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*Alexander Kalbarczyk*

# PREDICATION AND ONTOLOGY

STUDIES AND TEXTS ON AVICENNIAN AND POST-  
AVICENNIAN READINGS OF ARISTOTLE'S 'CATEGORIES'

SCIENTIA GRAECO-ARABICA

## Predication and Ontology

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Studies and Texts on Avicennian  
and Post-Avicennian Readings  
of Aristotle's *Categories*

by

Alexander Kalbarczyk

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## Preface

For approximately four years I enjoyed the privilege of thinking, reading, talking (and at times even dreaming) about a small treatise by Aristotle and the enormous effect it had on the course of intellectual history, particularly on a philosophical reform project that was launched more than thirteen centuries later in the Eastern part of the Islamic world.

The present book was written under fortunate circumstances: with a scholarship from the Cusanuswerk and in the framework of the British-German research project “Major issues and controversies of Arabic logic and philosophy of language,” based at Ruhr-Universität Bochum as well as Cambridge University and jointly funded by Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG) and the British Arts and Humanities Research Council (AHRC). I would like to express my deep gratitude to my first supervisor Cornelia Schöck (Bochum) for all her intellectual and practical support. Moreover, I would like to thank my second supervisor Peter Adamson (Munich) and the doyen of *Graeco-Arabica* Gerhard Endreß (Bochum) for their encouragement and inspiration. Last but not least I am grateful to Tony Street for the exciting workshops he organized at the University of Cambridge and to all participants of these memorable gatherings for their helpful remarks and challenging questions.

My Benedictine school in Augsburg enabled me to grow in the love of God and wisdom. During my studies in Berlin, Rome and Cairo I came across the relation of language and reality in all kinds of variations. The manner in which my family contributed to this book is too manifold to be expressed in few words: I am blessed to be the son of caring and committed parents, to be married to a wonderful woman who is my partner in all dimensions of being and to be the father of two marvelous children who taught me more astonishment and humility than philosophy ever could.



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# INTRODUCTION



In light of the great quantity, quality and impact of philosophical texts from the Islamicate world, the research on this rich intellectual tradition may still be said to be in its juvenile period. Notwithstanding some significant progress in the last years, this general assessment is to a large extent even true of the multifaceted oeuvre of the most famous and influential Muslim philosopher of all times, Abū ‘Alī al-Ḥusayn b. ‘Abdallāh b. Sīnā (d. 428 AH / 1037 AD), better known in the Latin West as Avicenna. Philologically sound editions of at least his major philosophical works, such as the *K. aš-Šifā’* and *al-Išārāt wa-t-tanbihāt*, are still missing – let alone complete and reliable translations into Western languages.

This rather discouraging state of affairs, by and large, also extends to the level of an analytical appraisal of Ibn Sīnā’s philosophy. To be sure, ever since Dimitri Gutas’ seminal study *Avicenna and the Aristotelian Tradition* has laid the ground for a systematic philosophical engagement with the Corpus Avicennicum,<sup>1</sup> some important advances have been made – in recent years especially in the field of his syllogistic<sup>2</sup> and ontology.<sup>3</sup> However, numerous parts of Ibn Sīnā’s philosophical project continue to remain *terrae incognitae*. What is more, even though Ibn Sīnā’s enormous influence on subsequent scholarship and erudition, both secular and religious, has long been recognized, and even though the later tradition has been identified as a wide field of intellectual activities and achievements which deserves to be studied in its own right,<sup>4</sup> comparatively little

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1 Dimitri Gutas, *Avicenna and the Aristotelian Tradition: Introduction to Reading Avicenna’s Philosophical Works* (Leiden: Brill, 1<sup>st</sup> ed. 1988, 2<sup>nd</sup> ed. 2014).

2 See Tony Street, “An Outline of Avicenna’s Syllogistic,” *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie* 84 (2002): pp. 129–160; and idem, “Avicenna on the Syllogism,” in *Interpreting Avicenna: Critical Essays*, ed. Peter Adamson (Cambridge: University Press, 2013), pp. 48–70.

3 See Robert Wisnovsky, *Avicenna’s Metaphysics in Context* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2003); Amos Bertolacci, *The Reception of Aristotle’s Metaphysics in Avicenna’s Kitāb aš-Šifā’: A Milestone of Western Metaphysical Thought* (Leiden: Brill, 2006); and Stephen Menn, “Avicenna’s Metaphysics,” in *Interpreting Avicenna: Critical Essays*, ed. Peter Adamson (Cambridge: University Press, 2013), pp. 143–169.

4 See Dimitri Gutas, “The Heritage of Avicenna: The Golden Age of Arabic Philosophy, 1000 – ca. 1350,” in *Avicenna and his Heritage*, ed. Jules Janssens and Daniel De Smet (Leuven: University Press, 2002), pp. 81–97; and Gerhard Endreß, “Reading Avicenna in the Madrasa: Intellectual Genealogies and Chains of Transmission of Philosophy and the Sciences in the Islamic East,” in *Arabic Theology, Arabic Philosophy: From the Many to the One: Essays in Celebration of Richard M. Frank*, ed. James E. Montgomery (Leuven – Paris – Dudley, MA: Peeters, 2006), pp. 371–423.



research has been dedicated to the analysis of philosophical issues and controversies in the post-Avicennian period.<sup>5</sup>

Given the eminent role which Aristotle's *Categories* and the abundant commentaries on this short work have played throughout the entire history of philosophy up to the present day and given the enormous amount of literature both on the *Categories* itself and on its exegetical history,<sup>6</sup> it is all the more surprising that Ibn Sīnā's reception of the *Categories* is still a seriously understudied domain. That is not to say that Ibn Sīnā's intense engagement with the *Categories* remained completely unnoticed. Dimitri Gutas discussed the introductory chapter of the *K. al-Maqūlāt* of the *Šifā'* where Ibn Sīnā forcefully argues for the exclusion of the *Categories* from the logic curriculum.<sup>7</sup> Richard Bodéüs very

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- 5 Particularly the field of post-Avicennian syllogistic has witnessed some remarkable progress; see, *inter alia*, Asad Q. Ahmed, "Interpreting Avicenna: Urmawī/Taḥṭānī and the Later Logical Tradition on Propositions," *Documenti e studi sulla tradizione filosofica medievale* 21 (2010): pp. 313–342; Khaled El-Rouayheb, "Impossible Antecedents and Their Consequences: Some Thirteenth-Century Arabic Discussions," *History and Philosophy of Logic* 30 (2009): pp. 209–225; idem, *Relational Syllogisms and the History of Arabic Logic 900–1900* (Leiden: Brill, 2010); Kamran Karimullah, "Unusual Syllogisms: Avicenna and Najm al-Dīn al-Kātibī on *per impossibile* Syllogisms and Implication (*luzūm*)," *Oriens* 43 (2015): pp. 223–271; Tony Street, "Avicenna and Ṭūsī on the Contradiction and Conversion of the Absolute," *History and Philosophy of Logic* 21 (2000): pp. 45–56; idem, "Fāhraddīn ar-Rāzī's Critique of Avicennan Logic," in *Logik und Theologie: Das Organon im arabischen und im lateinischen Mittelalter*, ed. Dominik Perler and Ulrich Rudolph (Leiden: Brill, 2005), pp. 99–116; and idem, "Afdal al-Dīn al-Khūnajī (d. 1248) on the Conversion of Modal Propositions," *Oriens* 42 (2014): pp. 454–513.
- 6 For a comprehensive analytical overview of the exegetical history of the *Categories* up to the 1980's, see Klaus Oehler, "Einleitung," in his German translation of the *Categories* (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 4<sup>th</sup> ed. 2006), pp. 42–96. For more recent developments, see Paul Studtmann, "Aristotle's *Categories*," in *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, 2013. For the earliest commentaries on Aristotle's *Categories*, see Paul Moraux, *Der Aristotelismus bei den Griechen*, vol. 1 (Berlin: De Gruyter, 1973), pp. 97–113, pp. 147–164 and pp. 182–185; and Michael Griffin, *Aristotle's Categories in the Early Roman Empire* (Oxford: University Press, 2015). For an excellent study on the Neoplatonic commentators, see Rainer Thiel, *Aristoteles' Kategorienschrift in ihrer antiken Kommentierung* (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2004); cf. Antony C. Lloyd, "Neo-Platonic Logic and Aristotelian Logic," *Phronesis* 1/1 (1955): pp. 58–72 and 1/2 (1956): pp. 146–160; and Ilsetraut Hadot, "The Role of the Commentaries on Aristotle in the Teaching of Philosophy according to the Prefaces of the Neoplatonic Commentaries on the *Categories*," *Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, Supplementary Volume: Aristotle and the Later Tradition* (1991): pp. 175–189. For the Byzantine tradition, see Katerina Ierodiakonou, "The Byzantine Reception of Aristotle's *Categories*," *Synthesis Philosophica* 39 (2005): pp. 7–31. For the medieval reception (with a particular focus on the Latin West), see the collective volume *Medieval Commentaries on Aristotle's Categories*, ed. Lloyd A. Newton (Leiden: Brill, 2008).
- 7 Dimitri Gutas, *Avicenna and the Aristotelian Tradition*, 2<sup>nd</sup> ed., pp. 300–303.

briefly contrasted al-Ḥasan b. Suwār's traditional reading of the *Categories* with Ibn Sīnā's critical attitude which he deemed to be inspiring for further research on Aristotle's treatise.<sup>8</sup> In a similar manner, Allan Bäck compared Ibn Sīnā's treatment of *Cat.* 1, in the course of which we see him introduce a complex division of various types of homonymy, with Ibn Rušd's much less original style of commenting – and concluded that Ibn Sīnā's creative approach makes him the ideal commentator for all readers, both medieval and modern, who appreciate a philosophically productive exegesis.<sup>9</sup> Moreover, Amos Bertolacci and Alexander Treiger closely studied Ibn Sīnā's elaboration on *Cat.* 1 against the background of the preceding commentary tradition.<sup>10</sup> Besides that, Amos Bertolacci also discussed Ibn Sīnā's reworking of *Cat.* 1 as a particularly apt case in point for the close interrelatedness between the logical and metaphysical parts of the *K. aš-Šifā'*.<sup>11</sup> Prior to this, Tiana Koutzarova had already made frequent recourse to the ontological doctrines which Ibn Sīnā expounds in the *Maqūlāt* of the *Šifā'* for the sake of gaining a better understanding of the *Ilāhiyyāt* of the *Šifā'*, especially with regard to the concepts of 'existent' (*mawğūd*) and 'substance' (*ğawhar*).<sup>12</sup> Apart from his reflections on Ibn Sīnā's role as a "commentator" of the *Categories*, Allan Bäck can also be credited as the first contemporary reader who paid attention to the remarkable reassessment of *Cat.* 2 which Ibn Sīnā pursues in chapter I,3 of the *Maqūlāt* of the *Šifā'*.<sup>13</sup> As far as Ibn Sīnā's reception of the

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- 8 Richard Bodéüs, "Mawqif Ibn Sīnā wa-dalālat Maqūlāt Aristū," *al-Mağalla at-tūnisiyya li-d-dirāsāt al-falsafiyya / Revue tunisienne des études philosophiques* 13–14 (1993): pp. 133–138.
- 9 Allan Bäck, "Avicenna the Commentator," in *Medieval Commentaries on Aristotle's Categories*, ed. Lloyd A. Newton (Leiden: Brill, 2008), pp. 31–71.
- 10 Amos Bertolacci, "Simplicius in Avicenna's Reworking of Aristotle's *Categories*," unpublished paper, presented at the workshop *The Reception of the Categories in the Arabic Tradition*, 3–4 April 2009, École Normale Supérieure Paris; and Alexander Treiger, "Avicenna's Notion of Transcendental Modulation of Existence (*taškik al-wuğūd, analogia entis*) and its Greek and Arabic Sources," in *Islamic Philosophy, Science, Culture and Religion: Studies in Honor of Dimitri Gutas*, ed. Felicitas Opwis and David Reisman (Leiden: Brill, 2012), pp. 327–363.
- 11 Amos Bertolacci, "The 'Ontologization' of Logic: Metaphysical Themes in Avicenna's Reworking of the *Organon*," in *Methods and Methodologies: Aristotelian Logic East and West, 500–1500*, ed. Margaret Cameron and John Marenbon (Leiden: Brill, 2011), pp. 27–51, esp. pp. 41–49.
- 12 Tiana Koutzarova, *Das Transzendente bei Ibn Sīnā: Zur Metaphysik als Wissenschaft erster Begriffs- und Urteilsprinzipien* (Leiden: Brill, 2009), esp. pp. 211–277. For a critique of Koutzarova's approach of reading Ibn Sīnā's *Metaphysics* predominantly through a scholastic lens, see the review by Heidrun Eichner, *Orientalistische Literaturzeitung* 107 (2012): pp. 39–41.
- 13 Allan Bäck, "The Ontological Pentagon of Avicenna," *The Journal of Neoplatonic Studies* 7 (1999): pp. 87–109. Cf. below, chapter 2.

actual list of Aristotle's ten categories is concerned, Paul Thom made a first attempt at situating Ibn Sīnā's systematization of the scheme of categories within the earlier commentary tradition.<sup>14</sup> In addition to these studies on particular chapters and issues of the *Maqūlāt* of the *Šifā'*, the recent discovery of an earlier Avicennian treatise on the *Categories* inspired some first considerations on how a developmental account might trace the various stages of Ibn Sīnā's reading of the *Categories*.<sup>15</sup>

What is lacking, however, is a close reading of larger parts of Ibn Sīnā's extensive *K. al-Maqūlāt* of the *Šifā'*. The present study, therefore, intends to pave the way towards a deeper contextualized understanding of Ibn Sīnā's critical account of the *Categories* within his wider project of rearranging the transmitted body of philosophical knowledge – a transformation process whose impact cannot be overestimated. Against the background of the late ancient commentary tradition and the subsequent exegetical efforts advanced by the Baghdad Peripatetics, it will become clear that the *K. al-Maqūlāt* of the *Šifā'* marks an important milestone in the gradual Avicennian reshuffle of the relationship between logic proper and ontology. In order to assess the philosophical impact of this realignment, I also take into account some of the subsequent developments in Ibn Sīnā's writings and in the emerging post-Avicennian tradition.

In doing so, my focus will lie on the two fundamental classification schemes which Aristotle introduces in the treatise: The fourfold scheme of *Cat. 2* and the tenfold scheme of *Cat. 4*. Both schemes pose the question of whether and how the manner in which an expression is predicated of another expression is connected to extra-linguistic reality, that is to say, on issues pertaining to the relationship between logico-linguistic and ontological divisions. These two areas are at the core of Ibn Sīnā's momentous reform of the Aristotelian curriculum – an ambitious philosophical project whose rationale, as we shall see, is given in the *Maqūlāt* of the *Šifā'* and whose implementation can best be observed in the *Išārāt*.

First of all, I will inspect the classical question which all ancient and medieval readers – including Ibn Sīnā and his Arabic predecessors and contemporaries

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14 Paul Thom, "The Division of the Categories According to Avicenna," in *Aristotle and the Arabic Tradition*, ed. Ahmed Alwishah and Josh Hayes (Cambridge: University Press, 2015), pp. 30–49.

15 See Alexander Kalbarczyk, "The *Kitāb al-Maqūlāt* of the *Muḥtaṣar al-awsaṭ fi l-mantiq*: A Hitherto Unknown Source for Studying Ibn Sīnā's Reception of Aristotle's *Categories*," *Oriens* 40 (2012): pp. 305–354, esp. pp. 320–321; and Heidrun Eichner, "The *Categories* in Avicenna: Material for Developing a Developmental Account?" in *Aristotle's Categories in the Byzantine, Arabic and Latin Traditions*, ed. Sten Ebbesen, John Marenbon and Paul Thom (Copenhagen: Det Kongelige Danske Videnskabernes Selskab, 2013), pp. 59–86.

– discuss before commenting on Aristotle’s text: What is the aim (σκοπός/*ḡaraḡ*) of the *Categories* or rather, what is the nature of the entities which are classified in the treatise (chapter 1)? As will become clear, it is precisely because Ibn Sīnā deems the answers provided by the Neoplatonic commentary tradition untenable that he argues for an exclusion of the *Categories* from logic. The consequences which this radical departure from the transmitted curriculum was to have for subsequent philosophical developments can well be observed in Faḡr ad-Dīn ar-Rāzī’s (d. 606 AH / 1210 AD) philosophical summa *al-Mabāḡiḡ al-mašriḡiyya*. Next, I will take a closer look at Ibn Sīnā’s views on the nature, justification and use of the fourfold scheme (chapter 2) and the tenfold scheme (chapter 3). Once again, Ibn Sīnā’s doctrinal disagreements with the preceding commentary tradition will also be studied under the aspect of their bearings on later Muslim philosophers. What both classification schemes have in common is the fact that they operate with the underlying dichotomy of substantial and accidental entities. While the division of *Cat. 2* contrasts individual substances with universal substances and individual accidents with universal accidents, the list of categories outlined in *Cat. 4* is commonly understood as consisting of one substantial genus and nine accidental genera. Finally, I will focus on exegetical discussions which concern the manner in which substance and accident can be said of whatever falls under them (chapter 4). Whereas Ibn Sīnā, by and large, adopts the traditional interpretation according to which accident – in contrast to substance – lacks conceptual unity and generic predicability, he discards the arguments which had previously been provided in favor of it as insufficient. This critical reassessment inspired some of his philosophical heirs to question the conceptual unity and generic predicability of substance as well. As we shall see, Ibn Sīnā’s comprehensive reappraisal of the *Categories* – both with regard to the epistemological place of the treatise as a whole and of the fundamental classification schemes it contains – was to have a defining impact on the study of logic, metaphysics, and even natural philosophy in the ensuing intellectual tradition of the Islamic East.



KEY ISSUES IN IBN SĪNĀ'S RECEPTION  
OF THE *CATEGORIES* AND IN THE  
ENSUING PHILOSOPHICAL DEBATES



# 1. Varying Approaches of Determining the Scope of the *Categories*

## A. STUDY

### 1.1. Pre-Avicennian Justifications for Including the *Categories* in the Logic Curriculum

Among the six (or more) main points of inquiry (κεφάλαια) which, according to the Neoplatonic commentators, need to be clarified prior to reading the *Categories*,<sup>16</sup> the question of the σκοπός, i.e., what the ‘aim’ or ‘scope’ of the treatise is, has remained subject to intense debates up to the present day.<sup>17</sup> Since among Aristotle’s ancient readers there appears to have been a broad consensus on the view that the *Categories*, in one way or another, aims at outlining ten *genera*, the investigation of its σκοπός usually amounts to the question of *what* the ten categories are genera of.

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16 Simplicius, for instance, lists the following six issues that need to be investigated prior to commenting on the treatise itself: (1) its aim/scope (σκοπός), (2) its usefulness (χρήσιμον), (3) the reason for its title (ἐπιγραφή), (4) its place in the curriculum (ἡ τάξις τῆς ἀναγνώσεως), (5) whether it is an authentic Aristotelian work (εἰ γνήσιον τοῦ φιλοσόφου τὸ βιβλίον), and (6) its division into chapters (ἡ εἰς τὰ κεφάλαια διαίρεσις); subsequently, he adds a seventh point: “it may also not be inappropriate to inquire under what part of his philosophy (ὑπὸ ποῖον μέρος αὐτοῦ τῆς φιλοσοφίας) the work is placed.” Simplicius, *In Aristotelis Categorias Commentarium*, ed. Karl Kalbfleisch (Berlin: Reimer, 1907), p. 8, ll. 10–13; English tr. by Michael Chase, *On Aristotle Categories 1–4* (London: Duckworth, 2003), p. 23 (modified). Two extant Arabic commentaries by representatives of the Baghdad Peripatetics, namely by al-Ḥasan b. Suwār and Ibn aṭ-Ṭayyib, discuss eight issues (which Ibn aṭ-Ṭayyib labels as *al-abwāb aṭ-ṭamāniya*): In addition to the seven points mentioned by Simplicius, they treat the “methods of instruction” (*anḥā’ at-ta’līm*) used in the treatise as a separate point of investigation. See al-Ḥasan b. Suwār, <Marginal Annotations on the *Categories*>, in *Manṭiq Aristū*, vol. 1, ed. ‘Abd ar-Raḥmān Badawī (Kuwait: Wikālat al-maṭbū‘āt, 1980), pp. 77–80; *an-Naṣṣ al-kāmil li-manṭiq Aristū*, vol. 1, ed. Farīd Ġabr (Beirut: Dār al-fikr al-lubnānī, 1999), introductory note, pp. 15–18; and MS Paris ar. 2346, fol. 157a, ll. 1–35. And see Abū l-Faraġ b. aṭ-Ṭayyib, *Tafsīr K. al-Maqūlāt*, in Cleophea Ferrari, *Der Kategorienkommentar von Abū l-Faraġ ‘Abdallāh ibn aṭ-Ṭayyib: Text und Untersuchungen* (Leiden: Brill, 2006), pp. 14–23 (Arabic).

17 For an analytical outline of discussions about the scope of the *Categories* among the ancient and late ancient commentators, see “Die Zielrichtung (der σκοπός) der Schrift,” in Rainer Thiel, *Aristoteles’ Kategorienschrift in ihrer antiken Kommentierung*, pp. 11–29.



In drawing on Alexander of Aphrodisias' complex account of which linguistic and extra-linguistic entities are covered by Aristotle's descriptive formula "those which are said without combination" (τὰ κατὰ μηδεμίαν συμπλοκὴν λεγόμενα), the Ammonian commentators unanimously discard three one-dimensional positions that may be taken on this issue: As John Philoponus, *inter alios*, emphasizes, the scope of the *Categories* may neither be limited to "concepts only" (νοήματα μόνα), nor to "expressions only" (φωναί μοναί), nor to "things only" (πράγματα μόνα).<sup>18</sup> In the same vein, Simplicius reports and rejects three one-dimensional readings of the *Categories* on the grounds that they would thwart an epistemologically sound inclusion of the treatise in the logic curriculum: Concepts *qua* concepts are studied in psychology, expressions *qua* expressions in grammar, and beings *qua* beings in metaphysics.<sup>19</sup>

According to Alexander of Aphrodisias, as quoted by Simplicius, the scope of the *Categories* must be seen in a combination of the linguistic, ontological and psychological dimensions. Thus, the ten categories are understood as "the simple and most generic parts of speech (τὰ ἀπλᾶ καὶ γενικώτατα τοῦ λόγου μόρια) which signify the simple things (τὰ ἀπλᾶ πράγματα σημαίνοντα) and [which signify] the simple concepts pertaining to these simple things (τὰ περὶ τῶν ἀπλῶν πραγμάτων ἀπλᾶ νοήματα)."<sup>20</sup> According to this formula, Alexander merely juxtaposes 'beings' and 'concepts' as two types of *significata* of the 'most generic simple expressions,' without clarifying the relations which hold between all three dimensions. Such a systematization effort can subsequently be found in Ammonius and John Philoponus who, with reference to Iamblichus, invoke the following formula: The *Categories* deals with "expressions (φωναί) which signify things through mediating concepts" (σημαίνουσαι πράγματα διὰ μέσων νοημάτων).<sup>21</sup> Thus, against the background of the semiotic triangle sketched in *De Interpretatione* 16a3–8, the Ammonian formula of the scope of the *Categories* understands each of the ten categories as a simple generic expression which

18 John Philoponus, *In Aristotelis Categorias Commentarium*, ed. Adolf Busse (Berlin: Reimer, 1898), p. 9, ll. 12–14 (my tr.); cf. the English tr. by Riin Sirkel, Martin Tweedale and John Harris, *On Aristotle Categories 1–5* (London: Bloomsbury, 2015), p. 47.

19 Simplicius, *In Categorias*, p. 9, l. 8 – p. 10, l. 5. For a schematic outline of Ibn Sīnā's and Simplicius' discussion of these three positions, see below, p. 25.

20 Quoted in Simplicius, *In Categorias*, p. 10, ll. 17–19 (my tr.); cf. the English tr. by Chase, p. 25. On Alexander's lost *Commentary on the Categories*, see Paul Moraux, *Der Aristotelismus bei den Griechen*, vol. 3 (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2001), pp. 3–15.

21 Ammonius, *In Aristotelis Categorias Commentarius*, ed. Adolf Busse (Berlin: Reimer, 1895), p. 9, ll. 17–18; cf. the English tr. by S. Marc Cohen and Gareth B. Matthews, *On Aristotle's Categories* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1991), p. 17. And see John Philoponus, *In Categorias*, p. 9, ll. 14–15; English tr. by Sirkel/Tweedale/Harris, p. 47.

signifies an extra-linguistic and extra-mental reality via the conceptualization process taking place in the human soul.

In contrast to this three-dimensional account of the scope of the *Categories*, Porphyry's formula "simple significant expressions inasmuch as they signify things" (φωναὶ σημαντικαὶ ἀπλαῖ καθὸ σημαντικαὶ εἰσι τῶν πραγμάτων)<sup>22</sup> omits the level of the νοήματα. It is not at random that Plotinus' most prominent disciple put such a particular emphasis on the semantic aspect of the treatise: rather than touching on the contested issue of the status of intelligible universals, Porphyry treats the *Categories* as a propaedeutic work which – as Steven Strange has argued – provides the student with an investigation of "the semantics of terms that apply primarily to sensibles."<sup>23</sup> Thus, by narrowing its scope to the semantics of our pre-philosophical everyday language, Porphyry – as a reaction to his teacher's critique of the faulty metaphysical outline given in the *Categories* – greatly minimizes the ontological significance of the treatise and, in doing so, succeeds in corroborating its role as the fundamental introductory textbook of logic.<sup>24</sup> Simplicius, who – as we have seen – was well-aware of the three-dimensional approach of formulating the scope of the *Categories*, deliberately follows Porphyry in stressing the semantic aspect of the treatise: "The scope concerns the simple (ἀπλαῖ) expressions (λέξεις), inasmuch as they are significative (καθὸ σημαντικαὶ εἰσιν)."<sup>25</sup>

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- 22 Porphyry, *Isagoge et In Aristotelis Categorias Commentarium*, ed. Adolf Busse (Berlin: Reimer, 1887), p. 58, ll. 5–6; English tr. by Steven K. Strange, *On Aristotle's Categories* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1992), p. 34 (modified).
- 23 Steven Strange, "Plotinus, Porphyry and the Neoplatonic Interpretation of the *Categories*," in *Aufstieg und Niedergang der römischen Welt*, part 2, vol. 36.2, ed. Wolfgang Haase and Hildegard Temporini (Berlin: De Gruyter, 1987), p. 974. Cf. Frans de Haas' assessment: "Everyday speech refers to what is most familiar to us, and therefore Porphyry considers the *Categories* to be primarily concerned with composite substances. If so, it is only natural that the scope of the *Categories* should be confined to the sensible realm"; in his "Did Plotinus and Porphyry disagree on Aristotle's *Categories*?" *Phronesis* 46 (2001): p. 493. For a short discussion of the relation between Plotinus' and Porphyry's understanding of the scope of the *Categories*, see below, pp. 224–225. Christos Evangelou characterized Porphyry's interpretation of the scope of the treatise as the "canonical exegesis." See Christos Evangelou, *Aristotle's Categories and Porphyry* (Leiden: Brill, 1988), p. 25.
- 24 The background of Porphyry's two-dimensional formula and its relation to the three-dimensional formula has, in light of the evidence offered by earlier Peripatetic traditions, recently been studied by Michael Griffin, "What does Aristotle Categorize? Semantics and the Early Peripatetic Reading of the *Categories*," *Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies* 55 (2012): pp. 69–108, which is a revised version of the first chapter of his DPhil thesis *The Reception of Aristotle's Categories, c. 80 BC to AD 220* (Oxford, 2009), pp. 26–69.
- 25 Simplicius, *In Categorias*, p. 40, ll. 18–19; English tr. by Chase, p. 55 (modified). For an analysis of Simplicius' discussion of the σκοπός, see Philippe Hoffmann, "Catégories et

As the *Tafsīr K. al-Maqūlāt* by Ibn Sīnā's contemporary Abū l-Faraġ b. aṭ-Ṭayyib (d. 1043 AD) attests, the fact that the Ammonian formula – in contrast to the Porphyrian formula – included the dimension of the νοήματα helped generate the misperception that Ammonius had intended to *restrict* the realm of the ten categories to “the forms realized in the intellect” (*aṣ-ṣuwar al-hāšila fī l-'aql*).<sup>26</sup> Curiously enough, John Philoponus – with reference to his teacher Ammonius – attributes the position which limits the *Categories* to the conceptual level to Porphyry.<sup>27</sup> Moreover, Abū l-Faraġ b. aṭ-Ṭayyib – possibly against the background of the fact that Alexander's account stresses the linguistic signification and mental conceptualization of the ἀπλᾶ πράγματα – characterizes *al-Iskandar al-Afrūdisī* as the “head” (*ra'īs*) of those scholars who claimed that the classification offered by the ten categories remains confined to the dimension of “existing things” (*al-umūr al-mawġūda*).<sup>28</sup> It should be noted that none of the extant commentaries on the *Categories*, whether in the Greek or Arabic tradition, actually embraces a one-dimensional view of the scope of the treatise. However, the frequent misattributions of these three one-dimensional positions to some prominent forerunners suggest that for the exegetical tradition these fiercely debated views were not merely three theoretically possible answers to the question of what the ten categories are genera of.

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langage selon Simplicius: la question du ‘skopos’ du traité aristotélicien des *Catégories*,” in *Simplicius: Sa vie, son œuvre, sa survie*, ed. Ilsetraut Hadot (Berlin: De Gruyter, 1987), pp. 61–90. For an account of Simplicius' relevance for the Arabic tradition, see Helmut Gätje, “Simplikios in der arabischen Überlieferung,” *Der Islam* 59 (1982): pp. 6–31; and Ilsetraut Hadot, “The Life and Work of Simplicius in Greek and Arabic Sources,” in *Aristotle Transformed: The Ancient Commentators and their Influence*, ed. Richard Sorabji (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1990), pp. 275–303.

26 Ibn aṭ-Ṭayyib, *Tafsīr K. al-Maqūlāt*, ed. Ferrari, p. 16 (Arabic), ll. 16–17.

27 Ammonius himself merely suggests that this is a position which is close to a view Porphyry in the *Isagoge* supposedly subscribes to; see Ammonius, *In Categories*, p. 9, ll. 8–11: “γένη δὲ δηλονότι φησὶ τὰ ὑστερογενῆ καὶ ἐννοηματικά, ὅθεν καὶ ὁ Πορφύριος εἶπεν ‘οὐδὲν ἄρα περιττὸν οὐδὲ ἐλλείπον περιέχει ἢ τοῦ γένους ῥηθεῖσα ὑπογραφή τῆς ἐννοίας.’ ὥστε καὶ ὁ σκοπὸς αὐτῶ περὶ μόνων νοημάτων.” English tr. by Cohen/Matthews, p. 17 (modified): “The genera he is talking about are clearly posterior in origin and are notional entities; this is why Porphyry says: ‘Therefore the description we have given of the concept of genus includes nothing excessive or deficient. So Aristotle's aim (σκοπός) concerns only concepts (νοήματα).’” For the explicit attribution to Porphyry, see John Philoponus, *In Categories*, p. 9, ll. 4–6: “οἱ δὲ περὶ νοημάτων μόνων νομίσαντες διαλέγεσθαι τὸν φιλόσοφον, οἷος ἐγένετο ὁ Πορφύριος, φασὶν ὅτι περὶ τῶν δέκα γενῶν ἐστὶν αὐτῶ ὁ λόγος.” English tr. by Sirkel/Tweeddale/Harris, p. 47 (modified): “Those who held that the Philosopher gives an account of concepts only, as did Porphyry, say that this account concerns the ten genera.” Cf. Rainer Thiel, *Aristoteles' Kategorienschrift in ihrer antiken Kommentierung*, pp. 16–17.

28 Ibn aṭ-Ṭayyib, *Tafsīr K. al-Maqūlāt*, ed. Ferrari, p. 16 (Arabic), ll. 2–3.

Porphry's well-attested stress on the semantic aspect of the scope of the treatise gave rise to the following interpretation: Abū l-Ḥayr al-Ḥasan b. Suwār b. al-Ḥammār (d. after 1017 AD) and his pupil Ibn aṭ-Ṭayyib both report that according to Porphyry a category is nothing but "the simple expression (*al-lafza al-basiṭa*) which signifies a certain thing (*ad-dāllatu 'alā amrin mā*), inasmuch as it is significative (*min ḥaytu hiya dāllatun*)," devoid of any additional qualifications;<sup>29</sup> and Ibn aṭ-Ṭayyib claims that to this end Porphyry provided the etymological explanation that the Greek expression *qātīgūriyās* means "nothing more than 'an expression signifying anything from among the things'" (*laysat akṭara min lafzatin dāllatin 'alā amrin mina l-umūr*).<sup>30</sup> Ibn Suwār contrasts this broad semantic approach with the narrower view that only those "simple expressions which signify the high genera (*ad-dāllatu 'alā l-aḡnāsi l-āliya*)" are eligible to be Aristotelian categories.<sup>31</sup> Moreover, he stresses the fact that these must be expressions "in the first imposition" (*fī l-waḍ' al-awwal*),<sup>32</sup> that is to say, expressions of an object-language referring to 'existents' in contrast to expressions of a grammatical or logical meta-language which would be 'in the second imposition.' He further qualifies them as being "significative through the mediation of the traces of them in the soul" (*dāllatun bi-tawassuṭi l-aṭāri llatī fī n-naḥsi minhā*),<sup>33</sup> thus introducing the conceptual level by means of a direct reference to the παθήματα τῆς ψυχῆς (*De Interpretatione* 16a6–7) which Ishāq rendered into Arabic as *al-aṭār allatī fī n-naḥs* and *aṭār an-naḥs*.<sup>34</sup> At the same time, Ibn Suwār also includes an inversion of the Porphyrian formula in his account of the "scope" (*ḡaraḍ*): The treatise is not only about significative expressions, inasmuch as they signify things, but also about "things (*umūr*), inasmuch as they are signified by a linguistic expression (*bi-l-lafz*)."<sup>35</sup>

Ibn aṭ-Ṭayyib in his *Tafsīr K. al-Maqūlāt* closely follows his teacher's formulation, with the notable difference that in his version the simple expressions,

29 Ibn Suwār, <*Marginal Annotations on the Categories*>, ed. Badawī, vol. 1, p. 80, ll. 7–8; ed. Ġabr, vol. 1, note, p. 18, ll. 14–15; MS Paris ar. 2346, fol. 157a, l. 38.

30 Ibn aṭ-Ṭayyib, *Tafsīr K. al-Maqūlāt*, ed. Ferrari, p. 16 (Arabic), ll. 30–31.

31 Ibn Suwār, <*Marginal Annotations on the Categories*>, ed. Badawī, vol. 1, p. 80, ll. 9–13; ed. Ġabr, vol. 1, note, p. 18, ll. 16–21; MS Paris ar. 2346, fol. 157a, ll. 39–40.

32 Ibn Suwār, <*Marginal Annotations on the Categories*>, ed. Badawī, vol. 1, p. 77, l. 5; ed. Ġabr, vol. 1, note, p. 15, l. 4; MS Paris ar. 2346, fol. 157a, l. 1.

33 Ibn Suwār, <*Marginal Annotations on the Categories*>, ed. Badawī, vol. 1, p. 77, l. 6; ed. Ġabr, vol. 1, note, p. 15, l. 5; MS Paris ar. 2346, fol. 157a, l. 1.

34 Cf. Aristotle, *al-'Ibāra*, in *an-Naṣṣ al-kāmil li-manṭiq Aristū*, ed. Farīd Ġabr (Beirut: Dār al-fikr al-lubnāni, 1999), vol. 1, p. 104, l. 1 and l. 5.

35 Ibn Suwār, <*Marginal Annotations on the Categories*>, ed. Badawī, vol. 1, p. 77, l. 6; ed. Ġabr, vol. 1, note, p. 15, ll. 5–6; MS Paris ar. 2346, fol. 157a, ll. 1–2.

rather than signifying the *summa genera* through a conceptualization process in the soul, directly signify universals which are *summa genera*:

His aim (*ğarađuhū*) in this book lies precisely in giving an account of the simple expressions (*al-alfāz al-basīta*) signifying the universal things (*ad-dālla ‘alā l-umūr al-kulliyya*) which are the highest genera (*allatī hiya l-ağnās al-‘āliya*) which are in the primary imposition, and of corresponding things (*al-umūr bi-ğasabihā*).<sup>36</sup>

Even though both Ibn Suwār and Abū l-Farağ claim that their own versions of the scope of the *Categories* are superior to what they believe to have been Porphyry’s position, namely a broad semantic reading, they do not, in fact, offer much more than a condensed account of what can be found in Porphyry’s extant short commentary. Not only does Porphyry confine the scope to the “primary imposition of expressions” (ή πρώτη θέσις τῶν λέξεων)<sup>37</sup> but he also specifies the formula “simple significant expressions inasmuch as they signify things” by restricting the aspect under which the πράγματα are considered to their differences “according to the genus” (κατὰ γένος) – in contrast to an investigation of how things differ “in number” (κατὰ ἀριθμόν).<sup>38</sup> Porphyry does indeed present an etymological argument which explains the meaning of κατηγορεῖν as “proclaiming (ἀγορεύειν) things (πράγματα) according to a *significatum* (κατὰ τι σημαϊνόμενον)” and “saying of things a significative expression” (τὸ λέξιν σημαντικὴν κατὰ πραγμάτων λέγειν).<sup>39</sup> But in the context in which he adduces this explanation it is clearly intended to support his view that the *Categories* amounts to an “elementary exposition (στοιχείωσις) of simple expressions, which considers them according to the genus inasmuch as they primarily signify things”<sup>40</sup> – and hence does not differ from the account favored by Ibn Suwār and Ibn aṭ-Ṭayyib who hold that the focus lies on generic expressions in primary imposition. Without being aware of it, they both reproduce the rather nuanced two-dimensional outline of the scope which Porphyry had given in his short commentary. The only difference appears to be that Porphyry’s clear-cut semantic emphasis now becomes somewhat damped through the inversion of his formula: The treatise deals with ‘expressions signifying things’ and ‘things signified by expressions.’

Such a double formula had also been favored by Ibn Suwār’s and Ibn aṭ-Ṭayyib’s Peripatetic forerunner Abū Naṣr al-Fārābī (d. 339 AH / 950 AD). However, if we take a closer look at his outline of the scope of the *Categories*, it becomes clear that al-Fārābī’s account especially stands out for another important

36 Ibn aṭ-Ṭayyib, *Tafsīr K. al-Maḡulāt*, ed. Ferrari, p. 18 (Arabic), ll. 5–7.

37 Porphyry, *In Categories*, p. 58, l. 4; English tr. by Strange, p. 34 (modified).

38 Porphyry, *In Categories*, p. 58, ll. 6–7 (my tr.).

39 Porphyry, *In Categories*, p. 58, ll. 16–18 (my tr.).

40 Porphyry, *In Categories*, p. 58, ll. 18–20; English tr. by Strange, p. 35 (modified).

modification. In his *Iḥṣāʾ al-ʿulūm* he characterizes the first book of the Aristotelian *Organon* as follows:

The first one contains the rules (*qawānīn*) pertaining to the simple intelligibles (*al-mufradāt mina l-maʿqūlāt*) and to the expressions which signify them (*al-alfāz ad-dālla ʿalayhā*). It is the book which in Arabic is called “Those which are Said” (*al-Maqūlāt*) and in Greek *Qatīgūriyās*.<sup>41</sup>

By and large, Porphyry’s semantic emphasis is still visible. But in marked contrast to Porphyry’s formula, the referents of the significative expressions are “intelligibles” (*maʿqūlat*) rather than *πράγματα*. This corresponds to al-Fārābī’s general account of the subject-matter of logic: To his mind, the purpose of logic lies in disclosing the “rules” (*qawānīn*) pertaining to “intelligibles (*al-maʿqūlāt*), inasmuch as the expressions signify them (*min ḥayṭu tadullu ʿalayhā l-alfāz*),” and to “expressions (*al-alfāz*), inasmuch as they signify the intelligibles (*min ḥayṭu hiya dāllatun ʿalā l-maʿqūlāt*).”<sup>42</sup> Thus, for al-Fārābī there can be no doubt about the fact that the *Categories* genuinely belongs to logic. While he singles out the fourth part of the *Organon*, i.e., the *Analytica Posteriora* dedicated to “apodeictic propositions” (*al-aqāwīl al-burhāniyya*),<sup>43</sup> as the centerpiece and target point of logic, he describes all three preceding parts, i.e., the *Categories*, *De Interpretatione* and *Analytica Priora* alike, as “preparatory and introductory treatises” (*tawṭīʾāt wa-madāhīl*) which function as “ways” (*ṭuruq*) towards the Aristotelian doctrine of demonstration.<sup>44</sup> According to al-Fārābī, “the parts of logic” (*ağzāʾ al-mantiq*) are not merely by convention but “by necessity” (*ḍarūratan*) eight,<sup>45</sup> and each of these eight parts corresponds to one of the books of the Aristotelian *Organon*.

In the *Madḥal* of the *Šifāʾ*, Ibn Sīnā discards the Fārābian formulation of the subject-matter of logic quite articulately: “There is no benefit in the account of whoever says that the subject-matter (*mawḍūʿ*) of logic is the consideration (*naẓar*) of expressions inasmuch as they signify meanings (*al-alfāz min ḥayṭu*

41 Al-Fārābī, *Iḥṣāʾ al-ʿulūm*, ed. ʿUṭmān Amīn (Cairo: Maktabat al-anḡlū al-miṣriyya, 1968, 3<sup>rd</sup> print), p. 87, ll. 1–3.

42 Al-Fārābī, *Iḥṣāʾ al-ʿulūm*, ed. Amīn 1968, p. 74, ll. 10–12. Cf. Deborah Black, “Aristotle’s ‘Peri hermeneias’ in Medieval Latin and Arabic Philosophy: Logic and the Linguistic Arts,” *Canadian Journal of Philosophy*, Supplementary Volume 17 (1991): p. 50. For a discussion of al-Fārābī’s account of the subject-matter of logic, see also Adamson, Peter / Key, Alexander, “Philosophy of Language in the Medieval Arabic Tradition,” in *Linguistic Content: New Essays on the History of Philosophy of Language*, ed. Margaret Cameron and Robert J. Stainton (Oxford: University Press, 2015), pp. 82–86.

43 Al-Fārābī, *Iḥṣāʾ al-ʿulūm*, ed. Amīn 1968, p. 87, l. 11.

44 Al-Fārābī, *Iḥṣāʾ al-ʿulūm*, ed. Amīn 1968, p. 89, ll. 7–10.

45 Al-Fārābī, *Iḥṣāʾ al-ʿulūm*, ed. Amīn 1968, p. 86, ll. 14–15.

*tadullu ‘alā l-ma‘ānī).*”<sup>46</sup> As we shall see, Ibn Sīnā’s fundamental reassessment of the subject-matter of logic had momentous consequences both for how he himself and subsequent generations of philosophers in the Islamic East viewed the scope of the *Categories*.<sup>47</sup> As a result, neither Porphyry’s two-dimensional nor Alexander’s and Ammonius’ three-dimensional accounts nor the variations of these two approaches formulated by al-Fārābī, Ibn Suwār and Ibn aṭ-Ṭayyib could continue to offer convincing justifications for the inclusion of the *Categories* in the logic curriculum.

## 1.2. Ibn Sīnā’s Gradual Departure from Peripatetic-Neoplatonic Conventions Regarding the Scope of the *Categories*: From the *Muḥtaṣar* via the *Šifā’* and the *Ta‘līqāt* to the *Iṣārāt*

### 1.2.1. Early Reflections on the Subject-Matter of Logic in *al-Muḥtaṣar al-awsaṭ fī l-mantiq*

In contrast to the much more elaborate *K. al-Maḳūlāt* of the *Šifā’*, Ibn Sīnā’s first complete exposition of the *Categories*, that is, the rather condensed *K. al-Maḳūlāt* of the *Muḥtaṣar al-awsaṭ fī l-mantiq*, does not address the question of the scope of the treatise or whether it genuinely pertains to logic. But since Ibn Sīnā structures the *Muḥtaṣar al-awsaṭ* into *al-Madḥal* (*Isagoge*), *al-Maḳūlāt* (*Categories*), *al-Ṭbāra* (*On Interpretation*), *al-Qiyās* (*Prior Analytics*), and *al-Burhān* (*Posterior Analytics*) without voicing any principled critique of the cogency of this arrangement, at this early stage he still appears to be willing to accept the *Categories*, by and large, as an integral part of the first five books of the logic

46 Ibn Sīnā, *K. aš-Šifā’, al-Mantiq, al-Madḥal*, ed. Ibrāhīm Madkūr (Cairo: al-Maṭba‘a al-amīriyya, 1952 [1371 AH]), I,4, p. 23, ll. 5–6. Cf. Black, “Aristotle’s ‘Peri hermeneias’ in Medieval Latin and Arabic Philosophy,” p. 54.

47 For Ibn Sīnā’s reformulation of the subject-matter of logic, see Abdelhamid Sabra, “Avicenna on the Subject Matter of Logic,” *The Journal of Philosophy* 77 (1980): pp. 746–764; Deborah Black, “Aristotle’s ‘Peri hermeneias’ in Medieval Latin and Arabic Philosophy,” pp. 54–56; Tony Street, “Arabic Logic,” in *Handbook of the History of Logic, Volume 1: Greek, Indian and Arabic Logic*, ed. Dov Gabbay and John Woods (Amsterdam: Elsevier, 2004), pp. 539–542; Tony Street, “Arabic and Islamic Philosophy of Language and Logic,” in *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, 2008, section 2.1 (“The Subject Matter of Logic”); and Kamran Karimullah, *Avicenna (d. 1037), Logical Theory, and the Aristotelian Tradition* (PhD thesis McGill University, Montreal, 2014), pp. 189–202. For post-Avicennian developments (with a particular focus on Afḍal ad-Dīn al-Ḥūnaḡī), see Khaled El-Rouayheb, “Post-Avicennan Logicians on the Subject Matter of Logic: Some Thirteenth- and Fourteenth-Century Discussions,” *Arabic Sciences and Philosophy* 22 (2012): pp. 69–90.

curriculum. In spite of the generally more traditional and more lenient attitude of the work, however, already in the *Muḥtaṣar al-awsaṭ* we can detect the emergence of Ibn Sīnā's sharp criticism of certain approaches and doctrines that have developed in the course of the long exegetical history of the *Categories*, such as the commentators' wide-spread attempts at proving the number of the ten *summa genera*.<sup>48</sup> Moreover, his introductory remarks on the subject-matter of logic already point towards the idea that the primary focus of logic should be restricted to the study of *mental* entities inasmuch as they are epistemologically productive.

The preceding *Madḥal* section of the *Muḥtaṣar al-awsaṭ*, which has yet to be edited, begins with some short reflections on the issues logic is concerned with and on its utility (*manfaʿa*). Notwithstanding the fact that the *Manṭiq an-Nağāt* – in clear contrast to the *Muḥtaṣar al-awsaṭ* – tacitly excludes the *Categories* from the logic curriculum by passing on seamlessly from the *Isagoge* part to a discussion of issues resembling Aristotle's *De Interpretatione*,<sup>49</sup> the programmatic opening passages of both works are virtually identical with one another.<sup>50</sup> Rather than expounding a theory of secondary intelligibles, the focus lies on giving an outline of what Ibn Sīnā deems to be the two major themes of logic, namely “conceptualization” (*taṣawwur*) and “acknowledgment of truth” (*taṣdīq*).<sup>51</sup> These two mental processes are introduced as the fundamental types of every scientifically sound “knowledge” (*ʿilm*) and “cognition” (*maʿrifa*): Whereas we conceptualize a thing's quiddity by way of a “definition” (*ḥadd*), we come to acknowledge the truth of a statement by way of a “syllogism” (*qiyās*).<sup>52</sup> Both the definition and the syllogism are characterized as being “compounded and constructed from intellected meanings” (*muʿallaf wa-maʿmūl min maʿānin maʿqūlatin*).<sup>53</sup> Thus,

48 See below, chapter 3.

49 For some preliminary reflections on the relation between *al-Muḥtaṣar al-awsaṭ fī l-manṭiq* and *Manṭiq an-Nağāt*, see my “The *Kitāb al-Maḥqūlāt* of the *Muḥtaṣar al-awsaṭ fī l-manṭiq*: A Hitherto Unknown Source for Studying Ibn Sīnā's Reception of Aristotle's *Categories*,” pp. 306–309 and the table on p. 350.

50 The identical opening passage roughly amounts to two folios in MS Istanbul Nuruosmaniye 2763 (fol. 1b, l. 6 – fol. 2a, l. 17) and two and half pages of Dānešpažūh's edition of the *Nağāt* (p. 7, l. 3 – p. 9, l. 7).

51 For an excellent account of the origin of these two notions, see Joep Lameer, *Conception and Belief in Ṣadr al-Dīn Shīrāzī (ca. 1571–1635): al-Risāla fī l-taṣawwur wa-l-taṣdīq* (Teheran: Iranian Institute of Philosophy, 2006), p. 19ff.

52 Ibn Sīnā, *al-Muḥtaṣar al-awsaṭ fī l-manṭiq*, *al-Madḥal*, MS Istanbul Nuruosmaniye 2763, fol. 1b, ll. 6–8; and Ibn Sīnā, *K. an-Nağāt*, ed. Moḥammad Taqī Dānešpažūh (Teheran: Entešārāt-e Dānešgāh-e Tehrān, 1985–86 [1364 SH]), p. 7, ll. 3–5.

53 This is the formulation used in the *Muḥtaṣar*; the *Nağāt* has *maʿmūl wa-muʿallaf min maʿānin maʿqūlatin*; see Ibn Sīnā, *al-Muḥtaṣar al-awsaṭ fī l-manṭiq*, *al-Madḥal*, MS Istanbul



even though there is no explicit reference to secondary intelligibles, Ibn Sīnā makes it clear right from the beginning that for him the primary task of logic is a study of the “composition” (*taʿlīf*) of entities existing *in intellectu* inasmuch as their composition yields, both in form and content, “the sound definition which is called a definition in the true sense” (*al-ḥadd aṣ-ṣaḥīḥ alladī yusammā bi-l-ḥaqīqati ḥaddan*) and “the sound syllogism which is called a demonstration in the true sense” (*al-qiyās aṣ-ṣaḥīḥ alladī yusammā bi-l-ḥaqīqati burhānan*).<sup>54</sup> Logic is, therefore, not introduced as an investigation of linguistic phenomena but as providing us with the “two tools” (*al-ālatāni*) which the rational faculty needs in order to “acquire everything which can be known about things [previously] unknown (*tuktasabu l-maʿlūmāta llatī takūna maḡhūlatan*) so that they become known by way of reasoning (*bi-r-rawiya*)”;<sup>55</sup> that is to say, by teaching us the art of definition and syllogism logic enables us to arrange *mental* entities in such a manner that subsequently – outside the realm of logic – we have the ability to conceptualize the quiddities of extra-mental entities and to analyze the truth of statements about extra-mental entities in a way which guarantees epistemological “certainty” (*yaqīn*).<sup>56</sup> As a side-effect, we will also gain the competence to detect weak or ill-formed definitions and arguments.

Notwithstanding this programmatic outline which unambiguously characterizes logic as a discipline dedicated to the study of *mental* entities, both the *Muḥtaṣar al-awsaṭ* and the *Manṭiq an-Naḡāt* proceed immediately to the investigation of “simple expressions” (*alfāz mufrada*). This thematic transition to the level of *linguistic* entities, which concurrently also marks the end of the close parallelism between the two works, is introduced as follows:

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bul Nuruosmaniye 2763, fol. 1b, l. 14; and Ibn Sīnā, *K. an-Naḡāt*, ed. Dānešpažūh, p. 7, ll. 11–12.

54 Ibn Sīnā, *al-Muḥtaṣar al-awsaṭ fi l-mantiq, al-Madḡal*, MS Istanbul Nuruosmaniye 2763, fol. 2a, ll. 4–6; Ibn Sīnā, *K. an-Naḡāt*, ed. Dānešpažūh, p. 8, ll. 8–10.

55 Ibn Sīnā, *al-Muḥtaṣar al-awsaṭ fi l-mantiq, al-Madḡal*, MS Istanbul Nuruosmaniye 2763, fol. 1b, ll. 9–10; Ibn Sīnā, *K. an-Naḡāt*, ed. Dānešpažūh, p. 7, ll. 6–7.

56 Ibn Sīnā, *al-Muḥtaṣar al-awsaṭ fi l-mantiq, al-Madḡal*, MS Istanbul Nuruosmaniye 2763, fol. 1b, l. 5 (the beginning of *Manṭiq Naḡāt* contains no reference *al-yaqīn*).

*al-Muḥtaṣar al-awsaṭ fi l-manṭiq*<sup>57</sup>

ولما كان الحدّ والقياس مؤلّفين من معاني والفاظ  
والعلم بالمفردات قبل العلم بالمؤلّفات، وجب أن  
يكون افتتاح الشروع في المنطق من تعليم  
المفردات.

Since the definition and the syllogism are compounded from meanings and expressions, and since the knowledge of simple entities precedes the knowledge of compound entities, the beginning of logic must open with the instruction of simple entities.

*Manṭiq an-Nağāt*<sup>58</sup>

لما كانت المحاطبات النظرية بألفاظ مؤلّفة والأفكار  
العقلية من أقوال عقلية مؤلّفة وكان المفرد قبل  
المؤلّف، وجب أن تتكلّم أولاً في اللفظ المفرد.

Since the [various] instances of theoretical speech come about through compound expressions, since the intelligible thoughts are made up of compound intelligible statements, and since the simple precedes the compound, we must talk first about the simple expression.

Against the background of Ibn Sīnā's initial insistence that logic is concerned with concepts inasmuch they allow the acquisition of new knowledge, neither the *Muḥtaṣar al-awsaṭ* nor the *Manṭiq an-Nağāt* appears to provide a sufficient explanation of why the logical investigations leading up to syllogistic mainly focus on *linguistic* phenomena: Whereas in the *Muḥtaṣar* simple concepts and simple expressions are juxtaposed as the two types of entities from which definitions and syllogisms are constructed, the *Nağāt* describes simple expressions as the basic units of speech and simple thoughts as the basic units of mental judgments.

### 1.2.2. An Intermediate Stage: Discussions of the Subject-Matter of Logic and of the Scope of the *Categories* in the *Šifā'* and in the *Ta'liqāt*

For an elaborate account of how the relation between mental and linguistic entities bears on the issues that need to be treated in logic, we have to turn to the *Madḥal* of the *Šifā'*. There, the gradual advance from the study of simple entities to the study of compound entities, on the one hand, and the fact that the logic curriculum offers an investigation of simple expressions in lieu of simple concepts, on the other hand, are explained as follows:

Since whatever is compounded (*mu'allaf*) is something whose nature cannot be known (*yastahīlu an tu'rafa tabī'atuhū*) when its simple parts (*basā'ituhā*) are un-

57 Ibn Sīnā, *al-Muḥtaṣar al-awsaṭ fi l-manṭiq, al-Madḥal*, MS Istanbul Nuruosmaniye 2763, fol. 2a, l. 17 – fol. 2b, l. 1 (= MS Istanbul Turhan Valide Sultan 213, fol. 3a, ll. 5–6).

58 Ibn Sīnā, *K. an-Nağāt*, ed. Dānešpažūh, p. 9, ll. 10–13.

known, it is appropriate that the knowledge of simple entities (*al-‘ilm bi-l-mufradāt*) precedes the knowledge of compound entities (*al-‘ilm bi-l-mu‘allafāt*). There are two manners in which simple entities (*mufradāt*) can be known: [1] One either knows them inasmuch as they are disposed in such a manner that from them the [kind of logical] composition that has been mentioned is brought about. [2] Or one knows them inasmuch as they are natures (*tabā‘i*) and [existing] things (*umūr*) to which that notion [i.e., the notion of being conducive to a logical composition] occurs. [...] The discipline of logic does not consider the simple entities from among these things (*mufradāt hādihī l-umūr*) inasmuch as they are in one of the two modes of existence (*min haytu hiya ‘alā aḥadi naḥway al-wuḡūd*), namely that which is in concrete things (*alladī fi l-a‘yān*) [i.e., *in re*] and that which is in the minds (*alladī fi l-aḍḥān*) [i.e., *in intellectu*]; nor does it consider the quiddities of things (*māhiyyāt al-ašyā‘*) inasmuch as they are quiddities (*min haytu hiya māhiyyāt*) but only inasmuch as they are predicates and subjects (*min haytu hiya maḥmūlāt wa-mawḏū‘āt*), universals and particulars (*kulliyyāt wa-ḡuz‘iyyāt*), and other such things which occur to these notions in the manner we have outlined above. As for the consideration of expressions, this is something to which necessity drives us. However, the logician inasmuch as he is a logician need not primarily occupy himself with linguistic expressions, except in the context of speech and dispute (*min ḡihat al-muḥātaba wa-l-muḥāwara*). And if it were possible for logic to be learned by means of a pure thought (*bi-fikratin sādiḡatin*) in which only the meanings would be regarded, this would be sufficient. [...] However, since necessity drives us to employing expressions and especially since it is impossible for the reasoning faculty to arrange meanings without imagining along with them their expressions – rather, reasoning is a confidential conversation between man and his mind by way of imagined expressions –, it follows that expressions have various modes on account of which there is a [corresponding] variety among the modes of whatever meanings in the soul correspond to them so that they [i.e., the meanings in the soul] attain [additional] qualifications which would not apply to them if there were no expressions. [...] Along with this necessity, giving an account of linguistic expressions which correspond to their meanings (*al-alfāz al-muḥābiqa li-ma‘ānihā*) is just like giving an account of their meanings, the only difference being that positing linguistic expressions is more practical.<sup>59</sup>

As has been discussed above, Ammonius justified the inclusion of the *Categories* in the logic curriculum by characterizing its scope with the three-dimensional formula “expressions (φωναί) which signify things (πράγματα) through mediating concepts (νοήματα).”<sup>60</sup> This suggests that for Ammonius a treatise which is primarily concerned with the study of *linguistic* entities inasmuch as they refer – via entities existing *in intellectu* – to entities existing *in re* may properly be regarded as falling within the realm of logic. Moreover, we have seen that

59 Ibn Sinā, *K. aš-Šifā‘, al-Manṭiq, al-Madḡal*, I,4, p. 21, l. 15 – p. 23, l. 4. Cf. Tony Street, “Arabic and Islamic Philosophy of Language and Logic,” section 2.1.2 (“Secondary Intelligibles”), text 7.

60 Ammonius, *In Categories*, p. 9, ll. 17–18 (emphasis added); cf. above, pp. 12–13.

Porphyry, Ibn Suwār and Ibn at-Ṭayyib, *inter alios*, insisted that the expressions treated in the *Categories* must be in the “primary imposition” (πρώτη θέσις / *al-waḍ‘ al-awwal*), thus taking the work to be a propaedeutic outline of the semantics of object-language expressions. Ibn Sīnā’s account radically departs from these approaches: For him the main focus of logic does not lie on a study of expressions – and even less on a study of expressions which signify *existing* things, regardless of whether an expression signifies something existing *in re* or *in intellectu*. Rather, since logic serves the purpose of enabling our mind to succeed in the transfer from things known to things unknown, its scope needs to be limited to second-order notions through which first-order notions can be arranged in an epistemologically fruitful manner. But since the human mind does not possess the ability to perform these mental acts of composition on the basis of simple mental entities only, we must – due to the secondary reasons of practicality and extrinsic necessity – also take into account linguistic entities which stand for the respective mental entities.<sup>61</sup>

However, this recourse to expressions, in turn, also has an effect on the concepts represented by them: The second-order notions which are applied to them for the sake of epistemological success would be different if the arrangement could be achieved by means of pure mental entities; thus, typical second-order notions, such as ‘functioning as a predicate’ or ‘functioning as a subject,’ point towards the language-dependency of the mental acts of composition. In the *Ilāhiyyāt* of the *Šifā’* the second-order notions which Ibn Sīnā introduces in *Madḥal* I,4 as the proper subject-matter of logic are labelled as “the secondary intelligible meanings (*al-ma‘ānī al-ma‘qūla at-tāniya*) which are based on the primary intelligible meanings (*allatī tastanidu ilā l-ma‘ānī al-ma‘qūla al-ūlā*)”; in this context, Ibn Sīnā once again stresses the fact that logic may study these notions only “with regard to how one can proceed through them from what is known to [knowledge of] what is unknown (*min ġihati kayfiyyati mā yutawaṣṣalu bihā min ma‘lūmin ilā maġhūlin*), not with regard to their being intelligible and their possessing intellectual existence (*al-wuġūd al-‘aqlī*).”<sup>62</sup> Thus, whereas

61 In the earlier Arabic tradition, the question of whether and in which way logic depends on language was at the heart of a famous controversy, that is, the debate between the logician Abū Bišr Mattā (d. 940 AD) and the grammarian Abū Sa‘īd as-Sirāfi (d. 368 AH / 979 AD) in 326 AH / 937–8 AD. Cf. Gerhard Endreß, “Grammatik und Logik: Arabische Philologie und griechische Philosophie im Widerstreit,” in *Sprachphilosophie in Antike und Mittelalter*, ed. Burkhard Mojsisch (Amsterdam: Grüner, 1986), pp. 163–299; and recently, Adamson/Key, “Philosophy of Language in the Medieval Arabic Tradition,” pp. 76–82.

62 Ibn Sīnā, *K. aš-Šifā’, al-Ilāhiyyāt (1)*, ed. Ğürġ Qanawātī and Sa‘īd Zāyid (Cairo: al-Hay‘a al-‘amma li-šū‘un al-maṭābi‘ al-amīriyya, 1960 [1380 AH]), I,2, p. 10, l. 17 – p. 11, l. 2. Cf.

Ibn Sīnā unmistakably excludes the possibility that linguistic expressions and concrete existents – that is to say, φωναί or λέξεις and ὄντα or πράγματα – may under a certain regard be seen as the primary issues of a logical treatise proper, intelligible concepts fall under the subject-matter of logic only inasmuch as they serve a narrowly defined epistemological purpose. It is merely for secondary reasons that logic deals with linguistic entities inasmuch as they stand for these kinds of mental entities.

Immediately after having given this exposition of the subject-matter of logic in *Madḥal* I,4, Ibn Sīnā turns to a rejection of the second part of al-Fārābī's double formula: That is to say, whereas al-Fārābī's definition of the subject-matter of logic includes both "intelligibles (*ma'qūlāt*), inasmuch as the expressions signify them," and "expressions (*alfāz*), inasmuch as they signify the intelligibles,"<sup>63</sup> Ibn Sīnā discards the idea that logic may – in a very general sense – be seen as a discipline that studies "expressions inasmuch as they signify meanings." The critical assessment of previous discussions of the scope of the *Categories*, which Ibn Sīnā undertakes in chapter I,1 of the *Maqūlāt* of the *Šifā'*, must be read against the background of this preceding account of the subject-matter of logic.

Whereas Simplicius, as we have seen above, rejected any one-dimensional reading of the *Categories* on the grounds that beings *qua* beings, concepts *qua* concepts, and expressions *qua* expressions are to be studied in ontology, psychology, and grammar, respectively,<sup>64</sup> Ibn Sīnā in *Maqūlāt* I,1 takes up this line of reasoning. However, he utilizes it for the sake of arguing that the ten *summa genera* need not be studied in logic at all. Rather, the three relevant aspects under which a scientific investigation of the *summa genera* can possibly be undertaken all pertain to other disciplines:

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Sabra, "Avicenna on the Subject Matter of Logic," p. 753; and Street, "Arabic and Islamic Philosophy of Language and Logic," section 2.1.2 ("Secondary Intelligibles"), text 5.

63 Al-Fārābī, *Iḥṣā' al-'ulūm*, ed. Amīn 1968, p. 74, ll. 10–12; cf. above, pp. 17–18.

64 See above, p. 12.

**Ibn Sīnā, *K. aš-Šifāʾ*,  
*al-Manṭiq, al-Maqūlāt*, I,1<sup>65</sup>**

**Simplicius, *In Categoriae*<sup>66</sup>**

- |         |   |  |                     |
|---------|---|--|---------------------|
| 5,7–9   | Knowing whether these things are to be characterized as genera ( <i>tūṣafu bi-l-ġinisyya</i> ) is not more necessary for him [i.e., the logician] than knowing whether other things are characterized as species ( <i>tūṣafu bi-n-nawʿiyya</i> ). Rather, [a] knowing these [states] with regard to how they exist ( <i>kayfiyyat al-wuġūd</i> ) pertains to first philosophy ( <i>al-falsafa al-ūlā</i> ); | They say that the scope concerns the very beings (ὄντα) which are signified by linguistic expressions. [...] In opposition to these considerations too, however, is [the fact that] the present book is a part of the study of logic, whereas to occupy oneself with beings <i>qua</i> beings is to engage in that philosophy which is metaphysical, and in general primary. | 9,22–23;<br>9,28–30 |
| 5,9–10  | [b] knowing these [states] with regard to the fact that the soul conceptualizes them ( <i>taṣawwur an-nafs lahā</i> ) pertains to a fringe area of natural philosophy which is close to first philosophy [i.e., psychology];  | Others say that the scope concerns neither significant (σημαίνουσαι) expressions (φωναί) nor signified (σημαινόμενα) things (πράγματα), but rather simple concepts (νοήματα). [...] These people, however, should have considered that to speak about concepts <i>qua</i> concepts does not pertain to the study of logic, but rather to that of the soul (περὶ ψυχῆς).      | 9,31–32;<br>10,4–5  |
| 5,10–11 | [c] and knowing that they demand expressions which are applied to them pertains to the discipline of the lexicographers ( <i>šināʿat al-luġawiyyin</i> ).   | Now, some say that they are expressions (φωναί), and that the scope concerns simple (ἀπλᾶί) expressions, and that it is the first part of logic. [...] Others, however, do not accept this scope. It does not, they say, pertain to the philosopher to theorize about expressions, but rather to the grammarian (γραμματικός).   | 9,8–9;<br>9,19–21   |

Ibn Sīnā especially rejects the idea that a logical investigation of the ten categories could be completely separated from the ontological dimension. While the

65 Ibn Sīnā, *K. aš-Šifāʾ*, *al-Manṭiq, al-Maqūlāt*, ed. Ibrāhīm Madkūr (Cairo: al-Hayʾa al-ʿamma li-šūʿn al-maṭābiʿ al-amīriyya, 1959 [1378 AH]), I,1, p. 5, ll. 7–11 [= § 8 of my translation in part B of this chapter (1.B.a)].

66 Simplicius, *In Categoriae*, p. 9, l. 8 – p. 10, l. 5; English tr. by Chase, pp. 24–25 (significantly modified).

preceding “validating logicians” (*al-mantiqiyyūna al-muḥaṣṣilūna*) thought that they had achieved such a distinction by viewing the *Categories* as a treatise which studies “the natures of the existents” (*ṭabā‘i’ al-mawǧūdāt*) only “inasmuch as they are signified by simple expressions,” Ibn Sīnā deems this formula to be futile. Rather, as soon as we classify one of the ten *summa genera* as substance and nine of them as accidents, we have, according to Ibn Sīnā, already transgressed the boundaries of logic and entered the area of metaphysics. For “the proofs (*al-barāhīn*) which confirm that these nine are accidents” cannot be derived from the mere fact that “they are signified by simple expressions” but ultimately amount to “proofs which point towards the states of their existence.”<sup>67</sup> Thus, when some preceding scholars claim that a classification of existents inasmuch as they are signified by expressions is not an ontological investigation, this is, to Ibn Sīnā’s mind, idle talk. Instead, the linguistic dimension will need to be taken into account when the ten categories are studied in metaphysics: Since every “true nature” (*ḥaqīqa*) of something existing *in re* has a corresponding linguistic expression, and since every scientific investigation – in one way or another – depends on the vehicle of language, an ontological study of the various kinds of existents inasmuch as they are existents will always have to pay attention to the linguistic framework in which it is carried out.<sup>68</sup> Any attempt at isolating an aspect under which the ten *summa genera* could exclusively be studied in logic merely results in “a hair-splitting issue, a petty outcome and an obscure distinction.”<sup>69</sup> To make matters worse, the study of the *Categories* in logic is not only of little use but may – for pedagogical reasons – even turn out to be “detrimental.”<sup>70</sup> *Ideally*, the student should simply accept everything he is taught in this treatise without demanding a demonstrative proof for its far-fetched claims, especially for the doctrine that any existent signified by a simple expression must fall under one out of ten highest genera which are genera in the proper sense – i.e., which apply to their species synonymously – and which, in turn, can be classified into the genus of ‘substance’ and into nine genera which are accidents.<sup>71</sup> *In fact*, however, the proleptic exposure to intricate ontological doctrines has led many a student to ponder on issues “whose verification [...] cannot be undertaken in this book.” As a consequence, the tradition of viewing the *Categories* as a propaedeutic treatise and of placing it at the beginning of the logic curriculum – which is a custom that Ibn Sīnā traces back to

67 Ibn Sīnā, *K. aš-Šifā’, al-Mantiq, al-Maqūlāt*, I,1, p. 7, ll. 9–13 [= § 14 (1.B.a)].

68 Ibn Sīnā, *K. aš-Šifā’, al-Mantiq, al-Maqūlāt*, I,1, p. 7, ll. 14–18 [= § 14 (1.B.a)].

69 Ibn Sīnā, *K. aš-Šifā’, al-Mantiq, al-Maqūlāt*, I,1, p. 8, ll. 2–3 [= § 15 (1.B.a)].

70 Ibn Sīnā, *K. aš-Šifā’, al-Mantiq, al-Maqūlāt*, I,1, p. 8, l. 11 [= § 16 (1.B.a)].

71 Ibn Sīnā, *K. aš-Šifā’, al-Mantiq, al-Maqūlāt*, I,1, p. 6, l. 7 – p. 7, l. 7 [= § 13 (1.B.a)].

an ancient pre-Aristotelian convention<sup>72</sup> – is accompanied by the danger that “phantasies remote from the truth” will trigger false beliefs. As soon as they will be firmly “inscribed” onto the “tablet” (*lawḥ*) of the student’s “intellect” (*‘aql*), these pre-mature ontological convictions will, in the further course of studies, be mixed with proper ontological doctrines – and the result will be utter confusion.<sup>73</sup> Even though Ibn Sīnā does not specify which doctrines he has in mind, his subsequent critique of the ontological conclusions which have been drawn from the fourfold scheme of predicative relations outlined in *Cat.* 2 points towards a likely candidate.<sup>74</sup>

To avoid these difficulties and to make sure all issues treated in logic strictly serve its epistemological purpose, Ibn Sīnā prefers a reformed logic curriculum in which the function that had traditionally been ascribed to the *Categories*, i.e., a study of simple expressions needed for the sake of logical compositions, is completely fulfilled by the *Isagoge*. For the sake of composing proper definitions and proper syllogisms the logician exigently needs to know whether an expression is used in a universal (*kullī*) or in a particular (*ḡuzʿī*) manner, and whether, in relation to what it applies to, it is essential (*dātī*) or accidental (*‘araḍī*). While the five predicables which classify simple universal expressions on the basis of their essentiality and accidentality are “conducive to the knowledge of compound expressions,”<sup>75</sup> the only benefit that could be derived from investigating the ten categories within logic does not outweigh the potential harm: Since a study of expressions inasmuch as they signify beings yields a “comprehensive understanding of things,” the student will have a chance to sharpen his ability of bringing up appropriate examples from the realm of whatever exists.<sup>76</sup> However, given the fact that an exclusion of the *Categories* from the logic curriculum will

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72 As al-Ḥasan b. Suwār’s *Marginal Annotations on the Categories* attest, the ancient pseudo-epigraphic tradition according to which Archytas of Tarentum had written a treatise entitled *Categories* prior to Aristotle must have been well-known among Arabic philosophers. For Ibn Suwār’s reference to *Arḥūtas* and to his *Kitāb fi l-Maqūlāt*, see ed. Badawī, vol. 1, p. 80, l. 13; ed. Ġabr, vol. 1, note, p. 18, ll. 21–22; MS Paris ar. 2346, fol. 157a, l. 41. There can be little doubt that Ibn Sīnā has this alleged pre-Aristotelian treatise in mind when he refers to the “convention and tradition” (*al-waḍʿ wa-t-taqlīd*) which Aristotle supposedly followed in composing the *Categories*; see Ibn Sīnā, *K. aš-Šifāʿ, al-Manṭiq, al-Maqūlāt*, I,1, p. 6, l. 10 [= § 11 (1.B.a)]. For Simplicius’ reference to Archytas, cf. below, pp. 152–153. For an edition and translation of Ps.-Archytas’ treatise on the categories, as well as an extensive introduction and commentary, see Thomas Alexander Szlezák, *Pseudo-Archytas über die Kategorien* (Berlin: De Gruyter, 1972).

73 Ibn Sīnā, *K. aš-Šifāʿ, al-Manṭiq, al-Maqūlāt*, I,1, p. 8, ll. 11–15 [= § 16 (1.B.a)].

74 Cf. below, chapter 2.

75 Ibn Sīnā, *K. aš-Šifāʿ, al-Manṭiq, al-Maqūlāt*, I,1, p. 3, ll. 10–12 [= § 2 (1.B.a)].

76 Ibn Sīnā, *K. aš-Šifāʿ, al-Manṭiq, al-Maqūlāt*, I,1, p. 5, ll. 17–18 [= § 10 (1.B.a)].



not give rise to any “noteworthy shortcoming,”<sup>77</sup> as soon as the student of logic has come to know the predicables, i.e., the contents of Porphyry’s *Isagoge*, he may immediately turn to an introductory investigation of name (*ism*) and verb (*kalima*) and of propositions (*qaḍāya*), i.e., the contents of Aristotle’s *De Interpretatione*, before becoming acquainted with the various types of syllogisms (*qiyāsāt*) and definitions (*taḥdīdāt*).<sup>78</sup>

In the *Maqūlāt* of the *Šifā’* Ibn Sīnā draws a clear-cut distinction between two types of “states” (*aḥwāl*) in which one can regard “simple expressions” (*alfāz mufrada*): Inasmuch as they are one of the five predicables, that is to say, inasmuch as they are used in a specific context of predication; and “inasmuch as they signify” things existing *in re* or *in intellectu*, that is to say, inasmuch as they signify a certain meaning from the realm of individuals, species or *summa genera*, irrespective of the specific predicative context. Since any consideration of whichever existent an expression signifies *per se* – regardless of whether the existent may have a lower or higher degree of particularity or universality – falls outside the scope of logic, there is no need to dedicate a separate logical treatise to the study of simple expressions inasmuch as they signify *summa genera*.<sup>79</sup>

In a remarkable passage from the *Ta’līqāt*, which has not received any scholarly attention yet and which can be read as a neat explanatory supplement both to *Madḥal* I,4 and *Maqūlāt* I,1, Ibn Sīnā revisits this distinction: All “simple expressions” (*alfāz mufrada*), first of all, have “states” (*aḥwāl*) on account of which they “signify what they mean,” e.g., “the expression ‘substance’ signifying whatever it signifies and ‘quantity’ signifying whatever it signifies,” that is to say, an expression inasmuch as it signifies anything from among the ten categories. But, in the second place, there are “states” (*aḥwāl*) which they can only acquire “inasmuch as they are intellected (*ma’qūla*) and conceptualized (*mutaṣawwar*), not inasmuch as they are existents (*lā min ḥaytu hiya mawǧūda*),” i.e., not inasmuch as they exist “in concrete things” (*fī l-a’yān*). Ibn Sīnā’s formulation points to his assumption of a strict correspondence between *alfāz* and *ma’ānī*: It is, of course, not the linguistic expressions which do or do not exist *in re* but the meanings signified by them. At the same time, Ibn Sīnā makes it clear that only the latter type, that is “considerations” (*i’tibārāt*) such as “universality and particularity, essentiality and accidentality” which occur to a

77 Ibn Sīnā, *K. aš-Šifā’*, *al-Mantiq, al-Maqūlāt*, I,1, p. 5, l. 6 [= § 8 (1.B.a)].

78 Ibn Sīnā, *K. aš-Šifā’*, *al-Mantiq, al-Maqūlāt*, I,1, p. 5, ll. 1–5 [= § 7 (1.B.a)].

79 Ibn Sīnā, *K. aš-Šifā’*, *al-Mantiq, al-Maqūlāt*, I,1, p. 4, ll. 10–21 [= §§ 5–6 (1.B.a)].

given meaning solely inasmuch as it “exists as an intelligible” (*mawǧūdun ma‘qūlan*), pertains to the subject-matter of logic.<sup>80</sup>

In this context, Ibn Sīnā introduces some important specifications concerning the conditions under which these “secondary intelligibles” (*al-ma‘qūlāt at-tāniya*) are to be investigated either in metaphysics or in logic: While “establishing” (*itbāt*) whether and in which manner the secondary intelligibles have existence is the task of an ontological investigation, the logician studies secondary intelligibles only under the aspect of proceeding through them “from what is known to what is unknown” (*min ma‘lūmin ilā maǧhūlin*). Furthermore, while the fact that a universal can exist as a genus, a differentia, a species, a proprium and a general accident can only be established in metaphysics, logic is concerned both with the study of universals which *are* genera, differentiae, species, propria and general accidents, and with elucidating the “quiddity” (*māhiyya*), the “concomitants” (*lawāzim*) and the “essential accidents” (*a‘rād dātiyya*) of any such universal.<sup>81</sup>

Strictly speaking, the five predicables are not introduced as secondary intelligibles themselves but rather as “conditions” (*šarā’it*) on account of which a certain type of secondary intelligibles qualifies as a subject studied in logic. That is to say, whereas “body” and “animal” are “primary intelligibles” (*ma‘qūlāt uwal*), their being “universal” (*kulliyya*) and their being “particular and individual” (*ǧuz’iyya wa-šaḥṣiyya*) are “secondary intelligibles” (*ma‘qūlāt tāniya*). However, the notion of being universal is a secondary intelligible which can only fulfill an epistemologically fruitful function if it meets the additional condition of being considered as one of the five predicables or of being considered in the “modes” (*ǧihāt*) of being “necessary” (*wāǧib*), being “absolute” (*muṭlaq*), and being “possible” (*mumkin*).<sup>82</sup> In introducing the modalities of propositions as another type of conditions on account of which secondary intelligibles become the subject-matter of logic, Ibn Sīnā once again stresses the clear-cut division of tasks between metaphysics and logic: While the former discipline establishes the existence of necessity and contingency, the latter defines what it means for a universal to hold by way of necessity or by way of contingency.<sup>83</sup>

What is more, in the *Ta’liqāt* Ibn Sīnā relates the two types of conditions that render a secondary intelligible epistemologically productive to the two

80 Ibn Sīnā, *at-Ta’liqāt*, ed. Seyyed Ḥoseyn Mūsaviyān [Seyyed Hossein Mousavian] (Teheran: Mo’assase-ye pažūhešī-ye ḥekmat va-falsafe-ye Īrān / Iranian Institute of Philosophy, 2013 [1391 SH]), no. 924, p. 507, ll. 2–9 [= §§ 11–12 (1.B.c)].

81 Ibn Sīnā, *at-Ta’liqāt*, ed. Mūsaviyān, no. 919, p. 502, l. 4 – p. 503, l. 3 [= § 1 (1.B.c)]; and no. 922, p. 506, ll. 5–7 [= § 9 (1.B.c)].

82 Ibn Sīnā, *at-Ta’liqāt*, ed. Mūsaviyān, no. 919, p. 503, ll. 3–7 [= § 2 (1.B.c)].

83 Ibn Sīnā, *at-Ta’liqāt*, ed. Mūsaviyān, no. 919, p. 504, l. 9 [= § 4 (1.B.c)].

fundamental types of knowledge which in the *Muḥtaṣar al-awsaṭ* and in the *Nağāt* had been the point of departure of his definition of the subject-matter of logic: Whereas considering a universal *qua* genus, *qua* species, *qua* differentia, *qua* proprium, and *qua* general accident is especially useful for the sake of succeeding in the “conceptualization” (*taṣawwur*) of any given quiddity, considering a universal inasmuch as it holds necessarily or possibly is conducive to “acknowledging the truth” (*taṣdīq*) of any given proposition.<sup>84</sup>

As we have seen, in his programmatic outlines concerning the “subject-matter of logic” (*mawḍū‘ al-manṭiq*) and “the scope of the *Categories*” (*ğaraḍ al-maqūlāt*) presented in the *Madḥal* and the *Maqūlāt* of the *K. aš-Šifā‘* and in some supplementary notes from the *Ta‘liqāt*, Ibn Sīnā advocates a fundamental restructuring of the logic curriculum. In the philosophical *summae* he composed or compiled thereafter, particularly in the logic parts of *K. an-Nağāt*, *al-Ḥikma al-mašriqiyya* and *al-Išārāt wa-t-tanbihāt*, this program will be put into practice.

### 1.2.3. Implementation of a Reform Program: A Glimpse at the Exclusion of the *Categories* from the Logic of *al-Išārāt wa-t-tanbihāt*

Whereas in the *Šifā‘* Ibn Sīnā, as we have seen, still deemed it necessary to argue at length why Aristotle’s *Categories* should rather not be studied as a treatise of logical propaedeutics, the *manṭiq* section of *al-Išārāt wa-t-tanbihāt* refrains from dedicating any thematic unit to the *Maqūlāt* – and does not, in fact, make any explicit reference the categories at all. Already in the opening passages it becomes clear that Ibn Sīnā’s concise account of the “scope of logic” (*ğaraḍ al-manṭiq*) leaves no room for a comprehensive inclusion of the issues treated in Aristotle’s *Categories* and in the commentatorial traditions it had generated. Ibn Sīnā sketches four thematic units which ought to be studied in logic: (1) “the kinds of transfers (*ḍurūb al-intiqālāt*) from things attained in man’s mind to those things whose attainment is yet desired (*umūr mustaḥṣila*)”; (2) “the states of these things” (*aḥwāl hādihī l-umūr*); (3) “the number of the types in which the arrangement and form of the transfer is carried out in a valid way (*‘alā l-istiqāma*)”; and (4) the number of the types in which the arrangement and form are invalid.<sup>85</sup> Shortly afterwards, Ibn Sīnā adds the following specification: Since logic serves a clearly defined purpose, namely an investigation of how “simple entities” (*al-mufradāt*) can be combined with one another in such a manner that man gains knowledge of things previously unknown, the logician need not be

84 Ibn Sīnā, *at-Ta‘liqāt*, ed. Mūsaviyān, no. 919, p. 505, ll. 3–8 [= § 5 (1.B.c)].

85 Ibn Sīnā, *al-Išārāt wa-t-tanbihāt*, ed. Muğtabā az-Zāri‘ī (Qom: Būstān-e Ketāb, 2008 [1387 SH]), p. 39, l. 9 – p. 40, l. 1.

come acquainted with “simple entities” (*al-mufradāt*) “in every regard” (*lā min kulli wağhin*), but only inasmuch as it becomes possible for a certain “arrangement” (*tartīb*) and “composition” (*ta’līf*) to occur to simple entities. Therefore, according to Ibn Sīnā, the logician only needs to consider “some of the states of simple notions” (*aḥwāl min aḥwāl al-ma’ānī*) before being able to investigate “the states of composition” (*aḥwal at-ta’līf*).<sup>86</sup>

In the second *išāra* of the second *nahğ* Ibn Sīnā provides us with yet another hint of why the *Categories* ought not to be treated within the logical curriculum. Having presented the proper definition of a logical genus and of a logical species, Ibn Sīnā addresses the question of the arrangement of genera and species: While he deems it necessary for the logician to know that the ascending order of genera and the descending order of species may not go on *ad infinitum*, the question which notions ultimately figure as the highest genera and lowest species does not need to be clarified within logic. Just as it is not upon the logician to investigate the number and the quiddities of the intermediate genera and species or of the lowest species, he likewise should refrain from doing so with regard to the highest genera. Instead of pondering over the question of where the genera ultimately “terminate” (*ilā māḍā yantahī*), the logician should content himself with knowing quite generally “that there are highest genera which are the genera of genera (*ağnās al-ağnās*); that there are lowest species (*anwā’ sāfila*) which are the species of species (*anwā’ al-anwā’*); that there are intermediate things which are genera with regard to that which is below them and species with regard to that which is above them”; and, finally, that each of them has certain “characteristic properties” (*ḥawāṣṣ*);<sup>87</sup> that is to say, he should, at least, be able to distinguish a genus from a species, as Ibn Sīnā had clarified in the preceding *išāra*. But whoever investigates “the quantity” (*kammiyya*) and the “quiddities” (*māhiyyāt*) of “the genera of genera” (*ağnās al-ağnās*) – and whoever assumes that this is more important for the logic curriculum than studying the quantity and quiddities of the numerous intermediate and lowest genera – departs from “what is necessary” (*al-wāğib*). Just like in *al-Maqūlāt* I,1 of the *Šifā’*, Ibn Sīnā once again stresses the fact that such a faulty manner of proceeding causes the mind to go astray.<sup>88</sup> Even though the treatise is not referred to by name, rejecting both the necessity and possibility of conducting within logic a thorough investigation of the highest genera amounts to a straightforward justification of why the *Categories* has been excluded from the reformed logic curriculum which Ibn Sīnā presents in the *Išārāt*.

86 Ibn Sīnā, *al-Išārāt wa-t-tanbihāt*, ed. az-Zāri’i, p. 40, ll. 3–7.

87 Ibn Sīnā, *al-Išārāt wa-t-tanbihāt*, ed. az-Zāri’i, p. 58, ll. 5–10.

88 Ibn Sīnā, *al-Išārāt wa-t-tanbihāt*, ed. az-Zāri’i, p. 58, ll. 11–13.

### 1.3. The Aftermath of Ibn Sīnā's Understanding of the Scope of the *Categories*

#### 1.3.1. In the Footsteps of Ibn Sīnā: Faḥr ad-Dīn ar-Rāzī's Exclusion of the *Categories* from Logic

Just as Ibn Sīnā's reform project may be characterized as critical Aristotelianism, Faḥr ad-Dīn ar-Rāzī's engagement with Ibn Sīnā's philosophy can aptly be labelled as critical Avicennism.<sup>89</sup> Especially ar-Rāzī's *Šarḥ al-Išārāt wa-t-tanbihāt* is, without a doubt, a critical commentary in the best sense of the word. However, when it comes to those passages in which Ibn Sīnā hints at the exclusion of the *Categories* from the logic curriculum, Faḥr ad-Dīn ar-Rāzī gladly follows Ibn Sīnā's revision of the Aristotelian *Organon*. As a matter of fact, in his *Šarḥ al-Išārāt* ar-Rāzī makes some instructive efforts at explaining and corroborating Ibn Sīnā's view on the *Categories*.<sup>90</sup>

As we have seen, Ibn Sīnā opens the *manṭiq* section of the *Išārāt* by stating, *inter alia*, that the logician ought to study the "states" (*aḥwāl*) of those things which enable his mind to proceed from the known to the unknown. It is precisely the short expression "the states of these things" (*aḥwāl hādihī l-umūr*) which receives great attention in ar-Rāzī's commentary on this passage<sup>91</sup> – and which prompts him to present a concise account of Ibn Sīnā's understanding of the subject-matter of logic. Without using the specific term here, ar-Rāzī deems the context appropriate for an exposition of the doctrine of "secondary intelligibles": When using the qualifying expression "the states of these things" Ibn Sīnā wants us to understand that "the quiddities present in the mind" (*al-māhiyyātu l-ḥādiratu fī d-dihn*) are "not in every respect disposed to man's acquisition of knowledge of the unknown" (*hiya ḡayru musta'iddatin min kulli l-wuḡūhi li-ifādati l-ilmī bi-l-maḡhūl*). Rather, this "disposition" (*isti'dād*) only comes about by certain "accidents" (*awāriḍ*) which are attached to the quiddities of things in the mind, such as "essentiality" (*ad-dātiyya*), "accidentality" (*al-aradiyya*), "being

89 Cf. below, p. 38, note 106.

90 In reading Faḥr ad-Dīn ar-Rāzī's *Šarḥ al-Išārāt wa-t-tanbihāt* my main source was MS Berlin or. oct. 1802, which – as one of only a few manuscripts – contains the entire *manṭiq* part and which abruptly ends in the midst of *namaṭ 2*, chapter 17 of the *ḥikma* part. I have constantly compared the version transmitted in this manuscript to the corresponding passages of 'Alī Reżā Naḡafzāde's edition of the logic part of the *Šarḥ al-Išārāt* (Teheran: Anḡoman-e Āṭār va-Mofāḡer-e Farhangī, 2005 [1384 SH / 1426 AH], vol. 1), which does not refer to the Berlin MS.

91 Ar-Rāzī, *Šarḥ al-Išārāt wa-t-tanbihāt*, MS Berlin or. oct. 1802, fol. 7b, l. 12 – fol. 8a, l. 7; ed. Naḡafzāde, p. 18, ll. 1–13.

a predicate” (*al-maḥmūliyya*), “being a subject” (*al-mawḍū‘iyya*), “being a genus” (*al-ġinsiyya*), and “being a differentia” (*al-faṣliyya*). According to ar-Rāzī’s commentary – which, in this passage, closely resembles some of Ibn Sīnā’s remarks in the first chapter of the *Maqūlāt* of the *K. aṣ-Šifā’* – an investigation of the quiddities with regard to their being genera and differentiae is useful for the logician since these allow him to obtain the “parts of definitions” (*aġzā’ li-l-ḥudūd*); and, in the same vein, knowledge of whether ‘being a predicate’ or ‘being a subject’ is attached to a thing’s quiddity enables the logician to determine its function as part of an “argument” (*ḥuġġa*). Yet, all these accidental properties which make the things’ quiddities disposed for the reasoning process – that is, for the transfer from the known to the unknown – are already sufficiently treated in the *Isagoge* (*Kitāb Īsāġūġī*). At the same time, for ar-Rāzī there can be no doubt that the *Kitāb Qāṭiġūriyās* is exclusively an ontological investigation of the “true natures of things” (*ḥaqā’iq al-umūr*). Against this background, he concludes his commentary on this passage by clarifying that, as a consequence, already in the opening chapter of the *Iṣārāt* Ibn Sīnā took care to formulate the scope of logic in a way which would exclude the *Categories* right away:

Since the *Šayḥ* believed that the *Book of Categories* does not belong to logic (*lammā kāna š-Šayḥu ya’taqidu anna kitāba Qāṭiġūriyās laysa mina l-mantiq*) he did, of course, state that logic investigates the transfers and those states of things from which the transfers come about (*lā ġarama dakara anna l-mantiqa yabḥatu ‘ani l-intiqālāti wa-‘an aḥwāli l-umūri llatī ‘anhā l-intiqālāt*), without stating that logic investigates those things in which those states are (*wa-lam yaḍkur anna l-mantiqa yabḥatu ‘an tilka l-umūri llatī fihā tilka l-aḥwāl*).<sup>92</sup>

Moreover, ar-Rāzī underpins Ibn Sīnā’s view that the logician needs to become acquainted with “simple entities” (*al-mufradāt*) only inasmuch as they are conducive to an epistemologically fruitful “arrangement” (*tartīb*) and “composition” (*ta’lif*) by offering a modified version of the Aristotelian example of the relationship between the builder and the material he uses for constructing a house:

The builder (*al-bānī*) needs to investigate the simple things from which the house is constructed, namely wood, bricks and stone, only inasmuch as they have the disposition (*musta’idda*) to accept the form of ‘houseness’ (*aṣ-šūra al-baytiyya*), not in all respects. For inasmuch as he is a builder he does not need to know whether the brick is compounded of indivisible parts or not and whether it is compounded of matter and form.<sup>93</sup>

92 Ar-Rāzī, *Šarḥ al-Iṣārāt wa-t-tanbihāt*, MS Berlin or. oct. 1802, fol. 8a, ll. 4–7; ed. Naġafzāde, p. 18, ll. 10–13.

93 Ar-Rāzī, *Šarḥ al-Iṣārāt wa-t-tanbihāt*, MS Berlin or. oct. 1802, fol. 8b, ll. 6–10; ed. Naġafzāde, p. 20, ll. 3–7.

Ar-Rāzī is aware of the fact that previous logicians did not merely hold that within logic one may investigate simple entities in just any regard but that there were various attempts at determining a specific aspect under which this could and should be done.<sup>94</sup> Yet, in sharp contrast to the justification efforts for the inclusion of the *Categories* into the logical curriculum presented by Ibn Sīnā's Aristotelian forerunners and contemporaries, ar-Rāzī is not interested in the question of whether simple things themselves could also be investigated in a non-ontological way in order to fit into the *Organon* as a useful preparatory or auxiliary means for logical and linguistic investigations. For as soon as logic is understood as a clearly defined discipline which may not just treat any linguistic and mental entities that might be of interest for other sciences but which, ultimately, addresses only those aspects which contribute *stricto sensu* to the construction of valid arguments and the acquisition of certain knowledge, the question must be reversed: Rather than asking how the traditional inclusion of the *Categories* could be justified one needs to ask whether or not the logician – for the sake of being a successful logician – exigently needs to become acquainted with an ontologically grounded classification scheme of simple beings. Ar-Rāzī's answer to this question once again closely follows Ibn Sīnā:

The investigation of the realities and true natures (*ḥaqā'iq wa-ṭabā'i'*) of these things, of how they are divided (*kayfiyyāt inqisāmihā*) into their species, and of their characteristic properties (*ḥawāṣṣ*) is extrinsic to logic (*ḥārīḡun 'ani l-mantiq*); indeed, the logician would not benefit from that at all, except that he would become able to adduce many examples with regard to every field of investigation (*irād al-amṭila al-kaṭīra fī kullī bābin*).<sup>95</sup>

Quite clearly, ar-Rāzī comments upon the beginning of the logic of the *Iṣārāt* with a very strong paraphrastic recourse to the first chapter of the *K. al-Maḡūlāt* of the *Šifā'* where Ibn Sīnā had presented his most pronounced arguments for excluding the *Categories* from logic. This indicates that – at least in this passage – ar-Rāzī's role as a commentator is one of filling in the gaps by means of offering more elaborate Avicennian material from other sources. In his commentatorial practice ar-Rāzī views the *Šifā'* as a necessary complement to the reduced manner of exposition characteristic for the *Iṣārāt*. This suggests that ar-Rāzī did

94 Cf. ar-Rāzī, *Šarḥ al-Iṣārāt wa-t-tanbīhāt*, MS Berlin or. oct. 1802, fol. 8b, ll. 10–11; ed. Naḡafzāde, p. 20, ll. 8–10: “Those who assume that the *Book of Categories* belongs to logic (*allaḡīna yaḡ'alūna kitāba l-Maḡūlāti mina l-mantiq*) argue that logic investigates the composition (*tarkīb*) of simple things (*mufradāt*) under a specific aspect (*'an ḡiha maḡṣūša*) and that, therefore, it is indispensable to become acquainted with these simple things which are the highest genera.”

95 Ar-Rāzī, *Šarḥ al-Iṣārāt wa-t-tanbīhāt*, MS Berlin or. oct. 1802, fol. 8b, ll. 15–17; ed. Naḡafzāde, p. 20, ll. 12–15.

not read these sections of the *Iṣārāt* as a departure from Ibn Sīnā's earlier writings but rather as a concise recapitulation (or even perfection) of Ibn Sīnā's previous efforts of reassessing the Aristotelian tradition. Furthermore, it is not only of interest that this part of the commentary draws on material from the *Šifā'*, but, all the more, that it draws on material from the *K. al-Maqūlāt* of the *Šifā'*. Even though the categories are not even mentioned by Ibn Sīnā in the passages under consideration, ar-Rāzī – being well-acquainted with the previous philosophical discourse – cannot help but read between the lines the old controversies and hence deems it necessary to explain the new approach offered by the *Iṣārāt* in light of Ibn Sīnā's earlier, more traditional mode of exposition. In all those passages in which ar-Rāzī thinks that the *Iṣārāt* are not explicit enough about the exclusion of the *Categories* he reads the much more elaborate remarks from the *Maqūlāt* of the *Šifā'* into the text of the *Iṣārāt*.

In his commentary on the second *iṣāra* of the second *naḥḡ*, ar-Rāzī does not present any additional arguments with regard to the exclusion of the *Categories*. Rather, he makes the short remark that the preceding sections have already sufficiently shown that the “true natures of these highest genera” (*ḥaqā'iq tilka l-aḡnās al-‘āliya*) should not be dealt with in logic.<sup>96</sup> Moreover, he reminds us why the logician may not assume an infinite chain of genera:

That the genera have a terminal point has already been clarified inasmuch as a genus is constituted by a differentia (*min ḥaytu anna l-ḡinsa mutaqaawwimun bi-l-faṣl*); if the [order of] genera did not have a terminal point (*law kānat al-aḡnās ḡayr mutanāhiya*), likewise the [order of] differentiae would not have a terminal point; hence, there would be infinitely many causes and things caused (*‘ilal wa-ma‘lūlāt ḡayr mutanāhiya*).<sup>97</sup>

As Faḥr ad-Dīn ar-Rāzī's commentary on these passages from the logic of the *Iṣārāt* shows, ar-Rāzī clearly supports Ibn Sīnā's position that both with regard to pedagogical and epistemological considerations the *Categories* should not be part of the logic curriculum. Not even an investigation of the categories under the aspect of their being highest genera – and hence being intrinsically connected to a logical theory of definition – would justify their treatment at this stage of the curriculum. There can be no doubt that ar-Rāzī's commitment to a strict ontological reading of the *Categories* – as opposed to earlier Neoplatonic attempts at de-ontologizing Aristotle's scheme of ten highest genera – must be attributed to Ibn Sīnā's forceful effort to exclude this treatise from the revised

96 Ar-Rāzī, *Šarḥ al-Iṣārāt wa-t-tanbihāt*, MS Berlin or. oct. 1802, fol. 36b (or.), ll. 6–8; ed. Naḡafzāde, p. 97, ll. 1–2.

97 Ar-Rāzī, *Šarḥ al-Iṣārāt wa-t-tanbihāt*, MS Berlin or. oct. 1802, fol. 36b (or.), ll. 4–6; ed. Naḡafzāde, p. 96, l. 14 – p. 97, l. 1. On the infinite regress of differentiae, see below, p. 232.



logic curriculum. At the same time, however, as soon as we will take a closer look at Faḥr ad-Dīn ar-Rāzī's own philosophical expositions, especially *al-Mabāḥiṭ al-mašriqiyya*, or at one of his other commentaries on an Avicennian work, namely the *Šarḥ 'Uyūn al-ḥikma*, it will become clear that this understanding of the *Categories* does not lead him to neglect the treatise altogether. Quite the contrary is the case: As shall be discussed below,<sup>98</sup> ar-Rāzī revives the scheme of ten categories as a useful structuring tool for composing a philosophical summa.

### 1.3.2. A Structural Revival of the Aristotelian *Organon*: Naṣīr ad-Dīn aṭ-Ṭūsī and al-'Allāma al-Ḥillī on the Role of the *Categories* in the Logic Curriculum

In clear contrast to Faḥr ad-Dīn ar-Rāzī's commentary, Ibn Sīnā's exclusion of the *Categories* from the logic curriculum and his implicit justifications for why the traditional structure of the Aristotelian *Organon* needs to be overcome do not receive any particular attention in Naṣīr ad-Dīn aṭ-Ṭūsī's (d. 672 AH / 1274 AD) discussion of the opening passages of the *Išārāt*. As a matter of fact, in this part of his commentary aṭ-Ṭūsī makes only one brief reference to the *Qāṭiḡūriyās* in the context of distinguishing between two types of "composition" (*ta'liḥ*): The composition of "explanatory statements" (*al-aqwāl aš-šāriḥa*),<sup>99</sup> that is, definitions and descriptions, and the composition of "arguments" (*ḥuḡaḡ*). Whereas the "form-related" (*šūriyya*) aspects of the composition of definitions and descriptions are dealt with in the *Isagoge*, the "substantive" (*māddiyya*) aspects, according to aṭ-Ṭūsī, are treated in the *Categories*.<sup>100</sup> Only subsequently, in his commentary on the second *išāra* of the second *nahḡ*, where Ibn Sīnā discards the study of the *summa genera* within logic as "a departure from what is necessary" (*ḥurūḡ 'ani l-wāḡib*),<sup>101</sup> aṭ-Ṭūsī addresses the question of whether or not the *Categories* should be included in the curriculum. Unlike Faḥr ad-Dīn ar-Rāzī who, as we have seen, in this context once again underlines the soundness and cogency of Ibn Sīnā's position, aṭ-Ṭūsī appears to be much more reluctant to accept Ibn Sīnā's reasoning and his harsh critique of the preceding scholarly tradition:

98 See below, pp. 179–183.

99 Dunyā's reading *al-aḥwāl aš-šāriḥa* (p. 130 (bottom), l. 6) instead of *al-aqwāl aš-šāriḥa* is clearly false. The reading *aqwāl* is attested by MS Leiden or. 95, fol. 6a, l. 27.

100 Naṣīr ad-Dīn aṭ-Ṭūsī, *Ḥall muškilāt al-Išārāt*, in Ibn Sīnā, *al-Išārāt wa-t-tanbīhāt*, ed. Sulaymān Dunyā (Cairo: Dār al-ma'ārif, 1983), vol. 1, p. 130 (bottom), ll. 6–7; MS Leiden or. 95, fol. 6a, ll. 27–29.

101 Ibn Sīnā, *al-Išārāt wa-t-tanbīhāt*, ed. az-Zāri'ī, p. 85, l. 12.

He [i.e., Ibn Sīnā] opposes the other logicians (*ya‘tarīdu ‘alā sā‘iri l-mantiqiyīna*). For their forerunner, namely the First Teacher [i.e., Aristotle], opened his teaching with an account of the ten categories (*maqūlāt*) which are the genera of genera (*aḡnās al-aḡnās*). In his book which is entitled *The Categories (al-qāṭiḡūriyās)* he pointed to their meanings (*ma‘āni*) and characteristic properties (*ḥawāṣṣ*) in the well-known manner (*‘alā l-waḡḥ al-maṣḥūr*) which is suitable for beginners. He made them [i.e., the categories] something like a postulate of this science [i.e., of logic] (*ṣibḥu muṣādaratin li-hādā l-‘ilm*), not a part (*ḡuz‘*) of it. The vast majority (*al-ḡumḥūr*) followed him in this. Indeed, in their explanations (*bayānāt*) they even added to it. There is no doubt that an investigation (*nazar*) of this does not pertain to logical studies. However, the verdict that – with regard to their being important or unimportant for this science – an investigation of them is just like an investigation of the intermediate and lower genera is a departure from a fair judgment (*ḥurūḡ ‘ani l-inṣāf*). For whenever the logician applies his rules he certainly needs that [i.e., knowledge of the categories] for the sake of hunting for the definitions (*iqṭināṣ al-ḥudūd*) and attaining the premises (*iktisāb al-muqaddamāt*).<sup>102</sup>

Whereas Ibn Sīnā had reproached his predecessors for their “departure from what is necessary,” aṭ-Ṭūsī, in turn, rejects Ibn Sīnā’s critique as a “departure from a fair judgment.” Even though he accepts the claim that a proper scientific “investigation” (*nazar*) of the ten categories cannot be pursued in logic, he nonetheless defends the structure of the traditional *Organon*. For just like any scientific discipline, logic as well may borrow some postulates from other disciplines for the sake of “completion” (*tatmīm*) and for the sake of achieving a certain “objective” (*ḡāya*).<sup>103</sup> Aṭ-Ṭūsī is convinced that a propaedeutic outline of the *summa genera* serves an important purpose in the logic curriculum; for in order to obtain sound terms and judgments, a logician needs to know “under which of the *summa genera* his *definiendum* and each of the two terms of his *quaesitum* fall.”<sup>104</sup> Thus, whereas it is important for the student of logic to become acquainted with the limited number of highest genera which comprise all other genera, he can dispense with a study of “the intermediate and lowest [genera] which are unlimited in number.”<sup>105</sup> Whereas Faḥr ad-Dīn ar-Rāzī’s commentary on the *Iṣārāt* enjoys the reputation of being highly critical or even polemical towards Ibn Sīnā’s text, Naṣīr ad-Dīn aṭ-Ṭūsī has been described as a champion

102 Aṭ-Ṭūsī, *Ḥall muṣkilāt al-Iṣārāt*, in Ibn Sīnā, *al-Iṣārāt wa-t-tanbihāt*, ed. S. Dunyā, vol. 1, p. 190 (bottom), l. 7 – p. 191 (bottom), l. 3; MS Leiden or. 95, fol. 21b, l. 26 – fol. 22a, l. 7.

103 Aṭ-Ṭūsī, *Ḥall muṣkilāt al-Iṣārāt*, in Ibn Sīnā, *al-Iṣārāt wa-t-tanbihāt*, ed. S. Dunyā, vol. 1, p. 181 (bottom), ll. 19–21; MS Leiden or. 95, fol. 21b, ll. 20–22.

104 Aṭ-Ṭūsī, *Ḥall muṣkilāt al-Iṣārāt*, in Ibn Sīnā, *al-Iṣārāt wa-t-tanbihāt*, ed. S. Dunyā, vol. 1, p. 181 (bottom), ll. 3–6; MS Leiden or. 95, fol. 21b, ll. 7–10.

105 Aṭ-Ṭūsī, *Ḥall muṣkilāt al-Iṣārāt*, in Ibn Sīnā, *al-Iṣārāt wa-t-tanbihāt*, ed. S. Dunyā, vol. 1, p. 181 (bottom), ll. 7–8; MS Leiden or. 95, fol. 21b, ll. 10–12.

of “mainstream Avicennism.”<sup>106</sup> The question of whether and why the *Categories* should or should not be studied within logic, however, confronts us with a case in which ar-Rāzī clearly supports Ibn Sīnā’s critique of the preceding tradition and in which aṭ-Ṭūsī, in turn, cautiously rejects the Avicennian reform project.

Against the background of his more lenient attitude towards the pre-Avicennian tradition in general and towards the treatment of the *Categories* in particular, it comes as no surprise that in his extensive Persian summa of logic, entitled *Asās al-iqtibās*, aṭ-Ṭūsī – notwithstanding his strong Avicennian leanings on a doctrinal level – fully revives the structure of the nine books of the extended Aristotelian *Organon*, that is, *Isagoge*, *Categories*, *On Interpretation*, *Prior Analytics*, *Posterior Analytics*, *Topics*, *Sophistical Refutations*, *Rhetoric*, and *Poetics*. In the *Asās* he justifies the inclusion of the *Categories* as follows:

The founder of logic (*vāze‘-e manteq*) [i.e., Aristotle] opened this science (*‘elm*) by presenting an account of the ten highest genera which are called the ten categories (*maqūlāt*). The later scholars (*mota‘aḥḥerān*) are of the opinion that – since a specification (*ta‘yīn*) of the natures of universals, whether they are high or low (*če ‘ālī če sāfel*), and a pointer to the concrete existents (*a‘yān-e mawǧūdāt*), whether they are substances or accidents (*če ġawhar če ‘araz*), does not have any connection to the discipline of logic, and since it is not upon the logician to undertake a verification (*taḥqīq*) of such issues – the treatment of these investigations (*ešteǧāl be-īn mabāheṣ*) within pure logic (*dar manteq-e maḥẓ*) amounts to a deviation [from the required curriculum] (*ta‘assof*) and to a forced effort (*takallof*). Nonetheless, there can be no doubt (*šobhat nīst*) that the art of defining (*taḥdīd va-ta‘rīf*) and the art of acquiring premises for syllogisms are impossible without conceptualizing the categories which are the highest genera and without differentiating each category from all other categories (*tamyīz-e har maqūle az maqūlhā-ye diǧar*).<sup>107</sup>

106 Whereas Dimitri Gutas distinguishes between “proponents” and “opponents” of “mainstream Avicennism” (and applies the latter label to such diverse thinkers as Faḥr ad-Dīn ar-Rāzī and Ibn Taymiyya), I deem it more suitable to draw a distinction between “mainstream Avicennism” and “critical Avicennism”; for Gutas’ classification, see his “The Heritage of Avicenna: The Golden Age of Arabic Philosophy, 1000 – ca. 1350,” p. 97. Recently, Robert Wisnovsky has offered a very apt characterization of the different attitudes by which ar-Rāzī and aṭ-Ṭūsī approach Ibn Sīnā’s oeuvre as follows: “Rāzī stood in relation to Avicenna as Avicenna stood to Aristotle: as a sometimes critical but nevertheless deeply indebted appropriator of the original author’s theories. Aṭ-Ṭūsī, by contrast, stood in relation to Avicenna as Averroes (Ibn Rushd, d. 595/1198) stood to Aristotle: as an energetic defender stamping out the corruptions of previous (mis)interpreters”; see Robert Wisnovsky, “Towards a Genealogy of Avicennism,” *Oriens* 42 (2014): p. 326.

107 Aṭ-Ṭūsī, *Asās al-iqtibās*, ed. Modarres Rezavī (Teheran: Entešārāt-e Dānešgāh-e Tehrān, 1982 [1361 SH]), p. 34, ll. 5–12; *va-* before *ešteǧāl be-īn mabāheṣ* should be ignored (in accordance with the “majority of manuscripts” (*bīštar nosaḥ*), as the apparatus attests).

