

Perspectives on Evidentiality in Spanish

Explorations across genres

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Perspectives on Evidentiality in Spanish

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Evidentiality in discourse

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1. Introduction

The present volume brings together two fundamental concepts: evidentiality, which we regard as a dynamic component in communication, and discursive genre, understood here as an operative factor of communication that both shapes and is shaped by the evidential content. Genres, as Swales (1990) acknowledges, are influenced by cultural and time constraints, and so is evidentiality and its expression. Therefore, it is paramount to uncover the ways in which evidential expressions acquire emerging pragmatic meanings tied to specific genres and discursive moves, particularly in languages that feature evidentiality as a functional category, as in Spanish. From this perspective, all the contributions in this volume share the common goal of investigating the pragmatic and discursive extensions of the evidential meaning, taking as a point of departure an interdisciplinary and intertextual model of evidentiality. In doing so, each contribution sheds light on particular aspects of the relationship between evidentials and discourse that have not been contemplated in former studies on evidentiality, namely the role of genre in modulating the evidential meaning, or the parameters of intersubjectivity, speaker's epistemic stance, and social identity as mediators between evidentiality and genre. On a more general note, the individual chapters seek to enhance our knowledge of the different facets and dimensions of evidentiality in actual discourse, and to account for some of the complex ways in which evidentials adapt their original indexical content in discourse, how these extensions of meaning might evolve to be part of the stable content of certain evidentials, and how these evidentials might become essential linguistic features of a particular discursive genre.

More precisely, the present volume is dedicated to investigations concerned with the array of pragmatic meanings that evidential markers attain and develop in discourse. By examining these extensions of the original core meaning of

evidentials – indication of the source of information –, the authors highlight the multiple dimensions that articulate, expand and enrich the evidential dimension in actual texts. This way, a more nuanced understanding of how evidentials operate in discourse emanates from the analysis. The articles encompassed in this volume make a significant contribution, theoretical as well as empirical, to the current state-of-the-art investigation of evidentiality in discourse, by inquiring into the still underdeveloped area of research of pragmatic enrichments of the evidential content that depend on genre and/or mode of communication (oral, written, or computer mediated).

We are concerned with the potential extensions of meaning conveyed by evidentials across a number of different genres, ranging from academic and scientific texts to illness narratives, from political and parliamentary discourses to online forum interactions. The genres examined in this volume illustrate a variety of discourses produced in different areas of public and private life, with the aim to uncover the multiple ways the semantics of evidentials can be exploited according to the discursive and interactional demands of effective communication. We also explore the evidential indication carried by certain linguistic forms across written and oral genres, to identify and systematize the array of pragmatic enhancements originating from the core evidential meaning that has been adapted to the goals and conditions of each type of communicative event.

All the chapters are empirical, corpus-driven, and eclectic with regard to the methods and the theoretical frameworks adopted. Some contributions (Kotwica; Maldonado & De la Mora; Llopis; Cabedo) combine a quantitative analysis with a qualitative analysis of the data, and investigate the semantics and pragmatics of evidentials across time and genres. Specifically, Kotwica's study examines the dimension of access to the evidence in a nineteenth century corpus of Spanish biology articles; Maldonado and De la Mora track the diachronic evolution of evidential-epistemic meaning of the Spanish marker *según* ('according to') across several diatopical varieties, whereas Llopis explores the role of *según* as a quotative in different written genres. Cabedo, in turn, addresses the contribution of prosody and genre on the evidential meaning of Spanish *por lo visto* ('apparently') across six oral discourse genres. Other contributions, in contrast, render a fine-grained qualitative analysis focusing on specific dimensions of the evidential meaning in particular genres. This is the line of research developed in the chapter by Albelda and Estellés, relative to the dynamicity of evidential scales in political and academic discourse; by González, with regard to epistemic stance in unplanned oral genres; by Figueras, on the rhetorical moves by which evidentials are deployed to articulate the psychological construct of the self in illness narratives; and by Miche, on the interplay between the categories of evidentiality and deonticity when performing the speech act of advice in online forum interactions. Taking a more theoretical standpoint, the contribution by Rodríguez Rosique on the array of discursive roles

of the Spanish future tense that extend beyond evidentiality completes the vision of evidentiality as a semantic domain that expands its deictic meaning through and within the discourse.

Once the general purpose of this collective volume has been laid out, and before proceeding to the presentation of the individual chapters (Section 4 below), a brief discussion of the notion of evidentiality and its articulation in discourse (Section 2), as well as a practical definition of the concept of genre applied in all the chapters, is necessary in order to lay the groundwork for bringing the two key notions of this volume – evidentiality and discourse genre – together (Section 3).

2. The domain of evidentiality

Evidentiality has been routinely defined as the coding of the source of information or the mode of knowledge (Aikhenvald 2004; Anderson 1986; Chafe & Nichols 1986; Squartini 2001; Willett 1988). More specifically, evidentiality constitutes the set of linguistic mechanisms wherein languages encode “how the speaker has come to know the proposition expressed by an utterance” (Fox 2001: 167). Being originally the focus of research of descriptive linguists interested in languages with morphological systems, evidentiality now attracts typologists (Aikhenvald 2004; Anderson 1986; Wierzbicka 1994; Willett 1988), discourse analysts (Chafe 1986; Du Bois 1986; Givón 1982; 1989; Hill & Irvine eds. 1993; Pomerantz 1984), psycholinguists (Aksu-Koç & Slobin 1986; Kamio 1994; 1997), and linguistic anthropologists (Fox 2001; Hill & Irvine 1993).

The investigation of the linguistic elements that carry the evidential meaning and the function that these elements play in communication has led to a distinction between languages in which evidentiality is a mandatory grammatical category and languages in which it represents an optional functional category “that refers to the perceptual and/or epistemological basis for making a speech act” (Cornillie 2009: 45). As a result, languages are classified in two groups with regard to the coding of evidentiality: group E_1 -languages (non Indo-European languages; cf. Diewald & Smirnova 2010), with obligatory marking by resorting to a defined set of mainly morpho-syntax devices (cf. Aikhenvald 2004; Boas 1911); and E_2 -languages, in which evidentiality is expressed by an open set of diverse, multifunctional, and nonobligatory devices deployed in discourse to point to the sources of direct and indirect information (Fetzer 2014; Fetzer & Oishi 2014). Evidentiality, in fact, is a functional category with a further scope than just grammar that operates in the majority of world languages, and, hence, this semantic domain is thought to be a language universal (Albelda 2015; Boye 2010; Cornillie 2009). Evidential markers represent a universal semantic class of units indexing the source of information.

In the case of Spanish, an E_2 -language, one of the problems faced by scholars has been the systematization of the conditions that a particular form or construction must meet to become an evidential marker (Albelda 2015). With the aim to respond to this query, several studies on the evidential mechanisms in Spanish have been conducted focusing on specific markers, namely, perception verbs (Cornillie 2007; Fernández Jaén 2012; Figueras in press; Albelda 2016); temporal structures and tenses, such as the future (Bermúdez 2005a; Escandell 2010; 2014; Rodríguez Rosique 2008; 2015), the conditional (Bermúdez 2004; González & Lima 2009), the imperfect (Leonetti & Escandell 2003), the present perfect tense (Bermúdez 2005a); lexical markers, like the old reportative adverb *dizque* (Babel 2009; De la Mora & Maldonado 2015); consecutive connectives (Bermúdez 2005b; Rodríguez Ramalle 2015); semi-auxiliary evidentials, such as *parecer* ('to seem') and *resultar* ('to appear') (Cornillie 2007); impersonal structures with the Spanish *se* or the personal pronoun *tú* (Fernández 2008; Hugo 2011); and syntactic constructions, including the subject raising structure (Bermúdez 2002; 2005b), the modal verb *deber* followed by *de que* (Schwenter 1999; Demonte & Fernández 2005), and *que* as a discursive marker with evidential adverbs (Rodríguez Ramalle 2007; 2008), among other mechanisms.

The fact that evidentiality can be regarded as a grammatical and as a functional category, in addition to the close relation that this semantic domain bears with epistemicity¹ have prompted some researchers to differentiate between a narrow and a wide view of evidentiality (Mushin 2001; Fetzer & Oishi 2014; Nuckolls & Michael 2012). The former, following Fetzer and Oishi (2014), is strictly circumscribed to the indication of the source of information, whereas the latter amounts to the specification of the source for the speaker's or the writer's epistemic evaluation of the information. For the proponents of this more inclusive definition,

1. The limits between evidentiality and epistemic modality have been one of the main theoretical hurdles in defining evidentiality (Dendale & Tasmowski 2001). For languages in which evidentiality is a functional category, this construct has been viewed as either the site where epistemicity and information source intersect (van der Auwera & Plungian 1998), or as a subdomain within the epistemic domain (Givón 1982; Chafe 1986; Ifantidou 2001).

From the end of the '90s onward, a concerted effort to specify the singular and distinctive nature of evidentiality, and its association with other related semantic domains, has been made. Within this line of research, several authors have advocated for a clear differentiation between epistemic and evidential contents (Aikhenvald 2004; Cornillie 2009; Cornillie et al. 2015; De Haan 1999), while others have intertwined both concepts. Thus, for Fetzer and Oishi (2014), by resorting to an evidential device, the speaker shows his/her commitment to the truth of the propositional content and, at the same time, conveys his/her stance toward the reliability of the source and the epistemic status of the information itself (cf. Chafe & Nichols 1986; Dendale & Tasmowski 2001; Diewald & Smirnova 2010).

epistemic modality, and other types of stances, and attitudes on propositions and states of affairs (knowledge) should be considered part of the domain of evidentiality (Nuckolls & Michael 2012). The dispute about these two competing conceptions of evidentiality has not yet come to a resolution in the literature.²

Following Bermúdez (2005b), we assume that evidentiality is not only concerned with the source of information of an utterance. It is also a deictic phenomenon referring to a speaker and his/her complex management of information and its sources. In Bermúdez's words: "La evidencialidad es una forma de perspectivización, esto es, un aspecto de la expresión del punto de vista del hablante" [evidentiality is a form of perspectivization, that is, an aspect of the expression of the point of view of the speaker] (Bermúdez 2005b: 30–31). The evidential coding tells nothing about the assessment of the source itself, or about the motivations and attitudes playing a role in the choice of evidential forms (Mushin 2000). However, the strategic deployment of evidentials always conveys an epistemic stance built on a complex evaluative relationship between the speaker, the proposition and the audience. To understand evidentials, the referential content of evidentiality has to be established in the situated discourse.

Evidentials, therefore, represent a class of grammatical means referring to the "perceptual sources of information" (Babel 2009). In addition, evidentials inform about how speakers construct the source of information (Babel 2009), an operation that implies evaluating the relationship between the speaker and the source. As a result, epistemic stance ("marking the degree of commitment to what one is saying, or marking attitudes toward knowledge", according to Kärkkäinen 2006: 705) becomes part of the evidential marking. Recent work on evidentials and stances also shows the interactive, intersubjective and dialogical nature of stance and evidentiality (Clift 2006; Kärkkäinen 2006; 2007; Lempert 2008; Du Bois 2007). Stance can be conceptualized in terms of a triangle of acts performed by a stancetaker (Du Bois 2007): evaluation of the object, positioning of the self, and alignment with other subjects. From this perspective, epistemic or evidential stance is built on the triadic relationship between a speaker, a proposition and the audience.

It follows that a fluid connection between evidentiality and other semantic domains, such as epistemicity and/or deonticity can be established through the articulation of epistemic and evaluative stances in particular texts. The limits and interrelations of evidentiality with other semantic categories, as well as the pragmatic enrichments of the core meaning of "source of information" associated with evidential forms when deployed in discourse become the focus of attention of the contributions included in this volume. Thus, Maldonado and De la Mora show how

2. More recently, Boye (2012) has proposed to regard evidentiality and epistemic modality as two distinct categories that subsume into the more inclusive and broader category of epistemicity.

the original evidential content associated with certain expressions (Spanish *según*, an evidential reportative marker) has diachronically evolved toward a more epistemic path in oral genres. This particular study reveals the changes in the original evidential meaning motivated both by genre and by the communication needs of the speakers. Relatedly, González uncovers the differences in the semantic-pragmatic functions and scope of the epistemic phrase *no sé* ('I don't know') in two oral genres (conversation and oral opinion reports). In the same line, Miche's contribution highlights the complex relations between deontic and evidential meanings when giving advice in an Internet forum platform. What these studies evince is that the communicative goals of the participants, combined with the features of the particular genre of the exchange, shape the evidential content, modifying and enlarging its original default indexical meaning.

The expression of evidentiality in discourse, therefore, is a multifunctional, dynamic and subjective operation that is constrained by the specific requirements of the communicative event. In fact, and according to Hoye (2008: 155), evidentiality in discourse involves the articulation of four components: *evidential texture*, *evidential weaving*, *the pragmatic principle of evidential substantiation*, and *evidential embedding*. Evidential texture embraces the evidential properties emerging from the particular composite of evidential expressions in discourse, whereas evidential weaving is concerned with the task of selecting the evidential expressions with which the speaker/writer will effectively build his/her epistemological stance. The pragmatic principle of evidential substantiation, in turn, together with the process of evidential embedding (the codification of the sources of the information deployed in the talk), explain the "why and how evidence is invoked in discourse" (Hoye 2008: 155). In the operation of supplying evidence for the claims made, evidential expressions might acquire and develop particular meanings sensitive to contextual factors, such as genre. The issue of the different meanings that the intertwinement between epistemic evaluations and evidential forms/units/constructions acquire in discourse is, precisely, the main focus of the contributions that constitute the present volume.

2.1 Evidentials in discourse

Whereas the grammar of evidentials has been extensively studied since the decade of the '80s (see the reviews in Aikhenvald 2004 and Speas 2008), the social, cultural, and interactional aspects factoring in when speakers/writers resort to evidentials have been less systematically considered (see Atkinson 1999; Chafe 1986; Cliff 2006; Fox 2001; Hill & Irvine 1993; Ifantidou 2001; Mushin 2001; Kärkkäinen 2003; Sakita 2002). Notwithstanding, in the mid-nineties evidence and evidentiality

started being regarded as inextricably associated with social, cultural and even political meanings among participants in interaction (Fox 2001). From that theoretical standpoint, Hill and Irvine (1993: 2) contended that “of central importance to an approach that emphasizes dialogicality and the social construction of meaning is the connection between knowledge and agency. To interpret events, to establish fact, to convey opinion, and to constitute interpretations as knowledge – all these are activities involving socially situated participants, who are agents in the construction of knowledge as well as being agents when they act on what they have come to know, believe, suspect, or opine”.

To further develop the investigation of evidentiality in discourse, in recent years there has been a growing interest in articulating a more complete and consistent description of the pragmatic and discursive dimensions of evidentials, as attested to in some collective up-to-date works. In particular, a renewed interest in the discursive aspects of evidential markers and strategies has emerged in the specialized literature. Within this framework, the contributions included in Nuckolls and Michael (2012) address relevant aspects of the interactional and cultural dimensions of evidentiality, taking into consideration the relation of these functional meanings with the grammatical properties of evidentials. Nuckolls and Michael (2012) contend that these elements perform social and interactional functions constraining both their occurrence and frequency in discourse. The grammaticalization of the evidential strategies, or lack thereof, depends on the societal functions attributed to them in the interaction. The study of grammaticalizing evidentials that are currently in use in E_1 -languages thus represents a way to explore the social factors involved in their deployment in different discourses, such as conversations, electronic news reports, or narratives of personal experience.

In a similar vein, Fetzer and Oishi (2014) bring together different contributions concerned with the discursive use of evidentials. All the studies are grounded in the assumption that evidentiality has to be regarded as a pragmatic construct, by which speakers codify their epistemic attitude toward the information provided. For Fetzer and Oishi (2014), the optionality in the evidential marking in E_2 -languages is significant in relation to the realization of speech acts in those languages. According to Fetzer and Oishi (2014), the functional status of evidentiality in E_2 -languages affords the speakers the strategies to enter evidence into the on-going discourse, either by referring explicitly or implicitly to the source of information. Direct attested evidence may be introduced by resorting to quotations and by spelling out the sources, while implicit or mediated evidence may be presented by deploying modal auxiliaries that index hearsay or reasoning as the source of the evidence. In the later scenario, evidentiality can be assigned the status of a pragmatic presupposition, in terms of the Gricean Principle of Cooperation, conversational maxims and conversational implicature (Fetzer & Oishi 2014: 326–327).

Relatedly, González (2015) offers a collection of contrastive empirical studies that delve into the evidential and epistemic context-bound strategies that are deployed by the speakers to convey their attitude and their commitment towards the informational content of their discursive productions. Evidentiality and epistemicity are, therefore, contemplated from a pragmatic and functional perspective that focuses on the interactional nature of communication. According to González (2015), this dynamic interactional approach situates evidentiality, as a discursive construct, in relation to factors such as participants' intentions, and the purpose and context of the exchange. In E_2 -languages, the coding of evidentiality is expressed through linguistic elements, lexical and syntactic, whose evidential and epistemic values "work as anaphoric and cataphoric units that bridge segments and make reference to previous and following stretches of discourse" (González 2015: 117–118).

With the specific focus on the issue of stancetaking in discourse, the recent volume edited by Marín Arrese, Haßler and Carretero (2017) tackles the issue of evidentiality and epistemic modality as connected to the speaker's epistemic stance. The volume adopts corpus-based methods, which allow the researchers to bring further insights into the linguistic reality of using evidentials in discourse. The majority of the articles in Marín Arrese, Haßler and Carretero (2017) deal with particular discourse domains and genres (journalistic and scientific texts, for instance), and the expression of stance in different cross-linguistic contexts.

All in all, these collective works expand our understanding of the evidential marking beyond its grammatical properties to engage in multifaceted and multi-leveled contextual descriptions of evidentials. Progressively, we have a better understanding of the socio-cultural and interactional factors that contribute to the articulation of evidentiality in the situated discourse. As a result, certain aspects of the analysis become more salient, such as the complex relationships between epistemicity and evidentiality and the different ways in which the epistemic status of the information and the speakers' attitudes toward knowledge are contextually managed. At the same time, a wealth of new analytic tools and concepts has been developed to better describe the discursive evidential dimension, such as expressive stance and interactional force when employing evidential markers in an utterance (Hanks 2012), epistemic stance expressions used as legitimation strategies (Marín Arrese 2011; 2015), epistemological positioning or stance (Bednarek 2006; Mushin 2001), or evidential texture of discourse (Hoye 2008).

As Papafragou (2000) remarks, communication is multi-layered, in the sense that there are different levels of meaning conveyed by the utterance; evidentials can contribute both to the proposition and to the higher-level representation of the speech act, and, in this regard, play a role in multiple acts of communication. Assuming this perspective, a better comprehension of how evidentials work in E_2 -languages (languages in which the evidential marking is not compulsory)

necessarily requires the exploration of their role in framing discourse. Consistent with this perspective, what the recent research on the pragmatics and discursive instantiation of evidentiality has revealed is that the choice of an evidential marker is motivated by a multiplicity of factors, including the speaker's motivation, attitude and stance toward the informational content, the specifics of the interaction, the intersubjective meanings related to the kind of interaction, the topic, and the genre (Hoye 2008). As many researchers have pointed out, the evidential meaning should not be considered a core, intrinsic and constant value of particular forms and constructions, but as a flexible, functional content that emerges in discourse, and is modulated and shaped within particular contexts and in co-occurrence with other meanings (Albelda 2015; Cornillie 2007; Boye 2010; Hassler 2010).

Taking this standpoint, the present volume delves into the underexplored interrelations between evidentiality and discourse genre in Spanish. All the contributions are the result of a panel held July, 2015, at the International Pragmatic Association Conference in Antwerp, Belgium, dedicated to reflect on the particularities of content and use of evidentials according to genre. Adopting a discursive approach, we assume that the functional category of evidentiality is brought to discourse by the deployment of a set of linguistic strategies that make explicit what counts as evidence in certain contexts and in certain textual genres, and what particular pragmatic meanings these mechanisms acquire, invoke and project onto the on-going discourse. Borrowing Hoye's (2008) reflections, the role of evidentiality in communication is more obvious and better investigated within and through discourse, in delimited and recognizable contexts where the multiple levels of meaning in interactional practices are manifested. Evidential meanings become, indeed, more apparent when considered contextually made.

Previous research on evidentiality in Spanish has underscored the difficulty of separating the semantic content codified by the evidential markers (essentially, the expression of the source or mode of information) and the pragmatic meanings that the use of these expressions generates contextually. These pragmatic values are quite rich and diverse, ranging from facework, irony, epistemic distancing, and mitigation, to boosting, or even mockery. In that regard, several studies have explored the triggering of particular pragmatic nuances of evidentials in relation to certain discursive genres. For instance, Cuenca and Marín (2012) systematize the different functions that the catalan word *clar* ('clear') plays in various syntactic and pragmatic contexts, whereas Estellés and Albelda (2014) perform a fine-grained analysis of the Spanish evidential expressions *al parecer, según parece* ('apparently') and *por lo visto* ('seemingly'), which, in certain contexts, develop modal meanings (such as attenuation or impoliteness) that are added to the core evidential meaning codified by these forms.

Adopting different theoretical frameworks, the studies collected in the present volume seek to uncover the extensions of evidential meaning resulting from discursive factors, such as genre, and the mediating communicative aspects of goals, motivations, attitudes, and stances of the speaker. More precisely, the authors address the following questions:

1. Is there an univocal relationship between evidential expressions and the pragmatic meaning(s) triggered by these expressions?
2. If there is not such a relationship, what are the factors, if any, favouring the emergence of one pragmatic meaning over the other(s)? Is genre one of these potential factors?
3. If genre mediates the relationship between evidentials and their meanings, what are the genres that more easily activate particular contextual meanings? Do these genres share any common features or traits that differentiate them from the rest?

3. Evidentiality and discourse genre: Pragmatic overtones

While evidentiality, as it has been previously discussed, has been narrowly defined as a semantic mechanism that serves to identify sources of information (Aikhenvald 2004; Bermúdez 2005b; Squartini 2008; Cornillie 2009; Hassler 2010), it is not always clear why speakers choose certain evidential mechanisms above others; or, in particular, why sometimes the sources of information must be marked or the specific speech act of reporting must be referenced. The factor of textual genre could account for some of these choices. If that is the case, evidentiality, a deictic category with pragmatic and discursive overtones in Spanish, might find its realization through various genres.

The concept of genre has been the focus of interest in the area of the studies of discourse, and, in particular, in the modality of written discourse for the last thirty years (Tardy & Swales 2014: 165). In most definitions, this construct is linked to actions and communicative purposes (Miller 1984; Swales 1990). Indeed, genres constitute rhetorical strategies that are socially and contextually situated, and, therefore, are always dynamic and in evolution (Tardy & Swales 2014). By virtue of their social situatedness, genres both modify and are modified by the communities of practice that adopt them. On the one hand, genres are constrained and defined by the values, beliefs, common experiences and shared knowledge that bond the members of the discourse communities. On the other hand, once a genre has been organized, users' practices and beliefs are also shaped by this conventional structure (as it occurs with genres of academic cultures; Berkenkotter & Huckin 1995).

Generally speaking, a genre is an abstract model consisting of a set of characteristics shaped by a concrete discourse community. As Swales (1990) proposes, a genre is a class of communicative events with common sets of communicative goals

that is shared by a community of speakers. Admittedly, genres are recognizable by users on the basis of formal features, such as grammatical constructions, lexical units, organizational structures, discursive moves, and even visual defining characteristics (Hyland 2004; 2008; 2015; Miller 1984; Tardy & Swales 2014). Genres thus serve as the backdrop for the analysis of any particular linguistic element (Calvi 2010; Biber & Conrad 2009; Giltrow & Stein 2009). The linguistic forms chosen for use in discourse can be derived from general rules of expression or be specially determined by the discourse genre. These forms can include all types of linguistic phenomena, such as evidentials, mitigation, irony, etc.




Figure 1. Factors in the deployment and use of evidential devices

Figure 1 suggests that a logical explanation for the deployment of certain linguistic forms (including evidentials) is the pressure exerted by certain social expectations on given textual architectures (understood as the discourse “skeletons” of genres); ultimately, they are social constructs built with a concrete socio-discursive purpose (Biber & Conrad 2009; Giltrow & Stein 2009). Similarly, there are superstructures (Van Dijk 1980a; 1980b) associated with the expression of various genres. For example, scientific articles share the Introduction–Literature Review–Method–Results and Discussion–Conclusion (ILM[RD]C) structure (Cargill & O’Connor 2009), while other genres, such as casual conversation, are much more free, although still governed by concrete floor transfer offset parameters (Sacks, Schegloff & Jefferson 1974; Levinson & Torreira 2015).

Genres are not mere collections of texts that share similar formal features, but, as Hyland (2015: 32) claims, they represent “the schema we develop through our shared experiences to see how these texts help construct particular contexts”. Genres become, in fact, what Bazerman (1997) calls “frames for social action”; that is, spaces to

create meanings and relationships (cfr. Swales 2004). From this perspective, the entities we refer to as genres determine both the “building” of discourse (or superstructure, following Van Dijk [1980a; 1980b]) and the various textual mechanisms that “inhabit” it. Among other things, the latter include several evidential forms (such as the future tense; Rodríguez Rosique this volume), the verbal periphrasis *tiene que* + infinitive (Miche this volume), the adverb or preposition *según* (Maldonado & De la Mora this volume), among others. For example:

- (1) A: ¿Qué hora es?
 [What time is it?]
 B: Serán_{Future} las cuatro
 [It must be four] (Bello [1847] 1971: 236) / Rodríguez Rosique this volume)

This use of the Spanish future tense is a general feature of spoken discourse, used in (1) by the speaker to show uncertainty as to the exact time. It also signals a sort of inferential evidentiality, since it refers to the speaker’s inner process (Escandell 2010; 2014). In everyday speech, then, the future tense serves as an evidential mechanism while also adding uncertainty, and even acting as a mitigator, given that it protects the speaker’s face in case the information given is mistaken.

This is so because the speaker follows a potential social expectation that citing the source of information lends credibility to what is said. This expectation is activated by the mental image of a prototypical reader or hearer (who is not necessarily present at the moment of utterance). The need for credibility leads to the use of mechanisms conveying objectivity and reliability: in terms of evidentiality, these mechanisms include direct quotation (*según dijo X Maldonado y De la Mora this volume; Llopis this volume; como se puede deducir de X, Albelda y Estellés this volume*).

- (2) El ministro ruso rechazó la oferta del presidente georgiano de enviar observadores al desfiladero de Pankisi, ya que, según dijo, los guerrilleros lo han abandonado tras un acuerdo con las autoridades georgianas.
 (El País, 2002, NCREA)
 [The Russian minister rejected the offer of the Georgian president to send observers to Pankisi Gorge because he said the guerrillas deserted him following an agreement with the Georgian authorities.] (Llopis this volume)

Example (2) illustrates a prototypical evidential marker, reported speech with a *verbum dicendi*. The mechanism is highly frequent in the written press, especially news items; it renders truthfulness to what is said and, generally, to the information presented.

However, the credibility of the source’s words does not necessarily need to be based on criteria of objectivity; at times the configuration of the genre requires the

use of more introspective language in order to attain credibility. For example, in illness narratives (Figueras this volume) speaking about the development of the sick self (Bury 1988; Charmaz 1999) requires an increased use of endophoric reference (Bermúdez 2005b), as well as the discursive construction of two selves: a current one, affected by its own imbalance brought on by illness, and a past one, which can be denied (eating disorder [ED]) or even diluted into an explanatory nothingness (borderline personality disorder).

- (3) mi tío me mandó las fotos que nos había hecho y al ver mi cuerpo en bikini sentí rabia, asco, odio, vergüenza. Pensé “¿cómo se te ocurre enseñar eso, no tienes conciencia de lo gorda que estás?”

[my uncle sent me the pictures he had taken of us and when I saw my body in a bikini I felt rage, disgust, hate, shame. I thought “How dare you show that, don’t you realize how fat you are?”] (Figueras this volume)

The excerpt in (3), from an ED narrative, shows instances of the internal and personal use of verbs of emotion (*sentí rabia*) as part of the evidential mechanism. While the information is known first-hand, it should be borne in mind that patients see their past self as an external being, which makes the use of evidential expressions important as a means of recognizing their illness and, indeed, towards making treatment possible.

To summarize, we have seen that there are genres that use evidentials as an anchor between the credible and the objective. Such is the case of scientific discourse (Kotwica or Albelda & Estellés, both this volume) and television news (Cabedo this volume). However, other genres, such as Internet forums, anchor the credible to the subjective.

Another important concept related to evidentiality and genre is intersubjectivity (Nuyts 2012). For example, in scientific articles (Kotwica this volume), evidence given is frequently shared by or accessible to the scientific community as audience. This is another instance of intersecting expectations activated by the genre: both the writer and the reader expect the evidence to be accessible. For example:

- (4) Caracteres. – Longitud total, hasta 250 mm.; latitud máxima, 1 a 4 mm. Las dimensiones varían según la edad y estado de contracción del ejemplar. En los nuestros sus apariencias eran tan diferentes, que los tuvimos por especies diferentes, hasta que su investigación microscópica nos demostró eran una misma. (17-1919-RevRAC)

[Constitution. – Total length up to 250 mm.; maximum latitude, 1 to 4 mm. Dimensions vary depending on age and state of contraction of the specimen. In ours [specimens] their appearances were so different, that we took them for different species until its microscopic examination showed us they were the same.] (Kotwica this volume)

Furthermore, evidentiality, credibility and modality (evaluation) are mutually required; indeed, the analysis of evidentiality and epistemicity as two elements fused into a single form is common. Thus, sources are identified and the degree of certainty is evaluated in a unified, not easily separated way. This is most readily observed in colloquial conversation (González this volume, exploring the expression *no sé*, ‘I don’t know’; and Miche this volume, focusing on the verbal periphrasis *tener que* + infinitive).

- (5) *No sé* (‘I don’t know’) as an adjunct / epistemic parenthetical:
 No me encuentro bien. **No sé**, creo que he pillado un resfriado.
 [I don’t feel well. I don’t know, I think I’ve caught a cold.]

(González this volume)

Lastly, while speakers’ preference to mark sources of information in a scalar manner has been studied extensively (models like De Haan [1998] or Faller [2002]), questions that have not been widely explored include the internal flexibility of these scales, and whether the preference for one source-marking form over another is due to the influence of genre. Indeed, it is interesting to observe the pragmatic game established in certain genres that use elements from these scales, but in the opposite direction to the expected one, or for unexpected strategic reasons.

Thus, in some genres, such as parliamentary discourse (Albelda & Estellés this volume), speakers use direct evidential mechanisms (“according to speaker X”) to include their own inferences. This word game is habitually associated with irony. We can summarize this as follows: according to speaker A, B said Y, where Y is an utterance/statement that puts B’s image into question. However, B did not really say Y; the speaker is using an argumentative strategy to attack a political opponent’s face. For instance, in (6), excerpted from the Spanish official parliamentary proceedings, the speaker resorts to the expression *al parecer* (‘apparently’) to introduce some information that is attributable to his political opponent (specifically, to Mr Ayllón and, by extension, to his political party):

- (6) Esto es lo que tenemos en este país, es decir, el país se está hundiendo y usted viene a culpar a la oposición de que se oponga. No me extraña para nada que el Parlamento le sobre porque, como dijo el propio señor Ayllón el otro día en la Diputación Permanente, el Gobierno lo que hace es intentar que el Parlamento no haga nada porque cuando el Parlamento actúa, **al parecer**, la crisis del país se profundiza. Pues defiendan ya ustedes directamente, y dejémonos de mandangas, un Gobierno autoritario con unas Cortes decorativas. Ya lo tuvimos durante muchos años y ya sabemos lo bien que le fue al país.

(Spanish Parliament proceedings, 2014.

Speaker: Carlos Martínez Gorriarán [UPyD])

[This is what we have in this country; our country is collapsing and you come to blame the opposition for exercising political opposition. No wonder that, according to you, the Parliament is unnecessary, because, as Mr. Ayllón himself said the other day in the Permanent Council, what this Government tries to say is that the Parliament does nothing, because when the Parliament acts, apparently, the crisis in our country worsens. Well, just stop beating about the bush and say it straight out: you want an authoritarian government with a decorative Parliament. We already had one for many years, and we know how good it was for the country.] (Albelda & Estellés this volume)

These pragmatic values are not limited to attacking the opponent's image, but also help preserve the opponent's face through mitigating linguistic forms, i.e., evidentials, and convey the core meaning of the source of information. They create a second layer of meaning that is activated contextually. These values include instances of irony and mitigation. The latter is observed primarily on occasions when speakers wish to protect their own face or that of their interlocutor (or reader) despite the message being expressed. This is the case, for instance, in the excerpt from a colloquial conversation in which one of the participants resorts to the evidential marker *por lo visto* to express his reluctance to commit to the reliability and truthfulness of the information about the infidelity rates in Norway. The evidential expression allows the speaker to preserve and save his face in the exchange:

- (7) A: y me ha hecho gracia luego también el noruego↑ // lo que ha salido diciendo↓ /
 quee- Humberto no sé- ¡ah! porque en ese programa dicen al principio algo
 de unass- de unass encuestas↓ no sé qué estadísticas↑ patatín patatán ¿no?//
 yy-// y dice el noruego↑ que también hicieron unas estadísticas en Holanda↑
 unas encuestas paraa alguna historia↑ y que **por lo visto**↑ // era curioso porque
 deel centro de Nolan- dee- de Noruega[...] del centro de Noruega al NORTE↑
 el norte de Noruega↑ que **por lo visto**↑ sí quee es verdad que en general era
 maayor la infidelidad↓/

(Corpus Valesco 2.0, Conversación 31, Intervenciones 37–45)

[A: and later, I also found it funny, that Norwegian guy, what he was saying, that- Humberto... I'm not sure what... Oh! Because, in this program, at the beginning, they say something about some- some surveys, something about some statistics, blah, blah, blah, right? And the Norwegian guy says that they also have made surveys in Norway, for some other reasons, and apparently... It was interesting, because in central Hol-... in central Norway [...] from central Norway to the north... in the north, in northern Norway, apparently it is true that, in general, infidelity rates are higher.]

(Corpus Valesco 2.0, Conversación 31, Intervenciones 37–45)

(Cabedo this volume)

Returning to Figure 1, it is clear that genres determine the use of any linguistic form they contain: social expectations always force the selection of certain words rather than others (Biber & Conrad 2009).

4. Presenting the chapters

In general this volume includes articles that deal in some way or another with the concrete relationship between evidentiality and discourse in Spanish, focusing in particular on the pragmatic extensions of the evidential meaning (reliability, epistemicity, obligation, shared knowledge, evaluation of the source, and so forth) in the context of various discourse genres:

1. Albelda and Estellés: evidentiality scales. Indirect pragmatic values. Academic and political discourse.
2. Kotwica: shared evidentiality. 19th century scientific discourse.
3. Figueras: perceptual, endophoric and indirect evidentiality in online illness narratives.
4. Miche: the verbal periphrasis *tener que* + infinitive (greater epistemicity than evidentiality). Online forums.
5. Cabedo: prosody of *por lo visto* in six oral genres, from more to less formal.
6. Llopis: the use of *según* as an evidential marker. Four written genres.
7. Maldonado and De la Mora: diachronic development of *según* (from evidential to epistemic). Written and oral corpus from CREA (*Corpus de Referencia del Español Actual*).
8. González: the verb *saber* (epistemic values) in conversational exchanges and oral opinion reports.
9. Rodríguez Rosique: use of the future tense (inferential evidentiality). Written and oral corpus from CREA (*Corpus de Referencia del Español Actual*).

These nine chapters can be grouped according to two focal issues: the studies dedicated to highlight the evidential strategies that have become more prevalent in certain genres, seeking to determine the idiosyncratic pragmatic nuances triggered by each genre; and the contributions that examine specific evidential markers and their pragmatic values, either linked to one specific genre or across different genres.

As part of the former group, Albelda and Estellés' contribution identifies and explores the phenomenon of "pragmatic indirectness" in evidentiality, as well as its role as a rhetorical strategy in two particular genres: academic and political discourse. The authors define "pragmatic indirectness" as the deliberate choice of evidence made by speakers/writers in a dynamic scale that organizes evidentials according to degrees of preference contextually determined. Depending on their

personal intentions and goals, and constrained by contextual expectations, speakers strategically try to modulate their discourse conforming to these scales. To do so, they resort to two main mechanisms: selection of the best evidence in a particular context; if not available, concealment of the (less preferable) evidence accessible by deploying evidentials located higher in the preference scale.

In connection to the semantics of evidentials, Kotwica's study delves into the notion of "access to evidence" (a concept akin to *intersubjectivity*) and applies this concept to develop a classification of criteria to differentiate between shared and non-shared evidence within the framework of the classical typology of evidential meanings. Scientific articles, argues Kotwica, promote shared and available evidence, and, hence, accessibility of evidence has to be regarded as one of the main features of evidentiality in academic genres. From this standpoint, the author examines the nature of the evidence in a corpus of Spanish biology articles produced in the period between 1850 and 1920, yielding the finding of a strong tendency to employ evidential constructions of shared nature. This result can be related to the discursive practices of the scientific community in that historical period.

Focusing on a different discursive genre, illness narratives, Figueras's chapter explores the sources of evidence to inform the self in three types of illness stories collected from the Internet: narratives of eating disorders (ED), borderline personality disorder (BPD), and chronic fatigue syndrome (CFS). The analysis revealed a different source of evidence in each type of personal account: visual perception, in the case of ED narratives (body as self); inner emotional states, for BPD stories (mood as self), and embodied perception, in CFS testimonies (sensations as self). These results indicate that evidential strategies are genre-sensitive and that they develop particular discursive functions according to the type of illness and the explicative frame adopted by the writer to produce the personal tale of the experience.

Turning the attention to online interactions, Miche argues that the notion of evidentiality is entrenched in epistemicity and intensification, and that Internet forums constitute a suitable platform to observe and to investigate the relation between these three dimensions. Miche explores the constructions *tienes que* + infinitive and *debes* + infinitive ['you have' + infinitive and 'you should' + infinitive] with deontic meaning, and she reaches the conclusion that these structures operate more to express modality than to indicate source of information. They are deployed to intensify the content and the quality of the speech act of advice.

Taking a complementary perspective, the works by Cabedo, Llopis, Maldonado and De la Mora, González, and Rodríguez attend to specific evidential constructions that acquire different values across genres. On that account, Cabedo's experimental contribution performs an analysis of 29 records of different variables, mainly phonic (TOBI accents, pitch, intensity, speech rate and so on), of the evidential discourse marker *por lo visto* ('apparently') in six oral discourse genres: everyday

conversation, discussion, sociolinguistic interviews, TV talks, parliamentary interventions, and news. The analysis showed significant differences in the prosodic patterns according to genre. Thus, a predominance of the tonal accent L + H* was found in news, political discourse and sociolectal interviews, whereas *por lo visto* as an independent intonational phrase was only present in the political discourse and sociolectal interviews. It appears that prosody allows discrimination between the *pragmatic* and the *core* meanings of the evidential *por lo visto* in genres in which both possibilities coexist.

The paper by Llopis examines the context-dependent meanings of the quotative individual lexical marker *según* by comparing its grammatical features, indication of sources of evidence (with special attention to reporting verbs), and frequency in four different genres: academic articles, essays, news and novels. The author observes that the evidential function of *según* is accomplished by means of a prepositional phrase or a clause bringing a reporting verb, in contrast to what happens with its lexical equivalent in other languages. She concludes that the evidential function is more common in written genres, with a noticeable increase in the news.

In a related study, Maldonado and De la Mora look at the diachronic evolution of the evidential-epistemic marker *según*, and provide a systematic organization of the synchronic values of this marker, both in oral and written registers of contemporary Spanish from CREA (*Corpus de Referencia del Español actual*) and CSDM (*Corpus Sociolingüístico de la ciudad de México*) corpora. The authors found that epistemic meanings were more prevalent in oral data, and that mitigating meanings were also present, noting that as the reportative meaning diminishes, the subjective evaluation of the event increases. Maldonado and De la Mora explain these values suggesting that *según* operates as a space builder, so that the assertion introduced by this marker is confined, not to the space of reference, but to an alternate space in which its veracity is defined in the conceptualizer's domain.

González's study, meanwhile, is concerned with the discussion of the semantic and pragmatic functions of the epistemic phrase *no sé* ('I don't know'). The author explores the attitudinal stance and the evidential grounding carried by this expression. González takes into consideration two unplanned oral genres: conversational exchanges and oral opinion reports. Both genres incorporate negotiation and, consequently, feature speakers' engagement and value judgments. The results of the analysis indicate a predominant role of *no sé* in both discursive genres as an attitude marker, conveying affect, judgement and appreciation. In addition, and as an epistemic form, *no sé* constitutes a marker of uncertainty, so that it expresses a low degree of commitment towards the propositional content.

Lastly, the focus of Rodríguez's chapter is to uncover the structure of discursive values brought up by the Spanish future tense that go beyond evidentiality in the conversational genre. Rodríguez reasons that, from a discursive viewpoint, future

can display a number of discursive roles and extend beyond evidentiality. Thus, the Spanish future tense can be used as a strategic tool to build negotiation and conversational management (persuasive future); to construe counter-argumentation (concessive future); or to perform an expressive speech act (mirative future). To articulate these values in discourse, they must have already been activated during the course of the interaction.

Altogether, each of the nine papers included in the present volume engages in a particular aspect of the complex intertwinement of evidential markers, pragmatic meanings, and genre when accounting for the dimension of evidentiality in discourse.

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On the dynamicity of evidential scales

Pragmatic indirectness in evidentiality as a rhetorical strategy in academic and political discourse

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Based on examples from academic papers and parliamentary debates in Spain, the present paper studies a particular phenomenon within evidentiality, which is called 'pragmatic indirectness' in this work. This phenomenon involves examples in which evidentiality is expressed formally in a certain way (for instance, it is *presented* as reporting someone else's words), but where the meaning conveys a different kind of evidentiality (for example, it is *actually* obtained through a process of reasoning). The existence of this phenomenon can be explained by the facts that

- a. Evidentials are organised according to scales: some evidentials are considered more preferable than are others, as the degrees of preference are changeable and determined contextually; and
- b. Speakers accommodate their discourse to these scales (more or less) strategically, depending on their intentions and goals, as well as on the expectations raised by the context; and they do so by
 - i. Choosing the evidence best ranked in a particular context and, if not available,
 - ii. By concealing the (less preferable) evidence they have available in the guise of evidentials located higher in the ranking.

Special attention will be paid to the role of discursive genres in the use and values of pragmatic indirectness in evidentiality.

Keywords: evidentiality, Spanish, genres, indirectness

1. Introduction

1.1 Aims and scope

Evidentiality, defined as the expression of the ‘source of information’, is a multi-faceted concept and has been regarded from very different perspectives, thus leading to varied classifications. For instance, some of these classifications consider the way in which the information was acquired (called *MODE OF KNOWING*; see Section 2.1), thus producing *visual*, *reported* or *inferred* evidentiality, depending on whether the speaker saw the evidence, heard it from someone else or obtained it through an internal process of reasoning, respectively. In real life, however, the boundaries between types are not clear-cut, especially when pragmatic meanings, which are contextually triggered, are added to the core meaning of source of information, as Section 2.2 will show.

In a given communicative situation, speakers may find themselves faced with two kinds of evidence: for instance, a speaker may have *seen* a fact but also have had this fact *explained* by someone else. When this situation occurs, scholars have found that the speaker chooses one kind of evidence over another and, thus the existence of *scales* can be posited from most to least preferable sources of evidence (most works agree on the preference for direct over indirect sources, for instance). These scales, as described in Section 2.3, are presented as static in the literature; in other words, they are meant to be universal and valid regardless of the situation in which they are uttered.

In Section 3, our work hypotheses will be presented, and illustrated via examples taken from academic and political discourses. We will claim that:

- a. The scales posited by the literature are not static but dynamic, in the sense that the order of preference varies constantly, is updated in each context and depends strongly on the communicative purposes of speakers, mainly on what speakers intend to get from their hearers. Since genres have different communicative purposes, these scales vary greatly from one genre to another.
- b. Furthermore, we will claim that speakers can take advantage of the dynamicity of these scales and use them strategically by making their evidence ‘look its best’ within a given context. This means that, despite the speaker having evidence that is only mildly preferable available, s/he may try to make the evidence look as if it is in the top position of preference. For instance, if a speaker has obtained some information by inferring it, but finds him/herself in a context in which the inference is least desirable, the speaker might disguise the source of the evidence and make it appear desirable in that context (for instance, by presenting it in the form of reported evidence). This mismatch between the form chosen by the speaker and the actual kind of evidence s/he has, and which is used with strategic purposes, is an example of ‘pragmatic indirectness’.

1.2 Some introductory examples

In Example (1), extracted from the Spanish official parliamentary proceedings (Estellés, in press), the speaker uses the form *al parecer* ('apparently') to present some information ascribable to his political opponent (specifically, to Mr Ayllón and extended to the party in the government to which Mr Ayllón belongs):

- (1) Esto es lo que tenemos en este país, es decir, el país se está hundiendo y usted viene a culpar a la oposición de que se oponga. No me extraña para nada que el Parlamento le sobre porque, **como dijo el propio señor Ayllón** el otro día en la Diputación Permanente, el Gobierno lo que hace es intentar que el Parlamento no haga nada porque cuando el Parlamento actúa, **al parecer**, la crisis del país se profundiza. Pues defiendan ya ustedes directamente, y dejémonos de mandangas, un Gobierno autoritario con unas Cortes decorativas. Ya lo tuvimos durante muchos años y ya sabemos lo bien que le fue al país.

(Spanish Parliament proceedings, 2014. Speaker: Carlos Mtnez. Gorriarán [UPyD])

[This is what we have in this country; our country is collapsing and you come to blame the opposition for exercising political opposition. No wonder that, according to you, the Parliament is unnecessary, because, **as Mr. Ayllón himself said** the other day in the Permanent Council, what this Government tries to say is that the Parliament does nothing, because when the Parliament acts, **apparently**, the crisis in our country worsens. Well, just stop beating about the bush and say it straight out: you want an authoritarian government with a decorative Parliament. We already had one for many years, and we know how good it was for the country].

The question is, was that information really stated by his opponent, as the verb *decir* ('say') leads us to think (*como dijo el propio señor Ayllón*, 'as Mr. Ayllón himself said')? Conversely, is this information a deduction made by the speaker, either on the basis of his/her knowledge of the person about whom s/he is speaking (Mr Ayllón) or on the basis of some words uttered by Mr. Ayllón at some moment in the past? Any educated citizen would agree that the speaker's statement is not a *real* report and that, if uttered at all, Mr Ayllón's words must have been significantly different from their shape in the speaker's report.

We shall now compare Examples (2) and (3), which are both excerpts from academic papers:

- (2) **Como se deduce de los datos incluidos en la Tabla 2**, en los cinco medios estudiados se impone con claridad la producción audiovisual ajena, que representa el 73.38% del total en 2011.

[As follows (lit. 'it is deduced') from the data in Table 2, in the five media studied, there is a clear predominance of foreign audio-visual production, which accounts for 73.38% of the total in 2011].

- (3) *Como se puede ver en la Tabla 1*, al igual que en distintos países europeos, también en España se ha estudiado el fenómeno en distintas investigaciones, unas de un ámbito estatal (Defensor del Pueblo, 1999), otras regionales (Carbonell, 1999; Hernández y Casares, 2002; Ortega, 1994 y 1998) y, por último, otras de carácter local (Cerezo y Esteban, 1992; Viera, Fernández y Quevedo, 1989). [As can be seen in Table 1, as in other European countries, Spain also has a phenomenon that has been studied in several surveys, some of them at a national level (Ombudsman, 1999), and some regional (Carbonell, 1999; Hernandez and Casares, 2002; Ortega, 1994 and 1998); finally, some of them were local (Cerezo and Esteban, 1992; Viera, Fernández and Quevedo, 1989)].

It is manifest that the actions expressed by *deducir* ('deduce') and *ver* ('see') in (2) and (3) respectively are one and the same. However, the formal choice is quite significant, as *deducir* is transparent, and *ver* is not. In other words, the facts that we, as readers, are supposed to *see* are actually logical deductions or conclusions that we are invited to draw from the raw data displayed on a table. In this regard, we *deduce*, just as (2) shows. However, it is also evident to any habitual reader of academic literature that the structure in (3) is more usual in papers than is the one in (2). The verb *ver* is highly polysemic and, no doubt, has incorporated the meaning 'deduce'. Thus, 'understand' (coming from the metaphor SEEING IS UNDERSTANDING) as a polysemy, but the question is, why would a writer prefer a verb that somehow disguises the inferential or reasoning process and favours the metaphoric alternative, as the latter less transparent?

The answer lies in the pragmatic meaning evidentials may acquire contextually, particularly in interactive settings. Section 2 will briefly summarise the semantic (2.1) and pragmatic (2.2) features attributed to evidentials, as well as the ordering of these evidentials based on scales of preference (2.3). Section 3 will present the evidential scales as dynamic, and the order in which elements are arranged within them as context and genre dependent (3.1). Finally, the pragmatic indirectness, or the lack of correspondence between form and meaning of evidentials in some contexts, is presented as a strategic use of evidential scales (3.2).

2. Evidentiality and pragmatics

2.1 How is evidentiality categorised?

Well beyond the narrow definition of evidentiality as a 'source of information' (Aikhenvald 2004), recent literature on evidentials has focused on classifying evidentials according to different categories and on establishing the criteria for such a classification. One of the most widespread categories is the *MODE OF KNOWING*; that

is, the type of process whereby the information was acquired. Nonetheless, other categories have been proposed to characterise evidentiality more appropriately, such as the TYPE OF SOURCE, the ACCESSIBILITY to the source and the DEGREE OF (IM) PRECISION of the source (Chafe 1986; Aikhenvald 2004; Bermúdez 2005; Squartini 2008; Cornillie 2009; Hassler 2010; Dehkordi & Allami 2012; Estellés & Albelda 2014; González-Condom et al. 2017; Alonso-Almeida 2015; Cornillie & Gras 2015; Kotwica 2016, in press; Figueras in press; Albelda, in press 1, amongst others.)¹

With regard to the MODE OF KNOWING, most works agree on the existence of *direct* evidentiality and *indirect* evidentiality, the former being acquired by sensorial, visual or auditory means, and the latter by means of inference or report (Chafe 1986; Aikhenvald 2004; Bermúdez 2005; Cornillie 2007; Wiemer 2010; De Haan 2013; Fernández Jaén 2015; Kotwica 2016). TYPE OF SOURCE refers to the locus from which the information was acquired, which is generally *self* (the speaker him/herself), *other* (hearers or people not present in the interaction) or *data* (which has also often been considered within the sphere of *others*, since it does not come from the self) (Frawley 1992; Bermúdez 2005; Squartini 2008; Kotwica 2016; Albelda in press 1). The criterion of ACCESSIBILITY refers to the availability of the evidence (Bermúdez 2005; Kotwica submitted; Kotwica this volume). In this regard, access to information can be *privative*, in that only the speaker can access the source of information, or it can be *universal*, when anyone can access it. Finally, the DEGREE OF PRECISION considers whether the source is *precise*, or unequivocally identified, or *non-precise*, when it cannot be identified because no specific data are provided (Dehkordi and Allami 2012; Albelda in press 1; Kotwica submitted; Kotwica this volume) Therefore, different degrees of precision exist, ranging from completely precise (the source is fully identified) to completely imprecise.

All evidential forms, in a given context, can thus be identified by using a matrix of traits specified in each of the previous categories. See, for instance, Example (4):

- (4) Gracias, señor presidente. ***Según las distintas intervenciones y justificaciones que tanto el presidente como la vicepresidenta y usted misma han hecho*** acerca de la motivación, del qué y el cómo, de su agresiva reforma laboral, consideran que esas motivaciones generan empleo.

(Spanish Parliament proceedings, 2012. Speaker: Pilar Lucio [PSOE].)
[Thank you, Mr President. *According to* the different interventions and justifications made by the president and the vice-president, as well as by yourself, on the what and the how of your aggressive labour reform, you consider that those motivations do generate employment]

1. This is not an exhaustive list. Other categories such as intersubjectivity (Nuyts 2012), polyphony (García Negroni 2016), basis of information and mode of access (Izquierdo 2016) have been posited, although these will not be addressed in this paper.

In (4), the construction introduced by *según* ('according to') expresses an *indirect-MODE OF KNOWING*, or a *reportative* evidentiality. The *TYPE OF SOURCE* is *others* (*según*), refers to the interventions made previously by other MPs), the *ACCESS* is *universal*, since all the MPs (as well as the ultimate addressees of the sessions, the Spanish citizens) have listened to the previous speakers, and the *DEGREE OF PRECISION* is *precise*, since the MPs who uttered the discourse reported are fully identified (the president, the vice-president and the MP to whom Ms Pilar Lucio is responding (*usted misma*, 'yourself')).

Nevertheless, these classifications hardly fit when applied to real, corpus examples. In other words, data from spontaneously produced discourse (be it oral or written) cast doubt on the clear-cut divisions between categories, as well as on the labels within categories.

2.2 The pragmatic dimension of evidentiality

The expression of evidentiality is often accompanied by additional pragmatic values, especially in languages in which the expression of evidentiality, as it is not part of their grammar, is not compulsory. This is the case, for instance, with the Spanish DMs *por lo visto* or *al parecer* ('seemingly'), which are entirely grammaticalised at present as evidentials, since their core (semantic) meaning is claimed to be 'source of information' (González Ramos 2005, 2016; Ruiz Gurillo 2005; Kotwica 2013, 2015; Estellés & Albelda 2014, 2016a; Marcos Sánchez 2016).

These DMs convey *indirect* evidentiality and, in general, an *imprecise* source; the kind of indexicality they show, which points to a separation between the speaker and the source of information, often results in pragmatic values related to the speaker's scepticism, disaffiliation or even disagreement with the information conveyed, and the speaker's position often leads to the interpretation of the evidential, among other possibilities, as

- a. mitigating the speaker's commitment to the proposition, usually to prevent him/herself from committing a face-threatening act, and/or
- b. presenting the information as being unreliable.

With regard to the first interpretation, speakers often use evidentials as mitigating devices (Chafe 1986; Estrada 2008; Hassler 2010; Kotwica 2013; Estellés & Albelda 2014; Albelda 2016b; Albelda in press 2; González Ramos 2016). That is the case in Example (4). Here, *por lo visto* ('apparently') in B's intervention expresses a distance between the information provided and the source of the evidence. *Por lo visto* works in (5) as a mitigating, pragmatic strategy (together with *lo que dicen es*, 'what people say is') used to minimise the responsibility of saying unpleasant things about others (the girl's family being economically/socially inferior to that of her boyfriend).

- (5) Enc.- Sí, pero tampoco tanto, yo esperaba más, yo esperaba más, más, porque Rafa me dijo que era... ¡uh! que el novio era de una familia que no sé que...
 A- ¿Qué era buena la familia?
 Enc.- Que el padre era constructor.
 B- Lo que dicen es que se ha peleado con, con el novio la chica; *por lo visto...* porque la consideran, pues yo la veo una familia muy bonita, hija mía.
 (Salvador (coord.), 2007. *El habla culta de Granada*, 305)
 [Interviewer: Yes, he was [rich], but not that much, I thought him richer, richer, because Rafa told me he was... wow!, that the groom was from a family whose...
 A: Was it a well-to-do family?
 Enc: ...whose father was a contractor
 B- What people say is, the girl had an argument with his boyfriend; *apparently*, because they [the boyfriend's family] consider her ... [but] I think she's from a very nice family, dear]

Facework-related meanings such as that in (5) are indeed frequent companions of evidentials; however, a non-negligible number of pragmatic values of evidentials are directly or indirectly based on a different aspect, *reliability*, which has been seen as a key notion to describe evidential expressions (Boye 2012; McCready 2014, among others). The relationship between evidentiality and reliability has been taken into consideration in complex and multiple terms. Building upon Givón's (1982) classification of degrees of epistemicity, Frawley (1992) pointed out that

- a. some kinds of evidentiality present the information as more reliable than others; and, as a result,
- b. there are a series of scales forcing speakers to choose one kind of evidentiality over another depending on the higher or lower degree of reliability to which they are associated.

In the following lines (Section 2.2.3), we will take a closer look at the presence of scales in the study of evidentiality.

