



THE POLITICS OF MULTILINGUALISM

Europeanisation, globalisation
and linguistic governance

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The Politics of Multilingualism

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Volume 6

The Politics of Multilingualism
Europeanisation, globalisation and linguistic governance
Edited by Peter A. Kraus and François Grin

The Politics of Multilingualism

Europeanisation, globalisation
and linguistic governance

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List of abbreviations

AIVD	<i>Algemene Inlichtingen en Veiligheidsdienst</i> (NL) (General Intelligence and Security Service)
ANC	African National Congress
ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations
AYCE	All-you-can-eat
B&B	Bilingualism and Biculturalism
BCR	Brussels-Capital Region
BE	Bantu Education
BSI	Brussels Studies Institute
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CIS	Commonwealth of Independent States
CJEU	Court of Justice of the European Union
CLB	Calvet Language Barometer
CSM	Code-switching and Code-mixing
DG	Directorate-General
EC	European Commission
ECB	European Central Bank
ECJ	European Court of Justice
EDI	Economic Development Index
EFA	Education For All
EGIDS	Expanded Graded Intergenerational Disruption Scale
ELF	English as a <i>Lingua Franca</i>
ELT	English Language Teaching
ENL	English as a Native Language
EU	European Union
FDI	Foreign Direct Investment
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
HDI	Human Development Index
HE	Higher Education
IMF	International Monetary Fund
ISO	International Organization for Standardization
IT	Information Technologies
L1	First Language
L2	Second Language
LFE	Lingua Franca English
LoL/T	Language of Learning/Teaching

LWC	Language of Wider Communication
MCA	Multiple Classification Analysis
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
NNS	Non-native Speaker
OCOL	Office of the Commissioner of Official Languages (CA)
OCSE	Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
OE	Open English
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OLA	Official Languages Act (CA)
PDR	People's Democratic Republic
PSD	<i>Partido Social Democrata</i> (P) (Social Democratic Party)
R&D	Research & Development
RP	Received Pronunciation
RPF	Rwandan Patriotic Front
RSFSR	Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic
SFSR	Soviet Federative Socialist Republic
SSGI	Social Services of General Economic Interest
TEU	Treaty of the European Union
TFEU	Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union
TOEFL	Test of English as a Foreign Language
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
UNCTAD	United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
USA/US	United States of America
USD	US Dollars
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
WSSE	World Standard Spoken English

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The politics of multilingualism

General introduction and overview

François Grin and Peter A. Kraus

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1. Diversity and multilingualism: A first approximation

The contributions to this book are connected to a larger research programme devoted to an assessment of the socio-political impact of complex diversity in Europe and Canada. In very general terms, the agenda of this programme consisted in investigating how the *simple* diversity of what we might call, from today's perspective, "traditional" industrial societies is giving place to a more *complex* diversity, in which a varying set of socio-economic, political, and cultural cleavages become intermingled in new and often challenging ways, in ways that entail a ubiquity of identity politics, from the mobilisation of minorities of all kinds to the rise of new populisms on the left and on the right (Tully, 2003).

At the level of identity-building, to call diversity "complex" does not solely imply pointing at constellations in which social cleavages and patterns of collective belonging overlap in shifting and intricate forms. Nor does it just mean that Western-type societies have become more diverse by incorporating new layers of cultural differentiation that reflect consecutive waves of immigration. The key point of the concept of complex diversity is to stress that the different layers of diversity which we tend to make out in our countries' given socio-cultural contexts – *i.e.*, typically, majorities, as well as "autochthonous" and "immigrant" minorities – are becoming increasingly permeable and heterogeneous with respect to their *internal* composition (Kraus, 2012: 10–11). Thus, for instance, to speak of a "German" national today does not tell us too much about her having or not having an "immigration background", her religious affiliation, as well as, for that matter, the linguistic repertoire she uses at home and at work.

When it comes to the effects which complex diversity is having in the realm of language, then, the logical point of departure is to look back and reappraise the critical role that the standardising of linguistic identities has played in the formation of the institutional flagship of high modernity that we have come to call the nation-state. If language has always been an indicator of major socio-cultural and

socio-political transformations, this indicative quality probably attained its first historical peak in the age of nationalism. At any rate, this is the obvious intellectual legacy that pioneers in the study of the interactions of language and nationalism, such as Benedict Anderson (2016), Karl W. Deutsch (1966), Joshua Fishman (1973), Ernest Gellner (1983) and Stein Rokkan (1999), have left us when it comes to confronting the linguistic dimensions of *modern* identities, as well as the modern dimensions of *linguistic* identities. With hindsight, and, in particular, in the context of European history, it seems hardly an exaggeration to argue that nation-building and linguistic standardisation were basically two sides of the same medal. When we look at the key issues at stake in the language politics of contemporary Western societies against this background, we detect a situation in which the legacies of the old persist and at the same time interact with the challenges of the new. To speak of the “legacies of the old” means, in the first place, addressing the enduring linguistic grievances connected with the making of the modern system of nation-states. Such grievances are mainly articulated by those groups that have become culturally and linguistically “minoritised” in the process of nation-state construction, such as the Welsh in Britain, the Basques and Catalans in Spain, the Sámi in Northern Europe and many others (May, 2012: 245–322). The “challenges of the new”, in contrast, involve the issue of how to deal with immigrant minorities and their languages: Should immigrant groups be entitled to linguistic rights in a similar way as “autochthonous” minorities, or should their original linguistic identity merely be seen as their private business once they have moved to their new host society? To what extent, if at all, should language tests assessing the proficiency which people have in the language of the receiving country be considered a requisite for immigrants to become citizens of that country (Beacco et al., 2017)? Such questions keep gaining weight due to the increased relevance of the transnational dimension in the life of migrant communities, a dimension that makes for ever more persistent ties between the sending and receiving societies (Vertovec, 2009; Kivisto & Faist, 2007). At the same time, the new politics of language are substantially marked by the emergence of integrated networks of large-scale communication, which frequently operate in English. In Europe, more specifically, the formation of a communicative space beyond national borders begs the question of the role of English as a European *lingua franca*.¹ After a long period in which political integration in the nation-state and the striving for the linguistic homogeneity of this nation-state could be considered to be almost interchangeable institutional objectives, the scenery of language politics seems to be in motion again, and we are experiencing a striking re-politicisation of language issues all over Europe and North America.

1. For opposing views on this topic, see Phillipson (2003), and Van Parijs (2011).

In a nutshell, this book contains the results of a first attempt at assessing the impact of complex diversity on the realm of language politics and policies, and at analysing how the legacies of the old interact with the challenges of the new in this realm. While an initial round of activities in the Research Networking Programme *Responding to Complex Diversity in Europe and Canada* (RECODE) focused on linguistic diversity in the context of nation-states,² the themes discussed in this volume mainly relate to the interplay of multilingualism, on the one hand, and the dynamics of transnationalism, globalisation and Europeanisation, on the other. One of the chief consequences of these dynamics is a substantial alteration of the functions of different languages and their position with respect to one another. Its effects are making themselves felt not only on a global scale and in regional arenas, but also on the national scale of state-level language policies, and at the local level of linguistic practices in multicultural neighbourhoods. This raises unprecedented challenges for contemporary societies, which have to engage ever more varied and pervasive manifestations of diversity. Meeting these societal challenges calls for the development of institutional responses which are in line with the new politics of language and multilingualism. Although there is an abundance of literature on multilingualism and diversity in the modern world (particularly in contemporary Europe), relatively little has been done towards elaborating an integrative view that identifies the key social and political dimensions at hand, and proposes a systematic approach to policy development on this basis. The purpose of this book is precisely to move in this direction, by charting some of this little-known terrain, emphasising the need to be simultaneously relevant at the international, national and local levels.

It is with this purpose that the contributions in this volume try to evaluate, on the one hand, the scope of the changes in the relationship between political and linguistic identities in Europe and North America, thereby offering a first evaluation of a “new” type of multilingualism that seems to be undermining the old links between (typically one) language and the nation-state. On the other hand, a second important set of questions revolves around the linguistic dimensions of transnational politics, and, in particular, around the issue of what an adequate and fair linguistic frame of transnational politics should look like. In this respect, contrasting Europe and Canada may offer some revealing insights. By comparison with many European cases, the homogenising character of the Canadian state, historically built on the basis of an arrangement between two distinct (French-speaking and English-speaking) linguistic communities, has been less accentuated. Over the last few decades, however, Europe has apparently been becoming a bit more

2. See the Working Papers No. 1–10 in the RECODE Online Working Paper Series. The papers can be downloaded from: http://www.recode.info/?page_id=50.

“Canadian” (Banting & Kymlicka, 2006). Even if they have in general been reluctant to adopt a “multicultural” approach officially, European democracies have undergone significant changes with regard to how the relationship between political and linguistic identities is institutionally framed and ultimately opened up to multilingual options.

We are well aware that the thematic area that we are dealing with here is a contested one and is in constant flux. Therefore, what we aim at, essentially, is to make an effective contribution to an ongoing conversation on the socio-political nature and management of multilingualism. At the same time, we understand that, in order to come to grips with this task in fruitful terms, our analytic endeavour has to take into account (at least) four major challenges, so that we come up with some diagnostic insights that may help us to grasp what is at stake in the field of the “new” multilingualism better:

- Contemporary approaches to multilingualism do not always display adequate awareness of the macro-level structural features that regulate the use of languages in culturally diverse settings. Language politics frequently seems to disappear in a universe of creative and quasi-spontaneous communicative interactions; the concomitant neglect of large-scale power structures, as well as of inequality of access to cultural resources in multilingual settings, often results in severely truncated accounts of multilingualism in socio-political context.
- In an unfortunate reciprocity, social scientists tackling linguistic diversity and multilingualism are often unfamiliar with important debates in language planning and sociolinguistics. Better awareness of what language is – and what languages are – can help them realise that language is not just an area of political regulation, but that language itself is a constitutive element of any political field. Thus, there can be no doubt that any political theory approach to issues of linguistic justice, for instance, will substantially benefit from an open-minded and consequent incorporation of concepts originating in the language disciplines (or frequently associated fields such as education), from traditional ones such as diglossic patterns of language use to more recent developments such as plural approaches to language learning.
- The challenge of assessing how the articulation of new linguistic identities may or may not be related to the unequal distribution of political power seems particularly relevant *vis-à-vis* the increasing use of English, including in varieties sometimes labelled as “global”, “European” or “Lingua Franca English” (not to be confused with “English as a *lingua franca*”, a very specific, and particularly problematic construct). Whereas, for some contributors to this volume, “straight-for-English” policies have a “linguistic” component, as they basically serve elite interests and not those of the mass of the population, other

contributors suggest that there may be a quasi-democratic potential in the appropriation of English and therefore advocate for transforming standard English into branches of regionalised dialects.

- Finally, and with regard to issues of linguistic governance articulated “from below”, it is obvious that mobility and transnationalisation entail challenges that can hardly be addressed in the context of the often dogmatic monolingualism associated with the period of expansion of national forms of rule, in which the dominant political tendency was to establish a tight bond between cultural standardisation and social integration. Rather, such challenges seem to require policy architectures that are as complex as the realities which they are supposed to tackle, thereby offering sophisticated institutional templates for linking “transnational” citizenship and multilingualism.

What, then, is the specific contribution that this book makes in order to address these challenges? *First*, we think that we offer a systematic, yet, at the same time, markedly interdisciplinary overview of our thematic area. Thus, the scholars represented in this volume cover a wide range of disciplines, including economics, geography, linguistics, philosophy, political science, and sociology. *Secondly*, and by way of consequence, we do not see language as an isolated variable, but as an element of a larger picture, the understanding of which requires an approach that productively combines the different perspectives of different disciplines without giving up its overarching analytic purpose. *Thirdly*, the approaches put to use in this book reflect a shared intention to develop a problem-oriented (and, ultimately, problem-solving) approach to the management of multilingualism. It is worth repeating that the main purpose of this volume is to contribute to an ongoing conversation. Accordingly, we hope that we have been able to open up some new paths, but are also well aware that there is still a long way to go towards a better understanding of multilingualism, the opportunities that it offers and the challenges that it poses.

2. The politics of multilingualism: Dealing with an object in constant flux

As mentioned above, this book refers to work carried out in the RECODE project. Many of the concerns that have come to the fore in the context of RECODE have found expression in the MIME³ project (2014–2018) under the 7th Framework Programme of the European Commission’s Directorate-General for Research and Innovation. Reciprocally, some of the work carried out in the MIME project has influenced the reflections proposed in the following chapters.

3. “Mobility and Inclusion in Multilingual Europe”; see www.mime-project.org.

Beyond the intellectual affinities between two projects, however, this book is but a step in a long-term enterprise in which the contributors to this collection are trying to come to terms with the complex web of processes that influence the nature and the role of linguistic diversity in contemporary societies. The chapters in the book reflect our shared awareness that this web of processes, and how we address them in research, is in a state of flux. This general observation applies to concepts and theories, to the terrain realities that these concepts and theories are supposed to help us come to grips with, and to the representations of these realities in the media and political discourse.

In order to characterise this book's contents and intentions appropriately, however, a little more needs to be said about the concerns to which we are responding, as well as the strategy adopted for this purpose. Clarifying these points will also serve to position the contributions in this volume with respect to a broader intellectual landscape.

There is fairly general agreement that linguistic diversity is a complex object, and that it cannot be adequately accounted for with a single discipline. However, this consensus often remains aspirational, and, when it comes to interdisciplinarity, practice typically lags behind intentions. This tendency is much in evidence in numerous edited volumes, handbooks and encyclopaedias about multilingualism or language policy, where a good measure of interdisciplinary balance could have been expected. However, most of these collections remain closely associated with one discipline or another.

This tendency can be observed both on the “language” and the “politics and policy” sides (for the former, see, for example, Spolsky, 2012; Tollefson & Pérez-Milans, 2018; Ortega & De Houwer, in press; Darquennes, Salmons & Vandenbussche, 2018; May & Hornberger, 2008; for the latter, see, for example, Kymlicka & Patten, 2003; Van Parijs, 2004; Castiglione & Longman, 2007). Of course, we should not think in terms of a binary opposition between “interdisciplinary” and “non-interdisciplinary”; rather, we are dealing with a continuum, and we find several examples of collections which, despite a main anchoring in one discipline or another, make ample space for contributions from other disciplines (for example, Arzoz, 2008; Fishman & García, 2010; Ginsburgh & Weber, 2016; Gazzola & Wickström, 2016; Gazzola, Templin & Wickström, 2018). A few edited volumes such as Ricento (2006), Berthoud, Grin & Lüdi (2013) or Hult & Cassels Johnson (2015) explicitly construct the object as an interdisciplinary one, allowing for more balance between disciplinary inputs. However, the extent of actual dialogue between contributions from different disciplines often remains incipient. Much work remains to be done in order to develop a genuinely interdisciplinary vision of multilingualism, along with institutional contexts that actively support this endeavour.

This book reflects the conviction that interdisciplinarity ought to be taken seriously, and that, when studying multilingualism, intellectual monoculture is perilous for several reasons. First, it allows scholars in one field of specialisation to ignore relevant concepts and methods developed elsewhere. Consequently, the literature contains numerous instances of “re-invention of the wheel”, and not infrequent examples of plain and simple mistakes. Second, and no less importantly, it exposes them to a serious risk of an endogamous groupthink, in which theoretically or empirically weak, or sometimes even flawed constructs go unchallenged.

The first problem, lack of familiarity with important concepts and theories in other disciplines, is particularly in evidence with respect to the core constructs needed to talk about multilingualism, politics and policy. For example, social scientists are often insufficiently aware of major debates in sociolinguistics. They sometimes content themselves with conceptions of language that fail to do justice to the complexity and fluidity of language, whether the latter is approached in terms of skills, practices, or representations. They are liable to adopt blanket definitions of constructs (including, obviously, multilingualism itself) that ignore the extreme variability of the ways in which individual social actors may experience it, depending on context or personal history. Social scientists usually know how to place specific elements of human experience in a consistent macro-level framework, and how to weigh the pros and cons of alternative language policies debated in the political arena (such debates being the stuff of the *politics* of multilingualism); however, they often need a finer-grained understanding of the complex manifestations of the very object of policy. In our case, the object is linguistic diversity. For this purpose, we need to develop social science approaches in which appropriate space and consideration can be given to the inputs and findings of the language disciplines.

Conversely, contributions emanating from the language disciplines often fail to take adequate precautions before venturing into other, “non-linguistic” areas when they attempt to relate language issues to their socio-economic context. Some contributions on multilingualism in the applied linguistics literature display a conspicuous lack of awareness of the macro-level structural features that regulate the use of language in culturally diverse settings. Frequent errors include, for example, confusion between two clearly interrelated, but nonetheless distinct, notions, namely, “politics” (roughly, the interplay, in the political arena, of conflicting interests and values) and “policy” (just as roughly, the set of measures adopted, downstream from a political debate, in order to implement the orientations adopted as an outcome of this interplay) (Scharpf, 1997). Likewise, misunderstanding of basic constructs in economic analysis is not uncommon in the applied linguistics literature. This is unfortunate, since many economic concepts are foundational in the analysis of public policy – including language policy. For example, it is important to understand that, in economics, “rationality” is *never* substantive, but procedural, which allows

for the inclusion of non-material and non-financial values in the assessment of the implications, for social actors, of alternative ways of experiencing and acting upon multilingualism (Grin, 1994, 2003). Some collections mentioned above, which purport to be about language policy (these words may even appear in their title) contain relatively little about politics, and barely a line about policy, while others apparently assume that the ethnographic description of language practices, simply because it refers to practices observed in a work setting, automatically makes this description economically relevant, despite the lack of any economics in it, be it in terms of variables or relationships between them.

Clearly, there is a need for much more reciprocal interdisciplinary exchange. Such an evolution, however, does not necessarily develop by itself. Despite lofty protestations of support for interdisciplinarity, institutional structures actively conspire against it, encouraging hyper-specialisation and silo thinking instead. There is work to be done, and this requires an interdisciplinary openness that lets the issues themselves (say, multilingualism) take centre stage, while various disciplines are then convened, without any of them being granted *a priori* greater (or lesser) legitimacy, to investigate it. For this to happen, a resolute shift away from the discourse of received, dominant intra-disciplinary approaches is necessary; genuine interdisciplinary practices need to be developed, and one of the goals of this book is precisely to make a modest contribution in this direction. Multilingualism, and how we deal with it, as societies, through concerted action, is the topic at the centre of the thirteen chapters in this volume, with authors from various disciplines and specialisations within linguistics and the social sciences. To use an image proposed by Scott Page (2011: 3), “jump[ing] the silo of [one’s] home discipline and advanc[ing] interdisciplinary science” remains one of the most exciting challenges of contemporary research.

The second problem, albeit related to the first, needs to be addressed separately because it appears to have particular saliency in the realm of research on language and multilingualism. Interdisciplinary dialogue requires a certain degree of shared references, as well as the willingness to submit one’s theories and conceptual tools to cross-examination by others, and, sometimes, to relinquish some of them and acknowledge alternative or even contrary scientific evidence. Independently of one’s disciplinary anchoring, the epistemology of research must therefore lend itself to debate and confrontation with other ideas and with potentially uncomfortable evidence.

This requires flexibility. Unfortunately, for reasons amply discussed elsewhere (whether in the epistemology of science in general or of the social sciences more specifically), orthodoxies tend to emerge and ossify, and this danger is much in evidence in some contemporary research on multilingualism. For example, a wide-spread – and initially commendable – attention to the *constructed* character of the

elements that contextualise and situate human experience with language seems to have drifted, in some cases, into a kind of knee-jerk reaction in which all kinds of constructs are hastily de-constructed and replaced (when an alternative is proposed at all) by far flimsier constructs (for a powerful analysis of this problem, see, for example, Castells, 2010: 31–34).

This problem is compounded by a shift of emphasis from the issues to the discourse about them; this shift is, *per se*, not surprising, because discourse is, indeed, a prime revealer of the processes through which constructs emerge. That reality and discourse are closely intertwined is undisputed; but that the study of the material reality of the human condition could somehow be *replaced* (instead of complemented) by the study of discourse about it is questionable. Consider, for example, contextual elements such as the structure of the state or the distribution of power between groups at a given point in time and space. Significant tracts of the literature on diversity and multilingualism, while purporting to analyse these elements, actually do not; instead, they comment on selected elements of discourse about them. Empirical research on, say, the impact (if any) of language legislation on multilingual practices in schools or at work is, then, liable to give way to commentary on the presumed intentions of the legislators (or of the interest groups which legislators are rather quickly assumed to serve), as such intentions could be inferred, more or less convincingly, from (selected) elements of discourse. In this shift, elementary epistemological precautions regarding generalisability may be given rather short shrift. The observation of a clutch of individual cases is often generalised with not even a thought for representativeness or other methodological requirements of the sound, judicious use of qualitative research.

The combined trends of injudicious de-construction, shift of emphasis from reality to discourse, and hasty generalisation, unfortunately, favour the emergence and ossification of schools of thought or, less charitably, permit too many chapels with their own liturgy. The problem is ubiquitous in the production, sharing, and dissemination of knowledge, but seems more acute when certain epistemological principles are neglected. A contribution to the study of multilingualism, then, will no longer be judged in terms of its actual scientific merit, but in terms of its use of the liturgy and conformity with the underlying dogma. Certain notions must be invoked and certain words must be pronounced (in a lecture) or written (in a paper) for a contribution to pass muster. In our view, this combination of trends is worrisome and needs to be countered by proper attention to the actual processes, complex as the latter may be. Critical attention (possibly in the form of de-construction) helps us to keep querying our favourite concepts, and the study of discourse, apart from being interesting in its own right, is a natural companion of the study of the processes about which discourse is produced. However, they cannot replace the painstaking identification, measurement, explanation and interpretation of the

actual processes themselves. De-construction may be de-constructed, and so-called critical approaches, having no monopoly on criticism, should not be immune from it. More specifically, we believe that research on multilingualism would greatly benefit from a generalised willingness to submit some cherished beliefs to the methodological criticism of other disciplines – hence, the undiminished importance of methodological rigour.

There again, we all need to leave our comfort zone. As noted earlier in this introduction, this book is intended as a contribution to a conversation about multilingualism. At the same time, then, it is an invitation to debate. In the thirteen chapters which follow, the contributions in this book attempt, drawing on a variety of disciplines and specialisations, to engage with different issues and arguments about multilingualism, politics and policy. The concepts, findings and interpretations put forward in this book are all open to discussion, in accordance to a scientific canon in which scientific research is not viewed as a body of definitive, established facts, but as a dynamic process that deepens and expands knowledge and relies on theoretical understanding, conceptual clarity, and on meticulous, methodologically-informed empirical scrutiny. Against the backdrop of the concerns just discussed, this book is particularly interested in dealing with complexity. We have already pointed out that the politics of multilingualism hark back to complex processes, and, beyond merely using the adjective, we need to come to grips with complexity as such. This book, however, is not about the complexity of diversity, linguistic or other (Page, 2011), or about the complexity of acting upon it through policy (Room, 2011), since this would have been another enterprise altogether. Rather, in line with our intention to let linguistic diversity, as such, take centre stage, we start out with the objectively growing complexity of manifestations of linguistic diversity in contemporary societies. This growing complexity, which is arguably, at least in large part, a result of globalisation, calls for responses that themselves display an adequate degree of complexity. Rising to this challenge requires, as we have seen, a sincere interdisciplinary effort. It also calls for accommodating complexity into our analytical work. This is why this book also operates as a link connecting the RECODE and the MIME projects. RECODE revisits the fundamentals of multilingualism and politics in a world of change; MIME examines the implications of an interdisciplinary approach to the management of linguistic diversity in which particular attention is devoted to the complexity of the processes at hand. Formal analyses of complexity (highlighting features such as non-linearity, power laws, spontaneous order, *etc.*) are not included in this volume, but the following contributions do address facets of multilingualism in a way intended to allow for the inclusion of such features. For example, one expression of complexity that surfaces in several chapters of this book is the interplay between the (possibly conflicting) motivations of micro-, meso- and macro-level actors – for example, individual citizens, organisations,

and the state. One of the phenomena that make the politics of linguistic diversity a complex object is precisely the non-convergence between the goals of different groups of actors operating at the different levels of a system, as well as the fact that the constraints affecting their action often differ.

In order to accommodate the questions that we wished to raise, we have decided to organise our investigation of the politics of multilingualism in three main themes, namely, the joint re-conceptualisation of multilingualism and collective identity; the connections between linguistic hegemony, linguistic insecurity and linguistic justice; and the challenges of a global linguistic governance, with particular attention to the role that *lingua francas* can – but sometimes also cannot – play in such governance.

3. The contributions in this book

The first thematic section of the book deals with multilingualism and the construction of collective identities. Chapter 2, authored by Linda Cardinal and Rémi Léger, opens this section, focusing on the case of Canada. The country has two official languages, English and French, an official multiculturalism policy that encourages the retention and use of non-official languages, and basic measures for the promotion of aboriginal languages. Cardinal and Léger raise the important question of language policy choices in Canada. They show why Canada made certain language policy choices – such as privileging English and French over other languages, including aboriginal languages – and avoided others. In answering the question, they rely on two key concepts from political science: “state tradition” and “language regime”. Taken together, these two concepts serve as the basis for a neo-institutional approach for the study of the politics of multilingualism. In Chapter 3, Konstantin Zamyatin discusses the case of Russia, whose language policy is different, but certainly not less complex than Canada’s. He shows that, in Russia, language policy is closely linked to nation-building. Empirical evidence proves that policy-makers have substantially increased their efforts at strengthening the position of Russian both in Russia and abroad in the recent years, with the intention of using language as a tool to foster national identity *vis-à-vis* “the peoples of Russia”, migrants and “compatriots abroad”. However, this might be not as easy a task as one might assume, as language itself impacts on the strategic choices in the nation-building process. From Russia, we move to Belgium and the intricate language situation in Brussels. In Chapter 4, Rudi Janssens argues that, in the 1970s, the Belgian state institutionalised a particular model without a national language, national political parties, national education or national media. For Brussels, this led to a complex linguistic dualism, with two language communities and a situation of partial power-sharing. Since then, however,

Brussels has been subject to a diversified form of migration. At present, half of the population have non-Belgian roots, which makes for a highly multilingual and multicultural environment. Janssen's contribution focuses on the situation that has resulted from this dynamic, a situation characterised by the confrontation between top-down identity-constructing bilingual policies, on the one hand, and the actual sense of belonging in a multilingual and multicultural setting, on the other.

Chapter 5, by Peter A. Kraus, approaches multilingualism in Europe with a model that highlights the tension between two types of need, namely, the need for "options" and for "ligatures". Options refer to the range of opportunities available to the members of a society to express who they want to be and implement what they want to do; ligatures hark back to the connections and sense of belongingness that a person may develop with his or her fellow citizens. In its traditional, unitary form, the nation-state establishes a setting in which options and ligatures are provided through one (usually "national") language. However, globalisation and the associated population movements give rise to an increasing disconnection between "language-as-an-option" and "language-as-a-ligature". This concerns members of both majority and minority communities. Kraus investigates the implications of this profound change on demands for linguistic recognition by different groups. In Chapter 6, Virginie Mamadouh uses the concepts of political geography to interpret the use of various languages in demonstrations against austerity policies in Eurozone countries. The thrust of the study is on the identification of signs that reveal the emergence of a transnational public space. It is particularly in contexts in which the public space is clearly dominated by one language that the use of a variety of languages indexes the presence and extent of what could be called the Europeanisation of collective action. Mamadouh's chapter can also be approached as a contribution to the general problem of identifying and measuring linguistic diversity, and using these measurements in a system of indicators.

This type of question is at the heart of Federico Gobbo's contribution in Chapter 7, which opens the second part of the book, devoted to problems of linguistic hegemony and linguistic justices. Gobbo proposes a critical perspective on various treatments of linguistic justice, before focusing on the "Calvet language barometer" (CLB), whose successive versions have been developed by a team led by the French sociolinguist Louis-Jean Calvet. Gobbo applies the CLB to multilingualism in South Tyrol, showing to what extent this barometer does – or does not – provide a relevant stepping-stone towards the assessment of linguistic justice. Chapter 8, by Helder de Schutter, pursues the notion of linguistic justice under a different angle, beginning with a critical discussion of the use of English in a *lingua franca* function. De Schutter points out that the generalised use of English gives rise to four types of injustice ("communicative", "resource", "life-world", and "dignity") which are not alleviated by the appeal to so-called "English as a *lingua*

franca” (ELF). Instead, de Schutter appeals to the establishment of localised and distinct, but stabilised forms of English such as Finnish English, Italian English, or Dutch English as a pragmatic compromise between, on the one hand, the centripetal forces currently encouraging the spread of (standard) English and, on the other, the normative requirement of developing strategies that reduce linguistic injustice.

Chapter 9, by Tom Ricento, is also about the global spread of English – understood here as the standard, mainstream English that non-native speakers typically wish to acquire, since competence in it is widely perceived to enhance socioeconomic mobility in countries where it is not official or demolinguistically dominant. Ricento proposes a broad panorama of the issue resting on an extensive assessment of the literature, showing that, although such socioeconomic effects do arise, it is important to avoid the eviction of local languages by English, since linguistic hegemony (whether of “global English” or of any language that might find itself in this position) proves detrimental to academic achievement and even to literacy among speakers of other languages. Chapter 10, authored by László Marác, contains a critique of the “linguaging” approach, which has gained some prominence in contemporary sociolinguistics. Marác argues that the hybrid varieties that are characteristic of contemporary urban linguistic landscapes in Europe offer no evidence of “linguaging”, but are instead to be regarded as traditional cases of code-switching and code-mixing involving identifiable languages. Accordingly, he sees no reason for abandoning the view that languages, although socially constructed, are characterised by a prototypical grammatical and lexical core.

The last thematic block of this book addresses *lingua franca* politics and global linguistic governance. In Chapter 11, François Grin examines four different notions encountered in certain strands of academic discourse about multilingualism, which have acquired an influential position in some segments of contemporary applied linguistics, in a critical way. The four notions reviewed here are “superdiversity”, “linguaging”, “commodification”, and “English as a *lingua franca* (ELF)”. Grin argues that, while each of these concepts is dubious on its own, their combination gives rise to particularly problematic implications for language policy. While the very use of these four notions raises questions regarding the evolution of applied linguistics, investigating them also matters to social scientists working on language issues, particularly language policy. The reason for this is that social scientists need to rely on sound analytical constructs in order to come to grips with the complexity of language and multilingualism as research objects, and as areas in which actual policies are selected, designed, implemented and evaluated. Chapter 12, by Robert Phillipson, returns to the topic of linguistic hegemony from a different angle. Phillipson analyses the web of processes through which a dominant language entrenches its hegemonic position. A core feature of these processes is that they present the hegemonic language as a *lingua nullius* – nobody’s language, hence,

everyone's language, thus posing as a purportedly neutral means of communication. These processes, which are reminiscent of what May (2012) calls "sanitisation", obscure the forces behind the power of the dominant language. In the international context, whether in Europe or beyond, these processes undermine our capacity to harness the potential of language policies for creating more just societies.

In Chapter 13, Astrid von Busekist aims at sketching out a fair transitory language regime for migrants. From von Busekist's perspective, a *lingua franca* regime based on what she labels "Open English" can co-exist with linguistic diversity and *ad hoc* multilingualism, and be transitionally sustained by bilingual bridge-speakers. In this regime, democratic requirements of inclusion and parity of esteem can be achieved through a creative non-permanent linguistic arrangement via *ad hoc* multilingualism plus Open English. Such arrangements seem particularly relevant in intermediary institutions and situations in which newcomers are not (yet) competent in the host-country's language. Finally, Chapter 14, by Jean-Claude Barbier tackles the delicate issue of English in the European Union (EU). While formal EU law acknowledges the equality of the 24 languages of the Member States, practice has sanctioned the blatant hegemony of the English language over the years. The United Kingdom has now decided to leave the European Union. Most social scientists do not care about this situation. As members of a trans-European elite, they privilege the certainties of a standardised European English over the strict demands of science and truth that, from Barbier's angle, need plurilingualism. Moreover, Barbier argues, language is indispensable for politics and, as EU politics is now largely made in English, non-speakers of English face exclusion from full political participation.

This book casts the net wide, and makes use of a large panoply of concepts, such as, "identity", "hegemony", "justice" and "governance", to cite just some of those used in the preceding paragraphs. They are defined along the way, as they are used by the different contributors.

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PART I

Reconceptualising multilingualism and collective identity

The politics of multilingualism in Canada

A neo-institutional approach

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Language and linguistic diversity are eminently political in Canada. The country has two official languages, English and French, an official multiculturalism policy that encourages the retention and use of non-official languages, and basic measures for the promotion of aboriginal languages. This chapter raises the important question of language policy choices in Canada. How and why Canada made certain language policy choices – for example, privileging English and French over other languages, including aboriginal languages – and avoided others. In answering this question, we rely on two key concepts from political science: “state tradition” and “language regime”. Taken together, these two concepts serve as the basis for a neo-institutional approach for the study of the politics of multilingualism.

Introduction

Language and linguistic diversity are eminently political in Canada. The country has two official languages, English and French, an official multiculturalism policy that encourages the retention and use of non-official languages, and basic measures for the promotion of aboriginal languages. However, the status and roles of official, non-official and aboriginal languages continue to give rise to political debates and social tensions. For instance, in Richmond, British Columbia, some residents have lobbied their City Council to ban Chinese-only commercial signs, which, they argue, have taken over the city landscape. While the City did not acquiesce to their demand, it did, however, hire a sign inspector, tasked with “promoting community harmony” and “encouraging the businesses to include English on their business signage, advertisements, and other forms of commercial communication” (Léger, 2015; see, also, City of Richmond, 2015).¹ More recently, two private bills con-

1. As an illustration of the political nature of language and linguistic diversity in Canada, the sign inspector job description includes the following notice under working conditions: “Disagreeable situations which include verbal abuse, threats, rudeness and the risk of potential violence may be experienced.”

cerning language and linguistic diversity were introduced in the Canadian Senate. The first (S-212) aims to recognise that the Indigenous peoples of Canada “have the right to use, preserve, revitalize and promote their aboriginal languages and the freedom to share their cultural heritage through the use of those languages”. Sponsored by Senator Mobina Jaffer, the second bill (S-222) calls for the Canadian state to promote and advance linguistic plurality.

Political debates and social tensions over language and linguistic diversity raise the important question of language policy choices in Canada. Specifically, this chapter asks how and why Canada made certain language policy choices – for example, privileging English and French over other languages, including aboriginal languages – and avoided others. In answering this question, we rely on two key concepts from political science: “state tradition” and “language regime” (see Cardinal & Sonntag, 2015a; 2015b). The concept of state tradition requires that we examine the dynamic context – historical, institutional and normative – in which state choices are made. For example, Canada’s language regime is premised on traditions of political compromise and federalism (Cardinal, 2015; Smith, 2010). The concept of language regime refers to how language and linguistic diversity are projected through state policies and acted upon by citizens. It thus comprises not only state institutions and rules, but also citizens’ practices and conceptions of language. Taken together, these two concepts serve as the basis for a neo-institutional approach for the study of the politics of multilingualism.

Our chapter is exploratory in nature. Its aim is to establish a research agenda on the politics of multilingualism anchored in state traditions and language regime. The first section is definitional and situates our approach in relation to main debates and concepts. The second examines Canada’s language regime through an exploration of the complex relationship between state traditions of political compromise and federalism, and in particular how these have evolved since the adoption of the *Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms* (Charter) in 1982. The third and last section highlights the impact of Canada’s state traditions and language regime on the politics of multilingualism. It will introduce the large menu of initiatives promoting multilingualism in the provinces and territories, and reflect on how this multiplicity relates to political compromise and federalism.

1. Defining multilingualism

Multilingualism can be viewed as both an individual and a societal phenomenon (Grin, 2010). The first refers to someone who has the ability to communicate in more than one language, while the second is a characteristic of societies. Societal multilingualism is concerned with linguistic attitudes, language choices and more broadly the status and roles of languages within a given society. The relevant literature envisages societal multilingualism in three distinct but related ways: historical and social fact, normative project and policy choice. The following section defines these three conceptions and situates our neo-institutional approach in relation to them.

1.1 Multilingualism as a historical and social fact

François Grin (2008) makes a useful distinction between objective and subjective linguistic diversity. Objective diversity refers to the number of languages spoken in a given context. A number of organisations and research groups track and record linguistic diversity in the world, including *Ethnologue*,² which catalogues languages and assesses their use and vitality. *Ethnologue* provides information on more than 7,000 “known living languages” around the world, of which close to two thirds are in Asia and Africa. Objective linguistic diversity – that is, the number of languages spoken – is thus higher on these two continents in comparison to Europe or the Americas.

This objective linguistic diversity is under threat. For Daniel Nettle and Suzanne Romaine (2000), languages and cultures have been made more vulnerable by globalisation, climate change and global capitalism. It is also under threat from the global spread of English. Braj Kachru (1990) has modelled the use and, importantly, the spread of English through three concentric circles: inner, outer and expanding. The inner circle comprises societies that have traditionally spoken English, including the United Kingdom, the United States, and Canada. The outer circle includes a number of societies where English is important for historical reasons – for example, India, Nigeria, and the Philippines. The expanding circle covers a range of countries where English is spoken as a foreign language or *lingua franca*. This last circle includes most of Europe, Russia, China, and others with no historical ties to English. In parallel research, Abram de Swaan (2001; see, also, Calvet 1999) places English at the top of the global language system. For him, English is the “hyper-central” language of this global system, and it tends to expand at the expense of “supercentral”, “central”, and “peripheral” languages.

2. www.ethnologue.com.

Conversely, subjective linguistic diversity refers to how global trends in migration, trade and overall mobility are fuelling new experiences of linguistic diversity. In many parts of the world, particularly in major cities, linguistic diversity is a daily reality. It is not just that linguistic diversity is part of the urban social fabric the world over, but that new linguistic patterns and even communities are emerging in these cities. People are confronted on a daily basis with old and new forms of linguistic diversity. For Grin (2008), these global trends have an impact on the subjective experiences that people have with language and linguistic diversity.

Our neo-institutional approach helps connect these subjective experiences to their historical, institutional and normative contexts. It enables us to explain better subjective experiences with language and linguistic diversity. Indeed, these experiences are largely conditioned by language regimes and state traditions. From our perspective, the task is to explain variations in how multilingualism as a historical and social fact is experienced within specific contexts.

1.2 Multilingualism as a normative project

Some of those concerned with endangered languages – that is, with the fact that half of the world’s languages could disappear before the end of the century – view multilingualism as a political and social ideal (Phillipson, 2003; May, 2001; Nettle & Romaine, 2000). However, how to promote multilingualism and to sustain linguistic diversity is a matter of debate. For example, the European Commission’s *Promoting Language Learning and Linguistic Diversity: An Action Plan 2004–2006* viewed multilingualism as a key value for the European Union (EU) and its Member States. It emphasised how linguistic diversity was one of the “defining features” of the EU (2004: 30). In response to this action plan and other European initiatives, Peter Kraus (2008) envisages the emergence of multiple and overlapping democratic spheres, each operating in different European languages.

Others have been decidedly more critical of multilingualism as a normative project. For one, the multilingualism promoted by many countries – for example, the learning of English or of other colonial languages – is seen as unfair to historical languages (Jostes, 2007). In Canada, Eve Haque and Donna Patrick (2015: 35) have been critical of how the federal language policy reproduces “racial hierarchies of colonialism” by reinforcing English and French dominance. In other cases, multilingualism has been dismissed as a constraint for democracy, economic development or citizenship (Van Parijs, 2004; de Swaan, 2001). François Grin (2010: 2) has, however, made the case that the costs of multilingualism are “generally low”, and ultimately that the benefits outweigh these costs.

The concepts of language regime and state traditions can help build bridges between normative projects and given contexts. For instance, a deeper understanding

of a country's state traditions can highlight areas of convergence and divergence with different normative projects on offer. In other words, our neo-institutional approach can help explain how and why certain normative projects have taken root while others have not.

1.3 Multilingualism as a policy choice

In terms of policy choices, the scholarship distinguishes between two broad types of language policies: territorial and personal (McRae, 1975). The territoriality principle privileges the official recognition of a single language within a defined geographical area – the entire state, a federal unit, or a region. In this case, language rights are only valid within the given territory. Prominent examples include Belgium, Switzerland, and Québec. Conversely, a policy based upon the personality principle – such as the federal language policy in Canada – grants language rights to citizens irrespective of where they live in the country, provided that numbers or demand warrant it. This second type of language policy generally promotes institutional multilingualism to ensure that citizens have the right to communicate with and receive government services in the official language of their choice.

International organisations also make language policy choices. For example, the UN adopted a Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic and Linguistic Minority in 1992, and a Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples in 2007. The first ensures the right of persons belonging to minorities to “use their own language, in private and in public, freely and without interference or any form of discrimination”. Within the EU, the Lund Recommendations (1999) encourage the representation and participation of minorities in public life, and the European Charter on Regional and Minority Languages (1992) commits Member States that have ratified the document to a number of principles and commitments.³

Our approach stresses the importance of investigating language policy choices. How and why international organisations and states choose one or more official languages is largely premised on norms, institutions and practices. If we are to explain how and why some policy choices are made and others are avoided, we need to understand better state traditions and language regimes.

3. In most cases, however, these Declarations or Recommendations do not create legal obligations for their signatories. For Will Kymlicka (2007: 4), these have indeed involved the “diffusion of a set of ideals and practices to which all states should aspire” and the “codification of a set of minimum standards below which no state should fall”. These norms and recommendations are thus tools that can help state and non-state actors articulate and advocate for fairer language policies.

2. State traditions and language regime in Canada

In this section, we examine Canada's language regime through an exploration of the complex relationship between competing state traditions of federalism and political compromise, on the one hand, and state traditions and the *Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedom*, on the other.⁴

The Canadian Confederation was established in 1867. It arose as a political compromise between its two founding peoples (English and French) and between its four founding provinces (New Brunswick, Nova Scotia, Ontario, and Québec). A number of its institutional features are the result of brokerage politics and elite accommodation. For instance, federalism was, in large part, adopted to accommodate French Canadian demands from Québec to protect their specific language and culture. Another example can be found in the constitutional protection of separate schools for Catholics in Ontario and Protestants in Québec. The first building-blocks of the modern Canadian language regime were also laid in this context. Section 133 of the Constitution referenced language rights in Parliament and before the courts. Specifically, English and French could be used in the Canadian Parliament and in the Québec Legislature as well as in any federal or Québec court. First Nations were excluded from constitutional negotiations, and their languages – the Algonquian, Athapaskan, Inuit and Iroquoian languages – did not figure in the Constitution. Other minority languages – including Gaelic, German and Irish – were also ignored.

The impact of political compromise and federalism on the modern Canadian language regime, as well as the relationship between these two state traditions, was to become much clearer over the first few decades of Confederation. For one, the practical implementation of Section 133 in the Canadian Parliament exposed the limits of the political compromise negotiated. English and French could be used during debates, but simultaneous translation was only introduced in 1959 (Delisle, 2009). In other words, French-speakers had the right to be heard but not necessarily understood during parliamentary debates in Ottawa.

More importantly, federalism enabled provinces to develop language policies that are distinct from the federal policy. In Canada, the provinces have prerogative over language in their areas of jurisdiction (Vipond, 1991). As a result, within a few decades of Confederation, provincial legislatures, supported in their efforts by the Orange Order of Canada and the Canada First Movement⁵ (Berger, 1970),

4. This section borrows from and expands on Cardinal (2015).

5. Briefly, the Orange Order of Canada is a branch of the Orange Order founded in Ireland in 1795. It is a fraternal organisation for British Protestants which had a particular influence on Ontario politics during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The Canada First Movement

severely restricted, if not outright banned, French as a language of instruction in public schools – education is importantly under provincial jurisdiction. More broadly, French and other minority languages were excluded from the public domain. Most provinces argued that minority language rights were too costly or that the numbers did not warrant public resources, in the process espousing a model of Anglo-conformity (Aunger, 2005). Another reason given was that Canada is a country of immigration and, as such, no group should receive special treatment – as if the English language is neutral and free of power relations (Hamel, 2010).

Canada's language regime changed in earnest during the 1960s due, in large part, to national unity considerations. The federal government was compelled to revise and strengthen language rights and accommodations in response to neo-nationalism in Québec and renewed mobilisations from French-speaking populations in other provinces. In 1963, the federal government created the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism (B&B Commission). It was tasked with recommending “what steps should be taken to develop the Canadian Confederation on the basis of an equal partnership between the two founding races, taking into account the contribution made by other ethnic groups to the cultural enrichment of Canada”. In its six-volume final report, the B&B Commission called for positive state action in relation to language rights, minority language schools and support for culture.⁶

In 1969, the federal government adopted the *Official Languages Act* (OLA), which gave equal status, rights and privileges to English and French. The OLA granted language rights to all Canadians in their relationship with the federal government.⁷ Canada's language regime nonetheless continued to be premised on political compromise and federalism. The federal government rejected the B&B Commission recommendations related to biculturalism and collective rights, and the OLA did not directly concern provincial governments. Most provinces responded with minor changes in the area of education, though New Brunswick and Ontario did revise their respective language policies. In the former, where French-speaking Acadians represented more than a third of the population, the

was founded in the nineteenth century. It was a conservative nationalist movement promoting protestantism and the English language in Canada.

6. Its recommendations included an official languages policy, language rights, minority language education rights and a language commissioner (see the special issue of *Canadian Issues*, *A Look at 50 Years of the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism*, 2013).

7. The OLA was premised on an understanding that Canadians should have the right to communicate with and receive federal services in the official language of their choice. It also sought to make the federal public service more representative of Canada's French-speaking population, while respecting the merit principle (see Turgeon & Gagnon, 2013).

provincial government made English and French its official languages in 1969. The latter would bring about changes upon a piecemeal basis over two decades, culminating in the adoption of legislation in 1986 (Cardinal & Normand, 2013).

The adoption of the Charter in 1982 entrenched the equality of English and French, gave the official languages constitutional status, and guaranteed official language minorities the right to receive an education in their mother tongue.⁸ The Charter would also require that a new language policy be legislated to bring it into line with the new constitutionally-defined language rights. This new OLA adopted in 1988 added (i) a commitment to enhancing the vitality and supporting the development of official languages minorities; and (ii) the right of civil servants to work in the official language of their choice. In the provinces, the Charter would trump federalism in the specific area of education. The constitutional guarantee of minority language educational rights required provinces to accept primary and secondary school instruction in French. Beyond education, however, the provinces have responded and continue to respond differently to official languages and linguistic diversity more broadly.

The contours of Canada's language regime were thus profoundly transformed in the two decades following the B&B Commission. Its content, however, would not immediately follow suit. It took multiple court challenges to translate into practice the rights and commitments laid out in the Charter and the new OLA. This court-driven transformation has been partly supported by the federal government. Most significantly, the federal government established and funded the Court Challenges Program to provide financial assistance to initiate Charter challenges relating to official languages and equality rights (Cardinal, 2000; see, also, Brodie, 2001). A body of jurisprudence favourable to official languages was developed from various cases supported by this Program. After initial hesitation, official language minorities embraced the court-centric approach (Normand, 2013). Courts have confirmed minority language educational rights, the language rights of the accused, the right to minority-language public services, the right to minority institutions, and defined substantive equality (OCOL, 2012).

However, the existence of the Court Challenges Program is no guarantee that rulings will be favourable to language rights and official language minorities

8. The Charter was adopted following the 1980 Québec referendum on sovereignty-association. The government of Québec asked its population for a mandate to negotiate a new partnership with Canada founded on additional political sovereignty and a new economic association. The referendum came after much debate in Québec on the failures of Canadian federalism and its inability to protect the French language. The population of Québec rejected the proposal for sovereignty-association due in part to the federal government promising to review the Canadian constitution. The Charter entrenched individual rights and freedoms alongside federalism.

(Cardinal & Léger, 2016). The courts initially showed little enthusiasm for positive state action in the area of language. In 1986, three cases – *Bilodeau*, *MacDonald*, and *Société des Acadiens du Nouveau-Brunswick* – led the Supreme Court to conclude that language rights in Canada needed to be viewed as a political compromise. In *Bilodeau*, the Court had to determine whether a summons in the province of Manitoba needed to be bilingual. In *MacDonald*, it had to rule on the legality of a unilingual French summons by the City of Montréal. As for *Société des Acadiens*, it had to decide on whether French-speakers in New Brunswick had the right to be heard in the official language of their choice in provincial courts. In each of these three rulings, the Supreme Court described language rights as a political compromise. In the first two, it ruled that summons did not need to be bilingual. In the third, it opined that French-speaking citizens in New Brunswick did not have the right to be heard or understood by the courts in their official language.⁹ The underlying assumption driving these rulings was that “courts should approach language rights with restraint” because these are “based on political compromise” (*Société des Acadiens*, paras. 64–65).

In contrast, the *Mahé* (1990) and *Beaulac* (1999) rulings evidenced a distinctive, purposive interpretation of language rights. In the first, the Supreme Court ruled that French-speaking parents had a constitutional right to the “management and control of their educational facilities”, which may warrant an independent school board where the numbers reflect the need (*Mahé*, para. 5). In the second, it opined that political compromise had to be discarded in favour of an interpretation founded on substantive equality.¹⁰ It wrote: “language rights must in all cases be interpreted purposively, in a manner consistent with the preservation and development of official language communities in Canada” (*Beaulac*, para. 25); this was a marked departure from the trilogy of 1986. In the 2000s, *Arsenault-Cameron* (2000) and *Des Rochers* (2009) further expanded upon the notion of substantive equality.

Taken together, court rulings have compelled not only the federal government but also the provinces to initiate measures and, in some cases, adopt policies favourable to official languages, in particular in the area of education. However, it is important to note that the courts have not overturned political compromise and federalism in the area of language. These state traditions continue to exert a strong influence within Canada’s language regime. For example, while the Charter

9. This ruling led to intense mobilisation from the French-speaking population in New Brunswick, which prompted the reinforcement of the provincial language regime (see Doucet, 1995).

10. Michel Hélie (2009: 396) writes: “In a nutshell, *Beaulac* reverses the restrained interpretative approach articulated in *Société des Acadiens*, and imposes a liberal and generous rule of construction that requires substantive equality as the new norm subject only to the requirement that the existence of a right first be established.”

obliged provinces to respect minority language educational rights, most provinces continue to have timid policies towards their French-speaking population. That said, court rulings have strengthened official languages rights and, in the process, forced limited positive state action from the federal government and the provinces. The result is a language regime that remains premised on political compromise and federalism, within certain parameters. Court rulings have, in fact, tempered the institutional and normative weight of political compromise and federalism in the area of language by affirming official languages rights.

3. The politics of multilingualism in Canada

In Canada, social science research on language and linguistic diversity has centred and continues to centre on the official languages. Major research themes have included the origins and ambitions of language policies, the governance of official languages and the impact of government support programmes on official language minorities (see Cardinal et al., 2015; Léger, 2013; Martel & Pâquet, 2012). While scholarship on language and literacy education has explored linguistic diversity, it remains, in large part, focused on the teaching and learning of languages – for example, education policy, curriculum development and pedagogies (Cummins, 1992; Dagenais, 2013; Duff, 2008; Edward, 1998; Guardado, 2012). In this context, the study of the politics of multilingualism – that is, state responses to language and linguistic diversity, and the effects and consequences of these language policy choices – remains an emerging research area. In this last section, our aim is to explore the connections and tensions between the official and non-official languages in Canada.¹¹ Specifically, we first want to discuss broad demographic and linguistic trends, and then elucidate how and why political compromise and especially federalism have guided and framed state – federal, provincial and territorial – responses to multilingualism.

11. Canada's historical use – and abuse – of linguistic diversity further complicates these connections and tensions. Following Confederation, the provinces made English the only language of instruction in public schools. In explaining and justifying their policy choices, most provinces argued that education could not be provided in French, Gaelic, German, Polish, Ukrainian and other languages, and besides that the culture of the country was to be British and its language was to be English (see Aunger, 2005). In other words, linguistic diversity was viewed as a problem that only Anglo-conformity could solve. Since the 1960s, the federal government, and to a lesser extent the provinces and territories, have made concessions towards French, and as a result English and French, Canada's official languages, are now pitted against linguistic diversity. This conflictual relationship between English – and later English and French – and linguistic diversity remains a signature of the politics of multilingualism in Canada.

Data on languages and linguistic diversity tell many stories about Canada (Statistics Canada, 2012a; 2012b). The first is that Canada is rich in linguistic diversity. In 2011, Canadians reported speaking more than 200 languages at home. These included English and French, more than 60 Aboriginal languages and a large number of “immigrant” languages.¹² In all, more than 20 per cent of Canada’s population (6.8 million people) reported speaking a language other than English or French at home. For most, this other language was an “immigrant” language. In fact, only 213,000 people reported speaking an Aboriginal language most often or regularly at home. Conversely, 22 “immigrant” languages were spoken at home by more than 100,000 people, of which the most common were Chinese (1.1 million),¹³ Punjabi (460,000), Spanish (439,000), Italian (438,000), Tagalog (384,000), and Arabic (374,000).

The second is that objective linguistic diversity varies immensely across the provinces and territories. In New Brunswick, for example, only 2.5 per cent of the population declared having a non-official language as their mother tongue. Outside French and English, the three largest linguistic communities – Mi’kmaq, German and Korean – had between 1,800 and 2,200 speakers (Statistics Canada, 2011a). For comparison, in Ontario, Canada’s most populous province, almost 26 per cent of the population reported having a language other than English or French as their mother tongue (Statistics Canada, 2011b). Moreover, this objective linguistic diversity is highly concentrated in cities and urban areas. In 2011, nearly 80 per cent of Canadians who reported speaking an “immigrant” language lived in the six major metropolitan areas – Toronto, Montréal, Vancouver, Calgary, Edmonton and Ottawa-Gatineau.

The third and final story is that the two official languages, and in particular English, exert a strong pull on Aboriginal and “immigrant” languages. In 2011, English was the mother tongue of about 58 per cent of the population (19.1 million) and nearly 84 per cent (28.4 million) declared being able to speak it. With regard to French, it was spoken by close to 30 per cent (10 million) of the population, about 22 per cent (7.3 million) for whom it was their mother tongue – the majority of whom lived in Québec. Overall, 98 per cent of the population declared being able to conduct a conversation in either English or French. Data on home language provide a further glimpse into the prominence of English (and, to a lesser extent, French). Of the 6.8 million people whom reported speaking an aboriginal or “immigrant”

12. In Canada, the term ‘immigrant’ languages refers to “languages (other than English, French and Aboriginal languages) whose presence in Canada is originally due to immigration” (Statistics Canada, 2012b).

13. This number includes Canadians having declared speaking Chinese, Cantonese and Mandarin.

language at home, 2.5 million people spoke English “most often” and another 1.35 million upon a “regular basis”. French had considerably less pull than English: less than 300,000 spoke French “most often”, and nearly 150,000 spoke it on a “regular basis”. As Statistics Canada (2012a: 11) observed, this datum on home language is significant because “the widespread use of English or French at home by parents influences the first language a child will learn at home”.

That said, language policies reach beyond this data and give life to linguistic diversity and the politics of multilingualism. English and French are Canada’s official languages, but the country is indeed home to a large menu of policies and initiatives which support minority language instruction and maintenance. Patricia Duff (2008) notes that “there has been legislative support for other languages since the late 1960s”. As we show below, some provinces are more active than the federal government in the promotion of languages and linguistic diversity. For instance, in some of the Western provinces and the Northern territories, language policies provide recognition and support to aboriginal languages.¹⁴

On the whole, the federal language policy provides minimal guidance for the recognition and accommodation of linguistic diversity. Section 27 of the Charter commits the state to “the preservation and enhancement of the multicultural heritage of Canadians”, but without explicit mention of non-official languages. Section 35 of the Constitution Act of 1982 recognises and affirms “the existing aboriginal and treaty rights of the aboriginal peoples of Canada”, but it does not make explicit mention of aboriginal languages. Finally, the *Canadian Multiculturalism Act* adopted in 1988 commits it to “preserve and enhance the use of languages other than English and French, while strengthening the status and use of official languages in Canada”. It also states that the Minister responsible “may facilitate the acquisition, retention and use of all languages that contribute to the multicultural heritage of Canada”.

Beyond this constitutional and legislative framework, the federal government has created a few funding programmes to promote the use of non-official languages. It includes the Aboriginal Languages Initiative, which invests approximately 5 million Canadian dollars per year in community-based initiatives geared towards the preservation and revitalisation of aboriginal languages. This Initiative endorses a “community-based approach” that aims to be “flexible and responsive to the broad range of community needs, goals, and priorities” (Canadian Heritage, 2015). Federal support for non-official languages is provided indirectly through programmes and initiatives overseen by Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada, which encourage cross-cultural understanding and civic participation (Citizenship and Immigration Canada, 2011).

14. We cannot discuss *local* language policies because this would require a much more complex survey of language initiatives in school districts and municipalities.

Support for non-official languages comes mainly from the provinces and territories. These have developed a number of programmes in support of community-based initiatives. From our perspective, the diversity of approaches to the acquisition, retention and use of minority languages speaks to the importance of federalism and its related principle of provincial autonomy. While Canada's language regime remains anchored in the promotion of English and French as official languages, state traditions of political compromise and federalism have enabled the provinces (and territories) to legislate and invest in languages and linguistic diversity. Provinces can, indeed, play a significant role within the politics of multilingualism in Canada. In fact, tensions between official and non-official languages at the federal level need not be reproduced at the provincial level, and it is because of federalism that the provinces can re-define the relationship between languages, with the exception of minority language educational rights guaranteed by the Charter.

In many ways, the provinces and territories have become rich terrains for language policy innovation that needs further investigation. For example, in Nova Scotia, a Minister of Gaelic Affairs is tasked with the promotion of the Gaelic language and culture. In addition, a Minister of Acadian Affairs ensures the province develops programmes and delivers public services in French. Ontario has an Office for Francophone Affairs responsible for administering the *French Language Services Act*.

In 2010, Manitoba became the first province to recognise its aboriginal languages officially. While it did not designate general responsibility or a specific mandate, the *Aboriginal Languages Recognition Act* nevertheless recognised that Cree, Dakota, Dene, Inuktitut, Ojibway and Oji-Cree are “spoken and used in Manitoba”. In 2015, the Manitoba government launched the Manitoba Aboriginal Languages Strategy. In collaboration with First Nations and educational institutions, the government will promote teacher training and facilitate the sharing of resources and expertise on aboriginal languages. The Strategy also commits the government to “update the current provincial curriculum to reflect Indigenous history and perspectives” and to work with universities to integrate “more Indigenous content into bachelor of education courses”.

British Columbia passed the *First Peoples Heritage, Language and Culture Act* in 1996. It created the First Peoples' Cultural Council, which is a First Nations-run Crown Corporation tasked with promoting and supporting aboriginal languages, arts and culture in British Columbia.¹⁵ Since 1990,¹⁶ the Council has allocated more than 26 million Canadian dollars for local, community-based initiatives across the

15. www.fpcc.ca

16. The First Peoples' Cultural Council was created in 1990 and enshrined in legislation in 1996.

province (First Peoples' Cultural Council, 2014). British Columbia also supports aboriginal language education. Its *Language Education Policy* (2004) stipulates the following: "all students, especially those of Aboriginal ancestry, should have opportunities to learn an Aboriginal language".

While similar programmes and initiatives exist in most provinces, although only one province is officially bilingual – New Brunswick – , and none is officially multilingual. Aboriginal and "immigrant" languages may be viewed as important, but these have not been granted official status within the provinces. The good will has thus far not been translated into the formal recognition of linguistic diversity or multilingualism.

Canada is also home to three territories: Nunavut, the Northwest Territories, and Yukon. These each have their own legislature, but, due to their specific status within Confederation, their jurisdictional authority is distinct from the provinces. In relation to languages and linguistic diversity, the federal language policy applies to the three territories, but each territory has legislated and initiated measures relating to aboriginal languages.

In the Northwest Territories, nine aboriginal languages were made official with English and French in 1988. The aboriginal languages can be used in legislative debates, before certain courts and to communicate with and receive services where there is "significant demand" and it is "reasonable". The territory also has a Languages Commissioner as well as an Aboriginal Languages Revitalization Board. In Nunavut, the territorial government is actively engaged in the promotion of the Inuit language – Inuktitut and Inuinaqtun. Beyond its *Official Languages Act* (2008), which recognises English, French and Inuit as the official languages, the territory has also adopted an *Inuit Language Protection Act* (2008), which provides special recognition and support for the Inuit language. There is a Languages Commissioner in Nunavut as well as an Inuit language authority responsible for developing and standardising the modern use of the language. Finally, the Yukon has two official languages, English and French, but Aboriginal languages from the Yukon can be used in the Legislative Assembly, and its *Languages Act* (1988) "recognizes the significance of aboriginal languages in the Yukon and wishes to take appropriate measures to preserve, develop, and enhance those languages".

For many, the next logical step is for the federal government to move forward and recognise the rights of aboriginal peoples to their language and culture. This may take place in the near future. For one, the Liberal Party won the last federal election in Canada in October 2015, and its election platform committed to enact the recommendations of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission.¹⁷ This

17. www.trc.ca

Commission has urged the federal government to recognise that Section 35 of the Charter includes languages rights,¹⁸ to adopt an *Aboriginal Languages Act*, to appoint an Aboriginal Languages Commissioner and to create post-secondary programmes in aboriginal languages (Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Canada, 2015). Another reason for which changes may occur soon is that the federal government announced in December 2016 that it would prepare legislation to promote and protect Canada's Indigenous languages.¹⁹

The federal government's openness and support for aboriginal languages may signal that a new critical juncture is on the horizon. The time may be ripe for further transformations to Canada's language regime. From our perspective, while changes may, indeed, occur, state traditions of political compromise and federalism will continue both to guide and to frame policies and representations in the area of language and linguistic diversity.

Conclusion

Building on scholarship in political science, we have proposed to examine the politics of multilingualism through the concepts of state traditions and language regime. Our neo-institutional approach to language and linguistic diversity draws particular attention to the interplay between institutions, norms and practices. Each language regime is characterised by particular historical, institutional and normative paths which help illuminate how and why certain policy options are chosen and others are avoided.

In Canada, language and linguistic diversity have been a prominent concern of public policy. Language policy choices have been path dependent on political compromise and federalism. These state traditions have guided and framed state responses to the politics of multilingualism. Changes have taken place at critical junctures – Confederation, the B&B Commission and the Charter – each followed by periods of incremental change. Since the adoption of the Charter in 1982, the courts have further contributed to the transformation of Canada's language regime by affirming rights and requiring positive state action. While their rulings have compelled federal and provincial governments to enact changes, Canada's

18. See Leitch (2006) and Poliquin (2013). Moreover, David Leitch and Lorena Sekwan Fontaine are preparing a constitutional challenge that argues aboriginal peoples in Canada have the constitutional right to educate their children in their own language under Section 35. See <http://www.cbc.ca/news/aboriginal/aboriginal-language-constitution-1.3525982>, last accessed 28 April 2016.

19. See <https://ipolitics.ca/2016/12/06/trudeau-announces-indigenous-language-bill-as-fn-frustration-mounts>, last accessed 18 October 2017.

language regime remains path dependent on political compromise and federalism. Put differently, in the Canadian federal system, provinces have a prerogative over language in their areas of jurisdiction, and, as such, have been able to legislate or initiate measures in the area of official languages and linguistic diversity.

Canada's language regime and its politics of multilingualism cannot be fully understood through statistical analysis or normative reflection. Our neo-institutional approach fills important gaps by elucidating how language policy choices are path dependent on state traditions and entrenched language regimes.

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A Russian-speaking nation?

The promotion of the Russian language and its significance for ongoing efforts at Russian nation-building

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The study explores Russia's language policy in its connection to the nation-building project. The data demonstrate that, in the recent years, the policy-makers have increased their efforts at strengthening the position of Russian both in Russia and abroad. The policy analysis reveals that the intention is to use the language as a tool to foster national identity. However, this might be not as easy a task as one might assume because language itself influences the choice of strategy in the nation-building process.

Introduction

The demise of the Soviet *bloc* presented the opportunity to form the current regional system of minority protection in Europe. Russia's ongoing efforts to re-assert its position as a regional power pose a challenge to the existing models of diversity management in the countries of the former USSR, because the pressure is exerted under the pretext of protecting the Russian-speaking populations. At the same time, this assertive stance in foreign policy is a continuation of Russia's domestic identity politics (see Snetkov, 2015). Although these policies are usually studied separately, an integrated study could be productive in the case of Russia's language policy.

In both domestic and foreign policy dimensions, the Russian language appears at the centre of identity politics. And here, the renewed emphasis on the "great Russian language" is part of the discourse on the newly sought "superpower" status of Russia. The line between domestic and foreign policies is further blurred due to intentional ambiguity in nation-building that serves the mutually excluding

ends of alternative nation-building projects (see Shevel, 2011). In the light of these developments, the changing role of language in identity-building deserves a theoretical evaluation. To wit, how do policy-makers intend to use language in identity politics?

The purpose of the chapter is to study Russia's language policy in order to understand the significance of language for nation-building. The exploration of the role that policy-makers assign to the Russian language might shed light on their strategy of nation-building. Nation-building is typically defined as an active process pursued by state leaders, intellectuals, educators, and others, in an attempt to give a state the qualities of a nation-state (see Kolstø, 2005). A peculiarity of this process in Russia is that language is employed both in the fostering of national identity in the country, and in the projecting of hard and soft power in neighbouring countries. In what follows, in the first section the chapter will explore official policy-defining documents in order to outline how language and nation are intertwined in Russia's political system, and what significance this link has for the language-policy framework and language ideologies.

In the following section, the chapter will explore the data on the recent developments in the state's language policy towards Russian analysed through the prism of its links to nation-building processes in three contexts: with regard to the "peoples of Russia" or traditional minorities, migrants, and "compatriots abroad", in order to identify the goals which the authorities pursue. This taxonomy is conditional, and inside each category further patterns could be differentiated, for example, depending on the share and status of minority groups in Russia's regions, migrant donor states, or knowledge and demands for Russian in the countries of the "near" and "far abroad".

There are many individual and comparative studies on the situation of Russian in the countries of the former USSR and somewhat less studies on the situation of Russian and non-Russian languages in Russia and its regions. This study will not seek to present a complete picture of the sociolinguistic situation, but, instead, is largely based upon data from existing research. The study will provide only some macro-level sociolinguistic data relevant to the demographics, status, and institutional support for Russian both outside and inside Russia.

Against this background, the study utilises the policy analysis approach. Language policy is studied as a public policy represented as a process from goals to outcomes. In order to be operational, language policy has to accommodate the nation-building agenda in its own terms. The political agenda is not entirely explicit and coherent, but it is possible to deduce its effects in policy. Policy alternatives corresponding to scenarios of nation-building have their implications for the linguistic situation. In each sub-section, the analysis concentrates on what the main features of the sociolinguistic situations are, what features were used to frame the policy

problems, what relevance this selection has to identity politics, what solutions to the problems were proposed, and what mechanisms were employed to tackle them. As the policy formation is still in progress, policy implementation and its evaluation is beyond the scope of this study.

In the final section, the chapter will, from a constructivist perspective, analyse the policy mechanisms that enhance identity-building and discuss how language-planning activities advance the nation-building agenda. As an instance of the sociologisation of science, an abstract sociological theory of social constructivism turns into a useful policy tool which, by emphasising a constructed character of identities, legitimises the nation-building agenda. And here, the project of a Russian-speaking nation is never listed as the first among the most likely scenarios. Yet, as this study will demonstrate, Russian linguistic nationalism is an important driver of state policy. The language not only serves as a tool for translating strategic aims into policy, but itself influences the very choice of strategy in the nation-building process.

1. Language, nation, and the state

1.1 Nation-building and language policy in Russia

The disintegration of the Soviet Union left deep traces in collective memories in post-Soviet Russia. Throughout the post-Soviet period, Russian political élites continuously presented regional separatism as an existential threat and were determined to restore a strong state, *inter alia*, by cultivating in the population a sense of belonging to one nation. Ethnic federalism and other Soviet legacies of institutionalised ethnicity were criticised for entrenching identities and providing a vehicle for nationalist mobilisation. The idea of civic nation-building was imported from the West and was legitimised as a necessary step on the way towards the establishment of a Western-style democracy. However, the dichotomy of “civic” *versus* “ethnic” nationalism does not fully work even in most of the European countries. In the liberal democratic context, too, there will be some cultural attribute attached to the nation-building project anyway, even if it only expresses the “banal nationalism” of the majority.

In Russia, ambiguity about which course nation building should take has now lasted for more than two decades (see Tolz, 2001; Shevel, 2011). In the early 1990s, Russia was established as a multinational federation, but, since that time, the nation-state building has slowly pushed its way into the country’s political agenda. A Strategy of the State Nationalities Policy (Presidential Decree, 19 December 2012) officially declared strengthening a Russian civic nation as its first aim. The approval

of this document should have marked a move from more than a two-decade-long debate over the issue to action, but the step did not really change the political landscape. Moreover, as the recent years witnessed a rapid rise in ethnic Russian nationalism, the Strategy included some references to the special role of the Russian language and culture (see, for example, p. 11). Although, in principle, the two projects are incompatible, the practice of Russian politics was able to converge them, at least in the mid-term perspective.

Realising the mobilising potential of nationalist ideology, the Kremlin pragmatically decided to control and utilise nationalism in the interest of the regime (March, 2012: 402). In their decision to adopt officially the nation-building agenda, the Russian authorities were led by an urge to preserve a monopoly in identity politics for the state. The official project substituted the traditional dichotomy about “nation” with something characterised as “state nationalism”. Instead of an allegiance to civic values, the Russian state promotes “traditional values” and the allegiance to the state itself in which it serves as “patriotism”. The central role envisaged for the state satisfies the ambitions both of “empire-builders” and “nation-builders”, because the project incorporates elements of the competing projects.

The nation-building model entails a drive to establish the congruence of political and cultural units, and, thus, puts forward some imperatives for policy-making. In the European context, a common standardised language typically serves as a marker of common identity in the nation-state, and, thus, facilitates the unity of a political community, although there are some examples of bilingual and multilingual national communities (see, e.g., Blommaert & Verschueren 1998). According to a common pattern, a government pursuing a nation-building project would deliberately attempt to spread the dominant language and evoke a language shift among the speakers of other languages. To legitimise this attempt, the dominant language will often be designated with the status of the national language, which is a symbol that connects language and nation.

How is language connected to nation-building in Russia? After the turn to a nation-state model, the current authoritarian political regime also attempts to use language as a tool in identity-building, aiming at the homogenisation of the population and its “linguistic unity”. There has already been a similar attempt of spreading Russian that aimed at constructing a “Soviet people” (see, e.g., Haarmann, 1992). Unlike some countries where state policy has its limits because the state’s engagement is only a niche activity, the Russian state has established itself as a monopolistic policy actor. Its choice of nation-building tools is not restricted by democratic rules. Notwithstanding this, the use of the dominant language in identity politics faces complications not only due to the country’s enormous linguistic diversity but also because Russian is the native language for many people living outside the country. The temptation to bring these people into an imagined community challenges the

existing political borders. Therefore, the ambiguity of the nation-building agenda and a lack of clear-cut limitations highlights the question about the role of language in identity-building.

1.2 Legal institutional framework

The Russian constitution recognised the “multinational people” of Russia as the bearer of sovereignty and this provision is still in force (Article 3, Constitution of the Russian Federation, 12 December 1993). Nowadays, the “hardware” of the institutions and the “software” of the ideologies built upon the constitution complicate the transformation of the country’s political identity from a multinational state towards the possible alternatives: a nation-state, a new sort of empire, or some other scenario of a “unique third way”.

A number of institutions were established during the first two post-Soviet decades, around which were formed regularised patterns of practices that reinforce the existing identities. Territorial institutional solutions prevail over the personality principle. The territoriality principle was laid into the institutional framework of Russia’s system of ethnic and linguistic diversity management, first of all, in the form of ethnic federalism (Articles 5, 66). The linguistic territoriality regime was enforced through language status planning in the form of the designation of languages with an official status (see Zamyatin, 2014). While the officialization was primarily an act of identity politics, it was also justified by language rationalization, using David Laitin’s term, that is, the need of territorial specification of a common language for purposes of efficient administration and rule (see Laitin, 1998: 350–351). The constitution designated Russian as the state language of the whole country and recognised the right of republics to have their own constitutions and state languages (Article 68).

In many countries, minority rights limit opportunities for nation-building. In Russia, a rights-based approach has not become the main instrument for diversity management, because the constitution recognised only some individual language rights. Moreover, language rights are mostly formulated as negative rights, such as the equality of rights regardless of language and non-discrimination upon the basis of language (Article 19). Few positive rights, notably the right to use one’s native language and the freedom to choose the language which one uses (Article 26), are not self-executing rights, that is, they cannot be invoked directly in court and demand policy measures for their implementation. For example, the implementation of the right to learn one’s native language depends on the commitment of a regional education agency in respective regions. Despite its formulation as an individual right, this is only a collective right (Article 9, Law on Languages of the Peoples of the RSFSR, 25 October 1991). In effect, whereas speakers of Russian enjoy the right

to use this language everywhere in the country, as was the case in the Soviet Union, the right to use non-Russian languages is territorially bound.

The changes in Russia's political system around the early 2000s brought a shift to language policy, too, which included the first moves towards a nation-building agenda. The legislative regulations regarding non-Russian languages were subjected to some changes, such as the introduction of the Cyrillic script as compulsory for the state languages of the republics (see Federal Laws, 24 July 1998 and 11 December 2002). In cases of collisions between the statuses of languages, the legal provisions were reinterpreted in favour of Russian as the state language of the whole country, and this exclusive status was emphasised time and again. A significant step in enforcing this status was the adoption of the Federal Law on the State Language of the Russian Federation (1 June 2005), which provided a catalogue of public domains in which the use of Russian is compulsory.

In recent years, the Russian state has lost the last traces of what was, according to the constitution, supposed to be “a democratic federal law-bound State”. Accordingly, language planning is only indirectly subjected to the influence of public attitudes. Rather, political élites pursue language planning for strategic considerations, which are then translated in a manipulative way both into language ideology and language behaviour. While some controversial normative principles with regard to languages were laid down in the legislation, a weak rule of law makes the discussion on normative foundations of language policy unnecessary. Law works here not so much for ensuring justice, but as an instrument to achieve policy objectives. Saying that is not to deny that normative choices are made in pursuing instrumentalist language-planning activities. This primacy of language status planning over language practices and ideologies may be characterised as a “top-down” policy approach (see Zamyatin, 2015: 280).

1.3 Language ideologies and state languages

It is a Soviet legacy that, in Russia, language policy is a branch of nationalities policy not only substantially due to the link established between nationalities and languages to territories, but also formally because statements on language policy are found almost exclusively in documents on nationalities policy. Adopted at the time of change, language legislation was deliberately vague and contained some Soviet legacies and Western ideas, which often contradicted each other. For example, the equality of Russia's peoples and their languages was proclaimed as one of the central policy principles, but it remained symbolic, because, at the same time, a *de facto* hierarchy of peoples and languages was established through the hierarchisation of ethnic regions and the designation of different statuses for languages (for more details, see Zamyatin, 2015).

The designation of Russian as the state language of the country re-asserted its dominant status. The official designation of one language often coincides with the spread of monolingualism. Indeed, in Russian legislation, societal bilingualism and multilingualism has become neither the policy goal nor its expected result. The state languages of Russia's republics constitute an exception: the status of the state languages is sometimes equated to the state of "official bilingualism" in the republics.

In the early 1990s, the republics gained significant regional self-governance, by unilaterally upgrading, in the declarations of state sovereignty, their political status to the "nation-state formations" titled after the "titular peoples" and formed in exercise of their right to national self-determination. Pursuing the nation building, the sovereignty declarations and later the republican constitutions, among other measures, designated the titular and Russian languages as the state languages of the republics among the symbols of national statehood. The Russian constitution enacted equality-in-rights of all regions and only symbolically recognised a special political status of the republics in allowing them to have their constitutions and state languages. After the re-centralisation, the link between the republic and titular group lost any legal meaning, although the titular state language continues to be an element of institutionalised ethnicity.

However, unlike in many former Soviet Union republics, the officialisation of the titular languages in the former autonomous republics of Russia has not resulted in any significant extension of their practical use. The promotion of titular languages in Russia's republics was viewed as a step towards nationalist mobilisation and, thus, as dangerous for the state's territorial integrity. Furthermore, the co-official status of Russian led to such extension being viewed as superfluous on the efficiency assumption. Notably, in the public domains where the status of titular languages was institutionalised, these were mostly symbolic elements of the status and not practical functions that were also actually implemented. The mainly symbolic recognition did not suffice to bring change to the interactional and symbolic order (Zamyatin, 2014: 112–113).

The official status opened the possibility for the preferential treatment of titular languages in some republics, but the affirmative measures neither reversed the language shift nor could they, in any meaningful way, challenge the dominant position of Russian (see next section). Despite the insertion of some institutional guarantees for the maintenance of linguistic diversity into legislation, the public has not actually embraced the idea of the equality of languages and the accompanying values and beliefs, which would amount to multilingual ideologies. There is a lack of awareness about the value and potential benefits of bilingualism, and the ideology of monolingualism has continued to prevail in Russia throughout the post-Soviet period. Russian still has the widest range of social functions and remains the main means of communication in all public spheres.

In contrast, Russian has lost its dominant position in many former Soviet Union republics. The promotion of titular languages became a priority on the political agenda of the post-Soviet states. The need to redress minoritisation of the titular languages in the Soviet past was presented as the argument for “language normalisation” through the official designation of the sole state languages, but the perception of the potential threat from Russia to their sovereignty was also an important policy driver (Rannut, 2008). At the same time, Russian scholars and politicians categorised this policy as “mobilised linguicism”, pointing to its roots in nationalist mobilisation and its discriminating effect on the rights of Russian-speakers (Guboglo, 1998). Specifically, the criticism regarded the compulsory use of titular state languages that was enacted in practice and closed the doors of public offices to many former ethnic Russian élites who typically lacked the language knowledge because of monolingual ideologies. However, the compulsory use of the state language is exactly the normative mechanism that the Russian authorities favour for the promotion of Russian, as will be demonstrated in the following section.

2. An analysis of the language policy in three contexts

2.1 Policy towards the “peoples of Russia”

2.1.1 *Sociolinguistic situation*

The collapse of the USSR has not changed the dominant position of Russian. In the post-Soviet period, the number of Russian-speakers in Russia was decreasing due to the negative demographic trends. While, in absolute terms, the number of those who reported knowledge of Russian dropped between 2002 and 2010 from 142.6 to 137.5 million, simultaneously the number of those who gave no response regarding language knowledge increased from 1.42 to 4.54 million (see the data of the 2002 and 2010 Population Censuses). The vast majority of those who gave no response probably know Russian, given its nearly universal knowledge. In 2010, 99.4 per cent of the Russian population reported knowledge of Russian (or 99.1 per cent of those who indicated ethnicity and language knowledge).