Thus, within logic the *Categories* function as an “instruction for the beginner” (*eršād-e mobtadī*).<sup>108</sup> Quite clearly, this is a return to the old Porphyrian paradigm of reading the *Categories* as a proleptic but useful introduction to the list of *summa genera* and related pre-philosophical classification schemes.

As we have seen above, Faḥr ad-Dīn ar-Rāzī’s commentary on those passages of the *Iṣārāt* in which Ibn Sīnā alludes to the exclusion of the *Categories* constantly draws on the first chapter of the *Maqūlāt* of the *Šifā’*. Conversely, Naṣīr ad-Dīn aṭ-Ṭūsī’s pupil al-‘Allāma al-Ḥillī (d. 726 AH / 1325 AD) copied into his commentary on *Maqūlāt* I,1 – contained in his *K. Kašf al-ḥafā’ min K. aš-Šifā’*, which is preserved in the unicum MS Dublin Chester Beatty 5151 – the respective passages of his teacher’s commentary on the *Iṣārāt*.<sup>109</sup> Having given some brief explanations on Ibn Sīnā’s critique, al-Ḥillī remarks that “the Most Excellent of the Verifying Scholars Naṣīr Allāh wa-d-Dīn aṭ-Ṭūsī,” to whom he refers as his *šayḥ*, “defended the First Teacher for the fact that he had brought up the ten categories [in logic] and that he had opened his teaching with them.”<sup>110</sup> On a general note, both al-Ḥillī and his teacher aṭ-Ṭūsī certainly share Ibn Sīnā’s view on the subject-matter of logic. Thus, al-Ḥillī leaves no doubt that – rather than studying “specified matters” (*mawādd mu‘ayyana*) – a logician should investigate “universal things (*umūr kulliyya*).”<sup>111</sup> However, just like his teacher, he nonetheless emphasizes the beneficial effect which a study of the *Categories* within logic may have. This attitude becomes clear both in his commentary on the *Maqūlāt* of the *Šifā’* and in his commentary on Naṣīr ad-Dīn aṭ-Ṭūsī’s *Tağrīd al-manṭiq*. In the latter work, we see him justify the inclusion of the *Categories* as being conducive to the “attainment of genera and differentiae” (*taḥṣīl al-ağnās wa-l-fuṣūl*); as a result, the student will be helped in “discovering (*istinbāt*) that which is to be defined and that which is to be inferred.”<sup>112</sup> To be sure, neither aṭ-Ṭūsī nor al-Ḥillī deem the *Categories* to be a “part” (*ğuz*) of logic – in the sense of pertaining to its “subject-matter” (*mawḍū‘*) which they both identify as the “secondary intelligibles” (*al-ma‘qūlāt aṭ-ṭāniya*). However, in contrast to Ibn

108 Aṭ-Ṭūsī, *Asās al-iqtibās*, ed. Režavī, p. 34, l. 15.

109 Cf. below, text 1.B.b.

110 Al-‘Allāma al-Ḥillī, *K. Kašf al-ḥafā’ min K. aš-Šifā’*, MS Dublin Chester Beatty 5151, fol. 5b, l. 6 [= § 1 (1.B.b)].

111 Al-‘Allāma al-Ḥillī, *K. Kašf al-ḥafā’ min K. aš-Šifā’*, MS Dublin Chester Beatty 5151, fol. 5b, ll. 24–25 [= § 6 (1.B.b)].

112 Al-‘Allāma al-Ḥillī, *al-Ġawhar an-naḍīd fī sarḥ Manṭiq at-tağrīd*, ed. Moḥsen Bidārfar (Qom: Entešārāt-e Bidār, 1983 [1404 AH / 1362 SH]), p. 23, ll. 7–8. Cf. Tony Street, “Arabic and Islamic Philosophy of Language and Logic,” section 2.2.1 (“Logic as a Formal Science”). For the corresponding passage in aṭ-Ṭūsī’s work, see *Tağrīd al-Manṭiq*, anonymous editor (Beirut: Mansūrāt mu’assasat al-‘alamī li-l-maṭbū‘āt, 1988 [1408 AH]), p. 13ff. (*al-faṣl aṭ-ṭānī fī l-maqūlāt*).

Sīnā and in contrast to Faḥr ad-Dīn ar-Rāzī who adopts Ibn Sīnā's harsh critique of the preceding philosophical tradition, they both are willing to accept the inclusion of the *Categories* in the logic curriculum – not merely as a historical remnant of the Aristotelian tradition but rather as the result of a pedagogically sound anticipation of issues whose proper verification can only be undertaken in metaphysics.

## B. TEXTS

### a. Ibn Sīnā, *K. aš-Šifāʾ, al-Mantiq, al-Maqūlāt*, I,1 [ed. Madkūr, pp. 3–8]

#### The Scope of the *Categories*

[(I.A) al-Ḥillī (fol. 2, ll. 1–3): “The Second Treatise: The Ten Categories (*al-maqūlāt al-‘ašr*); in It Are Several Sections (*fuṣūl*); the First [Section]: The Scope of the *Categories* (*ğaraḍ al-maqūlāt*); in It Are Several Issues (*maṭālib*); the First [Issue]: Whatever Is Connected to the Ten Categories – and That They Are Outside of This Science (*hurūğuhā ‘an hādā l-‘ilm*); in It Are Several Investigations (*mabāhit*)”<sup>113</sup>

[(I.A.1) al-Ḥillī (fol. fol. 2, l. 3): “The First [Investigation]: The Utility of the Five Expressions for Logic (*fāʾidat al-alfāz al-ḥamsa fi l-mantiq*)”]

[ed. Madkūr, p. 3, l. 8]

[§ 1] In what preceded [i.e., in the *Isagoge*] you have already come to know what the compound expression is (*māʾiyyat al-lafz al-murakkab*) and what the simple expression is (*māʾiyyat al-lafz al-mufrad*). You have come to know that the compound expression is composed (*yataʾallifu*) of the simple expression. And you have come to know that the simple expressions, inasmuch as they are universal (*kulliyya*) and particular (*ğuzʾiyya*), essential (*dātiyya*) and accidental (*aradiyya*), are divided into five divisions.

[§ 2] Now it is necessary [a] that you come to know that the knowledge of these five states of simple expressions is conducive to the knowledge of the compound expressions, inasmuch as you intend to know them;<sup>114</sup> and [b] that you come to the conviction that other states of simple expressions are not needed for the sake of knowing compound expressions; thus, not all states of simple expressions need to be utilized for the sake of knowing the states of expressions which are compounded in the manner of composition intended in logic (*at-tarkīb al-maqṣūd fi l-mantiq*), whereas these [states] belong to the things whose

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113 In reading the *K. al-Maqūlāt* of the *Šifāʾ* I found the manner in which al-Ḥillī’s commentary divides Ibn Sīnā’s intricate text into several “issues” (*maṭālib*) and “investigations” (*mabāhit*) quite helpful. In my translation I added the headings and sub-headings of al-Ḥillī’s commentary throughout. I would like to express my gratitude to Reza Pourjavady for having made a copy of MS Dublin Chester Beatty 5151 – the only known manuscript containing al-Ḥillī’s *Kašf al-ḥafāʾ min K. aš-Šifāʾ* – available to me. For the complete list of MSS I have consulted in reading the *K. al-Maqūlāt* of the *Šifāʾ*, see Appendix 2.

114 Al-Ḥillī reads *min ḥaytu tuqṣadu l-mufradu bihā* (“inasmuch as the simple [expression] is intended through them”) instead of *min ḥaytu taqṣidu l-maʾrifata bihā*. All MSS I have consulted confirm the reading *maʾrifa* (but it should be noted that in MS N *maʾrifa* looks very similar to *mufrad* so that the two could quite easily be confused).

attainment is useful for the discipline of logic; and [c] that the reason why the compound expressions are compounded according to [the rules provided by] the discipline of logic (*bi-ḥasab šināʿat al-mantiq*) is precisely to attain a means which can be used for acknowledging the truth and for conceptualization (*fī ifādat at-taṣdīq wa-t-taṣawwur*); this is accomplished by syllogisms (*qiyāsāt*), definitions (*ḥudūd*) and descriptions (*rusūm*).

[ed. Madkūr, p. 4, l. 4]

[§ 3] The syllogisms, as you will come to know, are composed of premises whose subjects need to be universal in order to pertain to the sciences. Also, their subjects and predicates need to stand in one of those relations of essentiality and accidentality which had been outlined [in the *Isagoge*] in order to pertain to demonstration (*burhān*).

[§ 4] Division (*qisma*) [i.e., *dihairesis*] is also one of the methods leading to the acquisition of knowledge of the unknown. The differentiating division (*al-qisma al-fāšila*) is that [kind of division] which divides the genera through the differentiae into the species, whereas the [vertical] ordering [of the *arbor porphyriana*] is preserved so that there is no leap from one level to a level that does not immediately follow it. It [i.e., a division] may also be carried out by propria (*ḥawāṣṣ*) and accidents (*aʿrāḍ*).

[§ 5] Knowing these five simple [expressions] (*al-mufradāt al-ḥamsa*) [i.e., the predicables] is useful for syllogisms.<sup>115</sup> But their utility for definitions and descriptions is even more obvious. For the definitions are [composed] of genera and differentiae; and the descriptions are [composed] of genera, propria and accidents – and they mostly<sup>116</sup> pertain to species. The fact that the study of these states which attach to the simple expressions is placed prior to the onset of coming to know the compounds is either necessary or quasi-necessary.

[(I.A.2) al-Ḥillī (fol. 3a, ll. 22–23): “The Second Investigation (*baḥṭ*): Knowledge of the Ten Categories Is Not Needed (*ḡayru muḥtāḡ ilayhā*) in This Discipline (*šināʿa*)”]

[ed. Madkūr, p. 4, l. 15]

[§ 6] The simple expressions also have other states [besides the five predicables]; these concern the fact that they signify things which exist in one of the two ways of existence that we had explained when we had made known the

115 [4.10] MS LG4m: *fa-maʿrifatu ḥādihī l-mufradāti min ḥayṭu tanqasimu ilā ḥādihī l-ḥamsa* (instead of *fa-maʿrifatu ḥādihī l-mufradāti l-ḥamsa*): “knowing these simple [expressions], inasmuch as they are divided into these five.”

116 [4.12] MSS LG4 and TD3 (as well as SA, M, H in app.) have *aṣaḥḥ* instead of *akṭar*; EC has *akṭar*; this is attested by MS B (used for EC) and MS LB3; LG4i and TD3m correct *aṣaḥḥ* to *akṭar*.

subject-matter of logic [i.e., existence *in re* and *in intellectu*]. There is no necessity whatsoever – not even a quasi-necessity – to know these for the sake of studying logic:

[1] neither with regard to the state of their signifying particular individuals (*min ġihati ħāli dalālatihā ‘alā l-ašḥāši l-ġuz’iyya*); for this is something which cannot be utilized in any of the sciences, let alone in logic;

[2] nor with regard to the state of their signifying the species; for this is something which does not help anyone (*lam yu’an bihī aḥadun*) in the discipline of logic, as the discipline of logic is completed without it;

[3] nor with regard to the state of their signifying the high genera for which it became customary to be called ‘categories’ (*maqūlāt*) and to dedicate to their treatment a separate book at the beginning of logic which is called *The Categories* (*qāṭiġūriyās*).

[ed. Madkūr, p. 5, l. 1]

[§ 7] Once the student of logic has come to know what we had taught about the states of the simple expressions and once he has come to know the name (*ism*) and the verb (*kalima*), he is able to proceed to the study of propositions (*qaḍāyā*) and their [various] divisions, of syllogisms (*qiyāsāt*), definitions (*taḥdīdāt*) and their [various] types (*aṣnāf*), and [to the study] of the material contents (*mawādd*) of syllogisms, the demonstrative and non-demonstrative definitions and their genera and species – even if it never crossed his mind that there are ten categories and that through the simple terms one signifies either these [categories] themselves or something falling under them.

[§ 8] No noteworthy shortcoming arises from neglecting this [i.e., the content of the *Categories*]. And no weakness intrudes into logic if someone is of the opinion that these categories are more or less in number. Knowing whether these things are to be characterized as genera (*tūṣafu bi-l-ġinsiyya*) is not more necessary for him [i.e., the logician] than knowing whether other things are characterized as species (*tūṣafu bi-n-naw’iyya*). Rather, [a] knowing these [states] with regard to how they exist (*kayfiyyat al-wuġūd*) pertains to first philosophy (*al-falsafa al-ūlā*); [b] knowing these [states] with regard to the fact that the soul conceptualizes them (*taṣawwur an-naḥs lahā*) pertains to a fringe area<sup>117</sup> of natural philosophy which is close to first philosophy [i.e., psychology]; [c] and knowing that they demand expressions which are applied to them pertains to the discipline of the lexicographers.

117 [5.10] EC has *ḥadd*; this reading is confirmed by MS B (used for EC) and MS LB3; MSS LG4 and TD3m (as well as D, AE, N, Y in app.) have the lectio facilior *ġuz’*.



[ed. Madkūr, p. 5, l. 12]

[§ 9] Knowing that the simple expressions apply to one of these things without specifying the expressions which apply to them is just like knowing that the existing things (*al-umūr al-mawǧūda*) have simple expressions which are posited for them *in actu* or *in potentia*. It is not more suitable for the logician, inasmuch as he is a logician, to know this about these [things, i.e., about the highest genera] than to know this about other things. Inasmuch as he is a logician he need not burden himself with knowing that the simple expressions are posited for a certain type of things, namely the general universals (*al-kulliyāt al-‘amma*) [i.e., the *summa genera*], while he does not know this with regard to another type of things, namely the specific universals (*al-kulliyāt al-ḥāṣṣa*) [i.e., the species].

[§ 10] There is, indeed, one single thing [which might justify the inclusion of the *Categories* in logic]: The student may in a certain regard derive a benefit from this instruction; for [by studying the *Categories*] he acquires some kind of comprehensive understanding of [existing] things (*iḥāṭatun mā bi-l-umūr*) and becomes able to adduce [various] examples (*amṭila*).

[ed. Madkūr, p. 6, l. 1]

[§ 11] Whenever there is a discrepancy (*iḥtilāf*) in the definitions (*ḥudūd*) on account of a discrepancy which is due to the fact that the definienda are in different categories, just like, e.g., in the case of the state of a thing which belongs to the category of the relatum (*mudāf*), then – for the sake of defining that thing – certain states which do not apply to something belonging to the category of substance may be needed; and it may be the case that – with regard to defining [them] – certain properties are specific to the species of quantity but not to the species of quality. As soon as these things are understood by themselves (‘*alā ḥiyālihā*’) [i.e., as soon as one studies metaphysics], it is easy to learn this – apart from the fact that for this purpose there is no pressing need to dedicate a separate unit to this instruction. For it is possible to learn the art of definition (*ṣinā‘at at-taḥdīd*) completely, without there being a need to treat this discipline (*fann*) [i.e., the *Categories*] separately; and without saying: “If certain things belong to the relatum, then their qualification (*ḥukm*) is such-and-such; and if they are potencies and qualities, their qualification is such-and-such.” Therefore, it is necessary for you not to exceed this degree in your quest for this discipline; and to be convinced that it is something which intruded into the art of logic [from outside] (*daḥīlun fī ṣinā‘at al-mantiq*); and to know something else: Namely that the author (*wādi‘*) of this book did not compose it for the sake of instruction but for the sake of [keeping with] convention and tradition (*al-waḍ‘ wa-t-taqlīd*); for through the [kind of] elucidation (*bayān*) which is suitable for logic it is impos-

sible for you to come to know what can be known of it [i.e., of the contents of the *Categories*] by way of verification (*taḥqīq*).

[ed. Madkūr, p. 6, l. 12]

[§ 12] It is necessary for you to know that everything by which they attempted to establish the number of these ten [categories], [and by which they attempted to establish] that there is nothing general<sup>118</sup> for them [i.e., that they cannot be subsumed under a higher genus so that their number could be reduced], that there is no overlap (*tadāḥul*) between them, that each of them has such-and-such a characteristic property (*ḥāṣṣiyya*), that nine of them differ from the first one on account of the fact that it [i.e., the first one] is a substance whereas they [i.e., the nine] are accidents and so forth amounts to elucidations (*bayānāt*) which have been imported from other disciplines (*ṣināʿāt*) and which have been extremely shortened [so that they have become useless]. For there is no other way to acquire knowledge of this than by means of a thorough examination (*istiḡṣā*). A thorough examination, however, only becomes possible after one has arrived at the level of science which is called ‘first philosophy.’

[ed. Madkūr, p. 6, l. 17]

[§ 13] Thus, it is necessary for you to realize that it is the scope of this book that – by way of taking this for granted – you become convinced that there are ten things which are high genera comprising the existents and that it is these to which the simple expressions apply; and that you come to know that one of them is substance and that the remaining nine are accidents, without it being demonstrated to you that the nine are accidents; rather, you simply have to accept this. Presently, it is impossible for us to demonstrate to you that the qualities and quantities are accidents without demonstrating to you the necessity of

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118 [6.12] Read with MSS LB3, B, LG4, TD3 *lā ʿamm lahā* instead of *lā ʿilm lahā*; Tiana Koutzarova, *Das Transzendente bei Ibn Sīnā*, p. 46, follows the Cairo edition and hence translates “daß es keine [je eigene] Wissenschaft von den Kategorien gibt”; accordingly, she concludes that for Ibn Sīnā the ten categories are “jene voneinander abgegrenzten und aufeinander nicht zurückführbaren ‚obersten Gattungen‘, die als erste Bestimmungen das Seiende in einer je bestimmten Hinsicht explizieren, ohne jedoch als Subjekte eine je eigene Wissenschaft zu begründen” (Koutzarova, *Das Transzendente bei Ibn Sīnā*, p. 48; emphasis added). Whereas Koutzarova’s interpretation can be directly attributed to the Cairo edition, Bäck’s translation of the entire sentence is more perplexing: “You need to know that all their attempts to establish a number for these ten [categories] fail, and that he [Aristotle] *did not take pains about it*” (quoted in Paul Thom, “The Division of the Categories According to Avicenna,” p. 34, note 9; emphasis added); the verb “to fail” is Bäck’s addition; moreover, he apparently confused ʿ*l-m* (i.e., ʿ*ilm* or ʿ*alam*) with ʿ*l-m* (i.e., *alam*) and then drew a connection between *alam* (“pain”) and the idiomatic English expression “taking pains about something.”

that number [i.e., of the number of the categories] but you simply have to accept this; and without demonstrating to you that each of them is a genus in the proper sense (*bi-l-ḥaqīqa*) – not in the sense of a modulated expression (*lafẓ mušakkik*) and not in such a manner that it would signify a non-constitutive concomitant (*lāzim ġayr muqawwim*). Moreover, at the beginning of your studies it is impossible for you to come to know, for example, that quality applies to the species which are below it in the manner of a genus – and that it is neither a homonymous nor a modulated nor a synonymous name; rather, it is constitutive<sup>119</sup> for what is below it. The same is true for quantity. Whoever occupied himself with that [issue] in this book burdened himself with something for which his ability does not suffice (*fa-qad takallafa mā lā yafī wus‘uhū*). The same is true for the state of the characteristic properties (*ḥawāṣṣ*) which were mentioned; for these were simply mentioned [and not properly investigated].

[ed. Madkūr, p. 7, l. 8]

[§ 14] What indicates that what I say is true is the fact that these investigations had already been omitted in the book which is the source (*al-aṣl*). Moreover, the totality of validating logicians (*kāffat al-mantiqiyyīn al-muḥaṣṣilīn*)<sup>120</sup> shied away from the claim that this book is a study (*naẓar*) of the natures of the existents (*tabā‘ī’ al-mawġūdāt*); rather, they said: “It is a study of them inasmuch as they are signified by simple expressions (*min ḥaytu hiya madlūl ‘alayhā bi-l-alfāz al-mufrada*).” However, the proofs (*al-barāhīn*) which confirm that these nine are accidents do not differ from the proofs which point towards the states of their existence. This cannot be proven of them inasmuch as they are signified by simple expressions. And the same is true for those other investigations. But as soon as the elucidation (*bayān*) of these states is connected to a study [of them] inasmuch as they are existent, their conviction that one should shy away from this [ontological reading of the *Categories*] becomes meaningless. Rather, such a study of them would [primarily] be a study inasmuch as they are existent and [only] subsequently inasmuch as they are signified by an expression. As a consequence, two approaches of studying [them] would be combined in it [i.e., in this book]. Whenever one studies the states of a thing inasmuch as it is existent one is, in doing so, aware of its state inasmuch as it is signified [by an expression]; for every true nature (*ḥaqīqa*) from the realm of existence (*mina l-wuġūd*) has a correspondence (*muṭābaqa*) from the realm of language (*mina l-lafẓ*).

119 [7.5] MSS LB3, LG4 and TD3 (but not TD3m) read *laysa muqawwiman*. In EC the negation is omitted; this reading is supported, *inter alia*, by MS B (used for EC) and al-Ḥilli’s commentary.

120 [7.9] MS LG4 reads *al-muḥliṣīna* (“sincere”) instead of *al-muḥaṣṣilīna* (“validating”).

[ed. Madkūr, p. 7, l. 18]

[§ 15] If, indeed, on account of the fact that things are signified [by expressions] there were characteristic properties (*ḥawāṣṣ*) which do not extend to the [things'] transformation into existence [i.e., properties which a thing has only inasmuch as it is signified not inasmuch as it exists], and if the investigation undertaken in this book were restricted to these and directed towards these [properties], then it would be appropriate to hold that whatever they stipulated with regard to the scope of this book – to the effect that they turned it into a purely logical study which is neither first philosophy nor natural philosophy – is a hair-splitting issue (*amr daqīq*), a petty outcome (*iḥrāğ laṭīf*) and an obscure distinction (*faṣl ġāmiḍ*).<sup>121</sup> And if they posited all these things by way of taking them for granted (*alā sabīli t-taslīm*), and if they said that these are the totality of things to which the simple expressions apply and from which the compound expressions are composed – indeed, that they are those things whose intentions in the soul (*ma'āniḥā fi n-nafs*) are the matters of the parts of those intentions which are compounded in the soul in such a manner that one is led to grasping things unknown (*idrāk al-mağḥulāt*), even if there were not any linguistic expression at all –, then they would also say something [in defense of their positions]. However, their insistence that this is a logical investigation and that this is connected to the fact that undoubtedly there are linguistic expressions (*bi-anna alfāzan lā maḥālata*)<sup>122</sup>, is merely a forced effort (*takallufun baḥtun*). This is why they became stupid and confused!

121 Al-Ḥilli's commentary suggests a different syntax (the syntactical differences are underlined; al-Ḥilli's additions are placed between parentheses):

نعم لو كان لكونها مدلولاً عليها خواص لا تتناول صرافة الوجود لكان البحث في هذا الكتاب مقصوداً عليها (لأنها مما ينفع في الإفادة)، لكن بالحري أن يظن أن هذا الذي عرّفوه من أمر غرض هذا الكتاب حتى جزّوه نظراً منطقيّاً، لا فلسفة أولى ولا فلسفة طبيعية، أمر دقيق وإخراج لطيف وفصل عامض.

"If, indeed, on account of the fact that things are signified [by expressions] there were characteristic properties which do not extend to the [things'] transformation into existence, then [*la-kāna* instead of *wa-kāna*] the investigation undertaken in this book would be restricted to these (for this is something whose acquisition is useful); but [*lākin* instead of *la-kāna*] it is appropriate to hold that whatever they stipulated with regard to the scope of this book – to the effect that they turned it into a purely logical study which is neither first philosophy nor natural philosophy – is a hair-splitting issue, a petty outcome and an obscure distinction."

The MSS I consulted confirm the reading of EC.

122 [8.8] MSS LG4, H (in app.), Y (in app.) read *bi-anna lahā alfāzan lā maḥālata* ("undoubtedly they have linguistic expressions"); EC (following MSS B, SA) reads *bi-anna alfāzan lā maḥālata*; the marginal annotation in MS B (= BH) explains this reading as follows: *ay bi-anna hāhunā bi-ḍ-darūratī alfāzan lā yustağnā 'ānhā* ("that is, that there are by necessity linguistic expressions which are indispensable").

[ed. Madkūr, p. 8, l. 10]

[§ 16] As for us, we say what we [just] said [i.e., we criticize these logicians' approach]; but then, whether we like it or not,<sup>123</sup> we follow the method and customs of the [vast majority of] people. Thus, we say: This book – and the fact that it is placed at the beginning, even though it is not of great use – may at the outset [of the curriculum] be detrimental. How often did I see a person whose soul was confused as a result of reading this book so that it made him fancy things whose verification – according to what they really are (*‘alā kunhihā*) – cannot be undertaken in this book! As a consequence, he becomes mixed up with phantasies remote from the truth; and on these grounds he arrives at [false] doctrines and opinions which stain his soul. Thus, onto the tablet of his intellect (*fī lawḥ ‘aqlihī*) something is inscribed which subsequently will not be deleted through inscribing onto it something else; and as soon as it mixes with it, he becomes confused.

b. al-‘Allāma al-Ḥillī’s Appendix to *K. aš-Šifā’*,  
*al-Mantiq, al-Maqūlāt*, I,1

[MS Dublin Chester Beatty 5151, fol. 5b, ll. 4–26]

The text between asterisks is a quote from Naṣīr ad-Dīn aṭ-Ṭūsī’s commentary on the second *išāra* of the second *naḥḡ* of the *Išārāt*; see *Hall muškilat al-Išārāt*, in Ibn Sinā, *al-Išārāt wa-t-tanbihāt*, ed. S. Dunyā, vol. 1, p. 190 (bottom), l. 7 – p. 191 (bottom), l. 21.

[I.A.3] The Third Investigation:  
The Defense by the Most Excellent  
of the Verifying Scholars

البحث الثالث في اعتذار أفضل المحققين

[§ 1] Here you must know that our *Šayḥ*, the Most Excellent of the Verifying Scholars Naṣīr Allāh wa-d-Dīn aṭ-Ṭūsī – may God rest his soul – defended the First Teacher for the fact that he had brought up the ten categories [in logic] and that he had opened his teaching with them.

هنا أعلم أنّ شيخنا أفضل المحققين نصير الله  
والدين الطوسي قدس الله روحه اعتذر للمعلم  
الأول في ذكره للمقولات العشر وافتتاح تعليمه  
بها.

[§ 2] Even if it does not pertain to the logical investigations, the verdict passed by the *Šayḥ* [i.e., by Ibn Sinā in his *Išārāt*], \* namely that – with regard to their being important or unimportant for this science – an investiga-

وإن لم يكن من المباحث المنطقية فإنّ حكم  
الشيخ \* بأنّ النظر فيها يجري مجرى النظر في  
الأجناس المتوسطة والسافلة في كونه مهمّاً أو

123 [8.10] Read with MSS B, SA, LB3, LG4, TD3 *ši'nā am abaynā* instead of *ši'nā aw bayyanā* (EC); no apparatus entry.

tion of them is just like an investigation of the intermediate and lower genera, is a departure from a fair judgment (*hurūḡ ‘ani l-insāf*). For whenever the logician applies his rules he certainly needs that [i.e., knowledge of the categories] for the sake of hunting for the definitions and attaining the premises. For as long as he does not know under which of the *summa genera* his *definiendum* and each of the two terms of his *quaesitum* fall with regard to the quiddity, it is impossible for him to attain the sequentially arranged differentiae and the other predicates from which the terms are compounded. And he gains from them the judgments with regard to [what is true for] the most part, as had been explained in the respective passages.

[§ 3] As for the intermediate and lowest [genera] which are unlimited in number, on account of the fact that the highest [genera], which are limited in number, comprise them he [i.e., the logician] can dispense with mentioning them.

[§ 4] This is similar to the following case: For the sake of protecting health and removing illness the physician, inasmuch as he is a physician, need not consider anything but the state of the human body, inasmuch as it is healthy and ill. For if he, inasmuch as he is a physician, considers the quiddities of random things which he might or might not make use of – i.e., [considerations such as] whether they pertain to minerals, plants or animals; where their minerals are; when the times of their realization are; what the conditions for their preservation are; how many they are –, [and if he does so] without having heard or learned in which way his knowledge [of these things] may be beneficial for his science, as if that [i.e., the consideration of these questions] were important and everything else [which pertains to medicine] unimportant, this would clearly be a departure from what is necessary. However, as soon as he conceives of the possibility that he might need these [considerations] for the sake of

غير محتمة في هذا العلم خروج عن الانصاف. فإن المنطقي إنما يحتاج في استعمال قوانينه لاقتناص الحدود واكتساب المقدمات إلى ذلك، لأنه ما لم يعرف أن محدوده وكل واحد من حدّي مطلوبه تحت أي جنس من الأجناس العالية يقع بحسب ماهية، لم يمكن له أن يحصل الفصول المترتبة، ولا سائر المحمولات التي يترتب منها التعريفات. ويستفاد منها التصديقات بحسب الأغلب، كما بين في مواضعها.

وأما المتوسطة والسافلة التي لا تنحصر في عدد فإنما يستغني عن إيرادها لاشتغال العالية المعدودة عليها.

ومما يشبه ذلك أن الطبيب من حيث هو طبيب يجب أن لا ينظر إلا في حال بدن الإنسان من حيث يصح ويمرض ليحفظ الصحة ويزيل المرض. فإن نظر من حيث هو طبيب في ماهيات أشياء ربّما يستعملها أو لا يستعملها، أهي معدنية أو نباتية أو حيوانية، ومعادنها أين هي، وأوقات تحصيلها متى هي، وشرائط حفظها ما هي، وكه هي، دون ما لم يسمع به أو لم يقع إليه مما يمكن أن تكون معرفته أضعف في علمه، كأن ذلك محتم، وغيره ليس بمهم، فخرج عن الواجب، إلا أنه لما تصوّر إمكان الاحتياج إليها في استعمال قوانينه الحافظة للصحة أو المزيلة للمرض أضاف النظر فيها بحسب الإمكان إلى علمه

applying his [medical] rules, which aim at preserving health and removing illness, he adds the consideration of these [questions], to the extent possible, to his science and even renders it a part of his science.

[§ 5] This also applies to the representatives of the other scientific disciplines. For they add to their disciplines whatever they need for the completion of their disciplines, even if it is extrinsic to them, so that through this [addition] they fully succeed in arriving at their objective. \*

[§ 6] There is something worth considering here. For the logician does not investigate specified matters; nor does he define a specific quiddity. Rather, the logician considers universal things. What he employs for his discipline renders these things compliant with whatever he intends in his employment [of these things] in it [i.e., logic].

بل جعله جزءاً من علمه.

وهذا دأب أصحاب سائر الصناعات العلمية  
فإتّهم يضيفون إلى صناعاتهم ما يحتاجون إليه  
في تكميل تلك الصناعات، وإن كان خارجاً عنها،  
ليتمّ بذلك الوصول إلى غاياتها. \*

وفيه نظر لأنّ المنطقي لا يبحث عن موادّ  
معيّنة ولا يحدّ ماهية خاصّة، وإنّما ينظر في  
أمور كليّة، والمستعمل لصناعاته يطبّق تلك  
الأمور على ما يريد استعماله فيه.

c. Ibn Sīnā, *at-Ta'liqāt*, no. 919–924

[ed. Mūsaviyān, p. 502, l. 3 – p. 507, l. 9  
= ed. Badawī (Cairo: al-Hay'a al-miṣriyya al-ʿamma  
li-l-kitāb, 1973 [1392 AH]), p. 167, l. 14 – p. 169, l. 8]

[919 (§ 1)]<sup>124</sup> The subject-matter of logic are the secondary intelligibles which are based on the primary intelligibles inasmuch as through them one proceeds from what is known to [knowledge of] what is unknown. The explanation of this is as follows: Any given thing has primary intelligibles, such as 'body,' 'animal' and the like, and secondary intelligibles which are based on these, that is, these things being universal, particular and individual. A consideration of how to establish (*itbāt*) [the existence of] these secondary intelligibles pertains to metaphysics. They are the subjects of logic not with regard to their existence taken absolutely; for their existence taken absolutely is established there [i.e., in metaphysics] – namely the question whether they have existence in concrete things or in the soul; rather, [they are the subjects of logic] under another condition, namely that through them one proceeds from what is known to [knowledge of] what is unknown. Establishing this condition pertains to metaphysics, namely knowing that the universal may be a genus, a differentia, a species, a proprium and a general accident. If the [existence of the] generic universal and the [existence of the] specific universal [i.e., the existence of the universal which is a genus and the existence of the universal which is a species] are established in metaphysics, the universal which meets this condition is a subject of logic. All concomitants and essential accidents which subsequently occur to the universal are established in logic.

[919] موضوع المنطق هو المعقولات الثانية المستندة إلى المعقولات الأول من حيث يتوصل بها من معلوم إلى مجهول. وشرح ذلك أن للشيء معقولات أول، كالجسم والحيوان وما أشبهها، ومعقولات ثانية تستند إلى هذه، وهي كون هذه الأشياء كلية وجزئية وشخصية. والنظر في إثبات هذه المعقولات الثانية يتعلق بعلم ما بعد الطبيعة. وهي موضوعة لعلم المنطق لا على نحو وجودها مطلقاً، فإن نحو وجودها مطلقاً يثبت هناك، وهو أنها هل لها وجود في الأعيان أو في النفس، بل بشرط آخر، وهو أن يتوصل منها من معلوم إلى مجهول. وإثبات هذه الشرطية يتعلق بعلم ما بعد الطبيعة، وهو أن يُعلم أن الكلي قد يكون جنساً، وقد يكون فصلاً، وقد يكون نوعاً، وقد يكون خاصّةً، وقد يكون عرضاً عامّاً. فإذا أثبت في علم ما بعد الطبيعة الكلي الجنسي والكلي النوعي، صار الكلي حينئذ بهذا الشرط موضوعاً لعلم المنطق. ثم ما يعرض للكلي بعد ذلك من لوازمه وأعراضه الذاتية يثبت في علم المنطق.

124 Al-Lawkarī's heading: "The subject-matter of logic."



[919 (§ 2)] The modes [of syllogisms] are also conditions on account of which the secondary intelligibles are the subjects of logic, namely knowing that the universal may be necessary, absolute or possible. Thus, on account of this, the universal is a subject of logic. Defining these things and verifying their quiddities pertains to logic, not to metaphysics. The same is true for defining the subjects of the other sciences.

[919 (§ 3)] In physics an equivalent to the secondary intelligibles [of logic] is the body: For it [i.e., the existence of the body] is established in first philosophy; and likewise, the characteristic properties on account of which the body becomes a subject of physics, namely motion and change, are established in it. However, one establishes the accidents which concomitantly apply to it after motion and change in physics. For the relation of the body taken absolutely to physics is just like the relation of the secondary intelligibles to logic; and the relation of motion and change to physics is just like the relation of the modes, of being a genus, and of being a species to logic. However, defining body and motion and verifying their quiddities properly pertains to physics; for it is up to the representative of a certain science to define the principles and the characteristic properties on account of which the principles are the subjects of that science, if the subject of that science is compounded. However, it is up to another science to establish [the existence of] the principles and characteristic properties on account of which the principles are the subjects of that science, in accordance with what had been explained in the *Burhān* [of the *Ṣifa*].

والجهاً<sup>125</sup> أيضاً شرائط تصير بها المعقولات الثانية موضوعة لعلم المنطق، وهو أن يُعلم أن الكلّي قد يكون واجباً أو مطلقاً أو ممكناً، فقد يصير بذلك الكلّي موضوعاً لعلم المنطق. وأمّا تحديد هذه الأشياء وتحقيق ماهياتها فيكون في علم المنطق<sup>126</sup>، لا في علم ما بعد الطبيعة، كالحال في تحديد موضوعات سائر العلوم.

ومثال المعقولات الثانية في علم الطبيعة الجسم، فإنّ إثباته يكون في الفلسفة الأولى، وكذلك إثبات الخواص التي يصير بها الجسم موضوعاً لعلم الطبيعة، وهي الحركة والتغير، يكون فيها. وأمّا الأعراض التي تلزم بعد الحركة والتغير، فإنّ إثباتها في علم الطبيعة. فنسبة الجسم المطلق إلى علم الطبيعة كنسبة المعقولات الثانية إلى علم المنطق. ونسبة الحركة والتغير إلى علم الطبيعة كنسبة الجهات والجنسية والنوعية إلى علم المنطق. وأمّا تحديد الجسم والحركة وتحقيق ماهيتها، فيصح أن يكون في علم الطبيعة، إذ تحديد المبادئ والخواص التي تصير بها المبادئ موضوعة لعلم ما يكون إلى صاحب ذلك العلم، إن كان موضوع ذلك العلم مركباً. وأمّا إثبات المبادئ والخواص التي بها تصير المبادئ موضوعة لذلك العلم، فيكون إلى علم آخر، على ما شرح في البرهان.

125 وللجهات ed. Badawī : والجهاً

126 الطبيعة ed. Badawī : المنطق

[919 (§ 4)] While establishing [the existence of] the modes [i.e., of being necessary, possible/contingent and absolute] pertains to metaphysics, defining them pertains to logic. In the same vein, while establishing [the existence of] motion pertains to first philosophy, defining it pertains to physics. The characteristic properties of the body may be established in physics and they may be established in metaphysics. The affirmative and the negative are established in metaphysics in the chapter on 'identity and diversity'; for there it [i.e., the affirmative or the negative] is treated as a universal and becomes a subject of logic. However, the question of which premise contradicts which premise and other such questions pertain to logic.

[919 (§ 5)] Thus, the secondary intelligibles, i.e., the universals which are [a] genera and species, [b] necessary and possible, are the subject-matter of logic. [ad a] The former, i.e., being a genus, being a species, being a differentia, being an accident, and being a proprium, are useful for conceptualization (*taṣwawwur*). [ad b] Being necessary, being possible and other [such] things are useful for acknowledging the truth (*taṣḍīq*). These universals – not taken absolutely but in this specific manner, namely inasmuch as through them one proceeds from what is known to [knowledge of] what is unknown, are the subject-matter of logic. If however, something is taken absolutely, it is of no use

فإثبات الجهات في علم ما بعد الطبيعة، وتحديدتها في المنطق، كما أنّ إثبات الحركة في الفلسفة الأولى، وتحديدتها في علم الطبيعة<sup>127</sup>. وخواص الجسم قد تثبت في علم الطبيعة، وقد تثبت في علم ما بعد الطبيعة. والموجب والسالب يثبت في علم ما بعد الطبيعة في باب الهو هو والغيرية،<sup>128</sup> فإنه يؤخذ فيه كلياً، ويصير موضوعاً لعلم المنطق. وأما أنه أتى مقدّمة تناقض أتى مقدّمة وغير ذلك ممّا هذه<sup>129</sup> سبيله في المنطق.

فالمعقولات الثانية، أعني الكليات الجنسية والنوعية والواجبة والممكنة، موضوع المنطق. فالأولى، أعني الجنسية والنوعية<sup>130</sup> والفصلية والعرضية والخاصية، ينتفع بها في التصوّر. والواجبية والممكنة وغيرها<sup>131</sup> ينتفع بها في التصديق. فهذه الكليات لا على الإطلاق بل على هذه الصفة، وهو من حيث يتوصّل بها من معلوم إلى مجهول، هي موضوع المنطق. وأما على الإطلاق فلا ينتفع بها في علم.

127 ما بعد الطبيعة ed. Badawī : الطبيعة

128 Cf. Ibn Sīnā, *K. aṣ-Ṣifāʾ, al-Ilāhiyyāt (2)*, ed. Muḥammad Yūsuf Mūsā, Sulaymān Dunyā and Saʿīd Zāyid (Cairo: al-Hayʾa al-ʿamma li-ṣuʿūn al-maṭābiʿ al-amiriyya, 1960 [1380 AH]), VII,1: "The concomitants of unity, namely identity (*al-huwiyya*) and its divisions; and the concomitants of multiplicity, namely diversity (*al-ḡayriyya*) and difference (*ḥilāf*) and the known types of opposition (*taqābul*)."

129 هذا : ed. Badawī : هذه

130 : ed. Badawī om. (saute du même au même) : والواجبة والممكنة، موضوع المنطق. فالأولى، أعني الجنسية والنوعية

131 : ed. Badawī غيرها : والواجبية والممكنة وغيرها

for any science.

[919 (§ 6)]<sup>132</sup> An example of this is the fact that sound taken absolutely is of no use for the science of music. Rather, the sound inasmuch as it is disposed to being compounded is the subject-matter of music. The secondary intelligibles are of two kinds: Those which are taken absolutely; and those which are considered under a certain condition – and on account of this condition they become a subject of logic.

[920 (§ 7)]<sup>133</sup> As soon as the universal has become a premise, it has become a subject; and it is considered from the point of view of logic, not universally.

[921 (§ 8)]<sup>134</sup> Establishing the mode of existence of something amounts to elucidating which [kind of] existence specifically pertains to it.

[922 (§ 9)]<sup>135</sup> Elucidating the quiddity of the universal, the particular, and the individual and elucidating some concomitants of these things, such as being a genus, being a differentia, and being a species and their modes, pertains to logic. And establishing their existence pertains to first philosophy.

[923 (§ 10)]<sup>136</sup> In every discipline the means of teaching are whatever is investigated in that discipline. In logic there are no means of teaching about the existents inasmuch as they are existent. Rather, this can only be done in the universal science [i.e., meta-

ومثال ذلك الصوت المطلق لا ينتفع به في علم الموسيقى، بل الصوت من حيث يقبل التأليف هو موضوع الموسيقى. فالمعقولات الثانية على نوعين: مطلقة، ومشروط فيها شرط<sup>132</sup> ما. وتصير بذلك الشرط موضوعاً لعلم المنطق.

[920] إذا صار الكلّي مقدّمة فقد صار موضوعاً، ويكون النظر فيه منطقياً لا كلياً.

[921] إثبات نحو وجود الشيء هو أن يبيّن أي وجود يخصّه.

[922] تبين ماهية الكلّي والجزئي والشخصي وتبين بعض لوازم هذه الأشياء، كالجنسية والفصلية والنوعية، وجهاتها في المنطق. وإثبات وجودها في الفلسفة الأولى.

[923] أنحاء التعليم في كلّ فنّ<sup>137</sup> ما يبحث عنه في ذلك الفنّ. وليس في المنطق أنحاء<sup>138</sup> تعليم الموجودات بما هي موجودات، وإثبات ذلك

132 بشرط : ed. Badawī

133 Al-Lawkarī's heading: "As soon as the universal has become a premise, it is a subject of logic."

134 Al-Lawkarī's heading: "Establishing the mode of existence of something."

135 Al-Lawkarī's heading: "Elucidating the quiddity of the universal, the particular and the individual pertains to logic; establishing their existence pertains to metaphysics."

136 Al-Lawkarī's heading: "Confirmation of this account" (*fī taqrīr hādā l-ma'nā*).

137 أنحاء التعليم في كلّ فنّ وأنحاء كلّ فنّ : ed. Badawī

138 أتبّا : ed. Badawī

physics]. Genus, differentia, species, proprium, and accident [inasmuch as they are existent] are among those means of teaching which pertain to the universal science, not to logic.

[924 (§ 11)]<sup>140</sup> The simple expressions have states which occur to them inasmuch as they are existent, just like the fact that they signify what they mean; for example, the expression 'substance' signifying whatever it signifies and 'quantity' signifying whatever it signifies.<sup>141</sup> And they have states which occur to them inasmuch as they are conceptualized, just like the universal and the particular, the essential and the accidental, and [further] cases in which they occur to them [i.e., to the expressions] inasmuch as they are intellected and conceptualized, not inasmuch as they are existents. For universality and particularity, essentiality and accidentality do not occur to man inasmuch as he is man; nor do they occur to him inasmuch as he exists in concrete things; rather, they only occur to him inasmuch as he exists as an intelligible; the intellect assumes these considerations [i.e., universality and particularity, essentiality and accidentality] with regard to it.

[924 (§ 12)] Such is the subject-matter of logic.

في العلم الكلّي. والجنس والفصل والنوع  
والخاصة والعرض من أنحاء تعليم العلم<sup>139</sup>  
الكلّي، لا من المنطق.

[924] للألفاظ المفردة أحوال تعرض لها من حيث هي موجودة، كدالاتها على معانيها، مثل دلالة لفظ الجوهر على ما يدلّ عليه، والكميّة على ما تدلّ عليه. ولها أحوال تعرض لها من حيث هي متصوّرة، كالكلّي والجزئي والذاتي والعرضي، وأمثال ذلك ممّا يعرض لها من حيث هي معقولة متصوّرة، لا من حيث هي موجودة. وذلك أنّ الإنسان من حيث هو إنسان لا تعرض له الكلّيّة ولا الجزئية ولا الذاتية ولا العرضية ولا من حيث هو موجود في الأعيان، بل إنّما تعرض له من حيث هو موجود معقولاً<sup>142</sup>، ويفرض<sup>143</sup> العقل فيه هذه الاعتبارات.

فيكون موضوع المنطق على هذا الوجه.

139 العلم : ed. Badawī om.

140 Al-Lawkarī's heading: "Confirmation of this account" (*fī taqrīr hādā l-ma'nā*).

141 Cf. *K. aš-Šifā'*, *al-Mantiq*, *al-Maḡūlāt*, I,1 [= § 6 (1.B.a)]: "The simple expressions also have other states [besides the five predicables]; these concern the fact that they signify things which exist in one of the two ways of existence that we had explained when we had made known the subject-matter of logic. There is no necessity whatsoever – not even a quasi-necessity – to know these for the sake of studying logic."

142 معقولاً : ed. Badawī

143 ويعرض : ed. Badawī



## 2. Ibn Sīnā's Reception of the Two Aristotelian Criteria for Dividing "Beings" (ὄντα): "Being Said of a Subject" and "Existing in a Subject"

### A. STUDY

#### 2.1. General Introductory Remarks on the Aristotelian Background

##### 2.1.1. Aristotle's Fourfold Division of "Beings" in *Cat. 2*

On numerous occasions Aristotle's methodological habit of classifying things in the world by means of linguistic considerations and criteria have made modern readers feel at unease. We would often like to draw a sharp line between use and mention, logical and ontological attribution, language and reality – and then find ourselves bewildered about the fact that Aristotle's philosophical proings in many instances take the liberty of transgressing these distinctions.<sup>144</sup> While this entanglement of linguistic and extralinguistic items may be said to be characteristic of the *Categories* as a whole, it becomes particularly dense and puzzling in the second chapter of the treatise. At the beginning of *Cat. 2* (1a16–19) Aristotle presents a bipartition of "those which are said" (τὰ λεγόμενα / *allatī tuqālu*)<sup>145</sup> into "those which are said in combination" (κατὰ συμπλοκὴν λέγεται / *mā yuqālu bi-ta'lifin*), conventionally understood to refer to compound signifying expressions, and "those which are said without combination" (ἄνευ συμπλοκῆς / *mā yuqālu bi-ğayri ta'lifin*), conventionally understood to refer to simple signifying expressions, and thus paves the way for the subsequent introduction of a tenfold division of those things which are signified by simple ex-

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144 As John Ackrill observed with regard to *Cat. 1*, "Aristotle relies greatly on linguistic facts and tests, but his aim is to discover truths about non-linguistic items"; Aristotle, *Categories*, tr. and comm. J. Ackrill (Oxford: Clarendon, 1963), p. 71. And, with regard to *Cat. 2*, Wolfgang-Rainer Mann warns the reader that "Aristotle pays virtually no attention to anything like the use/mention distinction"; W.-R. Mann, *The Discovery of Things: Aristotle's Categories and Their Contexts* (Princeton, NJ: University Press, 2000), p. 52.

145 Aristotle, *an-naṣṣ al-kāmil li-mantiq Aristū, al-Maqūlāt*, ed. Farīd Ġabr (Beirut: Dār al-fikr al-lubnānī, 1999), vol. 1, p. 27, l. 3.

pressions, i.e., the list of ten *summa genera* expounded in *Cat.* 4. In the second part of *Cat.* 2 (1a20–1b9), however, Aristotle shifts to a fourfold division of “beings/existents” (τὰ ὄντα / *al-mawǧūdāt*) which he arrives at by combining two criteria that both describe a relation in which any given thing may or may not stand to a subject (i.e., depending on one’s reading, to the logical subject of a predication or to an ontological substratum): Thus, with regard to the *of* relation it may or may not be the case that something “is said *of* a certain subject” (καθ’ ὑποκειμένου τινὸς λέγεται / *yuqālu ‘alā mawḏū‘in mā*); and with regard to the *in* relation it may or may not be the case that something “inheres *in* a subject” (ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ ἔστι / *hiya fī mawḏū‘in*).<sup>146</sup> Even though in the context of *Cat.* 2, Aristotle himself speaks neither of “universals” and “particulars” nor of “substances” and “accidents,” all of the extant ancient commentaries agree that – against the background of the examples Aristotle provides in this passage – the two criteria must be understood to aim at a “descriptive account” (λόγος ὑπογραφικός<sup>147</sup> or ὑπογραφή<sup>148</sup>) of four types of beings: (1) a universal substance (i.e., said *of* a subject but not inhering *in* a subject; in the further course of the treatise, this type will be referred to as “secondary substances”); (2) a particular substance (neither said *of* nor inhering *in* a subject; subsequently called “primary substance”); (3) a universal accident (both said *of* and inhering *in* a subject); (4) and a particular accident (inhering *in* a subject, but not said *of* a subject).<sup>149</sup> Whereas Aristotle picks up the distinction between “universals” (τὰ καθόλου / *kulliyāt*) and “particulars” (τὰ καθ’ ἕκαστον / *ǧuz‘iyyāt*)<sup>150</sup> in *De Interpretatione*, without however using in that context the terminological distinction between “*of* a subject” and “*not of* a subject,”<sup>151</sup> the relation of “inhering *in* a

146 *Manṭiq Aristū, al-Maqūlāt*, ed. Ğabr, vol. 1, p. 32, l. 1 – p. 33, l. 1.

147 Porphyry, *In Categorias*, p. 72, ll. 34–35.

148 Simplicius, *In Categorias*, p. 45, l. 21.

149 For a sketch of this fourfold scheme in the oldest extant commentary, see Porphyry, *In Categorias*, p. 71, ll. 20–22: “τὰ ὄντα ἢ οὐσία καθόλου ἢ οὐσία ἐπὶ μέρους ἢ συμβεβηκότα καθόλου ἢ συμβεβηκότα ἐπὶ μέρους.” English tr. by Strange, p. 53: “beings are either universal substance or particular substance or universal accidents or particular accidents.”

150 In other places the terms τὰ κατὰ μέρος and *ašhās* are used for particular/individual things.

151 Aristotle, *De Int.* 7, 17a39–40: “λέγω δὲ καθόλου μὲν ὃ ἐπὶ πλείονων πέφυκε κατηγορεῖσθαι, καθ’ ἕκαστον δὲ ὃ μὴ.” English tr. by Ackrill, p. 47 (emphasis added): “I call universal that which is by its nature predicated *of* a number of things, and particular that which is not.” Arabic tr. in *Manṭiq Aristū, al-Maqūlāt*, ed. Ğabr, vol. 1, p. 118, ll. 4–6: *wa-a’nī bi-qawlī kulliyyan mā min ša’nihī an yuḥmala ‘alā aktara min wāḥidin wa-a’nī bi-qawlī ǧuz‘iyyan mā laysa dālika min ša’nihī*. It should be noted, however, that in this passage a universal is defined as being predicated of *many things*, not of a *subject*. If one holds the view that the formula “being said *of* a subject” refers to an *essential* universal

subject” – in the terminological sense in which it is introduced in *Cat. 2* – does not play a role in the remainder of his logical treatises.<sup>152</sup>

A prominent passage from which many of Aristotle’s ancient and most of his Arabic readers could receive the impression that the systematic juxtaposition of the two relations in which a predicate may stand to a subject is not restricted to the *Categories* is a short remark from *De Int. 3* in which Aristotle characterizes the “verb” (ῥῆμα/*kalima*) as being “always a sign of what holds, that is, what holds of a subject” (καὶ ἀεὶ τῶν ὑπαρχόντων σημείον ἐστίν, οἷον τῶν καθ’ ὑποκειμένου).<sup>153</sup> Whereas this is the reading Ammonius reports of the Greek text Porphyry had commented upon,<sup>154</sup> Ammonius himself – and with him the ensuing commentatorial tradition and transmission of the text – prefers a reading he deems to be more congruent with what Aristotle had expounded in the *Categories*: καὶ ἀεὶ τῶν καθ’ ἑτέρου λεγομένων σημείον ἐστίν, οἷον τῶν καθ’

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predicate and not just to any type of universal predicate, the wording “of a subject” is of some importance. See below, pp. 87–92.

152 In the strict sense in which it is used in *Cat. 2* the expression “in a subject” does not reappear in Aristotle’s other extant works. Two passages which seem to be connected to the terminological usage introduced in *Cat. 2* can be found in the *Topics*: (1) IV,6, 127b1–4: “Ἐτι εἰ ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ τῷ εἶδει τὸ ἀποδοθὲν γένος λέγεται, καθάπερ τὸ λευκὸν ἐπὶ τῆς χιόνος, ὥστε δῆλον ὅτι οὐκ ἂν εἴη γένος καθ’ ὑποκειμένου γὰρ τοῦ εἶδους μόνον τὸ γένος λέγεται.” English tr. by W. A. Pickard-Cambridge, in *The Complete Works of Aristotle*, ed. Jonathan Barnes (rev. Ox. tr., Princeton, NJ: University Press, 1984), vol. 1, p. 214 (emphasis added): “Moreover, see if the given genus is said to be *in* the species as subject, as white in the case of snow, thus showing clearly that it will not be the genus; for the genus is only said of the species as subject.” Arabic tr. in *Mantiq Aristū, al-Ġadal*, ed. Ġabr, vol. 2, p. 748, ll. 3–5: *wa-yunzaru aydan in kāna l-ġinsu l-mawsūfu yuqālu fi l-mawḏū’i li-n-naw’i, bi-manzilati l-abyaḏi fi t-talġi, fa-mīna l-bayyini annahū laysa bi-ġinsin, wa-dālika anna l-ġinsa innamā yuqālu ‘alā n-naw’i l-mawḏū’i faqaṭ lā fi l-mawḏū’.* That is to say, ‘white’ is *in* ‘snow’; therefore, ‘white’ is only an accident of snow and cannot be its genus. (2) V,4, 132b19–21: “Ἐπειτ’ ἀνασκευάζοντα μὲν εἰ τὸ ὑποκείμενον ἴδιον ἀποδέδωκε τοῦ ἐν τῷ ὑποκειμένῳ λεγομένου· οὐ γὰρ ἔσται ἴδιον τὸ κείμενον ἴδιον.” English tr. by W. A. Pickard-Cambridge (rev. Ox. tr.), vol. 1, p. 223 (emphasis added): “Next, for destructive purposes, see if he has rendered a subject as a property of that which is said to be *in* the subject; for then what has been stated to be a property will not be a property.” Arabic tr. in *Mantiq Aristū, al-Ġadal*, ed. Ġabr, vol. 2, p. 767, ll. 16–17: *wa-ba’da dālika fa-inna l-mubḥila yanzuru in kāna wasfu š-šay’i l-mawḏū’i hāṣṣatan li-llaḏi yuqālu fi l-mawḏū’i wa-dālika annahū lā yakūnu hāṣṣatan mā wuḏi’a annahū hāṣṣatan.* That is to say, whereas a predicate may function as a proprium in relation to the subject, an argument can be refuted if it turns out that the subject has been stated to be the proprium of “that which is said to be *in* the subject,” i.e., of one of its predicates (whereas it is unclear if Aristotle intends to restrict this to accidental predicates).

153 Aristotle, *De Int. 3*, 16b10–11.

154 Ammonius, *In Aristotelis De Interpretatione Commentarius*, ed. Adolf Busse (Berlin: Reimer, 1897), p. 50, ll. 9–14.



ὑποκειμένου ἢ ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ, i.e., a verb "always a sign of what holds, that is, what holds [as something which is said] of a subject or [as something which inheres] in a subject."<sup>155</sup> Even though – for the purpose of establishing a more authentic Greek text – this variant can be easily dismissed as the result of the subsequent systematization effort on the part of a scholiast,<sup>156</sup> it does remain the decisive reading in the context of studying the Arabic reception of Aristotle's *Organon*. For in Ishāq b. Ḥunayn's translation, as preserved in MS Paris ar. 2346,<sup>157</sup> the passage is rendered as follows: "the verb is always a sign [→ marginal annotation on 'sign': 'i.e., it always signifies something which exists in something else'] of that which is said of something else, just like you say 'that which is said of the subject' [→ interlinear gloss on 'of the subject': 'i.e., essentially'] or 'that which is said in the subject' [→ interlinear gloss on 'in the subject': 'i.e., accidentally']".<sup>158</sup> Thus, al-Ḥasan b. Suwār's 'annotated edition' of the Arabic *Organon* not only corroborates – via the text it had received from the Ammonian tradition – the view that whenever something holds of something, it is either something which is "said of a subject" or something which "inheres in a subject," but furthermore – through the glosses which are intended to explain the meaning of the expressions "of a subject" and "in a subject" – subscribes to the standard Neoplatonic interpretation of these two criteria: The formulae "being said of a subject" and "inhering in a subject" are not only understood to distinguish between universals and particulars, on the one hand, and accidents and substances, on the other hand, but rather between *essential* predications (i.e., "of

155 Ammonius, *In De Interpretatione*, p. 47, ll. 10–11, and p. 49, ll. 22–30. While this is also the reading one finds in Immanuel Bekker's edition, Lorenzo Minio-Paluello – on the basis of Ammonius' report of Porphyry's text – chose to omit ἢ ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ.

156 Cf. Weidemann's remarks in Aristotle, *Peri Hermeneias*, tr. and comm. Hermann Weidemann (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 2002, 2<sup>nd</sup> ed.), pp. 175–176.

157 Cf. Richard Walzer, "New Light on the Arabic Translations of Aristotle," *Oriens* 6 (1953): p. 92; Henri Hugonnard-Roche, "Remarques sur la tradition arabe de l'*Organon* d'après le manuscrit Paris, Bibliothèque nationale, ar. 2346," in *Glosses and Commentaries on Aristotelian Logical Texts: The Syriac, Arabic and Medieval Latin Traditions*, ed. Charles Burnett (London: Warburg Institute, 1993), pp. 19–28; and Joep Lameer, "The *Organon* of Aristotle in the Medieval Oriental and Occidental Traditions," *Journal of the American Oriental Society* 116 (1996): pp. 90–98.

158 *wa-l-kalimatu dā'iman dalilun* [→ marginal annotation on *dalilun*: *ay annahā abadan tadullu 'alā amrin mawḡūdin fī ḡayrihī*] *mā yuqālu 'alā ḡayrihī ka-annaka qulta mā yuqālu 'alā l-mawḡū'i* [→ interlinear gloss on '*alā l-mawḡū'i*': *ay dātiyyan*] *aw mā yuqālu fī l-mawḡū'i* [→ interlinear gloss on *fī l-mawḡū'i*: *ay 'araḏiyyan*] (ed. Ḡabr, vol. 1, p. 110, l. 9 – p. 111, l. 1, with notes 10, 11, 12; MS Paris ar. 2346, fol. 180a, ll. 6–8). Cf. Fritz Zimmermann, *Al-Farabi's Commentary and Short Treatise on Aristotle's De Interpretatione* (Oxford: University Press, 1981), p. xxiv ff.

a subject”) and *accidental* predications (i.e., “in a subject”). This is the dominant view which will be forcefully attacked by Ibn Sīnā.

### 2.1.2. The Predicative Scheme of *Cat. 2* vs the Hylemorphic Approach of *Met. Z-H*

As Aristotle’s characterization of primary substance at the beginning of *Cat. 5* suggests, the predicative scheme of *Cat. 2* might primarily have been intended to serve as a toolkit for a hierarchization of types of beings,<sup>159</sup> that is to say, only particular substances, which are neither by means of the *of* relation nor by means of the *in* relation dependent on something which underlies (be it a word, concept or concrete thing), have a well-founded claim to ontological priority. However, if one pursues such a line of interpretation, one will need to deal with the problem that the ontology expounded in the *Categories* – with its clear preference of individual things and its twofold negative description of primary substance – does not only stand in remarkable tension with the Platonic primacy of forms but to a certain degree, depending on one’s interpretation of the various lines of reasoning explored in *Met. Z* and *H*, with some of Aristotle’s later reflections on the issue as well. There are several indications that in these two treatises Aristotle considers a thing’s form (εἶδος), which in a number of places (whether as the result of subsequent additions or not) is identified with its essence (τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι),<sup>160</sup> to be a plausible candidate for οὐσία in the primary

159 Aristotle, *Cat. 5*, 2a10–13: “οὐσία δὲ ἐστὶν ἡ κυριώτατά τε καὶ πρότως καὶ μάλιστα λεγομένη, ἢ μήτε καθ’ ὑποκειμένου τινὸς λέγεται μήτε ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ τινὶ ἐστὶν.” English tr. by Ackrill, p. 5: “A *substance* – that which is called a substance most strictly, primarily, and most of all – is that which is neither said of a subject nor in a subject.” Arabic tr. in *Manṭiq Aristū, al-Maqūlāt*, ed. Ġabr, vol. 1, p. 40, ll. 3–4: *fa-ammā l-ḡawharu l-mawṣūfu bi-annahū awwalī bi-t-tahqīqi wa-t-taqdīmi wa-t-tafāili fa-huwa lladī lā yuqāla ‘alā mawḏū‘in mā wa-lā huwa fī mawḏū‘in mā.*

160 The clearest expression of the equation “form” = “essence” = “primary substance,” which can be found in an aside in *Met. Z 7*, might well have been a subsequent addition. The passage reads: “ἀπὸ τέχνης δὲ γίγνεται ὅσων τὸ εἶδος ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ (εἶδος δὲ λέγω τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι ἐκάστου καὶ τὴν πρώτην οὐσίαν)” (1032a32–b2). English tr. by David Bostock, *Metaphysics: Books Z and H* (Oxford: University Press, 1994, reprint 2003), p. 10: “[t]he things produced by skill are those whose form is in the soul of the producer (and by the form I mean what being is for each thing and its primary substance)”; see also Bostock’s commentary on this passage, p. 119 and p. 125. Interestingly, in the lemmata of Ibn Ruṣd’s *Commentary on the Metaphysics* this phrase is contained in a passage which is not introduced by *qāla Aristāṭālīs* but which is marked as a quote taken from “Nicolaus’ book.” See Ibn Ruṣd, *Tafsīr Mā ba’d aṭ-Ṭabī‘a*, ed. Maurice Bouyges SJ (Beirut dār al-maṣriq, 1938–1952), vol. 2, p. 844: *tumma naḡidu fī kitābi Nīqulāwuš (?) yatlu hādā l-*

sense.<sup>161</sup> Starting from the assumption that substance must be "a principle and some sort of cause,"<sup>162</sup> *Met. Z 17* makes the effort of exploring what substance is by means of investigating what we seek when ask for a thing's cause; when we ask, for example, why bricks and stones are a house, we seek "logically speaking, the thing's essence."<sup>163</sup> Thus, in sharp contrast to the description of primary substance offered in *Cat. 2* and 5, οὐσία – being identified with a thing's form and essence – is now primarily treated as "the substance of something."

Whereas the ontological scheme of *Cat. 2* had been construed solely on the basis of two different subject-predicate relations, Aristotle's discussion of primary substance in *Met. Z* and *H* now draws on the hylemorphic conception he had previously developed in *Physics*:<sup>164</sup> Within the context of analyzing the princi-

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*qawla mā hādā naṣṣuhū*; "thereupon in Nicolaus' book we find this account to be followed by something which has the following wording." The subsequent phrase reads: *wa-l-aṣyā'u l-kā'inatu 'ani ṣ-ṣinā'ati llatī ṣūratuhā wa-māhiyyatuhā mawḡūdatun fī n-nafsi a'nī fī l-ḡawhari l-awwal*; "the things generated by art are those whose form and essence are existent in the soul, i.e., in the primary substance." This deviates from the Greek text as we know it in two important regards: (1) The term εἶδος/*ṣūra* is not explained by equating it with τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι / *māhiyya* and πρώτη οὐσία / *al-ḡawhar al-awwal*; rather, εἶδος/*ṣūra* and τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι / *māhiyya* are treated as a *hendiadyoin*; (2) "form" and "essence" are not equated with "first substance"; rather, the soul is identified with "first substance."

- 161 There has been a long scholarly debate on whether or not Aristotle in the course of *Met. Z* arrives at any definite conclusion on what he regards to be a substance in the primary sense (and whether or not such a search can really be regarded to be the main objective of that treatise). For a concise overview of the various modern interpretations of this old question, see the subsection "Die Theorie der *ousia* in *Metaphysik VII–VIII*" (pp. 337–341) in Christof Rapp, "Substanz," in *Aristoteles-Handbuch*, ed. idem and Klaus Corcilius (Stuttgart/Weimar: Metzler, 2011), pp. 335–342. For a fundamental critique of an approach that understands *Met. Z* primarily as an attempt at testing which candidates might meet the criteria for qualifying as a primary substance, see Stephen Menn, "On Myles Burnyeat's *Map of Metaphysics Zeta*," *Ancient Philosophy* 31 (2011): pp. 161–202.
- 162 Aristotle, *Met. Z 17*, 1041a9–10: "ἡ οὐσία ἀρχὴ καὶ αἰτία τις ἐστίν." Arabic tr. in Ibn Ruṣd, *Tafsīr Mā ba'd aṭ-Ṭabī'a*, ed. Bouyges, vol. 2, p. 1006, ll. 4–5: *wa-id al-ḡawharu ibtidā'un wa-'illatun mā*.
- 163 Aristotle, *Met. Z 17*, 1041a28: "τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι, ὡς εἰπεῖν λογικῶς." Arabic tr. in Ibn Ruṣd, *Tafsīr Mā ba'd aṭ-Ṭabī'a*, ed. Bouyges, vol. 2, p. 1007, l. 5: *māhiyyatu l-bayti miṭla llaḏī kāna bi-naw'i l-mantiq*.
- 164 In his *Epitome* of Aristotle's *Metaphysics* Ibn Ruṣd accuses Ibn Sinā of having failed to understand that it is physics which establishes that every natural being is a form-matter compound: "As for Ibn Sinā, he erred in this [question] completely, for he thought that he who practises natural sciences cannot show that bodies are composed of matter and form and that it lies in the responsibility of the metaphysician to show this"; see Ibn Ruṣd, *On Aristotle's 'Metaphysics': An Annotated Translation of the so-called 'Epitome'*, tr. Rüdiger Arnzen (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2010), p. 59; cf. Arnzen's commentary, pp. 229–230.

ples and causes of “those which are by nature” (τὰ φύσει ὄντα / *al-ašyā’ at-ṭabī’iyya*),<sup>165</sup> i.e., of natural beings, Aristotle had argued in *Phys. A 7* that “everything comes to be out of the underlying thing and the form” (ὅτι γίγνεται πᾶν ἔκ τε τοῦ ὑποκειμένου καὶ τῆς μορφῆς / *anna anāšira kulli kawnin hiya l-mawḏū’u wa-š-šūra*).<sup>166</sup> While “that which underlies” (ὑποκειμενον/*mawḏū’*) may be identified with a thing’s “matter” (ὕλη), its “shape” (μορφή) may be equated with its εἶδος in the sense of its “form” (but not necessarily in the sense of its species). In *Physics* Aristotle leaves the ontological question which of the two elements of a form-matter compound primarily deserves to be called οὐσία unresolved: “Whether the form or what underlies is the substance is not yet clear.”<sup>167</sup>

In *Met. Z 3* Aristotle resumes this open question and makes it indubitably clear that a thing’s ὑποκειμενον, identified as a thing’s ὕλη, ought to be excluded from the list of candidates since it fails to fulfill two decisive criteria, namely “being separable” and “being a certain this”;<sup>168</sup> the claim that matter in itself is neither a particular nor a separate being is in line with Aristotle’s theory that

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Even though, as Arnzen remarks, Ibn Rušd’s criticism is quite exaggerated, it correctly alludes to the fact that for Ibn Sīnā the principles of hylemorphism must be proven in the discipline of metaphysics; thus, in VI,1 of the *Ilāhiyyāt* of the *Šifā’* Ibn Sīnā establishes form (*šūra*) and matter (*hayūlā*) as causes which are “included in a thing’s subsistence and part of its existence” (*dāhīlan fi qiwāmihī wa-ğuz’an min wuğūdihi*), that is to say, as intrinsic causes in relation to a form-matter compound (*murakkab*); while the “formal cause” (*al-‘illa aš-šūriyya*) is that “through which the thing is what it is *in actu*” (*yakūnu š-šay’u bihā huwa mā huwa bi-l-fi’l*), the “elemental/material cause” (*al-‘illa al-‘unšuriyya*) is that “through which the thing is what it is *in potentia* and in which the potentiality of its existence resides” (*yakūnu bihā š-šay’u huwa mā huwa bi-l-quwwati wa-tastaqirru fihā quwwatu wuğūdihi*); see Ibn Sīnā, *K. aš-Šifā’, al-Ilāhiyyāt (2)*, VI,1, pp. 257–259. As we shall see, in *K. aš-Šifā’, al-Manṭiq, al-Maqūlāt I,3*, Ibn Sīnā’s revision of the fourfold division of *Cat. 2* aims, *inter alia*, at an integration of these two intrinsic causes, that is to say, at an integration of the hylemorphic conception of individual beings into Aristotle’s scheme of attributive relations.

- 165 Aristotle, *Phys. A 7*, 190b17–18 (my tr.). Arabic tr. in *aṭ-Ṭabī’a*, ed. ‘Abd ar-Rahmān Badawī (Cairo: ad-Dār al-qawmiyya li-ṭ-ṭibā’a wa-n-našr (1964–1965 [1384–1385 AH]), vol. 1, p. 62, l. 5.
- 166 Aristotle, *Phys. A 7*, 190b19–20. English tr. by William Charlton, *Physics: Books I and II* (Oxford: University Press, 1970, reprint 2006), p. 17. Arabic tr. in *aṭ-Ṭabī’a*, ed. Badawī, vol. 1, p. 62, l. 8.
- 167 Aristotle, *Phys. A 7*, 191a19–20: “πότερον δὲ οὐσία τὸ εἶδος ἢ τὸ ὑποκειμενον, οὐπω δῆλον.” English tr. by R. P. Hardie and R. K. Gaye (rev. Ox. tr.), vol. 1, p. 326. Arabic tr. in *aṭ-Ṭabī’a*, ed. Badawī, vol. 1, p. 64, ll. 14–16: *ammā ma’rifatu mā idā kānat aš-šūratu aw al-mawḏū’u huwa l-ğawharu fa-amrun lā yazālu ġamiḏan*.
- 168 Aristotle, *Met. Z 3*, 1029a27–28: “τὸ χωριστὸν καὶ τὸ τόδε τι ὑπάρχειν.” Arabic tr. in Ibn Rušd, *Tafsīr Mā ba’d aṭ-Ṭabī’a*, ed. Bouyges, vol. 2, p. 772, ll. 7–8: *anna l-mufāriqata wallatī tadullu ‘alā anniyyatin bi-qawli hādā š-šay’*.

matter alone is pure potency. In the same chapter, however, Aristotle also discards the possibility that the form-matter *compositum*, i.e., a concrete individual thing which according to the classification expounded in the *Categories* would enjoy the highest rank among substances, may properly be regarded to be a substance in the primary sense: "However, the substance compounded from both, I mean from both matter and shape, we may disregard; for it is posterior and clear. [...] But we must investigate the third kind of substance, i.e., form, for this is the most puzzling."<sup>169</sup> Thus, even though a particular substance fulfills three decisive criteria of being a substance – for it is not only a "certain this," but, besides that it can exist separately and, rather than being predicated of another thing, it functions as the subject of which other things may be predicated – the simple fact that a compound is always posterior in relation to the elements it is made up of hampers its claim to primacy. Therefore form – in the sense of a thing's essence – seems to be the only remaining contender. And there are good reasons to assume that at least temporarily Aristotle must have preferred the ontological primacy of the species-form which, in contrast to a superordinate genus, may be said to signify a "certain this." If *Met. Z* in the transmitted shape in which we have it today – and in which all known ancient and medieval commentators read it – is indeed to be regarded as a unified entity, there are, at the same time, clear indications that in this treatise Aristotle also wanted to argue for the view that no type of universal fulfills the criteria of being an οὐσία in the primary sense: Whereas a substance should "not belong to another thing" (ἢ οὐχ ὑπάρχει ἄλλῳ / *laysa huwa li-šay'in āhara*), a universal is always "common" (κοινόν/*muštarak*) to many things; moreover – in drawing on the "of a subject" criterion from *Cat. 2* – Aristotle makes it clear that a substance, that is to say, a *primary* substance – in contrast to a universal –, is "that which is not [predicated] of a subject" (τὸ μὴ καθ' ὑποκειμένου / *allaḍī laysa 'alā mawḍū'in*); and finally, "none of those which are predicated as being common [to many things] signifies a certain this" (οὐδὲν σημαίνει τῶν κοινῆ κατηγορουμένων τόδε τι / *laysa šay'un mina llatī tuħmalu bi-naw'in muštarakin yadullu 'alā hādā š-šay'*) but only "a such-as-this" (τοιόνδε / *mitla hādā*).<sup>170</sup> If, nonetheless, it is taken for

169 Aristotle, *Met. Z* 3, 1029a30–33: "τὴν μὲν τοίνυν ἐξ ἀμφοῖν οὐσίαν, λέγω δὲ τὴν ἐκ τε τῆς ὕλης καὶ τῆς μορφῆς, ἀφετέον, ὑστέρα γὰρ καὶ δήλη. [...] περὶ δὲ τῆς τρίτης σκεπτέον, αὕτη γὰρ ἀπορωτάτη." English tr. by Bostock, p. 4. Arabic tr. in Ibn Rušd, *Tafsīr Mā ba'd at-Ṭabī'a*, ed. Bouyges, vol. 2, p. 778, ll. 2–4: *la-nada'u ḥinanā hādā ḍikra l-ḡawhari llaḍī min kullayhimā, a'ni mina l-hayūlā wa-l-miṭāl, li-annahū ḡawharun aḥirun wa-bayyinun ayḍan [...] fa-la-naḡḡašu 'ani t-tāliṭi fa-inna fihi taḡayyuran kaṭīran*.

170 Aristotle, *Met. Z* 13, 1038b8–12; 1038b15–16; 1038b34 – 1039a2. Arabic tr. in Ibn Rušd, *Tafsīr Mā ba'd at-Ṭabī'a*, ed. Bouyges, vol. 2, p. 961, ll. 9–13; p. 962, l. 2, and p. 964, l. 4; p. 968, ll. 1–3. Cf. Christof Rapp, "Allgemeines konkret: Ein Beitrag zum Verständnis der

granted that in the course of Aristotle's quest for the πρώτη οὐσία the εἶδος ultimately wins the day, one will unavoidably be faced with the challenge of construing the εἶδος in such a way that it manages to meet all of these criteria, i.e., that it can be conceived as being non-universal, and yet does not become fully identical with a concrete material being, that is to say, with a compounded being.

However, regardless of the contested question what an εἶδος would have to be like in order to qualify as a *primary* substance, Aristotle's subsequent remarks in *Met.* H 1 suggest that at least in a certain *façon de parler* he was willing to grant a substantial status to all three basic notions of his hylemorphic conception of individual things, even though none of them might ultimately manage to meet all of his criteria:

What underlies is a substance, and in one way this is the matter (by which I mean that which is not a this in actuality, but is a this potentially), though in another way it is the formula and the shape (which is a this and is separable in formula), and in a third way it is what is compounded from these (and this alone can come to be and cease to be, and is separable without qualification – for of those substances which are given by a formula some are separable and some are not).<sup>171</sup>

What some commentators, both ancient and modern, have deemed to be particularly problematic is not only the fact that Aristotle's form-matter analysis is completely absent from the fourfold division introduced in *Cat.* 2 but that at

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Aristotelischen Substanzlehre," *Philosophisches Jahrbuch der Görres-Gesellschaft*, vol. 102 (1995): pp. 83–100.

- 171 Aristotle, *Met.* H 1, 1042a26–31: “ἔστι δ' οὐσία τὸ ὑποκείμενον, ἄλλως μὲν ἢ ὕλην (ὕλην δὲ λέγω ἢ μὴ τὸδε τι οὐσα ἐνεργεῖα δυνάμει ἔστι τὸδε τι), ἄλλως δ' ὁ λόγος καὶ ἡ μορφή, ὃ τὸδε τι ὄν τῷ λόγῳ χωριστόν ἐστιν· τρίτον δὲ τὸ ἐκ τούτων, οὗ γένεσις μόνου καὶ φθορά ἐστι, καὶ χωριστόν ἀπλῶς· τῶν γὰρ κατὰ τὸν λόγον οὐσιῶν αἱ μὲν αἱ δ' οὐ.” English tr. by Bostock, p. 32. Arabic tr. in Ibn Rušd, *Tafsīr Mā ba'd at-Ṭabī'a*, ed. Bouyges, vol. 2, p. 1027, l. 11 – p. 1028, l. 2: *wa-l-ḡawharu huwa l-mawḏū'u, wa-ammā bi-naw'in āḡara fa-huwa l-'unṣuru wa-aqūlu l-'unṣura llaḏī lammā lam yakun hāḏā š-šay'u bi-l-fi'li huwa hāḏā š-šay'u bi-l-quwwati, wa-bi-naw'in āḡara huwa l-kalimatu wa-s-sinḡu llaḏī huwa hāḏā š-šay'u wa-huwa bi-l-kalimati mufāriqun, wa-t-tāliṡu llaḏī min hāḏihī llaḏī l-kawnu wa-l-fasādu lahū waḡdahū wa-huwa mufāriqun bi-naw'in mabsūṡin fa-inna l-ḡawāhira llatī hiya ḡawāhirun bi-l-kalimati ba'ḏuhā na'm wa-ba'ḏuhā lā* (according to the GALex database there are only three instances in which μορφή is translated by the rather rare expression *sinḡ*, namely – besides the present case – at 1043a31 and 1055b14). Cf. Bostock's remark (in the context of commenting on *Met.* Z 13), p. 186: “One might say that there is an awareness that the criteria for being a substance cannot be jointly satisfied, but Aristotle's reaction to this seems to be that we must therefore admit as substances *each* of the three candidates, matter, form, and the compound of the two, one because it satisfies one criterion and another because it satisfies another. This, at any rate, seems to be the moral of H 1, 42<sup>a</sup>26–31.”

least in two regards the hylemorphic conception might stand in remarkable tension to the ontological hierarchy which may be inferred from the predicative criteria: (1) Firstly, if every individual substance is conceived as a form-matter compound, an individual substance may be taken to be posterior in relation to form and matter; (2) and secondly, since Aristotle in certain contexts identifies "that which underlies" (ὑποκείμενον) with a thing's "matter" (ύλη),<sup>172</sup> not only an accident but a thing's "form" (μορφή or εἶδος) as well may be characterized as "inhering in a subject"; an additional indication for the concurrence of "the accident in a subject" in the sense of the *Categories* with "the form in a subject" in the sense of *Metaphysics* has been drawn from the assumption that – as Porphyry, among others, maintains<sup>173</sup> – they both seem to share in the same descriptive account; for neither of them is a part of what it inheres in nor can either of them be separated from what it inheres in.<sup>174</sup>

As will be discussed later on, Ibn Sīnā inherits some basic exegetical assumptions on the scheme expounded in *Cat.* 2 from the commentary tradition, especially the idea that Aristotle makes use of *predicative* relations in order to classify both logico-linguistic and ontological phenomena, namely "accidents" and "substances" and "universals" and "particulars." He does, however, voice

172 See, *inter alia*, Aristotle, *Phys.* A 7.

173 Porphyry, *In Categorias*, p. 78, ll. 6–9: "{E.} Ποῖον οὖν τούτων τῶν ἐννέα λαμβάνεται ἐν τῷ ὑποκειμένῳ ἔν τινι; {A.} Τὸ ὡς ἐν τῇ ὕλῃ τὸ εἶδος. {E.} Διὰ τί; {A.} Ὅτι μόνα τὰ εἶδη τῶν ὑλῶν ἀχώριστά ἐστιν." English tr. by Strange, p. 61: "Q. To which of these nine senses does being in something as a subject belong? – A. To the sense in which the form is in the matter. Q. Why? A. Because it is only forms that are inseparable from their matter."

174 For Ammonius' report and refutation of this view, see Ammonius, *In Categorias*, p. 27, l. 30 – p. 28, l. 7: "πάλιν φασὶ 'τὸ εἶδος ἐν τῇ ὕλῃ ἐστὶ καὶ οὐκ ἔστι μέρος τῆς ὕλης καὶ ἀδύνατον χωρὶς εἶναι τῆς ὕλης· οὐκοῦν κατὰ τὸν προειρημένον λόγον καὶ τὸ εἶδος συμβεβηκὸς ἐστὶ'. φασὶ οὖν ὅτι πρῶτον μὲν τὸ εἶδος εἰ καὶ μὴ ἔστι μέρος τῆς ὕλης, ἀλλ' οὖν τοῦ συναμφοτέρου (οὕτω γὰρ καὶ τὴν χεῖρά φασιν οὐ τοῦ λοιποῦ σώματος μέρος εἶναι, ἀλλὰ τοῦ παντός), ἔπειτα δὲ τὸ μὲν εἶδος συμπληρωτικὸν ἐστὶ τῆς ἐκάστου οὐσίας καὶ τούτου φθαρέντος φθείρεται τὸ ὑποκείμενον, τὸ δὲ συμβεβηκὸς οὔτε συμπληροῖ τὴν οὐσίαν τοῦ ὑποκειμένου καὶ φθαρέντος αὐτοῦ οὐδὲν ἐβλάβη τὸ ὑποκείμενον· καὶ ταῦτα μὲν πρὸς τοὺς λέγοντας τὸν ὀρισμὸν ἐφαρμόζειν καὶ ἑτέροις." English tr. by Cohen/Matthews, p. 37: "Again it is said, 'Form is in matter and is not part of matter and cannot exist apart from matter. Therefore according to the aforesaid definition form, too, is an accident'. We reply that, in the first place, the form, even if it is not part of the matter, is yet part of the composite (for in this way we also say that the hand is not part of the rest of the body but rather of the whole body), and, in the second place, the form is constitutive of the substance of each thing and when it is destroyed the subject is destroyed. But the accident does not constitute the substance of the subject and when it is destroyed the subject is not damaged. These comments are directed towards those who say that the definition fits other things as well."

some serious doubts – not only with regard to the soundness and utility of the scheme itself but especially with regard to some scholars' inability to draw a proper distinction between the logico-linguistic and the ontological aspects it combines. But before focusing on Ibn Sīnā's critical reassessment of *Cat. 2* and of the commentatorial efforts generated by the fourfold scheme, it is worthwhile to take a look at an alternative strategy of getting a grip on the differing ontological hierarchization efforts Aristotle undertakes in *Cat. 2* and throughout *Met. Z*.

## 2.2. Excursus on Ibn Rušd's Approach in His *Talḥīṣ Mā ba'd aṭ-ṭabī'a*: Reading the Ontological Order Established in the *Categories* into the *Metaphysics*

Given the intricacy of Aristotle's different attempts at inquiring which thing may be rightfully called a πρώτη οὐσία, it is quite remarkable that for Abū l-Walid b. Rušd (d. 595 AH / 1198 AD) – who sees himself in the role of defending Peripatetic philosophy proper against rivaling philosophical and theological strands of thinking, most importantly against Ibn Sīnā's comprehensive revision of the Aristotelian tradition – the answer to this question appears to be indubitably clear. As one might already expect from the genre of this work, in his *Talḥīṣ Mā ba'd aṭ-ṭabī'a*, i.e., the *Epitome on the Metaphysics*, he deems it necessary to present a concise and unambiguous account of Aristotle's hierarchization of the various kinds of substances. In order to do so he resorts to reading the ontological order established in the *Categories* into the *Metaphysics*, that is to say, the straightforward differentiation between primary and secondary substances – with its clear ontological preference of particular things – is treated as Aristotle's authoritative doctrine, whereas one of the crucial questions of the explorations undertaken in *Met. Z*, namely whether and in which way essences may be regarded to be substances in the primary sense, is downgraded to reflecting merely a derivative “relational” usage of the term “substance”:

[1] ‘Substance’ is said primarily and in a manner most commonly accepted of ‘that which can be pointed to’ (*al-muṣār ilayhi*) which is not *in* a subject (*laysa fi mawḏū'in*) and which is not in any way [said] *of* a subject (*wa-lā 'alā mawḏū'in aṣlan*).

[2] Secondly, it is said of every universal predicate which makes known the quiddity of the ‘that which can be pointed to,’ namely genus, species, or differentia.

[3] Thirdly, it is said of everything signified by definitions (*'alā kullin mā dalla 'alayhi l-ḥudūd*), that is, either of everything which makes known the quiddity of a substance, or of that which makes known the quiddity of any given thing, regard-



less of which of the ten categories it belongs to. This is called substance only in a relational, not in an absolute manner.<sup>175</sup>

Even though in the *Metaphysics* Aristotle refrains from drawing on the relation of inherence in his search for the *πρώτη οὐσία*, in Ibn Rušd's account both attributive relations expounded in *Cat. 2* – i.e., “inhering in a subject” and “being said of a subject” – remain operative as the overriding criteria for providing an ontological hierarchization. As a result, [1] the position of primary substance is assigned to “something which can be pointed to,” i.e., the Aristotelian *τόδε τι*, now understood as an individual thing in external reality; [2] reflecting the claim Aristotle makes in *Cat. 5*, namely that “the species in which the things primarily called substances are, are called *secondary substances*, as also are the genera of these species,”<sup>176</sup> Ibn Rušd regards an essential predicate of such a *τόδε τι* to be a substance in a secondary sense; [3] and finally, the essence of any given thing (including the essential account of an accident) is not granted a claim to substantiality in its own right but is admitted to be a substance in a subordinate way, namely in relation to the thing for which it functions as an essence. Interestingly, Aristotle's extensive reflections on the ontological gradations between the substantiality of form and the substantiality of matter are completely absent from this account. Rather, only in passing the hylemorphic conception is presented as one out of various views held by the heterogeneous group labeled as “philosophasters (*mutafalsifūn*),” that is to say, all those scholars who – according to Ibn Rušd – deviate from Aristotle's established doctrine:

After it had been established that the most commonly accepted meaning of substance is ‘something which can be pointed to’ – for that this is a substance [of some

175 Ibn Rušd, *Talḥiṣ Mā ba'd at-ṭabī'a*, ed. 'Uṭmān Amīn (Cairo: Muṣṭafā al-Bābī al-Ḥalabī, 1958), p. 11, ll. 9–13 (my tr.). Cf. the German tr. by Simon van den Bergh, *Die Epitome der Metaphysik des Averroes* (reprint, Leiden: Brill, 1970), pp. 9–10; and the English tr. by Arnzen, p. 30. I follow Arnzen in incorporating the variant given by Amīn in note 8 into the text; the omission can safely be attributed to a *saut du même au même* (and it is unclear why Amīn repeats this scribal error); thus, the Arabic text should read as follows (the addition to Amīn's text is highlighted):

الجوهر يقال أولاً وأشهر ذلك على المشار إليه الذي ليس هو في موضوع ولا على موضوع أصلاً. ويقال ثانياً على كلّ محمول كُتبي عرّف ماهية المشار إليه من جنس أو نوع أو فصل. ويقال ثالثاً على كلّ ما دلّ عليه الحدود، وذلك إما على كلّ ما عرّف ماهية الجوهر، وإما على ما عرّف ماهية شيء ما أي شيء كان من المقولات العشر. ولذلك يقولون إنّ الحدود تعرّف ماهية الأشياء. وهذا إنّما يستحق جوهرًا بالإضافة لا بإطلاق.

176 Aristotle, *Cat. 5*, 2a14–16: “δεύτεραι δὲ οὐσίαι λέγονται, ἐν οἷς εἶδεναι αἱ πρώτως οὐσίαι λεγόμεναι ὑπάρχουσιν, ταῦτά τε καὶ τὰ τῶν εἰδῶν τούτων γένη.” English tr. by Ackrill, pp. 5–6. Arabic tr. in *Manṭiq Aristū, al-Maqūlāt*, ed. Ġabr, vol. 1, p. 40, ll. 5–7: *fa-ammā l-mawṣūfatu bi-annahā ḡawāhirun ṭawānin fa-hiya l-anwā'u llatī fihā tūḡadu l-ḡawāhiru l-mawṣūfatu bi-annahā uwalun wa-ma'a hāḏihī aḡnāsu hāḏihī l-anwā'i aydan.*

sort] had [even] been acknowledged among the totality of philosophasters –, they [i.e., the philosophasters] held that it is more appropriate to call that which makes known the quiddity of ‘this thing which can be pointed to’ [by the name] ‘substance.’

Therefore, whoever holds that the universals of ‘the thing which can be pointed to’ are the ones which make known its quiddity, holds that it has the highest claim to the name ‘substance.’ [...]

Likewise, whoever holds that the ‘thing itself which can be pointed to’ (*ad-dāt al-mušār ilayhi*) is composed of indivisible parts (*ağzā’ lā tatağazza’u*), calls these [indivisible parts] [by the name] ‘substance,’ just like we hear the contemporary theologians call the indivisible part [by the name] ‘individual substance.’

Likewise, whoever holds that ‘that which can be pointed to’ is, in fact, composed of matter and form, holds that form and matter have the highest claim to the name ‘substance’; and this is also relative to the view one holds about the matter of each single thing and about its [i.e., the matter’s] respective form.<sup>177</sup>

As can be seen, in this brief outline the Neoplatonic prioritization of universals, the atomism of the *mutakallimūn*, and the hylemorphic reflections of how and to which degree form and matter may be said to be substances, as expounded by Aristotle himself in *Met. Z*, are all grouped under the common aspect of posing a challenge to the doctrine of the ontological priority of ‘that which can be pointed to’ in the sense of a concrete individual being.

By highlighting the fact that Ibn Rušd excludes any hylemorphic considerations from the exposition of – what he deems to be – Aristotle’s established hierarchization of substances I do not intend to imply that he refrains from

177 Ibn Rušd, *Talḥiṣ Mā ba’d at-ṭabī’a*, ed. Amin, p. 11, l. 14 – p. 12, l. 8 (my tr.). Cf. the German tr. by van den Bergh, p. 10; and the English tr. by Arnzen, pp. 30–31. I do not think that Arnzen’s emendation (i.e., his proposed reading *wa-in kāna hādā ...* instead of *id kāna hādā ...*) is necessary to make sense of this sentence. Rather, if one understands *ašhar* to mean “most commonly accepted,” the insertion beginning with *id* can be taken to offer the reason for why this is the “most commonly accepted” meaning; after all, the “philosophasters” are only said to agree upon the view that a ‘certain this’ is “a substance” (*annahū ḡawharun*), not upon the view that it is the primary substance; and having conceded that an individual body may be called “a substance,” they still deemed it necessary to state which other thing in their view has yet a higher claim to be called “substance,” namely the quiddity of a ‘certain this.’ Thus I retain the following reading: ولما كان أشهر معاني الجوهر هو المشار إليه الذي هو لا في موضوع ولا على موضوع، إذ كان هذا هو المقتر به عند جميع المتفلسفين أنه جوهر، كان ما عترف ماهية هذا الشيء المشار إليه عندهم أخرى أن يستى جوهرًا. ولذلك من رأى أن كليات الشيء المشار إليه هي التي تعترف ماهيته رأى أنها أحق باسم الجوهر. [...] وكذلك من رأى أن الذات المشار إليها تتألف من أجزاء لا تتجزأ ستمها جوهرًا، كما نسمع المتكلمين من أهل زماننا يستون الجزء الذي لا يتجزأ الجوهر الفرد. وكذلك من رأى أن المشار إليه إنما يتألف من مادة وصورة، كانت الصورة والمادة عنده أحق باسم الجوهر. وذلك أيضاً بحسب ما يظن في مادة كل واحد من الأشياء وصورتها.

treating the form-matter analysis of individual beings within metaphysics altogether; quite the contrary is the case, as is well attested by the material presented in the second *maqāla* of his *Talḥiṣ mā ba'd at-ṭabī'a*. Rather, what I would like to stress is that when it comes to giving a concise outline of how to determine the ontological rank of the various types of beings which, in one way or another, have been called "substance," Ibn Ruṣd in his *Talḥiṣ mā ba'd at-ṭabī'a* chooses to neglect Aristotle's hylemorphic considerations and instead solely makes use of the two predicative criteria of *Cat.* 2; this allows him to arrive at the unambiguous result that it is individual things which ought to be treated as substances in the primary sense. Since he regards this as one of the essential teachings of Aristotle's *Metaphysics*, it is only consequential that in his *Epitome on the Categories* (*Talḥiṣ K. al-Maqūlāt*), in turn, he does not sense any need to reconcile the account given in the *Categories* with the account given in the *Metaphysics*; thus, it is not surprising that the form-matter analysis is completely absent from his *Talḥiṣ K. al-Maqūlāt*.<sup>178</sup>

In sharp contrast to such an approach, it is all the more interesting to see that for Ibn Sīnā, both in his condensed treatise on the *Categories* contained in the *Muḥtaṣar al-awsaṭ fi l-mantiq* and in his extensive *K. al-Maqūlāt* of the *K. aš-Šifā'*, one of the most pressing issues appears to be an integration of Aristotle's form-matter analysis into the ontological account of the *Categories*.

### 2.3. Ibn Sīnā's Ranking of Substances in *K. aš-Šifā'*, *al-Mantiq*, *al-Maqūlāt*, III,1–2

For Ibn Sīnā the question of whether and how one can arrive at an ontological hierarchization of various types of substances is inextricably linked to his well-known differentiation between essence and existence. Thus, in chapter III,1 of the *Maqūlāt* of the *Šifā'* he argues for the view that the account of what it means to be a substance – i.e., the essence of substantiality, namely "being not *in* a subject" (whereas "being" must not be understood to claim existence *in actu*)<sup>179</sup> – is univocally predicated of all types of substances, without there being any gradation in the sense of an equivocal predication *per prius et posterius*. The background of this discussion is Ibn Sīnā's refutation of the following claim: "Substance" may not be regarded to be a genus which is common to matter, to form, to a form-matter *compositum* (*al-murakkab*) and to a substantial being detached

178 See especially his outline of *Cat.* 2 and *Cat.* 5. Ibn Ruṣd, *Talḥiṣ K. al-Maqūlāt*, ed. Maurice Bouyges SJ (Beirut: Imprimerie Catholique, 1932), pp. 7–10 and pp. 15–36.

179 Ibn Sīnā, *K. aš-Šifā'*, *al-Mantiq*, *al-Maqūlāt*, III,1, p. 92, l. 4 – p. 93, l. 3 [= § 3 (4.B.d)]. For a full translation of *K. aš-Šifā'*, *al-Mantiq*, *al-Maqūlāt*, III,1–2, see below, pp. 261–277.

from body (*al-mufāriq*) since allegedly matter and form are – in relation to the concept of substantiality (*ma'nā l-ġawhariyya*) – prior (*aqdam*) to the other two types of substances.<sup>180</sup> Whoever takes such a position fails, according to Ibn Sīnā, to properly distinguish between priority in essence and priority in existence:

You have come to know the true nature (*haqīqa*) of 'being a substance' (*kawn al-ġawhar*) on account of the attribute (*ṣifa*) of 'being not in a subject' (*mawġūdun lā fī mawdū'in*). And you have come to know that 'being a substance' on account of this attribute is something in which there is neither priority (*taqaddum*) nor posteriority (*ta'aḥḥur*) – even if the attainment of existence (*huṣūl al-wuġūd*), which this aspect [of considering the quiddity, namely the quiddity *qua* quiddity] becomes related to [so as to attain one of the two modes of existence] (*allaḍi hādā l-i'tibār maqīs ilayhi*),<sup>181</sup> should occur *per prius et posterius* (*in kāna ... wāqi'an bi-taqaddumin wa-ta'aḥḥurin*) –, just like in the concept on account of which 'rational' is said of man there is neither priority nor posteriority and neither a higher nor a lower intensity. [...] That which indicates that in the true nature of substantiality, which we have expounded, there is neither priority nor posteriority is the fact that it is not possible for you to say: 'The fact that form is *per se* a quiddity which is such that – whenever it exists in concrete things (*iḍā wuġida fī l-a'yān*) – it is not in need of a subject and does not exist in a subject is prior to the fact that the same is true for the compound'.<sup>182</sup>

That means, with regard to the quiddity one cannot say that not being in need of a subject and not existing *in* a subject is an essential account that applies primarily to form and only secondarily to the form-matter *compositum*. Rather, with

180 For an outline of the position he intends to refute, see Ibn Sīnā, *K. aš-Šifā', al-Manṭiq, al-Maqūlāt*, III,1, p. 91, ll. 7–15 [= § 1 (4.B.d)].

181 Cf. Ibn Sīnā, *K. aš-Šifā', al-Manṭiq, al-Madḥal*, I,2, p. 15, ll. 1–5: *wa-māhiyyātu l-ašyā'i qad takūnu fī a'yāni l-ašyā'i wa-qad takūnu fī t-tašawwuri fa-yakūnu lahā i'tibārātun talāṭatun: i'tibāru l-māhiyyati bi-mā hiya tilka l-māhiyyatu ġayru muḍāfatin ilā aḥadi l-wuġūdayni [...], wa-i'tibārun lahā min ḥayṭu hiya fī l-a'yāni [...], wa-i'tibārun lahā min ḥayṭu hiya fī t-tašawwur [...]*. Cf. Marmura's tr. in his "Quiddity and Universality in Avicenna," in *Neoplatonism and Islamic Thought*, ed. Parviz Morewedge (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 1992), p. 84: "The quiddities of things may exist in the real instances of things or in conception. They will thus have three aspects: (a) a consideration of the quiddity inasmuch as it is that quiddity, without being related to either of the two [kinds] of existence [...]; (b) a consideration thereof inasmuch as it is in external reality [...]; and (c) a consideration thereof inasmuch as it is in conception [...]." Against this background, it is safe to assume that *hādā l-i'tibār* in *al-Maqūlāt*, p. 93, l. 12 must refer to (a) the quiddity *qua* quiddity before having become related to "existence," i.e., either to (b) external existence or to (c) mental existence (in the present context, *muḍāf ilā* and *maqīs ilā* can be taken to have the same meaning).

182 Ibn Sīnā, *K. aš-Šifā', al-Manṭiq, al-Maqūlāt*, III,1, p. 93, ll. 10–18 [= §§ 5–6 (4.B.d)].

regard to the quiddity all of the following things are equally said to be substances:

Substance is either [1] simple (*basīt*) or [2] compounded (*murakkab*), i.e., of the things which substance is compounded of, i.e., matter (*mādda*) and form (*šūra*).

[1.1] The simple [substance] either does not partake intrinsically (*ğayr dāhīl*) in constituting the compound (*taqwīm al-murakkab*), but is pure and detached (*barī'un mufāriqun*) [i.e., incorporeal].

[1.2.1] Or it does partake intrinsically in constituting it. And that which partakes intrinsically in constituting it does so either in the manner in which wood partakes intrinsically in the existence of the chair; and this is called matter.

[1.2.2] Or it does so in the manner in which the shape (*şakl*) of the chair partakes intrinsically in the chair; and this is called form.

[ad 1.2.1] Matter is that by which – if considered on its own – the compound does not have existence *in actu* but only *in potentia*.

[ad 1.2.2] Form is that through whose attainment the compound becomes that what it is *in actu*.

And all of this (*ğamī' dālika*) exists either as a universal or it exists as a particular.<sup>183</sup>

Thus, Ibn Sinā's classification yields the following four types of substances: [1.1] incorporeal substances, which later in the *Ilāhiyyāt* of the *Şifā'* will be further subdivided into soul and intellect;<sup>184</sup> [1.2.1] matter, which exists only in potency; [1.2.2] form, which – by being the formal cause of the compound – grants actual existence to matter; and [2] the form-matter compound, i.e., an individual body, which in terms of the essence of substantiality is on the same level as the other types of substances. As far as the quiddity is concerned, it is

183 Ibn Sinā, *K. aš-Şifā', al-Manṭiq, al-Maqūlāt*, III,1, p. 94, ll. 4–11 [= § 7 (4.B.d)].

184 Ibn Sinā, *K. aš-Şifā', al-Ilāhiyyāt (1)*, p. 60, ll. 9–14: *fa-innā kulla ġawharin fa-immā an yakūna ġisman wa-immā an yakūna ġayra ġismin. fa-in kāna ġayra ġismin fa-immā an yakūna ġuz'a ġismin wa-immā an lā yakūna ġuz'a ġismin bal yakūnu mufāriqan li-l-ağsāmi bi-l-ğumlati. fa-in kāna ġuz'a ġismin fa-immā an yakūna şuratahū wa-immā an yakūna māddatahū. wa-in kāna mufāriqan laysa ġuz'a ġismin fa-immā an takūna lahū 'alāqatun bi-đarbin [instead of t-ş-r-f] mā fi l-ağsāmi bi-t-tahrīki wa-yusammā nafsan, aw yakūnu mutabarrī'an 'ani l-mawāddi min kulli ġihatın wa-yusammā 'aqlan. "Every substance is either [1 = species A] a body or [2] not a body. [ad 2] If it is not a body, it is either [2.1] a part of a body or [2.2] not a part of a body but rather something which can be separated from the bodies altogether. [ad 2.1] If it is a part of a body, it is either [2.1.1 = species B] its form or [2.1.2 = species C] its matter. [ad 2.2] If it can be separated and is not a part of a body, it either [2.2.1 = species D] has a connection to a certain type [of thing] in the bodies due to the fact that it causes [their] motion, and this is called 'soul,' or [2.2.2 = species E] it is free from any kind of matter in every regard, and this is called 'intellect'." For the reading *bi-đarbin*, see the list of variants given in the Italian tr. by Amos Bertolacci, *Libro della guarigione: le cose divine* (Turin: UTET Libreria, 2008), p. 116.*

neither necessary nor appropriate to inquire whether universal substances or particular substances are primary.

In light of these results, it may at first appear surprising that in *al-Maqūlāt* III,2 Ibn Sīnā nonetheless adopts the well-known Aristotelian distinction between primary substances, i.e., individual substances, and secondary substances, i.e., the species of individual substances, and adds the further specification that the genera above substantial species are to be regarded as tertiary substances. However, in doing so he merely acknowledges the fact that – besides the univocal predication of the quiddity of substantiality – there are numerous other considerations which may justify a ranking between various types of substances. Whereas “individual substances” (*al-ġawāhir aš-šaḥṣiyya*) are not primary with regard to the true nature of substantiality,<sup>185</sup> they may, *inter alia* with regard to their priority and independence in existence,<sup>186</sup> be said to be “worthier of substantiality” (*awlā bi-l-ġawhariyya*).<sup>187</sup> After having discussed a total of four aspects under which things may be thought to be “worthier of substantiality” as well as several possible objections, Ibn Sīnā ultimately concludes that the highest claim appertains neither to “corporeal singulars” (*al-mufradāt al-ġismāniyya*), which now are ranked only second, nor to various gradations of “intellective universals” (*al-kulliyāt al-‘aqliyya*) and “sensible universals” (*al-kulliyāt al-ḥissiyya*),<sup>188</sup> but rather to those kinds of “intellective beings” (*al-‘aqliyyāt*) which are “self-subsisting singulars that are not connected to a subject which they are said of or which they inhere in” (*mufradātun qā’imatun fī dātihā*

185 Ibn Sīnā, *K. aš-Šifā’*, *al-Mantiq*, *al-Maqūlāt*, III,2, p. 96, ll. 1–2 [= § 2 (4.B.d)].

186 This is the aspect Ibn Sīnā discusses most extensively; see *K. aš-Šifā’*, *al-Mantiq*, *al-Maqūlāt*, III,2, p. 96, l. 5 [= § 3 (4.B.d)]; and p. 96, l. 8 – p. 97, l. 19 [= §§ 4–10 (4.B.d)]. The other three aspects are: [2] “the fact that the property on whose account the substance is a substance is [already] established, namely the realization in concrete things as not in a subject”; [3] “perfection and excellence,” which is especially true of immaterial beings; and [4] “the fact that they take precedence [over secondary substances] in being named” (*as-sabq ilā t-tasmiya*), i.e., individual substances are the first things of which it is known that they are not in a substance and hence they are the first things to receive the name ‘substance.’ For a discussion of the gradation between form and matter, with regard to existence, see Ibn Sīnā, *K. aš-Šifā’*, *al-Ilāhiyyāt* (1), II,4 (*fī taqdīmi ṣ-ṣūrati ‘alā l-māddati fī martabati l-wuġūd*).

187 Ibn Sīnā, *K. aš-Šifā’*, *al-Mantiq*, *al-Maqūlāt*, III,2, p. 96, l. 5 [= § 3 (4.B.d)].

188 Ibn Sīnā refers to the latter as “natural sensible universals” (*al-kulliyāt al-ḥissiyya aṭ-ṭabī‘iyya*), without providing an example in this context; see Ibn Sīnā, *K. aš-Šifā’*, *al-Mantiq*, *al-Maqūlāt*, III,2, p. 100, l. 15 [= § 19 (4.B.d)]. Al-Ḥillī in his commentary on this passage calls them “the universals of natural sensible beings” (*kulliyāt al-ḥissiyyāt aṭ-ṭabī‘iyya*) and provides the example of “body, insofar as it is body” (*al-ġism min ḥayṭu huwa ġism*); see al-‘Allāma al-Ḥillī, *K. Kašf al-ḥafā’ min K. aš-Šifā’*, MS Dublin Chester Beatty 5151, fol. 57a, l. 12.

*lā tata'allāqu bi-mawḍū'in tuqālu 'alayhi aw fihi*);<sup>189</sup> al-Ḥillī in his commentary on this passage identifies these highest types of substances with the ten celestial intellects (*al-ūqūl al-ašara*).<sup>190</sup> Thus, with regard to existential considerations Ibn Sinā presents us with an ontological hierarchization in which the individual form-matter *compositum* takes priority over universal species and genera, but in which, at the same time, the combination of the two criteria of immateriality and particularity trumps all other considerations.

To sum up, I would like to stress the fact that out of the attributive relations outlined by Aristotle in *Cat. 2* and treated by Ibn Rušd as two exclusive and equally important criteria for determining a thing's substantiality, Ibn Sinā accepts only the relation of inherence as providing us with a valid ontological distinction, namely the basic divide between what it means to be an accident and what it means to be a substance. The other relation, in contrast, does not yield any knowledge of a thing's essence but merely concerns the question of whether something exists as an individual instance or as a universal concept that can be predicated of others. As we have seen, Ibn Sinā does not lend ontological preference to universals but rather – on account of their immateriality and singularity – to intellectual individuals.

## 2.4. Ibn Sinā's Treatment of *Cat. 2* in *K. aš-Šifā'*, *al-Manṭiq*, *al-Maqūlāt*, I,3: An Attempt at Integrating Form and Matter into a Scheme of Attributive Relations

### 2.4.1. Ibn Sinā's Reading of *Cat. 2*: From the *Muḥtaṣar* to the *Šifā'*

Already in his rather early *al-Muḥtaṣar al-awsaṭ fi l-manṭiq* Ibn Sinā appears to be particularly troubled by the problems which arise if one assesses the ontological classification presented in *Cat. 2* in light of the hylemorphic analysis of substances Aristotle undertakes in *Physics* and *Metaphysics*. Since the *Muḥtaṣar* may generally be characterized as following the treatises of the *Organon* more closely than Ibn Sinā's subsequent efforts of reformulating the Aristotelian tradition, it

189 Ibn Sinā, *K. aš-Šifā'*, *al-Manṭiq*, *al-Maqūlāt*, III,2, p. 100, l. 12 [= § 19 (4.B.d)]. The related claim that "everything is more excellent than matter (*hayūlā*)" had already been made before in the context of discussing the aspects of "perfection" and "excellence" by which some beings may be said to be worthier of substantiality than other beings; cf. Ibn Sinā, *K. aš-Šifā'*, *al-Manṭiq*, *al-Maqūlāt*, III,2, p. 98, ll. 7–8 [= § 11 (4.B.d)].

190 Al-ʿAllāma al-Ḥillī, *K. Kašf al-ḥafā' min K. aš-Šifā'*, MS Dublin Chester Beatty 5151, fol. 57a, l. 7.

is all the more remarkable that in the exposition of *Cat.* 2 offered in this work Ibn Sīnā opts for a different point of departure: Instead of starting from Aristotle's attempt at classifying beings by means of the two predicative criteria of "being said of a subject" and "inhering in a subject," Ibn Sīnā first of all outlines two relations (*nisba*) in which any given subject (*mawḍūʿ*) may be characterized (*yūṣafu*) by any given predicate (*maḥmūl*), namely (1) either in the manner of *being* it (*bi-annahū huwa*), (2) or in the manner of *having* it (*bi-annahū dū huwa*). Whereas in the first case the subject *is* the predicate both in name and meaning (*isman wa-maʿnan*), just like when one predicates "animal" (*ḥayawān*) of "man" (*insān*), in the second case the subject *possesses* the predicate in meaning and in most cases will be called by a name which is derived from the predicate, such as saying of a man who has "courage" (*šaḡāʿa*) that he is "courageous" (*šuḡā*).<sup>191</sup> Thus, whereas Simplicius in his *Commentary on the Categories* had, on the one hand, identified "being said of a subject" with "synonymous predication," and, on the other hand, "inhering in a subject" with "homonymous predication,"<sup>192</sup> Ibn Sīnā stresses the connection between the *having* mode of attribution and "paronymous predication."<sup>193</sup> Only subsequently does Ibn Sīnā introduce Aristo-

191 Ibn Sīnā, *al-Muḥtaṣar al-awsaṭ fi l-mantiq, al-Maqūlāt*, in A. Kalbarczyk, "The *Kitāb al-Maqūlāt* of the *Muḥtaṣar al-awsaṭ fi l-mantiq*," § 11, p. 328, ll. 6–11.