2.2.1 *Evidentials and scales*

There are, as we have seen, many kinds of evidentials that convey many different kinds of information sources. When we face the communicative reality, this fact may result in a situation in which the speaker has several sources of evidence for a given fact; for instance, s/he may know a fact because s/he saw it, or because someone told him/her. This opens up the possibility for speakers to choose different kinds of evidentials. Many authors (Oswalt 1986; Willett 1988; Frawley 1992; Faller 2002; McCready 2015, among others) support the idea that some scales apply, as evidentials (or evidential types) are ordered from a greater or lesser degree of preference when a speaker has to choose among them. Below, Faller's (2002)

scale is presented as a representative example. Although there are slight differences among authors (normally due to their consideration of one or another evidential language as the basis of their studies), there is a general tendency to consider direct or self-related evidence types as the first choice for any speaker, and indirect evidence as the least preferable. The main theoretical disagreements are located in the rightmost pole, whereas De Haan (1998) and Oswald (1986) considered inference preferable to quotation/report, Willett (1988), for instance, considered reportative evidentials as being higher on the scale of preference than are inferentials.

Visual > auditory > other sensory > inference > secondhand > thirdhand > assumed
(Faller 2002: 50)

Based on the existence of such a scale, several generalisations can be made, amongst them the fact that, when several kinds of evidence are available, speakers will always choose the leftmost option. Or, from a slightly different perspective, in McCrady's (2015, 155) terms, they seek the 'best possible grounds', or the most reliable kind of evidence for the kind of proposition being asserted and which "com[es] from a source which, with respect to propositions of the kind being asserted, is as reliable as one can get".

As mentioned above, Frawley (1992, 411), building upon Givon (1982), maintained that the choice of one kind of evidential over another is the result of the combination of four different gradients:

1. Person: Speaker >Hearer >Third Person
2. Sense: Vision >Hearing >Other Senses >Feeling
3. Directness: Senses >Inference
4. Proximity: Near >Far

Therefore, the best possible option according to this view would be evidence (1) coming from the speaker, (3) acquired in a sensorial way, (2) more concretely through the vision and (4) coming from a nearby source, whereas the least desirable evidence would come from a third person acquiring information through feelings, particularly having inferred it, and coming from afar. Many combinatory possibilities exist between the two poles, always assuming that, when possible, the leftmost option is preferable within each scale. Reinterpreting Givon's scale in terms of the categories of evidentials explained in Section 3.1 (TYPE OF SOURCE, MODE OF KNOWING, and so on), the resulting 'linear' scale would be quite similar to that of Willett (VISUAL > ... >INFERENTIAL), revealing the preference for quotatives over inferentials.

The reason behind the different ordering of evidential types in the aforementioned scales is the criterion that, according to the authors, leads speakers to prefer one over another. All of them agree on the superiority of *directness* over *indirectness*, but, according to de Haan, *speaker involvement* also applies and, therefore, inferential

evidentials are located closer to the pole of direct evidence than are reportatives, since inference ultimately comes from the speaker whereas, by quoting, speakers use evidence coming from a source other than themselves (Faller 2002, 53).² In turn, Willett combines *directness* and *reliability*, thus assuming that evidentials can convey degrees of certainty and can therefore be related (in some way) to epistemic modality.

Reliability scales are common (Aikhenvald 2004, 338; Boye 2012, 165). Fitneva (2009) summarises further correspondences between evidentiality and reliability, and something similar is done by Matsui, Yamamoto & McCagg (2006), and by Papafragou et al. (2007), in which a straightforward correspondence between *direct experience* and *reliability* is posited, since direct evidence is always considered to be a more reliable source of information than indirect experience.

Such correspondence is usually presented as universal; in other words, valid for all languages, and static, or unchangeable regardless of the situation. Faller (2002), however, posited an interesting point: none of these scales (one privileging report over inference, the other vice versa) can be said to be absolutely correct, and “speakers do not prefer to base their statements on either on inferential or reportative evidence” (Faller 2002, 54). In addition, factors such as the context or the linguistic/cultural community (Willett 1988) may have an effect on the correspondence between kinds of evidentiality and degrees of reliability (Chafe 1986; Cornillie 2009). Bearing this in mind, the preference for one or another type of evidence is assessed based on the testimony of native speakers, who are given a complex situational setting (for instance, having two kinds of evidence available) and who are asked to express the evidence accordingly (Faller 2002, 54):

The first situation is one in which a farmer, say Pedro, notices that one of his hens is missing, and at the same time sees a trail of feathers on the ground leading away from the house. Knowing that foxes frequently steal hens, he might with fairly high certainty infer (19), using the conjectural enclitic –chá. [...] If he were later to meet his neighbor who tells him that she actually saw a fox leave Pedro’s yard with a hen, he would use (20) to report the event to other people... [preferring] the eyewitness report over their own inference. Now consider the same situation to begin with, i.e. Pedro infers (19). But he then later meets a different neighbor who is known to be a drunk. He tells Pedro that he saw a Puma leaving his yard with his hen. In this case, Pedro has conflicting information from two different sources. Let’s assume that Pumas are rarely seen in Pedro’s village, and that it is much more likely that it was indeed a fox. Then, given that the source of the report is not trustworthy, Pedro will probably simply disregard the drunk’s report, and continue to use (19) to tell other people about the event.

2. See Estellés (2015) for a different perspective on the ascription of reported evidentials to third parties/indirectness.

This approach is interesting and raises the question of the ‘authority’ of the source (for instance, in the case of the testimony of the drunken neighbour having witnessed a puma versus the speaker’s own inference (see Fox 2001; Heritage & Raymond 2005). However, one of the main shortcomings of this approach is that the contextual setting(s) presented and, therefore, the linguistic output provided by informants, is not (at least, not completely) genuine. It does not consider the real, communicative situation in which exchanges take place, namely interaction. The need for an interactional approach to evidentiality was highlighted by Cornillie & Gras (2015), and has rarely been considered in the literature, and always related with factors such as the socioepistemic status of the speakers, their authority and stance, and the organisation of the turns (Kamio 1994, 1997; Fox 2001; Heritage & Raymond 2005; Clift 2006; Hanks 2012; Heritage 2012; Sidnell 2012; Cornillie & Gras 2015; García-Ramón, in press).

We often use evidentials *in order to* do something. The approaches to the scales provided above assume that speakers only transmit information to some hearer(s), but merely informing is not our main goal in communication. As a matter of fact, everyday conversation (the most natural communicative situation in all cultures, regardless of their degree of literacy), does not have an ‘informative’ purpose (Halliday 1973, 2003), but mainly and typically an *interactive, interpersonal* one (Payrató 1998; Briz 1998). Most of the time, speakers aim to achieve goals that depend directly on their relationship to their conversationalist(s), be these goals local (getting someone to do/ to become convinced of something) or global (to gain the hearer’s social affiliation, acceptance, and so forth; see, for instance, Briz & Albelda 2013).

If this latter fact is considered, the situational settings presented to obtain information from native speakers should change from “How would you say this in this situation?” to “How would you say this *to this person* in this situation?” That is to say, the situational setting provided should include cues such as, “If *you want to convince your neighbours that you should all collaborate to build a fence to protect your hens from foxes*”. If this is the case, it is likely that the speaker would choose the reported testimony, possibly intentionally leaving out the fact that it was uttered by the drunken neighbour and focussing on the fact that *one neighbour told him that he actually saw an animal*. Is this behaviour lying? Maybe it is, but this is the way speakers behave in real contexts.

A complete understanding of evidentiality cannot be possible unless we abandon the assumption that speakers follow the Gricean principle of cooperation un-faillingly and naively, and if we assume that there are no intentions that lead them to ‘manipulate’ language. Speakers *act strategically*. The strategic, intentional use of evidentials to achieve discursive goals has been studied extensively (See Section 3.1) but, in the following lines, we will show how the speaker’s communicative purpose

may alter the way in which these scales are conceived. We claim that these scales are dynamic, are updated contextually, and that the order of preference can change according to the communicative goal intended (Section 3.1). As a result, speakers may alter the form of their evidence to make it suit the kind of evidence that is located higher in the ranking of preference, if it helps them to achieve certain communicative goals (Section 3.2).

3. Evidentials in interaction: Dynamic scales and pragmatic indirectness

3.1 On the dynamicity of evidential scales in context. Communicative goals

Changes in context and in communicative goals may challenge the correspondence between a given kind of evidentiality and a certain degree of preference in the choice thereof. In order to support this claim, we will examine two discourse genres in which the communicative goal is one of the key factors in their characterisation, together with their particular structure, style, type of content and addressees (Swales 2007), namely academic papers and parliamentary debates.

Let us focus first on academic papers. Academic discourse in general aims to (a) transmit some information (new scientific findings, for instance) and to (b) convince the scientific community that it must accept this information and must consider the findings as ‘background’ information in further studies (Hyland 2009; Kotwica 2016). To reach these goals, the author must present veracious information that is accessible to everyone, and which is *objective*. This *objectivity*, in terms of interaction, can be understood as ‘making one’s contribution *reliable for the audience*’. However, although some scales provided above present direct, self-related evidence as being more reliable than or preferable to other types of evidence, that order does not apply, for instance, in genres in which objectivity is the cornerstone, such as academic papers. Let us develop this idea further.

For example, if we consider the ‘state of the art’ of a paper, we can agree that any claim about a theoretical framework, or any idea that is based solely on the author’s thoughts, would immediately be criticised in a peer-review process. For instance, when an author needs to define a given concept before conducting a case study, it is expected that several definitions of the concept will be provided; in general, these definitions will have been published previously in other works by authors who are considered experts. It would be odd, if not unacceptable, for only the author’s own definition to be offered (unless the author of the article is a ‘sacred cow’ within his/her field). In most cases, any reader familiar with the topic would immediately judge that particular section as being ‘less reliable’, and this judgement would probably also be extended to the author him/herself. This is, therefore, a case in which the

traits ‘first-hand’ or ‘evidence based on the speaker’ do not go hand-in-hand with a ‘high degree of reliability’.

Thus, we could posit a new scale: when we write an academic paper (at least, with regard to the section dealing with the state of the art), the order of preference for evidence would privilege non-firsthand evidence. Thus, concerning the TYPE OF SOURCE, any information acquired by the speaker is intrinsically considered more subjective by the hearer than is information acquired via third persons or data. Thus, according to Givón’s scale of epistemicity,

Personal/deictic hierarchy: Speaker > Hearer > Third Person,

the internal order within the category ‘person’ would be altered when considering the presence of a speaker whom the author must convince:

Hearer > Third Person > Speaker

Taking Faller’s (2002, 50) classification,

Visual > auditory > other sensory > inference > **secondhand** > **thirdhand** > assumed

‘thirdhand’ and ‘secondhand’ (in bold) would definitely be higher in the ranking of preference; if the evidence were used in academic papers, it would be more like:

secondhand > thirdhand > visual > auditory > other sensory > assumed

To summarise, in general use, the testimony to a fact conveyed by the words of others renders the evidence less reliable for the speaker/writer than if s/he had witnessed the fact him/herself; therefore, the speaker would always choose visual evidence over reported evidence. However, in the opinion of the hearer/reader of an academic paper, evidence coming from *others* (be it from people or from data) is more *objective* than is evidence coming from the speaker him/herself. In part, this asymmetry is due to the dimension of ACCESS to the evidence: evidence coming from the speaker is not accessible to the hearer (especially if it is *inferred* by the speaker). Instead, information coming from a third person is equally accessible for both speakers and hearers. In this sense, the more *universal* the ACCESS to the evidence, the more *objective* the information is considered to be. As far as the DEGREE OF PRECISION is concerned, the more precisely a source has been identified, the more objective the information is believed to be, since the speaker shares all the details, thus allowing hearers to identify and access the source on equal terms.

However, the validity of this latter scale is not universal either. While this ordering seems to hold for the section on ‘state of the art’ in 21st-century scientific papers, consider Example (6), from an academic paper dating back to the 18th century (Kotwica 2016):

- (6) No es tan general esta ley que no tenga excepciones y algunas extraordinarias; pues **he visto** un macho de las pardas que fue padreantes de cumplir los tres meses. (1799, *Anales de Historia Natural*, Kotwica 2016, 251)
 [This law is general, but not to the extent of not having exceptions, some of which are extraordinary; since **I have seen** a brown-feathered male which became a father before being three months old.]

Here, the system for citing and referencing authors, presented above as essential in order to guarantee objectivity, has not yet been developed. We can see that the writer presents what he has *seen* (a pigeon) directly during his expeditions, as the best possible expression of objectivity. We may even find differences within a given genre in different cultures, since they have social, contextual and cultural conventions and constraints (Parodi 2010; Kotwica 2016). It can be claimed, therefore, that scales are not static; the order of the elements in the scale is dynamic, and is updated contextually in each communicative situation in which the evidential is used. Preferences change with time and with culture, depending on the authority of the source. Speakers calculate the situational coordinates, order the evidentials accordingly and choose the highest ranked option. This does not mean that no order exists or that the choice is chaotic. There are conventions with which speakers are familiar; for instance, those of genres. Genres can actually be seen as macro-contexts, or as sets of situational coordinates and communicative goals that often co-appear as a unitary block (Briz 2010).

Assuming that reliability for speaker and reliability for hearer (objectivity) do not fully coincide in the choice of evidence as the best possible means of expression (for example, *self* versus *others*), the logical consequence is that speakers might use this circumstance to make their discourses *seem* more objective or more reliable in the eyes of others, and they might do so strategically, depending on their goals (Fitneva 2009) or communicative purposes, which are both closely linked to the genre to which the discourse belongs.

3.2 Mismatches between form and meaning. ‘Pragmatic indirectness’ in evidentiality

As mentioned previously, the strategic, goal-oriented use of evidentials has been studied extensively (Chafe 1986; Carretero 2002; Marcos-Sánchez 2006, 2016; Cornillie 2009; Estellés & Albelda 2014; Kotwica 2013; Almeida-Alonso 2015; Cornillie & Gras 2015; Estellés 2015, in press; Albelda 2016a, 2016b, in press 1; Briz 2016; García-Negrón 2016; Marín-Arrese 2016; Figueras, in press), but evidentials in genuine interaction have even more complex, often concealed, intentions: speakers are competent to determine the kind of evidence that would be considered more preferable by the hearer in a given situation, and often disguise the actual source of their

evidence in order to fit the desirable shape and achieve their communicative goals. The rhetoric, strategic concealment is what we have termed ‘pragmatic indirectness’ in evidentiality, and is here conceived of as an instantiation of a more general kind of indirectness in language. As is known, human communication is highly inferential, and is more interpretative than literal (Levinson 2000). One of the most important and influential concepts in Pragmatics is that of *indirect speech acts* (Searle 1969, 1975), i.e. when the propositional form does not coincide with the illocutionary act expressed; simply put, this means what is said is not what is meant. This indirect contextual meaning is recovered by the internal mental processes of the speakers.

Indirectness is a far more general pragmatic strategy and can be applied to phenomena other than speech acts. An example of this is evidentiality, when pragmatic indirectness is used as a rhetorical strategy to achieve a certain communicative goal. Prototypically, we use evidentials to convey the meaning they express literally. For instance, if we consider the *MODE OF KNOWING*, an example of an evidential expression that is reportative would be (7):

(7) *Según* Paul Butel:

“the measures taken by England and France to protect their shipping and their trade (the English Navigations Acts of 1651 and 1660, Jean-Baptiste Colbert’s tariff-list and ordinances of 1664, 1667 and 1674) had a long-term effect. Added to this were the consequences of the naval conflicts, in particular those of the first Anglo-Dutch war of 1652–1654” [+ FOOTNOTE including the complete reference] [According to Paul Butel:]

In (7), a fragment from a paper published in a history journal, a verbatim quotation is introduced by a series of conventions: *según X* (‘according to X’), the use of quotation marks [“ ”], a paragraph break and indentation. The author of the quote is also stated explicitly (Paul Butel), as well as the complete reference of the work in which the reader can find the original text (year, title, page), here included in a footnote. If we describe Example (7) according to the matrix of traits presented in 1.1, it would be *indirect-reported* [*MODE OF KNOWING*], *others* [*TYPE OF SOURCE*], *accessible* [*ACCESSIBILITY*], and *precise* [*DEGREE OF PRECISION*], therefore being an excellent candidate to convey the pragmatic meaning of ‘objectivity’. It is *reported* and it is formally presented as being reported. The same applies to the *MODE OF KNOWING* in (2), here renamed (8):

(8) **Como se deduce de los datos incluidos en la Tabla 2**, en los cinco medios estudiados se impone con claridad la producción audiovisual ajena, que representa el 73.38% del total en 2011.

[As it is deduced from the data in Table 2, in the five media studied, there is a clear predominance of the foreign audiovisual production, which accounts for 73.38% of the total in 2011].

The author of (8), a fragment of a paper in the field of communication, states that the ‘predominance’ of the foreign audio-visual production *is deduced* from the numbers presented in Table 1. The introductory verb *deducir* is transparent with regard to the inferential way in which the information is acquired: Table 2 shows a set of data, and the ‘predominance’ is a logical conclusion that is derived by the reader from the numbers in the table. The MODE OF KNOWING in Example (5) is *inferential* and it is presented as such. The other dimensions of evidentiality are *others-data* [TYPE OF SOURCE], *accessible* [ACCESSIBILITY] and *precise* [DEGREE OF PRECISION].

However, this prototypical situation does not always apply, and mismatches between the choice of forms and the meaning of evidentials are frequent in naturally occurring discourse. Example (3), here renamed as (9), illustrates the most common way to present information in tables:

- (9) *Como se puede ver en la Tabla 1*, al igual que en distintos países europeos, también en España se ha estudiado el fenómeno en distintas investigaciones, unas de un ámbito estatal (Defensor del Pueblo, 1999), otras regionales (Carbonell, 1999; Hernández y Casares, 2002; Ortega, 1994 y 1998) y, por último, otras de carácter local (Cerezo y Esteban, 1992; Viera, Fernández y Quevedo, 1989). [As can be seen in Table 1, as in other European countries, the phenomenon has also been studied in Spain through several surveys, some of them at a national level (Ombudsman, 1999), some regional (Carbonell, 1999; Hernandez and Casares, 2002; Ortega, 1994 and 1998) and, finally, some of them local (Cerezo and Esteban, 1992; Viera, Fernández and Quevedo, 1989).]

The fragment in (9) is an example of pragmatic indirectness, because it selects an introductory verb *ver* [‘see’] to present a piece of information that was actually acquired through reasoning, as in (8). Strictly speaking, the surveys ‘also’ being carried out in Spain, and at a ‘national, regional and local level’ is not information that readers can actually or literally *see* in the table. Instead, these facts are obtained by deploying inner cognitive processes, developed by the reader, who (a) has read the previous lines in the article and already knows that some investigations have been conducted outside of Spain and (b) also has some knowledge about the regions and cities in Spain (otherwise, the reader would be incapable of contrasting the ‘national’, ‘regional’ and ‘local’ characteristics attributed by the authors to the territories mentioned in the table).³

3. The table mentioned in this article (Avilés & Monjas 2005: 28) shows one survey per row, containing the following information in columns: survey (author of the survey) / territory / year / contents. For instance, row #2 is Ortega / Seville / 1992 / Study in secondary schools in Seville, in collaboration with P. Smith (Sheffield) [our translation].

3.3 On pragmatic indirectness as a cancellation of compositional meaning. Foregrounding and backgrounding information

Speakers choose the best possible way to present their utterances in order for them to be effective. This often means that they seek the best way to get their hearers do something, be it something global (to be on good terms with them, to attain social affiliation) or local (to convince them about a given idea, to have them do something for them, and so on, see Briz & Albelda 2013). This search for effectiveness is also extended to the use of evidentials. Let us begin by saying that a strategic purpose can also exist when no apparent pragmatic indirectness is present (10); in other words, when evidentials convey the meaning they express literally (10):

- (10) Hasta mediados del siglo XVII la hegemonía económica de los Países Bajos en el Atlántico fue indiscutible. Pero a partir de entonces las cosas cambiaron. La contracción de su comercio en la Europa del Norte hacia 1650–1660, del que dependía su crecimiento; y, sobre todo, las nuevas ambiciones marítimas y coloniales de Francia e Inglaterra, obligaron a los Países Bajos a compartir el botín atlántico. *De acuerdo con* Paul Butel:

(...)

[Until the mid-seventeenth century the economic hegemony of the Netherlands in the Atlantic was indisputable. But thereafter things changed. The contraction of its trade in Northern Europe towards 1650–1660, on which its growth depended; and, above all, the new maritime and colonial ambitions of France and England, forced the Netherlands to share the Atlantic plunder. *According to* Paul Butel:]

In (10), the verbatim quotation is used to support the author's opinion on a particular matter. Including the opinion of others is perceived as the expected behaviour in the genre, an academic paper that seeks objectivity, as this objectivity is one of the main criteria for a work to be judged positively by the scientific community. Note, however, that despite respecting the external shape [*according to* + quote + reference], complete objectivity may not exist as such. Consider, for instance, Example (11):

- (11) ...es muy oportuno recordar aquí el **acertado juicio historiográfico** de Louise Dechêne, quien escribe estas **enjuiciosas palabras**: «dans une perspective de longue durée ce ne sont pas les compagnies métropolitaines qui comptent, mais l'organisation locale, qui engendre une société nouvelle» [+ FOOTNOTE including the complete reference]

[...it is very appropriate to recall here the **accurate historiographical judgement** of Louise Dechêne, who writes these **substantial words**: «dans une perspective de longue durée...».]

The evidential structure [identification of the author + direct quote + footnote including the complete reference] is identical in (10) and in (11). However, when examined more closely, the author's bias can be seen more easily in (11), because of the use of adjectives referring to the quote itself, such as *acertado juicio* ('accurate view') or *enfundiosas palabras* ('substantial words'). Examples such as (11) show how the fact that the genre 'academic paper' favours objectivity does not prevent subjectivity from existing. Example (8) above, for instance, is a testimony to the presence of subjectivity-related categories such as 'inferentiality', but the higher frequency of (9) points to the speakers' tendency to conceal it.

However, bearing in mind that some kinds of evidentials are preferred to others when speakers have a choice, it is sound to think that some kinds of evidentials are more preferable for hearers than are others when they have to judge the reliability of the evidence presented to them. As we have just seen, the scales of preference and reliability cannot coincide intrinsically for speakers and hearers. Even if we agree on 'directness' being more desirable than 'indirectness', it is undeniable that what is 'direct evidence' for the speaker is 'indirect' for the hearer; in other words, the hearer has not witnessed anything. Information reaches him/her after having been mediated by the speaker, and the hearer will judge the information as being more or less reliable depending on factors such as the extent to which s/he considers the speaker to be a trustworthy source or according to the kind of evidence.

Speakers, who are also hearers, are aware of this fact and use it for their own good. They give the audience what it wants to hear, and they choose to present their evidence in the best possible way given the context, thus making evidentials a plastic material they can adapt to suit their communicative goals.

Let us consider again Examples (8) and (9). We already know that the actions in both are the same, namely inferring (deducing) something from the data provided in a table. However, we also know that, despite (8) being more transparent, (9) is much more frequent. It would seem that, despite 'deducing' being the most transparent description of the action taking place, speakers prefer a less transparent option, thus cancelling out the possibility of a compositional meaning. Using *ver* sends the personal, subjective or conjectural component of *deducir* to the background, and thus tells us something about the way 'subjectivity' or 'conjecture' is regarded in academic discourse. In examples such as (9), the verb *ver* 'see' is actually the first part of the entire cognitive process, resulting in the (inferred) evidence. By using 'ver', speakers focus on this first part, or on the *input* of the inference, and background the second part, or the subjective/inferential stage of the process.

All of us can see the data in the table are [X. From X, we can deduce] Y

Example (9), however, is an example of *weak* pragmatic indirectness, in the sense that the cognitive value of the sensorial verb ‘to see’ is already part of its meaning.⁴ One of the facts that enables us to consider this example as a case of indirectness is precisely the frequency of vision-related verbs in this kind of context,⁵ as well as the relative scarcity of inference-related verbs, when only the latter truly reflects the process being carried out. Speakers may no longer be aware of this indirectness, but it has become a convention of the genre to prefer ‘vision’ verbs to ‘cognitive’ verbs (such as “deduce”), and this is unlikely to be accidental.

An example of *strong* indirectness is Example (1) above. The Speaker in (1), Mr Martínez-Gorriarán, is a member of UPyD, an opposition political party. By using ‘decir’, Martínez-Gorriarán is behaving as though the information linked to the member of the ruling party, Mr Ayllón, were the exact words he used. Inferring from Ayllón’s words but marking the inferred information and making it seem as though it had actually been uttered by a third party, he precludes responsibility for the words and disagrees both with the idea they express and with the person he holds responsible for this idea (Estellés, in press).

The process underlying Example (1) is exactly the same as in Example (9) above: The ‘inferential’ part of the process is informationally backgrounded by using the *verbum dicendi*, which is actually the input that first allowed the speaker to infer the information he is presenting:

- (1’) Mr Ayllón spoke previously and said X. I deduce from X that Y
 (9’) All of us can see the data in the table are X. From X, we can deduce Y

In parliamentary debates, pragmatic indirectness is not only more frequent but is also stronger; the main goal (at least in Spain at present) is to criticise the parties and MPs belonging to the rival political parties that share the same space (the congress). Pragmatic indirectness allows the disguise of those subjectively related traits present in evidentiality and the expression of individual opinions as though they had actually been uttered by rivals.

As a parliamentary debate is intrinsically argumentative, the appearance of objectivity in the criticism is a desirable condition to gain the electorship’s support. Again, the citizens must have the impression that the facts used by politicians as arguments are not only available (accessible) to them, but are crystal clear for everyone. If this is the impression politicians wish to create on their audience, inference, just as in academic discourse, will not help to create this illusion. By contrast,

4. The Dictionary of the Royal Academy includes the meaning ‘deduce’ sub voce ver ‘see’.

5. Ver (‘see’), *observar* (‘observe’), etc., as well as other vision-related verbs with inverted agentivity, such as *mostrar* (‘show’). The subject of the latter group is usually inanimate, as in ‘Section 3’, ‘Table 2’ ‘The lines above’, and so on, thus including the use of impersonality as a means of achieving objectivity.

using the reportative shape places the speaker and the audience on the same level of access: It foregrounds the fact that a previous intervention was ultimately the source of the evidence, but it backgrounds the fact that the filter of the speaker's subjectivity was applied. Another reason that pragmatic indirectness is extremely useful in parliamentary debates is the importance of arguments *ad hominem* in this political setting: MPs succeed when they reveal and highlight inconsistencies in the rival parties' discourses. This means that reports are a crucial source of evidence. However, the evidence is not always *actually* reported, but is sometimes an inference made from a report instead.

In both the discursive genres of academic papers and parliamentary debates, pragmatic indirectness serves (the appearance of) objectivity. Both genres are heavily argumentative and aim to obtain the hearer/reader's adhesion to the speaker/writer's ideas. The main difference is the internal functioning of argumentation, which is not confrontational in academic papers but is very much so in parliamentary debates. The latter claim does not mean that criticism is absent from academic papers, but, when it is present, it is oriented to prove hypotheses through experimentation, data analyses or bibliographic support; in other words, argumentation is used to favour the author's ideas. In parliamentary debates, by contrast, argumentation is construed from the destruction of the rival positions of other MPs; it is therefore aimed at others' ideas.

4. Final remarks

Indirectness in linguistic expression is a strong mechanism in human communication, regardless of the genre or situation in which it takes place. In addition, evidentials, when used as a means of achieving discursive aims, can express indirectness, thus deploying pragmatic and strategic uses. Therefore, when the evidence available for speakers/writers is insufficient to convey reliability to the hearers/readers, the speakers/writers usually disguise the evidence in the shape of a stronger kind of evidence; in other words, they construct their utterances to display the kind of evidentiality that is expected to be considered as more reliable by the hearers/readers in a particular context. Assuming the presence of such indirectness in the expression of evidentiality implies the assumption that certain evidence is considered more reliable than are other types; in other words, assuming the existence of reliability scales, the latter assumption is somewhat common in the literature on evidentiality.

However, assuming the existence of indirectness in the expression of evidentiality also implies assuming that the abovementioned reliability scales are dynamic, and that they might change according to the speaker's communicative goals or according to specific circumstances. This dynamicity has not been addressed as extensively in the literature as has the existence of the scales themselves, despite the

fact that, quite often, the higher or lower degree of reliability attributed to a given kind of evidentiality depends on factors such as the conventions and/or requirements of the discursive genre.

Some genres favour more *objective*, non-speaker related evidence, whereas others consider direct evidence, as experienced by the speaker, to be the most reliable source of information. Genres such as academic papers or parliamentary debates, with fundamentally rhetorical purposes, illustrate the indirect and dynamic vision of evidentiality quite well, since there is a communicative need to refer to certain sources in a veiled manner. It is the communicative purpose of the speaker and the expectations raised by the conventions of each genre that causes speakers to highlight or conceal (foreground or background) the source on which information is based. Thus, the idea that evidentiality has a strong pragmatic component in Spanish is proven, as is the fact that this component is highly variable when the context changes, leaving the core meaning, ‘source of information’, as the only feature common to all evidential forms.

The idea posited in this article must now be further tested and validated by contrasting several genres (oriented towards different communicative goals) and by observing which genres tend to present more indirectness, as well as the kinds of evidence that are considered more reliable in each case. Subsequent studies should provide more evidence that evidentiality is a mechanism capable of identifying discourse genres, and must therefore be included in any description thereof.

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Exploring evidentiality in Spanish Biology articles (1850–1920)

Intersubjectivity and accessibility of evidences

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This article examines the expression of evidentiality in scientific articles taking as a starting point the concept of *access to the evidence*, which is closely related to, albeit not equal with, *intersubjectivity*. Combining data from the existing theoretical background and corpus analysis, I classify the criteria for distinguishing shared from non-shared evidences within the traditional typology of evidential meanings. The analysis of a corpus of Spanish Biology articles (1850–1920) reveals the relevance of shared evidential constructions in this type of discourse and shows that the accessibility is especially linked to indirect evidential constructions.

Keywords: evidentiality, Spanish, scientific discourse, intersubjectivity, access to the evidence

1. Introduction

Evidential mechanisms are essential to scientific genres (Chafe 1986; López Ferrero 2001; Taavitsainen 2001; Fernández Sanmartín 2009; Janik 2009; Alonso-Almeida 2015). They are writer's tools for expressing data sources, describing experiments and recognising the preexisting body of knowledge. Moreover, evidentials often fulfill rhetorical and argumentative functions. They validate the research work (Grossman & Tutin 2010), specify the quality of the knowledge (Janik 2009) and support the writer's arguments (Hyland 2005), among others.

The special nature of evidentiality in scientific articles is readily perceivable on the surface of the texts by examining formally codified systems of referencing and quoting. These systems reveal that reportative evidentiality in scientific writing relies mostly on sources that are precisely specified by means of bibliographical references (Dehkordi & Allami 2012). Constructions of referencing and quoting are

representative for how one type of evidentiality – indirect reportative – is expressed in scientific writing. Nevertheless, in experimental science, visual and inferential evidences are also essential for transmitting the sources of information for the writer's claims (Taavitsainen 2001). The latter two evidential types cannot be described as more or less specific in the same sense as reportatives. Visual evidentials have a perceptual basis and refer to what the speaker/writer has perceived with his/her eyes (Whitt 2010a, 2010b). Inferentials involve a cognitive component and express the speaker's reasoning or conjectures that may be based on diverse types of perceived or known information (De Haan 2001; Squartini 2008). Neither visual nor inferential evidentials originate from second or third-hand sources that could be cited in the text as bibliographical references. What seem to characterize all types of evidences and sources of information in scientific articles is that they are usually available and shared among the scientists (Hyland 1998, 2005, 2009a). This suggests that evidential dimension of *intersubjectivity* (Nuyts 2001a, 2001b, 2012; Carretero 2002; Marín Arrese 2004; Whitt 2011, etc.) or *access to the evidences* (Bermúdez 2005) is of special importance in this type of discourse. My aim in this paper is to explore the expression of evidentiality in a historical corpus of scientific articles from the perspective of this dimension.

In the following sections, I first establish the boundaries between the existing concept of intersubjectivity and what I understand as shared/non-shared access to the evidence. Then I discuss the parameters offered by other scholars for considering the shared vs. non-shared (or subjective vs. intersubjective) nature of evidential constructions. Furthermore, I propose additional criteria specific to the context of scientific writing. The suitability of these criteria has been confirmed by the analysis conducted in a historical corpus of Biology articles in Spanish (1850–1920), the results of which are also discussed in this paper. The purpose of addressing a historical corpus is to investigate how the history of science influenced the shaping of shared evidential constructions in Spanish scientific articles. The period between 1850 and 1920 was crucial for the dissemination of new paradigms in Biology. This period also witnessed the institutionalization of disciplinary communities and the professionalization of the figure of scientist (Gomis Blanco 1989; Sala Catalá 1984; José Llorca 1992; López Piñero 1992; Banks 2008).

2. The dimension of *access* in evidentiality

In this paper, I follow the semantic-functional definition of evidentiality (Hassler 2010; Estellés & Albelda 2014; Albelda 2015; Estellés 2015; etc.). Therefore, I acknowledge evidential use of diverse language elements in Spanish that can convey evidentiality as their primary meaning (discourse markers such as *por lo visto*, *al*

parecer, dizque), or express evidential values only in specific contexts (verbs of perception, reasoning and communication, constructions with prepositions, etc.). Since evidentiality is a heterogeneous category in Spanish, I will resort to the term ‘evidential construction’ when referring to units that express evidential meaning. Furthermore, in this study I adopt a disjunctive perspective in treating evidentiality as a category separate from modality (albeit I recognize that the two categories are close and often coexistent in the same construction).

Many classifications of evidential meanings build on two dimensions: mode of knowing, which may be *direct* or *indirect* (Chafe 1986) and source of information, identified either as *self* or as *others* (Frawley 1992).¹ Bermúdez’s (2005) proposal includes a third dimension – the *access* to the information – to account for the special nature of two types of evidential meaning: endophoric and folklore (see Figure 1). What distinguishes these from other evidential types is not the mode of knowing or the source they convey, but rather the quality of being shared with others (folklore) or being available exclusively to the speaker (endophoric). Bermúdez (2005: 17) places endophoric and folklore evidentiality in the two poles of the “accessibility scale”. Endophoric evidentiality is defined by the exclusive access by the speaker while folklore is universally shared or accessible. The other evidential types are situated somewhere in between these two poles.

Mode of the access to the information	Source of the information	Access to the information
COGNITIVE	OTHERS	UNIVERSAL
↕	↕	↕
SENSORIAL	PERSONAL	PRIVATIVE

Figure 1. Dimensions of evidentiality according to Bermúdez (2005: 17)

It is logical to consider that, if evidence is used to support a statement, it must be first accessed by *someone*. By default, this *someone* is the speaker because “evidentials show the kind of justification for a factual claim which is available to the person making that claim” (Anderson 1986: 274). This is best illustrated by examples with (non)evidential uses of perception verbs. If the speaker has perceived a scene, he/she can use this act of perception as direct evidence (*I saw that...*); however, the perception of others can be reported only indirectly (*They told me they saw...*).

1. See Squartini (2001) for a more complete account on how these dimensions have been used in the literature.

The availability of the evidence to the speaker/writer is the *minimum* availability necessary to consider evidential reading of a linguistic element, but it does not have to be speaker-exclusive. In other words, the evidence must be accessible for, or available to, the speaker at least; however, it may also be available to others or shared with others. This idea of shared vs. non-shared status of evidential expressions has been addressed in studies focusing on the concept of intersubjectivity (Nuyts 2001a, 2001b, 2012; Whitt 2011; Carretero 2002; Marín-Arrese 2004, 2013; Cornillie 2007, 2009; Alonso-Almeida 2015; Marcos Sánchez 2016). Nevertheless, there seems to exist at least two theoretical-conceptual issues with bringing intersubjectivity into the discussion on evidentiality. I will revise them briefly.

First, as Nuyts (2012) points out, there exists terminological-conceptual problems with notions of *subjectivity*, *intersubjectivity*, *intersubjectification* and *objectivity*, as they have been used across different theoretical frameworks (semantics, grammaticalization theory and cognitive grammar) in which they “are referring to really different phenomena ... [even though they] are sometimes and to some extent ‘co-applicable’, in the sense that they can be used alongside each other in the account of one and the same linguistic phenomenon” (Nuyts 2012: 69).

The second problem concerns the scope of intersubjective dimension. Which type of information can be intersubjective or shared in evidentiality? Nuyts (2001a: 398) defines (*inter*)*subjectivity* as “an independent evidential-like qualificational category”; this category is determined by “whether the evidence (and the conclusion drawn from it) is only available to the speaker or is, rather, more widely known (including to the hearer)” (Nuyts 2001a: 398–399). Nuyts (2001b) also refers to (*inter*)*subjectivity* in terms of the responsibility for the epistemic qualification of the information. In the same line, Marín-Arrese (2013) links intersubjective choices to the dimension of “responsibility and accountability for the veracity of the information” (Marín-Arrese 2013: 424). According to this author, intersubjective evidential expressions that involve shared responsibility for the information are markers of higher reliability: “Information presented as intersubjectively shared, or as more objectively valid is more warrantable” (Marín Arrese 2013: 424). Therefore, in the discussion on the intersubjective nature of evidentiality (often linked also to modality) there coexist notions of *shared access* to the evidence (or *shared evidences*), *shared conclusions* and *shared epistemic responsibility*. What is problematic here, from my point of view, is the idea that the three types of shared information align in intersubjective evidential constructions. This would mean that if an evidence is shared, then both the conclusion drawn from it and the epistemic responsibility are also automatically shared, which is not always the case. This issue has been addressed by Cornillie (2007: 25) who shows that one can easily find examples in journalistic discourse in which sources or evidences are most probably shared (or available/accessible to the audience); however, this does not necessarily hold for

the proposition that comprises the speaker's reasoning based on such sources. The audience's endorsement for a conclusion is not automatically granted by the fact that they share the evidence on which this conclusion is based.

Provided that the evidence can be better specified, so as to untangle the confusion between information and evidence, the proposal of (inter)subjectivity can be applied. Evidence is then only a small and deliberately limited part of the information available to a broader group of people, i.e. the part that involves the very basis of the evidential statement. Thus, the shared or non-shared status of the information should be differentiated from the shared (intersubjective) or non-shared (subjective) reference to the specific evidence used for the statement. (Cornillie 2007: 25)

As suggested in the above statement, shared access to the source of evidence does not guarantee shared status of the conclusions based on it. This becomes even clearer in the case of reportative evidentiality. Even if the speaker/writer quotes a well-known/shared/accessible source, the reported piece of information can hardly be discussed in terms of "shared conclusion" or "shared responsibility". It seems that the inclusion of the latter two types of information (shared conclusion and shared responsibility) within the intersubjective dimension is due to the conception of evidentiality as part of modality.

In this study, I limit the discussion to shared vs. non-shared access to the evidence for a proposition, which builds primarily on Bermúdez's (2005) *access to the evidence* as a dimension of evidential meaning. For this reason, and because I isolate access to the evidence from other potentially shared pieces of information in evidential constructions, I choose to talk about (non)shared access to the evidence or (non)shared evidences, rather than (inter)subjectivity. Nevertheless, I still draw on some ideas proposed in studies on intersubjectivity for distinguishing shared from non-shared access to the evidence. It should be noted that I understand *access* in a quite literal way: does the speaker/writer suggest that the evidence is readily accessible or available to others? Does he/she make the evidence accessible to others, or is the evidence exclusively available to the speaker/writer?

2.1 Shared evidences in scientific writing

In scientific writing, evidential support for assertions is often anchored in disciplinary knowledge, universally available bibliographical sources and the results of experimental practices shared within the community of scientists. As observed by Nuyts (2001a: 389), in the context of scientific research intersubjective or shared evidences are likely to occur, because: "the author is reporting on the results of long term research performed by a (more or less) large community of scientists, and his/her opinion can hardly be considered a matter of a purely subjective commitment".

Alonso-Almeida (2015: 138) shows that evidential markers in scientific discourse often convey the idea of shared access to the evidence or “availability of information”. On a more general level, this can be interpreted within a framework of community practices and the types of information it shares.

Because of the nature of the sources of data in scientific discourse, it is plausible to expect that most evidences are shared or potentially available to the audience. The way in which the speaker/writer presents a piece of information is crucial in distinguishing between shared and non-shared context (Bermúdez 2005; Nuyts 2001a). While it is impossible to prove the actual universality of any piece of information, its real-world status is not as relevant as the effect intended by the writer. The intention of displaying shared rather than non-shared evidences can be linked to specific rhetorical or persuasive goals, for example, within the dimension of engagement with the audience (Hyland 2009a).

What exactly makes evidences accessible, shared or intersubjective? Several studies have attempted to answer this question either by assessing the (inter)subjective nature of different evidential types or concrete evidential structures (Carretero 2002; Bermúdez 2005; Squartini 2008; Whitt 2011; Marín-Arrese 2013; Alonso-Almeida 2015; Marcos Sánchez 2016). In the following sections, I will revise the existing proposals and discuss several additional criteria that are relevant in the context of scientific writing.

2.1.1 *Access in visual evidentiality*

One of the basic characteristics of direct evidentials is that the evidence is available to the speaker at the perception level (Anderson, 1986; Whitt 2010a, 2010b). Therefore, some direct evidence must be available to the speaker *at least*. This opens the possibility that the evidence is also shared with others. As Whitt (2011) points out, there are syntactic and contextual clues that help in distinguishing subjective non-shared from intersubjective shared evidential uses of verbs of perception.

After all, the complementation pattern in which a perceptual verb occurs can play a role in what type of evidence is indicated, as it plays a role in distinguishing subjective and intersubjective evidence. Equally vital is distinguishing between singular and plural first-person grammatical subjects with subject-oriented perception verbs.

(Whitt 2011: 360)

According to Whitt (2010b, 2011), first person plural verb forms (*we*) point to shared access or intersubjectivity, as well as verbs describing long-term observation or parenthetical constructions. Marín-Arrese (2013) refers to the intersubjective meaning of generalizing and impersonal forms of verbs such as *it seems*. For Spanish, Marcos Sánchez (2016) concludes that the dimension of (inter)subjectivity expressed by the presence of *me* versus *other/others* in different constructions with *ver* (‘to see’) helps to

account for their functioning as markers of different types of evidentiality. Moreover, it allows for retrieving their accurate pragmatic function in the discourse, based on the interaction between the speaker, the interlocutor, others and the knowledge.

In addition to the above syntactic clues, I posit that the superordinate criterion of the general context and communication of scientific ideas in the framework of scientific articles is essential for recognizing non-shared and shared evidential access. In Biology articles, a basic distinction can be drawn between simple vision/observation with the naked eye and vision aided by instruments. In the latter case, indication of specific methods and description of conditions in which the observation has been conducted may signal shared access to the evidence: the writer offers a specific route through which anyone can replicate the observation and obtain similar results. Furthermore, scientific articles often display visual elements and illustrations that represent the observed objects and serve not only as a demonstration of what the writer saw, but also as a way of sharing the visual evidence with the audience.

2.1.2 *Access in inferential evidentiality*

In Squartini's (2008) classification, different types of inferences are distinguished based on the role that more subjective, objective and intersubjective elements play in their formulation:

This gradient can be represented as a tension field between the speaker's most subjective reasoning, where conjectures originate, and a more objective kind of reasoning based on external evidence. An intermediate stage is represented by generic inferences that are less subjective than conjectures, for they are based on (possibly intersubjective) world knowledge, even though they lack the external validation provided by sensory evidence. (Squartini 2008: 925)

The three types of inferences in Squartini's classification involve different degrees of the speaker's own (subjective) reasoning and external evidences from the surrounding world or the speaker's world knowledge. For Squartini, *conjecture* is the most subjective inferential type, because it relies solely on the speaker's reasoning. In contrast, more objective or intersubjective clues are present as a support for the reasoning in both *circumstantial* and *generic* inferences.

What constitutes as evidence for circumstantial or generic inference shared in a specific context is the way in which it is presented. Even if the reasoning is a matter of personal cognitive processing, the evidences on which it draws can be shared within the discursive context. Carretero (2002: 19) considers that intersubjective evidential expressions "make explicit that the *evidence* which leads the speaker to the formulation of the epistemic qualification is known or accessible to a larger group of people, especially the addressee".

A practical example of how an evidence for inference can be shared is shown by Alonso-Almeida (2015). He analyses an inferential use of *parecer* + infinitive ('seem' + infinitive) followed by a Latin quotation which serves as evidence for the reasoning conveyed by *parecer* construction.

The Latin text follows the initial statement, and this constitutes the evidence, which has made possible this first statement. This allows the speaker to share his knowledge with his audience, and this availability of information is essential to create the impression of an intersubjective claim by offering the conceptualizer's own evidence in his construal of knowledge. Others might already know this knowledge in the scientific community, but this information is not accessible to readers.

(Alonso-Almeida 2015: 136)

While it is impossible to assess the availability of arguments, concepts and ideas on which the inferences can be based, it is possible to assess the presence of the evidences in the context. Although it is the speaker/writer who formulates an inferential claim, he/she can make the evidences available to others; for example, by describing the observation process, by including visual elements or by listing the logical arguments he/she is drawing on.

2.1.3 *Access in reportative evidentiality*

The most prominent feature of reportative evidentials is that the source of information is *others*. Regarding accessibility of the evidence, Bermúdez (2005: 17) believes that the default value of this type of evidentiality is "non-shared", as the speaker informs the hearer about the information he/she has received from a third party. However, I believe that the accessibility of indirect evidences depends heavily on the genre in which they appear. In a one-to-one conversation, speakers are entitled to report the information gained from a virtually limitless number of source types (relatives, friends, colleagues, public authorities, journals, TV-news, etc.). Nevertheless, scientific genres constrain the number of admissible sources to scientific papers and monographs, previous research, or "a community-based literature" (Hyland 2005: 51–52). The *community-based* character of the sources suggests they are accessible or shared. As Hyland (2005) points out, in the context of scientific writing, new knowledge is often created in collaboration between the writer and the readers. They rely on a shared context of knowledge evoked by bibliographical references: "Explicit reference to prior literature is a substantial indication of a text's dependence on context and thus a vital piece in the collaborative construction of new knowledge between writers and readers" (Hyland 2005: 158). Therefore, indirect evidences are made available to a broader audience by providing detailed bibliographical references.

A special type of indirect evidentiality is folklore or common knowledge (Willet 1988; Lazard 2001). Bermúdez (2005) proposes that the distinction of folklore from other reported evidentials is in the dimension of access to the information. In Bermúdez's (2005: 17) classification, folklore is the *universally accessible* evidential type, expressing the knowledge available to everyone. However, because accessibility is a scalar dimension, gradients exist even on this universal pole. So-called "common knowledge" is most often restricted only to a specific group of people – for example, the Spaniards, the scientists, the Biologists. Expressions of common knowledge are not unusual in scientific discourse and they represent the disciplinary *folklore* or knowledge shared among a concrete disciplinary community. As Koutsantoni notes (2004: 175), "Common knowledge markers consist of devices that stress common knowledge" and they include evaluative adjectives (*well-known*, *common*) and "expressions of generalized attribution" (*it is known*, *it is widely accepted*). The functioning of such markers is strictly connected with the goals and needs of scientific writing:

The function of this type of marker is to stress authors' commitment in propositions and to add to the argumentative force by presenting the view as one which is not theirs alone, but one which is shared with the wider community or with relevant experts (White, 2002). Common knowledge markers also indicate endorsement of sources which are highly respected in the field and carry the status of objective facts. At the same time authors emphasise their own status as members of this scientific community by showing awareness of these sources and by showing their relevance to their work. (Koutsantoni 2004: 176)

According to Koutsantoni (2004), common knowledge markers may refer to well-known, standard methods; they convey *normality* and solidarity among the members of the disciplinary community. Markers labeled by Koutsantoni as "expressions of generalized attribution" are called "non-specified ambiguous evidentials" in Dehkordi and Allami's (2012) classification of evidentials in scientific discourse. It is, in fact, a very special category, because it is the only evidential type mentioned by Dehkordi and Allami (2012) that does not provide precise reference to the source of information. However, the shared quality of the evidence on which these expressions rely justifies the lack of a precise reference:

Authors use this sort of marker to support their own claims and therefore strengthen them, by stressing the fact that they are based on knowledge that everyone in the field is (or should be) familiar with. Such markers are attributions, the source of information of which is received knowledge, which as Hunston (1993: 62) maintains, 'pushes the statement up the certainty scale'. (Koutsantoni 2004: 177)

According to Hyland (2009a), such markers contribute to the dimension of engagement in scientific writing, which refers to what is already agreed within the community:

Readers can only be brought to agreement with the writer through building on what is already implicitly agreed, and by explicitly referring to this agreement writers construct themselves and their readers as members of the same discipline or academic community. (Hyland 2009a: 123–124)

In conclusion, scientific writing possesses two ways of sharing indirect-reportative evidences. The first is by detailing the bibliographical data of the source from which information is reported. The second is by referring to the general knowledge shared within the community.

The way in which reported sources are presented in scientific articles has been conventionalized over past centuries (Banks 2008). In the intermediate stages of the evolution of the citing practices, reported sources appeared with different formats and were often described with little precision – for example, by means of mentioning only the author's name or the title (Salager-Meyer 1999; Banks 2008). Such citing practices can be interpreted as symptomatic for a closely-tied scholarly society where even unspecific references could be easily recognized (Salager-Meyer 1999). This can also be explained within the framework of the notion discussed here, that is, access to the evidences. If the community relies only on a limited number of bibliographical sources, then even an ambiguous (from our modern point of view) specification of the source would be considered sufficient to render an evidence available.

In the following section, I will test empirically the idea that scientific writing promotes evidential constructions based on shared evidences. I will explore the presence of shared and non-shared evidential constructions a historical corpus of Biology articles against the background of external circumstances of scientific communication in the period under study. In doing so, I depart from the idea that different features of scientific discourse change and evolve influenced by the external conditions of how the science is undertaken (Hyland 2009b: 35–36; Taavitsainen 2001: 23–24).

3. Corpus and methods

The empirical part of this study is based on a corpus of *circa* 90,850 words consisting of Biology articles published between 1850 and 1920. The corpus has been collected manually to ensure its homogeneity with respect to the following contextual features:

Medium and audience. All articles were published in prominent scientific journals edited by two Spanish scientific institutions (*Real Academia de las Ciencias* and *Sociedad Española de Historia Natural*) between 1850 and 1920. According to the historiography of science, the audience of these publications was specialists.

Originality of the contribution. Only articles presenting original work and originally written in Spanish were included in this study. I excluded translations, summaries and excerpts from foreign journals, as well as works in languages other than Spanish.

The corpus analysis has been conducted manually in order to retrieve all evidential uses of different language elements, such as verbs and verbal structures (verbs of saying, reasoning and perception), structures with prepositions (*según*, *para*, ‘according to’), adverbs, locutions, references, quotes, etc. Careful analysis of all forms and contexts has been conducted to determine their evidential meaning and the type of access to the evidence. The two main variables of the analysis are the type of evidence and access to the evidence. Within the first variable, I make the following distinctions:

1. *Visual evidentiality.* The evidence for the proposition is what the writer has seen, observed or perceived with the help of scientific instruments.
2. *Inference₁.* Proposition expresses writer’s reasoning based on stimuli he/she has perceived. The evidences are not always of a purely perceptual nature, for example, long-term observation or specific data pieces. Both types of evidences are typical for scientific writing in the field of natural sciences. Inference₁ is, therefore, similar to Squartini’s (2008) “circumstantial inference”, but slightly adapted to the realm of scientific discourse.
3. *Inference₂.* Proposition expresses writer’s reasoning based on abstract arguments, general knowledge or logical premises (similarly to Squartini’s 2008 “generic inference”). Under inference₂ I also include cases that resemble conjectures, where no specific evidence appears to exist. I believe that in scientific articles, evidences of purely conjectural nature would be extremely rare. In fact, the preliminary analysis of the texts proved that if a construction is analysed against a broader context, some kind of evidence underlying the inference can be retrieved.
4. *Reportative.* Proposition involves information transmitted by others, reports or citations from written or oral sources. This category also includes self-quotations where the scientist refers to his/her previous published research.

Regarding the second variable, the access to the evidence, the distinction between shared vs. non-shared evidences is based on various criteria that are summarized in Figure 2.

Evidential type	Non-shared evidence	Shared evidence
Visual	Forms that indicate personal vision (1st person singular or plural verb forms, pronouns, etc.)	Forms that indicate shared vision or observation (1st person plural verb forms or pronouns, generalizations, impersonal forms) Visual elements Description of observation methods Long-term or general observation
Inference ₁	Syntactic clues that limit the reasoning process to the writer Absence of evidences in the context	Syntactic clues that do not limit the reasoning process to the writer Evidences present in the context Visual elements
Inference ₂	Syntactic clues that limit the reasoning process to the writer Absence of evidences in the context	Syntactic clues that do not limit the reasoning process to the writer Arguments and evidences present in the context
Reportative	The source of information is not provided	The source of information is quoted (bibliographical reference) Markers of common knowledge

Figure 2. Classification of parameters for assessing the access to the evidence

Apart of classifying all evidential constructions according to the above variables, I have conducted a quantitative analysis with basic statistical methods to observe if specific types of evidences are more commonly shared in the corpus.

4. Results and discussion

Most of the 570 analysed evidential constructions in the corpus are based on shared evidences (76%) (Figure 3).




Figure 3. Shared vs. non-shared evidences in the corpus

The analysis reveals that there exists a statistical relationship between the type of evidential access and the type of evidential meaning.² Reportative constructions were most often of shared character (86%). Visual evidential constructions as well as both types of inferences were shared in a great number of cases (Figure 4), however they seem more likely to introduce non-shared evidences than the reportative.




Figure 4. Access in different types of evidentiality³

The chi-square test indicates that there exists an association between inference₁ and visual evidentiality and the non-shared access to the evidence, while the reportative correlates with the shared access. However, even in the case of the visual evidentiality and inference₁, the percentage of shared evidences is about 50% of the total number of occurrences. According to these results, the two evidential types considered traditionally as more objective/intersubjective (inference₂ and reportative) are often based on shared evidences. Nevertheless, the other two evidential types that traditionally have been regarded as more subjective or personal (visual and inference₁) also draw on shared evidences in quite a high percentage of cases.

In the corpus, 36% (28) of the occurrences of visual evidentiality are non-shared (Figure 5). These are constructions that signal isolated acts of perception carried by the speaker. No intention of sharing the observation or its results is conveyed in the context.

2. $\chi^2(3, N = 570) = 72.006, p = .000$

3. Numbers in parenthesis express the total number of tokens for each type of evidentiality in the corpus.




Figure 5. Results of analysis: access in visual evidentiality

- (1) *Reconociendo la cavidad abdominal del ♂ que ya tenía preparado para averiguar el cómo era posible que las crías se contuviesen vivas y encerradas en ella, ví, sin que acerca del hecho quepa ni la sombra de una duda, que el claustro paterno no era otra cosa que el saco bucal aéreo (...)* (8-1872-ASEHN)
 Recognizing the abdominal cavity of the ♂ that I had already prepared to find out how it was possible that the offspring could remain alive locked up in it; **I saw**, with no shadow of doubt, that parental cavity was nothing else but an air vocal sac (...)

Example (1) describes the writer's observation of the cavities of a male frog. The scientist explains what he saw after cutting open the body of the specimen; he uses a vision verb *ver* ('to see') conjugated in the first-person singular (*vi* – 'I saw').

- (2) *Las dos series de arborizaciones citadas del ganglio de pequeñas células permanecen, por lo común, algo separadas, llenando con sus ramitas las zonas moleculares limitantes; en algunos parajes, sin embargo, hemos notado que dichas arborizaciones rebasan sus propios límites, imbricándose y confundiéndose las de una serie con las de la otra* (13-1894-ASEHN)
 The two sets of the cited arborisations of the ganglion of small cells are usually slightly separate, and their branches fill the limiting molecular areas; in some places, however, **we have noticed that** these arborisations overflow their own boundaries, with mutual relationships and different series interweaving and blending with each other.

In Example (2), the writer indicates that he obtained the information through personal observation. The verb appears in first-person plural form (*hemos notado que*, 'we have noted that') which is an example of the so-called *nosotros de modestía* or *nosotros de autor* ('modesty we' or 'author's we') (García Negroni 2008) which refers to the author himself⁴ and is not inclusive of the readers of the text. According to

4. Example (2) is an excerpt from an article that has a single authorship, therefore, 1st person plural forms do not coincide with the number of the authors.

my data, this type of personal mark became prominent in Spanish Biology articles in the last quarter of the 19th century.

Examples (3) and (4) are representative of the shared-access visual evidentiality in the corpus.

