

RACE, DECOLONIZATION, AND GLOBAL CITIZENSHIP IN SOUTH AFRICA

CHIELOZONA EZE

Race, Decolonization, and Global Citizenship in South Africa

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At a time when some people are feverishly encouraging the growth of fractional forces, raising the tribe into the final and highest form of social organisation, setting one national group against the other, cosmopolitan dreams are not only desirable but a bounden duty; dreams that stress the special unity that hold the freedom forces together—[in] a bond that has been forged by common struggles, sacrifices and traditions.

—Nelson Mandela, *Conversations with Myself*

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Preface

I was an undergraduate student of comparative literature in Bayreuth, Germany, when Nelson Mandela won the Nobel Peace Prize in 1993 and South Africa's general election in 1994, and when he instituted the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC). Like millions of other people, I had the feeling that something of far-reaching global political and moral relevance was taking place in South Africa. Much later, as I read Mandela's biography, *Long Walk to Freedom*, and Desmond Tutu's *No Future without Forgiveness*, I was drawn to the social and moral reach of the ideas that these leaders projected. They provided alternatives to much of what I had understood about the African political and moral landscape. I knew that they were transforming (South) Africa, but I did not have the language to articulate my thoughts about this transformation. In 2004, when I was part of the UCLA Global Fellowship program as a postdoctoral fellow, I began to think seriously about the theoretical import of these two South African moral leaders and the historical relevance of South Africa's peaceful political transition. This transition and the moral premises of the TRC meant something larger than ordinary historical events.[1] They were a metaphor, a tool that can be used to explain the world in ways that could inform relationships between peoples in Africa and all over the world.

I had previously embraced most Western theories of life and society largely as an intellectual exercise. Very few of them could help me interpret my experience as a citizen of a postcolonial African country and of the world. Marxist theory did not help me understand my experience growing up under various military regimes. It never adequately explained any of Africa's structural and foundational problems. Nor were postcolonial theories of much help. However, shaped by these theories, I grew up eager to defend Africa against the West, but I never learned how to be in solidarity with other Africans who are not of my ethnicity. For the most part, solidarity had been understood as being collectively against the imperialists because of our common experience as colonized and black peoples in a world in which whiteness has been cast as the norm and blackness as its opposite. The conventional

postcolonial theories that emphasized difference therefore did not speak to my experience as an African who had encountered the humanity of white people outside the historical Manichaean paradigm. To be sure, postcolonial theory was a means of intellectual resistance to the technologies of oppression and exploitation instituted by colonialism. Its pitfall, though, lay in its reification of identity and difference even while it justifiably held Western nations accountable for the miseries in their former colonies. Theories of hybridity, *métissage*, and so forth that were meant to counter the absoluteness of the colonial paradigm fell short of suggesting robust ethical ways to live in a world of increasing diversity, or ways to find a solidarity that transcends the historical divide between the colonizer and the colonized and between various formerly colonized peoples. Nelson Mandela's and Desmond Tutu's South Africa provided the missing link.

That said, I am not yet ready to join those who have announced the imminent death of postcolonial theory.[2] I share Robert J. C. Young's concern that most of those who desire the end of postcolonialism are people who do not wish to hear about poverty, inequality, and oppression, and the many "distant invisible contexts which continue to prompt transformative energies of the postcolonial."[3] It does, however, appear that postcolonialism, at least in the African context, has devolved into an accusatory binarism that ultimately works against Africa. Those of us who grew up in independent African states and are witnesses to the corruption of their leaders that has led to their countries' dysfunction feel the pain of dishonesty when we blame the West for our conditions. Postcolonialism has not given us a tool with which we can account for the poverty, homophobia, genocide, xenophobia, sexism, and bigotry that wreak havoc in the lives of the people we know. Thus, the ultimate questions that have occupied my intellectual attention are these: How can we respond to the suffering and pain all around us? How can we explain and affect the system that controls our lives in such a way that we affirm the lives of people we know and are open to others we do not know? How can we affect human flourishing in Africa?

In attempting to answer these questions, I turn to Nelson Mandela. When he was released from jail on February 11, 1990, he went to the Cape Town Parade, where he shook hands with his former jailers and gave an impromptu speech, in which he asked all South Africans to start working for reconciliation. When he forgave his torturers and consequently appealed to his fellow South Africans to forge a common community by responding to the pain of others, I knew that there had to be ways of overcoming the legacies of a racist and colonial past other than

inflating a resistance anchored in difference. To be sure, philosophers such as Édouard Glissant have suggested that differences could be overcome by focusing on people's common humanity even while working toward redressing the injustices of the past.[4] In Mandela's view, though, emphasizing our common humanity demands extra steps from us; it behooves us to place the other, especially the disadvantaged people in society, at the center of our discourse and moral concern, and we can do so by changing the system that sustained them in their condition.

Increasingly postcolonial theory is being overtaken by decolonial theory, popularized by Walter Mignolo, Anibal Quijano, and others, which rightly claims the antislavery movement as a part of its ancestry. Indeed, Africanists such as Sabelo J. Ndlovu-Gatsheni situate Mandela within the decolonial liberation movement.[5] I endorse Ndlovu-Gatsheni's effort, but I think that even though the South African phenomenon exhibits strong commonality with the South American efforts to overcome the Euro-modernist colonialist vision of reality, it is unique in its suggestion of empathetic cosmopolitanism as a source and an enabling principle of universality or conception of common humanity.

Mandela and Tutu not only questioned centuries of negative stereotyping of Africans by the sheer power of their moral leadership; they also provided robust alternatives in their worldviews and self-perceptions rooted in the ancient Southern African communal practice of belongingness, called *ubuntu*. I interpret the TRC as an extension of Mandela's generous gestures of forgiveness and cosmopolitan spirit. For him openness and cosmopolitan dreams are not only desirable but an obligation.[6] We note that this is the same man who had set up the African National Congress's armed wing, *Umkhonto we Sizwe*, in 1961. Mandela's choice of forgiveness and openness in the postapartheid era is not a contradiction of the person who had adopted violence as a means to break the apartheid system. Whereas Mandela had subscribed to violence as a means to subvert the colonial condition, he duly understood the absolute necessity of moving beyond the rhetoric of violence once that condition no longer held. Openness is not a fancy word meant only for the cosmopolitan. It is first and foremost a realization of the incompleteness of one's world and a corresponding desire to reach out to others for that completion. It is a moral stance toward others and otherness.

In this book, I look at means through which the historical transition and the cultural developments in South Africa over the past two decades have not only sought to change the negative narrative about Africa, but also can provide models for explaining new ways of living

in the world. South Africa provides a narrative capable of completely upending Euro-modernist conceptions of identity and solidarity rooted in the abstractions of Logos. Mandela and Tutu are not the only ones to speak about overcoming the legacies of apartheid and creating a more humane society. Cultural theorists, poets, and novelists have engaged the same issues, and most of them share common cultural and moral traits with Mandela and Tutu, the most outstanding of which is their belief in the notion of global citizenship. In engaging this notion, I seek to answer these questions: How do they understand being human in a world that is increasingly marked by hatred of others? What are their ideas of difference and sameness, of justice and fairness? Can their understanding of their society provide us with guidance on how to live in our globalized world?

South Africa is far from being a promised land of conviviality. Economic and social disparities in different sectors of society spur social unrest that threatens to plunge the country into anarchy, which would effectively bury the hope and promise raised by Mandela and the writers considered here. But the post-Mandela negative developments are even greater reason we should reexamine that vision, and we do so in the belief that a people without vision is a people that is blind to the present.

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Introduction

New World Order, New Moral Challenges

Can Africa provide a theory of living in our globalized world? This question, admittedly rhetorical, stems from Jean Comaroff and John L. Comaroff's meditation on the new theoretical impulses from the global south. The answer is in the positive. Yes, Africa has provided a theory of living in the twenty-first century. This theory is in Nelson Mandela's vision of the post-apartheid South Africa; this theory is Nelson Mandela. The world greeted the transition from apartheid to democracy in South Africa as a unique phenomenon and viewed Nelson Mandela as a global icon of morality. Indeed, given its sordid colonial history, the country surprised the world with the peaceful and cosmopolitan nature of that transition. In the words of Njabulo Ndebele, the anticipated disintegration of the country in a "conflagration of violence did not take place."[1] Besides avoiding violence, the leaders of the transition emphasized the African National Congress's articulation of nonracialism, thus making South Africa a home for all peoples regardless of ancestry or background. South Africa thus provides a valuable case study for the appreciation of our world as a globalized space in which migration has become the norm. In Mandela, it gave the world an exemplar of decolonization whose potency lies in replacing the Euro-modernist, colonialist mind-set, built on exclusion, with a cosmopolitan one built on inclusion and openness to otherness. Against a background of centuries of intermixing and entanglement of different ethnicities and races, the country is a microcosm of the global sociocultural condition—nearly every society is becoming heterogeneous, comprising people from diverse races, ethnicities, religions, and other markers of identity.

South Africa's political and moral accomplishments led Philippe-Joseph Salazar to the belief that the country could be "a blueprint for the construction of a European nation."[2] Paul Gilroy expressed the hope that South Africa could provide "a new cosmopolitanism" for the world.[3] I agree with these sentiments. Yet, I cannot resist the nagging urge to wonder whether we can we still talk about the country in

optimistic terms now, more than twenty years after the transition. Did the forces of political change enhance economic justice, social cohesion, and human rights? What can the rest of the world learn from the successes and failures of South Africa as a postcolony or as a microcosm of a world that is being transformed by globalization and the mass migration of people?

Whereas South Africa's democratic institutions appear to be strong, recent sociopolitical trends raise questions about the country's developmental trajectory and may undercut the initial hopefulness of the peaceful transition to democracy. Among these are the cases of corruption and nativist political tendencies in Jacob Zuma's government and personal life,[4] high poverty rates among the black population, and waves of violent crimes, especially against women, immigrants from other black African nations, and members of the LGBT community.[5] A rise in cultural and social movements seems to have peaked in the #RhodesMustFall,[6] #FeesMustFall,[7] and "Arts Must Burn" demonstrations. Most of these were organized by the young generation of South Africans who call themselves the Born-Frees; that is, those who were born after the demise of apartheid and who challenge the core premises of the TRC. For example, the popular painter Ayanda Mabulu has called Mandela "a dignified bastard, [and] a political slut"; he argues that Mandela "was just an image, an idolised black man, who gave away property rights to the oppressor. Mandela was a huge sell-out who forgot about the freedom of his people."[8] Early in 2016, Zama Mthunzi, a third-year mathematical sciences student at the University of Witwatersrand, made a T-shirt with the inscription "Fuck White People."[9] In explaining that hate slogan, he claimed that he felt excluded because white students could afford to pay school fees, whereas he did not have money to pay his. He stated: "I was feeling hatred, because it was times of financial exclusion . . . and . . . white people are paying [school fees], they're relaxed, there are no financial problems so it arose that Black exclusion is so [rampant] in this institution."[10] On March 3, 2017, at the public lecture given by Ngũgĩ wa Thiong'o at the University of Cape Town, some black students walked up to the stage and asked the professor to tell white people in the audience to leave the hall. They stated their reason in a simple rhetorical question: "How do we have a lecture and form a consolidated voice, as the oppressed, in the presence of those who oppress us?"[11] The students demanded a safe, decolonized space, by which they meant a space without white people. It is ironic that they would demand a space without white people in the presence of one of the proponents of a decolonial world, marked by pluriversality

rather than Euro-modernist colonialist universality. Professor Ngũgĩ denied their demand.

The demonstrations and the students' demand for decolonization draw attention to the deplorable conditions of the majority of the black population; they articulate a sentiment shared by many who feel left behind by their government and who believe that a new approach to decolonization would take care of their problems. What is troubling about these events, however, is the speed with which this generation has disowned Mandela and his vision, on the one hand, and the youths' near-unanimous singling out of whites as the cause of their existential problems, on the other, as they ironically revert to the Euro-modernist exclusivist and essentialist mind-set that Mandela's decolonial intervention had rejected. Achille Mbembe captures the new movement's ideology and argues that the demonstrations have been largely explained as a response to black suffering, which the youths have referred to as "Black Pain." The demand for new rights is premised on the need to achieve what the 1994 transition failed to; it deems "decolonization and retributive justice the only way to restore a modicum of dignity to victims of the injuries of yesterday and today."[12] There is a growing tendency to resurrect the notion of Pan-Africanism, Steve Biko's concept of "Black Consciousness," and Frantz Fanon's uses of violence as a solution to contemporary problems.[13] This tendency signals a troubling desire for purity and singular identity in a world that can no longer contain those categories. Based on these developments, Alex Boraine, one of the architects of the peaceful transition and the TRC, has raised the specter of failed statehood and suggested that South Africa might go the way of Mugabe's Zimbabwe.[14]

The fear that South Africa is treading the path of Zimbabwe's economic and political dysfunction is justified. Yet, given the legacy of Mandela's moral capital and the continued works by major South African intellectuals and cultural leaders to maintain focus on the promise of that legacy, a strong case can be made for South Africa's resistance against a relapse into nativism. There is also a palpable effort to create and maintain a thriving spirit of fairness, inclusion, and cosmopolitanism, to hold on to the vision that Mandela embodied. Scholars and writers from diverse backgrounds and ethnicities are confronting these unacceptable developments in cultural commentaries, symposia, conferences, and publications, as during the fight against apartheid. This book engages the works of these statesmen, scholars, and writers; it focuses on South Africa's effort to address issues of race, culture, and identity in order to create a citizenry that responds to the ethical

challenges of a "runaway world."[15] It argues that at no time has Mandela's vision of empathy, universal solidarity, and global citizenship been as urgent as today.

Working from the perspective of the social sciences, scholars such as Hein Marais, John Saul, and Adam Habib have studied the new "rainbow" nation that was inaugurated under the leadership of Mandela and that is being tainted by his successors, especially Jacob Zuma.[16] The time has come for a study through the lens of the humanities. However, this book seeks to go beyond accounting for what has gone wrong; it points out what has been done right and charts the humanistic direction that those positive gestures could take the nation.[17] The book is premised on the necessity of defining a decolonial moral framework that will guide social relationships today, a framework that is devoid of anger and bitterness and is not dependent on the whims or fancies of any one person or group. Focusing squarely on cultural representations that suggest a cosmopolitan, decolonial view of contemporary South Africa and the world, this study examines the ways in which considerations of race, culture, and history can be transformed into visions of openness to cultural differences and experiences and respect for human rights and dignity.

Jean and John Comaroff argue that although the global south is rarely seen as a source of theories concerning world-historical events, the far-reaching historical transformations taking place there provide unique opportunities to theorize about our world: "In the face of the structural violence perpetrated in the name of neoliberalism . . . , the global south is producing and exporting some ingenious, highly imaginative modes of survival."[18] By "imaginative modes of survival" the Comaroffs are referring to new constructs, theories, and paradigms for meeting the challenges of globalization and modernity. I endorse their assertion that "in the present moment, it is the global south that affords privileged insights into the workings of the world at large."[19] Mandela's South Africa is an interesting case in point; it provides a model for a decolonized world, or what Walter Mignolo calls pluriversality or "pluritopic hermeneutics";[20] that is, the simple act of seeing and interpreting the world from many perspectives rather than from just one. This approach helps us to understand a world of entangled epistemologies, or what Ngũgĩ calls "globalectics."[21] South Africa's successful transition from apartheid to democracy, and undertaking of a public ritual of reconciliation, set the stage for a continual effort to achieve a desired model of conviviality. As a result, South Africa also has become an important example for the rest of the world regarding the resolution of

conflicts, some of which were rooted in centuries of hatred and essentialist or extremist ideologies that thrived by dehumanizing others.[22] Many countries have now either adopted the model of the South African TRC or have planned to do so. These include Sri Lanka, Colombia, and Sierra Leone. Thus South Africa situates itself in the midst of an increasingly interconnected world; it has produced a national vision that is both specific and universal in humanistic appeal. Indeed, in the last quarter century, no other country in Africa, and perhaps no other country in the world, has witnessed such a concerted effort to establish a boundary-defying solidarity among peoples. The lesson is simple: it is possible for people of diverse ethnicities and experiences to live together peacefully despite years of oppression and violence. Mandela and the other architects of the TRC created a veritable template for global citizenship—notwithstanding South Africa's current dalliance with nativism, violence, and resentment.

The emerging moral landscape in South Africa can teach others how to live in an increasingly fractured, yet globalized world. Rather than follow aspects of conventional postcolonial theories rooted in oppositional conceptions of identity, this new moral and cosmopolitan landscape builds on the notion of the common good becoming a veritable force of resistance against evil and human rights abuses. But the task is not just to recognize the common good; it is to actively work toward it by investing in others. Sadly, these positive developments have not received the international scholarly attention they deserve. Therefore, following Jean and John Comaroff, Achille Mbembe, and Sabelo Ndlovu-Gatsheni's lead, I submit that South Africa has exported an intellectual and cultural "product" that represents an ingenious, highly imaginative mode of survival that can inform a better understanding of our world. Landscapes of survival are to be found almost everywhere on the continent, especially in urban spaces. What makes the South African mode of survival unique is that it is derived from skillful negotiations of racial and ethnic differences, which relied in most cases on the rhetoric and moral injunctions of the southern African virtue called *ubuntu*. My examination of these new developments rests on the moral framework of global citizenship that was a component of Mandela's vision.

Given the increasing diversity of the ethnic, racial, religious, and cultural composition of many modern societies, and given that colonial ideology was constructed on perceived essentialist differences between the colonizer and the colonized, philosophers have proffered postmodernist ideas to challenge the structural paradigms that instructed

that hegemonic world. Concepts such as multiculturalism, hybridity,[23] and *métissage*[24] have contributed to the deconstruction of the absolutist world of the master and to the remaking of the postcolonial world in ways that promote the free and equal exercise of human rights by every individual. Even though these concepts have successfully challenged the metanarrative of the empire and thus played a role in the reshaping of political and cultural discourse about the new world, doubts remain as to whether they have brought people of diverse ethnicities together in ways that provide better alternatives to the old order. For example, while multiculturalism has effectively prevented dominant cultures from cleansing minority cultures, it is debatable whether it has improved the lives of individuals within the groups it purported to empower. It has frequently given rise to a backlash of fundamentalist metanarratives that inflict gratuitous suffering.[25] South Africa avoids the typical postcolonial path marked by oppositional conceptions of self.

Sabelo J. Ndlovu-Gatsheni locates Mandela in the company of "thinkers, activists, and intellectuals from the Global South who experienced the undersides of modernity, such as enslavement and colonization," and who have adopted a decolonial rather than postcolonial moral attitude to Euro-American notions of the world.[26] As Walter Mignolo states, the difference between postcolonial theory or postcoloniality in general and decolonial projects lies primarily in genealogy. Postcoloniality traces its genealogy to postmodernist interventions championed by Michel Foucault, Jacques Derrida, and others in Europe; Edward Said, Homi Bhabha, Gayatri Spivak, and others adapted the idea to their local geographies. Postcoloniality has an indisputable Marxist bent. The decolonial project traces its origin to Latin Americans' efforts to engage the colonial oppression of their world and is marked by the philosophy of liberation. Decolonial thinking focuses on racial discrimination and the hierarchy of being that has been the basis of European modernist ideology since the sixteenth century. According to Mignolo, this hierarchy "justified economic and political subordination of people of color and women and of course also in class exploitation; in the sense that 'class' acquired in Europe after the Industrial Revolution."[27] The difference is not limited to origins; it is rooted in ideology. The postcolonial approach, as I have suggested above, invests much in opposition and therefore produces commensurate moral attitudes; the decolonial approach, by comparison, is interested in expanding the vision of the world beyond Eurocentric Manichaeanism. An example of the pitfalls of a postcolonial ideological bent is Robert Mugabe, who

articulated resistance in racist, nativist, and xenophobic terms, as Ndlovu-Gatsheni has ably argued.[28]

I argue that Nelson Mandela's and Archbishop Desmond Tutu's emphases on empathy, forgiveness, *ubuntu*, and other virtues that actively bind people, rather than divide them, define the difference between the responses of South Africa and those of other African countries to the colonial experience.[29] The South African response is rooted in the awareness of transcultural contacts and affinities, the cosmopolitan spirit of interrelatedness, and the concept of multiple belongings, as opposed to unitary identities and ethnic isolation. South Africa's response is a good example of a decolonial ethics as espoused by the likes of Enrique Dussel and Mignolo.[30] My intent is to demonstrate how the visions inherent in the examples of Mandela and Tutu and the visions that are active in selected cultural and literary works of major South African writers seek to disrupt existing cultural hierarchies and prevent the emergence of nativist or autochthonous notions of identity, and, conversely, to show how such visions construct unifying moral narratives that, it is hoped, will urge an obligation on all to pursue socioeconomic fairness.

The role of empathy in politics and social interactions has not been adequately studied. Mandela may have been the first modern politician to deploy it effectively as a political tool.[31] And given the abiding reputation of cosmopolitanism as a lifestyle associated with cultural tourism or transnational mobility, I engage empathy as a means of tempering cosmopolitanism's perceived or real elitism and aloofness. In contrast to Enlightenment cosmopolitanism, which is rooted in the concept of Logos, Mandela's South African cosmopolitanism is located in the virtue of empathy and is deservedly called empathetic cosmopolitanism. In its role as a humanizing principle, empathetic cosmopolitanism enables us to embrace the humanity of others by putting ourselves in their position, and we do so without messianic assumptions. (I do not intend to suggest that South Africans have arrived at some kind of empathetic cosmopolitanism. Theirs is more of a process and a vision than a state that has been achieved.)

What, then, is global citizenship?[32] It is not a desire for a unitary world government or culture. It is not a socialist dream that seeks to eliminate political differences between peoples. Citizenship is a social and political term and activity. A citizen is literally a member of a city or state (*polis*) who is thereby vested with rights, privileges, and duties. That citizen is answerable to the government that controls the geographical boundary of said state and that protects the rights and

privileges. Hannah Arendt brings into focus a problem associated with global citizenship: "a citizen is by definition a citizen among citizens of a country among countries."[33] Understood in this way, global citizenship is unrealizable, because unitary, global government is an impossibility. Global governance, however, *is* a possibility. The world already has such a governing body in the United Nations (UN), which manifests global governance to the extent that it codifies and enables standards of human rights and dignity that have attained nearly universal recognition.[34] One example is the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which most countries have signed. Through the organs of the United Nations, or the nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) it recognizes, the UN attempts to hold accountable those governments that violate human rights.[35] The global citizen sees the world (*cosmos*) as his or her city or state (*polis*)—a functional impossibility. Global citizenship, then, must be understood figuratively, as an embracing of the moral and philosophical implications that exist in the affinities between oneself and all humanity.

Global citizenship does not require a world state, but it does involve conceiving of the world as a community, a space in which no one is disadvantaged on the basis of race, religion, gender, sexual orientation, or other markers of difference. It is an ethical stance of openness toward the world's people and environments; it is characterized by acceptance of the humanity of others at all times and in any place. It is not the first duty of a global citizen to *save* the other; rather, it is his or her obligation to *see* the other as a person with dignity.[36] It is to be hoped that this recognition will lead to the shared discovery of the value of an extended community in which human life flourishes. I contend that the implication of empathetic cosmopolitanism is human flourishing, and it is achieved in all who are responsive to others, regardless of background. This is a demand on all, the rich and the poor, immigrants and natives. One cannot ask others to be open to one's experience without showing the same openness to others' experiences.

This book depends less on empirical data than on qualitative analysis of ideas advanced by others in the form of speeches, memoirs, poetry, fiction, and essays. I generally conduct literary and philosophical close-reading of the selected texts. The texts themselves were chosen based on their proximity to Mandela's vision of a decolonial South Africa and my reading of the South African transition period as providing grounds for a theory of flourishing in a globalized world. The book is therefore designed to provide a cohesive argument for an inclusive humanity

rooted in empathy; that is, the simple act of considering reality from other people's perspectives and thereby making one's own less absolute. The goal is to identify and promote anything that fosters the appreciation of other people's humanity. In chapter 1, I discuss the TRC in light of its role in establishing moral frameworks that posit South Africa as a space for global citizenship. Informed by forgiveness, these new frameworks have overturned European modernist narratives of civilization and centuries of racist, essentialist, and divisive constructs. Forgiveness does not imply forgetting history; it implies openness to otherness and to the reality of a constructive search for justice and a renewed humanism. I provide an extended discussion of transcultural affinity, cosmopolitanism, and *ubuntu* as manifestations of the new moral topography of global citizenship.

In chapter 2, I establish that, as statesmen, Mandela and Tutu exemplify boundary-transcending moral values that are central to postapartheid society. They are global citizens par excellence, and I identify them as the embodiments of decolonial ethics. Chapter 3 discusses Zakes Mda's *Ways of Dying* and *Madonna of Excelsior* and Njabulo Ndebele's *The Cry of Winnie Mandela*. These works engage South Africa's recent history and examine the possibility of more positive and proactive attitudes in those who might be tempted to revert to anger and *ressentiment* given certain realities of that history, especially among the majority black population. Chapter 4 revisits the problems and rewards of cosmopolitanism in selected works by Nadine Gordimer, *The Pickup* and *No Time Like the Present*, and J. M. Coetzee, *Age of Iron* and *Disgrace*.

In the early part of 2015 South Africa witnessed a vicious wave of xenophobia that pitted black South Africans against black people from other African countries. Many were cut down with machetes and some were set on fire. The killings prompted Achille Mbembe to call it a particular form of self-hatred.[37] The leaders of many African countries condemned the attacks. That did not prevent yet another wave of attacks in 2017, as Dewa Mavhinga writes.[38] Against this backdrop, chapter 5 analyzes four novels: Ivan Vladislaviæ's *The Restless Supermarket*, Phaswane Mpe's *Welcome to Our Hillbrow*, K. Sello Duiker's *The Quiet Violence of Dreams*, and Damon Galgut's *The Impostor*. These novels examine different forms of conflict, bigotries, and promises of affinity in postapartheid society. The visions that these authors offer agree with Mandela's.

One of the cardinal traits of South African decolonization championed by Mandela is the notion of *ubuntu* as a principle of inclusion and of caring. *Ubuntu* symbolizes the exact opposite of the Euromodernist model of exclusion. Chapter 6 examines poems by Antjie

Krog (*Skinned*) and Ingrid de Kok (*Terrestrial Things*). In these works, the authors establish notions of transcultural affinity and race-transcendent solidarity as necessary conditions for the attainment of economic fairness and conviviality in society. These poets propose a robust model of decolonization that is rooted in *ubuntu*, empathy, and social responsibility.

South Africa has been an inspiration to the world. Some countries—among them Sri Lanka, Colombia, Sierra Leone, and Rwanda—have sought direct help from South Africa. Desmond Tutu traveled to Rwanda to preach to Rwandans from out of the wealth of knowledge he had gathered from the South African experience. The book's conclusion pursues the theme of the possibility of a new humanism in South Africa. It situates the South African TRC in the moral context of other similar commissions it has inspired and especially in the global effort to delink humanity from a colonialist mentality. This concept seeks to recapture the core of Nelson Mandela's moral vision and connects his vision to other decolonial efforts in the global south.

1

Theorizing the Present

Sources of the New Moral Self in South Africa

The South African TRC made difficult demands on South Africa's oppressed and exploited people; it asked them to forgive their oppressors.[1] The TRC's mission is further complicated by the absence of structural programs of sufficient scope and extent to address the basic living conditions of those impoverished by centuries of exploitation, forced displacement, forced labor, and other crimes against humanity.[2] Yet there is no question that the acts of forgiveness made a profound humanist statement about South Africans and the future of their society. The peaceful transition that the TRC brought about, and that was characterized by the ritual of forgiveness, established a moral framework of belongingness and care in postapartheid South Africa. What is a moral framework, and what is its place in a civil society?

We are what we are because we live by certain norms that guide our interpersonal relations. As individuals and as communities, we are endowed with moral and spiritual intuitions that take the form of values and goals. The philosopher Charles Taylor argues that we cannot afford the "ethics of inarticulacy" in regard to these intuitions; that is, we cannot rely on raw instincts if we are to maintain our society as one that respects individual rights and dignity. We need frameworks to sustain and justify those values and intuitions. He explains that "what is articulated here is the background we assume and draw on in any claim to rightness, part of which we are forced to spell out when we have to defend our responses as the right ones."[3] When Taylor speaks of frameworks within which we articulate and make sense of our experience, he speaks of a moral space within which we define ourselves. He states: "My identity is defined by the commitments and identifications which provide the frame or horizon within which I can

try to determine from case to case what is good, or valuable, or what ought to be done, or what I can endorse or oppose. In other words, it is the horizon within which I am capable of taking a stand."[4] What this means is simply that to exist as humans is to exist within a frame of meaning. That frame of meaning is the good, with which identity is connected. By the good, he means whatever has significance for us, and this can be determined only through the language of interpretation.[5] The work of interpretation of the good is not done in a vacuum; it is done in a community and in language, which "only exists, and is maintained within a language community. . . . One is a self only among other selves."[6] Gauging how close we are to what is significant for us takes place as a narrative, in the realization "that I understand my present action in the form of an 'and then': there was A (what I am), and then I do B (what I project to become)."[7] All frameworks permit of, indeed, place us before, an absolute question of "how near or far we are from the good."[8] Taylor characterizes these frameworks within the context of a moral ontology that captures our sense of being. To be is to define oneself in relation to the good and to others. What, then, is the good against which South Africa defines itself as a postapartheid nation? What is the framework of being a South African? Or, in what ways did the TRC reshape the paradigms within which South Africans define themselves and one another?

My goal is to explore the question implicit in the peaceful transition and the TRC: how can we create a society that stands in contrast to the one we opposed, the one that had denied the humanity of others? I seek to show that Mandela's goal was to prepare South Africa to overthrow apartheid paradigms without repeating or entrenching variant, destructive forms of the deposed system; it was to completely overthrow the Euro-modernist thought pattern that had given birth to apartheid. If difference was the foundational premise of apartheid, solidarity, grounded in empathetic cosmopolitanism, must be its opposite. Empathy (co-feeling), demonstrated in caring for others without regard to race or ethnicity, must be the source of the new self in South Africa.

The political transition to democracy in South Africa has been described as "one of the most outstanding liberation achievements of this [twentieth] century."[9] Much has been written about the TRC, yet questions linger, some of which even interrogate the justification for the TRC's very existence. Mahmood Mamdani argues that the TRC's "version of truth was established through narrow lenses, crafted to reflect the experience of a tiny minority," and therefore was a diminished truth.[10] Sampie Terreblanche reiterates Mamdani's observation,

arguing that in regard to the demands of social justice, "the beneficiaries of the power structures of white political supremacy and racial capitalism have a responsibility to make quite a substantial sacrifice towards those who have been the victims of these power structures."[11] Frederik van Zyl Slabbert argues that "the indescribable cruelty, torture, pain, confusion and senseless suffering experienced by the victims was never, other than in highly exceptional instances, answered with confession and accountability";[12] and Nomfudon Walaza indicts the TRC for its "insufficient healing and reparation."[13] Indeed, the demonstrations organized by the Born-Frees, mentioned in the introduction, are premised partly on their perceptions of the uselessness of the TRC's processes.

These critiques are valid.[14] The absence of the materiality of the achievements of the TRC, of course, does not translate to insignificance. The TRC may not have brought about any substantial changes to the material conditions of the oppressed majority, but it brought something of far-reaching relevance: it gave the oppressed a moral grounding from which they can make veritable claims to their reality and also provided universal alternatives to centuries of white hegemony. As John de Gruchy states, the pretransition history of South Africa had been shaped by moral values that were at best sectarian, serving some sections of the society while disadvantaging others: "There has never been a shared set of moral values that has bound South Africans together."[15] He argues that the TRC has created an atmosphere that allows society to transcend these sectarian moral imaginations and to focus attention on the common good. Johnny de Lange makes the same argument in his claim that "the creation of a truth commission offered the opportunity to deal with the past without dwelling on it and to establish the moral foundation from which to build a truly new South Africa."[16] Jonathan Tepperman argues that "the TRC represented an audacious attempt by the new African National Congress (ANC) government to address the country's troubled history in a nonvengeful way—a remarkable act of grace by people who had suffered terribly."[17]

Reversing the Colonial Moral Assumption of Apartheid: Forgiveness and Reconciliation

Racial differences based on innate qualities is a European invention. As Michael MacDonald recounts, when Europeans arrived in the

southwest corner of Africa in the mid-seventeenth century, they met people who were not only different from Europeans, but who also differed among themselves. The San and Khoikhoi are brown, for example, whereas the Xhosas are black. But these differences were merely noted in passing; no one "conceived of physical differences as axes of human organization."[18] The idea of imputing essentialist values to difference was born of Euro-modernist colonialist mind-set.[19] The essentialist definition of Africans along racial lines coincided with the rise of capitalist exploitation and colonization. The fact that the exploitation of the African people was justified by an appeal to their supposed moral inferiority has been adequately documented.[20] Hannah Arendt argues that the Boers saw the indigenous population in diametrical contrast to their image of themselves as a morally and intellectually superior race. The inferiority of the native population justified their need to be "civilized." The Boer concept of otherness became an example for later instances of racist and imperialistic paradigms on the continent and elsewhere.[21] More recently, Sven Lindquist has provided a broader history of the topography of European psychology of colonialism in Africa in his aptly titled book *Exterminate All the Brutes*.[22]

It is important, in this regard, to bear in mind that these European constructions of the other, especially Africans, emerged from Western Platonic-Cartesian conceptions of human nature as unalterably fixed and understandable only through categories of soul/reason/thought. Western conquerors of Africa, therefore, operated under ideologies that subsumed humans within a specific teleology.[23] In this regard, the moral-rhetorical force of the TRC turned the table on the West's moral legitimization of the ideologies of oppression. In forgiving their perpetrators, the victims of apartheid and racism in Africa demonstrated to their oppressors that they were not defined by the latter's evil deeds. The victims also showed that they did not perceive their oppressors in essentialist models in the manner that the Westerners did; to the contrary, the victims encountered them.[24] It is within this hermeneutic setting that I read forgiveness, as defined by the TRC, as a recasting of the moral framework of the new society; that is, as establishing the good against which people can define themselves.

It is my contention that forgiveness has created an enabling framework for a far-reaching, universal form of solidarity, one that stands in diametrical opposition to the basic conceptions and assumptions of apartheid itself. Building on Hugo van der Merwe's distinction between "top-down" and "bottom-up" views of reconciliation, Rosemary Nagy distinguishes between thick and thin conceptions of solidarity in

regard to reconciliation during South Africa's transition period. In top-down reconciliation, which is often an abstraction organized by elites, national political perspectives transcend community membership. The bottom-up approach to reconciliation establishes healthy networks of interpersonal relations. In South Africa, the TRC employed both stratagems. The *thin* conception of solidarity runs parallel to the top-down path of reconciliation. "Solidarity is forged around the commitment to democratic values and practices," whereas the *thick* conception of solidarity "may be characterized as bottom-up, interpersonal, unmediated solidarity brought about by moral transformation and substantive agreement."[25] Though the TRC pursued both thick and thin conceptions of solidarity, it heavily favored the former because of the belief in its moral, psychological, and social restorative powers.

Clarifying the importance of reconciliation in South Africa, Antjie Krog recalls the encounter between Mrs. Ngewu, the mother of one the seven young men killed in 1986 by the South African apartheid secret police. Askari Mbele, who had lured Mrs. Ngewu's son to the place they were killed, had requested to meet with her to confess. Krog quotes Mrs. Ngewu's assessment of the meeting: "This thing called reconciliation . . . if I am understanding it correctly . . . if it means this perpetrator, this man who has killed Christopher Piet, if it means he becomes human again, this man, so that I, so that all of us, get our humanity back . . . then I agree, then I support it all."[26] Integral to my discussion of the moral import of the TRC is Mrs. Ngewu's concern that Mbele can recover his humanity if and when he acknowledges that he had lost it. But Mrs. Ngewu does not stop at Mbele's reacquisition of his humanity; she also knows that she, too, reclaims her own. She acknowledges the importance of nurturing a moral ambience of forgiveness in which everyone can thrive.

Mrs. Ngewu's story gives us an excellent synecdoche for a deeper appreciation of the TRC and its most important virtues: forgiveness and reconciliation. It presents the core concepts of restorative justice that Desmond Tutu interprets as integral to the southern African system of justice: "We are bound up in a delicate network of interdependence because, as we say in our African idiom, a person is a person through other persons. To dehumanize another inexorably means that one is dehumanized as well. . . . Thus to *forgive is indeed the best form of self-interest.*"[27]

Tutu's bold claim that forgiveness is the best form of self-interest requires some form of hermeneutics of forgiveness to be fully appreciated. First, if it is true that a person is a person through other persons,

then it follows that in order for a person to become good or happy, the other, through whom he or she becomes a person, ought to be good and happy as well. This suggests that a dehumanized person invariably reflects his condition back onto society. What that society needs in order to regain its dignity is to restore the victim's humanity. Second, and perhaps more profound, forgiveness most directly benefits those who forgive. It readily releases them from self-defeating bitterness and rancor.

In the introduction, I referred to the student at the University of Witwatersrand who made the T-shirt with the inscription "Fuck White People." It is true that he expressed the widespread sentiment of disappointment with the current political state of affairs in the country. Judged from the perspective of TRC, however, it seems that he has defied the structure of the moral framework of the new society, ironically reverting to the paradigm of violence that the TRC had worked to overcome. His self-identification as a member of a historically oppressed group did little to rescue his slogan from the violence implied in it. Wendy Brown raises an important question in regard to oppressed people who seek recognition and fairness. She asks why the desire for recognition often produces "a politics of recrimination and rancor" and the tendency "to disdain freedom rather than practice it."[28] She argues that politicized identity often ends up subverting itself precisely because of its adoption of a "wounded character," produced by a spirit of *ressentiment*: the "moralizing revenge of the powerless."[29] I identify this self-subverting tendency of victims as a syndrome of suicide sustained by an uncritical exercise of righteous indignation. It flourishes in an absolute negativity toward, and ultimate rejection of, the world. As in the case of suicide bombers, the subject is ready to destroy the self in order to exact maximum vengeance on the other.

In Nietzsche's view, *ressentiment* is activated when the desire for vengeance for past injuries is coupled with the realization of one's powerlessness.[30] One therefore resorts to moralization; that is, to a cheap condemnation of the other, based on the binary of the evil oppressor and the innocent oppressed. Those who indulge in such judgments take it as given that to be a victim is to be morally worthy. They are thus encouraged to concoct value systems whose justifications lie exclusively in the supposed purity or the rightness of their position. The T-shirt protest is an expression of powerlessness that masks itself in anger. The protester resorted to an imaginary vengeance that ultimately worked against him by diverting attention from the central and legitimate issue

of black impoverishment. The T-shirt protester valorized whiteness, and in so doing, diminished himself. He failed to take himself seriously not only because of the implicit desire to hurt others, but also for simply failing to articulate his issue; that is, his condition as a dispossessed South African citizen.

If *ressentiment* is the dangerous act of clinging to ineffective, self-subverting feelings of recrimination, forgiveness is its opposite; it is the gaining of the power to practice freedom. Forgiveness is the releasing of self from recriminations and rancor, with a specific goal of engaging in an objective pursuit of justice and fairness. It is the refusal to instrumentalize history; that is, to use history as a justification of one's ideology, as has been the case in Zimbabwe, for example.

Tutu and the TRC sought to forestall the condition that would have made the production of placebo-values inevitable. In his view, forgiveness is necessary not for the sake of white people, but rather in spite of them, and whether they asked for it or not. Forgiveness seeks to remind South Africans that white people are not the source of the problem; they are not the issue. The real issue is injustice, which cannot be solved without the presence or the participation of white people as members of a community that seeks to overcome the legacies of apartheid. Forgiveness does not ignore history. Indeed, it functions only in the awareness of history; it removes vengeance and bitterness from history in order for former oppressors and their victims to engage meaningfully with one another. Nor does forgiveness imply abandoning the quest for justice. Forgiveness is an indication that a society has begun to search for fairness without prejudice or recrimination. That search therefore becomes a concern of the community in its entirety.

Mrs. Ngewu's belief in forgiveness and reconciliation and Desmond Tutu's articulation of the idea of restorative justice have one thing in common: openness to reality, signifying one's readiness to engage with others. Openness to being and to otherness is the constitutive element of the emerging moral topography. It is that which postapartheid South Africa has adopted through the actions and guidance of the TRC; it therefore has become a core element in the moral ontology of belongingness that is articulated in South Africa's constitution.[31] Thus, in forgiving former oppressors, the TRC has created a path for new relationships between people of diverse ethnicities, especially between white and black people. It is no longer a Hegelian master-and-slave relationship. It is rather a relationship based on the facticity of what Tutu refers to as belonging to "a bundle of life";[32] that is, the fact that people are mutually dependent.[33]

Global Citizenship: A Moral Framework in a Global Age

Earlier, I referred to Charles Taylor's discussion of moral ontology. I have also interpreted the moral framework suggested by forgiveness and reconciliation as implying openness to being. Openness is an essential aspect of the moral framework of postapartheid South Africa if only because it is the exact opposite of the apartheid ideology. Openness to reality and to otherness constitutes the essence of global citizenship.

What exactly is global citizenship, and what does it imply for South Africa and the world? A global citizen is a cosmopolitan. Mandela defines and praises cosmopolitanism as that which counters the growth of divisive forces: "At a time when some people are feverishly encouraging the growth of fractional forces, raising the tribe into the final and highest form of social organisation, setting one national group against the other, cosmopolitan dreams are not only desirable but a bounden duty; dreams that stress the special unity that hold the freedom forces together—[in] a bond that has been forged by common struggles, sacrifices and traditions."[34] Mandela identifies the actualization of cosmopolitan dreams not just as desirable, but as obligatory. He therefore raises a virtue—empathy—to an obligation. But what are those cosmopolitan dreams? How does Mandela's cosmopolitanism differ from other forms that have acquired negative connotations through their identification with European imperialist globalization? As discussed in chapter 2, I argue that what sets Mandela's cosmopolitanism apart is his emphasis on empathy. The true cosmopolitan perceives the world from the perspectives of other people and reorders his or her ethical relations accordingly. I therefore offer the term "empathetic cosmopolitanism" as a particular model of the postapartheid South African worldview; it is born of the effort to create a new society that recognizes openness as its operative principle.

The term cosmopolitanism derives from the Greek *kosmos* (world) and *polites* (citizen): *kosmopolitês* (citizen of the world). It is the idea that all human beings are citizens in a single community. Hugh Harris reminds us that "Democritus complains 'I visited Athens and no one knew me.' Yet, as a result of his wanderings farther afield, he could say, 'To the wise man every country is a dwelling-place, for the whole world is the fatherland of a good soul.'"[35] Democritus's conception of the good soul presupposes a positive personal disposition toward every other person. It describes someone whose humanity knows no boundaries. A person with a good soul is a citizen of the world. Martha Nussbaum argues for just this sort of moral attitude and interprets

Diogenes's famous declaration "I am a citizen of the world" to reflect spiritual expansiveness. Diogenes "refused to be defined by his local origins and local group memberships, which were central to a Greek male's self-image. He insisted on defining himself primarily in terms of more universal aspirations and concerns."[36] The cosmopolitan is "the person whose allegiance is to the worldwide community of human beings."[37] It is of particular importance that Nussbaum underscores not just the world, which could be an abstraction, but the *community of human beings*. The emphasis on humans, obviously of diverse ethnic extractions, beliefs, and political persuasions, draws attention to an essential component of cosmopolitanism: relation versus opposition. In being open to, and in relating with, diverse people, we form a community whose justification lies in its elementary openness to reality. Such a community is "the source of our moral obligations."[38] Exploring Plutarch's ideas, Nussbaum argues that after accepting this wide community of human beings with respect to basic moral values such as justice, "we should regard all human beings as our fellow citizens and neighbors."[39] In Nussbaum's analysis, cosmopolitanism involves a moral outlook. Luis Cabrera advances the moral outlook of cosmopolitanism in his conception of global citizenship, which he identifies as "the fully realized form of individual cosmopolitanism. It provides a guide for individual action within a globally oriented but still individualistic moral frame."[40] Noting that individual cosmopolitanism lacks an obligation to specific individuals, he argues that global citizenship must be "grounded in duties corresponding to widely recognized human rights."[41]

Global citizenship does not demand the relinquishing of one's history, or one's membership in a particular ethnicity. The Stoics, according to Nussbaum, provide us with an excellent model for the exercise of our allegiance to local as well as global communities. In the Stoic view, we are surrounded by many concentric circles, which move from the self to the immediate family, to the extended family, and on to neighbors, fellow city dwellers, and fellow countrymen. "Outside all these circles is the largest one, humanity as a whole." Our task as citizens of the world will be to "draw the circles somehow toward the center."[42] This formulation corresponds with what Kwame Anthony Appiah calls "cosmopolitan patriots."[43] In suggesting that the cosmopolitan affirms the humanity of every person, Nussbaum proposes an ethical cosmopolitanism, which is at the core of my inquiry, and which captures Mandela's vision for a globally oriented South Africa.

Nussbaum's mediation between patriotism and cosmopolitanism echoes Mitchell Cohen's concept of rooted cosmopolitanism. Cohen

takes issue with "votaries of multiculturalism," who have become "unreflective celebrants of particularism" and who fail to mediate between diversities within a particular geopolitical dispensation.[44] He cites David Ben-Gurion's metaphor of circles. Ben-Gurion described Israeli society as consisting of individuals within circles. These circles are not independent; they mesh and intermingle. Ben-Gurion writes: "when we stand in two circles it isn't a question of standing in two separate areas, one moment in one and the next in another, but rather in what is common territory to both of them."[45] For Cohen, then, standing in many circles implies accepting plural loyalties; this, in turn, has far-reaching "implications for concepts of citizenship."[46] He argues that being rooted in a particular place should enable us to realize our mutual interdependence rather than to rationalize exclusion.

David Hollinger's distinction between cosmopolitanism and pluralism emphasizes Cohen's and Nussbaum's approaches and helps us appreciate the moral rewards of cosmopolitanism. "Cosmopolitanism is more oriented to the individual as a member of a number of different communities simultaneously," whereas pluralism is oriented to the group, and always understands the individual as a member of a primary community. Pluralism relies on ascribed identity.[47] Thus from the outset, the cosmopolitan acknowledges that he can no longer define himself by the exclusion of people from his and other communities because, as Hollinger argues, the individual or unit has absorbed "as much varied experience as it can, while retaining its capacity to advance its aims effectively."[48] It is against this background that Ulf Hannerz examines cosmopolitanism as a mode of "managing meaning" in a complex, globalized world characterized by the "plurality of cultures understood as distinctive entities." In his view, cosmopolitanism "includes a stance towards diversity itself, towards the coexistence of cultures in the individual experience. A more genuine cosmopolitanism is first of all an orientation, a willingness to engage with the Other. It is an intellectual and aesthetic stance of openness toward divergent cultural experience, a search for contrasts rather than uniformity."[49] Hannerz is emphasizing the freedom of the individual to engage with people from other cultures. Such engagement presupposes an affirmation of those worlds. However, one is not obliged to accept every aspect of other cultures, much less adopt a messianic stance toward them. But does one also accept other people's humanity? My assumption is that such acceptance is implicit in Hannerz's conception of engagement and in the "coexistence of cultures in the individual experience." To have different cultures coexist in one's experience implies an openness rooted

in the assumptions that one's world is not hermetically sealed and that one's culture is insufficient to explain the complexities of reality.