192 Cf. Simplicius, *In Categorias*, p. 19, ll. 11–14: "καὶ γὰρ ἔμελλεν ἐρεῖν ὅτι τὰ μὲν ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ ὁμωνύμως κατηγορεῖται, τὰ δὲ καθ' ὑποκειμένου συνωνύμως, καὶ ὅτι παρωνύμως ἀπὸ τῆς ποιότητος λέγεται τὰ ποιά καὶ ἀπὸ τῆς ποσότητος τὰ ποσά." English tr. by Chase, p. 34 (modified; emphasis added): "After all, he intended later to state that what is *in* a subject is predicated *homonymously*, whereas what [is said] *of* a subject is predicated *synonymously*. He also intended to state that qualified things are so called paronymously from quality, and quantified things likewise from quantity."

193 A marginal annotation by al-Ḥasan b. Suwār on *Cat.* 3 (in *Mantiq Aristū*, ed. Ḡabr, vol. 1, p. 36) shows that among the Baghdad Peripatetics both connections (i.e., relating 'inherence in a subject' to homonymous predication and to paronymous predication) must have been known: "There are two kinds of the 'predication of that which is *in* a subject': [2a] Either by means of 'participation in the name' [i.e., homonymy], such as our saying 'the man moves / is set in motion' (*al-insānu yataḥarraku*); [2b] or by means of paronymous names (*al-muṣtaḡqa asmāʿuhā*), just like we say 'the man is a grammarian' (*al-insānu naḥwī*)." In this passage, al-Ḥasan b. Suwār might draw on Alexander's lost *Commentary on the Categories*. This is suggested by a remark we can find in Alexander's extant *Commentary on the Topics*; see Alexander of Aphrodisias, *In Aristotelis Topicorum Libros Octo Commentaria*, ed. Maximilian Wallies (Berlin: Reimer, 1891), p. 136, ll. 19–26: "ἀπ' οὐδενὸς γὰρ γένους παρωνυμῶς ἢ κατηγορίας· τὰ γὰρ γένη συνωνύμως τῶν εἰδῶν κατηγορεῖται. ἐν γὰρ τοῖς συμβεβηκόσι παρωνυμῶς ἢ κατηγορία μόνους, ὡς ἐν ταῖς Κατηγορίας ἐδείχθη· τῶν γὰρ ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ τινὶ ὄντων (ταῦτα δὲ ἦν τὰ συμβεβηκότα) τὰ μὲν παρωνύμως τὰ δὲ ὁμωνύμως ἐδείχθη κατηγορούμενα· λέγεται γὰρ ἡ ἐπιφάνεια λελευκῶσθαι καὶ τὸ σῶμα κινεῖσθαι καὶ ὁ ἄνθρωπος γραμματικὸς εἶναι ἀπὸ τῆς γραμματικῆς." "For among none of the genera the predication is paronymous; for genera



tle's criteria of "being said *of* a subject" and "inhering *in* a subject": (1) Firstly, whenever a predicate of the *being* mode of attribution is universal, that is to say, under the proviso that unnatural predication is excluded, it is called "that which is predicated *of* a subject"; in fact, every universal can be said to be "that which is predicated *of* a subject"; as we will shortly see with regard to Ibn Sinā's treatment of the same issue in the *Maqūlāt* of the *Šifā'*, this brief remark is not as trivial as it might at first seem to be. (2) Secondly, whenever a predicate belongs to the *having* mode of attribution, an additional distinction needs to be made, namely between "an accident *in* a subject" and "form *in* matter":

As for that which is predicated in the second mode, there are two aspects:

[1] Either its subject is *per se* realized in existence (*mutahaqqiq al-wuğūd bi-dātihī*) – and only afterwards<sup>194</sup> it becomes a cause for the existence of the predicate in it so that for the sake of its subsistence (*qiwām*) it [i.e., the subject] is not in need of the predicate, neither [in need of] this one nor of another one in its place. This relation is called 'existence in the subject' (*wuğūd fī l-mawḍū'*); and the predicate is called 'accident' (*'arad*).

[2] Or the bearer (*al-ḥāmīl*) does not have actual existence *per se* but only through that predicate or through another one which is in its place afterwards or beforehand. This relation is called 'existence in matter' (*wuğūd fī l-hayūlā*); and the predicate is called 'form' (*šūra*).

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are predicated synonymously of the species. Only among accidents predication is paronymous, as has been shown in the *Categories*. For it has been shown that of those which are *in* a certain subject (these were the accidents) some are predicated paronymously, while others are predicated homonymously. For one says 'the surface is whitened' and 'the body is set in motion'; and one says 'the man is a grammarian,' [which is derived] from 'grammar'" (my tr.). Among "modern commentators," the relation between 'inherence in a subject' and 'paronymous predication' has been stressed by James Duerlinger in "Predication and Inherence in Aristotle's *Categories*," *Phronesis* 15 (1970): p. 190. With regard to a view Ibn Sinā will later argue for in the *Maqūlāt* of the *Šifā'*, namely that even in the case of accidental predications the definition of the predicate is, in a certain manner, nonetheless predicated *of* the subject, it is important to keep in mind that according to Ammonius 'paronymous predication' (to which Ibn Sinā relates accidental predications) is closer to synonymous predication than to homonymous predication; see Ammonius, *In Categories*, p. 24, ll. 2–4: "εἰδέναι δὲ δεῖ ὅτι ἀκριβῶς μέσα οὐκ ἔστι τὰ παρώνυμα, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον πλησιάζει τοῖς συνωνύμοις· κοινωνεῖ γὰρ αὐτοῖς καὶ κατὰ τὴν κοινωνίαν τοῦ ὀνόματος καὶ τοῦ πράγματος." English tr. by Cohen/Matthews, p. 33: "One should be aware, however, that paronyms are not exactly in the middle, but come closer to synonyms. For they share with them commonality in the name and in the thing."

194 My edition of the *Maqūlāt* of the *Muḥtaṣar* erroneously has *tā'-mīm* instead of *tā'-mīm* (= *tumma*).

In this book – and in whatever proceeds in the same manner among the introductory works – this issue is not thoroughly investigated but accident and form are treated in one and the same manner.<sup>195</sup>

It seems that, by and large, in the *Muḥtaṣar* Ibn Sīnā is still willing to tolerate the troublesome congruence between the description of accident and the description of form as an inaccuracy owed to the introductory character of the *Categories* and thus refrains from a more pronounced criticism. Subsequently, however, in the much more extensive *K. al-Maqūlāt* of the *Šifā'*, the terminological and conceptual confusions which, according to Ibn Sīnā's analysis, have resulted from the fourfold scheme of *Cat. 2* will give rise to the conviction that a departure from the transmitted scheme is unavoidable.<sup>196</sup>

#### 2.4.2. An Outline of *K. aš-Šifā'*, *al-Manṭiq*, *al-Maqūlāt*, I,3

In chapter I,3 of the *Maqūlāt* of the *Šifā'*, which is a chapter that largely corresponds to the issues treated in *Cat. 2*, Ibn Sīnā voices grave doubts about the soundness and the utility of the fourfold scheme – and appears to be particularly critical of the subsequent commentatorial efforts generated by it. While a predicative scheme ought to provide us with a clear-cut distinction between whether a predicate is included in a thing's essence or not, the scheme of *Cat. 2*, in Ibn Sīnā's reading, combines the question of whether something can be predicated or not with the question of whether, at an ontological level, something is an accident or a substance. Against the background of his purely ontological reading of the relation of inherence one element of *Cat. 2*, namely the negative criterion "being not *in* a subject," was to play an important role in Ibn Sīnā's reshuffle of Aristotelian ontology – and subsequently was to gain even greater prominence in virtually all post-Avicennian philosophical accounts on how to classify beings; for "being not *in* a subject" is precisely the formula which Ibn Sīnā in numerous instances refers to as the notion commonly shared by all five species of substances.<sup>197</sup> However, within the context of *logic* Ibn Sīnā deems the criteria of the scheme of *Cat. 2* to be misleading.

195 Ibn Sīnā, *al-Muḥtaṣar al-awsaṭ fi l-manṭiq*, *al-Maqūlāt*, §§ 13–14, p. 328, ll. 15–21.

196 Cf. Ibn Sīnā, *K. aš-Šifā'*, *al-Manṭiq*, *al-Maqūlāt*, I,3, p. 18, ll. 4–6 [= § 1 (2.B.b)].

197 In addition to the abundant references to this formula in the context of the *Maqūlāt* and the *Ilāhiyyāt* of the *Šifā'*, see, *inter alia*, the following passages:

– 'Uyūn al-ḥikma, ed. 'Abd ar-Raḥmān Badawī (Cairo: Manšūrāt al-ma'had al-'ilmī al-faransī li-l-āṭār aš-šarqiyya, 1954), p. 48, ll. 5–6 and ll. 11–12: "Everything which is not *in* a subject – regardless of whether it is *in* hyle and matter (*fi hayūlā wa-mādda*) or whether it is not *in* hyle and matter – is said to be a substance. [...] Thus the substances are four: [1] quiddity without matter (*māhiyya bi-lā mādda*); [2] matter without form

One difficulty in reading chapter I,3 of the *Maqūlāt* lies in the multiplicity of purposes it is intended to serve, and, in connection to this, its puzzling structure. Rather than providing the reader, first of all, with a short outline of *Cat.* 2 or of the issues that need to be discussed in relation to it, Ibn Sinā defers a concise summary of the fourfold scheme to the very end of the chapter.<sup>198</sup> Instead, he starts out with a general disclaimer in which he warns his reader that the thorough investigation of a transmitted theory may at times result in the necessity to digress from that which is "commonly known" (*al-māshūr*), that is to say, from endoxic knowledge; however, as Ibn Sinā tells us, "a rational person" (*al-ʿāqil*) only departs from such commonly accepted doctrines, if it is inescapable to do so.<sup>199</sup> Thereupon, without providing any further explanation, Ibn Sinā turns, rather abruptly, to expounding a scheme of five types of attributes (*ṣifāt al-umūr*).<sup>200</sup> Having outlined a few exemplary cases for each of the five types of the

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(*māhiyya bi-lā šūra*); [3] form in matter (*šūra fi mādda*); [4] a compound of matter and form (*murakkab min mādda wa-šūra*)."

– *al-Muḥtaṣar al-awsaṭ fi l-mantiq*, § 33, p. 332, ll. 1–2: "The adequate description of [any kind of] substance is 'it is that whose existence is not in a subject'; the universal of it [i.e., the universal substance] and the particular of it [i.e., the particular substance] commonly share this description."

– *an-Nağāt, al-Mantiq, al-Burhān*, ed. Dānešpažūh, p. 153, l. 11 – p. 154, l. 1: "As for these ten genera, one of them is substance; and this is everything whose essence exists not in a subject, i.e., in a proximate substrate (*maḥall qarīb*); it subsists by itself in *actu*, without it [i.e., a substrate] and without being brought into subsistence by it (*lā bi-taqwīmihī*)."

– *al-Īsārāt wa-t-tanbihāt*, namaṭ IV,25, ed. az-Zārīʿī, p. 273, l. 12 – p. 274, l. 6: "Maybe someone could be of the [false] opinion (*rubbamā ḥunna*) that the meaning of 'that which exists not in a subject' (*ma'nā al-mawğūd lā fi l-mawdū'in*) comprises the First [i.e., God] and other things in the manner of the commonality of the genus ('*umūm al-ğins*) so that He [i.e., the First One] would fall under the genus of 'substance.' However, this is erroneous [i.e., God cannot be subsumed under the category of substance]. For the meaning of 'that which exists not in a subject' – which is like the description of substance (*allaḍī ka-r-rasmi li-l-ğawhar*) – is not at all 'that which exists in *actu* in such a way that it is not in a subject' so that as soon as someone would know that Zayd is *per se* (*fi nafsihī*) a substance he would also know that he exists in *actu*, not to mention the mode of this existence (*faḍlan 'an kayfiyyāti ḍālika l-wuğūd*). Rather, the meaning of that which is predicated of substance as its description [i.e., the meaning of 'existing not in a subject'] and which is [also] commonly shared by the species-substances (*al-ğawāhir an-naw'iyya*) in potency (*inda l-quwwa*), just as they [i.e., the species] commonly share their genus, is that it [i.e., substance] is a quiddity and a true nature whose existence only comes about as being not in a subject (*innahū māhiyyatun wa-ḥaqīqatun innamā yakūnu wuğūduhā lā fi mawdū'in*)."

198 Ibn Sinā, *K. aš-Šifā'*, *al-Mantiq, al-Maqūlāt*, I,3, p. 27, ll. 11–21 [= § 49 (2.B.b)].

199 Ibn Sinā, *K. aš-Šifā'*, *al-Mantiq, al-Maqūlāt*, I,3, p. 18, ll. 4–6 [= § 1 (2.B.b)].

200 Ibn Sinā, *K. aš-Šifā'*, *al-Mantiq, al-Maqūlāt*, I,3, p. 18, ll. 6–13 [= §§ 2–6 (2.B.b)].

new scheme,<sup>201</sup> Ibn Sīnā inserts a short clarification of the very general sense in which the term *mawḍūʿ* needs to be understood in the context of *Cat. 2*, if one wants to make sense of Aristotle's scheme.<sup>202</sup> The transition to a discussion of the two criteria on which the fourfold classification rests is marked by a brief list of the terminological and conceptual advantages (*fawā'id*) offered by the new scheme, resulting in the warning that soon the student will come to realize "which shortcoming ensues from neglecting this principle which we have given you," that is to say, which problems arise if instead of subscribing to Ibn Sīnā's revised scheme the old Aristotelian scheme, with all its internal difficulties and its heavy exegetical baggage, is to be retained.<sup>203</sup> The gist of the subsequent discussion of the two Aristotelian criteria,<sup>204</sup> which is interrupted by an excursus on unnatural predication,<sup>205</sup> can be summarized as follows: Whereas the criterion of "being said of a subject" can at best be taken to be redundant – for it is simply a newly coined term for the more common expression "universal" (*kullī*) in the sense of "that which is said of many" (*al-maqūl 'alā kaṭirīna*),<sup>206</sup> the criterion of "inhering in a subject" may indeed be regarded to yield an additional benefit. For it is not just another name for the more common expression "accident" (*'araḍ*) but provides us with an "explanatory account" of what it means to be an accident (*qawlun yašraḥu ismahū*),<sup>207</sup> and, *ex negativo*, of what it means to be a substance. However, judging from Ibn Sīnā's subsequent discussion of the problems that resulted from Aristotle's scheme, we will be better off discarding the superfluous criterion of "being said of a subject" altogether – and need to keep in mind that, even though the distinction between "being *in* a subject" and "being not *in* a subject" might have its merits, it is a valuable criterion which had been introduced in the wrong place. The cautiously critical assessment of Aristotle's criteria is followed by a forceful polemical attack on several erroneous views which some unnamed predecessors have held in the context of interpreting *Cat. 2*; this is, at the same time, the most extensive part of the whole chapter<sup>208</sup> – and will be resumed throughout the following three chapters (i.e., *Maqūlāt* I,4 – I,6). Ibn Sīnā's copious complaints about all the "idle effort" (*takalluf*) undertaken by these neglectful scholars correspond to his previous

201 Ibn Sīnā, *K. aš-Šifā'*, *al-Manṭiq, al-Maqūlāt*, I,3, p. 18, l. 14 – p. 19, l. 18 [= §§ 7–11 (2.B.b)].

202 Ibn Sīnā, *K. aš-Šifā'*, *al-Manṭiq, al-Maqūlāt*, I,3, p. 19, l. 18 – p. 20, l. 3 [= § 12 (2.B.b)].

203 Ibn Sīnā, *K. aš-Šifā'*, *al-Manṭiq, al-Maqūlāt*, I,3, p. 20, ll. 4–8 [= § 13 (2.B.b)].

204 Ibn Sīnā, *K. aš-Šifā'*, *al-Manṭiq, al-Maqūlāt*, I,3, p. 20, l. 9 – p. 23, l. 3 [= §§ 14–26 (2.B.b)].

205 Ibn Sīnā, *K. aš-Šifā'*, *al-Manṭiq, al-Maqūlāt*, I,3, p. 21, ll. 2–15 [= § 18 (2.B.b)].

206 Ibn Sīnā, *K. aš-Šifā'*, *al-Manṭiq, al-Maqūlāt*, I,3, p. 22, l. 7 [= § 21 (2.B.b)]; l. 18 [= § 24 (2.B.b)].

207 Ibn Sīnā, *K. aš-Šifā'*, *al-Manṭiq, al-Maqūlāt*, I,3, p. 22, l. 17 [= § 23 (2.B.b)].

208 Ibn Sīnā, *K. aš-Šifā'*, *al-Manṭiq, al-Maqūlāt*, I,3, p. 23, l. 4 – p. 27, l. 11 [= §§ 27–48 (2.B.b)].

warning of the grave deficiencies which arise from a predicative scheme that lacks the principled criteriology and terminological scrutiny of his own scheme.

### 2.4.3. Ibn Sīnā's Critique of Previous Interpretations of *Cat. 2*

#### 2.4.3.1. The Equivocity of *mawḍūʿ*

To Ibn Sīnā's mind, one of the crucial problems of the fourfold classification is the equivocity of the expression "subject" (*mawḍūʿ*), especially if Aristotle's form-matter analysis is to be integrated into the scheme. Ibn Sīnā attempts to attain a meaning in which "subject" can be understood with regard to both predicative relations, i.e., "being said *of* a subject" and "inhering *in* a subject"; the result is simply a rather general delineation *ex negativo*: Whenever an attribute (*ṣifa*) is *not* such that it is both extrinsic (*ḥāriḡ*) and constitutive (*muqawwim*) in relation to the thing to which it is attributed, that which is characterized by the attribute (*mawṣūf*) may be called a "subject" (*mawḍūʿ*), that is to say, both in the case in which an attribute is intrinsic and constitutive and in the case in which the attribute is extrinsic and non-constitutive.<sup>209</sup> However, as Ibn Sīnā further expounds in *Maqūlāt* I,6, apart from this comprehensive meaning of *mawḍūʿ* which suits both the *of* and *in* relation, or apart from the sense in which *mawḍūʿ* refers to the "logical subject" proper (in contrast to *maḥmūl*, i.e., the "logical predicate"), previous scholars have assumed at least three further meanings of *mawḍūʿ* in the context of *Cat. 2* and 3: (1) *Mawḍūʿ* has been taken to refer to the material substrate; or (2) to any kind of "bearer" (*ḥāmil*) in the most general sense, i.e., in a sense which encompasses both the material substrate and the subject of the *of* and *in* relation; (3) and even in the sense of *mubtadaʿ*, that is, a "grammatical subject" (in contrast to *ḥabar*, i.e., "a grammatical predicate").<sup>210</sup> Especially the first two senses are of importance for Ibn Sīnā's terminological clarification which aims at excluding the matter to which form is attributed from the meaning of "subject" (*mawḍūʿ*); for "form inhering *in* matter" is the only case in which the attribute is both extrinsic and constitutive (that is to say, form is not a part of matter but brings it into subsistence).

Since already in the case of the distinction between the *of* and *in* relation the term *mawḍūʿ* may lead to several misunderstandings, and since, as soon as one intends to design a classification scheme which includes the relation by which form inheres in matter, it becomes utterly impossible to delineate even a vague shared meaning of *mawḍūʿ*, Ibn Sīnā's revised scheme completely aban-

209 Ibn Sīnā, *K. aṣ-Ṣifāʾ, al-Mantiq, al-Maqūlāt*, I,3, p. 19, l. 18 – p. 20, l. 3 [= § 12 (2.B.b)].

210 Ibn Sīnā, *K. aṣ-Ṣifāʾ, al-Mantiq, al-Maqūlāt*, I,6, p. 45, ll. 12–14.

dons any reference to *mawḏū*<sup>c</sup>. Rather, his new scheme investigates the relation in which any given attribute (*ṣifa*) may stand to anything that is characterized by an attribute (*mawṣūf*), which not only allows for an avoidance of the problematic expression *mawḏū*<sup>c</sup> but which, at the same time, also marks a departure from Aristotle's approach of dividing *beings* by means of *predicative* relations.

#### 2.4.3.2. An Anonymous Predecessor, the Neoplatonic Commentators and al-Fārābī on "Being Said of a Subject"

Moreover, Ibn Sīnā frowns on any attempts at blurring the distinction between ontological criteria and predicative criteria *stricto sensu*. Since, as had already been mentioned, in his reading the formulae "being *in* a subject" and "being not *in* a subject" exclusively serve to delineate what it means to be an "accident *per se*" and a "substance *per se*," only the criterion of "being said of a subject" addresses a question which may be of importance in a predicative context, namely whether or not an expression is such that, whenever it functions as the predicate, one can devise a true statement of the form "the subject *is* the predicate," regardless of whether the predicate pertains to the essence of the subject. It is important to keep in mind that Ibn Sīnā understands "that which is predicated of the subject" (*al-maḥmūl 'alā l-mawḏū*) in the general sense of "that which is predicated of something" (*al-maḥmūl 'alā š-šay*), that is to say, a universal expression whose meaning may apply to any given thing from any given category. But since this may apply to extrinsic attributes as well, the criterion of "being said of a subject" may, in turn, not be taken to refer to essential predication, or rather, what it means to be "universal" may not be restricted to "that which is said in the manner of what a thing is." In the context of reviewing previous interpretations of *Cat. 2*, Ibn Sīnā disapprovingly quotes an "account of one of their forerunners" (*lafẓ ba'd muqaddimihim*),<sup>211</sup> that is to say, the teaching of an earlier scholar who identified universality with essentiality:

He said: "The reason why I said that the universal is that which is said of its particulars in respect of what the thing is (*inna l-kullī huwa llaḏī yuḥmalu 'alā ġuz'iyyātihī 'an ṭarīq mā š-šay*) – and this is that which is said of a subject – lies precisely in the fact that things might also be predicated of the subject in a different manner (*'alā ġayri hādihī l-ġiha*). An example of this [other manner of predication] is our predicating 'he walks' (*yamšī*) of Zayd. Thus we say: 'Zayd walks.' The meaning of 'he walks,' however, is not predicated of Zayd in the manner as if it [i.e., 'he walks'] were a universal (*amr kullī*) and Zayd its particular (*ġuz'uhū*), for 'he walks' is not predicated of Zayd in reply to the question 'what is he?' (*'inda l-mas'alati 'anhū mā huwa*). For if someone were to ask 'what is Zayd?' and if the person asked were to reply 'he walks,' his reply would be erroneous and false (*ḥaṭā'an wa-*

211 Ibn Sīnā, *K. aš-Šifā'*, *al-Manṭiq*, *al-Maqūlāt*, I,3, p. 23, l. 10 [= § 29 (2.B.b)].

*kidban*); for the meaning of 'he walks' does not signify Zayd's quiddity; rather, it is one of his acts (*fi'l min af'ālih*).<sup>212</sup>

I have not been able to spot the quote in any of the extant commentaries or scholia on the *Categories* (or on closely related passages from the *Isagoge*, *De Interpretatione* and the *Topics*). But we can draw a line between the view heavily criticized by Ibn Sinā and a short remark from Porphyry's *Commentary on the Categories in Question-Answer Form*. Here, we find Porphyry paving the way for an interpretation which was to become a standard view in the Neoplatonic exegetical tradition:

He [i.e., Aristotle] says that something is predicated of something as *of* a subject when it is stated as belonging to the 'what it is' (ἐν τῷ τί ἐστι κατηγορῆται). For example, 'to walk' (τὸ περιπατεῖν) is predicated *of* Socrates. But if we were to give [an account of] 'what Socrates is,' we would not say that he *is* 'to walk' (τὸ περιπατεῖν), because 'to walk' is not predicated of Socrates as *of* a subject. [...] So what is predicated *of* a subject must be more universal than the subject, and its name and account must both apply to the subject, that is, they must be capable of being synonymously predicated of the subject.<sup>213</sup>

In the context of explaining what it means to predicate something as *of* a subject, Porphyry equates "being said *of* a subject" with "essential predication" and "synonymous predication." Besides that, he makes the uncontentious remark that the predicate ought to be more universal than the subject. Already at the beginning of his discussion of Aristotle's criteria he had clarified that "if something is universal, it is said *of* a subject."<sup>214</sup>

Subsequently, a rather straightforward account of the equation "universal" = "predicated *synonymously* of many things" = "predicated *of* a subject" = "predicated *essentially*" will be provided by Simplicius: "[...] universals are those which are predicated *synonymously* of many things, which is exactly that which Aristotle calls '*of* a subject'; for that which is predicated in this manner is predicated of

212 Ibn Sinā, *K. aš-Šifā', al-Mantiq, al-Maqūlāt*, I,3, p. 23, ll. 11–17 [= § 30 (2.B.b)].

213 Porphyry, *In Categorias*, p. 80, ll. 4–8 and ll. 20–23: "Καθ' ὑποκειμένου φησιν ἐκεῖνο κατηγορεῖσθαι τινος, ὅταν ἐν τῷ τί ἐστι κατηγορῆται ἐκεῖνο <δ> ἀποδίδοται. οἶον τὸ περιπατεῖν κατηγορεῖται κατὰ Σωκράτους· ἀλλ' ἐὰν ἀποδιδῶμεν τί ἐστὶν Σωκράτης, οὐκ ἂν εἴπομεν αὐτὸν τὸ περιπατεῖν, ὥστε οὐ καθ' ὑποκειμένου κατηγορεῖται τοῦ Σωκράτους τὸ περιπατεῖν. [...] ὥστε τὸ καθ' ὑποκειμένου κατηγορεῖται, ὃ καθολικώτερον ὂν τοῦ ὑποκειμένου ἐφαρμόζειν αὐτῷ δύναται καὶ κατὰ τοῦνομα καὶ κατὰ τὸν λόγον, τοῦτ' ἔστι συνωνύμως λέγεσθαι δύναται κατὰ τοῦ ὑποκειμένου." English tr. by Strange, pp. 63–64 (modified; emphasis added).

214 Porphyry, *In Categorias*, p. 73, ll. 30–31: "εἴ τί ἐστι καθόλου, ἐκεῖνο καθ' ὑποκειμένου λέγεται." English tr. by Strange, p. 56 (emphasis added).

the subject *essentially*.<sup>215</sup> Thus, if a predicate which signifies a meaning that does not pertain to the essence of the subject, such as ‘he walks’ in relation to Socrates or Zayd, *per definitionem* cannot be predicated as *of* a subject, and if, at the same time, being predicated of something as *of* a subject is taken to be the criterion for whether an expression or concept is universal, accidental predicates may not be considered to be universal in relation to their subjects.<sup>216</sup>

Among the Baghdad Peripatetics, a clear-cut recourse to this line of interpretation, can, *inter alia*, be detected in Yaḥyā b. ‘Adī’s (d. 974 AD) annotations on Alexander of Aphrodisias’ *Treatise on the Difference between Genus and Matter* (*Maqāla fī l-farq bayna l-ḡins wa-l-mādda*; also transmitted under the title *That Matter is not the Genus / fī anna l-hayūlā ḡayr al-ḡins*).<sup>217</sup>

Thereupon he [i.e., Alexander of Aphrodisias] said: «I say» – i.e., ‘I mean’ – «that it» – i.e., the genus – «is a universal general» (‘*amm kullī*) – i.e., even before it has been conceptualized by differentiae it is one single universal general (*wāḥid ‘amm kullī*). To his saying «general/comprehensive (‘*amm*)» he [i.e., Alexander of Aphrodisias] added his saying «universal (*kullī*)» in order to distinguish between the gen-

215 Simplicius, *In Categorias*, p. 45, ll. 3–5: “καθόλου δέ ἐστιν τὰ πλειόνων κατηγορούμενα συνωνύμως, ὅπερ καθ’ ὑποκειμένου καλεῖ (τὸ γὰρ κατηγορούμενον οὕτως τοῦ οὐσιωδῶς ὑποκειμένου κατηγορεῖται)” (my tr.).

216 Apart from the manner in which Aristotle discusses his two criteria in the *Categorias* where all the examples he provides for “those which are said *of* a subject” are indeed instances of essential predication, the definition he gives for “holding universally” in *An. Post.* A 4, 73b26–28 may be regarded to be an important factor for the success of this line of interpretation: “καθόλου δέ λέγω ὃ ἂν κατὰ παντός τε ὑπάρχη καὶ καθ’ αὐτὸ καὶ ἢ αὐτό. φανερόν ἄρα ὅτι ὅσα καθόλου, ἐξ ἀνάγκης ὑπάρχει τοῖς πράγμασιν.” English tr. by Jonathan Barnes, *Posterior Analytics* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1992, 2<sup>nd</sup> ed.), p. 8: “I call universal what holds of every case and in itself and as such. It is clear, then, that whatever is universal holds of its objects from necessity.” Arabic tr. in *Manṭiq Aristū, al-Burhān*, ed. Ḡabr, vol. 1, p. 444, ll. 10–13: *wa-ammā l-kullīyyu fa-a’nī bihī l-amra l-mawḡūda li-l-kullī wa-bi-dātihī wa-bi-mā huwa mawḡūdatun fa-mina l-bayyinīn idan anna ḡamī’a llatī hiya kullīyyatun hiya mawḡūdatun li-l-umūri mina l-iḡṭīrār*. As a matter of fact, Simplicius’ account of what it means to be universal may be seen as a combination of the two definitions Aristotle gives in *De Int.* 3 and the *An. Post.* A 4: Whereas Simplicius’ “τὰ πλειόνων κατηγορούμενα” picks up Aristotle’s “ὃ ἐπὶ πλειόνων πέφυκε κατηγορεῖσθαι,” Simplicius’ reference to the fact that the predicate needs to hold of the subject “essentially” (οὐσιωδῶς) corresponds to Aristotle’s “καθ’ αὐτὸ καὶ ἢ αὐτό.”

217 This is an Arabic version of the quaestio “Ὅτι μὴ ἡ ὕλη γένος (“that matter is not genus”) from Alexander’s *Ἀπορίαι καὶ λύσεις*; for the Greek text, see Alexander of Aphrodisias, *Praeter commentaria scripta minora, Quaestiones*, ed. Ivo Bruns (Berlin: Reimer, 1892), pp. 77–79. English tr. by Robert Sharples, *Quaestiones 2.16–3.15* (London: Bloomsbury, 2013), quaestio 2.28, pp. 36–38. For the Arabic version of the treatise, see *Šurūḥ ‘alā Aristū mafqūda fī l-yūnāniyya wa-rasā’il uḡrā / Commentaires sur Aristote perdus en grec et autres épîtres*, ed. ‘Abd ar-Raḥmān Badawī (Beirut: Dār al-Mašriq, 1971), pp. 52–55 (= number 10 of the *rasā’il*).



erality/comprehensiveness of the genus (*'umūm al-ġins*) and the generality/comprehensiveness of the general accidents (*'umūm al-a'rād al-āmmiyya*); for the latter are not universal in relation to those things which they comprise (*fa-innahā laysat kulliyatan li-l-ašyā'i llatī ta'ummuhā*).<sup>218</sup>

Thus, according to Yaḥyā b. 'Adī's understanding, an accidental predicate may – at the extensional level – be said to be “general” (*'āmm*) in relation to the numerous subjects to which it applies, but since, in contrast to the genus, it does not signify the quiddity of the things of which it is said, it may – at the intensional level – not be taken to be “a universal” (*kullī*).

Such an understanding of what it means for an expression or a concept to be “universal” stands in remarkable tension to the view expounded by Yaḥyā b. 'Adī's alleged teacher Abū Naṣr al-Fārābī. With clear recourse to *De Int.* 7 (17a39–40) he defines “universal meanings/concepts” – and likewise expressions which signify such meanings – in his *K. al-Alfāz al-musta'mala fī l-manṭiq* as follows:

Among the meanings which one understands from the names (*al-ma'ānī l-mafhūma 'ani l-asmā'*) some are such that they are predicated of more than one subject (*an tuḥmalu 'alā aḡṭara min mawḏū'in wāhidin*); this is like the meaning which is understood from our saying ‘the man’ (*al-insān*) – for it is possible to predicate it of Zayd, of 'Amr and of others; for Zayd *is* (*huwa*) a man, and 'Amr *is* a man, and Socrates *is* a man. And likewise it is possible to predicate ‘the white’ (*al-abyaḏ*) of more than one. [...] Thus, the meanings which are such that they are predicated of more than one are called ‘the universal meanings’ (*al-ma'ānī l-kulliyā*), ‘the general meanings’ (*al-ma'ānī l-āmma wa-l-āmmiyya*) and ‘the meanings which are predicated of many’ (*al-ma'ānī l-maḥmūla 'alā kaṭirina*).<sup>219</sup>

To al-Fārābī's mind, various universal expressions, which – from the point of view of predicable semantics – may fulfill quite different functions in relation to the subject, can all be predicated of a subject, that is to say, expressions such as “animal” (i.e., a universal expression signifying a genus), “the man” (i.e., a universal expression signifying a species), “the sentient” (i.e., a universal expression signifying a differentia), and “the white” (i.e., a universal expression signifying a common accident) “are all universals which may commonly share in being predicated of Zayd and 'Amr; for Zayd *is* a ‘man’ and he *is* an ‘animal’ and he *is* ‘sen-

218 Yaḥyā b. 'Adī, “Šarḥ ma'ānī Maqālat al-Iskandar al-Afrūdīs fī l-farq bayna l-ġins wa-l-mādda” [= no. 2.41 in Gerhard Endreß, *The Works of Yaḥyā b. 'Adī: An Analytical Inventory* (Wiesbaden: Reichert, 1977)], in *Maqālat Yaḥyā b. 'Adī l-falsafiyya*, ed. Saḥbān Ḥalifāt (Amman: Mansūrāt al-Ġāmi'a al-Urdunniyya, 1988), p. 282, ll. 7–11.

219 Al-Fārābī, *K. al-Alfāz al-musta'mala fī l-manṭiq*, ed. Muḥsin Maḥdī (Beirut: Dār al-mašriq, 1968), p. 58, ll. 12–16, and p. 59, ll. 14–16. Cf. Cornelia Schöck, *Koranexegese, Grammatik und Logik: Zum Verhältnis von arabischer und aristotelischer Urteils-, Konsequenz- und Schlußlehre* (Leiden: Brill, 2006), p. 289.

sitive' and he is (*huwa*) 'white' (*abyaḍ*)."<sup>220</sup> In this regard, Ibn Sīnā appears to argue for a view which al-Fārābī, among others, has already held before him, namely that the universality and predicability of any given expression or concept do not depend on whether or not the subject shares in a common nature with it.

However, if one turns to al-Fārābī's treatment of the fourfold scheme of *Cat. 2*, which admittedly is difficult to assess since his *Long Commentary on the Categories* is – apart from a few Hebrew fragments – not extant,<sup>221</sup> it becomes clear that his understanding of the two criteria "in a subject" and "of a subject" significantly differs from the interpretation put forward by Ibn Sīnā. As we have seen, Ibn Sīnā insists that the distinction between "being an accident *per se*" and "being predicated accidentally of something else," on the one hand, and between "being a substance *per se*" and "being predicated essentially of something else," on the other hand, must not be conflated. Al-Fārābī, in turn, establishes in his *Short Treatise on the Categories* (i.e., the so-called *K. Qāṭāgūriyās ay al-Maqūlāt*) a strong link between these two modes of consideration: Whenever something is a substance, i.e., whenever something is not *in* a subject, and is, at the same time, predicated *of* a subject, it is predicated essentially. And whenever something is an accident, i.e., whenever something is *in* a subject, and is, at the same time, predicated *of* a subject, it may be predicated either accidentally or essentially, that is to say, it will be predicated essentially only in relation to an acci-

220 Al-Fārābī, *K. al-Alfāz al-musta'mala fi l-mantiq*, p. 60, ll. 6–8. Cf. Schöck, *Koranexegese, Grammatik und Logik*, p. 266.

221 In Zonta's edition and translation of the Hebrew fragments of al-Fārābī's *Long Commentary on the Categories*, al-Fārābī appears to equate "being said *of* a subject" with "essential predication": "In fact, with 'are said of a subject' Aristotle means what is predicated of a subject in order to let us know its essence and its quiddity"; see Mauro Zonta, "Al-Fārābī's *Long Commentary* on Aristotle's *Categoriae* in Hebrew and Arabic: A Critical Edition and English Translation of the Newly-found Extant Fragments," in *Studies in Arabic and Islamic Culture*, vol. 2, ed. Binyamin Abrahamov (Ramat Gan: Bar-Ilan University Press, 2006), English tr. p. 215, Hebrew text p. 244, ll. 9–10. However, I am not convinced that this particular fragment can safely be attributed to al-Fārābī. While almost all other fragments are introduced by the formula "said Abū Naṣr," this is the only fragment which, as Zonta himself acknowledges, is introduced by the formula "said the commentator Ibn Ruṣd" (*amar ha-mefareš Ben Ruṣd*). Given the great amount of lost works, the fact that this quote "does not correspond to any passage by Averroes, neither in his *Middle Commentary* nor in any other work" (Zonta, p. 193, note 38) does not in any way rule out the possibility that Judah ben Isaac ben Moses Cohen might have drawn this exegesis of *Cat. 2* from a source which is not available to us any more. Therefore, I would be hesitant to dismiss the reference to Ibn Ruṣd as a mere scribal error, as Zonta does. Cf. below, p. 226, note 533.

dent in whose essence it is included.<sup>222</sup> Thus, al-Fārābī reads *Cat. 2* as introducing a distinction between two kinds of universals:

There are two kinds (*darbān*) of universals (*kulliyyāt*): [1] One kind makes known of all of its subjects their essences (*yu'arrifu min mawḏū'atihā kullihā dawātahā*) and does not in any way make known of a subject anything which is outside of its essence; this is 'the universal of the substance' (*huwa kulliyyu l-ḡawhar*). [2] Another kind makes known of some of its subjects their essences and [makes known] of some other of its subjects something which is outside of their essences; this is 'the universal of the accident' (*huwa kulliyyu l-'araḏ*).<sup>223</sup>

Even though al-Fārābī does not provide us with an explicit distinction between ontological accidents and logical accidents and between ontological substances and logical substances, the fact that for him something may be an *accident* and yet may be predicated *essentially* suggests that he was at least aware of the need to discriminate between "accident *per se*" and "accident in relation to something else." However, this insight did not lead him to completely dissociate the ontological level from the predicative level, as Ibn Sinā is eager to do. Nor could we expect him to approve of an attempt at reading the fourfold scheme introduced in *Cat. 2* in a manner which systematically separates a criterion by which something may by itself be determined to be a substance or an accident from a criterion by which something may by itself be determined to be any kind of universal – and not either a universal which is predicated *of* a substance or a universal which is predicated *of* an accident. In al-Fārābī's reading, the "universal" by itself is "that which is said of many," regardless of whether it is predicated essentially or accidentally. But since, unlike Ibn Sinā's opponent (and unlike Ibn Sinā himself, for that matter), he does not simply equate "being a universal" with "being said *of* a subject," he can at the same time hold the view that everything which is said *of* a subject is predicated essentially. As his sketchy remarks on *Cat. 2* in his *Short Treatise on the Categories* suggest, he took the formula "said *of* a subject" to be restricted to those universal predicates which are applied to subjects that fall under the same ontological division as the predicate, i.e., either under the one *summum genus* "substance" or under one of the nine *summa genera* of "accident" – and such predications will, indeed, always be essential predications, even though this is not due to the fact that the predicate is a universal expression. Thus, he takes the middle ground between the two opposed radical readings: on the one side Ibn Sinā's opponent who must have held that "being said *of* a subject" is identical with "being a universal" and that, in addition to

222 Al-Fārābī, K. *Qāṭāḡūriyās ay al-Maqūlāt*, in *al-Mantiqiyāt li-l-Fārābī*, ed. Moḥammad Taqī Dānešpažūh (Qom: Manšūrāt maktabat Āyat Allāh al-'Uzmā al-Mar'ašī an-Naḡafī, 1988–1990 [1408–1410 AH]), vol. 1, p. 41, l. 2– p. 42, l. 8.

223 Al-Fārābī, K. *Qāṭāḡūriyās ay al-Maqūlāt*, ed. Dānešpažūh, p. 41, ll. 2–5.

that, “being said *of* a subject” always amounts to “signifying the quiddity,” and that therefore “universal” can be identified with “essential”; and on other side Ibn Sīnā himself who argues that “being said *of* a subject” refers to every universal expression whose meaning can be truly predicated of any given subject, regardless of whether the relation between predicate and subject is essential or not.

#### 2.4.3.3. Ibn Sīnā’s Refutation of the Identification of “Being Said *of* a Subject” with Essential Predication

In an attempt to refute the anonymous predecessor who equated “being said *of* a subject” not only with “being universal” but also with “being predicated essentially,” Ibn Sīnā mocks “this logician” (*hādā l-manṭiqī*) for having committed a blatant *petitio principii*: He attempted to establish the claim ‘every universal is something which is predicated of its particulars by means of an essential predication (that is, something which signifies a thing’s quiddity)’ on the basis of the premise ‘everything which is not predicated by means of an essential predication (that is, everything which does not signify a thing’s quiddity) is not a universal’ – but the latter amounts to nothing else than the contrapositive of the *quaesitum*.<sup>224</sup> The contraposition takes the following form: First of all, by means of obversion, from the original claim ‘every universal is something which signifies a thing’s quiddity’ one can immediately infer that ‘no universal is something which does not signify a thing’s quiddity’; secondly, this can be converted to ‘nothing which does not signify a thing’s quiddity is a universal’; finally, once again by means of obversion, one can infer from this that ‘everything which does not signify a thing’s quiddity is a non-universal.’ Subsequently,<sup>225</sup> this proposition is used as the major premise in the following syllogism:

- i ‘Everything which does not signify a thing’s quiddity’ [B] is ‘non-universal’ [A]  
[AaB]
- ii ‘He walks’ [C] is ‘something which does not signify a thing’s quiddity’ [B]  
[BaC]
- iii ‘He walks’ [C] is ‘non-universal’ [A]  
[AaC]

If one applies Ibn Sīnā’s terminological and conceptual distinctions to this example, *yamšī*, that is “he walks,” must be taken to refer to something which is an accident *per se* – and thus “inhering in a subject” – and an accidental/extrinsic attribute *in relation to* any given man, e.g., Zayd (which, in the context of giving examples, is the Arabic proper name commonly used in place of the Greek “Socrates”). Whenever we ascribe “he walks,” that is, an extrinsic attribute which is

224 Ibn Sīnā, *K. aš-Šifā’*, *al-Manṭiq*, *al-Maqūlāt*, I,3, p. 23, ll. 17–20 [=§ 31 (2.B.b)].

225 Ibn Sīnā, *K. aš-Šifā’*, *al-Manṭiq*, *al-Maqūlāt*, I,3, p. 24, ll. 1–5 [= § 32 (2.B.b)].

suitable to be applied to more than only one subject, to Zayd, it becomes – regardless of its ontological status – “something which is said *of* a subject.” At the same time, as Ibn Sinā argues, it would be absurd to deny that the definition of “he walks,” namely “it is something which moves from one place to another place by setting forward one foot and by leaning against the other one,” applies to Zayd as well,<sup>226</sup> even though the meaning of an extrinsic attribute is not predicated of a subject as that what the subject *is* (*kamā huwa*), but rather as something which is *in* it (*fīhi*) or which it *possesses* (*dū*).<sup>227</sup>

Whoever rejects the claim that, whenever something is predicated – regardless of whether it is intrinsic or extrinsic to the essence –, the subject can be characterized by the definition of the predicate as well and thus shares in its definition, would have to hold that “sharing in a definition (*al-mušāraka fī l-ḥadd*)” means that the definition is not merely predicated, but that it is also a definition.” That is to say, if Zayd is walking and “walking” is said of Zayd, the definition of “walking” would have to function as the definition of Zayd as well. The unpleasant result of such a view would be that “the species would not share in the definitions of the natural genera but would only share the names with them; for the definitions of the genera are not definitions for the species.” Even if the opponents were to attempt to refute this objection by saying “sharing in a definition means that that which is a definition for one of the two is either a definition for the other one or a part of the definition of the other one,” and thus might succeed in including genera, they would still be faced with the problem that not only the genus but also the proprium is predicated univocally of that which is below it, that is to say, it is predicated both in name and in definition. As a matter of fact, Ibn Sinā advocates the view that in the case of all five predicables, that is, in the case of all types of universal expressions, the definitions of the predicates apply to the subjects as well, even though these do not always fulfill the function of defining that of which they are predicated.<sup>228</sup>

Since Zayd “is only said of one single thing (*lā yuqālu illā ‘alā wāḥidin*)”<sup>229</sup> and since *yamsī* can be said both of Zayd and of other things, Zayd is a particular and *yamsī* a universal. In a nutshell: “Every general concept which is said of more than one thing (*kullu maʿnan ʿāmin yuqālu ‘alā aḵṭara min wāḥidin*), whichever way it might be said (*kayfa qīla*), is a universal (*kullī*); and [every] specific concept (*al-maʿnā l-ḥāṣṣ*) is a particular (*ḡuzʿī*).”<sup>230</sup> Any additional condition for universality or particularity can be denounced as being excessive:

226 Ibn Sinā, *K. aš-Šifāʾ, al-Mantiq, al-Maqūlāt*, I,3, p. 26, ll. 11–16 [= § 44 (2.B.b)].

227 Ibn Sinā, *K. aš-Šifāʾ, al-Mantiq, al-Maqūlāt*, I,3, p. 20, ll. 12–18 [= § 15 (2.B.b)].

228 Ibn Sinā, *K. aš-Šifāʾ, al-Mantiq, al-Maqūlāt*, I,3, p. 26, l. 18 – p. 27, l. 9 [= §§ 45–47 (2.B.b)].

229 Ibn Sinā, *K. aš-Šifāʾ, al-Mantiq, al-Maqūlāt*, I,3, p. 25, l. 10 [= § 38 (2.B.b)].

230 Ibn Sinā, *K. aš-Šifāʾ, al-Mantiq, al-Maqūlāt*, I,3, p. 27, ll. 12–13 [= § 49 (2.B.b)].

As for the assumption that the general predicate (*al-mahmūl al-‘āmm*) which is said both of Zayd and of something else must be something which is predicated of him with regard to his essence (*amran yuḥmalu ‘alayhi fi dātihī*), this is an additional condition which, in relation to Zayd, exceeds the condition for particularity and, in relation to the attribute, exceeds the condition for universality (*ṣarṭun zā'idun li-Zaydin ‘alā l-ḡuz'iyyati wa-li-ṣ-ṣifati ‘alā l-kulliyya*).<sup>231</sup>

Thus, Ibn Sinā, first of all, reproaches some of his predecessors for having held that “that which is said of a subject” must be taken to refer to “something essential which is constitutive for the quiddity” (*dātiyyan muqawwiman li-l-māhiyya*) and, as a consequence, for having confused universality with essentiality.<sup>232</sup> And in addition to that, he accuses them of having made the erroneous stipulation that the formula “existing in a subject” – i.e., the criterion for whether something is an accident or a substance – comprises both the ontological account of what it means to be an accident (*‘araḍ*) and the predicative account of what it means to apply to a subject accidentally (*‘araḍi*): “[...] with regard to ‘that which exists in a subject’ [they stipulated] that it be ‘accidental’ (*‘araḍi*); for in their view ‘accident’ (*‘araḍ*) and ‘accidental’ (*‘araḍi*) are one and the same thing, even though they differ in many respects. But in this place, the multitude of the differences between these two did not cross their minds.”<sup>233</sup> As a result of this confusion over the scope of Aristotle’s criteria, some of his predecessors, as Ibn Sinā remarks in *Maqūlāt* I,6, ultimately “lost their minds and held that one and the same thing may be a substance and an accident” (*fa-tahawwasat ṭabqatun wa-zannat anna ṣay’an wāḥidan yakūnu ḡawharan wa-‘araḍan*).<sup>234</sup>

231 Ibn Sinā, *K. aš-Šifā’, al-Mantiq, al-Maqūlāt*, I,3, p. 25, ll. 13–14 [= § 38 (2.B.b)].

232 Ibn Sinā, *K. aš-Šifā’, al-Mantiq, al-Maqūlāt*, I,3, p. 23, l. 4 [= § 27 (2.B.b)].

233 Ibn Sinā, *K. aš-Šifā’, al-Mantiq, al-Maqūlāt*, I,3, p. 23, ll. 4–6 [= § 27 (2.B.b)]. For a discussion of several passages from the *Corpus Aristotelicum* which may be taken to imply that Aristotle himself had already drawn at least a vague distinction between ‘logical accident’ and ‘ontological accident,’ see Lambertus de Rijk, *The Place of the Categories of Being in Aristotle’s Philosophy* (Assen: Van Gorcum, 1952), pp. 44–52.

234 Ibn Sinā, *K. aš-Šifā’, al-Mantiq, al-Maqūlāt*, I,6, p. 46, l. 7. It still would need to be determined whether Ibn Sinā simply exaggerates or whether there were really scholars who held the view quoted by Ibn Sinā. Porphyry, as quoted by Simplicius, as quoted in al-Ḥasan b. Suwār, *<Marginal Annotations on the Categories>*, ed. Badawī, vol. 1, p. 89, ll. 15–17; ed. Ḡabr, vol. 1, p. 31, note 6 (continued), ll. 10–12; MS Paris ar. 2346, fol. 159a, ll. 6–7, held the following view: “An example of this is whiteness (*al-bayād*): [a] For if it inheres in wool, it belongs to that which is ‘in a subject’ since it is not constitutive for the essence of wool. [b] If, however, it inheres in snow, it belongs to that which is not ‘in a subject’ since it is constitutive for the substance [i.e., the essence] of snow and, along with the substance, part of the subject (*wa-ḡuz’u mawḏū’in ma’a l-ḡawhar*).” However, Ibn Sinā, *K. aš-Šifā’, al-Mantiq, al-Maqūlāt*, I,6, p. 46, ll. 4–7, polemicizes against the following view (which is related to but not identical with Porphyry’s view): “[They said]: Whiteness (*al-bayād*) is also a part of ‘the white [thing]’ (*al-abyād*); for ‘the white

As the *Marginal Annotations on the Categories* by the Baghdad Peripatetic al-Ḥasan b. Suwār attest, both Ibn Sinā's discontent about those scholars who held that "matter" is one of the meanings that could be subsumed under "subject," and about those who claimed that something may be a substance and an accident if considered in two different regards or in relation to two different things, can be traced back to some passages from Simplicius' *Commentary on the Categories*, which al-Ḥasan b. Suwār quotes extensively in Arabic translation. To be exact, al-Ḥasan b. Suwār only tells us that he quotes "that which one of the commentators had reported of Porphyry (*mā ḥakāhu ba'ḍu l-mufasssirīna 'an Furfūriyūs*)"<sup>235</sup> – but it is not too difficult to identify all of these quotes as passages from Simplicius' commentary.

Porphyry, as quoted by al-Ḥasan b. Suwār via Simplicius, drew a distinction between subject in the first sense, namely "unqualified matter" (*al-hayūlā llatī hiya ḡayru mukayyafatin*), which is only "in potentia" (*bi-l-quwwa*), and subject in the second sense, namely "the qualified body which exists in actu (*al-ḡism al-mukayyaf al-mawḡūd bi-l-fi'l*)" and which can be pointed to," i.e., which is a τὸδε τι. Even though Porphyry, at first, claims that "subject" in *Cat.* 2 refers only to individual substances (which, as one might add, Ibn Sinā deems to be much too narrow in this context), he nonetheless applies the distinction between "of a subject" and "in a subject" – in the sense of signifying two different modes of predication – both to primary substance as a subject and to prime matter as a subject:

Aristotle intends by his saying 'subject' (*mawḡūd*) the second subject, namely the substance which is an individual (*al-ḡawhar alladī huwa šahṣ*) – and this is what he referred to by his saying 'neither of a subject nor in a subject' (*lā 'alā mawḡūd'in wa-lā fi mawḡūd'in*).

[a] Thus, everything which is predicated of this substance and which is said of it not in such a manner that it is substantial in relation to it (*lā 'alā annahū ḡawharī*

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[thing]' is 'a combination of substance and whiteness' (*maḡmū'u ḡawharin wa-bayādīn*); thus, 'whiteness' exists in 'the white [thing],' which is a substance, in the manner in which the part exists [in something] (*wuḡūda l-ḡuz*) – and thus it does not exist in it in the manner in which the accident exists in something (*naḥwa wuḡūdi l-'araḍi fi š-šay*); thus, it [i.e., whiteness] is a substance in it [i.e., in the white thing]. And exactly the same [whiteness] (*huwa bi-'aynihi*) is an accident in its subject; for it is in it not as a part of it, etc. (*wa-sā'ir dālika*). Thus, a group [of these scholars] lost their minds and held that one and the same thing may be a substance and an accident." The argument cited by Ibn Sinā is a bit different since it claims that 'whiteness' exists in a 'white thing' as a part – and therefore not as an accident – because it exists in it as a part of the compound of 'substance and whiteness' (and not, as Porphyry and Simplicius claim as part of the essence of a certain white thing, such as snow).

235 Ibn Suwār, <*Marginal Annotations on the Categories*>, ed. Badawī, vol. 1, p. 89, ll. 5–6; ed. Ġabr, vol. 1, p. 30, note 6 (continued), ll. 25–26; MS Paris ar. 2346, fol. 159a, l. 2.

*lahū*), but as the accident (*ka-l-‘araḍ*), belongs to that which is said to be ‘in a subject,’ just like heat inhering in iron.

[b] And everything which is predicated of it in such a manner that it is constitutive for its essence (*muḡawwim li-ḍātihī*), just like heat inhering in fire, is in relation to fire a part (*ḡuz*) [of its essence], but in relation to prime matter (*al-hayūlā l-ūlā*) it belongs to that which is ‘in a subject’ and [which is] an accident.<sup>236</sup>

However, “if [...] ‘that which is in a subject’ does not indicate all qualities but only those which are ‘brought in from outside’ (*daḡīlā*)”<sup>237</sup> (in contrast to those qualities which are a part of the substance, in the sense of a thing’s essence), one might raise the objection that, as a result, the fourfold scheme would fail to comprise all genera. To escape this difficulty, Simplicius, as quoted by al-Ḥasan b. Suwār, offers the following solution:

The reply to this is that the qualities which do not enter the substance from outside (*allatī laysat daḡīlatan ‘alā l-ḡawhar*), but which are constitutive for the substance of the thing (*bal hiya muḡawwimatun li-ḡawhari š-šay’*), because they are a part of it (*ḡuz’un minhū*), are substances; for Aristotle had clarified that the parts of substances are substances.<sup>238</sup>

236 Ibn Suwār, <*Marginal Annotations on the Categories*>, ed. Badawī, vol. 1, p. 89, ll. 19–24; ed. Ġabr, vol. 1, p. 31, note 6 (continued), ll. 15–20; MS Paris ar. 2346, fol. 159a, ll. 8–10. For the Greek text, see the quote in Simplicius, *In Categories*, p. 48, ll. 26–33 (= a part of fragment 55 in *Porphyrii Philosophi Fragmenta*, ed. Andrew Smith (Stuttgart/Leipzig: Teubner, 1993), pp. 45–46): “ὁ τοίνυν Ἀριστοτέλης τὸ δεύτερον ῥηθὲν ὑποκειμενον ἐνταῦθα λαβὼν τὸ κατὰ τὸ σύνθετον καὶ τὴν ἄτομον οὐσίαν, ὅπερ μήτε ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ εἶναι φησιν μήτε καθ’ ὑποκειμένου τινὸς λέγεσθαι, εἰκότως πᾶν τὸ μὴ οὐσιωδῶς ἐπ’ αὐτοῦ λεγόμενον, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὸ συμβεβηκέναι, ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ τούτῳ εἶναι φησιν, ὥσπερ τὴν θερμότητα ἐν τῷ σιδήρῳ· τὰ δὲ συμπληρωτικὰ ὡς τὴν τοῦ πυρὸς θερμότητα τοῦ μὲν πυρὸς μέρος ἂν εἴποι, ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ δὲ τῇ ἀποιῷ ὕλῃ.” English tr. by Chase, pp. 62–63 (modified; emphasis added): “Now Aristotle here having taken up the second above-mentioned subject – that which is in accordance with the composite and with individual substance, which, he says, neither is *in* a subject nor is said *of* any subject – rightly says that everything which is not said *of* it essentially, but as an accident, is *in* this as its subject, like heat *in* iron. Those things, however, which are completers, like the heat of fire, he would say are a part of the fire, and in qualityless matter as their subject.”

237 Ibn Suwār, <*Marginal Annotations on the Categories*>, ed. Badawī, vol. 1, p. 90, ll. 3–4; ed. Ġabr, vol. 1, p. 31, note 6 (continued), l. 27; MS Paris ar. 2346, fol. 159a, l. 13. Note that *daḡīl* renders ἐπέισακτος, which Chase translates as “adventitious” (cf. Yahyā b. al-Bīṭrīq’s translation of ἐπέισακτος at *De Generatione Animalium* 724b33, <http://telota.bbaw.de/glossga/glossary.php?id=108433>).

238 Ibn Suwār, <*Marginal Annotations on the Categories*>, ed. Badawī, vol. 1, p. 90, ll. 5–7; ed. Ġabr, vol. 1, p. 32, note 6 (continued), ll. 2–4 (at l. 3, Ġabr omits *li-annahū* before *ḡuz*’ *minhū*); MS Paris ar. 2346, fol. 159a, ll. 13–14. For the Greek text, see Simplicius, *In Categories*, p. 49, ll. 5–8: “ἢ χρῆν λέγειν ὅτι αἱ μὴ ἐπέισακτοι ποιότητες, ἀλλὰ συμπληρωτικαὶ τῆς οὐσίας, μέρη τῆς οὐσίας οὔσαι, καὶ αὐταὶ οὐσίαι εἰσὶν καὶ τῇ οὐσίᾳ



Thus, we get the following picture: Whereas in relation to "iron" "heat" would have to be classified as an accident, for it inheres in iron, not as a part of it, in relation to "fire," being a part of its essence, it would have to be classified as a substance. Even though Ibn Sinā, in his usual habit, does not mention any names, we can safely assume that it is this line of interpretation which he targets in making the following clarification:

Just like substantiality is not due to the fact that, in relation to a certain thing, something is not *in* a subject, but rather because *per se* it like this, accidentality is not due to the fact that, in relation to a specific thing, it is *in* a subject or not *in* a subject, but rather because *per se* it is in need of a certain subject, in whichever way this may be and whichever thing this may be.<sup>239</sup>

Ibn Sinā complains that, as a result of some of his predecessors' failure to properly distinguish between 'arad and ġawhar as ontological terms, on the one hand, and 'aradī and ġawharī or dātī as predicative terms, on the other hand, these scholars tacitly assumed six rather than four principles of division in their reading of the scheme of *Cat.* 2.<sup>240</sup>

#### 2.4.4. A Syllogism in the "of a Subject" Mode of Predication

##### 2.4.4.1. Ibn Sinā's Contemporaries and Andronicus of Rhodes on *Cat.* 3, 1b10–15

After having introduced the distinction between "being said *of* a subject" and "being *in* a subject" and having sketched some examples of the four types of pairings that can be obtained from these two relations, Aristotle at the begin-

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συμπεριλαμβάνονται· τὰ γὰρ μέρη τῆς οὐσίας οὐσίαι κατὰ τὸν Ἀριστοτέλη." English tr. by Chase, p. 63 (modified): "Or one needs to say that those qualities which are not adventitious, but rather are completers of substance, being parts of substance, are themselves also substances and are included together with substance; for according to Aristotle, the parts of substance are themselves substances."

239 Ibn Sinā, *K. aš-Šifā'*, *al-Manṭiq, al-Maqūlāt*, I,6, p. 49, ll. 13–16.

240 Ibn Sinā, *K. aš-Šifā'*, *al-Manṭiq, al-Maqūlāt*, I,3, p. 26, ll. 3–8 [= § 41 (2.B.b)]. For the distinction between 'arad and 'aradī, see also *K. aš-Šifā'*, *al-Manṭiq, al-Ġadal*, I,7, ed. Aḥmad Fu'ād al-Ahwānī (Cairo: al-Hay'a al-'amma li-šū'un al-maṭābi' al-amriyya, 1965 [1385 AH]), p. 70, ll. 3–6: "As for substance, it may be predicated of something in such a manner that it applies accidentally to it (*hamlan 'alā sabīlin annahū 'ariḍun laḥū*), just like 'animal' is predicated of 'the moving inasmuch it is moving' (*al-mutaḥarrik min ḥaytu huwa mutaḥarrik*); for its relationship (*nisba*) to 'the moving' is no other relationship than that of the accident, that is to say, the accident which is one of the five [predicables] which is the accidental (*al-'aradī*), not the other accident [i.e., the ontological accident]."

ning of *Cat.* 3 (1b10–15) very briefly discusses a syllogism in which both premises and the conclusion are in the “of a subject” mode of predication:

Whenever one thing is predicated of another as *of* a subject, all things said *of* what is predicated will be said *of* the subject also. For example, [ii (*minor*)] ‘man’ [B] is predicated *of* ‘the individual man’ [C] [BaC], [i (*major*)] and ‘animal’ [A] *of* ‘man’ [B] [AaB]; [iii (*conclusion*)] so ‘animal’ [A] will be predicated *of* ‘the individual man’ [C] also [AaC] – for the individual man is both a man and an animal.<sup>241</sup>

Taking this as further evidence for the assumption that “being said *of* a subject” means “being predicated synonymously and as belonging to the ‘what it is’” (τὸ συνωνύμως καὶ ἐν τῷ τί ἐστὶν κατηγορεῖσθαι) and that, therefore, a predication in the *of* mode amounts to giving a “definitional account” (τὸν λόγον τὸν ὀριστικὸν) of the subject,<sup>242</sup> Simplicius in his *Commentary on the Categories* paraphrases this syllogism as follows: “When, therefore, something is predicated as *of* a subject, just like [i] ‘man’ [is predicated] *of* Socrates, and when some other thing is predicated *of* the predicate as well, not just at random, but as *of* a subject and synonymously, just like [ii] ‘animal’ [is predicated] *of* ‘man,’ [iii] ‘animal’ will be predicated *of* Socrates too.”<sup>243</sup> According to Simplicius’ reading, all propositions in the *of* mode of predication do not only make universal claims about any given subject but always reveal something about the essence of the subject.

A brief survey of three extant Arabic commentaries on *Cat.* 3, 1b10–15, which have been composed before or during Ibn Sīnā’s lifetime in the intellectual milieu of the Baghdad Peripatetics, shows that – prior to Ibn Sīnā’s critical reassessment of the Aristotelian tradition – this understanding of the “*of* a subject” mode of predication, which Simplicius himself had inherited from the pre-

241 “Ὅταν ἕτερον καθ’ ἐτέρου κατηγορῆται ὡς καθ’ ὑποκειμένου, ὅσα κατὰ τοῦ κατηγορουμένου λέγεται, πάντα καὶ κατὰ τοῦ ὑποκειμένου ῥηθήσεται· οἷον ἄνθρωπος κατὰ τοῦ τινὸς ἀνθρώπου κατηγορεῖται, τὸ δὲ ζῶον κατὰ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου· οὐκοῦν καὶ κατὰ τοῦ τινὸς ἀνθρώπου τὸ ζῶον κατηγορηθήσεται· ὁ γὰρ τις ἄνθρωπος καὶ ἄνθρωπός ἐστι καὶ ζῶον.” English tr. by Ackrill, p. 4 (modified; emphasis added). Arabic tr. in *Manṭiq Aristū, al-Maqūlāt*, ed. Ġabr, vol. 1, p. 35, l. 1 – p. 36, l. 4: *matā ḥumila šay’un ‘alā šay’in ḥamla l-maḥmūli ‘alā l-mawḍū‘i qīla kullu mā yuqālu ‘alā l-maḥmūli ‘alā l-mawḍū‘i ayḍan, miṭālu dālika inna l-insāna yuḥmalu ‘alā insānin mā wa-yuḥmalu ‘alā l-insāni l-ḥayawānu, fa-yaḡību an yakūna l-ḥayawānu ‘alā insānin mā aydan maḥmūlan, fa-inna insānan mā huwa insānun wa-huwa ḥayawānun.*

242 Simplicius, *In Categories*, p. 51, l. 30 – p. 52, l. 3.

243 Simplicius, *In Categories*, p. 52, ll. 3–7: “Ὅταν οὖν ὡς καθ’ ὑποκειμένου κατηγορῆται, οἷον ὁ ἄνθρωπος τοῦ Σωκράτους, καὶ τοῦ κατηγορουμένου ἄλλο τι κατηγορῆται καὶ αὐτὸ μὴ ὡς ἔτυχεν, ἀλλ’ ὡς καθ’ ὑποκειμένου καὶ συνωνύμως, οἷον τὸ ζῶον τοῦ ἀνθρώπου, καὶ τοῦ Σωκράτους τὸ ζῶον κατηγορηθήσεται.” English tr. by Chase, p. 66 (significantly modified).

ceding Neoplatonic commentary tradition, remained the uncontested standard among Arabic readers of the *Categories*. In drawing on the connection between the "of a subject" mode of predication and synonymous predication, and in assuming that predicates are said univocally of different subjects when these subjects fall under the same category, al-Ḥasan b. Suwār in his *Marginal Annotations on the Categories* makes the following remark on *Cat.* 3, 1b10–15:

The 'predication of that which is [said] of a subject' is the predication which comes about univocally (*bi-t-tawāṭu*). This is the case with those which belong to one and the same nature (*al-ašyā' allatī min ṭabī'a wāhida*), i.e., those things which ascend to one and the same category (*allatī tartaqī ilā maqūlatin wāhidatin*), such as 'man' (*al-insān*), 'animal' (*al-ḥayawān*) and 'animate' (*al-mutanaffas*). For all these ascend to one and the same category, namely substance. The highest one among them is predicated of those which are below it by means of an *of* predication.<sup>244</sup>

Since in a proposition in the "of a subject" mode of predication the subject always shares in the nature of the predicate, the predicate, according to Ibn Suwār, "gives its name and its definition to that of which it is predicated" (*ya'fī ismahū wa-ḥaddahū li-mā yuḥmalu 'alayhi*).<sup>245</sup>

The same line of interpretation can be detected in the *Tafsīr ma'ānī Aristūṭālis fī K. al-Maqūlāt*. This paraphrastic commentary by a certain Abū Muḥammad 'Abdallāh b. Muḥammad al-Wāhibī is in all probability based upon the *Categories* part of the lost *Ṣafw aš-šarḥ li-Īsāgūgī wa-Qāṭiḡūriyās* by Abū l-Qāsim al-Kātib,<sup>246</sup> i.e., one of Abū l-Ḥasan al-'Āmirī's (d. 381 AH / 992 AD) disciples who has been identified with a scholar heavily criticized by Ibn Sīnā for his deficiencies in the field of logic, namely with Abū l-Qāsim al-Kirmānī (late

244 Ibn Suwār, <*Marginal Annotations on the Categories*>, ed. Badawī, vol. 1, p. 92, ll. 3–7; ed. Ğabr, vol. 1, p. 36, note 1 (continued), ll. 5.–9; MS Paris ar. 2346, fol. 159b (right-hand margin), ll. 7–8.

245 Ibn Suwār, <*Marginal Annotations on the Categories*>, ed. Badawī, vol. 1, p. 92, l. 9; ed. Ğabr, vol. 1, p. 36, note 1 (continued), l. 12; MS Paris ar. 2346, fol. 159b (right-hand margin), l. 9.

246 For the assumption that the *Tafsīr ma'ānī Aristūṭālis fī K. al-Maqūlāt* may very likely be a paraphrase of the *Ṣafw aš-šarḥ li-Īsāgūgī wa-Qāṭiḡūriyās*, see Everett Rowson, *A Muslim Philosopher on the Soul and its Fate: Al-'Āmirī's Kitāb al-Amad 'alā l-abad* (New Haven, CT: American Oriental Society, 1988), pp. 13–14. On the *Tafsīr ma'ānī Aristūṭālis fī K. al-Maqūlāt* see also Gerhard Endreß, "Die Bagdader Aristoteliker," in *Grundriss der Geschichte der Philosophie, begründet von Friedrich Ueberweg, Philosophie in der islamischen Welt*, vol. 1: 8.–10. Jahrhundert, ed. Ulrich Rudolph (Basel: Schwabe, 2012), p. 298. For a (not very satisfactory) edition of selected quotes from the *Tafsīr ma'ānī Aristūṭālis fī K. al-Maqūlāt*, see Mubahat Türker, "El-'Āmirī ve Katagoriler'in şehleriyle ilgili parçalar," *Araştırma Ankara Üniversitesi Dil ve Tarih-Coğrafya Fakültesi Felsefe Bölümü Dergisi* 3 (1965): pp. 87–122. Cf. below, p. 159, note 352.

4<sup>th</sup>/10<sup>th</sup> – early 5<sup>th</sup>/11<sup>th</sup> centuries).<sup>247</sup> Al-Wāhibī (most likely via Abū l-Qāsim’s *vorlage*) equates predicates in the *of* mode with “essential” (*dātiyya*) attributes, that is to say, a predicate in the *of* mode “makes known” (*yu‘arrifu*) and “constitutes” (*yuqawwimu*) the essence of the subject.<sup>248</sup> Therefore, according to al-Wāhibī, “whenever something is predicated of something by means of a logical predication and by an ‘*of* [predication],’ the nature of the subject belongs to the nature of the predicate (*idā ḥumila šay’un ‘alā šay’in ḥamlan maṭṭiqiyyan wa-bi-‘alā kānat ṭabī‘atu l-mawḍū‘i min ṭabī‘ati l-maḥmūl*).”<sup>249</sup> Hence, al-Wāhibī not only equates the “*of* a subject mode” of predication with essential predication but, furthermore, identifies essential attributes with constitutive attributes. To Ibn Sīnā’s mind such a view amounts to an untenable simplification of what it means to be predicated essentially.<sup>250</sup>

Not surprisingly, in his commentary on *Cat.* 3, 1b10–15, Abū l-Farağ b. aṭ-Ṭayyib, a student of al-Ḥasan b. Suwār and an eminent representative of the Baghdad Peripatetics in Ibn Sīnā’s days, characterizes the “*of* a subject” mode of predication in quite a similar vein:

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247 For the rather tentative suggestion that al-‘Āmirī’s (d. 381 AH / 992 AD) young *ḡulām* Abū l-Qāsim al-Kātib might be identical with the more mature scholar Abū l-Qāsim al-Kirmānī, see Jean [Yahya] Michot, “Une nouvelle oeuvre du jeune Avicenne: Note complémentaire à propos du ms. *Hüseyn Çelebi 1194* de Brousse,” *Bulletin de philosophie médiévale* 34 (1992): pp. 147–150. For a substantial corroboration of this assumption, see David Reisman, *The Making of the Avicennan Tradition: The Transmission, Contents, and Structure of Ibn Sīnā’s al-Mubāḥaṭāt* (The Discussions) (Leiden: Brill, 2002), pp. 166–170 and 172–185; having presented several strong indications, Reisman, p. 185, nonetheless formulates his conclusion a bit cautiously: “In conclusion, it is quite possible that the Abū l-Qāsim al-Kirmānī who played a role in the *Mubāḥaṭāt* texts can be identified with the ‘apprentice’ of al-‘Āmirī, later the chancellery secretary in the Būyid bureau at Rayy, who would compose a commentary on the *Eisagoge* and *Categories* in his early years as a scholar [...]. Ibn Sīnā’s poor relations with Abū l-Qāsim may also have become a part of his refutations of the Baḡdādī scholars, since it is likely that Abū l-Qāsim, in addition to his studies with al-‘Āmirī and relations with Miskawayh, may have also linked himself with the Baḡdādī school of philosophy (as Ibn Sīnā says he does in his Letter to the Scholars of Baḡdād).” Moreover, Reisman, p. 175, estimates that – if indeed we take the identification of Abū l-Qāsim al-Kātib with Abū l-Qāsim al-Kirmānī for granted – at the time of his first dispute with Ibn Sīnā, which took place in Hamaḍān in 405/1015, Abū l-Qāsim would have been “in his early to mid-sixties,” while Ibn Sīnā would have been “in his mid-thirties.”

248 Al-Wāhibī, *Tafsīr ma‘ānī Aristūṭālis fī K. al-Maqūlāt*, MS Istanbul Ayasofya 2483, fol. 90b, ll. 11–14. I would like to express my deep gratitude to Gerhard Endreß for having made this MS accessible to me.

249 Al-Wāhibī, *Tafsīr ma‘ānī Aristūṭālis fī K. al-Maqūlāt*, MS Istanbul Ayasofya 2483, fol. 90b, ll. 19–20.

250 Cf. above, pp. 87–92, and below, pp. 104–107.

Thus, whenever the predication pertains to the essence [of the subject] itself (*fa-matā 'āda l-ḥamlu ilā nafsi d-dāt*) so that the predicate and the subject are one and the same in their essence (*hattā yakūna l-maḥmūlu wa-l-mawḍū'u dātuhumā wāḥi-datan*), whereas there is [only] a difference with regard to specificity and generality (*wa-l-farq fi l-ḥuṣūṣ wa-l-'umūm*), the predicate is substantial (*ḡawharī*) and its predication is called an 'of predication' (*ḥaml 'alā*).<sup>251</sup>

In summing up the line of interpretation pursued in the three commentaries we get the following picture: In a syllogism in the *of* mode of predication in each of the three propositions the subject and the predicate will share in a common essence, i.e., they will fall under the same category, the only difference between subject and predicate being that the predicate will be more general than the subject, that is to say, while the predicate will be a higher-order universal the subject will be either a low-order universal or an individual; therefore, the definition of the predicate will possess definitional force in relation to the subject; in a nutshell, the predicate will be *essential* in relation to the subject.

The Arabic sources, as far as I can tell, do not even hint at any possibility of an alternative interpretation of the "of a subject" mode of predication or of a syllogism consisting of three propositions in the "of a subject" mode of predication. As a matter of fact, if throughout the Aristotelian tradition we are in search of a significantly different reading, we need to go back as far as to the first generations of Peripatetic philosophers, namely to an interpretation of *Cat.* 3, 1b10–15, which Simplicius attributes to Andronicus of Rhodes (1<sup>st</sup> century BC). By the time Simplicius composed his commentary Andronicus' *Paraphrase of the Categories* had in all likelihood already been lost; but through the material that had been preserved in Porphyry's now lost *Long Commentary on the Categories to Gedalios* he did have access to some notable doctrines upheld by Andronicus<sup>252</sup>; at any rate, he concludes his own commentary on *Cat.* 3, 1b10–15, by reporting the following dissenting opinion:

We should note, however, that Andronicus and some others say that not only those things which are predicated as belonging to the 'what it is' (τὰ ἐν τῷ τί ἐστιν κατηγορούμενα) are said to be predicated as *of* a subject (καθ' ὑποκειμένου κατηγορεῖσθαι), but other things as well, just like 'the musical' (τὸ μουσικόν) [is predicated] *of* (κατὰ) Aristoxenus, and 'the Athenian' (τὸ Ἀθηναῖος) [is predicated] *of* (κατὰ) Socrates, and likewise those things which, when we predicate them *of* something, we say that it [i.e., the subject] *is* (εἶναι) that very thing which we predicate. For when we say that Socrates is walking, we do not say that Socrates *is* 'to walk' (οὐ λέγομεν βαδίζειν εἶναι τὸν Σωκράτη), but we do say he *is* 'Athenian' and 'a philosopher' (Ἀθηναῖον δὲ εἶναι λέγομεν καὶ φιλόσοφον). Whatever is predicated *of* these, moreover, when we say the former *are* the latter, will also be said *of* the

251 Ibn aṭ-Ṭayyib, *Tafsīr K. al-Maqūlāt*, ed. Ferrari, p. 78 (Arabic), ll. 9–12.

252 P. Moraux, *Der Aristotelismus bei den Griechen*, vol. 1, p. 97.

subject. For if Socrates is a philosopher and philosophers are knowledgeable, then Socrates will also be knowledgeable.<sup>253</sup>

Thus, according to the view which Simplicius reports of Andronicus, whenever the subject can be said to *be* the predicate, regardless of whether the predicate pertains to the essence of the subject or not, the predicate applies to the subject in the “*of a subject*” mode of predication.

On the basis of Simplicius’ report, Paul Moraux interprets Andronicus’ position as an attempt at including not only essential predicates but also “mit dem individuellen Subjekt sehr eng verbundene Eigenschaften” (i.e., properties closely connected to the individual subject) under those predicates which are said of something as “*of a subject*.”<sup>254</sup> Thus, the two subjects mentioned in the examples, i.e., Aristoxenus and Socrates, seem to have led Moraux to the assumption that Andronicus’ extension of “*of a subject*” predications remains limited to particular subjects which can be characterized by certain “*per se accidents*,” i.e., the συμβεβηκότα καθ’ αὐτά which Aristotle refers to in other works (but not in the *Categories*).<sup>255</sup> By tacitly committing himself to an interpretation which – as Ibn Sīnā would complain – burdens the “*of a subject*” criterion with the task of delineating essential attributes and which, furthermore, appears to equate essential attributes with secondary substances, Moraux spots the following problem in the view ascribed to Andronicus: If the predication in the “*of a subject*” did not remain restricted to predicates which are “secondary substances,” the distinction between substance and quality (or, as one might add, possibly another accidental category) would be seriously blurred.<sup>256</sup> However, this problem would not arise

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253 Simplicius, *In Categories*, p. 54, ll. 8–16: “Ἰστέον δὲ ὅτι καὶ Ἀνδρόνικος καὶ ἄλλοι δὲ τινες οὐ μόνον τὰ ἐν τῷ τί ἐστὶν κατηγορούμενα καθ’ ὑποκειμένου κατηγορεῖσθαι φασιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἄλλα οἷον τὸ μουσικὸν κατὰ Ἀριστοξένου καὶ τὸ Ἀθηναῖος κατὰ Σωκράτους. καὶ ἴσως ἐκεῖνα ὅσα κατηγοροῦντές τινος ἐκεῖνο εἶναι λέγομεν αὐτὸ ὅπερ κατηγοροῦμεν (βαδίζειν μὲν γὰρ λέγοντες τὸν Σωκράτη οὐ λέγομεν βαδίζειν εἶναι τὸν Σωκράτη, Ἀθηναῖον δὲ εἶναι λέγομεν καὶ φιλόσοφον) καὶ ὅσα δὴ τούτων κατηγορεῖται, λεγόντων ἡμῶν ταῦτα ἐκεῖνα εἶναι, καὶ κατὰ τοῦ ὑποκειμένου ῥηθήσεται· εἰ γὰρ ὁ Σωκράτης φιλόσοφος καὶ ὁ φιλόσοφος δὲ ἐπιστήμων, ἔσται καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης ἐπιστήμων.” English tr. by Chase, p. 68 (significantly modified).

254 P. Moraux, *Der Aristotelismus bei den Griechen*, vol. 1, p. 104: “Andronikos war jedoch der Meinung, daß nicht nur essentielle Prädikate, sondern auch andere, mit dem individuellen Subjekt sehr eng verbundene Eigenschaften von diesem wie von einem Substrat prädiiziert werden und daher der oben angegebenen Prädikationsregel unterworfen sind.”

255 P. Moraux, *Der Aristotelismus bei den Griechen*, vol. 1, p. 105.

256 P. Moraux, *Der Aristotelismus bei den Griechen*, vol. 1, p. 104: “So unwichtig die Bemerkung des Andronikos auf den ersten Blick auch erscheinen mag, sie enthält einen schwerwiegenden Einwand gegen den in der kommentierten Schrift angegebenen Unterschied zwischen der Substanz und den übrigen Kategorien: Wenn das Prädiiziertwerden vom Individuum ὡς καθ’ ὑποκειμένου nicht mehr ausschließlich bei den zweiten Sub-

at all if – in breaking with the dominant exegetical tradition and in pursuing a line of interpretation which resembles Ibn Sīnā's understanding of *Cat.* 2–3 – solely the criterion of “being not *in* a subject” and “being *in* a subject” were taken to provide us with a distinction between substances and accidents, regardless of whether they are particular or universal.

As we have seen above, in his early *K. al-Maqūlāt* of the *Muḥtaṣar al-awsaṭ fī l-mantiq* Ibn Sīnā subordinates the distinction between “being said *of* a subject” and “being *in* a subject” to two more general attributive relations in which a subject (*mawḍūʿ*) may stand to a predicate (*maḥmūl*): (1) *being* the predicate and (2) *having* the predicate. Whereas the *being* mode of attribution encompasses not only the “*of* a subject” mode of attribution, in which the predicate is always universal, but also statements of unnatural predication, in which a particular predicate is attributed to an numerically identical individual, the *having* mode includes both the relation between accident and subject and between form and matter. In Ibn Sīnā's discussion of the *of* and *in* relation in chapter I,3 of the *Maqūlāt* of the *Šifāʾ* the notions of *being* the predicate and *having* the predicate still remain operative,<sup>257</sup> even if there Ibn Sīnā does not – at least not to the same degree as in the *Muḥtaṣar* – make use of them as distinctions which systematically precede the “*of* a subject” and “*in* a subject” modes of predication. In any case, we can draw a conceptual line from the doctrine attributed to Andronicus to Ibn Sīnā's systematization efforts both in the *Muḥtaṣar* and in the *Šifāʾ*: Just like Andronicus identifies the “*of* a subject” mode of predication with predicates which allow us to say that “the subject *is* the predicate,” regardless of whether the predicate pertains to the essence of the subject or not, Ibn Sīnā holds that every *universal* predicate in the *being* mode of attribution is something which is said *of* the subject. It might not be too far-fetched to assume that Ibn Sīnā – whether through Porphyry's *Long Commentary on the Categories* to *Gedalius*, Simplicius' *Commentary on the Categories* or another indirect source – was aware of the fact that earlier exegetes had understood Aristotle's “*of* a subject” criterion in a much more straightforward manner: An expression can be predicated *of* a subject if the subject can be said to *be* the predicate, e.g., since Socrates can be said to *be* ‘white,’ the paronymous expression ‘white,’ which can be taken to signify both a quality *in* a subject and the bearer of a quality, can be predicated of Socrates; however, the non-paronymous abstract expression ‘whiteness,’ which signifies a non-substantial essence, would need to be at-

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stanzen, sondern auch bei solchen Eigenschaften begegnet wie *Musiker* (von Aristoxenos), *Athener*, *Philosoph* (von Sokrates), dann verlieren die im 2. Kapitel dargelegten Unterscheidungsmerkmale ihre Gültigkeit, und es wird bedeutend schwieriger, die Grenze zwischen Substanz und Qualität zu erkennen.”

257 See Ibn Sīnā, *K. aš-Šifāʾ, al-Mantiq, al-Maqūlāt*, I,3, p. 20, ll. 9–18 [= §§ 14–15 (2.B.b)].

tributed to Socrates in a different manner, e.g., by saying “‘whiteness’ is *in* Socrates” or “Socrates *has* ‘whiteness’.”

Such an interpretation is in line with a more general rule we can derive from Aristotle’s refutation of a presumable counterexample to Celarent NXN discussed in *An. Pr. A 34*: Whereas, as Aristotle tells us, the alleged difficulty only arises if one were to allow for a premise in which “illness” (νόσος/*al-marād*), i.e., an expression signifying a non-substantial essence, is predicated of “man” (ἄνθρωπος/*insān*), i.e., an expression signifying a substance, the counterexample would not hold if “illness” were replaced by the paronymous expression “ill” (τὸ νοσοῦν / *al-marīd*), which may be taken to signify both a quality *in* a subject and the bearer of a quality.<sup>258</sup> Aristotle concludes the discussion by providing us with the following rule: “Thus it is clear that in such premises one should always replace [the expression signifying] the state by [the expression signifying] ‘that which is according to the state’ [i.e., ‘that which *has* the state’] and take it [i.e., the expression signifying ‘that which *has* the state’] as a term.”<sup>259</sup> As Marko Malink argues with recourse to Alexander of Aphrodisias’ *Commentary on the Prior Analytics*, the rationale behind this rule “seems to be that non-substance essence terms like ‘illness’ cannot be truly  $a_x$ -predicated of substance terms like ‘man’.” Rather, such a predication is only possible if the predicate is “a non-essence term like ‘ill’,”<sup>260</sup> which Aristotle would classify as a paronymous expression. As will become clearer shortly, Ibn Sīnā in his distinction between the manner in which a non-paronymous expression signifying something that falls under a different category than the subject, on the one

258 Aristotle, *An. Pr. A 34*, 47b40 – 48a12. My reading of *An. Pr. A 34* draws on the groundbreaking analysis undertaken by Marko Malink, *Aristotle’s Modal Syllogistic* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2013), pp. 152–156. The counterexample has the following form: The supposedly true premises (i) ‘health [A] necessarily holds of no illness [B]’ [ $Ae_N B$ ] and (ii) ‘illness [B] holds of every man [C]’ [ $Ba_x C$ ] yield the false conclusion (iii) ‘health [A] necessarily holds of no man [C]’ [ $Ae_N C$ ]. In this syllogism, in the minor premise (ii) an abstract expression which signifies a non-substantial essence (i.e., ‘illness’) is predicated of an expression signifying a substance (i.e., ‘man’). Aristotle appears to take issue with this and demands that ‘illness’ and ‘health’ be replaced by the paronymous expressions ‘ill’ and ‘healthy’; in this way, it becomes clear that the major premise (i) is false: ‘that which is healthy [A] necessarily holds of nothing which is ill’; that is to say, the revised major premise is false if one understands it in the sense that ‘someone who is healthy can never be ill.’

259 Aristotle, *An. Pr. A 34*, 48a26–28: “δῆλον οὖν ὅτι κατὰ τὰς τοιαύτας προτάσεις ἀεὶ τὸ κατὰ τὴν ἕξιν ἀντι τῆς ἕξεως μεταληπτέον καὶ θετέον ὄρον” (my tr.). Arabic tr. in *Manṭiq Aristū, al-Qiyās*, ed. Ġabr, vol. 1, p. 301, ll. 10–11: *fa-huwa bayyinun anna fi miṭli hādihī l-muqaddimāti yanbaġī an yu’ahāda dū l-hāli badala l-hāli wa-yaṣīru haddan*.

260 Marko Malink, *Aristotle’s Modal Syllogistic*, p. 155.



hand, and the corresponding paronymous expression, on the other hand, can function as a predicate draws on a closely related intuition.

2.4.4.2. Ibn Sīnā's Reassessment of Aristotle's Syllogism in the "of a Subject" Mode of Predication (*K. aš-Šifāʾ, al-Mantiq, al-Maqūlāt, I,5*):  
 Predicating Non-Essential Paronymous Expressions of the Subject

Against the background of Ibn Sīnā's warning not to equate the formula "being said of something as of a subject" with essential predication, which – as we have seen – he voices quite forcefully in the course of *Maqūlāt* I,3, one might be surprised to see that at the beginning of *Maqūlāt* I,5 (i.e., in the chapter which is chiefly concerned with *Cat.* 3, 1b10–15, and the commentatorial tradition connected to this passage) Ibn Sīnā at first sight seems to reproduce the Aristotelian example, along with its exegetical baggage, quite faithfully:

Whenever a thing [A] is predicated of [another] thing [B] as something which is said of a subject, and when thereupon that [second] thing [B] is predicated of [yet another] thing [C] as something which is said of a subject, so that there are two extreme terms [A and C] and one middle term [B], then that [thing] which had been said as that which is said of the subject [i.e., A] is said of that [thing] of which the first 'said thing' had been predicated [i.e., C (for B is the first thing of which something had been said – and B had been predicated of C)]; for example, [i (*major*)] whenever 'animal' [A] is predicated of 'man' [B] as something which is said of a subject, and [ii (*minor*)] whenever 'man' [B] is said of Zayd and 'Amr in the same manner of predication, then [iii (*conclusion*)] 'animal' [A] is said of Zayd [C] in the same manner of predication as well; for Zayd is an animal; and he shares with 'animal' in its definition (*wa-yaštariku ma'a l-ḥayawāni fī ḥaddihī*), that is to say, the definition of 'animal' is predicated of him [i.e., Zayd] because 'animal' is said of 'the nature of man'; thus, of everything of which 'man' is said, 'animal' is said as well; and 'man' is said of Zayd.<sup>261</sup>

Here Ibn Sīnā appears to stress the fact that there is an essential relation both between the major term 'animal' (functioning as the predicate of the first premise) and the middle term 'man' (functioning as the subject of the first premise), on the one hand, and between the major term 'animal' (functioning as the predicate of the conclusion) and the minor term Zayd (functioning as the subject of the conclusion), on the other hand. Yet, upon closer inspection it becomes clear that highlighting this essential relation is important not because it would prove the claim that all "of a subject" predications are essential predications but rather because – in the context of discussing the present syllogism – the fact that 'animal' is not just predicated of 'a certain man under certain circumstances' but of 'the nature of man' provides us with the warrant that the major premise is both

261 Ibn Sīnā, *K. aš-Šifāʾ, al-Mantiq, al-Maqūlāt, I,5*, p. 38, ll. 10–16.

universal and unconditionally true. In the course of the subsequent discussion Ibn Sīnā stresses the fact that the syllogism that had been provided by way of example – with the major term being the genus ‘animal,’ the minor term ‘the individual man’ and the middle term the species ‘man’ – could very well be replaced by a syllogism in which the relation between the major term and the middle term would be non-essential and yet the major term could still be predicated *of* that *of* which the middle term is predicated:

If it were to happen that instead of the genus there would be another thing (*wa-law ittafaqa an kāna badala l-ġinsi šay’un aḥaru*) which – in terms of applying generally [to that of which it is said] – would correspond to the judgment and characteristic of the genus (*huwa ‘alā ḥukmi l-ġinsi wa-šifatihī min ḥaytu l-‘umūm*), and if it were predicated *of* every middle term, then the fact that it is not essential (*kawnuhū ġay-ra dātī*) would not prevent that it is predicated *of* whatever falls under the middle term (*an yuḥmala ‘alā mā taḥta l-wāsiṭa*).<sup>262</sup>

Eventually, Ibn Sīnā supplements Aristotle’s example by a syllogism which purposefully avoids giving the impression that propositions in the “*of* a subject” mode of predication always amount to statements about the essence of the subject; at the same time, in all three propositions of this syllogism the predicates happen to be paronymous expressions:

You must know: [i (*major*)] Whenever the major term (*aṭ-ṭaraf al-akbar*) [A] is said *of* the middle term (*al-awsaṭ*) [B] [AaB]; [ii (*minor*)] and the middle term (*al-awsaṭ*) [B] is said *of* the minor term [C] [BaC] – whereas in none of these two cases ‘being said *of* something’ means that it is said essentially (*wa-lam yakun al-qawl ‘alā šay’in minhumā ‘alā mā’nā ḍ-dātī*) –, [iii (*conclusion*)] the major term [A] is also said *of* the minor term [C] [AaC]; for example: [ii (*minor*)] ‘the laughing one’ (*aḍ-ḍaḥḥāk*) [B] is said *of* every ‘man’ (*‘alā kulli insānin*) [C] [BaC]; [i (*major*)] ‘the walking one’ (*al-māšī*) [A] is said *of* every ‘laughing one’ (*‘alā kulli ḍaḥḥākin*) [B] [AaB]; [iii (*conclusion*)] thus, ‘the walking one’ [A] is said *of* every ‘man’ [C] [AaC].<sup>263</sup>

The syllogism introduced by Ibn Sīnā has the following form:

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|-----|--|---------------------|
| i   | ‘the walking one’ [A] is said <i>of</i> every ‘laughing one’ [B] | [Aa <sub>o</sub> B] |
| ii  | ‘the laughing one’ [B] is said <i>of</i> every ‘man’ [C]         | [Ba <sub>o</sub> C] |
| iii | ‘the walking one’ [A] is said <i>of</i> every ‘man’ [C]          | [Aa <sub>o</sub> C] |

Both in the minor premise and in the conclusion paronymous expressions signifying properties that are not substances (‘the laughing one / able to laugh’ and ‘the walking one / able to walk’) are said *of* an expression signifying a substance (‘man’). Unlike in the case of non-paronymous expressions which signify the essence of such non-substantial properties, i.e., ‘laughter / the ability to laugh’ and ‘to walk / the ability to walk,’ the paronymous expressions *aḍ-ḍaḥḥāk* and

262 Ibn Sīnā, *K. aš-Šifā’*, *al-Manṭiq*, *al-Maqūlāt*, I,5, p. 40, ll. 10–11.

263 Ibn Sīnā, *K. aš-Šifā’*, *al-Manṭiq*, *al-Maqūlāt*, I,5, p. 43, ll. 12–14.

*al-māšī* can be predicated of the subject: While one cannot say that 'man' is 'the ability to laugh' or is 'the ability to walk' but rather needs to say that he *has* the 'ability to laugh' and *has* 'the ability to walk,' there is no problem in saying 'man is the laughing one' and 'man is the walking one.'

The fact that Ibn Sinā chose two predicates which might be considered to be among the *propria* of "man" (which would, however, be a disputed claim with regard to "walking") should not be taken to indicate that in order for a predicate to be said of a subject, the relationship between subject and predicate must be either essential or convertible. As Ibn Sinā stresses in the context of defining "that which can be predicated of something" (*al-maḥmūl 'alā š-šay'*) in his later *Mantiq al-mašriqiyyīn*, the only criterion an expression needs to fulfill in order to be predicated of another expression is that it holds true of it, i.e., that the thing signified by the one expression is, at the same time, the thing signified by the other expression:

Whenever one says of any given thing that it is 'such-and-such' (*iḍā qīla li-šay'in mina l-ašyā'i innahū kaḍā*), then 'such-and-such' (*kaḍā*) is predicated of it (*maḥmūl 'alayhi*), regardless of whether this [predication] comes about by means of audible speech (*qawlan masmū'an*) or by means of intellected inner speech (*qawlan ma'qūlan baṭīnan*). And it is not a condition for 'that which is predicated of something' that its meaning is the meaning of that of which it is predicated (*wa-laysa min šarṭi l-maḥmūli 'alā š-šay'i an yakūna ma'nāhu ma'nā mā ḥumila 'alayhi*) so that it would be admissible to say 'man is a human being' (*al-insānu bašarun*) but inadmissible to say 'man is laughing / able to laugh' (*al-insānu ḍaḥḥākun*). Rather, its condition is [i.e., the condition something needs to fulfill in order to be predicated of something] that it is true of it [i.e., of the subject] (*an yakūna šādiqan 'alayhi*), even if it [i.e., the predicate] is not it [i.e., the subject] (*wa-in lam yakun huwa huwa*); for by saying 'man is laughing' one does not mean that 'man, inasmuch as he has the meaning (*mafhūm*) of humanity (*insāniyya*),' is 'the laughing one, inasmuch as he is laughing.' [...] That which we content ourselves with here [i.e., in logic] is that our saying 'man is laughing' means 'the thing which is the man is also [the thing which is] laughing.'<sup>264</sup>

Especially in the case of particular propositions, it may in many cases be possible to truly predicate of the subject a universal expression signifying an accidental property, provided that it is not the expression signifying the *essence* of the respective accidental property but a name paronymously derived from that

264 Ibn Sinā, *Mantiq al-mašriqiyyīn* (Cairo: al-Maktaba as-salafiyya, 1910 [1328 AH]), p. 12, ll. 14–20 and p. 13, ll. 10–11. Whereas in the *Mantiq al-mašriqiyyīn* Ibn Sinā does not explicitly address the original dispute on the correct understanding of what it means to be predicated of something (just like, in general, he does not grapple with the commentatorial tradition in this work anymore), this passage clearly echoes his previous attempts at freeing the criterion of whether something can be predicated of something from excessive ontological commitments.

expression, just like we may say “the piece of clothing is ‘white’ (*abyaḍ*) or is ‘whitened’ (*mubayyaḍ*)” but not “the piece of clothing is ‘whiteness’ (*bayāḍ*).”<sup>265</sup> Since the meaning of “(the) white (one)” (*al-abyaḍ*) – in contrast to “whiteness” (*al-bayāḍ*) – can be taken to be “a thing which possesses a color that disperses the vision,”<sup>266</sup> a paronymous (*muštaqq*) expression such as “white” or “whitened” is not just predicated according to the name but also “according to the meaning” (*bi-l-maʿnā*) and therefore synonymously.<sup>267</sup> This aspect is particularly stressed by Naṣir ad-Dīn aṭ-Ṭūsī in his explanation of Ibn Sinā’s “pointer to that which is predicated” (*išāra ilā l-maḥmūl*).<sup>268</sup> Having given an outline of what it means to be predicated in the *being* mode, i.e., ‘predication by way of synonymy,’ aṭ-Ṭūsī in a second step (which is not immediately motivated by the text he comments on) provides us with a concise account of ‘predication by way of paronymy’; in this context, we see him draw on the intuition that whenever one derives a paronymous name from an expression signifying an accidental attribute, this paronymous name may be predicated ‘by way of synonymy’:

Another kind of predication is called ‘predication by way of paronymy’ (*ḥaml al-ištiqāq*); this is the predication [in the mode of] ‘it has it’ (*huwa ḥamlu huwa dū huwa*), just like ‘whiteness’ [is predicated] of ‘body’. That which is predicated in this mode of predication (*wa-l-maḥmūl bi-dālika l-ḥaml*) is not predicated of the subject and of its definition by way of synonymy (*lā yuḥmalu ʿalā l-mawḍūʿi wa-ḥaddihī bi-*

265 In *K. aš-Šifāʾ, al-Manṭiq, al-Maqūlāt*, I,3, p. 20, ll. 12–16 [= § 15 (2.B.b)], Ibn Sinā points out that while a non-paronymous expression such as “whiteness” (*al-bayāḍ*) – which, as we might add, signifies a non-substantial essence – may not be predicated of “a piece of clothing” – i.e., of an individual substance – “according to the meaning” (*bi-l-maʿnā*), that is to say, “as that what it is” (*ka-mā huwa*), “that which is predicated according to the meaning” (*al-maḥmūl bi-l-maʿnā*), i.e., that which can truly be said of a piece of clothing, is “an expression paronymously derived from its expression” (*lafẓan muštaqqan min lafẓihī*), namely a universal expression such as “white” (*ayaḍ*) or “whitened” (*mubayyaḍ*).

266 Ibn Sinā, *K. aš-Šifāʾ, al-Manṭiq, al-Maqūlāt*, I,3, p. 26, l. 11–16 [= § 44 (2.B.b)].

267 For an account of the various meanings of *muštaqq* in Ibn Sinā, see Cornelia Schöck, “Name (*ism*), Derived Name (*ism mushtaqq*) and Description (*waṣf*) in Arabic Grammar, Muslim Dialectical Theology and Arabic Logic,” in *The Unity of Science in the Arabic Tradition: Science, Logic, Epistemology and their Interactions*, ed. Shahid Rahman, Tony Street and Hassan Tahiri (Dordrecht: Springer, 2008), esp. pp. 347–253.

268 Ibn Sinā, *al-Išārāt wa-t-tanbihāt*, ed. az-Zāriʿī, p. 43, ll. 4–9: “Pointer to that which is predicated (*išāra ilā l-maḥmūl*). Whenever we say: ‘Figure’ is predicated of ‘triangle,’ it [i.e., this predication] does not mean that the true nature (*ḥaqīqa*) of the triangle is the true nature of the figure. Rather, it means that the thing of which one says ‘triangle’ is the same thing of which one says ‘figure’ (*fa-huwa bi-ʿaynihī yuqālu lahū innahū šaklun*), regardless of whether in itself (*fī naḥsihī*) it is a third meaning [i.e., a meaning besides ‘triangle’ or figure] or whether in itself it is one of the two meanings [i.e., either ‘triangle’ or figure].”

*l-muwāṭa'a*). Rather, it is predicated [a] along with the expression 'having / in possession of' (*dū*), just like one says 'the body *has* whiteness' (*al-ġismu dū bayāḍin*). [b] Or a name is paronymously derived from it, just like [the name] 'the white' (*al-abyaḍ*); thus, it is predicated of it 'by way of synonymy' (*fa-yuḥmalu bi-l-muwāṭa'ati 'alayhi*) [and hence in the first mode of predication], just like one says: 'The body is white (*abyaḍ*).'<sup>269</sup>

On the ontological level, both "white" and "whiteness" would, of course, be classified as expressions signifying an accidental property and therefore would be said to "exist *in* a subject"; but on the level of predication, we could – according to the name and the meaning – truly predicate a paronymous form such as "white" of *one* piece of clothing and of *some* pieces of clothing, just like we might be able to truly predicate it of Zayd and 'Amr and *some* human beings.

However, statements of this sort, i.e., with a universal predicate and a particular subject, would not be of any use if we aim at devising a syllogism with a universal major premise and with a major term which cannot only be *truly* predicated of a certain thing signified by the middle term but of *everything* which falls under the middle term. In the context of formulating such syllogisms it will, indeed, be very likely that we deal with propositions in which the relationship between the subject and the predicate is one of essentiality or convertibility, even though this is not due to the fact that *per se* every universal expression which can be predicated *of* any given subject would either have to be essential or convertible in relation to the subject.

## 2.4.5. Ibn Sinā's Alternative Classification of Attributes

### 2.4.5.1. Short Excursus on Ibn Sinā's Terminological Clarifications in *K. aš-Šifā'*, *al-Mantiq*, *al-Madḥal*, I,5–6

In an effort to pave the way for a systematic and detailed discussion of Porphyry's five predicables (i.e., genus, species, differentia, accident and proprium), Ibn Sinā in *Madḥal* I,5 of the *Šifā'* investigates the ways in which any compounded "quiddity" (*māhiyya*) or "essence" (*dāt*) – i.e., something whose "true nature" (*ḥaqīqa*) is "composed" (*talta'imu*) of various "things and notions" (*umūr wa-ma'ānī*) but which, nonetheless, is realized as a "single notion" (*ma'nā wāḥid*) – may be related to any type of "attribute" (*šifa'*);<sup>270</sup> subsequently, these different relations between a *māhiyya* and a *šifa'* serve as a means of dividing "universal expressions" (*alfāz kulliyya*) into "essential" (*dātī*) and "accidental" (*'araḍī*) ex-

269 Našir ad-Dīn at-Tūsī, *Ḥall muškilāt al-Isārāt*, in Ibn Sinā, *al-Isārāt wa-t-tanbihāt*, ed. S. Duniyā, vol. 1, p. 142, ll. 7–10.

270 Ibn Sinā, *K. aš-Šifā'*, *al-Mantiq*, *al-Madḥal*, I,5, p. 28, l. 13 – p. 29, l. 2.

pressions. Ibn Sīnā wants to ensure that both a universal expression which signifies “the true essence of the thing” (*dātan haqīqiyyatan li-š-šay*),<sup>271</sup> i.e., an expression which signifies the *complete* account of what it means to be a certain thing, and a universal expression which signifies those “attributes” (*awṣāf*) of which the “true nature” (*haqīqa*) of the thing is “composed” (*talta’imu*)<sup>272</sup> can be classified as “essential.” Thus, he delineates essential expressions as follows:

Whenever (*idā*) a universal expression (*al-lafz al-kullī*) signifies a meaning (*ma’nā*) [= T1] whose relation (*nisba*) to the particular things which take on its meaning (*al-ğuz’iyyāt allatī tu’rađu li-ma’nāhu*) is a relation which is such that, whenever one imagines it [i.e., the relation] to be non-existent, the essence of the respective particular thing [= T2] must be non-existent [as well], not in such a manner that the essence of that thing [= T1] must be removed first so that it becomes possible to imagine the removal of this [other] thing [= T2]; rather, it is because the removal of this [= T1] makes it necessary that that thing [= T2] is removed [as well], be it [a] because this removed thing [= T1] is the true nature of its [= T2’s] essence or [b] because this removed thing [= T1] is one of those things which the true nature of its [= T2’s] essence is in need of in order to be constituted (*hādā l-marfū’u mim mā tahtāğū ilayhi haqīqatu dātihī li-yataqawwima*), [whenever a universal expression is such] it is called ‘essential’ (*fa-innahū yuqālu lahū dātī*).<sup>273</sup>

Thus, whereas a *type a* essential expression signifies the quiddity of the thing in its totality, just like ‘man’ signifies – in relation to any given man – the complete species, that is, ‘rational animal,’ a *type b* essential expression signifies something which “constitutes” (*yuqawwimu*) the quiddity, just like that which is signified by the expression ‘animal’ or the expression ‘rational’ constitutes ‘man’ or any individual man. As Ibn Sīnā further expounds in *Madḥal* I,6, those scholars who assumed a full identity between essential expressions and expressions which signifies a *constitutive* attribute (= Ibn Sīnā’s *type b* of essential expressions), erroneously excluded expressions which signify the quiddity from the realm of essential expressions:

As for their saying that ‘the essential (*ad-dātī*)’ is ‘that which is constitutive (*al-muqawwim*),’ this [definition] only encompasses those essential [expressions] which do not signify the quiddity (*mā kāna mina d-dātīyyāti ġayra dāllin ‘alā l-māhiyya*); for that which is constitutive is constitutive in relation to something else.<sup>274</sup>

That is to say, that which signifies the quiddity in its totality, i.e., a quiddity which has already been realized, may not be said to *constitute* the quiddity; rather, only the various notions which a compounded quiddity is made up of may

271 Ibn Sīnā, *K. aš-Šifā’*, *al-Manṭiq*, *al-Madḥal*, I,5, p. 30, l. 7.

272 Ibn Sīnā, *K. aš-Šifā’*, *al-Manṭiq*, *al-Madḥal*, I,5, p. 30, l. 8.

273 Ibn Sīnā, *K. aš-Šifā’*, *al-Manṭiq*, *al-Madḥal*, I,5, p. 31, l. 17 – p. 32, l. 3.

274 Ibn Sīnā, *K. aš-Šifā’*, *al-Manṭiq*, *al-Madḥal*, I,6, p. 33, ll. 12–13.

be regarded as being constitutive. Moreover, on an epistemological level Ibn Sinā clarifies that any compounded quiddity can only be grasped if – prior to its conceptualization – the mind attains its constitutive elements and thereupon continues to conceptualize them along with the quiddity, that is to say, a quiddity cannot persist *in intellectu* if one of those notions by which it had been constituted is negated of it:

Whenever this quiddity has constituents which precede it, insofar as it is a quiddity (*iḍā kāna lahā muqawwimāt mutaḡaddima min ḡaytu hiya māhiyya*), it cannot be realized as a quiddity unless these [constituents] precede it (*lam taḡḡsul māhiyyatan ḡūna taḡḡdumihā*). And as long as it has not been realized as a quiddity, it is realized neither as an intelligible nor as a concrete being (*lam taḡḡsul ma'qūlatan wa-lā 'aynan*) [i.e., neither as something existing *in intellectu* nor as something existing *in re*]. Thus, whenever it has been realized as an intelligible, it [i.e., the quiddity] has been realized, whereas that by which it is constituted (*mā tataḡawwamu bihī*) had – in the manner in which it [i.e., the quiddity] is constituted by it – been realized in the intellect along with it [i.e., the quiddity] (*wa-ḡad ḡaḡala mā tataḡawwamu bihī fi l-'aql ma'ahā 'alā l-ḡihati llatī tataḡawwamu bihī*). Thus, whenever this [constituent] has been realized in the intellect (*iḍā kāna ḡālika ḡāḡilan fi l-'aql*), the negation [of it] is impossible (*lam yumkin as-salb*). Thus, these constituents must be intellect-ed along with the conceptualization of the thing – in such a manner that one cannot ignore the fact that they exist with it (*lā yuḡḡalu wuḡūduhā lahū*), and [in such a manner that] it is impossible to negate them of it so that the quiddity would remain firm in the mind (*ḡattā taḡbuta fi ḡ-dihn*), even though these [constituents] would be removed in the mind *in actu*.<sup>275</sup>

As will become clear shortly, in the context of introducing his revised scheme of attributive relations at the beginning of *Maḡūlāt* I,3, Ibn Sinā deems it necessary to add a further specification to this account of the relationship between an essential attribute and the quiddity in relation to which it is essential: Whenever we predicate of a quiddity which has been established in one of the two modes of existence (i.e., either *in intellectu* or *in re*) an attribute which is one of those notions by which the quiddity had been constituted, this attribute may, strictly speaking, not be said to be “constitutive” any more: Rather, as soon as the quiddity has been completed that by which the quiddity had been constituted has become a “part” (*ḡuz*) of the quiddity; for example, ‘man’ or any individual man is constituted by that which is signified by the expression ‘animal’ or the expression ‘rational’ – and as soon as it has been realized, that which is signified by the expression ‘animal’ or the expression ‘rational’ has become a *part* of the quiddity, i.e., something which is “intrinsic” (*dāḡil*) to the account of what it means to be a man. This subtle terminological distinction between the condition under which one and the same attribute may be said to be either “constitutive” or “in-

275 Ibn Sinā, *K. aḡ-ḡifā', al-Mantiḡ, al-Madḡal*, I,6, p. 34, ll. 13–19.

trinsic / a part” in relation to a certain quiddity can be understood as the result of Ibn Sinā’s desire to distinguish between “established” and “non-established” subjects of attribution: While the former are *infimae species* which may exist *per se* – regardless of whether we think of them, speak of them, or ascribe predicates to them –, the latter are higher-order universals which, on an ontological level, are completely dependent on the existence of realized quiddities possessing a lower degree of universality.<sup>276</sup>

#### 2.4.5.2. The Fivefold Scheme of Attributive Relations Introduced in *K. aš-Šifāʾ*, *al-Mantiq*, *al-Maqūlāt*, I,3

Given his insistence on the necessity to scrutinize the number and scope of the criteria which are at play in Aristotle’s fourfold classification in *Cat.* 2 (or in one’s interpretation of that scheme), one might be a bit puzzled about the fact that Ibn Sinā’s alternative scheme is not accompanied by a discussion of the method by which he arrived at it. Without making any preceding explanatory remarks he straightforwardly introduces the following classification of five types of “attributes of things” (*ṣifāt al-umūr*):

[Type A] It [i.e., any given attribute] is either such that the essence of that which is described by the attribute (*al-mawṣūf*) has already been established (*qad istaqarra dātuhū*) as a subsisting concept (*maʿnan qāʾiman*) – and it is only afterwards that the attribute by which it is characterized (*aš-ṣifatu llatī yuṣafu bihā*) is attached to it as an extrinsic attribute (*talḥaḡuhū ḥārīḡan ʿanhū*), either [i] the way an accident is attached or [ii] the way a concomitant is attached (*luḡuqa ʿarīḡin aw lāzimin*).

