

From Pragmatics to Dialogue

Edited by
Edda Weigand and Istvan Kecskes

DIALOGUE STUDIES
31

John Benjamins Publishing Company

From Pragmatics to Dialogue

Dialogue Studies (DS)

ISSN 1875-1792

Dialogue Studies takes the notion of dialogicity as central; it encompasses every type of language use, workaday, institutional and literary. By covering the whole range of language use, the growing field of dialogue studies comes close to pragmatics and studies in discourse or conversation. The concept of dialogicity, however, provides a clear methodological profile. The series aims to cross disciplinary boundaries and considers a genuinely inter-disciplinary approach necessary for addressing the complex phenomenon of dialogic language use. This peer reviewed series will include monographs, thematic collections of articles, and textbooks in the relevant areas.

For an overview of all books published in this series, please see
<http://benjamins.com/catalog/ds>

Editor

Edda Weigand
University of Münster

Managing Editor

Răzvan Săftoiu
Transilvania University of Braşov

Editorial Advisory Board

Adelino Cattani
Università di Padova

Kenneth N. Cissna
University of South Florida

François Cooren
Université de Montréal

Robert T. Craig
University of Colorado at
Boulder

Marcelo Dascal
Tel Aviv University

Valeri Demiankov
Russian Academy of Sciences

Marion Grein
University of Mainz

Fritjof Haft
University of Tübingen

John E. Joseph
University of Edinburgh

Werner Kallmeyer
University of Mannheim

Catherine Kerbrat-Orecchioni
Université Lyon 2

Stefanie Molthagen-Schnöring
Hochschule für Technik und
Wirtschaft Berlin

Geoffrey Sampson
University of Sussex

Masayoshi Shibatani
Rice University

Talbot J. Taylor
College of William and Mary

Wolfgang Teubert
University of Birmingham

Linda R. Waugh
University of Arizona

Elda Weizman
Bar Ilan University

Yorick Wilks
University of Sheffield

Volume 31

From Pragmatics to Dialogue

Edited by Edda Weigand and Istvan Kecskes

From Pragmatics to Dialogue

Edited by

Edda Weigand

University of Münster

Istvan Kecskes

State University of New York, Albany

John Benjamins Publishing Company

Amsterdam / Philadelphia



The paper used in this publication meets the minimum requirements of the American National Standard for Information Sciences – Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials, ANSI Z39.48-1984.

DOI 10.1075/ds.31

Cataloging-in-Publication Data available from Library of Congress:
LCCN 2018015641 (PRINT) / 2018033395 (E-BOOK)

ISBN 978 90 272 0118 8 (HB)

ISBN 978 90 272 6374 2 (E-BOOK)

© 2018 – John Benjamins B.V.

No part of this book may be reproduced in any form, by print, photoprint, microfilm, or any other means, without written permission from the publisher.

John Benjamins Publishing Company · <https://benjamins.com>

Table of contents

Introduction	1
<i>Edda Weigand and Istvan Kecskes</i>	
Dialogue: The key to pragmatics	5
<i>Edda Weigand</i>	
Humboldt, Bhartrihari, and the dialogic	29
<i>Lisbeth A. Lipari</i>	
Moving beyond pragmatics: The role of dialogue in studies of “rhetoric in situ”	45
<i>Jennifer L. Adams</i>	
Progress in language teaching: From competence to dialogic competence-in-performance	61
<i>Marion Grein</i>	
Research interview as social interaction: Epistemic implications	83
<i>Letizia Caronia</i>	
Bounded segments of interaction: The case of redressing the breach of a cultural norm once it is flagged	113
<i>Robert E. Sanders and Anita Pomerantz</i>	
Dialogicity in written language use: Variation across expert action games	137
<i>Marina Bondi</i>	
Dialogic pragmatics and complex objects: Engaging the life and work of Gregory Bateson	171
<i>Ronald C. Arnett</i>	
Types and functions of pseudo-dialogues	189
<i>Arto Mustajoki, Tatiana Sherstinova and Ulla Tuomarla</i>	
List of contributors	217
Index	221

Introduction

Edda Weigand and Istvan Kecskes

University of Münster (Germany) / State University of New York
at Albany (USA)

This volume aims at building bridges from pragmatics to dialogue and overcoming the gap between two ‘circles’ which have cut themselves off from each other in recent decades even if both addressed the same object, ‘language use’. The first idea of looking beyond one’s own limits arose at the second International Conference of the American Pragmatics Association, held at the University of California, Los Angeles, in October 2014. Edda Weigand, invited by Istvan Kecskes, organized a panel on “Dialogue, Pragmatics and Culture”. The idea of joining forces emerged during the discussions held at the panel and became shaped more precisely in Kecskes’ chapter “From Pragmatics to Dialogue” in *The Routledge Handbook of Language and Dialogue* (2017).

Pragmatics means the study of natural language use. There is however no clear answer as to what language use means. We are instead confronted with multiple and diverse models in an uncircumscribed field of language use. The plurality of models seems to be accepted by implying that ‘anything goes’. Total arbitrariness and eclecticism however mean the end of science (Frawley 1987). When trying to transform such a puzzle of pieces into a meaningful picture we are confronted with the complexity of language use which does not mean ‘language’ put to ‘use’ but represents the *unity* of a complex whole and calls for a total change in methodology towards a holistic theory. Cartesian linguistics has come to its limits. The challenge is finding out the ‘architecture of complexity’ which combines competence with performance (Simon 1962; Weigand 2010). It seems to be mainstream opinion that language use results from the addition of components of performance, such as individuality, probability and cross-cultural differences, to the rule-governed system of language competence. Human beings, however, face complexity in performance from the very outset and are able to come to grips with it in their minds by their extraordinary ability of ‘*competence-in-performance*’. They do not add performance to competence but orient themselves according to rules as far as they go and *adapt* to conditions of performance by principles of probability. As *dialogic individuals* they are capable of mediating between their self-interests and dialogic concerns.

They use ‘*language as dialogue*’, which allows them to tackle the vicissitudes of their lives (Weigand 2009).

The time is ripe to outline in science how human beings proceed in everyday and institutional encounters in different languages and cultures. Dialogue analysis, from the very outset, accepted a view of ‘*language as dialogue*’ which had already been emphasised centuries ago by von Humboldt (1827/1963) and his dictum of ‘there is no speech without a counter-speech’. Addressing the unity of ‘*language as dialogue in performance*’, we can meanwhile rely on essential progress made in science which is manifest in crucial turning points: the *pragmatic turning point* from abstract systems to natural language use, the *dialogic turning point* of structuring language use as dialogic action and reaction, and finally the *turning point in science* from reductionism to holism (Weigand 2011).

A first essential step of building bridges was made by Istvan Kecskes in his chapter for *The Routledge Handbook of Language and Dialogue* (2017). He points to the ‘limits of pragmatics as long as it is restricted to one utterance’ and describes how these limits can be overcome by proceeding “from pragmatics to dialogue” and considering language use as dialogic and intercultural use (Kecskes 2017; 2016: 49). We both agree on crucial points such as:

- *Communication means dialogue*. Hearers are not only interpreters but interlocutors who react to the speaker utterance.
- On the bottom of the empirical sequence of utterances there is *language as action*.
- The general dialogic purpose of communication is coming to an understanding which is based on the sequence of *actions and reactions*.
- Searle’s speech act theory has to be adjusted to a *dialogic speech act theory* changing monologic and collective action to dialogic action. In this sense, any speech act is dialogically directed, either as initiative or reactive action.
- In his socio-cognitive approach, Kecskes not only distinguishes the communicative function of the speech act but also the communicative agenda or interest of the dialogue partner. This is in line with Weigand’s strategic principles and an extended definition of the speech act, which not only includes the purpose but also the *interest* of the interlocutor: INTEREST [PURPOSE (proposition)]
- Kecskes’ intercultural socio-cognitive approach accepts the double nature of human beings as *dialogic individuals*. Moreover, Kecskes points to recent neurological experiments on mirror neurons which verify human beings’ double nature (Arbib et al. 2005; Kecskes 2016: 49).

All these points underscore premises of a holistic dialogic approach to language in the action game (Weigand 2010; 2017) and manifest the turning point from Cartesian linguistics to post-Cartesian thought. The basic guideline is not separation

and addition but integration and adaptation to ever-changing surroundings according to principles of probability. Integration is the name of the game. Dialogue and its methodology of action and reaction can be traced back to human nature and provides the key to the unstructured field of pragmatics. The contributions to this volume share this common ground and address various perspectives in different types of action game.

Edda Weigand explicitly highlights the central point of *dialogue as the key to pragmatics*. She aims at overcoming the plurality of models in the field of pragmatics by turning the focus away from constructing models to understanding the natural object ‘language use’. We are, in the end, led back to acting human beings and their double nature as ‘dialogic individuals’.

Lisbeth A. Lipari enriches the dialogic idea by going back in history to ancient Indian linguistics and its influence on European linguistics. She emphasizes von Humboldt’s view of “language as, at heart, dialogic” and concludes with a concept of dialogue as “the way we do human being”.

Jennifer Adams also moves beyond pragmatics and considers the ways dialogue theory can enrich the study of ‘rhetoric in situ’. This recent development in rhetoric aims at a deeper understanding of the rhetorical situation through cultural analysis. Adams demonstrates that dialogue theory goes even further by considering rhetoric to be an inherent part of the structure of dialogue itself.

Marion Grein applies the central concept of competence-in-performance to issues of applied linguistics. She considers intercultural competence-in-performance to be the goal of modern language teaching. We are in need of a holistic dialogic model, such as the Mixed Game Model, which integrates all facets of language use. She illustrates how teaching a foreign language can proceed on the structural basis of minimal action games by analyzing some examples from a German textbook.

Research interviews are the focus of *Letizia Caronia’s* contribution. She analyses examples of interviews in social science research and discusses implications of the method of analysis on epistemic conclusions. Applying a dialogic approach will substantially change our view of scientific knowledge.

Robert E. Sanders and Anita Pomerantz introduce the term ‘bounded segments’ which represent action-reaction phases, minimal as well as extended, of the action game. A bounded segment starts when interacting persons launch a task or activity and comes to an end when an agreement has been reached or, at least, the different positions have become clear. They focus on bounded segments in the case of redressing the breach of a cultural norm.

Marina Bondi investigates dialogicity in written genres. She focuses on variation across expert action games and uses a combination of qualitative and quantitative tools in her analyses. The data achieved by corpus analytic methods are interpreted in terms of communicative action. In adopting a dialogic view of

communicative action she demonstrates that dialogicity represents the guiding principle in written genres as well.

Ronald C. Arnett introduces the dialogic principle of action and reaction into the approach of semiology and thus essentially extends narrow views of semiology which disregard the purpose of use when describing the ontology of an object-of-use. He describes the life and work of Gregory Bateson as an illuminating example of a dialogic pragmatics in action and response in the complexity of human life.

Finally, Arto Mustajoki, Tatiana Sherstinova and Ulla Tuomarla set up a typology of dialogues on the basis of the distinction between genuine dialogues and pseudo-dialogues. They define ‘pseudo-dialogues’ as a special type of non-standard dialogues caused by deviations from communicative norms. Their typology elaborates different types of ‘pseudo-dialogues’ which result from various criteria of the speech situation, for instance, talking to a person on television.

We hope that the various studies in this volume help to build bridges between different disciplines and deepen our understanding of human beings’ extraordinary ability of *dialogic competence-in-performance*. It is our double nature as dialogic individuals that constitutes the human species and allows us to come to grips with the vicissitudes of life.

References

- Arbib, Michael E., Erhan Oztop, and Patricia Zukow-Goldring. 2005. “Language and the Mirror-System: A Perception/Action Based Approach to Communicative Development.” *Cognition, Brain, Behavior* 3: 239–272.
- Frawley, William. 1987. “Review Article.” : van Dijk (ed.) 1985. *Handbook of Discourse Analysis I–IV. Language* 63: 361–397.
- von Humboldt, Wilhelm. 1827/1963. “Ueber den Dualis.” In W. von Humboldt. *Schriften zur Sprachphilosophie*, vol. 3, ed. by Andreas Flitner and Klaus Giel, 113–143. Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft.
- Kecskes, Istvan. 2016. “Can Intercultural Pragmatics Bring Some New Insight into Pragmatic Theories?” In *Interdisciplinary Studies in Pragmatics, Culture and Society*, ed. by Alessandro Capone and Jacob L. Mey, 43–70. Cham etc.: Springer. doi:10.1007/978-3-319-12616-6_3
- Kecskes, Istvan. 2017. “From Pragmatics to Dialogue.” In *The Routledge Handbook of Language and Dialogue*, ed. by Edda Weigand, 78–92. New York: Routledge.
- Simon, Herbert A. 1962. “The Architecture of Complexity: Hierarchic Systems.” *Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society* 106: 467–482.
- Weigand, Edda. 2009. *Language as Dialogue*, ed. by Sebastian Feller. Amsterdam/Philadelphia: Benjamins.
- Weigand, Edda. 2010. *Dialogue: The Mixed Game*. Amsterdam/Philadelphia: Benjamins. doi:10.1075/ds.10
- Weigand, Edda. 2011. “Paradigm Changes in Linguistics: From Reductionism to Holism.” *Language Sciences* 33(4): 544–549. doi:10.1016/j.langsci.2011.04.031
- Weigand, Edda. 2017. “The Mixed Game Model: A Holistic Theory.” In *The Routledge Handbook of Language and Dialogue*, ed. by Edda Weigand, 174–194. New York: Routledge.

Dialogue

The key to pragmatics

Edda Weigand

University of Münster (Germany)

When trying to find out the ‘state of the art’ in pragmatics we risk getting lost in a mix of diverse approaches which seems to be accepted as the ‘plurality of models’ but in the end means nothing other than ‘anything goes’. The ‘pragmatic turn’, which introduced the new natural object ‘language use’, waits to be structured by the ‘dialogic turn’, i.e. the insight that language use means dialogic use in a sequence of initiative and reactive actions. In this sense dialogue provides the key to the yet unstructured field of pragmatics. Human beings are dialogic individuals who use their abilities for dialogic purposes. It is their extraordinary ability of competence-in-performance which allows them to tackle the challenge of ‘living with uncertainty’.

Keywords: pragmatics, dialogue, action and reaction, the dialogic turn, plurality of models, competence-in-performance

1. The issue

Looking at the current state of the art in linguistics we are, on the one hand, confronted with a plurality of models and, on the other hand, with ‘circles’ cutting themselves off from other ‘circles’. Both attitudes are not desirable. Accepting the plurality of models on the basis of ‘anything goes’ implies giving up the criterion of consistency, which is fundamental to any scientific approach. Science is not a matter of arbitrariness or eclecticism. The other attitude of cutting oneself off implies declining taking part in discussions, which are a crucial constituent of scientific progress.

Genuine science emerges from the desire and “pleasure of finding things out” (Feynman 2001). *The ‘things’ linguists want to find out relate to language.* Language plays a central part in human life, but nonetheless confronts us with ever new surprises. It took rather a long time before we recognized that such a ‘thing’ as an independent object does not exist. Structuralists and generativists constructed an

artificial object of language as a system of signs. I remember that, decades ago, I was enthusiastic about finding out the atomic predicates of the meaning of signs by semantic decomposition. Enthusiasm however faded away when we became aware of the fact that there is no language as such, only 'language-in-use'. Highlighting the new object 'language-in-use' constituted the *pragmatic turning point* which has been crucial to the history of modern linguistics in the 20th century. However, the key issue as to what language-in-use means remained an open debate.

Linguistics changed from sentence linguistics to utterance linguistics and stopped there. Language-in-use however not only means changing sentences to utterances but represents a *complex new object-of-study which calls for a new methodology*. When searching for a minimal autonomous object of language-use we cannot stop at the empirical level but have to look at the complex whole, of which spoken language is a component. With the pragmatic turn the concept of language has become a *matter of use*. In contrast to matters that exist on their own, such as mountains, there are matters of use like language or trains or houses which cannot be grasped by simple 'ontological' questions. Their 'ontology' is, of necessity, tied to the purpose of use. They might be used differently, in the case of language, for instance, in language games of the Chomskyan type (1988: 38): *Which animal is in the cape? – The ape*. There is however a primary or salient use which defines the nature of the concept. The crucial question related to language therefore is to find out *why* we use language.

This article aims at settling the issue of a puzzle of multiple approaches which characterize pragmatics as a field of studies on language-in-use. This as yet unstructured field becomes a meaningful picture by finding out the nature of 'language-in-use'. The time when philosophers and scholars of the humanities could make assertions without feeling in charge of verifying them has passed. The brain is no longer a black box. Sociobiology allows us to verify our assertions, at least to a great extent. Human beings are dialogic individuals. This implies that the use of language means 'dialogic use'.

In this sense the article aims to clarify the concept 'language-in-use' by tracing it back to human nature and explaining 'use' by its dialogic structure. I will argue against accepting 'the plurality of models'. Pure observation has to give way to goal-oriented observation. Concentrating on our faculty of reason we can find out that we use language in order to come to some understanding. This cannot happen by 'anything goes'. The chaos is structured by 'laws of chaos' (Prigogine 1994) which, in the field of language use, are 'laws' of dialogic use. They allow us to form a meaningful picture out of multiple pieces of a puzzle.

The concept of dialogue tells us why and how we use language and thus allows us to structure the field of pragmatics. 'Use' is more than establishing or maintaining a 'relation'. The case of 'small talk' cannot be generalized. Use means trying

to achieve our purposes. Human beings are goal-oriented beings. As dialogic individuals they act and react in order to negotiate their mutual goals. A theory of dialogue in performance has to abandon traditional methods of abstraction and instead think about the ‘architecture of complexity’ (Simon 1962). We have to make a fresh start and be prepared for a change from reductionism to holism, from the addition of parts to the integration of components (for details of the theory of the Mixed Game Model see Weigand 2010). It would be desirable that pragmatists follow Istvan Kecskes in joining forces with dialogue scholars in their attempt at understanding language-in-use (e.g., Kecskes 2017). It goes without saying that dialogue remains a pragmatic object but an object that provides the methodological key to adequately structuring pragmatics.

2. What pragmatics is about

Reviewing the state of the art in pragmatics means taking a position on the ‘plurality of approaches’. Can this be scientifically justified by creating a ‘scientific’ universe in which anything goes, or does it only conceal lack of orientation? It seems to be mainstream opinion that ‘language use’ results from adding ‘use’ to ‘language’ or from putting language into context. ‘Theories’ of context are expected to settle the issue which an analysis of spoken language could not provide. In this way orthodox Cartesian methodology of separation and addition does not get problematized. The insight that ‘language use’ represents a new object, *a unity*, is missing. The question of what constitutes a ‘theory’ is not posed (Weigand 2016). The need of justification is brushed aside and replaced by reference to other members of the circle or to alleged ‘authorities’. A clear example of this type of doing ‘science’ can be found in one of the recent *Handbooks on Pragmatics*, the Oxford Handbook (Huang 2017). You only need to take a look at the Table of Contents and you will find nothing other than orthodox terms and methodologies put together. Let me now elaborate some basic fallacies of such a view. Although the *diversity of the approaches* makes it difficult to distinguish types, I think we can roughly identify the following structure.

Separating levels and items

Cartesian approaches are not worried about separating levels and isolating items which are not themselves independent in performance but exist only in artificial constructions. Even if *empiricists* scrutinize infinite amounts of ‘data’, they reduce the complex object to its empirical surface, whereas cognitivists focus on what empiricists neglect. Both ignore the fact that there are no separate levels of empirical

data versus cognitive items as such in performance but human beings who integratively use their abilities of speaking, thinking and perceiving in language use in order to achieve their goals. Observing ourselves in the way we proceed in face-to-face interaction, we can notice an interesting detail: we pass over much of what empiricists consider 'data', for instance, incomplete syntax, in order to arrive at an understanding. 'Data' needs to be functionally relevant as already Chomsky (1959) emphasized in his criticism of Skinner (Weigand 2004). Being involved in the complexity of the action game we cannot proceed otherwise: we draw our attention to as many variables as possible and go ahead, step by step, to particularities by adaptation. There is no other way to tackle complexity.

If we exclusively start from empirical means, we cannot arrive at their meaning in the complex whole. Meaning arises from the integration of different types of communicative means. *It is therefore meaning which determines expression not vice versa*. By picking out single empirical items or grammatical constructions we can only achieve partial results which can be completely wrong in another case of use. Corpus linguistic analyses on the basis of huge corpora and multimodal analyses can achieve some improvement of the results, but the principal error in constructing grammars of language use by starting from the expression side remains. So-called 'construction grammars' are, in the end, doomed to fail (Weigand 2017).

Cognitivists, in contrast to empiricists, focus on another level, the level of cognition which can only be artificially separated. They do not shy away from expressing views which ignore the social dimension of our lives, such as Scott-Philipps's *Speaking our Minds* (2014), and obviously carry on Chomsky's position that 'language is a tool for thinking' (Chomsky 1988; Weigand 1991). They finally seem to approach the fact that language is addressed to other human beings. In this sense Scott-Philipps (2015: 9) reaches out to some reduced version of dialogue at the cognitive level: "Put simply, speakers speak in order to mentally manipulate their audience, and audiences listen in order to gain access to the minds of speakers." Are we living in a mental world? Chomsky (2016: 23) at least admits in his concluding remarks that the study of language does not seem to be "approaching a terminal point" as he believed in his student days in the mid-twentieth century.

The scope of cognition has been extended to what is called 'distributed cognition'. Hutchins (1995), for instance, explores the cognitive properties of systems that are larger than an individual. Scholars of this movement criticize disembodied views of cognition, however without seriously taking into account the basic crux that cognition is integrated with other human abilities.

Seeking for a solution at the level of artificial terms

Mainstream pragmatics continues to use orthodox methodology which has been developed in modern linguistics for artificial systems of language. Terms and techniques remain the same, such as the 'sign', the linguistic 'code', truth-conditions and the technique of the addition of language and context. The question of what the new *object* of language-use is about is brushed aside. *Logical systems* still attract linguists. Should we indeed believe that language works like logical systems as, for instance, assumed by Vanderveken (1994: 99) or underlying the approach by Batt/Trognon (2018)? Whereas abstract systems of language might be related to logic, the natural system of language use has nothing to do with logic. *Performance has its own system of rationality* (Weigand 2014). Nonetheless neo-Gricean pragmatics continues tracing performance back to truth-conditions (e.g., Levinson 2000). Are we really the honest beings who express clearly and unmistakably what they mean as described by Gricean principles of communication? For me it is barely imaginable that the authoritative voice of a philosopher can induce scholars to refrain from using their own reason.

Among the approaches which relate to logic there is also *the pragma-dialectic approach* to argumentation by van Eemeren and his school. They start from logical dialectics as developed in antiquity and simply add a second part of 'strategic manoeuvring' in order to relate the logical system to pragmatic conditions of performance (e.g., van Eemeren 2010). The question of the inner coherence of such a procedure is not posed (Weigand 2006).

'Relevance' is another term which has been exploited without checking whether it is really 'relevant' (Sperber and Wilson 1986). '*Relevance theory*' does not take the term in the simple sense of everyday language use but applies it in a rather sophisticated manner which, in the end, means nothing other than Zipf's old law of the economy of use (1949). This does not prevent Piattelli Palmarini (1995: 158) from calling 'relevance' the 'law of pragmatics' (Weigand 2010: 24). How far away are we from finding out what the pragmatics of language use means?

There are still other terms artificially created to settle the issue of pragmatics, among them the term '*pragmeme*' (Mey 2001) which seems to allude to structuralist terms such as the 'morpheme' or the 'phoneme'. Pragmatics is however not a continuation of structuralism. The '*pragmeme*' has been defined as what results from putting Searle's abstract speech act into the context, and this represents a completely artificial procedure. However, *we do not put language into context*; on the contrary, we use language from the very beginning *in* context, i.e. context is integrated, not added to language use. Moreover, the term '*pragmeme*' is not only used for pragmatic issues in the strict sense, related to one utterance, but also for conversational issues and dialogue games. If new terms are to be considered as justified, they need

to be backed by theory. Which ‘theory’ however could justify such an empty circular definition of ‘pragmatics’ as a ‘set of pragememes’? Pragmatics still struggles to grasp its object ‘language-in-use’.

The term *interface* is another term which has been introduced to settle the pragmatic problem (e.g., Turner 1999). Pragmatists speak of the interface between semantics and pragmatics or the interface between pragmatics and syntax. At its core the term interface means nothing more than addition. Pragmatics is put to semantics or syntax, and pragmatists look for mutual influences caused by this juxtaposition. In performance however there is no longer orthodox syntax or semantics but, from the very outset, pragmatic syntax or utterance syntax and pragmatic semantics or meaning-in-use (Weigand 2017).

Besides pragmatics, there is another discipline, *semiotics*, which has also been confronted with the issue of how to tackle the problem of language use. However, in contrast to pragmatics, which created the ‘pragmatic turn’, semiotics did not even acknowledge that there is a new object ‘language use’ but constructed this new object according to the rules of the system as a constellation of ‘boxes’ (Weigand 2018a). The semiotic ‘box’ of language as a sign system has been extended by other ‘boxes’, for instance, the ‘box’ of the user. Semiotics, in its strict form, remains programmatically in the ivory tower of science. There is even a new discipline, *communicology*, created at the level of artificial tools (Lanigan 2018), which on the whole can be considered as a type of extension of semiotic methods. If we try to understand its methodology we find ourselves in a jungle of terms which is tentatively justified by reference to ‘authorities’, for instance, Eco (1976) and Jakobson (1971). The pragmatic issue does not exist for such artificial constructions.

Flying into vague concepts

The third type of approach applied by pragmatists in order to grasp the complexity of performance means flying into vague concepts, such as ‘perspective’, ‘discourse’, ‘dialogism’, or ‘relation’. What can be scientifically gained by describing pragmatics as ‘*perspective*’ and adding it to language as an artificial code (Verschuieren 1987)? ‘Perspective’ can mean anything and, in the end, means nothing. By changing the term ‘*discourse*’ from a concrete concept ‘text’ to a concept which reaches out to the whole by simply accepting ‘anything goes’, we leave any solid ground (e.g., van Dijk 1985). The flight into vague concepts only conceals not knowing what is really at stake.

To sum up

I think it has become evident that juggling with terms or accepting a variety of 'truths' will not help us move on. Language use is a matter of life, not a matter of orthodox restrictions or vague speculations. What needs to be done is to face the fundamentals of science and of theorizing (Weigand 2016). Trying to overcome the arbitrariness of 'truths' means searching for the unity of knowledge constituted by the object 'language use' itself.

Fortunately pragmatists are on the move. They recognize that they should stop cutting pragmatics off from dialogue analysis. Istvan Kecskes (2017) has paved the way by building bridges and pointing to the essentials of language use, i.e. the use of language in dialogue. Dialogue is not to be added, dialogue is there, integrated from the very outset, and offers the methodological key to structuring the field of pragmatics by understanding language use as language action and reaction.

The impulse for creating the pragmatic turn arose from the focus on the new object and the desire not to distort the natural object by methodology. We therefore have to *start with the complex object* of 'natural language use' and *derive methodology* from it. Different methodologies might arise for different components of the complex whole. They can be accepted as far as they are *complementary* or translatable and help us going ahead. In this way, multiplicity and diversity can be justified if they are due to the different nature of components, not as a technique of trial and error. Hypotheses need to be *verified*. Fortunately, verification has become possible in our day by extended anthropological observations and experimental neurobiological results.

3. The challenge of the dialogic turn

Let me now be more precise in explaining why the pragmatic turn only represents an intermediate step in our attempt to grasp language use. *The pragmatic turn waits to be structured by the dialogic turn* (cf., e.g., Weigand 2010; Hundsnurscher 1992). With the pragmatic turn we decided for a natural concept of language use, and simultaneously we faced the issue that the new complex object cannot adequately be addressed by methods of Cartesian linguistics. Cartesian linguistics is based on a concept of theory which consists of the reduction of empirical means by abstraction to a rule-governed structure. In this way, Chomsky reduced utterances to sentences, which are artifacts, and described these artifacts by dividing them into parts by phrase structure rules of the type: $S \rightarrow NP + VP$. Obviously such a methodology does not work in pragmatics. Nonetheless, structures of this type are still taken as basis of many pragmatic approaches, for instance, the neo-Gricean approaches (Levinson 2000).

Cartesian linguistics starts from artificial methodology and shapes the object according to it. If we no longer want to distort language as a natural object of use, we are, of necessity, confronted with the challenge of finding out the ‘*architecture of complexity*’. A complex object consists of various components but on the whole it is a *unity*, which does not arise from the addition of parts, but from the *integration of the components*. There are no separate levels, no independent items or parts which could be added together. The whole is more than the sum of parts. The architecture of complexity presupposes that the unity of the complex object represents an *autonomous unit*. I do not want to tackle the objection that there is no absolute autonomy in human life, which I consider to be a futile philosophical intervention. I only want to specify that what I call ‘autonomous unit’ is meant as ‘nearly autonomous unit’.

The nature of the object will tell us how it works. If the object is an object-of-use, as in our case of language use, its phenomenology, of necessity, presupposes finding out what it is used for. Language is used by human beings. Human beings are individuals and at the same time social beings. The way they act and behave is determined by their *double nature* as dialogic individuals and by the co-evolution of ‘genes, mind, and culture’ (Lumsden and Wilson 2005). The key to human action and behaviour are *human needs and desires* which are determined by the evolution of the species. Human beings’ double nature enables them to mediate between their self-interests and social concerns by an extraordinary ability which I called *competence-in-performance* (e.g., Weigand 2000). The challenge of science means addressing this ability with a theory which, of necessity, goes beyond traditional theorizing and faces complexity in a genuinely holistic approach (Weigand 2010).

The question why we use language can now easily be settled. In the attempt to fulfil their needs and desires human beings have to negotiate their purposes with their fellow beings, i.e. they act and react in order to come to an understanding, at least to a certain extent. Utterances are not adequately described as a means of speaking or expressing our thoughts; utterances are the carriers of action and result from the interaction of different human abilities, speaking, thinking, and perceiving. From this general purpose of language use *basic constituents* can be derived:

- Language use means language action.
- Action means dialogic action, i.e. action and reaction.
- Human beings’ competence-in-performance enables them to adapt to ever-changing environments and to mediate between possibly controversial interests.

These constituents already point to pillars of *methodology*. Whereas pragmatics is only the name of a field, ‘dialogue’ or ‘language use as dialogic action’ implies a specific methodology which allows us to analyse how language use works. Human beings proceed in performance by *principles of probability*, i.e. they orient themselves according to rules as far as they go and proceed by specialization from standard

cases to particular cases according to principles of probabilities. In this way, conventions are combined with individuality. Different positions have to be negotiated in dialogue in order to arrive at some understanding. We do not start from ‘common ground’ (Clark 1996) nor can we arrive at completely ‘equal ground’. We remain individuals-in-dialogue; understanding will therefore, of necessity, remain gradual.

Human beings are by their very nature endowed with their competence-in-performance to face the vicissitudes of their lives. They have various integrated abilities which interact with each other in the mixed game, as can be verified by findings of sociobiology (Damasio 2000). Human beings are not only dialogic individuals but also cultural beings, goal-oriented and persuasive beings and ethical beings as well (Weigand 2018a).

In principle, the gap between pragmatics and dialogue analysis represents a pseudo-gap. Istvan Kecskes’ socio-cognitive approach shares the basic points of a view of language use as dialogue (Kecskes 2017), to mention only the most important points:

- Language use means dialogic action, i.e. action and reaction connected by expectancy.
- Actions are not only determined by their purpose but as well by interests of the interlocutors, in Kecskes’ terms by the ‘communicative agenda’.
- His intercultural socio-cognitive approach is also based on the double nature of human beings who, in his terms, are ‘egocentric social beings’.

The pragmatic turn drew our attention to the natural object of language use. The dialogic turn showed us how to analyse this new object. In the following paragraphs I will shortly outline how basic components of this complex object can be structured according to the ‘architecture of complexity’: the change from orthodox speech act theory to a dialogic speech act theory, the structure of an utterance grammar based on the integration of components, and the general concept of meaning-in-use which is decisive for the structure of the lexicon in an utterance grammar.

4. The architecture of complexity

A genuinely holistic theory starts from the complex whole, in our case human beings’ action-and-behaviour in performance, and derives methodology from the object by specialization. Specialization of components becomes possible by ‘near decomposability’, a criterion defined by Simon (1962). In this way the ‘architecture of complexity’ unfolds according to fundamental premises of a holistic theory (see above):

The whole is more than the sum of the parts.
Integration is the name of the game.

4.1 Dialogue and speech acts

What I have called the ‘dialogic turn’ already takes effect at the very beginning, in the basic structure of action. The term action is used by many scholars, often without any attempt to define it. As mentioned above, using language does not only mean speaking but acting, which is due to human beings’ nature as goal-oriented beings. It also means dialogic action due to human beings’ double nature. Dialogic action comprises action and reaction, and this not only in the sense of ‘doing something’ but as actions in the sense of speech acts. The relation between action and reaction is not defined by empirical features such as the position in the sequence or frequency, as supposed in conversation analysis, but determined by the function of the initiative speech act. For instance, a representative speech act obviously aims at a response of acceptance, which is an intrinsic feature of the initiative representative speech act. Whether a response of acceptance is actually made in performance, depends on many factors of performance, mainly on the individuality of the interlocutor. Consequently the relation between action and reaction is a relation which can be expected, not a relation fixed by some code nor a relation left to arbitrariness. *Action is more than the use of specific words and more or something else than turn taking* (Weigand 2018a).

Levinson (2006) considers human beings as “interaction engines”. According to him “interaction is characterized by the ‘reciprocity of roles [...] yielding a turn-taking structure’. Actions can however not be defined by roles. Turn-taking in the sense of taking one’s role as speaker-addressee is an empirical feature of conversation which is a prerequisite for carrying on conversation. Adjacency pairs, for instance, question-answer sequences or greetings, are identified by frequency of use and intuitively classified by what might, at first glance, seem speech act purposes. However what can count as the purpose of a speech act has to be functionally defined in a speech act taxonomy and cannot be equated with speech act verbs (e.g., Weigand 2010: 132ff.). Turn-taking might, of course, serve a purpose that goes beyond taking the turn, for instance, the purpose of interrupting the interlocutor or of demonstrating some power in the community. Purposes of this kind are not purposes of speech acts but can be described as strategies in order to achieve our interests.

‘Actions’ are also different from ‘activities’. Activities can relate to practical actions such as doing sport. They can also mean movements such as walking in the sense of putting one foot before the other or movements of our mouth when we are speaking. Movements of the mouth in this sense are not actions but a prerequisite in order to speak. Actions, initiative as well as reactive, are primarily functional concepts which pave the way towards achieving the purpose of dialogue.

The first fundamental question to be settled in an action theory of dialogue means clarifying the difference between action and reaction, which, as just mentioned, is

not a difference of position but a difference in meaning. Only very few scholars have tried to catch this meaning difference. In my theory of ‘language as dialogue’ I defined initiative speech acts as making a dialogic claim and reactive speech acts as fulfilling this very claim, either positively or negatively or postponing the decision. In this way the connection between initiative and reactive speech acts of the interlocutors can be established (see, for instance, Weigand 2010).




Figure 1. The Dialogic Principle proper

Language use is thus, by its very nature, dialogic use. The architecture of a genuinely holistic theory claims that all constituents are derived from the complex object. In this sense, I derived a comprehensive speech act taxonomy of pairs of action and reaction from this first fundamental correlation of making and fulfilling the same dialogic claim (e.g., Weigand 2010).

Having dealt with questions of a dialogic speech act taxonomy in various publications, I will restrict myself to outlining some guidelines of how a comprehensive dialogic speech act taxonomy can be *derived by means of specialization*. We start from the overall purpose of dialogue, ie trying to come to an understanding, and derive step by step basic action types which are then specialized towards particular types of speech acts. The dialogic claim which constitutes the basic unit of action and reaction can be differentiated as a claim to truth or a claim to volition which relate to human beings’ mental states of belief and desire (Weigand 1991). All speech act types, basic as well as particular types, are dialogically oriented, the reactive speech act type being determined by the initiative speech act:




Figure 2. Dialogic typology of action

Having derived basic dialogic speech act types by specializing the dialogic claim (see above Figure 2), all other subtypes can be derived by further specialization of the claim and by introducing propositional criteria, as, for instance, in the case of directives (Weigand 2010: 155ff.):




Figure 3. Derived types of directives

In this figure, crucial differences between orthodox speech act theory and a dialogic speech act theory become evident. As I have dealt with these differences in detail in many publications (mainly in 2010), I only want to give two striking examples: the definition of ‘exploratives’ and Searle’s favourite type of ‘commissives’.

Compared with Searle’s basic types, not only reactive speech act types are included but also EXPLORATIVES are derived as a basic speech act type. Whereas Searle (1975) considers exploratives as a subtype of directives, the dialogic approach clearly demonstrates that they represent their own basic type. EXPLORATIVES aim at a reaction of RESPONSE whereas DIRECTIVES aim at CONSENT:

- (1) What time is it? – 12 o’clock.
EXPLORATIVE ↔ RESPONSE
- (2) Please take account of the time difference. – I’ll do that.
DIRECTIVE ↔ CONSENT

Action and reaction are correlated by their meaning and define each other mutually (for the complete derivation of all particular action types see Weigand 2010: 129ff.). It is indeed incomprehensible that most publications in pragmatics keep to Searle’s monologic speech act taxonomy even when analysing dialogic action games such as ‘advertising’ or ‘making compliments’. They completely brush aside the fact that language use means dialogic use which aims at a specific reaction. Another equally serious failure to account for the complexity of language use is the equation of speech acts with speech act verbs and the description of them using the outdated Cartesian methodology of Wierzbicka’s natural semantics metalanguage (Wong 2016).

Searle's favourite speech act type of COMMISSIVES represents another interesting case which demonstrates that he constructs his speech act types as independent, monologic types and ignores conditions of performance. His taxonomy only consists of illocutionary speech acts which are apparently conceived of as speech acts capable of initiating a sequence. Commissives however cannot be considered as independent speech acts as the following example demonstrates (Weigand 2010: 151):

(3.1) I would be pleased if you could come ↔ Thanks, I'll come.
to my party tomorrow.

DIRECTIVE

CONSENT

(3.2) Can I rely on it? ↔ Sure.

EXPLORATIVE

COMMISSIVE

Searle's commissives obviously have their place in the fourth move of the sequence. They take up the reaction of consent and strengthen it by a feature of commitment. Making a commitment constitutes a declarative speech act. Committing oneself to a future action is not an autonomous speech act but strengthens the preceding speech act of consent as a sequence-dependent declarative speech act.

4.2 Dialogue and utterance grammar

Any grammar should describe how meaning and expressions are correlated. This means for an utterance grammar of speech acts describing the correlation between the meaning of speech acts and dialogic means:




Figure 4. Action as correlation of purposes and appropriate means

I also included 'having emotions' among the devices although I am aware of the fact that emotions cannot intentionally be fully controlled. There are however texts in which the speakers intentionally try to achieve their goals by skilfully arousing emotions on the part of the audience. Describing the correlation between action meaning and means is especially difficult because it is, to some degree, dependent on the individuality of the speaker.

I tried to elaborate basic principles of an utterance grammar in a chapter of *The Routledge Handbook of Language and Dialogue* (Weigand 2017). I will therefore only point to a few crucial principles on which a Grammar of Utterance is built.

The first and central point is that utterances as carriers of speech acts are *dialogically directed*. How could, for instance, reactive utterances, as in the examples of the preceding paragraph, be described in a pragmatics which is restricted to a single utterance and ignores its relation to dialogic use? Consequently a genuine utterance grammar has to be based on a concept of ‘language as dialogue’ (Weigand 2009).

The other basic point is that utterances are not items of a code but dialogic means used by *individual speakers*. This can however not mean that the speakers create themselves their means, as maintained by Roy Harris (e.g., 1996) and his school of Integrational Linguistics. How could we then come to some understanding? Speakers have some liberty to modify conventions of use and even the right to restrict themselves to some private use of language, if they want. But why should they use language or gestures at all if only for private use? In the same way as the concept of ‘language as a code’ can be called a ‘myth’, also the concept of ‘language as completely arbitrary’ represents a myth (Weigand 2018b, c). Addressing the complexity of performance means facing some arbitrariness of use but at the same time coming to grips with it by being competent-in-performance, i.e. by knowing the ‘laws of chaos’, among them the basic laws of adaptation and of relying on principles of probability.

The core of an utterance grammar, the integration of different types of means, verbal, perceptual and cognitive, can be traced back to the integration of human abilities (Damasio 2000). Integration means that the ‘utterance’ is a complex whole of verbal, perceptual and cognitive means which interact. Their interaction has to comply with the primary condition of any grammar, the condition of *coherence*. The integration of different types of means is also responsible for the fact that utterances cannot be separated as distinct units at the empirical level. Utterances are not units of empirical means only but units of the correlation of meaning and means and include cognitive as well as perceptual means. Utterances are to be delimited at the level of meaning. Defining the utterance as *carrier of the action* means the utterance begins and ends with the speech act.

Any component of an utterance grammar will be affected by such premises, which will change the description of the traditional parts of a grammar, such as syntax and semantics. Introducing the term ‘interface’ will not settle the issue (see above 2). The change is complete. There is no interface between pragmatics and syntax or between pragmatics and semantics. Syntax and semantics are dialogic syntax and dialogic semantics from the very outset (see, for instance, Kempson’s concept of ‘interactive syntax’, 2017, in *The Routledge Handbook of Language and Dialogue*).

An utterance grammar is a component of the action game and dependent on fundamental principles of the mixed game. I will only mention one point which underlines the necessity to address pragmatics from the view of the dialogic turn. What pragmatists, e.g. Yule (1996), described as a ‘strange’ experience, namely that we can pass by a group of people talking together in our own native language and we understand nothing, is not strange but ‘normal’ language use. Pure observation will not suffice; we need to be *insiders of the game*, having access to its cognitive world and being able to distinguish what is relevant to perceive in the situation, if we want to understand what is talked about.

4.3 Dialogue and lexical meaning

Pragmatists still keep to Cartesian methods and separate a part of ‘semantics’ for describing the meaning of words by a set of features or by introducing some ‘interface’ between semantics and pragmatics. Facing the complexity of performance clearly shows that in language use there is no compositional semantics whatsoever of isolated words but dialogic semantics or ‘*meaning-in-use*’ (Wittgenstein 2009). Meaning-in-use mainly results from the use of words in phrases or collocations and calls for a total change in lexicology. If we want to shun artificial constructions, such as highly polysemous lexical items and multiple disambiguation, we have to accept that language use represents a *network of phrases* which not even the native speaker is always conscious of. We need corpus linguistic techniques and large corpora to become aware of the widely branching network of meaning-in-use. It often happens to me as native speaker of German that I am surprised to spot yet another usage of a word; recently, for instance, the use of the German adjective *fertig* which has completely different meanings in collocations with specific adverbs:

- | | | |
|-----|--|--|
| (4) | Bist du fertig? Wir müssen gehen. | Are you ready? We’ve got to go. |
| | Bist du <i>schon fertig</i> ? Wir haben noch etwas Zeit. | Are you ready? We’ve still got some time. |
| | Ich kann nicht mehr. Ich bin <i>ziemlich fertig</i> . | I can’t do any more. I’m rather exhausted. |

Phrases as components of utterances unfold their meaning in *dialogic use*. The same is true of so-called ‘pragmatic markers’ or ‘discourse markers’ which have recently been revealed as ‘*dialogue particles*’, for instance, in a study on Danish particles by Engberg-Pedersen and Boeg Thomson (2016). Another very clear example is the Italian particle *magari* which is difficult to translate:

- (5) Hai mangiato oggi? – Magari.
Have you eaten today? – If only it was true.

There is another interesting authentic example which demonstrates that the key to the meaning of words is their dialogic use (see also Weigand 2009: 297):

- (6) H Don't let yourself get infected!
 E Are you ill?
 H Didn't you see the water? Everyone's got a hobby.
 F I'd never do that when we pay so much just for cleaning.
 E Ah, now I understand. You're right. No, I won't let myself get infected!

It becomes immediately clear that pure observation is not enough to understand what is going on (see also Weigand 2009: 297). You need to be an insider of a game which is clearly a mixed game and requires the integrated use of our abilities of speaking, thinking and perceiving. I myself was an insider of this game, E, and can indicate what is not verbally expressed. H, F and E are neighbours, they live in the same house and are engaged in this small talk in front of the entrance of the house. H refers to what happened a few days ago: another neighbour had spilled water on the ground when cleaning the roof of the entrance. H alludes to this occurrence by the perceptual means of raising his head and looking and moving his body in the direction of the entrance hall and ironically commenting on it: *Everyone's got a hobby*. His wife F critically comments on the price they have to pay for the cleaning of the hallway and thus eventually clarifies the misunderstanding: the phrase *get infected* is not used in its salient meaning but actually means 'get infected by a mania for cleaning'.

From the very outset the interlocutors address the complex whole of small talk which takes place in order to maintain social relationships among neighbours. Understanding is not immediately achieved because the phrase *get infected* evokes its *salient meaning* of 'getting infected by illness' and needs to be corrected by gradually adapting to the particular case. Misunderstanding has been intentionally and mockingly produced by alluding to salient meaning. The example highlights again that pragmatic concepts, in this case salience, are in fact dialogic concepts (Giora 2003; Kecskes 2017).

The third example provides yet another argument against orthodox concepts of language as 'an instrument of thought' or 'speaking our minds', as maintained, for instance, by Chomsky (2016: 16) or Scott-Phillips (2014). In a model of 'language as dialogue' the pragmatic principle '*we mean more than we say*' represents a premise which cannot be questioned. We often mean something we do not explicitly express. Naturally, this can be the source of a misunderstanding as it, for instance, emerged in an exchange between a publishing house and an author of a textbook. The publishing company had published a series of textbooks. The author submitted their textbook, which was accepted by the publishing house. They assumed that as it was a textbook it would be published in the series. The series however was not

explicitly mentioned in the contract. In the end, it turned out that the publishing company wanted to publish the book as a single book, not as a volume in the series. We thus see that the title of Scott-Phillips's book is misleading. In this actual case, misunderstanding could have been avoided by trying to be more precise. However, in moving ahead in performance by adaptation we often leave details unexpressed. Due to the pressure of complexity, misunderstandings cannot always be excluded. Fortunately, they are mostly clarified in the ongoing dialogue.

All three examples unmask concepts roughly called pragmatic as being in essence dialogic concepts. They are, of course, pragmatic, but this does not help analyse their proper function. We do not 'speak our minds' but interact in order to achieve our mutual goals in dialogue. We hope that what is hidden in our minds can be inferred from what is said in concrete circumstances of the game. We do not start from common ground (Clark 1996) but try to arrive at some common ground of gradual understanding.

5. Examples of dialogic action games

Let us finally focus on the whole action game and demonstrate basic principles of the Mixed Game Model by a few examples.

5.1 So-called monologues

So-called monologues are of special interest to our question. Let us take Merkel's well-known utterance

(7) We can handle this.

which seems to be a monologic utterance and not in need of any 'dialogic key'. However this utterance has clearly been dialogically oriented towards the public as became clear by the fact that it triggered argumentative action games, among them the well-known debate with the leader of her coalition party, Seehofer, who contradicted her:

(8) A cap on the numbers is necessary to guarantee domestic security.

This debate is an action game of argumentation which can precisely be described at the level of a dialogic speech act theory (see above 4.1). Merkel's *we can handle this* and Seehofer's *we need a cap on the numbers* are assertive speech acts which aim at acceptance. They represent thesis and antithesis in a game of argumentation as their claims to truth contradict each other. At the same time they are indirectly

directive speech acts expressing a claim to volition which refers to practical action and aims at consent.




Figure 5. Thesis and antithesis as starting point of argumentation

In this sense Merkel's utterance is clearly dialogically directed and aims at encouraging the Germans to tackle the challenging situation (for details see Weigand 2018a).

5.2 Culture integrated

Culture is a clear example of the basic principle of 'integration' which determines the structure of utterance grammar (see above 4.2.). Human beings are cultural beings, and this contradicts pragmatic attempts to simply add cultural features to verbal features of the utterance. Culture is a feature of any community and manifests itself as an inseparable component of the utterance, as can be clearly seen in the following authentic action game. Two mothers talk about their daughters:

- (9) E Macht Ihnen Ihre Tochter auch Does your daughter criticize you
 ständig Vorwürfe? much, too?
 O Das soll sie sich mal erlauben! I'd like to see her try.

O repudiates a situation presupposed in E's utterance: reproaches are not permitted in the family culture of O. Cultural conventions are thus integrated into the utterance and cannot be separated at the empirical level.

Pragmatics fortunately is on the move, i.e. stopping with artificial constructions of addition and considering language use as the *unity* of social interaction.

5.3 Ethics integrated

In the same way as culture is integrated, ethics is also integrated. The history of approaches to ethics can be compared with the history of modern linguistics (Weigand 2018a). Both include a shift from artificial systems to ‘language’ or ‘ethics’ in dialogic performance. Both require a change in methodology from reductionism to holism or from Cartesian linguistics to post-Cartesian thought.

Our existing globalized society is characterized by the importance of the interests of the ‘masters of mankind’ (Adam Smith 2003: 96; Chomsky 2016: 239). Money and imperial power are all that counts. Even the meaning of words becomes totally dependent on the interests of the users (see above 4.3.). “Masters of mankind” in our day are “multinational conglomerates, huge financial institutions, retail empires, and the like”, which are, according to Chomsky’s political writings (2016a: 239), dedicated to the “vile maxim”: “All for ourselves and nothing for other people”. Obviously, this comes very close to the actual slogan “America first”. Due to such interests the people of countries of the Third World can be regarded as ‘saleable exotic objects’ who serve to fulfil the desires of the rich and mighty. The magical word ‘exotic’ can be taken as a striking example of how words can be used as powerful devices in a positive as well as negative sense, either appreciating the wonders of foreign cultures or disparaging their people as objects.

Human beings, individuals as well as groups and institutions, perceive the world differently according to their ideology and this influences their way of politics and presentation. We might consider *exotic* as a single lexical unit and describe its etymological meaning in ancient Greek as ‘outside’. ‘Outside’ means ‘outside of home’, which, if it is distant, can mean ‘foreign’. However, language use does not mean putting signs with a defined, fixed meaning into use. In language use there are no signs at all, there are words-in-use, among them ‘magical words’ like *exotic*. The meanings we can assign to the adjective *exotic* in present-day use all depend on the opposition to ‘at home’ or ‘familiar’ and can range from ‘foreign’ to ‘strange’, ‘striking’ and ‘attractive’ or can even allude to the phonetically similar adjective *erotic*. A dictionary which is restricted to single words will therefore be deficient and only demonstrates that the meaning of a word is its use. *Describing meaning-in-use means describing how the word is used in dialogue*. We not only use words in speech acts of description but primarily in speech acts of evaluation. Evaluations are not something marginal in language use but central to human action and behaviour insofar as we not only perceive or listen but cannot do other than evaluate what we have perceived or heard and take a position with regard to it. What is most important is the fact that *language use means action*, and action means intentional action which is affected by interests. Representation is dependent on our interests. The question therefore is why and in whose interests we use the adjective *exotic*.

This is a question which depends on the individual speaker, the culture they come from and their individual interests.

Let me illustrate the issue by another example: the phrase *the incredible India* which the Government of India in 2002 used to start an international marketing campaign to promote tourism. The interests seem to be clear: the adjective *incredible* is used to link up with ‘the wonderful exotic’. Its meaning was deliberately left vague and could be filled out by the pictures connected to the phrase. For Western perceivers these pictures of astounding colours, crowds of people, magical palaces, wild animals, and tropical vegetation, aroused the desire to visit a world unfamiliar to them, a foreign, beautiful and different cultural environment. They were addressed personally as ‘rerum novarum cupidus’, someone who is keen to discover something new.

In the same way, Thailand appeals to people’s curiosity on the internet and in tourism brochures by using the phrase *the amazing Thailand*, which is *a kingdom of wonder, filled with spectacular natural, cultural, and historical attractions*. Such a view of the wonderfully ‘exotic’ can suddenly shift to the negative, alluding to the dark side of erotic attractions and ‘fantasies’ by reference to *the world’s most sensual women*.

6. Conclusion and outlook

Science does not stand still but is continuously on the move in an attempt to achieve deeper insight into the objects of research. There are different disciplines and multiple issues, which are addressed from different viewpoints. They cannot lead anywhere, not everything is possible in a plurality of models. The direction should be the any-where of knowledge (Wilson 1999). In the humanities and social sciences, the object-of-study relates to describing and explaining human beings’ actions and behaviour. This complex object cannot be divided into parts but needs to be investigated as a complex integrated whole, starting from the whole and specializing the components, and in the end verifying the results by reference to the way our brain works. We should be honest and not attempt to *construct* models of ‘biolinguistics’ as artificial systems designed to confirm artificial linguistic models. We should not disparage the great moment when we were able to open the ‘black box’ and look inside. Every discipline and sub-discipline can focus on a component of the complex whole and contribute to the unity of knowledge by complementary or translatable approaches. This is what genuine interdisciplinarity means.

I fully agree with Istvan Kecskes (2017) that building bridges between pragmatics and dialogue analysis marks the direction in which research on language should proceed. In the interest of our common object-of-study we should join

forces, overcome separation in ‘circles’ and arbitrary models, and move ahead by acknowledging turning points which change the direction of research. *What is currently at stake is the turning point from pragmatics to dialogue.* Hypotheses do not suffice, they need to be verified by insights of sociobiology. In the end, it is human beings’ nature as dialogic individuals which lays the foundation for the human species. Sociobiology combines extended anthropological observations of different cultures and languages and neurobiological insights based on true experimental results. It is the pleasure of finding things out, not our own reputation which counts.

References

- Arbib, Michael, Erhan Oztop and Patricia Zukow-Goldring. 2005. “Language and the Mirror System: A Perception/Action Based Approach to Communicative Development.” *Cognition, Brain Behavior* 3: 239–272.
- Batt, Martine and Alain Trognon. 2018. “An Interlocutory Logic Approach of a Case of Professional Ethics.” In *Dialogic Ethics*, ed. by Ronald C. Arnett and François Cooren, 149–177. Amsterdam/Philadelphia: Benjamins.
- Brown, Penelope and Stephen C. Levinson. 1987. *Politeness: Some Universals in Language Usage*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Chomsky, Noam. 1959. “Review: G. F. Skinner: Verbal behavior. New York 1957.” *Language* 35: 26–58. doi:10.2307/411334
- Chomsky, Noam. 1988. *Language and Problems of Knowledge. The Managua Lectures*. Cambridge: MIT Press.
- Chomsky, Noam. 2016. “Minimal Computation and the Architecture of Language.” *Chinese Semiotic Studies* 12 (1): 13–24.
- Clark, Herbert H. 1996. *Using Language*. Cambridge etc.: Cambridge University Press. doi:10.1017/CBO9780511620539
- Damasio, Antonio. 2000. *The Feeling of What Happens: Body, Emotion and the Making of Consciousness*. London: Vintage.
- Eco, Umberto. 1976. *A Theory of Semiotics*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. doi:10.1007/978-1-349-15849-2
- Engberg-Pedersen, Elisabeth and Ditte Boeg Thomsen. 2016. “The Socio-Cognitive Foundation of Danish Perspective-Mixing Dialogue Particles.” In *Viewpoint and the Fabric of Meaning: Form and Use of Viewpoint Tools across Languages and Modalities*, ed. by Barbara Dancygier, Wei-lun Lu and Arie Verhagen, 125–142. Berlin: de Gruyter Mouton.
- Feynman, Richard P. 2001. *The pleasure of finding things out*. London: Penguin Books.
- Giora, Rachel. 2003. *On our Mind: Salience, Context, and Figurative Language*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195136166.001.0001
- Harris, Roy. 1996. *Signs, Language and Communication* London/New York: Routledge.
- Huang, Yan (ed.). 2017. *The Oxford Handbook of Pragmatics*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Hundsniischer, Franz. 1992. “Does a Dialogic View of Language Amount to a Paradigm Change in Linguistics: Language as Dialogue.” In *Methodologie der Dialoganalyse*, ed. by Sorin Stati and Edda Weigand, 1–14. Tübingen: Niemeyer.
- Hutchins, Edwin. 1995. *Cognition in the Wild*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

- Jakobson, Roman. 1971. Word and Language. In *Selected Writings*, vol. 2. 1962–2002. Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter.
- Keckes, Istvan. 2016. “Can Intercultural Pragmatics Bring Some New Insight into Pragmatic Theories?” In *Interdisciplinary Studies in Pragmatics, Culture and Society*, ed. by Alessandro Capone and Jacob L. Mey. 43–69. Berlin: Springer. doi:10.1007/978-3-319-12616-6_3
- Keckes, Istvan. 2017. “From Pragmatics to Dialogue.” In *The Routledge Handbook of Language and Dialogue*, ed. by Edda Weigand, 78–92. New York: Routledge.
- Kempson, Ruth. 2017. “Shifting Concepts of Language: Meeting the Challenge of Modelling Interactive Syntax.” In *The Routledge Handbook of Language and Dialogue*, ed. by Edda Weigand, 197–213. New York: Routledge.
- Lanigan, Richard L. 2018. “The Rhetoric of Discourse: Chiasm and Dialogue in Communicology” In *Dialogic Ethics*, ed. by Ronald C. Arnett and François Cooren. Amsterdam/Philadelphia: Benjamins.
- Levinson, Stephen C. 2000. *Presumptive Meanings. The Theory of Generalized Conversational Implicature* Cambridge, MA/London: MIT Press.
- Levinson, Stephen C. 2006. “On the Human ‘Interaction Engine.’” In *Roots of Human Sociality. Culture, Cognition and Interaction*, ed. by N. J. Enfield and Stephen C. Levinson, 39–69. Oxford/New York: Berg.
- Lumsden, Charles J. and Edward O. Wilson. 2005. *Genes, Mind, and Culture: The Coevolutionary Process*. New Jersey: World Scientific.
- Marchand, Trevor H. J. 2010. “Making Knowledge: Explorations of the Indissoluble Relation between Minds, Bodies and Environment.” *Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute* 16(1): 1–21. doi:10.1111/j.1467-9655.2010.01607.x
- Mey, Jacob L. 2001. *Pragmatics: An Introduction*: 2nd rev. ed. Oxford and Malden, MA Blackwell.
- Piattelli Palmarini, Massimo. 1995. *L'arte di persuadere. Come impararla, come esercitarla, come difendersene*. Milano: Mondadori.
- Prigogine, Ilya. 1994. *Les lois du chaos*. Paris: Flammarion [*Le leggi del caos* Rome: Laterza 1993].
- Scott-Phillips, Thom. 2014. *Speaking our minds*. London: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Scott-Phillips, Thom. 2015. “A précis of ‘Speaking our minds’” <http://cognitionandculture.net/webinars/speaking-our-minds-book-club/a-preacutecis-of-speaking-our-minds>
- Simon, Herbert A. 1962. “The Architecture of Complexity: Hierarchic Systems.” *Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society* 106: 467–482.
- Smith, Adam. 2003. *The Wealth of Nations*. New York: Bantam Classics.
- Sperber, Dan and Deirdre Wilson. 1986. *Relevance. Communication and Cognition*. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Turner, Ken (ed.). 1999. *The Semantics/Pragmatics Interface from Different Points of View*. Oxford: Elsevier.
- Vanderveken, Daniel. 1994. “A Complete Formulation of a Simple Logic of Elementary Illocutionary Acts.” In *Foundations of Speech Act Theory. Philosophical and Linguistic Perspectives*, ed. by Savas L. Tsohatzidis, 99–131. London/New York: Routledge.
- Van Dijk, Teun A. (ed.). 1985. *Handbook of Discourse Analysis*, vols 1–4. London: Academic Press.
- Verschuere, Jef. 1987. “The Pragmatic Perspective.” In *The Pragmatic Perspective. Selected Papers from the 1985 International Pragmatics Conference*, ed. by Jef Verschuere and Marcella Bertucelli-Papi, 3–8. Amsterdam/Philadelphia: Benjamins. doi:10.1075/pbcs.5.04ver
- Van Eemeren, Frans H. 2010. *Strategic Manœuvring in Argumentative Discourse: Extending the Pragma-Dialectical Theory of Argumentation*. Amsterdam/Philadelphia: Benjamins. doi:10.1075/aic.2

- Weigand, Edda. 1991. "The Dialogic Principle Revisited: Speech Acts and Mental States" In *Dialoganalyse III. Referate der 3. Arbeitstagung, Bologna 1990*, ed. by Sorin Stati, Edda Weigand and Franz Hundsnurscher, vol. 1, 75–104. Tübingen: Niemeyer. – Reprinted in Edda Weigand (ed. by Sebastian Feller). 2009. *Language as Dialogue*, 21–44. Amsterdam/Philadelphia: Benjamins. – Reprinted in *Interdisciplinary Studies in Pragmatics, Culture and Society* ed. by Alessandro Capone and Jacob L. Mey, 209–232. Cham etc.: Springer.
- Weigand, Edda. 1998. "Contrastive lexical semantics." In *Contrastive Lexical Semantics*, ed. by Edda Weigand, 25–44. Amsterdam/Philadelphia: Benjamins. doi:10.1075/cilt.171.03wei
- Weigand, Edda. 2000. "The Dialogic Action Game." In *Dialogue Analysis VII. Working with Dialogue*, ed. by Malcolm Coulthard, Janett Cotterill and Frances Rock, 1–18. Tübingen: Niemeyer. – Reprinted in Edda Weigand: *Language as Dialogue* (ed. by Sebastian Feller), 265–282. Amsterdam/Philadelphia: Benjamins.
- Weigand, Edda. 2004. "Empirical Data and Theoretical Models." *Pragmatics & Cognition* 12 (2): 375–388.
- Weigand, Edda. 2006. "Argumentation: The Mixed Game." *Argumentation* 20 (1): 59–87. doi:10.1007/s10503-006-9000-4
- Weigand, Edda. 2009. *Language as Dialogue. From Rules to Principles of Probability*, ed. by Sebastian Feller. Amsterdam/Philadelphia: Benjamins. doi:10.1075/ds.5
- Weigand, Edda. 2010. *Dialogue: The Mixed Game*. Amsterdam/Philadelphia: Benjamins. doi:10.1075/ds.10
- Weigand, Edda. 2014. "Rationality of Performance." *Philosophia Scientiæ* 18 (3): 247–268. doi:10.4000/philosophiascientiæ.1023
- Weigand, Edda. 2016. "How to Verify a Theory of Dialogue." *Language and Dialogue* 6 (3): 349–369.
- Weigand, Edda. 2017. "The Concept of Language in an Utterance Grammar." In *The Routledge Handbook of Language and Dialogue*, ed. by Edda Weigand, 214–233. New York: Routledge.
- Weigand, Edda. 2018a. "Ethics in Dialogue. Ideals and Reality." In *Dialogic Ethics*, ed. by Ronald C. Arnett and François Cooren, 1–23. Amsterdam/Philadelphia: Benjamins.
- Weigand, Edda. 2018b. "Preface." *Language and Dialogue* 8(1), Special issue on *Integrating Dialogue*, ed. by Răzvan Săftoiu and Adrian Pablé.
- Weigand, Edda. 2018c. "The theory myth." *Language and Dialogue* 8 (2),
- Wierzbicka, Anna. 1972. *Semantic Primitives*. Frankfurt/M.: Athenäum.
- Wilson, Edward O. 1999. *Consilience. The Unity of Knowledge*. New York: Vintage Books.
- Wittgenstein, Ludwig. 2009. *Philosophische Untersuchungen*. Philosophical investigations. Translated by G. E. M. Anscombe, P. M. S. Hacker and Joachim Schulte, rev. 4th ed. by P. M. S. Hacker and Joachim Schulte. Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 1st ed. 1953.
- Wong, Jock. 2016. "A Critical Look at the Description of Speech Acts." In *Interdisciplinary Studies in Pragmatics, Culture and Society*, ed. by Alessandro Capone and Jacob L. Mey 825–856. Berlin: Springer. doi:10.1007/978-3-319-12616-6_32
- Yule, George. 1996. *Pragmatics*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Zipf, George Kingsley. 1949. *Human Behavior and the Principle of Least Effort. An Introduction to Human Ecology*. New York: Hafner (facsimile 1972).