Cosmopolitanism as a European concept is fraught with problems that must be addressed if we are to appreciate its importance in understanding modern societies. We cannot fully come to terms with cosmopolitanism without reference to European universalism and the West's effort to impose its culture on the rest of the world. Brett Bowden argues that "the ideal of global citizenship is inextricably linked to the West's long and torturous history of engaging in overzealous civilising-cum-universalising missions in the non-Western world."[50] Cosmopolitanism has been misunderstood and misinterpreted as referring simultaneously to people without roots or people as privileged snobs.[51] Bruce Robbins notes that the term had been applied spitefully to "Christians, aristocrats, merchants, Jews, homosexuals, and intellectuals," and later promiscuously to "North Atlantic merchant sailors, Caribbean au pairs in the United States, Egyptian guest workers in Iraq, Japanese women who take gaijin lovers."[52]

Another problem with cosmopolitanism is that its moral reasoning is rooted in the Greek concept of Logos. The cosmopolitan transcends petty local affinities through the power of reason. Nussbaum has traced the history of the link between reason and cosmopolitanism from the Cynics (Diogenes), through the Stoics (Plutarch, Marcus Aurelius) to the Enlightenment (Kant).[53] For the Cynics, "the first form of moral affiliation for the citizen should be her affiliation with rational humanity; and this, above all, should define the purpose of her conduct."[54] Following their lead, the Stoics developed the concept of the world citizen, arguing "that each of us dwells, in effect, in two communities—the local community of our birth, and the community of human argument and aspiration."[55] For the Stoics, "the basis for human community is the worth of reason in each and every human being."[56] Kant appropriates their "idea of a kingdom of free rational beings equal in humanity, each of them to be treated as an end no matter where in the world he or she dwells."[57] Cosmopolitanism thus understood displays the same virtues and weaknesses as the concept of human rights, which is another "European invention," as Lynn Hunt has shown.[58] As Elizabeth Anker argues, human rights conceived in the European tradition of Logos overemphasizes reason and disregards the body to the degree that the body is seen "as an entity that must be repressed, quarantined, or otherwise mastered by reason."[59] What is said of human rights applies also to cosmopolitanism conceived of in the same tradition of Logos. That concept of cosmopolitanism is largely disembodied. All humans have a

capacity for reason, but that capacity is not exercised equally. Centering cosmopolitanism on reason leads to a form of elitism, hence the modern interpretation of cosmopolitans as snobs.[60]

Global Citizenship from the South: Empathetic Cosmopolitanism

It would be wrong to judge Western conceptions of cosmopolitanism as tainted by their associations with imperialist universalism or by their roots in Logos. These conceptions have the virtue of validating reason as a means of achieving a disinterested, objective assessment of the world. This is what Thomas Paine hoped to achieve in his formulation of the Rights of Man when he claimed that "in stating these matters, I speak an open and disinterested language, dictated by no passion but that of humanity. . . . Independence is my happiness, and I view things as they are, without regard to place or person; my country is the world, and my religion to do good."[61] Robbins believes that cosmopolitanism can be understood as a "fundamental devotion to the interests of humanity as a whole," and as a "detachment from the bonds, commitments, and affiliations that constrain ordinary nation-bound lives."[62] The constraints of "ordinary nation-bound lives" identified by Robbins are relevant to my reading of the cosmopolitan disposition, especially as they relate to South Africa. No human being can exist in complete independence from a nation or a culture. Yet while individuals might be in a sense bound within the geographic space of their nation, while they might be located within a given culture, their imaginations are not; they can transcend such boundaries, even if in limited ways. Robbins explains that the "term *cosmopolitics* represents one effort to describe, from within multiculturalism, a name for the genuine striving toward common norms and mutual translatability that is also part of multiculturalism."[63] The "mutual translatability" of cultures or experiences lends cosmopolitanism one of its saving virtues, especially when considered within a multiracial, multiethnic society.

Amanda Anderson acknowledges the negative aspects of cosmopolitanism, some of which I have already discussed, but points out the relevance of its universal element. She notes the difference between exclusionary and inclusionary cosmopolitanism: "In exclusionary cosmopolitanism, little to no weight is given to exploration of disparate cultures: all value lies in abstract or 'cosmic' universalism. In inclusionary cosmopolitanism, by contrast, universalism finds expression through

sympathetic imagination and intercultural exchange."[64] Anderson seeks to reclaim the primacy of universalism over essentialism, and argues that the new universalism "focuses on those ideals and practices that propel individuals and groups beyond the confines of restricted or circumscribed identities."[65] She introduces a helpful concept, "sympathetic imagination," that allows the cosmopolitan to experience the world of the other. In this context she defines cosmopolitanism not just as an intellectual program, but as an ethical ideal "for cultivating character and negotiating the experience of otherness."[66] She thus argues that a robust understanding of cosmopolitanism endorses "reflective distance from one's cultural affiliations, a broad understanding of other cultures and customs, and a belief in universal humanity."[67]

Anderson's insight assists my articulation of the South African conception of global citizenship, which is rooted in the postapartheid search for the humanity that is shared among ethnicities, races, cultures, or nationalities. Abstract, disembodied rules by which every individual is supposed to abide are insufficient in themselves; boundary-defying moral sympathies and outlooks are required if disparate groups are to bind into a true community. This is not just desirable; it is, referencing Mandela, a "bounden duty." From the South African perspective, a truly global citizen acknowledges the humanity and dignity of others as constitutive of her own. Negotiating the experiences of otherness demands that such a person interact with this other in a Martin Buber I–Thou paradigm. Anderson's "sympathetic imagination" plays an important role in this regard, though, in my opinion, sympathy becomes elitist in this context. Sympathy issues from a position of power that refuses to acknowledge the coequality of the victim with a sympathizer. "Empathetic imagination" seems more appositional to Anderson's moral conception of cosmopolitanism and to the South African condition. Suzanne Keen succinctly differentiates between the two emotions. An empathetic person says: "'I feel what you feel. *I feel your pain*,' whereas in sympathy one says 'I feel supportive about your feelings. *I feel pity for your pain*.'"[68] Sympathy is the near equivalent of pity.

One of the achievements of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission is the opening of portals of empathy through which South Africans might hear another's stories.[69] In so doing, they are able to put themselves in the positions of others. Empathy is thus established as an integral element of South Africa's cosmopolitan imagination. Nussbaum's definition of empathy as the "imaginative reconstruction of the experience of the sufferer" supports that definition. Empathy "involves

a participatory enactment of the situation of the sufferer, but always combined with the awareness that one is not oneself the sufferer."[70] Empathy teaches us the value of considering issues from other people's perspectives, thus keeping us in constant awareness of the presence of others in our thinking and being. As Simon Baron-Cohen puts it, "empathy occurs when we suspend our single-minded focus of attention, and instead adopt a double-minded focus of attention."[71] Understood in these ways, empathy is never passive; it urges us to become involved in the lives of others by confronting the systems that make their lives difficult. It opens us to others because it encourages a double focus of attention.

Cosmopolitanism without empathy is empty and snobbish. Empathetic cosmopolitanism encourages us to switch perspectives with others of different ethnic, racial, or cultural extractions in order to relate to them without the intrusion of power or prejudice. Therefore, in this context it is fair to assert that cosmopolitanism does not involve universal systems or cultures. Nor is it reducible to mere globe-trotting. One can be cosmopolitan without leaving one's birthplace. What is necessary is openness manifested in direct, personal relations to the other. Empathetic imagination is implied in what Gerard Delanty calls cosmopolitan imagination, which occurs "when and wherever new relations between self, other and world develop in moments of openness. It is an approach that shifts emphasis to internal developmental process within the social world rather than seeing globalization as the primary mechanism."[72] The ultimate test for the global citizen is captured in such questions as: What is my attitude to others who do not look like me and my people? Is it one of acceptance or rejection? Can I affirm their humanity as I do mine?

Global citizenship that is informed by empathy must take into account the knowledge of how people live. Global citizenship, thus understood, begins with the assumption that a person and her culture cannot be defined and that people need society's affirmation to attain the full realization of their humanity. Empathetic cosmopolitanism in South Africa traces its roots partially to the southern African concept of *ubuntu*, the main premise of which is that an individual does not exist alone in himself or herself. Understood as an extension of *ubuntu*, empathetic cosmopolitanism not only has ethical implications for how to relate to others in fulfilling ways; it also has a moral obligation to look after the other, especially the vulnerable members of society. We extend our care to others by creating an environment that enables them to thrive as humans with dignity. Exclusionary conceptions of

identity and solidarity run counter to empathetic cosmopolitanism. It would be a mistake in the sociopolitical life of South Africa, or indeed, of any nation, to believe that the search for social and economic justice must necessarily include nativist, essentialist, or absolutist solutions. A sympathetic reading of forgiveness, an essential part of the TRC, reveals precisely the opposite: through forgiveness, socioeconomic fairness can now be rigorously pursued, and pursued without bitterness and recriminations.

Transcultural Affinities

I stated in the introduction that the South African response to the colonial experience was rooted in the awareness of transcultural contacts and affinities. What is transcultural affinity? In what ways is it different from multiculturalism or multicultural affinity? Can it help us go beyond the inflated forms of difference and narrow conceptions of solidarity in a globalized world? A complete history of world civilizations reveals that the interpenetration of cultures and the mutual borrowing of cultural concepts and norms occur constantly. This borrowing has become more evident in our global age, an age in which information can travel instantaneously and cultural idioms are more easily traceable to their immediate sources.[73] The increasing awareness of the absence of purity in cultures has implications in academia. Anthropologists are no longer interested in the study of pristine cultures, because, as James Clifford suggests in "Travelling Cultures," there may never have been such a thing as a pristine culture.[74] Culture, which can be understood as a means by which different groups organize their lives, has always been in a process of change. Because of such borrowings, which are inevitable, cultural interpenetration has become a prominent aspect in modern cultural studies.[75] Multiculturalism, conceived as a means to preserve the distinctiveness of cultures, has become increasingly oxymoronic.

The German philosopher and cultural critic Wolfgang Welsch admits that multiculturalism is a well-intentioned political gesture on the part of Western liberal democracies. However, this gesture is hampered by conceptual flaws; it retains vestiges of narrow, traditional conceptions of culture that were shaped by the late-eighteenth-century German philosopher Johann Gottfried Herder. In Herder's view, "the cultivation of a people is the flower of its existence; its display is pleasing indeed, but transitory."[76] Herder uses the analogies of flowers, plants, and soil

to address the uniqueness of the individual, rooted in his own people. "The very appearance of the flower is a sign that it must fade: it has drawn to itself the power of the plant from the very root; and when it dies, the death of the plant must follow."[77] The strength of the plant and soil metaphor lies in its exclusivity. Herder praises the Greeks who "remained free from any intermixture with foreign nations so that their progress has been entirely their own," but who produced one of the greatest civilizations the world has known.[78] Therefore, Herder sees culture as monolithic, restricted to a given place, produced by a given people. David Eller identified him as the first activist of "ethnic consciousness,"[79] while Lutz Hoffman argues that German conceptions of *blut und boden* and Nazi ideology can be traced to Herder.[80] Herder's ideology is inherent in modern applications of multiculturalism that suppose groups practice their cultures assuming they and their cultures are pure and wholly distinct from other people and other cultures. Assumptions of cultural distinctiveness in turn help cultures to maintain their authenticity. Certain West African men in France, for example, justify their polygamy and the subordination of women in their households as important aspects of their heritage. Consider, too, cultures that subject girls to genital mutilation in the guise of preserving traditional rites.[81] The main rationale offered for the practice is the obligation to preserve one's culture, heritage, and traditions as distinct from those of the West.[82]

Welsch argues that such conceptions of cultures as monolithic is not realistic. He posits transculturality as the concept that captures the true contours of modern reality, and notes that "cultures de facto no longer have the insinuated form of homogeneity and separateness. Instead, they have assumed a new form, which is to be called *transcultural* insofar that it *passes through* classical cultural boundaries."[83] Transculturality asserts that cultures "interpenetrate or emerge from one another." The condition of culture is that of movement, and it implies appropriation and change. Transculturality seeks to emphasize the fact that cultures are infused with idioms from other cultures and are therefore already a synthesis. In sum, "the concept of transculturality aims for a multimeshed and inclusive, not separatist and exclusive, understanding of culture. It intends a culture and society whose pragmatic feats exist not in delimitation, but in the ability to link and undergo transition."[84] Welsch's transculturality corresponds to what Kwame Anthony Appiah calls "cosmopolitan contamination" and what Homi Bhabha characterizes as hybridity or the "Third Space."[85] Other terms—creolization, mongrelization, and *métissage*—have been advanced to underscore the fact

that cultures are always in the process of change, mixture, and appropriation. Related terms such as hybridity admittedly have unfortunate biological overtones, but they assert the inevitability of some degree of intermixing in the world.[86]

Charles Stewart suggests that syncretism captures the contours of modern cultures. Syncretism "describes the process by which cultures constitute themselves at any given point in time. Today's hybridization will simply give way to tomorrow's hybridization, the form of which will be dictated by historico-political events and contingencies."[87] He notes that the term was first used by Plutarch in the first century AD, and was later employed during the Reformation in Europe, when a Lutheran theologian, George Calixtus (1586–1656), sought a reunion with the Catholic Church. Fearing that its theology would be defiled by the apostasies of the breakaway church, the Roman Church rejected Calixtus's proposal, dismissing it as syncretic. The term was also used during periods of colonialism "to castigate colonial local churches that had burst out of the sphere of mission control and begun to 'illegitimately' indigenize Christianity instead of properly reproducing the European form of Christianity they had originally been offered."[88]

Syncretism is used derisively, but only by those who are ideologically invested in the purity of the system they feel the need to protect. Yet the underlying fact is that cultures always involve mixtures and syntheses. This is as true for Western cultures as it is for those of Africa. I am interested in the term only insofar as it captures the inevitable mixing of elements of multiple cultures. People assimilate aspects of other cultures because various aspects of their own culture may be inadequate to solve their problems or meet their needs. Ideally, syncretism represents the power of the human spirit to liberate itself from domination and to create solutions that fit spiritual needs. This, of course, does not occlude the formation of new ideologies that lay claim to purity, and thus hinder relations of people of diverse backgrounds.

Conceiving of one's culture as impure—that is, as comprising strands from other cultures—can help one avoid the temptation of using that same culture to justify one's oppressive relation to another person. But does this new conception of culture encourage affinity? Do *métissage*, *créolité*, or transculturality encourage cooperation between people? Since transculturality acknowledges the presence of other cultural idioms in one's own cultural realm, it allows (or ought to allow) for some form of flexibility and affinity; at least it blocks the argument of exclusion. I am using affinity here in its most basic meaning, as any form of commonality or similarity in worldview or self-expression. I am, of

course, not proposing a mere feel-good camaraderie between cultures. I am proposing a way of living and self-expression that is informed by the awareness of our dependency on others. I am envisioning a world that is anchored in profound consideration for the humanity of others regardless of backgrounds. The issue is therefore not just acknowledging some forms of commonality between peoples, but actually encouraging affinity. In defining transcultural affinity, I examine Johann Wolfgang von Goethe's concept of elective affinities.

Elective Affinities is the English translation of Goethe's 1809 novel *Die Wahlverwandtschaften*. It is the story of a couple, Eduard and Charlotte, who invite Captain (Eduard's boyhood friend) and Ottilie (Charlotte's orphaned niece) into their family. When Captain and Ottilie move in with Eduard and Charlotte, mutual personal chemistry engenders a series of love affairs that changes their lives. Goethe took the title from the science of chemistry and the knowledge that certain chemical elements readily bond with others. He declared that his novel is one of manners and social values. Eduard and Charlotte break established codes of behavior within their social class in their relations with Captain and Ottilie; Goethe suggests that elements (humans) with innate affinities (love) will form bonds regardless of these social norms or manners. In the context of Goethe's cosmopolitanism, affinity is not tied to ancestry, class, culture, or religion.[89] What is said of Eduard and Ottilie in the early nineteenth century can apply to relationships between people of diverse races and cultural backgrounds in the twenty-first century. Goethe was influential in the development of European concepts of cosmopolitanism. He is well known for his conception of world literature. As early as 1827, he was asserting that "national literature is now a rather unmeaning term; the epoch of world literature is at hand, and everyone must strive to hasten its approach."[90] Universal literature was made possible by the fact that in Goethe's time Europe was shaken by wars. European cultures "realized that they had already adopted foreign influences. This led to a desire for greater contact with one's neighbours, for a free exchange of ideas."[91] Goethe recognized that mutual influences were active among European cultures, and that those influences should be maintained. In this way, he contributed to the expansion of European imagination toward cultural openness.

Transcultural affinity instantiates in human relations what is already evident in culture; it is the action of people bonding with people of other cultural or racial backgrounds by being open to their experiences and humanity. It reveals the incompleteness of every culture and human experience and the necessity of mutual cultural interdependence for

self-fulfillment and actualization. My local culture or ethnicity can no longer stand in the way of my relating to persons from other cultures or ethnicities in fruitful ways. Transcultural affinity in South Africa seeks to break down artificial boundaries created by centuries of racist, classist ideologies, by considering as normal the interrelationships between people from different racial backgrounds.

Transcultural affinity, on the one hand, can also be understood as a feeling of transcultural empathy. Multicultural affinity, on the other hand, encourages interaction between cultures that consider themselves to be essentially pure and different from one another. Jodi Halpern and Harvey M. Weinstein provide us with a succinct characterization of empathy that can enhance our discussion: "Specifically, the major function of empathy is to individualize and particularize and thereby to challenge the major aspects of dehumanization. First, empathy differs from sympathy in that it entails seeking the individual perspective of another rather than generalizing or stereotyping."[92] Essentially, then, empathy attributes human qualities to others, and this attribution is enhanced by the realization that humans are essentially entangled with one another either through culture or history or in other means that are not easily demonstrable. The awareness of mutual social entanglement should therefore provide grounds for affinity within that society. In this way, transcultural affinity adopts an ethical stance in that it seeks to disrupt existing cultural hierarchies and mythologies of authenticity and belonging, and conversely to prevent the emergence of nativist notions of identity and solidarity.

Transcultural affinity is essential to the conception of global citizenship in that it acknowledges that a person's culture cannot fully express that person's relation to the world. A person is therefore by nature dependent on others to realize the possibilities inherent in her humanity. Openness is therefore a natural consequence of the awareness of that dependence.

The Virtues of Entanglement

After more than three centuries of living together, the races and ethnicities that make up South Africa have become so entangled that it is impossible to speak of one group to the exclusion of others; the fate of these groups, for better or for worse, is inextricably intertwined.[93] An example provided by Carli Coetzee reveals that many people of Afrikaner descent increasingly claim Krotoä, a Khoisan woman, as their

ancestor. In so doing, they demonstrate that South Africans are more entangled with one another than most of them seem willing to admit given the lingering legacy of apartheid.[94] The truth is that there had been a large degree of racial mixing, whether out of love or coercion, before apartheid criminalized it.

Sarah Nuttall argues that entanglement in South Africa is a potent means of social understanding. She has rightly observed that postcolonial theory celebrated difference "as a strategic tool against imperial definitions" and as a means for those subjugated by "imperial rule to maintain an authenticity from which they could articulate claims to selfhood."[95] As Brenda Cooper argues, postcolonial identity politics was positioned "within postmodern labyrinths of innate difference."[96] Thus postcolonial resistance, especially in Africa, was grounded in what Achille Mbembe has identified as the inversion of the Hegelian dialectics of difference.[97] Mbembe critiqued Africanists who inflated Africa's differences vis-à-vis the West: "In placing too much emphasis on the themes of identity and difference or economic marginalization, a number of analysts have . . . lost sight of the different ways in which networks and social relations all over the continent are being transformed and institutionalized in new forms."[98] By networks and social relations, Mbembe is referring to the fact that Africans are mutually entangled in Africa and with other people in the world. Monolithic definitions of Africa are therefore unconvincing. Furthering this line of thought, Nuttall argues that in South African and international cultural studies, the focus "has been on the black subject and the white subject as more or less discrete objects of study, and work that focuses on points of connections or similarities or affinities between people, hardly exists."[99] This is where her notion of entanglement is activated. Entanglement is a knotting of difference and sameness, and in regard to sociocultural relevance it is "a rubric in terms of which we can begin to meet the challenge of the 'after apartheid.'"[100] Entanglement is "a set of relations, some of them conscious but many of them unconscious, which occur between people who most of the time try to define themselves as different."[101] Entanglement does not imply a glossing over of the various forms of separation and difference that still exist and that have material consequences in people's lives. Rather, Nuttall focuses on how "sites and spaces in which what was once thought of as separate—identities, spaces, histories—come together or find points of intersection in unexpected ways."[102] She suggests that the ideas of established cultural differences can no longer be used as tools of oppression or of resistance. Thus the time has

arrived to invest in mutuality as capital. This investment is a virtue in itself.

I locate Nuttall in the camp of South African champions of open society. She seems, however, to have relied excessively and exclusively on fellow academics for her analysis of the developments in South Africa. For instance, she identifies six registers of entanglement in South Africa: historical, temporal, those involving complicity, those of people and things, those in the DNA signature, and racial.[103] She seems to have forgotten Desmond Tutu's definition and instantiation of entanglement in the history of South Africa. Tutu's ideas expressed in *The Rainbow People of God* are as much about entanglement (and sameness) as apartheid was about difference or apartness.

But the awareness of entanglement might not be enough to enhance global citizenship in South Africa. There is an additional problem with Nuttall's concept. Being entangled means being socially, historically, and culturally entwined. However, that does not yet mean that one is invested morally or affectively in another's being. As Carli Coetzee warns, to assert this entanglement can also be a self-forgiving white narrative; it can conveniently justify the "Afrikaners [return] to their roots."[104] The admission of entanglement is a positive step toward defying the absolutism inherent not only in the apartheid/racist construction of difference, but also in the various inflations of postcolonial resistance.

Ubuntu and the Value of Global Affinity

Desmond Tutu has designated *ubuntu* as the moral force behind the TRC. *Ubuntu* has attracted enthusiastic praise from many African thinkers. Some have apotheosized it; others have sought in it a silver bullet for African or global problems. Emmanuel Eze cautions against the latter interpretation and claims that *ubuntu*, understood as something essential to Africans, is similar to Negritude.[105] Antjie Krog has observed that some critics "saw the new world view as superficial and confusing, as agenda and ideology, used by the powerful to present political, legal and/or personal religious agendas in palatable form."[106] There have been excellent interpretations of the concept by some prominent South African thinkers.[107] Achille Mbembe's interpretation in particular helps our understanding. For him, it has to be understood as "the process of becoming a person, a certain proposition, not about identity as a metaphysical or ontological category as in the Western tradition,

but as a process of becoming as a relation; a relation in which the 'I,' meaning the subject, is understood as being made and remade through the ethical interaction with what or who is not him."[108] My interest in the concept follows Mbembe's interpretation, which I consider to be a register of emerging transcultural affinity in South Africa. Tutu believes that the triumph of *ubuntu* lies in the fact that it appeals to diversity by recognizing the humanity of even strangers. *Ubuntu*, he argues, "speaks of the very essence of being human. When we want to give high praise to someone we say, '*Yu, u nobuntu*': 'Hey, so-and-so has *ubuntu*.' Then you are generous, you are hospitable, you are friendly and caring and compassionate. You share what you have. It is to say, 'My humanity is caught up, is inextricably bound up, in yours.' We belong in a bundle of life."[109] Tutu's definition of *ubuntu* brings us closer to a better articulation and a more sophisticated, analytic appreciation of the concept. In this regard, the phrase "*Yu, u nobuntu*" (which Tutu renders, "Hey, so-and-so has *ubuntu*") applies the concept to specific individuals. It acknowledges that someone has a certain strength and quality of character. That it can be said of one person and not of another implies that it is an acquired trait as opposed to an essential characteristic limited to the people of a certain society. It is like the Greek *arête*: meaning moral virtue or excellence. *Ubuntu* provides the framework for the interpretation of South African experience in that it views the existence of the other as a condition of meaning in my own existence. This corresponds to Taylor's assertion that the language with which we interpret our relation to the good "only exists and is maintained within a language community" and that "one is a self only among other selves."[110]

I have discussed *ubuntu* extensively in my article "Decolonisation and Its Discontents: Thoughts on the Postcolonial African Moral Self."[111] Here I take seriously Magobe Ramose's argument that *ubuntu* is a principle of dialogue and therefore a register of openness. As an ethical principle, "it is flexibility oriented towards balance and harmony in the relationship between human beings and between the latter and . . . nature."[112] In this respect, *ubuntu* refers to the undying awareness of the other, and the virtue that enables one to relate to others without whom being would be inconceivable. In sum, *ubuntu* is a model of encounter that takes the humanity of the other as a starting point. To relate to the other is to recognize the dignity and equality of the person, and it asserts that any disregard for him or her inevitably diminishes oneself. In this way, *ubuntu* commands one to be essentially open to the other's humanity. The other, or society, is always present in one's imagination. This awareness is the foundation of global citizenship,

especially from the global south. It is not reason that conditions one to go beyond the pettiness of tribe or bigoted loyalties; it is the awareness of others in one's life. It is also one's ability to encounter them. It is therefore no surprise that Nelson Mandela incorporated *ubuntu* in his conception of open society. He asserts that "*ubuntu* does not mean that people should not enrich themselves. The question therefore is: Are you going to do so in order to enable the community around you to be able to improve?"[113] At the core of his explanation is the relation between an individual's act and responsibility toward others, including the social environment that obviously serves others.

Halpern and Weinstein argue that "in practice, ubuntu refers to face-to-face understanding between two human beings."[114] *Ubuntu* is therefore understood as an exercise in empathy because of the perceptual shift involved. *Ubuntu* is empathetic, because of the implicit perspective switch. The phrase "I am because you are" primarily acknowledges the rights of the other to be seen as an individual who deserves as much attention and dignity as I do.[115] It essentially privileges others by making them the generative force of one's existence and meaning. The speaker does not occupy a power position between the two; he sees reality from the other person's perspective, the perspective from which his own existence is established.

From *Ubuntu* to Afropolitanism: A New Ethic of Being

In his analysis of the peaceful political transition and the promises of the TRC in South Africa, Paul Gilroy expressed the hope that the "postcolonial world in general, and South Africa in particular, will in due course generate an alternative sense of what our networked world might be and become, a new cosmopolitanism centred on the global south."[116] Part of this new cosmopolitanism includes a redefinition of African identities and relationships inherent in the concept of Afropolitanism; it is an African inflection of the concept of cosmopolitanism.

Afropolitanism has attracted the attention of important African scholars including Achille Mbembe and Simon Gikandi.[117] To emphasize the importance of open-mindedness in regard to global citizenship, I reiterate previous definitions of Afropolitanism.[118] The Afropolitan is one who, by virtue of birth or affinity, can call any place in Africa his or her own place, while at the same time remaining open to the world. According to Taiye Selasi, who is credited with coining the term: "There is at least one place on the African continent to which we tie our sense

of self: be it a nation-state (Ethiopia), a city (Ibadan), or an auntie' kitchen. Then there's the G8 city or two (or three) that we know like the backs of our hands. . . . We are Afropolitans: not citizens, but Africans of the world."[119] Selasi's conception of the Afropolitan is based on the absence of fixity to a specific location and conversely on a marked mobility between Africa and the West. While I endorse the concept of spatial mobility and the "subtle tensions in between" national, racial, and cultural belongings, it is important to note that this mobility is not limited to relations between Africa and the West. It can also be between one African city and another, or even within a given African city. But spatial mobility is only symptomatic of interior mobility. Indeed, what really counts in the Afropolitan identity is interior mobility; that is, how negotiable the Afropolitan's self-perception and relation to the world is. One does not need to have crossed geographical boundaries to be Afropolitan; one only needs to cross the psychic boundaries erected by nativism, autochthony, heritage, and other mythologies of authenticity.

Afropolitans are what they are not because they move from one city to another, but because they are capable of occupying several cultural spaces and relations from which they define who they are. Their self-definition does not seek to exclude; rather, it seeks to include. The Afropolitan is one who stakes claims to Africa and to the world, and conversely admits that others can make the same claim to Africa. The Afropolitan believes that being African is not reductive to color, heritage, or autochthony; the Afropolitan's being is expansive. Whoever has lived on the continent long enough to identify with it is African; out of this flows all other conceivable forms of relationships. In the belief that to be is to relate, they conceive their relation in the following two paradigms.

Universal Narrative: Afropolitans acknowledge that their society comprises (or should comprise) people from diverse ethnicities, and their cultures can no longer be understood in purist categories. Appiah, who by the definitions above, qualifies as an Afropolitan, also argues that cultures or identities cannot be understood in purist terms. Cultural purity, he states, "is an oxymoron. The odds are that, culturally speaking, you already live a cosmopolitan life, enriched by literature, art, and film that comes from many places, and that contains influences from many more."[120] The universal narrative is not to be understood in Enlightenment terms as an essence that applies to everyone at all times. Rather, it is the fundamental relationality of everything; it is expressed in the Igbo proverb: *Ife kwulu, ife akwudebe ya* (Where one thing stands, something else stands beside it). In this regard, universality means

that one cannot consider a particular thing to the exclusion of others because of the fundamental openness of and to reality. An idea has meaning only in relation to other ideas. So it is in human life. I am human because I relate to other humans. Others affirm me; they provide the frame within which my story has meaning.

Finding Beauty in Otherness: Afropolitanism implies a conscious effort to affirm something in others and to seek to relate to them. It is the point where we begin to encounter others. The first question Afropolitans ask in this regard is: What do I (or can I) have in common with this person? The next question is: What is beautiful or admirable in this other? The third is: What can I learn from this person? When they have answered all these questions, the issue of how they are different from that person would have taken care of itself. Differences, to the extent that they affirm the humanity of others, become merely a reference point of individuality and respect rather than a point of exclusion.[121] With the above paradigms Afropolitanism paves a way to realize empathetic cosmopolitanism.

2

Nelson Mandela and Desmond Tutu as Global Citizens

It is not an overstatement to call Nelson Mandela and Archbishop Desmond Tutu fathers of postapartheid South Africa. Their greatest contribution to South Africa lies in their establishment of credible moral narratives and frameworks for open societies. I shall discuss Mandela in the first part of this chapter; the second part engages Tutu. I take to heart Mandela's conception of cosmopolitanism as a "bounden duty"; this is where I locate his vision of South Africa.[1] The same can be said of Tutu.

Although many critical observers of South Africa expected that Mandela's economic reforms should have been targeted to benefit the dispossessed majority population, very few deny his stature as a global icon of morality in South Africa.[2] He bequeathed the country enormous moral capital. Capital is, by definition, something that is capable of yielding profit when duly activated. This implies that the economic and social benefits that many people might have believed would come with Mandela's presidency were implausible to realize. But the groundwork has been laid, and, if properly harnessed, could transform South Africa. Writing about Mandela and the idea of moral capital, John Kane discusses four main sources of moral capital: "cause, action, example, rhetoric/symbolism." In Kane's view, "the real key for Mandela's success lay in the combination of the last two."[3] Kane argues that Mandela's skillful use of the first-person plural in regard to the challenges facing the new society is a testament not only to his rhetorical mastery, but also to his belief in the reconciliation exemplified by his own life. He forgave his jailers. His rhetoric and example would be meaningless had they not aimed at a universal, ethically justifiable goal.

Mandela as a moral icon and his contributions to South Africa have to be understood as lineaments of a larger moral inquiry. Dan D. Lazea and his coauthors interpret Mandela as a cosmopolitan, and

his cosmopolitanism is moral. For these scholars, Mandela achieved this recognition by "becoming a world symbol of moral integrity and political resistance."[4] He recognized the necessity of universal values of diverse ethnicity, and overcame "powerful dichotomies opposing universal and parochial values and commitments."[5] Mandela's cosmopolitanism issued from his extraordinary ability to put himself in the position of others who did not look like him, to anticipate their thinking and feeling, and to reach out to engage. He thereby reassured them that they were taken seriously, and that their input was needed to solve the problems besetting society.

Prior to Mandela's release from prison and the subsequent efforts to establish majority democratic rule in South Africa, many commentators in South Africa and elsewhere, especially in the West, feared an unprecedented racial bloodbath in that country, especially if the black population took over the reins of government. Many observers believed that the oppressed majority would rise against their historical oppressors and demand justice commensurate to their own suffering. However, the fundamental building blocks of the peaceful revolution that instead took place were laid on universal and ancient philosophical principles firmly anchored in liberal traditions and in virtues common to Africa and the West. Specifically, Mandela was a firm adherent of the ANC's philosophy of nonracialism.[6] He was convinced that to establish a functioning society, people must be made to realize their relation to the common good; that conflict resolution begins with changing the mind-sets that sustain enmity between individuals and between diverse populations; and that he himself must employ a deliberative, rational appeal to the riches of human experience as a rallying point for reconciliation and the creation of a new society. It will not advance our understanding of Mandela's contribution to South Africa to view him as a person without failures, whether personal or political.[7] My interest, however, rests solely on his efforts to nurse his country toward a truly civil society that respects human rights and dignity. As Sabelo J. Ndlovu-Gatsheni argues, Mandela "provided an antidote to the Euro–North American–centric modernity's master morality predicated on racial profiling and hierarchization of people."[8] In another instance, Ndlovu-Gatsheni expands his interpretation of Mandela's place in the global quest to make the world a place of human thriving for all. He writes: "Mandela deployed principles of critical decolonial ethics of liberation to question and challenge the modernity/imperial/colonial/apartheid paradigm of war and racial hatred directly. Mandela's uniqueness lies in his advocacy of a paradigm of peace informed by a full commitment

to democracy and human rights, to racial harmony, to racial reconciliation, and to post-racial pluriversalism."[9]

Integral to Mandela's embracing of empathy or plural points of view, in his political shepherding of the new country, is his belief that every human possesses "mercy and generosity. No one is born hating another person because of the colour of his skin, or his background, or his religion. People must learn to hate, and if they can learn to hate, they can be taught to love."[10] This view of the human character formed an integral part of his moral persuasion and informed his relations to people; it was a logical source of his cosmopolitan attitudes. The idea that every human is a moral tabula rasa means that nothing should prevent us from being open to others, and that it is a contradiction to define these as already fixed. He further states: "Even the grimmest times in prison, when my comrades and I were pushed to our limits, I would see a glimmer of humanity in one of the guards, perhaps just for a second, but it was enough to assure me and keep me going. Man's goodness is a flame that can be hidden but never extinguished."[11] Mandela's appeal to empathy and every individual's capacity for goodness is a tactical coaxing of that goodness in every human. He was the embodiment of his visions for South Africa. Joshua Muravchik has observed that "Mandela's eloquent speech, erect carriage, and dignified bearing mark him out for the aristocrat that in fact he is."[12] Mandela was well aware that his existence had acquired a larger-than-life relevance. He was now, for better or for worse, synonymous with the fate of a nation and with a cause that must be protected because of its universal relevance; he had become an icon. But this did not mean that he saw himself as a religious or ideological messiah; rather, he understood that his actions, or lack thereof, would have implications for the basic survival of a people whose humanity had been compromised by their oppressors. Indeed, Rob Nixon contends that Mandela rejected messianic or redemptive conceptions as they pertained to him. In his speeches, he made it clear that he was not a prophet, but a humble servant of the people, and that he was not even the elected leader of the ANC. In so doing, Nixon argues, Mandela "democratized responsibility for the future and subordinated his powers to popular authority [and reminded the people that] only 'disciplined mass action,' not individual genius, could assume the task of unifying the country."[13] The democratization of responsibility is consistent with Mandela's view of a diverse South African society that recognizes the equal rights of each constituent member. Therefore, in his view the common good trumps individual desires without the suppression of individuality that characterizes totalitarian regimes.

Emphasizing Mandela's unique gesture of reconciliation, Frederik van Zyl Slabbert notes that immediately after Mandela's release from prison, he went directly to the Cape Town Parade, shook hands with de Klerk and gave an impromptu speech in which he called for reconciliation.[14] These richly rhetorical gestures had a calming effect on a nation that was nervously watching its history evolve. No one knew exactly where the nation was headed. Anything was possible. In that speech, Mandela articulated his concerns and his hopes for the nation, and he called on each segment in South Africa to work toward the establishment of a society of equals. In the same speech he used the word nonracial many times to assert his conviction that South Africa belonged to all its citizens regardless of race, religion, background, or origin.[15] To underscore his belief in the universal principle of fairness, he repeated the words he had used in his 1964 trial: "I have fought against white domination and I have fought against black domination."[16] He thus put his listeners on notice that the capacity for oppression may exist in all races. He also left no doubt as to the universal disposition of his spirit. A nonracial society is a common good that transcends the needs of any group or individual. In his analysis of the speech's effectiveness, Andrew Brough observes that Mandela was careful to avoid appealing to the emotions of his audience, especially in consideration of his potential for becoming a cult figure. He was measured in his message; he reduced his argument "to a few key points and avoided using inflammatory or inciteful language that could have sparked a mass hysteria."[17]

Betty Glad compares the recent peaceful change in the former Soviet Union with that in South Africa with specific regard to the traits of the leaders during these two transitional periods. Mikhail Gorbachev, widely considered to be an authentic social reformer, was unable to reform Soviet society because "of personal struggle for power" and "narcissistic blows" between Gorbachev and Boris Yeltsin in particular.[18] Such dissension contributed in large measure to the flawed transition to democracy that ensued. Such was not the case in the South African transition. "Nelson Mandela, by way of contrast, worked with de Klerk against disintegrative forces within South Africa. Mandela had the charisma that could have tempted him to move on his own.[19] He kept his charms in check, preferring to use them for the advancement of society in general. He chose the path of compromise, which was possible because he and de Klerk shared the same goal: the construction of a multiracial democratic society. Both "realized that South Africa was a veritable powder keg of divergent interests and could disintegrate into anarchy or civil war if leaders were not careful."[20]

The underlying virtue in the Mandela/de Klerk successes therefore lay in their ability to acknowledge that, as individuals, we are only parts of something larger. That we belong to something larger than ourselves should not be seen through the prism of ideology or religion, but rather as an aspect of a moral framework—a society's moral ontology. The compromise achieved by Mandela and de Klerk owed not only to Mandela's wisdom as a leader, but also to his embodiment of the philosophical premises of *ubuntu* and cosmopolitan imagination. It was very difficult for Mandela to convince most of his fellow ANC members that violence was self-defeating. His decision to negotiate with the enemy instead of going all out for armed struggle was met with vehement opposition from ANC radicals. I argue that his skill as a transformational leader derived from his perception of the value of reverence toward society's moral frameworks; that is, respect for society at large as revealed in his elucidation of *ubuntu*.

Empathy as a Political Tool

I now return to Mandela's references to empathy as a political strategy.[21] Empathy is not a silver bullet for solving sociopolitical problems; it does not necessarily lead people to become compassionate citizens who are ready to enter into dialogue with others. It is possible to empathize with someone without feelings of compassion for that person. Nonetheless, Nussbaum believes that empathy is an important psychological guide for compassion and social responsiveness. "It is a very important tool in the service of getting a sense of what is going on with the other person, and also of establishing concern and connection."[22]

Human beings generally withhold empathy from others because cultural and ideological narratives present these others as manifestly foreign or different. Their differences are raised to an essentialist level in which they assume moral relevance. The others are often portrayed as contemptible and therefore deserving of their misfortune.[23] Nussbaum argues that the Nazis achieved their goals of "blocking empathy" in ordinary Germans by "portraying Jews as a separate kind similar to vermin or even inanimate objects," which portrayal thereby "obstructed compassion."[24] In her view, the genius of great cultures lies in their ability to dispose human beings toward empathy; these cultures sharpen people's receptivity and their capacity to feel. In the same way, I argue that Mandela's genius lay in making the citizens of South Africa open to seeing others as worthy of being listened to, worthy of entering into

negotiations. He sought to open the portals of empathy in order to achieve the ultimate goal of creating an open society.

Jodi Halpern and Harvey M. Weinstein have pointed out that "descriptions of the dehumanization involved in violence recount how people stereotype and distance themselves from their enemies."[25] Such dehumanization is actually what racism or any other ideology that reduces human beings to abstractions ultimately achieves. As I argued in chapter 1, Western conceptions of Africa in the past four centuries were based largely on stereotypes that distanced Westerners from the people of African descent in order to exploit, enslave, or kill them and to institute their own hegemony over Africans and other peoples. The denial of commonality between different groups makes arbitrary cultural differences simplistic and devious, thus justifying the imposition of Western hegemony. Mandela's first goal was to neutralize the hegemonic effect of racial categorization and to radically recast the moral backdrop against which these ideologies function; his goal was to decolonize the South African imagination. He set out to achieve this goal in two ways. He began by using himself as an example, and he epitomized the very virtue that categorization sought to block: empathy. I have already pointed out that Mandela neutralized inflated popular images of himself as a messiah. By placing himself on the level of others, he immersed himself in the common goal of saving a society that faced disintegration. He made the argument with his body. If he could serve the common good, so could others. I have also pointed out that Mandela's conception of *ubuntu* as a virtue enables people to consider their actions in relation to society's moral frameworks. He believed that the common good, understood not in ideological terms but as that which promotes human well-being, must be given priority by every individual.

I will now review some of his speeches to examine his uses of empathy as a rallying point for South Africans of all ethnicities. One such speech was to the Interfaith Commissioning Service for the TRC. In the very first sentence, Mandela highlights the place of suffering in the experience of South Africans: "All South Africans face the challenge of coming to terms with the past in ways which will enable us to face the future as a united nation at peace with itself."[26] He concludes the first paragraph with the most important word: reconciliation. In this speech, he set forth the ground rules and the moral justifications for the TRC. Above all, it involves a mutual acknowledgment of the pain that people have endured. Commenting on this speech, Kenneth S. Zagacki and Patrick A. Boleyn-Fitzgerald state that "Mandela transformed anger or

hatred into mildness and good temper." In so doing, he began to bring about reconciliation.[27]

Mandela himself embodied his own words. Zagacki and Boleyn-Fitzgerald characterize Mandela's rhetoric as "non-angry," which is morally more attractive than angry rhetoric. Mandela's nonangry rhetoric and demeanor have great moral implications for the country; they made people believe in the process of democracy, and also prepared people to transform the experience of suffering into something that can serve the common good. His example gave victims the hope that they would be heard. Mandela therefore "cultivated in himself and in others noble dispositions or virtues such as discipline and calmness,"[28] virtues that are indispensable in a democratic process.

Mandela realized that a simple empathetic gesture, even if only symbolic, would inspire people from different racial and ethnic backgrounds to engage as human beings and no longer as objects frozen in categories. Creating such a paradigm shift will not be an easy task, but it is arguably the most important step toward affinity. People must see and feel the humanity of others and recognize their basic human rights in order to enter into dialogue with them. On April 13, 1993, Mandela addressed the nation following the assassination of Chris Hani, the controversial leader of the South African Communist Party and chief of staff of *Umkhonto we Sizwe*, the armed wing of the ANC. The assassin was Janusz Waluś, a far-right Polish immigrant. In this address Mandela said: "Tonight I am reaching out to every single South African, black and white, from the very depths of my being. A white man, full of prejudice and hate, came to our country and committed a deed so foul that our whole nation now teeters on the brink of disaster. A white woman, of Afrikaner origin, risked her life so that we may know and bring to justice, this assassin."[29] Mandela's speech appears skillfully designed to create associations with the past. "A white man, full of prejudice and hate." Most black Africans could apply these terms to former colonial masters. The identity of Hani's murderer was disturbing in many ways. First, it identified the killing as blatantly racial and thus evoked painful historical memories. It rightly shamed many white South Africans, forcing them into a moral dilemma. White South Africans were forced to condemn the immigrant whose act threatened to derail attempts to overcome past injustices. Yet, in condemning the act, they also implicitly condemned their own long history of racial violence. In the same speech, Mandela acknowledged the role of the white woman who identified the white assassin. Thus, in the same breath, he identified evil and its redress

as coming from a single source: humanity, the human condition. In stepping forward to identify a man of her own race for the good of the nation, the woman helped insure that the assassination would achieve the opposite of what the assassin had intended. Her gesture allowed the humanity of white South Africans to come into its own. Many white South Africans expressed their condolences to their black compatriots. Mandela seized the unique opportunity that the assassination had provided to prepare his fellow South Africans for his message of unity: "Now is the time for our white compatriots, from whom messages of condolences continue to pour in, to reach out with an understanding of the grievous loss to our nation, to join in the memorial services and the funeral commemorations."[30] Mandela capitalized on expressions of sympathy and condolence from whites. Their sense of loss was proof of their capacity for empathy. He therefore invited them to consider Hani's death in light of the profound collective grief that their black compatriots had endured in the past. Chris Hani's death therefore became symbolic of the black experience in South Africa. But Mandela was quick to acknowledge that the experience of suffering was shared by black and white South Africans alike. For the first time in South African history, whites and blacks mourned an individual death officially and simultaneously. Blacks and whites discovered their common humanity in their expressions of sorrow at the death of Chris Hani. Mandela therefore made the expression of a common humanity possible and simultaneously revealed the capacity for empathy. Zagacki argues that by acknowledging the right of South African blacks to mourn, and by welcoming "the sympathy of whites, Mandela discovered a basis for a primordial reconciliation between conflicted races, at least immediately after Hani's murder."[31]

As if borrowing from the Aristotelian conception of virtue, which states that a virtuous person is one who acts virtuously, Mandela appealed to his compatriots to do something: "Our decisions and actions will determine whether we use our pain, our grief and our outrage to move forward to what is the only lasting solution for our country."[32] Grief is an expression of loss; it is also an indication of one's capacity to feel the pain of the other. Mandela suggests that grief alone achieves nothing in society. If people are not moved to change the conditions that produce their suffering, then their grief is useless. This is an instance of Mandela's successful appeal to shared suffering as a political strategy. Philippe-Joseph Salazar qualifies this aspect of Mandela's job as "attempting the nation's delivery in his speech—'delivery' as labor or travail of the South African nation."[33]

In his homage to the iconic South African poet, Ingrid Jonker, Mandela also paints the same picture of the possibility of all sharing the pain of one person. Jonker, who took her own life, knew both personal suffering and the suffering of others. Her father, Dr. Abraham Jonker, a prominent MP, had divorced Ingrid's mother, leaving her penniless. "Ingrid watched her mother descend into poverty and spiral into madness until she committed suicide when Ingrid was 10."[34] Her mother's suffering instilled in her a haunting fear of rejection. Ingrid's case is typical of the consequences of patriarchal oppression. The pain and humiliation she experienced sensitized her to injustice and oppression.[35] She would draw on the wisdom gained by her experience when she saw a black baby shot in his mother's arms. It was this painful experience that gave birth to her poem "Die Kind," rendered in English as "The Child Who Was Shot Dead by Soldiers at Nyanga."[36]

Seizing this poem and its circumstances, Mandela singled out Jonker as a model for his dream of a new South Africa. In the speech "South Africans, Africans, and Citizens of the World," he states that she "became a South African, an African and a citizen of the world."[37] Mandela begins this speech with these words: "The certainties that come with age tell me that among these we shall find an Afrikaner woman who transcended a particular experience." Age and experience taught him that we become citizens of the world, as Jonker had, not by barricading ourselves against the experiences of other people, but by being fundamentally open to them. Mandela implies that being a citizen of South Africa and of the world means reaching out to the other and recognizing an aspect of oneself in this other's experience. In his remarks, Mandela therefore instantiates his idea of global citizenship in the life of another great South African whose humanity transcended the circumscriptions of race and culture. Ingrid Jonker recognized herself in the child who was shot in his mother's arms. The poem gives the impression that the child did not die; rather, he took on a new form of life to trek through all Africa "without a pass." The poem works specifically at the moment the speaker magically merges with the self of the victim. It is at the point of self-identification with that black child that Jonker became more than herself; she was able to transcend her individual self in order to connect with the other. Her phrase "without a pass" refers specifically to the South African pass law, but also to the idea of world citizenship that enables a person to travel without the stamp of nationality or other markers of identity. Jonker's humanity helped her transcend the artificial limits and boundaries that the old regime had established. Mandela identified with Jonker in the same

way that she identified with the dead child; he therefore built his rhetoric on that sense of humanity and argued that it is to Jonker and "others like her, we owe a debt to life itself. To her and others like her, we owe a commitment to the poor, the oppressed, the wretched and the despised."[38] Jonker's life teaches "that our blemishes speak of what all humanity should not do. We understand this fully that our glories point to the heights of what human genius can achieve."[39]

Mandela weaves the experiences of suffering among white compatriots into the larger narrative of suffering that the whole nation, especially the black majority, were experiencing, and in so doing he creates a credible narrative of affinity in a demonstration of political and moral wisdom. Zagacki recognizes Mandela's speeches as attempts to "transform identity-based justifications for violence rooted in the past into certain kinds of ethical and political interaction."[40] The most important stage during the transition period, according to Zagacki, was when Mandela urged South Africans to recognize "the frailty and mortality of one another."[41] The ability to see one's mortality in other people's suffering acknowledges Mandela's recognition of the role of empathy in politics. Zagacki identifies certain operative virtues and dispositions that would bring the country together; they demonstrate the shared commitment to a "fundamental dialogic act, such as empathy, understanding, and shared grief, since these acts revealed the possibility for new relationships and political community."[42] Zagacki's observation underscores the efficacy of Mandela's uses of these virtues, especially empathy.