[Type B] Or that which is described by the attribute is such that its essence has already been established, but the attribute by which it is characterized is not attached to it the way something extrinsic is attached; rather, it is a part of its subsistence (*ḡuzʾ min qiwāmihī*).

[Type C] Or it [i.e., the *mawṣūf*] is such that its essence has not been established yet and the attribute is attached to it in order for its essence to be established, but it is not a part of its essence (*wa-laysat ḡuzʾan min dātihī*).

276 Cf. the remarks Ibn Sinā makes in the *Ilāhiyyāt* of the *Šifāʾ* in the context of discussing the difference between ‘body as a genus’ and ‘body as matter’: “Thereupon (*tumma*), the ‘absolute body,’ which is not ‘a body in the sense of matter’ [but rather ‘a body in the sense of the genus’], derives its existence and combination [with other notions that determine it] only from the existence of its species (*al-ḡismu l-muṭlaqu llaḏī laysa bi-maʿnā l-māddati innamā wuḡūduhū wa-iḡtimāʿuhū min wuḡūdi anwāʿihī*). All those things which are posited below it [i.e., below the genus ‘body’] are the causes of its existence (*wa-mā tūḏaʿu taḡtahū fa-hiya asbābun li-wuḡūdihī*). It [i.e., ‘the absolute body’ / ‘body in the sense of the genus’], however, is not a cause for their existence.” Ibn Sinā, *K. aš-Šifāʾ*, *al-Ilāhiyyāt* (1), V,3, p. 217, ll. 2–4.



[Type D] Or it [i.e., the *mawṣūf*] is such that its essence has not been established yet and the attribute is not attached to it extrinsically (*min ḥāriḡin*); rather, it is a part of its existence (*ḡuz' min wuḡūdihi*).

[Type E] Or its essence [i.e., the essence of the *mawṣūf*] has not been established yet and the attribute is not attached to it on account of its essence itself (*wa-ṣ-ṣifatu talḥaḡuhū lā li-naḡsi dātihi*); rather, it is attached to it on account of that which establishes it [in its existence], either the way [i] a concomitant [ii] or a primary accident is attached (*bal luḥūqa lāzimin li-mā yuḡarriruhū aw 'āriḡin laḥū awwal*).<sup>277</sup>

Even though Ibn Sīnā does not provide us with an explicit discussion of the criteria on which this classification is based, we can discern a recourse to the following two basic notions:

(1) On the side of the *mawṣūf*, Ibn Sīnā draws on the criterion of whether its essence is "established" or not. In his subsequent discussion of an example of type D it becomes clear which kind of *mawṣūf* may be characterized as something whose essence has not been established yet (*lā yakūn qad istaḡarra dātuhū ba'd*): "in the case of body, taken absolutely, no attained existence has been established yet" (*fa-inna l-ḡisma muḡlaḡan lā yataḡarraru laḥū wuḡūdun muḥaṣṣalun ba'dahū*).<sup>278</sup> Therefore, in the present context I understand *istiḡrār* to be used in the sense of *ḥuṣūl* and *ṡubūt*,<sup>279</sup> that is to say, it refers to the fact that an essence is sufficiently determined in order to be realized either as a concrete thing or as the corresponding universal, i.e., as an individual or "the species in its completeness (*an-naw' bi-tamāmihi*)."<sup>280</sup> A non-determined essence, in turn, is either a universal with a lower degree of specificity, i.e., a *bare genus* which can only be realized by means of additional specifications, or an *uninformed matter* which can only be realized by acquiring a form. As Ibn Sīnā explains in more detail in chapter V,3 of the *Ilāhiyyāt* of the *Šifā'* – namely in the context of distinguishing between 'body in the sense of matter' and 'body in the sense of the genus' – "the absolute body (*al-ḡism al-muḡlaḡ*),"<sup>281</sup> i.e., body as a genus which by itself merely has the meaning of being a substance that possesses length, breadth and depth, is "like something which is yet unknown" (*ka-l-maḡhūl ba'd*); for "one would not know what form it takes and how many forms

277 Ibn Sīnā, *K. aṣ-Šifā'*, *al-Manṡiq, al-Maḡūlāt*, I,3, p. 18, ll. 6–13 [= §§ 2–6 (2.B.b)].

278 Ibn Sīnā, *K. aṣ-Šifā'*, *al-Manṡiq, al-Maḡūlāt*, I,3, p. 19, ll. 4–5 [= § 10 (2.B.b)].

279 For the synonymy of *ḥuṣūl* and *ṡubūt*, cf. Deborah Black, "Mental Existence in Thomas Aquinas and Avicenna," *Mediaeval Studies* 61 (1999): pp. 49–50: "On Avicenna's construal, then, to say that some thing is in the soul is to say that an essence or quiddity *exists* in some way in that soul. Avicenna is emphatic that this is truly a mode of existence or being, and that as such it is completely on a par with concrete existence in the external world. Neither one nor the other mode is less 'realized' (*al-muḥaṣṣal*) or 'established' (*al-muḡbat*) than the other, to use Avicenna's own synonyms for the existential order."

280 Ibn Sīnā, *K. aṣ-Šifā'*, *al-Ilāhiyyāt (1)*, V,3, p. 217, l. 13.

281 Ibn Sīnā, *K. aṣ-Šifā'*, *al-Ilāhiyyāt (1)*, V,3, p. 217, l. 2.

it comprises; and the soul seeks to attain this [that is to say, this additional specification] since a thing which is a realized body [and nothing else] has not yet been established *in actu*.<sup>282</sup>

(2) On the side of the *ṣifa*, Ibn Sīnā applies two inter-connected levels of criteria, namely (a) whether or not an attribute is “extrinsic” (*ḥāriġ*) in relation to the *mawṣūf*, that is to say, whether or not it is a part (*ġuzʿ*) of its essence; (b) and whether or not an attribute is “constitutive” (*muqawwim*) in relation to the *mawṣūf*. Thus, Ibn Sīnā now adds the following specification to the account of constitutive attributes presented in *Madḥal* I,6: In those cases in which the essence of the *mawṣūf* has already been established (types A and B), the attribute cannot be but non-constitutive, regardless of whether or not it is included in the thing’s essence. That Ibn Sīnā intends to draw a distinction between being intrinsic to the essence and being constitutive in relation to the essence becomes particularly clear in the discussion of the example he provides for type B:

An example of the second [division] is your saying ‘man is an animal.’ For man is a realized nature (*ṭabīʿa mutaḥaṣṣila*) which, after being a man (*baʿd mā huwa insānun*), is not in need of something that constitutes it (*lā taḥtāġu ilā mā yuqawwimuhā*). If this should be difficult for you, consider Zayd instead of man: Nevertheless [i.e., even though Zayd has already been realized], animal is a part of its quiddity (*ġuzʿ min māhiyyatihī*).<sup>283</sup>

Thus, whether an intrinsic attribute is constitutive or non-constitutive solely depends on the essence of the *mawṣūf*: If, by an act of attribution, we affirm of a complete species which has been realized *in intellectu* (e.g., ‘man’) or *in re* (e.g., Zayd) a notion which is included in its essence (e.g., ‘animal’), this intrinsic *ṣifa* does not perform the function of constituting the *mawṣūf*, that is to say, since the essence has already been established, there is simply no need to bring it into subsistence. Rather, whenever we affirm something of an established essence, we can only analyze whether or not it is a part (*ġuzʿ*) of it. Moreover, something may be constitutive in relation to the *mawṣūf*, even though it is not a part of it, as is the case with form in relation to matter.

282 Ibn Sīnā, *K. aš-Šifāʿ, al-Ilāhiyyāt (1)*, V,3, p. 218, ll. 1–3; cf. the English tr. by Michael Marmura, *The Metaphysics of The Healing* (Provo, UT: Brigham Young University Press, 2005), p. 166. On the background of this discussion see also Ibn Sīnā, *K. aš-Šifāʿ, al-Manṭiq, al-Burhān*, ed. Abū l-ʿAlāʾ ʿAfifī (Cairo: al-Maṭbaʿa al-amiriyya, 1956 [1375 AH], I,10 – a chapter closely related to *Ilāhiyyāt* V,3 (as a matter of fact, a significant portion of text seems to have been copied verbatim from one of these two chapters into the other one).

283 Ibn Sīnā, *K. aš-Šifāʿ, al-Manṭiq, al-Maqūlāt*, I,3, p. 18, ll. 15–17 [= § 8 (2.B.b)].

In this context, one possible source of confusion may lie in the variety of expressions Ibn Sīnā uses for that of which an attribute may or may not be a part:

(type B)	“part of its subsistence” ( <i>ğuz' min qiwāmihi</i> );
(example of type B)	“part of its quiddity” ( <i>ğuz' min māhiyyatihī</i> );
(type C)	“not part of its essence” ( <i>laysat ğuz'an min dātihī</i> );
(type D)	“part of its existence” ( <i>ğuz' min wuğūdhī</i> );
(example of type D)	“part of its quiddity, that is, part of its definition” ( <i>ğuz' min māhiyyatihī ay ğuz' haddihī</i> );
(recourse to the example of type B in the context of discussing type E)	“part of its existence” ( <i>ğuz' wuğūdhī</i> ).

In my interpretation of Ibn Sīnā's scheme, the criterion of whether the *şifa* is intrinsic or extrinsic in relation to the *mawşūf* should for all five types be taken to refer to the essence of the *mawşūf*; in those places where Ibn Sīnā speaks of *qiwām* or *wuğūd*, instead of *dāt* or *māhiyya*, there is merely a change in focus: The attribute is part of an essence whenever the essence is realized in a certain mode of existence. Even in the case of type D, where that which is characterized by the attribute does not yet have a “realized existence” (*wuğūd muḥaşşal*) and thus has not attained a degree of specificity at which it could be realized as a complete species *in intellectu* or as an individual *in re*, Ibn Sīnā describes the *şifa*, e.g., “substance” (*ğawhar*), as being “part of the existence” of the *mawşūf*, e.g., “body taken absolutely” (*al-ğism muṭlaqan*): Even though our mind asks for further specifications in order to be able to conceptualize a body, the definition of body may be said to exist *in intellectu* – and in this sense, “substance” is “part of its existence.” However, Ibn Sīnā is cautious not to speak of *qiwām* or *wuğūd* in the case of type C: For matter *qua* matter may not be said to exist in any way.<sup>284</sup>

On the basis of these two criteria and the examples discussed by Ibn Sīnā himself I would like to propose the following interpretation of the revised scheme of attributive relations:

284 Cf. Jon McGinnis, *Avicenna* (Oxford: University Press, 2010), 55: “The reason why Avicenna believes that the matter would cease to be if it lacked a form is that for him the form explains the actual existence belonging to a thing, whereas the matter explains a thing's potential existence, where ‘potentiality’ is understood as preparedness to receive a form that is different from the form presently existing in the thing. Thus, if matter were ever wholly devoid of all forms, it would not *actually* be anything, that is, it would not exist, since any actual existence it has must come from a form.”

- Type A.** An attribute applies extrinsically to something whose essence is established  
 → **extrinsic attribution with regard to a specific entity realized *in re* or *in intellectu***;  
 i.e., the essence has been realized in existence; that is to say, the essence is either realized as a concrete thing, e.g., as an individual such as Zayd; or as a complete species, such as ‘man’; this vaguely corresponds to ‘inherence in a subject’ in the sense of *Cat. 2* (if the attributive relations of *Cat. 2* are limited to concrete things and their proximate universals);  
 type A is subdivided into two types of attributions:  
 i. common accident; e.g., ‘white’ in relation to ‘man’ or Zayd;  
 ii. concomitant [i.e., a proprium]; e.g., ‘capable of laughing’ in relation to ‘man’ or Zayd.
- Type B.** An attribute applies intrinsically to something whose essence is established  
 → **intrinsic attribution with regard to a specific entity realized *in re* or *in intellectu***;  
 e.g., ‘animal’ in relation to ‘man’ or Zayd.
- Type C.** An attribute applies extrinsically to something whose essence is established through that attribute  
 → **hylemorphic attribution**;  
 this corresponds to ‘inherence *in* a subject’ in the sense of Aristotle’s form-matter analysis in *Physics* and *Metaphysics*;  
 e.g., any given ‘form’ in relation to an ‘uninformed matter disposed to receive it.’
- Type D.** An attribute applies intrinsically to something whose essence is not established yet  
 → **intrinsic attribution with regard to a non-specific entity** (i.e., something which cannot be realized unless further specifications are added to it);  
 e.g., ‘substance’ in relation to ‘absolute body’ (= ‘body as genus’).
- Type E.** An attribute applies extrinsically to something whose essence is not established yet  
 → **extrinsic attribution with regard to a non-specific entity**;  
 this is subdivided into two types of attributes:  
 i. concomitant;  
 e.g., ‘having the disposition to move and rest in the where’ in relation to ‘absolute body’ (i.e., the quiddity of body in the sense of ‘being merely a substance possessing length, breadth and depth, and nothing else’ does not have the disposition to move and rest – but as soon as it is realized in existence, ‘moving and resting’ apply to it as a concomitant); ‘occupying space’ (*taḥayyuz*) in relation to ‘uninformed matter’;  
 ii. primary accident;  
 e.g., predicates such as ‘white’ or ‘black’ in relation to an ‘uninformed matter’ (i.e., as soon as a matter is realized in existence, it has a color; in this sense, ‘white’ and ‘black’ are primary accidents).

Figure 1. The Fivefold Scheme of *K. aš-Šifāʾ, al-Mantiq, al-Maqūlāt*, I,3

As indicated by this schematic outline, almost the same constellation of criteria applies both to cases C and E: The essence of the subject is not established in existence and the attribute is extrinsic to the essence. What distinguishes the two cases from each other, however, is the fact that C is characterized by an additional aspect: This is the unique case in which the *extrinsic* attribute fulfills the function of determining the essence of the subject in existence, that is to say, of bringing it into subsistence; for in order to exist *in actu* matter always requires a form, but the form does not belong to the quiddity of matter:

An example of the third [division] is matter (*hayūlā*) and form (*šūra*). For in relation to matter, form is an attribute which is extrinsic to its essence and by which its essence is established as something subsisting *in actu* (*qā'imatan bi-l-fi'l*). If it were not for form, the existence of matter would be impossible – not in such a way that form would be a concomitant [of matter] after matter has been constituted (*lā 'alā anna š-šūrata lāzimatin ba'da t-taqawwum*); rather, it [i.e., form] is constitutive and determining and yet it is not a part of matter (*wa-laysat ma'ā dālika ġuz'an mina l-hayūlā*).<sup>285</sup>

In this context, it is important to keep in mind that for Ibn Sinā form functions as a formal – and thus as an *intrinsic* – cause only in relation to the form-matter *compositum*, not in relation to matter;<sup>286</sup> thus it poses no difficulty for him to classify form in relation to matter as an *extrinsic* attribute.

In a pioneering article on Ibn Sinā's revised fivefold scheme – which, as far as I can tell, has hitherto been the only scholarly contribution dedicated to giving an outline of the first part of *Maqūlāt* I,3 – Allan Bäck remarks that with

285 Ibn Sinā, *K. aš-Šifā', al-Mantiq, al-Maqūlāt*, I,3, p. 19, ll. 1–3 [= § 9 (2.B.b)].

286 See Ibn Sinā, *K. aš-Šifā', al-Ilāhiyyāt* (2), VI,1, p. 259, ll. 9–10: *wa-innamā š-šūratu 'illatun šūriyyatun li-l-murakkabi minhā wa-mina l-māddati fa-š-šūratu innamā hiya šūratun li-l-māddati wa-lākin laysat 'illatan šūriyyatan li-l-māddati*. "Form is a formal cause only in relation to that which is compounded from it and from matter; thus, form is merely a form in relation to matter; it is, however, not a formal cause in relation to matter." Cf. the English tr. by Marmura, p. 196. For the distinction between form as the cause of matter inasmuch as it exists *in actu* in the compound, on the one hand, and of matter inasmuch as it is matter, on the other hand, see Amos Bertolacci, "The Doctrine of Material and Formal Causality in the *Ilāhiyyāt* of Avicenna's *Kitāb aš-Šifā'*," *Quaestio* 2 (2002): p. 136. For Ibn Sinā's bipartition of the four causes, see Ibn Sinā, *K. aš-Šifā', al-Ilāhiyyāt* (2), VI,1 (*fī aqsām al-'ilal wa-aḥwālīhā*, "on the divisions and states of the causes"). For two differing interpretations of this bipartition, see Jean Jolivet: "La répartition des causes chez Aristote et Avicenne: le sens d'un déplacement," in *Lectionum varietates: hommage à Paul Vignaux (1904–1987)*, ed. idem, Zénon Kaluza and Alain de Libera (Paris: Vrin, 1991), pp. 49–65; and (including a critical revision of Jolivet's results) Robert Wisnovsky, "Towards a History of Avicenna's Distinction between Immanent and Transcendent Causes," in *Before and After Avicenna: Proceedings of the First Conference of the Avicenna Study Group*, ed. David Reisman (Leiden: Brill, 2003), pp. 49–68.

regard to case C Ibn Sīnā “clearly departs from the text of the *Categories*.” At the same time, Bäck appears to be somewhat dissatisfied about the example of “form” applying to “matter,” which he deemed to be “hardly an informative example.”<sup>287</sup> As we have seen, already in his *Muḥtaṣar al-awsaṭ fī l-mantiq* Ibn Sīnā had been conscious of the fact that under the fourfold classification scheme we might be forced to swallow the attributive identity between two ontologically very distinct types of beings, namely a substantial form inhering *in* matter and an accident inhering *in* a subject which is ontologically prior.

Moreover, within the *Maqūlāt* of the *Šifā'* Ibn Sīnā in numerous instances clearly indicates that the necessity to distinguish between form and accident – whether by means of a completely new systematization or by means of providing a thorough supplement to the transmitted fourfold scheme – is by far one of the most pressing problems posed by *Cat. 2* for the later tradition. Thus, at the end of chapter I,5 of the *Maqūlāt* of the *Šifā'* – after having discussed the case of a syllogism whose three propositions are such that, on an ontological level, the predicate-term signifies an accident which inheres in that which is signified by the subject-term so that, on an attributive level, the predicate applies to the subject accidentally<sup>288</sup> – Ibn Sīnā suddenly announces a return to the “main issue (*ar-ra's*),” namely the proper distinction between form and accident:

Let us return to the main issue! We say: Whenever two essences are such that one of them is realized in the other one, in such a manner that it is a primary realization (*ḥuṣūlan awwaliyyan*) and that one of them cannot be kept apart from the other one (*lā yatamayyizu minhū šay'in 'ani l-āḥara*) – unlike in the case of the peg in the wall, for the interior of the peg is free from the wall –, and in such manner that if one were to point to that essence, the pointer would encompass the two things together, and in such a manner that each of them provides its respective owner (*šāhib*) with an attribute (*šifa*), a property (*hay'a*) and a characteristic (*na't*), [when-

287 Allan Bäck, “The Ontological Pentagon of Avicenna,” p. 98.

288 Ibn Sīnā, *K. aš-Šifā', al-Mantiq, al-Maqūlāt*, I,5, p. 43, l. 14 – p. 44, l. 19. In this context, Ibn Sīnā takes issue with the “commonly accepted” (*mašhūr*) view that such a syllogism would be “impossible” (*munṭani'*) since supposedly “one accident cannot be predicated of another accident” (*al-'araḍ lā yuḥmalu 'alā l-'araḍ*), i.e., since in the minor premise the middle term B would be an accident inhering in the minor term C [Ba<sub>in</sub>C], in the major premise the major term A would be an accident inhering in the middle term B [Aa<sub>in</sub>B], and in the conclusion the major term A would be an accident inhering in the minor term C [Aa<sub>in</sub>C], we would have a major premise in which the accident A would be predicated of the accident B, which the commentators Ibn Sīnā refers to deem to be inadmissible. Ibn Sīnā replies that from the fact that every accident is “*in* a subject” it does not follow that an accident may not be a subject for other accidents; quite the contrary is the case, “for many of the accidents exist in the substances only by means of other accidents” (*li-anna kaṭīran mina l-a'rādi innamā yūḡadu fī l-ḡawāhiri bi-tawassuṭi a'rādin uḥrā*).

ever this is the case,] it [i.e., the respective other one] is either [1] an **accident** (*'araḍ*) in its owner or [2] a **form** (*ṣūra*). This is so for the following reason:

[*ad 1*] If its owner which is characterized by it (*ṣāhibuhū l-mutaṣṣifu bihī*) is constituted on account of itself (*mutaqawwim bi-d-dā'i*), and this [other thing] is only constituted through it (*innamā yataqawwamu bihī*), then it is an accident.

[*ad 2*] And if its owner has not been constituted yet (*lam yataqawwam ba'du*), unless [it has been constituted] through it, and if it is entitled to constituting its owner, then it is a form.

They both have in common (*yaṣtarikāni*) that they are in a substrate (*maḥall*). But [*ad 2*] the substrate of one of the two is called matter (*mādda*); and the substrate of the other one is called subject (*mawḍū'*).<sup>289</sup>

By speaking in a rather general manner of a *ṣāhib* or a *maḥall* or, according to his terminology, in a more specific manner of a *mawḍū'* in which an accident may be realized in a primary way, Ibn Sinā purposefully avoids the doctrine that it is always a substance (*ḡawhar*) in which an accident is realized; rather, he wants to allow for the possibility that an accident might first of all pertain to another accident and only through that other accident (or a chain of accidents) to a substance, just like the property of "being visible" (*kawnuhū mar'iyyan*) only inheres in the "body" through the "color" in which it inheres in a primary way.<sup>290</sup> To Ibn Sinā's mind then, the question one should focus on in this context is not whether or not the substrate (*maḥall*) which a certain property inheres in is a substance or not but rather whether or not it can be fully realized without the property which inheres in it: Whenever a substrate for the sake of being constituted is not in need of the inhering property, the inhering property will be an "accident" inhering *in* an ontologically prior "subject"; and whenever the reverse is the case, it will be a "form" inhering *in* "matter."

Therefore, against the background of the particular attention which Ibn Sinā throughout his reading of *Cat.* 2 and 3 pays to sorting out the relation between accident and form, I think that the example provided for type C of the fivefold attributive scheme brings us straight to the heart of what is at stake here: Ibn Sinā's revision aims at solving the terminological and conceptual problems that had been caused by the subsequent entanglement of the various layers of linguistic and ontological classification efforts undertaken in the *Categories* and in *Metaphysics*, and hence one of the most fundamental purposes of Ibn Sinā's new scheme must be seen in achieving a more systematic integration of the hylemorphic conception into a scheme of attributive relations.

289 Ibn Sinā, *K. aṣ-Ṣifā'*, *al-Mantiq, al-Maqūlāt*, I,5, p. 45, ll. 1–7.

290 Ibn Sinā, *K. aṣ-Ṣifā'*, *al-Mantiq, al-Maqūlāt*, I,5, p. 44, ll. 8–9.

#### 2.4.6. Concluding Remark on the Fivefold Scheme of *K. aš-Šifāʾ*, *al-Mantiq*, *al-Maqūlāt*, I,3

By way of summary, we may read the new scheme expounded in *Maqūlāt* I,3 as Ibn Sīnā's attempt at tackling the following issues: (1) The terminological and conceptual tensions that had resulted from a synoptic reading of the various expositions of ontological classifications in Aristotle's *Categories* and *Metaphysics* are avoided – not by means of subtle reinterpretations of the Aristotelian texts and the extensive commentatorial efforts triggered by them but rather by means of a complete replacement; none of the two criteria that had previously been used in the fourfold scheme of *Cat. 2* is preserved (even though “being not *in* a subject” is retained in an ontological context). (2) The result is a division that classifies the relationship in which any given attribute (*ṣifa*) may stand to any given thing characterized by an attribute (*mawṣūf*) – and not a division of *things* by means of *predicative* relations. One important advantage of this approach lies in the fact that the danger of confusing accidents with accidental predicates and substances with substantial/essential predicates is seriously diminished. (3) The basic divide between universals and particulars – which had previously been established by the “*of* a subject” relation – is discarded. In Ibn Sīnā's view, when referring to terms and concepts which are suitable to be said of many, it suffices to speak of “universal expressions” and “universal meanings” rather than “those which are said *of* a subject.” (4) What Ibn Sīnā intends is a scheme which unambiguously differentiates between accidental and essential predication – and this is achieved by his distinction between attributes that are *intrinsic* and attributes that are *extrinsic* in relation to the essence of the *mawṣūf*. (5) Moreover, the revised scheme serves the additional purpose of grasping these two basic types of predications both at the level of established essences (i.e., sufficiently specific entities existing *in re* or *in intellectu*) and non-established essences (i.e., genera *per se* or matter *per se*). (6) And finally, the special relation by which form is attributed to matter now is unmistakably separated from all other types of attributions, that is to say, from intrinsic and extrinsic attributions, both at the level of determined and non-determined essences.

#### 2.5. A Note on the Aftermath of Ibn Sīnā's Reading of *Cat. 2*

As a result of Ibn Sīnā's critique and reassessment of *Cat. 2*, the distinction between ‘being said *of* a subject’ and ‘existing *in* a subject’ and the fourfold scheme derived from it cease to play a significant role in the subsequent philosophical tradition of the Islamic East. Of the two predicative relations the post-



Avicennian tradition only retains the 'in relation' – not in the context of logic but as the decisive criterion for distinguishing, both in metaphysics and in natural philosophy, between substance and accident. In the context of predication, Ibn Sīnā's distinction between 'being intrinsic to the essence' and 'being extrinsic to the essence,' on which he bases his alternative classification of attributive relations introduced in chapter I,3 of the *Maqūlāt* of the *Šifā'*, becomes a standard criterion for drawing the line between essential attributes and accidental attributes. However, the fivefold scheme in its entirety, which Ibn Sīnā himself does not dwell on in his later writings, receives little, if any, attention among post-Avicennian philosophers.

Ibn Sīnā's immediate pupil Bahmanyār b. al-Marzubān (d. 458 AH / 1066 AD) included in his *Taḥṣīl* a short treatise on the *Categories* which combines elements both from the *K. al-Maqūlāt* of the *Muḥtaṣar al-awsaṭ fī l-manṭiq* and the *K. al-Maqūlāt* of the *Šifā'*. Even though Bahmanyār's account of *Cat.* 2, by and large, does not adopt Ibn Sīnā's harsh critique of previous exegetical efforts and refrains from any direct reference to the alternative fivefold scheme, his discussion of the 'of relation' and 'in relation' is clearly influenced by the reassessment presented in the *Šifā'*. At first, Bahmanyār gives precisely the same account we have already encountered in Ibn Sīnā's *al-Muḥtaṣar al-awsaṭ fī l-manṭiq*:

**Ibn Sīnā, *al-Muḥtaṣar al-awsaṭ fī l-manṭiq***  
[ed. Kalbarczyk, p. 328, ll. 6–9]

الموضوع يوصف بمحموله على وجهين: إما أن يوصف  
بأنه هو اسماً ومعنى، كقولنا الإنسان حيوان، وإما أن  
يوصف بمحموله لا بأنه هو في المعنى ولكن بأنه ذو هو  
في المعنى أو له هو في المعنى. ويتفق في الأكثر أن  
يشتق لذلك الموضوع من محموله اسم فيقال هو شجاع  
ولا يقال هو شجاعة.

The subject is characterized by its predicate in two modes: [1] Either in such a way that it is it both in name and meaning, just like we say 'man is an animal'; [2] or it is characterized by its predicate not in such a manner that it is it in meaning but such that it *has* it in meaning. Most commonly, it happens to be the case that for such a subject a name is paronymously derived from its predicate; for

**Bahmanyār, *at-Taḥṣīl***  
[ed. Moṭahharī, p. 26, ll. 10–13]

الموضوع يوصف بمحمول على وجهين: أحدهما  
بأنه هو اسماً ومعنى، كقولنا الإنسان حيوان،  
أو يوصف بمحمول لا بأنه هو ولكن بأنه ذو  
هو أو له هو. والقسم الثاني يشتق لذلك  
الموضوع من محموله اسم، فيقال شجاع ولا يقال  
هو شجاعة.

The subject is characterized by a predicate in two modes: [1] One of them is such that it is it both in name and meaning, just like we say 'man is an animal'; [2] or it is characterized by a predicate not in such a manner that it is it but such that it *has* it. In the case of the second division, for such a subject a name is paronymously derived from its

one says ‘he is courageous’ and not ‘he is predicate; for one says [‘he is] courageous’ and not ‘he is courage.’

In what follows, Bahmanyār – now on the basis of some relevant passages from the *Maqūlāt* of the *Šifā*<sup>291</sup> – clarifies the relationship between ‘being said of a subject’ and ‘universality.’<sup>292</sup> After that, in close structural parallelism to the *Muḥtaṣar* and with reference to material from both Avicennian treatises on the *Categories*, he discusses the syllogistic pairings of ‘in a subject’ and ‘of a subject’ predications.<sup>293</sup> The corresponding chapter from the *Muḥtaṣar* simply ends with the remark that the expression ‘subject’ which is used in both predicative relations is said “by way of homonymy” (*bi-l-ittifāq*); for while in the case of ‘being said of a subject’ the expression may mean either ‘substance’ or accident, in the case of ‘existing in a subject’ it must always mean ‘substance.’<sup>294</sup> As we have seen above, in the *Šifā* Ibn Sinā attempts to give a very general description of ‘subject’ which suits both predicative relations and instead points to the fact that the more serious problem lies in the equivocal usage of ‘subject’ in this general sense, on the one hand, and of ‘subject’ in the sense of the material substrate in which a form inheres, on the other hand.<sup>295</sup> Bahmanyār, however, subscribes to the earlier line of reasoning presented in the *Muḥtaṣar*, while combining it, at the same time, with a crucial aspect of Ibn Sinā’s new fivefold scheme of attributive relations:

The expression ‘subject’ in the two divisions [i.e., ‘in a subject’ and ‘of a subject’] is used by way of homonymy (*bi-štirāk al-ism*), as you will come to know [...]. By ‘subject’ (*mawḍū*) one may mean something which has already been perfected (*mā qad ustukmila*) and to which an attribute (*šifa*) occurs (*ya’riḍu*) only subsequently, while that attribute does not convey to it any perfection (*kamāl*) concerning its essence (*dāt*) and true nature (*ḥaqīqa*); this is just like ‘man’ (*insān*) whose ‘being a man’ (*insāniyya*) is perfected on account of the parts (*ağzā*) by which ‘being a man’ is completed – and subsequently it becomes something to which the existence of whiteness and blackness occurs (*tumma yaširu mā’rūḍan li-wuğūdi l-bayādi wa-sawādi*). Everything which is in such a state is called ‘subject’ [in the second sense]; however, in relation to that which constitutes its essence and true nature (*mā yuqawwimu dātahū wa-ḥaqīqatahū*) it is not called ‘subject’ [in the second sense]. The difference between ‘subject’ in this sense and ‘subject’ in the preceding sense is that when ‘subject’ is taken in this sense something exists *in* it; and when it is taken

291 See Ibn Sinā, *K. aš-Šifā’*, *al-Mantiq, al-Maḥḥalāt*, I,3, p. 20, l. 18 – p. 21, l. 20 [= §§ 16–20 (2.B.b)].

292 Bahmanyār b. al-Marzubān, *at-Taḥṣīl*, ed. Mortaḍā Moṭaḥharī (Teheran: Entesārāt-e dānešgāh, 1997 [1417 AH / 1375 SH]), p. 26, l. 15 – p. 27, l. 5.

293 Bahmanyār b. al-Marzubān, *at-Taḥṣīl*, ed. Moṭaḥharī, p. 27, l. 6 – p. 28, l. 3.

294 Ibn Sinā, *al-Muḥtaṣar al-awsaṭ fi l-mantiq, al-Maḥḥalāt*, § 28, p. 330, ll. 19–21.

295 Cf. above, pp. 80–81.

in the first sense, something is predicated of it (*yuhmalu 'alayhi š-šay*). Whenever something exists *in* the subject, it is not characterized as 'being it' (*lā yūsafu bi-annahū huwa*); for one does not say 'the body is whiteness' (*al-ġism huwa l-bayāḍ*). However, 'subject' in the other sense is characterized as 'being the predicate' (*yūsafu bi-annahū l-maḥmūl*); thus, one says 'man is an animal' (*al-insānu ḥayawānun*).<sup>296</sup>

Here Bahmanyār makes the following systematization effort: The expression 'subject' as used in the 'in relation' must refer to an entity "which has already been perfected" or, in Ibn Sīnā's terminology, to something whose essence "has already been established as a subsisting concept." This is, according to Bahmanyār, a substance in which an accident inheres. The linguistic convention for expressing this relation is 'the subject *has* a certain attribute.' In contrast to this, Bahmanyār, takes 'subject' as used in the 'of relation' to refer to an entity whose essence is yet to be constituted: For example, the essence of 'man,' namely his 'being a man,' is only perfected on account of 'animal,' which is not merely an extrinsic attribute but which is a part of the essence of 'man.' The linguistic convention for expressing this relation is 'the subject *is* a certain attribute.' Thus, for Bahmanyār the two predicative relations which Ibn Sīnā expounds in the *Maqūlāt* of the *Muḥtaṣar*, namely 'an attribute being *in* a subject' and 'a subject *having* an attribute,' on the one hand, and 'an attribute being said *of* a subject' and 'a subject *being* an attribute,' on the other hand, remain the standard classification which is only slightly modified by recourse to an additional criterion introduced in the *Maqūlāt* of the *Šifā'*.

Bahmanyār's alleged pupil Abū l-ʿAbbās al-Lawkarī (d. ca. 517 AH / 1123 AD) did not continue this thread. Since he bases the (hitherto unedited) *Bayān maʿānī K. al-Maqūlāt* of his *Bayān al-ḥaqq bi-ḍimān aṣ-ṣidq* entirely on the *Maqūlāt* of the *Šifā'*, it comes as no surprise that he gives a short outline of Ibn Sīnā's fivefold scheme.<sup>297</sup> However, since his paraphrastic account of this pas-

296 Bahmanyār b. al-Marzubān, *at-Taḥṣīl*, ed. Moṭahharī, p. 28, l. 5 – p. 29, l. 9. The omitted passage (p. 28, ll. 6–19), which is introduced by *bi-ʿibāra uḥrā* and which simply repeats Bahmanyār's initial account of *Cat.* 1, appears to be a later addition.

297 Abū l-ʿAbbās al-Lawkarī, *Bayān al-ḥaqq bi-ḍimān aṣ-ṣidq*, *al-Mantiq*, *al-Maqūlāt*, MS Teheran Ketābhāne-ye Ehdāʾī be-Dānešgāh-e Tehrān Meškāt 250 (108), fol. 15b, ll. 3–15. On al-Lawkarī and his *Bayān al-ḥaqq bi-ḍimān aṣ-ṣidq*, see Roxanne Marcotte, "Preliminary Notes of the Life and Work of Abū al-ʿAbbās al-Lawkarī (d. ca. 517 AH / 1123 AD)," *Anaquel de Estudios Árabes* 17 (2006): pp. 133–157; and Jules Janssens, "Al-Lawkarī's Reception of Ibn Sīnā's Ilāhiyyāt," in *The Arabic, Hebrew and Latin Reception of Avicenna's Metaphysics*, ed. Dag Nikolaus Hasse and Amos Bertolacci (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2012), pp. 7–26. Until now, only the *Madḥal* and *Ilāhiyyāt* parts have been edited: *Bayān al-ḥaqq bi-ḍimān aṣ-ṣidq*, *al-Mantiq*, *al-Madḥal*, ed. Ibrāhīm Dībāġī (Teheran: Moʿassase-ye Enteshārāt-e Amīr Kabīr, 1986 [1364 SH/ 1429 AH]); and *Bayān al-ḥaqq bi-ḍimān aṣ-ṣidq*, *al-ʿilm al-ilāhī*, ed. Ibrāhīm Dībāġī (Teheran: al-Maʿhad al-ʿālī al-ʿalamī li-l-fikr wa-l-ḥadāra al-islāmiyya, 1995 [1373 SH / 1414 AH]).

sage, by and large, simply copies Ibn Sīnā's text *verbatim*, his reception of the scheme of attributive relations fails to amount to a conceptually fruitful endeavor.<sup>298</sup>

A rare instance of a philosophically interesting engagement with Ibn Sīnā's new scheme can be found at a much later stage of Islamic philosophy, that is, during the Šafawid period. In his momentous philosophical summa entitled *al-Ḥikma al-muta'aliya fi l-asfār al-'aqliyya al-arba'a* Šadr ad-Dīn aš-Šīrāzī, better known as Mullā Šadrā (d. 1050 AH / 1640 AD), devotes quite a long portion to the *Categories*.<sup>299</sup> The entire second "journey" (*safar*) deals with "substances" (*ḡawāhir*) and "accidents" (*a'rād*) under the heading of "natural philosophy" (*al-'ilm at-ṭabī'i*). Thus, Mullā Šadrā adopts Porphyry's interpretation that Aristotle's list of categories amounts to a classification of *sensibilia*.<sup>300</sup> It is particularly in the sections dedicated to 'accidents' – i.e., in what corresponds to the fourth *ḡuz'* of the edited text – that Mullā Šadrā thoroughly engages with questions raised in Aristotle's *Categories*. In these discussions he draws both on Ibn Sīnā's *Maqūlāt* of the *Šifā'* and on corresponding passages from the second book of Faḥr ad-Dīn ar-Rāzī's *al-Mabāḥiṭ al-mašriqiyya*, that is, on the part dedicated to "the qualifications of substances and accidents" (*aḥkām al-ḡawāhir wa-l-a'rād*).<sup>301</sup> In the chapter on the "definition" (*ta'rīf*) of accident Mullā Šadrā provides us with the following outline:

You must know that there are several divisions (*aqsām*) of the attributes of things (*šifāt al-umūr*). For whatever is characterized by an attribute (*al-mawṣūf*) is either [1] such that an essence has been established for it as being *in actu* (*istaqarrat laḥū dātun mutaqqarraratun bi-l-fi'i*) or [2] it is not like that.

[*ad* 1] As for the first one, it is either [1.1] such that the attribute which is attached to it is extrinsic to it, either the way a concomitant [i.e., inseparable] accident or the way a separable accident is attached to it; or [1.2] it is not attached to it as something extrinsic; rather, it is a part of its subsistence.

[*ad* 2] As for the second one, it is either [2.1] such that the attribute is attached to it in order for its essence to be established through it [i.e., through the attribute] – it being either [2.1.1] a part of the meaning of its essence (*ḡuz' min ma'nā dātihī*) or [2.1.2] not a part of the meaning of its essence; or [2.2] the attribute is not among those things which establish its essence; rather, it is attached to it in the manner in

298 For a synoptic presentation of Ibn Sīnā's text and al-Lawkarī's text, see below, pp. 140–142 (2.B.c).

299 For a broad overview of the structure of this complex work, see Rüdiger Arnzen, "The Structure of Mullā Šadrā's *al-Ḥikma al-muta'aliya fi l-asfār al-'aqliyya al-arba'a* and his Concepts of First Philosophy and Divine Science: An Essay," *Medioevo* 32 (2007): pp. 199–239. Cf. Sajjad Rizvi, *Mullā Šadrā Shīrāzī: His Life and Works and the Sources for Safavid Philosophy* (Oxford: University Press, 2007), p. 52ff.

300 Cf. above, p. 13, and below, p. 225.

301 Cf. below, p. 181, figure 12.

which something is subsequently – on account of that which establishes the thing *per se* – attached to the thing after it has been completely established and after its existence has been completed, either the way a concomitant or a separable [accident] is attached.

[ad 1.1 (= Example A)] An example of the first [division] is the existence of whiteness in relation to the body (*wuğūd al-bayād li-l-ğism*) or of laughing in relation to man.

[ad 1.2 (= Example B)] An example of the second [division] is the existence of the soul in relation to the animal.

[ad 2.1.1 (= Example D)] An example of the third [division] is the existence of the natural form (*aş-şūra aţ-ţabī'iyya*) in relation to the body in the absolute sense (*al-ğism al-muṭlaq*), inasmuch as it [i.e., body] is a spatially extended nature in the absolute sense (*bi-mā huwa ṭabī'atun imtidādiyyatun 'alā l-iṭlāq*).

[ad 2.1.2 (= Example C)] An example of the fourth [division] is the existence of form in relation to matter (*wuğūd aş-şūra li-l-hayūlā*).

[ad 2.2 (= Example E)] An example of the fifth [division] is the existence of whiteness or of the property of occupying space in relation to matter (*wuğūd al-bayād aw at-taḥayyuz li-l-hayūlā*).<sup>302</sup>

Mullā Şadrā's outline of the five types of attributive relations can be schematized as follows:




Figure 2. Mullā Şadrā's Outline of the Fivefold Scheme

302 Şadr ad-Dīn aş-Şīrāzī [Mullā Şadrā], *al-Ḥikma al-muta'aliya fī l-asfār al-'aqliyya al-arba'a*, vol. 4: *al-ğuz' al-awwal min as-safar aţ-tānī*, ed. M. Riḍā al-Muzaffar and Riḍā Luṭfī (Beirut: Dār Iḥyā' at-turāṭ al-'arabī, 1990 [1410 AH], 4<sup>th</sup> print), p. 236, l. 20 – p. 237, l. 7.

Since this is not the place to assess the role which these five types of attributive relations play within Mullā Ṣadrā's philosophical system, two short remarks need to suffice: In the second "journey" (*safar*) of his *al-Ḥikma al-muta'aliya* Mullā Ṣadrā – in contrast to virtually all of his predecessors – treats Ibn Sīnā's fivefold scheme as the fundamental guideline for arriving at a philosophical classification of attributes. Moreover, what Mullā Ṣadrā's own account achieves is bringing Ibn Sīnā's fivefold scheme to a higher level of systematization by conceptualizing it as the result of one overriding criterion and three dihairctic divisions.

## B. TEXTS

a. Ibn Sinā, *al-Muḥtaṣar al-awsaṭ fī l-manṭiq, al-Maqūlāt*, chs. 2–3  
[ed. Kalbarczyk, pp. 327–330]

### [Chapter 2] The Relation (*nisba*) of the Genera to Their Differentiae

[§ 8] Every differentia which is constitutive (*muqawwim*) for the high genus (*al-ḡins al-‘ālī*) is constitutive for the genus which is below it, just like the differentia of body which constitutes it is constitutive for the animal – not the other way around; for it need not be the case that the differentiae which are constitutive for the animal are constitutive for the body.

[§ 9] Every differentia which divides the lowest genus (*muqassim li-l-ḡins al-asfal*) divides the highest genus. Hence, when there is an animal which is rational and one which is non-rational, there is also a body which is rational and one which is non-rational – not the other way around; for not everything which divides the high [genus] divides the low [genus]; [*add. in marg.:*] <rather, the differentiae which are constitutive for the lowest genus divide the high genus>; taking nourishment and not taking nourishment, for example, divide the body but do not divide the animal.

[§ 10] You have already come to know how the genera which are [arranged] one below the other [i.e., in an *arbor porphyriana*] share in certain differentiae and how they are distinct with regard to certain differentiae. As for the differing genera which are not [arranged] one below the other, all of their differentiae differ, just like in the case of knowledge and animal. For knowledge belongs to the quale (*al-kayf*) and animal to substance. The differentiae which constitute knowledge are unlike the differentiae which constitute animal; and the differentiae which divide knowledge into its species are unlike the differentiae which divide animal into its species.

### [Chapter 3] The Relation (*nisba*) of Subjects to Predicates

[§ 11] The subject (*mawḏū‘*) is characterized (*yūṣafu*) by its predicate (*maḥmūl*) in two modes: [1] Either in such a way that it *is* it both in name and meaning (*bi-annahū huwa isman wa-ma‘nan*), just like we say ‘man is an animal’; [2] or it is characterized by its predicate not in such a manner that it *is* it in meaning but such that it *has* it in meaning (*bi-annahū dū huwa fī l-ma‘nā*). Most commonly, it happens to be the case that for such a subject a name is paronymously derived from its predicate; for one says ‘he is courageous’ and not ‘he is courage.’ It may also be the case that they are alike in name; for example,

one says ‘just man’ and ‘just character,’ ‘white body’ and ‘white color’; thus, the name is one and the same but the meaning is not one and the same – nor is the subject its predicate in meaning.

[§ 12] [ad 1] Whenever the predicate of the first division (*al-qism al-awwal*) is a universal it is specified in relation to its subject; hence, is said to be ‘predicated of a subject’ (*maḥmūl ‘alā mawḏū’*). Every universal is ‘predicated of a subject’; this is because every universal has several particular subjects of which the universal is predicated in such a manner that they *are* it, i.e., a predication in name and definition. This is what is specifically called by that name (*laqab*).

[§ 13] [ad 2] As for that which is predicated in the second mode (*bi-l-wağh at-tānī*), there are two aspects (*wağhaynī*): [2.1] Either its subject is *per se* realized in existence (*mutahaqqiq al-wuğūd bi-dātihī*) – and only afterwards<sup>303</sup> it becomes a cause for the existence of the predicate in it so that for the sake of its subsistence (*qiwām*) it [i.e., the subject] is not in need of the predicate, neither [in need of] this one nor of another one in its place. This relation is called ‘existence in the subject’ (*wuğūd fī l-mawḏū’*); and the predicate is called ‘accident’ (*‘araḏ*).

[§ 14] [2.2] Or the bearer (*al-hāmīl*) does not have actual existence *per se* but only through that predicate or through another one which is in its place afterwards or beforehand. This relation is called ‘existence in matter’ (*wuğūd fī l-hayūlā*); and the predicate is called ‘form’ (*ṣūra*). In this book – and in whatever proceeds in the same manner among the introductory works – this issue is not thoroughly investigated but accident and form are treated in one and the same manner. There is something which they both have in common, namely their being predicated by way of paronymy. That meaning is called ‘accident’ and that relation is called ‘existence in the subject.’

[§ 15] As for an account of a thing’s realization [in existence] (*taḥqīq*), it is such as we had indicated: Every essence which does not exist *in* a subject, is a substance; and every essence which exists *in* a subject is an accident.

[§ 16] The meaning of our saying ‘that which exists *in* a subject’ is that it is ‘the existent *in* something, not as a part of it, and its subsistence is impossible without that *in* which it is’; rather, its subsistence is realized through the subsistence of that in which it is *per se*.

[§ 17] Our saying ‘the existent *in* something’ distinguishes between that which we intend here [i.e., the accident] and the existence of the whole in the parts; for the whole does not exist in one single thing (*fī šay’ wāḥid*) but in several things together. Even if among accidents there should be something which

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303 The printed text of my edition of the *Maqūlāt* of the *Muḥtaṣar* erroneously has *tā<sup>2</sup>-mīm* instead of *tā<sup>2</sup>-mīm* (= *tumma*).



exists in two things, such as contiguity and parallelism, it is nonetheless existent in each of these two; for each of them is contiguous and parallel.

[§ 18] Our saying 'not as a part of it' distinguishes between the accident being in its subject and the part being in its whole.

[§ 19] As for the remainder, let us distinguish between something being in a place (*fī l-makān*) and it [i.e., the accident being *in* its subject]; between something being in a container (*fī l-wi'ā'*) and it; between something being in time (*fī z-zamān*) and it; between the substance being in accidents, just like we say "such-and-such is in [the state of] fertility" (*fulān fī l-ḥiṣb*), and it; and between the cause being in the effect (*al-'illa fī l-ma'lūl*) and it. For all these share in the fact that their subsistence does not depend on that which they are in (*bi-anna qiwāmahū laysa fīmā hiya fīhi*). It is permissible for them to be separated from what they are in: Thus, the body changes place, time and container and the substance changes an accident – and yet it remains in subsistence. Moreover, one can imagine a body not in a place without it becoming null and void (*wa-lā yabṭulu*); and a body being in one moment not in time without it becoming null and void. Even if it should happen to be the case that one such thing is concomitantly attached (*mulāzim*) [to what it is in], the subsistence of that which it is in does not come about through it.

[§ 20] As for the accident, it cannot be separated from its specific subject [and continue to exist in another subject]. Also, the subsistence of its subject does not come about through it but rather its [i.e., the accident's] subsistence through it [i.e., the subject].

[§ 21] Moreover, the form constitutes (*tuqawwimu*) its matter; and matter can be separated from its form. Thus, matter being in form is not like the accident being *in* the subject; nor is form being in matter like the accident being *in* the subject.

[§ 22] As for the universals (*kulliyāt*) in their particulars (*ḡuz'iyyāt*), such as the genera (*aḡnās*) in the species (*anwā'*), and the particulars in their universals, such as the species in the genera, this is distinguished [from the accident being *in* the subject] on account of the fact that the genus is a part of the meaning of its species (*ḡuz' min ma'nā naw'ihī*) and that the species is a part of the generalness of its genus (*ḡuz' min 'umūm ḡinsihī*). It is permissible to imagine the genus to be existent without this species and the nature of the species being existent; and that no genus is [said] *of* it. For a genus is only [said] *of* it if along with it the other species exist [as well]; but it is not a condition for the existence of the species that the other species exist along with it.

[§ 23] Thus, we have drawn a distinction between the accident and between everything [else] which is said to be in something.

[§ 24] Of substance there is a particular, such as Zayd, and there is a universal, such as man. Of accident, there is a particular, such as this whiteness, and there is a universal, such as the whiteness. Thus, the universal substance (*al-ḡawhar al-kullī*) is said *of* a subject and not existent *in* a subject: since it is universal, it is not [said] *of* a subject; and since it is a substance, it is not *in* a subject. The particular accident (*al-‘arad al-ḡuz’i*) is *in* a subject and is not [said] *of* a subject: its being *in* a subject is due to its being an accident; and its being not [said] *of* a subject is due to its not being a universal. The universal accident (*al-‘arad al-kullī*) is both [said] *of* a subject and *in* a subject: it is [said] *of* a subject because it is universal; and it is *in* a subject because it is an accident. The particular substance is neither said *of* a subject nor existent *in* a subject; for it is neither universal nor an accident.

[§ 25] Whenever something [B] is predicated *of* a subject [C] and a third one [A] is predicated *of* it [i.e., B] by an ‘*of* a subject’ predication as well, it [i.e., A] is predicated *of* its subject [i.e., C] by an ‘*of* a subject’ predication, just like ‘animal’ [B] is [said] *of* ‘man’ [C], subsequently, ‘body’ [A] is [said] *of* ‘animal’ [B] – and hence, ‘body’ [A] is [said] *of* ‘man’ [C] as well [Ba<sub>of</sub>C – Aa<sub>of</sub>B → Aa<sub>of</sub>C].

[§ 26] If, however, something [B] is existent *in* a subject [C] and another thing [A] is predicated *of* that thing [B], it need not be the case that it [A] is predicated *of* its subject [C], just like ‘whiteness’ [B] is *in* ‘body’ [C] and ‘color’ [A] is [said] *of* ‘whiteness’ [B] [but ‘color’ (A) is not predicated *of* ‘body’ (C); Ba<sub>in</sub>C – Aa<sub>of</sub>B ↯ Aa<sub>of</sub>C].

[§ 27] If something [B] is said *of* a subject [C] and another thing [A] is existent *in* that thing [B], it need not be the case that the first one [A] is [said] *of* the third one [C],<sup>304</sup> just like ‘animal’ [B] is [said] *of* ‘man’ [C] and ‘being a genus’ [A] is *in* ‘animal’ [B] but ‘man’ [C] is not said to be a ‘genus’ [A] [Ba<sub>of</sub>C – Aa<sub>in</sub>B ↯ AaC].

[§ 28] A subject of that which is [said] *of* a subject may be a substance, just like Zayd in relation to man, and it may be an accident, just like whiteness in relation to color. As for the case of a subject of that which is *in* a subject, it cannot be anything but a substance. Thus, the name ‘subject’ is used in these two [predicative relations] by way of homonymy.

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304 MS N (which I followed in my edition) has *al-awwal* and *aṭ-ṭānī*, MS T has *al-awwal* and *aṭ-ṭālīṭ*; neither of these two corresponds to the order in which the terms are introduced – but now I think that it makes more sense to follow MS T and hence treat ‘man’ as the third term and ‘genus’ as the first term.

b. Ibn Sīnā, *K. aš-Šifāʾ, al-Manṭiq, al-Maqūlāt*, I,3  
[ed. Madkūr, pp. 18–27]

**Elucidating the Meaning of That Which Is Said of a Subject or Which Is Not Said [of a Subject] and of That Which Exists in a Subject or Does Not Exist [in a Subject]**

[(I.C) al-Ḥillī (fol. 10b, ll. 18–19): “The Third Issue (*maṭlab*): Elucidating the Meaning of That Which Is Said of a Subject or Which Is Not Said [of a Subject] and of That Which Exists in a Subject or Does Not Exist [in a Subject]; in It Are Several Investigations (*mabāhiṭ*)”]

[(I.C.1) al-Ḥillī (fol. 10b, l. 19): “First [Investigation]: The Division of Predicated Attributes (*taqṣīm aš-šifāt al-maḥmūla*)”]

**[(1) Introduction of an Alternative Fivefold Scheme of Attributive Relations]**

[ed. Madkūr, p. 18, l. 4 – p. 20, l. 8]

[§ 1] First of all, I say that a thorough examination of [any instance of] theoretical reflection (*istiḡṣāʾ an-naẓar*) might make it necessary to depart from that which is commonly accepted (*al-mašhūr*). If this reaches your ear, think well of it and do not close your mind because of the occurrence of something you had not been familiar with. You must know that a rational person (*al-ʿāqil*) only departs from that which is commonly accepted if it is inescapable to do so.

[§ 2] After that, you must know that there are several divisions (*aqsām*) of the attributes of things (*ṣifāt al-umūr*). For it [i.e., any given attribute] is either [Type A] such that the essence of that which is described by the attribute (*al-mawṣūf*) has already been established (*qad istaqarra dātuhū*) as a subsisting concept (*maʿnan qāʾiman*) – and it is only afterwards that the attribute by which it is characterized (*aš-ṣifatu llatī yūṣafu bihā*) is attached to it as an extrinsic attribute (*talḥaḡuhū ḥariġan ʿanhū*), either [i] the way an accident is attached or [ii] the way a concomitant is attached (*luḡūqa ʿariḍin aw lāzim*).

[§ 3] [Type B] Or that which is described by the attribute is such that its essence has already been established, but the attribute by which it is characterized is not attached to it the way something extrinsic is attached; rather, it is a part of its subsistence (*ġuzʾ min qiwāmihī*).

[§ 4] [Type C] Or it [i.e., that which is characterized by the attribute] is such that its essence has not been established yet and the attribute is attached to it in order for its essence to be established, but it is not part of its essence (*wa-laysat ġuzʾan min dātihī*).

[§ 5] [Type D] Or it [i.e., that which is characterized by the attribute] is such that its essence has not been established yet and the attribute is not attached to it extrinsically (*min ḥariġ*); rather, it is part of its existence (*ġuzʾ min wuġūdihī*).

[§ 6] [*Type E*] Or its essence [i.e., the essence of the *mawṣūf*] has not been established yet and the attribute is not attached to it on account of its essence itself (*wa-ṣ-ṣifatu talḥaquhū lā li-nafsi dātihī*); rather, it is attached to it on account of that which establishes it [in its existence], either the way [i] a concomitant [ii] or a primary accident is attached (*bal luḥūqa lāzimin li-mā yuqarriruhū aw ‘arīḍin lahū awwal*).

[§ 7] [*Example A*] An example of the first [division] is your saying ‘man is white’ or ‘man is [capable of] laughing.’

[§ 8] [*Example B*] An example of the second [division] is your saying ‘man is an animal.’ For man is a realized nature (*ṭabī‘a mutaḥaṣṣila*) which, after being a man (*ba‘d mā huwa insānun*), is not in need of something that constitutes it (*lā taḥtāḡu ilā mā yuqawwimuhā*). If this should be difficult for you, consider Zayd instead of man: Nevertheless [i.e., even though Zayd has already been realized], animal is a part of its quiddity (*ḡuz’ min māhiyyatihī*).

[§ 9] [*Example C*] An example of the third [division] is matter (*hayūlā*) and form (*ṣūra*). For in relation to matter, form is an attribute which is extrinsic to its essence and by which its essence is established as something subsisting *in actu* (*qā‘imatan bi-l-fi‘l*). If it were not for form, the existence of matter would be impossible – not in such a way that form would be a concomitant [of matter] after matter has been constituted (*lā ‘alā anna ṣ-ṣūrata lāzimatun ba‘da t-taqawwum*); rather, it [i.e., form] is constitutive and determining and yet it is not a part of matter (*wa-laysat ma‘a dālīka ḡuz’an mina l-hayūlā*). You have already understood the difference (*faṣl*) between these two.

[§ 10] [*Example D*] An example of the fourth [division] is [the attribute of being a] substance in relation to the ‘body’ predicated of animal. For body in the absolute sense (*muṭlaqan*) – as something for which no realized existence (*wuḡūd muḥaṣṣal*) has been established – only comes about if there are extrinsic accidents and attachments. Indeed, it [i.e., body] is in need of differentiating extrinsic properties which are attached to it and which constitute it – and still, substance is a part of its quiddity, i.e., a part of its definition.

[§ 11] [*Example E*] An example of the fifth [division] is [a] matter if it is characterized by whiteness or by blackness or by the property of occupying space and the like; and in the same manner, [b] body in the absolute sense (*al-ḡism al-muṭlaq*) [i.e., body qua body] if it is characterized as ‘having the disposition to move and rest in the where’ and the like. [*ad a*] For matter is not *per se* established in its existence; and in the same manner, [*ad b*] body [qua body] is not *per se* established in its existence. These states (*aḥwāl*) do not belong to those things which establish [the existence of] this [i.e., matter qua matter] or that [i.e., body qua body] (*laysat mimmā yuqarriru hādihī aw dāka*), even though afterwards [i.e., after the thing has been established in its existence] they are

either [i] concomitants of everything which is established [in its existence] on account of that which establishes it [in its existence] or [ii] they follow it and are attached to it [as primary accidents]. Whenever something belongs to this type, it has an attribute which is not attached to it extrinsically in order to constitute the thing; rather, regardless of whether that which is characterized by the attribute is constituted *per se* or not constituted, it is called 'subject' of that attribute. [*ad a*] Hence, matter is not something functioning as the subject of that which is called form; for it [i.e., form] is an extrinsic attribute that constitutes matter as a thing *in actu* (*šay'an bi-l-fi'l*) [hence, the relation of matter to form belongs to Type C and not to Type E]. Man [in contrast] functions as a subject of animal, for animal is not attached to him extrinsically, even if it [i.e., animal] constitutes him [i.e., man]; rather, animal is a part of the existence of man. [*ad b*] Body functions as a subject for [the attribute of] whiteness; for if it were not constituted yet, it would not be constituted if it were constituted through whiteness; rather, it is only constituted by other things. Hence, if one relates it [i.e., body] to whiteness, it [i.e., body] must have already been constituted without it [i.e., whiteness]. Whiteness functions as a subject for color; for it is not constituted by it in a manner as if it were extrinsic to it.

[§ 12] Whenever a thing's relationship to its attribute is not in the manner of a thing's relationship to something both extrinsic and constitutive, it [i.e., that which is characterized by the attribute] is a subject (*mawḏū'*), be it [i] that the attribute is constitutive and not extrinsic (*muqawwimatan wa-laysat ḥāriḡatan*), or [ii] that it is extrinsic and not constitutive (*ḥāriḡatan wa-laysat muqawwimatan*). This is the way you must understand 'subject' (*mawḏū'*) in this place, even though in other places it may be used with different terminological conventions (*isti'amalāt ḡayriḥi*).

[§ 13] This thorough account has [several] advantages: [1] The first one is an awareness of this difference. [2] The second [advantage] is that [the term] 'subject' (*li-yakūna li-l-mawḏū'*<sup>305</sup>) used in the *in* and *of* relations [i.e., 'being *in* a subject' and 'said *of* a subject'] (*fī nisbatay fī wa-'alā*), which will be treated shortly, has a comprehensive meaning (*ma'nān ka-l-ḡāmi'*) – and only subsequently the relation is differentiated into these two relations, i.e., into the *in* relation and the *of* relation; [3] [an additional advantage is the fact] that there is a difference (*farq*) between accident and form; [4] and that [on the basis of this account] it is not<sup>306</sup> necessary to say that one and the same thing may be an

305 [20.4] Read with MSS B, SA, IN1, LG4, TD3 *li-l-mawḏū'* instead of *al-mawḏū'*. The entry in the *apparatus criticus* of EC seems to be confused: "*li-l-mawḏū'*: *al-mawḏū'* (MS AL)," as if the text read *li-l-mawḏū'*.

306 [20.7] Read with MSS B, SA, IN1, LG4, TD3 *an lā yuḥtāḡa* instead of *an yuḥtāḡa* (EC); no apparatus entry.

accident and a form. You will learn these things soon; and you will learn which shortcoming ensues from neglecting this principle which we have given you [above].

[(I.C.2) al-Ḥillī (fol. 11b, ll. 21–22): “Second Investigation (*baḥṭ*): The Division of That Which Is Related to the Subject and the Division of Predicate and Subject into Universals and Particulars (*qismat mā yunsabu ilā l-mawḏū‘ wa-qismat al-maḥmūl wa-l-mawḏū‘ ilā l-kullīyyīna wa-l-ḡuz’iyyīna*)”]

[(2) Short Discussion of the Transmitted Fourfold Scheme]

[ed. Madkūr, p. 20, l. 9 – p. 23, l. 3)]

[§ 14] We say: Whenever something is related to a subject, its relationship to the subject comes about in one of two modes: [*1<sup>st</sup> mode: of relation*] Either it is such that it is possible to say ‘the subject is it’ (*inna l-mawḏū‘a huwa*), just like in the case of ‘animal’ it is possible to say ‘man is it’ (*inna l-insāna huwa*), when one says ‘man is an animal’ (*hīna yuqālu inna l-insāna ḥayawānun*). Whichever thing is like this is that which is predicated of something (*al-maḥmūl ‘alā š-šay’*) and that which is predicated of the subject (*al-maḥmūl ‘alā l-mawḏū’*).

[§ 15] [*2<sup>nd</sup> mode: in relation*] Or it is not such that it is possible to say ‘it is it’ (*innahū huwa*) but rather such that one says ‘it is in it’ (*inna fihī*), just like in the case of ‘whiteness’ it is not possible to say of its subject – if you assume it to be a piece of clothing or a piece of wood – that it is it; for it is utterly impossible to say ‘the piece of clothing is whiteness’ or ‘the piece of wood is whiteness.’ Since it exists in relation to the subject (*wa-li-annahū mawḡūḏun li-l-mawḏū’*), one [i] either says that the piece of clothing ‘possesses whiteness’ (*ḏū bayāḏ*) [ii] or one says that the piece of clothing is ‘whitened’ or ‘white’ (*mubayyaḏ aw abyāḏ*). It is, properly speaking (*bi-l-ḥaqīqa*), not predicated of the subject according to the meaning, [namely] as that which it is (*kamā huwa*). Rather, that which is predicated according to the meaning is [a] either an expression paronymously derived from its expression [i.e., from the name of the attribute] (*lafzan muštaqqan min lafzihī*), [b] or compounded of its expression and the expression of the relationship [i.e., an expression indicating the type of relationship] (*mu’allafan min lafzihī wa-lafzi n-nisba*), [c] or its predication (*ḥamluhū*) comes about by way of ‘participation in the name’ [i.e., by way of homonymy], not by way of ‘[participation] in the meaning’ [i.e., not by way of homonymy]. However, something like that (*miṭla hādā*) is, even if it is not predicated of the subject, without a doubt something which exists in it (*mawḡūḏan fihī*).

[§ 16] Whenever something is predicated of the subject – if it [i.e., the subject] is taken *per se* without the attachment of a quantifier (*min ḡayri ilḥāqi sūrin bihī*) –, it [i.e., the subject] must be either [i] universal (*kullīyyan*) or [ii] particular (*ḡuz’iyyan*).

[§ 17] [ad ii. *Particular subject*] If it is particular, that which is predicated of it must be either [ii.1] universal or [ii.2] particular. [ad ii.2] If it is particular, this particular would not differ from it (*lam yakun dālīka l-ḡuz'ī ḡayrahū*) [i.e., the subject and the predicate would be identical]. For whenever there are two particulars which differ from each other, one of them cannot be predicated of the other.<sup>307</sup>

[§ 18] [*An excursus on unnatural predication (ii.2)*] Whenever this is the case, it is, properly speaking, not a subject and something predicated of itself in a natural manner but rather [it is a subject and a predicate only] with regard to speech and language (*bal bi-ḥasabi l-qawli wa-l-lisān*), just like in the case of your saying 'Zayd is Abū l-Qāsim' or 'he is Ibn 'Amr', unless by 'Ibn 'Amr [i.e., son of 'Amr]' you were to mean a concept which someone else could share with him [i.e., if 'Amr were to have more than one son]; for then it would be a universal. If, however, you specifically designate it to him, there is no other Ibn 'Amr except this one – and this one is Zayd. Likewise, if you were to say 'this white one is this scribe' (*hādā l-abyaḍu huwa hādā l-kātib*), you would refer to one and the same subject (*mawḍū' wāḥid*); 'his being this white one' does not have a greater claim to functioning as the subject or the predicate than the other one [i.e., 'his being this scribe'] does. Even though the nature of man in it [i.e., the quiddity of being a man as present in the individual man] does have a greater claim to functioning as the subject than the nature of the scribe does – I mean these two [concepts] in the absolute sense –, this scribe is, nonetheless, identical with this man. If you consider one of these two, insofar as he is this man without any condition besides this 'being a man,' and if, conversely, you were to consider the other one in exactly the same manner, the one would not be predicated of the other. For neither is a certain man (*insānun mā*), insofar as he is this man, this scribe, nor is this scribe, insofar as he is this scribe, this man, I mean insofar as there are two different modes of consideration. If in each of these two cases you take into account only its one distinctive mode of consideration – under the condition that nothing else is taken into account –, then the two modes of consideration differ from each other and are non-identical (*muḥtalifāni mutabāyināni*). Therefore this scribe, insofar as he is this scribe, is not this tall one, insofar as he is this tall one. Rather, one of these two is deprived of the other (*bal aḥaduhumā maslūbun 'ani l-āḥar*); there is neither a predication nor does one of them function as a subject; none of these two is the subject of the other nor is it said of it, i.e., affirmatively (*bi-l-iḡāb*).

307 Thus, ii.2 can be excluded. As a consequence, when something is predicated of a particular subject, the predicate is universal (ii.1).

[§ 19] [ad ii. *Universal subject*] If the subject is universal, that which is predicated of it could, properly speaking, not be anything but universal; for the nature of the universal cannot function *per se* – without the particular quantifier being attached to it – as the subject of an individual. Otherwise the universal nature would, on account of its nature, require it to be ‘this [particular] thing which can be pointed to’ (*hādā l-mušār ilayhi*).<sup>308</sup>

[§ 20] If this is the way things are, it necessarily follows for everything which is said of a subject [regardless of whether it is a particular or universal subject] that it is a universal; this applies if its ‘being [said] of a subject’ is understood in accordance with that which we have said.

[§ 21] Even if it is not taken in this way but if its ‘being [said] of a subject’ is taken to signify that it is ‘that which is said of many’ (*maqūlun ‘alā kaṭīrīn*), this account [i.e., ‘that which is said of many’] would concur [in meaning] with this name [i.e., ‘universal’] (*kāna hādā l-qawlu murādīfan li-hādā l-ism*);<sup>309</sup> and the omission of the commonly known expression, namely the expression ‘universality’ and the expression ‘that which is said of many,’ and the invention of this [new] expression [i.e., ‘being said of a subject’] constitute an extra effort which is of no use. The assumption (*taṣyīr*<sup>310</sup>) that those things which are related to things functioning as their subjects belong to two divisions, namely things which are said of their subjects and things which exist in their subjects, amounted to an idle effort (*takallufan*) in which the expression ‘subject’ (*lafzu l-mawḍūʿ*) was used in one and the same place with two meanings that are neither in agreement with each other nor in a close relationship of similarity to each other. This is excessive and superfluous! Rather, the most appropriate thing for us to do would be following the method (*sabīl*) we had [already] followed [above, i.e., at the beginning of the chapter where the five types of attributive relations had been outlined]. There is, however, no necessity in either of these two methods but it would be sufficient to say ‘universal’ and ‘particular.’ Yet, since this idle effort had already been undertaken, it is appropriate for us to extract a useful aspect from it in the manner we had outlined [above].

[§ 22] Thus, we now say: [*I<sup>st</sup> relation: being said of*] Everything said of a subject in the proper sense [of being said of something, i.e., not by means of an unnatural predication] is a universal; and every universal is necessarily (*darūratan*) something which is predicated of a subject; for it has – whether *in actu* or *in*

308 Thus, both in the case of a particular and a universal subject, that which is predicated of it must be universal.

309 That is to say, this would not be a different understanding because a ‘universal’ is ‘something which is said of many’; the result would be an unnecessary polyonymy.

310 Read with MSS Y (reading not recorded in the apparatus of EC), IC4, ID3, TM5 *taṣyīr* (rasm *t-ṣ-y-y-r*) rather than *taṣīru/taṣayyur* (rasm *t-ṣ-y-r*).



*potentia* – particulars of which the universal is said in this mode of predication (*hādā l-qawla*).

[§ 23] [*2<sup>nd</sup> relation: existing in*] Everything which exists *in* a subject is that which is said to be an accident (*allaḍi yuqālu lahū 'araḍ*). This being so, every accident is something which exists *in* a subject; for 'accident' is a name posited for this meaning (*ismun mawḍū'un li-hādā l-ma'nā*). With regard to this mode [i.e., with regard to the *in* relation], we are not faced with the unpleasantness which in the case of the other mode, [namely the mode] which applies to the universal, had followed from the occurrence of polyonymy. For even if in the case of that [other] mode [i.e., the *of* relation] it should be possible to say what has been said about it without the occurrence of polyonymy, this mode [i.e., the *in* relation] would retain its polyonymy and nonetheless those [unpleasant] things that had ensued [with regard to the *of* relation] would not follow [with regard to the *in* relation]. This is because the benefit (*fā'ida*) which results from using the expression 'existing *in* a subject' as a polyonymous name for 'accident' (*isman murādifan li-l-'araḍ*) or as an account which concurs [in meaning] with its name (*qawlan murādifan li-ismihī*) is due to fact that introducing this division [i.e., 'existing *in* something' and 'not existing *in* something'] yields an additional benefit (*bi-sababi l-qismi llaḍi fī irādihī ḡayru murādifin fā'idatan*). For, properly speaking, this is not [just] a polyonymous name for 'accident' but rather an explanatory account of the name 'accident' as it takes care of signifying a certain part of it [i.e., of its quiddity].<sup>311</sup>

[§ 24] As for the universal, your saying 'that which is said of many' [already] explains its name. 'That which is said *of* a subject' (*al-maqūl 'alā mawḍū'in*) is a name which has a meaning from which – on the basis of the argument we had pointed to [above] – follows that it is 'something which is said of many' (*ma'nā yalzamuhū an yakūna maqūlan 'alā kaḍirina*) [hence, the expression 'said *of* a subject' is redundant].

[§ 25] As for 'that which exists in a subject,' it is an account which concurs [in meaning] with the name 'accident.' For 'accidentality' means nothing else than 'the fact that a thing has existence in a subject'; and the meaning of [the expression] 'that which exists in a subject' is that which we will determine later on [i.e., in chapter I,4].

[§ 26] Since this has been established, we say: Whichever thing is not said *of* a subject is the particular (*al-ḡuz'ī*). And, conversely, whichever thing does not exist *in* a subject is that which we call substance.

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311 As a consequence, the formula 'not existing in a subject' has an additional epistemological value and is not just a second name for 'accident.'

[(I.C.3) al-Ḥillī (fol. 13b, ll. 13–14): “Third Investigation (*baḥṭ*): Elucidating the Error of Whoever Is of the Opinion That That Which Is Said of the Subject Is the Essential and Not Anything Else; and That That Which Exists In a Subject Is the Accidental; and the Error of Whoever Fancied the Universal to Be Constitutive (*bayān ḡalaṭ man ḡanna anna l-maqūl ‘alā l-mawḏū‘ huwa ḡ-dāṭī lā ḡayr wa-l-mawḡūd fī l-mawḏū‘ huwa l-‘araḡī wa-ḡalaṭ man yūhimu anna l-kullī huwa l-muqawwim*)”]

[(3) A Critique of Previous Commentators]

[ed. Madkūr, p. 23, l. 4 – p. 27, l. 9]

[§ 27] Furthermore (*tumma*), some people stipulated that ‘that which is said of a subject’ must be essential and constitutive for the quiddity (*dāṭiyyan muqawwiman li-l-māhiyya*) and that ‘that which exists in a subject’ must be accidental (*‘araḡī*). For in their view, the accident (*al-‘araḡ*) and the accidental (*al-‘araḡī*) are one and the same thing, even though they differ in many respects. Yet, in this place the great number of differences did not cross their minds!

[§ 28] Thus, these people judged that ‘white’ (*al-abyaḡ*), whenever it is said of this white thing (*iḡā qīla ‘alā hādā š-šay‘i l-abyaḡ*), is not something which is said of a subject but rather something which exists in a subject; for they were of the opinion that ‘white’ (*al-abyaḡ*) exists in a subject, as they were of the opinion that ‘white’ is an accident. They even went beyond this so that they said: “The universal is [only] that which is constitutive for the quiddity of the thing” – as if something else could not be a universal!

[§ 29] Let us present what one of their forerunners expressed in his attempt at establishing this concept (*lafḡa ba‘ḡi muqaddimihim fī taṣḡīhi hādā l-ma‘nā*); and let us point to the infamy which lies in it so that it will become clear that the right position is that which we have upheld.

[§ 30] He said:

“The reason why I said that the universal is that which is said of its particulars *in the mode of what the thing is* [i.e., by means of an essential predication] – and this is that which is said of a subject – lies precisely in the fact that things might also be predicated of the subject in a different mode. An example of this [other mode of predication] is our predicating ‘he walks’ (*yamšī*) of Zayd. Thus we say: ‘Zayd walks.’ The meaning of ‘he walks,’ however, is not predicated of Zayd in the manner as if it [i.e., ‘he walks’] were a universal (*amr kullī*) and Zayd its particular (*ḡuz‘uhū*), for ‘he walks’ is not predicated of Zayd in reply to the question ‘what is he?’. For if someone were to ask ‘what is Zayd?’ and if the person asked were to reply ‘he walks,’ his reply would be erroneous and false; for the meaning of ‘he walks’ does not signify Zayd’s quiddity; rather, it is one of his acts.”

[§ 31] [Ibn Sīnā’s reply (A). *Petitio principii*] Just look at this logician! He treated the assumption that the universal is that which is predicated of its particulars *in the mode of what the thing is* [i.e., by means of an essential predica-

tion] as his *quaesitum* and as his claim (*maṭlūbuhū wa-da'wāhu*). Thereupon, he wanted to provide a proof for this claim. And he conducted the proof (*bayān*) of this [claim] by assuming that that which is not predicated *in the mode of what the thing is*, is not a universal. However, this [proposition] is [merely] the 'conversion of the opposition' of that which is sought ('*aks an-naqīd li-l-maṭlūb*) [i.e., a *contraposition* of the universal affirmative proposition which the opponent seeks to establish – and hence a *petitio principii*]. If it were self-evident (*bayyin*) or granted (*musallam*), the first [claim] would have followed immediately (*lakāna l-awwalu lāziman 'an kaṭābin*)!

[§ 32] Thereupon, he specified the question with regard to a particular, namely 'he walks,' and omitted 'the one who walks' (*wa-taraka l-māšī*); for this sophism (*muḡālaṭa*) had occurred more often with regard to 'the one who walks,' since 'the one who walks' is a name (*ism*), whereas 'he walks' is a verb (*fi'l*). We must not let ourselves be affected by this as well! Rather, we say: When he wanted to prove that 'he walks' is not a universal, he used the first *quaesitum*, which had been doubted, as the major premise (*muqaddima kubrā*) in the proof that this is not a universal. Thus he said: "[i] Since 'he walks' does not signify the thing's quiddity, [ii] and since everything which is not said of the thing's quiddity is not a universal, [(iii) therefore, 'he walks' is not a universal]." This [i.e., the major premise] is that which had been transferred from the *quaesitum* to its proof (*inṣarafa 'ani l-maṭlūbi ilā bayānihī*); for it and the *quaesitum* are alike in their judgment (*ḥukm*) [i.e., they have the same propositional content].

[§ 33] [Ibn Sīnā's reply (B). *Is the premise more known than the conclusion?*] If, however, he should be of the opinion that this [i.e., the major premise] is not the same as the *quaesitum* but that from it follows the *quaesitum* – and it is characteristic of syllogisms to assume things from which follows the *quaesitum*, for these things are more known [than the *quaesitum*] –, then one must say to him: It is unavoidable for you either [1] to take this premise in this place as [self-evident] (*'alā annahā bayyina*) or [2] to make it evident first – and only afterwards the *quaesitum* could be made evident on the basis of it [i.e., first of all the premise would have to be proven and after that the premise could be used in a proof whose conclusion would be the *quaesitum*].

[§ 34] [Ibn Sīnā's reply (B.1). *Assuming the major premise to be self-evident*] If it [i.e., the major premise] is self-evident (*bayyina bi-nafsihā*), the idle effort of these syllogisms (*takalluf hādihī l-qiyāsāt*) would not be needed! Rather, this would simply have to be assumed. Hence one would say: "Since that which is not said with regard to a thing's quiddity, is not a universal, every universal is something which is said in reply to the question 'what is it'." Then (*tumma*) [there would be another problem, namely that] the claim that this [negative

proposition] is evident and that it is even more evident than [the affirmative proposition] “every universal is something which is said in reply to the question ‘what is it’” is a claim which is remote from comprehension (*da‘wā ba‘ida ‘ani l-‘uqūl*). For whoever [in opposing this claim] says “not every universal is something which is said in reply to the question ‘what is it’” simultaneously says “not everything which is not said in reply to the question ‘what is it’ is not a universal” (*laysa kullu mā laysa maqūlan fī ḡawābi mā huwa fa-laysa bi-kullī*).

[§ 35] [Ibn Sīnā’s reply (B.2). *Assuming the major premise to be in need of a proof*] If, however, it [i.e., the major premise] needs to be made evident so that the *quaesitum* could be made evident on the basis of it, why did he use this itself [i.e., the major premise] as part of the syllogism which makes it [i.e., the major premise] evident in order to make the *quaesitum* evident through it [i.e., through the major premise]?

[§ 36] [Ibn Sīnā’s reply (C). *Why is the (general term) ‘non-universal predicates’ (al-maḥmūlātu ‘alā š-šay’i llatī laysat kulliyyatan) replaced by the exemplary case ‘yamšī’?*] Moreover, does the introduction of ‘he walks’ (*idhāl yamšī*) yield any other benefit (*fā’ida*) than replacing by it [the general term] ‘those things predicated of something which are not universal’? A proof was to be provided for the claim that ‘those things which are not predicated *in the mode of what the thing is*’ (*al-maḥmūlāt lā min ṭarīq mā huwa*) are not universal – but how should this be proven by assuming that ‘those things which are not predicated *in the mode of what the thing is*’ are not universal?

[§ 37] [*Another faulty doctrine related to the above-mentioned view: ‘A particular falls only under one universal’*] In this chapter we have already pointed to something [i.e., to yet another problematic assumption] without, however, having expressed it clearly. This is closely related to what he said in his delusion, namely that ‘he walks’ is not a universal because ‘Zayd’ is not a particular of ‘he walks.’ For his saying “because ‘Zayd’ is not a particular of ‘he walks’” is something which the mind accepts instantaneously (*mimmā yasbuqu ilā d-dihni qubūluhū*), as the mind had conceived instantaneously that Zayd is an individual belonging to the species ‘man’ (*anna Zaydan šaḥṣun min naw’i l-insān*); and that the individual is a particular of the species; therefore he was instantaneously of the opinion that it is a particular of the species and not a particular of anything else – as if it were not possible for something to be a particular of two things (*ka-anna š-šay’a lā yaḡūzu an yakūna ḡuz’iyya šay’ayn*)!

[§ 38] [Ibn Sīnā’s reply: *The perspective needs to be reversed, i.e., ‘being a particular’ does not mean that something falls only under one universal (i.e., that only one universal is said of it) but, quite the contrary, that it is not said of anything*] It is, however [despite the alleged obviousness of this argument], necessary to grasp what is understood by our saying ‘such-and-such is a particular of such-

and-such' (*inna kaḏā ġuz'ī kaḏā*). Hence we say: By saying 'such-and-such is a particular of such-and-such' we mean that it is a certain thing which is characterized by such-and-such [i.e., by a certain attribute] (*mā yūṣafu bi-kaḏā*) so that it is such-and such (*fa-yakūna kaḏā*). This does not entail that solely that particular [subject] is characterized by it [and not anything else] (*lā yalzamu an yūṣafa ḏālika l-ġuz'iyyu bihī waḥdahū*). [Now the perspective changes from 'one thing being only characterized by one attribute' to 'the attribute being said of many things.'] For such-and-such [i.e., any given attribute] functions as an attribute both of that thing and of something else – either *in actu* or *in potentia* (*ṣifatu lahū wa-li-ġayrihī bi-fi'lin aw quwwatin*). If, however, the attribute (*waṣf*) were something which is – both *in actu* and *in potentia* – solely predicated of this [particular thing], if this were the case, it [i.e., the particular subject] would, in fact, not be a particular of that attribute (*lam yakun huwa ġuz'iyya ḏālika l-waṣf*) [for in this case subject and predicate would be identical]. If both this [subject] and other things are characterized by it [i.e., by this attribute] by means of an attribution with one and the same understanding and one and the same definition and by means of an attribution in the manner that it is it, without the occurrence of paronymy (*waṣfan 'alā sabīlin annahū huwa min ġayr iṣtiqāq*), then this [i.e., the attribute] is more general in application (*wuqū'*) than that [i.e., than the subject characterized by the attribute], and that [i.e., the subject] is more specific than this [i.e., the attribute]. For Zayd is more specific (*aḥaṣṣ*) than 'he walks' and 'he walks' is more general (*a'amm*) than Zayd. For Zayd is only said of one single thing (*lā yuqālu illā 'alā wāḥid*). 'He walks,' in contrast, is said of that of which Zayd is said and of something else. Thus, Zayd is one of the particular things of which 'he walks' is predicated. This is precisely what we mean by [the term] 'particular.' As for the assumption that the general predicate (*al-maḥmūl al-'amm*) which is said both of Zayd and of something else must be something which is predicated of him with regard to his essence (*amran yuḥmalu 'alayhi fī ḏātihi*), this is an additional condition which, in relation to Zayd, exceeds the condition for particularity and, in relation to the attribute, exceeds the condition for universality (*ṣarṭun zā'idun li-Zaydin 'alā l-ġuz'iyyati wa-li-ṣ-ṣifati 'alā l-kulliyya*).

[§ 39] [*Ibn Sīnā fosters his view by referring to the consensus among scholars with regard to the predication of propria and accidents*] As a matter of fact, people agreed that the propria (*al-ḥawāṣṣ*) and accidents (*al-a'rāḏ*) are universals. And these have, insofar as they are [in relation to their subjects] propria and accidents, particulars which [with regard to their essences] are remote from them (*wa-lahā min ḥaytu hiya ḥawāṣṣ wa-a'rāḏ ġuz'iyyāt ġarība 'anhā*) [i.e., they are not predicated essentially]. For example, '[capable of] laughing' (*aḏ-ḏaḥḥāk*) in relation to 'this [specific] laughing [man], insofar as he is this [specific] laugh-

ing [man]' (*hādā d-dahḥāk min ḥaytu huwa hādā d-dahḥāk*), is not a proprium but rather a species and something which is constitutive for his quiddity (*naw'un wa-muqawwimun li-māhiyyatihī*), as you have already learned [in the *Isagoge*]. Yet, it is a proprium in relation to 'man.' The particulars of 'laughing,' insofar as it is a proprium, are the individuals of 'man' [i.e., individual human beings] (*aṣḥāṣ al-insān*). As for individual human beings, insofar as they are human beings, these are not constituted by 'laughing'; for it [i.e., 'laughing'] is not part of the quiddity of human beings (*ḡayr dāḥil fī māhiyyatihā*) because it does not constitute its quiddity. Nonetheless, it is a universal said of many things (*kulliyyun maqūlun 'alā kaṭirīn*) which are its particulars, insofar as it is a proprium.

[§ 40] [*An additional argument against the view that "something which is said of something" is always said by means of an essential predication*] Moreover, if 'white' in relation to 'man' and 'he walks' in relation to Zayd did not belong to those which are said of a subject but if, instead, they were accidents, it would be unavoidable that the name 'accident' is [1] either said of 'the accidental [predicate]' (*al-'araḍī*) and of the 'real [i.e., ontological] accident' (*al-'araḍ al-ḥaqīqī*) by means of pure equivocity (*bi-ṣtirāk baḥt*), that is, neither by means of 'modulation' [i.e., 'focal homonymy'] nor univocally (*lā taškika wa-lā tawāṭu'a fīhi*); [2] or that it is not said equivocally.

[§ 41] [*Option 1: equivocity of 'accident'*] If it [i.e., 'accident'] were said equivocally, it would follow that the number of divisions in accordance with the concepts would be greater than the number of divisions they adduce; for in this case, the principles (*uṣūl*) of division would be six: [1] universal; [2] particular; [3] substance and [4] accident in one of the two senses [of substance and accident, respectively]; and [5] substance and [6] accident in the sense of 'substantial [predicate]' and 'accidental [predicate]' (*bi-ma'nā l-ḡawharī wa-l-'araḍī*). Each of the two senses of 'accident' (*kullu wāḥidīn mina l-'araḍaynī*) has, as a matter of fact, been used in the examples they adduce in this context, that is to say, those ignoble scholars have used these rotten conditions (*ṣurūṭ fāsida*), I do not mean to say that the first one who taught us this introduced any of this.

[§ 42] [*Option 2: univocity of 'accident'*] If 'accident' were to apply to both of them univocally, this [common] meaning should be indicated.<sup>312</sup>

[§ 43] But those [scholars] agreed that in the case of 'that which is in a subject' [i.e., the ontological accident] its 'subject' (*mawḍū'uhū*) does not commonly share with it [i.e., with 'that which is in a subject'] both its definition and its

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312 That is to say, someone should make it explicit what the common meaning of 'accidental predicate' and 'ontological accident' is – but since no one has made this effort, this option can be excluded.

name; rather, it might only share with it its name, whereas its definition is not predicated of it.

[§ 44] Furthermore (*tumma*), whenever we say about Zayd 'he walks' and 'he is white' and [whenever] we inquire the definition of 'he walks' – namely 'it is a thing which moves from one place to another place by setting forward one foot and by leaning against the other one' – and inquire the definition of 'white' – namely 'it is a thing which possesses a color that disperses the vision' –, we recognize that both of these definitions belong to that which is said of Zayd. For just as we say about Zayd 'he walks,' we say that 'he moves from one place to another place by setting forward one foot and by leaning against the other one'; and just as we say that he is 'white,' we say that 'he is a body which possesses a color that disperses the vision.' Hence, it is clear that this discourse belongs to those things one does not need to pay a lot of attention to.

[§ 45] [*What does it mean to share in a definition?*] We ought to remember here what had been said [in chapter I,2] about the [various] modes of participation (*al-mušāarakāt*) [i.e., the modes a commonly sharing a name, i.e., homonymy (sharing the name only) and synonymy (sharing the name and the definition)] and the [various] modes of difference (*al-mubāyanāt*) [i.e., the modes of differing with regard to the name, i.e., heteronymy, polyonymy and paronymy]: In that context they [i.e., these scholars] had agreed that it can be taken for granted that the five [types of predicables] are predicated univocally and that the proprium [being one of the five predicables] is also predicated univocally. You know how quickly they forget – unless [in defense of their view] they were to say that 'sharing in a definition' (*al-mušāraka fī l-ḥadd*) [actually] means that the definition is not merely predicated [i.e., it does not merely mean that if Zayd is walking and walking is said of Zayd, the definition of 'walking' is also predicated of Zayd]; rather, it means that it is also a definition [of the thing of which it is predicated; i.e., the definition of 'walking' would have to function as the definition of Zayd as well]. As a consequence, the species would not share in the definitions of the natural genera but would only share the names with them. For the definitions of the genera are not definitions for the species [even though the definitions of the genera can be predicated of the species below the respective genus]. Moreover, individuals do not have any definitions at all. Hence, how should they share in the definitions of the genera?

[§ 46] [*Another futile attempt at defending their position*] If, however, they made an idle effort to present yet another excessive argument and hence said 'sharing in a definition means that that which is a definition for one of the two is either a definition for the other one or part of the definition of the other one,' this would be disproven by their own claim (*taṣḍīquhum*) that the genus and the proprium commonly share the feature of being predicated univocally of that

which is below them – both with regard to the name and the definition. And all of them have agreed to this.

[§ 47] Therefore, this is not the meaning of ‘sharing in a definition’; rather, it means that ‘that which is understood by a thing’s name, be it a definition of it or a description of it, is predicated of that thing of which the name is predicated; thus, the thing is characterized by the meaning (*maʿnā*) of the name, just like it is named by its expression (*lafz*), even if that [meaning] does not function as a definition of the thing.’

#### [(4) Concluding Remarks and Summary]

[ed. Madkūr, p. 27, ll. 10–21]

[§ 48] Through these things it has become clear that they were very careless! Moreover, it has become clear that the reason for this [carelessness] is their opinion that the accident which is one of the five [predicables] is the same as the accident which we talk about in this book [i.e., they held the erroneous view that the predicative accident is the same as the ontological accident].

[§ 49] What is more, through this it may have even become clear that [a] every general concept (*maʿnā ʿāmm*) which is said of more than one thing (*yuqālu ʿalā aktara min wāhid*), whichever way this might be (*kayfa kāna*), is a universal; [b] and [that] the specific concept (*maʿnā ḥāṣṣ*) is a particular; [c] and that the accident which is opposed to substance is that which we are about to define [i.e., in the *Categories* the ontological accident is treated]; [d] and that things (*al-umūr*) [are divided into the following classes]:

[1] Those things which are said *of* a subject and do not exist *in* a subject; these are the universals of things which are substances; since they are universals, they are said *of* something; and since they are substances they do not exist *in* something.

[2] Or those things which exist *in* a subject and are not said *of* a subject; these are the particulars of accidents; since they are accidents, they exist *in* something; and since they are particulars, they are not [said] *of* something.

[3] Or those things which are said *of* a subject and which exist *in* a subject; these are the universals of accidents; for in relation to their particulars they are said *of* a subject, such as the universal whiteness in relation to a certain whiteness; and since they are accidents, they exist *in* a subject.

[4] Or those things which are not said *of* something and which do not exist *in* something; these are the particulars of substances, such as Zayd and ʿAmr and such as ‘this matter,’ ‘this form’ and ‘this soul’; since they are substances, they do not exist *in* a subject; and since they are particulars, they are not said *of* a subject.



### c. The Fivefold Scheme of Attributive Relations in the *Categories* Part of al-Lawkarī's *Bayān al-ḥaqq bi-dimān aṣ-ṣidq*

Ibn Sinā, *K. aṣ-Ṣifā'*, *al-Mantiq*,  
*al-Maqūlāt*, I,3, §§ 2–13

For an English translation,  
see above, pp. 126–129.

al-Lawkarī, *Bayān al-ḥaqq  
bi-dimān aṣ-ṣidq, fī bayān  
ma'ānī K. al-Maqūlāt*

[MS Teheran Meškāt 250 [108], fol. 15b]

Deviations from Ibn Sinā's text are  
underlined.

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[§ 2] وبعد ذلك فاعلم أنّ صفات الأمور على  
أقسام: [1] لأنه إما أن يكون الموصوف قد استقرّ ذاته  
معنى قائماً، ثم إنّ الصفة التي يوصف بها تلحقه  
خارجاً عنه لحوق عارض أو لازم، مثل قولنا  
الإنسان أبيض أو ضحّاك.  
[§ 7] مثال الأول قولك الإنسان أبيض أو ضحّاك.

[§ 3] [2] وإما أن يكون الموصوف أخذ بحيث قد  
استقرّ ذاته، لكن الصفة التي يوصف بها ليست  
تلحقه لحوق أمر خارج بل هو جزء من قوامه.  
[§ 8] ومثال الثاني قولك الإنسان حيوان. فإنّ  
الإنسان طبيعة متحصّلة لا تحتاج إلى ما يقوّمها بعد  
ما هو إنسان. وإن أشكل عليك هذا فخذ مكانه  
زيداً، ومع ذلك فإنّ الحيوان جزء من ماهيته.

[§ 4] [3] وإما أن يكون أخذ بحيث لا يكون قد  
استقرّ ذاته بعد، بل الصفة تلحقه لتقرر ذاته  
وليست جزءاً من ذاته.

[§ 9] ومثال الثالث الهيولى والصورة. فإنّ الصورة  
صفة للهيولى خارجة عن ذاتها قائمة  
بالفعل. ولو لاها لاستحال وجودها، لا على أنّ

نقول إنّ صفات الأمور على خمسة أقسام: [1] أحدهما أنّ الموصوف يكون قد استقرّ ذاته  
معنى قائماً، ثم إنّ الصفة التي يوصف بها تلحقه  
خارجاً عنه لحوق عارض أو لازم، مثل قولنا  
الإنسان أبيض أو ضحّاك.

[2] والثاني أن يكون الموصوف أخذ بحيث قد  
استقرّ ذاته، لكن الصفة التي يوصف بها  
ليست تلحقه لحوق أمر خارجاً بل هي جزء  
من قوامه، مثل قولنا الإنسان حيوان، فإنّ  
الإنسان طبيعة متحصّلة لا تحتاج إلى ما يقوّمها  
بعد ما هو إنسان. <...> ومع ذلك فإنّ الحيوان  
جزء من ماهيته.

[3] والثالث أن يكون أخذ بحيث لا يكون قد  
استقرّ ذاته بعد، بل الصفة تلحقه لتقرر ذاته  
وليست جزءاً من ذاته، مثل الهيولى والصورة.

فإنّ الصورة صفة للهيولى خارجة عن ذاتها بها  
تتقرر ذاتها قائمة بالفعل، ولو لاها لاستحال  
وجودها، لا على أنّ الصورة لازمة بعد التقوم،

الصورة لازمة بعد التقوم بل مقومة مثبتة، وليست مع ذلك جزءاً من الهيولى. وقد فهمت الفصل بين هذين.

[4] [§ 5] [4] وأما أن يكون أخذ بحيث لا يكون قد استقر ذاته بعد والصفة ليست تلحقه من خارج بل هو جزء من وجوده.

[10] [§ 10] ومثال الرابع الجوهر للجسم المحمول على الحيوان. فإنّ الجسم مطلقاً لا يتقرر له وجود محصل لا يكون بعده إلاّ العوارض واللواحق الخارجة بل يحتاج إلى أمور خارجة فصلية تلحقه وتقومه، والجوهر مع ذلك جزء من ماهيته، أي جزء حده.

[5] [§ 6] [5] وأما أن لا يكون قد استقر ذاته والصفة تلحقه لا لنفس ذاته بل لحق لازم لما يقرره أو عارض له أول.

[11] [§ 11] ومثال الخامس الهيولى إذا وصفت بالبياض أو السواد أو التحيز وما أشبه ذلك. وكذلك الجسم المطلق إذا وصف بأنه مستعدّ للحركة والسكون في الأين وغير ذلك. فإنّ الهيولى غير متقررة الوجود بنفسها وكذلك الجسم غير متقرر الوجود في نفسه.

وهذه الأحوال ليست بما تقرّر هذه أو ذلك، وإن كانت تلزم بعد ما يتقرر بما تقرّر وتنبهه أو تلحقه. فما كان من هذه الجملة له صفة ليست لاحقة من خارج لتقومه بل كان الموصوف متقوماً في ذاته أو غير متقوم فإنه يسمّى موضوعاً لتلك الصفة، فلا تكون الهيولى موضوعة للشيء الذي يسمّى صورة لأنها صفة خارجية مقومة للهيولى

بل مقومة مثبتة، وليست مع ذلك جزءاً من الهيولى. <...>

[4] والرابع أن يكون أخذ بحيث لا يكون قد استقر ذاته بعد، والصفة ليست تلحقه من خارج، بل هي جزء من وجوده، مثل الجوهر للجسم المحمول على الحيوان. فإنّ الجسم مطلقاً لا يتقرر له وجود محصل لا يكون بعده إلاّ العوارض واللواحق الخارجة، بل يحتاج إلى أمور خارجة فصلية تلحقه وتقومه، والجوهر مع ذلك جزء من ماهيته، أي جزء حده.

[5] والخامس أن لا يكون قد استقر ذاته، والصفة تلحقه لا لنفس ذاته، بل لحق لازم لما يقرره أو عارض له، مثل الهيولى إذا وصفت بالبياض أو السواد أو التحيز <...>، وكذلك الجسم المطلق إذا وصف بأنه مستعدّ للحركة والسكون والأين وغير ذلك. فإنّ الهيولى غير متقررة الوجود بنفسها، وكذلك الجسم المطلق غير متقرر الوجود في نفسه.

وهذه الأحوال ليست بما تقرّر هذه أو ذلك، وإن كانت تلزم بعد ما يتقرر بما تقرّر وتنبهه أو تلحقه. فما كان من هذه الموصوفات له صفة ليست تلك الصفة لاحقة من خارج لتقومه، بل الموصوف يكون متقوماً في ذاته أو غير متقوم، فإنه يسمّى موضوعاً لتلك الصفة. فيلزم من ذلك أنّ الهيولى لا تكون موضوعة للصورة

شيئاً بالفعل. ويكون الإنسان موضوعاً للحيوان لأن الحيوان ليس لاحقاً له من الخارج، وإن كان يقوم، بل هو جزء وجوده. ويكون الجسم موضوعاً للبياض لأنه وإن لم يتقوم بعد فليس يتقوم إذا تقوم بالبياض بل إنَّما يتقوم بأشياء أخرى. فهو إذا قيس إلى البياض يكون قد تقوم دونه. ويكون البياض موضوعاً للون لأنه ليس يتقوم به على أنه من خارج.

لأن الصورة صفة خارجية مقومة للهولى شيئاً بالفعل، يكون الإنسان موضوعاً للحيوان لأن الحيوان ليس لاحقاً له من خارج، وإن كان يقوم، بل هو جزء وجوده. وكذلك الجسم المطلق يكون موضوعاً للبياض، لأنه وإن لم يتقوم بعد، فليس يتقوم بالبياض، بل إنَّما يتقوم بأشياء أخرى. فهو إذا قيس إلى البياض يكون قد تقوم دونه. وأيضاً يكون البياض موضوعاً للون، لأنه ليس يتقوم به على أنه من خارج، بل اللون ذاتي للبياض.

[§ 12] ويكون جميع ما نسبته إلى الصفة ليست على نسبة شيء إلى الخارج المقوم موضوعاً، سواء كانت الصفة مقومة وليست خارجة أو كانت خارجة وليست مقومة. فيجب أن تفهم من الموضوع هاهنا هذا، وإن كان قد يستعمل في مواضع أخرى استعمالاً غيره.

ويكون جميع ما نسبته إلى صفة غير نسبة شيء إلى خارج مقوم موضوعاً، سواء كانت الصفة مقومة وليست خارجة، أو كانت خارجة وليست مقومة. فيجب أن تفهم من الموضوع هاهنا، وإن كان قد يستعمل في مواضع أخرى استعمالاً غيره.

[§ 13] وفي هذا التفصيل فوائد. أحدها الشعور بهذا الاختلاف. والثاني ليكون للموضوع المستعمل في نسبي في وعلى المذكورين بعد معنى كالجامع، ثم تفصل النسبة إليهما، أعني إلى نسبة في وإلى نسبة على. وأن يكون بين العرض والصورة فرق. وأن لا يحتاج إلى أن يقال إنَّ شيئاً واحداً قد يكون عرضاً وجوهراً. وهذه أشياء ستعرفها عن قريب، وتعرف ما في إغفال هذا الأصل الذي أعطيناك من الحلل.

وفي هذا التفصيل فوائد: أحدها الشعور بهذا الاختلاف. والثاني أن يكون للموضوع المستعمل في نسبي في وعلى المذكورين بعد معنى كالجامع، وأن يكون بين الصورة والعرض فرق، وأن لا يحتاج إلى أن يقال إنَّ شيئاً واحداً قد يكون جوهراً وعرضياً. وهذه أشياء ستعرفها عن قريب، وتعرف ما في إغفال هذا الذي أعطيناك من الحلل.

### 3. Attempts at Providing a Systematization of the Scheme of Ten Categories

#### A. STUDY

##### 3.1. The Greek Background: Ammonian and Themistian Approaches of Dividing the Categories

The question of whether and how the list of categories could be justified seems to have troubled readers and commentators ever since Aristotle's small treatise began to function as the starting-point of the classical philosophy curriculum. After centuries of various justification efforts, Immanuel Kant, who took the categories to be the "pure concepts of understanding" ("reine Verstandesbegriffe"), passed a rather harsh verdict: Since Aristotle "had no principle" ("kein Principium") in his quest for "these fundamental concepts" ("diese Grundbegriffe"), he simply "rounded them up as he stumbled on them" ("so raffte er sie auf, wie sie ihm aufstießen")<sup>313</sup> – a view which eighty years later was forcefully challenged by Franz Brentano's attempt at carrying out a complete deductive proof of the scheme of categories exclusively on the basis of fundamental Aristotelian principles.<sup>314</sup> Thus, modern philosophy resumed and perpetuated a heated debate which can be traced back at least as far as to the Neoplatonic commentary tradition.

Whereas in his brief exegetical remarks on *Cat.* 4 the Alexandrian commentator Ammonius Hermiae does not address the question of how the list of ten categories could be justified,<sup>315</sup> he provides some hints at a possible systematization of the scheme of categories in his discussion of *Cat.* 8 and 9. First of all, his

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313 Immanuel Kant, *Werke in zwölf Bänden, Band III: Kritik der reinen Vernunft 1*, ed. Wilhelm Weischedel (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1975), pp. 116–119, esp. p. 119. English tr. by Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood, *Critique of Pure Reason* (Cambridge: University Press, 1998), pp. 210–213, esp. p. 213.

314 Franz Brentano, *Von der Mannigfachen Bedeutung des Seienden nach Aristoteles* (Freiburg i. Br.: Herder'sche Verlagshandlung, 1862), ch. 5, §§ 12–13, pp. 144–178; new ed. by Werner Sauer (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2014), pp. 133–161. English tr. by Rolf George, *On the Several Senses of Being in Aristotle* (Berkeley/Los Angeles/London: University of California Press, 1975), pp. 94–118.

315 Cf. Ammonius, *In Categorias*, p. 32, l. 17 – p. 35, l. 8.

explanation of why in certain cases “the genera of qualities” (τὰ γένη τῶν ποιότητων) may be said to be “relata” (τὰ πρὸς τι), while their “species” (εἶδη) may belong to the category of “quality” (τὸ ποιόν),<sup>316</sup> prompts him to introduce a dihairetic scheme of the first four categories:




Figure 3. Ammonius' Dihairetic Scheme of the First Four Categories

What is remarkable about this division is the fact that the distinction between accident and substance is not achieved by contrasting ‘something which is in a subject’ with ‘something which is not in a subject’ but rather by identifying substance with ‘subject’ and accident with ‘in a subject.’ Since in his exegesis of *Cat. 2* Ammonius explains that the reason why Aristotle did not simply equate substance with ‘subject’ lies in the fact that “the primary and divine substances are certainly not subjects” (οὐ γὰρ δήπου καὶ αἱ πρῶται καὶ αἱ θεῖαι οὐσίαι εἰσὶν ὑποκείμενα),<sup>317</sup> it is clear that the substances covered by the scheme of “beings” (ὄντα) which Ammonius outlines in the context of discussing *Cat. 8* are restricted to *sensibilia*; for only these are the kinds of substances which always function as the subjects of certain accidental features. As we shall see, the two criteria by which Ammonius arrives at a division of three accidental categories will, in one way or another, reappear in most subsequent schematizations of the categories, both in the late ancient Greek and in the Arabic traditions: (1) Acci-

316 Ammonius, *In Categorias*, p. 91, ll. 10–13.

317 Ammonius, *In Categorias*, p. 26, ll. 2–3 (my tr.).

dents may either be “in a relation” (ἐν σχέσει) or “not in a relation” (οὐκ ἐν σχέσει); (2) and non-relational accidents may either be “divisible” (μεριστός) or “indivisible” (ἀμέριστος).

Shortly afterwards, in the context of treating the categories of doing and being affected (*Cat.* 9, 11b1ff.), Ammonius resumes this fourfold scheme – and now labels substance, relatum, quantity and quality “the principal and primary categories” (αἱ κυρίως καὶ πρῶται κατηγορίαι). Without attempting to conceptualize all ten categories within one unified scheme of successive dihairetic divisions, Ammonius justifies the remaining six categories as genera which “result from combining substance with the other three [primary categories]” (γίνονται ἐκ τῆς συμπλοκῆς τῆς οὐσίας πρὸς τὰς λοιπὰς τρεῖς), i.e., with quantity, quality and relatum;<sup>318</sup> this yields the following three divisions:




Figure 4. Ammonius' Second Scheme: The Six Categories Which “Result from Combining Substance with the Other Three”

This approach assumes a fundamental divide between four primary and six derivative *summa genera* – and hence poses at least one obvious problem: Whereas the ten categories are generally taken to be simple terms which signify simple notions, the categories of where and when, doing and being affected, having and position could now, at least in a certain sense, be understood to be compound notions.

This becomes particularly obvious in John Philoponus' systematization of the ten categories which, following his teacher Ammonius, he outlines in the context of discussing *Cat.* 9: Rather than starting from the distinction between substance and accident (which Aristotle, without a doubt, held to be the supreme distinguishing criterion), John Philoponus first of all makes it clear that the ten *categories* fall into two groups: “the simple ones” (ἀπλᾶ), i.e., substance, quantity, quality and relatum, and those which “have [their] being in accordance with taking two together and combining the simple ones” (κατὰ συνδυασμὸν καὶ συμπλοκὴν τῶν ἀπλῶν τὸ εἶναι ἔχουσι).<sup>319</sup> This implies that, prior to divid-

318 Ammonius, *In Categorias*, p. 92, ll. 6–12 (my tr.).

319 John Philoponus, *In Categorias*, p. 163, ll. 4–5 (my tr.).

ing the categories according to their essential features, one may, first of all, divide them according to their conceptual simplicity and composition:




Figure 5. John Philoponus' First Scheme: Simple vs Compounded Categories

Brentano complains that this account gives rise to the idea that the four primary categories amount to “the only categories among the ten” (“die [...] einzigen Kategorien unter den zehn”). Since the six compounded categories lack a “proper unity” (“eigentliche Einheit”) and, as a consequence, fail to have a “proper being” (“eigentliches Sein”), this approach nourishes the conviction that substance, quantity, quality and relatum are “the only proper beings” (“die einzigen eigentlichen ὄντα”), that is to say, the only uncompounded beings. Hence, Brentano denounces this Ammonian-Philoponian approach as being founded upon a blatant “misunderstanding of Aristotle’s basic thought” (“Mißkennung des Aristotelischen Grundgedankens”).<sup>320</sup>

Whereas John Philoponus labels his first scheme as a classification of “categories” (κατηγορίαι), he subsequently outlines a second scheme which aims at providing a classification of “beings” (ὄντα). The first scheme can be read as elucidating the fundamental distinguishing criterion through which the second scheme is attained (see figure 6).

