of journalism and by extension public discourse in general. McManus defines commercialization as “... any action intended to boost profits that interferes with a journalist’s or news organization’s best effort to maximize public understanding of those issues and events that shape the community they claim to serve” (McManus 2009: 219).

General concerns about the influences of commercial concerns, profit motivations, and market logics on other spheres of society have a long history, as evidenced, for example, by the publisher Henry Holt’s lament of the increased influence of literary agents in the publishing business (Holt 1905), or the teacher James Peyton Sizer’s 1917 treatise on the (negative) moral consequences of the commer-

cialization of leisure (Sizer 1917). Indeed, one of the key arguments for the establishment of the first public service broadcaster in Britain in the 1920s was to avoid commercialization of culture (Burns 1977: 42; Reith 1924: 57). The dominant theoretical framework for understanding commercialization in journalism follows this tradition and has been critical/Marxist in nature (e.g., McChesney & Foster 2003; McManus 1994; Hallin 2008; Thussu 2008).

Of course it is deeply problematic for democratic society that an institution that has both been given and taken upon itself to fulfil basic democratic functions also has been organized primarily as a profit-driven enterprise, but in light of, for example, Robert Picard's observations on the economics in journalism in this volume, it is also evident that a perception of "commercialization" as a destructive process ignores the fact that journalism has been a commodity (and therefore subject to commercial concerns) since at least the mid-19th century (Baldasty 1992; Habermas 1989). In fact, for Habermas, the commercialized decline of the news media began not in our contemporary era but with the rise of the mass press in the mid-19th century (Habermas 1989: 185) and was inextricably linked to the emergence of advertising as a way to fund newsgathering and -distribution (Habermas 1989: 193). Scholars such as McManus do acknowledge this long history of journalism as a commercial practice (McManus 2009: 219 ff) but argue convincingly that the process of commercialization has been accelerating particularly in the past two decades due to interconnected trends, such as the economic rationalization of news organizations, rise of public (i.e. stock) ownership of news organizations, and the rise of competing alternative news sources (McManus 2009; see also Lacy & Martin 1998). To these trends we could add the rise of online advertising and the concomitant focus on news that can be easily and widely shared and "clicked" (Currah 2009: 47 f; Karlsson & Clerwall 2013) All these things are seen as driving news organizations to get rid of staff, increasingly automate work tasks and work processes, and above all to focus on content that is sensationalist and entertainment and lifestyle-oriented. There is thus a strong link between commercialization and another process called *tabloidization*, which refers to the idea that all news organizations become more like tabloids in terms of what kind of news they produce and how they present the news.

In a recent counterpoint to the commercialization argument, Ryfe (2017: 138 f) notes that the institution of (US) journalism has historically been shaped by the interplay between three other institutions, namely market, state, and civil society. What has happened over the past two decades or so is that the market pole has *weakened* vis-à-vis the others, rather than strengthened. This point is supported by overwhelming empirical evidence of loss of advertising revenue and subscription revenue, newspaper closures, job losses in journalism, and so on. One could observe that if commercialization is the enemy of journalism then it is not a very successful one.

Of course, the commercialization argument is more sophisticated and there is no necessary contradiction between declining commercial fortunes and an in-

creased dominance of market logics. It stands to reason that in an environment where competition over scarce revenue is increasing, commercial logics would come to dominate over professional ones. Still, within the discourse of commercialization, media companies and conglomerates are often presented as all-powerful agents of domination, whereas in reality they have declined significantly according to most measures of commercial success and power – both individually and as a market sector – over the past couple of decades.

These two accounts (those of great commercial power and great commercial decline, respectively) shows that there is some friction within the commercialization concept. But there is also great agreement in how change is viewed: as noted previously, commercialization has been present in journalism at least since the mid-19th century and caused gradual changes to journalistic work and professional values, but in the contemporary era the pace of commercial change has exploded. The exact time scale of this is somewhat unclear (McManus' and Underwood's concerns over commercialization stem from the pre-Web era, for example). Commercialization is furthermore seen as changing pretty much all aspects of journalism, from work organization and work practices to actual news content, as well as the ways in which audiences are addressed and invited to interact with the news.

There is a certain circularity to the commercialization perspective: changes in journalism are explained as resulting from an increased dominance of commercial imperatives over other imperatives, which is in turn demonstrated by the fact that these commercial imperatives appear to change journalistic practices and texts. In short, there is no detailed theoretical explanation as to *why* commercial concerns would necessarily and in all instances be dominant over, say, political or civil society concerns. States are not devoid of resources and tools for resisting market influence and civil society is a powerful norm-creating institution in its own right that would not necessarily be subordinated to the commercial sphere in all instances (and indeed it has not been, historically speaking). True to its Marxist roots, the commercialization account of change in journalism sees commercial forces as nigh-invincible.