Having prepared the ground for the connectivity between disparate groups, Mandela moved on to urge reconciliation. He kept the ghost of the violent past alive as a necessary rhetorical device that showed the listener not only that the nation had indeed moved forward, but also that it needed to complete the process of full reconciliation. Whites had been made aware of the crimes committed in their name; therefore, they could no longer claim that too much was being demanded of them. Nor could the black majority claim that justice was not being pursued, since that was exactly what Mandela sought to address through civilized means that included multiparty negotiations. In the address to the plenary session of the Multi-Party Negotiating Process, on November 17, 1993, Mandela balanced the relationship between the past and the present: "We emerge from a conflict-ridden society; a society in which color, class and ethnicity were manipulated to sow hatred and division. We emerge from a society which was structured on violence and which raised the specter of a nation in danger of never being

able to live at peace with itself."[43] Mandela acknowledged that doubt remained in the hearts of blacks and whites alike. He welcomed these fears as elements of the pain of mutual growth and assured the people that such doubts and fears were normal, but that the people had a place in the new society. Such inclusiveness instantly casts the new society as the exact opposite of the absolutist, hegemonic principles of exclusion that characterized the society that was on its way out, and that had been established on violence and essentialist stratification, one in which the oppressors never bothered to imagine themselves in the situation of those they oppressed. Quite to the contrary, the new society, Mandela urges, will be "grounded on friendship and our common humanity—a society founded on tolerance. That is the only road open to us. It is a road to a glorious future in this beautiful country of ours. Let us join hands and march into the future."[44]

Emphasizing Mandela's moral capital, Zagacki points out that "one could only create a civil society through the probity of one's example."[45] Zagacki makes the point that without a trustworthy leader, a mere call for empathy and global citizenship cannot take any society closer to understanding or reconciliation. Because of the culture of empathy that Mandela himself had established, his use of the word "we" was an invitation to individuals to consider that he was speaking to them personally, and as one of them. Those individuals also become active participants in maintaining society's moral frameworks. In order to forestall moral self-righteousness among his followers, and to emphasize the affinities between himself and the nation, Mandela carefully argued that every South African could lay claim to being a victim of violence and was therefore worthy both of empathizing and needing other people's empathy. As I have pointed out, in his address to the Interfaith Commissioning Service for the TRC, Mandela went on to place emphasis where emphasis belonged—on the victims.

Reconciliation and openness are also involved in overcoming history, not only in the sense of being informed by the past, but also by refusing to be determined by it. In South Africa, the sixteenth of December has been and is currently observed for different reasons. It had been the Day of the Vow for Afrikaners, a day of remembrance for the *Voortrekkers* who defeated a Zulu army at the Battle of Blood River. In 1961 it became the day when ANC activists began taking up arms to overthrow apartheid. It is now celebrated as the day of reconciliation. Mandela's speech on December 16, 1995, brought together the possibilities of going beyond the past in order to forge a future that would belong to everyone: "Today we no longer vow our mutual destruction

but solemnly acknowledge our interdependence as free and equal citizens of our common motherland."[46] Mandela's gesture is a symbol of the ultimate triumph over the past, or at least of the intent to rise above the encrusted categories of victor and vanquished that fanned the embers of hatred. His vision of having hitherto warring groups call South Africa their "common motherland" is the highest vision of global citizenship. If it could be realized in South Africa, it could surely be realized anywhere.

Desmond Tutu and the Moral Conditions of the Rainbow Nation

James S. Damico and Mark Baildon use the term "relational cosmopolitanism" to "signify the interconnectedness among contexts, peoples, and policies." In this context, relational cosmopolitanism simply "recognizes that our common humanity transcends borders and boundaries."[47] The term, they argue, best qualifies Desmond Tutu's approach to the other and to the world in general. Tutu was never one to shy away from engaging issues of universal humanitarian concern; his activism, taken as a whole, was characterized by a concern for how people relate to one another and to their world at large. Speaking at the UN's first global campaign to promote gay rights in July 2013, Tutu declared that he would never worship a "homophobic God" and would rather go to hell than find himself in a "homophobic heaven." He accentuated his support for gay rights by making reference to his work as an antiapartheid activist: "I am as passionate about this campaign as I ever was about apartheid. For me, it is at the same level."[48] Tutu's equating of black liberation struggles with those of the queer community roots each in a universal moral justification that asserts moral race- or group-transcendence aimed at respect for the individual regardless of background. Tutu's reference to God and heaven in regard to his advocacy for gay rights is consistent with the nonnegotiable moral condition that shapes his relation to the members of these oppressed groups and to all members of the "rainbow nation." This condition is an essence from which every other thing derives its meaning and toward which every other thing tends. It is ontological and teleological; that is, it is the source of being and the end to which all beings tend. This moral condition is the ultimate guarantor of meaning and belongingness in community. Tutu, a man of God, does not posit God as the guarantor of his activism as a pope would; God is not the source of his moral

conviction. Rather, his uses of God or heaven are best understood as metaphors for the non-negotiability of the moral conditions of the dignity and equality of all humans. My central focus in this section is to explore Tutu as an incarnation of the precept that all people, regardless of background, share the same humanity and should be accorded rights and dignity. As in the Mandela section above, I am interested in Tutu's vision of South Africa as a space of open humanity and how he embodied that vision.

Desmond Tutu is a living icon of global citizenship. His status as such can be evaluated by considering his remarks on the final report of the TRC, the founding of which possibly stands at the summit of his towering life achievements. Like Mandela, Tutu acknowledges an incontrovertible fact of South Africa's experience: the ubiquity of pain and suffering: "Our country is soaked in the blood of her children of all races and of all political persuasions."[49] He does not stop at the assertion that South African history is one of violence; he sharpens the moral focus of his introduction by particularizing that violence in individual suffering, thereby opening the discussion of what society can do to alleviate that suffering. He makes particular reference to the experience of 20,000 Afrikaner women and children who died in concentration camps during the Second Anglo-Boer War. There is also a need for reconciliation between the English and the Afrikaner communities.[50]

Tutu, in linking the recent suffering of the victims of apartheid with that experienced during the Second Anglo-Boer War (1899–1902), seems to suggest that it is not too late for the English to apologize for the deaths of women and children in concentration camps, just as it is appropriate for the perpetrators of the crimes of apartheid to apologize for the suffering they inflicted on the black population. Tutu prepares the ground for the mutual acknowledgment of the humanity of all South Africans, past and present. He urges South Africans to practice switching perspectives, to acquire a capacity for empathy, which is arguably the most effective virtue leading to reconciliation within societies.

Tutu's vision is also to be appreciated from the standpoint of the moral reconstruction of a ruined society. Reflecting on the restorative form of justice particular to South Africa, Elizabeth Kiss argues that "the task of creating a just society is one of moral reconstruction."[51] Also, on the importance of the moral edifice of a new country, Halpern and Weinstein state "that it is the interpersonal ruins, rather than ruined buildings and institutions that pose the greatest challenge for rebuilding society."[52] Tutu realized the immensity of the challenge facing perpetrators and victims alike. Victims of oppression often nurse

self-destructive responses to their suffering that morph into an intense hatred of the oppressor and the desire to exact vengeance. These feelings become self-destructive specifically when the victims remain impotent against the former oppressors. Even if the victims are able to assume political power, they may be compromised by reactionary impulses stemming from a passion for vengeance, and they may end up hurting the most vulnerable within their community. With a view toward preventing a situation where the oppressed turn into oppressors, Tutu encouraged virtues that would enhance proactive stances to the world.[53]

In her famous report on the TRC, Antjie Krog describes the farewell service for Desmond Tutu when he retired as the Anglican archbishop of Cape Town. During his sermon, Tutu identified the challenges presently facing the majority of South Africans: "In the past, we were 'against.' Against oppression, against apartheid. Our essence was against. And we were so single-minded. But the time has come to change from the 'against' mode to the 'for' mode."[54] One cannot build institutions, or a nation, from mere opposition. Nor can humanity thrive on reactionary attitudes. Morality is based on standing for something. Tutu suggests that society, especially that of the black population, needs to find something to identify with.

In the previous chapter, I stated that Tutu's ideas as expressed in the sermons of *The Rainbow People of God* are as much about entanglement (and sameness) as apartheid was about difference or apartness. Sameness, for him, results from the fact that all South Africans are members of one democratic society and must work to liberate one another. He also defines sameness in a religious sense to mean that all people—black, white, brown—are children of the same God. Some people might not feel comfortable with Tutu's religious language. I fully understand their reservations given the absolutist nature of religious beliefs. However, Tutu's religious language should not blur his uncompromisingly cosmopolitan, all-inclusive conception of society. I interpret his religious idioms in light of his uses of *ubuntu* as a virtue that urges openness without seeking to influence others toward our own dispositions or beliefs.

Tutu's conception of sameness is central to his understanding of openness to otherness. I use "sameness" to qualify Tutu's vision of South African society not in the way ideologies and hegemonies envision societies—that is, not "leveling out differences and standardizing contexts and expectations in the smallest details of our daily lives."[55] I use it against the backdrop of apartheid and other systems that thrived

on perceived essentialist differences between races. Sameness, in this sense, posits that people are entangled in the same fate as those who share the same society. Therefore, they share the same humanity.[56]

Tutu's conception of sameness is spiritual and moral rather than cultural: people are tied to one destiny as humans. For him,

> the universe has been constructed in such a way that unless we live in accordance with its moral laws we will pay the price for it. One such law is that we are bound together in what the Bible calls "the bundle of life." Our humanity is caught up in that of all others. We are human because we belong. We are made for community, for togetherness, for family, to exist in a delicate network of interdependence.[57]

Tutu had used a similar context of sameness in his explanation of *ubuntu*. He combines biblical terminology with that of traditional African worldviews to enhance his own, cosmopolitan view, which, as I have stated above, is relational. In so doing, he asserts that there is a common thread of humaneness or humanity that runs in all cultures. This thread necessarily negates claims of essentialist differences between African and Western cultures or humanities. In Tutu's philosophy, therefore, traditional African morality, embodied in *ubuntu*, and the moral premises of the Bible merge and urge the acknowledgment of oneness, which is anchored in an undeniable source: the law of nature and of the love of others. Therefore, by the grace of moral laws, we are all the same.[58]

As an Anglican archbishop, it was natural for Tutu to employ religious terminologies. Yet his ideas are not limited to or by the religious world. Nor does he expect a religious conversion from his audience. As Rosemary Nagy has observed, the religious overtones of the TRC are "in large part due to the influence of the TRC chairperson Archbishop Desmond Tutu, but the ideas of moral transformation and moral reconstruction are also central to restorative justice."[59] Nagy suggests that Tutu's perceived religious precepts function within secular spheres. He does not talk about personal salvation that is considered to result from accepting the message of Christ. Forgiveness is central to Christianity, but one does not have to be a Christian or adherent of any other religion to exercise it.

The title of his book *No Future without Forgiveness* situates forgiveness as the absolute condition for the realization of solidarity; it is at the core of the existence of a community.[60] Tutu introduces his discussion of the role of forgiveness by recounting his visit to Rwanda, which in the 1990s experienced a horrendous outbreak of genocidal

massacres.[61] Tutu thus directs our attention toward the graphic consequences of the failure of forgiveness. This is consistent with his warning to South African blacks to reject resentment by identifying what they stand for, rather than being identified only by what they are against.[62] Without forgiveness, the struggle for justice would mutate into abstract forms of ideology. Forgiveness prepares the forgiving party to stand for something. Without forgiveness, a party remains bound to what it is against and therefore blocks itself from the generative potentiality that the future may offer. Those who refuse to forgive, Tutu suggests, are trapped in the past, and therefore refuse to be, or are unable to be, open to newness and to otherness. To forgive is to prepare oneself for what Tutu characterizes as a universal *ubuntu*, the fundamental relationality of all living things: "we are bound together by bonds of a caring humanity, a universal sense of *Ubuntu*; [as] when victorious powers set up a Marshall Plan to help in the reconstruction of their devastated former adversaries."[63] Tutu is clear that "forgiveness is not being sentimental."[64] It is an active force that issues from the injured person, for whom personal and communal healing is vital. Forgiveness demonstrates that those who forgive have realized that reality is not merely about themselves as individuals. Though they deserve the right not to forgive, their forgiveness contributes to the common good and to the healing of all. Healing restores humanity to both the injured and the injurer. It is the essential aspect of restorative justice.[65]

There are many questions regarding whether or not restorative justice is truly just. It is not the task of my inquiry here to address this issue. My interest is in Tutu's goal of weaving transcultural affinities that begin when the injured person is able to forgive and when the perpetrator of evil is ready to accept his or her culpability. The act of forgiveness and that of admission of guilt bind the two parties to the fate of the community. Affinity finds its justification in this shared fate. But what if perpetrators of evil do not admit their crimes? What if the victims want to forgive, but "don't know whom to forgive"?[66]

Tutu argues that even if the perpetrators of evil do not admit their crimes, it is still in the interest of victims to forgive: "Victim families have every right initially to the normal, valid, human response of rage, but those persons who retain a vindictive mind-set ultimately give the offender another victim. Embittered, tormented, enslaved by the past, their quality of life is diminished."[67] In the end, forgiveness is realized in, and activated by, those who forgive. Forgiveness exists in the relation between those individuals and society at large. Embittered individuals are a danger to society. Forgiveness frees injured individuals from

bitterness, and in so doing, equally disposes them toward openness, enabling them to become active participants in a rainbow society.

In a speech on September 13, 1989, at one of the largest protest marches against apartheid in Cape Town, Tutu formulated the concept that South Africans, in their many colors, are the "rainbow people of God." He addressed F. W. de Klerk directly, urging him to come and see the many faces of the protest marchers: "This country is a rainbow country. This country is Technicolor. You can come and see the new South Africa!"[68] Further on, he accused the apartheid regime of having made the whole people "one color: purple. We say we are the rainbow people! We are the new people of the new South Africa!"[69] Tutu's joy at the many colors of the South African people is a manifestation of his attitude toward diversity, his understanding of South Africa as constitutive of different peoples making a common community. His joy at this constellation is rooted in his belief in people's openness to otherness and their expression of solidarity with strangers. He is thus a strong proponent of global citizenship.

Rainbows exist intangibly in the sight and minds of the observer and only from certain angles. When Tutu describes South Africa as a rainbow nation, is he calling for the people to readjust their perspectives in order to see the different colorations of reality? Or is he referring to a change of attitude toward the country? Most people who observe a rainbow react with delight; they marvel at the wonders of creation, yet what they observe has only a subjective existence. Neither do virtues have objective existence; they exist in virtuous persons.

Another characteristic of the rainbow is that all the colors stem from one source: the light of the sun, which shines on all. In making reference to the rainbow, which issues from a source that does not exclude people based on difference, Tutu espouses a philosophy characterized by openness and inclusiveness. Michael Battle notes that Tutu espoused "a utopian community" rooted in the idea that God is not racial;[70] God has space for all—God, who says through Jesus Christ: *in my Father's house there are many rooms.* This community, as Tutu has declared, is a Technicolor community.

Conclusion: No Future without Openness

In his biography, *Long Walk to Freedom*, Mandela aptly captures his transformation into a global citizen and his dream for South Africa: "It was during those long and lonely years that my hunger for the freedom

of my people became a hunger for the freedom of all people, white and black."[71] His transformation can also be seen as an extension of his empathetic imagination. He realized that freedom and human flourishing, which he deeply longed for, are the very things that unite him with others; they are therefore common nodal points of cosmopolitanism. He states, "I am not truly free if I am taking away someone else's freedom. Just as surely as I am not free when my freedom is taken from me. The oppressed and the oppressor alike are robbed of their humanity."[72] For Mandela, cosmopolitanism that binds people to a common fate in South Africa is not a choice; it is a necessity.

Empathy and forgiveness, as Mandela and Tutu have shown, must be seen not as signs of weakness, but as the courage and strength to affirm our existence as inextricably linked with the existence of others. These qualities are also powerful political skills that those interested in nation-building must possess. The successes of the TRC have only set the stage for a more encompassing and far-reaching deliberation on how South Africans can live together. Empathy or superior moral consciousness does not immediately or necessarily translate into specific policies that would right the wrongs of the past or benefit everyone in society; it can, however, establish a basis for such policies. Herein lies, for me, the superiority of Mandela's and Tutu's moral choices and their transcultural concerns. To think of them in relation to their strengths and weaknesses as individuals, and their visions for their society and the world, is to think of them as global citizens. They are citizens of South Africa, Africa, and the world.

3

The Violence of History and the Angel of Forgiveness

One of the challenges facing postapartheid South Africa is how to build a society that does not replicate the moral ills of the apartheid regime and has as its foundation principles of fairness and inclusion. I argued in chapter 2 that Nelson Mandela and Desmond Tutu took steps in that direction by steering their society toward the named universal principles. Their insistence on forgiveness does not imply a glossing of the injustices of the past. Nor does it mean abandoning the quest for fairness. Rather, their efforts are some of the preliminary, albeit most defining, steps in establishing a truly democratic society.

To those skeptical of Africa's ability to democratize, President Jacob Zuma's and even some of President Thabo Mbeki's missteps might be taken as symptomatic of widespread political dysfunction on the continent. To sympathetic students of African history, however, these missteps could be seen as nothing more than hiccups in the country's long journey toward a better society. Of greater importance, in my thinking, is how South African intellectuals conceive of their society and how they relate to history. I give special attention to the intellectuals of the majority black population because of their being in position to influence others not only through the force of their arguments, but also through their affective proximity to the majority. How do these black intellectuals imagine the future of their society, especially within the social and moral contexts of forgiveness and reconciliation? How do they interpret the oppression of the past and the wounds they have experienced? Do they position themselves as having been purified and necessarily made good by the grace of having been victims? This chapter examines the cosmopolitan visions of two of the most prominent postapartheid black South African intellectuals, Njabulo Ndebele and Zakes Mda. I argue that while, like many others, they keep memories

of the past alive, they warn against the adoption of a moral rectitude that might arise from the feeling of hurt. Instead, they enhance the moral visions of Mandela and Tutu and encourage society to draw lessons from the oppression of the past to create a more equitable and fair society for all. They specifically urge acceptance of the fact that South Africans are historically, culturally, and racially entangled and therefore share the same fate. The term "colored," which had a negative connotation during the apartheid era, has become, in postapartheid taxonomy, a signifier of the interrelatedness of peoples and cultures. I proceed by first discussing Ndebele's philosophical thoughts on the possibility of a new, cosmopolitan South Africa; I analyze his mythopoeic work *The Cry of Winnie Mandela.* I then discuss Mda's two novels, *Ways of Dying* and *The Madonna of Excelsior.*

Njabulo Ndebele and the Search for Common Values in South Africa

In 1986 Ndebele gave a lecture on the state of South African literature during apartheid. The lecture was visionary in the sense that it pointed to a future that looked beyond resistance to apartheid. Four years after the lecture, apartheid began to crumble, particularly with the release of Nelson Mandela from jail. Ndebele doubted the effectiveness of "protest literature" to address the human condition because of its inability to engage history and its obsession with appealing to the conscience of oppressors.[1] To Ndebele, everything in the machinery of apartheid is spectacular: the "mass shootings and killings; mass economic exploitation . . . ; the mass removals of people; the spate of draconian laws passed with the spectacle of parliamentary promulgations."[2] The spectacular thrives in the realm of the abstract, in ideology. The nature of the spectacular is to ignore the particular. Thus, the literature that responded to the spectacular reciprocated its ills and became equally spectacular, especially in its intent to indict. Ndebele describes that particular literature as "demonstrative, preferring exteriority to interiority; it keeps the larger issues of society in our minds, obliterating the details; . . . it calls for emotion rather than conviction; it establishes a vast sense of presence without offering intimate knowledge. . . . It is the literature of the powerless identifying the key factor responsible for their powerlessness."[3] Ndebele's 1986 notions of the spectacular and the ordinary in South African culture seem more pertinent now than ever. Pumla Dineo Gqola has deployed Ndebele's notion of the spectacular

in her reading of the postapartheid performance of masculinity. She uses the term "masculinist spectacle" to characterize "the hypervisible, and self-authorizing performance of patriarchal masculinity in public spaces, where such performance hints at masculine violence or a contest between forms of manhood."[4] She critiques Jacob Zuma's behavior during his 2006 rape trial, behavior that sadly prefigured Zuma's dysfunctional government. Zuma's government seems to be a natural result of his abstract thinking already displayed in his treatment of his rape case, for he did not see the victim of his rape as an individual, but rather as a member of a group that is governed by his abstract ideology. If the spectacular thrives on the abstract, the function of the particular is to reverse its effects. Ndebele called on apartheid-era black writers to concentrate on the particular; the ordinary in this regard also applies to postapartheid social actors. As he argues,

> the ordinary day-to-day lives of people should be the direct focus of political interest because they constitute the very content of the struggle, for the struggle involves people not abstractions. If it is a new society we seek to bring about in South Africa, then that newness will be based on a direct concern with the way people actually live. That means a range of complex ethical issues involving man-man, man-woman, woman-woman, man-nature, man-society relationships.[5]

Given the urgency of the visions articulated in his 1986 lecture, Ndebele could be said to have predicted the tasks of postapartheid intellectuals in regard to interpersonal relationships. He understands that true decolonization means toppling the colonialist frame of mind and turning attention to the humanity of all. He is concerned with the moral topography of a country in which peoples from different races and ethnicities have become entangled in such a way that their disentanglement borders on self-destruction. The spectacular seeks to destroy the ethical—that is, the man-man, man-woman, woman-woman, human-nature, and human-society relationships. In his lecture titled "South Africans in Search of Common Values," which builds on the ethical premises of the aforementioned lecture, Ndebele observes that South Africans do not yet have a common set of values as a people. Since the end of the political struggles against apartheid in 1994, South Africans have lacked a central defining idea or "a national consciousness" around which most of them can rally.[6] We can also understand Ndebele's reference to national consciousness in regard to relationships between people from diverse ethnic and racial backgrounds. Ndebele does not deny the moral framework established by the TRC; indeed, his

essay works within its assumptions, but he goes beyond it and seeks to couch the national consciousness in its premise. Thus the question is how leaders (political, religious, and intellectual) can bring about the development of the much needed social and national consciousness.

At first glance, it seems obvious that a people who have emerged from centuries of oppression will have nothing in common. Indeed, one might be making a mistake in expecting a unifying national consciousness or identity from a country that is still reeling from the traumatic consequences of centuries of violence and oppression. One of the goals of the TRC is to create a national consciousness that is understood as an extension of a moral framework. As Sarah Nuttall has argued, South African blacks and whites are entangled in the reality of history. The present generation of South Africans of all ethnicities must take up the urgent task of fruitfully harnessing the reality of history in view of creating a national consciousness that is uniquely South African and at the same time globally oriented in its moral reach.

This new South African moral topography will seek to answer the question of what it means to be South African. How do South Africans relate to history either as direct witnesses or as a people living in its shadows? How can I fruitfully negotiate between myself and the other? In light of these questions and the new moral foundation that they imply, Ndebele sees the new dispensation—especially the Mandela government—more positively. He praises it for having achieved a great deal within a short time. These achievements began with the creation of an inclusive definition of citizenship and now, on a practical, day-to-day level, involve providing millions of South Africans with water, electricity, telephone, education, and jobs. For him, Mandela's successful government "had the real potential to send centuries of racial stereotypes tumbling down dramatically and irrevocably."[7] Ndebele is particularly optimistic about the promise of the TRC, which, in his judgment, has not only allowed the nation to acknowledge the terrible aspects of the past, but has also encouraged people to ponder the relationship between that past and the future. In short, people can now imagine the future with the help of the past. To demonstrate the ways in which the TRC can help South Africans imagine the future, Ndebele highlights one of the values of the TRC: "Where in the past the state attempted to compel the oppressed to deny the testimony of their own experience, today that experience is one of the essential conditions for the emergence of a new national consciousness."[8]

In regard to the moral appreciation of the present, another value of the TRC is, as Ndebele states, "the verbalisation of pain and suffering

through an official medium recognised as a result of change that was fought for, and the enforced revelation of the deeds of perpetrators."[9] Ndebele characterizes this voicing of pain as the "raising of social temperature," and it is to be understood as an open indictment of the apartheid government and everything it stood for in the history of the oppression of the black population. That said, it is not an indictment in the sense that the victims luxuriate in a feeling of moral excellence; rather, it is a factual reckoning with the past as a necessary part of addressing the present. The fact that the National Party, which had hitherto wielded power unchallenged, silently admitted to its moral deficiency has meant not only a subtle shift in power dynamics but also a change in the country's centuries-old moral narrative. The accuser is now the accused. But the TRC accusation is not informed by an ideology that would have exacted a price in the form of retributive justice. On the contrary, what follows the accusation is a dramatic negation of the Western model of justice, or the Euro-essentialist mind-set. Rather, it is forgiveness, which is not an empty gesture. It is, as Ndebele states, a lowering of the temperature that had been raised by the verbalization of pain or by open accusation. For him, the lowering of the temperature "should translate into visible measures for improving the lives of the victims of the past, who even while they are still in a state of severe disadvantage, ought no longer to experience themselves as victims."[10] Forgiveness also means that the forgiving party is not interested in denying the perpetrators their rights and privileges; the forgiving party would, in the spirit of common humanity, want to extend the same benefit of fairness to all citizens. I take to heart Ndebele's notion that, within the moral parameters of the TRC, the victims of years of apartheid violence ought no longer to see themselves exclusively as victims. This, of course, does not imply the denial of legacies of oppression and exploitation; rather, it means that the former victims are now in the position, given their moral capital, to proactively construct their world in ways that are ethically superior to apartheid. One of the places to start is with the construction of a new, all-inclusive South African identity.

In Nuttall's concept of entanglement, South Africans are knotted with one another in many ways. The central idea is that the concept of racial or cultural purity is an oxymoron. No South African is exclusively X or Y; people are always X *and* Y, or X in one situation and Y in another. In respect to this constellation, Ndebele argues that in South Africa "identities seem to shift constantly depending on the classification of participants involved in any particular situation. They can fall

into any of the categories of race, ethnicity, class, political affiliation, geographical location, gender, generation and numerous others. There is a constant ebb and flow of shifting identities in South African history which constantly subvert any tendency towards simplification."[11] Ndebele's proposition of relational rather than oppositional identity configuration suggests that in South Africa, every person is linked to every other person because people stand in concentric circles that overlap other circles. This mirrors Ben-Gurion's explanation of Israeli society. The rejection of easy identity categorization and the admission of relational identity construction has obvious moral implications; it counters the simplistic identity construction of the apartheid ideology while running parallel to solidarity and empathy. We empathize more easily with those with whom we identify.[12]

In *The Cry of Winnie Mandela*, Ndebele examines the complicity of black South Africans in apartheid crimes of the past. That complicity, too, is part of the conception of self. A balanced notion of postapartheid society must repudiate binary moral judgments; that is, the notion that only whites are guilty of apartheid violence, while only blacks are victims. To be sure, the majority black population and other members of minority ethnicities were almost exclusively targeted for exploitation and disenfranchisement under apartheid crime. That, however, does not imply the moral excellence of black people.

Victimhood and Claims of Moral Rectitude

According to Jeffrey Murray, *The Cry of Winnie Mandela* is a "hybrid form—part novel, myth, essay, and biography [that] matches the complexities of its subject matter."[13] It is a mixed-genre text and a political commentary, a blend of fiction and historical facts. Yet it is not historical fiction. It is a narrative of four women who wait for their men who have been taken away by the apartheid police. Their stories resonate with the story of the most famous woman in South Africa, Winnie Mandela. Focusing mainly on Winnie, I will approach the text as a philosophical meditation on the moral foundations of the postapartheid society. If I attribute some of the expressions or statements to Ndebele rather than to the characters who made them, I do so not to ignore the conventions of literary analysis, but because I consider the text as a philosophical essay. I argue that Ndebele takes a moral stance on the violent crimes of the apartheid era in general and those committed by blacks in particular.

Winnie Mandela is a respected figure in South African history. Her role in the liberation of the black population and the pain she consequently endured cannot be overestimated. Though the suffering of each of the women in the narrative cannot be underrated, hers symbolizes the suffering of the nation. She spent 491 days in solitary confinement, where she is said to have been tortured. Through her suffering, she symbolized the experience of millions of victims of forced removal, detention, and other forms of apartheid violence. Yet Winnie's dedication to the liberation of her people was costly. Willingly or not, she became as violent as the regime she was seeking to overthrow. According to her biography on Biography.com, she endorsed "deadly retaliation against black citizens who collaborated with the apartheid regime," and she is said to have had bodyguards called the Mandela United Football Club, essentially a collection of thugs known for their brutality. Her biography continues: "In 1989, a 14-year-old boy named Stompie Moeketsi was abducted by the club and later killed."[14] One of the four women in the narrative brings all the accusations against Winnie to the fore:

> So much ugliness was ascribed to you: kidnapping children; gruesome beatings and torture of children; disappearances and deaths; assassinations, defamations and denunciations; intimidation and terror. All ennobled in your mind by one justification: the "country that you love," the "millions of my people," all in the name of your husband. That is how, in his absence, you kept him close to you, even though . . . you may have crossed the line, and begun to wish for his perpetual absence.[15]

Ndebele alerts us to the fact that oppressors often co-opt the oppressed into their ideology. Thus, as the woman narrates, Winnie began to ignore the pain of individuals because of her obsession with the cause. Her love of the abstract even made her begin to wish for the perpetual absence of the man in whose name she fought. In her mind, therefore, she had become the cause. In her own narrative, Winnie admits that she tainted herself with violence.[16] She learned how to violate others from white people who were obsessed with order, one of "the central features of whiteness."[17] She was taught by the Boer policemen, "children of Major Theunis Swanepoel, the master torturer."[18] They tortured by bringing chaos into a person's life through pain, and, having disorganized the person's life, they left the person wanting for order. Winnie explains, "You are deprived of order in order to desire it even more. Yes. The insidious workings of ideology, when it attaches itself to the way you meet your daily personal needs, and transforms itself into a natural law."[19]

For Louis Althusser, a significant characteristic of ideology is that it functions as an omnihistorical reality in the sense that its structure and functioning are immutable, present in the same form throughout history. Ideology is nonhistorical because it is an imaginary creation whose exact origin cannot be located—for there is none—and therein lies its hold on people's imagination. As an ungraspable reality or an ideal, it serves the group as a means of honoring and controlling the individual. Ideology succeeds in welcoming individuals as subjects in what Althusser calls interpellation.[20] Frantz Fanon has argued in *Black Skin, White Masks* that racism co-opts blacks in its ideology through the mechanism of internalization.[21] It is therefore of little surprise that Winnie wonders why she became attached to Major Swanepoel, why she became his "daughter."[22] When Major Swanepoel was tired of torturing her, she carried inside her like "pregnancy, the terrible weight of loneliness and the embers of rage."[23] Winnie internalized not only rage but also a degree of moral certainty that came from her wound.

The overarching argument of the narratives in *The Cry of Winnie Mandela* becomes more evident when we understand Winnie's explanation of her transformation into a torturer. Her error was falling into the trap of abstractions. She reified resistance and distorted the liberation of her people into an ideology that notoriously totalizes reality and subsumes the individual. She mistook resisting evil as resisting those who did not agree with her. Because she identified so much with resistance to oppression as an ideology, mistakenly conflating herself with the cause, she formed an army of blind followers who became her own children just as the brutal apartheid police became the children of their leader. They would follow her "through kidnappings, AK-47s, torture that [she] learned so well from Major Theunis Swanepoel,"[24] seeking to create order where none existed. She therefore became tainted. It is true that her evil deeds pale in comparison to those of the apartheid state, but they are evil nonetheless. They lack moral concerns and harbor the kind of mind-set that militates against the building of sustainable community. Ndebele's concern is that the reification of protest eventually ends up mimicking the spectacular. This is reflected in the fact that, ultimately, Winnie becomes a metaphor for black people's dalliance with absolutism.

The consequence of Winnie's turn to violence against her own people was still felt much later, after the demise of apartheid. A "jackroller" phenomenon sprang up from the remnants of the vigilante squad she had formed: "These were groups of boys who abducted girls and raped them in a collective, making rape such a pervasive social phenomenon

today, even babies are raped. The jackrollers graduated into carjackers, who kill without a thought. . . . Former freedom fighters regroup as cash-in-transit robbers."[25] Winnie, it turns out, became the South African Frankenstein whose creation haunted the violent postapartheid landscape. Ndebele subtly refers to the fact that many South Africans are still in a mode of protest and put themselves in harm's way by defying the white man long after he exited the seat of sociopolitical power. In Ndebele's thinking, therefore, the major challenge of the new dispensation is surviving the violent legacies of both apartheid oppression and resistance to it. He sees the TRC as taking a necessary first step in that direction. For him, the TRC "was really not about truth, but about the revelation of deliberately hidden facts so this revelation might lead to new interpretations of our social realities and new knowledge in the public domain. It was about enriching ethical consciousness in that public domain."[26] I consider it essential for the self-perception of the new society that Ndebele reads the TRC within ethical paradigms. The TRC is about creating a new moral topography. The public ritual of expiation functions to calm the raging spirit of vengeance. The TRC ritual can undoubtedly be seen as a biblical sacrificial goat (the *pharmakos*) that is chased into the wild or killed in the glare of the public. The sacrificial goat is designed to carry public and private grievances away from the community. Having consigned the *pharmakos* to the desert, the community can begin to rebuild, and the rebuilding of communities is fundamental to sustaining nationhood. Those who do not take an active part in the ritual of expiation are left out of the grace that comes with it. In this context, we can also understand forgiveness as a releasing of self from the urge to exact vengeance for the crimes of the past.

Zakes Mda: The Difficult Task of Building Community

Zakes Mda's *Ways of Dying* captures the dilemma and hopes of postcolonial, postapartheid South Africa. Set in the violent transition years in South African politics, it represents the indeterminate gray of dawn or dusk. It is a book of grief but also of hope, a book of hatred but also of love. Above all, it is a book that catalogs various forms of sacrifice made by individual South Africans and their communities. Though told in the third-person plural—the "we" perspective—it is generally a story of one individual, Toloki, who takes a job as a "Professional Mourner" in a city steeped in violence. He attends funerals in the townships, well

dressed and crying for the victims of the city's violence. He eventually reunites with the flame of his youth, Noria, whose affections his own father had stolen. Toloki and Noria bear scars from the violence in their lives, but they turn to each other in gestures of care, consolation, and redemption that are richly symbolic.

Ways of Dying raises the questions implicit in *The Cry of Winnie Mandela*. Like Ndebele, Mda seeks to defuse any feeling of moral righteousness in the black majority, and he does this in hopes of drawing attention to the task of building community. The narrative arc begins with an announcement—"there are many ways of dying"—and ends with a paragraph informing us that this time, at least, the smell of burning rubber that fills the air is not mingled with the sickly stench of roasting human flesh.[27] This "pedagogical" structure indicates Mda's moral and political vision of history: there is hope, but it is hope born of pain. The deep experience of pain accompanied by forgiveness will aid the people in making a leap of empathy, without which society cannot overcome its violent past. Toloki demonstrates the reach of empathy by identifying with the victims of history and mourning their deaths. Though he has his own experience of pain, he elects not to make it central in his life, but instead chooses to identify with other people's pain through acts of mourning. His mourning is liberating in that it sets him free from the effects of bitterness and rancor.

In *A Story of South Africa*, Susan VanZanten Gallagher depicts the horrendous violence that marked the dying years of apartheid. In 1985–86 the government instituted new measures that became known as "the war against children." Thousands of children became political detainees and were held without charge for offenses ranging from school boycotts to protests against the government. According to Gallagher, the New York–based Lawyers' Committee for Human Rights issued *The War against Children: South Africa's Youngest Victims*, a report detailing cases of violence that the apartheid regime committed against black children. This report "chronicles dozens of individual cases in which children were killed or tortured by security forces. . . . According to the government's statistics, the South African police killed at least 201 children during 1985 and 92 children during 1986."[28] Of course, the violence did not stop with the official declaration of the end of apartheid. In fact, it increased during the negotiations for a peaceful transition that began in 1990. In his essay "The Violence-Negotiation Nexus," Timothy D. Sisk shows that "just as the negotiation process began, violence in the poverty-stricken townships and destitute rural areas—home to South Africa's disenfranchised and disadvantaged majority black

population—soared."[29] Whereas the rate of violence had ranged from 500 to 1,250 deaths in the 1980s, the 1990s saw it reach 2,250 to 3,750 deaths, including cases of inter- and intraracial and tribal violence, most of which were political. Though political violence was deeply rooted in the widespread confusion of politics during the transition, "ethnic mobilization," which contributed to that violence, became "an expression of much deeper insecurity."[30] The members of different ethnic groups resorted to violence to avert the greater calamity they feared would befall them. One such act was the assassination of Chris Hani, which became metonymic of the suffering of most of the black population. Given that he was killed by a Polish immigrant whose intent was to disrupt the peaceful transition and thereby preserve white minority rule, many commentators feared that the incident would generate a bloodbath across the nation.

Hani's death was not only the culmination of seething violence; it was also sacrificial. As Kenneth Zagacki explains, Mandela and the rest of the country hoped that the assassination, which entailed remembering the past, would "clear the way for better relations and political change in the future."[31] In this sense, Hani's death would function as a surrogate to avert greater calamity, with the surrogate role conferring on it a redemptive quality. Were Chris Hani to have died in a motor accident, his death would not have galvanized the nation, but because he died as a representative of a group and a cause, commemoration of his death attained the status of a ritual.

René Girard holds that the loss of hierarchy and distinction gives birth to "fierce rivalries and sets members of the same family or social group at one another's throats."[32] He argues that quelling an impulse to violence is often more difficult than rousing it. But "once aroused the urge to violence triggers certain physical changes that prepare men's bodies for battle";[33] it necessarily seeks an outlet, a "surrogate victim" when the original cause of the violence is not accessible. A society immersed in violence could thus be facing its own demise. To survive, that society must undertake something to "stem this rising tide of indiscriminate substitutions and redirect violence into 'proper' channels."[34] The exercise might appear irrational, but it has its own logic. The emphasis here is on diversion or displacement of violence that has been aroused. The displacement or substitution usually fulfills a sacred function; it averts greater violence and initiates redemption. According to Girard, "society is seeking to deflect upon a relatively indifferent victim, a 'sacrificeable' victim, the violence that would otherwise be vented on its members, the people it most desires to protect."[35]

Within this context of surrogacy or deflection of greater violence, we can understand Toloki as a professional mourner.

Ways of Dying begins with the death of a five-year-old child that shakes the foundation of the black community. What is particularly disturbing is that the death is neither accidental nor caused by the community's traditional enemies—the whites. This is a black-on-black crime. The nurse presiding over the child's burial tells the group gathered there: "The little brother was our own child, and his death is more painful because it is of our own creation."[36] Perhaps the group that killed the five-year-old does not know it was engaged in a diversionary ritual. Indeed, the shock that ripples through the community after the boy's death can be attributed to the cathartic effect of that act of violence, and therefore to its redemptive qualities. With that death, the community finally comes to its senses and indicates its readiness to embrace life; it realizes that these killings have gone too far and are destroying the core of the community's future—its children. This communal realization is the justification for the first-person plural voice in which the community speaks. This narrative approach implies that whatever has prompted a united response to reality must have life-or-death consequences. It is therefore imperative that the community do something to stop the impending apocalypse. The first step toward healing and the prevention of disaster is the search for truth, the only thing that can set one free, and the search for truth coincides with the emergence of Toloki. In his role as a public mourner, he becomes a bearer of truth. His public performance of mourning inscribes the pain of death on the public psyche. The "we" narration is consistent with the notion that truth is not an individual affair. It is, as Martin Heidegger demonstrates in his interpretation of the Greek word for truth, *aletheia*, a revealing, a disclosure, total openness. Truth, Heidegger argues, is not *adequacio intellectus ad rem*, not the attribution of correct propositions to an object by a human subject and then a declaration of them as true; rather, "truth is disclosure of being through which an openness essentially unfolds."[37] This spirit of total openness is reflected in a gesture toward global citizenship when the community-narrator in *Ways of Dying* indicates that the Nurse who addresses the mourners at the boy's funeral is describing the incident the way he saw it: "Like all good Nurses, he is going to be faithful to the facts."[38] Nurses are agents who help the sick to recover or babies to thrive. Their job is to nourish. Toloki listens to this Nurse, taking in all the Nurse's words.[39] At this point, Toloki is the receptor of the truth that the Nurse brings to light. It is important to note that the Nurse is not a public accuser of white people; that is, one

who seeks to establish that the terror in the land was instigated by white people. On the contrary, the Nurse points to the suffering that blacks cause one another. In this way, the Nurse seeks to nip the temptation of self-righteousness in the bud.

By telling the truth, the Nurse will eventually nurture the community back to health. In that capacity, his character functions as an allusion to South Africa's readiness to confront the crimes of the past or, more specifically, to the South African TRC that found human rights abuses on both sides. The community acknowledges that there is no need to pretend that they do not know "everything about everybody." The community, or the eternal spirit of the "we," knows and sees everything. That spirit makes use of narrative, which creates identities and shapes existence. The "we" spirit even boasts about its control of that medium: "The community is the owner of the story, and it can tell it the way it deems it fit."[40] For now, though, it has chosen the path of *aletheia*, of openness. It is difficult to image a genuine healing without openness, without truth.

Regardless of who tells the story, the "I" or the "we," stories are always about individuals in a given community. The "we" narrator is aware of this, and that is why the narrative focuses on two characters who represent the whole community and embody forces that must be reconciled for the community to experience redemption. The characters, Toloki and Noria, also stand for the forces of death and life, ugliness and beauty, victimizer and victim. But the narrative is specifically about Toloki, the archetype of the wretched of the earth. Now that Toloki has been initiated and literally nursed in the truth of the society's condition, the "we" narrator takes him through the violent landscape of South Africa. In his life and position as a professional mourner, he reveals everything that has gone wrong in South Africa. He has reasons to mourn. His community considers him ugly; however, it acknowledges his talent. He is a good painter. He loves to paint flowers and mountains and huts, but he does not paint humans.[41] It is logical that since people avoid him, he will not paint their portraits. This mutual repulsion can be interpreted as a metaphor for the particularly violent conditions that have arisen from the hatred and spite brooding in South Africa for centuries. In short, Toloki represents the victims of apartheid.

Violence begins early in Toloki's life, in the place he is supposed to feel at home. His father, Jwara, rejects him from the outset. He abuses Toloki verbally while at the same time being fatherly and loving to Noria, a girl Toloki's age, one in whose hands he is like clay and for

whom he buys gifts such as chocolates and sweets. Naturally such treatment arouses spite in Toloki, who calls Noria a "stuck-up bitch."[42] In calling Noria this, Toloki is only expressing his natural disdain for his father's unfair relation to her. In this situation, we see opposing forces at work: ugliness and beauty, oppressed and oppressor. These forces must be reconciled in the manner of the TRC. Noria embodies the image of the oppressor, but she may not be aware of the havoc she creates in Toloki's life, for she is not overly antagonistic toward him. Jwara is the source of Toloki's anguish, but Noria is aware of Jwara's positive attitude to her. She sings for him and thereby inspires him to create. In Noria, therefore, we see a complex melding of the forces of creation and destruction. But as far as Toloki is concerned, she is a manipulator. She is the recipient of the love that, by right, should be his. His life is damaged from the cradle onward, marred by abuse and denial of love. It is thus no surprise that he embraces death, if only figuratively. He knows the pain of rejection and has gained some wisdom from it. He has acquired the ability and the willingness to put himself in the position of those who suffer. From this wealth of empathy, he chooses to embrace the pain of community by mourning every death he can. He embodies his violence-ridden community and demonstrates cofeeling by calling attention to the pain of loss. Notably, his anger and frustration are not directed at any particular human. He does not seek to inflict pain on any person. Rather, his frustration is directed at the ultimate sign of pain: death. He seems to have forgiven his father and all those who inflicted pain on him, and his forgiveness frees him to focus on the causes of his society's downfall. Toloki is an embodiment of the values of forgiveness.

We can also understand Toloki's profession with the help of religiocultural tropes, if only because the novel makes use of Christian tropes such as the Immaculate Conception through the death of Vutha, Noria's child. Melissa Tandiwe Myambo remarks that the novel ends on New Year's Eve, just a week after Toloki's reunion with Noria at Vutha's funeral on Christmas Day. Myambo asks, "Was Vutha, finally, the Christ-like martyr sacrificed for the well-being of the nation so that we learn the lessons of tolerance, cultural unity and true democracy?"[43] I share Myambo's reading. Vutha can certainly be seen as a sacrificial object that, in the words of René Girard, acts as a surrogate to ward off further violence. Toloki is also a surrogate, even more so because he sees himself as having a special calling and standing for the benefit of his community. He understands himself as being in the service of a greater force—the spirit of the community—and his mission is to be at the

place where the community's sadness converges. He therefore chooses to die many deaths by taking a symbolic journey with the dead.

To accentuate his mission, Toloki tells Noria: "I mourn for the dead. I cannot stop mourning, Noria. Death comes every day. Death becomes me, it is a part of me."[44] He identifies himself with death, surely not as a negative force, but in a figurative way that signals his sacrifice for the community. In this respect, his position as a professional mourner is symbolic; it is a sign of finitude and of the absurdity of violence. Above all, he carries the anger and pain of the people, and in so doing, he shows them how to deal with these feelings. Whoever has been hurt must feel with others in similar situation. One way to share the experience of the dead is to sit on the mound of a grave; in so doing, Toloki is ritually buried with the dead, sacrificing his pleasures and his dignity in his role as a professional mourner. This is reflected in his daily life as he becomes the community's laughing stock: "Dirty children follow him. They dance in their tattered clothes and spontaneously compose a song about him, which they sing with derisive gusto."[45] But he knows he is on a sacred mission; he is a sacrificial object, who, as the community's mourner, becomes a conduit for its sorrows, sins, and iniquities. He is the community's scapegoat.