Knowledge of Russian among non-Russians increased during the two decades between 1989 and 2010 from 88 per cent to 96.2 per cent. However, demographers dispute these numbers and argue that this increase might have been caused not only by an actual spread of Russian, but also by the relaxation of the criteria for measuring language knowledge from so-called “free knowledge”, as in the 1989 census, to mere “knowledge” and the inclusion of the possibility of reporting one’s knowledge of up to three languages in the last two censuses (see Vishnevskii, 2013: 127). As a result, the increase in the census data on languages reflects, first of all, an

improvement in the skill of understanding and not necessarily in those of speaking, reading, and writing. Despite the loosened criteria, in 2010, up to 30 million people or only 21.6 per cent of the population reported a knowledge of languages other than Russian (the same share might be assumed among those who gave no response). During the eight years between the last censuses, the share of those who knew languages other than Russian dropped by about two per cent (from 23.7 per cent in 2002, my calculation).

Claims of knowledge of a foreign language, such as English or German, constitute less than half of the reported other languages (language knowledge was a self-declaratory category with a multiple choice options). If the number of those reporting a knowledge of English somewhat increased between 2002 and 2010 (from 6.95 to 7.57 million or from 4.8 per cent to 5.5 per cent), then the reported knowledge of German decreased almost by a third (from 2.89 to 2.07 million or from 2 per cent to 1.5 per cent, which included ethnic Germans). Given the low effectiveness of foreign language teaching in school in Russia, the reporting might instead reflect a change in the assessment of one's own language repertoire in order to demonstrate one's accomplishment as reflected in the prestige that is associated with knowing other languages rather than in an actual shift in its knowledge, often minimal in the first place (see Vishnevskii, 2013: 133–134). A low level of foreign language knowledge reinforces the dominant monolingual ideology.

The situation with many languages of Russia varies significantly. Among the languages with more than one million speakers, only the number of Chechen-speakers has slightly increased (from 1.33 to 1.35 million between the last censuses). A similar pattern is also common for traditional societies among the rapidly growing peoples of the North Caucasus with hundreds of thousands of speakers, such as Avars, Kumyks, Ingushs, or Kabardins, *etc.*, who are among the least assimilated (see Vishnevskii, 2013: 139–141). The decrease in the number of Ukrainian speakers (from 1.81 to 1.13 million) is foremost a change in linguistic identity, which is also typical for many other minorities lacking their “own” ethnically-defined territorial units. Language shift is the main reason for the decrease in the numbers of speakers of other sizeable languages (from 5.65 to 4.28 million Tatar speakers, from 1.38 to 1.15 million Bashkir speakers, and from 1.33 to 1.04 million Chuvash speakers), but here the dynamics are different within the titular republics and outside their borders. A shift among non-Russians to the Russian language typically constitutes the main trend also for the dozens of the small and large languages of Russia. Among those who maintain their languages, diglossic bilingualism is often predominant.

Thus, Soviet policy had a lasting effect which was expressed in the heavy asymmetry in the patterns of bilingualism. The policy was effective in the promotion of a one-sided “national-Russian bilingualism” in the Russian SFSR (see Haarmann,

1992). While a knowledge of Russia's many languages by ethnic Russians is rather rare, one fourth or 6.6 million of those who identified themselves as non-Russians claimed Russian as their native language (Tishkov, 2013: 15). Moreover, due to the link between ethnic and linguistic identity many could have declared their "ethnic language" as their native language, even though, in reality, they have a poor or no knowledge of this language (see, e.g., Vishnevskii, 2013: 141–143).

2.1.2 *Language planning*

However, Russian official rhetoric does not accent the endangered state of many languages or the decrease in a linguistic diversity. Instead, the authorities emphasise the exceptional importance of Russian as a "global" or "world language" amongst the other languages in Russia, and its "degradation" in political and socio-linguistic terms, for example, its "contamination with foreign words". In particular, official reports state that the situation of ethnic Russians and the Russian language in some republics is deteriorating and is, thus, constituting a potential threat to the territorial integrity of the state. Alleged threats to the position of Russian in the regions put the language issue within the context of national security. Accordingly, societal multilingualism is viewed as a factor that undermines linguistic and national unity. For example, the evidence is produced that ethnic Russians have been "squeezed out" of the North Caucasus, and that this has contributed to the low level of knowledge of Russian among non-Russians from this region. Plans have been announced to resettle ethnic Russians in this region. In practice, Russian continues to perform the function of the *lingua franca* even in Dagestan and more widely in the North Caucasus.

Furthermore, it is argued that the rights of Russians are being infringed in some other republics as a result of the preferential treatment given to titular languages. For example, compulsory teaching of titular state languages to all students in some republics, irrespective of ethnicity, was sanctioned by Russia's language law, but was then now represented as being at the expense of Russian. Compulsory teaching of the co-official titular language in Bashkortostan, Tatarstan, Yakutia and Tyva resulted in the "factual displacement of Russian from the school curricula in favour of the national language". The solution was seen in the enforcement of anti-discrimination clauses and the "imposition of stricter norms for regulating the interaction of Russian with other languages of Russia" (Analytical Note, 2012: 8–9, 44–45).

It seems that the rhetoric about discrimination is used as a pretext to constrict further the use of non-Russian languages in the public sphere. It is notable that the erosion of the position of non-Russian languages is being completed not through a change in the legal framework, but through policy adjustments and administrative measures. This is so because, in the Russian legal system, administrative regulations

often take precedence over legislation due to the degree of discretion given to officials (see Zamyatin, 2014: 104–106).

Simultaneously, a wide range of language-planning activities has been pursued through the federal target programmes “Russian Language” (approved regularly since 1996). These included arranging international campaigns and events, the training of teachers and preparation of supply materials, the creation of consultative bodies, associations and foundations, *etc.* The current Federal Programme “Russian Language (2016–2020)” (Government Decree, 20 May 2015) aims straightforwardly at “developing the omnifaceted use, advancement and promotion of the Russian language” instead of its mere “support and popularisation”, as in the previous programmes. At the same time, the envisaged practical measures are quite modest in the conditions of the economic crisis.

The previous programme (Government Decree, 20 June 2011) had been more ambitious, which had, as its first performance indicator, the share of citizens for whom Russian was their native language. According to this indicator, the programme aimed at increasing the proficiency in Russian as a native language from 80 per cent of Russian citizens (i.e. the share of those who declared themselves ethnic Russians in the 2010 population census) to 85 per cent in 2015. Based upon the census data, according to which a quarter of the 20 per cent of non-Russians reported Russian to be their native language, the goal was to affirm change in their linguistic identity.

One crucial field where the change in policy also demands legislative change is education. The mechanism for changing the balance between the use of Russian and local languages as the medium of instruction and their teaching as a subject of native language is through recognising that people can have multiple identities and two or more native languages. As a nearly universal knowledge of Russian among the Russian citizens is achieved, the task that policy-makers envisage is the spread of Russian not just as a second language but as a national language for non-Russians. A precedent for this was created in Soviet times with the invention of the formula of the “second mother tongue” (see Haarmann, 1992: 111–112).

The first practical step in this direction was the enforcement of the voluntary character of native language learning in the 2007 education reform, which, in essence, is a duplicate of the analogous 1958 reform. However, the reform was poorly perceived in the republics that were reluctant to implement it. After Vladimir Putin’s statement at the session of the Council for Interethnic Relations in July 2017 that “forcing the person to learn a language which is not his/her native is impermissible”, the Public Prosecutor’s Office still demanded the republics to increase the volume of the teaching of Russian and to enforce the teaching of the titular state languages only on a voluntary basis.

The promotion of the use of a single language coupled with the discouragement of the public use of other languages reveals an assimilationist objective. According to the logic of instrumentalist language planning, multiple identities are seen as a step towards ethnic and linguistic assimilation.

There is the need to recognise the right to voluntary assimilation, the right of a citizen to choose language and culture, the right to be in several cultures ... Similarly, a citizen has the right to switch to another language that gives more life opportunities. Russian is such a language in Russia. (Tishkov, 2013: 14–15)

Thus, in the context of traditional groups, the goal is “consolidation”, which implies a unificationist agenda and would result in a further shift in policy emphasis from accommodation towards assimilation. It is symptomatic that the term “(cultural) integration” is applied in diversity management only in the context of immigrants and the “near abroad”.

2.2 Policy towards migrants

2.2.1 Sociolinguistic situation

While the policy of merging the numerous nationalities of the USSR into a Soviet people failed, the policy of spreading Russian as the language of the builders of communism not only in Russia but also in the other Soviet Republics and the countries of the Soviet bloc was quite effective (see Pavlenko, 2008). The reason might be that the spread was achieved less as a result of the language policy, which might provoke resistance, but more as a by-product of structural societal changes that favoured the use of Russian as the language of “wider communication”, which, in Soviet and post-Soviet terminology, is called “the language of inter-nationality communication” (see Koenig, 2000: 66). The role of Russian as a *lingua franca* in the USSR became one of the major factors in post-Soviet times for Russia becoming a destination country for migration from the former Soviet republics.

In the early 1990s, for a number of reasons, primarily due to economic difficulties in many countries of the former USSR, ethnic Russians and other Russian-speakers started to return to Russia. Russia benefited from migration both economically and demographically, because these people compensated for a drop in the Russian population (Zakharov, 2015: 417). Since the late 1990s, their immigration was encouraged, *inter alia*, through the executive programme for the repatriation of “compatriots” (Presidential Decree, 22 June 2006), which targeted skilled workers with a knowledge of Russian. While the programme was directed, first and foremost, at ethnic Russians, up to half of the repatriates are reportedly of some other ethnicity.

According to official data, there were more than ten million temporary labour migrants in Russia. The approved quota for low-qualified foreign workers (1.6 million work permits for 2014) did not meet demand in any way. In 2015, about the same amount of labour migrants from the countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) have been able to obtain work patents. Up to fourth fifths of these three million people are former Soviet citizens or their descendants, and are now considered as aliens in Russia. There is large scale, uncontrolled labour migration from Central Asia and the South Caucasus. According to expert evaluations, three to five million were permanently employed illegally (see Zakharov, 2015: 341–342). However, in the last years, the number of labour migrants have dropped somewhat after the introduction of stricter requirements for their entry, stay and employment (see below).

2.2.2 *Language planning*

The position of migrants in Russian society is complicated. Some political forces view the large number of migrants as a threat that provokes inter-ethnic tension. This tension adds to the rise of ethnic Russian nationalism. Paradoxically, ethnic hatred is directed not only towards migrants from Central Asia or the South Caucasus, but also towards people from the North Caucasus, who are Russian citizens, which undermines the civic nation project. Xenophobia is expressed, for example, in negative attitudes to non-Russian speech on the street (see Verkhovskii, 2014: 24, 29–30).

Russian policy-makers identified the migrants' low knowledge of Russian or lack of it as a problem. Extensive studies ordered by the authorities demonstrate that the level of Russian knowledge has deteriorated significantly, especially in Central Asia. According to the estimates, up to 95 per cent of migrants have at least some knowledge of Russian, but only half of their family members do (Analytical Note, 2012: 42). Economic arguments and the value of Russian is also emphasised, and its knowledge is propagated by linking it to Russia's increasing competitiveness and the claim that it improves migrants' chances in life.

The authorities have taken some action to address the problem identified. In addition to arranging language courses and teacher training, there are language tests. Since 2014, Russian language proficiency was made compulsory in the work environment for migrant workers. From 1 January 2015, labour migrants were required to prove their knowledge of the Russian language, history and legal framework in order to obtain new or to renew old work permits and labour licences, or residence permits in Russia (Federal Law, 20 April 2014).

Knowledge of Russian is a pre-condition for “compatriots” acquiring Russian citizenship and, thus, for their emerging in the Russian legal space. The dominant purist ideology demands a near native knowledge of Russian. Language works here

as a mechanism of exclusion and marks the border of the national community. At the same time, the presence of both internal and external migrants makes Russian society much more diverse and multilingual than officials are ready to acknowledge (see, for example, the data testifying to the distribution of language knowledge among recent migrants in Vishnevskii, 2013: 134–137). One reason for their reluctance to acknowledge this everyday multilingualism might be the wish to represent Russia as a much more homogenous society than it actually is in order to justify their image of national identity.

2.3 Policy towards “compatriots abroad” and beyond

2.3.1 *Sociolinguistic situation*

The promotion of Russian in the USSR, in the Soviet *bloc*, and in the world at large became the core of language policy in the late Soviet period (see, e.g., Haarmann, 1992). As a result of this policy, according to estimates, there were a total of 312 million people in the world who knew Russian by 1990, of which 164 million had this language as their native language and 148 million spoke it as “second” or foreign language (see Arefiev, 2012: 390; this author presents official monitoring data of the Education Ministry). The dynamics of Russian since that time have been pre-determined by a number of recent trends connected to the changing position of Russian under the conditions of globalisation (see Ryazanova-Clarke, 2014: 11).

The first trend was a decline in the use of Russian in the post-Soviet states due to their nation-building programmes, which was prevalent especially during the decade following the collapse of the USSR. One effect of de-russification can be seen in the data that show that, during the two decades between 1990 and 2010, the number of ethnic Russians in the former Union republics decreased from 25.3 million to 14.8 million not so much due to assimilation as due to their departure to Russia and, more often, to Western countries. In the same period, the number of students learning Russian in the former Soviet Union republics fell by almost a half (from 28.3 million to 14.3 million students); among them, the number of those having Russian as the language of instruction in school decreased threefold (from nine to three million students); somewhat more instruction was maintained in higher education – for every sixth student (see Arefiev, 2012: 395–396).

The number of students learning Russian fell most significantly in other foreign countries, in particular in Central and Eastern Europe, where learning it used to be compulsory (from 20 million to 1.5 million students). By 2010, the number of people in the world who knew Russian fell to 260 million, including 146.8 million native speakers, and this tendency will continue if the situation in education is taken into account (for systematized data and a prognosis, see Arefiev, 2012). During the post-Soviet decades, Russian has had less prestige and was often associated as the

language of the Soviet Union and a vehicle of russification; for example, Russian ceased to be a *lingua franca* not just in the Baltic States but also elsewhere, where young people in particular often prefer to use English for this purpose.

Scholars point to an identity crisis for non-titular groups in the post-Soviet states. David Laitin suggested that, while, for some of these people, the Russian language ceased to be a marker of ethnicity, for the Russian nationalist discourse abroad in general, the Russian language was “the essential element of Russianness”. However, contrary to what he predicted, language has not replaced ethnicity as the identity marker among non-titular groups in the former Soviet Union republics, and a new identity for the “Russian-speaking population” has not emerged (see Laitin, 1998: 264–265, 320–321). The host states typically adopted differentiated treatment of these groups, according to their ethnicity: Russians, Ukrainians, *etc.*, and not as “Russian-speakers”. Yet, the post-Soviet states face difficulties in the integration of these people, because many of them continue to live in a Russian informational space.

An opposite trend of the growth in the use of Russian in some former Union republics was noted in connection to an economic growth in Russia in the first decade of the new millennium and consequently a higher value being placed on Russian. Some scholars argued that Russian retained its position as a regional *lingua franca*, notably, in such domains as transfrontier business or new information technologies (Pavlenko, 2008: 27). It was further argued that, due to economic factors, the demand for Russian language learning has somewhat increased. At the same time, the data presented above on the international decline of Russian speak for themselves, which can be explained by its demise as a language of opportunity and its lower international prestige its association with Putinism. Its status suffered considerably after the establishment of an authoritarian regime, but, in particular, attitudes towards the country may have been influenced by the events in Ukraine. There are vested interests in both overstating and understating the numbers and tendencies, for either assertive or alarmist reasons. More sociolinguistic research is needed on the functioning of Russian as a *lingua franca*.

2.3.2 *Language planning*

Despite the absence of transparency in the data produced to date, Russian politicians, at numerous parliamentary hearings, round-tables of legislative and executive authorities, have identified the decrease in the number of Russians and Russian-speakers worldwide and, in particular, in the former USSR countries, as a policy problem, and Russia has made significant efforts to turn the Russian-speaking population, first of all in the post-Soviet countries, into a “Russian diaspora” and into “compatriots”, to reinforce their connections to Russia and, thus, to discourage their integration in the host societies.

According to the law, “compatriots abroad” include not only Russian citizens living abroad, but also those former Soviet citizens and their descendants who “share common language, religion, cultural heritage, customs, and traditions” (Federal Law, 24 May 1999). The policy was to create the channels for direct inclusion of the “compatriots” into the Russian nation. Simultaneously, a broader interpretation was also present that drew in language and other ethnic elements (Malinova, 2010: 98). Since 2010, “compatriots abroad” also include those persons “who made free choice in favour of spiritual and cultural connection with Russia and who usually belong to peoples which have historically lived on the territory of the Russian Federation” (Federal Law, 23 July 2010; see Shevel, 2011: 192–193). Since 2014, citizenship process was eased for the ‘Russian-speakers’.

At the same time, Russia’s policy towards “compatriots abroad” is “permanently torn between two competing logics” (see Laruelle, 2009: 32–33). On the one hand, Russian authorities see their interest in attracting a skilled labour force in order to compensate for a continuing demographic decline in Russia, as already mentioned. On the other hand, the authorities also see that it is in their interest that Russian-speakers stay in the host countries in order to project Russian influence. Contrary to the expectation of some experts, the emphasis on the promotion of Russian abroad is directed as much at ethnic Russians as at other Russian-speakers, which could partially resolve this dilemma.

According to estimates based on national censuses, 61.7 million people possessed an active knowledge and 32 million people a passive knowledge of Russian in the CIS and the Baltic States around the years 2009–2012 (Arefiev, 2012: 432). The first number includes those who “constantly use the language” and correlates with the data on the knowledge of Russian among non-Russians in the USSR, according to the 1989 census and a possible trajectory from that. The second number includes those who, “to a certain extent, understand the language but do not use it as a communication tool and gradually lose language skills”, and is, at the very least, exaggerated, and not to mention problematical. Certainly, many of the former USSR citizens retain at least some knowledge but their generalised inclusion in the data reflects the wishful thinking of policy-makers.

The Kremlin considers the presence of large Russian-speaking communities in post-Soviet countries to be a political resource. Russian scholars have classified these countries into clusters in terms of demand for and knowledge of Russian. According to data on public opinion, the highest level of language knowledge is in Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine, in each of which about two thirds of the inhabitants are active users, including such domains as family, friends, and work. The highest level of language demand is reported in Tajikistan, Armenia, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan, with more than a third wishing to study or improve their knowledge of Russian (see Yatsenko, et al., 2008: 160).

The Russophones in the neighbouring countries are seen as the subjects of Russia's "compatriots" policy. In the late 2000s, the authorities intensified their activities to maintain Russia's influence, *inter alia*, since 2008 through the Federal Agency for the Affairs of the CIS, Compatriots Living Abroad, and International Humanitarian Cooperation, under the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The activities of the *Russian World Foundation* are specifically directed at the promotion of the Russian language and Russian culture abroad.

After Vladimir Putin's return to the Kremlin in 2012, Russia's foreign policy started to become even more pro-active with a focus on the countries of the former USSR. The 2013 Foreign Policy Concept added a policy goal of "consolidating the Russian diaspora abroad" (Presidential Decree, 12 February 2013). The Concept for State Support and Promotion of the Russian Language Abroad (3 November 2015) included the task of "increasing the motivation of compatriots abroad in maintaining the ethnocultural and linguistic identity".

It seems the authorities envisage two major policy devices to reach this goal. The first is the advancement of the position of Russian in schools. The schools with Russian-medium instruction are considered the key for the maintenance of Russian. The "Concept 'Russian School Abroad'" (4 November 2015) was approved as the basis for the development of an executive programme with the same name. The plan is that these schools will be created under Russian legislation or international treaty, or function under the national legislation of the host country.

The second device is the status planning of Russian, which is aimed to address the problem of the low level of its international prestige. Russia urges CIS members to establish an official status for Russian. The argument used is that this status would symbolically confirm the social role that Russian already has in the life of many countries. The status of "state language" is envisaged as the best choice, because it implies both a symbolic and a practical function. To date, Russian has the status of a state language only in Belarus (along with the titular language). The second best choice is the status of "an official language", which lacks the symbolic link to the statehood. Russian is used as an official language in Kyrgyzstan and can be officially used in Kazakhstan. Perhaps, unsurprisingly, Russian has also a co-official status in unrecognised republics of Transnistria, Abkhazia, and South Ossetia. The third choice, as in Moldova and Tajikistan, is the status of "the language of inter-nationality communication". A further possibility being considered is the status of "a minority language", which includes a responsibility on the part of the host state to secure the rights of its speakers under international minority rights treaties. In the event that this last option remains unavailable, the intention is to advocate the teaching of Russian as an (optional) study subject among other foreign languages in public schools.

It is within the sovereignty of individual countries to decide such issues as the designation of official languages or the selection of languages for the purpose of education. Russia is pressing for propositions on languages to be inserted into international treaties to which it is a signatory, both multilateral and bilateral (reportedly, 47 treaties in 2014). When some countries, first of all, the Baltic States, refuse, Russia applies pressure by arranging international campaigns for minority rights and against linguistic discrimination. In addition, Russia encourages Russian minority NGOs to demand that Russian be given the status of a second state language, notably, in Latvia. Although such an outcome is highly unlikely, a further incentive for this pursuit is that, in this way, Russian could become an official language of the European Union. Alternatively, populist political statements are also periodically made at official events that propose achieving the status of an EU official language using the possibility of collecting one million signatures from European citizens in favour of such a step.

3. Policy mechanisms of identity-building

3.1 From problems to goals

Data on recent policy developments demonstrate that the promotion of Russian has become *the* priority of Russia's language policy in different contexts, both inside and outside the country. The stage of the formulation of policy problems amounts to a representation of the situation in a certain perspective and involves social constructivism. It is possible to infer the peculiarities of the agenda-setting from the data on how the policy problems were framed. In all three contexts, the policy demand for the spread of Russian is ideologically constructed and substantiated in alarmist tones that describe the decline of the language as a result of hostile policies or of deviations from the linguistic norm.

An effective way to ensure that a particular issue is put on the policy agenda is to posit the situation in the context of threats. The identification of policy problems in the Federal Programme "Russian Language (2011–2015)" illustrates this in the following way:

[There is] a threat of disintegration of the united informational, educational, social-cultural, and economic space of the Russian Federation, the infringement of the personal rights of Russian citizens due to discrimination upon the basis of language, the weakening of national self-identification of the Russian citizens (*rossiane* – author's note), a decrease in the intensity of integration processes in the CIS and the Baltic States, [and] a decrease in Russia's prestige in the world community.

Notably, the executive document on language policy mentions integration and identification that are elements of the nation-building agenda, embracing aspects of both foreign policy and domestic policy.

The framing of the policy problems to which the promotion of Russian is presented as the solution indicates that the policy goal is not mere rationalisation but mobilisation based upon language. Language can be mobilised both to prove the existence of national identity and to impose it. The claim of a nearly universal knowledge of Russian by Russian citizens, although problematical, is nevertheless presented as proof that the national identity already exists (see, e.g., Tishkov 2013: 15). At the same time, mobilisation allows not only for the diffusion or spreading of a common language *within and throughout* the country, but also creates an image of the national community based upon language *beyond* its borders. Thus, language transcends the mutual exclusivity of alternative projects regarding the nation. The policy is led by its own logic of the maximisation of the diffusion of the language.

Language serves a dual function in society. Led by practical considerations, people not only choose useful languages, but also pursue status *vis-à-vis* speakers of other languages in their choice of language repertoires (see Laitin 1998). Language functions not only as a practical tool of communication but is also perceived as a symbol of the identity of the speaker, one which has a value both in and of itself. Pursuing language rationalisation, the policy-makers regulate a communication function by standardising the language use within certain domains. And by pursuing mobilisation based upon language, the policy-makers utilise its symbolic function, by manipulating the values attached to languages, thereby, reinforcing social and economic divides.

The two sides of language policy are further referred to as instrumental and symbolic policies. Even if, in reality, these instrumental and symbolic branches of policy overlap, one can generalise that the instrumental policy targets, first and foremost, language practices through the regulation of the practical use of a language in the institutional context while the symbolic policy targets language ideologies. In this framework, what resources and policy devices have been employed in recent years to promote the use of Russian?

3.2 From resources to tools

Pursuing an instrumental policy, Russian policy-makers have provided institutional support for the promotion of Russian both within the country and abroad. The volume of support has depended on discursive resources such as demographics and functional status, which contribute to the ethnolinguistic vitality of groups in

different contexts. In order to legitimatise the policy, policy-makers use the data of population censuses, statistics, as well as the data produced in sociolinguistic research. Clearly, these data are only representations of the actual situation and can be manipulated. For example, as was pointed out above, the data on language knowledge is problematical.

These representations then serve as the basis upon which claims for language status are made. Language status is a powerful legal tool that legitimises one language and de-legitimising other languages, and is functional both for the reproduction of demographic resources and for its instrumental use in spreading the language. It is no wonder then that status planning of Russian, along the institutional support for acquisition planning, prestige planning, and corpus planning, have become the main policy device. A variety of social, political, and legal statuses is employed, as the language performs several social functions not only in Russia itself, but also abroad. Language status is a device which also enables (demands for) institutional support for language from the governments of the neighbouring countries.

While every public policy has a “material” and “symbolic” dimension, language policy is primarily a symbolic policy due to the fact that language is its target and tool. Accordingly, institutional measures aim not only at some immediate tangible changes, for example, the production of language knowledge, but also at creating representations for the production of meaning. Symbolic policy creates discursive resources based upon social values. Institutions reinforce identities not only instrumentally but also by creating a symbolic reference-point for people to associate with. Notably, status becomes an important device of symbolic policy, which sustains and transforms language ideologies (see Malinova, 2010: 91–92). This is why the political battles over the labelling of social phenomena were among the most heated.

Accordingly, in addition to the quantitative data manipulation, the discursive entities themselves are constructed in a way which is designed to suit policy goals. Assigning status not only influences the prestige of a language, but also reinforces and sometimes creates identities. For example, the free choice of the language that individuals use limits state intervention in the private sphere. However, state policy could also indirectly interfere in the private sphere by means of the normative use of terms that facilitate a seemingly “voluntary” choice of language by individuals, who shift to using the dominant language for economic and other reasons. Among the terms that represent statuses, we can find, for example, “the language of inter-nationality communication” or “the *lingua franca*” in its original narrow sense as the medium of communication between linguistically diverse populations without ever being the native tongue of any group. The latter function takes place in several contexts: in Russia itself among ethnic non-Russians and among migrants, and outside Russia among “Russian-speakers”.

In denying accusations of an assimilationist objective, policy advocates sometimes argue that, in this case, the language is promoted only for communicative use with no explicit reference to its role as an identity symbol. However, by acquiring a language, an individual also inwardly digests a system of representation that provides a shared world view with common values, a Humboldtian *Weltanschauung*, which can be manipulated in symbolic politics (see Koenig, 2000: 59–60).

Among the discursive resources at hand, the most effective one is when the state imposes the dominant language with an official status, thus, sanctioning its compulsory use. In the post-Soviet discourse, the status of “state language” is connected both to the nation and the state, because it bears both the symbolic function of the national language and the practical function of the official language as the working language of the public authorities (see Zamyatin, 2014: 16–18). This status is the nexus of the instrumental and symbolic aspects of language policy and nation-building.

The symbolic function of “state language” status should suffice, in the context of a civic nation, to emphasise the special role of a common language without necessarily impeding the use of other languages. As in some other countries, the legitimate inclusion of migrants into the community is conditional on their compulsory knowledge of Russian as the state language. This conditioning was a response to the influx of newcomers from the former USSR republics and to the rise of xenophobia and ethnic nationalism. If the concept of “the state” is re-defined to mean the nation-state, the concept of the “state language” should automatically match the contours of the nation under state nationalism. The literal meaning of the concept “state language” is that this is the language of the state.

However, if the new strategic aims include the incorporation of an ethnic component that extends beyond existing political borders, state language status does not function as an effective mechanism of mobilisation. The statuses of the language of inter-nationality communication and the *lingua franca* among non-Russians in Russia do not meet this aim, either. The role of language as a *lingua franca* does not presume the need for a nation-state. The Soviet Union was not a Russian nation-state, even if Russian was its *lingua franca* (see Brubaker, 1996: 28–29). Among proposed formulas to signify the changing role of the Russian language in society, one was explicitly applied in an ethnic context, according to which Russian is represented as “the national language of the (ethnic) Russian people”, as in the Federal Programme “Russian Language (2002–2005)” (Government Decree, 27 June 2001).

To date, the search has not resulted in a new formula. Nowadays, the new symbolic role is encoded in the euphemisms that describe “Russian as the fundamental basis of civic self-identification, cultural and educational unity”, as in the current Federal Programme. “The language of the nation” is expected to function as a tool

of mobilisation and inclusion of both non-Russians in Russia, through the demand of its “nearly native knowledge”, and of Russian-speakers abroad, through the policy of “the consolidation of the Russian diaspora”.

3.3 From actions to results

The interplay of ethnic and linguistic identity adds momentum to identity politics. To date, language occupies a significant, though not the leading, place in the identity structure of Russian citizens (see, e.g., Tolz, 2001: 262–263; the recent data are less reliable but, reportedly, the identity structure has not significantly changed). In this context, it seems that the rationale behind the actions of the authorities is to break this conjunction of ethnic and linguistic identity in order to enable identity-building upon the basis of the Russian language. It seems that the domestic policy is aimed not at outright eradication of alternative ethnic identities but at loosening institutionalised identities. However, the recognition of multiple identities accompanies the creation of a hierarchy amongst them with national identity at the top. Simultaneously, multilingualism is being ignored, and a shift in linguistic identity towards Russian is being encouraged.

The application of a monolingual ideology in defining the group creates the image of a homogenous category (see Blommaert & Verschueren, 1998: 207–208). Along with Orthodox Christianity, language knowledge is considered as a stronger basis for categorisation than ethnicity, *inter alia*, in ascribing someone as belonging to the “Russian World”. The incentive for an alternative transfrontier Russian nation-building project is that it capitalises on existing language repertoires and the task involves only a symbolic reshuffling in the hierarchy of the multiple identities that a large portion of the populations of some neighbouring countries tend to have, which can be done relatively quickly. At the same time, while the demographic resource is rapidly narrowing as a result of the nation-building efforts of the post-Soviet states, there are limited discursive and material resources to pursue a language-diffusion policy abroad.

Policy-makers take advantage of an open-ended definition of Russianness to ascribe an ethnicity by language and to extrapolate desired interpretations on whole groups, although the people might actually identify themselves in a complex way, for example, as Russian-speaking ethnic Ukrainians. The fact that people are bilingual and multilingual, and that Russian is just one language in their repertoires vanishes in the gap between hierarchised identities. At the same time, language repertoires also increase “identity repertoires”. However, language repertoires and status considerations do not always reveal language attitudes. Moreover, such qualifications as self-identification and loyalty to Russian are often necessary to understand the attitudes.

Policy-makers are cautious to avoid describing the project in ethnic terms and take care to define “compatriots abroad” as “Russian-speakers” instead of “ethnic Russians”. The former is less specific and can be applied to broader target groups. Building of a nation based upon language is considered to be more legitimate than the one based upon ethnicity. This aspiration, however, will face difficulties. Policy-makers are not free to invent and reinterpret concepts for the social construction of identities because they themselves are bound by the range of discursive resources that they use. In other words, along with other cultural attributes, it is language repertoires that confine the range of possibilities for identity-building.

Conclusion

The study of the language policy of the Russian state has demonstrated that, in the last decade, the promotion of the Russian language – both domestically and internationally – has become a policy priority. The argument of this chapter was that the promotion of Russian is to be comprehended as part of a nation-building agenda. Since Soviet times, language policy – both formally and substantially – is part of the nationalities policy and its goals are subordinated to the goals of nationalities policy. It is an early Soviet legacy that language was linked to territory in the building of “Socialist nations”. Without breaking this link, a late Soviet legacy was to spread Russian by enhancing its role as the language of inter-nationality communication as a step towards “merging” “Socialist nations” into a “Soviet people” and influencing the countries of the Soviet *bloc*.

This pattern repeated itself in post-Soviet Russia. In the early 1990s, the recognition of a “multinational” character of the state included the status planning of some languages, but the policy goals did not include multilingualism. In the 2000s, authoritarian tendencies coincided with the development of a nation-building agenda and a renewed emphasis on Russian as a tool of identity-building aiming at the homogenisation of the population. Since the 2010s, nation-building officially became the goal of nationalities policy, but the focus of language promotion was also extended to “compatriots abroad”.

When the management of linguistic and ethnic diversity is historically arranged through the territorial principle, as it is in Russia, language is a thick identity category, which limits the room for re-interpreting identities. As a result, a nationalist project cannot just omit the language issue. It is part of the discursive game that the issue of language somehow should be addressed in the project. More than a decade ago, David Laitin argued that the Russian state – as the representation of the Russian people – was at the centre of Russian national discourse while the Russian nationalist discourse abroad was focused on the Russian language. During the last decade,

the Russian authorities have endeavoured to overcome this division and present a coherent narrative about the nation by merging the two. The goal is to be achieved through a “top-down” policy approach in which the state is the main policy actor.

The analysis demonstrated that – both in its instrumental and symbolic aspects – the policy serves the goal of nation-building. The data analysed in the three contexts shows that the policy measures are directed primarily at symbolic change, because, inside the country, Russian, anyway, is already the dominant language used both in the public, and, more and more, in private spheres, and opportunities are limited for the instrumental promotion of Russian abroad, especially since Russia went into recession. The policy mechanism in the country involves steps to break the link between language and ethnicity and to diminish the significance of language as an identity marker. In this way, language is officially presented as being culturally neutral, which is also done to encourage its role as a *lingua franca* in the “near abroad”. But the recent emphasis on Russian as a cultural attribute of the nation undermines its integrative function. Continued efforts and a change of generation are needed to achieve the desired change in the discourse. For the time being, language remains a significant marker of identity.

Thus, instead of being just another construct in the discourse, language itself dictates the content of the projects, inclining them towards including the cultural attribute. A nation needs symbols, and language can be one of them. The Russian language is simultaneously a symbol of a civic identity, of an ethnic Russian identity, and of the state itself. In the link between nation and language, the first influences the second and *vice versa*. As a result, language is an element shared by nearly all the nationalist projects and might even be their lowest common denominator as the most inclusive marker. This link pre-disposes the re-definition of national identity to be based upon language. The promotion of Russian in all three dimensions of language policy contributes to the reinforcement of the linguistic emphasis in the projects. While nation-building imposes monolingualism, language, in its turn, to a large extent pre-determines the route of nation-building along linguistic lines.

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The impact of mobility and migration on the identity-constructing policy in Brussels

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The Belgian model is based upon monolingual territories and the integrative power of the two traditional “imagined communities” of Dutch and French speakers. The institutionalisation of this policy in the 1970 led to a particular political model without a national language, national political parties, national education or national media.

For Brussels, this resulted in a complex model of dual bilingualism with two language communities and a situation of partial power-sharing. Since then, however, Brussels has been subject to a diversified form of migration which has led to the current situation in which half of the population has non-Belgian roots. This results in a highly multilingual and multicultural environment.

However, this identity-constructing policy based upon the two traditional language groups no longer meets the expectations of this diverse population. This chapter focuses on the confrontation between top-down identity-constructing bilingual policy and the framing of the political debate, on the one hand, and the sense of belonging in a multilingual and multicultural setting, on the other.

1. Introduction

More and more European cities are characterised by the growing multilingual nature of their populations. In order to understand the debate on urban multilingualism in a specific city, one has to take the historical context and the delicate role that language issues have played into account. Due to a long history of language conflict, language and identity are two key elements in Belgian politics. In the continuous process of state reform, identity construction is frequently used as a political strategy, as part of the protection of the traditional language communities (Witte & Van Veldhoven, 1999; 2011). In a situation of geographical language contact, as is the case in Brussels, the partial “shared rule” model, based upon the transfer of political responsibilities to the two traditional language groups, is used to solve

language and culture-related conflicts. It enables both language communities to develop their own strategies within the same geographical area. However, a political mindset based upon a society divided into two exclusive and exhaustive language communities collides with the reality of linguistic diversity that asks for a different political approach.

This chapter deals successively with the historical basis of Belgian language policy: it describes its translation into the current Brussels model, discusses the impact of immigration on this policy, and, finally, depicts the reaction of the multilingual and multicultural population on the current dual identity-constructing policy. The analysis of the Brussels case can serve as an example of the consequences of urban diversity and its political implications, and, as such, may provide interesting thoughts for language policy in other European cities as well.

2. The basis of Belgian language policy: From a personality to a territoriality principle

The history of Belgian language policy is an example of the mutual interaction of language use, social identity-building and political power in a process of state formation. Although the freedom of language use was one of the fundamental rights (Article 30) taken up in the Constitution of 1831, it has always been a contested issue. The Romance-Germanic language border divided the new country into two parts: north of this border, people spoke Flemish dialects (related to the Dutch language), while, in the south, different Walloon and Picardian dialects were used as local vernaculars (related to the French language). In both parts of the country, the political, economic, cultural and religious elite spoke French. In this context, freedom of language use was synonymous with the use of French. The linguistic divide was essentially a social divide. The rise of the political impact of the Flemish Movement, initially a cultural and intellectual movement striving for the conception of a standard variety of Dutch and the recognition of the Flemish culture, resulted, in 1898, in the so-called “Equality Law”, which indicated that both French and Dutch were considered as equal languages in court cases and in the administration. However, despite the constitution, general bilingualism for the entire territory seemed politically unrealisable. The only solution seemed to be the demarcation of the area where Dutch was acceptable as an official language. In this way, the personality principle was replaced by the territoriality principle. Initially, the linguistic status of municipalities was made dependent on the ten-yearly language censuses. In the heated political climate after World War II, the results of the census were paralysing the country, and a more stable and permanent solution was needed. By fixing the language border in 1963, the language status of the municipalities

is detached from the number of speakers of the official languages. The language border also became a political and administrative one.

Monolingual communities are the norm. A first exception to the ideal of monolingual territories can be found in the 27 municipalities along the language border, which grant so-called “language facilities” to their inhabitants. Citizens speaking an official language other than the official language of the municipality, can use that language in contact with the government and as a language of education at primary school level. Nevertheless, the language itself is not considered as an official language and cannot be used as the language of governance. The second exception to the monolingual logic is Brussels, labelled as the “bilingual Brussels Capital Region” (in short “Brussels”, as it will be used here) where both French and Dutch hold an equal status independently of the number of speakers (Witte, 2009). By dissociating the official language of the municipality and the home language of the inhabitants, official linguistic minorities do not exist according to Belgian legislation. This has its consequences in the context of the international protection of language minorities. Although the Belgian national government signed the “Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities”, a treaty of the Council of Europe, the Flemish government refused to ratify it because they do not want the French speakers in Flanders/Vlaanderen (the Flemish Region) to be regarded as a minority, as is




Figure 4.1 The Belgian multi-level political approach


specified in this convention. It illustrates the possible tensions between the national solutions for dealing with language issues and the international approach towards the protection of linguistic minorities. In this regard, a short introduction into the genesis of Belgium's language policy is essential.

One can define the Belgian political mindset as a system built on two democracies divided by the language border where gradually more legislative power is given to the regional councils of Flanders and Wallonia and to the Flemish, French- and Dutch-speaking Communities. The devolution of the political power from the national level to the sub-state echelon allowed for more local control over certain tools regarding cultural and economic policies. Communities are competent for issues related to language and culture (for instance, cultural policy, education, health policy, social welfare, immigrant integration policy, *etc.*). Next to the communities, the regions are competent for territorial issues (the economy, employment, environmental issues, energy, transport, geographical planning, nature conservation, supervision over local authorities, *etc.*). If the regions or communities have authority over one specific policy domain, they exercise their authority autonomously and cannot be overruled by the federal level. This results in a country without national political parties, without a national language that is an official language for the country as a whole, without national media, and without a national education system.

From a marker of social identity, language became a marker of regional identity. The "territorialisation of language" (Javeau, 2016) led to the institutionalisation of two "sub-nation states" with their own political and administrative institutions and an educational system passing the language and the culture of the region towards the next generation. However, this has not stopped the tensions between the two traditional language communities from still dominating the political debate. The current political model is based on the pacification of the conflicts between these communities. Pacification politics refer to a policy that tries to prevent conflicts rather than solving them (Dewachter, 2001). The result is a highly-developed sense of compromise (Houben, 2005), resulting in an *ad hoc* agreement which reflects a common denominator at the time of the political negotiations, one which fails to result in a clear coherent political model. The solution is temporary by definition. Parallel to the development of the Belgian state structure, more competences were transferred to the European level as well, sometimes contradicting the Belgian political pacification logic based upon territoriality. Language policy, which, from a historical point of view, focuses on solving particular local problems, has to take the international context, often based on other concepts and principles, into account. In the current context of migration and intra-European mobility, language and identity politics have gained in importance.

3. Urban bilingualism according to Brussels standards

Within Belgium's political logic, Brussels takes a special place. To understand the current political tensions on language issues in Brussels, one has to take the basics of language policy, as described in previous part, into account. Due to the social status of French in the nineteenth and the first half of the twentieth century, Brussels shifted from a city in which the overall population spoke a Dutch dialect, to a region with French as the *lingua franca*. The "Frenchification" of Brussels was mainly caused by Dutch-speakers who started to use French as a (second) home language, and an educational system with French as the language of instruction, rather than by a high influx of French-speakers dislodging the autochthonous or indigenous Dutch-speakers. Learning French was an indication of their aspiration for upward social mobility. It is in this context that we must understand the evolution of the results of the consecutive language censuses. Figure 4.2 illustrates the Frenchification of the former dominantly Flemish city of Brussels in the nineteenth century (De Metsenaere, 1990). The percentage of unilingual Dutch-speaking inhabitants decreased from almost 70 per cent in 1846 to less than 10 cent in 1947. At the same time, the percentage of unilingual French-speaking citizens increased, albeit with fluctuations, from slightly over 30 per cent in 1846 to almost 40 per cent a century later. However, since the end of the nineteenth century/beginning of the twentieth century, the largest language group has spoken both French and Dutch. Although bilinguals were the dominant group, they did not fit the Belgian political mindset. A



Source: Belgian Law Gazette, see www.docuvlaamserand.be. [DU = Dutch; FR = French; GE = German]

Figure 4.2 Percentage of the Brussels population per language group, based upon the language censuses

bilingual urban community where the majority of the citizens master both languages, was never a political premise for the solution of the language contact situation in the Belgian historical context where monolingual communities were the ideal.

When fixing the language border, the Brussels Capital Region is the only officially bilingual area in Belgium, with both Dutch and French speakers sharing the same official status, regardless of the number of its speakers. The agreement on the protection of Dutch in Brussels is part of the delicate Belgian system of checks and balances between the two main language communities, in which the Dutch-speaking minority is “over represented” at the Brussels level, while other protection mechanisms at national level prevent the overall Dutch-speaking majority from outnumbering the French-speaking community in the national parliament. But the basic assumption of the political model, which pre-supposes that every citizen is a member of one of the language communities, holds true for Brussels as well. There is a clear difference between the political mindset and discussions about it, on the one hand, and the reality of language use in everyday life, on the other. The linguistic composition of the population, as reflected in Figure 4.2, hardly permits an individual to be exclusively linked to one of the two prescribed “imagined communities” (Anderson, 1991). Given the high number of bilinguals, language proficiency, as such, is not a criterion but rather the feeling of being part of one of the two communities. The political concept of “sub-nationality”, defining a clear criterion for membership, does not exist in the Brussels context. The institutionalisation of bilingualism “à la mode de Bruxelles” is such that, in all circumstances, a citizen must be able to speak his or her preferred language. The citizen is not supposed to be bilingual, the system is. Bilingualism means that, on every occasion, a citizen must have the free choice between French and Dutch, and that this choice is unconditional, so that a previous decision does not determine the next one. For instance, it implies that one can easily ask for an ID-card in Dutch and a driving licence in French, but that bilingual forms are not permitted since one must have the opportunity to choose between a form in French or one in Dutch.

This duality is also extended to education, with two independent systems with Dutch or French as the language of instruction, and where parents also have the unconditional free choice for each of their children while these children can switch between both systems as well. Education is one of the contested issues between both groups and is a crucial element in the identity-policy of the Dutch-speaking minority (see Janssens & Vaesen, 2015). The institutionalisation of education is a perfect illustration of the relation between official languages or language groups. A comparison between the education systems of different bi/multilingual regions (in this case Montréal and Luxembourg) serves to clarify matters here. The educational system in Montréal (see, also, McAndrew & Janssens, 2004) can be considered as a hierarchical dual system under the umbrella of one ministry of education. French

is the dominant language and all children have to attend French-medium education. There is a smaller English-medium system as well, although this is reserved for Canadians with English antecedents. English-speaking African immigrants, for instance, have to attend the French-medium schools and are denied access to English-medium schools even if English is their home language. In Luxembourg, which has three official languages,¹ there is a unique educational system in which the different languages are used as the language of instruction at a particular moment in the curriculum, with the expectation that all citizens will become trilingual. Where Montréal implements a policy based upon the integration of the population into the dominant group meanwhile recognising a specific (well-defined) minority for which education is provided, Luxemburg focuses on learning languages and not on language groups. In Brussels, the situation is more ambiguous. Education was trying to link the theoretical dual model of two monolingual communities with a largely bilingual population.

4. From bilingual to multilingual Brussels

The current political model, based upon the two traditional language communities, originates from the pacification of the political situation before 1960. Since then, the population of the Brussels region has changed radically. Labour migration, organised by the Belgian authorities, led to the presence of a Turkish and Moroccan immigrant community in Brussels, next to other Mediterranean nationalities that were already prominently present in the capital. The Belgian colonial past resulted in a strong African presence as well, after the independence movement in 1960–65. As one of the main capitals of the European Union (EU) and as the NATO headquarters, Brussels also hosts a lot of rich western immigrants, the so-called “expats”. In its slipstream, other international organisations and companies have opened offices in Brussels, thereby attracting a highly-skilled international labour force. With the events following the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, the direction of the immigration changed from south to north into east to west. The enlargement of the EU and the right of nationals of the Member States to move and reside freely within the EU territory, led to the presence of a large group of Polish, Bulgarian and Romanian immigrants. Conflicts and a worldwide economic crisis (2008-) resulted in an influx of individuals or small groups of economic refugees, which has recently increased sharply with arrivals from conflict zones in Asia and Africa. While most of the people in the previous enumeration can be classified as traditional migrants, new forms of mobility are also having a growing impact on Brussels. Institutional,

1. Luxembourgish, French and German.

geopolitical and technological changes have enabled an increase in the magnitude and speed of the circulation of people and information around the world, all of which change the nature of migration, resulting in a high number of temporary residents. Currently, more than 50 per cent of the Brussels population has non-Belgian roots. This all inevitably results in an increasing linguistic diversity.

Belgium has kept no statistics of the linguistic background of its inhabitants since the last census data of 1947. The Language Barometer Research project is the first scientific survey-study that has been attempted to sketch a representative picture of the language situation in Brussels. The project tries to give a representative picture of the language relations in Brussels in all their complexity, to obtain a clear understanding of the dynamics generated by these language relations, and to acquire an insight into the relationship between language and identity. Today, the project consists of three surveys in Brussels and one in the periphery of the city (see Janssens, 2001, 2007, 2013, 2014a, 2014b). Every survey is based upon 2,500 face-to-face interviews of a representative sample of the adult Brussels population. The samples are selected from the National Population Register based upon age, gender and municipality. The method guarantees that the results are representative at the level of the Brussels-Capital Region. The figures on the linguistic background of the current population illustrates a drastic shift in the home language situation of the adult inhabitants of Brussels during the last decade. The figures in Table 4.1 refer to the family in which the primary language acquisition took place. The home language is defined as the language or languages that one grows up with: the language or languages that the parents use in communication with each other and with the respondent. The categorisation of the home languages is based upon the official languages. Five categories are retained: Brussels residents that grew up in a family that only spoke French; a family that only spoke Dutch; a traditional bilingual family that spoke French and Dutch; new bilinguals who grew up in a family that spoke French combined with a language other than Dutch; and other language speakers who grew up in a family that did not speak Dutch or French. The number of families coming from abroad and adapting Dutch as their second home language is too restricted to be included in a separate category.

Table 4.1 Home language of the family of origin

Home language	Survey 2001 Overall results	Survey 2013 Overall results
French	51.7%	33.6%
Dutch	9.1%	5.4%
Dutch/French	10.1%	14.1%
French/Other language(s)	9.4%	14.9%
Other language(s)	19.7%	32.0%

Source: Janssens (2013).

The group of Brussels residents from monolingual French-speaking families is the largest, but, whereas it represented over half of Brussels residents at the turn of the century, it is currently reduced to one third of the adult population. The number of Brussels residents from monolingual Dutch-speaking families continues to fall. Together, both groups do not even represent 40 per cent of the population. Among youngsters (18–25 years old), traditional monolingual families speaking one of the official languages only account for one third of the population. It appears that the official languages are increasingly spoken in families that combine them with another home language. For the youngest age category, bilingual families are the majority and, as such, as natural as French-speaking or Dutch-speaking families in the past.

5. The end of traditional language socialisation

The political and social structures of Brussels, based upon two official languages, originate from the complex interplay between the concepts of regions and communities as part of the Belgian pacification process. In the previous sections, the genesis of this complex system was explained in brief. The language conflicts between Dutch-speakers and French-speakers has shifted from a cultural conflict between Dutch-speakers and a French-speaking elite towards a political conflict between two parts of the country. Mass migration of Dutch-speaking working-class people from the rural north to the industrial south in the nineteenth century had no impact on this conflict, since improving their living conditions was much more crucial for them than the recognition of their cultural and linguistic background. Language as a *social* marker of identity was gradually replaced by language as a *political* marker. In Brussels, Frenchification was a process of language shift, rather than a conflict between two different communities. Nevertheless, the citizens of Brussels are supposed to be a member of one of those two communities, of which the majority is living in another region. There is no clear membership criterion that links an inhabitant of Brussels directly to one of the two communities, but the communities are represented by institutions such as education, cultural organisations, *etc.* The unconditional free choice is in line with the rationale of the territoriality principle where the link between individual language behaviour and the structural political component is cut. In Brussels, this political component is translated into two ideal types, the monolingual Dutch-speaking and monolingual French-speaking family as the emanation of the political system with Flemish and Francophone political parties. The way in which the regional elections are organised is an illustration of this political mindset. In the electronic voting booth, the Brussels citizen must first make the choice between the screen with the list of French-speaking or Dutch-speaking political parties, after which he or she can make an ideological/political choice. Clearly, reality is much more complex than the assumed structural approach. The

permanent struggle with bilinguals and the way bilingualism is politically dealt with, or not dealt with, serves as an illustration of this approach. Nowadays, the situation turns out to be even more complex. The citizens that grew up in a monolingual Dutch-speaking or French-speaking family, the two types of families corresponding to the dual community model, became a minority themselves within Brussels. This raises the question of to what extent the traditional structures of language socialisation still play their pre-supposed role? How do people with a mixed or allophone language² background fit into this model?


When, after the Second World War, the shortage of labour in Belgian industry was answered by an active recruitment of labourers from the Mediterranean area, migration was considered as an economic problem and integration was not an issue as these so-called “guestworkers” were supposed to go back to their country of origin at the end of their employment. The oil crisis in 1974 initiated a “migration stop”, signifying that the only legal possibility for foreigners to enter the country was for family re-unification or as a political refugee. Meanwhile, the growing impact of Brussels as one of the capitals of the EU resulted in an influx of highly-qualified West-European immigrants working for the European institutions and the international organisations and companies that accompanied this EU presence. Given their perceived higher social status and the economic returns on their presence, they were absent from the political debate on language issues. Although, every year, thousands of non-Belgians entered the country mainly *via* Brussels (the “migration stop” had a temporary reducing effect since only 40,000 people annually came to live in Belgium, but, since the 1990s, their number has been growing, and, since 2014, these figures fluctuate around 165,000), there was no migration policy as such. The fact that non-Belgians were excluded from political decision-making since they had neither passive nor active voting rights, made them invisible in the political debate on Brussels, even though one third of the inhabitants of the Brussels Capital Region has a foreign nationality. This changed in 1996 when, according to the Treaty of Maastricht, EU-citizens obtained passive voting right for local (and European) elections. Since 2004, all non-Belgians who have been living in the country for more than 5 years have the same right as well. The Flemish political parties in Brussels and its periphery, in particular, feared that these new voters would connect with the French-speaking parties, thereby endangering the precarious equilibrium between the traditional language communities. This fear proved unfounded as very few of them made their way to the ballot box, given the complex procedure that preceded the vote.

Nevertheless, since the turn of the century and definitely after the 9/11 terror attacks in the US (11 September 2001), the migration and multicultural policies of

2. A person of which the family language is other than Dutch or French.

several European countries has been called into question (Vertovec & Wessendorf, 2010). Whereas discussions on migration had previously been conducted within an economic framework, now cultural integration and assimilation became more and more important. In the Belgian context, migration policy is the responsibility of the national level, and focuses on preventing people from entering the country illegally and on the expulsion of illegal immigrants. Integration policy, however is the political responsibility of the language communities. This results in a different policy north and south of the language border. As is the case in Germany, The Netherlands, Austria and Denmark, the Flemish Community applies mandatory integration courses for newly-arrived immigrants focusing on language learning. In contrast, the Francophone Community, like France, focuses on voluntary integration programmes (CSES, 2013). There is one exception: EU nationals cannot be subject to this integration policy since it may function as an extra protective threshold on the labour market which does not apply to people with Belgian nationality. Because of the specific situation in Brussels and the free choice between the services offered by both communities, there is no compulsory integration policy for adults, either. This leaves education as the only institution indirectly linking an immigrant to one of the two communities.

Keeping control over its own educational system is one of the main pillars of the Belgian system. For the Dutch-speaking minority in Brussels, education with Dutch as the language of instruction was crucial to the preservation and expansion of their language and culture. As in Flanders, the system focuses on children with Dutch as their family language. Figure 4.3 illustrates the remarkable evolution of the background of the pupils in the Dutch-medium schools in Brussels. Unfortunately, comparable figures for French-medium education are lacking.



Source: VGC

Figure 4.3 Home language of pupils in kindergarten of Dutch-medium schools

The Dutch-medium education system has always attracted French-speaking pupils, especially when a growing number of children from immigrant descent entered the French-medium system from the 1970s onwards. This resulted, in the early 1990s, in a situation with an almost equal proportion of pupils from a monolingual Dutch-, French- and traditional bilingual background. Almost 17 per cent spoke another language or languages at home. In the following 20 years, the number of Dutch-speaking children halved, the number of pupils from traditional bilingual and French-speaking families increased by 50 per cent, while the category of those children raised in families speaking other languages tripled. Nowadays, approximately 37 per cent have Dutch as a home language, but not even 10 per cent of the pupils come from a monolingual Dutch-speaking family. The majority of the pupils neither speak Dutch nor French at home. However, the pedagogical approach and the educational objectives are still grafted on a classroom with Dutch-speaking pupils. The pre-supposed emotional link between the citizens and the language communities represented by the language of instruction at school has become an instrumental one. The Dutch-medium system evolved from an educational system for the Dutch-speaking minority in Brussels to an educational system with Dutch as the language of instruction but open to all children. The current composition of the school population means that the original target population has become a minority among the pupils. The majority of children rarely use the language of instruction outside the school walls. Recently, the demographic evolution caused a capacity problem in the Brussels' schools. The question arises as to what kind of education Brussels needs. This is not just a technical or ideological discussion, but something that touches the everyday life of most families. Already, from the first language barometer survey, there was a clear indication that the majority of the respondents were not satisfied with this system (Janssens, 2001). The pedagogical approach based upon the language of instruction as the assumed home language is no longer suitable [to prepare youngsters for a culturally- and linguistically-diverse society. Thus, education has become the first structural component of the Brussels system that has been called into question more generally among the population.

6. Language, identification and political consequences

Brussels has become multilingual and diverse in all aspects of everyday life. The organisation of formal solidarity, still built on the duality of the two traditional communities with language representing the binding force in these communities, is put under pressure by this diversity. Education, as illustrated in previous section, is a fine example of this. The question arises as to how one creates an ordered society in such a pluralistic context and encourage people to display solidarity in

their behaviour (Komter et al., 2000), and what role language plays in this respect? Language is more than a simple means of communication; it plays a central role in forging relationships and consequently also in one's perception of "others." The theoretical approach adopted by Smolicz (Smolicz, 1981; 1991) refers in detail to the importance of language for both personal and group identification. In his study on the ethnically diverse Australian society, Smolicz concludes that each ethnic group has particular cultural values that are essential to the existence of the group, which he defines as core values. In a migration society, these values can shift over time, but linguistic loyalty seems vital for the very survival of the group itself. In Brussels, the political and social structures are based upon loyalty to one of the two traditional communities. This raises the question of whether, in a complex and diverse society, language as a core value can survive if the members of the group have multi-directional loyalties (Omoniyi & Fishman, 2006), and/or when language loses its symbolic function (Clyne & Kipp, 1999).

The analysis of the data on Brussels supports the above reasoning. In different domains, different loyalties and emotional choices are involved as a result of the complex interaction of language as an instrument of communication and as an identity marker. Based upon the data of the Language Barometer project there is a clear shift between the results of the 2001 survey and the 2013 survey from the use of French as *lingua franca* towards the use of a combination of languages, although the number of citizens fluent in French has hardly changed. The number of bilingual families has increased, the number of languages combined within the Brussels families has increased, in the work place the knowledge of all three working languages (Dutch, French and English) is needed, in different neighbourhoods local vernaculars which combine different elements of the dominant languages in that area are spoken, *etc.* The results on language use show that people do not always make a logical choice based upon the instrumental use of languages and do not automatically prefer the *lingua franca*. A multilingual urban society does not function based upon the most "rational" language choice, rational in the sense that language use strives for the optimal outcome based upon the linguistic resources of the participants in the interaction. With almost 90 per cent of the citizens mastering French, it is the greatest common denominator, but the use of the language as a single language of communication has declined. In a multilingual context, people speak and combine languages to a great extent, according to the context and the perception of the different languages in play (Janssens, 2013).

This diversity in language use is a strong indication that linguistic behaviour is not guided by the proposed integration of the citizens into one of the two language communities. The results of the Language Barometer Research Project provide an insight into the way in which autochthonous citizens and citizens from non-Belgian descent link up with the traditional political-linguistic divide. The

operationalisation of the relation between language and identity is analysed by incorporating a module on self-identification into the questionnaire. The respondents indicate to what extent they can identify themselves with a set of concepts that are commonly used within the political discourse on language and identity. They had the choice between several alternatives based upon language, geographical entity, ethnicity, and nationality. This does not mean that the selected concepts are the predominant factor upon which their identity is based or that they are not subject to change. Identity is, by definition, multidimensional and relative over time. Not only can a person use a different frame of reference over time, but the content of the terms with which they identify themselves are also subject to change, especially if they cover a sensitive political content. Consequently, the respondents were asked to make two choices: the category with which they could identify themselves the “most”, and the category with which they could “also” identify themselves.

Table 4.2 compares the results for the last two surveys for both Belgians and non-Belgians. It distinguishes four types of concepts: local geographical non-language related concepts (local municipality, Brussels); general geographical non-language related concepts (Belgium, Europe); concepts referring to the language communities (Dutch-speaker, Fleming, French-speaker, Walloon); and concepts which suggest a certain distance (cosmopolitan, alien, or “other” country). The figures refer to the relative number of respondents that mentioned the concepts as their first or second frame of reference. In the next section, we will discuss some of the most significant findings based upon a multiple classification analysis (MCA).

Table 4.2 Identification

Identification	Survey 2007		Survey 2013	
	Belgians	non-Belgians	Belgians	non-Belgians
Local municipality	9.1%	15.7%	37.1%	32.7%
Brussels	44.8%	26.7%	58.1%	42.3%
Belgium	72.5%	24.5%	43.8%	16.3%
Europe	31.2%	53.1%	11.9%	18.2%
Dutch-speaker	0.3%	–	4.4%	3.2%
Fleming	4.7%	–	2.8%	1.1%
French-speaker	23.3%	13.4%	20.6%	15.5%
Walloon	1.2%	–	3.1%	1.3%
Cosmopolitan	4.2%	5.5%	4.9%	10.8%
Alien	1.3%	7.2%	5.2%	18.4%
“Other” country	4.7%	48.0%	2.9%	12.8%

Source: Janssens (2013).

The most popular categories with which people identify are geographical non-language related concepts. The own municipality, Brussels, Belgium, and Europe are geographic entities that refer to the location where the respondents live. Irrespective of their linguistic background, they can be used by everyone as a basis for identification. What these concepts have in common is that they transcend the traditional linguistic divide and cannot be claimed by a particular language group.

Although one might assume that, at first glance, linguistic background has little to do with whether one identifies with the local level or not, the language or languages that were spoken in the family in which people grew up appear to be the most important variable to explain the variability of the different choices of identification. Mixed language families cite the municipality significantly more as their principal frame of reference. These people underline the positive aspects of the multilingual and multicultural character of their municipality. To them, it is more common to mix various languages at an adequate level than to switch to French as the *lingua franca*. People with Belgian roots prefer Belgium as their frame of reference, while inhabitants from immigrant descent consider themselves significantly more as “from Brussels”. The differences between both surveys for the Belgian nationals can partly be explained by the growing diversity within this group due to the naturalisation of third-country nationals. Europe is the least popular concept in this context and is mainly used by those who are directly or indirectly related to the European institutions as an employer; they are frequently using English as their *lingua franca* rather than French.

The group of language-related concepts is less popular. Whereas identification as a French- or Dutch-speaker directly refers to the language itself, Flemish and Walloon also refer to the duality that characterises the political landscape in Brussels. Almost 25 per cent of Brussels residents identify themselves with one of these language-related concepts. The original home language is the strongest predictor. What is remarkable is the incompatibility of being “Flemish” or a “Dutch-speaker”, as shown in the 2013 survey. Flemish is mainly used by those people born in monolingual Dutch-speaking families in Flanders; “Dutch-speakers” are the more urban-oriented highly-educated Dutch-speakers. This contradiction emerges throughout the analysis (Janssens, 2013).

Although language is the most decisive factor in the process of identification, it is only a minority of the citizens from a monolingual French- or Dutch-speaking family that consider the language community as their primary concept of identification. The linguistic background no longer automatically leads to an identification with one of the traditional language groups even for monolingual Dutch-speaking and French-speaking families. Local multilingual identification frameworks (the local municipality, Brussels, *etc.*) are on the rise. The more general multilingual identification frameworks (Belgium and Europe) are losing impact, but still remain

more important than the identification frameworks that refer directly to monolingual language groups or regions (Dutch, French, Flemish or Walloon). The dominant political mindset with two linguistic communities is no longer the main frame of reference of its inhabitants.

This identification is not important as a classification system as such, but as a basis to analyse to what extent it also shapes the way in which people act and make (language-related) political choices. For this purpose, the respondents were asked how they wanted to be represented at political level. In total, 30 per cent of the respondents want to be represented by a monolingual political list. Nevertheless, those who identify themselves as a “Fleming” or “Francophone”, or as a “Dutch-speaker” or a “French-speaker”, support a monolingual list significantly more. The majority of the citizens prefer a bilingual list. Especially those who see themselves as Belgian or *Bruxellois*, are over-represented within this group. Nearly 20 per cent of the inhabitants of Brussels believe language is an irrelevant criterion for political representation, a figure that is significantly higher among those born abroad. One may conclude that the city has become much more important as the frame for identification than the communities. Among the non-Belgians, citizens with the French nationality see themselves as part of the French-speaking community in Brussels, while other immigrants are primarily city-oriented.

7. The spearhead function of civil society

Although there is no mandatory integration policy in Brussels, newcomers are assumed to identify themselves with one of the traditional language communities. In 2014, the Brussels government agreed on a mandatory integration policy, but, to date, this has not yet been implemented. Their proposal is in line with the Brussels model with two parallel integration processes, one for each language community. In contrast with the political reality, the analysis of the identification process of both Belgians and non-Belgians proves that the dual political and institutional logic is losing ground. The city itself, characterised by a high degree of diversity, is playing an increasingly important role both in community-building and as the frame of identification. Social cohesion, bridging and bonding (Putnam, 2000), are no longer based upon the traditional notion of the Brussels bilingual society. The major tendency is to transcend the current institutional logic with “Brussels” and the “local municipality” as the plausible levels of identification. This tendency is not new. The first Language Barometer Survey (Janssens, 2001) already pointed at a number of elements within public opinion which contradicts the dominant political mindset. According to the 2001 survey, the majority of the inhabitants

of Brussels, both Belgians and non-Belgians, asked for a new political statute for Brussels. They wanted to decrease the involvement of the two traditional language communities, in favour of a regional approach with Brussels as the central integrating frame of reference.

In spite of the inertia at the political level, different small scale urban initiatives challenge the existing political structures. They take the multilingual and multicultural reality of the city as their starting-point. From 2004 on, small informal public platforms were popping up. In 2004 the Manifesto group was launched as an open citizens platform focusing on the question “Which community(ies) for Brussels?”, referring to issues like education, cultural policy, finance, the relations with the Flemish periphery and bilingual political parties. In 2005, *Bruxsel Forum* and *Aula Magna* were founded, two discussion *fora* on the future of a multilingual and multicultural future for Brussels (Nassaux, 2011). It was the start of a broader movement supported by civil society, the labour unions and the cultural and academic world, which resulted in the organisation of the Brussels Citizens’ Forum in 2008. Based upon scientific presentations, and a joint-effort of Dutch-speaking and French-speaking academics, discussions were organised all over Brussels during a period of six months. These discussions were held in a mixture of French, Dutch and English. The common ground upon which these discussions were based referred to Brussels as a small multicultural world city and the primacy of the city as a living environment (*Etats Généraux de Bruxelles*, 2010). Other organisations, such as the *Marnix-Plan-for-Brussels*, for instance, set up initiatives to promote individual trilingualism and language learning. Although it did not result in immediate political action, its importance lay in the networking capacity of the event and its influence on the agenda-setting of the political debate.

What all these initiatives have in common is their intention of reducing the impact and structural anchoring of both traditional language communities, and to expand the political competences of Brussels as a third region at the same level as Flanders and Wallonia. One recurring discussion is the possibility of shifting the authority over the competences exercised by the communities to the regional level. In the multi-layered Belgian political system, the language communities are competent for, among others, culture, education, and integration. These are the essentials of the identity policy as implemented by both communities, and, as a consequence, highly delicate to change since they are considered as the “life insurance” of the bi-community system. It explains the defensive attitude of the Dutch-speaking minority in Brussels, which locally enjoys the protection of its majority position at the Belgian level *via* these competences. Disturbing this equilibrium also threatens the protection of the French-speaking minority at national level. The most probable solution within the Belgian context is the creation of an additional structure

in Brussels within which collaboration can be organised but where the political responsibility still lies with both communities. However, the current situation is a political stalemate and a lack of top-down initiatives.

The main impact of mobility and migration is not the increasing presence of non-Belgians on the political scene, but the changing relationship between the traditional language communities. This goes hand-in-hand with the awareness of the gap between the situation in Brussels and in the rest of the country. The challenges which both language communities are facing in Brussels are the same, and differ in many respects with those that these communities are facing outside the capital region. While politicians are still looking for solutions within the traditional framework, civil society is slowly trying to bridge the gap between the communities. The most successful *rapprochement* is within the field of culture. In accordance with the political mindset, both the Flemish and the Francophone Community set up different structures to organise and support cultural organisations and initiatives. This makes it complicated for cultural operators in Brussels if they want to develop collaborative projects bridging these communities. As their funding mainly comes from the Francophone or Flemish Communities (depending on their official working language), almost no appropriate financial sources exist to encourage collaborative projects in the city. And notwithstanding the importance of culture for the own community, cultural expressions transcend – almost by definition – the classical linguistic divide. Artists are eager to take the lead in challenging society. Tired of waiting for the politicians to take action, the “Réseau des Arts à Bruxelles” and the “Brussels Kunstenoverleg” took the joint-initiative of drafting their own collaborative agreement, signed by more than 100 cultural organisations. Together, they have developed a “Cultural Plan for Brussels”. What is important here is that the main cultural institutions, subsidised by the communities, are the driving-force behind this initiative. By taking this position, they often even go against their own statutes. The “Cultural Plan for Brussels” challenges the current policy structure, starting from an urban-based approach managing culture and rejecting the monolingual and community-based framework (Constanzo & Zibouh, 2014). The arts sector may be considered as a progressive one, but even within (higher) education joint-initiatives are taken to encourage cooperation between institutions with a different language regime. The dual educational system has already been discussed in a previous section. This duality is also established at university level. In 2010, the rectors of the three main universities, two Francophone (*Université Libre de Bruxelles*, and *l'Université Saint-Louis*) and a Flemish one (*Vrije Universiteit Brussel*), signed an agreement to create the Brussels Studies Institute (BSI). The institute, funded by the regional authorities, functions as a network to encourage joint-research initiatives as well as to disseminate knowledge about Brussels by engaging with political decision-makers, civil society and individual citizens, in an interactive way.

While the Brussels region has no competences regarding the educational system, they indirectly support the cooperation between the institutions of both language communities.

While these grassroots initiatives originate from the changing multilingual and multicultural nature of the current urban society, people with a migration background and the international community linked to the EU-presence are scarcely represented. But, where civil society and some of their leading members formerly had strong connections to the existing political structures, now they support the vague idea of a “Brussels identity”. They can be seen as the forefront of a new elite, rejecting the identity-constructing policy of the current political mindset.

8. Conclusions

The political mindset starts from the assumption that the language background of the residents of Brussels is a binary zero-sum game, in which the citizens belong to either the French- and Dutch-speaking language community. In the first sections of this contribution, the genesis of the Brussels pacification model was discussed. Notwithstanding the drastic shift in the linguistic and cultural background of the citizens, this mindset has hardly changed. The political structures, depending on those of the rest of the country, are still ignoring the different reality of the city. Nevertheless, the choice between a community *versus* a city-oriented approach is scarcely on the agenda. The latter approach stresses the fact that Brussels can no longer be considered as a place in which two communities are living together, but as a highly diverse, small, world city that no longer fits the confines of the constitutional solutions of the Belgian pacification model. This city-oriented approach is widely discussed by the social actors in different domains of society: there is a call for change in education in general and for a different language-learning approach in particular, the idea of political representation does not run parallel with the political structures, and more regional political autonomy for Brussels is supported by the majority of the citizens. The first Language Barometer survey already pointed to an increasing “Brussels feeling” (Janssens, 2001).

One of the main differences with the traditional language arguments is the role of civil society, where new social agents emerge with different political norms and values. In the previous stages of the state reform process, civil society was the arena of political ideas supported by the traditional political families. In the current debate, different groups and organisations come with their own solutions that are based upon expert views in the domain in which they want to introduce changes. This evolution does not come out of the blue, but is part of the changing identity formation framework that evolved gradually from a linguistic to an urban one. It

is the urban identity that offers an alternative framework for identification, next to the political one based upon the traditional communities. This new cleavage divides both traditional communities. The evolution within the traditional Dutch-speaking community is a perfect illustration of it. In the twentieth century, if you spoke Dutch as a home language, you were considered to be a Fleming. At the end of that century, there was a discussion within that community as to whether they should be perceived as Flemings living in Brussels, or as people from Brussels who speak Dutch, which was already an indication of the difficult relation between a diversifying Brussels context opposing the rest of the Dutch-speaking community living in a predominantly Dutch-speaking Flanders. Today, identification as a Dutch speaker (urban vision) or as a Fleming (community vision) in Brussels are incompatible identities. A different, but comparable, evolution is taking place among the French-speakers who see themselves as *Bruxellois* (urban vision) or as Francophones (community vision), although both concepts are more compatible and are less subject to public debates (Janssens, 2013). Where this discussion seems to be restricted to the Belgian citizens, it is triggered by the effect of the presence of non-Belgians who serve to emphasise the particular situation of Brussels.

This identity shift is reflected in language use as well. Mobility and migration play a crucial role in this evolution. Although the overall majority of the citizen masters French, participants in a conversation do not tend to shift to this *lingua franca* but use a broader linguistic repertoire combining different languages and reflecting the multilingual nature of society. First of all, the relation between both official languages has changed: traditional bilingualism today is valued much higher than ten years ago, the number of children growing up in traditional bilingual families is increasing, and, in the Dutch-medium education system, there are more pupils speaking French at home than Dutch. The emotional value as languages of two communities is partly replaced by their instrumental value, and these languages are less and less considered as belonging to a specific community. Where, for instance, Dutch was considered as the language mainly used within the Dutch-speaking community, half of the group of citizens that indicate that they speak the language fluently grew up in a family where no Dutch was spoken, while the majority of the speakers that spoke the language as their home language combined it with another language. Meanwhile English has become the second best-known language and its use has almost “exploded” in the last ten years. While, in the first Language Barometer survey, English was referred to as a language often known but seldom spoken, nowadays, it is used frequently in daily conversations. Even in official communication, although not legally accepted, the language is used. As such, it became a second *lingua franca*. But it is not only these three contact languages that play an important role in daily life. The technological evolution means that citizens from all over the world are able to communicate with their friends and family in the

languages of their country of origin. These languages have a function in a transnational community, as is the case in Brussels, and are, therefore, part of the Brussels language repertoire and are also passed on to the next generation of youngsters. The use of Arabic is illustrative. Youngsters of second and third generation immigrants use it more often than their parents, although they will not speak standard Arabic but a local version mixed with French. The language is used for both local and international communication. Even Moroccans of Berber decent switch from Berber to the local Arabic, since it is perceived as being more prestigious within their community and among their peers (for an illustration, see Van Mensel, 2014).

This new attitude contradicts the monolingual identity-constructing policy of the Flemish and Walloon region, and results in a growing demand for an organisation representative of the Brussels region that can face the current challenges of diversity. The shift from prescribed imagined communities towards a regional urban identification requires new models of inclusion. Instead of stressing different languages as the core values of different groups in society, multilingualism should be valued as the core value of an urban society. Building an inclusive society in a multicultural and multilingual context fails when one expects to create a general sense of belonging based upon the language of one particular language community. A multilingual society can only function when people speak different languages. Monolingualism, even based upon the *lingua franca*, creates a new divide (Janssens, 2015). The present political organisation struggles with the multicultural and multilingual nature of its population and still focuses on the integration (read assimilation) of immigrants into the traditional language communities. In a city where half of the population is of foreign descent, one can no longer avoid the issues of transnationalism and multilingualism. Education, culture, and integration, three policy domains that are organised in Brussels by the language communities, should develop permanent structures of cooperation. However, the government fails to respond to these questions and one can wonder to what extent the current political capacity succeeds in incorporating this challenge. Where possible, as in the cultural world, a bottom-up approach uses the current setting to create these new structures or to re-define the existing ones. In this discussion, it is civil society, rather than the political world, that takes the lead. The government is no longer the only political actor. Other competent social agents within civil society reflect new visions and take part in the political debate, not as members of the existing political parties, but as separate organisations. This is not only the case in Brussels, but also in a growing number of other Belgian cities as well. The advantage of a politically bilingual city such as Brussels is that they are used to coping with language differences, while the problem is the harshness of the political structure based upon these differences. Due to migration, old models of inclusion are being questioned. What can definitely be learned from the Brussels example is that there is no single best model for solving

these problems. It is a (slow) step-by-step process of trial and error. Future research should focus on similar processes in other cities, in order to unravel the different coping strategies of both politicians and civil society in dealing with a multilingual and multicultural population.

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From glossophagic hegemony to multilingual pluralism?

Re-assessing the politics of linguistic identity in Europe

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The chapter assesses the politics of multilingualism in contemporary Europe by focusing on the role of options and ligatures in the framing of linguistic identities. Whereas nation-state construction mostly entailed the establishment of monolingual spaces that should make for a convergence of linguistic ligatures and linguistic options, the emergence of new transnational settings at different levels is contributing to an increasing disconnection between language-as-an-option and language-as-a-ligature that affects not only minority, but also majority, members. This dynamic may have important implications for how demands for linguistic recognition are articulated by different groups.

1. “Glossophagia” and the modern European polity

Linguistic nationalism has left a heavy imprint in the making of modern Europe. With the emergence of the European nation-state, political and linguistic borders became increasingly congruent, making for a patchwork of discrete political units characterised by distinct languages. Yet, it is not linguistic diversity *per se* which sets Europe apart from other areas of the world. Approximately 225 autochthonous languages are spoken in contemporary Europe. This is not much, in comparison with the Americas, Africa or Asia, where the number of the indigenous languages counted by linguists ranges from 1,000 to over 2,000. What gave European modernity a unique dimension was the great weight that linguistic factors were to attain in the construction and mobilisation of national identities (Coulmas, 1985: 29–31). Ultimately, these mobilisations established a strong connection between the standardised vernaculars, on the one hand, and particular states with their particular political cultures, on the other.

Religion and language must be considered key elements of state-making and nation-building in Europe. In the period of absolutism, European rulers began to link the principle of territorial sovereignty to the quest for culturally homogeneity within their states.¹ In more or less implicit terms, *cuius regio, eius lingua* became the logical complement to the motto *cuius regio, eius religio*. In the Western half of the Continent, language standardisation initially followed a *top-down* dynamic. Pioneers of state formation such as France aimed at establishing uniform linguistic standards across their territory for reasons of administrative efficiency. This objective stood in clear correspondence with the imperatives of economic and bureaucratic rationalisation so thoroughly analysed by Max Weber in his sociology of the state (1980: 815–837). An early example of the priorities of absolutist language policy is the *Ordonnance de Villers-Cotterêts* (1539), which prescribed that all written legal communication in the French state had to be in French (Jacob & Gordon, 1985: 111–112). By and by, the tendency to create a monolingual frame of communication between public authorities and the people whom they governed became a common feature of political modernisation in Europe. The tendency became even stronger to the extent that language began to be conceived of as an identity marker that could be used for similar purposes as religion, and serve the “proto-nationalist” cause of strengthening the links between states, rulers and subjects. In the Scandinavian area, we find a high degree of interlocking of religious and linguistic factors in the making of collective identities already at an early stage: as a consequence of the establishment of Lutheran state churches, the vernaculars became the medium of religious ceremony and school instruction. This made for a setting in which “national cultures” could be forged in smoother ways than in Southern and Central Europe, where Latin retained a prominent position due to the unbroken strength of Catholicism.