Humboldt, Bhartrihari, and the dialogic

Lisbeth A. Lipari

Denison University (USA)

Drawing on the work of von Humboldt (1963, 1997, 1999) and the 5th century BCE Indian Grammarian Bhartrihari (1971), this essay sketches how dialogue is neither a special-use of language nor a specific mode of pragmatics, but forms instead the primordial character of all language. When the study of language is restricted to Saussure's bifurcated paradigm, the ontologically basic character of dialogue is concealed. In what follows, I will first briefly sketch a history of ancient Indian linguistics and its influence on European linguistics, then briefly review Saussure's bifurcated conceptions of *langue* and *parole*, and then illustrate several ways that Bhartrihari and Humboldt saw language as, at heart, dialogic.

Keywords: communicative consciousness and praxis, dialogue, Indian philosophy of language, interlistening, intersubjectivity, linguistics, pragmatics, speech, speaking, and listening

1. Introduction

All speaking is founded on dialogue.
(Humboldt 1963: 335)

Ever since the Swiss linguist Ferdinand de Saussure defined language as “speech less speaking” in the early part of the 20th century, dialogue has largely been seen as a formal structure of language practice rather than, for example, as the very essence of language itself. But a closer examination of the thought of Wilhem von Humboldt, and its precursors among the ancient Indian Grammarians, reveals an alternative paradigm to Saussure's structuralist model of language without speech – one in which the dialogic nature of language bridges both structure and practice, speaking and hearing, and language and thought. Drawing on the work of von Humboldt (1963, 1997, 1999) and the 5th century BCE Indian Grammarian Bhartrihari (1971), this essay sketches how dialogue is neither a special-use of language nor a specific mode of pragmatics, but forms instead the primordial character

of all language. When the study of language is restricted to Saussure's bifurcated paradigm, the ontologically basic character of dialogue is concealed. For just as to Humboldt *human language* was dialogic from its origins, so too, to Buber, was *human being* dialogic from its primordially relational origins.

To Buber, the relation between self and other is foundational to human existence because the self can only come to *be* through dialogic relation. "I become through my relation to the Thou; as I become I, I say Thou" (1958: 11). To Humboldt, not only is the 'I' given in the 'Thou' automatic, but "language is formed in speaking" (1963: 148). That is, to Humboldt language is not merely the aggregation of concrete properties, regulating properties or rules, or grammatical structures, but in the production of speech from a speaker to a hearer. "Speech is not composed out of words that have preceded it; the words, on the contrary, emerge from the totality of speech" (Humboldt 1958: 70). Similarly, Bhartrihari located language not in its parts, but in the whole flash of meaning generated in the minds of both speakers and listeners, dialogically, together. Thus, as Buber (1958) formulated the dialogic word pairs "I-It" and "I-Thou" as constituting the ontological basis of the human, so Humboldt articulated the dialogic relation as the basis of human language.

In what follows, I will first briefly sketch a history of ancient Indian linguistics and its influence on European linguistics, then briefly review Saussure's bifurcated conceptions of *langue* and *parole*, and then illustrate several ways that Bhartrihari and Humboldt saw language as, at heart, dialogic.

2. Indian philosophy of language

European linguistics developed out of a long tradition of Indian philosophy of language that can be dated back to the ancient Indian grammarian Pānini (1897), who first devised a systematic organization of language into grammatical, phonetic, and morphemic categories that influenced generations of subsequent language philosophers and linguists. The earliest-known studies of the relationship between language and thought date at least to fifth- or sixth-century BCE India, where the Sanskrit grammarians, Pānini, Yaska, and later Patañjali, created an extensive and systematic analysis of the categories and rules of language and meaning. At the time, the study of grammar that "was regarded as the gateway to other disciplines" of Veda study, which also included disciplines such as phonetics, etymology, metrics, and ritual (Matilal 1990).

For over a thousand years the Vedas were transmitted orally from generation to generation and because of their sacred importance, great emphasis was placed on teaching correct language use, from matters of pronunciation to the proper use of grammar. Accordingly, the early Vedic philosophers studied language in order

to develop a means of teaching students correct usage, and it was in this context that Pānini created the world's first systematic analysis of the categories and rules of language and meaning. At approximately four thousand rules, Pānini's grammar includes both phonetic and syntactic rules with a level of detail and theoretical complexity that led the American linguist Leonard Bloomfield to declare in the 1930s that it was "one of the greatest monuments of human intelligence. It describes, with the minutest detail, every inflection, derivation, and composition, and every syntactic usage of its author's speech. No other language, to this day, has been so perfectly described" (1933: 11). According to Max Müller, the Indian science of grammar was at least until the late 19th century the only known system in no way influenced by the Greeks (1869: 116). Similarly, the Finnish linguist Itkonen writes that "[t]o me it is beyond question that at least until the year 1970 a comparable grammar was produced nowhere in the world, that is, a grammar that would have to the same extent combined extensive coverage of data with theoretical sophistication" (1991: 68–69).

For at least several centuries, Pānini's grammar was transmitted orally and thus required exacting and extensive memorization by priests, scholars, and students. Itkonen (1991) quotes a Chinese Buddhist traveler to India in the 6th century CE who gives a description of the twenty-plus years required to study grammatical science, beginning from the age of six (Itkonen 1991: 12–13). The work of two other Indian grammarians made a long-lived impact on the study of grammar and the philosophy of language prior to the common era: Yaska (5th century BCE), who developed word classifications and etymology, and later Patañjali (2nd century BCE), who published extensive commentaries on Pānini's grammar and focused centrally on semantics. According to Matilal, "Yaska's contribution lay in singling out two main (ontological) categories, a process or an action and an entity or a being or a thing" (1990: 19).

Nearly a thousand years after Pānini, another great grammarian emerged in India who theorized an interconnection between sound and word, speaking and listening, and language and thought. This was the third great Indian philosopher of language, Bhartrihari, who challenged the dominance of formal representational view of language and meaning found in the then prevailing *Nyāya* school of philosophy. Although "all [philosophers of classical India] believed in the close correspondence between language and reality" (Bronkhorst 2001: 476), Bhartrihari's thinking was distinct in emphasizing the underlying interconnection and indivisibility of language and thought. Bhartrihari's central text, the *Vākyapadīya* ("On Words and Sentences"), develops Patañjali's earlier concept of *sphota*, or "true" sounds, the initial yet silent awareness of sound. According to Matilal, *sphota* is "the real vehicle of meaning ... a word or a sentence is not just a concatenation made up of different sound units arranged in a particular order, but a single whole" (1990: 77).

Unlike other competing schools of thought, such as the *Mīmāṃsā* and *Nyāya*, which held phonemes to be the fundamental elements of language because speech sounds could be subdivided no further, Bhartrhari held that “the whole is greater than the sum of its parts” (Beck 1993: 53) Thus, in contrast to other schools of Indian philosophy Bhartrhari held that the apparently atomistic structures of language – such as the temporal sequentiality of speech or the grammatical units of words, stems, and roots – do not exist word in the mind.

For ... Bhartrhari, there are no divisions in speech acts and in communicated meanings Such divisions are useful fictions and have an explanatory value in grammatical theory, but have no reality in communication ... the sentence-meaning becomes an object or content of a single instance of a flash of cognition (*pratibhā*).
(Deshpande 2011: 25)

3. Humboldt’s context

Around the same time that European Enlightenment scholars were beginning to think with greater sophistication about mind and reason, European missionaries and fortune seekers were encountering the philosophies of the East. The result was a significant but largely unacknowledged influence of Indian philosophical perspectives on European thought. According to Shastri’s history of classical Sanskrit literature, the translation of ancient Sanskrit into European languages began with the missionaries in the seventeenth century, when the Dutch Preacher Abraham Roger published a Portuguese translation of Bhartrhari (Shastri 1974). According to Master, Roger’s 1651 *Open-Deuretot het verborgen Heydendom*, contained several of Bhartrhari’s stanzas that “were translated into Portuguese for him by a Brahman ... This book appeared in a German translation in Nuremberg in 1663” (1946: 798). The next major translations were of Sanskrit legal texts translated into English by Warren Hastings and William Jones, beginning in 1776. A short while later, great works of classical Sanskrit literature were translated into English and then German in the 1780s and ’90s. Master describes how:

Jones’s work excited great interest in Germany particularly. His translation of *Sakuntala* was rendered into German in 1791 by Georg Forster and was read with enthusiasm by Goethe and by Herder, the two great protagonists of the national romantic school. A German translation of Jones’s translation of Manu’s Code appeared in 1797, and his occasional papers were also translated into German in 1795–1797.
(1946: 803)

Herder also included Bhartrhari’s moral proverbs from Roger’s version in 1778 (Master 1946), and Wilhelm (1961) also claims that Goethe, Heine, Novalis, Hegel,

and Schopenhauer were introduced to Indian literature through Herder. Colebrook (1873) was the first to translate Pānini's grammar into English and published the preface to his translation in *Asiatic Researches* in 1801 and in 1808 F. von Schlegel (1849) published a highly influential volume of translations of sections of the Indian classics the *Ramayana*, the *Mahābhārata*, and the *Manusmṛti* in his *On the Language and Wisdom of the Indians*. Latin translations of the Upanishads, along with German translations of the Rig Veda, soon followed.

Because few scholars had access to the original Sanskrit manuscripts at this time, most only first learned of these texts in translation, and had to travel to England or France to study the original texts themselves. Humboldt studied Sanskrit manuscripts in England at the British Museum while serving as Prussian Ambassador and in 1812 Bopp began a five-year study in Paris with his tutor de Chezy, who employed various translations as teaching material for his pupils (Mueller-Vollmer 2017; Master 1946). According to Master (1946: 803):

Antoine de Chezy, who taught F. von Schlegel Persian in 1803, was enabled by this catalogue to pick out what he needed for study from these manuscripts, which, as he tells us in an unpublished letter, he had always longed to understand. He commenced his study in 1806, using the translations of Wilkins and Jones as dictionaries, and later Carey and Marshman's translations, which were brought to him by George Archdall. With the further help of Wilkins's grammar (1808) he taught Bopp, Humboldt, August von Schlegel.

At the time, translations were also important for standardizing European scripts for transliterations of Devanagari characters. Masters writes, "It is perhaps not too much to say that comparative studies would have been impossible without a scientific system of transliteration into Roman characters of the various languages involved" (1946: 805). Bopp's 1820 classic "Analytical comparison of the Sanskrit, Greek, Latin and Teutonic languages, shewing the original identity of their grammatical structure," led to the conception of Indo-European language, an antecedent language from which many other (principally Indian and European) languages emerged. By the middle of the 19th century, "in almost every continental university there is a professor of Sanskrit who lectures likewise on Comparative Grammar and the science of language" (Müller 1869: 168).

Yet in spite of this well-documented history, most contemporary studies of language and linguistics give a minimal nod of acknowledgment to the Sanskrit grammarians and their contribution to the study of language; many – including Leonard Bloomfield – begin their histories of linguistics with the Greeks (1933). But the historical record bears witness to a tremendous yet largely unacknowledged influence of the ancient Indian philosophers to the study of language and thought in Europe and the Americas. Bopp cites Pānini extensively in all three volumes of

his comparative grammar, the first part published in 1833 (1885). According to Bronkhorst, “[i]t seems safe to conclude that Bopp’s view on the structure of the Indo-European languages was to at least some extent influenced by Pānini and his school” (1992: 460). Moreover, some scholars today argue that comparative philology may have not originated in Europe at all, but in far earlier scholarship on the relationship between Persian and Sanskrit (Pollock 2009). During the 19th century, however, scholars such as Wilhelm von Humboldt were far from shy about claiming this Indian influence on their thinking. Humboldt – the German Enlightenment philosopher, diplomat, and minister of education – not only studied Sanskrit (as well as many other languages), but he created the first professorships and programs of Sanskrit studies in Germany. It is not clear whether or to what extent Humboldt was influenced by Bhartrhari’s *Vakyapedia*, but his ideas about language resonate with Bhartrhari’s holist perspective that conceived language and thought to be deeply connected, mutually interdependent, and, at times, indistinguishable. Humboldt articulated his appreciation of Indian thought in his 1822 lecture “On the National Character of Languages” (1997: 58) as follows:

If Indian literature and language become as well known to us as Greek, which can scarcely fail to be the case in view of our present desire for knowledge, then the character of both will, on the one hand, leave its mark on our treatment of our own language, on our thinking, and creative writing, and, on the other hand, both provide us with a powerful aid to the expansion of the sphere of ideas and help in the search for the diverse paths which lead man to become acquainted with that sphere.

4. Saussure and language use

By 1900, language studies became immortalized by the teaching and eventual publication of the work of the Swiss linguist Ferdinand de Saussure, who drew a great deal of (only partially acknowledged) inspiration from Pānini and the Sanskrit grammarians. However, unlike von Humboldt, Saussure was influenced much more by Panini’s structural approach to language study than by Bhartrhari’s more holistic incorporation of both language structure and language use. Instead, Saussure thought the principal aim of linguistics should be to “determine the forces that are permanently and universally at work in all languages, and to deduce the general laws to which all specific historical phenomena can be reduced” (1959: 6). Saussure’s landmark *Course in General Linguistics*, published in 1916, laid the foundation for what would become structuralist linguistics, separating language into two separate parts – what he called language (*langue*) and speaking (*parole*). To Saussure (1959), *langue* is “the true and unique object of linguistics” (1959: 232), while the activity of speaking (*parole*) has

no place in linguistics except through their relation to language ... Language and speaking are then interdependent; the former is both the instrument and the product of the latter. But their interdependence does not prevent their being two absolutely distinct things. (Saussure 1959: 18–19)

Thus, in contrast to von Humboldt, the fleeting and ephemeral aspects of speech were seen by Saussure as a performance, distinct and separate from the systematic solidity of language. “Language is speech less speaking. It is the whole set of linguistic habits which allow an individual to understand and to be understood” (1959: 77). Having thus expelled speaking from the school of linguistics, Saussure then turned his attention to language as “a system whose parts can and must all be considered in their synchronic solidarity” (1959: 87), and this systematicity he viewed to be the proper aim of linguistics. And although contemporary scholars such as Chomsky, and at the time Saussure, credited Humboldt’s influence on their own work, they tended by and large to ignore his philosophical ideas, which tended to be left behind (Mueller-Vollmer 2017). But what of von Humboldt’s more integrated philosophical and empirical perspectives on language structure and use? What do they suggest? The next sections of this paper explore what of aspects of Humboldt’s thinking seems to have been left behind by modern linguistics. In so doing, it sketches three aspects of von Humboldt and Bhartrihari’s thinking on language as it pertains to what might today be called a dialogic perspective that views language as fundamentally dialogic, largely inextricable from thought, and characterized by a world-making, constitutive power that is far different from the so-called Whorfian debates with which it has been associated.

5. Dialogical language

One consequence of Saussure’s fateful partition of *langue* and *parole* is that studies of language-use have tended to be subordinated to the formal structures of linguistics. I refer here to the definition of linguistics as the scientific study of *language as a formal system* wherein *langue* is “the true and unique object of linguistics,” while the activity of speaking (*parole*) has “no place in linguistics except through their relation to language” (1959: 232). But from a dialogic view, the elemental unit of language is neither the verb phrase nor the utterance, but the two-fold process of address-and-response – a perspective that acknowledges the bi-fold nature of language as both speaking and listening, the inevitable presence of an “other,” and the underlying social origin of language. We will take each of these in turn.

As is well known, studies of language use have tended, by and large, to favor the voice rather than the ear, generally passing over listening in favor of speaking. In scholarly as well as quotidian parlance, it would appear that language study is

principally concerned with speech, banishing listening to the silent subservience of dialogue's other. Whichever way it is glossed – as rhetoric, dialogue, language, or argumentation – the Western conception of the *logos* emphasizes speaking at the expense of listening. Yet somehow, von Humboldt was not limited by the Greek and Latin conceptions of *logos*, and saw a much rounder, dialogical dimension of language. “The very possibility of speech is determined by address and reply” (1997: 132). Thus rather than limit analysis to speaking, Humboldt theorized the importance of the inter-animating dyadic duality of self-other, speaking-listening, individual-society. In this perspective, there is no one side of the hyphen without the other.

Both von Humboldt and Bhartrihari stress the importance of the listener in the act of understanding. To Humboldt, thought, voice, and hearing are inseparably bonded (1999: 55).

He writes, “...language rests on the duality of dialogue. We have so far mentioned only the simple empirical phenomenon. But there lies in the primordial nature of language an unalterable dualism, and the very possibility of speech is conditioned by address and response.” (1963: 336). Similarly, Bhartrihari's *Karika* 53 holds that: “Just as the mind of the speaker first dwells on the words (and not their parts when he wants to convey their meaning) similarly, the activity of the hearers first arises out of the words (and not their parts) in their attempt to understand their sense” (1971: 11). Moreover, Bhartrihari's listeners are generating at least as much, if not more meaning, as they are receiving. As he writes: “Even before the vibrations of the speech-organs (which produce the word) have subsided, other sounds, are formed from the word (*sphoṭa*) itself, as one flame from another” (p. 23). Thus, to Bhartrihari, meaning is not in the utterance itself, but is a movement achieved by the listener's consciousness.

Similarly, to Humboldt, the listener was not separate from the speaker in a fundamental way, both were inter-animating and co-determined processes. He writes, “But how could the hearer gain mastery over the spoken word, solely through the growth of that power of his own, developing in isolation within him, if there were not in both speaker and hearer the same essence” (1999: 58). And later he describes how listening is itself a mode of understanding. “What is heard does more than merely convey information to oneself; it readies the mind also to understand more easily what has not yet been heard; it makes clear what was long ago heard, but then half understood; or not at all” (p. 58). Thus meanings are never fixed or final; their discovery forever awaits the next listener.

As with the interdependence of speaking and listening, language itself was to Humboldt also two-fold, manifesting in the relation of an I and a thou which can only emerge in the arena of mutual interaction. As he writes in his 1827 essay “On the Dual Form:” “All speaking is founded on dialogue in which, even when more

than two are present, the speaker always opposes the ones spoken to as a unit other than himself. Even in his thoughts man speaks to an “other,” or to himself as though he were an “other” (1963: 335). Thus Humboldt conceived of language as the universe in which human beings dwell – in it we live and cannot truly exist outside of it. Accordingly, he writes:

A word, born singly in a single individual, resembles so much a merely illusory object! And language cannot be brought into reality by a single individual, but only socially, by the joining of one daring experiment to another. In other words, the word must gain thing-hood; language must gain extension in a listener and a responder. (1963: 336)

Similarly, to Bhartrihari the sociality of language is revealed through its context-sensitivity, and the changing nature of meaning depending on situation. He writes in *Karika* 137 “The same person (at different times), and different persons, understand the meaning of the same word in different forms due to the changing conditions of understanding” (1971: 69).

Humboldt’s philosophy of language thus differs profoundly from Saussure’s model of linguistics as a science whose object of study was “a well-defined object in the heterogeneous mass of speech facts” (1959: 232). Indeed, Humboldt’s philosophy of language reflects what Weigand (2011) calls a post-Cartesian perspective wherein language

does not exist as an independent object or a set of rules but interacts, from the very beginning, with other human abilities. Even if linguistic approaches are beginning to recognize the limits of reductionism, they have not totally ceased from addressing language as a sign system and adding on interaction or pragmatics. (Weigand 2010: 269)

Thus, a dialogic perspective on language bridges both micro and macro aspects of human experience. It is, intersubjective, perhaps performed at the individual level but never apart from the social. As Buber wrote, “I become through my relation to the *Thou*; as I become *I*, I say *Thou*” (1958: 11). And this introduces the next important of the dialogic perspective – the bi-fold relation of what Bhartrihari called *Pasyanti* (Pillai 1971), Luria called the ‘semantic set’ (1981), Vygosky called ‘inner speech’ (1986), and what Humboldt calls the relation of language and thought.

6. Dialogical thought

Just as we have become accustomed to hearing, in the English word “dialogue,” *di-* as dual or two and *logos* as speech or argument, we typically think about dialogue as two or more people speaking together, exchanging observations and ideas back and forth. But an etymological listening also hears in *dia-* the Greek prefix for through, across, or by way of, and in *logos* the pre-Socratic Greek idea for both speaking and listening, language and thought (Lipari 2014b; Johnstone 2012). Thus, if we listen closely, we may hear an echo of an idea about dialogue as the way through, or by way of, listening, thinking, and speaking. And something like this way of thinking can be heard when Humboldt writes “Speech is a necessary condition for the thinking of the individual in solitary seclusion. In appearance, however, language develops only socially, and man understands himself only once he has tested the intelligibility of his word by trial upon other” (1999: 56).

For the ancient Indian Grammarians, meaning was located inside, not outside, the mind. Thus the center of their inquiry concerned the relationship between thought and language, rather than between reality and representation. As Deshpande (2011) describes it, “Whether or not things are real, we do have concepts. These concepts form the content of a person’s cognitions derived from language. Without necessarily denying or affirming the external reality of objects in the world, grammarians claimed that the meaning of a word is only a projection of intellect” (Deshpande 2011: 21). To Bhartrihari, thought and language are one and the same thing, manifesting inseparably through what he calls ‘the word.’ “There is no cognition without the operation of the word; shot through and through is cognition by the word” (Murti 1974: 321). Thus Bhartrihari’s ‘word’ does not ‘stand for’ or represent’ an idea, it constitutes it in a way similar to how “the fire stick acts as the cause for further lights” (1971: 10). Wherein to Humboldt, “Language is the formative organ of thought ... thought and language are therefore one and inseparable from each other” (1999: 54); to Bhartrihari, “Human reasoning is the power of words” (1971: 31). As Bhartrihari’s Karika 123 says, “In this world no comprehension is possible except as accompanied by speech. All knowledge shines as permeated by speech” (p. 28), and Karika 126 “This speech exists within and outside all living beings. Consciousness can exist in all creatures only after it is preceded by speech” (p. 28–29).

As I have described elsewhere, the dialogic is not merely a mode of communicative praxis, but it is also an aspect of communicative consciousness (Lipari 2017). Thus the apparent polysemy of the word “dialogue” can describe both a fundamental character, quality, or condition of consciousness – as a quality or characteristic of thought itself – or it can describe a form, structure, model of communication praxis, as in dialogue in a play, film, or book; a musical device or structure; and so forth.

This is the sense of dialogue as designating a communicative praxis in the form of a conversation or discussion; a literary, oratorical, or rhetorical, form; elements of theater, music, film, etc. Humboldt's dialogical thought is thus a description of communicative consciousness not dissimilar from what Bakhtin (1981) calls the dialogic imagination. That is to say that dialogue is not exterior to processes of thought, but is inherent within it. These ideas of the interdependent origination of thought and speech have also been expressed in the work of Soviet psychologists such as Lev Vygotsky (1986) and Alexander Luria (1981).

By integrating language and thought in these ways, the dialogic perspective also offers a reprieve from the dominance of linear diachronous temporality in conceptualizing spoken language by incorporating the more the overlapping synchronous temporalities characteristic of thought. Thus in terms of the dialogic perspective on consciousness, experiences, thoughts and expressions are always embedded in networks of signification that precede the particular moment (conversations, movies, arguments, class lessons, ideologies, narratives, etc.) and continue long after the moment ends. For example, Bhartrihari describes listening as an instantaneous synchronous constitutive process: "Simultaneously with the last sound, the word is apprehended by the mind in which the seed has been sown by the (physical) sounds, and in which ripening (of the speech) has been brought about by the telling over (of the sounds)" (1971: 18). Because of these always already existing and infinite future meaning possibilities, all communicative acts vibrate with echoes of resonance. Like Indra's web, the notes of intersecting connections vibrate as new nodes of connection and pass away, though none ever fully passes away. Some echoes always remain.

It should also be stressed here that *dialogic thought* manifests not merely through auditory or oral dimensions, but encompasses a broader range of embodied and sensory practices and phenomena that are not immediately recognizable as dialogue – such as gesture, expression, intonation, posture, and transpersonal aspects of cognition. Unlike the *Nyāyas*, who differentiated perception and speech, Bhartrihari considered that "each awareness, including sensory perceptual awareness, must be, in order to be of any use to us, also linguistic, i.e., penetrated with words" (Matilal 1990: 39). Thus while not all communication occurs linguistically in the form of a dialogue, there is no communicative consciousness that is not dialogic in this sense. Dialogic mind is not exterior to processes of thought or communication, but permeate the whole, inherently within it. As Weigand rightly asserts, "post-Cartesian linguistics is called upon to tackle the issue of how body, mind and language are interconnected and dialogically put to social action" (2011: 1). A further understanding of dialogue as embodied interaction is explored through the concept of interlistening (Lipari 2014a, 2014b).

7. Conclusion: Dialogical world-making

To von Humboldt, it is precisely its dialogical nature that gives language its world-making, constitutive power. Humboldt's idea is that language "has a creative influence itself in that it gives form to ideas and thus encourages new ideas and combinations of such" (1997: 63). That is to say, meaning making is always in the process of creating and recreating language, and thereby culture. Thus, "one must free oneself from the notions that language can be separated from that which it designates" (1963: 236). Similarly, to Bhartrhari, language does not reflect objects in the world but makes them manifest, as he writes in *Karika* 129: "It is words which establish things" (1971: 29). With this, Bhartrhari offers a productive rather than a representative view of language, which is a means for bringing forth and thereby constituting worlds (Lipari 2014a). Humboldt too viewed language as a productive rather than a representational process. "The mutual interdependence of thought and word illuminates clearly the truth that languages are not really means for representing already known truths, but are rather instruments for discovering previously unrecognized ones" (1963: 246). That is, language is not simply a tool that humans use. Rather, it is a culturally based, life-shaping force that exerts power over humans; "It is language itself which restrains me when I speak ... It then becomes evident how small, in fact is the power of the individual compared to the might of language" (1999: 63).

Thus an appreciation of Humboldt's contributions to linguistics and philosophy means an appreciation of the dialogic perspective. Humboldt conceived of language as the life space of *human being*. As he writes:

the bringing-forth of language is an inner need of human beings, not merely an external necessity for maintaining communal intercourse, but a thing lying in their own nature, indispensable for the development of their mental powers and the attainment of a worldview, to which man can attain only by bringing his thinking to clarity and precision through communal thinking with others. (1999: 3)

Thus, Humboldt declares, language "[i]n itself ... is no product (*Ergon*), but an activity (*Energiea*)" (1999: 21). And this is where debates over linguistic relativism miss the point. The so-called Whorfian debate, which wrongly interprets Humboldt in terms of Sapir and Whorf's ideas about the relation between thought and language, misconstrues how Humboldt conceptualized language, thought, and the social as inter-animating inter-dependent elements of human experience. Even Sapir and Whorf may not recognize their thinking in these debates, as Goddard writes: "Whorf recognized the existence of non-linguistic cognitive processes such as memory, attention and perception (in fact, these processes are very important to him; see later), but he took it for granted that linguistic thinking is the major

component of what makes human cognition distinctive” (2003: 396). Moreover, even sympathetic discussions of Humboldt and linguistic relativism, such as recent studies by McElvenny 2016; Smith 2009; Pajevic 2014; Longhurst 2011; Golubovs’ka 2009, tend to neglect the dialogic dimensions of Humboldt’s thought entirely.

Thus in explorations of the relation of dialogue and pragmatics, Humboldt has not been sufficiently understood as theorizing the way language is fundamentally dialogic and the implications that follow from this fact. Although many of von Humboldt’s ideas find expression in the Soviet schools of Bakhtin, Vygotsky, and Luria, much Western linguistics tends to read Humboldt either as a precursor to structural linguistics (Chomsky) or a precursor to linguistic relativism (Whorf). Either way, however, seems to miss the deeply dialogical nature of Humboldt’s thinking, and its perhaps inadvertent debt to ancient Indian philosophy of language.

In conclusion, dialogue is far more than a linguistic, semiotic or transmission system of signs and symbols that represent objects and concepts in the external and internal worlds. Rather, the human “world” comes into being through dialogical language and thought – it is the way humans collaboratively construct, inhabit, and transform our shared social worlds. What this means is that whatever might really and truly exist on the planet, in the skies, and below the seas, there is no human vantage point outside of the dialogic dimensions of language – anything and everything we can say about the world (or about language and dialogue) must be said with, within, and through language. To Humboldt, “However internal language may altogether be, it yet [it] has at the same time an independent outer existence that exerts dominion against man himself” (1963: 282). Thus, dialogue is neither merely a praxis, nor an instrument that “reflects” or “represents” or “stands for” objects and concepts “out there” in the world; it is a creative event of world-making. Dialogue in other words, is the way we do human being.

References

- Bakhtin, Mikhail M. 1981. *The Dialogic Imagination*. Translated by Caryl Emerson and Michael Holquist. Austin: University of Texas.
- Bakhtin, Mikhail M. 1984. *Problems of Dostoyevsky’s Poetics*. ed. by Michael Holquist, translated by Caryl Emerson and Michael Holquist. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
- Bakhtin, Mikhail M. 1986. *Speech Genres & Other Late Essays*. Translated by Vern McGee. Austin: University of Texas.
- Beck, Guy L. 1993. *Sonic Theology: Hinduism and Sacred Sound. Studies in Comparative Religion*. Columbia, South Carolina: University of South Carolina Press.
- Bhartrihari. 1971. *Vākyapadīya: Critical Text of Cantos I and II*. Translated by K. Raghavan. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass.
- Bloomfield, Leonard. 1933. *Language*. New York: Henry Holt.

- Bopp, Franz. 1885. *A Comparative Grammar of the Sanskrit, Zend, Greek, Latin, Lithuanian, Gothic German and Slavonic Languages*. University of California Libraries.
- Bronkhorst, Johannes. 1992. "Pānini's View of Meaning and Its Western Counterpart." In *Current Advances in Semantic Theory*, ed. by Maxim I. Stamenov, 455–464. Amsterdam: John Benjamins.
- Bronkhorst, Johannes. 2001. "The Peacock's Egg: Bhartrhari on Language and Reality." *Philosophy East and West*. 51(4): 474–491. doi:10.1353/pew.2001.0053
- Bronkhorst, Johannes. 2005. "Bhattoji Diksita on Sphota." *Journal of Indian Philosophy*. 33: 3–41. doi:10.1007/s10781-004-9052-4
- Buber, Martin. 1958. *I and Thou*. New York: Scribner.
- Colebrooke, H. T. 1801/1873. "On the Sanskrit and Prakrit Languages." In *Miscellaneous Essays*, ed. by H. T. Colebrooke, with Life of the Author, by His Son, Sir T. E. Colebrooke, vol. 1, new edition. London: Trubner.
- Deshpande, Madhav. 2011. "Language and Testimony in Classical Indian Philosophy." In *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, ed. by Edward N. Zalta. Available online at <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2011/entries/language-india/>.
- Goddard, Cliff. 2003. "Whorf Meets Wierzbicka: Variation and Universals in Language and Thinking." *Language Sciences*. 25: 393–432. doi:10.1016/S0388-0001(03)00002-0
- Golubov'ska, Iryna. 2009. "Language World Models: Universal and Specific Features." *Philologica Jassyensia*, Anul V, Nr. 1 (9): 131–140.
- von Humboldt, Wilhelm. 1963. *Humanist without Portfolio: An Anthology of the Writings of Wilhelm von Humboldt*. Translated by Marianne Cowan. Detroit, MI: Wayne State University Press.
- Humboldt, Wilhelm von. 1997. *Essays on language*, ed. by Theo Harde and D. Farrelly. Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang.
- Humboldt, Wilhelm von. 1999. *On Language: On the Diversity of Human Language Construction and Its Influence on the Mental Development of the Human Species*, ed. by Michael Losonsky, Translated by Peter Heath. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Itkonen, Esa. 1991. *Universal History of Linguistics*. Amsterdam: John Benjamins. doi:10.1075/sihols.65
- Johnstone, Christopher Lyle. 2012. *Listening to the Logos: Speech and the Coming of Wisdom in Ancient Greece*. The University of South Carolina Press.
- Lipari, Lisbeth. 2014a. *Listening, Thinking, Being: Toward an Ethics of Attunement*. State College, PA: Penn State University Press.
- Lipari, Lisbeth. 2014b. "Interlistening and the Idea of Dialogue." *Theory and Psychology*. 24(4): 504–523. doi:10.1177/0959354314540765
- Lipari, Lisbeth. 2017. "The Speech We Do Not Speak: Dialogic Mind, Praxis, and Ethics." *Language and Dialogue*. 7(1): 45–62
- Luria, Alexander R. 1981. *Language and Cognition*. Edited by James V. Wertsch. New York: Wiley.
- Longhurst, C. A. 2011. "Unamuno, Schleiermacher, Humboldt: A Question of Language." *Hispanic Review, Autumn*: 573–591.
- Master, Alfred. 1946. "The Influence of Sir William Jones upon Sanskrit Studies." *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies*. 11(4): 798–806. doi:10.1017/S0041977X00089813
- Matilal, Bimal Krishna. 1981. "Error and Truth: Classical Indian Theories." *Philosophy East and West*. 18: 321–333. doi:10.2307/1398409
- Matilal, Bimal Krishna. 1988. "Śābdabodha and the Problem of Knowledge-Representation in Sanskrit." *Journal of Indian Philosophy*. 16: 107–122. doi:10.1007/BF00209707

- Matilal, Bimal Krishna. 1990. *The Word and the World: India's Contribution to the Study of Language*. Delhi: Oxford University Press.
- McElvenny, James. 2016. "The Fate of Form in Tradition." *Language and Communication* 47: 30–42.
- Mohanty, Jitendra N. 1993. *Essays on Indian Philosophy Traditional and Modern*, ed. by Purushottama Bilimoria. Delhi: Oxford University Press.
- Mueller-Vollmer, Kurt and Messling, Markus. 2017. "Wilhelm von Humboldt." In *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, ed. by Edward N. Zalta.
- Müller, F. Max. 1869. *Lectures on the Science of Language*. From the 2nd London ed. rev. New York: Charles Scribner.
- Murti, Tiruppattur Rameshayyar Venkatachala. 1974. "Some Comments on the Philosophy of Language in the Indian Context" *Journal of Indian Philosophy*. 2: 321–331. doi:10.1007/BF00184353
- Murti, Tiruppattur Rameshayyar Venkatachala. 1983. *Studies in Indian Thought: Collected Papers of Prof. T. R. V. Murti*, ed. by Harold G. Coward. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass.
- Pajevic, Marko. 2014. "Translation and Poetic Thinking." *German Life and Letters* 67: 6–21.
- Pānini. 1897. *Ashtadhyayi*. Translated by Srisa Chandra Vasu. Benares.
- Pillai, K. Raghavan. 1971. "Translator's note on Karika 145." In *Vākyapadiya: Critical Text of Cantos I and II*. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass.
- Pollock, Sheldon. 2009. "Future Philology? The Fate of a Soft Science in a Hard World." *Critical Inquiry*. 35: 931–961. doi:10.1086/599594
- Saussure, Ferdinand. 1959. *Course in General Linguistics*, ed. by Charles Bally and Albert Sechehaye, Translated by Wade Baskin. New York: McGraw-Hill.
- Schlegel, Friedrich. 1849. *On the Language and Wisdom of the Indians*. Translated by E. Millington. London: Henry G. Bohn.
- Shastri, Gaurinath. 1974. *A Concise History of Classical Sanskrit Literature*. Delhi: Motilal
- Smith, J. Mark. 2009. "The Rippling of Verschiedenheit: Wilhelm von Humboldt on Philology, Usage and Intra-linguistic Diversity." *European Romantic Review* 20(2): 237–245.
- Vygotsky, Lev. 1986. *Thought and Language*. Translated by Alex Kozulin. Cambridge, MA: Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
- Weigand, Edda. 2010. *Dialogue: The Mixed Game*. Amsterdam: John Benjamins. doi:10.1075/ds.10
- Weigand, Edda. 2011. "Introducing Language and Dialogue." *Language and Dialogue* 1(1): 1–3. doi:10.1075/ld.1.1.01wei
- Wilhelm, Friedrich. 1961. "The German Response to Indian Culture." *Journal of the American Oriental Society* 81(4): 395–405. doi:10.2307/595685

Moving beyond pragmatics

The role of dialogue in studies of “rhetoric in situ”

Jennifer L. Adams

DePauw University (USA)

For centuries, scholars have approached the study of rhetoric as a language-based method of analysis for understanding persuasion and as argumentation. However, more recently, scholars of rhetoric have expanded their focus to include images, architectures, and events. One development in this area has been “rhetoric in situ,” generally referring to studies of communication that present a richer understanding. In this chapter, I will first explore the scholarship related to the development of ethno-methodological techniques for understanding rhetoric and their relationships to linguistic pragmatics. Then, I will consider the ways that dialogue theory, as advanced by Edda Weigand, would enrich the study of rhetoric in situ, especially given their shared goals of understanding the contexts of lived experience.

Keywords: rhetorical criticism, rhetoric in situ, participant-observation, dialogue theory

1. Introduction

Over the past several decades, scholars of rhetoric have come to recognize the influence of rhetoric in nearly all types of human communication, broadening the scope of contemporary rhetoric studies beyond its traditional focus on obviously persuasive and argumentative language. Aristotle famously defined the parameters of the field in fourth century B.C.E. by declaring that rhetoric was the counterpart of the dialectic and included “the faculty of discovering in any given case the available means of persuasion” (2007). His definition laid the groundwork for centuries of scholarship focused upon rhetoric as persuasive speech and it is only comparatively recent scholars who have expanded his basic interpretations. Burke, who preferred a broader interpretation of rhetoric that included all human identification with others as persuasive, can be largely credited with today’s more expansive definitions of

rhetoric. In suggesting that “wherever there is ‘meaning’, there is persuasion” (Burke 1969: 172), he invited scholars to understand rhetoric as any language designed to create consubstantiality, or a feeling of connection, in creatures who were biologically lone entities: “A is not identical with his colleague, B. But insofar as their interests are joined, A is identified with B. Or he may identify himself with B even when their interests are not joined, if he assumes that they are, or is persuaded to believe so” (p. 20). In this way, Burke invited scholars to imagine persuasion functioning in language that was not overtly persuasive in nature.

Following Burke’s lead, scholars doing rhetorical criticism in the late twentieth century began expanding the types of language they studied. For example, in one of the most popular textbooks on the subject, Foss (2008) defines rhetoric as “the use of symbols to influence thought or action,” and encourages burgeoning rhetorical critics to think broadly when considering “artifacts” for analysis: “It [the artifact] may be any instance of symbol use that is of interest to you and seems capable of generating insights about rhetorical processes – a song, a poem, a speech, a work of art, or a building, for example” (2008: 12). In contemporary critical research in rhetoric, one can now find analyses of shopping malls, museums, parks and landscape architecture, private homesteads, city plans, music concerts, and more.

As rhetorical critics pushed their boundaries, they developed new methods and frames for analysis as well. Responding to the spatial turn, scholars have integrated qualitative-ethnomethodologies to investigate rhetoric as it unfolds in a particular time and place. Indeed, the popular professional organization Rhetoric Society of America recently acknowledged the growth in such studies by hosting a summer symposium in 2016 on the topic of “rhetoric in situ” for investigators interested in analysis designed to understand rhetoric within its lived context. Given the burgeoning interest in methods that combine rhetorical analysis and communication ethnography, I use this chapter to consider a productive blending of dialogue theory and “rhetoric in situ.” To accomplish this goal, I will first review the extant literature on rhetoric in situ, focusing upon those encouraging and/or engaging ethno-methodological methods for researching rhetorical phenomenon. Next, I will review the related literature encouraging the use of pragmatics as a method of linguistic discourse analysis when analysing transcripts from the field in ethno-methodological research and its relation to rhetoric studies thus far. In a spirit of encouraging collaborating across disciplines, I conclude by considering the ways that dialogue theory, as advanced by Weigand (2010), would move beyond pragmatics to enrich the study of rhetoric in situ, especially given their shared goals of understanding the contexts of lived experience. While not all projects using ethnomethodology to study rhetoric require linguistic understanding, some scholars interested in using scientific language analysis may thus be encouraged to learn of the inherent role of rhetoric in Weigand’s dialogue theory and the mixed game.

2. Rhetoric in situ

The term “rhetoric in situ” has recently emerged as an umbrella term for the academic study of lived, in-the-moment rhetorical phenomenon in place by using methods that combine traditional rhetorical criticism with some type of ethnomethodological analysis. Scholars who work to understand the rhetorical dimensions of an event or experience in which they participate and observe are engaged in “participatory critical rhetoric,” (Middleton et al., 2015). As they note, “accessing, documenting, enacting, and analysing these extratextual [sic] forms of in situ rhetoric calls for new ways of doing rhetorical scholarship that involve the critic’s presence in the moment of rhetorical invention and draw from the tools of fieldwork and qualitative inquiry to participate with and interpret these embodied and emplaced performances of rhetoric” (p. xiv). In publishing a text that explains the theories and offers methods for these new ways of doing rhetoric scholarship, Middleton and his co-authors note that they are responding to an already existent “trend” (p. xiv) toward rhetoric in situ, at least among scholars in the United States, and in this section, I will review the seminal articles in the development of this trend.

As early as 1992, Conquergood described a “thriving alliance between rhetoric and ethnography” that also included a commitment to performance studies, which integrate theories of the performing arts with social science and literary criticism (1992a: 80). Well-known for his innovative research using organizational communication perspectives to understand street gang behavior that he observed while living amongst them in Chicago, Conquergood (1992b) helped popularize communication ethnography as a method in the study of organizational and interpersonal communication. (For a detailed history of ethnography in communication studies, see Saville-Troike 2008). Simultaneously, in critical rhetorical studies, research using performance theory to analyse the production of meanings in specific locations, most notably memorial spaces, space emerged and a new interest in “visual rhetoric” gained popularity (for several examples, see Dickinson, Blair and Ott 2010). The growing body of literature in communication ethnography and visual rhetoric converged in recent decades with the publication of several essays calling specifically for a rhetoric that would be aware of context through observation participation in the field, a rhetoric in situ.

Endres and Senda-Cook (2011: 261) propose that social movement rhetoric, in particular, would benefit from the inclusion of a heuristic of place. Recognizing that the actual physical place where a social movement happens has rhetorical impact in the overall meaning of the event, Endres and Senda-Cook develop a critical lens called “place-as-rhetoric” to highlight place as a rhetorical artifact. Through an extended analysis of a Step-It-Up climate change rally in Salt Lake City, the authors demonstrate the ways that “the very place in which a protest occurs is a rhetorical

performance that is part of the message of the movement” (p. 258–259). In this way, argue Endres and Senda-Cook, the literal communication context itself and not merely communication about the context becomes part of the message. Importantly, while Endres and Senda-Cook acknowledge that these meanings can be analysed by scholars who have not been in the field, they believe that first hand participant observation is better because “it allows the researcher to more fully attend to the embodied and sensual aspects of place in protest” (p. 271). Endres and Senda-Cook inspired other scholars to investigate the role of place as it impacts arguments in protest, including Adams’s (2015) investigation of a self-sustaining homestead run as a protest to the larger capitalist economic system operating in the United States and Harlow’s (2016) analysis of battlefields in presidential rhetoric. These essays all suggest a growing sensitivity to the context of a message that is essential, not superfluous, to meaning and represent a growing interest in rhetoric in situ.

Similarly, Hess (2011: 128) calls for a critical rhetoric that attends to everyday language rather than presidential speeches or mass-circulated messages and suggests the study of vernacular events as sites of “locally articulated languages [that] articulate against oppressive macrocontext”. Hess names his method critical-rhetorical ethnography, and envisions an activist researcher who both observes advocacy events but who also participates in them as a community member. While Hess is primarily concerned with the role of the researcher as an activist within a vernacular organization, his method for engaging in rhetorical invention and analysis in this essay requires participation within the lived experience of the moment as well as a reliance upon interview transcription and fieldwork observation to write-up scholarship that emerges from activism.

Finally, Middleton, Endres, and Senda-Cook (2011) suggest guiding principles for rhetorical field methods and argue for the importance of such methods. According to these authors, “by focusing on embodied utterances and performances by individuals, rhetorical field methods provide a lens for accounting for the corporeal and aesthetic dimensions of rhetoric (p. 389). Like Hess, these authors envision a critical rhetorical method that enables rhetoricians to not only analyse but also to participate in organizations and social events that are of importance to them. Yet, even scholars who are interested in maintaining a more traditional observational stance in their research will find use in the authors’ demand to study rhetoric within the social context from which it emerges. As they explain, “rhetoric is not constituted simply by texts or textual fragments, but through a combination of material contexts, social relationships, identities, consciousnesses, and (inter-related) rhetorical acts that produce meanings and that are constructed between rhetor, audience, and particular contexts” (p. 391).

Taken together, this literature suggests that ethnography has become an accepted method in an era where rhetoric is understood primarily as identification

toward consubstantiality rather than pure persuasion (Wilkins and Wolf 2012). And, while many of the examples cited here engage a critical rhetoric wherein the participant observer is a supporter of a vernacular cause or movement, a political commitment is not a necessary pre-condition of embodied methods in rhetorical analysis. For example, Wilkins and Wolf (2012) summarize the work of many scholars in communication, sociology, and linguistics to document and encourage the “systematic analysis of cultural meaning” (p. 18). They argue, “Through the study of situated rhetoric we argue one can gain insight into the place of communication in our lives and how it affects the experiences we have, the choices we make as communicators and the consequences to those choices” (p. 19). Whether done in overtly ideological ways as in critical rhetoric or whether engaged for discovery in cultural comparison, rhetoric in situ, or the analysis of living language in the field or context where it occurs, is becoming an important methodology in the study of rhetoric and meanings.

3. Linguistic pragmatics, sociolinguistics and rhetoric

Most of the research on rhetoric in situ has been developed by scholars in the United States affiliated with communication studies departments, but this is not to suggest that it represents the totality of embodied studies of rhetoric and language meaning. Indeed, there is a distinguished record of scholars bridging linguistics and sociology in an attempt to understand meanings in language exchanges between real, living participants who exist within specific cultural contexts. Often, the designation of sociolinguistics is applied to such work, and very frequently, the linguistic analysis methods employed are associated with pragmatic linguistics. Although my goal in this chapter is ultimately to encourage a consideration of Weigand’s (2010) Dialogue Theory and its mixed game method to move beyond pragmatics as methodology appropriate for language analysis in embedded research, a review of the literature of sociolinguistics from a pragmatic perspective will be useful in showing the ways that linguistics have been incorporated into other ethnographic studies focused upon culture. Also, important, and reviewed here, is the research suggesting a bridge between rhetorical analysis in general and pragmatics. This body of research ultimately suggests the usefulness of scientific linguistic analysis to embodied research in general and possibly to new ethnographic-based studies in rhetoric specifically.

In the most general way, pragmatics is being used in linguistics by those working to understand meaning as it relates to a particular speech situation that typically includes an addresser and addressee, a context, goals, illocutionary act [verbal acts with a specific goal] and utterance(s) [linguistic products of the illocutionary act]

(Leech 1983: 15). Pragmatist linguists recognize that meaning in human interaction does not come exclusively from the literal words and their arrangement because words are used and interpreted differently by different users in different contexts. Philosophically, most linguistic pragmatists trace their foundation to the work of Austin (1962) and Searle's (1969) writings on speech act theory and Grice's (1975) work conversational implicatures (Korta and Perry 2015).

Pragmatics has been incorporated into the analysis of transcripts from the field by researchers in anthropology, sociology and related disciplines seamlessly in the use of conversation analysis, a method derived from Searle and Austin's speech act theory that highlights the social dimensions of language use. In a piece published posthumously based upon her ethnographic work with Ilongots, Rosaldo (1982) acknowledges concerns with Searle's limited intra-cultural perspective while still arguing that conversation analysis can reveal important subtle meanings inherent in talk between interlocutors. Rosaldo demonstrates that systematic analysis of talk was important to ethnographers in the field. Another early attempt to include conversation analysis as part of an ethnography is Moerman (1987), who published a book titled *Talking Culture: Ethnography and Conversation Analysis*. In it, he argued:

I am not proposing that ethnographic data be restricted to conversational transcripts and ethnography to their analysis. But I am insisting that those who use talk in order to discover what people think must try to find out how the organization of talk influences what people say. The data and techniques of conversation analysis permit this. (1987: 9)

Ethnographic methods are uniquely designed to capture living people talking and interacting with each other, and so these early efforts represent the promise incorporating the systematic precision offered by conversation analysis.

Other scholars have written about the importance of using linguistic pragmatics to enhance what we learn from ethnographic research. In a chapter positioning conversation analysis as an emergent method in sociology, Maynard argues that "Doing CA [conversational analysis] involves scrutiny of recordings and detailed transcripts and would seem to be a more intense kind of observation, potentially adding to ethnographic strategies. Or, from the other direction, we could say that ethnography enhances the CA style of close inspection of talk" (2006: 56). He demonstrates the mutual benefits gained by their pairing in an analysis of his own field transcripts on receiving bad news, and shows how using sequential analysis of talk prevents a glossing over by ethnographers too quick in interpreting meaning in any given situation (Maynard 2006: 83). Helen Spencer-Oatley's (2000/2008) text offers a thorough guide for scholars wishing to use pragmatic analysis in the field to understand the role of talk in cultural analysis, and her book includes instruction chapters about procedures for data collection that can be used for systematic

linguistic analysis. In yet another example, Creece offered support for “linguistic ethnography,” a term she proposes as a bridge for all those using methods blending ethnomethodology and linguistics, arguing that “[l]inguistic ethnography argues that ethnography can benefit from the analytical frameworks provided by linguistics, while linguistics can benefit from the processes of reflexive sensitivity required in ethnography” (2008: 232). In 2015, Creece developed her ideas on linguistic ethnography in a guide book for collecting, analysing and presenting data from a perspective that embraces the systematic analysis of pragmatics and the embodied, experiential perspective of ethnographic field work.

Sociologists, anthropologists and linguists have not been alone in calling for a blending of linguistic pragmatics and ethnography, and scholars in rhetoric studies have also articulated the benefits of blending systematic language analysis. Pragmatics, specifically, has occasionally been incorporated by those who study rhetoric as persuasion. Jacobs (2000) puts forth the idea that rhetoric, typically theorized as a monologic form of language, and dialectic, typically theorized as a dialogic form of language, share a similarity in language patterns despite centuries of scholarship highlighting their differences. He also argues that rhetoric and dialectic share similarities in the way they conceptualize argument: as a social activity, as actual language use with the goal to manage controversy and dissent (p. 262). Given their similarities, Jacobs proposes their union, suggesting that using normative pragmatics as a frame to better understand meaning in argument helps bridge the divide between rhetoricians and dialecticians. Jacobs argues that this perspective brings two important contributions to the study of argument in rhetoric: “First, treating argumentation as normative pragmatics would focus attention on the communicative properties of actual argumentative messages. Second, it would focus attention on analysis and assessment of the functional properties of argumentation as an activity” (p. 262). Jacobs demonstrates what this blended method can achieve by providing analysis of magazine advertising as narrative arguments from magazine advertising: normative pragmatic analysis can highlight the “symbolic inducements manifest in a message” without losing focus upon rhetorical strategies vital to understanding argument (p. 272).

One benefit gained by a method of analysis that uses both a linguistic model and traditional rhetorical analysis is an inherent focus on meaning and thus away from a tendency in rhetorical criticism to speak about effectiveness of any utterance, which is impossible to determine. At the same time, it allows for the identification of norms and functions as they were adjusted to the particular context from which an argument emerges (p. 273). Importantly, however, Jacobs rejects the notion that all language aimed toward assent is argument and insists on a formal definition, breaking from the understanding of most American scholars in rhetoric studies who see argument more broadly (p. 263). Even so, this essay is important in that it suggests

a practical union of rhetoric and linguistic pragmatics for the purpose of gaining even deeper insight from language than one could with either method alone.

An exhibit of the interesting possibilities in criticism incorporating blending of linguistic analysis and rhetorical analysis for a more a holistic understanding of an utterance in context is a book edited by Tracy, McDaniel, and Gronbeck (2007). Contributors to the volume all focused upon the language surrounding a particular event in Colorado involving an elementary school student who had been removed from a public school science fair when she attempted to report on perceptions of beauty in black and white dolls (p. 3–4). Some scholars used the tools of rhetorical analysis to understand the arguments and persuasion used in the controversy, while others used discourse analysis to reveal different patterns and trends about arguments levelled within this political context. In justifying this project, Tracy (2007) argues in the introduction that while rhetoric is generally classified as a subject of the humanities and discourse analysis as a social science, there are underlying similarities between them including, (1) a preference for different text-based methods; (2) a “conviction that how individuals and societies go about constructing representations matters;” and (3) a belief that the performance and context matter (p. 13). As a result, their differences complement one another. Tracy acknowledges that scholars using each method still retained disciplinary concerns about scope and focus with one another, but argues that even so, their combined insights still reveal more together about the function of language than either one could alone (p. 13). The merger resulted in a “more discourse-oriented rhetorical analysis and a more rhetorically oriented discourse analysis” (Aakhus 2007: 206), and exemplifies the possibilities when scholars across disciplines offer their shared insight on a single artifact.

A second notable example of an analysis blending linguistics with rhetoric comes from Prasch (2016) who focused particularly on deixis within rhetorical analysis in an analysis of an address by Harry S. Truman. Prasch (2016) focuses her analysis on participants and context and names it “rhetorical deixis”:

a theoretical and methodological orientation that infuses the linguistic concept of deixis with rhetorical understandings of ethos, place, and time. As a discipline, rhetoric is uniquely qualified to interrogate how these relational, spatial, and temporal axes implicate each other. A rhetorical approach to deixis does not simply identify these coordinates; it asks why they are there, what they symbolize, and how this symbolization constitutes specific audiences, geopolitical realities, ideologies, and ways of being in the world. (2016: 167)

This author recognizes the usefulness of such a method not only to the analysis of textual, historical artifacts of speech but also to the more broad spatial and participative definitions of rhetoric popular now. Prasch (2016) highlights the concerns

that emerge from a “scholarly emphasis on bodies, objects, sensation, materiality, ethnography, and in situ criticism” (p. 166) before engaging an analysis using linguistics and rhetoric to partly answer them:

How are we to account for the material dimensions of a speech designed for and delivered in place? How do we define context, particularly in light of new methodological approaches such as rhetorical field methods, ethnography, autoethnography, and audience studies? And what is the critic’s job in “recovering” the materiality of historical texts – the bodies, sensations, locations, and temporalities addressed and constituted through speech? (2016: 166)

Prasch’s answer is to combine a model of linguistic analysis with rhetoric, and her work is instructive for others wishing to begin in similar research projects.

Combined, the research cited here all demonstrates the importance of research that spans the insights of sociology, linguistics, and rhetoric. While the contributions to the understanding of human interaction from each of these fields has been significant, I argue that when scholars with different specializations in language studies work together, the possibilities for deeper understanding are multiplied. As Tracy (2007) notes, the philosophical differences between scholars of rhetoric and scholars of language analysis are not inconsequential. Even so, I propose that dialogue theory, the mixed game model proposed by Edda Weigand, can help scholars transcend those differences.

4. Weigand’s dialogue theory

Linguist Edda Weigand has developed a cohesive model for dialogue analysis throughout a distinguished record of scholarship culminating, but not ending, with her 2010 book *Dialogue: The Mixed Game Model*. The promise of her model is most simply stated by Trognon (2013), who notes that Weigand moves “beyond all the existing approaches gathered under the term pragmatics” to present an “epistemological, methodological, and theoretical framework” that “can even play a fundamental role in the project of unifying the natural (biology), the formal (linguistics, logic, artificial intelligence), and the social sciences (psychology, sociology) of human beings” (2013: 458). To Trognon’s list, I would add the humanities (rhetoric and rhetorical analysis). After a brief explanation of Weigand’s theory, I will argue that dialogue theory offers promise for rhetoric analysis in general, and for rhetoric in situ specifically.

Fundamentally, Weigand’s dialogue theory differs from much of what is happening in both linguistic and rhetorical analysis due to her rejection of the Saussurian notion that language is an object in-and-of itself, free from the people who use it

(Weigand 2010). To be clear, Weigand challenges both Saussure and later Chomsky for their removal of the human being, as a speaker or thinker, from the study of language, which she argues cannot be understood as an object separated from the people who use it. Toward this end, a centerpiece of the mixed game model is “competence in performance,” a concept that really describes the multiple competencies required for people to communicate, including perception, interpretation, and language. For Weigand (2010), these competencies are naturally occurring and in fact, rooted in our neurology. She states (p. 3) that “human beings have a double nature: they are individuals and social beings at the same time” as a result of having a physical body that is singular while still retaining a biological impulse toward complex social living with his or her peers. People are thus “epigenetically programmed as social beings who need dialogue for reasons of survival” (p. 49), born with an inclination toward dialogue that is ever being developed throughout a human lifespan. Importantly, Weigand believes humans have a natural competency that allows them to dialogue through language, but that does not extend to a natural capacity for understanding meaning. Weigand observes that “we are confronted with divergent understanding, misunderstanding and non-understanding as an inevitable consequence of interaction among individuals” (p. 60). Because of this “meaning and understanding are different for different individuals” (p. 74). In sum, although language use is an evolutionary, biological development in the mixed game model, understanding is not necessarily clear and obvious, necessitating analysis not only of what is said, but how it is said, in what tone it is said, using what patterns of kairos, and other similar concerns.

The mixed game model has three constitutive principles: a principle of action acknowledging that people are individual actors who are aware of an act toward their own self-interest; a principle of dialogue acknowledging that people are also social actors who use communication to initiate or respond in dialogue; and a principle of coherence that acknowledges that the ability to speak and use language is one of many related human abilities inherent in our biology that enables dialogue (Weigand 2010). Underlying each of these principles are regulative principles, which can be said to offer balance between a person’s concerns of both self and other, and executive principles, which are strategies that a person considers useful and effective in meeting their individual and social needs through dialogue. Interlocutors are naturally skilled at using these principles, although they are not necessarily even in their adeptness, and dialogue seen through the deployment of these principles is termed “action games” in Weigand’s model (2010: 129).

One reason that Weigand’s theory promises to offer rhetoricians an appealing method when studying language-in-use is that persuasion and influence are built in to Weigand’s theory (Adams 2017). In an explanation that will likely resonate with rhetoricians, Weigand (2010) writes, “rhetoric is inherent to dialogue. Texts are not

just rhetorical texts if they contain rhetorical figures, they are always produced by human beings who are attempting to achieve more or less effectively certain purposes in dialogic interaction” (p. 3). Indeed, rhetorical skill is implied by and necessary for competence in performance (Adams 2017). Rhetoric is inherent in dialogue, and Weigand (2009) acknowledges this by formulating specific rhetorical principles, which are “strategies for pushing claims and arguments and on the other to strategies for the use of specific evaluative expressions” (p. 140) and which operate alongside the regulative and executive principles. The rhetorical principles involve rationality and logic, as traditional concerns of argument, but they also include attention to power, emotion and other contextual influences upon dialogic utterances.