3.3 Digitalization

Just as with the two preceding concepts, *digitalization* has a rich literature of its own. The rapid spread of personal and workplace computers in the 1980s and 1990s, the increased capacity of digital information storage and transfer, and the emergence of a global digital communication network generated academic interest across a number of fields in the social sciences and humanities. Touchstone works considered issues such as how digital media (in particular the global digital network) would change nearly all aspects of human life, including business and everyday life practices (Castells 1996; Negroponte 1995) as well as working life

(Zuboff 1988); the nature of personal identity in a digital, networked world (Turkle 1984, 1995); and how digital media change both the form and content of media texts (Bolter & Grusin 1999). These issues – and others – have also been seen as central to journalism and have generated a body of research where the impact of digitalization of nearly every aspect of journalism has been studied. Key areas of study include but are not limited to research on how journalistic work is changing in the face of digitalization (Deuze 2003; Örnebring 2016; Powers 2012; Russial 2000; Singer 2004); how digitalization changes the news text itself and the presentation of it in various ways (Barnhurst & Nerone 2001; Matheson 2004; Weber 2012); and how digitalization and distribution via digital networks changes news audience behavior and news consumption (Costera Meijer & Groot Kormelink 2015; Webster & Ksiazek 2012).

Looming large in this literature – even if he is not always quoted directly – is Marshall McLuhan and his determinist view of technology: as technology changes, so too does the commercial conditions of journalism as well as its professional values and practices. Under technological determinism, it is technology that is the independent variable and commercialization and professionalization the dependent ones. This strong technological determinism was particularly prevalent in early accounts of digitalization in journalism (“early” here meaning shortly after the introduction of the World Wide Web to a broad audience in the mid-1990s). In his 2000 article on technology and journalism, John Pavlik even opens with the statement “Journalism has always been shaped by technology”, and then, in the following section, “Technology has, for better or worse, exerted a fundamental influence on how journalists do their jobs” (Pavlik 2000: 229). Similar strong statements on the influence of technology on journalism can be found, for example, in the work of McNair (1998) and Welch (2000).

In general, the strong technological determinism of early research on journalism and digitalization has since been replaced by a “softer” one, acknowledging that technology use and adoption will be inflected by existing social structures and institution, but at the same time pointing out that different technologies have different potentials. A key term in this softer version of determinism has been affordances (“... properties of the world that are compatible with and relevant for people’s interactions”, Gaver 1991: 79), a term originally from perceptual psychology (Gibson 1977) but popularized for analysis of digitalization and digital media by Gaver (1991) (see also Hutchby 2001) – using examples such as how thin vertical door handles afford pulling and flat horizontal plates afford pushing, and how onscreen buttons afford pushing but not moving and editing (Gaver 1991: 80, 81). Just like references to McLuhan are rare in determinist research on journalism and digitalization, so too are references to Gibson and Gaver uncommon in journalism research, where social and technological factors are viewed as integrated (though there are exceptions, e.g., Graves 2007).

From many of the referenced studies of journalism and digitalization, one can see that the common view of change is largely *empirical* and self-evident. There is

of course some merit to this perception of self-evidence. The move from a technology not existing to being accessible is of course a readily observable one, as is the move from a technology being accessible to its use being required on a day-to-day basis. Many studies of the digitalization of journalistic work have highlighted the perceived suddenness and rapidity by which technological assemblages, such as multiplatform production and audience interactivity, were incorporated as requirements in the workplace, and how skill demands and work tasks related to new technologies likewise were perceived by many journalists as sudden and intrusive (Avilés et al. 2004; Huang et al. 2006; Chang-de 2006; Quinn 2006). After all, there was a time when there was no Internet, no World Wide Web, no Google, no social media, no digital cameras, no integrated content management systems, no smartphones, and journalism was produced and performed perfectly well without them.

Journalism researchers have largely accepted their respondents' accounts of rapid and uncomfortable change, perhaps because many journalism researchers have been or still are journalists themselves and thus also have personal experience of technological change in the workplace. This individualized view of change has generally failed to notice or at least adequately account for the gradual and often long-term organizational adaption of various digital technologies in the news industry (though see Boczkowski 2004, 2010; Marjoribanks 2000); many technologies were introduced gradually and unwillingly into news organizations and did not spread beyond specialist employees.

Overall, digitalization as a process of change in journalism is perceived as very rapid and ever-escalating – digital desktop publishing is followed by the World Wide Web which is followed by multiplatform/convergent news production which is followed by the Google revolution, the social media revolution, and the smartphone revolution. The scholarly adoption of journalism's own discourse of speed (Hampton 2004; Örnebring 2010) has encouraged the perception of digitalization as an unstoppable, often destructive force, despite attempts to historicize and critically deconstruct this view (Curran 2010; Curran, Fenton & Freedman 2016). And even if one acknowledges the gradual nature of adoption of many technologies, taken together all the changes linked to digitalization are – rightly or wrongly – generally perceived as revolutionary.

3.4 Moving on

Based on this overview, we can see that “change” in journalism research has mostly been understood in empirical rather than theoretical terms. The three concepts I have argued have been the dominant ones for understanding change in journalism are not theoretical concepts per se but rather *heuristic* ones: they have been used to make sense of and bring together aspects of change that have been seen

as related. Two of the concepts (commercialization and digitalization) have also been used to *explain* change but in a generalized fashion and often based on empirical evidence drawn from a single nation or organization. As Nielsen (2013: 408) points out, economy- and technology-driven perspectives on change cannot account for the different paths of change in journalism that emerge from comparative cross-national analysis.