In the course of the gradual transition to democracy that started with the French Revolution, linguistic nationalism gained momentum as a *bottom-up* phenomenon. Having served for centuries as an instrument of administrative penetration, the French language was now celebrated in the discourse of the Jacobins as a symbol of universal reason and as an asset for collective emancipation. Ultimately, the revolutionary zeal only increased the pressures on the speakers of the different vernaculars (such as Basque, Breton and the Occitan dialects), which were still vastly used in the peripheries well into the nineteenth century, to embrace French as their “mother tongue”, given that the regional languages were now not only considered to obstruct the consolidation of uniform state structures, but put under the suspicion of sustaining potentially anti-republican purposes. (Maas, 1989: 39–41) Thus,

1. See Burke (2004) for an account of the social and institutional uses of language in Europe before the rise of nationalism.

albeit with a change of emphasis, the republican pattern of integration regarding language stood in continuity with the absolutist legacy in the French case. In other parts of Europe, in contrast, the activation of the bottom-up dimension in language politics entailed a massive challenging of the former bases of cultural hegemony within given state structures. This tendency became particularly virulent in the vast multi-ethnic empires of the East: from the Czech lands to Ukraine, from the Baltic to the Balkans, nationalist movements assigned the defence and vitalisation of the vernaculars a central place on their political agendas. The view that an individual language expressed the “soul” of a people, and that all languages bore equal dignity, irrespective of the allegedly “lower” or “higher” status of the particular cultures which they represented, became a recurrent motive of nationalist mobilisations (Hroch, 1985). For those who embraced this view, the vernaculars were no less than the main template on which to articulate the struggle against national alienation and the collective revolt against an imperial rule which, as such, was rule in Turkish, Russian or German.

Roughly speaking, we will find some combination of top-down and bottom-up dynamics in almost all settings where language became a salient political issue in Europe. The historically more entrenched – and, in general terms, larger – territorial European states, most of them in the West, tended to follow the strategy of an “official” nationalism,² whose goal was to achieve higher degrees of political legitimacy by compelling minorities to assimilate linguistically. In Eastern Europe, in contrast, the national movements constituted under the flag of linguistic emancipation ultimately triggered the crisis of ancient empires and opened the path leading to the national independence of many countries. It has to be noted that, in general, the creation of these new states did not imply that their elites adopted an approach towards linguistic diversity more benign than that of the previous imperial rulers over the same territories. All over Europe, the social mobilisation that made for a convergence of the quest for popular sovereignty and nationalist objectives in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries reinforced the weight of “national” languages as languages that were considered to represent specific national identities (Deutsch, 1966). Thus, the nation-states became the basic institutional “containers” (Giddens, 1985) of democratic politics in processes that largely ran parallel with the diffusion of standardised vernaculars. Acknowledging such parallelism, however, should not lead us to share “grand national narratives”, according to which there are perennial bonds linking a particular nation to “its” particular language, and a particular language to “its” particular nation. Moreover, the appreciation of a historical trend should not become a source for drawing normative conclusions for the present, as

2. For a detailed discussion of this concept, see Anderson (1991: 83–111).

the politics of cultural and linguistic standardisation implied heavy costs for those groups on whom the standards of the titular nations were imposed, turning them into minorities with a substantially reduced scope for collective self-determination.

As Eisenstadt (1999) cogently shows, Jacobinism has been a pervasive factor in the institutional architecture of modernity. When it comes to the articulation of linguistic identity, its imprint has involved a massive push for homogenisation. From the Jacobin perspective, linguistic diversity makes for a possible divide of political society and civil society that has to be overcome for the sake of the national whole. At any rate, linguistic attachments that might give rise to claims for recognition must remain strictly subject to the control of the state. The closer modern European states followed this Jacobin line, and thereby strived to achieve cultural homogeneity both in terms of strengthening their administrative capacity and in terms of fusing patterns of cultural and political legitimation, the more they turned into linguistic assimilation machines. In its belligerent version, the European nation-state appears as a “glossophagic” state (Calvet, 1974), a state that devours minority languages in order to establish a strict monolingual regime in the public realm.

It is against this background that one may have to concede that there is a disturbing potential in the historical dynamics of democratisation to incite practices of homogenisation that often entailed forced linguistic assimilation, and, in more extreme cases, were hardly distinguishable from ethnic cleansing (Mann, 2005). Democratic theory has tended to take for granted that democratic principles unfold in linguistically integrated spaces. Yet, the actual interplay between democratisation and linguistic integration and/or assimilation in modern Europe deserves a more thorough assessment. It has almost become a commonplace to associate the rise of representative democracy with the development of a public sphere in which enlightened citizens conduct an open debate on matters of general concern (Habermas 1990). Yet, we should not ignore that, in the institutional context of European modernity, the formation of public spheres followed the logic of nation-state construction.³ Thus, the public sphere not only implied new options for political participation, it also involved the consolidation of a common discursive frame based on the homogenising logic of the nation-state, and was thereby in tension with socio-cultural diversity. To the extent that such diversity resisted assimilation, the “official” public narratives linking democracy and the nation clashed with counter-narratives denouncing the hegemonic strategies underlying national integration (Cederman & Kraus, 2005: 293–297). Although such constellations attained a particularly virulent character among the “late” nationalists in Eastern

3. The close links between the emergence of public spheres and nationalism are discussed from different angles in Calhoun (1992).

Europe, they are by no means absent in the West, as the current secessionist pressures in the United Kingdom, Spain and Belgium exemplify.

In our collective imagery, we tend to abstract from the more disconcerting aspects of the history of democracy, the nation-state and cultural integration in Europe. Having been trained in cognitive environments largely shaped by methodological nationalism, we take for granted what the political maps of Europe show us by assigning particular colours, names and cultural attributes to discrete political entities. The observation also holds with regard to the institutional framing of linguistic identities. From the perspective of the standard European, *the* standard is the majority standard: he or she will therefore not expect a Swedish citizen to be Sámi-speaking, a Spanish citizen to be Basque-speaking, or a Romanian citizen to be Hungarian-speaking. A citizen's identity is tied to a nation-state, and what we consider to be the language of "the" nation and of "its" citizens is typically the majority language.

2. Options and ligatures in the making of linguistic identity

Current debates on the value of linguistic diversity often start from the matter-of-fact observation that about one third of the 5,000 to 6,000 languages which are spoken in the world at present must be considered to be endangered. Linguists tend to interpret the death of a language as a catastrophe. In their opinion, those who belong to a language community experience the disappearance of their language as a "traumatic event".⁴ The trauma of language death will become a recurrent experience throughout the twenty-first century, as the waning of linguistic diversity at global level – measured as the decrease in the absolute number of living languages – seems to be an unstoppable trend. Major efforts are being made in the scientific realm to compensate for this trend by gathering sufficient information on languages that are dying, so that they can be codified for forthcoming generations.

At the same time, losing "one's" vernacular is hardly synonymous with becoming speechless. Even if language X is not passed from one generation to the next, those who belong to different generations – parents and children – keep communicating with each other, albeit in another language than the one employed when their parents talked to their children's grandparents. Thus, the process parallel to language death is language substitution, a process by which the speakers of language X switch individually and collectively to language Y. Such a dynamic can frequently be observed in situations in which contact between distinct language communities entails the subordination of a "low-standard" vernacular *vis-à-vis* a

4. René Schiering, quoted in *Spiegel Online*, 28 August 2011.

“higher” language. Language substitution is also a recurrent feature in immigration societies: the grandchildren of, say, Polish or Italian immigrants to the US have lost their ancestors’ native tongues, even if they keep labelling themselves Polish or Italian Americans. For many of those affected by it, this loss tends to become a cause of major regret (Portes & Hao, 2002).

Ultimately, the question of language death, and, by extension, of language rights that should contribute to avoiding the corresponding dynamic, cannot be detached from the question of human rights: languages are not subjects, their speakers are. Clearly, those who suffer when a language disappears are not the languages as such, but the members of the communities who share a particular language. The qualification should be uncontroversial, yet it still leaves significant potential for contrasting views on what is effectively lost in the process of language substitution.

The commitment that the members of a language community exhibit towards “their” language will vary greatly depending on contextual factors. In most general terms, people (majorities as well as minorities) tend to experience language as something that belongs to them in a unique way, *i.e.*, as an asset that establishes critical links between their immediate life-world and the realm of institutionalised collective practices (in education, work, politics, *etc.*), thereby constituting a core element of their identity. At the same time, and, in particular, to the extent that such links only offer limited access to the fully-fledged institutional realms characteristic of modern societies, as is typically the case with many minority groups which lack or, rather, are denied equal access to such institutional completeness (Breton, 1964), the asset may limit their communicative experiences to a comparatively narrow set of possibilities. Nonetheless, in the latter case, the minority language still creates a basic *tie* between an individual and the life-world to which he or she feels emotionally attached, however bounded its functional scope may appear to be to an outside observer. The tie dimension is precisely what makes minority languages so important from the perspective of their speakers. This does not impede, however, the same speakers from appreciating the value of another language – especially if this language is a *lingua franca* – in operating as a *gate* to a universal *koiné*, to a virtually unbound community of speakers that provides them with an endless range of new learning opportunities. Ultimately, the variation of attitudes that people adopt towards language(s) in a multilingual context will be related to how the relationship between the tie dimension and the gate dimension of a given linguistic repertoire is socially and politically framed.⁵

Reflecting on language as a gate and on language as a tie opens up interesting possibilities to relate the debate on linguistic diversity to a conceptual distinction

5. See May (2012: 206–244) for majority and minority approaches to such framing in the realm of education.

that was introduced three decades ago in social and political theory (Kraus & Kazlauskaitė-Gürbüz, 2014: 521–524). In his contribution to understanding the key patterns of integration in modern societies, Ralf Dahrendorf (1979: 30) distinguishes between options and ligatures. “Options are possibilities of choice”; they provide people with “structural opportunities for choice”, thereby offering them a template for individual decisions. Ligatures, in contrast, “are allegiances; one might call them bonds or linkages as well”. As the German-British sociologist further writes: “Perhaps it could be said that as choices are the subjective side of options, so linkages, or bonds, are that of ligatures.” And: “Ligatures create bonds and thus the foundations of action; options require choices and are thus open for the future.” (Dahrendorf, 1979: 31) According to Dahrendorf (1979: 30), the central significance of options and ligatures stems from the fact that they constitute the “life chances” which individuals in contemporary societies have. For him, we depend on such life chances, which have to be understood as a function of the relations between options and ligatures, to realise our human potential fully. Dahrendorf (1979: 31) places great emphasis on this relational aspect, as focusing exclusively on only one of the two elements would give us a heavily distorted picture of social reality:

A maximum of options is not by itself a maximum of life chances, nor is a minimum of options the only minimum of life chances. Ligatures without options are oppressive, whereas options without bonds are meaningless.

At the same time, his view is that there is not necessarily a zero-sum relationship between options and ligatures (Dahrendorf, 1979: 33): our options may increase, while we keep our ligatures, and *vice versa*.

As Dahrendorf (1979: 31) himself concedes, conceptualising life chances in terms of a mix of options and ligatures does not make for a radically new approach to social theory; it should be understood as a recapitulation of an old motive in sociological analysis, a motive which is already fully present in the work of Durkheim, Tönnies and Weber. Thus, in the work of these pioneers of sociology, the dynamic of modernisation had already been associated with an extension of choices, which simultaneously implied an erosion of bonds. How can this conceptualisation now be made fruitful in our discussion of linguistic diversity?

Firstly, Dahrendorf’s concept may help us to better grasp the peculiar force and success of the language policies adopted by European nation-states in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. In a nutshell, the aim of these policies was to make for a *complementary role of options and ligatures in the construction of the citizens’ linguistic identities*. It is true that, as the story told by Ernest Gellner (1983) poignantly shows, language standardisation was a process that was based on the functional imperatives of industrial societies, in which the professional options of individuals largely depended on their sharing a common language. Yet, Gellner

tends to focus too strongly on just one side of the picture, as the collective mobilisation of people united by their national language was not – and never could be – a phenomenon triggered exclusively by sheer functional necessity; it was the mobilisation for an identity that people experienced as “authentic”, that is, for an identity which provided them with ligatures.

Secondly, it seems clear that *a strong commitment to protecting linguistic diversity will go hand in hand with highlighting the importance of language as a ligature, as a social tie*. From this angle, the very “value” of “smaller” languages with a limited *lingua franca* potential, such as Basque or Estonian, is based on the fact that they represent a grid of collective experience that is historically and culturally mediated, a grid on which individuals can rely when they interpret the world and make meaningful choices. It is mainly for this reason that – for those people who belong to communities whose languages are fading – a decline of linguistic diversity not only implies the loss of their native tongue, but also a loss of ligatures. In extreme cases, this disappearance of ligatures is not even compensated for by the increase of options: although communal bonds disappear, modernity’s benefits remain absent. The situation of members of indigenous groups who have been forced to assimilate into the structures of majority societies offers us perturbing evidence of what it means to lose ligatures without gaining options. Members of such collectivities are often uprooted and simultaneously not given a proper chance to work out an approach in order to deal with the dominant culture on their own terms.⁶ In summary: if the realisation of our potential as human beings relies on the availability of effective combinations of options and ligatures, linguistic diversity plays a pivotal role in the reproduction of those identification patterns that make for meaningful ties between us and our social environment. Thus, being given the possibility of maintaining and affirming such ties thereby becomes a question of dignity, both at the level of individuals and at the level of collectivities.

Our capability to develop multilingual repertoires shows that linguistic identities are not monolithic blocks, but are malleable and layered, instead. This malleability and layeredness sets language apart from religion, the other politically most prominent marker of cultural diversity. All contemporary societies are characterised by high degrees of religious pluralism. At the same time, many European states assign an official or semi-official status to more than one religious denomination. When it comes to religion, despite all efforts at fostering ecumenism and tolerance,

6. See, for instance, the appalling account Szeverényi and Wagner-Nagy (2011) give of the situation of the Nganasans, a small Finno-Ugric group whose territory is on the Taymyr Peninsula, in the West Siberian North. The dying of their language goes hand in hand with a waning of group identity that has not entailed, however, the provision of new options for group members.

the additive or complementary effect which can be accomplished in the institutional domain is clearly not transferable to the level of individuals: as bilinguals, we may easily be able to switch languages from one sentence to the next, but this does not mean that we can operate in the same way with regard to our religious allegiances, starting an exchange of opinions as, say, an Orthodox Jew and ending it as a Calvinist Protestant. Cultural diversity entails a strong variation of basic patterns of identification and orientation, and this variation may adopt discrete forms at the level of groups and of individuals. Nevertheless, the connections between the collective and the individual levels seem to be remarkably more rigid in the realm of religion than in that of language. Even if our individual capacity for acquiring and mastering new languages has limits, it is still true that we are able to familiarise ourselves with different communicative codes and to become proficient in several languages. As the – admittedly not uncontroversial – view of language that Wilhelm von Humboldt put forward 200 years ago holds, particular languages contribute to framing how we see things in particular ways;⁷ in consequence, learning new languages should mean acquiring new standpoints from which to grasp the world. From this perspective, our individual capability for coping with multilingualism enables us to act from varying linguistic standpoints. Such capability remains without correspondence in the realm of religious attachments. This begs a key question which I will take up in the final section of this chapter: It concerns the possibility of combining multilingual repertoires with multiple linguistic ties and identity patterns in ways that supersede the institutional legacies of the golden age of nationalism.

Against the background of the approach sketched out in the previous sections, we may assume that all attempts at working out institutional strategies for dealing with linguistic diversity should benefit from the relative elasticity of our communicative dispositions and skills: the main strategy to adopt would thereby consist in generalising multilingual repertoires that allow people to open linguistic gates *and* to secure linguistic ties. This does not mean, however, that multilingualism will work *per se* as some kind of magic formula that could be introduced uniformly and without further specifications for the purposes of paying tribute to diversity and avoiding language conflict. That our linguistic identities have an alterable and complementary character gives us the potential to develop a multilingual repertoire. However, it is precisely this alterability which also affects the relationship of what we perceive to be the key factors in terms of gate-opening and tie-securing with regard to the status of a particular language or a particular set of languages. Multilingualism provides us with the possibility of finding a balance between

7. Deutscher (2010) presents a recent re-statement of this perspective.

different languages. At the same time, the balance may well be more unstable than we may have initially assumed, because the context-dependence and changeability of what we consider to be options and what we consider to be ligatures in the domain of language also produce moments of tension that seem inescapable.

3. The issue of recognition and the limits of glossophagia

What is the problem with the “glossophagic” state? Why do people not want to be linguistically assimilated? What is the rationale behind the survival of minority languages? Why are members of linguistic minorities prepared to incur great personal sacrifices when it comes to defending their language? What is the point in maintaining a particular *linguistic* identity? Why would we not want to always establish a relationship of full identity between language-as-an-option and language-as-a-ligature? To put it in the bluntest terms: Why should we be concerned if we all woke up one day speaking one and the same language – for the sake of simplicity, let’s assume it would be English – and thus returned to a world of pre-Babelian simplicity?

To tackle these questions from the angle of the politics of language, we have to take, as a point of departure, the fact that diversity is a key theme in all attempts to elaborate a theory of democracy that is up to date.⁸ Few other themes have attracted as much attention in the recent normative debates on how to articulate legitimate forms of rule for increasingly heterogeneous and complex societies. One strand of these debates, which has been highly influential for the argumentation put forward here, regards recognition as a key category for reconciling cultural diversity and democratic citizenship. However, political philosophers and theorists have tended to discuss the “politics of recognition” (Taylor, 1992) at a high level abstraction. The approach adopted in this chapter therefore suggests that, in order to understand the linkage of diversity and recognition better, we have to rely on a *political* theory of language that devotes particular attention to the *expressive* aspects of linguistic identities and linguistic repertoires. From this expressive angle, language has a great bearing on the “self-understanding” (in a very literal sense) of a community and its members, as it plays a central role in providing them with ligatures. The recognition of linguistic identities thereby contributes in a substantial way to the protection of individual freedoms. Moreover, it endorses in the institutional realm the connections that exist between language as a social bond and language as a source of self-esteem.

8. The following account draws on Kraus (2008: 78–105).

From the perspective of Johann Gottfried Herder and Wilhelm von Humboldt, key exponents of the German enlightenment who both highlighted the social component of the expressive dimension of language, language is a key aspect in all attempts to understand humanity as unity in differentiation. It is a pivotal resource for the constitution of human autonomy and freedom. At the same time, it creates elemental social bonds, as this autonomy is embedded in the collective practices of language communities. On the one hand, individual speech acts ultimately always refer to a speech community. On the other, this speech community is ultimately defined and sustained by language itself. Humboldt (1836: 72) uses the vivid image of a web – *Gewebe* – to capture how language simultaneously shapes and is shaped by human communication. Through the process of acquiring the communicative resource of a language as individuals, we develop attachments to a specific, culturally-defined community. We are placed, to paraphrase Humboldt, in a web created and re-created in the vast context of synchronic and diachronic production of meaning. If a language forms an irreducible social web, as the line of reasoning running from Herder and Humboldt via Ludwig Wittgenstein to Charles Taylor (2016) holds, then the securing of potentials for individual development and freedom becomes a matter of a collective support, which, in modern polities, must translate into institutional provisions devoted to reproducing this web. There is no opposition between assigning rights to a language group and securing individual freedoms: if the dignity of individuals is to be respected, the linguistic and cultural identity of their communities of origin must be recognised to a satisfactory extent as well (Patten, 2014; Taylor, 1992). When the cultural bases which underlie our personal development and which we regard as authentic are institutionally ignored, negated or even repressed, our self-esteem, which is an asset of great significance in the process of forging and protecting our individual autonomy, will be severely hampered, too. In consequence, securing this autonomy becomes contingent upon linguistic recognition.

Some 30 years ago, in a pioneering comparative study devoted to analysing the causes and political implications of the “ethno-linguistic” revival in modern, industrialised Western European societies, the Finnish political sociologist Erik Allardt, after analysing a broad sample of empirical cases, reached the conclusion that the mobilisation of territorial linguistic minorities in the developed West should generally not – or, at any rate, not anymore – be interpreted as a reaction against types of discrimination which are linked to social exclusion and bear negative material consequences. Europe’s “autochthonous” linguistic minorities in the 1970s were, in most cases, not struggling to overcome a situation of direct social and economic subordination, but were instead struggling for recognition, as Allardt (1979: 43–47) put it already 40 years ago in a path-breaking contribution. He thereby anticipated a debate which should attain great prominence in present-day political theory. Thus,

according to his study, the key point for understanding the claims for linguistic recognition consisted in seeing that the minorities' main motivation for mobilising was to have their *self-categorisation* accepted by the majority(ies). Indeed, up to the present, for the bulk of the minority groups in question, this self-categorisation is not so much related to socio-economic background conditions. Ultimately, its core is based on the will to articulate a distinctive cultural identity whose principal symbol is language.

Thus, groups with a relatively high capacity for political mobilisation – such as the South Tyroleans in Italy, the Basques and the Catalans in Spain, the Flemings in Belgium, or the Welsh in the United Kingdom – are not adequately characterised if we attribute an inferior position in the cultural division of labour to them. Their demands focus on establishing institutional provisions that allow them to reproduce a collective identity which they consider as specific and protect them from being assimilated into the majority. The particular dialectic to which these groups are exposed makes socio-economic equality inconsistent with a subordinate cultural status. What is at stake in the demands raised by minorities of this kind is less related to questions of material status than to questions of self-respect and dignity.

The interpretation of the struggles for linguistic recognition that Allardt put forward in 1979 has become even more persuasive in the light of the rise of “identity politics” on a global scale. The evidence of recent decades confirms that the rejection of assimilation is a factor as relevant in the dynamics of political mobilisation as the will to overcome social exclusion and economic injustice (Tully, 2008: 91–123). If we combine Allardt's political sociology approach and the important strand of current political theory that stresses the significance of recognition for working out the consented terms of justice reciprocally, the conclusion is that, in democratic settings, self-categorisation in quite an elementary sense is a critical first step in the exercise of self-determination. This applies both at the level of the individual and at the level of groups. Even more importantly, it connects the two levels, and the connection is especially relevant when it comes to language, for linguistic self-categorisation requires the availability of plausible categories, and hence of categories that are unavoidably tied to the communicative *praxis* of language communities.⁹ The linguistic identities that we may adopt as individuals always relate to a socially – and, in consequence, collectively – produced symbolic universe. It is the very universe to which our ligatures connect. Language thus offers us a prime example of how the freedom and creativity that we have as individuals are situated, as they are resources embedded in collectively-shaped cultural settings. Such situatedness bears particular weight when it comes to political freedom: to

9. This point is elaborated in Kraus (2008: 80–83).

develop our capabilities as citizens we have to act with others and rely on communicative skills articulated through language. It is obvious that the emergence of these skills is contingent upon cultural and social bonds, upon linguistic ties. Accordingly, with regard to language, if we want to take situatedness seriously, we have to respect and protect linguistic diversity. To give just one concrete example: the freedom of speech of the members of a linguistic minority cannot be restricted to the right to communicate freely in the majority language; it must also include the right to acquire and use the minority vernacular freely. In a similar way, linguistic recognition should aim at alleviating the burden that members of minority groups have to bear in comparison with those who belong to the majority, if they are to be regarded as equally free. Typically, developing multilingual repertoires that cover both the non-dominant as well as the dominant language is something minority individuals are supposed to do; those who belong to the majority, in contrast, will not face major problems if they choose to rely exclusively on the dominant language in their day-to-day interactions. The minority language may well enjoy some form of limited official recognition in such a setting, but we can hardly speak of a relationship of recognition based on reciprocity and evenness.

Recapitulating Allardt's account of the mobilisation of linguistic minorities in Western Europe continues to be a worthwhile exercise that allows us to address some substantial political issues currently raised by cultural and linguistic diversity in Europe. However, if we want to achieve a comprehensive understanding of the conflict potentials that are characteristic of multilingual contexts, we must take an important additional step and connect the focus on recognition in the politics of language with a prominent research line that emerged with the study of *diglossia* (Fishman, 1967) in the field of socio-linguistics. The concept of diglossia points at linguistic settings in which two or more languages occupy clearly separate functional domains within the same society. This functional separation typically overlaps with a social hierarchy, in which a "high" language, used in the realms of education, administration, finances and the media, can be distinguished from a "low" language. In modern Europe, the phenomenon of diglossia is closely related to the dynamic of state formation sketched out in the first section of this chapter: the glossophagic state, whose origins can be traced back to Villers-Cotterêts, does not necessarily ban multilingualism from all realms of society. Nonetheless, by establishing a monolingual regime in the key domains of public communication, it marginalises those languages which are not assigned an official status. As Fishman (1971: 286–288) has shown, diglossia and societal bilingualism combine in different ways: their correlation largely mirrors the dynamics of social and political change. The empirical evidence we have available indicates that the co-existence of two (or more) languages within one territory on equal grounds requires major institutional efforts, if politically virulent status conflicts – struggles over recognition

in terms of equal dignity – are to be avoided. It has been argued that societal bilingualism without diglossia tends to be intrinsically unstable (Laponce, 1987: 33–42). Indeed, in officially bilingual metropolitan environments such as Montréal, Brussels or Barcelona, we keep hearing complaints that the costs of developing and sustaining a bilingual communicative repertoire are not evenly shared by different language groups, so that bilingualism ultimately remains an asymmetric practice.

In connection with theories of recognition, the concept of diglossia makes a substantial contribution to improving our understanding of language conflict in Western-type democracies. We can say that, in general terms, claims for recognition raised on the terrain of language policy are claims made in order to alleviate, and sometimes even to overcome, the effects of diglossia. By mobilising for linguistic equality, the members of the groups exposed to a diglossic institutional environment aim at expanding the range of social and functional domains in which they can use their vernacular language. Take the case of a minority language such as Basque, which shares a co-official status with Spanish in the Autonomous Community of the Basque Country and in Navarra: for the advocates of the Basque cause, formal co-officiality must translate into a *de facto* equality of use that includes public administration, the system of primary and higher education, as well as the media. Being able to speak Basque at home will not suffice. What is required are institutional arrangements that allow for having court proceedings in Basque, or quantum physics taught in the vernacular at high schools and universities. In brief, linguistic recognition implies that individuals who belong to a minority group are given the option to live an everyday life that is not too dissimilar to the communicative “normality” experienced by the members of the dominant group. It is quite revealing that asymmetries in bilingual repertoires are perceived as particularly problematical within groups whose members experience diglossic situations as situations of status inconsistency, an inconsistency that results from the tension between political and socio-economic equality, on the one hand, and the lack of equal cultural respect, on the other.¹⁰ In this respect, the protest against the dominance of French in Belgium initiated by the new Dutch-speaking middle class a few decades ago may be considered a paradigmatic case in point.

10. On equal respect and parity of esteem as features of a (linguistically) just society, see Van Parijs (2011: 117–120).

4. The politics of multilingualism in a context of complex diversity

In Europe, as in other parts of the Western hemisphere, the sociolinguistic settings of the present are characterised by an increasingly complex diversity (Kraus, 2012), a diversity that stems from the juxtaposition and intertwining of (a) autochthonous languages (which may be linked to a majority or to a minority group), (b) immigrant languages, and (c) a *lingua franca* (which, in some cases, may coincide with one of the previous categories). Ultimately, this increase reflects forms of mobility linked to a dynamic of transnationalisation that entails an uncoupling of territorially-based allegiances and cultural practices. As it changes the standard patterns of socio-cultural interaction, complex diversity also has substantial implications for the framing of language-based civic identities. New forms of mobility and transnationalisation entail challenges that can hardly be addressed in the context of the dogmatic monolingualism associated with the period of expansion of national forms of rule, in which the dominant political tendency is to establish tight bonds between social integration and cultural standardisation.

The protracted cultural and ethnic homogenisation of Europe – to be more precise: of the units configuring the European state system – reached its peak around 1950 (Therborn, 1995: 47). By then, Europe had, for several centuries, undergone processes of population structuring that ran parallel to the expansion of national forms of rule. In the course of these processes, political authorities designed and implemented homogenising strategies that involved enforced assimilation, population transfers, and ethnic cleansing. Against this background, it seems reasonable to claim that, in recent decades, the Continent has become the site of massive changes, reversing the long-lasting trend towards cultural homogenisation that had been one of the hallmarks of European modernity. The reversal has left a particularly strong imprint in the urban landscape of Western Europe, where immigration from the Continent's peripheries, from the East and South of the Mediterranean, and from other parts of the world has seen the rise of a new heterogeneity, a heterogeneity stabilised by transnational networks that create durable links between immigrant-sending and immigrant-receiving areas.

The imprint of the new heterogeneity has a significant linguistic dimension if we consider the great weight attained by immigrant languages such as Arabic, Turkish, or Urdu in a great number of West European cities. The increasingly frequent use of English as the standard vehicle of communication at the higher end of the social scale – by managers, bankers, IT developers, or university researchers – puts an additional layer of complexity on the picture. Be it in Frankfurt, Stockholm, or Amsterdam, English has, to a significant extent, displaced the local vernaculars at the level of high communication in important functional domains. This does not mean that the local languages – which, in most cases, are also identical with

the national language – are bound to disappear, in spite of the concerns ventilated by the autochthonous middle classes about the future of the linguistic community with which they typically identify. The changes that I am pointing out do indicate, however, that patterns of social stratification and of linguistic differentiation tend to overlap again in Europe's urban settings, and that the new heterogeneity is producing a situation that has some common elements with the articulation of socio-cultural diversity in medieval towns (Geary, 2001: 40). Thus, it may well make sense to apply the concept of the “new medievalism” not only to the re-assembling of the structures of power and territory after high modernity, but to extend the use of this term also to the analysis to the re-configuration of the relationship between territorialised authority and cultural identity in our times.

Forms of migration that involve an intensified mobility of people in time and space are a critical factor in this re-configuration. While being dispersed across different world regions, migrant groups remain connected to their homelands by a continuous travelling back and forth, as well as by the communicative infrastructure of the digital age. What manifests itself in neo-medieval attire at local level is very much the expression of a transnational dynamic that makes for stable links between the countries of origin and the countries of destination. Transnationalism has an obvious impact on the shaping of linguistic identities (Vertovec, 2009: 70–72). The interplay of an increased physical mobility with the possibility of staying in touch with one's home region through virtual space may contribute to the persistence of multilingualism at the expense of the tendency to linguistic assimilation that used to prevail in former contexts of migration. In terms of multilingual complexity, the new heterogeneity finds its most vivid manifestation in those European cities that have inherited a pronounced “endogenous” linguistic diversity from the past, a diversity which is becoming intermingled with the patterns of linguistic differentiation that originate from a heavy influx of immigrants. Thus, locations such as Brussels, Helsinki, Luxembourg City and Barcelona, where local “majority” and “minority” languages interact with the languages of immigrant communities, and where English has made significant irruptions in the realm of business and academic instruction, can be considered as social laboratories for studying the making and unmaking of linguistic identities under particularly intricate conditions (Kraus, 2011a: 29–33). In these cities, the challenges of transnationalism and of Europeanisation combine in particularly fascinating ways, and the need to manage diglossia and even triglossia in the context of a shared civic space has become a salient feature of everyday language politics.

While places such as Brussels and Barcelona may offer particularly striking examples for the intertwining of old and new patterns of multilingualism, the effects of “neo-medieval” change can ultimately be grasped all over Europe. The spread of English as the standard of trans-European communication has important

consequences with regard to the status of national languages, whose hegemony seems more questionable today than 100 years ago. The rise of European English involves an obvious push towards multilingualism, as well as a generalisation of the diglossic pressures which now affect the bulk of the population, and not just mainly minority members. From the perspective adopted in this chapter, a key issue to be scrutinised is how European English is re-defining the historical role of national languages, which had consisted in establishing a strong link between options and ligatures when it came to structuring the linguistic identities of citizens. This link is now weakened by the increasing options associated with English in countries that are not English-speaking. At any rate, the exercise of blending options and ligatures in a linguistically uniform national container seems to be facing more and more limitations due to the challenges of heterogeneity and cultural complexity. It seems that traditional structures of hegemony have come under threat, at least if we listen to those who are professionally committed to safeguarding the position of the national languages of the larger European states, such as French, German, or Italian (Trabant, 2014). As the national languages remain institutionally well-entrenched, we should not expect that the identity rearrangements brought about by the “new medievalism” will lead to a substantial devaluation of their status in the near future. Nonetheless, it seems also clear that the European average citizen will have to expand his or her linguistic repertoire beyond what used to be the national standard in order to make sure that he or she has sufficient communicative options (not to mention, the multiplication of potential ligatures due to the transnationalisation of our societies).

Against this background, the key question to be assessed is to what extent transnationalisation and Europeanisation will trigger the emergence of new linguistic identities. Will complex diversity entail a re-articulation of the politics of linguistic recognition on a European scale? Unsurprisingly, the picture that we get when we look at current developments is a mixed one. On the one hand, the recent advance of right-wing populism in a great number of European countries has a distinctive cultural component (Judis, 2016: 89–108). From the *True Finns* in the North-Eastern periphery of the Continent to the *Front National* in France, the populists claim to come to the rescue of supposedly endangered majority identities. Tellingly, they tend to dislike immigration and European integration on equal terms, and their nostalgia of a past characterised by simple diversity makes them eager to return to homogenising practices that make sure that options and ligatures coincide again under a politically-enforced identity regime with its obvious linguistic implications. On the other hand, the structures fostering complex diversity have become deeply embedded in our societies. The spread of European English should be considered to be just one significant aspect in the tableau of complexity. We may well be reasonably critical of the forces that underlie the incursions that English is

making in our everyday lives, but it will be difficult to hold that the hegemony of English derives primarily from political imposition. The spread of English is gently transforming the relationship between the layers of linguistic diversity, and between linguistic minorities and majorities, as it is leading to the emergence of what could be labelled a “super-majority” which includes the members of all other language groups *vis-à-vis* our “own” linguistic community.

It remains to be seen if this transformation will entail the making of new identity patterns, and if it will lead to new forms of expressing linguistic authenticity, in the sense that the use of English by non-native speakers that tended to have a basically instrumental character is displaced by forms of bilingualism that ultimately also bear significant bicultural components.¹¹ In general terms, speakers of minority languages seem thus far less concerned about European English than those who identify primarily with well-established and once powerful national languages. The French worries about the standing of the language of “universal reason” may, again, offer a paradigmatic example in this respect. We should not be too naïve about the dynamics involved in the rise of English. However, if we place ourselves in the minority position, there might be a reason for being mildly optimistic: to the extent that Europeanisation is not synonymous with Anglicisation *tout court*, and that it instead contributes to a substantial increase of multilingual repertoires among European citizens, it may ultimately also contribute to making members of majorities – majorities which, it should be noted, are possibly on their way to becoming *former* majorities – more sensitive to the significance of linguistic identity issues and thereby furthering their understanding of minority demands.

As I have argued in an earlier section of this chapter, a language policy that is capable of meeting the contemporary challenges of diversity should set up multilingual arrangements that respect the equal dignity of people who identify with different language communities. It should open linguistic gates, yet without ignoring the importance of linguistic ties. Citizens would thereby not only be provided with communicative options, but also be encouraged to maintain their communicative ligatures. Beyond all the challenges that it poses to those identities that are moulded according to the logic of homogeneity that prevailed in high modernity, complex diversity implies the chance of developing a normatively sound and sociologically informed policy framework for a multilingual Europe. To be sure, there are plenty of good reasons for perceiving the dynamic of Europeanisation-cum-English as a major threat to cultural diversity (Phillipson, 2003). To counter-balance this threat requires, in the first place, that an innovative politics of language be articulated in Europe. What remains strikingly lacking at transnational level are actors and

11. I am paraphrasing the conceptualisation introduced by Fishman (1980).

mechanisms that offer an up-to-date alternative to the mobilisation of the collective identities which sustained the construction of nation-states centuries ago (Kraus, 2011b: 31). Without such an alternative, all attempts at defining a sound balance between linguistic options and linguistic ligatures for an ever more diverse Europe are potentially doomed to remain an intellectually attractive, yet politically toothless academic exercise.

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Transient linguistic landscapes of activism

Protesting against austerity policies in the Eurozone

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This chapter explores the political geography of activism against austerity policies in the Eurozone (the Member States of the European Union using the euro as their common currency) through a study of language use in demonstrations. Arguably, the protestors' performance produces transient linguistic landscapes with placards, posters, banners, and other languaged signs which are used in this analysis to examine the Europeanisation of collective action. When public space in the local context is clearly dominated by one (state) language, political signs in different languages reveal some transnational engagement. Such multilingual signs can be interpreted not only as the expression of the diversity of the linguistic backgrounds among participants to the collective action (revealing either some transnational mobilisation or the multilingual repertoires of local participants) but also as evidence for/of the tactical use of a language (potentially) understood by the addressees outside the local and national contexts and for the emergence of a transnational public sphere. Using pictures of the protests published in conventional media or uploaded on Flickr, the image hosting website and online community, this chapter discusses signs in the local language, borrowings, English signs, signs in other languages than the national one (next to English), and code mixing.

Introduction

The linguistic diversity of Europe is often seen as the main barrier to the development of a pan-European public sphere in the European Union. This applies to collective action as much as to parliamentary politics and the media. This chapter examines the challenge of multilingualism for urban movements in a globalising world. It shows how linguistic issues interact with the geographies of grassroots mobilisations and their multiscale struggles, both in terms of grievances, resources, political opportunities, and ideologies. More specifically, the chapter explores the political geography of activism against austerity policies in the Eurozone (the

Member States of the European Union using the euro as their common currency) through a study of language use. Arguably, the protestors' performances produce transient linguistic landscapes with placards, posters, banners, and other languaged signs which are used in this analysis as an indicator of the Europeanisation of collective action.

When public space in the local context is clearly dominated by one (state) language, political signs in different languages reveal some engagement with a transnational audience. Such foreign language or multilingual signs can be interpreted as an expression of the diversity of the linguistic background of participants to the collective action (revealing some transnational mobilisation and/or a coordinated campaign), or the multilingual repertoires of local participants (rooted in transnational migration, economic and cultural globalisation, and/or European integration), but this can also be seen as evidence of the tactical use of language (potentially), one which is understood by the addressee(s) outside the local and national contexts and for the emergence of a transnational public sphere. In the case of the Eurozone and the protests related to austerity measures, these addressees could be the *troika* of the European Commission, the European Central Bank and the International Monetary Fund, or politicians and public opinions in other Member States.

The chapter is organised as follows. It first briefly discusses the challenge of European multilingualism for transnational activism. It then introduces the concept of transient linguistic landscapes and turns to the analysis of the protest signs and the data collection. Finally, it presents the results of the analysis by foregrounding different types of engagements with the local and transnational linguistic diversity of the European Union, and concludes with some directions for further research.

1. Political activism and multilingualism in Europe

Europe's linguistic diversity is both celebrated and criticised. On the one hand, this diversity is seen as one of the specific qualities of the continent and is protected by diverse institutional mechanisms. On the other hand, it is often seen as a problem, a linguistic reality seriously complicating the development of a European political sphere and of a European labour market, while, at the local and national levels, communication problems associated with immigrations are seen as causes of social exclusion.

Although many other institutional factors play a role in these difficulties, linguistic diversity itself is perceived as a "problem" for social inclusion because of the crucial role that language homogenisation has played in the emergence of European nation-states. This situation has been reinforced by the political choice, as part of

the European political and institutional project, to institutionalise this linguistic diversity between established nations (including the recognition – at the time of writing – of no less than 24 official and working languages). Further social and political integration (in the sense of the intensification of social interaction)¹ in Europe is hampered by both horizontal multilingualism (*i.e.*, the juxtaposition of rather linguistically homogenous territories in Europe), and vertical multilingualism (*i.e.*, the increasing linguistic diversity within any territory (*i.e.*, the use of many languages by its residents), especially in cities where linguistic diversity has been enhanced by immigration and other globalisation processes.

Politically, the linguistic diversity of the continent is often perceived as an obstacle to the formation of a EU-wide polity and to the fostering of a European public sphere. While there is a common currency (at least in the Member States that are part of the Eurozone), there is no common language, and, consequently, there are no common audio-visual media or newspapers to foster a EU-wide public debate. A few news channels such as *Euronews*, do have the ambition of functioning as transnational and multilingual media, but they broadcast in a limited number of languages. Likewise, a few websites do provide news articles in translation (<http://www.presseurop.eu> from 2009 to 2013, or <http://euractiv.com>) in search of a European public, but they cover a limited number of domains and a limited number of languages. This hindrance to the formation of a EU-wide public sphere not only applies to parliamentary politics, but also to the possibilities and the practicalities of transnational political activism.

To some extent, this preoccupation with the “problem of multilingualism” is not simply the result of practical problems, but is firmly rooted in the role of linguistic homogenisation and the creation of national languages in the process of modern state-formation and nation-building in Europe (see, for historical accounts of this process, Baggioni, 1997; Wright, 2000, 2004; Geary, 2001; Judt & Lacorne, 2002; Burke, 2004; Heerikhuizen *et al.*, 2004; Mar-Molinero & Stevenson, 2006; Castiglione & Longman, 2007; Schreiner, 2006; Loriaux, 2008; Stevenson & Carl, 2010; Hüning *et al.*, 2012). The issue of linguistic diversity and co-existing languages in political processes has been examined more closely in the case of political deliberation (Eco, 1994; Mamadouh, 1999b, 2002; Phillipson, 2003; Kraus, 2008; Kjær & Adamo, 2011) and of the functioning of EU institutions (Coulmas, 1991; Labrie, 1993; Calvet 1996; Truchot, 1994; Mamadouh, 1999a; Maurais & Morris, 2001; Arzoz, 2008; Wodak, 2009; Hanf *et al.*, 2010; Gazzola & Grin, 2013).

1. Here, integration has a broader meaning than incorporation in a pre-existing society (as in Migration Studies) or than “European integration” as the political integration of Member States into the political framework of the European Union (as in European Studies).

At local level, linguistic diversity has also increased dramatically over the past decades and most European cities have become multilingual in the sense that they host residents speaking a large number of different languages, although they are sometimes very few to share the same language. How many languages are present in a specific locality is often unknown. Statistics are not available about language skills and uses, but surveys suggest a great diversity. Surveys about school pupils in a selection of European cities show that they speak a large number of different languages at home: eighty in The Hague, in The Netherlands, to name just one example (see, for comparisons, Extra & Yağmur, 2004, 2011; Barni & Extra, 2008). This diversity (often called super diversity (Vertovec, 2007) or complex diversity (Kraus, 2011)) reflects the migration flows of the past decades and the make-up of the urban population in terms of nationality and ethnic background. As a reaction to this new and enhanced diversity and other social problems linked to international migration and globalisation, language issues have become political issues in Western European countries, and language tests have been introduced for naturalisation and even in certain cases for residence permits (Piller, 2001; Extra et al., 2009; Hogan-Brun et al., 2009; Van Avermaet, 2009; Slade & Möllering, 2010).

In this chapter, I am concerned with political activism and the issue of the Europeanisation of activism. Despite contemporary processes of globalisation and Europeanisation, political activism – like other democratic activities – is often conceptualised by default within the framework of national politics. It is taken for granted that activism is deployed in a *national* political arena. However, transnational political activism is not new and has been noticed. Social movements (both “old” labour or nationalist movements and the so-called *new* social movements that emerged in the 1960s) were and are often constitutive of international waves of mobilisation-sharing goals, thematic issues and ideologies, (for example, socialism, feminism, pacifism, environmentalism) and/or action repertoires,² (for example, sit-ins, squatting, peace camps, or, more recently, mass online petitioning) (Duyvendak et al., 1992; Kriesi et al., 1995). Transnational networks have recently been strengthened by shared global objectives in so far as they were articulated in the global social justice movement, the anti-globalisation movement and the alter-mondialisation movement (a movement promoting a *different* type of globalisation, based upon solidarity, not on neo-liberal competition³), while shared global

2. In social movement theory, repertoire refers to the set of protest tools and tactics for collective action used by a movement or its organisations.

3. In French and several other languages there are two words for globalisation: “globalisation” and “mondialisation”, neologisms derived from “globe” and “world” respectively, and used to signal different dynamics of global integration, the first more economical and top down, the second more cultural and bottom up.

resources (the new communication technologies) make new forms of translocal⁴ mobilising and organising easier (Della Porta et al., 1999; Fougier, 2006; Nicholls et al., 2013).

The Europeanisation of political activism is a special case of de-territorialisation of national politics. It is part of a broader process of Europeanisation linked to the European integration project, the increasing importance of EU policies and politics, and the emergence of a European polity. In general, it has been noted that the Europeanisation of protest has been rather limited, compared to the growing importance of EU decisions (Tarrow, 1994; Della Porta et al., 1999; Imig & Tarrow, 2000, 2001; Imig, 2002; Marks & Steenbergen 2003; Della Porta, 2003; Della Porta & Tarrow 2005). Protesters often target their national government, rather than the European Commission, Council or Parliament, when they demand the amendment of a EU policy. In other words, national challengers act in the national polity in order to bring about changes in the European polity. Nevertheless it has also been noted that interest groups, including some well-established movement organisations, are well organised in Brussels to take advantage of the opportunities that European institutions offer when they consult civil society. For example, venue shopping has been signalled among organisations looking for the best venue to defend the rights of asylum seekers (Guiraudon, 2001) or of the unemployed (Chabanet, 2010).

There are many expressions of Europeanisation and/or transnationalisation, and they do not necessarily develop at the same pace. These include:

- Europeanised and/or transnational objectives (*i.e.*, claims towards actors in the EU arena);
- Europeanised and/or transnational activities (such as transnational campaigns, joint-action days, transnational marches); and
- Europeanised and/or transnational organisations (*i.e.*, transnational action groups and movements, and European umbrella organisations).

Scholarship about the Europeanisation of activism is mainly based upon media analysis using news reports about political activism, the organisations involved, their reported objectives and targets (Imig & Tarrow, 2001). Others have held surveys at big collective events such as the European Social Forum (Della Porta, 2003). In this chapter, I focus on demonstrations as a performance of protest and more specifically on the languages used to perform protest. The study is limited to written texts, although sounds (chanting, shouting, declaiming, singing...) are, no doubt, also relevant linguistic elements in the action repertoire of a movement.

4. Translocal refers to connections between different localities (possibly but not necessarily transnational).

By definition, demonstrations are about showing, demonstrating, performing and communicating discontent, disagreement, and discomfort, and at voicing demands. The targeted audience is very diverse: like-minded activists, opponents or members of a not yet mobilised public. It can be targeted explicitly or implicitly, directly or indirectly. It includes:

- The direct audience, the people present in the public space in which the demonstration takes place: both participants that are comforted by the demonstration of the strength of the collective, and the passers-by that can bear witness to the mobilisation; and
- The indirect audience, reached through reports about the demonstration in the media (both conventional mass media and new media, both media controlled by the participants and other media). In this indirect audience, we should distinguish at least between three important publics: (a) the decision-makers that the protesters want to influence; (b) public opinion (civil society organisations, political parties, the electorate) who are potential allies and could eventually influence the decision-makers; and (c) the conventional media – both gatekeepers and the driving force of the public debate – on which activists depend for visibility and publicity.

Studies of the Europeanisation of political activism generally examine whether political activists mobilise and organise around European issues that are trying to influence the decision-making process at EU level; in other words, the decision-makers in Brussels (the European Commission, the Council), Frankfurt (the European Central Bank), Strasbourg (the European Parliament) or Luxembourg (the European Court of Justice). Moreover, they consider whether they will mobilise around a new pro-anti EU cleavage (Neumayer, 2008; Mudde, 2012), next to the more traditional cleavages that structure European political life (such as centre *vs.* periphery, church *vs.* state, owner *vs.* worker, land *vs.* industry, that were originally described by Lipset & Rokkan, 1967).

The aim of this chapter is to examine how activists try to address a Europeanised audience by using more languages than the one predominant in the local and national context of their political action. Arguably, using slogans in a language that is foreign to the place in which it is shown can be interpreted as an intention to communicate to an “other” outside that context. It can be the targeted audience of the decision-makers in Brussels or in Frankfurt, or a non-local and non-national public. The absence of signs in a foreign or “other” language should not, however, be seen as the ignorance of these remote audiences. There are other ways to reach them. Activists can use logos and other visual objects, and try to communicate beyond words, or they can just rely on the mediation of skilful observers and reporters who will translate the message into another language for the intended audience.

2. Demonstrations as transient linguistic landscapes

Before turning to the materials collected, a few remarks are due on multilingualism and the ways to deal with linguistic diversity. There is growing appreciation, both among academics and among the general public, of the diversity of the strategies that individuals and groups develop to communicate across languages. In recent years, more and more work has been carried out in applied linguistics and sociolinguistics to document the various practical ways in which individuals and groups deal with linguistic diversity. The idea that mediators are necessarily professional translators and interpreters has given way to more diverse options, although the potentials and the limitations of each of these options are often contested. Alternative mediating practices such as *lingua franca* (Seidhofer 2011), passive multilingualism, *lingua receptive* or intercomprehension (Conti & Grin, 2008; Ten Thije & Zeevaert, 2007), code switching, and code mixing (Jørgensen, 2011; Backus et al., 2013) are acknowledged. From this growing scholarship on the many social aspects of multilingualism, one can derive questions and expectations about the use of languages in demonstrations with a clear transnational and/or Europeanised character, expecting protestors to engage with linguistic diversity, possibly by mixing languages or using English.

Possible reasons for expecting linguistic diversity to be visible on the signs displayed at demonstrations pertain either to the local linguistic diversity in which the protests occur (both the local movement and the local social and spatial context) and/or to the extra-local audience that one wants to reach. The local context is important as the presence of texts in another language in a demonstration could be the expression of linguistic diversity among protesters (local or external) or of linguistic diversity among the direct local audience targeted. In this sense, demonstrations form transient linguistic landscapes and can be approached from the perspective of linguistic landscapes (Landry & Bourhis, 1997; Gorter, 2006; Shohamy & Gorter, 2008; Papen, 2012). The research done on urban linguistic landscapes focuses generally on cities in which languages compete, either state and regional languages, national and migrant languages, or national and globalisation languages (English, or the language of dominant tourist groups such as the Germans or the Dutch in specific Spanish localities). This may be an inspiration to study the linguistic make-up of demonstrations and other localised expressions of political activism. In this body of research, the presence of (written) text in the public space (for example, on street signs, traffic signs and advertising billboards) both express and shape the relations between language groups in that specific locality. Demonstrations shape *transient* linguistic landscapes as they are, by definition, temporary, even if some flyers may litter the pavements long afterwards and some of the graffiti may remain visible for weeks, months or even years, as a last echo of a demonstration (depending on the effort made to remove any trace of it).

A demonstration generally targets a much broader audience than the public in the locality in which it physically takes place. It is generally the national political arena (larger protests for this purpose are often convened in symbolically-laden public spaces in the capital city; see Wagenaar et al., 2000) which is often conceived as a homogenous, monolingual public space, although there are several exceptions such as Brussels, Helsinki or Montréal where the bilingualism of the nation is also represented. Targeting an even broader public audience, for example, EU citizens, implies acknowledging the linguistic diversity of this indirect audience. For this purpose, one can expect protest signs in another EU language, especially when the European decision-makers targeted are not expected to read the local language(s) or when protesters want to communicate their message to the public in other Member States, a public that does not speak the same language.

In any event, activists depend on mediators who will report about the demonstration, and describe and possibly analyse and contextualise what they have seen. Such representations are conveyed through written text (in newspaper articles), spoken text (in radio broadcasts), or pictures (next to written text in newspaper articles or on blogs, next to spoken text on television, and next to both spoken and written text on multimedia news platforms online). Journalists should be well equipped to translate the messages put on display by the demonstrators, but *de facto* even foreign correspondents stationed for longer periods of time in a specific location are not always fluent in the local language(s) and not always able to contextualise the signs that they observe. Therefore, it can be expected that, when the transnational audience gains importance, the demonstrators will want to make sure that their message comes across by doing the translating themselves, especially when they consider the direct impact that the pictures and video footages may have on televised news and on the Internet. The signs will then “speak for themselves” as they will speak to these “foreign” audiences directly. Moreover, even if journalists are fluent in the local language(s), they are likely to report more often on the signs that they see as being visually self-explanatory for their home audience.

To convey a point in a transnational, multilingual public sphere – in this case, the emerging European public sphere – activists will want to reach their audience by using the language(s) that they see as the most suitable for this purpose. This language might be English as a language of wider communication, or another European language, not the local language. The meaning of the use of English is, however, extremely difficult to interpret: it is more than the dominant language in European transnational circles, as it is also the language of global communication (based upon US hegemony in global trade, science, the media, and culture), the main language of European communication in the EU institutions, higher education, business and transnational media, the official language of specific Member States (the UK and Ireland) and the language used by European politicians in their

capacity as the representatives of key EU institutions. The use of European languages other than English and the local one, is easier to interpret as a gesture towards an audience in the Member State(s) that use that specific language, be it the general public or the decision-makers.

In addition, activists involved in a transnational wave of mobilisation can be expected to share slogans and demands. Slogans “travel”, and, as they travel, they are copied and/or adapted by demonstrators in different locations. This adaptation can happen through a process of localisation (translating the slogan into the local language and adapting it to the local situation) or through a process of adoption and amplification through identical repetition. In the latter case, slogans are used to establish the connection between events and struggles in different locations more strongly. Moreover, some slogans with high symbolic value, because they have been used in a particularly large, long and/or successful struggle in the past, can be re-discovered and re-used to emphasise connections between the past and the present struggles. In such a process, slogans in foreign languages can function as a rallying-point to a transnational, multilingual audience. In these cases, messages in a foreign language are expressions of transient linguistic landscapes that emerge from, and, at the same time, shape, a transnational and/or Europeanised public sphere.

The rest of the chapter presents a study of the linguistic diversity performed in recent demonstrations in selected European cities in 2010–2013. There have been many protests, loosely and strongly connected to each other, especially as part of the 2011 Occupy movement and the 2011–2013 demonstrations against the austerity measures taken to address the Euro crisis. Both of these are reactions to the 2008 financial crisis and its consequences, but both also build upon the anti-globalisation and global justice movement of the 1990s and the 2000s. (Adams, 1996; DeFilippis, 2001; Eagleton-Pierce, 2001; McFarlane & Hay, 2003; Mamadouh, 2004; Brand & Wissen, 2005; Herbert, 2007; Leitner et al., 2007; Zajko & Béland, 2008) The Occupy movement emerged when Occupy Wall Street evolved into a broad, global movement of protest against the consequences of the banking crisis that started in the US in 2007–2008 and consisted of hundreds of local groups occupying public space in cities all over the world (Hardt & Negri, 2011; Castells, 2012; Harvey, 2012; Aalbers, 2012; Uitermark & Nicholls, 2012; Harcourt, 2012; Mitchell, 2012a, 2012b; Taussig, 2012). The banking crisis had a severe impact on European banks, and thereafter the financial sectors and the economies of most European countries, albeit in different forms and to different degrees. It has affected the Member States of the Eurozone more seriously, especially those that had to rescue failing banks and transformed their loss into public debt, and consequently failed to comply with the criteria of the Stability and Growth Pact agreed in the European Monetary Union. As a result, some Member States needed *ad hoc* financial rescue programmes and

the help of others, but this aid was offered only conditionally. In this context, austerity measures were imposed by the *Troika* formed by the European Commission (EC), the European Central Bank (ECB), and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) (for views on the protests, see Douzinas, 2013; Taibo, 2013).

In both series of demonstrations (*Occupy* and *Indignados*), the use of foreign languages is expected to be relevant for the expression of the web of connections in which local activists are involved: translocal networks of activists and transnational audiences. Possible differences between the two sets of events could be understood as differences between the processes of globalisation and the processes of Europeanisation, although these are greatly entangled, both in general and in this specific case. The sovereign debt crisis of several EU Member States and the ensuing Euro crisis were directly related to the banking crisis and its real-estate bubbles. To date, studies of collective action in Europe show that protests are expected to be directed mainly against the national governments and how they handle their relations with regulating institutions.

3. Political activism and the analysis of protest signs

Demonstrating in the public space is a form of political activism that is highly visual. The performance of protest is fundamentally visual: it is about demonstrating numbers to show that there are large numbers of people mobilised behind certain demands. Studies of the protest signs used during demonstrations are, however, sparse (Dragičević Šešić, 2001; Philipps, 2012; Taussig, 2012; Garrett, 2013). In this sense, each body involved in the protest can be studied as part of this visual assemblage. This analysis, however, is limited to the visual aids used to convey the content of a political message: be they political affiliations or political claims and demands.

The visual aids used in demonstrations are diverse. They include:

- Symbols;
- Colours;
- Logos;
- Images, pictures, drawings, cartoons; and
- Letters and words.

And they can be found on diverse types of carriers:

- flags;
- banners;
- posters;
- (sandwich) boards;
- flyers;

- items of clothing such as T-shirt, leather jackets, hats, uniforms;
- graffiti and murals.

And can be carried by mobile bodies (marching, running, charging, fighting or dancing), bikes, balloons and other vehicles, or by immobile bodies (standing, sitting or lying), and immobile carriers such as tents, walls, pavements.

In this chapter, I focus on banners, posters, (sandwich) boards, flyers and graffiti, featuring slogans, keywords and other text messages. Although I was interested in the linguistic landscapes shaped by the arrangements of these public texts, I am looking here at reports about individual texts because the data collection consists of pictures of the protests and they often focus on one sign at the time. Pictures of these performances are a secondary performance of activism through participants portraying each other or the acknowledgement of reception by the public, either as passers-by or as press photographers as professional mediators.

From the perspectives introduced above (local linguistic landscape and transnational public sphere), the practical questions that need to be addressed are: Which language(s) are used? If several languages are used together, in which combinations (translation, code mixing, cross-references, word plays and puns, possibly even neologisms)? How can this be explained? Is it the expression of the linguistic diversity among the demonstrators? Of the linguistic diversity among the direct audience locally present? Or the linguistic diversity among the remote indirect audience, be it the decision-makers to be influenced or the general public?

4. Data collection

To research transient linguistic landscapes systematically, participant observation seems to be the most suitable method, either as a participant in or at a demonstration, be it a very localised view of the whole event, or as a participant in the direct audience watching a demonstration passing by. In this particular case of translocal demonstrations, it was not possible to attend demonstrations held at the same time in different cities.

An alternative is to collect reports about demonstrations. The main weakness of such an approach is clearly its indirect character. It is dependent on the selection made by those present at the events: the participants, the direct audience, journalists, possibly police forces or opponents. Nevertheless, it was the approach which most suited my purpose since I wanted to include different demonstrations in different locations in different cities in different countries and at different moments in time. In addition, I was interested in the way in which the images of these banners travel. In this sense, it was meaningful to focus on the signs that were considered worthy of a picture and of circulation among a broader audience.

To collect pictures or images, I considered three different avenues. The first was to browse through the websites of key conventional media (and the print edition of certain newspapers). The second was to browse through the websites of grassroots organisations involved in the protests. The third was to use social media sites to identify additional pictures representing visual aids uploaded by others, not necessarily the campaigners and not the professional photographers of the conventional news media.

For the collection of a large set of texts, I browsed the picture-sharing site *Flickr* using keywords pertaining to demonstrations and protest, in combination with key dates and different cities (Amsterdam, Athens, Barcelona, Berlin, Brussels, Dublin, Frankfurt, Lisbon, Paris, and Rome, and London outside the Eurozone). I searched the site with keywords using both the local and English names of the cities and various words for demonstrations, protests, as well as more specific terms such as “Occupy”, and “*Indignados*”. Again, the return of searches using keywords depended on the tagging and the comments provided by the users of *Flickr* when they uploaded their pictures. Locations and dates occasionally revealed some inconsistencies between the automatic tagging registration and the additional comments.

In addition, I looked at the websites of conventional media such as major newspapers, television and radio corporations and news agencies in selected European countries (The Netherlands, France, Belgium, the UK, and Germany) for additional background information and visual materials.

They are many caveats to the use of such a social media as a resource for social science research. *Flickr* is a large and international platform, but its prevalence is socially and geographically constrained (Poorthuis, 2010). It is noteworthy that there was much less material on Athens and Nicosia on *Flickr* than on the other cities. It is possibly due to my own linguistic limitations (I could use a few keywords in Greek but not check comments sufficiently) so that I have possibly failed to locate the relevant sets of pictures. A more probable explanation may come from a much more modest presence of Greek and Cypriot youth online in general and on *Flickr* more specifically (compared to countries such as the UK, The Netherlands, and Belgium). It certainly does not reflect a lack of protests in these two cities (Van Gent et al., 2013).

These limitations are acceptable since the procedure was not intended to assess the occurrence of multilingual signs quantitatively (for example, to measure language vitality), nor in an absolute or in a relative sense, compared to those in the local language. Instead, it was meant as an inventory of the presence of such signs, and an attempt to make some sense of the functions of the signs in other languages. Are they the expression of a local linguistic diversity or of a European linguistic diversity? Do languages interact or co-exist? Are codes mixed? Are slogans borrowed?

5. Protest signs and language used: Making linguistic plurality visible?

In the rest of the chapter, I present a first foray into the issue of language use in street protests. I present a number of examples to demonstrate some of the dynamics at work. The analysis stresses the predominance of the local language, the hegemony of English among signs in other languages, and highlights the travelling or transmigration of some of the rallying slogans, sometimes in their original code, sometimes in translation. Rather than presenting the observations city by city, I have sorted typical examples of linguistic encounters. Clearly, this comes at the cost of de-contextualising the signs and more generally the demonstrations in which they were spotted and, by so doing, of disempowering the demonstrators. The messages here are mainly studied from a linguistic perspective and not for their content. However, in my view, the choice of a language is an act of political communication, too, with a strong symbolic message. In addressing a certain audience, rather than another, this reveals a very political choice. Ideally these analyses should not be separated. For this chapter, the signs will be nevertheless grouped according to linguistic features. The following categories will be discussed: signs in the local languages, translocal borrowings, signs in English, signs in other languages than the national one (but not English) and code mixing (signs in more than one language).

The selected texts are quoted in the original form as follow:

Ex0 (for example or exhibit number 0):

Original Text [language – translation into English, if applicable] {location of the demonstration date and source, and for conventional news media: location, source and publication date}

Signs in the local language

The vast majority of texts found on the visual aids to the protests are monolingual. They are generally messages in the local language. In the two bilingual cities, Barcelona and Brussels, the relation between the two local languages was asymmetrical. In Barcelona, most of the signs that I spotted were in Spanish, with few in Catalan, and in Brussels in French, with few in Dutch. It may be a true reflection of the proportion of signs on the streets or an effect of the selection by those taking and uploading pictures.

- (1) Papa, mama, que has fetavui a la feina? [Catalan – Dad, mum, what did you do at work today?] {Barcelona 15 June 2011 *Flickr*}

Borrowings in translation: Translocal echoes

There are many occurrences of **localised texts**, or texts which refer to texts and signs used and seen in other cities in other countries. They may have been used in translation or have been borrowed (that is: in the original code). Note that the borrowings go in all directions (not necessarily from Wall Street to the periphery, from London to the rest of Europe), and that they are not limited to borrowings between European cities, but also well beyond that (North America for example). However it is striking that I did not find any reverberations with demonstrations in the Arab World (especially Tunis and Cairo) that were so prominently followed around the world in the same period: the so-called Arab Spring following December 2010 (Fregonese, 2011, 2013; Ramadan, 2013; Mamadouh, 2013). Although the use of the French slogan “*dégage*” [French for “get out of the way”] after its success in Tunisia (“*Ben Ali dégage*”) had travelled to Cairo – despite the fact that French is not widely used there – it seemed not to have travelled to Western Europe. Or, more precisely stated, it was not reported to have been used. The one exception found on *Flickr* after a search for the term was at the venue of the *Alter Summit* in June 2013 in Athens (thus not at a demonstration):

- (2) Troika dégage [French – troika get out]
 {Alter Summit in Athens 8 June 2013 *Flickr*}

The use of the same phrase (literally or in translation) can be interpreted as a way to stress the connections between protests between different localities. The content of the message is more important than the language: it works as a common flag. The connection is made visible for the local audience, through the use of signs seen earlier in the press coverage of protests elsewhere or in the self-reporting from grassroots organisations. Some of the same slogans travel through the Eurozone, others were found outside the Eurozone, in London, or even outside the European Union, for example in the United States.

- (3) a. Sorry voor het ongemak, wij proberen de wereld te veranderen [Dutch –
 Sorry for the inconvenience; we are trying to change the world]
 {Amsterdam 24 October 2011, *Flickr*}
- b. Sorry for the inconvenience; we are trying to change the world
 {Dublin 9 December 2011, *Flickr*}
- c. Sorry for the inconvenience; we are trying to change the world
 {London 11 November 2011, *Flickr*}
- d. Sorry for the inconvenience; we are trying to change the world
 {New York City NY 15 October 2011, *Flickr*}
- e. Sorry for the inconvenience; we are trying to change the world
 {Oakland CA 22 October 2011, *Flickr*}

- f. Sorry for the inconvenience; we are trying to change the world
 {San Jose CA 11 April 2012, *Flickr*}

Another iconic slogan was the slogan adopted by the General Assembly of Occupy Wall Street in August 2011 “We are the 99%”, the majority of the population resisting the 1% richest and mightiest people in the world: These percentages travelled well in Europe, both in English and in other languages.

- (4) a. 99% crisis 1% robbers {Brussels 15 October 2011 *Flickr*}
 b. 99% en crisis 1% ladrones [Spanish – 99% in crisis, 1% thieves]
 {Madrid 27 November 2011 *Flickr*}

Other reverberating slogans were found on both sides of the Atlantic, not in the US, but in Mexico City.

- (5) a. Si no nos dejan soñar no los dejaremos dormir [Spanish – if they do not let us dream, we won't let them sleep]
 {Barcelona, *Flickr* 24 May 2011} {Barcelona 9 May 2011 *Flickr*}
 b. If they don't let us dream, we won't let them sleep
 {London 29 May 2011 *Flickr*}
 c. If they don't let us dream, we won't let them sleep
 {Brussels 15 October 2011 flickr}
 d. Si no nos dejan soñar no los dejaremos dormir [Spanish – if they do not let us dream we won't let them sleep]
 {Barcelona, *Flickr* 24 May 2011} {Mexico City 15 October 2011, *Flickr*}
 e. If they don't let us dream, we won't let them sleep
 {Nicosia 20 March 2013, *Le Monde*}
 f. If they don't let us dream, we won't let them sleep
 {Birmingham 19 March 2013, *Flickr*}

And translation between English and Spanish also occurred within Europe.

- (6) a. No somos mercancía en manos de políticos y banqueros [Spanish – we are not merchandise in the hands of politicians and bankers]
 {Madrid 27 November 2011 *Flickr*} {Seville 29 May 2011 *Flickr*}
 b. We are not merchandise in the hands of politicians and bankers
 {Belfast 30 December 2011 *Flickr*}

There was not necessarily an English variant available in the associated series of slogans observed.

- (7) a. Dutch and French
 Alleen samen delen zal de wereld redden [Dutch – only sharing will save the world]
 {Amsterdam 22 October 2011, *Flickr*}
 b. Le partage sauvera le monde [French – sharing will save the world]
 {Paris 15 October 2011, *Flickr*}

- (8) a. French and Spanish
 Europe des peuples, pas des marchés [French – Europe of the peoples, not of the markets] {Paris 15 October 2011 *Flickr*}
- b. La Europa de las personas, contra la UE de los mercados [Europe of the peoples, not of the markets] {Madrid 16 March 2013 *Flickr*}

A peculiar case of travelling slogans can be found in the use of the term **Indignados** (from Spanish, but echoing the originally French pamphlet *Indignez-vous!* Hessel 2010) after the Spanish M15 movement in March 2011, and of the term **Occupy** after Occupy Wall Street.

- (9) a. Indignados {Amsterdam 16 October 2011 *Flickr*}
 The French equivalent *indignés* or the Italian *indignati* have been encountered, not the German, Dutch or English ones.
- b. Les indignés en colère + T shirt [French – the outraged are angry]
 {Brussels 15 October 2011 *Flickr*}

While *indignados* was widely used in comments, tags and labels on *Flickr* for pictures of the protests in London, I surprisingly did not spot any picture of protest signs featuring this word, nor any sign in another language than English on pictures of the London protests (although I might have missed some among the 37,000+ pictures resulting from a search for “London and Occupy” as I did not open each picture individually to check the smaller signs).

English signs

Texts in English are very common too, especially in Amsterdam and in Brussels. They may have different functions, however. Sometimes, they are expressing the cosmopolitan make-up of the demonstrating crowd and are addressing a cosmopolitan local audience (Amsterdam, Brussels). In other words, English texts can be read as an expression of a local linguistic landscape in Amsterdam and in Brussels (see Janssens, 2007; O'Donnell & Toebosch, 2008; Favell, 2008; Van der Welle, 2011). In other contexts (Lisbon, Nicosia), they seem clearly meant for a remote transnational audience, but, in some other cases (Paris, Frankfurt, Rome), the targeted audience remains unclear: A diverse local population of activists or remote politicians?

- (10) The AIVD wants to follow you on twitter – Loesje
 {Amsterdam 22 October 2011 *Flickr*}

The AIVD (short for *Algemene Inlichtingen en Veiligheidsdienst*) is the Dutch General Intelligence and Security Service, and *Loesje* is originally a Dutch collective

making political posters. It was created in 1983 in Arnhem and had become international (*i.e.*, multilingual) by the end of the 1980s. Since 2005, it has had an international office in Berlin and is now active promoting freedom of speech in 30 countries including the USA, and in many languages (www.loesje.org). The statement is a typical *Loesje* statement, and, by referring to the Dutch intelligence agency, it clearly targets a Dutch audience, in the sense of an audience living in The Netherlands. Using English here is a way to include locals who are not Dutch speaking, and/or to play with the use of English in the globalised media in order to look connected.

Other examples seem to target the local audience and reflect the use of English as common language of communication among the demonstrators and in public. These examples are many and diverse in terms of their messages and forms as the selection shows:

- (11) a. The revolution begins at home {Amsterdam 22 October 2011 *Flickr*}
 b. Europe's top 5 banks made euro 28 billion in profits in 2010!!! Say no to austerity {Amsterdam 22 October 2011 *Flickr*}
 c. 1% tried to fuck my future but now they will fail {Amsterdam 22 October 2011 *Flickr*}
 d. Things are going wrong, together we can change it, let's talk. Occupy together {Amsterdam 12 November 2011 *Flickr*}
 e. Occupy!!! Workers of the world unite! {Amsterdam 10 November 2011 *Flickr*}
 f. We are all individuals {Amsterdam 10 November 2011 *Flickr*}⁵
 g. None are more hopelessly enslaved than those who falsely think they are free {Amsterdam 15 October 2011 *Flickr*}
 h. We are the ancestors of the future [graffiti on pavement] {Amsterdam 24 October 2011, *Flickr*}
 i. We are the 99% {Brussels 15 October 2011 *Flickr*}
 j. Be unique, own the street {Paris 14 December 2011 *Flickr*}
 k. WE ARE THE NEW BARBARIANS Occupying Our ROME {Rome 22 October 2011 *Flickr*}
 l. It is not our debt, we camp {Rome 5 March 2013 *Flickr*}
 m. Occupy Frankfurt Reclaim the city {Frankfurt 21 October 2011 *Flickr*}

In certain locations, the English texts are more difficult to interpret. It remains unclear whether they target a local or a transnational audience.

5. This slogan refers to an iconic scene of collective action in *Monty Python's Life of Brian*, a 1979 British religious satire comedy film.

- (12) a. People of Europe rise {Berlin 15 October 2011 *Flickr*}
 b. Occupy France supporting Occupy Wall Street
 {Paris 15 October 2011 *Flickr*}
 c. Occupy world {Madrid 27 November 2011 *Flickr*}
 d. #OccupyWallStreet Take the stock exchange!
 {Barcelona 18 September 2011 *Flickr*}
 e. We are the 100% One world one voice {Lisbon 14 October 2011 *Flickr*}
 (which echoes the American slogan coined at a general assembly of Occupy
 Wall Street in August 2011 “we are the 99%”)
 f. Error 404 – Democracy not found {Lisbon 15 September 2012 *Flickr*}

Finally, other examples of English texts clearly target a remote audience, either decision-makers or a transnational public. They have been widely diffused by conventional media in other countries. The clearest examples were found in Lisbon and Nicosia after the rescue packages imposed by the *Troika*.

- (13) a. Shame on you troika {Lisbon 12 November 2011 *Flickr*}
 b. “It is no measure of health to be well adjusted to a sick society” 99%
 {Lisbon 16 October 2011 *Flickr*}

These statements can arguably be read as answers to demands from Brussels and certain Member States. Similar attempts to communicate across national borders to create a supranational European public opinion include more elaborate attempts to influence the public across borders. A particularly noteworthy response was the Portuguese video produced in several linguistic versions – “*Eusou um berlinense/ Ich bin ein Berliner*” made by blogger and politician Rodrigo Moita de Deus (of the conservative party PSD) and published online just before the visit of the German Chancellor Angela Merkel to Lisbon in November 2012.⁶ The video was originally meant to provide information to Germans about the Portuguese and to improve their reputation and generate some empathy.

Numerous examples of signs addressed to a remote audience pertain to Cyprus:

- (14) a. Troika go home {Nicosia 27 March 2013 *Flickr*}
 b. Europe is for its people, not for Germany {Nicosia 18 March 2013 *Flickr*}
 c. Hands off Cyprus {Nicosia 18 March 2013 *Flickr*}
 d. Hands off Cyprus {Nicosia, in: *De Volkskrant* 20 March 2013}

6. Available at: <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QaZzGkzFAT0> in Portuguese, <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jEYHumStsfM&feature=youtu.be> in German with Greek subtitling, <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xmj7xYStJDQ> in English <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Kswt-p43fwv8> in German <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2SY3SrPibeQ> in German with English, French Spanish, Portuguese subtitling, last accessed June 2014.

- e. Where is the solidarity?
{Nicosia, in: *Libération* 21 March 2013, *De Volkskrant* 21 March 2013}
- f. No!!! [written on the palms of the demonstrator's hands] {Nicosia, in: *Libération* 18 March 2013; *De Volkskrant*, 19 March 2013, 20 March 2013}
- g. No!!! [picture of a palm with "no" written on it]
{Nicosia, in: *Le Monde*, 20 March 2013}
- h. This is about dignity {Nicosia, in: *De Volkskrant* 21 March 2013}
- i. You are killing us [on the bodies of demonstrators lying on the ground]
{Nicosia, diaporama on www.hln.be March 2013}
- j. Merkel & Schäuble Go home and stay...
{Nicosia, *De Volkskrant* print 21 March 2013}
- k. Fuck Europe; we have gas {Nicosia, www.bnr.nl 13 March 2013}
{Nicosia, *De Volkskrant* print 21 March 2013}
- l. [EU blue flag with yellow stars arrange to form a swastika] hang the bankers – hands off people's savings {Cyprus, *De Volkskrant* 21 March 2013}
- m. [picture of face Merkel with Hitler-style toothbrush moustache] Get out of our country {Nicosia, *De Volkskrant* print, 21 March 2013}

Nevertheless, the extensive use of English signs in Nicosia is not only related to the involvement of external (mainly EU) institutions in the solutions imposed on Cyprus but also needs to be contextualised in the post-colonial heritage of the island, which gained its independence from the UK in 1960 and the widespread use of English as its third language, next to Greek and Turkish, the two official languages.

Signs in other languages than the national one, and other than in English

Signs with texts in other (non-local) languages are less common, but they include texts in Spanish, Italian, German, and Dutch. In some cases, they serve participants with a different linguistic background; in very rare cases, a remote audience.

Texts in Spanish were most likely introduced by Spanish-speaking participants; they refer to Spanish and Latin-American struggles denoting the involvement of Latin American activists, and not to a local Spanish-speaking audience or to a transnational Spanish audience.

- (15) a. E Chile hay recursos de sobra para una educación gratuita y de calidad [Spanish – In Chile there are resources for a free education of good quality...]
{Paris 15 October 2011 *Flickr*}
- b. La razón de la fuerza o la fuerza de la razón ? indignados! [Spanish – The reason of force or the force of reason? The outraged!]
{Paris 20 November 2011 *Flickr*}

The latter also probably refers to the Chilean motto: *Por la razón o la fuerza* [by reason or by force].

It is striking that some of these “foreign language” slogans refer directly to older struggles:

- (16) a. Tierra y libertad [Spanish – land and freedom]
 {Amsterdam 22 November 2011 Flickr}

Referring to the Mexican revolution and the Spanish civil war.

And even more relevant:

- (16) b. Que se vayan todos [Spanish – they must all go]
 {Paris 15 October 2011 Flickr}

This was the slogan of the Argentinean protests of 2001 and it has since become a rallying slogan used by activists in the alter-mondialist movement,⁷ Spanish-speakers and non-Spanish speakers alike.

- c. Wir sind das Volk [German – we are the people]
 {Lisbon 12 November 2011 Flickr}

This was the slogan of 1989 Eastern German protesters who brought about the opening of the East German-West German border and the fall of the Berlin Wall, which marked the end of the Cold War, the collapse of Communist regimes in Eastern Europe, and led eventually to the re-unification of the Germany.

In a few, albeit significant, instances, signs with text in German or in Dutch address a remote audience: the European decision-makers, *i.e.*, the German Chancellor Angela Merkel in Athens and Lisbon in 2012, and the Dutch Minister of Finance and President of the Eurogroup Jeroen Dijsselbloem in Nicosia in early 2013. It could be argued that they address their national electorate: German and Dutch public opinion.

- (17) Cyprus zegt “Nee” [Dutch – Cyprus says “No”] {Nicosia, www.bnr.nl
 13 March 2013, diaporama www.hln.be March 2013}
 {Nicosia, *De Volkskrant* print 21 March 2013}

Code mixing

Bilingual texts are sparse, unless the terms “occupy” and “indignados” are counted as English, or as Spanish respectively. It could be argued that they should not be counted as such because they have quickly become loan words in other languages, especially *Occupy* in Dutch and German, and *indignados* in French, so that such texts should be seen as being monolingual rather than occurrences of code-mixing.