Because all human communication is to “come to an understanding, the basic structure of dialogue involves an action, the making of a claim, and a reaction, the fulfilling a claim” (Weigand 2010: 141). Scholars use this structure as a basic framework to begin formal analysis of a dialogic exchange, considering not only the words spoken but also any nonverbal communication and other cues that emerge from the context. Utterances, or fragments thereof, spoken in an interactive exchange are called action games, and are examined for their function in relation to the principles of action, dialogue and coherence (see Weigand 2010: 126–154, for detailed descriptions and taxonomy of the types of action games and their use in analysis).

Thus, while pragmatics as a movement in linguistics was revolutionary in acknowledging the role of context beyond sentence structure and syntax in meaning, dialogue theory goes even further by suggesting that purposeful language use is a natural human skill. As I explained in an earlier section in this chapter, pragmatics was a vital step in moving linguistics closer to the concerns of rhetoric. Yet, Weigand’s dialogue theory and accompanying mixed game method moves beyond merely addressing rhetorical concerns, to making rhetoric an inherent part of the structure of dialogue itself. Given this, I will now explore how Weigand’s mixed game model would enrich some projects using rhetoric in situ, especially given their shared goals of understanding meaning through lived experience.

Projects undertaken by scholars doing research in the field who wish to understand language use in the context of the specific local culture would benefit from moving from pragmatics (often using conversation analysis) to dialogue. I want to be clear that many scholars currently engaged in rhetoric in situ do not typically transcribe interaction with an eye toward the functional interactional moves, but I am suggesting that when scholars in rhetoric decide to investigate an event in order to better understand the function of rhetoric therein, they will likely encounter situations where a close understanding of meaning in interaction becomes beneficial. Just as sociologists, anthropologists, and communication ethnographers in the past have turned to linguistic analysis, the scholars interested in this new wave of rhetoric in situ may turn to linguistic analysis when, for example, a close study of

understanding or misunderstanding is needed. In those cases, I am suggesting that dialogue theory can be more useful in a fully integrated way in rhetoric studies than the earlier attempts reviewed here. From the perspective of dialogue, neither culture nor language is isolated. Both are understood as integrated, and meaning is derived not only from the words spoken in interaction but from all variables in the scene.

5. Rhetoric in situ and the mixed game model

While my suggestion that scholars using embodied rhetoric as a method consider applying dialogue theory and the mixed game method as part of their framework is somewhat novel, I have made similar arguments previously (see Adams 2017). Even so, I am not the first to specifically suggest an affinity between rhetoric studies and dialogue. Weigand (2008b) edited a volume titled *Dialogue and Rhetoric*, in which collaborators reviewed rhetorical paradigms, analysed the role of rhetoric in language using the mixed game model, and even published a round table discussion involving scholars of linguistics, rhetoric, and argumentation about the extent to which they are in fact distinct disciplines. In the introduction to this volume, Weigand makes note of an important trend among contributors and their understanding of rhetoric: “the majority of scholars are no longer worried about combining different voices and different aspects which would have been considered heterogeneous components according to the tenets of a scientific approach which required the separation of competence and performance. On the contrary, they try to demonstrate how these ‘voices’ interact as components in the actual dialogic game” (2008a: ix). Indeed, later in the introduction, Weigand speaks specifically for the need of a bridge to connect the ever-increasing use of performance-studies in rhetoric and the competence models, and she astutely notes that no agreement between the two camps can be found in theory; instead, common ground can be found by focusing on the “speakers or human beings who are capable of coming to grips with the complexity of dialogic interaction” (p. x). Quite simply, “It is human beings’ mind where the bridge is to be found” (p. x). I suggest that my proposal to consider use of the mixed game model in conjunction with rhetoric in situ another trestle in the building of that bridge.

Cissna and Anderson’s (2008) chapter in Weigand’s volume on *Rhetoric and Dialogue* exemplifies the union between rhetorical criticism and dialogue that I envision here, with the only difference being that Cissna and Anderson do not extend their arguments to embodied rhetorical analysis. Even so, their arguments build a foundation for moving forward in this vein. Ultimately, they propose an “emergent approach to studying dialogic rhetoric that draws on both rhetorical criticism and discourse analysis” (Cissna and Anderson 2008: 39). They analyse four

different examples of dialogic rhetoric, not only illustrating that such an approach is possible but in some cases preferable when researching the meaning of language as action and reaction. Importantly, they recognize that meaning is made between the participants in dialogue.

The move to a more embodied study of rhetoric, a critical rhetoric in situ, is still new and scholars engaged in this research are charting new territory in terms of the appropriate methods to best understand the dynamics of those situations. While there will remain traditionalists stymied by the imagined boundaries of their disciplines, there are others who will push those boundaries in search of a more complete understanding of language-in-use. Many in rhetoric argue that the move to a deeper understanding of the rhetorical situation through cultural analysis is not just an addendum, “but a crucial part of the future of rhetorical analysis” (Wilkins 2012: 8). As scholars of rhetoric, we would be wise to embrace these new avenues for understanding meaning and the different insights available from the application of different, complementary methods. Importantly, this is not simply a move toward mixed methods. Dialogue theory and the mixed game model are inherent in rhetorical language, and blending the two perspectives merely offers greater insight within the same frame.

References

- Aakhus, Mark. 2007. “Understanding ordinary democracy: The intersection of discourse and rhetorical analysis”. In *The Prettier Doll: Rhetoric, Discourse, and Ordinary Democracy*, ed. by Karen Tracy, James P. McDaniel and Bruce E. Gronbeck, 205–217. Tuscaloosa, AL: University of Alabama Press.
- Adams, Jennifer. 2015. “Home as a place of protest: Scott and Helen Nearing and the construction of the modern American homestead.” In *Stories of Home: Place Identity, Exile* ed. by D. Chawla and S. Holman Jones, 135–148. London: Lexington.
- Adams, Jennifer. 2017. “Self-interest and social concern.” In *The Routledge Handbook of Language and Dialogue*, ed. by Edda Weigand, 294–306. New York: Routledge.
- Aristotle. 2007. *On Rhetoric: A Theory of Civic Discourse*, 2nd edition, transl. by G. Kenney. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Austin, John L. 1962. *How to Do Things with Words*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Burke, Kenneth. 1969. *A Rhetoric of Motives*. Berkeley: University of CA.
- Cissna, Kenneth and Rob Anderson. 2008. “Dialogic Rhetoric, Co-authorship, and Moments of Meeting.” In *Dialogue and Rhetoric*, ed. by Edda Weigand, 23–38. Amsterdam: John Benjamins. doi:10.1075/ds.2.05cis
- Conquergood, Dwight. 1992a. “Ethnography, Rhetoric, and Performance’ [Book review].” *Quarterly Journal of Speech* 78 (1): 80–98. doi:10.1080/00335639209383982
- Conquergood, Dwight. 1992b. “Life in Big Red: struggle and accommodations in a Chicago polyethnic tenement.” In *Structuring Diversity*, ed. by L. Lamphere, 95–144. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.

- Copland, Fiona and Angela Creese. 2015. *Linguistic Ethnography: Collecting and Analysing and Presenting Data*. London: Sage.
- Creese Angela 2008. "Linguistic ethnography." In *Encyclopedia of Language and Education*, 2nd edition, volume 10: Research Methods in Language and Education ed. by K. A. King and N. H. Hornberger, 229–241. New York: Springer.
- Dickinson, Greg, Carol Blair, and Brian Ott. 2010. *Places of Public Memory: The Rhetoric of Museums and Monuments*. Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press.
- Endres, Danielle and Samantha Senda-Cook. 2011. "Location Matters: The Rhetoric of Place in Protest." *Quarterly Journal of Speech* 97(3): 257–282. doi:10.1080/00335630.2011.585167
- Foss, Sonja. 2008. *Rhetorical Criticism: Exploration and Practice*, 2nd edition. Long Grove, IL: Waveland.
- Grice, H. 1975. "Logic and Conversation." In *Syntax and Semantics*, vol. 3: Speech Acts, ed. by Peter Cole and J. Morgan, 41–58. New York: Academic Press.
- Harlow, Rachel M. 2016. "Souvenir Battlefields: How Presidents Use Rhetoric of Place to Shape the American Ethos." *American Communication Journal* 18(1): 45–62.
- Hess, Aaron. 2011. "Critical-rhetorical ethnography: Rethinking the place and process of Rhetoric." *Communication Studies* 62(2): 127–152. doi:10.1080/10510974.2011.529750
- Korta, Kepa, and John Perry. 2015 "Pragmatics." In *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, ed. by E. Zalta. URL =<<https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2015/entries/pragmatics/>>.
- Jacobs, Scott. 2000. "Rhetoric and dialectic from the standpoint of normative pragmatics." *Argumentation* 14(3): 261–286. doi:10.1023/A:1007853013191
- Leech, Geoffrey. 1983. *The Principles of Pragmatics*. London: Longman.
- Maynard, Douglas. 2006. "Ethnography and Conversation Analysis: What is the Context of an Utterance?" In *Emergent Methods in Social Research*, ed. by Sharlene Nagy Hesse-Biber and Patricia Leavy, 55–94. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
- Middleton, Michael, Danielle Endres, and Samantha Senra-Cook. 2011. "Articulating Rhetorical Field Methods: Challenges and Tensions." *Western Journal of Communication* 75(4): 386–406. doi:10.1080/10570314.2011.586969
- Middleton, Michael, Aaron Hess, Danielle Endres, and Samantha Senda-Cook. 2015. *Participatory Critical Rhetoric: Theoretical and Methodological Foundations for Studying Rhetoric in Situ*. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books.
- Moerman, M. 1987. *Talking Culture: Ethnography and Conversation Analysis*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.
- Prasch, Allison M. 2016. "Toward a Rhetorical Theory of Deixis." *Quarterly Journal of Speech* 102(2): 166–193.
- Rosaldo, Michelle Z. 1982. "The Things We Do with Words: Ilongot Speech Acts and Speech Act Theory in Philosophy." *Language in Society* 11(2): 203–237. doi:10.1017/S0047404500009209
- Saville-Troike, Muriel. 2008. *The Ethnography of Communication: An Introduction*, vol. 14. New York: John Wiley and Sons.
- Searle, John R. 1969. *Speech Acts: An Essay in the Philosophy of Language*. London: Cambridge University Press. doi:10.1017/CBO9781139173438
- Spencer-Oatley, H. 2000/2008. *Culturally Speaking: Culture, Communication and Politeness Theor*. London: Continuum.
- Tracy, Karen. 2007. "Introduction: A Moment of Ordinary Democracy. In *The Prettier Doll: Rhetoric, Discourse, and Ordinary Democracy*, ed. by Karen Tracy, James P. McDaniel and Bruce E. Gronbeck 3–21. Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press.

- Tracy, Karen, James P. McDaniel, and Bruce E. Gronbeck (ed.). 2007. *The Prettier Doll: Rhetoric, Discourse, and Ordinary Democracy*. Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press.
- Trognon, Alain. 2013. "Pragmatics Re-Established on its Feet. Weigand's Mixed Game Model 2010." *Language and Dialogue* 3(3): 457–475. doi:10.1075/ld.3.3.07tro
- Weigand, Edda. 2008a. "Introduction: Rhetoric or how to integrate the different voices." In *Dialogue and Rhetoric*, ed. by Edda Weigand, 3–21. Amsterdam: John Benjamins. doi:10.1075/ds.2.03wei
- Weigand, Edda. 2008b. *Dialogue and Rhetoric*. Amsterdam: John Benjamins. doi:10.1075/ds.2
- Weigand, Edda. 2009. *Language as Dialogue: From Rules to Principles of Probability*. Amsterdam: John Benjamins. doi:10.1075/ds.5
- Weigand, Edda. 2010. *Dialogue: the Mixed Game*. Amsterdam: John Benjamins. doi:10.1075/ds.10
- Wilkins, Richard and Karen Wolf. 2012. "The Role of Ethnography in Rhetorical Analysis: The New Rhetorical Turn." *Empedocles: European Journal for the Philosophy of Communication* 3(1): 7–23. doi:10.1386/ejpc.3.1.7_1

Progress in language teaching

From competence to dialogic competence-in-performance

Marion Grein

University of Mainz (Germany)

The article maintains that language teaching has to include the teaching of cross- or intercultural dialogic competencies. Cross-cultural competencies are often linked to the field of cross- or intercultural pragmatics. Yet, most approaches to pragmatics are hardly suitable to discover what language use is all about. We are in need of a dialogic holistic model, integrating all facets of language use. The theory set up by Weigand (2010) integrating the human abilities of speaking, thinking, and perceiving, is a convincing approach to be taken as the basis of teaching intercultural competence within language teaching. I will first sketch the development of the goals of language learning and teaching in common, then turn to intercultural communicative competence and then depict Weigand's dialogic approach, the so-called Mixed Game Model (MGM).

Keywords: language teaching, communicative competence, cross-cultural competence, Mixed Game Model, competence-in-performance, textbook

1. The role of cross-cultural communication in language teaching

First, we will take a short look at the goals of language teaching, the definition of communicative competence within language teaching studies and then turn to the implementation and teaching of cross-cultural competencies. The basic problem, here, seems to be the diverging concept of the term “competence” within linguistics and second language teaching. In linguistics, we have the more or less strict separation of linguistic competence as the system of linguistic knowledge possessed by the speaker and his or her linguistic performance as the way the language system is used in communication. Within language teaching, competence is always interpreted as a merge of knowledge and skill, with the focus on skills as clearly stated by the obligatory “can-do”-statements (i.e. can express his ideas; can criticize, can

greet someone). Linguistic competence within language teaching, thus, is understood as communicative capabilities and skills, that is competence-in-performance. Whenever the term ‘competence’ is mentioned within this article, it refers to the fuse of performance and competence.

1.1 The goals of language teaching: Communicative competence

Nowadays the basic goal of language teaching is the promotion and development of learners’ communicative competence. Learners are to be enabled to use language in ways which are communicatively effective and appropriate. Focusing the communicative function of language led to a movement away from formal analysis of sentential structures and grammar. Language is considered as a means of communication between speakers and hearers as social beings, with a specific personal background, using language with specific purposes. Communicative competence includes grammatical competence (including vocabulary, pronunciation and spelling), sociolinguistic competence, discourse competence and strategic competence (knowledge and application of verbal and non-verbal communication strategies that may compensate for limitations in one or more of the other areas) (cf. Canale 2013: 2ff).

As early as 1980, language was no longer equated with grammar and language teaching was no longer grammar-based. Communication in language teaching was understood to have the following characteristics:

- a. is a form of social interaction, and is therefore normally acquired and used in social interaction;
- b. involves a high degree of unpredictability and creativity in form and message;
- c. takes place in discourse and sociocultural contexts which provide constraints on appropriate language use and also clues as to correct interpretations of utterances;
- d. is carried out under limiting psychological and other conditions such as memory constraints, fatigue and distractions;
- e. always has a dialogic purpose (for example, to establish social relations, to persuade, or to promise);
- f. involves authentic, as opposed to textbook-contrived language;
- g. is judged as successful or not on the basis of actual outcomes (cf. Canale 2013: 3f., referring to Breen and Candlin (1980) and Widdowson (1978))
- h. and is defined as negotiation between at least two individuals through the use of verbal and non-verbal symbols (cf. Breen and Candlin 1980; Wells 1981).

As mentioned, in any language learning and teaching contexts, communicative competence was and is understood as the underlying system of knowledge and skill

(competence and performance) required for communication; the learner is encouraged to acquire “actual communication” skills, bearing in mind his or her specific conditions such as memory, perceptual constraints, emotions and distractions. The term “actual communication” is used instead of the more common term “performance” (cf. Canale 2013: 5, cf. Section 2: dialogic competence-in-performance). As early as 1980, Wiemann and Backlund (1980: 188) considered “performance as a part of competence – not as a separate concept”. Furthermore, communicative competence, already in the 1980s, was considered as interacting with other systems of knowledge and skill (e.g. world knowledge) as well as with human factors (e.g. volition and personality) (cf. Canale and Swain 1980). Grammatical competence (i.e. knowing and using), thus, was and is considered as one – important though – facet of communicative competence. As mentioned above, in the 1980s, next to grammatical competence, sociolinguistic competence, discourse competence and strategic competencies were considered as basic in language teaching. Sociolinguistic competence implied that learners had to acquire the extent to which utterances are produced and understood appropriately in different sociolinguistic contexts. Primarily, they were taught how to verbalize specific communicative functions (e.g. commanding, inviting, complaining, etc.) in a given situation. Nowadays, sociolinguistic competence is often referred to as pragmatic competence. And pragmatic competence, I believe, is language-in-use competence which is definitely dialogic language-in-use embedded in sequences of action and reaction as implemented in the MGM (see Section 2, dialogic competence-in-performance). Discourse competence implied the teaching of means or devices to build up cohesion and coherence in spoken and written texts, which again can be equated to dialogic language-in-use competence. And finally, as defined above, strategic competence as the knowledge of verbal and non-verbal communication strategies that may compensate for limitations in one or more of the other areas are taught to the language learners. Even though presented as four different competencies, these four can be subsumed as communicative competence. As mentioned above, communicative competence was and is defined as knowledge (competence) and skill (performance) required for communication. And again, I would argue that this is dialogic language-in-use competence in accordance with the MGM.

By 2001, the definition of communicative competence was extended: “Communicative competence refers to a person’s ability *to act* in a foreign language in a linguistically, socio-linguistically and pragmatically appropriate way” (Council of Europe 2001: 9) and, on the basis of communicative competence, intercultural competence entered the field and in the beginning was defined as “one’s awareness of others’ cultures as well as one’s own culture” (Hamiloglu and Mendi 2010: 16). In the following section, I will outline how culture entered the field of language learning and teaching.

1.2 The integration of culture into the language learning curriculum

Until the 1980s, language learners were merely confronted with objective culture (cf. Berger and Luckmann 1967): political and economic systems, art, music, literature, clothing and cuisine (national and regional studies – cognitive approach, emphasis on facts). With the so-called communicative turn, everyday culture (living, recreation, entertainment, education, etc.) was added to the curriculum. During the 1980s, subjective culture studies entered the classroom, this included the learned and shared patterns of beliefs, behaviours and values of interacting human beings (intercultural approach) (cf. Pauldrach 1992: 6). Tomalin and Stempleski (1993); Pulverness (1995) and Paige et al. (2003) classified culture into big “C” and small “c”, Big C being equivalent to “objective culture” and small “c” to subjective culture.

Pauldrach (1992: 6) compares the three approaches

didactic concept	cognitive approach	communicative approach	intercultural approach
integration into the language lessons	no (separate lessons on regional studies (Landeskunde))	yes	yes
primary objective/goal	knowledge: facts about objective culture and society	communicative competence in everyday communication	communicative and cross-cultural competence
Focus	institutions	everyday conversations	self- and other-awareness, cultural awareness

Figure 1. Culture within the language teaching curriculum

The intercultural approach included the study of “pragmatics” in language learning. Ishihara and Cohen (2014: x) argue that “pragmatics has increasingly become mainstream in second and foreign-language (L2) teaching and learning”. The learner needs to acquire so-called “pragmatic ability”. Pragmatic ability of second language learners implies that they know how to communicate within the new language, taking the cultural and social context into account. Yet, in order to be able to teach “how to communicate within the new language”, we are in need of a viable approach which at first analyses the “new” language systematically. On the basis of this language-in-use analysis, textbooks can be developed. I am convinced that the MGM is an applicable approach including and connecting all the necessary competencies.

Yet, let me first outline the further developments sticking to the quest for “pragmatic ability”.

It was argued that learners at the beginning of their language learning usually relate the pragmatic ability they have in their first language (L1) to the pragmatic abilities of the target language. Often, they just translate their L1 speech acts into the second or foreign language – which can result in either miscommunication or at least an unpleasant or uncomfortable feeling between the interlocutors (cf. Bardovi-Harling and Mahan-Taylor 2003; Cohen and Ishihara 2004; Félix-Brasdefer 2006a, 2006b; Félix-Brasdefer and Koike 2012). In Uzbekistan people kept asking me “aren’t you very tired?”, a normal speech act of greeting there, yet, I felt uncomfortable, wondering whether I looked that fatigued. Actually, Ishihara and Cohen (2014: xi) mostly equate pragmatics with the exploration of speech acts like requesting, refusing, apologizing, complimenting, and complaining – which are, in fact, minimal action games (see Section 2, cf. Weigand, Chapter 1, this volume).¹ They, furthermore, argue that pragmatics should be best taught in interactional social contexts – again using dialogues as a basis. But what is pragmatics? How can pragmatics be taught in language class? It is easy to see that it is not the fuzzy concept of pragmatics, comprising of many approaches that will help to gain communicative competence. In order to achieve pragmatic ability – or rather communicative ability –, the learner needs a grounded theory of language usage – as explored in Weigand (Chapter 1, this volume). Her concept of language-in-use (competence-in-performance) dissolves the strict distinction between competence and performance, and – as will be shown – solves the problem of the fuzzy concept of pragmatic ability.

Yet, let us continue with the pragmatic ability-approach in language teaching. Pragmatic ability in L2, in accordance with Ishihara and Cohen (2014: 3), encompasses listening, reading, speaking and writing. Here, I will focus on listening and speaking competencies only.

As a listener we need to understand the communicative purpose, communicated verbally and non-verbally. The listener doesn’t only have to “interpret” the speaker’s utterance, but will react by means of subsequent utterances. He or she will turn to the role of the speaker. As a speaker, he/she needs to know how to act verbally and non-verbally with respect to the situation (directness, politeness, formality, etc.). The “interpretation”, however, often needs more than verbal, non-verbal or contextual knowledge. The listener, furthermore, needs to know the way the specific language learned offers back-channelling. In Grein (2011), I outlined that German

1. They do, however, argue “although speech acts are given major attention ..., we neither equate them with pragmatics nor suggest that speech acts should dominate the L2 curriculum ... Speech acts are only one component of pragmatics, ...” (Ishihara and Cohen 2014: x)

females give verbal backchannels after approximately eight morphemes, whereas Japanese females tend to backchannel after three morphemes. Again, not adhering to these principles might lead to miscommunication and misunderstanding. Interjections, conversational fillers, closing devices and so forth have to be taught, next to specific diverging speech acts. The US statement “we must get together soon”, for instance, is not meant as a serious invitation, but as an idiomatic expression of “good bye”. The language learner has to be enabled to understand this type of minimal action game and to react by means of a suitable subsequent utterance or action. He or she needs to be aware of the fact that dialogues are set up by language specific principles, not rules. Ishihara and Cohen (2014: 13) maintain

the norms of the community tend to make a certain pragmatic behavior more or less preferred or appropriate in a given context by speakers in that community. So pragmatic norms refer to a range of tendencies or conventions for pragmatic language use that are not absolute or fixed but are typical or generally preferred”.

Kohonen, Jaatinen, Kaikkonen and Lehtovaara (2014: 3) operate with the concept of “language use” in language teaching and state: “It is not enough to know the language primarily as a formal linguistic system. Language use is always contextualized, purposeful and interactive communication which involves negotiation between the participants, the tolerance of ambiguity and respect for diversity”. Kohonen, Jaatinen, Kaikkonen and Lehtovaara (2014: 5; 101f.) suggest the notion of “intercultural action competence” as the new goal of foreign language teaching and ask for a holistic approach arguing (2014: 64):

First of all, we must go beyond the traditional borders of linguistics, including applied linguistics, and move into a cross-disciplinary area. The holistic view of learning means that learners are involved in every learning situation with their whole personality: as knowing, feeling, thinking and acting individuals.

Bardovi-Harling and Mahan-Taylor (2003); Cohen and Ishihara (2004); Cohen (2005) and Félix-Brasdefer (2006a) developed curricula for teaching speech acts in the foreign language classroom, comprising of speech act learning and speech act use strategies. As hopefully made evident second language teaching theory is on the right track, but still in need of a grounded theory of language usage – and the holistic dialogic MGM seems to be a suitable solution.

2. Mixed game model (MGM)

All of the apriori mentioned competencies (communicative, pragmatic, socio-linguistic, discourse and intercultural competence) are integrated into one holistic theory within the MGM by Weigand (cf. Chapter 1, this volume); Weigand 2010). Dialogue analysis within the MGM provides a clear methodological device to dissolve the clear-cut distinction between competence and performance in linguistic theory; in conformity with modern language teaching theory her theory combines knowledge and skill (competence-in-performance) and includes all the factors defined as “pragmatic ability”. The basis of the MGM are human beings (with needs, desires and abilities, linguistic skills, cognition, perception, emotions and their sociocultural background) living in the world, communicating with specific purposes. There is no communication without a purpose, even if the purpose is merely to establish or strengthen social relationship (small talk). Speech, cognition, perception and having emotions interact. When we intend to teach language-use, we have to start off with analysing language-use, i.e. competence-in-performance which adheres to principles and not rules. Analysing language-use we have to look at human beings’ actions and behaviour in dialogic action games. Cognition, perception and thus speech are culture-specific. Culture pervades what we are as human beings, how we act, how we think and, thus, how we talk and even how we listen. Human beings are socialized into their specific cultural context(s), and culture influences their interaction with each other. Whenever people of different cultures communicate (even in the *lingua franca* English), problems within these intercultural dialogues typically arise when the communicators have widely different values and concepts of language-in-use. Even if both communicators are genuinely interested in communicating with each other, it can be difficult to secure successful communication if they have different values or beliefs about the world (cf. Grein 2017: 347; Kohonen et al. 2014: 64). If we intend to include “intercultural action competence” (cf. Kohonen et al. 2014, Chapter 3) as an integral part of foreign language teaching, we first have to analyse the language-in-use of the native speakers, an approach already applied in cross-cultural and interlanguage pragmatics (cf. Bardovi-Harlig and Hartford 2005; Boxer and Cohen 2004; Blum-Kulka, House, and Kasper 1989; Félix-Brasdefer 2006a and b, 2012). Yet, these analyses can be unified and improved with the help of the MGM as a dialogic holistic model, integrating multiple human abilities such as cognition and perception. Cognition and perception – as well as conventions and principles of language usage – are determined by personal preferences, the specific situation, prevailing emotions and the cultural background of the communicators. Speakers are not restricted to rules, but have to be taught communicative techniques, i.e. communicative means and language-in-use principles.

Let’s take a short glance at the MGM (for details cf. Weigand 2017).




Figure 2. The dialogic MGM model

Major principles of Weigand's model are the Action Principle (AP) and the Dialogic Principle proper (DP). The AP states that we communicate because we have a specific communicative purpose and in trying to fulfil our communicative purpose, we use different communicative or rather dialogic means (verbal, cognitive and perceptual means). If my purpose is to convince a friend to join me to a shopping tour, there are numerous forms of utterances I can choose (join me to the city, why don't you come along, how about accompanying me to the city, wouldn't shopping be a good idea etc.). The different functionally equivalent utterances are for example dependent on the communicative situations.

The DP claims that communicative actions are dialogic actions, mutually dependent on each other. The minimal autonomous communicative unit, thus, is the interdependence of an initiative speech act which makes a pragmatic claim and the reactive speech act which is expected to fulfil this very claim (cf. Weigand 2009: 170). The communicative purpose of any dialogue is to come to a gradual understanding. The link between the initiative and the reactive speech act does not need to be explicit, but can also be inferred. Or as Weigand (2009: 160) puts it: "coherence is *no longer given in the text, it is given by the interlocutors*". In the dialogic view the speaker is not facing the world, but another speaker within the world (cf. Weigand 2009: 79). Coherence is established in the minds of the interlocutors. As interpreters, our cognitive background and knowledge enables us to understand the

minimal action game. Yet, the language learner often lacks the necessary cognitive background. Thus, language teachers and foremost text books have to operate with minimal action games (dialogues), and the language teacher needs to be aware of the possible differences due to different socio-cultural backgrounds.

Fundamental premises according to Weigand (2010; cf. Grein 2017: 354ff.) are:

1. Language is used by human beings and cannot be separated from them.
2. Human beings are oriented towards purposes or needs. Purposes are a key concept for explaining human behaviour.
3. Human beings are always different human beings and do not only take different roles as speaker and interlocutor.
4. Human beings are social beings. They use their language or communicate in order to come to an understanding with other human beings, i.e., they have to correlate and to negotiate their positions, tasks and interests.
5. Language use accepts misunderstanding.
6. For human beings there is no independent world, no reality as such, only a world perceived by them.
7. The minimal communicatively autonomous unit is the action game, a unit of our cultural world which comprises the different communicative worlds of the interlocutors.
8. The action game is not constituted as a type of situation, but determined by its interactive purpose.
9. The authentic text represents a component in the action game. Human beings use different abilities together as communicative means. They produce verbal texts and simultaneously, and not separable, they draw inference and rely on what can be perceived in the speech situation. Language use therefore can in most cases be described only incompletely from the observer perspective and is only in part represented by corpora of authentic texts.
10. Not everything is said explicitly, not everything can be said explicitly because of the complexity of meaning to be negotiated.

In fact, all speech acts are dialogic acts:



Figure 3. Dialogic principle proper

The basic dialogic patterns are the following:

REPRESENTATIVES (claim to truth) ↔ ± ACCEPTANCE

Representative speech acts make a claim to truth, the reactive speech act, thus, is the speech act of accepting (or not accepting).

A: Angela Merkel is doing a good job.

B: I agree/No, I don't agree.

The reactive speech act 'fulfils' the very claim of the initiative act in an abstract sense which can be positive or negative.

DIRECTIVES (claim to volition – practical action) $\Leftrightarrow \pm$ CONSENT

We have a specific initiative action, here the directive speech act, which makes a pragmatic claim with regard to the interlocutor. Its specific quality is that of a claim to the performance of a practical action, e.g., "give me the book". Either the book could be handed over without any further speech act (practical action) or by a reactive speech act which fulfils the claim in positive or negative form, called CONSENT. Even if the interlocutor refuses to perform the action, they have come to an understanding. The abstract notation Directives \Leftrightarrow Consent contains the positive as well as the negative point.

A: Don't forget to use the vacuum cleaner!

B: Ok, I will/No, not today!

EXPLORATIVES (claim to volition – knowledge) $\Leftrightarrow \pm$ RESPONSE

An explorative speech act aims for a response. It makes a claim to volition which relates to knowledge.

A: Where will you spend your summer holidays?

B: In Spain.

DECLARATIVES (claim to volition – creating social structures) \Leftrightarrow [CONFIRM]

In declarative speech acts (like "I baptize you"), making and fulfilling a claim coincide. Uttering a declarative speech act implies that something is made to exist or be valid. A reaction, thus, is not necessary. Small talk with the communicative purpose of establishing and maintaining social relations can be considered to be declarative as well (Weigand 2010: 226).

Weigand (2010: 154) summarizes:

Action types which

- create a piece of world are declaratives
- change the world are directives
- express the world are representatives and
- ask questions about the world are exploratives.

The basic action games have further subtypes. DIRECTIVE subtypes can be set up by differentiating the directive claim to volition (cf. Weigand 2010: 160):

- the claim of an ORDER defined by the availability of sanctions
- the claim of a REQUEST relying on mutual cooperation
- the claim of a PLEA appealing to the helpfulness and kindness of the interlocutor.

Representatives have the following subtypes (cf. Weigand 2010: 163ff, 172), that will not be elaborated in detail:

ASSERTIVES ⇔ ACCEPT	claim to truth which is not immediately evident; basis of reason and arguments
IDENTIFIERS ⇔ ACCEPT	claim to truth, based on the knowledge which refers to definitions
INFORMATIVES ⇔ [COMMENT]	aim at being taken notice of
CONSTATIVES	claim refers to truth which appears obvious
external world ⇔ CONFIRM	
internal world ⇔ BELIEVE	
EMOTIVE ⇔ EMPATHY	announcing or expressing emotions, emotives (in earlier versions expressives) aim at empathy and compassion
CONDITIONAL ⇔ ACCEPTANCE / BELIEF	modal claim to truth; conditionals aim at a speech act of acceptance or belief
DELIBERATIVE ⇔ ACCEPTANCE	modal claim to truth; express the possibility of a state of affairs
DESIDERATIVE ⇔ BELIEF / ACCEPTANCE	modal claim to truth; express a desire and include emotional involvement
NORMATIVE ⇔ ACCEPTANCE	modal claim to truth; aim at acceptance of norms

Learning a new language starts off with standard utterances for initiative and reactive actions in specific action games, which often are culture-specific. Let me again turn to the action game of greetings. As mentioned, learners tend to just translate their L1 speech act sequence (initiative and reactive action) into the “new” language. In Uzbekistan it would be:

- A: [Peace on you] Hallo Marion, how are you? Have you had a good night sleep? Aren't you very tired?
 B: [Peace on you] Hallo Dilorom, thank you I am fine. How are you? How is your mother? How is your son?

In Japan it would be

- A: Good morning. Are you fine?
 B: Thanks to you, I am very fine. And you?

Both minimal action games do by no means sound German when translated literally. Learners, thus, are in need of authentic sequences of utterances. And these authentic minimal action games need to be implemented into a context. Cultural values deeply influence cognition and preferences, and often the teacher needs to explain diverging values and norms – and, thus, needs to be aware of diverging views.

Whereas for instance a compliment is mostly perceived as something positive by Germans, it may be embarrassing for Japanese when expressed within a group. With the help of minimal action games, integrating compliments, learners can become aware of the adequate usage within the new language. And it is not only the perception of compliments which differs: translating a Latin American *piropos* (compliment to female strangers) like “tantas curvas y yo, sin frenos” (‘such curves and me without brakes’) literally could be considered as an insult by German women.

Within modern language teaching textbooks, minimal action games are presented within authentic contexts, supported by pictures and movie clips. They can, often indirectly, help learners to become aware of cultural differences, i.e. pictures demonstrating gender equality in Germany, the appropriate talking distance, eye contact, display of emotions and the frequency of touch. With the help of pictures and movies, nonverbal and paraverbal clues are given. As mentioned, culture takes hold of human beings in the shape of internalized attitudes and preferences which need to be transported in language-teaching. All aforementioned dialogic patterns have to be integrated into the textbook. As an example for the differences, I will take two short authentic examples within the minimal action game, comparing German and Japanese (cf. Grein 2007).

Situation: A salesman is trying to sell you a new product. Both, the German and the Japanese refuse to buy the product.

- A: (German): Nein, danke. Kein Interesse (No. Thank you. I am not interested).
 B: (Japanese): Chotto kangaesasete kudasai (Let me think about it a moment).

Situation: You come late to an official meeting.

- A: (German): Mein Auto ist liegen geblieben und dann musste ich den ADAC einschalten und der hat das Auto dann abgeschleppt. Sorry.
 (My car broke down and I had to call the automobile club to tow the car away. Sorry.)
 B: (Japanese): Osoku natte sumimasen. Mattaku watashi no fuchuuide. Gomeiwaku wo okakeshite moshiwakearimasen. (I am very very sorry to be late. It was completely due to my carelessness. I very much apologize for the inconvenience and causing trouble.)

Whereas the German minimal action game focuses on an explanation, the Japanese is using very polite versions of excuses – mostly avoiding any explanation. Again, translating the replies literally would be considered rude in both cultures.

Language teachers can become aware of dialogic language-in-use differences (competence-in-performance) when language is analysed by means of the MGM and language teaching textbooks have to operate with authentic real life examples and authentic dialogues. Whereas older textbooks focussed on written texts and unauthentic spoken language-use, the modern generation of teaching materials is in fact applying minimal action games as will be demonstrated in the following section.

3. Minimal action games in a German textbook (*Schritte plus neu*)

A short analysis of a German textbook (*Schritte plus neu*) will show the dialogic character of language-in-use examples. I will take a closer look at the beginner's level A1 (CEFR).²

It starts off with the various possibilities of introducing oneself, showing that there are functionally equivalent utterances of introduction (principles, not rules). The translation into English can be considered another example of different language-usage. Literal translations would hardly sound authentic.

1 Sehen Sie die Fotos an und hören Sie.

Wer ist das? Verbinden Sie.

The exercise shows four photographs (A, B, C, D) and four speech bubbles with German text. A blue line connects the first speech bubble to photo A.

- Speech bubble 1: Ich heiÙe Lara Nowak.
- Speech bubble 2: Mein Name ist Walter Baumann.
- Speech bubble 3: Ich bin Sofia Baumann.
- Speech bubble 4: Ich bin Lili.

Photos: A (girl), B (girl), C (man), D (woman).

[Take a look at the pictures and listen. Who is who? Find and draw a line to the correct answer; I am called Lara Nowak, My name is Walter Baumann, I am Sofia Baumann, I am Lili]

Illustration 1. Minimal action game of greeting (verbal)

2. The permission for all screenshots was granted by Hueber Verlag.

The dialogic character is visualized and again a comparison of the authentic German version and the English translation shows that a literal translation is inappropriate:

- ◆ Guten Tag. Mein Name ist Richard Yulu.
- Guten Tag, Herr ...
Entschuldigung, wie heißen Sie?
- ◆ Richard Yulu.
- Ah, ja. Guten Tag, Herr Yulu.
Ich bin Helga Weber.
- ◆ Guten Tag, Frau Weber.
- Das ist Richard Yulu.
- ▲ Guten Tag, Herr Yulu.
Ich bin Magdalena Deiser.
- ◆ Guten Tag, Frau Deiser, freut mich.
- ▲ Herzlich willkommen
im Park-Klinikum.

Wie heißen Sie?

Ich heiße

Ich bin ...

Mein Name ist ...

Hello, I am Richard Yulu.
Hello Mr. ... sorry, what was your last name?
Richard Yulu.
Oh, yes. Hello Mr. Yulu.
I am Helga Weber.
Hello Mrs. Weber.
This is Richard Yulu.
Hello Mr. Yulu. I am Magdalena Deiser.
Hello, Mrs. Deiser. Glad to meet you.
Welcome to Park-Clinic.

I am called ...
I am ..
My name is ...

Illustration 2. Minimal action game of greeting and introducing oneself (verbal)

Nonverbal clues are added to the verbal action games by means of pictures. With the help of these pictures, learners can observe that with elderly the handshake is still conventional, whereas especially younger females either just nod or in case of close friends hug and kiss each other on the cheek. Learners can, furthermore, observe the distance between interlocutors. Furthermore, they learn that elderly are addressed with “Sie” (formal ‘you’), whereas young people prefer to use “du” (informal ‘you’).

Hören Sie und ordnen Sie zu.

bist du kommst du kommen Sie Ich heiße



A



B

- ◆ Guten Tag. Mein Name ist Lara Nowak.
- ◆ Guten Tag. Freut mich.
Ich heiße Klara Schneider.
 Woher , Frau Nowak?
- ◆ Aus Polen.
- ◆ Hallo. Ich bin Lara. Und wer?
- ▲ Hallo! Ich bin Henry.
 Woher , Lara?
- ◆ Aus Polen.

Listen and fill in the gaps.

Hello. I am Lara Nowak.

Hi. I am Lara. And you?

Hello. Glad to meet you. I am

Hi. I am Henry.

Klara Schneider

Where do you come from?

Where do you come from?

Poland.

Illustration 3. Minimal action game of greeting and introducing oneself (verbal and non-verbal)

The target language is introduced by minimal action games, often visualizing the dialogic structure.

D3 Hören Sie das Telefongespräch. Sprechen Sie dann mit Ihrem Namen.



◆ Firma Microlab,
 Valentina Schwarz,
 guten Tag.

◆ Guten Tag Herr ...

◆ Entschuldigung, wie ist Ihr Name?

◆ Ah ja, Herr Kostadinov. Einen Moment bitte ... Herr Kostadinov? Tut mir leid, Frau Bär ist nicht da.

◆ Auf Wiederhören, Herr Kostadinov.



○ Guten Tag.
 Mein Name ist
 Kostadinov. Ist
 Frau Bär da, bitte?

○ Kostadinov.

○ Kostadinov. Ich buchstabiere:
 K-O-S-T-A-D-I-N-O-V

○ Ja, gut. Vielen Dank.
 Auf Wiederhören.



Listen to the telephone conversation. Then try with your own name.

Microlab Corporation. Valentina Schwarz,
hello.
Hello Mr. ...
Sorry, could you repeat.

Oh, yes, Mr. Kostadinov. Just a second please
Mr. Kostadinov. I am very sorry, but Mrs. Bär
is out of office.

Goodbye, Mr. Kostadinov.

Hello. I am Mr. Kostadinov. I would like to
talk to Mrs. Bär, please.

Kostadinov.

Kostandinov. Let met spell my name.
K-O-S-T-A-D-I-N-O-V.

Yes, well ok. Thank you. Goodbye.


[Goodbye only on the phone]

Illustration 4. Minimal action game on the phone

Learners are acquainted with the fact that in German there is a phrase for goodbye which is only used at the phone [Auf Wiederhören instead of Auf Wiedersehen]. In addition to these pictures, movie clips with authentic minimal action games are systematically integrated – within these movie clips nonverbal communication is easy to observe.

Hallo und Guten Tag!

-  1 Sehen Sie den Film ohne Ton an. Was meinen Sie: Was sagen die Personen? Notieren Sie.



.....
.....

.....
.....

.....
.....

-  2 Sehen Sie den Film nun mit Ton an und vergleichen Sie.

Hi and Hello!

Take a look at the movie in silent mode. What do you think? What are the interactants going to say. Take notes.


Now watch the movie with sound and compare.

Illustration 5. Minimal action games in video clips

In lesson 2, the learner can easily observe that it is possible to give various replies to the question “how are you?”. In Uzbekistan and Japan it is mostly obligatory to reply “I am well”.

Wie geht's? Hören Sie und ordnen Sie zu.

- Gut, danke.
- A Super.
- Na ja, es geht.
- Ach, nicht so gut.
- Danke, sehr gut.



How are you? Listen and match.

Okay, thanks; Perfect; Well, I'm okay; Well, I don't feel well (today); Thanks, very well.

Illustration 6. Minimal action games of greeting/well-being

Lesson 3 introduces first purchasing action games (DIRECTIVES).

Verkäuferin/Verkäufer

- ◆ Bitte schön?
Kann ich Ihnen helfen?

- ◆ Wie viel (brauchen/
möchten Sie denn)?

- ◆ Gern./Hier, bitte. (Möchten
Sie) Sonst noch etwas?

- ◆ (Das macht/kostet dann) ... Euro, bitte.

Kundin/Kunde

- ◆ Ich möchte Birnen.
- ◆ Ich hätte gern Spinat.
- ◆ Ich brauche Brötchen.
- ◆ Wo finde ich ...?
- ◆ Haben Sie ...?

- ◆ Ein Pfund Brot.
- ◆ Ein Kilo Lauch.
- ◆ Drei Birnen.
- ◆ 100 Gramm Speck.
- ◆ ...

- ◆ Nein, danke. Das ist alles.



Salesman/Saleswoman

Yes please? May I help you?

How much/how many would you like?

My pleasure. Here you go. Anything else?
Ok, that's .. Euro.

Customer

I would like pears.
I would like to have spinach
I need some rolls
Where are ...
Are there any ...

One pound of bread.
One kg of leek.
Three pears.
100 g of bacon.

No, thank you. That's it.

Illustration 7. Minimal action games of purchasing (directives)

In lesson 4 learners are again confronted with a telephone dialogue. Answering the phone clearly differs from nation to nation. In authentic action games learners acquire the appropriate minimal action game in German. Again, even comparing German to English shows different authentic utterances.

Hören Sie noch einmal und ordnen Sie dann die Fragen zu.

Sind Sie heute zu Hause? Welche Farbe hat der Tisch? Und wie groß ist er? Und wo wohnen Sie, bitte?



- ◆ Schuster. Hallo.
 - ◆ Stimmt.
 - ◆ Also, der Tisch ist dunkel, dunkelbraun.
 - ◆ Ungefähr zwei Meter lang und 60 Zentimeter breit.
 - ◆ Naja, genau ist er zwei Meter und zwei Zentimeter lang.
 - ◆ Ja, ich bin da.
 - ◆ In der Schellingstraße 76.
- Hallo, hier ist Häussler. Sie verkaufen doch einen Schreibtisch, richtig?
 - Gut. Welche Farbe hat der Tisch?
 - Aha, das ist gut, ja.
 - Hm ... Wie lang ist er denn genau?
 - Aha, gut!
Ich möchte den Tisch gern sehen.
 -
 -

Listen again and match the questions.

Are you at home today? Could you tell me the colour of the table? How large is the table? And, could I have your address, please?

Hello, I am Mrs. Schuster.

Yes.

Well, the table is rather dark, dark brown.

Approximately 2 meters in length and 60cm in height.

Well, exactly 2 meters and 2 cm.

Yes, I am here.

It's Schelling street 76.

Hello, my name is Häussler. You are offering a desk, right?

Good, would you tell me the colour?

Oh, that sounds good, well, how large is the table?

Well, and exactly?

Oh, that's fine. I would very much like to take a look at the table. Are you at home today?

And, could I have your address, please.

Illustration 8. Minimal action games of purchasing (directives)

In lesson 8, various EXPLORATIVE action games are given:

<p>Was sind Sie/ bist du von Beruf? Was machen Sie/ machst du (beruflich)?</p>	<p>Ich bin .../Ich arbeite als ... bei... Ich bin Schüler(in)/ Student(in). Ich studiere noch /Ich gehe noch zur Schule. Ich mache eine Ausbildung als ... Ich habe einen Job/ eine Stelle als ... Ich bin angestellt./ selbstständig. Ich arbeite jetzt nicht./ Ich bin nicht berufstätig. Ich bin zurzeit arbeitslos.</p>
--	---

- ◆ Was bist du von Beruf?
- Ich bin Student und ich habe einen Job als Fahrer. Und du? Was machst du?

What is your profession?	I am .../I work as ...
What do you do for a living?	I am a pupil/I am a student (male/female). I am still studying/I am still a pupil. I am now training/qualifying as a ... I am working as ... I am employed as .../I am a freelancer. At the moment I am taking a break/I am currently not working. I am currently unemployed.

Illustration 9. Minimal action games of exploratives

The textbook introduces the learner to life in Germany, implements cultural factors indirectly and integrates the necessary authentic language games.

Textbook authors need analysis of all real life minimal action games in order to integrate them into adequate language teaching materials. Especially the integration of movie clips is a guarantee for success. Language analysis based on the MGM seems to be the best way to help language teaching authors setting up communicative, authentic and culture-specific materials.

4. Concluding remarks

Modern language teaching and learning has to aim at culture-specific dialogic competence-in-performance. Instead of strictly delineating competence and performance, the MGM conjoins competence and performance. Language learners need dialogic skills, and the MGM is based on dialogue analysis. Pragmatics and “pragmatic ability” are fuzzy terms, analysing dialogue by means of the MGM enables us to grasp the culture specific principles of language-usage. Dialogue analysis within the MGM provides a clear methodological device to analysing language-use, i.e. competence-in-performance which adheres to principles and not rules, integrating the human abilities of speaking, thinking, and perceiving. Language teaching theory should definitely turn into the direction of dialogue analysis in accordance with the MGM.

References

- Bardovi-Harlig, Kathleen and Beverly S. Hartford. 2005. "Institutional Discourse and Interlanguage Pragmatics." In *Interlanguage Pragmatics: Exploring Institutional Talk*, ed. by Kathleen Bardovi-Harlig, and Beverly S. Hartford, 7–36. Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum.
- Bardovi-Harlig, Kathleen and Rebecca Mahan-Taylor. 2003. *Teaching Pragmatics*. Washington, DC: United States Department of State.
- Berger, Peter L. and Thomas Luckmann. 1967. *The Social Construction of Reality*. Garden City, NY: Doubleday.
- Blum-Kulka, Shoshana, Juliane House, and Gabriele Kasper (ed.). 1989. *Cross-Cultural Pragmatics: Requests and apologies*. Norwood, NJ: Ablex.
- Boxer, Diana and Andrew D. Cohen (ed.). 2004. *Studying Speaking to Inform Second Language Learning*. Clevedon, UK: Multilingual Matters.
- Breen, Michael P. and Christopher N. Candlin. 1980. "The Essentials of a Communicative Curriculum in Language Teaching." *Applied Linguistics* 1(2): 89–110. doi:10.1093/applin/1.2.89
- Canale, Michael and Merrill Swain. 1980. "Theoretical Bases of Communicative Approaches to Second Language Teaching and Testing." *Applied Linguistics* 1(1): 1–47. doi:10.1093/applin/1.1.1
- Canale, Michael. 2013. "From Communicative Competence to Communicative Language Pedagogy." In *Language and Communication*, ed. by Jack C. Richards and Richard W. Schmidt, 2–27. [Reprint of the 1983 version]. London: Routledge.
- Cohen, Andrew D. and Noriko Ishihara. 2004. *A Web-Based Approach to Strategic Learning of Speech Acts. Report to the Center for Advanced Research on Language Acquisition (CARLA)*. Available online at http://carla.umn.edu/speechacts/sp_pragmatics/for_researchers.html, accessed on November 13, 2016.
- Cohen, Andrew D. 2005. "Strategies for Learning and Performing L2 Speech Acts." *Intercultural Pragmatics* 2(3): 275–301. doi:10.1515/iprg.2005.2.3.275
- Council of Europe. 2001. *Common European Framework of Reference for Languages: Learning, Teaching, Assessment (CEFR)*. Available online at www.coe.int/t/dg4/linguistic/Source/Framework_EN.pdf, accessed on November 13, 2016.
- Félix-Brasdefer, J. César. 2006a. "Teaching the Negotiation of Multi-turn Speech Acts: Using conversation-analytic tools to teach pragmatics in the FL classroom." In *Pragmatics and Language Learning*. Vol. 11, ed. by Kathleen Bardovi-Harlig, J. César Félix-Brasdefer, and Alwiya Omar, 165–197. University of Hawaii at Manoa: National Foreign Language Resource Center.
- Félix-Brasdefer, J. César. 2006b. "Speech Act Perception in Interlanguage Pragmatics: Exploring the minds of foreign language learners." *Series A: General and Theoretical papers*, No. 652: 1–27. Essen: Universität Duisburg.
- Félix-Brasdefer, J. César and Dale Koike (ed.). 2012. *Pragmatic Variation in First and Second Language Contexts: Methodological issues*. Amsterdam and Philadelphia: John Benjamins. doi:10.1075/impact.31
- Grein, Marion. 2011. "Frauen und Männersprache in Deutschland und Japan: Gesprächsbegleitende Signale [Female and male language in German and Japanese: discourse markers]." In *East Asian Intercultural Studies*, ed. by Konrad Meisig, 27–40. Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz.
- Grein, Marion. 2017. "How Culture Affects Language and Dialogue." In *The Routledge Handbook of Language and Dialogue*, ed. by Edda Weigand. London: Routledge. 347–366.

- Grein, Marion. 2007. *Kommunikative Grammatik im Sprachvergleich: Die Sprechaktsequenz Direktiv und Ablehnung im Deutschen und Japanischen* [Communicative Grammar within Comparative Linguistics: Directives and Refusals within the German and the Japanese Language]. Tübingen: Niemeyer. doi:10.1515/9783110938883
- Hamiloğlu, Kamile and Bahar Mendi. 2010. "A Content Analysis Related to the Cross-cultural/ Intercultural Elements Used in EFL Coursebooks." *Sino-US English Teaching USA* 7(1): 16–24.
- Ishihara, Noriko and Andrew D. Cohen. 2014. *Teaching and Learning Pragmatics: Where Language and Culture Meet*, 2nd edition. Harlow, Essex, England: Longman/Pearson Education.
- Kaikkonen, Pauli. 2014. "Intercultural Learning through Foreign Language Education." In *Experiential Learning in Foreign Language Education*, ed. by Viljo Kohonen, Riitta Jaatinen, Pauli Kaikkonen, and Jorma Lehtovaara, 61–105. London; New York et al.: Longman.
- Kohonen, Viljo, Riitta Jaatinen, Pauli Kaikkonen, and Jorma Lehtovaara (ed.). 2014. *Experiential Learning in Foreign Language Education*. London; New York et al.: Longman.
- Niebisch, Daniela, Sylvette Penning-Hiemstra, Franz Specht, Monika Bovermann, and Angela Pude. 2016. *Schritte plus neu. Kursbuch A1* [Step by Step new edition. Language Course Book]. München: Hueber Verlag.
- Paige, R. Michael, Helen Jorstad, Laura Siaya, Francine Klein, and Jeanette Colby. 2003. "Culture Learning in Language Education: A Review of Literature." In *Culture as the Core: Perspectives on Culture in Second Language Learning*, ed. by Dale L. Lange and R. Michael Paige, 173–236. USA: Information Age Publishing.
- Pauldrach, Andreas. 1992. "Eine unendliche Geschichte. Anmerkungen zur Situation der Landeskunde in den 90er Jahren" [A never ending story: remarks on regional studies in the 1990s]. *Fremdsprache Deutsch* 6: 4–15.
- Pulverness, Alan. 1995. "Cultural Studies, British Studies and EFL." *Modern English Teacher* 4(2): 7–11.
- Tomalin, Barry and Susan Stempleski. 1993. *Cultural Awareness*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Weigand, Edda. 2009. *Language as Dialogue*. Amsterdam and Philadelphia: John Benjamins. doi:10.1075/ds.5
- Weigand, Edda. 2010. *Dialogue. The Mixed Game*. Amsterdam and Philadelphia: John Benjamins. doi:10.1075/ds.10
- Weigand, Edda. 2017. "The Mixed Game Model: A Holistic Theory." In *The Routledge Handbook of Language and Dialogue*, ed. by Edda Weigand. London: Routledge.
- Weigand, Edda. 2018. "Dialogue: the key to pragmatics." In *From Pragmatics to Dialogue*, ed. by Edda Weigand and Istvan Kecskes. Amsterdam and Philadelphia: John Benjamins. doi:10.1075/ds.31.02wei
- Wells, Gordon. 1981. *Learning through Interaction: The study of language development*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. doi:10.1017/CBO9780511620737
- Widdowson, Henry G. 1978. *Teaching Language as Communication*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Wiemann, John M. and Philip Backlund. 1980. "Current Theory and Research in Communicative Competence." *Review of Educational Research* 50(1): 185–199. doi:10.3102/00346543050001185

Research interview as social interaction

Epistemic implications

Letizia Caronia

University of Bologna (Italy)

This chapter discusses and empirically illustrates the epistemic implications of a dialogic approach to language when used as a research tool. I analyze examples of one of the most commonly used methods in social science research, the interview, and discuss some implications of foregrounding the performative and emergent properties of dialogues occurring between the researcher and her informants. I contend that applying a dialogic view of language to the specific forms of talk used for doing research, requires a substantial change in how we conceive of scientific knowledge and what we expect from it. This is perhaps the reason why researchers often ignore contemporary linguistic theory and preserve their working tools from it: what if we consider referentiality as a dialogic, interactive achievement?

Keywords: epistemics, language use, indexicality, intersubjectivity, referentiality, reflexivity, relativism, research interview, social interaction

1. Introduction

Forty years ago, in a chapter titled “On the Architecture of Intersubjectivity”, the social psychologist Ragnar Rommetveit wrote:

The notion of an utterance deprived of its context of human interaction is as absurd as the notion of a fall deprived of the gravitational field within which it takes place. *What is made known* in an act of verbal communication can therefore be properly assessed only if we venture to explore the architecture of intersubjectivity within which it is embedded. [...] Communication aims at transcendence of the “private” worlds of the participants. It sets up what we might call “states of intersubjectivity.” (Rommetveit 1976: 163– 164, emphasis in original)

His conception of communication as simultaneously embedded in and building a common world of meaning, greatly influenced communication scholars interested in bridging “language and society” and lies at the core of the so-called interactive

sociocultural turn in social sciences (Wertsch 1985, 1993). Since this theoretical turn and having dismissed any approach or research program “separating text and context” (Weigand 2009: 65), utterance and enunciation, referential and pragmatic meaning, representational and instrumental function (Halliday 1973), scholars in different fields advanced that language should be considered “as an interactive phenomenon” (Duranti and Goodwin 1992). Consequently, the analysis of social interaction (and dialogue as its prototypical form, see Berger and Luckman 1966 Halliday 1976) has been proposed as a unique methodological tool to gain access to the ways people index, construct and maintain temporarily shared worlds of meaning and set up “states of intersubjectivity” (on dialogue and dialogism see Linnell 1998, 2009; on dialogue as interaction, see Weigand 2009, 2010; Bazzanella 2002; on the different definitions of dialogue, see Stati 1982).

This interactive view of language implies a consistent theory of meaning. Since the 70s, the cognitive-oriented ideational theory of meaning (i.e. meaning as encoded in and referred by a system of symbols; language functions as encoded in linguistic forms; situational meanings as encoded in cultural scripts of social events, see Goodenough 1957; Schank and Abelson 1977; Quinn and Holland 1987) has been progressively rejected in favor of an interactional theory of meaning. Within this approach, meanings, functions and speech acts are considered only partially codified in lexicon, grammar and linguistic forms and only partially ruled by cultural scripts and social norms governing communication. These open-ended codified meanings are crucial resources (see the notion of interpretive repertoires, Potter and Wetherell 1987) for participants, yet it is only in the course of interaction that language functions, meanings and speech acts are jointly accomplished. In short, meaning is not encoded nor decoded: it is interactively constructed in and through situated talking activities. As conversational analysts have largely shown, declaratives may be used and acknowledged as questions (Heritage 2012; Labov and Fanshell 1977) and what an utterance does (e.g. answering by informing; challenging the question premises by informing, Raymond 2003; questioning by noninterrogatives, Freed and Ehrlich 2010; Thompson, Fox, and Couper-Kuhlen 2015) is only partially encoded in the grammatical structure; rather, it is locally established by participants in the course of the interaction.

Clearly enough, the notion of “meaning as a situated and practical accomplishment” certifies the shift towards a theory of language as action and the success of the “emergence perspective” on communication (Heritage 2010): language is not considered primarily a system of symbols to represent the world but as a performative tool for constructing (a common world of) meaning and coordinating activities in a consensual way (Steier 1991). From a language-as-a-constitutive-activity perspective, not even the representational (or “ideational”, Halliday 1973) function belongs to language itself, but rather, it is an interactive achievement of

language users. In the same vein, description and similar genres implying a linguistic representation of reality are considered and analyzed as joint activities locally accomplished and coordinated through the social use of language. Research domains where this perspective has been adopted include, yet are not limited to: studies on courtroom credibility (Jacquemet 1996), classroom talk (Mehan 1979, Pontecorvo et al. 1998), peer talk-in-interaction (Goodwin 1991; Corsaro 1985), therapeutic discourse (Labov and Fanshell 1977), medical interaction (Heritage and Maynard 2006), everyday story-telling (Ochs and Capps 2001), oral performances in traditional as well as contemporary societies (Duranti 1994; Duranti and Brenneis 1986), text interpretation (Eco 1979), ethnographic description and writing (Clifford and Marcus 1986; Moerman 1988), language use in workplaces (Drew and Heritage 1992; Fasulo and Zucchermaglio 2008), and organizational communication (Cooren 2010; Putnam and Nicotera 2009). Scholars from a wide variety of fields such as those mentioned above accepted and endorsed an interactive view of language and its main implication: each and any form of language use – even a written text (Drew 2006) or what we are used to considering a monologue – is “dialogic”, i.e. embedded in a sequence of actions and reactions (Weigand 2009, 2010), consistently displaying traces of distal and proximal multiple voices (Baxter 2011: 49), and highly indexical and reflexive far beyond what we were used to acknowledging, i.e. the indexical expressions (see Heritage 2010).

However, there is a domain where such a theoretical perspective did not find fertile ground: social research itself and its methods. Although it has been fifty years since the pragmatic turn in language and communication studies, and despite three decades of epistemological inquiries on the performative-constitutive (rather than constative) nature of social science methods (see Briggs 1986; Caronia 1997; Drew, Raymond, and Weinberg 2006), the ideology of methodological tools as “transparent windows’ into social reality” still pervades “much of the literature on methodology” (Mondada 2009: 69). Why is this the case? In the following pages I advance the hypothesis that the relative blindness of social research methods to what is a truism in social sciences advancement – i.e. language use is a joint, dialogically organized activity (Clark 1996, Weigand 2009) – is consistent with and necessary to maintain our trust in the validity and reliability of scientific knowledge. To illustrate the point, I will focus on one of the most frequently used methods to gather data in social science research: the interview and, particularly, the in-depth qualitative interview.

2. Research interviewing: What's in a practice?

The interview has been and still is one of the most frequently used tools of social science research. Some estimations suggest that 90% of research does use interviews or interview-gathered data¹ (Brenner 1981; Tracy and Robles 2010). The trust in interviews as an instrument for scientific investigation and in interview data as a solid base for scientific knowledge warrants, therefore, particular attention. According to some epistemologically attentive scholars (Briggs 1986; Kvale and Brinkmann 2009; for an overview see Alvesson 2011), behind the shared trust in interviews and the most common analytical procedures applied to interview-gathered discourses, there are crucial assumptions concerning the nature of language and its core function. Although social scientists are supposedly equipped with sophisticated theories of language use, more often than expected they appear to rely on selective representation of language functions focused on referentiality that is typical of laypersons (Silverstein 1981): when designing, using and analyzing interviews, the researcher assumes that the informant will talk primarily if not merely to describe, refer to or otherwise communicate the aspects of the world the interview is about, whether this world is constituted of facts or of ideas, opinions, and attitudes toward facts. A corollary of this assumption concerning the referential vocation of the interview is an ambiguous attitude toward it: although this linguistic event is often recognized as a particular form of institutional talk, in the vast majority of cases *it is not analyzed as such*.