- (3) *En las aves es muy precoz esta aparición en los ovarios, pero en los mamíferos es bastante difícil determinarla, á pesar de que la observacion ha demostrado y lo manifiesta diariamente, que se encuentran huevos en los ovarios de terneras muy jóvenes, y aun de fetos (...)* (6-1856-MemoRAC)

In birds, the ovaries begin to show very early, but in mammals it is quite difficult to determine when it happens, although as **observation has shown and manifests daily**, eggs can be found in the ovaries of very young calves, and even of fetuses (...)

In (3), the information regarding the existence of ova in the ovaries of very young mammals is justified by visual evidences that are part of a more generalized and universal observation repeated daily. The *observation* is presented as a piece of evidence available to anyone interested in learning about the animal reproduction. Additionally, the wider context to which this example belongs establishes general facts about the formation of ovaries that are presented as universal truths rather than isolated observations.

- (4) *En la parte externa del ganglio **obsérvase con fuertes aumentos que el contorno del cuerpo celular queda íntimamente abrazado por dos ó tres arborizaciones digitiformes que constituyen, reunidas, un pequeño nido pericelular. Y á su vez, cada fibra suministra ramificaciones para dos ó tres células vecinas. En el lado interno del foco (...)** cada fibra **parece** rodear una sola célula; con todo, **examinando con fuertes objetivos, se llega á percibir en algún sitio que una sola horquilla terminal puede aplicarse á dos corpúsculos vecinos. (Figure 11, b.)*** (13-1894-ASEHN)

On the outside of the ganglion, **it can be observed with magnification** that the outline of the cell body is closely surrounded by two or three finger-like arborisations that together constitute a small pericellular nest. Each fibre supplies ramifications to two or three neighbouring cells. On the inner side of the focus (...) each fibre **seems to surround** a single cell; however, by **examining with strong lenses, it can be perceived that** in some parts a single terminal bifurcation can be applied to two neighbouring corpuscles. (Figure 11, b.).

Example (4) illustrates another way in which shared visual evidences appear in scientific articles. All verbs that express perception in this passage have impersonal or generalizing forms (*obsérvase* ‘it can be observed’, *parece* ‘it seems’, *se llega á percibir* ‘it can be perceived’) and thus render the observation more universal. Furthermore, the writer explains the method of examination carried out “with magnification”

or “with strong lenses”. Finally, a reference to a visual element can be appreciated (“Figure 11, b”), which allows the reader to replicate the observation. The presence of the figure enables anyone to follow the original observer’s eyes while reading the description of the structure of a ganglion. Providing visualizations is one of the most prominent ways of sharing visual evidences in scientific articles. Examples (3) and (4) are emblematic of late 19th century experimental methods that not only changed the way science was undertaken, but also affected the language.

In case of inference₁, the proportion of shared and non-shared evidences is very similar (Figure 6).




Figure 6. Results of analysis: access in inference₁

As previously explained, inference₁ represents the speaker’s/writer’s reasoning based on concrete evidences from the external world that the speaker perceives through the senses. Shared access to the evidence is indicated by specific inferential constructions, in addition to the presence of the evidences in the context. Writers can share their conclusions by describing in detail how the external evidences were obtained or by reproducing the evidence with visual elements, as in (5):

- (5) *Células. – Se muestran estrelladas, con apéndices divergentes repetidamente ramificados y cubiertos de asperezas. Existen asimismo células voluminosas y células enanas. No parecen existir entre ambas especies de elementos diferencias de situación, ni de morfología y conexiones. (Figure 5, C.)* (13-1894-ASEHN)
 Cells – they appear stellate, with diverging appendages repeatedly branched and covered with roughness. There are also bulky cells and dwarf cells. **Differences do not seem to exist** between the two types of elements regarding situation, or morphology and connections. (Figure 5, C.)

In the cited passage (5), a visual piece of evidence (“Figure 5, C.”) is made available to the audience so that they can trace the writer’s evidences leading to the conclusion about two types of cells. Inference₁ differs from visual evidentiality in that there exists a greater distancing of the speaker/writer from the evidence anchored in the

external world. This distancing is the result of applying a more fine-grained filter of mental processing through which a sensory evidence passes before an assertion is formulated. On the contrary, assertions based on purely visual evidences do not shift as much away from what can be seen directly with the eyes.

Non-shared inferences₁ are presented in the discourse as a result of personal reasoning based on evidences available only to the as in Example (6).

- (6) *Caracteres. – Longitud total, hasta 250 mm.; latitud máxima, 1 a 4 mm. Las dimensiones varían según la edad y estado de contracción del ejemplar. En los nuestros sus apariencias eran tan diferentes, que los tuvimos por especies diferentes, hasta que su investigación microscópica nos demostró eran una misma.*
(17-1919-RevRAC)

Constitution – total length up to 250 mm.; maximum latitude is 1 to 4 mm. Dimensions vary depending on age and state of contraction of the specimen. In ours [specimens] their appearances were so different, that we thought they were different species until **microscopic examination showed us** they were identical.

Inference₂ is less numerous in the corpus than inference₁, and in most cases, it is based on shared evidences (Figure 7).




Figure 7. Results of analysis: access in inference₂

Inference₂ draws on logical arguments or general knowledge of the speaker. Shared examples of inference₂ often involve impersonal or generalizing constructions, or adjectives that indicate the logical or evident nature of the conclusions: *lógico es suponer* ('it is logical to suppose'), *es evidente* ('it is evident'), etc. Moreover, the logical arguments underlying the writer's reasoning often are exposed in the context, suggesting that other people could easily use them to formulate the same ideas.

Inferences₂ based on non-shared evidence are normally conveyed by constructions with 1st person marks which limit the cognitive processes to the writer, for example *a nuestro entender* ('to our (my) understanding'), *suponemos* ('we (I) suppose'). Non-shared inference₂ is sometimes expressed by constructions typically linked to conjectures (for example, the dislocated future tense) (Example 7).

- (7) *En realidad, jamás hemos podido comprobar de visu este hecho en los batracios, que mi hermano y C. Calleja han visto con toda claridad en los mamíferos. Suponemos que igual disposición ocurrirá en estos seres, pero jamás nos ha sido dable observar la extinción total de una de estas fibras (...)* (15-1905-MemoSEHN)
 In fact, we never have confirmed de visu in amphibians what my brother and C. Calleja have seen clearly in mammals. **We assume that** the same arrangement **will occur** in these creatures, but we have not been able to observe the total extinction of one of these fibres (...).

Regarding reportative evidentiality, shared access to evidence is linked with specificity and precision of the evidence provided in the text, that is, with the presence of bibliographical sources. In addition, I consider references to general disciplinary knowledge as universally shared. Reportative evidences are clearly the most accessible type of evidentiality in the corpus, with the number of shared occurrences of 86% (Figure 8).




Figure 8. Results of analysis: access in reportative

In the corpus, quotes of previous studies by others or by the writer himself are frequent. Integral references sometimes indicate the source in a very descriptive way (8):

- (8) *Pictet en su Synopsis de los neurópteros de España, página 57, dice también...*
 (11-1882-ASEHN)
 Pictet in his *Sinopsis of neuroptera from Spain*, page 57, says also...

Different patterns of non-integral references also occur, for example in parenthesis or in footnotes.

The degree of precision in specifying the source ranges from references that mention only the author's name to complete references that include the author's name, title of the article, publication year and paging.

- (9) *El profesor español Calderón, y el académico belga Morren, han llegado por distintos caminos á unas mismas, ó al menos muy parecidas conclusiones. Ambos opinan que el fenómeno de la nutrición vegetal á expensas de diferentes individuos animales, es más general de lo que podría creerse en presencia de los anteriores datos.* (9-1878-ASEHN)

The Spanish professor, Calderon and the Belgian academician, Morren, have arrived by different routes at the same, or at least very similar, conclusions. They both believe that the phenomenon of plant nutrition at the expense of different individual animals is more general than one might think in the light of the previous data.

Examples such as (9) are cases where the source of evidence is semi-specified by mentioning only the names of scientists responsible for a claim (and in some cases their nationality and/or affiliation). In older texts in the corpus (especially 1850–1872), many references provided only the authors' names while in the texts from the last two decades in this study (1900–1920), full references to the sources were cited in the whole article (often the first time a book or paper was quoted). In the subsequent quotes, only the author's name appeared. I believe that even the semi-specified evidences can be considered as shared or accessible within the circumstances of scientific research conducted by a closely-knit disciplinary community in the second half of the 19th century. Salager-Meyer (1999) observed similar referencing patterns and linked it to the structure of the scientific community:

These undated and undocumented references are typical exponents of an individually-, privately-based and non-specialized medicine and of a small, non-professionalized and “visible” scientific community. (I borrowed this very accurate expression – which means “the fellow physician next door” – from Dudley-Evans and Henderson 1993.) They also reflect the absence of an explicit codified system of scientific documentation. (Salager-Meyer 1999: 290)

Special kind of reportative constructions are markers of universal knowledge shared within the disciplinary community (Examples (10) and (11)). They convey evidences that can be placed on the most accessible point in Bermúdez's (2005) scale.

- (10) *Ahora bien, se reconoce también universalmente que toda la muchedumbre de células, contenidas en una planta pluricelular, proceden de la célula única, por que comenzó aquella (...)* (10-1878-ASEHN)

However, it is also universally recognized that the whole mass of cells contained in a multicellular plant are derived from the single cell from which it originated (...)

- (11) *Poseen las caléndulas, como se sabe, flores compuestas, que se cierran por la acción del sol (...)* (7-1861-MemoRAC)
 Calendula have, **as it is known**, composite flowers that close under the influence of the sun (...)

In the Examples (10) and (11) the information is presented as pertaining to the common disciplinary knowledge, and therefore specific sources are not provided. In the corpus, such constructions of shared knowledge are relatively uncommon (8% of all reportative constructions, 31 tokens) and are more frequent in articles from the corpus published between 1850 and 1900, which seems to reflect the relationships among the small disciplinary community from that period.

The non-shared reportative evidences (Figure 8) in the corpus are cases where the writer indicates that a source exists but decides to leave out any details of it. These non-specified, thus non-shared, reportative evidences are typically introduced by such constructions as: *según ciertos autores* ‘according to some authors’, *como han afirmado varios autores* ‘as several authors have claimed’, *pensaron algunos* ‘some (people) thought’, *algunos creen* ‘some (people) believe’, *se asegura* ‘it is claimed’, *se ha dicho* ‘it has been said’, *según dicen* ‘as they say’, etc.

Note that for reportative evidentiality such impersonal structures suggest lower accessibility, but they lead to rather accessible reading of visual or inferential evidentiality. In scientific discourse, the presence of precisely specified quotes and references prove that a piece of information belongs to the disciplinary (shared) knowledge.

5. Conclusions

I revisited concepts of *intersubjectivity* and *access* in evidentiality and focused on the (non)shared character of the evidences in scientific writing, arguing that the accessibility of evidences is one of the most prominent evidential dimensions in this type of discourse. In developing the classification of parameters for analysing access to the evidences, I considered some syntactic and formal criteria (personal marks, verb forms, etc.) as well as two layers of contextual criteria. First, the presence of evidences in the direct context (references, logical arguments as support for a conclusion, visual elements, description of methods and experiments, etc.). Second, the influence of the general context of scientific research during the study period. Combining both criteria was crucial for providing insight into the functioning of some specific constructions in the corpus, such as poorly specified references or allusions to common knowledge.

According to the results of the corpus analysis, the scientists from the period of study tended to select evidential constructions that rely on apparently shared,

accessible or universal sources (this was the case in 76% of evidential constructions analysed in this study). Among all types of evidences, the reportative were more likely to express shared sources (86%) than more direct evidential types (visual – 64%, inference₁ – 47%).

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Performing the self in illness narratives

The role of evidentiality

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Narrating the personal experience of a chronic illness poses the challenge of reflecting on epistemic states and sources of evidence that shape the person's past, present and future selves. To explore the role of evidentials in different illness stories, 32 unsolicited narratives of eating disorders (ED), 28 accounts of borderline personality disorder (BPD), and 29 testimonies of chronic fatigue syndrome (CFS) were selected from the Internet. The analysis revealed that, in ED narratives, the enactment of the self was realized via visual perception, and the body was construed as self. In BPD narratives, inner emotional states were adopted as the source of evidence, and the mood was defined as self. In CFS narratives, the evidence informing the self came from embodied perception, and sensations were understood as self. Evidentials, therefore, are genre-sensitive and develop particular discursive functions in different illness narratives.

Keywords: evidentiality, illness narratives, eating disorders, borderline personality disorder, chronic fatigue syndrome

1. Introduction

Narratives in recent years have acquired a more prominent role in the study of illness, as they represent the tools available to the sufferers to articulate their personal meanings of the experience (Bury 1988; Charmaz 1999; Kleinman 1988; Morse & Johnson 1991).¹ Throughout the narrative, individual storytellers make consequential decisions, such as how they present themselves, who else is represented, what relations are built and how they evolve over the course of the illness experience, as well as

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what events and actions are depicted in the story. Narrators also determine what the purpose of the story is and how and to whom their everyday life with the ailment is told (Good 1994; Riessman 2003; Vindrola-Padros & Johnson 2014). As a result, illness narratives invariably bring out the multifaceted personal and social meanings projected on the identifiable positionalities and discourses embedded within the telling (Mattingly, Lawlor & Jacobs-Huey 2002). By the very act of narrating, the identity created by the teller in relation with the illness is produced, enacted and put in place (Hydén 2010). "Telling a story is performing it, acting out a process of interpreting, constituting, and positioning one's experience" (Hydén & Brockmeier 2008: 6–7). Ultimately, the storytelling carries a performative force to play the self (Hydén 2010).

Narrative and self are, as a matter of fact, inseparable. As Ochs and Capps (1996) point out, through the use of narratives, we develop a new understanding of our selves to make sense of our personal experiences while, at the same time, the very articulation of our individual stories shapes and colors those insights and discernments. With every telling, the narrator and his/her audience deepen into the process of self-understanding. Constrained by the dimensions of time and space, however, narrators can only articulate partial selves, made of specific memories, roles and expectations (Munn 1992; Ochs & Capps 1996).

Given the potential of narratives to entertain a variety of versions of the self (a myriad of past, present and future selves, with different positionalities, social roles, emotions, goals, and states of knowledge), personal stories always reveal an evolving identity (Ochs & Capps 1996); that is, autobiographical accounts generate identities performatively materialized through the telling (Riessman 2003). Therefore, selves are not discrete entities, but fragmented realities in flux and with porous limits (Ochs & Capps 1996; see Cavanagh 2007; Lifton 1993). Our selves, continually in the making, are not necessarily the same across time and space, or even different versions of self do not cohere (Ochs & Capps 1996). Narrative activity bonds and realizes these different and unstable versions of the self into a unified entity, bringing to the fore a sense of consistency out of lived experiences.

When suffering from a chronic disease, however, previous patterns of living and performing in the world are no longer possible, and have to be relegated to the time prior to the illness. The self, socially built in relation to others, then feels lost: the old self-concept – that is, the structure of attributes about the self that has been cognitively consistent for some time – is now irrelevant as the evolution of the illness inevitably effaces former selves, lives and actions (Charmaz 1983). The person has to acquire new definitions of self that override many features of the pre-illness self-image (see Frank 1993). In the case of severe mental illness, the project of forging the discursive connections between the subject's situated, fluctuating and evolving selves complicates even further. The telling is drastically compromised by the disorder (Baldwin 2005; Gerhardt & Stinson 1994; Hydén 1995), and so are

opportunities to engage in the narrative enterprise. The sufferer's capacity to construct his/her own self and his/her relationships in coherent and significant ways is substantially transformed and, as a consequence, his/her personal account, that does no longer fit the standard conceptualizations of narrativity, is disqualified and dispossessed (Baldwin 2005).

Whether the person is living with a physical or a mental chronic condition, his/her autobiographical account is likely to be a "broken narrative". With this term, Hydén and Brockmeier (2008: 10) refer to the "problematic, precarious, and damaged narratives told by the people who in one way or another have trouble telling their stories, be it due to injury, disability, dementia, pain, grief, psychological or neurological trauma". Taking the concept of "broken narrative" as a starting point, the aim of the present study is to explore the construction of self through evidential strategies in three different online storied accounts: narratives of eating disorders (ED), narratives of borderline personality disorder (BPD), and narratives of chronic fatigue syndrome (CFS).

ED and BPD have been classified as psychiatric disorders and, hence, conferred the stigmatized status of *mental illnesses*, a label that marginalizes the person, setting him/her apart from those defined as "normal" (cf. Kvaale et al. 2013). EDs feature significant disturbances in eating behavior and weight regulation (*Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM)*, 5th ed.; American Psychiatric Association 2013). BPD, in turn, has been defined as a personality disorder (*DSM*, 5th ed., American Psychiatric Association 2013), characterized by instability in affect, interpersonal relationships, cognition, behavior, and self (Gunderson 2009; Gunderson & Links 2008; Lieb et al. 2004).² As for CFS (also known as *myalgic encephalomyelitis*), it constitutes an "idiopathic, long term, multi-faceted, potentially disabling and life-disrupting illness" (Drachler et al. 2009). Physicians tend to regard its causes as psychosomatic, rather than organic (Giles 2006) – a characterization that sufferers strongly reject (Horton-Salway 2001). As a result, the perceptions of the illness are often disqualified, evaluating them as the by-product of pure imagination or mental instability (Conrad & Baker 2010).

What these three conditions have in common is the gendered contested nature of the illness (Bülow 2004, 2008; Conrad & Barker 2010; Giles 2006),³ a social status that makes it difficult for narrators to produce and to enact a legitimate sick self in their stories. In addition to the struggle for legitimacy, the severity of ED, BPD

2. There are links between BPD and ED. The common psychiatric comorbidities of people affected with BPD are affective disorders, substance use disorders and eating disorders (Gunderson & Links 2008).

3. ED, BPD and CFS are mainly diagnosed in women (see, respectively, Giles 2006; Shaw & Proctor 2005; Åsbring & Närvänen 2002).

and CFS has a long lasting effect on the self-concept of the sufferer. Inevitably, the afflicted person confronts the challenge of narratively reflecting on the self and its different, and often conflicting, past, present and future versions. The evidential mechanisms with which ED, BPD and CFS narrators tentatively articulate and perform their precarious identities through the telling constitute the focus of the present study.

1.1 Evidentiality and construction of self in ED, BPD and CFS narratives

According to Charmaz (1983), the illness experience sets forth situations in which the person has to learn new definitions of the self, and is forced to relinquish and substitute self-descriptions that are no longer valid. To narrate this evolution, the sick person resorts to cultural frameworks defining illness and health, previous social experiences and general knowledge to elaborate on the meanings of his/her present condition and his/her future existence. Through introspection and insightful reflection, the individual participates in a mental dialogue with the new versions of the self that emerge from the illness event (Charmaz 1983). In fact, this autobiographical reflection is what, in Semerari et al.'s (2007: 111) words, turns narrative into a "form of reasoning that combines significant quantities of information and puts it into structures (stories) that a person can quickly draw on to solve identity problems" (cf. Bruner 1990). Illness narratives emerge, thus, as unique scenarios where the epistemic processes of understating new and old versions of the self through transformations and ruptures can be traced and examined. Living the illness means learning about one's self and one's identities.

A particularly useful dimension to study the rhetoric of self-making (Battaglia 1995) in illness narratives is linguistic evidentiality (Figueras in press). Evidentials afford the means to evaluate the sources of knowledge upon which the person draws his/her self-image. Stating the source of the information for the claims made about who the person was and who he/she has become facilitates the task of handling the perceptual, mental and emotional facets of the self that are often in contention when rationalizing the illness. The critical role of evidentiality in boosting the self-image reveals itself even clearer when considering that an illness is a perceptual phenomenon, rather than just a complex physiological condition (Didelot & Hollingsworth 2010). Given the variability of the perceptual factors, both the frequency and the manifestation of the illness can be modified according to the circumstances and so can be the selves we create to make sense of both the physiology and the psychology of the disorder.

Consistent with this view, the purpose of this study is to uncover the discursive workings of the self in the three illness narratives considered (ED, BPD and

CFS), showing the differences in the rhetorical self-making through the analysis and systematization of the evidential mechanisms informing the self. Each of these three disorders places a different strain on the construction and enactment of new versions of the self after the diagnosis, and on the reasoning operations to talk about the self. The question is how the sense of loss of identity and disruption of self in ED, BPD and CFS are discursively construed with linguistic mechanisms such as evidentiality, and how the person manages the sources of information to deal with new forms of self-knowledge. Since living the illness represents, in essence, a conscientious and concerted effort to rebuild self-knowledge, the deployment of evidential strategies in the narratives to define the self can be analyzed as an act of self-marking (see Butler 1990, 1995). Accordingly, the different kinds of evidential information devised in the narratives to fulfill the goal of self-definition can then be regarded as markers of the self (see Charmaz 2010). By identifying the patterns of evidentiality in ED, BPD and CFS narratives it is possible to uncover the interactive subtleties, argumentative practices and rhetorical moves that are part of the construction of the self in each of these three types of illness narratives.

2. Methodology

2.1 Sample

The sample for the present study was comprised of a total number of 89 non-solicited first-person online narratives written in Spanish. 32 were personal stories produced by people who claimed to experience or to have experienced an ED; 28 were accounts of living with BPD; and 29 were CFS narratives. The three subsamples were collected during the month of May of 2015 through a systematic Google search with the key words “testimonios/ experiencias/ narrativas de anorexia/ trastornos de la conducta alimentaria/ trastorno límite de personalidad/ síndrome de fatiga crónica”. The 89 narratives were gathered from treatment centers’ websites, personal blogs, websites run by associations of sufferers and their families, and public forums. The majority of narratives were produced during the course of the illness or when the person was still undergoing treatment, as the narrators themselves recognized in their texts.⁴

4. Considering the ethical issues in the use of personal narratives for research, for the present study all references to real names or identifying information, as well as the URL addresses and website names, have been erased, with the aim to protect the authors’ identity by ensuring their anonymity.

I decided to rely on online accounts, rather than on any other material gathered through more conventional and traditional ethnographic techniques, because I aimed to explore the rhetorical ways deployed by the narrators when sharing experiences with someone who had coped with similar vicissitudes of life. The need to communicate with other sufferers is a particularly important aspect in making sense of a contested illness (Bülow 2004), as is the case for the three conditions considered in this study. More often, the illness is problematic and troublesome to explain, particularly in situations of interaction with medical practitioners, because the person usually feels being questioned, mistrusted or delegitimized (Clarke & James 2003).

2.2 Procedure

The 89 narratives of the sample were initially read and reread to become acquainted with the data and to explore the similarities and differences in the three types of illness stories. In the second phase, the evidential strategies used in each narrative to talk about the self were highlighted. The third phase entailed the classification of the evidential markers of the self according to the fundamental dimensions and subdomains of evidentiality laid out in Bermúdez (2005). The fourth and final phase consisted in determining the patterns of evidentiality to produce the self that were characteristics of each type of illness narrative.

2.3 Analysis

The data were analyzed in the framework of discourse psychology (DP) (Edwards & Potter 2005; Wiggins & Potter 2008), a particular version of discourse analysis concerned with the ways in which discourse is action oriented. Discursive psychology draws upon social constructionism, with tenets from ethnography, discourse analysis and ethnomethodology (cf. Edwards & Potter 1993; Potter 1996; Potter & Wetherell 1987). The analytical focus is on the ways psychological issues and concepts are put to use in interactive, social, and cultural practices. From the DP standpoint, narratives are grounded in interaction, and so key psychological constructs, such as self and identity, can be explored within the ins and outs of discourse, and not as mental products that exist in the “outside” of the real talk. A discursive psychological approach, in summary, is concerned with the organization of discourse in its rhetorical and argumentative usages.

As applied to the study of how self and identity-claims are performed (and performative) in illness narratives, the DP approach affords the means to examine the contradictions and inconsistencies when discursively constructing the self as reflecting the narrators’ efforts “to work up identity claims that do appear as

complex, reportable, and authentic, and not too obvious, challengeable, or immature” (Bamberg 2005: 222). Thus, rather than mere manifestations of lack of narrative coherence, contradictory and/or contentious versions of the self set the path to illuminate the ways storytellers juggle their social identities in certain contexts (Bamberg 2004). The relevant question for the DP analyst working on the notion of selves and identities is how these entities are realized in discourse, how they are enacted and (re)produced, how they are drafted as projects always under revision, and what is the psychological business attended to by the participants in the interaction. In the particular case of the three illness narratives considered in this study, the analytic concern is to determine how the evidential dispositive is used to perform different illness identities within ED, BPD and CFS narratives.

3. Results

3.1 Self and evidentiality in ED narratives

According to the clinical literature, disturbances in cognitive, behavioral, and emotional elements of body image constitute core factors in the psychopathology of anorexia nervosa and bulimia nervosa (Cash & Deagle 1997). Rather than a pure perceptual aberration, the ED body-image disturbance seems to be linked to a cognitive-emotional distortion. Symptomatic individuals tend to allocate their attention more towards their self-identified ugly body parts than to their self-identified beautiful body parts (Jansen et al. 2005; Tuschen-Caffier et al. 2015), while underlying knowledge structures (schemas) guide the person to attend, memorize and interpret appearance stimuli in ways that serve to maintain the disorder (Treat et al. 2010; Vitousek & Hollon 1990; Williamson et al. 1999).

The subsample of ED narratives examined in the present study included many instances of personal testimonies produced by the sufferers when they were about to be discharged from the institutional setting where they had undergone treatment. By sharing their experiences, and consenting to publish their stories on the websites of those institutions, they aimed to provide a first hand, informed account of the illness and the transition toward recovery, that might help other sufferers and their families to bear hope and find a “cure” for the disorder. In this context, the ED narrative was framed within the explanatory model of the illness developed in the clinical setting, and, hence, the experience was construed reinterpreting the psychiatric definitions of the disorder with the sufferer’s own understandings of the experience. Accordingly, one of the clinical descriptors that became a key theme in the ED narratives was “distorted perception of the body”, as the author of (1) recounted in her tale:

- (1) Me miraba al espejo y podía ver cómo mis piernas y mis caderas se hinchaban, mi visión de mi cuerpo estaba completamente distorsionada. [*I looked at myself in the mirror and I could see my legs and my hips swelling, my vision of my body was totally distorted.*]

This fragment exemplifies the efforts commonly made by ED narrators to make sense of the body distortion symptomatology. In general, the illness was described by focusing on the experience of body image. The storyteller portrayed the meanings of the illness as the result of the defective functioning of the perceptual visual system (“mi visión de mi cuerpo estaba completamente distorsionada”), and not as the by-product of biased cognitive structures of knowledge (schemas) that directed the attentional and interpretative operations processing the appearance stimuli. Perceived as a direct visual stimuli, the image in the mirror could be emotionally appraised and evaluated (often resorting to terms with negative valence), as is exemplified in (2):

- (2) mi tío me mandó las fotos que nos había hecho y al ver mi cuerpo en bikini sentí rabia, asco, odio, vergüenza. Pensé “¿cómo se te ocurre enseñar eso, no tienes conciencia de lo gorda que estás?” [*my uncle sent me the pictures he had taken of us and when I saw my body in a bikini I felt rage, disgust, hate, shame. I thought “How dare you show that, don’t you realize how fat you are?”*]

The negative emotion associated with the perceptual self-image in passage (2) was discursively construed as the evidence that guided cognition and defined the self-concept: “al ver _[VISUAL PERCEPTION] mi cuerpo en bikini sentí _[EMOTION] rabia, asco, odio, vergüenza. Pensé _[COGNITION] “¿cómo se te ocurre enseñar eso, no tienes conciencia de lo gorda que estás?”. The structure of conceptions of the self elaborated during the course of the illness was, therefore, discursively defined, constrained and concretized in the ED narratives with the visually perceptible attributes of size and shape. The self created during the illness was, in essence, a perceptual self (Figueras in press).

With the therapeutic intervention, the person learned to conduct assessments of the self that were based on a new set of evidence sourced from systems other than visual perception. Vision was disqualified as “distorted” and so was the information obtained and processed in this cognitive domain. In spite of this reassessment, the perceptual distortion was still represented in the ED narratives as the symptom that, according to the sufferers, featured the disorder and dominated the illness experience. Consequently, the ED was often anthropomorphically construed as a player that fooled the afflicted person and was responsible for the disturbances in body image, and as the force that ultimately drove the negative emotions feeding the disorder, as the narrator of (3) acknowledged:

- (3) lo importante no es el cuerpo, es la visión que la enfermedad nos da de él y cómo nos sentimos dentro de nosotros. Nos engaña, no le escuchéis ni lo penséis, lo que vemos en el espejo es lo que quiere la enfermedad que veamos. [*What is important is not the body, but the vision that the illness gives of it and how we feel inside. It lies to us, don't listen to it, don't believe it, what we see in the mirror is what the illness wants for us to see.*]

The adoption of the clinical symptomatology when explaining the disorder implied that narrators embraced fundamental aspects of the external authoritative discourse on EDs and used the clinical narrative to shape and transform the self. By borrowing and endorsing the “pathological attributes” of the self during the illness, while at the same time struggling with those psychiatric descriptors when personalizing the experience, the narrator simultaneously internalized the rules and policies that medicalized the condition and resisted them (Foucault 1982). The discourses socially available to construct self-knowledge were taken by the subject and applied to create a certain truth about the self (Foucault 1997: 224–225). As a result, the technologies of the self devised in the ED narratives naturally situated body perceptual disturbances as the preferred identities reflecting the dominant discourse that policed those disorders.

From an epistemic perspective, ED narratives represented the sufferers’ attempts to reexamine the knowledge that had been structuring the self during the time of the illness in order to adapt the new knowledge, obtained via other sources, during the first stages of recovery. The challenge faced by the narrator was to reach and maintain a different epistemic state in which new aspects of the self were explored to requalify identity. The markers used during the illness to specify the self, such as size and shape, were then discredited and dispelled. This complex transition from the perceptual self to a new version of the self required a mandatory reassessment of the sources of information informing the self. Logically, one core issue addressed in the ED narratives was the reconsideration of perceptual information as the only valid source of information to define the self (Figueras in press).

In reality, visual perception operated in ED narratives as a vehicle to establish the continuity between the personal past, present and future. It also served the purpose of integrating contradictory information about the self into an overarching and consistent image of the sufferer that took into account ongoing social events (such as the therapeutic intervention). This discursive enterprise could be traced in ED narratives by exploring the propositional content introduced by the Spanish perception verb *ver* (‘to see’), a flexible polysemic lexical strategy to mark evidentiality. From its basic meaning of physical perception, *ver* displays a wide range of semantic extensions, developed according to the context.

Basically, the interpretation of *ver* is constrained by the object of perception; that is, by the complements. Therefore, and depending on the structure, *ver* indexes information as coming from different sources (perception, mental states, inference, and even indirect reference). ED narrators skillfully exploited the evidential meanings conveyed by *ver* to depict the transition from the self shaped with visual perceptual information during the illness to the new self, still in process, elaborated via inference and reasoning in the process of recovery. Both versions of the self, often in opposition, coexisted in many ED accounts, although varied in the weight and the level of agency that the narrator assigned to each one when narrating the experience. Thus, when the storyteller looked back into her past in search for the causes of the present condition, direct perception of body size and shape usually became the key factor in the onset of the illness and in its maintenance, as the examples in (4a–b) show:

- (4) a. a veces [...] incluso **me**_[DIRECT OBJECT] **veía**_[VERB] **más gorda**_[PREDICATIVE COMPLEMENT]
 aunque la báscula pusiera lo contrario. [*Sometimes [...] I even saw myself fatter although the scale indicated otherwise.*]
- b. Esto está siendo muy duro porque no paro de comer y cada día **me**_[DIRECT OBJECT] **veo**_[VERB] **más gorda**_[PREDICATIVE COMPLEMENT] [*This is getting too hard because I cannot stop eating and every day I see myself fatter*]

The construction *direct object* (Personal pronoun) + *ver* + *predicative complement* (Adjective Phrase) represents a pseudo-attributive construction, the result of the process of grammaticalization of the verb *ver* (Fernández 2012). With this syntactic pattern, the narrators in 4(a–b) discursively constructed the self as the property or set of properties (denoted by the adjective) that had been gathered through visual perception. The perceptual information, in the statements provided in (4a–b), arose from an internal mental state (images, dreams, desires, perceptual illusions, emotions, fantasies) and, hence, constituted direct endophoric evidence (Bermúdez 2005). The subject concretized the self as the direct representation gathered from visual perception, considered an undisputable source of factual evidence during the illness.

When the sufferer engaged in the project of recovery, he/she was forced to identify and to openly question the perceptions and cognitions that had been conforming the self when living with the ED. The therapeutic intervention demanded from the person to process and to accommodate new indirect evidence, mainly drawn from reasoning and inferring, that problematized the self that had been crafted with perceptual evidence. The dialectical tension between the perceptual self (the self created during the illness) and the new cognitive self (the self emerging in therapy), as well as the difficulties to harmonize and perform the sick and the recovering identity were discursively handled in the ED narratives by resorting

to one particular construction: *ver* modified by ambiguous or vague expressions, with undetermined reference, as direct object, such as in the examples in (5a–b):

- (5) a. Me preocupa mi salud pero como tampoco lo veo le quito importancia [*I am worried about my health but since I don't see it I think it is not important*]
 b. si tengo un problema primero me centro en ello para poder resolverlo y el físico pasa a segundo plano. Pero no es fácil y menos cuando estás completamente metida en el TCA porque entonces aunque intentes verlo no puedes. [*If I have a problem I focus first on the issue and I try to resolve it and the body is secondary. But it is not easy, particularly when you are completely into the ED because then, although you try to see it, you are not capable.*]

In (5a–b), *ver* is used to index indirect evidence, conveyed by the neutral pronoun *lo* ('it'). ED narrators resorted to this particular structure to insert a turn in the story: once the perceptual self had been introduced and its role in relation with the illness had been established, narrators usually reproduced the new indirect evidence, learned in recovery, that openly challenged the previous perceptual self. Sufferers questioned the validity, accuracy and reliability of these new cognitions to furnish a different version of the self. One way to express their uncertainty and ambivalence with regard to the new evidence challenging the perceptual self was by employing the unstable complement *lo* ('it'). The denotative and referential content of *lo* was undetermined and had to be inferentially enriched during the course of communication (Fernández 2012). The narrator, unable or unwilling to make explicit the inferential evidence marked by *ver*, introduced *lo* to avoid dealing discursively with the cognitions that would lead her to discard visual perceptual evidence as a reliable marker of the self. Therefore, and despite the attempts to appeal to new sources of indirect evidence, such as inference, the narrator still sought to pose direct perception as the privileged source of information to make sense of her selfhood.

One step further in the process of substituting the sick perceptual self for the recovering cognitive self was represented in the ED narratives with the construction *ver* + *direct object* (Finite Complementizer Clause), as exemplified in (6a–c):

- (6) a. vi [que me había engordado unos 4 kilos]_{FINITE COMPLEMENTIZER CLAUSE}
 [*I saw that I had put 4 kilos on*]
 b. cuando veía [que en la báscula bajaba sentía alegría]_{FINITE COMPLEMENTIZER CLAUSE}
 [*When I saw in the scale that my weight was down I felt happiness*]
 c. cuando veía [que adelgazaba me sentía muy alegre]_{FINITE COMPLEMENTIZER CLAUSE}
 [*When I saw that I was getting thinner I felt very happy*]

According to Bermúdez (2005), this particular construction is used to index indirect evidence, specifically inference, as a source of information. Its interpretation as indirect perception derives from the impossibility of reading the structure on the basis of physical perception alone (Rodríguez Espiñeira 2000). In the ED narratives, however, the meaning conveyed by the finite complementizer clause is generally a conclusion directly obtained from empirical observation, rather than one reached without any processing of visual information. This syntactic pattern, therefore, was exploited in the ED narratives to still maintain direct perceptual evidence as a reliable source of information for self-definition.

Finally, a cognitive self emerged in ED narratives by inserting structures with *ver* modified by a finite complementizer clause that conveyed a conclusion drawn independently from (visual) perception, such as in (7):

- (7) a. [Carta a mi cuerpo] ahora **veo** [que te he controlado porque había partes de mi vida que no controlaba]_{FINITE COMPLEMENTIZER CLAUSE} [Letter to my body] [now I see that I've controlled you because there were parts of my life I was not controlling]
- b. **ver** [que el cuerpo es simplemente la carcasa]_{FINITE COMPLEMENTIZER CLAUSE} Y [que si todos ponemos de nuestra parte podemos aceptar que la gente es como es]_{FINITE COMPLEMENTIZER CLAUSE} [to see that the body is just a shell and that if we do our best we can accept people for who they are]

Ver is followed, in the excerpts in (7a–b), by a finite complementizer clause carrying the meaning of inferential evidence. The inferred evidence made explicit in these passages has been obtained through a process of reasoning, and depicted as the end result of deduction and intellectual activity. In both (7a) and (7b), *ver* indexed indirect cognitive evidence, a new source of assumptions with which the narrator strategized the self that was in process of becoming during recovery.

The analysis of the evidential mechanisms informing the self in ED narratives revealed that the continuity between the self during the illness and the self in recovery was established on the basis of the transition from evaluative direct perception (expressed with pseudo-attributive structures like *direct object + ver + predicative complement*), to indirect perception (*ver + direct object (pronoun lo)* structures), to finally reach cognitive perception (*ver + direct object (finite complementizer)* structures). The transformation of the self from the illness toward recovery was built on the transition from what was presented as purely phenomenological or experiential to what was strictly marked as mental or cognitive.⁵ Indirect evidence (inference

5. As Shohet (2007) found in her linguistic analysis of ED accounts, in the struggling to recover, narrative explanatory models of the illness are regularly questioned, as well as the authenticity and accuracy of the subject's experiences. Therefore, the transition between the self created during the disorder and the self-to-be in recovery is not yet realized (Figueras in press).

and reasoning) was discursively constructed as the new source of information about the self and about the external world that was learned and used in recovery, as opposed to direct perception, reevaluated as unreal and unreliable, since it was driven by the disorder and led to distorted thinking (cf. Figueras in press).

3.2 Self and evidentiality in BPD narratives

According to the American Psychiatric Association, one of the diagnostic criteria for BPD is a “markedly impoverished, poorly developed, or unstable self-image, often associated with excessive self-criticism; chronic feelings of emptiness; dissociative states under stress” (*DSM*, 5th ed.). The problems of identity faced by the BPD sufferer are, basically, the lack of differentiated and integrated representations of self and others, the lack of long-term goals, a negative self-image, and the lack of a sense of continuity in self-perception over time (Fuchs 2007; Jørgensen 2006; Jørgensen et al. 2012; Wilkinson-Ryan & Westen 2000). Considering the self disturbances experienced by persons with BPD, the question posed to the present research was how evidentiality was managed in BPD narratives, and what evidential domains and strategies the authors deployed to construe their identities.⁶

The thematic analysis of our sample revealed that BPD sufferers tended to talk about themselves by listing their extreme behaviors, rather than describing who they were in terms of a set of stable traits about their personal attributes (that is, in terms of a self-concept). Past actions and feelings were not directly used to qualify or construct the self, and, hence, there was no continuity of personal past, present and future in BPD narratives, but only frequent shifts between different states of affect. The result was a rhetorical split of the self, or what Fuchs (2007: 381) qualifies as a temporal “fragmentation of the narrative self”. The temporal fragmentation occurred when the self was presented as completely identified with the momentary state of affects and emotions, and the person portrayed himself/herself as unable to take distance from the immediate and overwhelming present feelings, as was the case for the narrator in (8):

- (8) Ahora mismo **me siento fatal**, es un momento bajo. Solo tengo ganas de gritar, de patear y de llorar. Y ni siquiera sé el motivo. [*Right now I feel awful, it is a bad moment. I just want to scream, to make a fuss, and to cry. And I don't even know the reason.*]

6. The BPD narratives collected for the present study were published in public personal blogs and in an open forum of people affected by the disorder. Many of the authors recognized having been diagnosed with BPD.

The inability to integrate past and future in a concrete image of the present self was often construed in the BPD narratives by voicing an impervious feeling of chronic emptiness (Fuchs 2007), as well as a strong need for others to fill the inner void and to give structure to reality. The segment in (9) illustrates this rhetorical move:

- (9) *hablo o escribo demasiado y nadie quiere oírme, ni leerme, canso a todos. [...] Todo eso me hace sentir más vacía [I talk and I write too much and nobody wants to hear me, nor to read me. I wear everybody out. All of that makes me feel emptier]*

BPD narrators might adopt on occasions the clinical narrative of the disorder (e.g. Jørgensen 2006), as was the case in (10), when the teller framed the feeling of chronic emptiness as a defining pathological trait of the disorder:

- (10) *Algo que destaco sobre mi vivencia con el TLP, es el sentimiento de vacío crónico, uno de los rasgos de este trastorno. [Something I would like to stress about my experience with BPD is the feeling of chronic emptiness, one of the features of this disorder.]*

Thus, and similarly to ED sufferers, individuals with BPD often produced their stories embracing and internalizing parts of the medical discourse that labeled them as mental patients. Acknowledging the diagnosis, and endorsing the clinical symptoms of the disorder were mechanisms applied by the narrator to rationalize the experience. The explanatory model of the illness provided the meanings with which the self could be talked, defined, and made intelligible to oneself and to the audience. Without this framework, the narrator struggled with the uncertainties related to identity, to the point of posing explicit questions about who he/she was and manifesting his/her inability to resolve these identity issues, as shown in (11) and (12):

- (11) *Quién soy?, no lo se. [Who am I? I don't know.]*
 (12) *No sé quién soy, ni lo que siento, ni adónde se encaminan mis pasos. [I don't know who I am, what I feel, where I am going.]*

Narrators used to construe their lack of self-knowledge as the result of unexpected and inexplicable changes in the environment, without any apparent cause, as was reflected in (13); thus, the self was regularly depicted as unstable and fragile:

- (13) *¿Quién soy? Creí que lo sabía apenas hace un minuto. De repente, ya nada resulta familiar. Ya nada parece estar bien, ya nada parece estar SEGURO- nada parece estar como antes. [Who am I? I thought I knew it a minute ago. Suddenly, nothing is familiar any more. Nothing seems to be o.k., safe. Nothing seems to be like it was before.]*

In the excerpts in (11), (12) and (13), narrators staged what in the clinical field had been characterized as *identity diffusion*, a construct referred to the difficulties experienced by BPD individuals to provide a straight answer to identity questions, such as “who am I?” (Jørgensen 2006; Jørgensen et al. 2012). The subject has trouble integrating aspects of the self into a coherent and stable image of who he/she is.⁷ BPD narrators often construed the lack of self-definition as part of their own identity, and enacted self-diffusion by splitting identity between opposite versions of the self that were never combined nor reconciled in a whole image. This was the case for the person in (14), when defining herself at the same time as empowered and powerless:

- (14) En ocasiones rozo la brillantez y el absurdo, toco con los dedos cierta omnisciencia que me asusta, y a la que no escucho; y de pronto, soy el ser más pusilánime e inútil del mundo. [*Sometimes I am close to brilliance and absurdity, I touch with my fingers certain omniscience I don't listen to; and all of the sudden, I am the most timid and useless human being in the world.*]

Following Fuchs (2007: 382), splitting is the “tendency to regard and evaluate a present object or person in a one-sided and absolute manner, without any shadings or ambiguities, and separated from its context. All deviating aspects are neglected and split off”. As one of the narrators made clear in her story, “si pudiera definir mi forma de vida en tres palabras, estas serían: todo o nada” (*if I could define my life with three words, those would be: all or nothing*). Identical all-or-nothing dualism was articulated in the narratives when describing the emotions that ruled and overpowered the person’s present, momentary existence: only oppositional, confrontational affects were part of the self-description. Polarized emotions were, in fact, what for the author of (15) constituted her core inner self:

- (15) **vaivenes de sentimientos** que se alternan entre los dos polos, yendo del hielo al fuego y vuelta a empezar. ¿Cómo puede una estar tan convencida de una cosa, que se jugaría la vida misma y al poco tiempo estar totalmente convencida del sentimiento opuesto? [...] **Y sin embargo, no puedo evitarlo, no puedo y tampoco quiero en el fondo, no sé ser de otra manera, forma parte de mi identidad** [*fluctuations of feelings that alternate between two poles, from the ice to the fire and all over again. How can one be so convinced about something that I would risk my own life and at the same time to be convinced of the opposite feeling? However, I cannot help myself and I don't want to, I don't know how to be different, it is part of my identity*]

7. The phenomenon of identity diffusion can be related to the identity problems in late modernity (see Jørgensen 2006 for a complete explanation). The difference between the experiences of self-construction in BPD and non-BPD individuals lays in the inability of the borderline sufferer to assemble and integrate the multiple identities into a unitary self-narrative.

The emotional turmoil was described in metaphorical terms in (15), with perpetual “swings” between extreme feelings. Then the subject connected emotions with reasoning and inquired about the cause for thinking in such extreme ways. The question, however, remained open and unanswered, revealing that the narrator was not committed to reflect and take distance from her sentiments to build self-knowledge. This rhetorical construction of identity was, in fact, characteristic of BPD narratives. Thus, feelings and emotions, and not inference and reasoning (indirect inferred evidence), became the raw evidential materials to construe self and identity, as the author of (15) explicitly recognized when he/she claimed: “no sé ser de otra manera, forma parte de mi identidad”.

According to Deutsch (1965), people who suffer identity diffusion pick up signals from the outer world, and mold themselves and their behavior accordingly (high field dependency). Marcia (1980), subsequently, claims that people with insufficiently developed identities tend to substantially change their self-evaluations in response to external feedback. Some BPD narrators, however, challenged this clinical description by openly expressing their inability to interpret the information from the outside world, as the person clearly stated in (16):

- (16) Yo no puedo decir lo que pasa a mi alrededor, como tú. No, para mí no tiene sentido. Parte de esta foto, está pegada con parte de esa otra... ¿qué se supone que debo ver? ¿qué puedo saber de todos estos mensajes mezclados que vienen en este puzzle? Yo solo cojo parte. El resto no lo entiendo. [*I cannot tell what's going on around me, like you do. No, this does not make any sense to me. A piece of this picture is part of this other picture... What am I supposed to see? What can I know about all the mixed messages that come in this puzzle? I only get part of it. I don't understand the rest.*]

The narrator of (16) construed herself as someone who perceived reality differently from the imaginary non-BPD interlocutor (referred to with the pronoun *tú*, ‘you’), to whom she was explaining what it meant to feel and to live with BPD. The physical world was, therefore, introduced in the universe of discourse, and perception was qualified as a valid source of evidence. The problem arose, according to the narrator, when trying to extract meaning from the fragmented reality she perceived. With the rhetorical question “¿qué se supone que debo ver?”, the person faced the unmet challenge of combining the pieces of information gathered through the senses to make a coherent portrait (a “puzzle”, in the narrator’s own words). In contrast to the non-BPD person, the author of (16) portrayed herself as someone unable to draw inferences from direct perception. For her, visual evidence could not be transformed into cognitive evidence (as opposed to what ED narrators experienced).⁸

8. According to Jørgensen (2010), the BPD sufferer wrestles with autobiographical reasoning, the reflective thinking used to forge the connections between the self and one’s personal life.

Voicing the difficulties to concretize the self in the light of direct and indirect evidence from the outside world became part of the BPD narrator's political discourse about the illness. The vindication of the lack of knowledge about oneself and others came to represent a way of existing in the world, a discursive strategy to perform the BPD identity, as the narrator in (17) explicitly recognized:

- (17) Lo que es real, lo que es verdad, si pienso o no que puedo cuidar de mi misma, o lo que siento, o lo que está bien o lo que está mal, cambia de un minuto a otro, así, que **simplemente no lo sé. No me importa saber.** [*What is real, what is the truth, whether I believe or not that I can take care of myself, what I feel, what is right or wrong, it changes every minute, so I don't know. I don't care I don't know.*]

Compared to ED narrators, BPD experiencers offered a distinctive performance of the self. One revealing aspect to show this difference was how they reproduced the scene of the mirror to reflect on their sense of self. The person with BPD, unlike the ED sufferer, presented himself/herself as unable to offer a focused, unambiguous and clear image of the self. Whereas direct external information, gathered via perception, was essential to define the self during the acute phase of ED, it became meaningless for the person with BPD. As articulated in the excerpt in (18), the subject dissociated himself/herself from the image perceived in the mirror, not recognizing it as a reflection of his/her self, and expressing feelings of alienation:

- (18) Me miro en el espejo y no me reconozco, no sé qué ni quien soy, ni siento nada por la imagen que me devuelve, que me mira en la distancia. [*I look at myself in the mirror and I don't recognize myself. I don't know who I am. I have no feelings for the image that the mirror gives back to me, the image staring at me in the distance.*]

Many BPD sufferers rhetorically struggled with providing a concrete and focused definition of the self. Therefore, a sharp contrast emerged in the narratives examined for the present study between the enduring "essential self", built on visual perception, that was discursively articulated as in ED accounts, and the "missing or deserted self", recurrently depicted in the BPD narratives. Unable to rely on external sources of evidence to inform the self, and lacking the sense of a core essential self, BPD narrators accounted for the illness experience by exclusively focusing on internal mental states. Direct endophoric evidence, concretized in the domain of affects and emotions, was the material mobilized by BPD narrators to produce a contextualized self – a self that was not shaped by a set of stable, defining features. In the rhetoric of the self in BPD narratives, the verb *sentir* ('to feel'), as opposed to the verb *ver* ('to see'), commonly used in ED narratives, became the lexical item regularly used to index direct endophoric evidence, as exemplified in (19):

- (19) La tristeza [...] no se mide sumando y evaluando las cosas dramáticas que nos han pasado en la vida, sino en cómo las **sentimos** y, en mi caso, las **siento** mucho, **siento** una terrible desolación. [*Sadness is not measured by adding and evaluating the dramatic things that occur in our lives, but by how we feel them, personally, I feel them very much, I feel a devastating grief.*]

According to Fernández (2012: 396), *sentir* is a multimodal verb, since it conveys evidence coming from all of the sensorial and perceptual modalities (vision, hearing, touch, smell, and so forth). The sensorial perception, via the expression of a wide range of physiological phenomena (the sensation of heat, cold, pain, hunger, exhaustion, etc.), was, diachronically, the original, and most basic meaning of *sentir*. From the initial cognitive meaning of experience, *sentir* has evolved to carry a more subjective range of meanings, which includes the order of the abstract perception of emotions, that is, the sensations activated in the mental world of the subject (Fernández 2012), such as “the dramatic things that occur in our lives” and “a devastating grief”, mentioned in (19). Essentially, this more abstract emotional content, often introduced by the direct object modifying the verb *sentir*, was the endophoric evidence marking the self in BPD narratives. The direct object invariably denoted a negative emotion that the narrator tended to present as the result of her interoceptive sensitivity, as in (20a–b):

- (20) a. *siento* [**un dolor agudísimo de entumecimiento**]_{DIRECT OBJECT} *Sentir así* [**la ausencia de mí misma.**]_{DIRECT OBJECT}
 [*I feel a very sharp pain from numbness. I feel the absence of myself.*]
- b. Hay veces, muchas veces, en las q *siento* [**que tengo la piel del revés.**]_{DIRECT OBJECT}
 Es decir, [**q voy en carne viva por el mundo**]_{DIRECT OBJECT}
 [*There are many, many times, when I feel that I have my skin inside out. In other words, I am going through life in living flesh*]

With the direct object of *sentir* in both (20a–b), BPD narrators articulated an internal physical sensation in terms of embodied metaphors. The corporeal imagery served the purpose of providing further evidence for the intensity of the feelings experienced by the subject. Characteristically, BPD accounts constituted negative emotional valence narratives. Fear, anger and sadness, three of the most basic emotions (Zinck & Newen 2007), were the most recurrent sentiments reproduced in the narratives (see Dammann et al. 2011), as is reflected in the excerpts in (21a–d):⁹

9. Actually, negative affectivity, characterized by anxiousness, emotional lability, separation insecurity and depressivity are diagnostic features of BPD, according to the American Psychiatric Association (DSM, 5th ed., 2013).

- (21) a. Miento, hay **miedo, dolor, y un asco** infinito. [*I am lying. There is fear, pain, and endless disgust.*]
 b. **Dolor...** [...] **todo me afecta, todo me enfada, todo me entristece, todo me deprime.** [*Pain... I feel anger towards everything, I feel sadness for everything, I always feel depressed.*]
 c. **Me duele y me duele y me duele.** [*It hurts, and it hurts, and it hurts*]
 d. Yo no elegí que esto **doliese** tanto. Yo estoy al margen de **este dolor, esta rabia y esta tristeza** [*I didn't choose that it hurt so much. I am at the edge of this pain, this anger, and this sadness*]

Similarly as with *ver*, *sentir* appeared in the BPD narratives in the syntactic construction *direct object*_(Personal pronoun) + verb + *predicative complement*_(Adjective Phrase), as illustrated in (22):

- (22) [**me**]_{DIRECT OBJECT} [**siento**] [**solo**]_{PREDICATIVE COMPLEMENT} Terriblemente solo... abandonado, incomprendido, sin esperanzas, fracasado. [*I feel lonely. Terribly lonely... abandoned, not understood, hopeless, a loser.*]

In this construction, *sentir* has lost its full meaning and it functions as a pseudo-attributive verb, a mere link between the subject and the attributed quality (Fernández 2012). BPD narrators regularly deployed this structure to construe emotions as the mental states around which they revolved to produce contextualized interpretations of the self. Self-image, hence, was depicted as circumstantial and highly dependent on the emotional mood with which the person was experiencing reality at any present moment. Momentary and transitory internal perceptions thus became the defining features of the narrative self.

When cognitions were introduced in the account, BPD narrators resorted to the construction *sentir* + *finite complementizer clause*, to express an epistemic evaluation (Fernández 2012: 429). In this particular context, *sentir* could be intellectually interpreted as 'to know', or 'to believe', as was the case for the excerpts in (23a–c):

- (23) a. **siento** [que perdería una parte de mí...] _{FINITE COMPLEMENTIZER CLAUSE} [*I feel I would lose part of myself...*]
 b. **sentir** [que no perteneces a ningún lado, que nadie te comprende] _{FINITE COMPLEMENTIZER CLAUSE} [*to feel that you don't belong anywhere, that nobody understands you*]
 c. **siento** [que cada día que pasa es peor] _{FINITE COMPLEMENTIZER CLAUSE} [*I feel that everyday is worse*]

The finite complementizer clauses in (23a–c) described cognitive perceptions representing inferred evidence and forms of knowledge not based on direct embodied experiences (Fernández 2012). As these examples illustrate, the form of self-knowledge

for BPD narrators was the conceptualization of basic emotions. More generally, BPD narrators opted to talk about the day-by-day, minute-by-minute state of their emotional life as a way to perform the self, rather than to adopt an epistemic positioning from which they could reflect on who they were, who they had been, and who they aspired to be (a scheme often developed in ED narratives). Consequently, there was no narrative of self-development. Since the self was never essentialized, there was no place in the BPD narratives for an autobiographical evolution. The present self-concept was missing, and so were past and future versions of the self. The only way for the self to be represented was by proxy, through the expression of negative valence emotions. The result was a peculiar atemporal style of telling the experience of living with BPD, the permanent present tense, a common deictic frame for all the narratives examined in this section.¹⁰

3.3 Self and evidentiality in CFS narratives

CFS is a severe debilitating condition with a sudden onset marked by the appearance of inexplicable symptoms. The unexpected presence of the illness drastically alters the sense of inner continuity and coherence of one's life. In this context, the disease is naturally construed and understood as an external event that intrusively has taken its own place in the person's life (Bury 1982), and triggers a process of identity disruption (Åsbring 2001). Due to the contested nature of the condition (Åsbring & Närvänen 2002; Guise et al. 2007), CFS sufferers, in contrast to other chronic patients, initially reject their former, pre-illness fully functional selves, and establish new selves over time (Clarke & James 2003). When there are no legitimizing discourses available, people devise new identities, or, in Clarke and James' (2003) terms, a "radicalized self". Rather than the desire of returning to a former self, people with CFS reject and distance themselves from the values defining the pre-illness self (Whitehead 2006a). The new self reinvented during the illness is made out of the realistic evaluation of what can be achieved at the individual level.¹¹

To understand the structure of selves in the sample of CFS narratives for the present study, it is relevant to consider the virtual environment in which these accounts were produced. The majority of the personal CFS stories were posted on an Internet forum of people afflicted with this condition. Many of the sufferers were in the acute and medium term phases of the illness, and they felt and expressed

10. As Adler et al. (2012) concluded, individuals with BPD exhibit a recognizable pattern of narrative temporal disruption, consistent with the difficulty to create a "coherent 'self-narrative' that weaves together past, present, and future" (Bradley & Westen 2005: 937). See, also, Jørgensen et al. (2012) for the construction of identity in BPD autobiographical narratives.