The lack of a strong theoretical foundation for understanding change should not detract from the considerable empirical contributions to describing change that have been generated by journalism scholarship. In the final section of this chapter, I will focus on these empirical contributions and attempt to systematize them.

4 A typology of change in journalism: aspects and analytical levels

In the previous section, I focused on the questions of the time scale of change, the nature of change (revolution vs evolution), and the causes of change, all viewed through the lens of the common heuristic concepts of professionalization, commercialization, and digitalization. In this section, I shift focus to the two last questions on change presented on p. 556 of this chapter: which aspects are changing, and on what analytical level the changes occur or are observed.

Under the headings of professionalization, commercialization, and digitalization I have presented ten different empirical changes in journalism – this is by no means (as we shall see) and exhaustive list but it does cover many of the areas of change where the empirical evidence is multifaceted and strong. These changes are, in the order I have covered them, 1. the onward march of professionalization for most of the 20th century; 2. the more recent de-professionalization of journalism; 3. the economic rationalization of news organizations; 4. the increased importance of the so-called “clickstream” as a source of revenue; 5. the tabloidization of news content; 6. the financial weakening of legacy news organizations and the legacy news industry as a whole; 7. digital technologies changing journalistic work practices and work demands; 8. digital technologies changing the news text itself; 9. digital technologies changing news audience behavior; and 10. the gradual and often slow organizational adoption of new technologies. We have already talked about revolution vs evolution, time scale, and causation in relation to these changes, but as can be seen these changes all pertain to rather different aspects of the field we call “journalism” – and the empirical evidence for each comes from very different sources at different levels of analysis.

One can divide the different aspects of journalism in many ways; I have here chosen a fourfold division of: Texts, Actors, Actions, and Values. Texts refer to the

Tab. 28.1: A typology of change in journalism.

Aspect	Analytical level		
	Individual (micro)	Organizational (meso)	Institutional/Industry (macro)
Texts			
Actors			
Actions			
Values			

content aspect of journalism: what is written (or visually presented, or both) and how it is written. Actors are the people and organizations involved in producing journalism; Actions are the activities they undertake in order to accomplish this production. Values, finally, refer to the normative aspects of journalism: the ideas about what constitutes “good” and “bad” (in a broad sense) within the field. This is not the only division possible but it does capture the fact that journalism is both an activity (performed by a set of very diverse actors) and a particular set of texts, and that the quality and legitimacy of both the activities and the set of texts are judged by a shared (but not uncontested) value system. Changes in all of these aspects can then in turn be analyzed on the individual (micro) level, the organizational (meso) level, or the institutional or industry (macro) level, creating the typology presented in Table 28.1.

Looking again at the changes I have described in this chapter, (5) and (8) describe changes to the Text aspect of journalism; (1) (partly), (6), and (9) describe changes primarily to different categories of Actors in journalism; (3), (4), (7), and (10) changes primarily pertaining to the Actions that some of these actors take; and (1) (partly) and (2) refer to changes to the Values aspect.

(1) is almost solely analyzed at the individual level (through aggregate individual survey responses); (2) likewise; (3) commonly analyzed at the organizational level (i.e. with data gathered from different organizations, sometimes individual ones, sometimes aggregated); (4) also analyzed at the organizational level; (5) analyzed at the individual level but here through aggregated individual content items rather than survey responses; (6) at the institutional/industry level using industry-spanning data; (7) equally at both the individual and organizational levels; (8) at the level of aggregated individual texts; (9) at the level of aggregated individual data (both survey data and other forms of digital trace data generated by users); and (10) at the organizational level.

These classifications taken together would allow these changes to be mapped as follows:

Table 28.2: Changes detailed in this chapter classified.

<i>Aspect</i>	<i>Analytical level</i>		
	Individual (micro)	Organizational (meso)	Institutional/Industry (macro)
Texts	(4) Tabloidization (8) Digital changes to news texts		
Actors	(1) March of professionalization (education/ demographic traits) (9) Digital technology changing audience behaviour		(6) Weakening of legacy media
Actions	(7) Digital technology changing work	(3) Economic rationalization (4) “Clickstream” (7) Digital technology changing work (10) Organizational technology adaptation	
Values	(1) March of professionalization (ethics/values) (2) De-professionalization		

Some observations about change can then be made based on this table: first, we see that what is often conceived of in the literature as coherent areas of change often stretch across aspects and analytical levels. In the professionalization literature, for example, some aspects of professionalization deal with the Actor aspect whereas others deal with the Values aspect, and in the case of digital technologies changing working practices and work demands, the analysis is sometimes conducted on the individual level, sometimes on the organizational level. The purpose of the typology is not prescriptive, i.e. I am not saying an area of change should be described as solely part of one aspect or that it should be analyzed at a specific level of analysis. But highlighting the fact that the same body of research, addressing the same kind of change, can operate on different analytical levels or in different aspects of journalism can help address the confusion that sometimes occurs around both causation and what “change” in journalism actually consists of.