7. See note 3 above.

- (18) a. Occupy Amsterdam, 6 maanden bezetting Amsterdam [Dutch – Occupy Amsterdam – 6 months of occupation in Amsterdam]
 {Amsterdam 22 October 2011 *Flickr*}
- b. Occupy de banken [English – Occupy+Dutch – the banks]
 {Amsterdam 21 March 2012 *Flickr*}
- c. #Protesteer #staak #occupy Mensen boven winst (Dutch: hashtags Protest strike English – hashtag occupy; Dutch – People above profit) [sticker on tent]
 {Amsterdam 28 November October 2011 *Flickr*}
- d. Occupy Wetstraat [NB: Wetstraat is the Dutch name of a main street in Brussels (in French *Rue de la loi*) where key European and national institutions are located, and its literally meaning – Law street – is important where the legality of the action of bankers, financial institutions and politicians was disputed]
 {Brussels 15 October 2011 *Flickr*}
- e. Les indignados, ce n'est pas aux salariés de payer la crise, c'est aux riches, aux banques et aux politiques [T shirt][Spanish borrowing *indignados* in French – it is not for the workers to pay for the crisis, it's for the rich, the banks and the politicians]
 {Brussels 15 October 2011 *Flickr*}
- f. Liebe Occupy Kritiker Erwartet keine fertigen Lösungen! [German – Dear Occupy critic, do not expect ready-made solutions]
 {Frankfurt 5 December 2011 *Flickr*}
- g. Systemkrise Occupy Frankfurt (German – system crisis + English: Occupy Frankfurt)
 {Frankfurt 23 March 2012 *Flickr*}

By contrast, other combinations do mix elements from different languages and do express the diversity in the local linguistic landscape. Clearly, due to the method chosen – the collection of uploaded pictures that often isolate individual signs rather than offer a panoramic view of a linguistic landscape – the juxtaposition of texts in different languages cannot be properly accounted for in this study, except for cases in which the photographer, deliberately or not, captured several signs at once.

- (19) [two signs next to each other, hung on a bike] Freedom is never voluntarily given by the oppressor, it is demanded by the oppressed ... Occupy! Geen fietsen plaatsen, worden verwijderd dmv slijptol [Dutch: no bikes allowed – they will be removed with a grinder]
 {Amsterdam 25 November 2011 *Flickr*}

In a few exceptional cases, the same message is provided in two or more languages on the same sign, in two local languages, in the local language and English, in the local language and German, or two non-local languages.

- (20) French / Dutch (local linguistic landscape)
 Contre l' EUROPE du CAPITAL, pour une EUROPE SOCIALISTE! www.gauche.be
 Neen aan het EUROPA van het KAPITAAL; Voor een SOCIALISTISCH EUROPA www.actieflinks.be [Against a capitalist Europe, for a socialist Europe]
 {Brussels 12 May 2012 *Flickr*}
- (21) French / English (transnational public sphere)
 [Greek flag] Peoples rise up! Peuples levez-vous!
 {Brussels 15 October 2011 *Flickr*}
- (22) French / English (transnational public sphere or transnational banking elite?)
 Êtes-vous seulement humains? Us world [French – are you only humans?
 English – us world] {Brussels 15 October 2011 *Flickr*}

Some bilingual signs were targeting decision-makers, more specifically, the German Chancellor Angela Merkel

- (23) English/Greek
 Get out of our country bitch / ΕΞΩ ΑΠΟ ΤΗΝ ΠΑΤΡΙΔΑ ΜΑΣ ΣΚΥΛΑ
 {Athens 9 October 2011 *Flickr*}
- (24) Portuguese/German
 Merkel fora da qui !Raus hier! [Portuguese – Merkel get out of here – German – get out of here]
 {Lisbon 12 November 2011 *Flickr*}

A bilingual sign in two non-local languages was spotted on a Belgian news website and pertain to the March 2013 protests in Nicosia. It is noteworthy because it is clearly targeting a transnational audience, but does not use English to do so. Instead, the national languages of two other Member States are used to address public opinion directly there. The text is in Italian and in Spanish, and features a warning to the Italian and Spanish public about their vulnerability to both the crisis and the policies imposed by the *Troika* to remedy it in the near future:

- (25) Italian/Spanish
 Oggi io, Domani tu; Hoy yo, Mañana tu [Me today, you tomorrow]
 {Nicosia, at Kack.be 19 March 2013}

Finally, there were a very small number of multilingual signs combining the same message in two or three languages on the same banner. They echo monolingual signs used elsewhere coming together in that specific location. It is no coincidence that they were spotted in Brussels, arguably the capital city of the EU, sparsely, but increasingly, used as EU public space.

- (26) a. French/English/Spanish Spanish/French/English
 On est, we are, somos 99%
 No pagaremos su deuda
 On ne payera pas leur dette
 We will not pay their debt
 {Brussels 15 October 2011 *Flickr*} {several pictures}

And this resonates with monolingual banners captured elsewhere:

- (26) b. French
 On ne payera pas leur dette [We will not pay their debt]
 {Paris 27 November 2011 *Flickr*}
- c. Catalan
 No pagarem el seu deuda [We will not pay their debt]
 {Barcelona 29 March 2012 *Flickr*}
- (27) [Italian flag] [difficult to decipher but it seems to read]: La libertà è partecipazione], Freedom is involvement, libertée est participation, libertad es participacion [same statement in Italian, English, French, Spanish]
 {Brussels 15 October 2011 *Flickr*}

However, such a language choice and borrowing are not the only way to express transnational bounds. Other ways to demonstrate transnational solidarity include the waving of national flags, the naming of people from other countries or places, either to include others or to demonstrate support from elsewhere.

- (28) Irlanda estamos contigo [Spanish – Ireland is with you]
 {Madrid 15 October 2011 *Flickr*}
- (29) a. Berliner Girls against Merkel politics {Athens 9 October 2011 *Flickr*}
 b. Stop Racism in Germany and in Greece {Athens 9 October 2011 *Flickr*}
- (30) Indiens, Tchèques, Suédois, Italiens, Chypriotes, Aborigènes, Syriens, Egyptiens, Chiliens, Islandais, Allemands, Suisses, Vénézuéliens, Russes, Mexicains, Yéménites, Roumains [French – Indians, Czechs, Swedes, Italians, Cypriots, Aborigines, Syrians, Egyptians, Chileans, Islanders, Germans, Swiss, Venezuelans, Russians, Mexicans, Yemenites, Romanians]
 {Paris, 23 November 2011 *Flickr*}

Discussion and conclusion

Browsing through hundreds and hundreds of uploaded pictures of the participants at and spectators of demonstrations in (Western and Southern) European cities in 2010–2013 yields a series of visual images that bear witness to diverse transient linguistic landscapes. Notwithstanding this, the most obvious finding is that the signs in the local language, the official language of the state in which the city is located, are largely predominant. There are a few exceptions. In the case of bilingual cities, one official language seems to be more dominant than the other: French over Dutch in Brussels, Spanish over Catalan in Barcelona. In Amsterdam and Brussels, there are also a large number of signs in English, and this probably not only reflects the composition of the activists involved in the local *Occupy* groups (Uitermark and Nicholls, 2012), but also the composition of the group of photographers visiting the city and uploading pictures on *Flickr*.

In general, this linguistic diversity reflects more clearly an orientation towards a translocal audience and towards activists elsewhere, than towards the linguistic diversity of the locality. English is widely present but has a different function in Amsterdam and Brussels, and in Nicosia and Lisbon, for example. In any event, other languages are much less visible.

Foreign language elements are often incorporated and can be seen as loan words in the vocabulary of local activists: *Occupy!* and *Indignados*. Slogans from older struggles (East Germany 1989, Argentina 2001) have been re-appropriated. Clearly, these borrowings and these translations also function as markers of trans-local connections, the connectivity of local activists, and/or the localisation of a global message. On the other hand, a markedly local content can be framed in English, either as a sign of internationalisation or as the expression of a /diverse local linguistic landscape.

There were noteworthy absences: texts in Arabic and references to the so-called Arab Spring. Again, this may be a weakness of my way of collecting pictures. Nevertheless, the use of Arabic is unlikely for many reasons: demonstrators might have no access to the language, and they may not wish to target an Arabic-speaking audience of activists, decision-makers, reporters or general public. What is more surprising is that the Arab Spring experience is visually not used as rallying-point, despite its obvious topicality and the many similarities between the mobilisations on both sides of the Mediterranean in the recent years (Fregonese, 2011, 2013; Verdeil, 2011). It may be that activists do not want to be associated with Arabic (because of the connotations of its script with visual images linked to *Al Qaeda*, *Hezbollah* and similar political organisations and movements). Finally, another likely explanation is that spectators do not take pictures of such signs because they have no access to their meaning. As they do not understand these signs, they are unlikely to take a

picture of them or to share the picture online. Likewise, professional photographers and conventional media may refrain from showing them, either because of the connotations already mentioned, or because they expect them not to be understood by their audience. In a similar fashion, there were no references to the Coloured revolutions (Otpor in Serbia in 2000, Rose in Georgia in 2003, Orange in Ukraine in 2004...), nor signs in Cyrillic or Georgian. Another noted absence in the Cypriot case is the lack of pictures with signs in Russian, considering the presence of a sizeable Russian population and their role in the (local) banking crisis. More generally, migrant languages do not appear in the material collected, despite the fact that all the cities under scrutiny have large populations of migrants.

All the same, the collected pictures convey a sense of limited, albeit still real, engagement with different aspects of linguistic diversity in the EU as a polity. Its main weakness is that the collected signs were taken in isolation (although their location in a certain city at a certain time was maintained). The use of English and German revealed that demonstrators sometimes aimed at directly engaging European decision-makers, especially the German Chancellor Angela Merkel. This connection is strengthened by other visual materials (especially in Athens, but also in Nicosia and in Lisbon) in which protestors associate Nazi iconography with the Chancellor and comparing the present dominance of German preferences in EU monetary and budget policies with the German occupation during World War II (a remarkable twist in the Portuguese case, but also in Cyprus since it, too, was not occupied during the Second World War, although it was involved as a British crown colony).

Although not quantitative, the analysis suggests differences between the cities involved. In Amsterdam and Brussels, English seems to be a prevalent language in the local linguistic landscape, as well as in the transient linguistic landscape of the demonstrations, while Paris is more multilingual (with not only English, but also Spanish) than the remaining cities. We can observe an unbalanced relation between the centre and the periphery with greater use of English and other national languages in peripheral cities located in countries that are confronted with greater financial problems to address than those at the centre: either key decision-makers such as the German Chancellor and the Dutch President of the Eurogroup, or “the people” in these countries. This is extremely important as it suggests that the use of English in Nicosia or in Rome, for example, does not pertain to the formation of a European public sphere, but seems, instead, to express resistance to the hegemony of Germany in EU monetary, budgetary and economic issues, and of the IMF as an expression of US hegemony in the post-Second World War and post-Cold War economic order.

Last, but not least, local linguistic diversity rarely translates into linguistic diversity among activists. While the examples collected show that Paris hosted many

activists with a non-French background, the huge linguistic diversity of London does not translate into the transient multilingual landscape of the *Occupy* movement. It is worth noting that, in his analysis of signs displayed at Occupy Wall Street, Taussig (2012) does not include any signs in a language other than English, either. Here, too, the linguistic diversity of New York City does not translate into a linguistically diverse transient linguistic landscape of protest.

Finally, and not surprisingly, although it should be approached with caution as the study was not about measuring the presence of different languages quantitatively, the engagement with the linguistic diversity of the EU is more visible in the protests against EU policies regarding the so-called Euro crisis in Greece, Portugal and Cyprus, than in the protests of the *Occupy* movement that were not directly reacting to EU policies.

To proceed beyond the limitations of this study, the analysis of the protest signs should be expanded and contextualised in at least two different directions. Firstly, it should be localised and take the composition of texts through (purposive and contingent) juxtaposition as the expression of local collective action. Further research should study how the use of “other” languages is embedded in demonstrations as practice, in social movement organisations, how it is negotiated, decided upon, realised and reflected upon. Do spontaneous forms (handwritten signs) differ from manufactured posters? How do texts travel from one city to the other? From one event to another? From one group to another? From one activist to the other? Based on this study, it is clear that these transnational networks are not solely Europeans, they include activism in other Western locations beyond Europe, but not in the Arab world or in India, or not even Eastern Europe.

Secondly, further research should contextualise the texts in a chain of imagination, representation and performance of protest, resistance to globalisation, and change. How are the texts represented, cited and diffused through conventional and new media? It would be useful to study systematically how certain texts circulate in the conventional media and in which countries. For example, the sign with Dutch text reported from Nicosia has been widely printed in Dutch and Flemish newspapers and posted on Dutch and Flemish news websites, but not in media published in other languages. It shows that the professional press in the different countries interpret the sign as having the Dutch audience as its addressee (hence, the attention of the Dutch press) while the Flemish press picked it up because its Dutch-speaking readership consists of competent readers of the sign, while the French, German or British press did not feel that the sign was for their readership, even if, *de facto*, the targeting of the President of the Eurogroup should concern *all* EU citizens equally, not just those residing in a Dutch-speaking country.

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PART II

Linguistic hegemony, insecurity and linguistic justice

How to measure linguistic justice?

Theoretical considerations and the South Tyrol case study of the Calvet Language Barometer

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When the concept of linguistic justice was proposed by Pool (1991) in order to cope with the asymmetries quite often found in multilingual contexts, it immediately provoked a great deal of debate. To sum up the debate, there is broad agreement on the meaning of linguistic in-justice, but it is still not clear what linguistic justice really is. This doubt is reflected in the mechanics of the proposed methods for the evaluation of multilingual contexts. What are we measuring? In particular, justice for whom, for example, national citizens or migrants? At which level of analysis, that is to say, at local, national, or transnational? The answers to these types of questions will determine our choice of the right – or at least the appropriate – parameters to be taken into account in order to design an index of the proposed measurement method. In other words, measures are far from neutral, in spite of the fact that they are quantitative, especially in the field of analytical sociolinguistics (Iannàcaro & Dell’Aquila, 2011). After almost a decade of refinements, in particular by Van Parijs (2004, 2011, 2012), Grin (2011), and Grin and Gazzola (2007) observed that the intangible value of a language, being one of the main carriers of culture, is quite often left aside in the indexes that propose to measure linguistic justice as a whole. The only variable that seems to be generally accepted as being relevant is territory.

In this chapter, I examine the Calvet Language Barometer (CLB) in its latest version, published on the web in 2012, under the perspective of linguistic justice. I will proceed backwards, as the CLB aims to measure the “linguistic altitude” of languages in isolation – *i.e.*, their position on the scale – while linguistic justice refers to languages in contact and mainly to multilingual contexts. However, the worldwide gravitational model presented in Calvet (2006, 1999), is naturally compatible with the CLB and can be used for this purpose. The case study of South Tyrol will be presented in order to test the CLB in this perspective, showing to what extent the barometer works, where it does not work, and why. In the conclusion, some preliminary ideas about a genuine multilingual measure of linguistic justice will be presented, based upon an operative notion of multilingual equilibrium.

1. Introduction

When dealing with multilingualism, one of the most important methodological issues still left open is how to measure the linguistic context under analysis. Languages live through their speakers: they shape their identity, assess attitudes towards life, and also provide opportunities for mobility – both in terms of levels in society and in terms of movement from one place to another. Intuitively, some languages are in high positions while others not. This is evident in the case of the extremes of the scale: we all agree that English is the language in the highest position nowadays, while endangered languages are in the lowest positions by definition.

However, when we try to clarify what “high” and “low” really means, everything becomes complicated. Grin and Gazzola (2007) already pointed out that quantitative models of the economics of language should take care not only of effectiveness and efficiency (cost-benefit analysis), but also of fairness and communication goals, which are less tangible. In fact, they are influenced by the so-called “symbolic value” nested into languages, quite often left aside in the models that attempt to cope with an ecology of languages – *i.e.*, a social environment in which languages, considered as complex adaptive systems (see Beckner et al., 2009), are in contact. Finding viable parameters for this symbolic value is not straightforward. We find ourselves in a paradox. On the one hand, it is not easy to compare two languages in a given situation by an undisputed set of parameters collected into an index. On the other, we cannot avoid addressing this problem. In fact, every discourse about language diversity presumes a scale of strength – regardless of what this really means.

Gazzola (2014a, 2014b and 2014c) offered an overview of the different perspectives of linguistic justice present in the literature until now, and the need for an index of linguistic justice in order to compare different situations is increasingly evident among the scholars (Alcalde, 2014). Even though linguistic justice was introduced in the 1990s by Pool (Gazzola, 2014b: 4), it was Van Parijs (2004, 2011, 2012) who popularised it not only in academia, but also in the media, focusing on the role of English as a *lingua franca*, a concept highly criticised by many commentators, amongst whom one finds Gazzola and Grin (2013) from a language economy point of view, and the review of Jenkins’ book on the subject by Gobbo (2010), from the perspective of applied linguistics. Defining linguistic justice as an evaluation of the efficiency and fairness of concurrent language-regime scenarios seems to be the most advanced approach in the literature, because it also takes fairness into account (Gazzola & Grin, 2013; Gazzola, 2014c). These studies elaborate on official statistical datasets such as Eurobarometer surveys and Eurostat, which cover broad territories, such as the European Union. Gazzola (2014b) offers a preliminary survey about the two main approaches to linguistic justice, while an extensive overview of the literature can be found in Alcalde (in press).

The first approach is grounded in the theory of justice, based upon liberal egalitarianism, which is the scientific and ideological reference that Van Parijs hails from. Having a minority language as a first language is generally perceived as a handicap – the majority of mankind does not speak the central languages, in Calvet’s terms (see below for details). The second approach praises multilingualism as a value *per se*, as individuals have the human right to develop themselves through their own language, and not the language(s) of others – for example, in schools. In order to have a fair and efficient Europe, for example, this group of authors argues that we need multilingual Europeans – for instance, Marácz and Rosello (2012). The two groups – liberal-egalitarians and “multi-lingualists” – share neither the tools of analysis, nor the results. Indeed, one can conclude that liberal-egalitarians put the individual citizen and his or her rights first, while multi-lingualists put group rights first, and this can partially explain the striking difference in the literature over linguistic hegemony, linguistic (in-) security and linguistic (in-) justice.

From a sociolinguistic point of view, in the official statistical datasets used in the literature, there is no explicit evaluation of the strength of a language (*i.e.*, the prestige from the point of view of the speech community) or the vitality of a language (in the sense of Jules Gilliéron), which can be described as the language loyalty within the speech community, in particular concerning the intergenerational transmission of the language itself (for an analysis of quantitative treatments of language vitality, see Iannàccaro & Dell’Aquila, 2011). Thus, crucial sociolinguistic aspects are simply not taken into account in the literature on linguistic justice, because of the lack of available data and of the different backgrounds of the researchers in the field – not only applied linguistics and translation studies, but also political science and philosophy and economics. For example, key terms such as “planning” or “*laissez-faire* policy” have different meanings, depending on the background of the authors using them (Gazzola, 2014a: 4). This methodological problem is particularly important when we try to depict concurrent scenarios in order to change the *de jure* and *de facto* language policy of the institutional agents in charge. In fact, it is far easier to depict unjust linguistic situations than to propose improvements – if not solutions – in which all the linguistic actors feel they are being treated on an equal basis, in which everybody is in a comfortable position, which we can describe as a position of language security.

At the moment, there is no concrete proposal for measuring linguistic justice through an index, at least according to this author’s knowledge. However, one of the few proposals to capture simultaneously the difference in strength between languages in quantitative and sociolinguistic terms is the Calvet Language Barometer (CLB). Its name comes from the authors, Louis-Jean Calvet and Alain Calvet, respectively a renowned linguist and his brother, a mathematician. In this chapter, the CLB will be analysed as a candidate for measuring linguistic justice. Although

the CLB does not address multilingual settings, but, instead, evaluates every single language, it can be easily applied to situations in which languages are in contact, borrowing the worldwide gravitational model presented in Calvet (2006, 1999). It is important to note that the analysis will not evaluate the CLB *per se*, but only for the purpose of assessing linguistic justice. It is worth noting that, while Calvet (2006, 1999) is well aware of multilingualism and its value *per se*, the CLB is similar to the liberal-egalitarian approach from a methodological point of view. This, the analysis of the CLB can give us useful insights and valid indications in order to build an explicit index of linguistic justice in the near future, thereby overcoming the methodological *impasse* described before. I will proceed backwards. First, the CLB will be presented and discussed. Then, the gravitational model of Calvet (2006, 1999) will be used, in order to introduce a possible use of the CLB in multilingual situations. As Südtirol or South Tyrol is a well-known multilingual case in the sociolinguistic literature, the CLB will be applied to this case study in order to test the CLB itself. The chapter concludes with some general considerations, mainly from a sociolinguistic point of view.

2. A barometer to measure the altitude of languages

The CLB was launched in 2010 through a web site,¹ and takes 137 different idioms of the world into account, analysed into ten parameters. In 2012, an update was made, taking 563 languages into account, and an eleventh parameter was added. More parameters can be added in the future, depending on the needs of the users of the CLB itself, according to what is stated on the web site. The authors themselves give some interesting suggestions of possible parameters, such as the number of scientific publications in a given language per year, the production of films in the said language, *etc.* Nonetheless, as there has been no update since 2012, I assume that the CLB is stable.

Clearly, one of the criteria in choosing parameters is completeness. What should be done if data concerning a parameter simply do not exist? The authors suggest assigning a value of zero: for example, setting the number of scientific publications to zero in a minority language belonging to Papua or Cameroon does not radically change the overall picture. Alternatively, it is possible to assign the average value in the column based on similar languages according to the other parameters, so as not to introduce deviations into the analysis. However, it is important to emphasise the fact that these techniques should be avoided whenever possible: they are used

1. The actual link is: <http://wikilf.culture.fr/barometre2012>, (last accessed 14 November 2017). No changes have been proposed since 2012.

only for the robustness of the index, as they do not express real-world data. Another important point highlighted by the authors is the fact that there is some overlap between the parameters: in other words, the data are not always independent. For example, it is well known that the Human Development Index is negatively correlated with the total fertility rate. All these limitations should be considered with care when using the CLB in the task of evaluating the degree of linguistic justice in a concrete society.

The weight of the parameters can be adjusted according to the preferences or requirements of the CLB user by means of a slider on the web site. Thus, the CLB is actually a meta-index, because this possibility can generate a number of indexes with very different results, making the CLB both (a) flexible, and (b) not so “user friendly”. Therefore, as a result, all parameters are considered to be equivalent, unless otherwise stated, in order to avoid possible misunderstandings. Each parameter is presented and discussed *per se*, with special intention being given to finding a measure of linguistic justice.

Parameter 1: The number of speakers

There is an implicit assumption that the number of speakers is the most important parameter, which is also the parameter generally used by laymen when evaluating the “strength” of a language. In fact, the choice of the languages considered by the barometer is determined by the number of speakers: the baseline used in 2010 was 5 million speakers, while, in 2012, this was reduced to 500,000 speakers. The source of these numbers is the publication *Ethnologue: Languages of the World* (2014). Despite its imperfections – as admitted by the authors on the web site – *Ethnologue* is still the most complete source for this kind of information. On the other hand, the authors argue that *Ethnologue* tends to dissect language varieties too finely, creating a lot of sub-classes, which can cause problems in counting. They cite the case of Malay as an example – in which more than twenty different varieties have been identified. Thus, even the first and most important parameter in the CLB shows evident limits.

The problem of designing the linguistic map, of choosing when to consider a distinctive variety to be a language of its own, is far from straightforward. This problem is well-known in sociolinguistics – as well as in language policy and planning – and it was addressed by Kloss (1967), who introduced the concept of “Ausbau language”. A language is “Ausbau” when it is deliberately elaborated, (re-) shaped, for political and identity reasons, and distinct from another language which is dominant. The general aim is to prevent the Ausbau language from being confused with the other, stronger language in contact. The act of giving a definite

name to the language variety and a distinctive writing system is usually the first step in “Ausbauization” (the term coined by Mauro Tosco), *i.e.*, the process of becoming Ausbau, *i.e.*, how the language is shaped in order to access non-traditional, prestigious domains of use; the first step of the process of becoming Ausbau is to establish a writing norm that is actually used by the speakers. This process cannot be easily measured in absolute terms, as it is put into practice by always keeping the dominant language in mind as a point of reference: the relation between the dominant and the dominated language should be adjusted in order to leave more space to the dominated language, with the intention of maintaining and promoting it. Unfortunately, descriptions of languages usually consider each language as though it were a stand-alone entity, without regard for the multilingual environments in which they live. An example of this can be found in the world map by *Ethnologue* (Lewis et al., 2014), which is an important reference for typological studies.

In this model, the degree of Ausbauization is implicit and, as a result, the proposed taxonomy sometimes produces puzzling results. For example, Greek minorities in Southern Italy, Griko and Grecanic, are not considered to be a variety distinct from standard Modern Greek. In fact, they are all listed with the ISO-code <ell>, instead of having different ISO-codes, which would mark them as distinct languages. In fact, Griko and Grecanic are structurally and sociolinguistically different from Modern Greek: for instance, they are usually written with Latin characters, instead of Greek characters, and – more importantly – they are endangered languages. In fact, the intergenerational transmission of these varieties is not guaranteed: in the Expanded Graded Intergenerational Disruption Scale (EGIDS) – published by Lewis et al. (2010), the same linguists who maintain the publication *Ethnologue: Languages of the World* – these varieties are below level 4, which is the safety line. In contrast, Modern Greek is a language definitely out of danger, being the official language of a well-recognised state, Greece (EGIDS = 1, *i.e.*, Institutional).

The fact that *Ethnologue* is based upon the EGIDS can sometimes be problematic, as the main parameter of the EGIDS to measure linguistic vitality and strength is the number of L1 (first language) speakers and their age: the authors of the CLB cite the case of Swahili, which is spoken as an L2 (second language) much more than as an L1. During the revision of the CLB proposed by Calvet and Calvet in 2012, the new parameter of vehicularity was added, which will be discussed below.

Parameter 2: Entropy

Entropy is a notion used in physics, and one which has only recently been applied to the field of linguistics. The authors of the CLB refer to the work of Paolillo et al. (2005) which attempted to differentiate between the languages spoken in different

countries from the languages spoken in only one country – in the latter, entropy would be zero. The assumption is that the language spoken in each country is uniform: in other words, there is a perfect match between languages and countries/states. Clearly, it is perfectly understandable that the existence of different countries in which a given language is spoken is a driving force that leads to the emergence of different norms – suffice it to think of the varieties of the Dutch language in Holland and Flanders, for instance. On the other hand, languages often present a lot of variation within the borders of a single country. From a sociolinguistic point of view, the barometer attributes a prominence to the diatopic axis (*i.e.*, the geographic variable in language variation) over the diastratic axis (*i.e.*, the variable that indicates the relation between the social position of the speakers and their language use). In other words, the notion of territory is considered to be the main variable to evaluate the position of languages on the scale, which is a highly questionable assumption, as some languages show a considerable degree of diastratic variation – for instance, German and English (Neumann, 2014). Consequently, languages are evaluated by using the *normative written variety* that they actually show, regardless of their sociolinguistic complexity. Therefore, only languages with a high degree of Ausbau can be considered by the barometer: languages without a stable, written variety cannot be taken into account, regardless of the numbers of speakers who use them. I will come back to this point later.

Parameter 3: Vehicularity

Although there is a lot of literature about vehicular languages as such, it is rare to find a clear definition of the property of vehicularity in abstract and general terms. The CLB offers a definition in quantitative terms: vehicularity is represented as a ratio between the number of L2 speakers *vis-à-vis* the number of total speakers (L1 + L2). So, a language spoken only as an L1 will have zero vehicularity, while the vehicularity of a language with no L1 speakers will have vehicularity set to one. Interestingly, according to the authors, Hindi is a purely vehicular language, which is hardly believable: in the Indian census data of the last years (1991, 2001, 2011), a significant percentage of Indians indicated Hindi as their mother tongue (data available from the government official web site²). Even if the notion of “mother tongue” and L1 are not equivalent (for a critical perspective, see Bonfiglio, 2013, 2010), it seems reasonable to suppose that L1 Hindi speakers *do* exist. Perhaps, the only language which is purely vehicular in this sense is Esperanto, where no monolingual speakers exist: furthermore, even in the case of bilingual families,

2. Census Data Online: <http://www.censusindia.gov.in>.

Esperanto has no clear distinctive normative status, compared to non-native, but fluent, language speakers, according to language experts, such as Lindstedt (2010). In any case, the Calvet evaluation of Hindi is determined by the data, which does not touch the definition of vehicularity. In fact, this definition of vehicularity as a ratio is very clear and intuitive, and, in my opinion, it should be used when convenient, even without the whole apparatus of the CLB.

Parameter 4: Official status

As acknowledged by the authors, a language can be *de facto* official without holding this status as a result of a legal document: the level of recognition of a language by the political authorities is a complex topic, one in which the level of the authority (local, national, or transnational) should at least be identified properly. The authors use the data provided by Leclerc on his web site entitled *L'aménagement linguistique dans le monde* (language arrangement across the world), which distinguishes between official languages in sovereign states *versus* non-sovereign, attributing a 0.5 value to the latter, with the *caveat* that it counts only once if it is official in different regions of the same sovereign state. However, there are some situations that lead to paradoxes. For instance, the case of Italy is of particular interest here: Italian is official not only in Italy and in Switzerland (both as a federal language and in the Cantons of Ticino and Grisons), but also in the sovereign states of San Marino, the Vatican (with Latin as the state language, which means that it counts 0.5) and the Sovereign Military Hospitaller Order of Saint John of Jerusalem of Rhodes and of Malta. The overall value is 4.5, rank eight in the top ten, after Serbian (value: 4.75) and before Mandarin Chinese (value: 4). It is evident that the political weight of Italy in respect of the status of the Italian language is different from that of San Marino or of the Hospitallers, even though they all value 1. This parameter is particularly problematical, because it does not refer to the speech community in any way, unlike the previous ones. Moreover, there is no consideration of the status of the language in supranational entities, such as the European Union or the United Nations: clearly, being an official language in these institutions contributes to strengthening the language, but this fact is not turned into valuable data.

Parameters 5 and 6: The role of translation

Translation is an important means of diffusing ideas which originally belong to another language, so it rightly deserves two parameters, namely, the distinguishing source, and the target languages. Here, the CLB uses the data provided by the *Index Translationum* by Unesco. This index measures the number of translations

by language published since 1979, classified into nine categories: (i) general and bibliography; (ii) philosophy and psychology; (iii) religion and theology; (iv) law, social sciences, and education; (v) natural sciences; (vi) applied sciences; (vii) arts, sports, and games; (viii) literature; (ix) history, geography, and biography. The *Index Translationum* has the advantage of both the coverage of several languages and the neutrality guaranteed by Unesco. However, even this index presents some problems. In particular, the main problem occurs when matching the world map of languages according to *Ethnologue* with the world map of Unesco. The authors are aware of this. The case of Serbo-Croatian of the former Yugoslavia, now split up into Serbian, Croatian, Bosnian and Montenegrin, as well as the complex situation of Arabic, are discussed by the authors. Essentially, they re-framed the data according to the ISO codes of the languages, which is a reasonable solution – but the problem still remains. From a methodological point of view, the CLB is calculated here by using indirect data, *i.e.*, raw data that were already collected for other purposes and transformed independently. In other words, these two parameters devoted to translation are not based upon data, but upon another index instead, so that the CLB becomes partially a meta-index. The same is true for parameter 9, as we will see below.

Parameter 7: International literary awards

Literature is a factor that testifies to the high level of the Ausbau of a language: only a small percentage of the languages of the world are recognised as vehicles of world literature through prizes and awards. This parameter has the previous ones as its basis. In fact, works must be known in an international setting before they are nominated for an international literary award, such as the Nobel Prize for Literature. There are a number of reasons why the Nobel Prize cannot suffice as the only source for this parameter: in particular, the eurocentrism and the left-wing orientation of the political orientation of the Nobel committee. Nominees count 0.5 (only once, if nominated many times), while winners count 1. Nominees and winners are considered according to the languages in which they write, not their nationality. For example, Ngũgĩ wa Thiong'o is counted twice, for English and for Gikuyu – which is admittedly questionable if we think of the reasons that led him to use English (Thiong'o, 1986). The authors are aware that the parameter is imperfect, but it is nevertheless important for the self-esteem of the speakers of the languages, where international literary awards exist. Perhaps, it would be better to consider it as a correction or control factor of the *Index Translationum* taken globally. However, this is, admittedly, possible if the user of the CLB changes the weight of the different parameters.

Parameter 8: The number of Wikipedia articles

This parameter considers the “grand total” of the articles on Wikipedia by September 2011. This parameter shows severe limits, due to the internal policy of Wikipedia. First, it does not consider real articles differently from stubs, which can even be generated by software. There is already a specific episode about Wikipedia in Volapük, a language planned for international purposes before Esperanto, whose interest now is merely historical: more than 100,000 stubs were generated by a single user with the help of a software robot, and, after a discussion in January 2008, Wikipedia administrators decided to keep the articles anyway.³ This was a very extreme case, which abruptly pushed Volapük into the second range of languages (more than 100,000 articles) with only 30 active users registered.⁴ To make a comparison, Armenian has a similar number of articles, but it has 209 active users. Another problem is how to count languages with more than one writing system, such as Norwegian, which has two distinct Wikipedias. I think that the number of active users should be taken more seriously into account in analysing the impact of Wikipedia. For example, if we list the top ten Wikipedias, according to the number of active users, Dutch is no longer in second place, but goes down to eighth place: this means that Dutch language contributors, who number more than 4,000, are very active in opening new pages, compared, for example, to the Polish language, which has a similar number of contributors, but few articles (+1,700,000 for Dutch, a bit more than one million for Polish). Moreover, Hale (2014) pointed out that the role of multilingual users (just over 15%) is important in the maintenance and growth of Wikipedias. In fact, multilingual users are far more active than their monolingual counterparts, and act as concrete bridges between the different versions. In this specific case, an index of the language vitality of Wikipedia could be made upon the basis of fine-grained data, as a lot of data suitable for statistical analysis are always available and are updated monthly or even daily in some cases. At the very least, the number of active speakers compared to the number of the total speakers (L1 + L2) could be performed, in order to form an index of the activity of the various Wikipedias. The simple “grand total” of Wikipedia articles is not enough.

3. http://meta.wikimedia.org/wiki/Proposals_for_closing_projects/Radical_cleanup_of_Volap%C3%BCK_Wikipedia.

4. http://meta.wikimedia.org/wiki/List_of_Wikipedias#Grand_Total (last accessed 16 June 2014).

Parameters 9 and 10: Human Development Index (HDI) and total fertility rate

If, in the case of translation, an index was a source of data, in this case, an index is used as it is. The Human Development Index (HDI) is used by the UN to measure the achievements of countries in education, health, and income. It is calculated for the member countries of the UN, not for their languages. However, the explanation by Calvet and Calvet here is insufficient: after all, the HDI and the total fertility rate are indexes unrelated to languages. In fact, surprising results are obtained: classification solely according to this criterion gives different results when it considers languages belonging to the same country. For instance, the Hawai'i Creole English is ranked in second position while English (American? English? Global?) is in fourth position: although the distance between the two is small (the difference is only 0.021), it is not clear *why* they are different. I think that the use of this index for languages is spurious, and should not be used at all. Similar issues arise for the total fertility rate, which is part of the report in which the HDI is also used, and it is again calculated for countries, not languages. At most, Parameters 9 and 10 can be allowed, but with very little weight.

Parameter 11: Language use in the Internet

This parameter can be put into relation with Parameter 8 concerning Wikipedia, as both illustrate the presence of the language on the web. However, if the data offered for Wikipedia by its Foundation are reliable, I doubt that these Internet World Stats really are. In fact, the source of the web site⁵ is the Miniwatts Marketing Group, a limited liability company, legally established in 1997 in Bogotá, Colombia. Furthermore, the data here are already an elaboration by the Miniwatts company based upon the US Census Bureau, Nielsen Online, and other sources, not all explicitly listed: it is simply impossible to double-check the data. It is very different from a public institution such as the UN, the source of the two previous parameters, or the Wikipedia Foundation, where raw data are always available, because of the free software licence. As in the case of Parameters 9 and 10, the influence of Parameter 11 should not be kept to the minimum.

5. <http://www.internetworldstats.com/stats.htm>, last accessed 16 June 2014.

Two versions of the barometer: Unweighted *versus* weighted

In Table 7.1 (below), the reader can see a comparison of the original CLB and with different weights for different parameters, after their discussion. In particular, the weight of the most problematic parameters were given a weight of 0.25 (international literary awards, HDI and total fertility rate, and language use on the Internet), while the less problematic parameters were given a weight of 0.5 (official status, and translation). The other parameters that do not present particular problems were left as they are.

Table 7.1 An application of the Calvet Language Barometer with and without weights

Parameters			Weight	Weight
Number of speakers			1	1
Entropy			1	1
Vehicularity			1	1
Official status			1	0.5
Role of translation			1	0.5
International literary awards			1	0.25
Number of Wikipedia articles			1	1
Human Development Index			1	0.25
Total fertility rate			1	0.25
Language use in the Internet			1	0.25

Rank	Language	Score	Rank	Language	Score
1	English	9.062	1	English	5.427
2	Spanish	7.806	2	Spanish	5.131
3	French	7.733	3	French	4.580
4	German	6.987	4	German	4.108
5	Russian	6.335	5	Russian	4.024
6	Japanese	6.187	6	Mandarin Chinese	3.918
7	Dutch	6.138	7	Portuguese	3.792
8	Italian	6.131	8	Italian	3.684
9	Portuguese	5.97	9	Dutch	3.670
10	Mandarin Chinese	5.964	10	Japanese	3.635
11	Swedish	5.543	11	Hindi	3.382
12	Turkish	5.321	12	Turkish	3.309
13	Norwegian	5.232	13	Bengali	3.288
14	Polish	5.2	14	Rumanian	3.231
15	Danish	5.104	15	Farsi	3.157

Source: Elaboration from the CBL web site (data calculated 19 June 2014).

The top five languages are left untouched by the change: English, Spanish, French, German, and Russian are the highest languages in the barometer. On the other hand, there is a significant change in Mandarin Chinese, which moves up from position 10 to position 6, switching positions with Japanese. The re-organisation of the influence of the parameters also lets some non-Western languages climb up the scale: Hindi, Bengali and Farsi show up in the first fifteen, while the three main Scandinavian languages (Swedish, Norwegian, and Danish) disappear from this group.

The CLB has the merit of being very flexible: the weighted model, however, which takes the observations made until now into account, presents a view of the languages of the world that is closer to reality. On the other hand, the CLB is not robust enough to be used as such as an index of linguistic justice.

3. The gravitational model and the barometer

Before the launch of the CLB in 2010, Louis-Jean Calvet had worked for years on the ecology of world languages (1999, 2006). Several authors had used the word “ecology” in different ways; Calvet considers languages as “ecolinguistic systems” (2006: 46), using ecology in the sense of Immanuel Wallerstein’s World systems theory. Systemics, as mentioned above, are specifically applied to linguistics by Beckner et al. (2009) in considering languages as complex adaptive systems. In Calvet’s view, each language is part of an ecological “niche”, constituted by its relations with other languages, “by the place it occupies in the ecosystem, *i.e.*, by its functions and by its relations with the environment – essentially, that is, by geography, which plays a defining role in the spread of languages” (2006: 24). It is clear that the defining role of the ecolinguistic system is – again – territory, which drives the whole analysis. If we want to apply the CLB to measure linguistic justice, we have to identify a definite ecolinguistic system as the context under scrutiny. However, as we have already seen, the CLB cannot be directly applied to any ecolinguistic system, because languages are placed in the CLB according to the absolute number of L1 speakers worldwide, regardless of the variable of territory. Only in some cases are languages located in specific areas, in particular, minority languages and Creole languages. For instance, minority languages such as Sicilian, Lombard and Piedmontese are mainly rooted in specific regions of Italy – although the presence of communities abroad has its importance, mainly for symbolic reasons.

In order to try to solve the problems illustrated so far, let us take the gravitational model of Calvet (2006, 1999) to compare the weight of different languages. Unlike the CLB, this model is qualitative. The gravitational model was originally

introduced by Abram de Swaan (2001), and it is still in use – for example, by Hiddinga and Crasborn (2011) for sign languages. The basic idea comes from astrophysics: the world is seen as a galaxy in which languages are the stars. If a star has a higher mass, it will be in a more prominent position. In the terms of the CLB, it will be in a higher position on the scale. Following this metaphor, bilingual speakers form a constellation of languages, as they are the connectors. Some languages are more attractive than others, and a dynamic equilibrium between central and peripheral languages emerges, with four levels of weight in total.

The reference-point of the galaxy is currently English, the hyper-central language: L1 speakers tend to be monolingual, while non-natives tend to learn it as an L2. This situation is called *vertical bilingualism*: an L1 speaker of a peripheral language shows a tendency to learn a more central language. This can be reflected in the CLB in terms of vehicularity and the *Index Translationum*: both should show high values. At the second level, there are the super-central languages: Arabic, Chinese, French, Hindi, Malay, Portuguese, Russian, Spanish, and Swahili. Calvet observes that L1 speakers tend either to be monolingual or vertically bilingual with English. In terms of the CLB, all these languages are official (Parameter 4) in at least one sovereign state, and they also have good scores in terms of vehicularity and in the Index Translationum. At the third level, there are more or less one hundred central languages, where L1 speakers show a tendency towards vertical bilingualism with super-central languages, while the 5,000 peripheral languages (level 4) show not only vertical, but also horizontal, bilingualism – when a speaker acquires an L2 of the same weight (it should be in a similar position in the CLB). According to the author of the galaxy model, Jean-Louis Calvet, vertical bilingualism proceeds step-by-step: in Senegal, a speaker of Serere or Diola (level 4) will acquire Wolof (level 3) before French (level 2), and finally English (level 1; Calvet, 2006: 61). Henceforth, in the case of the very complex ecolinguistic systems in Africa, four levels of analysis are needed.

However, it seems to me that several educational policies in various parts of the world tend to jump directly to learn level 2 languages (such as French) and, in particular, the level 1 language, to wit, English, not following the multiple-stage process illustrated above. Moreover, in many ecolinguistic systems – for instance, in Europe or in Canada – it is sufficient to have three levels in total, instead of four. This raises the question of the appropriateness of the names of the classes: in particular, I doubt that L1 speakers of Occitan or Piedmontese ever refer to their own languages as “central”, following Calvet’s proposal, especially if we take into account the fact that there is no periphery (*i.e.*, level 4) left.

There is another limitation in Calvet’s gravitational system, which is not linked to a particular ecolinguistic systems, but turns out to be a theoretical one. The

model assumes that every language is connected with one – and only one – other language – like planets and satellites. In several contexts, the relations between different languages residing in the same ecolinguistic niche are more complex than this. Let us consider L2 languages learnt because of mobility or motility (Houtkamp, 2014) – cases which are not explicitly dealt with by the author. For instance, a bilingual German-English person working and living in The Netherlands would probably learn Dutch in order not to be excluded from important domains of the life of the inhabitants of the ecolinguistic system in which he or she happens to live. For this reason, I argue that typed connections – in the sense used in graph theory – between languages should be introduced here: in other words, there is more than one possible link between languages. Calvet (2006: 61) distinguishes between spontaneous learning and programmed learning (for example, at school) in the case of vertical and horizontal bilingualism. While verticality and horizontality are easily depicted by the directions of the connections, I will use dotted lines for spontaneous acquisition (informal learning), while continuous lines will be used for programmed, structured learning (formal and non-formal learning). Programmed learning does not block spontaneous language acquisition, rather, it reinforces it, and, for this reason, a stronger, continuous line was chosen; in contrast, spontaneous learning is mainly context-dependent, and, in general, is weaker. Furthermore, the presence of an explicit language-learning policy changes the symbolic value of the L2 language: under a *ceteris paribus* assumption, a programmed learning strategy is stronger than a spontaneous one. Finally, the symbolic relevance of an L1 should be depicted accordingly: therefore, the names referring to L1 will be put in bold type. Figure 7.1 below illustrates the example presented above.




Figure 7.1 A complex ecolinguistic system with both vertical and horizontal bilingualism

In sum, it seems more useful to apply *some* parameters of the CLB, instead of the whole apparatus, according to the case under analysis. In fact, a majority language in absolute terms can become a minority language in a specific ecolinguistic system. Each parameter should be selected carefully, with a proper weight, possibly avoiding

the most problematical ones – especially those based upon the existing indexes. Then, Calvet’s definition of vertical vs. horizontal bilingualism can be applied on a three or four-level scale, again, according to the context. Roughly speaking, African contexts need four, while European ones seems to need only three in most cases. Typical links for bilingualism are proposed here, on the basis of the distinction between spontaneous language acquisition vs. programmed language learning. The symbolic value of the mother tongue – with an oversimplification, corresponding to the L1 – is retained as the starting-point of the multilingual situation, finally permitting a description of the strength of the specific language in the context, and the attitudes towards language learning by the prototype actors, defined along with their mother tongues.

I argue that a description of the languages present in a specific ecolinguistic system is pre-condition to any consideration about linguistic justice. The final goal is to find a non-unjust language policy for every actor, so that, on the one hand, the language learning effort would be more or less the same for everybody, while, on the other, the actors’ communicative possibilities would be the highest. My point is that a sociolinguistic notion of linguistic justice, which we can call *sociolinguistic justice* here, should be investigated in depth, in which the learning efforts and communicative possibilities are the main concurring variables, so that the context could be described as a dynamic (socio-) linguistic equilibrium. Now, after these necessary adaptations, we can apply this set of tools to a case study.

4. An application: The barometer of the linguistic justice in South Tyrol

South Tyrol is often considered a success case of language management. The ecolinguistic system of this area, which is politically part of Italy, with a complex historical background linked to the Austrian Empire, and with a geographic border with Switzerland, contains three distinctive language groups: Germans, Italians and Ladins. Traditionally, the overall political strategy to prevent conflicts can be described as “separation under the same roof”: the three groups should avoid contact as much as possible, also thanks to the fact that the territory is very mountainous, while formal co-operation was guaranteed through the institutions which are, to a large extent, autonomous from the central government in Rome. According to Pallaver (2014), there is a movement towards a new strategy of an associative conflict-resolution model, in which co-operation between the three linguistic groups operates at different levels, starting from initiatives coming from civil society.

The multilingual landscape of South Tyrol is therefore complex, as there is clear evidence of the contacts between the three languages over a long period of time. We will refer to the results of the four-year research project *Kontatto*, which ended in May 2014, and which aimed to study in detail what happens in terms of identity in a border territory like South Tyrol. The endogenous linguistic systems there belong to different groups: standard German and the local German dialect are Germanic, while Italian and Ladin are Romance languages. Their constant and close contacts for decades (if not centuries) have led to the phenomena of linguistic innovation, induced by contact itself. Italian is spoken mainly in the cities of Bozen-Bolzano and Meran-Merano as well as in the Bassa Atesina area, while German is spoken by the majority of the population, mainly in its local, non-standard Germanic dialects. On the other hand, Ladins are located in the valleys where they belong by tradition, in particular, Badia and Gardena, if we consider South Tyrol alone as our ecolinguistic “niche”. The degree of multilingualism can vary a lot, considering that South Tyroleans can have three different L1s: in particular, Italians in the cities tend to be monolingual, while Germans shows a tendency towards the programmed acquisition of Italian: finally, Ladins often acquire both. In the Bassa Atesina, the situation is more fluid, but, in any case, it is unlikely that Ladin will be acquired by the L1 speakers of Italian and German (for research in this field, see Meluzzi et al., 2013). The three prototypical situations, according to the different mother tongues considered, are illustrated in Figures 7.2 and 7.3 below. However, English always plays a hyper-central role, which is also made institutionally clear in the language policy of the Free University of Bozen/Bolzano, which is officially trilingual (English, German, and Italian) and intercultural, according to its motto.⁶




Figure 7.2 The ecolinguistic system of South Tyrol from the perspective of a prototypical L1 Italian

6. See the web site: <http://www.unibz.it>, last accessed 27 August 2014.




Figure 7.3 The ecolinguistic system of South Tyrol from the perspective of a prototypical L1 Ladin

From a sociolinguistic point of view, the three prototypical L1 speakers are too simple. On the other hand, our aim is to compare the efforts of the typical multilingual strategies and the attitudes of the three different communities in order to identify linguistic injustice and to overcome it whenever possible. It is clear that the Ladins are keen to acquire a richer multilingualism than the others: their language effort is higher. Thus, while obtaining a communicative power similar to German L1 speakers, they are clearly in an unjust position. On the other hand, the vertical multilingualism of the Italian L1 speakers is scarce: their language effort is low compared to that of the others, and thus they obtain a slightly lower communicative power, compared to the other two groups.

Unfortunately, given that it is a lesser-used language, Ladin is not considered in the CLB, and thus a direct comparison between the languages using the other parameters is simply impossible. However, as stated above, the most fruitful way to use the CLB is to look at each single parameter, according to the concrete needs of comparison. For example, in this case, the official status (parameter 4) clearly confirms the disadvantages of Ladin, compared to German and Italian. A helpful parameter should be calculated on the basis of the *Index Translationum*, but it is limited to the territory under analysis, as well as a calculation of the vehicularity rate within South Tyrol, in order to put the situation in equilibrium.

5. Final observations

It is very difficult to calculate the weight of any language, although the CLB is a concrete proposal in this direction. Even if severe limitations have been found, some ideas contained within it can be used as a first step towards establishing a comprehensive methodology to evaluate the linguistic (in-) justice of a given ecolinguistic system, identified through its territory and through more robust sociolinguistic data. The general aim is to find the optimal equilibrium between the following two related variables: first, the language-learning effort, and then the corresponding communicative power obtained. The fine-tuning of this interpretation of linguistic justice as balanced multilingualism remains a task for the future.

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Linguistic justice and English as a Lingua Franca

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Several academic circles are currently theorising the global use of English, including the following two: on the one hand, a group of linguists have argued that English as a Lingua Franca (ELF), is to be distinguished from English as a Native Language (ENL), of which ELF is not an inferior version. On the other hand, a number of political philosophers have developed theories of linguistic justice that zoom in on the normative case both for and against the global dominance of English. These two “schools” – ELF and linguistic justice – have developed simultaneously but have not engaged with each other to date. In this chapter, I examine the extent to which the linguistic injustices that the emergence of English brings to non-native speakers are reduced by the shift from a conception that prioritises native-speaker norms for English to a conception that legitimises ELF. I first argue that there are four such injustices – communicative, resource, life-world, and dignity injustices. Subsequently, I analyse for each of the injustices what difference ELF could make. My argument is that ELF reduces – but does not remove – the injustices connected to the emergence of English as the world’s lingua franca. But once we are talking about degrees of injustice reduction, other options are available as well. A more significant reduction of the injustices is possible, I argue, through establishing L1-based norms of English.

Introduction

In this chapter, I examine global linguistic justice, defined as the just political response to the emergence of English as a global vehicular language. Theories of global linguistic justice answer normative language policy questions such as: Is this emergence unjust? And: How should states respond to the consequences of this phenomenon for non-native speakers of English?

In the existing debate within normative political theory about *linguistic justice*, most of the attention has focused on the issues of *interlinguistic* justice raised by the existence of different language communities within the same state, such as, French, English and a large number of indigenous languages in Canada. Canadian scholars, in particular, have published significantly about the moral foundations of language rights (see, e.g., the contributions in Kymlicka & Patten (2003), which jumpstarted the recent linguistic justice debate, even though there were earlier linguistic justice analyses, such as Pool (1991) and Green (1987)).

But, despite the dominant attention given to interlinguistic justice, global linguistic justice has also appeared as a focus of discussion in the linguistic justice literature. This is, in large part, due to the normative attention given to the spread of English by Philippe Van Parijs, who is the author of the first monograph dedicated to linguistic justice, *Linguistic Justice for Europe and for the World* (2011). In this book, Van Parijs strongly defends the spread of English as a crucial instrument of global distributive justice, while simultaneously advocating several measures to compensate for the injustices that accompany this spread for non-native speakers of English.

Linguistic justice researchers are usually political scientists or philosophers. But it is important that researchers in linguistic justice communicate with researchers from more traditional fields of language policy analysis such as sociolinguists (Grin, 2003; De Schutter, 2007). On the one hand, increased interdisciplinarity can assist linguists in getting clearer on the normative premises of their engagements and the ideological nature of their endeavours. On the other hand, it can help theorists of linguistic justice to improve the linguistic premises of their normative arguments. For example, it may cure the latter of their sometimes naïve assumptions about language and in particular of the “discreteness” concept of language, the idea that languages are territorially demarcated, are easily distinguishable, and that people always have one clear mother-tongue (L1) identity.

Fortunately, linguistic justice theorists and sociolinguists working on language policy have been increasingly attentive of each others’ findings.¹ But several bridges are still missing. For example, while sociolinguists from the second half of the twentieth century to this day have intensely studied intralinguistic varieties (such as dialects), normative theorists have to date neglected intralinguistic justice.

This contribution is dedicated to another missing bridge in the existing work on language policy: the content of global linguistic justice. In the slipstream of Van Parijs’ work, several normative political theorists have reflected upon the justice

1. Recently, for example, a volume has appeared which has as its central aim building bridges between language policy scholars and political philosophers (Ricento, Peled & Ives, 2015).

of English as the global *lingua franca* (see, for example, Steiner, 2003, Van Parijs, 2011; Réaume, 2015; Robichaud, 2015; Stilz, 2015). At the same time, in the past fifteen years, a fast growing new debate in linguistics has emerged focusing on the use of English as a *lingua franca* (see, for example, Seidlhofer, 2011; Mauranen, 2012; Jenkins, 2014; Mackenzie, 2014).² Several among these linguists have argued that the kind of English that is used as a *lingua franca* should not be thought of as being “owned” by native speakers of English. Instead English as a Lingua Franca (ELF) has legitimacy in its own right and is not a deficient form of English as a Native Language.

The linguistic interest in ELF and the political philosophy interest in linguistic justice have developed simultaneously, but the two literatures have so far not engaged with each other (see Gazzola & Grin, 2013, for an exception). For example, Van Parijs and several of his followers talk about English without making a difference between English as a Native Language (ENL), and English used as a Lingua Franca (ELF). ELF researchers, however, stress that simply talking about “English” wrongly assumes “that the ‘E’ is the same in ENL and ELF. But of course they cannot be” (Seidlhofer, 2011: 16).

Conversely, apart from some minor references (e.g., Seidlhofer, 2011: 99), ELF researchers have not engaged with the linguistic justice literature. Due to this lack of theoretical attention to the nature of the injustices and inequalities that accompany the spread of English, some of the arguments of ELF-theorists about this injustice are left unsubstantiated. For example, assertions about non-native speakers losing their linguistic disadvantage once English is spoken as ELF (Jenkins, 2014: 39–40; Seidlhofer, 2011: 16) need a conception of what the injustice or disadvantage consists of, and of how ELF solves or relaxes it. Only then can claims about the greater justice of ELF be appropriately made.³

At the same time, if the kind of English that ELF is can indeed be significantly dissociated from the English of native speakers, then this will have serious repercussions for the case for the injustice of English as the world’s global vehicular

2. Here, I will focus on linguistic justice and ELF but the “linguistic neglect” in the linguistic justice research also is true of other discussions of the nature of English beyond the “inner circle” today, such as the World Englishes literature. In this chapter, I do not focus on World Englishes theorists directly, limiting my explicit attention to ELF-scholars. Some of my conclusions, however, will end up close to claims also the World Englishes paradigm has made. This chapter is therefore a “prequel” to a second endeavour which will confront the linguistic justice and the World Englishes literatures. I thank an anonymous referee for pressing me to clarify this point.

3. Also the question of whether ELF-researchers are driven by an ideological agenda or have merely limited their role to a description of existing practices (Jenkins, 2014: 27), would benefit from a direct normative engagement with its premises.

language. So the ELF argument must enter the normative discussion over global linguistic justice and may reshuffle existing positions and reorient its prevalent arguments.

Performing this double injection – inserting ELF into the linguistic justice debate, and introducing normative justice analysis into the ELF debate – is the goal of this contribution. My question is: “Is the emergence of English as a *Lingua Franca* unjust?”, by which I replace the following conventional question of global linguistic justice: “Is the emergence of English unjust?”, wherein English is usually implicitly understood as ENL, the property of native speakers.

The chapter proceeds in four steps. I first articulate four distinct dimensions of linguistic injustice borne by non-native speakers in a world where English emerges as the global *lingua franca*. I then present the central assumptions and findings of the ELF research programme. In a third step, I evaluate the extent to which each of the four dimensions of injustice is reduced by the shift from English understood as ENL to EFL. In the final step, I argue for stronger measures to keep non-native English apart from ENL: L1-based forms of non-native English, and a clearer standardisation of non-native Englishes. These are sometimes defended by theorists active within the World Englishes network (see Kachru, Kachru & Nelson, 2006, for an overview). But a full confrontation of the literature on linguistic justice with that on World Englishes (another interdisciplinary “missing bridge”) will have to wait for a sequel to this chapter – here I zoom in only on the impact of ELF on linguistic justice.

1. Four injustices

Many people are uneasy about the spread of English. But it is often hard to pin down what the problem is. In this first part, I will articulate an account of the injustices that accompanies the spread of English as a vehicular language. I will claim that global linguistic injustice comes in four types: communicative injustice, resource injustice, life-world injustice, and dignity injustice.⁴ In each case, the injustice stems

4. In the emerging literature on linguistic justice, Van Parijs (2011) has been most prolific in thinking through global linguistic justice, and my description of three of the injustices (communication, resources and dignity) draws on his articulation. In addition to these three (and in contrast with Van Parijs, see his 2011: 31–36), I add a distinct dimension called life-world injustice – the idea that the dominance of English brings along a dominance of the English cultural life-world: the dominance of English is not the dominance of a neutral linguistic code but one imbued with a cultural life-world that also comes to dominate over other life-worlds.

from the fact that the language that becomes the global *lingua franca* for all is spoken by a subset of its users as their native tongue.⁵

1. The first injustice is communicative in kind. All else being equal, native speakers of English in the world today are generally more fluent in English than others who have learned English *after* learning their first language(s) and use English as a vehicular language. This is to be explained by the fact that acquiring a second language constitutes a long and tiresome process that almost never fully succeeds: even advanced speakers of a second language tend to retain a disadvantage when speaking the language compared with native speakers of that language. This communicative inequality is the basis for many other types of inequalities: because native speakers are funnier, snappier, more fluent and generally in greater command of the language, they are better able to get a point across convincingly in whatever job or position they find themselves, to be successful in negotiating business and other deals, to apply for international jobs in sectors where English is needed, to find temporary or summer jobs as students (since language teachers of English are universally needed), and so on (see, also, Phillipson, 2003: 40; and Grin, 2011a).

In a world without native speakers of English, where English would be foreign to all, communicative inequality in English would be a less significant problem. Even though speakers of languages that are linguistically more distant to English than others would still have a disadvantage, the main injustice problem with English results from the fact that it is not just spoken by non-native speakers: communication between different L1-speakers occurs in the language within which one large subset of the communicative agents communicates very naturally, bringing significant disadvantages to all others. Such a system leads to undeserved disadvantages for non-native speakers of English. These disadvantages are morally arbitrary in the sense that they accrue to some for no morally sound reason.

2. Connected to the first is a distinct global linguistic injustice, not based on disadvantages of communicative proficiency in the vehicular language but on disadvantages of *bringing about* that language. This second injustice is resource-based. The injustice starts from the fact that there is now a global system operating in English involving global aviation, global business and commerce, global academia,

5. The notion of the “native speaker” has been criticised lately by numerous linguists. They have often unravelled the notion by distinguishing between, for instance, language of heritage, language of identification and language of communication or expertise (see Tan, 2014, for an excellent overview of the debate). I realise there will be many instances where the concept gets blurry, where one’s language of expertise will, for instance, differ from the language one identifies with. But the fact that the concept gets blurry for many people should not cloud the fact that the concept does work for very many people, who together hold a certain linguistic prestige as “owners” of English, which leads to unjust disadvantages for many others, or so I will now argue.

aspects of a global Anglo-American based culture, and so on. This possibility of cross-lingual communication is a benefit for all, but there are significant burdens involved in bringing it about. These burdens involve learning the shared language through investments of time, energy and money. These investments are very significant and are estimated to total “several thousands of hours of study, practice and exposure, typically up to 10.000 or 15.000 hours” (Grin, 2011a: 60). These burdens of time, energy and money are necessary: without them no *lingua franca* would exist.

The problem is that these burdens are borne exclusively by non-native speakers. Whereas all people grow up in a language, some need to learn an additional language in order to sustain the system, whereas others, the native speakers, can use their first language. The fact that only non-native speakers shoulder the extra expenditure in time, energy and money involved in transforming the language that is a native language to some into a *lingua franca*, constitutes an injustice of resources, more specifically an injustice in the sense that some need to invest these resources whereas others do not, even though everyone benefits from having the vehicular language. It is like making a cake, whereby all will share the benefits of eating or selling of the cake, but only some do the preparatory work; and that continually and repeatedly: it is always the same ones doing the work, while everyone is benefiting. The native speakers are thus free-riding on the efforts of the non-native speakers.

One additional and distinct dimension of this resource injustice is that the resource investments imply a financial benefit for the native speakers. English teaching is, for example, a pre-condition for the functioning of the current global system, and native speakers are the stereotypical providers of such education and of the course books on which they are based (Phillipson, 2003: 85). In addition, because English is omnipresent in states where it is spoken as a native language, more so than in states where it is predominantly used solely as a *lingua franca*, the former are the go-to places for people who want to acquire more fluency in that language, which is one reason why these states receive a larger influx of foreign students than others. And, of course, once non-native speakers have invested the resources to learn English, these often highly-skilled foreigners have an extra reason to apply for jobs or go on holiday in those states in which they know the local language. So we don't just have injustice residing in the fact that non-native speakers have to invest resources of time, energy and money, whereas native speakers do not. In addition, these resources flow – to a large extent – back to those selfsame people who don't contribute to the burdens of producing the *lingua franca*. Those who benefit from the cake without contributing to its creation also happen to be paid for not contributing. They profit twice.

This second resource injustice is distinct from the first injustice of communication. Even if there were no communicative injustice, there would still be a resource-based injustice. To see this, imagine the counterfactual possibility that all

non-native speakers were able to attain a level of proficiency in English, so perfect that no communicative inequalities remained between them and native speakers. If this were the case, then the fact that non-native speakers have borne the burdens of investing time, energy and financial resources into learning English still constitutes a significant unfairness. There would be no communicative injustice, but there would be resource-based injustice. The converse relationship also holds: even if we were able to reduce all the effort needed to learn a language to the mere taking of a pill that would give us perfect English proficiency, then there would be no resource injustice but there would still be communicative injustice.

Here, again, it is true that, in a world without native speakers of English, where English would be foreign to all, resource injustice would be a less significant problem since everyone would need to invest resources. But it would not disappear, since, even then, speakers of languages that are linguistically more distant from English than others would still need to invest more resources to reach a similar level of proficiency: the Japanese learner of English would need to invest more time, money and energy than the speaker of German. English would then be like Esperanto: foreign to all, but more foreign to some.

3. The third injustice is life-world injustice, which consists of the problem that, with the global adoption of one particular language, its connected cultural life-world comes to dominate over that of non-native speakers. To develop this point, we need to show that language is linked to a cultural life-world and that the Anglophone life-world comes to dominate over that of non-native speakers through the adoption of English.

What is meant by life-world is the set of assumptions that the average adult takes for granted: it involves shared common understandings, shared assumptions about the world, about who we are, what we believe, what shocks and offends us, what we desire, and so on (see Habermas, 1984). Language gives us access to this life-world. Children growing up in a specific language are made familiar with the literature of that language, with shared cultural references, with shared ways of formulating arguments, and specific catchphrases in the public sphere and so on. Language knowledge on such occasions functions like a key: you need to speak the language to access what is discussed in it. Once inside the room to which the key gives access, you will be surrounded by arguments and styles of discussing that will influence you and which are not readily available to people who don't speak the language.

This importance of the life-world to which a language gives access, and the influence that language has on subjectivity has been stressed by a long tradition since the eighteenth century by French revolutionary theories of linguistic justice, as developed by Grégoire (1794) and Barère (1794), who both argued that *patois* speakers

should be liberated from the narrow life-world to which their linguistic repertoire gives access and should be assimilated into a French context, as well as by romantic theories developed by Herder and his romantic followers, who reached the opposite conclusion from the same linguistic life-world premise: linguistic groups ought to be independent as far as possible because to enforce a distinct horizon upon people is to rule with external force, rather than in a way that chimes organically with people's identities and expectations (Herder, XIII: 384–385).

In the last few decades, similar ideas have been adhered to in the political philosophy debates over nationalism, multiculturalism and linguistic justice. An impressive number of political philosophers have advocated linguistic and cultural rights on the basis of the importance to individuals of living within their own linguistic-cultural-national life-world. This life-world argument – language and culture open up a context of choice, a life-world – is today the most often heard argument for protecting linguistic and cultural minorities in debates over multiculturalism, nationalism and linguistic justice (Taylor, 1992; Tamir, 1993; Raz, 1995; Kymlicka, 1995). Not granting French speakers in Québec language rights that give them access to their own linguistic and national context of choice (through the establishment of public education in French, for example), the argument goes, would force them to conduct their life in the life-world of English. This will lead to disorientation for those who don't master English well enough, to identity problems given their decreased access to French, and it will cut them off from the national traditions of their predecessors.

One of the most prominent defenders of this argument is Will Kymlicka, who defends group-differentiated rights (such as self-government rights and language rights) on the basis of the liberal idea of autonomy. His argument is that access to a linguistic-cultural-national context is a necessary pre-condition of the liberal value of autonomy. Autonomy requires the disposition of a set of options, and, since linguistic-cultural entities are option packages, they can be understood as the contexts of choice necessary for the value of autonomy to be satisfied (Kymlicka, 1995: 83). As Kymlicka (1995: 84) puts it, "people's capacity to make meaningful choices depends on access to a cultural structure", and thus to impose another cultural structure on them is to endanger their autonomy and freedom. This leads Kymlicka and others to a defence of group-differentiated rights which aim to preserve access to an individual's own linguistic and cultural structure.

This argument is usually made within domestic interlinguistic justice, where it functions as an argument for why minority languages and minority nations deserve some form of political protection and language rights. But the argument is also valid in the case of speaking a *lingua franca*. Just as using English in Canada is thought to lead to disorientation and lack of autonomy for Québécois, so can using English as the language for a global system be thought to lead to a lack of

autonomy for non-native speakers in this global realm. For native speakers, English has a normal connection to their life-world. Colloquial utterances and idiomatic ways of speaking match the historical culture to which English gives access. English is adapted to the life-world of English speakers and filled with cultural references.

Now, if a language is going to be systematically used as a language for non-native speakers as well, then we can expect a disconnection between that language and the life-world within which non-native speakers live. If, for example, in the academic landscape, the humanities are increasingly conducted in English in states where English is not an official or a native language, then a disconnection emerges between the world of references of the language used for scholarship and the world of references that belongs to the subjects that are discussed, which, in turn, leads to a disconnect between English-operating scholars and society in a manner that does not exist if the scholarship is conducted in the national language. Since a language “is a carrier of intellectual and cultural references”, the “spread of a language cannot be a neutral phenomenon” (Grin, 2011b: 31). The spread of Anglo-American cultural influence is thus enhanced by speaking the language connected with that life-world, and most other life-worlds become increasingly peripheral. This *peripheralisation* of non-native contexts is, of course, not solely due to linguistic factors. But the linguistic factor plays a crucial role: as a result of it, non-native speakers conduct their life in part in a language from a different life-world, and native speakers of English are increasingly leading their life in an Anglo-American life-world (with less translation of foreign books and cinema). If this analysis is correct, then we can speak of a colonisation of non-English life-worlds, not by the system (as in Habermas’ colonisation of the life-world thesis) but by another life-world, that of Anglo-American culture. The existence of a vehicular language both contributes to this colonisation, and enhances it.

4. The last injustice is based on the loss of dignity experienced by non-native speakers. People’s self-respect and dignity are often affected by the esteem their language receives from others, from the state or from the communicative arrangement within which they find themselves. This is the case because the status accorded to a language is often seen as a sign of the status accorded to its speakers. For example, if there are several, let us assume, equally sized language groups in a society, whereby the language of one of the groups is officially endorsed as the only state language, and made into the sole language of the education system, the parliament and the judicial system, then this is often experienced as an assault on the dignity of the speakers of the unrecognised languages.

This “feeling” of a lack of dignity is reasonable because we generally think that it is important that states grant equal dignity to all their citizens. By equal dignity, I mean the idea that people are socially enabled to have the confidence

that their position is equally respected, that they are not second-class citizens.⁶ If states or supranational institutions are not guided by the ideal to do so, then we can speak of dignity injustice. This idea is also why, for example, John Rawls spoke of “self-respect” as a crucial primary good (Rawls, 1999: 386). And self-respect or dignity has a linguistic component because people generally value their first language, as a result of which, when the state (or a supranational institution) chooses one of the component language groups and grants its language superior status, it accords some groups of citizens higher importance than others.

This dignity complaint has, in the recent literature, mainly been stressed by Van Parijs, who made this argument explicit for global linguistic justice. Van Parijs says that those whose language does not receive equal dignity are expected to “bow” linguistically to others who can continue to speak their own language. Against this, he argues that we need “to avoid it always being the same group who do the linguistic ‘bowing’” (2011: 141). The dignity charge about English bears some resemblance to an early-modern tradition that is sometimes called “vernacular humanism” (Patten, 2006): its protagonists challenged the dominance of Latin by pointing out that neglecting one’s own vernacular leads to a lack of self-respect or dignity: dignified citizens don’t want to bow symbolically for other languages and want to speak their own tongue with self-confidence.

This linguistic injustice as lack of dignity is distinct from the other three. Even if there were a linguistic pill that would give me perfect proficiency in English with no effort (if the pill were, for example, free), and even if I am perfectly happy to be immersed into a new life-world, there would still be the problem that, in communication between English speakers and non-English speakers, it is always the latter who have to do something extra, who need to change. This would be similar to asking only some people, who are selected by applying a morally arbitrary criterion – say, those whose name starts with a certain letter or those who belong to a certain caste – always to make a detour on the pavement when crossing someone with a different first letter or from a different caste. It confers a message of inferiority.

2. English as a Lingua Franca

Since the new millennium there has been a surge in research in sociolinguistics on the use of English as a Lingua Franca (ELF). There is now a school of ELF scholars, who have produced a number of books, *corpora* of ELF use, and even a journal (see Seidlhofer, 2011; Cogo & Dewey, 2012; Jenkins, 2014; Mackenzie, 2014). In

6. I have adapted this definition of dignity from Freeman’s rendering of Rawls’ definition of self-respect (Freeman, 2007: 153).

this section, I limit myself to summarising and presenting the main findings and presuppositions of this school, before moving on to discussing to which extent introducing the ELF possibility into the global linguistic literature changes the moral assessment of the rise of English, in the next section.

ELF can be defined as “any use of English among speakers of different first languages for whom English is the communicative medium of choice, and often the only option” (Seidlhofer, 2011: 7). Using English in this way, as a *lingua franca*, is theorised to be quite different from using English as a Native Language (ENL). Seidlhofer conceptualises ELF by invoking a “Virtual English”, with several possible instantiations, two of which are ENL and EFL: ELF is “not a version of ENL but an alternative realization of some common linguistic resource” (2011: 111). This common linguistic resource of which ENL and ELF are realisations is Virtual English, “a third point of reference for ELF and ENL speakers alike” (2011: 111).

The point of ELF research is to find out what ELF is, and how it differs from ENL in terms of the linguistic form and function, and in the perceptions of its users. ELF researchers emphasise first that speaking ELF implies not being guided by the native-speaker ideology, the idea that non-native speakers should approximate as much as possible to the way native speakers speak English, for example, in terms of accents and idiomatic language use. If English language teaching is based on the native speaker ideology, as it usually is, then non-native speakers are always at a disadvantage when they communicate with native speakers; their speech is then conceived as deficient. ENL is, therefore, not the best model for ELF speakers. ENL is marked by “characteristic vocabulary, idiomatic phraseology, and references and allusions to shared experience and the cultural background of particular native-speaker communities” (Seidlhofer, 2011: 16). But, for ELF use, these native-speaker features are “irrelevant”:

If non-native speakers using English as an international language (*i.e.*, the vast majority) could bring themselves to embrace the much more relevant model of a competent ELF speaker, their supposed disadvantage would become an advantage enjoyed by bi-or multilingual speakers as the far better adapted communicators in intercultural interactions. (Seidlhofer, 2011: 16)

By detaching EFL from ENL in this way, English is no longer to be seen as the property of the native speakers: English becomes “common property”, “freed from the ties that bind it to its native speakers and their national interests and becomes altered by its new owners to suit their needs and purposes” (Seidlhofer, 2011: 68–69). ELF is then a “legitimate use of English in its own right” (Seidlhofer, 2011: 24; see, also, Jenkins, 2014: 27). What would be considered mistakes on the ENL view of English and the native-speaker ideology, are then often reinterpreted as legitimate differences. For Jenkins, what constitutes “correctness” in ELF is “converging

appropriately within the confines of the specific interaction in progress” (Jenkins, 2014: 38). And we should see non-native accents as “legitimate aspects of their regional English accents rather than as pronunciation errors” (Jenkins, 2014: 32).

But what does ELF look like? What are the features that make it distinct from ENL? Here are a few examples collected by ELF researchers in recent years (examples drawn from Seidlhofer, 2011: 124–151; and Jenkins, 2014: 30–35):

- making nouns that are uncountable in ENL countable: e.g., “two informations”, “producing evidences”;
- using THAT in relative clauses to refer to persons;
- redundancy reduction: e.g., dropping the third person singular in the present tense: “he come home”;
- additive redundancy (the opposite of redundancy reduction): e.g., “we can *discuss about* this” where ENL speakers would say “we can discuss this”;
- using “isn’t it?” in tag questions, instead of “shouldn’t they?”, “don’t you?”, *etc.*
- “overusing” certain verbs like *do, have, make*;
- code-switching through the deliberate insertion of words from the non-English first language, e.g., a French native speaker who inserts the words “*fleur bleue*” in an ELF conversation (Cogo, 2010: 301).

Several ELF scholars have composed *corpora* of ELF communication on which they base such descriptions of the form of ELF. But, at the same time, these ELF researchers all emphasise that “form follows function” (Cogo, 2008). ELF is functionally defined: it is English that functions as a *lingua franca* (Seidlhofer, 2011: 77). The focus of ELF research is not on producing a full description of the form of ELF as a new “variety” with its own vocabulary and syntax, but rather to document what the communicative strategies that speakers employ are. For example, features of ELF such as the avoidance of idiomatic usage are explained by the fact that ENL idioms are less effective ways of communicating in ELF settings. Such formal features are motivated by the functions which they perform (Seidlhofer, 2011: 148). ELF researchers focus on describing the functions of communicative practices that enable people to adapt their speech so that it is appropriate for the diverse contexts in which it is used (Seargeant, 2012: 89).

But there is another reason why ELF research is not inclined to describe minutely the form of ELF. ELF is far too diverse to be codified. ELF is not described as one variety of English but as “a variable way of using it” (Seidlhofer, 2011: 77). The community that speaks ELF is too big and too linguistically and culturally diverse to be able to constitute the type of community from which a unified code could emerge.

The heterogeneity of ELF forms the main distinction between ELF and the World Englishes paradigm. The shared background of, for example, speakers of

Indian English, Singapore English or Nigerian English results in the fact that these are increasingly understood as new varieties of English in their own right. A certain standardisation can be seen to be in process, and slowly these post-colonial contexts come to be recognised as having the same status as other varieties of English, such as British English, American English or Australian English. ELF and the World Englishes paradigm share the idea that such new Englishes are legitimate ways of speaking in their own right and should not be seen as deficient means of speaking English. But ELF researchers distance themselves from the idea that ELF would be one new *variety*. Whereas World Englishes research

primarily involves the study of bounded varieties, that is the nativized Englishes of post-colonial nations such as India, the Philippines, and Singapore, ELF research operates *across* national boundaries. (...) ELF researchers see English as so bound up with globalization that it is no longer realistic to talk of Englishes, be they native, nativized, or foreign, only in a national sense. (Jenkins, 2014: 28)

Whereas the World Englishes are national varieties of English, much of ELF research describes global and postmodern types of English that are so fluid that they resist nationalisation, standardisation and codification. Whereas the World Englishes movement is concerned about nationalising language, ELF is about globalising language. Some ELF researchers therefore associate World Englishes still with the age of nationalism, whereas ELF is about a post-national sphere of globalisation (see Jenkins, 2014: 28). A “lingua franca” “conveys a sense of a liberating additional means of communication” (Seidlhofer, 2011: 80), a “conceptual innovation reflecting the realities of globalized communication in the 21st century” (Seidlhofer, 2011: 81). Whereas, in post-colonial states, the distinctiveness of bounded varieties serves the purpose of establishing a different, but equally legitimate, English, in the “Expanding Circle” and in Europe in particular, “the dominant discourse is one of overcoming the linguistic monocultural mindset associated with 19th century nation states” (Seidlhofer, 2011: 79). ELF researchers thus connect the absence of a standard code with the argument that ELF speakers *should* not be guided by pre-affirmed standard norms: instead, the norms for communication should be negotiated, “*ad hoc*”, in the conversation itself.

3. Does English as a Lingua Franca reduce global linguistic injustice?

Does the fact that we could speak English as ELF change the nature of the four injustices? In particular, does ELF reduce global linguistic injustice?

ELF scholars are optimistic with regard to the potential of ELF to curb the disadvantage for non-native speakers. When English is conceived as ELF rather than as ENL, the non-native speakers lose much of their disadvantage. Non-native speakers of English who use ELF would then be even better suited to communicating in interlingual contexts than monolingual speakers of English without the relevant communication skills and command of ELF. This point has been stressed by Sue Wright, who argues that it is those who are not accustomed to multilingual contexts who are disadvantaged: English native speakers who continue to “use English as they would with a homogenous group of native-speakers” and who don’t possess the interlinguistic skills of accommodation and linguistic negotiation are now at a severe disadvantage (along with non-native speakers who don’t have those skills). Wright argues that the skills needed to engage in effective ELF interaction require a form of “linguistic awareness that comes with second language acquisition” (Wright, 2015: 122). Jennifer Jenkins claims that the term “native speaker” may even become pejorative as non-native speakers (NNSs) “lose their linguistic advantage, with English being spoken as an International Language [= ELF] no less – and often a good deal more – effectively by ‘NNSs’” (Jenkins, 2014: 39–40). As Barbara Seidlhofer puts it:

once one thinks of English as ELF, then the language obviously no longer poses the same threat of domination. (2011: 68)

Others have expressed more scepticism and have emphasised that ELF does not do away with the unfairness for non-natives speakers (Fiedler, 2010; Gazzola & Grin, 2013). In answering this question, the fourfold typology of injustices may be helpful.

Let us start with the first two injustices (1. communication, and 2. resources). Resolving these two injustices would require ensuring: (1) the possibility of obtaining perfect English proficiency for non-native speakers or, if not perfect, then at least resulting in a proficiency imperfection that is equally imperfect to native and non-native speakers, (2) realised either by zero resource input or by equal resource input for all (native and non-native speakers alike). The simple free pill hypothesised above that gives instantaneous perfectly equal proficiency without any adverse effects would erase the two first injustices.