In his role as one who redirects people's anger, Toloki dramatizes sorrow to provoke a chain of expiatory mimesis; he wants others to imitate his sympathetic gestures. As René Girard argues, violence cannot be denied, but it can be "diverted to another object, something it can sink its teeth into," and "the purpose of the sacrifice is to restore harmony to the community, to reinforce the social fabric. Everything else derives from that."[46] It is true that Toloki does not shed his blood physically; we may, however, assume that he does so vicariously in his embracing of other people's deaths.

Whereas it is correct to interpret Toloki's sacrifice as a religious ritual, it is also appropriate to examine his other form of sacrifice and redemption that is not strictly ritualistic: his attention to Noria. He not only forgives Noria; he also pays loving attention to her. Here his noble spirit comes to the fore. He has *ubuntu*, and he has it only because he has been able to forgive and love her. Toloki seeks to connect people to one another through his exercise of affinity, with which he is concerned on a communal level. Affinity triggered by true mourning can prevent further bloodshed and rebuild the community. Toloki takes steps in that direction at his reunion with Noria after several years apart. The first thing he offers is to help her put her life together again.[47] We begin to appreciate Toloki's magnanimous spirit even more when we realize

that Noria is grieving; she has just lost her son, and her shack has been demolished. She needs all the help she can get. Having accepted Toloki's offer, she tells him to return to his quarter while she stays behind to watch over the building materials meant for the reconstruction of her shack. But Toloki does not want to leave her alone; he offers to stay with her, and they begin the reconstruction of her shack. This rebuilding of her home is a metaphor for the reconstruction of their relationship. It also foreshadows the reconstruction of the community that will be championed primarily by women, and the rebuilding of South Africa in general. Toloki and Noria work through the night, and the next morning the "sun rises on Noria's shack."[48] The shack has a miraculous aspect. When the neighbors awake, they "witness the wonder that grew in the night. They marvel at the workmanship, and how the plastic and canvas of different colours have been woven together to form patterns."[49] Myambo highlights the "different colours" as symbolic of South Africa as a "Rainbow nation."[50] The appearance of the shack is also indicative of the result of initiatives toward affinity. Thus, Toloki's resolve to go beyond vengeance opens up hitherto unknown possibilities in their world. Forgiveness has previously unimagined positive consequences; it taps into the wealth of a proactive stance in life. Inspired by Toloki and Noria, the community becomes open, realizing the profound wealth of such gestures. In short, they lay the groundwork for global citizenship.

When the children of the community see Noria and Toloki hard at work, they offer their help, carrying water in small buckets. Toloki notices that some of the children who mocked him earlier are among them. They too have been transformed by the mystery of his forgiving spirit, his reconciliation with Noria, and the reconstruction of their world that this reconciliation has generated. Toloki and Noria's reconciliation gives both of them and the villagers a new lease on life; it revives their latent creativity. They begin to create again, mixing "soil and water to make very soft mud."[51] The softness that results from the mixture of soil and water is symbolic of the condition of society when the ideals of reconciliation are achieved. It is particularly important that Noria and Toloki do not look for redemption in the afterlife or in the mystical realm. Redemption is here and now, and it consists of discovering the beauty in living. That beauty lies in the openness that is brought about by forgiveness and affinity.

Impressed by the beauty of Noria and Toloki's new life, the villagers also begin to create. They imitate Noria and Toloki. Aristotle states that humans are distinguished from animals not only by our capacity

to reason, but also by our mimetic faculty. We imitate desire; we imitate the good and the bad.[52] Toloki's profession is to move members of the community to come to terms with the pain of loss. By imitating him in his profession, they realize how each person has contributed to the violence that threatens to consume them all. The most important triumph of imitation occurs when the neighborhood children who had earlier mocked Toloki suddenly lend their hands to the reconstruction of Noria's shack. They imitate Noria and Toloki's gestures of sacrifice, care of each other, and creativity; the children begin to sing. Mothers then imitate their children; they "bring all sorts of household items to the shack."[53] Thus the neighborhood is brought to life by the redemptive power of mimesis. Noria is happy to let Toloki know that life at the settlement is a result of mutual assistance: "We are like two hands that wash each other."[54] In this simple adage, Noria expresses Mda's vision of South Africa as a space of possible affinity between hitherto opposing forces, between people of different backgrounds.

Given the absolute necessity of forgiveness and reconciliation in society, it is not surprising that Mda writes copiously about violence. He sets up the backdrop against which we can best appreciate not only what Mandela and Tutu have done for the country, but also what others must do to put society on a creative trajectory. *Ways of Dying* is important not only in its rejection of the tone of protest, or what Elleke Boehmer calls the "upfront, hard-hitting, mimetic aesthetic" that had dominated apartheid-era novels.[55] It also courageously confronts the hypocrisies and human rights abuses within oppressed groups and the liberation party itself. The fact that the formerly oppressed group is implicated in the violence of oppression hinders them from ascribing excessive moral importance to their past oppression. Both the "we" narrator and the community believe that South African life is worth redeeming.

Nothing Human Is Alien to Me: Dealing with a Skewed Reality

In my discussion of *The Cry of Winnie Mandela*, I suggested that Winnie is a metaphor for the complicity of some sectors of the black population in the moral decadence of South Africa. In the remaining section of this chapter, I will discuss Ndebele's and Mda's reading of the colored people in South Africa as a metaphor of the new society and its possibilities. For most people familiar with South African apartheid racial categories, the term "colored" has a different meaning than it does in America. In the South African context, colored people are

those of mixed race. Given the infamous law against miscegenation, which, based on the primordial racial binary identities of black and white, criminalized racial mixing, the colored were viewed negatively by people of both races. They were often not considered authentic South Africans because of their lack of roots in either of the two opposing categories.[56] Their place in South African society became comparable to that of the tragic mulatto in nineteenth-century America. Ndebele and Mda, however, see colored people as holding a key to understanding the true contours of postapartheid society. Specifically, they embody what Nuttall has identified as the tangled nature of South Africa. They are, therefore, a metaphor for global citizenship. In a fitting tribute to the new state of South Africa, Nadine Gordimer cites the words of one of the victims of the horrors of apartheid, Tokyo Sexwale, lately premier of Gauteng, who was married to a white woman: "If blacks get hurt, I get hurt. If whites get hurt, that's my wife, and if you harm coloured people, you're looking for my children. Your unity embodies who I am."[57]

In *The Cry of Winnie Mandela*, Ndebele portrays the colored as those whose lives symbolize the full extent of freedom because they can "choose not to choose between the two but to embrace both fully."[58] Ndebele reaches for a truly universal goal by suggesting that South Africans have become entangled with one another like the children of black and white parents. The question is no longer one of choosing between two parents, without either of whom the biracial children could exist. He anticipates that the day "the Coloured exercises such choices will be the day the Coloured ceases to be Coloured. It will be a choice to become deeply human, shedding instrumentality and statistical being. Free no longer to keep the white man in power, but to explore new realms of existence. . . . Free to be self-sustaining as being."[59] Ndebele's hopes for the colored stand for his hopes for the future of postapartheid society: a time in which people can shed instrumentality and relate to one another in a truly cosmopolitan spirit.

Mda also sees the colored in South Africa not as tragic, but as embodying the promise of global citizenship. His novel *The Madonna of Excelsior* is based on the 1971 case in which nineteen people from Excelsior were charged under the Immorality Act, which prohibited sexual intercourse between blacks and whites. With this historical event as the background, he examines the paradoxes of race, human relations, and human existence. Mda's concern is what to do with the twisted condition of postapartheid South Africa as symbolized by Popi, a character born of such an illicit relationship. He engages the question by taking

us through the absurdity of the construction of difference. Excelsior is an Afrikaner farming community in South Africa's rural Free State. The largely white community protects its whiteness with religious and political laws. The people, who believe that as Calvinists they should live in "accordance with our faith in the Word of God, [develop] a policy condemning all equality and mongrelisation between White and Black. God's Word teaches us, after all, that He willed into being separate nations, colours and languages."[60] Yet their priest, Reverend Francois Bornman, is among the five men who meet regularly with black women in Johannes Smit's barn for sex orgies that produce colored kids, one of whom is Popi.[61] It is also ironic that young white boys in this community desire their black maids and then grow up to despise the women through whom they are initiated into manhood. Tjaart Kronje, a boy whom Niki, a black maid, took care of, loved to be strapped to Niki's back, and "he induced an erection and worked himself up with unseemly rhythmic movements. All that time the boy had been pretending to play horsey-horsey, he had in fact been in venereal heaven at her expense."[62] But the boy is not the first white male to desire or take advantage of Niki. Johannes Smit raped her when she was still a girl and has never stopped desiring and seeking her attention. Sadly, Niki cannot report Smit because it would imply that she had sex with him, and black women were sent to "jail for sleeping with white men" under the Immorality Act.[63]

The first-person plural omniscient narrator, a voice of the community, reminds the world that this kind of entanglement has always existed between white settlers and the black indigenous population; it is, in fact, what gave birth to the present South Africa. The narrator sarcastically takes us back to the beginning of such sexual entanglements, thereby alerting us to the contradictions of the laws against miscegenation and the apartheid regime that followed: "It was the Golden Age of Immorality in the Free State. Immorality was a pastime. It had always been popular even before laws were enacted in Parliament to curb it. It became a pastime the very day explorers' ships weighed anchor at the Cape Peninsular centuries ago, and saw the yellow body parts of Khoikhoi women."[64] As N. S. Zulu states, "the collective voice in Mda's novel mocks apartheid essentialisms and the racist maintenance of the boundaries between black and white on the grounds that they divide the uncivilised from the civilised."[65] The narrator's tone is sarcastic, especially when explaining the social status of the white men who take part in sex orgies with black women. For example, the "we" says of their arrival at the court, "If ever there was a person who had been framed,

then it had to be the dominee, we all agreed. We knew of him as a man of God who preached obedience to His laws against adultery and miscegenation."[66] The Reverend Bornman seeks to excuse himself by using a theological argument: "The devil had sent black women to tempt him and to move him away from the path of righteousness. The devil had always used the black female to tempt the Afrikaner. It was a battle that was raging within individual Afrikaner men."[67] By situating the discourse in the realm of the spirit, Reverend Bornman firmly locates it within the paradigms of essentialism. The triumph of the narrator's sarcastic tone lies in exposing the construction of the status quo for what it is: a sham.

How can one explain the contradiction inherent in the white man's secret desire for the black woman and his open disdain of her body? Has it to do with the fear of admitting the humanity of a people whom his ideology has defined as the absolute other, a people on whose sweat and blood the wealth of European colonialism rested? In his 1987 Jerusalem Prize Speech, J. M. Coetzee talked about the law of miscegenation in South Africa. That law had deeply symbolic relevance in the consciousness of the hereditary masters of South Africa. Its origins "lie in fear and denial; denial of an unacknowledgeable desire to embrace Africa, embrace the body of Africa; and fear of being embraced in return by Africa." To Coetzee, the failure to love is at the "heart of the unfreedom of the hereditary masters of South Africa."[68] Mda draws attention to the structures of this unfreedom in apartheid South Africa and how it can be overcome in the postapartheid dispensation.

To a degree, *The Madonna of Excelsior* is a frame narrative. It provides a backdrop for the story of an artist, Father Claerhout, who can be understood as Mda's tool in the deconstruction of South Africa's rigid binary valuation. He is a distorter of reality and an embodiment of contradictions. He is a Catholic priest, yet he takes interest in painting nude women. He is called trinity—the entangled nature of divinity. He is "a great admirer of big hands and big breasts. He is, after all, still the same trinity: man, priest and artist. The Threeness that has tamed the open skies, the vastness and the loneliness of the Free State."[69] We understand that the people call him trinity because he is twisted together with or caught in a condition that we otherwise call reality. There is no clarity in his being, just as there is no clarity in the being of the Trinity. The *Catholic Encyclopedia* defines the Trinity as a term "employed to signify the central doctrine of the Christian religion—the truth that in the unity of the Godhead there are Three Persons, the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit, these Three Persons being truly distinct one from

another."[70] The Trinity is a mystery, meaning that it defies explanation. Is this what Father Claerhout signifies? Is he Mda's suggestion of the impossibility of distinguishing man from God, reality from illusion, the past from present, indigenes from strangers? Might Father Claerhout signify Mda's rejection of essentialism and claims of authenticity? Mda suggests answers to these questions in the ending sections of the narratives, especially when the characters accept their condition as a product of entanglement between different forces in South Africa.

Anger and Self-Acceptance

In his discussion of cosmopolitan contamination, Kwame Anthony Appiah tells the story of Publius Terentius Afer, a Roman slave of North African origin who established himself as a playwright. He was known for using elements of Greek plays in his own for the Latin audience. He was then accused of contaminating Latin drama. Terentius gave an answer: "*Homo sum, humani nihil a me alienum puto*"—I am a human being; I consider nothing that is human alien to me. Appiah adapts Terentius's philosophy to explain the cultural mix in our time owing to globalization, a mix that renders all attempts at achieving authenticity ironic.[71] I think that Terentius's and Appiah's philosophy of human contamination also applies to South Africa in regard to culture, but especially in regard to humans. As the narrative of *The Madonna of Excelsior* shows, South Africa is a hodgepodge of races and ethnicities; it is a product of entanglements. Many of the entanglements, like the examples of sexual intercourse in the narrative, were not willed. Regardless, the outcome is no less human than the product of consensual sexual intercourse; Popi is no less human than Viliki, her brother, whose father is black. The narrator celebrates the new world that emerged from the mix of races: "From the outrage of rape . . . , our mothers gave birth to beautiful human beings. As beautiful as the Seller of Songs, who could create beautiful things. As beautiful as Popi, who could not create, but who knew how to love beautiful creations."[72] Mda encourages openness to humans regardless of their color or origin; he warns South Africa by making a direct reference to the dysfunction of Zimbabwe, which came about because of the nativist ideologies of its leaders.

Zimbabwe attracted the sympathy of freedom fighters all over the world, but it quickly descended into one-party totalitarianism and dysfunction when the formerly oppressed majority took power and, instead of expanding their vision of reality, began to promote narrow,

bigoted policies: "Zimbabwean leaders had failed their people, and [now entrenched] themselves in power . . . rendering their own country bankrupt and ungovernable. They were trampling on the human rights of their own people."[73] Viliki seems to defy that Zimbabwean inclination to bigotry. He fears for the future of his country and wonders how long Mandela's legacy of tolerance will last: "Already he could see signs of the arrogance of power gradually turning into racial arrogance—even within the Movement, which had prided itself on being a non-racial party."[74] It is therefore not surprising that Viliki, representing a section of the new generation, not only accepts his biracial/colored sister, Popi, but also falls in love with another biracial/colored girl, the Seller of Songs. To him, nothing human is alien.

In her review of *The Madonna of Excelsior*, Diana Wyli states that Mda has portrayed the anger seething in the black and white communities. The Boers are angry that they no longer have a firm grip on power. The black South Africans are angry at the violence of the past that has rendered them economically powerless. Mda shows that dissipating anger and paving the way for affinity are possible through cultivating or investing in one another's humanity. Mda addresses South Africa through Niki when she admonishes Popi for her anger: "Remember, my child, anger eats the owner."[75] She also encourages her to accept herself, just as the Seller of Songs has: "'Your hair cannot be a curse, Popi,' said Niki quietly. 'God cannot create a curse on your head.'"[76] These words are as important for Popi as they are for postapartheid South Africa. But it is also important that people accept one another. Perhaps this is the strategic role of Viliki, Popi's brother; he has no problems accepting Popi and the Seller of Songs. And perhaps this is the hermeneutic importance of Pule, Viliki's father, who comes home to die. Popi does not fail to seize this opportunity to demonstrate to others what she needs dearly—acceptance and affinity: "Popi had welcomed him with open arms. Viliki with a sour face and Niki with quiet dignity, bordering on indifference."[77] In her speech at her mother's birthday, at which Pule is present, Popi "thank[s] God for the gift of rain. It was a sign of good fortune." She goes on to call Pule "our father," thus planting herself firmly in that world.[78] Pule literally confers legitimacy on Popi, despite his own frailty, but of greater importance is the symbolic demonstration of affinity between Pule, Popi, Viliki, and Niki.

The four most important characters for the "we" narrator—Niki, Viliki, Popi, and the Seller of Songs—are inspired by their newfound affinity and openness to care about their world. Niki begins to tame bees. She becomes a producer of honey, which she distributes to

people. In her humility, she does not believe that she looks after bees; rather, she says, "they look after me." Meanwhile, Popi's shame has gone, and she has "to earn a living somehow. She could not rely on the bees, as Niki gave away most of the honey without expecting any payment for it."[79] Viliki, for his part, abandons politics after a short stint as a politician. He is captivated by the person of the Seller of Songs, and he takes to the world with her: "they traversed the Free State, from one farm village to another, selling their songs at people's feasts and parties . . . [and they had] the power to turn the dullest of parties into torrid revelries of dance and laughter."[80] "While Viliki and the Seller of Songs sell songs, Popi sells her sweat," harvesting crops.[81]

Popi also has an outstanding talent that serves the community more than harvesting crops does. She has a very beautiful voice, and, like Toloki, the professional mourner in *Ways of Dying*, she entertains or consoles people at burials. Mda writes, her "voice rose above all voices. Its undulations carried from the cemetery to the houses in Mahlatswetsa Location a kilometer away, sending tremors of comfort even to those who had not bothered to attend the funeral."[82] Popi's talent and her dedication to community allow people to see her for who she really is—a human being: "When she sang, her listeners forgot that she was the despised boesman girl, and thanked God for lending her the voice of angels."[83] In Popi and the Seller of Songs, as well as in Toloki (*Ways of Dying*), Mda suggests that healing begins with rejecting anger and bitterness and accepting the multiethnic reality of the South African human condition; rather than submitting themselves to anger arising from their awareness of the injustices of the past, South Africans should nurture the virtue of care. It is a difficult task, but there does not seem to be a better alternative. It is, after all, their earth that they will till and harvest, in the manner that Popi has.

4

The Challenges of Cosmopolitan Thinking in a Postapartheid Society

In chapter 1, I argued that Mandela initiated a different kind of cosmopolitanism that is rooted in empathy (co-feeling), rather than in pure reason. He is not the only one to recognize the importance of co-feeling in South Africa. In this chapter, I focus on how Nadine Gordimer and J. M. Coetzee appeal to empathy as an essential element of open society.

Empathy has not been accorded its deserved attention in literary and cultural studies until the recent renewed interest in affect theory.[1] The absence of empathy in academic and political discourses is due, in large part, to the influence of the Euro-modernist tradition that privileged reason over feeling, dismissing feeling as ephemeral. Given the condition of our world as a globalized space in which people from different backgrounds and ethnicities live together, it has become increasingly obvious that reason alone cannot account for mutual understanding and conviviality between people.

Without being able to put oneself in the position of others, one might not be able to appreciate their worldview, much less participate in their world. I understand "co-feeling" as a concept that captures not only the affinity between one person and another, but also all forms of solidarity and human rights. In *Inventing Human Rights*, Lynn Hunt argues that narratives of co-feeling have played a pivotal role in the conception of human rights. For example, the novels of eighteenth-century Europe provoked a "torrent of emotions"[2] in their readers because of the way in which they shed light on the suffering of their protagonists. Hunt suggests that Jean-Jacques Rousseau's novel, *Julie or the New Heloise*, and others such as Richardson's *Pamela* (1740) and *Clarissa* (1747–48) contributed to the ideals in the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen,[3] a document that served as

the cornerstone of the French Revolution and presaged the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

What Hunt has said of these eighteenth-century authors applies equally to Nadine Gordimer and J. M. Coetzee in terms of their conception of openness to others and respect for others' rights. As Nobel Prize–winning authors, Gordimer and Coetzee are recognized for their deep insights into the human condition and the far-reaching cosmopolitan range of those insights. Their importance in the world of letters is comparable to that of Mandela and Tutu in South Africa's sociopolitical sphere. Coetzee and Gordimer are also moral icons; they resisted apartheid in their own ways, and so helped to usher in and shape South Africa's moral imagination. They are bound to South Africa's moral framework by what Coetzee calls an "ambits of moral judgement," the condition that urges us to judge our acts in their relation to the pain of others and to the common good. I discuss Gordimer and Coetzee within the context of the new framework I presented in chapter 1. To establish the historical and theoretical continuity between the apartheid-era and postapartheid moral imaginations of these authors, I discuss two apartheid-era novels—Coetzee's *Age of Iron* and Gordimer's *Burger's Daughter*—as having anticipated the postapartheid age of cosmopolitan living. I then analyze Coetzee's *Disgrace* as a novel that interrogates the abuses of power and pleads for empathy and Gordimer's *The Pickup* and *No Time Like This* as instantiations of the promises and challenges of postapartheid South Africa as a space of cosmopolitan solidarity. I pay attention to transcultural contacts to the degree that they suggest a possibility for openness to otherness and empathy. In fact, I look specifically for the moment that Gerard Delanty has characterized as that in which "new relations between self, other and world develop in moments of openness."[4]

"Ambits of Moral Judgement"

Nadine Gordimer occupies a central position in South African human rights struggles in particular and in the cosmopolitan imagination in general. She was a founding member of the Congress of South African Writers, a "non-racial organization of antiapartheid writers established in July 1987, informed by Black Consciousness and Maoist ideas."[5] She was also a card-carrying member of the African National Congress, a tireless antiapartheid activist, and a close confidante to Nelson Mandela. She is said to have helped him polish his famous "I Am Prepared

to Die" speech at the Rivonia trial.[6] Indeed, "Gordimer was one of the first people Nelson Mandela wanted to see upon his release from prison in 1990."[7]

As a white South African who was, by implication, privileged within the apartheid system, Gordimer benefited from apartheid's social and economic arrangements. However, she did not take advantage of her whiteness to further her position as an intellectual in society; she did not remain silent in the face of tyranny and the arbitrary division of people into factions by the apartheid machinery. On the contrary, she was among the handful of white liberal intellectuals who joined hands with black intellectuals to establish a race-transcendent solidarity against apartheid and a multiracial affinity in South Africa.

Burger's Daughter is arguably Gordimer's most profound and, in some respects, most activist apartheid-era novel. It firmly established her as an engaged antiapartheid intellectual. It centers on the life of Rosa Burger, a young woman whose parents were staunch members of the antiapartheid movement and who gave their lives for their beliefs. Rosa knows she was named after Rosa Luxemburg, the Polish-born Jewish Marxist theorist and revolutionary socialist. Rosa therefore appears to have been predetermined to bear social responsibility. This is undoubtedly a burden that she, like the prophet Jonah in the Bible, seeks to escape. She abandons South Africa and lives for a while in Europe, but eventually she can no longer live in peace with her conscience and returns to South Africa to continue the struggle for which her parents died.

A central incident in Rosa's life sums up her reluctance toward her parents' antiapartheid activism and establishes the moral core of the novel. She is driving to Orlando, a township in the urban area of Soweto, in the city of Johannesburg. She encounters a donkey-pulled cart on a dirt road. A woman and child are bundled under sacks in the cart, and the cart's driver is standing up and furiously beating the donkey. Rosa observes: "The donkey didn't cry out. Why didn't the donkey give that bestial snort and squeal or excruciation I've heard donkeys give not in pain but in rut. It didn't cry out. It had been beaten and beaten. Pain was no shock, there is no way out of the shafts."[8] The incident shocks Rosa as it does the reader. We are made to wonder why the cart driver keeps beating the donkey, inflicting untold pain on the poor animal. We also wonder why the donkey does not cry. The driver has no empathy for the poor animal, but Rosa does. She imagines the pain of the donkey, and this becomes her burden. She is afflicted by guilt because she drives away without

objecting to the donkey's needless pain. She laments, "I could have put a stop to it, with them, at no risk to myself. No one would have taken up a stone. I was safe from the whip, I could have stood between them and the suffering—the suffering of the donkey."[9] The relationship between the cart driver and the donkey is a metaphor for the relationship between the repressive state apparatus and black people who are treated as if they feel no pain. The episode is metonymic of South African brutality. In his analysis of the novel, Coetzee makes clear the moral demands of the narrative. For him, Rosa has made an empathic leap in putting herself in the position of the helpless animal, and she is anguished. In her anguish, what she "waits for is a time when humanity will be restored across the face of society, and therefore when all human acts, including the flogging of an animal, will be returned to the ambit of moral judgement."[10] Coetzee uses "ambit of moral judgement" to refer to the condition in which certain acts of human suffering make us cringe or put us to shame and directly threaten to dislodge personal, community, or cosmic balance. Those acts must be judged by their relation to the common good. *Burger's Daughter* is an exposition of the ways in which apartheid devastates the humanity of the oppressed. Gordimer's concern is with a relationship that is built on co-feeling with the other. In line with Coetzee's reading of the novel, Gordimer anticipates the postapartheid time in which humanity will be restored across the face of society; it is the time in which universal moral frameworks will supersede the parochial frameworks of apartheid.

What is true of Gordimer's *Burger's Daughter* also applies to Coetzee's *Age of Iron*. In the latter novel, the narrator describes a scene that is key to understanding the conundrum of apartheid's violence, on the one hand, and the possibility of affinity in the face of difference, on the other. Bheki is the son of Mrs. Curren's housekeeper, Florence. He and his friend beat up Mr. Vercueil, a vagrant whom Mrs. Curren has given shelter. The boys claim that Mr. Vercueil is drinking himself to death and that drinking turns him "into a dog."[11] Florence is proud of them and even makes a startling judgment about Vercueil: "he is rubbish. He is good for nothing." Mrs. Curren confronts them and lets them know that Vercueil "is not a rubbish person." She lowers her voice and speaks to Florence alone. 'There are no rubbish people. We are all people together.'"[12] Mrs. Curren's profound observation about the humanity of all persons seems to draw on the same vision that gave birth to Desmond Tutu's notion of a rainbow people of God. In voicing this universal vision of humanity, Mrs. Curren looks beyond the point at which the

senseless violence of apartheid will end, to the time when people's acts will be subjected to "ambits of moral judgement."

The assault on Vercueil is an appalling imitation of the political drama of South African apartheid violence. Ironically it is Mrs. Curren, a member of the privileged class, who intervenes, imposing her clear moral vision on the situation. The ensuing dialogue with Florence highlights the complicated and self-destructive moral position Florence has adopted as well as Mrs. Curren's careful, self-doubting, yet morally clear, stand. Seizing the moment, Mrs. Curren compares the beating to the heinous act of burning people alive: "They kick and beat a man because he drinks. They set people on fire and laugh while they burn to death."[13] The two acts have one thing in common: they issue from hearts that have not learned to feel the pain of others. Florence is a prime example; she is surprisingly bigoted, having effectively insulated herself against other people's feelings. She is under the illusion that she is strong and therefore sees the world only through the lens of a strong/weak binary. She has a different opinion of the boys whom Mrs. Curren condemns. The kids, she says, are "good children" because they are like iron, and "we are proud of them."[14] To Florence, being like iron implies the rejection of pain, especially the pain of the other. It is being closed within oneself rather than open to others. Mrs. Curren fails to convince Florence, and having realized her own unwilling complicity with the evil system, she has few options other than hope: "Children of iron, I thought. Florence herself, too, not unlike iron. The age of iron. After which comes the age of bronze. How long, how long before the softer ages return in their cycle, the age of clay, the age of earth?"[15] Mrs. Curren's desire for the softer ages within the context of apartheid is figurative of Coetzee's desire for a society in which people will relate to one another as humans, an age in which human relations will be guided by a universal moral framework informed by co-feeling.

In his 1987 Jerusalem Prize speech, Coetzee talked about the law of miscegenation in South Africa. This law had deep symbolic relevance in the oppressors' consciousness. To him, the failure to love is at the "heart of the unfreedom of the hereditary masters of South Africa."[16] The law of miscegenation held the country in bondage in a society of masters and slaves, one in which no one was free. That said, the law of miscegenation was but one symptom of a far-reaching Hegelian malady. Like Hegel's master, white settlers in South Africa allowed themselves only a one-dimensional recognition from the natives. There was, as Coetzee claimed about the self-appointed master race of whites, a

"denial of an unacknowledgeable desire to embrace Africa, embrace the body of Africa; and fear of being embraced in return by Africa."[17] At stake here is the hardening of the construct of difference. According to Coetzee, the cure to this malady is to see that "there are no rubbish people. We are all people together."[18]

Coetzee's analysis of apartheid South Africans' hatred of others helps us to understand his vision of a new society in which people are responsive to the humanity of others. He anticipates that South Africa will move from the age of iron to the age of clay. For this transformation to occur, those who witness how innocent people are oppressed must do something; they must "suffer the shame of it."[19] Can awareness of the "ambits of moral judgement" restore the humanity denied under apartheid brutality? In the next sections, I discuss how Gordimer seeks to restore humanity across the face of society in *The Pickup* and *No Time Like the Present*, after which I conclude with a critical examination of Coetzee's *Disgrace* as an explication of the difficulty of cosmopolitanism and a plea for the acceptance of the radical humanity of all.

Creating a Cosmopolitan Space

In "Living on a Frontierless Land: Cultural Globalization," Gordimer engages the question of how a country can move beyond itself while retaining its national specificity, how it can "procreate a culture that will benefit itself and others." She believes that it is possible for a country to achieve self-transcendence if the effort begins at home. She gives the example of her own country, South Africa, which had been the "epitome of cultural isolation."[20] Gordimer speaks about how her "home" can create a new culture that is local and global at the same time, one that is not hampered by nativism, bigotry, or crippling ideologies. In the same manner in which Nelson Mandela called Ingrid Jonker "a South African, an African and a citizen of the world,"[21] Gordimer envisions her new country as embodying the national, the continental, and the global. Given the structure of the world today, there does not seem to be any better alternative than for South Africans to be simultaneously local and global.

In her essay "The Status of the Writer in the World Today: Which World? Whose World?" Gordimer demands that African writers adopt a fundamental openness to reality: "Let our chosen status in the world be that of writers who seek exchanges of the creative imagination, ways of thinking and writing, of fulfilling the role of repository

of people's ethos, by opening it out, bringing to it a vital mixture of individuals and peoples re-creating themselves."[22] They can re-create themselves by imagining a truly cosmopolitan space, one that is not delimited by ideologies or defining narratives about people. As Gordimer writes, "only then can we make reality of culture 'living on its land': the frontierless territory of creativity."[23] Derek Barker observes a shift in Gordimer's literary production spanning from the apartheid to postapartheid eras, noting that "local South African concerns are succeeded by more global concerns."[24] For Ileana Dimitriu, Gordimer's aesthetic and thematic shift is more remarkable in *The Pickup*, which is Gordimer's "first novel to imbue the locality with significant global resonance [as] the novel unfolds in two locations, in South Africa and North Africa."[25] Gordimer captures the turn in her aesthetic concern in her aptly titled essay "Turning the Page: African Writers and the Twenty-First Century." She reminds African writers that "in a future of increasing intercontinental contact," the idea of "a 'pure' indigenous culture" is no longer possible.[26] There have, however, always been elements of globality or cosmopolitanism in her fiction. Even in her writings about local issues, her moral world has always been directed toward what is larger than the South African experience. Eleni Coundouriotis argues that in Gordimer's fiction, especially *The Conservationist*, "a kind of internationalism from within asserts itself against apartheid's efforts to separate out and sever connections in its own historical myth-making."[27] Coundouriotis's observation underscores the underlying cosmopolitan feeling in Gordimer's works, especially in the two novels under consideration here.

A central idea in *The Pickup* is amply foreshadowed in the first two pages of the narrative. A car breaks down on a busy road of a major South African city that we will later recognize as Johannesburg.[28] The driver is Julie, a young white woman. The other drivers are impatient; some hurl expletives at her: "Get going. Stupid bloody woman. *Idikazana lomlungu, le*." A defining moment in the whole mess is when "she throws up hands, palms open, in surrender."[29] To highlight the function of this scene as a foreshadowing event, the narrator wraps up this three-paragraph opening chapter in a remarkable way:

> There. You've seen. I've seen. The gesture. A woman in a traffic jam among those that are everyday in the city, any city. You won't remember it, you won't know who she is. But I know because from the sight of her I'll find out—as a story—what was going to happen as the consequence of the commonplace embarrassment on the streets; where it was heading her for, and what. Her hands thrown up, open.[30]

The metafictional gesture of this paragraph prepares the reader for a philosophical and ethical journey into the life of the protagonist. The intended community comprises the reader, the narrator, and the helpless protagonist, Julie. The choppy, broken sentences easily dramatize the arbitrariness of the community that arises thereby. This community, as we shall learn, reflects the condition of our globalized world, a world in which the ease of communication and mobility of goods and people bring strangers together. We encounter Julie as part of that truly globalized world. The incident does not take place in any city and in any time; it takes place in postapartheid Johannesburg. Times have changed, and the traffic, which could have been dominated by whites, is now made up of people of different ethnicities. This is a dramatic change in the human geography, and it has consequences in the cultural topography of the new country. Ruth A. H. Lahti argues that Julie's throwing her hands open "is a gesture of surrendering to the social authority of the scene, and in its parallel to the movement of a criminal submitting herself to the authorities, the gesture simultaneously insists that with her hands being 'open,' she is innocent (unarmed), not an accomplice to the social crimes that have structured life on this street."[31] It is symbolic that a white person, otherwise a figure of power and privilege in that postcolonial society, professes her powerlessness amid people of different ethnicities. More than signifying her not being an accomplice in the social crimes of the past, her gesture suggests her acceptance of the new order and symbolizes her openness to reality. Julie's universal gesture also indicates her vulnerability and dependence on others. Two black men, one of whom is described as unemployed and a beggar, help push her car "into a loading bay."[32] Thus Julie, who had hitherto been shielded from the world of otherness by the apartheid power structures that cocooned her in the suburbs, finds herself thrust into otherness. The truth, however, is that she has long been dependent on others through the system that exploited these others without acknowledging them. The only difference is that in this instance, she is forced to admit openly her vulnerability and dependence by the fact that others now have access to political or social power. Her car must be repaired. It will be taken care of by a man whose identity is suspect, an illegal immigrant who goes by the false name of Abdu. We do not know his country of origin. Abdu is a stranger, also vulnerable, and dependent on others for meaning and existence. Thus far in the narrative, Gordimer establishes the most important narrative *topoi* of which the reader needs to be aware: vulnerability and mutual dependence in this age marked by hypermobility and impermanence. It is important that

the first time we encounter Julie, she does not present herself from a position of power, regardless of the privilege her whiteness affords her in South Africa. We thus see her for what she is: a human being who appeals to us in her ordinariness. She is appealing because her gesture of vulnerability urges us to reach out to her, and in so doing, we establish some form of affinity.

The Pickup has been discussed as a novel of migration and displacement and as a search for identity. Ileana Dimitriu argues that it "is about conditions of dislocation in post-ideological times: it is an exploration of how immigration, as well as emigration, affect the sense of self in human interaction."[33] Perhaps it is simply about people of diverse cultural or national backgrounds coming in contact and allowing for new possibilities. Emma Hunt, for instance, argues that the novel is about issues of identity in a global city "where increasing deterritorialization means that there is no place to ground a sense of self. . . . the quest for belonging finally demands a return to the concept of place, but not necessarily to the space defined by the nation's borders."[34] The narrative structure of *The Pickup* rests on two linear trajectories that stand in contrapuntal relation: the first centers on Abdu's illegal migration to South Africa; the second centers on his repatriation, and with him Julie's legal migration to his unnamed country somewhere in the Arabian or African desert. The modalities of mobility on which these two embark are unequal: one is considered illegal while the other is legal, or merely a relocation. Through the drama of the unequal conditions of the mobility of these two characters, Gordimer indicts neoliberalism and global privilege, sadly symbolized by white skin. Julie and Abdu are typical creations of a globalized order; both seek to leave their past behind them, but they do so on unequal terms. But perhaps more than the issue of dislocation, Gordimer forces us to imagine what happens when two persons from diverse cultural backgrounds meet in this age of globalization. Can they share a mutual cultural and moral space? My interest in these two characters rests largely on the question of what their encounter reveals about our new world in regard to transcultural affinity and cosmopolitan solidarity. In what ways are we better positioned to appreciate the other as a possibility for us to encounter ourselves? Can an encounter with a stranger expand our moral imagination?

Even before meeting Abdu, Julie has acquainted herself with otherness and made peace with it. She is a member of the "regular's table" at which friends from different South African ethnicities gather to spend time in a café. They celebrate the new dispensation and are known as "elective siblings who have distanced themselves from the ways of

the past, their families, whether these are black ones still living in the old ghettoes or white ones in The Suburbs."[35] This table of elective siblings necessarily reminds us of Goethe's elective affinities (*Wahlverwandtschaften*). Thus, at the table, the young men and women seek to do what their parents' generation could not: redefine identities and relationships as choices rather than destiny, as avowed rather than ascribed. This is why they call their gathering place a "regular's table" instead of a high table. They are regular because they attend the café on a regular basis, but also because they are regular citizens; that is, ordinary human beings in the manner that Gordimer describes herself—"a common relative in the human family."[36] The café is appropriately called EL-AY (L.A.), an allusion to Los Angeles, one of the largest global cities. In going to the café, Julie "was down in a thoroughfare, a bazaar of all that the city had hitherto not been allowed to be by the laws and traditions of her parents' generation."[37] AbdouMaliq Simone argues that African global cities increasingly show themselves as places of identity contestation, of assemblage, collaborations, networks, and ambiguity. They enable new allegiances and identities.[38] African cities are, above all, "places of thickening connections."[39] For him, "the city is the conjunction of seemingly endless possibilities of remaking. With its artifice of architecture, infrastructures, and sedimentation channeling movements, transaction, and physical proximity, bodies constantly are 'on the line' to affect and be affected, 'delivered up' to specific terrain and possibilities of recognition or coalescence."[40] Johannesburg, the city in which the members of the regular's table meet, is as much a character as is Julie. It is typical of the African global cities of which Simone speaks. At EL-AY Café, the archetypal global city of Los Angeles meets an African global city. Here the regulars contest their inherited identities and forge new alliances. Lewis Mumford describes a city as "a geographic plexus, an economic organization, an institutional process, a theater of social action, and an aesthetic symbol of collective unity. The city fosters art and is art; the city creates the theater and is the theater."[41] He states that "it is in the city, the city as theater, that man's more purposive activities are focused, and work out, through conflicting and cooperating personalities, events, groups, into more significant culminations."[42] The concept of city as theater suggests that in the city the drama of human interaction is displayed in all its colorations. In African villages there is an absence of what Saskia Sassen calls a "new politics" that the city provides.[43] By new politics, Sassen means the possibility of the interrogation of the order of things that arises when people from different backgrounds interact. For Sassen, "the international

character of major cities lies not only in their telecommunication infrastructure and international firms; it lies in the many different environments in which these workers exist."[44]

Sassen's suggestion that the city provides an opportunity for a new politics supports Mumford's concept of the city as a theater. With Abdu and Julie, a new politics emerges. When Abdu is asked to name his country, he refuses. His reluctance introduces an important element in our understanding of a globalized world. As the narrator explains, "He's telling them: —I can't say that—'my country'—because somebody else made a line and said that is it."[45] Through Abdu, Gordimer alludes to the conception of our world as a boundless city. The arbitrariness of countries—and nationalities—is also an allusion to South Africa and therefore a suggestion that any search for a primordial identity is a misnomer. Through these elements, Gordimer poses questions that are at the core of my inquiry: Who is a global citizen? What does it mean to belong to a place, or to be a member of certain communities? What is the appropriate response to the humanity of people who do not look like you and who now share the same geopolitical space? Can people still safely retreat into the old, putatively pristine fortresses of their own origin?

Gordimer thus sets the stage for her presentation of South Africa as a cosmopolitan space. Johannesburg plays an important role in this regard; it is a microcosm of postapartheid South Africa, a place that must be approached with "open palms" such as Julie displays. We have three characters—Johannesburg, Julie, and Abdu—who enable our inquiry into the structure of global citizenship. What will their interaction reveal about the challenges of cosmopolitanism?

Imagination, Empathy, and Cosmopolitan Sensibilities

Amanda Anderson states that "cosmopolitanism endorses reflective distance from one's cultural affiliations,"[46] and this aptly describes Julie's attitude to her country. Julie's cosmopolitan sensibility is born in the moment she distances herself from her father, turning against the privilege and bigotry he stands for; it blossoms when she arrives in Abdu's country. Abdu (now Ibrahim ibn Musa[47]) does not fully accept what he interprets as Julie's boundless sense of freedom and privilege:

> He sees that this—the first cup of coffee at the EL-AY Café, the love-making in her bed, the wild decision to come to this place, this country, from which she could not be dissuaded, even—yes—the marriage he then had

> no choice but to insist on—all this was another of the adventures she prided herself on being far enough from her father's beautiful house always to be ready for.[48]

Luis Cabrera argues that those who cross boundaries in search of a new life and new opportunities, and therefore new identities and new moralities, act "as though it were already possible to be a global citizen."[49] In this light, we can provisionally consider Abdu a global citizen, but he is one only to the degree that he acts as though it were an important part of being human to cross boundaries. His own cosmopolitan citizenship is, of course, qualitatively different from that of Julie, who has developed the capacity to distance herself from her cultural affiliation. Julie is essentially open to the world and is aware of her place in it as a cosmopolitan. It is therefore not surprising that she feels liberated in that nameless country, one that even Abdu could not be proud of and could not claim as his. "She was suddenly exhilarated and laughed, feeling for the hand of this new beginning. I'm here! I'm here!"[50] The repeated declaration underlines her wish to be rooted in a foreign soil, a place she can never be considered an autochthon.

Julie's presence in Abdu's country is, as I have pointed out, a culmination of what began even before she came to know Abdu. She is not bound to a country, and this is expressed in her rejection of her father, who is the ultimate signifier of nationalism rather than internationalism. Indeed, Gordimer's depiction of Julie's character is packed with signifiers. Just as Julie's open palms at the beginning of the text suggest her openness to the world, her words in Abdu's country carry symbolic weight. Her repeated declaration "I'm here! I'm here!" suggests her immersion in the present, in the body as a thing to be respected, in life as it is, not in a life subsumed in promises or ideologies. At this point she stands in contrast to Abdu, who still believes that his life lies elsewhere, even as he is unable to distance himself from his cultural affiliation. She has nothing to justify her joy in the present other than her love of Abdu and life. She does not even think, as her father did, that she could easily lose her life.[51] She easily adapts to the less than optimal life conditions in Abdu's country.

Julie often comes off as too self-confident and perhaps arrogant: she buys two tickets to fly out of South Africa with Abdu, and she does so without informing him. She justifies her action with a typical upper-middle-class girl's explanation: "Nobody has to be responsible for me. I am responsible for myself."[52] Sadly, she seems to want to be responsible for Abdu's life. Abdu does not like that, and he does not hide his

rejection, saying, "For yourself. Always yourself. You think that is very brave. I must tell you something. You only know how to be responsible for yourself here—this place, your café friends, your country where you have everything. I can't be responsible. I don't want it."[53] The difference between Abdu und Julie could not be more profound. An undercurrent in Abdu's observation is his feeling of helplessness and his suspicion that Julie is just a child of privilege.

Some commentators such as Dana C. Mount and Lahti have emphasized Julie's privilege as informing her behavior.[54] I think, though, that it might be a mistake to assume that she is simply a product of privilege. It is true that Julie is privileged; however, she appears to be ashamed of that unmerited advantage in life. Were she to lay claim to her privilege, especially in the way her father foresaw, she would not be open to Abdu; it would mean asserting her difference from Abdu. But she does not see Abdu in that binary valuation, making it even more disturbing that Abdu keeps referring to her privilege. Indeed, Abdu reminds Julie of the difference between them: "You people have no choose—choice—or you have choice. Only two kinds. Of people—."[55] Later in the narrative, he repeatedly comments on her privilege or riches.[56] Abdu's perception of Julie seems to be frozen into privileged and less privileged categories. This overdetermined way of seeing "white" people, or people of European ancestry, does not allow him to encounter the other's (specifically, Julie's) humanity. In turn, Abdu's perception of Julie hampers his own humanity, whereas Julie's humanity admits imperfection and thereby strives for more fulfillment.

There must be some deeper justification for why Julie considers "her crowd. Mates. Brothers and Sisters" as "strangers" while she regards Abdu as "the known."[57] One explanation lies in her conception of cosmopolitan solidarity. Hers is the perfect enunciation of The Table's vision of elective affinity. The moment she encounters a perfect stranger (with false name and no country), she discovers that she has never known her elective siblings "in the real sense of known that she has now with him, the man foreign to her."[58]

Abdu is a catalyst for Julie's cosmopolitanism. He helps us to understand the degree to which Julie has liberated herself from ascribed identity and embraced her own definition of self. Unaware of Julie's rejection of her father, Abdu pushes her toward him, saying, "You can go to your father. He knows many things."[59] Abdu's expression reminds the reader of the implicit meaning of patriarchy: the father knows what is good for you, or, in the words of the popular 1950s American television series, "Father Knows Best." But Julie has rejected her father and

what he stands for: the country or fatherland. She is not patriotic. The members of The Table are doubtlessly aware of the new dispensation in their country, and how entangled they all are with one another and with the world at large. Yet this is not enough for our understanding of Gordimer's conception of a cosmopolitan society. Julie discovers to her chagrin that the elective siblings of The Table are not truly open; they are not open to Abdu, who now is the ultimate other: "There was talk: That relationship's getting heavy, our girl's really gone on that oriental prince of hers. Where was it she picked him up, again?"[60] Their elective affinity is structurally deficient because it is circumscribed by nationality. For them, "the oriental prince" belongs to another nation, another ethnos outside South Africa, and is therefore not deserving of their openness. He is the ultimate other. Their reluctance toward him is proof of the challenges of global citizenship.

The members of The Table are not cosmopolitan in the sense we have discussed thus far. They are largely snobs or phony elites, who, in their claim of having transcended the bigoted world of their forebears, fail to extend their humanity beyond the confines of their nation. They fail to stretch their imagination to include a true otherness. Julie seems to possess the requisite trait for a morally consequential notion of entanglement and openness in twenty-first-century society. She has the gifts of introspection and empathy that are integral to a more fulfilling conception of global citizenship. At a dinner organized by her father for a couple about to "relocate," probably to Australia, Julie compares the couple's situation to that of Abdu: "Julie is seeing the couple as those—her father's kind of people—who may move about the world welcome everywhere, as they please, while someone has to live disguised as a grease-monkey without a name."[61] Julie's ability to think about such things, about the world and people's places in it, and to empathize with the other distinguishes her from the bunch of elective siblings at The Table. This ability makes her a global citizen.

Julie is also a litmus test for other people's notions of solidarity. She goes with Abdu to Mr. Motsamai, the renowned black lawyer who is a friend of her father. Mr. Motsamai, like many black South Africans, is a survivor of apartheid's vicious racial categorization and strict definition of affinity. Rather than help Julie and Abdu, he aims to make Julie understand (as Julie sees it) the inappropriateness of her plan to settle with Abdu. Julie judges Motsamai: "she knows what he's up to, claiming his rightful brotherhood of his people's suffering along with his present successful distancing from it."[62] In Julie's judgment, Mr. Motsamai's moral compass is informed by a narrow conception of solidarity: he

sees only his own people's suffering. Employing her characteristic gift of introspection and critical faculties, she correctly distances herself from Mr. Motsamai and what he stands for.[63]

Global Affinity as a New Grammar of Ethical Responsibility

When Julie travels to Abdu's desert village, she fully decenters her self-perception as a privileged white woman. She also distances herself spatially from her culture. Her effort to see reality from other people's perspectives comes full circle. She also experiences being uprooted firsthand, but rather than make her uneasy, being uprooted brings out the best in her. In Abdu's desert village, she realizes the promises of The Table of elective siblings. She becomes a sister to the women there. As Emma Hunt observes, "Gordimer sets up the desert in opposition to the global city: the desert is contrary to accumulation, ambition or ego, and represents instead scarcity and a corresponding spiritual purity."[64] Might this "spiritual purity" be synonymous with true affinity with other people; that is, with the condition of the psyche that is not clouded by prejudice? Julie seeks affinity with others not in Logos; rather, she feels with them in a typical Mandela paradigm.