Second, the focus on the individual and to some extent organizational analytical levels to some extent seems to come at the expense of institutional/industry-level analysis, which is in line with my earlier observation that the individual-

practitioner perspective dominates journalism research as a whole – but also in part due to the simple fact that the individual and organizational levels are easier to operationalize than the institutional/industry level. This does not mean that institutional-level changes have not been studied. For example, in the text/institutional level box, we could place what could be called “model discourse” changes (or, following Hartley (1995), changes in “textual regimes”), i.e. textual changes that occur beyond just the aggregated individual texts but rather to the overarching principles of journalistic textual construction. Such changes are quite well documented by media historians (as they rely not only on the analysis of the news texts themselves but also of other texts such as policy documents, journalists’ biographies, and so on) and all arrive at similar results: on a longer (100+ years) time scale the journalistic model discourse has become more interpretive and less event-centered (Barnhurst & Mutz 1997; Djerf Pierre & Weibull 2008; Fink & Schudson 2014).

Similarly, changes in the actor aspect have also been observed on the institutional/industry level, with the most obvious change being the emergence or entry of entirely new categories of organizations into the journalistic field. The news industry’s loss of advertising revenue to companies such as Google and Facebook are well described (Currah 2009; Picard in this volume). Social media companies like Facebook and Twitter are not only shifting the industry boundaries through their competition for advertising revenue but also their rising importance as news platforms and distribution channels (Hermida et al. 2012; Newman 2009). And while the entry of new social media actors into the institution of journalism gets a lot of public and scholarly attention, we also need to note that companies, like temping agencies, also increasingly are actors in the journalistic field and contribute to ongoing shifts in how journalism is organized and paid for (Örnebring & Ferrer Conill 2016).

5 Conclusion

It would be a relatively easy task to “fill” the currently empty boxes of the typology with other kinds of change in journalism – tabloidization could also be studied on the organizational level, for example, if the research question is whether a particular news organization has been more tabloidized over time. This is not the purpose of the typology, however. Rather, it serves to illustrate that the a-theoretical nature of the concepts that have guided understanding of change in journalism research often makes for problematic generalizations, where professionalization, commercialization, and digitalization are all used to refer to many kinds of changes that may be somewhat related but which more often are quite analytically distinct. The typology itself does not provide a theoretical way out of this situation but can hopefully at least help to untangle the interrelations, distinctions, and causalities

surrounding that which journalism research is today almost solely focused on studying: change.

Further reading

As has been the point of this whole chapter, there is a wealth of literature describing how journalism has changed, but hardly any on the concept of change itself nor on how to theorize change. As such, the critical research review by Stanyer and Mihelj (2016) serves as an excellent introduction to the issue of conceptualizing, studying and theorizing change in communication research. Ryfe's recent (2017) book *Journalism and the Public* is a good companion text, as it deals specifically with journalism and demonstrates how to think theoretically about change in relation to a specific issue in journalism research (journalism's relation to the public).

The literature on each of the three processes of change discussed in this chapter – professionalization, commercialization, and digitalization – is rich and extensive. On professionalization, the historical overview of survey time series by Brownlee and Bream (2012) provides perhaps the best overview, along with the other texts from the same edited collection (Weaver and Willnat, 2012). On commercialization, McManus' 1994 book *Market-Driven News* remains a classic reference, and his later (2009) overview of the field is a very comprehensive update on more recent research. On digitalization, the *longe durée* perspective of Barnhurst and Nerone (2001) is a useful corrective to much of the presentist debate and research on the topic, as is James Curran's criticism of the future-centric perspective of much journalism scholarship (Curran, 2010).

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François Heinderyckx

29 The Future of Journalism Scholarship

Abstract: As the news sector struggles to come to terms with the turmoil triggered by digital technologies, relevant journalism scholarship is more needed, but also significantly more complicated, than ever. The systemic changes affecting journalism are challenging the entire body of theories, methods, and epistemologies that developed since the early 20th century. This chapter reflects on the nature of the challenges faced by journalism scholars and suggests strategies to reclaim the high ground in a crucial field which is quickly shifting and broadening from “Journalism Studies” to “News Studies”.

Keywords: scholarship, journalism studies, news studies, volatility, polyphony, complexity, challenges

The vibrancy of research in any particular field is primarily driven by three factors: the societal importance of the objects of study, their instability, and the ensuing societal uncertainty. Scholarly attention tends to grow upon objects, phenomena and institutions which are seen, at least potentially, as playing a significant role in contemporary societies. This is even more so when key elements appear to be changing and shifting rapidly in ways that escape predictability. Journalism and news media are engaged in a major and uncertain systemic transformation, while they are still considered to play a central role in the functioning of democratic societies. Journalism research seems destined for a bright future.