11. Not every CFS sufferer, however, develops this kind of self-identity (Whitehead 2006a).

the need to share with others information about the symptoms and their encounters with medical professionals. With regard to the different stages of the CFS, Whitehead (2006b) observes that people usually adopt “the traditional sick role” in the acute phase, while in the medium term they experience “movement between disability as part of the total self, total debility, and/or the adoption of a supernormal identity”. A more “positive reconstruction of self” is attained in the long-term phase of the illness (Whitehead 2006b: 1023).

For the CFS narrators, the onset of the illness induced, on the one hand, the process of losing their former self, capable of full body functioning, and, on the other, the project of replacing the old pre-illness self with a different identity. The new self that arose from CFS was described as one who experienced unusual and debilitating bodily physical sensations (see Hart & Grace 2000). Confronted with this unfamiliar set of embodied perceptions, the sufferer tried to fit this new evidence into a comprehensive explanatory model of the symptoms. Over time, and to cope with the illness, the CFS sufferer discursively projected an alternative sense of the normal (Clarke & James 2003). This was the case, for instance, for the author of (24):

- (24) Estoy cansaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaada. Por suerte tengo pocos pero buenos amigos, una familia muy contenedora y un novio con el cual estoy hace tres años..... pero por otro lado a veces siento que todo esto no termina, y a pesar de que estoy mucho, muchísimo mejor que antes, no puedo evitar frustrarme, no sé por qué pero también siento como si yo fuera culpable de lo que me pasa... pero se que estoy llevándolo bien, hago cosas que me gustan, mi vida no pasa completamente por la enfermedad, intento estar bien predispuesta con energía positiva. [*I am tired. Luckily I have a few good friends, a family and a boyfriend of three years... but, on the other hand, I sometimes feel that this is endless, and although I am better, much better than before, I cannot help but feel frustrated, I don't know why but I also feel guilty for my condition... but I know I am doing well, I do things I enjoy, my life is not dominated by my illness, I try to maintain a good attitude with positive energy.*]

In (24), the narrator invoked certain markers of the self (Charmaz 2010), such as having good friends, a supportive family, and a boyfriend, to devise an identity still connected to the former pre-illness fully functional self. Thus, one set of markers referred to the interpersonal aspects of the former self. However, these positive facets of the current self were counterbalanced with the negative valence emotions that shaped the CFS experience, such as frustration (“no puedo evitar frustrarme”) and blame (“siento como si yo fuera culpable de lo que me pasa”). In spite of these setbacks, the overall evaluation was somehow positive, since the person remained functional at some more general and unspecified level, such as doing the “things” she enjoyed, or trying to distill more “positive energy”.

To fully grasp the effort made by the narrator in (24) to construe a new self with the markers that measured her physical and social functioning, her personal account should be contextualized in a wider discussion about the social meanings of illness and health; and, more specifically, in relation to the question of illness legitimacy. The CFS narratives in our sample were created in a context of delegitimation, and, because of that, the authors often dealt with the questioned credibility of their condition by alluding to, and by disputing the inferences that others drew about them and their condition. These inferences were basically of two kinds: either the person was committing malingering, or her symptomatology was qualified as merely psychosomatic and, hence, not real (see Banks & Prior 2001; Horton-Salway 2001). These two inferences and the associated attitudes of doubt regarding the genuineness of CFS dramatically altered the ways in which the narrator performed his/her identity work.

To deal with delegitimation, CFS narrators often reproduced in their stories the negative views and assumptions held by family members and acquaintances about their health status, and they proceeded to disqualify this reported evidence by evaluating it as inaccurate or wrong. Indirect reported evidence was, thus, introduced with an echoic use (Wilson & Sperber 2012) in the narratives, with the aim to discredit others' opinions and remarks, and to discursively construe a more credible self-image. In (25), for instance, the CFS sufferer employed the impersonal structure with *se* to mark the statement “esta enfermedad se confunde con facilidad con vagancia” as evidence from public knowledge (Hart 2011) – that is, as indirect reported evidence coming from “communal epistemic background” (Bednarek 2006: 640). Then, the narrator framed this common accusation of being “lazy” (a social stigmatized label) as a wrong attribution to explain the limitations and disabling effects of CFS:

- (25) Esta enfermedad **se confunde** con facilidad con vagancia, incluso aunque la persona afectada nunca haya sido considerada como vaga [*This illness is often mistaken by laziness, even if the afflicted person has never been viewed as lazy*]

Indirect reported evidence was also deployed in the narratives to account for the encounters between the sufferer and members of the medical profession. CFS narrators typically reported interactions with medical practitioners in which their altered self-perceptions were regarded with skepticism and dissension (see Travers & Lawler 2008). These interactions, as Whitehead (2006a) remarks, are often highly political in nature, since the way the CFS patient explains and discursively manages his/her symptoms is in conflict with how they are understood and defined in the clinical arena. In CFS narratives, the reproduction of the doctor-patient interactions constituted indirect reported evidence. As exemplified in (26), this kind of evidence (transmitted as reported speech) was generally used by the narrator to position his/her self *vis-a-vis* the socially medical sanctioned version of the ill person, and to

epistemically distance himself/herself from the delegitimizing medical assessment of “psychosomatic symptoms”:

- (26) Lo increíble es que un medico de medicina interna de la teknon [...] **me decía que** todo esto eran sintomas psicomaticos y que me fuera al psiquiatra. [*It is incredible that an internal medicine doctor at the Teknon clinic used to tell me that these were psychosomatic symptoms and to see a psychiatrist.*]

In addition, CFS narratives often contained the convoluted tale of all of the medical encounters faced by the person until he/she reached the final (and satisfactory) diagnosis of CFS (see Huibers & Wessely 2006). The search for a diagnosis represents, as Whitehead (2006b) argues, an “important element in identity reconstruction in the medium term identity” (Whitehead 2006b). Indeed, in those cases in which the narrator had received the official CFS diagnosis, he/she regularly initiated the story self-presenting with the CFS label, such as in (27):

- (27) Me presento, tengo 52 años y vivo en Barcelona. **Estoy diagnosticada de SFC desde Febrero por el Dr. Fndez-Solá.** [*I introduce myself, I am 52 years old and I live in Barcelona. I have been diagnosed with CFS since February by Dr. Fernández Solá.*]

The diagnostic label was used by the narrator in (27) to frame the whole story, since the tale that followed was construed in reference to the explanatory model of the illness: the subjective perceptions and sensations (fatigue, for instance) were portrayed as characteristic symptoms of CFS and the narrative was focused on the search for an effective treatment. The indirect evidence that the diagnosis represented elevated the person’s experience from a questionable, doubtful and maybe imaginary psychosomatic condition to a socially reputable medical pathology with a specific denomination and a recognizable clinical status.

In spite of the diagnosis, CFS narrators usually dealt in their personal stories with the impossibility of verifying the illnesses using any objective measure (or evidence in the form of proof, cf. Hart 2011), as the narrator in (28) acknowledged:

- (28) He perdido la cuenta de cuantos doctores he visitado y cuantos exámenes me he hecho, y siempre lo mismo, no muestran nada [*I lost track of all the doctors I’ve seen and all the tests I’ve had. Every time it is the same, the tests don’t show anything*]

Confronted with this reality, CFS narrators proceeded to contest the absence of undisputable empirical evidence that proved the authenticity of his/her health condition. Without the possibility of fitting the experience within the typical explanatory framework of a legitimate illness, patients’ own observations became the source of the evidence deployed in their accounts to validate the (sick) self (see Walker

2012). One way to manage the questioned nature of the narrator's health condition consisted of offering a detailed description of perceptions and sensations as direct physical perceptual sensory evidence of the illness. These representations generally included descriptions of physical sensibilities (to heat, to cold, to smells, and so forth), as represented in (29); perceptions associated to a specific body condition (30); and indefinite generalized body or mental sensations, such as pain, tiredness, lack of concentration, often explained with hypothetical comparative structures to communicate the sensation with the maximum precision (31):

- (29) Recuerdo perfectamente el día que desarrolle **las sensibilidades**, estaba tirado en la cama revolviendome de los **dolores** y de la fatiga y la paranoia que ello te crea en la cabeza, tenía una **sensación** de tener los musculos completamente abiertos (aunque las pruebas no reflejaran nada) y de repente es como que el cuerpo entero **se me hipersensibilizo y notaba** todo lo que había a mi alrededor [I remember the day I developed these sensations perfectly well, I was lying in bed, feeling a lot of pain and fatigue and the paranoia of these feelings in my head, I got the sensation of my muscles completely open (although the test did not record anything) and suddenly it was like my whole body became hypersensitive and I was feeling everything that happened around me]
- (30) Empezaron a darme **pinchazos** ambos muslos y digamos que se me extendió a ambas piernas. A lo largo de todo este tiempo había tenido [...] **molestias de garganta..**
[I started noticing pricks in both thighs and, let's say, I felt the pricks in both legs. In all this time I'd had [...] a sore throat]
- (31) **Estos dolores** consisten en la **sensación** de tener la cabeza oprimida, embotada, [como si hubiera aire]_{COMPARATIVE STRUCTURE}, [como si mi mente estuviera realmente agotada o exhausta por no dormir]_{COMPARATIVE STRUCTURE} Cuando me siento así, concentrarme me cuesta, es [como si mi mente desconectara o quisiera evadirse]_{COMPARATIVE STRUCTURE}
[These pains are the sensation of a compressed head, dull, like there was air inside, like my mind was truly exhausted or worn out because of sleep deprivation. When I feel like this, it is very hard for me to concentrate, it is like my mind becomes disconnected or wishes to escape.]

All the symptoms featuring the debilitating condition belonged to the domain of the bodily, direct physical perception, and were conveyed applying the vocabulary associated with that semantic network: *sentir* ('to feel'), *sensación* ('sensation'), *molestias* ('discomforts'), *síntomas* ('symptoms'). The sensorial content introduced by these lexical items was fundamentally of interoceptive and proprioceptive perception (see Fernández 2012). Thus, the subject's sensitive consciousness was instituted as the source of evidence in CFS narratives, and direct physical perception of a wide

range of physiological phenomena was used to perform the self. All the subjective sensations and embodied perceptions were presented and discursively produced as prototypical of CFS, a strategy applied by the narrators to reinforce their credibility in the forum.

These rhetorical strategies revealed the struggle that CFS narrators endured to balance the articulation of the sick self against the background of cultural definitions of what a legitimate illness was. Ultimately, CFS narratives reflected CFS sufferers' reactions to their personal worth when their health status was socially questioned (cf. Edwards & Potter 1993). To be regarded as worthy, CFS narrators linked what they were experiencing to what was culturally considered appropriate or "normal" (Radley & Billig 1996). Specifically, CFS sufferers strove to fit their subjective perceptions into the medical master storyline of illness (see Ochs & Capps 1996) by providing the reader with a detailed and thorough list of symptoms, such as in (32):

- (32) Febrícula casi a diario, fatiga extrema, sensación gripal continua, síncope vasovagales por intolerancia ortostática, poliaquiuria (tener que miccionar muchísimas veces al día), sudoración nocturna extrema (tener que cambiarme hasta 5 veces por la noche de ropa debido a la cantidad), disnea, astenia, extrasístoles, intolerancia a olores (y, en picos de enfermedad a luz y sonidos), síntomas gastrointestinales (alternando diarreas y estreñimiento), manos congeladas y, en muchas ocasiones sudorosas, dolor diseminado, especialmente en el lado izquierdo del tórax (por lo que acudo a un cardiólogo que tras ECG y eco, descarta patología), en los epicondilos, rodillas, dolores de cabeza frecuentes, ganglios inflamados (especialmente en pecho y nuca), alteraciones muy importantes del sueño con pesadillas, sueños vívidos, despertares, mal descanso, pérdida de 15 kg de peso, graves problemas cognitivos (pasar de estudiar en inglés, a casi no entender ni lo que leo en castellano, intercalación de letras al escribir, olvidar lo que se va decir o en lo que se está pensando), etc... [*Low-grade fever almost daily, extreme fatigue, continual flu symptoms, lightheadedness with postural change, polyuria (urinating multiple times daily), extreme night sweats (changing night clothes at least five times), dyspnea, asthenia, extrasystoles, intolerance to smells (and at the height of the disease to light and sound), gastrointestinal symptoms (alternating diarrhea and constipation), cold hands and often sweating, systemic pain especially in the left thorax (for which I went to see a cardiologist and after EKG and echocardiogram, no pathology), in the epicondyles, knees, frequent headaches, inflamed lymph nodes (especially in the chest and the neck), important sleep alterations with nightmares, vivid dreams, restlessness, poor rest, the loss of 15 kilos, serious cognitive problems (going from studying in English to not even being able to read in Spanish, interpositioning letters while writing, forgetting what I was going to say or of what I was thinking), etc...*]

With the deployment of clinical terminology in (32), which echoed a medical-like descriptor of illness, the narrator sought to strategically attribute legitimacy to the personal account (disputing malingering). In addition, he made available to the audience an itemized record of symptoms with the aim of rhetorically presenting as objective evidence of the illness what in reality was his personal psychological experience. With these mechanisms, the narrator aligned his discourse to the medical meta-narrative of the illness available in the Western culture (Carless 2008) and he did so by producing a discourse that reproduced some of the categories and meanings of that cultural narrative (see McLeod 1997). From this perspective, the medical terminology, as used in (32), contextually played the role of indirect reported evidence to substantiate and to perform the role of the sick self. Deploying indirect evidence in that way, the narrator accounted for himself in a way that overrode the concerns of value and morality that questioned his true identity as a sufferer (cf. Radley & Billig 1996).

The descriptions of symptoms, as illustrated in (32), functioned, thus, as rhetorical “warrants”, “concerns with blame”, or “efforts at legitimation” (Radley & Billig 1996). Since the symptoms stood as illness warrants, a tale of sensations and changes in bodily function was the narrative display of the illness. Such tales, in fact, could be seen as an enactment of the sick self through the body (see Radley & Billig 1996). In that sense, the direct perceptual evidence introduced in CFS narratives was close to what Shotter (1981) called ‘avowals’, or exemplifications of a way of being. Unlike reports, avowals cannot be proved true or false, but rather sincere or insincere. The struggle for legitimacy in CFS narratives was, in fact, a discursive strategy to enact a convincing performance of the sick self. The main sources of evidence that informed the CFS self were, in sum, direct perceptual evidence (mainly interoception), together with indirect reported evidence disputing or confirming the legitimate status of the illness.

4. Discussion and concluding remarks

The aim of the present study was to examine how the evidential dispositive was deployed in three different illness stories to perform the self. The analysis revealed that ED, BPD and CFS narrators resorted to illness-specific sources of information to discursively construct the self. The kind of evidence mobilized in each type of illness narrative (direct perceptual, endophoric, indirect reported, indirect inferred) ultimately operated as a marker of the self, that is, as an indication of the properties defining the self contextually created with the telling.

In ED stories, direct visual perception was construed as the main source of information to produce and to problematize the self, both in the pre-treatment phase

and in the first stages of the recovery process. In ED narratives, the body, metaphorically understood as self, was concretized and materialized with the physical visual properties of shape and size. The perception of these properties during the illness, and the reassessment of this perception as an inaccurate marker of the self during recovery constituted the core meaning of many ED stories.

In BPD narratives, in turn, inner emotional states (direct euphoric evidence) became the source of the information to talk about the self. The basic recurrent metaphor in these narratives was *mood as self*. Since the emotional states were lived as transient and variable, the person struggled to provide a self-description built on a set of stable traits and features (a self-concept). Besides, the exclusive focus on the emotional dimension allowed the narrator to qualify the information gathered from direct perception and from indirect reported evidence (claims, reports and assessments made by others) as foreign and strange to the self.

As for CFS narratives, bodily perceptions and sensations (direct perceptual evidence) became the source to concretize and materialize the self. In our sample of CFS stories, identity was understood in terms of sensations and physical perceptions of a sick self. The key metaphor capturing the core meaning of the illness experience was *sensations as self*. Indirect reported evidence was politically used by CFS narrators to dispute and to question the stigma associated with the illness, distancing the sufferer from the opinions of medical professionals, family members and close friends who systematically denied the legitimacy of his/her condition. The sick self was, then, defined in opposition to others' images of the CFS narrator.

None of these three illness stories followed the script of a restitution narrative (Frank 1995), the culturally preferred and most common type of narrative. In a restitution narrative, the movement is always away from the illness to return to the healthy pre-illness state, once the person has undergone the socially sanctioned treatment. Restitution narratives are not self-stories, in the sense that they "bear witness not to the struggles of the self but to the expertise of others"; the ones in charge of providing the care and the cure (Frank 1995: 92). They are stories narrated *by* a self, but they are not *about* that self, as opposed to the narratives examined in the present study, in which illness is represented as an impossible moral choice to meet the prior self (Frank 1995).

ED and CFS stories in our sample started with a restitution narrative, but quickly evolved to quest narratives. BPD accounts, instead, constituted chaos narratives.¹² In Frank's (1995) classification of illness narratives, quest entails the search of a new self that results from the experience of having suffered, whereas chaos depicts the sufferer's inability to reflect and make sense of the illness, and to give any defining

12. As Frank (1995: 76) acknowledges, "all three narratives types are told, alternatively and repeatedly".

meaning to the self. In quest stories, the ill person is afforded the voice to tell his/her own story (Frank 1993). The illness experience is produced as a journey that transforms selfhood. Alternatively, in chaos narratives the self is not in control. The stories reveal “vulnerability, futility and impotence” (Frank 1995: 97). As the opposite of restitution, chaos never contemplates getting better. Illness is not transitory but permanent, a state of being in the world. No process of self-transformation is made part of the story, and, therefore, there is not a new self that comes into existence from the illness ordeal (Frank 1993).

For ED and CFS narrators in our sample, illness became a powerful medium for the expression of self-transformation and self-achievement. A radical new self, still in the process of becoming (see Frank 1993), emerged in those personal stories. In ED narratives, the new self had features of the self previous to the illness, but acquired new insights and knowledge obtained via therapeutic intervention. Visual perception was construed as the bridge connecting the sick self and the recovering self. However, the focus of the visual perception evolved in ED narratives from the body as self to the mind as self; that is, from the perceptual self during the illness to the cognitive self developed in recovery. In recounting their stories, ED sufferers assumed the moral responsibility of self-transformation, a characteristic feature of the quest storyline. To gain access to new version of the self, ED narrators reassessed the sources of evidence, drawing a transition from visual perception to cognition.

CFS narrators shared with ED narrators the realization that restitution was no longer possible, since the condition had become a disabling, debilitating illness with deleterious functional consequences in their daily lives. For the narrators who believed they were suffering from CFS, but who had not yet received an official diagnosis, the personal accounts combined traits of the restitution and the chaos narratives (cf. Whitehead 2006a). The struggle to obtain the medical recognition of their condition, combined with the feeling of being lost in limbo in the medical system, threw the undiagnosed person into a chaos narrative filled with the description of severe, confusing and inexplicable physical sensations and perceptions. These patients were in the quest of the “sick self” by legitimizing the physical symptoms. For those already diagnosed with CFS, acceptance of the condition and renegotiation of a new identity in harmony with the new physical limitations became part of the narrative plot. Legitimized CFS sufferers developed a new version of the self on the basis of new perceptions and sensations that shaped and defined who they were and how they acted in the external world. They created a new version of the self that was shaped by the processes of sensing the body and embodying its physical perceptions.

BPD narrators articulated a different representation of the self in their accounts. As in ED and CFS narratives, BPD narratives were self-stories, but the suffering was too unbearable for a self to be told (Frank 1995). Therefore, the teller’s voice

got lost into chaos, resulting in more chaos because of that loss (Frank 1995). BPD narratives reproduced an inner world of constant emotional turmoil; swinging affective states were lived and felt in permanent opposition. Descriptions of extreme emotions experienced without sequence or discernible causality, and no narrative order, were deployed in the BPD narratives as the raw material to build the self. There was no reflective past and no anticipated future, but only an anti-narrative atemporal present in which the self was enacted as embodied feelings. Rather than stories about the self, BPD accounts were meant to be non-self-stories (Frank 1995).

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Evidentiality, deonticity and intensification in Internet forum language

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We analyze the Spanish verbal periphrases *tienes que* + infinitive and *debes* + infinitive [*you have to* + infinitive and *you should* + infinitive], with a deontic meaning, in an Internet forum. These verbal forms are used to give advice to other Internet users. After analyzing their functions, we reached the conclusion that such periphrases, with deontic value, function as epistemic modals: on the part of the speaker, they imply an axiological evaluation of his or her advice in terms of it being essential and necessary. Its evidential value (in the sense of information validation rather than as a source) derives from two factors. From a pragmatic inference: when a speaker expresses a high degree of certainty, to the extent of presenting an act as a requirement or obligation, he or she must have compelling evidence in order to believe that. And from an argumentative strategy: in order to justify their exhortations, the speakers draw on their personal experience and present themselves as witnesses who guarantee the validity of their recommendations.

Keywords: evidentiality, deontic modality, intensification, internet genres

1. Introduction

Numerous studies have served to highlight the interrelationships between epistemic modality, evidentiality, and intensification (Cornillie 2009; González 2014, 2015; Miche 2014, 2015; Torrent 2015). However, studies of the interrelationships between deontic modality, evidentiality, and intensification¹ are far fewer.² This

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2. I have recently become aware of a thesis on deontic modality by Thegel (2017a) – presented at Uppsala University – and of an article by the same author entitled *Intersubjective strategies in*

article therefore aims to analyze these relationships within a particular discursive genre: an Internet forum where personal stories about diet-free weight loss are shared. As a discursive genre, the public Internet forum presented itself as a favorable environment within which to examine evidentiality and its related categories, since it constitutes an exchange of opinions and experiences between people who in general do not know each other; the question of *legitimacy* and *credibility* of opinions therefore assumes great importance in this exchange.

This article specifically analyzes the Spanish deontic modal periphrases in the second person singular *tienes que* + infinitive and *debes* + infinitive [*you have to* + infinitive and *you should* + infinitive] to examine the interaction between evidentiality, modality, and intensification. We concentrate on the relationships established between these three categories and discuss the function of these deontic modal periphrases within the above-mentioned discursive genre.

Interest in these deontic expressions (*tienes que* + infinitive and *debes* + infinitive [*you have to* + infinitive and *you should* + infinitive]) arises from the fact that many forum writers urge readers to adhere to their advice (or knowledge) as a necessity (or requirement). We posed the question of what this implies as a communicative attitude, both at the evidential and modal levels. We began with the hypothesis that the deontic modality confers force (i.e., intensifies) the act of recommending (or advising) to the extent that the recommendation is presented as an absolute necessity, in addition to expressing a high degree of certainty on the part of the speaker concerning the recommended action. Its evidential value derives from that deontic intensification and from the marking of the type and source of evidence (Cornillie *et al.* 2015): the speaker says that he or she has personally experienced what he or she recommends. Our focus is discursive insofar as it takes into account the parameters of the context within which these periphrases have been used.

2. Work methodology and preliminary considerations concerning the corpus data

Our study essentially takes a corpus data-driven approach. Qualitative analysis of the verbal periphrases that constitute the object of this study leads to a reflection on how the different theoretical notions defined further below (point 3) relate to each other within a specific genre (the Internet forum).

Seven examples of verbal periphrases have been selected from contributions made to a forum on the Spanish version of the *Yahoo! 2* messaging platform in 2015.

deontic modality: evidential functions of Spanish deber 'must'. <http://www.journals.vu.lt/kalbotyra/article/viewFile/10375/8320>. Much of the improvement to this article is due to those two works, which have been a source of inspiration.

The topic of this discussion forum was diet-free weight loss. This forum was found in the *Yahoo!* web portal under the heading “beauty and style” and then the “body care” sub-category thereof. The initial question that opened the discussion was the following:³ “*I want to lose weight but I’m incapable of dieting. Can someone please tell me what to do?*”. Fifty people responded to the question with opinions and suggestions. Of the 50 responses, 19 were from men (or in any event signed with male names), and 14 were from women. The gender of the authors of the 7 remaining responses could not be determined given that they were signed with nicknames (for example, *el perrito inocente*, *rastatas*, *JkAr070*, *Fer*, *starling*, *Nose T*, *Alif*, *Ce fer*, *Gamer*, *OverLoad*, etc.).

Public Internet forums⁴ bring together individuals who share common interests or hobbies and, through their virtual discussions, experience, knowledge, and personal information are transmitted. Contributions are fundamentally personal, subjective and direct (advice given is often based on prior experience of the people providing it). The participants of the forum examined in our study did not know each other⁵ as evidenced by the following statement extracted from one of the messages: “If you’re from Barcelona, it’s now fashionable to use patches, which have helped me a lot.”

As various authors (Crystal 2001; Hyland 2002) have pointed out, in the case of digital communications, the traditional separation between orality and writing is blurred. Technology makes communication almost immediate, which leads to relatively short and rapid exchanges, creating a discursive, spontaneous composition, developed with little reflection or contemplation. In such exchanges, it is quite common to find implicit and frequent errors, the level of formality is low (colloquial expressions, contact markers, scant grammatical processing, truncation and phonetic elision, verbal style, etc.). All of these features make this style of writing very close to speech.

The absence of a shared time-space between the users and, therefore, the absence of a physical context that supports the message has led to the emergence of emoticons or typographical basic facial expressions (laughter represented as :-)) or :), sadness as :-(or :(and a kiss as :*) to express the various moods of users.

Another means of addressing the lack of nonverbal expressivity in digital communication is word games or expressive deformations (Cassany 2002: 10). We also found several contributors using uppercase characters to highlight some aspect of the message that the writer deemed important:

3. “¿Quiero perder peso pero la dietas no ban con migo alguien puede decirme que hacer por favor?” The content provided by the contributors to this forum is presented in the original text, despite spelling and grammatical errors, thus ensuring the authenticity of the material gathered.

4. A public forum is one in which anyone can participate, reading and sending messages without having to register in advance.

5. Some Internet forums are made up of communities of contributors who know each other.

- (1) Mira no hagas dietas que es un sacadineros y además cuándo las dejas engordas el doble a lo que se llama efecto yoyó. Hay que comer de todo con moderación y zapatilla es decir deporte. ACLARO LA ANSIEDAD ES LO QUE NOS HACE COMER. Conchi [13]
 [Hey don't diet it's just a waste of money and what's more when you stop you put on twice as much due to what they call the yo-yo effect. You should just eat everything in moderation and do some sport. TO CLARIFY, ANXIETY IS WHAT MAKES US EAT.] Conchi [13]

Regarding the immediacy of this verbal communication, it is worth noting that we find reactive contributions without any type of preliminary context and with a large number of dynamic verbal forms (imperative and deontic) directed at the interlocutor with a *perlocutionary* purpose. For example, the first response in the forum begins thus:

- (2) Ejercicio. Correr es lo mejor, un quema grasas. Hacerlo en baja intensidad mejor, es cuando mas gras se quema y no menos de 45 minutos. Cambiar tus hábitos alimenticios, poco hidratos de carbono, todo a la plancha, no fritanga, 5 comidas al día, tomar fruta y verduras y cena muy ligera. No se pasa hambre, pero tienes que comer cosas bajas en calorías (...). Jose Maria [2]
 [Exercise. Running is best, it's a fat burner. Doing it low intensity is better, it's when you burn the most fat and no fewer than 45 minutes. Change your eating habits, fewer carbohydrates, everything grilled, nothing fried, 5 meals a day, eat fruit and vegetables and a very light dinner. You don't go hungry, but you have to eat low-calorie food (...)]. Jose Maria [2]

The contribution starts with a greeting (*Hello*), without any meta- discursive verb to frame the intention of the speaker such as *I recommend exercise*. The noun exercise is fully immersed in one of the recommendations. Thereafter we see a series of infinitives follow (*to run, to do, to change, to eat fruit*) as elliptical forms of counseling, similar to imperatives. Most Internet chat room contributions are similarly direct and directive. Despite the numerous and varied deontic forms appearing in this forum,⁶ we shall focus solely on two verbal periphrases – *tienes que* + infinitive and *debes* + infinitive [*you have to* + infinitive and *you should* + infinitive] – in order to elucidate their discursive function in this genre and their relationship with evidentiality, epistemic modality and intensification of the act.

6. Among other deontic forms, we observed many exhortative forms such as infinitive, substantive and imperative constructions, as well as the modal forms *hay que* + infinitivo y *puedes* + infinitivo [it is necessary to + infinitive and you can + infinitive]; and even dialectal variants such as “a huevo”, meaning that an action is forced (cf. § 4).

3. The theoretical question

In the literature, there is a wide range of definitions of evidentiality depending on how the relationship between notions of epistemic modality and evidentiality are understood. In a narrow, sense evidentiality is strictly limited to the indication of the source of information (Fetzer & Oischi, 2014), whereas, in a broad sense, it refers to the specification of the source of the speaker's or the writer's epistemic evaluation of the information (Cabedo & Figueras, this volume). For the proponents of this more inclusive definition, epistemic modality, and other types of stances, and attitudes on propositions and states of affairs (knowledge) is considered part of the domain of evidentiality (Nuckolls & Michael 2012).

The modal verbs under analysis in this article do not provide any information about how the speaker has processed or acquired the information (deduction, hearsay, etc.) conveyed in his or her statement. However, insofar as these deontic verbs are supported by an epistemic source that creates the expression of necessity, these modal verbs can be taken as having an evidential function.⁷

So, our paper is based on a broad conception of evidentiality, seen as “the kinds of evidence a person has for making factual claims” (Anderson 1986: 273), or as the quality of the evidence put forward for an epistemic qualification (Nuyts 2001a: 386).

The fact that Romance languages use elements of their modal system to provide information about the source of information leads to a series of consequences that are well documented by González Vázquez (2006, 156). One such consequence is the difficulty of determining the specificity of evidentiality, which can be relegated to the field of modality. Another is that evidentiality gives priority to its role of epistemic justification or support, to the detriment of its function as a source of information (González Vázquez 2006). Whatever the case may be, everyone agrees to say that, in Spanish, the notion of evidentiality is manifested instead as a functional category or as “evidential strategies”, which means that “categories whose main meanings do not reflect information source can acquire evidential extensions” (Aikhenvald 2007: 210; Cabedo & Figueras this volume; Hennemann 2012; Thegel 2017a: 250).

As Hennemann (2012: 32) has pointed out, epistemic modality can be understood in two different ways: as the expression of an axiological and subjective evaluation in terms of good and bad (for example, this diet is highly effective or this diet has benefited me greatly); or as “the speaker's evaluation of the probability of the state of affairs” (*this diet can work for you, surely this diet will work for you*, etc.). In

7. From the same perspective of relating deontic modality to evidentiality, we also find the study by Thegel (2017b) on Spanish *deber*, which shows this modal ‘must’ in its deontic readings, relating it to the notion of evidentiality and intersubjectivity.

the latter of the two, epistemic modality expresses evaluations of the probability or possibility of a situation occurring or not. In Spanish, that notion does not normally manifest itself through the verbs *poder* and *deber* [*can* and *must*].

Deontic modality is usually defined as modes of obligation, which include the ideas of obligation, permission and prohibition (Thegel, 2017a: 39, inspired by von Wright). In Spanish, this notion can be expressed using the auxiliary verbs *poder*, *deber* and *tener que* [*can*, *must* and *have to*]. Let's take a look at two examples, the first heard in a conversation and the second taken from our corpus.

- (1) En Suiza, a los 16 años ya puedes comprar alcohol
[In Switzerland, you can buy alcohol at the age of 16]
- (2) Yo lo que te recomiendo para perder peso es lo siguiente: andar como mínimo 1 hora al día a un ritmo alegre, respecto a las comidas puedes realizar las comidas normalmente pero sin abusar ni llenarte demasiado, lo que si viene muy bien es que la cena sea ligera como por ejemplo un sándwich o cereales y cenar como mínimo un par de horas antes de irte a dormir. María [5]⁸
[What I recommend to you to lose weight is the following: walk a minimum of one hour per day at a brisk pace, for meals you can eat normal meals but without going overboard stuffing yourself, another good thing is having a light dinner like for example a sandwich or cereals and eating at least a couple of hours before you go to bed] María [5]

In (1), through the modal *can*, the speaker makes it known that, at the age of 16, Swiss citizens have permission to buy alcohol; the deontic source, in the form of a law, provides then with a guarantee of such permission. In (2), however, the speaker makes an exhortation to her addressee, expressing what he or she must do. In this case, the verb *poder* [*can*] does not constitute a true obligation, and instead should be interpreted as a recommendation that takes the form of permission. The speaker does not have the authority to compel the addressee to act in such a way, but what he or she can do is give his or her opinion or view in the form of deontic modality, with the aim of convincing him or her. As Thegel (2017a: 39) rightly says, deontic necessity is very useful for transmitting values, making recommendations or referring to rules.

The initial definition by von Wright (1951) (cf. Thegel 2017a: 39) has since been reinterpreted by authors such as Nuyts et al. (2010), who consider that concepts of obligation, permission and prohibition do not fit into the deontic category. They prefer to speak of deontic modality and of a “directive”, which differ in relation to questions of authority. In directive situations, an authority (usually someone other than the speaker) has the power to enable him or her to influence the conduct of

8. The number in brackets at the end of each example represents the statement number in order of appearance in the forum.

modal subjects, thereby compelling them to do something or not (for example, the biblical commandment *Thou shalt not kill*, or Example (1) above). The authors classify the directive as an illocutionary notion, which forms part of the communicative functions and, more specifically, of the speech act system (Nuyts et al. 2010: 32). In contrast, in prototypically deontic cases, the deontic source (usually though not necessarily the speaker), rather than really obliging, permitting or prohibiting, performs an evaluation by expressing an attitude towards the state of things, in accordance with his or her own moral code, or with a shared moral code (Nuyts et al. 2010: 17).

In agreement with Nuyts et al., we share the idea that obligatory, permitted and prohibited notions are insufficient and partially inadequate to account for deontic modality. With an example from our corpus, we have just seen that such modality often serves to reflect a personal opinion of the speaker or an attitude about how things should be or how someone else should act. This position also appears in the thesis by Thegel (2017a: 40), who shows how the speaker, as the source of the obligation, expresses his or her point of view about a necessity without having the authority to compel the subject to carry out the action in question.

However, we shall not apply the distinction between deontic modality and directive introduced by Nuyts et al. (2010) to the analysis of our corpus. As we shall see in Section 4, our occurrences are examples of deontic modality because, in the majority of the cases, the speaker is the source of the obligation and normally expresses his or her point of view about slimming, without that source having authority to compel the subject to carry out the action. The only directive that our occurrences might have is in relation to the structure of the verbal interaction, which requires the forum contributors to have an asymmetrical relationship concerning knowledge. The initial question posed by the woman who opened the discussion (“¿alguien puede decirme que hacer, por favor?” [Can someone please tell me what to do?]) indicates that she expects others to let her know what to do. However, this asymmetry is not linked to the notion of “authority” as it is usually understood, but instead to certain declarative positions that contributors take when joining the forum. Additionally, we interpret the imperative and exhortative forms appearing in our corpus as modal markers that respond to a strategy of convincing and of intensifying their ideas. We shall therefore use the term deontic modality to refer to the recommendations about how the modal subject should act.

Furthermore, in this study, we use the term necessity in a broad sense, which includes notions of obligation, recommendation, rule, necessity and personal opinion (regarding an action that the speaker considers necessary or appropriate). Thus, when referring to deontic necessity, we include a whole range of functions that can be transmitted through the use of *deber* and *tener que* [*have to* and *should*].

4. *Tienes que + infinitive [you have to + infinitive] vs. debes + infinitive [you should + infinitive]*

The verbal periphrases that we analyze here have already been the object of different studies that have tried to describe their distinctive traits to establish how deontic *tener que* and *deber [have to and, in the verbal periphrases of this study, should]* differ (cf. Gómez Torrego 1988, 1999; Silva-Corvalán 1995; Sirbu-Dumitrescu 1988; NGLÉ 2010 and, most recently, Thegel, 2017a).⁹ For a summary of those studies and of the parameters that usually appear in the literature on their differences, we would refer the reader to the thesis by Thegel (2017a: 52–63). Since our aim is to analyze the functions of these deontic modalities, as well as their potential evidential values, we shall take as the analysis criterion the notion of source of necessity (cf. Thegel, 2017a: 182 et seq.), which we shall differentiate from the justification of necessity. We understand the source of necessity to be a person or an authority responsible for creating that necessity, and the justification of necessity to be the reasons that the subject gives for that necessity.

All of our occurrences of *tener que* and *deber [have to and should]* are in the second person singular, which means that it is the speaker expressing the necessity that is directed at a you, the person who opened the discussion with her question. We analyze three examples of *tienes que + infinitive [you have to + infinitive]* and four of *debes [you should + infinitive]*.

We note here that we are leaving the statements made by forum contributors in their original grammatical state. We have simply italicized these comments to distinguish them from our own text. The number in brackets at the end of each example represents the statement number in order of appearance in the forum.

4.1 The source of necessity in *tienes que + infinitive [you have to + infinitive]* and *debes + infinitive [you should + infinitive]*

- (1) Ejercicio. Correr es lo mejor, es un quema grasas. Hacerlo en baja intensidad mejor, es cuando mas grasa se quema y no menos de 45 min. Cambiar tus hábitos alimenticios, poco hidrato de carbono, todo a la plancha, no fritanga, 5 comidas al día, tomar fruta y verduras y cena muy ligera. No se pasa hambre, pero tienes que comer cosas bajas en calorías. Grasas saturadas prohibidas, en principio. Yo soy la prueba, 41 kilos perdidos y además ahora estoy en forma.:

Jose María [2]

9. This linguist proposes a qualitative and quantitative study of *tener que* ‘have to’ and *deber* ‘must’. She reaches the conclusion that the *deber* ‘must’ periphrasis implies an intersubjective necessity, whereas *tener que* ‘have to’ has a strong tendency to appear when the speaker is the source and expresses a personal opinion, besides needing a conflictive environment.

[Exercise. Running is best, it's a fat burner. Doing it low intensity is better, it's when you burn the most fat and no fewer than 45 minutes. Change your eating habits, fewer carbohydrates, everything grilled, nothing fried, 5 meals a day, eat fruit and vegetables and a very light dinner. You don't go hungry but you have to eat low-calorie food. No saturated fats, in principle. I'm proof, 41 kg lost and now I'm in great shape.:)].
Jose Maria [2]

- (2) pues en mi caso tienes q aser 2 cosas aser ejercicio y a huevo la dieta¹⁰ por q si solo a ses ejercicio pero comes mucho no te funciona tienes q hacer las 2 cosas o solo ponte faja.
Susan [16]
[well in my case you have to do 2 things exercise and diet of course because if you only do exercise but you eat a lot it doesn't work you have to do both things otherwise just wear a girdle.]
Susan [16]

In both Examples (1) and (2), what we find is the personal and (subjective) opinion of a speaker who gives several pieces of advice, in exhortative mode, to an addressee of the verbal exchange who is physically absent. In Example (1), the speaker begins his intervention by setting out what he considers the most effective way of losing weight. This opinion is followed by an axiological (epistemic) evaluation: “Correr es lo mejor” [Running is best]. The explanation for that is then presented: “es un quema grasas” [it's a fat burner]. It is forceful because of the attributive construction, where there is no doubt at all. After giving an initial series of guidelines about the type of exercise he recommends, the speaker then turns to the topic of food (“poco hidrato de carbono, todo a la plancha, no fritanga, 5 comidas al día, tomar fruta y verduras y cena muy ligera” [fewer carbohydrates, everything grilled, nothing fried, 5 meals a day, eat fruit and vegetables and a very light dinner]). The deontic modality *tienes que* + infinitive [*you have to* + infinitive] appears just after a negation, in an environment described as favorable to that periphrasis by Thegel (2017a: 193). The statement containing the modal verb begins with a polemic negation “No se pasa hambre” [You don't go hungry], which indicates, based on the theory of polyphony by Ducrot (1984: 171–233), that the speaker negates in advance any possible objection by his interlocutor; that negative statement is followed by “pero tienes que comer cosas bajas en calorías” [but you have to eat low-calorie food], whose counter-argumentative connector marks the fact that the speaker annuls the potential inference that could be drawn from “No se pasa hambre” [You don't go hungry], i.e., that you can eat everything. The source of this deontic modality originates from the speaker, from his opinion, which is formulated at the time of speaking and appears as a personal contribution. We therefore interpret the source of this necessity as being personal and subjective. Finally, after presenting a series of actions that he considers fundamental to slimming down, the speaker justifies

10. In the Mexican variant of Spanish, “a huevo” means that an action is forced or obligatory.

the reasons for which he deems them necessary by putting forward the argument of proven effectiveness: “Yo soy la prueba, 41 kilos perdidos y además ahora estoy en forma” [I’m proof, 41 kg lost and now I’m in great shape].

Example (2) has similar characteristics to Example (1). The intervention begins with “pues en mi caso” [well in my case], indicating that the necessity that follows “tienes q aser 2 cosas aser ejercicio y a huevo la dieta” [you have to do 2 things exercise and diet of course] originates from a direct personal experience that the speaker has had. Two deontic modalities appear in this statement; the first through the modal verb *tener que* [have to] and the second through the Mexican idiomatic expression “a huevo”, meaning that an action is forced or obligatory.¹¹ The speaker warns her interlocutor that if she does not want to diet,¹² she can do all the exercise she wants but she will not slim down (“si solo a ses ejercicios pero comes mucho no te funciona” [if you only do exercise but you eat a lot it doesn’t work]). Her intervention ends with the necessity to do both things. Again, we can see that *tienes que* + infinitive [you have to + infinitive] intervenes within a conflictive environment (Thegel (2017a: 192 et seq.), where the speaker’s opinion that motivates the necessity to do both things (exercise and diet) is in opposition to the idea of the interlocutor, who wants to slim down without dieting. In this second example, the justification that motivates the speaker’s opinion can be found at the beginning “en mi caso” [in my case] which we interpret as being equivalent to in my experience, because it also refers to a source of direct experience.

The third and final example of the periphrasis *tienes que* + infinitive [you have to + infinitive] can be found in the following intervention:

- (3) Hola, proba con una dieta alcalina, o vegana es la mejor forma de ser sano y estar delgado, para esto tenes que comer mucha fruta verdura granos, yo la estoy siguiendo hace medio año y no es necesario restringir calorías, tenes que infórmate bien. Besos espero que te ayude <https://goveganlife.word-press.com/dieta-vegana-semanal/> Gala [45]
[Hi, try an alkaline diet, or vegan is the best way to be healthy and slim, for that you have to eat lots of fruit vegetables cereals, I’ve been on it for half a year now and it isn’t necessary to reduce calories, you have to inform yourself well. Kisses I hope this helps you <https://goveganlife.word-press.com/dieta-vegana-semanal/> Gala [45]

11. <http://www.fundacionlengua.com/es/huevo/art/187/>

12. We would remind readers that the initial question posed by the woman who opened the discussion was that she specifically wanted to slim down without dieting: “I want to lose weight but I’m incapable of dieting. Can someone please tell me what to do?”. Cf. Section 2.

This example differs slightly from the first two in the sense that the first necessity (*tener que [have to]*) does not seem to conflict with the interlocutor's wish. However, it is possible to defend speaker's proposal that goes against the interlocutor's will because she proposes a diet (alkaline or vegan). The modal source of the first periphrasis could be considered external to the speaker, since it comprises the precepts of vegan diets (an interpretation corroborated by the fact that the speaker ends her intervention with a link, i.e., a source that is not hers). Nevertheless, we are inclined to think that the source of necessity is the opinion of the forum user, who assumes those precepts as her own, as underscored by the axiological evaluation ("una dieta alcalina, o vegana es la mejor forma de ser sano y estar delgado" [an alkaline diet, or vegan is the best way to be healthy and slim]). So, what motivates the necessity in the first occurrence is the speaker's positive evaluation of such a diet ("es la mejor forma de ser sano y estar delgado, para esto tienes que comer mucha fruta verdura granos" [is the best way to be healthy and slim, for that you have to eat lots of fruit vegetables cereals]). That precept is justified by: "yo la estoy siguiendo hace medio año y no es necesario restringir calorías" [I've been on it for half a year now and it isn't necessary to reduce calories]. Here, the speaker tries to convince her interlocutor by putting to her the argument that she will not have to diet, but simply change her diet. Again, the necessity is justified by the speaker's experience.

The second verbal periphrasis *tienes que + infinitive [you have to + infinitive]* of this intervention appears in the reason for the necessity to follow a vegan diet: "no es necesario restringir calorías, tienes que infórmate bien" [it isn't necessary to reduce calories, you have to inform yourself well], where, through polemic negation, the speaker shows that she has taken into consideration her interlocutor's request of not wanting to diet. The source motivating the latter necessity is, once again, the opinion of the speaker, who assures her that she can slim down without restricting calories if she informs herself well about how to follow a vegan diet.

To sum up, in the three occurrences of *tienes que + infinitive [you have to + infinitive]* with deontic value that we have just analyzed, all of the sources of necessity are the forum user's personal and subjective opinions. To justify them, the speakers use the argument of experience. We advance the hypothesis that the nature of such justifications is motivated by the fact that the speakers, who do not represent any authority, law or rule, have to use experience in order to convince. Furthermore, the fact that we find *tienes que + infinitive [you have to + infinitive]* in situations where the speaker comes into conflict with what is expected by the addressee is consistent with Thegel (2017a) and Fernández de Castro (1999: 188), who underscore that *tener que [have to]* is an indication of a necessary action, whose existence means a potential conflict. A demand can always come up against a subject's will or preferences, which can be called a 'clash' of wills.

4.2 Analysis of the periphrasis *debes* + infinitive [*you should* + infinitive]

- (4) Yo lo que te recomiendo para perder peso es lo siguiente: andar como mínimo 1 hora al día a un ritmo alegre, respecto a las comidas puedes realizar las comidas normalmente pero sin abusar ni llenarte demasiado, lo que si viene muy bien es que la cena sea ligera como por ejemplo un sándwich o cereales y cenar como mínimo un par de horas antes de irte a dormir. Además debes complementarlo bebiendo como mínimo 2 litros de agua diaria, cuanto más bebas mejor, más toxinas elimina el cuerpo a través de la orina y además de toxinas también elimina grasas. Y por lo demás poco más, puede complementarlo con algún producto como este <http://salondebellezaruth.com/suplemento...> ya que ayudan a drenar y son un buen complemento. Espero que esto os sirva a mi me ha venido muy bien llevo perdidos ya 5 kilos y de forma natural.

María [5]

[What I recommend to you to lose weight is the following: walk a minimum of one hour per day at a brisk pace, for meals you can eat normal meals but without going overboard stuffing yourself, another good thing is having a light dinner like for example a sandwich or cereals and eating at least a couple of hours before you go to bed. Also you should complement this by drinking at least 2 liters of water every day, the more you drink, the more toxins you eliminate from the body through urine and besides toxins you eliminate fat too. And aside from that there's little else, you can supplement it with a product like this <http://salondebellezaruth.com/suplemento...> because they help to drain and are a good complement. I hope this will help you it works very well for me I've lost 5 kg already in a natural way.]

Maria [5]

Intervention (4) with a markedly subjective contribution “yo lo que te recomiendo” [What I recommend to you], where the presence of the first-person personal pronoun indicates that the speaker wants to personalize her contribution. After a series of recommendations that do not require any particular diet (walking, eating light meals and having dinner early), the deontic *debes* [*you should* + infinitive] appears just after the adverb *además* [also], which introduces a new necessity, that of drinking at least 2 liters of water a day. The source of that necessity (of drinking at least 2 liters of water a day) is not presented as a personal opinion of the speaker; indeed, its origin is difficult to establish. Is it the speaker's opinion? Is it a rule that the speaker recommends? Regarding the justification of that recommendation, we also find an axiological opinion (“cuanto más bebas mejor, más toxinas elimina el cuerpo a través de la orina y además de toxinas también elimina grasas” [the more you drink, the more toxins you eliminate from the body through urine and besides toxins you eliminate fat too]) but we do not know where it comes from. In other words, we do not know if comes from a source external to the speaker or from her own experience.

Whatever the case may be, it is clear that the speaker does not personally evoke the precepts she gives at any time.

A common feature of Examples (5) and (6) is the conditional structure.

- (5) Si eres de Barcelona, ahora se han puesto de moda unos parches que me ayudaron bastante, y te podría pasar un número de teléfono para hablar con un comercial de este producto. Es un parche que debes ponerte durante unas horas y expulsas las grasas sobrantes a través de excreciones del pis y eso. Yosefbakalimail.com para saber más. Yosef [8]
 [If you're from Barcelona, it's now fashionable to use patches, which have helped me a lot, and I can give you a phone number to speak with a sales agent about this product. It's a patch which you should put on for a few hours and it expels excess fats through excretion of piss and such. Yosefbakalimail.com if you want to know more]. Yosef [8]
- (6) Si las dietas no te gustan lo que debes hacer es intentar reducir progresivamente la comida que ingieres al día. Por ejemplo (...) [34]
 [If you don't like diets what you should do is try to gradually reduce your daily food intake. For example (...)] [34]

In Example (5), the speaker refers to a rule that does not come from him but instead from a source external to him: the rules he recommends for using that product ("Es un parche que debes ponerte durante unas horas" [It's a patch which you should put on for a few hours]). This necessity is justified by the fact that such patches "me ayudaron bastante" [have helped me a lot]. The reason is personal in this case, but unlike in the examples of the periphrasis *tienes que* + infinitive [*you have to* + infinitive], here it is evaluated from a certain position of externality and distance ("bastante" [a lot]).

In Example (6), despite the fact that the recommendation ("lo que debes hacer es intentar reducir progresivamente la comida que ingieres al día" [what you should do is try to gradually reduce your daily food intake]) takes a source that is internal to the discourse (the condition imposed by the addressee of this intervention), it is not the speaker's. At no time does the speaker say that he or she has shared that circumstance. The externality of the source comes from the fact that the speaker does not recommend his or her recipe. Instead, he or she recommends a strategy in accordance with the addressee's circumstances ("Si las dietas no te gustan" [If you don't like diets]). In this example, both the source of necessity and of its justification are oriented towards the addressee and not towards the speaker.

- (7) Yo he probado con el Herbalife y me ha dado resultado, obviamente debes mantener ejercicio de forma continua, [41]
 [I've tried Herbalife and it's worked for me, obviously you should keep exercising continuously,] [41]

Finally, in Example (7), the periphrasis *debes* [*you should* + infinitive] comes after the adverbial locution “obviamente” [obviously], marking the fact that the speaker situates him or herself in relation to a rule, which he or she qualifies as evident or obvious: the necessity to do exercise in order to slim down. The deontic source of that necessity as an intersubjective¹³ source, accessible to all. The reason for that necessity is that vitamin supplements (Herbalife) alone are not enough to slim down. That reason is presented as a personally experienced one (“Yo he probado con el Herbalife y me ha dado resultado” [I’ve tried Herbalife and it’s worked for me]).

5. Conclusions

The aim of this article was to show how the deontic and epistemic modalities relate to the concept of evidentiality in an Internet forum. To that end, we analyzed the two verbal periphrases *tienes que* + infinitive and *debes* + infinitive [*you have to* + infinitive and *you should* + infinitive], with a deontic meaning, based on the criterion of the source of necessity in order to establish the functions they have in such a forum.

The analysis showed that both deontic forms presented opinions under the modality of necessity, albeit with a slight nuance. When using *tienes que* + infinitive [*you have to* + infinitive], the speaker presents him or herself as the person responsible for the creation of such necessity, which is expressed subjectively and forcefully, with a high degree of adherence. However, when using *debes* + infinitive [*you should* + infinitive], instead of presenting him or herself as the person responsible for (i.e., the source of) the necessity, the speaker presents him or herself as the spokesperson of a series of rules that take the interlocutor or a product whose effectiveness the speaker praises as the source of reference. The speaker’s declarative position therefore differs according to the function of the modal verb. In this article, we are conscious of the fact that the analysis of the seven examples (three of *tienes que* + infinitive [*you have to* + infinitive] and four of *debes* + infinitive [*you should* + infinitive]) does not allow any definitive conclusion to be drawn about their semantic differences, but we would like to point out that our analysis corroborates the conclusions reached by Thegel (2017a: 202). According to that author, *tener que* is used mainly to present a personal position, whereas *deber* is used to indicate agreement in order to present the necessity as general and visible to all.

13. “Intersubjectivity” in the sense defined by Nuyts (2012): an (epistemic or deontic) attitude shared between the speaker and a larger group of people, thus applying these concepts to the field of modality.

Regarding the deontic and epistemic modality, the analysis showed how the expression of necessity implies an axiological judgment (epistemic): the speaker performs an evaluation in terms of something being ‘very important’ or ‘highly recommendable’ when qualifying his or her advice as ‘necessary’ according to his or her own code in the case of *tienes que* + infinitive [*you have to* + infinitive], or according to a rule (a shared or intersubjective judgment) in the case of *debes* [*you should* + infinitive]).

Concerning the evidential¹⁴ value of such interventions, we found that it occurred in two different planes of the discourse. Firstly, in the deontic value of those verbs. Presenting opinions under the modality of necessity implies that the speaker possesses good evidence (i.e., a source) to justify or support that necessity. Such evidence lies not in the semantics of verbs, but rather in an inferential process based on the intensification that provides the speech act with deontic modality. In the case of *tienes que* + infinitive [*you have to* + infinitive], the source of necessity is presented as a personal and subjective opinion, and, in the case of *debes* [*you should* + infinitive], it is presented as a shared or intersubjective rule. Secondly, we observed an evidential function in the strategies that the speakers used to convince their interlocutors. In order to justify their recommendations, the speakers give their direct personal testimonies, assuring the interlocutor that they have personally experienced what they are recommending.

Finally, the strong presence of deontic forms in such exchanges responds, in our opinion, to the conditions of this verbal genre. Being an exchange characterized by immediacy and speed, the speakers have to convince their interlocutors of the validity of their opinions in very few words. The expression of necessity is ideal for both intensifying an opinion and expressing a high degree of adherence to it in order to impress on the interlocutor the importance and ‘obligatory nature’ of the precepts recommended therein.

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14. Evidentiality is understood here as “source of the speaker’s or the writer’s epistemic evaluation of the information” (cf. 3).

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Prosody, genres and evidentiality in Spanish

The case of “por lo visto”

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The aim of this paper is to present a prosodic analysis of the evidential discourse marker *por lo visto* (‘apparently’) in six oral discourse genres: everyday conversation, discussion, sociolinguistic interviews, TV talks, parliamentary interventions, and news. The multimedia material used for this study comes from real samples of spontaneous speech; among the sources used are linguistic corpora (Valesco, CORLEC) and TV websites, or the Spanish government’s official site. In the experimental design, 29 records were analysed statistically according to different variables, mainly phonic (TOBI accents, pitch, intensity, speech rate and so on). The results showed that (a) the tonal accent L + H* is predominant in news, political discourse and sociolectal interviews; (b) only the political discourse and sociolectal interview showed examples of *por lo visto* as an independent intonational phrase; and (c) prosody seemed to differentiate the *pragmatic* and the *core* meanings of the evidential *por lo visto* in genres in which both possibilities coexist (excluding genres in which the examples are only oriented towards the *core* evidential pole (news) or towards the *pragmatic* pole (political speech)).

Keywords: prosody, genres, evidentiality, *por lo visto*, Spanish

1. Introduction

Evidentiality, in other words a semantic notion conveying ‘source of information’ (Aikhenvald 2004, 2014), is expressed in Spanish via a number of words, particularly through adverbs and discourse markers, as well as through certain syntactic structures (Cornillie 2008, 2009; Albelda 2015, among many others; see also Chafe & Nichols 1986 for other ‘non-evidential’ languages such as English). However, the core, default meaning ‘source of information’ is often accompanied by pragmatic, contextual nuances, such as irony, mitigation, distance, and the like.

It has been pointed out that a relationship exists between the discourse genre and the triggering of some particular pragmatic nuances of evidentials (Estellés & Albelda 2014; Cuenca & Marin 2012; Cornillie & Gras 2015).

Following this line of thought, in the following lines we will analyse one particular discourse marker (DM) with evidential meaning, *por lo visto* ('apparently') (González 2005; Marcos 2005; Estellés & Albelda 2014; Cornillie & Gras 2015) with a twofold aim. Firstly, to find out whether the triggering of a particular pragmatic meaning depends only on the genre in which the evidential DM appears or if, as we hypothesise, there are prosodic factors that favour one interpretation over another. Secondly, in case prosody does play an active role in triggering pragmatic meanings associated with evidentials, to explore prosodic *markedness* and to describe the prosodic behaviour of evidentials by answering the following questions:

- a. Does a prosodic mark (altered pitch, different intonation curves, and so forth) accompany the semantic/pragmatic *markedness*? In other words, are evidentials uttered with a special, marked prosody when they convey additional pragmatic meaning(s)?
- b. If so, is this relationship consistent? If not, can the 'unmarked' prosody correspond to different meanings depending on the genre, thus suggesting that the 'default' evidential interpretation is not independent of the genre?