For Julie, cosmopolitan thinking demands responsibility for the other; it is the acceptance of the humanity of the other without condition. It is not adventure in foreign cultures; it is encounter. In contrast, Abdu's experience of being uprooted, which resulted in his encounter with other cultures, has not significantly altered his thinking. He seems to be interested in no human being in particular. His mother, his uncle, and Julie all are committed to seeing him happy. His uncle employs him in his automotive shop; he even makes Abdu his assistant with the prospect of Abdu taking over the shop.[65] Even Julie discovers another possibility of settling in that seemingly hostile environment with Abdu. With the help of Maryam (Abdu's younger sister), she learns about the rice farm in the desert; it is possible to drill for a well and then begin to produce food. She is even ready to take out money from her trust fund. Julie's belief is summed thus: "Here. You could have it both. The mute desert and the life-chorus of green."[66] Abdu is obsessed with fleeing his condition, but he is not interested in encountering people. Every human being he meets is a means to an end for him. Another subtle difference between his desire for mobility and hers is that Julie's love for him was not predicated on her intense desire to flee her country. She decided to leave only to be with him because she saw in him not a

stranger, but "the known."[67] The fact is that she fulfills her long-held wish to expand her world by refusing her father's idea of rootedness. Julie moves to expand her horizon; Abdu moves to flee himself. Indeed, at this juncture we observe that being a migrant or being in exile is not the same as being a global citizen. Abdu's attitude is such that he seeks to maintain cultures in a purist or multicultural model rather than in a transcultural one.

Julie's cosmopolitan attitude has consequences, one of which is her great sense of responsibility for those she encounters. For a true citizen of the world, mobility increases the possibilities for openness. Julie did not need to leave South Africa to express her solidarity with what Martha Nussbaum has identifies as "the person whose allegiance is to the worldwide community of human beings."[68] Abdu only catalyzed what was present in her, if confusedly so. Indeed, Abdu acts as Julie's conduit to a larger stage on which she can truly dramatize her solidarity with other humans she is not related to by blood. Even though the village people see her as a tourist, she never perceives her being in the village as transient.[69] She is careful to distinguish herself from tourists and imperialists. Tourists are not interested in the lives of the village people. She is.

The distance Julie has moved from her place of birth and privilege grants her a space in which she can articulate a more global perspective on life. She ruminates: "We were playing at reality; it was a doll's house, the cottage; a game, the EL-AY Café."[70] While at the EL-AY, she and others had merely played with the idea of elective affinity; in Abdu's village, she is in true affinity with people; she therefore relates to them based on mutual dependence. One of her most striking encounters is with a Bedouin girl, a paradigm of the residents of the desert. The desert itself offers the possibility of pure encounter; that is, encounter unmediated by modernity and its tools of communication (hypermobility) that ironically disrupt true communication between humans. As Laura Winkiel states, Julie's "response to the desert indicates her open reception to its otherness—what is not represented and therefore limited by her culture and its temporal and spatial structures of everyday life. Subject/object demarcations and inner/outer spheres are blurred."[71] Commenting on the scene, Dimitriu employs the concept of what she calls "emancipated multiculturalism and the embrace of diversity in a new South Africa."[72] It is helpful to interrogate the idea of emancipated multiculturalism, especially given what we know about the conceptual flaw of multiculturalism—that is, that it considers cultures as hermetically sealed entities and people as belonging

irrevocably to their cultures in the same way that plants belong to the soil in which they sprout. Julie reveals this conception of culture and the solidarity that arises from it as barren. Multiculturalism indeed prevents mutual translatability of experiences, and therefore encourages the avoidance of responsibility. But Julie, an example of a transcultural agent, embraces the responsibility that comes from immersing oneself in other people's cultures and experiences.

It is more important to Julie to realize the dream of elective affinity with strangers in a foreign country than just to flee her own country. Maryam, Abdu's younger sister, is a maid in a rich household nearby. She is a very clever girl who dreams of educating herself. The most she can get of that dream is to coax her father into allowing her to learn to read the Koran. She is figurative of the gifted women of her world who are trapped by their gender, and to whom exposure to another world provides a better alternative. She sees in Julie a sister, and quickly befriends her. She wants to learn English, and Julie wants to learn Arabic from her.[73] Having expanded her scope of affinity as a global citizen, Julie can put herself in the situation of these women.[74] These three form a bond, a sisterhood as siblings, that for Julie effectively replaces the role that The Table of elective siblings had played. These new siblings are undoubtedly superior to the elective siblings at EL-AY Café because the trio's bond is devoid of patriotism; it is rooted not in Logos, but in their bodies. They are complete strangers who discover that the only thing they have in common is their humanity. Out of strangers emerge siblings, fellow citizens of the world. Maryam and the other women who open their world to Julie are, in their own rights, global citizens, even though they have not left their village. Their affinity gives credence to what Bruce Robbins calls "mutual translatability" of experiences.[75]

Gordimer suggests that solidarity implies engagement with others; it means that we can no longer look the other way when someone is in distress. Responsibility for others begins when their suffering becomes ours. We respond to their humanity. This is one way to understand Julie's life starting from the moment she arrives in Abdu's community. She wants to learn the language.[76] Delanty states that "cosmopolitan imagination occurs when and wherever new relations between self, other and world develop in moments of openness."[77] Julie's encounter with Abdu's people demonstrates profound moments of openness. Learning a people's language is obviously one way of opening oneself to another culture,[78] but Julie's decision to open herself to the world of Abdu's desert village expresses itself not only in her desire to learn

Arabic, but also in her keen perception of the pain that the disadvantaged members of that society suffer.[79] Being in that desert village offers her a unique opportunity to exercise feminist empathy. By feminist empathy I mean the ability to feel oneself in the experience of a woman who is suffering because of her gender.[80]

Julie decides not to travel with Abdu to America, even though she helps him secure a US visa. Gordimer writes, "Her hands are up, palms open, fingers splayed, holding him off. No. It's not that. I am not going."[81] The gesture with which she signals to Abdu her firm decision to stay in his desert village reminds us of the hand gesture when her car stalls in traffic. If we had hitherto suspected that she was hopelessly naive and incapable of asserting her will, we are consoled with this show of determination, which is due to the responsibility she has taken upon herself. Having bonded with Maryam and others, she can no longer afford to break away from them, especially given that they need her for the expansion of their axis of affinity; doing so would mean deserting her responsibility. She does not give a reason for her decision, but based on her outbursts of joy it is obvious that it has a lot to do with her newfound affinity with the people in the desert village. She feels more fulfilled than she did with her parents. She is not interested in spatial mobility that does not enhance interior mobility. In her thinking, exterior mobility must parallel interior changes; that is, the readiness to redefine who one is.

In his blind exercise of patriarchal authority, Abdu blames the women of the family for his wife's decision to stay in the village. The blame is interesting in terms of what it reveals, especially about the bond between Julie and the women. Abdu accuses Maryam of fulfilling Julie's wish for affinity: "What do you tell her, you are the one, you tell her what to do here, you make her your sister here."[82] Even his mother is considered Julie's ally and therefore a danger to his existence.[83] It is ironic that what Abdu perceives as dangerous or evil—that is, Julie's elective sisterhood with these women—turns out to be Julie's virtue.

The last scene of the narrative reveals a lot about the nature of the elective affinity (read: global citizenship) that Julie has sought throughout the story. The taxi takes Abdu away for his flight to America while Julie stays behind in the village. She goes back to the room she shared with Abdu. Khadija comes to her. She "put an arm round her conspiratorially, smiled intimately and held out the bunch of sweetness, smooth dark shiny dates. She spoke in Arabic, the foreigner understands enough, now."[84] This closing scene of the book brings full circle the gesture of Julie's open palms in the opening scene. Julie is able to

transform her weakness into strength. Ironically, her strength derives from the support she gets from other people. Her open palms remain open, but Khadija lends her support by putting an arm around her.

Julie's life in Abdu's desert village fulfills Gordimer's belief that a proper, critical understanding of the globalization of culture will unfailingly help us "make reality of culture 'living on its own land': the frontierless territory of creativity."[85] Julie lives in a frontierless territory. Abdu, who seems to stand in her way of relating to her new siblings, must remove himself from that new world without frontiers. Indeed, he seems to embody frontiers based on his refusal to exit his patriarchal mind-set.

Turning Disgrace into Grace

Nadine Gordimer has painted an optimistic picture of the world through her protagonist. Julie's seemingly endless capacity to empathize and to weave affinity with strangers leaves no doubt as to what Gordimer thinks or hopes for her country. J. M. Coetzee, on the other hand, is at best reserved about the possibility of limitless empathy, especially in the wake of the demise of apartheid.

Bhekizizwe Peterson challenges the simplistic understanding of the postapartheid society that some interpretations of the TRC suggest. He points to the questions that must be asked: "Why do we need reconciliation? What is it that made us not to be reconciled?"[86] He acknowledges the reluctance among the general populace toward reconciliation and argues that "any re-articulation of the nation needs to deal with where and how the majority of the people are at this point in time. Whether you call it a national project or not, there are social, political and economic changes that are imperative in order to address the deep levels of inequity and inequality between different sectors of the society."[87] In stating that the question of violence and trauma in the larger sectors of the population must be addressed, Peterson refers specifically to the violence in the black community—violence that had been programmed by centuries of oppression. By implication he also refers to the possibility of widespread violence owing to endemic socioeconomic injustice. The TRC and the noble ideas of forgiveness cannot wish away the probability that people will rise to demand fairness in society if it has been denied them. J. M. Coetzee is one of the writers who avoid a rosy portrait of South African society and allude to the probability of some form of violent uprising if the demands of the dispossessed

population are not addressed. By presenting us with complex characters in *Disgrace*, he enables us to raise questions that must be answered if South Africa is to succeed in the trajectory of openness and forgiveness. *Disgrace* is the most popular and highly acclaimed postapartheid novel. Many critics have pointed out the parallel between the novel and the TRC.[88] My interest is in Coetzee's idea of reconciliation in terms of affinity between hitherto disparate, irreconcilable sectors of society. He addresses this through David Lurie, a divorced, fifty-two-year-old professor of communications and romantic poetry who uses his position as a professor to seduce one of his students. The abuse of power is obviously against the code of conduct of his university, and when it becomes known to the school authorities, he is forced to face the consequences, one of which is the loss of job security. Disgraced, he goes to live with his daughter Lucy on her farm. There he encounters black Africans, people with whom he would otherwise have had little in common. The black Africans rape his daughter.

Disgrace catalogs many ramifications of violence, but it also offers opportunities for redemption. Ewald Mengel argues that Coetzee believes in some kind of future for South Africa, but it is one in which whites "accept the guilt accumulated in the past, and opt for atonement and reconciliation by unusual, even unheard of measures."[89] One such measure is embodied by Lucy's annoyingly spineless acceptance of her rape and her submission to the inhuman condition imposed on her by her rapists: "Lucy has to play the role of both scapegoat and Holy Mary. Through her patient suffering, she seems to be taking the (white) sins of South Africa's history upon her shoulders."[90] The imbalance of power between David and his student, Melanie, not only foreshadows the rape of Lurie's daughter, but also dramatizes the historical imbalance of power between blacks and whites. David Lurie performs on a microcosmic level what has been taking place throughout South African history: abuse of power. The rape of Lucy mirrors the rape of the land and of the black people. Coetzee's narrative suggests that whoever feels offended by the fact that three black men raped Lucy, a white woman, should also feel offended by what had been going on historically. He uses the horror of one to explicate the heinousness of the other. Both are unforgiveable. The rape also points to the difficulty of global citizenship in a country that has yet to overcome the trauma of the past. We do not know whether Lucy forgives her rapists. She simply accepts the status quo. It is interesting that she does not pursue justice as many readers would wish. Contrary to Oscar Hemer, I do not read *Disgrace* as an allegory of the TRC.[91] I am

more interested in mining the possibility of love and the idea of living in community in the narrative.

Lucy's decision to carry to term the pregnancy resulting from the rape is difficult to understand, but it is her decision, and the reader is bound to respect the fact that she decides to love the child that will be born of that violent encounter. Her love of that child is no less valid than the love other parents have for their children. Perhaps herein lies some form of redemption. Lucy's choice seems to suggest that regardless of how a child is conceived, what counts and what makes the child fully human is the love it is given. Thus, while she may not have forgiven those who raped her, she is open to the child growing in her. Is this a metaphor for the new South Africa?

There is a thematic continuity between *Age of Iron* and *Disgrace* regarding love and acceptance of the other. One of the profound moments that envisage the age of clay occurs when Mrs. Curren declares that she is going to love Bheki's friend. She loves him despite himself and despite her feelings toward him.[92] Love is also at the heart of the quest for redemption and affinity or reconciliation with others. It is the irony of fate that Lurie, who had exercised his power over women (Soraya, the prostitute he had patronized, and Melanie) without regard to their feelings, becomes a victim of power abuse. He is emasculated when he witnesses his daughter being raped by three black men. The irony is that up until that moment, he has seen women only through the prism of utility. Now, occupying a powerless position in a patriarchal dispensation, he does not become an object in the woman's eyes. The women in the narrative do not pay him back in his own coin; rather, they treat him with dignity. They offer him grace—that is, the possibility of redemption. While Lucy provides him with shelter, Bev Shaw drives him to the hospital, attends to him, and helps take care of his injuries. Bev's relation to Lurie recalls that of the Magistrate to the native girl in *Waiting for the Barbarians*.[93] The Magistrate and the girl end up having sex, thus performing the ultimate sacrament of affinity. This is also the case with Bev Shaw and David Lurie.[94] Their sexual intercourse is unlike that between him and Melanie or Soraya. For one, Bev is not reduced to an object of desire. David's encounter with Bev brings him down to earth, so to speak, or better stated, down to the floor, for it is on the floor that Bev spreads a blanket. In this simple act, she gives him what he has been lacking.

In his discussion of the possibility of grace in the novel, Derek Attridge reminds us that "grace is something given, not something earned. . . . Grace is a blessing you do not deserve, and though you

may seek for grace, it comes, if it comes at all, unsought."[95] Could it be that Bev Shaw has given David the much needed blessing? Did she help David or even the reader discover the repressed parts of himself? Charles Sarvan locates Lurie's discovery of grace in his encounter with Bev Shaw. Bev arguably gives him back his humanity, understood in the sense that Mrs. Curren in *Age of Iron* anticipated; that is, in the sense that the age of clay promises. Sarvan points out that "soon, Lurie and Bev cease to have sex . . . , [and] simply lying in each other's arms is a mutual anointing, a healing that Lurie needs far more than Bev. [This points to the] . . . beginnings of moral regeneration."[96] Attridge identifies grace as "the arrival of the unexpected in unexpectedly beneficent form."[97] He argues that to claim that "Lurie achieves something approaching a state of grace is to claim that his daily behaviour testifies to some value beyond or before the systems—moral, religious, emotional, political."[98] In Bev Shaw's hands, Lurie becomes malleable like clay. She molds him into human shape. The job of reorienting David did not begin with their having sex. Indeed, sex with one another turns out to be the culmination of Bev Shaw's acts of grace to him. Earlier in the text, Bev initiates him into her work at the animal clinic.[99] He learns how to take care of animals, whether they are alive or dead. Of importance here is that he learns to care for something, and in doing so he begins to feel the pain of others. The narrator's analysis of Lurie's condition reveals much about his transformation: "Curious that a man as selfish as he should be offering himself to the service of dead dogs. There must be other, more productive ways of giving oneself to the world, or to an idea of the world."[100] The issue, though, is that David has given himself up to the world in this form. As Sue Kossew observes, because Lurie has made peace with the world to which Bev has introduced him, he "finds a kind of grace for himself and the dogs, a way of working through the endlessness of his scepticism and towards repentance."[101] Against this backdrop, sexual intercourse gains a whole new dimension; it becomes an encounter with two adults occupying the same power positions. It is no longer based on exploitation of his position of authority, as with Melanie, or something to be bought, as with Soraya.

Lurie's grace consists of the fact that he appears to reconcile and achieve some peace with himself. He does so by learning to care for others. Mrs. Curren achieves the same goal through her warm gestures to Mr. Vercueil. What these characters have in common is the search for connection to other people. To achieve redemption, each individual must strive for connection with the other. In this regard, there is a thematic and visionary continuity between *Age of Iron* and *Disgrace*, and

this is so strong that it is fair to argue that in Lurie, the possibility of an age of clay becomes more palpable. Again, the age of clay is one in which people relate to themselves as the human beings that they are, and to other people in the same way.

Conclusion: Building a Common Narrative

In *No Time Like the Present*, Gordimer treats contacts between cultures as having no extraordinary significance, which is in line with her self-identification as a regular citizen of South Africa; that is, one who desires no extra attention because of the color of her skin or her status as a Nobel Prize winner. The marriage between Steve and Jabulile, a black and white couple, is just like any marriage between two blacks or two whites, a marriage between two humans who are attracted to one another. This is, indeed, what human relationships should be about. Unfortunately, cultural, political, and religious ideologies always come between and seek to prevent humans from being who they are. Ideologies impose identities on people, whereas empathy disables the absoluteness of ideologies and thereby renders ordinary or regular what had hitherto been perceived through the prism of exoticism. Steve and Jabulile are veterans of the struggle against apartheid. They fell in love and married when such interracial union was illegal: "She was black, he was white. That was all that mattered. All that was identity then. Simple as the black letters on the white page. It was in those two identities that they transgressed."[102] The law of miscegenation had established a solid wall between these two identities in the assumption that they are monoliths with no commonality. Yet, even within one part of the two supposed monoliths, there are further differentiations. The narrator points out that while the woman's color was seen as black, the man's whiteness is "not as definitive as coded in old files. Born in the same past era, a few years before her, he's a white mix—that was of no significance so long as the elements were white. Actually, his mix is quite complicated in certain terms of identity not determined by colour. His father was a gentile, secular, nominally observant Christian, his mother Jewish."[103] While telling us that Jabulile, or Jabu, and Steve were prevented by law from coming together on the pretense of their difference, Gordimer subtly challenges the premise on which the ideology of difference was constructed by drawing attention to yet more difference within sameness—that is, within whiteness. With the apartheid age over, a new dispensation has arrived. Steve and Jabulile are no longer occupied with

the most important task of the past, which was fighting apartheid; they can get on with the task of living. Now part of the South African middle class, their life is divided into during and after apartheid. "Now everything is after,"[104] and their worries include finding a good place to live; a good school for Sindiswa, their child; communing with neighbors and former comrades.[105]

The core of Gordimer's idea of the ordinariness of encounter between people is simply that affinity grows as people get to know each other. When people are kept apart either by ideology or distance, the likelihood of their knowing and appreciating one another remains slim. Indeed, they are most likely to fear one another. She examines the cultural importance of a school that used to be a whites-only institution for children. When she passes by the school five years into the postapartheid era, she is pleased to see the opposite of the apartheid-era condition. At the end of school day, children surge out of school: "They are all shades of colour—South African black, South African Indian, South African mélange, South African white. They are growing up with a common initiating experience, into life. . . . These children are not being kept apart to learn to hate, to fear the unknown, the untouched in one another."[106] Of importance is the phrase "a common initiating experience into life," which suggests that the only way for people of diverse racial backgrounds to build a truly civil society is to have common narratives. Njabulo Ndebele has identified such narratives as a common set of values or "a national consciousness" around which most South Africans can rally.[107] In Gordimer's thinking, this can be achieved if South Africans give up seeing one another through the prism of the past and of racial prejudice, and instead see each other in an unmediated way, as fellow humans.

In the ordinariness of encounter between people of diverse backgrounds, people influence and are influenced by others; they pick up aspects of other people's culture, habits, and even lifestyles. In *No Time Like the Present*, this ordinariness of encounter has become the norm, as "comrades, even if white, find expressive the few words in the languages of black comrades they've picked up."[108] One example is *Khale, Khale*, meaning "slowly, careful." What is most appealing in Steve and Jabu's life is its normality. Aside from their obviously different backgrounds, one would hardly know they are an interracial couple. They live their life like intraracial couples do. And when Steve asks Jabu to teach him her language, he seeks to make full that circle of normality in their relationship.[109] In seeking to learn Jabu's language, Steve reverses the position of the settlers or the missionaries, of the colonial masters whose language had to be learned by the colonized. Steve is seeking to

establish mutual lines of communication between him and his wife and his daughter. When Jabu expresses surprise that he wants to learn Zulu, he retorts that he is not a foreigner, and the narrator comments on the normality of the new condition. This, too, is normative of the global citizenship to which they both now lay claim.

The narrator's reference to the fact that Steve is now African can also be appreciated via the concept of Afropolitanism. The Afropolitan, as we have seen, is a person of any ancestry who has lived on the African continent long enough to identify with it and its people. The Afropolitan is rooted in Africa but does not conceive of himself according to nativist paradigms. Steve's notion of the world is in line with the era ushered in by Mandela, the archetypal African global citizen. Steve and Jabulile are intense admirers of Mandela. They despise Jacob Zuma with the same intensity. Zuma can rightly be seen as an antagonist to Mandela in South Africa's political drama. The narrator uses Zuma's infamous rape scandal to expose the risks that cultural relativism poses to the idea of global citizenship.[110]

Whereas Mandela and Tutu embody global citizenship, Zuma is emblematic of the return of autochthonous thinking in South Africa.[111] Writing in the wake of the 2015 outburst of xenophobic violence, Daniel Magaziner and Sean Jacobs recall the Zulu ethnonationalism that nearly derailed the peaceful transition of 1994. It "has now morphed into a malignant 'nativism' that threatens post-apartheid democracy." Zuma, who is Zulu, seems to luxuriate in this new atmosphere of nativism.[112] Jabu does not hide her distaste for Zuma. She, like many other forward-looking South Africans, black and white alike, is disillusioned by Zuma's nativist politics. For them, South Africa is no longer a cosmopolitan space because nativism seems to have gained widespread acceptance. Through Steve and Jabu's distaste for Zuma and the direction he is taking the country, Gordimer warns South Africans about the fragility of the cosmopolitan ideal.

5

Of Xenophobia and Other Bigotries

Forging Transcultural Visions

In chapter 3, I argued that Njabulo Ndebele and Zakes Mda urge the black population of South Africa to move beyond their justified anger about past oppression in order to build a society superior to apartheid. Here I develop these core arguments and examine how the younger, postapartheid generation of writers—notably Phaswane Mpe, Ivan Vladislavić, and K. Sello Duiker—seeks to defy the binary thinking of the postapartheid era in the interest of forging a transcultural future.[1] In the concluding section of this chapter, I discuss Damon Galgut's *The Impostor* as a work that highlights empathy as a tool of social cohesion. As I hope to make evident in my discussion, these authors use Coetzee's rhetorical and hermeneutical gestures by deploying the virtues of basic human encounter to defuse the horrors of the irrational fear of the other. They promote empathy and cosmopolitan imagination as transgressive to the absolutism of nativist ideologies and as capable of promoting transcultural affinity. Either directly or indirectly, Mpe, Vladislavić, and Duiker rely on *Waiting for the Barbarians* as an intertextual frame.

In *Welcome to Our Hillbrow*, Mpe makes specific reference to Coetzee's *Waiting for the Barbarians*. The migrants are seen as the cause of nearly all the social and moral malaise in Hillbrow. The situation in Hillbrow replicates that in an unnamed town in *Waiting* where the indigenous people are characterized as barbarians by the colonizing power and are seen as the cause of social evils in society. Ken Barris discusses the influence of Coetzee's first novel, *Dusklands* (1974), on Vladislavić, arguing that "despite Vladislavić's originality, commonalities between the early writing of J. M. Coetzee and his own are evident. These commonalities are sufficiently numerous and significant to justify their characterization

as an intertextuality of technical means."[2] In an interview with Christopher Warnes, Vladislavić admits to Coetzee's influence: "I came to Coetzee slightly later. He's a superb writer. It's impossible to write in South Africa without being influenced by him. I keep returning to my 'formative years.'"[3] Vladislavić's commonality with Coetzee is especially evident in their handling of tropes as means of creating hermeneutic contexts. Vladislavić uses the categories of purity/impurity, outsider/insider, and us/them to characterize and challenge the traditional conceptions of community and solidarity in South Africa. There is, in this regard, a commonality between *The Restless Supermarket* and *Waiting for the Barbarians*. What is true of *The Restless Supermarket* and *Welcome to Our Hillbrow* can also be said of K. Sello Duiker's *The Quiet Violence of Dreams*.

In discussing the phenomena of xenophobia, homophobia, and racism in the above works, I seek to flesh out how Mpe, Vladislavić, and Duiker articulate their society as a transcultural space in which different cultures not only exist side by side, but also engage and feed off one another. I use Coetzee's apartheid-era book *Waiting for the Barbarians* as an interpretive aid in my reading of the works of these writers.

Waiting for the Barbarians has been read as an allegory of apartheid. It captures the ideologies that both sustained apartheid violence and anticipated postapartheid xenophobic and homophobic violence. Judie Newman argues that Coetzee's intertextual frame is Mary Douglas's *Purity and Danger*, an analysis of the concepts of pollution and taboo. Douglas's ideas inform the plot, imagery, structure, and politics of *Waiting*. Douglas states that "ideas about separating, purifying, demarcating and punishing transgressions have as their main function to impose system on an inherently untidy experience. It's only by exaggerating the difference between within and without, above and below, male and female, with and against, that a semblance of order is created."[4] Douglas's notion of purity and danger elucidates Coetzee's exposition of the Empire mind-set. The notion of unbridgeable difference has to be maintained between the citizens of the Empire and the barbarians.

Maria Boletsi provides a rich interpretation of the term *barbaroi*. It involves the Greek imitation of the incomprehensible clamor of the languages of foreign people whose speech sounds like "bar-bar." It is comparable to indicating that somebody is saying, "blah, blah, blah." This mocking imitation, she argues, attests to at least one thing: "an unwillingness to understand the other's language and thus to make the encounter with the other a communicative occasion. Consequently, the term barbarian entails a collective construction of the other in a way that helps define the civilized subject itself—by specifying its negative

limits. In this construction, the other is supposedly invalidated because it can never speak back and question its construction."[5] According to Georges Pericles, the Greeks, for instance, believed that the Persians were an illogical people "addicted to wine and accustomed to deliberate together about the gravest matters when drunk, and then to review their decisions next day when sober."[6] That conviction developed and became embedded in the Greeks' consciousness as their art and philosophy flourished and culminated in their assertion that their culture was the birthplace of reason.[7] Just as Coetzee's *Waiting* makes ample use of the Greek implication of *barbaroi*, so does Mpe's *Welcome*. The second-person omniscient narrator in *Welcome* remarks that South Africans, who considered themselves as autochthons, regarded other Africans seeking refuge in South Africa in derogatory terms derived from how their languages sounded: "*Makwerekwere* was a word derived from *kwere*, a sound that their unintelligible foreign languages were supposed to make, according to the locals."[8] Xenophobia is, of course, not exclusive to South Africans; they follow the well-trodden, notorious path of hating the stranger while maintaining an inflated sense of self. Mpe seeks to deflate these paired vices of xenophobia and delusions of moral excellence.

The narrator in *Welcome* observes that South Africa erected "electric fences around the boundaries of South Africa trying to keep out the barbarians from Mozambique Zaire Nigeria Congo Ivory Coast . . ."[9] Later in the narrative, the narrator describes the protagonist reading "John Maxwell Coetzee's *Waiting for the Barbarians*."[10] Indeed, Mpe suggests that South Africans seek to build a fortress to hold off imaginary invaders, those who are "coming to take [their] jobs in the new democratic rainbowism of African renaissance that threatened the future of the locals."[11] In *Waiting*, an anonymous magistrate is posted to a small town on the remote border of an anonymous Empire. He is the chief imperial administrator of this town. When rumors of a barbarian invasion begin to circulate, Colonel Joll, a representative of the internal security service, arrives to take command. Joll comes as a protector of standards and purity in the Empire. He is the Hegelian master who has subdued the other and made him a slave. If the difference between the master and the slave is not kept, then the battle that made the position of the master possible will soon become meaningless.

At the beginning of the story, we learn that the soldiers caught some prisoners—members of the fisherfolk—in a raid within twenty miles of the outpost. Among the prisoners are an old man and a boy who are thought to be enemies of the Empire. Thus, the enemies are no longer

anonymous entities; they are embodied and decidedly different from the citizens because they speak "patois." In typical Hegelian dialectical format, difference serves to define the barbarians. At this stage, their difference is in their dialect, which is figurative of their incoherence, lack of standards, and authenticity; these deficiencies are further proof of their subordinate status. They are therefore to be kept apart from citizens of the Empire. Naturally, the Empire would not allow for anything that would corrupt its imagined purity. We learn that the barbarians are detained on suspicion of theft.[12] In *Welcome*, the indigenous Hillbrowans also project their own weaknesses onto the *Makwerekweres*. Thus, the Hillbrowans share the same delusions of moral rectitude that the citizens of the Empire possess.

Colonel Joll's means of establishing order on the frontier is to create the binary of purity and impurity. He must arouse and maintain in the minds of the citizens the hatred of imaginary enemies in order to give them a false sense of importance. This becomes ingrained in the minds of the children. They believe that the barbarians are among them; they scream and will not be comforted. Even adults believe that the barbarians have dug a tunnel under the walls to come and go as they please. However, the hysteria about the barbarians provides an opportunity for people to reveal their true selves. Instances of their own evil are now projected onto the unknown, the blank slate that is identified as the barbarian. For example: "Clothing disappeared from washing-liners, food from larders, however tightly locked," and people believe it was the handiwork of the barbarians; moreover, "Three weeks ago a little girl was raped. . . . Her friend claimed a barbarian did it."[13] Colonel Joll is a moral rabble-rouser, and with him the worst aspects of people materialize. In the minds of Joll and the citizens who believe him, the barbarians are the cause of all evil in society.

Embodying the Empire's ideas of purity and authenticity, and therefore its limitless power, Colonel Joll is not shy about exercising that power over the natives. For example, his men make a preemptive raid, and as in the beginning of the story, they make a haul of barbarians. There is "a file of men, barbarians, stark naked, holding their hands up to their faces in an odd way as though one and all are suffering from toothache."[14] The humiliation of the barbarians is a potent way of demonstrating to the citizens of the Empire how privileged they are. The barbarians are further humiliated when Joll steps forward and writes with charcoal on their bodies: "ENEMY . . . ENEMY."[15] The colonel operates within the Saussurean structuralist paradigm in which a sign has meaning only in relation to its opposite, to what it is not. The same

thinking supported apartheid. Charcoal on obviously pale skin is jarring, and onlookers are left to figure out what the signifier stands for. Stef Craps suggests that this is a good example of Colonel Joll's imperial hermeneutic circle; he "produces marks of torture on the bodies of his victims only to read these marks as signs of guilt. The only truth that he can extract from the barbarians is the one he has projected onto them."[16] Michael Valdez Moses argues that the significance of writing on the natives' bodies lies in the Empire's claim to inscribe itself on the other, who is thought to have no history: "The barbarian Other generally appears in the novel as a blank slate onto which the Empire engraves itself, that is, the Empire gives itself form by writing on its subjects."[17] The patois of the barbarians is significant in this regard; it signifies disorder and the inscribing of imperial language is supposed to bring order.

As in *Waiting*, *Welcome* exposes the ideology that sustains the fear of strangers. The strangers are totalized as vectors of disease and moral turpitude. The omniscient narrator reminds Refentše about the hypocrisies of the Hillbrowans. "Cousin would always take the opportunity during these arguments to complain about the crime and grime in Hillbrow, for which he held such foreigners responsible; not just for the physical decay of the place, but the moral decay."[18] Strangers from other African countries are not the only ones pinpointed as the source of evil in society; weaker members of society are also othered and even lynched.[19] The hypocrisies of the people made them believe that AIDS "was caused by foreign germs that travelled down from the central and western parts of Africa. . . . AIDS's travel route into Johannesburg was through *Makwerekwere*; and Hillbrow was the sanctuary in which *Makwerekwere* basked."[20] The narrator's vision represents Mpe's transcendent moral attitude toward postapartheid society. The people's lack of vision turns them into bitter humans who unleash violence on one another. The people fail to realize that many of the relatives "they had buried in the past two years were victims of AIDS. It was easy to be ignorant of this, because the disease lent itself to lies. Such people were thought to have died of flu, or of stomachache. Bone throwers sniffed out the witches responsible, and they were subsequently necklaced."[21] Necklacing is a form of public lynching in which victims are burned alive with a car tire around their chest and arms. As Emily S. Davis states, "what this xenophobic discourse masks is the fact that many of the ills blamed on the immigrants are a consequence of internal displacements resulting from South Africa's rapid emergence as a regional, and increasingly global, economic powerhouse."[22] It is convenient for the Hillbrowans

to blame the other for their own crimes; they, like Colonel Joll, inflict on others the crime that is latent in themselves. They block themselves from perceiving others' feelings because the ideology to which they have been exposed reduces those others to the status of objects or enemies. The fear of strangers obviously benefits the power structures of Hillbrowan society; it is maintained as an ideological tool that masks their leaders' inhumanity and incompetence. Xenophobia also gives the ordinary people the illusion of self-importance through contrast. If the strangers are evil, they—the natives—must be good. The natives' violence toward strangers is, in effect, their effort to instrumentalize their ill-conceived moral binarism.

Purity and Impurity as Categories of Legitimation

Whereas Mpe employs the categories of stranger/native to expose the binarism of postapartheid society, Vladislavić examines the vestiges of apartheid racial categorization of peoples. *The Restless Supermarket*, published in 2001, is about Aubrey Tearle, a conservative ex-proofreader who is at odds with the social and political changes taking place in his country. The novel is set in 1993, just before the first general election that would usher in majority rule in South Africa. Café Europa, one of Tearle's favorite haunts in Johannesburg, which had been exclusive to white patrons, is about to close its doors. Tearle grumbles that standards are in decline; he is determined to educate his fellow citizens about the dangers of losing standards, of mixing people. The first section of *The Restless Supermarket*, "Café Europa," concludes with the narrator, Tearle, observing a corpse decaying in the open "as if a reef of disorder lay just below the surface or a civilization had gone to ruin here before we ever arrived."[23] In pointing to the decaying corpse, Tearle draws attention to the social chaos purportedly brought about by the new dispensation; he is determined to keep society from being so. In the penultimate paragraph of the narrative, Tearle revealingly draws attention to the first-person plural by interrogating himself: "What do I mean by 'we'? Don't make me laugh."[24] Of course, he knows what he means by "we." He knows he means the settlers—Europeans—who claimed to have ordered the chaotic lives of the indigenous populations, the Africans, believing that without Europeans, there would be corpses everywhere.

An examination of Tearle's profession further reveals his worldview. Tearle is "a proofreader by profession. When [he] retired half a dozen years ago, [he] came to live in a flat in Prospect Road on the edge of

Hillbrow."[25] As a proofreader emeritus, he devotes his time to picking out errors in the use of his dear language. As Mike Marais observes, "for Tearle, the linguistic order of the colonial English must be recovered, and with it those differences and values which it instills in the social formation and which he sees as inherent and eternal."[26] This fixation with colonial English and the values it instills casts Tearle's mind-set in the binary mold, with Tearle representing the old order out of which South Africa is in the process of emerging. Tearle's foil, Martinus Theodosius Wessels, mocks Tearle's obsession with linguistic purity. As Tearle complains, "He mispronounces things deliberately to get under my skin."[i] Why does Wessels deliberately mispronounce words in the presence of a man obsessed with getting things right? What is the fate of Tearle, who believes that "changing with the times won't save [him]"?[28]

Like *Waiting*, *The Restless Supermarket* is an allegory of sorts, especially in its depiction of the demise of Café Europa. Café Europa is an allegory of Europe; everything in it has symbolic relevance, and one of the most important symbols is the picture of Alibia, the walled city. Hanging on the wall of the café, this picture is a symbol of a protected enclave or set of values. Tearle is proud to identify himself as an "an old hand at the Café Europa, their most venerable patron, an incorrigible European" and a "proofreader by profession."[29] He sees his task as preserving the protected set of values.

Tearle's profession is Vladislavić's device for exploring the constructions of essentialism and purity in South Africa, given that it is the role of proofreaders to maintain "standards" in the language.[30] Language is understood here as the bastion of culture and, in fact, of existence. To exist is to do so in a language. In that regard, Tearle represents the old order, and he is coping with the changes that seek to strip his society of its European identity. Tearle's linguistic proofreading seamlessly transitions into his social proofreading and is his way of measuring existence. It might strike one as odd for a citizen of South Africa to describe himself as European, but apartheid had been about precisely that, about European settlers seeking to re-create and maintain a purist European enclave in the heart of Africa. This is why Tearle regrets the demise of apartheid. He is happy that Café Europa is an island of "European ambience."[31] He differentiates between ambience and atmosphere. Atmosphere is superficial, invented, and can be sprayed on with aerosol. Ambience, in contrast, must "accrue over time."[32] He alludes to the idea that Europe has tradition, while America, standing for a new world of racial and cultural mixture, is superficial. Europe's long tradition, or its ambience that has accrued over time, confers authenticity or

realness on Europeans. Part of the ambience is the sort of music played there: "The Isle of Capri" or "Arrivederci Roma."[33] This music suggests nostalgia for the continent the Europeans left behind. Tearle and the other patrons of Café Europa live in that nostalgia, stubbornly wedded to the idea of re-creating Europe in Africa.

The painting of imaginary Alibia hanging on the wall of Café Europa represents Europe as a reference point for white construction of identity and difference. As Althusser argues, "ideology represents the imaginary relationship of individuals to their real conditions of existence."[34] In Tearle's case, the ideology of Europe is where imaginary purity is preserved. It is his "imaginary homeland."[35] In his thinking, this authenticity created by ambience must not be allowed to succumb to change. Alibia is "a perfect alibi, a generous elsewhere in which the immigrant might find the landmarks he had left behind."[36] Vladislavić creates a pun with the dictionary meaning of alibi: "a claim or piece of evidence that one was elsewhere when an act, typically a criminal one, is alleged to have taken place."[37] Thus when Tearle says that his "eye was drawn to the city on the wall, to the walled city of Alibia, where [he] had roamed so often in [his] imagination,"[38] he sees an excuse to live in a place other than where he presently is; he wishes to live in a walled city.

Tearle's discerning talent as a proofreader is displayed in his dexterity with words. He wants to impress Mevrouw Bonsma, one of the patrons of the Café Europa, with his System of Records, especially his lexical gymnastics, which he describes as "flashy routines full of pikes and rolls and tearless with a twist, moves I could execute in my sleep. '**Medley**, Mevrouw,' I would say. "Heterogeneous mixture. See meddle, **Meddle**, busy oneself unduly. And **mêlée**. Same root in 'mix'—from the Latin *misceo*."[39] Tearle dislikes mixture because it has something in common with medley; it is meddling with the order of things. Indeed, heterogeneity is melee, which is, according to its dictionary definition, confusion; turmoil; jumble, a confused hand-to-hand fight or struggle among several people. *Melee* has a French origin, while *to meddle*, which is to involve oneself in a matter without right or invitation, has Middle English, Old French, and Latin origins. With his knowledge of the etymologies of these words, Tearle immerses himself deeper and deeper into Europeanness. The irony here is that Europe is itself heterogeneous, as the constitution of its languages proves. Europe has always been transcultural. It is interesting that Tearle perceives his job in moral terms: "a responsibility."[40]

Impressed by his ideas of European identity, Tearle observes that "standards of proofreading have been declining steadily since the

nineteen-sixties, when the permissive attitude to life first gained ground, and so have standards of morality, conduct in public life, personal hygiene and medical care, the standard of living, and so on."[41] The 1960s were a turbulent time the world over, with the decade marking a shift in the political and moral landscapes in the West and in Africa. It was a particularly stormy time in South Africa. The police fired upon antipass protesters in Sharpeville on March 21, 1960. The famous Rivonia trial took place in 1963–64. Tearle fears that the impending changes in South Africa in the 1990s will bring the turbulence of the 1960s all over again. This fear increases his fixation on keeping things apart—that is, maintaining apartheid. He takes a cue from Merle, his fellow patron of Café Europa and mentee, "laying sentences side by side, building up paragraphs incrementally, nudging those into groups or 'fascicles.'"[42] In his use of the word "fascicle," Tearle makes a subtle play on fascism. The dictionary definition of fascism clarifies the allusion: "a separately published installment of a book or other printed work" or (anatomy), "a bundle of structures." In the same vein, fascism derives from the Italian *fascio* (bundle, political group), from the Latin *fascis*, a bundle. Is Tearle attracted to fascism? He believes that his thinking is logical and his fear is justified because "getting things right is not just a matter of form (although that is important enough in itself), but of necessity. Dotting one i might be regarded as a mere punctilio, and failing to do so dismissed as a trifle. But all the dots left off all the i's accumulate, they build up, they pack together like a cloud over a field of stubbly iotas."[43] Tearle's linguistic editing therefore runs parallel to social proofreading, and it is not surprising that his obsession with keeping language pure suggests fascism in society; that is, keeping people in bundles. He observes with consternation that society's taste is changing rapidly: "Something new every week. Men's outfitters folding up and chicken grillers hatching. Why this obsession with poultry? Was it a tribal thing?"[44] His question of whether the obsession with poultry is tribal pokes fun at the African American, and by now global, signifier of black cuisine: love of fried chicken. In Tearle, Vladislavić mocks the absurdity of fascism in South Africa.

The Quiet Violence of Dreams is about the effects of cultural categorizations on individuals, especially on those who have discovered that there are more possibilities in the world than one's cultural space can offer. The novel explores sexuality as an issue that easily excites society's purity/impurity binary valuations. Tshepo is a black gay sex worker at a gay massage parlor. He has a mostly white clientele. Through Tshepo's encounters with his white clients, Duiker explores gay sexual

orientation and relationships between blacks and whites, issues that firmly belong to the pure/impure, us/them, insider/outsider binarism. In what reads like a page from early European existentialist texts by Camus or Sartre, Tshepo, the protagonist, begins the account of his life with an address directed at the self and the world, the two entities whose relationship the narrative seeks to interrogate.

> There is no one to blame. It's about me. It's always been about me. I accept that now. But I still find it hard to explain what really happened, what was really going on in my life. There's a part of me that will never be the same again. I feel like I've lost something or got lost in something too big to describe with easy words. So much happened in a short space of time. I don't know where to begin to look for the answers so for now I live with questions.[45]

Tshepo is traumatized by the horrific murder of his mother. His life is unhinged. He experiments with drugs as an undergraduate at Rhodes University. He spends time in Valkenberg Mental Hospital. His only true contact with the world is Mmabatho, but he expands his circle of contacts when he begins to work as a male prostitute at a men's massage room, where he discovers his sexual orientation. He does not seem to find answers to his questions even in this subculture, but he finds some measure of happiness.

Duiker touches on the central existentialist and even postmodernist idea of the impermanence of the self when Tshepo announces right away that there is a part of him "that will never be the same again." The truth is that the self has never been the same as originally conceived. Tshepo is in search of what he knows is lost and will never be found; that is, what can never be pared down to something concrete: the self. His search can be understood as an effort to create his own meaning, and this entails going beyond the boundaries of his world. Based on the existentialist thematic sketch in the first paragraph, which is justified in the narrator's unsettled life and quest for meaning outside his culture, Tshepo's world must be transcultural. His question is understood as an attempt to reach outside self toward the other. The text is ultimately more revealing in the questions it raises than the answers the protagonist provides for his own meaning. The issue foreshadowed by the questions that trouble the protagonist in the first paragraph is that of his dissimilarity from the people he is supposedly like (black Africans), and his similarity to the people from whom he obviously differs (Europeans). He thus discovers difference within sameness and sameness within difference. By highlighting Tshepo's difference from fellow

Africans, whom the apartheid ideology qualified as homogeneous, Duiker suggests heterogeneity within Africa just as Vladislavić does within Europe.

Nearly every figure in *The Quiet Violence of Dreams* stands for something larger than him- or herself. Tshepo's stint at Valkenberg, a mental institution, is a metaphor for his conception of his life in his damaged society. For him, the institution is a place that reduces everyone to the same context. He has questions about that, too, so he decides to break away in order to discover himself.[46]

Mmabatho is an effective foil to Tshepo, and as such she discloses what Tshepo is interested in rejecting. Mmabatho seems to be the only one Tshepo can trust, but their developments take different trajectories. She becomes more conservative, while he is more progressive. "You must be careful of Makwere—kwere," Mmabatho warns. Tshepo is surprised, and he accuses her of xenophobia.[47] The point here is to sharpen Tshepo's image as an inherent cosmopolitan by suggesting that Mmabatho is xenophobic. To be sure, Mmabatho seems to turn more conservative with time. In her, Duiker presents us with alternative ways to engage the questions that occupy Tshepo. As Annie Gagiano observes, Duiker "does give unmistakable emphasis to Tshepo's vision as the more daringly future-directed of the two."[48] Indeed, "Duiker's text, like Tshepo's life, depicts a courageous, violence-threatened search for new myths, for a new frame of identity."[49]

Tshepo is against the glorification of Haile Selassie.[50] The Rastafarians have deified Emperor Selassie, who for them is the most visible sign of their rootedness in Africa. We can better appreciate Duiker's argument with the Rastafarians if we recall the nativist, essentialist ideological strain of their music. Peter Tosh, for example, identified Africanness with blackness:

> Don't care where you come from
> As long as you're a black man, you're an African.[51]

In rejecting Haile Selassie and pointing out his cruelty toward his subjects, Tshepo also interrogates their Pan-African identity construction. He raises questions about the danger of cultural categorizations: "Can I claim Afrikaans, Coloured tsotsi taal, Indian cuisine or English sensibilities as my own? Must I always be apologetic for wanting more than what my culture offers? Am I a sell-out, an Uncle Tom? Isn't sticking to your own culture ruthlessly a kind of stagnation, a type of incest?[52] Duiker presents a character, who, questioning the us/them binary, feels

an intense affinity to other cultures but is hampered to reach out to them by his culture's expectation that he should remain authentic. Mpe, Vladislavić, and Duiker thus draw our attention to the enduring hierarchies that must be interrogated if society is to attain the desired goal of openness.

The City as Social Cosmopolitan Drama

In chapter 4, I referred to Lewis Mumford's characterization of the city as a "geographic plexus" and as a "theater of social action."[53] Viewing the city as a theater suggests that in the city, the drama of human interaction is displayed in all its colorations. The city is a space of cultural connections and transcultural affinity.

In a style reminiscent of James Joyce's in *Ulysses*, Phaswane Mpe sketches a map of a city in *Welcome to Our Hillbrow* so that with the novella in hand, the reader can walk from one end of it to the other without losing his or her way. Mpe's concern is not to make street maps obsolete, though; it is to situate the reader in the maze of a city that has been traversed by people from different ancestral and racial backgrounds, people who were once strangers to the city and to one another. He situates the reader in a spot that is emblematic of our globalized world. The narrator repeats a verbal gesture of hospitality to Refentše—"welcome to our Hillbrow"—before giving a specific description of the many routes that converge toward Hillbrow.[54] By welcoming Refentše to Hillbrow, the narrator makes him a stranger, suggesting that he has less of an autochthonous claim to Hillbrow than do other strangers. He has yet to understand Hillbrow, and this is why he takes a walk through it.