320 Franz Brentano, *Von der Mannigfachen Bedeutung des Seienden nach Aristoteles*, ed. 1862, pp. 179–180; ed. 2014, p. 161. English tr. by George, pp. 119–120 (modified). It should be noted that at the time Brentano composed his study, the Berlin editions of the *Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca* were not available yet; he received John Philoponus’ account of systematizing the ten categories through a scholion which he believed to have been authored by Ammonius.




Figure 6. John Philoponus' Second Scheme: The Division of Beings

John Philoponus' version of the Ammonian approach shares three basic features with the scheme outlined by his teacher: (1) At the highest level of dividing accidents, the criterion of relatedness and unrelatedness is applied; (2) non-relational accidents are further subdivided through the criterion of divisibility and indivisibility; (3) the six remaining categories are the result of a combination of the primary categories.

However, the specific manner in which Philoponus puts the third feature to practice marks, at the same time, a significant variation of the Ammonian approach: For the expression “κατὰ συμπλοκὴν δὲ τῆς οὐσίας πρὸς μίαν τούτων ἢ πρὸς ἑαυτὴν” (“according to a combination of substance with one of these or with itself”)<sup>321</sup> indicates that the other six categories are *either* the result of pair-

321 John Philoponus, *In Categoriais*, p. 163, ll. 6–7 (my tr.).



ing a substance with a quantity, a quality and a relatum *or* the result of combining a substance *with a substance*. While the categories of where and when, doing and being affected are still grouped in the same pairings as in Ammonius' commentary, the category of having is no longer classified along with the category of position as a combination of substance and relatum but is now treated as the combination of a substance with another substance: "whenever it is combined with itself, it brings about having" (αὐτῇ δὲ ἑαυτῇ συμπλεκόμενη ποιεῖ τὸ ἔχειν).<sup>322</sup> As a consequence, the Ammonian 2 x 3 scheme of classifying the non-primary categories is abandoned. Moreover, Ammonius' problematic identification of substance with 'subject' is replaced by an account which describes substance as something which "subsists *per se*" (καθ' ἑαυτὰ ὑφέστηκεν) and accident as something which "has its being in others" (ἐν ἑτέροις ἔχει τὸ εἶναι). Contrary to the juxtaposition of 'subject' and 'in a subject,' this is an encompassing description; and contrary to the juxtaposition of 'not in a subject' and 'in a subject,' this is an affirmative description. Even though John Philoponus presents his outline continuously (and not, as his teacher Ammonius had done, scattered over two different exegetical passages), his commentary still refrains from establishing a systematic connection between the upper level, i.e., the four primary categories, and the lower level, i.e., the six remaining categories: He does tell us that the six are generated from the four but he does not make it explicit whether – and if so, where – the six are to be grouped with regard to the first *dihairesis* of accident, i.e., relational vs non-relational.

Such an attempt can, however, be found one generation later in a commentary which has been attributed to two of Olympiodorus' Christian pupils (and hence to two of Ammonius' grand-disciples), namely David the Armenian and Elias of Alexandria.<sup>323</sup> As we shall see, the systematic integration effort which is

322 John Philoponus, *In Categories*, p. 164, l. 4 (my tr.). In the transmitted text things are a bit more complicated: First of all, it seems to introduce a departure from Ammonius' 2 x 3 scheme (p. 163, ll. 6–7); then it contains a passage which takes the 2 x 3 scheme for granted (which Busse deems to be an addition, see p. 163, apparatus, ll. 1–3) – and in the end it once again returns to the initial idea of combining substance with substance (p. 164, l. 4). In order to make the text consistent from a doctrinal point of view, Busse not only treats the conflicting passage as an unauthentic addition but deems it necessary to insert, once more, ἡ ἑαυτῇ at p. 163, l. 13 (cf. apparatus, l. 8: *inserui*).

323 See Elias [David], *In Porphyrii Isagogen et Aristotelis Categorias Commentaria*, ed. Adolf Busse (Berlin: Reimer, 1900), p. 159, ll. 6–24. While the Greek manuscript tradition attributes the work to David, Busse in his introduction to the *editio princeps* of the commentary favors Elias' authorship; see Elias [David], *In Categories*, pp. v–x. On the basis of some cautious considerations by Jean-Pierre Mahé, Ilsetraut Hadot stated quite confidently in *Der Neue Pauly* that the commentary "is most definitely a work of David of Armenia." See Jean-Pierre Mahé, "Appendice II: David l'Invincible dans la tradition arménienne," in Simplicius, *Commentaire sur les Catégories*, fasc. 1, ed. Ilsetraut Hadot (Leiden:

made in this commentary will turn out to be of importance with regard to the subsequent Arabic tradition.




Figure 7. David's/Elias' Scheme: An Elaboration of Olympiodorus' Version of the Ammonian Scheme

Brill, 1990), p. 196; and Ilsetraut Hadot, "Elias, neuplaton. Philosoph, 6. Jh.," in *Der Neue Pauly*, vol. 3, ed. Hubert Cancik and Helmuth Schneider (Stuttgart: Metzler, 1997), p. 991; the English version (*Brill's New Pauly*) is available at <http://referenceworks.brillonline.com/entries/brill-s-new-pauly/elias-e329330#e329350> (in the English version, the entry is attributed to Pierre Hadot). However, the attribution to David has been forcefully challenged by Richard Goulet in his entry on "Élias" in the *Dictionnaire des philosophes antiques*, vol. 3, ed. Richard Goulet (Paris: CNRS, 2000), pp. 57–66, esp. pp. 60–65. Marwan Rashed, who supports the attribution to Elias, has presented some strong arguments for identifying David with the mysterious 'Ilyns whom the Arabic tradition knows as one of the commentators of the *Categories*. He takes 'Ilyns to refer to "ὁ Ἕλληνας." See his "Les marginalia d'Aréthas, Ibn al-Ṭayyib et les dernières gloses alexandrines à l'*Organon*," in *Scientia in Margine: Études sur les Marginalia dans les manuscrits scientifiques du Moyen Âge à la Renaissance*, ed. Danielle Jacquart and Charles Burnett (Geneva: Librairie Droz, 2005), pp. 57–73, esp. pp. 65 and 68.

Since their common teacher Olympiodorus – in contrast to Ammonius and John Philoponus – had already integrated a similar scheme into his remarks on *Cat.* 4,<sup>324</sup> the novelty of David’s or Elias’ outline does not primarily lie in the fact that it is presented in the context of commenting on *Cat.* 4 (rather than *Cat.* 8/9). In connection with that relocation, both Olympiodorus and David/Elias retain Aristotle’s terminological convention of characterizing substance as ‘not in a subject’ and accident as ‘in a subject.’ Whereas Olympiodorus in the first *dihairesis* of accident contrasts two accidents which are “*per se*” (καθ’ αὐτό), namely quantity and quality, with the seven remaining accidents which are “in a relationship” (ἐν σχέσει),<sup>325</sup> in David’s/Elias’ commentary the relational accidents are described *ex negativo* as being “not *per se*” (οὐ καθ’ ἑαυτό); as a result, the criterion of relatedness and unrelatedness has been transformed to a distinction between accidents which are *per se* and accidents which are not *per se*.

More importantly, in David’s/Elias’ commentary the six categories which are derived from the four primary categories are explicitly subsumed under the same criterion as the category of relatum: Whereas the relatum is characterized as an accident which, in addition to being not *per se*, is a “mere relationship” (σχέσις μόνη), the six remaining categories are characterized as non-*per se* accidents which are “conceptualized according to a relation to other things” (κατὰ σχέσιν ἄλλων νοεῖται).<sup>326</sup> The distinction between whether an accident is conceptualized as a pure relation or as a relation between a substance and another non-substance category results in a *dihairesis* of the non-*per se* accidents. Due to the fact that there are three primary non-substance categories to which any given substance could be related, this is followed by a triadic scheme of accidents which are neither *per se* nor pure relations.

Another particular feature of David’s/Elias’ systematization can be detected in its programmatic beginning: Whereas Aristotle is said to have undertaken a “bare enumeration” (ψιλὴ ἀπαρίθμησις) of the categories making known “that they are ten” (ὅτι δέκα) without explaining “why they are ten” (διὰ τί δέκα), the commentator sets for himself the task “to put forth the reason why they are ten” (τὴν αἰτίαν προσθῶμεν διὰ τί δέκα).<sup>327</sup> Thus, in his outline of the scheme of categories the commentator appears to be confident to address not only the first scientific question, i.e., “the that” (τὸ ὅτι), but also the second one, i.e., “the why” (τὸ διότι).<sup>328</sup> In comparison to this rather ambitious approach, the assessment

324 Olympiodorus, *Prolegomena et In Categorias Commentarium*, ed. Adolf Busse (Berlin: Reimer, 1902), p. 54, ll. 3–31.

325 Olympiodorus, *In Categorias*, p. 54, ll. 7.

326 Elias [David], *In Categorias*, p. 159, l. 15 (my tr.).

327 Elias [David], *In Categorias*, p. 159, ll. 6–9 (my tr.).

328 Cf. Aristotle, *Analytica Posteriora* B 1, 89b24.

that had previously been given by David's/Elias' teacher Olympiodorus had been significantly more modest: "We said *that* they are ten, as we have shown by such and such a division" (φαμὲν ὅτι δέκα, ὡς δηλώσομεν ἔκ τινος διαρρέσεως τοιαύτης);<sup>329</sup> that is to say, the division can only establish *that* there are ten categories but does not provide us with a scientifically sound "reason" (αἰτία) for *why* there are ten categories.

In comparison to John Philoponus' version, it should be noted that David's/Elias' outline refrains from explicitly labelling substance, quantity, quality and relatum as 'simple' and those accidents which are generated from a combination of the previous four categories as 'composite.' However, in the ensuing outline of some ἀπορίαι which need to be addressed in connection with this approach of dividing the categories, we see David/Elias discuss the following question:

In what way do we say that these ten categories are simple (ἀπλᾶι) if only the four are simple, whereas the six are composite (σύνθετοι)? We call them 'composite' because for us – as beginners – they appear to be composite (ἐμφορασιν ἡμῖν συνθέσεως εἰσάγουσιν), although they are simple.<sup>330</sup>

The characteristic feature of the Ammonian approach lies precisely in the idea that there are, on the one hand, four primary categories which themselves are not the result of a combination of other *summa genera* and which therefore can be called 'simple'; and that there are, on the other hand, six secondary categories which – on a conceptual level – are 'compounded' from the previous ones. Paul Thom has recently contrasted al-Kindī's approach of drawing a distinction between 'simple' and 'composite' accidents with Olympiodorus' approach of classifying accidents as 'being *per se*' and 'being in relation.'<sup>331</sup> It is certainly accurate to observe that for al-Kindī the criterion of simplicity fulfills the same function as the criterion of 'being *per se*' or 'being unrelated' for Olympiodorus, namely to separate quantity and quality from the other accidental categories. But this does not mean that the criterion of simplicity and composition is specific to al-Kindī's schematization of the categories. Rather, as we have seen, the

329 Olympiodorus, *In Categorias*, p. 54, ll. 4–5 (my tr.).

330 Elias [David], *In Categorias*, p. 159, ll. 20–24 (my tr.).

331 See Paul Thom, "The Division of the Categories According to Avicenna," p. 33. For al-Kindī's division of the categories, see "Risālat al-Kindī fī kammiyyat kutub Aristūṭālīs wa-mā yuḥtaḡu ilayhi fī taḥṣīl al-falsafa," in *Rasā'il al-Kindī al-falsafiyya*, ed. Muḥammad 'Abd-al-Hādī Abū Rīda (Cairo: Dār al-fikr al-'arabī, 1950 [1369 AH]), p. 365, l. 4 – p. 366, l. 9 and p. 370, l. 11 – p. 372, l. 1.; cf. the annotated English tr. by Peter Adamson and Peter Pormann, "On the Quantity of Aristotle's Books" in *The Philosophical Works of al-Kindī* (Oxford: University Press, 2012), pp. 282–283 and p. 285 (Thom did not consult Adamson's and Pormann's translation but refers to an unpublished paper by Dimitri Gutas).

different versions of the Ammonian approach are all based on the underlying assumption that there are four ‘simple’ and six ‘composite’ categories. In Brentano’s assessment, David’s/Elias’ subsequent attempt to justify the composition of the six secondary categories as a mere ἔμφασις συνθέσεως, i.e., a mere “appearance of synthesis,”<sup>332</sup> does not provide a sufficient solution to the problem that the Ammonian approach from the very outset explains six of the ten simple things as the result of composition.

Among the commentaries of the Ammonian school, Simplicius’ schematization of the ten categories strikingly differs from the versions presented by his colleagues.<sup>333</sup> He shares with the Ammonian approach the idea that, whereas certain accidental properties are “relational” (κατὰ σχέσιν), quality and quantity are both to be classified as “non-relational” (ἄσχετοί). Moreover, he also treats doing and being affected, position and having, and where and when as three pairs which can each be subsumed under a joint criterion. However, from the very outset the differences are much greater than the commonalities: Not only is the distinction between primary simple and secondary composite categories abandoned but the nine accidental categories are no longer grouped under a common description of accident (such as ‘in a subject’ or ‘in other things’). Instead, at the highest level of Simplicius’ scheme, “beings” (ὄντα) are divided into a group of “subsistences and potencies” (ὑπάρξεις καὶ δυνάμεις) and a group of “activities” (ἐνέργεια). Whereas the latter immediately yields one pair of accidental categories, namely doing and being affected, the former encompasses both substance and the seven remaining accidental categories which are introduced as those which “subsist in others” (ἐν ἄλλοις ὑφεισθήκασιν). By breaking up Ammonius’ triadic schematization of the six composite categories, Simplicius manages to operate solely with dichotomous criteria and thus achieves a completely dihairetic scheme of the ten categories. In addition to this methodological rigor, however, Simplicius’ account stands out for its reluctance towards the idea that the list of categories could and should be defended as a compelling Aristotelian doctrine: In reply to those who criticize the list as insufficient, Simplicius remarks that “introductory treatises” (εἰσαγωγικὰς πραγματείας), such as the *Categories*, need not be “disposed towards exactness” (πρὸς ἀκρίβειαν διακειμένως); in the same context we also see him uphold the view that an attack of the “division or enumeration” (διαίρεσις ἢ ἀπαρίθμησις) of the categories ultimately does not target Aristotle but rather “the Pythagoreans and

332 Franz Brentano, *Von der Mannigfachen Bedeutung des Seienden nach Aristoteles*, ed. 1862, p. 180; ed. 2014, p. 162; English tr. by George, p. 119.

333 Simplicius, *In Categorias*, p. 67, l. 26 – p. 68, l. 16. Cf. the English tr. by Chase, pp. 82–83. For a schematic outline, see Rainer Thiel, *Aristoteles’ Kategorienschrift in ihrer antiken Kommentierung*, p. 174.

Archytas, who had made the division into ten genera prior to Aristotle” (πρὸς τοὺς Πυθαγορείους καὶ Ἀρχύταν [...] ὃς πρὸ τοῦ Ἀριστοτέλους τὴν εἰς δέκα γένη διαίρεσιν ἐποίησατο).<sup>334</sup> Moreover, when he presents his own attempt at systematizing the list of categories he introduces it quite cautiously: “If, however, anyone desires to hear an inclusive division, which includes these ten genera, *perhaps* it would run like this” (εἰ δέ τις ἐπιθυμεῖ περιληπτικὴν τινα διαίρεσιν ἀκοῦσαι τὰ δέκα γένη ταῦτα περιλαμβάνουσαν, τάχα ἂν εἴη τοιαύτη);<sup>335</sup> and he concludes it by admitting (albeit a bit polemically) that for those who demand exactness his “encouragement” (παραμυθία) to accept the list of categories will certainly be defective.<sup>336</sup> Even though Simplicius’ very specific approach to systematizing the *summa genera* largely remained a solitary phenomenon, a reverberation of his strictly dihairetic method and of his reluctant attitude towards the project of justifying the list of categories may be detected in one of Ibn Sīnā’s outlines of the scheme of categories, as will be discussed shortly.<sup>337</sup>

Besides the various attempts at justifying the list of categories made by commentators of the Ammonian school, the markedly different Themistian approach of dividing accidents deserves some particular attention with regard to subsequent Arabic developments. The *Fihrist* not only mentions Themistius as the author of a commentary on the *Categories*<sup>338</sup> but also ascribes a *Kitāb Qāṭiḡūriyās ‘alā ra’y Tāmistiyyūs*, i.e., a “book of the *Categories* according to Themistius’ view,” to Ḥunayn b. Ishāq.<sup>339</sup> While in Greek or Arabic no complete Themistian account of the *Categories* has been preserved, in Latin a Themistian paraphrase with the title *Categoriae decem* has come down to us. This concise textbook, which traditionally had been attributed to Saint Augustine,<sup>340</sup> groups the nine accidental categories into three triads. While substance (*usia*) is only very briefly characterized as “that which bears the other nine” (*quae novem*

334 Simplicius, *In Categoriais*, p. 67, ll. 23–25. English tr. by Chase, p. 82. For Ps.-Archytas’ *Book on the Categories*, cf. above, p. 27, note 72.

335 Simplicius, *In Categoriais*, p. 67, ll. 26–27. English tr. by Chase, p. 82 (emphasis added).

336 Simplicius, *In Categoriais*, p. 68, ll. 13–16. English tr. by Chase, p. 83.

337 See below, pp. 163–167.

338 Ibn an-Nadīm, *K. al-Fihrist*, ed. Reza Taḡaddod (Teheran: Markaz-e Našr-e Dānešgāhī, 1971 [1350 SH]), p. 309, l. 5. For a complete translation of the entry on the *Categories*, see below, Appendix 3.

339 Ibn an-Nadīm, *K. al-Fihrist*, ed. Taḡaddod, p. 353, l. 9 (in the entry on Ḥunayn b. Ishāq). For a concise overview of the Arabic reception of Themistius, see Elisa Coda, “Themistius, Arabic,” in *Encyclopedia of Medieval Philosophy: Philosophy between 500 and 1500*, vol. 2, ed. Henrik Lagerlund (Dordrecht: Springer, 2011), pp. 1260–1266.

340 For the disputed question of who might have authored the treatise, see Georg Pfligersdorffer, “Zur Frage nach dem Verfasser der pseudoaugustinischen *Categoriae Decem*,” *Wiener Studien: Zeitschrift für Klassische Philologie* 65 (1950/51): pp. 131–137.

*caeteras sustinet*), the accidents are distinguished by the criterion of their intrinsicity or extrinsicity in relation to substance: (1) “quality” (*qualitas*), “quantity” (*quantitas*), and “position” (*iacere*) are described as being “in the substance itself” (*in ipsa usia*); (2) “where” (*ubi*), “when” (*quando*), and “having” (*habere*) as being “outside of substance” (*extra usian*); (3) and “relatum” (*ad aliquid*), “doing” (*facere*), and “being affected” (*pati*) as being “both inside and outside of substance” (*intra et extra usian*).<sup>341</sup>




Figure 8. The Themistian Division of the Categories  
(as Presented in Ps.-Augustine, *Categoriae decem*)

The short outline of the *Categoriae decem* gives no further explanation of this triadic scheme; nor does it claim to provide a justification of *that* or of *why* there are ten categories. Rather, it merely offers a sketch of the basic parameters by which the Themistian tradition grouped the nine accidental categories. A closer look at the Arabic reception of the Themistian approach will shed some light on at least one of its underlying assumptions.

<sup>341</sup> Ps.-Augustine, *Categoriae decem (Anonymi Paraphrasis Themistiana)*, in *Aristoteles Latinus* I,1-5, ed. Lorenzo Minio-Paluello (Bruges – Paris: Desclée de Brouwer, 1961), pp. 144–145 [51–54].

### 3.2. Ibn Sīnā's Report of a "Well-Known Division" (*qisma mašhūra*)

#### 3.2.1. Outline of the Division Presented in *K. aš-Šifā', al-Mantiq, al-Maqūlāt, II,5*

In the *K. al-Maqūlāt* of the *Muḥtaṣar al-awsaṭ fī l-mantiq* Ibn Sīnā purposefully refrains from "establishing" (*itbāt*) the claim that the ten categories "cannot be less or more in number." He deems such an endeavor to be "impossible" (*mimmā lā yumkinu*) – and hence disapproves of the attempts made by his predecessors. To his mind, any philosophical justification of Aristotle's list of categories amounts merely to a "forced effort" (*takalluf*) which does not yield "anything necessary" (*šay'an darūriyyan*).<sup>342</sup>

Nonetheless, in the *K. al-Maqūlāt* of the *Šifā'* Ibn Sīnā dedicates an entire chapter to the project of providing a "proper account" (*ḥaqq al-wafā'*) of whatever method of vindicating the number of the categories has reached him. Before engaging with a specific schematization of the categories, he first of all wants to give a general outline of "three approaches" (*anḥā' talāṭa*) which are needed for the sake of a successful "validation" (*taṣḥīḥ*) of Aristotle's list of categories. In what follows, Ibn Sīnā discusses only two questions that need to be answered – and leaves open the possibility that the second requirement might be met in two different ways; that is to say, while the first approach is indispensable, the second and third approaches could be read as alternatives (in commenting on this passage, al-Ḥillī somehow seems to have lost track and numbers only two of the announced three approaches<sup>343</sup>).

(1) First of all, it has to be established that every category is predicated of everything that falls under it only by means of a "genus-predication" (*qawl al-ğins*), which requires the exclusion of the following three modes of predication: (i) "coincidence in name" (*al-ittifāq fī l-ism*), that is, pure homonymy; (ii) a gradation *per prius et posterius*, which is the most common instance of focal homonymy, i.e., *taškik*; (iii) and the non-homonymous, yet at the same time non-constitutive, "manner in which concomitants are predicated" (*qawl al-lawāzim*),<sup>344</sup> that is to say, none of the ten categories may be predicated in the same manner in which 'accident' is predicated of the nine accidental categories. If, for example, a close scrutiny should yield the result that the essences of "af-

342 Ibn Sīnā, *al-Muḥtaṣar al-awsaṭ fī l-mantiq, al-Maqūlāt*, § 29, p. 331, ll. 6–7.

343 See al-'Allāma al-Ḥillī, *K. Kašf al-ḥafā' min K. aš-Šifā'*, MS Dublin Chester Beatty 5151, fol. 47b, ll. 9–10 and fol. 48a, ll. 17–18 [= headline to § 2 and § 4].

344 On the predication of concomitants, see below, pp. 232–234.



fective quality and affections” (*kayfiyya inḥi‘āliyya wa-inḥi‘ālāt*) and of “possessions and conditions” (*al-malakāt wa-l-ḥalāt*) ultimately do not share any essential feature but are only concomitantly said to be qualities, these two species would become *summa genera* in their own right – and hence the number of categories would increase. Since, however, none of the “predecessors” (*mimman salafa*) has undertaken such a “thorough investigation of the theory at hand” (*tadqīq an-naẓar*), the question of whether the ten *summa genera* are indeed predicated of all of their alleged species by way of a synonymy, essential and constitutive predication cannot be deemed to be settled.<sup>345</sup>

(2) According to the second approach, one needs to establish that there is no genus outside of the ten categories. This is to be achieved by way of dividing ‘the existent’ in such a manner that Aristotle’s tenfold scheme is the only possible result. What Ibn Sīnā has in mind here is a *dihairesis* in the strict sense, that is, a series of dichotomous divisions with mutually exclusive criteria at all levels. However, Ibn Sīnā complains that, even though such a manner of proceeding had indeed been on some of his predecessors’ agenda, this is yet another area in which he did not receive “anything true” (*ṣay’un ḥaqīqiyyun*) from them.<sup>346</sup>

(3) Thirdly, Ibn Sīnā suggests that the comprehensive and compelling nature of the list of categories might also be shown by a non-dihairetic approach – and now he attests that he has received at least one such attempt made by previous scholars.

Since this prompts him to turn to a discussion of a specific transmitted approach of systematizing the ten categories, we can assume that to his mind the scheme under consideration fails to be a proper *dihairesis*. Nonetheless, he labels it the “well-known division” (*al-qisma al-mašhūra*), thus reflecting the looser sense of “division” which is widespread in the commentary tradition. As Paul Thom has already observed,<sup>347</sup> the “well-known division” outlined by Ibn Sīnā is clearly related to the Themistian approach preserved in the *Categoriae decem*: By operating with the criterion of whether an accident is intrinsic or extrinsic in relation to a substance, the nine accidental categories are grouped into the same three triads. However, the criteria in the version presented by Ibn Sīnā are much more nuanced than in the extremely brief account of the *Categoriae decem*. While the formula *et intra et extra* (“both intrinsic and extrinsic”) could be taken to amount to sheer absurdity or at least to create a conceptual problem, the version given in the *Šifā’* characterizes the three accidents pertaining to the third triad as follows: Each of them “is only fully realized (*innamā yatimmu*) between it,” i.e., the subject, “and something extrinsic” (*ṣay’ min ḥāriġ*). In contrast to the

345 Ibn Sīnā, *K. aš-Šifā’*, *al-Mantiq, al-Maqūlāt*, II,5, p. 82, l. 7 – p. 83, l. 3 [= §§ 2–3 (3.B.b)].

346 Ibn Sīnā, *K. aš-Šifā’*, *al-Mantiq, al-Maqūlāt*, II,5, p. 83, ll. 4–6 [= § 4 (3.B.b)].

347 Paul Thom, “The Division of the Categories According to Avicenna,” p. 36.

members of the first triad, it is not a property which is “fixed in its subject” (*mustaqirran fī mawḍū‘ihī*) and which occurs to it without there being any extrinsic cause; and in contrast to the members of the second triad, “it is not solely due to something extrinsic” (*laysa min ḥāriḡin faqat*); that is to say, accidents of the third triad require the subject to possess a certain intrinsic disposition so that they can be realized as the result of the interplay between that intrinsic disposition and an extrinsic cause.<sup>348</sup> Conceptualized in this way, the criterion posited for the third triad does not appear to be problematic at all.




Figure 9. Ibn Sinā’s Outline of the “Well-Known Division”

Moreover, while the *Categoriae decem* simply sketches a neat grouping of the nine accidental categories, without addressing the problem of how the list of ten categories could be justified, the account presented in the *Šifā’* explicitly aims at establishing the soundness of Aristotle’s scheme of categories. By introducing the outline with *qāla ba‘ḍuhum*, Ibn Sinā makes it clear that he quotes or reports a doctrine held by another scholar – and this anonymous predecessor describes his agenda as follows: “Substance is, without a doubt, one of the categories; and as soon as we have divided (*qasamnā*) the nine which are accidents into their nine-ness (*ilā tis‘iyyatihā*), the categories have been completely attained as ten

348 Ibn Sinā, *K. aš-Šifā’, al-Manṭiq, al-Maqūlāt*, II,5, p. 83, ll. 13–18 [= § 8 (3.B.b)].

(*tammāt al-maqūlāt ‘ašaratan*).<sup>349</sup> What is more, the thinker quoted by Ibn Sīnā does not only embed the outline of the 3 x 3 division of accidents into an effort to defend the Aristotelian scheme of categories but also provides a self-reflexive justification of the method he uses. As can be seen, the remarks which are meant to explain the well-established philosophical “custom” (*‘āda*) of resorting to a triadic scheme are closely related to the first two chapters of Aristotle’s *De Caelo*:

Ibn Sīnā’s quote of justifications for the usage of a triadic scheme <sup>350</sup>	Corresponding passages from Aristotle’s <i>De Caelo</i> A, 1–2 <sup>351</sup>	
“Threeness is a perfect number ( <i>‘adad tāmm</i> ); therefore, ‘all’ ( <i>kull</i> ) and ‘total’ ( <i>ḡamī</i> ) is only said of ‘three’ ( <i>lā yuqālu ... illā li-t-ṭalāta</i> ).”	“Of two things, or men, we say ‘both’ (ἄμφω), but not ‘all’ (πάντας): the first time that term [i.e., ‘all’] is applied is when there are three things.”	268a 16–19
“The praises [of God or of several deities] ( <i>at-tasābih</i> ) are threefold ( <i>mutallāta</i> ).”	“[...] having taken it [i.e., the number three] from nature as one of her laws (ὡσπερ νόμους ἐκείνης), we make further use of this number in the worship of the Gods (πρὸς τὰς ἀγιστείας χρώμεθα τῶν θεῶν).”	268a 13–15
“The movements ( <i>ḥarakāt</i> ) are three.”	“[...] all movement that is in place, all locomotion, as we term it, is either straight or circular or a combination of these two which are the only simple movements. [...] as body found its completion in three [dimensions] (ἀπετελέσθη ἐν τρισὶ), so its movement completes itself in three [forms].”	268b 17–18; 25–26
“The dimensions ( <i>aqtār</i> ) are three.”	“A magnitude if divisible one way is a line, if two ways a surface, and if three a body. Beyond these there is no other magnitude (οὐκ ἔστιν ἄλλο μέγεθος), because the three [dimensions] are all (διὰ τὸ τὰ τρία πάντα εἶναι); and [being divisible] in three ways is [like being divisible] in all ways.”	268a 7–10

349 Ibn Sīnā, *K. aš-Šifā’, al-Mantiq, al-Maqūlāt*, II,5, p. 83, ll. 11–12 [= § 7 (3.B.b)].

350 Ibn Sīnā, *K. aš-Šifā’, al-Mantiq, al-Maqūlāt*, II,5, p. 83, l. 1 – p. 84, l. 3 [= § 9 (3.B.b)].

351 English tr. by John L. Stocks (rev. Ox. tr.), vol. 1, p. 447 (significantly modified).

Thus, Ibn Sīnā's report clearly attests that the Themistian version available to him vindicated the approach of grouping the nine accidental categories into three triads with reference to various virtues and peculiarities of the number three which Aristotle, partially in summarizing the Pythagoreans' doctrines, discusses at the beginning of *De Caelo*.

### 3.2.2. An Arabic Source for the Themistian Approach of Systematizing the Scheme of Categories: The *Tafsīr ma'ānī Aristūṭālis fī K. al-Maqūlāt*

As we will see shortly, Ibn Sīnā was well aware of the differing approach by which the Ammonian commentary tradition divided and justified Aristotle's ten categories. Nonetheless, in the *Maqūlāt* of the *Šifā'* he singled out only the Themistian approach and labelled it "the well-known division." Thus, we can assume that the Themistian account of dividing the categories was not just vaguely known to the Arabic tradition but must have circulated quite prominently. Yet, apart from the outline given by Ibn Sīnā in *Maqūlāt* II,5 no other Arabic account of the Themistian division has hitherto been identified.

Already fifty years ago, Mubahat Türker had published a very short quote from an Arabic version of the Themistian paraphrase of the *Categories*. However, since the fragmentary and faulty text which she provided suddenly broke off in the middle of a sentence before the actual division of the categories starts,<sup>352</sup> the significance of the text could not be recognized. The quote forms an important part of the *Tafsīr ma'ānī Aristūṭālis fī K. al-Maqūlāt*, i.e., the paraphrastic commentary by a certain al-Wāhibī who quite likely drew on a work that is directly related to one of Ibn Sīnā's adversaries, i.e., Abū l-Qāsim al-Kirmānī (late 4<sup>th</sup>/10<sup>th</sup> – early 5<sup>th</sup>/11<sup>th</sup> centuries).<sup>353</sup> Since this unedited text contains a Themistian account which is significantly more elaborate than the very short version given in the Latin *Categoriae decem* and since it may even be regarded as a direct Arabic quote from the lost Themistian *Paraphrase of the Categories*, in

352 The fragment 'edited' by Mubahat Türker begins with *wa-qad awrada Tāmīṣṭiyūs* and ends rather abruptly in the middle of a sentence with *innamā yuqālu lahū 'araḍun bi-ḥasabi ...* (fol. 93b, l. 18 – fol. 94, l. 1; i.e., the passage between the two asterisks in my transcription of the Arabic text); the short text provided by Türker contains at least one grave misreading (*al-mawḡūdāt az-zāhir* [sic] *li-l-ḡins* [sic] instead of *al-mawḡūdāt az-zāhira li-l-ḥiss*). See Mubahat Türker, "El-‘Āmiri ve Katagoriler'in şehleriyle ilgili parçalar," p. 107.

353 Cf. above, pp. 94–95.

what follows I will present a longer passage from the commentary on *Cat. 4* in Arabic with a facing English translation.<sup>354</sup>

[§ 1] Whoever disagrees with Aristotle on this [i.e., on the number of the categories] proceeds in one of the following ways:

[1] He either claims that the number of the categories is smaller than this [i.e., than ten]; as soon as it has become clear to him that there is a greater number [of categories] than he claimed, his account has become untenable.

[2] Or he claims that there are more than this; as soon as it has become clear to him that whatever he claims [to be an additional category] is included in [one of] these [ten categories], his account has become untenable.

[3] Or he replaces something by something else. [3a] If he does so only with respect to the expression [by which one labels any of the categories], just like 'property' (*qunya*) and 'having' (*lahū*), and 'posture' (*nuṣba*) and 'position' (*waḍ*), there is nothing to debate about! [3b] And if he does so with respect to the meaning, just like motion as a replacement for doing and being affected, it becomes clear to him that 'motion' is a homonymous expression and that it does not function as a *sumum genus*.

[§ 2] For the sake of verifying this [scheme of categories] through a division Themistius had presented something by which Aristotle's account is explicated.

فأما جميع من خالف أرسطو طالس في ذلك فهو

(١) إما أن يدعى أن عدد المقولات أقل من هذه، فإذا تبين له زيادة على ما يدعيه فقد بطل قوله.

(٢) وإما أن يدعى أنها أكثر منها، فإذا به تبين له أن الذي يدعيه داخل في هذه فقد بطل أيضاً قوله.

(٣) وإما أن يدل شيئاً بشيء. فإن كان من جهة العبارة فقط، كالقنية وله والنسبة والوضع، فلا تنازع. وإن كان من جهة المعنى، كالحركة بدل يفعل ويفعل، فيتبين له أن الحركة من المتفقة اسماؤها ولا تكون جنساً عالياً.

\*وقد أورد تامسطيوس على تحقيق ذلك من طريق القسمة ما يتضح به قول أرسطو طالس.

354 The Arabic text is based on MS Istanbul Ayasofya 2483, fol. 93b, l. 12 – fol. 94a, l. 14.

[§ 3] He [i.e., Themistius] said:

فقال:

“The first among those existents which are apparent to sense-perception is the self-subsistent nature – and this is the substance. Moreover, it is also apparent by way of sense-perception that there is a nature which is opposed to this one [i.e., to substance] and whose subsistence comes about through it [i.e., through substance] – and this is the accident. Since one calls this [nature] accident only on account of the relation [in which it stands to substance] and since its [respective] relation [to a substance] differs, our saying ‘accident’ is a homonymous expression; and what can be conceptualized from it are precisely three aspects:

”أول الموجودات الظاهرة للحس هي الطبيعة القائمة بذاتها وهي الجوهر. وظاهر من طريق الحس أيضاً أن هاهنا طبيعة مقابلة لهذه قوامها بها وهي العرض. ولأتمها إنما يقال لها عرض بحسب\* الإضافة، وإضافتها مختلفة، فقد صار قولنا عرض من المتفقّة اسماؤها، والذي يمكن أن يتصور من ذلك ثلاثة أوجه لا غير:

[§ 4] [1] The first one: Its connection to substance is due to itself without needing for it [i.e., for this connection] anything extrinsic; rather, its beginning and perfection are in it. These are three things: The quantum, the quale, <and the position>; and there is no fourth one.

(١) أحدها أن يكون تعلّقها بالجوهر من ذات نفسه لا يحتاج فيه إلى شيء من خارج، لكن بدوّها وكمالها فيه. وهذه ثلاثة أشياء: الكمّ والكيف <الوضع> لا رابع لها.

[§ 5] [2] The second one: Its specificity in being connected to its subject lies in the fact that it has an extrinsic principle through which its beginning, generation, and perfection come about in the essence of the substance. These are also three things: Where, when, <and having>; and there is no fourth one.

(٢) والثاني أن تكون خاصيتها في تعلّقها بالموضوع له بأن يكون لها مبدأ من خارج يكون منه بدوّها ونشوءها وتماها في ذات الجوهر. وهذه أيضاً ثلاثة: أين ومتى <وله> ولا رابع لها.

[§ 6] [3] The third one is intermediate between these two: It is neither possible to say that it is in the substance only on account of itself nor that its principle and generation are only due to something extrinsic; rather, both states of affairs are simultaneously present. These are also three: The relatum, doing, and being affected; and there is no fourth one. Each of these three has a certain share of being connected [to a subject] on account of something which is in it [itself] and [a

(٣) والثالث متوسط بين هذين لا يمكن أن يقال هو في الجوهر من ذات نفسه فقط، ولا أن مبدأه ونشوءه من شيء من خارج فقط، لكن يظهر فيه الأمران جميعاً. وهو أيضاً ثلاثة: المضاف ويفعل ويفعل لا رابع لها. ولكل واحد من هذه الثلاثة قسط في تعلّقه بما هو فيه وبآخر خارج عنه في بدوّه وكماله.

certain share of being connected to a subject] on account of some other thing which is extrinsic to it in its beginning and its perfection.

[§ 7] Hence, the states of substance are subsumed under three triads in accordance with the fact that to them pertains some faculty which generally applies to the principles of things, as Aristotle had explained in *De Caelo et Mundo*.<sup>355</sup>

فانحصرت أحوال الجوهر في ثلاث ثلاثيات  
بحسب ما لها من القوة الشائعة<sup>356</sup> في مبادئ  
الأمر، كما بيته أرسطوطالس في كتاب السماء  
والعالم.

In the paragraph before the long quote attributed to Themistius (§ 1) al-Wāhibī makes it clear that all three kinds of arguments which have been raised against the comprehensiveness and definiteness of Aristotle's list of categories – namely, that there are more, less or other categories – can be refuted. Thus, the context in which he embeds the Themistian approach of dividing the categories is the project of providing a “verification” (*taḥqīq*) of the scheme of ten *summa genera* (§ 2). The combination of *wa-qad awrada Tāmīṣṭiyūs* (§ 2) and *fa-qāla* (§ 3) indicates that al-Wāhibī deems the following account to be a direct quote; but since it is quite likely that he himself merely relies on a commentary by Abū l-Qāsim, namely the *Ṣafw aš-šarḥ li-Īsāgūgī wa-Qāṭiḡūriyās*, we need not expect him to have had immediate access to a full Arabic version of the Themistian paraphrase of the *Categories*.

Contrary to the division of the nine accidental categories outlined in the Latin *Categoriae decem*, the division of the ten categories in al-Wāhibī's Themistian quote takes “sense-perception” as its starting point (§ 3): Substance is introduced as the first existent “apparent to sense-perception” (*aḏ-ẓāhira li-l-ḥiss*) and, at the same time, as “the self-subsistent nature” (*aṭ-ṭabī'a al-qā'ima bi-dātihā*). Likewise, the existence of accident as that which is “opposed to” and which “subsists through” substance is also introduced by reference to “sense-perception.” Thus, the Themistian quote makes it clear that the list of categories concerns only the realm of *sensibilia*. By characterizing accident as a “homonymous expression” (*mina l-muttafiqa asmā'uhā*), the possibility that accident might be thought to be a genus is excluded right away. At the same time, the fact that there is not one definition of accident paves the way to the outline of

355 Cf. Aristotle, *De Caelo* A, 1–2.

356 The scribe of MS Ayasofya 2483 (whose manner of punctuation is generally rather sloppy and inconsistent) writes السائعة (i.e., “[the power/potency which is] permitted in ...”); but not only in terms of content but primarily in terms of syntax السائعة is the better reading.

three different conceptualizations of accident: (1) Firstly, those accidents which, for the sake of occurring to a given substance, are not in need of “anything extrinsic” (*šay’ min ḥāriġ*) to the substance but whose “beginning (*bad’*) and perfection (*kamāl*)” are entirely contained in it (§ 4); (2) secondly, those accidents whose “beginning, generation, and perfection” in a substance only come about through an “extrinsic principle” (*mabda’ min ḥāriġ*) (§ 5); and thirdly, an “intermediate” (*mutawassiṭ*) group of accidents whose generation in a substance is neither fully due to “itself” nor to “something extrinsic” but which comes about through a collaboration of intrinsic and extrinsic factors (§ 6). Just like Ibn Sīnā’s outline of the “well-known division,” the Themistian quote given by al-Wāhibī refrains from using for this third group the problematic characterization of ‘being both intrinsic and extrinsic.’

Finally, the last paragraph (§ 7) establishes an important link between the Themistian account available to Ibn Sīnā and the Themistian account available to al-Wāhibī. As we have seen, Ibn Sīnā quotes several advantages of the number three which can all be traced to the first two chapters of Aristotle’s *De Caelo*. Al-Wāhibī’s version, in turn, claims that the approach of subsuming the nine accidents under three triads can be justified with regard to the fact that a triad possesses a “faculty which generally applies to the principles of things” – and he makes it explicit that this idea is derived from Aristotle’s *De Caelo* (that is, the *K. as-Samā’ wa-l-‘ālam*). As we have seen above, any attempt at providing a rationale for the 3 x 3 approach is entirely missing from the Latin *Categoriae decem*.

### 3.2.3. Ibn Sīnā’s Revision of the “Well-Known Division”

The clear-cut parallelism between Ibn Sīnā’s outline of the “well-known division” and the quote given by al-Wāhibī indicates that Ibn Sīnā reported the Themistian account rather faithfully and did not simply prop up a straw man. But contrary to al-Wāhibī he finds the Themistian division of the categories quite unsatisfactory: As a mere “approximation” (*taqrīb*) it fails to be even “close” (*qarīb*) to an adequate justification of the list of categories.<sup>357</sup> Yet, as Ibn Sīnā remarks later on, even though one could indeed come up with a significantly improved division which would be “closer” (*aqrab*) to the truth, as long as neither attempt will amount to “the truth itself” (*al-ḥaqq nafsuḥū*) they will both remain “remote” (*ba‘īdāni*) from the truth.<sup>358</sup> In spite of this skeptical stance, Ibn

357 Ibn Sīnā, *K. aš-Šifā’*, *al-Manṭiq*, *al-Maqūlāt*, II,5, p. 84, l. 4 [= § 10 (3.B.b)].

358 Ibn Sīnā, *K. aš-Šifā’*, *al-Manṭiq*, *al-Maqūlāt*, II,5, p. 86, ll. 16–17 [= § 22 (3.B.b)].



Sīnā deems it worthwhile to supplement his presentation of the Themistian account with a revised version which is meant “to consolidate this approach (*an yudda‘ama hādā l-ma‘had*) and to somewhat strengthen it (*yu‘akkada qalīlan*)”<sup>359</sup> – but which does not claim to provide a sufficient proof of Aristotle’s list of categories.

Ibn Sīnā’s revised version starts from the same assumption as the Themistian account: Any accident can be classified according to whether or not “its conceptualization” (*taṣawwuruhū*) requires “the conceptualization of something which is extrinsic to its subject (*taṣawwuru šay’in hāriḡin ‘ani l-mawḏū‘i lahū*).”<sup>360</sup> However, at the highest level of division Ibn Sīnā abandons the third option – not chiefly because he takes issue with the idea of an interplay between extrinsic and intrinsic factors but rather because his entire revision project is clearly motivated by the aim of devising a *dihairesis* in the strict sense, that is, a series of dichotomous divisions with mutually exclusive criteria at all levels.

The first Themistian triad – i.e., quantity, quality and position, which are all characterized as not being in need of anything extrinsic to the subject – remains preserved in Ibn Sīnā’s revised scheme. However, Ibn Sīnā inserts an additional level of distinction into this triad, thus grouping both quantity and quality under a common characterization: Whereas quantity and quality are treated as accidents which require neither an intrinsic relation between the parts of the subject nor an extrinsic relation between the subject and another thing,<sup>361</sup> position, in contrast, is described as an accident which occurs to a subject precisely on account of such an intrinsic relation between its parts.<sup>362</sup> The manner in which Ibn Sīnā describes position closely resembles Olympiodorus’ characterization of that category as an accident which “has a relation to the intrinsic parts” (πρὸς τὰ οἰκεῖα μόρια ἔχει τὴν σχέσιν).<sup>363</sup> Moreover, the fact that quantity and quality are described as accidents which occur to the subject neither on account of an extrinsic nor on account of an intrinsic relation also follows the Ammonian tradition which treats these two categories as the only two non-relational accidents. However, when Ibn Sīnā subsequently discusses a feature commonly shared by quantity and position he somewhat modifies the non-relational nature of quantity: First of all, he adds the specification that position and quantity both occur on account of the “division of a multiplicity” (*qismat al-kaṭra*), that is, they are both due to the fact that certain unified subjects are made up of several distinguishable

359 Ibn Sīnā, *K. aš-Šifā’, al-Mantiq, al-Maqūlāt*, II,5, p. 84, l. 5 [= § 10 (3.B.b)].

360 Ibn Sīnā, *K. aš-Šifā’, al-Mantiq, al-Maqūlāt*, II,5, p. 84, ll. 5–6 [= § 10 (3.B.b)].

361 Ibn Sīnā, *K. aš-Šifā’, al-Mantiq, al-Maqūlāt*, II,5, p. 84, l. 18 – p. 85, l. 3 [= § 13 (3.B.b)].

362 Ibn Sīnā, *K. aš-Šifā’, al-Mantiq, al-Maqūlāt*, II,5, p. 84, ll. 8–11 [= § 12 (3.B.b)].

363 Olympiodorus, *In Categorias*, p. 54, l. 22 (my tr.).

ble parts.<sup>364</sup> But whereas the accident of position is the result of a potential or actualized *intrinsic* relation which holds between these parts and which results in a “unified state” of the whole (i.e., the one specific position which in a given situation applies to the entire subject),<sup>365</sup> the accident of quantity may be regarded as an actualized relation between the whole and the parts,<sup>366</sup> that is to say, a relation which renders the subject countable by single units.<sup>367</sup>

Nonetheless, his description of position and his treatment of quantity and quality as a dyad which is defined via the exclusion of two types of relations clearly attest that in his revised scheme Ibn Sīnā incorporates certain elements which are absent from the extant Themistian accounts but which can be identified in the commentaries of the Ammonian school. This becomes even more obvious in his rearrangement of the other two Themistian triads which are now both subsumed under the criterion of requiring a relationship to something which is extrinsic to the subject. As we have seen above, the idea that some accidents can be conceptualized as the result of combining substance with other accidents of a higher rank is typical for the Ammonian approach of dividing the categories. This is precisely the classificatory notion which Ibn Sīnā applies in his treatment of those five accidents which he characterizes as the result of a non-reciprocal relationship between the subject and a non-relational accident. Below this level, the second Themistian triad, which comprises the categories of where, when and having, retains its conceptual unity; for all three are described as accidents which can only come about if the subject stands in a non-reciprocal relationship to a quantity. Whereas having results from the subject’s relation to a spatial container which moves along whenever the subject moves and where results from the subject’s relation to a spatial container which does not move along, when occurs on account of the relation between the subject and time.<sup>368</sup> In dissolving the conceptual unity of the third Themistian triad, Ibn Sīnā’s revised scheme conceptualizes the categories of doing and being affected as the same dyadic group as the Ammonian tradition: They are both described as resulting from a relationship between the subject and a quality.<sup>369</sup> Contrary to the Themistian account, the category of *relatum* is separated from doing and being affected – and is now classified by a criterion of its own, namely as the only accident which comes about by way of a reciprocal relationship between the subject and something extrinsic. In describing the category of relation (*iḍāfa*) as

364 Ibn Sīnā, *K. aš-Šifāʾ, al-Manṭiq, al-Maqūlāt*, II,5, p. 85, l. 6 [= § 14 (3.B.b)].

365 Ibn Sīnā, *K. aš-Šifāʾ, al-Manṭiq, al-Maqūlāt*, II,5, p. 85, l. 16 [= § 12 (3.B.b)].

366 Ibn Sīnā, *K. aš-Šifāʾ, al-Manṭiq, al-Maqūlāt*, II,5, p. 85, l. 5 [= § 14 (3.B.b)].

367 Ibn Sīnā, *K. aš-Šifāʾ, al-Manṭiq, al-Maqūlāt*, II,5, p. 84, l. 19 [= § 13 (3.B.b)].

368 Ibn Sīnā, *K. aš-Šifāʾ, al-Manṭiq, al-Maqūlāt*, II,5, p. 86, ll. 5–9 [= § 20 (3.B.b)].

369 Ibn Sīnā, *K. aš-Šifāʾ, al-Manṭiq, al-Maqūlāt*, II,5, p. 86, ll. 9–12 [= § 21 (3.B.b)].

a kind of “relationship” (*nisba*) which requires a “corresponding reciprocity” (*in ikās mutašābih*),<sup>370</sup> Ibn Sīnā adopts a description which is reminiscent of Simplicius’ characterization of *relata*’ as those relational accidents which “are said according to a relation to correlatives” (κατὰ σχέσιν [...] πρὸς ἀντιστρέφοντα λέγονται).<sup>371</sup>

Overall, the result of Ibn Sīnā’s revision can be interpreted as a combination of Ammonian and Themistian elements – with an additional methodological commitment to which Simplicius in his rather idiosyncratic scheme had already subscribed as well, namely the restriction to dichotomous pairs at all levels of distinction; but apart from the methodological resemblance the result of Ibn Sīnā’s revision clearly differs from the outline given by Simplicius (see figure 10).

Notwithstanding some important commonalities, the fact that Ibn Sīnā explicitly excludes the possibility of a relationship between a subject and the relatum marks a clear difference between his revised scheme and the Ammonian tradition. To be precise, Ibn Sīnā argues quite generally against a relationship between a subject and *any* relational category – but at this level of distinction there is no higher-ranking relational category besides the relatum. The reason he provides is an infinite regress argument: A relation to a relation to a relation must ultimately culminate in a relation to a non-relational accident, namely to quantity, quality, or position. In the ensuing outline of the five remaining accidents the possibility of a relation between a subject and a position is tacitly excluded. Such a combination would, of course, have created some methodological difficulties as it would have disrupted Ibn Sīnā’s continuous chain of dihairetic pairings; yet, the more systematic reason for its exclusion may be seen in the fact that under the revised scheme – with its borrowings from the Ammonian tradition – position as well can, in a certain sense, be conceptualized as a relational category. But since Ibn Sīnā’s revised scheme still commences with the Themistian criterion of intrinsicity and extrinsicity, there is no unified group under which the various kinds of relational categories could be subsumed. As we shall see, at a subsequent stage Ibn Sīnā will present yet another alternative schematization which will abandon the overriding Themistian notion altogether and which instead will restore the Ammonian distinction between relational and non-relational accidents.

370 Ibn Sīnā, *K. aš-Šifāʾ, al-Mantiq, al-Maqūlāt*, II,5, p. 85, ll. 9–11 [= § 15 (3.B.b)].

371 Simplicius, *In Categorias*, p. 68, l. 3 (my tr.).




Figure 10. Ibn Sīnā’s Revised Version of the “Well-Known Division”

### 3.3. An Alternative Schematization of the Categories: The Division of Accidents Outlined in the *Ta'liqāt* and the *Metaphysics* of the *Dānešnāme*

Even though Ibn Sīnā deems his revised version of systematizing the scheme of categories to be clearly superior to the “well-known division,” that is, to the standard Themistian approach, he does not claim for it any degree of epistemological certainty or rational coerciveness; nor is he convinced that the project of proving Aristotle’s list of categories could and should be pursued as a serious scientific investigation at all. Rather, his revised version may be interpreted as a propaedeutic attempt at providing the student of logic with an example of what a methodologically sound *dihairesis* of the conventional list of ten *summa genera* might look like – regardless of whether or not such an outline may claim any demonstrative force.

In the context of devising a concise summary of metaphysics, we see Ibn Sīnā opt for quite a different approach of classifying the nine genera of accidents. The *Ilāhiyyāt* of the Persian *Dānešnāme*, which was probably composed shortly after the completion of the *Šifā*,<sup>372</sup> presents a classification which is much closer to the Ammonian than to the Themistian scheme. Whereas the Persian outline given in the *Dānešnāme-ye ‘Alā’ī* has at least received a modest degree of scholarly attention,<sup>373</sup> its presumable Arabic *vorlage* has not been taken into account yet. As a matter of fact, even though thirty years have passed since Jules Janssens published a provisional list of parallels between the *Dānešnāme-ye ‘Alā’ī* and the *Ta’liqāt*, the interrelatedness between these two texts has largely remained ignored.<sup>374</sup> Thanks to Seyyed Ḥoseyn Mūsaviyān’s

372 Cf. Dimitri Gutas, *Avicenna and the Aristotelian Tradition*, 2<sup>nd</sup> ed., p. 118 and p. 145.

373 For the Persian text, see Ibn Sīnā, *Elāhiyyāt-e Dānešnāme-ye ‘Alā’ī*, ed. Moḥammad Mo’in (Teheran: Entešārāt-e Dānešgāh-e Tehrān, 1952), pp. 28–31. Cf. the somewhat paraphrastic English tr. by Parviz Morewedge, *The Metaphysica of Avicenna: A Critical Translation-Commentary and Analysis of Fundamental Arguments in Avicenna’s Metaphysica in the Dānišh Nāma-i ‘alā’ī* (The Book of Scientific Knowledge) (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1973), pp. 26–27; and the more reliable French tr. by Mohammad Achena and Henri Massé, *Le livre de science I (logique, métaphysique)* (Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 1955), pp. 108–110. For a brief analysis of this approach of dividing the nine accidents, see Paul Thom, “The Division of the Categories According to Avicenna,” pp. 44–46.

374 For a list of parallels between the *Ta’liqāt* and the *Elāhiyyāt-e Dānešnāme-ye ‘Alā’ī*, see Jules Janssens, “Le Dānes-nāme d’Ibn Sīnā: un texte à revoir?” *Bulletin de philosophie médiévale* 28 (1986): pp. 164–165. See also his “Les *Ta’liqāt* d’Ibn Sīnā: essai de structuration et de datation,” in *Langages et philosophie: hommage à Jean Jolivet*, ed. Alain de Libera (Paris: Vrin, 1997), pp. 109–122; and idem, “Ibn Sīnā’s *Ta’liqāt*: The Presence of Paraphrases of and Super-commentaries on the *Ilāhiyyāt* of the *Šifā*,” in *Islamic Philoso-*

new edition of the *Ta'liqāt* we are now in a much better position to study that complex collection of notes and fragments.<sup>375</sup> Notwithstanding the fact that a close structural and philological analysis of the manner in which Ibn Sīnā transformed his scattered Arabic notes into a Persian *summa* would go far beyond the scope and capacity of this study, it might be useful to take a first step into this direction by providing a synoptic juxtaposition of those parallel passages from the *Ta'liqāt* and the *Dānešnāme* which concern the systematization of the nine accidental *summa genera*.

	<i>at-Ta'liqāt</i>	<i>Elāhīyāt-e Dānešnāme-ye 'Alā'ī</i>	
	[ed. Mūsaviyān, no. 944, p. 524, l. 7 – p. 526, l. 11 (= ed. Badawī, p. 174, l. 17 – p. 175, l. 9)]	[ed. Mo'in, p. 28, l. 5 – p. 31, l. 3] <sup>376</sup>	
524,7	في أنّ العرض نوعان	پیدا کردن حال عرض	28,5
	That the accident falls into two kinds	Making visible the state of the accident	
524,8	العرض نوعان:	پس عرض دو گونه بود:	28,6
	The accident falls into two kinds:	The accident falls into two kinds:	
524,8–9	أحدهما هو الذي إذا تصوّرتَه، لم تخبج إلى أن تنظر إلى ما هو خارج عن ذاته.	یکی آنکه صورت بستن تو اورا حاجت نیفکند بآنکه هیچ گونه پچیزی جز جوهر وی و بیرون از جوهر وی نگاه کنی.	28,7–8

*phy, Science, Culture, and Religion: Studies in Honor of Dimitri Gutas*, ed. David Reisman and Felicitas Opwis (Leiden: Brill, 2012), pp. 201–222. On the question of which of the two works served as the *vorlage* for the other one, cf. Dimitri Gutas, *Avicenna and the Aristotelian Tradition*, 2<sup>nd</sup> ed., p. 119: “Avicenna wrote the work [i.e., the *Dānešnāme*; AK] apparently by translating into Persian sections that he had written earlier in Arabic. [...] It is not yet clear whether the entire text was translated from previously written Arabic sections or just those that have survived (or were selected to survive) in the *Notes* [i.e., the *Ta'liqāt*; AK] and elsewhere.”

375 Ibn Sīnā, *at-Ta'liqāt*, ed. Mūsaviyān. There is no need to use 'Abd ar-Raḥmān Badawī's defective edition any longer.

376 In his *Maqāṣid al-falāsifa* al-Ġazālī translates large parts of Ibn Sīnā's *Dānešnāme* into Arabic. If one compares the Arabic fragments on which Ibn Sīnā based his Persian *Dānešnāme* with al-Ġazālī's Arabic re-translations, it becomes clear that al-Ġazālī did not consult the respective passages from the *Ta'liqāt*. For the parallel passage of the chapter under consideration, see Abū Ḥāmid al-Ġazālī, *Maqāṣid al-falāsifa*, ed. Sulaymān Dunyā (Cairo: Dār al-ma'ārif, 1961), pp. 163–165 (*al-qawl fī l-a'rād*).

	[1] One of them is such that whenever you conceptualize it you do not need to consider anything extrinsic to its essence [i.e., substance].	[1] One of them is such that whenever you conceptualize it you do not in any way need to consider anything other than its substance and extrinsic to its substance.	
524,9-10	والثاني هو الذي لا بد لك في تصوّره أن تنظر إلى ما هو خارج عن ذاته.	و دیگر آنست که چاره نیست ترا اندر تصوّر کردن وی که بچیزی بیرون نگاه کنی.	28,9-10
	[2] The other one is such that, in conceptualizing it, it is indispensable for you to consider something extrinsic to its essence [i.e., substance].	[2] The other one is such that, in conceptualizing it, it is indispensable for you to consider something extrinsic.	
524,10	والقسم الأول نوعان:	و قسم پیشین دو گونه است:	28,10
	[ad 1] The first division falls into two kinds:	[ad 1] The first division falls into two kinds:	
524,10-11	أحدهما هو الذي بسببه <sup>377</sup> يقع على الجوهر المقدار والقسمة والأقل والأكثر، وهو الكمية.	یکی آنکه جوهر را بسبب وی اندازه برافتد و قسمت بود و کمی و بیشی بود، و این را چندی خوانند و بتازی کمیت.	28,11-12
	[1.1] One of them is such that by virtue of its measurement and division, more and less befall substance; this is the quantity ( <i>kammiyya</i> ).	[1.1] One of them is such that by virtue of its measurement and division, more and less befall substance; this is called 'how-much-ness' ( <i>čandi</i> ), in Arabic 'quantity' ( <i>kammiyat</i> ).	
524,11-525,2	والثاني أن لا يكون كذلك، وهو حالة في الجوهر لم تحتاج في تصوّرك إياه إلى ما هو خارج عن ذاته، وهو الكيفية.	و یکی آنکه نه چنین بود، بلکه وی حالی بود اندر جوهر که تصوّر وی حاجت نیارد بچیزی بیرون نگریدن، و نه ورا بسبب وی قسمت بود، و این را چگونگی خوانند و بتازی کیفیت.	28,13-15

سببه : ed. Badawī بسببه 377

- [1.2] The other one is not like that; this is a state in substance for whose conceptualization one does not need anything extrinsic to its essence [i.e., substance]; this is the quality (*kay-fiyya*).
- [1.2] And one of them is not like that; rather, it is a state in substance for whose conceptualization one does not need to consider anything extrinsic, and by virtue of which it [i.e., substance] does not become divisible; this is called 'how-ness' (*čegūnegī*), in Arabic 'quality' (*kay-fiyyat*).
- 525,2 مثال الكمية: العدد والطول والعرض والعمق والزمان. مثال كميته: شمار، و درازنا، و پهنا، و سسترا، و زمان. 28,16
- [ad 1.1] Examples of quantity: number, length, width, depth, and time. [ad 1.1] Examples of quantity: number, length, width, depth, and time.
- 525,3-4 ومثال الكيفية: الصحة والسقم والعفة والتعقل والعلم والقوة والضعف والكلام والطعم وما شاكلها، وكذلك التدوير والتطويل والتثليث والتربيع. و مثال کیفیت: درستی، و بیماری، و پارسایی، و بخردی، و دانش، و نیروی، و ضعیفی، و سپیدی، و سیاهی، و بوی، و مزه، و آواز، و گرمی، و سردی، و تری، و خشکی و هر چه بدین ماند، و نیز گردی، و درازی، و سه سوئی، و چهار سوئی، و نرمی، و درشتی آنچه بدین ماند. 28,16-29,4
- [ad 1.2] Examples of quality: health and illness, chastity, prudence, knowledge, power and weakness, speech, taste, and whatever is like these; and in the same vein, roundness, longness, being threefold and being fourfold. [ad 1.2] Examples of quality: health and illness, chastity, prudence, knowledge, power and weakness, whiteness and blackness, odor, taste, sound, warmth and cold, wetness and dryness, and whatever is like these; and in the same vein, roundness, longness, having three sides and having four sides, mildness and strictness, and whatever is like these.
- 525,5 والقسم الثاني سبعة أنواع: وقسم دوم هفت گونه است: 29,5
- [ad 2] The second division falls into seven kinds: [ad 2] The second division falls into seven kinds:
- 525,5 أحدها الإضافة، یکی اضافت، 29,6



- [2.1] One of them is relation. [2.1] One of them is relation.  
 525,5-7 29,10-13  
 و هي حالة للشيء يكون كونه نسبتته<sup>378</sup>، وبه  
 نسبت بود و بدان نسبت دانسته آید که  
 مثل الأبوة للأب من چیزی دیگر برابر وی بود، چنانکه پدری  
 جهة أن الابن موجود مقابل له، وكذلك  
 مر پدر را از جهت آنکه پسر موجود بود  
 الصداقة والأخوة والقرابة.  
 برابر وی و همچنان درستی و برادری و  
 خویشاوندی.
- [ad 2.1] It [i.e., *idāfa*] is a thing's state which is such that the thing's being is its relation (*nisba*), and by virtue of which one knows that another thing is its counterpart, just like fatherhood in relation to the father inasmuch as the son exists as his counterpart; and in the same vein, friendship, brotherhood, and kinship. [ad 2.1] Relation (*eżāfat*) is a thing's state [in] which it [i.e., the thing] is by virtue of that relation (*nesbat*), and which is such that by virtue of that relation (*nesbat*) one knows that another thing is its counterpart, just like fatherhood in relation to the father inasmuch as the son exists as his counterpart; and in the same vein, friendship, brotherhood, and kinship.
- 525,7 29,6  
 و یکی کجایی که بتازی این خوانند،  
 والأین،
- [2.2] [Another one is] the where. [2.2] One of them is the 'where-ness' (*koğā'i*) which in Arabic is called 'where' (*ayna*).  
 525,8 29,14-15  
 و این، بودن چیزی بود اندر جای  
 وهو كون الشيء في مكانه، مثل أن يكون  
 خویش، چنانکه اندر زیر بودن و زیر  
 أعلى أو أسفل.  
 بودن و هر چه بدین مانند.
- [ad 2.2] It is a thing's being in its place, just like being above and being below. [ad 2.2] Where (*ayna*) is a thing's being in its place, just like being below and being above, and whatever is like these.
- 525,8 29,6-7  
 و یکی کجی که بتازی متی خوانند،  
 والمتی،

378 بسببه ed. Badawī: نسبتته

Both of the Arabic and the Persian version the variant *sabab* instead of *nisba* is transmitted: *ḥālatun li-š-šay'i yakūnu kawnuhū bi-sababihī*; and *ḥāl-e čizī būd ke ū-rā bed-ān sabab būd*.

[2.3] [Another one is] the when.	[2.3] One of them is the 'when-ness' ( <i>keyī</i> ) which in Arabic is called 'when' ( <i>matā</i> ).	30,1-2
525,8-9	وهو كون الشيء في الزمان، مثل كونه كاري را دی بودن و دیگری را فردا بودن. أمس وغداً،	30,1-2
[ad 2.3] It is a thing's being in time, just like its being yesterday or tomorrow.	[ad 2.3] When ( <i>matā</i> ) is a thing's being in time, just like one action being yesterday and another one being tomorrow.	
525,9	و یکی نهاد که بتازی وضع خوانند، والوضع،	29,7
[2.4] [Another one is] the position.	[2.4] One of them is the position ( <i>nehād</i> ) which in Arabic is called 'position' ( <i>wad</i> ).	30,3-7
525,9- 526,4	وهو حال وضع أجزاء الجسم في الجهات المختلفة، كالقيام والقعود، ومثل اليد والرجل والرأس وسائر الأعضاء وأوضاعها عند الجهات، مثل اليمين والشمال، والسفل والعلو، والقدام والخلف، فإنه إذا كان بحال، يقال له قائم، وإذا كان بحال أخرى، يقال له قاعد. و اما وضع، حال نهاد جزوهای جسم بود بجهتهای مختلف چنانکه نشستن و برخاستن و رکوع و سجود، و چون دست و پای و سر و اندامهای دیگر را نهادهای ایشان سوی جهت های راست و چپ و زیر و زیر و پیش و پس بحالی بود گویند نشسته است و چون بحالی دیگر بود گویند ایستاده است.	30,3-7
[ad 2.4] It is the state of the position of the parts of the body in the various directions, such as standing and sitting; just like the positions ( <i>awdā</i> ) of the hand, the leg, the head and the other limbs with regard to the [various] directions, such as right and left, below and above, in front and behind; for when it [i.e., any of these limbs] is in a [certain] state, one says of it 'standing'; and when it is in another state, one says of it 'sitting.'	[ad 2.4] As for position ( <i>wad</i> ), it is the state of the position ( <i>nehād</i> ) of the parts of the body in the various directions, such as sitting and standing, bowing down and prostrating; when the positions ( <i>nehādha</i> ) of the hand, the leg, the head and the other limbs are – with regard to the directions of right and left, below and above, in front and behind – in a certain state ( <i>bi-hāli</i> ), one says [of any of these limbs] 'it is sitting'; and when it is in another state, one says 'it is standing.'	

526,4-7

و فرق میان اضافت و میان این نسبتهای و الفرق بین الإضافة وبين النسب الأخر  
دیگر آنست که معنی اضافت از نفس هو أنّ معنى الإضافة يكون من حصول  
بودن آن چیز بود که نسبت بویست چون نفس کون ذلك الشيء الذي تنسبه<sup>379</sup>  
پدری که از نفس هستی پسر بود و از إلیه، فإنّ الأبوة من نفس وجود البنوة  
هست بودن وی و این نه از نفس بودن وتحصل من نفس کونها، وحصول الأبن لا  
مکان بود، و متی نه از نفس بودن زمان يكون من نفس حصول المكان، ولا متی  
بود و همه بر این قیاس گیر. من نفس حصول<sup>380</sup> الزمان.

30,13-31,3

The difference between the [category of] relation (*idāfa*) and the other relationships (*nisab*) lies in the fact that the meaning of relation comes about through the realization of the very being of the thing to which one relates it; for fatherhood comes about through the very existence (*wuğūd*) of sonhood, and it [i.e., fatherhood] is realized through its [i.e., the sonhood's] very being; the realization of the where, in turn, is not due to the very realization of the place; nor is the realization of the when due to the very realization of time.

The difference between the [category of] 'relation' (*ezāfat*) and these other relationships (*nesbathā*) lies in the fact that the meaning of relation comes about through the very being of the thing to which one relates it, just like fatherhood comes about through the very existence (*hastī*) of the son and through his [i.e., the son's] being (*hast būdan*); the where, in turn, is not due to the very being (*būdan*) of the place; nor is the when due to the very being of time; all [other relational categories] are to be comprehended analogously.

--- [2.5 missing]

و یکی داشت که بتازی ملک خوانند،

29,7-8

[2.5] One of them is having (*dāšt*) which in Arabic is called 'property' (*milk*).

--- [2.5 missing]

و اما ملک بودن چیز مر چیز را بود،  
و این باب مرا هنوز معلوم نشده است

30,8-9

[ad 2.5] As for something being the property of something, this category (*bāb*) has not yet become known to me.

379 بنسبته ed. Badawī: الذي تنسبه

380 ed. Badawī om. : المكان، ولا متی من نفس حصول

526,7-9

و یکی کنش که بتازی ان یفعل گویند، و و آن یفعل الشيء، و آن یفعل، و هما یکی بکنیدن که بتازی ان ینفعل خوانند. المقولتان. فإن یفعل و ینفعل جزآن لهما.

29,8-9

[2.6-7] [Another one is] doing and [yet another one is] being affected; these are two categories; for doing and being affected are their two parts.

[2.6-7] One of them is the 'act' (*koneš*) which in Arabic is called 'doing' (*an yaf'ala*); and one of them is 'being done' (*bakonīdan*) which in Arabic is called 'being affected' (*an yanfa'ila*).

526,9-10

و اما ان یفعل چنان بود چون بریدن آنگاه که همی برد و سوختن آنگاه که همی سوزد. فأمّا أن یفعل<sup>381</sup> فهو نسبة الشيء إلى ما يؤثر فيه تأثيراً على سبيل تخریجه إلى الفعل من القوة لا دفعة بل على التدریج.<sup>382</sup>

30,10-11

[ad 2.6] As for doing, it is a thing's relation to that which produces an effect in it – in such a manner that it leads to an act which derives from a power not at once but gradually.

[ad 2.6] As for doing (*an yaf'ala*), it is such as cutting at the time something cuts [some other thing] and burning at the time something burns [some other thing].

526,10-11

و اما ان ینفعل چنان بود چون بریده شدن آنگاه که بریده شود و سوخته شدن آنگاه که سوخته شود. وكذلك أن ینفعل هو نسبة المتأثر عن هذا التأثير المذكور.

30,12-13

[ad 2.7] In the same vein, being affected is the relation of that which is affected by the effective action just mentioned.

[ad 2.7] As for being affected (*an yanfa'ila*), it is such as being cut at the time it is cut and being burned at the time it is burned.

Just like Ibn Sīnā's revised version of the Themistian division, this classification of accidental genera begins with the distinction between those which can only be conceptualized along with something which is extrinsic to the subject and those whose conceptualization does not require the consideration of anything extrinsic to the subject. On a linguistic level, it is noteworthy that the expression *dātuhū* in the Arabic version does not signify the 'essence' of the accident but rather its substance in the sense of 'the subject bearing the accident'; in the Persian version Ibn Sīnā renders this as *ḡawhar-e vey*, i.e., 'its substance.' In terms of structure, the main difference to the revised scheme of the *Šifā'* lies in

381 یفعل: ed. Badawī: أن یفعل

382 بالتدریج: ed. Badawī: على التدریج

the fact that by dissolving the first Themistian triad – i.e., quantity, quality, and position – and by distinguishing quantity and quality from all other accidental genera, Ibn Sīnā adopts the basic outline of those versions of the Ammonian scheme which explicitly contrast two non-relational / *per se* accidents with seven relational / *non-per se* accidents. Whereas David/Elias had described only the six secondary relational accidents as those which are “conceptualized according to a relation to other things” (κατὰ σχέσιν ἄλλων νοεῖται), for Ibn Sīnā the conceptualization of something extrinsic now functions as the defining feature of all seven relational categories, i.e., both the relatum, on the one hand, and where and when, doing and being affected, having and position, on the other hand. Even though in his outline of the seven relational categories Ibn Sīnā clearly draws on common descriptions that are traceable to the preceding commentary tradition, he refrains from grouping these characterizations into distinct subclasses. As a consequence, in comparison to the completely *dihairetic* approach which he pursues in the revised scheme of the *Šifāʾ* the systematization of accidents offered in the *Taʿlīqāt* and *Dānešnāme* appears to be based on a much weaker conceptual footing (see figure 11).

If, however, we take into account Ibn Sīnā’s dismissive stance towards the project of proving Aristotle’s list of categories, the methodological rigor he displays in the revised scheme of the *Šifāʾ* can even be considered to be misleading; for it could easily give rise to the impression that a careful systematization of the ten categories may actually succeed in deducing the scheme of *summa genera*. In this respect, the conceptually looser scheme of the *Taʿlīqāt* and *Dānešnāme* may be taken to be much more appropriate for the task: Within the context of summarizing some basic concepts of metaphysics it does not pretend to provide more than just a structured account of inductive descriptions; that is to say, it aims at “making visible” (*peydā kardan*) some distinctive features of various accidental beings without addressing the question of whether and why one could not conceive of a different list of *summa genera*.




Figure 11. Ibn Sinā’s Division of Accidents in the *Ta’līqāt/Dānešnāme*

### 3.4. Faḥr ad-Dīn ar-Rāzī on the Systematization of the Ten *Summa Genera*

#### 3.4.1. The Categories in *al-Mabāḥiṭ al-mašriqiyya*

##### 3.4.1.1. A Paraphrase of Ibn Sīnā's Revised Scheme

In his philosophical summa *al-Mabāḥiṭ al-mašriqiyya* Faḥr ad-Dīn ar-Rāzī dedicates several chapters to the question of whether and how a sound justification of the Aristotelian list of ten *summa genera* could be given. In the context of reflecting on “whether there is no category outside of these ten” (*fī annahū lā maqūlata ḥārīḡata ‘an hādihī l-‘ašara*) ar-Rāzī offers an account of the revised scheme which Ibn Sīnā proposed in the *Maqūlāt* of the *Šifā*.<sup>383</sup> Without mentioning the fact that Ibn Sīnā's outline was intended as an attempt at improving the so-called “well-known division” (*al-qisma al-mašhūra*), ar-Rāzī begins his paraphrastic outline as follows:

The *Šayḥ* argued for this [claim] by saying: We have clarified that the contingent beings (*al-mumkināt*) are restricted to substances and accidents. Thus, as soon as we will have clarified that the accidents are restricted to the remaining nine, what was sought will be attained.<sup>384</sup>

In these opening remarks ar-Rāzī combines the Themistian point of departure – that is, the claim that there can be no doubt about the fact that everything we perceive is either a substance or an accident – with his own agenda of drafting a comprehensive account of contingent beings. In this context he reports quite faithfully Ibn Sīnā's revision of the Themistian approach of dividing only the nine genera of accidents, without combining this scheme of accidents with his systematic division of the various kinds of substances: Every accident must be either (1) “such that is conceptualization requires the conceptualization of something extrinsic to its subject” (*an yaḥtāḡa tašawwuruhū ilā tašawwuri šay'in ḥārīḡin ‘an mawdū'ihī*) or (2) “such that it does not require it.”<sup>385</sup> The first type of accident is subdivided by means of the criterion of whether or not it is the result of an intrinsic relationship between the parts of the subject. Whereas this criterion sets apart position, on the one side, from quantity and quality, on the other side, the criterion of whether or not the accident can only occur to a divisible

383 See above, pp. 163–167.

384 Faḥr ad-Dīn ar-Rāzī, *al-Mabāḥiṭ al-mašriqiyya*, ed. Muḥammad al-Mu'tašim bi-Llāh al-Baḡdādī (Beirut: Dār al-kitāb al-‘arabī, 1990 [1410 AH]), vol. 1, p. 272, ll. 3–5.

385 Ar-Rāzī, *al-Mabāḥiṭ al-mašriqiyya*, vol. 1, p. 272, ll. 6–7.

subject marks the distinction between quantity and quality.<sup>386</sup> The other accidents are all treated as the result of a “relationship” (*nisba*) between the subject which bears the accident and an extrinsic thing: Whereas the relatum (*mudāf*) is characterized as the result of a mutual relationship,<sup>387</sup> the five remaining accidents are conceptualized either as the result of a one-sided relationship in which a substance stands to a quantity (or rather, to another quantified substance), thus yielding the accidents of when, where, and having;<sup>388</sup> or as the result of a one-sided relationship in which a substance stands to a quality (or rather, to another qualified substance), that is, doing and being affected.<sup>389</sup> Ar-Rāzī concludes his paraphrase by discarding the scheme as “a forced effort which Ibn Sīnā made” (*mā takallafahū š-šayhu*) with the aim of elucidating the reason why there are only ten categories – “in spite of the fact that he [i.e., Ibn Sīnā] was aware of its badness and weakness.”<sup>390</sup> As we will see shortly, ar-Rāzī not only questions the soundness of this specific attempt at justifying the list of categories but rather deems the project of providing a definite rationalization of any scheme of *summa genera* to be a futile undertaking altogether. Nonetheless, in a certain respect his own use of the ten categories may, *cum grano salis*, be characterized as more Aristotelian than Aristotle and the Peripatetics ever were; for the categories played a vital structural role in the composition of the largest part of ar-Rāzī’s *Mabāḥiṭ*.

#### 3.4.1.2. The Categories as a Useful Tool for Structuring a Philosophical Summa

While the first book of the *Mabāḥiṭ* offers a propaedeutic treatment of the so-called “common things” (*al-umūr al-‘amma*),<sup>391</sup> the second book aims at providing an exhaustive exposition of “contingent beings” (*mumkināt*), that is to say, no less than an account of all existing things besides God, thus assembling themes traditionally split between metaphysics and physics. On the one hand, such an approach accelerates the departure from the established structure which had previously been provided by the standard Aristotelian units broadly dating

386 Ar-Rāzī, *al-Mabāḥiṭ al-mašriqiyya*, vol. 1, p. 272, ll. 7–11.

387 Ar-Rāzī, *al-Mabāḥiṭ al-mašriqiyya*, vol. 1, p. 272, ll. 13–14.

388 Ar-Rāzī, *al-Mabāḥiṭ al-mašriqiyya*, vol. 1, p. 273, ll. 1–5.

389 Ar-Rāzī, *al-Mabāḥiṭ al-mašriqiyya*, vol. 1, p. 273, ll. 5–9.

390 Ar-Rāzī, *al-Mabāḥiṭ al-mašriqiyya*, vol. 1, p. 273, ll. 9–10.

391 As Eichner has noted, by “common things” ar-Rāzī means two very different types of things: “(a) general properties of existents (existence, essence, unity); (b) properties which are divisions of existence (‘necessary-contingent’, ‘eternal-temporally originated’).” See Heidrun Eichner, “Dissolving the Unity of Metaphysics: From Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī to Mullā Ṣadrā al-Shīrāzī,” *Medioevo* 32 (2007): p. 166.



back to Andronicus' editorial efforts. Yet, on the other hand, in the interest of keeping this vast material somehow manageable ar-Rāzī's ambitious attempt of treating all issues pertaining to contingent existents within a single treatise exigently requires a sound structuring principle. To that end, ar-Rāzī reactivates the scheme of categories as a suitable organization template – and it is exactly this structure which later was to figure as the basis for the composition of ar-Rāzī's seminal *Mulaḥḥaṣ fī l-ḥikma* whose defining impact on the subsequent philosophical and theological traditions has recently been investigated.<sup>392</sup> A schematic representation of the contents of the second book reveals ar-Rāzī's structural and content-related recourse to Aristotle's *Categories* (see figure 12).

The book on contingent beings is divided into three parts: Before engaging with more specific discussions on each of the categories ar-Rāzī gives us an elaborate *muqaddima* consisting of 15 *fuṣūl* in which the most important matters of dispute concerning the definitions and properties of substances and accidents are presented. It should be noted that ar-Rāzī treats many of the standard issues which Aristotle and his commentators addressed within the separate chapter on substance (that is, *Cat.* 5) already here as preliminary clarifications, such as the claim that nothing is contrary to substance, that substance is a τὸδε τι etc. Subsequently, ar-Rāzī dedicates a long *ḡumla* (about 520 pages of printed text)<sup>393</sup> to the accidental categories; once again, he opens this part with yet another *muqaddima* in which he adduces general considerations about the division, status and scope of the scheme of categories. After that, he offers a detailed outline of each of the nine accidents, including particularly complex sub-divisions and thematic insertions with regard to quantity and quality. In all these *excursus* one could easily lose track of the structural coherence of the work without keeping in mind the underlying recourse to the scheme of categories. At the end of the first *ḡumla*, ar-Rāzī inserts two further thematic units as complements of a comprehensive account of accidental occurrences: Reflections on causation and on motion and time. Finally, the second *ḡumla* (consisting roughly of 450 pages of printed text)<sup>394</sup> draws on the material which had been presented in the first *muqaddima*, namely on ar-Rāzī's general characterization of substance within the scheme of categories.

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392 Cf. Heidrun Eichner, *The Post-Avicennian Philosophical Tradition and Islamic Orthodoxy: Philosophical and Theological summae in Context* (unpublished habilitation thesis, Halle 2009).

393 Ar-Rāzī, *al-Mabāḥiṭ al-mašriqiyya*, vol. 1, pp. 267–791.

394 Ar-Rāzī, *al-Mabāḥiṭ al-mašriqiyya*, vol. 2, pp. 9–463.

**BOOK 2: Qualifications of substances and accidents (*aḥkām al-ḡawāhīr wa-l-a'ṛāḍ*)**

- [I] *muqaddima* [ed. Beirut 1990, vol. 1, pp. 235–267]
- faṣl* 1 The quiddity of substance and accident [235–236]
- faṣl* 2 Making known the accident [237–240]
- faṣl* 3 Description of substance [240–243]
- faṣl* 4 Is substance said of that which is under it  
by means of a genus-predication? [243–247]
- faṣl* 5 Are the universals of substances also substances? [247–248]
- faṣl* 6 The particulars are more entitled to substantiality than the universals [248–250]
- faṣl* 7 There is nothing which is contrary to substance [250]
- faṣl* 8 Substance is a “certain this” [250–251]
- faṣl* 9 Substance is that which accepts non-relational contraries [251]
- faṣl* 10 Accident is not a genus [252–253]
- faṣl* 11 The impossibility of the transfer of accidents [253–256]
- faṣl* 12 The permissibility of one accident subsisting in another accident [256–257]
- faṣl* 13 The impossibility of one accident subsisting in two substrates [258–259]
- faṣl* 14 That which inheres in a substrate must be divided in accordance  
with the divisions of the substrate in which it inheres [259–265]
- faṣl* 15 One and the same thing may not be a substance and an accident [265–267]
- [II] 1<sup>st</sup> *ḡumla*: ACCIDENTS [ed. Beirut 1990, vol. 1, pp. 267–791]
- [1] *muqaddima* [267–276]
- baḥṭ* i Whether each of the ten categories is a genus [269–270]
- baḥṭ* ii Whether these ten categories are *summa genera* [270–272]
- baḥṭ* iii Whether there is no category outside of these ten [272–275]
- baḥṭ* iv How these categories are divided into their species [276]
- [2] 1<sup>st</sup> *fann* QUANTITY *faṣl* i – xxiv [277–367]
- [3] 2<sup>nd</sup> *fann* QUALITY *muqaddima*, *qism* 1–4  
(with numerous *fuṣūl* and sub-sections) [368–554]
- [4] 3<sup>rd</sup> *fann* The rest of the categories [555–585]
- [i] 1<sup>st</sup> *bāb* RELATUM (*al-muḍāf*) [555–575]
- [ii] 2<sup>nd</sup> *bāb* The rest of the categories
- [a] 1<sup>st</sup> *faṣl* WHERE [578–580]
- [b] 2<sup>nd</sup> *faṣl* WHEN [581]
- [c] 3<sup>rd</sup> *faṣl* POSITION [581–582]
- [d] 4<sup>th</sup> *faṣl* HAVING [582–583]
- [e] 5<sup>th</sup> *faṣl* DOING and BEING AFFECTED [583–585]
- [5] 4<sup>th</sup> *fann* Causes and things caused [586–668]
- [6] 5<sup>th</sup> *fann* Motion and time [669–791]
- [III] 2<sup>nd</sup> *ḡumla*: SUBSTANCES [ed. Beirut 1990, vol. 2, pp. 9–463]
- [1] 1<sup>st</sup> *fann* Bodies:  
[a] MATTER, [b] FORM, [c] COMPOUND OF MATTER AND FORM [9–228]
- [2] 2<sup>nd</sup> *fann* Psychology: [d] SOULS [231–439]
- [3] 3<sup>rd</sup> *fann* Substances detached from bodies: [e] INTELLECTS [441–463]

Figure 12. Rough Structure of the Second Book of ar-Rāzī's *al-Mabāḥiṭ al-mašriqiyya*

In his structural recourse to the ten categories ar-Rāzī does not exclusively concentrate on an outline of the accidental genera but deems a systematic division of the various kinds of substance at least equally important. Since he refrains from treating the categories as any kind of linguistic scheme of predicates, it is only consequent that he leaves out the Aristotelian criterion of ‘not being said of something / being said of something’ by which the distinction between primary and secondary substances is attained.<sup>395</sup> Rather than discussing the difference between primary and secondary substances, he aims at integrating Ibn Sīnā’s five ontological sub-divisions of substance into the scheme of categories.<sup>396</sup>

According to the division expounded in the *Mabāḥiṭ*, if something is not in a subject, it must be either in a substrate or not in a substrate (first *dihairesis*). If it is in a substrate, it is (1) a form. If it is not in a substrate, it must either be itself a substrate or not a substrate (second *dihairesis*). If it is itself a substrate, it is (2) matter. If it is not itself a substrate, it must either be compounded of form and matter or not (third *dihairesis*). If it is compounded of matter and form, it is (3) a body. If it is not compounded of matter and form, it must either have a connection to the material substrate or not (fourth *dihairesis*). If it has a connection to the material substrate, it is (4) a soul. If it has no connection to the material substrate, it is (5) an intellect (see figure 13).<sup>397</sup>

On the basis of this account of the five kinds of substances the second *ḡumla* dedicates three *funūn* to all issues pertaining to substances *qua* bodies (including their constituting substantial parts, namely matter and form), substances *qua* souls and substances *qua* intellects. As we will see at the end of the next chapter of this study, ar-Rāzī’s insistence on the fivefold distinction of substance is in line with his view that substance may not in any way be treated as a unified *summum genus*.<sup>398</sup>

All in all, ar-Rāzī not only uses the Aristotelian categories, which he received mainly through the channel of Ibn Sīnā’s *K. al-Maqūlāt* of the *Šifā’*, as a convenient structuring tool. Rather, throughout the *Mabāḥiṭ* we see him engage with virtually all of the major issues addressed in the *Categories* or in the exegetical literature, especially with questions concerning the ontological and epistemological status of the ten *summa genera*.

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395 However, it should be noted that in subsequent sections it becomes clear that a rather general distinction between particular and universal substances is still retained, even if the ‘predicative language’ with which Aristotle had introduced the respective criterion is avoided.

396 Cf. Ibn Sīnā, *K. aš-Šifā’*, *al-Ilāhiyyāt* (1), II,1.

397 Ar-Rāzī, *al-Mabāḥiṭ al-mašriqiyya*, vol. 1, p. 236, ll. 17–22.

398 See below, pp. 230–237.




Figure 13. Faḥr ad-Dīn ar-Rāzī's Division of Substances in *al-Mabāḥiṭ al-mašriqiyya*

### 3.4.2. The Categories in the *Šarḥ 'Uyūn al-ḥikma*

Faḥr ad-Dīn ar-Rāzī's *Šarḥ 'Uyūn al-ḥikma*, which in all probability is one of his latest works,<sup>399</sup> offers us a comprehensive summary of what might arguably be called his mature view on the categories. The section which is dedicated to Ibn Sīnā's short outline of the Aristotelian *summa genera* in the *'Uyūn al-ḥikma* falls into two parts: At the beginning – after having clarified that the treatise “does not in any way pertain to logic” (*lā ta'alluqa lahū bi-l-manṭiqi l-battata*) – ar-Rāzī tells us that, first of all, he considers it expedient to present a “condensed scientific account” (*kalām 'ilmī mulaḥaṣṣ*) of the *Categories*.<sup>400</sup> Hence, ar-Rāzī

399 As Shihadeh observes, the *Šarḥ 'Uyūn al-ḥikma* in one instance refers to book 7 of *al-Maṭālib al-'āliya min al-'ilm al-ilāhī* – a book whose completion, again according to Shihadeh, can be dated to the year 605/1208–9, that is, roughly one year before ar-Rāzī's death in 606/1210. See Ayman Shihadeh, *The Teleological Ethics of Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī* (Leiden: Brill, 2006), pp. 10–11.

400 Ar-Rāzī, *Šarḥ 'Uyūn al-ḥikma*, ed. Aḥmad Ḥiḡāzī as-Saqqā (Cairo: Maktabat al-Anḡlū al-Miṣriyya, 1979–80 [1400 AH]), vol. 1, p. 95, l. 5 – p. 96, l. 1. Due to the poor quality of as-Saqqā's edition, in all cases of doubt I consulted MS Leiden or. 712 (for the part on the *Categories*, see fol. 23, l. 8 – fol. 32, l. 4). I am grateful to Jan Just Witkam for having made this MS available to me.

provides us in the first part with a concise outline of what a systematic division of the categories might look like and only subsequently, in the second part, with a close commentary on Ibn Sīnā's text. The reason why ar-Rāzī opted for this way of proceeding presumably lies in the fact that Ibn Sīnā's extremely sketchy presentation would not have offered enough reference points for a satisfactory integration of issues which ar-Rāzī deems worthy of discussion. All of ar-Rāzī's systematization efforts, however, are carried out against the background of the initial *caveat* that – due to the simple fact that in the *ʿUyūn al-ḥikma* Ibn Sīnā kept in line with his “predecessors” (*al-mutaqaddimīna*) – the investigation of the issues at hand is conducted in the wrong place.<sup>401</sup>

Right at the beginning of the “condensed scientific account” ar-Rāzī makes it clear that the transmitted list of *summa genera* may not be thought to encompass all kinds of beings:

Being (*al-mawǧūd*) – if it does not accept non-being (*al-ʿadam*) – is God. He is that which is *per se* necessary (*al-wāǧib li-dātihī*). If, however, being does accept non-being, it is that which is *per se* contingent (*mumkin li-dātihī*); it is either not in a subject – and this is ‘substance’ – or it is in a subject – and this is ‘accident’.<sup>402</sup>

According to this exposition, the overriding classification criterion for a division of the various kinds of being is the distinction between necessary (that is, the Avicennian *wāǧib al-wuǧūd*) and contingent. Hence, Aristotle's distinction between “being not in a subject,” which is generally understood to describe substances, and “being in a subject,” which is meant to characterize accidents, does not figure as the superordinate ontological criterion any more but applies only to the realm of *contingent* beings.

In the exposition of the list of categories given in the *Šarḥ ʿUyūn al-ḥikma* two fundamental Aristotelian classification paradigms which cannot easily be reconciled within one ontological theory both remain operative: The distinction between “not in a subject” and “in a subject” from the *Categories* and the form-matter distinction from *Metaphysics*. A clear-cut terminological distinction between “being in a subject” (*fī l-mawḏūʿ*) and “being in a substrate” (*fī l-maḥall*) – echoing previous commentatorial efforts to remove the troublesome equivocity of the Aristotelian ὑποκείμενον<sup>403</sup> – allows ar-Rāzī to achieve this integration. According to this distinction, *mawḏūʿ* (that is, ‘subject’) must be understood to be more specific than *maḥall* (that is, ‘substrate’). For *maḥall* may both refer to the matter in which a form inheres (that is, to an inherence of one kind of substance in another kind of substance) and to a subject in which an accident in-

401 Ar-Rāzī, *Šarḥ ʿUyūn al-ḥikma*, ed. as-Saqqā, vol. 1, p. 95, l. 6.

402 Ar-Rāzī, *Šarḥ ʿUyūn al-ḥikma*, ed. as-Saqqā, vol. 1, p. 96, ll. 3–5.

403 See above, pp. 80–81.

heres, that is to say, to an ontologically prior substance in which an ontologically posterior accident inheres (or, arguably, also to an ontologically prior accident in which an ontologically posterior accident inheres). While in the first case (that is, *maḥall* in the sense of *hayūlā/mādda*), the inhering thing (*ḥāl*), namely the form (*ṣūra*), is the cause for the existence of the substrate, in the second case (that is, *maḥall* in the sense of *mawḍūʿ*), the inhering thing, namely the accident (*ʿaraḍ*), owes its subsistence to that in which it inheres. Against this background, ar-Rāzī holds that, since the contradiction of a more specific expression is always more general than the contradiction of the more general expression, the contradiction of ‘being in a subject’ is more general than the contradiction of ‘being in a substrate.’<sup>404</sup> As ar-Rāzī had already argued in the more extensive parallel passage of the *Mabāḥiṭ*, while ‘not being in a subject’ is an adequate description of substance, the alternative formula ‘not being in a substrate’ would be too narrow; for the latter fails to include forms. Hence, a general relationship of inherence in a substrate (*ḥulūl*) may not figure as the superordinate criterion for a division of contingent beings. Rather, since a general relationship of inherence – devoid of implying a clear ontological hierarchization – is a feature which stretches across the substance-accident-division (for accidents are inhering things and substantial forms are inhering things as well), only the expressions ‘in a subject’ and ‘not in a subject’ are suitable for depicting relative ontological dependence or independence.<sup>405</sup>

Ar-Rāzī uses the distinction between ‘subject’ and ‘substrate’ to introduce the five substances whose dihairetic justification he had presented at length in the *Mabāḥiṭ*. Now form, matter, body, soul and intellect become connected to his outline of a scheme of *summa genera*. That is to say, five substantial kinds are contrasted with nine accidental kinds – and neither substance nor accident is conceived of as genus but only as a concomitant notion.<sup>406</sup> In systematizing the accidental categories ar-Rāzī does not refer to Ibn Sīnā’s revised version of the Themistian approach any more, as he had done in the *Mabāḥiṭ*. Instead, he sketches his own version of the alternative schematization which Ibn Sīnā – with recourse to the Ammonian approach – had laid out in the *Taʿlīqāt* and *Dānešnāme*; however, ar-Rāzī does not group quantity and quality under a

404 Ar-Rāzī, *Šarḥ ʿUyūn al-ḥikma*, ed. as-Saqqā, vol. 1, p. 96, ll. 7–17. In ll. 9–10 I read with MS Leiden or. 712, fol. 23a, ll. 15–16 *al-mawḍūʿ ʿaḥaṣṣ mina l-maḥall* (instead of *al-mawḍūʿ ʿaḥsan mina l-maḥall*, as as-Saqqā’s edition, has it).

405 For the more extensive parallel passage in the *Mabāḥiṭ*, see ar-Rāzī, *al-Mabāḥiṭ al-mašriqiyya*, vol. 1, pp. 235–236. For Ibn Sīnā’s discussion of *mawḍūʿ* and *maḥall*, see above, pp. 113–114.

406 Cf. below, pp. 230–237.

common description but treats each of these two non-relational categories separately:

The accident is either such [1] that it requires a division (*yaqtadī qismatan*); or [2] a relationship (*nisba*); or [3] neither a division nor a relationship. [ad 1] The first one is quantity (*al-kamm*). [...] [ad 2] As for the accident which requires a relationship, none of the predecessors has given a reasonable account (*lam yaqul aḥadu mina l-mutaqaddimīna kalāman ma'qūlan*) concerning its restriction to a limited number of divisions. In my opinion, it is most suitable that – regarding this [issue] – we content ourselves with the [method of] induction (*istiqrāʾ*): [2.1] One of them is the relationship of the thing to its place – and this is the where. [2.2] The second one is the relationship of the thing to its time or to a term denoting its time (*ẓarf zamānīhī*) – and this is the when. [2.3] The third one is relation (*idāfa*), such as [the relation between] fatherhood and sonship. [2.4] The fourth one is something causing an effect<sup>407</sup> on something else – and this is doing. [2.5] The fifth one is a thing's acceptance of an effect – and this is being affected. [2.6] The sixth one is a thing being surrounded by another thing, insofar as the latter moves along when the former moves – and this is having.<sup>408</sup> [2.7] The seventh one is the property which occurs to the body on account of the relationships which come about between its parts and on account of the relationships which come about between these parts and things extrinsic to them – and this is position. [ad 3] As for the accident which requires neither a division nor a relationship, it is quality.<sup>409</sup>

Whereas Ibn Sīnā in the *Ta'liqāt* and *Dānešnāme* contrasts two accidental categories for whose conceptualization nothing extrinsic to the subject is needed with seven accidental categories which can only be conceptualized along with something extrinsic to the subject, ar-Rāzī's two criteria of whether or not an accident requires the subject to be divisible or whether or not an accident requires the subject to be related to another thing yield a triadic division: Quantity is an accident which can only occur to a divisible subject; the seven "relational categories" (*al-maḥūlāt an-nisbiyya*)<sup>410</sup> are accidents which can only occur to a subject standing in some kind of relationship to another thing; and quality is an accident which occurs to a subject merely on account of itself. Overall, the divisions which ar-Rāzī discusses in the *Šarḥ 'Uyūn al-ḥikma* can be schematized as two concomitant class terms, i.e., substance and accident, and fourteen generic

407 I read with MS Leiden or. 712, fol. 24a, l. 1 *ta'tīru š-šay'i fī š-šay'* (and not, as as-Saqqā's edition has it, *mā bihī š-šay'u fī šay'in*).

408 I read with MS Leiden or. 712, fol. 24a, l. 2 *ḡida* ("possession"), which is a common alternative expression for *lahū* (instead of *ḥadduhū*, as as-Saqqā's edition has it).

409 Ar-Rāzī, *Šarḥ 'Uyūn al-ḥikma*, ed. as-Saqqā, vol. 1, p. 97, ll. 6–7 and ll. 11–21; MS Leiden or. 712, fol. 23b, l. 10 – fol. 24a, l. 4.

410 Ar-Rāzī introduces the label 'relational categories' only later in the course of his commentary on Ibn Sīnā's short outline of the categories; see *Šarḥ 'Uyūn al-ḥikma*, ed. as-Saqqā, vol. 1, p. 109, l. 4. Before that he simply describes them as 'requiring a relationship.'

kinds, five of which are subsumed under substance and nine of which are subsumed under accident (see figure 14).




Figure 14. The Five Substantial and Nine Accidental Kinds in ar-Rāzī's *Šarḥ 'Uyūn al-ḥikma*



While ar-Rāzī has stated right from the beginning that this rather tentative list may not be regarded as the result of deductive reasoning, in the further course of his exposition he voices his doubts even more clearly: The scholars of the philosophical tradition not only failed to provide a proof for the claim that all of the ten categories are genera, let alone *summa genera*. What is more, they also did not manage to establish that “their division into the well-known divisions” (*taqsīmuḥā ilā l-aqsāmi l-mašhūra*) is indeed “a division of genera into their proximate species” (*taqsīmu l-aḡnāsi ilā anwā‘ihā l-qarība*).<sup>411</sup> Eventually, ar-Rāzī appears to criticize the Aristotelian tradition for its incapacity to meet basic Aristotelian demands towards a sound scientific theory. To ar-Rāzī’s mind, one needs to accept the fact that whoever wants to arrive at a list of *summa genera* cannot resort to anything but a tentative bottom-up approach.

### 3.4.3. Concluding Remark on ar-Rāzī’s Reception of the Scheme of Categories

The way in which ar-Rāzī – whether in the *Mabāḥiṭ* or in the *Šarḥ ‘Uyūn al-ḥikma* – refers to and makes use of Aristotle’s list of categories suggests quite a pragmatic stance: As long as it can be modified in such a way that it allows for the difference between the Creator and His creation to be respected and as long as it has not been conclusively disproved, it may serve as a useful working model for getting order both into the arrangement of things in the world and, related to that, into our attempts at composing a philosophical *summa*. Yet since, at the same time, it must, by and large, be viewed as the product of philosophical convention, one should always keep in mind that this is merely one out of several human approaches of rationalizing the limited amount of knowledge we have access to. For ar-Rāzī, the only ontological distinction we may be absolutely certain of – regardless of the intellectual tradition in which one converses – is the fundamental difference between *wāḡib* and *mumkin*, that is, between God and everything He creates. Thus, in his reassessment of the scheme of categories we see ar-Rāzī combine Ibn Sīnā’s harsh criticism of unfounded claims of the preceding philosophical tradition both with Ibn Sīnā’s ontological use of the two modal notions of *wāḡib* and *mumkin* and with the aim of integrating the philosophical working model of the ten Aristotelian *summa genera* into the framework of a religiously informed ontology. In doing so, ar-Rāzī, via Ibn Sīnā, engages both with the Themistian and Ammonian approaches of systematizing the

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411 Ar-Rāzī, *Šarḥ ‘Uyūn al-ḥikma*, ed. as-Saqqā, p. 99, ll. 7–9; MS Leiden Or. 712, fol. 24b, ll. 13–14.

categories – but deems neither one of these two approaches nor Ibn Sīnā’s revised scheme to provide epistemologically satisfying answers.

## B. TEXTS

### a. Ibn Sīnā, *al-Muḥtaṣar al-awsaṭ fī l-manṭiq*, *al-Maḡlāt*, ch. 4

[ed. Kalbarczyk, p. 331]

#### [Chapter 4] That Which Is Said in Combination and without Combination

[§ 29] As for that which is said without combination, truth (*ṣidq*) and falsehood (*kiḏb*) do not enter it; for in it there is neither an affirmation (*iḡāb*) nor a negation (*salb*) nor a judgment (*ḥukm*); for every judgment comes about by [predicating] one thing of another thing (*bi-ṣay'in 'alā ṣay'in*) – and this is a combination.

As for those which are said without combination, their meanings (*ma'ānīhā*) fall under one of the ten high genera which are [1] the substance (*al-ḡawhar*), [2] the quantum (*al-kamm*), [3] the quale (*al-kayf*), [4] the relatum (*al-muḏāf*), [5] the where (*al-ayn*), [6] when (*matā*), [7] the possession (*al-milk*), [8] the position (*al-waḏ'*), [9] doing (*an yaḑ'ala*) and [10] being affected (*an yanfa'ila*). We shall give a detailed account of each of these ten. We do not, however, occupy ourselves with establishing that they [i.e., the highest genera] cannot be less or more in number; for this is impossible – and everything which had been said with regard to this is a forced effort (*takalluf*), not anything necessary (*ṣay'an ḏarūriyyan*).

[§ 30] We do, however, say that 'the existent' (*al-mawḡūd*) does not comprise the ten [genera] as a genus (*lā ya'ummu l-'aṣarata 'umūma l-ḡins*) and that accident (*al-'araḏ*) does not comprise the nine [accidental genera] as a genus (*lā ya'ummu t-tis'ata 'umūma l-ḡins*). For everyone holds [1] that it is a condition for the genus that it be essential (*ḏātī*); [2] and the majority holds that it has to apply synonymously and be predicated equally (*mutawāṭi' al-ḥaml*) of its particulars. These two notions are both missing in the case of 'the existent' and 'the accident.'

[§ 31] [*1<sup>st</sup> condition*] This is because whenever we understand the meaning and definition of a thing,<sup>412</sup> we do not thereby gain an understanding of whether it is existent or non-existent. For if we know what the rectangular triangle is, we know which genus or essential differentia it has – and hence it is impossible for us not to know things like the triangle as such, the figure, and the quality. The

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412 Instead of *ma'nā ṣay'in wa-ḥaddahū* one might also read *ma'nā ṣay'in waḥdahū* ("the meaning of a thing alone").

existence [of a rectangular triangle], however, needs to be proven. Therefore, existence is [only] attached to the quiddity and does not constitute it (*lāzim lā muqawwim li-l-māhiyya*). Likewise, if we know whiteness and heat, we know by necessity that they are both qualities, whereas – as long as it has not been proven – it remains unclear to us that they are both accidents. ‘Accident’ attaches to the nine and is not essential for them (*lāzimun li-t-tis‘ati lā dātī*). Likewise, it [i.e., accident] does not make known<sup>413</sup> their essences but only makes known<sup>414</sup> their relations to the subject; at first their essences exist in the intellect and only subsequently they become related to the subject. Hence, it has become clear that neither ‘the existent’ nor ‘the accident’ is essential.

[§ 32] [*2<sup>nd</sup> condition*] Moreover, they are both not synonymous. For ‘the existent’ first applies to substance and subsequently, by way of a known sequence (*tartīb ma‘lūm*), to the quale, to the quantum and to the rest of these [i.e., the other categories]. The same is true for accident; for the quantum is prior to the where and prior to when; and according to some people the quale is prior to the quantum, whereas according to others the quantum is prior to the quale. Hence, it has become clear that neither ‘the existent’ nor ‘accident’ is a genus.

### b. Ibn Sīnā, *K. aš-Šifā’, al-Mantiq, al-Maqūlāt*, II,5

[ed. Madkūr, pp. 82–88]

#### Making Known the State of the Number of the Categories

[(II.E) al-Ḥillī (fol. 47b, ll. 4–5): “The Fifth Issue (*maṭlab*): Making Known the State of the Number of the Categories and That They Are Not More Than Ten (*wa-annahā lā tazīdu ‘alā l-‘ašara*)”]

[ed. Madkūr, p. 82, l. 4]

[§ 1] From among the things pertaining to the investigation we are undertaking what has remained to be examined is a validation of the number of these categories (*tašhīḥ al-‘adad alladī li-hādihī l-maqūlāt*) and of the claim that – if they cannot be reduced to a smaller number – they likewise cannot be extended to a larger number. This is something which the totality of logicians attempted to do. And I provide a proper account (*ḥaqq al-wafā’*) of whatever has reached me. The way to proceed in this validation requires<sup>415</sup> three approaches [of reasoning] (*anḥā’*):

413 My edition has *na‘rifu* but I think the reading *yu‘arrifu* would be preferable.

414 Once again, my edition has *na‘rifu* but *yu‘arrifu* would be preferable.

415 [82.6] Read with MSS B, IA2, IC4, ID3, IN1, LB3, LG4, N, OP4, S, SA, TD3, TM5, Y *yahūḡu* instead of *yahruḡu* (EC).

[**(II.E.1) al-Ḥillī** (fol. 47b, ll. 9–10): “**First Investigation (baḥṭ): The First Approach of Reasoning (an-naḥw al-awwal mina n-naẓar)**”]

[§ 2] [*1<sup>st</sup> approach: establishing that every category is said of that which is below it by means of a genus-predication*] The first one is to establish that none of these categories is predicated of that which is below it<sup>416</sup> in a different way than by means of a genus-predication (*annahū wa-lā wāḥida min ḥādihī l-maḡulāti illā wa-yuḡālu ‘alā mā taḥtahū qawla l-ḡins*). This [claim] requires that it be established that their predication of that which is below them [i] does not come about by means of a coincidence in name (*laysa ‘alā sabīli l-ittifāqi fī l-ism*) [i.e., homonymously]; [ii] and that it does not come about by means of predicating one and the same meaning with differing degrees of priority and posteriority so that they would be predicated by means of ‘modulation’ [i.e., ‘focal homonymy’] (*taškik*); and moreover, [iii] that it [i.e., their predication] does not come about the way concomitants are predicated (*qawl al-lawāzim*); these [i.e., the concomitants] are said of that which is below them in an equal manner without any difference [i.e., univocally], yet they do not belong to those which are constitutive (*al-muḡawwimāt*); rather, they belong to the concomitants (*al-lawāzim*) or to the relational properties (*al-umūr al-iḍāfiyya*) by which a thing’s quiddity is not constituted.

[§ 3] As soon as they establish that the category is predicated of that which they had assumed to be one of its species as a predication with one and the same meaning which is constitutive for the quiddity of these species – and that it is not predicated by means of one of the excluded modes (*laysa ‘alā sabīl aḥad al-wuḡūh al-mustaṭnāt*) –, each of them is a genus in the proper sense for that which has been assumed to be one of its species; and the relationship of one of these to that which has been assumed to be one of its species would not be the relationship which ‘accident’ has to the nine [accidental categories] or the relationship which ‘existent’ has to the ten [categories] or the relationship which [the category of] relation has to a number of them, namely to [the relational categories of] where, when, having, doing and being affected. For if quality, for example, did not apply to those things which have been assumed to be its species in accordance with the conditions by which a genus applies to something, but if it [i.e., quality] applied to them [only] in the manner of the concomitants (*al-lawāzim*) [i.e., non-essentially], even if it applied to them with one and the same meaning, it would not be a genus for that which is below it. Rather, if that which is below it is predicated of that which is more specific than that which is below it in the manner in which something constitutive is predicated, every

416 [82.8] Read with MSS AE, B, IA2, IC4, ID3, IN1, LB3, LG4, N, OP4, S, SA, TD3, TM5, Y *taḥtahū* instead of *taḥta* (EC).

single one of those which are below it becomes, properly speaking (*bi-l-ḥaqīqa*), the highest genus. Hence, one single genus of it [i.e., of quality] would, for example, be that which is called ‘affective quality and affections’ (*kayfiyya infī‘āliyya wa-infī‘ālāt*); and the other genus would, for example, be the ‘possessions and conditions’ (*al-malakāt wa-l-ḥalāt*); as a consequence, quality would be said of these not by means of a genus-predication but in the manner the concomitants are said. Thus, the number of genera which would, properly speaking, be highest genera would be higher than the number that had been mentioned. This manner of thoroughly examining the theory at hand (*hādā l-wağh min tadqīq an-nazar*) is something which none of the predecessors had dealt with.