In order to provide an answer to the previous questions, this paper is structured as follows: Section 2 explains the genres selected for this study and provides examples thereof. Section 3 describes the method followed in the study, including the audio-visual corpus employed, the variables considered and the statistical techniques applied. Section 4 analyses the most relevant results obtained for each genre after conducting a phonic study as well as a contrastive analysis between the core and the pragmatic meaning of *por lo visto*. Finally, Section 5 summarises the main findings.

2. Selected genres and samples

For the present study, six oral genres have been selected, namely everyday conversations, discussions, sociolinguistic interviews, TV talk, parliamentary interventions and news. The particular choice of these genres is based on their importance in the literature, in which these genres have been regarded as the most representative or frequent in the wide variety of genres a speaker may encounter on a daily basis (Biber & Conrad 2009).

Furthermore, each genre has some specific features that differentiate it from the rest; thus, in general, the genres selected here can be grouped according to their higher or lower degree of preparation, their formality/informality, and according to their overall aim (Gregory & Carroll 1978). In other words, the purpose with which they were originally conceived (written text conceived of as being read aloud, to be read individually, and so on). A brief outline of the genres considered is provided in the following Section:

- a. Freewheeling, everyday conversation: no or little preparation / low degree of formality. This genre is understood based on the criteria established by Briz (1998), according to which everyday (“colloquial”) conversation shows non-predetermined turn-taking, communicative dynamicity, the presence of feedback, immediacy and a non-transactional aim (in other words, talking for the sake of talking), as well as the aforementioned traits of lack of preparation and an informal register (Cabedo & Pons 2013).

(1) A: y me ha hecho gracia luego también el noruego↑ // lo que ha salido diciendo↓/ quee- Humberto no sé- ¡ah! porque en ese programa dicen al principio algo de unass- de unass encuestas↓ no sé qué estadísticas↑ patatín patatán ¿no?// yy-// y dice el noruego↑ que también hicieron unas estadísticas en Holanda↑ unas encuestas paraa alguna historia↑ y que por lo visto↑ // era curioso porque deel centro de Nolan- dee- de Noruega[...] del centro de Noruega al NORTE↑ el norte de Noruega↑ que por lo visto↑ sí quee es verdad que en general era maayor la infidelidad↓/

(Corpus Valesco 2.0, Conversación 31, Intervenciones 37–45)

A: and later, I also found it funny, that Norwegian guy, what he was saying, that- Humberto... I'm not sure what... Oh! Because, in this program, at the beginning, they say something about some- some surveys, something about some statistics, blah, blah, blah, right? And the Norwegian guy says that they also have made surveys in Norway, for some other reasons, and apparently... It was interesting, because in central Hol-...in central Norway [...] from central Norway to the north... in the north, in northern Norway, apparently it is true that, in general, infidelity rates are higher.

(Corpus Valesco 2.0, Conversación 31, Intervenciones 37–45)

- b. Interviews: medium preparation / medium-low degree of formality. For this genre, we have considered sociolectal interviews due to the availability of large corpora in Spanish. Sociolectal interviews are conducted and recorded for the purpose of collecting linguistic information; this means that interviewees are aware of being recorded and they must answer a series of questions asked by the interviewer, with turn-taking dynamics being quite strictly established beforehand (Moreno 2003).

(2) E: ¿así que cantan?

I: y cuando vienen con los camiones y esas cosas / ahora ya menos / pero antes me acuerdo<alargamiento/> cuando estaba esto má<alargamiento/>s <vacilación/> // cuando tenía más vida el cuartel porque ahora ya<alargamiento/> / **por lo visto** han trasladado a muchos /

E: <simultáneo> ¡ah! </simultáneo>

I: <simultáneo> muchos </simultáneo> soldados hh / pues era horrible / cuando venían de maniobras / ahí<alargamiento/> y los ruidos de los camiones / motos / coches / de todo / (Corpus Preseea, ALCA_M13_005)

E (interviewer): So, they sing?

I (interviewee): and when they come with their lorries and that stuff... Now it's not like it was before, but I remember... when all this was more... when the military base was more alive... because now... apparently many (soldiers) have been relocated

E: oh!

I: many soldiers... Anyway, it was terrible, when they came back from their military exercises...there... the noise of the lorries, the motorbikes, the cars... everything (Corpus Preseea, ALCA_M13_005)

c. Debate: medium-high preparation/medium-high degree of formality. Here, a set of TV debates has been selected. Debates are considered to be a different genre from ordinary TV talks (Sp. *tertulia*; see (d)) due to the argumentative purpose of debates, in which speakers aim to persuade / convince their hearers (Brenes 2005).

(3) A: ...Y Esperanza Aguirre que no para de aparecer en todos los/ fotogramas que vemos en cada caso de corrupción que se produce en Madrid/ está esta señora/ que eran cargos de confianza/ tiene no sé cuántos alcaldes/ diputados/ consejeros/ implicados/ y ella/ cazando talentos/ porque **por lo visto** los que cazaba eran bastante sinvergüenza (Al Rojo Vivo, La Sexta TV, 20-02-2014)

A: ...And Esperanza Aguirre, she keeps appearing in each and every frame... in all the cases of corruption happened in Madrid, this lady is always present... they were posts of her confidence... who knows how many of her majors, deputies, counsellors are involved, and meanwhile she keeps head-hunting... because, apparently, the 'heads' she was hunting were scoundrels

d. TV Talks: high degree of preparation / high degree of formality. TV Talks (Sp. *tertulia*), do share some traits with debates but, as mentioned previously, they normally present a situation in which speakers do not intend to persuade or to convince their interlocutors in an aggressive way (Briz 2013), thus reducing the dynamicity of turns and, consequently, sticking to the plan decided upon prior to the show (notes, highlights, and so on) to a greater degree. Macrostructurally speaking, however, their differences from debates are minimal.

- (4) A: eso digo.
 B: Claro.
 A: Hoy he preguntado eso
 B: y con uno solo de nosotros se hace muchísimas urnitas de esas, muchísimas.
 A: ¿Cuántas/ cuántas?
 B: **Por lo visto**/cabemos muchas urnas//Cada uno de nosotros damos de sí, damos de sí muchísimo.
 C: (RISAS) (Corpus Preseea, ALCA_M13_005)

e. Interventions in parliamentary debates: high degree of preparation/ high degree of formality. The samples were retrieved from the official Parliament Proceedings of the Spanish Congress (www.congreso.es). In general, the intrinsically argumentative basis of political discourse, as in TV debates, has been pointed out (Brenes 2012) but here, communicative exchanges are not as immediate and the turn-taking system is extremely strict and seldom varies. In addition, speeches tend to have been written beforehand and read aloud during the sessions, thus having an impact on the degree of formality.

- (5) R: En relación con la segunda comparecencia que habíamos pedido y después de oír su intervención, me tengo que ratificar en lo que dije la semana pasada: no tiene ambición, no le interesa ni le preocupa la política pesquera; a nosotros, sí. A usted, **por lo visto**, hay que traerla a la fuerza a esta Cámara aunque sea simplemente para informar, que es de lo que se trataba en la solicitud de esta comparecencia. Se trataba de saber cómo está el sector pesquero español en relación con el mercado ruso, nada más, tan sencillo como eso, señora ministra.... (Diario de Sesiones del Congreso de los Diputados, 17 de septiembre de 2014)

R: Regarding the second appearance we requested, and after hearing your speech, I have to ratify what I said last week: you have no ambition, no interest or care for fisheries' policy; we do. You, *it seems*, must be brought forcibly to this House, even if it is just to inform, which was the purpose stated in the request for this hearing. The purpose was to know what the situation of the Spanish fishing sector is, in relation to the Russian market. Nothing more. As simple as that, Madam Minister...

f. News: full preparation/ high degree of formality. For this genre, a sample of a TV news broadcast has been collected. In search of greater homogeneity, only the interventions by the journalists in the studio have been considered; that is to say, interventions by correspondents made from the scene of events. News discourse has been described from a prosodic point of view (de la Mota & Rodero 2010).

- (6) El presidente de la FIFA Joseph Blatter ha vuelto aa montar un pequeño revuelo con sus preferencias sobre los futbolistas que deben ser premiados/ y la últimas sugerencia sobre el balón de oro ha sido la del alemáan Neuer. **Por lo visto** ha habido un mal entendido/ pero Ancelotti/ ya había opinado.

(News, TVE, 29-10-2014)

FIFA President Joseph Blatter has once again caused a small controversy with his preferences on the players who should be awarded the Golden Ball, and the last suggestion has been the German goalkeeper Neuer. Apparently there has been a misunderstanding, but Ancelotti had already spoken his mind.

3. Methodology

In the following lines, the multimedia material used will be listed, as well as the procedure whereby this material was analysed, the acoustic/auditory treatment of the data and the variables used in the experimental design. Finally, the statistical tests that were conducted will be described in detail.

3.1 Multimedia material

Finding freewheeling oral material that is also suitable for analysis is a complicated task, given the high acoustic standards a sample must meet for it to be analysed properly. In addition, the oral corpora currently available in Spanish do not include many examples of *por lo visto*. All things considered, it was necessary to enrich our database with additional material that did not come from linguistic (macro) corpora. The sources of the additional material considered are displayed in Table 1, in which an approximate number of words is also provided for each genre.

From Table 1, different observations can be made. Firstly, since linguistic corpora include the total number of words for each genre, it was easy to calculate the relative frequency of *por lo visto* per million words. However, the additional sources used as corpora, such as the webpages of different TV channels (Radio Televisión Española and La Sexta), do not provide the number of words in the transcription or in the subtitles; therefore, this datum could not be included for 5 and 6. In addition, a different distributional characteristic can be seen in *por lo visto* via the genres analysed. Thus, according to several researchers (González-Ramos 2005), *por lo visto* is more frequent in genres in which exchanges are faster or more dynamic, and therefore when communicative immediacy is a priority; this is the case with conversations, debates and TV talks. Accordingly, in less spontaneous genres, such as (sociolectal) interviews or parliamentary discourse, *por lo visto* is less frequent. Based on this observation, *por lo visto* presumably has a low frequency in TV news, as broadcast news is a type of discourse that is written and then read aloud in a formal tone.

Table 1. Sources of the materials studied

	Type of source	Name	Genre	Total words	Cases found	Freq. per million
1	Corpus	Val.Es.Co	Everyday conversation	120246	4	33,27
2	Corpus	CORLEC	Everyday conversation	269500	11	40,82
			TV talk	142500	5	35,09
			TV debate	93500	4	42,78
3	Corpus	PRESEEA	Sociolectal interview	600000	9	15,00
4	Corpus	CORPES	TV talk	6000000	6	1
5	Web	www.rtve.es	News/debate	¿? (>1000000)	6	¿?
6	Web	www.lasexta.com	News/debate	¿? (>1000000)	6	¿?
7	Web	www.congreso.es	Parliamentary debate	109800000	1160	10,56

Finally, all the cases considered had a filter applied in order to select the optimal audios and to ensure homogeneity in the statistical calculations. The final number of occurrences obtained after filtering the audios has produced the following results: everyday conversation (5), sociolectal interviews (5), TV talk (5), TV debate (4), parliamentary debates (5) and news (5).

3.2 Acoustic and auditory processing of the data

The focus of the analysis in the study of intonation can follow a phonetics-based method or it can go a step further and look for repercussions in phonology. Similarly, any phonic segment can be analysed according to global phonetic characteristics, such as a ‘block of speech’ (Cabedo 2013) or, by contrast, the analysis can be carried by placing more importance on the melody, understood as a succession of the individual phonetic values of each of the syllables. In the first analysis, factors such as tonal range or general prosodic emphasis is regarded as important type of analysis to look at; however, in the second type of analysis, which is adopted by most scholars, more attention is paid to the melody and to the individual tonal patterns (Cantero 2002). Either of the above-mentioned methods can be useful to study how speakers perceive elements within wider strings of discourse. A ‘marked’ degree of perceptibility can be due to several reasons: for instance, high perceptibility can be *expected* (as in stressed syllables) or *unexpected*, as in the expression of certain pragmatic nuances. The latter is superimposed on the expected high perceptibility by overstressing the stressed syllable, or by using an atypical melody, in which tonal rises or falls become perceptible in non-stressed syllables.

The phonetic analysis in this study has been conducted using PRAAT (Boersma & Weenink 2016). After collecting the audio files, the fragment containing *por lo visto* was isolated, and a new audio file was created for each occurrence. The fragments containing *por lo visto* started two seconds before the DM, and ended two seconds after the DM was uttered. These shorter, more easily manageable files were tagged orthographically according to three tiers; in other words, the text files were attached to and synchronised with the audio created using PRAAT (.TextGrid format).

The tagging process starts with a *PointTier* used to measure the phonic values observable in the middle point of each vocalic sound in *por lo visto*. The second tier is used to measure the phonic value of each syllable (the analysis of these last parameters is quite frequent in intonation studies in Spanish; see Prieto & Roseano 2010; Cantero 2002; Roseano & Fernández-Planas 2013). Finally, the third tier targets the entire DM and isolates it from the rest of the acoustic material in the file. Thus, the acoustic and tonal values (pitch, intensity, duration and so on) have been measured taking three reference points into account: the middle point of the vowels ([o], [o], [í] and [o]), the syllables ([por], [lo], [βís] and [to]) and the whole DM ([porloβísto]).

The phonological analysis has been conducted using two different systems of melodic analysis: The first, TOBI (Tone and Break Indices), which was created by Pierrehumbert (1980) and adapted for Spanish by Estebas & Prieto (2009, 2010), is based on a nominal appointment of tonal rises (HIGH) or falls (LOW). The second system is the *Análisis melódico del Habla* (AMH; ‘melodic analysis of speech’), which is based on a visual analysis of the melodic configuration and was developed by Cantero (2002). This system offers an innovation, since it standardises the tonal values and expresses the tonal rises and falls as relative percentages (not as nominal HIGH/LOW tags.)

3.3 Phonic and descriptive variables

The following variables have been considered:

- Genre.
- Core/pragmatic meaning.
- F0/Pitch. Global and per syllable.
- Intensity. Global and per syllable.
- Duration. Global and per syllable.
- Hz transformation into semitones per syllable.
- TOBI level assignment. Pretonic syllable, tonic syllable and post-tonic syllable.
- Break indices. Previous and posterior to *por lo visto*.
- AMH transformation per syllable.

The variables above can be divided into two groups: The first group includes strictly phonic variables (pitch, intensity, duration, semitones, TOBI, Break, AMH and the like). In our database, six out of seven phonic variables were numeric (the variable *TOBI level assignment* assigns the tags H [High], L [Low] and the combinations thereof). The second group includes purely nominal variables, which are variables that provide a descriptive classification such as ‘genre’ (which includes six categories, such as conversation, interview, parliamentary debate and so on), or the ‘core/pragmatic meaning’ (these are examples in which only the core, evidential value of *por lo visto* is present versus examples in which other pragmatic nuances, such as irony, mitigation and humour, appear).

3.4 Frequencies and statistical analyses

As mentioned in Section 2, six genres have been studied, although only 29 audio recordings were finally included in the experimental stage of the analysis due to the poor quality of the others (having been recorded in the open air, or at least not in a studio). The scarcity of samples has not permitted the application of some statistical analyses, such as cross-tables or log-linear models (Field 2009). Nonetheless, despite the sample not being big enough, the representativeness of the data is supported by additional factors: All the samples of *por lo visto* are individual; in other words, they have been produced by different speakers during different communicative events.

Three statistical tests were carried out in this study, namely the t-student test, the one-way ANOVA and the chi-square goodness of fit. The guidelines provided by Field (2009) and Gries (2013) have been followed.

4. Genre analysis

The analysis per genre is divided into three types of analysis: two complementary phonic studies on one hand and, on the other, an analysis taking the possible divergence, influenced by prosody, between semantic and pragmatic cases of *por lo visto* into account.

Firstly, the phonological analysis (Section 4.1.) examines the melodic configuration, following the AMH model (Cantero & Font 2009; see Section 4.1.1). The tonal and bitonal pitch accents collected have been analysed following the TOBI model, based extensively on the guidelines established by Roseano & Planas (2013; see Sections 4.1.2. and 4.1.3). Secondly, the phonetic analysis (Section 4.2.) focuses more on the acoustic values and not on the melodic behaviour itself; in this scenario, statistical methods have been used to detect similar or different groups.

Finally, as it has been stated, Section 4.3. will discuss the difference between the core meaning of *por lo visto* in contrast to any possible contextual increment or deviation of that meaning. Initially, a prosodic markedness is expected to accompany any additional sense.

4.1 Phonological study

4.1.1 Melodic patterns according the AMH model

Here, the melodic configuration of *por lo visto* is analysed in the different genres under investigation. To do this, the AMH model (Cantero 2002; Cantero & Font 2009), which homogenises the pitch values according to the percentage of rise or fall between the middle points of the vowels, was adopted. The melodic pattern of *por lo visto* can be seen in Figure 1.




Figure 1. Melodic pattern of *por lo visto* across genres

Figure 1 illustrates how *por lo visto* has a similar melodic pattern in all the genres considered. Nevertheless, in four of them (news, sociolectal interviews, parliamentary debates and TV debates), there is a tonal fall in the second syllable [lo] in comparison to the first syllable [por], and the tone rises again notably in the stressed syllable [βís].

In conversation, and particularly in TV talks, the rise is constant from the very first syllable. More specifically, conversation is the genre in which the melodic curve shows the most remarkable difference between the second [lo] and the third, stressed syllable [βís], with a rise of approximately 30 standardised Hz. We must bear in mind that in spontaneous, immediate genres such as everyday conversations, a constant rising tonal inflection often appears in cases in which a marked

pause is also present at the end of the sequence *por lo visto*. This point will be further explained in Section 4.1.3.

With regard to the global pitch (see Section 4.2), the different melodies in Table 1 are ordered based on the highest pitch value registered in the stressed syllable. The genres in which the stressed syllable is most notably emphasised are news, conversations and parliamentary debates, although television debates and sociolectal interviews are not far behind. TV talks, however, differ from the rest in this regard.

These results could have several explanations. Firstly, concerning news and parliamentary debates, the reason is their original written nature (they are first written, then read aloud) and the speaker knows (and has even rehearsed) the place(s) in which s/he must emphasise her/his words. In everyday conversation, a speaker emphasises those segments susceptible of being interpreted according to a given pragmatic value (also, the global pitch rises when an adequate sound perception is intended).

In summary, with regard to the melodic configuration, two main patterns exist, namely the circumflex configuration, found in almost all the genres considered, and a constant tonal rise, found specifically in TV talks and in conversations.

4.1.2 *Tonal accents*

The melodic configurations, transcribed and adapted to fit theSP-TOBI model (Estebas & Prieto 2009; 2010), reveal some patterns idiosyncratic in the collected data.

Table 2. Frequency of tonal accents across genres

Genre	Accents	Freq.	Genre	Accents	Freq.	Genre	Accents	Freq.
Conversation	H*	1	News	H + L*	1	Parliamentary debate	L* + H	2
	H + L*	1		L + H*	3		L + H*	3
	L*	1		L* + H	1			
	L* + H	2	TV Debate	L* + H	3	Sociolectal interview	L*	1
	L + H*	1	TV Talk	L* + H	5		L + H*	3

Again, despite the lack of sufficient material to carry out statistical tests, some remarkable facts can be deduced from Table 2. Firstly, in everyday conversation, speakers use a wide variety of prosodic modulations when uttering *por lo visto* (H*, H + L*, L*, L* + H, L + H*). There is only one case of repetition in the dislocated accent L* + H, which is commonly associated with counterexpectative questions and requests (Estebas & Prieto 2009; 2010).

Secondly, a recurrent bitonal accent is found in parliamentary debates, news and sociolectal interviews. This bitonal accent is aligned with the stressed syllable ($L + H^*$), and is commonly associated with declarative sentences (narrow focus). The rise in the stressed syllable is traditionally considered the expected accent structure in Spanish (Quilis 1981, 1993) but some, more recent, studies have considered the accent dislocation as the default structure in Spanish (Llisterri et al. 2003).

In parliamentary discourses, TV talks and TV debates, the bitonal accent $L^* + H$ has also been found frequently. The relationship between tonal accents and the evidential versus evidential + pragmatic meaning will be addressed in Section 4.3.

4.1.3 Break indices and boundary tones

According to the literature on DMs (Martín-Zorraquino & Montolío 1998; Portolés 2001), many DMs (as well as parentheticals, vocatives, and so on), as they are considered extrasentential or secondary elements in the discourse, are normally uttered between pauses in Spanish. Nevertheless, this perspective has been challenged by other phonic studies that have approached spontaneous discourse, since they found the opposite situation (Hirschberg & Litman 1993; Holmes 1988; Wichmann 2009; Cabedo 2013). In this sense, it must be considered that oral discourse is uttered rapidly, and therefore utterances follow each other almost without pause.

Regardless of the genre, the number of breaks in the use of *por lo visto* is far from the expected normal distribution, as Table 3 shows:

Table 3. Break indices observed and expected in the database

Row tags	Observed	Expected	Expected proportion
3_3	7	2.4	.1
3_4	5	5.4	.225
4_3	9	5.4	.225
4_4	3	10.8	.45

In general, the fact that 4_4 would be the most frequent option was expected and, although the expected frequency introduced (45%) is low, considering recent works (Cabedo 2013), the results obtained are statistically significant [Chi square (3, $N = 24$) = 16.88, $p = .0007$]. Despite the numbers of data collected not being very high, Koehler and Larntz' (1980: 336) claim that "if the total number of observations is at least 10, the number categories is at least 3, and the square of the total number of observations is at least 10 times the number of categories, then the chi-square approximation should be reasonable", has been followed.

In general, if we consider the standardised residuals, those categories not agreeing with that which was expected would be (a) 3_3, with a residual of 2.97, and (b) 4_4, with -2.37 . In other words, in contrast to the position in some of the literature

(Martín-Zorraquino and Portolés 1999), *por lo visto* is more frequently integrated in a broader phonic unit for DMs in general, and is therefore not systematically bordered by pauses.

The distribution of breaks according to the genre is presented in Table 4:

Table 4. Observed frequency of break indices across genres

Genre	Breaks	Freq.	Genre	Breaks	Freq.
Conversation	3_3	3	Parliamentary debate	3_3	1
	3_4	3		4_3	2
				4_4	2
TV Debate	4_3	2	Sociolectal interview	3_3	1
	3_4	1		3_4	1
News	3_3	1	TV Talk	4_4	3
	3_4	1		3_4	2
	4_3	3		3_3	3

The expected 4_4 structure was only found in parliamentary debates and sociolectal interviews, while most genres showed a 3 break at the end of *por lo visto*. This is most likely due to the middle-high degree of planification of the discourse and the relatively unlimited time at the speaker's disposal, unlike in news, in which the time is highly restricted.

Despite the structure 4_4 not having been found in conversation, there is one case of 3_4 structure and, therefore, the sequence in which *por lo visto* is integrated can be considered an intonational phrase.

The boundary tones most frequently found in break 4 alternate between H% and L% in conversations and sociolectal interviews. In break 3, which is more frequent in our corpus, all genres show continuative H- values, with the exception of conversations and sociolectal interviews. These two genres, together with news, show the L- tone.

In short, TV debates, TV talks and news are less notably separated from the speech uttered after; the speech rate constrains the phonic expression of *por lo visto*, which becomes an *intermediate phrase* or, more generally speaking, allows *por lo visto* to fit into a broader prosodic sequence.

4.2 Acoustic analysis

The data in Section 4.1.2 suggested that the phonological perspective is inconclusive for establishing prosodic differences across genres, since the melodic configuration of *por lo visto* does not vary substantially (it must be considered that *por lo visto* is a relatively short sequence of four syllables). Therefore, in the following lines, a phonetic analysis is presented focussing on acoustic variables, both global (considering

por lo visto as a whole) and per syllable (see Section 3.2). A one-way ANOVA test (Field 2009; Gries 2013) was conducted to compare the results for all six genres; for those variables in which an influence of genre was found, a further Tukey HSD test was carried out to observe the resulting similarities and differences.

Five variables were found to have statistically significant results, but only one was related to individual syllabic values: the pitch value in the first syllable [por]. The rest of the variables with a significant effect have been precisely the global variables, i.e. those considering the entire sequence *por lo visto* as one only element of analysis.

In the following Section, only the significant results that were found are provided. At the $p < .05$ level for the six factors established per genre, there was a significant effect on:

- Global pitch. [$F(5, 25) = 7.86, p = 0.000$]. Post hoc comparisons using the Tukey HSD test showed two different groups:
 - TV talk ($M = 114.16; SD = 2.51$), TV debates ($M = 119.75, SD = 2.78$), sociolectal interviews ($M = 124.56, SD = 39.68$).
 - Everyday conversations ($M = 183.70; SD = 34.81$), parliamentary debates ($M = 195.31; SD = 37.88$), news ($M = 211.75; SD = 42.81$).
- Duration. [$F(5, 25) = 3.45, p = 0.019$]. Post hoc comparisons using the Tukey HSD test indicated that the mean score for TV talk ($M = 0.42, SD = 0.14$) and TV debates ($M = 0.43, SD = 0.18$) was significantly different from the one for sociolectal interviews ($M = 0.65, SD = 0.11$).
- Global intensity. [$F(5, 25) = 28.75, p = 0.000$]. Post hoc comparisons using the Tukey HSD test revealed three different groups:
 - TV debates ($M = 59; SD = 0.69$) and TV talk ($M = 62.50; SD = 0.98$)
 - News ($M = 69.08; SD = 1.34$) and parliamentary discourse ($M = 69.87; SD = 4.73$).
 - Sociolectal interview ($M = 76.93; SD = 2.95$) and everyday conversations ($M = 78.91; SD = 5.98$).
- Speech rate. [$F(5, 25) = 4.59, p = 0.005$]. Post hoc comparisons using the Tukey HSD test indicated that the mean score for TV talk ($M = 9.56, SD = 1.23$) and TV debates ($M = 9.37, SD = 1.34$) was significantly different from the one for sociolectal interviews ($M = 6.27, SD = 0.98$).
- F0 of syllable [por]. [$F(5, 25) = 3.70, p = 0.014$]. Post hoc comparisons using the Tukey HSD test indicated that the mean score for TV talk ($M = 89.26, SD = 2.03$) and TV debates ($M = 87.82, SD = 1.97$) was significantly different from the one for News ($M = 117.64, SD = 31.32$).

The most striking aspect after observing the statistical results is that TV talk and TV debates had low pitch and intensity values compared to the other genres; along the same lines, short duration and high speech rate seem to be compensating for the absence of tonal marking and intensity. This duration and speech rate are similar

to those in other genres, but sociolectal interviews differed significantly, because it showed a longer duration and a slower speech rate.

With regard to tonal range and intensity, there is a separation between genres that typically show a low phonic register, such as TV talks and TV debates, and those typically showing high phonic registers, such as everyday conversations, parliamentary debates, TV news and sociolectal interviews. In this regard, it was expected that sociolectal interviews would reveal lower values.

High phonic registers in TV news or parliamentary debates can be explained by two main reasons (see Section 4.1.1). On one hand, they are *recited* discourses; on the other hand, their very format favours phonic emphasis. In conversation and sociolectal interviews, the high values are due to the immediacy of the interaction (Cabedo 2007).

4.3 Core meaning versus pragmatic meaning

That there is a difference between evidentials used only with their *core* meaning versus when they are accompanied by *pragmatic meanings* has been previously stated in the literature. Estellés & Albelda (2014), for instance, claimed that the cases of evidentials with additional pragmatic meaning (mostly instances of impoliteness in their corpus) are uttered with a marked prosody.

As mentioned previously, the size of the present corpus does not allow us to conduct a statistical analysis to observe similarities or differences in the prosodic realisation of purely evidential *por lo visto* and pragmatically tainted *por lo visto*; in other words, also expressing im/politeness, irony, humour and so on (see Sections 3.1 and 3.2 for an explanation of the technical limitations of the corpus). Consequently, the purpose of this work is extending the scope of the results obtained in Estellés & Albelda's (2014) work to more genres. By applying a t-student test, the differences between the examples categorised as *core* and those categorised as *pragmatic* will be described; therefore, all 29 examples of *por lo visto* that were collected will be considered as a whole. This comparison has been made using all the phonic variables, both global and per syllable. Figure 2 illustrates the most relevant phonic data.




Figure 2. Relevant prosodic values in core versus pragmatic meanings of *por lo visto*

Figure 2 reveals how the expression of pragmatic values entails an increase in the F0 and intensity values, as well as longer duration and, consequently, lower speed rate. The combination of these phonic factors when uttering *por lo visto* results in a better perception (in line with Estellés & Albelda [2014]).

Nevertheless, in the overall analysis, the statistical results are not significant for any of the variables considered. When looking at the data in more detail, an interesting fact emerges. Both parliamentary interventions and news have high prosodic records, but they have inverse values. Practically all the examples in the news are catalogued as having a *core* meaning, whereas the opposite was the case for parliamentary interventions, as all of them showed an additional pragmatic meaning. Studies such as those by Harris (2001) and San-Martín & Guerrero (2012), among others, have highlighted that parliamentary discourse, as it is expected to be argumentative, conveys impoliteness in most cases. News has an informative/objective purpose, while political discourse in general seeks to confront and discredit a political opponent in most cases.

Thus, in order to execute an adequate prosodic analysis, the values corresponding to news and parliamentary interventions have been discarded, because they were conditioned by factors related directly to the discursive reality to which they belong. Having discarded these values, the statistically significant value is the *global F0*. There was a significant difference in the scores for *core* ($M = 121.10$, $SD = 22.80$) and *pragmatic* ($M = 165.01$, $SD = 45.35$) conditions: $t(20) = 1.580$, $p = 0.026$. These results are in line with Estellés and Albelda's (2014) claim that the pragmatic values go hand-in-hand with a phonic marker that, at least in the present study, is significant in terms of the tonal values registered.

With regard to tonal accents (see Section 4.1.2), no statistically significant correspondence between tonal accents in the sequence *por lo visto* and the meaning (*core/pragmatic*) expressed can be found. In fact, the bitonal accent $L^* + H$ can be found in *core* and *pragmatic* meanings equally (four times each). Note, however, that three out of four core instances with the $L^* + H$ pattern appear in TV talks.

What seems to be more interesting is that seven cases with *pragmatic* meaning show the $L + H^*$ accent, three of them in parliamentary interventions and two in sociolectal interviews.

Finally, internal phonic differences were also found in one genre when expressing *core* and *pragmatic* meanings. This was the case in everyday conversation, as Examples (7) and (8) show. This intra-genre contrast needs to be further analysed, whether for *por lo visto* or for any other evidential marker.

Let us consider Figure 3, which shows the standardised melodic configuration of *por lo visto* in (1), here renamed (7), provided below.




Figure 3. Melodic pattern of *por lo visto* in (7) with pragmatic meaning (self-image; mitigation)

- (7) A: y me ha hecho gracia luego también el noruego[↑] // lo que ha salido diciendo[↓]/
 quee- Humberto no sé- ¡ah! porque en ese programa dicen al principio algo
 de unass- de unass encuestas[↓] no sé qué estadísticas[↑] patatín patatán ¿no?//
 yy-// y dice el noruego[↑] que también hicieron unas estadísticas en Holanda[↑]
 unas encuestas paraa alguna historia[↑] y que por lo visto[↑] // era curioso porque
 deel centro de Nolan- dee- de Noruega[...] del centro de Noruega al NORTE[↑]
 el norte de Noruega[↑] que por lo visto[↑] sí quee es verdad que en general era
 maayor la infidelidad[↓]/

(Corpus Valesco 2.0, Conversación 31, Intervenciones 37–45)

A: and later, I also found it funny, that Norwegian guy, what he was saying, that- Humberto...I'm not sure what... Oh! Because, in this program, at the beginning, they say something about some- some surveys, something about some statistics, blah, blah, blah, right? And the Norwegian guy says that they also have made surveys in Norway, for some other reasons, and apparently... It was interesting, because in central Hol-... in central Norway [...] from central Norway to the north... in the north, in northern Norway, apparently it is true that, in general, infidelity rates are higher.

(Corpus Valesco 2.0, Conversación 31, Intervenciones 37–45)

Speaker A in (7) is a woman, aged between 26 and 55, from Valencia (Spain). In (7), the speaker uses *por lo visto* with a concrete evidential value: There is a reference to an external source, a Norwegian speaker, who provided some information about a survey on infidelity conducted in his country. Here, the melodic configuration is rising, the global F0 is high (mean: 206 Hz) and there is a tonal rise in the stressed

syllable (L + H*). The *pragmatic* meaning expressed is self-image protection, achieved by mitigating A's statement. According to Levinson (2000), marked meanings tend to also be marked formally, and in this example the added pragmatic value is expressed via high prosodic values. Now, let us compare this latter case with the *core meaning* in (8), the melodic configuration of which is provided in Figure 4.




Figure 4. Melodic pattern of *por lo visto* in (8), with the core meaning

- (8) A: todos son superdotao(s)
 B: (solamente-) / (solamente saben) / que juegan muy bien al ajedrez
 C: ya / (y so-) / y nada máh
 D: habilidades sociales **por lo visto** Kasparov no tiene ninguna / ¿no?
 A: ¿Kasparov? / sí
 D: ¿habilidades [socia]les?
 C: [esa-]
 B: Kasparov sí / (Kasparov) es un tipo / hipercarismático
 A: all of them [chess players] are gifted people
 B: (they just-) / (they just can) / they play chess really well
 C: I see / (and jus-) / and nothing else
 D: **apparently** Kasparov has no social skills / does he?
 A: Kasparov? / yes, he does
 D: Social skills?
 C: [that-]
 B: Kasparov does have social skills/ (Kasparov) is a hypercharismatic guy
 (Corpus Val.Es.Co 2.0, Conversación 34, Intervenciones 535–548)

As in (7), in (8) D is a (different) woman aged 26–55, and is from Valencia. D's first intervention states that Kasparov, according to the general opinion or to sources other than D, has no social skills. It is the first time this fact appears in the conversation and no added pragmatic values for *por lo visto* can be argued. The prosody shows a lower tonal register (mean: 134 Hz) and an expected melodic configuration (L + H*).

By observing (7) and (8), as was pointed out in Section 4.1, it seems evident that the difference in pragmatic behaviour between *core* and *pragmatic* meanings does not emerge from the melodic configuration or the tonal accent used, but from something wider, namely the global F0 taking *por lo visto* as a whole.

5. Conclusions

In this section the main findings of the preceding sections will be summarised. This study, in general, has analysed the different behaviour of the Spanish evidential DM *por lo visto* in six oral genres, namely everyday conversations, parliamentary interventions, sociolectal interviews, TV news, TV talks and TV debates.

When considered per genre, the melodic configurations correspond to two general patterns: The circumflex pattern, showing a valley in the syllable [lo] and a remarkable rise in [βís], can be found in all genres, while a pattern of continuous tonal rise has been found in TV talks and, to a lesser extent, in everyday conversations.

Tonal accents are equally distributed according to genre, with the exception of news, parliamentary interventions and sociolectal interviews, in which L + H* is more frequent; in the rest of the genres, the displaced accent L* + H is more frequent.

Por lo visto is usually integrated within a wider intonational phrase. In other words, it is not flanked by pauses; instances of *por lo visto* as an independent intonational phrase have only been found in parliamentary interventions and in sociolectal interviews.

The boundary tone in intermediate phrases is mainly H- in all genres, except in conversations and sociolectal interviews, where L- is found.

With regard to global F0 and global intensity, *por lo visto* behaves in a significantly different manner depending on the genre in which the DM is included. News, parliamentary interventions and conversations have a global F0 that is significantly higher than it is in the other genres studied. TV talks and debates, in turn, show the lowest intensity values.

The variables of duration and speech rate also show significant differences depending on the genres. In TV talks and debates, *por lo visto* is uttered significantly faster than it is in sociolectal interviews in which the pace is slower.

Our data, not being abundant, do not permit the establishment of a statistical relationship between prosodic marking and the expression of a pragmatic value that

is added to the core, evidential meaning of *por lo visto*. However, some genres (conversations and sociolectal interviews) seem to show a tendency to use prosody to mark the presence of pragmatic meanings, whereas other genres are clearly oriented towards the purely evidential (news) or pragmatic pole (parliamentary debates).

Acknowledgements

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‘No sé’

Epistemic stance, evidential grounding and scope in unplanned oral genres

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The aim of this paper¹ is to analyze and discuss the semantic-pragmatic scope that epistemic phrases such as Spanish ‘no sé’ (*I don’t know*) play in oral opinion reports, a genre that implies a strong presence of value judgements and engagement on the part of the speaker.

The stance frame that such epistemic phrases provide as fixed epistemic formulas has been pointed out by several authors that work in the interactional epistemic domain (Kärkkäinen 2003, 2007; Scheibman 2000, 2001; Thompson 2002), exploring whether the scope of these formulas (*I think, I don’t know, I guess, I thought and I remember*) extends over something that has yet to be verbalized (forward scope) or over something that has already been verbalized in the preceding turn (backward scope). The working hypothesis is that, contrary to conversational genre, where such fixed formulas tend to provide a forward scope, in opinion reports the scope is twofold, with a stronger presence of backward scope, in the case of ‘no sé’. Findings suggest: (i) strong presence of the epistemic phrasal form (‘no sé’), rather than the predicative one, in the genre analyzed; (ii) predominant role of ‘no sé’ as attitude marker, to convey affect (to construe emotional responses), judgement (to convey moral evaluations) and appreciation (to construe the value of things).

Keywords: oral genre, epistemic phrase, parenthetical, attitude, stance, appraisal, commitment, Spanish, Catalan, English, *I don’t know*, *no sé*

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1. Introduction

The degree of involvement and commitment to the truthfulness and probability of a message is linguistically marked by the speaker or writer by means of lexicogrammatical elements such as auxiliary and modal verbs, adverbials, pragmatic markers and evidential phrases. In the interactional domain, these forms are treated as a type of epistemic modality or of evidential marking used as a discourse strategy to show the stance and ground the attitudinal position of the speaker (Bednarek 2006; Cornillie 2010; Hoyer 2008; Sidnell 2012; González 2015). Appraisal Theory (Martin & White 2005) approaches these forms as discourse strategies that help express the interpersonal meaning in the interacting domains of attitude, engagement and graduation. By means of them, speakers express their feelings, emotional reactions, judgements and opinions, showing their degree of alignment, disalignment and commitment towards the propositional meaning of their message and towards that of their interlocutors. The interplay between the subject's opinion and attitude, and his/her evaluation towards what s/he is saying or towards the situation establishes a strong bond between epistemicity and speaker's stance, understood in terms of speaker's attitude (Biber et al. 1999; Conrad & Biber 2001; Nuyts 2001; Martin & White 2005).

From a functional perspective, these epistemic forms work as parenthetical modality markers or 'epistemic parentheticals' (EPARs; Thompson & Mulac 1991) detached from the main clause, as exemplified in (1) below. See the formal and functional differences with (2), where the verb phrase is part of the main clause in a complement clause construction, and (3), where the marker is a reply to an information question, conveying the semantic meaning of 'insufficient knowledge':

- (1) **No sé**, me dijo que me llamaría pero no lo ha hecho, **no sé**, me parece que no lo hará.
[I don't know, he told me he would call me but he hasn't, I don't know, I think he won't]
- (2) Tengo que decidirme de una vez, pero **no sé** que hacer.
[I have to take a decision, but I don't know what to do.]
- (3) A: Sabes si Ana vendrá al cine con nosotras? B: **No lo sé**.
[A: Do you know if Ana will come to the movies with us? B: I don't know.]

The epistemic phrase under analysis (1) emerges as a conversational routine that speakers use to convey their affective or evaluative stance to negotiate or assess their point of view, in a dialogued as well as in a monologued piece of discourse. Thompson and Mulac (1991) study the phenomenon of 'that-deletion' in complement clauses including first person subjects followed by a cognitive verb (they focus on I think) and their grammaticization into 'epistemic phrases' that express

the degree of the speaker’s commitment (‘I think exercise is really beneficial, to anybody’) and ‘epistemic parentheticals’ (‘It’s just your point of view you know what you like to do in your spare time *I think*’) (their examples; 1991: 313). Thompson and Mulac define the latter as “the epistemic phrase consisting of a subject and a verb which appears in some position other than before a clause that could be considered its complement.” (1991: 317). In this paper, I will adopt Thompson and Mulac’s terminology, focusing on the use of *no sé* as an epistemic parenthetical (from now on EPAR) as illustrated in (1) above.

As other epistemic forms, the verbal collocation *no sé* has undergone a process of grammaticization that results in the functioning of the phrase as if it was an epistemic adverb that conveys a low degree of commitment on the part of the speaker, similar to *maybe* or *perhaps*, often working as a marker of uncertainty, with a range of other pragmatic functions. From a formal point of view, the alternation between the two possible uses illustrated in (1) and (2) – with and without a complementizer – and the variation between these and (3), including a proform that goes back to a previous referent, indicates such process of grammaticization and lexicalization, typical of discourse markers and conversational formulas that are frequently present in oral interactions (González 2004, 2015). As will we see in the following sections, the core meaning of *no sé* as marker of ‘insufficient knowledge’ (Tsui 1991; Diani 2004) and as a reply to an information question has evolved into a marker that displays a variety of epistemic pragmatic functions. Furthermore, the presence of the first person pronoun linked to the fact that we are dealing with a cognitive verb (*know*) enhances the subjectivity and the positioning of the speaker’s self, allowing the participants of the exchange to personalize their messages and talk (Sheibman 2000; Baumgarten & House 2010).

The aim of this paper is to analyze and discuss the semantic-pragmatic functions and divergent scope that epistemic phrases such as Spanish and non-standard Catalan² *no sé*³ (*I don’t know*) play in informal spontaneous conversations and in oral opinion reports; both genres imply negotiation, value judgements and engagement on the part of the speaker. The stance frame that such epistemic phrases provide as fixed epistemic formulas has been pointed out by several authors that work in the interactional epistemic domain (Kärkkäinen 2003, 2007; Scheibman 2000, 2001;

2. The methodology used to elicit this corpus is experimental. See full explanation of the method in two articles published in co-authorship in *Lingua* (<http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.lingua.2014.11.008>) and in *Discourse Processes* (<http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/0163853X.2014.969137>)

3. The standard Catalan form includes the pronoun that goes back to a preceding referent: *no ho sé* (literally: I don’t know it). The presence of [non-standard] *no sé* in colloquial oral Catalan is probably due to the language contact situation between Spanish and Catalan in Catalonia.

Thompson 2002; Baumgarten & House 2010), exploring whether the scope of these collocations (I think, I don't know, I guess, I thought and I remember) extends over something that has yet to be verbalized (forward scope) or over something that has already been verbalized in the preceding turn (backward scope). The working hypothesis is that, contrary to conversational genre, where such fixed formulas tend to provide a forward scope (Kärkkäinen 2010), in oral opinion reports the scope is twofold, with a stronger tendency towards backward scope, in the case of *no sé*. Findings suggest: (i) a predominant role of *no sé* as attitude marker, to convey affect (to construe emotional responses), judgement (to convey moral evaluations) and appreciation (to construe the value of things); (ii) the use of the epistemic form to convey a low degree of commitment towards the propositional content of the message.

From a methodological perspective, the two unplanned oral genres that I have chosen offer striking formal and functional differences. Whereas spontaneous conversations present a dialogical sequence of turn-taking roles, with a continuous dynamic process of negotiation between the participants, oral opinion reports provide a particular frame of analysis inasmuch as they are monologued stretches of discourse that do not have such sequential organization; there is just a single speaker that gives an opinion to the addressee, after being asked a question on a specific controversial issue. Providing an opinion on a controversial issue implies, on the speaker's side, stance-taking and epistemic positioning. In oral opinion reports, besides the propositional content of the message, the speaker has to express his/her thoughts, attitude and feelings towards the issue, with the ultimate goal of convincing the listener of the soundness of his/her arguments. The data used in the present study are taken from several Spanish corpora found in the internet such as *Corpus Español Actual (CEA)*, *Corpus Lingüístico de la Universidad de Vigo (CLUVI)* and *Corpus de Español Coloquial (Val.es.co)*, as well as from a Catalan corpus of opinion reports elicited by the author in co-authorship.⁴ It is important to point out that my approach is qualitative, leaving quantitative methodology for a future study, with a larger amount of data.

This paper is organized in three main sections. In Section 2 I describe and illustrate the pragmatic functions of *no sé* in unplanned oral genres, taking Tsui's (1991) and Diani's (2004) proposals on *I don't know* as framework. In Section 3 I discuss the theoretical notions of stance, subjectivity and grammaticization of *no sé*. In Section 4 I focus on the notion of backward and forward scope proposed by Kärkkäinen (2010), analyzing the scope of *no sé* in the selected corpus. Finally, I discuss the findings and the validity of my working hypothesis linked to the scope of this epistemic form.

4. I haven't found any study on Spanish or [non-standard] Catalan *no sé* working as epistemic parenthetical in oral unplanned discourse.

2. Pragmatic functions of *no sé* in unplanned oral genres

There is a profuse number of studies on English and Spanish conversational routines, pragmatic markers and formulaic language, but not so many on subject + cognitive verb collocations working as EPARs.⁵ Tsui's (1991) seminal article on the pragmatic functional profile of *I don't know*, the English counterpart of Spanish *no sé*, is a basic reference in the study of this particular use of the phrase. Besides the prototypical semantic meaning of 'insufficient knowledge', as in (3) above, Tsui pinpoints six pragmatic functions of *I don't know* that occur in conversational discourse and are not considered a reply to a previous question: (i) avoiding assessment; (ii) prefacing disagreement; (iii) avoiding explicit disagreement; (iv) avoiding commitment; (v) minimizing impolite beliefs; and (vi) marking uncertainty. All the functions depend on the placement of *I don't know* in the sequential organization of the discourse. Her framework is based on Goffman's (1967) work on 'face' and on the 'avoidance process' that speakers carry out in a face-to-face communicative exchange. As she reports, Goffman claims that the best way for speakers to prevent threats to their face or to others' face is avoidance, employing deception, circumlocutions and ambiguities (1967: 17). Thus, in the case of *I don't know*, the point would be that speakers make use of it in oral exchanges neither because they are incapable of supplying the required information nor because they are unwilling to do so, but because they are motivated by a need to save their own face. Tsui (1991: 609–611) provides the following example to illustrate it (4). Note that D is a response to a previous assessment, not to a request for information. She points at the fact that the lexical verb is uttered in high key, which shows a contrast to the expectations of an agreement on C's part. By using it, prefacing disagreement, the speaker mitigates its face-threatening effect.

- (4) [BCET:D:18]
 [C is pointing at some pictures on the wall.]
 C: Don't you – I thought those pictures were quite interesting.
 D: /i don't KNOW/ All art is useless.

5. Kärkkäinen (2010) points out that the scope of epistemic phrases is not only affected by their position but also by the prosodic realization of the phrase or the clause. In a previous study (Kärkkäinen, 2003) she found out that "the right-binding prosody was by far the most frequent in everyday unplanned speech, i.e. the epistemic phrase was prosodically integrated into the pitch contour of the following intonation unit, most commonly a clausal one [...]". She suggests to see Kaltenböck (2007) for a full account of the four types of prosodic binding between epistemic phrases and their host constructions in British English.

As Tsui puts it, “Prefacing a disagreement with a declaration of insufficient knowledge reduces the speaker’s commitment to the truth of the proposition expressed in the disagreement, hence mitigating its face-threatening effect.” (1991: 611). In (4), D makes a strong [negative] assessment (‘All art is useless’) prefaced by *I don’t know*, pushing it into the turn. It is a dispreferred response that is delayed to save face, working as some pragmatic markers do (*well* in particular) in dispreferred responses, hesitations or disagreements. On a similar line of argument, Diani (2004) comments on the use of *I don’t know* as a conversational strategy or ‘protective manoeuvre’ used by speakers to preserve face and to respect the principles of politeness, claiming that “it makes communication more smooth because if the hearer is offended s/he may walk out or never consent to speak to her/his interlocutor again.” (2004: 157). Same as Tsui, Diani claims that *I don’t know* is a strategy to control and reduce the degree of commitment to the truth of a proposition, working as a face-threat mitigator and as a marker that helps the speaker express a personal opinion without taking full responsibility for its truth-value (i.e. showing some degree of uncertainty). Linked to the pragmatic functions of avoiding disagreement overtly and reducing the speaker’s commitment, the author comments on the use of *I don’t know* working as some pragmatic markers do (*well, oh, I mean*) to preface a dispreferred response and to mitigate the potential negative effect of an answer (2004: 161), making reference to Schiffrin’s (1987) pioneering work on discourse markers. See Diani’s example (2004: 164) in (5):

- (5) <M01> [...] Oh well old Jesus Christ would be happy to hear that wouldn’t he?
 <F03> *Well I don’t know.* *Well* I hope I still go up there to see him eventually
 <M01> Yeah
 <F03> and perhaps [...]

The instances of *no sé* found in the corpora of analysis show similar pragmatic functions to those pinpointed by Tsui (1991) and Diani (2004). I will adopt Tsui’s classification to discuss and illustrate the pragmatic functions of *no sé* as EPAR.

2.1 Avoiding assessment

This function is directly related to Goffman’s (1967) ‘avoidance process’, that is, to the strategy used by speakers to save face and avoid doing a face-threatening act. See it exemplified with *no sé* in (6), a conversation held between a group of friends who are all professionals, talking about education, affect and cultural issues related to the anglosaxon world.

- (6) [COE-cinta 031-ccon031b.asc-27-3-91]
 <H1> La sociedad americana es muy muy muy est muy preocupada en este momento... por los niños pequeños...
 The american society is very very very is very worried at this moment... about small children.
- <H2> Pero porque justamente han pasado un problema de que no les han dado ningun ejemplo.
 But just because they have gone through a problem that nobody has given them any example.
- <H3> Por su puritanismo. Son unos puritanos espantosos.
 Because of their puritanism. They are awfully puritan.
- <H6> Sí esa es la diferencia, que aquí no estamos preocupados por eso porque esa es una expresión
 yes this is the difference, that here we're no worried for this because this is an expression.
- <H3> No sé.
 I don't know.
- <H6> generalmente normal o natural.
 Generally normal and natural.
- <H3> Que no puedo hablar de Estados Unidos.
 That I cannot talk about the United States.
- <H6> Con sus excepciones.
 With its exceptions.
- <H3> pues ... ya que no... no he estado, pero...
 well... since I haven't.... I haven't been, but...
- <H1> Como va a ser una cuestión natural si no es una... si no es un problema de carácter nacional, si es un problema de... de... de... problema sicológico de transmisión de padres a hijos.
 How is it going to be a natural question if it is not a.... If it is not a nationwide problem, if it is a problem of...of...of... a psychological problem of transmission from parents to children.

Note that H3 makes use of *no sé* in response to an assessment of H6. The woman declares insufficient knowledge not because she doesn't know the answer, which she provides in her following turns (the reason why she cannot talk about the US is because she hasn't been there), but because she declines to fully commit with the referent that is unknown to her. Tsui (1991: 610), paraphrasing Pomerant'z words (1984: 57), claims that "assessments are made of productions of participations" based on the fact that when speakers make them, they do so on a basis of knowledge of what they are talking about. In (6), it is clear that H3 does not have that basis of knowledge and thus declines to go on with H6's previous argument.

2.2 Prefacing disagreement

The difference that Tsui makes between this pragmatic function and the previous one is that in this case the speaker has access to the referent but chooses to push it into the turn to avoid a blunt disagreement with the previous assessment; the result is that there is no contiguity between the two turns. It was exemplified in (4) above and we can see it illustrated with *no sé* in (7). The conversation is between a mother (H2) and a daughter (H1) who is going to get married.

- (7) [COE-cinta 037-ccon037b.asc-18-6-91]
- <H1> preguntan... tres días antes de la boda te preguntan exactamente cuantas personas esperas.
ask... three days before the wedding they ask you exactly how many people you expect.
- <H2> Una semana antes.
a week before.
- <H1> Sí, una semana.
Yes, a week before.
- <H2> Me ha dicho...
s/he has told me...
- <H1> Con lo cual es... yo cogería el teléfono y empezaría a decir: “Oye, vais a venir, vais a...?”
so... I would take the phone and I would start by saying: “listen, are you coming, are you...?”
- <H2> Hombre, uno por uno. No, no, yo también, eh? Yo lo voy a hacer pero así.
Well, one by one. No, no, me too, of course. I’m going to do it like this.
- <H1> Es que si no te lo cobran, claro, o sea...
otherwise they definitely charge you, I mean...
- <H2> Claro.
Of course.
- <H1> *no sé*, creo que te... hay algo que... hay un margen... hay un margen pero poco y te cobran carísimo.
I don’t know, I think that they... there’s something that... there is a margin... there is a margin but little and they charge you a lot.

In the above interaction, the daughter (H1) doesn’t comply, to a full extent, with the mother (H2) in claiming that the restaurant charges the cost of the event. She argues that there is a margin and makes use of *no sé* to preface a disagreement, introducing her turn afterwards by means of another epistemic verb, *creo* (literally: believe), that in this context expresses uncertainty about her claim. We will see in the following section that this pragmatic function is highly common in the use of *no sé* when reporting an opinion.

2.3 Avoiding explicit disagreements

This function occurs in contexts where the speaker introduces either an implicit disagreement or a dispreferred response; it is a way to disagree with the prior assessment without stating it openly. See it illustrated in (8). The interactional context is the same as that of (6); in this particular case, the group of friends are talking about climate change.

- (8) [COE-cinta 031-ccon031b.asc-27-3-91]
 <H4> Hombre, el problema es que tan pron en esta época nunca ha hecho buen tiempo, creo yo, no?
 Well, the problem is that so soo... in this time of the year the weather has never been good, I believe, isn't it?
 <H5> Bueno, no. Ha llovido pero esto no se ha dado.
 Not really. It has rained but this has never happened before.
 <H4> No? no se ha dado?
 Really? Is that so?
 <H5> Hombre, nevar así...
 Well, snowing like this...
 <H4> Hombre...
 Well...
 <H3> Depende
 It depends
 <H4> Hombre...
 Well...
 <H3> de los años, hombre. Es que estamos a final de marzo, hombre.
 On the years, really. We are at the end of march, man.
 <H5> No sé...
 I don't know
 <H4> Es normal que haya un poco de frío y nieve.
 It's normal that it is a bit cold and some snow
 <H5> Bueno, oye, vámonos.
 Well, listen, let's go

In the sequential organization of the interaction, H5 starts his argument by assessing that the type of weather they now have is unusual (snowing so much at this time of the year). H4 and H3 do not agree with H5 and preface their disagreements with *well*, a common pragmatic marker typically used to introduce dispreferred responses, as a way to attenuate the possible negative reaction on the hearer and avoid a face-threatening effect. Note also that H5 introduces *no sé* at the end of the interaction, right before closing it ('well, listen, let's go'). In terms of position and scope (Kärkkäinen 2010), this *no sé* has a backward scope, that is, it makes reference to something that has already been verbalized in a previous turn and works as a closure marker. I will go back to this point in Section 4.

2.4 Avoiding commitment

Tsui proposes this function in relation to contexts where the speaker makes use of the EPAR to preface reluctance or discomfort to provide an answer that may represent a commitment to the propositional content of his/her words or to the other's. In Tsui's words, "It is neither a refusal nor a compliance, but rather a conveyance of discomfort and reluctance without committing himself to either a compliance or a refusal." (1991: 617). The presence of the epistemic marker is typical in responses to invitations, requests for permissions or any kind of act that requires some sort of commitment on the part of the speaker. In certain discourse genres, like oral opinion reports, the use of *I don't know* carrying out this function is extremely common. See it illustrated in (9), found in the oral opinion reports of the corpus of analysis (in this case, reported in Catalan). Speakers have been asked to give an opinion on the use of aspirin or acupuncture, when they have a health problem. It is a controversial issue in our cultural context.