The idea of mobility is prominent even in the first few pages of *Welcome*, a narrative that moves from the rural Tiragalong to Hillbrow to Oxford and finally to heaven. As Meg Samuelson observes, "Mpe writes outward from Hillbrow—moving from the local to encompass the national, the continental, the global and, finally, the cosmological."[55] When Refentše moves from one end of the city to the other, he seeks to insert himself in the present. But the road to the present leads through the past. He encounters names that reveal the ancestries of those who inhabited or shaped the city. They are Smuts, Van der Merwe, Goldreich, and so forth. These used to be strangers, as are the African migrants, the *Makwerekwere*. In another instance, a street direction is given when Refilwe, Refentše's former girlfriend, travels to Oxford for

further studies. She takes a "five minutes' walk from the Headington Hill Campus of the University."[56] Given that ample attention is devoted to Refentše's and Refilwe's time on the streets of Hillbrow and Oxford, we are alerted to their being the ones who need to go through the maze of social drama with which Mpe indicts South Africans for their bigotry. Michel de Certeau imbues those who walk the streets with insights. According to Certeau, "the ordinary practitioners of the city live 'down below,' below the thresholds at which visibility begins. They walk—an elementary form of this experience of the city; they are walkers *Wandersmänner*, whose bodies follow the thicks and thins of an urban 'text' they write without being able to read it."[57] Walking allows people to see and to master what they see; they navigate the strategies of the city's design—that is, the structures of power. On the street, they encounter others with whom they could enter into conflict and/or solidarity. Hillbrow is a theater, a stage on which the drama of human encounter takes place. As Sarah Nuttall notes of *Welcome*, "the narrative repeatedly performs an act of embrace."[58] Refentše is in love with a woman named Lerato. He catches her having sex with Sammy, his best friend, and commits suicide out of frustration. Refilwe had been Refentše's lover, but Refentše left her because she was cheating on him. Refentše also had had sex with Sammy's girlfriend, Bohlale, who has been heartbroken because Sammy slept with prostitutes. In addition to these many literal embraces, Nuttall's double entendre points to the novella's web of entanglements. The narrative is one of deep corporal and affective encounters. Nuttall argues that "Hillbrow is a city of strangers, in which the terms of civility and incivility have to be negotiated."[59] Our moral compass is tested in this encounter of strangers. We are confronted with the question of our relation to those who are obviously vulnerable in our society. We ask with Emmanuel Levinas: What does the face of the stranger say to me?[60]

Like in *Welcome*, mobility is integral in *The Quiet Violence of Dreams*. Tshepo moves in and out of a mental hospital, in and out of jail, and from one part of the city to the next. In each of these moves, he encounters people and is enriched by his encounters. Of importance to Duiker are Tshepo's various transcultural contacts: with the man from Palermo; with West from Britain, who gives him a lecture on the history of important gay men; with Chris; with Shaun, Francois, Carrington, Sebastian, Cole, and so forth—all of whom are workers at Steamy Windows. Each meeting contributes to Tshepo's knowledge of self and expands his vision of the world. This is the cosmopolitan goal of the narrative. In the openness engendered by his encounters,

Tshepo becomes the quintessential global citizen. With his first client, an investment banker from Palermo, he feels relaxed for the first time in the presence of another person. "They communicate with [their] bodies," and he observes how good it is to "have someone want to be with [him], even if he pays [him] the sort of attention that wouldn't be deemed customary by a lot of people."[61] At this juncture, Duiker provides answers to the existential questions that Tshepo raises at the outset. Meaning rests in encounters with others. West is an English gentleman who imagines gay culture as morphing into a better alternative to heterosexual, violence-prone hegemony. He believes that gays are drawn to art because of the inherent serenity of gay imagination and cites as examples Michelangelo, da Vinci, and other great artists in history who are said to have been homosexuals. Tshepo muses about his encounter with West:

> I spend the evening thinking about West, thinking about my life, wondering about all the things that have influenced me. What do they mean? Is it possible to draw sincere meaning from all the things that I have known from black and white culture? Is it possible to feel South African and feel like I can draw inspiration from white South Africa, that I can identify with them? Is it possible to feel South African and not to always source my culture to a particular race group?[62]

Against the backdrop of this meditation, the characters that Tshepo meets become figurative of Duiker's vision of global citizenship. West, the Englishman, might as well stand for the West as a geographical and cultural space. In West and Tshepo, there is a fruitful encounter between Western and African cultures. With this encounter as a hermeneutic key, we begin to understand the significance of Tshepo's other encounters. Peter, another white client, reveals that he chose Tshepo because he is anonymous because of his color.[63] Tshepo seems to enjoy being tagged anonymous. He is sure of at least one thing: no identity will be imposed on him. Indeed, the absence of a definite identity fits his search for self. He is a blank slate on which anything can be written and erased. Peter is also anonymous to him. Anonymity becomes a common ground for encounter and implies the absence of prejudgment. All these encounters culminate in Tshepo's true sexual contact with men who penetrate him. Penetration stands as a figure of his journey inward. It is instructive that he makes this journey only when he has literally opened himself to others and otherness. In Duiker's writing, strangers are not our opposite; rather, they are what might help us penetrate ourselves. This is why Tshepo finds being penetrated a ritual of

liberation: "Perhaps this is the last rite of passage for me: liberating my body. No one should tell me what I can and can't do with it, when it is I who face loneliness, despair, confusion."[64]

But Duiker is not under any illusions about the difficulties that might arise from encounters between strangers. Tshepo knows this too well. He happily watches two young black men kiss and imagines what a complex world they are to face: "You will probably feel schizophrenic half the time, switching between two cultures and languages that are as different and diverse as flowers and apples. You will probably feel the influence of the one at the expense of the other. . . . [I remember] how conflicted I felt at whether I should concentrate on speaking Sotho or English."[65] Admitting the potential conflicts that arise when people from different cultural and linguistic backgrounds meet one another is a good condition for such inevitable encounters, and it reflects a recognition of the nature of life in a globalized world. Reality has lost its purity; cultures are entangled in one another; and people are faced with not just two but multiple languages. These situations have their risks and rewards.

Overcoming the Fear of the Other: The Role of Empathy

Dick Penner argues that "at the core of *Waiting for the Barbarians* is the Magistrate's evolving ethical awareness."[66] In the Magistrate we see a relation to the other that is marked by openness. He is therefore an example of global citizenship, even at the darkest point of the Empire enterprise. We observe the Magistrate's ethical awareness in his deflation of Colonel Joll's absolutism by questioning the place of his own heart: "I feel my heart grow heavy. I never wished to be drawn into this. Where it will end I do not know. I am a country magistrate, a responsible official in the service of the Empire, serving out my days on this lazy frontier."[67] But the Magistrate does not seem to be satisfied with just doubting the absolutism of the Empire; he reaches out to the barbarians in a gesture of empathy, a gesture informed by cosmopolitan sentiment.

Coetzee's allegory is also about pain—how it is produced, and how we can stop it. Specifically, though, it is concerned with our attitude toward the suffering of others, and this is revealed not only in the gradual increase in the Magistrate's awareness of the evil of the Empire, but also in his personal judgment that establishes his moral position: "'When some men suffer unjustly,' I said to myself, 'it is the fate of those who witness their suffering to suffer the shame of it.'"[68]

He suggests that there can be no innocent bystander in conflicts that have moral consequences and supports this judgment with a description of a scene in which he has unfamiliar feelings while out on a hunt. Having taken aim at a buck, he is unable to shoot. For a moment, the buck seems rooted to the spot. Both the hunter and the hunted are frozen in time and space. The Magistrate reflects that "there seems to be time for all things, time even to turn my gaze inward and see what it is that has robbed the hunt of its savour."[69] He later reveals that there are configurations "in which events are not themselves but stand for other things."[70] What does this encounter with the buck signify? What ethical implications does Coetzee suggest with this anecdote? We see that the Magistrate is particularly sensitive when faced with the other's experience of pain, and this feeling extends even to animals.[71] Of far-reaching moral significance is that, in turning his gaze inward and thereby implementing an important cosmopolitan rite, the Magistrate discovers a fundamental truth about life: pain is universal. The moment the hunter imagines himself in the position of the hunted, his hunting instincts freeze. In this regard, the events stand both for themselves and for other things. Having put himself in the position of the hunted animal, the Magistrate extends the same empathetic gesture to the barbarians:

> See who lies drunk in the gutter, and see who kicks him where he lies. It is this contempt for the barbarians, contempt which is shown by the meanest ostler or peasant farmer, that I as Magistrate have had to contend with for twenty years. How do you eradicate contempt, especially when that contempt is founded on nothing more substantial than differences in table manners, variations in the structure of the eyelid?[72]

In the first section of the narrative, the Magistrate's identification with the fisherfolk is expressed when he suspects that the elderly barbarian and his nephew were indeed telling the truth. As he moves closer to them, he retreats further from the Empire, and by the time he meets the barbarian girl, a bond is already formed. She is one of the people caught by Colonel Joll's men and tortured. Crippled and poor, she supports herself by begging and prostitution. While she is in this condition, the Magistrate discovers her and employs her as a domestic. The degree to which he distances himself from the hegemonic thinking of the Empire equals his recognition of the individuality of the barbarians. Their encounter and the bond that develops thereby support Gerard Delanty's definition of cosmopolitan imagination and my argument that cosmopolitanism must be realized through individual

encounters. The Magistrate describes in minute detail his devoted care of the brutalized girl. In a scene reminiscent of Jesus washing the feet of his disciples to demonstrate humility and love, the Magistrate washes and massages the girl's feet and legs. But unlike Jesus's act of humility, the washing of the barbarian girl becomes a ritual in which she must be naked, which leaves the Magistrate's motives suspect.[73] Susan VanZanten Gallagher judges the Magistrate's act as a perversion of purification. In her view, he "seems to be trying to absolve himself of the guilt he feels for having allowed the torture to take place. But he is also attempting to penetrate her secret being, to find her deepest and most hidden feelings."[74] As perverse as the ritual might seem, I see it as a necessary encounter that reveals not only the girl's utter vulnerability—her nakedness—but also the Magistrate's wish to open himself up to be desired as a caring person.

I have established that Mary Douglas's *Purity and Danger* is all about how strict dichotomies are used to maintain homeostasis in society. In this regard, it is how the notions of purity and impurity are used to maintain an imperial or racist status quo, then the Magistrate's engagement with impurity, or what the reader may interpret as perversion, should be read as a literal and figurative crossing of boundaries. In this case, crossing boundaries means for the Magistrate no longer assuming the power position that the Empire had conferred on him; it also means revealing himself as an ordinary human being who cares about others. His perverse act defuses his position as the Magistrate. We see him as ordinary.

Though it is important to challenge the absolutism of the Empire, it is more productive, at least from the Magistrate's point of view, to focus on humanity's experience of pain and how to relieve it. The pain of others has so humiliated him that he can no longer stand aloof. Thus, his perverse acts represent his attempts to feel the other's pain and the futility of such an enterprise. We cannot feel other people's pain; we can only imagine it, and that is always an imperfect undertaking. In a dramatic gesture of vulnerability, the girl unwraps her bandaged feet to reveal what the Empire has done to her. In caressing the girl and thereby situating himself between pity and longing, the Magistrate seems to want to suffer vicariously. We may assume that he wants to defuse the terror and the exoticism imposed on victims of the Empire.

In addition to the impossibility of one person feeling another's pain, there is another barrier between the Magistrate and the barbarian girl. The visible symbols of that barrier are the wounds the Empire inflicted

on her, especially the mark on the corner of her one eye.[75] He wants to understand it to the same extent that he wants to understand the writings of the Empire and its power to write history. However, it is arguable whether we can ever understand why people inflict pain on others. At best, we can empathize with victims and try to ease their suffering. The Magistrate, as a lone individual, cannot stop the Empire any more than he can stop evil in the world.

When the Magistrate says, "I was the lie that Empire tells itself when times are easy, he [Joll] the truth that Empire tells when harsh winds blow,"[76] he disturbs the Empire's conventions and traditions. In all its operations, the Empire presents two faces—one good, one bad. The Magistrate does not want to declare himself innocent of the whole project, for he is, after all, part of the system. He might not be as evil as Joll, yet, as an agent of the Empire, he cannot be deemed innocent; this is the motivation behind his earnest effort to distance himself from the Empire by crossing the boundaries it has set up. We begin to understand the significance of his crossing the Empire's boundaries if we recall his refusal to have sex with the girl while they were still within the boundaries of the Empire, even though she desired it. His refusal has to do with what I have identified as the barrier between them; they belong to different polarities of power. Whereas he is of the Empire, she is a barbarian. Sex within the boundaries of the Empire would have been only another way of writing on her or injecting himself into her being. Symbolically, it would be no different from what Colonel Joll, acting as the Empire, does. As Boletsi observes, "the desert—the neutral, formless space outside the borders of the town—erases with dust and wind the violence of limits and categories. Away from the limits of imperial discourse, the girl comes to him on her own terms."[77] As soon as they leave the confines of the Empire, the girl is no longer at a "loss for words."[78] She regains there exactly what was taken from her: the power to control her narrative. Indeed, the Magistrate is "surprised by her fluency, her quickness, her self-possession."[79] On that neutral ground, at the mercy of the elements, the master/slave construct falls apart. There in the desert, the girl again desires him, and he reciprocates.[80] The binary opposition between them vanishes, and his touch becomes more fulfilling. They encounter each other as free and equal beings. The Magistrate's sexual act with the barbarian girl is a consummation of his openness to her. Outside the confines of the Empire and the powers of ideology, in the openness of the desert, they entangle with and in each other as equals.

I earlier argued that Vladislavić, Mpe, and Duiker are heavily inspired by Coetzee's moral and cosmopolitan sensibilities. They also provide us with characters who consciously defy the artificial boundaries erected by the ideologies of race, sex, gender, and so forth. People from diverse backgrounds embrace one another. In exposing the bigotry of the citizens of Hillbrow and Tiragalong, the narrator in *Welcome* allows us to imagine what could help the people out of their condition: an act of embrace. Nuttall has observed that this act of embrace is repeated, but the narrator seems to be interested in more than physical embrace; he is interested in empathy. Because of the author's sensitivity to human frailty, no character is portrayed in absolutist terms. Even when a character is engaged in a morally questionable act, we are challenged to put ourselves in the character's position, and we do so, bearing in mind—as the narrator reminds us—that we are all mortals and may not be above that particular character's frailty. This is not to excuse the frailty; it is to encourage an openness to the humanity of others and to admit that they are not exhausted in their present limitation. In a tone that urges Refentše to engage in introspection, the narrator reminds him of the situations surrounding his suicide after he catches his girlfriend in bed with his friend Sammy: "But your imagination also clouded your memory, so that you forgot, for the time being at least, the humanness of what they did; the humanness of what you and Bohlale had done—a humanness that could be viewed as human only so long as it remained uncovered by prying eyes and unpublicised enthusiastic tongues."[81] The narrator suggests that a simple stretch of the imagination could have saved Refentše, Lerato, and Sammy, who also committed suicide. In this regard, Refentše is metonymic of the South Africans who have forgotten how they relied on solidarity from other parts of the world during apartheid. The South African blacks were vulnerable during apartheid, and some of them sought refuge in other parts of Africa, just as people from these other parts of Africa are now seeking refuge in South Africa.[82] To be sure, Refentše was never xenophobic. He always knew that "many of the *Makwerekwere* [the people] accused of this and that are no different to us—sojourners, here in search of green pastures."[83] His only weakness was his failure of introspection regarding his friends' sexual liaison. But he realizes his shortcoming the moment he arrives in heaven. From there, he wishes to convince the people of Tiragalong not to judge Refilwe harshly. Rather, they should try to "understand that Refilwe was only doing what we all did; searching for happiness, for meaning in life."[84]

One might view Refentše as the reincarnation of the Magistrate in *Waiting*. As I established above, the Magistrate is characterized by his power of introspection and the expanse of his imagination.[85] Refentše is also portrayed as an open-minded person. However, his imagination comes to perfection only in heaven. There he understands that he should have known that humans are all mortals: "Refentše was incapable of saying: 'You are just a mere mortal, Refilwe. I am sure you will learn your lessons like all of us.'"[86] The realization that all humans are mortal is Refentše's cosmopolitan moment, the moment he admits that others are, indeed, mirrors of ourselves, not opposites. Heaven also "affords the benefit of retrospect and omniscience," and he understands that he is now a killer: "You killed yourself. And unintentionally, you have also killed your own mother."[87]

Duiker's *The Quiet Violence of Dreams* is also about touch as a means of defying the fear of other bodies. Mirroring the Magistrate's washing of the slave girl and his sexual intercourse with her, the massage in Steamy Windows plays the same figurative role that embrace does in Mpe's *Welcome*. By the time Tshepo has massaged different bodies, he has lost the fear of whiteness and of other bodies. Dobrota Pucherova argues that "Duiker's focus on queer desire in conceptualising his political and ethical vision for the New South Africa reflects the national atmosphere, which responded to the stubborn homophobia of both African nationalist and apartheid discourses with a focus on gay liberation in the new constitution."[88] For Samuelson, Duiker "interrogate[s] and transgress[es] a range of borders—social, national, ontological and epistemological."[89] The novel concludes in the same manner that it begins, with Tshepo thinking about his life, his mobility, and his encounters:

> When I think about Cape Town and walking along its pristine beaches, I remember how kelp floated in vast quantities in the surf . . . When I think about Cape Town and all the experiences I had with the many coloured faces I met, I become suspicious and curious. Perhaps life was giving me a hint. Perhaps the future of mankind lies in each other, not in separate continents with separate people. We are still evolving as a species, our differences are merging.[90]

Even though Tshepo dreams about a future in which differences will be minimal, he is never confused about the locus of redemption: in the individual. He says, "I know where my greatest treasures lie. They are within me."[91] His greatest treasures include his ability to reach out to the other in empathetic gestures.

The Unavoidability of Entanglement

I have discussed J. M. Coetzee's judgment of South Africa's law of miscegenation as a result of whites' fear of embracing blacks and their fear of being embraced, because doing so would negate their perception of themselves as hereditary masters. Just as whites thought they were the hereditary masters of apartheid South Africa, so do the postapartheid South Africans in *Welcome*, operating within nativist paradigms, think themselves to be the masters of their new world. They lack the cosmopolitan imagination that aids our recognition of other people's right to claim *our city* as theirs.

The ultimate test for the cosmopolitan is posed by asking, "What is my attitude to others who do not look like me and my people?" and "Can I affirm their humanity as much as I do mine?" The context of these questions allows us to appreciate the moral depth of Martha Nussbaum's definition of the cosmopolitan as "the person whose allegiance is to the worldwide community of human beings."[92] In *Welcome*, Mpe encourages the idea of commitment to the human community. In Refentše and Refilwe, we encounter characters whose imaginations become cosmopolitan the moment that new relations between them, other people, and the world evolve into moments of openness. This is perhaps the function of the ever-present mobility in the narrative. As Nuttall argues, "The figure of the migrant comes to overlay the earlier trope of race (whites seldom appear in the novel, nor is race conflict a theme or major subtext of Mpe's writing) and even dominates the urban spaces the novel explores."[93] For Mpe, mobility—as I have noted above by citing de Certeau—offers the individual the opportunity to navigate not only the strategies of the power structures of the city, but also inherited mythologies of origin and belonging. Travelers, as James Clifford makes clear, constantly define, and are being defined, by the reality they encounter.[94] Emma Hunt argues that the postapartheid opening of boundaries within South Africa and between South Africa and the world "can be harnessed to build an inclusive city and a heterogeneous society that reject the boundaries of race, ethnicity, and nationality set up by apartheid in favour of a broad vision of allegiance based on a common humanity."[95] I endorse Hunt's interpretation, and argue that it agrees with Mpe's moral and cosmopolitan vision.

The question of common humanity is Mpe's central concern. The narrator's definition of heaven aids our understanding of Mpe's vision for his society: "Heaven is the world of our continuing existence, located in the memory and consciousness of those who live with us

and after us. It is the archive that those we left behind keep visiting and revisiting; digging this out, suppressing or burying that. Continually reconfiguring the stories of our lives."[96] In regard to my conception of cosmopolitan imagination, I find it helpful that the narrator locates heaven in consciousness rather than spatially. In this heaven, Refentše fully realizes the Hillbrowans' shortsightedness. As Emily S. Davis remarks, "Heaven thus holds a certain promise as the space of 'welcome' to an expansive 'our,' as the locus of an expansive cosmopolitan consciousness";[97] and for Nuttall, it is "a place of insights, from which to view and review 'our world.'"[98] Heaven therefore is a perspective from which one observes the smallness of lives on earth; it is the triumph of a universal moral order that seeks to accord every person rights and dignity regardless of ancestry. Heeding Njabulo Ndebele's call for South African writers to shun the spectacular and instead pay attention to the ordinary,[99] Mpe takes consciousness as the most ordinary thing at everyone's disposal. Whereas religious people would wait for the spectacular in the form of salvation from above, Mpe urges us to look inward. It is not accidental that the narrator observes that "no one seemed to care that the treatment of *Makwerekwere* by the police, and the lack of sympathy from the influential Department of Home Affairs, ran contrary to the human rights clauses detailed in the new constitution of the country."[100] Having thus laid out the moral principles that describe certain standards of human behavior, the narrator has the right to accuse South Africa of contravening the rights of individuals, especially the rights of the vulnerable ones: strangers.

Vladislavić locates questions of human rights and dignity in the ordinariness of everyday human encounters. The last section of *The Restless Supermarket*, "The Goodbye Bash," begins with an instructive biblical epigraph: "Ye blind guides, which strain out the gnat, and swallow the camel."[101] The epigraph suggests part of Vladislavić's discursive concern. In the biblical passage, Jesus addresses the scribes and Pharisees, those who were pedantic and punctilious in their attention to often insignificant details but overlooked weighty issues of human concern. They were very precise in small matters of the law but loose in more serious matters of interpersonal relationships. For them, to be moral was to obey the law. Jesus did not ignore the law; on the contrary, he drew attention to the human person, or, as expressed in Emmanuel Levinas's terminology, to the face of the other, the stranger. Might this be what Vladislavić seeks to capture with the epigraph? Shameem Black argues that "Vladislavić's work invites us to consider how important confrontations with atrocity emerge not only in the well-publicized

hearings of the TRC, but also in the physical character of everyday life. Confronting the past, his writing suggests, requires thinking about how to build and inhabit the future."[102] Inhabiting the future also involves answering the question of how people of diverse backgrounds can share a common space in ways that can enrich them. In a globalized world, cultural mix seems unavoidable.

In the first section of the novel, Tearle remarks that Wessels ogles "the coloured girls, most of them young enough to be his daughters."[103] This is in tune with Wessels's attraction to the impure, to what is mixed and "contaminated,"[104] and suggests that even in the moment when people are insisting on purity, the drive to mix takes place. Change and mixture are also occurring on the level of language, with new words being created by merging two independent concepts. Tearle states, "I remember crossing spoons with a waiter in a so-called Pizzaghetti Factory one evening. 'Pizzaghetti? Factory? It's the nadir of poor taste.'"[105] Spilkin, another patron of Café Europa, has a liaison with Darlene, a non-European woman whose "great-grandfather on the mother's side came from Madras."[106] Tearle is surprised to know that Spilkin is already speaking pidgin: "Long time no see."[107] Given that Tearle's friends have lost their European obsession with purity and are now part of the evolving landscape of encounter and mixture, Tearle realizes that he, too, needs a makeover: "Somewhere near dawn, I was gazing through the window at the lights of the south spread out to the horizon, when I became aware of my reflection in the glass, my cheeks stubbled, my nose throbbing, my excrescences, occipital and cranial, pulsating, my hair crying out to be cut, rampant, quaquaversal, awry."[108] The death of Merle, his close associate, reminds him of mortality and what we humans have in common regardless of class or race: "Death itself was the greatest decline in standards of all. That was the certainty I had always been trying to evade."[109] Hopefully, becoming aware of this certainty will bring people to their senses. This is explored through the demise of Café Europa, the place that had been exclusively for whites and now has a clientele of diverse ethnicities. The depiction of Café Europa toward the end of the narrative contrasts with what we saw at the beginning. Times have changed, and the oasis of European exceptionalism has been invaded by newcomers. They "came rolling in. 'Yo!' they said. Raylene, Nomsa, Floyd. The new girl—she hadn't been hardened yet, I thought. . . . A new boy too, so black he would have served quite well as a printer's devil."[110] True to Tearle's fears, the hitherto peaceful Café Europa has become a site of confusion—"chairs had been dragged to tables and a few ragged circles constituted"[111]—and

the people are a mob. Tearle reflects, "To think that the Café Europa had once been a haven in an urban jungle, and now the jungle was here too, on our side of the pale."[112] It is interesting that Tearle refers to pale, the origin of which dates to the thirteenth century. *Pale* is term for the fence that divided English civilization from the Irish barbarians. Now blacks have crossed the pale, literally gone beyond it, and to Tearle, this signifies the ultimate demise of standards: "I scrutinized without blinking. The Café was barely recognizable. They had turned it upside down. Nothing but black faces on every side. Who were the invaders?"[113] There issued a "pandemonium," a skirmish (melee), during which Floyd, one of the newcomers, "stabbed himself in the head," and the "café looked like a battlefield."[114] The scene seems to fulfill Tearle's fear of corruption. He thus feels justified for having insisted on standards, the lack of which invariably leads to conflict.

There is a turning point in the narrative and Tearle's life, a point that brings him closer to the unavoidability of encounter and entanglement between cultures in the age of globalization. When the ambulance comes and Floyd is put on a stretcher, about to be carted away, Floyd raises his voice to Tearle: "You gotta stand by me, Mr. T. Don't let me die, man. Don't let me die."[115] Perhaps this plea reminds Tearle of Merle's death and his thought that death was the *greatest decline in standards of all*. He stays with Floyd, although the narrator does not clarify whether he stays out of pity or empathy. What is important is that he feels touched by the voice of this black young man fighting for his life, and in return, Tearle reaches out to touch in his own way. While they are in the hospital, Tearle comes in closer contact with Shirlaine, Floyd's girlfriend. Shirlaine is colored. So, like Spilkin and Wessels, Tearle now feels connected to people of color. To be sure, his connection is different from those of Spilkin and Wessels. Wessels desires them and Spilkin becomes friends with one of them, while Tearle merely finds himself in the company of one. These are various forms of transcultural contact and possibilities for affinity. They are different instantiations of the Magistrate's embrace of the barbarian girl. The etymology of Shirlaine's name suggests what Homi Bhabha has identified as the hybrid form of today's reality, and in its way defies the idea of purity.[116] Shirlaine explains her name to Tearle: "My mom made it up. My grannies are Shirley and Charmaine, and she didn't know which one to call me after, so she came up with a combination. It couldn't go the other way round, because that would been 'Charley.'"[117] Shirlaine is therefore composited, a blend, a hybrid. Her identity is in the liminal space. At this juncture, Tearle's association with her becomes figurative.

He willy-nilly makes peace with the fact that the new reality is, as he observes of Shirlaine, a "portmanteau" kind of omnibus.[118] The reference to portmanteau seems to suggest Tearle's admission of the fact that reality must make room for differences and opposites.

It might be surprising that Tearle and Shirlaine get on well, especially given that, in his social proofreading, he sees her color as a dent. They walk through the city, an activity that he has not been used to. Yet, old habits die hard. He refers to Shirlaine's shade of skin as something like "tropical sands, amber dawn. But it was more like fudge."[119] Fudge suggests faking or ambiguity. Does Shirlaine suggest the in-betweenness of the new order? Still himself lost in that world of in-between, finding himself between rejection and acceptance of Shirlaine, Tearle makes another instinctive gesture of affinity or care toward her. Aware that she is hungry, he suggests that they go for "some chicken."[120] Given that he had earlier qualified poultry as some "tribal thing," this decision suggests a significant ethical shift in him. Going out to eat, of course, does not mean that he has accepted her. He is merely getting to know her and her world. He even observes to himself: "The last time I'd set foot here, it was to rebuke the manager for the menu's B-B-Q chicken and Cornish pastries."[121] He must painfully realize that his wish to "pass this entire city through the eye of the proofreader's needle" is impossible.[122] As if in a bout of nostalgia, he reminds us that his Alibia is still there, his "blessed citizens of elsewhere."[123] But he also realizes that he is not elsewhere; he is on the streets of Hillbrow, forced by the new dispensation to share pleasantries with a young woman whose identity is at best indeterminate. On the street Tearle experiences an *ubuntu*-moment; he realizes that he cannot exist without the other. Café Europa and the Alibi on the wall are symbols of Eurocentric solipsism that now lie in the past. As he looks out the window, he observes the lights of the city and remembers Merle's advice "to look on the bright side."[124] They seem to have discovered each other as humans and as capable of being helpful to one another. As Nuttall argues, "Tearle, perpetually out of touch with his city throughout the novel, even though he calls himself a 'true Johannesburger,' finally comes actually to inhabit its streets, to fall kicking and screaming into the future."[125] Nuttall argues that the street is important in Vladislavić's and Mpe's narratives. The idea that every person is out on the street after the demise of Café Europa suggests the condition of the new country after the demise of apartheid. Everyone is thrown out into the open and is therefore tasked with relating in the same spirit, as it is impossible to avoid contact with people of other backgrounds. Apartheid was designed to prevent these contacts.

Of course, no one knows what will happen when people encounter one another. There is, however, the possibility of transcultural connection, which, in the case of Tearle and Shirlaine, has not yet morphed into a true affinity. The street, however, provides more opportunity for that than Café Europa would have.

Conclusion: White Guilt, Black Anger, and the Need for Empathy

Like the three novels discussed thus far in this chapter, Damon Galgut's *The Impostor* engages with the possibility of affinity between hitherto declared enemies, and it does so via empathy. In *The Impostor*, postapartheid South Africa is called "a new name" that has not yet been spelled out correctly.[126] But the process of determining the correct spelling has begun. The majority of the black population, hitherto denied access to society and the job market, must be given their fair share of opportunity. But jobs are limited, which means that some whites must lose theirs. Adam Napier, a middle-aged white man, loses his job and house. He goes to live in his brother's house in the country, and there he chances upon Kenneth Canning, a childhood friend, who is married to Baby, a black woman. The most portentous of the encounters in the narrative is the marriage between Canning and Baby. In what ways does Galgut use these two characters and their world to probe the moral foundations of the new South Africa? What kind of moral principles should guide the encounters of peoples of diverse backgrounds?

Any discourse on South Africa that ignores the massive, unjust, and oppressive shifting of wealth is incomplete, to say the least. Any moral judgment of the country must begin with the knowledge of this aspect of South African history. Accordingly, *The Impostor*, which is about the relational compass of the new society, centers on the moral foundations of the historical interaction between blacks and whites through interracial encounters in postapartheid times. Canning inherits his wealth, Gondwana, a huge game park, from his father, despite their relationship not being ideal.[127] Gondwana consists of different farms his father bought and patched together before his sudden death from a heart attack.[128] In fact, Canning had not been on speaking terms with his father, but being his father's only living relative, he inherits the game park. He has a love-hate relation to his immense wealth; he is also keenly aware of how it came to be, how his father "bought" up people's small farms and consequently evicted the people from their homes and

homelands: "Canning explains that his father had had to dynamite any habitable buildings on the various farms he'd bought, so that squatters could not move in. It's as if the land has been emptied out by war."[129] The moral bankruptcy of the history of Gondwana is the main source of Canning's conflicted relation to the land, apart, of course, from his spoiled relationship to his father. Indeed, his father's lack of love for him is figurative of the old man's lack of love and consideration for the people whose livelihood his pet project destroyed. Canning is nevertheless unwilling to give up his inheritance, which is lawfully his regardless of its origin.

In Canning's conflicted attitude toward his father and the game park, Galgut creates a microcosm of South Africa's wealth distribution, especially owing to white privilege. What should society do about the millions of people whose land was violently taken away from them, and who were forced into the ghettoes? Is it morally justifiable to take lands back from their legal rightful inheritors? To sharpen our understanding of the moral challenges of the new condition, Galgut creates a black man of Canning's age who is on the receiving end of Canning's father's wealth acquisition.

Lindile is the son of Canning's father's servant. Growing up, Canning and Lindile are very close; they even engrave their names on the same stone: "Kenneth/Lindile. There's a blurred date underneath." Canning describes him as his first playmate: "a little black boy, Lindile. He was the son of Ezekiel and Grace—you know, the old couple at the lodge." He refers to the engraving on the rock as what they did "when we were very young. Before we grew up and realized how complicated the world was." They are no longer friends because "the world got complicated."[130] It is interesting how Canning uses the word *complicated* to qualify his acceptance of the new order of things. Things were not complicated when he did not understand the morally questionable condition of his life; they became so when he and Lindile became aware of it, and Lindile began to ask questions, and "he got all political and turned angry."[131] It is ironic that Canning qualifies Lindile's attitude as political even though the privileged condition Canning enjoys is a direct result of a violent political process. The narrator captures the true "complicated" nature of Canning's life in the following observation:

> There are contradictions in Canning's story that Adam can't work out. On the one hand, he refers to his childhood in slighting, bitter terms; on the other, he lapses into moments like these, where he becomes whimsical and nostalgic. He speaks about his father as a hard, angry man, an old-style feudal overlord, but then mentions casually that he could speak

> two languages and paid for the education of his loyal servants' child. It's hard sometimes to know where one's sympathies should lie.[132]

Canning embodies the contradiction in the postapartheid white community. Many whites acknowledge the injustice of the past, especially the unfairness of the distribution of wealth that accounts for the impoverishment of the black population; they condemn the architects of apartheid, yet they cannot let go of their privilege that resulted from that unfair distribution of wealth.

Allegory is effective because it simplifies complex issues in ways that are easy to grasp. Everything in allegory has a symbolic relevance, and in that respect, we understand the game park as symbolic of South Africa. Curiously enough, the narrator describes the park as "very strange. It is like an old colonial dream of refinement and exclusion, which should have vanished when the dreamer woke up."[133] Galgut uses this extended metaphor to help us situate these actions within South Africa's moral ontology. Was the unhindered exploitation of blacks and the parallel wealth acquisition of whites a dream that should have vanished when the dreamer woke up? Is the postapartheid era the postdream moment of awareness? These are some of the questions that Galgut wants his narrative to answer. Indeed, some answers can be found through an exploration of the symbols within the extended metaphor.

One of many symbols in this dream is the rock on which the names of Kenneth and his childhood friend are etched. At the point that Kenneth and Lindile engrave their names, they admit what Nuttall has identified as South Africans' entanglement in one another. The rock signifies the entanglement of their pasts and the unavoidable moral responsibility facing them in the present, postapartheid order. Seen from the perspective of Walter Benjamin's concept of history, Lindile and Canning are the names of the descendants of the vanquished and the victors. They are fated to go their separate ways, one carrying the pain and anger of his ancestors' loss, the other, often ignorant of the past, or feigning it, wholly dedicated to preserving his heritage.[134]

Perhaps without being aware of it, Canning begins to preserve his heritage the moment he starts to justify the status into which he and Lindile are born as part of the complicated world. He knows that he needs a new moral, if dubious, legitimation in the new dispensation. Baby fulfills that role. He proudly announces that he and Baby are "a new South African couple."[135] They are a rainbow couple. To demonstrate his bona fide involvement in the fate of the new society, Canning

speaks two languages. Part of Galgut's use of allegory includes a mild form of sarcasm, a mockery of the elitist understanding of a rainbow nation.

Canning is a consummate capitalist who pulls all the necessary strings to his profit. Having quickly understood the mood of the country, he instantly puts together a circle of "multiracial business associates," comprised of the criminal East European mafia and corrupt black African officials such as Sipho, "a mid-ranking politician" from Cape Town.[136] Even Adam, who at the beginning of the narrative refuses to give the police two hundred rand as bribery for his traffic offense, eventually compromises his morality by becoming part of Canning's corrupt circle. He is further drawn into the mess by having an affair with Baby. Canning implicates the black leadership in the world of Gondwana, thus demonstrating the insidious lure of neoliberal ideology in the new society. Indeed, the narrative seems to have predicted the moral collapse in society, or to have re-created its incipience. For example, in 2012, more than thirty-four demonstrating Marikana mine workers were shot by the police in an act that seemed to mimic the repressive pattern of apartheid.[137] As South African journalist Benjamin Fogel writes: "The ANC, to which Mandela committed his life, has descended into a thick morass of social conservatism, neoliberal technocracy, patronage networks, corruption, and increasingly authoritarian politics. The party lacks any sort of unifying narrative or future vision for the country."[138] To better appreciate the complexity of the postapartheid condition, Galgut invites us to occupy the positions of Lindile and Canning. How do these two solve the issues of their complicated world? Between Canning and Adam are Baby and Lindile, black South Africans, who, we might say, should know better. Yet we are painfully aware of what is lacking in their encounter.

Galgut's allegory of the game park raises many questions, the most important of which concerns his characters' ethical bearing. What moral ontology guides their relationships? Like all truly complex narratives, *The Impostor* makes the reader complicit in the sordidness of the world of the characters. Thus, we are somewhat sympathetic to some aspects of their lives even while we condemn their vile behavior. Canning is one such character. We feel for him as an unloved child. His mother died at his birth, and his father saw him as the cause of his wife's death and therefore could not bring himself to love Canning. Could Canning's problem have resulted from the trauma of his father's hatred of him? We understand his distance from his father and the complexity of his character; that is, "the two warring extremes of

Canning's nature."[139] We read his internal conflicts as an example of white guilt resulting from an awareness of the origin of his privilege. However, Canning does not undertake any palpable action to change the present condition in which his privilege thrives, and this inaction affects our degree of sympathy for him.

Adam, like his biblical namesake, is guilty not of initiating an evil act but of being dragged into one. The biblical legend tells us that Adam was "lured" into sin by Eve. That, however, did not diminish the significance of his participation in the corruption of the world. Similarly, Adam Napier is lured into sin by his love of Baby, a former prostitute. The only time Adam objects to anything that would compromise his character is when he refuses to bribe the police. From that point on, he demonstrates no clear moral bearing. We understand, though, that his lack of moral clarity parallels the increasing difficulty of his life. This is seen in Adam's relationships with the mayor, Baby, and Blom. It is true that Adam does not know the contents of the package he delivers to the mayor. However, he becomes fully aware of its implications later. One day when he gathers the dross in front of his house and sets it on fire, the mayor drives by and reminds him that it is against municipal regulations to have fires within a hundred meters of any residence. In effect, Adam is contravening the regulations of the city, and he has not yet removed the alien tree in front of his house even though he had been told to do so. The mayor uses the occasion to drag Adam into the corruption in which he and Canning have long been engaged; he ignores the alien tree in front of Adam's house, and later tells him that the package Adam delivered wasn't for him personally: "Every cent of it was for the party. I did it for my country."[140] Adam's complicity is complete when Canning tells him that he wanted him to be part of the whole mess: "That's why I got you to take the money. Of course I could've done it another way, I could even have paid him myself. But I wanted you involved somehow. It was just a symbolic thing."[141] Canning's setting Baby on Adam is symbolic too; it is symbolic of the complicity of white people in the corruption of the country.[142] Even Blom, another shadowy figure who is Adam's next-door neighbor, initiates Adam into a secret by revealing that "he tortured and killed and kidnapped for the government."[143] To make Adam fully complicit in the crimes of white people in South Africa, Blom tells him: "Everything I did, I did for you. And other people like you."[144] Adam's guilt is most clearly manifested after he sleeps with Baby: "The guilt doesn't touch Adam until later, when he's back at home. Then what happened, what he did, begins to eat at him."[145] Yet sex with Baby is not a onetime thing. Even when he

realizes that having sex with Baby is morally untenable, he is unable to withdraw from that; this signifies white people's desire for the land.

Adam and Canning can be seen as two sides of the same coin of white guilt: complicit by association or membership in a privileged group whose advantage rests on the disadvantage or exploitation of other groups. Galgut thus far has created a web of connections that is bereft of a moral framework. Relationships in the novel are guided by the degree to which the characters can enhance their individual greed. They have little or no regard for others.

White guilt and black anger are not helpful in understanding the South African postapartheid condition, as these traits are in themselves neither positive nor negative. We can judge guilt and anger only in relation to what they condition us to do. Lindile embodies the impotence of black anger as no other character does. His anger that leads Canning's father to suspend paying for his school fees is nothing short of righteous indignation. However, as much as we welcome his anger at apartheid, we are disappointed in the mysterious diffusion of that anger after its demise. Why does his emotion not morph into responsibility? Does he simply forget about the past and how it helped shape the present? What about his parents? Why must the old couple appeal to Adam for food and accommodations when they are dismissed from their job, even though their own son has a meaningful job elsewhere?

Lindile's anger at the oppression of his people is based on a universal moral principle and should impel some action rooted in responsibility. But it does not. Indeed, Lindile becomes part of the new wave of the black middle class as a lecturer at a college in Nyanga. He might not have become rich like Canning or Gavin, Adam's brother, but we are surprised to learn that he has not seen his parents for up to ten years. He is therefore presented as lacking the basic virtue of care not just of others, but also of his own family. When Adam calls Lindile to tell him about his parents' condition, Adam greets him with the usual form: "We're very glad to see you"; to which Lindile responds, in a tone sarcastic and accusatory: "I'm sure you are."[146] He will not relate to Adam on normal grounds. His T-shirt carries "an image of marching workers under a clenched fist."[147] The clenched fist is a visible symbol of his anger; yet the more we know of him, the more disappointed are we that he is unable to effect any change with his anger. Lindile's reaction when Adam tells him the reason for his call is bizarre: "You have given my parents a bed for a few nights, you have given them some food. Now you want to get rid of them. So you have called their son in Cape Town, who hasn't seen them in more than ten years, to come and take them

away."[148] Any reader with a casual knowledge of South African history or literature will remember Nyanga, especially in Ingrid Jonker's poem "The Child Who Was Shot Dead by Soldiers in Nyanga."[149] Nyanga reminds readers of a major apartheid atrocity.

Galgut portrays Lindile as a bit cartoonish, especially when he demands money from Adam. But the larger picture here is that Lindile's anger is hidden under his sarcasm, and he perceives that all whites are financially well-off and therefore have the means of helping poor blacks. Underneath Lindile's anger is a feeling of helplessness and an abdication of responsibility. He cautions his parents not to make themselves "servile" and not to "dance in front of this man [Adam]."[150] He erroneously believes that true power lies in money: "Money has always been the problem. Even before this. Even when they were working, they had nothing."[151] The truth, however, is that money is not Lindile's problem. His problem is the lack of co-feeling for the immediate members of his community: his parents. His anger is still anchored in the abstract, and so is his solution—empty anticapitalist gestures that remind one of Mugabe's anti-imperialist rhetoric. If we are to understand Lindile as figurative of the new, empowered black middle class, then that class has yet to grasp the basic virtues of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission. Lindile has not yet liberated himself from bitterness and rancor. The issue, therefore, is his empathy deficit and how to make up for it.

But just as Lindile's anger hampers his awareness of his responsibility, Baby's bitterness turns her against the weaker members of her own race. When Canning first meets her, she works as a prostitute in Johannesburg. Canning qualifies her job as a call girl—"she wasn't a common street whore. No, she worked for an escort service"[152]—but this does not limit the shock of the revelation. Most importantly, though, Adam's picture of Baby comes full circle. He can only imagine what Baby has had to go through in order to arrive at her present position. He imagines her "upward struggle out of poverty, the ruthless reliance on her beauty to create the opportunities for herself."[153] Canning makes it explicit: "She comes from a hard place. She had a bad, tough start. She's travelled a long way in her life."[154] Sadly, though, her efforts seem to be invested in suppressing her difficult past and maintaining a distance from it, including adopting aspects of the master's system of oppression. The narrator highlights the tense relationship between Baby and Grace, Lindile's mother. Neither glance nor acknowledgment passes between them when Grace comes to serve them coffee. Baby merely tells her, "The coffee is for the master, Grace. Put it down

there."[155] Baby's lack of regard toward Grace does not escape Adam's attention, and "he wonders, abstractedly, what it feels like for somebody like Grace to be taking orders from Baby. Just a few years ago they would've both been in the same position: exiled from power, with no prospects, no future. Now everything has changed for Baby, while for Grace it has all stayed the same."[156] Baby does not seem to possess the introspection or imagination that would allow her to think as Adam does here. She does not seem to care that barely a decade ago she and Grace were both exiled from power and therefore experienced the worst form of pain and humiliation. Her major flaw is her lack of empathy. This same character flaw allows her to dismiss the old couple from their job. Without means, the elderly couple goes from house to house in search of employment and a place to sleep: "We are trying all the houses here. Because we are hungry. The madam, she told us we must go, but we have no place to go. So we are looking."[157] The elderly couple is vulnerable. Standing in front of Baby, the couple tests her responsiveness to the weak. But, rather than respond to them as fellow humans, she rejects them; she is hampered by bitterness, which prevents her from relating to people in fulfilling ways. She feels that because she was poor and oppressed due to her blackness, her ethically questionable relationships to other people are justified. So does Lindile. Their anger and bitterness are as ineffective as Adam's and Canning's inner conflicts and guilt. Indeed, white guilt runs parallel to black anger, and both are abstractions that fail to address the conditions of people in society.

Adam realizes the importance of self-redemption while Lindile's parents are still with him. He does not blame society, Baby, or even Lindile for Lindile's parents' condition, which is morally satisfying. Only deeds by individuals that target individuals can redeem the individual and society. Adam embodies these deeds. In a demonstration of his generous understanding of South Africa as a space for all, he takes in Lindile's parents saying, "I have to do something with you."[158] The narrator emphasizes that "they are, by a twist of fate, his guests."[159] Adam becomes the biblical Good Samaritan, the quintessential global citizen. He tries to arrange a life for the two and eventually contacts Lindile. In this simple act lies his redemption and that of the country, as Adam's choice proves that humanity is not circumscribed by race.