[(I.I.E.2) al-Ḥillī (fol. 48a, ll. 17–18): “Second Investigation (*baḥṭ*): The Second of the Three Approaches of Reasoning (*an-nazar at-tānī mina l-anḥā’ at-talāṭa*)”]

[§ 4] [*2<sup>nd</sup> approach: establishing by means of a division of ‘the existent’ that there is no genus outside of these ten*] The second approach is to establish that there is no genus outside of those [ten categories] that had been mentioned by means of dividing ‘the existent’ until one reaches the division that results into these [categories]. Even if in the field of constituting the essence this [way of proceeding, i.e., a *dihairesis*] were accepted (*wa-in sūmiḥa fī amri t-taqwīmi li-d-dāt*), it is also a matter in which nothing true has been transmitted from them [i.e., from previous scholars] to us (*wa-huwa ayḍan mā lam yabluğnā ‘anhum fīhi šay’un ḥaqīqiyyun*). Later on we will set out what they said.

[§ 5] [*3<sup>rd</sup> approach: another attempt at showing that there is no genus outside of these ten*] Or they establish by means of another approach (*bi-wağh aḥḥar*), which is not the [method of] division, that it is impossible that there be any genus apart from these genera (*an yastahīla an yakūna ġinsa ġayra ḥādihī l-ağnās*), provided that there is a way to do so (*in kāna ilā miṭli dālīka sabilun*). As far as I can tell, they did, in fact, carry out something which amounts to something like that (*wa-mā ‘indī annahūm ‘amalū šay’un ya’taddu bihī fī dālīka*).

[§ 6] [A] Let us begin [with the presentation of this method]. Thus, we give an account of one of the well-known approaches of division (*wāḥidan min anḥā’i l-qismati l-mašhūra*) so that we can thoroughly reflect upon its state. [B] Thereupon, we will burden ourselves (*natakallaḥu*) with arriving at a division which brings us closer to a means of achieving this aim (*qismatan tuqarribu ilā ḥādā l-ğaraḍi s-sabīla*), without there being, however, any warrant that by doing so a full account of its true nature may be provided (*min ġayr an tuḍmana muwāḥatu l-ḥaqīqati bihā fīhi*).

[ed. Madkūr, p. 83, l. 11]

[§ 7] [*ad A. The well-known division of the categories*] To the well-known division (*al-qisma al-mašhūra*) pertains that which one of them said:

«Substance is, without a doubt, one of the categories; and as soon as we have divided the nine which are the accidents into their nineness, the categories have been completely attained as ten.»

[§ 8] He said:

«The accident is [i] either such that it is fixed in its subject (*mustaqirran fi mawḍūʿihī*), that it does not occur to it extrinsically on account of something else (*ḡayra wāridin ʿalayhi bi-sababi ḡayrihī min ḡariḡin*), and that it is not in need of a relationship to that extrinsic thing; there are three divisions [of this type of accident]: quantity, quality, and position. [ii] Or it is such that it [i.e., the accident] occurs to it [i.e., to the subject] extrinsically (*wāridan ʿalayhi min ḡariḡin*) – in such a manner that, for the sake of it [i.e., for the sake of acquiring this accident], it [i.e., the subject] does not have the need for any property (*amr*) originating from itself; rather, the existence of something extrinsic on which it is based suffices<sup>417</sup> for it; there are three divisions [of this type of accident]: where, when, and having. [iii] Or it is such that there is a property (*amr*) which is only fully realized between it [i.e., the subject] and something extrinsic; and it is not solely due to something extrinsic; there are three divisions [of this type of accident]: relatum, doing and being affected.»

[§ 9] Thereupon, he made this threeness [i.e., the use of three triads] even stronger; he commended their usage as

«being in accordance with the custom<sup>418</sup> which evolved from the usage of rhetoric with regard to some issues of philosophy (*ḡāriyan ʿalā l-ʿādati llati ḡarat min istiʿmāli l-ḡiḡābati fi baʿḡi masāʿili l-falsafa*), inasmuch as they say in praise (*taqrīz*) of the threeness: “threeness is a perfect number; therefore, ‘all’ and ‘total’ is only said of ‘three’; the praises [of God or of several deities] are threefold; the movements are three; and the dimensions are three, and the like.” This is what they said.»

[ed. Madkūr, p. 84, l. 4]

[§ 10] [*ad B. Ibn Sīnā*’s revision of the well-known division of the categories] You have already learned that this [division] is something which is [merely] carried out by means of an approximation [to the truth] and is not something which [itself] is in close proximity [to the truth] (*ʿalā sabāli taqrībin ḡayri qarībin*). But it is possible to consolidate this approach and to somewhat strengthen it by saying: Every accident must be either such that [1] its conceptualization requires the conceptualization of something which is extrinsic to its

417 [83.16] Read with MSS IA2, ID3, LB3, LG4, OP4, SA, TD3 (and al-Ḥillī’s commentary) *bal yakfīhu wuḡūdu amrin min ḡariḡin* instead of *bal bi-kayfiyyati wuḡūdi amrin min ḡariḡin* (EC); the variant *yakfīhu* is not given in the apparatus of EC – even though MS SA (which was used for EC) has *yakfīhu*.

418 [83.18] Read with MSS AE, B, IA2, IC4, ID3, IN1, LB3, LG4, N, OP4, S, SA, TD3, TM5, Y ʿāda instead of *mādda* (EC); no apparatus entry.

subject; [2] or such that it does not require it (*immā an yaḥūḡa taṣawwuruhū ilā taṣawwuri šay'in ḥāriḡin 'ani l-mawḏū'i laḥū aw lā yaḥūḡa ilā dālika*).<sup>419</sup>

[§ 11] [*ad 2. No conceptualization of something extrinsic is required.*] That which does not require it [i.e., an accident whose conceptualization does not depend on the conceptualization of something which is extrinsic to the subject in which the accident inheres] exists in three divisions (*aqsām*): [2.1.] It is either such that – even though it does not require it – it may require the occurrence of a relationship with regard to those things which are in it and which are not extrinsic to it (*ilā wuḡū'i nisbatin fi ašyā'in hiya fihi laysat ḥāriḡatan 'anhū*); [2.2. and 2.3.] or it is such that it does not require it at all.

[§ 12] [*ad 2.1. Position*] If it does require it [i.e., if it requires an intrinsic relationship], this requirement renders the subject divided in a certain respect (*ḥādihī l-ḥāḡatu taḡ'alu l-mawḏū'u munqasiman bi-waḡhin mā*), namely in such a manner that it [i.e., the subject] has parts of which some differ from others with regard to the relationship; and this is the category of position. For it is the relationship which the parts of the body have to each other so that each of them is a [single] where which is [distinguishable] from the whole (*huwa nisbatu aḡzā'i l-ḡismi ba'ḏah ilā ba'ḏin anna kullā wāḥidin minhā ayna huwa mina l-kull*). These are the variations (*iḥtilāfāt*) which apply to them *per se* (*ta'riḏu laḥā bi-d-dāt*), inasmuch as they are divisible parts (*min ḥaytu hiya aqsāmun tanqasimu*).<sup>420</sup> As for that which is due to other accidents (*allaḏī yakūnu bi-a'rāḏin uḥrā*), such as colors and odors, these [accidents] only come about afterwards; they come about after the dividing relationship which holds between them inasmuch as they are parts by which the thing is divided. Indeed, this variety is due to an 'otherness' (*ḡayriyya*) on account of which every single one of them differs from the other one *per accidens*; but it is not the case that on account of that ['otherness'] the whole acquires one unified property by which it could be counted (*hay'atun wāḥidatun ya'taddu biḥā*). However, our [present] objective (*ḡaraḏunā*)<sup>421</sup> concerns nothing but a state pertaining to the whole on account of relationships which the parts have to each other with regard to a certain property (*fi amrin mā*) – in such a manner that it is a unified state with regard to the whole (*fi amrin mā ḥālan wāḥidatan li-l-kull*). This appears to be the [category of] position with regard to the whole and the [category of] relation (*iḏāfa*) with regard to the parts.

419 A paraphrase of what follows can be found in ar-Rāzī's *al-Mabāḥiṭ al-mašriḡiyya* (beginning with almost the same wording Ibn Sīnā uses: *immā an yaḥtāḡa taṣawwuruhū ilā taṣawwuri šay'in ḥāriḡin 'an mawḏū'ihī aw lā yaḥtāḡa*); see above, pp. 178–179.

420 [84.12] Read with MSS OP4, LB3 *aḡzā' tanqasimu* instead of *aḡzā' munqasim* (EC).

421 [84.15] Read with MSS LB3, LG4, OP4 *ḡaraḏunā* instead of *'araḏiyyan* (EC).



[§ 13] [*ad* 2.2. and 2.3. Quantity and quality] If, however, the conceptualization of that [accident] does not require a relationship occurring in it, it must be either [2.2.] such that it is a property (*amr*)<sup>422</sup> which is due to its essence and which, inasmuch as it applies to it, makes it possible for substance to be counted by a single unit, assuming in it a continuous or a discrete count – and this is [the category of] quantity (*kammiyya*); or it must be [2.3.] such that it is not like this and such that it is a property (*hay'a*) which is realized in the body and whose conceptualization does not require that one assumes for the body, in order for its conceptualization to become possible, any relationship to anything else whatsoever, be it *in actu* or *in potentia* – and this is called [the category of] quality (*kayfiyya*).

[§ 14] [*Summary: position, quantity, quality*] As for the [category of] position, it requires a certain relationship which the parts of the body have to each other, either *in actu* or *in potentia*. As for the [category of] quantity, it requires a certain relationship which the whole has to the part or to the parts *in potentia*. These two, i.e., position and quantity, have in common that, in order for their conceptualization to become possible, they both in a certain way point towards the division of a multiplicity.<sup>423</sup> And each property which, in order to be conceptualized, does not in any way require any division and which, in order to be conceptualized, furthermore does not require any relationship to anything extrinsic is [something which belongs to the category of] quality. Hence, it has become clear that this division is carried out under three aspects.

[§ 15] [*ad* 1. *The conceptualization of something extrinsic is required*] As for that [accident] which requires a relationship (*nisba*) [to something which is extrinsic to its subject],<sup>424</sup> it is either [1.1.] such that it requires a relationship which makes the quiddity be said with regard to that to which it is related (*an tağ'ala l-māhiyyata maqūlatan bi-l-qiyāsi ilā l-mansūbi ilayhi*); hence, there is a corresponding reciprocity in the meaning of the relationship – and this is the [category of] relation (*iḍāfa*); or it is [1.2.] such that the relationship does not require that; hence, it is either a relationship [1.2.1.] to substances or [1.2.2.] to accidents.

[§ 16] [*ad* 1.2.1.] As for the [relationship to] substances, it is – due to the way they are – not appropriate to assume that they have a relationship or that they stand in a relationship to anything (*fa-innahā li-anfusihā lā tastahiqqu an*

422 [84.18] Read with MSS LB3, LG4, OP4 *amran* instead of *aṭaran* (EC).

423 [85.6] Read with MSS LB3, OP4 *qismat al-kaṭra* instead of *qisma wa-kaṭra*.

424 [85.9] Read with MSS LB3, LG4, OP4 *nisba* instead of *nisba ilā ḥārīḡ*; in terms of content, the latter is, of course, correct; but since *ilā ḥārīḡ* is missing in the earlier MSS, it was probably added by a subsequent reader or commentator (it is contained in al-Ḥilli's commentary).

*yuğ‘ala lahā aw ilayhā nisbatan*); rather, they have an appropriate claim to having things and states in them through which they are specified (*bal innamā tastahiqqu li-umūrin wa-aḥwālin fihā taḥtaṣṣu bihā*).

[§ 17] [*ad* 1.2.2.] Hence, that which has to be taken into consideration is that which is related to the accidents. These accidents must either be [1.2.2.1.] such that they are from among the accidents of relationship (*min a‘rāḍi n-nisba*); or [1.2.2.2.] such that they are not from among the accidents of relationship.

[§ 18] [*ad* 1.2.2.1.] As for the relationship to accidents which are [themselves] relationships (*ilā a‘rāḍin hiya nisbatun*), it belongs to those things which continue in an infinite regress (*mina l-umūri llatī tatasalsalu ilā ḡayri n-nihāya*). Nonetheless, the relationship to the relationship, in the end, leads up to a relationship to an ultimate thing for which the relationship holds; it stands still at the first non-relational thing (*tastaqirru ‘inda awwala ḡayri mansūbin*); otherwise it would go on *ad infinitum*. [*ad* 1.2.2.2.] Hence, the proper ultimate relationship (*an-nisbatu l-ḥaqīqiyyatu l-aḥīratu*) is, after all, a relationship to those accidents in which there is no relationship. Hence, it is either a relationship [1.2.2.2.1.] to quantity; or [1.2.2.2.2.] to quality; or [1.2.2.2.3.] to position.

[§ 19] [*ad* 1.2.2.2.1.] The things do not become related to the quantities (*kammiyyāt*), whichever way they may be, but – if they become related to them – they must be related to a quantity which renders a substance possessing a quantity measured<sup>425</sup> in relation to another substance; that [substance], in fact, measures it either by the measure of its essence or by the measure of its [accidental] state.<sup>426</sup> And, with regard to the measure of the body, none of the [accidental] states of the body has a fixed measure differing from the measure of the body. Rather, just like it [i.e., just like the measure of the body], it must be a non-fixed measure; thus, the state is not fixed; and every non-fixed state is called motion. Therefore, this relationship [i.e., the relationship to quantity] either comes about [1.2.2.2.1.1.] by a measure which becomes, on account of its existence in a body, a body that underwent change in its state, namely with regard to the fact that it contains it or is contained in it (*yuḥtawā*) – and this is the ‘spatial container’ (*al-ḥāwī*); or [1.2.2.2.1.2.] by a measure of the [accidental] state in the way in which we have [already] described it – and this is time (*zamān*).

[§ 20] The relationship to quantity, therefore, must either be such that it is a relationship to the ‘spatial container’ or such that it is a relationship to time. [*ad*

425 [85.20] Read with MSS LB3, LG4, OP4 and al-Ḥilli’s commentary *muqaddaran* instead of *miqdāran* (EC).

426 Ar-Rāzī in his paraphrastic quote of this passage distinguishes between *bi-miqdāri dātihī* and *bi-miqdāri ṣifatin* (whereas Ibn Sīnā’s text has *bi-miqdāri dātihī aw bi-miqdāri ḥālihī*); see ar-Rāzī, *al-Mabāḥiṭ al-maṣriqiyya*, p. 272, ll. 23–24.

1.2.2.2.1.1.] The relationship to the ‘spatial container’ is either<sup>427</sup> a relationship to [1.2.2.2.1.1.1.] a container which does not move along when the thing moves and which is not attached to it (*ilā ḥāwin lā yantaqilu bi-ntiqālihī wa-lā yalzamuhū*) – and this is the where (*al-ayn*) which is either a relationship to a first place or to a second place; or [a relationship] to [1.2.2.2.1.1.2.] a container which remains attached to it whenever the thing moves (*ilā ḥāwin lāzimin ‘inda n-nuqla*) – and this is, according to the doctrine of some of the validating scholars, the category of having (*maqūlat al-ḡida*). Hence, it appears to be clear (*ka-l-bayyin*) that the kinds of categories which result from the relationship to quantity are either [the category of] where or [the category of] when [which is the relationship to time, i.e., 1.2.2.2.1.1.] or [the category of] having.

[§ 21] [*ad* 1.2.2.2.2.] As for the relationship to quality, you must know that it does not hold for every substance that it renders one substance related to another substance; rather, [this only holds of] a quality which is in this [substance] on account of that [substance] and [vice versa] which is in this [substance] on account of that [substance] (*kayfiyyatun fī hādā min dāka aw min dāka fī hādā*). And if the quality is generated by one of the two substances in the other substance (*min aḥadi l-ḡawharayni fī l-āḥara*), [1.2.2.2.2.1.] the [accidental] state in which the quality arises from both of them (*al-ḥālu llaḍī tatakawwanu fīhi l-kayfiyyatu min hādayni*) is the category of being affected (*maqūlat an yanfa‘ila*); and [1.2.2.2.2.2.] the [accidental] state from which the quality arises (*al-ḥālu llaḍī tatakawwanu minhū l-kayfiyya*) is the category of doing (*maqūlat an yaf‘ala*).

[§ 22] [*Ibn Sīnā’s criticism of this attempt to provide a rationale of why the categories must be ten*] This is a forced kind of approximation (*darbun mina t-taqrībi mutakallifun*) of which I cannot guarantee (*lā aḍmanu*) whether it is correct and whether it bears up against the examination of the [scientific] set of rules (*imtiḥān al-qānūn*). Yet, of that which is presently available to me it is that which is closest [to attempting to answer the question why there must be ten categories] (*illā annahū aqrabu mā ḥaḍarnī fī hādā l-waqt*). It is possible for you to seek other methods with regard to this [question] and to burden yourself in a forced manner (*wa-an tatakallafa*). If you were to see some benefit (*fā‘ida*) or [even] a proper argument (*ḥuḡḡa ḥaḳīqiyya*) in that, you would want to come up with yet another division which would be closer [to the truth] than this [division]. However, both that which is close [to the truth] and that which is closest [to the truth] is still remote, as long as it has not arrived at truth itself (*al-ḥaqq nafsuhū*). Hence, this amount [of arguing] (*hādā l-qadr*) is sufficient for us to make the states of these ten [categories] known (*fī ta’rīfi aḥwālī hādihī l-‘ašr*).

427 Read with MSS LB3, LG4, OP4 *immā* instead of *abadan immā* (EC).

[ed. Madkūr, p. 86, l. 18]

[(II.E.3) al-Ḥillī (fol. 50b, l. 1): “Third Investigation (*baḥṭ*): Elucidation of the Simple and the Compound Expression (*bayān al-laḥẓ al-mufrad wa-l-murakkab*)”]

[§ 23] These ten expressions and their meanings are those which are the parts of that which is compounded. Not every expression (*laḥẓ*) which is acoustically and linguistically compounded is compounded with regard to the logicians’ terminological convention. For [proper names such as the theophoric names] ‘*Abdullāh* [i.e., “God’s servant”] and ‘*Abdurrahmān* [i.e., “servant of the Merciful”] and [such as the nickname] *Ta’abbāṭa Ṣarran* [meaning “who carries evil under the arm” and referring to the pre-Islamic poet Ṭābit b. Ġābir b. Sufyān] and other such expressions are – even though they are linguistically compounded – not compounded in the perspective of the logician; for – inasmuch as they were designated to be nicknames and proper names – it is not intended to signify any meaning whatsoever through their parts, even though it might be the case that with regard to a different subject a meaning is signified through them.

[§ 24] It may also be the case that an expression is not compounded with regard to language but is compounded with regard to the logician’s perspective, just like when someone says *a’išu* [“I live”] and *ta’išu* [“you live”]; for the *hamza* [i.e., “a”] of *a’išu* and the *tā’* [i.e., “t”] of *ta’išu* both signify [something] in the manner in which a simple expression signifies a simple meaning [i.e., they signify the simple meanings “I” and “you”]. [The expression] *ya’išu* [“he lives”] with a *yā’* [i.e., “y”], in turn, is not counted among the compounds; for the *yā’* in it does not signify a relation to [one] concealed subject only; thus, nothing else is contained in it than merely the signification which the verb has, i.e., it signifies an unspecified subject. But whenever one says *a’išu* [“I live”] and *ta’išu* [“you live”] – with *hamza* and *yā’* – there is a specification of the subject; and this exceeds the signification which the verb has. We shall clarify this later on.

[§ 25] It is these ten from which one derives the parts of compound expressions which are called “phrases” (*aqwāl*). Some of those which are compounded from these meanings (*ma’ānī*) are a proposition and a statement (*qaḍiyya wa-ḥabar*); this is that which is capable of being true or false, just like we say “man is an animal” (*al-insān ḥayawān*). Others are not a proposition and a statement; this is that which is not capable of it [i.e., of being true or false], just like we say “Zayd the scribe” (*Zayd al-kātib*). The same holds for the composition (*tarkīb*) which applies to definitions (*ḥudūd*) and descriptions (*rusūm*). That is to say, the expressions which are compounded come one after the other by way of adding to the preceding meaning a defining characterization (*ta’rīf*) or specification (*taḥṣīs*) in such a manner that it is it (*‘alā annahū huwa*). This is that with regard to which it is possible to use [the relative pronoun] “who/which” (*alladī*); for when you say “the rational mortal animal” this is just like when you say “the

animal which is the rational one which is the mortal one.” The same [i.e., the incapability of being true or false] holds for the composition which applies to a prayer (*du‘ā*), a question (*mas‘ala*), an order (*amr*), a prohibition (*nahiy*), an exclamation (*nidā*) and other things which have been enumerated in other places.

[§ 26] As for the simple expressions, they signify neither a true nor a false meaning; as a matter of fact, their meanings or units in the soul (*ma‘ānīhā aw āḥādūhā fī n-nafs*) are neither true nor false, that is, according to the manner in which truth and falsehood are in meanings. Rather, when these expressions are compounded in a specific manner of composition they signify a true meaning or a false meaning: When their meanings are compounded in the mind they are true if they correspond to existence (*in ṭābaqat al-wuḡūd*); and they are false if they do not correspond to it. Thus, even if they [themselves] are neither true nor false, they are parts of those which are true and false (*aḡzā’ aṣ-ṣādiqa wa-l-kāḍiba*).

## 4. Disputes about the Conceptual Unity and Generic Predicability of Accident and Substance

### A. STUDY

#### 4.1. Problems Concerning the Description of Accident and Its Relation to the Nine Non-Substance Categories: Ibn Sīnā's Departure from the Preceding Commentary Tradition

##### 4.1.1. General Overview of Ibn Sīnā's Assessment of the Aristotelian Description of Accident

Both in his *al-Muḥtaṣar al-awsaṭ fī l-manṭiq* and in his *K. aš-Šifā'* Ibn Sīnā discusses quite extensively the formula by which Aristotle at *Cat. 2*, 1a24–25 explains the expression “in a subject.” Since throughout the commentary tradition the phrase ὃ ἐν τινι μὴ ὡς μέρος ὑπάρχον ἀδύνατον χωρὶς εἶναι τοῦ ἐν ᾧ ἐστίν (“what is in something, not as a part, and unable to subsist separately from what it is in”) is taken to refer to all non-substance beings, it is, at the same time, understood to provide us with an explanation of what an accident is. This is one of the rare passages in Ibn Sīnā's two treatises on the *Categories* where he quotes Aristotle verbatim. However, it is worth noting that whereas he uses almost exactly the same wording both in the *Muḥtaṣar* and in the *Šifā'*, his version of the formula differs from the only extant Arabic translation of the *Categories*, i.e., the translation by Ishāq b. Ḥunayn:

Ibn Sīnā: *al-mawḡūdu fī šay'in lā ka-ḡuz'in minhū wa-lā yašihū qiwāmuhū (min) dūna mā huwa fihi.*<sup>428</sup>

Ishāq b. Ḥunayn: *al-mawḡūdu fī šay'in lā ka-ḡuz'in minhū wa-laysa yumkinu an yakūna qiwāmuhū min ḡayri llaḏi huwa fihi.*<sup>429</sup>

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428 Ibn Sīnā, *al-Muḥtaṣar al-awsaṭ fī l-manṭiq*, *al-Maqūlāt*, § 16, p. 329, ll. 3–4; and *K. aš-Šifā'*, *al-Manṭiq*, *al-Maqūlāt*, I,4, p. 28, ll. 4–5 [= § 1 (4.B.a)]. The *Muḥtaṣar* omits *min* before *dūna*.

429 *Manṭiq Aristū*, *al-Maqūlāt*, MS Paris ar. 2346, fol. 159a, ll. 23–25; ed. Badawī, vol. 1, p. 34, ll. 10–11; ed. Ġabr, vol. 1, p. 33, ll. 3–4 (Ġabr erroneously reads *li-ḡuz'in* instead of *ka-ḡuz'in*).

In the extant Arabic exegetical treatises on this passage written by Ibn Sīnā's predecessors or contemporaries, no deviation from Iṣḥāq's version can be observed.<sup>430</sup> This is even true for Yaḥyā b. 'Adī, who according to Ibn an-Nadīm's *Fihrist* is reported to have produced his own translation of the *Categories*.<sup>431</sup> However, for the time being one can only speculate whether Ibn Sīnā simply paraphrased Iṣḥāq's version or whether he did, in fact, have access to another translation.<sup>432</sup>

According to Ammonius, Aristotle's formula must be conceived as being "analogous to a definition" (ἀνάλογον ... ὀρισμῶ) and thus as having a genus-species structure: whereas "in something" (ἐν τινι) functions as the analogue of the genus, the remaining elements of the formula are the differentiae, that is to say, they ensure that the manner in which the accident inheres in something is sufficiently distinguished from the various other ways of "being in some-

430 See, for instance, al-Wāhibī, *Tafsīr ma'ānī Aristūṭālis fī K. al-Maḳūlāt*, MS Istanbul Ayasofya 2483, fol. 88b, ll. 5–6, and Ibn aṭ-Ṭayyib, *Tafsīr K. al-Maḳūlāt*, ed. Ferrari, p. 74 (Arabic), ll. 1–2.

431 Yaḥyā b. 'Adī, "Maḳālat Yaḥyā b. 'Adī b. Ḥamīd b. Zakariyyā' fī anna l-'arād laysa huwa ḡinsan li-t-tis' al-maḳūlāt al-'arādiyya" [= no. 3.34 in Gerhard Endreß, *The Works of Yaḥyā b. 'Adī: An Analytical Inventory*], in *Maḳālat Yaḥyā b. 'Adī al-falsafīyya*, ed. Saḥbān Ḥalifāt (Amman: Manšūrāt al-Ġāmi'a al-Urdunniyya, 1988), p. 144, ll. 11–12. According to the account of the *Fihrist*, Abū Sulaymān as-Siġistānī al-Mantiqī (ca. 300/912 – ca. 374/985) "had asked Abū Zakariyyā' to translate this book along with the commentary of Alexander of Aphrodisias (*annahū istanqala hādā l-kitāba Abā Zakariyyā' bi-tafsīri l-Iskandar al-Afrūdīsī*)"; see Ibn an-Nadīm, *al-Fihrist*, ed. Gustav Flügel (Leipzig: F. C. W. Vogel, 1871–1872), vol. 1, p. 248, ll. 24–25; ed. Taġaddod, p. 309, ll. 7–8. If one reads – as is attested by Ibn al-Qiftī – *Abū Zakariyyā'* instead of *Abā Zakariyyā'* and thus takes *istanqala* to have only one object, it is Yaḥyā b. 'Adī who commissioned the translation; see Ibn al-Qiftī, *Ta'rīḥ al-ḥukamā'*, ed. Julius Lippert (Leipzig: Dieterich'sche Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1903), p. 35, ll. 10–11. Cf. Appendix 3. Paul Sbath lists a *Kitāb Qāṭiġūriyās li-Aristūṭālis* with the addition *naqalahū mina r-rūmiyyati ilā l-'arabiyyati Abū Zakariyyā' Yaḥyā b. 'Adī* ("Abū Zakariyyā' Yaḥyā b. 'Adī translated it from Greek into Arabic"). Provided that the information given by Sbath is accurate (which need not necessarily be the case), at the beginning of the 20<sup>th</sup> century an additional translation of the *Categories* which had been produced by Yaḥyā b. 'Adī or at least in his surroundings was still preserved as part of the private collection of the Greek priest al-Ḥūrī Quṣṭantīn Ḥuḍarī of Aleppo; see P. Sbath, *al-Fihris*, part I (Cairo: Imprimerie Al-Chark, 1938), p. 69, no. 563 (for the catalogue entry) and p. VII (for the identification of the collector). Apart from Yaḥyā b. 'Adī's alleged translation, Ibn an-Nadīm *Fihrist* mentions several Arabic paraphrases – i.e., "abridgments (*muḥtaṣarāt*) and synopses" (*ġawāmi'*) – of the *Categories*; see Ibn an-Nadīm, *al-Fihrist*, ed. Flügel, vol. 1, p. 248, ll. 26–28; ed. Taġaddod, p. 309, ll. 9–10.

432 In any case, a systematic analysis of all passages in which Ibn Sīnā appears to quote the *Categories* verbatim would be a desideratum for further research.

thing.”<sup>433</sup> In the same vein, Abū l-Farağ b. aṭ-Ṭayyib, who refers to the formula as “the description of accident” (*rasm al-‘araḍ*), characterizes the expression “the existent in something” (*al-mawğūd fī šay’*) as “being equivalent to the genus” (*yağrī mağrā l-ğins*).<sup>434</sup> As shall be discussed below in more detail, Yaḥyā b. ‘Adī treats “the existent” (*al-mawğūd*) as the genus of the formula; thus, whereas the Greek expression ἔν τινι is devoid of any existential implications, its Arabic rendering as *al-mawğūd fī šay’* made it possible for Yaḥyā b. ‘Adī to shift the emphasis of the discussion to the role which “the existent” plays in the definition of “accident.”<sup>435</sup> Ibn Sīnā, in contrast, deems Aristotle’s formula to fall short not only of providing a sufficient “definitional explanation” (*bayān ḥaddī*) but also of qualifying as a “real description” (*rasm ḥaqīqī*); rather, he characterizes it as a “kind of explanation by which one is led to the name (*naw‘un mina l-bayāni l-muḥāli bihī ‘alā l-ism*), just like one explains a name by a name which is more widespread and more known (*bi-smīn ašhara wa-a‘rafa*),” that is to say, a nominal definition.<sup>436</sup> Against the background of Aristotle’s discussion of the various senses of ἄλλο ἐν ἄλλῳ in *Phys.* Δ 3 and other common usages of related expressions, Ibn Sīnā agrees with his predecessors that “in something” is a “homonymous expression” (*lafz muštarak*)<sup>437</sup> which is in need of further qualifications in order to succeed in making known what an accident is. With a clear recourse to the commentary tradition, Ibn Sīnā in his two treatises on the *Categories* discusses the following ways of “being in something” (see figure 15):

433 Ammonius, *In Categorias*, p. 26, ll. 30–34. Cf. Simplicius, *In Categorias*, p. 46, ll. 4–6.

434 Ibn aṭ-Ṭayyib, *Tafsīr K. al-Maḡlāt*, ed. Ferrari, p. 74 (Arabic), ll. 5–7.

435 Yaḥyā b. ‘Adī, “fī anna l-‘araḍ laysa huwa ġinsan,” p. 144, ll. 12–13. Cf. below, pp. 213–214.

436 Ibn Sīnā, *K. aš-Šifā’*, *al-Manṭiq*, *al-Maḡlāt*, I,4, p. 28, ll. 8–9 [= § 2 (4.B.a)].

437 Ibn Sīnā, *K. aš-Šifā’*, *al-Manṭiq*, *al-Maḡlāt*, I,4, p. 28, l. 7 [= § 2 (4.B.a)].



Ibn Sīnā, <i>al-Muḥtaṣar</i> , <i>al-Maqūlāt</i> , ch. 3	Ibn Sīnā, <i>K. aš-Šifā'</i> , <i>al-Maqūlāt</i> , ch. I,4	Aristotle, <i>Phys.</i> Δ 3	Commentaries on the <i>Categories</i> <sup>438</sup>
(1) <i>wuḡūd al-kull fī l-aḡzā'</i> [§ 17]	(I) <i>ḥāl al-kull fī l-aḡzā'</i> [p. 28, l. 16 – p. 29, l. 1]	(210a16–17) τὸ ὅλον ἐν τοῖς μέρεσιν	(i) The whole <i>in</i> the parts (P/A/S/O/J/E)
(2) <i>kawn al-ḡuz' fī kullihī</i> [§ 18]	(IV) <i>wuḡūd al-ḡuz' fī l- kull</i> [p. 31, l. 12]	(210a16) τὸ μέρος ἐν τῷ ὅλῳ	(ii) The part <i>in</i> the whole (P/A/S/O/J/E)
(3) <i>kawn aš-šay' fī l- makān</i> [§ 19]	(IX) <i>kawn aš-šay' fī l- makān</i> [p. 32, ll. 1–4]	(210a24) ἐν τόπῳ	(iii) <i>In</i> a place (P/A/S/O/J/E)
(4) <i>kawn aš-šay' fī l- wi'ā'</i> [§ 19]	(XIII) <i>fī l-inā'</i> [p. 35, l. 16]	(210a24) ἐν ἀγγείῳ (falls under ἐν τόπῳ)	(iv) <i>In</i> a container (P/A/S/O/J/E)
(5) <i>kawn aš-šay' fī z- zamān</i> [§ 19]	(VIII) <i>kawn aš-šay' fī z- zamān</i> [p. 31, ll. 17–19]	<i>not men- tioned</i>	(v) <i>In</i> time (A/S/O/J/E)
(6) <i>kawn al-ḡawhar fī l-a'arād</i> [§ 19] (substance <i>in</i> the accidents)	(XI) <i>kawn al-ḡawhar fī l-a'arād</i> [p. 32, l. 7]	<i>not men- tioned</i>	<i>no correspondence</i>
(7) <i>kawn al-'illa fī l- ma'lūl</i> [§ 19] (the cause <i>in</i> that which is caused)	---	<i>not men- tioned</i>	<i>no correspondence</i>
(8) <i>kawn al-hayūlā fī ṣ-šūra</i> [§ 21] (matter <i>in</i> form)	(XII) <i>al-mādda al-kā'ina fī ṣūra</i> [p. 35, ll. 6–7]	<i>not men- tioned</i>	<i>no correspondence</i>
(9) <i>kawn aš-šūra fī l- hayūlā</i> [§ 21]	(III) <i>ḥāl aš-šūra fī l- mādda</i> [p. 31, ll. 8–11]	(210a21) τὸ εἶδος ἐν τῇ ὕλῃ	(vi) Form <i>in</i> matter (P/A/S/O/J/E)

438 Porphyry (= P), *In Categorias*, p. 77, l. 37 – p. 78, l. 5; Ammonius (= A), *In Categorias*, p. 29, ll. 5–23; Simplicius (= S), *In Categorias*, p. 46, l. 5 – 47, l. 7; Olympiodorus (= O), *In Categorias*, p. 47, ll. 6–21; John Philoponus (= J), *In Categorias*, p. 32, ll. 7–26; and Elias/David (= E), *In Categorias*, p. 149, ll. 16–33. I have already briefly discussed the manner in which Ibn Sīnā deals with this formula in his *Muḥtaṣar* in my “The *Kitāb al-Maqūlāt* of the *Muḥtaṣar al-awsaṭ fī l-mantiq*: A Hitherto Unknown Source for Studying Ibn Sīnā’s Reception of Aristotle’s *Categorias*,” pp. 314–316.

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---	(VII) <i>aš-šūra fī l-murakkab</i> [p. 31, l. 16]	<i>not mentioned</i>	<i>no correspondence</i>
(10) <i>al-kulliyāt fī ḡuz'iyyātihā ka-l-aḡnās fī l-anwā'</i> [§ 22]	(IIa) <i>wuḡūd al-ḡins fī l-anwā' min ḥaytu l-'umūm</i> and <i>wuḡūd an-naw' fī l-ašḥāṣ</i> are two cases of <i>wuḡūd al-kullī fī l-ḡuz'iyyāt min ḥaytu huwa kullī</i> [p. 31, ll. 4–7]	(210a19) τὸ γένος ἐν τῷ εἶδει	(vii) The genus <i>in the species</i> (P/A/S/O/J/E)
---	(IIb) <i>wuḡūd ṭabī'at al-ḡins fī ṭabī'at an-naw' al-wāḥid min ḥaytu humā ṭabī'atāni</i> [p. 31, ll. 12–13; see also p. 32, ll. 9–10]	<i>not mentioned</i>	<i>no correspondence</i>
(11) <i>al-ḡuz'iyyāt fī kulliyātihā ka-l-anwā' fī l-aḡnās</i> [§ 22]	(V) <i>wuḡūd 'umūmiyyat an-naw' fī 'umūmiyyat al-ḡins min ḥaytu humā 'ammāni</i> ; this is an instance of <i>ḥāl al-ḡuz'ī fī l-kullī</i> [p. 31, ll. 13–15]	(210a18) εἶδος ἐν γένει	(viii) The species <i>in the genus</i> (P/A/S/O/J/E)
(12) <i>kawn al-'araḍ fī mawḏū'ihī</i>	(XIV) <i>kawn al-'araḍ fī mawḏū'ihī / ḥāl al-'araḍ fī l-mawḏū'</i>	<i>not mentioned</i>	(ix) <i>In a subject in the sense of Cat. 2, i.e., the accident in a subject</i> (A/S/O/J/E)
---	(X) <i>kawn aš-šay' fī l-ḡāya</i> [p. 32, ll. 5–6]	(210a23) ἐν τῷ τέλει	(x) <i>In a goal</i> (τέλος) (P/A/S/O/J/E)
---	---	(210a21) ἐν βασιλεῖ (example of ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ κινητικῷ)	(xi) <i>In the ruler; in that which effects something</i> (P ἐν τῷ κρατοῦντι; A/S/O/J/E ἐν τῷ ἄρχοντι; O/E equate this with ἐν ποιητικῷ)
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Figure 15. Different Ways of “Being *In* Something”

It is noteworthy that in his earlier *K. al-Maqūlāt* of the *Muḥtaṣar*, Ibn Sīnā integrates the case of “the cause in that which is caused” (*al-‘illa fī l-ma‘lūl*) into his list of the different senses of “being in something”; in doing so, he draws on the Neoplatonic principle that “the first cause exists in all of its effects” (*al-‘illatu l-ūlā tūḡadu fī l-aṣyā’i kullihā ‘alā tartībin wāḥidin*).<sup>439</sup> Moreover, both in the *Muḥtaṣar* and in the *Šifā’* one of his main foci lies on incorporating various hylemorphic ways of inherence, that is to say, not only “form in matter” but also “matter in form,” which is reminiscent of Aristotle’s statement that matter, when existing in actuality, is “in the form” (ἐν τῷ εἶδει ἔστιν, *Met.* Θ 8, 1050a15–16);<sup>440</sup> in the *Šifā’*, this is further supplemented by the two cases of inherence in the σύνολον, i.e., “matter in the compound” (*al-mādda fī l-murakkab*) and “form in the compound” (*aṣ-ṣūra fī l-murakkab*).

By drawing on a systematization effort which has most fully been preserved in Simplicius,<sup>441</sup> Ibn Sīnā groups the criteria by which “the accident in the subject” is distinguished from other inhering things into three classes: (1) The distinction may be achieved either solely on grounds of the formula “being in something” without any qualifying additions (or rather, on grounds of a specific understanding of that formula); (2) or on grounds of the additional criterion “not as a part of it” which, *inter alia*, does not hold of “the part in the whole,” “the species in the genus,” “matter in the compound” and “form in the compound”;<sup>442</sup> (3) or on grounds of the additional criterion “its subsistence is impossible in separation from it” which, *inter alia*, does not hold of “something in time,” “something in a container,” “something in a place,” “something in a goal,” “the substance in the accident” and “matter in form.”<sup>443</sup> While, on a general level, the

439 Anonymous, *Liber de causis*, ed. Otto Bardenhewer (Freiburg i. Br.: Herder, 1882), p. 102, l. 2 (§ 23).

440 It should be noted that the scribe of MS Istanbul Nuruosmaniye 2763 (which preserves the *Muḥtaṣar* in its entirety) seems to have taken issue with Ibn Sīnā’s addition of “matter in form”: While in the main body of the text “matter being in form” and “form being in matter” are both distinguished from “the accident being in the subject,” the marginal correction by the *scriba doctus* turns this into a chiasmic scheme, i.e., “form being in matter” needs to be distinguished from “the accident being in the subject” – but “matter being in form” needs to be distinguished from “the subject being in the accident” (*kawn al-mawḏū‘ fī l-‘araḍ*); see MS Istanbul Nuruosmaniye 2763, fol. 6b, l. 8.

441 Simplicius, *In Categorias*, p. 47, ll. 11–28.

442 Ibn Sīnā, *al-Muḥtaṣar al-awsaṭ fī l-mantiq*, *al-Maqūlāt*, § 18, p. 329, l. 9; § 22, p. 329, l. 22 – p. 330, l. 2; *K. aṣ-Šifā’*, *al-Mantiq*, *al-Maqūlāt*, I,4, p. 31, ll. 12–16 [= § 14 (4.B.a)].

443 Ibn Sīnā, *al-Muḥtaṣar al-awsaṭ fī l-mantiq*, *al-Maqūlāt*, § 19, p. 329, ll. 10–17; *K. aṣ-Šifā’*, *al-Mantiq*, *al-Maqūlāt*, I,4, p. 31, l. 17 – p. 32, l. 10 [= §§ 15–20 (4.B.a)]. In the *Šifā’* Ibn Sīnā does not explicitly state how “something in a container” is distinguished from “the accident in the subject” but since this is a rather uncontroversial case one may surmise that he would still group this into the same class as in the *Muḥtaṣar*. Simplicius also includes

expositions Ibn Sīnā gives in the *Muḥtaṣar* and in the *Šifā'* agree with each other, his tendency of providing a critical reassessment of previous exegetical activities is much more prominent in the *Šifā'*.

This becomes particularly clear with regard to the first way of drawing the distinction which Simplicius' commentary refers to in the context of a brief discussion of "the whole in the parts." According to Simplicius, this case differs from the inherence of the accident on account of the fact that the whole "is in several things" (ἐν τισίν ἐστιν) and thus not "in something" (ἐν τινί);<sup>444</sup> this is quite a subtle distinction which Ibn Sīnā himself still echoes in the *Muḥtaṣar*: "The whole does not exist in one single thing (*fī šay' wāḥid*) but in several things together (*fī ašyā' ġumlatan*)."<sup>445</sup> While the idea that ἐν τινί might mean "in exactly one thing – and not in numerous things" – is introduced here in reply to the question of whether the formula by which Aristotle characterizes the accident does indeed *exclude* all other inhering things, it will soon reappear in the context of discussing the reverse problem, namely whether Aristotle's formula succeeds in *including* all kinds of accidents.<sup>446</sup> In the *Šifā'* Ibn Sīnā appears to be quite skeptical of whether this is really an adequate reply at all: Upon further consideration, it becomes clear that the whole is neither in every single part nor in the totality of the parts; "for it itself is the totality of the parts" (*li-annahū nafsuhū ġumlat al-ağzā*).<sup>447</sup> Thus, one should be careful not to confuse "the whole" (*al-kull*) with "wholeness" (*al-kulliyya*), the latter being "a form of completeness (*šūra tamāmiyya*) which does not subsist by itself but rather in the parts altogether"<sup>448</sup> and which functions as a "general accident" (*'araḍ 'āmm*) in relation to the parts.<sup>449</sup> Properly speaking, therefore, it is "wholeness" – and not "the whole" – that exists in the parts, just like, for example, the form of "being ten" (*al-'ašriyya*) is realized in the sum of ten ones.<sup>450</sup> Therefore, if one says that "the whole is *in* the parts," this is merely "figurative speech" (*qawl mağāzī*),<sup>451</sup> that is to say, only on the level of language the whole inheres in the parts, "even if in reality (*ḥaqīqa*) it is neither in a thing (*lā fī šay'*) nor in numerous instances of the thing (*wa-lā fī ašyā'in minhā*)."<sup>452</sup> Ibn Sīnā complains that – far from hav-

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in this group 'the inherence of that which is moved in the moving cause' and 'the inherence of things which are ruled in the ruler' – cases which Ibn Sīnā does not consider.

444 Simplicius, *In Categorias*, p. 47, ll. 27–28.

445 Ibn Sīnā, *al-Muḥtaṣar al-awsaṭ fī l-manṭiq*, *al-Maqūlāt*, § 17, p. 329, ll. 5–6.

446 See below, pp. 220–221.

447 Ibn Sīnā, *K. aš-Šifā'*, *al-Manṭiq*, *al-Maqūlāt*, I,4, p. 30, ll. 6–7 [= § 9 (4.B.a)].

448 Ibn Sīnā, *K. aš-Šifā'*, *al-Manṭiq*, *al-Maqūlāt*, I,4, p. 29, l. 1 [= § 4 (4.B.a)].

449 Ibn Sīnā, *K. aš-Šifā'*, *al-Manṭiq*, *al-Maqūlāt*, I,4, p. 30, l. 12 [= § 10 (4.B.a)].

450 Ibn Sīnā, *K. aš-Šifā'*, *al-Manṭiq*, *al-Maqūlāt*, I,4, p. 28, l. 16 – p. 29, l. 5 [= § 4 (4.B.a)].

451 Ibn Sīnā, *K. aš-Šifā'*, *al-Manṭiq*, *al-Maqūlāt*, I,4, p. 30, l. 10 [= § 10 (4.B.a)].

452 Ibn Sīnā, *K. aš-Šifā'*, *al-Manṭiq*, *al-Maqūlāt*, I,4, p. 30, l. 20 [= § 10 (4.B.a)].

ing anything to do with Aristotle's discussion of the formula "being in something" – the distinction between "the whole in the parts" and "the accident in the subject" as well as the distinction between "in several things" and "in one thing" is an innovation on the part of "those who make forced attempts" (*al-mutakallifūna*).<sup>453</sup> This is one of several instances in which Ibn Sinā accuses the commentators of overloading the text with discussions which only arise as a result of terminological confusions or other extrinsic problems – in the present case as a result of the failure to discern the literal and figurative usage of an expression. Whereas an accident "is an accident precisely because it is in something" (*fa-innamā huwa 'araḍun li-annahū fī šay'in*), regardless of whether it is in one thing or in an aggregate that is made up of several things, the whole is not in anything at all but is only by way of license *said* to be "in several things and not in something," i.e., not merely in one single thing.<sup>454</sup>

Since in the *Šifā'* Ibn Sinā – in contrast to Simplicius – rejects the distinction between "in something" and "in several things" as hair-splitting and instead differentiates between the literal and figurative usage of an expression, he argues that by the same token one may also draw a distinction between the way the accident inheres in the subject, on the one hand, and "the existence of the universal (*kullī*) in the particulars (*ḡuz'iyyāt*), inasmuch as it is universal (*min ḡaytu huwa kullī*)," on the other hand. This applies both to "the existence of the genus in the species, insofar as it is general (*min ḡaytu l-'umūm*)" and to "the existence of the species in the individuals (*ašḡās*)."<sup>455</sup> While Simplicius discusses only the case of "the coordinated genus" (το γένος το κατατεταγμένον) which "completes (συμπληροῖ) the substance (τὴν οὐσίαν) of the species,"<sup>456</sup> i.e., an immanent universal which is part of a thing's essence,<sup>457</sup> and thus argues that this case is sufficiently separated from the way the accident inheres in the subject through the addition of μὴ ὡς μέρος, Ibn Sinā introduces a distinction between the genus with regard to being general and the genus with regard to its nature: Since a universal *qua* being a universal, i.e., on account of the fact that it is a general expression and not on account of the fact that it has a certain nature or meaning, inheres in a species or individual only on the level of linguistic con-

453 Ibn Sinā, *K. aš-Šifā'*, *al-Mantiq, al-Maqūlāt*, I,4, p. 30, ll. 18–19 [= § 10 (4.B.a)].

454 Ibn Sinā, *K. aš-Šifā'*, *al-Mantiq, al-Maqūlāt*, I,4, p. 31, ll. 1–3 [= § 11 (4.B.a)].

455 Ibn Sinā, *K. aš-Šifā'*, *al-Mantiq, al-Maqūlāt*, I,4, p. 31, ll. 4–7 [= § 12 (4.B.a)].

456 Simplicius, *In Categorias*, p. 47, ll. 15–16. English tr. by Chase, p. 61.

457 "Κατατεταγμένον" refers to a common nature which is realized in an individual; Thiel translates it as "das Gleichgeordnete" in order to stress the fact that it is a universal which – in contrast to the *universale ante rem* and *post rem* – is on the same level as the individual thing, i.e., a *universale in re* or *in multis*; cf. Rainer Thiel, *Aristoteles' Kategorienschrift in ihrer antiken Kommentierung*, pp. 52–54.

vention, it cannot be regarded to be a part of it. Only the case of “the existence of the nature of the genus (*wuğūd ṭabī‘at al-ğins*) in the nature of one single species (*fī ṭabī‘at an-naw‘ al-wāhid*), inasmuch as both are natures (*min ḥaytu ḥumā ṭabī‘atāni*),”<sup>458</sup> may be distinguished from the accident on grounds of the “not as a part” criterion.

If one compares Porphyry’s exposition of nine ways of “being in something” with the more extensive enumerations and systematizations undertaken by subsequent commentators from the Ammonian tradition (i.e., besides Ammonius himself, his pupils Simplicius, Olympiodorus and John Philoponus, as well as Olympiodorus’ alleged pupil Elias/David), an important exegetical development can be traced: Whereas the later commentators aim at distinguishing the manner in which an accident inheres in a subject from all other ways of “being in something,” Porphyry identifies “being in something as in a subject” (ἐν τῷ ὑποκειμένῳ ἔν τινι) with the manner in which “form is in matter” (ἐν τῇ ὕλῃ τὸ εἶδος); for both accidents and forms inhere in something in such a manner that they are “inseparable” (ἀχώριστὰ) from what they inhere in, i.e., from any given subject or from matter.<sup>459</sup> In the extant brief version of his commentary Porphyry, unfortunately, does not address the immediate problem which ensues from such an understanding of Aristotle’s formula: The accidental beings of the *Categories* would then, unequivocally, share the same fundamental feature as the substantial forms of *Metaphysics*, namely their being in a ὑποκείμενον.<sup>460</sup> To avoid this difficulty, the other commentators list “the being of the accident in the subject” as a separate sense of “being in something.” Simplicius makes it explicit that – contrary to previous exegetical efforts – these two senses of “being in something” may not be equated; “for there is a great difference between [being] as in a subject and [being] as in matter” (πολλὴ γὰρ διαφορὰ ἐστὶν τοῦ ὡς ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ πρὸς τὸ ὡς ἐν ὕλῃ).<sup>461</sup> Ibn Sīnā follows the later commentators’ intuition that one must draw a fundamental distinction between the expressions “being in matter (*wuğūd fī l-ḥayūlā*),” in the sense of the form (*šūra*) inhering in a material substrate, and “being in the subject (*wuğūd fī l-mawḏū‘*),” in the sense of the accident (*‘araḍ*) inhering in an underlying substance. However, whereas Simplicius claims that the “not as a part” criterion may be taken to be a decisive distinguishing mark between “form in matter” and “the accident in

458 Ibn Sīnā, *K. aš-Šifā‘, al-Manṭiq, al-Maqūlāt*, I,4, p. 31, ll. 1–3 [= § 11 (4.B.a)].

459 Porphyry, *In Categorias*, p. 78, ll. 5–10.

460 Cf. above, p. 66.

461 Simplicius, *In Categorias*, p. 46, ll. 22–23. English tr. by Chase, p. 61 (modified).

the subject,”<sup>462</sup> Ibn Sīnā both in his *Muḥtaṣar* and in the *Šifāʾ* only accepts the additional distinction discussed by Simplicius: In the case of the accident, “that which is in a subject takes its being from the subject” (τὸ εἶναι παρὰ τοῦ ὑποκειμένου λαμβάνει); but in the case of “form in matter,” the reverse is true, that is, “form gives being to matter” (τὸ δὲ εἶδος δίδωσιν τῇ ὕλῃ τὸ εἶναι).<sup>463</sup> Against this background, Ibn Sīnā argues that the difference between the inherence of the accident and the inherence of form does not hinge on Aristotle’s “not as a part” criterion but becomes clear through a specific understanding of “in something”: Whereas that in which the accident inheres must be taken to be “something whose subsistence is realized by itself (*fī šayʾ mutaḥaṣṣil al-qiwām bi-nafsihī*) and whose thingness (*šayʾiyya*) had already been completed without that which exists in it,” that in which form inheres, i.e., matter, is “by itself not an actual thing” but is only actualized through that for which it functions as a “substrate” (*maḥall*), namely through form.<sup>464</sup> In a closely related passage from the beginning of Alexander of Aphrodisias’ *quaestio* πρὸς τὸ μὴ εἶναι τὸ εἶδος ἐν τῇ ὕλῃ ὡς ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ (“that form is not in matter as in a subject”) the issue of whether that which the other thing inheres in exists *in actu* without that which inheres in it becomes more explicitly linked with Aristotle’s inseparability criterion: “that which is in a subject is in something which is *in actu* and which is able to exist even apart from what is in it as in a subject” (τὸ δ’ ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ ὄν ἐν τινὶ ἐστὶν ἐνεργεία ὄντι ὃ δύναται εἶναι καὶ χωρὶς τοῦ ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ αὐτῷ ὄντος).<sup>465</sup> However, as Ibn Sīnā stresses in the *Muḥtaṣar*, on the level of predication there is “something which they both have in common” (*mā yaštārikāni fīhi*); for both form and accident are “predicated by way of paronymy” (*maḥmūlatayn bi-l-ištiqāq*).<sup>466</sup> That is to say, just like an accident is predicated of any given substance either in the *having* mode (e.g., “Socrates *has* courage”) or by means of a paronymous expression (e.g., “Socrates *is* courageous”), we say that a “bronze” *has* a “statue-shape” or *is* “statue-shaped” (but not that it *is* the “statue-shape,” i.e., the form of a statue). Since a genuine understanding of the distinction between the two different ways in which they inhere in a subject lies beyond the realm of the issues properly studied within logical

462 Simplicius, *In Categorias*, p. 46, ll. 25–26: “τὸ δὲ ἐν ὕλῃ εἶδος ὡς ἐν ἀνειδέῳ καὶ μέρει οὐσίᾳς.” English tr. by Chase, p. 61 (modified): “The form which is in matter is [in something] as in something formless and as a part of substance.”

463 Simplicius, *In Categorias*, p. 46, ll. 26–27 (my tr.).

464 Ibn Sīnā, *K. aš-Šifāʾ, al-Mantiq, al-Maqūlāt*, I,4, p. 31, ll. 8–11 [= § 13 (4.B.a)]. On the notion of *šayʾiyya*, see Robert Wisnovsky, “Notes on Avicenna’s Concept of Thingness (*šayʾiyya*),” *Arabic Sciences and Philosophy* 10 (2000): pp. 181–221.

465 Alexander of Aphrodisias, *Ἀπορίαι καὶ λύσεις*, p. 17, ll. 11–12. English tr. by Robert Sharples, *Quaestiones 1.1–2.15* (London: Duckworth, 1992), *quaestio* 1.8, p. 43 (modified).

466 Ibn Sīnā, *al-Muḥtaṣar al-awsaṭ fī l-mantiq, al-Maqūlāt*, § 14, p. 328, l. 21.

propaedeutics (*fī hādā l-kitābi wa-mā yağrī mağrāhu mina l-madāhil*, as Ibn Sīnā puts it) accident and form need, at least provisionally, be treated in exactly the same way (*yağrī l-‘aradu wa-ş-şūratu mağran wāhidan*).<sup>467</sup> Thus, in the propaedeutic context of the *Categories* important ontological distinctions may become blurred both by virtue of pedagogical considerations and on account of the fact that things which considerably differ from each other with regard to their essential features may, on the level of language, nonetheless share in the same predicative structure. As we have seen before,<sup>468</sup> Ibn Sīnā’s newly devised fivefold scheme of attributive relations aims at avoiding this difficulty.

#### 4.1.2. Is Accident a Genus for the Nine Non-Substance Categories?

Already Iamblichus’ pupil Dexippus (4<sup>th</sup> century AD) reports and repudiates two closely related approaches of reducing the categories to only two *summa genera*: They have all been subsumed (1) under “things which are by themselves” (τὰ καθ’ αὐτά) and “things which are in relation to something else” (τὰ πρὸς τι), i.e., *relata*<sup>469</sup> – a view which in Simplicius’ commentary will be attributed to Xenocrates and Andronicus;<sup>470</sup> (2) or under “substance” (οὐσία) and “accident” (συμβεβηκός), which Dexippus subsequently equates with a division into “substrate” (ὑποκείμενον) and “accident.”<sup>471</sup> Even though Aristotle, according to Simplicius’ reading, was well aware of the fact that there is “one grasp/comprehension” (μία περίληψις) of accident – and thus drew the twofold distinction between “substrate” (ὑποκείμενον) and “those which are around/with the substrate” (τὰ περὶ τὸ ὑποκείμενον)<sup>472</sup> –, he nonetheless refrained from treating accident as a genus for the various kinds of accidental beings. In Simplicius’ assessment the adherents of both reductionist approaches “somehow seem to say the same” (ταυτόν πως δοκοῦσι [...] λέγειν): He complains, *inter alia*, that “even though the accidents are many genera” these scholars reduced all of them to one single genus of accident, namely to the “that which is in relation to something else” (τὸ πρὸς τι).<sup>473</sup>

467 Ibn Sīnā, *al-Muḥtaşar al-awsaţ fī l-manţiq, al-Maqūlāt*, § 14, p. 328, ll. 19–21.

468 Cf. above, pp. 107–115.

469 Dexippus, *In Aristotelis Categorias Commentarium*, ed. Adolf Busse (Berlin: Reimer, 1888), p. 31, ll. 11–13.

470 Simplicius, *In Categorias*, p. 63, ll. 21–24.

471 Dexippus, *In Categorias*, p. 31, ll. 13–17. Cf. the English tr. by John Dillon, *On Aristotle Categories* (London: Bloomsbury, 1990), p. 64.

472 Simplicius, *In Categorias*, p. 64, ll. 9–11.

473 Simplicius, *In Categorias*, p. 63, ll. 24–30. Cf. the English tr. by Chase, p. 78.



#### 4.1.2.1. Al-Fārābī, Yaḥyā b. ‘Adī, al-Wāhibī and Ibn aṭ-Ṭayyib on Why Accident Is Not a Genus

In the Arabic philosophical tradition, there appears to be a general consensus that accident may not be regarded to be a *summum genus*. However, the justification strategies advanced by various authors markedly differ from one another. Al-Fārābī in his *K. al-Ḥurūf* only briefly reports the opinion that the categories may be reduced to “what that thing there is” (*mā huwa hādā l-mušār ilayhi*), i.e., substance in the sense of an essential feature or an account of a thing’s essence, and “its accident” (*‘araḍuhū*); that is to say, whereas – according to this opinion – the first category makes known “the essence of the subject” (*dāt al-mawḍū’*), the second category “makes known what is extrinsic to its essence” (*‘arrafa mā huwa ḥārīḡun ‘an dātihī*). Without presenting a detailed argument, al-Fārābī repudiates this view on the following grounds: Just like the formulae ‘not in a subject’ and ‘in a subject,’ the distinction between ‘what makes known the essence’ and ‘what makes known something extrinsic to the essence’ provides us with a “description” (*rasm*) of substance and accident. However, “the meaning of accident is not a genus which comprises the nine” (*laysa ma’nā l-‘araḍi ḡinsan ya‘ummu t-tis‘a*) but rather “a certain relation that each of these categories has to that thing there” (*iḍāfatun mā li-kulli wāḥidatin min hādihī l-maqūlāti ilā l-mušāri ilayhi*), i.e., something which “attaches” (*laḥiqa*) to all accidental genera and species without amounting to an “intelligible nature” (*ṭabī‘a ma‘qūla*) by which they “are characterized” (*tūṣafu*).<sup>474</sup> It is noteworthy that, even though al-Fārābī himself does accept the claim that substance is a genus, in this context we see him hint at the possibility of extending the non-generic status of accident to substance as well (or at least to a certain understanding of substance): “likewise, our saying ‘what makes known what that thing there is’ signifies also a relation that attaches to each of the species of that thing there and to the genera of its species.”<sup>475</sup> Whereas the predicative characterizations which provide us with an account of what it means to be ‘the substance of something’ and ‘the accident of something’ both fail to amount to a genus, al-Fārābī’s discussion still leaves open the possibility that the ontological characterizations ‘existing not in a subject’

474 Al-Fārābī, *K. al-Ḥurūf*, ed. Muḡsin Maḥdī (Beirut: Dār al-Maṣriq, 1970), § 54, p. 93, l. 18 – p. 94, l. 3.

475 Al-Fārābī, *K. al-Ḥurūf*, ed. Maḥdī, § 54, p. 94, ll. 7–8. One level above substance and accident, this also holds for ‘category’: While it is common to all categories, it does not function as one *summum genus* but applies to them either as a “a shared name” (*ism muṣṭarak*), i.e., equivocally, or “in such a manner that it signifies the relation that attaches to them in general” (*an takūna dāllatan ‘alā l-iḍāfati llati laḥiqathā ‘alā l-‘umūm*); ibidem, ll. 8–10.

and ‘existing in a subject’ may succeed in functioning as the proper descriptions of two *summa genera*.

In an elaborate attempt at tackling this issue, al-Fārābī’s alleged pupil Yaḥyā b. ‘Adī dedicated a separate treatise to the relation in which the general term ‘accident’ stands to each of the nine accidental categories. Like generations of Peripatetic philosophers before him, he aims at refuting the claim that “the meaning of accident” (*ma’nā l-‘araḍ*), namely “the existent in something, not as a part of it, and such that its subsistence is impossible without that which it is in” (*al-mawḡūdu fī šay’in lā ka-ḡuz’in minhū wa-lā yumkinu an yakūna qiwāmuhū min ḡayri llaḍī huwa fihi*), can be regarded to be a genus which comprises all nine accidental categories. His approach, however, noticeably differs from what can be found in the extant commentary tradition.

At the outset, Yaḥyā b. ‘Adī takes it for granted that in the descriptive formula of accident the expression ‘the existent’ takes “the position of the genus” (*manzilat al-ḡins*). Thus, whereas the Greek expression ἔν τινι does not have any existential implications, in Ibn ‘Adī’s discussion of the Arabic expression *al-mawḡūd fī šay’* the center of attention shifts from *fī šay’* to *al-mawḡūd*. At the same time, he makes it clear that since the expression “the existent” (*al-mawḡūd*) is a “paronymous name” (*ism muštaqq*) and since “every entity from whose name a name for something else is derived” (*kullu dātīn yuštaqqu li-ḡayrihā ismun min ismihā*) must be taken to be “existent in the entity for which the name is derived” (*mawḡūdatan fī d-dāti llatī yuštaqqu lahā l-ism*), ‘existence’ must be existent in the formula ‘the existent in something.’<sup>476</sup> Against the background of these two presuppositions, he proceeds to show that the expression ‘existence’ signifies neither a “matter” (*hayūlā*) or “form” (*ṣūra*) nor a “genus” (*ḡins*) or “differentia” (*faṣl*).<sup>477</sup> Rather, ‘existence’ – which by way of paronymy is included in the descriptive account of accident, i.e., in the formula ‘the existent in something’ – is an “accident” (*‘araḍ*).<sup>478</sup>

However, ‘existence’ could not be an accident “in relation to an entity which is a genus for the nine [accidental] categories” (*li-dātīn hiya ḡinsun li-ttis’i l-maḡūlā*); for in this case, it would have to “apply concomitantly to all species of that genus” (*lāziman li-ḡamī’i anwā’i dālīka l-ḡins*). This would have the consequence that whenever anything from among the nine accidental categories “exists in relation to the substance” (*wuḡida ... li-l-ḡawhar*), i.e., whenever an accidental property is present in a substantial substrate, the substance would “by way of paronymy” (*‘alā ṭarīqi ištiqāqi l-ism*) also have “to be characterized by

476 Yaḥyā b. ‘Adī, “fi anna l-‘araḍ laysa huwa ḡinsan,” p. 144, ll. 11–19.

477 Yaḥyā b. ‘Adī, “fi anna l-‘araḍ laysa huwa ḡinsan,” p. 145, ll. 4–25.

478 Yaḥyā b. ‘Adī, “fi anna l-‘araḍ laysa huwa ḡinsan,” p. 146, ll. 1–5.

the meaning of the accident” (*an yun‘ata l-ğawharu bi-ma‘nā l-‘araḍ*).<sup>479</sup> Even though Yaḥyā b. ‘Adī avoids calling such an attribution “a predication of a subject,” there is a clear agreement between him and Ibn Sīnā concerning the assumption that whenever an accidental property is attributed to a substance, the accident *paronymously* lends both its name and its definition to the substance;<sup>480</sup> for example, on account of the accident of “number” (*‘adad*) any given substance becomes “numbered/countable” (*ma‘dūd*) and thus in a certain way also shares in the “name” (*ism*) and “meaning” (*ma‘nā*) of number. Since, therefore, a substance may share in the meaning of any of the accidental genera and since, at the same time, it is clear that “it is impossible for a substance to share in the meaning of accident” (*al-‘araḍu lā yumkinu an yašrahakū l-ğawharu fī ma‘nāhu*), Yaḥyā b. ‘Adī concludes that accident is not an accidental genus. Thus, he constructs a syllogism in the modus Cesare which he deems to consist of “two premises whose truth is evident” (*min muqaddimatayni bayyinatay aṣ-ṣidq*):

<i>minor</i>	Every ‘genus from among the genera of accidents which occur to a substance’ [S] is ‘something in whose meaning substance shares’ [M]	[SaM]
<i>maior</i>	‘The meaning of accident’ [P] is not ‘something in whose meaning substance shares’ [M]	[PeM]
<i>conclusio</i>	No ‘genus from among the genera of accidents which occur to a substance’ [S] is ‘the meaning of accident’ [P]	[SeP]

This conclusion, according to Yaḥyā b. ‘Adī, can be converted to the proposition “accident is none of the genera of accidents which occur to substance” (*inna l-‘araḍa laysa huwa wa-lā wāḥidan min aḡnāsi l-a‘raḍi l-‘arīdati li-l-ğawhar*) – and hence the desired result has been achieved.<sup>481</sup>

A much more common and considerably simpler line of reasoning is followed in al-Wāhibī’s *Tafsīr ma‘ānī Aristūṭālis fī K. al-Maqūlāt*: Drawing on the assumption that genera always need to be predicated univocally, al-Wāhibī argues that the reason why accident may not be regarded to be one single genus lies in the fact that ‘accident’ is said by way of equivocity, that is, what it means to be an accident differs with regard to each of the nine accidental categories.<sup>482</sup>

In the Arabic philosophical tradition the most comprehensive account of why accident is not a genus has been preserved in the *Tafsīr K. al-Maqūlāt* by Ibn Sīnā’s contemporary Abū l-Farağ b. aṭ-Ṭayyib, the main representative of the later generation of Baghdad Peripatetics. Whereas Simplicius, as we have

479 Yaḥyā b. ‘Adī, “fi anna l-‘araḍ laysa huwa ḡinsan,” p. 146, ll. 10–21.

480 Cf. above, pp. 100–104.

481 Yaḥyā b. ‘Adī, “fi anna l-‘araḍ laysa huwa ḡinsan,” p. 147, ll. 8–12.

482 Al-Wāhibī, *Tafsīr ma‘ānī Aristūṭālis fī K. al-Maqūlāt*, MS Istanbul Ayasofya 2483, fol. 94b, ll. 10–13.

seen, had attributed to Xenocrates and Andronicus the view that the ten categories may be reduced to “things which are by themselves” (τὰ καθ’ αὐτά) and “things which are in relation to something else” (τὰ πρὸς τι),<sup>483</sup> Ibn at-Ṭayyib singles out Xenocrates (*Ksānuqrātis*) as the “head” (*raʿīs*) of a “group” (*tāʿifa*) of scholars who held that “substance comprises (*yaʿummu*) the substances and accident comprises (*yaʿummu*) the accidents” and who therefore accused Aristotle of an unnecessary “multiplication” (*taktīr*) of *summa genera*.<sup>484</sup> Subsequently, he outlines five arguments by which Xenocrates’ claim may be refuted: While he makes it explicit that he deems the first argument to be faulty and the fifth argument to be “the truth” (*al-ḥaqīqa*), he does not spell out his attitude towards the other three arguments; however, since he did not dispute their soundness and ultimately constructs the fifth argument on basic tenets of the preceding arguments, we can surmise that he regarded them to provide adequate reasons, even though the ultimate argument in his view certainly performs best.

The first argument, which Ibn at-Ṭayyib quite clearly disapproves of, runs as follows: If accident were a *summum genus*, its “name and definition” (*al-ism wa-l-ḥadd*) would have to be predicated of the nine accidental categories “in one and the same manner” (*ʿalā watīratin wāḥidatin*),<sup>485</sup> i.e., by way of synonymy. However, by drawing on the Ammonian assumption that the accidental categories are divided into quantity and quality, on the one hand, and into “seven relational categories” (*maqūlāt an-nisab as-sabʿ*), on the other hand, one might hold that whereas quantity and quality are indeed “existent in something not as a part of it” (*mawǧūdatāni fī šayʿin lā ka-ǧuzʿin minhū*), the relational categories are “existent between two things, not as a part of these two” (*mawǧūdatun bayna šayʿayni lā ka-ǧuzʿin minhumā*), that is to say, since the category of when, for instance, is a relationship (*nisba*) between any given thing and “a time” (*zamān*) and since likewise all other relational categories are various types of “relationships” (*nisab*) “between two extremes” (*bayna ṭarafayni*), they fail to be included under the definitional formula ‘in something’.<sup>486</sup> The reason why Ibn at-Ṭayyib deems this argument to be problematic lies in the fact that – on the basis of a grave misunderstanding of Aristotle’s explanatory formula – it excludes seven accidental genera from the proper description of accident: “What Aristotle

483 See above, p. 211.

484 Ibn at-Ṭayyib, *Tafsīr K. al-Maqūlāt*, ed. Ferrari, p. 99 (Arabic), ll. 13–18.

485 Ferrari’s edition (p. 99, l. 20) reads: *waǧaba an yuḥmala ʿalayhā bi-l-ismi wāḥidin* [sic] *ʿalā watīratin wāḥidatin*. Without having been able to consult the MS, in terms of both sense and grammar I deem the reading given in ʿAlī Ḥusayn al-Ġābirī’s 2002 edition (reprint Damascus: Dār at-takwīn, 2010, p. 179, ll. 12–13) to be preferable: *waǧaba an yuḥmala ʿalayhā l-ismu wa-l-ḥaddu ʿalā watīratin wāḥidatin*.

486 Ibn at-Ṭayyib, *Tafsīr K. al-Maqūlāt*, ed. Ferrari, p. 99 (Arabic), l. 23 – p. 100 (Arabic), l. 9.

means by describing the accident as ‘existent in something’ is ‘that which is not self-subsistent’ (*allādī huwa ġayr qā’im bi-nafsihā*) – and this may be both *in* one single subject and *between* two subjects.” Aristotle, according to Ibn aṭ-Ṭayyib’s assessment, did provide a complete description of that which is an “existing accident” (*araḍ mawġūd*), that is to say, not simply “a relationship” (*nisba*) which in a certain sense also exists in something, namely “in the intellect (‘*aql*),” but rather any extra-mental “non-self-subsistent” property which can only exist by inhering in something else. The unnecessary linguistic confusion may be avoided by describing the accident as “existent *for/at/in relation to* a thing, not as a part of it (*al-mawġūdu li-šay’in lā ka-ġuz’in minhū*);” for this formula, in Ibn aṭ-Ṭayyib’s understanding, makes it clear that an accident may be either “*in the thing*” (*fī š-šay’*) or “*between it and something else*” (*baynahū wa-bayna ġayri-hī*).<sup>487</sup>

The subsequent three arguments which Ibn aṭ-Ṭayyib cites in support of the claim that accident is not a genus are closely related to one another. The second argument draws on the basic structure of a proper Aristotelian genus-differentia definition: While the genus is always included in a well-formed definition, accident in contrast is “not present in the definition of one of the nine accidental categories.”<sup>488</sup> Against the background of a less rigorous method of giving an account of what a thing is, the third argument departs from the observation that “the ancient philosophers” (*al-ḥukamā’ al-quḍamā’*) deemed it permissible to describe the nine accidental categories without any reference to accident; rather, they described quality, for instance, as that which is said in reply “whenever one asks about a certain individual ‘how he is’ (*kayfa huwa*).” From the fact that the various genera of accidents are not described by means of superior principles, one can conclude that they themselves are “are nine supreme kinds (*ru’ūs*) and highest principles to the utmost degree (*hiya fī l-ġayati mina l-’ulūw*),” that is to say, each of them is “an ultimate form (*šūra*) which the soul extracted from the things (*istanbaṭathā n-nafsu mina l-umūr*).”<sup>489</sup> Ibn aṭ-Ṭayyib’s fourth argument is related to the discussion of how one might arrive at a methodologically sound derivation of the ten categories:<sup>490</sup> If accident were to function as a genus, an inductive approach of justifying Aristotle’s list of nine accidental categories would have to make it apparent that “they have it [i.e., accident] in common (*ištirākuhā fihī*),” just like it is apparent that “the rational and the non-rational [...] both have ‘animal’ in common (*ištirākuhumā fī l-ḥayawān*).” However, as becomes clear by way of “inductive reasoning” (*istiqrā*), the nine accidental

487 Ibn aṭ-Ṭayyib, *Tafsīr K. al-Maḳūlāt*, ed. Ferrari, p. 100 (Arabic), ll. 13–20.

488 Ibn aṭ-Ṭayyib, *Tafsīr K. al-Maḳūlāt*, ed. Ferrari, p. 100 (Arabic), l. 28.

489 Ibn aṭ-Ṭayyib, *Tafsīr K. al-Maḳūlāt*, ed. Ferrari, p. 101 (Arabic), ll. 5–12.

490 Cf. above, chapter 3.

genera differ from each other “to the highest degree of difference” (*‘alā gāyat at-tabāyun*).<sup>491</sup>

With regard to the second and the third arguments Ibn at-Ṭayyib lays particular emphasis on the claim that in the *Categories* Aristotle defines or describes the nine accidental categories “inasmuch as they are essences (*dawāt*)” and not “inasmuch as they are accidents (*a‘rāḍ*),” that is, Aristotle, in Ibn at-Ṭayyib’s reading, only gives an account of what they are by themselves and not of what they are in relation to something else.<sup>492</sup> This idea will be resumed in Ibn at-Ṭayyib’s fifth argument which he himself marks as the most decisive one: At the outset he offers a systematic account of two different ways in which accidents may be classified: (1) “inasmuch as they are essences (*dawāt*)” each of them falls under one of the nine accidental genera; (2) and “inasmuch as they are accidents (*a‘rāḍ*),” that is, inasmuch as they are considered as being “related” (*muḍāf*) to something else, they all fall under “the meaning of accident” (*ma‘nā l-‘araḍ*).<sup>493</sup> While Aristotle pursues the first way, i.e., the *per se* classification of accidents, as part of his outline of a tenfold division into *summa genera*, the second approach, which hinges on the question of whether or not things “are independent by themselves” (*istiqlālūhā ‘alā nafsihā*), is operative in the twofold division into substance and accident. Moreover, in an attempt at integrating Porphyry’s list of five predicables, Ibn at-Ṭayyib adds yet a third way of devising a list of supreme kinds, namely a fivefold division into genus, species, differentia, property and accident, which is obtained if the classification is carried out under the aspect of “generality and specificity” (*al-ḥuṣūṣ wa-l-‘umūm*).<sup>494</sup> Since ‘accident,’ against the background of these three distinct dimensions of classifying things, does not apply to the nine accidental categories with regard to their essences but only with regard to their being dependent on something else, it may not be regarded to be a *summum genus*; for the *summa genera*, by definition, only classify things with regard to their essences.

#### 4.1.2.2. Ibn Sīnā on Why Accident Is Not a Genus

Both in the *Muḥtaṣar* and in the *Šifā’* Ibn Sīnā agrees with the dominant view that the nine accidental genera may not be taken to fall under a conceptually unified highest genus of ‘accident.’ However, if one takes into account Ibn Sīnā’s insistence on drawing a sharp-cut line between “the accident” (*al-‘araḍ*), which

491 Ibn at-Ṭayyib, *Tafsīr K. al-Maqūlāt*, ed. Ferrari, p. 101 (Arabic), ll. 16–20.

492 Ibn at-Ṭayyib, *Tafsīr K. al-Maqūlāt*, ed. Ferrari, p. 101 (Arabic), l. 33 – p. 101, l. 4; and p. 101, ll. 14–15.

493 Ibn at-Ṭayyib, *Tafsīr K. al-Maqūlāt*, ed. Ferrari, p. 102 (Arabic), ll. 5–8.

494 Ibn at-Ṭayyib, *Tafsīr K. al-Maqūlāt*, ed. Ferrari, p. 102 (Arabic), ll. 9–19.

he identifies with any non-self-subsistent ontological entity in the sense of *Cat.* 2, and “the accidental” (*al-‘aradī*), which he equates with any accidental feature in the sense of one of the Porphyrian predicables,<sup>495</sup> it becomes clear that the justifications offered by his Arabic predecessors and contemporaries are – to a large extent – unacceptable to him. First of all, Ibn Sīnā would strongly disagree that substance and accident as discussed in the *Categories* may be understood as ‘what makes known the essence’ and ‘what makes known something extrinsic to the essence’; rather, to his mind this distinction must be treated as corresponding to the dichotomy between *dātī* vs ‘*aradī*’ which is a fundamental tenet of predicable semantics (as he discusses in great detail in *Madḥal* I,5–6 of the *Šifā’*).<sup>496</sup> As a result, already at its very point of departure al-Fārābī’s argument for why accident is not a genus cannot be embraced by Ibn Sīnā. Moreover, even though, as we shall see, there is a certain resemblance between Ibn aṭ-Ṭayyib’s and Ibn Sīnā’s justification strategies, the fact that Ibn aṭ-Ṭayyib in this context understands ‘accident’ exclusively as a relational notion which – in contrast to the classification into the nine accidental genera – does not have a bearing on what a thing is *per se*, suggests that for him something can be labelled as an ‘accident’ only in relation to something else and not because its own essence requires it to be an accident. Whereas for Ibn aṭ-Ṭayyib, as a consequence, “the name ‘accident’” (*ism al-‘arad*) comprises the nine accidental genera only “inasmuch as they are related (*muḍāfa*) to that in which they are,”<sup>497</sup> Ibn Sīnā in the *Maqūlāt* of the *Šifā’* is careful to take the more nuanced position that it is precisely the accident’s “essence” (*dāt*) which “necessitates this relation” (*taqtadī hādihī n-nisbata*).<sup>498</sup>

One of the disagreements which Ibn Sīnā would have with Yaḥyā b. ‘Adī is connected to the view that any given substance may in a certain way be said to share both in the “name” (*ism*) and the “meaning” (*ma’nā*) of any of its accidents. We need to keep in mind that, according to Ibn Sīnā, the species and genera of accidents may be predicated of substances only in the *having* mode of attribution or by way of paronymy and that hence the meaning or definition of any accidental attribute is not predicated of a substance as something which it *is*.<sup>499</sup> One may, therefore, very well say that a substance shares in the meaning of accident – not in the sense of ‘*being* something which exists in a subject’ but in the sense of ‘*having* something which exists in a subject.’ But if ‘sharing in the meaning’ is understood in this way, Yaḥyā b. ‘Adī’s major premise – i.e., ‘the

495 On this distinction, see above, p. 27 and pp. 89–92.

496 Cf. above, pp. 104–107.

497 Ibn aṭ-Ṭayyib, *Tafsīr K. al-Maqūlāt*, ed. Ferrari, p. 101 (Arabic), l. 13.

498 Ibn Sīnā, *K. aš-Šifā’, al-Mantiq, al-Maqūlāt*, II,2, p. 65, l. 13 [= § 15 (4.B.b)].

499 Cf. above, pp. 87–92.

meaning of accident' is *not* 'something in whose meaning substance shares' – is clearly false. However, if 'sharing in the meaning' is understood in a stricter sense, namely not only as *having* it but as *being* it, Yaḥyā b. 'Adī's minor premise – i.e., every 'genus from among the genera of accidents which occur to a substance' is 'something in whose meaning substance shares' – becomes untenable. What is more, Yaḥyā b. 'Adī's very understanding of Aristotle's description of accident and substance as 'existent/being in a subject' and 'existent/being not in a subject' is a prominent instance of an *existential* reading of these two formulae. As will be shown shortly in the context of discussing the description of substance, Ibn Sīnā strongly refuses any interpretation which takes *mawḡūd* in these two formulae to imply a thing's *actual* existence in a subject or not in a subject.<sup>500</sup>

With regard to the reasons which Ibn Sīnā himself provides in support of the claim that 'accident' is not a genus, one can observe a certain shift in focus which must have taken place between his composition of the *Muḥtaṣar* and the *Šifā'*. In the *Maqūlāt* of the *Muḥtaṣar* the claim that accident ('*araḍ*') is a *summum genus* is refuted with precisely the same reasoning which Ibn Sīnā uses in order to show that 'existent' (*mawḡūd*) is not a *summum genus*: (1) Neither of them is essential (*dātī*); and (2) neither of them is predicated univocally but rather in a certain mode of focal homonymy, namely *per prius and posterius*. The fact that in Ibn Sīnā's view 'existent' fails to meet the two basic criteria for functioning as a genus, i.e., essentiality and synonymy, should come as no surprise: By drawing on his conviction that one always ought to distinguish between a thing's essence and a thing's existence, Ibn Sīnā in this context makes it clear that "whenever we understand the meaning and definition of a thing, we do not thereby gain an understanding of whether it is existent or non-existent."<sup>501</sup> Moreover, since a fundamental distinction between the way substances *are* and the way accidents *are* lies at the very core of Aristotle's and Ibn Sīnā's ontological thinking, 'being/existence' cannot be conceptualized as a notion that is said of all things with completely the same meaning and in exactly the same manner; rather, it "first applies to the substance and subsequently, by way of a known sequence (*tartīb ma'lūm*), to the quale, to the quantum and to the rest of these,"<sup>502</sup> that is to say, not only between substances and accidents but even among the various kinds of accidental beings there is a ranking *per prius et posterius*. Less obvious might be the reasons for the claim that accident as well is neither "essential" nor "synonymous" in relation to Aristotle's nine accidental categories. Mirroring his remarks on 'existent' (*mawḡūd*), Ibn Sīnā argues that when we know whiteness

500 Cf. below, pp. 223–224.

501 Ibn Sīnā, *al-Muḥtaṣar al-awsaṭ fi l-manṭiq, al-Maqūlāt*, § 31, p. 331, l. 11.

502 Ibn Sīnā, *al-Muḥtaṣar al-awsaṭ fi l-manṭiq, al-Maqūlāt*, § 32, p. 331, ll. 18–19.



and heat “we know by necessity that they are both qualities, whereas – as long as it has not been proven – it remains unclear to us that they are both accidents”; accident, therefore, attaches to the nine accidental categories as a non-essential “concomitant” (*lāzim*) which “makes known their relations to the subject,” i.e., to the substance by which the accidents subsist.<sup>503</sup> While Ibn Sīnā will recall this line of reasoning in the *Šifāʾ*, the additional claim that – not only with regard to ‘existing’ but also with regard to being an accident – some accidents take precedence over others and hence may not be said to be ‘accidents’ by way of synonymy,<sup>504</sup> subsequently will not be reiterated.

In the *Maqūlāt* of the *Šifāʾ* Ibn Sīnā undertakes an extensive “critical review” (*taʿaqqub*) of previous assessments of the question of whether accident is a genus. According to the scholarly opinions reported by him, there had been particular doubts as to whether the formula ‘existent in a subject’ applies to (1) “when” (*matā*), (2) “where” (*ayna*), (3) “the relatum” (*al-mudāf*), and (4) “wearing armor” (*tasalluḥ*), i.e., an instance of the category of “having.” Some interpreters must have held that since when and where have “numerous subjects” (*mawḍūʿāt kaṭīra*)<sup>505</sup> and since the relatum and being armed are “in two subjects,”<sup>506</sup> these four kinds of accidents cannot be said to be ‘existent in a subject.’ In short, these scholars argued that the reason why accident fails to function as a genus must be seen in the fact that the account of what it means to be an accident, namely ‘existent in a subject,’ does not comprise all nine accidental categories “in the proper sense” (*tanāwulan ḥaqīqiyyan*).<sup>507</sup> This line of reasoning is closely related to al-Wāhibī’s claim that – since each of the various kinds of accidents “occurs to the substance (*yaʿriḍu li-l-ḡawhar*) in a way which differs from the way in which the other one occurs to it (*ʿalā ḥilāfi mā yaʿriḍu lahū li-āḥar*)” – the expression ‘accident’ is said “by way of homonymy” (*bi-l-ittifāq*).<sup>508</sup> However, the assumption that the nine accidental genera all have different quiddities does not need to lead to the conclusion that ‘accident’ is a plainly equivocal expression. Rather, in the *Šifāʾ* we see Ibn Sīnā argue for the position that, while the Aristotelian account of accident does apply to all kinds of accidents, the meaning of accident is not “included” (*dāḥil*) in or “constitutive”

503 Ibn Sīnā, *al-Muḥtaṣar al-awsaṭ fi l-mantiq*, *al-Maqūlāt*, § 31, p. 331, ll. 14–15.

504 Ibn Sīnā, *al-Muḥtaṣar al-awsaṭ fi l-mantiq*, *al-Maqūlāt*, § 32, p. 331, ll. 19–20.

505 Ibn Sīnā, *K. aš-Šifāʾ*, *al-Mantiq*, *al-Maqūlāt*, II,2, p. 63, l. ll. 5–8 [= § 2 (4.B.b)] and p. 64, ll. 2–4 [= § 7 (4.B.b)].

506 Ibn Sīnā, *K. aš-Šifāʾ*, *al-Mantiq*, *al-Maqūlāt*, II,2, p. 64, ll. 12–14 [= § 9 (4.B.b)]. Cf. the first argument reported by Ibn aṭ-Ṭayyib, see above, pp. 215–216.

507 Ibn Sīnā, *K. aš-Šifāʾ*, *al-Mantiq*, *al-Maqūlāt*, II,2, p. 63, l. 5 [= § 1 (4.B.b)].

508 Al-Wāhibī, *Tafsīr maʿānī Aristūṭālīs fi K. al-Maqūlāt*, MS Istanbul Ayasofya 2483, fol. 94b, ll. 10–13.

(*muqawwim*) for the quiddities of the nine accidental genera; thus, “the fact that it is an accident is not present in the definition of any of them” (*lā yūḡadu fī ḥaddi šay’in minhā annahū ‘araḍun*).<sup>509</sup> In this context, Ibn Sīnā once again mentions the resemblance between the relation in which ‘*araḍ*’ stands to the nine non-substance categories and the relation in which *mawḡūd* stands to all ten categories, which had been his point of departure in the *Muḥtaṣar*. However, whereas the outline offered in the *Muḥtaṣar* is structured by the parallelism between ‘existing’ and ‘accident’ – and in connection to that, by a discussion of non-essentiality and focal homonymy –, in the *Šifā’* Ibn Sīnā endorses the following account of why ‘accident’ never signifies a thing’s “nature” (*tabī‘a*): Instead of being a part of the essence of any of the accidental categories, ‘accident’ signifies the fact that each of the various quiddities of the various kinds of accidents has the same inevitable attachment, that is to say, everything which falls under one of the genera of accidents – whatever its quiddity may be – must “have a relation to that which it is in” (*lahū nisbatun ilā mā huwa fihī*),<sup>510</sup> namely a relation of ontological dependence. By reflecting on any of the different accidents’ quiddities alone it still remains unknown “that they are in need of a subject” (*annahā muḥtāḡatun ilā mawḍū‘in*). Rather, the fact that they are ontologically dependent can only be proven in metaphysics, not within the logical propaedeutics offered by the *Categories*.<sup>511</sup>

#### 4.2. The Question of Whether Substance Is a Genus: From Plotinus via Ibn Sīnā to the Later Islamic Philosophical Tradition

##### 4.2.1. Ibn Sīnā’s Argument for the Comprehensive Generic Status of Substance Against the Background of Plotinus, Porphyry and al-Fārābī

In chapter III,1 of the *Maqūlāt* of the *Šifā’* – that is, in the first out of three chapters dedicated to *Cat. 5* – Ibn Sīnā holds that the formula ‘being not in a subject’ is a characterization (*šifa*) by which becomes known “the true nature of being a substance” (*ḥaqīqat kaww al-ḡawhar*).<sup>512</sup> Even though Ibn Sīnā does not explicitly address the issue of the definability of substance, it becomes clear that – since it is impossible to devise a genus-differentia definition for any of the categories (that is to say, for any of the *summa genera*) – in the context of investigating

509 Ibn Sīnā, *K. aš-Šifā’*, *al-Manṭiq, al-Maqūlāt*, II,2, p. 66, ll. 4–5 [= § 17 (4.B.b)].

510 Ibn Sīnā, *K. aš-Šifā’*, *al-Manṭiq, al-Maqūlāt*, II,2, p. 65, l. 13 [= § 15 (4.B.b)].

511 Ibn Sīnā, *K. aš-Šifā’*, *al-Manṭiq, al-Maqūlāt*, II,2, p. 66, ll. 1–2 [= § 16 (4.B.b)].

512 Ibn Sīnā, *K. aš-Šifā’*, *al-Manṭiq, al-Maqūlāt*, III,1, p. 93, l. 10 [= § 5 (4.B.d)].

what a substance *is* we need to content ourselves with a “description” (*rasm*)<sup>513</sup> which makes known a “characteristic property” (*ḥāṣṣiyya*).<sup>514</sup> Only the formula ‘being not in a subject’ qualifies as a characterization that is common to all substances and excludes all non-substances; as Ibn Sīnā puts it: “None of the substances is in a subject (*laysa šay’un mina l-ḡawāhiri fi mawḏū’in*); and nothing which is in a subject is a substance (*wa-lā šay’a mim mā huwa fi mawḏū’in fa-huwa ḡawharun*).”<sup>515</sup> Thus, in Ibn Sīnā’s view, the formula ‘being not in a subject’ equally applies to the *quiddity* of any given substance, that is to say, it is true of what it means to be a form, a matter, a form-matter *compositum*, and a substance detached from a body (*al-mufāriq*), i.e., a soul and an intellect. As has been discussed above, against the background of his well-known distinction between essence and existence Ibn Sīnā holds that, even though with regard to their *existence* some substances may be prior to other substances, such an existential gradation may not be taken to imply a gradation with regard to the *quiddity*.<sup>516</sup> To Ibn Sīnā’s mind, whoever holds that “not being in need of a subject and being not in a subject” is primarily true of the quiddity of form and only secondarily true of the quiddity of a form-matter *compositum* fails to distinguish between being prior with regard to essence and being prior with regard to existence. Rather, the account of what it means to be a substance equally applies to all substances, regardless of whether some of them exist prior to others. However, as should be noted with regard to subsequent discussions, even though Ibn Sīnā thus managed to establish that the meaning of ‘substance’ may be predicated synonymously of all kinds of substances, this argument does not offer a decisive proof for the claim that this univocal predicate must be a genus; rather, what Ibn Sīnā achieved was providing a successful refutation of one of the main arguments for why substance should not be taken to be a comprehensive genus.

Ibn Sīnā presents his argument as a reaction to a group of scholars who held that the *summum genus* ‘substance’ in the sense of the *Categories* could only be conceived as a univocal and generic predicate if its scope were restricted to corporeal substances.<sup>517</sup> Ibn Sīnā briefly hints at two lines of reasoning which had been pursued by these scholars in their attempts to show that substance would be predicated “equivocally” (*bi-l-ittifāq*) or, at least, by means of “focal homonymy” (*taškik*), as is the case with the predication of ‘existent’ (*mawḡūd*), if it were understood in a sense which is “more general” (*a‘amm*) than ‘corporeal

513 Ibn Sīnā, *K. aš-Šifā’, al-Mantiq, al-Maqūlāt*, III,1, p. 92, l. 4 [= § 3 (4.B.d)].

514 Ibn Sīnā, *K. aš-Šifā’, al-Mantiq, al-Maqūlāt*, III,3, p. 102, l. 13 [= § 1 (4.B.d)].

515 Ibn Sīnā, *K. aš-Šifā’, al-Mantiq, al-Maqūlāt*, III,3, p. 102, ll. 16–17 [= § 2 (4.B.d)].

516 Ibn Sīnā, *K. aš-Šifā’, al-Mantiq, al-Maqūlāt*, III,1, p. 93, ll. 10–18 [= §§ 5–6 (4.B.d)]. See above, pp. 70–74.

517 Ibn Sīnā, *K. aš-Šifā’, al-Mantiq, al-Maqūlāt*, III,1, p. 91, ll. 7–8 [= § 1 (4.B.d)].

substance'; on the basis of Ibn Sīnā's remarks these two arguments may be reconstructed as follows:

(1) Matter and form are prior to that which is compounded of them and they are principles of the compound; likewise, the substance which is detached from body (*al-mufāriq*), being the cause of matter and form, is prior to all other substances and is the principle of all other substances. Since these scholars hold that the "principles" (*mabādi'*) may not fall under the same category as "those things which possess the principles" (*dawāt al-mabādi'*),<sup>518</sup> substance may not be regarded to be a genus commonly shared by these different kinds of substances.<sup>519</sup> To this Ibn Sīnā briefly replies that if in this context it were valid to restrict the sense of priority to existential priority, substance would even fail to function as a common genus for different kinds of bodies; for some bodies are prior to other bodies (and, as one might add, in a certain sense some are the principles of others).<sup>520</sup>

(2) Moreover, some scholars tried to construct an argument on the basis of the Aristotelian insight that 'existence' (*wuġūd*) is predicated of ontologically different things *per prius et posterius*: If 'existence' by itself is predicated by means of focal homonymy, so the argument runs, by adding the negative qualification 'not in a subject' to it one certainly cannot render it a predicate applying to the things that fall under it without any gradation, i.e., in a univocal manner.<sup>521</sup> As Ibn Sīnā understands it, this argument rests on the assumption that 'being/existing' (*mawġūd*) in the descriptive formula of substantiality is taken to refer to "the state of the existent, insofar as it exists" (*hāl al-mawġūd min haytu huwa mawġūd*).<sup>522</sup> However, if this interpretation were correct, none of the universals – that is to say, not even the universals of corporeal substances – would qualify as universals: For the only mode of *existence* applicable to them is 'existence in the soul'; and since this would be a manner of 'existing in a subject,' universals would fail to meet the criterion of 'being/existing not in a subject.' As a consequence, Aristotle's secondary substances would be inconceivable. Thus, Ibn Sīnā accuses these scholars of having relied upon the erroneous presupposition that 'being not in a subject' is identical with "actual existence in concrete things (*fī l-a'yān*), not as in a subject."<sup>523</sup> This amounts to the claim that actual

518 Cf. Aristotle, *Met.* B 3.

519 Ibn Sīnā, *K. aš-Šifā'*, *al-Manṭiq, al-Maqūlāt*, III,1, p. 91, ll. 9–12 [= § 1 (4.B.d)].

520 Ibn Sīnā, *K. aš-Šifā'*, *al-Manṭiq, al-Maqūlāt*, III,1, p. 92, ll. 1–3 [= § 2 (4.B.d)].

521 Ibn Sīnā, *K. aš-Šifā'*, *al-Manṭiq, al-Maqūlāt*, III,1, p. 91, ll. 13–15 [= § 1 (4.B.d)].

522 Ibn Sīnā, *K. aš-Šifā'*, *al-Manṭiq, al-Maqūlāt*, III,1, p. 92, l. 6 [= § 3 (4.B.d)]. Cf. Yaḥyā b. 'Adī's understanding of 'existent' in the description of 'accident' as outlined above, pp. 213–214.

523 Ibn Sīnā, *K. aš-Šifā'*, *al-Manṭiq, al-Maqūlāt*, III,1, p. 93, l. 1 [= § 3 (4.B.d)].

existence is “constitutive” (*muqawwim*) for the quiddity of any given substance. In sharp contrast to such an existential import, as it were, Ibn Sīnā explains the meaning of the descriptive formula of substantiality as follows: It is “the notion and the quiddity to which attaches in the realm of concrete things, whenever they exist, [the property] that their existence is not as in a subject” (*al-ma'nā wa-l-māhiyyata llatī talzamuhā fī l-a'yāni idā wuǧidat an yakūna wuǧūduhā lā fī mawdū'in*).<sup>524</sup> Everything whose essence complies with this requirement – even if it were an individual which does not exist *in actu* or a species whose existence is doubtful – falls under the genus of ‘substance.’

Where are we to look for the anonymous opponents who argued that substance might only function as a generic predicate if its application is restricted to the realm of sensible beings? As the *locus classicus* for such a claim one can certainly identify Plotinus’ famous critique of the scheme of ten categories in *Enneads* VI,1–3. Plotinus does not develop an argument which claims that ‘being/existing’ in the formula ‘being not in a subject’ stipulates actual existence. However, in close proximity to such a line of reasoning, the point of departure in his investigation of the scope of the ten categories is the focal homonymy of the predicate τὸ ὄν, i.e., ‘being.’ The Aristotelians are correct in claiming that ‘being’ is not predicated synonymously of all ten categories.<sup>525</sup> However, then one needs to ask them whether each of the ten *summa genera* applies equally to both “intelligible beings” and “beings perceived by sense,”<sup>526</sup> especially whether substance functions as “one genus” (ἐν γένος) across the *intelligibilia-sensibilia* divide or whether it is said homonymously of “that there” and “this here.”<sup>527</sup> Plotinus himself provides the following answer: If substance were taken to be predicated synonymously of both intelligible and sensible substances, an absurdity would result: Even though things which differ from each other by a gradation *per prius et posterius* cannot fall under a “common genus” (γένος κοινόν), the genus ‘substance’ would have to signify the same meaning with regard to primary and secondary beings.<sup>528</sup> A bit surprisingly, Plotinus does not think that

524 Ibn Sīnā, *K. aš-Šifāʾ, al-Mantiq, al-Maqūlāt*, III,1, p. 92, ll. 10–11 [= § 3 (4.B.d)].

525 Plotinus, *Opera*, tomus III, ed. Paul Henry and Hans-Rudolf Schwyzer (Oxford: University Press, 1982), *Enneas* VI,1, 1.18–19: “ὄτι γὰρ οὐ συνώνυμον τὸ ὄν ἐν ἅπασι, λέγουσι καὶ ὀρθῶς λέγουσι.”

526 Plotinus, *Opera*, tomus III, *Enneas* VI,1, 1.19–20: “μᾶλλον δὲ ἐκεῖνο πρῶτον ἐρωτητέον, πότερα ὁμοίως ἐν τε τοῖς νοητοῖς ἐν τε τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς τὰ δέκα [...].”

527 Plotinus, *Opera*, tomus III, *Enneas* VI,1, 1.23–25: “[...] καὶ εἰ τὰ ἐκεῖ ὄντα ὑφ’ ἐν γένος ὑπακτέον τοῖς ἐνταῦθα, ἢ ὁμωνύμως ἢ τε ἐκεῖ οὐσία ἢ τε ἐνταῦθα.”

528 Plotinus, *Opera*, tomus III, *Enneas* VI,1, 1.25–28: “εἰ δὲ συνωνύμως, ἄτοπον τὸ αὐτὸ σημαίνειν τὴν οὐσίαν ἐπὶ τε τῶν πρῶτως ὄντων καὶ τῶν ὑστέρων οὐκ ὄντος γένους κοινού, ἐν οἷς τὸ πρότερον καὶ ὕστερον.” In my rendering of the beginning of this sentence, I follow the German tr. by Richard Harder, *Plotins Schriften*, Bd. IV (Hamburg:

the Aristotelians themselves conceived the scheme of categories as a classification of all beings: “But in this division they do not speak about *intelligibilia*; thus they did not want to divide all beings; rather, they neglected those which are beings in the highest degree.”<sup>529</sup> With a view to the subsequent tradition it should be stressed that Plotinus does not accuse the Aristotelians of having assumed that substance functions as a genus for all substantial beings but rather reproaches them for having limited themselves to the study of sensible beings and, as a consequence, for having failed to come up with a classification of intelligible beings.

Thus, the fact that Plotinus’ pupil Porphyry was to establish the *Categories*, preceded by his *Isagoge*, as the fundamental introductory treatise of the Neoplatonic logic curriculum – and in doing so considerably fostered the eminent role this work was to play in the ensuing school tradition – does not compel us to assume that with regard to their readings of the *Categories* there must have been significant doctrinal tensions between these two scholars. Rather, Plotinus’ claim that the Aristotelians themselves did not extend the scheme of categories to *sensibilia*, along with his conviction that it represents an *ontologically* insufficient classification, can be seen as paving the way for his pupil’s strict propaedeutic and logical reading of the *Categories*.<sup>530</sup> That is to say, for Porphyry it is a treatise which out of pedagogical considerations, devoid of any strong metaphysical commitments, takes the phenomena of the sensible world as its point of departure. Whereas Plotinus had attempted to prove that the ten categories may not be conceived as *summa genera* that comprise both *intelligibilia* and *sensibilia*, Porphyry, as a result of his teacher’s position, limited the scope of the treatise to “simple significant expressions, insofar as they signify things.”<sup>531</sup>

When assessing Ibn Sinā’s reading of the *Categories* it is important to keep in mind that for many centuries of Aristotelian scholarship the ‘Plotinian-Porphyrian paradigm,’ as I would like to call an interpretation that restricts the categories to the sensible world, had been the dominant view. In contrast to this,

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Meiner, 1967), p. 99: “Sind sie dagegen im gleichen Sinne benannt, so ergibt sich die Unsinnigkeit, daß Seinsheit dann dasselbe bezeichnen müßte [...]” – as opposed to the English tr. by Arthur Armstrong, *Plotinus VI*, Loeb Classical Library (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1988), p. 15: “But if ‘substance’ is used in the same sense there as here, it will be absurd for it to mean the same thing [...]”

529 Plotinus, *Opera*, tomos III, *Enneas VI*, 1, 1.28–30: “ἀλλὰ περὶ τῶν νοητῶν κατὰ τὴν διαίρεσιν οὐ λέγουσιν· οὐ πάντα ἄρα τὰ ὄντα διαίρεισθαι ἐβουλήθησαν, ἀλλὰ τὰ μάλιστα ὄντα παραλελοίπασιν.”

530 See Steven Strange, “Plotinus, Porphyry and the Neoplatonic Interpretation of the *Categories*.” Cf. above, p. 13, note 23.

531 Porphyry, *In Categorias*, p. 58, ll. 5–6: “ἔστιν γὰρ περὶ φωνῶν σημαντικῶν ἀπλῶν, καθὸ σημαντικαὶ εἰσι τῶν πραγμάτων.”

Ibn Sīnā sees no reason to doubt that Aristotle's tenfold classification is an attempt at subsuming *all* kinds of beings, regardless of their ontological rank, under ten comprehensive *summa genera* (but one should note that Ibn Sīnā does have some doubts about the method and success of that attempt).

Unfortunately, al-Fārābī's *Long Commentary on the Categories*, where one could expect an articulate illustration of the manner in which the 'Plotinian-Porphyrrian paradigm' of reading the categories was alive in the generations of Arabic-Islamic philosophers before Ibn Sīnā, is not extant – and his *Short Treatise on the Categories* not only remains silent on the issue of the scope of the *Categories* but also refrains from an explicit discussion of the extent to which substance may function as a genus.<sup>532</sup> However, a few years ago Mauro Zonta was able to identify some Hebrew fragments of al-Fārābī's *Long Commentary on the Categories* in a supercommentary on Ibn Rušd's *Middle Commentary on the Categories*, composed by the 15<sup>th</sup> century Jewish scholar Judah ben Isaac ben Moses Cohen.<sup>533</sup> On the basis of this material it becomes clear that the view refuted by Ibn Sīnā, namely the claim that substance may function as a genus only in relation to corporeal substances, was the position which in the preceding Arabic tradition was prominently upheld by al-Fārābī:

The substance considered here is, generally speaking, the bodily substance. [...] Other people said that, among the beings, there are substances that are not bodies and are not at all composed of bodies. Now, Aristotle does not refer here to these things, and the qualification he gives to the substance does not fit them.

Other people said that some of the substances are composed, and others are simple – and the former are composed of the latter; they called matter and form 'simple substances' [...]; they thought the substances composed of simple substances were posterior to them in nature; and they thought that simple substances more deserve to be called substances than composed ones. Now, Aristotle does not intend here to speak about the things that those people thought of as simple substances, because these things and their qualifications have to be self-evident, and the qualification of substance here does not refer to any of them; rather, Aristotle intends to let us know the substance that is commonly known as such, that is, some of the sense-

532 But it should be noted that even in the *Short Treatise* the limitation to corporeal substances becomes at least implicitly clear; for in the course of his discussion of substance al-Fārābī solely focuses on corporeal substances.

533 This little-known scholar worked probably at the beginning of the 15<sup>th</sup> century in Northern Italy (see Zonta, "Al-Fārābī's *Long Commentary* on Aristotle's *Categoriae* in Hebrew and Arabic," p. 189) – and is not to be confused with the more famous 13<sup>th</sup> century Toledan scholar Judah ben Moses ha-Cohen. See also Mauro Zonta, "Fonti antiche e medievali della logica ebraica nella Provenza del Trecento," *Medioevo* 23 (1997): pp. 515–594, esp. pp. 525–526; and idem, "Una disputa sugli universali nella logica ebraica del Trecento: Shemuel di Marsiglia contra Gersonide nel *Supercommentario* all'*Isagoge* di Yehudah ben Yiṣḥaq Cohen," *Documenti e studi sulla tradizione filosofica medievale* 11 (2000): pp. 409–458.

objects that are said to be substances, their species and their genera; he goes up to the most general among substances perceived by senses and stops there, assuming it, in this book, as the supreme genus.

Therefore, this is what should be understood about the substance in this book; it should be called 'bodily substance' or 'corporeal substance.'<sup>534</sup>

As these remarks on *Cat. 2* show, there are two exegetical approaches al-Fārābī discards: Not only does he reject the view that incorporeal substances might be subsumed under the genus 'substance' but, at the same time, he also disapproves of any attempts at integrating the hylemorphic conception of individual things, i.e., the view that every particular substance is composed of matter and form, as Aristotle recurrently states in the context of his *Physics* and *Metaphysics*, into the propaedeutic account given in the *Categories*.

As we have seen, Ibn Sīnā in the *Maqūlāt* of the *Šifā'* argues in favor of both of these two approaches rejected by al-Fārābī. Against the background of his distinction between essence and existence, this comes as no surprise: For as soon as the descriptive formula of substantiality, namely 'being not in a subject,' is, at the level of the quiddity, regarded as a property which equally applies to all kinds of substances, regardless of whether they are simple or compounded, whether they are sensible or corporeal, or whether they are prior or posterior, the old Plotinian conviction that things which differ from each other by a gradation *per prius et posterius* cannot fall under a common 'genus' has become obsolete.

#### 4.2.2. The Post-Avicennian Debate on Whether Substance Is a Genus

##### 4.2.2.1. A Question by Rukn ad-Dīn b. Šarafšāh al-Astarābādī

Among post-Avicennian scholars the question of whether and in which way substance may be thought of as a genus appears to remain the subject of some considerable controversy. A valuable insight into the divisiveness and confusion that ensued in the course of this debate can be gained from the scholarly exchange between the young Rukn ad-Dīn b. Šarafšāh al-Astarābādī (d. ca. 715 AH / 1315 AD), a philosopher, jurist and grammarian from the intellectual milieu of the Marāġa observatory, and his aged patron Našīr ad-Dīn aṭ-Ṭūsī: Among the twenty questions on vexed issues from all philosophical disciplines, which Ibn

534 Mauro Zonta, "Al-Fārābī's *Long Commentary* on Aristotle's *Categoriae* in Hebrew and Arabic," English translation on pp. 225–226 (modified), Hebrew text on pp. 250–251. For al-Fārābī's understanding of the nature of Aristotle's ten *summa genera*, cf. Stéphane Diebler, "Catégories, conversation et philosophie chez al-Fārābī," in *Les Catégories et leur histoire*, ed. Otto Bruun and Lorenzo Corti (Paris: Vrin, 2005), pp. 275–305; and Thérèse-Anne Druart, "Al-Fārābī, the *Categories*, *Metaphysics*, and *The Book of Letters*," *Medioevo* 33 (2007): pp. 15–37.



Šarafšāh al-Astarābādī addresses to aṭ-Ṭūsī, one single question is dedicated to the doubts which have arisen over the generic predication of substance.

First of all, al-Astarābādī reports that he has come across the following reason for why substance may not be regarded as a genus in relation to the different kinds of substances: The substantial species would have to commonly share in substantiality and would, at the same time, have to be distinguished from each other by differentiae (*fuṣūl*); drawing on the assumption that everything is either an accident or a substance, one would have to hold that these differentiae are substances as well; for accidents may not be constitutive for substances; however, these substances once again would need to be distinguished from each other by means of differentiae – and, as a consequence, an infinite regress would follow. But this is “impossible” (*muḥāl*) – for if it were true, the “quiddity” (*māhiyya*) of a substantial differentia (or, one might add, of any kind of substance) could ultimately “not be conceptualized” (*lā yataṣawwaru*).<sup>535</sup> Al-Astarābādī seems to be inclined to subscribe to this line of reasoning<sup>536</sup> – but at the same time he is bewildered by the fact that Aṭīr ad-Dīn al-Abharī (d. ca. 660–663 AH / 1263–1265 AD), whom he reverentially refers to as his *mawlā*, rejected this argument on the grounds that substance might very well be thought of as a genus in relation to substantial species but not in relation to substantial differentiae.<sup>537</sup> What adds to al-Astarābādī’s confusion about the matter is the fact that, even though Aṭīr ad-Dīn al-Abharī dismissed the argument just mentioned, he nonetheless appears to be opposed to the idea that substance is a genus for all kinds of substances, albeit on different grounds: For al-Abharī, according to al-Astarābādī, furthermore held that the meaning (*ma’nā*) of ‘substance,’ namely being “a quiddity which is such that whenever it exists in concrete things it derives its existence from the concrete thing as something which is not in a subject” (*al-māhiyyatu llatī idā wuġīdat fī l-a’yāni kāna lahā wuġūdun mina l-’ayni lā fī mawḏū’in*), may be true of various quiddities which completely differ from each other and which thus do not fall under a common genus.<sup>538</sup> Even though the term *lāzim* is not used here, this argument clearly points to the idea that substance may be thought of as a concomitant rather than a genus (a view which will shortly be treated in more detail<sup>539</sup>). Be that as it may, Ibn Šarafšāh

535 Aṭ-Ṭūsī, *Aġwibat Masā’il al-Astarābādī li-Naṣīr ad-Dīn aṭ-Ṭūsī*, ed. ‘Abdallāh Nūrānī, in *Collected Texts and Papers on Logic and Language*, ed. Mehdi Mohaghegh and Toshihiko Izutsu (Teheran: University Press, 1974), p. 260, ll. 16–20.