Some exceptions should be mentioned. Not surprisingly, they concern scholars committed to a socioconstructionist analysis of social research methods. Scholars from this school of thought have shown that the interview is not a means to grasp, record or gather thoughts, opinions, experiences, accounts, memories or even “facts” that are already present in a reality out there or in the “mind” of the interviewee. Rather, interviews are a particular kind of social interaction through which participants use their turns of talk (questions, answers and receipts) to jointly construct, shape, negotiate and finally end up with situated and context-dependent versions of what they are talking about (see among others Gergen and Gergen 1991; Potter and Wetherell 1987; Tracy and Robles 2010). Yet, apart from methodologists aware of the dialogic turn in language studies (see Silverman 2001; 2007) and scholars in conversation analysis interested in studying the interactive machinery

1. As a matter of fact, a huge amount of what social sciences treat as data is report-formatted information. And this is precisely the point discussed here: this information is treated as if it were not “talk” produced within a specific social interaction but rather a transparent representation of what talk is about (see Potter and Wetherell 1987). This is a crucial difference with respect to what is considered as ‘data’ in most contemporary research in pragmatics, sociolinguistics and conversation analysis where talk is the data and not a vehicle for the data.

at play in interviews (see among others Potter and Hepburn 2005, 2012; Wooffitt and Widdicombe 2006), surveys (Houtkoop-Steenstra 2000; Maynard et al. 2002; Maynard and Schaeffer 2002) and focus groups (Wilkinson 2006; Markova et al. 2007), those who use interviews as a tool to investigate substantive topics, implicitly assume that this linguistic event has a peculiar ontological status: it is a pure stimulus to prompt utterances about the world. Interviews are still conceived of – or at least analyzed – as fishing rods (Briggs 1986)² where the only issue at stake is whether or not their design fits with the research goals: some types of interview are more suitable and apt for fishing for certain kinds of information; other types are preferable for other aims. Yet if they are built according to the research goals and administered in the right manner, they are able to grasp an independent and already established reality.

Interestingly enough, this view of the research interview as a tool able to grasp an independent world withstood even the anti-positivistic critiques of traditional conceptions and uses of qualitative interviews as a way to access participants' everyday practices (what they do) and to gather facts (how things are in the world the discourse refers to). As a consequence of this typical anti-positivistic critique, in most cases interviews have been dismissed as a means to access what people do and re-endorsed as useful tools to gain access to the informants' world of meanings. Yet despite this anti-positivistic maquillage, the shift from facts to meanings does not necessarily align with a theory of language use as a joint and therefore *dialogical* activity (Weigand 2010; Linell 1998, 2009). When interviews are used to understand the meaning participants attribute to their surrounding world or the cultural models they use to make sense of what the research is about (see Holland and Quinn 1987), they often (although not necessarily, see Wetherell, Taylor and Yates 2001) conceal a cognitive-oriented ideational theory of meaning and culture (see Keesing 1987; Tyler 1978). Culture, meanings, world visions, attitudes and other cognitive dimensions supposedly motivating people's behaviors are considered as lodged in the mind, displayed by discourse and analyzable as observable and stable facts by means of analysing the propositional content of the answers to the research questions. Meaning and cultural models are, therefore, reified as if they constituted a "body of definitions, premises, statements, postulates, presumptions, propositions and perceptions about the nature of the universe and the man's place in it" (Schneider 1976: 202). At the root of such an ideational theory of meaning there is a representation of language use centered primarily, if not exclusively, on its referential function: talk (in interviews) is conceived of as displaying, indexing or referring to this world of meaning.

2. See also the metaphor of interview as a thermometer, i.e. an instrument that – if well made – is able to grasp the status of an independent world (Powney and Watts 1987)

3. Meaning as a bounded, stable and observable entity: The bias theories

It would be unfair to claim that social science methodologists hadn't paid attention to the linguistic nature of the vast majority of social science methodological tools, the interview included. On the contrary, methodologists have been very sensitive and even hyper accurate analysts of the linguistic features of the question-answer structure that characterize the vast majority of research methods (Hyman, Cobb et al. 1975; Bailey 1978). However, their epistemological perspective sheds a peculiar light on the issue. Language and contextual dimensions (e.g. the individual characteristics of the interviewer; the locus where the interview takes place) are conceived of as a potential source of bias which could alter the response and affect the reliability, validity and comparability of data. Great attention has been paid to the interviewer's wording, intonation, sequence and formulation of the questions to avoid misunderstanding and any suggestions of the expected answer. To minimize the famous "researcher's effect" (Singer, Frankel, and Glassman 1983) and maximise the probability that the different individuals of the sample are exposed to the same stimulus, a traditional methodological *caveat* suggests that interviewers should ask the same questions, in the same order, formulated in the same way. Even intonation should remain the same across different interviews (Bailey 1978: 171).

Typically, the bias issue and related methodological caveat have been raised within a quantitative approach to social reality where standardization of the "stimulus" is considered an attainable and mandatory condition for any subsequent processing of data (Caronia 2014). However, the pressure to identify language and context biases (e.g. the sex and age of the researcher, the interview logistics and time of the day, etc.) in interview and avoid them as far as possible, is part of a qualitative researcher's mindset as well. Methodological handbooks still suggest how to conduct interviews to minimize the occurrence of such biases and facilitate "self expression" (Benney and Hughes 1970 quoted in Taylor and Lindlof 2011: 187). Such instructions on how to do good qualitative interviewing include (yet are not limited to): paying attention to how the questions are formulated and how they are answered (Powney and Watts 1987), being able to distinguish and differently use directive questions and non-directive questions (e.g. example questions and experience questions, Spradley 1979); creating a friendly atmosphere (Kanisza 1995), beginning the encounter with some kind of "informal talk" (Labov 1966); being knowledgeable about the topic, gentle and forgiving, providing smooth transitions between the topics, paying attention to the emotional tone, supportively listening and referencing earlier answers (see Tracy 2013: 161), probing by different tactics (see Bernard 2002; Dick 2006; Stylianou 2008) or identifying a good facial expression (Lindlof and Taylor 2011: 205).

Clearly enough, there is long term consensus that the social research interview is a linguistic performance: most of the caveats and the know-how traditionally advanced in methodological literature can be easily explained by a deep awareness of the linguistic dimension of this research tool and by a kind of commitment to the idea that “questions do not spring up in a vacuum: questions are underpinned by matrices of assumptions, possibilities, explanations, arguments and expectations, about what would constitute a reasonable response” (Tracy and Robles 2009: 132). Consequently, mainstream approaches to standardized and qualitative interviews avoid what is still (although often implicitly or ambiguously) perceived as a bias:³ designing the good question is a means to neutralize or at least control the linguistic and interactive features of this form of linguistic performance by knowing (and hopefully avoiding) their effects on the answer. Performing in the right way is, then, the methodological guarantee that the qualitative researcher will gain access to informants’ knowledge or make respondents “disclose their subjective standpoints” (Lindlof and Taylor 2011: 179).

4. Telling in interviews: When and for whom meaning is an interactive achievement?

The typical methodological approaches consistent with this ideational theory of meaning are thematic analysis (Boyatzis 1998, van Maanen 1990, Braun and Clark 2006) and other forms of content analysis (see the analytical procedures suggested by the grounded theory approach, Charmaz 2006) that basically treat the discourse gathered by means of interviews as a mirror of underlying concepts, schemes or other cognitive entities conceived of as “belonging” to speakers, caught by the interview and rendered by the analysis. Examples of research adopting this approach to the discourse of interviews include subject matters as different as : ethnic prejudices (van Dijk 1987), teachers’ cultural models of the foreign child (Caronia 1996), folk models of the mind (D’Andrade 1987), marriage (Quinn 1987) or gender types (Holland and Skinner 1987); beliefs about the source of AIDS (Flaskerud and Rush 1989), perceptions of public policies of media governance by family members

3. As mentioned above, in the last few decades, a relatively restricted community of scholars did pay attention to the unavoidable link between local interaction and data construction in social research methods without conceiving it as a problem to solve. However, their critical remarks and methodological suggestions did not cross the borders of their community nor become mandatory in mainstream social research. I will refer to these works in different loci of this chapter and provide an epistemological explanation of such a relative failure.

(Caronia and Caron 2011), how business executives use e-writing practices to manage impressions (Caron et al. 2013) and parents' ethical decision-making in a neonatal intensive care unit (van Maanen 2014). In many of these studies the goal is a variant on the idea put forward by van Maanen (1990) which holds that qualitative methods serve the purpose of gathering descriptive evidence from which underlying patterns and structures of meaning may be drawn.

The approach to interview discourse used by the above-mentioned (and similar) studies basically consists in coding informants' transcribed talk (line by line or by identifying bigger units of analysis, see Charmaz 2006) according to more or less general and locally identified categories that synthesize the *propositional* content of speaker's talk. Even researches genuinely committed to understanding people's sense-making and copying strategies consider talk as the expression of some deeper cognitive meanings as if it were the primary vehicle of what the researcher is interested in.⁴ Answering more or less open-ended questions) and telling are primarily, if not exclusively, conceived of as ways of shaping and disclosing something speakers have in *their* mind. The interaction (i.e. the interview) is nothing but an occasion that triggers something already there (although some remarkable exceptions occur, see the focus on persuasion and face by van Dijk 1987). The speaker owns (and is accountable for) his or her world of meaning; the researcher owns and is accountable for the instrument to bring it out.

The following examples illustrate what I call the ideational-representational approach to the discourse gathered through interviews.

In order to analyze participants' lived experiences and – particularly – parents' decision-making in neonatal intensive care units, van Maanen (2014) introduces the reader to some relevant background information inferably drawn from the interview-based study (2014: 81). He then quotes a long stretch of informants' talk and draws some inferences that bring the local talk to a more general category-level.⁵

- (1) Sometimes it is the outcome of an investigation that announces the urgency of a decision, such as a head ultrasound showing severe brain injury in an ill infant. Other times, it is the constellation of intensive therapies being utilized

4. See for instance the phenomenological psychological analysis of the lived-experience of participants (Giorgi 2009, van Maanen 2014) or the Interpretive Phenomenological Analysis (Smith, Flowers and Larkin 2009)

5. This example from van Maanen (2014) has been selected not because the approach is unusual nor because there is something wrong or weak in the analysis of data. On the contrary, it is a very sophisticated and clear example of an approach to interview talk, that is extremely diffused although not always sensitive to the nuances of respondents' talk and performed according to qualitative standards as rigorous as those attained by Michael. A. van Maanen in this as other extremely interesting works of his.

in the deteriorating condition of a child that signals a decisional juncture. In such moments, health care professionals may call on parents to consider options – the possibility of a decision. The alternatives may include initiation, limitation, or withdrawal of medical therapies. For parents, the choice is not always seen:

The doctors kept on asking us about withdrawing care. We felt pressured to decide, almost hounded, to take Sam off life-support. It was as if they thought that we did not get it. But we knew that he could be severely disabled, that his chances were so poor. Yet, how could we kill him? How could we have a part in ending his life? We avoided the staff to avoid the discussion. We avoided coming in to see our son, just to avoid being confronted with the predicament of having to face some kind of impossible decision. We just wanted to let him have a chance. If he was to die, he would die on his own. We did not want to take his death away from him.

From the health care professionals' catechizing call, "to take Sam off life-support," and the parents' inability to respond in consideration, "how could we?" we may discern that sometimes an ethical decision is experienced as a choice without choice.

(van Maanen 2014: 282–283)

Note that the informants' words are reported immediately after a preface ('For parents, the choice is not always seen') that frames the subsequent reported speech as if it was an occurrence of a type (not seeing any choice), and the speakers the text refers to as if they were representative of a category of people (parents). This double generalization is extremely interesting and useful in terms of data-making: from an occurrence, inferably yet not explicitly presented as an example of a class of similar events, the analyst has created two types: a category of people (the parents) and a category of lived-experience: "sometimes an ethical decision is experienced as a choice without choice". Note also that the quoted words are selected from what supposedly is the whole interview as if the researcher's words (prompts, questions, yet also backchannel signals, silences, nods) were nothing more than what elicited the quoted ones. The informants' words are presented as forming a coherent, consistent, readable text, reporting what they thought and felt during the moment recounted in the interview as crucial or emblematic with respect to the topic at hand. Of course, the final form given to the speaker's talk could be the original one (we actually do not know), yet it seems to be the outcome of an editing work that purified talk from what generally characterizes it: vagueness, inconsistency, indeterminacy as well as markers signaling the speakers' epistemic stance. In short, three main dimensions of any form of talk-in-interaction are neglected: social organization (i.e. the dialogical nature of talk), indexicality and reflexivity (i.e. "the context-shaped, context renewing nature" of talk, Heritage, 1984a: 242), and the discourse markers signaling how what was said, was said. Informants are depicted as having clear cut, stable and already made "ideas" (e.g. opinions, memories, assessments, etc..) in mind, and merely engaged

in doing one single thing with words: communicating these “ideas”, i.e. informing. What constitutes the data-base (i.e. interview talk) seems to be restricted to the propositional content of the utterances. The following case, analyzed by Wooffitt and Widdicombe (2006) illustrates a similar phenomenon.

In order to enlighten the missing interactional basis of research interview, the authors focus on the analyst’s work on the transcripts and the attribution of content categories to stretches of talk. They report an example of thematic analysis used by Smith and Osborne (2003) who illustrate how to use the interview in understanding the way participants make sense of their personal and social world.

(2) Transcript	Analyst’s analytic notations
1. M. Since it started getting bad, I was always snappy with it but not like this, it’s not who I am it’s just who I am if you know what I mean, it’s not really me, I get like that and I know like, you’re being mean now but I can’t help it. It’s the pain, it’s me, but it is me, me doing it but not me do you understand what I’m saying? If I was to describe myself like you said, I’m a nice person, but the I’m not am I, and there’s other stuff, stuff I haven’t told you, if you knew you’d be disgusted I just get so hateful	Anger and pain Struggle to accept self and identity-unwanted self Lack of control over the self Responsibility, self vs pain Shameful self-struggle with unwanted self fear of judgment
2. Int. When you talk about you and then sometimes not you, what do you mean?	
3. M. I’m not me these days, I am sometimes, I am all right but the I get this mean bit, the hateful bit, that’s not me.	Unwanted self rejected as true self
4. I. What’s that bit? (Smith and Osborne 2003: 68–69, quoted in Wooffitt and Widdicombe 2006: 40)	

As Wooffitt and Widdicombe note, the analyst’s notations in the right column concern only the interviewee’s talk. None of the interviewer’s contributions is given similar analytical attention, as if they were devoid of interest. Given that research questions typically concern *participants’* worlds of meaning and not how these meanings are locally constructed in interaction, this irrelevance is understandable, although not really convincing. The problem with making the interviewer’s turns (analytically) irrelevant is that the analyst treats the interviewee’s turns as if they were independent of the interviewer’s questions and consequent agenda setting. Once the

dialogical chain is “deleted”, not analyzed or otherwise unseen or underestimated (see the right column reporting the analyst’s labels), it is impossible to notice the selection operated by the interviewer (see 2) on the long list of topics raised by the interviewee (see 1). Similarly, it is nearly impossible to appreciate how the interviewee’s subsequent focus (see 3) on what will be considered by the analyst an occurrence of the “unwanted self theme”, is shaped by the interviewer’s immediately preceding turn (see 2).

These as similar analytical procedures have crucial consequences on the fabric of data: the analyst attributes meaning (i.e. the relevant or most frequently recurring themes) to respondents as if these meanings belonged to them and emerged as such in a (relative) social vacuum. Ignoring the interactional root of the respondent’s talk is – therefore – more than an analytical option; it is an epistemic tool: once the architecture of intersubjectivity is analytically deleted it becomes invisible and unnoticeable, and meanings appear as if they were *not* locally constructed in interaction yet belonging to the respondents’ cultural world or idiosyncratic mind.

The cases above are examples of a typical procedure in analyzing talk-in-interview: no room is analytically provided to how the talk is delivered and how it is interactively constituted. Talk is eradicated from the social interaction it arises from – the research interaction – and considered as a mirror of underlying entities: participants’ discourse represents their world of ideas-about-the-world. The clues of the speakers’ underlying (cultural or cognitive) patterns are the lexical choices and syntactic structures that would mirror or index the informants’ world vision. An ideational theory of meaning is coherently linked to a theory of “talk as text” (Hanks 1989).

Despite decades of critical appraisal of the mainstream approaches to the research interview⁶ the vast majority of social science researchers still work according to the assumptions and the program of cognitive approaches to language and meaning systems: “discerning how people construe their world of experience by how they talk about it” (Frake 1969: 29). Talk is seen as a mere epiphenomenon of a shared cultural grammar or – in approaches centered on individuals – as a mirror of their internal states. Approaches to methods in social science research developed ignoring social theory and what language studies and social cognition studies recognized as typical of human interaction and verbal communication in any social occasion: their being context-sensitive dialogically organized ways to constitute actual and remote social worlds. Why – when dealing with language as a tool for doing research – is there an enduring commitment to ignoring what we

6. See among others, the discursive psychological critique of interview talk (Potter and Wetherell 1987; Billig 1987; Edwards 2004; 2006); the conversation analysis critique (Potter and Hepburn 2005, 2012; Wilkinson 2006); critiques from educational and sociolinguistic studies (Caronia 1997; Briggs 1986).

are quite ready to attribute to language use when it is the *object* of inquiry? Why are there all these efforts to neutralize the dialogical structure of research interviewing?

I suggest that ignoring the dialogical construction of the data has two major epistemic implications. First, this vision presupposes and at the same time maintains our belief⁷ in a stable, observable and describable world. Second, cultivating a representation of language use selectively focused on its referential function and neglecting that meaning is a jointly constructed interactional achievement (Dore and McDermott 1982) are functional to preserving the myth of scientific knowledge as a mirror of reality and the hope that with due caution “scientists can safely avoid disfiguring the picture of nature with their own fingerprints” (Gergen and Gergen 1991: 71).

To argue in favor of this thesis, the next section will illustrate what the epistemic consequences are of shifting from a representational-ideational theory to a dialogical-interactional theory of language and meaning when dealing with research interviewing. In the conclusion, I will suggest that resistance to accepting the pragmatic and dialogical nature of interviews allows researchers to avoid what scientific research fears the most: the irrelevance research findings would have if they were a mere byproduct of the research method and context.

5. From a dialogic point of view: Research interview as social interaction

Conceiving interview within an interactional/dialogical perspective on language and meaning implies paying attention to real talk and noticing that – as Moerman had it – “meaning is situated, not abstract; enacted, not embodied; negotiated, not decoded; consequential, not prior, to use” (Moerman 1988: 97). A research interview is not a world apart where nothing happens except eliciting/providing information. During research interviews – as well as in any other social occasion – people do an enormous amount of things beyond describing, referring to, or displaying their world visions: they persuade, orient to agreement, manage their face, establish and maintain their locally relevant identities (i.e. “the informant”, the “researcher”, see Caronia 1997; Tracy and Robles 2009) and constantly engage in epistemic as well as affective stance-taking toward what they are talking about. These activities are undertaken, visible and analyzable mostly on the interactive and turn design levels and therefore they would unlikely be taken into account by analytical approaches focused on the propositional content of speech. As illustrated before, they are rarely coded and analytically crossed with the propositional content of the informants’ utterances. Notwithstanding, these activities frame what the informants are delivering as “data” and radically impact on the substance of what they tell. Rethinking

7. Pragmatics strongly undermines this belief and – focusing on the constitutiveness of contingencies in language use – claims for the “end of certainty” (Toulmin 2001, quoted in Weigand 2010: 4).

the interview as a social interaction basically implies conceiving and analyzing the interview from both a pragmatic perspective (i.e. what people do by telling what they tell) and a dialogical one, i.e., how “what is told” is inherently and unavoidably locally crafted as an interactive, sequentially organized achievement. The following examples illustrate the epistemic consequences of analyzing interview talk within a dialogic theory of language and communication. The excerpts belong to a corpus of qualitative in-depth interviews conducted with a sample of Italian preprimary schoolteachers. They were aimed to understand how Italian preprimary schools coped with the presence of foreign children, what changes – if any – occurred in the management of school activities and communication with families.

6. The question – answer game⁸

The following excerpt illustrates the primary – although often neglected – dialogical device of research interviewing: the question-answer adjacency pair (Tracy and Robles 2009). The interviewer is a researcher (Res) while the interviewee is a teacher (Tea).

(3) [CaroCC130]

- 1 Res sei bambini avete. senti, quelli della tua sezione di che nazionalità sono?
six children you have. listen, those in your classroom what are their nationalities?
- 2 Tea sono due egiziani, una bimba egiziana, un bimbo egiziano, un bimbo tunisino
they are two egyptians, an egyptian girl, a egyptian boy, a tunisian boy
- 3 Res come hanno reagito i bambini italiani alla presenza di questi compagni?
how did the Italian children react to the presence of these classmates?
- 4 hai visto qualche=
did you see any=
- 5 Tea = ma guarda: ti dico: (.) proprio fisicamente non si nota perchè
=well loo:k I te:ll you (.) really physically you don't notice because
- 6 sono tutti molto chiari di pelle abbiamo di più: (.) un bambino che è
they are all very light-skinned we have mo:re (.) a boy who has
- 7 stato adotatto, dello Sri Lanka, ecco cominciano
been adopted, from Sri Lanka, so they're starting
- 8 adesso a notare queste differenze
now to notice these differences

8. The title clearly quotes and refers to Edda Weigand's mixed-game metaphor (Weigand 2010)

In 1, the interviewer starts by repeating what the interviewee has just said when answering the previous question where the interviewer asked for the number of foreign children attending the school (not transcribed): the total number of foreign children attending the school is six. The interviewer goes on asking for the nationality of those attending the speaker's classroom. The question establishes the "nationality" as the membership categorization device (Sacks 1972) for identifying the foreign children they are talking and will talk about. So, when the interviewer asks how Italian children reacted to the presence of "these classmates", he is anaphorically referring to the classmates having a foreign nationality. Yet the referential meaning of "these children" appears to be negotiable. In the answer provided in 5, the interviewee proposes a local interpretation of the question: the Italian children's reactions to the presence of children of diverse nationalities are interpreted as, and limited to, reactions to their skin color. There is no particular reaction because "physically you don't notice" (line 5) and "they are very light-skinned" (line 6). She then continues with a designed-as-hesitating elliptical component ("we have mo:re (.), line 6) that introduces a new topic and marks a difference with what she has just said, i.e. there wasn't any particular reaction because the foreign children are very light-skinned. She then makes the case of an adopted child from Sri Lanka (who, according to the Italian law is *not* a foreign child) and – by using the discourse marker "so" (the Italian adverb *ecco*) – she juxtaposes the two components of her turn: the adopted child from Sri Lanka and the Italian children starting to notice "these" differences (lines 7–8). Leaving the audience the burden of filling in the unsaid, she implies that *in this case* the Italian children are starting to react to these differences where "these" refer to the already mentioned somatic differences. Without saying it explicitly, the teacher is pointing to "colourism" as a relevant issue to analyze when talking about "foreign" children in the classroom. However, this shift does not occur in a vacuum: the researcher's question has just introduced the category of "Italian children" and the subtopic of their reactions towards "these" classmates, i.e. the foreign children. Although the speaker may be held accountable for interpreting the interviewer's contribution in terms of "reaction to somatic difference"; nonetheless, the interviewer's question contributed to fixing the topic (the reaction) and in establishing two categories for organizing the subsequent talk: the "Italian children" (reacting) and "the children of different nationalities" (reacted to).

Can we presume that the relevance of "colourism" was in the mind of the respondent before and independently of the interviewer's question? Can we infer that this is part of the respondent's subjective world of meaning just disclosed by the interviewer's prompt? We simply do not know. What we know in an observable and analyzable way is that the question-answer device produces a joint, moment-by-moment

construction of *what counts as a 'foreign child' to talk about*: the criterion of nationality raised by the interviewer in 1 is gradually transformed by the respondent into the somatic differences criterion (lines 5–8) through the mediation of the interviewer's focus on Italian children's reactions (lines 3–4).

7. Post hoc ergo propter hoc: Contradictions or context shaped contributions?

In a traditional approach to interview talk one of the recurrent problems for the analyst is dealing with informants' "contradictions" (Potter and Wetherell 1987): utterances or bigger stretches of talk whose propositional content is not consistent. It could be two different versions of the same event occurring in different moments of the interview or ways of talking about the topic at hand that convey opposite meanings, ideas, opinions or interpretation. The analyst often has to resolve this contradiction and establish which stretch of talk is the most representative of the interviewee's thought. In the most sophisticated cases, the analyst does this by establishing the more relevant or recurring meaning (vs. deviant or less recurrent occurrences). The problem with such an "editing" approach is twofold: first the alleged complexity of the informant's system of meaning is reduced and made internally coherent according to the interviewer's system of analysis and second, the contributions are perceived as contradictory because they are fixed in an asynchronous, flat and monological text: the one crafted by the analysis itself.

The following excerpt from another interview illustrates a typical case of "contradiction" in informant's talk.

(4) [caroif1996]

- 1 Res e voi? quanti bambini stranieri
and what about you? how many foreign children
- 2 ci sono nella tua sezione?
are there in your class?
- 3 Tea due
two
- 4 Res due e quanti anni hanno?
two and how old are they?
- 5 Tea e::hm tre anni, tutti e due
- 6 *we:ll three years old, both*
- 7 Res tre anni e di che nazionalità sono?
three years old and what is their nationality?

- 8 Tea bei:nh , Moussa è un bambino del Marocco
we:ll, Moussa is a child from Morocco
 e:: Valerio ↓invece (0.5) ↑suo padre
a::nd Valerio ↓instead (0.5) ↑his father
- 9 è filippino, sua madre è italiana
is filipino, his mother is italian,
- 10 comunque: cioè come dire lui:: ↑ lui sembra. assomiglia
anywa:y well I mean he:: ↑he seems. he looks
- 11 moltissimo a suo padre dunque:: è filippino.
exactly like his father so:: he is filipino
- 12 Res *uhm uhm*
 [...]
- 13 Res avete cambiato qualcosa nelle vostre attività didattiche
did you change something in your didactic activities
- 14 data la presenza di questi bambini stranieri
given the presence of these foreign children?
- 15 Tea dunque: ma:: direi che:: entrambi vivono qui dalla nascita
so: we:ll I would say tha::t both have lived here since their birth ,
- 16 hanno sempre frequentato le scuole di Reggio, sono sempre
they have always attended Reggio schools, they have always
- 17 stati tra bambini di Reggio, l'altro
been with children from Reggio, the other one,
- 18 quello con il padre filippino sua madre è italiana
the one whose father is filipino his mother is italian
- 19 dunque lui lo considero quasi: , totalmente italiano dire
so he: : I consider him almo::st, totally italian I would say.

The same child categorized as Filipino because of his physiognomy, during the flow of the discourse becomes “completely Italian”: his categorization changes and the analyst has to deal with a contradiction in the informant’s talk and system of categorization of children as “foreign children”. If we adopt a sequential approach to meaning, this contradiction is easily explained: the teacher’s contributions (lines 10–11 and 18–19) are shaped by different questions (lines 1 and 13) that create different, yet conditionally relevant, contexts. In the discursive context established by a question aimed at remembering the number and the nationality of the foreign children attending the school, this child is categorized as Filipino because of his somatic traits. In the discursive context established by the question concerning the possible changes made in the didactic activities to cope with the foreign pupils attending the school, the teacher changes this categorization: from “Filipino” the child becomes “almo::st totally Italian”.⁹

9. Although the latter categorization corresponds to the legal status of any child born from an Italian parent, it is not this dimension that the teacher points to in this component of her

What is the teacher doing through this “contradiction”? And what kind of information about the “world out there” or her ways to interpret it, can the researcher gather?

By mentioning the immersion of the children in an Italian socio-cultural context from their birth and by adding the fact that the mother of the Filipino-looking child is Italian, the teacher is projecting and – at the same time justifying – the fact that they did not change any didactic activities. When talking with an expert (the interviewer was an Italian *pedagogista*) and within the contemporary pedagogical mainstream discourse on intercultural education as a subtype of special needs education, their school policy – not changing anything – needs to be justified. Interestingly enough, this justification is not constructed upon a different pedagogical theory but on the construction of these children as Italian from a sociocultural point of view.

A question arises as to the kind of information the researcher gathers through this apparently contradictory discourse: is this child perceived (and treated) as Filipino or as Italian? Is he discursively referred to as “Italian” just to locally justify a didactic practice or because he is – legally speaking – an Italian citizen? What alternative corresponds to what she thinks in the “world out there”, i.e. the world of practices the interview is about and the research aims to describe? What is in the teacher’s mind? Unfortunately, we do not know. Any attempt to simplify informant’s talk to find out what the informant stably thinks in a world out there (i.e. out of the specific dialogical interaction), her context-independent clear-cut ideas on which pupils are foreign and why, would be misleading. Note also that the informant provides more than a few cues that index the uncertain nature of her categorization: lexical mitigations and hesitation (“anywa:y”; “how to say”; “I mean he:.”; lines 10 and 11; “so:: we:ll I would say tha:t”; line 15; “so he:: almost”; “I would say”, line 19) display her epistemic stance toward the propositional content of her utterances. If we pay attention to the “small talk” surrounding the “information” we are bound to notice – as the participants do – that although the answers are delivered in the form of declarative statements they shouldn’t be treated as such: hedges and mitigations frame the statements as provisory, uncertain, locally crafted versions of what the questions are about.

What we know and discover by analyzing the sequential dimension of interview talk as well as how talk is designed and delivered, is the locally emergent nature of “content”. In this case, we can appreciate the speaker’s different ways of considering (some) children. These ways can be regarded as constituting – at least here and now – part of the speaker’s interpretive repertoire (Potter and Wetherell 1987): were they already in the mind of the speaker or are they locally constructed as responsive to the interviewer’s question? This is exactly what we do not know and

contribution. In a discursive environment where she underlines that these children have been living in an Italian socio-cultural context, the reference to the Italian mother points to the socio-cultural as well as linguistic dimensions of his development.

perhaps this is exactly what we should no longer look for. Since there is no reliable way to purify interview talk from its pragmatic and dialogical properties (Kvale and Brinkmann 1996; Caronia 1997, 2014; Silvermann 2006; Speer 2002), data are unavoidably contingent.

Clearly enough, this epistemic claim raises a problem concerning the nature of the data (i.e. the information we gather) and the kind of scientific account of reality we can build upon such data. I will come back to this issue in the conclusions.

8. Meaning and the dialogical organization of talk: Rethinking the researcher's effect

Focusing on a micro detail occurring during a sequence of storytelling (i.e. a negotiation concerning the length of the events recalled by the interviewee) in the following case I illustrate how in research interviewing (just as in any other occasion of language use), meaning is jointly accomplished one interaction at a time.

The excerpt comes from an in-depth interview with a preprimary schoolteacher who has been telling the story of the arrival of Cristina, a Chinese immigrant child who didn't speak or understand a single word of Italian (on the roles of storytelling in research interviews, see Mishler 1986; Caronia 1997). The story occurs as a reply to the following interviewer's question.

(5) [CaroCC243-247]

22 Res: si=si lo so=questo e invece un aspetto che ci interessa abbastanza, ya=ya *I know=that and instead something that we are quite interested in*

l'inserimento, no? di questi bambini che no::n che non parlano the inclusion, right? of these children who do::nt who don't speak l'italiano cosi, voi che avete fatto di concreto? Italian, so, you what have you done concretely?

23 Teach. ah, abbiám fatto: un po' alla bell'è meglio eh! intanto *well, we have do:ne, we did what we could eh! first con i genitori non ci si capiva tanto with the parents we didn't understand each other really loro l'italiano::: la mamma qualche parola, il papà proprio niente.*

they Italia:::n the mother a few words, the father, nothing at all

After providing the answer to the question and the setting phase of the incipient story (turn 23), the teacher goes on describing in detail Cristina's arrival and her first few days at school that are depicted as dramatic: the parents are said to have left the little girl in the morning, coming back at the end of the day without apparently

doing anything to moderate the impact of this situation on their daughter and ignoring the teachers' requests to come back early in the day to take their daughter home. The girl is described as crying desperately all day long, the first, the second and even the third day, without eating or even accepting anything to drink from the teachers and falling asleep, exhausted from crying all day. The third day, she is described as crying less, but continuing to avoid sitting with the other children, not approaching anybody and refusing to eat. Little by little, the storyteller eases the dramatic tension of the story, and Cristina is depicted as starting to eat some pieces of bread in secret, then as starting to play alone with some objects, looking at the other children from a distance and replying with a shy smile when the teachers admire her nice dress. After some days, she is described as starting to smile when she arrives in the morning (until turn 69, not transcribed).

Without going into the details of how the story is told and how its occurrence is a collaborative accomplishment (i.e. the interview makes it relevant by asking for an account of "concrete actions", the respondent selects this particular story from all the possible stories, as an answer to this question), we focus on what comes next, starting from turn 70.

(6) [CaroCC260]

70 Res questo dopo quanto, ha cominciato ad essere così un po' inserita, anche così

this after how long, did she start settling in like that, even like that

71 Tea ma: in questa maniera: anche dopo un mese: così

but: in this way: even after one month like that

72 Res ah, però [quindi per un mese invece niente

oh: wow, [so for one month instead nothing

73 Tea [quindici giorni=un mese

[fifteen days=one month

(.)

74 Tea quindici giorni, ha cominciato col sorriso che prima stava sempre

fifteen days, she started smiling whereas before she was always

tutta così e::h! con quella faccia triste, un po' chiusa un po' arrabbiata

completely that way e::! with that sad face, a little reserved a little angry

70 is a typical "third turn", a crucial although underestimated and under-analyzed sequential component of the interview, where the interviewer accomplishes interactional work whatever he replies in this structurally provided locus (silence included, see Heritage 1985a). In this case, the interviewer uses a deictic to point to what the teacher has just described (the first cues of well-being by the little girl) and asks when this happens. Tying her utterance to the previous one with a variation of the

deictic (“like that” turn 70; “in this way”, turn 71), the teacher answers the question providing a specific lapse of time: “even after one month” (71). Some paralinguistic cues and lexical mitigations (marks of hesitation, “bu::t”, and approximation “like that”) signal a certain degree of uncertainty, as if the teacher is evaluating right here right now how much time it took for the girl to feel reasonably well at school. In the subsequent turn, the interviewer formulates (Heritage 1985; Heritage and Watson 1980) what the teacher has just said and proposes his own understanding of the information: “oh: wow, so for one month instead nothing”. Through this formulation, the interviewer accomplishes more than a few activities. By prefacing it with a marker of surprise (“oh wow”, on “Oh” as a change-of-status token see Heritage 1984b) and adding a consecutive “so” followed by a contrastive marker (“instead”), he: a) assesses the lapse of time as being inappropriate (one month is implicitly assessed as a markedly long lapse of time where the child “instead” didn’t provide any cues of well-being) and b), invites the interviewee to check the information. The interviewee treats the interviewer’s formulation as an other-initiated repair (Schegloff, Jefferson, and Sacks 1977) and goes on rethinking the temporal version of the events. She replies with a self-repair: one month becomes “fifteen days=one month” and then, after a pause, definitively “fifteen days”.

Of course, it would be easy to invoke the researcher’s effect or even a bias introduced in 72 by the evaluative component that prefates the formulation (wow). In this case, we could advance a face issue and interpret the interviewee’s self-completed repair as a means to conform to the socially expected answer. In this specific social occasion, the social discourse and expectancies are embodied by the interviewer treating the interviewee’s reply as problematic: one month of discomfort is too much for a child attending a preprimary school, a context expected to be very sensitive and able to cope with children’s separation anxiety. Yet even in this case, what we appreciate is that the interviewer himself has been channeled toward this evaluative reply by the interviewee who displayed uncertainty or doubts as to her – locally produced – temporal estimation. Had the interviewer ratified the “one month” version with a simple acknowledgment token followed by a totally new question, would this version have been maintained or still self-repaired by the informant? And if she had maintained the “one-month version”, would it correspond to the historical reality the story is supposed to tell, or would it be a locally crafted answer valid within the “world of the interview”? We simply do not know. What we know is that participants dialogically co-construct “fifteen days” as the appropriate version of the length of the events in the story. They both participate in such a local crafting and they are both responsible for (and should be held accountable for) this data. In the traditional approach, the fact that this answer is context-shaped and jointly crafted would be conceived of as the result of a bias to avoid, or a symptom of an invalid answer to discard. From a dialogical point of view,

this answer is what any answer is: appropriate to and constitutive of both the proximal context (i.e. the preceding and following turns of talk, see Heritage, 1984a) and the distal context (i.e. the research situation, the participant's professional identities at play, the known social discourses on the topic at hand), understandable within them and jointly produced as the locally shared version of the events. In interview as in any other dialogic interaction: "utterances are designed to tie with, or 'fit' to, prior utterances [...] and an utterance has significant implications for what kinds of utterances should come next" (Wooffitt 2001: 54). Understandably enough, researchers committed to producing substantive knowledge on socially relevant phenomena such as the integration of immigrant children in schools resist this view of discursive data as reflexive (i.e. produced by the tools used to discover them), indexical (i.e. interpretable only within the context of their production) and dialogically organized.

9. The dialogical nature of research interviewing: The epistemological consequences of a neglected dimension

It is now forty years since studies in language and interaction as well as research in social cognition abandoned a cognitive approach to talk and thought in favor of a discursive, interactional perspective aimed to understanding how people construct the sense of what is going on, locally shared versions of what they are talking about, their identities as well as the crucial dimensions of the world they live in. Since then, the use of language has been conceived of as an interactive phenomenon: any individual contribution, even those apparently monological (e.g. sermons, public speech) is conceived of as profoundly responsive to and co-authored by different voices (Baxter 2011; Linell 1998; Weigand 2009; Duranti and Brenneis 1986). Consequently, the analysis changed its main focus from the individual (talk, behavior, mind, thoughts, remembering, arguing) to units of interaction: individual contributions are considered to be dependent on what participants say and do (with words as well as other communication modalities) moment by moment. Another idea has gained consensus over the last few decades: language is never exclusively referential; rather it is a socially organized performative tool used to create and negotiate meaning. Social organization is not a collateral characteristic of talk, having no influence on its semantic and pragmatic dimensions; rather, it "can also (and thereby) affect the substance of what gets talked about" (Schegloff 1987: 225). In this view, knowledge and meanings are not conceivable as lodged in peoples' mind, waiting to be transferred (through dialogues) from one individual to another. Rather they are located, distributed and reflexively mediated by the semiotic artifacts used by interactants (Wertsch 1985; Resnick, Levine, and Teasley 1991).

As mentioned above and despite the growing acceptance of such a theoretical advance in social sciences, this view of language and dialogue never really affected the use of interviews as a ‘transparent “window” on underlying cognitive processes’ (Wilkinson and Kitzinger 2000: 809) or “on social reality” (Mondada 2009).¹⁰ Although tricky, this schizophrenic theoretical framing of language use is far from being inexplicable.

Commonsense ideas about scientific research as well as classical epistemology call for valid and reliable data: scientific findings should correspond to or index the phenomenon the research is about (validity issue), should be independent from the circumstances of their gathering and reproducible by different researchers (reliability issue). As we illustrated in analyzing Excerpts 3, 4, 5 and 6, extending an interactional theory of meaning and a dialogical theory of language to the meaning and language respectively produced through and used by scientific research radically undermines these two pillars of modern science. If we accept that language use in research interviewing is not immune from the characteristics recognized to language use in any social contexts (see above), there is no means to preserve the validity-and-reliability requirement. Any attempt to do this results in a further

10. David Silverman insists on the advantage of taking into account the dialogic nature of research interviews, showing the difference between analyzing “instances or sequences” and suggests taking analytical perspectives able to combine “depth and breadth” (Silvermann 2007: 64). I fear that; it would be difficult to take an analytical perspective which does not sacrifice the complexity of the dialogical interaction used to produce data, without reducing the analysis to the mere social organization of interview. Furthermore, I suspect that combining “mapping the wood” and ‘chopping up trees’ (Silvermann 2007: 63) is less a technical problem (solvable by merging different analytical procedures) and more an epistemological dilemma: either we accept that meaning is a context-sensitive practical accomplishment by interactants or we don’t. In the first case we accept that discourse is more easily tied to the context of the interview than to the context of the situation/event the interview is about (see Briggs 1986; Agar and Hobbs 1982). In the second case, we assume that the discourse we gather through interviews represents, stands for or mirrors ideas, opinions, cultural models or simply facts that basically belong to the speaker’s world. We select and quote what we consider representative instances of it. In a few words, these different analytical approaches differ not (only) because they produce different data (maps of wood vs. chopped trees) but moreover, because they are consistent with and index two very different and conflicting epistemologies and related theories about language and reality. As a third option, we can assume – without being able to demonstrate it in any possible way – that talk in interaction is *also* a referential vehicle of ideas, opinions, attitudes concerning the world “out there” and already part of the respondents’ mind-set. In this case, either we work to separate as much as possible discourse from its interactional roots, to purify data from the marks of its dialogical origin and to treat data as an index of the world out there the research is about, or we resign ourselves to accepting that our data are nothing more than “shadows on a wall” (Duranti 2006). In some sense this third option is nothing more than a compromise that conceals the epistemological dilemma rather than solving it.

claim in favor of the specificity of social sciences with respect to natural sciences and in different criteria to assess validity and reliability. Yet claiming a specificity of social sciences does not solve the core issue raised by dialogism: the contingent, mutually constructed quality of the discursive data we gather and therefore the partial, provisory and circumstantial nature of the knowledge we gain from them.

Within an interactional theory of meaning and a dialogical theory of language there is no means to know if data correspond to or are an index of what the research is about and/or “just” locally crafted (see Example 3); there is no means to know if they are contingently shaped by the circumstances (see Example 4 and 5), jointly negotiated with the researcher “right here right now” (Example 6) and/or if they would be consistent across different circumstances. In short, applying what we are ready to admit for language as an object of our research to the language we use as a research tool, implies accepting data indexicality and reflexivity and forgoing data validity and reliability as normatively defined and usually excepted.

The so-called postmodernist program in social science radically adopted this venue: basically it foregoes differentiating between scientific methods and ethnomethods, between evidence and opinion, folk beliefs and scientific analysis: science is nothing more than another social practice where some versions of reality are locally negotiated as appropriated (for a strong critique to postmodern methodological proposals and theoretical assumptions see Silvermann 2007). In claiming that meaning is constructed dialogically when doing research, postmodern and constructionist approaches undoubtedly created a problem of relevance: who might be interested in those fuzzy pictures that capture the provisory and situated nature of the knowledge locally produced in and through research interviews? What is the relevance of scientific understanding if we cannot distinguish it from everyday understanding? A part from those who are interested in the process as such (e.g. ethnomethodologists, conversationalists, scholars of dialogue as a phenomenon *per se*), who might be interested in research data if meaning and even referentiality were interview-dependent dialogical achievements? Those interested in gaining scientific substantive knowledge of the phenomena the interviews are about should accept the ephemeral dialogic construction of this knowledge, its being provisory and – first and foremost – contingently dependent on the research circumstances. Understandably enough, this relativist outcome is something social researchers, stakeholders, citizens, decision-makers, and moreover, funding agencies are not necessarily ready to accept. As society, we still wish to cultivate the illusion that scientific knowledge differs from the *doxa*, that scientific data are a reasonably good and trustable representation of the phenomena the research is about, that folk beliefs – although having “honorable status [...] are not the same intellectual object as a scientific analysis” (Moerman 1974: 55, quoted in Silverman 2006: 6).

I suggest that the relatively low impact of dialogical theories of language and meaning in mainstream ways to conduct social research and analyze research data, stems from their being not consistent with the ever enduring positivistic epistemology of most social science researchers and with what laypersons still expect from any scientific account of reality: its being a generalized or generalizable model of reality which implements our understanding of it and can be used as a solid premise for planning actions *for* such a reality. In a few words, the positivistic belief in a stable, observable and describable world “out there” provides the foundations for our shared trust in scientific knowledge and even when this belief is officially rejected, it still characterizes folk theories of communication and reality. Accepting and applying a dialogical theory of language use to talk in interviews (or surveys and any other linguistic based research tool) would therefore entail a substantial change in what we expect scientific knowledge to be.

It is not surprising that even researchers genuinely committed to an interactional view of communication and meaning-making often display their profound attachment to a very different (folk) theory of language and meaning when dealing with the tools of their inquiry. In this case, it is as if they shifted to the ideational-representational theory they dismissed decades ago as a valid theoretical framework to make sense of language, interaction and culture construction. As Charles Briggs said, “both our unquestioned faith in the interview and our reluctance to adopt a more sophisticated means of analyzing its findings emerge from the fact that the interview encapsulates our own native theories of communication and reality” (Briggs 1986: 3). A change in theorizing from reductionism to holism (Weigand 2011) may be a way to cope with the fact that ‘living with uncertainty’ (Toulmin 2001) is not a problem to resolve but rather the distinctive feature of the life-world where we live as human beings, and social scientists as well.

References

- Agar, Michael and Jerry R. Hold. 1982. “Interpreting Discourse: Coherence and the Analysis of Ethnographic Interviews.” *Discourse Processes* 5(1): 1–32. doi:10.1080/01638538209544529
- Alvesson, Mats. 2011. *Interpreting Interviews*. London: Sage.
- Bazzanella, Carla. 2002. *Sul dialogo* [On Dialogue]. Milano: Guerini.
- Bailey, Kenneth D. 1978. *Methods of Social Research*. New York: Free Press.
- Baxter, Leslie. 2011. *Voicing Relationships: A Dialogic Perspective*. London: Sage.
- Benney, Mark and Everett C. Hughes. 1970. “Of Sociology and Interview.” In *Sociological Methods*, ed. by Norman K. Denzin, 190–198. Chicago: Aldine.
- Berger, Peter L. and Thomas Luckmann. 1966. *The Social Construction of Reality*. New York: Penguin Books.
- Bernard, Russel H. 2002. *Research Methods in Anthropology. Qualitative and Quantitative Approaches*, 3rd edition. Walnut Creek, CA: Altamira.

- Billig, Michael. 1987. *Arguing and Thinking: A Rhetorical Approach to Social Psychology*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Boyatzis, Richard E. 1998. *Transforming Qualitative Information: Thematic Analysis and Code Development*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
- Braun, Virginia and Victoria Clarke. 2006. "Using Thematic Analysis in Psychology." *Qualitative Research in Psychology* 3 (2): 77–101. doi:10.1191/1478088706qpo630a
- Briggs, Charles. 1986. *Learning How to Ask. A Sociolinguistic Appraisal of the Role of Interview in Social Science Research*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. doi:10.1017/CBO9781139165990
- Brenner, Michael. 1981. "Aspects of Conversational Structure in the Research Interview." In *Conversation and Discourse: Structure and Interpretation*, ed. by Paul Werth, 19–40. London: Croom Helm.
- Brenner, Michael. 1982. "Response Effects of the 'Role-Restricted' Characteristics of the Interviewer." In *Response Behaviour in the Survey Interview*, ed. by Wil Dijkstra and Johannes Van der Zouwen, 131–165. New York: New York Academic Press.
- Caron, André H. and Letizia Caronia. 2007. *Moving Culture. Mobile Communication in Everyday Life*. Montreal: McGill-Queens.
- Caron, André H., Jennie M. Hwang, Boris H. J. M. Brummans, and Letizia Caronia. 2013. "Business Writing on the Go: How Executives Manage Impressions Through E-mail Communication in Everyday Work Life." *Corporate Communication: An International Journal* 18(1): 8–25. doi:10.1108/13563281311294100
- Caronia, Letizia. 1996. "Chi è il bambino straniero? Educazione e costruzione sociale dell'eticità" [Who is the Foreign Child? Education and the Social Construction of Ethnicity]. In *Incontri di Infanzia. I bambini dell'immigrazione nei servizi educativi* [Childhoods' Meetings. Immigrated Children in Educational Contexts] ed. by Graziella Favaro and Antonio Genovese, 44–67. Bologna: Clueb.
- Caronia, Letizia. 1997. *Costruire la Conoscenza. Interazione e Interpretazione nella Ricerca sul Campo in Educazione* [Constructing Knowledge. Interaction and Interpretation in Educational Field Research]. Firenze: la Nuova Italia.
- Caronia, Letizia. 2014. "The Fabric of Certainty: Ignoring Interactional Details as an Epistemic Resource in Research Interviews." In *Communicating Certainty and Uncertainty in Medical, Supportive and Scientific Contexts*, ed. by Andrzej Zuczkowski et al., 249 – 271. Amsterdam/Philadelphia: John Benjamins.
- Caronia, Letizia and André H. Caron. 2011. "Family Morality and Cultural Identity in Parents' Use of the Quebec Movie Rating System." *Journal of Children and Media* 5(1): 20–36. doi:10.1080/17482798.2011.533485
- Clark, Herbert H. 1996. *Using Language*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. doi:10.1017/CBO9780511620539
- Clifford, James and George E. Marcus. 1986. *Writing Culture: The Poetics and Politics of Ethnography*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Charmaz, Kathy. 2006. *Constructing Grounded Theory. A Practical Guide Through Qualitative Analysis*. London: Sage.
- Cooren, François. 2010. *Action and Agency in Dialogue: Passion, Incarnation and Ventriloquism*. Amsterdam/Philadelphia: John Benjamins. doi:10.1075/d5.6
- Corsaro, William. 1985. *Friendship and Peer Culture in the Early Years*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
- D'Andrade, Roy. 1987. "A Folk Model of the Mind." In *Cultural Models in Language and Thought*, ed. by Dorothy Holland and Naomi Quinn, 112–147. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. doi:10.1017/CBO9780511607660.006

- Dick, Hilary Parsons. 2006. "What to do with 'I don't know': Elicitation in Ethnographic and Survey Interviews." *Qualitative Sociology* 29: 87–102 doi:10.1007/s11133-005-9008-3
- Dore, John and Robert McDermot. 1982. "Linguistic Indeterminacy and Social Context in Utterance Interpretation." *Language* 58: 374–398. doi:10.1353/lan.1982.0004
- Drew, Paul. 2006. "When Documents Speak: Documents, Language and Interaction." In *Talk and Interaction in Social Research Methods*, ed. by Paul Drew, Geoffrey Raymond, and Darin Weinberg, 63–80. London/Thousand Oaks/New Delhi: Sage. doi:10.4135/9781849209991.n5
- Drew, Paul and John Heritage (ed.). 1992. *Talk at Work: Interaction in Institutional Settings*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Drew, Paul, Geoffrey Raymond, and Darin Weinberg. 2006. *Talk and Interaction in Social Research Methods*. London/Thousand Oaks/New Delhi: Sage.
- Duranti, Alessandro. 1994. *From Grammar to Politics: Linguistic Anthropology in a Samoan Village*. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press.
- Duranti, Alessandro. 2006. "Transcripts, Like Shadows on a Wall." *Mind, Culture and Activity* 13(4): 301–310. doi:10.1207/s15327884mca1304_3
- Duranti, Alessandro and Donald Brenneis. 1986. "The Audience as Co-Author." *Text* 6(3): 239–247. doi:10.1515/text.1.1986.6.3.239
- Duranti, Alessandro and Charles Goodwin. 1992. *Rethinking Context. Language as an Interactive Phenomenon*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Eco, Umberto. 1979. *Lector in Fabula*. Milano: Milano Bompiani.
- Edwards, Derek. 2004. "Analyzing Racial Discourse: The Discursive Psychology of Mind-World Relationships." In *Analyzing Race Talk: Multidisciplinary Approaches to the Research Interview*, ed. by Harry van den Berg, Margaret Wetherell and Hanneke Houtkoop-Steenstra, 31–48. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. doi:10.1017/CBO9780511489792.004
- Edwards, Derek. 2006. "Discourse, cognition and social practices: the rich surface of language and social interaction." *Discourse Studies* 8(1): 41–49.
- Fasulo, Alessandra and Cristina Zuccheromaglio. 2008. "Narratives in the Workplace: Facts, Fiction and Canonicity." *Text and Talk* 28(3): 351–376. doi:10.1515/TEXT.2008.017
- Flaskerud, Jacquelyn H. and Cecilia E. Rush. 1989. "AIDS and Traditional Health Beliefs and Practices of Black Women." *Nursing Research* 38(4): 210–215. doi:10.1097/00006199-198907000-00005
- Frake, Charles O. 1969. "The Ethnographic Study of Cognitive Systems." In *Readings in the Sociology of Language*, ed. by Joshua A. Fishman, 434–446. The Hague: Mouton.
- Freed, Alice F. and Susan Ehrlich (ed.). 2010. *Why do you Ask. The Function of Questions in Institutional Discourse*, 87–107. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Gergen, Kenneth and Mary H. Gergen. 1991. "From Theory to Reflexivity in Research Practice." In *Method and Reflexivity: Knowing as Systemic Social Construction*, ed. by Frederick Steier, 76–95. London: Sage.
- Giorgi, Amedeo. 2009. *The Descriptive Phenomenological Method in Psychology: A Modified Husserlian Approach*. Pittsburg, PA: Duquesne
- Goodenough, Ward H. 1957. "Cultural Anthropology and Linguistics." In *Report of the Seventh Annual Round Table Meeting on Linguistics and Language Study*, ed. by Paul L. Garvin, 167–173. Washington, D.C: Georgetown University.
- Goodwin, Marjorie H. 1991. *He-said-she-Said: Talk as Social Organization among Black Children*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
- Halliday, Michael. 1973. *Explorations in the Functions of Language*. London: Edward Arnold.
- Halliday, Michael. 1976. "Anti-languages." *American Anthropologist* 78: 570–584. doi:10.1525/aa.1976.78.3.02a00050

- Heritage, John. 1984a. *Garfinkel and Ethnomethodology*. Oxford: Polity.
- Heritage, John. 1984b. "A Change-of-State Token and Aspects of Its Sequential Placement." In *Structures of Social Action*, ed. by J. Maxwell Atkinson and John Heritage, 299–345. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Heritage, John. 1985. "Analysing News Interviews: Aspects of the Production of talk for an Overhearing Audience." In *Handbook of Discourse Analysis*. Vol.3: Discourse and Dialogue, ed. by Teun A. van Dijk, 95–117. London: Academic Press.
- Heritage, John. 2010. "A Galilean Moment in Social Theory? Language, Culture and Their Emergent Properties." *Qualitative Sociology* 34: 263–270. doi:10.1007/s11133-010-9180-y
- Heritage, John. 2012. "Epistemics in Action: Action Formation and Territories of Knowledge." *Research on Language & Social Interaction*, 45 (1): 1–29. doi:10.1080/08351813.2012.646684
- Heritage, John and Douglas W. Maynard. 2006. *Communication in Medical Care. Interaction between Primary Care Physicians and Patients*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. doi:10.1017/CBO9780511607172
- Heritage, John and Rod Watson. 1980. "Aspects of the Properties of Formulations in Natural Occurring Conversations: Some Instances Analysed." *Semiotica* 30: 245–262. doi:10.1515/semi.1980.30.3-4.245
- Holland, Dorothy and Naomi Quinn (ed.). 1987. In *Cultural Models in Language and Thought*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. doi:10.1017/CBO9780511607660
- Holland, Dorothy and Skinner Debra. 1987. "Prestige and Intimacy: The Cultural Models Behind Americans' Talk about Gender Types." *Cultural Models in Language and Thought*, ed. by Dorothy Holland and Naomi Quinn, 78–111. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. doi:10.1017/CBO9780511607660.005
- Houtkoop-Steenstra, Hanneke. 2000. *Interaction and the Standardized Survey Interview: The Living Questionnaire*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. doi:10.1017/CBO9780511489457
- Hyman, Herbert H. and William J. Cobb. 1975. *Interviewing in Social Research*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Jacquemet, Marco. 1996. *Credibility in Court. Communicative Practices in the Camorra Trials*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Kanisza, Silvia. 1995. "L'intervista nella ricerca educativa [The Interview in Educational research]." In *La ricerca sul campo in educazione. I metodi qualitativi [Educational Field Research. Qualitative Methods]*, ed. by Susanna Mantovani, 35–81. Milano: Bruno Mondadori.
- Keesing, Roger M. 1987. "Models, 'Folk' and 'Cultural': Paradigms Regained?" In *Cultural Models in Language and Thought*, ed. by Dorothy Holland and Naomi Quinn, 78–111. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Kvale, Steinar and Svend Brinkmann. 2009. *InterViews: Learning the Craft of Qualitative Research Interviewing*. London: Sage.
- Labov, William. 1966. *The Social Stratification of English in New York City*. Washington: Center for Applied Linguistics.
- Labov, William and David Fanshell. 1977. *Therapeutic Discourse: Psychotherapy as Conversation*. New York, NY: Academic Press.
- Lindlof, Thomas R. and Taylor Bryan C. 2011. *Qualitative Communication Research Methods*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage
- Linell, Per. 1998. *Approaching Dialogue: Talk, Interaction and Contexts in Dialogical Perspectives*. Amsterdam/Philadelphia: John Benjamins. doi:10.1075/impact.3
- Linell, Per. 2009. *Rethinking Language, Mind and World Dialogically: Interactional and Contextual Theories of Human Sense-Making*. Charlotte, NC: Information Age Publishing.

- Marková, Ilana, Per Linell, Michèle Grossen, and Anne Salazar Orvig. 2007. *Dialogue in Focus Groups. Exploring Socially Shared Knowledge*. London: Equinox.
- Marnette, Sophie. 2005. *Speech and Thought Presentation in French: Concepts and strategies*. Amsterdam/Philadelphia: John Benjamins. doi:10.1075/pbns.133
- Maynard, Douglas W. and Nora Cate Schaeffer. 2002. "Standardization and Interaction in the Survey Interview." In *Handbook of Interview Research: Context and Method*, ed. by Jaber F. Gubrium and James A. Holstein, 577–602. London: Sage.
- Maynard, Douglas W., Hanneke Houtkoop-Steenstra, Johannes van der Zouwen, and Nora Cate Schaeffer (ed.). 2002. *Standardization and Tacit Knowledge: Interaction and Practice in the Survey Interview*. New York: John Wiley & Sons.
- Mehan, Hugh. 1979. *Learning Lessons: Social Organization in the Classroom*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. doi:10.4159/harvard.9780674420106
- Mishler, Elliot. 1986. *Research Interviewing: Context and Narrative*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Moerman, Michael. 1988. *Talking Culture: Ethnography and Conversation Analysis*. Philadelphia, Penn.: University of Pennsylvania Press.
- Moerman, Michael. 1974. "Accomplishing Ethnicity." In *Ethnomethodology*, ed. by Roy Turner, 54–68. Harmondsworth: Penguin.
- Mondada, Lorenza. 2009. "Videorecording Practices and the Reflexive Constitution of the Interaction." *Human Studies* 32: 67–99. doi:10.1007/s10746-009-9110-8
- Ochs, Elinor and Lisa Capps. 2001. *Living Narrative. Creating Lives in Everyday Storytelling*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Pontecorvo, Clotilde, Anna Maria Ajello, and Cristina Zucchermaglio. 1998. *Discutendo si Impara [Learning Through Talking]*. Roma: Carocci.
- Potter, Jonathan and Alexa Hepburn. 2005. "Qualitative Interviews in Psychology: Problems and Possibilities." *Qualitative Research in Psychology* 2(4): 281–307. doi:10.1191/1478088705qp0450a
- Potter, Jonathan and Alexa Hepburn. 2012. "Eight Challenges for Interview Researchers." In *Handbook of Interview Research 2nd ed.* by Jaber F. Gubrium and James A. Holstein, 555–570. London: Sage.
- Potter, Jonathan and Margaret Wetherell. 1987. *Discourse and Social Psychology: Beyond Attitudes and Behaviour*. London: Sage.
- Powney, Janet and Mike Watts. 1987. *Interviewing in Educational Research*. London: Routledge.
- Putnam, Linda L. and Anne M. Nicotera (ed.). 2009. *Building Theories of Organization: The Constitutive Role of Communication*. New York, NY: Routledge.
- Quinn, Naomi. 1987. "Convergent Evidence for a Cultural Model of American Marriage." In *Cultural Models in Language and Thought*, ed. by Dorothy Holland and Naomi Quinn, 173–194. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. doi:10.1017/CBO9780511607660.008
- Raymond, Geoffrey. 2003. "Grammar and Social Organization: Yes/No Interrogatives and the Structure of Responding." *American Sociological Review* 68 (6): 939–967. doi:10.2307/1519752
- Raymond, Geoffrey. 2010. "Grammar and Social Relations: Alternative Forms of Yes/No-Type Initiating Actions in Health Visitor Interactions." In *Why do you Ask. The Function of Questions in Institutional Discourse*, ed. by Alice F. Freed and Susan Ehlrich, 87–107. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Resnick, Lauren, John M. Levine, and Stephanie Teasley. 1991. *Perspectives on Socially Shared Cognition*. Washington, DC.: American Psychological Association. doi:10.1037/10096-000
- Rommetveit, Ragnar. 1976. "On the Architecture of Intersubjectivity." In *Social Psychology in Transition*, ed. by L. H. Strickland, K. J. Gergen and F. J. Aboud, 163–175. New York: Plenum Press. doi:10.1007/978-1-4615-8765-1_16

- Sacks, Harvey. 1972. "On the Analyzability of Stories by Children." In *Directions in Sociolinguistics: The Ethnography of Communication*, ed. by John J. Gumperz and Dell Hymes, 325–345. New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston.
- Schank, Roger C. and Robert P. Abelson. 1977. *Scripts, Plans, Goals, and Understanding: An Inquiry into Human Knowledge Structures*. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum.
- Schegloff, Emanuel. 1987. "Between Micro and Macro: Context and Other Connections." In *The Micro-Macro Link*, ed. by Jeffrey Alexander, Bernard Giessen, Richard Munch, and Neil Smelser, 207–234. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press.
- Schegloff, Emanuel, Gail Jefferson, and Harvey Sacks. 1977. "The Preference for Self-Correction in the Organization of Repair in Conversation." *Language* 53(2) :361–382.
doi:10.1353/lan.1977.0041
- Schneider, David M. 1976. "Notes Toward a Theory of Culture." In *Meaning in Anthropology*, ed. by Kenneth H. Basso and Henry A. Selby, 198–220. Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press.
- Silverman, David. 2001. *Interpreting Qualitative Data: Methods for Analysing Talk, Text and Interaction*. London: Sage.
- Silverman, David. 2007. *A Very Short, Fairly Interesting and Reasonably Cheap Book about Qualitative Research*. London: Sage.
- Silverstein, Michael. 1981. "The Limits of Awareness." *Sociolinguistic Working Papers* 84. Austin: Southwest Educational Developmental Laboratory.
- Singer, Eleanor, Martin R. Frankel, and Marc B. Glassman. 1983. "The Effect of the Interviewer Characteristics and Expectations on Response." *Public Opinion Quarterly* 43: 68–83.
doi:10.1086/268767
- Smith, Jonathan A. and Mike Osborn. 2003. "Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis." In *Qualitative Psychology: A Practical Guide to Research Methods*, ed. by Jonathan A. Smith, 51–80. London and Thousand Oaks CA: Sage.
- Smith, Jonathan, Paul Flowers, and Michael Larkin. 2009. *Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis: Theory, Method and Research*. London: Sage.
- Speer, Susan A. 2002. "Natural and Contrived Data: a Sustainable Distinction?" *Discourse Studies* 4: 511–525.
- Spradley, James P. 1979. *The Ethnographic Interview*. New York: Holt-Reinhart & Winston.
- Steier, Frederick. 1991. "Research as Self-Reflexivity, Self-Reflexivity as Social Process." In *Research and Reflexivity*, ed. by Frederick Steier, 1–11. London: Sage.
- Stati, Sorin. 1982. *II Dialogo. Considerazioni di Linguistica Pragmatica* [Dialogue. Advances in linguistic pragmatics]. Napoli: Liguori.
- Stylianou, Stelios. 2008. "Interview Control Questions." *International Journal of Social Research Methodology* 11: 239–256. doi:10.1080/13645570701401289
- Thompson, Sandra A., Barbara A. Fox, and Elizabeth Couper-Kuhlen. 2015. *Grammar in Everyday Talk. Building Responsive Actions*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
doi:10.1017/CBO9781139381154
- Toulmin Stephen 2001. *Return to Reason*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Tracy, Karen, and Jessica Robles. 2009. "Questions, Questioning, and Institutional Practices: An Introduction." *Discourse Studies* 11(2): 131–152. doi:10.1177/1461445608100941
- Tracy, Karen and Jessica Robles. 2010. "Challenges of Interviewers' Institutional Positionings: Taking into Account of Interview Content and the Interaction." *Communication Methods and Measures* 4(3): 177–200. doi:10.1080/19312458.2010.505501
- Tracy, Sarah J. 2013. *Qualitative Research Methods*. Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell.