It is of profound significance that Adam's simple act of reaching out to Lindile's parents is not done out of guilt. Rather, his gesture is informed by an ethical act of perspective switching. Adam is a person of deep introspection, imagination, and empathy. Indeed, these are

some of the traits that link Adam, the Magistrate (*Waiting for the Barbarians*), and Julie (*The Pickup*). Adam's love of poetry is presented as a ligament that binds him to humanity. Each time he distances himself, he gets pulled into the mess of the new society, and therefore away from humanity and from what he perceives as his true self, and at these times, he thinks of his poetry. Indeed, poetry becomes a metaphor for his inner voice.[160]

The strength of Adam's empathy manifests itself in the moment he realizes that Lindile's parents are old enough to be his: "That image, of his mother and father without a place to sleep, decides him." He instantly offers his bed to them.[161] In a society marred by an essentialist conception of difference, it is significant that a white man imagines an elderly black couple as his own parents. In doing so, Adam humanizes them and establishes a strong affinity with them; he no longer sees them as the radical other in the way that apartheid ideology had taught him to do. Contrasting his reaction to the elderly couple with Baby's response fleshes out not only Adam's and Baby's moral attitudes to the new dispensation, but also, arguably, the core argument of the narrative. Adam goes to Baby to beg on behalf of Grace and Ezekiel. Baby is not interested in taking them back, arguing that they are past their time: "they can't stay on—all this is changing. There's no place for them here any more."[162] Baby has bought into the typical perspective of the neoliberal order that emphasizes only people's utility toward the maximization of profits. In a bid to arouse her conscience, Adam paints the implication of her action and words in drastic terms: "'Fuck the poor,' he says, 'is that it?'"[163] She insists on her stance, making it known that she doesn't care about them: "'Why should I?'"[164] Adam tries to lead Baby to subject her actions to moral judgment, to exercise empathy. He says, "'that could have been your life,'" but she quickly dismisses that sentiment; "'But it isn't,' she says. 'Is it?'"[165] Strictly speaking, Baby is right. It is not her life. But in her answer lies the problem of neoliberalism, which has become the gospel of postapartheid society. Even more devastating to the moral foundation of the new society is Baby's retort to Adam's challenge that she put herself in the position of the elderly couple who have now been rendered homeless and without means:

> You don't know anything about me. Not anything. If you did, you wouldn't speak like this. You don't know how I've fought, the things I had to do to get to where I am. If I'm over here and they're over there, that's because I'm stronger. And part of being strong is doing what you have to do. Do you think I'm going to give up my life, give up all *this,* for them? Are you crazy? You can keep your pity and your sentiment, you can

> keep your white man's weakness. You've never been desperate, not for one day in your life.[166]

Baby believes that it is not her duty to put herself in the shoes of the poor. But this is a case of *ressentiment*-induced feeling of moral excellence, the feeling that her past pain has already atoned for her present failings. She believes that she does not owe society anything, and the world still owes her a lot. Earlier, the narrator remarks the same thing about Lindile, who is "stuck in the past, pinned down under his anger, which is like a huge rock on his chest. Adam will never be able to do enough, give enough, to make things right."[167] Through Baby and Lindile, Galgut exposes the empathy deficit in the new South Africa. Adam seems to have realized that deficit thanks to his ability to stretch his imagination and switch perspectives. He shows us what is possible when people from different cultures encounter one another as people, not as representative of their ethnicities.

What is peculiar to Baby and Lindile is that their past is without memory understood as beneficial to the reconstruction of the present. Lindile has entirely forgotten what literally forced his parents into poverty; he has even forgotten his parents. Baby and Lindile are consumed by bitterness and vengeance rather than a search for justice. It is also peculiar that Baby qualifies Adam's invocation of empathy as "white man's weakness," "sentiment," and "pity."[168] Empathy is indeed none of the above; it is superior to all, and above all, it is a necessary condition for South Africa's moral ontology. Baby believes that the new order in society needs the opposite of empathy and a demonstration of one's vulnerability; she thinks it is time for toughness toward the weak. On the contrary, what South Africa needs is for individuals to imagine themselves in the positions of others, especially the dispossessed. That gesture could enhance their openness to reality and their capacity to relate to people from backgrounds other than theirs.

6

Narrating *Ubuntu*

The Weight of History and the Power of Care

In 1983, at the height of apartheid police brutalities, Ingrid de Kok published "Small Passing," a poem dedicated to "a woman whose baby died stillborn, and who was told by a man to stop mourning, 'because the trials and horrors suffered daily by black women in this country are more significant than the loss of one white child.'"[1] The poem draws attention to the dignity of every individual who has experienced private suffering outside the context of national tragedy. No type of suffering is so intense that it can replace another. Thus, a woman who has lost her child at its birth deserves as much attention as do the parents of the children massacred by the apartheid security forces. To be sure, the contexts of these experiences are quite different; one is natural, while the other is gratuitous. We should nevertheless pay attention to each with the goal of relieving the pain of those who suffer. The failure to consider individual contexts easily leads to ideological responses, which notoriously prescribe solutions that ironically ignore individual experiences such as pain or pleasure. Solidarity expresses itself in one person's resolve to end another person's pain; solidarity is always born of an individual's relation to other individuals, regardless of their backgrounds. "Small Passing" is emblematic of de Kok's mythopoeia, which is constructed around instances of people's pain.

De Kok's poetics have profound similarities with the poetry of Antjie Krog, who became one of Africa's leading public intellectuals thanks in part to *Country of My Skull*, her celebrated report on the works of the TRC. Krog and de Kok can be read within the tradition of the Sestigers—or Sixtyers—a group of South African writers of Afrikaner ancestry who stood up against the inhumanities of apartheid, "reacting against the National Party's increasingly authoritarian policies."[2]

The group's poets included Breyten Breytenbach, André Brink, Adam Small, Bartho Smit, and Ingrid Jonker.[3] The philosophy of the Sestigers is best understood in the words of André Brink, who wrote in the November 1968 issue of the Sestiger magazine *Kol*: "If I speak of my people then I mean: every person black, coloured [mixed race] and white, who shares my country and my loyalty towards my country. This is the essence of my argument that our whole country must be opened up for writing [*oopsgeskyft*, literally "written open"] and that we writers should start taking account of what 'our whole country' really is."[4] De Kok was born in 1951, while Krog was born the following year, nearly one and a half decades before the prominent female member of the Sestigers, Ingrid Jonker, committed suicide. Based on their poetry's uncompromising moral stance against inhumanity, these two can be called Jonker's heirs. They operate within the Sestigers' paradigm of resistance to inhumanity. In this chapter that engages Krog and de Kok, I begin by examining Krog's mythopoeia as a bridge between the apartheid past and the postapartheid present. In light of the importance of the past, I also highlight the role of memory in individual and communal redemption by seeking the best way to interpret history.

Beyond reading Krog's and de Kok's poetry in the Sestigers' tradition, it is also appropriate to interpret the Sestigers' concerns within the hermeneutic demands of *ubuntu*. Ultimately, Krog and de Kok operate within the moral premise of *ubuntu*. Indeed, they have embraced the ancient black African concept as their own.

Antjie Krog's Poetics of Affinity: History and the Role of Memory

Antjie Krog's moving account of the proceedings of the TRC, *Country of My Skull*, has been praised as providing an important window into South African society. That said, the book has its flaws. Meira Cook critiques Krog for not adhering to realistic reportage by arguing that in privileging imaginative reconstruction of the testimonies of the victims of apartheid, Krog subjected her text to the "inconsistencies and falsehoods of narrative in a contingent world."[5] Sarah Ruden is less forgiving of this aspect of Krog's work. In her view, Krog appears to have given both trivial and serious incidents equal narrative attention.[6] Ruden argues that in Krog and the TRC, "the sufferings of the victims are publicly devalued because recognizable structures of authority—legal, narrative—are missing. The crimes are not 'real' crimes

because there are no trials. The stories are not 'true' stories because they have no background or beginnings or endings, which we hold, consciously or unconsciously, as markers of real experience."[7] Taiwo Adetunji Osinubi situates his reading of the text in the "context of [Krog's] affective network with invisible audiences" because of Krog's excessive imaginative reconstruction of the testimonies of the victims of apartheid.[8] For him, Krog does violence to the victims of the apartheid regime in her narration "at moments of illusory reception." Furthermore, "the emotive narratives are perceived to be doing the work of factual redress that they do not and cannot necessarily achieve."[9] They insinuate a "narrative closure."[10] I understand Osinubi's suspicion of narrative violence and Ruden's fear that Krog might have "reduced the victims . . . to literary figurines."[11] However, I suggest that what Ruden and Osinubi consider Krog's vice—her imaginative reconstruction of much of the victims' testimonies—might, indeed, be her virtue. Was Krog merely appropriating people's narratives for her own end? If so, to what end? Did she believe that her narrative implied a "closure on the individual acts of violence,"[12] or was she opening up a new sphere in which truth could manifest itself? A sphere of the imagination? *Country of My Skull* has been identified, rightly, as reportage, memoir, essay, and diary entry. For those who know and appreciate Krog's poetry, the book can also be read as an extension of her mythopoetic works. In this context, I see it as an interpretive aid for her poetry.[13] What Krog's poems and *Country of My Skull* have in common is her empathy with the wretched of the South African earth. In both genres, she retrieves the history of the oppressed in an effort to salvage their present and make it whole. I examine selected poems as well as passages from *Country of My Skull* with the goal of highlighting Krog's engagement with history as a living present.

In *Country of My Skull*, Krog depicts a scene in which the bones of victims of the apartheid security-police violence are exhumed to help the TRC understand what happened in the past. The section is titled "To assimilate truth piece by piece." The reader sees pictures of the unearthed bones and hears the testimonies of the perpetrators. One of the perpetrators comments, "She was brave this one; hell, she was brave. . . . she simply would not talk."[14] The scene is important in understanding Krog's role as a reporter, who chronicles history, and as a poet. It is factual, a record of what actually happened. It is also figurative in its performance of the act of digging up truth that must be *assimilated piece by piece*. Krog does not argue, and few would be so naive to believe that the TRC is the only agency competent to solve the problems of

South Africa. Assimilating the truth piece by piece acknowledges the overwhelming magnitude of the horrors of South Africa's past. With this, Krog is working in the tradition of Walter Benjamin, who believes that truth must be assimilated bit by bit or in flashes.

Benjamin admits the impossibility of knowing the past as it really happened. This does not mean that the details of the past do not matter. They do. But they reveal themselves in bits, and it is necessary for one to seize each flash of memory.[15] Of importance in Benjamin's thinking is his recognition of the transient nature of memory; as a transient property it is liable to being lost or distorted and abused. The one who uses memory must be aware of this. This awareness includes the fact that the chronicler of history engages with empathy either to strengthen the present according to the vision of predecessors or to free it from the stranglehold of the past. The heirs of the ruling class write with empathy for their ancestors, whose lives and actions established the status quo and are interpreted as heritage. The chronicler is burdened by melancholy, which becomes clear: "once one asks the question, with whom does the historical writer of historicism actually empathize. The answer is irrefutably with the victor. Those who currently rule are however the heirs of all those who have ever been victorious. Empathy with the victors thus comes to benefit the current rulers every time."[16] In contrast, with attention to the material conditions of people, the historical materialist contemplates with horror the world that the ruling class interprets as cultural heritage and acknowledges that that world "owes its existence not only to the toil of the great geniuses, who created it, but also to the nameless drudgery of its contemporaries. . . . He regards it as his task to brush history against the grain."[17] Thus, the historical materialist also views history with empathy, but instead for the dispossessed. That is why he or she has an eye for the drudgeries of the contemporaries of geniuses.

Michael Löwy explains the importance of taking up memory in the moment of danger. It is to "show presence of mind (*Geistesgegenwart*) to grasp the unique moment, this fleeting precarious opportunity of salvation (*Rettung*) before it is too late."[18] Benjamin uses the words *Rettung* and *Erlösung* interchangeably to mean salvation or redemption, and within the Marxist tradition of class struggle, this is understood as the restoration of equity and fairness.[19] Benjamin critiques Marx's exclusively materialist interpretation of history and emphasizes the importance of the spiritual elements in the struggle such as "confidence, courage, humour, cunning and fortitude."[20] As Löwy explains, "if it [the struggle] were not driven by certain moral qualities, the dominated

class could not fight for its liberation."[21] Part of the moral qualities that the chronicler of history has to be conscious of is also the awareness of the vulnerability of memory itself; as a transient property, memory cannot be made absolute. It is therefore necessary that the person who engages in a struggle for justice and fairness does so from the perspective of humility arising from the awareness of one's vulnerability.

With the help of Benjamin's thinking, we ask: for whom does Krog record snippets of South African history? In one of the less factual moments of her reportage, she comments that the "hearing has little to do with the past. It has everything to do with the future."[22] The observation seems ironic given that the goal of the commission was to deal with the past, but herein lies the truth of Krog's mythopoeia. What does the future mean to her? The past is past; it cannot be reconstructed and, as Benjamin argues, history cannot record the past as it happened; it records only flashes of memory that are at risk of being lost. And from the victor's perspective, the goal of all recording is to preserve a heritage. From the perspective of the defeated, the goal is to seek redress for wrongs and to address the material imbalance in the present. To do so, it is necessary to examine the origin of the status quo that the privileged seek to preserve; this is the special role of the poet serving as the historian of the oppressed or one who seizes *a memory as it flashes in a moment of danger*. The footnote to the poem "Lady Anne Barnard at the Castle of Good Hope" provides a historical context for the poet's reflections about the history of South Africa's oppression.[23] Lady Anne Barnard (1750–1825) was born into the Scottish nobility. She married a commoner, Andrew Barnard, who was sent to South Africa as secretary of the Cape of Good Hope in 1797. She accompanied him to his post but later went back to Scotland. But Lady Anne was no mere footnote to history. Untypical of a woman in that period in British history, she refused to be silent, and in flashes of inspiration, she revealed to the world the beginnings of the British colonial enterprise in South Africa—that is, how the present condition of inequality came to be.

The poem "'I Think I Am the First Woman'—Lady Anne on Table Mountain" gives insight into the workings of Lady Anne's mind. She is fully aware of her position as a woman among the men of her class. In the person of Lady Anne, Krog suggests a convergence of patriarchy and colonialism. Lady Anne is at the summit of Table Mountain (a flat-topped mountain—*Tafelberg*—overlooking the city of Cape Town),[24] and from this vantage point she acquires a unique perspective, enabling her to see everywhere in all directions. We assume that she has a male companion, and she tells him: "the climb wipes out /

everything between us."[25] What, then, had been between them? Might she be referring to the ideology of patriarchy and privilege that her companion embodies as a man? If so, when everything between them has been wiped out, they see reality as it is; they observe reality in a disinterested manner without the prejudices of gender or colonial ideology. She observes:

> from above you can really sketch everything
> corruption seems only malicious injustice temporary
> and at its worst the village below merely shoddy
> see how cute the stonepoint Castle (my pretty abode!)
> oh my God do we have to? yes, we sing: save George our King[26]

Table Mountain occupies a position in Lady Anne's life like that occupied by Lady Anne in Krog's poetics. It is a metaphor, or more accurately, an allegory, as the section is aptly titled. The mountain is an unencumbered observation post and a position of power. When Lady Anne climbs Table Mountain, she invites her audience to a place and position from which they can see the truths of her experience. Through Lady Anne's life, Krog extends the figure of Table Mountain in the history of South Africa. Lady Anne becomes an allegory, a narrative in which objects, persons, and actions assume symbolic relevance. The stanza above invites attention in its references to "God," the "king," "corruption," and "injustice." God and the king refer to the ideological apparatuses of South Africa's ruling classes, while corruption and injustice stand for the effect of these ideologies in the lives of the ruled. Lady Anne's observations contrast the condition of the village below with the settler's duty to sing "save George our King." She interrogates the British imperious enterprise in South Africa. In her question, she lays the groundwork for a future deconstruction of the oppressive colonial system. Might that groundwork be in our understanding of the apartheid era world? I think she suggests that any form of reconciliation in the present must begin with a solid understanding of the past.

The poem "Lady Anne Barnard Looks Out on Table Bay" drives home the truth of what has been suggested in "'I Think I Am the First Woman'—Lady Anne on Table Mountain." Lady Anne still occupies her position as a chronicler of the past. She records the arrival of a ship, and she prepares parcels for home. Then something happens to her. The corruption she referenced while on Table Mountain finds its way to her:

then the smell hits us—unearthly
so putrid it seems the most primordial
of stenches. it's coming from the bay
says the cook. by midday everybody knows:
a slave ship is unlawfully looking to put to land
609 Congolese—my husband suspects
. . .
"But why does it smell so?" "Anne, in the ship,"
my stolid husband, "they are lying row upon row—
packed shackled to form filthy strings shelf upon shelf
the doctor does not dare go down because of diarrhea
heat, stench; the deck deadly slippery from mucus and blood."[27]

Narrating from the perspective of historical materialism, Lady Anne draws the reader's attention to the real history of South Africa, and she does so with horror. We are left to wonder why the husband's demeanor is qualified as stolid. His indifference belies his moral apathy and the colonizers' frame of mind. He probably sees history as a series of conquests, unlike Lady Anne. As Löwy has argued, Benjamin sees history "from the standpoint of the defeated, as a series of victories of the ruling classes."[28] Löwy further explains that "current struggles cast into question the historical victories of the oppressors, because they undermine the legitimacy of the power of the ruling classes, past and present."[29] In Lady Anne, Krog challenges the legitimacy of the ruling classes and calls attention to the degree that fairness has not yet been achieved for all. She reminds us of the labor and sacrifices of the black population who built South Africa with their sweat and blood. Forgotten in the history written by the descendants of the white victors, black South Africans remain faceless and nameless.

In "Lady Anne Looks Out Again from the Castle of Good Hope," Krog reveals other horrors of the past:

thus begins our new governor:
commission on every slave ship illegally dropping anchor
and the following "free blacks" executed this morning
for being "rebellious"[30]

The next stanza supplies the names of the free blacks while the two-line stanza that follows reads like a note for the future: "just a list of heretics / for future composers."[31] Lady Anne thus gives names to the victims of the European conquest, and thereby makes it possible for us to imagine them as individuals to whom we can relate. She places

them within the reach of our empathy, and in reaching out to them in gestures of empathy, we not only accord them their dignity, we also extend our cosmopolitan reach. This is, therefore, one of the ways in which Krog seeks to dispose her South African world toward cosmopolitanism. In this regard, she enhances the humanist gestures of Ingrid Jonker. However, Lady Anne does not stop at drawing attention to the pain of black people in South Africa; she calls them heretics, emphasizing their resistance and refusal to be dominated. They resisted both their erasure and the official ideology that denied their humanity, thus alerting the larger (and future) world to the origin of the unfair status quo. In the note for future composers we feel the truth of Benjamin's observation that the historical materialist writes with the perspective of the dispossessed in mind. The chronicler knows that the conflict is not over. For Benjamin, "The only writer of history with the gift of setting alight the sparks of hope in the past, is the one who is convinced of this: that not even the dead will be safe from the enemy, if he is victorious. And this enemy has not ceased to be victorious."[32] To be victorious in this respect is to shape the narrative of how the past came to be what it was. Lady Anne, in sympathy with the defeated, writes a note for the future composers of the redemption song with the knowledge that, at least because of the strength of her testimony, the victors will not have total control over the narrative of the past. She believes that that struggle is ongoing. This is consistent with P. P. van der Merwe's observation that "Antjie Krog shapes real and imagined, or amplified, events from the life of her heroine in such a way that they not only offer an image of the past, but also suggest parallels with the present and foretell a possible future."[33]

The poem "In Transit—a Cycle of the Early Nineties" reinforces the importance of history as written by the defeated or their sympathizers. It attaches dates to the cycle of history and records the escalation of violence in South Africa between 1988 and 1995. The violence was especially intense from 1986 to 1990. As Susan VanZanten Gallagher reports, the years 1986–89 marked the "final outrage of self-destruction of South Africa."[34] The crisis in the townships worsened; the numbers of those killed in incidents of black protest reached the thousands. Thousands of schoolchildren were arrested and thrown into jail by the apartheid police.[35] The first stanza of "In Transit" takes the reader to the last two years of the 1980s: "first Christmas weekend under the / state of emergency 1988."[36] The rest of the poem casts a pall of fear over the areas of the city in which the state of emergency was imposed; it also reveals the condition of the children in prison, "so many

thousands of children" who "crawl from the foundations like rats."[37] The picture of these children contrasts with the following image of a privileged white parent:

> I play the piano with children dressed
> as Mary and Joseph and angel sing:
> *away in a manger*
> *a trough for his bed*[38]

In the Lady Anne poems and those set in late-twentieth-century South Africa, Krog creates situations that are centuries apart but similar in the degree of violence and its consequences for the black populations of South Africa. She forces the descendants of white rulers to engage with the injustices of the present as part of their heritage, and this engagement is not without consequences. The desperate, ratlike children could easily have been descendants of the "heretics" who paid with their lives for protesting against their oppression (in "Lady Anne Looks Out Again from the Castle of Good Hope"). Krog allows the reader to contrast the condition of children who grew up playing piano with that of those who grew up "crawl[ing] from the foundations like rats." In the contexts of the new South African moral frameworks, the "piano children" are challenged to engage with history and interpret the present from the perspective of the other.

In the poem "Land," Krog confronts history head-on. The speaker addresses the land as if it were a person: "under order from my ancestors you were occupied / had I language I could write for you were land my land."[39] The run-on syntax displays the speaker's confused emotional attachment to the land, which plays the double role of both object and subject. In the phrase "under order from my ancestors," the speaker acknowledges the violence that runs in her veins. She can neither remove herself from these violent beginnings nor detach her being from the land. She is now part of the land as much as the land is part of her. This is the source of her conflict; she cannot find adequate words with which to relate to the land that did not belong to her, but which has become hers by conquest. South Africa's colonial history is steeped in violence. The descendants of the colonizers may not have contributed to it, but they continue to benefit from it. They cannot return to the place they came from because they *are* where they came from. But the conflict in the speaker's mind arises from the fact that, compared to the descendants of the conquered black population, she is privileged, and thus she has moral crimes to answer for. Questions of

justice and fairness force the land to reject her: "me you never wanted / me you could never endure."[40] Yet her solidarity is unyielding: "I want to go underground with you land / land that would not have me / land that never belonged to me."[41] Her solidarity reminds the land that both of them (she and the land) are now knotted in the same fate.

Whereas in "In Transit—a Cycle of the Early Nineties" the speaker parallels the piano-playing descendants and those who crawl out of buildings like rats, the speaker in "Land" plunges into the complex moral world that results from a ruthless interrogation of history. The speaker's conflict is testimony to her humanity. She knows that as a privileged white person, she could simply keep silent and enjoy her privilege, but her humanity does not allow her to do this; it has been roused by the suffering that resulted from her ancestors' violent usurpation of the victims' lands. In the speaker's conflict, Krog again writes from a Benjaminesque view of history as an ongoing struggle to redress the present. The last line of the poem is an expression of the speaker's sincere yearning to establish an affinity with the other who has always been considered different. There is also an admission of the utter complexity of that yearning. It is affinity nonetheless, and in it, hope and redemption reside. Krog argues that there can hardly be a genuine affinity in South Africa without knowledge of history.

Confronting the truth of the past is a necessary first step in a long process of reconciliation and redemption in South Africa. While the peaceful transition from apartheid to democracy gives hope to the belief that South Africa is on its way to racial reconciliation, Krog suggests that reconciliation is impossible without a radical reexamination of the past coupled with a willingness to forge affinity, which is primarily an individual act. That act requires a radical repositioning of one's moral and philosophical compass, one that amounts to a total transformation of the self. She teaches us that the ideological energy required to turn Afrikaners back into Africans might equal that which turned some Europeans into Afrikaners.

Carli Coetzee points out that *Country of My Skull* is addressed to a "black woman to whom the text is dedicated, a victim with Afrikaner names on her lips."[42] Krog specifically asks this black woman—metonymic of the oppressed black population victimized by apartheid—for forgiveness and, possibly, entry into their community. As Coetzee contends, Krog acknowledges that this entry is not yet a possibility. She obviously recognizes that she can never be black, that she can never experience what it is to be black. Krog, however, gives us insight into her feelings about the testimonies through descriptions of her bodily

reactions: "And suddenly it is as if an undertow is taking me out . . . out . . . and out. And behind me sinks the country of my skull like a sheet in the dark—and I hear a thin song, hooves, hedges of venom, fever, and destruction fermenting and hissing underwater. I shrink and prickle."[43] Krog's detailed descriptions of her bodily reactions during the testimonies of the victims of apartheid can only be those of a privileged body feeling another body's pain, a body wanting to be in true affinity with the other that had otherwise been considered radically different. As Coetzee concludes, through these reactions "Krog is able to imagine herself connected to the country and able . . . to feel that she belongs to a black heart—is loved by a black heart."[44] Contrary to Osinubi's fears that Krog is more concerned "with invisible audiences"[45] and therefore does violence to her narration, she locates the future of her society in the ability of the individual to connect with invisible audiences, with humanity. It is also a call for the invisible audiences (including her Afrikaner compatriots) to develop a co-feeling, an affinity with the victims of the apartheid past. One connects with invisible audiences by imaginatively reconstructing the painful experience of the victims, and this presupposes a recognition of their humanity. An untitled poem in *Country of My Skull*, like the book as a whole addressed to "every victim who had an Afrikaner surname on her lips" and other victims of apartheid, captures Krog's notion of affinity.[46] The poem begins:

> because of you
> this country no longer lies
> between us but within

The first line instantly establishes a bond between the speaker (whom we assume to be Krog) and "this country," which is her larger South African world. The conjunction "because" gives the victim a prominent place in that world. The victim is an agent by grace of the testimonies she has given; that is, she transforms the world that she and the speaker share. The speaker does not refer to herself until the third stanza, where we learn that the world that the victim has transformed now lives in the speaker's skull.

> in the cradle of my skull
> it sings, it ignites
> my tongue, my inner ear, the cavity of heart
> shudders toward the outline
> new in soft intimate clicks and gutturals

This is our first intimation of affinity between the speaker and the victim; it is initiated through the world in which they have already become entangled. In this stanza, the speaker now partakes of the idioms of the new world, not from a distance, but by submitting herself to the "soft intimate clicks and gutturals" of the new world. The feeling that was initiated earlier now evolves into a hermeneutic of participation. It is a huge step for a white person to speak in the clicks and gutturals of a language that was hitherto tagged as barbaric; it signals an identification with that world and those who inhabit it.[47] The process of the speaker's affinity with the addressee comes to completion in the last three lines of the poem: "You whom I have wronged, please / take me // with you." This plea to the victim is as far as any demonstration of affinity can go. Of course, Krog does not commit identity suicide; she does not reject her whiteness. She has merely widened the scope of her humanity to incorporate others who had been excluded from it by the ideology propagated by the spokespersons of her ethnic group. Embracing the idiom of other cultures into her own does not diminish her original world. On the contrary, the gesture enriches her world by broadening its horizon of meaning.

The notion of embracing other people's world and their feelings seems to be natural to us humans. The Chinese philosopher Mencius (372–289 BC) talks about people's natural reactions to the pain of others. He is best known for giving Confucianism its most profound philosophical grounding. He says, "No man is devoid of a heart sensitive to the suffering of others. Suppose a man were, all of a sudden, to see a young child on the verge of falling into a well. He would certainly be moved to compassion."[48] Lady Anne attests to the truth of Mencius's philosophy. Perhaps without willing it, she acquires the perspective of those oppressed by her own people. Their pain becomes hers. Would she have stopped their pain had she been able? This is to be assumed. The same could be said for Krog, who identifies both with her and with the oppressed. But perhaps it is more important and more realistic that Lady Anne/Krog feel the pain of those who suffered under Afrikaner cruelty and record it for the future. Empathy cannot stop another's pain; however, it can bridge or at least narrow the gap between people, and thus prevent future oppression. In the poem "Scar," Krog refers exclusively to the pain to which people have been subjected over time. The last two stanzas are a call to action that could lead the country further toward justice:

but mighty tree blooming into the all-self
suffering should liberate
us all into seasons of consciousness

forefather, our blackening blood demands:
a redistribution of pain.[49]

Krog transfigures the typical Marxist/socialist redistribution of wealth into "a redistribution of pain." She does not suggest that the privileged be subjected to undue suffering or that the dispossessed or the oppressed have a monopoly on pain. Rather, she suggests that those whose pain has been relieved by the suffering of others should experience sacrifice as part of the reconciliation in the new country. That sacrifice can begin when the privileged swap perspectives with the oppressed. From the foregoing, and within the context of Krog's thinking, it is logical to suggest that a white descendant of the original settlers who oppressed the indigenous population can become African through an act of empathy or active transcultural affinity. This *act of becoming* is precisely what Krog seeks to achieve through her poems and in *Country of My Skull*.

De Kok and the Hermeneutics of Pain

De Kok's poetics further the arguments proposed by Krog in a seamless dialogic affinity. Just as Krog opposes the destructive tendency of politics to deny the past or reframe it to the advantage of those in power, de Kok is against the pacifying sermons of forgiving and forgetting. In her essay "Cracked Heirlooms: Memory on Exhibition," she contends that "there is a strong impulse in the country, supported and sustained by the media, for a grand concluding narrative, which will accompany entry into a globalized economy and international interaction with the world."[50] In line with the grammar of the TRC, she identifies this impulse as the urge to forgive and forget. She contrasts the role of artists and producers of culture with that of politicians who might stand to gain most from the loss of memory of the past. She argues,

> Cultural institutions and artists face an especially challenging task, of permitting contradictory voices to be heard as testimony or in interpretation, not in order to "resolve" the turbulence, but to recompose it. This involves resistance to increasing pressure on art and the public

> institutions to contribute directly to the psychic requirements of "settlement" and nation building. If yoked to those imperatives, art too will become victim to the pressure to "forgive and forget."[51]

De Kok does not ignore the psychological and moral significance of the TRC, but she argues that the TRC alone is not in a position to bring about peace and fairness; it has only paved the way. The arts and arts education in South Africa, she argues, must be devoted to a "large-scale restoration of 'the cracked heirloom.'"[52] Evident in de Kok's thinking is her reading of South Africa as a treasure, albeit a fractured one; it is a broken vase, and much devotion and love is required to repair it. In her thinking, therefore, the TRC is the process of the search for truth and reconciliation, not an episode in the history of South Africa. It must be the way of being South African. The search for truth and reconciliation must translate into something more than a verbal request for, and granting of, forgiveness; this is perhaps a way to understand de Kok's poetry. How do we deal with the enormous pain of individuals whose existence had been destroyed by others' greed and inhumanity? How can society interpret and respond to the pain of individuals like the woman in "Small Passing" who lost her child at birth and who was told that her pain was nothing compared to the pain of many black people suffering under apartheid?

Reviewing de Kok's collection *Terrestrial Things*, Simon Lewis suggests that "in response to apartheid atrocities, as related to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC), and to AIDS, de Kok confronts the near-impossibility of making sense. [She is aware] that digging into South Africa's recent history might overwhelm us with an overload of 'evidence' that will not cohere into any sort of an 'account.'"[53] We are already overwhelmed by the bits of information from the crimes of the apartheid police. Yet there are questions of whether we can truly make sense of the apparent banality of the evil of some of the details. One of the goals of the TRC was to recover the truth of the country's years of human rights abuses, especially during the apartheid era. Is it possible to express adequately the pain that people experienced during that time? Truth is considered the first step toward healing and reconciliation. According to reports, Desmond Tutu, the chairman of the commission, broke down in tears many times after learning the magnitude of what the state's oppressive apparatus did to people. Yet what was revealed during the TRC sessions is considered by many to be only the tip of the iceberg of apartheid oppression. It is also worthwhile to wonder whether those who testified articulated even half of what

was done to them; this leads to the larger question of whether we can put into words the degree of our humiliations at the hands of fellow humans. Specifically, can South African blacks ever articulate the truth of centuries of displacements, racial genocide, mass pauperization of black populations, torture, and death? Elaine Scarry argues that physical pain destroys language. Indeed, pain reduces us to the prelinguistic stage of human development, the stage at which tears are a form of communication. For Scarry, the destruction of language has political consequences because it makes overt "precisely what is at stake in 'inexpressibility' [and it] begin(s) to expose by inversion the essential character of 'expressibility' whether verbal or material."[54] Silence and tears seek to communicate something; they challenge people to respond.

De Kok highlights not only the inexpressible suffering and pain of the past, but also that of the postapartheid era, an era that was supposed to usher in prosperity for all; she does so in hopes of eliciting people's compassion. Sarah Brophy and Susan Spearey argue that "de Kok's poems not only draw attention to the continued apartheid of suffering, but they also gesture toward the urgent need to acknowledge that we exist as human beings only in relation to one another, and to one another's suffering, however difficult such a vision of mutual implication may be to attain."[55] I agree with their assessment of de Kok's poetry. I am particularly interested in what they call the continued apartheid of suffering in South Africa, and I understand it to mean that the undue experience of pain is unevenly distributed in postapartheid society. It is apt to remark, as they have implied in their essay, that de Kok is not as interested in the continued suffering of most of the black population under poverty or privation resulting from the forces of the capitalist market-oriented economy as she is in human suffering per se. As they note, de Kok "invited readers to encounter in intimate terms the physical, psychological, and spatial effects of entrenched difference, and to glimpse, often through radical gestures of empathy, the possibilities for social transformation."[56] In the remaining part of this chapter I examine some of de Kok's postapartheid poems in light of the above observation.[57]

The poem "Parts of Speech" is ironically about what is left unsaid, and what could not be said; it is about pain so intense that silence becomes the best expression of it. The first stanza paints a memorable picture of figures hunched by the weight of what they have experienced and what they cannot express verbally, perhaps because they have lost the voice to do so:

Some stories don't want to be told.
They walk away, carrying their suitcases
held together with grey string.
Look at their disappearing curved spines.
Hunch-backs. Harmed ones. Hold-alls.[58]

De Kok rattles the reader with the anthropomorphism of stories. It is not humans who walk away with their stories; rather, stories assume human shape and walk away, hunched by what Elaine Scarry has identified as the inexpressibility of pain. If it is true that a picture is worth a thousand words, it is all the more urgent in regard to the human condition that poetry aids our engagement with the other by suggesting images that speak to our senses.

Are the stories' "curved spines" the poet's perception of people's exploited and damaged bodies? The poet urges us to see bodies that have been exploited and abused to the point of utter disfigurement: the disappearing curved spines. According to Mark Doty, a National Book Award–winning poet and critic, "every achieved poem inscribes a perceptual signature in the world."[59] "Parts of Speech" does exactly that, allowing us to perceive instantaneously the immensity of what could not be expressed in words during the TRC sessions. Certain things cannot be put into words; they must be felt. Some aspects of human suffering are better imagined than stated; this is exactly what the fourth stanza urges us to do:

Why still believe stories can rise
with wings, on currents, as silver flares,
levitate unweighted by stones,
begin in pain and move towards grace,
aerating history with recovered breath?[60]

The speaker's interrogation should be understood as an invitation for us to cease the pornography of narratives of pain, part of which the testimonies of the TRC seemed to represent: "Why still imagine whole words, whole worlds": rather than invest our energy in "verbs, verbs that move mountains,"[61] we should take seriously the implication of the silence of the oppressed, of disappearing curved spines. We cannot be compassionate merely by consuming others' stories; we can be by imagining others as humans—that is, by putting ourselves in their positions so that their suffering and pain become ours. To this end, Sam Durrant rightly argues that even though it is difficult to express pain, de Kok "through the ancient art of metaphor . . . finds a way to embody and

'hold-all' the grief that remains unexpressed, and in so doing performs an act of imaginative identification that gestures towards the possibility of community."[62]

In "Tongue-Tied," de Kok becomes more explicit in directing our attention to the speech-defying experience of pain, drawing us closer to the TRC sessions. A victim of violence who has come to testify is asked, "Do you promise to tell the truth / the whole truth and nothing but the truth?"[63] The second stanza brings us face-to-face with the victim:

> Someone's been hurt.
> But she can't speak.
> They say she's "tongue-tied."[64]

The persona goes on to describe the woman's difficulty in articulating her experience. The victim speaks haltingly, dropping in hints about what happened to her and her family. We are not told explicitly, yet we know that she, her children, and probably her mother experienced unspeakable violence. At the point at which she becomes speechless, or tongue-tied, our imagination takes over the narrative thread. As if rightly figuring out what our imagination might have constructed, the woman concludes: "That's the truth. So help. Whole. To Tell."[65] In this instance there is a dialogue between the woman and the reader who has responded to the persona's invitation to deploy his or her imagination.

Even the transcriber of the TRC testimonies lets us know that the truth can hardly be transcribed. In the poem "The Transcriber Speaks," the transcriber is so overwhelmed by what he hears that he asks, "But how to transcribe silence from tape?" This line and the others I have examined suggest, as I have noted above, that the TRC sessions barely touched the tip of the iceberg of human suffering during the apartheid era.

I do not suggest that de Kok ignores the importance of words or narrative. In fact, like other poets, she admits that without words, we would be all the poorer. Yet the belief that truth as revealed in the commission proceedings leads to redemption or reconciliation—as in the TRC's motto, "Truth, the Road to Reconciliation"[66]—is only half the truth. De Kok puts the victims within the ambit of our empathy, or at least within the most elementary form of relation. We get to know them. Susan Spearey argues that "challenging the assumptions that breaking silence is in and of itself redemptive or liberating, the TRC poems pose crucial questions, asking whether all that is signified by silence can be

translated into language; investigating how 'truths' that emerge can be received, integrated and enacted transformatively."[67] In the poem "The Archbishop Chairs the First Session," which is based on the role of Archbishop Tutu as the chair of the TRC, de Kok sharpens her discourse on truth that defies articulation, or, rather, she suggests ways of arriving at the truth other than verbalization:

> On the first day
> after a few hours of testimony
> the Archbishop wept.
> He put his grey head
> on the long table
> of papers and protocols
> and he wept.[68]

We do not know what the Archbishop heard. It is perhaps not important; what is important is the form his body takes after he hears those things. As in "Parts of Speech," in which stories walk away hunched, the Archbishop is hunched by the weight of the testimonies to which he is now privy. In what reads like a list poem in its ordinariness, de Kok enables us to picture what might have made the archbishop weep. The verb "weep" is mentioned four times. The last line, "and he wept," heightens the list of what moved the man of God to tears; it has the same effect as the famous shortest verse in the Bible: "Jesus wept" (John 11:35).

Weeping is one of the most fundamental expressions of human frailty. It delineates the inexpressibility of pain and the fact that we feel pain either directly in our own flesh, or indirectly by empathy. In the biblical scene in which Jesus weeps, he breaks down after hearing of the death of his friend Lazarus. His weeping therefore shows him as both human and humane. It underlines his power of compassion. Might this be what moved Archbishop Tutu to weep after hearing the testimonies of man's inhumanity to man? Does de Kok want us to participate in weeping over the evil of the world? Is this her way of encouraging affinity in her society? The strength of the poem lies in showing us the effect of people's experience of pain without narrating that pain through details. The penultimate stanza amplifies the effect of the first one, especially with the repetition of Tutu's weeping:

> There was a long table, starched purple vestment
> and after a few hours of testimony,
> the Archbishop, chair of the commission,
> laid down his head, and wept.[69]

We are intrigued by the stand-alone line, the last stanza: "That's how it began."[70] What exactly began there? Does the speaker refer to the reality of postapartheid South Africa? Perhaps that reality begins in the recognition of the importance of the Archbishop's weeping; it begins in the hermeneutics of his tears, and in those of people who feel like he does. As Spearey argues, "The poem invites readers to suspend cognitive responses, to dispense with what we already 'know.' Instead, we are encouraged to step closer, to begin again by experiencing the affective dimension of the psychological breaking point of a public figure."[71] Certainly, the poem is an invitation to enter into affinity with the victims of inhumanity. One might observe that Jesus and Tutu have this in common: they are religious figures. But one does not need to be religious to be able to mourn the death of beloved ones, or to weep in the face of people's undeserved pain. One does not need to be religious to put oneself in the position of others. The capacity to feel (or respond to) other people's pain is innate in us. Indeed, as renowned anthropologist Frank de Waal argues, it is one of the primary instincts that humans have in common with all primates.[72] It functions without regard to culture or ideology, except, of course, where it has been systematically blocked by culture and ideology as has been seen in racist and sexist societies.

I read de Kok's poems about the TRC as her prolegomenon to a truly new society, one that calls for individual and communal responsibility for all, especially the vulnerable members of society. This responsibility begins with our openness to the experiences of those who have suffered unspeakable pain; we owe them our moral attention.

In "Body Parts," de Kok ushers in a new beginning with a wish, a prayer for a truly new beginning. The poem is composed of six couplets that conclude with a stand-alone line. The supplicatory couplet—"May the wrist turn in the wind like a wing / the severed foot tread home ground"[73]—suggests mobility; it is movement toward a commonly desired state in society. The first line implies a phoenix rising from the ashes. Yet while the prayer might be for South Africans to rise from the ashes of apartheid, they are to remain bound to "home ground" or to the earth. The remaining couplets continue the wish list initiated by the first. The last two stanzas stand out in their powerful suggestions of the crimes of the past:

> And may the unfixable broken bone
> loosed from its hinges

now lying like a wishbone in the veld
pitted by pointillist ants.[74]

The South African past is like an "unfixable broken bone loosed from its hinges." Every attempt to return to the "original position" will not only be impossible but may also loosen more bones from their hinges without the prospect of fixing any. Yet we cannot give up by making the cheap excuse that the past cannot be fixed. Rather, we get help from ants, who, like a pointillist painter, keep working with the goal of building a home for themselves without thinking that their work might not come to fruition. The speaker alerts us that our redemption is in the smallest details of our lives. These, rather than the temptation to indulge in an ideological project of reshaping society, will redeem us; they will "give us new bearings." In "Body Parts," therefore, the poet does not anticipate an organic healing. Such would be an impossible undertaking. Rather, she suggests a reconstituted perspective on the violence of the past. Only a new attitude toward the totalizing approach of the past can give us "new bearings."[75]

What, then, are the new bearings that the last line announces? Based on the overarching tone of the poems thus discussed, I suggest that "new bearings" means new moral persuasions—anything but what the apartheid past stood for: hospitality, empathy, and compassion, virtues that can enhance affinity between peoples and promote global citizenship. These virtues are not ideological. Rather, they manifest themselves when one individual takes a closer look at the condition of another and takes steps toward the recognition of that individual as a person. Adopting a new moral persuasion that takes the dignity and well-being of the other as an integral part of the common good (moral framework) is perhaps the greatest task facing South Africans, especially in the face of a neoliberal market economy that seems to apotheosize individualism and the survival of the fittest.

Earlier I argued that memory plays an important role in Antjie Krog's conception of redemption. Memory is important also in de Kok's poetics. The poem "Sticks on Stone" lists the types of things to remember:

What to remember returning home?
Use the prodding iron,

herd memories into a pen
especially the fattened one,

the thin one,
the one with the bent back leg

and the one we gave a name to,
the pretty one, the pretty one.[76]

The last two lines of the poem's section IV establish what to do with what is remembered: "observe intersections, scry the mirror / of the forgotten, read the bones."[77] We "scry" a mirror or a crystal ball in the belief that the future can be revealed. In South African traditional religions, the diviners, or *sangomas*, are known to throw bones and read them to find the truth. De Kok deploys these ancient practices as a metaphor for society's search for redemption by keeping memories alive. To remind us that the search for redemption or the solutions to society's malaise is not going to be easy, the poem ends with a couplet of interrogatives: "Pure song: what's that? / Why do we hear a dying fall?"[78] Is it possible to sing a pure song while the texts before us (the mirror or the bones) reveal the harsh realities of the past? Can we remain complacent when we hear a dying fall?

In his review of *Terrestrial Things*, Lewis states that de Kok's challenge to "the reader to shift from the privileged position of observer and judge is the most chastening in a collection which does not flinch from implicating its readers in the material they are reading about."[79] Our responsibility lies in our response to "the dying fall." We respond to the dying fall through empathy, and in doing so, we see the victims as fellow citizens deserving of our affinity. Global citizenship consists of seeing the other as a fellow citizen of the same world (city) in which one lives. De Kok urges us to go beyond recognition of this fact; she asks us to engage.

De Kok suggests that compassion should be an integral part of our social makeup. "The Head of the Household" presents us with a bleak picture of a girl who has just turned thirteen. She is thrust into the role of the head of her parents' household. She "is a girl of thirteen / and her children are many."[80] We can only surmise what might have happened to her parents in the last four stanzas of the poem:

for ambulance, hearse,
the delivery vans

that will fetch and dispatch
the homeless, motherless

unclean and dead
and a girl of thirteen,

children in her arms,
house balanced on her head.[81]

Death is the ultimate marker of our finitude; it leaves a vacuum whenever it occurs. The poem insinuates an emptiness akin to that left by death. But then just as the awareness of our finitude urges us to find meaning in our lives—as the existentialists argue—we are urged to fill the void created by the teenage girl's loss. After the death of her parents, the thirteen-year-old girl must balance her parents' household on her head; she must embrace responsibility for which she is obviously not prepared. The poet spares us the pornographic details of her parents' demise; in that way, she forces our imagination to concentrate on the girl and the "children in her arms." I have noted Lewis's argument that de Kok's poetry implicates "its readers in the material they are reading about."[82] Readers are not allowed the pleasure of a disinterested observer; they are drawn into the conditions of human frailty that are thrust on them in subtle forms, in forms that prod without being overbearing and are deeply moral without being moralistic.

Perhaps the question that instantly comes to mind when we are faced with a situation like the girl's is: what can I do? In South Africa, such situations abound. Of course, expecting people to help in every situation that demands helping hands is impossible, and literature does not prescribe what to do. However, through a careful layering of competing images and metaphors, de Kok challenges her society to embrace "new bearings" premised on affinity with the other. In "Women and Children First," she expands the sectors of the populace that need to benefit from society's new beginnings:

It's always been so.
This makes it worse.
Women and children first.

First to be hurt
last to be nursed.
It's always been so.[83]

Mashudu C. Mashige argues that we can read de Kok's poetry "with an eye towards examining the various trajectories that inhere in her quest for the reclamation of the feminine voice, especially within the context of a masculinist society."[84] Accordingly, "Women and Children First" is a feminist poem to the degree that it deals with the position of women in society. But the poem is not only about women; it is also about

society's relation to its most vulnerable members. In patriarchal societies, women and children are most vulnerable given their dependence on the positions the patriarchal ideology has assigned to men. The short, clipped lines in "Women and Children First" lend the poem an emphatic mood, as does the repeated line: "It's always been so." Thus, we are enjoined to ask why the described condition has always been the case. Works by important women writers, such as Virginia Woolf's *A Room of One's Own* and Adrienne Rich's "Diving into the Wreck," to name only two, have suggested how the condition of women came to be shaped by tradition aided by society's mythologies.[85] In seemingly innocent stories such as the Fall of Adam and Eve and Pandora's Box, society keeps alive the image of the woman as the source of evil in the world. This explains why de Kok's poem begins with the provocative line "it's always been so." But should it always remain so? Should we remain complacent in the face of women's experience of pain? De Kok does not think we should. To the contrary, she urges us to get involved in other people's lives by challenging the narratives and the system that hamper their thriving.

In its appeal to the most vulnerable in society, "The Child at the Lights" begins like Ingrid Jonker's famous poem "The Child Was Shot Dead by Soldiers in Nyanga."[86] Like Jonker's poem, it establishes a relationship between the vulnerable person and society. Whereas in "The Child Was Shot Dead by Soldiers in Nyanga" society's violence hits the child directly, in de Kok's poem the child is affected only indirectly, by privation: "The child in the street / motions, asks for something."[87] Whereas the child dies in Jonker's poem, in "The Child at the Lights" the child is utterly dependent, or figuratively dead to the passersby and those in cars whose windows are rolled up, steamy, "unopened to his mouthed request."[88] I endorse Brophy and Spearey's argument that we are dehumanized in the moment we objectify the other. In the moment when the passengers in a car roll up their windows and effectively shield themselves from the entreaties of these vulnerable members of society, the dehumanization of all is complete and reciprocal; "because the child is treated as an object, the observers also become less than human."[89] The speaker becomes more direct in addressing what happens or should happen when people are confronted with vulnerable members of society:

> All remember the call
> for a hardened heart,
> for welded arteries,
> a wary pulse,

when children irrupt
at the traffic lights
at the threshold of the city.[90]

Ubuntu as a Register of Universal Affinity

The poem asks whether we can still lay claim to humanity if we insulate ourselves against other people's vulnerabilities. Thus, to be human is to be open to others' humanity. De Kok challenges us to examine the fact that even though the social and economic problems in South Africa might have been created by the legacies of apartheid, their solution must come from all sectors of society and from every individual. In defining some groups of people as fundamentally inferior and different from others, the apartheid system blocked people's natural portals of empathy so that affinity between peoples was ascribed rather than avowed or elected. A new bearing in South Africa must encourage elective affinity by undermining the ideologies of race, class, ancestry, and autochthony.