It is clear that ELF does not approximate a real-life realisation of this pill. Non-native speakers need to invest a disproportionate amount of time, money and energy in learning a language that others learn as part of growing up in a community. And, when they do so, they usually end up with a language that is very often less perfectly mastered than it is by native speakers.

1. Communicative injustice is grounded in the disadvantages of non-native speakers in communicative proficiency. ELF is surely a form of English, as is acknowledged by ELF researchers, such as by Seidlhofer's argument that it is a realisation of virtual English, of which ENL is also a realisation (see, also, MacKenzie, 2014, who throughout the book, claims that ELF is English). Nobody challenges the idea that EFL is closer to ENL than, say, Chinese as a native language. ELF is different from ENL but significantly closer to it than to most, if not all, other "languages" on Earth. Indeed, all the examples in the ELF *corpora* suggest that what these speakers produce is formally close to ENL syntax, morphology and vocabulary. Compare an ENL speaker listening to or reading ELF with a speaker with no knowledge whatsoever of English: the ENL speaker will be considerably better able to understand the message as well as to interact. So communicative injustice is not solved by switching from ENL to ELF as the vehicle of global communication.

But communicative injustice is distinct from resource injustice. So the question is: Irrespective of the amount of resources invested, does ELF solve communicative disadvantages? Can someone who does invest the required resources become perfectly able to speak ELF to such an extent that the communicative disadvantage disappears?

ELF will, to some extent, help here, compared with ENL. If ENL is taken to be the language that non-native speakers should strive towards, then there is considerably more distance to be bridged compared with the possibility of ELF as the end goal. Because of its lack of idioms, its higher regularity, its negotiated meanings, and its influences from the non-native speakers' original languages, it will be easier for non-native speakers to fully master ELF fully than ENL. While asking non-native speakers to lose their native accents completely and acquire a native speaker accent in English is very difficult, if not impossible, ENL is a much easier goal; it is an attainable ideal.

So ELF may be better than ENL from the point of view of communicative efficiency. This, of course, does not mean that it is better than other alternatives, such as no longer choosing English for crosslingual communication, and replacing it, for example, with translation (Gazzola & Grin, 2013) or with some other solution, such as Esperanto or the choice of another *lingua franca* (which all have problems of their own). But considering that English has already spread and gains new ground with every generation in non-native states in the world, if we could succeed in relocating the goal of communication from ENL to EFL, considerable ground would have been won.

Clearly, it is important to realise that this considers the possibility that ELF will be seen as a legitimate use of English in its own right. In the current world, the native-speaker ideology still reigns. Very often, in inter-lingual contexts where native speakers are present, the native speakers are seen as linguistic judges of how to phrase and say things. They are asked to help with identifying the correct tense

for a verb, and non-native speakers who use online search engines as thesauri for testing the correct ways of putting things into English try to make sure to identify native speaker references, for example, by only searching for pages from the UK or the US. In the minds of most non-native speakers (and native speakers alike), native speakers are the real judges of English and perfect proficiency means proficiency in the native way, both for oral and written communication.

There is sometimes some confusion in the work of ELF researchers as to whether they are describing an existing state of affairs or rather a possible state of affairs. Often, ELF researchers want English to be understood as ELF, rather than as ENL. But, for example, Jenkins realises very well that we are a long way from ELF being understood as a legitimate variety in its own right, both by native and non-native speakers. For example, in the afterword of her book about ELF in universities, she admits that:

the overall picture provided by my studies of HE [higher education] English language policies and practices is one in which native English ideology seems to be pretty much in operation around the entire HE world. (2014: 207)

So ELF, once one masters it and once it is accepted as completely legitimate by all, would help. But it will surely not remove the disadvantage altogether, for several reasons. First, it is reasonable to assume that non-native speakers will still tend to face some communicative burdens due to the fact that the language will always be less “natural” to them than their first one. It is easier to remember the best sign for an object or an idea in one’s native tongue, or to describe feelings or complex ideas more accurately. Indeed, the fact that ELF researchers describe ELF-forms as redundancies, work-arounds, or over-uses of certain words like “do” or “put” suggests that non-native speakers may need somewhat more time to express something than native speakers would. Even though the idioms of native speakers may often not be productive in ELF settings, and even though they too need to “tone down” their ENL, it is still easier for them to select the right or the more accurate verb or noun in the right context.

Secondly, we need to consider that we are comparing native and non-native speakers across the board. While it is *possible* for non-native speakers to speak English very well, across the board it is still true that non-native speakers do less well in ELF than native speakers. This is not controversial; take any passage spoken in ELF and present it to all individuals globally: clearly, native speakers⁷ will do better than non-native speakers on average, simply because their knowledge

7. Since ELF is defined as “any use of English among speakers of different first languages” (Seidlhofer, 2011: 7), ELF is also spoken by native speakers.

of ELF will vary between 0 and 100 (100 being perfectly proficient) among the non-native speakers. Among the native speakers, it is simply impossible to have zero knowledge of ELF. So communicative efficiency is possible, but, in this world, it is mastered more by the native speakers. ELF will help a bit, but will certainly not solve this issue.

A third reason for why ELF would not solve communicative injustice is related to the lack of immediate clarity of what constitutes good ELF. It is hard in ELF to distinguish “between authentic non-standard alternatives and persistent error” (Sowden, 2012: 92): Are the deviations of ELF (such as the omission of the s-suffix for verbs in the third person singular) markers of a distinct kind of English or are they “mistakes” that English learners make on their way to full proficiency in English? The lack of clarity regarding the standardisation of these deviations constitutes a problem for the communicative efficiency of ELF-speakers since it puts its speakers in a position of communicative uncertainty (Fiedler, 2010: 212). Evidently, beginners whose knowledge of English is close to zero will make “mistakes”. At the other end, many L1-features uttered by non-native speakers should not be seen as mistakes: proficient non-native ELF speakers don’t need to change their accent (completely). But between both points (absolute beginners and proficient speakers) lies a wide zone of English knowledge levels where speakers will be uncertain about whether what they say is a valid feature or a mistake because the nature of ELF as described is one which eschews concepts of errors against clear pre-conceived norms. But the danger is that dropping transparent pre-given norms will augment, rather than reduce, communicative uncertainty. Perhaps dropping standard norms can work as a communicative equaliser in the case of native non-standard speakers who are linguistically sufficiently certain about the dialect forms that they use. But, in the case of learners, who, by definition, acquire things that they did not know before, and are interested in speaking the language better, the lack of clearly defined norms may increase their feeling of lack of knowledge and may thus create uncertainty. It seems that liberation from clear norms only works emancipatorily for those who have internalised a different, hitherto restrained or unrecognised, norm in the language. But for those who come to acquire the new language as learners who speak another language, ELF’s intrinsic openness and lack of norms may only reinforce the most privileged version, in this case ENL. An aspiring ELF speaker would have trouble distinguishing what to do when she is not communicating successfully in ELF. Wouldn’t she need to be led by ENL first, before being able to copy it imperfectly and possibly adapt it? For example, Jenkins claims that ELF speakers may use “idiomatic language in innovative ways, resulting in the creation of idioms that do not exist in ENL” (Jenkins, 2014: 34). An example she mentions is *we should not wake up any dogs*, instead of the ENL-phrase *let sleeping dogs lie*. But this

example would only work if we assume that the non-native speaker at least knows that there is an expression in ENL that allows one to use the dog metaphor for “not reawaking or kindling”, but perhaps does not remember it perfectly. By contrast, to say *it’s dog weather* wouldn’t be effective if said in English even though it is a literal translation of the Dutch “*het is hondenweer*” (the weather is very bad). So, the ELF speaker must first be guided by ENL before she can talk ENL in a more relaxed, ELF, manner. Clearly, she could explain the Dutch-based “it’s dog weather” to her fellow ELF speakers, but to do that consistently (every time she uses the expression with others) partly defeats the purpose of using the metaphor.

As a result, it is hard to know when one masters ELF: the tipping point of being a fluent ELF speakers is hard to determine. Removing the native-speaker ideology will not help here: the question is not one of knowing whether something is a error from the point of view of ENL, but from the point of view of ELF. So, the lack of standardisation or codification in ELF continues to be a problem even for people who invest significant resources into learning English. I should add that even experienced non-native speakers of English may face communicative injustices. Hesitation about the proper form or expression leads them to insecurities or lack of communicative capacity when speaking in public, when taking part in a panel discussion, or in meetings.

To conclude, ELF will not remove communicative injustice, because many non-native speakers do not speak ELF, because many who do are still not *as* fluent as native speakers are in English, and because it is hard for learners to know when exactly they speak proper ELF. But since English is spreading independently of whatever we may think of it, if we could re-locate the desired communicative end-situation from ENL to ELF, communicative injustice would certainly be reduced. It would make it easier than ENL for non-native speakers, and it would make it a little bit more difficult than ENL for native speakers.

2. How does ELF impact on global resource injustice? This injustice is not about communicative disadvantage but about the fact that non-native speakers need to invest resources into learning English, which the native speakers do not need to do. The claim of some ELF defenders is that the resource disadvantage will gradually disappear once we shift from ENL to ELF. Once ELF is the norm for global communication, both ENL and speakers of other languages need to invest resources. This will re-install a form of equality in resource-investments. Consider Sue Wright’s argument that non-native speakers may be able to communicate better in ELF than native speakers. She argues:

Who are then the skilled communicators? Those monolingual native-English speakers whose limited language experience encourages them to see any 'linguistic form as a fixed self-identical signal' (Voloshinov, 1994: 33) or those English-speaking multilinguals who have been trained to see language as 'a changeable and adaptable sign'. (Wright, 2015)

Wright's point is that non-native speakers may be better able to engage in the process of mutual linguistic adaptation and negotiation so typical of ELF, because they are more flexible linguistic negotiators due to the fact that they have learned to juggle with two languages. If she is right, then, rather than disadvantaged, non-native speakers may be advantaged.

But Wright focuses on arguing against the claim that non-native speakers are necessarily and always disadvantaged. She cannot not make the reverse claim, that non-native speakers are necessarily and always advantaged. In fact, she discerns four groups: non-native speakers who are skilled communicators in ELF; non-native speakers who are unskilled communicators in ELF; native speakers of English who are skilled communicators in ELF; and native speakers who are unskilled in ELF. Wright's point is that advantage and disadvantage depend on the skill to engage in mutual linguistic negotiation, not on the fact itself of speaking English as a native or a non-native language. This means that native speakers of English could also become skilled communicators of ELF, as long as they make the necessary efforts, for example, by learning a second language or by acquiring cross-lingual communication skills. So, we cannot say that non-native speakers are, in principle, advantaged in ELF: at best, Wright can claim that ELF installs resource *equality* – those who learn ELF get equal opportunities.

On closer inspection, however, it appears that Wright's point about the lack of disadvantage of non-native speakers only kicks in after we discount the invested resources. This is because Wright compares non-native speakers of English, who, by definition, have invested the necessary resources to be able to communicate in English, with native speakers who have not invested the resources to acquire ELF skills. Perhaps, then, the non-native speakers win, but this argument disregards the inequality in resource investment as the basis of this communicative inequality. If the native speakers only adapted a bit, they would be as effective. This adaptation could be very limited since the linguistic distance to be bridged between ENL and ELF is smaller than between ELF and another language altogether. To judge resource inequalities, the relevant comparison is not between native and non-native speakers, but between native speakers of another language and native speakers of English. Native speakers of another language need to invest more time, more money and more energy than the latter in learning ELF. In fact, one might argue that speakers of a non-English language need to do two things: they need to

acquire English (though not ENL) *and* they need to learn to be linguistically flexible (because Wright allows for the fact that non-native speakers may not be skilful communicators in ELF). Native speakers of English only need to learn the latter. In addition, in this world, ELF can practically only be learned by learning ENL so the native speakers win twice: they have to adapt very little since they only need to learn ELF and they win by the advantages of the fact that the monetary resources flow back to the native speaker communities.

Precisely because of this inequality in resource investment, it may be too soon to bury the distinction between native speakers and non-native speakers, as some ELF scholars argue we should. Jenkins, for example, states that since “nobody is a native speaker of ELF” and since “ELF is not about how closely someone approximates ENL”, “nativeness loses both its relevance and its traditional positive connotations”; “there seems to be no point at all in retaining [the distinction between native and non-native speakers] for ELF”. As she goes on to argue:

And this is also true of academic ELF, including academic writing where, as Ferguson points out, ‘the native speaker and the non-native speaker both start out as novices, a position of parity that the native/non-native dichotomy obscures’.

(Jenkins, 2014: 38–39)

But this point ignores resource injustice. *Once* the non-native speaker has invested all necessary resources to be a fluent non-native speaker of English, then indeed native and non-native speakers may approximate a position of “parity” when it comes to developing academic ELF (though it is hard to believe that native speakers would not retain communicative advantages). But in a world in which we need to communicate across the boundaries of our native languages, choosing ELF and academic ELF as the language of communication surely does not approximate parity. Non-native speakers carry a disproportionate amount of the burdens of producing the *lingua franca*, and they surely do not *start out* as novices on an equal plane with native speakers. Burying the native/non-native distinction may be intended for good purposes – to act against the native speaker ideology – but it also clouds the fact that ELF is still very disadvantageous to non-native speakers from the point of view of resource investment.

In conclusion, ELF does not do much to remove resource injustice. Native speakers win out because the amount of resources to invest in order to master ELF is smaller if one already speaks ENL.

3. How does ELF impact on the third injustice based on the cultural life-world dominance that comes with the dominance of English? To re-capitulate, this life-world claim runs as follows: people learn English as a tool to communicate with across linguistic boundaries, but, since the tool functions as a native language by a community with a cultural background, its *lingua franca* is accompanied by the dissemination

of elements of that native culture, which is privileged over all others. Now, promisingly, ELF detaches English from the “culture-specific frames of reference of native English” (Jenkins, 2014: 13), and therefore from its native background culture. It does so in two ways: through de-culturalisation and re-culturalisation.

Firstly, it de-culturalises English by taking many colloquial utterances and idioms out of the language, such as *hoist with your own petard*, *getting short rift* (Seidlhofer, 2011: 133), *in my book* (meaning: in my opinion), *see you on the flip side*, etc. It is precisely these which are severely weakened or avoided in ELF. So, very clear links between English and its native life-world are disconnected in ELF.

It has to be remarked, though, that this kind of de-culturalisation is limited to the linguistic features of the code that is spoken. It cannot prevent the impact of the cultural background of ENL on the non-native speakers. Because it is easier for an ELF speaker whose L1 is a language other than English to read literature, and Internet content, and watch movies and series produced in ENL than in any other language except the speaker’s L1, ENL-products can more easily maintain a privileged role in shaping the cultural life-world of non-native speakers.

The second way in which English is detached from its native culture, is by inserting non-native utterances or idioms into it: re-culturalisation. This allows ELF to be fairer to all other background cultures, by rendering L1-based metaphors, colloquial utterances, and styles in ELF. Examples of this can be found in the use, by a non-native French speaker, of blue flower/*fleur bleue* for “cheesy” (Cogo, 2010: 301), or of the Dutch “the bullet is through the church” [*De kogel is door de kerk*] (meaning “the die is cast”, often thought to refer to the point of no return reached when even churches would be attacked during the Spanish occupation of Holland in the Eighty Year’s War, 1568–1648). Other examples include “from the house” instead of “on the house” (at the management’s expense) (Seidlhofer, 2011: 135) or simply using L1-syntax in English. As Jenkins argues, speakers may engage in such code-switching in order to “introduce their own cultural norms to ELF speakers from other backgrounds” (Jenkins, 2014: 35). So, these are ways to anchor English in non-native horizons and to fill it with non-native references that make it more distinct from the background culture of ENL.

There is, however, a downside to this “re-culturalisation”. Using the Seidlhofer/Widdowson notion of a virtual language, we could imagine that virtual language to be realised in a distinctly “culturalised” way, filled with stable non-native cultural idioms and manners of speech. Alongside American English, Australian English or Ghanaian English, we would then have ELF. But ELF does not genuinely approximate this theoretical possibility. This is because the non-native “filling” in ELF must always be temporary. ELF is used in such diverse contexts that it is hard for such non-native idioms and expressions to establish themselves and become well-known. As ELF researchers stress, such non-native additions to English must

always be negotiated, and explained in the conversation itself. The person inserting “*fleur bleue*” precedes it with “blue flower” and then later on is asked to explain it. So re-culturalisation is intrinsically unstable: while ELF may provide support for the non-native tweaking that is already happening in many contexts, the stability and distinctness that this tweaking brings is weakened to a large extent as a result of the diverse nature of ELF – the non-native filling needs to be re-inserted and re-explained each time they are used.

In sum, ELF provides important ways for English to be both de-culturalised and re-culturalised. But both claims are relatively weak: de-culturalisation cannot prevent English native culture from having more impact than other cultures, and the *ad hoc* nature of the native tweaking makes re-culturalisation fickle.

4. The fact that ELF reduces the dignity injustice is one of the major reasons for the existence of ELF. Words such as “recognition”, “ending inferiority”, “esteem”, “power”, “ending native domination”, and “dignity” are among the central reasons invoked for understanding ELF as a variety in its own right. Also the points about “ownership”, the fact that it should not be the native speakers who are to be seen as the “owners” of English now that more non-native speakers speak the language, show that regaining dignity is an important reason for speaking ELF. Seidlhofer, for example, invokes dignity-related concepts for characterising the nature of ELF by claiming that “fighting the (ab)use of ‘English’ for exerting *power and domination* via mainstream ELT [English language teaching]” is very difficult (22; italics mine). As MacKenzie states (2014: 2): “the leitmotif of the proponents of ELF is that it is different from but *not inferior* to ENL” (italics mine). And Seidlhofer claims that “once one thinks of English as ELF, then the language obviously no longer poses the same threat of domination” (2011: 68). What Thumboo says about World Englishes is crucially also true of ELF: “in these literatures there is an attempt to restore dignity” (quoted approvingly by Seidlhofer, 2011: 78). ELF is essentially about restoring dignity and status to non-native speakers, by dislocating the ownership over English from its native speakers.

How is dignity affected by ELF? We can understand the non-native ownership that comes with ELF as providing a double dignity compensation. First, it allows non-native speakers to speak English with confidence, without an inferior feeling of linguistically bowing to ENL norms. Second, it symbolically takes some status away from native speakers by the very fact that their native tongue is suddenly seized, and changed, by others.

Notwithstanding this, the fact that ELF is inherently flexible and unstandardised will be a handicap for its dignity-conferring function. The following anecdote will stand us in good stead: in 2014, I was the supervisor of an eminent (native English speaking) scholar, who was to receive an honorary doctorate from my

university (KU Leuven). For the formal ceremony, I had to write an honorary speech, applauding the scholar's achievements. So, in my official role as a professor representing the university which has Dutch as its official language, I was formally addressing a very large audience in English. As part of a standard procedure for such formal speeches, my speech was "edited" beforehand by a "native speaker". Surely, as a matter of "dignity", this is problematical: Why should a non-English university in an official role have to succumb to the ENL rules of English? Now, if ELF becomes successful, we would no longer be ruled by such a "native speaker ideology". But who would then "check" my speech? Perhaps, it would be an ELF professional. But this professional wouldn't have any norms to abide by except for general principles such as communicative appropriateness or adaptive success; but how do we define these in this context? Could the result meaningfully differ from ENL? I assume the professional would not suggest dropping my use of the third person "s". Nor would I have to create new verbs such as "forsify" or "levelize" in my speech. But could the professional be guided by anything else but "tolerance for ENL-deviations"? Had such a speech been given in Dutch, it would appeal to the (remarkably) clear norms of standard Dutch, which would be the appropriate version of the language to use for this occasion. But what would be the appropriate version of English to use for this occasion? If ELF has no rules and is only guided by "the function" to be performed, then it seems that ENL will naturally rise as a dominant rule-giver.

In fact, a process may be at work whereby freedom from norms may lead to a dominance of the stronger variety, at least as far as life-world and dignity issues are concerned. In linguistic justice discussions, scholars often refer to Jean Laponce, who has claimed that, in cases of peaceful contact between languages, the more powerful language tends to dominate and assimilate the other language(s) (2001: 188–189). This law helps explain processes of language shift whereby, under conditions of "linguistic freedom" unrestrained by, for example, standardisation attempts or legal language laws, a more dominant language may exert assimilation pressure on a weaker language. Van Parijs has aptly summarised this "Laponce mechanism" as:

The nicer people are with one another, the nastier languages are with each other.
(2000: 219)

It seems that the Laponce mechanism can also be applied intralinguistically, between two "versions" (or uses) of the same language, such as ELF and ENL. ELF is described by its scholars as diverse, flexible, unstable and ruled by *ad hoc* norms that resist standardisation. Contrast this with ENL, which has pre-given norms laid down in dictionaries and grammars, is backed by a rich history, and has speakers who speak the language more fluently and more often than ELF does (since they

speak English as a “native” language). Such a contrast between an open and chaotic ELF and a firm and well-established ENL may support Lacordaire’s adage that “between the strong and the weak, between the rich and the poor, between the lord and the slave, it is freedom that oppresses and the law that sets free” (Leuprecht, 2003), which is, in fact, a more general formulation of the law of Laponce. Non-native speakers may surely be in the majority numerically speaking, but since the native speakers have a clear set of codified sources and a native self-confidence that is, in part, based on it, enabling freedom for all through a norm-free appraisal of non-standardised forms of speaking English will *de facto* end up restraining the options of the non-native speakers. An unruly and intrinsically hybrid use of English for *lingua franca* purposes may lead to ENL still being the perceived norm for many *lingua franca* functions. ELF as it is currently characterised seems to work well for informal contexts (such as tourism or Erasmus exchanges) but English is increasingly used in formal *lingua franca* situations that require some *gravitas* such as the one described above. Other examples include English in non-native academic settings when teaching courses, English in NGO settings, and English in transnational politics. Government leaders in Western Europe outside of Britain and Ireland are increasingly criticised by their English-savvy populations for the underdeveloped state of their English. Surely, we wouldn’t want an ENL norm to guide their speech, even though this is what the critics have in mind as the proper goal, often for their lack of knowledge of a non-ENL possibility. But to relax all norms or reduce them to what is communicatively clear (no matter how imprecise, clumsy and sterile the English may be) also doesn’t seem to match the kind of English suited for such a role.

4. Other and further solutions

The ELF enthusiast who thinks that ELF makes the injustice for non-native speakers disappear is misguided. Non-native speakers will still face significant and undeserved communicative, resource-based, life-world-based and dignity disadvantages, as I have analysed above. However, there is no reason for the ELF defender to take such a naïve position. In response to the realisation that there are significant disadvantages, ELF defenders simply need to point out that ELF still does better than ENL. While ELF does not erase the disadvantages for non-native speakers, it does reduce them. It is certainly easier for non-native speakers to communicate in ELF than in ENL; somewhat fewer resources are needed to get to ELF than to ENL (even though still fewer are needed to get from ENL to ELF); ELF is more de-culturalised and re-culturalised than ENL; and dignity is increased compared with ELF. One may still think that other solutions than English are better, such as translation, a

constructed language, inter-comprehension strategies, technological advances and so on (see Gazzola & Grin, 2013). But, in any case, the use of English as a vehicular language exists and is engulfing all states in the world. For the foreseeable future, English is here to stay, so it makes sense to think about strategies for dealing with it. And among the two main strategies for dealing with English that we currently have, ENL and ELF, ELF is far from perfect but still less imperfect than ENL.

But if ELF is comparatively better than ENL – yet still imperfect – we might want to think of ways to improve it. There may be ways to tamper with ELF itself to make it more suitable for the reduction of non-native injustices (even though no solution based on “English” can ever make them disappear). In the remainder of this chapter, I will explore one such improvement: the possibility of developing non-native L1-standards for English.

One problem encountered in the above analysis is that ELF’s open, flexible, *ad hoc* and negotiated nature is, at the same time, both a benefit and a curse for the reduction of the injustices. It is a benefit because it makes ELF easier to speak, easier to gain proficiency in, more malleable in terms of life-world adaptation, and more dignified compared with ENL: all four injustices are reduced. But this same flexibility and lack of norms also makes it more vulnerable than ENL in terms of injustice reduction. This is because the lack of norms makes it difficult to distinguish “between authentic non-standard alternatives and persistent error” (Sowden, 2012: 92): Are the deviations of ELF (such as the omission of the *s*-suffix for verbs in the third person singular) markers of a distinct variety of English or are they “mistakes” that English learners make on their way to full proficiency in English? As a result, ELF does not establish a clear communicative norm and thus leads to communicative insecurity. In addition, ELF’s flexibility and variability makes the establishment of re-culturalised English unlikely. It also puts its speakers into a position of weak dignity: as Fiedler argues, speakers of ELF

might be suspected of going in for the model because of their own problems in mastering the subtleties of English. To me this psychological factor seems to be a serious obstacle to ELF. (2010: 212)

In such cases, the Laponce-like tendencies described above ultimately may do away with some of the advantages of ELF, since it presents ENL in a more attractive light for many non-native speakers. This situation may appear as a paradox: the same features that make ELF more attractive at the same time make it more vulnerable.

It does not mean, though, that it really is a paradox: if we could tamper with ELF in such a way that the “curse” is weakened while not reducing the benefit, the problem could be better resolved. What could be done in order to avoid the disadvantages of ELF is to set up a clearer standard for ELF. But it is hard to see how such ELF standardisation could be inclusive of the global heterogeneity that

characterises ELF. As Seidlhofer, Jenkins, and Cogo all stress, there is not one unified ELF code for two reasons: the first is that speakers usually transfer L1-features into it; the second is that speakers don't spend enough time together in such a way that specific varieties might form – ELF features are constantly created on an *ad hoc* basis and have no time to cement themselves into regular forms. Both facts explain why clear codification is difficult. Some critics have even argued that its internal heterogeneity makes the distinct existence of ELF questionable: Is there more unity between the ELF of Russian and Danish speakers than there is between each of these and standard British English (see Sowden, 2012: 91–92; and Fiedler, 2010: 210)?

But there is a way to turn the reasons for the drawback of heterogeneity into an advantage. Speakers transfer L1-features and don't form a regular speech community that would allow them to develop clear common norms. But these common norms do, to some extent, exist among English speakers sharing the same L1. Therefore, we might want to articulate L1 standards of English used as a non-native language for *lingua franca* purposes. We may start to think about distinct varieties of ELF based, to a large extent, on the native language of the non-native speakers of English.⁸ In this way, the vehicular English project might more closely resemble the World Englishes approach (including the idea that there are Indian, Singaporean and Nigerian varieties of English, apart from British, American and Australian ones) than a pure ELF approach. This would also align better with the dignity and recognition concern that is equally at the very heart of ELF and the World Englishes approach. In the World Englishes paradigm, codification is seen as a way of making a variety a legitimate and equal form of English (see Seargeant, 2012: 96; Seidlhofer, 2011: 78–79). Something similar might need to happen for the use of English as a *lingua franca*. The fact that ELF is so heterogeneous that standardisation cannot get off the ground, that little establishment can take place, is not a counter-argument against the possibility of staking out regional/national/linguistic varieties of English, since this national/linguistic establishment is desirable for the compensation of the four injustices that I have discussed. What counts for dignity, for example, is that there should be a way to speak English whereby non-native speakers themselves determine what the norm is; the most straightforward way to have such norms is to draw on the shared features that emerge from sharing the same first language.

8. I am sketching here a so far unrealised possibility. Call it a (modest) utopia. I am not claiming that it is already realised or that it will at some point be realised. My claim is also not that, once realised, it will make the injustices disappear: because English as the global *lingua franca* is the native language of a subset of that global population, the injustices will persist. What I am arguing is that English is here to stay for at least the near future, that non-native speakers need to find ways to cope with English, and that non-native “standardisation” will do a better job at reducing the injustices than several alternative models.

What counts for life-world injustice reduction is that the de-culturalisation and the re-culturalisation can be carried out with a measure of stability. Communicative justice may be furthered by establishing clear norms of ways of speaking English. The same is true of resource justice: what matters is that non-native speakers can get to a clear end-point at which they no longer need to invest more resources (other than for maintaining their level of proficiency). If ELF is too heterogeneous for such tweaking to take general standardisable forms, then we might draw the circles of commonality closer and base it on L1 features.

English might then be thought of as a polycentric *lingua franca*, not just as a polycentric native language: just as languages such as English, Spanish and German are polycentric in the sense that they have multiple standard forms for the different states in which they are spoken as a native language (Ammon, 1995), so could vehicular English also come in different standards. Alongside Irish English, American English, Australian English and British English, we could then not only distinguish Singaporean English, Nigerian English, or Indian English, but also various forms of English from the expanding circle: say, Russian English, German English, Spanish English, and so on.

Having such L1-varieties of English might allow for the production of a standard code that would give speakers a clearer proficiency target, offer an identifiable end-point for resource investment, and, once mastered, enables them to speak with communicative confidence and dignity, while also providing them with a more extensive “life-world” embeddedness. Such native tweaking is already happening, and I believe there are normative grounds for supporting this evolution.

However, even here the intralinguistic analogue of the Laponce mechanism may work to the disadvantage of the non-native standards: given that the code thus developed will necessarily be less frequently used, especially since it is only spoken as a non-native language, and, as such, will not usually be used for communication between speakers of the same L1 (for they could use this first language for internal communication), but only in *lingua franca* contexts. We may therefore want to strengthen the basis for local or L1-based forms of non-native ownership of English in two ways. The first is to draw on existing patterns of usage to fortify their – perhaps frail – existence by publishing lists of English usage. For example, lists could be published of, say, Danish English usage for the local equivalents of words commonly expressed in the *lingua franca*, such as local words for professional names that will also be used in English (such as “promotor” for “thesis supervisor” in Belgian-Dutch), for official holidays (e.g., the Chinese official holiday of “Dragon Boat Day”), for local words for political institutions and political functions (e.g., for *Bundeskanzler* or the *minister-president*) universities or department names, for the spelling and accents of names of cities, for idiomatic language that does not yet exist in English, for words that have no proper English form yet (such as the

Dutch word *bakfiets* for cargo bicycles that seat multiple young children in front of the handlebars) and so on.

But secondly, in addition to drawing on existing norms, we may also set out to invent norms where they do not yet exist. For example, we could invent standard ways of starting and ending a letter, or of mentioning the hour and the calendar. For example, whereas in Dutch people can pronounce 18:40 as the Dutch equivalent of “ten past half seven” (tien over half zeven), the English rendering might be similar. Or we could standardise the numerical rendering of the time in English usage by drawing on its rendering in speakers’ L1: right now, in many European contexts, people think they ought to use the 12 hour clock that is dominant in most Anglophone states, whereas rendering the time according to the 24 hour clock could be just as useful.

This second solution of inventing norms might meet the standard criticism against standardisation attempts: Why seek to regulate the language use of people if they might be used to different norms and may thus be disadvantaged by their lack of knowledge of the standard code? In response, I think it must be stressed that what we are talking about here is speaking a second, non-native language: the fact that a standard code is being transferred cannot be an objection since, by definition, learning a new language involves acquiring a new code that one did not know before. Perhaps the lack of knowledge of the standard argument can work as a critique of standardisation intralinguistically with regard to dialects, but it cannot do so interlinguistically, when it comes to the learning of a new language. What else is the learning of a new code than the learning of things which one did not know before? In addition, as I have argued above, there are reasons to think that standards for English knowledge as a non-native language are desirable: rather than decreasing, non-native standards will increase communicative, resource, dignity, and life-world justice.

So to make such non-native standardisation realisable, we may draw on existing usage to publish lists of non-native Englishes (for example, local English words for German English, Dutch English, Spanish English, and so on) as well as to craft non-existent norms (such as numerical norms). Injustice-concerned language planners may do all this. But, in addition, we may also appeal to existing language academies. Many standard languages (but not English) have state-backed language academies that supervise the codification and maintenance of the standard version of the language. So we might propose language academies not only to describe rules (such as spelling, grammar and a dictionary) for the native language use of the citizens that they serve, but also for those citizens’ vehicular language use. As vehicular language use takes up an ever-greater portion of the overall language use, rules will be needed in the case of official state communication and in the public realm. Instead of relying on existing standards of native English such as General

American or Standard British, national language academies could work out their own rules for the vehicular language use of their citizens. This would provide the strongest possible way to allow non-native speakers of English to be able to see themselves as instantiating rules for English that are not experienced as deviations. In this way, it is possible for them to speak English without linguistic bowing to ENL norms, and with dignity, according to their own rules. Would there be a more meaningful way of seizing English than by making it submit to the state-backed rules of a language academy, an essential non-English idea?⁹

To avoid the important problem that the resulting English would run the risk of fragmenting up to the point where the very existence of a vehicular language for inter-lingual communication would be in peril (see, also, Robichaud, 2015), we might appeal to a vehicular analogue of a solution used for native languages with official status in more than one state: to co-administer (part of) their shared linguistic code in international institutions such as the *De Nederlandse Taalunie*, the *Rat für deutsche Rechtschreibung*, or the *Asociación de Academias de la Lengua Española*. For example, in February 2015, the most authoritative Belgian newspaper published a word list with 1,000 Belgian-Dutch words that were traditionally disapproved of for use in formal contexts since they were too “Belgian”. The purpose of the list is to foster the attitude that the use of these very commonly used words in Belgian-Dutch should (like the words for *jam*, *motor vehicle inspection*, *misery*) be legitimate. It is perfectly imaginable that, in a context where Dutch speakers increasingly use English when publishing, when presenting papers, as tourists, when engaging in politics at EU level, they would benefit from having a clear Dutch-English norm that does not force them either to acquire ENL or to succumb to the very low norm of being “communicatively appropriate”. Virtual English could then materialise into clearly, if only slightly, distinct varieties of English with their own codification, following, for example, the logic of the Australian *Macquarie Dictionary* (Schneider, 2010: 220).

Doing so might perhaps come closest to reaching communicative certainty, establishing a clearer end-point at which no further resources would have to be invested, instantiate the best possible life-world re-culturalisation and the most credible form of speaking English in a dignified way by not having either to rely on ENL or run the risk of being seen as unsuccessful ENL speakers. This would also be a stronger way for English to be seen as the common ownership of mankind. As Gazzola and Grin rightly stress, it is not really possible to “own” a language: what one really “owns” in a meaningful sense may perhaps be the competence in English (2013: 96). But this doesn’t change the phenomenon that native speakers are often

9. English does not have a language academy. Jonathan Swift proposed to erect one in 1712, and John Adams proposed an academy for “federal English” for the US in 1780.

perceived as the ones who can really decide what is English and what is not, in part, because they are almost always more competent in English than non-native speakers. Very often, in inter-lingual contexts where native speakers are present, the native speakers are seen as linguistic judges of how to phrase and say things. In the minds of very many native speakers, native speakers are the real judges of English and perfect proficiency means proficiency in the native way, both for oral and written communication. It is precisely such symbolic forms of ownership that we should seek to avoid if we are interested in compensating for life-world and dignity injustices. And standardising national or language-based varieties of ELF in this way may better realise the ideas behind ELF than its current *ad hoc* derived endonormative conceptualisation.

Conclusion

Does ELF diminish linguistic justice along the four lines? Certainly: it presents the attractive vision to non-native speakers that they are not to see native speakers as the real judges of English. Fewer resources are needed, a more equitable communicative setting is reached, English is, to some extent, detached from its native life-world, and dignity is restored because what non-native speakers speak is now seen as a legitimate form of English in its own right. But several problems remain, and some intensify through ELF. First, resource investment remains fundamentally unequal. Second, because ELF is not stable and is inherently dynamic, it is unclear for speakers what the communicative target is, which can result in communicative uncertainty. Moreover, a proficiency gap remains. Third, de-culturalisation and re-culturalisation are, while to some extent possible, fundamentally unstable in ELF, and, therefore, ELF remains tied to Anglo-Saxon life-worlds. Fourth, given status inequalities between, on the one hand, ELF, and, on the other, a long-established ENL with strong literary and national traditions, we may expect intralinguistic Laponce and Lacordaire problems that upset dignity.

To curb these, I have hypothesised in the final section that, since it is ELF's inherent instability that prevents a more successful reduction of the communicative, life-world, and dignity disadvantages, we may seek to put forward non-native standards on an L1-basis, by drawing on existing usage and by creating new conventions. This would result in a polycentric *lingua franca*, just as there are polycentric native languages such as German, Dutch and English. Such L1-based ways of speaking English make the polycentric *lingua franca*, English, internally more diverse. They give a clearer communicative norm to guard against proficiency uncertainty. They are convincingly able to transfer L1-features and expressions to English, thereby providing for a more stable and more robust re-culturalisation. And they restore

dignity by appropriating the language, setting norms for it, and giving speakers the confidence that what they speak is proper English as well, according to local rules, the standardisation of which provides speakers with a more credible counterweight to ENL standards than the flexibility of ELF can.

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The promise and pitfalls of global English

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In this chapter, I explore the purported and actual effects of global English in contexts in which it is often seen as a way of enhancing socioeconomic mobility. While some studies suggest that proficiency in English in countries where it is not an official or dominant language may correlate with higher wages, many other studies demonstrate that English-medium instruction in these countries is detrimental to academic achievement and the attainment of a high level of literacy in any language. The chapter also explores the concepts “English as a Lingua Franca” (ELF) and “Lingua Franca English” (LFE) and critically examines claims that there is, or could be, a “neutral” variety of English for global communication, one that requires a change in current views on the nature of language itself.

Introduction

The interests and aspirations of individuals and governments in both low- and high-income countries where English is a foreign/second/additional/official non-indigenous language are often connected to individual desires to enhance “market” value abetted by governmental desires to promote societal economic development, in part, by attracting foreign direct investment (FDI). There is a widespread assumption in many non-English dominant countries that, by using English as a medium of instruction, or as a core subject in the curriculum, individuals and societies will reap benefits, be they material, psychological, strategic, symbolic, or all of the above. Yet, the data to support such assumptions is, at best, equivocal and, more often than not, the data suggest that, for example, early exposure to English-medium instruction in low-income countries where it is not the language of the home or community is detrimental to academic achievement and the attainment of a high level of literacy in any language. Several studies document that higher levels of English proficiency, controlling for other relevant factors, do not independently lead to increased international trade; in fact, societal multilingualism, generally, controlling for other potentially moderating factors, correlates with

increased trade, and English *per se* has no special or unique effect in this regard (Arcand & Grin, 2013; Melitz, 2008). In this chapter, I will consider the arguments and data on the economic “promise” of English as an additional language, along with the arguments and data that demonstrate the drawbacks and limitations of English-medium instruction as a tool for socioeconomic advancement in low-income countries.

1. Neutral English?

There are many reasons to account for the current and growing popularity of English around the world. Park and Wee (2012: 154) argue that “... as English is presented as having convertibility that can apply to different markets in different contexts, it is now recognized as a language with a universal reach”. Wee (2011) notes that this “neutrality” argument is specious, part of an ideology in which a language (English) is represented as affecting all members of a community equally and not discriminating against anyone. Park and Wee (2012: 226–227) describe the connection between the fiction of English as a neutral language and the discourses of neoliberalism:

The problem...is not that opportunities for learning English are distributed unequally (though that is a problem). The problem is that the image of the entrepreneurial self leads us to believe that if one has access to English, that will serve as linguistic capital with maximal convertibility, allowing us to reach diverse audiences, fully develop our untapped potential, and become a well-adapted person in the neo-liberal market – when this is patently not true.

Park and Wee (2012: 172) conclude that “... the entrenched ideological constructions of English (as entity, as commodity, as capital with global convertibility)” need to be de-mystified:

Neoliberal commodification transforms language into an acquirable skill, obscuring and reproducing class-based inequalities of power that undergird the structure of the linguistic market. (Park & Wee, 2012: 200)

It is more than obvious that the “universal” English market is anything but universal. For persons with the right kind of English, with the right kind of education and social capital, with particular skills in particular sectors of the globalised economy, English can certainly provide an economic benefit. However, for a far greater number of people worldwide, English is largely irrelevant to their prospects for social mobility. Equally problematic is the matter of English as one “thing”, one “universal”

variety, English as a “*lingua franca*” that serves effectively as a “neutral” instrument for intercultural communication. The view of the English “market” as universal (in the sense that the language is assumed by some to be relevant in almost all domains almost everywhere) depends, in large part, on English as a universal code, and a code that is not tied to any particular culture or world-view. Such interlocking views are highly problematic and, in order to forestall the global spread of English, it is necessary to expose and explore these twin myths. In this chapter, I will provide evidence that demonstrates that markets for English are far from universal and that arguments that view English as a neutral “tool” for communication are misplaced.

2. English markets

While proficiency in English, whether as a first, second, or third language, does provide an advantage for careers and employment in certain sectors of the global economy, the number of available jobs and the number of jobs being created that require significant knowledge of English is very, very small compared to the numbers of workers seeking jobs worldwide. While there are many factors that impact on labour markets, it is possible to look at sectors of the economy, investment patterns, and, from the data, make informed judgements about the relative values of languages within identified employment sectors. We can also discern correlations between capital investments and the relative presence of particular educational and linguistic resources, globally. Even a cursory examination of one economic sector – the knowledge economy – reveals the ways in which knowledge of certain “world” languages, and particular competencies and fluencies in those languages, provides a competitive advantage, but only if they are coupled with the appropriate educational credentials (Grin et al., 2010).

Castells (2006: 58) estimates that only about 200 million of the world’s [formal] workforce of three billion workers (about 7%) find work through the 53,000 or so multinational corporations and their related networks; yet, this workforce is responsible for 40 per cent of global GDP and two-thirds of world trade (Williams, 2010: 50). *Lingua francas* are frequently used in these companies, regardless of their location, and English is by far the most common. Ammon (1995) reports that the German Chambers of Commerce recommend the use of English as the sole language of communication for transactions with 64 countries; German is recommended as a co-language for 25 countries and Spanish for 17. These data suggest that English is a global *lingua franca* for players in the knowledge economy, and English, French, German, and Spanish are European *lingua francas*.

Again, we can turn to the processes of neoliberalism and their globalised effects to account for the movement of skilled labour to countries whose state or national language is English or to companies which use English as the primary language of their activities. European mergers and acquisitions exceeded 1 trillion USD during 2005 (Williams, 2010: 28). The US alone accounted for another 1.16 trillion USD in the value of mergers and acquisitions in 2005, followed by the UK (305 billion USD) (Williams, 2010: 28). Many of these mergers involved technology companies. These new mega-companies have no obligation to retain their headquarters in the “home” country and they increasingly tend to relocate their headquarters to countries with the most favourable corporate taxation regimes (Williams, 2010: 30). In 2010, the OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, consisting of 30 members) countries with combined corporate income tax rates significantly lower than the US included Ireland (12.5%), Iceland (15%), Switzerland (21%), Denmark (25%), Finland (26%), Sweden (26%), Norway (28%), and the UK (28%); by comparison, the US rate was 39 per cent, well above the OECD average rate of 25.5 per cent. Clearly, English is the dominant language in technology and the knowledge economy, and these countries have English either as the national language or a language spoken by high percentages of the relevant workforce. The combination of favourable corporate tax policies, a highly developed infrastructure, a highly educated workforce, and one that speaks English as their primary or second/additional language helps perpetuate and increase the disparities between rich and poor countries by motivating corporations to locate their home offices in these rich countries.

Only the countries that invest massively in education and research can appropriate the foreign technologies necessary to catch up with the rich countries. The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) claims that the poorer countries are the origin of only 8.4 per cent of the spending on R&D in the world, with 97 per cent of this being in Asia.¹

1. These data were reported by the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), and are cited in Williams (2010: 33).

3. English and development in postcolonial and expanding circle countries

In response to the “Straight-for-English” approach² that has taken hold in many “outer circle” and “expanding circle” countries,³ a number of studies have been conducted on the role played by English in the educational systems and economies of low-income countries. This research has been published in special issues of academic journals, including the *TESOL Quarterly* (“Language in Development”, 36 (3), 2002) and the *International Journal of the Sociology of Language* (“Indigenous Language Capital and Development”, 225, 2014), among others; edited volumes, for example, *Critical Perspectives on Neoliberal Globalization, Development and Education in Africa and Asia* (edited by Dip Kapoor, Rotterdam: Sense Publishers, 2011); *English as an International Language: Perspectives and Pedagogical Issues* (edited by Farzad Sharifian, Bristol: Multilingual Matters, 2009); *Language and Poverty* (edited by Wayne Harbert, Bristol: Multilingual Matters, 2009); and *English and Development: Policy, Pedagogy and Globalization* (edited by Elizabeth J. Erling and Philip Seargeant, Bristol: Multilingual Matters, 2013); and many other volumes and monographs that could be mentioned. There have also been publications that have focused on the economic aspects of English in employment and international trade, including, Azam and Prakash (2010); Ku and Zussman (2010); Levinsohn (2007); Martin and Lomperis (2002); Grin (2001); and Melitz (2008). The empirical research and policy implications strongly suggest that, where English is promoted by governments as a means to enhance foreign investment and promote development, the best advice is “proceed with great caution”. Few scholars would argue that the teaching and learning of English in low-income countries should be completely abandoned; however, given the limitations in material and human resources and the low levels of literacy and rates of school completion in the economically poorest countries in Africa and Asia, the overall consensus is that money and human resources would be better spent in developing literacy and academic skills through local or national languages, while English may best be taught as a subject if there are sufficient resources to justify it.

2. The “Straight-for-English” approach is an immersion model in which children learn in the second language from the start of schooling. According to Taylor and Coetzee (2013: 1), most schools in South Africa offer mother-tongue instruction in the first three grades of school and then transition to English as medium of instruction in the fourth grade. However, in recent years, a number of schools have changed their policy, resulting in variation across grades in the language of instruction received in the early grades.

3. The concentric circle model proposed by Kachru, with inner, outer, and expanding circle countries in which English is a native/dominant, (post)colonial, and second/foreign language, respectively, has been criticised for its inadequacy in dealing with current contexts of global language use, “a twentieth century construct that has outlived its usefulness” (Bruthiaux, 2003: 161).

It is not surprising that research on the role of English in development, especially in postcolonial countries, is equivocal. Depending on the research questions posed, the methodology used, and the metrics used to determine “success”, where the learning of English is either an independent or dependent variable, various outcomes can result. For example, Ku and Zussman (2010) found that, “in a survey of 100 countries in which English is not a first language, the acquisition of English-language skills could be seen as enabling the promotion of foreign trade” (cited in Seargeant & Erling, 2013: 4). They based their conclusion largely on the mean national test scores on the Test of English as a Foreign Language (TOEFL) over a period of thirty years; controlling for other factors that might influence trade, they found that English proficiency has a strong and statistically significant effect on bilateral trade flows. In contrast, Arcand and Grin (2013), using average TOEFL scores from fifty-four countries and GDP as the measure of development, found that widespread proficiency in English throughout countries in postcolonial sub-Saharan Africa and Asia does not appear to be associated with higher levels of economic development, while widespread use of local languages does correlate with economic development. More specifically, Arcand and Grin (2013: 262) conclude that:

When English language skills are no longer viewed as an exogenous variable ... but as a social feature that can co-vary with other variables, including income itself, we find that it is no longer associated with economic outcomes. ... In short, English is not ‘special’ in terms of economic development or growth.

In studies on market returns associated with English, there is some evidence that, for *individuals*, English proficiency in South Africa has been shown to have a direct positive effect on labour market returns; for example, Casale and Posel (2011), controlling for an individual’s amount of education, found a significant wage premium for black South Africans with fluency in English literacy. But Levinsohn (2007) found that English proficiency was more of an advantage for white South Africans compared to black South Africans. Turning to another postcolonial context, Azam and Prakish (2010) investigated the effects of English-speaking ability on wages in India. While fluency in English (compared to no ability in English) increased the hourly wages of men by 34 per cent, and having even a little proficiency in English increased male hourly wages by 13 per cent, returns to English were lower for women, and were also significantly lower for members of India’s Scheduled Castes (Dalits) (in Seargeant & Erling, 2013: 6). Thus, and not surprisingly, they conclude that:

upward mobility does not come automatically with English skills in India; some obstacles, which likely include long-rooted discrimination against low caste, impede low caste group members even when they have a skill that is valued by the modern labour market. (Azam & Prakash, 2010: 18)

Thus, systemic discrimination based on gender and social class diminish the value of English proficiency, even controlling for educational attainment.

In a study on the relations between language diversity and foreign trade, Melitz (2008: 669) found that:

despite the dominant position of English as a world language, English is no more effective in promoting trade than other major European languages. On the other hand, the major European languages as a group (including English) are more efficient than other languages in promoting trade. Further, both literacy and a diversity of tongues at home do indeed boost foreign trade.

The finding that “illiteracy must interfere especially with foreign trade, and it follows that literacy promotes foreign relative to home trade” (672) is not surprising, as national literacy rates very often correlate with GDP and other measures of economic and social development, even though GDP, as a measure of economic activity in countries in which the great majority of economic activity takes place in the informal economy, is quite limited. Clearly, the connections from language skills to foreign trade, foreign trade to GDP, and GDP to development and quality of life are complex. To put it differently, the distribution of skills in a language shared with a trading partner does not directly generate higher GDP, let alone welfare. The relative contributions to a country’s GDP made by foreign trade depend on far more than the percentage of people in country x who share a common language with people in country y . Rates of adult literacy and completion of primary and secondary schooling are widely used indices of development and quality of life. It is in this regard that the “Straight-for-English” education policy in many postcolonial and expanding circle countries is most controversial. In a review of the literature, Rassool (2013: 53) reports on the role of English as a medium of instruction in Pakistan, Zambia, and South Africa. She notes that, in Pakistan, “the country’s focus on English as the medium of education has contributed to high levels of illiteracy amongst the population as a whole – 53% in 2005; 57% in 2009”. This is because English and Urdu are the languages of choice for the urban elite, whose children receive relatively higher quality education in English medium schools, while the urban poor and rural communities tend to become literate (albeit at a much lower rate than the urban elites) mainly in one of the regional languages. This urban/rural-rich/poor dichotomy disadvantages students educated in regional languages since English represents the medium of education at the tertiary level, which favours students educated entirely in high-quality English-medium schools who will have greater opportunities for employment in the formal economy. A greater investment by the government in public education across-the-board would certainly help to improve educational attainment, including literacy rates, even if English were widely used as the medium of instruction. In postcolonial Zambia,

where English is the national language and medium of education, research funded by the World Bank (Rasool 2013: 54) found that:

the use of English as a medium of instruction negatively affected the pupils' reading and arithmetic skills, and was unlikely to support good learning, especially in the critical early primary grades ... it orientates the entire school process in a direction that only a small percentage of pupils will follow. Culturally, it undercuts the local languages and the values they embody. (Kelly, 1991, cited in Djité 2008: 61)

Rasool (2013: 54) notes that acknowledgement by policy-makers in Zambia that literacy and numeracy are best developed through a language familiar to learners has led to modest changes, including the policy initiatives entitled *Educating Our Future* (1996) and the *New Breakthrough to Literacy Program* (1999) in which initial literacy (Grade 1) courses were offered in seven official languages. Yet, despite these apparent changes in official attitudes and policy adaptations, the belief that English is the vehicle to higher education and economic success dominates societal consciousness. And although school completion rates have improved from 63.6 per cent (2000) to 72 per cent (2004), only 53.3 per cent of the adult population is literate (IMF 2007). Rasool (2013: 55) suggests that:

Zambia's reliance on English as the medium of education could be questioned in relation to its low yield in the provision of highly skilled workers able to participate in the redefined global labour market.

Although we can note similarities in the experiences of postcolonial and expanding circle countries regarding the attraction to English in primary schooling, there are important historical differences in how English came to occupy its current position as a sought after commodity. For example, in South Africa, the use of African languages in education is associated with apartheid Bantu Education (BE) from the 1950s and has triggered an aversion to African languages as media of instruction. Many Africans feel that BE means inferior education, because of its association with the apartheid regime. According to Lafon (2008: 45):

The use of African languages as LoL/T (Language of learning/teaching) is restricted to underprivileged schools whilst the privileged schools invariably and regardless of their population will have English ... as LoL/T. The continuing systematic association between these two parameters is crucial. The use of African languages as LoL/T is clearly construed by African parents and the public at large as embodying poor quality education.

Thus, "Straight-for-English" in South Africa in the 1990s was based not so much on an aversion to the use of African languages as media of instruction, as it was on a movement towards higher-quality education. Casale and Posel (2010: 18), in a recent study, found that "English language proficiency acts as a signal to employers of the quality of education that the worker has received", and, hence, their suitability

for employment. However, as high-quality English-medium education tends to be less accessible to those groups that have been socially, economically, and politically disadvantaged historically (Rassool, 2013: 56), proficiency in English becomes a default mechanism for the maintaining of both the social divisions and the inequality for the majority black population.

The recent history in Rwanda differs from that of South Africa, but the perceptions about the importance of English in education are similar. Following the genocidal policies of the then Hutu government and the guerrilla insurgency war in 1994, the Anglophone Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) took control of the country from the Francophone Hutu-led government. The Anglophone elite rapidly instituted a process of Anglicisation, in part for the same reasons that English has been adopted in many other countries:

Rwandans perceived that the future of globalization is written in English, and they wanted to be able to participate in that new world. (Samuelson, 2013: 219)

Rwanda gained membership in the Commonwealth of Nations (formerly, the British Commonwealth) in 2009, even though estimates of the total number of English speakers in Rwanda range from 1.9 per cent to 5 per cent of the population. Yet, even though 99 per cent of the population can speak Kinyarwanda, the two dominant elites in the country also speak English and/or French, with the Anglophone elite being firmly in power since the end of the war in 1994 (213). The emphasis on English in education through official government policies has ignored the importance of mother-tongue education that would allow students to develop literacy in Kinyarwanda while also learning English (or French) as a subject in the early grades (225). In Rwanda, as in India, South Africa, Pakistan, Zambia, Tanzania, Malawi, Zimbabwe, and many other countries in Africa and elsewhere, decision-making about language policies in education tends to reflect the agendas of the most powerful groups, which includes seeking the foreign investment and loans necessary to bolster their ability to maintain power, rather than the soundness and practicability of specific policies. The point is that “Straight-for-English” very often interferes with the goal of universal education, and, thereby, hampers social and economic development. Williams (2014: 137) summarises the effects of the “Straight-for-English” policy in African countries in this way:

To date ... the evidence suggests that the dominant role of English in primary schools has, for the majority, proved to be a barrier to education, rather than a bridge. Students fail to acquire language capital, so human capital is not accumulated, and no economic capital accrues. It is no surprise, then, that whether one looks at development in terms of economic progress or of human needs, poor countries such as Malawi, Zambia and Rwanda that use ex-colonial languages in education have not hitherto made great strides

4. Research on *Lingua Franca* English

Given the enormous range of varieties called “English” in the world today, some used in local contexts for particular/limited purposes, others which are used for a broad range of personal and professional purposes, it is fair to ask whether there is an identifiable variety of English that can be described, taught, and used by the persons who acquire it as an additional language, a language that is not tied to any geographical place, any culture, any social class, any ethnicity, or any profession; if so, what would this variety look like? Esperanto, an auxiliary language, constructed by Ludwik Lazarz Zamenhof in the late nineteenth century, is the most notable example of a language with an international speech community, and with few native speakers. Although Esperanto has been taught and learned for more than a century, and is undoubtedly more popular than any other constructed language, the demographics of Esperanto’s global speech community are fairly skewed. Piron (1989) claims there are about three million users worldwide, about three-quarters of whom are European. Other studies have reported that speakers of Esperanto tend to be disproportionately older, highly-educated males who already have competence in many other languages.⁴ Despite this (apparently) less than universal appeal of Esperanto, it remains the strongest candidate for a constructed auxiliary language among the many candidates that have come and gone over the past century.⁵ The most successful *lingua francas*, in terms of numbers of speakers, functional utility, and longevity, have been natural languages, such as Persian, Arabic, Greek, Latin, and more recently, English. In his 2010 book entitled *The Last Lingua Franca: English Until the Return of Babel*, Nicholas Ostler argues that *lingua francas* come and go, serve their particular purposes, often reflecting the ascendancy of economic, political, and military power, but that, with advances in translation and communication technologies, “the communicative power of any of the major languages will essentially be global” (285). He argues, quite convincingly, that English may well be the last language to serve the purposes and goals typically associated with a *lingua franca*. This is so because “each community has its own language, as if by nature. [A] wider uniformity of language is, by contrast, hard-won and needs enforcement” (286). Clearly, there are different communities of English

4. Rasic (1995) found that two-thirds of his respondents had tertiary-level education, and “on average, respondents declared a knowledge of 3.4 languages in addition to their native tongue(s) and Esperanto” (Fettes, 1996: 55). Rasic found the ratio of male to female Esperanto users 7:3.

5. Edwards (2010: 179) mentions some of the more successful constructed languages over the past century. These include: *Volapiik* (1880); *Latino Sine Flexione* (1903); *Ido* (1907); *Occidental* (1922); *Novial* (1928).

users, globally, and different requirements for membership in those communities in terms of shared interests and motivations for communication. Data on the range of domains in which Lingua Franca English has been used are somewhat limited, although examples are provided by Canagarajah (2013), Meierkord (2004), Firth (1996), and Lesznyák (2002).

As Bolton (2009) notes, despite the research on world Englishes in recent decades that has charted the de-centring and re-centring of English language studies across a variety of fields, “world ‘English’ in the singular suggests the existence of a transnational standard linked to the power of the USA and UK in particular areas of communication, including computers and international publishing” (306). With regard to international publishing, Hamel (2007) documented the dominance of English in the international scientific periodical literature. He found that in 1996, nearly 91 per cent of scientific publications were in English, followed by 2.1 per cent in Russian, 1.7 per cent in Japanese, 1.3 per cent in French, and 1.2 per cent in German. In some fields, English is even more dominant; nearly 95 per cent of all publications in physics between 1992 and 1997 were in English. In the social sciences and humanities, between 1974 and 1995, publications in English increased from 66.6 per cent to 82.5 per cent, and the second most common language was French, which decreased from 6.8 per cent to 5.9 per cent during this period. If a person wants to have an impact as a scientist, English is indispensable, and the variety of English that is required for publication in scientific journals must be in line with the expectations of the community of scientists who edit these publications. McArthur (1997) argues that a global standard of English is most associated with print and broadcast media, international commercial and technological language, legal and administrative language, and the education sector. Therefore, while it might be useful to think of English as existing along a continuum, with varying distances from purported standardised varieties, it is important to keep in mind that an English continuum, globally, also corresponds with inequalities in terms of access to the high-quality education required for social mobility, and access to English-medium education for the large majority of people in low-income countries, especially at the secondary and post-secondary level, is highly correlated to social status and income.

Wright (2004: 172), referring to Pool (1991), comments that there are only two alternatives to ensure equality in multilingual communicative situations: either everyone learns everyone else’s language or everyone learns a language that is external to the group. Fiedler (2010) adds to this comment that:

Quality and success in learning of foreign languages vary hugely, but ... competence in several languages will probably be restricted to an elite of the intellectual and gifted few.

The point here is that it is not really useful to talk about *a* Lingua Franca English, but rather a multiplicity of English varieties, even a range of Englishes, many of which are local (and often not standardised), and others, usually standardised in written form, which are often required for particular domains in the formal economy, and which are not widely available in low-income countries. Some English varieties may serve *lingua franca* functions in some contexts for certain purposes, depending on the expected level of proficiency for the domains in which it functions. What seems to be true, based on the available research, is that *lingua franca* interaction is not automatically co-operative or symmetrical, nor does it always lead to successful communication.

As I will demonstrate in what follows, the way in which scholars from various language-related disciplines describe and analyse English very often reflects their research agendas and, relatedly, particular beliefs and, therefore, expectations they may have about what constitutes “successful” communication when English is the vehicle involved in oral interaction between non-native speakers. It is also important to emphasise that the domains in which ELF research has been conducted are skewed towards interactions between relatively privileged, highly educated, multi-lingual individuals who represent a tiny subset of the global workforce for whom English is largely irrelevant in their daily lives.

5. Is there a variety of English that can be called a *Lingua Franca*?

The term “*lingua franca*”, or “Frankish⁶ language” in Italian, was used to describe a contact variety of the eastern Mediterranean in the first half of the second century (Ostler, 2010: 4). It was a pidgin,⁷ comprised mostly of Italian (80%) with vocabulary from various languages, including Arabic, Greek, Portuguese, Occitan, and Spanish. It was used mainly in commerce and diplomacy, originally in the eastern Mediterranean and later throughout much of northern Africa and the Middle East

6. According to the Oxford English Dictionary, *lingua franca* in its original sense of applying to a Western pidgin vernacular, appeared in Italian dictionaries in 1553; it is found in English in the works of John Dryden (1680) and Jonathan Swift (1726). The term *lingua franca* meaning any language that is used by speakers of different languages as a common medium of communication is found as early as 1697 (referring to Malayan), 1731 (Hebrew), 1872 (Urdu) among many other examples. There are also metaphorical extensions of the term, as in “Cold war recrimination became the east-west *lingua franca*”, the *Times*, 2 July 1955.

7. A pidgin is a hybrid of two or more languages, with less complex grammatical rules and more limited vocabulary than languages with a broad base of native speakers. Some are widely used, such as TokPisin in Papua New Guinea, while others have more limited distribution.

(*Oxford English Dictionary* 2013). Today, in popular discourse, English is more properly understood as a language of wider communication (LWC), the native or second language of upwards of 750 million people, with another 750 million people who use it as a foreign language (Crystal, 2003: 68–69). However, unlike a *lingua franca* used as a contact language for limited purposes and duration, English is used by its millions of speakers (native and non-native) for a wide range of purposes, personal and professional. Neither the *lingua franca* of the eastern Mediterranean nor Latin during and after the Middle Ages had native speakers, but they were connected to many other languages via multilinguals (Ammon, 2010: 104); English, on the other hand, has several hundred million native speakers, along with many millions for whom it is an important second or additional language. This means that there is a great range in the “Englishes” (oral and written) globally, and a great likelihood for asymmetries in communication potential because of the varied contexts in which English is acquired and used, a fact that has been a focus of concern for applied linguists for a long time (e.g., Phillipson, 2003; Ammon, 2003). Fiedler (2010: 213) concludes that English is not a genuine *lingua franca* and a segment of its users, its non-native speakers, are treated unfairly. It is important to note that among scholars who write about English as it is used in non-English dominant countries, a distinction is sometimes made (albeit, with a great deal of inconsistency and incoherence) between ELF (English as a Lingua Franca) and LFE (Lingua Franca English). In fact, the distinction offered by leading scholars has led to more confusion than clarity. For example, Seidlhofer (2011: 25) argues that ELF should not be categorised in formal terms as a variety of the language [English]; rather Seidlhofer “conceives of ... [ELF] functionally and not formally defined: it is not a variety of English but a variable way of using it – English that functions as a *lingua franca*”. Canagarajah (2007b) proposes the term Lingua Franca English (LFE) as an alternative to ELF, and then argues that there is no pre-existing language system “out there”, but that instead LFE is negotiated and “comes into being” in each context of communication between (mostly) non-native English speakers. Scholars who have conducted empirical research on what some refer to as Lingua Franca English (LFE), while others refer to English as a Lingua Franca (ELF), argue that communication using these variously named varieties of English works relatively smoothly with few instances of communication breakdowns. The essential theoretical construct invoked by scholars such as Canagarajah (2007a), Meierkord (2004), Gramkow Anderson (1993), and Firth (1996), among others, is the existence of a speech community comprised of members who are able to do whatever is necessary to effectuate successful interpersonal communication through the medium of English.

Canagarajah (2007a) focuses on the pragmatic features that enable what he refers to as successful LFE communication; he argues that:

LFE is not a product located in the mind of the speaker ... [but rather] a social process constantly reconstructed in sensitivity to environmental factors. (94)

What seems to motivate successful interpersonal communication between non-native English speakers,⁸ even those with a rudimentary knowledge of the language, according to Canagarajah (2007b: 925–26), is a will to communicate despite varying linguistic backgrounds and competence in English:

Because of the diversity at the heart of this communicative medium, LFE is intersubjectively constructed in each specific context of interaction. The form of this English is negotiated by each set of speakers for their purposes. The speakers are able to monitor each other's language proficiency to determine mutually the appropriate grammar, phonology, lexical range, and pragmatic conventions that would ensure intelligibility. Therefore, it is difficult to describe this language a priori. It cannot be characterized outside the specific interaction and speakers in a communicative context.

Because the language deployed in a particular context is actively negotiated by the participants, “what might be inappropriate or unintelligible in one interaction is perfectly understandable in another”. (926) Gramkow Anderson (1993: 108) seems to imply that there are, in fact, multiple varieties of LFE that are invoked in particular contexts by different participants in the community:

there is no consistency in form that goes beyond the participant level, *i.e.*, each combination of interactants seems to negotiate and govern their own variety of *lingua franca* use in terms of proficiency level, use of code-mixing, degree of pidginization, *etc.*

These observations are captured in Canagarajah's (2007b: 931) claim that “meaning is socially constructed, not pre-existing. Meaning does not reside in the language; it is produced in practice”. “Thus,” according to Canagarajah (2007b: 926), “LFE raises serious questions about the concept of language system. Is it possible to consider form as constituting an indeterminate, open, and fluid system?” It would seem that there are cognitive, and not merely social/affective, implications for the position taken by Canagarajah; in essence, he claims that members of the virtual LFE speech community (a community with very fuzzy boundaries, at best) have developed unique and very particular abilities and skills that separate them from monolingual native English speakers, or other monolingual speakers, and calls into question what is meant by the term “linguistic competence”. Given that LFE interlocutors cannot predict in advance how a particular conversation will develop

8. The category “non-native English speaker” is clearly too broad to support generalisations about the existence of a global LFE speech community.

(linguistically), “participants have to be radically other-centered. They have to be imaginative and alert to make on-the-spot decisions in relation to the forms and conventions employed by the other. It is clear that communication in multilingual communities involves a different mind-set and practices from the mind-set and practices in monolingual communities”. (931) However, the ability to negotiate meaning when speakers of varying levels of shared language competence interact is not at all new, surprising, or unique to users of LFE, and observations about LFE certainly do not justify, even obliquely, the positing of a “new” theory about the concept of language systems. There is a rich and long tradition of research on the ways in which speakers who come from different language backgrounds or with asymmetric fluency in a shared language develop the means – linguistic, non-verbal, pragmatic – to communicate. Sometimes, these adaptations are given technical names, often labelled “registers” in mainstream linguistic terminology, such as “foreigner talk” (Ferguson, 1971), “baby talk” (Ferguson, 1977), and even “pidgins” that might arise for limited use, and concepts such as “audience design” (Bell, 1984) and “accommodation theory” (Giles, 1973) are used by scholars to indicate how attentive conversationalists may converge towards the people to whom they are talking. Even though the linguistic “gap” that exists in foreigner talk, in which a native speaker simplifies their language directed to a non-native speaker, and baby talk, the simplified language a mother uses to communicate with her pre-verbal child, is usually far greater than the proficiency gap between typical users of LFE (although there doesn’t seem to be any “typical” member, linguistically, of this speech community, or a threshold level of English proficiency for speakers of LFE), the same strategic motivations and principles apply (Ferguson, 1982). Humans are able to do a great many things with and through language, including figuring out how to deploy their linguistic resources to establish relationships with people from other linguistic and cultural backgrounds. The effects of language contact, along with language-internal changes following long-established linguistic principles of morphological simplification, phonological assimilation, and ease of articulation (among other processes) can and do lead to new language varieties over time. However, it seems there is little evidence that LFE is a new variety or register, or even a variety *in vitro*, given the enormous free variation noted by scholars who have studied it. The fact that LFE users tend to be tolerant of “errors” in the speech of other LFE speakers is more a reflection of speakers’ attitudes (and researchers’ subjective assessment of those attitudes) engaged in non-native with non-native communication than about the variety itself. Some researchers (e.g., Canagarajah) focus on the special skill sets of LFE users that enable communication to occur, despite the obstacles that exist at the level of code; others (such as Seidlhofer, 2011) find the construct LFE to be unhelpful and counter-productive, since LFE is not clearly defined and, in fact, is so amorphous as to be meaningless and indefinable

using any reasonable linguistic criteria. Still others find the enterprise of describing a unique variety of English for use as a *lingua franca* to be wrong-headed and ill-advised (e.g., Quirk, 1990), since most language learners (these critics claim) aspire to acquire a more “standard” variety of American or British English because of its perceived higher status and instrumental value in higher education and professional fields that require high levels of “standard” English. Neither Canagarajah nor Seidlhofer argue against the value of these “standard” varieties, or that many second and/or additional English language learners may very well prefer to acquire them instead of, or in addition to, LFE. Yet, despite their definitional and philosophical disagreement on the reality and validity of a variety called “English as a Lingua Franca” (ELF) *versus* a variety called “Lingua Franca English” (LFE), both Seidlhofer and Canagarajah argue that some “variety” or “performance” of English, whether it is called ELF or LFE, should be taken seriously as a viable option for many second language learners. In reviewing the growing literature on ELF talk, House (2003: 559) summarises the research which leads her to conclude that ELF has characteristics of a language, but a “language for communication”:

In sum then, ELF appears to be neither a restricted language for special purposes, nor a pidgin, nor an interlanguage, but one of a repertoire of different communicative instruments an individual has at his/her disposal, a useful and versatile tool, a ‘language for communication’. As such, it can be distinguished from those other parts of the individual’s repertoire which serve as ‘language(s) for identification’.

The confusion in the literature, clearly revealed in the above description in which ELF is characterised as a “repertoire of different communicative instruments”, a definition that is so vague as to be meaningless, is compounded by competing (and contradictory) claims for the legitimacy of both ELF and LFE as varieties. The ultimate goal of supporters of LFE, according to Canagarajah (2007b: 925), is to establish its legitimacy as a “variety” whose users “have native competence of LFE, just as they have native competence in certain other languages and cultures”. At the same time, House (2003: 557) goes so far as to claim that “ELF is neither a language for specific purposes nor a pidgin, because it is not a restricted code, but a language showing full linguistic and functional range”. Thus, ELF and LFE supporters argue that the “variety” which they describe, usually in the most general terms, is both “real” and “legitimate”, even though there is little or no evidence to support the “reality” of either of the so-called varieties, other than in the most subjective and impressionistic terms. Unlike Esperanto, which can be taught and which is rule-governed (albeit with variations), there is currently no fleshed out variety of ELF or LFE to be taught or learned (Jenkins, 2007: 23). The existence of “standard” written varieties of English, which are required for social mobility in the formal knowledge economy, and the reality of the existence of nearly a half billion

native speakers in countries where English has existed for a very long time suggest that the prospects for the development, or natural “evolution”, of an identifiable variety called *Lingua Franca English*, or of “world standard spoken English” (WSSE) (Crystal, 2003) are quite slim, given the wide geographic, social, and instrumentally varied niches and domains where English exists in the world. What seems to be most lacking in the research published thus far is an explanation of the motivation for a broad-based expansion of ELF or LFE beyond local, and/or highly specialised domains. More information is needed on the socio-demographic profile of the ELF/LFE virtual community, and especially an analysis of how ELF/LFE diffuses across geographic and social spaces, and why it would (or would not) expand beyond the current spaces (virtual or physical) it currently inhabits. These are the sorts of questions and research goals that have motivated sociolinguistic scholarship for the past half century and which should be brought to bear with regard to the reality, vitality, and characteristics of ELF/LFE, and the factors that will influence the spread (or obsolescence or transformation) of ELF/LFE over time.

Conclusions

Holborow (Block, Gray, and Holborow 2012: 21–22) notes

The post-crash world has reminded us that the levels of capital investment, more than language and communication, are the shapers of social power. ... Communication skills, sadly, do not make economies; they are put to use within existing production structures and their being put to use at all is dependent on events in the real economy.

Further to this point, Holborow (1999: 58) notes that:

it is not only a fantasy, but also a politically motivated deception to claim that language skills can replace real – that is, material – social and economic development. At the same time, this argument is not enough to respond to the equally real aspirations that working class and oppressed people often express for greater stability and prosperity in their (and their children’s) lives. Just as the social and material ‘fruits of society’ are distributed unequally within and among societies, so too is access to English.

The fact that English works reasonably well as a *lingua franca* for players in the knowledge economy does not mean that socially and economically marginalised individuals are being “irrational” because they prefer to have their children educated in a language associated with mobility rather than in their mother tongue. However, and especially in low-income countries, lack of resources generally leads to poor educational outcomes in public schooling, whether the medium of

instruction is English or a regional or national language. This can be seen, for example, in Cambodia, the Lao People's Democratic Republic (PDR), Myanmar, and Vietnam where Khmer, Lao, Myanma, and Vietnamese, respectively, have been adopted as the media of instruction in schooling, and in South Africa, Namibia, Zambia, and Rwanda, where English has been widely adopted as the medium of instruction in primary schooling. Djité (2011) found that, even in countries with relatively high levels of literacy, such as Cambodia and the Lao PDR, these countries were ranked 104 and 108 out of 129 countries, respectively, on the UNESCO's EFA (Education For All) Economic Development Index (EDI) in 2009 (cited in Djité, 2014: 155–56).

The globally-influenced economic realities that tend to perpetuate low levels of income in poor countries, such as very low levels of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), low rates of literacy and school completion, lack of infrastructure and adequate medical care, among other factors, are not ameliorated by the choice of one language or another as the medium of instruction. A more general way to capture this point is to say that the economic value of English as an additional language (whether it is called a language of wider communication, a *lingua franca*, or something else) cannot be determined apart from the socioeconomic/sociopolitical/sociocultural context(s) in which it is acquired and used. In many countries, the level of teachers' English proficiency and the way in which the language is taught (Williams, 2014) correlates very often with outcomes, in terms of actual language skills. There are clearly socioeconomic and sociopolitical "facts" that favour access for some (and not others) to English in postcolonial and expanding circle countries, and especially to the "appropriate" sort of English that can lead to access to the domains where this linguistic capital can be "cashed in".

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Languages, norms and power in a globalised context

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An important branch of linguistics, namely, sociolinguistics, considers “languages” as normative social constructs and not as fixed communication tools characterised by an identifiable set of core features. The latter position was defended in the early sociolinguistic studies of Joshua Fishman on language decline and maintenance in the second half of the twentieth century and in the influential work on generative grammar of Noam Chomsky. In contradiction or contrast to this position, today’s sociolinguistics, which I will refer to as “mainstream sociolinguistics” in this chapter, claims that, in the default case, languages have no fixed boundaries and that they are, in fact, “fluid”. The main argument which mainstream sociolinguistics puts forward to support this claim is that the output of speech production, i.e., referred to as “linguaging”, taps from linguistic resources and not from identifiable languages. This chapter argues against this theory. Firstly, multilingual phenomena, including hybrid varieties of global English and hybrid expressions in linguistic landscapes, including that of the Dutch city of Utrecht which claimed to support the linguaging-approach, are, in fact, traditional cases of code-switching and code-mixing involving identifiable languages. Secondly, the linguaging-approach, in contrast to the languages-approach, makes the wrong predictions. The absence of identifiable languages predicts the “flattening” of linguistic power relations. However, it will be argued that, even in a linguistically highly diverse context, a re-arrangement of power relations between languages takes place and that language hierarchies pop up. Hence, the theory which recognises individual languages makes the correct predictions. Thus, there is no reason to abandon the language concept of early sociolinguistics or Chomskyan linguistics that languages, or at least some modules of language, especially in the domain of semantics and pragmatics, are socially constructed, but that, at the same time, they are characterised by a prototypical grammatical and lexical basic core.

Introduction

Mainstream sociolinguistics is defending the position that languages do not exist, but are, in fact, social constructions which result from normative behaviour. This view is challenging the position defended by formal approaches to language, such as Chomsky's generative grammar, which argues that the identity of each language is defined by a set of core features, even if it is acknowledged that the semantics and pragmatics of languages are constructed socially.¹ Mainstream sociolinguistics operates with post-modern linguistic terminology, such as *linguaging*, to express the idea of language-as-a-resource. In this chapter, I will argue that the linguistic phenomena which claimed to cover such post-modern linguistic concepts have a limited applicability and scope. The so-called *linguaging*-phenomena have little communicative currency due to the fact that they are determined highly individually, actually they play a role only in informal communication and they deviate from standard monolingual or multilingual language use and communication (Phillipson, 2012). I will have a closer look at two types of linguistic phenomena that have been claimed to be explained by *linguaging*, namely, global English, also referred to in mainstream sociolinguistics as English as a Lingua Franca (ELF), and multilingual expressions in the linguistic landscape. The latter is a case study of the linguistic landscape in the city of Utrecht where the intermingling of Dutch and English is involved. In the latter case, I will rely on the method and framework of linguistic ethnography which is outlined in detail in the work of Jan Blommaert (2010, 2012, 2013) in order to pursue my analysis.

It will be concluded that, in both cases, phenomena of linguistic diversity which have been labelled "*linguaging*" in mainstream sociolinguistics are, in fact, instances of code-switching and code-mixing (CSM) which involve established languages. This conclusion supports the position advocated in Edwards (2012). If this is correct, then *linguaging*-phenomena do not offer empirical evidence in order to question the assumption central to formal linguistic theories that each language possesses an identifiable set of core features marking its identity, even though the language in question, or some of its modules are normative, social constructs.

1. The position of mainstream sociolinguistics is defended in the publications of Ad Backus, Jan Blommaert, Monica Heller, Cornelia Hülbauer, Jens Norman Jørgensen, Kasper Juffermans, Clare Mar-Molerino, Ben Rampton, Rosita Rindler Schjerve, Eva Vetter, Barbara Seidlhofer and the relevant references cited therein. See Edwards (2012: 81: 102) for the position of Joshua Fishman in terms of language decline and maintenance, and 'reversing language shift' dominating research in the period of early sociolinguistics and for the 'languages' position in Chomskyan tradition Chomsky (2002, 2008). From this it follows that the *linguaging*-approach is a contested position in the field of general linguistics.