- Tyler, Stephen A. 1978. *The Said and the Unsaid. Language, Thought and Culture: Advances in the Study of Cognition*. New York: Academic Press.
- Van Dijk, T. 1987. *Communicating Racism. Ethnic Prejudice in Thought and Talk*. London: Sage.
- Van Manen, Max. 1990. *Researching Lived Experience: Human Science for an Action Sensitive Pedagogy*. London, ON, Canada: Althouse Press.
- Van Manen, Max. 1997. "From Meaning to Method." *Qualitative Health Research* 7: 345–369. doi:10.1177/104973239700700303
- Van Manen, Michael A. 2014. "On Ethical (In)Decisions Experienced by Parents of Infants in Neonatal Intensive Care." *Qualitative Health Research* 24(2): 279–287. doi:10.1177/1049732313520081
- Weigand, Edda. 2009. *Language as Dialogue*. Amsterdam/Philadelphia: John Benjamins. doi:10.1075/ds.5
- Weigand, Edda. 2010. *Dialogue: The Mixed Game*. Amsterdam/Philadelphia: John Benjamins. doi:10.1075/ds.10
- Weigand, Edda. 2011. "Paradigm Changes in Linguistics: From Reductionism to Holism." *Language Sciences* 33: 544–549. doi:10.1016/j.langsci.2011.04.031
- Wertsch, James V. 1985. *Culture, Communication and Cognition: Vygotskian Perspectives*. Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press.
- Wertsch, James V. 1993. *Voices of the Mind. Sociocultural Approach to Mediated Action*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Wetherell, Margaret, Stephanie Taylor, and Simeon J. Yates (ed.). 2001. *Discourse as Data: A Guide for Analysis*. London: Sage.
- Wilkinson, Sue. 2006. "Analyzing Interaction in Focus Groups." In *Talk and Interaction in Social Research Methods*, ed. by Paul Drew, Geoffrey Raymond and Darin Weinberg, 50–62. London/Thousand Oaks/New Delhi: Sage. doi:10.4135/9781849209991.n4
- Wilkinson, Sue and Celia Kitzinger. 2000. "Thinking Differently About Thinking Positive: A Discursive Approach to Cancer Patients' Talk." *Social Science and Medicine* 50: 797–811. doi:10.1016/S0277-9536(99)00337-8
- Wooffitt, Robin. 2001. "Researching Psychic Practitioners: Conversation Analysis." In *Discourse as Data. A Guide for Analysis*, ed. by Margaret Wetherell, Stephanie Taylor, and Simeon J. Yates, 49–92. London: Sage.
- Wooffitt, Robin and Sue Widdicombe. 2006. "Interaction in Interviews." In *Talk and Interaction in Social Research Methods*, ed. by Paul Drew, Geoffrey Raymond, and Darin Weinberg, 28–49. London/Thousand Oaks/New Delhi: Sage. doi:10.4135/9781849209991.n3

Bounded segments of interaction

The case of redressing the breach of a cultural norm once it is flagged

Robert E. Sanders and Anita Pomerantz
State University of New York at Albany (USA)

This study examines naturally occurring instances of “bounded segments” of interaction. A bounded segment has a start point when interacting persons launch a task or activity, and a completion point when they reach closure. The importance of bounded segments from a dialogical perspective is that they account for the extensiveness of most interactions, and for the combination of successive action-reaction pairs into a progression from start point to completion point. In the instances we examine, the start point occurs when a participant flags a breach of a cultural norm by the other, and the end point occurs when the flagger is satisfied that the breach has been redressed, or the parties mutually give up trying to achieve an acceptable resolution.

Keywords: activity analysis, dialogue analysis, bounded segment, start point, completion point, cultural norm, normative breach

1. Bounded segments of interaction

There are two observable features of interaction that are so obvious that we tend to take them for granted but, from a dialogical perspective, they are essential. One is that most interactions are more extensive than a single action-reaction pair. The other is that interactions do not consist of an arbitrary succession of such pairs. These two features are the empirical face of what Weigand (2014) conceptualizes as “dialogic activities”:

Dialogic activities have goals and purposes. They are actions and reactions among different human beings who might have different individual purposes. Understanding cannot be presupposed. Consequently, dialogue means negotiating meaning and understanding in order to arrive at an agreement.

(Weigand 2014: 2)

The first feature, the extensiveness of most interactions, is a consequence of the participants being engaged in a mutual, inherently dialogic, activity – either to bring about some practical end result they cannot bring about on their own, such as making an arrangement or resolving a dispute; or to satisfy a relational or social exigency, as in conversational socializing (Sanders 2003), or keeping in touch (Drew and Chilton 2000). Such activities involve a working-through of the matter at hand that generally cannot be achieved within the scope of a single action-reaction pair. The second feature, that the succession of pairs is not arbitrary, is a further consequence of being engaged in a dialogical activity. An activity is constituted by its delimited ends and the means of achieving them, so that engaging in an activity successively constrains the content and actions that can relevantly, meaningfully, be produced next.

But it is not by happenstance that people become engaged in such dialogical activities; they have to be launched. It is therefore critical that the way one party launches an activity makes it recognizable to the other(s) that an activity was launched, and what the activity is, whether launched at the outset of the interaction or in medias res. We presume that in general the recognizability of the launching of an activity and what it is depends on more than the language used in launching it. Consistent with Weigand's (2010, 2014) claim that humans are cultural beings, the participants in the interactions we examine here have, and rely on having, shared cultural knowledge of the activity, and the conditions that warrant or are suitable for launching it.

In that an activity is launched, and so it has a start point; and the parties then engage in it until they bring about closure, and so it has a completion point; therefore, activities occur by definition within bounded segments of interaction.¹ As noted, the participants' contributions within such bounded segments are expected to, and constrained to, sustain a focus and proceed in a direction towards achieving one or another of the end results that would bring about closure on the matter at hand, whether a practical or a social or relational one. And concomitantly the participants are expected to, and constrained to, continue interacting about the matter at hand until they have brought about closure on the matter, or else after making the effort to achieve closure, the parties mutually conclude that they cannot do so and give up further effort.

1. This does not rule out that engagement on the matter at hand within a bounded segment may be interrupted or suspended one or more times before the parties bring about closure and reach a completion point. If that happens, we predict that the parties will resume their engagement in that bounded segment until they reach a completion point, and if not, deem it as having come to an abnormal end.

In each of the three cases we analyze, a disclosure was made in the course of ongoing talk that was responded to by flagging as objectionable either what was disclosed, or that it was disclosed at all. Flagging the disclosure as objectionable launched an activity in which the offender was burdened to redress the offense and the flagger to assess the adequacy of that redress. We call this activity a *remedial exchange*. The data we analyze are from our transcriptions of naturally occurring speech in one telephone call (Case One) and two face to face interactions (Cases Two and Three), taken from an archive of audio recordings of interactions created by Robert Hopper at the University of Texas.

Although our data and transcript notation conventions correspond to those commonly used by conversation analysts, we have undertaken what is better referred to as *dialogue analysis* or *activity analysis*. Our interest in the data is their dialogical aspects: the force or hold that an activity exerts on the participants to see it through once it is launched; the shared cultural/normative knowledge that is a prerequisite for launching and engaging in an activity; and the constraints the activity places on the production and understandings of the participants' respective, successive, utterances.

1.1 The start point

In each of our three cases, Person A disclosed a past action or current attitude incidentally, as a contribution to ongoing talk on some topic or matter, to which Person B responded by flagging the disclosure as objectionable in that it breached a cultural norm.² The flag is the start point of a bounded segment about Person A's "wrong" conduct that engenders the activity of a remedial exchange (cf. Goffman 1971).

In each case the flags are indirect in that they do not actually state that there is something objectionable about the disclosure let alone specify what was objectionable about it. Rather, the flagger's response "interrupts" the forward trajectory of the talk that was underway and focuses attention on the disclosure, seeming to expect that the offender will recognize from this response that something just said was not simply surprising, it was objectionable; and also to recognize what was objectionable about it, and how that flagged breach can be redressed (whether by accounts that justify or excuse it, or by recanting – admitting wrong-doing or

2. Our claim about what cultural norm was breached in each case is based on the talk itself – what was flagged, the content of the efforts to redress the breach, and what redress was and was not acceptable. There are the germs of ethnographic field work in this, so that we regard these claims as more likely to be enriched and expanded than overthrown if ethnographic field work in the participants' shared culture were ever undertaken.

somehow “undoing” the breach). And in each of the cases we examine, the flagger’s tacit expectation is borne out: The offender does recognize that his or her disclosure has been flagged as objectionable, recognizes what is objectionable about it, and how to redress it (although this recognition does not seem to be as immediate in the second case as in the first and third).

It is a well-accepted premise that what is regarded as good, bad, valuable, useless, dangerous, harmless, etc. varies by culture. “Each culture develops its own specific ways of constructing moral responsibilities” (Bergmann 284). We agree with Bergmann that the claim that people’s culture specifically shapes the types of conduct, events, personalities, etc. they respect or disrespect, value or devalue, etc. leaves out the role of language in the process. The raw behavior that comes to be evaluated may be cast differently by different observers and, moreover, can be redefined or reshaped as talk progresses. Rather than applying cultural premises to raw behavior, participants apply cultural premises to conduct that has been given shape or definition via the description along with the associated inferences applied to the behavior. Drew (1998) explicates the relationship between descriptions and (culturally based) evaluations:

Insofar as descriptions are unavoidably incomplete and selective, they are designed for specific and local interactional purposes. Hence, they may, always and irretrievably, be understood as doing moral work – as providing a basis for evaluating the “rightness” or “wrongness” of whatever is being reported. (1998: 295)

Much of the time, the rightness or wrongness, appropriateness or inappropriateness, etc. of what is being described is implicit in – that is embedded in, or implied by – the description. However, there are occasions in which the rightness/wrongness of what a participant is reporting is treated as the focus of the talk, as happens in the cases we examine once a start point is created by flagging a disclosure—what was disclosed or that it was disclosed—as objectionable.

1.2 Carrying on to reach a completion point

In the cases we examine here, once the breach of a cultural norm is flagged, closure on the matter at hand is brought about to the mutual satisfaction of the participants (first and second cases), or they mutually abandon further effort to bring about closure after trying to do so and failing (arguably, the third case). Again, we attribute this to the inclination of people, once they become engaged in working through the matter at hand within a bounded segment, to remain engaged until they reach a completion point, although we expect that the extent of their persistence will be found to vary across situations, individual participants and their relationship, and the importance each attaches to the matter at hand.

2. Remedial work

Goffman offers a conceptual framework for understanding the interrelationship between interaction and the moral order. His analysis of the remedial work that participants do in response to breaches remains foundational to much subsequent work on remedial interchanges.

The function of remedial work is to change the meaning that otherwise might be given to an act, transforming what could be seen as offensive into what can be seen as acceptable. This change seems to be accomplished, in our Western society at least, by striking in some way at the moral responsibility otherwise imputed to the offender; and this in turn seems to be accomplished by three main devices: accounts, apologies, and requests. (Goffman 1971: 109)

Goffman notes that accounts and apologies are offered by the offender after he or she has committed an untoward action with the aim of transforming what was offensive to be seen as acceptable.³ However any given remedial action may or may not be accepted as sufficient and adequate by the potentially offended party, so multiple remedial attempts may be performed. Goffman suggests that the remedial interchange continues until ritual equilibrium has been reestablished or another form of termination is accomplished. Of particular value for our project is Goffman's notion that once the moral order has been disturbed, participants in interaction have a moral obligation to preserve the social order and restore ritual equilibrium. Hence, once the flagger flags something in another participant's talk or action as "objectionable," the offender has a moral obligation to engage in redressive work with the aim of transforming the "objectionable" conduct into acceptable conduct. If successful, the redressive work restores normalcy in the relationship and the segment is completed.

Scott and Lyman's (1968) classic analysis of the use of accounts influenced much of the subsequent work on accounts. They define accounts as linguistic devices employed when an action is subjected to evaluative inquiry. Accounts are offered to explain unanticipated or untoward behavior and bridge the gap between actions and expectations. They describe two main types of accounts: *excuses* which are accounts in which one uses socially approved vocabularies for mitigating or

3. Participants about to commit an untoward action have other options for remedial work as well. As Goffman points out, they may ask permission to engage in what could be considered a violation of the potentially offended person's rights. Disclaimers also are used prior to performing a potentially offensive action (Hewitt and Stokes 1975). In addition, participants can shape their descriptions 'defensively' so as not to be seen as responsible for a potentially blameworthy action or event (Drew 1998). However, we do not see such anticipatory remedial work in the cases we examine.

relieving responsibility when conduct is questioned, and *justifications* which are accounts in which one accepts responsibility for the act in question but denies the pejorative quality associated with it.

Scott and Lyman discuss the reliance on culturally shaped expectations in account sequences. They treat accounts as standardized within cultural groups where certain accounts are routinely expected when activity falls outside the domain of expectations. An account that is not honored will be regarded as either *illegitimate* or *unreasonable*. The particular account offered by the offender as well as the reception of the account by the flagger is shaped by the participants' cultural premises or background expectancies.

Both the account offered by *ego* and the honoring or non-honoring of the account on the part of *alter* will ultimately depend on the *background expectancies* of the interactants. By background expectancies we refer to those sets of taken-for-granted ideas that permit the interactants to interpret remarks as accounts in the first place.

(Scott and Lyman 1968: 53)

The concepts derived from Scott and Lyman's paper that we find particularly useful for our study are the distinction between excuses and justifications and the integration of cultural background expectancies within the activities of giving and responding to accounts.

Sterponi wrote two papers that have relevance to our project. In the earlier paper, Sterponi (2003) investigated account episodes in middle-class Italian families. She found two designs for eliciting accounts: a direct request for an account (for example, "Why were you doing that") and a narrative elicitation (for example, "Tell me what you were doing") and shows that the two methods of elicitation make different remedial moves relevant. In contrast to those ways of eliciting accounts, the ways we found respondents flagging the offender's talk or action as 'objectionable' were much less direct – confirmation requests in the first and third cases, disincentives to continue in the second.

Sterponi (2014) went on to compare the priming moves to elicit accounts used with two age groups, and found that as children grow older, parents increase the complexity of the moral reasoning tasks. The parents continue to be receptive to their children's accounts but require them to be more sophisticated and convincing. We can apply these findings to our study in which an adult flags 'objectionable' conduct of another adult and the offender engages in redressive activity that is not terminated until the flagger accepts it. First, when flagging 'objectionable' conduct of another adult in the same culture, the flagger can expect the offender to recognize the 'offensive' conduct with only a minimal flagging of the problem. Second, the offender would be aware that the flagger will not necessarily honor his or her account, and more sophistication might be called for.

3. Data

3.1 Case one: Beth discloses to a suitor that her “ex-boyfriend” has a key to her house

The matter at hand arises during a phone conversation between Beth and Alex about possibly starting to go out with each other. Despite Alex’s interest, and Beth’s encouragement that they do so, Alex remains unconvinced by her efforts to assuage his doubts about her involvement with other men. As they talk about where her ex-boyfriend Jack fits in, Beth discloses that Jack has a key to her house, and Alex flags this disclosure as a trouble source. Beth responds by promptly engaging in the remedial exchange Alex’s flag engendered, in which she provides an excuse. When Alex does not express satisfaction with the first version of her excuse, she upgrades and expands it, evidently this time to Alex’s satisfaction. This brings about closure on the matter of the key and reaches a completion point that is marked by their going back to their prior negotiation about how Beth will fit Jack into her life.

3.1.1 *Producing the trouble source*

In Example 1a, Beth is negotiating how to make it acceptable to Alex if her ex-boyfriend Jack remains in her life “as a friend of mine” (line 6):

- (1a) (He Has a Key?): Hopper Archive, “Shelly”
- 1 Alex: Don’t don’t start treatin’ me like you want to go out with me: you know
 - 2 if if (0.2) if [he’s ((Jack)) your guy and you like him a whole=
 - 3 Beth: [Wait.
 - 4 Alex: =bunch (0.6) you know, don’t be teasing me: and maniplatin’ m↑e.
 - 5 (0.4)
 - 6 Beth: Well what if he’s ((Jack)) a friend of mine.
 - 7 (0.3)
 - 8 Alex: [That’s fine
 - 9 Beth: [-hh And I don’t want to lose his friendship and he:-
 - 10 Alex: that’s fine but you know you can’t let him just you know: run your life.
 - 11 Beth: -hh So what’ll I do I just say “Jack no more gimme back my key, yuh
 - 12 can’t come over any more unless I invite you.”

Beth’s disclosure that Jack has a key to her house is made in the course of asking Alex whether he expects her to take control in the manner of the formulation she offers of an announcement she could make to Jack about how the arrangement between them is going to change (lines 11–12).

3.1.2 *The start point: Flagging the trouble source*

In response to Beth's disclosure that Jack has a key, Alex at first expresses approval of her formulation of her announcement to Jack, but then asks for confirmation of what she disclosed.

- (1b) (He Has a Key?): Hopper Archive, "Shelly"
 11 Beth: ·hh So what'll I do I just say "Jack no more gimme back my key, yuh
 12 can't come over any more unless I invite you."=
 13 Alex: =Yeah= ((in a raised voice)) he has a ke::y to your hou::se?

There are three aspects of Alex's response to Beth's formulation of what she might tell Jack that flag her disclosure that Jack has a key as a trouble source (line 13). First Alex abruptly shifts his focus from the adequacy of her formulation to her embedded disclosure. Second, in responding with a request for confirmation, Alex singles out and casts what Beth disclosed as unexpected. Third, Alex's confirmation request is spoken in a raised voice, with vocal emphasis on what is troubling – that Jack has a *key*, the key to her *house*.

3.1.3 *The cultural norm that Beth breached: How women should treat suitors*

Alex's flagging Beth's disclosure, and Beth's prompt engagement in a remedial exchange (Examples 2b and 2c below), indicate that they share, or mutually know, a cultural norm breached by Jack's having a key. We infer that the norm is the ethical dictum Alex articulates in lines 1 and 4–Beth should not be "treatin' me like you want to go out with me:" and "teasing me: and maniplatin' m↑e." Jack's having a key is inconsistent with Beth's insistence that her relationship with Jack has cooled and he is in her life as just a friend. Having a key to Beth's house gives Jack free entry into her private space, something that may be accorded a lover, but not someone who is just a friend as she professed Jack to be. In thus seeming to have misled Alex about where Jack fits in her life, Beth has violated that ethical dictum.

3.1.4 *The remedial exchange*

Beth's immediate response to Alex's flag is to engage in the remedial exchange it engenders. She does so with an embedded correction that provides an account, more precisely, an excuse, in that she positions herself as not responsible for the problematic state of affairs, for Jack's having a key: he does not "have" a key, he "took" one.

- (1c) (He Has a Key?): Hopper Archive, "Shelly"
 13 Alex: Yeah= ((in a raised voice)) he has a ke::y to your hou::se?
 14 Beth: He: [took one
 15 Alex: [hh

16 (0.2)
 17 Alex: ·hh We::ll- Yi:h-

Beth's account in line 14 addresses what Alex presumably inferred, that if Jack has a key, it is because Beth gave it to him and wants him to have it. Beth's response (economically, deftly) counters that inference with an account of how Jack came to have the key, he "took" it. If Jack took the key, then he was not given it, and he therefore has it against her will. If so, then she is not guilty of deceiving or manipulating Alex about where Jack fits in her life.

However, where Alex could respond in line 17 by expressing satisfaction with this account, he does not. He seems to be started on a comment, arguably a counter-point in that it is prefaced with "Well" (cf. Schegloff and Lerner 2009). In lieu of getting an expression of satisfaction with her account, Beth proceeds to expand and enrich it (lines 18–19). The new, upgraded version of her account in Example 1d indicates that she inferred her initial account did not satisfy Alex because it only accounted for Jack's having gotten the key, not for his still having it.

(1d) (He Has a Key?): Hopper Archive, "Shelly"
 14 Beth: He: [took one
 15 Alex: [hhih
 16 (0.2)
 17 Alex: ·hh We::ll- [Yi:h-
 18 Beth: [And I took it ba:ck, and- and we had a fight, then
 19 he took it he took it again-

Beth's enriched account (lines 18–19) sustains her first account that she did not "give" the key to Jack. But now she depicts his still having it as having happened after she retrieved it, the result of a "fight" between them, implying he now has it by force despite her resistance. This is underscored by Beth's recurrent use of the verb "took" to refer to the way the key changed hands back and forth, connoting struggle and conflict, not trust, affection, and intimacy. Her vocal register as she tells this verges on tearfulness.

3.1.5 *The completion point*

Beth's expanded account excuses her from being responsible for Jack's having the key both then and now; rather, it faults Jack and makes Beth his victim. In that way Beth counters the inference that she is guilty of manipulating Alex into going out with her by misleading him about her relationship with Jack. Alex is evidently satisfied by this expanded account, in that he tacitly adopts Beth's contention that she is Jack's victim (lines 20–21: "the guy is walking all over you").

(1e) (He Has a Key?): Hopper Archive, “Shelly”

- 18 Beth: And I took it ba:ck, and- and we had a fight, then he took it again-
 19 ·hhh I just think I’m [just gonna hafta
 20 Alex: [We:ll the guy’s walkin all over you, if
 21 you don’t like him, you know, then ↑dump ‘im. (0.4) U::m but
 22 you know- I mea- he’s a nice guy you don’t want to be mean
 23 to him ·hhhh but just u::h (1.4) show him the way it is.

Alex’s evident satisfaction with Beth’s account achieves closure on this matter of the key and reaches the segment’s completion point, in that Alex then changes the subject back to their negotiation before the segment began about how Beth should handle Jack (lines 20–23).

3.2 Case two: Will discloses to co-workers that he wishes he could get a divorce

The matter at hand is Will’s disclosure of marital disaffection to several co-workers over a series of turns, progressing from saying he was too young when he married to saying he wishes he could get a divorce. His disclosure of marital disaffection is flagged by two women in the group as a trouble-source. But Will evidently does not recognize that they flagged his disclosure as objectionable; instead he responds to their flags as if the trouble-source was their disbelief in his seriousness, in that he goes on to expand his disclosure by explaining why he had not already filed for a divorce despite wanting one. One of the women again flags this expanded disclosure as a trouble-source, this time in a way that engenders a brief remedial exchange. Will drops talk of divorce and reverts to just implying rather than directly claiming marital disaffection. When that is met with silence, he recants his claim of marital disaffection entirely, which evidently suffices to bring about closure on the matter and a completion point.

3.2.1 *Producing the trouble-source*

In a lunchtime conversation, a church’s staff members turned from talk about the upcoming (American football) Super Bowl game to talk about how old they were, where they were, which team they supported, and what they were doing when the first Super Bowl was played 16 years earlier. In the talk leading up to Example 2a, Tess says she was 20 years old then, Kathy observes that Tess was “just gittin’ ma:r-ried” then, and June asks Will what he was doing then. Will replies that he was “Havin’ fu:n” and “enjoy::’n.” But a few turns later, Evan asks Will if he was already married at that time (Example 2a, line 1). Will affirms that yes, he was married already (line 2), but adds the negative assessment that he got married too young, at the age of nineteen (lines 2 and 5).

- (2a) (Wish I Could Get a Divorce): Hopper Archive, “Church Lunchroom”
- 1 Evan: Were you married already?
- 2 Will: Yah. (0.2) I got married too you:ng.
- 3 (0.2)
- 4 female: ([])
- 5 Will: [Got married when I was nineteen.
- 6 Evan: Oh yeah that was way too young.

Will does not present his assessment that he married too young as at all delicate or objectionable, and he may have said it just to defend his prior self-depiction as a fun-loving nineteen year old. And it seems that Evan did not understand it as, or did not want it to become, a serious matter in that he made light of it by responding to a nominally negative assessment with an upgraded agreement (line 6).

Evan’s making light of Will’s negative assessment of having already been married at nineteen did not divert Will from making further upgraded disclosures of marital disaffection. The implication of Will’s assessment that he was too young when he married is that he had regrets about having gotten married. Will continues on to make this explicit (Example 2b, lines 8 and 10).

- (2b) (Wish I Could Get a Divorce): Hopper Archive, “Church Lunchroom”
- 6 Evan: Oh yeah that was way too young.
- 7 (1.7) ((soft chuckle by woman in background))
- 8 Will: Yeah. I hated that day too.
- 9 (1.2)
- 10 Will: Wish I could get a divorce.

In overtly disclosing his marital disaffection, Will injects the disclosure of a serious personal matter into what had been a lighthearted, non-disclosive conversation up to that point among co-workers who evidently were not intimates.

3.2.2 *The start point: Flagging the trouble-source*

Tess and June each respond to Will’s disclosure in a way that indirectly, but unequivocally, flag it as a trouble-source.

- (2c) (Wish I Could Get a Divorce): Hopper Archive, “Church Lunchroom”
- 10 Will: Wish I could get a divorce.
- 11 Tess: Ouh!
- 12 (1.0)
- 13 Tess: Ch- uh! Ch- uh! ((clearing throat as if she swallowed wrong))
- 14 (0.7)
- 15 Will: I do [n’t want to be mar- ↑I do I’m ↑serious.
- 16 Tess: [Will!
- 17 June: Now now ↑now ((sing song)).

Tess flags Will's having said he wishes he could get a divorce as a trouble source in a complex, progressive way (lines 11, 13, 16). She first, immediately, produces a guttural exclamation (line 11) that may have been a result of choking on what she was eating, followed by sounds of clearing her throat (line 13). This response of trouble swallowing having occurred just then implies shock and surprise (regardless of intent), and is followed by a more overtly reproachful response in line 16: She exclaims Will's name (line 16), a conventional way of admonishing someone for having said too much or gone too far.⁴ On the heels of Tess' flag, June also flags Will's talk of divorce as a trouble source in line 27, intoning "Now now ↑now" with a singsong quality. This too is a conventional way of expressing disapproval, reminiscent of the way a parent might (gently) reproach a child who has gone too far and should stop now.⁵

3.2.3 *The cultural norm that Will breached: To whom one discloses marital disaffection*

The cultural norm that Will breached does not seem to involve his desire for a divorce, in that neither Tess, June, nor Will give any indication that they regard his marital disaffection as accountable. Rather, we infer from the others' resistance to engaging in this line of talk at all (perhaps starting with Evan's making light of it) that the cultural norm Will breached is that he disclosed his marital disaffection to the wrong people, or more precisely, people not in the category of those to whom one would make such a disclosure, and therefore people who do not want to be, nor have any obligation to be, its recipients. Those to whom one is expected to make such disclosures are those who would be affected, and/or those who can and should be called on to help. Sacks (1992) got at this in his study of suicide hotline calls, where he found that for help with important serious matters, callers and call-takers took for granted that one would first turn to others in the category of intimates (partners, family, and close friends) and when that is insufficient, to those in the category of professionals (psychiatrists, or in those cases, hotline call-takers). Will's co-workers are not included in either of those categories, and so Will's disclosure to them of marital disaffection and unfulfilled desire for a divorce would be a breach of that cultural norm.

4. In addition to Emerson's (2015) attention to minimal ways a trouble source may be flagged, Sterponi describes minimal prompts to redress a breach in family interaction: "Severe stares, gestures of dissent, a raised hand threatening spanking, and minimal verbal prompts, such as exclamations or summons, are indexical forms parents sometimes deployed for signaling a breach." (2014: 133)

5. Sterponi describes a reproach as "a statement that points to an improper conduct and signals it as recurrent and previously sanctioned." (2014: 131). She considers that both reproaches and minimal prompts are performed with the expectation that the improper conduct will be redressed.

3.2.4 *Will continues his disclosure despite its being flagged as a trouble-source*
 Will continues on with his disclosure despite Tess and June having flagged it as objectionable. Arguably, this is not necessarily because he is unaware of or does not share the cultural norm that Tess and June flagged his disclosure for breaching, but because their flags interrupted his disclosure. It is accountable to want a divorce and yet not seek one, so that in overlap with Tess' admonishment, Will may have been on the way to accounting for his inaction in line 15: "I don't want to be mar-" *but I can't get a divorce yet because X*. But in response to Tess' choking sounds and admonishment, Will self-interrupts what may have been his account for inaction by protesting that (despite his inaction) he was serious, and then goes on (or continues on) to provide that account – that he could not afford it because his children were still young enough that he would be liable for child support (lines 18–19).

- (2d) (Wish I Could Get a Divorce): Hopper Archive, "Church Lunchroom"
 15 Will: I do[n't want to be mar- ↑I do I'm ↑serious.
 16 Tess: [Will!
 17 June: Now now ↑now ((sing song)).
 18 Will: But I can't get out of it though cause I can't- (0.2) support- can't
 19 () child support.
 20 (0.5)
 21 Tess?: ((chuckles?))
 22 Will: Maybe in five mo- no seven more ye:ars (0.2) all my kids'll be
 23 gro:wn then, (0.5) I can relax.

Will's insistence on his seriousness and the account he provides for not yet going ahead with a divorce amplifies his disclosure and his breach of the cultural norm regarding the categories of people to whom one discloses such a serious personal matter. Tess and June, who flagged Will's disclosure as a trouble-source, do not respond at all. Evan's response (not shown) is to move the talk away from marital disaffection and divorce by latching onto and disputing what Will said about being able to "relax" about money matters in "seven more ye:ars"; citing a deferred retirement savings plan Will was enrolled in that involves tax penalties if any of it is withdrawn before reaching age 59½. It is unknowable whether Evan missed or disregarded that Will's talk had been flagged as breaching a cultural norm, and that he had not (yet) redressed it, or whether Evan had undertaken to prevent the breach from getting any worse by changing the subject. Either way, having been flagged without any redressive action undertaken, Will's cultural breach remains standing.

3.2.5 Remedial exchange: Will backs away from and then recants his disclosure

Despite Evan having succeeded in leading their talk away from it, Tess returns their talk to the matter of Will's marital disaffection in a way that again flags the talk as a trouble-source. Tess asks Will whether he has yet disclosed to Betty (presumably Will's wife) what he just disclosed to the group – that Betty's term as his wife will not be life-long, that he has decided on a "time line" for ending it.

(2e) (Wish I Could Get a Divorce): Hopper Archive, "Church Lunchroom"

36 Will: =Yea: [:h

37 Tess: [Have you given Betty (.) her time line?

38 (1.5)

39 Will: Ihyeah (0.5) .hhh

40 (1.5)

41 Will: No we talked about it one time but (0.5) I mean (0.2) she said she
42 wouldn't get married no more and I wouldn't get married no more.

43 (1.2)

44 Will: And we- we- we (even), we we got married so soo::n?

45 (2.5)

Tess's question presupposes that Will has unilaterally made the decision about how long to keep the marriage going and that Betty may not yet know about it. In raising the question, Tess brings more to the fore the cultural norm that Will's disclosure breached—the matter of to whom Will should (and tacitly, should not) disclose this matter of wishing he could get a divorce.

Will's response to Tess' question moves towards redressing his breach of this cultural norm by starting to back away from his disclosure. This is done initially by indicators that he does not have a ready answer to her question, neither "yes" nor "no." There are notable gaps before and after he starts his answer (lines 38, 40); he begins to answer with "Ihyeah" and then after a gap restarts with "No" (lines 39, 41). Similarly, his elaboration after "No" at first seems to affirm that they did talk about his plans for seeking a divorce after the children are grown (line 41: "No we talked about it one time"), but it turns out that his answer is that they did not. The "it" they talked about was only the matter he initially raised—that they were too young when they married – not his plan for getting a divorce. In this answer, he thus omits talk of wanting a divorce, so that his marital disaffection is now only implied and no longer asserted. He thereby mitigated the breach of having disclosed such disaffection to the wrong people. But his answer is met with notable silences, indicating it has not been accepted as having redressed the breach (lines 44, 46).

3.2.6 *The completion point*

Having reported that he and Betty agreed that they got married too soon, now simply implying marital disaffection rather than stating it, Will provided himself an opportunity to reverse his position that he is currently unhappy in the marriage. If someone is too young when he or she gets married, the consequence is not necessarily marital disaffection; instead there may be difficult times at first that the couple overcomes. Will takes the opportunity he gave himself and reverses his position, now giving a positive assessment of his marriage (lines 47–48). Rather than marital disaffection as he previously asserted, he indicates that they managed to overcome the difficulties created by having married so young (line 47: “it had worked out pretty good though”), thus recanting the disclosure.

(2f) (Wish I Could Get a Divorce): Hopper Archive, “Church Lunchroom”

- 41 Will: No we talked about it one time but (0.5) I mean (0.2) she said she
 42 wouldn't get married no more and I wouldn't get married no more.
 43 (1.2)
 44 Will: And we- we- we (even), we we got married so soo::n?
 45 (2.5)
 46 Will: But uh (.) it had worked out pretty good though, you know, nothin'
 47 to complain about.

Arguably, if Will recants his disclosure of marital disaffection, then to the extent it is possible, he undoes having breached a cultural norm in having made the disclosure to his co-workers at all. That this does bring about closure on the matter, and they do reach a completion point, is evident from a somewhat step-wise change of topic the others bring about at that point (not shown) (cf. Jefferson 1984 on step-wise transitions out of troubles-talk). Evan takes the first step towards a change of topic, why they need to keep working. This is not entirely disconnected from their prior talk, it is a matter touched on in Will's previous account of being currently unable to afford a divorce. But Evan now disregards that, and latches the need to work to something else, being poor. Tess and June, the ones who flagged Will's disclosure as a trouble source, take the next step, decoupling the topic of having to work from economic need entirely. They suggest that one would work just to have something to do even if one were not in need of the income.

3.3 Case three: Peter discloses that he shot some cats and a dog while hunting

The matter at hand arises as Peter tells his girlfriend Janice about his hunting trip with his friend Tom from which he had just returned. Peter discloses that, in addition to having shot some game animals, they also shot some cats and a dog. Janice flags what he disclosed as a trouble-source, launching a bounded segment in which Peter initially resists Janice's efforts to engage him in a remedial exchange, but then does go on to engage with her in a quite protracted one. In their remedial exchange, Peter provides Janice with a succession of justifications, each of which Janice counters, until Janice evidently concludes, and Peter accepts, that the effort is futile. Janice produces a markedly insincere acceptance of his justification, and Peter changes the subject.

3.3.1 *Producing the trouble-source*

Peter's conversation with Janice after he returns from his weekend hunting trip addresses several topics before he discloses what they killed—why he didn't let her know he would be coming back much later than she expected, what the weather was, what the small town was like that they stayed in, the kind of people there, and so on, and finally, the game they killed, turkey and deer. At that point, Peter realizes she is recording their conversation, questions it, and the recorder is switched off. When the recorder is switched back on, they pick up where they left off, but seem to now be “staging” the conversation, in that Janice asks a question she previously asked that he previously answered (line 1: “So d'ja kill anything?”). Peter reports/repeats the information he had given her previously, that yes, they “killed” turkey and deer (line 3). But then he adds something new, he discloses that they also “shot” some cats and a dog (lines 4–5). Arguably that this was new information, and was flagged by Janice as a trouble-source, put an end to staging the conversation.

(3a) (Killed a Dog): Hopper Archive, “Steadies Talk/Argue”

1 Janice: So d'ja kill anything?

2 (1.2)

3 Peter: Yeah, (0.2) we killed (.) two turkey and a (0.2) coupla deer. (0.5) Uh::

4 (0.7) (Other than) that (0.5) we sho: t a buncha stuff. (0.7) We shot

5 (0.7) ya know, (0.5) some ca::ts 'n (0.7) a do::g

Peter's way of reporting what they killed differentiates killing game animals (turkey and deer) from shooting non-game, normally domestic, animals (cats, a dog). He starts, unhesitatingly, with a report of the game animals they killed: line 3, “Yeah, (0.2) we killed (.) two turkey and a (0.2) coupla deer.” The disclosure that they also

shot non-game animals is positioned second, and in several ways Peter displays that it is problematic—there are frequent pauses and an uninformative build up that delay the disclosure: lines 4–5, “(Other than) tha:t (0.5) we sho:t a buncha stuff. (0.7) We shot (0.7) ya know, (0.5) some ca::ts ‘n (0.7) a do::g”

3.3.2 *The start point: Flagging the trouble-source*

It seems from Janice’s response to Peter’s disclosure of having shot some cats and a dog that this came as an unwelcome surprise. Janice initially flags this disclosure as a trouble-source by responding to it with a confirmation request that replaces “shot” with “killed” (Example 4b, line 6: “You killed a ca:t?”).

(3b) (Killed a Dog): Hopper Archive, “Steadies Talk/Argue”

4 Peter: (Other than) tha:t (0.5) we sho: t a buncha stuff. (0.7) We shot (0.7) ya

5 know, (0.5) some ca::ts ‘n (0.7) a do:[:g, and

6 Janice: [You killed a ca:t?

Janice’s confirmation request flags what Peter disclosed as a trouble-source first by being produced in overlap before he has quite finished reporting what they killed. Second, her confirmation request does not come in response to his naming the game animals they killed, but only after hearing him say “cats.” Third, she does not respond with a simple echo of his saying that they “shot ... some ca::ts” (plural) as if there might be a hearing problem, but rather names what seems an essential condition, that they “killed a cat” (singular) implicating that the breach is to have “killed” any cat at all, even one.

3.3.3 *The cultural norm that Peter breached: Which animals recreational hunters can kill*

Peter’s orientation to his disclosure that he and Tom “shot” some cats and a dog as problematic, and Janice’s response, indicates that they share, or mutually know of, a cultural norm regarding what categories of animals can be targeted by recreational hunters, so that animals not in those categories are proscribed as targets. From our own knowledge, the category of game animals does not include, and sometimes overtly excludes, many wild animals (e.g., under current regulations, wolves and eagles), although some of these may be designated as pests to be eradicated by professional hunters on commission (e.g., wild pigs or invasive predators like boa constrictors). More to the point, given the way Peter disclosed it, and Janice’s response, the category of game animals that are targets certainly excludes domestic animals, presumably farm and work animals as well as household pets.

In this case, we note that Janice may also be applying a more extreme norm, one they do not share – a norm against killing animals altogether, or against killing for sport. When Janice asks about the results of the hunting trip, both before switching off the tape and after resuming, her phrasing of her question indicates that she does not approve of recreational hunting in itself. Rather than ask the question in the way someone who hunts might (“Did you get anything?” or even “Did you shoot anything?”) she formulates it in the way an opponent of hunting is likely to, in that she foregrounds its troubling aspect, killing (line 1, “d’ja kill anything?”), and sustains that in replacing Peter’s “shot” with “killed” in describing what he did to some cats and a dog.

3.3.4 *Pursuing a remedial exchange in the face of resistance*

Despite Peter’s own orientation to his disclosure as problematic, indicating his recognition that what he disclosed breached a cultural norm, he does not respond to Janice’s flag by promptly entering into a remedial exchange. Instead he resists doing so by responding to the surface meaning of her utterance as requesting confirmation by providing it (line 8: “[Yes] We killed a cat.”) instead of responding to its indirect meaning of flagging a breach. While his response resists engaging in a remedial exchange, it adopts Janice’s way of foregrounding the disclosed breach by replacing his report of having “shot ... some ca::ts” with an affirmation that they “killed” even one cat.

In light of Peter’s resistance to engaging in a remedial exchange at all, Janice could have concluded just then that it was futile to pursue a remedial exchange and moved to end the segment almost as soon as she began it, but she does not. It was evidently sufficiently important to her that Peter provide her with a satisfactory account for having shot cats and a dog that she makes a protracted effort to engage him in a remedial exchange by pursuing it with a succession of flags (Example 3c).⁶ The first two of these are additional confirmation requests (lines 12 and 14) and the next two are expressions of disbelief (lines 17 and 19). And Peter continues to resist by responding each time to what Janice asks or expresses rather than the flagging action her responses count as, with confirmations (line 16) and affirmations (lines 18 and 20) instead of redress.

6. This resembles a case examined by Schegloff (1995) where a question was responded to with the information it directly asked for, thus missing or disregarding what action the question counted as (in that case, a pre-announcement), and so the question was asked twice more in pursuit of a response to the action.

- (3c) (Killed a Dog): Hopper Archive, “Steadies Talk/Argue”
- 6 Janice: You killed a ca:t?
 7 (0.7)
- 8 Peter: We killed a cat.
 9 (0.7)
- 10 Peter: (That’s private, see).
 11 (1.2)
- 12 Janice: Did you really?
 13 (1.7)
- 14 Janice: (°That is°)- you killed a do:g?
 15 (0.7)
- 16 Peter: °Yeah.°
- 17 Janice: Nah:.
- 18 Peter: Yeah h-h-. .hsh
- 19 Janice: You didn’t really.
- 20 Peter: And just a real do:g, just a little- a [regular do:g.
 21 Janice: [↑W_{hy}:?]

What is noteworthy here is that even though Peter is resistant to engaging in a remedial exchange, he does not move on. He remains engaged with Janice, tacitly taking issue with her having flagged his having killed cats and a dog as breaching a cultural norm by affirming it unapologetically. While he does not respond to her second flag on line 12, he responds with a muted confirmation to her third flag, a confirmation request, in line 16; then he responds in line 18 to her fourth flag, an expression of disbelief, with affirmation coupled with (dismissive?) laugh particles; and to her fifth flag, a more elaborated expression of disbelief, with a more elaborated affirmation that emphasizes that this animal was unequivocally in a proscribed category, “just a real do:g.” It is only when Janice then flags his disclosure as a trouble-source for the sixth time by directly asking for an account (line 21: “↑W_{hy}:?”) that Peter changes his stance and enters into a remedial exchange.

3.3.5 *The remedial exchange*

Despite the difficulty Janice has in getting Peter to satisfactorily redress the breach of the cultural norm he disclosed, and the trouble Peter has in doing so to her satisfaction once he attempts it, it is clear that both are drawing on the same cultural knowledge about which animals are included in the category of “game” for hunters to kill. What Peter’s justifications add up to is that these particular animals that he shot behave in a way, or pose a threat of a kind, that removes them from their otherwise protected status and places them in the category of “pest” to be exterminated (not game to be hunted).

The protracted remedial exchange between Peter and Janice is summarized in the following table of extracts from the give-and-take of his justifications and her rebuffs of them.

(3d) (Killed a Dog): Hopper Archive, “Steadies Talk/Argue”⁷

Row	Peter’s Justifications	Janice’s Rebuffs
1	Because it scares all the deer, and it eats the quails	↑Pete, that is <u>aw:ful</u> ::: That is ↑ <u>aw:ful</u> . And a ca- that is (.) <u>gross</u> .”
2	We <u>had</u> to Janice, awright? For the (leagues), we have to for the (leagues). ⁷	No you didn’t have to. ↑That’s <u>bu::ll</u> .
3	To keep it- it- (0.2) disturbs up the wild animals.	That dog does not go out in the field t’ start scaring up the deer and keeping (you from killing)
4	<u>Yes</u> it does, I <u>promise</u> you it does. It- it stirs up th- the <u>quai::l</u> , (0.2) it ruins their nest, (0.7) it eats their <u>e::ggs</u> ‘n stuff	So you just <u>kill</u> it, you don’t take it somewhere, you just <u>kill</u> it.
5	Ya can’t <u>catch</u> ‘em, Janice. (0.5) Ya just have to shoot ‘em.	What, ‘ts just a wild do:g, it just is like a coyote, ‘r what?
6	I’m sure it i::s. I mean yer millions of miles from any <u>civilization</u> , it’s just <u>out</u> there, just <u>wandering</u> <u>around</u> . (0.5) Usually they’re in like a ↑ <u>pa:ck</u> . (0.5) A pack of dogs ‘n they’re just runnin’ around (0.5) <u>scarin</u> ’ up everything	I think y’all was probably just <u>bo::red</u> , cuz you couldn’t kill any () animals

While there is a unifying theme that runs across Peter’s justifications (the harms the dog did to wildlife necessitated killing it – on behalf of the “leagues”), there are shifts in Janice’s rebuffs. Possibly there was no justification she would have found acceptable, and by rebuffing his justifications, was pressing Peter for an admission of, and remorse for, his “wrong” conduct. Where she rebuffs Peter’s first justification in Row 1 with a negative assessment of the act itself, she rebuffs his expansions on that justification in Rows 2 and 3 by disputing the validity of his claims, and does this again in Row 5. In Row 4 Janice shifts ground again; instead

7. We surmise that “leagues” refers to associations of hunters with which Peter and Tom are somehow affiliated, who may hunt the same prey in the same territory as Peter and Tom did.

of disputing that the dog's harms to wildlife necessitated killing it, she disputes that killing it was the only remedy. In Row 6, Janice shifts again, rebuffing Peter's insistence that killing the dog was the only remedy by ascribing a less worthy motive to their action than protecting wildlife, that instead they acted out of boredom and a desire to kill something.

Peter evades Janice's accusation of boredom without flatly rejecting it, and builds on his characterization of the dog as feral. At that point, Janice seems to give up her resistance to his justifications, or perhaps her hope of eliciting remorse rather than justification.

(3e) (Killed a Dog): Hopper Archive, "Steadies Talk/Argue"

57 Janice: I think y'all was probably just bo::red, cuz you couldn't kill any
58 () animals.

59 Peter: ↑Well. (0.5) mm probably, a little of that too, but still, they have to
60 be exterminated.

61 (1.2)

62 Janice: ↑'Kay.

63 (0.7)

64 Peter: They do.

Rather than engage Janice in a dispute about his motivation, Peter builds on his prior characterization of the dog as feral, thus putting it in the category of pests that "have to be exterminated" (lines 59–60). Janice responds in line 62 with what is outwardly acceptance ("↑'Kay"), yet Peter evidently does not consider that they have reached a completion point. Peter may not have been certain that she was actually satisfied in that her accepting response got minimal expression compared with her lengthier rebuffs and objections; it was vocalized with a rising inflection that could be understood as surrender rather than acceptance; and it came after a notable delay, unlike an agreement that is recognizably genuine (Pomerantz 1984). This may be what occasioned Peter's reiteration of his main contention that these dogs have to be "exterminated" (line 64: "They do.") despite Janice's having already "accepted" it.

3.3.6 *The completion point*

In the remaining part of this bounded segment, Janice expresses her acceptance of Peter's accounts three times in succession, but the way she does this each time is again readable as insincere, perhaps even sarcastic. Perhaps it is for that reason that Peter provided her with a succession of opportunities to accept his justification in a more convincing way before he gave up and changed the subject.

- (3f) (Killed a Dog): Hopper Archive, “Steadies Talk/Argue”
 65 Janice: You’re official exterminator now, I gue[ss].
 66 Peter: [Mm hm
 67 (1.5)
 68 Peter: And the ca:ts (.) eat the quail.
 69 Janice: Aw [::
 70 Peter: [The baby quail, (0.2) awright?
 71 (1.0)
 72 Janice: Sure.
 73 (4.5)
 74 Peter: So whadja d_o this weekend?

Janice “accepts” Peter’s justifications first by adopting his terminology (line 65: “You’re official exterminator now, I guess.”). In doing so she tacitly accepts his categorization of the dog as a pest, but at the same time there is a sarcastic aspect in that she asserts that in shooting the dog, he abandoned the role of recreational hunter and took a different role to which he was not actually entitled: “official exterminator.” Peter created a next opportunity for Janice to more sincerely accept his justification by now citing harms the cats did, perhaps strengthening the rightness/necessity of “exterminating” them. Janice’s response again seems accepting, a conventional display of pity for the quail (line 69: “Aw::”). But this response is of uncertain sincerity, in that it is minimal and conventional, and in manner and substance at odds with her prior expressions of sympathy for the cats and dog. Peter provides Janice one more opportunity to (unequivocally) accept his justifications by adding that the cats’ victims are “baby quail” and presses for her endorsement with the tag “Awright?” (line 70). Janice’s response comes after a gap, and is again minimal (Line 72: “Sure”), and thus is no more convincingly sincere than her prior responses. After a notable gap during which each may have been waiting for more from the other without having anything more to add, Peter evidently concludes they had reached a completion point, and he changes the subject to ask about what she did over the weekend he was gone, without resistance from Janice.

4. Conclusion

Interactions are by definition sites in which people engage each other in inherently dialogical activities, by which we mean that participants perform their actions in relation to one or more prior actions and possible upcoming actions on the way to bringing about some practical or social end result. Accordingly, we need to consider the particular activity or activities in which the participants are engaged to appreciate the way a succession of action pairs are related.

But this does not account for the launching of the activity and the duration of the participants' engagement in it. The cases we examine indicate that when particular activities are launched, that represents the start point of a bounded segment. In such cases, the participants sustain whatever activity the matter at hand engenders for working through it until they reach closure and bring about a completion point. But as the cases we examine show, once an activity is launched, it does not always go smoothly. This is arguably what happened in the second case we examined, Will's disclosure of marital disaffection. After Will's co-workers flagged the disclosure as objectionable, rather than engage in a remedial exchange, he engaged in an effort to secure their belief in his seriousness while the others engaged in an effort to get Will to retract his disclosure or at least end that line of talk.

To shed light on such occurrences, we need to examine ways in which start points are created as well as investigate how the participants shape their contributions to respond to the prior talk and anticipate possible upcoming talk that might lead them towards closure, as we have started doing here. This requires attention not just to the talk itself, but to the cultural knowledge, interpersonal knowledge, and/or institutional knowledge on which the participants depend for understanding what matter is being introduced for them to work through and what activity is called for to work through it.

References

- Drew, Paul. 1998. "Complaints about transgressions and misconduct." *Research on Language and Social Interaction* 31(3-4): 295-325. doi:10.1080/08351813.1998.9683595
- Drew, Paul and Kathy Chilton. 2000. "Calling just to keep in touch: regular and habitualised telephone calls as an environment for small talk." In *Small Talk*, ed. by J. Coupland, 137-162. Harlow, England: Longman.
- Emerson, Robert M. 2015. *Everyday troubles: The Micro-Politics of Interpersonal Conflict*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. doi:10.7208/chicago/9780226238135.001.0001
- Fox, Barbara 2015. "On the notion of pre-request." *Discourse Studies* 17(1): 41-63. doi:10.1177/1461445614557762
- Goffman, Erving. 1971. *Relations in Public: Microstudies of the Public Order*. New York: Basic Books, Inc.
- Hewitt, John P. and Randall Stokes. 1975. "Disclaimers." *American Sociological Review* 40(1): 1-11. doi:10.2307/2094442
- Jefferson, Gail. 1984. "On stepwise transition from talk about a trouble to inappropriately next-positioned matters." In *Structures of Social Action: Studies in Conversation Analysis*, ed. by John Maxwell Atkinson and John Heritage, 191-222. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Pomerantz, Anita. 1984. "Agreeing and disagreeing with assessments: Some features of preferred/dispreferred turn shapes." In *Structures of Social Action: Studies in Conversation Analysis*, ed. by John Maxwell Atkinson and John Heritage, 57-101. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

- Sacks, Harvey. 1992. *Lectures on Conversation*, Vol. 1 and 2, ed. by Gail Jefferson. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
- Sanders, Robert E. 2003. "Conversational socializing on marine VHF radio: Adapting laughter and other practices to the technology in use." In *Studies in Language and Social Interaction*, ed. by Phillip Glenn, Curtis LeBaron, and Jenny Mandelbaum, 309–326. Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum.
- Schegloff, Emanuel A. 1995. "Discourse as an interactional achievement III: The omnirelevance of action." *Research on Language and Social Interaction* 28(3): 185–211.
doi:10.1207/s15327973rlsi2803_2
- Schegloff, Emanuel A. and Gene H. Lerner. 2009. "Beginning to respond: Well-prefaced responses to wh-questions." *Research on Language and Social Interaction* 42(2): 91–115.
doi:10.1080/08351810902864511
- Scott, Marvin B. and Stanford Lyman. 1968. "Accounts." *American Sociological Review* 33(1): 46–62. doi:10.2307/2092239
- Sterponi, Laura. 2003. "Account episodes in family discourse: the making of morality in everyday interaction." *Discourse Studies* 5(1): 79–100. doi:10.1177/14614456030050010401
- Sterponi, Laura. 2014. "Caught red-handed: How Italian parents engage children in moral discourse and action." In *Talking about Right and Wrong*, ed. by Cecilia Wainryb and Holly E. Recchia, 122–142. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. doi:10.1017/CBO9781139207072.008
- Weigand, Edda. 2010. *Dialogue: The Mixed Game*. Amsterdam: John Benjamins. doi:10.1075/ds.10
- Weigand, Edda. 2014. "Rationality of performance." *Philosophia Scientiae* 18(3): 1–21.

Dialogicity in written language use

Variation across expert action games

Marina Bondi

University of Modena and Reggio Emilia (Italy)

The chapter looks at dialogicity in written language use, focusing on how expert knowledge is recontextualized in different action games. Using a corpus of journal articles, newspaper columns and blog posts by the same author (Paul Krugman), the analysis centres on: (a) participants (the expert community, the writer and the reader), (b) communicative action and (c) the evaluative dialogue between writer and reader. The study highlights that research action games take scholarly debates as their starting point and involve the expert community, while knowledge dissemination recontextualizes expert argument in a wider participation framework: columns highlight the authority of the writer by presenting a self-contained argument; blogs present the post as the opening move of a polylogue addressing different participants.

Keywords: dialogicity, academic language use, research and knowledge dissemination, journal articles, columns, blog posts

1. Introduction

Studies on academic language use have paid increasing attention to the dialogic and interactive aspects of written communication (Hunston 1994, 2000; Hyland 2000, 2005b; Thompson 2001), focusing on how authors negotiate meanings with their readers showing involvement, solidarity and respect for their readers' views. Intersubjective positioning is identified as a key issue and often looked at in a dialogic perspective. Whether academic language use is considered from a sociological point of view or from the perspective of language for academic purposes, the widely held perception is that writing does not take place in isolation and that verbal action is always performed dialogically. Following Bakhtin's (1981) view that dialogicity is not an exclusive property of a specific type of language use but it is rather the constitutive basis of any language use, studies on academic language use have

often looked at the different ways in which dialogicity characterizes different action games. The notion of language as dialogue suggests conceptualizing the components of language as action and reaction in communication (Weigand 2010a) and identifying language-in-use with language-as-dialogue (Weigand 2009, 2010b: 506). Communicative acts are understood in relation to the reactive utterances that readers/hearers are expected to fulfil. This naturally involves exploring the complexity of the sequences of utterances that manifest interactivity in written texts. The aim of this study is to explore the communicative means that manifest dialogicity within the framework of the notion of “dialogic action game” (Weigand 2009: 265): how far do the resources manifesting dialogicity characterize different action games?

The chapter is structured as follows. Section 2 deals with the background literature on the dialogicity of written texts and proposes a grid for the analysis of dialogic features, including participants-oriented features, action-oriented features and traces of an evaluative dialogue between the writer and the reader. Section 3 presents a case study of different action games (including research and knowledge dissemination) performed by the same scholar: Paul Krugman. Section 4 provides a qualitative analysis of markers and patterns of interaction in the text of a research paper, following the analytical grid proposed. The next two sections present an overview of the quantitative data that characterize dialogicity in the corpus of research articles and in two knowledge dissemination action games: newspaper columns and online blog posts.

2. Background: The dialogicity of academic writing

When considering academic language use as a field of human (social) activity, dialogicity can be seen at play on at least two levels: the level of the internal dialogue between the writer and the reader and the level of the external dialogue between participants in the discourse community, including other internal and external voices. Authors may indeed interact in different ways with readers and with other researchers.

The attention paid by specialized discourse studies to interactivity and interpersonality in written language use can be related first of all to the importance that the notion of “discourse community” has had in the definition of specialized genres (Swales 1990). The notion has proved to be fruitful and problematic at the same time: communities of specialists may provide the dominant needs for the emergence of new genres and for the establishment of conventions, but specialists also communicate with non-specialists. And yet, scholars are always making their claims in the light of current debates: scientific communities do not only influence the conventions of writing, they constitute an essential element which crucially influences language use.

From this point of view, each single publication can be seen as a step in an ongoing dialogue, acting both as an initiation and as a response in the scientific debate. Research publications normally present their arguments after reviewing the relevant literature and placing their own work in the context of ongoing debates, often outlining patterns of conflict and consensus (Hunston 1993, 2004, 2005) sometimes to the point of direct agonism and ritualized adversativeness (Tannen 2002). The dialogic nature of disciplinary language use can be seen most clearly when looking at argumentation (Van Eemeren and Garssen 2008) and at controversies in history (Barrotta and Dascal 2005; Dascal 1989; Dascal and Boantz 2011; Dascal and Chang 2007; Fritz 2010). Today, on the other hand, the extended participation framework of the web, and the potentially non-finite set of intertextual relations that texts can establish in virtual arenas, make the study of dialogicity even more complex, for the difficulty of identifying a specific discourse community and describing the patterns of writer/reader dialogue with a specific reader in mind.

Academic publications always represent different voices. According to some, they even “dramatize” these voices (see Nølke et al. 2004; Fløttum 2005): research articles can be seen as polyphonic dramatizations where the author interacts with different positions in order to present his/her own point of view. The most obvious tool of this representation of different voices is provided by attribution, a topic that has attracted considerable attention among academic discourse scholars. Building on the distinction introduced by Sinclair (1982) between *averral* (where the reader can assume that the responsibility for each proposition lies with the speaker or writer) and *attribution* (where a proposition is indicated as deriving from a source), Swales (1990) has drawn attention to the different pragmatic implications of integral and non-integral citations and parenthetical citations. Following Swales’ seminal work, studies on citation in research genres have been particularly prominent, variously paying attention to the different evaluative meanings expressed (Hunston 2000) and the ways in which citation practices vary across disciplines (Hyland 1999; Thompson and Tribble 2001; Charles 2006) and reviewing practices (Diani 2009; Soler Monral and Gil-Salom 2014; Kwan and Chan 2014). The issue has also been studied with a view to cross-linguistic analyses (Soler-Monreal and Gil-Salom 2011; Gil-Salom and Soler-Monreal 2014, Dontcheva-Navratilova 2016) and to the native/non-native speaker status of the writer (Pecorari 2006) or to national/international circulation (Hewing et al. 2010). It is also important to remember that most of these studies, while not always referring to Tannen’s notion of “constructed dialogue” (Tannen 1989), generally acknowledge that reference to other voices in the text establishes a form of “constructed dialogue” by which the author constructs a dialogic interrelationship between the writer, the authors quoted and the target reader that is functional to the communicative purpose of the text.