The fate of journalism scholarship isn't just driven by that of journalism. It is also contingent on the future of research in the social science and humanities, where it is essentially anchored, with a few tendrils stretching towards outposts in the natural sciences, empirical sciences, and formal sciences (mathematics and statistics), if only to borrow a few tools and concepts.

Journalism scholarship must be in marching order to face the challenges ahead. News is a topic relevant in many disciplines where it can be studied, or at least taken into account, without being flagged as a study of journalism. Meanwhile, the importance and complexity of journalism have led to the organic growth of a dedicated field, usually referred to as “journalism studies” or “journalism research”, within the still youthful (and contested as a discipline) “communication science”. The boundaries of what belongs within journalism studies are unclear and further blurred by the fact that journalism itself has become difficult to define and apprehend (see Chapter 1).

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1 Moving target

Studying contemporary social phenomena is like trying to capture a moving target. The faster the target moves, the more challenging it becomes, the more creativity is required to adapt the methods, the epistemology and, ultimately, the theories to the new circumstances. Journalism and news media move fast and are caught in a broader convulsion driven by the development of information and communication technologies. The convulsion reaches so deeply that journalism inevitably collides with other social objects, some new, some old, themselves engaged in a frenzy of agitation.

Not all research objects are that unsteady. In fact, one could split science in two categories: one that groups disciplines studying *immutable* objects; the other that groups disciplines studying evolving or *morphing* objects. The study of immutable objects is found in most “natural sciences” (e.g., physics trying to understand the structure of atoms or biology trying to understand living cells) where knowledge builds up incrementally; where generations of scholars understand their objects of study better and better; where new findings complement, refine, or gradually replace an existing body of knowledge. Then there is the study of objects which, themselves, change over time, within a context which is also evolving. This is typically the case in social sciences (e.g., trying to understand factors that influence public opinion), and it requires distinguishing between general principles that are not (or hardly) time sensitive, and the bulk of knowledge that is mostly applicable to a specific context (social, geographical, and temporal). Knowledge does build up incrementally as well, but only marginally and with various caveats. Whatever social sciences can find, show, or even prove, in one place, at one point in time, will likely not apply completely in another place, at another point in time. Social sciences do develop quite a strong body of theories, but aren’t incremental in the same way as the natural sciences. The precision and accuracy of, for example, weather forecasts increase as the models and tools keep improving. But predicting the outcome of an election and the role of media within that process is an ongoing challenge where, periodically, most of what we thought we knew is proven inaccurate or inept within a specific context, leading scholars to start over and deploy the full force of rigorous research to figure things out, again.

Studying journalism and news media is studying objects in contexts, all of which evolve permanently, at varying pace, every so often in leaps and bounds. There might be short periods of relative stability, but there are also times of sudden changes, most of which come unannounced or differently from what was announced. As a result, journalism studies do not so much progress along a path of ever-increasing understanding of its objects, but rather on a more tumultuous path of building up a body of theories, methods, and epistemology that find themselves challenged cyclically when, confronted to new realities, they appear to have lost relevance. Some will be declared obsolete when they appear insufficient to account

for recent events, trends, and other social realities. Others will be revisited. Others still will be developed anew in the face of new realities.

Because hardly anything can be taken for granted, journalism scholars are to show a specific strand of creativity. They don't just face the next hurdle on the path to knowledge. They must contemplate the possibility to renounce some of the certainties they had; they must challenge the existing body of knowledge not just in the case that it appears to have been mistaken (which is still a possibility), but also in the case that it has lost its relevance. While natural sciences sort between the true and the false, the accurate and the erroneous; social sciences must also cope with the obsolete or the "not completely true anymore" or "not this time". The abundance of literature on changes in journalism and news media shows the concern among scholars for understanding and anticipating change (see for example Fenton 2010; Lee-Wright, Phillips & Witschge 2012; Zelizer 2017, 2009).

2 Volatile epistemic polyphony

The ensuing instability is further aggravated by the healthy polyphony that is so characteristic of the social sciences. There are different views, theories, or approaches which diverge sometimes to the point of opposing and contradicting each other. Unlike in the natural sciences, divergence isn't necessarily a temporary state until one theory can be proven right, while the others are therefore proven wrong. Instead, they constitute different ways to understand and interpret the social world. Each of these different lenses might induce a bias or be limited in scope, or be plain wrong; but together, they provide a mesh of knowledge which, though unstable and fragmented, constitutes an intensely rich body of scholarship.

Journalism scholars face an additional torment which is rather unusual in science: the volatility of its core concepts. The shock wave of digital technologies is disrupting even fundamental notions such as "news", "media", "journalism", "journalist", "source", or "audience". Views on the subject vary across national, cultural, and epistemic boundaries, even when the global spread of digital transformations might falsely induce a sense of worldwide convergence and universal phenomena. As the objects, the context, and the concepts appear to be in flux, the inquiry into journalism becomes so intense it might be on the verge of a complete paradigm shift.