The conclusion that languaging-phenomena are, in fact, instances of CSM involving established languages is also supported by the politics of language, *i.e.*, the relation between linguistic diversity and power. Note that these CSM-variants which appear in multilingual contexts have little or nothing to do with language policy or linguistic diversity management. The linguistic engineering of a society which designs the institutions for managing linguistic diversity will rely on normative languages in the first place. Institutions are, by definition, the outcome of norm-based governance strategies and will implement norm-based entities, such as languages that are identifiable, and make possible sophisticated language use as a contribution to successful social interaction. This rules out any highly individual, spontaneous production of language, such as instances of CSM as an input to language policy or language diversity management. Furthermore, languaging implies that the power relations between languages and language hierarchies are “flattened” out because established languages do not exist, only bundles of linguistic features do. However, language hierarchies do occur in various cases of linguistic diversity as well. It has been richly documented that the spread of global English is a hegemonistic process which pushes indigenous languages to a lower position in the language hierarchy, as will be discussed below in the section on global English. Interestingly, it is even demonstrated by the proponents of languaging themselves that new language hierarchies come into being in the environment of linguistic superdiversity. Hence, the languaging-framework clearly makes the wrong predictions here. If there are no established languages, and only linguistic resources, then language hierarchies in the context of superdiversity would be absent, leading to a world in which linguistic democracy and justice would prevail. However, this is clearly not the case. A clear example of this is provided by ethno-linguistically-mixed territories with a language hierarchy in which an official language, the majority language, dominates a minority language or languages. In such a context, the latter is restricted in use and asymmetric bilingualism or multilingualism occurs, that is to say the minority-language speakers also speak the majority language but not *vice versa* (Marácz, 2014). This results into unequal social patterns, such as exclusion, marginalisation, and reduced chances on the labour market for the speakers of the minority languages (Csata, 2016).

This does not mean that CSM-strategies cannot be useful in everyday multilingualism and multilingual communication. Even though the communicative potential is low in such cases, CSM in which both majority- and minority-speakers participate might be used to “flag” the other languages contributing to the neutralisation of ethno-linguistic tension and conflict. For example, greetings in the language of the other in multilingual contexts unmistakably have this effect.² Hence,

2. See Iriberry and Uriarte (2012) for a discussion of flagging in the case of minority languages.

the language variants produced by CSM flag the equality of both the languages and the speakers in complicated multilingual contexts. Although flagging plays a role in conflict prevention in societies with a clear language hierarchy, it does not affect justice, in the sense of Rawls (1971), or its applications in other linguistic settings positively.

1. Languages

Itkonen (2008) argues that the notion of “language” has different meanings. In his view, the socially-constructed basis of languages is more relevant than its mental-cognitive representation. According to him, languages are primarily social constructs and hence a specific language, such as English, displays a normative base to its mental-cognitive representation. I agree with him that languages – or more precisely some of the modules, such as semantics or pragmatics – are socially constructed, but that their identifiable core values, such as a recognisable grammar and vocabulary are no less relevant for understanding both language and the world in which we live. Since his first writings on the theory of grammar, this position has been defended in the work of Chomsky (Chomsky, 2008: 31–32). The fact that languages, or some of its modules, are socially constructed does not mean, however, that they lack a basic core, a prototypical grammatical and lexical system derived from the Universal Grammar that is represented at the cognitive mind-state level (Chomsky, 2002: 8–9). A particular grammar is then a stable state that has been derived from the Universal Grammar and might vary from its initial state due to its parametric setting (Chomsky, 2008: 233). As a result, the English language character of a dictionary of English is common to all or shared by all its native speakers. So, languages, or some of its modules, although socially constructed, possess identifiable core features. It should be noted that this interpretation of “languages” facilitates the politics of language, *i.e.*, the intervention of political power into language regimes (Bourdieu, 1991; Safran, 2004; May, 2012: 4–6).

Political ideologies and regimes have been very active in the “making” of languages by imposing norms on language use (Pool & Grofman, 1984; Pool, 1990; Calvet, 1998; Okuka, 1998; Witte & Van Velthoven, 2011; and Sonntag & Cardinal, 2015). The European standard dominated by national languages originates from nation-states guided by a Herderian-type of nationalist ideology. These national languages are normative in the sense that they exclude all other languages and language variants from their territory. As a consequence, the European compartmentalisation of languages is artificial and is due to socio-political interventions. In the course of their history, nation-states have been trying to standardise, codify and lexically expand the language selected – often a purified hybrid or creolised variant

to strengthen the identity of the imagined homogeneous language community – to become the official language.³

It is true that the politics of language has led, in many cases, to the disappearances of dialectical heritages, and to the outbreak of linguistic conflicts and even wars (Calvet, 1998; Witte & Van Velthoven, 2011). However, the nation-state ideology with its norms of monolingualism and “pure” language that prescribe only to “one” language for creating homogeneous speech communities has also made possible the rapid modernisation of states, and the spectacular growth of living standards, in the modern world, at least. Nation-states with their uniform citizenship including a common communication language have provided a successful response to facilitating inclusion, developing social cohesion, and making possible effective communication at a sophisticated level which has resulted in modernisation and innovation.⁴ Hence, the reasons for political intervention to shape normative monolingual and multilingual languages regimes have been manifold, as have the consequences of linguistic engineering itself.

The construction of a national language in order to modernise the state was sometimes only possible at the expense of another linguistic heritage. The Turkish leader Kemal Atatürk and his supporters were aware of the fact that the Turkish language had to be standardised and codified in order to forge a nation from the ruins of the Ottoman Empire. This led to a substantial reduction of the Arabic heritage that had played an important role in the Ottoman Empire (Lewis, 2002). The language purification of Turkish from its Arabic linguistic heritage allowed the Turkish nation to accommodate to Western ideas of statecraft and catch up with Western social-economic engineering. Romania has applied a different tool of linguistic engineering employing the fact that the basic core of the language is Romance. The Romanian language originated from a mixed code of a predominantly Romance grammar and a predominantly Slavic vocabulary (Du Nay, 1977; Décsy, 1973: 108–111). Due to its Slavic ties, Romanian is quite often classified as a member of the Balkan-Sprachbund, thereby exemplifying a range of Balkanisms. In the nineteenth century, the Romanian language renewal proposed to re-Latinise Romanian, *i.e.*, to replace the Slavic vocabulary with words and expressions from modern French and Italian. This strategy not only raised the Romance make-up

3. Consider Marác (2016).

4. Putnam (2007) argues in a highly-contested study that diversity at local level leads to a decrease in social capital for everyone, *i.e.*, majority- and minority-language speakers. Even if true, in the age of supranational norms and values, and concrete instances of international law protecting diversity and identity, it would be impossible to impose a policy of total assimilation on linguistic minorities and migrants. Hence, the uniformising policy of the nation-states is no longer tenable in its classical form.

of the Romanian language, it also strengthened its political ties with France and Italy. Thus, the re-making of the Romanian language also made possible advantageous international relations in the West. At the end of the First World War, this Romanian strategy paid off. The Romanians managed to expand their state and established Greater Romania with the support of the allied winners of the First World War. French and Italian politicians thought that, due to linguistic similarities, the Romanians were also culturally connected to the West and fit to govern a larger state, including different groups of ethno-linguistic minorities.

The nationalist paradigm had serious repercussions in that it made it difficult for multilingual countries to recognise the languages spoken on their territory as official languages. Thus, it is only in modern times that multilingual countries have begun to install language regimes which develop arrangements for multilingualism (Pool, 1990). The construction of a general communication language in order to create more cohesion in multicultural societies has been attested as well. The Yugoslav language was established for making social and ethnic cohesion in an area of Southeast Europe that was traditionally divided into small but related ethno-linguistic groups, and for developing South Slavic geopolitical power to counterbalance German and Turkish influences in the Balkans. These South Slavic ethno-linguistic groups formed the building-blocks for the construction of the Yugoslav language. A prominent supporter of Austroslavism, the Slovene linguist Franz Miklosisch (Okuka, 1998: 12) laid the foundation for this language which heavily relied upon Serbian and Croatian. A common Yugoslav language and Austroslavism did not materialise in the Austro-Hungarian Empire but the idea of the common Yugoslav language and state were realised in the twentieth century and reached its peak under Tito's Communist rule after the Second World War.

These cases illustrate that standard or official languages have been artificially constructed, that is to say, they are codified and standardised as a result of language planning, *i.e.*, normative interventions by governing bodies and organisations into the life of linguistic communication codes (Johnson, 2013: 26–30). Language policy and linguistic diversity management is, however, norm-based by definition, and targets established recognisable languages, even though some of their modules are constructed (Ricento, 2006; Spolsky, 2009). In sum, devices for language policy and language planning heavily rely on an institutionalised society which operates with normative concepts, including languages. Simultaneously, language policy devices do not account for the non-normative use of language and languages.

2. Linguaging

Recent approaches in mainstream sociolinguistics have challenged the Chomskyan view on language as a social construct with recognisable grammatical and lexical core features. It should be noted that this concept of language has also questioned the value and impact of the early work in sociolinguistics on language decline and maintenance in the sense of Joshua Fishman (García et al., 2006). Modern sociolinguistics has adopted the view that, as a result of globalisation, and other transnational processes in linguistically-diverse societies, heritage languages are used as “linguistic resources” which yield complex hybrid linguistic phenomena.⁵

Against the backdrop of globalisation, linguistically diverse societies are referred to as a case of “superdiversity”. Jørgensen and Juffermans (2012b) define this concept as follows:

Superdiversity is a term for the vastly increased range of resources, linguistic, religious, ethnic, cultural in the widest sense, that characterise late modern societies. The term stands for a ‘diversification of diversity’ and describes a new order which is influenced by two sets of developments.

In the view of Jørgensen and Juffermans, the diversification of diversity is closely linked to two aspects of globalisation, *i.e.*, firstly, mobility, including migration flows, and, secondly, new technical developments, such as the social media of communication accessible to the masses, with the help of mobile phones and the Internet. The outcome of these aspects of globalisation is a spectacular increase of all sorts of diversity, including linguistic diversity.⁶ These developments imply that the individual in late modern superdiverse societies is likely to encounter a much wider range of resources than was characteristic of Europe just a few decades ago. A consequence of this is that superdiversity is accompanied by an increasingly

5. See the references in footnote 1 above.

6. Due to the fact that superdiversity involves language-as-a-resource and excludes the concept of an established language a different term and definition is needed for superdiversity. Kraus elaborates on the notion of complex diversity (Kraus, 2012: 9–10). According to him, “European societies becoming more diverse in terms of incorporating new layers of diversity. The different building blocks (or layers) of diversity must themselves be regarded as becoming increasingly heterogeneous too” (Kraus, 2012: 13). Kraus argues that languages are socio-political layers which can turn complex diverse themselves in the context of globalisation. Consequently, the complex diversity approach distinguishes several independent linguistic layers, including global *lingua francas*, like English; national languages; autochthonous minority and migrant languages and the interplay between these languages in terms of juxtaposition and intertwining, *i.e.*, code-switching and code-mixing. Although complex diversity is to be preferred over superdiversity for this reason, I will use the term “superdiversity” for the ease of reference in the course of this chapter.

important lack of predictability in everyday life. People must be prepared to meet and interpret phenomena, forms of behaviour, attitudes, and meanings which they have never encountered before, and encounter them in new contexts. In linguistic terms, however, the increase in the various patterns of multilingualism is not *per se* about more different languages, but about more different linguistic features that are used as resources for new, unexpected hybrid phenomena.

These hybrid linguistic phenomena have been described as the result of what is referred to in post-modern terminology as “*linguaging*”. This term fits well into the collection of buzzwords that characterises the discourse of globalisation studies (Steger, 2009: 9; and De Kloet, 2014). Jørgensen and Juffermans (2012a) define *linguaging* as follows:

Linguaging is the unique human capacity to change the world through communication with others by means of language, i.e. systematically organized arbitrary signs. All human beings language, and they do so to achieve their goals. *Linguaging* is individual and unique in the sense that no two persons share exactly the same set of linguistic features. Language is at the same time a social phenomenon in the sense that it is shared and exclusively acquired and practiced in interaction with others. Languages in the plural exist only as sociocultural (ideological) abstractions.

Hence, Jørgensen and Juffermans consider the input of *linguaging* to be linguistic resources and its output to be the linguistic features that interlocutors use to produce speech and make communication possible. This implies that “*specific*” languages do not exist. The authors (2012b) comment on languages as follows:

Sociolinguistics regards boundaries between languages as arbitrary and historically contingent, as the result of particular histories of standardisation and regulation. A *linguaging* perspective sees language in actual practice not as bounded, countable entities that are given in the world, but as dynamic, creative potential to produce meaning through the use of arbitrary signs. A *linguaging* perspective conceptualises language as a verb (as practice or behaviour), rather than as a noun (a thing or an object) and places the activity and the agents (*linguagers*) in focus rather than the linguistic system (*languages*).⁷

According to mainstream sociolinguistics, *linguaging* is the basic activity that people perform when they produce language and communicate. This theory rejects *specific* languages as ideologically-constructed abstract concepts which do not exist in real life. National languages in Europe, as discussed above, are viewed in this framework as completely unnatural (Heller, 2011: 7). In sum, the proponents of *linguaging* marginalise the role of established languages with identifiable core

7. See Jørgensen and Juffermans (2012b).

features in the process of speech production and communication. According to them, what is actually taking place is the use of linguistic resources from *whatever* language for communicative purposes.⁸

It should be observed that this theory has far-reaching consequences for the analysis of multilingual phenomena. The languaging-framework predicts that, in cases of linguistic superdiversity, no specific languages can be isolated and that no language hierarchies exist between the languages involved, because we have to deal solely with linguistic features and not with established languages. However, the theory which acknowledges languages claims that specific languages can be isolated even in multilingual phenomena. Let us test these predictions with concrete cases of multilingualism which appear in the cases of global English and the multilingual landscape.

3. Global English

With the proliferation of linguistic diversity in the context of globalisation, transnational communication strategies will become more relevant.⁹ One of these transnational communication strategies involves *lingua franca* communication. A *lingua franca* is a bridge language that is used by interlocutors for communicative purposes, one which is not their native language (*i.e.*, L1) (Hülmbauer, 2011b). Phillipson (2006, 2009) argues that English is on the rise as a global *lingua franca* and that its expansion on a global scale is driven by the hegemonic political and economic ambitions of, first, the British Empire, and, later, in the twentieth century, of the United States. The position of global English is rather problematical, though.¹⁰ There is the competition in the functional domains between global English and local indigenous languages, most often the official languages of nation-states. Local languages are losing functional domains to English, *i.e.*, giving rise to a Fishman-type of diglossia (García et al., 2006). Furthermore, the status of native speakers in the global version of English is not clear. The number of L2 (second language) speakers of English has by now far exceeded the number of L1 speakers, or, to put it differently, L2 speakers of global English are in the clear majority compared to its L1 speakers. The question arises of whether the norms of the native speakers will dominate the norms of global English as well, or whether, in the end, new norms for

8. This is referred to in mainstream sociolinguistics as the polylingual norm. See, for further discussion, Blommaert and Rampton (2011), Blommaert (2013), Hülmbauer (2011a, 2011b), Jørgensen and Juffermans (2012a, 2012b), and Jørgensen, Rindler-Schjerve and Vetter (2012).

9. See the papers in Jørgensen (ed.) (2011), and Kimura (2011).

10. See also the papers in Ricento (2015), and Grin (Chapter 11 in this volume).

global English will emerge due to defective language use of L2-speakers of English? In the first place, there are the different versions of English, such as British English, American English and so on, which makes it difficult for the non-native speaker of English to determine what the precise norms of English actually are. Normally, the norm-based version of English is British English, the standard variant of English that we know as Oxbridge English and is being taught to L2 speakers of English in formal education across the globe. So, the spread of global English should in principle be the spread of English as a Foreign Language (EFL). Let us refer to this variant of global English as *Lingua Franca English* (LFE). However, it has been argued that the version of English spoken across the globe is rather an English-based language variant that is mixing, intermingling and sampling with local languages as the outcome of language use and communication. Basically this variant of global English, including both the norm-based and the code-switched variants of English is labelled by Seidlhofer and her collaborators as *English as a Lingua Franca* (ELF) (Seidlhofer, 2013). Hülmbauer (2011a) defines ELF as follows:

ELF is the currently most widespread and most frequently used manifestation of the lingua franca mode. It is defined as the use of an English-based resource as a shared means of intercultural communication between speakers with different *primary lingua*-cultural backgrounds. ELF is to be viewed as a flexible mode of communication rather than as a fixed code. It is not defined as a set of formal features but as a flexible, dynamic resource: linguistic form is driven by functional purposes. With mutual intelligibility between the participants as the overall aim, considerations of correctness are overruled by notions of effectiveness. ELF is individually shaped by its users, and, by implication, not by “the English language”. Rather, it is a variable intercultural adaptation based on English, which is determined by accommodative strategies between the speakers, which are typically characterised by plurilingual elements. ELF, in this definition, does not represent a restricted language resource. It can – potentially – take any form – from simplified to complex – and can potentially fulfil any function – from a basic interaction to the most elaborate argument.

It should be noted that the interpretation of different types of global English ties in with the “languages *contra* languaging” debate discussed in this chapter. The global variant of standard English, *i.e.*, LFE follows a precisely determined set of norms on the use of correct language and effective communication, whereas the variants of English connected to the English-based resource ELF can be used on an individual basis without any restrictions. In practice, the latter will be a highly code-switched English-based language variant mixing with local languages and yielding an infinite number of individual or more local forms. These forms produce in fact neologisms in the spelling, grammar, semantics, pronunciation and syntax of this highly code-switched English-based language variant (Edwards, 2012: 34–38). So, the difference between LFE and ELF boils down to the question of “normativity”,

but it cannot be called into question that, in both cases, we are dealing with the English language and not with *ad hoc* linguistic resources, although the ELF forms in spelling, grammar, semantics, pronunciation and syntax deviate from the norm that is prescribed.

4. Multilingual landscape

All major European cities are linguistically so diverse that they have been characterised as superdiverse (Blommaert, 2012; 2013). Here, I will discuss the interplay of global English and local Dutch in the linguistic landscape of the city of Utrecht. This particular case of linguistically hybrid expressions in the linguistic landscape of the city of Utrecht has not been discussed in the literature, but I consider the phenomena referred to in this section as a standard case for the proponents of the *linguaging* approach. However, an advantage of analysing a case study that has not been hitherto discussed is that the arrangement of the data and their interpretation could be independently tested in a fieldwork session undertaken by the author of this chapter. The case study unambiguously demonstrates that the linguistically hybrid expressions do not necessarily favour a linguaging analysis of the data, but, instead, demonstrate that it is safe to rely on languages in order to decode the data. From this, it also follows that the ethnographic approaches of multilingual linguistic landscapes in the linguaging literature should be reinterpreted along the lines of analysis put forward in this chapter. This analysis supports the conclusion of Edwards (2012: 34–38), who argues that the linguistic phenomena that the linguaging framework claims to cover are not really new, but are simple cases of code-switching and code-mixing of existing languages.

Utrecht is the fourth city of The Netherlands in size with around 350,000 inhabitants. It functions as the most important infrastructural railroad and motorway hub in the central part of the country. The most prominent canal in the inner city is the *Oudegracht* (the Old Canal). The ground excavated was used to raise the sides of the canal creating a two-level street along the canal. This made the creation of permanently dry cellars and new quays at water level possible, hence, the typical wharf-basement structures below street level. Many of these cellars have been converted into restaurants and cafés. One of these restaurants is called “*De Oude Muntkelder*” or “The Old Coin Cellar”, which is a traditional Dutch pancake restaurant, which is called in Dutch “*pannenkoekenrestaurant*” or “pancake-restaurant”. At the front of the cellar, there is an advertisement on a banner.¹¹ Consider the photograph below:

11. See Picture 10.1, photographed on 15 June 2014 by the author.



Picture 10.1 Restaurant *De Oude Muntkelder*, Utrecht, Holland

The bilingual English-Dutch text qualifies as an instance of languaging in a super-diverse context. The line on the highlighted red strip reads “All-you-can-eat voor 12,50”, or “All-you-can-eat for 12.50”. The phrase “All-you-can-eat” is actually an English sentence that consists of basic words that every Dutch citizen who has attended primary school is able to read and understand. The hyphens between the English words warn the reader, however, that the phrase should not be interpreted as a plain sentence describing a rudimentary action of “unlimited eating”, but that it should instead be interpreted as an adjective referring to a nominal concept. The phrase is, in fact, modifying a noun producing the reading of “All-you-can-eat buffet or restaurant”. In this sense, it refers to an American sales concept that has been ascribed to the Las Vegas publicity and entertainment manager Herbert MacDonal, who invented the idea in 1956. “All-you-can-eat” (also abbreviated as AYCE) is closely related to a family of buffets, including the French *buffet*, the Swedish *smörgåsbord*, etc., where customers pay a fixed fee after which they can help themselves to as much food as they wish to eat in a single meal. In sum, the concept of “All-you-can-eat buffet or restaurant” has its own history and is rooted in early and newer stages of globalisation.

The English sales concept “All-you-can-eat” cannot be put into Dutch by translating the English phrase word-by-word which would produce “*alles wat je kunt opeten*” or “all what you can up-eat-infinitive”. This Dutch counterpart has a literal meaning which clearly lacks the American sales concept reference. A Dutch phrase such as “*onbeperkt eten*” “unlimited eat-infinitive” which, translated back into

English, renders “unlimited eating” is closer to the sales concept “All-you-can-eat”, but still lacks the discourse of the American sales concept “All-you-can-eat”. The English phrase which expresses the American sales concept had to be chosen on the banner text because in Dutch no such counterpart exists.

It should be noted here that globalisation clearly interacts with an old local Dutch (and Belgium) tradition of serving pancakes exclusively in a “*pannenkoek-enrestaurant*” “pancake restaurant”, as is indicated by the text on the banner.¹² The local Dutch tradition is emphasised by the name of the restaurant itself, “*De Oude Muntkelder*”, “The Old Coin Cellar”. Furthermore, tradition is also emphasised by the decoratively-styled “D” of the Dutch definite article “*De*”, or “the”, which reminds us of a medieval codex. However, the English phrase “Free Wifi” on the sign indicates that this traditional restaurant is connected to the globalised world. The term “Wifi” refers to local area wireless technology that allows electronic devices, such as personal computers, *etc.*, to exchange data or connect to the Internet by using specific radio waves from an Internet access point. The rest of the linguistic signs on the banner are Dutch. Dutch “*voor*” is English “for” producing the phrase “All-you-can-eat for 12.50 euros”. The Dutch phrase “*maandag tot en met donderdag*”, “Monday until Thursday”, below the highlighted phrase makes it clear to the Dutch speakers what the time interval is for this “unlimited eating for a fixed amount of 12.50 euros”.

In sum, the linguistic landscape in the centre of Utrecht displays multilingual expressions. A Dutch-English bilingual advertisement text appears on a banner in front of the pancake restaurant *De Oude Muntkelder* located at the *Oudegracht*. The sign is addressing speakers of Dutch in the first place, although it contains two English phrases “All-you-can-eat” and “Free WiFi”. Both phrases are familiar technical terms from the vocabulary of the globalised discourse. The first one stems from the domain of American management and sales; the second originates from the IT terminology. The Dutch language itself has no expressions for the concepts to which these English terms refer. Dutch has simply borrowed these expressions from English to express the related concepts. What seems to be a case of languaging in a superdiverse setting is, in fact, a Dutch-based expression with two

12. Scholars of globalisation refer to the complex interaction between the global and local as “glocalisation” which is characterised by cultural borrowing (Holton, 2011: 14–15). Steger (2009: 77) claims that the resulting expressions of cultural hybridity cannot be reduced to clear-cut manifestations of “sameness” or “difference”. According to him, such processes of hybridisation have become most visible in fashion, music, dance, film, food, and language (see, also, Marác 2011). If this is correct, linguistic “glocalisation” phenomena analysed in this chapter are a subcase of a much broader cultural pattern. The hybridisation of food and food services as a subcase of globalisation has been discussed in Pieterse (2009), especially in Chapter Three and Chapter Four. This is also clearly the case with the “All-you-can-eat” formula discussed here.

English phrases interwoven into the text. Hence, in this case of linguistic diversity, we are not dealing with a randomly used linguistic device, *i.e.*, lexical features from Dutch and English, but with a regular case of CSM, *i.e.*, the use of two, sometimes more, languages in the same linguistic event (Backus, 2012). Code-switching in this banner text which includes Dutch and English is triggered by the fact that there are no Dutch words or expressions available for the concepts connected to typical globalisation expressions, such as words and expressions from the domains of management and sales techniques and IT terminology. Consequently, English language words or expressions are inserted in the Dutch base. Hence, there is no reason to assume that this code-switched text does not involve the core-features of the grammar and vocabulary of two established languages in question, namely, Dutch and English.

5. Multilingualism and power

The concept of considering language as a “resource” not only rejects the very existence of languages with their own form and identity, but also rejects an insightful analytic concept to the study of politics and society. Bourdieu (1991), and Ives (2015), with the latter relying on a Gramscian analysis of languages and power, argue that there is always an aspect of power involved in the case of language. The ruling élites install a normative variant of the official language to control their power positions, as has been discussed in the case of the nationalist or multicultural paradigms above. It should further be noted that, without acknowledging “languages”, the concepts of language hierarchies and multi-level layers at which languages are, in fact, in competition for recognition are blurred. This point of view is, however, contrary to serious academic literature on the world system of languages and the conflicts between languages in this system (de Swaan, 2001; Calvet, 2006; Weber, 2009).

Due to the fact that the nation-state ideology marginalises multilingualism in contradiction to the ideology of globalisation and Europeanisation, some commentators consider the former, but not the latter, to be harmful for multilingualism.¹³ However, the political, economic and cultural forces of globalisation being driven by political liberalism and by the ongoing conquering of new market shares have led to a number of negative consequences for linguistic diversity and languages as well (Phillipson, 2006, 2009; May, 2012: 206–225), such as the borrowing of a “field” which is missing from one’s own vocabulary, as the case study of a multilingual expression in the linguistic landscape of the city of Utrecht illustrates, diglossic effects

13. This position is defended in Rindler Schjerve and Vetter (2012) and Jørgensen, Rindler-Schjerve and Vetter (2012).

or, even worse, language loss, language death and ineffective special programmes for reversed language shift and revitalisation (García et al., 2006). The problem is, however, not the English language *per se*, but rather its hegemonistic aspirations.¹⁴ The pidginisation and creolisation of local languages did not start with the global expansion of English. Spanish had already affected the indigenous languages within its colonial empire much earlier in a similar way as English does today (Hamel, 2005; Mar-Molinero & Stewart, 2009; and Mignolo, 2012: 236–237).

The forces of globalisation are also affecting the language regime of the European Union. Even though equality of languages is officially declared in the Union, it has not led to the equality of languages in the European language constellation.¹⁵ Weber (2009) points out that language conflicts are being fought in the European Union due to the fact that the institutional language regime is tending towards English monolingualism, and regional and minority languages have not received full recognition. Weber is not convinced that these tensions will ease in the near future.

It is equally controversial to assume that, against the backdrop of globalisation, a liberal language policy will lead to new democratic forms. Rather, it is to be expected that new language hierarchies will emerge. In a representative study of everyday multilingualism in the Brussels-Capital Region (BCR), Janssens (2013: 146) observes that, in the context of superdiversity, three languages are used for communication, *i.e.*, Dutch, English and French, but that French functions as the *lingua franca* providing the basis for CSM-phenomena. The findings of Janssens (2013) are confirmed independently by the study of Maly et al., (2014: 81), which describes a superdiverse language situation in the municipality of Saint-Gillis in BCR with French as the *lingua franca*. The position that French has taken at the top of the BCR's language pyramid is jeopardising an inclusive and democratic society in a linguistically superdiverse context.

In sum, it is an illusion to think that, in the context of globalisation, a liberal language ideology will generate equality among languages. Institutions which are themselves the result of norms cannot do without normative language use and behaviour, and normative interventions in the life of languages. Hence, a multilingual

14. See, for further discussion, Grin (Chapter 11 in this volume).

15. All official languages of the Member States of the Union are official languages in the institutions of the Union. This is guaranteed by language regulation 1/1958. However, the institutions are allowed to choose their own language regime freely. The difference between official and working language is defined in Article 6 of the language regulation. Although language regulation 1/1958 is formally operative, the practical situation is developing towards dominance of English as the working language in the European Commission. This is practically used as a solution to the issue of “multilingual Europe” (see Phillipson 2013).

society will engage more linguistic justice not when all linguistic norms are dropped, as is proposed by the proponents of the languaging-framework, but rather when all heritage or established languages involved are recognised and when the relation in terms of power and dominance between these languages is regulated in a fair way.

Concluding remarks

This chapter supports the conclusion of Edwards (2012: 34–38), who argues that linguistic phenomena that the languaging-framework claims to cover are not really new. They are, in principle, variations on well-known and well-studied linguistic patterns, like CSM. There is no reason to treat ELF and the linguistic landscape discussed in this chapter differently from such linguistic patterns. Hence, these phenomena make clear that there is no reason to consider established languages with identifiable core features as non-existent and to consider a vague notion such as languaging as being responsible for code-switched and code-mixed variants. Rather, CSM is particularly common in everyday informal conversations between bilingual or multilingual speakers. However, it is ruled out in cases of sophisticated speech, and the freedom to switch tends to be more limited if the conversation is formal, if not all participants are well-known to each other, and especially, if not all of them are judged to be good at the languages involved (Backus 2012).

In addition, CSM tends to be frowned upon as a sign of the deterioration of a language, as a type of sloppy speech. When attitudes like this prevail, it will generally only be found in informal speech. Thus, CSM is, in fact, a mode of “incomplete multilingualism”, and the language variants to be used in this mode will necessarily deviate from the standard use of the languages involved. What is new – and this certainly has to do with the shape and intensity of globalisation processes – is the complexity of the CSM-phenomena and their seemingly unlimited combinatory potential against the backdrop of globalisation. In principle, all sorts of primarily grammatical and lexical elements of established languages can be used as a resource for mixing, switching and sampling in the processes of speech production and language use.

From this, it also follows that it is not realistic to hypothesise that non-normative language use, like CSM, will lead to more societal inclusion. These transnational communicative strategies have been misleadingly referred to as a concept for “inclusive multilingualism” in Backus et al., (2013). As soon as the communicative context tends to be more formal, CSM will achieve precisely the opposite of what inclusion and democracy promoting devices in multilingual communication intend to achieve, namely, exclusion.

The idea to reject established languages is making language policy, and linguistic diversity management, superfluous. However, linguistic engineering in the case of language policy and linguistic diversity management generate language hierarchies, in the case of the nationalist, multicultural and globalisation paradigms. We should observe that these language hierarchies are in conflict with linguistic justice, which claims to be satisfied by the languaging-approach, because language use in this framework follows the principle of “anything goes”. These language hierarchies due to the hegemonic status of global English and other *lingua francas* over national and other types of languages, and the domination of minority and migrant languages by institutionally-supported national languages are completely overlooked in the languaging-approach. The languages-approach is, however, able to neutralise language hierarchies as languages are part of supranational, national, and regional institutional frameworks. Hence, from the point of view of linguistic justice, the languages-approach should be preferred over the languaging-approach.

I agree with mainstream sociolinguistics that the research methods used in the field of what Blommaert and Rampton (2011) refer to as “linguistic ethnography” prove to be insightful tools to analyse complex linguistic environments at different layers of representation. Hence, there is always an ethnographic component to the so-called languaging-phenomena (Johnson, 2013: 148–151). In the intertwining of globalisation and localisation processes, structural aspects of languages in the sense of Chomsky’s formal grammar do, in fact, interact with socio-political processes, semantics and knowledge of the world that can be studied insightfully in terms of ethnography and anthropology (Johnson, 2013: 163–165). This is clearly demonstrated in the above case study of the linguistic landscape in the city of Utrecht underlining Blommaert’s claim that:

Ethnographically we will always see complex blending, mixing and reallocation processes. (Blommaert, 2010: 196)

It should be noted, however, that, in these complex blending, mixing, and re-allocation processes, creative processes of speech production and language use always appear as well. Individual, spontaneous, creative patterns of speech production and language use in the context of globalisation give us insight into the cognitive processing of grammatical and lexical knowledge. These phenomena have a bearing on the human cognitive capacities, and demonstrate, first and foremost, the immense creative capacity of the human mind. The principle of creativity has been central in a family of linguistic and cognitive frameworks that have originated from the work of Chomsky in formal grammar (Chomsky, 2008: 350–351). Hence, from the linguistic point of view, the study of CSM and other cases of spontaneous, creative speech production contribute to the study of cognitive sciences.

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PART III

Lingua Franca and global linguistic governance

On some fashionable terms in multilingualism research

Critical assessment and implications for language policy

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This chapter examines, in a critical way, four different notions encountered in certain strands of academic discourse about multilingualism, which have acquired an influential position in some segments of contemporary applied linguistics. The four notions reviewed here are “superdiversity”, “linguaging”, “commodification”, and “English as a lingua franca (ELF)”. The argument made in this chapter is that, while each of these concepts is problematic on its own, their combination gives rise to particularly problematic implications for language policy. The policy stances that can be derived from those notions are potentially harmful on allocative and distributive grounds, since they may undermine both linguistic diversity and linguistic justice. This chapter shows why they should be avoided, or at least substantially amended, in order to formulate policy responses aiming at the preservation of a genuine, sustainable and fair multilingualism. While the very use of these four notions raises questions regarding the evolution of applied linguistics, investigating them also matters to social scientists working on language issues, particularly language policy. The reason for this is that social scientists need to rely on sound analytical constructs in order to come to grips with the complexity of language and multilingualism as research objects, and as areas in which actual policies are selected, designed, implemented and evaluated.

1. Introduction

In this chapter, I discuss the implications of four notions that currently enjoy considerable popularity in some specialisations within the language disciplines. For the purposes of my argument, I shall characterise these specialisations as belonging

to “applied linguistics”.¹ It goes without saying, however, that “applied linguistics” refers to a wider range of sub-disciplines among the language disciplines, and that many scholars who characterise their activities as belonging to applied linguistics do not necessarily espouse the notions discussed in this chapter.

The notions in question are “superdiversity”, “linguaging”, “commodification” and “English as a lingua franca” (“ELF”), and the discussion proposed in the following pages reflects a certain degree of puzzlement, which is that of an academic researcher hailing from “the social sciences” (understood in a broad sense, and extending to economic theory, which is my main academic port of call), as distinct from “the humanities”, among which the language disciplines, including applied linguistics, may be acceptably categorised.

I have addressed the conditions of successful interdisciplinary collaboration in the study of linguistic diversity and its management on a number of occasions in earlier work (e.g., Grin, 1994, 1996, 2003a, 2005; Grin, Marácz, Pokorn & Kraus, 2014), emphasising the exciting possibilities opened up by such collaboration. This chapter, therefore, can be seen as pursuing earlier questions. This time, however, I do so with a degree of concern, because the notions that I will be discussing – and criticising – in these few pages are problematical on a number of counts.

I am certainly not alone in experiencing a sense of unease regarding the notions in question. They are not embraced by the entirety of the linguistics profession, even within its more applied orientations, such as sociolinguistics (as opposed to, say, neo-Saussurian structural linguistics). They are, in fact, derided by many respected linguists. Even some authors who are enthusiastic proponents of one or two of the notions criticised here are liable to ignore or dismiss the others. Nevertheless, what these four constructs have in common is that they are frequently referred to in discourse on language policy – or discourse that purports to address language policy issues. Hence, they influence some segments of research on language policy, and could be referred to when assessing actual policy options. They are, indisputably, part of the conversation to which this volume is intended to contribute, and my chief reason for engaging with these notions here is that they may do more harm than good, which is why a critical re-consideration is necessary.

Several of the shortcomings of these fashionable notions have been identified and exposed by various authors in recent years. However, criticism has usually focused on their scientific merit (or absence thereof) more than on their potential effects for language policy in theory and practice, or on the adverse consequences

1. An alternative might have been to assign them to “sociolinguistics”, but the latter field is often presented as part of the applied linguistics family, and the vast majority of scholars contributing to the specialisations in question have been trained in the language disciplines, rather than the social sciences.

that they can carry at two levels – multilingualism as such, and linguistic justice. One important, and hitherto barely addressed, aspect of the problem is that these detrimental effects are particularly harmful when they are fed by a conflation of the mistakes that each of these notions invites us to make.

This chapter is not intended as a complete or definitive de-construction, which would require a full-length book. A more comprehensive discussion would be needed in order to address properly the epistemological underpinnings of what is, with hindsight, a surprisingly misguided voyage into a (mainly) post-modern blind alley (on this more general problem, see Bouveresse, 1999). Rather, this chapter is intended as a call to pursue an interdisciplinary discussion, and as a stepping-stone for a more detailed, and, no doubt, necessary, critical examination of the policy implications of certain fashionable catchwords in contemporary applied linguistics.

2. Fads in applied linguistics as a policy risk

The notions that I wish to discuss here, with an increasing degree of concern, are “superdiversity”, “languaging”, “commodification”, and English as a “*lingua franca*”. These terms are frequently encountered in scientific publications and have been the object of sustained intellectual work by noted scholars in recent years. Using some of these terms appears to have been almost *de rigueur* in large segments of applied linguistics since the early 2010s (among numerous examples, see, e.g., Jørgensen et al., 2011; Davis, 2014; Lee, 2014).

Despite their current vogue, there are reasons for considering such terms as problematical on several counts, and the first goal of this chapter is to assess them critically as such. Others have already expressed serious doubts about them, in particular Williams (2010), Edwards (2012), May (2012), Phillipson (2012), Mackenzie (2014), Kubota (2014), O’Regan (2014), Pavlenko (2016), MacSwan (2017), and Block (2017), to name but a few.

However, such criticism tends to be directed at the above notions one or two at a time, whereas there are reasons for considering them jointly, since together, they may well contribute to a dynamics of injustice and domination. Criticism has also been mainly geared to the analytical shortcomings of these notions, rather than the potentially adverse implications of using them in language policy selection, design, implementation and evaluation. Some of these adverse implications have been pointed out by others, for example, Phillipson & Skutnabb-Kangas (2013), Piller & Cho (2013), May (2014), and Wiley (2014), but the commonalities between the terms in question still need to be examined. This need has been signalled, usually in passing, in some of my own work, both alone or with others, (e.g., Grin, 2010;

Grin, Sfreddo & Vaillancourt, 2010; Grin & Gazzola, 2013), but the problem in question requires more targeted scrutiny, and this is what this chapter sets out to do.

As part of this examination, we shall explore an additional concern, namely, the fact that the potentially deleterious effects of each of these notions is reinforced by their very convergence, unintentional as the latter may be. Indeed, what makes this conjunction particularly intriguing is that the notions in question tend to be used by scholars from distinct, sometimes even competing, schools of thought in applied linguistics. Let it be clear, therefore, that this chapter does not suggest, let alone argue, that some kind of conspiracy is afoot. What matters is that the advocacy or use of the notions to be discussed here may result in unfortunate recommendations which, if they were acted upon, would have unexpected and undesirable effects on the allocation and distribution of material and symbolic resources in a globalising world. A particularly worrisome implication is that macro-level politics, as well as geopolitical issues tied with language, are simply ignored. This risks undermining, probably unintentionally, the efforts made through public policies, in particular language policies, to ensure a more efficient and fair allocation and distribution of these resources.

The negative effects that I have just mentioned fall, indeed, into the two foundational categories of policy analysis: some belong to its allocative side (“efficiency”), some to its distributive side (“fairness”). This reference to policy is crucial, not only because it provides the analytical backdrop of my argument, but also because it can serve to clarify the ideological perspective that informs my stance in this chapter. Since the focus of the latter is not on language policy selection, design and evaluation as such (presented, e.g., in Gazzola, 2014; Gazzola & Grin, 2017), it is best to explain these two key notions right away and then to move on to the core of my argument.

Resource *allocation*, in the most general sense, refers to the use of material *and* symbolic resources. These resources can be used more or less efficiently in the production of material *and* symbolic commodities. “Commodities” extend well beyond market goods and services, and cover the full range of human activities, also including, therefore, the realisation of the non-market (non-material, non-financial) aims that individuals and groups may pursue. Resource allocation can be assessed at a very macro level (society as a whole), at a very micro level (the individual), or at the meso level of an organisation (a household, a firm, a non-profit association, *etc.*). In the context of language policy selection, design, implementation and evaluation, the macro level is particularly relevant, because language policy, as a political and legal intervention, normally applies to a jurisdiction. Nevertheless, whatever assessment is made at the macro level cannot be divorced from the assessment of the related micro-level processes, because the aggregate (society), though not equal to the mere *sum* of its components (individuals, households, small groups), still

represents the *consolidation* of its components.² In a language policy context, the use of material and symbolic resources may give rise to more or less diverse linguistic environments, and some are more “efficient” than others, in the sense that they generate more aggregate welfare, as measured with respect to the goals, interests and preferences of the unit of analysis considered. My ideological position in this respect should be clear: I consider, on grounds of *efficiency* which may encompass the non-market elements of human experience (Grin, 2003a), a multilingual, multipolar world to be generally preferable to (that is to say, more efficient than) a uniform, unipolar world.³

Resource *distribution* refers to the way in which material and symbolic resources are spread throughout the population as a result of a certain resource allocation. Any social, political and economic arrangement (independently of whether it is the product of an explicit policy or not) results in a certain distribution of resources both among individuals and among groups. In a language policy context, distribution primarily refers to the advantages enjoyed (or the disadvantages suffered) by people in relation to their linguistic attributes. For example, various languages may enjoy a relatively equal status, implying that a person’s linguistic repertoire (by which I mean his or her first language and the range of the second or other languages that he or she may know) containing these languages entails neither undue privilege nor unfair treatment. Whether a particular arrangement is considered fair or unfair depends on the ideological views that prevail in society at a given time. Policy analysis stops short of labelling any particular state of affairs as fair or unfair, leaving this judgement to normative political theory and to political debate. It focuses instead on the identification of winners and losers, and on the measurement of how much the winners win, and how much the losers lose. This does not mean that the work of the policy analyst is devoid of normative implications, but that essential questions such as “standing” (which concerns *whose* gains and losses are taken into account), as well as the nature of the effects which are considered relevant, are questions that policy analysts generally do not presume to solve on their own. Nonetheless, the information that they can deliver to citizens allows for a better-informed debate, be it in academic circles or in the political arena. However, any observer also has his or her own ideological views, and here again, my ideological position must be clear: I consider, on grounds of

2. On the issue of aggregation in language policy assessment, see, e.g., Dalmazzone (1988) or Grin (2003a).

3. It does not follow that more multilingualism is, always and everywhere, better than less multilingualism (Grin, 2003b; Page, 2011), but that, all other things being equal, linguistic diversity is allocatively preferable to uniformity, and that this rank-ordering extends to many comparisons between “more” or “less” diversity.

fairness, that a multilingual, multipolar world is preferable to (that is to say, is one which ensures more social justice than) a uniform, unipolar world.

Therefore, be it on grounds of efficiency or fairness (examined at closer range in Grin, Sfreddo & Vaillancourt 2010, Gazzola & Grin 2013, Grin 2015), I am in favour of societal multilingualism, which tends to be dynamically correlated with a high occurrence of individual multilingualism.⁴ Many of the authors whose work I discuss in this chapter profess to share the same view (which is also widespread in the social sciences),⁵ but the notions of “superdiversity”, “linguaging”, “commodification”, and – in a specific sense – “*lingua franca*”, turn out to be dangerous for multilingualism and for social justice. This may be seen as a bit of a paradox, considering that these notions are usually advocated with many protestations of uncompromising social conscience.

I shall not question the political motives that underpin the notions criticised in this chapter. In fact, we can certainly credit the scholars who use them with well-intentioned motives. The fact remains, however, that the use of these notions ends up serving some specific interests, rather than others, often in an unexpected way, and while this may not clearly come to the fore in the context of purely academic speculation – a perfectly legitimate pursuit in which no holds should be barred – it does in the context of real-world language policy. Language policy confronts us with challenges that we can only deal with if we are equipped with the relevant notions and instruments. In many ways, practical language policy provides a form of validity check for these notions, not at the level of their intellectual value *in abstracto*, but at the level of their observable or potential effects in practice. In short, what this chapter questions is not so much the notions of “superdiversity”, “commodification”, “linguaging” and “*lingua franca*” *per se* (in the sense of academic constructs that can emerge from scientific conjecture), but some of the implications that these notions carry with them if applied to the selection, design, implementation and evaluation of language policies.

4. “Dynamic” should be understood as referring to the specific sense that this adjective carries in formal modelling, that is, to the interlocking of events between successive time periods. For example, the spread of *individual plurilingualism* at time t affects *societal multilingualism* at time $t + 1$, which in turns influences the extent of individual plurilingualism in $t + 2$.

5. It is not unanimous, however. For example, Archibugi (2005: 549) sees linguistic diversity as an “obstacle to equality and participation”; Morgan (2005) sees little advantage in multilingualism relative to linguistic convergence towards English; Van Parijs (2011) suggests that linguistic diversity is an overrated value.

3. About “superdiversity”

Let me start with “superdiversity”, which is perhaps the most innocuous of the terms that I wish to discuss here. The notion of “superdiversity” has already been eloquently de-constructed by Pavlenko (2016), to which the reader is referred, since many of the essential points that needed to be made about “superdiversity” can be found there; accordingly, this section is kept short.⁶

Questioning “superdiversity” might seem odd, considering how widely it is used in the recent literature, and, in certain ways, I have no major query with it. More precisely, this chapter does not dispute, from a *positive* standpoint, the generally increasing occurrence of linguistic diversity in western or westernised societies (despite recent examples of ethnic *unmixing*), or, sing, from a *normative* standpoint, the praises of uniformity. Quite the opposite, it is a deep concern for diversity that motivates the questions raised in this chapter.

The term “superdiversity” is generally attributed to Steven Vertovec, who used it in a paper published in the journal *Ethnic and Racial Studies* (Vertovec, 2007). This term is intended to “underline a level and kind of complexity surpassing anything previously experienced in a particular society” (p. 3). But the issue here is not so much the coinage of this term in the context of Vertovec’s analysis, as the subsequent overuse of the term by other authors. We are told that “superdiversity” is “characterised by a tremendous increase in the categories of *migrants*, not only in terms of nationality, ethnicity, language and religion, but also in terms of motives, patterns and itineraries of migration, processes of insertion into the labour and housing markets of the host societies, and so on” (Blommaert & Rampton, 2011: 1; my italics). Indeed, just as these two authors suggest, the term “superdiversity”, rather than being formally defined, is usually *characterised* – and it is characterised as highlighting features such as the more multi-faceted nature, the greater occurrence and extent, and the more varied experience of the ethnic, linguistic and cultural diversity encountered by social actors in contemporary societies. However, what is not obvious is the fact that the coining of this new term was necessary. After all, the phenomenon itself has already been described, from a postcolonial linguistics perspective, by Kubchandani (1994); the American historian David Hollinger had already, more than twenty years ago, noted the “diversification of diversity” in North American society (Hollinger, 1995). What is clear is that in *urban societies* (particularly, *western* urban societies) ethnic, linguistic and cultural diversity tends

6. In addition, Pavlenko’s enlightening contribution investigates a question not addressed here, namely, the conditions of the dissemination of this term in the dominant academic discourse in applied linguistics.

to be manifested in more diverse and more complex ways nowadays than was usually the case a few decades ago.

To account for this, we can also use the notions of “deep” and “complex” diversity, which may sound less attractive or adventurous than “superdiversity”, but which do at least offer the advantage of avoiding the risk of reification which is in evidence in the very term “superdiversity”. I use “deep diversity” in a sense which is compatible with, but nonetheless slightly different from, Taylor’s (1993), in order to refer to the co-presence, in a society, of a wide range of languages and associated cultural expressions, across the many sources and expressions of this diversity, also carrying the three features characterising “superdiversity” just listed. However, the adjective “deep” is there to emphasise the need to consider several *levels* jointly in the study of the diversity, seen as a *process*, rather than a state of affairs (Grin & Rossiaud, 1999). This emphasis on the interplay between various levels of experience (the individual, the small groups to which he or she belongs, as well as the larger ones) is itself anchored in the theory of social movements in globalisation, in which *subjectivation*, the process through which individuals come to view themselves as the legitimate, autonomous agents of their personal lives and social participation, plays a crucial role (Rossiaud, 2013). At the same time, it harks back to the well-known problem of scale, just as geographers combine different scales of observation (Grin, Maráz, Pokorn & Kraus, 2014). The closely related and wholly compatible concept of “complex” diversity, which emphasises the issue of scale a little less, and the structuring features of diversity a little more, is “meant to come to grips with a constellation in which cultural identities and social cleavages overlap and intertwine in manifold ways [...] [pointing to] a social and political context in which diversity has become a multidimensional and fluid phenomenon” (Kraus, 2012: 13).

On balance, it is not clear what is gained by referring to “superdiversity”. John Edwards (2012: 34) makes no bones about calling it “obviously unnecessary”. “Unnecessary” does not inevitably mean harmful. But what ought to make us suspicious of the term is the unquestioning, almost devotional, way in which it seems to be used by many (Pavlenko, 2016). This, in itself, suggests that the risk implicit in such a term, namely, that of reification, has already materialised in the very writing of those who are quick to denounce it, and this is usually not a good thing for sound scientific analysis, which needs to operate with clearly defined and testable concepts.

4. About “languaging”

Let me turn to another, and – in my opinion – more serious matter, namely, the notion of “languaging” (sometimes “translanguaging”). Some of the literature puts these terms forward in order to characterise the patterns of language use in which multilinguals combine their skills in various languages, transcending the (supposedly artificial or “invented”) barriers between them.

I shall mostly leave aside the question of whether the term “languaging” serves a real need to describe something that could not be described without it. John Edwards tells us that it is an example of “jargon and neologism to no useful purpose” (2012: 37–38), and of “pretentiousness and barren verbiage” (*ibid.*). We can agree that, as a general rule, jargon is best avoided, but it is not, *per se*, a major problem.

What is more worrisome is the concomitant claim that “named” languages are irrelevant and artificial constructs. I strongly suspect that this claim rests on a logically flawed inference, which, moreover, does not stand the test of empirical examination (MacSwan, 2017). The claim seems to be that, *since* the users of human languages operating in multilingual settings draw on an internal linguistic repertoire, a sort of continuum in which “named” languages blend into each other, *then* it follows that these “named” languages are irrelevant constructs.⁷ To a certain extent, I find this claim, though not true, to be heuristically interesting, in that it helps us to question the categories through which we think about the world (Pennycook, 2006; Makoni & Pennycook, 2007).

However, let us first observe that the premise remains, to a significant extent, a conjectural one, as illustrated in much of the recent work in applied linguistics (e.g., Creese & Blackledge, 2010): this claim is merely one possible interpretation of the observations of interaction in multilingual settings. While plausible in some cases, it is not necessarily the most plausible one across the board. The notion of a “linguistic repertoire”, from which, or out of which, we are supposed to be “languaging”, makes sense as a conceptual device for developing a more flexible, perhaps a more plastic,

7. This claim is to be distinguished from the correct observation that the boundaries between languages are socio-historically determined. For example, the notion that languages *in general* are, in a sense, “invented”, had also been discussed by Heugh (2003) in her analysis of the historical backdrop of South Africa’s language policy, noting that “[...] missionaries, as early as 1906, acknowledged that they had made serious errors in the description of African languages (*viz.* that there was significant overlap amongst languages which they had described as separate or different from one another). [...] From 1928 language committees began various renewed attempts to eliminate or reduce the discrepancies and ‘artificial boundaries’ between languages”. On the emergence and demarcation of European languages, see Hüning, Vogl and Moliner (2012).

understanding of language *in communication*. However, the notion of “linguaging” itself does not necessarily follow, and the latter might well be another example of reification – of bestowing, through the coinage of a signifier, the seal of existence on an artificially contrived notion, and one for which, at this point, neurolinguists and psycholinguists appear to have found little or no evidence. Thanks to recent progress in neuro-imaging, the notion that the use of different languages activates different (in the sense of language-specific) parts of the brain has been abandoned. However, recent findings show that the very fact of using different languages mobilises different areas of the brain and reflects the need, for bilingual language users switching between languages, to *inhibit* one language in order to speak the other (Abutelebi et al., 2008); different areas are activated not because some parts of the brain are allocated to different languages, but because bilinguals use some areas of the brain (and expend energy) to keep languages *separate*. This has been observed in combinations involving mother tongue and/or additional languages – concepts which I return to later.

Clearly, we all have a linguistic repertoire in which many languages are present and can be activated in various ways and to various degrees during interaction. And in this sense, I share the conviction that visions of language as separate, discrete silo-like elements of experience or competence are not adequate, and are becoming less so in hybrid multilingual contexts, *particularly* those found among *urban migrant populations*. But again, it simply does not logically follow that there is such a thing as “linguaging”. Certainly, we can all make the rather banal observation that we can draw on the full range of our linguistic skills, and that, when we speak and write, we can, and often do, combine the languages in our repertoires in flexible and creative ways in order to achieve certain communicational goals (Cummins, 2000). Contiguity, continuity, blending, and hybridity are all well-known processes. They are solidly documented in dialectology as well as in the study of *intercomprehension* (Conti & Grin, 2008) or receptive competence (ten Thije & Zeevaart, 2007). But, again, it does not follow that “linguaging” is a relevant notion – it might at best be a re-labelling of the modes of language use in “exolingual” settings that have been observed for decades. It follows even less that “named” languages are irrelevant and do not exist, as some scholars have recently claimed (see, again, Blommaert & Rampton, 2011: 1). In fact, this claim implies that any form of distinction between language and speech is invalid – a proposition that would need to be demonstrated, or at least explicitly identified. Since no such demonstration is offered and since the “linguagist” argument treats this absence of distinction as an axiom, the argument itself is circular, even tautological.

Nobody denies that languages are the product of human agency and develop historically, and nobody claims that they are watertight compartments:

[l]anguages and the identities with which they are associated are, of course, social constructions: ‘inventions’ if you like. Language and language varieties, both across people and communities, as well as within individual linguistic repertoires, lack sharp boundaries: of course they do. But again, this is nothing new.

(Edwards, 2012: 36)

Even scholars in translation studies, who are typically most attentive to the differences between languages, also tend to be the most aware of the *connections* between them, not only in morphology and syntax, but also in pragmatics and the associated cultural anchoring. Nor would anyone deny that bilingualism is not the mere addition of two monolingualisms (Grosjean, 2010). But all these observations do not come in contradiction with the plain fact that, in everyday experience, it still makes sense to refer to languages as “Spanish”, “English”, “Efik” or “Malayalam”.⁸ The hybridity of practices and backgrounds, the complexity of linguistic repertoires, and the manifold ways in which these repertoires are used, do not carry the consequence that languages do not exist or that named languages are irrelevant.

In the same vein, one fails to see the compelling theoretical or empirical reasons why concepts such as “‘native speaker’ and ‘mother tongue’ [...] should be done away with [or] have no place in the sociolinguistic toolkit” (Blommaert & Rampton, 2011: 5), because such a claim is consistently contradicted by hard evidence from survey results.⁹ Most human beings have no difficulty at all identifying one, sometimes two, or occasionally more mother tongues.

The fact that some people can have more than one mother tongue has been recognised in the literature for a long time, and complex patterns of individual multilingualism have been described by many, including Pattanayak (1988). Although globalisation may be dampening such contrasts, individual multilingualism is

8. If we believed in this extreme form of “linguaging”, it would follow that, right now, I am not *really* using English when writing this chapter, or that when I interact with others in my usual francophone surroundings, talking to family and friends, I am not *actually* using French.

9. Consider, for example, a database of almost 49,000 respondents, which brings together almost the entirety of young Swiss men from two consecutive yearly cohorts (for more details on this database, see Grin et al., 2015). The respondents, asked about their mother tongue, are *explicitly* told that they may not feel comfortable identifying one mother tongue alone, which flags the possibility of distancing oneself from the notion, and the choice is offered to mention more than one mother tongue. Even in Switzerland, whose resident population *and* citizen population are characterised by a high degree of international mobility with considerable immigration and the occurrence of “interlinguistic” marriage, the percentage of respondents who indicate *one and only one* mother tongue always exceeds 96%; in all such surveys where respondents are pointedly invited not to take the notion of mother tongue for granted, less than 1% of respondents decline to indicate one (occasionally two) mother tongues.

traditionally more frequent in certain parts of the world, where it is nothing new. For example, a volume edited by Singh (1998) almost thirty years ago tells us about high-level professionals from India, West Africa or Sri Lanka, who are completely fluent in English *and* in at least one or more languages, often non-European ones. There is no doubt that the semantic content of “mother tongue” needs to be clarified and contextualised, and it is often more comfortable to use the notion of “first” or “main” language. This exercise in clarification and contextualisation must build on a person’s linguistic biography (a convenient definition of mother tongue, to all intents and purposes, being the first language acquired *and* still understood – as in the Canadian census question), skills (the mother tongue often being the language a person knows best, in which he or she feels most secure, and in which he or she is *recognised* by others as a “native speaker”), or sense of identity (the statistically most common pattern being one in which the mother tongue is the language most closely associated with a person’s identity).

To my knowledge, there is no database designed to test systematically, for a representative and large-scale sample, the degree of coincidence between these three dimensions. However, overwhelming circumstantial evidence indicates that, for a large proportion of speakers, probably the vast majority, they do coincide, and that from an *emic* perspective in which some linguists seem oddly uninterested, the existence of distinct, named languages is a plain fact. The burden of proof, then, is definitely on those who would claim otherwise. This coincidence is, of course, not true for everyone. Some people have particularly complex histories and rich repertoires, such as the late Stephen Wurm, a famous Australia-based linguist and polyglot, who claimed to have about ten mother tongues out the several dozen languages in which he was said to be fluent. Some people growing up in homes where parents have different mother tongues themselves, and who are schooled through the medium of another language, may find it difficult to pinpoint one language and call it “mother tongue”. But all this in no way justifies the inference, conceptually or empirically, that the very notion of a language learned first during childhood, mastered better than other languages, and with which a person has a particularly close and long-term association, is always and everywhere irrelevant.

To sum up, what is striking about the notion of “*linguaging*” is the disconcerting weakness of both its theoretical and empirical basis.¹⁰ It is difficult to see why we

10. The “*linguaging*” literature is replete with hasty generalisations. For example, Phillipson and Skutnabb-Kangas (2013), reviewing the 2012 *Routledge Handbook of Multilingualism* find in it the claim (p. 237) that “heterogeneity of languages [is] found in most classrooms in the twenty-first century”. This is a careless generalisation from classrooms which one can indeed observe in some neighbourhoods of major western European or north American cities, but it does not apply to vast tracts of China, India, Argentina or Brazil (let us also warn against a frequent confusion, and

need it at all, not to mention what inspires it, beyond idiosyncratic interpretations of piecemeal, non-representative observations. *Perhaps* it has some heuristic value, which is good, but otherwise it is difficult to find any need for the term. Perhaps much of what “*linguaging*” is about ultimately boils down to the utterly banal observation that we all have our own set of *idiolects*.

A word could be said in passing of the notion of “*translanguaging*”, whose analytical robustness is also open to debate, but which is often used to refer to classroom practices that at least offer some interesting pedagogical implications. At a very general level, persons learning an additional language can certainly benefit from pedagogical approaches that are not fixated on the notion of sharply separate languages (MacSwan, 2017) and emphasise a fluid circulation between the languages present in a learner’s repertoire or linguistic environment. This applies irrespective of whether their linguistic repertoire already contains a greater or smaller range of skills, and whether, within that range, they feel that they can identify parts of it that they are comfortable calling their “*mother tongue*”. Plural approaches can encourage the learners of another language to make use of the language(s) that they already know. But this is not particularly novel. It is, in fact, well-known, and it is at the very heart of the concept of *intercompréhension* and the pedagogical approaches that it has inspired (Meissner, 2008). It does not follow, however, that the translanguaging practices observed in a given case should be turned into a “*referential*” for language learning, first because it would be irrelevant, considering the intrinsic changeability and instability of such practices, second because it would be sociolinguistically irresponsible, considering that, in the real world, actors are generally required to demonstrate competence in “*named*” languages.

The reason why the foregoing considerations matter is that the denial of the reality of languages, far from being a bold progressive gesture, may turn out to be a regressive and objectively imperialistic move. We should assume that this is not the intention, but the deleterious effects are worrisome. This (somewhat paradoxical) outcome is also denounced by Phillipson (2010), May (2012), Kubota (2014) and myself (Grin, *in press a*). It has to do with the simple fact that the speakers of dominated or “*minorised*” languages need their language (or languages) to be identifiable and identified; they need their language or languages to be recognisable, so that they, in turn, can be recognised. Instead, the advocates of “*linguaging*”, by denying

point out that urbanisation *per se* does not necessarily entail more diversity). It does not even apply, at the other end of the scale, to tiny Switzerland with its nearly 25 per cent foreign population (the highest percentage in Europe after Luxembourg), as soon as one moves away from urban centres. Thus, the adjective “*most*” is seriously misleading. There is a clear, and, arguably, Eurocentric tendency, in this literature, to generalise from urban migrant settings as though they were the statistical norm (this drift is also pointed out by Pavlenko, 2016).

the validity of the very concept of language, are literally pulling the rug from under their feet. Very practically, language is a key category in much of human rights law; denying the existence of languages blocks the access of minoritised groups to it. But more fundamentally, if languages in general do not *really* exist, if they are misleading constructs, this is true of small languages as well. Why, then, fight for them? It would be absurd. Better then to drift along with the flow of globalisation; better meekly to accept and adopt a dominant language – and linguistic diversity is no longer an issue. May observes that, in the mind of the scholars whom he describes as “cosmopolists”, “the ongoing use of ‘local languages’, via language rights or the broader politics of multiculturalism, simply entrenches social, cultural, and political isolationism, as well as socioeconomic disadvantage” (May 2014: 16). English is then presented as the neutral, default language; it is portrayed (usually implicitly) as being magically exempt from any association with particular interests. This is why the advocates of the notion of “linguaging”, particularly when they go one step further and deny the existence of languages, are not just making scientifically spurious claims. They are also, willingly or not, the objective allies of linguistic imperialism and linguistic injustice. All this, of course, is dangerous for genuine multilingualism, because multilingualism, by definition, requires that there be a plurality of languages.

But, as we shall see, threats to multilingualism are further complicated by the advent of another strand of discourse.

5. About “commodification”

At this juncture, we may observe an odd convergence between some segments of applied linguistics, on the one hand, and some voices in neo-Bourdieuian critical sociolinguistics, on the other. There is something surprising about this convergence, since scholars in the latter group often express sharp disagreement with the “linguaging” literature, viewed as being naïvely blind to language-related conflict, and, in particular, to the fact that language is instrumental in the reproduction of socioeconomic inequality. Nonetheless, this occasional, but fundamental, disagreement does not hinder analogous conclusions.

Authors who denounce “commodification” (e.g. Heller, 2003; Heller & Duchêne, 2012) take issue with a process that they detect in matters of language use and language policy. This process may be defined as “the treatment as potentially tradable ‘commodities’ of various goods, services, other non-material entities and even people that were hitherto *not* viewed as such” (Grin, in press b). The notion of commodification has a distinguished intellectual history, but its relevance in the

study of language policy seems rather narrow.¹¹ It has limited relevance in terms of economic analysis, but it can be useful in the diagnosis of some language problems, by appropriately pinpointing certain processes that can be observed in the sphere of multilingualism. More specifically, unequal power positions between different language communities can have consequences for the treatment and use of different languages in various contexts, including work-related ones.

A classic example is that of employees at call centres based in low-income countries and operating in an international language such as English or French for a clientele based in North America or Western Europe. The fluency of the employees in English or French can be seen as a labour market asset, since possessing such skills is a condition for being hired – thus, language is “commodified” (as can, incidentally, any skill that helps one get a job, which suggests that, at a certain level at least, denouncing commodification comes close to belabouring the obvious). However, employees at such call centres are often required by the management to erase almost any trace of accent that might be considered as non-standard by the clients. For example, an employee in Bangalore may be required to adopt, in telephone interaction with customers, phonological traits closer to received pronunciation (RP) (in English), thereby disguising his or her usual or normal way of using or speaking English. In such cases, the generic process of commodification is compounded by (un)chosen self-denial and erasure. There is no doubt that commodification can, in such cases, be enmeshed with significant symbolic violence, and that these twin processes are abetted by a certain economic and political order. To sum up, the notion of commodification, particularly when the latter is studied in connection with forms of symbolic or even material violence, can be useful in keeping us alert to the links between language and power. To put it differently, it can serve to remind us that the harmful effects of the fundamental connections between (the control of) language, on the one hand, and power, on the other, do not vanish just because the legitimacy, in the public space, of a broader range of languages is

11. An issue that this chapter will leave aside is that of the intrinsic relevance of the notion of “commodification” as an offshoot of Marxian economic theory (as distinct from “Marxist” ideology), as well as the complex distinction, in the context of language processes, between commodification and reification (as developed by Marx and, later, by Horkheimer). Let me simply observe that it is quite possible to recognise the existence of processes of reification in economic activity and to be critical of them (in particular, of the subject-object confusion it entails), without endorsing the idea that commodification (even if averred) carries politically comparable implications. The difference proceeds from the autonomy of demand, a point that Marxian economics has largely neglected, which contributes to explaining why it only plays a marginal role in contemporary economics. (Blaug, 1997). For a detailed critique of “language commodification”, see Block (2017).

recognised; even paeans to multilingualism may end up enshrining new forms of language-based inequality.

This critique is valid, but it turns out to be a rather myopic response to a justified question. This is because the “critical sociolinguistics” argument is also articulated in terms of a critique of named languages, particularly the official languages used by the state apparatus. These are promptly dismissed as mere instruments of oppression used by the state, which is assumed to be in the hands of an elite and thus bent on reproducing socioeconomic inequality. But just as in the writings of the “cosmopolists” denounced by May, a logical leap is often made, in the critical sociolinguistics literature that denounces commodification, to the conclusion that any form of officially developed defence of a “named” language must be inspired by the self-interested designs of a local or national ruling class which has appropriated the state and which manipulates language to its advantage, usually through the definition of acceptable variants and modes of use of the language in question. This profoundly *un-emic* perspective simply ignores, with post-modern abandon, empirical findings about the meaning that people assign to language, particularly to what they experience as *their* language (May, 2012), particularly in diachronic perspective (Debray, 2017). It also comes perilously close to assuming (though it is never clearly stated) that non-elite members supporting minority language protection and promotion must be poor dupes, victims of false consciousness. “Commodification”, in this context, is seen as part and parcel of a strategy that necessarily panders to narrow class interests, a strategy which is all the more evil because what is commodified needs to be identified, and a language must therefore be named – a sin immediately labelled as “reification”.

This line of writing comes in another variant, in which the defence of a local or particular language is quickly suspected of crass nationalism. But what, then, is *non* nationalism? The weakness of the argument resides in the implicit choice of the counterfactual. Are there no interests at stake at all in the promotion of a dominant language, perhaps English? This question is left conveniently in the dark, but the implication is that the dominant language of globalisation magically becomes a *neutral* default language (e.g., Motschenbacher, 2013), a point that is rightly criticised as deeply unrealistic in the literature (Phillipson, 2003 and *this volume*; Ricento, 2012 and *this volume*; Barbier, *this volume*). The only way, then, not to be branded as a nationalist is to submit to the continuing spread of English or a variant of it.

This is a clear case of erasure in which the critical sociolinguistics discourse may end up in uncomfortable epistemological company, because reifying the largely imaginary notion of “languaging” amounts to erasing the power relationships that entrench the dominant role of English. Both the “languaging” and “critical sociolinguistics” lines of discourse naturalise the hegemony of a dominant language and de-legitimise the struggle of oppressed groups, which can be dismissed as

intrinsically backwards, essentialist, and nationalistic. Along the way, the whole strand of research (and language activism) subsumed under the label of *linguistic human rights* (Skutnabb-Kangas & Phillipson 1994, 2016) is ignored, although this is precisely where the oppressed can find the analytical tools that they need to fight oppression, and we end up with the absurd situation in which small groups fighting for the survival of their language and culture in the face of linguistic imperialism may be branded as nationalistic.

The critical sociolinguistic denunciation of so-called “commodification” can end up being equally preposterous. Apart from stretching a concept well beyond analytically reasonable use, the accusation of “commodification” is judgemental and patronising. This is because, if the speakers of a small, threatened language decide, democratically and of their own accord, to use not only rights-based arguments, but also market-related arguments, and, to the extent possible, to harness market forces for the purposes of *reversing language shift* and contributing to the re-assertion of a sense of collective dignity, they ought, if anything, to be supported. It is hard to make out what legitimacy the critical scholars have to criticise them. Moreover, even if “commodification” (in the negative sense assigned to it by its critics) does occur, it simply does not follow that a discourse of commodification replaces or displaces other discourses that support linguistic diversity in general or the individual elements that make up that diversity. The discourse of rights can perfectly well converge with it, as shown by analyses rooted in sociolinguistics (e.g., Fishman, 1991; Gal, 2012; May, 2012; Flores Farfán & Ramallo, 2013) or language policy evaluation across contexts (e.g., Grin & Vaillancourt, 1999; Kymlicka & Grin, 2003; Gazzola & Grin, 2013).

6. About English as a Lingua Franca (ELF)

Let us now turn to a fourth problematic construct, namely, “English as a *lingua franca*”, which one could be tempted to write with hyphens, “English-as-a-lingua-franca”, in order to underscore how different it is from the notion of “*lingua franca* English”.¹²

12. The expression “lingua franca English” refers to the use of English in international communication, but without conjuring up the idea of something intrinsically *different* from English – as the “English as a lingua franca” approach does. In this sense, “Lingua franca English” is equivalent, though programmatically more loaded, to the notion of “global” English as critically assessed by Phillipson (2017 and *this volume*). In this chapter, I do not discuss “lingua franca English” or “global English”, having done so elsewhere (e.g., Grin, 2015).

Before we proceed, let me point out that the issue here is not the English language at all. The issue is linguistic hegemony and the associated linguistic injustice. A similar problem would arise if the internationally dominant language were Mongolian, Wolof or Spanish. It just so happens that it is English that is currently in this dominant position, as a result not of some kind of “natural” phenomena, but of geopolitical processes that are, by definition, inseparable from issues of power. We should not naturalise named languages, but even less should we naturalise linguistic hegemony.

But, of course, the temptation to do so is great. If one is undisturbed by the notion that a particular language (at this point, English) is somehow destined to become *the* international language, one may assume or hope that its ties with its primary roots (*i.e.*, traditionally English-speaking countries) will progressively loosen, to the point where English is no longer associated with those countries. Insistence on the intrinsically constraining nature of all languages sometimes appears with an implicit exemption of English from this limitation, leading to the endorsement of three beliefs: first, that English (if used “as a *lingua franca*”) is a mere tool for communication, and not the carrier of any particular values (other than, perhaps, values of sunny internationality); in other words, English is neutral while no other language is; second, that English is *per se* liberating, whereas all other languages can be, or perhaps should be suspected of being nationalistic prisons; third, that English is not the carrier of any class interests – whereas all other languages, down to the smallest minority language, are liable to be the vessels of a nationalistic or xenophobic agenda.

These beliefs have been analysed in the literature, and their naïveté or their fraudulent character have been exposed by others from a variety of angles. I have already mentioned the work of Phillipson and May, and could also refer to the eloquent de-construction by O’Regan (2014) here. We might also think, for another perspective, about the writings of Anna Wierzbicka (e.g., 2014), who suggests one possible avenue into the psycholinguistic exploration of the non-neutrality of languages. All this is known, and, instead of belabouring these points, I would like to emphasise another one, which has to do with the policy implications of *English as a lingua franca*, or “ELF” for short.

The “ELF” approach is represented by a number of authors (House, 2003; Cogo & Jenkins, 2010; Hülmbauer & Seidlhofer, 2013; Motschenbacher, 2013; *etc.*), and their respective constructions of the notion of ELF are not totally identical. However, the gist of the argument shared by these authors goes as follows: the English spoken among non-natives is not *really* English, it is something ontologically different, and this changes everything.

I have elsewhere (e.g., Grin, 2011; Gazzola & Grin, 2013) pointed out that the definition of ELF is hopelessly befuddled and self-contradictory. Sometimes, it is a

language, sometimes it is not. Sometimes, it is a variety of English, which is why ELF scholars actively seek regularities in ELF in order to describe what characterises this variety, but sometimes, no, it is absolutely *not* a variety of English. Sometimes, it is neither a language of its own (although a noted proponent, such as Juliane House, says that it is like one and should be taught as a foreign language), nor a variety of English, but a type of interactional situation. Sometimes, rather than an interactional situation, it is more of a mind-set that people adopt when they are in certain types of interactional situations. But two key issues remain ever undefined, and the questions they raise are unsolved: the level of competence in English that users of ELF are assumed to have or not to have, and the features of “ELF” interactions according to whether they do or do not involve native speakers.

Let us leave aside other, more peripheral problems, such as the fact that, in this case, the term “lingua franca” is a misnomer – a point explained in detail by Sabine Fiedler (2011), because a real *lingua franca* is one that draws – in a relatively balanced way – on the various linguistic repertoires of the different speakers; a *lingua franca* is not the language of *some* interlocutors imposed on all the others. But, after all, there is no doubt that English is currently the language most commonly used in communication between people with different linguistic backgrounds, particularly when the range of backgrounds present is broad. The main problem lies elsewhere – namely, with the claim that ELF is radically distinct from “English” (some people, following the French journalist Jacques Nerrière, have called it “globish”), and they insist that it is not “learner English” or an imperfect way-station along the path to higher mastery. No, it is a different kind of animal altogether; it uses a “core” which indeed comes from English, but which draws on the native languages of those speaking it.¹³

Let us also skip over another conceptual weakness of the ELF narrative, namely, the completely anecdotal character of what is described as the defining features of ELF. Let us also pass over one more inconvenient fact, namely, that these features are unstable. This has been conceded not by ardent enemies of ELF, but by careful specialists who are not *a priori* hostile to it, but have come to realise the problematic nature of many facets of the ELF literature (e.g., Formentelli, 2012; Mackenzie, 2014).

Both conceptually and empirically, the very notion of *English as a lingua franca* turns out to be surprisingly weak. If it is nevertheless quite popular, it is probably because it is an accessory to the process of erasure of power relations that we have

13. Interestingly, advocates of ELF usually have no problem with the concept of native speaker: they actually vitally need it, since they keep contrasting native speakers with non-native speakers of English.

already seen at work in the case of “linguaging”. But “ELF” operates differently and goes one step further – in essence, with a syllogism that runs more or less as follows, and contains three propositions:

- Proposition 1: “Yes, of course, the spread and generalised use of English *may* be imperialistic and it *may* end up jeopardising linguistic diversity”;
- Proposition 2: “However, English, when used as a *lingua franca*, is *not really* English”;
- Proposition 3: “Therefore, English when used as a *lingua franca* is not imperialistic and poses no threat to linguistic diversity”.

Clearly, this is nothing but a very crude rhetorical trick, and it conspicuously ignores, under the ostensibly harmless label of “*lingua franca*”, the social, political, geopolitical, economic, scientific, and cultural implications of hegemony. But it plays well with some audiences, because it provides a convenient legitimation for the worldwide spread of a dominant language, while, at the same time, de-legitimising various forms of resistance to this spread.

We may pardon, ignore or gloss over many of the weaknesses of ELF. We can dismiss it as irrelevant because it is so deeply flawed, both conceptually and empirically. However, it would be very unsatisfactory to overlook the erasure of power relationships that permeates the ELF discourse. There is no doubt that, in the real world, language learners studying English are aiming for a standard variety approaching native speaker norms – *nobody* is asking to be taught ELF, *instead*. Nobody wants to be taught a form of English in which the “-s” ending of the third person singular of a verb conjugated in the present tense is omitted. Nobody wants to be taught that a tag question like “isn’t it?” at the end of a sentence is invariable and does not change in accordance with the verb of the principal clause, or the inflection used.

Learners, then, seem to have a more realistic assessment of relevant learning goals than many proponents of ELF, recognising that competence in English will deliver more benefits, be it material or symbolic, if acquired in forms that match, or closely approximate, native speaker norm. Language economics research provides abundant evidence of this, the most direct form of it being that statistically robust rates of return on competence in English as a foreign language increase together with the level of English achieved. Swiss survey data ($N = 2400$) indicate that, for men, the rates of return on the investment in English-language skills rise from around 8 per cent for a B1 level to around 15 per cent for a B2 level, and that they exceed 20 per cent for C1 and above, controlling for standard determinants of earnings such as education, experience, and gender (Grin, 2001). Apart from statistical results, ample circumstantial evidence shows that various forms of privilege and

prestige are associated with the mastery of English. Symbolic advantage is often intertwined with direct or indirect material implications, and *vice versa*. The key fact, however, remains that English language skills pay off more when they are close to a native speaker standard, and native speakers are often those who benefit most of all from the dominance of English. Therefore, one of the side effects of propagating the myth of ELF is to entrench the actual domination further by shoring it up with scientifically spurious arguments.

The dynamics of injustice and domination have, of course, multiple dimensions. One of them is that language spread, owing to the cultural and political references that remain tied to language, also entails the spreading of certain values. In this way, the world order is progressively being altered. As we have seen, there is ample evidence, some circumstantial, some reflected in hard econometric results, that this change channels material and symbolic benefits in the direction of certain élites – possibly a transnational elite to which, arguably, academics are party irrespective of their L1, but one to which, undoubtedly, the upper classes of English-speaking countries belong. Commentators like Robert Phillipson and Tom Ricento (*this volume*) as well as Joe Lo Bianco have examined in greater detail various aspects of this link where, again, the problem is not English *per se*, but linguistic hegemony.

7. Conclusion

In the preceding pages, I have tried to highlight the problematic nature of the notions of “superdiversity”, “linguaging”, “commodification”, and “English as a lingua franca (ELF)”. The emphasis has been placed less on their analytical shortcomings, which have often been identified and very perceptively criticised by others before, than on their damaging implications for language policy selection and design.

The problem is compounded by the fact that the conceptual and empirical errors encapsulated in these four notions can be, and sometimes are, conflated in some of the contemporary applied linguistics discourse. The proponents of ELF provide “linguaging” advocates with some of the ideological justification that they need, thereby contributing to a perspective on multilingualism which, if anything, endangers multilingualism and linguistic justice. Much of the critical sociolinguistics discourse, despite protestations to the contrary, finds itself in the position of an accessory to this regrettable undermining of careful analysis and responsible policy development. The superdiversity discourse, then, merely provides some background noise that contributes to the general obfuscation.

The four notions discussed in this chapter are not necessarily used together, but the discourse in which one or more of them is put forward typically uses one

or more of the six following claims, arranged here as an argumentative succession that includes these four notions:

1. we live in a world of *superdiversity* in which languages constantly and everywhere intermix;
2. consequently, it no longer makes much sense to refer to discrete, named languages, since languages mix and combine in our linguistic repertoires;
3. when using these elements of our repertoire, we are activating a communicational competence that transcends constructs such as language *X* or language *Y* – we are *linguaging*, which further establishes the notion that named languages are inventions of little relevance;
4. given that it fails to acknowledge the above, the defence of named languages is intrinsically regressive and dangerously bound up with essentially nationalist tendencies;
5. moreover, particular interests are liable to ride the political wave of language activism (when this activism refers to named languages), since language (in the form of language *X* as distinct from language *Y*) is a traditional vehicle for the production and reproduction of socioeconomic inequality, and this process often crystallises in language *commodification*;
6. by contrast, in a globalising age, English is the neutral, non-nationalistic receptacle towards which global language dynamics are gravitating, and when used *as a lingua franca* and spreading in this particular way, English cannot be imperialistic.