(9) [oral-acu-pair 2]

Eee... bueno... pot ser diver- Hi ha gent que hi creu per exemple **no sé**, si creus més en aquest rotllo de... des chi... tot, s'energia i tot, jo sóc un poc escèptic. Però... Igual hi ha gent que ho ha provat i li funciona i... **no sé**. Però en aquest món avui en dia, **no ho sé**, jo crec que no... no funcionaria **no ho sé**, igual si estàs allà dalt d'una muntanya i tal en plan en pau i això, poster allà dalt funciona... però **no sé**, no, jo no sóc... **no sé**, preferesc un altre tipus de medicina. Eee... well... it may be fun. There are people who believe for example *I don't know*, if you believe more in all this stuff of... of chi... everything, energy and all, I'm a bit sceptical. But... there must be people who have tried it and it has worked for them and... *I don't know*. But in our present world, *I don't know*, I think that no... it wouldn't work *I don't know*, maybe if you are at the top of a mountain and so on like in peace an all, maybe up there it works... but *I don't know*, no, I'm not... *I don't know*, I prefer another type of medicine.

Oral opinion reports are quite unique to analyze pragmatic marking, in general, and epistemic forms, in particular, since the author's voice and self-face is predominant. Besides, formally speaking, they are monologued stretches of discourse without the sequential organization of conversational turn-taking, and therefore without the possibility to negotiate meaning. When the informant is asked to report an opinion on a controversial issue, s/he has to code it in such a way that his/her feelings, beliefs and attitude is fully expressed. The use of the language and the specific words that the speaker uses becomes, in this particular genre, extremely relevant since s/he does not have the input of an interlocutor to make the discourse advance and change. The reported opinion has to be coherent but, above all, make sense to the listener since it has to comply with what has been asked.

In (9), the informant is providing an opinion on the use of acupuncture. Note the frequency of use of *no sé* with its variants: six occurrences of the EPAR in five lines, practically one each time he initiates a line of thought or argument. Instead of providing a straightforward first assessment stating 'I don't like acupuncture', and thus committing himself to the propositional meaning of his message, he goes on justifying his positioning and presenting his thoughts and feelings towards acupuncture in a tentative way to prevent doing a face-threatening act and saving his negative face: 'I am a bit sceptical', 'I believe that it would not work [in our present world]', 'maybe it would if you are at the top of a mountain'. Besides, notice the evidential marking (i.e. sources of knowledge or information) that he presents when giving his opinion on the use of acupuncture; he grounds it on indirect reported information ('some people believe on it'; 'some people has proved it and say that it works'). Evidentiality and epistemicity usually go hand-in-hand in discourse (cf. González 2014, 2015, 2017): the more committed a speaker is towards the propositional content of his/her message, the higher the use of evidential marking to back it up. In (9) the speaker avoids this commitment, being very generic about the sources ('some people') and not offering any kind of scientific evidence that would definitely legitimize his opinion and give it authority.

From a formal point of view, (9) presents another phenomenon typical of these epistemic forms, which is variation of reduced and full forms: four of the six occurrences present a subject + verb pattern: *no sé* (I don't know); the other two present a subject + pronoun + verb pattern: *no ho sé* (I don't know it), which is the standardized Catalan form. Scheibman (2000) has investigated the phonetic variation of the vowel sound of *don't* in *I don't know*, with full and reduced forms (*don't* and *dunno*), finding out a functional split between the two and a connection with a process of grammaticization. I will further comment on this issue in the following section.

2.5 Minimization of impolite beliefs

The characteristics of this pragmatic function are very similar to those that apply for 'avoiding explicit disagreement' (2.3. above), i.e. minimize the face-threatening effect of a negative assessment by means of an implicit disagreement. The difference, though, is rather formal. According to Tsui (1991: 618), the utterance where the marker occurs is in first assessments, followed by a second assessment that is usually negative. This structure would respond to the politeness principles that operate in conversation, according to which speakers should minimize the expression of impolite beliefs (Tsui 1991 quoting Leech 1983). The occurrences found in this interactional context are usually prefaced by a hedge (*sort of*) or a pragmatic marker (*well*) that mitigate the negative effect on the interlocutor, connection which has been pinpointed by Diani (2004) and commented on in the previous section. See

(10), where the speaker makes use of *no sé* prefaced by *bé* (well) at the end of his report when asked about his opinion on acupuncture, trying to minimize the effect that may have on the interviewer.

(10) [oral-acu-pair 9]

[...] deu ser... es força efecte... placebo. Però en...els casos que tinc propers els ha funcionat. I jo crec, o sigui, personalment no ho he viscut, però... això. Bé, **no sé**. No ho faria... crec. No faria acupuntura, de fet. Sóc molt escèptica. [...] it must be... it's rather placebo effect. But in... the cases I know have succeeded. And I think, I mean, personally I haven't experienced it, but... that is. *Well, I don't know*. I wouldn't do it... I think. I wouldn't do acupuncture, in fact. I am very sceptical.

Notice that the utterance following '*bé, no sé*' includes a conditional verb form and an epistemic verb that signals uncertainty. By means of all this epistemic marking, the speaker softens and minimizes the potential unwelcomed reaction that his opinion may have on the listener. As closure marker, we will see in the following section that the position of this EPAR has a backward scope.

2.6 Marker of uncertainty

From the six pragmatic functions of *I don't know* pinpointed by Tsui, uncertainty is one of the most common. It is used to mark uncertainty in relation to the truth value of the proposition it introduces or as a preface to a reply, indicating a low degree of commitment and thus engagement on the speaker's side. As far as position is concerned, it can have a forward or a backward scope, preceding or following the utterances it affects. In the following opinion report (11) the speaker makes use of *no sé* showing a strong degree of uncertainty about the harmful effects that aspirin may have in one's body.

(11) [oral-aspi-pair 8]

[...] sí, sí que jo crec que funciona, el que passa és que és això, que pot tenir molts pros però també pot tenir molts contres com per exemple... no saps què fa a dins del teu cos, o sigui, és un àcid que... **no sé**, et treu algo, o t'adorm algo... o sigui, és agr- jo crec que... funciona, però és agressiu per al teu cos. I ja està.

[...] yes, yes, I think it works, the thing is that it's like this, that it can have many pros but it can also have many cons like for example... you don't know what it does inside your body, I mean, it's an acid that... *I don't know*, it takes off something or it puts something to sleep... I mean, is agr- I think that... it works, but it's aggressive for your body. And that's it.

Note that the speaker initiates his report by making a strong assessment in favour of aspirin (*yes, yes, I think it works*) but then introduces, by means of concessive phrasing, all the cons and fears about its potential negative effects, showing, towards the end, a clear uncertain stance about the consumption of aspirins. The use of *no sé*, in this context, has a twofold purpose: it works as a marker of uncertainty and, at the same time, as a conclusive marker that, similar to *anyway*, signals the speaker's stance and wraps the previous arguments up into the final most important one: aspirin may be very aggressive for your body. The final coda ('and that's it') puts an end to the story, similar to the *labovian* structuring of narratives of a past personal experience.

The following section will tackle the stance-taking role of *no sé* with the first person pronoun 'I' and the way the phrasal unit has grammaticized and lexicalized from its literal meaning of 'not knowing something' to its preponderant subjectified meaning, illustrated by the pragmatic functions discussed above and in the variation of full and reduced forms. Four main works of reference will be discussed in relation to the issue: Scheibman's (2000, 2001, 2002), Thompson & Mulac's (1991), and Baumgarten & House's (2010).

3. Stance, subjectivity and grammaticization of *no sé*

As we have seen, besides expressing propositional content, when speakers interact they also express their inner feelings, value judgements, emotions and attitude. They do so towards the interlocutor's words and reactions, towards the expression of their own arguments and towards the situation or activity they are carrying out. They take a stance, personalizing their talk, making evaluations and showing empathy. In face-to-face communication, it is the interpersonal function of language, and not the ideational, the one that stands out and really prevails.

Baumgarten and House (2010: 1184) claim that high frequency subject + verb collocations such as *I think* and *I don't know* are markers of stance-taking because they encode "the speaker's perceptions, feelings, attitudes, evaluations and opinions in discourse." Their study on their use by English L1 and English as lingua franca (ELF) speakers shows that these markers are the most frequent "stance-marking devices" in their database, highlighting the fact that ELF speakers communicate in different English varieties in communicative encounters (2010: 1184–1185). The authors illustrate it by means of different formal patterns (2010: 1195):

- (12) As a simple clause construction:
I don't know so much about Japanese. (ELF1)
- (13) In main clause, in complement clause construction:
I don't know why it's not, not pre... I, I really ask myself why there is no LAW against such things. (ELF2)

(14) As a verbal routine:

It's like, **I don't know**, if you look like and think of (this), it goes to what works best especially in business and things like that because I don't know if that's people get lazier but they wanna be more effective. (L1)

Whereas (12) and (13) encode the core semantic meaning of the collocation, that is, 'insufficient knowledge' (cf. Tsui 1991; Diani 2004), (14) encodes a pragmatic meaning that has nothing to do with a deficit in knowledge but with the speaker's uncertainty and lack of full commitment to previous and following propositional contents. According to Baumgarten and House (2010), in L1 speakers use *I don't know* as a *verbal routine* (in this work, as an epistemic parenthetical or EPAR) in a hearer-oriented fashion.

In the L1 discourse, the pragmatic uses of *I don't know* can be seen as hearer-oriented in that they implicate potential disagreement and potentially different opinions on the subject matter, inviting divergent contributions from the other participants. This is especially evident in the utterance-/turn-final uses of *I don't know*, which clearly serve to signal that hearer uptake is possible. But also in utterance-initial and utterance and turn-medial positions *I don't know* has a hearer-oriented quality in that it serves to convey to the hearer(s) that the speaker is avoiding an unequivocal stance and a fully committed statement, ostensibly in order not to monopolize the talk and to force the speaker's opinion upon the discourse and the other participants. This use of *I don't know* invites the hearer's evaluation of the speaker's contribution and evokes the impression that the conversational floor is, in principle, open. (2010: 1196).

The stance-taking role of *no sé* is highlighted by the fact that the subject that collocates with the cognitive verb is the first person singular pronoun 'I', which facilitates his/her anchoring in the discourse. As source of subjectivity, the use of first person pronoun allows speakers to introduce a personal perspective to their talk, facilitating the expression of their feelings, attitudes and beliefs. In their study on the use of person and verb type related to subjectivity, Baumgarten & House (2010) and Scheibman (2001) make reference to Benveniste's (1966/1971) seminal work on subjectivity in language and his claiming that it is precisely the grammatical category of pronouns that provides speakers with the capacity to express themselves and their positioning. Baumgarten and House word it like this: "I + *predicate* combinations in discourse are self-revelations. They are the prime sites of the speakers' self-stylization." (2010: 1185). They investigate *I think* and *I don't know* collocations in British and in American corpora concluding that *I don't know* is the most common stance-marker (2010: 1186). The formal structures and the meaning variants of these two verb phrases as simple clause constructions (12), as main clause in complement clause constructions (13), and as verbal routines (14)

show the way the units have evolved both grammatically and lexically, responding to a process of grammaticization and lexicalization. Formally speaking, the position of the phrases as verbal routines, totally detached from the predicative structure of the utterance, shows a mobility characteristic of parenthetical markers or adverb adjuncts, used by speakers to comment on their personal stance in relation to the propositional content of the utterance, contrary to manner adverbs that work as verbal postmodifiers (*Frankly*, I don't want to talk about it *vs* I don't want to talk about it *frankly*). Thus, as parenthetical markers, they can be placed in utterance-medial, clause-medial, utterance-final and clause-final position. See in (15) and (16), from Baumgarten and House (2010: 1189), a case of medial position:

- (15) Because you have to take 2 years in high school and I **don't know** that's just a thought cause they're like: Oh, I wanna be like Tom Cruise or like all these movie-stars and so then they I don't know. (L1)
- (16) And so especially the younger people, I **think**, go for that, the new stuff. (L1)

Functionally speaking, these parentheticals carry out epistemic [figurative] meanings (14) that have evolved from referential [literal] meanings (12) and (13). In an interactional context, speakers use language much more to express their thoughts, feelings and reactions than for purely informative purposes. Subjectivity (the expression of emotions) and subjectification (its coding in grammatical structures) have become the focus of analysis in the last years (Scheibman 2001: 61). The pioneering work of Traugott (1995) has explained this process extensively, stating that the process of evolution of language implies a progression from propositional to subjective meaning, with a change in syntactic structures and of grammatical categories that have evolved into more context-dependent units of meaning.

Thompson and Mulac's (1991) quantitative study on the grammaticization of epistemic parentheticals (EPARs) in English hypothesize that the grammatical and lexical changes that such markers have undergone have to do with frequency and semantics: "those subjects and verbs occurring most frequently without [complementizer] *that* are precisely those which occur most frequently as EPARs." [...] "the meanings of the verbs most frequently used as epistemic phrases (EPs) are those associated with belief as a mode of knowing." (1991 :317). They explain their process of grammaticization as a shift in grammatical category, from being 'free' verbs (*think, know, guess*, among the most common ones) to markers of mood, behaving, as argued in the previous section, as adverbial adjuncts in some contexts of use; a head element becomes then a dependent element. They conclude: "decategorialization is very much in evidence in the evolution of EPs: The lexical category of the erstwhile combination of Noun + Verb can best be characterized as the secondary category 'Adverb.'" (1991: 325)

The semantic bleaching and grammatical change of Spanish *no sé* shows similar characteristics to those pinpointed above. There has been a decategorialization from being a ‘free’ verb, head in a main clause structure, as in ‘Mi madre sabe muchas cosas’ (‘My mother knows many things’) to being a mood element and a dependent verb, when functioning as epistemic marker. The process would thus involve a change in syntactic and in semantic terms: from being the head of a verb phrase that is a clause constituent (with and without a complement following) to being an adjunct (equalling *maybe*), totally independent from the predicate; from having a literal referential meaning – (17), (18) and (19) – to having a pragmatic figurative meaning (20):

- (17) As a simple clause construction:
No sé nada sobre cambio climático.
 I don’t know anything about climate change.
- (18) In main clause, in complement clause construction:
No sé qué decir. Hay algo que no sé si es cierto, pero me lo han contado.
 I don’t know what to say. There is something that I don’t know if it’s true, but I’ve been told.
- (19) As a syntactic unit in response to a request for information:
 A: Es verdad que Almodovar ha hecho una nueva película?
 Is it true that Almodovar has made a new movie?
 B: No lo sé.
 I don’t know.
- (20) As an adjunct / epistemic parenthetical:
No me encuentro bien. No sé, creo que he pillado un resfriado.
 I don’t feel well. I don’t know, I think I’ve caught a cold.

Furthermore, in terms of variation of the forms (Scheibman 2000), the loss of the proform or referent that we often find in colloquial Spanish (*no lo sé > no sé*) and in non-standard Catalan (*no ho sé > no sé*) oral corpora could also be a proof of that change, as the opinion report (9) above shows. In this same line of argument, but from a phonetic perspective, Scheibman (2000) investigates the phonetic change of *don’t* into *dunno*, establishing a direct relationship between frequency of occurrence of the reduced form in a corpus of spontaneous conversation and the range of pragmatic functions it carries out. Her findings suggest that there is a high percentage of reduced forms that perform interactive tasks related to face-saving: mitigation (hedging), softening disagreement, and lack of certainty (2000: 118).

4. Position and scope of *no sé* in unplanned oral genres

Studies conducted by scholars working on epistemic marking in spontaneous unplanned discourse have proven, through qualitative and quantitative analysis, that everyday speech shows a high density of this sort of phrasing (Thompson & Mulac 1991; Kärkkäinen 2003, 2010; Baumgarten & House 2010; Bybee & Hopper 2001, *inter alia*). Their position, prosody, and semantic scope in the sequential structuring and context of the discourse in which they occur has been a particular focus of interest in the past years (Kärkkäinen 2010; Kaltenböck 2007). In this section, I will comment on the position and scope of *no sé* from a qualitative view, following Kärkkäinen's (2010) proposal on the definition of scope:

[...] It is important to point out that I do not refer to a strictly syntactic scope, as in most cases the utterances in question do not contain any elements of syntactic subordination or superordination (such as the subordinator/complementizer *that*). By scope, then, I primarily understand semantic-pragmatic scope or 'the stretch of language affected by the meaning of a particular form, even if it does not coincide with the scope of that form as just defined'. (Crystal 2003: 407). (2010: 203)

Kärkkäinen points out that, although the scope of epistemic phrases, in general, is usually local in interactional context, affecting just one clause or phrase, with some specific epistemics, like *I don't know* and *I think*, the scope may be more global, pragmatically affecting prior and following discourse sequences⁵. In this line of argument, Kärkkäinen suggests two sorts of scope: (i) Forward scope: When the scope "extends over something yet to be verbalized in the turn-in-progress"; and (ii) Backward scope: "[...] having something in their scope that was just verbalized in the immediately preceding turn-so-far." (2010: 203).

In the corpus Kärkkäinen (2010) analyzes, everyday unplanned speech, the scope of the epistemic phrase can be clausal or phrasal, although her findings suggest a stronger presence of forward clausal scope. She takes prosody (intonation units) into account, too, providing large quantitative data base to back up her conclusions. In her classification and quantitative analysis, Kärkkäinen does not make a distinction between those followed by a complementizer and those which are parenthetical, that is, detached from the predicative structure. Taking intonation and clausal and phrasal scope into account, she then makes a classification of six types: (i) Clausal forward scope: intonation unit / clause-initial; (ii) Phrasal forward scope: intonation unit / phrase-initial; (iii) Phrasal or clausal forward scope: separate intonation units; (iv) Phrasal or clausal backward scope: separate intonation units; (v) Forward and backward scope: medial position in an intonation unit; (vi) Clausal and phrasal backward scope: final position in the intonation unit.

For the purpose of the present study on *no sé*, I will only consider (iii) and (iv), as my interest is on the use of this unit as epistemic parenthetical, working as a

separate intonation unit. As separate intonation units, epistemic phrases with *forward* scope tend to occur in contexts where there is hesitation, repairs and on-line planning. As Kärkkäinen (2010) points out, the scope is determined by the way the conversation unfolds and it is not always crystal-clear, having to always take into account the interactional context. In the case of *I don't know*, she assigns *forward* scope when the epistemic unit ends in non-final intonation and the speaker carries on talking, expressing alignment and affiliation with the prior turn. See it illustrated in (21) and (22). *Backward* scope is assigned when the epistemic unit ends in final intonation and it is positioned after the speaker has expressed a proposition, as an after-thought that highlights the speaker's commitment to his/her preceding talk. See it exemplified in (23) and (24).

Phrasal or clausal forward scope: separate intonation units

- (21) clausal scope <SBCSAE 4/486>
 Carolyn: They're just giving –
 I think,
 it sounds,
 like,
 to me,
 they're giving you a lot of shit for no reason.
- (22) phrasal scope <SBCSAE 28/725>
 Jill: It was really quick.
 I think,
 Um,
 .. like mid-August.

Phrasal or clausal backward scope: separate intonation units

- (23) <SBCSAE 56/538>
 [he] is a cutie
 I mean he... he's..
 He models for Shepler's magazine.
 ... Really nice looking fellow.
 ... I don't know.
- (24) <SBCSAE 35/58>
 Patty: It doesn't measure your creativity,
 It doesn't ... measure you know so...
 Stephanie: Mom,
 I know.

In both types of scope there is the possibility that the epistemic phrase is preceded by a pause (25) which, according to Kärkkäinen, makes it easier to visualize that the unit is independent and has grammaticized. In this respect, she concludes that,

as an independent unit of talk, the fact that it has phrasal or clausal scope is not as relevant as it is with the other types aforementioned.

(25) <SBCSAE 56/279>

Gary: ... (H) What happened to Matt.

Julie: ... % I don't know

I think he wandered off.

In Kärkkäinen's (2010) quantitative survey of high-frequency epistemic phrases, results show that clausal scope prevails over phrasal scope, and that forward-looking scope dominates over backward scope. However, when it comes to *I don't know* as a separate intonation unit, backward and forward scope are quite balanced. In the qualitative study that I have performed of *no sé* in spontaneous conversations and in opinion reports, I have observed a genre distribution, with a stronger presence of forward scope in conversations and preponderant backward scope in opinion reports. The observation is purely qualitative, and would require a larger corpus to validate it quantitatively. In my view, this distribution makes sense if we take into account the characteristics of each genre. Conversations involve dynamic contexts of unplanned interaction, where participants use epistemic marking to keep the conversation going, to negotiate the floor, and to show alignment or disalignment with the prior turn. Oral opinion reports are monologued stretches of discourse that provide an attitudinal stance of the speaker on a given subject, and contain a great deal of evaluative language, evidential marking, value judgements and epistemic strategies to save face.

I will provide two samples of each genre, to illustrate my observation. The first conversation (26) is between two friends who are talking about night parties in the streets.

(26) (Corpus Valesco 2.0, Conversación 1, Intervenciones 387–395)

A: § luego tee- te vas a tomar algo↑/ hablas con la gente↑ estás [un poco→]
then you go out to drink something / talk with the people / you are a bit

B: [lo malo↑] lo malo de estas fallas↑ fue precisamente que llovió the bad thing
about these 'fallas' was precisely that it rained

A: que llovió↓/ por lo de las verbenas§
that it rained / talking about partying

B: § porque las verbenas↑ a mí también me gustan bastante// pero mira→
because parties I also like parties quite a lot / but look

A: es más divertido→/ no sé/ yo qué sé/ [y además/ se montan muchas verbenas→ al aire libre=]

It is more fun I don't know / I don't know at all / and besides there are many parties outside

B: [además está al aire libre/ a mí me gusta estar al aire libre↓ todo] besides it is outside / I like to be outside all

A: = a mí también me gusta mucho// y se montan verbenas↑ yo qué sé/ y hay muchas en plan así sano/ que dices→ que noo§

I like it a lot too / and there are parties I don't know at all / and there are many like this / that you say that they are noo

B: § sí sí [no↓ claro]

yes, yes [no of course]

A: [no son las típicas/] o sea la gente que se pone ahí a emborracharse y todo↑ [quee]

[They are not the typical ones] I mean people who start getting drunk and all [that]

Note that in (26) speaker A uses *no sé* with forward scope, showing on-line planning and hesitation when presenting his attitudinal stance in favour of outside parties, intensified by another epistemic marker '*yo que sé*' (I don't know at all) which reinforces alignment with previous talk. His stance contrasts with the fact that, in his three unfolding turns, A tries to build up positive arguments that sustain the preceding assessment ('*es más divertido*', it is more fun), so we could conclude that the use of this epistemic marker represents for the speaker a starting point that helps him plan de sequence of his argumentation. The second example of forward scope (27) is a conversation between two participants who are talking about the difficulties of raising a child nowadays. Speaker B starts the argument and makes use of *no sé* to show uncertainty.

(27) (Corpus Valesco 2.0, Conversación 1, Intervenciones 256–264)

B: [y además]/ hoy↑ en parte↑ ¡bueno!/ hoy↓// hoy/ y siempre/ ¿no?/ educar a- a un niño↑ es muy difícil/ o sea→ más difícil de lo que parece and besides nowadays in part well nowadays and always right? raising a child is very difficult I mean more difficult than it seems

A: yaa

yeah

B: porque ¡vamos!/[a]

because ¡come on!

A: [yo] es que se ve que me gustan las cosas difíciles→ [o sea]

I apparently I like difficult things I mean

B: [no/ pero] es que normalmente antes↑ no sé/ a lo mejor estoy equivocao/[peroo// pues→=]

no but the thing is that in the past I don't know maybe I'm wrong but well

A: [es que ¿sabes lo que?]

the thing is – you know what?

B: = educar al niño↑ era darlee↑// pues loo- lo esencial/↑ que no le faltase de nada↑ y- yy ya está

raising a child was giving him // well the esencial / that he had everything he needed and that's it

Forward scope of *no sé* is sustained by the fact that, from the moment B uses the epistemic parenthetical, reinforced by the presence of a modal verb following (*a lo mejor estoy equivocado*, maybe I'm wrong), he adds up arguments to support his stance and assessment that raising a child is very difficult.

My preliminary observations on the corpus of oral opinion reports suggest that speakers tend to use the full lexical form of the EPAR (Spanish *no lo sé* / Catalan *no ho sé*) at the beginning and in the middle of the report with a literal/referential meaning, and the reduced form (Spanish and non-standard Catalan *no sé*) towards the end, with a range of pragmatic meanings. So a possible secondary hypothesis, to validate in a further research, could be that, besides genre distribution, variation of the form has a role too: in monologued spontaneous speeches, whereas the full form has forward scope, the reduced form has backward scope. See now two samples of opinion reports that exemplify the position of *no [ho] sé* with backward scope. In (28) the informant is giving his opinion on the consumption of aspirin.

(28) [oral-aspi-pair 9]

Mira, feia molt temps que no me'n prenia, però ara ja he tornat a re-prendre'n com l'ús, l'he substituït per als ibuprofenos quan tinc mal de cap, i realment em funciona, perfectament. I no és tan potent com un ibuprofeno, no destrossa tan el fetge, crec. Bueno, és que... li parlo de la meva experiència i en cap moment... he notat efectes contradictoris. Tot i que s'ha de dir que... quan tens la menstruació o així, com que... dilueix molt més la sang... I no... no és bo. Però bueno, per això, saps? **No ho sé.** Vull dir, no sóc una experta de... química ni res, llavors no puc dir... **Jo què sé** Saps? No puc dir del cert això funciona o no, perquè conté (?) aquest components, **I no sé...** Parlo de la meva experiència com a... ús... domèstic, normal.

Look, it has been a long time since I didn't take it, but now I have already started taking it again, I've substituted it by ibuprofens when I have a headache, and it really works for me, perfectly well. And it is not as powerful as an ibuprofen, it does not damage the liver so much, I think. Well, I... I talk about my experience and never... I have noticed negative effects. Even though I should say that... when you have your period or so, because it makes the blood more fluid... and no... it's not good. But well, just because of this, you know. *I don't know.* I mean, I'm not an expert of... chemistry or else, then I cannot say... *I don't know at all* you know. I cannot say hundred per cent sure that this works or not, because it has those components, and *I don't know...* I speak of my experience as a... consumer... domestic, normal.

Note that the speaker utters the full form *no ho sé* – making reference to the object of discussion – followed by *jo que sé* (I don't know at all) and *no sé* with backward scope, making reference to his preceding talk. The position of the three forms in the report is paradoxical, in the sequential organization of the utterances. On the one hand, the speaker starts his account by offering direct evidence that aspirin

works because he has taken it. On the other hand, he makes use of the markers *no ho sé* and *jo que sé* to show and intensify his uncertainty towards the act (not the scientific facts) of taking it. It is worth noticing that in both cases the use of the two epistemic forms does not express ‘insufficient knowledge’; on the contrary, the speaker has direct evidence that aspirin works (‘it really works for me’; ‘I talk about my experience’) and grounds that evidence and attitudinal stance from the start of his account. However, the epistemic units help him express a personal attitude, subjectifying its discourse. Furthermore, he ends it with a final *no sé* that, in the sequential organization of the report, serves as closure or coda. In terms of grammaticization and position, the sequential use of the three forms could serve to illustrate the secondary hypothesis aforementioned, i.e. progressive loss of referential meaning into pragmatic meaning, and full form with forward scope vs reduced form with backward scope. The following Excerpt (29) reinforces that preliminary observation.

(29) [oral-acu-pair 10]

Pues, realment no n’he sentit parlar mai de... de... algun conegut així, directe, que ho hagi provat, per tant **no sé dir-te si...** funciona o no, perquè no tinc cap exemple, però mmm... El que jo- sí, el que conec per ma mare o amigues que l’han fet servir per... coses que no hi entens (?), per exemple aprimar o perdre pes, i aquí sí que... Mmm... elles m’han dit que que s- que han comprovat que funciona, el que passa és que **jo no sé si realment és...** Mmm... que equilibri o sigui que la inserció de les agulles al seu cos equilibri el flux del... del txi... o si més bé és l’efecte placebo que tu en penses que... et penses que va funcionar i... **no sé**, men- mentalment t’ho creus i allò funciona...

Well, I have never heard about it really from... from... an acquaintance like, direct, that has tried it, so I cannot tell you/*I don’t know if... it works or not*, because I don’t have any example, but mmm... What I – what I know from my mother or friends that have tried it for... Things you don’t understand, for example being on a diet or losing weight, and here yes... mmm... they have told me that that... they have proved that it works, the point is that *I don’t really know if it is...* mmm... that balance I mean the insertion of needles in your body balances the flux of... Of the txi... or else it rather has a placebo effect that makes you think that... You think that it’s going to work and... *I don’t know*, men-mentally you believe it and that thing works.

In (29), the speaker makes use of the subject + cognitive verb collocation twice in a complement clause construction (*I don’t know if...*), both with literal, referential meaning that denotes lack of knowledge on whether acupuncture works or not. Both uses have forward scope; the informant develops his argumentation by grounding his evidence: although he does not have direct evidence that acupuncture works, he does have indirect evidence (mother, mother’s friends) that it has positive effects

on the body. Towards the end, *no sé* works as a closure marker or coda, acquiring pragmatic functions, same as (28) above. Note that the speaker goes from using the epistemic forms literally at the beginning of his report, objectifying the issue, to using it pragmatically towards the end, subjectifying the object of discussion and showing his stance-taking, committing himself to his lack of certainty, with the ultimate purpose to save face.

5. Discussion and concluding remarks

The qualitative analysis of *no sé* in two unplanned oral genres has shown its primary role as marker of epistemic stance in interactional contexts, carrying out a range of pragmatic functions. The progressive loss of propositional referential meaning of the cognitive verb into figurative metaphorical meanings when found in spontaneous oral discourse proves the grammaticization of the form, reinforced by its frequency of use in unplanned speech corpora. Speakers make use of the marker not to convey the semantic meaning of 'insufficient knowledge', as is the case in simple clause constructions ('*I don't know* so much about Japanese') or in complement clause constructions ('*I don't know* why she keeps on calling'), but as a parenthetical modality marker detached from the syntactic structure of the main clause to reduce the speaker's commitment, to preface dispreferred responses and to mitigate the potential negative effect of an answer in face-threatening situations, as a strategy of 'avoidance'. In this line of thought, in conversations speakers make use of *no sé* to show uncertainty and to avoid explicit disagreements, following the principles of politeness and using it as a face-threat mitigator; they can express their opinions without taking full responsibility for their truth-value.

As epistemic parenthetical (EPAR), *no sé* shows mobility and emerges as a conversational routine ('It's like, *I don't know*, I don't feel comfortable when they're around'), in the line that some pragmatic markers found in spontaneous speech (*well, oh, I mean*) do. In terms of stance, speakers make use of it to express their attitude, value judgements and emotions, both towards the interlocutor's words and reactions and towards their own argumentative line of thought, personalizing their talk and subjectifying it by using the first person singular pronoun 'I'. The collocation of the cognitive verb with the first person pronoun facilitates the anchoring of the speaker in the discourse, unabling him/her to introduce a personal perspective to the talk and thus the possibility to express closeness and empathy, in face-to-face communication. The position and semantic scope of *no sé* as EPAR in the sequential structure and context of the analyzed speeches is worth mentioning too. The working hypothesis that there is a genre distribution seems to hold: whereas forward scope is preponderant in the dialogued turn-taking conversational genre,

backward scope is dominant in monologued pieces of opinion reports. This makes sense if we take into account the characteristics of each unplanned oral genre: conversations involve negotiation of meaning and floor-taking, in a dynamic process of argumentative unfolding and positioning of the participants involved in the interaction; in oral opinion reports speakers have to prove their attitudinal stance in terms of value judgements, sources of information (evidential marking), evaluative language and epistemic strategies that help them assess their argumentative point.

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The Spanish quotative *según* across written genres

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This research aims to provide an insight into characterization of quotative markers from a specific and prototypical Spanish one, *según*. The analysis is corpus-based, specifically the data comes from four different genres (academic articles, essays, news and novels). Our study examines the linguistic features, the source of information, the combination with reporting verbs, and the frequency in relation to genres. Thus, it underlines that, in contrast to the counterpart in other languages, the evidential function of *según* is fulfilled by means of a prepositional phrase or a clause bringing a reporting verb. Also, it demonstrates the modification of the prototypical specific source (3d person) causes a reduction of reliability as a pragmatic extension, and it shows the evidential function is the most frequent across written genres and has increased significantly in news.

Keywords: evidentiality, evidential function, quotative markers, reported speech, reporting verbs, genres

1. Introduction

European languages lack strictly speaking evidentials, since they do not have an evidential grammatical paradigm and the expression of evidentiality is not obligatory. Instead, according to Aikhenvald (2004, 2007), they have *evidential strategies*, concept that turns out to be a grab bag as includes so different means: on the one hand, grammatical forms whose evidential meaning is secondary (e.g. tense markers), and on the other, lexical units (e.g. verbs, adjectives), reported constructions, parentheticals and particles which may carry or carry the evidential value as a basic meaning. Thus the pattern of evidential strategies and the grammatical approach

in evidentiality do not seem to fit well in most of the European languages¹ since it neither allows us to recognize items that mainly fulfil an evidential function nor to describe their uses accurately (cfr. Boye & Harder 2009; Lampert & Lampert 2010; Dendale & Bogaert 2012).

As a result, in European languages evidentiality has been investigated from a semantic-pragmatic approach² (Squartini, 2008; Cornillie 2009; Boye & Harder 2009; Diewald & Smirnova 2010; Hassler, 2010; Lampert & Lampert 2010; Dendale & Bogaert 2012; Albelda, 2016a). Taking for granted the first three of Anderson's criteria (1986: 274–275), evidential markers are catalogued those that show some evidence that justify what is conveyed, are comments about the main predication and carry evidential meaning as their primary meaning (cfr. Boye & Harder 2009; Dendale & Bogaert 2012 for a critical revision). Also, they generally underwent a process consisting of becoming pragmatic markers triggered by the subjectification principle (cfr. Aikhenvald 2004, 2007). Therefore, there is no doubt that these markers are different from grammar evidentials.

By applying these criteria, Spanish markers such as *por lo visto*, *al parecer*, *evidentemente*, *según dicen*, *parece que*, *se ve que* and so forth are said evidential markers (González 2005; Cornillie 2009; Cornillie & Gras 2015; Albelda 2016a, 2016b; among others). These markers express indirect evidentiality through inference or hearsay and present different degrees of fixation. By contrast, little attention has been paid to those items that display indirect evidentiality specifying the source, except for a few works (Maldonado & De la Mora 2015; Izquierdo, under revision; Kotwica, in press; Llopis, under revision). This disregard could be due to different reasons: that indirect evidentiality specifying the source is related to other fields (reported speech, citation), that there is a lesser number of items of this type (*según*, *para...*) or even the fact that indirect evidentiality without specification is more common and more prototypical than evidentiality with specification, as noticed in several works and in some definitions of evidentials (e.g. “forms referring to the source of the information without specifying” in Lazard 2001: 362).

1. Regarding typologically evidential languages, Lazard (2001: 365) considers that the individual categories “are not fully comparable” and “cross-language comparison, and consequently linguistic typology, are impossible”. If so, it seems to be more unwise examining non-typologically evidential languages with the same criteria of the evidential languages.

2. See Izquierdo, González & Loureda (2016: 9–45) for a revision of the evidentiality concept in Spanish linguistics.

2. General aim and hypotheses

This research aims to fill the mentioned gap to some extent by examining the evidential function in *según*, which is grammaticalized and widely recognized as a Spanish quotative marker,³ the same as the lexical equivalents in other languages (*according to* (Eng.), *selon* (Fr.), *secondo* (It.), *segundo* (Port.), *segons* (Cat.)). Following Aikhenvald (2004), quotative markers or quotatives⁴ are characterised by introducing the specific source of the information, different from reportatives in which the source comes from someone else (cfr. Lampert & Lampert 2010).

As usual, there is no correspondence one-to-one between form and meaning. *Según* carries non-evidential meanings, such as the general meaning of “accordance” (1), from which the quotative meaning derives (2). Also, the Spanish form *según* often combines with reporting verbs, as *secondo* from Portuguese and *segons* from Catalan.

- (1) Lo importante, hasta bien entrada la Modernidad, era «vivir» según las pautas de la «única religión verdadera». (Acad. Art.)
‘Up to the time of the Modernity period, the most important was to live according to the rules of the one true religion.’
- (2) Según Mintel, los primeros productos lanzados al mercado con el reclamo publicitario “nano” datan del 1997. (Acad. Art.)
‘According to Mintel, the first products were launched with the advertising slogan “nano” dating from 1997.’
- (3) Durante los días de la muestra, se entregará el premio Concurso Literario Fogón, según informó el Instituto Ferial de Madrid (IFEMA). (RAE, CREA, El Mundo, 2003)
‘During the days of the exhibition, the prize of the Fogón Literary Competition will be awarded, as reported by the Instituto Ferial de Madrid.’

3. Here ‘quotatives’ or ‘quotative markers’ is understood in a narrow sense; some authors (e.g. Plungian 2001), however, use this term in a broad sense to refer to any reportative marker (including specific or unspecific reported speech).

4. In relation to the typology of reported information, Willett (1988: 57) differentiated second-hand, third-hand and folklore. Plungian (2001: 352–353) considered two additional distinctions for mediated evidentials: specific vs. unspecific reported speech or non-definite author vs. tradition or common knowledge. The fine distinctions by Willett (1988) and by Plungian (2001) could not be generally applied in Spanish, except from a few lexical bundles (e.g. for the second distinction: non-definite author *según dicen* – tradition *según la leyenda*). In this way, Hassler (2002: 160) states that quotatives belonging to a non-typologically evidential language do not tend to indicate if the information is second or third hand. Recently, Lampert & Lampert (2010) divide these markers into three groups: reportatives, quotatives and reportative-quotatives.

In (1) and (3) *según* fulfils an evidential function, but in a different way, through the quotative *según* in a prepositional phrase (*PP-según* here in after) (1) and through a clause headed by *según* next to the reporting verb (*C-según* here in after) (3). In contrast to (1), in (3) *según* does not correspond to a preposition but a modal adverb and is translated into the lexical equivalent in some Romance languages, such as Portuguese and Catalan, but no in others, such as French or Italian, nor in English (4). Consequently, it seems that the evidential function in (3) is to largely generated by using a reporting verb, as we will see later.

- (4) *según* dijo: segons digué (Cat.), segundo disse (Port.) *según*
dijo: comme il dit (Fr.), stando a quello che dice (It.), as he said (Eng.)

Nevertheless, the distinction between (1) and (3) has not been explored yet; indeed, both uses are often treated as if they had the same functioning and the same status as evidentials. Thus, we will examine various features separately in the prepositional phrase with the quotative *según* (*PP-según*) and the clause with the modal *según* plus a reporting verb (*C-según*) in order to find out if there are further differences.

In this article, we would like to test mainly the following hypotheses. First, the quotative function is genre-related and its frequency is expected to be greater in news. Second, the referent related to the quotative function could be also correlate with genres, being more specified in genres that required accuracy. Lastly, the structures *PP-según* and *C-según*, which have different grammatical category and meaning, could also differ in position and modalization.

Next Section (3) we explain the methodology used in this study. In the Section (4), we briefly offer a semantic description of *según*, show the results of the frequency of each meaning in relation to the genres, and give clues to recognize the quotative function. The Section (5) starts describing grammatical features such as scope and position; then it examines in detail the referent indicating the source of information; lastly, it analyses the type of reported discourse and reporting verbs used beside *C-según*. The Section (6) aims at offering a preliminary characterization of quotative markers. In the Section (7), we go back to the hypotheses and summarize the main conclusions derived from the study.

3. Methodology

The analysis is corpus-based. By collecting corpus data, we consider distinguishing the genre to which the instances belong is crucial in this case. The indirect evidentiality with specification is supposed to be more present in genres where the precise data are required, therefore we select news and academic papers. Moreover, we find it is also relevant to compare to genres that are less accurate, such as essays, or genres that are less prone to give specific details, such as novels. In the two last

genres, we could find less common uses that could help to outline a more complete spectrum of the evidential functions fulfilled by *según*. In this way, by contrasting genres we can examine if the functioning differs and test if the frequency of evidential function is genre-related.

As seen in Table 1, we collected similar amount of words for each genre, in total we retrieved 1,069 examples.

Table 1. Corpus of the study

Academic articles	588,700
Essays	556,207
News	554,572
Novels	555,841
Total number of words	2,255,320

We gathered academic articles coming from different fields (experimental sciences, social sciences and humanities and arts), which were accessed on line. For the other genres, we selected digitalized books and newspapers that are included in CREA (Corpus de Referencia del Español Actual, RAE) and are dated between 2002 and 2004; when collecting data from newspapers, we focused primarily on news.

4. Distinguishing the quotative function

4.1 Meanings of *según* in relation to genres

Studies on evidentials generally explain quotatives focusing on *según* or its counterpart in other languages (*according to* (En.), *selon* (Fr.), *secondo* (It.)). Apart from the quotative value, this item carries more meanings forming a more complex semantics, as observed in the entries⁵ of dictionaries. Considering the senses registered in dictionaries and observed in corpus data, we distinguished eight meanings:⁶ accordance (with a system, procedure, plan, etc.) (see Example 1), the source of

5. The *Diccionario de partículas* by Santos offers the longest and most complex entry; for instance, the definition about accordance and the modal meaning are separated into seven items. In *Diccionario de la Real Academia Española* the aspectual meaning does not appear and, in *Diccionario de Uso del Español*, the meaning about the correlative proportion is not included. Concerning the French lexical equivalent *selon*, Coltier & Dendale (2004: 593) distinguish three meanings: *conformité*, *dependance* and *origine*.

6. See Maldonado & De la Mora (this volume) for a different distinction of meanings. The meaning called by them “causal” corresponds to the meaning labelled here by “dependence”; it refers to instances in which there is a correlation between conditions and results.

information (see Example 2), dependence, quantitative (correlative proportion), aboutness (with respect to), modal (see Example 3), aspectual (simultaneous actions) and possibility.

These set of meanings can be put into three groups, accordance, dependence and mode, and are linked to each other by semantic relations (see Figure 1). Also, the meanings belonging to each group have in turn a semantic resemblance as long as they may be diachronically⁷ related; for instance, the meaning of accordance in general is closed to the quotative one, which is a specification developed at the discourse level. Furthermore, from a cognitive view, all these meanings could be explained from the basis of a *space builder* with different patterns (Fauconnier), according to Maldonado & De la Mora (2015).




Figure 1. Meanings of *según*

The results of analysis of these meanings in relation to four genres are shown in Table 2.

Table 2. Results of meanings in relation to genres

Genre/ meaning	Accordance	Quotative	Dependence	Quantitative	Aboutness	Modal	Aspectual	Possibility
Academic articles	27	94	20	7	17	28	0	0
Essays	32	104	32	4	10	39	4	0
News	22	331	16	5	7	144	2	0
Novels	13	37	25	0	0	41	6	2

7. Octavio de Toledo (2016: 186–207) describes the evolution of the prepositional uses of *según* and discusses the semantic relations among them. Only the meaning of aboutness is missed in his study, so it could be a meaning developed in Modern Spanish. This meaning consists of indicating a thematic frame, as in “trataremos de caracterizar los riesgos potenciales según el tipo de terapia, sus condiciones y sus factores ante los que nos encontremos” (Acad. Art.) (we try to characterize the potential risks according to the type of therapy and their conditions and factors, which we come across).

As observed, the quotative value is the most used in academic articles, essays and news, for which it comprises more than triple the number of instances. The frequency of use in news is even more remarkable. The meanings of accordance and dependence have comparable results regarding genres. The meanings of quantitative correlation and aboutness are more linked to academic articles and essays since the number of instances is reduced in news and there is no case in novels. Only two examples with the meaning of possibility were documented, and they were in exchanges of novels as an answer to the previous turn; this meaning may be used more in speech genres. Regarding the modal value, it has a high frequency in every genre, most noticeably the number of cases in news. By examining all uses with modal value in detail, we observed that *según* appeared followed by a *reporting verb* in 78.9% of cases (202 of 256), and specifically in news in 92.4% cases (135 of 146); consequently, the clause frequently fulfils a quotative function.⁸ This result, besides that of the quotative value, shows that *según* very often operates as a resource to mention the specific source of the information provided, and it is even more frequently used in news, which may be due to this genre is the most reportative.

In next subsections, we will centre on the recognition of the quotative meaning of *según* in prepositional phrases (*PP-según*), and we will provide a first glance at a characterization of the clause formed by *según* plus a reporting verb (*C-según*).

4.2 The recognition of the quotative value in *PP-según*

The identification of the quotative value is based on two criteria. Firstly, the indication of the source of information, a criterion that differentiates the quotative meaning from other meanings, such as the meaning of accordance that is closed to it. Second, the propositional scope (cfr. Boye & Harder 2009; Boye 2010), which implies that the prepositional phrase with *según* must have scope over a proposition.

In the corpus data, we found some doubtful instances that were solved by applying both criteria. In (5), the prepositional phrase with *según* has scope over “las pomadas de sílicea D6”, not over the whole sentence; indeed, if this phrase is placed in the initial position (5’), it would not make sense. “Según la preparación tradicional de Schüssler” does not indicate the source of information but refers to a specific type of ointment prepared following the procedure by Schüssler.

8. López Izquierdo (2013) compares the uses of *según* and *como* + *verba dicendi* in medieval Castilian and observes that main function of these items was introducing reported speech.

- (5) Las pomadas de sílicea D6, según la preparación tradicional de Schüssler, son otro recurso que se muestra sumamente positivo en este tipo de problemas.
(RAE, CREA, Alfredo Ara, 2004)
'Siliceous D6 ointments, according to the traditional preparation of Schüssler, are another resource that is very positive in this type of problem.'
- (5') (# According to the traditional preparation of Schüssler, siliceous D6 ointments are another resource that is very positive in this type of problem.)

The presence of metalinguistic voices does not guide the recognition of the quotative value, as observed in (6) in which "según las indicaciones" is displayed as a (modal) verbal complement.

- (6) Al levantarse, aplicación local de una decocción de cinco minutos, en un litro de agua, de las siguientes plantas: Malva silvestris L. 30 gramos de flores y hojas, Althaea officinalis L. 20 gramos de la raíz. Se aplicará en compresa según las indicaciones dadas en el capítulo. (RAE, CREA, Alfredo Ara, 2004)
'On rising, we should do a local application of a decoction of five minutes in a litter of water of the following plants: Malva sylvestris L. 30 grams of flowers and leaves, 20 grams of the root. It will be applied with a compress following the instructions given in the chapter.'

On the contrary, in (7), *según* points to the source of information "las indicaciones de Aubert de Villaine", and its scope is the whole sentence; because of this, it has a quotative meaning.

- (7) Ninguno de los vinos se había decantado, aunque se habían abierto todas las botellas con anterioridad, según las indicaciones de Aubert de Villaine.
(RAE, CREA, El Mundo, 2003)
'None of wines were decanted, although all the bottles were opened before according to the instructions of Aubert de Villaine.'

Concerning the source of information, we must bear in mind that the source of information can also correspond to ideas (estimations, previsions, hypotheses, etc.) that are contained in documents or were communicated orally, as we will see later. In (8), it is supposed that if the writer specified a point of view ('las teorías evolucionistas') is because he consulted some documents (books, papers, etc.) in which this view is explained, so *PP-según* is pointing to an approach but also, though secondarily, to a report as well.

- (8) El problema radica en que, según las teorías evolucionistas, las necesidades sexuales del hombre estarían encaminadas a dejar el mayor número de posibles descendientes en el planeta. (RAE, CREA, Alfredo Ara, 2002)

‘The problem is that, according to evolutionary theories, the sexual needs of men are designed to leave the largest possible number of descendants on the planet.’

A distinct case is in (9) in which *según* means “depending on” and gives an observation not a report.

- (9) Según la teoría gramatical empleada, también se hace uso de los términos permutación y transposición. (Acad. Art.)
 ‘Depending on the grammatical theory used, the terms permutation and transposition are also used.’

4.3 The quotative clause (*C-según*)

When *según* combines with a *reporting verb*, the quotative value remains schematically within a general modal meaning and *según* works as an adverb not as a preposition. This configuration justifies that the substitution by *como / tal como* is more plausible than the substitution by *conforme a (lo que)*.

- (10) Durante los días de la muestra, se entregará el premio Concurso Literario Fogón, según informó el Instituto Ferial de Madrid (IFEMA).
 (RAE, CREA, El Mundo, 2003)
 ‘During the days of the exhibition, the prize of the Fogón Literary Competition will be awarded, according to the Instituto Ferial de Madrid.’
- (10′) Durante los días de la muestra, se entregará el premio Concurso Literario Fogón, tal como informó el Instituto Ferial de Madrid (IFEMA).
 ‘During the days of the exhibition, the prize of the Fogón Literary Competition will be awarded, as Instituto Ferial de Madrid informed.’
- (10″) Durante los días de la muestra, se entregará el premio Concurso Literario Fogón, conforme a lo que informó el Instituto Ferial de Madrid (IFEMA).

However, if we delete the verb, the quotative value is activated as a primary meaning.

- (10″′) Durante los días de la muestra, se entregará el premio Concurso Literario Fogón, según el Instituto Ferial de Madrid (IFEMA).

Indeed, the quotative clause (11) is translated into English and French either with the evidential marker (*according to, selon*) or with a modal conjunction (*as, comme*) plus a *reporting verb* (see Example 4).

- (11) according to Instituto Ferial de Madrid / as Instituto Ferial de Madrid reported.
 (12) selon Instituto Ferial de Madrid / comme l’ informe Instituto Ferial de Madrid.

Actually, these cases differ in the presence or absence of a *reporting verb*. Hence, we could say that the quotative function in (10) is constructed in a greater extent from the *reporting verb*, and in a lesser extent from the complex meaning of *según*, whose quotative value is here less clear-cut. Also, we should bring up that, when *según* has a modal meaning (equal to “as”), it frequently collocates with a reporting verb (around 80% of uses), now and since a long time ago (cfr. López Izquierdo 2013; Maldonado & De la Mora this volume). This involves that the quotative function is a contextual meaning since it is linked to a specific context but regular and relatively fixed in usage. It corresponds to a type-meaning⁹ in terms of Levinson (2000) or a meaning related not to the system or the usage but to the norm according to Coseriu (1981). In any case, what fulfils a quotative function is the clause as a whole (*según* + reporting verb), which shows that Romance languages (this construction is also in Catalan and Portuguese) have various mechanisms to express evidentiality. In the line with Lampert & Lampert (2010), the construction could be considered reportative-quotative. For Aikhenvald (2004: 105; 2007: 214), taking for granted that *según* was an evidential marker, this construction would be something between evidential marker and evidential strategy.

Before the analysis, we will compare the frequencies of use in the corpus data. In Figure 2, we observe the number of non-evidential cases, the uses with a quotative value (PP-*según*) and the cases of this quotative construction (C-*según*).




Figure 2. Results of evidential and non-evidential uses

Although PP-*según* is clearly the most frequent, C-*según* is common enough. In academic articles, it comprises 18.7% of evidential uses. This is increased in essays (26.3%) and in news (28.6%) and is much larger in novels (47.9%).

Given this, we wonder why users sometimes choose C-*según*. We estimate that this can be caused by three motives: first, it may be due to the clause allowing

9. “General expectations about how language is normally used” (Levinson 2002: 22).

introduction of more bits of information (13); second, it permits a greater modalization of discourse and third, it avoids the identical repetition of *según* (a stylistic resource). In (14), circumstantial information (when) is added, and it is used a speech act verb (*denunciar*).

- (13) Según informó el 19 de marzo el Gobierno de La Rioja en una nota
(RAE, CREA, ABC, 2004)
‘As reported on March 19 by the Government of La Rioja in a note’
- (14) según denunció ayer el sindicato CGT. (RAE, CREA, ABC, 2004)
‘as reported yesterday by the union CGT.’

From a rhetorical-discursive perspective, it seems that the writer takes this construction as equal to the quotative *según* and uses it to add details and modalize the discourse more.

In addition to this quotative construction, we found instances in which verbs with evidential meaning (sensory or inference) (15, 16) are used (7 of 228) and the evidential value of *según* is also blurred. These cases are less regular than those previously analyzed.

- (15) Según se ha podido observar en el último entrenamiento
(RAE, CREA, El Mundo, 2003)
‘As could be observed in the last training’
- (16) Eso era lo más duro, según pude deducir de las conversaciones con algunos de aquellos firmantes que decidieron. (RAE, CREA, Iñaki Ezquerro, 2002)
‘That was the hardest, as can be deduced from conversations with some of those signatories who decided.’

5. Analysis and description of the quotative function in *según*

5.1 Grammatical features

5.1.1 *The structure and scope of PP-según and C-según*

For Wiemer (2010: 107) the quotative *según* is an adposition with a reportative function: “Semantically, adpositions modify NPs, whereas syntactically they are their heads, rendering PPs. Consequently, we must distinguish their constituent-internal scope, which is purely adnominal, from the scope taken by the PP as a whole” (Wiemer 2010: 107). PP-*según* can also be integrated in a defining clause formed by *según* + a relative pronoun (*el cual / la cual / los cuales / las cuales*). Differently, the modal-quotative *según* is a modal adverb that functions as a nexus of a clause. Therefore, PP-*según* and C-*según* have different internal structures:

PP-*según*: *según* + NP (source of info) (+ other complements)

C-*según*: *según* + a reporting verb + NP / PP (source of info) (+ other complements)

As a whole, PP-*según* as well as C-*según* mainly function as an external comment indicating the source of information and modifying sentences (17) or clauses (18).

- (17) Según el director general de Farmacia, el nuevo sistema podría estar vigente a lo largo de 2005. (RAE, CREA, ABC, 2003)
‘According to the general director of the Pharmacy, the new system could be in effect throughout 2005.’
- (18) El ministro ruso rechazó la oferta del presidente georgiano de enviar observadores al desfiladero de Pankisi, ya que, según dijo, los guerrilleros lo han abandonado tras un acuerdo con las autoridades georgianas. (RAE, CREA, El País, 2002)
‘The Russian minister rejected the offer of the Georgian president to send observers to Pankisi Gorge because he said the guerrilla bands abandoned him after an agreement with the Georgian authorities.’

Just a few cases had scope over phrases (2.6% in PP-*según* and 6% in C-*según*); in these, the writer tries to avoid the responsibilities of the controversial content (19).

- (19) Anasagasti podrá seguir la ruta de esas 22.470 pesetas que tardaron tres años en ser pagadas sibilinamente – según él – por las arcas del Estado. (RAE, CREA, Iñaki Ezquerro, 2002)
‘Anasagasti will be able to follow the path of those 22,470, which took three years to be paid mysteriously – he said – by the state treasury.’

5.1.2 *The position of PP-según and C-según*

Regarding the position, PP-*según* and C-*según* can be placed at the beginning (17, 18), before (20) or after the verb (21) or at the end of the sentence or segment (7, 10).

- (20) Su frase favorita, según el humorista Forges, era: “Si se quiere, se puede”. (RAE, CREA, Pérez de Silva, 2002)
‘His favourite sentence, according to the humourist Forges, was: “If you want, you can.”’
- (21) Dislocado es, según el RAE, un sinónimo para desamparo. (Acad. Art.)
‘Dislocado’ is, according to RAE, a synonym for helplessness.’

As seen in Table 3, in PP-*según* every genre shows a clear preference for the initial position. In news, this preference is slightly reduced by the number of cases in final position, which reaches 28.1%. Concerning C-*según*, the preferred position in essays and novels is also the initial one; however, academic articles and specially news show a clear preference for the final position (58% final position in news and 56.6% in academic articles).

Table 3. Results of PP-*según* and C-*según* regarding position

PP- <i>según</i>	initial	preverbal	postverbal	final	total
Acad articles	69 (73.4%)	7 (7.4%)	7 (7.4%)	11 (11.8%)	94 (100%)
Essays	81 (77.9%)	5 (4.8%)	6 (5.7%)	12 (11.6%)	104 (100%)
News	192 (58%)	25 (7.5%)	21 (6.4%)	93 (28.1%)	331 (100%)
Novels	25 (67.6%)	2 (5.4%)	3 (8.1%)	7 (18.9%)	37 (100%)
C- <i>según</i>	initial	preverbal	postverbal	final	total
Acad articles	7 (30.5%)	1 (4.3%)	2 (8.6%)	13 (56.6%)	23 (100%)
Essays	23 (65.7%)	2 (5.8%)	3 (8.5%)	7 (20%)	35 (100%)
News	48 (34.8%)	7 (5.1%)	3 (2.2%)	80 (57.9%)	138 (100%)
Novels	17 (47.2%)	7 (19.5%)	3 (8.3%)	9 (25%)	36 (100%)

5.2 The source of information

In terms of the referent showing the source of information,¹⁰ we examined the first, second and third grammatical person for a specific source and folklore and hearsay for an unspecific source (see Table 4). As predicted, the most frequent source in PP-*según* and in C-*según* was the third person and the specific source. A few unspecific cases were documented in every genre, especially for C-*según* in essays and novels. These genres are not subject to strict conventions for references and allow a little inaccuracy concerning sources; thus, they use the non-specific option as tool at the service of argumentative (in essays) or narrative (in novels) purposes. By contrast, the genres of precision, namely academic articles and news, generally specify the source as much as possible.