Scholars must embrace the volatile epistemic polyphony of journalism studies as a uniquely fecund breeding ground for innovation and creativity in our understanding of the news. Flexibility and uncertainty must be accepted as inherent to the field and should encourage some degree of laxness with the theories and definitions that usually frame quality research, without indulging in complete relativism. By focusing exclusively on change and disruption, journalism scholars will neglect the deeper trends and general principles that are key to understanding change.

“Fascination with the new and disruptive must be balanced with attention to the resistant and persistent” (Carlson et al. 2017: 13). The ambient exaggeration of pseudo-revolutionary innovations driven by the marketing of information and communication technologies contributes to a loud background noise forcing scholars to carefully sort the frivolous from the significant, while also seeking the weak signals that might be cues to unforeseen emerging trends.

3 Confronting complexity

Today’s science remains dominated by a Cartesian approach to complexity: breaking down complex objects into smaller units whose complexity can be better managed. Splitting complexity leads to a fragmentation of science fields and disciplines into ever more specialized subunits. This disaggregation of science appears as a necessity to face the increasing complexity that is uncovered as science progresses. More detailed knowledge requires more specialized scholars, tools, methods, and theories, leading to a flourishing of scholarly subfields – such as journalism studies – to keep knowledge advancing. Yet in doing that, there is a risk of losing the broader perspective, which is especially crippling on topics like news and journalism, where phenomena and various elements of context are so intricately intertwined. We must therefore organize bridges and nodes among the various offshoots of journalism research to keep the focus on the fuller picture.

Breaking down the complexity of journalism stems from two simultaneous processes: organic branching and disciplinary incursions. *Organic branching* occurs when large-scale studies of a particular aspect of journalism that involve a significant number of scholars, require the development of specific methods, and produce abundant volumes of output, end up growing into its own branch within which more research will develop to bring expansion, conceptualization, and comparisons to the initial work. Audience studies, communication for social change, digital journalism, photojournalism, and newsroom ethnographies are but a few examples of such organic branching. Academic journals, book series, and scholarly societies play an essential role in institutionalizing, then bundling together the emerging branches and the corresponding web of knowledge on the topic.

Disciplinary incursions typically take place when journalism is successfully approached using the frames, theories, and methods of more established disciplines. This is very common within communication research because it involves a large portion of scholars educated in traditional disciplines in the social sciences and humanities and who join communication research simply because of the nature of the topic that they work on. For example, journalism ethics is an incursion of philosophy into journalism studies. Media economics, media law, media history, journalism and peace studies, and literary journalism are other examples. Such incur-

sions are only natural given the prominent role played by news media and journalists in the lives of people and institutions.

Prominent authors have produced sophisticated lists and matrices to take stock of the range of approaches to communication research. Early efforts in this area were crude and possibly misleading (e.g., Harold D. Lasswell's description of the subdivisions of the field by a simple question related to an act of communication – "Who says What in Which Channel, to Whom with What Effect?" (1948)), but they started a necessary debate on the nature and boundaries of the field. In his seminal work on mass communication theory, Denis McQuail distinguished four types of media theories based on whether their focus was media-centric or society-centric, and culturalist or materialist (McQuail 1994: 3), while he also acknowledged not just a range of theories but of research traditions.

4 Object, field and discipline

Journalism studies, in their institutionalized form, are situated within the broader scope of communication studies (or communication science). Although journalism and news media have been subject to academic scrutiny for ages, the formal markers of journalism studies as a distinct and somewhat autonomous operation are quite recent. While journalism was at the heart of Unesco's interest in supporting the creation of the International Association for Media and Communication Research (IAMCR) in 1957 (Hamelink & Nordenstreng 2016), the Journalism Studies division of the International Communication Association (ICA) was only started as an Interest Group in 2004 (Tumber 2005: 551). Flagship academic journals are also recent initiatives: *Journalism: Theory, Practice, and Criticism* and *Journalism Studies* were both launched in 2000; *Digital Journalism* in 2013. There are much older journals related to journalism, but they are mostly focused on the profession and aimed at professionals, or they cover specific aspects such as political communication, as is the case with *The International Journal of Press/Politics* launched in 1993. Book series, conferences, and dedicated schools and faculties are further signs of the advent of journalism studies and education as an academic project.

Although journalism and news media are, originally, just a set of topics and objects of study, journalism studies has grown into a field, i.e. a strand of research relying on "key conceptual propositions that animate journalism studies as a distinct and fruitful scholarly project" (Carlson et al. 2017: 5). Should these shared characteristics evolve into a distinct set of methods and heuristic principles, a coherent body of theories and a singular epistemology, journalism studies could be headed towards becoming its own discipline.

Meanwhile, the complex intricacies of factors and contexts to be taken into consideration while studying the news led to an inexorable expansion of the field, which will inevitably feel too scattered at one point. Some will then advocate to

refocus and go back to the essence of the field, to the core of news gathering, writing, and disseminating. Now with journalism leaving the newsroom, news content blending with other genres and colonizing all possible channels, journalism is set at a high pace. Specialization is welcome in many cases (audience, production ...), but it should not obscure the need to keep an eye on the broader picture.