At a stroke, the defence of “named” languages, even very small ones, has been invalidated, and the spread of English has been legitimised – all this upon the basis of scientifically spurious constructs. No doubt many vested interests are quite happy to be able to invoke justifications using one or more of the six claims above. But such justifications are dangerous for most languages, and hence for linguistic diversity since, as specialists of complexity such as Johnson (2007) and Page (2011) remind us, diversity, by definition, implies a collection of distinct elements. These justifications also reinforce, rather than alleviate, problems of language-based inequality, and the associated implications in areas such as higher education and teacher training are worrisome.

I hope that the foregoing sections make it clear why I suggest handling some notions that are currently fashionable in applied linguistics with caution – and, preferably, not use them at all. I have tried to show that the notions in question are problematic on three counts: they are logically flawed, empirically dubious (unless they are perfectly banal), and, because of the policy implications that some presume to derive from them, potentially deleterious in the real world, both because they may be detrimental to linguistic diversity and ultimately contrary to linguistic justice.

Let me, in closing, reiterate a point made at the outset, namely, that this chapter is intended as a contribution to the ongoing interdisciplinary conversation about multilingualism and its management through policy. This chapter does not claim to pass definitive judgement on the notions that it criticises – “superdiversity”, “linguaging”, “commodification” and “English as a lingua franca”; my arguments can be countered, and these pages should therefore be seen as a challenge to the proponents of these four notions. No scientific question or approach is *a priori* invalid, and there is always something to be learned by observing how other scholars investigate the ways in which multilingualism works; there is always some kind of heuristic value to the exercise. But it should not undermine the efforts that we need to make in order to ensure a just, sustainable multilingualism in a multipolar world.

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English, the *Lingua Nullius* of global hegemony

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Purportedly democratic states have many unjust and undemocratic features. This is also true of the management of EU affairs, including its multilingualism. These weaknesses co-articulate with an increased use of English in globalisation, neoliberalism, and greater European integration. There has been a transition from European colonisation worldwide, ostensibly justified by the Western myth of *terra nullius*, to worldwide penetration of American imperialism as a *cultura nullius*, in McDonaldisation processes in many social functions that accompany military and economic empire. English is now increasingly marketed as a necessity, as though it serves all equally well, a *lingua nullius*. Some European Commission initiatives accord linguistic priority to English, or argue for it as a seemingly neutral lingua franca, in effect a *lingua nullius*. This obscures the forces behind the power of English. Its hegemony has serious implications for speakers of other languages and their cultures. This chapter documents some of the workings of the project to establish “global English”.

The operation of the supranational EU system, and of EU-funded activities in Member States, builds on the evolution of novel forms of linguistic governance, “integration through law” (treaties), and judgments of the European Court of Justice. These not only interpret law but are teleological: they extend supranational law and the scope of the Common Market. Another example of the extension of English linguistic hegemony is the way in which the EU administration of post-conflict Bosnia has failed to achieve its goal of creating a viable state, but has served to enshrine English as a new language of power. Noble human rights aims are aspired to, but are subject to the influence of the forces behind corporate empire, a project that unites the USA and the EU. The failure to create more just societies and to substantiate deliberative democratic principles confirms the analysis of scholars who assess that “international relations” are pathologically inadequate, and that we have reached the “endtimes” of human rights. English in global and EU governance strengthens particular interests that are obscured by the myth of it as a *lingua nullius*. Existential language policy issues should not be consigned to the mercy of the market.

1. An overture

Democracy is less hateful than other contemporary forms of government. It starts from the assumption that all types are needed to make a civilization... Two cheers for Democracy: one because it admits variety and two because it permits criticism. Two cheers are quite enough. (E. M. Forster, 1939)¹

I like to think of British and Americans moving about freely over each other's wide estates with hardly a sense of being foreigners to one another. But I do not see why we should not try to spread our common language even more widely throughout the globe and, without seeking selfish advantage over any, possess ourselves of this invaluable amenity and birthright. ... Let us go forward as with other matters and other measures ... Such plans offer far better prizes than taking away other people's provinces or lands or grinding them down in exploitation. The empires of the future are the empires of the mind. (Winston Churchill, 1943)²

Our daily experience shows that the implementation of the freedoms of the Common Market is not always neutral towards culture and language. In many cases, the logic of market integration only leaves little leeway for the logic of cultural particularity. (Peter A. Kraus, 2011: 28)

Contrary to the wording affirmed in the Bologna Declaration, the reform of higher education serves the purpose of replacing the linguistic and cultural diversity of Europe by an English linguistic monopoly. (Hans Joachim Meyer, 2011)³

English: the language of higher education in Europe – it seems inevitable that English, in some form, will definitely become the language of higher education. (James Coleman, 2006)⁴

... it seems to me indisputable that Global English is becoming the *lingua franca* of Christianity in the twenty-first century.... contemporary language globalization is somehow related to the amazing Christian revival that we see worldwide. (Zoltán Dörnyei, 2009: 156, 157)⁵

1. From "What I believe", a selection of writings first published in 1951, cited in adjusted form from Forster (1965: 77 and 78). Forster was one of the most influential British novelists of the twentieth century.

2. At Harvard University, when receiving an honorary doctorate, available at: <http://www.winstonchurchill.org/learn/speeches/speeches-of-winston-churchill/118-the-price-of-greatness>.

3. "Entgegen dem Wortlaut der Bologna-Erklärung dient also die Studienreform dem Ziel, die dort beschworene sprachliche und kulturelle Vielfalt Europas durch ein englisches Sprachmonopol zu ersetzen" (2011: 61). All translations are mine.

4. In a survey article on English-medium teaching in European higher education, p. 11.

5. From an anthology probing the links between the worldwide English teaching industry (TESOL) and contemporary Christian missionary organisations, Wong and Canagarajah (eds, 2012).

... the English used as an international scientific language is not a lingua franca, a non-language. English is a completely normal language with its specific monolingual semantics, like all other languages. [...] It is the bearer, like all other natural languages, of a particular vision of the world. As such it is not universal and purely objective, which is what real lingua francas were. (Jürgen Trabant, 2012: 108)

Unfortunately, relationships between languages have not always been characterized by the image of the bridge, but by that of the wall. This is the wall of the inequality of power. The inequality has its basis in economics and politics, but philosophically, its roots lie in the conception of a relationship between languages in terms of a hierarchy: a kind of linguistic feudalism and linguistic Darwinism.

(Ngũgĩ wa Thiong'o, 2012)⁶

These samples of the discourse of political and linguistic governance pinpoint symptoms and trends that have become clearer in recent time. *E. M. Forster's* humanist wisdom on the strengths and limitations of democracy sounds less valid in the twenty-first century, with diversity, and criticism of established orders increasingly constrained, even in academia. *Winston Churchill*, speaking in the USA, was in effect launching a plan to establish English as the language of global linguistic governance throughout the post-World War II world, the creation of an empire of the mind that would be English-speaking with the British and Americans in power worldwide.

The other texts reveal European integration being critically assessed by three Germans, a political scientist (*Kraus*), a former Minister of Education (*Meyer*), and a Romance language scholar (*Trabant*), whereas a British language policy academic (*Coleman*) uncritically endorses a language shift in European higher education. An applied linguist based in the United Kingdom (*Dörnyei*) approves of English teaching going global as a medium for Christian missionising, whereas a Kenyan novelist, the author of an influential book on the decolonisation of the mind (Ngũgĩ, 1986), is critical of hierarchisation by means of language, linguisticism.⁷ Ngũgĩ broke free from the linguistic imperialism imposed by the British in colonial Kenya to become a champion of oppressed languages, writing in African languages as well as English so as to reach a different readership. His lifework in fiction and non-fiction has been to expose corruption both locally in Africa and globally, and to work for change and linguistic justice, in the classic role of the critical intellectual (Collini, 2006).

Each of these extracts raises existential issues for individuals and cultures. They provide glimpses of the prevailing ideologies of linguistic governance into which we are all socialised. It is no surprise that people based in the UK see things

6. In Rapatahana and Bunce (eds, 2012: 11–12).

7. This term was coined by Skutnabb-Kangas in the 1980s by analogy with racism, sexism, and classism.

differently from others because uncritical endorsement of English linguistic hegemony is widespread in British political and academic discourse. It chimes with a neoimperial dream of the UK continuing as a “great” power. The English language is of major significance for the British economy, not least for higher education, the cash cow of studies through the medium of English. Democracy is weakened when higher education is seen as a business proposition rather than as a public good. European Union policies have done little to resist English language hegemony despite a formal commitment to multilingualism.

After this appetizer, I want to begin by addressing the wider global context that our efforts should be situated in. This is necessary because many realise that all is not well with how our world is run: there are major environmental, military, economic, and sociocultural crises that dovetail with an intensification of inequality between the richest 1 per cent and the rest; governance flounders both nationally and internationally; disaffection with politicians has led to increased success for protest parties with dubious democratic credentials. Language policy interlocks with all such issues: hierarchy is structurally anchored and entrenches linguistic injustice. The chapter progresses from general issues to concern about the European Union’s malfunctioning, and the failures of human rights implementation, so as to explore the interlocking of these issues with hegemonic English dominance, effectuated through a mix of coercion and consent. I will attempt to relate this sobering big picture to linguistic governance issues in corporate-led globalisation concretely, with examples at different levels, global and regional, in academia and the law, and language policy discourse that furthers the project of English worldwide linguistic hegemony. The chapter has sections as follows:

- Voices of concern;
- The colonial inheritance;
- Contemporary neoimperial discourse;
- Integration through law;
- Implementing human rights?;
- Multilingualism in the EU system;

1.1 Voices of concern

Among those pleading convincingly for change, and trying to galvanise young people into socially responsible political action, is Tony Judt, the recently deceased historian. In *Ill Fares the Land: A Treatise on our Present Discontents*, he summarises deep flaws in the capitalist system, the fraudulent marketing of neoliberalism as though globalisation is inevitable, and the intensification of inequality in morally and socially indefensible ways. While politics mainly operates at the national level,

economics does not. Politicians no longer deserve our trust: they are “mediocre and venal public servants. Politically speaking, ours is an age of pygmies” (Judd, 2011: 164–165).

The corporate market and banking remain unchecked, thriving offshore while the 99 per cent, the majority world that democracy is serving badly, are vulnerable onshore. Much has been achieved since Oliver Goldsmith’s poem, *The Deserted Village*, written in 1770, which Judd’s book begins with:

Ill fares the land, to hastening ills a prey,
Where wealth accumulates, and men decay.

However, the wealth of the few is again accumulating fast (Stiglitz, 2002, 2015; Piketty, 2013), and humanity suffers. The catastrophic unemployment figures in southern European countries, and the disillusion of young people in many parts of the world, are worrying symptoms of the sociopolitical disintegration and disconnection that economic and financial mismanagement trigger. Change in governance is therefore urgently needed.

In like mode, in South Africa, a passionate book, Mamphela Ramphele’s *Conversations with my Sons and Daughters* (2012), attempts to trigger political participation by the younger generation because those in power have failed them. This medical doctor, anti-apartheid activist (partner of Steve Biko), former World Bank employee and Vice-Chancellor of the University of Cape Town, is appalled at the corruption of her country, and its failure to offer most of its young people any chance of leading a fulfilling life. There is, in effect, no good governance in South Africa, as in many other countries, so it is logical for citizens to have no faith in their leaders.

One of the factors intensifying the disconnection between a self-aggrandising elite and most of the population in South Africa is language policy, and specifically the linguistic favouring of English by decision-makers. The ANC has failed to strengthen the nine African languages that the Constitution recognises as official. In its institutions and schools, “Post-apartheid South Africa is presiding over the death of indigenous African languages” (Ramphele, 2012: 42). Social and cultural cohesion cannot be achieved through English in an unjust, hierarchical multilingual society. This pattern holds in virtually all former colonies in Africa and Asia, and there are comparable unmet challenges elsewhere.

In *The Spirit Level: Why Equality is Better for Everyone* (Wilkinson & Pickett, 2010), epidemiologists document the correlations between inequality in wealthy societies and severe social problems. More equal polities are more harmonious. However, even in more egalitarian societies, imposition of a single national language does not ensure equality between social classes.

Another voice campaigning for a major re-assessment of our world is a British international lawyer with experience of politics at the highest levels nationally and inside the UN and the EU, Philip Allott, in *Eunomia: New Order for a New World* (1990). *Eunomia* is “a political condition of good law well administered”.⁸ Allott became disillusioned by how the international system operates:

British diplomacy had for centuries played a leading part in making a world system whose peculiar rationality could also be seen as a form of madness. Politicians and diplomats were privileged inhabitants of a world of unreality, an unreality which was life-threatening on a grand scale – a form of pathological behaviour. And it followed also that the role of international lawyers had been to seek to rationalize and regularize pathological behaviour. (Allott 1990: xii)

This criticism could also apply to mainstream social science activity, in particular, in political science and economics.⁹ Allott’s polymath book elaborates a radical paradigm change in societal governance at all levels from the small group to the international and global. It is all-encompassing at several theoretically explicit levels,¹⁰ and challenges us to think holistically.

A key dimension of Allott’s analysis is the gap between decision-makers and the community whose interests they are supposed to promote. This gap has been narrowed in some democratic countries, but not in the management of international affairs. Governance cannot function successfully if there is no bottom-up support for systems of leadership. International relations are constantly in flux, but, in essence, they only represent a compromise between different national interests. War is a declaration of impotence and intensifies problems internally and externally. Governance currently has neither the goal of ensuring that the needs of all people worldwide are met, nor their active support or participation: there is no *demos*. The EU fits this diagnosis perfectly, as does USA’s exceptionalism, with Obama declaring:

8. “Eunomia”, in: *The New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary on Historical Principles*, Oxford: 1993.

9. And equally in the humanities, in the view of John Pilger, 2002. For Bourdieu (1989), what academics have to choose between is sitting in an esoteric ivory tower, doing commissioned work for those in power, or maintaining academic freedom and autonomy while addressing pressing social issues.

10. Apart from briefly introducing key sources of inspiration, it is entirely without references and footnotes. The overall thrust is summed up in an 8-page concluding synopsis.

Here's my bottom line: America must always lead on the world stage. ... The question we face ... is not whether America will lead, but how we will lead.¹¹

Along with these indications of societal malfunctioning nationally and internationally, there have been two constants – global processes of Europeanisation and Englishisation. In the national policies of the UK and the USA, systematic efforts over centuries went into attempts to convert a multilingual reality into a monolingual state. After 1945, English became the dominant language of international relations, trade, banking, scientific scholarship, and popular culture, not by chance, but through American leadership. The groundwork was laid in think tanks funded by US foundations during the war, and implemented in the UN, the World Bank, the IMF, NATO, and countless other ways as a deliberate strategy of the US government.

The whole world should adopt the American system. The American system can survive in America only if it becomes a world system.

(President Harry Truman, 1947, cited in Pieterse, 2004: 131)

The expansion of English worldwide has been a key constituent of British and American policy since the 1940s (Phillipson, 1992, 2009), and American empire and linguistic imperialism co-articulate. We need to clarify how this process of governance through English was established.

1.2 The colonial inheritance

The first step was the occupation of the Americas in the sixteenth century at the behest of the Roman Catholic Papacy. European languages accompanied settlers and traders, and were strengthened by colonisation and an imperial world order. Military success for the British over the French in North America, India, and Europe ensured the consolidation of English. As did the military defeat by the USA of the Mexicans and Spaniards, which ensured territorial expansion in North America, the Caribbean, the Philippines and the Pacific.

The British philosopher John Locke provided a rationalisation for Europeans arrogating to themselves a God-given right to occupy territory elsewhere. In the chapter on Property in *Two Treatises of Government*, 1698, Locke argues that God

11. Obama was speaking at West Point, cited in *The Guardian*, 28 May 2014. Between the end of the Cold War and 9/11 (the attacks on 11 September 2001), US presidents intervened militarily every 17 months on average, including Panama, Kuwait, Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia and Kosovo, but Obama said the end of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq offered the chance of a new approach. It has become evident since then that conflict has, in fact, escalated.

commanded people to labour, as a result of which they can increase their possessions: “God, by commanding to subdue, gave Authority so far to *appropriate*” (1988: 292). Since the indigenous peoples of America have failed to labour, “they are rich in Land, and poor in all the Comforts of Life”. Nature has given them the same resources as people elsewhere, and productive territory, but they “for want of improving it by labour, have not one hundredth part of the Conveniences we enjoy” (*ibid.*, 296–297). From which, Locke draws the conclusion that:

In the beginning, all the World was *America*, and more so than it is now; for no such thing as *Money* was any where known. (*ibid.*, 301)

The fruits of labour can be converted into gold, silver, or money, which can then be used as a way of legitimating “disproportionate and unequal Possession of the Earth”, this inequality being, in Locke’s claim, “tacitly but voluntarily” agreed on by society (*ibid.*, 302).

This argument was supposed to justify European colonisation and to sanctify Christian proselytisation. Land, in what became named the Americas, was *terra nullius*, land supposedly belonging to no-one, to which its benighted inhabitants had no claim or rights. The ideological foundation for this argument is the dichotomy between *us* (the “civilised”) and *them* (the “barbarians”) that has been deeply rooted in the thinking of the Western world since the time of the ancient Greeks.¹² The same fraudulence applied when the British took over African land and dispossessed its occupants. Colonised Kenyans became exploited labour in the “White Highlands” and “learned in school that white people had discovered Mount Kenya and many of our lakes, including Lake Victoria” (Ngũgĩ, 2010: 168). “Manifest Destiny”, the doctrine that “white Americans were a special people” with a right to expand territorially and impose their values, if need be by force of arms, dates from 1845 when the USA was expanding to the west and the south (Goldfield et al., 2008: 361).

English was the dominant language of the British Empire, the USA and its colonised territories. While there were many indications of a wish for English to spread worldwide among apologists for empire in the nineteenth century, the first reference to English as a “world” language dates from a conference with Carnegie Foundation funding in New York in 1934 that specifically aimed at establishing close collaboration between the USA and the UK to achieve global impact (Phillipson, 2009: 113). In 1964, I was commissioned into the “army of linguistic missionaries” that a semi-official UK policy study had elaborated a plan for (Routh,

12. Herodotus attributed this dichotomy to the Egyptians.

1941).¹³ Institutional structures were expanded on both sides of the Atlantic from the 1950s (Phillipson, 1992: 137–172).

In parallel was a huge range of activities to promote US norms in academia in Europe. In the inter-war period, more funding for research in the UK was provided by US foundations than from British sources (Phillipson, 1992: 236). In the cultural Cold War, all western European countries experienced massive efforts by the USA, often funded by the CIA, to project Hollywood, influence intellectuals, reading habits, and cultural and political life in general (Saunders, 1999). In occupied territories such as Austria, de-nazification involved systematic efforts to Americanize education and health systems as well as intellectual and cultural norms (Wagnleitner, 1994). McDonaldisation (Hamelink, 1994; Ritzer, 2011) has penetrated academia, the business world, the media, lifestyles and entertainment, clothing and consumer goods in countless ways. Neoliberal economic principles dovetail with cultural norms. Consumerist capitalism of the American kind is projected as a *cultura nullius* of universal relevance, a necessity in the modern world (Kayman, 2004).

1.3 Contemporary neoimperial discourse

English is projected as a *lingua nullius*, a language that everyone needs in basic education worldwide.¹⁴ In British Council policy texts, which are used in advising governments worldwide,

English is now seen as a ‘basic skill’ which all children require if they are fully to participate in 21st century civil society ... It can now be used to communicate to people from almost any country in the world ... We are fast moving into a world in which not to have English is to be marginalised and excluded.

(Graddol, 2006)

13. Routh was an adviser to the para-statal British Council. His book provides a rationale for consolidating the position of English globally once the fascist governments had been defeated. It propounds that “A new career service is needed, for gentlemen teachers of English with equivalent status to ‘the Civil Service, Army, Bar, or Church’, [...] generated by a ‘training centre for post-graduate studies and research’, and a ‘central office in London, from which teachers radiate all over the world’”. The new service must “lay the foundations of a world-language and culture based on our own”. The book can be seen as a roadmap for how the profession of English Language Teaching was brought to life in the 1950s (Phillipson, 1992: 136–152, 173–222).

14. *Terra nullius* in international law signifies land to which no-one holds legal title. The impact of *cultura nullius* and *lingua nullius* is likewise to disconnect those affected from their cultures and languages. Cultural and linguistic expansion do not occupy vacant space but are necessarily in competition and conflict with local practices.

No evidence is adduced for this claim, which is formulated in the passive (“is seen”) without any indication of who underwrites the claim. The argument that you can communicate in English with “people from almost any country in the world” is flawed. Two-thirds of the world’s population have no proficiency in English. You don’t get far in Latin America, southern Europe, most of Africa, the Middle East or Asia – even in India – with English outside elite circles and tourist sites.

Even in Scandinavia, where I have lived for 40 years, proficiency in communication in English above a crude spoken level is not widespread. Contrary to what Coleman, cited initially, asserts, the expansion of English in higher education in Europe consists almost invariably of English being added to national language repertoires rather than replacing them (Dimova, Hultgren & Jensen, eds., 2015). While English is of major importance for the global economy, assuming that it is so “basic” that it is a requirement for economic success is contradicted by the fact that the economies of China, Japan and Korea, all key players in globalisation, succeed through using local languages in basic education, as do continental European countries.

The British Council’s arguments are a re-run of the imperialism of the colonial age. The assumption is that English is the sole language of globalisation, and in everyone’s interest, which is patently untrue (Skutnabb-Kangas & Phillipson, 2010). British Council activity in promoting the learning of English is ubiquitous. Its rationale is part political, and part economic, since most of the para-statal’s budget derives from teaching and examining English. Its directors are recruited from the business world. Martin Davidson, its Chief Executive, asserts in the Annual Report 2009–10:

*English next India*¹⁵ tells us that from education to the economy, from employability to social mobility, the prospects for India and its people will be greatly enhanced by bringing English into *every classroom, every office and every home*.

(italics added, see Phillipson, 2016b)

This brazen neoimperial idea, a *lingua nullius* argument, is in conflict with principles of social justice in India, as articulated by Gandhi, Tagore, Nehru, and present-day Indian educational linguists (Skutnabb-Kangas, Phillipson, Mohanty & Panda, eds., 2009). Amartya Sen, the Nobel Prize for economics laureate, pleads for more equitable policies that could enable the needs of the entire population of India to be met (Drèze & Sen, 2014).

15. A follow-up by David Graddol to his earlier, global *English Next*. It uses similar arguments to his colonial predecessors, notably Lord Macaulay (Phillipson, 2016b). The notion that a single British “expert”, commissioned by the British Council, can sort out language education in India is neocolonial in itself.

Advocates of English for all, nationally and internationally, are false prophets. The discourse of English being “owned” by all who use it ignores the inequalities that are generated by and through English. Biased promotion of English is widespread in political and academic discourse. One variant of this ideology is currently fashionable among researchers into English as a *Lingua Franca* (ELF). They generalise from features of the English of non-native speakers in conversational interaction, to make unalloyed claims about English no longer being connected to the grammar and semantics of the cultures in which the language evolved and became standardised.¹⁶ The theoretical and methodological weaknesses of this empiricist activity have been exposed in several articles.¹⁷ The study of ELF in the business world is more securely founded (e.g., Louhiala-Salminen & Kankaanranta, 2011). In the interaction between native and non-native speakers of English in a commercial global organisation (Neeley, 2013) or a British university (Śliwa & Johansson, 2014) many significant variables are in play, including status, inhibition, self-assessed fluency, anxiety, distrust, and inequality. EU propagation of English as a *lingua franca* is analysed later in this chapter.

A lucid example of the misuse of the term *lingua franca* can be seen in an Argentine government educational policy document:

English is the language of international communication which unites a universal community in brotherhood with no geographic or political frontiers. English has become the natural *lingua franca* and has thus gained distance from its cultural roots.¹⁸

Hamel comments (2003: 134):

This is a good example of the ideology of ‘many Englishes’, of a de-territorialised and neutralised language that belongs to nobody and therefore to everybody; as if English were not backed any longer by the world’s most powerful army and navy.

16. A recent example by a German author (Motschenbacher, 2013): her empirical study is of English in informal interviews on television, and concludes with quotations from Jenkins (‘international academic communication is today hardly ever native communication’, p. 204), Seidlhofer (people can operate with their own ‘common sense’ criteria, p. 194), and Widdowson (‘the old conditions of relevance and appropriateness no longer apply’ p. 193). This creates the impression that non-native speakers can do without any of the vocabulary, syntax, or phonology that has evolved in the UK, USA and elsewhere. It is also typical of ELF empirical studies that they exclusively focus on *speech*, the role of written English is ignored, but this does not deter authors from drawing bold conclusions about the English *language*.

17. See, for instance, Gazzola and Grin (2013), and references there.

18. Hamel (2003: 134, Footnote 7) cites a study by Valera in 1999.

There is nothing “natural” about why English is powerful in the modern world.

In the colonial age, missionaries were deeply involved in educational activity. This merging of agendas has been reactivated in the neoimperial age. “Global” English teaching is being harnessed to Christian missionary activity (see the quotation from Dörnyei initially). The ethics of the symbiosis of a profession and a religious faith, global English teaching and universalising Christianity, has been subjected to critical scrutiny by both adherents and critics (Wong & Canagarajah, eds., 2009). However, an underlying factor is that a substantial section of the US population apparently believes that “English (and the teaching of English) was not simply a language (or teaching of a language), but it was a language that best carried the word of God”: this is supposed to legitimate proselytising, American wars for “democracy”, and the ideology of manifest destiny (Mahboob, 2009: 272–273). The true believers in English and Christianity are convinced that their mission is of “divine” inspiration and should “inspire the whole profession” of English teaching worldwide (Suresh Canagarajah’s Foreword to Wong, Kristjánsson & Dörnyei, eds., 2012) in a re-tuning of the white man’s burden.

What some see as a *lingua divina* is seen by the victims of territorial, cultural and linguistic dispossession as a *lingua diabolica*.¹⁹ *Terra nullius* has morphed into English as a *lingua nullius* in the Americas and Australasia. Its export as “global” English represents a project to establish English as the language of neoliberal empire serviced by global finance whatever the consequences for other cultures and languages.

The *lingua nullius* arguments are comparable to the way political apologists for neoliberalism claimed that There Is No Alternative (TINA) (Margaret Thatcher, cited in McMurtry, 2002: 19) and that this system was “universal”, (Tony Blair: “the economic theology of the Market is the soul of its absolutist word order”, *ibid.*, 21). There is a boom in the market for English learning products and know-how, for fee-paying “international” schools, for English-medium universities, for English ever earlier in “basic” education, for “native speaker” teachers. This affects former colonies, and the “informal” empires of Latin America, the Middle East and some Asian countries. The “demand” for English educational materials is complemented by the “supply side” expansion worldwide of British publishers, which are now industrial conglomerates.²⁰

19. See the article ‘*Lingua franca* or *lingua frankensteinia*? English in European integration and globalisation’, by Robert Phillipson, followed by Comments by six scholars, and a Response, originally published in the journal *World Englishes* 27/2, 2008, 250–284, and reprinted in Phillipson (2009: 147–194). For anthologies of English as Hydra, see Rapatahana and Bunce (eds, 2012), and Bunce et al. (eds, 2016).

20. Among market leaders are Pearson plc and the Macmillan Group (now German-owned).

Supply and demand feed on each other, interlocking with the economic, political and cultural forces that underpin them and profit from them. The demand for English has increased through the globalisation of NATO, with the active involvement of several Member States of the EU (Nazemroaya, 2012). The shock treatment imposed on Iraq involved the destruction of Iraqi higher education and US-led efforts to re-structure education from top to bottom by Americans with no familiarity with the Arab world (Klein, 2008). Among the direct beneficiaries in the short term were higher education institutions in the UK, to which Iraqis were sent for training, and the symbiotic English-teaching business, teaching materials, language schools, consultants, *etc.* Linguistic and educational neoimperialism (Bunce et al., eds., 2016; Kabel, 2016) follow in the wake of invasion, here in treacherous territory.

1.4 Integration through law

Many of the symptoms of inequality and crisis alluded to initially in this chapter can be observed in the way in which the European Union operates. The capricious term “democratic deficit” seems to indicate that a deficit could be simply converted into a surplus, but the constitutional treaty, the remoteness of the EU from the concerns of EU citizens, and the way EU institutions function preclude this.

Analysis of the EU needs to relate to the *project* of greater integration in its multiple forms, and to *products* (treaties, laws, budgets, buildings, actions, *etc.*) and the *processes* involved in administering these at the supranational and national levels (Morgan, 2005: 4). Language policy in EU institutions and in Europe overall has always been politically sensitive so that, with the exception of the practicalities of its translation and interpretation services (e.g., Stubb, 2006), it has never been subjected to thorough analysis. There have been a number of EU initiatives to strengthen language learning, but none at the level of assessing the overall language ecology of Europe, or the significance of linguistic hegemony.

European integration has entailed a substantial transfer of sovereignty to the supranational EU level progressively since the 1950s. The legal basis upon which the EU operates is determined in treaties and Eurolaw, the “*acquis communautaire*” that signals the shift from national into supranational law, including the most recent (Lisbon) constitutional treaty. Law plays an increasingly important role in transnational affairs. There is a vast literature on this topic by lawyers, who track different historical trajectories in member states and legal process – natural law, legal positivism, legal realism, common law, and fundamental rights (e.g., de Búrca, Kilpatrick & Scott, eds., 2014; Šarčević, ed., 2015).

The European Court of Justice (ECJ)²¹ is a supranational constitutional court of a type that some countries have (USA, Germany) whereas others do not (Scandinavia), or at least not formally (the UK). ECJ judgments are promulgated in all 24 official languages, but the working language of the court is French. It is the text in French that all judges, one from each Member State, must reach consensus on. It is arguable that, because of the increased role of English in both Europe and the EU system, combined with law students increasingly reading texts written in English, the use of English at the ECJ, and of ideas formulated in English, is being strengthened (Hervey, 2013). The ECJ legal method itself is in constant evolution (Neergaard & Nielsen, eds., 2013).

The role of the ECJ is to adjudicate in the light of the key legal texts and principles enshrined in treaties that are designed to promote peace, security, and a so-called “free”, now explicitly neoliberal, market economy. When cases are taken to the ECJ, the judicial method in force involves more than an interpretation of Eurolaw on the litigation in question. Analysis of its judgments over many years shows that the Court has based them on five sets of variables: its approach can be literal, historical, contextual, or comparative (contrasting different national traditions), and, significantly, teleological (Hervey, 2014). This means that cases are determined in relation to the overall goals of European unification, including a rigid commitment to market forces.

The court’s conclusions are therefore controversial, entailing the exclusion of alternative economic thinking, a reduction of national sovereignty, and an expansion of what is decreed in EU treaties. ECJ judgments not only *interpret* what the law is understood to be, but are also *constitutionalising* it. This reflects the reality that the EU is, as the French put it, “*en construction*”. The EU is a never-ending project of European unification, with ECJ judgments taking this project forward, despite disagreement about where the EU is heading, and without the accountability to citizens that a parliament or government has. This is the complex, arcane world that Allott denounces in *Eunomia*.

Disputes about Eurolaw have given rise to many difficulties of interpretation for national courts, which are often obliged to have recourse to the “same” EU text in several languages: see the articles by lawyers from Spain, the Czech Republic, and Sweden in Kjær and Adamo, 2011, and cases analysed from a language management perspective (Dovalil, 2015). The adjudication of cases involving the interpretation of Eurolaw cannot rely on formulations in one national language only. This exemplifies the complexity, and unpredictability, of legislation in parallel in 24 languages, each with its own historically determined traditions and baggage. This

21. The Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) after the ratification of the Treaty of Lisbon.

explodes the myth of “the same meaning” being present in Eurolaw in parallel in 24 languages. It therefore reinforces the authority of hegemonic languages, French, and increasingly English.

Governance as constituted by the ECJ is unaccountable to any *demos*. Justices and European Commissioners are undemocratically nominated by the Member States. Few EU citizens identify positively with EU governance, which is seen as remote, unrepresentative, and linguistically and communicatively foreign. Supranational integration through law is for *cognoscenti* only. It is administered by pygmy politicians and bureaucrats, and even more remote international lawyers with their hands tied by the mandate of the diffuse political goal of European integration and the constraining commitment to neoliberalism. The market forces that the EU exists to promote also consolidate English linguistic hegemony, examples of which are given below.

2. Implementing human rights?

An example of a rather different, but equally problematical, integration through law can be found in the human rights business, norm-setting to articulate and codify universal values in international covenants, their ratification by states, and their potential implementation. Significant achievements have been attained, but the human rights system can be seen as having reached its “endtimes” (Hopgood, 2013). In this analysis, people at the grassroots level know only too well what human rights are, especially when they are victims of crude injustice. However, the way human rights have evolved over the past century and a half has resulted in institutional petrification, the subordination of rights to political causes, and instrumental fiascos. Hopgood unmasks in detail,

the legacy of the transformation since the 1970s: human rights in the end were subsumed by the politics of American power and market-based democratic liberalism. Secular religiosity, the European legacy, was the cornerstone of an active effort to construct a plausible metanarrative of impartiality. The leverage offered by the huge resources of the US state and the power of neoliberalism facilitated the global spread of human rights as an ideology and cultural practice of middle-class liberals. Allying with power was too good an offer to resist. But this is a one-way journey. Once authority is converted from moral to political there is no alchemical process that can reverse it. Once Human Rights, no longer sacred, are considered indispensable allies of power, they are left to rely on international institutions and their funding markets to survive. The language of human rights will not disappear any time soon for precisely that reason. The question of what difference they make – what impact they achieve- will only become more insistent.

(Hopgood, 2003: 171)

Hopgood's analysis of the endtimes of the human rights system echoes Allott's denunciation of the international relations and international law systems. Both the ECJ and the European Court of Human Rights suffer from these weaknesses. What use to the linguistically oppressed is Article 22 of *The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union* – “The Union shall respect cultural, religious and linguistic diversity” – if “respect” is not actionable, does not confer rights, nor any duties on the EU or its Member States?

Despite the limitations and constraints that frustrate the implementation of human rights nationally and internationally, agreement on norms that should be applied to all humans is a noble ideal. Many of the extensive legal instruments that articulate norms have been ratified. In the field of language rights, there has been considerable progress in determining fundamental principles. Some minority language communities have succeeded in obtaining language rights that they were formerly denied (Skutnabb-Kangas & Phillipson, eds., 2017²²).

A concrete case of human rights endtimes can be seen in the experience of post-war Bosnia, which is explored in *Language Rights: From Free Speech to Linguistic Governance* (Pupavac, 2012).²³ She shows convincingly that external control, mainly by the EU, building on the Dayton Agreement, has perpetuated ethnolinguistically-based political division and caused disempowerment. The measures undertaken by “the international community” have failed to achieve their ends. As in occupied Iraq, key outsiders were grossly ignorant of the local context, and paternalistic. Self-government has been undermined, and no political, cultural, or economic problems have been solved in Bosnia.

Pupavac sees international agents as modern-day Rudyard Kiplings (ibid., 195), apologists for undemocratic neoimperial exploitation. Her wide-ranging book does not define linguistic governance or handle it consistently, though many contexts are explored. She rightly stresses that linguistic and cultural factors are vectors for political interests, which coalesce in class interests, exemplified by “schools whose elite constituencies identify themselves and their interests more with the international

22. *Language Rights*, edited by Tove Skutnabb-Kangas and Robert Phillipson (2017) is an authoritative multidisciplinary collection of texts and analysis of the evolution of language rights in international and national human rights principles and practices over the past century. The four volumes cover “Language rights: principles, enactment, application” (volume 1), “Language policy in education: violations or rights for all?” (volume 2), “Language endangerment and revitalization; language rights charters and declarations” (volume 3), and “Language rights: challenges in theory and implementation” (volume 4). There are introductions and 95 key texts from law, education, language policy, political theory, philosophy, anthropology, economics, minority studies, deaf studies, and indigenous cosmologies. There are case studies of language rights in many countries, written by scholars from all continents.

23. I have reviewed the book in *Language Policy*, 2016, 15 (1): 113–115.

community, rather than their local ethnic community” (ibid., 191). Education – through the medium of English at school and university levels – is shaped to serve elite interests and disconnection from the resolution of local needs. This is similar to the position in many former colonies. Pupavac condemns the neocolonialism imposed on Bosnia, with the complicity of elites, and notes a significant consequence of linguistic imperialism:

... global governance of Bosnia has ironically expanded the role of English in public life, and exacerbated the distance of the new internationally sponsored elites from non-English-speaking sections of the population. (ibid., 196)

Externally imposed governance promotes the linguistic neoimperialism of English and its users, and establishes a new comprador class.

The falsity of what imperial powers saw as a “civilising” mission was denounced by many who were at the receiving end of colonisation, for instance, in Gandhi’s plea in 1909 for home rule in India (Gandhi, 2010). Theorists of colonialism with a training in psychiatry and psychology see colonising and colonised cultures as characterised by cultural pathology and psychopathology: “The civilising mission built on the ‘decivilisation’ of the coloniser”, as noted by Aimé Césaire (cited by Nandy, 1983: 30). This decivilisation was experienced by George Orwell as a British colonial police officer in Burma: “when the white man turns tyrant it is his own freedom that he destroys” (Orwell & Angus, 1968: 269). Nandy stresses that the effects of colonisation were more severe in the UK than in India because the vast majority of the population in India were unaffected, whereas ideals of empire were internalised by all classes in the UK.

Rabindranath Tagore, Nobel Prize laureate for Literature in 1913, in his book on nationalism (Tagore 2010, first published in 1917), showed uncannily foresight when predicting that the formation of regional power blocs would intensify the exploitation of the weak, and result in an “organized gregariousness of gluttony, commercial and political” (ibid., 55). It is arguable that adherence to the neoliberal policies of financial and corporate neoliberalism by the EU, ASEAN, and the African Union exemplify what Tagore was warning against: imperial hubris and social *malaise*, with the human rights system powerless to counteract it significantly.

These trends exemplify Allott’s denunciation of international relations activity and its regulation. The USA has attempted to apply the doctrine of exceptionalism and manifest destiny for two centuries throughout the Americas, and more recently in Asia (Vietnam, Afghanistan), the Middle East (Iraq, Syria) and Africa (Libya, Somalia).

US armed forces are now involved in 49 out of 54 African states, along with the former colonial powers of France and Britain, in what’s becoming a new carve-up of the continent. (Milne, 2014: 20)

The EU is solidly active and complicit in coalitions “of the willing”. The corporate world and EU’s policies on trade, agriculture, fishing, and energy manifestly do not serve the interests of the entire world’s citizens, despite a good deal of Janus-faced rhetoric as well as funding for less ignoble purposes. The EU’s commitment to peace, security and prosperity through “free market” neoliberalism – values that are in no sense specifically European – strengthens the hold of corporate interests and international capital, to the benefit of the global 1 per cent.

Allott (in Chapter 13 of *Eunomia*) shows how democracies involve a high degree of accountability by political leaders to the populations who vote them into power, whereas there is no corresponding bond in international relations (typified by diplomacy and war), where the participants represent national governments. International relations therefore function in an unaccountable, moral political vacuum, and the interests of populations worldwide are not defended. The national pygmies are presumptuous dwarfs at the international level. British Prime Ministers perform as loyal acolytes of American empire and ardently promote global English. Global institutions represent the interests of states and are not accountable to the world’s population. The cumbersome, ineffective functioning of the EU and of the UN Security Council exemplify debility at the international level very clearly. International governance is not equipped to provide global leadership. It facilitates US policy of dominating friends and enemies alike.

2.1 Multilingualism in the EU system

Eurolaw is promulgated in all 24 official languages. Minority languages have no place. Full interpretation between all EU languages is only provided for in certain contexts. In the management of EU affairs there is a hierarchy of languages, with English now unmistakably at the top. English has progressively become the default in-house language, toppling French from the peak of the linguistic hierarchy. Activities in French and English have been institutionalised as the languages of linguistic governance in practice, though not in law. Documents for consideration in Member States are often sent out in English, and possibly French, rather than in the relevant national languages. The fact that most EU texts are now initially drafted in English led the *Délégation nationale à la langue française et aux langues de France*, in its Annual Report of 2006 to conclude “... le français tend à devenir une langue de traduction et non plus de conception”. In other words, a monolingual culture and mindset within EU institutions affects content as well as form.

The Commission’s website invariably has all documents in English, fewer in French, and far fewer in other languages. The websites of EU presidencies have been criticised by the European Ombudsman for using an excessively limited set of

languages.²⁴ The rotating Presidency's websites are typically only in English, French and the host country's language. After a German complaint to the Ombudsman about this inequality of access, he determined that presidencies were at fault in using such a small set of languages, and that the practice should be changed.²⁵ A follow-up vote in the European Parliament on 20 November 2008 specifying that "the information on the Council Presidency website should ideally be available in all official Community languages" was endorsed by an overwhelming majority. However, from the Swedish presidency in 2009 onwards, the Ombud's recommendations have been ignored. Hegemonic forces, following a financial rationale that ignores a principle of democratic access, remain uncontested.

The EU system fails to live up to the ideals of "respecting" multilingualism that the EU both in principle and in law is committed to. EU linguistic governance undemocratically erects a barrier between a technocratic elite and citizens of diverse linguistic backgrounds. Political and economic governance in a language that the majority of citizens have little, if any, competence in is a recipe for conflict. In addition, most EU documents and institutional activities are too specialised and technical for ordinary citizens to relate to in any language.

Another example of inequality: when there is communication, spoken or written, between proficient users of English and others with limited competence in English, the communication is asymmetrical, unequal. Often, this injustice goes unchallenged, due to the expectation that people can "manage" in English. As a result of many EU texts being written in unclear or incorrect English, and similar problems with French, the translation service has the task of improving such texts before they are translated. Clearly, these practices reflect inequality and inefficiency, and do not facilitate culturally diverse language use. Many EU linguistic governance procedures serve to strengthen the hegemony of English.

My experience of seven years of involvement in the Directorate-General for Research (now Research and Innovation) demonstrates how a hegemonic status for English is being established, both within the Commission and in Member States. In the "Guide for Applicants" for funding from the Seventh Framework Programme,²⁶ there is the following advice: "Proposals may be prepared in any official language of the European Union. If your proposal is not in English, a translation of the full proposal would be of assistance to the experts", *i.e.*, to those

24. See the European Ombudsman's press release No. 6/2006.

25. See the Ombudsman's draft recommendation to the Council of the EU in complaint 1487/2005/GG of 14 March 2006 (24 pages).

26. <http://cordis.europa.eu>.

assessing the quality of the proposal for funding. The rhetoric of all EU languages being valid is formally acknowledged, but it is clear that applications have to be written in English. Applicants for whom English is not the primary professional language -there are many in southern and eastern Europe and elsewhere – are at a significant structural disadvantage when the application has to be in English. This hegemonic trait is compounded by the fact that the expert evaluators are drawn from all EU countries (and occasionally North America), for many of whom English is not the primary working language, even if they are professional researchers. Even if they can “manage” in English, their facility in being able to express themselves optimally in English may be limited, particularly when it comes to formulating the written response in English that all applicants are entitled to, when every word counts.

These examples of how the EU conducts its affairs reveal clearly that efficiency and linguistic equality are seriously constrained. To argue that this way of conducting affairs is necessary for pragmatic or practical reasons is to ignore the reality of those with high-level proficiency in English being favoured. EU discourse and the administration of EU funds are linguicist. The reality of a hierarchy of languages within EU institutions can justify seeing the management of multilingualism as constituting a form of linguistic apartheid (Phillipson, 2003). There is anecdotal evidence that speakers of some national languages feel this way.

A Europe-wide language policy feasibility study was requested by the European Parliament, and commissioned by the DG for Education and Culture. The task was given to a consultancy with wide experience of servicing EU institutions. Its report (18 May 2005: 118 pages) was based on extensive consultation with a wide range of people concerned with many aspects of language policy. It describes needs, conditions, and modalities, and proposes the creation of a European Agency for Linguistic Diversity and Language Learning. Their mandate excluded attention to the internal workings of EU institutions and migrant languages. The report confirms that a wealth of professional expertise exists that decision-makers ought to draw on. It makes a strong case for either a Linguistic Agency, like other high-prestige EU agencies (dealing with the environment in Copenhagen, and fundamental rights in Vienna), or alternatively a network of Language Diversity Centres to strengthen policy formation and implementation, particularly for regional minority languages. The feasibility study reveals a widespread perception that there is a serious need for policy advice and information for national and EU decision-makers. This was overwhelmingly the case in new Member States, whereas the established ones consider such functions “not useful”. There was also near unanimity in responses in rejecting English as a sole *lingua franca*. The study concludes that:

A no-action scenario would seriously undermine the credibility of the EU in this field.

In fact, the Linguistic Agency proposal was rejected unilaterally and undemocratically by the Commission. It chose to ignore well-informed advice. What it did decide on was to support the Network on Promoting Linguistic Diversity within the framework of the programme “Integrated Lifelong Learning (2007–2013)”. But funding for “regional and minority languages” was significantly reduced.²⁷ This represents a serious downgrading of funding for languages. Whatever credibility the EU might have gained by creating a portfolio for a Commissioner for Multilingualism 2007–2010 was seriously undermined by no action on an Academy and reduced action on minority languages. The Commissioner had little, if any, impact.

The EU’s Chief Scientific Advisor, Ann Glover, experienced that the Commission’s political agenda often conflicts with the scholarly evidence submitted to it. The process of relating to evidence is manipulated. It subordinates professional input to political goals, facts are “twisted”.²⁸ Glover noted this in several high-profile policy areas, but even in the language policy field, this undemocratic and uninformed pattern holds. For instance, the recommendation that two foreign languages should be taught in primary schools, and the dogma that “the earlier foreign languages are learned the better the results”, which has been preached by the EU for decades, are invalid unless many pedagogical conditions are met, which they seldom are.²⁹ Inconvenient scholarly input is simply ignored.

The DG for Translation has begun publishing a series of language policy studies. A study of *lingua franca* in 2011 covers some historical and contemporary ground, but selectively, and without ever clarifying in what way the term *lingua franca* is understood or used in EU contexts, which was a prime goal of the study. It conflates *lingua franca* with English. The study has major weaknesses,³⁰ which does nothing to increase one’s respect for an institution that is committed to maintaining

27. *Mercatornews* 33, September 2007, reports that the total sum of annual EU funding for Regional and Minority Languages declined from 1.2 million euros annually to 149,000 euros.

28. See http://www.euractiv.com/sections/eu-priorities-2020/eu-twisting-facts-fit-political-agenda-chief-scientist-says-302399?utm_source=EurActiv+Newsletter&utm_campaign=490926e7f9-newsletter_science__policymaking&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_bab5f0ea4e-490926e7f9-245763065, last accessed 28 May 2014.

29. The early start fallacy, along with a monolingual approach to foreign language learning, are key elements in an inappropriate “global English” pedagogy (Phillipson, 1992: Chapter 7).

30. It assumes English functions in a neutral egalitarian way, and while noting that there can be an element of hierarchy involved, it ignores the political and economic factors that account for the way English has been expanding worldwide and in continental Europe. The “conclusion” section fails to sum up ideas presented earlier and introduces completely new ones. The study is accompanied by transcripts of interviews with three individuals, without their status or role being described. Later language policy studies published by the DG have named authors, and are more professional, but these authors are not EU translators, unlike the *lingua franca* study.

multilingualism while ensuring efficiency in EU affairs. One of those interviewed for it was Philippe Van Parijs, whose advocacy of an extension of the role of English is seriously flawed (Barbier, 2012; Phillipson, 2012; May, 2015). It is fair to conclude that the study is special pleading for English. The study was published anonymously, which can create the impression that it represents the authoritative understanding in the EU of the concept *lingua franca*.

A *lingua franca* – in its traditional sense – is a hybrid form of language for limited instrumental functions. Scholars who focus exclusively on the instrumental use of languages ignore the connection between power and class: by advocating English for everyone, their work unintentionally “becomes a crucial element of an international business class structure. It facilitates the growth and spread of multinational corporations and trade” (Ives, 2006: 136–137).³¹ This, of course, is a primary goal of the EU.

The term *lingua franca*, initially coined during the Crusades as a synecdoche (Europeans = Franks), became established in the eastern Mediterranean to describe the simplified language that was used between people from different linguistic backgrounds for trading purposes. It was a restricted form of language, mixing elements from several European languages that had evolved from Latin (French, Italian, Catalan), Greek, and Arabic. A *lingua franca* in the original sense of the term is incomplete language, a pidgin language, and never a mother tongue. There is therefore a logical inconsistency in using the term to refer to a rich national language that also has international functions. Such semantic imprecision can be seen as imperialist when the expansion of English occurs at the expense of other national languages (Phillipson, 2016a), for instance, in academia (e.g., Trabant, 2012, cited initially).

Among the many orchestrating a rhetoric that uncritically promotes global English are uninformed and uncritical native speakers. Advocacy of global English is at its most aggressive when the Director of the British Council in Germany claims that “English should be the sole official language of the European Union”.³² Glyn Morgan, in *The Idea of a European Super-state: Public Justification and European Integration*, (2005) writes that:

The spread of English as the European *lingua franca*, the emergence of a common transnational youth culture, the convergence of business practices, and – most important of all – widespread adoption of European constitutional practices (and perhaps even a Constitution) can be seen as steps along the road to a European nation-state.

31. For a related criticism of the work of Abram de Swaan, see Phillipson (2009: 251–257).

32. Cited in *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 26 February 2002.

He may be right about such steps, but he seems unaware that his possible scenario builds on biased presuppositions:

- it assumes that English is a neutral *lingua franca*, serving all equally well, whereas high-level proficiency in English is rare in much of Europe, and, in any case, many languages serve cross-national purposes in Europe;
- it fails to reveal that “a common transnational youth culture” is essentially consumerist ideology promoted by transnational multimedia corporations;
- it ignores the fact that “business practices” derive from the US corporate world, and the conceptual universe it embodies, and this is taught at business schools, in asymmetrical symbiosis with national traditions;
- EU constitutional practices and legislation have hybrid origins, and equal force in 24 languages, so that a possible European nation-state could never be monolingual.

Morgan exemplifies the tendency of many native speakers of English “to mistake Anglo English for the human norm” (Wierzbicka, 2006). I would add that he also takes Americanisation as a universal norm.

2.3 English hegemony

The tension between an increased use of English and the vitality of national languages has been of major concern to several European governments in recent years. When linguistic governance changes, for instance when an increasing number of functions are carried out in a prestigious “international” language, it is vital to identify the causal factors behind such changes. Language policies need to be in force so as to ensure a balance between advancing English and the continuation of the use of national languages for key societal functions. This is government policy in the Nordic countries, as elaborated in a non-binding Declaration on a Nordic Language Policy.³³ Some countries have given serious consideration to implementation measures, resulting in legislation in Sweden to ensure the continued vitality of Swedish,³⁴ and in the formulation by many universities in the Nordic countries of explicit language policies. These invariably relate to the need to function in national and international languages in higher education and research. How this works through in practice is being researched in many countries (Dimova et al., 2015; Boussebaa & Brown, 2016). This activity in higher education and its analysis represent a partial

33. www.norden.org

34. Språklag (2009: 600). Available at: https://www.riksdagen.se/sv/dokument-lagar/dokument/svensk-forfattningssamling/spraklag-2009600_sfs-2009-600.

response to Tony Judt's question "What is to be done?" Similarly, several universities in South Africa are engaging seriously with establishing bilingual or trilingual academic competence, rather than blindly following an English-Only policy.³⁵

Membership of the EU or participation in the Bologna Process (the unification of higher education and research across 49 European countries into a common "area" or market³⁶) places many constraints on national autonomy, including linguistic autonomy, in countless overt and covert ways that largely serve to strengthen the status and use of English. Treating English as a *lingua nullius* in any such contexts runs the risk of serving the inequitable interests of corporate globalisation and American empire, with severe consequences for languages other than English and the global 99 per cent.

In western European countries in which there are high levels of proficiency in English, an increased use of English can be seen as linguistic capital accumulation, for the individual and the group. The repertoire of languages in use is expanded, *i.e.*, additive bilingual or multilingualism is being established. By contrast, if English replaces a national language in key functions, in academia, politics, business, or cultural life, to the point where other languages are downgraded and excluded, what has taken place is linguistic capital dispossession. It is possible to identify the policies, discourses, and agents involved in such processes, the forces in action locally and externally, hegemonic pressures of coercion and consent, structures and discourses that facilitate the new patterns of linguistic governance.

English in global and EU governance strengthens particular interests that are obscured by the myth of it as a *lingua nullius*. Loose use of the term *lingua franca* can function as a smokescreen that obscures the underlying causal factors. English can function as a *lingua economica*,³⁷ a *lingua academica*, a *lingua bellica*, or a *lingua cultura* in ways that are non-threatening to other languages and the cultures they are anchored in. The degree to which uses are positive or negative can be assessed empirically, as can the extent to which linguistic imperialism is in force (an issue explored in a book that assesses whether the EU can be considered as an empire, Phillipson, 2016a), and whether linguistic injustice is occurring. The market forces behind English are so ubiquitous in contemporary Europe, and not least in the EU system, that existential issues for speakers of other languages are definitely at stake, and need to be addressed if English is not to function as a *lingua frankensteinia*.

35. The most active are the Universities of Kwa Zulu Natal, Limpopo, and Stellenbosch, but how the language policies are handled is controversial.

36. www.ehea.info

37. US financial control systems have been effectively internationalised in ways that progressively obliged all banking systems to conform to them (Panitch and Konings, eds., 2008).

Language policy issues should not be consigned to the mercy of the market. Human rights can serve to counteract the forces behind the market economy. Whether they do so is an empirical question in any given context.

One can speculate on whether global governance is a metaphor, a myth, or a project. Globalisation is, as Bourdieu writes (2001, in translation 2010), a pseudo-concept that conceals the interests hidden behind the notion and the interests that it serves. By contrast, “internationalisation” (in French “*mondialisation*”) is activities and processes that are locally generated and not subject to global market pressures (Bourdieu, 2001: 83). English manifestly does serve a vast range of good purposes in the modern world in international communication. Global English, on the other hand, is in no sense a reality, if it is understood as meaning either that English is used universally, which is patent nonsense, or that it serves the interests of the entire world’s citizens, which it equally patently does not. What needs to be resisted is advocacy of English as a universal *lingua franca* whenever it serves as the *lingua nullius* of an indefensible capitalist empire in our multilingual world.

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Idealism or pragmatism?

Ad hoc multilingualism and Open English

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This chapter aims at setting out a transitory fair language regime for migrants. I show that a lingua franca regime in “Open English” can co-exist with linguistic diversity and *ad hoc* multilingualism, and that this regime can be sustained transitionally by bilingual bridge-speakers. Democratic requirements of inclusion and parity of esteem can be achieved through a creative non-permanent linguistic arrangement via *ad hoc* multilingualism plus Open English, particularly relevant in intermediary institutions and situations where newcomers are not (yet) competent in the host-country’s language.

Introduction

In the normative debate on just immigration policies and the legitimacy of border control,¹ the question of language skills has mainly focused on the fairness and the conditions of language testing and/or the legitimacy of imposing pre-entry language tests. A fair – albeit temporary – language regime specifically designed for migrants is, however, rarely spelled out. The literature looks at the language component of citizenship contracts, namely, language training,² the fairness of the host-society’s

1. For two opposing views in the debate about immigration and border control: Joseph H. Carens, *The Ethics of Immigration*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013; David Miller, “Immigrants, Nations, and Citizenship”, in: James S. Fishkin and Robert E. Goodin (eds), *Population and Political Theory*, Malden MA-Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010.

2. See, for example, Antony John Kunnan, “Language Assessment for Immigration and Citizenship”, in: Glenn Fulcher and Fred Davidson (eds), *The Routledge Handbook of Language Testing*, Abingdon: Routledge, 2012, pp. 162–177; Rainer Bauböck and Christian Joppke, *How Liberal are Citizenship Tests?*, European University Institute, Florence, 2012; Ricky van Oers, Eva Ersbøll and Dora Kostakopoulou, *A Re-definition of Belonging? Language and Integration Tests in Europe*, Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff, 2012; Andrew Shorten, “Linguistic Competence and Citizenship Acquisition”, in: Gideon Calder, Philip Cole and Jonathan Seglow (eds), *Citizenship Acquisition*

expectations regarding language skills, and best practices regarding efficient language acquisition within the broader picture of democratically-justifiable immigration policies. The goal is to integrate migrants (applicants for residency, and would-be citizens³) into the host-country by, among others, granting them access to language training and enabling them to acquire the official tongue.⁴

In this chapter, I try to imagine an alternative programme. Instead of discussing the fairness and the pitfalls of the linguistic aspect of current immigration policies,⁵ I look at a transitory language regime for newcomers through a combination of *ad hoc* multilingualism and *lingua franca*. By *ad hoc* multilingualism I mean the transitional and spontaneous co-presence of individual speakers of different languages in a given situation of communication where languages are mutually unintelligible.⁶ The type of *lingua franca* that I will consider will be referred to as Open English (OE),⁷ and builds on the model of pre-democratic *linguae francae*.

and National Belonging. Migration, Membership and the Liberal Democratic State, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010; Sara Wallace Goodman, "Controlling Immigration through Language and Country Knowledge Requirements", *West European Politics*, 34 (2), 2011, pp. 235–255; Thom Brooks, *Becoming British: UK Citizenship Examined*, London: Biteback Publishing, 2016.

3. In some cases refugees as well who are a special category of persons protected by the 1951 UNHCR Convention (<http://www.unhcr.org/1951-refugee-convention.html>). See Diana Eades, "Testing the Claims of Asylum Seekers: The Role of Language Analysis", *Language Assessment Quarterly* 6 (1), 2009, p. 30–40.

4. Citizenship testing comprises a language test in most European countries. In the UK, for example, the test is very expensive (£1226 plus extras): <https://www.gov.uk/life-in-the-uk-test/book-life-in-uk-test>, but a handbook is available to prepare for the test.

In Germany, the fees are relatively low (€ 25), and the country provides an online interactive training for the test: <http://www.bamf.de/EN/Willkommen/Einbuengerung/WasEinbuengerungstest/waseinbuengerungstest-node.html>. In The Netherlands, the naturalisation rate dropped by 50 per cent after the introduction of the test in 2003, the test costs are € 280. In France (loi no. 2011–672, 16 June 2011), the test is free of charge, but the material to prepare for it is quite costly; see <http://www.testdenationalite.fr>.

5. I have done so elsewhere: Benjamin Boudou and Astrid von Busekist, "Language Proficiency and Migration: An Argument against Testing", in: Michele Gazzola, Torsten Templin and Bengt-Arne Wickström (eds), *Language Policy and Linguistic Justice: Economic, Philosophical and Sociolinguistic Approaches*, Heidelberg: Springer, 2018, forthcoming.

6. In my last section, I add bilingual or multilingual "bridge-speakers" to my proposal.

7. Open English, in my definition, is a combination of different versions of World English (Jennifer Jenkins, *World Englishes*, London, Routledge, 2003), International English or Global English (David Crystal, *English as a Global Language*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), explored in the literature, including lingua franca English, LFE (Suresh Canagarajah,

As much of the literature on linguistic justice has been devoted to the best balance between linguistic diversity and a common language,⁸ I use these terms exactly but apply them to my proposal of a transitory fair regime for migrants. I aim to show that a *lingua franca* regime can co-exist with linguistic diversity and *ad hoc* multilingualism, and that this regime can be sustained transitionally by bilingual bridge-speakers; in short, that *ad hoc* multilingualism plus Open English is relevant in intermediary institutions and situations where newcomers are not (yet) competent in the host-country's language, and that the democratic requirements of inclusion and parity of esteem can be achieved through a creative non-permanent linguistic arrangement.

The goal is to encourage the co-presence of a special kind of *lingua franca* with linguistic diversity while welcoming *ad hoc* multilingualism in places relevant for

"Lingua Franca English, Multilingual Communities, and Language Acquisition", *The Modern Language Journal*, 91, 2007, Focus Issue, pp. 924–939), and English as a lingua franca, ELF (Barbara Seidlhofer, "Research Perspectives on Teaching English as a Lingua Franca", *Annual Review of Applied Linguistics* 24, 2004, pp. 209–239). In Kachru's view of World English for example, Open English would belong the outermost circle of his model, the less institutionalised one and the furthest away from "norm English" (Braj B. Kachru, *The Alchemy of English: The Spread, Functions, and Models of Non-native Englishes*, Chicago IL: University of Illinois Press, 1986).

Open English differs from ELF and LFE in the following sense: I understand OE as a contemporary version of Franco (see Jocelyne Dakhlia, *Lingua Franca, Histoire d'une langue méritée en méditerranée*, Arles: Actes Sud, 2008), for example, a form of spontaneous Esperanto meant for very basic communication, and for conveying very basic ideas, not for purposes of norm-language interaction.

I am aware that it is still a form of English and hence vulnerable to the critique of imperialism (led by Robert Phillipson, for example: *Linguistic Imperialism*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), but I am not claiming that OE is "neutral", nor do I advocate English as a global *lingua franca* in this chapter. English is, in my hypothesis, the best understood foreign language by those who master it the least well (Philippe Van Parijs, *Linguistic Justice for Europe and the Rest of the World*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011). Although I have little empirical proof, I would say that a vast majority of individuals have some notions (be it some words) of English. English, therefore, seems to have a degree of familiarity to virtually every speaker other languages do not have. Open English is a *pragmatic vocabulary re-invented by the participants in every specific situation of communication* and is therefore particularly well suited for newcomers as transitional means for communication.

8. The debate has been led, namely, by Philippe Van Parijs, who published his book *Linguistic Justice for Europe and the Rest of the World*, *op. cit.*, in 2011, after more than 20 years of publishing and refining his theory. For a recent discussion of Van Parijs' work, see Helder De Schutter and David Robichaud, "Van Parijsian Linguistic Justice – Context, Analysis and Critiques", in: *Linguistic Justice. Van Parijs and his Critics, Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy*, (2015) 18/2.

newcomers, for example, in intermediary institutions where speakers *should* have control over their own fate: (interaction with immigration administration, parents at their children's schools, the workplace, neighbourhood councils, and possibly local democracy⁹).

I firstly rely on a pre-democratic understanding of *linguae francae* where the purpose of a shared language is primarily pragmatic and not about identity. Adopting another language as a tool for communication does not mean abandoning our language-bound cultural identities, quite the opposite: historical *linguae francae* are *sui generis* blends of a multiplicity of linguistic ingredients and identities.

I secondly focus on *ad hoc* multilingualism, which I view as specifically relevant for newcomers. Newcomers participate in their own native tongue *and* in an idiosyncratic variety of English, possibly or additionally assisted by bridge-speakers. What matters is not the level of language, norm English, but mutual intelligibility and the conveying of basic ideas in transitory situations.

Before moving to a more detailed account of my proposal, I begin by laying out the traps of two dominant paradigms in language policy analysis: I warn against methodological nationalism and I re-qualify diversity as *participatory* diversity against “diversity as mixing”, and “diversity as juxtaposition” in Section I. I then present the two items of my proposal – *ad hoc* multilingualism and Open English – in Section II, and illustrate them with a table. I also add a proviso, “bridge-speakers” before concluding with some remarks on the desirability of my proposal in current language policies combining fair participation, and pragmatic integration of newcomers that are consistent with principles of fairness, parity of participation, and “parity of esteem” (Van Parijs, 2011). My account is not an alternative to Van Parijs’ model; rather, it supplements it with measures for newcomers. I pursue another goal, that of offering a transitory solution for migrants in situations of linguistic vulnerability.

1. Re-thinking diversity and nationalism

Designing a fair proposal demands that we keep some premises in mind: although it is important to remain sensitive to the beauty of languages, and the quality of the language, the more urgent question to be addressed regarding migrants is inter-comprehension, rather than aiming for immediate acquisition of the official

9. It is in these institutions and situations that individuals are the most vulnerable. My proposal serves to make interaction within these places smoother in order to resist domination and exclusion due to the non-mastery of the official tongue.

norm-language. Tackling the problem of access to the relevant *loci* for migrants, before aiming at participation in the civil society, in the workplace, and eventually in politics, despite linguistic shortcomings, means that we have to focus on the first generation,¹⁰ and invent intermediary enabling spaces of communication. By this, I mean imperfect *linguistic* interaction, but satisfactory basic *communication*, for example, the ability to convey basic ideas and to act upon them, even in the absence of a rich vocabulary and the right accent. Lastly, and most importantly, we need to include immigrants in our overall reflection on fair language policies. Migrants, applicants for citizenship, residents, all those who need linguistic skills to lead a meaningful life in their new host country, including children. The question of language training is the second step. I am concerned with the very first period of arrival in the host-country.

1.1 Two dominant paradigms: Identity and utility

Much has been written in recent years on fair language policies and the balance between the principles that should govern them (De Briey & Van Parijs, 2002; Van Parijs, 2003, 2011; Kymlicka & Patten, 2003; Grin & Gazzola, 2013; De Schutter & Robichaud's special issue on Van Parijs, 2015) but relatively little on fair language policies specifically designed for migrants (see Footnote 2). This may have to do with the *summa divisio* between the two major paradigms "language as identity", and "language as utility". I will argue in the following that both these paradigms struggle with nationalism and with defining diversity, or both. My proposal seeks to overcome this tension in the situations that I consider: both utility and identity are relevant, and one can look at them as complementary.

Let's look at language as identity first. Language is part of our most valuable self-identification (the subjective aspect), language is culture, and national or community culture is best expressed in a national or community language (the collective aspect), and hence demands loyalty to that specific nation, community, or group (Sandel, 1982; Walzer, 1983; Miller, 2005). States, in this paradigm, have a moral duty to accommodate language communities and provide access to a "societal culture" in the specific (minority) language (Kymlicka, 1995, 2001). Language belongs to our thick identity and is almost a functional equivalent to our comprehensive moral doctrines. Patten goes as far as to compare language to religion (Patten, 2003). However, in Kymlicka's view, we owe first nations and communities with a "full societal culture" more than we owe immigrant groups, as a question of *rights*

10. Instead of looking at the "third generation language shift" (Alba et al., 2002).

in a restorative perspective.¹¹ But if the rationale is to integrate immigrants (and Kymlicka favours transitory preferential treatment for immigrant groups), and to favour the development of a historical identity, then we must take the linguistic identity of immigrants into account and offer them the *means* to integrate beyond granting access to language training, at least in the first instance.

Language can also be conceived of as a mere tool, on the other hand, made to connect as many speakers as possible and create large networks of communication (de Swaan, 2001). In this scenario, languages have no “intrinsic value” (Réaume, 2000, who disagrees with this instrumental version), they serve as connecting devices. The more people they connect, the more useful they are. The more central to a virtually global language repertoire they are, the more useful they are, with English clearly being the ultimate hypercentral language (de Swaan, 2000).

This is as though there were thick (moral, linguistic) identities on the one hand, and cold rationality on the other.¹² In reality, both paradigms overlap to a certain extent, and, from a normative point of view, the relevant question is what kind of policies should democracies design in order to recognise both the intrinsic value of a language for its speakers and enable the efficiency of communication given the empirical fact of linguistic diversity. To what extent does the inclusion of migrant languages into fair language policies alter these paradigms? I believe that efficiency of communication with and among migrants may be achieved through *ad hoc* multilingualism (identity) and Open English (efficiency), at least as a transitional measure.

The *lingua franca* debate is often about the utility of global communication, mobility and the market.¹³ I agree with Van Parijs – who treats language skills in the same way as other morally arbitrary endowments or handicaps via an adapted

11. Kymlicka distinguishes multinationality and polyethnicity where multinationality is concerned with historical minorities or nations and polyethnicity with immigrant groups. The rationality regarding historical nations is to provide them with specific and quite far-reaching collective rights, whereas the rationality regarding immigrant groups is to facilitate integration while offering transitory preferential treatment. W. Kymlicka, *Politics in the Vernacular: Nationalism, Multiculturalism and Citizenship*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001.

12. A third model, offered by David Laitin (Laitin, 2000), is “procedural”, and not “outcome oriented”. In this model, linguistic preferences are morally neutral, a minimalist state practices benign neglect and displays no symbolic preferences for specific languages. This model is not really convincing, for states “speak”, they issue laws, they communicate with their constituency and cannot have a hands-off policy regarding languages.

13. The social and economic value of big languages (Pool, 1991a & b; de Swaan, 2001; Van Parijs, 2004), and at times about transnational political participation (the relevant constituency to discuss global problems cannot be the nation state, therefore we need a common language to solve them).

“difference principle” – that *lingua franca* proposals are fair only when they are designed to be compatible with allocative, distributive or cooperative justice (Van Parijs, 2011). The identity model is certainly more generous and subjectively more realistic, more sensitive to the psychology of individual speakers, whereas the utility model seems to be efficient in theory but does not keep its promises when it comes to evaluate costs or burden-sharing (Grin & Gazzola, 2013). The territorial proviso in Van Parijs’ linguistic justice model (Van Parijs, 2011), on the other hand, is an attempt to take identity into account, while preventing the exclusion of monolingual speakers from global English, and the erosion of smaller languages.

This is the general picture, but what about migrants? Do they fit into the model of territorial protection of languages plus *lingua franca*? I believe they do, but only after a transitional period in which states ought to cater for the immediate linguistic needs of migrants.

1.2 Two traps: Methodological nationalism and diversity as juxtaposition

The dominant paradigms (identity and utility) have to struggle with two additional issues: methodological nationalism, on the one hand, and the choice of the desirable type of diversity, on the other. Both are relevant for the debate on migrant language regimes in fair and democratic immigration policies. The identity paradigm is trapped by methodological nationalism, while the utility paradigm is trapped by an under-conceptualised definition of diversity.

Methodological nationalism is the nationalism of social scientists who remain committed to the nation state as a horizon for political action. Social sciences are state-centred (the normatively unjustified or unexplained legitimacy of the nation-state as a framework for analysis), territorialist (space is understood as divided into territories), and groupist (society is equated with “national society”) (Dumitru, 2014). In short, the state remains the normative framework for language policies. Methodological nationalism is so far reaching that, even in the literature on multiculturalism and even among the most mindful towards ethno-cultural (and thus linguistic) justice, such as Kymlicka (1995, 2001¹⁴), the relevant political

14. For historical minorities, anti-discrimination policies, affirmative action, and preferential policies maintain and protect cultures (“State multiculturalism” in Canada is a good example). The political rationality is to grant specific rights to promote the development of “historical identity” as we have mentioned above. Immigrants have specific needs, and should therefore be granted specific aid for targeted integration. As a liberal Kymlicka argues that we should guarantee civic rights and value personal autonomy. As a culturalist, that individuals can only be free if they identify with one societal culture.

boundaries are state-boundaries: it is within states that multiculturalism and linguistic justice can flourish.¹⁵

Diversity can mean different things. As a statement of facts, as an infra-political descriptive tool, diversity simply expresses that we are in the presence of many different kinds (of objects, goods, languages). As a normative, typically contemporary, political and liberal virtue, diversity is a “good”: a safe countermeasure against conservative or authoritarian unifying politics and hegemonic centralisation. But diversity unspecified really conflates two notions: diversity as mixing and diversity as juxtaposition.

Diversity in the sense of *mixing* may, in the long run, be detrimental to the weaker community. Diversity in the sense of *juxtaposition* is best understood when compared to social stratification in pre-modern political settings. In pre-revolutionary empires, communities, classes, and guilds shared one territory, under the rule of one sovereign but with virtually no contact among vertically-stratified groups. This kind of diversity is, *in principle*, incompatible with modern liberal democratic standards

15. See W. Kymlicka and K. Banting, “Immigration, Multiculturalism, and the Welfare State,” *Ethics and International Affairs*, 20 (3), 2006, pp. 281–304, in which the authors claim that integration is best achieved through the acknowledgment of the national project and the national narrative, in this case multicultural Canada. “immigrants are expected to accept the nation-building policies that accompany multiculturalism (with its expectation of learning an official language, naturalization, citizenship education, and so on), and to internalize the national narrative in which multiculturalism is portrayed as a distinctive and worthy collective national project.” (pp. 301–302). “[...] Notice that this happy compatibility of diversity and solidarity depends on preserving the category of national citizenship as a reference point for debates on the management of ethnocultural diversity. It is the willingness of immigrants to make a commitment to becoming Canadian citizens that sustains public commitment to multiculturalism, and if there were no tangible distinction between citizens and noncitizens, there would be no basis for this reciprocal commitment.” (p. 302) “[...] the reserving of certain rights and responsibilities for national citizens should not be dismissed as the relic of a nationalist ideology that has been rendered obsolete by diversity and global migration. Rather, it may be a crucial factor that enables states to deal with these new challenges.” (p. 304).

And: “From our perspective, postmodernists are right that multiculturalism has often become a tool of nation building, and a tool for normalizing immigrants as national citizens. We would argue, however, that this is legitimate and indeed desirable, so long as (a) the conception of national citizenship respects the legitimate minority and cultural rights of all groups, (b) the means used to promote this national identity are morally permissible, and (c) the resulting sense of national solidarity is used to advance legitimate public goals, including redistribution.”, note 39, p. 302.

Kymlicka does, however, argue in his *Multicultural Odysseys: Navigating the New International Politics of Diversity* (New York, Oxford University Press, 2007), that multicultural accommodations could be adapted to transnational entities such as the EU (Chapter 6).

if one wants to achieve an inclusionary participatory democracy, but points to a kind of diversity that we can witness in many places where groups and communities co-habit with almost no contact, no common language, and no common political and cultural values. In some places, legal or institutional pluralism even provides these groups with great autonomy.

So what kind of diversity do we really want to achieve?¹⁶ We want to avoid diversity that is detrimental to vulnerable communities which are dominated by hegemonic groups, but we also want to achieve meaningful diversity without simply juxtaposing entities. As democrats, in other words, we value horizontal communication among *individuals*. In the light of the moral relevance of identity, the political requirements of fairness, parity of participation and parity of esteem, diversity must be re-defined. Parity of participation is only possible by downplaying differences, and parity of esteem can only be achieved by recognising the equal moral weight of all participants regardless of their language skills.

I would like to argue that evaluating the fairness of language policies from a democratic point of view should be guided by the value of participation in public life. Democratic participation requires a common language or common languages. This seems pretty straightforward in Western democracies. But participation not only occurs through classical political channels (voting or protesting), it is also shaped both by and through intermediary associations and local institutions such as schools, companies, political *fora*, neighbourhoods, or town councils. These institutions are the ones with which migrants are first in contact, and they need some (linguistic) skills to be able to communicate in these places.

I suggest we use these intermediary institutions as relevant *loci* to reflect upon alternative ways of multilingual communication. I believe they are morally relevant spaces in which the impact and the power of individuals over their own (linguistic) fate should be maximal.

16. What kind of diversity is good for what kind of polity? Why is it better to have more than one colour, class, language, kind? Because it enhances the quality of democracy? Because it makes us better people?

Because its good for our GDP? The utilitarian-fairness model seeks to solve the diversity as mixing dilemma by mitigating its perverse effects (the unintended detrimental consequences for the weaker communities), but the solutions seem neither realistic nor desirable, neither in terms of costs (Grin, 2004; Gazzola & Grin, 2013; Gazzola, 2014), nor in terms of peoples willingness to share the burdens of language training. The utilitarian-fairness model also wants to avoid juxtaposition by introducing an overarching lingua franca (but doing so may re-introduce juxtaposition by means of the territoriality proviso).

1.3 Beyond territorial protectionism and diversity accommodation, two paradoxes

I have so far spelled out what I believe to be the problems in handling linguistic fairness regarding migrants: we need to re-think linguistic boundaries and re-frame the normative question regarding the democratic rationale for language policies in adding an element on the timeline: *ad hoc* multilingualism and Open English for newcomers before moving on to state-provided language training. Meanwhile, we have encountered two paradoxes.

The first paradox concerns methodological nationalism. The idea of a consubstantiality between language, nation, community, and territory is still relevant for language policies. For historical reasons, because past language policies were tied to nation building (Busekist, 1997, 1998, 2004, 2006, 2009); and because contemporary language policies cannot disregard boundaries. In some countries, language policies have even become means to *control* immigration (via language testing in civic integration contracts for example (Carens, 2003, 2011; Boudou & Busekist, 2018); in others they have served accommodationist policies, but rather *within* states (in Canada, India, or South Africa for example), and not across state borders.

Europe's language policy is based on the idea of the equality of, and "equal respect" due, to all European languages.¹⁷ The EU is committed to "diversity". But the EU defines that diversity from *within* the boundaries of the member states. The result is (a) diversity – juxtaposition as defined above, and (b) enhances the centrality of English clearly detrimental to Europe's small languages; as Abram de Swaan puts it: "the more languages, the more English". In other words we have yet to invent an alternative to territorially bound linguistic protectionism that includes immigrants, or design policies that are consistent with the *lingua franca* + territoriality principle while remaining fair to migrants.

The second paradox has to do with the respective weight of normative claims and empirical evidence, and divides idealists and realists, ideal and non-ideal theory. On the one hand, idealists argue that diversity maintenance is morally desirable, and economically sustainable. Numbers show that intra-European translations, for example, are less costly than in the Canadian federation (Vaillancourt & Coche, 2009), and Grin and Gazzola have shown that European multilingualism is not as expensive as opponents argue (Grin, Gazzola & Vaillancourt, 2015; Gazzola, 2013). On the other hand, proponents of a *lingua franca* regime do admit that English would lead to a huge problem of exclusion (*circa* 50% of Europeans do not

17. Decision No 1934/2000/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 July 2000 on the European Year of Languages 2001, available at: <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/GA/TXT/?uri=celex:32000D1934>.

master English¹⁸), but still find the burden of translation costs too high (Firdmuc, Ginsburg & Weber, 2004) and do not agree with the diversity lovers on alternative scenarios such as a set of three or more languages, free use of translation budgets, *etc.* (Ginsburg & Weber, 2012). In short, there is uncertainty about the empirical, social, political, democratic consequences of specific language policies. Is the goal to enhance the quality of democratic policies or to accommodate diversity? This is a crucial question: inclusion into the *demos* may mean a different kind of accommodation than territorial protection combined with *lingua(e) franca(e)*.

I argue that a linguistic democracy which includes specific policies for migrants (both the means to integrate into the *demos*, and accommodation of diversity) can be reconciled with specific *lingua franca* policies, that parity of participation and parity of esteem can be achieved through *ad hoc* multilingualism, that a certain pragmatism of *lingua franca* policies can be defended against charges of hegemony, domination, elitism and exclusion, and that the culture-bound morally convincing quest for linguistic diversity can be defended against charges of costly, and, to some, pointless, accommodation policies.