536 Cf. his critical remarks on the counterargument provided by al-Abharī; see aṭ-Ṭūsī, *Aġwibat Masā’il al-Astarābādī li-Naṣīr ad-Dīn aṭ-Ṭūsī*, p. 261, ll. 2–5.

537 Aṭ-Ṭūsī, *Aġwibat Masā’il al-Astarābādī li-Naṣīr ad-Dīn aṭ-Ṭūsī*, p. 260, l. 21 – p. 261, l. 1.

538 Aṭ-Ṭūsī, *Aġwibat Masā’il al-Astarābādī li-Naṣīr ad-Dīn aṭ-Ṭūsī*, p. 261, ll. 6–9.

539 See below, pp. 232–234.

al-Astarābādī is puzzled both about the issue as such and about the way it has been treated by Aṭīr ad-Dīn al-Abharī and therefore kindly asks Naṣīr ad-Dīn aṭ-Ṭūsī for a thorough clarification.

#### 4.2.2.2. A Short Excursus on Aṭīr ad-Dīn al-Abharī

Even though I have not been able to identify the two arguments reported by al-Astarābādī in a work written by al-Abharī, the “chapter on substance and accident” (*faṣl fī l-ġawhar wa-l-‘araḍ*) in the *Ilāhiyyāt* part of his *Hidāyat al-ḥikma* makes it clear that al-Abharī did reject the view that substance is a genus comprising all kinds of substances:

Substance is not a genus of these <five> divisions [i.e., form, matter, form-matter compound, soul, intellect]; for if it were a genus, that which is included under it would be composed of a genus and differentia. But this is not the case. For the soul is not composed because it intellects the simple quiddity; thus, it is not composed. Otherwise it would follow that the simple quiddity which inheres in it is divided [into genus and differentia]; and this is absurd.<sup>540</sup>

As had already been noted by Mullā Ṣadrā in his commentary on this passage, the argument provided here is problematic in several regards: Not only does it, without any further explanation, infer from the state of the object of intellection to the state of the soul – and then, *vice versa*, from the state of the soul to the state of the object of intellection –, but it also leaves open the possibility that, even if substance is not a genus in relation to the soul, it might still be said of the other kinds of substances by means of a genus-predication.<sup>541</sup> The argument via the infinite regress of substantial differentiae would have avoided these difficulties – but as we have learned from al-Astarābādī’s account al-Abharī refused to subscribe to it since he considered the possibility that that which is a genus in relation to the species may nonetheless be predicated of differentiae in a non-generic manner. Hence, both from al-Astarābādī’s account and from the “chapter on substance and accident” of the *Hidāyat al-ḥikma* we get the impression

540 Facsimile of MS Ayasofya 2475, contained in Aṭīr ad-Dīn al-Abharī, *A Guide to Philosophy: The Hidāyat al-Ḥikmah of Athīr al-Dīn al-Mufaḍḍal ibn ‘Umar al-Abharī al-Samarqandī*, tr. Syed Ali Tawfik al-Attas (Subang Jaya: Pelanduk Publications, 2009), p. 255 (folio number not indicated); I have modified al-Attas’ English translation of the passage (ibidem, p. 162); cf. Ṣadr ad-Dīn aṣ-Ṣirāzī [Mullā Ṣadrā], *Ṣarḥ al-Hidāya al-Aṭīriyya*, ed. Muḥammad Muṣṭafā Fūlādīkār (Beirut: Dār Iḥyā’ at-turāṭ al-‘arabī, 2001 [1422 AH]), p. 309, ll. 5–15. While MS Ayasofya 2475 reads *wa-l-ġawharu laysa ġinsan li-hādihī l-aqsām ...*, the (unmarked) lemma in the ed. of Mullā Ṣadrā’s commentary reads *wa-l-ġawharu laysa ġinsan li-hādihī l-ḥamsa ...*; al-Attas’ English translation combines both readings: “Substance is not a genus of these five divisions [...]”

541 For Mullā Ṣadrā’s rather intricate assessment of this argument, see his *Ṣarḥ al-Hidāya al-Aṭīriyya*, ed. Fūlādīkār, p. 309, ll. 11–15.

that al-Abharī knew and pondered several arguments for the view he favored, namely the denial of the generic predicability of ‘substance,’ but ultimately failed to provide a full and convincing documentation of this position (or at least, this was the assessment given by one of his pupils).

The various lines of reasoning sketchily alluded to by al-Abharī and al-Astarābādī can all be identified as bits and pieces of Faḥr ad-Dīn ar-Rāzī’s much more comprehensive critique of the view that substance is a genus. Against this background, it appears not too far-fetched to assume that al-Abharī simply inherited this doctrinal stance from the dominant figure of the preceding generation of scholars, namely Faḥr ad-Dīn ar-Rāzī – and that, as a consequence, Ibn Šarafšāh al-Astarābādī who attests a strong scholarly affiliation with both Aṭīr ad-Dīn al-Abharī and Nāšīr ad-Dīn aṭ-Ṭūsī found himself sitting on the fence between a teacher heavily influenced by what might be called ‘critical Avicennism,’ one the one hand, and a teacher who in his days was the main representative of what Dimitri Gutas has labeled as ‘mainstream Avicennism.’<sup>542</sup>

#### 4.2.2.3. Faḥr ad-Dīn ar-Rāzī’s Refutation of the Claim That Substance Is a Genus

In the introductory part of the second book of his philosophical summa *al-Mabāḥiṭ al-mašriqiyya*, that is to say, in the context of paving the way for an all-encompassing account of contingent beings, both *ḡawāhir* and *aʿrāḍ*, Faḥr ad-Dīn ar-Rāzī dedicates a separate chapter to the question of “whether or not substance is said of that which is below it by means of a genus-predication” (*fī anna l-ḡawhara maqūlun ‘alā mā taḥtahū qawla l-ḡinsi am lā*).<sup>543</sup> The manner in which he treats this issue provides us with an illustrative case in point of what it might mean to be a ‘critical Avicennist’: For Faḥr ad-Dīn ar-Rāzī clearly concurs with Ibn Sīnā’s refutation of previous arguments which denied that substance is a genus commonly shared by all substantial beings. However, the futility of these earlier arguments does not lead him to agree with Ibn Sīnā’s conclusion but rather to present some alternative arguments against the generic predicability of ‘substance.’

<sup>542</sup> Cf. above, p. 38, note 106.

<sup>543</sup> Faḥr ad-Dīn ar-Rāzī, *al-Mabāḥiṭ al-mašriqiyya*, vol. 1, pp. 243–247. This chapter appears to be the main source for the corresponding chapter in Mullā Šadrā’s *al-Ḥikma al-mutaʿaliya*, entitled “whether or not the meaning of substance is predicated of that which is below it by means of a genus-predication” (*fī anna ḥamlu maʿnā l-ḡawhari ‘alā mā taḥtahū ḥamlu l-ḡinsi am lā*); see Šadr ad-Dīn aš-Šīrāzī [Mullā Šadrā], *al-Ḥikma al-mutaʿaliya fī l-asfār al-ʿaqliyya al-arbaʿa*, vol. 4: *al-ḡuzʿ al-awwal min as-safar aṭ-ṭānī*, ed. M. al-Muzaḥfar / R. Luṭfī, p. 246ff.

As one of the bad arguments for making the right claim, ar-Rāzī outlines an approach which is strongly reminiscent of the Plotinian critique;<sup>544</sup> the argument runs as follows: Whenever things differ from each other *per prius et posterius* a univocal predication is impossible; since “substances detached [from matter]” (*al-ġawāhir al-mufāriqa*) have a higher claim to substantiality than bodies, and since a body has a higher claim to substantiality than uninformed “matter” (*hayūlā*), it is – due to the gradation between these things – impossible to predicate ‘substance’ univocally of all of them. In his refutation of this argument ar-Rāzī follows quite faithfully the Avicennian distinction between conceptual and existential priority:

[...] it is not the case that some substances have a higher claim to substantiality than others; rather, some of them have a higher claim to external existence (*al-wuġūd al-ḥāriġī*) than others. And we have already said that external existence is not included in the concept (*mafḥūm*) of substantiality. In that which is substantiality there is no difference in priority and posteriority (*bi-t-taqaddum wa-t-ta’ahḥur*). As for priority and posteriority, they both pertain to existence (*‘ā’idāni ilā l-wuġūd*). This is just like what we have said about numbers: The lower [number] is prior to the greater [number] with regard to existence; but – since this is not a priority in numberness (*‘adadiyya*) but in existence – this does not impair the ‘being-a-genus’ (*kawn ġinsiyyan*) of number. For the ‘being-a-number’ of three is not due to the ‘being-a-number’ of two, even if three is only existent on account of two being existent (*li-aġli kawni l-itnayni mawġūdan*).<sup>545</sup>

This basic distinction is the common ground which in the subsequent debate unites ‘critical’ and ‘mainstream’ Avicennists, as it were. To give just one out of numerous examples, in his *al-Asrār al-ḥāfiya fī l-‘ulūm al-‘aqliyya* al-Allāma al-Ḥillī, one of Nāṣir ad-Dīn aṭ-Ṭūsī’s most prominent pupils, dedicates a longer passage to establishing the anti-Rāzian view that substance is indeed a genus – and in this context he stresses the fact that the counter-argument via the priority of certain kinds of substances over other kinds of substances had merely been “transmitted from some of the older scholars” (*nuqila ‘an ba‘di l-qudamā*); thus, after the refutation of some more challenging objections, the old Plotinian line of reasoning is briefly alluded to but it becomes clear that in al-Ḥillī’s days it had

544 It should be noted that *Enneads* VI,1–3 is not included in the extant *Plotiniana Arabica*. Therefore, one can only speculate whether and how certain arguments and doctrines of these three chapters might have become known to the Arabic tradition. But regardless of this uncertainty about the channels of transmission, the doctrinal connection is evident. For an overview of the contents of the *Plotiniana Arabica*, see *Plotini Opera, Tomus II: Enneades IV–V, Plotiniana Arabica*, ed. Paul Henry and Hans-Rudolf Schwyzer (Paris: Desclée de Brouwer, Brussels: L’Édition Universelle, 1959), pp. 489–501. For a philosophical assessment of Plotinus in the Arabic tradition, see Peter Adamson, *The Arabic Plotinus: A Philosophical Study of the ‘Theology of Aristotle’* (London: Duckworth, 2002).

545 Ar-Rāzī, *al-Mabāḥiṭ al-mašriqiyya*, vol. 1, p. 244, l. 24 – p. 245, l. 7.

been completely deprived of its previous argumentative force. Rather, for al-Ḥillī it can easily be filed away by means of a short reminder of the difference between being prior “with regard to the notion of substantiality” (*fī maʿnā l-ḡawhariyya*) and being prior “with regard to actual existence” (*fī l-wuḡūdi l-fīlī*).<sup>546</sup>

However, in the ongoing dispute over the generic predicability of ‘substance’ Faḥr ad-Dīn ar-Rāzī’s critical reassessment of Ibn Sīnā’s reasoning opens up a new area of disagreement and, in connection to this, significantly alters the question at stake. The Plotinian argument had only intended to establish that substance in the sense of one of the ten Aristotelian categories cannot be predicated synonymously of things which differ from each other with regard to priority and posteriority and thus merely refuted the claim that substance is a genus of *all* substantial beings. Faḥr ad-Dīn ar-Rāzī’s treatment of the issue, in turn, aims at a comprehensive attack on the idea that substance might, even to a limited degree, be taken to be a genus.

One particularly contested argument in this context is derived from the problematic status of substantial differentiae; as we have just seen, al-Astarābādī thought that this was a rather convincing line of reasoning and did not understand the objection raised by al-Abharī. Faḥr ad-Dīn ar-Rāzī bases his argument on the widely held view that, with regard to their quiddities, the differentiae of substances would have to be substances as well. Thus, if substance were a genus in which the five species of substance (that is, form, matter, compound, soul, and intellect) commonly share, these five species would have to be distinguished from each other by means of differentiae which, in turn, are substances themselves. However, if substance were predicated of these differentiae by means of a genus-predication (*qawl al-ḡins*), there would be an infinite regress of substantial differentiae and genera. This unpleasant consequence can, according to ar-Rāzī, only be avoided if substance is assumed to be extrinsic to the quiddity of those things of which it is predicated, that is to say, if it is predicated of them as an “extrinsic concomitant” (*lāzim ḥārīḡī*).<sup>547</sup>

546 Al-ʿAllāma al-Ḥillī, *al-Asrār al-ḥāfiya fī l-ʿulūm al-ʿaqliyya*, ed. Markaz al-abḥāt wa-d-dirāsāt al-islāmiyya (Qom: Markaz-e entešārāt-e daftar-e tabliḡāt-e eslāmī, 2001 [1421 AH / 1379 SH]), p. 424, l. 20 – p. 425, l. 1.

547 Ar-Rāzī, *al-Mabāḥiṯ al-mašriqiyya*, vol. 1, p. 245, ll. 8–15: “If substance were a genus, the species included in it (*al-anwāʿ ad-dāḥila fihī*) would be differentiated from each other by means of differentiae (*fusūl*). And these differentiae would either need to be [i] such that they are substances in their quiddities; [ii] or that they are not substances. [ad ii] If they are not substances, they would be accidents; and this is impossible (*muḥāl*); for the subsistence/constitution (*qiwām*) of the accident comes about through the substance; and that which is constituted by a thing is not, at the same time, constitutive for that same thing. [ad i] Hence, it would have to be a substance (*taʿayyana an yakūna*

Thus, we can see that the line of reasoning which, according to al-Astarābādī's account, al-Abharī approved of, is based on the second part of ar-Rāzī's argument: Al-Abharī assumes that the quiddities of various things which all are called substances may *completely* differ from each other. This clearly draws on the view that substance is extrinsic to the quiddities of different kinds of substances and that, as a consequence, substance is predicated of them as a concomitant. However, al-Abharī seemed hesitant to accept the first part of the argument, namely the claim that an infinite regress is unavoidable if substance is a genus and if, at the same time, the differentiae of substances are also substances. Rather, al-Abharī is quoted as asking the rhetorical question: "Why should it not be permissible that it [i.e., substance] is a genus in relation to the species, while not being a genus in relation to the differentia?" Aṭ-Ṭūsī, in his response to al-Astarābādī's question, confirms that with this remark al-Abharī was on the right track and adduces the following example: In the statement 'body is a three-dimensional substance,' 'substance' is predicated of the species 'body' as its genus; and in the statement 'three-dimensional must be a substance,' 'substance' is predicated of the differentia 'three-dimensional' as something which is attached to it, that is, as a concomitant.<sup>548</sup> To put it differently,

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*ḡawharan*). In this case, substance would have to be said of it [i.i] either by means of a genus-predication (*qawl al-ḡins*); or [i.ii] the way concomitants are predicated (*qawl al-lawāzim*). [ad i.i] If ['substance' were to be said of the quiddity of the differentiae that constitute the various kinds of substances] by means of a genus-predication, the differentia would be equal to the species in being constituted by the nature of the genus (*fī l-taqawwumi bi-ṭabi'ati l-ḡins*); hence, it would need yet another differentia; therefore, an infinite regress would follow. [ad i.ii] If, however, it would be said of it the way extrinsic concomitants (*al-lawāzim al-ḥāriḡiyya*) are predicated, this would be that which was sought [i.e., in this case 'substance' would not be predicated as a genus but merely as a concomitant]." Since ar-Rāzī appears to hold that there must always be a differentia above a genus, at the very top of any classificatory scheme we may not assume genera but only concomitants.

548 Aṭ-Ṭūsī, *Aḡwibat Masā'il al-Astarābādī li-Naṣīr ad-Dīn aṭ-Ṭūsī*, p. 261, ll. 13–21: "Not everything which is a substance is a species of the substances so that it is distinguished from the other substances by means of a differentia. Thus you say to 'laughing / someone who laughs' (*aḍ-ḍāhik*) 'man' and to 'writing / someone who writes' (*al-kātib*) [you also say] 'man'; and in applying 'man' to both of them there is no need for differentiae. In this manner the differentia of the substance is a substance – and it [i.e., the differentia] is not a species in relation to substance (*wa-laysa bi-naw'in li-l-ḡawhar*) so that it would be in need of another differentia. And in this manner the differentia of quantity is a quantity and the differentia of quality a quality. There is truth in the discourse (*kalām*) of the Eminent and Blissful Aṭīr ad-Dīn – may God have mercy on him. One should not reply to him: 'Since it [i.e., substance] is a genus in relation to the species, it necessarily follows that it is a genus in relation to the differentia of the species [as well].' For 'substance' is predicated of 'body' by saying: 'It is a substance which possesses three dimen-

‘having three dimensions’ always *implies* substance but substance is not part of its quiddity.

In making this distinction, aṭ-Ṭūsī clearly draws on chapter V,6 of the *Ilāhiyyāt* of the *Šifāʾ* where Ibn Sīnā discusses a misunderstanding that might arise in connection with the ontological status of substantial differentiae:

[...] we say that the genus is predicated of the species in such a manner that it is a part of its quiddity (*‘alā annahū ġuz’un min māhiyyatihī*). And it is predicated of the differentia in such a manner that it is a concomitant of it, not in such a manner that it is a part of its quiddity. [...]

After all this, it has become clear that it is not necessary for every differentia to have a differentia. And it must be known that the statement “the differentiae of substance are a substance and the differentiae of quality are a quality” has the following meaning: It is concomitantly attached to the differentiae of substance that they are a substance; and it is concomitantly attached to the differentiae of quality that they are a quality; it does not mean that in the case of the differentiae of substance it is such that the definition of substance is included in that which is understood by their quiddities – as if they [i.e., the differentiae] were substances *in themselves*; and [it does not mean] that in the case of the differentiae of quality the definition of quality is included in their quiddities – as if they [i.e., the differentiae] were a quality.<sup>549</sup>

Ibn Sīnā, ar-Rāzī and aṭ-Ṭūsī commonly acknowledge the difference between *qawl al-ġins* and *qawl al-lāzim*. However, ar-Rāzī – in contrast to Ibn Sīnā’s and aṭ-Ṭūsī’s position – rejects the idea that ‘substance’ may be predicated as a genus in relation to substantial species and as a concomitant in relation to substantial differentiae. Rather, his argument seems to take it for granted that if ‘substance’ is predicated of *certain* substantial entities as a *lāzim*, we are better off to content ourselves with the view that it is a *lāzim* in relation to *all* substantial entities.

This position concurs with ar-Rāzī’s general skepticism<sup>550</sup> – or even pessimism<sup>551</sup> – about man’s ability to grasp genera and differentiae beyond the level

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sions’; and it [i.e., ‘substance’] is predicated of ‘that which possesses dimensions’ by saying: ‘that which possesses three dimensions must be a substance,’ i.e., ‘substantiality’ is inseparably attached to it (*yalzamu l-ġawhariyya*), just like it is said: “That which is in possession of [the art of] writing is a man.”

549 Ibn Sīnā, *K. aš-Šifāʾ, al-Ilāhiyyāt (1)*, V,6, p. 232, ll. 16–17; p. 235, ll. 1–5.

550 Whereas it would be tempting to draw a line between ar-Rāzī’s nowadays often-quoted sobriquet *Imām al-Mušakkikīn* (literally, “the leader of those who raise doubts”) and ar-Rāzī’s skepticism, Shihadeh has convincingly argued that those Safavid philosophers who called ar-Rāzī by that name simply intended to refer to the multiple doubts (*šukūk*) he had raised against some of Ibn Sīnā’s views, not to a tendency of general skepticism; see Ayman Shihadeh, “The Mystic and the Sceptic in Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī,” in *Sufism and Theology*, ed. idem (Edinburgh: University Press, 2007), p. 103. The pejorative connotation which *mušakkik* may have is reflected in Pines’ translation “Maître des Ergoteurs”;

of mere nominal definitions, that is to say, within a widely ramified hierarchy from *summa genera* all the way down to *infimae species*. For example, in the *Manṭiq al-Mulahḥaṣ*, after having outlined the five predicables ar-Rāzī voices the following caveat:

Whenever we come to know two things which, in certain regards, have something in common, and which, in another regard, differ from each other, it is not possible for us to know about the *complete commonly shared set [of properties]* which one it is and how it is; and [it is not possible for us to know] about the *complete differentiating set [of properties]* which one it is and how it is. If this is [already] very difficult, acquiring differentiae and genera by means of verification is of the highest degree of difficulty.<sup>552</sup>

In his study on Faḥr ad-Dīn ar-Rāzī's scientific approach, Bilal Ibrahim refers, *inter alia*, to this passage in order to show that ar-Rāzī fully dispenses with Aristotelian-Avicennian quiddities or real definitions and replaces them by nominal definitions which are devoid of any ontological commitments.<sup>553</sup> However, notwithstanding the abundance of critical remarks or suggestions of alternative paths, throughout ar-Rāzī's oeuvre there are also significant passages in which he substantiates and utilizes key elements of Ibn Sinā's theory of definition and predication. Against this background, I find it difficult to discard these Rāzian instances of essentialism as sheer dialectical concessions. Be that as it may, it is clear that ar-Rāzī displays a deep dissatisfaction with the fact that even with regard to some of their most important doctrines the philosophers did not man-

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see Shlomo Pines, "Études sur Awḥad al-Zamān Abu'l-Barakāt al-Baghdādī," in *The Collected Works of Shlomo Pines, Volume I: Studies in Abu'l-Barakāt al-Baghdādī* (Jerusalem: Magnes Press, 1979), p. 74.

- 551 For an analysis of the epistemological pessimism which ar-Rāzī displays in two of his late works, cf. Ayman Shihadeh, *The Teleological Ethics of Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī*, pp. 181–199. It would be worthwhile to investigate whether and to which degree subsequent scholars whose philosophical and theological expositions are deeply influenced by ar-Rāzī, as is the case with Abharī, for example, follow ar-Rāzī's pessimistic attitude. I have the suspicion that, even though al-Abharī – on a structural and systematic level – very much depends on ar-Rāzī, for him the Aristotelian-Avicennian optimism, which does not envision a fundamental obstacle that might prevent us from arriving at a full set of *shared* and *distinguishing* properties and which thus assumes that one might very well acquire a complete scheme of genera, differentiae, and species, remains the overriding attitude towards our scientific efforts.
- 552 Ar-Rāzī, *Manṭiq al-Mulahḥaṣ*, ed. Aḥad Farāmarz Qarāmalekī and Ādīne Aṣḡarīneżād (Teheran: Dānešgāh-e Emām Ṣādeq, 2002/2003 [1381 SH]), p. 90, ll. 2–6.
- 553 Bilal Ibrahim, "Faḥr ad-Dīn ar-Rāzī, Ibn al-Hayṭam and Aristotelian Science: Essentialism versus Phenomenalism in Post-Classical Islamic Thought," *Oriens* 41 (2013): 379–431; for Ibrahim's translation and analysis of the above-mentioned quote from the *Manṭiq al-Mulahḥaṣ*, see p. 359ff.



age to live up to their own epistemological standards. Thus, after his multifaceted attack on the view that substance is a genus (of which I have focused on one out of four arguments which ar-Rāzī deems to be valid), ar-Rāzī concludes the chapter by turning the tables on his predecessors: “Those who affirm that it [i.e., substance] is a genus do not even have a spurious argument (*šubha*) in favor of it – let alone a proper argument (*huğğā*) – so that we would need to refute it.”<sup>554</sup>

In the further course of the *Mabāḥiṭ* ar-Rāzī ultimately extends his doubt to all ten *summa genera*. In order to undertake a proper investigation of whether any of the ten categories is indeed a genus one would, first of all, need to establish that each of them meets all of the following five criteria:

[1] Firstly, [it is necessary] that we clarify that the divisions which are subsumed under every single of these ten [categories] commonly share in a certain characteristic (*waṣf*); for [even] the lowest ranks of the genus must have something in common [...].

[2] Secondly, [it is necessary] that we clarify that the manner in which they have something in common is affirmative (*ṭubūṭī*); for if it were negative (*salbī*), it would not be a genus. [...]

[3] Thirdly, [...] it is indispensable for us to clarify that this affirmative thing is said univocally of that which falls under it – and not by means of focal homonymy [...].

[4] Fourthly, [...] it is indispensable for us to clarify that it belongs to the essential properties (*ad-dāṭiyyāt*), not to the accidental properties. [For example,] if we held it permissible for [the category of] quality to be said of the four divisions which have been assumed to be its species in the manner in which a concomitant (*lāzim*) is predicated, not in the manner in which constitutive properties (*muqawwimāt*) are predicated, quality would not be a genus. [...]

[5] Fifthly, [it is necessary] that we clarify that this [characteristic (*waṣf*)] which is [1] commonly shared, [3] predicated univocally, [2] affirmative, and [4] constitutive (*dālika l-muṣṭarak al-mutawāṭī' at-ṭubūṭī al-muqawwim*) is the completeness of that which is commonly shared between the species (*kamālu l-muṣṭaraki bayan l-anwā'*) [...].<sup>555</sup>

In his later *Šarḥ 'Uyūn al-ḥikma* ar-Rāzī briefly introduces exactly the same list of five criteria – and now clearly voices his doubt of whether this philosophical work program could ever be completed: “Establishing (*iṭbāt*) these five things with regard to each of the ten [categories] is virtually impossible (*ka-l-muta'addir*).”<sup>556</sup> However, as we have seen above,<sup>557</sup> this pessimistic assessment leads him neither to lowering the logical standards nor to abandoning the scheme of *summa genera* altogether.

554 Ar-Rāzī, *al-Mabāḥiṭ al-mašriqiyya*, vol. 1, p. 247, ll. 11–12.

555 Ar-Rāzī, *al-Mabāḥiṭ al-mašriqiyya*, vol. 1, p. 269, l. 6 – p. 270, l. 10.

556 Ar-Rāzī, *Šarḥ 'Uyūn al-ḥikma*, ed. as-Saqqā, p. 98, ll. 17–20; MS Leiden Or. 712, fol. 24b, ll. 2–4; I read with the MS *muta'addir* instead of as-Saqqā's *mu'tadir*.

557 Cf. above, pp. 188–189.

#### 4.3. Concluding Remark on the Generic Status of Accident and Substance

The old question of whether accident may be regarded to be a *summum genus* – which among late Ancient Greek commentators and among Arabic philosophers up to and including Ibn Sinā had predominantly been controversial with regard to providing the adequate reasons for the non-generic status of accident – ceases to be a significant issue of debate in the later Islamic philosophical tradition. Ibn Sinā's view that accident in the sense of 'being/existing in a subject' is merely a "concomitant" (*lāzim*) which applies to all accidental genera and accidents without being included in their various essences was to become the *communis opinio*. At the same time, however, Ibn Sinā's approach of treating both accident in relation to the various kinds of accidental beings and substance in relation to the substantial differentiae as a concomitant was to pave the way for a more radical position which assumed substance to be a concomitant in relation to *all* substantial beings. Thus, when ar-Rāzī questions the claim that the category of substance is a genus which comprises all substantial beings no return to the old Plotinian paradigm is at work. Rather, one can, in a nutshell, trace the following development: Plotinus' *ontological* critique of Aristotle's scheme of categories had posed, *inter alia*, the question of whether substance may be a *summum genus* for beings from different ontological grades – which is a problem that subsequently, in light of Ibn Sinā's distinction between essence and existence, was to become obsolete. Faḥr ad-Dīn ar-Rāzī initially addresses the question of whether substance qualifies as a *summum genus* of anything at all. Ultimately, he arrives at the fundamental *epistemological* objection that it is impossible for us to sufficiently prove that anything whatsoever, including substance, qualifies as a *summum genus*.

## B. TEXTS

For an account of accident in *al-Muḥtaṣar al-awsaṭ fi l-manṭiq*, see ch. 3, §§ 15–23, and ch. 4, §§ 30–32 (for an English translation of these passages, see above, pp. 123–124 and pp. 190–191).

### a. On Accident 1: Ibn Sīnā, *K. aš-Šifāʾ*, *al-Manṭiq*, *al-Maqūlāt*, I,4 [ed. Madkūr, pp. 28–38]

#### Explanation of the Definition of Accident, Namely It Is ‘Existing in a Subject’ (*mawǧūd fi mawḍūʿ*)

[(I.D) al-Ḥillī (fol. 16a, ll. 7–8): “The Fourth Issue (*maṭlab*): Explanation of the Definition of Accident (*šarḥ ḥadd al-ʿaraḍ*); in It Are Several Investigations (*mabāḥiṭ*)”]

[ed. Madkūr, p. 28, l. 4]

[(I.D.1) al-Ḥillī (fol. 16a, l. 8): “First [Investigation]: Its Description (*rasm*)”]

[§ 1] Let us now explain (*natabayyanu*) the meaning of our saying ‘existing in a subject’ (*al-mawǧūd fi mawḍūʿ*). It had been described as follows:

«That which exists in something, not as a part of it, and whose subsistence is impossible without that which it is in (*annahū l-mawǧūdu fi šayʿin lā ka-ǧuzʿin minhū wa-lā yašihū qiwāmuhū min dūna mā huwa fihi*).»

[§ 2] [‘Existing in something’ without any additional qualification applies to many different things] Our saying ‘that which exists in something’ (*annahū l-mawǧūdu fi šayʿin*) applies to many things – to some by way of synonymy (*bi-t-tawāṭuʿ*), to some by way of modulation [i.e., ‘focal homonymy’] (*bi-t-taškīk*), and to some by way of similarity (*bi-l-ištibāḥ*). The manner in which it [i.e., the description ‘existing in something’] applies to all of these things is neither the manner in which a synonymous expression (*lafẓ mutawāṭiʿ*) would apply nor the manner in which a modulated expression (*lafẓ mušakkik*) would apply; rather, it applies [to them] as a homonymous expression (*wuqūʿ lafẓ muštarak*), that is to say, whenever it is put into relation to all of these things (*iḍā qīsa ilā ǧamīʿihā*).

Nor is this explanation (*bayān*) which is constructed upon it a definitional explanation (*bayān ḥaddī*) – and it is not even a real description (*rasm ḥaqīqī*). Rather, it is a kind of explanation by which one is led forward to the name (*nawʿun mina l-bayāni l-muḥāli bihī ʿalā l-ism*), just like one explains a name by a name which is more widespread and more known (*bi-smīn ašhara wa-aʿrafā*).

[§ 3] The shortcoming of this [description] is that the masses (*al-ǧumhūr*) know various things which are said to be ‘in something’ (*fi šayʿ*). Therefore, the one who gives this explanation (*al-ātī bi-hādā l-bayān*) intends to say that this

accident is ‘that which is in a subject’ (*al-kā’in fi l-mawdū’*) and that its ‘being in a subject’ is neither like such-and-such a manner of being in something nor like such-and-such a manner [of being in something] until the homonymy (*al-iştirāk fi l-ism*) ultimately vanishes so that only one single meaning remains which then – after the uncertainty (*šubha*) which is due to homonymy has been removed – is made known by means of examples. For the removal of the uncertainty which is due to homonymy can come about in two ways:

[1] First, by giving the definition which is intended by the name or by giving the description.

[2] Second, by negating [all] those meanings which are included under the homonymous usage of the name (*al-ma‘ānī ad-dāhila tahta iştirāk al-ism*) until that which remains is indicated (*ḥattā yudalla ‘alā l-bāqī*), not with regard to its essence, but by negating all that which does not apply to it.

[ed. Madkūr, p. 28, l. 16]

[Group 1: distinctions on the basis of the interpretation of “being in something”]

[§ 4] [Distinction I: ‘the accident in the subject’ vs ‘the whole in the parts’] Thus, by his saying ‘that which exists in something’ he distinguishes ‘the state of the accident’ from ‘the state of the whole in the parts’ (*al-kull fi l-ağzā’*). For the whole has a form of completeness which does not subsist by itself but rather in the parts altogether, not in every single one of them; ‘tenness’ (*al-ašriyya*), for example, is a certain wholeness (*kulliyatun mā*) which is not realized in every single ‘one’ but in all of its parts – for whenever they are complete and are added up, the form of ‘tenness’ will be realized as a result. Through first philosophy this will become clear to you according to its true nature (*‘alā kun-hihī*). As soon as one says ‘that which exists in something’ [in contrast to ‘that which exists in the totality of things’], the uncertain relation between ‘accident’ and ‘wholeness’ (*kulliyya*) has already been removed.

[ed. Madkūr, p. 29, l. 6]

[(I.D.2) al-Ḥillī (fol. 16b, ll. 12–13): “Second Investigation (*baḥṭ*): Replies to the Objections to Our Saying ‘In Something’ (*ağwibat i‘tirādāt ‘alā qawlinā fi šay’in*)”]

[§ 5] [Objection (a): ‘Being in something’ does not comprise relata] Someone might say:

«The relations (*al-idāfāt*), such as ‘contiguity,’ ‘brotherhood’ and others, exist in two things, not in one thing.»

[*Ibn Sīnā’s reply to objection (a)*] – The reply to this is what we will say in the proper place, namely in the context of defining the relatum (*min ta‘rifinā l-mudāfa*).

[§ 6] [*Objection (b): Time is an accident and yet it is not in something*] Someone might say:

«Time (*az-zamān*) is, according to your view (*‘indakum*), an accident – and it is not in something.»

[*Ibn Sīnā’s reply to objection (b)*] – The reply to this is: It is in something. An explanation of this will be given in physics (*al-‘ilm at-ṭabī‘ī*).

[§ 7] [*Objection (c): Place is an accident and yet it is not in that which has the place*] Someone might say:

«Place is also an accident and yet it is not in ‘that which has a place’ (*al-mutamakkīn*).»

[*Ibn Sīnā’s reply to objection (c)*] – The reply to this is: It is in something. An explanation of this will also be given in physics (*al-‘ilm at-ṭabī‘ī*).

The logician cannot provide a sufficient explanation of this. Rather, he must remind people of the fact that this premise, namely that time is not in a place, should not be taken for granted; and the same holds for other [premises] as well.

[§ 8] [*Objection (d): Wholeness is an accident as well but it does not exist in one single thing*] Someone might say:

«Even though the whole (*al-kull*) is a substance, the wholeness (*al-kulliyya*) is in things and is an accident. For according to your view (*‘indakum*), the wholeness, such as, for example, ‘tenness’ and other such things, is not counted among substances; rather, these are accidents; and their existence is not in one single thing.»

[*Ibn Sīnā’s reply to objection (d)*] – [In reply to this] it is said: It is not precluded that the first subject of the accident is composed of numerous things whose totality had become a subject for the accident (*mu‘allafan min ašyā‘in kaṭīratin takūnu ġumlatuhā qad šārat mawḍū‘an li-l-‘araḍ*). This totality, inasmuch as it is a totality, is the subject of that accident. And it is, inasmuch as it is a totality, one single thing. Thus, if the wholeness (*al-kulliyya*) is an accident and has a subject, the subject which bears it is not its subject, inasmuch as it is [numerous] things, so that every single one of them would bear that accident, but inasmuch as there is something which is the result of their aggregation (*hāšilun min iġtimā‘ihā*). It is merely precluded that the accident is in [numerous] things in such a manner that one single accident is an accident in every single one of these things (*‘alā an yakūna l-wāḥidu minhū ‘araḍan fī kulli wāḥidin minhā*).

[§ 9] [*Objection (e): If these numerous things make up a unity, why did you say before that the whole is in numerous things and not in one single thing (see above: distinction I)?*] If someone says:

«Why was your reply [to the question] concerning the existence of the whole in the parts not this reply? And why did you argue that the accident [in the subject] is dis-

tinguished from the whole [in the parts] on account of the fact that the whole is in [numerous] things? For the whole is not in every single one of them but in their totality (*ḡumla*) – and this totality is one single thing, inasmuch as it is a totality.»

[*Ibn Sīnā's reply to objection (e)*] – Then we say [in reply to this]: It is not permissible to say that the whole is *in* the totality of the parts (*innahū fī ḡumlati l-aḡzā'*) since it itself is the totality of the parts; for the sum of the parts is nothing else than the totality (*fa-lā yakūnu maḡmū'u l-aḡzā'ī šay'an dūna l-kull*). Thus, how should the whole be by itself (*fa-kayfa yakūnu l-kullu fī nafsihī*)? As for the wholeness (*al-kullīyya*), it is that with regard to which this is said (*allatī tuqālu fihā dālika*); it is the state of this totality, inasmuch as it is a totality (*ḡālū ḡumlati min ḡaytu hiya ḡumlatun*).

[§ 10] [*The whole in the parts' is only a metaphorical expression*] In reality (*bi-l-ḡaḡīqa*), whenever someone says 'the whole is *in* the parts,' this is figurative speech (*qawl maḡāzī*). Its meaning is that the existence of the wholeness (*kullīyya*), on account of which the whole is what it is (*allatī bihā l-kullu huwa mā huwa*), is in the parts – as if the parts were things to which occurs a certain [accidental] property from which the whole is derived (*ka-anna l-aḡzā'a ašyā'un ya'riḡu lahā ḡay'atun mā yakūnu minhā l-kull*); this property is the wholeness (*al-kullīyya*); and this property is a general accident ('*araḡ ḡāmi*'). The whole is composed (*mu'allaf*) of that property and of the singular things (*al-afrād*). Therefore, one [only] says *per accidens* (*bi-l-'araḡ*) that the whole is in the parts, i.e., its wholeness is in the parts and its subsistence is in the parts (*ay kulliyatuhū fī l-aḡzā' wa-qiwāmuhū fī l-aḡzā'*).

You do not really need to occupy yourself with this distinction but you only need to do so in view of the initial confusion over the term in its literal and in its figurative usage (*al-iltibāsu fī bādi'i l-amri bayna l-musta'mali bi-l-ḡaḡīqati wa-bayna l-maḡāzī*). With regard to the examples adduced in these places, it may very well be the case that you also come to know the difference between the literal [meaning] and the figurative [meaning] (*bayna l-ḡaḡīqī wa-bayna l-maḡāzī*) of which you initially might not have known that it is figurative. But it seems that we do not have an urgent need for [knowing] this difference. I think that the first one who gave this description (*ar-rāsīm al-awwal*) did not have anything in mind which concerns this difference. Rather, this is an invention of people who make a forced effort (*al-mutakallifūna*). The aspect which constitutes the forced effort is as follows: Whenever one says of the whole that it is in an object (*fī amrin*), it is merely said to be in several things (*fa-innamā yuqālu innahū fī ašyā'in*), even if in reality it is neither in a thing nor in numerous instances of the thing (*wa-in kāna huwa bi-l-ḡaḡīqati lā fī šay'in wa-lā fī ašyā'in minhā*) [since this is only a metaphorical expression].

[ed. Madkūr, p. 31, l. 1]

[§ 11] [Summary: *The accident vs the whole*] [1] As for the accident, it is only an accident because it is in something (*fa-innamā huwa ‘araḍun li-annahū fī šay’*). If it should happen that it is in a certain respect in numerous things, it is not an accident on account of this fact but on account of the fact that it is in something, be it a sum of things or something else. [2] As for the whole, its being a whole is only according to figurative speech ‘in several things and not in something [i.e., one thing].’

[§ 12] [Distinction II: *The distinction between the literal and the metaphorical usage of ‘in something’ may also be extended to distinguishing the ‘accident in the subject’ from ‘the genus in the species’ or, generally speaking, ‘the universal in the particular’ (IIa: ‘with regard to being general’; later on, IIb will be introduced: ‘with regard to the nature’)] This is a way of explaining this difference. In my opinion, one needs this [i.e., this way of explaining the difference between the accident and the whole]. If one needs it, this also marks a difference between ‘the existence of the accident in the subject’ and ‘the existence of the genus in the species (*anwā’*),’ with regard to being general (*min ḥaytu l-‘umūm*), and ‘the existence of the species (*naw’*) in the individuals,’ and, in general, between it [i.e., the accident] and ‘the existence of the universal (*kullī*) in the particulars (*ḡuz’iyyāt*), inasmuch as it is universal [i.e., a universal exists *in* the particulars only metaphorically].’*

[ed. Madkūr, p. 31, l. 8]

[(I.D.3) al-Ḥillī (fol. 17b, ll. 20–21): “Third Investigation (*baḥṭ*): The Meaning of Our Saying ‘In Something Not as a Part of It’ (*ma’nā qawlinā fī šay’in lā ka-ḡuz’in minhū*)”]

[§ 13] [Distinction III: *‘the accident in the subject’ vs ‘form in matter’]* If by our saying ‘that which exists *in* something’ (*al-mawḡūd fī šay’*) we mean ‘*in* something whose subsistence is realized by itself (*fī šay’ mutaḥaṣṣil al-qiwām bi-nafsihī*) and whose thingness (*šay’iyya*) had already been completed without that which exists in it or is complete without it so that that which it bears [i.e., that for which it function as a substrate] does not bring it into subsistence (*lā yuqawwimuhū mā yaḥmiluhū*),’ this marks a difference (*farq*) between ‘the state of the accident in the subject’ (*ḥāl al-‘araḍ fī l-mawḍū’*) and ‘the state of form in matter’ (*ḥāl aṣ-ṣūra fī l-mādda*). For form is the thing which renders its substrate ‘existent *in actu*’ (*al-amr alladī yaḡ‘alu maḥallahū mawḡūdan bi-l-fi’l*) – and its substrate is by itself not a thing *in actu* (*laysa bi-nafsihī šay’an bi-l-fi’l*) but only through form (*illā bi-ṣ-ṣūra*).

[ed. Madkūr, p. 31, l. 12]

[Group 2: distinctions on the basis of the additional formula ‘not as a part of it’]

[§ 14] [*Distinctions IV (part in the whole), IIb (nature of the genus in the nature of the species), V (the species in the genus = the particular in the universal), VI (matter in the compound), VII (form in the compound)*] His saying ‘not as a part of it’ distinguishes that [i.e., the accident] from [IV] ‘the existence of the part in the whole’ (*wuğūd al-ğuz’ fī l-kullī*), [IIb] ‘the existence of the nature of the genus in the nature of one single species, inasmuch as both are natures’ (*wuğūd ṭabī‘at al-ğins fī ṭabī‘at an-naw’ al-wāhid min ḥaytu humā ṭabī‘atāni*), [V] ‘the existence of the generality of the species in the generality of the genus, inasmuch as both are general’ (*wuğūd ‘umūmiyyat an-naw’ fī ‘umūmiyyat al-ğins min ḥaytu humā ‘ammāni*), and, in general, it distinguishes ‘the state of the accident in the subject’ from ‘the state of the particular in the universal’ (*ḥāl al-ğuz’ī fī l-kullī*) which is the regard in which one says of the particular that it is in the universal.

[VI] Likewise, it distinguishes it from ‘the existence of matter in the compound’ and [VII] from ‘[the existence of] form in the compound.’

[ed. Madkūr, p. 31, l. 17]

[(I.D.4) al-Ḥillī (fol. 18a, ll. 10–11): “Fourth Investigation (*baḥṭ*): The Meaning of Our Saying ‘Its Subsistence Is Not Possible in Separation from It’ (*ma’nā qawlinā wa-lā yumkinu qiwāmuhū mufāriqan laḥū*)”]

[Group 3: distinctions on the basis of the additional formula ‘its subsistence is not possible in separation from it’]

[§ 15] [*Distinctions VIII (in time), IX (in a place), X (in a goal), XI (substance in accident), XII (matter in form), IIb (nature of the genus in the nature of the species)*] [VIII] His saying ‘its subsistence is not possible in separation from it’ distinguishes ‘the being of the accident in its subject’ (*kawn al-‘araḍ fī mawḍū‘ihī*) from ‘the thing being in time’ (*kawn aš-šay’ fī z-zamān*). For the thing which is in any instance of time whatsoever (*fī ay zamān faraḍtahū*) can be assumed to be separated from it in favor of another instance of time (*ilā zamān āḥar*). But this is not the case with the state of the accident in its subject.

[ed. Madkūr, p. 32, l. 1]

[§ 16] [IX] And likewise, [the formula ‘its subsistence is not possible in separation from it’ distinguishes the accident from] ‘the thing in the place’ (*aš-šay’ fī l-makān*). For from the fact that it is in a place it does not necessarily follow that it is such that it would not subsist without the place. For neither from the fact that this is something which has a place (*min ḥaytu huwa dū makān*) nor from the fact that that is a place (*min ḥaytu ḍālīka makānun*) does it follow that that which has a place cannot be separated from the place. If this should be the



case [i.e., if the thing should indeed be inseparable from its place], it would have to be so for a different reason. However, the manner in which an accident is in a subject necessitates it [i.e., the inseparability], inasmuch as this is a subject and that is an accident.

[§ 17] [X] And likewise, [the inseparability criterion distinguishes the accident from] ‘the thing being in the goal’ (*kawn aš-šay’ fī l-ġāya*). For ‘the thing being in the goal’ may be separated from the goal, such as ‘man in happiness’ (*al-insān fī s-sa’āda*), ‘the body in health’ (*al-badan fī ṣ-ṣiḥḥa*), and ‘the manager in the management’ (*as-sā’is fī s-siyāsa*).

[§ 18] [XI] Likewise, [it distinguishes the accident from] ‘substance being in the accident’; for the substance is separable from the accident and its subsistence is possible without it.

[§ 19] [XII] Likewise, nothing precludes that matter [in form], inasmuch as it has the meaning of matter, is separated from form in favor of another form.

[§ 20] [ad IIb] And the nature of the genus may exist in separation from the nature of the species in another species (*qad tūġadu mufāriqatan li-ṭabī’ati n-naw’i fī naw’in āḥar*).

However, logic cannot provide a sufficient investigation of such issues.

[ed. Madkūr, p. 32, l. 11]

[I.D.5] al-Ḥillī (fol. 18b, ll. 10–11): “Fifth Investigation (*baḥṭ*): Replies to the Objections to That (*aġwibat i’tirādāt ‘alā dālīka*)”]

[§ 21] Nonetheless [i.e., even though logic is not the proper place to discuss these questions], the *aporiai* with regard to this [description] are numerous (*lākinna š-šukūka ‘alā hādā kaṭīratun*). Let us mention these [*aporiai*] and let us solve them in a certain manner.

[§ 22] [Aporia (a): Six cases in which the inseparability criterion applies to other things besides accidents] Among them is the following [*aporiai*]:

«[i] One says of the thing that it is in time in the absolute sense (*innahū fī z-zamāni l-muṭlaq*); and it cannot be separated from time in the absolute sense. [ii] And one says of the thing that it is in place in the absolute sense (*innahū fī l-makāni l-muṭlaq*); and it cannot be separated from place in the absolute sense. [iii] Likewise, one says of a substance that it is in the accident in the absolute sense; and it cannot be separated from the accident in the absolute sense. [iv] Some bodies cannot exist unless in the place which they are in – and yet these [bodies] are not accidents, just like the moon in its orbit (*falak*). [v] Some matters (*mawādd*) cannot be separated from the form which they have in favor of another form, such as the matter of the celestial sphere (*falak*) – and yet these are not accidents. [vi] No form (*lā šay’a mina ṣ-ṣūra*) can be separated from matter – and yet you had said: ‘Form being in matter differs from the [accidental] thing being in a subject.’»

[§ 23] [*Ibn Sīnā*’s solution of aporia (a)] – [In reply to this] we say:

[ad i/ii/iii. *An argument to solve these three cases: A specifically determined accident exists in a specifically determined subject – and not in a thing in the absolute sense*] First of all, the meaning of our saying ‘it is impossible for it to be separated from that which it is in’ is that any specifically determined existent belonging to it whatsoever (*ay mawğūd mu‘ayyan minhū aḥaḍtahū*) which is in the specifically determined thing in which it exists (*fī š-šay’ al-muta‘ayyin alladī huwa fihi mawğūdu*) may not be separated from that specifically determined thing (*lam yağuz mufāraqātuhū li-dālīka l-mu‘ayyan*); rather, the very cause of its subsistence is that it is in it (*bal ‘illatu qiwāmihī hiya annahū fihi*). It is not the case that this [i.e., the subject which the accident exists in] is a thing which it becomes attached to after it [i.e., the accident] had already been constituted in *actu* [i.e., after it had already been brought into subsistence]. For this reason, the accident has specifically been designated by the name ‘that which exists in a subject’; for this is the manner of [its] existence (*iḍ huwa i’tibāru l-wuğūd*). And the other one has specifically been designated by the expression ‘being said of the subject’ (*al-qawl ‘alā l-mawḍū*); for the universal is only existent in the linguistic expression or in conceptualization (*iḍ al-kullī innamā yakūnu mawğūdan fī l-lafz aw fī t-taṣawwur*) – and both [i.e., both uttered language and mental language] are a statement (*qawl*) [i.e., universals only exist in language or in thought, not in extra-linguistic and extra-mental reality]. This is our aim (*ğaraḍunā*) in what we are saying [here]. Thus, the doubt (*šubha*) about [ad ii] place in the absolute sense, [ad i] time in the absolute sense, and [ad iii] accident in the absolute sense (*al-makān wa-z-zamān wa-l-‘araḍ al-muḥlaqāt*) vanishes on account of what we have stipulated about the specific determination [of the accident and its subject] (*mā ištaraṭnāhu mina t-ta‘yīn*).

[§ 24] [*Another argument: A thing in the absolute sense exists only in the mind*] Moreover, [the doubt vanishes] with regard to the fact that something is in things in the absolute sense only according to imagination (*min ġihati anna š-šay’a innamā yakūnu fī l-muḥlaqāti bi-ḥasabi l-wahm*). Our account [of the description of accident], however, has been given according to [concrete] existence (*bi-ḥasabi l-wuğūd*). As you know, nothing is in existence except concrete things existing in concrete things which are all individual (*a‘yān mawğūda fī a‘yān kulluhā šaḥsiyya*). Our account concerns the mode of existence which they have (*naḥw wuğūdiḥā alladī lahā*) – and not the mode of imagination (*naḥw at-tawahhum*). If instead we were to consider the mode of imagination, it would indeed be possible for us to take many accidents as being separable from the subjects in imagination (*mufāriqan li-l-mawḍū‘āt fī t-tawahhum*).

[ed. Madkūr, p. 33, l. 9]

[§ 25] [ad iv. *An argument to solve the doubt about the moon in its orbit*] As for the moon in its orbit, this is something which becomes attached to it by way

of an extrinsic attachment (*amrun lazimahū min ḥāriḡin luzūman*) – not in such a manner that the cause for the existence of the moon, inasmuch as it is the nature of moonness (*min ḥaytu hiya ṭabī'atu l-qamriyya*), would be its being in its place [namely in its orbit]. Therefore, it is possible to assume that in a certain regard the moon has a part (*an yufraḡa li-l-qamri ḡuz'un bi-waḡhin mā*); for every body can be assumed to have a part in a certain regard; and that which is assumed as one of its parts is not characterized as being in the place of the whole or as being in any place whatsoever. You will learn this [namely that the part has no place] in physics. Besides that, the reason for this does not lie in the fact that it [i.e., the moon] is in the place – so that its being in the place would make it necessary that it is inseparable from the place. Rather, this becomes necessary only on account of something else than its being in the place. The accident, however, has this [i.e., the property of 'being unable to exist in separation'] on account of the fact that it is *in* a subject.

[§ 26] [ad vi. *An argument to solve the doubt about form in matter*] As for the form which is in matter (*aṣ-ṣūra allatī fi l-mādda*), according to the view of those philosophers who establish the validity of their claims ('*inda l-ḥukamā' al-muḥaṣṣilīna*) matter is not the cause of its subsistence (*laysat al-māddatu 'illata qiwāmiḥā*); rather, the cause of [the existence of] form is a thing which is also the cause of [the existence of] matter, although [with regard to the cause of the existence of matter] this is only the case through the intermediation of form (*bi-tawassuti ṣ-ṣūra*). The fact that its essence has a disposition towards that which it constitutes as existing *in actu* [i.e., a certain matter] is [merely] a concomitant [property] of form.

[ed. Madkūr, p. 34, l. 1]

[§ 27] [*Report of an earlier account of the difference between 'the form in matter' and 'the accident in a subject'*] Some people said (*qāla qawmun*):

«The difference between 'the existence of form in matter' and 'the existence of the accident in the subject' is that form is a part of the compound (*anna ṣ-ṣūrata takūnu ḡuz'an mina l-murakkab*), whereas the accident is neither a part of the subject nor of the compound.»

And the result of this was that some people ultimately said:

«If you do not put form into relation to the compound but to the recipient (*al-qābil*), it [i.e., the form] is an accident. And if you put the accident into relation to that which results from combining it [i.e., the accident] with the subject, it [i.e., the accident] is a form.»

[§ 28] [*Ibn Sīnā's critique of this view*] This account is quite vicious and confused! This is because in the preceding description [of accident] it had neither been stipulated that the accident is not a part of anything whatsoever nor that it

is not<sup>558</sup> a part of the compound; rather, [it had been stipulated] that it is not a part of the subject when it had been said ‘not as a part of it’ (*lā ka-ğuz’ minhū*), i.e., ‘of the subject’ (*ay mina l-mawḏū*), i.e., of that in which it is an accident (*ay mina llaḏī huwa ‘araḏun fihi*). So let this be a difference between ‘the existence of the accident in the subject’ and ‘the existence of form in the compound’! But that is not what is sought (*wa-laysa l-maṭlūbu hādā*). Rather, what is sought is the difference between ‘the existence of the accident in the subject’ and ‘the existence of form in matter’ which is a different consideration than ‘the existence of form in that which is compounded of it and of matter.’ If in the description [of accident] it had been said ‘the accident exists in something not as a part of anything whatsoever’ (*inna l-‘araḏa mawğūḏun fi šay’in lā ka-ğuz’in min šay’in al-battata*), then the issue would indeed be in accordance with what they say. And if therefore the accident were not a part of anything whatsoever, neither of the subject nor of the compound, and if the form, in turn, were a part of one of these two, namely of the compound – not a part of matter –, then the difference [between accident and form] would perhaps be in accordance with this account [which these other scholars gave].

However, this is not what is understood by our saying ‘existing in something not as a part of it’; rather, what is understood by this statement is that it is not a part of the thing in which it exists in the manner in which something exists in its substrate. Since this is not what had been said – and since, in addition to that, it is not true – their view is merely a folly (*haḏayān*)!

The reason why this [i.e., their interpretation] is not true is precisely the fact that accidents may very well be parts of things which are compounded of them and of substances (*ağzā’ min murakkabāt minhā wa-mina l-ğawāhir*). Thus, from the composition of a substance and an accident a meaning which is compounded of these two (*ma’nā murakkab minhumā*) and which each of these two is a part of (*kullu wāḥidin minhumā ġuz’un minhū*) may result, just like [example 1] the ‘chair’ is [compounded] of ‘wood’ and an accident in it (*‘ariḏ fihi*). The ‘wood’ is, in reality, its subject [i.e., that which underlies the shape of the chair] and not a matter (*wa-l-ḥašabu mawḏu’un laḥū bi-l-ḥaḳīqati laysa bi-māddatin*); and just like [example 2] in the case of the ‘hollowness’ (*taq’ir*): for from [the composition] of it and of the ‘nose’ results a thing, namely ‘the snub-nosed’ (*al-aftas*). Hence, this consideration [of the difference between accident and form] is vicious and futile!

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558 [34.6] Read with MSS B (not in app.), LB3, LG4, SA (not in app.), TD3 *wa-lā fihi an lā yakūna* instead of *wa-lā fihi an yakūna* (EC).

[ed. Madkūr, p. 35, l. 1]

[§ 29] [*Does Aristotle in Cat. 2 refer to accident in a more general sense than the ontological accident, namely to 'being in a substrate' either in the sense of the accident or in the sense of form?*] There is something which you must carefully pay attention to (*šay'un yağibu an tamīla ilayhi kulla l-mīl*), namely that it appears to be the case that in this description by which the accident had been described [the expression] 'accident' was not intended to refer to that [accident] of which – and of whose distinction from form – man attains knowledge as soon as he has penetrated deeply into philosophy; rather, what had been intended is a meaning which is more general than this accident [i.e., more general than the ontological accident which will be treated more thoroughly in metaphysics] (*ma'nā a'amm min ma'nā hādā l-'araḍ*), namely the meaning which comprises both this accident and the form (*al-ma'nā lladī ya'ummu hādā l-'araḍa wa-š-šūra*) – and this [comprehensive meaning] is 'being in a substrate' (*al-kawn fi l-maḥall*), whereas that which occurs [to the substrate] is a property of it (*wa-l-ḥāšilu hay'atun laḥū*), regardless of whether this substrate (*maḥall*) is a matter (*mādda*) or a subject (*mawḍū'*). For it is not to be excluded (*lā yab'udu*) that the name 'accident' is said of these two [different] things [i.e., of 'form' and of 'accident *stricto sensu*'] in such a manner that they both coincide in it and in what is understood by it in a certain respect [namely in the aspect of 'inhering in something'] (*qawlan yattaḥiqāni fihi wa-fi maḥmūhā bi-wağhin*). However, similarity (*ištibāh*) is neither unavoidable nor inescapable.

[ed. Madkūr, p. 35, l. 6]

[§ 30] [*ad v. The reverse case: 'Matter inhering in form' (= distinction XII)*] As for the case of the matter which is in a form (*amru l-māddati l-kā'inati fi šūratin*) in such a manner that the matter cannot be separated from that form in favor of another one, this is a difficult issue (*amr muškil*). It is as if it [i.e., the case of 'matter in form'] would render this description faulty and defective; for it makes it comprise both this matter and the accident (*'amm li-hādihī l-mādda wa-l-'araḍ*). And, what is more, one says of matter that it is *in* this form [in such a manner that it complies] with these other conditions [i.e., the matter which is inseparable from the form would fulfill all other conditions which according to the description of *Cat. 2* the accident fulfills].

[§ 31] [*A general reply to the problematic case v: The Categories addresses the general public and is based on commonly known terminological conventions*] It seems that one of the considerations (*wuğūh*) by which one replies to this [objection] and which serves as a reply to other issues as well is the fact that this book is only addressed to the general public; for the beginner is also counted as belonging to the level of the general public. This description is based upon a

linguistic expression in its commonly known usage (*lafz muta'arif*) – and the explanation of its states is provided in accordance with the linguistic expression.

[§ 32] Furthermore, the commonly known usage of the expression 'in' (*lafzat fi*) includes neither the relation of form to matter nor to the relation of matter to form. But it does include both the relation of the substances to the accidents, just like their saying 'Zayd is in a state of being relaxed' (*Zayd fi r-rāḥa*), and the relation of the accidents to the substances, just like their saying 'whiteness is in a body' – along with other things which the commonly known usage [of the expression 'in'] comprises, such as [*ad* distinction VIII] 'the thing in time' (*aš-šay' fi z-zamān*), [*ad* distinction IX] '[the thing] in the place,' [distinction XIII] '[the thing] in the container' (*fi l-inā*), [*ad* distinction IV] 'the part in the whole' and whatever follows this pattern. If the difference (*farq*) [between the 'being in something of the accident and the 'being in something' of other things] is attained by means of excluding these commonly known ways [of using the expression 'in'], then in the commonly known usage nothing which is said to be 'in something' would remain, except for the accident; hence, the student (*al-muta'allim*) would immediately be of the opinion that that existence is 'the existence of the accident in the substance,' even though this is not the case.

[§ 33] We have already indicated that this definition is given in accordance with the linguistic expression (*bi-ḥasabi l-lafz*) and not in accordance with a comprehensive meaning (*laysa bi-ḥasabi ma'nān ḡāmi'in*) which is posited in a general sense and to which subsequently differentiae are attached. If it [i.e., this definition] is given in accordance with the linguistic expression and its differentiation (*bi-ḥasabi l-lafzi wa-tafṣīliḥi*) – and in the manner we have indicated –, it is not implausible to consider in it the usage of the general public (*al-isti'māl al-ḡumhūrī*) and not those terminological conventions (*iṣṭilāḥāt*) which are only attained after the commonly known usage of the general public and which can be used in the sciences upon closer examination.

Hence, it is not possible to grasp a [strict philosophical] purpose of this [common-sense usage of 'in something' which is applied in *Cat. 2*]. For the application of a name to [numerous] things by way of homonymy or by way of similarity (*bi-l-iṣṭirāk awi l-iṣṭibāḥ*) does not pertain to those things which are assessed in a precise way or which are defined (*mimmā yuḍbaṭu aw yuḥaddu*). One can give a precise assessment or a definition only of things with regard to which one intends a compliance with the meaning (*murā'atu l-ma'nā*), be it by way of synonymy (*tawāṭu'*) or by way of modulation (*taškīk*) [i.e., 'focal homonymy'], as we have mentioned.

If matter and form are both in accordance with the description (*ṣifa*) that has been given of them, the general public does not use the expression 'one of them is in (*fi*) the other one' but rather says '[one of them] is with (*ma'a*) the

other one,' especially in the case of 'matter *in form*' [i.e., according to the general linguistic convention one would have to say 'matter is *with form*'].

[ed. Madkūr, p. 36, l. 7]

[§ 34] If someone intends to remove this [homonymy on account of] similarity (*ištibāh*), which we are now confronted with in light of the existence of the [strictly scientific] terminological conventions which came up after the commonly known convention, he needs to augment [the expression] 'that which exists *in something*' by [the description] 'in such a manner that it [i.e., the inhering thing] provides it [i.e., the substrate] with an attribute and a characterization' (*ḡā'īlan iyyāhu šifatun wa-na'tun*). For this is not more modulated or even more homonymous (*fa-inna hādā laysa ašadda taškīkan bal ittifāqan*) than the expression 'that which exists *in something*' (*lafẓat al-mawḡūd fī šay'*). For while matter does not provide form with an attribute and characterization, i.e., the [kind of] matter with regard to which the objection had been raised, it is the form which provides it [i.e., matter] with a characterization and an attribute.

[§ 35] [A futile attempt at providing a distinction between matter and form] If someone says:

«The difference is as follows: It lies in the nature of matter that it can replace a form through which it is brought into subsistence, such as this form, [by another form]; but it is the form which does not disappear from it. Therefore, it [i.e., the fact that form is inseparably attached to matter] is a constraint which [is not due to the nature of matter but which] accidentally occurs to it on account of this form. As for the accident [in contrast to matter], it lies in its nature that it is 'that which is brought into subsistence through the subject (*mutaqawwim bi-l-mawḡūd*)' and it does not lie in its nature that it is transferred from it [to another subject] (*wa-laysa fī tibā'ihā l-intiqālu 'anhū*).»

– This statement is unacceptable. For it will be verified in the sciences (*'ulūm*) that the matter with regard to which the objection had been raised (*inna l-māddata llatī fihā š-šakk*) cannot subsist without a form (*lā taqūmu bi-lā šūra*) and that the ability to receive another form does not lie in its nature; thus, its nature relies upon this form (*mawqūfan 'alā hādihī š-šūra*).

[§ 36] However, we have insured our expression against this [way of drawing a] distinction [between matter and accident] (*'alā annā ḍammanā i'tibāranā 'an hādihī t-tafriqa*) in such a manner that it is not improbable that we have hit upon a point which concerns the difference [between matter and accident], namely the fact that we have said: [a] It is not necessary that matter – on account of its being a matter (*li-kawnihā māddatan*) – is dependent on and connected to a specifically determined form (*lā yalzamuhā an takūna muta'alliqatan muqāranatan li-šūratin bi-'aynihā*); rather, only after its being a matter this [inseparable connection to a specific form] might become necessary for it on ac-

count of a species-related property or a nature, whichever it might be (*li-naw'iyyatīn aw ṭabī'iyyatīn kayfa kānat*). [b] As for the accident, [in contrast to matter] its dependence on the subject is due to the most general of its meanings (*ta'alluquhū bi-l-mawḏū'i li-a'amma ma'ānīhi*), namely its being an accident (*kawnuhū 'araḍan*). This is also convincing.

[ed. Madkūr, p. 37, l. 1]

[§ 37] [Aporia (b): *Inseparable accidents without which the substance could not subsist*] Among the *aporīai* [which are discussed in connection with the description of the accident] is also the issue of those accidents which are inseparable (*al-a'rād allatī lā tufāriqu*) and without which the substance could not subsist (*lā yūḡadu l-ḡawharu qā'iman dūnahā*).

[*Ibn Sīnā's reply to aporia (b)*] – But it is not the case that the reason why they are inseparable is precisely the fact that the substance is brought into subsistence on account of being in them so that 'its [i.e., the substance's] subsistence would not be possible without them' (*lā yaṣihḡu qiwāmuhū dūnahā*) [cf. the description of accident above]. Rather, this is a concomitant property of it [i.e., of substance] (*bal dālika amrun lāzimun lahū*). And it [i.e., substance] brings them [i.e., the accidents] into subsistence [and not the other way around]. As for the accident, the meaning of [the statement] 'it is inseparable' (*annahū lā yufāriqu*) is that its subsistence is not possible by itself in separation (*bi-nafsihī mufāriqan*) but its subsistence is derived from something which is inseparable (*mustafādun mimmā lā yufāriqu*).

[§ 38] [*Since in the mind accidents are separable from substances the inseparability criterion does not distinguish between accidents and substances at the intellectual level*] However, with regard to the separation which the imagination achieves, there is no difference between substance and accident; for the imagination may separate the accident from the substance (*fa-inna l-'araḍa qad yufarriquhū l-wahmu 'ani l-ḡawhar*).

[ed. Madkūr, p. 37, l. 7]

[§ 39] [Aporia (c): *Accidents are separated when they vanish*] Another *aporīa* in connection with this description is as follows:

«There are accidents which are separated from the substance by way of vanishing (*mina l-a'rādi mā yufāriqu l-ḡawhara bi-buṭlānīhi*). But [in contrast to this phenomenon] you have said: 'The accident is not separated from the substance.'»

[*Ibn Sīnā's reply to aporia (c)*] – [In reply to this], it is said: By this we mean that it [i.e., the accident] is not separated [from the substance] as something which subsists without it [i.e., without the substance]. As for the case in which it [i.e., the accident] is separated from it on account of the fact that it [i.e., the



substance] remains [in existence], whereas the accident vanishes, this is something we did not speak about. Don't you know that we have said: 'it is impossible for it to have subsistence without that which it is in'?

[ed. Madkūr, p. 37, l. 11]

[§ 40] [Aporia (*d*): *The fragrance of the apple*] Another *aporia* in connection with this [description] is the following statement:

«According to your view the fragrance is an accident (*inna r-rā'ihata 'indakum 'aradun*). Therefore it would have to follow that it cannot subsist in separation from the apple (*mufāriqatan li-t-tuffāh*). But we do see the fragrance subsist in separation from the apple in another subject.»<sup>559</sup>

[§ 41] [*Ibn Sīnā's reply to aporia (d)*] – It is said [in reply] to this: Whenever the fragrance which comes from the apple exists in the air, it is not the case that it has been transferred from the apple [to the air] and has abandoned the apple. Likewise, whenever the heat which comes from the fire exists in the air, it is not the case that it has been transferred from the fire [to the air] and has abandoned the fire. Rather, this either happens through the origination (*hudūt*) of another heat and another fragrance in the air; or through the scattering of parts which dissolve from it in the air (*'alā sabīli inbiṭāti aǧzā'in mutaḥallilatin minhā fi l-hawā'*). Physics will yield the truth about this issue.

[§ 42] If it were correct (*law kāna ṣaḥīhan*) that whenever the air is fragrant and whenever it is heated the quality [of heat] has vanished from the fire and the quality [of fragrance] has vanished from the apple so that both of them would exist without the respective quality; and if, furthermore, it were correct that the two qualities would not have vanished from the fire and from the apple if there had been no transfer [to the air]; and if these two [qualities] did not exist in the air as a new formation (*ibtidā'an*) but if exactly the same thing which had previously existed in the fire and in the apple had been transferred, not in such a manner that it disappeared and thereupon the origination of something similar took place, [if all this were the case], this [interpretation] would be true. But physics will show that the situation is quite different! Thus, as long as this premise cannot be taken for granted, the [alleged] contradiction does not follow.

[§ 43] The most a logician can achieve is to know that it [i.e., the alleged contradiction] does not follow! If, however, the logician should occupy himself with explaining and clarifying *how* this is the case, as has been customary to do, he would transgress the boundaries of his discipline without possessing the sufficient ability to achieve what he intends.

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559 Cf. Simplicius, *In Categorias*, p. 49, ll. 10–20.

b. On Accident 2: Ibn Sīnā, *K. aš-Šifāʾ*, *al-Mantiq*, *al-Maqūlāt*, II,2  
[ed. Madkūr, pp. 63–66]

**Accident Is Not a Genus for the Nine [Accidental Categories]; a Critical Review (*taʿaqqub*) of What Has Been Said about This**

[(II.B) al-Ḥillī (fol. 36b, ll. 2–3): “The Second Issue (*maṭlab*): Accident Is Not a Genus for the Nine Categories; a Critical Review of What Has Been Said about This; in It Are Two Investigations (*baḥṭāni*)”]

[ed. Madkūr, p. 63, l. 4]

[(II.B.1) al-Ḥillī (fol. 36b, ll. 3–4): “First [Investigation]: Some of the Indications They Have Given of This (*baʿd adillatihim ʿalā dālika*)”]

[§ 1] [(I) *An erroneous argument for the claim that accident is not a genus of the nine accidental categories: The definition of accident does not include all accidents (i.e., ‘accident’ is said equivocally)*] There are some well-known statements (*aqwāl mašhūra*) about the fact that the accident may not be taken to be a genus in relation to these nine [accidental categories] (*fī manʿi ġinsiyyatihī li-hāḍihī t-tisʿa*). Among these is their following statement (*minhā qawluhum*):

«The definition of accident does not include all nine [accidental categories] in the proper sense [but some of them only figuratively] (*inna ḥadda l-ʿaraḍi lā yatanāwulu t-tisʿata tanāwulan ḥaqīqīyyan*).»

[§ 2] [(1) *The category of when does not fall under the definition of accident*] They try to corroborate this by way of examples (*yuḥāwilūna taṣḥīḥahū bi-amṭilatin*<sup>560</sup>); among these is their following statement:

«In the case of ‘yesterday’ (*ams*) and ‘last year’ (*ʿām awwal*) each of these is one single thing (*kullu wāḥidin minhumā amrun wāḥidun*), whereas their subjects are numerous (*wa-mawḍūʿātuhū kaṭīratun*). And it is impossible (*mustaḥīl*) that it [i.e., ‘yesterday’ or ‘last year’] exists in all of them [i.e., in all of its numerous subjects] (*an yakūna huwa mawḡūdan fī ġamīʿihā*). For an accident which is one in number (*al-ʿaraḍ al-wāḥid bi-l-ʿadad*) will not be in numerous subjects (*mawḡūʿat kaṭīra*) in a manner as if it were existent in each of them (*ʿalā annahū mawḡūḍun fī kullī wāḥidin minhā*). Therefore, no such thing is *in* a subject; and yet it is an accident.»

[*Ibn Sīnā’s reply to (I.1)*] – This is foolish talk (*ḥurāfa*)!

[§ 3] [*a. When*] For if by ‘yesterday’ and ‘last year’ we mean the notion of when (*maʿnā matā*) – and this is ‘the being in time’ (*al-kawn fī z-zamān*) –, then each of the subjects has a specific relation on account of which it – and not something else – is in its time (*lahū nisbatun ḥāṣṣatun huwa bihā dūna ġayrihī fī zamānihī*). For ‘Zayd’s being in his time’ is not exactly the same as ‘Amr’s being

560 [63.5] Read with MSS B (not in app.), LB3, LG4, OP4, SA (not in app.), TD3 *bi-amṭilatin* instead of *bi-asʿilatin* (EC).

in that time' – as if the two instances of being [in time] were one in number ('*alā anna l-kawnayni wāḥidun bi-l-ʿadad*).

[§ 4] [*b. Two views on 'time itself': (1) One single subject vs (2) numerous subjects but one single primary moment of time with regard to which things are said to be 'in time'*] If however, one means by it 'the time itself' (*az-zamān nafsuhū*), then the time is in the subject in which the motion, whose number is the time, takes place (*fa-inna z-zamāna fī l-mawḏūʿi lladī fīhi l-ḥarakatu llatī z-zamānu ʿadaduhā*). [b1] This is according to the view of some people ('*inda qawm*) one single subject (*mawḏūʿ wāḥid*). [b2] And according to the view of some other people ('*inda qawm*) it is numerous subjects (*mawḏūʿāt kaṭīra*); according to their view, one out of numerous moments of time is prior [to the other moments of time] (*wa-yakūnu ʿindahum zamānun mina l-azminati mutaqaḏdiman*) – and this is the one [moment of time] with regard to which things are considered, so that one says that they are in 'one single time' (*fī zamān wāḥid*). As for the separate parts of movable things (*tafāriq al-ašyāʿ al-mutaḥarrika*), each of them has, according to their view, a specific time (*zamān ḥāṣṣ*). However, when people say 'such-and-such a thing and such-and-such a thing are in a moment of time which is one in number' (*inna kaḏā wa-kaḏā fī zamānin wāḥidin bi-l-ʿadad*), according to their view this refers to nothing else than 'the primary single fixed moment of time' (*laysa illā bi-z-zamāni ṭ-ṭābiti l-wāḥidi l-awwal*).

[§ 5] I did not give an indication of whether this doctrine or the other doctrine is correct; rather, I merely indicated that this manner of providing an argument, which is meant to establish the claim that the definition of accident does not include time, is futile.

[§ 6] Some people said:

«Time does not depend on a subject (*lā yataʿallaqu bi-mawḏūʿin*).»

Thus they said (*fa-hunāka qālū*):

«It is a substance (*innahū ḡawharun*).»

However, the knowledge of what is correct and what is futile of these doctrines will be attained in the discipline of the natural philosophers (*fī šināʿat aṭ-ṭabīʿiyyina*). Since there is no other doctrine besides these three [i.e., views a, b1, b2] – and since these three are such that 'time' is either assumed to be a substance [so that it is not a problem that the definition of accident does not include it] or such that it is assumed to be defined by the definition of accident – this statement [i.e., argument I] can be neglected.

[ed. Madkūr, p. 64, l. 2]

[§ 7] [(I.2) *The category of where does not fall under the definition of accident*]

Likewise, these people [i.e., the same people who presented argument I] stated the following argument:

«The definition of accident does not include the [category of] where (*al-ayn*). For ‘being in the marketplace’ (*al-kawn fī s-sūq*) is one single notion (*ma‘nā wāhid*) in which many things commonly partake (*yaštariku fihi kaṭīrūna*); thus, it is inadmissible that each of these [things] functions as a subject of it [i.e., of ‘being in the marketplace’]; nor [is] the totality [a subject of it]; for otherwise nothing except the totality would be characterized by it [i.e., by the attribute ‘being in the marketplace’].»

[§ 8] [*Ibn Sīnā’s reply to (I.2)*] – The reply to that is this same reply (*hādā l-ḡawāb nafsuhū*): Even though the marketplace is one in relation to all things [which are in the marketplace], since it is not ‘the real place’ (*al-makān al-ḥaqīqī*), it is precluded that several things commonly partake in it. Rather, it belongs to ‘the place in general’ (*al-makān al-‘āmm*); thus, each single thing has a ‘being in it’ [i.e., in the marketplace] which is specific to it and not to anything else. For the marketplace is not a where but falls under the category of substance. If they equated this place with the place which falls under the category of the accident [i.e., under the category of where], it would be impossible for them to assume in it [i.e., in the market in the sense of an accidental where] a number of things. The where – provided that there is such a thing, and this is indispensable (*in kāna wa-lā budda*) – is merely ‘the relation to the marketplace’ (*an-nisba ilā s-sūq*); and each of the things which are in the marketplace has a relation which is specific to it, [a relation] which concurs with the other relation [i.e., with a relation which another thing has to the marketplace] in species but which differs from it in number. What we consider here, however, concerns that which is ‘one in number’ and not ‘that which is one in species.’

[ed. Madkūr, p. 64, l. 12]

[§ 9] [(II) *Another erroneous argument for the claim that accident is not a genus of the nine accidental categories: (1) Relation is in two subjects, not in one subject*] Moreover, they said:

«The relatum (*al-muḏāf*) can only exist in two subjects. Thus, it does not exist in something [i.e., one thing] but in two things.»

[§ 10] [(II.2) *The Category of having is in two subjects, not in one subject*] Moreover, they said:

«‘Armament / being armed’ (*at-tasalluḥ*) is a notion which is not in a subject because it is in two subjects. For its subject are the arms and the bearer [of arms] (*al-lābis*).»

[§ 11] [*Ibn Sīnā's reply to (II.1)*] – Thus, we say: As for the relatum, things are not as they surmised them to be. First, because the fact that something is in two things perhaps does not preclude that it is in each of the two. And if it is not precluded that it is in each of the two, then the fact that it is in two things does not remove its ‘being in something’ (*fa-laysa kawnuhū fī šay'ayni rāfi'an kawnuhū fī šay'*). For it had not been said ‘only in one single thing’ – just like the fact that the father is a father in relation to two sons does not preclude his being a father in relation to one single son; and the fact that ‘animal’ is said of several things does not preclude its being said of each of them.

[ed. Madkūr, p. 64, l. 18]

[§ 12] [*The difference between 'that which exists in a subject' and 'the whole in the parts'*] For some things it may indeed be the case that ‘the existence in many’ (*al-wuġūd fī l-kaṭra*) precludes that something is in one thing simultaneously with being in those many things. The difference between ‘that which exists in a subject,’ inasmuch as it exists in something (*min ġihati annahū mawġūdun fī šay'*), and ‘the whole being in the parts’ (*kawn al-kull fī l-aġzā'*) is that the whole is in several things but is not in one single of these things at all. In the case of that which is in a subject, in contrast, it is not to be excluded (*laysa yab'udu*) that it exists in several subjects (*an yakūna mawġūdan fī mawḏū'āt*) and that nonetheless it exists in every single of these subjects (*fī mawḏū'in mawḏū'in minhā*); these two states do not exclude each other (*lā tamāni'a bayna l-ḥālayni*).

This would be the case if the doctrine they followed – namely the claim that there is a relation which is one in number (*iḏāfa wāḥida bi-l-ʿadad*) and which is commonly shared by *relata* which are two in number (*muštarika bayna muḏāfatayni iṭnayni bi-l-ʿadad*) – were a correct doctrine (*maḏhaban ṣaḥīḥan*). The truth, however, will be shown to be contrary to this. And in those passages where we will speak about the relatum we will clarify in which way this is the case (*sa-nubayyinu kayfiyyatahū*).

[ed. Madkūr, p. 65, l. 7]

[§ 13] [*Ibn Sīnā's reply to (II.2)*] As for ‘armament / being armed’ (*at-tasalluḥ*) and whatever they stipulated with regard to it (*wa-mā taʿallaqū bihī fīhī*), the reply to this is as follows: ‘Armament / being armed’ (*at-tasalluḥ*) is a relation (*nisba*) and a state (*ḥāl*) which the bearer (*lābis*) has towards arms (*inda s-silāḥ*) and by which ‘the one who is armed’ (*al-mutasallaḥ*) is characterized (*yūṣafu*). Thus, one says ‘he is armed’ (*innahū mutasallaḥ*) on account of an ‘armament’ (*bi-tasalluḥ*) which is a characterization that applies to him (*huwa waṣfun lahū*), even if it comes about on account of the relation to another thing [i.e., to ‘arms’] (*wa-in kāna bi-n-nisbati ilā ġayriḥi*). Even if it comes about on

account of the relation to another thing, it is not necessary that it [i.e., the relation of ‘being armed’] is *in* that other thing [as well] (*fa-laysa yağibu an yakūna fī dālika l-ğayr*). For there is a difference between ‘the existence *in* something’ (*al-wuğūd fī š-šayʿ*) and ‘the relation *to* something’ (*an-nisba ilā š-šayʿ*).

[§ 14] [*Concluding remark on the above-mentioned arguments*] Such follies (*miṭla hādihī l-haḍaynāt*) are of no help in claiming that accident is not a genus, even though it is true that accident is not a genus.

[ed. Madkūr, p. 65, l. 12]

[(II.B.2) al-Ḥillī (fol. 37b, l. 22): “Second Investigation (*baḥṭ*): The Proof of This (*al-burhān ‘alā dālika*)”]

[§ 15] [(III) *A valid argument for the claim that accident is not a genus of the nine accidental categories*] However, they [also] said something else, namely:

«‘Accident’ does not signify the nature of ‘whiteness’ and ‘blackness’ (*lā yadullu ‘alā ṭabīʿati l-bayāḍi wa-s-sawād*) nor does it signify the natures of the other accidents. Rather, it signifies that it [i.e., ‘whiteness’ or ‘blackness’ or any given accident] has a relation to that which it is in (*‘alā anna laḥū nisbatun ilā mā huwa fihī*) and that its essence necessitates this relation (*wa-‘alā anna dātahū taqtaḍi hādihī n-nisba*). The genus, in contrast, signifies the nature of things and their quiddity in themselves (*al-ğinsu yadullu ‘alā ṭabīʿati l-ašyāʿi wa-māhiyyātihā fī anfusihā*<sup>561</sup>) – and not a relation which is [merely] attached to their quiddities (*wa-lā mā yalḥaqu māhiyyatahā mina n-nisba*).»

[§ 16] This account hits the target (*sadīd*)! An indication (*dalīl*) of this lies in the fact that the expression ‘accidentality’ (*lafẓat al-‘araḍiyya*) [a] either signifies the fact that something exists *in* a subject – and hence it signifies this relation [of being in a subject] (*fa-takūnu dalālatuhū ‘alā hādihī n-nisba*); [b] or it signifies the fact that on account of its essence something is such that it is indispensable for it to have a subject (*annahū fī dātihī bi-ḥaytu lā budda laḥū min mawḍūʿ*) – and this is also an accidental notion (*maʿnā ‘araḍī*). This is because the relation in which this notion stands to most accidents, such as quality (*kayfiyya*), quantity (*kammiyya*), and position (*waḍʿ*), is a property which is not constitutive for their quiddities (*amrun ġayru muqawwimin li-māhiyyātihā*); for their quiddities are [first of all] represented as being perceived and comprehended (*tatamattalu mudrakatan mafhūmatan*) – and only subsequently a doubt arises with regard to many of them: For it is [still] not known that they are in need of a subject until this will be proven in first philosophy, so that some people assumed these things to be substances.

561 [65.14] Read with MSS LB3, LG4, OP4, SA (not in app.) *māhiyyātihā fī anfusihā* instead of *māhiyyatihā fī anfusihā* (EC).

[§ 17] The relation in which ‘accident’ stands to these things is the relation in which ‘existent’ (*al-mawǧūd*) stands to the quiddities of the ten [categories], inasmuch as it is not included (*dāhil*) in the quiddity. Just like ‘existent’ is not constitutive for the quiddity of these ten [categories], ‘accidentality’ (*al-‘araḍiyya*) is not constitutive for the quiddity of the nine [accidental categories]. Therefore, the fact that it is an accident is not present in the definition of any of them (*lā yūǧadu fī ḥaddi šay’in minhā annahū ‘araḍun*).

### c. On Substance 1:

Ibn Sīnā, *al-Muḥtaṣar al-awsaṭ fī l-manṭiq*, *al-Maqūlāt*, ch. 5

[ed. Kalbarczyk, pp. 332–333]

#### [Chapter 5] On Substance

[§ 33] The adequate description (*ar-rasm al-musāwī*) of substance [i.e., the description which equally applies to all substances] is: It is that whose existence is not in a subject. What is universal of it shares with what is particular of it in this description. For the universal is a substance as well; this is because man is a substance and his substantiality is not due to the fact that he is Zayd; rather, when ‘Amr is a substance, his substantiality is completed on account of the fact that he is a man; for the meaning of ‘mankind’ (*ma‘nā l-insāniyya*) necessitates substantiality, whichever way this may be. It may accidentally occur to ‘mankind’ that one considers with regard to it the generalness (*‘umūm*) so that it becomes a species; and that one considers with regard to it the specificity (*ḥuṣūṣ*) so that it becomes an individual (*šahṣ*). The substantiality of everything which is per se a substance (*mā huwa ḡawhar bi-dātihī*) does not cease on account of the fact that accidents are attached to it, whichever way these might be. If the universal man were not a substance, it would not be predicated of the substance in such a manner that it is it (*bi-annahū huwa*) but rather it would be predicated in such a manner that it has it (*bi-annahū dū huwa*). On account of this it is known that the *summa genera* of substances are substances as well; for it [i.e., the genus] is predicated of the substance in such a manner that it is it, not in such a manner that it has it.

[§ 34] A property (*ša‘n*) of the differentiae is the fact that the differentiae are predicated in two manners: [1] Firstly, when<sup>562</sup> one says that man is rational, rational is taken as a differentia which is predicated of the substance in such a manner that it is it. [2] Secondly, it is predicated of man in such a manner that man has rationality so that rationality alone is taken as a simple differentia

562 My edition has *ka-mā*; I now think that *lammā* would be the better reading.

which is predicated in the sense of ‘having.’ These differentiae, however, are parts of the substances. And whatever is not a substance may not be a part of substance; for whatever is not a substance may not be prior to substance. These differentiae, therefore, are forms – and the forms are substances, not accidents.

[§ 35] Hence, it has become clear that the universals of substances are substances [as well] and that – after the particular substances – they are the ones which underlie the accidents. The particular substances, however, are the primary substances; for they subsist in reality on account of themselves without any underlying subject whatsoever. One can imagine an individual to be existent alone without there being a universal which is said *of* it and *of* other things. In the case of the universals, however, it is impossible for a universal to subsist as a universal without there being a particular below it; for the existence of the universals is [an existence] *of* a subject. Thus, the primary substances are the particulars, the secondary [substances] are their species and the tertiary [substances] are their genera; for the relation (*qiyās*) in which the genera stand to the species is like the relation in which the species stand to the individuals.

[§ 36] [*1<sup>st</sup> characteristic of substance: it is not receptive of more or less*] Among the properties which are characteristic of substance (*ḥawāṣṣ al-ḡawhar*) – as opposed to many [other] categories – is the fact that it is not receptive of a stronger and weaker intensity and of an increase and decrease in the nature of its species. For a man does not have a higher claim (*lā yakūnu insānun awlā*) to being a man than another man; nor is his ‘mankind / being a man’ less than it [i.e., than someone else’s ‘being a man’]. The quantum, however, shares with it [i.e., substance] in this; and the same holds for a species of the quale and for the where, as you shall come to know in the proper place.

[§ 37] [*2<sup>nd</sup> characteristic of substance: a ‘certain this’*] A characteristic property of substances which is specific to substance alone is the fact that it signifies something which is intended (*maqṣūd ilayhi*) by means of a pointer (*bi-l-iṣāra*) [i.e., a τὸδε τι]. The other categories do not share with it in this [property]; for pointing to something amounts, in reality, to pointing to their substances. If it were not for their substances, it would be impossible to point to where they are. Thus, one points to them [i.e., to the accidents] *per accidens* (*bi-l-araḍ*) and to the substance *per se* (*bi-d-dāt*). This characteristic property, however, does not comprise every substance. For one cannot point to an intellected substance (*ḡawhar ma‘qūl*), regardless of whether it is particular or universal. Also, whenever a particular sensible substance (*ḡawhar ḡuz‘ī maḥsūs*) is taken as a universal, it is transformed into an intellectual [substance] so that one cannot point to it. Therefore, only the particular sensible substances share in this characteristic property.



[§ 38] [*3<sup>rd</sup> characteristic of substance: it is receptive of contraries*] Among the properties which are characteristic of substance is the fact that exactly one and the same [substance] is – by way of a change in itself – an underlying subject for contraries. This is unlike the case of the opinion which at one time is characterized as being true – and then the state of affairs [which one has an opinion about] changes, while it [i.e., the opinion] remains the same, so that it is [now] characterized as being false; this is [not like the case of substance] because this change does not occur to the opinion on account of itself (*bi-dātihī*) but rather on account of the fact that the state of affairs undergoes a change in itself; thus, that which changes is the state of affairs. The opinion, in turn, remains in its state – and the only change that occurs to it concerns its relation to the state of affairs. The change of a relation is unlike the change of the thing itself. Therefore, no change has occurred to the opinion itself – and even if it should have occurred to it, this would not be due to a change in itself and on account of itself but rather due to a change of something else. This characteristic property does not apply to every substance. This is because the intellective substances (*al-ḡawāhir al-‘aqliyya*) may not be receptive of contraries. Moreover, the secondary substances, inasmuch as they are secondary substances, are not receptive of a succession of contraries.

[§ 39] [*4<sup>th</sup> characteristic of substance: nothing is contrary to it*] Among the properties which are characteristic of substance is the fact that nothing is contrary to it (*lā didd lahū*). Certain species of the quantum and a species of the quale may share with it in this [characteristic property]. However, one may be of the opinion that it does not hold of every substance that nothing is contrary to it; for the forms are substances and they are contrary one to another. In reply to this it is said: If by ‘contraries’ (*mutaḍāddāt*) one means those which succeed one another in one and the same subject by way of nullifying one another, whereas they differ from one another to the greatest extent, then there is no contrariety among forms; for they are not in a subject. This characteristic property, therefore, comprises all substances. However, if this is not what is meant [by the expression ‘contraries’], it does not hold for every substance that nothing is contrary to it.

d. On Substance 2: Ibn Sīnā, *K. aš-Šifāʾ*,  
*al-Mantiq, al-Maqūlāt*, III,1–3

Chapter III,1  
[ed. Madkūr, pp. 91–95]

**The Primary, Secondary and Tertiary Substances; and in General, the State of the Gradations between Universal and Particular Substances with Regard to Substantiality**

[(III.A) al-Ḥillī (fol. 51a, ll. 21–23): “The Third Section (*faṣl*): The Category of Substance; in It Are Several Issues; the First Issue (*maṭlab*): The Primary, Secondary and Tertiary Substances; and in General, the State of the Gradations between Universal and Particular Substances with Regard to Substantiality; in It Are Several Investigations (*mabāḥiṭ*)”]

[ed. Madkūr, p. 91, l. 7]

[(III.A.1) al-Ḥillī (fol. 51a, ll. 23–24): “First [Investigation]: Report of an Argument of Someone Who Assumes Substance to Apply by Way of Modulation and to Non-Bodies (*naqlu d-dalili man ḡaʿala l-ḡawhara wāqiʿan bi-t-taškiki ʿalā l-aḡsāmi wa-ḡayrihā*)”]

[§ 1] Let us now talk about the category of substance.

[Report of a doctrine that had been upheld by some predecessors: ‘Substance’ may not be said univocally of bodies and non-bodies] Some people had made the following claim:

«[1a] It is possible for the expression ‘substance’ to be said by way of synonymy and generic predication (*ʿalā t-tawāṭuʿi wa-l-qawli l-ḡinsi*), if one intends to apply it to bodies only. [1b] If, however, one intends to apply it to a meaning which is more general than ‘body’ (*ʿalā maʿnā aʿamm mina l-ḡism*), this can only come about by way of homonymy or by way of modulation [i.e., ‘focal homonymy’], as is the case with ‘existent’ (*fa-innamā taqaʿu bi-l-ittifāqi awi t-taškiki wuqūʿa l-mawḡūd*). [1b.1] This is because matter (*al-hayūlā*) and form (*aṣ-ṣūra*) are – with regard to the meaning of substantiality (*fī maʿnā l-ḡawhariyya*) – prior (*aqdam*) to the compound (*al-murakkab*); and that which is detached [from body] (*al-mufāriq*), which is the cause (*sabab*) of the existence of these two [i.e., of matter and form] (*sababu wuḡūdihimā*) and the cause for the fact that one of them [i.e., matter] is brought into subsistence through the other one [i.e., through form] (*wa-sababu qiwāmi aḡadhimā bi-l-āḡar*), is prior to all of these [i.e., matter, form, and compound]. [1b.2] And [this is] because the principles (*al-mabādiʿ*) do not fall under one and the same category (*maqūla wāḡida*) as the things which possess the principles (*dawāt al-mabādiʿ*).»

In spite of that (*wa-maʿa dālīka*), they had acknowledged that their ‘existing not in a subject’ (*anna kawnahā mawḡūdatan lā fī mawḡūʿ*) is something which all of them [i.e., matter, form, compound and detached substance] share in, even

if ‘existing not in a subject’ should apply primarily to some of them and only subsequently to others of them. And they said:

«[2] If [already] ‘existence’ (*al-wuġūd*) [by itself] is said of these *per prius et posterius* (*bi-t-taqaddum wa-t-ta’ahhur*) [and hence by way of modulation], attaching ‘not in a subject’ to it [i.e., to ‘existence’] – and this is a negative notion (*ma’nā salbī*) – does not make ‘existence’ apply to them at one and the same level (*‘alā martaba wāhida*) [and therefore does not change the fact that ‘existence’ is predicated by way of modulation].»

[ed. Madkūr, p. 91, l. 16]

[**(III.A.2) al-Ḥillī** (fol. 51b, l. 23): “**Second Investigation** (*baḥṭ*): **The Reply to This** (*al-ġawāb ‘an dālika*)”]

[§ 2] Thus, first of all we say (*fa-naqūlu awwalan*): [*ad 1b*] From these considerations (*ġihāt*) it does not follow that the category of substance is not a genus both for that which is a body and for that which is not a body. As for [*ad 1b.1*] the state of priority and posteriority and [*ad 1b.2*] the state in which the principles share and do not share in the same genus with the things which possess the principles, this is an issue which we had already explained to you (*qad salafa laka minnā bayānan*). And besides that, even the bodies [themselves], which without any doubt share in the genus of ‘body,’ are not on the same level. Rather, some bodies are prior to other bodies.

[§ 3] [*ad 2. Existence applies to substance accidentally since it is not a part of its quiddity*] As for the discourse (*ḥadīṭ*) about the [expression] ‘existent’ which is employed in the description (*rasm*) of substance and [the claim] that, undoubtedly, it applies primarily to some of them and only subsequently to others, this is an *aporia* which deserves to be solved (*fa-huwa šakkun wa-ḥaqquhū an yuḥalla*). Thus we say: When we say ‘substance is that which exists not in a subject’ we do not mean by ‘that which exists’ in it [i.e., in this formula] the state of that which exists, inasmuch as it exists, as we will clarify shortly. For if this were the case [i.e., if in the description of substance ‘that which exists’ were to refer to ‘the existent, inasmuch as it is existent’], it would be impossible to assume that the universals are substances. This is because they do not have any existence whatsoever in concrete things (*li-annahā lā wuġūda lahā fī l-a’yāni l-battata*). And their existence in the soul is merely like ‘the existence of a thing in a subject.’ If by ‘existing / that which exists’ one were to mean this<sup>563</sup>, namely ‘that which exists in concrete things,’ the state of affairs would indeed (*bi-l-ḥaqīqa*) be as they had thought: Some of them [i.e., some substances] would be prior to others [with regard to substantiality]. However (*bal*), by ‘that which exists not as in a subject’ they intend the meaning and the quiddity (*al-ma’nā*

563 [92.9] Read *dālika* instead of *w-l-k* (EC).

*wa-l-māhiyya*) which is such that it concomitantly applies to it in concrete things, whenever it exists, that its existence is not as in a subject (*allatī talzamu-hā fī l-a'yāni idā wuḡīdat an yakūna wuḡūduhā lā fī mawḡū*), just like one says 'laughing / able to laugh' (*daḥḥāk*), that is, 'it has the disposition to laugh in a state of amazement (*'inda ta'aḡḡub*). If you want the difference between these two affairs to become clear to you [i.e., between the two ways of understanding the phrase 'existing not in a subject'], and that one of these two is the meaning of 'substance,' whereas the other one is not, then [a] consider a certain individual (*šaḥṣan mā*), such as Zayd, whenever it [i.e., the individual thing] is absent from you (*idā ḡāba 'anka*); [b] or [consider] a certain species from among the substances along with the possibility that it disappears from the world, provided that in your opinion its disappearance is possible [i.e., under the condition that (contrary to Aristotle's doctrine) you deem it possible for a species to become extinct]; [c] or [consider] a species whose existence is doubted: [In all of these three cases] you know that it [i.e., the certain individual, or the substantial species which is extinct or whose existence is doubted] is a quiddity which is such that, whenever it exists in concrete things, it exists not as in a subject (*annahū māhiyyatun idā kānat mawḡūdatan fī l-a'yāni kānat lā fī mawḡū*); and you know that this meaning (*ma'nā*) is the first constituting property of its true nature (*al-muqawwim al-awwal li-ḥaqīqatihi*), just like you know that it is a substance. However, you do not know whether it exists *in actu* (*bi-l-fi'l*) in concrete things (*fī l-a'yān*) not as in a subject; rather, it might still be non-existent (*ma'dūm*) for you. For [the description] 'existence *in actu* in concrete things not as in a subject' is not constitutive for the quiddity of Zayd nor for any from among the substances; rather, it is something which is attached [to it] in the manner in which 'the existent' is attached, which – as you have learned – attaches to the quiddity of things (*lāḥiqun li-māhiyyati l-ašyā*). This [i.e., 'existence *in actu* in concrete things not as in a subject'] is not a genus but rather the first one [i.e., 'existing not as in a subject' (without any existential import)].

[§ 4] [*The case in which a thing's quiddity is existence, i.e., the case of God's quiddity: God is not a substance and does not share in a constituting property with substances*] Therefore, whenever the quiddity of a thing is existence and whenever it is free from a subject, it is not [included] in a genus and it does not share [in something] with the substances – in the sense that they [i.e., the substances] are things and meanings to which existence merely attaches [rather than being its quiddity], whenever this attribute (*ṣifa*) [i.e., existence] is attached to them. Indeed, there is no constituting property (*amr muqawwim*) which that thing [whose quiddity is existence] and the various species-like things of substances (*naw'iyāt al-ḡawāhir*) would have in common (*bi-š-šarika*). For that which is constitutive in relation to that thing [i.e., in relation to that whose quiddity is

existence], is, in turn (*naẓīrahū*), an accident in relation to these [i.e., in relation to the substances], just like the existence which comes to be (*al-wuġūd al-hāsil*) [i.e., the existence which occurs accidentally to a substance], regardless of how it comes to be [i.e., regardless of whether it is realized *in re* or *in intellectu*]. And likewise, that which is constitutive in relation to these [substantial] species-like things (*naw‘iyyāt*) – namely that which is understood from the meaning of substantiality – is not said of that thing [i.e., of that whose quiddity is existence]; for there is no quiddity other than existence to which existence would attach (*māhiyyatu ġayru l-wuġūdi yalḥaquhā l-wuġūd*).

[ed. Madkūr, p. 93, l. 10]

[§ 5] [“Being not in a subject” is said of all substances without modulation / focal homonymy] Thus, you have come to know the true nature (*ḥaqīqa*) of ‘being a substance’ (*kawn al-ġawhar*) on account of the attribute (*ṣifa*) of ‘being not in a subject’ (*mawġūdun lā fī mawḍū*). And you have come to know that ‘being a substance’ on account of this attribute is something with regard to which there is neither priority (*taqaddum*) nor posteriority (*ta‘aḥḥur*) – even if the attainment of existence (*ḥuṣūl al-wuġūd*), which this aspect [of considering the quiddity, namely the quiddity *qua* quiddity] becomes related to [so as to attain one of the two modes of existence] (*allādī hādā l-i‘tibār maqīs ilayhi*), should occur *per prius et posterius* (*wāqi‘an bi-taqaddumin wa-ta‘aḥḥurin*) –, just like in the concept on account of which ‘rational’ is said of man there is neither priority nor posteriority and neither a higher nor a lower intensity. However, as for the specification as ‘[existing] *in actu*,’ which is [subsequently] attached to this [quiddity] and which is such that the differentia amounts to a primary potency to acquire it [i.e., existence *in actu*] as well as other [accidental] properties, there is a difference [*per prius et posterius* or by way of another mode of modulation].<sup>564</sup>

[§ 6] That which indicates that with regard to the true nature of substantiality, which we have expounded, there is neither priority nor posteriority is the fact that it is not possible for you to say: ‘The fact that form is *per se* a quiddity which is such that – whenever it exists in concrete things (*iḍā wuġida fī l-a‘yān*) – it is not in need of a subject and does not exist in a subject is prior to the fact that the same is true for the compound.’ Or [the truth is indicated by the fact that it is not possible to say]: ‘This true nature in the compound depends – in

564 [93.14–15] Al-Hillī’s commentary (fol. 52b, l. 23 – fol. 53a, l. 1) adds some helpful explanations (marked in bold):

وأما التمييز بالفعل الذي يلحق ذلك المعنى الذي هو الماهية التي يلزمها التمييز، والذي الفصل قوة أولى عليه وعلى غيره من الأمور العوارض اللاحقة به، ففيه اختلاف بتقدم وتأخر وقلة وكثرة وشدة وضعف وأولوية وعدمها.

asmuch as it is characterized by this attribute [i.e., by ‘being not in a subject’] – on the fact that [prior to it] the form is characterized by this attribute (*muta‘alliqatun bi-kawni ṣ-ṣūrati ‘alā hādihī ṣ-ṣifa*),’ just like you say: ‘The fact that the form exists in the manner in which it does, namely not as in a subject, is prior to the existence of the compound; for its existence [i.e., the existence of the form] is prior to its existence [i.e., the existence of the compound]; and its existence [i.e., the existence of the compound] depends on its existence [i.e., the existence of the form]; and that existence which it [i.e., the form] has is the existence not as in a subject.’ As a result (*fa-idan*), this does not make it necessary that substance is not a genus.

This is the meaning of the essence of substance (*ma‘nā dāt al-ḡawhar*). Thereupon, after this [discussion], we must defer some special *aporiai* (*ṣukūk ḥāṣṣiyya*) to ‘The Book of Appendices’ (*Kitāb al-Lawāḥiq*).<sup>565</sup>

[ed. Madkūr, p. 94, l. 4]

**[(III.A.3) al-Ḥillī (fol. 53a, ll. 9–10): “Third Investigation (*baḥṭ*): Division of the Substances; and Completion of the Account on the Fact that Existence *in actu* Is Not a Condition for Substantiality (*taqṣim al-ḡawāhir wa-tatimmat al-kalām fi ‘adam iṣtirāṭ al-wuḡūd bi-l-fi‘l fi l-ḡawhariyya*)”]**

[§ 7] [*Simple substance vs compounded substance; four types of substances: compounded substance; matter; form; detached substance*] Rather [i.e., instead of dealing with these special *aporiai*], we say: Substance is either [1] simple (*basīṭ*) or [2] compounded (*murakkab*), i.e., of the things which substance is compounded of, i.e., matter (*mādda*) and form (*ṣūra*).

[1.1] The simple [substance] either does not partake intrinsically (*ḡayr dāḥil*) in constituting the compound (*taqwīm al-murakkab*), but is pure and detached (*barī‘un mufāriqun*) [i.e., incorporeal].

[1.2.1] Or it does partake intrinsically in constituting it. And that which partakes intrinsically in constituting it does so either in the manner in which wood partakes intrinsically in the existence of the chair; and this is called matter.

[1.2.2] Or it does so in the manner in which the shape (*ṣakl*) of the chair partakes intrinsically in the chair; and this is called form.

[*ad* 1.2.1] Matter is that by which – if considered on its own – the compound does not have existence *in actu* but only *in potentia*.

[*ad* 1.2.2] Form is that through whose attainment the compound becomes that what it is *in actu*.

And all of this (*ḡamī‘ dālīka*) exists either as a universal or it exists as a particular.

565 For an account of Ibn Sīnā’s *Appendices*, see Dimitri Gutas, *Avicenna and the Aristotelian Tradition*, 2<sup>nd</sup> ed., pp. 160–164.

[§ 8] If substance, as you have learned before, is only a substance on account of its quiddity, to which the existence in concrete things (*a'yān*) or in thoughts (*awhām*) is [subsequently] attached, and not inasmuch as it exists in concrete things – for otherwise that which is understood by the expression ‘substance’ would be modulated [i.e., focally homonymous] (*mušakkik*) and not synonymous, as they [i.e., those who restrict substance in the sense of the *Categories* to corporeal substances] had said; rather, we mean by ‘substance’ the thing whose specific quiddity has, whenever it exists in concrete things, a claim (*ḥaqq*) to existing not as in a subject – [if all this is the case], it necessarily follows that this [substantial] quiddity, such as, for example, ‘man’ (*al-insān*), is on account of its true nature (*li-ḥaqīqatihā*) [and not on account of its existence] a substance; for man is only a substance because he is a man, not because he exists in concrete things in a mode of existence (*naḥwan mina l-wuḡūd*).

[ed. Madkūr, p. 94, l. 16]

[(III.A.4) al-Ḥillī (fol. 53b, ll. 11–12): “Fourth Investigation (*baḥṭ*): The Universals of Substances and Their Individuals Are Substances (*anna kulliyyāt al-ḡawāhir wa-šaḥṣiyyātahā ḡawāhir*)”]

[§ 9] If he [i.e., man] is a substance because he is a man (*wa-idā kāna ḡawharan li-annahū insānun*), then all of his attachments (*fa-mā laḥiqahū mina l-lawāḥiq*) [i.e., properties which are not included in the notion of ‘humanity’], I mean, [attachments] such as individuality and generality (*aš-šaḥṣiyya wa-l-‘umūm*) [i.e., existence as a particular vs existence as a universal] and, moreover, such as being realized in concrete things (*al-ḥuṣūl fī l-a'yān*) or being established in the mind (*at-taqarrur fī d-dīhn*), are properties which become attached to a substance. The attachments (*lawāḥiq*) of substance are concomitants (*lawāzim*) and accidents (*a'rād*) [i.e., *lawāḥiq* comprises both *lawāzim* and *a'rād*]; they are such that its [i.e., the substantial thing’s] substantiality does not vanish (*lā tabṭulu*) along with them so that its essence would vanish; thus, they would have become attached to something other than the substance; for the essence of the substance would have already vanished.

[ed. Madkūr, p. 95, l. 1]

[§ 10] [*Both individuals and universals may be substances*] As a result (*fa-idān*),<sup>566</sup> the individuals in concrete things are substances; and the universal intelligible (*al-ma'qūl al-kullī*) is a substance as well; for it is true (*šaḥīḥ*) of it that it is a quiddity which, whenever it exists in concrete things, has a claim (*ḥaqq*) to being not as in a subject. And this is not because it is an intelligible of substance (*ma'qūl al-ḡawhar*). For with regard to the intelligible of substance

566 [95.1] Read with MSS OP4, LB3, LG4, TD3 *fa-idān* instead of *fa-inna* (EC).

there might be a doubt about its property (*šakk fī amrihī*); for one might hold that it [i.e., the intelligible of substance] is knowledge and [therefore] is an accident. Rather, the fact that it is knowledge is a property (*amr*) that occurs to its quiddity only accidentally; and this [property] is the accident [i.e., the accidental occurrence of being knowledge is the accident, not the intelligible of substance]. But as for its quiddity, it is the quiddity of substance. And that which shares with substance in its quiddity is [itself] a substance.

[§ 11] Moreover, the definition of the species, inasmuch as it is a nature, and the definition of the genus as well, inasmuch as it is a nature, are both predicated of the individuals about which there is no doubt that they are substances. Thus, that which shares with them in their definition is [itself] a substance.

If they were only substances because they exist in concrete things and are surrounded by accidents, the substantiality of the things (*umūr*) would occur accidentally to their quiddity; for it is true (*ṣaḥḥa*) that existence is an accidental occurrence with regard to these quiddities; and [as a further consequence], the accidental occurrences would render something which by itself is not a substance a substance; thus, it would be a thing to which it would occur accidentally that it is a substance; and substantiality would occur accidentally to a thing. Since this is impossible, the universals of substances are – with regard to their quiddities [and thus on account of themselves and not on account of the individuals] – substances.

### Chapter III,2 [ed. Madkūr, pp. 95–102]

#### The Primary, Secondary and Tertiary Substances

[(III.B) al-Ḥillī (fol. 54a, ll. 20–21): “The Second Issue (*maṭlab*): Primary, Secondary and Tertiary Substance; in It Are Several Investigations (*mabāḥiṭ*)”]

[ed. Madkūr, p. 95, l. 15]

[(III.B.1) al-Ḥillī (fol. 54a, ll. 21–22): “First [Investigation]: The Specification of Primary Substance (*ta’yīn al-ḡawḥar al-awwal*)”]

[§ 1] [(A) Two ways of being ‘first/primary’] The primary substances, however, are the individual things (*lākinna l-ḡawāhira l-ūlā hiya š-šaḥṣiyyāt*). Among the things which share in one and the same nature (*al-umūr al-muštarika fī ṭabī’a wāḥida*) ‘primary/first’ (*al-awwal*) may be [said] in two ways:

[1] It [i.e., any given thing sharing in this common nature] may either be ‘primary’ with regard to precisely this meaning (*fī dālika l-ma’nā bi-‘aynihī*), just like substance – in relation to accident – is ‘primary in existence’ (*awwal fī l-wuḡūd*).