Avoiding the fragmentation of the field should not deter efforts to take stock of a diversifying and branching of journalism studies. An inventory should be kept in the form of various mappings that would render the diversity of objects, methods, and approaches while helping keep a sense of the field. Like a topographic plotting, the maps should show peaks and troughs, plains and valleys, dense forests and bare deserts, lakes and rivers. If repeated or updated regularly, dynamic field maps would show trends and evolutions, brooks growing into rivers, forests into jungles; efforts could be undertaken to fertilize a desert or plan the exploration of a valley or a peak. One particular map should situate journalism studies in relation to other, neighbouring fields and monitor border areas to show incursions, obstacles, and gaps.

5 Shifting center of gravity

The academic center of gravity of journalism studies is unsteady. There are significant differences across the world to begin with. In some countries, schools of journalism or faculties of journalism provide high visibility and indicate strong institutional support, while in other places, journalism studies and education are buried under several layers of domains and sub-domains (e.g., in Japan, for historical reasons, journalism and communication studies are often embedded in English departments). Oftentimes, the institutional anchoring does not result from institutional strategic planning, but from the initiatives of a handful of committed scholars whose efforts developed into a cluster of activities situated where they saw an opportunity for growth, not always where it made the most sense academically.

Beyond institutional positioning, the center of gravity can also be seen as resulting from the different forces pulling journalism in various disciplinary directions. The harder the pull on journalism, the closer it will be to one particular discipline (social science, political science, philosophy, literature, arts ...). Emerging topics within journalism can also shift the balance as specific areas of knowledge become more relevant. Data journalism invites collaboration with computer scientists and statisticians. User generated content and citizen journalism renew interest for intellectual property, which reaches out to law scholars. The decline in advertising revenues and the search for new business models require the implication of business and economics scientists.

The combination of disciplinary incursions creates a complex mesh of multidisciplinary whose influence on the dynamics of journalism studies is significant,

yet difficult to control. The balance of forces can be seen as determined by attractors as described in chaos theory, where small changes in the configuration of attractors can have major systemic consequences that are very difficult to predict.

New topics, trends, and phenomena inspire journalism scholars' new research: data journalism, datafication of news, networked journalism, global journalism, post-factual journalism, fact-checking, news aggregation and curation, trust in the news, impartiality (in relation to balance and objectivity), newsworthiness, native advertising, filter bubbles, advocacy journalism, citizen journalism, participatory journalism, user generated content, crowd sourcing, crowd funding, and many other topics of interest emerge and struggle for attention, modifying the global balance of journalism scholarship, not necessarily to hog the stage, but creating new conditions, and adding a new layer that lets us still see the older layers underneath, but in a different way, partially blocking the view and distorting all or parts of those lower layers.

The field is spreading and morphing in ways that require new interdisciplinary borrowings and appropriations, thriving on the ever-richer variety of disciplinary lenses.

6 Concepts, theories, and practice

The volatility of even the core concepts of news and journalism is challenging for a field attempting to consolidate its scholarly foundations. The confusion is partly the result of an abusive use of the concepts by marketers, entrepreneurs, militants, and even laypeople. The concepts are stretched and the terminology becomes blurred and confusing. Because we are dealing with objects that are present in most people's everyday life, the tension between common meanings (often vague and shifting) and scholarly meanings (supposedly univocal and unambiguous) is unavoidable. Unfortunately, little tension is left as journalism scholars, unsettled by the quick succession of systemic changes and generous in their choice not to be too normative during this persistent phase of transformation, seem to have withdrawn from any attempt to maintain the conceptual and terminological points of reference.

Concepts should always be debatable and no doxa or dogma should force a scholarly community to agree on terms and their definitions. Yet, lacking a minimal set of shared fundamental concepts could be seen as a lack of maturity for the field, and a liability when debating and challenging scholarship as issues of misunderstanding and misrepresentation will occur. While journalism scholarship thrives, such fundamental concepts as "journalism" (Deuze 2005), "journalist", and "news" are not just unclear (Zelizer 2009: 4), they are fiercely disputed. Some recommend moving away from a newsroom centric conception of journalism and towards a dynamic definition (Deuze & Witschge 2017: 5). Such uncertainty might

be contingent on the uncertainty of the sector and its context, and therefore just a temporary state. Yet, should the state of disruption last, journalism scholars will be expected to bring clarification, to shed light, to reframe the concepts, and possibly to expand them. When, for example, a lawsuit stumbles upon whether an individual is or isn't a journalist, and therefore is or isn't protected by the laws that protect journalists, journalism scholars are expected to provide bearings, attributes, and properties to clarify the boundaries of a profession which, in many countries, is recognized by law as playing an important part in the social and political functioning of that country. Scholars are not judges or even policy makers, but they are expected to develop and share relevant knowledge to account for significant societal changes.