Explicit attribution is certainly not the only manifestation of a dialogue with the reader and the community. The analysis of academic language use as interaction has also contributed to studying the nature and structure of communicative events in academic contexts, especially the rhetorical organization of written academic genres (Swales 1990; Bhatia 1993; Hyland 2000). The field has been characterized by great attention to language as action and to functional sequences of language acts. Genre analysis typically develops an interest in how different communicative events deploy the communicative resources of language in ways that are both conventional and functional to the purpose of the interactants, thus including both writer and reader of a written text.

In describing the structure of research paper introductions, for example, Swales has developed a model – “CARS” (Create A Research Space) – based on sequences of communicative acts responding to two types of challenges: creating a rhetorical space and attracting readers into that space (e.g. Swales and Feak 2004). Move 1 (*Establishing a Territory*) takes the scientific community as its starting point: it is realized by demonstrating that a general area of research is worthy of investigation and by introducing and reviewing key sources of prior research in that area to show where gaps exist or where prior research has been inadequate. Move 2 (*Establishing a Niche*) introduces the specific research by indicating a gap in previous research, challenging assumptions or raising a question. Move 3 (*Occupying the Niche*) announces the purposes of the research and describes the remaining organizational structure of the paper.

In an interactional perspective, academic writing clearly shows traces of different types of dialogue: scholars do not only reflect the debates taking place in the scientific community, they also construct an on-going written dialogue with their readers (e.g. Fløttum et al. 2006: 159–214). The typical structure of introductions outlined above clearly reflects both preoccupations: placing one’s work in the context of scientific debate and guiding the reader through one’s own text. In studies on the dialogue with readers, specific attention is often paid to language elements that realize the distinctive capacity of language use to refer to itself.

This capacity for self-reference is often identified as “reflexivity” or “metadiscourse”. If reflexivity is the term used for the capacity of language to refer to itself (as of Lyons 1977: 5), reference to “discourse reflexivity”, “metadiscourse” or “meta-communication” normally implies awareness of the interactive aspects of language use. The notion of metadiscourse was originally proposed by Vande Kopple (1985) and Crismore (1989) with reference mainly to academic writing. It reflected, however, a general interest in reflexivity, i.e. in an “interactive plane” of discourse, to follow Sinclair’s terminology (1982/2004). In this perspective, communicative intents are realised “in a continuous negotiation between participants” (Sinclair 1985: 15), often referred to as “the internalization of dialogue” (2004: 102 ff.).

The role of reflexivity in the linear structure of both spoken and written language use is further explored in Sinclair and Mauranen's "organizational units", elements in the linear structure of discourse that "help manage the utterance and the discourse", especially "turn taking, changes of topic and the interrelations among chunks of content and stretches of discourse" (2006: 60). An important distinction they make is that between interactive and text-oriented organizational units. Interactive units aim at initiating the interaction and maintaining it by framing and focusing moves, while text-oriented units focus on segments of the message and point to textual sequences and textual coherence. Text-oriented units become more prominent in written use, but both types of units are present and needed to realize the aim of the writer and to establish and manage the dialogue with the reader.

A typical feature of written discourse reflexivity is the need to highlight the general structure and topic sequence of formally monologic texts. This is often done with specific meta-statements, as in the authors' use of a so-called "road map" as part of an introduction (Swales and Feak 2004), indicating the outline of the article structure (see also Bondi 2010). Such devices are clearly useful in supporting the understanding of longer texts.

Obvious signals of writer-reader dialogue are personal pronouns like *you*, *I* or *we* (Hyland 2002a; Fløttum 2005; Fløttum et al. 2006; Harwood 2005a, 2005b; Lorés Sanz 2008), as well as interrogatives and imperatives (Hyland 2002b; Fløttum et al. 2006) or direct and indirect addresses to the reader: *you might wonder, you should be able to realize*, etc. All of these features presuppose and explicitly mark the presence of a reader "in the text" (Thompson 2001), whose attention is captured and selectively focused on key issues or junctures in the writer's argument, whether we are dealing with more expository or more argumentative writing: "Readers may be asked to draw inferences, to make objections, at times even to assume a given ideological position, only to be brought to agreement with the writer by successive steps in the argumentative sequence" (Bondi 1997). Hyland speaks of reader's engagement, i.e. writers' "recognizing the presence of their readers, pulling them along with their argument, focusing their attention, acknowledging their uncertainties, including them as discourse participants, and guiding them to interpretations." (Hyland 2005a: 178). Textual markers of reader's presence in the text may vary diachronically (Hyland and Feng 2016) and cross-culturally (Mur Dueñas 2008).

Hyland's definition of metadiscourse (Hyland 2000, 2005b, 2009) is extensive, thus including a wide range of phenomena that help us conceptualize the interaction between the writer and the reader through the text.¹ Hyland's work has been

1. Under the heading of "interactive metadiscourse" he lists the features used to organize information in ways that are likely to be coherent and convincing for the intended audience (2005b: 50): transition markers (*similarly*), frame markers (labelling discourse act, e.g. *to*

extremely influential in academic discourse studies, both in drawing attention to the persuasive nature of academic language use and in focusing on a writer's development of an appropriate relationship with readers through expressions of stance and engagement. His focus on writer's stance and reader's engagement contributes to a dialogic view of academic discourse: always presenting and supporting a position, and at the same time projecting the communicative needs and reactions of a potential audience. Readers have a constitutive role in how writers construct their claims, as the recognition of alternative voices is essential to consensus-making in academic argument (see also Hyland 2014).

The recognition of alternative views is also central in Appraisal Theory (Martin and White 2005), where specific evaluative resources are identified as Engagement. This definition of Engagement is different from Hyland's, but equally central to a description of academic interaction and certainly particularly apt to catch the resources that realize Bakhtinian dialogism: i.e. the resources by which speakers/writers adopt a stance towards what they say, and acknowledge (or do not acknowledge) the existence of other positions. These resources have traditionally been treated under headings such as "modality, polarity, evidentiality, intensification, attribution, concession and consequentiality" (Martin and White 2005: 94). In Appraisal Theory they are looked at in dialogic terms, in terms of their contribution to intersubjective positioning rather than to truth conditions.

In this perspective, readers are always "engaged" in dialogue with writers, irrespective of their explicit marked presence in the text, because writers are always negotiating positions of alignment/disalignment with a reader, both when they make categorical assertions (that construe the text as monoglossic, not open to discussion) and when they make tentative assertions (that construe the text as heteroglossic, i.e. open to discussion). Martin and White (2005: 102) speak of "dialogic expansion" when the utterance makes allowances for dialogically alternative positions and of "dialogic contraction" when the utterance tends to restrict the scope of dialogically alternative positions.

The study of evaluative language has been central to studies on academic language use for at least two decades. Work by Hunston (Hunston and Thompson 2000; Hunston 2011) has been extremely influential in this area. Drawing together elements of language that may otherwise be classified in different ways, Hunston

summarize), endophoric markers (e.g. *see figure*), evidentials (attribution to sources) and code glosses (additional explanations). "Interactional metadiscourse", on the other hand, refers to resources that involve readers in negotiating the author's perspective: hedges and boosters (variously acknowledging or excluding alternative views), attitude markers (indicating the writer's affective attitude), self-mention and engagement markers (reader pronouns, imperatives and references to shared knowledge).

(2000) shows how evaluations of both Status (modality and evidentiality) and Value (attitudinal meanings expressing desirability in terms of good/bad) contribute to authorial positioning and at the same time to reader positioning and textual structuring.

The key role of these resources in academic action games may of course be seen to depend on the specific nature of academic communication, which is widely acknowledged today as inherently argumentative and persuasive (Hyland 2000, 2005b, 2014; Livnat 2012; Zaleska 2014). From a dialogic point of view, academic writing can be classified as a “representative” speech act, and should be seen as part of an action game which is fulfilled by the acceptance of the claim (Weigand 2009: 36 and 2010a).

Any academic speech act is both a response to prior action and the potential initiation of further exchange. The dialogic dimensions of this exchange is inevitably characterized by the different levels we have considered here and the features to be observed – reflexive and evaluative – depend on the perspective we adopt in analysing the action game. I would like to distinguish three perspectives, depending on the elements we focus on: the participants, the action itself (with its structure) and the evaluative dimension of the dialogic action.

In a participant-oriented perspective, the relevant dialogic features are those that manifest the ongoing dialogue on both discourse planes (Sinclair 1982): dialogue with the community and reader-writer dialogue. These include forms of attribution and forms of explicit reference to a writer and a reader. On the one hand, this will mean paying attention to the general or specific identity of the voices involved, the choice of markers of attribution (*according to ...*, *discuss*, *claim*, *show*, etc.), involving different forms and degrees of evaluation of the other voices and of their claims, as well as other signals of consensus and conflict with other textual voices (e.g. *he rightly claims*, *the surprising claim*). On the other hand, one should consider different forms of self-reference (e.g. *we*, *this paper*, *the analysis*) and various representations of the reader-in-the-text: pronouns and forms of direct address such as imperatives and interrogatives. These also contribute to highlighting rhetorical structure, thus introducing a focus on the development of communicative action.

In an action-oriented perspective, the relevant dialogic features will mostly depend on the complexity of the “turn”. This normally requires complex sequences of utterances and extended argument, thus involving more complex cognitive tasks on the part of the Reader. Relevant features will be the (meta-)communicative means expressing “explicitly what is being done” (Weigand 2010a: 143) at a particular point in the sequence of utterances: in other words, different types of organizational units (Sinclair and Mauranen 2006) highlighting the organization and the negotiation of meanings. These will be manifested at different levels, including the visual and verbal organization of the text into sections or phases of action games

in the most complex forms, as well as more specific rhetorical structures guiding readers' understanding, e.g. by means of outlines and meta-statements anticipating or recapitulating textual strings (e.g. *see below for an illustration*) or local organizational units signalling specific relations (e.g. transition markers such as *therefore, thus, notwithstanding that*).

Finally, the perspective interested in evaluative dialogue (partly overlapping with the other two) will focus on evaluation and dialogism: (a) how claims, arguments and attributions are assessed in both epistemic and attitudinal terms, Status and Value in Hunston's terms (Hunston 2000), including markers of relevance, which play a major role in academic argument; (b) how attributions, claims, arguments, reflexive and organizational units position the reader in terms of acknowledging different forms of dialogic contraction or expansion.

Figure 1 summarizes the model, which will be exemplified in the next section. The three main perspectives are represented as overlapping areas identified by labels in grey. The graph also maps relevant resources at different levels of language analysis, with their overlapping.




Figure 1. Towards a model of dialogicity in academic discourse

3. A case study of Paul Krugman

The study of textual dialogicity is well worth exploring in different action games, where different communicative purposes and structures can be expected to reflect different participant identities, or different forms of writer's positioning and inter-subjective positioning of the reader.

The case study of Paul Krugman has been chosen here for the multiplicity of economic writings he has produced: books, research articles, published lectures, reports, newspaper comments, blogs etc. Arguably, we are dealing with a somewhat individual case, as Paul Krugman has been awarded the Nobel prize for economics and has been a leading opinionist in the US for decades. This may of course result in writing practices that cannot be taken to be representative of all economic writing, but should be illustrative of how a single author interprets dialogicity in different action games.

The analysis focuses on three action games – research papers, columns and blog posts – to explore their different potential for dialogicity, paying particular attention to the way they start and direct dialogue. We will focus in particular on the difference between the dialogicity of formally monologic texts such as journal articles and newspaper columns and of formally dialogic written texts such as blogs, in order to explore the nature of blogs and their impact on academic language use. The nature of this dialogue has been further explored elsewhere (Bondi forthcoming). When one considers the extended participation framework offered by the web and the potentially non-finite set of intertextual relations that texts can establish, the problems of defining the kind of interaction they indicate becomes particularly noticeable and questions of discourse pragmatics (cf. Herring et al. 2013) become prominent. Virtual discourse communities are rapidly created, extended and maintained through shared knowledge and forms of communal bonding (Yus 2011: 110). Blogs seem to have had significant impact on science communication, both on the way scientists communicate with peers and on the dissemination of science to the lay public. Scholars often deploy linguistic features typical of personal, informal, and dialogic interaction to create intimacy and proximity, engaging in critical analysis of the recontextualized research and focusing on its relevance, and using explicit and personal expressions of evaluation (Luzón 2013).

For the purpose of this study I have considered a subcorpus of a much larger corpus of materials collected for a wider study of Krugman's scientific production and public statements over the years. In particular I have made use of:

- a. 10 journal articles spanning over 20 years and mapping developments in the “new economic geography” that deserved him the Nobel prize in 2008 “for his analysis of trade patterns and location of economic activity”;² the corpus (KRUG10JAs) comprises ca. 60,000 words and articles have a mean length of 5,878 words;
- b. A corpus of 50 columns published in the *New York Times* and a corpus of 149 related blog posts published on Krugman’s personal blog (“The conscience of a Liberal”, <https://krugman.blogs.nytimes.com/>) collected between 2008 and 2012 (respectively ca 60,000 and 40,000 words); the mean length of posts is 396 words, while the mean length of columns is about 814 words.

The analysis centres on markers of dialogicity according to the three perspectives outlined above, focusing respectively on: (a) the participants; (b) the action; (c) the evaluative dialogue created. These will help me define what might be called the “dialogic profile” of the different action games.

The study combines tools from dialogue studies and corpus linguistics (Bondi 2017), occasionally borrowing notions from argumentative analysis, such as the notion of discourse and counter-discourse in the dialectics of argumentative discourse. Attention is paid to the different ways in which each action game manifests dialogic sequences both intra- and inter-textually.

The first part of the analysis provides a qualitative study of a single research article, meant to illustrate the multiplicity of lexico-grammatical resources that characterize the three perspectives indicated, and the ways in which they contribute to the representation of the position of the writer in relation to the discourse community and the reader.

The second part of the analysis presents the results of a quantitative study of the three modules in the corpus. These were analysed using *Wordsmith Tools 6.0* (Scott 2012). The quantitative study starts with an overview of frequency data of the journal articles corpus and proceeds with an analysis of keywords, as calculated

2. “Increasing Returns and Economic Geography”, *Journal of Political Economy*, 1991: 99, 483–99; “First Nature, Second Nature and Metropolitan Location”, *Journal of Regional Science*, 1993: 33, 129–144; “Complex Landscapes in Economic Geography”, *American Economic Review* 1994: 84, 412–16; co-authored with M. Fujita, “The new economic geography: Past, present and the future”, *Papers Reg. Sci.*, 2004: 83, 139–164; co-authored with A. Venables, “Globalization and the inequality of nations”, *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 1995: 110, 857–880; “Space: The Final Frontier”, *Journal of Economic Perspectives*, 1998: 12, 161–174; “What’s new about the New Economic geography?”, *Oxford Review of Economic Policy*, 1998: 14, 7–17; “The Increasing Returns Revolution in Trade and Geography”, *American Economic Review* 2009, 99: 3, 561–571; “The theory of Interstellar Trade”, *Economic Inquiry*, 2010: 48, 1119–23; “The New Economic Geography, Now Middle-aged” *Regional Studies*, 2011: 45, 1 – 7.

by *Wordsmith*. The software identifies as keywords word forms with frequencies that are higher or lower than an expected standard in statistically significant ways. Contrasting the wordlists obtained from the three subcorpora, we can get an indication of what might be the distinctive features of each genre, i.e. those that vary in statistically significant ways across the three corpora.

Within the economy of the present study, attention was paid to potential dialogic markers that are manifested as word forms, ignoring for example the occurrences of syntactic features such as imperatives (e.g. *Consider the following examples*). The corpus was not tagged or annotated, as the point was to show more generally how quantitative data can contribute to outlining a profile of dialogicity across different action games.

Keywords were calculated by comparing the journal articles corpus with the columns and the blog posts. Comparison between columns and posts was also carried out to complete the profiling. Attention was paid to both positive keywords (those that are significantly more frequent in the first corpus or text) and negative keywords (those that are significantly less frequent and therefore more frequent in the corpus used for reference).

Concordances were checked to select relevant features in wordlists and keyword lists as well as to categorize elements. The word form *like* for example was included in the list and categorized as an organizational unit because the only function with relevant frequency was that of introducing examples. Similarly, the word form *good* though rather frequent was not taken into consideration as an evaluative expression as its use proved to be quite expectedly nominal rather than adjectival. Others like *comparative* were also excluded because found in the largely accepted term *comparative advantage* and therefore thought to be more relevant in terms of profiling the topic or the “aboutness” of the corpus than its dialogic features.

Many of the forms included would of course require a close analysis that lies outside the scope of this paper. The word form *do* is a case in point: it certainly deserves pride of place among markers of dialogicity, as it variously signals interrogatives (*What do I mean by that? How do you assess stories?*), (contrastive) emphasis (*rivers and ports do matter; insiders really do have the key*) or negation (in combination with *not*). Other occurrences, however, are forms of the general verb in various phraseological combinations and do not count as dialogic. The complexity of many common word forms certainly deserves more specific attention than we can provide here.

Concordances were not only studied to identify the effective role played by dialogic uses in the occurrences, but also at times to consider other relevant co-textual factors, such as those identified by Sinclair (1996) as “semantic preference”, the tendency of a word form to co-occur with lexical elements characterized by specific semantic traits, and “semantic prosody”, its tendency to associate with specific combinations of meanings, as well as with positive or negative values.

4. Dialogicity in research articles

The section first provides an extensive qualitative analysis of a key text and then presents an overview of features characterizing research articles.

4.1 Focus on Krugman (1991)

The article under scrutiny (“Increasing Returns and Economic Geography”) is the 1991 paper that is often identified as the starting point of the new economic geography (cf. the scientific background compiled by the prize Committee of the Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences, 3). Building on previous work on economies of scale and international trade, the article presents the so-called core-periphery model. The paper develops a model of how a country can “endogenously become differentiated into a an industrialized ‘core’ and an agricultural ‘periphery’ (1991: 483), as manufacturing firms tend to locate in regions with larger demand, depending on transportation costs, economies of scale and the share of manufacturing in national income.

The introduction places the paper in the context of a general lack of attention for economic geography in economic theory, while highlighting that aspects of economic geography such as regional concentration of manufacturing are regarded as important in urban studies and industrial organization theory, and above all in the perception of non-experts. This amounts to Establishing the territory and Establishing the niche, according to the CARS model (see above). The introduction then moves on to Occupying the niche, by stating that the purpose of the paper is to develop a model that might incorporate the role of geographical concentration, based on the interaction of economies of scale with transportation costs. The introduction concludes with an outline of the four sections following:

- (1) Section 1 sets the stage with an informal discussion of the problem. Section 2 then sets out the analytical model. In Section 3, I analyse the determination of short-run equilibrium and dynamics. Section 4 analyses the conditions under which concentration of manufacturing production does and does not occur.

(p. 484)

The main argumentative structure of the paper is that of much model-based economic reasoning: the first section identifies the relevant literature and discusses the assumptions of former accounts of diversification, refuting them and defining the postulates that inform the model to be presented. The new model is proposed on the basis of a simplified scenario (two regions with two kinds of production) and previous work. The model is then tested to study short-term and long-term

equilibrium and to explore the necessary conditions for manufacturing concentration, the factors that work against regional divergence and the implications. The argument is developed analytically, relying heavily on mathematical demonstration.

4.2 Participants-oriented perspective

4.2.1 *The community*

Krugman chooses to produce a very sketchy account of the “territory” in the introduction, highlighting the scarcity of economic research focused on regional concentration of manufacturing. The account involves both a specific reference to a particular study and generic references to organizational theory and the *layman*. As far as economic theory is concerned, the “niche” is prepared by mentioning *few notable exceptions* and *emerging trends* in *recent literature*. In the section exploring bases for regional divergence, Krugman depicts *most of the literature* as following Marshall in identifying reasons for localization and refers appreciatively to Hoover (*a particularly clear discussion of agglomeration economies*). After acknowledging that these accounts have *considerable validity*, he proposes *a somewhat different approach* focusing on why manufacturing might end up concentrated in one area. The preliminary discussion draws on a few references for their classic schemes or specific expressions, while restating the goal of incorporating observations by geographers into a *simple yet rigorous model*.

The development of the model requires another couple of references (adding up to 14 altogether), while 3 self-references are introduced to be able to draw on arguments developed elsewhere. Most of the citations are again limited to either general indication of the account proposed or mention of a specific denomination. Only two citations (Hoover 1948; Dixit and Stiglitz 1977) are actually also explicitly evaluated, respectively as *clear discussion* and *remarkably powerful framework*. Authors like Marshall and Samuelson are referred to without any explicit citation: this depicts them as pillars of the discipline, whose theory is well known and requires no reference.

4.2.2 *Self-reference and reference to the reader*

Apart from the three self-citations already mentioned, the paper exemplifies careful use of a range of forms of self-mention, which I will identify as “personal” when realized through first person pronouns *I* and *we* and “locational” when based on self-reference nouns like *paper*, *article*, *study*, *analysis* etc. (see also Bondi 2014). The communicative purpose is attributed to the study itself by locational self-reference (*The purpose of this paper is*), while further explanation is introduced by inclusive *we* and personal self-reference (*what we shall see is that it is possible to develop a very*

simple model). The outline privileges locational self-reference (Section 1, 2 and 4), but first person singular reference is chosen for Section 3, the analysis of short-run equilibrium according to the model proposed.

In the literature review, when refuting existing theories, the writer introduces *I* to foreground the novelty of his approach:

- (2) These accounts of industry localization surely have considerable validity. In this paper, however, I shall offer a somewhat different approach aimed at answering a somewhat different question. Instead of asking [...], I shall ask [...]. I shall also adopt the working assumption that. (p. 485)

Once the assumptions are developed, the advantages of the new approach are presented again with an inclusive *we* (*by focusing on pecuniary externalities, we are able to make the analysis much more concrete than if we allowed ...*). The purpose is again attributed to *this paper* and inclusive *we* is used consistently to signal steps in language use, marking basic assumptions and basic operations in the mathematical demonstration (*before we move on to this model, this is about as far as an informal story can take us; we consider a model of two regions; we let L1 and L2 be [...]; we turn next to the structure of transportation; we shall use this common agricultural price/wage rate as numeraire; we can now turn to the behavior of firms*), only to go back to first person singular when rounding up the model: *I have now laid out the basic structure of the model*.

Analytical Sections 3 and 4 make extensive use of the inclusive *we* that characterizes mathematical demonstration, with reference to both cognitive and verbal procedures (*we then suppose, we begin by looking at, we move from short-run to long-run equilibrium, etc.*). Two occurrences of general-reference *one* strike as mapping patterns of alignment and disalignment: the first one introduces the final step in the demonstration of the first conclusion as to short-run equilibrium and the second introduces a counter-argument to be refuted in the study of long-term equilibrium.

The final section re-introduces the pronoun *I* to present the denomination of a specific term (*I shall refer to such a hypothetical firm as a "defecting" firm*) and to underline the main point of the article in the concluding sentence: *I hope that this paper will be a stimulus to a revival of research into regional economics and economic geography*.

On the whole there is no explicit reference to the reader with second person pronoun. The reader is involved rather by way of inclusive *we* in occurrences that mark the steps in the argumentation. This is also shown by noticeable use of interrogatives and imperatives.

4.2.3 *Interrogatives and imperatives*

The fact that direct and indirect questions are often used to set the general and specific topics of the research will come as no surprise. The text comprises 9 questions: the first (Example 3) sets the general research question of the paper; the series of questions in the literature review (Example 4) highlight the specificity of the approach proposed and detail the general question; Example 5 marks an important development in the presentation of the model, while Example 6 (from the final section) marks a crucial point in the demonstration.

- (3) Why and when does manufacturing become concentrated in a few regions, leaving others relatively undeveloped? (p. 484)
- (4) how far does a technological spillover spill? [...] And Where will manufactures production take place? [...] But where will demand be large? [...] How far will the tendency toward geographical concentration proceed, and where will manufacturing production actually end up? (p. 485–486)
- (5) We may now ask the crucial question: “How does ω_1/ω_2 vary with f ? We know by symmetry that when $f = 1/2$, that is, when the two regions have equal numbers of workers, they offer equal real wage rates. But is this a stable equilibrium? (p. 492)
- (6) Now we ask: Is it possible for an individual firm to commence production profitably in region 2? (p. 494)

It is thus clear that questions, while formally manifesting the presence of an interlocutor, are extremely useful in guiding the reading process, in that they structure the analytical thinking of the reader on the basis of the cognitive process chosen by the writer.

Imperatives play a very similar role. Their intense presence here is typical of mathematical reasoning. They are used to: (a) share with the reader given data or postulates (and of course at the same time construct the scenario on which the whole reasoning is based): *Suppose that there are a large number of manufacturing firms, each producing a single product*; (b) share conventional formulae: *Define Z_{11} as the ratio of region 1 expenditure on local manufactures to that on manufactures from the other region*; (c) focus the reader’s attention on the rationale of the argument or on specific sequences: *First note what we want to do with [...]; let us begin then with the most straightforward of the parameters*.

It will soon be apparent that the same role could be played by meta-statements with inclusive *we* guiding the reader through the text (*next we turn to transportation costs*). Irrespective of form, reference to the reader is usually accompanied by reference to the cognitive procedures of the reading process, thus leading us into the action-oriented perspective.

4.3 Action-oriented perspective

From the point of view of action-oriented elements, i.e. the verbal communicative means that organize the sequence of utterances into what can be perceived as coherent action, we consider all the reflexive elements that structure language use at different levels. Three formal categories become prominent: meta-statements anticipating or recapitulating units of the text, labelling nouns used to refer to (and to categorize and evaluate) units of the text (see Charles 2003; Thompson 2012; Feng and Hyland 2015, 2016) and transition markers or connectors.

At the level of the whole text, the division into an abstract, an introduction and four sections is signalled by lay-out and many other reflexive structures. These include headings indicating what counts as an 'introduction' or 'section', as well as the outline of the four main sections offered at the end of the introduction (See Example 1 above).

Many examples of reflexive statements have already been noticed in relation to the use of first-person pronouns. These are often found in meta-statements used to highlight the organization of the paper (*We may now ask the crucial question, Next we turn to transportation costs* etc.). Statements of this kind typically signal a significant change of topic or perspective. Their use is particularly marked at the end of sections. Examples 7, 8 and 9 illustrate the way the writer marks the end of one major step in reasoning and the beginning of a new one, in Sections 1, 2 and 3 respectively:

- (7) This is about as far as an informal story can take us. The next step is to develop as simple a formal model as possible to see whether the story just told can be given a more rigorous formulation. (p. 487)
- (8) I have now laid out the basic structure of the model. The next step is to turn to the determination of equilibrium. (p. 490)
- (9) It is possible to proceed entirely numerically from this point. If we take a somewhat different approach, however, it is possible to characterize the properties of the model analytically. (p. 495)

At a more local level, organizational units highlight the argumentative sequences of the text. Together with reflexive statements and labelling nouns, we might list here transition markers and frame markers: adjuncts or conjuncts signalling either the relationship between utterances or the function of the utterance they introduce. The most obvious signals are those that outline the sequence of topics or arguments produced by the writer. This involves typically temporal markers (*We can now turn to the behavior of firms*) or markers of temporal sequence, such as *first*, *second* and *third*. Other important items in this perspective are labelling nouns. In Example 6, for instance, the expression *three reasons* gives the reader instructions as to what to expect; the subsequent text, quite unsurprisingly, lists the three reasons anticipated:

- (10) Most of the literature in this area follows Marshall in identifying **three reasons** for localization. **First**, the concentration of several firms in a single location offers a pooled market for workers with industry specific skills, [...]. **Second**, localized industries can support the production of non-tradable specialized inputs. **Third**, informational spillovers can give clustered firms a better production function than isolated producers. (p. 484–485)

Examples of meta-argumentative labelling nouns – nouns that signal the role of the utterance within the structure of the argument – are quite frequent in the text, whether referring forward (as in the example above) or backward (*The implications of these results can be seen diagrammatically*).

The writer can guide the reader through the logical steps of an argumentation in different ways. From a dialogic point of view, the most significant sequence is probably that of concessive patterns. Concessive constructions involve two propositions: one proposition is conceded and admitted to be valid, but immediately followed by a proposition which is presented as more valid than the first (somehow against the expectations created by the first). Formally, concessive constructions can be encoded in different kinds of hypotactic and paratactic constructions, ranging from prepositional phrases (e.g. with *despite*), to subclauses (e.g. with *although*) to sentence adverbs (e.g. *however*). Example 6 clearly marks the conceded sentence with *admittedly* and the writer's claim with *however*:

- (11) **Admittedly**, models descended from von Thünen [...] play an important role in urban studies, [...]. On the whole, **however**, it seems fair to say that the study of economic geography plays at best a marginal role in economic theory. (p. 483)

Occurrences of this kind signal the writer's awareness of possible objections on the part of the reader: having said that little attention has been paid to economic geography, Krugman acknowledges that there has been interest in other areas, only to be able to state more explicitly that economic theory should also pay attention. Similarly, in leading up to the conclusion of the paper, the writer acknowledges potential criticisms of his work by conceding the weaknesses of his model (*obviously*), only to highlight its strength (*however*), before restating the main point (*thus*).

- (12) **Obviously** this is a vastly oversimplified model even of the core periphery issue, and it says nothing about the localization of particular industries. The model does illustrate, **however**, how tools drawn from industrial organization theory can help to formalize and sharpen the insights of a much-neglected field. **Thus** I hope that this paper will be a stimulus to a revival of research into regional economics and economic geography. (p. 498)

Another important pattern is that of inferential sequences, where the writer signals a shift from given assumptions and postulates to the inferences that can (and should) be drawn from them and their potential implications.

- (13) We can **now** turn to the behavior of firms. Suppose that there are a large number of manufacturing firms, each producing a single product. **Then given** the definition of the manufacturing aggregate (2) and the assumption of iceberg transport costs, the elasticity of demand facing any individual firm is $\sigma[\dots]$. The profit-maximizing pricing behavior of a representative firm in region 1 is **therefore** to set a price equal to $[\dots]$ **If** there is free entry of firms into manufacturing, profits must be driven to zero. **Thus** it must be true that $[\dots]$ (p. 489)

This last example also shows quite clearly that dialogic features often act in synergy and come in clusters. The whole sequence above relies on at least three types of expressions. First, there are communicative means that express the relationship to be established between utterances, such as *now* and *then*, signalling temporal sequence, or *given*, *therefore*, *if* and *thus*, signalling conditions and consequences. Then, there are units that frame steps in the action game in terms of their function in the ongoing dialogue between the writer and the reader (*turn to*, *suppose*). Finally there are modal expressions, such as *can*, *is ...to* or *must* (*be true that*), acknowledging the need to negotiate meanings (vs. bare assertions, presented as somewhat unquestionable). The spectrum of possibilities leads us to the ever present role of an evaluative dialogue between participants.

4.4 Evaluative dialogue

Expert writers constantly express their position as to the truth value of the statements they make and as to the validity of their own arguments (modal claims). They also express evaluations oriented to their system of values or to the relevance of their own arguments, rather than truth conditions. The presence of evaluative elements in a representative action game does not change its nature; quite the contrary: evaluating and taking position is ~~in~~ an inherent element of communication (cf. Weigand 2010a: 201). The communicative resources of evaluative dialogue as defined here thus include both the whole range of expressions of modality (modal verbs, periphrases and adverbs) and attitudinal evaluations in positive and negative terms (e.g. *good vs bad*) or evaluations of importance. This evaluative dialogue overlaps with the previous two perspectives in that it contributes to constructing the identity of the participants and to representing the structure of the communicative action performed.

Extract 14 exemplifies the intensity of modal expressions in mathematical demonstration.

- (14) In order to produce in region 2, a firm **must be able to** attract workers. To do so, it **must** compensate them for the fact that all manufactures (except its own infinitesimal contribution) **must** be imported; thus, we **must** have [...]. Given this higher wage, the firm **will** charge a profit-maximizing price that is higher than that of other firms in the same proportion. We **can** use this fact to derive the value of the firm's sales. In region 1, the defecting firm's value of sales **will** be the value of sales of a representative firm times [...]. In region 2, its value of sales **will** be [...], so the total value of the defecting firm's sales **will** be ...
- (p. 494)

The reader is guided through the demonstration and presented with a strong degree of certainty and predictability that opens very little space for disagreement. If dialogic contraction tends to dominate the sections where the argument is developed mathematically, expressions of dialogic expansion are more frequent in the introduction and the literature review, where the use of hedges (acknowledging the possibility of different voices) is quite intense: saying that something is *relatively*, *largely*, *frequently*, *generally* the case, or that it *might* be the case, ascribes the writer different degrees of adhesion while giving the reader greater space for disagreement.

The evaluative dialogue between the writer and the reader does not only concern modal claims, but also simple claims qualified by reference to other values, such as that of 'importance'. Having said that the study of economic geography *plays at best a marginal role in economic theory*, the writer develops this idea further in ways that re-iterate the negative attitude expressed by *marginal* through an anaphoric use of the negative labelling noun *neglect*, followed by a highly evaluative statement of the central problem the writer wants to tackle with his paper:

- (15) On the face of it, this neglect is **surprising**. The facts of economic geography are **surely among the most striking** features of real-world economies, at least to laymen. For example, one of **the most remarkable** things about the United States is that in a generally **sparsely populated**, much of whose land is **fertile**, the **bulk** of the population resides in a **few clusters** of metropolitan areas; a quarter of the inhabitants are **crowded** into a **not especially inviting** section of the East Coast.
- (p. 483)

The adverbial introducing the whole extract – *on the face of it* – signals that what follows is presented as the way the situation seems, in order to show later that it is really different. The peculiarity of the situation is highlighted by boosters (*surely most striking; the most remarkable thing*) that qualify the problematic contrast between the distribution of the population and the expectations that would arise from other data, such as the land being *fertile* and the metropolitan areas *not especially inviting*. The elements that contribute to this evaluative dialogue are manyfold: explicit evaluative expressions, mitigated or intensified expressions, explicit

statements or implications, all leading to the careful construction of an essential phase of the action game of a research paper: problem identification.

Evaluative language use obviously contributes to developing both the writer's identity and the writer's main points. In Example (13) above, for instance, the choice of adjectives constructs the identity of the scholar as attentive to economic processes that explain real world trends, while at the same time focusing the reader's attention on the central issue of the paper.

4.5 The journal articles corpus

An overview of the small corpus of ten articles might provide an interesting background to the analysis carried out above. The articles can be seen as mapping the success of the core-periphery model and monitoring changes in the identity of the writer. The articles employ different formats, including two co-authored papers, one of which in the form of a dialogue. They also show variation in the preferred dialogic features. The increasingly more established authority of the writer is reflected in his adoption of a more conversational style and a more confident use of informal language, such as reference to the Nobel prize as *that Swedish thingie* (2010).

From the point of view of markers of dialogicity, we notice first that what distinguishes the text used for the sample analysis from the other texts in the corpus is only that the adjective *new*, mostly used to refer to the new economic geography, emerges as significantly more frequent in subsequent papers (thus showing the impact of the writer's model). *New* is also the most frequent adjective in the corpus (336 occurrences, 5.2 per thousand words), although its evaluative meaning certainly gets reduced once *new economic geography* becomes the standard denomination of the area of study. The total occurrences of the word form *new* in the journal articles corpus (excluding capitalized *New* for *New York*) are 296, 161 of which are found in the cluster *new economic geography*.

Other evaluative elements may be more significant. Table 1 illustrates the frequencies of potentially evaluative items in the corpus with a frequency of at least 5 occurrences per ten thousand words (pttw). The data highlight the relevance of modal elements, and particularly of predictive *will*, typical of the key speech act in formal economics, where models are expected to be able to predict economic behavior. The range of modal verbs is also accompanied by other expressions of epistemic modality (*possible, potential*) and frequency (*no*), as well as by conspicuous presence of *do* and *does*. Concordance analysis reveals that only 21 occurrences of *do* and 1 of *does* are forms of the general verb, whereas the vast majority of the occurrences are actually dialogic (either as interrogatives or emphatics).

Table 1. Frequency of potentially evaluative word forms

Word Form	Freq.	pttw	Word Form	Freq.	pttw	Word Form	Freq.	pttw
<i>Will</i>	200	33	<i>general</i>	64	11	<i>Could</i>	45	7
<i>Can</i>	182	30	<i>must</i>	61	10	<i>Very</i>	42	7
<i>Would</i>	126	21	<i>possible</i>	60	10	<i>different</i>	40	7
<i>Than</i>	119	20	<i>do</i>	59	10	<i>Larger</i>	39	6
<i>About</i>	100	17	<i>less</i>	55	9	<i>particular</i>	39	6
<i>May</i>	92	15	<i>Potential</i>	55	9	<i>Further</i>	35	6
<i>No</i>	81	13	<i>high</i>	52	9	<i>Should</i>	35	6
<i>Large</i>	74	12	<i>does</i>	52	9	<i>Simple</i>	33	5
<i>Even</i>	72	12	<i>like</i>	52	9	<i>interesting</i>	32	5
<i>Many</i>	70	12	<i>important</i>	48	8	<i>Similar</i>	32	5
<i>Much</i>	70	12	<i>might</i>	46	8	<i>advantage</i>	29	5
<i>Most</i>	66	11	<i>relative</i>	46	8			
<i>Well</i>	65	11	<i>small</i>	46	8			

The table also includes other potentially evaluative elements. These involve hedges and boosters (*about, no, many, much, even, well, very, etc.*), comparative elements (*than, most, less etc.*) and explicit evaluations, including evaluations of importance (*important, interesting*), typically used to guide the reader's attention (*it is important to point out ...*). Some evaluative elements categorize entities in terms of what are perceived as the most relevant dimensions and factors in the analysis (i.e. size: *large, small; high costs*). Others contribute to the development of the argument, specifying cases and outlining general trends (*general, particular*) or qualifying the model (*simple*). It is interesting to see that these point to values that are supposed to be shared by the reader, who is depicted as interested in distinguishing general rules from particular cases and aiming at simplicity rather than complexity.

Table 2 illustrates the frequencies of items actually referring to participants (with at least 5 occurrences pttw).

Table 2. Participants

Word Form	Freq.	pttw	Word Form	Freq.	Freq. pttw	Word Form	Frequency	Freq. pttw
<i>we</i>	266	44	<i>you</i>	64	11	<i>our</i>	46	8
<i>I</i>	179	30	<i>economists</i>	59	10	<i>my</i>	32	5
<i>Krugman</i>	89	15	<i>paper</i>	48	8			

Concordance analysis of *we* shows that the most frequent collocates are modal verbs (*can, will, need, would, must, shall*) and verbs of cognition or verbal action (e.g. *see, assume, note, know, turn, show*). The range of *I* collocates is similar, though

more restricted (*would, will, shall; think, understand, hope, agree*). Of the 48 forms of *paper* that actually referred to an article, 44 were self-reference and only 4 were used to refer to other papers. One could of course add to this the 161 occurrences of *new economic geography*, somehow representing the author himself. The voice of the writer emerges as very personal, but this is not surprising among American economists, and certainly not surprising for the specific author.

Table 3 illustrates the frequencies of other relevant items in the corpus. These include: on the one hand, potentially reflexive nouns (*model, point, example, level, effect, role, story, factor, process etc.*) and verbs (*assumed, see, modelling, using*); on the other hand, organizational units that mark transitions in discourse by connecting propositions or discourse units (*but, if, so, however, then, what, also, because, whence, thus, now ...*). Both categories evidence the key role played by model-based reasoning and logical inferential argument (*If p then q*) in economics and in Krugman's academic writing.

Table 3. Action-oriented elements

Word Form	Freq.	pttw	Word Form	Freq.	pttw	Word Form	Freq.	pttw
<i>Model</i>	257	43	<i>example</i>	55	9	<i>Process</i>	34	6
<i>But</i>	253	42	<i>rather</i>	53	9	<i>See</i>	35	6
<i>Models</i>	205	34	<i>where</i>	53	9	<i>Who</i>	35	6
<i>If</i>	141	23	<i>given</i>	52	9	<i>Yet</i>	35	6
<i>So</i>	123	20	<i>like</i>	52	9	<i>Indeed</i>	34	6
<i>Then</i>	105	17	<i>effect</i>	49	8	<i>Value</i>	34	6
<i>however</i>	103	17	<i>why</i>	47	8	<i>assumed</i>	33	5
<i>What</i>	92	15	<i>role</i>	43	8	<i>Fact</i>	33	5
<i>Also</i>	87	14	<i>Since</i>	44	8	<i>modeling</i>	33	5
<i>Because</i>	83	14	<i>story</i>	44	8	<i>assumption</i>	33	5
<i>When</i>	74	12	<i>effects</i>	41	8	<i>Issues</i>	32	5
<i>How</i>	73	12	<i>let</i>	41	7	<i>Question</i>	32	5
<i>Thus</i>	70	12	<i>part</i>	39	7	<i>Suppose</i>	32	5
<i>Now</i>	64	11	<i>while</i>	39	7	<i>Section</i>	31	5
<i>Point</i>	61	10	<i>too</i>	36	6	<i>Using</i>	30	5

5. Dialogicity in research and in knowledge dissemination

Having traced the dialogic profile of the small corpus of journal articles, the analysis can now focus on columns and blog posts.

5.1 Comparing research and knowledge dissemination

The keywords obtained by comparing journal articles to columns and blog posts provide indications of what characterizes Krugman's scientific papers as against his writings for a wider audience. Table 4 lists the potentially dialogic expressions found as positive keywords with their frequency, normalized pttw frequency (blank if less than 1), in order of keyness.

Table 4. Journal articles: positive keywords

Keyword	Journal Articles Freq.	Pttw	Columns and Posts Freq	Pttw	Keyness
<i>model</i>	257	43	31	3	336,97
<i>models</i>	205	34	23	2	274,88
<i>new</i>	306	51	92	9	256,84
<i>theory</i>	156	26	18	2	207,31
<i>Krugman</i>	89	15	5	5	140,23
<i>figure</i>	93	15	12	1	119,10
<i>thus</i>	70	12	4		109,95
<i>modeling</i>	33	5	0		64,72
<i>section</i>	31	5	0		60,80
<i>such</i>	126	21	73	7	54,21
<i>geographers</i>	26	4	0		50,99
<i>approach</i>	45	7	9		48,06
<i>equation</i>	24	4	0		47,07
<i>factors</i>	46	8	13	1	40,22
<i>assumed</i>	35	6	8		34,85
<i>general</i>	64	11	31	3	34,68
<i>larger</i>	39	6	11	1	34,14
<i>traditional</i>	27	4	4		32,87
<i>central</i>	16	3	0		31,38
<i>analysis</i>	60	10	30	3	31,31
<i>depends</i>	24	4	3		31,05
<i>theorists</i>	19	3	1		30,26
<i>pattern</i>	25	4	4		29,52
<i>depend</i>	21	3	2		29,47
<i>properties</i>	15	2	0		29,42
<i>determines</i>	15	2	0		29,42

In a participant-oriented perspective, it becomes apparent that third-person self-reference (*Krugman*) is prominent in journal articles, when compared to columns and blog posts. Generic reference to *geographers* and *theorists* denotes the most important interlocutors for the specific subject.

In an action-oriented perspective, we can see a conspicuous set of word forms referring to elements and relations typical of economic reasoning (*model, models, theory, modeling, approach, pattern, equation, factors, analysis*), logical argument (*assumed, depend(s), determines, thus*), scientific writing (*figure, section*), and extended writing in general (*such*).

The main trace of evaluative dialogue lies in the significantly higher use of *new, general, larger, traditional* and *central*. It is interesting to note that some of these adjectives represent widely shared values among scientific communities. The need for generality is common to many disciplines, but it assumes a key role in economics, often interested in contrasting general models and theories with historical specificity: *model, theory* and *models* account for about 30 of the 64 concordances of *general*, especially as *general equilibrium model* and *general location theory*. *New* and *Traditional* are also largely used in academic discourse to contrast one's proposed theory with previous approaches: this is done consistently in the evaluative occurrences of *new*, setting the *new* economic geography or new elements of its approach against *traditional (economic) geographers/trade theory/location theory/spatial analysis/regional science literature* etc. Other evaluations are related to specific tenets of the theory proposed: *larger* points to the relevance of size in the analysis (whether attributed to *market, expenditure* or *population*), while *central* often combines figuratively evaluative occurrences (*central theme*) with locative uses (*central region*).

5.2 Focus on columns

The keywords obtained by comparing columns to journal articles present a picture of journalistic writing. Table 5 reports potentially dialogic word forms, frequencies, normalized frequencies and keyness value.

Table 5. Columns vs Journal articles

Key word	Freq. Columns	pttw	Freq. journal articles	Pttw	Keyness
<i>bad</i>	46	11	2		68,69
<i>now</i>	134	33	64	11	59,73
<i>what</i>	164	40	92	15	57,91
<i>who</i>	94	23	35	6	55,61
<i>don't</i>	48	12	6		55,41
<i>people</i>	76	19	25	4	50,43

Table 5. (continued)

Key word	Freq. Columns	pttw	Freq. journal articles	Pttw	Keyness
<i>but</i>	311	76	253	42	49,48
<i>right</i>	74	18	25	4	47,96
<i>about</i>	161	39	100	17	47,69
<i>aren't</i>	26	06	0		47,04
<i>last</i>	46	11	8	1	46,23
<i>you</i>	120	29	64	11	45,80
<i>just</i>	72	18	26	4	43,87
<i>lot</i>	42	10	7	1	43,07
<i>nothing</i>	38	9	7	1	37,12
<i>should</i>	77	19	35	6	36,52
<i>that</i>	879	214	988	164	33,97
<i>ever</i>	24	6	2		31,40
<i>worse</i>	35	9	8	1.	30,31
<i>much</i>	109	27	70	12	30,28
<i>Huge</i>	23	6	2		29,75

The set of action-oriented forms include conjuncts (*what, who, but, that*), typical of shorter texts, and adverbial *now*, typical of journalistic discourse.

Evaluative elements are definitely conspicuous: while epistemic elements manifest the writer's voice (*much, just, lot, about* or *right*, mostly used as an intensifier, e.g. *right now, right away*), attitudinal adjectives (*huge, worse, bad*) are used to highlight (and discuss) the problems in focus, such as *huge increase in government spending*, things *getting worse* and *bad policy*. The typical representation of counter-discourse that is expected of a column in the Anglo-Saxon press may be related to a distinctive frequency of negative elements such as *nothing, ever, don't* and *aren't*. Another typical trait of columns could be the intense use of modal *should*, signalling the role played by suggestions and recommendations, where the journal article corpus showed intense use of modals expressing logical possibilities.

Special attention should also be paid to the frequency of *people*, which seemed to suggest at first that the columnist might include people's opinion where the academic had introduced fellow economists. It turned out however that only 29 of the 76 occurrences of *people* were actually related to some form of projection, either in the form of a discourse verb (e.g. *say, praise, propose*) or a verb of cognition (e.g. *understand, know, realize*), leaving the majority of occurrences to characterize people as an object of discourse rather than as participants. When considering people as participants, however, it became apparent that these occurrences did not refer to people in general, but rather to specific political or institutional figures (*supposedly serious people, people who praised Ireland as a role model, the same people now lecturing the rest of us, powerful people in Washington etc.*). Concordance analysis also

revealed that the semantic prosody of these occurrences was systematically negative in the columns (where these voices invariably represented counter-discourse), whereas in the journal articles only two occurrences with negative prosody were found. The word thus turned out to be an important evaluative tool for columns to introduce a negative representation of different opinions.

In a participant-oriented perspective the most obvious feature is a marked use of *you*. This is obviously not always a direct form of address to the reader (*If this sounds to you like something Herbert Hoover might have said, you're right: It does and he did.*). In some cases the reference is rather impersonal (*spending on things you don't like is still spending*) and might even exclude the vast majority of actual readers: when the writer asks *Why expand your capacity when you don't have enough sales to make full use of the capacity you already have?* the reference is to people in business. The overwhelming majority of occurrences, however, are meant to guide the reader through the argument, as shown in Extract 14, where *you* is used to involve the reader in the argument, highlight different positions, refute some and of course lead the reader towards the writer's main claim:

- (16) Are **you**, or is someone **you** know, a gadget freak? If so, **you** doubtless know that Wednesday was iPhone 5 day [...]. [...] the unveiling of the iPhone 5 might provide a significant boost to the U.S. economy, adding measurably to economic growth over the next quarter or two.

Do **you** find this plausible? If so, I have news for **you**: **you** are, whether **you** know it or not, a Keynesian – and **you** have implicitly accepted the case that the government should spend more, not less, in a depressed economy. Before I get there, let's talk about where the buzz is coming from. [...] the reason JPMorgan believes that the iPhone 5 will boost the economy right away is simply that it will induce people to spend more.

And to believe that more spending will provide an economic boost, **you** have to believe – as **you** should – that demand, not supply, is what's holding the economy back. [...] If **you** believe that the iPhone 5 can give the economy a lift, **you've** already conceded both that the total amount of spending in the economy isn't a fixed number and that more spending is what we need. (*The iPhone stimulus*)

All these elements contribute to highlighting features of the American so-called “op-ed” column, i.e. an evaluative piece of argument expressing the opinion of a specific author on a current problematic issue that involves open engagement with opposite views and often includes explicit recommendations.

5.3 Focus on blog posts

Krugman keeps a personal (thematic) blog, where he selects the most relevant news for public discussion. Eliciting response-comments seems to be an important element of any blog, together with the promotion of the writer's position and ideas. The difference between columns as blog posts, both meant for a larger non-expert audience, might lie in the need to open up space for response (and ultimately acceptance). The comparative analysis of posts and comments offers an extremely clear picture of the different dialogic profile of posts and comments, as shown in Table 6.

Table 6. Posts vs Columns

Key word	Freq. Posts	Pttw	Freq Columns	Pttw	Keyness
<i>I</i>	604	102	149	36	152,63
<i>my</i>	108	18	13	3	54,12
<i>you</i>	346	58	120	29	46,62
<i>think</i>	117	20	21	5	42,74
<i>OK</i>	37	6	0		38,83
<i>really</i>	109	18	21	5	37,06
<i>Me</i>	81	14	12	3	34,99

There is first of all a marked presence of references to the participants in the form of first and second person markers (*I, my, me, you*). The verb form *think*, obviously creating the space for introducing opinions, also plays an important part in the representation of participants, as it collocates with both *you* (*if you think about*) and *I* (*I don't think, what I think*). *Think* stands out to be the most frequent collocate of *I*, followed by *know, guess, mean, said, understand, read, wrote, like, hope, find, suspect, see, say* etc.

The semantic preference for verbs of cognition and verbal action is evident and also turns out to be the most important for *me*, although with different constructions. Constructions with *me* are more explicit in picturing a dialogue with the reader. The most common is *Let me + start /count the ways/ throw in/ draw on/ weigh in/ talk about/ point/ repeat/ add/ show* etc. Other expressions offer similar representations of dialogue (*Readers have asked me, Trust me, Share/disagree with me*) and express attitudinal (*bothers me/strike me/surprise me*) or epistemic position (*seems to me*).

Similarly, an analysis of the concordances of *my* reveals a tendency of the adjective to qualify the writer's argument or epistemological position: *my assumption/ hope/ belief/argument/ post/ entry/ explanation/guess/ immediate question/ informed guess/ reaction/ judgement* etc.

The prominence of the identity of the writer is undeniable: first person singular self-reference is altogether (134 pttw) more than three times as much as that in comments (42 pttw) and at least twice as much as in journal articles (*I*, 49 pttw; *my*, 5pptw; *me* 3 pttw). First person self-reference thus turns out to be a key element in profiling the three genres, with scientific writing occupying an intermediate position between the very personal stance of blog posts and the more impersonal stance of columns.

The explicit presence of a *you* is also highly characteristic of the different action games, with a normalized frequency of 58 occurrences pttw in posts, 29 in comments and 11 in journal articles. In the explicit presence of a second-person representation of the (potential) reader, scientific argument and blog posts stand at the opposite extremes. The pronoun is often accompanied by modals (*can. could, should, might* etc.) and verbs of cognition of discourse (*think, see, argue, see, etc.*) in blog posts and the presence of the reader as partner-in-argument is marked:

- (17) So what is fiat money? It is, as Paul Samuelson put it in his original overlapping-generations model (pdf), a “social contrivance”. [...] In fact, **you could argue** that almost every asset in a modern economy owes its value to social convention; green pieces of paper could become worthless, but then so could any paper claim, which is, after all, worth something only because laws say it is – and laws can be repealed. And once **you realize** that a social convention is not at all the same thing as a bubble, several related fallacies fall into place. (*Things that aren't bubbles*)

The frequency of discourse marker *OK* (32 occurrences out of the 37) can also be explained along similar lines: it is not just a matter of giving the text a “spoken” flavor, but rather a marker of agreement or concession, as in *OK, but why does that matter?* Interestingly, the use of *OK* is also often related to the presence of a reader, by presenting the post itself as a response – *OK, some readers have asked me to react to this critique* – or linking to the reader’s supposed response – *Don't like that? OK, so no euro.*

Finally, the use of *really* marks another interesting aspect of dialogicity. It is not only a booster of writer’s stance (*I really like the analogy; it's a really bad metaphor*) but also a tool guiding the reader’s attention to relevant elements in the information structure. In fact, it is often used in pseudo-cleft constructions focusing on the information that follows (*what's really going on here*) or in reformulating constructions preceded by *you* or *we* and followed by verbs like *want, meant, matters* etc.: *Do you really want to say that schoolteachers, firefighters, and nurses provide nothing of value?*

The specificity of posts against columns thus appear to be clearly based on the participant-oriented dimension, i.e. on forms of self-mention and reader's engagement explicitly suggesting actual turn taking.

6. Concluding remarks

The study has adopted a tripartite model for the analysis of dialogicity in different action games. The three main perspectives are represented as overlapping areas, depending on the elements in focus: participants, the nature and structure of communicative action and the evaluative dialogue that negotiates participants' positions. In a participant-oriented perspective, the relevant dialogic features are those that manifest the ongoing dialogue with the community (attribution) and represent the presence of the reader and the writer in the text (reference items, interrogatives and imperatives). In an action-oriented perspective, the relevant dialogic features will involve organizational units intended to make explicit what is going on in the sequence of utterances. Finally, the perspective interested in evaluative dialogue (partly overlapping with the other two) will focus on evaluative language use (in both epistemic and attitudinal terms) and dialogism (in terms of acknowledging different forms of dialogic contraction or expansion).

The model has been used for an analysis of the different elements that manifest dialogicity in texts by the same scholar (Paul Krugman). The qualitative analysis has illustrated the complex interrelationship between different features in a single key scientific text. The quantitative analysis has focused on features manifested at word-form level and provided data for a dialogic profile of the three different types of action games.

The analysis has shown that research often takes dialogic debates as its starting point, thus contextualizing the internal argument in terms of what is relevant to the expert community. It is characterized by intense use of epistemic evaluation and reference to a few epistemological values (generality and simplicity), as well to the importance of novelty in research. Participants are presented in different forms but inclusive *we* seems to dominate, emphasizing alignment and commonality between expert writer and expert reader.

Knowledge dissemination, on the other hand, recontextualizes expert argument in a wider (mass-media) participation framework. Columns tend to highlight the authoritative stance of the author by presenting a self-contained representation of the argument, rather than by emphasizing the explicit presence of an external authority. The voice of the writer is manifested more by evaluative stance than first-person reference. The action game is characterized by a marked presence

of second-person pronoun *you*, often involved in the representation of potential counter-discourse or steps in the argument, whereas *people* is preferred in reference to unquestionably rejected counter-discourse. The self-contained representation of counter-arguments constitutes the key dialogic element of columns, highlighting the picture of contrasting opinions rather than conflicting individuals. By acknowledging other opinions, the writer can more effectively lead the argument to a conclusion.

The dialogic structure of blogs clearly highlights their nature as opening moves in polylogues, addressing the interests of different types of participants. Recontextualization involves different strategies, above all greater explicitness in reader's engagement. Blog posts certainly give great prominence to the writer, but they also introduce new collaborative practices in developing discourse, using the reader as partner in an open and ongoing dialogue. The writer shows greater awareness of a reader who might want to participate in discussion: he presents his own posts as responses to previous debates and explicitly elicits comments, by asking questions and inviting to discuss. The writer is also more probably aware of the extended participation framework of the web, as "unknown, heterogeneous, and varied audiences may participate in co-constructing research debates" (Mauranen 2013: 30–31).

More generally, the chapter has shown how integrating qualitative and quantitative tools for analysis can contribute to the study of dialogicity, by substantiating statements about language choice with reference to data and by offering tools for an interpretation of data in terms of communicative action, beyond immediate lexico-semantic associations (Bondi 2014). Adopting a dialogic view of communicative action allows language studies to overcome the limits of a focus on single utterances, to show that even formally monologic texts can be seen as a sequence of actions and reactions and ultimately that dialogue itself can provide methodological tools for a study of language variation in terms of variation across dialogic action games.

Acknowledgment

This study is part of a National research project financed by the Italian Ministry of University and Research: "Knowledge Dissemination across media in English: continuity and change in discourse strategies, ideologies, and epistemologies (PRIN 2015TJ8ZAS).

References

- Bakhtin, Mikhail. 1981. *The Dialogical Imagination*. ed. by Michael Holquist. Austin: University of Texas Press.
- Barrotta, Pierluigi and Marcelo Dascal (ed.). 2005. *Controversies and Subjectivity*. Amsterdam: Benjamins. doi:10.1075/cvs.1
- Bhatia, Vijay. 1993. *Analysing Genre. Language Use in Professional Settings*. London: Longman.
- Bolander, Brook. 2012. "Disagreements and agreements in personal/diary blogs: A closer look at responsiveness." *Journal of Pragmatics* 44 (12): 1607–1622. doi:10.1016/j.pragma.2012.03.008
- Bondi, Marina. 1997. "Reported argument in economics textbooks. A meta-pragmatics of argumentative dialogue". In *Proceedings of the 16th International Congress of linguists*, ed. by Bernard Caron, Paper 41 (CD). Amsterdam: Elsevier Science.
- Bondi, Marina. 2010. "Metadiscursive practices in introductions: Phraseology and semantic sequences across genres." *Nordic Journal of English Studies* 9(2): 99–123.
- Bondi, Marina. 2014. "Integrating corpus and genre approaches: Phraseology and voice across EAP genres." In *Corpus Analysis for Descriptive and Pedagogic Purposes: English Specialised Discourse*, ed. by Maurizio Gotti and Davide Simone Giannoni, 43–62. Bern: Peter Lang.
- Bondi Marina. 2017. "Corpus Linguistics." In *The Routledge Handbook of Language and Dialogue*, ed. by Edda Weigand, 46–61. London: Routledge.
- Bondi, Marina. Forthcoming. "Try to prove me wrong: Dialogicity and audience involvement in economics blogs." *Discourse, Context and Media*.
- Bondi, Marina and Giuliana Diani. 2015. "I am wild about cabbage: Evaluative 'semantic sequences' and cross-linguistic (dis)continuities." *Nordic Journal of English Studies (NJES)*, 14(1): 116–151.
- Bondi, Marina and Corrado Seidenari. 2012. "And now I'm finally of the mind to say I hope the whole ship goes down ...: Markers of subjectivity and evaluative phraseology in blogs." In *Corpus Linguistics and Variation in English*, ed. by Joybrato Mukherjee and Magnus Huber, 17–27. Amsterdam: Rodopi. doi:10.1163/9789401207713_004
- Charles, Maggie. 2003. "This mystery: A corpus-based study of the use of nouns to construct stance in theses from two contrasting disciplines." *Journal of English for Academic Purposes* 2: 313–326. doi:10.1016/S1475-1585(03)00048-1
- Charles, Maggie. 2006. "The construction of stance in reporting clauses: A cross-disciplinary study of theses." *Applied Linguistics* 27(3): 492–518. doi:10.1093/applin/aml021
- Crismore, Avon. 1989. *Talking with Readers: Metadiscourse as Rhetorical Act*. New York: Peter Lang.
- Dascal, Marcelo. 1989. "Controversies as quasi-dialogues." In *Dialoganalyse II*, ed. by Edda Weigand and Franz Hundsnurher, 147–159. Tübingen: Narr. doi:10.1515/9783111584737.147
- Dascal, Marcelo and Han-Liang Chang (ed.). 2007. *Traditions of Controversy*. Amsterdam: Benjamins. doi:10.1075/cvs.4
- Dascal, Marcelo and Victor Boantz (ed.). 2011. *Controversies Within the Scientific Revolution*. Amsterdam: Benjamins. doi:10.1075/cvs.11
- Diani, Giuliana. 2009. "Reporting and evaluation in English book review articles: A cross-disciplinary study." In *Academic Evaluation*, ed. by Ken Hyland and Giuliana Diani, 87–104. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Dontcheva-Navratilova, Olga. 2016. "Rhetorical functions of citations in linguistic research articles." *Discourse and Interaction*, 9(2): 51–74.