On the other grammatical persons, in C-*según* the first person was only documented in academic articles (*según leemos*, *según indicamos*). Regarding PP-*según*, a few instances with the first person (*según mi...*) were collected in essays and novels, genres more subjective than academic papers and news. The second person only appeared in dialogic contexts of novels (*según tú*, *según usted*). Differently, in oral genres, it seems probable enough that there may be more examples of first (and second) person and also an unspecific source (*según dicen*) (see Maldonado & De la Mora 2015; Albelda 2016a).

10. Concerning academic writing that has strict reference conventions, Dehkordi & Allami (2012) and Kotwica (in press) proposed classifications for evidentials based on the specificity of source. Dehkordi & Allami divided our unspecific source into two groups, ambiguous and unambiguous. Kotwica distinguished between specific (it provides the specific reference) and semi specific (it provides the author but no the reference) regarding our specific source.

Table 4. Results of PP-*según* and C-*según* regarding the referent

PP- <i>según</i>	1st person	2d person	3d person		
			specific source	unspecific source folklore	unspecific source / hearsay
Acad articles	0	0	92	1	1
Essays	6	0	88	3	7
News	0	0	324	3	4
Novels	3	2	28	2	2
C- <i>según</i>	1st person	2d person	3d person		
			specific source	unspecific source folklore	unspecific source / hearsay
Acad articles	4	0	19	0	0
Essays	0	0	24	2	9
News	0	0	134	1	3
Novels	0	0	25	2	9

5.2.1 *The referents of the specific source in the third person*

To analyse the variety of referents belonging to the third person, we consider (1) who the information was attributed to (person, group or organism) and (2) from which (speaking or writing) basis or (3) from which ideas it was extracted (belonging to an author or theory). Similarly, Wiemer (2010: 107–8) includes the two first types in the collocations of adpositions¹¹ with a reportative function, only the third is missed. In Table 5 we show the words documented in our corpus data.

Actually, these variables cross over. The third kind requires the author of the source, which can be a person or a school of thought (22), and the second one often is used beside the author (23).

- (22) Según la teoría del psicoanálisis, las fobias son temores desproporcionados e irracionales que experimenta el sujeto (...).

(RAE, CREA, Bernabé Tierno, 2004)

‘According to the theory of psychoanalysis, phobias are disproportionate and irrational fears experienced by a person.’

11. Referring to the first one, he states that “the adposition collocates only with names of persons (or groups of people); this collocation restriction is loosened only in favour of names of institutions or bodies of people with some official function” (Wiemer 2010: 107). For him, markers of the second type “collocate with names of products of speech, e.g. written texts, announcements and dictionary entries” and “can occur with names of other products of intellectual activity such as research results, public surveys, etc.” (Wiemer 2010: 108).

- (23) Según la declaración oficial del Premio Nobel, los laureados en esa ocasión habían seguido “un ingenioso método para encontrar y analizar el antiprotón”.

(RAE, CREA, Miguel Ángel Sabadell, 2003)

‘According to the official statement of the Nobel Prize, the prize-winners on that occasion followed “an ingenious method to find and analyze the antiproton.

Regarding C-*según*, in contrast with PP-*según*, the information is not usually linked to an idea (theory, hypothesis, etc.), and the speech acts (accusation, confession, complaint, etc.) are expressed by verbs (24).

- (24) según denuncian los ecologistas (RAE, CREA, ABC, 2003)

‘according to reports from environmentalists.’

Table 5. Possible referents for a specific source

Who was the info attributed to?	Person	proper noun personal / demonstrative pronoun an individual: autor, responsable, portavoz, director, testigo, etc. (<i>author, the person in charge, spokesperson, director, witness, etc.</i>)
	Group of people	regarding specializations (historiadores, físicos, médicos, etc.) (<i>historians, physicists, doctors, etc.</i>) more general groups (expertos, profesionales, especialistas, investigadores, etc.) (<i>experts, professionals, specialists, researchers, etc.</i>)
	Organism	proper noun fuentes (oficiales, policiales, etc.) (<i>sources (officers, police, etc.)</i>) asociaciones, instituciones, sociedades, comités, agencias, empresas, gobierno, departamentos, partidos políticos, periódicos, etc. (<i>associations, institutions, societies, comities, agencies, companies, government, departments, political parties, newspapers, etc.</i>)
Which basis was it extracted from?	Document	libro, artículo, informe, datos, texto, comunicado, registro, acta, escrito, noticias, código, ley, acuerdo, norma, etc. (<i>book, paper, report, dates, text, announcement, register, certificate, writing, news, code, law, agreement, norm, etc.</i>)
	Work	estudio, trabajo, cálculos, estadísticas, autopsia, encuesta, auditoría, etc. (<i>study, work, calculations, statistics, autopsy, enquiry, audit, etc.</i>)
	Speech (written) act	afirmación, confesión, declaración, acusación, denuncia, etc. (<i>statement, confession, statement, accusation, complaint, etc.</i>)
Which ideas were reported?	Oral tradition	leyenda, refrán, tradición, etc. (<i>legend, saying, tradition, etc.</i>)
	Idea	teoría, hipótesis, paradigma, opinión, estimación, etc. (<i>theory, hypothesis, paradigm, opinion, estimation, etc.</i>)

In *C-según*, locative (25) and impersonal (26) constructions are sometimes used, but, on these occasions, the source normally appears in the surrounding text.

- (25) según consta en la documentación brindada por el propio hotel
(RAE, CREA, Iñaki Ezquerro, 2002)
'as stated in the documentation provided by the hotel'
- (26) según se demuestra en varios trabajos realizados por científicos españoles
(RAE, CREA, El País, 2002)
'About two million Spaniards suffer apnea hypopnea syndrome (SAHS)'

5.2.2 *Uses of a specific source in the third person*

As regards PP-*según*, in academic articles, the specific and exact source tends to be indicated by means of a proper noun (30 cases of 37). Even, though the precise name is omitted, it is often possible to find out the source because it was mentioned earlier or because the reference is inserted in parenthesis or in a footnote. This case is classified by Dehkordi and Allami (2012: 1901) as non-specific unambiguous evidentials.

- (27) De hecho, según algunos trabajos, su frecuencia puede llegar a ser incluso superior a otras formas de expresión ciertamente más conocidas y analizadas, como por ejemplo la agresión física directa (Acad. Art.)
'In fact, according to some studies, the frequency may even be superior to other forms of expression more known and analysed, such as direct physical aggression.'

In essays, groups of people with academic specialisations were more often mentioned, such as *según los astrónomos* ('according to astronomers').

Regarding news, a more variety of mechanisms to refer to the source of information is used; they show the whole scale, from non-specificity to complete specification, and contain a significant quantity of cases with only a sort of specification. The number of references to organisms is remarkable (28). There are also circumlocutions that very often add some details to avoid responsibility (29) and paraphrases that substitute the real name or the exact source (30), which is likely not known by the journalist. In (31), one of the preferred names in the news – *fuentes + specification* – appears (15 examples were collected in news, one in academic articles and none in the other genres).

- (28) Según el Instituto Nacional de Estadística (RAE, CREA, El País, 2002)
'According to the National Statistics Institute'
- (29) según el último comunicado difundido ayer por la radio pública vasca
(RAE, CREA, El Mundo, 2003)
'according to the latest statement spread yesterday by Basque public radio'

- (30) Según un responsable de la firma de seguridad mi2g
(RAE, CREA, El País, 2002)
'According to senior security of the mi2g firm'
- (31) según fuentes del sector
(RAE, CREA, ABC, 2004)
'according to industry sources'

The tendency to accuracy is quite high in news on politics, economy and social (and sociocultural) events; however, in scientific news, vague names referring to groups of people who normally have good standing (experts, researchers, professionals, etc.) are sometimes used, such as *según los expertos* ('according to experts').

Similarly, in *C-según*, there is a high percentage and great variation of specific sources in news, including proper nouns and substitutions as well as general references with more or less accurate data (32), vague references (33) and allusions to specific sources (34).

- (32) según revela un trabajo británico presentado recientemente en la Semana de la Patología Digestiva celebrada en Florida (EEUU)
(El Mundo, 2003, RAE, CREA, El Mundo, 2003)
'As a British study recently presented at the Digestive Pathology Week held in Florida reveals.'
- (33) (refiriéndose a la guerra del Golfo)
según la bautizaron los principales periódicos del mundo.
(RAE, CREA, Pedro Del Rey del Val, 2003)
'referring to the Gulf War' 'as called by the world's leading newspapers.'
- (34) según señaló un reciente estudio
(RAE, CREA, ABC, 2004)
'According to a recent study'

5.2.3 *Uses of an unspecific source in the third person (hearsay and oral tradition)*

A few cases found in the different genres were motivated by a rhetorical purpose. In (35), the author maintains a neutral stance but shows controversy concerning the matter by using *algunos* (not everyone agreed with this opinion). Differently, in (36) the journalist opted for not specifying the source so as to not compromise the original source (as being not official) or maybe to manifest a hearsay or rumour going round.

- (35) (...) Cosa que, *según algunos*, es justo lo que ocurrió.
(RAE, CREA, Pombo, 2004)
'Stuff like that, according to some, was just what happened.'
- (36) *Según algunos medios*, Reyna habría fijado como fecha límite (para las elecciones) la primera quincena del mes de julio. (RAE, CREA, El Mundo, 2003)
'According to some media, Reyna had set a deadline (for elections) of the first two weeks of July.'

In essays and novels, the presence of non-specificity is slightly greater than in other genres. The main verbs used in *C-según* are the reporting verbs *contar* (*según se cuenta, según cuentan, según contaban*) and *decir* (*según dicen, según se dice, según se decía*) and in a minor extent *parecer* (*según parece*). These constructions are often used by the author as mitigating tools to protect him or herself, as he does not completely commit him or herself to the truth of what is being told (see Maldonado & De la Mora 2015 for oral examples of unspecificity with *según*).

- (37) Cualquiera diría que está colada por ese fulano, pero no me fío. Podría ser que sólo estuviese enamorada del amor. Eso es, *según dicen*, lo que les pasa a muchas mujeres a cierta edad. (RAE, CREA, Tomeo, 2004)
 ‘Anyone would say that she is madly in love with this guy, but I do not believe it. It could be that she is in love with love. This is, they say, what happens to many women at a certain age.’

In relation to oral tradition, a few instances of folklore proceeding from four genres were documented (only one of *PP-según* in academic articles); though each use is produced for distinct reasons, it occurs more argumentative in essays (38), and is related to narration in novels (39).

- (38) Una imagen vale más que mil palabras, *según el dicho popular*, pero si evaluamos así una fotografía, ¿en cuánto tasaríamos imágenes en movimiento y con sonido? (RAE, CREA, Pedro Del Rey del Val, 2002)
 ‘A picture is worth a thousand words’, according to the saying, but if we evaluate a photography in this manner, how much would we value images in movement and with sound?’
- (39) Le dije que no, que no la había visto (la película); y entonces me la contó de cabo a rabo. Y *según la leyenda*, falsa por supuesto, a la Piconera la fusilaron los gabachos exactamente aquí. (RAE, CREA, Pérez Reverte, 2002)
 ‘I said that I did not watch (the movie), and then he told me about it from beginning to end. And according to legend, false of course, the French executed “la Piconera” by firearm right here.’

5.2.4 *Uses of first and second person*

Regarding *C-según*, just a few instances of first person were collected in academic articles. For them, the author refers to others part of the paper contributing to intertextuality and / or involving the reader in an intellectual task (40).

- (40) según hemos dicho al principio del capítulo anterior (Acad. Art.)
 ‘as we said at the beginning of the previous chapter’

Concerning PP-*según*, a few cases of first and second person were detected in the corpus data. When the first person is used (*según mi experiencia, mi opinión, mi criterio*), in general *según* is not properly a quotative (the information is not coming from someone else), and the mode of knowing is cognitive. In this way, Squartini (2008) crossed two categories, the source of information (self / other) and the mode of knowing. The change of grammatical person in PP-*según* involves a change of mode of knowing that becomes cognitive and is mainly used to describe generic inferences (at least in our corpus data). These cases were collected in essays (6 examples) and novels (3 examples), genres more subjective. As seen in (41), this use is, in a certain way, similar to that of quotatives, as if the writer wanted to mark the words' authorship.

- (41) Al margen del tipo de tratamiento, *según mi experiencia*, es fundamental empezarlo siempre lo antes posible, con la aparición de los primeros síntomas. (RAE, CREA, Alfredo Ara, 2002)
 'Without taking into account the type of treatment, according to my experience, it is essential to always start as soon as possible with the first symptoms.'

The second person as a referent only appeared in novels, specifically in interventions. In (42), PP-*según* serves to check the opinion of the other speaker and introduces a conclusion.

- (42) O sea, que *según usted* no fue un fusilamiento. (RAE, CREA, Cercas, 2001)
 'That is, according to you, it was not an execution by firing squad.'

In both the last cases, we consider that a change in the deictic sphere occurs. Hassler (2010: 224), following De Haan (2005), considers evidentiality as a deictic phenomenon and states that "if the speaker uses indirect evidential markings, the circumstance expressed by him took place outside of his deictic sphere"; on the contrary, when direct evidential expressions are used, "the described circumstance has taken place within the deictic sphere of the speaker". By using the first and the second person, the references of these persons are no longer exophoric but endophoric. They take place in a specific (or pretended) situation, and, consequently, what is said comes into spatial-time coordinates (here, now).

The change of the deictic sphere generates pragmatic extensions. In (41), to be more persuasive, PP-*según* mitigates the illocutionary force of the content to convince readers. Differently, in (42), PP-*según* reduces the grade of truth by highlighting the content and enclosing it in a particular view. In a comparable way, Maldonado and De la Mora (2015) point out that using overt pronouns (*según yo, según tú, según ellos*) is one of the "main forms in which the veracity of what is being conveyed can be called into question" because "the validity of what is being said is restricted to a specific space" (Maldonado & De la Mora 2015: 492), particularly to the dominion of a specific participant who has a particular view of the facts.

5.2.5 Summary

As exposed earlier, the prototypical type of source of *según* is a specific referent (person or document) that stays outside the deictic sphere. The modifications of one of these criteria give rise to peripheral cases, either by using an unspecific source (allusion to hearsay) or by placing the referent of the source within the deictic sphere of speaker. These uses normally involve pragmatic extensions.




Figure 3. (Un)Specificity and the deictic sphere in quotatives

5.3 The evidential function in relation to reported discourse

Quotatives and reported discourse fulfil the same aim, showing that another person's words are being reported. In addition, PP-*según* and C-*según* are linked to reported discourse for the presence of original text in the segment indicated. In order to examine the combination of *según* with quotations, we established four types of reported discourse: rewording (43), rewording + textual words (44), rewording + textual sentences¹² (45) and direct discourse (46). This is a vast classification in comparison with other taxonomies, but it is adjusted to the study's purposes. Following the distinction of reporting/quoting and idea/locution by Caldas-Coulthard (1994: 296), we can state that there is gradation among them from the first one that completely centres on the idea to the last one that reproduces the locution.

- (43) *Según el director general de Farmacia*, el nuevo sistema podría estar vigente a lo largo de 2005. (RAE, CREA, ABC, 2003)
 'According to the general director of the Pharmacy, the new system could be in effect throughout 2005.'
- (44) La abogada del patriarca pidió el archivo de la causa contra él por la demencia senil que padece "irreversible e incurable", *según certificó el forense de los juzgados*. (RAE, CREA, ABC, 2004)
 'The patriarch's lawyer asks for the file of the case against him because he is suffering from senile dementia that is "irreversible and incurable" as the court medical examiner certified.'

12. Similar to indirect discourse that is almost textual, Authier-Revuz 1978.

- (45) *Según declaró el portavoz de la citada comisión, Farid Ayar, la campaña electoral “terminará 48 horas antes del inicio de la votación”, en la que serán elegidos los 275 diputados de la Asamblea Nacional.* (RAE, CREA, ABC, 2004)
 ‘As stated by the commission spokesman Farid Ayar, the election campaign “will end 48 hours before the start of the vote” in which 275 deputies shall be elected by the National Assembly.’
- (46) El IV es, de momento, el favorito de Miguel Ángel de Gregorio. Pero según nos dice, “nunca sabré si llegué a extraer todo el potencial que tenía la uva, ya que solo lo pudimos hacer dos veces, en 1998 y 1999.”
 (RAE, CREA, El Mundo, 2003)
 ‘The fourth is, for now, the favourite Miguel Angel de Gregorio. But he tells us, “I will never know if I got to extract all the potential that the grapes had because we could only do it twice, in 1998 and 1999”’

As seen in Table 6, the instances of rewording (“completely”) are used most in PP-*según* as well as C-*según* in every genre. There is a relative use of the other types of reported discourse in academic articles, essays and news, in which it seems that the author uses the other’s discourse in order to gain credibility. On the contrary, in novels *según* appears in a few occasions with quotes, likely due to this genre using other mechanisms to introduce a character’s words (turns in dialogues).

Table 6. Results of PP-*según* and C-*según* according to the type of reported discourse

PP- <i>según</i>	rewording			direct discourse	total
	completely	+ textual words	+ textual sentences		
Acad art	74 (78.8%)	7 (7.4%)	8 (8.5%)	5 (5.3%)	94 (100%)
Essays	85 (81.8%)	4 (3.8%)	7 (6.7%)	8 (7.7%)	104 (100%)
News	233 (70.4%)	33 (9.9%)	44 (13.3%)	21 (6.4%)	331 (100%)
Novels	34 (91.9%)	1 (2.7%)	0	2 (5.4%)	37 (100%)
C- <i>según</i>	rewording			direct discourse	total
	completely	+ textual words	+ textual sentences		
Acad art	19 (82.6%)	1 (4.4%)	0	3 (13%)	23 (100%)
Essays	29 (82.8%)	0	4 (11.45%)	2 (5.75%)	35 (100%)
News	101 (73.2%)	15 (10.8%)	12 (8.7%)	10 (7.2%)	138 (100%)
Novels	32 (88.9%)	1 (2.75%)	2 (5.6%)	1 (2.75%)	36 (100%)

5.3.1 *Reporting verbs as contextual clue of C-según*

The presence of reporting verbs in *C-según* implies series of differences in relation to *PP-según*. Basing on the comparison between *selon* and reporting verbs by Coltier (2002), we observe that *C-según* evokes a distinct act of enunciation, it allows the elements of enunciation act to be expressed (e.g. addressee), and it also conveys what is said and how it is said (by means of the verb). *PP-según*, however, does not presuppose a situation of enunciation, does not allow the elements of enunciation to be expressed and it only presents what is said. Thus *C-según* allows for greater modalization than *P-según* as reporting verbs are tools at the service of the modalization of the other's discourse.

In the evidentiality framework, it seems more appropriate to speak in terms of "speaker involvement"¹³ (Cornillie & Delbecque 2008) than speaker commitment, which is associated with epistemic modality (e.g. likelihood of being true). By means of evidential markers, the speaker shows the conceptualization and construction of the meaning expressed and, in a certain way, her evaluation of how or what is being said.¹⁴

To characterize the gradation from less speaker involvement to more speaker involvement, we started from the taxonomy of speech-reporting verbs by Caldas-Coulthard (1994) and Sánchez García (2012) and took into account the *reporting verbs* collected in our corpus data. We divided the *reporting verbs* into two groups. On the one hand, there is the area of less speaker involvement, including declaratives and verbs with metalinguistic indication; on the other hand, there is the area of more speaker involvement, which is comprised of verbs showing stress, directives, verbs giving an opinion and argumentatives. In the first group, the speaker conceptualizes the content and glosses the mode of communicating it without any evaluation, whereas, in the second group, the speaker also conceptualizes the author's manner, purpose, thoughts and stance and makes them explicit. Therefore, the author's comment on the source of the information provided is more involved than in the previous case.

13. The notion of involvement proposed by these authors is based on the cognitive concept of construal, that is, "the speaker's ability to construe one and the same situation in a number of alternate ways of a making sense of it differently" (Cornillie & Delbecque 2008: 40).

14. Another approach to study modalization in evidentiality that is different from the one adopted here is the concept of "engagement", one of the main domains of the appraisal theory (Martin & White 2005). Indeed, "engagement deals with sourcing attitudes and the play of voices around opinions in discourse" (Martin & White 2005: 35). Particularly, the attribution, one of the meanings of engagement, is about the formulations that mark the external source and differentiate from the authorial voice through simple acknowledge (as in reporting verbs such as say, report, state) or show distance (as in claim) (Martin & White 2005: 113).

Table 7. Reporting verbs in relation to speaker involvement

Less speaker involvement	Declaratives	decir, informar, contar, afirmar, indicar, señalar, relatar, determinar, declarar, anunciar, manifestar, (<i>say, inform, tell, state, indicate, point out, relate, determine, declare, announce, manifest</i>)
	Metalinguistics	escribir, leer, hablar, definir, explicar, comentar, describir, mencionar, llamar, dictar, apuntar (<i>write, read, speak, define, explain, comment, describe, mention, call, dictate, write down</i>)
More speaker involvement	Showing stress	poner de relieve, destacar, asegurar (<i>emphasize, highlight, claim</i>)
	Directives	sugerir, denunciar (<i>suggest, denounce</i>)
	Giving opinion	entender, ver, creer, considerar (<i>understand, see, believe, consider</i>)
	Argumentatives + supporting	postular, constatar, demostrar, sostener, confirmar (<i>postulate, verify, demonstrate, hold, confirm</i>)

As observed in Table 8, the most frequent verbs are by far those that manifest less involvement.

Table 8. Results of reporting verbs

C- <i>según</i>	declaratives	metalinguistics	highlighting	directives	giving opinion	argumentatives
Acad art	9	7	1	2	2	2
Essays	16	12	2	0	2	3
News	92	28	3	14	3	5
Novels	22	2	2	2	2	0

In academic articles and essays, the average between declaratives and metalinguistics is quite similar, although academic articles present more of a repertoire of verbs than do essays, in which authors use often *contar* (47).

- (47) Según contaba el propio periodista Jesús Mariñas en la revista *Época*
(RAE, CREA, Pérez de Silva, 2002)
'As the journalist Mariñas explained in the magazine *Época*'

Regarding news, the highest quantity took also place for declaratives (59.3%), among which *informar* (32 of 138) and *explicar* (23 of 138) were the preferred verbs.

- (48) Según explicaron tras el entrenamiento los jugadores Luis García y Van Bronckhorst
(RAE, CREA, El Mundo, 2003)
'As they explained after training the players Luis Garcia and Van Bronckhorst'

- (49) según informaba ayer el diario *The Scotsman* (RAE, CREA, El País, 2003)
‘as reported by the newspaper *The Scotsman* yesterday.’

In novels, the declaratives used more were *decir* (11 of 31) and *contar* (9 of 31); these results may be similar to oral genres, as novels sometimes simulate orality.

- (50) Aguirre era historiador y, según decía, llevaba varios años estudiando lo ocurrido durante la guerra civil en la comarca de Banyoles.
(RAE, CREA, Javier Cercas, 2002)
‘Aguirre was historian, and he said he spent several years studying what happened during the civil war in the region of Banyoles.’

6. Characterization of quotative markers

In Spanish, the specific source of reported speech can be expressed by various means¹⁵ of which the most relevant are the grammatical subject of reporting verbs, the prepositions *según* and *para* followed by the source and lexical units such as *en palabras de* or *en términos de*. As far as *según* and *para* concerned, they are much closer to grammatical evidentials for their grammatical category (prepositions).

Also, other items can fulfil a quotative function in some contexts. For instance, the discourse marker *por su parte* develops a quotative extension when introducing reported speech and the possessive *su* is referring to its author (Llopis under revision).

- (51) Por su parte el alcalde de Maó, Arturo Bagur, añadió que “buena parte de los recursos económicos del Ajuntament se destinan al geriátrico”.
(RAE, CREA, Última Hora Digital, 2004)
‘The mayor of Maó, Arturo Bagur, on his part, added that “a significant part of the Town Council’s financial resources is used for the elderly.”’

In addition, some discourse markers¹⁶ which usually convey that what is being said proceeds from hearsay or inference, may occasionally refer to a specific source mentioned earlier in the text (Maldonado & De la Mora 2015; Cornillie & Gras 2015),

15. Estellés (2015) argues that, in colloquial conversations and in contexts of direct reported discourse (especially when *verba dicendi* are omitted), the prosody signals ‘reported’ or ‘quoted’ discourse and, therefore, the presence of evidentiality.

16. Olbertz (2007) and De la Mora & Maldonado (2015) identified examples in which *dizque* introduce an utterance that can be attributed to a specific source. Cornillie & Gras (2015) also found instances in which *evidentemente*, *por lo visto*, *al parecer* and *se ve que* are referring to a specific source.

but adding attitudinal extensions, as though the speaker wants to distance him or herself from the statement. Lampert & Lampert (2010: 318) state that markers of mediated evidentiality require “the discourse domain for their evidential function to be actualized”. This explains that some known evidentials (*dizque*, *por lo visto*, *al parecer*) could work as quotative markers in some contexts.

Taking into consideration the literature on quotatives as well as the analysis carried out here, quotatives can be characterized by the following features: (a) they indicate a specific source, (b) they imply (in general secondarily) a reportative mode of knowledge, (c) they appear beside reported speech and presuppose a previous verbalized discourse, (d) they denote reliability or credibility, (e) they are polyphonic marks and (f) they contribute to the continuation of the discourse topic. Next, we explain each one of these characteristics.

- a. Quotatives indicate the specific origin of a report as opposed to reportatives, which do not specify the exact author (Aikhenvald 2004; Lampert & Lampert 2010). The source of information can be an individual, a document or more rarely expressed an idea.
- b. Quotatives express the source of information and secondarily imply the mode of knowledge,¹⁷ which is indirect and reportative (e.g. Willet 1988; Palmer 2001 [1986]; Plungian 2001, 2010; Akhenvald 2004; Coltier & Dendale 2004). The speakers do not indicate directly how they obtained the information, but as they are rewording it, they must have heard or read this content.

Regarding source and mode of according to somebody, Lampert and Lampert (2010) hold that quotatives “regularly foreground the source as an obligatory component of the expression’s direct reference and attentionally background the mode” (Lampert & Lampert 2010: 311). In the Spanish *según*, two functioning depending on the structure can be distinguished. In *PP-según* the indication of mode is also secondary or backgrounded and derives from the primary or foreground, which is the source. In *C-según*, however, because of the presence of reporting verbs, both the source and the mode of evidence are explicit. For Lampert and Lampert (2010: 311,319), this case would be designated as reportative-quotative.

In addition, concerning the mode of knowing, some authors add another criterion, personal / non-personal (Plungian 2001, 2010) or self / other (Squartini 2008).

17. The indirect evidentiality without specification indicates the mode of access to the information, whereas the indirect evidentiality specifying the source expresses the source of information. This parameter (source of info) is, according to some authors, secondary and not essential so as to the recognition of evidentials, since the main feature showing is the mode of access to information (see Izquierdo for this issue, under revision). Accordingly, for Izquierdo (under revision), as *según* introduces the source or basis (enunciative or inferential), *según* is not an evidential marker.

Following these authors, quotatives are mainly non-personal since the information usually comes from another person.

- c. In quotatives, the source of information is “*douée de la parole*” (cfr. Charolles 1987: 254; Dendale & Coltier 2004: 595). The user reproduces the content from the original text by different means, by presenting paraphrases, quotations or both. These markers point to the report and “refer to info from other texts” (Hyland 2005: 49). Similarly, referring to *según*, Maldonado & De la Mora (2015: 491) explain that “it operates (...) in the dominion of discourse and communication: whatever is reported is based on previous attested information”. Therefore, quotatives are linked to reported speech and their use presuppose a previous verbalized discourse. Both quotatives and reported speech intersect and complement each other (Aikhenvald 2004: 141; Hassler 2010) but differ in some features, e.g., quotatives allow a lesser modalization of discourse than does reported speech (cfr. Coltier 2002).
- d. Citing the origin of a text, they denote the reliability of information and make it assumed as true (cfr. Dehkordi & Allami 2012). This credibility does not have to do with an epistemic judgement about the probabilities of being true; rather, it is extremely related to the authority of sources and the faithful and objective reproduction by the author, so the degree of reliability is derived from the context and not properly from the marker (cfr. Alonso-Almeida & Adams 2012; Dehkordi & Allami 2012; Maldonado & De la Mora 2015; Kotwica in press). In this line, Squartini considers that there is not an epistemic extension in quotatives; rather, in them, “the speaker accurately reports other utterances, without overmarking any evidential distance” (Squartini 2008: 939).
- e. They are polyphonic marks, they introduce an *énonciateur* or voice different from that of the utterance’s author (cfr. Coltier 2002, regarding *selon*) as it occurs in indirect discourse. According to Ducrot & Carel (2009), the *énonciateur* is a guarantor who is responsible for the content. Quotatives cause a splitting into two enunciators: the first corresponds to the speaker (locutor) and the second to a third person to whom the information is attributed, that is, the guarantor.
- f. Finally, they normally contribute to the continuation of the discourse topic (Coltier 2002: 98; Llopis under revision). This function is secondary and emerges as a result of the discourse structure: a topic is being discussed and then the quotative introduces a voice whose report adds information.

7. Conclusions

This study has contributed to characterize quotatives from a specific and prototypical quotative, *según*. The quotative function of *según* is fulfilled in two ways: the prepositional phrase with the quotative *según* and the clause with the modal (quotative) *según* plus a reporting verb. They differ in grammar structure and partly in their meaning (completely evidential primary meaning in the quotative *según* and less clear-cut evidential meaning in the (modal)-quotative). However, from a rhetorical-discursive perspective, it seems that the writer takes both constructions as equal, and he/she uses *C-según* to add more details and modalize the discourse more with a reporting verb.

With respect to the first hypothesis (if the quotative function is genre-related and it is more used in news), we found that *según* is more frequently used as a quotative marker in all the genres under study. In *PP-según* the quotative meaning predominates over the rest of the distinguished meanings (dependence, modal, aboutness, aspectual or possibility) in academic articles, essays and news. If we add the instances of *C-según*, the difference is around 60% in academic articles, essays and novels and about 90% in news. As expected, these results demonstrate that this genre (as likely also for other press genres) functions as a catalyst for developing evidential functions, particularly the quotative function. Journalists tend to report information indicating its origin to increase the credibility of what they are telling.

The second hypothesis was about contextual features, i.e. whether the type of referent could be also genre-related.

The specific source prototypically concerns the third person, so it is out of the deictic sphere. Specifically, the third person usually points out to whom the information was attributed (person, group or organism) or on which (speaking or writing) basis it was extracted. It more infrequently refers to which ideas (belonging to an author or theory) were reported. The source can vary from being non-specific (allusion to hearsay or folklore) to the first or second person falling on the deictic sphere of the speaker. These modifications cause a reduction of reliability (pragmatic extension). This shows that credibility regarding quotatives is based on the precision of the specific source. Thus, when the source is unspecific, the supposed reliability is lost and a mitigating extension is generated (*según algunos*, *según parece*).

Regarding connections of referents to genres, in news *PP-según* and *C-según* presents a greater variety of mechanisms to refer to the source of information. This includes complete specification, semi-specification through general or vague references (or even allusions to specific sources that are not provided), and in a few cases non-specificity. Journalists show that they try to specify as much as possible, using the repertoire offered in this genre. In this regard, the indication of the source in academic articles is most precise, as the exact origin is usually written down, very

often via a proper noun. By contrast, in essays and more significantly in novels, the presence of non-specificity is slightly greater for *PP-según* as well as in *C-según*. These genres are not subject to strict conventions for references (in contrast to academic genres and news) and allow a little inaccuracy concerning sources. Also, a few instances of *PP-según* with the first person (*según mi...*) were collected in essays and novels, genres with more subjectivity than academic papers and news.

The third hypothesis aims at possible differences between *PP-según* and *C-según* beyond grammatical category and meaning, specifically position and modalization.

We observed that every genre shows a clear preference for the initial position in *PP-según*. However, concerning *C-según*, the final position is preferred in academic articles and especially news. But the main difference concerns the modalization. *C-según* allows greater modalization and participation of the writer as she can convey what and how through the verb and can include the addressee and other details, something that rarely occurs in *PP-según*. All the same the most frequent reporting verbs are by far those that manifest less involvement (declaratives and metalinguistics), so the writer says something more about the linguistic act but in a measured way. A final remarkable feature between both constructions is that *PP-según* implies firstly the source of information and secondarily the mode of knowledge, whereas *C-según* involves both source and mode, because of the presence of the reporting verb.

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Según along time

Following an epistemic path

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This paper attempts to show that *según* has developed not only evidential reportative functions, but also a set of meanings that move towards the dominion of epistemicity. Diachronic analysis, shows that the original meaning of *según* (Lat. *secundare* 'to second, to follow') gradually moves towards evidential domains. A synchronic analysis of written and oral contemporary Spanish, shows an increase on reportative uses in both registers. Epistemic meanings are considerably more frequent in oral data, and some of these meanings (i.e. questioning the trustworthiness of a proposition) are only found in this register. It is proposed that as some properties of the core meaning are lost – particularly the link with the source of information – the degree of subjective evaluation of the event increases (Langacker 1990). It is also claimed that *según* functions as a space builder (Fauconnier 1985), becoming an evidential-epistemic marker such that the assertion is never located in the *space of reference* and only shows up in an *alternative space* where veracity is restricted to the conceptualizer's domain. Thus, while third person uses are mostly epistemic, first and second person subjects impose an attenuative reading.

Keywords: evidentiality, epistemic markers, *según*, Spanish

1. Introduction

Typological studies on evidentiality have shown that evidential markers tend to extend their meanings to epistemic domains especially to meanings related to speaker's evaluation of the trustworthiness of information (Aikhenvald 2004, 2006). Spanish is not the exception. Numerous studies have shown different ways in which evidential markers and evidential strategies have developed epistemic meanings (Travis 2006; Olbertz 2007; Miglio 2010; De la Mora & Maldonado 2015; Maldonado & De la Mora 2015) and in some cases, evidential markers have developed non-factual

meanings (Olbertz 2007; Squartini 2009; De la Mora & Maldonado 2015). Studies that deal with the effect on genre on the expression of epistemic values, have also shown that epistemic extensions of evidential markers are commonly observed in oral discourse rather than in written discourse (González, Roseano, Borrás & Prieto, 2017).

Dizque, is one of the evidential markers in Spanish that has shown epistemic extensions. *Dizque* (from the apocopation of a verb of saying *decir* – *diz* plus the complementizer *que*) has been analyzed in many dialects and from different theoretical perspectives (Kany 1944; Travis 2006; Olbertz 2007; Babel 2009; Miglio 2010; De la Mora & Maldonado 2015). Most of the data shows that this form has developed epistemic overtones, however current studies, particularly in Mexican Spanish, also recognize the development of non-factual meanings (Olbertz 2007; De la Mora & Maldonado 2015), a common semantic development of evidentials as proposed by Squartini (2009):

- (1) A los seis meses de andar *dizque* gobernando se puso enfermo. (1990-CREA)
'After six months of *dizque* (*pretending*) governing he fell ill.'
- (2) ...y a sudar frío en la escuela. Aquí en la casa *dizque* estoy enfermo de la garganta, pero la verdad es otra es la pura paranoia
'...and sweating at school. Here at home I *dizque* (*pretend to*) have sore throat, but that's not true, it's all paranoia' (De la Mora & Maldonado 2015, 175)

Along with Spanish *dizque*, some authors have investigated the marker *según*, that has been recognized as a *bona fide* evidential, since it encodes source of information from a third party or a document (González-Vergara 2011; Alonso-Almeida 2012; Alonso-Almeida & Adams 2012; Maldonado & De la Mora 2015):

- (3) *Según* el censo 2002, el 26.8% de los hogares chilenos tiene conexión a internet con banda ancha.
(La Tercera. 10 de septiembre de 2008) (González-Vergara 2011, 150)
'*Según* (*according to*) the 2002 census, 26.8% of Chilean households has broadband internet'
- (4) La niña ya genera sus propias defensas y *según* los médicos que la atienden ha superado el mal (2014-CREA)
'The girl generates her own defenses and *según* (*according to*) the doctors that are taking care of her she is over the sickness'

Maldonado & De la Mora (2015) found that the uses of *según* have extended to pragmatic domains in which *según* questions the veracity of what is being conferred, without referring to a speech act or without encoding source of information, a pattern similar to the one observed in *dizque*. At the same time a comparison between oral and written data, shows that some meanings are restricted to oral register.

- (5) *Según yo nadie* (sic) se daba cuenta/ no (risa)/ y nace la niña/ ¡en octubre!
 (Maldonado & De la Mora 2015, 494)
 ‘*Según yo* (according to myself) nobody knew it (that I was pregnant)...no (laugh) and the girl was born in October’
- (6) y me ponía a leer/ *según yo* me ponía a leer/ ¡y empezaba!/ a deletrear así/ este/
 de una en otra letra (Maldonado & De la Mora 2015, 495)
 ‘and I was reading, well *según yo* (I was pretending) I was reading, I started to spell the letters one by one’

Maldonado & De la Mora (2015), propose a model that explains the semantic extensions of *según* ‘to second, to follow’ into epistemic domains. They argue that the core meaning of the form ‘to second, to follow’ is present in almost all uses: either as someone copying or emulating the content of some source taken as a trustworthy authority; events that follow some established content, be it rules, norms or well-established procedures; acting according to established rules; doing something depending on someone or something else, etc. According to Maldonado & De la Mora (2015) these meaning extensions are possible because the basic meaning ‘to second, to follow’ allows *según* to operate as a *space builder* (Fauconnier 1985), in which the content of the alternative space must fulfill the conditions of the referent space. *Según* connects an *alternative space* to the *reference space* such that X’ is true as long as it follows the content of X in R, and it is this schematic representation that sets the base for further discourse developments:




Figure 1. *Según* basic pattern (Maldonado & De la Mora 2015, 490)

The basic evidential value of *según* fully corresponds to the semantic content of the lexical form, a preposition connecting two forms, now taken into the sphere of discourse. Thus, in *Comportarse según las normas* ‘Behave according to the rules’ *según* is not an evidential marker, it is the model of conduct followed by people. To become an evidential reportative marker, *según* must change from the dominion of actual events and actions to that of discourse. This is a case of dominion shift that preserves the schematic representation of the base form. In order for *según* to become an evidential-epistemic marker some properties must be lost. The truth value of the utterance is no longer assumed as shared knowledge established in the speech community but it depends on where or who the utterance comes from.

Evidentials have been explained in terms of source of information (Chafe 1986; Willet 1988; Floyd 1997; Aikhenvald 2004). Information can be directly accessed

mainly via visual perception, in which case it is attested or inferred, or it can be indirectly obtained from a verbal secondary source. Evidentials reproducing information from a specific source are *reportatives*, while those coming from non-specific sources are known as *hearsay* markers. Izquierdo (2016) and Izquierdo, González & Loureda and Cornillie (2016) have adequately underlined the ambiguity of the notion of *source of information*, as it is particularly problematic for inferred information. In *Debe haber sido muy desagradable* ‘It must have been quite unpleasant’ the source of information is not relevant, instead *mode of access* is crucial, i.e., the way the information is accessed determines the epistemic interpretation of *debe haber sido* ‘it must have been’. While mode of access is crucial for evidentials based on perception, such as *al parecer* ‘it seems’ and *por lo visto* ‘as can be seen’ and so on (González Ramos 2016), in *según* its linking referential properties constitute the base for both its evidential and epistemic extensions. Mode of access for *según* is less significant than source of information.

The epistemic values of *según* are those in which the veracity of the utterance is called into question. A statement may be questioned either i) because the source of information becomes diffuse (*hearsay*) as in Figure 2, where the space builder (Fauconnier 1985) connects with the dashed circle representing the lack of specificity of the source of information, or ii) due to the fact the connecting properties of *según* are reduced in scope to a specific speech act participant, be it the speaker (S), the hearer (H) or other (O). In either case the truth of the statement is questioned (t?). Under restricted scope the assertion is never located in the *space of reference* (R). It is thus valid only in an *alternative space* where veracity is restricted to some interlocutor or to the conceptualizer’s domain, as can be seen in Figure 3. To the extent that the scope of *según* is restricted to a specific participant, via a proper name or a pronoun, the validity of an assessment reduces accordingly:




Figure 2. Hearsay




Figure 3. Restricted scope

Such validity is even further reduced when it is the speaker himself who questions the veracity of something, as in cases where *según* directly modifies a predication (*era según mi padre* ‘he was allegedly my father’. The content of the proposition becomes questionable to the extent that it activates the inference that the subject of the event pretends to do some action which, of course, does not take place (*según trabaja de noche* ‘he sort of works at night’).

Según parallels *dizque*, in terms of evidential uses and further epistemic overtones. Yet *según* has received little attention in the literature compared to *dizque*. However, to the extent that the evidential and epistemic values of *según* do not stem from either verbs of perception nor from verbs of speech, it is necessary to explore the historical forces inducing the emergence of these interpretations.

In this paper, we account for the diachronic development of *según* (‘to follow’, ‘to second’ ‘according to’, depending’, ‘pursuant to’) and its evidential and epistemic extensions observed in current Spanish. We present a diachronic analysis that shows the stability of the core meanings of *según* across time, as well as the causes inducing the emergence of evidential and epistemic readings. We also discuss the effect of genre in the development of epistemic meanings as we compare data from oral and written corpora. The data analyzed in this paper comes from Mexican Spanish, a variety in which epistemic meanings have been documented (Maldonado & De la Mora 2015).

2. Methods

2.1 Data and corpora

In order to explore the diachronic development of *según*, we analyzed 1061 examples from four different corpora: CORDE (*Corpus Diacrónico del Español*, RAE), CREA (*Corpus de Referencia del Español Actual*, RAE) CORPES (*Corpus del Español del Siglo XXI*, RAE) and CSCM (*Corpus Sociolingüístico de la Ciudad de México*, Butragueño & Lastra 2011). For the diachronic analysis, we extracted examples from written corpora from the 13th to the 21st Century, as for the analysis of oral data, examples were extracted from the *Corpus Sociolingüístico de la ciudad de México* that includes interviews from 1997 to 2005. Oral and written data analyzed correspond to Mexican Spanish, with the exception of data from 1200s to 1500s that corresponds to Peninsular Spanish. All examples were coded and classified based on meaning. Coding was cross-checked by two reviewers for reliability purposes. A total of ten uses/meanings of *según* were found. We will describe these uses in the next section.

2.2 Meanings and uses

From the analysis of meanings and uses of *según* in the 1061 examples we identified 10 different uses that were classified as follows:

a. *According*

This category includes all examples in which the subject acts following a canon, a pattern, an expected behavior based on tradition (7) and (8):

- (7) y os encamina a buscar el gusto de Dios, a obrar *según* su santa voluntad; y para que obréis según ella (1640-CORDE)
‘and they show us the way to God, to act *según* (*according to*) his will; so, you will act according to it’
- (8) las “democracias modernas”: expresión, reunión y asociación, se redefinen ahora *según* la lógica del mercado mundial (2001-CREA)
‘the “modern democracies”: expression, reunion and association, are redefined now *según* (*according to*) the world market’s logic’

The behavior may also be guided by written credited documents such as laws, written agreements or contracts, as in (9) and (10).

- (9) debe preceder a la prisión, *según* el párrafo I, artículo 2º de la primera ley (1836-CORDE)
‘it must go to jail, *según* (*according to*) the 1st paragraph, article 2 on the first law’
- (10) un hecho que merezca, *según* las leyes, ser castigado con pena corporal (1836-CORDE)
‘something that deserves body punishment, *según* (*according to*) the laws’

b. *Causal*

There is a set of causal relationships established among events. In the most obvious case there is causal determinacy, i.e., the conditions of the first event determine the behavior of the second as in (11) and (12).

- (11) El timbre de su voz cambiaba *según* las preguntas que me hacía (Maldonado & De la Mora 2015, 490)
‘Her pitch voice changed *según* (*depending on*) the questions she asked’
- (12) a veces voy cada ocho días/ dos veces por semana/ *según* como estén las ventas (2011-CSCM)
‘sometimes I go once a week, twice a week *según* (*depending on*) how sales are going’

c. *Depending*

These examples are characterized by dependency relationships between two events. There is a conditional rather than a causal relationship. Should and

how the first condition take place the second will also hold as can be seen in (13) and (14):

- (13) exactamente/ *según* lo que me salga yo <~yo:>/ invento el precio que le/ que la voy a vender (2011-CSCM)
‘Exactly, *según* (*depending on*) what I get, I make up the price’
- (14) son las semillas de los vicios o de las virtudes, *según* el uso que se hace de ellas (2011-CSCM)
‘they are the seeds of vices or virtues, *según* (*depending on*) how you use them’

d. *Reportative documents*

Within this category, we included what we considered as reportative markers in which the source of information is retrieved from reliable documents. Documents can come from official institutions such as journals, newspapers, boards and so on. We distinguish two functions for documents: laws dictating behavior, *versus* documents containing information to be shared. Only the latter class belongs to this category (15–16):

- (15) porque éstos fueron destruidos por agentes de la misma policía, que, *según* reporta el periódico...
‘because those were destroyed by police agents, that *según* (*according to*) the newspaper...’
- (16) En Nuevo León, *según* datos del sistema de vigilancia epidemiológica en 1999 se registraron 3.9 casos (2001-CREA)
‘In Nuevo Leon, *según* (*according to*) the database from the epidemiological prevention system in 1999, 3.9 cases were identified’

e. *Reportative human source*

We were in need to distinguish reportatives based on documents from those in which humans were the source of information. This distinction will be crucial in the development of reportatives and epistemic uses in the evolution of Spanish, since the degree of reliability decreases as the information comes from humans. Reportatives with humans frequently co-occur with verbs of speech.

- (17) Los ataques se iniciaron, *según* testigos, cuando fuerzas estadounidenses trataban de cercar el domicilio (2004-CREA)
‘the attacks started, *según* (*according to*) the witnesses when American forces were trying to surround the house’
- (18) cuando estuve en Aseguradora Hidalgo/ me/ me enfermé de las/ *según* me habían informado que tenía yo tres discos (2011-CREA)
‘when I worked in Hidalgo Insurance I got sick, *según* (*according to them*) I had three discs’

f. *Generic reference*

In contrast with the previous categories whose source of information is a specific document or a person, in *generic reference* there is no precise source. This *hearsay* category is normally encoded with *según* + indefinite pronouns or impersonal marking *según esto*, *según se dice* as in (19–20):

- (19) En el sureste del referido cerro de Coronilla se halla, *según* dicen, otro Real de minas de plata (1743-CORDE)
 ‘Southeast from the Coronilla Mountain, you can find, *según* (*that’s what it is said*), another silver mines’
- (20) Sus familiares más cercanos de inmediato se apoderaron de la casa, *según* esto para cuidar a la tía, y la tía, rodeada de tantos compañeros, se murió de soledad unas semanas después (2006-CORPES)
 ‘Her closest relatives immediately took over the house, *según esto* (*supposedely*) to take care of the aunt, and the aunt surrounded by so many people died of loneliness’

g. *Reportative-questioning*

Different from the pure reportative use, the reportative-questioning category includes all cases in which the veracity of what is reported is called into question, as can be seen in (21) and (22):

- (21) no y es que *según* están combatiendo eso // pero a mí se me hace absurdo que/ vendo cosas piratas y me den un permiso (2011-CSCM)
 ‘they *según* (*are pretending*) they are fighting against it (piracy), I think it is absurd that they sell pirated products’
- (22) ... pues sí/ *según* // es/ bueno/ el estudio (2011-CSCM)
 ‘well *según* (*according to*) them the studio is good’

h. *Restrictive*

Here *según* takes some pronominal form or a proper name that restricts the value of what is being conferred to the realm of some participant, be it the speaker, the hearer or a third person.

- (23) Y le digo/ “bueno/ a ver/ *según* tú/ ¿cuánto vale tu libertad?”/¿sabes esto cuánto...? (2011-CSCM)
 ‘and I tell him, “well let’s see, *según* tú (*for you*) how much does your freedom cost?” Do you know how much it costs?’
- (24) *Según* yo nadien (sic) se daba cuenta/ no (risa)/ y nace la niña/ ¡en octubre! (2011-CSCM)
 ‘*Según* yo (*for me*) no one knew (laugh) and suddenly the baby was born, in October!’

In this category, we have included cases of pragmatic attenuation. These are combinations of *según* with first person pronouns where the pragmatic strength of an assertion is diminished:¹

(25) Entonces / lo que tienen que hacer/ *según yo*/ es ponerlo a/ a repartir cosas
(2011-CSCM)

‘So, what you have to do, *según I (in my view)*, is to have him handing things around’

i. *Questioning*

Questioning is a category that includes all the cases in which *según* questions the veracity of the phrase over which it has scope, without having a reportative function. In (26) the speaker doubts that the professor was assessing her project:

(26) hice mi protocolo/ mi proyecto// que *según* me estaba asesorando un tipo// que cuando le llevaba para revisiones/ me decía/ “¡ay mi hija <~mija>!/ le está quedando bien bonito”
(2011-CSCM)

‘...I wrote my protocol, my project, that *según (supposedly)* a guy was checking, but every time he had to give me feedback he just said “my dear, your project is beautiful”’

j. *Pretending*

These are cases in which *según* encodes non-factual information, things that cannot be connected to the space of reality. To the extent that things happen exclusively in the speaker or hearer’s dominion, the events referred to might not be real. People can pretend to do things so long as there is a restrictive pronoun. First and second person pronouns are dominant for this reading:

(27) y me ponía a leer/ *según yo* me ponía a leer/ ¡y empezaba!/ a deletrear así/ este/ de una en otra letra
(2011-CSCM)

‘and I was reading, well *según yo (I was pretending)* I was reading, I started to spell the letters one by one’

Along these categories, the emergence of epistemic values come from cases where the truth value of proposition is called into question. On the one hand, the trustworthiness of an utterance diminishes when the source of information is not precise (*generic reference*). Other epistemic values emerge when the truth value of an utterance is reduced to the realm of some participant (*restrictive*). All other

1. This in fact constitutes a new category for current Mexican Spanish spoken discourse. Yet in order to simplify matters, we will keep it as part of the restrictive uses of *según* from which it develops.

epistemic values correspond to cases where the veracity of the utterance is seen as false (*reportative-questioning, questioning, pretending*). In the following section, we will show the emergence of these values in the evolution of Spanish across genre and time.

3. The diachrony of *según*

In this section, we explore the diachronic evolution of *según* from its source meaning to new epistemic developments. Table 1 shows the uses and distribution of *según* across time.

3.1 General patterns

One of the most interesting findings from the diachronic analysis is that all the meanings documented in the thirteenth century are still present in contemporary Spanish, however their distribution is different. The first documented use of *según* comes from the thirteenth century. In this period, the most frequent meanings correspond to *according* (44%), followed by *reportative* (29%) and finally *depending* (15%). The diachronic analysis of *según* shows a very consistent pattern in terms of the most prevalent meanings. As we can see in Table 1, *according, depending* and *reportative meanings* are the most frequent uses across time. Interestingly, these three meanings have the basic pattern of following a previous model, as suggested in Figure 1. There is a causal relationship between the source and the target, as represented by *according* and *depending* meanings. The non-causal relationship is represented by reportative meanings of *según* which are documented since the thirteenth century and refer to documents as unquestionable sources of information:

- (28) *según* la declaración que el rey don Sancho hizo (1326-CORDE)
 ‘*según* (*according*) to the statement that the King Sanchi made’
- (29) guardar e mantener todo bien e conplidamente, *según* que en la dicha sentençia se contiene (1375-CORDE)
 ‘to keep everything dutifully, *según* (*as*) it is expressed on the judgment’

This pattern is common up to the sixteenth century, in which the reportative use with human referents becomes productive. Causal meanings are documented since the thirteenth century and are observed across time until nowadays, however its frequency of use is consistently low, less than 10%.

Table 1. Uses and distribution of *según* in written corpora across time

Meaning	Period									
	1200s	1300s	1400s	1500s	1600s	1700s	1800s	1900s	2000–2004	2004–2010
According										
%	44	28	30	34	37	28	48	43	34	28
Causal										
%	6	10	0	0	2	1	2	6	0	4
Depending										
%	15	9	11	25	21	26	26	12	14	16
Reportative documents										
%	26	49	51	17	25	17	2	6	6	19
Reportative human										
%	3	3	7	15	7	11	10	19	35	15
Generic Reference										
%	0	1	1	9	5	17	6	5	3	6
Restrictive										
%	6	0	0	0	3	0	6	9	8	11
Pretending										
%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
Total(%)	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100%

It may be noticed that some epistemic categories (*reportative questioning* and *questioning*) are not present in this table. This is due to the fact that instances of these categories only showed up in oral contemporary Spanish, as Table 2 will show.

3.2 Reportatives and rhetoric forms

Reportative uses of *según* are present early on, however there are two clear stages: from the thirteenth to the fifteenth century, reportative uses only have documents as the source of information. It is around the sixteenth century that human subjects, either identified or unidentified, become the source of information.

From the thirteenth to the fifteenth centuries, the reportative uses with a document as reference correspond to almost 90% of all the reportative uses. It is worth mentioning that, since documents are the source of information, the veracity of the report is highly reliable.

In this period, it is common to observe anaphora rhetoric forms linked to the source of information, such as *según sobredicho es* ‘as mentioned above’. These forms comprise more than 50% of the reportatives found in these three centuries:

- (30) oy día de la Era desta carta en el dicho monte, *según* dicho es uos vendo por treynta maravedís desta (1346-CORDE)
 ‘this day of this era in the space of this letter *según* as already said I sell you this for thirty maravedis’
- (31) al dicho mi parte e le hicieron de daño, *según* dicho es; e condenados, que los mande dar (1531-CORDE)
 ‘they hurt the afore mentioned father of mine, *según* (as already) said; and have them condemned’
- (32) los dichos deán e cabildo e de las otras cosas *según* sobredicho es (1311-CORDE)
 ‘the aforementioned prelates and the counciland other things *según* (as already) said above’

The fact that documents are the source of information makes the truth-value of the proposition highly reliable. Around the sixteenth century, reportative uses of *según* with documents as the source of information are still observed, however it is around this century that the reportative forms with humans as a source of information emerge and start to overtake the reportative meanings.

3.3 The establishment of the reportative meaning

Between the fifteenth and the sixteenth centuries the rhetoric form for reportatives with reference to documents diminishes, and by the eighteenth century the form disappears. As the reportative uses with documents sources diminish, reportative uses with human sources increase. This process starts around the seventeenth century where reportative documents diminish from (25%) to (17%). On the other hand, reportative human sources increase from (7%) to (15%) since the fifteenth century and it maintains high frequencies all along. By this time, *reportatives* with identified human referents correspond to 15% of the data. On the other hand, *generic reportatives* emerge around the sixteenth century (9%). There is thus a move from trustworthy documents, to less reliable human sources (33), to even less credible generic hearsay sources (34):

- (33) indios reverenciándoles como a dioses, porque *según* decían ellos, sanaban los enfermos (1650-CORDE)
 ‘indians venerating them as gods, because, *según* (according to) they said, they cured those that were sick’
- (34) lo llamaban Quezalquate, que *según* se dice fundó este aquella cibdad (1525-CORDE)
 ‘they called him Quezalquate and *según* (according to) what they say, he founded the city’

The establishment of the reportative meaning with human referents opens the window for doubt. As opposed to documents, which are highly reliable, reports coming from a human source cannot be as reliable as documents. Therefore, reportative meanings with human sources allow for the development of epistemic overtones. This is even more evident in the appearance of generic reportatives around the sixteenth century which remain active until contemporary Spanish. The reduction of credibility of the source licenses the emergence readings that question the veracity of the utterance. There is a second path for epistemic readings: restrictive uses which will be analyzed in the next section.

3.4 The emergency of epistemic uses

Once *según* appears as a reportative marker with human referents, it opens the door to epistemic uses in which the content of the proposition headed by *según* is true only in certain speaker's mental space, usually a third person. These restrictive uses are observed from the first time around the seventeenth century and become very productive after the nineteenth century. More than 90% of the restrictive uses found in written corpora correspond to third person singular pronouns:

- (35) Atienden a la justicia, y *según* ella, condenan a muerte a nuestro cliente
(1818-CORDE)
'they observe the law, and *según* (*according to it*), they sentence our client to death'
- (36) algunos conocimientos de/ de ciertas/ teorías que *según* él ha estudiado de este Rod Steiner
(2011-CSCM)
'He has some knowledge about certain theories that *según* (*according to*) him, he has studied from Rod Steiner'

To the extent that the truth value of the utterance is restricted to a specific person it cannot be taken as shared knowledge located in the space of reality but only in the dominion of that participant. This will be even more evident as we explore restrictive uses for first and second person in the following section.