Likewise, journalism studies must keep its body of theories up to date. First, the best-known theories, which developed going back to the early 20th century, should be challenged and sorted between those which have lost all relevance (some probably hardly ever had any) and should be clearly retired, those which should just be upgraded to the new context, and those which appear to stand their ground in spite of all the changes that are taking place. Although all major legacy theories should still be taught for their historic importance, students should be made aware that not all theories should be considered on an equal footing. Some still want to apply the Two-Step-Flow model, in its initial form, or even the General Communication System in its original version that even its author Claude E. Shannon would challenge. Agenda Setting, News Value, Gatekeeping, Framing: the list of "must-teach" theories should be complemented by a list of theories for which there is a reasonable consensus within the scholarly community that they are useful in understanding journalism and news media today. While doing this, journalism scholars must set right a structural issue plaguing journalism theory: Westernization (Wasserman & De Beer 2009). An excessive portion of theories is based on empirical evidence collected in North America and Western Europe. Although most scholars are perfectly aware of the fact that journalism and news are very sensitive to cultural context, theories tend to present as universal (if only implicitly) what should not even be generalized beyond the original national or even local context of data collection. Even when such limitations are acknowledged by the authors, the deficit of empirical studies and the ensuing theoretical developments in areas other than Europe and North America is a liability for the entire field and it is a collective responsibility of the global community of journalism scholars to fix it. Recent efforts by international learned societies, international institutions and even publishers are encouraging.

Concerted efforts have to be directed towards updating and expanding the existing body of theories. This also requires that theoretical work be valued in a context where the pressure to publish tends to encourage scholars to invest resources into empirical research whose results can be disseminated in thin slices (and in many publications) at the expense of efforts of generalization in the form of theo-

retical work which is harder to publish and requires significantly more time to produce.

While strengthening theories, journalism scholarship must keep its finger on the pulse of practice and perpetuate or even reinvigorate the deep ties that exist between journalism research and journalism education, between journalism scholars and news professionals. Yet, the nature of the relationship must be clarified. Journalism scholars are often split between conflicting social responsibilities. On the one hand, they are expected to guard key principles of quality journalism, worry about citizens being properly informed and promote the fourth estate; while, on the other hand, they are in close contact with the industry which seeks guidance in the face of adversity and solutions to its problems of profitability and legitimacy and wants graduates with specific skills to implement these solutions (Heinderyckx 2014).

7 Towards news studies

Names and titles of many books, curricula, courses, departments, institutions, and research centers still refer to “the press” in a synecdochic manner to speak more broadly of news media. The shift in terminology is gradual, and there is little loss of meaning. Yet, for the younger generations, the very notion of a printing press producing newspapers as a primary source of news is becoming remotely abstract, and even the synecdoche will become obscure.

Meanwhile, we may have reached the next stage in the evolution of the news chain. As the boundaries of journalism are blurring and even defining what is a journalist has become problematic, as new hybrid forms of news-related content production have appeared and new ways to be informed about current events have multiplied, we may have to face the fact that designations such as “journalism research” and “journalism scholarship” are no longer characterizing the realm of our research and our teaching accurately.

Until the digital disruption, journalism was the inescapable core of news circulation and how people became aware of relevant events taking place in their environment. The development of information and communication technologies at the turn of the century has opened up and diversified ways to gather, process, and circulate news and the people involved in doing so. The traditional actors and institutions of the news industry (often referred to as “legacy”) have been struggling to keep their legitimacy and save their business. One of the promising strategies in doing so is to reaffirm the need for professional, well-trained and clearly identified news workers capable of dealing with unprecedented attempts to distort reality, spread rumors and confusion. Whether or not journalism, redux, and the traditional news industry, will indeed make it back into the game is still undetermined. Meanwhile, the scope of journalism scholarship has expanded to a large

body of phenomena that interfere with the traditional news chain and compete for attention among people, many of whom are both fascinated and at a loss with the radical disruption that affects their news diet.

Given the scope of the academic field in this new context, “journalism scholarship” is now, at best, a synecdoche for an area of study that spans well beyond journalism. Within the existing terminology, “news” probably best characterizes the field so that “news studies”, “news research”, and “news scholarship” would much more accurately encapsulate the reality of the research being conducted today and in the foreseeable future.

Further reading

In her 2011 article “Journalism in the Service of Communication”, Barbie Zelizer argues that journalism scholarship constitutes a central driving force of the broader field of communication research. Jay G. Blumler and Stephen Cushion, in their 2015 article “Normative Perspectives on Journalism Studies: Stock-taking and Future Directions”, reflect on the necessary but complicated dialogue between journalism scholars and practitioners and the danger of excessive attention to the functioning of the institutions involved in the news sector. Looking back to the first decade of the 21st century as a way to introduce a special issue of *Journalism Practice* on “Theories of Journalism in the Digital Age”, Steen Steensen and Laura Ahva (2015) analyze articles published in leading academic journals of the field to describe recent efforts in theorizing journalism. Looking forward, a series of panels and discussions about the future of journalism research organized within the International Communication Association (ICA) is summarized in a stimulating five-section article in *Journalism Studies* by Stephanie Craft, Kevin G. Barnhurst, Bonnie Brennen, Theodore L. Glasser, Thomas Hanitzsch, and Jane B. Singer (2014).

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