- Feng, Jiang and Ken Hyland. 2015. "The fact that: Stance nouns in disciplinary writing". *Discourse Studies* 17(5): 1–22.
- Feng, Jiang and Ken Hyland. 2016. "Nouns and academic interactions: A neglected feature of metadiscourse." *Applied Linguistics* 1–25.
- Fløttum, Kjersti. 2005. "The self and the others: polyphonic visibility in research articles." *International Journal of Applied Linguistics* 15(1): 29–44. doi:10.1111/j.1473-4192.2005.00079.x
- Fløttum, Kjersti, Trine Dahl, and Torodd Kinn. 2006. *Academic Voices: Across Languages and Disciplines*. Amsterdam: Benjamins. doi:10.1075/pbns.148
- Fritz, Gerd. 2010. "Controversies". In *Historical Pragmatics*, ed. by Andreas Jucke and Irma Taavitsainen, 451–481. Berlin: de Gruyter.
- Gil-Salom, Luz and Carmen Soler-Monreal. 2014. *Dialogicity in Written Specialised Genres*. Amsterdam: Benjamins. doi:10.1075/ds.23
- Harwood, Nigel. 2005a. "Nowhere has anyone attempted ... in this article I aim to do just that: A corpus-based study of self-promotional I and we in academic writing across four disciplines." *Journal of Pragmatics* 37(8): 1207–1231. doi:10.1016/j.pragma.2005.01.012
- Harwood, Nigel. 2005b. "We do not seem to have a theory ... the theory I present here attempts to fill this gap: Inclusive and exclusive pronouns in academic writing". *Applied Linguistics* 26(3): 343–375. doi:10.1093/applin/ami012
- Herring, Susan, Dieter Stein, and Tuija Virtanen. (ed.). 2013. *Pragmatics of Computer-Mediated Communication*. Berlin: DeGruyter. doi:10.1515/9783110214468
- Hewings, Anne, Theresea Lillis, and Dimitra Vladimirova. 2010. "Who's citing whose writings? A corpus-based study of citations as interpersonal resource in English-medium national and English-medium international journals." *Journal of English for Academic Purposes* 9(2): 102–115. doi:10.1016/j.jeap.2010.02.005
- Hunston, Susan and Geoffrey Thompson (ed.). 2000. *Evaluation in Text*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Hunston, Susan. 1993. "Professional conflict-disagreement in academic discourse." In *Text and Technology: in Honour of John Sinclair*, ed. by Mona Baker, Gill Francis and Elena Tognini-Bonelli, 115–134. Philadelphia: Benjamins. doi:10.1075/z.64.o8hun
- Hunston, Susan. 1994. "Evaluation and organization in a sample of written academic discourse. In *Advances in Written Text Analysis*, ed. by Malcolm Coulthard, 191–218. London: Routledge.
- Hunston, Susan. 2000. "Evaluation and the planes of discourse: Status and value in persuasive texts". In *Evaluation in Text*, ed. by Susan Hunston and Geoffrey Thompson, 176–207. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Hunston, Susan. 2004. "It has rightly been pointed out: Attribution, Consensus and Conflict in Academic Discourse." In *Academic Discourse, Genre and Small Corpora*, ed. by Marina Bondi, Laura Gavioli and Marc Silver, 15–33. Rome: Officina.
- Hunston, Susan. 2005. "Conflict and consensus: Construing opposition in applied linguistics." In *Strategies in Academic Discourse*, ed. by Elena Tognini Bonelli and Gabriella Del Lungo, 1–15. Amsterdam: Benjamins. doi:10.1075/scl.19.o2hun
- Hunston, Susan. 2011. *Corpus Approaches to Evaluation: Phraseology and Evaluative Language*. London: Routledge.
- Hyland, Ken. 1999. "Academic attribution: Citation and the construction of disciplinary knowledge." *Applied Linguistics* 20(3): 341–367. doi:10.1093/applin/20.3.341
- Hyland, Ken. 2000. *Disciplinary Discourses: Social Interactions in Academic Writing*. London: Longman.

- Hyland, Ken. 2002a. "What do they Mean? Questions in Academic Writing." *Text* 22(4): 529–557. doi:10.1515/text.2002.021
- Hyland, Ken. 2002b. "Directives: Argument and engagement in academic writing." *Applied Linguistics* 23(2): 215–239. doi:10.1093/applin/23.2.215
- Hyland, Ken. 2005a. "Stance and engagement: A model of interaction in academic discourse." *Discourse Studies* 7: 173–192. doi:10.1177/1461445605050365
- Hyland, Ken. 2005b. *Metadiscourse*. London: Continuum.
- Hyland, Ken. 2014. "Introductory chapter: Dialogue, community and persuasion in research writing." In *Dialogicity in Written Specialised Genres*, ed. by Luz Gil-Salom and Carmen Soler-Monreal, 1–20. Amsterdam: Benjamins. doi:10.1075/ds.23.02hyl
- Hyland, Ken and Giuliana Diani. 2009. *Academic Evaluation: Review Genres in University Settings*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. doi:10.1057/9780230244290
- Hyland, Ken and Jiang Feng. 2016. "We must conclude that ...: A diachronic study of academic engagement." *Journal of English for Academic Purposes* 24: 29–42.
- Kwan, Becky and Hang Chan. 2014. "An investigation of source use in the results and the closing sections of empirical articles in information systems: In search of a functional-semantic citation typology for pedagogical purposes." *Journal of English for Academic Purposes*, 14: 29–47.
- Lillis, Theresa. 2003. "Student writing as 'academic literacies': Drawing on Bakhtin to move from critique to design." *Language and Education* 17(3): 192–207. doi:10.1080/09500780308666848
- Lillis, Theresa. 2011. "Legitimizing dialogue as textual and ideological goal in academic writing for assessment and publication." *Arts and Humanities in Higher Education* 10(4): 401–432. doi:10.1177/1474022211398106
- Livnat, Zohar. 2012. *Dialogue, Science and Academic Writing*. Amsterdam: Benjamins.
- Lorés Sanz, Rosa. 2008. "Genres in contrast: The exploration of writers' visibility in research articles and research article abstracts." In *English as an Additional Language in Research Publication and Communication*, ed. by Sally Burgess and Pedro Martín Martín, 105–122. Bern: Peter Lang.
- Luzón, María José. 2013. "Public communication of science in blogs: Recontextualizing scientific discourse for a diversified audience." *Written Communication* 30(4): 428–457. doi:10.1177/0741088313493610
- Lyons, John. 1977. *Semantics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Martin, Jim and Peter White. 2005. *The Language of Evaluation: Appraisal in English*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Mauranen, Anna. 2010. "Discourse reflexivity: A discourse universal? The case of ELF." *Nordic Journal of English Studies* 9(2): 13–40.
- Mauranen, Anna. 2013. "Hybridism, edutainment, and doubt: Science blogging finding its feet." *Nordic Journal of English Studies* 13(1): 7–36.
- Mur Dueñas, Pilar. 2008. "Analysing engagement markers cross-culturally: The case of English and Spanish business management research articles." In *English as an Additional Language in Research Publication and Communication*, ed. by Sally Burgess and Pedro Martín Martín, 197–213. Bern: Peter Lang.
- Nølke, Henning, Kjersti Fløttum, and Coco Norén. 2004. *La ScaPoLine. La théorie scandinave de la polyphonie linguistique*. Paris: Kimé.
- Pecorari, Diane. 2006. "Visible and occluded citation features in postgraduate second-language writing." *English for Specific Purposes* 25(1): 4–29. doi:10.1016/j.esp.2005.04.004
- Scott, Michael. 2012. *WordSmith Tools version 6*. Stroud: Lexical Analysis Software.

- Sinclair, John Mc. H. 1982. "Planes of discourse." In *The Two-fold Voice: Essays in Honour of Ramesh Mohan*, ed. by S. N. A. Rizvi, 70–89. Hyderabad: Pitambar Publishing Company.
- Sinclair, John. 1985. "On the integration of linguistic description." In *Handbook of Discourse Analysis*, ed. by Teun van Dijk, 13–28. London: Academic Press.
- Sinclair, John. 1996. "The search for units of meaning." *Textus* 9(1): 75–106.
- Sinclair, John. 2004. *Trust the Text. Language, Corpus and Discourse*. London: Routledge.
- Sinclair, John and Anna Mauranen. 2006. *Linear Unit Grammar. Integrating Speech and Writing*. Amsterdam: Benjamins. doi:10.1075/scl.25
- Soler-Monreal, Carmen and Gil-Salom, Luz. 2011. "A cross-language study on citation practice in PhD theses". *International Journal of English Studies* 11(2): 53–75.
- Soler-Monreal, Carmen and Luz Gil-Salom. 2014. "Academic Voices and claims: Reviewing practices in research writing." In *Dialogicity in Written Specialised Genres*, ed. by Luz Gil-Salom and Carmen Soler-Monreal, 23–54. Amsterdam: Benjamins. doi:10.1075/ds.23.03501
- Swales, John. 1990. *Genre Analysis*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Swales, John and Christine B. Feak. 2004. *Academic Writing for Graduate Students: Essential Skills and Tasks*, 2nd edition. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press.
- Tannen, Deborah. 1989. *Talking Voices*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Tannen, Deborah. 2002. "Agonism in academic discourse." *Journal of Pragmatics* 34(10–11): 1651–1669. doi:10.1016/S0378-2166(02)00079-6
- Thompson, Geoff. 2001. "Interaction in academic writing: Learning to argue with the reader." *Applied Linguistics* 22(1): 58–78. doi:10.1093/applin/22.1.58
- Thompson, Paul. 2012. "Achieving a Voice of Authority in PhD Theses." In *Stance and Voice in Written Academic Genres*, ed. by Ken Hyland and Carmen Sancho-Guinda, 119–133. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. doi:10.1057/9781137030825.0016
- Thompson, Paul and Chris Tribble. 2001. "Looking at Citations: Using Corpora in English for Academic Purposes." *Language Learning and Technology* 5(3): 91–105.
- van Eemeren, Frans H. and Bart Garssen (ed.). 2008. *Controversy and Confrontation: Relating Controversy Analysis with Argumentation Theory*. Amsterdam: Benjamins. doi:10.1075/cvs.6
- Vande Kopple, William J. 1985. "Some exploratory Discourse on Metadiscourse". *College Composition and Communication* 36: 63–94.
- Weigand, Edda. 2009. *Language as Dialogue*. Amsterdam: Benjamins. doi:10.1075/ds.5
- Weigand, Edda. 2010a. *Dialogue: the Mixed Game*. Amsterdam: Benjamins. doi:10.1075/ds.10
- Weigand, Edda. 2010b. "Language as Dialogue". *Intercultural Pragmatics* 7(3): 505–510. doi:10.1515/ijprg.2010.022
- Yus, Francisco. 2011. *Cyberpragmatics: Internet-mediated Communication in Context*. Amsterdam: Benjamins. doi:10.1075/pbns.213
- Załęska, Maria. 2014. *Retorica della linguistica: scienza, struttura, scrittura*. Frankfurt: Peter Lang.

Dialogic pragmatics and complex objects

Engaging the life and work of Gregory Bateson

Ronald C. Arnett

Duquesne University (USA)

This essay frames the insights of pragmatics within the stream of everyday life as a normatively dialogical communicative activity. Pragmatics understood as existentially dialogical moves from abstraction to concrete engagement of events and persons. Dialogic pragmatics eschews the assumption that one can single-handedly construct the world, embodying a humble and simultaneously creative social task of infinite semiosis. In order to illustrate this perspective, I turn to a brief outline of pragmatics and then illuminate this perspective with emphasis on the holistic and relational insights of Gregory Bateson's work and life. I end with discussion of Bateson's life as a complex object that reveals dialogic pragmatics in unceasing framing of action and reaction, an act of infinite semiosis.

Keywords: Gregory Bateson, dialogue, complex objects, communicology, pragmatism

1. Introduction

A cogent summary of the intellectual history of pragmatics constitutes Betty J. Birner's (2013) *Introduction to Pragmatics*. She states that "literal meaning is the domain of semantics; the 'additional meaning' [of inferred/interpretative meaning] is the domain of pragmatics" (p. 1). Literal and inferred/interpretative meaning are two ways of understanding, with the latter emphasis tied to pragmatics ever attentive to context (p. 2). Knowledge of pragmatics has kinship with linguistic knowledge in that both are "rule-governed" (p. 3). Unlike linguistic rules, pragmatic rules are implicit and inferential, making this form of meaning "slippery." Pragmatics includes the "non-literal, context-dependent, inferential, and/or not truth-conditional" (p. 4). Of course, the boundary between pragmatics and semantics is fuzzy and often a matter of debate; pragmatics is central to the field of

“discourse analysis” (p. 5). Finally, pragmatics involves “description” of what people do, with no reliance on prescriptive “ought” or telling. Pragmatics invokes descriptive rule engagement that is implicitly researcher-intuitive and involves empirical observation in natural settings.

2. Pragmatics and complex objects

Semiotics, outside the domain of pragmatics, addresses literal word meaning, which is, however, often in dispute; this disputed reality creates ambiguity and imprecision that open the door conceptually to pragmatics. “Philosopher H. P. Grice, generally considered the father of the field of pragmatics, observed that meaning is far from a unitary notion” (Birner 2013: 22). Grice suggested that pragmatics is conceptually and socially field-dependent; meaning is responsive to the environment. In general, semantics, again without the focus on pragmatics, is “context-independent,” while pragmatics is “context-dependent.” Pragmatics and its contextual focus conceptualize truth discerned via “contrastive meaning,” which consists of “non-truth-conditional” comparison and dissimilarity that informs connotation (p. 35). Pragmatics of meaning dwells within context and discloses significance via contrast and comparison; one must discern importance (the height and weight of a sign) in dialogic engagement between points of difference.

Trognon explicates work on pragmatics with a direct connection to pragmatics/dialogue. In “Pragmatics Re-established on Its Feet: Weigand’s Mixed Game Model 2010,” Trognon (2013: 458) outlines why he considers Weigand’s scholarship on pragmatics and dialogue “one of the best theories ... for studying causal or institutional interactions in the social sciences.” Trognon’s discussion of the human species within the social dimension of human life leads to understanding pragmatic forms of expression manifested in individual behaviour. He agrees with Weigand; three basic social pillars pragmatically shape human behaviour and action: “human nature, culture, and environment.” Individual “competence-in-performance” must respond to each of these pillars. Competency within performative action suggests that the interplay of the social and the individual give rise to a “social individual” (p. 459). The individual worlds of persons interacting and, at times, colliding are due to a fundamental human existential fact – we are social creatures. “Dialogue” is the pragmatic ingredient that permits the individual and the social to co-inform and co-enrich one another. Dialogue guides competence in performance, pragmatically replacing an imposed assurance of “certainty” with an existential rationality that Peirce (1998: 309) termed “reasonableness.” Dialogue invites existential and pragmatic “cohesion” between social and individual dimensions of human engagement (Trognon 2013: 460).

The individual makes claims that assert action that then generates pragmatic reaction, permitting claims to be tested – confirmed or not in the social world. Weigand, as understood by Trognon (2013), differentiates between one-phase games and multi-phase games. Dialogue facilitates each of the game sequences, with concurrent dialogues shaping complex and mixed games that involve numerous subsystems. Institutional games are complex and tied deeply to context. Within all institutions, “utterance grammar,” or what others term “communicative grammar” or “pragmatic grammar,” offers insight into meaning; dialogically, an interplay between action and reaction constitutes performative discernment of human meaning. This orientation unites multiple disciplines and lends to a pragmatics of dialogue that affects understanding of signification (p. 472). The linkage among terms such as pragmatics, dialogue, and meaning assists understanding of complex objects within a given experience.

3. From paradox to metacommunication: Complex objects

Rich and Craig continue the conversation about meaning and communicative pragmatics; their work provides a bridge between the insights of Weigand and Bateson. Rich and Craig (2012: 383) pragmatically address complex objects with a stress on dialogue as they employ concepts from Bateson’s project: “metacommunication, paradox, and schismogenesis.” Rich and Craig explore understanding of complex objects with consideration of the Cuban Missile Crisis.

Rich and Craig (2012) seek to understand complex objects central to engaging experience that seems mad and perplexing. Complex objects are central to multiple mixed games that compose the pragmatics of dialogue in analysis of the Cuban Missile Crisis. This event, like the events of September 11, 2001, encompasses complex objects forever resistive to simple interpretations. Rich and Craig discuss the pragmatic importance of “metacommunication” for commenting on communication that is a step above or distant from the ongoing discourse. Their emphasis on metacommunication resides within a hope of limiting aggressive communication between communicative partners; metacommunication limits sparks that can spiral out of control (p. 385). Commenting on communication from a position of “distanciation” illustrates how metacommunication functions as a form of “deterrence.”

Rich and Craig (2012) use Bateson’s conception of metacommunication, which includes words and gestures that rely on environmental experiences within contexts that situate relationship negotiation. Bateson did not place confidence in speech acts alone; he was attentive to the complexity of a holistic communicative environment. Engaging complexity of objects is also enhanced by the pragmatic importance of “paradox,” which Bateson detailed in his ecology of communication,

an approach emphasizing responsiveness to environments defined by irrationality (p. 392–393). Such communicative environments, according to Bateson, require an understanding of paradox. Metacommunication shifts a communicative environment from the restraints of a “double-bind” where one is damned if one does a given action and damned if one refuses such engagement; such a context requires a creative understanding of paradox. Bateson sought to transform a “double bind” into constructive options within a communicative environment, which he termed a “transcontextual” gift that invites a temporal common ground at a metacommunication level of meeting (p. 394).

A transcontextual gift requires a communicative agent to infuse conversation with creative use of paradox. When paradox is no longer the central guiding process within an irrational system, “schismogenesis,” defined as an act of irrational spiraling toward destructive tension, is likely to shape communicative engagement. A communicative agent who understands the necessity of paradox in contentious and ambiguous situations uses mutual uncertainty in order to relax tension, which engages metacommunication of deterrence. Rich and Craig contend that Bateson’s conception of metacommunication situated within the communicative environment is hospitable to understanding paradox as one meets and defuses the irrational. Metacommunication lessens the impact of a double bind by shifting the focus from an unreflective normative conclusion to consideration of constraints announced by multiple options (p. 394). Bateson’s notion of metacommunication acts as a pragmatic dialogic response to environments charged by double-bind possibilities.

Bateson’s work generated national attention during his time with the Palo Alto group.¹ Wendel Ray and Karin Schlanger offer an account of this beginning in an interview with John H. Weakland. Weakland was the first person that Bateson asked to be a part of the Palo Alto Group. Weakland met Bateson at the New School for Social Research in New York in 1946 where Bateson taught anthropology from 1946 until 1947. The school had numerous faculty members who were European immigrants seeking asylum from Nazi tyranny (Ray and Schlanger 2012: 55). At the New School, Bateson taught both practical and theoretical courses; it was difficult for students to differentiate between the practical and the theoretical classes. Bateson’s courses reflected a unity of theory and application reflecting his interest in “communication and social interaction” (p. 57). The principal emphasis of the

1. After receiving a grant from the Josiah Macy, Jr., Foundation in 1954, Bateson was the director of a project in which the group studied schizophrenic communication until 1959. From 1959 until 1962, the Palo Alto group began to research family psychotherapy with a grant from the Foundations’ Fund for Research in Psychiatry, and Bateson was the principal investigator. In 1961, Bateson and Don Jackson received the Frieda Fromm-Reichmann Award for their work involving schizophrenia (Bateson 1977: 249).

interview with Weakland was a repeated reminder about the incredible array of scholars Bateson routinely encountered, such as Margaret Mead, Milton Erickson, and Alan Watts, to name but a few. The key to the interview was Weakland's underscoring the intellectual range of Bateson and his work as a scholar of paradox. Bateson integrated the theoretical and the practical as equally necessary in an act of pragmatic dialogue.

Porcar and Hainic (2011: 4) continue an emphasis on the notion of the pragmatic, stressing the "interactive dimension of communication." The authors discuss the move from mechanistic theories to "organicist theories" (p. 5). Their insights are far afield from the Shannon and Weaver mathematical model of communication; they emphasize Bateson's gathering of Birdwhistell, Hall, Goffman, and Watzlawick in order to challenge the conventional view of communication as information alone. The Shannon and Weaver perspective is pristine to the point of being unresponsive to everyday communicative life. Bateson's group refuted their viewpoint with assumptions initiated by Wiener's circular model of communication linked to cybernetics.

Bateson's think tank used the notion of "expression" to replace "representation," with the former tied to the organism and context and the latter associated with the machine. The organism metaphor connected the discussion to the insights of Bertalanffy and general systems theory (p. 7) with an emphasis on the frame/relational dimension of messages, which offers shape to and understanding of content. The social process of communication consists of multiple dimensions, ranging from gesture to the look within interpersonal space. Multiple elements of communication shift discussion from "telegraphic" to "orchestral" considerations for understanding. Contextual rules offer insights into the manner in which communication renders meaning in social life; "messages are polyphonic" (p. 9). Communication embraces texture through the "semantic and pragmatic" levels of meaning (p. 10). Communication lives within actual relationships that embody us; insights do not emerge from the past alone. Later, those within the school of thought gathered by Bateson claimed an essential axiom: the impossibility not to communicate (p. 11–12). This perspective on the impossibility to abstain from communication is contrary to Bateson's perspective. He contended: communication is an action of "both persons conjointly" (Lanigan 1975: 100). Bateson's orientation renders the adage, "one cannot not communicate," a form of semantic nonsense.

Bateson and the Palo Alto group agreed that there are two basic levels of communication: "content and relationship" (Porcar and Hainic 2011: 7). Each person in an interaction organizes "the sequence of events and their structure subjectively." Communicators engage one another both "digitally and analogically." Communication interactions are "symmetrical or complementary," depending upon whether there is stress on sameness or difference (p. 12). Each of these pragmatic

readings of communication interaction underscores the “social” and “cultural” importance of a complex task that does not yield consistent and simple understanding due to the fact that communication is “circular and continuous” (p. 13–14). The Palo Alto School of pragmatics of human communication focused on the “how” of human action more than an investigation into “why” (p. 16). Bateson’s communication project centered on generative rules that make signification possible – these rules are interactive. “Conceiving communication as an interactional process, ‘the new conception of communication’ (Winkin 1981) overcomes the strictly linguistic telegraphic model of coding and decoding messages. In other words, passing from the functional study of behaviour to explaining its generative rules necessarily implies the problem of signification” (Porcar and Hainic 2011: 17). Signification necessitates a dialogue that resides pragmatically within the ongoing process of generative rule making that structures and frames communicative interaction.

The Palo Alto School begun by Bateson worked with a pragmatic dialogic view of communicative interaction. Implicit rules generated in social settings moved communication from a universal exercise to a contextual and collective enterprise. The connection between the pragmatic and dialogue yields generative rules. Consistent with this perspective, Fisher (1982: 39) examined “communication pragmatism” from the lens of Bateson’s contributions. Fisher outlined several propositions of communication pragmatism, which I paraphrase here: (1) the human is a social creature, (2) communicative enactment engages and creates reality, (3) the fulcrum of communication is relationship propelled by interaction, (4) relational maintenance necessitates re-enactment in social routines, and (5) human meaning requires interpretation—it cannot be assigned or imposed (p. 39–41).

Fisher suggests the fundamental importance of relating. Relating trumps all other conceptions of communication. Relating with others is the central communicative skill. The relational importance of communication engages and enacts rules of interaction. Relationships require time and work; when relationships move in problematic directions, the origin of treatment rests within the social dimension of the human condition. Fisher’s reading of Bateson’s *Steps to an Ecology of Mind* centered on the interplay between holistic and event-driven moments in a relationship; communication enacts relationships, giving rise to interactive rules that guide persons dialogically and pragmatically. Fisher and Bateson’s work points to a holistic and dialogic pragmatism that is at the center of an essay by Catt, in which he examines two different sciences of communication, situating his perspective within a philosophical context.

4. Communicology and complex objects

Catt (2014: 201) brings communicology into the conversation about pragmatism; he distinguishes between a social science perspective and human science, with the latter attentive to “cultural-semiotic constraints on embodied phenomenological experience.” Catt’s approach rests within European/Continental philosophy and American pragmatism. The latter commitment of pragmatism permits communicology to unite the practical and the philosophical. Catt moves from message and instrumentality of social science to an emphasis on experience and contextual/cultural embodiment of meaning within the human sciences. The experience of communication takes on pragmatic import in communicology, as Catt contends with two basic repetitive assumptions: (1) “we cannot not communicate” and (2) “communication *is* behaviour” (p. 204). Neither of these assertions takes into account experience and understanding within the field of communication. Only communicology emphasizes communicative experience inclusive of “abductive [logic]” and “synthetic logic.”² Catt offers a summary of the evolution of the concept of communicology with a discussion of four distinct and interrelated phases of its development.

The first phase emphasized rhetoric, with early Greek and Roman understanding connected to cosmologies:

Rhetorical study never lost its allegiance to the cosmologies of the Greeks and Romans. By the middle of the twentieth century, rhetoric had settled on the study of oratory and propaganda and remained committed to the view that the source of a message controls audience perception. Or, where the audience was taken into account, it was for the purpose of adapting a message to a public, both of which were often statically conceived. (Catt 2014: 205)

Catt (2014: 205) states that the National Communication Association website claims that “messages are used to generate meaning,” missing an emphasis on human experience. Catt laments the conceptual domain of rhetoric that relies principally upon messages.

Catt then recounts a second stage that marked a significant shift from rhetoric, with the emergence of the social sciences personified by the Macy Foundation in New York; this move united the fields of information and communication theory. One of the major works representing this changing conception of communication, according

2. Abduction, according to Peirce, is “a method of forming a general prediction without any positive assurance that it will succeed either in the special case or usually, its justification being that it is the only possible hope of regulating our future conduct rationally, and that Induction from past experience gives us strong encouragement to hope that it will be successful in the future” (Peirce 1998: 299). According to Catt (2014: 204), phenomenology is abduction and abduction is a form of synthetic logic.

to Catt (p. 206), was *Communication: The Social Matrix of Psychiatry*, by Ruesch and Bateson (1951). Their book aligns communication with culture and semiotic processes and an emphasis on communicative experience with pragmatic consequences. This emphasis later yielded one of the most influential works on communication, *Pragmatics of Human Communication*, by Watzlawick, Beavin, and Jackson (1967).

The third phase stressed a hermeneutic of communication centered on dialogic and existential issues attentive to pragmatic and empirical communicative experience. Catt once again offered a lament about professional communication associations; for instance, both the International Communication Association and the National Communication Association had presidential addresses that framed empirical hegemonic language exclusively tangled with quantitative analysis of data – totally discounting a hermeneutic tradition. The fourth phase assumes the importance of post-positivist and cultural theory, with a number of these scholars distancing themselves from the word “science.” According to Catt, communicology benefited from each of these movements; communicology continues to work within a human science paradigm, understanding communication as embedded within experience and culture.

Communicology unites phenomenology, hermeneutics, and cultural sign systems as one understands in actual experience; perception is a social, not an individual, event, and has semantic roots; it is intersubjective, not individually subjective. Catt’s semiotic phenomenology dwells within the insights of Peirce, Husserl, Cassirer, Jakobson, and Lanigan. In fact, Ruesch (1972) published a collection of his own scholarship, titled *Semiotic Approaches to Human Relations*; however, it is not this work but that of *Pragmatics of Human Communication* that captured the imagination of the field of communication. Communicology, more than the *Pragmatics of Human Communication* volume, follows the tradition of semantics that resists reductionism and seeks understanding of pragmatic engagement within communicative experience that is unresponsive to abstract messages.

From the perspective of communicology, messages are a necessity, but not sufficient for communication experience to call forth responses. Human science engages a “dialectical unity of perception and expression, of experience and behaviour, and theory and practice” (Catt 2014: 215). Morris, who was central to American semiotics, rubbed shoulders with American pragmatists. Morris completed his dissertation on semiotics under the direction of George Herbert Mead. Catt claims that symbolic interaction was a particular view of semiotics. However, Dewey corrected Morris more than once, calling attention to Morris’s behaviouristic discussion as missing the phenomenological semiotics of Peirce; pragmatism has roots in phenomenology. Dewey and Mead took their pragmatic insights into human science, not what is conventionally termed social science; Catt asserts that they pointed to “semiotic phenomenology [as] the semantic space where the *habitus* [habits] and *hexis* [disposition] meet *in* and *as* embodied communicative practice” (p. 216).

Communicology is attentive to pragmatic understandings of communicative practice consistent with Peirce's "symbolic effect of semiosis" (p. 217), which engages creative and interpretive understanding in the human science of communication.

Catt recounts three major points within the field of communication related to the development of communicology. First, Murray, Bagwell, Nichols, and Wiksell forged a path for the International Communication Association on January 1, 1950, which gathered scholars interested in the human sciences (Catt 2014: 217). Such work made possible Joseph A. DeVito's *Communicology: An Introduction to the Study of Communication*, written in 1978 with a focus on the human sciences in communication. In 2000, Richard Lanigan initiated the International Communicology Institute, which provides a dedicated site for the study of the communicative interplay of semiotics and phenomenology with concern for dialectical interaction of culture and person with experience and consciousness.

The work of communicology is scientifically rigorous and, in the words of Catt, often opposed to the near anti-intellectualism of cultural studies. Communicology does not commence with an ideological agenda, but demands methodological rigor that seeks "understanding," not "explanation" dependent upon past reflection. Understanding reveals the context within which choices are made; the task of choice making begins within a cultural context that ultimately "illuminates meaning" (Catt 2014: 221). Catt stresses that communicology is a human science; it is neither a social science of abstraction nor a humanities perspective void of public and rigorous explication of scientific findings about understanding human experience and behaviour:

Communicology is a new discipline influenced by a long tradition in American pragmatism and European philosophy. Its paradigm exemplar is semiotic phenomenology. Its initial motivation is that which always returns, the "natural attitude" which, today, we know to be positivist thinking. Yet, communicologists follow the path of "perpetual beginners" advocated by Merleau-Ponty in due homage to Husserl. Conscious experience is formed, not by external forces delivered through the ostensible linear path of the senses, but by the incorporated phenomenological *semiosis* of culture (Catt 2014: 221).

Catt outlines communicology as situated in reflexivity within human experience and culture, ever attentive to understanding; as he states, communicology is an exemplar of semiotic phenomenology. A pragmatic conception of dialogue is central to inquiry attentive to the phenomenological experience of culture, context, and understanding. Semiotic phenomenology points to steps to an ecology of experience that informs communicative understanding. Such a view of human science returns this essay to Bateson and his conceptualizing of communication as situated understanding within human experience.

5. Bateson's biography as a complex object

The pragmatic dialogic insights of Bateson give shape to a biographical summary article by Stagoll (2005), who outlines the pragmatic importance of dialogue in understanding experience. This perspective is contrary to the "pathological reductionism [...] ... materialism and dualism afflicting Western science." Bateson called for thinking grounded in ideas of "cybernetic circularity, sacred unity and ecologic awareness, and building a foundation for the great integration of hierarchically ordered processes Bateson called 'mind'" (2005: 1036). Stagoll acknowledges that the rising star of Bateson faded, which makes it increasingly essential to reflect on "patterns that connect" (p. 1042).

Bateson insisted that epistemology always begins with the personal. Stagoll (2005: 1043) reminds readers of Bateson as a six-foot five-inch chain-smoking cougher who spoke the King's English. He was collaborative, questioning, and bound to avoid straight lines in lectures, all delivered without formal notes. A pragmatic dialogic investigation asks what context/relational environment permitted the emergence of such a scholar. Context and culture are dialogically pragmatic in their impact upon us. Culture and context are reminiscent of Taylor's (1989) *Sources of the Self* – culture, context, historical moment, and narrative coherence situate us. Bateson was born in 1904 in Grantchester, England, into an intellectual aristocracy; Bateson's father, William, founded the School of Genetics at Cambridge and popularized a number of Gregor Mendel's unknown experiments. William named his third son after Mendel, Gregory. Interestingly, William eventually became an anti-Darwinist; he refused to accept the power of "genetic atomism" as an adequate explanation of evolution. Recent theory continues to vindicate the elder Bateson, with contemporary knowledge affirming that genes interact with one another. Bateson's father unfortunately felt defeated at the end of his life; he questioned whether his choice of following Mendelism was appropriate. Continuing the interplay of extreme commitment and self-doubt at the conclusion of a life, Gregory followed a similar pattern, never quite escaping his father's ghost. The Bateson family had an aura of a "Greek tragedy" with one of Gregory's brothers killed in World War I; on his birthday, the other brother committed suicide in 1922, in full public view at Piccadilly Circus (Stagoll 2006: 122–123).

Gregory began work in zoology. Later, he made a break from the family tradition and studied anthropology. After his father's death in 1927, Gregory fled to the Pacific seeking study and refuge from a mother who had already suffered the loss of three loved ones. Bateson stated early on that he had grown weary of traveling from one place to another and "poking my nose into the affairs of other races" (p. 123). When Gregory met Margaret Mead in New Guinea his conversations came intellectually alive; he returned home to England with the first major breakthrough

of his career, a focus on “schismogenesis.” Bateson’s first book on New Guinea, understood via the notion of schismogenesis, a pattern he identified, was an example of what Bateson termed “experiments in thinking” (p. 123).

Schismogenesis is a set of cumulative interactions between two distinct but related groups, which lead to extreme and sharply differentiated patterns. Symmetrical schismogenesis occurs when each of the groups tries to outdo the other and behaviours escalate – for example, in acts of domination or boasting. Complementary schismogenesis refers to a reciprocal relationship which generates extreme or polarized positions of one-down, one-up communicative engagement³ (p. 124). Repeatedly, Bateson returned to questions of pattern with an intentional focus on challenging loose thinking as he critiqued induction. In 1936, Bateson and Mead married. They arrived in Bali together where they studied the non-competitive nature of the men in that environment. One wonders what they might consider the reasons for massacres in Bali that transpired 30 years later.⁴

When Bateson returned to the West, World War II was beginning; his base was New York, where he joined the office of Strategic Services that eventually became the Central Intelligence Agency. His reflections on intelligence agencies after the war were consistently negative. Later, however, people learned of his brave work in the war effort—his efforts assisted the Allies. From Bateson’s perspective, he did what was asked, and his suspicion of such organizations continued for the remainder of his life. In 1946, Bateson was a founding member of the Macy Conferences on Cybernetics; central to this group was Norbert Wiener, who coined the term “cybernetics,” stressing that computers and machines receive “input” that generates “output” that morphs once again into “input”; the circular nature of information and feedback was fundamental to their early work and central to cybernetics.

Feedback loops are *abstract* patterns of relationships. They are embedded in physical structures or living organisms, but can be formally distinguished from these actual structures. In addition, feedback can couple machines and organisms, and the machine can be seen as an extension of the organism and vice versa. For Bateson, feedback, the capacity of a system to respond to information in self-corrective ways, was a general property of life, or more precisely ‘mind’ (Capra 1996: 55). This was an idea Bateson would develop over the rest of his life (Stagoll 2006: 126).

Bateson understood information as that form of difference that makes a difference, which emerges via form, circularity, and pattern. Bateson later assumed the

3. Bateson (1972: 70) provides an example of complementary schismogenesis as the arms race between the United States and the Soviet Union.

4. During the 1960s, the Nationalist party (PNI) carried out various coup attacks against the Communist party (PKI). An estimated 80,000 Balinese people, or 5% of Indonesia’s population, was killed after villages were demolished (Robinson 1995: 1–18).

role of critic, as cybernetics increasingly followed a mechanistic route. Bateson's understanding of input stirring output that then converts once again into input answered the question of the ghost in the machine (p. 125–126); circularity of information made the dualisms of person and machine and subject and object forms of antiquarian thinking.

In the late 1940s, Bateson separated from Mead and lost his position at Harvard; he was increasingly depressed. To shift his fortunes, he connected with the Langley Port Clinic where Ruesch was exploring communication within a “tribe” of professional psychiatrists. Bateson also examined the Alcoholics Anonymous movement, as well as issues of ecology; in each case he rejected the belief that one can regulate a larger system with unilateral control. He proceeded to publish a book with Ruesch, *Communication: The Social Matrix of Psychiatry*, which was largely ignored. Ruesch and Bateson stressed cybernetic interaction between social behaviour and internal psychological behaviour. Unfortunately, their work lost to “reified DSM diagnoses [...] and reductionist neuromythologies” (Stagoll 2006: 127). Bateson differentiated between digital and analogic coding, with the former differentiated from what it represents and the latter taking on the shape of the information represented. Both digital and analogic codes are part of communication; the latter functions as “metacommunication” that comments upon the communication. When levels of communication go unrecognized, “paradoxes” generate “double binds,” which Bateson understood as one of the major sources of schizophrenia (p. 127). The notion of the double bind became well known – consistently called into question.

When Bateson gathered his team at Palo Alto, consisting of Haley, Weakland, and Jackson, they all struggled to understand the power of “paradoxes of abstraction” (Bateson 1967), which remained at the heart of Bateson's discussion of the double bind in communication. To the consternation of Bateson, Haley sought to make Bateson's work practical with an emphasis on double bind tied to power dynamics. This move by Haley, however, led to Bateson's parting with Haley; Bateson refused to endorse dualisms of winner and loser, a misconception of his view of double bind. This contention resulted in the publication of the book *Pragmatics of Human Communication* without Bateson as a co-author; he contended that the work stole at least thirty of his ideas. Discouraged, Bateson left the Palo Alto group to study dolphins in 1963 under the direction of John Lilly in St. Thomas (Riley 2014), and he then traveled to Hawaii to study with the Oceanic Institute (Brockman 2004). Unlike the others connected with the Palo Alto group, Bateson never wanted to change people; he just wanted to do research to learn. Double bind inquiry, no matter how confusing it was for some, was creatively heuristic for the study of “entanglements and over-closeness” (Stagoll 2006: 129). Bateson, however, stood firm in his refusal to reify his understanding of the term. He defiantly turned

his back on those seeking to build on his work with empirical research that Bateson dismissed as limited in depth.

After the publication of *Steps to an Ecology of Mind* in 1972, Bateson became a cult figure in California. He involved himself in the Green movement, articulating an existential fact – when organisms destroy their environment, they destroy themselves. Once again, Bateson did not feel comfortable with those wanting to use his work; again, as he did at Palo Alto, he resisted the reification of his ideas. Bateson rejected two sides of sloppy thinking: behaviourist thought and mystical idealism. When he was dying of lung cancer in the 1970s, he completed two more books with his daughter Mary Catherine that functioned as exemplars of thinking between these two extremes. The first book, *Mind and Nature*, provided a forum for the discussion of the mind understood as an archetype of a complex living system composed of culture, biology, and mental processes. Bateson's understanding of the mind extended far beyond skin and matter. The mind is a complex object that finds identity in the interplay of organism and environment. Bateson scorned Cartesian detachment, emphasizing an existential fact – we live within nature, not as distant onlookers. Understanding comes from the “inside,” not from the stance of a spectator (Stagoll 2006: 131).

Bateson's final book, *Angels Fear: Towards an Epistemology of the Sacred*, was published after his death. In this work, “Bateson traced destructive human action to inappropriate descriptions, such as those based on by [sic] supernaturalism (pure mind without matter) and materialism (matter without mind)” (Stagoll 2005: 1043). He framed a space for religious thinking that refuses residence in either extreme position. Religious metaphors offer ways of understanding and engaging gaps in knowledge that, when filled too quickly, take us to problematic places. Bateson called himself a “fifth generation unbaptized atheist” (Stagoll 2006: 131). Bateson's emphasis in his last book was on the performative metaphor of “sacred.” He framed two understandings of the word “sacred.” The first centered on caution; we should not “tinker” without awareness of the likelihood of unknown consequences. The second emphasized a holistic order that calls forth awe and humility in response to existence. Bateson states that he was not a deist, but when he looked at the ocean, it simply seemed alive with the sacred. At the end, “Bateson died haunted by a sense of urgency that the narrow definition of human purpose, which had lost ‘the sacred’ in a materialist and technological society, was leading to irreversible ecologic disasters” (Stagoll 2005: 1044). Like his father, he lamented an inability to communicate important issues about the human condition and frequently felt misunderstood. In retrospect, however, the public eventually deemed his father as correct; one wonders if the son may experience a similar corrective fate.

Bateson's biographer David Lipset called him “doubly anachronistic” in that he was both ahead of and behind his own times. He questioned status quo thinking with

an emphasis on relational and holistic patterns within “self-organizing biosphere[s]” (Stagoll 2005: 1044). Bateson’s thinking countered reductive and quantitative thinking. His contextual understanding foreshadowed a postmodern critical sentiment toward autonomy void of context and social constraints. Using the language of Peirce, Bateson pointed repeatedly to the importance of abduction without ignoring or limiting insights from induction and deduction (Peirce 1998: 299). Bateson’s life and work pointed to an existential pragmatics akin to Weigand’s (2015) “dialogue in the stream of life,” which renders understanding of complex objects as both existentially accessible and constituted with ambiguity.

6. Dialogic pragmatics: Understanding complex objects

This essay examined a number of complex objects, ending with a brief biography of Bateson, in order to illustrate a basic assumption—dialogic pragmatics of action and response in the stream of everyday life is the primary manner through which we meet and understand communicative experience. Engaging Bateson’s biographical material as an existential complex object, I offer the following summary of ideas that yields a picture of dialogic pragmatics in action. Dialogic pragmatics seeks experiential understanding of complex objects by attending to the following elements:

1. *Additive Meaning* – dialogic pragmatics registers the reality of additive meaning beyond literal interpretation. Pragmatics begins with a basic assumption: meaning is context-dependent. Meaning and understanding emerge via a pragmatic dialogue between persons and contexts. The context of a biography offers pragmatic insight into the meaning of events. Life activities make sense within experience; experiential understanding contrasts with standing above the human condition.
2. *Competency as Performative Action* – dialogic pragmatics at a macro level of understanding brings the social and individual dimensions of the human condition into creative engagement with one another. Dialogic pragmatics seeks understanding in performative action; this perspective was and is central to understanding Bateson’s conception of a double bind.
3. *Dangers of Schismogenesis* – dialogic pragmatics assumes the vitality of difference and the unintended consequences of sameness; schismogenic competition between persons emerges when parties are unwilling to understand and acknowledge the reality and significance of differences. Dialogic pragmatics attends to unintended consequences, which Bateson understood as inevitable via spiraling efforts toward perfection witnessed in the reification of concepts.

4. *The Importance of Complementary Relationships* – dialogic pragmatics with recognition of difference understands the vitality of complementary relationships; one does not learn from symmetrical relationships, but from admission of difference. Dialogic pragmatics assumes that difference matters; Bateson refused to amalgamate his ideas into a general pool of thought.
5. *Relational Understanding* – dialogic pragmatics envisions relational understanding. Insights do not materialize in isolation but through association and patterns. Bateson understood patterns as central to meaning; missing relational connections moves outside a basic conviction of dialogic pragmatics – relationships and patterns point to a story-laden conception of meaning.
6. *Communicology* – dialogic pragmatics engages semiotic phenomenology for understanding communication within and during experience. Dialogic pragmatics happens in communicative experiences, not in efforts of abstract imposition of theories. Bateson engaged empirical life within experience, following the assumption that we live within, not above, dialogic pragmatics.
7. *Abduction* – dialogic pragmatics assists one in understanding within experiences, ever cognizant of insight beyond the grasp of induction and deduction. Bateson’s understanding of the sacred depends upon abduction, which points to without imposing or grasping. Dialogic pragmatics offers fuzzy clarity, not precise universal understanding.
8. *Bateson and a Crooked Line* – dialogic pragmatics manifests itself in understanding a life via the lens of a crooked line. Moments of interruption and difference lend insight into an unexpected reaction – the unplanned reality of lived experience. Dialogic pragmatics engages a crooked line, permitting human beings to walk where angels fear to tread.

Bateson’s life and work was a dialogic pragmatics in action and response, respectful of the empirical and the concrete that resiliently resist reductionism, atomism, and individualism. Life consists of patterns and relations that guide as one discerns within understanding responsive to awe and wonder. As stated in this essay, within the work of Edda Weigand, we find a voice similar to Bateson’s cry for holistic understanding of human life. She, like Bateson, turns differently than a Cartesian linguistics where theory seeks to impose upon understanding and experience through “definition, abstract rule-governed competence and [ignorance of] features of practice ... [and] performance” (Weigand 2015: 218). Weigand reminds us of “competence-in-performance” attentive to an “architecture of complexity” where the whole is always greater than the addition of the assembled parts. Weigand stresses the interaction of rules and chance, the negotiation of explanation and description, and the importance of social-cultural signification. Dialogic pragmatics

understands communicative experience in the midst of performance. If a communicative task is done, one seeks to explain through and within another form of communicative performance. Dialogic pragmatics yields understanding within communicative performances and experience. Dialogic pragmatics embraces creative and innovative precision of abduction that fosters clarity and reason beyond the conventions of induction and deduction alone. Dialogic pragmatics dwells in performative action and response, informed by experience and abduction, and guided by clarity void of asserted reification. Dialogic pragmatics offers direction without imposition: such is the land in which Bateson's notion of the sacred dwells.

References

- Bateson, Gregory. 1967. *A Theory of Play and Fantasy: A Report on Theoretical Aspects of the Project for Study of the Role of the Paradoxes of Abstraction in Communication*. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill.
- Bateson, Gregory. 1972. *Steps to an Ecology of Mind*. New York: Ballantine Books.
- Bateson, Mary Catherine, Ray Birdwhistell, John Brockman, David Lipset, Rollo May, Margaret Mead, and Edwin Schlossberg. 1977. *About Bateson*. New York: John Brockman Associates, Inc.
- Birner, Betty J. 2013. "Defining Pragmatics." In *Introduction to Pragmatics*, 1–35. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing.
- Brockman, John. 2004. *Gregory Bateson: The Centennial*. Retrieved from https://www.edge.org/conversation/john_brockman-gregory-bateson-the-centennial
- Capra, Fritjof. 1996. *The Web of Life: A New Scientific Understanding of Living Systems*. New York: Random House.
- Catt, Isaac E. 2014. "The Two Sciences of Communication in Philosophical Context." *Review of Communication* 14(3–4): 201–228. doi:10.1080/15358593.2014.986876
- DeVito, Joseph A. 1978. *Communicology: An Introduction to the Study of Communication*. New York: Harper & Row.
- Fisher, Aubrey B. 1982. "Communication Pragmatism: Another Legacy of Gregory Bateson." *Journal of Applied Research on Children* 10(1): 38–49. doi:10.1080/00909888209365211
- Lanigan, Richard. 1975. "The Speech Act Theory of Interpersonal Communication: Stimulus for Research." *Journal of Applied Communications Research* 3(2): 98–101.
- Peirce, Charles S. 1998. *The Essential Peirce: Selected Philosophical Writings*, ed. by the Peirce Edition Project. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
- Porcar, Codruta and Cristian Hainic. 2011. "The Interactive Dimension of Communication: The Pragmatics of the Palo Alto Group." *Journal of Communication and Culture* 1(1): 4–19.
- Ray, Wendel A. and Karin Schlanger. 2012. "John H. Weakland: An Interview in Retrospect." *Journal of Systemic Therapies* 31(1): 55–73. doi:10.1521/jsyt.2012.31.1.53
- Rich, Marc Howard and Robert T. Craig. 2012. "Habermas and Bateson in a World Gone M.A.D.: Metacommunication, Paradox, and the Inverted Speech Situation." *Communication Theory* 22: 383–402. doi:10.1111/j.1468-2885.2012.01412.x

- Riley, Christopher. 2014. "The Dolphin Who Loved Me: The NASA-funded Project That Went Wrong." *The Guardian*. Retrieved from <http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2014/jun/08/the-dolphin-who-loved-me>
- Robinson, Geoffrey. 1995. *The Dark Side of Paradise: Political Violence in Bali*. New York: Cornell University Press.
- Ruesch, Jurgen. 1972. *Semiotic Approaches to Human Relations*. Belgium: Mouton & Co. doi:10.1515/9783110816228
- Ruesch, Jurgen, and Gregory Bateson. 1951. *Communication: The Social Matrix of Psychiatry*. New York: W. W. Norton & Co.
- Stagoll, Brian. 2005. "Gregory Bateson (1904–1980): A Reappraisal." *Australian & New Zealand Journal of Family Therapy* 39: 1036–1045.
- Stagoll, Brian. 2006. "Gregory Bateson at 100." *Australian & New Zealand Journal of Family Therapy* 27(3): 121–134. doi:10.1002/j.1467-8438.2006.tb00710.x
- Taylor, Charles. 1989. *Sources of the Self*. Cambridge: University of Cambridge Press.
- Trognon, Alain. 2013. "Pragmatics Re-established on Its Feet: Weigand's Mixed Game Model 2010." *Language and Dialogue* 3(3): 457–476. doi:10.1075/ld.3.3.07tro
- Watzlawick, Paul, Janet Helmick Beavin, and Don D. Jackson. 1967. *Pragmatics of Human Communication*. New York: W. W. Norton & Co.
- Weigand, Edda. 2015. "Dialogue in the stream of life." *Language and Dialogue* 5(2): 197–223. doi:10.1075/ld.5.2.01wei
- Winkin, Yves. 1981. *La nouvelle communication*. Paris: Éditions du Seuil.

Types and functions of pseudo-dialogues

Arto Mustajoki¹, Tatiana Sherstinova² and Ulla Tuomarla¹

¹University of Helsinki (Finland) / ²St. Petersburg University (Russia) and National Research University Higher School of Economics (Russia)

In pure dialogues, the speakers address their words to recipients who concentrate on listening, while in pseudo-dialogues the recipients are not able to listen, or prefer not to listen. The speaker may be fully aware of the recipient's mental absence. The aim of the chapter is to study how pseudo-dialogues are used in everyday communication. We differentiate four main categories of pseudo-dialogues based on the role of the recipient: a human recipient who is present in the situation but whose role in the interaction is secondary; a physically remote human recipient; a non-human recipient (a dog, a computer, etc.); a speaker who speaks to himself/herself (no other recipients than oneself). In most cases, the manner of speaking in pseudo-dialogues largely resembles that of pure dialogues. Examples of the usage of pseudo-dialogues are taken from the St. Petersburg One Day of Speech Corpus.

Keywords: dialogue, pseudo-dialogue, non-standard dialogue, talking to oneself, talking to animals, talking to a computer, listener, recipient, ORD project

1. Introduction

Some researchers speak of a written language bias in linguistics (see especially Linell 1998, 2012; Marková 1982). Indeed, there is a clear discrepancy between the reality of language use and the main formats of general language descriptions, such as grammars. The basic form of language in vivo is oral conversation, but when compilers of grammar books describe language, they generally cite written texts for examples and evidence. Researchers who emphasise the primary nature of oral dialogues usually point out that the very essence of language as a human tool of communication is revealed in daily spontaneous dialogues of native speakers. The famous Russian language philosopher Mikhail Bakhtin expressed this very clearly by arguing that everyday conversation is the primary speech genre and that written texts as well as other forms of 'organized cultural communication' are secondary genres (Bakhtin 1986). This position is supported by many other researchers, such as Daniel J. Levinson, who

observes the following: “Conversation is clearly the prototypical kind of language use, the form in which we are all first exposed to language” (Levinson 1983: 284; compare also: Abercrombie 1965: 3; Liddicoat 2007: 1; Zemskaia 1987: 4).

In line with the idea of the primary nature of dialogical speech, we argue that the general understanding of oral conversation is too narrow and does not correspond to the real picture of human communication. According to the standard view, oral conversation is a joint effort by its participants. We concede that Grice’s Cooperative Principle is present in many communicative encounters, but within more or less prototypical face-to-face dialogues involving two or more active participants, there is a great variety of types of verbal expressions that lack the basic features of a dialogue, such as cooperativeness and the active role of the recipient. Dialogues may even lack a listener in the stricter sense of the word, as is the case when we speak to animals or inanimate objects, or when we speak to a person who is spatially or mentally absent. We refer to these cases as pseudo-dialogues.

We propose that a more accurate picture of human communicative behaviour can be constructed only by considering all the verbal actions that a person is involved in during his or her everyday life. A major project by researchers from Saint Petersburg University called *Odin rechevoi den* (ORD, ‘One day of speech’) reveals the very essence of human communicative behaviour, which is ragged, full of malformed encounters and, above all, extremely diverse (Asinovsky et al. 2009). This type of empirical data reveals that the canonical communication situation with participants concentrating on the conversation itself is far from being the only type of human verbal behaviour. We will cite some statistics and excerpts from the material produced by the ORD project as evidence for the necessity to pay more attention to various types of pseudo-dialogues.

What we are attempting to do is in line with the demand that researchers need to adopt a more holistic view of language use that takes into consideration the complex socio-cognitive nature of human communication (see, especially Kecskes 2010; Weigand 2004, 2011). If we take this demand seriously, we arrive at the need to apply an approach to research language that is phenomenon-driven rather than one that is theory or method-driven (for additional details, see Mustajoki 2017a). This means that a researcher first closely examines the phenomenon in question without determining beforehand the method to be used. We have adopted this orientation by analysing dialogical language use in its whole complexity and by attempting to determine its full range of characteristics.

We will first consider the factors and constituents that influence interaction. We subsequently examine some classifications of dialogues. In the next section, we attempt to classify pseudo-dialogues and to elaborate on their functions. That section begins with a definition of a pseudo-dialogue. Finally, we illustrate pseudo-dialogues by providing some statistics and examples from the ORD project. In the concluding section, we systematise the findings we have made.

2. Constituents influencing the course of communication

Applying the phenomenon-driven approach, first we need to explore in more detail the constituents that determine the course of interaction in communicative situations. Interaction between people is about making choices. As any human behaviour, the process of communication consists of conscious or unconscious choices. These are affected by various factors and the most important of these are illustrated in Figure 1 (cf. Mustajoki 2017a).




Figure 1. Main constituents influencing the course of communication

Some of the constituents presented in the figure are obvious. Linguistic capacity determines the frames of producing and comprehending speech. The mental worlds of the participants reflect how they interpret elements of speech and determine the social norms to be followed in communication: what can and should be said in that particular context. Some external circumstances present serious obstacles for interaction, such as the noise made by a vacuum cleaner at home, loud music at a disco, or traffic noise in the street. When we take part in a conversation, we also have various communicative needs, including conscious or unconscious intentions, hidden agendas, and overt or covert aims. We may only want to comment on the surrounding world or on our feelings, or discuss our future plans. We may aim to compliment, flatter, thank, hurt, insult, or humiliate the person(s) we are talking to. Or we simply want to make contact with another human being (for more details, see Mustajoki 2017a).

However, it is important to consider the non-communicative needs of speakers more thoroughly. This question has been widely discussed within the Communication Accommodation Theory (CAT). In their review article, Howard Giles and Jordan Soliz (2014) differentiate four major principles that occur in our communicative behaviour influencing participants in their interaction. Each of the principles is concretised by a set of detailed goals and needs as “signal positive face and empathy”, “signal common social identities” and “self-esteem”. Self-esteem is part of a wide human need to be regarded as smart, intelligent, and humorous. It is linked to the social construction of identity (for example, see Bucholtz and Hall 2005; Kiesling 2013). According to Scott F. Kiesling (2013: 449), individuals desire to continually renew their identities by expressing different facets of their identity at different times depending on the company. In the role of the speaker, for the sake of self-presentation, people may also use expressions that hinder understanding.

In addition to these factors influencing our behaviour in real life communicative encounters, we would like to pay special attention to the need to avoid cognitive effort and regard it as a separate constituent that influences communication. The non-communicative needs mentioned above affect how the participants in interaction consider their desires as members of social groups, families and workplaces. Another important factor in communication is the avoidance of cognitive effort. This derives from a general need to minimise the use of resources in achieving the goal people attempt to attain. For example, when we are not in a hurry, we tend to prefer walking to running. The same is valid for all human behaviour and for communication in particular (cf. Bargh and Chartrand 1999; Dijksterhuis 2004; Shintel and Keysar 2009). This avoidance of effort has a profound impact on the course of daily conversations. Interlocutors often concentrate on the course of interaction in an insufficient way.

Few previous studies on human conversation have focussed on the avoidance of cognitive effort. The main explanation for ignoring this aspect of communication is the normative attitude that prevails in mainstream research due to applied research methods. Dialogues are usually studied in such experimental situations where this phenomenon is less visible. When real communication is analysed, the consequences of the participant’s poor concentration on the communication itself are typically interpreted as exceptional deviations from an ideal dialogue, not as a normal part of human communicative behaviour. In her book on fictive interaction, Esther Pascual refers to this type of opportunity by observing: “We talk to newborn babies, pets, plants, and at times even computers and automobiles. Also, no caregiver is bound to be too surprised, let alone worried, by the sight of a preschool child interacting with an imaginary companion, whether this is a personified object, like a stuffed animal or a doll, or an invisible friend” (Pascual 2014: 4). However, pseudo-conversation with these categories of recipients is only one type of non-standard dialogue.

Moreover, concerning their roles in communication, the speaker and the recipient are in very different situations; it is much easier for the recipient not to concentrate on the interaction. However, speakers can also minimise their cognitive effort – for example, by using regular speech patterns (formulaic language) or by repeating her/himself as much as possible. Istvan Kecskes (2015) describes how speakers attempt to balance using their favourite words and expressions with being creative. His data consists of L1 and L2 communication encounters. Another consequence of non-concentration on speaking that is caused by a speaker's laziness or fatigue is improper recipient design. This especially occurs in non-official communication encounters amongst family members, friends and acquaintances when we tend to think that it is unnecessary to pay attention to how we speak. During interaction, this leads to egocentric behaviour, which may be impractical from the communicative perspective and which may cause unclear pronunciation, elliptic and cryptic speech and common ground fallacy (cf. Mustajoki 2012, 2013, 2017b; Pietikäinen 2016).

A number of studies have produced a variety of scientific descriptions on the role of the recipient in conversation (Goffman 1981; Clark and Carlson 1982, among others). However, most of them consider dialogues with third parties, that is, people who are involved in the conversation although they are not the participants who are the speaker's target audience. The following roles for third parties have been identified in the literature: overhearer, eavesdropper, bystander (for a review on this issue, see Dynel 2010; O'Connell and Kowal 2012: 4–8). The ethos of other studies concerning dialogical conversation is usually insufficient to fulfil the criteria of a good listener. The existence of a high number of guidebooks on "How to listen correctly" attests to the severe problems that frequently arise in this regard. Indeed, unlike the speaker's situation, it is much easier for the recipient to be "absent" and to pretend to be listening while thinking of something else. When the speaker notices this, he/she may ask: *Are you listening to me?* However, this paper demonstrates in more detail that there are also some speech genres where the speaker, at least unconsciously, accepts that the recipient is not concentrating on listening.

In this respect, listening resembles the way in which our senses work. For example, we are especially selective in the usage of sight. We recognise only a minuscule portion of the visual information that travels through our eyes to our brain. This mechanism resembles oral stimuli perception, although the amount of information in the latter case is much smaller. Everyone has experienced selectiveness in listening. During the buzz of conversation, which occurs in settings such as a reception, when someone mentions your name, you suddenly hear it even when you were not listening to the conversation at large. This is because whenever possible, we only browse the vocal world around us and only wake up to listen when needed. At its easiest, this occurs when the recipient is a part of a larger audience, but sometimes this can also happen in dyadic face-to-face conversation.

The famous “Invisible Gorilla test” conducted by Daniel Simons and Christopher Chabris shows how selective people are in perceiving what is happening around them. When Simons and Chabris asked people to concentrate on some aspect of a video, these participants failed to notice a gorilla on a basketball court that also appeared in the video. This phenomenon is called inattention blindness or perceptual blindness. While it is difficult to design experiments that would produce similar dramatic consequences of “inattention deafness” or “perceptual deafness”, there is no reason to believe that our ears are more reliable than our eyes in this respect. In fact, we also have some experimental evidence for this. For example, Gareth Roberts and his colleagues (Roberts et al. 2016) devised a test that demonstrates that people are poor in recognising clear incoherence in the texts they listen to. In real life situations where listeners always have a considerable number of various stimuli, it is much more likely that the important constituents of speech remain unrecognised.

For recipients, one additional feature may reduce their concentration on listening. Particularly in more formal circumstances when the need for self-esteem and self-presentation is accentuated, the recipients may listen less due to their preparing for their anticipated lines to contribute to the presentation. The speaker usually does not notice this because the recipient pretends to listen.

3. Types of dialogues

We begin this section by briefly commenting on the terminology we adopted because researchers define terms differently. The term “dialogue” has two main meanings: on the one hand, it consists of an exchange of phrases between two or more persons in a concrete communicative situation (such as between John and Mary in the kitchen), and on the other hand, it involves long-lasting contact between groups of people (such as between China and the US or between Christians and Muslims) (for elaboration on the various understandings of the term “dialogue”, see Carbaugh 2013; Linell 2017). Dialogue has also been developed as a major method in management styles (Senge 1990; Isaacs 1999) and in the development of peace processes (Saunders 1999). A more comprehensive understanding of a dialogue is also adopted in studies where it is seen as a foundation of reality (for example, see Buber 1923/2008; Bohm 2006). In the former meaning, “dialogue” closely resembles the notions of “conversation” and “interaction”. Each of these words has certain nuances in their use but, in this paper, we use these words as synonyms. The word “communication” is used by us in a wider sense.

The persons who engage in an interaction/dialogue/conversation are its “participants”. Even though the same person plays both roles of a speaker and a recipient during interaction, these roles need to be differentiated because the general idea

of a conversation is that participants speak one at a time and any other participant listens. For these roles, we prefer the terms “the speaker” and “the recipient”. The word “utterer” does not reflect the whole spectrum of the role of a speaker. For the “recipient”, some other alternatives have been suggested, namely the “listener”, the “hearer”, the “comprehender” and the “addressee” (see an overview in Dynel 2010; O’Connell and Kowal 2012: 4–8). However, from the perspective of the focus of our paper, all these terms are unsuitable, because recipients do not always listen and the speaker does not always address her/his speech to a certain person. The term “hearer” could, in some situations, reflect the inactive role of the recipient, but in certain types of pseudo-dialogues, no hearer is present. We therefore consider the term “recipient” to be more neutral in this sense, albeit not ideal, because the recipient does not always actually receive the message. For this reason, we also adopt the term “pseudo-recipient”.