[2] Or it is with regard to this meaning neither first nor last (*an lā yakūna fī dālika l-ma'nā awwalan wa-lā aḥīran*) but primary in another regard and another meaning (*awwalan bi-waḡhin āḥara wa-ma'nān āḥara*).

[ed. Madkūr, p. 96, l. 1]

[§ 2] [ad 1. Primary substances are not primary with regard to the meaning of substantiality] As for the individual substances, they are not primary with regard to the true nature of substantiality (*laysat awwalan fī ḥaqīqati l-ḡawhariyya*), even if they are worthier [of it] (*wa-in kānat awlā*). There is a difference between 'first' (*awwal*) and 'worthier' (*awlā*); for not everything which is 'worthier of something' (*awlā bi-šay'*) is 'prior with regard to it' (*qablun bi-hī*).<sup>567</sup> Rather, it may be worthier of it if the attachments<sup>568</sup> and perfections of the thing (*lawāḥiq aš-šay' wa-kamālātuhū*) apply to it more than to something else (*takūnu laḥū aktara mimmā li-ḡayrihī*) or if, with regard to existence, they apply to it earlier than to something else (*aw aqdama laḥū fī l-wuḡūd mimmā li-ḡayrihī*). The particulars are not primary with regard to the true nature of substantiality (*fī ḥaqīqati l-ḡawhariyya*). For this true nature applies to the quiddity they have – and with regard to it they do not differ from something else [to whose quiddity applies the nature of substantiality].

[ed. Madkūr, p. 96, l. 5]

[(III.B.2) al-Ḥillī (fol. 54b, l. 9): “Second Investigation (*baḥt*): The Individuals Are Worthier of Substantiality Than the Universals (*anna l-ašḥāš awlā bi-l-ḡawhariyya mina l-kulliyyāt*)”]

[§ 3] [(B) There are four ways in which primary substances are worthier of substantiality] However, the individual substances are worthier of substantiality (*awlā bi-l-ḡawhariyya*). [i] For they are primary (*awwal*) with regard to existence (*awwal min ḡihat al-wuḡūd*); [ii] and [they are primary] with regard to the fact that the property on whose account the substance is a substance is [already] established (*min ḡihati taqarruri l-amri llaḍī bi-i'tibārihī kāna l-ḡawharu ḡawharan*), namely the realization in concrete things not as in a subject (*huwa l-ḥuṣūlu fī l-a'yāni lā fī mawḍū*); [iii] and [they are primary] with regard to perfection (*kamāl*) and excellence (*faḍīla*) as well; [iv] and [they are primary] with regard to the fact that they take precedence [over secondary substances] in being named [by the name 'substance'] (*min ḡihati s-sabqi ilā t-tasmiya*).

567 [96.2] I retain the rather unusual form *qablun bihī* which is attested, *inter alia*, by MS LB3. Four MSS listed in the apparatus of EC (D, SA, M, N) and MS OP4 have *qabluhū*.

568 [96.3] Read with MSS B, OP4, LB3, LG4 and TD3 *lawāḥiq* instead of *w<sup>-2</sup>-h-q* (*wa-aḥaqq?*) (EC); the omission of the initial *lām* is probably a mere misprint.

[§ 4] [ad *i. An individual substance is primary with regard to existence*] As for [being primary] with regard to existence, the universal substances, inasmuch as they are universal *in actu* (*min ḥaytu hiya kulliyya bi-l-fiʿl*), are either said in relation to the particulars *in actu* (*maqūlatun bi-l-qiyāsi ilā l-ḡuzʿiyyāti bi-l-fiʿl*) or one considers for them a relation to them [i.e., to the particulars] (*aw muʿtabarun lahā nisbatun ilayhā*). This [type of] existence which they have is that they are in a certain manner said of certain subjects (*an takūna maqūlatan bi-waḡhin mā ʿalā mawḍūʿāt*); thus, it is indispensable for them to have subjects (*fa-lā budda lahā mina l-mawḍūʿāt*). The individual [by contrast] is – for the sake of being an individual, i.e., something whose meaning is not said of many, neither on the level of existence nor on the level of imagination (*ḡayru maqūlin maʿnāhu qawlan wuḡūdiyyan aw wahmiyyan ʿalā kaṭratin*) – not in need of another thing being said of it and of other things (*ilā an yakūna šayʿun āḥaru maqūlun ʿalayhi wa-ʿalā ḡayrihī*). Otherwise, in the case of any given individual the fact that its existence is established would be conditioned by the fact that there is another thing along with it. But since every individual can – for the sake of being established in existence (*fī taqarrur wuḡūdihi*) – dispense with its fellow (*šāhib*) [i.e., it can exist without something else which falls under the same universal], it can also dispense with the universal (*huwa mustaḡnin ʿani l-kullī*).

[ed. Madkūr, p. 96, l. 14]

[§ 5] [*Objection (a): The particular, inasmuch as it is particular, depends on the universal (just like the universal, inasmuch as it is universal, depends on the particular)*] If someone should pose a question and say:

«Just like the universal is only a universal in relation to the particular, the particular is only particular in relation to the universal; and just like the quiddity of the particular, inasmuch as it is a quiddity, does not depend on the universal, but [depends on the universal] only inasmuch as it is a particular, the quiddity of the universal, inasmuch as it is its quiddity, does not depend on the particular, but depends [on the particular] only inasmuch as it is a universal.»

[*Ibn Sīnā's reply to objection (a)*] – The reply to this is: We do not speak here of ‘universal’ and ‘particular,’ inasmuch as they are a pair of *relata* (*mutadāyifān*). Rather, by ‘universal’ we mean ‘that which is said of many’ [i.e., the account of what it means *per se* to be a universal]; and by ‘particular’ we mean ‘that which is not said of many but which is one in number’ (*mā laysa maqūlan ʿalā kaṭirīna bal huwa wāḥidun bi-l-ʿadad*) [i.e., the account of what it means *per se* to be a particular], just like Zayd and ‘Amr. And this meaning does not depend on the universal. We do not consider Zayd and ‘Amr, inasmuch as he [i.e., Zayd or ‘Amr] is a particular of its universal (*ḡuzʿiyyu kullīhi*),<sup>569</sup> but inasmuch

569 [97.2] Read with MSS OP4 and LB3 *kullīhi* instead of *kullīyyatihi* (EC).

he is a single individual (*šaḥṣ mufrad*). This is opposed to the universal not in the manner in which *relata* are opposed to each other (*muqābalatu ḡayra muqābalatu l-muḏāf*); and the existence of this [particular, i.e., the particular *per se* not as a *relatum*] does not depend on the nature of the universal.

[ed. Madkūr, p. 97, l. 5]

[§ 6] [*Objection (b)*] And if someone should say:

«Just like the existence of a specific individual (*aš-šaḥṣ bi-ʿaynihī*) does not depend on the universal being existent (*bi-an yakūna l-kulliyyu mawḡūdan*), the universal as well does not depend on a specific individual (*aš-šaḥṣ bi-ʿaynihī*).»

[*Ibn Sīnā's reply to objection (b)*] – We say: We too did not consider a specific individual [only]. Rather, we say that the individual nature in the absolute sense (*inna t-ṭabīʿata š-šaḥṣiyyata ʿalā l-iṭlāq*) – for the sake of its existence – does not depend on the existence of the universal nature, inasmuch as it is universal, so that it would be indispensable for it [i.e., for the individual] to be associated with it [i.e., with the universal]. The universal nature, however, inevitably depends on a certain individual.

[§ 7] [*Objection (c)*] If someone should say:

«The nature of 'man' is prior (*aqdam*) to the nature of Zayd [and not the other way around].»

[*Ibn Sīnā's reply to objection (c)*] – We say: We did not assume the quiddity of substance, inasmuch as it is a quiddity. Rather, we assumed it [i.e., the quiddity of substance], inasmuch as it is a universal quiddity. And only afterwards we made this judgment (*tumma ḡakamnā hādā l-ḡukma*); thus, this [i.e., our judgment about the priority of Zayd] is according to the priority in existence (*naḡwa taqaddumi l-wuḡūd*).

[§ 8] [*Objection (d)*] If someone should say:

«You assumed one of the two [i.e., the universal or the particular], inasmuch as it is a *relatum*, and you assumed the other one, inasmuch as it is not a *relatum*.»

[*Ibn Sīnā's reply to objection (d)*] – We say: No one is entitled to judge us with regard to the fact that [first of all] we assume it [i.e., the universal or the particular] in whichever way we want to assume it and subsequently pass a judgment on it which is only true under the condition that it is assumed in this way. Rather, if we passed a false judgment on that which has been assumed – regardless of the way in which it has been assumed – he would be entitled to dispute it.

[§ 9] [*The logician considers only universals as such and not universals inasmuch as they are related to external things, i.e., inasmuch as they are existent*] Besides that (*wa-baʿda dālika*), the usefulness in [all] this lies in the fact that the

logician considers these things only inasmuch as they are universal. As soon as he puts them into relation to external things (*ḥārīḡāt*), he considers them inasmuch as they are existent; hence, it would necessarily follow that the thing which is put into a relation [to something else] is universal and that the external thing to which it is related is singular, just like it is in existence.

This is one manner (*naḥw*) [in which individuals substances are primary].

[ed. Madkūr, p. 97, l. 19 / p. 98, l. 1]

[§ 10] [ad ii. *An individual substance is primary with regard to the degree to which the property on whose account it is a substance is established*] As for the mode of its priority according to the manner in which the property on whose account one evaluates the substantiality of substance is established, it is as follows: Substantiality is the quiddity which is such that, whenever it exists, it is not in need of a subject. This property [i.e., 'being not as in a subject'], to which the quiddity is put into relation [i.e., with regard to which one evaluates whether the quiddity of a thing is such that it is a substance or not], has already been realized (*qad ḥaṣala*) for the primary substances. However, it has not been realized for the universal substances.

[ed. Madkūr, p. 98, l. 4]

[§ 11] [ad iii. *An individual substance is primary with regard to perfection and excellence*] As for the discourse about perfection and excellence, some people said:

«Since they [i.e., the individual substances] are subjects [i.e., underlying things] (*mawḏū'āt*) and principles (*uṣūl*) for other things, and since the subject and the principle are more excellent, they are more excellent.»

This is haphazard talk (*kalām ḡuzāfi*)! For it is not evident that the principle and the subject must be more excellent. Rather, it may be the case that something which possesses the principle (*dū aṣl*) and which, in addition to having the principle, has even more excellence is more excellent and more perfect than the principle [itself]. For that reason [it is true to say]: How much more excellent than matter [which is an underlying thing and a principle of some sort] is everything [which possesses matter]! However [i.e., instead of the futile reason adduced by these other scholars], the excellence of these individual things is [due to] the fact that the purpose (*qaṣd*) in nature is directed towards the existence of these individuals. The acts and states which must be realized are only (*innamā*)<sup>570</sup> realized from these and for these.

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570 [98.9] Read with MSS OP4 and LB3 *fa-innamā* instead of *fa-inna mā* (EC).

[ed. Madkūr, p. 98, l. 10]

[§ 12] [ad *iv*. *An individual substance is primary with regard to 'being named'; a recourse to the Aristotelian distinction between 'of a subject' and 'in a subject' (Cat. 2)] As for the discourse about the precedence in being named, it is as follows: Since the first things of which one knows that they exist not as in a subject are the particular individuals, it is appropriate for them to take precedence over all [other] things. For they are subjects for their universals in the 'of mode' (*'alā sabīli 'alā*); and [they are subjects] for the accidents in the 'in mode' (*'alā sabīli fi*). Thus, the existence of every [other] thing is such that it is either said of them or exists *in* them [i.e., the existence of universals depends on their predicability, i.e., they need to be predicated of particulars].*

[ed. Madkūr, p. 98, l. 13]

**[(III.B.3) al-Ḥillī (fol. 55b, ll. 22–23): “Third Investigation (*baḥṭ*): That There Is a Difference between Universal Substances with Regard to Priority (*anna bayna l-ḡawāhir al-kulliyya tafāwut bi-s-sabq*)”]**

[§ 13] [(C) The gradation between species and genus – relations between things on different levels of the *arbor porphyriana* ('vertical relations')] Even though [in a certain sense] these universal substances are [all] secondary [substances], there is something on account of which they differ from each other [in rank] (*fa-inna lahā fimā baynahā tafāwutan*). For among them the species (*naw*) is worthier (*awlā*) of substantiality than the genus (*ḡins*). This is because it shares in the quiddities of primary substances to a more intensive degree (*li-annahū ašaddu mušāarakatan li-l-ḡawāhiri l-uwali fi māhiyyatihā*); for it signifies them to a higher degree than the genus signifies them (*yadullu 'alayhā dalālatu akṭara min dalālati l-ḡins*). For if you ask: 'What is Zayd and what is 'Amr?' and you say '[he is] a man' (*insānun*), this is a more complete reply (*ḡawāb atamm*) than if you reply 'he is an animal'; in the latter case, no full account of the quiddity has been provided yet (*lā takūnu qad wufiyat al-māhiyya*). Rather, it is possible for the one who asks ['what is Zayd?'] to continue the investigation. Everything which has a higher degree of commonality with the first one, inasmuch it is first, is closer to it, inasmuch as on account of this [closeness to the first one] it is prior and posterior. Thus, it is worthier of substantiality.

[§ 14] The state (*ḥāl*) of the genus, inasmuch as it is universal, in relation to the species which is below it is just like the state of the species in relation to the individual which is below it. And just like the individual is prior to the species only because it is a subject for genus and species, so is the state of the species in relation to the genus [i.e., the species is prior to the genus because the species is a subject for the genus]. It [i.e., the species] is – after the individual (*ba'd aš-šaḥṣ*) – also a subject for the universal accidents so that these [accidents] exist in

it (*fa-tūğadu fīhi*). For [the species] ‘man’ is a subject for many accidents, e.g., for ‘walking’ (*al-māšī*) and ‘two-footed’ (*dī riğlayn*); and [the species] ‘raven’ [is a subject] for ‘black’ (*al-aswad*). Thus, the relation (*qiyās*) of the species to the genus and the other things which come after the individual things is just like the relation of the individual to the species and to the other things.

[ed. Madkūr, p. 99, l. 7]

[§ 15] [*Objection (a)*] However, someone might say:

«The solution which you had presented in reply to the above-mentioned objection, namely [the objection] ‘just like the universal depends on the particular, the particular depends on the universal’ – [which you had solved] by saying ‘the individual is not the same as the particular which is a *relatum* of the universal, with regard to the meaning’ [see above (B), *objection (a)* and *reply (a)*] – is a solution which is of no use if one raises the analogous objection with regard to the species [in relation to the genus]. For the species is not like the individual; rather, it is only said in relation to the genus. Hence, the species is only a species in relation to the genus, unless by ‘species’ you were to mean the *infima species* (*an-naw‘ as-sāfil*) whose ‘being a species’ (*naw‘iyya*) is due to its relation to the individuals [and not to its relation to the genus]. As a consequence (*tumma*), the account you had given would be restricted to the relation (*muqāyasa*) between the *infima species* (*an-naw‘ al-aḥīr*) and its genera and would not include (*lā yatanāwalu*) the relation which holds between an intermediate species (*naw‘ mutawassit*) and a genus that is higher than it. Hence, it would be a non-comprehensive explanation (*bayān ġayr mustaw‘ab*); and it would not be posited in the sense of a primary imposition (*wa-lā mawḏū‘an ḥaytu yakūnu waḏ‘uhū*<sup>571</sup> *awwaliyyan*). For [even though you have not provided an argument which suits this case] you undoubtedly assume that the relation which holds between that which is an intermediary species and that which is a genus above it is the same as this relation [between *infima species* and genus; or between the individual and the universal].»

[§ 16] [*Ibn Sīnā’s reply to objection (a)*] – We say: We did not consider ‘man,’ inasmuch as it [i.e., the expression ‘man’] is a species which is said in relation to genus. Rather, we first of all considered the relation (*muqāyasa*) between the universal (*al-kullī*) [on the one hand] and that which is not universal and which shares with the universal in the [same] quiddity and of which the universal is said [on the other hand]. What we consider now concerns only the universal which – among a pair of universals which have something in common and which differ in generality and specificity – is a genus, namely the question of what its state (*ḥāl*) is in relation to the universal which has something in common with it and which is more specific than it and is not a genus. Thus, we define this state! The universal ‘man’ – for the sake of being a universal ‘man’ –

571 [99.14] Read with MSS OP4 and LB3, along with MSS S, AE, AL, H, Y (in app.), *waḏ‘uhū* instead of *waṣfuhū* (EC).

is not in need of a thing above it whose species it [i.e., the universal ‘man’] can be. Rather it is in need of a thing below it. Indeed, the universal ‘animal’ – for the sake of being a universal ‘animal’ – is not in need of a universal ‘body’ above it, but not the other way around. Even if ‘man,’ inasmuch as it is a species, should be in need of the genus, and likewise ‘animal,’ we now do not consider the nature of ‘man’ and [the nature of] ‘animal,’ inasmuch as it is a species. Rather, we consider the nature of the species, inasmuch as it is a universal only. Considering the nature of the species, inasmuch as it is a universal, is not the same as considering the nature of the species, inasmuch as it is the nature of the species or inasmuch as it is a species.

[ed. Madkūr, p. 100, l. 8]

[§ 17] [*Objection (b)*] Someone might say:

«You have assumed the intellective substances (*al-ḡawāhir al-‘aqliyya*) to be posterior to the sensible substances (*al-mahsūsāt*). From this it would have to follow that [ii] the intellect (‘*aql*) and [i] the Creator (*bārī*) – praised be He – are posterior to the sensible individuals.»

[§ 18] [*Ibn Sīnā’s reply to objection (b)*] – We say in reply to this: [ad *i*: *God is not a substance*] First, as for the Creator – exalted be He –, from what had been said above you should know that He is not included under the genus of the substances.

[§ 19] [ad *ii*. *Besides species and genera there are also ‘singular intellective beings’ – and these rank highest, i.e., they rank even above individual sensible beings*] Second, even if the species and the genus are intellective substances (*ḡawāhir ‘aqliyya*), not all intellective beings (‘*aqliyyāt*) are species and genera. Rather, among intellective beings there are [also] singular beings (*mufradāt*) which subsist *per se* (*qā’ima fī dātihā*) and are not dependent on a subject which they are said of or which they inhere in (*lā tata‘allaqu bi-mawdū‘in tuqālu ‘alayhi aw fihī*). And these [1] intellective singular beings (*al-mufradāt al-‘aqliyya*) are worthier of substantiality than every other thing. As for [their being worthier of substantiality] than [2] corporeal singular beings (*al-mufradāt al-ḡismāniyya*), it is because they [i.e., the intellective beings] are the causes of their existence. As for [their being worthier of substantiality] than [3] intellective universals (*al-kulliyāt al-‘aqliyyāt*), provided that they [i.e., the intellective beings] have them [i.e., provided that singular intellective beings have species and genera], it is because they are singular beings (*mufradāt*), as we had indicated before. As for [their being worthier of substantiality] than [4] natural sensible universals (*al-kulliyāt al-ḥissiyya aṭ-ṭabī‘iyya*), it is because they [i.e., the intellective beings] are worthier of substantiality than those which are worthier of

substantiality than these, I mean, the corporeal singular beings (*al-mufradāt al-ḡismāniyya*).

[§ 20] As for the relation we had assessed before (*al-muqāyasa llatī taqad-damat minnā*), we did not assess the relation between sensible beings (*al-maḥsūsāt*) and these intellectual substances (*al-ḡawāhir al-aqliyya*) but between individuals (*šahṣiyyāt*) and [their corresponding] universals (*kulliyyāt*). Provided that among intellectual universals there is indeed an ‘individual multitude’ (*katra šahṣiyya*) which ‘[the property of] being a [certain] species’ comprises (*ta‘ummuhā naw‘iyyatun*), and ‘[a property of] being a [certain] species’ which ‘[the property of] being a [certain] genus’ comprises, the relation (*munāsaba*) between them would be in accordance with this relation.<sup>572</sup> It seems that this only exists among some of them, not among others [i.e., there are intellectual beings to which the particular/universal distinction does not apply].

[§ 21] The same is true for the state of the simple things (*al-basā’it*) which the sensible [substances] have (*allatī li-l-maḥsūsa*) [i.e., form and matter which are both simple and which make up the compound]: The individual forms (*aṣ-ṣuwar aš-šahṣiyya*) are prior to the species-forms (*aṣ-ṣuwar an-naw‘iyya*). For example, the form of ‘this water’ and ‘that water’ is prior to the form of ‘water in the absolute sense’ (*al-mā’ al-muṭlaq*).

Since we have finished the assessment of the relations which hold between these substances vertically (*‘umqan*), let us now consider the relations which hold between them horizontally (*‘urḍan*).

[ed. Madkūr, p. 101, l. 5]

[(III.B.4) al-Ḥillī (fol. 57a, ll. 23–24): “Fourth Investigation (*baḥṭ*): Relations Which Hold Horizontally (*al-muqāyasāt ‘urḍan*)”]

[§ 22] [(D) Relations between things on the same level of the *arbor porphyriana* (‘horizontal relations’)] Thus we say: [*i. Relations between individuals*] Even if the particular individuals (*al-ašḥāš al-ḡuz‘iyya*) may surpass each other (*tafāḍalat*) with regard to certain properties (*umūr*), they nonetheless, inasmuch as they are individuals, do not precede each other on the level of their quiddities. [*ii. Relations between species*] And the same is true for their species.

[§ 23] [ad *i*] For Zayd is not worthier of the nature of his species being said of him than another individual [man] is. He may, however, be worthier of certain accidents which occur to his individual substantiality. For example, if he is more knowledgeable than he [i.e., another individual man] is, he is worthier of

572 That is to say, regardless of whether things are intellectual or sensible, any given individual always ranks higher than its corresponding universal; thus, if an individual intellectual being has a corresponding universal, the intellectual universal would rank below the intellectual individual.



knowledge than he is [i.e., then Zayd has a greater claim to ‘knowledge’ being said of him than someone else does].

[§ 24] [ad ii] And in the same manner, ‘man in the sense of the species’ (*al-insān an-nawī*) is – with regard to his claim to the rank of the ‘species-related substantiality’ (*fī istiḥqāqihī darağata l-ğawhariyyati n-naw‘iyyati*) and with regard to his claim of the genus being predicated of him – not worthier (*awlā*) than the ‘[species] horse,’ even if he may be worthier than it if one considers him in relation to dignity (*şaraf*) and excellence (*fađīla*).

[ed. Madkūr, p. 101, l. 10]

[§ 25] [(E) The status of substantial differentiae] In reality (*fī l-ḥaqīqa*), there are no other substances after the primary substances except their species and their genera [i.e., in reality the differentiae of substances are not substances]. As for the differentiae, in a certain respect (*min ġihatini*) they are like the species (*tağrī mağrā l-anwā*); from this you have already learned what they depend on (*mā ta‘tamiduhū*) [i.e., what their ‘basis’ is, namely individual beings]. In another respect, however, it is as follows:

[§ 26] [*i. ‘Simple differentiae’: Differentiae in the sense of form are substances*] By ‘differentiae’ (*fuşūl*) one either means the form (*şūra*) which is like ‘rationality / ability to speak’ (*nuṭq*). These [differentiae in the sense of forms] are not predicated of Zayd and ‘Amr, even though they are substances (*wa-in kānat ġawāhir*). The assessment of the relation between them [i.e., the forms] and the individuals and species is not undertaken with regard to generality and specificity (*fī i‘tibāri l-‘umūmi wa-l-ḥuşūş*) [i.e., the question one needs to ask is not whether the form is a universal, or whether the form is more or less general or specific than an individual or the corresponding species]; rather, [this assessment is undertaken] with regard to simplicity and composition (*bi-i‘tibāri l-basāṭati wa-t-tarkīb*) [i.e., while the form is simple, the individual and the species are compounded]. They are ‘formal substances’ (*ğawāhir şūriyya*) [i.e., they belong to one of the five species of substance, namely form] in relation to them [i.e., either in relation to the individuals or in relation to the species], whereas exactly the same relation holds between their particulars [i.e., particular forms, such as ‘Zayd’s rationality’] and their universals [i.e., universal forms, such as ‘rationality’]. If they are put into relation with compounded things (*al-murakkabāt*), inasmuch as they are their simple [parts] (*basā‘ituhā*), they are prior (*aqdam*) [to them] in the manner in which the principle (*mabda‘*) is prior to that which possesses the principle (*‘alā dī l-mabda‘*). In relation to their particulars, they are species and genera. Thus, they are also species and genera of substances, even if in relation to something else they are differentiae.

[§ 27] [*ii. ‘Logical differentiae’: Differentiae which are predicated of substances do not include substantiality*] As for the differentiae which are real logical

differentiae (*fuṣūl mantiḡiyya haḡiḡiyya*), such as ‘the rational / able to speak’ (*an-nāḡiq*), in the case of such differentiae, even though [in existence] they cannot be anything but substances, the meaning of substantiality, as you have learned, is not included in them (*ḡayr muḡamman*). Rather, the meaning of such a differentia, say, of ‘the rational,’ is that it is ‘a thing which is in possession of rationality’ (*ṣay’un dū nuḡqin*). Thereupon (*tumma*), this thing cannot be anything but a substance, i.e., it is indispensable for it that substantiality is attached to it (*lā yaḡlū min luzūmi l-ḡawhariyyati laḡū*) [i.e., it *implies* substantiality but does not *include* substantiality]. This issue had previously been verified for you [i.e., in the context of explaining the modes of signification and their importance in the context of predicable semantics in *al-Madḡal (Isagoge)*].<sup>573</sup>

[§ 28] To sum up, the substances are the individuals of substances, their species and their genera. And in the manner which has been outlined their differentiae are counted among their genera and species.

[ad *i*] If the detached differentiae (*al-fuṣūl al-muḡarrada*), which are the forms, are put into relation with the natures of the species which are compounded of them [i.e., of the forms], they are worthier of substantiality by way of precedence. However, they are not worthier of substantiality by way of perfection (*kamāl*).

[ad *ii*] As for the logical differentiae, they are posterior with regard to substantiality in a different regard. For substantiality is [merely] attached (*lāzima*) to them [i.e., they merely *imply* substantiality] but is not intrinsic (*dāḡila*) to that which is understood by them (*fī maḡhūmihā*). For you have already learned that ‘the rational’ must not be taken<sup>574</sup> to be ‘a substance or an animal which is in possession of rationality’ but ‘a thing which is in possession of rationality’ (*ṣay’an dā nuḡqin*).

573 On the three modes of signification in Ibn Sīnā, see Nora Kalbarczyk, *Sprachphilosophie in der islamischen Rechtstheorie* (Leiden: Brill, 2018), chapter 2.2.

574 [102.8] Read with MSS LB3 and OP4 *an lā yu’ḡada* instead of *an lā yūḡada* (EC).

## Chapter III,3

[ed. Madkūr, pp. 102–111]

## The Descriptions and Characteristics of Substance

[(III.C) al-Ḥillī (fol. 58a, l. 25): “The Third Issue (*maṭlab*): The Descriptions and Characteristics of Substance; in It Are Several Investigations (*mabāḥith*)”]

[ed. Madkūr, p. 102, l. 13]

[(III.C.1) al-Ḥillī (fol. 58b, l. 1): “First [Investigation]: The Characteristic Property by Which It Is Described (*ḥāṣṣiyyatihi llatī rusima bihā*)”]

[§ 1] [A. ‘Being not in a subject’] All substances share in a characteristic property which equally applies to them (*ḥāṣṣiyya musāwiya laḥā*), namely their being ‘existent not as *in* a subject’ (*hiya annahā mawḡūdatun lā fī mawḡū‘in*). Since the logical differentiae are [by way of implication/attachment] substances – even though the genera and species are worthier of that, as you have learned [i.e., they are worthier of substantiality since substantiality is part of their quiddity] – they are also ‘existent not as *in* a subject’; for they give to their individuals [i.e., the individuals of which they are predicated] their names in accordance with their definitions (*iḍ kānat ta’tī ṣaḥṣiyyātahā asmā’ahā bi-ḥudūdiḥā*) [i.e., they are predicated both at the level of the linguistic expression and the meaning]. [In contrast to that,] those which are said as ‘being *in* a subject’ [i.e., as accidents] may apply [to them, i.e., to substantial individuals] in name only (*wāfaqat fī l-ism faqat*).

[§ 2] [*The fact that substantial parts and particulars are in something does not mean that they are in a subject*] None of the substances is *in* a subject; and none of the things which are *in* a subject is a substance. If the parts of substance are *in* the wholes (*al-kullāt*) which are the compounds (*al-murakkabāt*), and [if] their particulars (*ḡuz’iyyātuhū*) are *in* the universals (*kulliyyāt*), it does not necessarily follow from this that they [i.e., the parts *in* the wholes and the particulars *in* the universals] are [in something as] ‘*in* a subject’; for you have already learned that ‘the existence *in* the subject’ differs from ‘the existence of the parts *in* the wholes’ and ‘[the existence of] the particulars *in* the universals.’

[§ 3] [*Critique of the view that one and the same thing may be a substance and a quality in two different regards*] Do not pay any attention to the following statement (*mā yuqālu*):

«The forms and the non-logical differentiae (*inna ṣ-ṣuwara wa-l-fuṣūla ḡayra l-mantiqiyya*) only belong to the category of substance with regard to their being a part of substance (*bi-ḥasabi i’tibāri kawnihā ḡuz’an li-l-ḡawhar*). However, in relation to their ‘matters’ (*bi-l-qiyāsi ilā mawāddihā*) [i.e., with regard to their existence as material beings], they are accidents and belong to the category of quale (*maqūlat al-kayf*).»

You have already learned that nothing belongs *per se* [i.e., on account of its essence] (*bi-d-dāt*) to two categories. And you have learned that these too are in relation to their ‘matters’ not accidents and that quality (*al-kayfiyya*) is said of them and of the meaning of the category [of quality] by way of sharing in the name [but not in the meaning, i.e., homonymously], not by means of a genus-predication (*bi-štirāki l-ismi lā ka-qawli l-ğins*).

[§ 4] [‘Real substances’ and ‘logical differentiae’ share in the description ‘being not in a subject’] Thus, the real substances (*al-ğawāhir al-ḥaqīqiyya*) [i.e., substantial individuals, species, and genera which are substances on account of their quiddities] and the logical differentiae (*al-fuṣūl al-manṭiqiyya*) share in this characteristic property; for these [i.e., the logical differentiae] are also substances. The logical differentiae and the secondary substances [i.e., substantial species and genera] share in the fact that in relation to the individuals of substances they are said in the manner of ‘that which is said of a subject’ (*qawla l-maḳūli ‘alā mawḏū’in*).

[§ 5] Thus, this characteristic property, i.e., ‘being not in a subject’ (*al-kawn lā fi mawḏū’*), is [i] in relation to ‘substance in the absolute sense’ (*al-ğawhar al-muṭlaq*) [i.e., regardless of whether it is simple or compounded, particular or universal, real or logical] an equally applying (*musāwiya*) and convertible (*mun‘akisa*) property [i.e., ‘being *not* in a subject’ equally applies to every substance; and ‘being *not* in a subject’ and substance are convertible], and [ii] in relation to the real substances (*al-ğawāhir al-ḥaqīqiyya*), i.e., the individuals, the species, and the genera, it is more general (*a‘amm*) [for, in addition to real substances, it also comprises the logical differentiae of substances].

[ed. Madkūr, p. 103, l. 13]

[(III.C.2) al-Ḥillī (fol. 59a, ll. 6–7): “Second Investigation (*baḥṭ*): Substance Can Be Intended by a Pointer (*anna l-ğawhar maḳṣūd ilayhi bi-l-išāra*)”]

[§ 6] [B. ‘A certain this’] There are other characteristic properties [besides the description ‘being not in a subject’]. One of them is the characteristic property which – according to the commonly held view (*mā yurā fi l-mašhūr*) – applies to every substance. But this is not the case! Rather, it only applies to some substances. Thus, it belongs to those characteristic properties which specify that which is [already] specific and which do not comprise it [as a general property] (*mina l-ḥawāṣṣi llatī taḥuṣṣu l-maḥṣūṣa wa-lā ta‘ummuhū*). This characteristic property is: ‘Substance is something which can be intended by a pointer’ (*anna l-ğawhara maḳṣūdun ilayhi bi-l-išāra*). For a pointer (*al-išāra*) is a sensible or intellectual indication of a specific thing with which no other thing shares in this [indication] (*dalālatun ḥissiyyatun aw ‘aqliyyatun ilā šay’in bi-‘aynihī lā*

*yašrahuhū fihā šay'un ġayruhū*), even if it belongs to its species (*wa-law*<sup>575</sup> *kāna min naw'ihī*) [i.e., even if it falls under the same species as the thing indicated].

[§ 7] [*This characteristic property does not apply per se to accidents*] This pointer does not apply to accidents, except accidentally. For they [i.e., the accidents] become distinct and multiple only through the substances to which they pertain (*innamā tašīru mutamayyizatan mutakaṭṭiratan bi-l-ġawāhiri llatī lahā*). Each of them becomes a single specific thing on account of the specification of its subject (*kullu wāḥidin minhā yašīru wāḥidan muta'ayyinān li-ta'ayyuni mawḍū'ihī*).

[§ 8] [*The 'sensible pointer' is restricted to substances which occupy space*] The sensible pointer which specifies the subject (*al-išāra al-ḥissiyya al-mu'ayyina li-l-mawḍū'*) only includes the substances which have a specification on account of their delineation in space (*al-ġawāhir dawāt at-tamayyuz bi-t-taḥayyuz*).

[§ 9] [*What is an 'intellective pointer'? Can there be an 'intellective pointer' to accidents as well?*] As for the pointer which is commonly held to be intellective (*wa-ammā l-išāratu l-mašhūratu bi-annahā 'aqliyyatun*), this includes the accidents as well. [i] However, if it includes them with regard to their meanings (*min ḥayṭu ma'ānīhā*), this is not the pointer which we designated; for their meanings admit of being shared (*šāliḥa li-š-šarika*) [i.e., if one indicates a meaning, it is such that more than one thing can share in the meaning – and hence such a pointer would not be specific]. [ii] And if it includes them [i.e., accidents] and if they [i.e., these accidents which are pointed to in the mind] are such that nothing shares in them – and this must be specifically designated by the name 'pointer' –, the intellect (*al-'aql*) is unable to do this, unless it [i.e., the mind] had already specified them by means of various intellective subjects through which the accidents are multiplied [i.e., one cannot imagine a specific accident which is not shared by many without imagining a specific subject which this accident belongs to]. These [subjects] had already been multiplied on account of themselves before those accidents were multiplied; or they are multiple because of causes which had multiplied them before the accidents were multiplied, just like certain 'matters' (*mawādd*) which these [subjects] have and to which they stand in a certain relation, as you will learn in the appropriate place. Thus, in this meaning as well the 'intellective pointer' does not include the intellective accidents by way of a primary intention, provided that they [i.e., the intellective accidents] exist [at all] (*lā tatanāwalu ayḍan al-a'rāda l-'aqliyyata in kānāt mawḡūdatan tanāwalan bi-l-qaṣḍi l-awwal*). Therefore, those which can be in-

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575 [103.16] Read with MSS OP4, LG4, TD3, along with MSS SA, N, Y (in app.), *wa-law* instead of *law* (EC).

tended by a pointer, i.e., by way of a primary intention by way of a pointer (*ay bi-l-qaṣḍi l-awwali bi-l-iṣāra*), are the substances and not the accidents.

[ed. Madkūr, p. 104, l. 9]

[§ 10] [*The ‘pointer’ which is characteristic for certain substances is either taken to be a ‘sensible pointer’ only or a pointer in a more general sense which comprises the ‘sensible pointer’ and the ‘intellective pointer’ (but it is not taken to be the ‘intellective pointer’ only)*] There is no dispute (*lā munāqaṣata*) that the ‘pointer’ which had been mentioned [as a characteristic property of some substances] is either [a] taken to be ‘sensible’ (*an tuḡ‘ala l-iṣāratu l-maḍkūratu ḥissiyyatan*) so that it points to the sensible substances only (*ilā l-ḡawāhiri l-ḥiyyiyati faqat*) or [b] that it is taken to be more general than that so that it comprises both pointers [i.e., the ‘sensible pointer’ and the ‘intellective pointer’], even if this is not by way of synonymy [i.e., even if ‘pointer’ should be said equivocally of these two different types]; for many of the descriptions and definitions which had been mentioned for these things are [said] in this [mode of predication, i.e., equivocally] (*fa-inna kaṭīran mina r-rusūmi wa-l-ḥudūdi sabīluhā ḥādihī s-sabīla*) [i.e., in the context of the *Categories* the strict criteria of proper scientific definitions are not always fulfilled].

[§ 11] [*This characteristic property is restricted to primary substances*] However, this is a characteristic property of the primary substances [only], not of secondary [substances]. For there is no pointer to universals (*fa-innahū lā iṣāratu ilā l-kulliyyāt*) since there is no distinct specification in them (*id lā ta‘ayyuna fihā*). Do not think that if you pointed to Zayd you have already pointed to ‘man’ (*fa-qad aṣarta ilā l-insān*). For there is a difference (*farq*) between ‘man’ and Zayd, even if ‘man’ is predicated of Zayd. If there were no difference, it [i.e., ‘man’] would always be predicated of Zayd only (*la-kāna abadan maḥmūlan ‘alā Zaydin faqat*) and every man would be Zayd. Indeed, ‘man’ and the other universals do not signify ‘something which can be pointed to’ (*lā tadullu ‘alā muṣārin ilayhi*) but [they signify] ‘anything whatsoever from among those which can be pointed to’ (*‘alā ayyi wāḥidin ittafaqa mina l-muṣāri ilayhi*).

[§ 12] [*Species, in contrast to genera, give things a distinct ‘whichness’ (but in contrast to individuals they cannot be pointed to)*] Among them, i.e., among the secondary substances, [1] there are those which in addition to that (*ma‘a dālīka*)<sup>576</sup> [i.e., in addition to signifying ‘any single thing whatsoever from among

576 [104.16] Read with MSS LB3, N (not in app.), TD3, TM5, Y (not in app.), along with MSS BḤ, D, AE, M (in app.), and with al-Ḥilli’s commentary *ma‘a dālīka* instead of *ma‘nā* (EC). *Ma‘nā* is attested by MSS B (which in the margins, i.e., BḤ, is corrected to *ma‘a dālīka*), IC4, ID3 (which has *ma‘a* without *dālīka* and as an interlinear correction *ma‘nā*),

those which can be pointed to'] gives them [i.e., the individuals] a 'whichness' (*ayyiyya*)<sup>577</sup> by which they are distinguished (*yatafarrazu*<sup>578</sup> *bihī*), such as the species-related things (*ka-n-naw'iyyāt*). [2] And there are those which do not give them a 'whichness' (*ayyiyya*) by which they are distinguished, such as the genus which is the genus of genera [i.e., the highest genus]; if, however, it [i.e., a highest genus] does accomplish a distinction (*infirāz*), this does not come about in relation to those things which share in the genus but in relation to 'existence' [which is even more general since it encompasses the ten *summa genera*].

[§ 13] Whenever these secondary substances convey a 'whichness' (*ayyiyya*) [about the primary substances], they convey about them an essential 'whichness' (*afādathā ayyiyyatan dātiyyatan*). This amounts to distinguishing a group [of things] on account of the essence (*wa-huwa ifrāzu ġumlatin bi-d-dāt*) without, however, considering that they are under a general one which encompasses them or not (*annahā tahta 'āmmīn ya'ummuhā aw laysa*). Therefore, this 'whichness' is not the 'whichness' of the differentia (*laysat tilka l-ayyiyyatu ayyiyyata l-faṣl*). For the distinction which the differentia yields is a distinction under the [common] genus (*ifrāzun tahta l-ġins*). This manner of yielding a distinction is not said of the species, except in a certain regard *per accidens* (*lā yuqālu 'alā n-naw'i illā bi-l-'araḍi min waġhin mā*), as you have already learned. By saying '*per accidens*' (*bi-l-'araḍ*) I mean that which something possesses not in a primary manner (*awwalan*) but [only] on account of something else; by saying '*per accidens*' (*bi-l-'araḍ*) I do not mean that its nature [i.e., the nature of the species] in reality does not yield a distinction (*anna t-ṭabī'atahū lā tufriзу bi-l-ḥaqīqa*). Quite the contrary, for [the species] 'man' does yield a distinction. However, it only yields a distinction because there is a 'distinguisher' (*mufriз*) in it which is the first one in it [i.e., which is primary with regard to yielding the

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IN1, LG4 (which in the margins is corrected to *ma'a dālīka*), and S. MSS OP4 and SA have neither *ma'a dālīka* nor *ma'nā*.

577 [104.16] Read with MSS B (not in app.), ID3, LB3, N (not in app.), OP4, TD3m, and with al-Ḥilli's commentary (where the word has explicitly been dotted, even though the scribe usually omits the diacritic dots) *ayyiyya* instead of *anniyya* (EC). See also Amos Bertolacci, "A Hidden *Hapax Legomenon* in Avicenna's *Metaphysics*: Considerations on the Use of *Anniyya* and *Ayyiyya* in the *Ilāhiyyāt* of the *Kitāb al-Ṣifā'*," in *The Letter before the Spirit: The Importance of Text Editions for the Study of the Reception of Aristotle*, ed. Aafke M.I. van Oppenraay (Leiden: Brill, 2012), pp. 289–309. *Anniyya* is clearly attested by MSS AE, LG4, S, TD3 (corrected in the margins to *ayyiyya*). In MSS IC4, IN1, SA, TM5, and Y the second letter is not dotted and thus one could read both *anniyya* and *ayyiyya*.

578 [104.16] Read with MSS LB3 and OP4 *yatafarrazu* instead of *tanfarizu* (EC). I tend to follow the reading of MSS OP4 and LB3 but both readings would render the same meaning.

distinction; the species which contains this ‘distinguisher,’ in turn, only yields a distinction on account of the ‘distinguisher’ and thus only secondarily or ‘per accidens’].

[§ 14] [*The two modes in which universal substances signify something, without however pointing to one specific ‘certain this’*] Thus, the universal substances signify (*tadullu*) anything (*‘alā ayyin*) in two modes (*min waḡhayni*): [1] The first [mode] is that they do not signify ‘precisely this thing which can be pointed to’ (*hādā l-mušār ilayhi bi-‘aynihī*) but rather ‘anything whatsoever’ [from among those which can be pointed to] (*‘alā ayyi wāḡhidin kāna*). [2] And the second [mode] is that they yield a distinction by way of a substantial distinction (*annahā tufriзу ifrāzan ḡawhariyyan*).

[§ 15] [*This characteristic property applies to substances only, albeit not to all substances*] Thus, this characteristic property which is related to the pointer (*al-mansūba ilā l-išāra*) is a characteristic property of substance in such a manner that it does not apply to anything else but to substance (*‘alā sabili annahā lā tūḡadu illā fi l-ḡawhar*), even though it does not apply to all substances (*wa-in kānat lā tūḡadu li-ḡamī‘i l-ḡawāhir*). Therefore, the manner in which it is specific to substance is due to the fact that one says that among the categories (*mina l-maqūlāt*) substance is the category which applies to things which this condition comprises (*tūḡadu fi l-umūri llatī yaštamilu ‘alayhā hādā š-šart*), just like one says that the Ka‘ba is a characteristic property of Mecca – not in such a manner that all of its [i.e., Mecca’s] parts are the Ka‘ba but in such a manner that some of its parts are the Ka‘ba, whereas the same is not true for Medina.

[ed. Madkūr, p. 105, l. 14]

[(III.C.3) al-Ḥillī (fol. 60a, l. 12): “Third Investigation (*baḡt*): Substance Has No Contrary (*anna l-ḡawhar lā ḡidd laḡū*)”]

[§ 16] [C. ‘Nothing is contrary to a substance’] Substance has a characteristic property which encompasses all of its species but which is not a characteristic property of substance [by which it is distinguished] in relation to every accident but only in relation to some accidents. This [characteristic property] is that it does not have a contrary (*ḡidd*) since it does not have a subject.

The contrary (*aḡ-ḡidd*) which we talk about in this place (*alladī l-kalāmu fihi hāhunā*) is a property (*amr*) which shares in the subject with that which is its respective contrary, whereas they [i.e., the two contraries which have the same subject] are two essences which apply to it successively and for which it is impossible to be in it simultaneously.

If, however, by ‘contrary’ one should mean everything which shares in a substrate (*maḡall*), be it matter or a subject, the account which would have to be given with regard to that issue would be different; and it would be conceivable



that the form-substances (*al-ğawāhir aṣ-ṣūriyya*) have a contrary [namely if one form succeeds another form as inhering in the same material substrate].

[ed. Madkūr, p. 106, l. 3]

[§ 17] It is not upon the logician to make an attempt at proving these things by way of verification (*an yuḥawila ibānata hādihī l-ašyā'i bi-t-taḥqīq*); for he will not have the capability to do so sufficiently. Rather, the most that can be achieved [in the context of logic] is to obtain knowledge of this [issue] by way of induction (*bi-l-istiqrā'*) or by means of arguments which are taken from commonly known things (*bi-ḥuḡağin ma'aḥūḍatin mina l-mašhūrāt*), and [in addition to that] to remove from him [i.e., the logician] some of the doubts (*šukūk*) he is faced with by way of inductive examples which make him understand that that which he himself finds troublesome (*mā iḥtalağa fi ṣadrihī*) or those doubts which are presented to him [by other people] are false (*kāḍib*), even if their removal [by itself] does not make it necessary for him to be convinced that this is true (*lā yuğibu i'tiqādahū anna hādā ṣādiq*).

Induction makes it evident that 'man' and 'horse' do not have a contrary (*didd*). As for the 'hot body' (*al-ğism al-ḥārr*) and the 'cold body' (*al-ğism al-bārid*), they are not contrary to each other on account of their essences (*laysa yataḍāddāni bi-dātayhimā*) but only *per accidens* (*bi-l-'araḍ*); for those things which are contrary to each other in them are 'the heat' (*al-ḥarāra*) and 'the coldness' (*al-burūda*).

[§ 18] [*This characteristic property does not pertain to substances alone*] Other categories share in this characteristic property as well; for there is also no contrary to quantity (*al-kammiyya*). If someone should raise a doubt by presenting 'the small' (*aṣ-ṣağīr*) and 'the big' (*al-kabīr*) as a case which contradicts this view, it would be upon me to solve this and to falsify this. However, it would be upon him to contemplate the fact that he knows that four and three and five do not have contraries; for no number is worthier [than another number] of being assumed to have the utmost degree of difference in relation to these [numbers, i.e., four, three and five] so that it would be a contrary – unless there would be some [number] which is the farthest away from it and which differs from it to the utmost degree. As soon as one knows through this kind of explication that there is nothing which is contrary to three and four, one has found something from [the category of] quantity which shares with substance in having no contrary, i.e., certain species [of quantity] as we have mentioned, even if there should be something from [the category of] quantity which does have a contrary, such as, for example, 'numerousness' (*al-kaṭra*) and 'fewness' (*al-qilla*), provided that both are quantities and that both are contraries. Since the objection

(*al-i'tirād*)<sup>579</sup> is removed as soon as one concedes that contrariety is present in 'bigness' (*kibar*) and 'smallness' (*ṣiġar*), and in 'numerousness' and 'fewness,' there is no use in making an effort of clarifying that 'numerousness' and 'fewness,' and 'the big' and 'the small' are neither quantities nor contraries.

Thus, even if quantity shares in this [characteristic property] with substance, certain species of other categories do not share in it. For most things belonging to [the category of quality] have contraries, even if some of them also do not have a contrary.

[ed. Madkūr, p. 107, l. 1]

[(III.C.4) al-Ḥillī (fol. 61a, l. 13): “**Fourth Investigation (*baḥṭ*): Substance Is Not Receptive of a Stronger and Weaker Intensity (*anna l-ġawhara lā yaqbalu ṣ-ṣiddata wa-d-ḍa'fa*)”]**

[§ 19] [D. ‘A substance is not receptive of more and less’] This characteristic property is followed by another one, namely that substance, moreover, is not receptive of that which is more and less intensive (*anna l-ġawhara aydan lā yaqbalu l-ašadda wa-l-aḍ'afa*). For that which increases in intensity becomes more intensive by starting from a state which is the contrary of the state to which it moves in the process of becoming more intensive; hence, it gradually leaves behind the state of weak intensity (*hālat aḍ-ḍa'f*) as it turns towards the state of strong intensity (*hālat al-quwwa*); or it leaves behind the state of strong intensity as it turns towards the state of weak intensity – and both states are contrary opposites which cannot co-exist [in one and the same subject] (*mutaqābilātāni mutaḍāddatāni la yaġtami'āni*). If they were accidents, the stronger intensity and weaker intensity would be in the accidents [but not in the substances in which these accidents are] – and this is how it is (*wa-hādā mimmā yakūnu*). If, however, they were substances, there would be a contrariety in substance; and this had been excluded [for nothing is contrary to substance]. Thus, if the characteristic property which preceded this one had been posited in an absolute manner (*iḍā wuḍ'iat al-ḥāṣṣatu llatī qabla hādihī waḍ'an muṭlaqan*), [then simultaneously] this characteristic property had been posited as well; for

579 [106.15] This passage is most likely corrupted. MSS OP4, ID3, LG4, TD3, TM5, Y (all unambiguously dotted in this place) have *al-ġaraḍ* instead of *al-i'tirād* (i.e., “since the *objective* has been removed ...”); according to the apparatus of EC, MS Y has *al-ʿaraḍ* but this information is not correct; in MS Y, *al-ġaraḍ* is followed by *lā yartaḥi'u* (the negation has been correctly noted in the apparatus of EC). The reading favored by EC, namely *al-i'tirād*, can be found in MSS B, IC4, IN1, LB3 and N. MSS AE, S, TD3m have *al-a'rād*; the apparatus of EC attributes the reading *al-ʿaraḍ* to AE but this is false; the apparatus of EC does not give a variant for MS S; in the marginal correction in TD3 *al-a'rād* is followed by *lā taqa'u*. MS SA has *al-ʿaraḍ* (not in app.); al-Ḥillī's text reads: *wa-id yartaḥi'u l-i'tirād*.

an increase and decrease in intensity is excluded along with the exclusion of contrariety.

[ed. Madkūr, p. 107, l. 8]

[§ 20] Thereupon, the type of contrariety which is such that in its removal from substances no intensification comes about (*tumma d-darbu mina t-tadāddi llaḍī lam yatašaddad fī raf'iḥī 'ani l-ḡawāhir*), belongs to those things for which it is impossible that one of them is [gradually] transformed to another one of them by means of an increase and decrease in intensity (*mimmā lā yaḥtamilu l-mašīru min ba'dihā ilā ba'ḍin 'alā s-sabīli l-ištīdādi wa-t-taḍa'uf*). For it is not the case with all contraries that the transformation from one of these [things] to another one comes about in this way [i.e., by way of a gradual increase and decrease in intensity]; rather, it may come about instantaneously (*daf'atan*). Indeed, the removal of the receptivity to contrariety removes [the receptivity to] a decrease and increase in intensity. Positing it, however, [i.e., positing the receptivity to contrariety] neither necessitates nor posits it [i.e., the receptivity to a decrease and increase in intensity].<sup>580</sup>

[ed. Madkūr, p. 107, l. 12]

[§ 21] [*Refutation of a false opinion*] Someone had been of the following opinion:

«An increase and decrease in intensity may come about with regard to things which are not between the contraries [i.e., excluding contrariety does not exclude a receptivity to more and less]. An example of this is that 'health' (*aṣ-ṣiḥḥa*) is neither a contrary of 'beauty' (*ḥusn*) nor of its contrary; and 'the beauty' [of an individual] may be more [intensive] than 'the health' [of this individual] (*wa-rubbamā kāna ḥusnun akṭara min ṣiḥḥatin*).»

You should not pay any attention to this! For the doctrine advocated by the person who holds this opinion is a manner of considering the more and the less which differs from what we have advocated here [i.e., what he means by 'more and less' differs from what we mean by 'more and less'] (*naw'un min i'tibāri z-ziyādati wa-n-nuqṣāni ḡayru llaḍī dahabnā ilayhi hāhunā*).

[§ 22] [*What kind of 'more and less' is intended here?*] Just like substance is not receptive of an increase and decrease in intensity by way of motion (*al-ištīdād wa-t-tanaqquṣ 'alā sabīl al-ḥaraka*), there is no substance which is more

580 Excluding the property of 'being receptive of contraries' excludes the property of 'being receptive of more or less'; but the mere fact that someone assumes that something has the property of 'being receptive of contraries' does not mean that the same thing must also have the property of 'being receptive of more and less' – for there is a type of contrariety in which there is no transformation from more to less or less to more.

intensive and less intensive (*lā yakūnu minhū mā huwa ašadd wa-mā huwa aq'af*). I do not mean [that nothing among substances is more or less intensive] by way of assessing the relation [between various substances] in accordance with being worthier and more entitled and by way of regarding it vertically [i.e., between genera, species, and individuals]. For it had already been said that in a certain respect (*min wağhin*) some substances are worthier (*awlā*) of substantiality than others. Rather, what I mean is assessing the relation in such a manner that it is specified as belonging to one nature (*tabī'a wāhida*) and one definition (*ḥadd wāhid*). And [in this respect] no individual man is more intensive in 'being a man,' which is his substance, than another individual man – in the manner in which a 'whiteness' (*bayād*) may be more intensive in 'being whiteness' than another whiteness. Moreover, no individual man is more intensive in 'being an individual man'<sup>581</sup> than an individual horse in 'being a horse' – in the manner in which one may imagine that a 'whiteness' is more intensive in its 'being whiteness' than a 'blackness' in its 'being blackness' and that 'heat' in its 'being heat' (*ḥarāriyya*) is more intensive than 'coldness' in its 'being coldness.'

The same is true for the species which are on the same level (*al-anwā' allatī fī darağa wāhida*). For none of them is more intensive in its 'belonging to this kind' (*fī bābihī*) than another one since we assumed that the genera are always predicated of them in an equal manner (*id faradnā anna l-ağnāsa innamā tuḥmalu 'alayhā bi-s-sawiya*).

[§ 23] [*The difference between 'being worthier' and 'being more intensive'*] Even though the primary substances are worthier of substantiality than the secondary substances, they are, nonetheless, not more intensive in substantiality (*laysat ašadd fī l-ğawhariyya*). Being worthier is not the same as being more intensive (*wa-l-awlā ġayru l-ašadd*). For being worthier depends on the *existence* of substantiality (*yata'allaqu bi-wuğūdi l-ğawhariyya*). Being more intensive, in contrast, depends on the *quiddity* of substantiality (*yata'allaqu bi-māhiyyati l-ğawhariyya*).

[*Quantity shares this characteristic property with substance*] The quantum (*al-kamm*) also shares with substance in this [characteristic property], as we shall explain later.

[ed. Madkūr, p. 108, l. 9]

[(III.C.5) al-Ḥillī (fol. 62a, l. 10): "Fifth Investigation (*baḥṭ*): Substance Is Receptive of Contraries (*anna l-ğawhar qābil li-l-aḍḍād*)"]

[§ 24] [E. 'A substance is receptive of contrary properties'] On the surface, one might believe (*wa-qad yu'taqadu fī zāhiri l-amr*) that the characteristic

581 [108.2] Read with MSS LB3, OP4 *šaḥṣu insānin fī annahū šaḥṣu insānin* instead of *šaḥṣu insānin* (EC).

property which is most specific for substance (*aḥaṣṣ al-ḥawāṣṣ bi-l-ḡawhar*) is that its quiddity is a quiddity which, whenever it is individualized, becomes a subject for contraries (*wuḍiʿat li-l-aḍḍād*<sup>582</sup>); for one specific substance (*al-ḡawharu mā l-wāḥidu bi-ʿayniḥi minhū*), not the universal substance, is such that it may be receptive of contraries on account of a change in itself. The universal substance, in turn, is not receptive of contraries; for the universal comprises every individual – and it is not true that every individual is black and that every individual is white.

[ed. Madkūr, p. 108, l. 13]

[§ 25] [*Refutation of the view that the universal accident is receptive of contraries as well*] If someone should be of the following opinion:

«The universal accident is also receptive of a pair of contraries, just like ‘color’ may be ‘whiteness’ and ‘blackness,’»

– his opinion (*ẓannuhū*) is refuted by the fact that it is not ‘the color that is blackness’ which is receptive of ‘the color of whiteness’ so that ‘blackness’ would be stripped off from ‘color’ and instead it [i.e., ‘color’] would be covered by ‘whiteness.’ Rather, one says about ‘color taken absolutely’ (*al-lawn al-muṭlaq*) that it is receptive of a pair of contraries only in the sense that it is the one and the other [i.e., ‘blackness’ and whiteness’]; or in such a way that the nature of being a color is isolated in the mind in an abstract sense (*bi-an tufrāza ṭ-ṭabiʿatu l-lawniyyatu muḡarradatan fī l-wahm*) so that in the mind it becomes receptive of any of the two differentiae [i.e., black or white] whatsoever. However, we do not speak about such things. Rather, we speak about the receptivity in the realm of existence (*al-qubūl alladī fī l-wuḡūd*) and about the receptivity which concerns one single recipient (*qābil wāḥid*). If the universal ‘color’ were indeed to receive both of them, every ‘color’ would have to be ‘blackness’ and every ‘color’ would have to be ‘whiteness.’ If the abstracted nature of color were to be receptive of that, it [i.e., the nature of color] would not be ‘blackness’ and ‘whiteness,’ but rather it would be ‘blackened’ and ‘whitened’ so that it is not the case that a certain color (*lawnun mā*) is ‘blackness’ and that a certain color is ‘whiteness’; these two would succeed one another (*la-kānā ʿalā t-taʿāqub*) and would not apply [to ‘color’] simultaneously (*wa-lā maʿan*).

[ed. Madkūr, p. 109, l. 3]

[§ 26] [*This characteristic property does not comprise all substances but only ‘changing substances’ (both particulars and corresponding universals)*] This char-

582 [109.10] Read with MS OP4, along with MSS D, H, Y (in app.), and with al-Ḥilli’s commentary *li-l-aḍḍād* instead of *al-aḍḍād* (EC).

acteristic property does not comprise every substance (*lā ta‘ummu kulla ḡawharin*); for not every substance is receptive of contraries. The simple intellectual substances (*al-ḡawāhir al-‘aqliyya al-basiṭa*) might not change at all (*qad lā tataḡayyaru l-battata*); and whatever does not change at all is not receptive of contraries. Rather, only the substances which change (*al-ḡawāhir al-mutaḡayyira*) and the corporeal substances which are compounded of matter and form (*al-ḡawāhir al-ḡismāniyya al-murakkaba min hayūlā wa-ṣūra*) are receptive of them [i.e., of contraries] – but not all corporeal compounds (*al-murakkabāt al-ḡismāniyya*); for many celestial bodies (*al-aḡsām as-samāwiyya*) are not receptive of contraries. Only some corporeal substances are receptive of that.

[§ 27] [*This characteristic property equally applies to those to which it applies*] This characteristic property applies equally to those [substances to which it applies, i.e., to changing substances]; and it is a characteristic property which is not restricted to the particulars of those substances only but which applies to all of them [i.e., both particular and universal ‘changing substances’]. For one also predicates of their universals that whichever of them is one in number is receptive of such-and-such [contraries] (*anna l-wāḥida minhā bi-l-‘adadi yaqbalu kaḏā wa-kaḏā*), and that, even though its universality is not receptive of that on account of its universality, its universality is characterized by the attribute that ‘whichever of them is one in number is receptive of that.’ As for the individuals, whichever of them is one in number is receptive [of contraries].

[ed. Madkūr, p. 109, l. 12]

[§ 28] [*An objection and Ibn Sīnā’s reply*] If someone should say:

«If you assume this characteristic property to be such that it is suitable to apply to universals, it is not suitable to apply to particulars; for one does not say about Zayd: ‘Whichever of him is one in number is receptive of contraries.’»

– The reply to this is: This is true and correct (*ḥaqq ṣaḥiḥ*). According to the first consideration of the nature of corporeal substance which had been mentioned (*fī n-naẓari l-awwali li-ṭabī‘ati l-ḡawhari l-ḡismāni l-madkūr*) this characteristic property is considered [only] with regard to its [i.e., the nature’s] quiddity. Of those which belong to it, there is a universal and a particular (*fa-minhā kullī wa-minhā ḡuz’ī*) – and this characteristic property becomes attached to the universal on account of the fact that it is attached to the nature and that it is attached to the category [of substance] in such a manner that it [i.e., the ‘attachment’] is said with regard to some substances [only] which are specific and do not comprise the subjects of that which is specified.

[ed. Madkūr, p. 109, l. 18]

[§ 29] [*Refutation of the opinion that some accidents are receptive of contraries as well*] Someone could be of the following opinion:

«There are accidents which follow the same pattern [and which therefore admit of contraries as well]; this is because [*example 1*] a statement (*al-qawl*) can be true and can be false; and [*example 2*] an opinion (*aẓ-ẓann*) can be true and subsequently become false; and [*example 3*] the surface (*as-saṭḥ*) can be white and then become black.»

– This doubt (*ṣubḥa*) is clarified in the following way:

[*ad 1*] As for the statement, it does not remain exactly the same (*bi-ʿaynihī*) in relation to truth and falsehood. Thus, whichever of it is one in number is not receptive of truth and falsehood.

[ed. Madkūr, p. 110, l. 2]

[*ad 2*] As for the opinion, it does remain the same – and thus it is subject to this doubt.

[§ 30] [*The commonly known reply to this problem*] The commonly known reply (*al-ḡawāb al-maṣḥūr*) to this doubt comprises both [*ad 1*] the statement and [*ad 2*] the opinion. It runs as follows:

«As for the statement and the opinion, there is no change at all with regard to the state of each of these two; rather, the change from one state to another state is merely an accident which occurs to the thing which one talks about or the thing which one has an opinion about. The contraries succeed one another with regard to applying to that thing, not with regard to applying to the statement and the opinion.»

[§ 31] [*Ibn Sīnā's critique of the commonly known reply to this problem*] This reply, stated in this manner, however, does not hit the target (*ḡayr sadīd*). For from the fact that the thing [which someone has an opinion about] is transformed (*yastahīlu*) it does not necessarily follow that the opinion is not transformed. For the thing is transformed in a manner which necessitates a transformation in the opinion, namely in the case in which the thing is transformed with regard to the fact that it is existent and in which the opinion that it is existent has been true [prior to the thing's transformation]; for as soon as (*iḏā*)<sup>583</sup> it has become non-existent, while the opinion about its existence remains unchanged, the opinion has been transformed as well, inasmuch as this unchanged opinion about it [i.e., about the existence of the thing] has become false, whereas prior to that it had been true. Therefore, this solution [i.e., the commonly known reply]

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583 [110.9] Read with MSS LB3, OP4, SA (not in app.), along with MSS D, AE, M, N (in app.), *fa-iḏā* instead of *fa-iḏ* (EC). MSS Y (in app.) and LG4 have *fa-in*; al-Ḥilli has *wa-in*.

merely affirms another transformation – and does not offer anything to negate the first transformation. This is because it affirms of the thing [which someone has an opinion about] a transformation with regard to its existence and non-existence. But what we had been talking about concerned the transformation of truth and falsehood.

[§ 32] It is known that on account of the fact that the opinion is true there is a notion [of being true] in the opinion (*anna li-kawni ḡanni ṣādiqan maʿnan fī ḡ-zann*), even if it [i.e., the notion] is relational (*iḡāfiyyan*). This notion [of being true] had disappeared – not from the thing [which someone has an opinion about] alone but from the opinion (*wa-hādā l-maʿnā qad zāla lā ʿani l-amri waḡdahū bal ʿani ḡ-zann*). For this characterization (*waṣf*) [i.e., this notion], namely ‘that it is true’ (*annahū ṣādiqun*), i.e., that it is in accordance with existence (*muṡābiqun li-l-wuḡūd*), applies to the opinion, not to the thing. And if it disappeared, it disappeared precisely from that which it was in.

[§ 33] Not every characterization (*waṣf*) which changes in accordance with the thing (*yataḡayyaru ʿalā ṣ-ṣayʿ*), needs to be established and fixed (*mu-taḡarriran ṡābitan*). Rather, the relatum (*al-muḡāf*) also belongs to the group of the characterizations and accidents which are attached to the things (*min ḡumlati l-awṣāfi wa-l-aʿrāḡi llati talḡaqu l-aṣyāʿ*), as they [i.e., these other scholars] acknowledged. Nothing precludes that the change of one thing is the cause for the change of another thing, just like in the case of the sun’s setting and absence: For this is the cause for the change of the state of the earth and the air; and each thing changes in itself. From the fact that the thing [which someone has an opinion about] had been transformed it does not necessarily follow that the opinion had not been transformed by way of another transformation which is a consequence of the transformation of the thing [which someone has an opinion about].

[§ 34] [*Ibn Sīnā’s reformulation of the relation between ‘being receptive of contraries’ and ‘changing in itself’*] However, if one says “substances are receptive of contraries on account of the fact that they are transformed in themselves with regard to non-relational notions and by way of a primary transformation (*inna l-ḡawāhir taḡbalu l-aḡḡāda bi-an taṡaḡila fī anḡusihā fī maʿānin ḡayri muḡāḡatin istaḡālatan awwaliyyatan*), i.e., a transformation which is not merely the consequence of the transformation of another thing in the manner of the relatum” – this attribute (*ṣifa*) does not apply to the opinion (*ḡann*) and thus the doubt has been resolved (*wa-inḡallat*<sup>584</sup> *aṣ-ṣubḡa*).

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584 [111.4] Read with MSS OP4, SA (not in app.) *inḡallat* instead of *inḡallat* (EC).



[ed. Madkūr, p. 111, l. 5]

[§ 35] [ad 3] As for the surface, it is also not transformed by way of a change which occurs to it in itself but due to the fact such a change occurs to its subject.

If we studied the matter thoroughly and if by our saying ‘by its change in itself (*bi-tağayyurihī fī nafsihī*)’ we meant that ‘on account its essence alone it is not in need of anything else in order to be a subject for contraries through which it changes in itself (*annahū mustağniyan bi-dātihī waḥdahū fī an yakūna mawḏū’an li-l-aḏḏādi yatağayyaru bihā bi-nafsihī*), in such manner that it does not need anything which constitutes it (*mā yuqīmuḥū*) and which accidentally occurs to it for the sake of that change (*wa-mā ya’riḏuhū li-dālika t-tağayyur*)’ – then [ad 3] the surface, [ad 2] the opinion, and [ad 1] the statement would all be excluded from sharing with it in this [characteristic property] in any regard whatsoever.

[ed. Madkūr, p. 111, l. 9]

[§ 36] [*Ibn Sīnā’s refutation of the argument that accidents are not receptive of contraries since they cannot function as the substrates of other accidents*] As for the following discussion:

«The accidents by themselves do not function as the substrates of [other] accidents (*lā taḥmilu l-a’rād*); and from them [i.e., the accidents] no [other] accidents will disappear by being succeeded by [other] relational and fixed accidents by way of a primary removal and by way of a primary accidental occurrence which would apply to the substance through its intermediation.»

– This is something of which I do not think that someone who has good judgment (*al-munṣif*) would be committed to it. Although the substance is the cause for the existence of the accident, this does not necessarily preclude the possibility that there are properties (*umūr*) which occur to, accompany and are attached to the accident in a primary manner (*ta’riḏu li-l-‘araḏi wa-talzamuhū wa-talḥaquhū luḥūqan awwalan*) – and that only subsequently they are attached to the substance through its [i.e., the accident’s] intermediation (*wa-tumma talḥaqu l-ḡawhara bi-tawassuṭihā*), even if the attachment [i.e., the ‘secondary accident’] exists simultaneously with it [i.e., the ‘primary accident’] in the substance and is along with it [i.e., the ‘primary accident’] in need of it [i.e., the substance]. Likewise, nothing precludes it [i.e., the accident] from also having species and genera which are said of it.

You shall find the verification of this [issue] (*taḥqīq dālika*) in the sciences (*fī l-‘ulūm*) [and not in an introductory treatise such as the *Categories*].

[§ 37] [*Two points which support the claim that accidents by themselves do not undergo change (and thus are not receptive of contraries)*] Let us sum up two

points which support the claim that the accident is – on account of its essence alone and on account of a change in itself – not receptive of any contraries: Indeed, it is [1] either such that it changes with regard to something which is related to it (*fī amr muḍāf*), which is not a change in itself, i.e., [which is not a change] with regard to a fixed property in its essence (*fī hay'atin qārratin fī dātihī*); [2] or it changes on account of that which it is in. Generally speaking, the accident does not undergo a change which would be specific to it itself but it only undergoes a change [*ad* 1] on account of something which is related to it or [*ad* 2] as a consequence [of a change in its subject].



## SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION



As the present study has shown, Ibn Sīnā's *K. al-Maqūlāt* of the *Šifā'* marks a decisive turning point in the Arabic-Islamic reception of Aristotle's *Categories*. The preceding Greek and Arabic commentary tradition, by and large, had followed the old Porphyrian paradigm of reading the *Categories* – both on epistemological and pedagogical grounds – as an introductory treatise of logic which allows the student to become acquainted with simple linguistic expressions inasmuch as they signify extra-linguistic entities. However, as Ibn Sīnā advocates a fundamental reform of the transmitted Aristotelian curriculum and, particularly, a specification of the subject-matter of logic, the *Categories* ultimately forfeits its *raison d'être* within the *Organon*.

The starting point of my investigation has been a question which runs through the entire commentary tradition: Are the classificatory notions introduced in the treatise intended to categorize linguistic, physical or mental entities or do they, in one way or another, comprise all three levels? This is the question about the aim or scope of the *Categories* (see chapter 1). In the classical commentary tradition two answers had turned out to be particularly influential: Whereas Porphyry had taken the categories to be “simple significant expressions inasmuch as they signify things,” Ammonius had characterized them as “expressions which signify things through mediating concepts.” In any case, they are regarded as being relevant for logic on pedagogical grounds: Before the student of logic learns how to form and use *compound* expressions in an epistemologically reliable manner, he needs to become acquainted with *simple* expressions; and since an introduction to logic may not resort to previous philosophical knowledge, the simple expressions discussed in the *Categories* remain limited to things which are accessible through sense-perception. Ibn Sīnā deems this justification strategy to be of little value. What is more, as the present study has shown there is a growing tendency in Ibn Sīnā's works to identify conceptual deficiencies in the traditional structure of the *Organon*. As Ibn Sīnā ultimately overcomes that structure, both the Porphyrian and the Ammonian formulae are deprived of their original function.

By taking a closer look at key passages from *al-Muḥtaṣar al-awsaṭ fī l-manṭiq*, *K. aš-Šifā'* and *al-Išārāt wa-t-tanbīhāt*, we have encountered a gradual development in Ibn Sīnā's critical appropriation of Aristotle's *Categories*. In his first treatise on the *Categories*, i.e., the *K. al-Maqūlāt* of the *Muḥtaṣar*, Ibn Sīnā does not voice any principled objection to including an account of Aristotle's ten *summa genera* in the logic curriculum. However, as the introductory chapter in

the *Madḥal* part of the *Muḥtaṣar* shows, already at this early stage Ibn Sīnā highlights “conceptualization” (*taṣawwur*) and “acknowledgment of truth” (*taṣdīq*) as the two major themes of logic. He characterizes logic as a discipline which is chiefly devoted to the study of *mental* (rather than physical or linguistic) entities inasmuch as these are epistemologically fruitful, i.e., inasmuch as they enable us to proceed from what is known to what is unknown. Subsequently, in the *K. aš-Šifāʾ* these mental entities are labelled as “secondary intelligibles” and are elevated to the proper subject-matter of logic. In contrast to a view held by al-Fārābī, in the *Madḥal* of the *Šifāʾ* Ibn Sīnā explicitly rejects the idea that “expressions inasmuch as they signify meanings (*maʿānī*)” may genuinely pertain to the subject-matter of logic. To Ibn Sīnā’s mind, there can be no doubt that primary intelligibles and their corresponding entities in the physical world fall outside the scope of logic.

Against this background, Ibn Sīnā in the *K. al-Maqūlāt* of the *Šifāʾ* then expounds his fundamental critique of the transmitted curriculum. Whereas in the context of predication the question of whether an expression applies essentially or accidentally is, indeed, of importance, the question of whether that which is signified by the expression is a substance *per se* or an accident *per se* transgresses the limits of what a logician needs to reflect. That is to say, a logician has to become acquainted with the relations that are classified by the scheme of predicables, not with the essences classified by the scheme of categories. Therefore, in Ibn Sīnā’s reformed logic curriculum the function that had traditionally been ascribed to the *Categories*, i.e., a study of simple expressions needed for the sake of logical compositions, is completely fulfilled by the *Isagoge*. Since Ibn Sīnā deems a proleptic and unnecessary exposure to ontological classification schemes not only useless but even harmful, he ultimately argues for an exclusion of the *Categories* from the logic curriculum.

Nonetheless, in the *K. aš-Šifāʾ* we see Ibn Sīnā make a significant contribution to studying and commenting on the *Categories* within a logical context. However, this need not be a performative contradiction. Rather, the entire *K. al-Maqūlāt* of the *Šifāʾ* may be read as an attempt at illustrating the many *aporiai* which have resulted from (what Ibn Sīnā deems to be) a wrong-headed exegetical treatment of this treatise. Thus, after a thorough discussion of virtually all issues pertaining to the *Categories* and its commentary tradition, Ibn Sīnā concludes the *K. al-Maqūlāt* of the *Šifāʾ* with a rather pessimistic remark: “Let us content ourselves with what we have said about the *Categories*; for anything we would add to this would be superfluous – and it is not unlikely that the extent to which have treated it is also superfluous.”<sup>585</sup>

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585 Ibn Sīnā, *K. aš-Šifāʾ*, *al-Mantiq*, *al-Maqūlāt*, VII,4, p. 273, ll. 15–16.

Whereas in the *Šifā'* Ibn Sīnā lays the conceptual groundwork for an exclusion of the *Categories*, this program will subsequently be put into practice – most prominently and most forcefully in the logic of *al-Iṣārāt wa-t-tanbihāt*. There, the *Categories* are only briefly alluded to: Just like a logician need not know the number and the quiddities of the intermediate genera and species or of the lowest species, a thorough investigation of the *summa genera* is irrelevant to him as well. Instead, he should content himself with knowing quite generally that there are highest genera without, however, knowing how many there are and which essential features they have.

As we have seen, already at an early stage of his reception of the *Categories* and its exegetical history two core issues spark Ibn Sīnā's criticism: the fourfold division of predicative relations expounded in *Cat.* 2 and the tenfold division of *summa genera* introduced in *Cat.* 4. Even though in the *Muḥtaṣar* Ibn Sīnā is much more faithful to the transmitted school tradition than in his later works, the *Muḥtaṣar* provides some first hints at his emerging skepticism towards the philosophical soundness of the doctrines connected to these two chapters.

With regard to the predicative relations introduced in *Cat.* 2, i.e., “being said of a subject” and “being in a subject,” the *Muḥtaṣar* already points to the following difficulties: The expression “subject” (*mawḍūʿ*) is used homonymously in these two formulae and the ontological classification derived from them is hard to reconcile with Aristotle's hylemorphism (see chapter 2). In response to these problems, the *Muḥtaṣar* introduces the relations of “being an attribute” and “having an attribute” as more adequate characterizations of two basic types of predication. This terminological clarification is indicative of Ibn Sīnā's uneasiness towards the merging of linguistic and ontological classification schemes. Subsequently, in the *Maqūlāt* of the *Šifā'* Ibn Sīnā's critical attitude will give rise to a more rigorous distinction between the predicative notions of being “accidental” (*ʿaraḍī*) and being “essential” (*dātī*), on the one hand, and the ontological notions of being an “accident” (*ʿaraḍ*) and being a “substance” (*ḡawhar*), on the other hand. Whereas in the dominant interpretation of the fourfold classification scheme of *Cat.* 2 these two strands are inextricably interwoven, Ibn Sīnā's alternative classification scheme aims at an unambiguous differentiation between essential and accidental predications. He sketches a division of the relations which can hold between any given attribute (*ṣifa*) and any given entity characterized by an attribute (*mawṣūf*). The scheme captures whether an attribute is intrinsic or extrinsic to the *mawṣūf*, that is to say, whether or not it pertains to it essentially. The fivefold classification Ibn Sīnā expounds in chapter I,3 of the *Maqūlāt* of the *Šifā'* marks the departure from an exegetical tradition which had justified the Aristotelian fourfold scheme as an attempt at achieving a fundamental division of beings by means of predicative relations. As a *logical* classifi-



cation Ibn Sīnā deems the division into universal substances, particular substances, universal accidents and particulars accidents to be useless; for the division between substance and accident can only be obtained in metaphysics. But even as an *ontological* classification the fourfold scheme is problematic, not least because it does not allow for a satisfactory integration of Aristotle's hylemorphic conception of beings. Ibn Sīnā's criticism of *Cat. 2* is closely connected to his exclusion of the treatise from the logic curriculum: Since the two predicative relations of accidentality and essentiality can fully be comprehended without prior knowledge of what it means to be a substance *per se* or what it means to be a certain type of accident *per se*, the largest part of Aristotle's *Categories* ceases to be relevant in the context of logic.

As for the tenfold classification introduced in *Cat. 4*, Ibn Sīnā mainly takes issue with later exegetical developments (see chapter 3). Since Aristotle sketches his list of ten *summa genera* only briefly without giving any explanation as to why and how he originally arrived at it, he left a gap which many commentators were glad to fill. Already in the *Muḥtaṣar* Ibn Sīnā unambiguously rejects any attempts at establishing the conceptual necessity or ontological exhaustiveness of the list. As the present study has revealed, in the *Maqūlāt* of the *Šifā'* Ibn Sīnā picks up this thread by offering an elaborate reassessment of the Themistian justification of Aristotle's list of *summa genera*. In doing so, he also resorts to justification efforts that can be traced back both to Ammonius and Simplicius. Moreover, in the *Metaphysics* of his Persian summa *Dānešnāme* and in a parallel passage from the *Ta'liqāt* he presents a schematization of the nine accidental genera which is largely based on a division outlined by Ammonius. However, as Ibn Sīnā has to admit, neither the historic models nor his own attempts at devising a cogent systematization of the categories can meet the criteria of a sound scientific argument. Thus, Aristotle's scheme may at best offer some pre-scientific orientation.

Notwithstanding the fact that Ibn Sīnā ultimately excluded the treatise from the logic curriculum, Aristotle's *Categories* was to remain a pivotal text for later generations of Muslim philosophers – especially through the lens of the *Maqūlāt* of the *Šifā'*. As we have seen, a particularly elaborate and creative treatment of the *Categories* – under the new paradigm of post-Avicennian Aristotelianism – can be traced throughout the oeuvre of Faḥr ad-Dīn ar-Rāzī. In his reception of the *Categories*, ar-Rāzī, to a certain degree, turns out to be a faithful disciple of Ibn Sīnā: He adopts the dismissive stance towards previous attempts at vindicating the inclusion of the *Categories* in the *Organon*, strictly rejects the blending of logical and ontological classification schemes, and advocates the view that there cannot be a sound deductive justification of the traditional scheme of *summa genera*. At the same time, however, ar-Rāzī not only embraces Ibn Sīnā's critical

approach to the transmitted philosophical curriculum but also extends this attitude to his reading of the Avicennian oeuvre itself. In a nutshell, Faḥr ad-Dīn ar-Rāzī criticizes both the older Aristotelian and the emerging Avicennian traditions for violating their high epistemological standards which he himself gladly adheres to. With regard to his reading of the *Categories*, a prominent instance of his departure from a basic Aristotelian and Avicennian conviction can be seen in his refutation of the generic predicability of substance (see chapter 4). Yet, notwithstanding his principled critique of some doctrinal and methodological shortcomings connected to the *Categories*, Faḥr ad-Dīn ar-Rāzī is quite pragmatic in his own use of the transmitted scheme of *summa genera*. While the ten categories may help us structure a philosophical treatise on everything that exists besides God, they remain a useful but unprovable working model. As a matter of fact, while ar-Rāzī demands strict rational scrutiny in our reflections on God's creation, he ultimately deems man's intellectual capability inadequate for arriving at a full classification of things in the world. In this regard, Faḥr ad-Dīn ar-Rāzī's thinking combines the ideal of demonstrative science with a religiously informed epistemological modesty.



# APPENDICES



## 1. Table of Contents of the *K. al-Maqūlāt* of the *Šifā'*

<i>maqāla</i> , <i>faṣl</i>	chapter heading	page range in the Cairo ed. [tr. in in the present work]	corresponding chapter in the <i>Categories</i>
I,1	The scope ( <i>ğaraḍ</i> ) of the <i>Categories</i>	3–8 [1.B.a, pp. 41–48]	---
I,2	The expressions which coincide [in name but not in meaning, i.e., <i>homonyma</i> ]; those which concur [in meaning, i.e., <i>synonyma</i> ]; those which differ [both in name and meaning, i.e., <i>heteronyma</i> ]; those which are derived [i.e., <i>paronyma</i> ]; and whatever is like these	9–17	<i>Cat. 1</i>
I,3	Elucidating the meaning of that which is said <i>of</i> a subject or which is not said [ <i>of</i> a subject] and of that which exists <i>in</i> a subject or does not exist [ <i>in</i> a subject]	18–27 [2.B.b, pp. 126–139]	<i>Cat. 2</i>
I,4	Explanation of the definition of accident, namely it is 'existing <i>in</i> a subject' ( <i>mawğūd fī mawdūʿ</i> )	28–38 [4.B.a, pp. 238–252]	<i>Cat. 2</i>
I,5	The pairings which occur between 'being said <i>of</i> ' ( <i>qawl ʿalā</i> ) and 'existing <i>in</i> ' ( <i>wuğūd fī</i> ) and the question of what [kind of conclusion] they yield	38–45	<i>Cat. 3</i>
I,6	A refutation ( <i>ifsād</i> ) of whoever says 'one and the same thing is an accident and a substance under two [different] regards'	45–51	---
II,1	The manner in which the genera relate to their dividing ( <i>muqassima</i> ) and constitutive ( <i>muqawwima</i> ) differentiae; an instruction on these ten <i>summa genera</i> ; the manner in which	55–62	<i>Cat. 4</i>

	'the existent' is divided into them; and the beginning of the account on [the claim] that they are ten which do not fall under a [common] genus, which do not overlap, and outside of which there is no [additional] genus		
II,2	Accident is not a genus for the nine [accidental categories]; a critical review ( <i>ta'aaqub</i> ) of what has been said about this	63–66 [4.B.b, pp. 253–258]	---
II,3	A critical review of the statements of those who deem it necessary for them [i.e., the categories] to be reduced [in number] or to overlap	66–69	---
II,4	An outline of things ( <i>umūr</i> ) which were erroneously believed to comprise some of the ten [categories] as a genus ( <i>'umūm al-ġins</i> ) or to be extrinsic to the ten [categories]; and a completion ( <i>tatmīm</i> ) of the account on this [issue]	70–81	---
II,5	Making known ( <i>ta'rif</i> ) the state of the number of the categories	82–88 [3.B.b, pp. 191–200]	---
III,1	The primary, secondary and tertiary substances; and in general, the state of the gradations between universal and particular substances with regard to substantiality [SUBSTANCE 1]	91–95 [4.B.d, pp. 261–267]	<i>Cat. 5</i>
III,2	The primary, secondary and tertiary substances [SUBSTANCE 2]	95–102 [4.B.d, pp. 267–277]	<i>Cat. 5</i>
III,3	The descriptions and characteristics of substance [SUBSTANCE 3]	102–111 [4.B.d, pp. 278–293]	<i>Cat. 5</i>
III,4	Beginning of the account on quantity ( <i>al-kammiyya</i> ) [QUANTITY 1]	112–124	<i>Cat. 6</i>
IV,1	An elucidation ( <i>bayān</i> ) of the other division of the quantum ( <i>al-kamm</i> ) and an elucidation of the quantum <i>per accidens</i> ( <i>al-kamm bi-l-'araḍ</i> ) [QUANTITY 2]	127–134	<i>Cat. 6</i>

IV,2	The characteristics of the quantum [QUANTITY 3]	134–143	Cat. 6
IV,3	Beginning of the account on the relatum ( <i>al-mudāf</i> ); making known ( <i>taʿrīf</i> ) its earlier definition; an explanation ( <i>ṣarḥ</i> ) of that definition; and a comprehensive pointer to the divisions of the relatum [RELATUM 1]	143–150	Cat. 7
IV,4	The characteristics of the relatum [RELATUM 2]	150–155	Cat. 7
IV,5	A verification ( <i>taḥqīq</i> ) of the relatum which is the category ( <i>al-mudāf alladī huwa al-maḳūla</i> ); the difference between that which is a relatum <i>per se</i> ( <i>mudāf bi-d-dāt</i> ) and that to which relatedness ( <i>iḍāfa</i> ) applies only accidentally or concomitantly ( <i>ʿarīḍ laḥū aw lāzim</i> ); and the characteristics of the relatum which is the category [RELATUM 3]	155–164	Cat. 7
V,1	Making known ( <i>taʿrīf</i> ) the quality ( <i>al-kayfiyya</i> ) and its first divisions [QUALITY 1]	167–173	Cat. 8
V,2	Critical review of the aspects by which some people divided the quality into its four species [QUALITY 2]	174–180	Cat. 8
V,3	Making known the true nature ( <i>ḥaqīqa</i> ) of two species of quality, namely [ <i>1<sup>st</sup> species</i> ] condition ( <i>al-ḥāl</i> ) and possession/habitus ( <i>al-malaka</i> ); and [ <i>2<sup>nd</sup> species</i> ] capacity and incapacity ( <i>al-quwwa wa-l-lā-quwwa</i> ) [QUALITY 3]	181–185	Cat. 8
V,4	Outline of the <i>aporiai</i> ( <i>ṣukūk</i> ) concerning the species which is related to capacity and incapacity [QUALITY 4]	186–191	Cat. 8
V,5	[ <i>3<sup>rd</sup> species</i> ] The affective qualities and the affections [QUALITY 5]	191–196	Cat. 8
V,6	Solution of the remaining <i>aporiai</i> [QUALITY 6]	197–201	Cat. 8



VI,1	[4 <sup>th</sup> species of quality] Outline of the species of the fourth genus of quality [= investigations 1–3] [QUALITY 7]	205–212	Cat. 8
VI,2	[investigation 4] Making known ( <i>taʿrīf</i> ) the state of the angle ( <i>zāwiya</i> ) and in which manner it pertains to quantity or quality or position or to something else; [investigation 5] making known the state of the external form ( <i>hilqa</i> ) and in which manner it is one species – notwithstanding the composition which is in it; [investigation 6] and the remaining <i>aporiai</i> concerning this genus from among the four genera [of quality] [QUALITY 8]	213–218	Cat. 8
VI,3	Making known ( <i>taʿrīf</i> ) the difference between a quality and between that which possesses a quality; and [making known] the states which hold between these two; and the accidents and the characteristics of quality [QUALITY 9]	218–222	Cat. 8
VI,4	Solution of the <i>aporia</i> which concerns the overlap of some species of the quale and other things with some species of the relatum [QUALITY 10]	223–228	Cat. 8
VI,5	WHERE and WHEN	228–233	Cat. 9
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VII,1	Those which are opposed to one another ( <i>al-mutaqābilāt</i> ) [OPPOSITES 1]	241–249	Cat. 10
VII,2	The <i>aporiai</i> ( <i>šukūk</i> ) which concern what had been said about opposition ( <i>taqābul</i> ) [OPPOSITES 2]	249–259	Cat. 10
VII,3	Asserting ( <i>taʿbīr</i> ) the qualifications ( <i>aḥkām</i> ) and characteristics ( <i>ḥawāṣṣ</i> ) of those which are contrary to one another ( <i>al-mutaqāddāt</i> ) [OPPOSITES 3]	260–265	Cat. 11
VII,4	Priority and posteriority	265–273	Cat. 12

## 2. List of Manuscripts of the *Maqūlāt* of the *Šifā'* Consulted for this Study

In reading the *Maqūlāt* of the *Šifā'* I soon came to realize that the printed Cairo edition (EC) is far from reliable. Apart from the fact that the editors do not bother to provide any justification for their selection of MSS, even a superficial look at some of the MSS used for that edition quickly reveals that the printed text does not provide us with a reliable access to the text transmitted in these MSS – not to mention the numerous misprints. Unfortunately, the preparation of a critical edition of the *Maqūlāt* of the *Šifā'* could not be undertaken as part of the present study and remains a desideratum for future research. Nonetheless, I deem it necessary to lay open the source material that was available to me in studying and translating selected chapters of the *Maqūlāt* of the *Šifā'* (i.e., especially I,1; I,3–4; II,2; II,5; III,1–3). In the focus of my attention were the two oldest witnesses I could spot, that is, MS London British Library OR 113 from the end of the 6<sup>th</sup> century *hiğrī* and MSS Oxford Pococke 123/124 from the beginning of the 7<sup>th</sup> century *hiğrī* (I would like to express my deep gratitude to Amos Bertolacci for having made the two Pococke MSS available to me). In addition to that, I also consulted some later Iranian MSS and three indirect witnesses, namely the paraphrase by Ibn Sīnā's alleged grand-disciple Abū l-'Abbās al-Lawkarī (d. ca. 517 AH / 1123 AD), and the commentaries by al-'Allāma al-Ḥillī (d. 726 AH / 1325 AD) and al-Fāḍil al-Hindī (d. 1134 AH / 1722 AD).

In preparing my list of MSS I have – aside from the hints given in the MSS themselves – greatly benefitted from an unpublished list of the MSS of the *Šifā'* which the late David Reisman kindly made available to the participants of the international colloquium “The Manuscript Tradition of Avicenna's *Kitāb al-Shifā'*: The Current State of Research and Future Prospects” (Pisa, Scuola Normale Superiore, 22 – 24 September 2010) and from Amos Bertolacci's groundbreaking research on the manuscripts of the *Ilāhiyyāt* of the *Šifā'* (see especially his “On the Manuscripts of the *Ilāhiyyāt* of Avicenna's *Kitāb al-Shifā'*,” In *Islamic Thought in the Middle Ages: Studies in Text, Transmission and Translation, in Honour of Hans Daiber*, ed. Anna Akasoy and Wim Raven (Leiden: Brill, 2008), pp. 59–75). Moreover, the bibliographies by Qanawātī (*Mu'allafāt Ibn Sīnā*, Cairo: Dār al-ma'ārif, 1950) and Mahdavi (*Fehrest-e nošehā-ye mošannafāt-e Ebn-e Sīnā*, Teheran: Entešārāt-e Dānešgāh-e Tehrān, 1954) as well as Madkūr's intro-

duction to the Cairo edition of the *Maqūlāt* provided some supplementary information.

### Direct Witnesses

Location, Collection Number	Siglum	Date	Additional remark
MS London British Library OR 113 (=British Museum 1655)	LB3	576 AH (1180–1181 AD). To my knowledge, this is the oldest extant witness containing the entire <i>K. al-Maqūlāt</i> of the <i>Šifā'</i> (under the assumption that MS Cairo Dār al-Kutub Taymūr 140 does not include the <i>Maqūlāt</i> ).	The MS contains the complete <i>Maqūlāt</i> . Since the logic part ends with the <i>fann</i> on <i>Ši'r</i> Cureton/Rieu ( <i>Catalogus codicum manuseriptorum orientalium qui in Museo Britannico asservantur, pars secunda, codices arabicos amplectens</i> , London 1871, p. 745) did not notice how much was missing in the other parts (even though the increasing discrepancy between the oriental and the occidental foliation could have served as a hint). The <i>Burhān</i> part breaks off in the midst of ch. 3 of <i>maqāla</i> 3; <i>Ġadal</i> , <i>Safsafa</i> , <i>Hiṭāba</i> are incomplete as well.
MS Oxford Pococke 124	OP4	Probably the same as MS Pococke 123.	Contains the following parts of the <i>Maqūlāt</i> : <i>maqāla</i> 2, <i>faṣl</i> 3 to the end; <i>maqāla</i> 3, 4, 5; <i>maqāla</i> 6, <i>faṣl</i> 1.
MS Oxford Pococke 123	OP3	602 AH (1205 AD).	Contains the following parts of the <i>Maqūlāt</i> : <i>maqāla</i> 6, <i>faṣl</i> 2 to the end; <i>maqāla</i> 7 (+ <i>al-Ṭbāra</i> ).
MS Istanbul Yeni Cami 772 <i>used for EC</i>	Y (EC: <i>yāʿ</i> )	628 AH (1230–1231 AD).	The MS contains the complete <i>Maqūlāt</i> .

MS Istanbul Nuruosmaniye 2710	IN1	666 AH (1267–1268 AD). According to the colophon (fol. 339a), the scribe began with the transcription on 25 <i>Rabīʿ al-Awwal</i> 666 (25/3/666 AH = 13 December 1267 AD) and finished it seven months later on 25 <i>Šawwāl</i> 666 (25/10/666 AH = 8 July 1268 AD).	The MS contains the complete <i>Maqūlāt</i> .
MS Istanbul Ayasofya 2442	IA2	671–674 AH (1272–1276 AD). According to a note on fol. 1a, the “writing of this book” began in the year 671 and came to an end in the year 674.	The MS contains the <i>Maqūlāt</i> only partially: At the beginning of chapter III,3 the text abruptly breaks off (= EC, p. 103, l. 8: <i>id hiya aydan ġawāhir ...</i> ) – and is resumed in the middle of a sentence from chapter III,4 (= EC, p. 117, l. 18: ... <i>al-iḏāfi wa-kaṭīran mā</i> ). Besides that, a significant part of the <i>Madḥal</i> (corresponding to 16 pages of EC) is missing; on fol. 4a, l. 36, the scribe breaks off in the midst of chapter I,5 (ending with ... <i>bal naʿūdu ilayhi tāniyan</i> = EC, p. 28, l. 12); after a separating sign (i.e., a circled dot), on top of which the number ‘47’ has been written in red ink, he jumps (on the same folio in the same line) to the middle of chapter I,8 (beginning, in the midst of a sentence, with <i>al-ištirāk fi d-dātiyya ...</i> = EC, p. 45, l. 2).
MS Istanbul Aşir Efendi 207 <i>used for EC</i>	AE (EC: ‘ayn)	680 AH (1281–1282 AD)	The MS contains the complete <i>Maqūlāt</i> .
MS Istanbul Carullah 1424	IC4	693 AH (1293–1294 AD). According to the colophon on fol. 467b, the scribe finished his work in the year 693.	The MS contains the complete <i>Maqūlāt</i> .

MS Istanbul Damad İbrahim 823	ID3	697 AH (1297–1298 AD). According to the colophon on fol. 558a, the scribe finished his work in the year 697.	The MS contains the complete <i>Maqūlāt</i> .
MS Cairo Azhar Baḥīt 331 <i>used for EC</i>	B (EC: <i>bāʿ</i> )	7 <sup>th</sup> c. AH (13 <sup>th</sup> c. AD)	The MS contains the complete <i>Maqūlāt</i> .
MS Istanbul Damad İbrahim Paşa 822 <i>used for EC</i>	SA (EC: <i>sīn-alif</i> )	8 <sup>th</sup> c. AH (14 <sup>th</sup> c. AD)	The MS contains the complete <i>Maqūlāt</i> .
MS Istanbul Damad İbrahim Paşa 824 <i>used for EC</i>	S (EC: <i>sīn</i> )	834 AH (1430–1431 AD)	The MS contains the complete <i>Maqūlāt</i> .
MS Teheran Mağles-e Šūrā-ye Melli 1895	TM5	994–995 AH (1586–1587 AD)	The MS contains the complete <i>Maqūlāt</i> .
MS Istanbul Nuruosmaniye 2708 <i>used for EC</i>	N (EC: <i>nūn</i> )	10 <sup>th</sup> c. AH (16 <sup>th</sup> c. AD)	The MS contains the complete <i>Maqūlāt</i> .
MS Teheran Dānešgāh Meškāt 243	TD3	1075 AH (1664 AD)	The MS contains the complete <i>Maqūlāt</i> .
MS Leiden Golius Or. 4	LG4	No date available. Witkam (p. 225) estimates it to be “considerably older than the 10/16 <sup>th</sup> century owner’s mark on the title-page.”	The MS contains the complete <i>Maqūlāt</i> . For additional information, see J. J. Witkam “Avicenna’s Copyists at Work: Codicological Features of the Two Leiden Manuscripts of the <i>Kitāb al-Shifāʾ</i> ,” <i>Oriens</i> 40 (2012): pp. 223–255.

## Indirect Witnesses

Location, Collection Number	Author, Title	Date	Additional remark
MS Teheran Ketābkhāne-ye Ehdā'ī be-Dānešgāh-e Tehrān Meškāt 250 [108], foll. 14a–26a	Abū l-‘Abbās al-Lawkarī, <i>Bayān al-ḥaqq bi-ḍimān aṣ-ṣīdq, al-Mantiq, al-Maqūlāt</i>	601 AH (1205 AD)	This is a paraphrase of the entire <i>Maqūlāt</i> of the <i>Šifā'</i> ; for the most part, it consists of a collection of literal quotations from the original work.
MS Dublin Chester Beatty 5151	Ḥasan b. Yūsuf b. Muṭahhar al-‘Allāma al-Ḥillī, <i>Kaṣf al-ḥafā' min K. aṣ-Šifā'</i>	729 AH (1329 AD)	This commentary on the <i>Maqūlāt</i> of the <i>Šifā'</i> runs up to the category of <i>idāfa</i> (i.e., up to the end of IV,5); it is doubtful whether the continuation of the commentary which is announced in the colophon has ever been written. Most likely, this MS is a <i>unicum</i> . For a short description of this work, see Sabine Schmidtke, <i>The Theology of al-‘Allāma al-Ḥillī (d. 726/1325)</i> (Berlin: Klaus Schwarz 1991), p. 58.
MS Teheran Mağles-e Šūrā-ye Mellī 1920, foll. 18b–48a	al-Fāḍil al-Hindī (Bahā' ad-Dīn M. b. Tāğ ad-Dīn Ḥasan b. M. al-Iṣfahānī), ‘ <i>Awn Iḥwān aṣ-Ṣafā'</i> ‘ <i>alā fahm K. aṣ-Šifā'</i>	1089 AH (1678 AD)	This work is probably identical with al-Fāḍil al-Hindī's <i>Talḥiṣ aṣ-Šifā'</i> ; cf. Henry Corbin, <i>La philosophie iranienne islamique aux XVIIe et XVIIIe siècles</i> (Paris: Buchet/Casel, 1981), p. 335.

## Sigla of the Manuscripts of the 1959 Cairo Edition of the *Maqūlāt*

Siglum in the apparatus of EC	Siglum in my notes	
Bāʾ	B	MS Cairo Azhar 331 [ <i>Bahīt</i> 331 <i>huṣūṣiyya</i> , 3415 <i>Bahīt bi-l-Azhar</i> ]
Bāʾ-Ḥāʾ	BḤ	glosses in MS Cairo Azhar 331
Dāl	D	MS Cairo Dār al-Kutub 894
Dāl-Alif	DA	MS Cairo Dār al-Kutub 262 ḥ
Sīn	S	MS Istanbul Süleymaniye Damat Ibrahim Paşa [ <i>Sulaymāniyya Dāmād</i> ] 824
Sīn-Alif	SA	MS Istanbul Süleymaniye Damat Ibrahim Paşa [ <i>Sulaymāniyya Dāmād</i> ] 822
ʿAyn	AE	MS Istanbul Āṣir Efendi [ʿĀṣir] 207 (in Süleymaniye)
ʿAyn-Alif	AL	MS Istanbul ʿAli Emiri [ʿAmīrī] 1504
Mīm	M	MS London British Museum [ <i>Maḥḥaf Briṭāni</i> ] 7500
Nūn	N	MS Istanbul Nuruosmaniye [ <i>Nūr ʿUṭmaniyya</i> ] 2708
Hāʾ	H	MS London, India Office [ <i>Maktab Hindi</i> ] 4752
Yāʾ	Y	MS Istanbul Yeni Cami [ <i>Ġāmiʿ</i> ] 772

## Additional Abbreviations in My Notes

m	<i>marginal annotation</i>
i	<i>interlinear gloss</i>
in app.	<i>a variant is mentioned in the apparatus of the Cairo edition</i>

### 3. The *Categories* in Ibn an-Nadīm's *al-Fihrist* and Ibn al-Qiftī's *Ta'riḥ al-ḥukamā'*

#### Ibn an-Nadīm, *al-Fihrist*

[ed. Flügel (F), vol. 1, p. 248; ed. Tağaddod (T), p. 309]

Account on the *Categories* (*qāṭiḡūriyās*), translated (*bi-naql*) by [1] Ḥunayn b. Ishāq.<sup>586</sup> Among those who explained it and commented on it (*šarahahū wa-fassarahū*) are [2] Porphyry; [3] Stephanus of Alexandria; [4] 'llyns,<sup>587</sup> [5] John the Grammarian [= John Philoponus], [6] Ammonius, [7] Themistius, [8] Theophrastus, [9] Simplicius; and a man known as [10] *Tāwun* [= *Theon*] in Syriac and Arabic (*wa-li-raḡulin yu'arafu bi-Tāwūn suryānī wa-'arabī*); and he adds [to that material] from Simplicius' commentary up to the [category of] relation.<sup>588</sup>

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586 It appears more likely that Ḥunayn b. Ishāq only authored the Syriac translation and a Themistian paraphrase (*K. Qāṭiḡūriyās 'alā ra'y Tāmistiyyūs*) of the *Categories* but not the Arabic translation (on the Themistian paraphrase, see above, pp. 153–154 and pp. 159–163). A comparison with the entry on *De Interpretatione* is instructive: “Ḥunayn translated it into Syriac and Ishāq into Arabic” (*naqala Ḥunayn ilā s-suryānī wa-Ishāq ilā l-'arabī*). The same mode of collaboration can also be assumed for the *Categories*. The annotated Baghdad 'edition' of the *Organon* (= MS Paris Bib. nat. ar. 2346) which al-Ḥasan b. Suwār composed on the basis of Yaḥyā b. 'Adī's autograph attributes the translation to Ishāq. See the colophon (printed in Bouyges' edition of Ibn Rušd's *Talḥiṣ K. al-Maqūlāt*, p. 122): “Aristotle's book which is called *Qāṭiḡūriyās*, i.e., those which are said (*al-maqūlāt*), has come to an end. Al-Ḥasan b. Suwār corrected it (*šahḥahahū*) on the basis of the autograph by Yaḥyā b. 'Adī (*min nuṣḥati Yaḥyā b. 'Adī llatī bi-ḥaṭṭihī*). This is the copy which he [i.e., Yaḥyā b. 'Adī] had collated with the autograph by the translator Ishāq (*allatī qābila bihā d-dustūra lladī bi-ḥaṭṭi Ishāqi n-nāqil*). And it has been collated with the autograph by 'Isā b. Ishāq b. Zur'a, which he had also copied from Yaḥyā b. 'Adī's exemplar which had been copied from the archetype (*dustūr al-aṣl*) which is the autograph by Ishāq b. Ḥunayn. And they concurred with one another” (my tr.). For a Latin translation of this colophon, see *Aristotelis Categoriae Graece cum Versione Arabica Isaaci Honeini Filii*, ed. Julius Zenker (Leipzig: Engelmann, 1846), pp. 3–4. In contrast to Zenker, August Müller deemed the account of the *Fihrist* to be more reliable than the information provided by MS Paris Bib. nat. ar. 2346; see his *Die griechischen Philosophen in der arabischen Überlieferung* (Halle: Verlag der Buchhandlung des Waisenhauses, 1873), pp. 49–50.

587 On 'llyns, see above, pp. 148–149, note 323.

588 I follow ed. F.: *wa-yuḏāfu min tafsiṛi Sinbliqūs ilā l-muḏāf* (rather than ed. T: *wa-yuṣābu min tafsiṛi Sinbliqūs ilā l-muḏāf*). I think that *ilā muḏāf* must be taken to mean “up to the chapter on the *relatum*,” i.e., “up to chapter 7”; this meaning of *ilā l-muḏāf* had not been



Among the remote commentaries (*min ġarīb at-tafāsīr*) is a fragment attributed (*yuḍāfu*) to [11] **Iamblichus** (*Amlīḥis*). The šayḥ Abū Zakariyyā' [Yaḥyā b. 'Adī] said: "It seems that this was falsely attributed (*manḥūlan*) to Iamblichus; for in multiple places of the treatise (*fī taḍā'ifi l-kalām*) I have seen [the expression] 'Alexander said.'" And the šayḥ Abū Sulaymān [as-Siġistānī al-Mantiqī (ca. 300/912 – ca. 374/985)] said that he had asked [12] **Abū Zakariyyā'** [Yaḥyā b. 'Adī] to translate this book with the commentary of [13] **Alexander of Aphrodisias**, about three hundred folia. Among those [Arabic philosophers] who interpreted the book are [14] **Abū Naṣr al-Fārābī** and [15] **Abū Bišr Mattā**. There are compendia (*muḥtaṣarāt*) and epitomai (*ġawāmi'*) of this book – both with and without tree diagrams (*mušaġġara wa-ġayr mušaġġara*) – by a group of scholars, among them [16] **Ibn al-Muqaffa'**, [17] **Ibn Bahrīz**, [18] **al-Kindī**, [19] **Iṣḥāq b. Ḥunayn**, [20] **Aḥmad b. aṭ-Ṭayyib**, [21] **[Abū Bakr] ar-Rāzī**.

### **Ibn al-Qiftī, *Ta'rīḥ al-ḥukamā'***

[ed. Lippert, p. 35]<sup>589</sup>

Account on the *Categories* and of those who translated and explained it (*wa-man naqalahū wa-šarahahū*). [1] **Ḥunayn b. Iṣḥāq** translated it from Greek into Arabic (*mina r-rūmiyyati ilā l-'arabiyya*). A number of Greeks and Arabs (*ġamā'atun min yūnān wa-mina l-'arab*) explained it and commented on it, among them [2] **Porphiry**, Greek (*yūnānī*); [3] **Stephanus of Alexandria**, Greek (*rūmī*); [4] *'Ilyns* Greek (*rūmī*); [5] **John the Grammarian** [= **John Philoponus**], the Patriarch of Alexandria; [6] **Ammonius**, Greek (*rūmī*); [7] **Themistius**, Greek (*rūmī*); [8] **Theophrastus**, Greek (*yūnānī*); [9] **Simplicius**, Greek (*yūnānī*); and a man known as [10] **Tāwun** [= *Theon*], Syriac and Arabic. Among the remote commentaries (*min ġarīb at-tafāsīr*) is a fragment by [11] **Iamblichus** (*Amlīḥis*). The šayḥ Abū Zakariyyā' Yaḥyā b. 'Adī said: "This must have been falsely attributed (*manḥūlan*) to Iamblichus; for in multiple places of the treatise (*fī taḍā'ifi l-kalām*) I have seen [the expression] 'Alexander said.'" I said: "This account (*kalām*) does not preclude [that this commentary had been written by Iamblichus]; for it might have been the case that some of the later [scholars] had added

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considered by the previous translators of this passage; see August Müller, *Die griechischen Philosophen in der arabischen Überlieferung*, p. 9: "ein teil aber der erklärung des SIMPLIKIOS wird einem andern beigelegt"; Francis Peters, *Aristoteles Arabus* (Leiden: Brill, 1968), p. 6: "Part of the interpretation of Simplicius is attributed to someone else"; Bayard Dodge, *The Fihrist of al-Nadīm* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1970), vol. 2, p. 598: "From the commentary of Simplicius there is an addition to the supplement."

589 Additions and significant differences as compared to Ibn an-Nadīm's earlier account are underlined.

the expression 'Alexander' to the other expression; this is not impossible." And the šayḥ Abū Sulaymān al-Mantiqī as-Siġistānī said: "Abū Zakariyyā' Yaḥyā b. 'Adī requested that this book be translated along with the commentary by the [12] Aphrodisian, i.e., Alexander,<sup>590</sup> about three hundred folia. Among the Muslim philosophers who interpreted the book are [13] Abū Naṣr al-Fārābī and [15] Abū Bišr Mattā. There are compendia (*muḥtaṣarāt*) and epitomai (*ġawāmi'*) of this book – both with and without tree diagrams (*mušaġġara wa-ġayr mušaġġara*) – by a group of scholars, among them [16] Ibn al-Muqaffa', [17] Ibn Bahrīz, [18] al-Kindī, [19] Iṣḥāq b. Ḥunayn, [20] Aḥmad b. aṭ-Ṭayyib, [21] [Abū Bakr] ar-Rāzī.

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590 Al-Qiftī's version – as opposed to the *Fihrist* – suggests the following more plausible account: Yaḥyā b. 'Adī had only commissioned the translation of the *Categories* along with Alexander's commentary and had not done the translation himself.



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