4. Tracing the epistemic path. Evidence from oral corpora

In order to investigate the effect of register in the emergence of epistemic overtones, we analyzed data from oral and written contemporary Spanish. Unfortunately, we do not have oral diachronic data. We can only draw partial conclusions in relation to register effect. Table 2 illustrates the uses and distribution of *según* in contemporary Mexican Spanish in three different corpora from 1997 to 2012.

Table 2. Uses and distribution of *según* in contemporary written and oral Spanish

Meaning	Period		
	2000 to 2004 (CREA, written) N = 100	2004 to 2012 (CORPES, written) N = 100	1997 to 2005 (CSCM, oral) N = 127
According			
%	34	28	2
Causal			
%	0	4	1
Depending			
%	14	16	16
Reportative			
%	41	34	15
Generic Reference			
%	3	6	9
Reportative-questioning			
%	0	0	9
Pretending			
%	0	1	4
Restrictive			
%	8	11	26
Questioning			
%	0	0	18
Total(%)	100%	100%	100%

One of the most striking differences on the restrictive uses of *según* is found when oral and written data are compared. The diachronic analysis of written data across time shows that restrictive meaning is less than 10% of the data, however for oral data, restrictive uses doubled the written uses (26%). Another difference observed between oral and written corpora is that restrictive uses with first person pronouns are only found in oral register. Unfortunately, we don't have diachronic data for oral register that allow us to determine if these uses were part of the system before. Yet it is clear that these uses are restricted to oral register. According to Aikhenvald (2006) reportative evidentials carry additional meanings if the proposition they head has a first person subject. We find first and second person pronouns restricting the truth-value of an assessment to the exclusive realm of speech act participants.

(37) Y le digo/ "bueno/ a ver/ *según* tú/ ¿cuánto vale tu libertad?/ ¿sabes esto cuánto...?/ 'And I tell him/ "well/let's see/ *según* tú (*in your view*)/ what is the value of your freedom? Do you know that, how much...?'

(38) *Según* yo nadien (sic) se daba cuenta/ no (risa)/ y nace la niña/ ¡en octubre! 'según I (as for me), nobody knew it...no (laugh) and my girl was born in October'

Similar to the data from old Spanish, data from contemporary Spanish shows that *according*, *depending* and *reportative* meanings are still the most frequent in written register. Data from written corpus from 2000 to 2004 (CREA Corpus) reveals that these three meanings correspond to 89% of the data. A similar pattern is observed for data collected between 2005 and 2012 (CORPES Corpus), for which *according*, *depending* and *reportative* meanings cover 78% of the data. The pattern observed for oral data is completely different. The aforementioned meanings (*according*, *depending* and *reportative*) only comprise 34% of the data. The other 66% is distributed along other uses, some of which are not even found in written corpora. This is the case of *reportative-questioning*, *pretending* and *questioning*.

- (39) [bueno]/ el señor/ *según* era mi papa [questioning]
 ‘Well/ that man, *según* (*allegedly*) was my father’
- (40) I: [porque haz de cuenta] que según tú (in your mind) estás lavando a/ a los muertitos [pretending]
 ‘I: because imagine that, *según* you you are washing the dead spirits

We propose that *restrictives*, *reportative-questioning*, *pretending* and *questioning* uses, convey meanings that have already moved away from the reportative to the epistemic domain in oral genres. Unfortunately, as we mentioned before, we do not have oral data from previous centuries to attest the presence of epistemic meanings before the twentieth century. The analysis shows that in contemporary Spanish these epistemic meanings are highly frequent, especially for oral register. In the case of written corpora from 2000 to 2004 and from 2005 to 20012, data shows that epistemic meanings correspond to 6% and 9% of the data. In the oral corpus, the epistemic meanings correspond to 52% of the examples. Besides the high frequency on the epistemic meanings, data shows how all meanings that express non-factual, fictitiously created or dubious situations are only found in oral corpora, underlying once again the importance of looking at language in discourse.

5. Conclusions

Diachronic and synchronic analysis of *según* in Mexican Spanish shows that dependency relations (*according*, *depending* and *reportative*) are pretty stable across time and registers. All meanings of *según* found in the thirteenth century are still present in contemporary Spanish, however new meanings have also developed. These new meanings are all speaker-related and, even though they can be found in written registers, they are by far more commonly observed orally. Diachronic analysis from written corpus (CREA), shows that the original meaning of *según* (Lat. *secundare* ‘to second, to follow’) gradually moves towards evidentiality and

epistemicity in subjective domains. When comparing current uses of *según* in Mexican Spanish across oral and written registers, data shows that the core meaning is still present. As already pointed out by González, Roseano, Borrás and Prieto (2017), rates of epistemic meanings are higher in oral register than in written use. The analysis presented here for *según*, along with previous literature on Spanish *dizque*, provides empiric evidence for Maldonado and De la Mora's model proposed in 2015, as well as for Squartini's (2009) semantic evolution of evidentiality:

SOURCE MODEL > EVIDENTIAL > EPISTEMIC EVIDENTIAL > NON-FACTUAL

We have attempted to show that *según* has undergone a process of semantic attenuation *a la* Langacker (1990), by which the basic pattern of 'following a previous model' has lost some of its properties to license more subjective interpretations. Izquierdo (2016) and Izquierdo González & Loureda (2016) have proposed that evidentiality depends more on the way information is accessed than on the source of information. We have shown that both, in the synchronic and behavior and the historical evolution of *según*, mode of access is a secondary force as compared to the quality of the source of information. First, only documents and trustable sources could operate as reliable sources. Then, things move from well defined to very diffuse generic sources of information which led to the emergence of epistemic truth questioning readings. A different process of epistemic formation takes place when the source is reduced to a third person participant. More questionable are utterances whose validity is reduced to the realm of speech act participants. Finally, the scope of this subjective marker is maximally reduced as the speaker questions the veracity of something by letting *según* modify directly some noun or verb phrase (*según era mi padre* 'allegedly he was my father'). The trustworthiness "feature" of *según* became dubious, either as sources turned vague, when they were restricted to the scope of some exclusive participant or, even worse, when reduction involved only the conceptualizer. Such restrictions licensed events to lose credibility, leading the way towards epistemic values that not only detach themselves from reality but also restrict themselves to more and more subjective epistemic representations. As we leave valuable sources behind truth is restricted to one's own mind.

Corpora

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Tenses in interaction

Beyond evidentiality

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This chapter analyzes the discursive functions performed by the future in Spanish. In order to do so, it departs from a definition of the future based on the deictic ‘distance forward’ instruction, which may be projected along a subjectivity axle and cross different levels of meaning. When distance is projected upon the utterance, the future plays several discursive roles and traverses a variety of categories that go beyond evidentiality. More specifically, the future in Spanish can be a powerful tool to persuade and convince (persuasive future); it can also help control disagreement as part of a counter-argumentation strategy (concessive future); or it can participate in an assessment process (mirative future). Information occurring in the future must have been previously activated for these values to arise, which naturally happens in the context of interaction.

Keywords: future, (inter)subjectivity, (counter)argumentation, mirativity

1. Time, tense, tenses, and the puzzle of the future

The present chapter¹ focuses on the discourse functions of some tenses in Spanish; it especially deals with those expressing posteriority in their most basic temporal sense, and, more precisely, with the synthetic or morphological future, even though an essential difference between the future and the conditional will be drawn in the last section. In this way, it will be shown that the future is likely to intersect with different categories beyond temporality, amongst which not only evidentiality appears but also some others which turn this verbal form into a very powerful tool for discourse.

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Tense has traditionally been considered a grammatical category that codes time and functions deictically (Comrie 1985). Thus, in contrast to the past – (1) –, which places the event as previous to the time of speech, and the present – (2) –, which places the event as simultaneous to the now of the speaker, the future – (3) – locates the event after the time of speech:

- (1) Juan *vino* ayer
'Juan came home yesterday'
- (2) María *está* en casa hoy
'María is at home today'
- (3) El equipo *jugará* mañana
'The team will play tomorrow'

The deictic peculiarity of the future – i.e. that of placing the event in a moment that has not taken place – is related to a number of modal values (Dahl 1985). For instance, when the future occurs with a non-agentive subject, it triggers a predictive sense. Instead, it may be interpreted as a promise if it appears with the first person; or as a request, if combined with the second person. Furthermore, the future can be understood as a universal truth when it occurs with an indeterminate subject and is linked to a kind of cyclical knowledge (RAE 2009). Despite these modal flavors, the future still plays a temporal role in Examples (4) to (7) below; that is to say, it still places the event after the now of the speaker.

- (4) El próximo fin de semana *lloverá* en buena parte del país
'It will rain in most parts of the country next weekend'
- (5) Mañana te *compraré* un helado
'I will buy you an ice cream tomorrow'
- (6) *Entregarás* el proyecto la semana que viene
'You will hand in your homework next week'
- (7) Todos *moriremos* algún día
'We all will die someday'

More interestingly, however, the future can occur in non-posteriority contexts, as exemplified by (8). In these cases, it has been related to inferential evidentiality, insofar as the speaker expresses a calculation or a conjecture by means of this form; and to epistemic modality too, since the speaker evaluates the proposition as probable:

- (8) A: ¿Qué hora es?
'What time is it?'
B: *Serán*_{Fut} las cuatro
'It must be four'

(Bello [1847] 1971: 236)

The versatility that characterizes the future has often raised a certain degree of controversy when trying to classify it. According to a number of authors, the future remains a temporal form even in cases such as (8). This is De Saussure's (2013) proposal; in his view, it is not the temporal value – which continues to be future – that changes in (8), but the nature of the event, which comes from expressing *p* to convey *verification of p*. This change of nature becomes possible through a change of perspective, or expressed differently, the state of affairs in examples like (8) is represented by a third entity located in the future which can assert its truth. It follows from this not only that the speaker is unable to assert the event in the present – he does so allocentrically in the future – but also that his degree of commitment exceeds mere possibility or uncertainty – in fact, it is categorized as high probability. According to other authors, though, the future essentially constitutes a modal form, as Giannakidou & Mari (2012) argue for Italian and Greek; more specifically, the future behaves as a modal of necessity, shaping a paradigm with *must*. From this point of view, the temporal value of the future is only a derived form that arises when the speaker has direct knowledge of a relevant moment – i.e. the one in which the event takes place.

From broader perspectives, including the philosophical one developed by Jaszczolt (2009) or the cognitive one advocated by authors such as Langacker (1999, 2011) and Brisard (2010), the future is assumed to be modal because time in general is modal. Thus, according to the former, the notions of present, past or future belong to psychological or inner time and do not exist out of human experience, where *now* occupies a privileged status.² Consequently, psychological time can be defined as a relative detachment from the certainty of now, either because it is considered an anticipation (of the future) or because it represents a fragmented memory (of the past). From a cognitive point of view (Langacker 1999, 2011; Brisard 2010; Brisard & Patard 2011), tenses, the same as mood, are *grounding predications*, since they relate the proposition to the situation of speech (*ground*). This relationship has an essentially modal nature because it is based on the status of knowledge assigned to propositions. The cognitive proposal, however, goes further in accepting different levels of actuality, in contrast to inactuality – or fictivity.

With the boom of studies on evidentiality, the future has even come to be defined as a grammatical evidential in the sense of Aikhenvald (2004). According to Escandell (2010, 2014), the future in Spanish always behaves as an inferential, conveying the notion that the only source for the event is the speaker's inner process, either because this event lies at some other time (which corresponds to the temporal interpretation) or because it happens at some other space (which explains examples such as (8)).

2. See also Mozersky (2015) for an alternative philosophical perspective, where present, past and future are equally real.

1.1 Future, discourse, and evidentiality

When it seemed that the debate about the analysis of the future focused on the supremacy of the modal value over the temporal one (Giannakidou & Mari 2012), or vice versa (De Saussure 20139), or on which analytical tool – either modality (Van der Auwera & Plungian 1998) or evidentiality (Squartini 2001) – seemed wider for the treatment of this verbal form, attention seems to have shifted towards other uses: the discursive ones; namely, persuasive – (9) –, concessive – (10) –, or mirative – (11) –.

- (9) Por supuesto que pensamos llegar a un acuerdo con ella; no queremos escándalos. Pero nos gustaría tener un triunfo en la mano por si Paula pretendiera acudir a los tribunales. Un testigo en su contra. Es decir, tú, César. En realidad, se repitió atolondradamente César, Paula se merecía el despido. No tienes más que firmar aquí; y te garantizo que guardaré el papel en la caja fuerte y que solo lo sacaré en caso necesario. Si todo marcha bien no lo sabrá nadie, o casi nadie; pero *comprenderás*_{Fut.} que tenemos que cubrirnos las espaldas.

‘Of course, we mean to reach an agreement with her; we want no scandals. But we would like to have an ace up our sleeve in case Paula should intend to go to court. A witness against her. That is, you, Caesar. In fact, Caesar thoughtlessly repeated to himself, Paula deserved the dismissal. You just have to sign here; and I assure you I’ll keep the paper in the safe and I’ll only bring it out if necessary. If everything goes well, nobody – or hardly anybody – will know about this; but you have to understand that we have to cover our back’

(RAE, CREA, R. Montero, *Amado Amo*)

- (10) A: Pero llega este, y que si estoy agotado, que si el jefe me odia, que si la cena, que si la tele y en cuanto me descuido, se me duerme.

B: Eso no es cierto, me hago el dormido, que es diferente. Y lo hago en defensa propia, porque una cosa es hacer el amor, que es lo que yo pretendo, y otra correr los mil gustos libres, que es lo que pretendes tú, y eso no es sano, Matilde.

A: Pues no *será*_{Fut.} sano, pero a mí me deja como nueva.

‘A: Then comes this guy, and he goes: I’m exhausted, the boss hates me, the dinner, the TV, and before I realize, he falls asleep.

B: That’s not true; I pretend to be asleep, which is different. And I do so in self-defense, because making love – which is what I want – is one thing; and a thousand-free-tastes run – which is what you intend – is a different matter, and that’s not healthy, Matilde.

A: Well, it may not be healthy, but it makes me feel like new’

(RAE, CREA, Oral)

- (11) ¡Trae una tirita, que se ha cortado este! (Abre el cajón de la mesilla.) Yo creo que había aquí alguna... (Ve encima de la mesilla un preservativo y lo coge.) ¡Serás_{Fut.} hijo de puta!
 'Bring a band-aid, this guy has cut himself! (She opens the bedside table drawer.) I think there was one here... (She sees a condom on the bedside table and takes it.) Such a motherfucker!
 (RAE, *CORPES XXI*, J. L. Alonso de Santos, *Cuadros de amor y humor, al fresco*)

The discursive values of the future, such as those appearing in Examples (9) to (11), show that the behavior of this verbal form cannot be exclusively explained in terms of evidentiality, especially if the latter is conceived in its classical sense – as a category pointing to the source of information and the way to access it. Hence why a number of authors have utilized alternative parameters to describe such values. These alternative parameters originally arise as new domains within evidentiality to end up becoming independent categories. Nevertheless, this perspective makes it possible to describe a single value of the future as belonging to two different categories; this is exemplified by the concessive future – (10) –, which has been analyzed both as a case of intersubjectivity *à la* Nuyts (Squartini 2012) and as a case of mirativity (Rivero 2014). Other authors suggest an alternative definition of evidentiality. This is the case of García Negroni (2016), who defines this category from a polyphonic, argumentative perspective, as the representation that the utterance offers about the source of the point of view on which the *énonciation* is based and about the attitude that the speaker shows towards it.

Most recent analyses focused on the values of the future that occur in Examples (9) to (11) outline their link to shared knowledge. In fact, one of the pending issues in studies on evidentiality – and, accordingly, on mirativity and intersubjectivity – resides in how to deal with its relation to information structure. Along these lines, some evidentialist proposals try to connect both domains. Bermúdez (2005), for instance, argues that the traditional conception of evidentiality – based only on the source of information and the way to access it (Willett 1988) – has proved unsatisfactory, and that a third dimension consequently needs to be added: a continuum extending from private access to information – restricted to the speaker – to universal, unrestricted access; the information that is only available to the speaker and the addressee would lie somewhere in between. The problem with this proposal is how to determine the relationship between the three parameters that shape the evidential domain in this model. The solution to this problem could be found in the notion of (inter)subjectivity simultaneously claimed by Nuyts (2001a, 2001b, 2012). The concept of (inter)subjectivity arises as a revision of the distinction drawn by Lyons (1977) between subjective and objective epistemic modality. Nuyts (2001a, 2001b;

cf. also Cornillie 2009) takes up this distinction and formulates it in terms of quality of the evidence and according to the perspective of the speakers involved in the interaction: at one end of this continuum, only the speaker has access to the evidence, which allows him to acquire a personal responsibility concerning the information provided as well as the epistemic evaluation of it (subjectivity); at the other end, the evidence is accessible for a larger group of people, who thus share the responsibility for the information supplied. In a later paper, Nuyts (2012) highlights that (inter) subjectivity is not merely a new parameter within evidentiality, but an independent semantic category; more precisely, it emerges as a discursive tool that allows participants to negotiate their respective stances in the interaction. From this perspective, a subjective markedness is expected when the speaker believes that he should not involve anybody else in his statement, either because he does not know anything about other people's stances or because he completely disagrees with them. Instead, an intersubjective markedness is expected when the speaker wants to show the addressee that his stance is neither isolated nor arbitrary, or when he assumes that an agreement exists between him and the addressee, and he wants to make it explicit. (Inter)subjectivity is therefore placed *vis-à-vis* mirativity. Nuyts' proposal actually represents a bridge between evidentiality and information structure. However, a number of issues remain unresolved, amongst others, the status that (inter)subjectivity occupies with respect to evidentiality and mirativity, the relation that (inter) subjectivity holds with other semantic as well as discursive categories, and how the distinction between activated and non-activated information fits in this model. As shown below, this last dichotomy not only can help explain the information that appears in the interaction and needs to be discussed before being included as part of the shared knowledge but will also turn out to be crucial when it comes to dealing with some discursive uses of the future.

From the position adopted in this paper, the values of the future displayed in Examples (9) to (11) are analyzed in deictic terms. The updating of the deictic template on various levels of meaning allows us to systematically explain the discursive values of the future and to connect them to temporal, modal and evidential values at the same time. This proposal specifies both how the different meanings of Examples (9) to (11) arise and the special informative circumstances that trigger them. More generally, this paper offers a unitary way to describe the behavior of the future in Spanish. In order to achieve this aim, the chapter is organized as follows: it has a general definition of the future based on the deictic 'distance forward' instruction as its starting point (Section 2). When the distance invoked by the future is projected upon the utterance, it has an impact on discourse. This can happen when the information has been previously activated – something that naturally takes place within an interaction (Section 3). The projection of the distance invoked by the future over the utterance explains how this verbal form interacts with different

semantic as well as discursive categories and triggers the different meanings displayed in Examples (9) to (11) (Section 4). It can thus be concluded that an essential definition of the future in terms of ‘distance forward’ helps distinguish it from some other forms of posteriority, e.g. conditional (Section 5).

2. A deictic definition for the future³

Regardless of their respective conceptions about the future as a temporal, modal or evidential constituent, almost every author who has taken an interest in this verbal form recently insists on its instructional nature. Thus, according to De Saussure (2013) or Escandell (2010, 2014), the future has a procedural – *versus* conceptual – meaning, since it provides an instruction to interpret the propositional content.⁴ Likewise, when they define tenses as grounding predications, Langacker (1999, 2011) and Brisard (2011) assume that their function consists in *indicating* the relationships of propositions with the ground. In their view, a single *schematic* definition may additionally be assigned to each temporal form, which can subsequently result in a variety of specific values.

Based on our approach, the aforementioned instructional value has a deictic nature. Firstly, because it is assumed from Bühler ([1934] 1967) that deixis underlies any trace of subjectivity or presence of the speaker in the utterance, and the way traversed by the future advances precisely along an axle of subjectivity, as will be shown below. Secondly, because the deictic characterization of the future helps us interpret its function in temporal, and epistemic – modal as well as evidential – terms, and discursively too. Thirdly, because most of the categories that the future intersects with have been defined as deictic (De Haan 2005; Haßler 2010). Fourthly, because the deictic label is neutral with respect to some other terminologies – amongst others, procedural meaning (Blakemore 2001), discursive deixis (Levinson 2000), use-conditional meaning (Gutzmann 2013) or expressive meaning (Potts 2005, 2007) – and, at the same time, it reflects the feature shared by them all. And, finally, because the definition of the future in terms of ‘distance forward,’ which comes from the speaker as an *origo*, establishes the basis for a clear contrast between the future and other forms expressing posteriority, e.g. the conditional.

Thus, the future invokes a deictic instruction which can be defined as ‘distance forward’ (Fleischman 1989). This instruction may be projected along a subjectivity

3. See a first version of the deictic definition of the future based on the ‘distance forward’ instruction in Rodríguez Rosique (2015a).

4. See Rivero (2014) for an alternative view. According to her, the future contributes to propositional meaning.

axle (Traugott 1989, 2010; Schwenter 1999) which crosses the different levels of meaning established by Sweetser (1990) due to successive scope widenings (Bybee, Perkins & Pagliuca 1994; Traugott & Dasher 2002).

At the content level, the future works inside the proposition; in other words, the deictic instruction is oriented towards the event and consequently interpreted in temporal terms – more precisely, as posteriority.

At the epistemic level, the deictic instruction is projected over the proposition and can therefore be interpreted either evidentially or modally. From the evidential point of view, the speaker introduces the event as the result of an inference, a calculation or a conjecture; distance forward can thus be justified because a deduction always follows its evidence (Langacker 2011; Martines 2017). In modal terms, unlike what happens to past forms, distance forward is interpreted in positive terms – or expressed differently, as an intermediate point between hypotheticality and certainty (Akatsuka 1985; Squartini 2008; Cornillie 2009; Rodríguez Rosique 2011; De Saussure 2013); the instruction is now justified because it presents the event as subject to a subsequent corroboration (Pérez Saldanya 2002; De Saussure 2013).⁵ A specific circumstance must concur for the future to work at the epistemic level: the future must be dislocated; i.e. extracted from the context of posteriority (Rojo & Veiga 1999).

Finally, at the utterance level, distance is projected over the speech act; hence why the future may develop various interpersonal values (Pérez Saldanya 2002) associated with the notion of intersubjectivity developed by Traugott (Traugott and Dasher 2002; Traugott 2010). Once again, a requirement exists for the ‘distance forward’ instruction to be projected upon the utterance: the proposition occurring in the future must have been previously activated – something that naturally happens in the context of interaction. This requirement consequently links the discursive values of the future to information structure, as will be seen in the next section. Beyond the well-known distinction between new and given information (conceived as shared knowledge), the dichotomy ‘activated vs. non-activated information’ will prove crucial when it comes to dealing with the behavior of the future in discourse.

5. The question of whether it is possible to draw a distinction between evidentiality and modality in the cases of inferentiality has become an almost classical controversy. According to Van der Auwera & Plungian (1998), inferentiality is the field where modality and evidentiality collapse; in other words, all inferential cases actually represent necessity. For Squartini (2008) or Cornillie (2009), inferentiality is an evidential category which accepts different degrees of speaker’s modal commitment, from weak to strong – the independence of both categories would thus remain safe. To tell the truth, in the absence of any other contextual clues, the epistemic future is usually interpreted as ‘probable’ in modal terms; however, see Rodríguez Rosique (2017) for the analysis of results obtained from the interaction between the Spanish future and different modal adverbs. For a general treatment of the relations between evidentiality and modality, see the already classic paper by Dendale & Tasmowski (2001), and the recent revision by González, Izquierdo & Loureda (2016).

3. Interaction as a joint activity

Information structure arises naturally within interactive environments. Interaction is a kind of joint activity carried out by two agents acting in coordination with each other, as it happens when dancing a waltz, making love or playing a piano duet (Levinson 1979, Clark 1996). The most basic setting where interaction takes place is conversation, as shown by its status as a universal phenomenon; it requires no special training and becomes essential when acquiring a first language too (Fillmore 1981; Clark 1996). Conversation therefore arises from the alternation of successive turns taken by different speakers (Briz 2003) and prototypically exhibits a number of features: (a) it is oral; (b) it is dialogical; (c) it is immediate, since it happens on a face-to-face basis, and the interlocutors share both time and space; (d) it is dynamic, being based on the constant alternation of the roles occupied by speaker and hearer, which are not predetermined; and e) it is cooperative, insofar as participants collaborate in the construction of meaning (Schegloff 1996; Briz & Val.Es.Co. 2000; Portolés 2004). Several *deviations* may be established from here, though (Fillmore 1981); for instance, conversations between imaginary characters in fictional environments and even different layers of activity (Clark 1996), as it happens when one of the participants introduces a story about – real or fictional – people.

Common ground (CG) constitutes a vital ingredient for any kind of joint activity. When people take part in a conversation, they carry a set of knowledge, beliefs, and assumptions with them. CG does not simply appear there, it actually changes during the multiple interactions where participants are involved, so a need exists to build it up in each one of those interactions. For this reason, the speaker advances hypotheses on what CG would be like at the beginning of the interaction – or, expressed differently, on what the other knows about a certain topic, i.e. the Initial Question Hypothesis (Gutiérrez Ordóñez 1997) – in order to organize his discourse. This mechanism relies upon the existence of several shared foundations, such as cultural communities – which are in turn determined by nationality, education, politics, ethnicity, and gender, to quote but a few issues – and by perceptual experiences, as well as joint actions (Clark 1996).

From the dynamic semantics perspective, CG does not remain static but is updated as the interaction proceeds (Stalnaker 1978; Lewis 1979; Heim 1983). The linguistic actions that help increase CG are assertions, which add pieces of information to the shared state of affairs. However, this approach has a drawback (Ginzburg [2012] 2015); it only works with successful communicative acts. Actually, two options exist when a speaker asserts a proposition: (a) the addressee accepts it and incorporates it into the CG; or (b) he questions it. The dynamic perspective just takes into account the first case.

Hence why the notion of *activation* or *saliency* arises orthogonally to that of CG (Chafe 1976; Prince 1992; Dik 1997; Lambrecht 1994; Dryer 1996).⁶ Activated or salient information is the one that the speaker assumes to be profiled in the addressee's mind, and it can be either situational or discursively-activated. This information need not be real, since activation does not qualify propositions epistemically. Furthermore, being a concept related to short-term memory, it is possible to trace an activation continuum which would have the focus of activation – or that to which we pay special attention – as one of its ends; semi-deactivated information – or the one which has been previously activated but has progressively lost prominence – also lies there; lastly, accessible information – i.e. the information which has not been activated as such but is inferred from another previously activated one – can also appear along this continuum. By contrast, non-activated information is placed right at the other end.

Information structure behaves as a trigger for the projection of the deictic instruction over the utterance. Depending on the peculiarities of the construction where it operates, the future will eventually acquire different meanings and develop a variety of discursive tasks.

4. Discursive functions of the future

In contrast to its temporal as well as epistemic roles, the discursive functions of the future arise when the deictic 'distance forward' instruction is projected upon the utterance. As explained above, the information occurring in the future must have been previously activated for this to happen. Once this requirement has been met, the future becomes a powerful discursive tool.

6. Ginzburg ([2012] 2015) uses the concepts of Question Under Discussion [QUD] (Roberts 1996) and LatestMove to propose his theory on the interactive stance. QUD is somehow equivalent to discourse topic; or, expressed differently, it is a set of subjects at issue which are stacked according to conversational precedence. With regard to LatestMove, it appears as the last illocutionary move – or the last ones. Obviously, these notions have to do with activation and with the need to negotiate meaning. However, the notion of activation is preferred in this chapter, since it leads us to include not only contextual or discursive information but also situational one, even though it is true that the situation can be considered a kind of proposition as well. Furthermore, Ginzburg's proposal is based on reactive moves, being thought for rectifications, corrections, rejections, and so on. The future may have a reactive function – especially in concessive cases, despite the possibility for mirative ones to be regarded as the reaction towards a situation too. Nevertheless, its instigating role is also essential, as will be shown in Section 4.

4.1 Persuasive future

The first discursive function becomes visible in examples like (9), now repeated in (12), and also in some others, such as (13) and (14), where the future pursues a *persuasive* aim (Rodríguez Rosique, 2017):

- (12) Por supuesto que pensamos llegar a un acuerdo con ella; no queremos escándalos. Pero nos gustaría tener un triunfo en la mano por si Paula pretendiera acudir a los tribunales. Un testigo en su contra. Es decir, tú, César. En realidad, se repitió atolondradamente César, Paula se merecía el despido. No tienes más que firmar aquí; y te garantizo que guardaré el papel en la caja fuerte y que solo lo sacaré en caso necesario. Si todo marcha bien no lo sabrá nadie, o casi nadie; pero *comprenderás*_{Fut.} que tenemos que cubrirnos las espaldas.

‘Of course, we mean to reach an agreement with her; we want no scandals. But we would like to have an ace up our sleeve in case Paula should intend to go to court. A witness against her. That is, you, Caesar. In fact, Caesar thoughtlessly repeated to himself, Paula deserved the dismissal. You just have to sign here; and I assure you I’ll keep the paper in the safe and I’ll only bring it out if necessary. If everything goes well, nobody – or hardly anybody – will know about this; but you have to understand that we have to cover our back’

(RAE, CREA, R. Montero, *Amado Amo*)

- (13) ¿Qué esperabas? Creo que no tienes muy buena memoria. La dejaste con una llamada telefónica. ¿Te acuerdas? Pocas justificaciones, ganas de deshacerte de un estorbo, ¿no? *Reconocerás*_{Fut.} que no fue un comportamiento muy elegante. ‘What did you expect? I don’t think you have a very good memory. You left her with a phone call. Do you remember? Few justifications, a desire to get rid of a nuisance, right? You have to acknowledge that it was not a very elegant behavior.

(RAE, CORPES XXI, M. P. Janer, *Pasiones romanas.*)

- (14) Y si Antonio pide su cena en este mismo momento, pero de repente tiene algún antojo o desea entregarse a la bebida y, por tanto, deja de lado el plato, es preciso tener preparado otro para servírselo no bien se le antoje. Por lo cual *entenderás*_{Fut.} que es necesario tener preparadas varias cenas a la vez, ya que resulta imposible adivinar la hora exacta en que puede producirse el capricho... ‘And if Antonio asks his dinner at this very moment, but suddenly has a craving or (suddenly) wishes to indulge in drinking, and therefore leaves the dish aside, it is necessary to have another dish ready to be served lest he fancies to have it (one). Therefore, you have to understand that it is necessary to prepare several dinners at the same time, since it is impossible to guess the exact time at which the whim may occur’

(RAE, CREA, T. Moix, *No digas que fue un sueño*)

Examples such as (12)–(14) have been included under the traditional label of ‘future of necessity’ (Fernández Ramírez 1986). The future of necessity is usually related to the origins of simple future in Romance – to be found in an ancient periphrasis of obligation (Fleischman 1982; Company 2006). In such cases, the verb form is assumed to present the event as foreseen or expected because the previous circumstances lead to obtain/reach it as a conclusion. It is considered a typical use when formulating mathematical demonstration or general principles, as (15) shows, and is thus associated with a formal register (Fernández Ramírez 1986; Pérez Saldanya 2002). In fact, from a radical evidentialist perspective, Escandell (2014) characterizes it as an old-fashioned use that represents the result of a learnt grammar.

- (15) Como ambos atributos coinciden radicalmente, resultará que se anulan
 ‘Since both attributes coincide, it will follow that they cancel each other out’
 (Fernández Ramírez 1986: 293–294)

Examples (12) to (14), however, are not perceived as obsolete; on the contrary, they seem quite productive in ordinary interactions. It will be shown below that the future has abandoned the epistemic domain to access the discursive one in these cases.

The examples of persuasive future illustrated by (12) to (14) exhibit a number of features that suggest a change of meaning in the verb form. Firstly, they inevitably appear in the second person – preferably singular, but plural is possible too. Indeed, this preference for the second person constitutes a formal reflection of the future’s movement towards the domain of discourse and interaction.

Secondly, this meaning is restricted to a group of verbs, such as the one formed by *comprender*, *reconocer* or *entender*, which characteristically denote states of knowledge. These verbs tend to undergo a process of semantic change towards (inter)subjectivization (Traugott & Dasher 2002; Traugott 2010) through which they end up conveying evaluative and illocutionary meanings. Thus, *comprender* may express both ‘to understand something’ and ‘to find someone’s feelings justified or natural’; *reconocer* may denote both ‘to establish the identity of something’ and ‘to acknowledge something as true’; and *entender* can mean both ‘to have a clear idea of something’, ‘to know’, as well as ‘to know someone’s intention’ or even ‘to judge’ (DRAE 2014). The persuasive value of the future precisely arises with the evaluative or illocutionary meanings.

Thirdly, the future forms a paradigm with modals denoting obligation – such as *tener que* ‘to have to’ + infinitive – or even with the imperative, as observed in (16)–(18), thus showing a directivity value (Traugott & Dasher 2002; Nuyts 2001a, 2008):

- (16) Comprenderás_{future} / tienes que_{modal} comprender / comprende_{imperative} que
 tenemos que cubrirnos las espaldas
- (17) Reconocerás_{future} / tienes que_{modal} reconocer / reconoce_{imperative} que no fue un
 comportamiento muy elegante

- (18) Entenderás_{future} / tienes que_{modal} entender / entiende_{imperative} es necesario tener preparadas varias cenas a la vez

As for the equivalences displayed in (16)–(18), a number of linguists (Myhill & Smith 1995; Myhill 1997; Traugott & Dasher 2002) have highlighted that several languages frequently utilize deontic modals as an instrument to persuade the addressee that a group of people has reached a general consensus regarding some issue, ultimately seeking to make the addressee admit some argument or conclusion. The future thus performs a similar function to that played by certain consequence elements with an illative function (Rodríguez Ramalle 2016); in fact, this meaning of the future is usually preceded by illative constituents, such as *por lo cual* in (14). However, the presence of illatives does not constitute a precondition for this meaning to arise, (15) being a clear example. What is more, these cases may be preceded by contrastive elements without this altering their persuasive meaning – (12) –, something which usually occurs when some kind of negotiation is required to persuade the addressee (Garrido Rodríguez 2004).

From the approach adopted by Bermudez (2005) mentioned above, the modal and imperative versions in Examples (16) to (18) introduce the information as a case of universal access, while the future presents it as a case of shared access between the speaker and the addressee. According to Nuyts' proposal (2001a, 2001b, 2012), the modal and the imperative introduce the information as intersubjective – more precisely, as information shared between the speaker and some other people for the purpose of convincing the addressee; in turn, the future introduces information as intersubjective too but, in this case, the information appears as shared by the speaker and the addressee, with the aim of making explicit an agreement that is actually sought by the speaker.

Our paper portrays the 'distance forward' instruction as being projected over the utterance when information has been previously activated. The information provided by the future in cases such as (12) to (14) counts as inferable (Prince 1992) or accessible (Dryer 1996); being more specific, the addressee has to build a bridge – through a *bridging* process as defined by Clark (1977) – between this information and the preceding discourse due to discourse relations (Garrido 2007; Duque 2016). The future does not operate over the event here – as it happened in the temporal value – nor over the proposition – as it happened in epistemic ones –, but over the utterance. The verb form consequently becomes an argument-building mechanism: as opposed to the evidential inferential meaning, the future no longer represents the speaker's inferences, but an *invitation* to inference (Rocci 2012).⁷ In

7. In fact, the discourse relations involved here are between those of cause/consequence and those of evidence (cf. Duque 2016). For the connection between causality and (counter)argumentation, see also Schwenter (2000) and Reig Alamillo (2011).

terms of the Argumentation Theory developed by Anscombe and Ducrot ([1983] 1994), the information introduced by the future is presented as a conclusion directly stemming from a previous argument, as Examples (19), (20), and (21) respectively schematize:

- (19) Argument: Paula puede acudir a los tribunales
 ‘Paula may go to court’
 Conclusion: Tenemos que cubrirnos las espaldas
 ‘We have to cover our back’
- (20) Argument: La dejaste con una llamada telefónica
 ‘You left her with a phone call’
 Conclusion: No es un comportamiento muy elegante
 ‘It is not a very elegant behavior’
- (21) Argument: Si Antonio deja el plato de la cena hay que servirle otro
 ‘If Antonio leaves his dish aside, it is necessary to have another dish ready to be served’
 Conclusion: Es necesario preparar varias cenas a la vez
 ‘It is necessary to prepare several dinners at the same time’

Unlike what happens in the versions with the modal and the imperative, the future allows the speaker to distance himself from the utterance, and consequently the instruction is presented in a more attenuated way. Nevertheless, since the piece of information introduced by the verb form appears as a conclusion that the addressee himself has to reach following the discursive flow, this conclusion acquires the status of necessary, which contributes to the persuasive meaning exhibited by the verb form.

4.2 Concessive future

The so-called concessive future (Gili Gaya [1951] 1993) – as the one occurring in (10), now repeated in (22) – is one of the discursive values that has received the most attention.

- (22) A: Pero llega este, y que si estoy agotado, que si el jefe me odia, que si la cena, que si la tele y en cuanto me descuido, se me duerme.
 B: Eso no es cierto, me hago el dormido, que es diferente. Y lo hago en defensa propia, porque una cosa es hacer el amor, que es lo que yo pretendo, y otra correr los mil gustos libres, que es lo que pretendes tú, y eso no es sano, Matilde.
 A: Pues no *será*_{Fut.} sano, pero a mí me deja como nueva.
 ‘A: Then comes this guy, and he goes: I’m exhausted, the boss hates me, the dinner, the TV, and before I realize, he falls asleep.

B: That's not true; I pretend to be asleep, which is different. And I do so in self-defense, because making love – which is what I want – is one thing; and a thousand-free-tastes run – which is what you intend – is a different matter, and that's not healthy, Matilde.

A: Well, it may not be healthy, but it makes me feel like new'

(RAE, CREA, Oral)

This use has been traditionally conceived as nothing but a contextual variation of the epistemic future (Fernández Ramírez 1986; RAE 2009). This is also Escandell's (2010) opinion, although from an evidentialist perspective. According to her, the concessive future represents a variant of primary evidential meaning. More specifically, Escandell argues that, through the concessive future, the propositional meaning is presented once as factual (in A's turn) and once as non-factual (in B's turn); to which she adds that denying perceptual access to the proffered content implies that the speaker does not believe in it. In a later paper, Escandell (2014) refines her analysis and characterizes the concessive future as an echoic use of the inferential evidential value, which acquires a dissociative effect: by using the concessive future, the speaker B attributes the propositional content to the speaker A, and identifies some mental process of A as the only source of information, from which the dissociative effect derives. The explanation of the concessive future offered by Escandell (2010, 2014) thus revolves around the exploitation of non-factuality: either it emerges as a rhetorical consequence of non-factuality (2010) or it results from an *a posteriori* attribution of non-factuality to the proposition uttered by a previous speaker.

Nevertheless, some other analyses (cf. Squartini 2012; Rodríguez Rosique 2015a; García Negroni 2016) have shown that the concessive future is not a mere variation of the inferential value, but a new meaning, as the impossibility of being subordinated to verbs denoting an inferential process demonstrates:

- (23) #Yo {creo / infiero / deduzco / intuyo} que no será sano, pero a mí me deja como nueva

The detailed study of the concessive future in Italian carried out by Squartini (2012) led him to state that the proof of this being a new semantic extension lies in the fact that the concessive future only occurs in factual contexts. From his perspective, the concessive future serves to implement a discursive concession strategy which consists of three moves (Couper-Kuhlen & Thompson 2000): a first move, where the speaker A makes a statement; a second move, in which the speaker B acknowledges the validity of this statement (the concessive move); and a third move, where the speaker B further develops the validity of a potentially contrastive statement. In Squartini's view, as opposed to the epistemic future – where the speaker places himself as a primary source – the concessive future makes the speaker appear as a secondary

source: he accepts what has been provided by another source and assumes some kind of responsibility with respect to the content. According to him, what all the interactional contexts where the future occurs have in common is the reference to an intersubjectively-shared evidence – in the terms of Nuyts (2001a, 2012).

Squartini's proposal seems revealing, since it acknowledges that the concessive future constitutes a new meaning of this verb form and appeals to information available "in the air" that can be used to describe the discursive uses of future. However, it also poses some problems (cf. Rodríguez Rosique 2015a). On the one hand, the concessive future in Spanish may be factual – as in (22) – or non-factual – as in (24) below. The occurrence of the concessive future as well as that of the other discursive values are not related to the factual/non-factual status of information, but to its activation. As mentioned above, activated information does not necessarily have to be factual.

- (24) <T4>: Porque piensan que así, consintiéndoles, lo mismo están más felices [...] 'Because they think that, in that way, spoiling them, they could even feel happier'
 <T8>: Sí, a los niños los *harán*_{Fut.} muy felices pero no es eso lo que les interesa. 'Yes, they may make children very happy, but that is not what they need'
 (Azorín, 2002: 374)

On the other hand, in contrast to the persuasive future examined above, the speaker who uses the concessive future does not mean to share any responsibility with respect to the information provided by his interlocutor, but rather to distance himself from it.

According to García Negroni (2016), the concessive future also represents a new meaning and not just a mere contextual variation of the epistemic future. She specifically analyzes this value as a case of reportative evidentiality, following the line initiated by Reyes (1990) or Bolón Pedretti (1999). Based on a polyphonic, argumentative conception of evidentiality, she claims that the morphological future urges us to look for the source of an invoked point of view in another previous discourse, which the speaker accepts for a moment.

Nonetheless, one may wonder whether concession – or momentary acceptance – resides in the use of the future or if the future is concessive simply because it occurs in the weak (and thus concessive) member of a contrastive structure – invoked by *pero* in this particular case. In relation to this, note the difference between using the present and the future in an example like (22), as (25) reflects:⁸

8. In fact, Español Giralt (2011) argues in relation to this same example, obtained from CREA, that it is not a concessive value, since the speaker does not really concede – and it could not thus be replaced by an *aunque* structure –, but what she calls a replicative value. We are dealing with a concessive use because the future occurs in the weak member of a contrastive structure, but it is true that, unlike the present form, the future has an attenuating, *déréalisant* function. It is

(25) Pues no {es_{Pres.} / será_{Fut.}} sano, pero a mí me deja como nueva

According to our hypothesis in the present paper, the concessive future is just another instance where the deictic ‘distance forward’ instruction is projected upon the utterance. As already mentioned above, this happens when the information has been previously activated. In the specific case of concessive examples, the information occurring in future counts as the focus of activation; note that A answers *eso no será sano* after B’s utterance *eso no es sano* in (22), as schematized in (26):

(26) B: *Eso no es sano*
 ‘That is not healthy’
 A: *No será_{Fut.} sano*, pero a mí me deja como nueva
 ‘It may not be healthy, but it makes me feel like new’

When the distance invoked by the future is projected over the utterance in a contrastive structure, it reduces the argumentative strength of the discursive segment in which this verb form appears. It deserves to be highlighted that the segment *algo no es sano* ‘something is not healthy’ actually represents the weak argument for the conclusion *no hacerlo* ‘not to do it’, whereas the segment introduced by *pero* (*algo me deja como nueva* ‘something makes me feel like new’) represents a stronger argument for the opposite conclusion *hacerlo* ‘to do it’ – the one ultimately imposed in the counter-argumentative strategy – as shown in (27):

(27) algo no es sano me deja como nueva
 ‘something is not healthy’ ‘it makes me feel like new’

no hacerlo ←————→ hacerlo

The use of the future allows the speaker to distance himself from the utterance, which is interpreted as a *déréalisant* effect (Ducrot 1995); or, expressed differently, the distance towards the utterance softens even more the argumentative strength of an already weak segment. Therefore, when using the future, the speaker is not merely accepting (Squartini 2012) the interlocutor’s proposal, even momentarily (García Negroni 2016) – as he would do if he used the present form – but he *grudgingly* accepts it (Sweetser 1990; Traugott & Dasher 2002). That is to say, he distances himself from it. In this sense, the weak counterargument expressed with the future largely resembles a weak counterargument introduced by *aunque* ‘although’ plus subjunctive – (28) –, where the subjunctive mood increases the irrelevance of the

in this way that the structure with a concessive future + *pero* can be replaced by the structure ‘*aunque* + subjunctive,’ since the subjunctive shares the attenuating value with the future, as will be explained in more detail below.

protasis for the apodosis, in contrast to what would happen if the indicative mood had been used instead (Rodríguez Rosique 2008):

- (28) Aunque no *sea*_{subj.} sano, a mí me deja como nueva

From a formal perspective, the concessive future has been recently related to mirativity. More precisely, Rivero (2014) argues that examples such as (22) are in fact mirative cases; or, to put in a different way, that the future behaves as a weak modal operator with an evidential base by which the speaker does not assume any responsibility for the information and may even deny it.⁹ Even though a clear connection exists between contrastive and mirative values, the analysis of the relationship between future and mirativity in this chapter is confined to evaluative cases, such as the ones dealt with in the next subsection. As for the distinction between the concessive and the mirative future, it will be treated at the end of Subsection 4.3.

4.3 Mirative future

The clearest cases where the Spanish future interacts with mirativity are the evaluative ones (Rodríguez Rosique 2015b), as illustrated by the following examples:

- (29) ¡Trae una tiritita, que se ha cortado este! (Abre el cajón de la mesilla.) Yo creo que había aquí alguna... (Ve encima de la mesilla un preservativo y lo coge.)
¡Serás_{Fut.} hijo de puta!
‘Bring a band-aid, this guy has cut himself! (She opens the bedside table drawer.) I think there was one here... (She sees a condom on the bedside table and takes it.) Such a motherfucker!’
(RAE, *CORPES XXI*, J. L. Alonso de Santos, *Cuadros de amor y humor, al fresco*)
- (30) AMPARO: (Muy dolidita.) ¿Para eso he vuelto? ¿Para que me digas que busque un chico que me haga feliz? (Pausa.) ¡Serás_{Fut.} cabrito!
‘AMPARO: (Very upset.): That’s what I’ve come back for? For you to tell me to look for a guy that makes me happy? (Pause.) Such a bastard!’
(RAE, *CORPES XXI*, B. Baltés, *Teatro. Piezas breves*)

Mirativity has been defined as a universal category which marks the status of a proposition regarding the speaker’s general knowledge structure (DeLancey 1997, 2001). To be more specific, it has to do with the natural trend that languages have to distinguish between information about the world that is integrated into the speaker’s knowledge

9. According to Rivero, the concessive future is also different from the epistemic future. In her view, they represent two ends of a scale: the speaker shows high confidence in indirect information and accepts its validity in the epistemic future – which is thus understood as a strong modal – but doubts or even rejects the validity of evidence in the concessive future – consequently understood as a weak modal.

and information that does not form part of the speaker's overall image about the world. Thus, it is not only a notion related to information structure but also contains an evaluative component. In fact, a number of authors, including Aikhenvald (2012) and Peterson (2013), have recently argued that the semantic core of mirativity revolves around the concept of surprise and the notion of *unprepared mind* introduced by Aksu and Slobin (1986).

Mirativity is linked to several categories. Beyond the well-known – and controversial – connection to evidentiality (Lazard 1999; Hill 2012), mirativity also relates to exclamation and exclamativity (Hengeveld & Olbertz 2012; Rett 2012). Exclamation constitutes a sort of expressive speech act that may express surprise, enthusiasm or outrage, amongst other feelings, due to intonation, as it happens in (31) (Alonso Cortés 1999). However, this speech act can be grammaticalized in a construction where the conventional implicature – *à la* Potts (2007) – triggered by the evaluative intonation falls over a presupposed content (Castroviejo Miró 2008, 2010). This is what happens in *wh*-exclamatives like those in (32):

(31) ¡He aprobado!
'I have passed the exam!'

(32) ¡Qué bonito es!
'How nice it is!'

The cases of mirative future presented in (29) and (30), and now repeated in (33), are precisely related both to an exclamation – constituted by a copulative structure with an emphatic *un* (34) (Portolés 1993; Fernández Leborans 1999; Suñer 1999) – and to an exclamative construction (35):

(33) ¡Serás hijo de puta! / ¡Serás cabrito!
'Such a motherfucker!' / 'Such a bastard!'

(34) ¡Eres un hijo de puta! / ¡Eres un cabrito!
'You are a motherfucker!' / 'You are a bastard!'

(35) ¡Qué hijo de puta (eres)! / ¡Qué cabrito (eres)!
'What a motherfucker you are!' / 'What a bastard you are!'

In any case, although all three of them share the expressive component, they exhibit a number of differences as well. It is true that these three structures are strongly linked to the communicative situation, but their degree of subsidiarity varies, as shown by the possibility to postpone the subject in the case of (34) – as can be observed in (37) – and the necessity to do it, if it does appear, in (33) and (35) – as exemplified in (36) and (38), respectively.¹⁰ Whereas (37) informationally behaves

10. Note that it generally becomes difficult to use an explicit lexical subject with the second person in Spanish, unless it is interpreted as a vocative and thus left outside the syntactic structure.

as an assertion, (38) introduces the propositional content (*Juan es un hijo de puta*) as a presupposed one, which forces the speaker to accommodate that content when it does not form part of the common ground (Lewis 1979). With regard to (36), the propositional content occurring in the future appears as an *accessible* one this time; in other words, it derives from information which has just been activated.

(36) ¡Será hijo de puta Juan! vs. #¡Juan será hijo de puta!

(37) ¡Es un hijo de puta Juan! vs. ¡Juan es un hijo de puta!

(38) ¡Qué hijo de puta (es) Juan! vs. #¡Juan qué hijo de puta (es)!¹¹

Furthermore, unlike what happens in other languages (Squartini 2012), the mirative future in Spanish is always depreciatory (RAE 2009); or, expressed differently, it only works when the assessment has a negative nature, as shown by the anomaly of (39). What is more, this negative evaluation constitutes the interpretation obtained by default when the utterance occurring in the future remains suspended – (40):

(39) #¡Será_{Fut.} simpática!
'Such a nice girl!'

(40) ¡Será_{Fut.}...!
'Such a...!'

The behavior shown by the future in such cases is equally explained because the deictic 'distance forward' instruction has been projected over the utterance. Once again, the information must have been previously activated for this to happen. In the specific case of the mirative future, the latter presents the proposition as an accessible one, or one derived from some previous information. The speaker's distance towards his utterance is then interpreted in evaluative terms as a rejection or criticism towards the situation activated either contextually or discursively.

The cases of mirative future are often preceded by *pero* or by exclusive, exclamative *si* (Porroche 1998; Alonso Cortés 1999; Montolío 1999; Pavón 1999; Schwenter 1999; Iglesias 2000; Hernanz 2012), as exemplified in (41) and (42); however, even if these elements are removed, the future still preserves the same value.¹² Examples (43) and (44) illustrate it:

For this reason, the third person has been utilized in the paraphrases provided in (36)–(38).

11. The sentence improves with an explicit verb, and, especially, if *Juan* is understood as a topic, outside the syntactic structure: *Juan, ¡qué hijo de puta es!*

12. These structures with *si* have been analyzed as cases of suspended structures, either as comparative-consequence clauses – such as *Si será X que...* –, where the second clause is omitted (cf. Albelda 2007; RAE 2009), or as examples of noun clauses constructions with an omitted main clause – *Fijate / Mira si será x*. Diachronically, Iglesias (2000) has argued that the latter (*Fijate / Mira si será X*) are previous to the former (*Si será X que...*). Likewise, it would be necessary to determine

- (41) –Por eso me elegiste.
 –Que yo te elegí. Pero ¿tendrás_{Fut.} morro?¹³
 ‘–That’s why you chose me
 –That I chose you? You’ve got a real nerve, haven’t you?’
 (RAE, CREA, L. Beccaria, *La luna en Jorge*)
- (42) ¡En un lugar con tanto calor, talar árboles que dan sombra! ¡Si será_{Fut.} bestia!
 ‘In such a hot place, to cut down trees which provide shade! Such a brute!’
 (RAE, CREA, *Caretas*)
- (43) ¡Tendrás_{Fut.} morro!
- (44) ¡Será_{Fut.} bestia!

The connection between the concessive and the mirative future arises once more. In fact, it must be admitted that both types of future share several features, such as their relationship with contrast, the projection of distance towards the utterance or the need for the previous activation of information. However, they also present a number of differences: firstly, while the future occurs in a weak (counter)argument in the concessive case, the mirative case shows future occurring in the sufficient segment (Portolés 1998), which can also be reinforced by *pero* or *si*; secondly, whereas the concessive future reintroduces a proposition which has just been the focus of activation, the mirative future presents the proposition as being accessible from a previously-activated information; and finally, while the relation in which the concessive future participates takes place between arguments, the relationship where the mirative future appears is between a situation and the way in which the speaker reacts to –or evaluates– it (Malchukov 2004). In short, the concessive future and the mirative future perform different discursive functions. Whereas the former contributes to a counterargumentative strategy, the latter contributes to an expressive speech act.

the relationship between this *si* and the other values of the conjunction, and even the affirmative adverb. Such structures have been recently analyzed as cases of insubordination (Gras 2011; Schwenter 2016). Interestingly, these structures admit other tenses apart from the future. The focus of our paper is placed on why the future can abandon the domain of the structure, representing another example in which the verb form stops being a grammatical category to become a discursive one.

13. Note that sometimes the writer doubts about how to transcribe mirative future; it usually occurs with exclamation marks, but there are some other cases, such as (37), where it appears with question marks, perhaps because the future already invokes the evaluative value, and then the exclamation marks are not needed any more.

5. Conclusion

The present chapter has shown that the discourse values of the future in Spanish exceeds the limits of a classical definition of evidentiality – understood as the source of information and the way to access it. In this way, broader interaction-based definitions of evidentiality have been reviewed, such as the accessing parameter added by Bermúdez (2005), the notion of (inter)subjectivity established by Nuyts (2001a, 2001b, 2012), or the polyphonic, argumentative view of García Negroni (2016), highlighting their connection to shared knowledge. From this perspective, several previous approaches to the discursive values of the future have been extensively discussed. An alternative, systematic analysis of the Spanish future has been proposed in order to answer the various questions raised by these explanations.

The deictic characterization of the future – as an instruction which invokes ‘distance forward’ and can be projected over different levels of meaning – may unitarily explain its discursive functions, as well as the connection to temporal and epistemic ones. When information occurring in the future has been previously activated, the distance is projected towards the utterance; as a result, the future may contribute to several discursive tasks, such as negotiation of information (persuasive future), counter-argumentation (concessive future), or evaluation (mirative future).

In deictic terms, the future has traditionally been conceived as an *absolute* form, unlike the conditional, which has been classified as *anaphoric* or *relative* (Comrie 1985). Actually, the distance forward instruction comes from the speaker as *origo* and, depending on the level of meaning where it works, the origin may be understood as: the speaker’s here and now (temporal value); the speaker’s current state of knowledge (epistemic value); or the speaker’s role as a participant in the interaction (discursive value). Instead, the deictic value of the conditional stems from an intermediate point, different from the speaker’s (Cosieriu 1976; Brisard 2010). This entails a number of consequences: in the temporal field, it expresses future of past; in the epistemic realm, in addition to the values shared with the future in the sphere of the past, the conditional also develops a modal value of negative distance and resembles a reportative indirect evidential too; furthermore, it can be used as a way to soften directive speech acts. The unitary treatment of all these values from a deictic point of view along with their implications in the context of discourse poses a new challenge. In short, the characterization of the future in deictic terms materializes in a sufficiently broad definition to explain all its values, most of which naturally arise in interaction.

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Evidentiality in communication is better investigated in delimited and recognizable contexts where the multiple levels of meaning in interactional practices are manifested. Taking this viewpoint, the present volume explores the interrelations between evidentials and textual genre in Spanish. Adopting a discursive perspective, all of the chapters examine how the functional category of evidentiality is brought into discourse, which set of linguistic strategies evidentiality makes explicit, what counts as evidence in certain contexts and in certain textual genres, and what particular pragmatic meanings these mechanisms acquire, invoke and project onto the on-going discourse. In particular, this book is concerned with the relationship between evidential expressions and the pragmatic meaning(s) triggered by those expressions, and the role of genre in shaping the evidential meanings. The volume is addressed to both theoretically and empirically minded scholars in the disciplines of Pragmatics, Discourse Analysis, Sociolinguistics, Communication Studies, and Psychology.

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