For a brief overview of the different classifications of dialogues, we begin with the basics. Douglas Walton and Fabrizio Macagno (2007) argue that the theory of dialogue types can be traced back to Aristotle. The authors refer to Aristotle in their own classification that forefronts the communication situations of debate, arguing and arriving at six types of dialogue: persuasion dialogue, negotiation, inquiry, deliberation, information seeking and eristics. For the last type, the starting point is conflict and antagonism.

In addition to factual (real) interactions, Esther Pascual (2006, 2014) also differentiates fictive interaction. While participants talk to each other in factual interaction, in fictive interaction, the speaker utilizes dialogical elements in speech and this underlines its interactional nature. Examples of these are rhetoric questions, such as *What was that?* posed in the middle of a monologue; *Who needs that car?* (= Nobody needs that car) or other quotes from a dialogical speech, as *Develop a ‘Yes, I can do it’ attitude* and *The Christian fundamentalist movement is one that believes in, we’re right, you’re wrong, no matter what.*

Daniel C. O’Connell and Sabine Kowal (2012), following the example of other researchers (among others, see Clark 1996) make another distinction within dialogues and divide them in two types: conversational and empractical dialogues. In conversational dialogues, speaking is the primary activity, while in empractical speech, non-linguistic activities are primary and speaking functions as an additional and occasional element used to help to achieve the goal. When we buy a train ticket, unless we do it online, we usually have to say something in order to buy it, but we can minimise our speech to the seller and concentrate on receiving the ticket. Afterwards, when we recount what we did, we do not say that we had a conversation with the ticket seller, but that we bought a ticket. As we will demonstrate later, in some cases with a “pseudo-recipient”, the speaker speaks in fact to her/himself.

One option for a classification of dialogues is the degree of cooperativeness. A general aim of interaction is to avoid friction and conflicts. To achieve this strategic goal, people try to be cooperative and polite (Grice 1975; Leech 1983). However, Grice's Cooperative Principle seems not to be a universal feature of interaction (for example, see Gu 1994; Sarangi and Slembrouck, 1992). To begin with, it is not evident what is (or should be) meant by cooperativeness. Is this a joint effort to achieve linguistically acceptable speech, or something more that reaches beyond linguistic goals? Surely a participant may be cooperative in interaction in different ways and to a variable degree. A participant may pursue an extra-linguistic goal that may or may not be shared by other participants. In any case, there are probably many goals. A participant simply may also be finishing another speaker's sentences, thus providing a linguistic aid (for better or for worse) or, on a higher level of interaction, he/she may recur to linguistic means to express empathy towards other communicants.

A good example of the complexity of human communication is empathy but it cannot always be captured in words. One simple means of expressing empathy is to reflect on what has already been said by others in one's own speech (act). The objective of our study is to analyse pseudo-dialogues as a relatively frequent type of casual, everyday interaction that is not an interaction in the literal sense. As a form of pseudo-interaction, pseudo-dialogues do not presume active co-operation on the behalf of recipient(s), if there is any. We do claim, however, that this type of soliloquy behaviour is generally accepted and recognised by the overhearer as a non-participatory activity. The roles of the overhearer are interesting and we shall discuss them later in this paper. A passive recipient can be considered rather essential to some types of pseudo-dialogues, as we shall see. In general, even if many types of human conversation can be characterised by cooperativeness, some types of speech are only minimally, if at all, participatory.

Even though cooperativeness is a variable, communicants usually have multiple goals simultaneously. Yueguo Gu (1994) proposes a distinction between rhetoric and pragmatic cooperativeness, notions that relate to different levels of interaction. Pavlidou (1991: 12) similarly distinguishes between formal cooperation and substantial cooperation. The issue of politeness and cooperativeness is also highly context-sensitive and dependent on cultural habit. For example, being polite in Finland is not at all the same as being polite in the US.

In practice, examining language in itself, no matter how closely, does not always permit us to detect speakers' attitudes and intentions that underlie their words. One major risk is misinterpretation, especially when regarding written communication because nonverbal communication plays a major role in expressing emotions and attitudes. Another factor that may prevent a correct interpretation of each other's goals is the cultural differences between communicants.

Due to the diversity in the types of non-cooperativeness, it is impossible to create a systematic scale of them. However, they can be demonstrated by the main constituents that influence the course of communication and these were presented in Figure 1:

- Differences in linguistic capacities: difficulties in comprehension caused by the speaker's improper recipient design and a misbalance in the language skills of the interlocutors may lead to situations where the listener starts to pretend to understand.
- Differences in mental worlds, especially in intercultural encounters, easily cause the behaviour of interlocutors to be interpreted as impolite; one example is that in France, it would be considered impolite not to greet a person sitting in a social space, such as a physician's waiting room. This resembles what occurs in Finland when we do not know this person, it is more usual to respect his or her private space and not to greet him/her; both ways of behaviour can be considered polite in their own cultural context.
- Differences in communicative needs are an obvious reason for non-cooperativeness. For instance, let us imagine a situation in which one of the interlocutors strives for a positive or normal tone of speaking, but the other is oriented to confrontation and aims to hurt or provoke the other participant in the dialogue.
- Non-communicative needs, such as self-presentation and the desire for esteem by other people, easily overcome listening and lead to a battle for the communicative space and to one concentrating on one's own speech at the expense of listening.
- Avoidance of cognitive efforts may mean in practice an unwillingness to concentrate on listening on the pretext that one person already knows what the other person is going to say or that first person qualifies it as unimportant.
- External circumstances, such as the presence of people for whom we feel antipathy, may regulate our behaviour in interaction so that we are anxious about asking for clarification, such as in a meeting.

Examples and causes of non-cooperativeness demonstrate the diversity of communicative encounters, and one manifestation of this is the frequent occurrence of pseudo-dialogues.

4. Types of pseudo-dialogues

Let us now turn to the analysis of pseudo-dialogues, i.e. such communicative situations that do not fulfil the criteria of a rounded dialogue. These criteria include characteristics such as "reciprocity of perception" and "interactivity" (for example, see Fiehler et al. 2004: 23). In real (pure) dialogues, the speakers address their words to recipients who concentrate on listening, while in pseudo-dialogues, the

recipients are not able to listen, or prefer not to listen due to their being more or less mentally absent. In addition, the speaker may be fully aware of that. This definition of pseudo-dialogues rules out a number of situations where the speaker expects that recipients are listening, but in reality, they are not (for example, a teacher's explanation in the class, or conference presentation; partial concentration on listening is common for television and radio broadcastings). Nonetheless, non-listening or half-listening is also common in daily dialogical conversations due to the factors mentioned above.

Pseudo-dialogues also lack the "open-endedness" that O'Connell and Kowal (2008) mentioned as one of the four basic features of a spoken dialogue. Pseudo-dialogue often consists of one phrase produced by the speaker. Short dialogues are also possible in other circumstances due to interruptions by the participant or by external conditions, but for pseudo-dialogues, brevity is a natural characteristic, not a failure or malfunction.

One possible criterion to use to classify pseudo-dialogues could be the type of communicative situation. This approach was adopted by Irina Vepreva (2012) in her study that describes the speech of car drivers directed to 'quasi-addressees', as she puts it. After analysing a high number of authentic examples, Vepreva differentiates six types of quasi-addressees: the car itself (as in (1)–(2)), other drivers, who of course do not hear the speech (3), pedestrians (4), traffic policemen (5), (bad) streets or roads (6) and finally the driver himself (less often herself) (7) (The translations try to give the same expression as the original Russian phrases).

- (1) How are you, Mers? I like you, darling (after the car has started in a cold weather)
- (2) Haloo! The light is green!!
- (3) Why are you all so lazy today!!
- (4) Ugh, you are hiding again in bushes.
- (5) What a hole! They wreck my car!
- (6) I'd definitely like to have such a Volvo.

According to Vepreva, the speech of drivers to quasi-addressees is caused by the discomfort that they feel while at the wheel due to their quickly changing circumstances. This type of activity serves a clear function, which is not communicative: the driver tries to rid himself or herself of a bad mood or of negative feelings. In other words, this is a way to neutralise a negative situation. As examples (1–2) show, sometimes the dialogue imitates small talk. In all instances, we see a very natural wording of feelings, which is similar to dialogues between people in face-to-face encounters.

It could be possible to identify other contexts that are typical and common for pseudo-dialogues, such as "at home". However, it seems to us that it is more fruitful to base the classification of pseudo-dialogues on the characteristics of the (pseudo-) recipient. We differentiate four main categories based on the role of the recipient:

1. a human recipient who is present in the situation but whose role is secondary in the interaction;
2. a physically remote human recipient;
3. a non-human recipient;
4. a speaker who speaks to himself/herself (no other recipients than oneself).

These categories can be divided into subgroups. Let us now turn to an overview of them.

1. We begin with situations that resemble a normal face-to-face dialogue with a present, human recipient. As opposed to those, the role of the recipient in pseudo-dialogues is minimal or he/she is not listening at all. The speaker is the clear initiator of the dialogue and is very active in speaking. Furthermore, he or she may or may not be aware of the “unconventional” nature of the communication.

In the first three cases below, it is possible that the recipient assumes a more active role in the course of conversation, but this is not obligatory nor a rule.

- 1a. **Unburden speech.** Let us consider a situation where Mary is returning home after a hard day at work. Her husband is sitting in a chair and is pre-occupied with something on his smartphone. She speaks in a fretful tone:

Mary: Dear, I had a terrible day at work. Our new boss is awful. Bla bla ...

John: Hm.

Mary: Bla bla. Bla bla ... Bla ...

John: Hm.

Mary: I want to find a new job.

John: Hm.

Mary: Did you buy fish?

John: Hm.

Mary: Are you listening to me?

John: What did you say?

As we can see, Mary wants to vent her emotions. It is important for her that she has someone close to whom she can relate the terrible events that occurred at work. It is not necessary that the other person concentrates on listening because merely her recounting these annoying incidents improves her mood. When Mary shifts from the unburden mode to normal interaction, she shifts her mode of speech and the role of the recipient changes, which is evident by the end of the dialogue. In unburden speech, the role of the recipient clearly differs from normal dialogical speech.

The situation described above is typical for unburden speech: there is something that the speaker finds extremely annoying and the (pseudo)-recipient is usually a close person. However, similar communicative situations may arise when the recipient is a stranger and the reason for

turning to her/him is a strong desire to express major emotional feelings. Imagine the following case: Michel is sitting in a train and receives a phone call where they tell him that he has won 1 million euros in a lottery. After learning such marvellous news, he has an urgent need to tell it to just about anyone and so he begins to speak of it to his nearest co-passenger. The latter may join the joyful situation, but it is just as likely that he/she may only pretend to listen. This is an instance of an occasional recipient, while in the first example, the role of the recipient only affects a very close person, a confidant.

- 1b. **Spontaneous commenting on what is happening.** A substantial part of our communication with other people consists of commenting on something. We may comment on politicians' activities, changes in the weather or a goalkeeper's mistake in yesterday's football match. This may occur in a bar, in a café, at work, or at home. These situations do not differ substantially from conversations of other types as regards the roles of the speaker and the recipient: the speaker is willing to say something and the recipient is either interested in it or not. The following constitutes a different type of commenting, which involves Mary watching television:

Mary: Obama looks very tired.

John: (silence)

Mary: He must have problems with Michelle.

John: (silence)

Mary: No, the economy worries him.

John: (silence)

In this situation, the addressee may be watching television as well, doing something in the kitchen, reading a newspaper or, most probably, doing something with his mobile phone. However, this is not relevant here, because the function of the commenting is not to initiate a dialogue but only to break the silence, to fill the space with speech and to spell out what the viewer thinks about what she has seen. In a wider context, this can be considered as a part of ritual speech that strengthens the relationship.

One can encounter a similar situation when a couple is hiking. Usually the hikers maintain a short distance between them and their walking makes some noise. Nevertheless, the hikers usually have the need to comment on what they experience, such as: *I have never seen that bird, I could easily live in that house, What a mess they have in their backyard, It's getting dark* These comments may be heard and one can receive a response, but it is just as likely they are not even being heard. Again, this does not harm the speaker because we are not dealing with a real dialogue. These utterances

have other functions, such as just talking to oneself or merely keeping a person company.

A different type of spontaneous commenting is represented in the following example: Vladimir Putin, in those days the Russian premiere, and Matti Vanhanen, the Finnish prime minister, attended the inaugural event at the Finnish House in Saint Petersburg. One of the authors of this paper hosted the opening ceremony and in that capacity welcomed the guests of honour by saying in Russian: *Ja serdecho privetstvujju nashih vysokih gostej*. The word “vysokij” has two meanings in Russian: ‘tall’ and ‘esteemed’. So, literally, this phrase could be translated into English in two ways, as either ‘I cordially welcome our esteemed guests’ or ‘our tall guests’. Vladimir Putin was in a good mood and said to himself in a low voice: *Zdes’ tol’ko odin vysokij tshelovek*, ‘There is only one tall person in here’, looking at Vanhanen, who is 200 cm tall. The situation was rather exceptional, but the comment itself was typical for pseudo-dialogues in that it was spontaneous; it was not directly addressed to anyone and it was a reactive speech act in the sense that no further comments or responses (apart from laughter perhaps) were expected.

- 1c. **Empractical speech.** The notion of empractical speech was discussed in the previous section. One can ask whether empractical speech always falls into the category of pseudo-dialogues. Indeed, the role of the participants is different in empractical speech in comparison to real conversation because the focus is on a certain activity but not on talking. However, in most cases of empractical speech, dialogue itself is rather normal with two active participants. Consider the following situation: John is handing a document to his boss and says: *Here is the document*. The boss takes the document and replies: *Thank you*. Nonetheless, in some circumstances, empractical speech can also constitute a pseudo-dialogue. This occurs when the speaker explains what he/she is doing to a recipient and does not expect a vocal reaction, as when a parent dresses a small child and says something such as: *We are going to the shop and you will wear ...* or when a nurse gives the daily portion of pills to a dementia patient and says: *Today we will take one pink pill and two white ones*. Usually these types of utterances are pronounced in a lower voice and in a monotone tone that implies the non-conversational nature of speech. The child and the patient may or may not comment on the speaker’s utterance.

In the three above-mentioned cases, we considered that the recipient could change her/his position from a quasi-recipient to a real one. In the further case, the recipient is permanently or occasionally in a state such that he/she is not able to participate in the conversation.

- 1d. **Conversational speech with a person who is not able to take part in interaction.** The speaker of these situations states something to a recipient who is present but recognised as someone who is unable to participate in the interaction. Typical recipients are babies, highly intoxicated persons, or seriously ill patients. The most dramatic situation is the speech directed to a person in a coma or to a dead body.

There is extensive variation in these situations. A parent, being alone with a baby, speaks to it differently from a family friend in the presence of parents; in the latter case, the speaker addressees her/his words as much to the parents as to the baby. A police officer “interacts” with an intoxicated person in another manner than the spouse of that person who may blame her/him with saying *You bastard!* or *You never learn!* or explain his/her own activity in the spirit of empractical speech, such as: *I put you to the bed.* As for patients who have lost their ability to speech, every case is unique. If the patient is able to utilise compensatory methods or technical devices in interaction (such as eye movements, touching, etc.), we are not dealing with a pseudo-dialogue but with a special case of a real dialogue.

The significance of speaking to babies and to patients who have lost their ability to speak has been demonstrated in dozens of studies. These situations can clearly motivate speakers to engage in pseudo-dialogues, but surely it is important not only to the recipient but also to the speaker. A (pseudo-)conversational contact with such a person normalises the attitude to her/him: when I interact with that person, as with other people, I regard her/him as such.

2. What unites the next types of pseudo-dialogues is the existence of a remote, usually human recipient who is not present in the same space with the speaker. There is extensive variation in these types of communicative situations. Let us consider some basic types of these situations.
- 2a. **Talking to a person who can be seen but who does not hear the speech.** Let us imagine the following situation: you are standing in front of a window and suddenly see a pedestrian in the street who does not notice an approaching car. You spontaneously shout to her/him *Be careful!* Recall another typical situation of this type of pseudo-dialogues we already discussed above, commenting on a car-driver, on other drivers, or on a traffic officer: *Move on! Why are you standing there!* Shouting to the referee is also a rather normal behaviour during a sports event: *You idiot!, Penalty!, Are you blind?* However, cheering for fans by yelling the name of the club or by singing is, strictly speaking, a different case, because the players hear the collective voice of the crowd.

- 2b. **Talking to a person on television.** People evidently have a need to “say” something to persons who appear on television. We previously described the comments a viewer makes on what is happening on television. While watching, the viewer directs her/his words to the person who is saying or doing something on the screen. The utterances the viewers make depend on the person who is the object of interest at that time. One may say to a politician *I won't vote for you anymore, You are an idiot or I don't believe you*, to a pop-artist *I love you, You shouldn't wear that dress, You think you are pretty*, or *Go home!*, or to a football player *Pass!!, Move on!, Why do you miss all the time?*. All these reactions are spontaneous and usually produced in an affective voice.
- 2c. **Talking to a person who is absent.** This takes place when the speaker is in an emotional mood and has an urgent need to “speak” to a close person. A typical case is a girl or a boy who is not only thinking of but also talking to her boyfriend or to his girlfriend. Speaking may take the form of a dialogue so that the speaker also plays the role of the recipient, uttering words of love and admiration, or requests directed to that beloved person (*I am waiting for your call!!!*). The most urgent situation occurs when the couple has had a fight some days before and both of them are now eagerly waiting for a phone call. A similar situation may arise when we rehearse an important approach to someone, such as when we plan to ask for someone's hand or for a promotion at work.
- 2d. **Leaving a voice message.** A voice message is, with respect to expression, a monologue at the moment of leaving it, but it functions as a dialogue with a person who then will listen to the message. When using a desk phone, usually several possible people can listen and the message usually begins with a self-presentation: *It is John calling. Could you please call me as soon as possible?*
3. What unites the next categories of pseudo-dialogues is talk to a non-human recipient. Because a human being is the prototypical participant in a conversation, in the case of a non-human recipient, we encounter a strong element of humanisation or personification of the object in hand. We speak to these recipients as if they would understand our speech as people do.
- 3a. **Talking to pets or other animals** (dogs, cats, horses, fish, etc.). This is one of the most frequent types of pseudo-dialogues. Although the situation resembles a human-to-human interaction, there are also differences. In their research, John Rogers with his colleagues (1993) compared the speech that dog-owners use in interactions with their dogs and in interactions with other dog-owners. The results show that these modes are very different in practice. It is rather understandable that the speech directed to dogs

consists of a great number of imperatives (57.5% in comparison to 1.5%), but dog-owners also ask their own dogs questions more often than other dog-owners. Deborah Tannen (2004) emphasises the significant role of conversation with pets in building cohesion and well-being within families. People talking to pets, evidently, do not think of such consequences when speaking to them spontaneously.

There are some studies on the differences of the language people use in speaking to dogs (doggerel) or to children (motherese). For example, Kathy Hirsh-Pasek and Rebecca Treiman (1982) argue that these modes of speaking are structurally very similar (also compare: Mitcell 2001; Ermolova 2015). On the other hand, from the point of view of the recipient, these situations are very different. By listening to human speech, a child learns step-by-step to speak that language, while a dog or other pets might learn to understand human speech to some extent, but definitely will not ever speak in that language.

- 3b. **Talking to plants and artefacts.** From the perspective of speech functions, this category somewhat resembles the previous one. However, this recipient is not able to react in any way. A dog or a horse may answer to the speech by wagging its tail or by “smiling” in their personal ways, while plants or clothes do not react anyhow. Nonetheless, another approach to this question is provided in the best-seller guidebook of Maria Kondo, the Japanese tidying specialist. She advises us to talk to our clothes after wearing them. If we thank them for performing their role well, the clothes feel themselves better and will better withstand us wearing them the next time.

Perhaps the most famous episode involving an artefact being addressed to is from *The Cherry Orchard* by Anton Chekhov. In the first act of this play, Leonid Andrejevitsh Gajev, an aristocrat, and the brother of the landowner Ljubov Aleksandrova Ranevskaja, gives a talk to a bookcase in a very solemn style. This talk begins: “Dear much respected bookcase, I hail with gladness your existence, which already for more than a hundred years has been devoted to the enlightened ideals of goodness and justice [–]”.

- 3c. **Talking to technical devices.** This is also a wide-spread phenomenon. Some of the examples by Vepreva that we mentioned above fall into this category. Speaking to your car while you drive is definitely not only a feature of Russian drivers. Apparently, the most typical case of a “recipient” is, however, not a car but a computer. The analyses of dialogues with a computer made by A.V. Zavadziorova (2008) reveal that speaker reactions fall into two main categories: they are rational that imitate the way of functioning of the computer, or they are emotional reactions that reflect the anger and frustration of the speaker. Usually the words are directed straight to the

computer: *Why are you so slow today; You want to play up again, ah!* In Russian, a computer is considered to be both a man (kompjuter) and a woman (mashina). So, in rebuking the computer for bad behaviour, one can speak to it: *durak* (a male fool) or *dura* (a female fool). Furthermore, the computer as an important constituent of a modern life style is surrounded by metaphors that personify it. A computer has a memory, we can teach it and it is able or not able to answer or it does not wake up or worse: it has a virus. In recent years, we have started to wonder to which extent they already behave like humans. In five or ten years, when a linguist is writing a paper on pseudo-dialogues, he/she will surely have a special section on human-computer/robot dialogue. The main question will be whether the computer dialogue still differs from a human-to-human one.

- 3d. **Talking to a present human-like thing.** This type of pseudo-dialogues is very frequent in children's speech. As a matter of fact, if a child never uses pseudo-dialogue, this may be a concern for parents. The most typical silent partner of a dialogue is a doll or a puppet. Children can have long conversations with dolls about their feelings, doings, clothing and eating. The way the child speaks to a doll closely resembles human-to-human conversation. From a developmental point of view, the child also learns to care for a baby and to speak to her/him. This situation is very natural because it is analogical to a standard conversation. Besides dolls and puppets, various monsters and alien figures may also be regarded as human-like objects of speech. A child can similarly speak to toys, such as cars, trains, Lego houses – practically to any object, even to a piece of paper.
- 3e. **Praying.** Praying is a dialogue between a Heavenly Father (Forgiving Creator, Unseen Redeemer, Powerful Protector) and his sinful servant (lonely seeker, fearful child, confused/grateful sister/son). According to the Prayer online website, the prayer may send various messages to the higher power when he/she needs help, begs for advice, thanks for forgiveness, pleads for patience, searches understanding, etc. In the case of praying, we have to consider the difference between silent, inner speech and expressing one's thought aloud. If we understand by inner speech take away personal clarification of thoughts consisting of verbal but also pre-verbal and non-verbal elements, praying resembles more an oral dialogue than inner speech. We do not say that a prayer is thinking, we say he/she is speaking to a/the god/God. Indeed, praying can be, and often is, conducted aloud. Therefore, praying may be regarded as a (marginal) type of pseudo-dialogues.
4. Finally, we will consider speaking by oneself, that is, communicative situations where there are no real or virtual recipients. This topic definitely leads us to Mikhail Lotman's term "autocommunication" (for example, see Lotman 1990).

However, in many cases, autocommunication occurs in a written form and the manner of communication is rather far from that of a dialogue. Certainly, when one is writing down a shopping list and then reads it later at the shop, the procedure resembles leaving a voice message on the phone with the difference that the recipient is the text compiler and everything takes place through a piece of paper but not through recording a voice message. A prototypical case of writing to oneself is a diary, but one can see autocommunicative features also in other texts, even in academic dissertations (Kallio and Sandström 2009). David Brooks (2011) regards speaking to oneself as a great human privilege: “The nice thing about being human is that you never need to feel lonely. Human beings are engaged every second in all sorts of silent conversations – with the living and the dead, the near and the far.” Let us consider some typical situations where speaking to oneself takes place in an oral form.

- 4a. **Spontaneous reactions to sudden events.** When something extraordinary occurs, we may express our feelings (surprise, anger, joy, etc.) aloud without thinking whether or not other people are present. Although these reactions are spontaneous and highly automatized, the speaker may be able to accommodate the expression to the situation. So, if we hit our finger with a hammer, we may swear profusely when other people are not listening, but we may use less brutal expressions if there are others who can hear us.
- 4b. **Rehearsal.** When preparing for a future important situation, we may rehearse our speech aloud. Some speakers do this every time before a public presentation. Newscasters may read aloud all the texts before the transmission. Presidents definitely do so when they prepare their most important talks.
- 4c. **Speaking to oneself.** Sometimes people speak to themselves. This can be regarded as thinking aloud. The goal may be spurring oneself in an important matter, remembering what happened recently, commenting on politics, etc. Some people only think of these matters and never speak aloud of them, some others think aloud occasionally, some do this more often. For some people, the only word they may utter aloud by themselves is a specific mantra. It could also be that this type of activity occurs without even noticing it by people themselves.

5. Observations on pseudo-dialogues in ORD material

In this section we consider pseudo-dialogues based on examples taken from the One Day of Speech corpus (Odin Rechevoi Den, ORD). Our goal is, first, to test whether the classification is applicable to authentic speech and, second, to obtain an understanding of the frequency of pseudo-dialogues in everyday life.

We begin with a short description of the ORD project. The corpus is being created with the aim to study Russian spontaneous speech in natural communicative

situations (Asinovsky et al. 2009). Individuals-volunteers of both sexes between the ages of 16 to 83 and of different occupations were requested to spend a day with active audio recorders to record all of their verbal interactions. Most participants made recordings over the course of a single day, which gave rise to the Russian title of the resource, ORD. A similar method was adopted earlier to obtain long-term recordings and to collect data for the British National Corpus (Burnard 2007) and for the JST ESP corpus in Japan (Campbell 2004).

The recordings were made in St Petersburg in 2007, 2010 and 2014–2016. At present, the corpus contains more than 1 250 hours of audio recordings made by 127 respondents (66 men and 61 women) (Bogdanova-Beglarian et al. 2016). During their recording days, the volunteer participants took part in various communication situations (business/professional, familial, customer-service related, educational, etc.). For this reason, the material reflects spoken language styles in their natural environment (at home, in offices, in educational institutions, in cafeterias and restaurants, in a car or outdoors, etc.) and concerns a wide range of topics (family matters, work and professional issues, hobbies, leisure, politics, goods, theatre, sports, arts, and many others) (Sherstinova 2015). As such, the ORD corpus is a unique resource for the study of diverse everyday communicative encounters.

Everyday spoken communication may be divided into large communication episodes – referred to as macro episodes – united by settings/scenes of communication, social roles of participants and their general activity (Sherstinova 2015). Macro episodes somewhat resemble the stages within acts in a theatrical plot structure. The main types of communicative situations distinguished in the ORD corpus are the following: common conversations (domestic, leisure, etc.), work (business) communication, learning and education, service encounters, and public presentation. The analysis of 2 802 micro episodes from 121 informants reveal that the borders between these types of micro-episode are not always clear. Nonetheless, what is evident is that common (domestic, leisure) conversations constitute by far the most frequent type of macro episodes, comprising more than 60% of the total. In this part of the material, pseudo-dialogues are much more frequent than in working life episodes. This is understandable, because at home and during other free time encounters, the circumstances are less structured and include more diversity.

Let us now turn to some examples that were collected from the ORD corpus. We consider them in two blocks: in the first situations where the speaker speaks to her/himself and then situations where the speaker speaks to animals. The first category comprises 124 macro episodes. In most cases, other people are also in the room (friends, family members, colleagues) and it is impossible to define to which extent the speech is also directed to them or only to the speaker her/himself. In fact, the speaker probably does not consider that. Even so, the number of these cases is so large that on that basis, we can estimate that every day at least 10 million Russians use language in this way.

These episodes are on average shorter (8 min) than episodes on the whole (15 min). The usual places for these pseudo-dialogues are at home, in the street and on transport. The most frequent counterparts are computers and cars. Speaking in these situations is usually rather disorganized. An extract from a talk to/with a computer demonstrates that very well (a free translation of the Russian text): rather .../long process // hmm ... rather long process // it's time already ... / so / I will make ... / it's a great pity / that I don't have / give me / you get nothing / and nothing get // now / let's try to put more light and contrast // light / a little bit more / less // less contrast / ok? // we will preserve the file / save as / ALT-A / save / so / where / where so // (ordS24-24)

As we can see, the text is difficult to understand, and this is not due to the rough translation. Real text extracts are often linguistically disordered and can only be understood in authentic situations. This example demonstrates very concretely the multifunctional nature of such speech. This is partly talk to the computer, partly to oneself, partly thinking aloud and partly empractical speech that accompanies doing something.

Let us consider some other examples:

- (1) A doctor in paediatrics is walking to see a patient and looks for the patient's house. While walking, he explains to himself the process of searching by describing the houses and comments on whether one of them could be the right one (ordS44-26)
- (2) A young designer, driving a car, addresses five different abuse words and swear-words to other drivers (ordS74-05)
- (3) After a phone call, the person working at a centre for technical advice comments on the naïve behaviour of the person who just phoned. This is, apparently, a rather typical scene: he speaks as if to himself, but other workers in the same room may hear it (ordS35-06)
- (4) A woman, 64 years old, is alone at home and speaks to her scarf: you are so beautiful/so beautiful/but I don't know how to wear you nicely (ordS24-26)

The material also includes long passages where a young woman speaks to her friend's baby and an elderly woman talks to her dead son at a cemetery. A further example demonstrates a rehearsal of a serious conversation that a woman is going to have with the headmaster of the school where her child is studying.

The material consists of 76 episodes where the speaker directs her/his words to a pet, usually to a cat or a dog. In most cases, the episodes take place at home. Usually there are other people in the room as well. The overall attitude to the pet is very personal and human-like. Speaking to pets probably serves several functions: breaking silence, showing positive attitude to the pet, enjoying having a neutral, faithful

listener, expressing one's emotions. These encounters may take the form of a long pseudo-dialogue, as in one of the examples where the informant had a six-minute "dialogue" with a cat. That dialogue includes many hypocoristic words that are commonly used by Russians.

An analysis of real-life conversations shows that there are many situations, in which the role of the participants is rather obscure. The speaker is often unsure as to whether the recipient hears and listens to her/him. An interesting point concerning the material is that there is no single example of the phrase *Tshto ty skazal(a)?* 'what did you say', whereas there are dozens of examples with the phrase *Ty menja slyshish?* 'do you hear me'. The speaker often doubts whether or not her/his phrases are heard and listened to. This shows well how typical for everyday conversations is the grey area between speaking by oneself and telling something to another person. It may be that the less official the speech situation is, the more frequent such semi-functional speech is. There is a scale of interactivity in these passages varying from clear cases of speaking by oneself, to sharing important information with the recipient.

6. Conclusion

The aim of this chapter was to define one type of non-standard dialogues, pseudo-dialogues. If we consider the entire spectrum of human verbal activities, we realise that standard – in the sense of ideal, fulfilling all the maxims of Grice – dialogues are rare. Continuous deviations from conversational and pragmatic norms are caused by poor circumstances (noise and distance between interlocutors), incapacity and an unwillingness of participants to play the roles of the speaker and the recipient, and a lack of concentration on interaction. Pseudo-dialogues represent a special type of non-standard dialogues. From the perspective of the goals of the dialogue, there is nothing wrong with pseudo-dialogues, because in many cases, the speaker knows in advance that the recipient will not be an active conversational partner.

Pseudo-dialogues vary greatly and there are many borderline cases between pseudo-dialogues and dialogues with an active recipient. Nevertheless, it is possible to propose a classification of pseudo-dialogues. This classification is preliminary and requires further studies and reasoning.

We begin with the situations that are the closest equivalent to standard dialogues because these involve a human recipient. He/she is, however, not an active participant of the conversation. In some situations, he/she may take part in the conversation by giving some signs of listening or commenting on what the speaker says, but this is optional. In some other circumstances, the recipient is unable to do that.

Table 1. Pseudo-dialogues with a human recipient who is present in the situation but whose role is secondary in the interaction

Type of pseudo-dialogue	Typical recipient	Recipient's participation	Functions of speaking
Unburden speech	A close person to the speaker	Possible but not necessary	Venting of strong, usually negative emotional feelings
Spontaneous commenting on what is happening around	A close person to the speaker or an acquaintance	Possible but not necessary	Small talk, self-expression
Empractical speech (the speaker explains or comments what he/she is doing)	Anyone who is in contact with the speaker	Possible but not necessary	Doing is essential, speaking accompanies it
Speaking to a person who is not able to take part in interaction	A baby, a patient in a coma	Not possible verbally but may be possible by other means (smiling, mimics, etc.)	Speaking creates a normal-like atmosphere for the situation

The second group of pseudo-dialogues comprises situations where the recipient is situated elsewhere than the speaker. This means that the recipient does not hear the speech directed to her/him.

Table 2. Pseudo-dialogues with a remote human recipient

Type of pseudo-dialogue	Typical recipient	Recipient's participation	Functions of speaking
Talking to a person who can be seen but who does not hear the speech	A person seen from a window, from a car; a referee far from spectators	As a rule, not possible as he/she does not hear speech	Spontaneous emotional reaction
Talking to a person on television	A person seen on the TV screen	Not possible	Spontaneous emotional reaction
Talking to a person who is absent	An important person who is not present	Not possible	Expressing one's feelings
Leaving a voice message	Anyone whom the speaker has tried to reach by telephone	Will listen to the message later	Informing about the call or its content

The third type of pseudo-dialogues may sound similar to a normal 'person-to-person dialogue' if we look only at the speaker's behaviour, but the recipient is not a person, but a personified creature, which is not able to react to the speech in a human way.

Table 3. Pseudo-dialogues with non-human recipients

Type of pseudo-dialogue	Typical recipient	Recipient's participation	Functions of speaking
Talking to pets or other animals	A dog, a cat, a horse or any pet, rarely a wild animal	A pseudo-recipient, which may 'answer' or react in its own way	Creation a sense of well-being of the speaker; establishing contact with pets
Talking to plants and artefacts.	Usually a thing, a 'friend' of the speaker at home	A pseudo-recipient with no real reactions, imaginary 'answers' possible	Creation a sense of well-being of the speaker
Talking to technical devices	A computer, a car, a television and other technical devices or things	A pseudo-recipient with no real reactions, imaginary 'answers' reactions possible	Dissatisfaction with the work of the device; less often thanking it for a good work
Talking to human-like things	A doll or other toys	A pseudo-recipient with imaginary answers	An important element for the acquisition of dialogue skills by children
Praying	God, a god or a god-like creation	A pseudo-recipient, may 'answer' in gods characteristic manner	Asking or thanking for help, confessing one's sins, a ritual which enables stable life

The fourth group of pseudo-dialogues consists of situations that only involve a recipient who is the speaker her/himself. There is only a fine line here between saying something to oneself in thoughts.

Table 4. Pseudo-dialogues with oneself

Type of pseudo-dialogue	Typical recipient	Recipient's participation	Functions of speaking
Spontaneous reactions to sudden events	The speaker her/himself	There may be an occasional hearer but not necessarily	Spontaneous emotional reaction
Rehearsal	The speaker her/himself	The speaker thinks up the reaction of the future real recipient	Exercising for an important presentation or encounter
Imaginary conversation	The speaker her/himself	The speaker behaves as if there were a reaction of an imaginary participant	Leading an imaginary conversation, which is impossible in reality
Speaking to oneself	The speaker her/himself	The recipient is the speaker her/himself. Often spontaneous, automatic speaking, sometimes the speaker may begin a dialogue with him- or herself	Filling an empty space with some noise, helping to understand something better, encouraging oneself.

This paper proposed one possible classification of pseudo-dialogues. There are also certainly other options to define these non-standard oral expressions that have incomplete dialogical features. In a similar way, there are further criteria to classify them. One useful criterion to begin with could be their function from the perspective of the speaker.

References

- Abercrombie, David. 1965. *Studies in Phonetics and Linguistics*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Asinovsky, Alexander, Natalia Bogdanova, Marina Rusakova, Anastassia Ryko, Svetlana Stepanova, and Tatiana Sherstinova. 2009. "The ORD Speech Corpus of Russian Everyday Communication "One Speaker's Day": Creation Principles and Annotation." In *Text, Speech and Dialogue*, ed. by Vaclav Matoušek and Pavel Mautner, 250–257. Berlin: Springer.
doi:10.1007/978-3-642-04208-9_36
- Bakhtin, Mikhail M. 1986. *Speech Genres and Other Late Essays*, translated by Vern W. McGee; edited by Caryl Emerson and Michael Holquist. Austin, TX: University of Texas Press.
- Bargh, John A. and Tanya L. Chartrand. 1999. "The Unbearable Automaticity of Being." *American Psychologist* 54, 462–476. doi:10.1037/0003-066X.54.7.462
- Bogdanova-Beglarian, Natalia, Tatiana Sherstinova, Olga Blinova, Olga Ermolova, Ekaterina Baeva, Gregory Martynenko, and Anastasia Ryko. 2016. "Sociolinguistic Extension of the ORD Corpus of Russian Everyday Speech." In *Speech and Computer, SPECOM 2016. Lecture Notes in Computer Science*, ed. by A. Ronzhin, R. Potapova, and G. Németh, vol. 9811, 659–666. Springer, Switzerland. doi:10.1007/978-3-319-43958-7_80
- Bohm, David. 2006. *On Dialogue*. New York: Routledge.
- Brooks, David. 2011. *Social Science Palooza II*. New York Times, March 17.
- Buber, Martin. 1923/2008. *Ich und Du*. Stuttgart: Raclam.
- Bucholtz, Mary and Kira Hall. 2005. "Identity and Interaction. A Socio-Cultural Linguistic Approach." *Discourse Studies* 7(4–5): 585–614. doi:10.1177/1461445605054407
- Bunz, Ulla and Scott W. Campbell. 2004. "Politeness Accommodation in Electronic Mail." *Communication Research Reports* 21: 11–25. doi:10.1080/08824090409359963
- Burnard, Lou (ed.). 2007. *Reference Guide for the British National Corpus* (XML edition). Published for the British National Corpus Consortium by Oxford University Computing Services, 2007. Available at: <<http://www.natcorp.ox.ac.uk/docs/URG/>>. Retrieved: February 2, 2016.
- Burnard, Lou (ed.). 2016. *Reference Guide for the British National Corpus* (XML edition). Published for the British National Corpus Consortium by Oxford University Computing Services, 2007. Available online at www.natcorp.ox.ac.uk/docs/URG/, accessed on February 2, 2016.
- Campbell, Nick. 2004. "Speech & Expression; the Value of a Longitudinal Corpus." *LREC 2004*: 183–186.
- Carbaugh, Donal. 2013. "On Dialogue Studies." *Journal of Dialogue Studies* 1(1), 9–18.
- Clark, Herbert H. 1996. *Using Language*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Clark, Herbert H. and Thomas B. Carlson. 1982. "Hearers and Speech Acts." *Language* 58(2): 332–372. doi:10.1353/lan.1982.0042

- Dijksterhuis, Ap. 2004. "Think Different: The Merits of Unconscious Thought in Preference Development and Decision Making." *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 87(5): 586–598. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.87.5.586
- Dynel, M. 2010. *Not Hearing Things – Hearer/listener Categories in Polylogues*. mediAzioni 9. Available online at <http://mediazioni.sitlec.unibo.it>
- Ermolova, O. 2015. "Lingvisticheskie osobennosti obschenija cheloveka s domashnimi zhivotnymi." [Linguistic features of human conversation with domestic animals] *Vestnik Permskogo universiteta. Rossijskaja i zarubezhnaja filologija* 4(32): 58–66.
- Fiehler, Reinhar, Birgit Barden, Mechthild Elstermann and Barbara Kraft. 2004. *Eigenschaften gesprochener Sprache*. Tübingen: Gunter Narr.
- Fields, Chris. 2002. "Why We Talk to Ourselves?" *Journal of Experimental & Theoretical Artificial Intelligence* 14: 255–272. doi:10.1080/09528130110112303
- Giles, Howard and Jordan Soliz. 2014. "Accommodation Theory: A Situated Framework for Relational, Family and Intergroup Dynamics." In *Engaging Interpersonal Theories*, second edition, ed. by D. Braitlewaite and P. Schrodtt, 159–167. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
- Goffman, Erwing. 1981. *Forms of Talk*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.
- Grice, H. Paul. 1975. "Logic and Conversation." In *Syntax and Semantics 2: Speech Acts*, ed. by P. Cole and J. L. Morgan, 41–58. New York: Seminar Press.
- Gu, Yueguo. 1994. "Pragmatics and Rhetoric: A Collaborative Approach to Conversation." In *Pretending to Communicate*, ed. by H. Parret, 173–195. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter. doi:10.1515/9783110847116.173
- Hirsh-Pasek, Kathy and Rebecca Treiman. 1982. "Doggerel: Motherese in a New Context." *Journal of Child Language* 9(1): 229–237. doi:10.1017/S0305000900003731
- Isaacs, William. 1999. *Dialogue and the Art of Thinking Together*. New York: Doubleday.
- Kallio, Tomi J. and Johan Sandström. 2009. "Academic Writing as Autocommunication – the Case of Doctoral Dissertations on CSR." *Culture and Organization* 15(1): 75–87. doi:10.1080/14759550802709566
- Kecskes, Istvan. 2010. "The Paradox of Communication: Socio-Cognitive Approach to Pragmatics." *Pragmatics and Society* 1(1): 50–73. doi:10.1075/ps.1.1.04kec
- Kecskes, Istvan. 2015. "Is the Idiom Principle Blocked in Bilingual L2 Production?" In *Bilingual Figurative Language Processing*, ed. by R. R. Heredia and A. B. Cieśliska, 28–53. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. doi:10.1017/CBO9781139342100.005
- Kiesling, Scott F. 2013. "Constructing Identity." In *The Handbook of Language Variation and Change*, 2nd edition, ed. by J. K. Chambers and N. Schilling-Estes, 448–467. Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell. doi:10.1002/9781118335598.ch21
- Leech, Geoffrey N. 1983. "Language and Tact." In G. Leech *Explorations in Semantics and Pragmatics*, 79–117. Amsterdam: John Benjamins.
- Levinson, Stephen C. 1983. *Pragmatics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Liddicoat, Anthony J. 2007. *An Introduction to Conversation Analysis*. London: Continuum.
- Linell, Per. 1998. *Approaching Dialogue: Talk, Interaction and Contexts in Dialogical Perspectives*. Amsterdam/Philadelphia: John Benjamins. doi:10.1075/impact.3
- Linell, Per. 2012. "On the Nature of Language: Formal Written-Language Biased Linguistics vs. Dialogical Language Sciences." In *Cognitive Dynamics in Linguistic Interactions*, ed. by A. Kravchenko, 107–124. Cambridge: Cambridge Scholar Publ.
- Linell, Per. 2017. "Dialogue, Dialogicality and Interactivity." *Language and Dialogue* 7 (3): 301–335. doi:10.1075/ld.7.3.onlin

- Lotman, Yuri M. 1990. *Universe of the Mind*, translated by A. Shukman. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
- Marková, Irina. 1982. *Paradigms, Thought, and Language*. Chichester New York: Wiley.
- Mitcell, Robert W. 2001. "Americans' Talk to Dogs: Similarities and Differences with Talk to Infants." *Research on Language and Social Interaction* 34(2): 183–210. doi:10.1207/S15327973RLSI34-2_2
- Mustajoki, Arto. 2012. "A Speaker-Oriented Multidimensional Approach to Risks and Causes of Miscommunication." *Language and Dialogue* 2, 216–242. doi:10.1075/ld.2.2.03mus
- Mustajoki, Arto. 2013. "Risks of Miscommunication in Various Speech Genres." In *Understanding by Communication*, ed. by E. Borisova and O. Souleimanova, 33–53. Cambridge: Cambridge Scholar Publ.
- Mustajoki, Arto. 2017a. "The Issue of Theorizing: Object-of-Study and Methodology." In *Language and Dialogue: A Handbook of Key Issues in the Field*, ed. by E. Weigand, 234–250. New York: Routledge.
- Mustajoki, Arto. 2017b. "Why is Miscommunication More Common in Everyday Life than in Lingua Franca Conversation?" In *Current Issues in Intercultural Pragmatics* (Pragmatics and Beyond New Series, vol. 274), ed. by I. Kecskes and S. Assimakopoulos, 55–74. Amsterdam/Philadelphia: John Benjamins. doi:10.1075/pbns.274.04mus
- O'Connell, Daniel C. and Sabine Kowal. 2008. *Communicating with One Another: Towards a Psychology of Spontaneous Spoken Discourse*. New York etc.: Springer. doi:10.1007/978-0-387-77632-3
- O'Connell, Daniel C. and Sabine Kowal. 2012. *Dialogical Genres: Empractical and Conversational Listening and Speaking*. New York etc.: Springer. doi:10.1007/978-1-4614-3529-7
- Pascual, Esther. 2006. "Fictive Interaction within the Sentence: A Communicative Type of Fictivity of Grammar." *Cognitive Linguistics* 17(2): 245–267. doi:10.1515/COG.2006.006
- Pascual, Esther. 2014. *Fictive Interaction: The Conversation Frame in Thought, Language and Discourse*. Amsterdam/Philadelphia: John Benjamins.
- Pavlidou, Theodossia. 1991. "Cooperation and the Choice of Linguistic Means: Some Evidence from the Use of Subjunctive in Modern Greek." *Journal of Pragmatics* 15: 11–42. doi:10.1016/0378-2166(91)90024-R
- Pietikäinen, Kaisa S. 2016. "Misunderstandings and Ensuring Understanding in Private ELF Talk." *Applied Linguistics* 1–26.
- Roberts, Gareth, Benjamin Langstein and Bruno Galantucci. 2016. "(In)sensitivity to Incoherence in Human Communication." *Language & Communication* 47: 15–22. doi:10.1016/j.langcom.2015.11.001
- Rogers, John, Lynette A. Hart and Ronald P. Boltz. 1993. "The Role of Pet Dogs in Casual Conversations of Elderly Adults." *The Journal of Social Psychology* 133(3): 265–277. doi:10.1080/00224545.1993.9712145
- Saunders, Harold. 1999. *A Public Peace Process*. New York: Saint Martin's Press. doi:10.1057/9780312299392
- Sarangi, Srikant K. and Slembrouck, Stefaan. 1992. "Non-Cooperation in Communication: A Reassessment of Gricean Pragmatics." *Journal of Pragmatics* 17: 117–154. doi:10.1016/0378-2166(92)90037-C
- Senge, Peter. 1990. *The Fifth discipline. The Art & Practice of Learning Organisations*. Currency: Doubleday.
- Sherstinova, Tatiana. 2015. "Macro Episodes of Russian Everyday Oral Communication: Towards Pragmatic Annotation of the ORD Speech Corpus." In *Speech and Computer, SPECOM 2015. Lecture Notes in Computer Science*, ed. by A. Ronzhin, R. Potapova, and N. Fakotakis, vol. 9391, 268–276. Heidelberg: Springer. doi:10.1007/978-3-319-23132-7_33

- Shintel, Hadas and Boaz Keysar. 2009. "Less is More: a Minimalist Account of Joint Action in Communication." *Topics in Cognitive Science* 1: 260–273.
- Tannen, Deborah. 2004. "Talking the Dog: Framing Pets as Interactional Resources in Family Discourse." *Research on Language and Social Interaction* 37(4): 399–420.
doi:10.1207/s15327973rlsj3704_1
- Vepreva, I. T. 2012. "Razgovory avtomobilista za ruljom i tipy kvaziadresata." [Conversations of car-drivers and types of quasi-addressees] *Russkii iazyk segodnja*, vypusk 5, 82–92.
- Walton, Douglas N. and Fabrizi Macagno. 2007. "Types of Dialogue, Dialectical Relevance and Textual Congruity." *Anthropology & Philosophy* 8(1–2): 101–119.
- Weigand, Edda. 2004. "Emotions: The simple and the Complex." In *Emotions in Dialogic Interaction*, ed. by E. Weigand, 3–31. Amsterdam/Philadelphia: John Benjamins. doi:10.1075/cilt.248.03wei
- Weigand, Edda. 2011. "Paradigm Changes in Linguistics: From Reductionism to Holism." *Language Sciences* 33: 544–549. doi:10.1016/j.langsci.2011.04.031
- Zanadvorova, A. V. 2008. "Obshchenie cheloveka s kompjuterom" [Interaction of a human with a computer]. In *Russkii iazyk. Aktyvnye protsessy na rubezhe XX-XXI vekov*, ed. by L. P. Krysin, 579–611. Moscow: Iazyki slavianskih kul'tur.
- Zemskaja, E. A. 1987. *Russkaja razgovornaja rech': lingvisticheskii analiz i problemy obuchenia* [Russian colloquial language: linguistic analysis and problems of teaching]. Moscow: Russkii jazyk.

List of contributors

Jennifer L. Adams is an Associate Professor of Communication and Theatre at DePauw University, where she teaches courses in Rhetoric and Interpersonal Communication, including Gender and Communication. With interests spanning contemporary rhetorical theory, philosophy, and human interaction, her recent research has focused upon love letters as a communicative genre. She has also published several scholarly articles on letter writing, and continues to research personal correspondence through written, non-electronic mediums. Additionally, she has been researching the life and work of nineteenth century Indiana suffrage leader, Helen Gougar and is working on an annotated collection of the works of Helen Gougar in addition to her work on interpersonal letter writing.

Ronald C. Arnett is Professor and Chair of the Department of Communication and Rhetorical Studies and the Patricia Doherty Yoder and Ronald Wolfe Endowed Chair in Communication Ethics at Duquesne University, USA. He is the author/coauthor of eleven books and the recipient of six book awards. His most recent work is *Levinas's Rhetorical Demand: The Unending Obligation of Communication Ethics* (2017, Southern Illinois University Press). He was selected as a 2017 Distinguished Scholar by the National Communication Association.

Marina Bondi is Professor of English Linguistics at the University of Modena and Reggio Emilia, Italy and Director of the *CLAVIER* centre (*Corpus and Language Variation In English Research*). She has published extensively in the field of genre analysis, EAP and corpus linguistics, with a focus on argumentative dialogue and language variation across genres, disciplines and cultures. Among her recent publications: "The future in reports: prediction, commitment and legitimization in CSR" (in *Pragmatics and Society*), "What came to be called: evaluative *what* and authorial voice in the discourse of history" (in *Text & Talk*) and "Corpus Linguistics" in *The Routledge Handbook of Language and Dialogue* (2017).

Letizia Caronia is Full Professor at the Department of Education (University of Bologna, Italy). Her research deals with the communicative constitution of knowledge in institutional, scientific and ordinary interaction, and the role of things as communicative agents in social contexts. Her current projects concern the epistemics of research interaction, interprofessional interaction in medical settings, family interaction and parent-teacher interaction. She authored and co-authored

close to fifty articles in international peer reviewed scientific journals and chapters in collective books. She has written, co-written or edited ten books and special issues in Italian, English and French.

Marion Grein is an Associate Professor and Director of the Master's Program German as a Foreign Language at the Johannes Gutenberg-University Mainz, Germany. The focus of her work is research into language teaching ('neurolidactics'), cross-cultural and dialogue studies and the deployment and effectiveness of multimedia and digital learning. She is currently looking at different intellectual learning styles and the influence of learning biographies on learning preferences. Marion Grein is a member of the IADA, member of the Advisory Board of Dialogue Studies, a member of the Editorial Board of Language and Dialogue and advisor of the Hueber Publishing House, Germany, specialized in language teaching textbooks and materials.

Istvan Kecskes is Distinguished Professor at the University of New York at Albany, USA. He is the President of the American Pragmatics Association and the CASLAR (Chinese as a Second Language Research) Association. His book *Foreign language and mother tongue* (Erlbaum 2000) was the first to describe the effect of the second language on the first language based on a longitudinal research. Dr. Kecskes' book *Intercultural Pragmatics* (OUP, 2013) is considered a ground-breaking monograph that shapes research in the field. He is the founding editor of the journal *Intercultural Pragmatics* and the Mouton Series in Pragmatics published by Mouton de Gruyter, as well as the bilingual (Chinese-English) journal CASLAR (*Chinese as a Second Language Research*).

Lisbeth A. Lipari is a full Professor in Department of Communication at Denison University in Granville, Ohio, USA. With over thirty-three publications, Lipari continues her exploration in European phenomenology, language philosophy, dialogic philosophy, ethics, and listening. Lipari refers to language philosophies in order to develop a theoretical lens on listening as a communicative praxis between ethico-political spheres. Her recent book, *Listening, Thinking, Being: Toward an Ethics of Attunement* (2014, Penn State University Press) received the top book award from NCAs Ethics Division in 2015 and Philosophy of Communication Division in 2016.

Arto Mustajoki is Professor Emeritus of Russian language and former Vice-Rector and Dean at the University of Helsinki, Finland. His research interests include functional syntax, corpus linguistics, linguistic methodology, communication failures, Russian mentality and research policy. His book with Henriikka Mustajoki "New approach to research ethics" was published by Routledge in 2017. Mustajoki is active in popularising research and compiling teaching materials for learning Russian. In 2013 he was awarded the State Prize for his book "Light Introduction to Russian". Mustajoki's blogs on science policy, the university, and Russia are very popular.

Anita Pomerantz is Professor Emerita of Communication at the State University of New York at Albany, USA. She is a Conversation Analyst who works with audio and videotapes of interaction to analyse the principles relied upon and the methods used for agreeing and disagreeing, seeking information, and negotiating responsibility for blameworthy and praiseworthy deeds in interpersonal, medical, and legal contexts. She has served as Chair of the Language and Social Interaction Divisions of the National Communication Association and the International Communication Association.

Robert E. Sanders is Professor Emeritus of Communication at the State University of New York at Albany, USA. He is past editor of the journal *Research on Language and Social Interaction*. His publications focus on strategy and influence in interaction. These include articles stemming from presentations at the International Association for Dialogue Analysis meetings: “Strategy and creativity in dialogue” (2012) and “The representation of self through the dialogic properties of talk and conduct” (2012).

Tatiana Sherstinova received her diploma from the Department of Mathematical Linguistics, St. Petersburg State University, Russia, in 1991. She completed her doctoral thesis on Computational Phonetics in 1996. Sherstinova has taken part in the creation of major spoken resources for the Russian language, including the Phonetic Fund of the Russian Language and the ORD Speech Corpus of Everyday Spoken Russian. At present, she is Associate Professor in Mathematical and Structural Linguistics at St. Petersburg State University, Russia.

Ulla Tuomarla holds a permanent position as a university lecturer in French Linguistics and Translation at the University of Helsinki (Finland) since 2008. She is also a docent in French language since 2002. Her doctoral thesis, published in 2000, dealt with reported speech and quotation practices in the press. She is specialized in discourse analysis and argumentation. At present she is involved in an international research project on hate speech and verbal aggression.

Edda Weigand is Professor Emerita of Linguistics at the University of Münster, Germany. She is Honorary President and Founding Vice-President of the International Association for Dialogue Analysis and Assistant Secretary-General of the Committee of UNESCO FILLM. On the basis of a general notion of “language as dialogue” (2009, Benjamins) she has written many articles and authored or edited several books on dialogue theory, pragmatics, speech act theory, lexical semantics and other topics, among them her latest book on *Dialogue: The mixed game* (2010, Benjamins). Recently she edited *The Routledge Handbook of Language and Dialogue* (2017). She is editor-in-chief of the journal *Language and Dialogue* (Benjamins) and the series “Dialogue Studies” (Benjamins).

Index

A

abduction 177, 184–186
action and reaction 2–5, 11–16,
57, 63, 138, 171, 173
appraisal 93, 107, 142, 169
architecture of complexity 1, 4,
7, 12–13, 26, 185
argument 20, 38, 51, 55, 137,
141–144, 149–151, 153, 155,
157–158, 160, 162–167, 169
argumentation 9, 21–22, 26–27,
36, 45, 51, 56, 58, 139, 150,
153, 170

B

bias 88–89, 102, 189

C

citation 139, 149, 168–170
cognitive effort 192–193
commenting 20, 173, 194,
200–202, 206, 209–210
communicative
consciousness 29, 38–39
communicology 10, 26, 171,
177–179, 185–186
competence-in-performance
1, 3–5, 12–13, 61–63, 65, 67, 73,
79, 172, 185
complex objects 171–173, 177,
184
convention 164
conversation analysis 14, 50,
55, 58, 86, 93, 110, 112, 135, 213

D

dialogic pragmatics 4, 171,
184–186

E

empiricists 7–8
empractical speech
195, 201–202, 208, 210
engagement 114, 120, 135,
141–142, 162, 165–166, 169,
171–172, 174, 178, 181, 184
epistemic 3, 83, 91, 93–95,
99–100, 107, 144, 156, 161,
163, 165
epistemology, epistemological
53, 85, 88–89, 103–104, 106,
163, 165, 180, 183
ethics 23, 25–27, 42
ethnography 46–48, 50–51, 53,
57–59, 107, 110–111
evaluation 23, 143–145, 165,
167–169

H

human nature 3, 6, 172

I

ideational theory 84, 87, 89,
93–94
indexicality, indexical 83, 85,
91, 103, 105, 124
Indian philosophy of language
29–30, 41
integration 3, 7–8, 12–13, 18, 22,
64, 79, 103, 118, 170, 180
interactive 18, 26, 55, 66, 69,
83–86, 89, 94–95, 103, 108,
137, 140–141, 175–176, 186
interface 10, 18–19, 26
interlistening 29, 39, 42
intersubjectivity 29, 83–84,
93, 110
interview 48, 83, 85–95, 97,
99–111, 174–175, 186

L

language as dialogue 2, 4, 15,
18, 20, 25, 27, 59, 81, 112, 138,
170
language, interactive view of
84–85
logic 9, 25–26, 53, 55, 58, 177,
213

M

meaning, theory of 84, 87, 89,
93, 104–105
meaning, world(s) of 83–84,
87, 90, 92, 96
metadiscourse 140–141,
167–170
method(s) 3, 7, 10–11, 19,
45–58, 83, 85–86, 88–90,
93–94, 105–106, 108–112, 118,
177, 190, 192, 194, 202, 207
Mixed Game Model 3–4, 7, 21,
53–57, 59, 61, 67, 81, 172, 187

N

negotiation 22, 62, 66, 80, 100,
119, 122, 140, 143, 173, 185, 195
non-human recipient
189, 199, 203

O

organizational units 141,
143–144, 152, 158, 165

P

Palo Alto school 176
participant observation 48
persuasion 45–46, 49, 51–52,
54, 90, 169, 195
plurality of models 1, 3, 5–6, 24
positivistic 87, 106

postmodernist 105
 pragmatism 171, 176–179, 186
 praxis 29, 38–39, 41–42
 probability, principles of 1, 3,
 12, 18, 27, 59
 pseudo-dialogue 189–190,
 201–202, 205, 209–211

Q

qualitative methods 90, 109
 questions 6, 15, 70, 84, 86–92,
 98–99, 108, 110–111, 128, 136,
 145, 151, 166, 169, 181, 195, 204

R

rationality 9, 27, 55, 136, 172
 recipient 189–190, 193–204,
 206, 209–211
 referential, referentiality
 83–84, 86–87, 94, 96, 103–105
 reflexivity, reflexive 51, 83,
 85, 91, 103, 105, 108, 110–111,
 140–141, 143–144, 152, 158,
 169, 179

relational understanding 185
 relevance 9, 26, 96, 105, 118,
 144–145, 154, 156, 160, 215
 reliability, reliable 85, 88, 100,
 104–105, 194
 representational approach 90
 rhetoric 3, 26, 36, 45–49, 51–59,
 177, 195–196, 213
 rhetoric in situ 3, 45–49, 53,
 55–58
 rhetorical criticism 45–47, 51,
 56, 58

S

schismogenesis 173–174,
 181, 184
 scientific knowledge 3, 83,
 85–86, 94, 105–106
 semiotics 10, 25, 172, 178–179
 social organization 91, 103–104,
 108, 110
 social research 58, 85–86, 89,
 106, 108–109, 111–112, 174
 sociobiology 6, 13, 25

T

thematic analysis 89, 92, 107
 turning point 2, 6, 25
 turn-taking 14

U

unburden speech 199, 210
 unity of knowledge 11, 24, 27
 utterance grammar 13, 17–19,
 22, 27, 173

V

validity 85, 88, 104–105, 132,
 149–150, 154
 visual rhetoric 47

This volume aims at building bridges from pragmatics to dialogue and overcoming the gap between two ‘circles’ which have cut themselves off from each other in recent decades even if both addressed the same object, ‘language use’. Pragmatics means the study of natural language use. There is however no clear answer as to what language use means. We are instead confronted with multiple and diverse models in an uncircumscribed field of language use. When trying to transform such a puzzle of pieces into a meaningful picture we are confronted with the complexity of language use which does not mean ‘language’ put to ‘use’ but represents the unity of a complex whole and calls for a total change in methodology towards a holistic theory. Human beings as dialogic individuals use language as dialogue which allows them to tackle the vicissitudes of their lives. Dialogue and its methodology of action and reaction can be traced back to human nature and provides the key to the unstructured field of pragmatics. The contributions to this volume share this common ground and address various perspectives in different types of action game.

“All language is dialogic, whether we talk with others or with ourselves. If pragmatics is the study of how we collaborate using language, we must study dialogic performance. Eminent scholars in the field of pragmatics, dialogue studies and the philosophy of language present arguments for a paradigm change in linguistics, moving our focus from the individual mind to the verbal interaction happening between people.”

Wolfgang Teubert, *University of Birmingham, UK*

“What can pragmatics, conceived as the detailed study of language use, learn from dialogue studies? This is the key question this wonderful volume addresses by building bridges between two fields that too often tend to ignore each other. A must read for anyone interested in investigating the dialogical aspects of life, language and communication.”

François Cooren, *University of Montreal, Canada*

ISBN 978 90 272 0118 8



9 789027 201188

John Benjamins Publishing Company