There are two conditions to a just language regime for migrants: (1) Open English as a *lingua franca* and *ad hoc* multilingualism; and, possibly or additionally, (2) the presence of bridge-speakers. These two principles support the values of democracy, for example, non-domination, equality, inclusion, diversity, and autonomy.

2. Open English and *ad hoc* multilingualism

2.1 *Lingua franca* and participatory diversity

The supporting idea of the first component of my proposal is to encourage the co-presence of linguistic diversity and a suitable *lingua franca*: to wit, Open English.

On which historical *lingua franca* models can we lean to construct a contemporary model? Pre-democratic *linguae francae* were all “imperial” without being

18. According to Gazzola, only 14 per cent of EU citizens speak English, only 21 per cent master English on a “fairly good level” as a second language in the Member states, and only 7 per cent to 8 per cent of the world population speaks English.

See Michele Gazzola, “The Linguistic Implications of Academic Performance Indicators: General Trends and Case Study”, *International Journal of the Sociology of Language*, no. 216, 2012, 131–156; see, also, M. Gazzola and F. Grin, “Is ELF more Effective and Fair than Translation? An Evaluation of the EU’s Multilingual Regime”, *International Journal of Applied Linguistics*, 23 (1), 2013, 93–107.

necessarily “imperialistic”,¹⁹ and pragmatic without being identitarian. In polyglot (juxtaposition-diversity) societies, *linguae francae* were non-problematical languages: used for administrative bilingualism where diglossia was the rule to manage vast territories, *linguae francae* were useful, relatively flexible (adaptable to the context and the speakers), and ecumenical (Dakhliya, 2008). Pre-democratic *linguae francae* therefore display neither the fairness problems that we face with contemporary English, nor the identity issues of national languages, as explained above. In pre-democratic settings, and in the absence of contemporary democratic values and principles, kinship is defined neither in terms of the horizontal citizenship of particular states, nor in national terms. Context-bound communication occurred within very small settings: only professionals (merchants, administrators or clergymen, for example) dealt with trans-contextual communication for pragmatic, liturgical or diplomatic reasons. It was neither fair nor unfair to have access to or to speak Greek, Latin or Franco, a language relating to the Mediterranean merchants: social stratifications were such in pre-national or pre-democratic empires, states, societies, that it would be anachronistic to reason in terms of fairness. Languages – in fact, a myriad of dialects, more or less related to sovereign languages – were not defined as a community good or as an outward sign of identity; they were not defined *vis-à-vis* *linguae francae*, and there was no policy designed to protect these languages. The relationship between speakers and languages was pragmatic.²⁰ *Linguae francae* were about individual and pragmatic diglossia, and, most importantly, they did not involve belonging or membership in a *demos*.

Consider Franco, the Mediterranean merchant’s language, (including the Southern Mediterranean, a bridge language between speakers of European and Semitic languages²¹): Franco was a hybrid language, something like a spontaneous Esperanto allowing people to communicate in a linguistic free-zone where languages met on a relatively neutral ground. Franco had no “territory”, no “centre”, no standardised grammar and no “owners”. It was a purely practical tool for communication.

19. The relationship between Latin and Christianity is certainly imperialistic, but the *lingua franca* which I have in mind, Franco, is not. One may also argue that linguistic imperialism in pre-democratic societies applies only to very small segments of literate individuals, clerks and administrators, and does not have the same impact as in contemporary post-nationalistic literate societies.

20. There were, of course, top-down attempts, even in early stages, to “nationalise” languages or to tie languages to specific sovereign territories. The story is well known. The édit de Villers Cotterêts under François I (1589) is an oft cited example.

21. Jocelyne Dakhliya, *Lingua Franca, Histoire d’une langue métisse en méditerranée*, Arles: Actes Sud, 2008.

That kind of *lingua franca* communication has, of course, changed with the rise of democracy and nationalism. Firstly, because national languages serve an entirely different purpose: they are meant for horizontal communication, they are meant to integrate into a nationwide web of literacy, to foster “context-free communication” (Chomsky, 1986, quoted by Gellner, 1983), for purposes of mobility within the boundaries of the national territory, and to form a political community (Busekist, 2008). Once national languages have been defined as signs of belonging – a good example of this is the way French was “nationalised” under the French Revolution (Busekist, 2004) – the balance between languages changes: every language now “belongs” to a people or *vice versa*.

Keeping this in mind, let’s turn to a functional equivalent of Franco. Is it too far fetched to consider Open English, as such, an equivalent? After all, Open English, like a *lingua franca*, has no real centre (neither the UK nor the US is such a centre, and therefore neither the UK nor the US are *hegemonic* providers of language related culture); it is a “hybrid” language (Canagarajah, 1997; Jenkins, 2009) with very little, if any, *a priori* norms (House, 2003); it is, like Franco, contextual, situational, and dynamic. It is also universal in the sense that every speaker has to learn it – even, to a certain extent, native speakers of norm-English, because of the amount of idiosyncrasies (Firth, 1996): there are as many languages as speakers. Open English is a multilingual, *sui generis* language.

2.2 *Ad hoc* transitional multilingualism

The supporting idea of *ad hoc* multilingualism is to encourage the co-presence of languages transitionally, preferably with the help of a multilingual *lingua franca* and bilingual speakers (see below), relying on willing translators and the cognitive flexibility of speakers. This proviso is meant to prevent embarrassing situations, in other words to support self-respect socially, and to prevent arbitrariness: every language has equal weight. In intermediary social institutions and situations in which newcomers are particularly vulnerable this kind of co-presence is valuable: it enables and empowers participants who do not master the official language(s) of the host-country.²²

The multilingual participation of newcomers in social situations of vulnerability may be counter-intuitive, *political* participation even more so. It may, however, be a means to rehearse political participation on a small scale, and represent a helpful

22. Individuals, findings show, prefer transitional situations, in academic settings especially studied by House: diglossic situations are preferred over immediate immersion (House, 2003: 567). Why would migrants prefer immediate immersion if even academics struggle with the host-country’s language?

transitory situation: *ad hoc* multilingualism is not meant to prevail. Non-ideal theory and policy recommendations demand pragmatism: how can migrants who do not master the official or national language(s) take charge of their lives under conditions of self-respect and parity of esteem? It is eventually desirable that migrants learn the host country's language, and it is desirable that members of the *demos* eventually speak a common tongue (official, national, franca), but intermediary situations are psychologically reassuring, immediately efficient and supportive of linguistic self-respect. Intermediary institutions are places where individuals can participate, integrate and interact in a meaningful way. This proviso fits the utility *and* the identity paradigm.

Our understanding of the relationship between linguistic diversity and the quality of democracy is empirically weak. Multilingual democracies are said to be more fragile, but in my proposal, democratic policies at micro and meso levels would actually be able to function: they are tailored to prevent exclusion and domination, and are meant to help migrants to make claims, to be heard in their first interactions with the host society. In the following, I try to summarise the strengths of each principle that I believe applies to my proposal. I will comment on them and explain what they achieve with regard to democratic principles in a table *infra*.

The following principles match democratic requisites and test the desired outcome of *ad hoc* multilingualism plus *lingua franca*. Compared to current situations in which migrants arrive without mastery of the host-country's language and have to rely on language training provided by the host-country, my proposal seems to be fairer and more efficient in the first instance.

Intercultural communication (versus acquisition plus use)

Ad hoc multilingualism and Open English ideally achieve inter-cultural communication²³ on the spot: interaction is facilitated and accelerated, compared to training/acquisition (step one) and use (step two). For "maxi-mean" purposes (Van Parijs, 2006: 5), this certainly imperfect use of communication skills via an imperfect language is second best to full mastery of the language and the social codes that come with speaking a language (Bernstein, 1973; Bourdieu, 2001). This principle is sensitive to the side-effects of poor speech in contexts of social injustice (Labov, 1972). It is also akin to "liberation linguistics".²⁴

23. House (2003), and Seidlhofer (2001, 2004) observe similar results for LFE.

24. "A general term for several forms of linguistic beliefs and practices that accent the sociopolitical dimension of language variation, is rooted in contexts of social injustice and seeks to transform these contexts radically in the interest of the speaker of the 'other tongue' – the non-native speakers." Bhatt (2001: 528).

This principle leans on my comprehension of Open English (see Footnote 7).²⁵ It is clear that this kind of English – and we should not be too restrictive in defining its exact scope – is, unlike national languages, and unlike second languages, meant for basic efficient communication only, especially communication among non-natives, whereas English as a second language is specifically taught to communicate with natives. It is a “language for specific purposes”, exactly like Franco or pre-democratic *linguae francae*, which all had common features with local languages and dialects, but were still considered *sui generis* languages (for administrators or merchants). For many linguists, supporters of *lingua franca* English in particular, Open English would be a “co-language”, additional to the native tongues, but not substitutive (Hüllen, 1992, 2003; Jenkins, 2009; Fiedler, 2011).

No standard (rather than no norms: Norms are negotiated ad hoc) versus domination by natives

Open English, but this is true for World English also, has no *a priori* fixed standard or norm. In so far as there is no standard, speakers are not evaluated according to a given standard (“norm language”), because Open English does not have such a standard, it is “hybrid in nature”.²⁶ Hybridity becomes the norm, in a “let it pass principle in which idiosyncrasies are overlooked”, (Firth, 1996: 243). The relevant concept is “community of practice” (as in ELF according to House, 2003: 573):²⁷ with a minimal set of grammatical rules, “contexts of intercultural global communication are unpredictable, and the mix of participants and purposes have to be encountered in real situations” (Canagarajah, 2007: 927).

In this on-going negotiation of only temporary norms, for the purpose of the present conversation, domination is downplayed: speakers do not comply with external repertoires and norms but elaborate them *hic et nunc*, together. Studies show that groups indeed negotiate *ad hoc* norms and seem to display high levels of group solidarity, inter-subjectivity, and cooperation. (House, 2003).

25. And resembles House’s definition of LFE: LFE (Lingua franca English), which “appears to be neither a restricted language for special purposes, nor a pidgin, nor an interlanguage, but one of a repertoire of different communicative instruments an individual has at his or her disposal, a useful and versatile tool, a ‘language for communication’. As such it can be distinguished from those other parts of the individual’s repertoire which serve as ‘languages for identification’”. (House, 2003: 557)

26. This is what Canagarajah (2007), says about *World English* (2007, 926).

27. “The activity-based concept of community of practice with its diffuse alliances and communities of imagination and alignment fits ELF interactions well because ELF participants have heterogeneous backgrounds and diverse social and linguistic expectations. Rather than being characterized by fixed social categories and stable identities, ELF users are agentively involved in the construction of event-specific, interactional styles and frameworks.” (House, 2003: 573).

Consensus and creativity

Seidlhofer, for example, argues for Lingua franca English, which she compares in its goal to politics in general, “overtly oriented towards compromise, consensus, mutual help, and solidarity” (Seidlhofer, 2004: 218). While I do not necessarily agree with that definition of politics, she has a point in stressing the consensual rather than the agonistic linguistic interaction.

Creativity may even be the main characteristic of a peaceful, compromise seeking interaction, and may allow for specific cultural influences to enchant and to enhance the common language. Bhatt goes even further by arguing that LFE (a more elaborate version compared to Open English where English is redefined as “multi-canon”) is culture-sensitive and is able to convey socially appropriate meanings²⁸ without domination:

English is used as a medium to present canons unrelated to traditional Judeo-Christian associations or the European cultural heritage of the language. Thus the English language has become ‘multicanon’. (Bhatt, 2001: 538)

Creativity in English is determined less by the usage of native speakers and more by the usage of non native speakers, who outnumber native speakers.

(Bhatt, 2001: 528)²⁹

Cultural autonomy and reciprocity versus acculturation or (summoned) integration

Open English escapes domination because the purpose of using it is not to become member of another community (as in the classical timeline: integration, acculturation or assimilation). It is rather about reciprocity:³⁰ even Canagarajah – who is critical *vis-à-vis* ELF – believes that “mutual interests permit individuals to move in and out of multiple communities to accomplish their goals”, and “paradoxically,

28. “I am convinced that ‘native speaker’ in the sense of the sole arbiter of grammatically or one whose intuitions of a proprietary nature about his or her mother tongue and which are shared only by others of his own tribe is a myth propagated by linguists, that the true meaning of the lexeme ‘native speaker’ is a proficient user of a specified language, and that this meaning satisfies all contexts in which linguists, anthropologists, psychologists, educators, and others use it, except when it directly refers to the speakers mother tongue or first-acquired language without any assumptions about the speaker’s linguistic competence” (Bhatt, 2001: 540, 541), quote from T.M. Paikeday, *The Native Speaker is Dead!*, Toronto: Paikeday, 1985.

29. “Indian writing in English is but one of the voices in which India speaks. It is a new voice, no doubt, but it is as much Indian as the others”; “innovations in their structure and use [in new/indigenous varieties] reveal a linguistic response to the constraints of the grammar of their respective native cultures” (Bhatt, 2001: 537, 538).

30. Reciprocity being a key concept for fair language situations within political liberalism.

culture specific strategies *complement* intercultural communication” (Canagarajah, 2007: 927). In other words, cultural and individual autonomy is protected, and domination is downplayed.³¹

*No territoriality (versus nationalism or hegemony)*³²

Open English has another important virtue: it is anti nationalistic. It is immune to methodological nationalism, and every form of constrained territoriality. Open English has no territory of reference, language “communities” are virtual, and resources are shared in a heterogeneous linguistic and cultural setting. Territory and language are disconnected. That does not mean that individual speakers are homeless, quite the contrary: their national, cultural, ethnic and territorial roots inform OE and render it “polycentric” (Bhatt, 2001). It is a language beyond borders. Therefore this kind of English cannot be accused of imperialism (*contra* Phillipson, 2008) nor of universalism, in the sense of universally valid norms.³³ Phillipson may be right about the imperialism of “standard” English, he may even have a point when he argues that the template for LFE or World English is after all English. I believe however, that we should move beyond the stigma of imperialism and address questions of cross cultural communication pragmatically in a non-ideal framework. And I see no contradiction in encouraging a means of communication – be it derived from English – and the promotion, Phillipson cherishes, of native tongues. As I have said before, I am not offering an alternative model, and even if

31. In India for example, there is a “stupendous competence in LFE” that comes from language awareness and socialization in the native communities which have unclear and blurred boundaries as to languages and dialects. Multiple memberships and multilingualism are so much the rule that it is difficult to tell which of them is the “mother tongue”, Khubchandani (1997). “The difference between Punjabi and Hindi, Urdu and Hindi, Dogri and Punjabi, and Konkani and Marathi can be explained only through a pluralistic view of languages”; “Acknowledging the heterogeneity of language and communication would force us to develop more democratic and egalitarian model’s of community and communication” (Canagarajah, 2007: 931 and 934).

32. Robert Phillipson believes that English as a *lingua franca* is precisely that: hegemonic and imperialistic. Not through effective imperialism, but rather through soft power. The British Council for example imposes norms, legitimates their use and encourages native domination). The asymmetric relationship between producers and consumers of norms is internalised as natural and heteroglossic and hierarchical arrangement of languages are pervaded by hegemonic value judgements, ideologies, symbolic and material investments (Bhatt, 2001). English as a commercial *lingua franca*, on the other hand, is linked to the economic supremacy of the US. See Phillipson (2013). As I have argued above, I do not contest the fact that English, even Open English, is not a neutral language. But this does not matter for my proposal.

33. Interestingly, miscommunication in LFE situations occurs with English natives only, as they tend to treat their own local norms as universally valid (House, 2003 quoted by Canagarajah, 2007: 929).

I do believe that Van Parijs' model (English as a lingua franca plus territoriality) is indeed vulnerable to Phillipson's critique regarding hegemony, my proposal serves only transitory situations and looks at a specific set of speakers.

Pragmatic versus identitarian

As in pre-democratic *linguae francae*, although the content of exchanges remains crucial, it is the situation that pragmatically commands the practices. This is why OE is a language for communication and not a language for identification.³⁴ "Contextual identities" trump thick national identities. The latter remain intact and important, the contextual identity is an additional and temporary layer. One may add, from a utilitarian standpoint: "What brings people together is not what they share (language, discourse, values), but interests to be accomplished" (Canagarajah, 2007: 931). In that sense, identities are based on *affiliation* and *expertise* rather than ascribed by birth, family, race, or blood (Canagarajah, 2007: 939, quoting Rampton, 1990). Communicative skills and intelligibility trump ideology and identity.³⁵

Communication versus translation

Direct communication is encouraged over translation. Translations are necessary of course,³⁶ but, in this model, they are *ad hoc* and unprofessional: they occur during the exchange, and they are carried out by participants in the conversation.³⁷

34. This is consistent with what House says about ELF: "Because ELF is not a national language, but a mere tool bereft of collective cultural capital, it is a language usable neither for identity marking, nor for a positive 'integrative' disposition toward an L2 group, nor for a desire to become similar to valued members of this L2 group, simply because there is no definable group of ELF speakers. ELF users, then, use ELF as a transactional language for their own communicative purposes and advantage." (House, 2003: 560).

35. Such a largely utilitarian motive seems to me to be incompatible with viewing ELF users, as I take, for example, Phillipson (1992) to do, as "pawns" in an imperialistic game, where formerly militaristic and colonial inroads are now linguistically replayed. There is a sad truth behind de Swaan's (2001) assessment of the politically correct fight against "linguistic imperialism", "linguicism" and the proclamation of everybody's right to speak the language of their choice. "Alas," he writes, "what decides is not the right of human beings to speak whatever language they wish, but the freedom of everybody else to ignore what they say in the language of their choice." (2001: 52). If one wants to communicate beyond one's own local circle, one will have to (and often want to) learn a language which links one with wider circles of communication, with a language with a high "communication value (Q-value)" (de Swaan, 2001: 33ff.) (House, 2003: 560).

36. Linguistic disadvantages can be fixed instrumentally by providing translation services, subsidies, incentives, tax breaks, and so on. See Ruth Rubio-Marín, "Language Rights: Exploring the Competing Rationales", in: Will Kymlicka and Alan Patten (eds), *Language Rights and Political Theory*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003, pp. 52–79.

37. (Written) translations, such as those of the EU, for example, pose a larger problem not only regarding accuracy and quality (Ginsburgh & Weber, 2012), but also regarding the veritable role

Conclusion: Equality and non-exclusion, identity and interest

Everything we have said shows that OE is step one for an egalitarian language policy designed for migrants. OE is made of as many languages as speakers participating in the conversation, because it seeks common ground while making room for local variations. OE acknowledges equality and partnership. Every speaker is treated in exactly the same way, exclusion is virtually impossible, and so is domination. There are no pre-conditions for entering the conversation, no judgements or *a priori* assumptions about linguistic competence, and no pre-conditions for membership in an ephemeral community.

Skills are complementary. The language situation in India, according to Khubchandani or Canagarajah, although they look at the natives of the different languages of the Subcontinent, should inspire language policies designed for migrants:

the edifice of linguistic plurality in the Indian subcontinent is traditionally based upon the complementary use of more than one language and more than one writing system for the same language in one space. (Khubchandani, 1983: 96)

If social spaces feature complementary and not exclusive use of languages, mixing of languages is the norm, not the exception. (Canagarajah, 2007: 931)

As David Crystal puts it:

We may, in due course, all need to be in control of two standard Englishes – the one which gives us our national and local identity, and the other which puts us in touch with the rest of the human race. In effect, we may all need to become bilingual in our own language. (Crystal, 1988: 265)

Table 13.1 Democratic expectations, *lingua franca* and *ad hoc* multilingualism

Principles	OE	<i>Ad hoc</i> multilingualism
Equality & non exclusion	Let it pass principle and idiosyncrasies	Equality as complementarity
Equality & parity of participation	Negotiate language on equal terms	Access to administration, institutions
Parity of esteem & cooperative justice	Speakers participate on equal terms, are equally respected	Language diversity as value Morally, culturally, politically relevant

(continued)

translations play in EU discourses on equality. The EU translation bureau “translates the EU’s illusion of equality into an illusion of facile translatability” it is “important that the translation exists, not what it is like...”, Kaisa Koskinen, 2000, “Translating in EU Commission, *The Translator*, 6, 2000, pp. 49–66. “The pertinent question for the EU is not so much ‘How many languages’ or ‘Which languages’ as ‘How should the mediation between speakers of different languages be organized?’ Improving your own communication potential by learning English (the rational choice answer) is only one of the many options available.” (Mamadouh, 2002: 341).

Table 13.1 (continued)

Principles	OE	<i>Ad hoc</i> multilingualism
Equity & non domination	No elitism Competence is irrelevant Performance trumps competence	No elitism Competence is irrelevant No high language Fair distribution of cultural burdens
Diversity & non exclusiveness	<i>Ad hoc</i> norms, open	Contingent, no <i>a priori</i> language rule, not outcome oriented
Recognition	Collective action (not us <i>v.</i> them)	Maximum control over social, economic life and environment Multilingualism as asset instead of threat
Security	Language are secured and tied to individuals	Language differences are valued and safe
Pragmatic & Utile	Intercultural communication is enhanced without sacrificing individual languages / speakers	One-language speakers are not discouraged
Imperialism	Linguistic and cultural heterogeneity without borders	Millet Principle
Cultural Autonomy	Communities of practice	Communities of speech
Identity & membership	Thick identities remain untouched Language identity is relative to the communities and languages one considers salient in different contexts	Multiple memberships Language identity is relative to the communities and languages one considers salient in different contexts
Reciprocity	Shared resources	Shared resources
Consensus & Creativity	Consensus oriented, cooperative, mutually supportive	No competition / no hierarchy between language groups
Majority & Minorities	Shared responsibility for communication, efficiency	Shared commitment to democracy and immigration Commitment to sustain multilingualism
Territoriality	Virtual territories	<i>Ad hoc</i> temporary spaces of communication

2.3 *Ad hoc* multilingualism plus bridge speakers

Let's now take a look at situations in which the kind of approach discussed above may be useful, while adding bilingual bridge speakers. The underlying idea being that, in diglossic situations, everybody speaks his or her own language or a set of languages, and bilinguals, if present, act as "bridges" (Rodriguez, 2006³⁸).

Individual bilingualism of "bridge-speakers", who are not necessarily natives,³⁹ and *ad hoc* multilingualism are meant to promote participation in what we have defined as intermediary institutions: administrations dealing with migrants, employment offices, hiring companies, parent-teacher meetings in schools, neighbourhood councils and the like. Gender equality is taken into account: (single) mothers with children, for example, who are unable to interact with teachers and other parents are encouraged to participate.⁴⁰

Participation is therefore firstly understood as "access" (Rodrigues, 2006) to relevant institutions before being framed as *political* participation (but there really is a continuum: participation in relevant spheres for the individual goes from being a parent to participating in political assembly). In this sense, the addition of bridge speakers is tailored for the less endowed in a different way than Van Parijs' maxi-mean or maxi-min principle, but with similar expectations: social support for self-respect in Rawlsian terms. This addition to my proposal also rejects the idea that interests and motivations have to be mutually intelligible for all in all places, and at all times. The proposal advocates different, simultaneous arenas or spheres, and fluid forms of participation.

38. "Making such communication possible ultimately depends on the development of bilingual agents. Through bilingual and multilingual participants, communication can occur across groups. Facilitating the complex communicative interests of a multilingual society thus requires acknowledging that human resources, in the form of individual bilinguals, are both necessary and worth developing. In other words, human resources in the form of members of sub-communities exist and can help bridge language barriers. Even the United States Supreme Court has recognized the potential of these resources." (Rodriguez, 2006: 724).

39. The "bridge-speakers" can also be immigrants, newcomers with more linguistic experience, than their fellow migrants.

40. "When speakers of different languages inhabit the same space, friction often results. In January 2005, for example, a child-court judge in Tennessee made headlines for ordering a number of non-English speaking women involved in custody or neglect disputes to take English language classes for 'the good of their children'. In at least one case, the court apparently threatened that failure to comply within six months would result in the termination of parental rights." (Rodriguez, 2006: 688).

Diversity is defined here neither as diversity-mixing, nor as diversity-juxtaposition, but rather as “fair distribution of ‘cultural burdens’” (Rodriguez, 2006): everyone has to battle against incomprehension. Both the majority and the minority are responsible and in charge of the cultural and linguistic consequences of immigration. The absence of linguistic vulnerability and the chances of being heard, the opportunity to make one’s claim in one’s own language produces confidence and hence participation, engagement and efficiency (especially for parents and in the workplace).

Ad hoc multilingualism matches multiple, non-exclusive, membership: thick cultural identity expressed in the individual’s mother tongue is sustained, and interaction beyond the community is enabled via *ad hoc* multilingualism helped by bridge-speakers. Identity and utility are linked but belong to two complementary, fluid and overlapping spheres.⁴¹

As in the first set of principles (before adding bridge-speakers), the question of territoriality is not relevant. Territoriality is a collective good designed for groups to protect their linguistic integrity from free-riders, in other words, it protects languages. In my proposal, individuals (migrants) are the relevant items, not groups (Johnstone, 2000). And as in the first series, communicational interest comes first. Overlapping spheres are more important than a constellation or a hierarchical ordering of languages as in de Swaan’s model (de Swaan, 2001). Spheres allow more flexible policies, travelling among and within spheres. Access to a multiplicity of associations and groups without any *a priori* competences are possible. Bilingual speakers, or bridge-speakers communicate across spheres and across groups.

Adding bridge-speakers highlights equity, rather than equality. There should be no discontent among groups, and no discontent among individuals. My proposal is fair both individually and collectively. As in the first series, elitism or domination are downplayed because native competence is irrelevant, and because there is no norm language involved. The way in which Fraser and Honneth frame recognition and parity of participation (Fraser & Honneth, 2003) as a way of alleviating class, gender, and culture biases in democratic theory can be exported to language matters: only in situations in which such biases are systematically downplayed can participation occur.

A heavy preference for monolingualism will limit the forms of political expression available to a citizenry and risk alienating non dominant segments of society from politics.
(Rodriguez, 2006: 750)

41. In a Project called *Communicating in English as a lingua franca* House found that “transfer of foreign conventions into ELF discourse does not lead to misunderstandings” (House, 2003: 567); in other words, cultural identity through language exists regardless of the specific language of communication.

In intermediary social institutions, individuals should have maximal control over their own lives and environment. As they do not have to comply (at least temporarily) to norms and standards which they have not contributed to elaborate, using one's own language is no longer a threat, and *ad hoc* multilingualism becomes an asset. Multilingualism, in this context, actually becomes an asset for all citizens, not just for migrants: the sheer presence of a multiplicity of languages could be seen as a positive contribution to linguistic and cultural pluralism. Bridge-speakers act as ambassadors, and display some kind of civic virtue in enabling communication with newcomers. Rodriguez, for example, quotes examples of county public schools in Florida where language diversity is understood as a promotion for participation in both language groups (Rodriguez, 765).

Ad hoc multilingualism, supplemented by OE and bridge-speakers is hence a type of affirmative action: an *affirmative multilingualism*. It is valuable and enabling for the targeted individuals and bears a wider social and educational benefit.⁴² Its main goal is to foster inter-comprehension among disconnected individuals and communities, and eventually to enhance the quality of democratic participation and voice.⁴³

Conclusion

In this chapter, I have tried to revise the classical idea of *lingua franca* policies through an alternative ethic of communication.

My proposal is modest – it aims at satisfactory basic communication rather than deep linguistic interaction – it is sensitive to the weakest speakers, migrants with no or poor linguistic skills in the host-society's language(s), and it is consistent with important democratic principles, namely, linguistic fairness and social support for parity of esteem (Van Parijs, 2011). I highlighted equality and reframed diversity. The proposal is modest for another reason: it is concerned with the micro and meso levels of social interaction, intermediary institutions where individuals should have a say over their own fate. Fair access to these institutions is crucial to a just and democratic immigration policy: interaction with the host-country and integration are encouraged without the burden of having to master the official tongue from the start. The first contact with the host-society is both determining and important for

42. This is how Dworkin views affirmative action. Ronald Dworkin (2003), "The Court and the University", *New York Review of Books*, 50 (8): 15; idem (2004), "What the Court Really Said", *New York Review of Books*, 51 (13): 12.

43. Again, I am concerned with a continuum that runs from admission to residency and eventually to citizenship.

newcomers, who need to take care of practical issues before moving on to proper language training in the official or national language(s).⁴⁴ Bridge-speakers act as translators in given situations. Civic commitment is encouraged, democracy is rehearsed on a small scale.

The first part of my proposal rehabilitates the utility of pre-democratic *linguae francae* through what I have called Open English. Although the travel in time and across political normativities is a bit rough, and probably needs some more elaboration, the idea is to bypass two of the major problems posed by contemporary *lingua franca* policies: identity and nationalism. OE is, like Franco, for example, a pragmatic tool that supplements, instead of replaces, native languages. Such a multilingual *lingua franca* escapes strict norms and domination by natives, but allows for identities to be expressed.

The addition of bridge-speakers is pragmatic. In situations of weak or no linguistic overlap, a multilingual *lingua franca* is useful for the reasons spelled out above, and bilingual bridge-speakers smooth situations involving speakers of mutually unintelligible languages. *Ad hoc* multilingualism (as opposed to individual bilingualism) is conceived as a transitional, rather than a permanent, situation. It would not make sense to include newcomers, immigrants, foreign workers and would-be citizens, as I do, without insisting on the desirability of eventually learning the host country's language for all kinds of good reasons: employability, mobility, integration, successful application for citizenship, *etc.* (Boudou & Busekist, 2018). Participation in intermediary institutions and associations is the first step towards political participation and inclusion.

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44. We have discussed the principles that should guide polities in implementing language training elsewhere, see Boudou and Busekist, 2018, op. cit.

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European integration and the variety of languages

An awkward co-existence

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While formal EU law acknowledges the equality of the 24 languages of the Member States, practice has sanctioned the blatant hegemony of the English language over the years, and the United Kingdom has now decided to leave the European Union. Most social scientists do not care about this situation. As members of a trans-European elite, they privilege the certainties of a standardised European English over the strict demands of science and truth that need pluri-lingualism. But there is more to pluri-lingualism than being an indispensable vector to rigorous social science. Language is also indispensable for politics and, as politics is now made in English in the European Union, non-speakers of English now face exclusion from full participation in politics. Contrary to received wisdom, this concerns the majority of European citizens. One key obstacle to the modification of language practices across the Union lies in the structural features of EU law itself, with regard to its very conception of language as a discriminating instrument.

Introduction

In official publications, there is no limit to praising the riches of cultural diversity, especially linguistic diversity and multilingualism brought to the European Union (EU). The Union regularly commissions groups of “intellectuals” to write reports¹ which keep supporting a presumed “union in diversity”. Is this unanimous assessment to be confirmed when checked against actual language practice in the EU

1. See, for instance, the Report by the “Group of Intellectuals to advise the European Commission on the contribution of multilingualism to Intercultural Dialogue” published in 2008, and the Report “Enhancing motivation for language learning” by the “High Level Group on Multilingualism” published in 2007, available at: europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-07-1396_fr.pdf, last accessed 27 August 2015.

institutions? A sociological analysis quickly shows that the answer to this question is negative: a considerable gap exists between the political correctness of texts and real practice. In the first section of this chapter, we will show that, while formal EU law acknowledges the equality of the languages of the Member States through various legal instruments (Treaties and Charters, as well as linguistic regimes), *de facto* practice has long since sanctioned the blatant hegemony of the English language. For many social scientists, this has not raised any difficulty and they contend that there is no language question in Europe. As sociologists, we beg to differ for one simple reason: politics in Europe are increasingly made in English, and those citizens who have no access to English competence are disadvantaged. In a second section, this *de facto* situation provides the opportunity for a transitory reflection about the notional feasibility of public policies, especially at the EU level, that could redress or mitigate this source of inequality among EU citizens. Although this chapter does not wish to elaborate on the normative ways and means, it can but acknowledge that very little social support exists for such public intervention. In a third section, however, we contend that, in the direction of more variety and multilingualism, a probably even stronger obstacle to the modification of language practices across the Union lies in the structural features of EU law itself, with regard to its very conception of language: moreover, the EU has no special competence in terms of language policy. In conclusion, introducing more multilingualism, more language diversity and more pluri-lingualism in political practices related to European integration not only demands gathering support for policies to promote them, but also support for changing some core functioning of EU law. Let us start from primary EU law² and explore the way it deals with the issue of linguistic diversity, before checking language use in EU institutions for political and administrative activity (Kjær & Adamo, 2011). Confronting EU law and actual practice shows a striking discrepancy, because of the hegemony of what, in sociological terms, we could call “European English”.³

2. *Primary legislation* is the law of the Treaties, whereas Directives and Regulations are EU *secondary legislation*. EU law stemming from case law is referred to as *supplementary law*.

3. Calling it European English allows for distinguishing it from British or American English (Barbier, 2015a). This is one variant of English and it has a more limited currency as what is often named “English as lingua franca” or “lingua franca English”. European English is used in EU forums but also on a wider scale. The European Court of Auditors (Secrétariat général, Translation Directorate, “Misused English Words and Expressions in EU Publications”, September 2013) issued a report about the limits of this English (online publication: available at: http://ec.europa.eu/translation/english/guidelines/documents/misused_english_terminology_eu_publications_en.pdf, last accessed 27 August 2015).

1. When formal equality between national languages meets “all-English” practice and when the legitimacy of the EU is challenged by various linguistic factors

Political communication by EU elite groups has played for a long time with the positively staged symbols of European identity and the “united in diversity” motto (Kraus, 2008: 48–49); moreover, as citizen trust in the EU was quickly dwindling in the years of the economic crisis (2007/8-?), officials in the Commission tried to stick to what was always thought of as an outstanding asset of European integration, the combined value of European cultures (Barbier, 2015a).

1.1 Impeccable primary law

With regard to *primary law*, its letter is entirely unambiguous: equal status for all official languages is the rule without any restriction. As Article 55-1 TFEU (Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union), commonly known as “Lisbon” Treaty [ex Article 53 TEU]⁴ reads:

This Treaty, drawn up in a single original in the Bulgarian, Czech, Danish, Dutch, English, Estonian, Finnish, French, German, Greek, Hungarian, Irish, Italian, Latvian, Lithuanian, Maltese, Polish, Portuguese, Romanian, Slovak, Slovenian, Spanish and Swedish languages, the texts in each of these languages being equally authentic, shall be deposited in the archives of the Government of the Italian Republic, which will transmit a certified copy to each of the governments of the other signatory States.

As a consequence, EU law is only binding for a citizen when written in his or her language (Kjær & Adamo, 2011). Similarly, as of principle, versions of decisions and legislation are considered equally valid in whatever official language. “Respect” for “its rich cultural and linguistic diversity” features among the highest superior European values listed in Article 3 TFEU [ex Article 2 TEU], as sustainable development, equality between men and women, social and territorial cohesion. A complement to Article 55, Article 20 (TFEU) establishes the right of citizens to use their language when they relate to the EU and its institutions. On top of this, the Union’s Charter of Fundamental Rights⁵ encompasses additional explicit provisions. Since the Charter is referred to in Article 6 of the TFEU [ex Article 6 TEU], its legal value is equal to the Treaty’s. Among its provisions, Article 22 reads:

The Union shall respect cultural, religious and linguistic diversity.

4. Treaty on the European Union (TEU), EU Official Journal, 26.10.2012.

5. Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, EU Official Journal, 18.12.2000.

Hence, as far as primary legislation is concerned, the EU's normative commitment in favour of linguistic diversity and multilingualism in general is beyond doubt. It should nevertheless be remarked that the legal statement of the respect for linguistic diversity is not strictly considered as a general principle of EU law (Vanhamme, 2007: 366); as will be seen later, this brings about the consequence that linguistic diversity may be hierarchically submitted to other superior principles of the EU legal order. The latter have been established over the years as derived from the case law of the European Court of Justice (ECJ; the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) after the Treaty of Lisbon came into force). From a formal legal point of view, the principle of equal status of official (national) languages has been maintained from the early stages of the European Communities and in the European Union. It has been strongly associated with the Member States' common support of the symbolic equality that they are entitled to as national states. The principle informs the present *linguistic regime of the Union*, which was first enacted by Regulation no 1 of the Council in 1958. At that time, the Union had only four languages – Dutch, German, Italian and French – for six countries, all being at the same time “official languages” and “the working languages of the institutions of the Community”. The regime was extended to the present 24 languages, three of them enjoying a status of working languages (German, French and English), a status which is *not, however, formally legal*. Moreover, the various institutions of the EU have linguistic regimes of their own: for instance, the European Parliament has a multilingual regime and all languages are admitted in its political process. Incidentally, Gazzola (2006) has shown that this regime was not in the least economically unsustainable, as many economists and experts wrongly claim. The working language of the Court of Justice of the European Union is French – a language regime which is not formalised in EU law – and its decisions are first taken and published in French (after which they are translated and made authentic in all other official languages).

1.2 “All-English” dominant trend in the practice of EU institutions

The formal equal status of the 24 languages of the European Union is, however, radically limited in the real world, as actual language practice within EU institutions contradicts the letter of the treaties. In this chapter, we focus on the linguistic circumstances of the making and enacting of binding law (this includes primary and secondary legislation but also certain legal decisions by the Commission⁶). As we will see, this type of law enjoys a special status with regard to translation.

6. For a systematic discussion of the legal effects of EU legislation and the distinction hard/soft law, see Guinard (2009, p. 143 *et seq.*)

On the other hand, when EU institutions only “communicate” or when soft law is concerned, their standards of translation are entirely different. Legal translation, by contrast, is strictly controlled and, as a consequence, is the preserve of special legal departments in the Council, the Parliament and the Commission, while mainstream translation falls under the responsibility of Directorate General for translation and interpretation. Hence, the situation in the domain of binding law and the special legal departments is essential to consider when one wishes to assess the actual role of languages.

For instance, the powerful EU Council administration employs a great number of lawyer-linguists⁷ in its Directorate for Quality of Legislation, who work on texts that are almost always drafted in English nowadays (95%, the remaining 5% supposed to be in French) (Barbier & Colomb, 2015). Their strategic function is to deal with the first steps of pieces of legislation once their principle has been agreed upon by the Member States. The existence of working languages such as German and French, as well as the mainstream recourse to pivot languages in translations does not affect this situation of hegemony of the English language. This is why linguists often refer to the EU linguistic regime as *de facto* “all-English” (Oustinoff 2008). Controversies nevertheless regularly happen in the day-to-day functioning of EU institutions. These conflicts result from the mundane and often unpredictable statements and attitudes of officials, politicians and administrative officers who insist on speaking their own national language during meetings. Once, a Finnish Minister refuses to read the English version of his original Finnish opening talk at a meeting. Another time, in 1999, Gerhard Schröder refused to sign a text that was not translated in German. Such symptoms of a permanent unease are repetitive and well known among EU officials, but they are generally discarded as unimportant and ignored. Another example can be drawn from a different, but often observed, situation: for some particular occasions, the European Commission publishes documents in English only, failing to post their translations on the official website. This was, for instance, the case at the end of May 2012, when a controversy was started and reported on one of the most famous “blogs” in Brussels.⁸ A veritable sea of 1,500 pages had been suddenly posted in English on the Commission’s website, regarding the fiscal and financial situation of Member States, and translated versions never materialised. At the beginning of 2013, in another case, after lengthy

7. At the time of our interviews in the department, there were four lawyer-linguists for each of the 24 official languages.

8. See, for instance, Jean Quatremer’s blog “I want you to speak English or to get out”, 31 May 2012, available at: <http://bruxelles.blogs.liberation.fr/2012/05/31/peut-on-gouverner-une-zone-euro-qui-compte-330-millions-de-citoyens-dans-une-langue-qui-est-parlee-que-par-moins-de-5-mi>, last accessed 11 November 2015.

consultations, the Commission published what can be considered as the single most important social policy text in the years 2009–2015, *i.e.*, the “Social Investment Package Communication” [COM(2013) 83 final 20.2.2013]. The communication (as a “binding” text) was translated into the 23 languages at the time, but its “accompanying documents” were never translated and will presumably never be. A similar situation happens every year for the texts involved in the “European Semester” procedure.⁹ These are but three instances of a very common practice that all Member States and all EU officials, in fact, condone: *all-English*. Unfortunately, it brings about another confirmation of what philosopher Philippe Van Parijs theorised under the name of an apparently inexorable mechanism, *i.e.*, the “maximin”, which he praises as a step toward English as a common language among elites (Van Parijs, 2011: 13–21). According to the mechanism, wherever a dialogue takes place between foreigners, they eventually choose English because English is always the language that the smaller number of participants do not understand at all. Despite the letter and principles of EU law, despite the special “*Öffentlichkeit*” that the European Parliament represents, because of its special linguistic regime, the hegemonic language use in EU forums is European English, *i.e.*, an *ad hoc* variety of international English shared by the participants in transnational and supranational areas of communication at “EU level”. Moreover, the law-making process within the various EU forums (notably, the political communication forum, but also the policy community forums) and the formal institutions, as well as the press and media, increasingly entail discussion and exchange of texts in English. European English, distinct from British English, has become the dominant language of European politics, because it is the language spoken by elites in the European transnational forums and arenas of politics (Barbier, 2015a). If all European citizens were equally learned and competent in the English language, the hegemonic use of English would have a limited impact.¹⁰

1.3 The exclusion from English for a majority of EU citizens and the increasing practice of politics in English

But the situation is very different: those citizens who are excluded from English (Gazzola, 2014) are *ipso facto* excluded from politics. They may keep their linguistic rights in the sense referred to in the first sections of the present chapter but they

9. For instance, in 2017, for the Communication on Country Reports, delivered only in German, French and English, see https://ec.europa.eu/info/strategy/european-semester/european-semester-timeline/analysis-phase_en.

10. What always remain anyway are inevitable misunderstandings linked to political communities and cultures (Barbier, 2015a).

are left with only one possibility, *i.e.*, taking part in local politics. Among the elite circles of the EU, who happily share the privilege of English speaking, an optimistic *doxa* has reigned according to which, English has become a “*lingua franca*”, a vehicular language for the EU (Van Parijs, 2011). As Kjær and Adamo (2011) have shown, this is not the case for EU law, which remains inaccessible to the immense majority of EU citizens.¹¹ More generally, precise statistics have now shown that, even with the optimistic and mendacious assessment of the Eurobarometer (based on self-declaration), across the European Union, in 2006, the proportion of people supposedly able to speak a second language – in their majority, English – was 56 per cent whereas, in 2012,¹² the proportion was only 54 per cent.¹³ What all this boils down to is that a *very fragile majority of people are, according to their own declarations, able for mundane purposes to use some form of second language that is generally English-like*. Mainly because the second language in many countries is not English (it is only in 19 out of 25 countries), and given that English is not counted as a foreign language in the UK and in Ireland, the mean strict rate of English speaking according to the Eurobarometer was only 38 per cent among Europeans in 2012. This left out 6 out of 10 people and was far from substantiating the claim, either by Van Parijs or by the Commission’s spin-doctors, according to whom English already functioned as a “*lingua franca*” in Europe. In fact, in most countries, only a minority of the population speaks and/or understands English, and EU peoples are *de facto* excluded from English in the majority (Barbier, 2015a). This is especially the case in the Latin countries (Gazzola, 2015). It has also been estimated that about 6 per cent of the European population (Piron, 1994)¹⁴ is, in reality, able to speak English proficiently. If it should certainly be updated, the Piron estimate has the immense advantage of resting on independent surveys, and not on haphazard Eurobarometer measures that take as granted the self-assessment of people who say

11. Notwithstanding the commonly made observation according to which national law is also often *de facto* inaccessible to “ordinary people” (Barbier & Colomb, 2012), access to EU law is further complicated by its translation (see further).

12. The European Commission does not spend money easily on language surveys. Since 2001 (first special Eurobarometer survey), only two were organized, in 2006 and 2012 (see: “Europeans and their languages”, (June 2012, EB 386). All Eurobarometer surveys are accessible at: http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/index_fr.htm.

13. Part of this decrease was explained by the change in Russian speaking in Bulgaria, but also as a consequence of the separation of the Czech Republic and Slovakia.

14. For his assessment, Piron especially draw on two articles, one by Udo van de Sandt from a *Lintas Worldwide* 1989 survey and another by Mark Fettes (1991). For Fettes, 6 per cent of the population possesses a “*truly correct comprehension*” (of English) (p. 201) and he adds: “*other languages are presumably doing less well, and the figures for active competence would be still lower.*” (p. 202)

they are “able to hold a conversation”¹⁵ in a foreign language. European English may well be a “*lingua franca*” today, but only for a small European elite of consultants, researchers, politicians and civil servants. *A priori*, this sheds light upon a deep limitation in the practice of European democracy.

1.4 A special case: Is EU law especially foreign to EU citizens?

In such circumstances, the relationship of EU citizens to EU law has also attracted greater attention. Precisely, in EU law’s relationship with the various official languages lies an additional difficulty which affects the legitimacy of the EU. This element is, of course, not easily understood from a perspective internal to EU law, *i.e.*, a strictly legal perspective. *For legal experts, it is “normal” that, having established a separate “legal order”, the EU has the following obligation to secure a corpus of EU law of its own; because of the equal value of the various versions (see the above sections), this brings to the fore a functional necessity, which is similar to the requirements of international law, for instance, in the domain of the International Declaration of Human Rights. As one legal scholar argues, EU law draws from legal traditions of the Member States, but it has its autonomy,*¹⁶ The specific question, though, derives from the fact that the EU is not only an international treaty or convention as others are, but that it is a legal order in itself. What has still not been fully considered in this respect is the peculiar relationship of EU citizens to EU law, parallel with their relationship with the law of their Member State citizenship. Hence, the fact that EU law is written in the citizen’s own language (national language) brings about the fact that the legal meanings often differ between the – for instance – French version of EU law, and the French version of French law. The following example illustrates this tricky point, meaning that translation, explicitly organised in order to consolidate the “autonomy of EU law” brings problems that influence *the legitimacy of EU law, as perceived by EU citizens.*

As any other human domain of human practice, EU legislation is bound to be confronted, anyway, with the problem of translation. Lawyers-revisers and lawyers-linguists who draft legislation for the EU institutions have to abide by specific professional guidelines. Lawyers-revisers and lawyer-linguists are special legal professions who should not be mixed with the vast majority of translators and interpreters who are employed by Directorate General Translation. This latter

15. Question 48a of the special Eurobarometer survey of languages reads: “Which languages do you speak well enough in order to be able to have a conversation, excluding your mother tongue?”

16. The principle of the autonomy of EU law was crucial in the rejection by the CJEU of the proposed agreement for joining the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.

domain of translation belongs to “political communication”. By contrast, lawyers-revisers and lawyer-linguists belong to special directorates, such as the Directorate “Quality of Legislation” which is attached to the administration of the Council of Ministers. As the result of their drafting will eventually provide the exact wording of all pieces of legislation of the Union, it is easily understood why their trade or work should be closely monitored and controlled by very strict rules. One of their key principles explicitly states:

As regards legal terminology, terms which are too closely linked to a particular national legal system should be avoided.¹⁷

Admittedly, the historical sources of EU law are multiple and have varied across time, sometimes giving privilege to German, French, or Italian legal sources (Mancini, 2000). This has left various imprints on the legislation that today governs the EU. But there is another, less known and more subtle, aspect that derives from the key principle just quoted. Although EU law has 24 official versions corresponding to its (equivalent) official languages, each of these versions is, in fact, a “de-territorialised” version of the original. Guideline no 5.4 of the Guide continues:

The aim is that, as far as possible, and taking account of the specific nature of Union law and of its terminology, the act should be perceived by those called on to apply or interpret it in each Member State (officials, judges, lawyers, *etc.*) not as a ‘translation’ in a negative sense but as a text which conforms to a certain legislative style. (ibid., p. 13)

The Guide illustrates EU legal authorities’ deliberate political-strategic intention to confer upon EU law a special “style” and status, a certain quality which makes it different from any single counterpart national legislation. Formulated, for instance, in French, EU law will be different in key aspects of vocabulary of French legislation, and Belgian or Luxembourgish for that matter. It is easy to illustrate this point with examples taken from the Treaty.

We will take two examples, the term “workers”, especially used in Article 45 (TFEU) and the term “social partners” (Chart 14.1). For the first term, the chart shows that translations in the four languages selected mainly differ from the legal term that is normally used in their “original” languages. When using EU legislation translated into their own language, laymen and ordinary citizens are thus confronted with unexpected, unusual, expressions (for instance, “*travailleurs*” in French, instead of the mainstream “*salariés*”). The effect is to make EU law more

17. This is guideline no: 5.3.2, p. 13 of the *Joint practical guide of the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission for persons involved in the drafting of EU legislation* (English version), available at: <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/content/techleg/KB0213228ENN.pdf>, consulted on 11 November 2015.

distant for them. The second term, “social partners” has a different rationale. In English, the British term “*labour and management*” was chosen for the treaty, except for the EU level: only transnational associations of business and of workers are recognised as true “social partners”, whereas the traditional expression is used at the national level, be it for Ireland or the United Kingdom, where industrial relations traditions differ greatly.

Chart 14.1 “Workers” and other notions in Title IV, Chapter I of the treaty (Freedom of movement)

French	English	German	Italian
Les travailleurs Art. 45	Workers	Die Arbeitskräfte	I lavoratori
Travailleurs et employeurs Art. 153	Workers and employers	Arbeitnehmer und Arbeitgeber	Datori di lavoro e lavoratori
Partenaires sociaux art. 152, 153, 154, 155	Social partners: only EU level, not 153: management and labour	Sozialpartner	Parti sociali
Travailleurs migrants salariés et non salariés (art. 48)	Employed and self-employed migrant workers	zu- und abwandernden Arbeitnehmern und Selbstständigen	Lavoratori migranti dipendenti e autonomi
(to be compared with) legal expressions in use in national legal languages			
Salariés, ^a travailleurs, travailleurs indépendants, etc.	Workers, employees, managers Professionals	Arbeitnehmer, Angestellte	Dipendenti
Salariés et employeurs Partenaires sociaux			

^a Norbert Elias, among others, did note, as a distinction with the adjective “*proletarisch*” that there is no strict equivalent in German of the French adjective “*salarié*”, because it is built from the notion of “*Arbeiter*” (Elias, 1992: 302).

As we have just seen, the practice of inserting legal terms that differ from legal terms in the corresponding national languages into EU law is the outcome of a deliberate choice. While it makes EU legislation appear less familiar, more distant, it also indirectly contributes to the symbolic formation of a distinct EU legal order, making it appear more consistent as an order. On the other hand, it also renders the understanding and “ownership” of EU legislation by European citizens more difficult, especially for the most vulnerable and less educated among them. *In empirical terms, at the national level, only a minority of citizens are able to understand, master and use their legal system. At the supranational level, the situation is inevitably worse.* More broadly, when we also include the mainstream use of languages and translation in the day-to-day actual politics of the European Union, the political importance of

translation is present everywhere at all times. The quarrel, eventually won by the Greek government in 2015 regarding the dismissing of the hated word “*Troika*” and its substitution by the term “the institutions” is significant here. There are numerous examples of such conflicts and contradictory claims by governments: all show the dire intrinsic limitations of translation. The political substance of sovereignty is always involved, as when, for instance, German Chancellor G. Schröder refused to sign a text related to the Nice Treaty that had not been translated in German. Primary legislation is interspersed with notions that are difficult to translate, but are very familiar and essential in a specific national “legal order”. The notion of “*services publics*” in French is one of them. It is absent from the TEU and TFEU except for the special case of transport services. The term is, in general, substituted with “services of general interest”; this has not prevented serious difficulties and uncertainties from arising (Neergaard, 2009) even after decades of existence of EU law. The term “public service” is, however, common in British and international English, as in all Latin languages. But the Commission has argued that the diversity of the organisation of such services is an undeniable fact (Moderne & Marcou, 2001; Supiot, 2005). It was indeed extremely ironic to see that, in 2009, in order to nudge Irish citizens towards voting for the Lisbon Treaty that they had rejected in 2008, the European Council issued a “solemn” declaration stating that it attached an extreme importance to “public services”,¹⁸ a notion that does not feature in EU primary law. It is an empirical fact that a long list of problems stem from the combined effect of translation principles and the deliberate de-contextualisation, de-territorialisation purposes of EU legislation. Another conspicuous one has been the controversial translation of some provisions of the Charter of the European Union Fundamental Rights. Chart 14.2 gives the translations eventually accepted in five languages, illustrating the contrast between Germany and the four other countries. The former strictly wished that an explicit mention was made of the religious “heritage” of Europe (*geistig-religiös* as against its spiritual and moral heritage).

Chart 14.2 Preamble of the Charter of Fundamental Rights (Extract)

French	German	English	Italian	Spanish
Conscience de son patrimoine spirituel et moral	In dem Bewusstsein ihres geistig-religiösen und sittlichen Erbes	Conscious of its spiritual and moral heritage	Consapevole del suo patrimonio spirituale e morale	Conscience de su patrimonio espiritual y moral

18. Presidency Conclusions, 18 & 19th June 2009, Annex 2, “Solemn declaration on Workers’ rights, Social policies and other issues”, available at: https://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/108622.pdf, last accessed 11 November 2015.

The choice of language – and, in particular, the *actual hierarchy and balance* of language uses in the European Union constitute a typically political and strategic issue. When law is concerned, similar determinants apply. The CJEU is a powerful actor in this process. Without the existence of any particular legislation, it has kept French as a working and procedural language from the very beginning of the Communities. This is a conspicuous exception in an “all-English” environment, but the main characteristic of EU law lies in its primacy over national legislations, organised around the Court itself. It is a typical and highly symbolic fact in this respect that, in its case law, the CJEU has “invented” the notion of “fundamental freedoms” to qualify the freedoms of movement. Absent from primary law, such a legal category is important for the Court, which wishes to put economic freedoms on an equal symbolic footing with the fundamental rights and freedoms of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.

1.5 The democratic deficit?: Could it be linked to language practice and English?

It was argued in the previous section that, by contrast with their greater familiarity with their national law, the “foreignness” of law to citizens could be an obstacle towards the positive perception of the legitimacy of the European Union. True, this question links up to a broader one, *i.e.*, the debate about an existing “democratic deficit”, which has long been discussed in the European Union, both by social scientists and by citizens. Among social scientists, many have contended that, first, a similar deficit has also existed at national level (Schmidt, 2006), while some have denied that a “deficit” existed at all (Moravcsik, 2002). However, during the first decades of the 2000s, the discontent of the voters with the EU has become a well-accepted reality. As a consequence, scholars have started to explore the potential link between the situation of being “excluded from English” and opinions hostile to European integration. Such a link is especially preoccupying in the case of lower-educated people (Gazzola, 2014; Barbier, 2015a).

All in all, in the present circumstances, the European Union combines the following features: a formal recognition of the equal status of all official languages; a cross-cutting hegemony of the English language in the forums and the formal arenas where European politics are made and European law is prepared; *de facto* linguistic regimes which give a relative and slowly receding privilege to French and German in EU institutions, except for the special situation of the European Parliament. In times when, rightly or wrongly, the legitimacy of European government and governance (Scharpf, 2010) is increasingly challenged, and when the long-existing “elite-bias” (Cautrès & Grunberg, 2007) has become a stable trait of public opinion across the EU, the importance of language practice in politics has

become more salient on the agenda and the questions related to linguistic rights, to the translation of law, and to the influence of law in general should be more precisely explored. However, before analysing the complex relationship of present day EU law with the notion of language in general, it is necessary to reflect in greater detail upon the point of whether, after all, there is any demand in the EU for language diversity.

2. Why EU-level policies in favour of language diversity are unlikely to gain great support in the near future

It could well be the case that dire legitimacy problems exist and persist which are related to the structures and substance of EU government and governance; it could also be that some of these difficulties were objectively linked to the role of language practices and the unbalanced dominance of the English language in EU politics. Yet, at the same time, the demand for more linguistic diversity would not, all in all, emerge strongly. Those who are in favour of language diversity often tend to assume that their preference is widely shared, but, in the real world, this is not the case for reasons that we shall shortly deal with in this intermediate section.

The first one is that one should strictly distinguish the existing interest in EU-level politics among the general public and the mundane relationship to languages of the small sections of the EU population that actively participate in the arenas and forums where these politics are really practiced. These small sections belong to the better educated part of the active population and to the groups that are the more fluent in European English. They are bound to be very sensitive to the functional need of communicating with their counterparts who do not share their mother tongue: hence, the mechanical consequence that Philippe Van Parijs qualified as the “maximin” principle. Elite circles are under strong instrumental pressure to communicate and deal with problems, and they are forced to use a common language. For a long time now, this language – for all its flaws and shortcomings, is the only one available. It is certainly not a proper “*lingua franca*” for the entire European population (Barbier, 2018), but it has functioned for a long time now as a *lingua franca* for the elite population at EU level (Ostler, 2010). Another important reason lies in the British interests linked to the economics of language in Europe and in the world: Michel Grin has shown that, estimated in 2004, the economic advantage derived from the role of English in the EU amounted to more than 1 per cent of the British GDP, a net annual payment of 10 billion euro (Grin, 2005). Despite the fact that this estimate has not been updated since, the UK’s strategic interest in their “world language” is still great. Hence, whatever the inequalities of access to English and the disadvantages which are borne by great masses of citizens

(Barbier, 2015a), the relatively small elites of the administration, management and political circles “in Brussels” make do with their shared resource, to wit, *European English*. Many might be unsatisfied by the state of things, but they are happy with implicitly participating in and condoning English hegemony, whereas they are absolutely refusing, on the other hand, to alter the formal equality of languages in the Treaty. Such behaviour pertains to a classic “satisficing” rationale (as opposed to “optimising”): once principles (the formal equality of all languages) are safe, one is “satisfied” to muddle through and “English is enough” for mundane activities. Hence, it is highly unlikely that much support could be gathered in the near future to change the present situation.

As members of elites, social scientists also belong to circles where the diversity of languages is not seen as an important factor of life. Only very few indeed care about the evolution of translation and interpretation as an object of sociological inquiry (Sapiro, 2014). Discussions about possible pluri-lingualism or multilingualism are too often dismissed by social scientists – often economists, but not exclusively – who claim that huge costs are involved in such linguistic regimes, costs which Europe could not sustain (Van Parijs, 2011). That such false claims have been effectively refuted a long time ago (Grin, 2005; Gazzola, 2006) does not fundamentally alter the situation: the European Commission itself soberly estimates the present cost of a very partial multilingualism at between 1 and 2 euros per citizen in the Union.¹⁹ Yet, opponents of multilingualism keep recycling the same alarms; even the few who, like Van Parijs (2011), admit to the existence of a “language issue” in the EU put the economic argument at the forefront of the debate. But there is more to the point: a conception is very well disseminated among elite circles – again including social scientists – according to which using a single language for transnational activities (namely, European English) is normatively preferable to using a diversity of languages. In this respect, national languages pass as “instruments” of the past, and the practice of a common English, as their opposite, as *a language of progress for the future*. Thus, Van Parijs goes so far as to write that, if “narcissist” people want to keep their mother tongues, they should be prepared to pay for this (2011: 37, 172), and he envisages a Europe – and even a world – where cosmopolitanism prevails and where sharing *lingua franca* English is one of the features of a better social justice: at best, national language practice is reserved for national/local politics and for lower level education, university education being entirely, but slowly, converted to English. True, not all social scientists concur with Van Parijs, but only very few care about a potential link between the

19. “The translation and interpreting services of all institutions together cost the equivalent of 1.05% of the EU’s total budget for 2004, or €2.28 per citizen per year”, Communication from the Commission, 22 November 2005 – A New Framework Strategy for Multilingualism [COM(2005) 596 final], p. 12.

increasing distrust of voters in the EU and the fact that these voters are, because of their missing or weak English skills, excluded from EU-level politics. Apart from the special case of the Francophonie movement, initiatives that try and correct the many aspects of English dominance or hegemony, especially in higher education, are extremely rare.²⁰ All in all, with the conspicuous exception of sociolinguists, social scientists (sociologists, political scientists, economists, *etc.*) rarely address this question (Kraus, 2008; Sapiro, 2014; Barbier, 2008, 2013). A handful of economists do concur, however (Gazzola, 2014; Grin, 2005). Famous linguists are also relatively generally marginalised, when not entirely disregarded (Hagège, 2012; Ostler, 2010). A general explanation of these paradoxes lies in the far reaching economisation of human activities in the modern European world, and the unilateral faith in the economic functioning of the world: in this respect, languages, the number of which is constantly dwindling, are seen as relics of the past, in the face of economic progress. Again, it points to an application of the “satisficing” principle in a world of bounded rationality.

3. The uncanny relationship of EU law with language

In the first sections of the this chapter, we quoted the unequivocal normative statements of the European institutions in favour of cultural and language diversity. We showed that there was still a considerable discrepancy between theory and practice. As a concluding argument, we would like to add one additional sociological observation: the role played by EU law brings about a further obstacle, an obstacle which is legal and is actually two-pronged.

3.1 The lack of EU competences

From an *internal* legal perspective, one has to admit that, first, the EU has no special competence on language issues and that language policies have remained a national preserve. Hence, the Union only interferes in symbolic terms or, at best, by promoting language diversity through possible soft law provisions. As a consequence, policies promoting language equality and multilingualism have remained marginal and have not been funded at EU level (Jostes, 2007; Barbier, 2008, 2013; Kraus, 2008).

20. For a contrary example, see the Higher Education Conference’s initiative in Germany, November 2011 [Sprachenpolitik an deutschen Hochschulen] asking for a fair balance between the use of English and German at Universities, available at: http://www.hrk.de/uploads/media/Empfehlung_Sprachenpolitik_MV_22112011.pdf, last accessed on 27 August 2015.

3.2 The complex relationship of EU economic law with other domains of national legislation

The distribution of competences between the national and the supranational levels is certainly not the main reason why EU level intervention for a positive protection or promotion of languages is not really feasible: much more importantly, it is incompatible with the complex system of norms that EU law now forms after more than 60 years of existence. As it is extremely seldom that scholarship in European law is tested in the area of language rights and policies, undertaking a parallel analysis between economic law and social law – a much more widespread concern – will be useful: findings deriving from the unequal relationship between social law and economic law can be useful guides for analysing the uncanny relationship of language to EU law in general. Here again, one has to recall the immense distance that exists between legal scholarship and a sociological analysis. And because, from an internal perspective, everything indeed functions smoothly within the EU legal order, challenging the democratic legitimacy of the Union is not acceptable. First, there is the *primacy of EU law* over national law, a primacy that is democratically sanctioned by the treaties because the EU must implement its legitimate economic competences (legislating about economic freedoms and about the protection and promotion of competition, as well as the fight against all forms of economic discrimination). That EU law has slowly and gradually incorporated an *economic form of reasoning* stemming from the “Law and Economics” school of law is not in itself a source of concern. Secondly, primary law incorporates a so-called *subsidiarity principle*, which, in theory, functions as a protection of national legal competences. “Primacy” and subsidiarity are supposed to be clearly separated. As formal definitions go in the very language of European legal scholars, *primacy is a principle that rules on the relationship between EU Law and the law of the Member States. Subsidiarity, in contrast, is a criterion for the exercise of EU competences: under the principle of subsidiarity, in areas which do not fall within its exclusive competence, the Union shall act only if and in so far as the objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States, either at central level or at regional and local level, but can rather, by reason of the scale or effects of the proposed action, be better achieved at Union level.* Hence, from a formal point of view, it has meant that national competences were supposedly out of reach from illegitimate incursions of the EU.

But a socio-political taking stock of the consequences of the evolution of EU law, including the crucial part played by Pretorian law enacted since the 1960s, will be taken into consideration here: legal developments have led to immensely complex interactions and consequences, the importance of which are only seldom

acknowledged by legal experts, and totally unheard of by mainstream EU citizens. How do these complex interactions of legal doctrine and practice function in a nutshell? First, there is the structural feature of the *asymmetry of the EU legal system*. At least in theory, EU law only applies when EU competences are involved: for other areas of rights and legislation, national law will be relevant instead: this is the essence of the problem of asymmetry that contrasts the EU legal order with other fully-fledged national legal orders. According to EU legal doctrine, this should not bring about special difficulties, but, in practice, this means that certain areas of legislation are privileged at EU level. They are all the more privileged because, as Pierre Rodière, one of the most competent specialists in EU law, has noticed, “major difficulties stem from the extreme value given to freedoms of movement by the CJEU”; he added that “it was only the overestimation of these freedoms that could be contested” (Rodière, 2016: 93), and not their constitutional value. Indeed, freedoms of movement (and the right to establishment) constitute the legal cornerstones of Union integration, and they are deemed to ensure improved competition and the smooth functioning of the common market. By contrast, in the EU legal order, *other rights* (including, foremost, social rights) are considered solely in terms of how they might be affected by market functioning (or *vice versa*, how they might affect the market’s functioning). Hence, applying them “for their own sake” has never, strictly speaking, been an explicit political task of the EU (De Schutter, 2005). This legal conception explains the EU’s concern about languages: that they are a matter of interest is, first and foremost, because linguistic education can have repercussions on the mobility and freedom of movement of European citizens, (or, as will be seen later, repercussions on discrimination): it is not *a priori* to promote the cultural value of languages themselves, let alone of the humanities. A first contradiction lies here, at the minimum a conflict, which is reinforced by the fact that the principle of linguistic diversity is not among the general principles of EU law, as has already been mentioned. In passing, one should recall that the basic principles of EU law which resulted in the creation of an autonomous legal order are entirely linked to the hyper-active strategy of the CJEU. In the early 1960s, the CJEU (at the time, the European Court of Justice (ECJ)) adopted two famous decisions (*Van Gend & Loos*, 1963 and *Costa/Enel*, 1964). Both still constitute the legal ground explaining why the European Union is not simply an international treaty like any other, but a legal order in its own right (Weiler, 1991). When one interviews legal experts and lawyers in the European institutions today (Barbier & Colomb, 2012), one is struck by the fact that the majority of them is apparently convinced that (or acts as if) the primacy of EU law and its legal order *de facto* apply universally. Yet, this is not the case, at least in theory, because the Member States have retained their own competences, for instance, in language policy and social policy.

3.3 When economic law spills over to the rest of legislation

A second fact is that, over its 60 years of existence, EU law has displayed another conspicuous feature that political scientists call a “spill-over effect”. Basically, this means that, in a number of ways, legislation adopted on the basis of legitimate competences and explicit intentions tends to “taint” other areas which, originally, were not meant to be affected. With the progress of European integration, this spill-over effect has been especially conspicuous when economic competence (the Union’s mainstream competence) and economic law were concerned. As Rodière summed up recently (2016: 92), quoting case-law references to what he called “this contradiction”,

l’autonomie normative des États membres sera étroitement bridée dès l’instant où la norme sociale pour laquelle le droit national est compétent recoupe une norme économique relevant du droit de l’Union.²¹

As a consequence, an EU “economic” legal order has, in practice, tended to prevail over all the national legal orders, and the primacy consequences extend in practice to matters where the European Union has no competence, notwithstanding the existing “subsidiarity principle” (Barbier & Colomb, 2012).

Many examples can be taken of this in the domain of social law, which are useful for assessing the ontological status of language at EU level. A first one is the protection of the right to strike, and its famous treatment in cases such as *Viking* and *Laval* in December 2007, when the exercise of the right to collective action was (although recognised) heavily restricted by the Court. Five years later, the European Commission even produced a blueprint for a Regulation (COM 2012 (130) final of 21.3.2012²²) intended to implement the principle according to which, whenever a conflict between them arose, economic freedoms always trumped social rights, and especially the right to collective action. At the last minute, this proposal was withdrawn from the agenda, but the move by the European Commission, then presided by José M. D. Barroso, was very significant of the threat economic law has represented for the rest of legislation. A second example of the uneasy relationship between economic law and social rights is social protection: in 2017, this immensely important political domain still depends on a twin piece of case-law²³

21. “... the normative independence of Member States will be strictly limited once a social norm for which competence belongs to national law happens to overlap an economic norm pertaining to EU law.”

22. Council Regulation on the exercise of the right to take collective action within the context of the freedom of establishment and the freedom to provide services.

23. The famous Poucet-Pistre 1993 CJEU double ruling.

for its protection from the influence of market competition, and the strategic basis for EU societies has never been catered for by secondary law (Barbier & Colomb, 2015). A third example concerns the normative autonomy of Social Services of General Economic Interest (SSGIs), a special application of the initial Services of General Economic Interest present in the first EU Treaty. In this social policy (Barbier 2015b) area, EU integration has gradually spilled over: from an initially limited scope restricted to network services and monopolies, EU law now reaches far into the domain of the legal definition of domiciliary care, childcare, *etc.* The spill-over process at the same time typically provides an instance of “negative integration”, challenging national practices and introducing new rules by promoting the basic freedoms of movement (and freedom of establishment), free competition and the common market, and fighting state aid. This is happening in a context where the EU has no competences whatsoever and has brought about legal uncertainty in the entire area of SSGIs (Barbier & Colomb, 2015). But such services exemplify the fact that the *CJEU’s power of decision in the last instance* hangs over social services as *a sword of Damocles*. It remains within this *last resort power* to define what sort of services fall in the “economic” category, and what others fall in the complementary “non-economic” one. Finally, and more generally, sociologists and a significant group of legal scholars stress the fact that EU law has been undergoing a process of inexorable economisation in recent decades, and the economisation of EU law is contagious. Increasingly, one can observe that the decisions of the Court of Justice bring with them the power of controlling all the definitional conditions of the cases and cannot be challenged before any other court (Barbier, 2008). Among these powers, *the defining power* of what is “economic” has led to a situation where social services have been more and more “*economised*” (Neergaard, 2009: 42–47). Some interpret this as *rampant “economisation”* (Guinard, 2009: 463–467; Supiot, 2009).²⁴ The lessons drawn from sixty years of interaction between economic and social EU law should be heeded for in the special case of languages.

3.4 Illusory protection: The subsidiarity principle

In the area of language, the EU has no competences. Language policies have remained the preserve of the nation states. From this, people who lack expertise about the complex intertwining of EU and national law tend to draw the conclusion that the principle of subsidiarity entails that EU law has no influence on language practice and legislation (apart from the provisions related to equality of languages

24. Ambiguity is, for instance, pervasively present in the present discussions about the notion of ‘social enterprises’ following the EU 2020 strategy.

reviewed in the previous sections). But this is not the case because, empirically, the principle of subsidiarity is unable to limit the reach of EU economic law. Some time ago, French Law Professor Pierre Rodière noted that in matters of social and labour law, the boundary between competences did not matter anymore in reality, because of what he named “the large power of reach and influence”²⁵ of EU law. This matter-of-fact legal assessment refuted the simplistic view of “subsidiarity” acting as a protection against undesirable intervention by the EU institutions, and it is certainly not isolated among legal scholars. Guinard (2009), for instance, has shown that the first consequence of the implementation of the subsidiarity principle is to bring all types of national/domestic legislation under the review of the EU’s legal authorities (the Commission and the CJEU) in order to assess whether such legislation has no direct or indirect effect on EU legislation in its exclusive areas of competence. This review goes very far in practical terms and EU law plays a growing role in matters which are deemed to be the preserve of national authorities. This leads to the fact that no Member state of the EU in 2017 is free to enact provisions related to language use without first abiding by this check. A recent example about the use of French in workplaces and building sites provides a very adequate illustration. It was dubbed “*clause Molière*”, Molière being summoned by alleged defenders of the French language. In 2017, French right-wing politicians, especially regional councillors, were trying to impose the use of French on building sites in order to oppose the recruitment of posted workers and to pass as the protectors of French workers. The French government had to rescue its *préfets*, issuing a special cross-ministerial instruction explaining in detail the CJEU case law:²⁶ imposing the use of French in public procurement procedures, the government explained in full consistence with EU law, was exactly discrimination, and thus, entirely illegal in French law. In the particular instance, the right of the French government to legislate to impose French on its territory was trumped by EU economic law, which ruled out any possible resort to the principle of subsidiarity. But more broadly, one has to admit that this principle is of very limited application: in an interview in September 2010, a CJEU law clerk (*référéndaire*) argued with us that the principle of subsidiarity was actually more “political” than really operational, and that it mainly implied a symbolic acceptance in order to placate the concerns of the Member States (Barbier & Colomb, 2015). All in all, this amounts to a situation where the

25. “*La grande puissance d’expansion*” of EU law, he wrote, takes place “*en dehors même des domaines spéciaux dans lesquels les autorités communautaires ont une compétence pour agir*” (even in the absence of explicit competence of EU institutions) (Rodière, 2008: 5).

26. Instruction interministérielle relative aux délibérations et actes des collectivités territoriales imposant l’usage du français dans les conditions d’exécution des marchés. (ARCB1710251), 27 April, 2017).

resort to the principle of subsidiarity, which is extremely improbable here, can, in practical terms, not be a bulwark against the increasing intervention of EU law in all matters of legislation, *de facto* hollowing out this principle.

3.5 Language as an ontologically discriminatory obstacle

Finally, the protection of language and of language diversity should certainly not be considered as a significant area of the potential application of the subsidiarity principle for one much more important, ontological and uncanny reason: *in economic terms, in "law and economics", language is an instrument of discrimination*. In order to understand this, one certainly has to forget the normative and enthusiastic assessments of the riches of language and its extraordinary value that feature in the articles of the Treaty and the Charter of Fundamental Rights. In more matter-of-fact and mundane practice, the point where languages are mainly concerned with EU case law is when they are involved in issues of competition law, and the economic freedoms (free movement of persons, capital, goods, services and the freedom of establishment in other Member States). The legal scholar Jan Vanhamme once wrote about "linguistic obstacles" and started this way:

Admittedly, the majority of such obstacles stem from the existing multilingualism in Europe. Therefore, one cannot qualify them as illegal without jeopardizing linguistic and cultural diversity, one essential value enacted by Article 22 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights.²⁷

This starting-point says it all: the legal scholar finds himself in total confusion: How could he dare consider language diversity, an essential European value in itself, as an "obstacle"? Yet, the dread of under-estimating a special European value could not detain the EU law scholar for a long time: he has to bow before another prominent value, economic law. Hence, he went on:

but in certain cases, the linguistic obstacle is such that it really acts as a barrier to the free movement of goods, persons, or as a restriction to the freedom to provide services in the EU. As such, its legality is in question. (Vanhamme, 2007: 362)

Following this legal reasoning implies that any situation of fact can be qualified as "illegal" as long as it acts in practice as a barrier to competition and free movement, notwithstanding the circumstance that the European Union has no legal competence in the matter. From this very important legal point stems the fact that linguistic issues are rarely the object of EU case law, as recent legal reviews demonstrate

27. My translation.

(Vanhamme, 2007; Candela Soriano, 2002). *As of principle, language may be seen as “discriminatory” from the point of view of an individual who does not speak or understand it: this implies that language use in situations of economic competition is only conditionally legal.*

Typically, the Court considers “exceptions”, *i.e.*, cases when a potential linguistic “obstacle” could be acceptable. They will be exceptional and will have to be specially justified by “linguistic requirements”. Deriving from national legislation, such requirements prevail in very few circumstances, despite possible “discrimination”. This is, for instance, the case in the labelling of goods. A Member State will be authorised to impose the translation of a label in its national/official language, or in an “easily understandable language”, to wit, English.²⁸ Moreover, Directive 97/4/CE (27-1-1993) provides – again reasoning by exception – that the Member State will be able to impose its official language only if it brings forward evidence of the necessity to mention the proper information to consumers, a necessity that cannot be substituted by other less restrictive measures. Finally, such supplementary information can only be accepted when the Member State deems it sufficiently important to make it compulsory (Candela Soriano, 2002: 29). A second domain is patents, where the principle of translation into the national language is accepted. But a third area of possible contradiction pertains to the freedom of movement of persons. It goes without saying that measures designed to exclude other Europeans citizens are forbidden (see the “Molière clause” above). Discrimination for motives of nationality/citizenship are, in fact, the main area where litigation occurs, for instance, for occupations and professions, while reciprocal recognition applies extensively for certifications and qualifications. Hence, a legal provision imposing a special requirement can only be implemented when language skills are indispensable, which brings about another illustration of the “exception” rationale. Moreover, Member States that impose language requirements for “overriding reasons” for certain professions/occupations are obliged to demonstrate that such requirements are “proportional” and could not be substituted by less “discriminatory” means. It is the Member State’s burden to provide evidence as to the effectivity of the measures. In the domain of languages, as in many others (Barbier & Colomb, 2012), EU legislation prevails over national legislation, thus allowing only an extremely limited margin for the promotion of any defence of a national language other than English.

28. The official language of the Member state cannot be the only language used for labelling: hence, English generally functions as the “easily understandable language”.

Conclusion

This last example fully illustrates the clear contradictions that cross EU legislation in its manifold relationships with national legislations. In this chapter, we started from the official consideration of all the languages of the Union as extremely valuable “assets”. This is because, as Kraus (2008, p. xii) once noted, “language can be considered a ‘hard’ evidence for how cultural elements play a role in the construction of our *civic* identities”, and because one accepts the “intrinsic value of linguistic bonds, thereby conceding that members of smaller language groups deserve to be protected against assimilationist pressure”. There also exist numerous reasons why language, and its diversity, can be considered as an essential part of humanity, and of humanities. Yet, all these justifications, for all their hard philosophical substance hardly stand today in the face of the pervasive influence of EU economic law. The contradiction is at its worst between the celebration of humanities, on the one hand, and the prosaic impossible promotion of linguistic diversity for fear that it could lower the alleged universal effectiveness of the competition principle in all areas of social life in the Union, on the other. The asymmetry of the EU legal order, the detrimental consequences of implementing the principle of primacy of EU economic law are all part of this situation. No imaginable resort in the future to the principle of subsidiarity can help policies, national policies or EU level policies alike, to promote and preserve languages, unless the present complex functioning of the EU legal order is radically overhauled. As Dieter Grimm suggested, this probably implies starting from a “de-constitutionalisation” of EU law. Leaving aside, he argues, provisions which are really of constitutional nature, the rest of legislation could be spared the “unwanted consequences of the Court of Justice’s interpretations” and national laws could be corrected “as is practiced in any democratic state” (Grimm, 2015: 112). One can dream of the emergence of such a situation, in which language, far from being an ontological obstacle, a mere economic instrument, could regain some of its centennial non-economic value.

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This book proposes a multidisciplinary assessment of the impact of complex diversity on language politics and policies, analysing how the legacies of the old interact with the challenges of the new. Its main focus is on the interplay of multilingualism on the one hand, and the dynamics of transnationalism, globalisation, and Europeanisation on the other. This interplay confronts contemporary societies with unprecedented questions, as they face the need to come to grips with increasingly varied and pervasive manifestations

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