The white settler population in South Africa invested centuries of oppositional ideology built on master/slave dialectics, the goal of which was to lock the other in a category of permanent inferiority. When the speaker in the untitled poem in *Country of My Skull* asks the black woman to whom the poem is dedicated to take her, Krog suggests that there are many ways of being African. She embodies one of those ways and thereby demonstrates a transcultural affinity, which is establishing kinship with people of other cultural or racial backgrounds by being open to their humanity and adopting some idioms of those cultures. It implies transcending inherited biases toward other cultures and peoples and switching perspectives with people from these cultures. Krog has literally liberated herself from the vestiges of apartheid's binary valuation. In her thinking, the beneficiaries of centuries of oppression in South Africa cannot begin to redeem themselves until they switch perspectives with the victims of that oppressive system. Krog proposes thinking from multiple perspectives by acknowledging the necessity of transcultural interconnectedness. She confesses, "As a white South African I am disturbed by the fact that I always notice this interconnectedness as a kind of second thought. Something does not make sense and then I realize that is because I think as an unattached individual."[91] Krog argues that as human beings, we are all connected with others, even at our most "unattached" moments. For this insight, Krog pays

tribute to Desmond Tutu, who has fruitfully interpreted the concept of *ubuntu*. She contrasts the African moral self championed by Tutu with that of the self-centered West derived from the Platonic-Cartesian thinking self. The African interconnected moral self that Krog lays claim to as an African is the self in conversation with the other: "The conversation that eventually creates the moral entity is not with the self, but with the people around one, the stranger-accommodating community. One's self awareness is not formed by splitting oneself into two, but by becoming one-in-many dispersed as it were among those around one."[92] Krog underscores the fact that "interconnectedness-towards-wholeness" is not a communal feast. On the contrary, going beyond oneself to reach out to others presumes a laborious effort on the part of the individual. It is also "more than just a theoretical knowledge that all things in the world are linked"; rather, "it means both a mental and physical awareness that one can only 'become' who one is, or could be, through the fullness of that which is around one—both physical and metaphysical."[93] "Interconnectedness-towards-wholeness" is a process of becoming that is fulfilled in the individual, but only in the presence—physical or spiritual—of others, living or dead. Only within the context of interconnectedness, which is a profound rejection of Hegelian oppositional and Cartesian solipsistic notions of identity, can a former Afrikaner be truly African. Within this context, the African can strengthen his or her relation to the world. From the *ubuntu* perspective, Africans, the victims of centuries of oppression, must also work for their own redemption by consciously rejecting every temptation to dwell in anger and bitterness-driven self-righteousness that might flow from their positions as victims. In the spirit of transcultural affinity, they must not yield to the temptation to adopt the Hegelian master position through autochthonous or nativist ideologies. Rather, they too must work toward global citizenship by realizing the promises of a community that has now become polychromatic and multifaceted.

As affinity becomes more universal, it becomes more fulfilling if it is not premised on race, gender, or class. Only then can there be conditions for a true discourse and mutually enriching co-feelings. Ignoring the seduction of autochthony, gender, class, or ancestry, affinity opens the gateways of empathy to people as people, not as members of my group. Herein lies the poetics of affinity and the call to global citizenship.

Conclusion

South Africa in Search of a New Humanism

In the preface, I stated that I gained a new perspective on the world after reading Nelson Mandela's *Long Walk to Freedom* and Desmond Tutu's *No Future without Forgiveness*. Mandela and Tutu gave me a new theory to explain my world by providing alternatives to much of what I had understood about the African political and moral landscape. The alternative they provided was rooted in ancient southern African communal practice of belongingness, called *ubuntu*. They thus delivered tools with which society can effectively upend the conventional understanding of postcolonial theory in Africa. I thus no longer see my identity in oppositional paradigms; I see it in relation to others. Their own model of engaging their postcolonial world can also be understood with the help of the decolonial resistance idiom articulated by Latin American thinkers such as Walter Mignolo, Anibal Quijano, Enrique Dussel, and others. Sabelo Ndlovu-Gatsheni has provided a profound reading of Mandela and convincingly placed him in that decolonial tradition.

As Quijano has argued, European modernity, which is traced above all to Descartes, is rooted in instrumental rationality. Rationality serves a purpose that is the separation of the subject from the world and the consequent labeling of the world as objects to be conquered. Distinction between subject and the world becomes that between self and other, and this distinction is further applied to others who do not belong to one's race and space. These others are conceived of as homogeneous, also to be conquered, colonized, or used as objects. Modernity and coloniality are, therefore, intertwined. Quijano states that "it is necessary to extricate oneself from the linkages between rationality/modernity and coloniality, first of all, and definitely from all power which is not constituted by free decisions made by free people. . . . [We must acknowledge] the heterogeneity of all reality."[1] I understand Quijano to mean that heterogeneity prevents the concentration of power and meaning in one source, which ultimately leads to abuse. For example, European

modernism usurped the power to dictate meaning in the world and consequently degraded others to the level of meaninglessness.

Mignolo states that the major cause of the current global crisis is the "persistence of global coloniality." To be sure, "coloniality is shorthand for the 'coloniality of power' and both are stand-ins for the 'colonial matrix of power,' or the CMP."[2] For him, therefore, the cure for the chaos is the rejection of, or delinking of self from, coloniality or the capitalist greed introduced into the world by Euro-modernism. Rejecting the colonialist mind-set is, according to Mignolo, "creating and promoting pluriversality, which involves delinking from ego conquiro and ego cogito, so much entrenched in the formation of modern subjects/subjectivities: the winner, the most successful, the number one, the world leader, and all the other social roles that modernity and its aftermath—globalism—have created."[3] Delinking implies also adopting a new moral attitude, which must be ethically engaged and work "for the wellbeing of 'the people,' instead of working solely for the institutions and their beneficiaries."[4] Mignolo states that decoloniality, or rejecting the Euro-modernist objectification of others, must be grounded in humanness. I understand his rejection of *ego conquiro* and *ego cogito* to mean an embracing of *ego relatio,* which, as we have seen, is what Mandela and his South Africa stand for.

Apartheid-like colonialism and the apartheid regime that came to power in South Africa in 1948 were manifestations of European rationality/modernity and the objectification of the world. As Ndlovu-Gatsheni argues, "Mandela emerges as an uncompromising historian and a champion of decolonial humanism, and his political thought cannot be ignored in the present-day search for decolonial-liberatory modern political theory."[5] I extend Ndlovu-Gatsheni's perception of Mandela to South Africa during the transition period, and more specifically, the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission, which created a moral framework rooted in a radical rejection of the colonialist conception of the world.

South Africa was not the first country to institute a commission for truth and reconciliation. Indeed, as Desmond Tutu and the South African members of the TRC have acknowledged, such commissions had been formed in Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, and other countries and were instrumental in the conception of the South African TRC. But South Africa adopted a unique approach of forgiveness and restorative justice. Tutu has gone on to preach the value of restorative justice, especially in Rwanda. He counseled boundless forgiveness, stating that "ultimately we must concentrate on forgiveness and reconciliation because, if we

concentrate on retribution, I am fearful that the spiral of violence, resentment and payback will never end.[6]

The South African TRC not only inspired the Rwandan Truth and Reconciliation Commission; as Constance Johnson writes, "On September 14, 2015, Sri Lanka's government announced a plan to establish a Commission for Truth, Justice, Reconciliation modeled after the one established in South Africa to handle crimes from the era of apartheid, and Sri Lanka will receive advice from South Africa to guide the country in helping victims and locating missing individuals."[7] In addition, Adriaan Alsema writes that "Colombia's President Juan Manuel Santos inaugurated an historic Truth Commission that will investigate the victimization of civilians during the 52-year war between a multitude of actors, including the state."[8] Sierra Leoneans also inaugurated their own South Africa–inspired Truth and Reconciliation Commission for their country.[9]

There is an increasing awareness of the global relevance of the South African model of truth and reconciliation as helping to usher in the much-needed rejection of the colonialist mind-set and the acceptance of the humanity of all. This is surely the case regardless of shortcomings associated with it. Indeed, recent sociopolitical developments in South Africa urge caution about a premature celebration of an anticipated promised land. The sad reality on the ground, some of whose manifestations I mentioned earlier, seems to call into question the validity of Mandela's and Tutu's visions. However, I think that rather than counsel despair, these developments urge an awakened consciousness about the relevance of the visions. A people without vision, it is said, is stuck in the tomb of the past. Given the racial and ethnic constitution of the country, which is a mirror of the global condition, South Africa has no alternative but to maintain a moral framework that promotes openness to difference.

The approaches of many scholars engaged in the South African sociopolitical situation are located in the social sciences. For instance, Hein Marais critiques the many strategic choices made since the early 1990s that have compounded the legacies of colonialism.[10] John Saul and Patrick Bond note that South Africa has one of the highest rates of protest and dissent in the world owing to its high poverty and unemployment rates. They hope that the next liberation struggle will correct some of the ills of the first one.[11] Adam Habib analyzes South Africa's transition into democracy and its prospects for inclusive development. He presents an understanding of the complex political, economic, and historical forces that shape the country's destiny and argues for an

active citizenry.[12] Gillian Hart decries the rise of populist politics and the doomed direction in which the country is moving.[13] Neville Alexander is concerned about the mismatch between the kind of South Africa South Africans aspired to during the liberation struggles and the South Africa they got.[14]

Rather than highlight many of the failures of the postapartheid society to live up to its humanistic promise, I have focused on aspects of South African life and narratives that still hold out some hope for what Jean and John Comaroff have called "highly imaginative modes of survival."[15] I have highlighted the human factor in the mechanics of nation-building. In recognition of that human factor, the Stellenbosch Institute for Advanced Studies, a prestigious research institute in South Africa, organized a series of symposia in 2009 and 2010 that were dedicated to examining what it means to be human in South Africa. The organizers aptly titled the project "The Humanist Imperative in South Africa Today," and the participants explored various ways in which South Africa could achieve a new humanism.[16] The project was timely in its engagement with the questions of what went wrong and in its implicit task of mapping out visions of society beyond the neoliberal model. The participants in the symposia were aware of the weight of history and the fact that not much had been done to address the massive impoverishment of the black population. Of far-reaching importance, however, is their notion of where things can go right, and what needs to be done to make things right. I fully endorse their recognition that any search for a new humanism includes attention to the material conditions of the impoverished black population. I relate the core arguments developed in the foregoing chapters to key observations of some of the symposia's participants.

Jonathan Jansen provides a profound discussion of the requisite condition for South Africa to flourish as a cosmopolitan space. That condition is an awareness of history and the understanding of the historical embeddedness of knowledge and a readiness to engage individuals as they present themselves to us. Jansen analyzes black people's justifiable anger and suggests that in order to understand it, white people must switch perspectives with blacks. The magic of perspective-switching also works when one considers that many descendants of white people cannot be held accountable for the crimes of their forebears. He argues that "if transformation were going to happen at all, it would have to happen at the level of knowledge."[17] In his view, solutions must be rooted in a race- and ethnicity-transcendent imagination, derived from an awareness of how we are shaped by what we know. He observes that

people often co-opt issues of race or ethnicity to further their private interests or to avoid taking responsibility for those who most need attention rather than seek to understand the historical conditions that shaped people's lives.[18] Well-intentioned scholars and activists embarking on the task of overthrowing oppression and its legacies have often ended up entrenching the oppositional mind-set that produced such oppression in the first place. Jansen gives an example that involves Critical theory—a school of thought derived from Marxist, anticapitalist class struggle: "Critical theory receives and constructs the world as divided between black and white, working and privileged classes, citizens and illegal immigrants, men and women, straight and queer, oppressors and oppressed."[19] Jansen argues that in adhering to these divisions, Critical theory ignores the "people . . . the bodies . . . who carry knowledge within themselves that must be engaged, interrupted, and transformed."[20] His own experience of suffering and hardship bred anger and resentment toward whites. He grew up nurtured by the assertive philosophy of black consciousness, which made "black identity and black power central to its ideological tenets much more appealing than [the] nonracialism of Nelson Mandela's African National Congress." Jansen "had firm views about white privilege and a very clear understanding about redistribution from white hands back to the original inhabitants of the land."[21]

Not many people would agree with Jansen's dismissal of Critical theory. It is, however, important to note the probable risk of reifying difference if one fails to engage Critical theory critically, and this can further identity politics. Postcolonial theory, especially in Africa, fell into that trap. Ultimately, Jansen warns against identity politics, which achieves the opposite of what proponents claimed it would—the redress of past injustices. Indeed, it has failed precisely because it does not address humans as humans; it addresses them as representative of the groups to which they can be said to belong. Warning against resorting to identity politics, Jansen reminds us that apartheid would not have worked for as long as it did without the collaboration of some blacks. At the same time, it eventually fell apart because it was confronted with universal human solidarity, which included the participation of whites. As he explains, "Black South African elites are as much part of the capitalist system of exploitation as are their white compatriots, while prejudice and bigotry are not restricted to white citizens."[22] Jansen seems to suggest some degree of introspection in the belief that developing an awareness of how we came to be what we are can help us work on our own prejudices in order to be open to others.

Another participant in the symposia, Bernard Lategan, has suggested a notion of identity that agrees with Sarah Nuttall's concept of entanglement. For Lategan, "A more humane society will require not only the internalisation of our multiple identities, but also the ability to utilize the overlap with our fellow citizens to build bridges and to weave a complex net of social relations that will be strong enough to function with the opposing force of the complex world in which we find ourselves."[23] Having multiple identities is not the same as having multiple personalities. The concept of multiple identities suggests that a person could be *x* and *y* at the same time. In this sense, *x* merely relates to and complements *y*, and neither is complete without the other. The shift from singular to multiple identities is not an easy one. According to Lategan, it requires the presence of three factors: changes in attitude, expansions of framework, and recognition of the process. Attitude refers to the "way in which identity is approached," and it involves the "willingness to consider alternatives" to the previous, often restrictive "experience with singularity."[24] Framework refers to the way in which identity is conceptualized. I understand Lategan to mean that all self-perception takes place within a context, and the larger and more complex the context is, the more likely a person will be to perceive her- or himself in models of multiple identities, or as seeing reality according to a pluriversalist model. Acknowledging the process is an admission of one's contingency and becoming.

In his own contribution, Njabulo Ndebele dismisses the supposition that solutions to postapartheid problems will come from prepackaged group answers. Rather, the answers "will emerge from the interactions of sturdy, open-minded agents."[25] Thus, the emphasis on groups should yield to an emphasis on society, which is to be understood as people of diverse races and ethnicities. Although groups as markers of identity cannot be entirely dismissed, they "should progressively give way to the needs of individuals forming lasting or temporary collectives, within or across groups, which result in shifting or ever widening personal identities."[26] We can appreciate the operative words in Ndebele's thinking—for example, "free individuals" and "open-minded agents"—against the backdrop of some of his ideas that I sketched earlier. Open-mindedness and freedom keep the victims of history from becoming trapped in bitterness and bigotry; they also allow privileged persons, or, as the case may be, former oppressors, to switch perspectives with the victims of oppression. Ndebele's use of "agents" as opposed to "reagents," actors as opposed to reactors, is important. Seen from his perspective, a new humanism takes place in a society in which people who recognize

openness as a virtue take up the mantle of agency, one in which all people are concerned with being as doing; that is, doing something that can enhance the being of others and of society. By being as doing I do not suggest conceiving of a human person in a materialist or capitalist model, as in being in the service of production. Rather, I understand it as an individual's will to contribute something to the flourishing of society. People become more attuned to freedom when it is conceived positively rather than negatively; they understand freedom not only as freedom from constraint, but as freedom to do something. In this way, people assert their freedom and humanity and at the same time defend the freedom and humanity of others. Indeed, South Africa experienced such a surge of energy under the leadership of Nelson Mandela. In the early years of his government, South Africans were full of hope; many people were ready to contribute their part toward the survival and thriving of their society.

Neville Alexander's concerns, framed in the question of how we can reestablish a culture of positive values that is socially critical but not destructive in its modalities, seem to echo precisely what South Africa lost in the years following Mandela's exit from power. He argues that "a humanism of the 21st century will have to be based on what Gorz calls the *principle of sufficiency* which . . . [translates] as *Enough is as good as a feast.*"[27] The virtue of "enough is as good as a feast" obviously thrives when people have realized the dire situation of their society. It thrives under the assumption that people are ready to contribute to society and are ready to appreciate other people's contributions. Every sincere effort is enough. This, I think, is a core supposition of the idea of *ubuntu*, as I explained in chapter 1. It is the idea expressed in the saying *Umuntu ngumuntu ngabantu* (A person is a person through other persons). Philosopher Thaddeus Metz takes the *ubuntu* phrase "through other persons" to mean that "the only way to become a real person is in the context of a positive relationship with others, specifically, prizing community with them."[28] He interprets community in terms of identity and solidarity, and for him, to exhibit solidarity with others is to "act in ways that are expected to benefit each other. Solidarity is also a matter of people's attitudes such as emotions and motives being positively oriented toward others, say, by sympathising with them and helping them for their sake. For people to fail to exhibit solidarity would be for them either to be indifferent to each other's flourishing or to exhibit ill-will in the form of hostility and cruelty."[29] Understood in the context mapped by Metz, the essential components of global citizenship remain those that enable us to conceive of ourselves as being human because

we "participate" and we "share" in the humanity of others, regardless of difference.[30] This *ubuntuan* virtue links the authors we have discussed to the concept of global citizenship from the South. Understandably, some are more explicitly linked than others, but all are either directly or indirectly concerned with openness to reality.

My concern in this book has been openness to the humanity of others and how it can be achieved in a traumatized society. It is the question of how South Africa can be a thriving space for all, regardless of ethnicity or race. Elsewhere I have argued that part of Africa's problem lies in the conventional understanding of postcolonial resistance, especially as championed by Chinua Achebe.[31] Solidarity was understood in a narrow oppositional model. Hence the absolute necessity to expand the African reality beyond opposition. The novels and poems we have examined have shown us that humanism takes place precisely where humans live and die, where humans flourish in the face of exigencies and vicissitudes. Most of the characters in the works on which this study has focused have one thing in common: the desire to meet the other, to cross boundaries of race, gender, religion, sexuality, and ethnicity. For example, David Lurie (*Disgrace*) is a snobbish character who, exiled from power and therefore brought down to earth, seeks to regain his humanity by learning to feel other people's pain. His attention to suffering and dying dogs reminds him and the reader of their mortality. In the end, what matters to him is a connection to the other. He is humanized by the attention that other humans bring to him not as someone who is subservient to them, but as their equal. They show him the respect and warmth he has never shown others. Phaswane Mpe's Refentše (*Welcome to Our Hillbrow*) is able to judge his life on earth and the lives of his people from heaven, where he realizes that life is better lived when people abandon their xenophobia and become open to one another in order to learn from and enrich others. In Vladislavić's *The Restless Supermarket*, Tearle starts out rejecting the changes taking place in his society that is modeled on European culture. He wants to preserve the status quo that granted him privileges as a white man and that reduced blacks to subservient positions. He could afford to avoid blacks while the artificial world of apartheid still lasted, but the postapartheid condition demands a new moral and social orientation. He now finds himself entangled, sharing spaces with those he had otherwise avoided. In our global age marked by mobility, encountering people of other racial and ethnic affiliations is unavoidable. The question is how we adjust our moral compass in order to relate to others in more fulfilling ways.

I have chosen literary rather than social or exclusively cultural texts because of the role that stories play in human interaction. Stories about other people bring them closer to us. When we read stories, we partake of the lives of others. As David Palumbo-Liu argues, literature "delivers" the lives of others to us and challenges us to respond and to relate to them.[32] This is in the spirit of the TRC. We tell stories to be fully human, making sense of our experiences through the act of narrating them. This is true in both chirographic and oral cultures. Stories also make us aware of the humanity of others and of the necessity of according them their rights as humans. The stories of others bring us within the ambit of their humanity. They excite our empathy and open us to their experiences. A new humanism must have what the old society lacked: a solidarity that cuts across race, class, gender, and all markers of difference. A knowledge of history is essential. But knowledge without the ability to switch perspective with the other is futile. As I have sought to make clear in this book, openness to the experiences of others is the basis of global citizenship. In short, global citizenship begins with knowing the other, particularly with knowing how that person's knowledge of the world is constituted. We enter the new humanism the moment we express sincere interest in other people and their history, thus recasting the world history no longer in the Hegelian confrontational model, but in an *ubuntuan* relational one. We do not lose our identity in relating to others. On the contrary, we get to know the part of ourselves that would have remained unknown and unexplained, and so unenriched. With the help of a cosmopolitan attitude, we begin to adopt a vision of the world that is informed by empathy and hopefully begin to interpret reality in pluriversal rather than in universal grammar.

Notes

Preface

1. The term "peaceful transition" does not intend to ignore the fact that many people, especially blacks, lost their lives. But it generally refers to the fact that there was no race war which the world had feared.

2. Patricia Yaeger, "The End of Postcolonial Theory? A Roundtable with Sunil Agnani, Fernando Coronil, Gaurav Desai, Mamadou Diouf, Simon Gikandi, Susie Tharu, and Jennifer Wenzel," *PMLA* 122, no. 3 (2007): 633–51. See also Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, *Empire* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2001); and David Scott, *Refashioning Futures: Criticism after Postcoloniality* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999).

3. Robert J. C. Young, "Postcolonial Remains," *New Literary History* 43 (2012): 19–20.

4. See Édouard Glissant, *Poetics of Relations* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1997).

5. Sabelo J. Ndlovu-Gatsheni, "The Decolonial Mandela: Embodiment of Peace, Justice and Humanism," *Journal of Developing Societies* 31, no. 3 (2015): 305–32. See also Sabelo J. Ndlovu-Gatsheni, *The Decolonial Mandela: Peace, Justice and the Politics of Life* (New York: Berghahn Books, 2016).

6. Nelson Mandela, *Conversations with Myself* (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2010).

Introduction

1. Njabulo Ndebele, "Of Lions and Rabbits: Thoughts on Democracy and Reconciliation," *Pretexts: Literary and Cultural Studies* 8, no. 2 (1999): 153.

2. Philippe-Joseph Salazar, *An African Athens: Rhetoric and the Shaping of Democracy in South Africa* (Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 2002), xvii.

3. Paul Gilroy, "A New Cosmopolitanism," *Interventions* 7, no. 3 (2006): 289.

4. See, for instance, Njabulo Ndebele, "'Anatomy of the Gupta-Zuma Syndrome,'" March 20, 2016, http://city-press.news24.com/News/anatomy-of-the-gupta-zuma-syndrome-20160320.

5. "Xenophobia in South Africa," *Boston Globe*, June 27, 2008, http://www.boston.com/bigpicture/2008/06/xenophobia_in_south_africa.html; "Xenophobic Attacks Spreading," Irin News, May 23, 2008, http://www.irinnews.org/report/78386/south-africa-xenophobic-attacks-spreading.

6. "What the #RhodesMustFall Campaign Represents," News24, March 22, 2015, http://www.news24.com/Archives/City-Press/What-the-RhodesMustFall-campaign-represents-20150429.

7. Basani Baloyi and Gilad Isaacs, "South Africa's 'Fees Must Fall' Protests Are about More than Tuition Costs," October 28, 2015, http://www.cnn.com/2015/10/27/africa/fees-must-fall-student-protest-south-africa-explainer/.

8. "Ayanda Mabulu Blasts Mandela," http://www.culture-review.co.za/culture-ayanda-mandela (accessed April 17, 2016, no longer active).

9. Masego Panyane, "Protest for 'F*ck White People' Student," *Wits Vuvuzela*, February 8, 2016, http://witsvuvuzela.com/2016/02/08/30921/.

10. Ibid.

11. Mohammed Jameel Abdulla, "Should Ngũgĩ wa Thiong'o Have Asked White People to Leave His UCT Public Lecture?" *Daily Vox*, accessed May 2, 2018, https://www.thedailyvox.co.za/ngugi-wa-thiongo-white-people-uct-jameel-abdulla/.

12. Achille Mbembe, "Achille Mbembe on the State of South African Political Life," Africa is a Country, September 19, 2015, http://africasacountry.com/2015/09/achille-mbembe-on-the-state-of-south-african-politics/.

13. Sipho Hlongwane, "Bring Back Black Consciousness, Killed by 'Non-racialism,'" *Daily Maverick*, March 10, 2011, http://www.dailymaverick.co.za/opinionista/2011-03-10-bring-back-black-consciousness-killed-by-non-racialism/#.VvZ8KE1-OUk.

14. Alex Boraine, *What's Gone Wrong? South Africa on the Brink of Failed Statehood* (New York: NYU Press, 2014).

15. Anthony Giddens, *Runaway World: How Globalization Is Reshaping Our Lives* (London: Routledge, 1999).

16. Hein Marais, *South Africa Pushed to the Limit: The Political Economy of Change* (London: Zed Books, 2011); John S. Saul and Patrick Bond, *South Africa—the Present as History* (London: James Currey, 2014); Adam Habib, *South Africa's Suspended Revolution: Hopes and Prospects* (Athens: Ohio University Press 2013).

17. This implies that my book will be less empirical, unlike those of the above authors. The bulk of my analysis will be done via literary and philosophical texts.

18. Jean Comaroff and John L. Comaroff, "Writing Theory from the South: The Global Order from an African Perspective," *World Financial Review*, November 13, 2013, http://www.worldfinancialreview.com/?p=543; see also Jean Comaroff and John L. Comaroff, *Theory from the South: How Euro-America Is Evolving toward Africa* (Stellenbosch, SA: Paradigm Publishers, 2011).

19. Ibid.

20. W. D. Mignolo, *The Darker Side of the Renaissance: Literacy, Territory, and Colonization* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1995).

21. Ngũgĩ wa Thiong'o, *Globalectics: Theory and the Politics of Knowing* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2012).

22. This, to be sure, has not taken care of the massive impoverishment of the black population. The actors in the TRC are aware of that. The TRC has, however, set a stage for a productive engagement with economic inequality.

23. Robert J. C. Young, *Colonial Desire: Hybridity in Theory, Culture and Race* (London: Routledge, 1995). See also Homi K. Bhabha, *Nation and Narration* (London: Routledge, 1990).

24. Francoise Lionnet, *Autobiographical Voices: Race, Gender and Self-Portraiture* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1989).

25. Susan Moller Okin raised similar concerns. See "Is Multiculturalism Bad for Women?" in *Is Multiculturalism Bad for Women?* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999): 10–23.

26. Sabelo J. Ndlovu-Gatsheni, "The Decolonial Mandela: Embodiment of Peace, Justice and Humanism," *Journal of Developing Societies* 31, no. 3 (2015): 306.

27. Walter D. Mignolo, "Introduction: Coloniality of Power and De-colonial Thinking," *Cultural Studies* 21, nos. 2–3 (March–May 2007): 164.

28. See Sabelo Ndlovu-Gatsheni, "Africa for Africans or 'Natives' Only? New Nationalism and Nativism in Zimbabwe and South Africa," *Africa Spectrum* 1 (2009): 61–78; and Sabelo J. Ndlovu-Gatsheni, "Making Sense of Mugabeism in Local and Global Politics: So Blair Keep Your England and Let Me Keep My Zimbabwe," *Third World Quarterly* 30, no. 6 (July 2009): 1139–58.

29. We admit that South Africa's history of racialized inequality and oppression is distinctive. But that makes the black people's approach to transition even morally richer. There is, though, still a lot to be done to address the economic condition of the black population of South Africa.

30. Enrique Dussel, *Twenty Theses on Politics* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2008); Mignolo, "Introduction," 155–67.

31. See Chielozona Eze, "Nelson Mandela and the Politics of Empathy: Reflections on the Moral Conditions for Conflict Resolution in Africa," *African Conflict and Peacebuilding Review* 2, no. 1 (2012): 122–35.

32. I discuss the concept of global citizenship more fully in chapter 1. I use global citizenship and cosmopolitanism interchangeably, to designate an ethical disposition toward the world, rather than a political theory or program.

33. Hannah Arendt, cited in Brett Bowden, "The Perils of Global Citizenship," *Citizenship Studies* 7, no. 3 (2003): 352.

34. I am grateful to Njabulo Ndebele for pointing out this fine distinction to me.

35. See Michael Muetzelfeldt and Gary Smith, "Civil Society and Global Governance: The Possibilities for Global Citizenship," *Citizenship Studies* 6, no. 1 (2002): 55–75.

36. I use the word "save" also in terms of missionary or civilizing projects undertaken by certain self-proclaimed promoters of universal principles.

37. Mbembe, "Achille Mbembe Writes about Xenophobic South Africa."

38. Dewa Mavhinga, "Xenophobic Violence Erupts in South Africa: Local Group's March against Immigrants in Pretoria Today Turned Violent," Human Rights Watch, February 24, 2017, https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/02/24/xenophobic-violence-erupts-south-africa.

Chapter One

1. Critical observers of the South African TRC have wondered why the onus fell on the victims to forgive the perpetrators. There was limited pressure on the perpetrators to ask for forgiveness. Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa Report, vol. 6, March 21, 2003, https://www.gov.za/documents/truth-and-reconciliation-commission-south-africa-report.

2. I am aware of South Africa's Black Economic Empowerment, which is understood as a growth strategy targeting the South African economy's weakest point: inequality. Critics have, however, observed that it does not address structural issues. It only helps those blacks who had been somewhat better off than the impoverished majority.

3. Charles Taylor, *Sources of the Self: The Making of Modern Identity* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1989), 8–9.

4. Ibid., 27.

5. Ibid., 34.

6. Ibid., 35. This is in line with Alasdair MacIntyre's notion of humans as dependent rational animals. Alasdair MacIntyre, *Dependent Rational Animals: Why Human Beings Need the Virtues* (Chicago: Open Court, 1999). See also Alasdair MacIntyre, *After Virtue* (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1981), 208–23.

7. MacIntyre, *Dependent Rational Animals*, 47.

8. Ibid., 45.

9. Johnny de Lange, "The Historical Context, Legal Origins and Philosophical Foundation of the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission," in *Looking Back, Reaching Forward: Reflections on the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa*, ed. Charles Villa-Vincencio and Wilhelm Verwoerd (Cape Town: University of Cape Town Press, 2000), 14.

10. Mahmood Mamdani, "A Diminished Truth," in *After the TRC: Reflections on Truth*, ed. Wilmot James and Linda Van De Vijver (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2001), 59. See also Mahmood Mamdani, "Reconciliation without Justice," *South African Review of Books* 10, no. 6 (1997): 3–5.

11. Sampie Terreblanche, "Dealing with Systemic Economic Injustice," in *Looking Back, Reaching Forward: Reflections on the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa*, ed. Charles Villa-Vincencio and Wilhelm Verwoerd (Cape Town: University of Cape Town Press, 2000), 272.

12. Frederik van Zyl Slabbert, "Truth without Reconciliation, Reconciliation without Truth," in *After the TRC: Reflections on Truth and Reconciliation in South Africa*, ed. Wilmot James and Linda Van De Vijver (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2001), 65.

13. Nomfundo Walaza, "Insufficient Healing and Reparation," in *Looking Back, Reaching Forward: Reflections on the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa*, ed. Charles Villa-Vincencio and Wilhelm Verwoerd (Cape Town: University of Cape Town Press, 2000), 254.

14. See, for instance, Moeletsi Mbeki and Nobantu Mbeki, *A Manifesto for Social Change: How to Save South Africa* (Johannesburg: Picador Africa, 2016). My book is not concerned with the economic or social restructuring of the country. I am rather more interested in the moral implications of the path suggested by Mandela and the TRC.

15. John de Gruchy, "The TRC and the Building of a Moral Culture," in *After the TRC: Reflections on Truth and Reconciliation in South Africa*, ed. Wilmot James and Linda van De Vijver (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2001), 168.

16. De Lange, "Historical Context, Legal Origins," 17.

17. Jonathan D. Tepperman, "Truth and Consequences," *Foreign Affairs* 81, no. 2 (2002): 132.

18. Michael MacDonald, *Why Race Matters in South Africa* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2006), 33.

19. Walter Mignolo, *The Darker Side of Western Modernity: Global Futures, Decolonial Options* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2011.

20. Emmanuel Eze, ed., *Race and the Enlightenment: A Reader* (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 1997). See also Valentine Mudimbe, *The Idea of Africa* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994), 31–45.

21. Hannah Arendt, *Origins of Totalitarianism* (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1966), 191–207. See also Albert Memmi, *The Colonizer and the Colonized* (London: Earthscan Publications, 1965).

22. Sven Lindqvist, *"Exterminate All the Brutes": One Man's Odyssey into the Heart of Darkness and the Origins of European Genocide* (New York: The New Press, 1997).

23. The difference between the European and African conceptions of the human person, especially as expressed in the philosophy of *ubuntu*, lies in the absence of ideological goals. For the African, humans are not moving toward a final end that is supposed to give them meaning. Humans derive their meaning in the community of other humans: meaning is in being.

24. I use encounter in the sense that Martin Buber employs in his notion of I–Thou relationship. I refer specifically to his formulation "Alles wirkliche Leben is Begegnung" (All real life is encounter). See Martin Buber, *I and Thou* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1970).

25. Rosemary Nagy, "Reconciliation in Post-Commission South Africa: Thick and Thin Accounts of Solidarity," *Canadian Journal of Political Science* 35, no. 2 (2002): 328–29.

26. Antjie Krog, "'This Thing Called Reconciliation . . .': Forgiveness as Part of an Interconnectedness-Towards-Wholeness," *South African Journal of Philosophy* 27, no. 4 (2008): 356; see also Antjie Krog, *Country of My Skull: Guilt, Sorrow, and the Limits of Forgiveness in the New South Africa* (New York: Three Rivers Press, 1998), 142.

27. Desmond Tutu, *No Future without Forgiveness* (New York: Image Doubleday, 1999), 35; emphasis added.

28. Wendy Brown, *States of Injury: Power and Freedom in Late Modernity* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995), 55.

29. Ibid., 55, 66.

30. Friedrich Nietzsche, *On the Genealogy of Morality*, trans. Maudemarie Clark and Alain J. Swensen (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing, 1988), 19.

31. The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, http://www.justice.gov.za/legislation/constitution/SAConstitution-web-eng.pdf.

32. Tutu, *No Future without Forgiveness*, 31.

33. I will explore Desmond Tutu's concept of "bundle of life" further on.

34. Mandela, *Conversations with Myself*, 17.

35. Hugh Harris, "The Greek Origins of the Idea of Cosmopolitanism," *International Journal of Ethics* 38 (1927): 7.

36. Martha C. Nussbaum, "Kant and Stoic Cosmopolitanism," Jo*urnal of Political Philosophy* 5, no. 1 (1997): 5.

37. Martha C. Nussbaum, "Patriotism and Cosmopolitanism," in *For Love of Country: Debating the Limits of Patriotism*, ed. Joshua Cohen (Boston: Beacon Press, 1996), 4.

38. Ibid., 4.

39. Ibid., 7.

40. Luis Cabrera, *The Practice of Global Citizenship* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 5.

41. Ibid., 9.

42. Nussbaum, "Patriotism and Cosmopolitanism," 9.

43. Kwame Anthony Appiah, "Cosmopolitan Patriots," *Critical Inquiry* 23, no. 3 (1997): 617–39.

44. Mitchel Cohen, "Rooted Cosmopolitanism: Thoughts on the Left, Nationalism, and Multiculturalism," *Dissent* (Fall 1992): 483.

45. Ibid.

46. Ibid., 482.

47. David Hollinger, *Beyond Multiculturalism: Postethnic America* (New York: Basic Books, 1995), 86.

48. Ibid., 84.

49. Ulf Hannerz, "Cosmopolitans and Locals in World Culture," in *Global Culture: Nationalism, Globalization and Modernity*, ed. Mike Featherstone (London: Sage Publications, 1990), 239.

50. Brett Bowden, "The Perils of Global Citizenship," *Citizenship Studies* 7, no. 3 (2003): 350. See also John K. Noyes, "Goethe on Cosmopolitanism and Colonialism: Bildung and the Dialectic of Critical Mobility," *Eighteenth-Century Studies* 39, no. 4 (Summer 2006): 444.

51. For more on cosmopolitanism see Garrett W. Brown and David Held, eds., *The Cosmopolitanism Reader* (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2010).

52. Bruce Robbins, "Introduction," in *Cosmopolitics: Thinking and Feeling beyond the Nation*, ed. Pheng Cheah and Bruce Robbins (University of Minnesota Press, 1998), 1.

53. See Immanuel Kant, *Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch*, trans. Benjamin F. Trueblood (Washington: The American Peace Society, 1897), https://books.google.com/books/about/Perpetual_Peace.html?id=wZZJAAAAYAAJ.

54. Martha C. Nussbaum, "Kant and Stoic Cosmopolitanism," *Journal of Political Philosophy* 5, no. 1 (1997): 5.

55. Ibid., 6.

56. Ibid., 7.

57. Ibid., 12. For a profound introduction to the history of cosmopolitanism, see Pauline Kleingeld and Eric Brown, "Cosmopolitanism," *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Fall 2014 ed.), ed. Edward N. Zalta, http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2014/entries/cosmopolitanism/.

58. Lynn Hunt, *Inventing Human Rights: A History* (New York: W. W. Norton, 2007). Hunt, to be sure, discusses the role of co-feeling in the evolution of the ideas of human rights in the eighteenth century.

59. Elizabeth S. Anker, *Fictions of Dignity: Embodying Human Rights in World Literature* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2012), 4. See also Joseph R. Slaughter, *Human Rights, Inc*: *The World Novel, Narrative Form, and International Law* (New York: Fordham University Press, 2007).

60. For more on the weaknesses of cosmopolitanism, see Derek Heater, "Does Cosmopolitan Thinking Have a Future?" *Review of International Studies* 26 (December 2000): 179–97.

61. Thomas Paine, *"Rights of Man," "Common Sense," and Other Political Writings*, ed. Mark Philp (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), 281.

62. Robbins, "Introduction."

63. Ibid., 12–13.

64. Amanda Anderson, *The Way We Argue Now: A Study in the Culture of Theory* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2006), 72–73.

65. Ibid., 70.

66. Ibid., 74.

67. Ibid. 72.

68. Suzanne Keen, "A Theory of Narrative Empathy," *Narrative* 14, no. 3 (2006): 209. See also Suzanne Keen, *Empathy and the Novel* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007).

69. On how stories open portals of empathy see Keen, *Empathy and the Novel*; and Arthur W. Frank, *Letting Stories Breathe* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2010).

70. Martha Nussbaum, *Upheavals of Thought: The Intelligence of Emotions* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 327.

71. Simon Baron-Cohen, *Zero Degrees of Empathy* (London: Allen Lane, 2011), 10.

72. Gerard Delanty, "The Cosmopolitan Imagination: Critical Cosmopolitanism and Social Theory," *British Journal of Sociology* 55, no. 1 (2006): 27.

73. See, for instance, Kwame Anthony Appiah's discussion of the history of African American adoption of the Ghanaian Kente cloth in *Cosmopolitanism: Ethics in a World of Strangers* (New York: W. W. Norton, 2006).

74. James Clifford, "Travelling Cultures," in *Cultural Studies*, ed. Lawrence Grossberg, Cary Nelson, and Paula Treichler (New York: Routledge, 1992), 96–116.

75. See also Edouard Glissant, *Caribbean Discourse: Selected Essays* (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1989), esp. 140–41.

76. Johann Gottfried Herder, *Ideas on the Philosophy of the History of Mankind* (New York: Bergman, 1966), 394.

77. Ibid., 395.

78. Ibid., 391.

79. Jack David Eller, *From Culture to Ethnicity to Conflict: An Anthropological Perspective on International Ethnic Conflict* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1999), 50.

80. Lutz Hoffman, *Das deutsche Volk und seine Feinde: Die volkische Droge—Aktualitat und Entstehungsgeschichte* (Cologne: Payrossa Verlag, 1994), 96. See also Royal J. Schmidt, "Cultural Nationalism in Herder," *Journal of the History of Ideas* 17, no. 3 (June 1956): 407–17; and Robert R. Ergang, *Herder and the Foundations of German Nationalism* (Boulder: Colorado University Press, 1931).

81. Okin, "Is Multiculturalism Bad for Women?," 10–23.

82. For more on the weaknesses of multiculturalism, see W. Kymlicka, *The Rise and the Fall of Multiculturalism? New Debates on Inclusion and Accommodation in Diverse Societies* (UNESCO, 2010); and J. Parens, "Multiculturalism and the Problem of Particularism," *American Political Science Review* 88, no. 1 (March 1994): 169–81.

83. Wolfgang Welsch, "Transculturality: The Puzzling Form of Cultures Today," in *Spaces of Culture: City—Nation—World*, ed. Mike Featherstone and Scott Lash (London: Sage Publications, 1999), 197.

84. Ibid., 200.

85. Appiah, *Cosmopolitanism*, 111; Homi Bhabha, *The Location of Culture* (New York: Routledge, 1994), 37.

86. Ulf Hannerz, "American Culture: Creolized, Creolizing," in *American Culture: Creolized, Creolizing*, ed. Erik Asard (Uppsala: Swedish Institute of North American Studies, University of Uppsala, 1988), 7–30.

87. Charles Stewart, "Syncretism and Its Synonyms: Reflections on Cultural Mixture," *Diacritics* 29 (1999): 41.

88. Ibid., 46.

89. Ulrich Beck, *The Cosmopolitan Vision* (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2006), 1.

90. Johann Peter Eckermann, *Conversations with Goethe [1835]*, quoted in David Damrosch, *What Is World Literature?* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2003), 1.

91. Goethe, quoted in John David Pizer, *The Idea of World Literature: History and Pedagogical Practice* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University, 2006), 19.

92. Jodi Halpern and Harvey M. Weinstein, "Rehumanizing the Other: Empathy and Reconciliation," *Human Rights Quarterly* 26, no. 3 (2004): 568.

93. I do not downplay the fact that apartheid had put a wedge between peoples, effectively assuring unequal development.

94. Carli Coetzee, "Krotoä Remembered: A Mother of Unity, a Mother of Sorrow," in *Negotiating the Past: The Making of Memory in South Africa*, ed. Sarah Nuttall and Carli Coetzee (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998): 113–19.

95. Sarah Nuttall, *Entanglement: Literary and Cultural Reflections on Post-Apartheid* (Johannesburg: Wits University Press, 2009), 31.

96. Brenda Cooper and Andrew Steyn, *Transgressing Boundaries: New Direction in the Study of Culture in Africa* (Cape Town: University of Cape Town Press, 1996), 165.

97. Achille Mbembe, "African Modes of Self-Writing," *Public Culture* 14, no. 1 (2002): 239–73.

98. Achille Mbembe, "Ways of Seeing: Beyond the New Nativism, Introduction," *African Studies Review* 44, no. 2 (2001): 1.

99. Nuttall, *Entanglement*, 31–32.

100. Ibid., 11.

101. Ibid., 12.

102. Ibid., 20.

103. Ibid., 2–9.

104. Coetzee, "Krotoä Remembered," 115.

105. Emmanuel Chukwudi Eze, *On Reason: Rationality in a World of Cultural Conflict and Racism* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2008), 234.

106. Krog, "This Thing Called Reconciliation," 354.

107. See, for instance, Christian B. N. Gade, "What Is Ubuntu? Different Interpretations among South Africans of African Descent," S*outh African Journal of Philosophy* 31, no. 3 (2012): 484–503; Thaddeus Metz, "Toward an African Moral Theory," *Journal of Political Philosophy* 15 (2007): 321–41; Thaddeus Metz and Joseph Gaie, "The African Ethic of Ubuntu/Botho: Implications for Research on Morality," *Journal of Moral Education* 39, no. 3 (2010): 273–90; and Mark Tschaepe, "A Humanist Ethic of Ubuntu: Understanding Moral Obligation and Community," *Essays in the Philosophy of Humanism* 21, no. 2 (2013): 47–61.

108. Thomas M. Blaser, "Africa and the Future: An Interview with Achille Mbembe," Africa is a Country, November 20, 2013, https://africasacountry.com/2013/11/africa-and-the-future-an-interview-with-achille-mbembe/.

109. Tutu, *No Future without Forgiveness*, 31.

110. Taylor, *Sources of the Self*, 35.

111. Chielozona Eze, "Decolonisation and Its Discontents: Thoughts on the Postcolonial African Moral Self," *South African Journal of Philosophy* 34, no. 4 (2015): 408–18.

112. Magobe Ramose, "The Ethics of Ubuntu," in *The African Philosophy Reader*, ed. P. H. Coetzee and A. P. J. Roux (London: Routledge, 2003), 326.

113. "Nelson Mandela Explains Ubuntu Philosophy," posted to Daily Motion by "Kuryraym," 2014, video, 01:37, http://www.dailymotion.com/video/x182h7h_nelson-mandela-explains-ubuntu-philosophy_lifestyle. See also Claire E. Oppenheim, "Nelson Mandela and the Power of Ubuntu," *Religions* 3 (2012): 369–88.

114. Halpern and Weinstein, "Rehumanizing the Other," 565.

115. I will return to this phrase in my discussion of Thaddeus Metz's notion of *ubuntu* in the conclusion.

116. Gilroy, "New Cosmopolitanism," 289.

117. Achille Mbembe, "Afropolitanism," in *Africa Remix: Contemporary Art of a Continent*, ed. Njami Simon and Lucy Durán (Johannesburg: Johannesburg Art Gallery, 2007), 26–30; Simon Gikandi, "Foreword: On Afropolitanism," in *Negotiating Afropolitanism: Essays on Borders and Spaces in Contemporary African Literature and Folklore*, ed. Jennifer Wawrzinek and J. K. S. Makokha (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2010), 9–11. See Chielozona Eze, "Rethinking African Culture and Identity: The Afropolitan Model," *Journal of African Cultural Studies* 26, no. 2 (2014): 234–47; and Chielozona Eze, "We, Afropolitans," *Journal of African Cultural Studies* 28, no. 1 (2016): 114–19.

118. See Eze, "We, Afropolitans."

119. Taiye Selasi, "Bye-Bye Babar," The LIP, March 3, 2005, http://thelip.robertsharp.co.uk/?p=76. Theoretically speaking, Selasi's idea builds on Kwame Anthony Appiah's 1997 essay "Cosmopolitan Patriots," which he expanded in *Cosmopolitanism: Ethics in a World of Strangers* (2006). My reflection owes much to the latter.

120. Appiah, *Cosmopolitanism*, 113.

121. A person with a different sexual orientation than one's own is just a person with a different sexual orientation. The person with white skin color is just a person with white skin color. This, of course, does not blind us to the privileges that whiteness carries in certain societies. In this regard, the Afropolitan is keenly aware of history, not from the perspective of vengeance but of fairness.

Chapter Two

1. Mandela, *Conversations with Myself*, 17.

2. See, for instance, Sampie Terreblanche, *Lost in Transformation: South Africa's Search for a New Future since 1986* (Sandton, SA: KMM Review Publishing, 2012).

3. John Kane, *The Politics of Moral Capital* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 119.

4. Dan D. Lazea, Roxana Ghita, and Camil-Alexandru Parvu, "Nelson Mandela and His Cosmopolitan Legacies," in *Cosmopolitanism and the Legacies of Dissent*, ed. Tamara Caraus and Camil-Alexandru Parvu (New York: Routledge, 2015), 115.

5. Ibid., 155. See also B. J. de Klerk, "Desmond Tutu: Living Icons of Reconciliation," *The Ecumenical Review* 55, no. 4 (October 2003): 324, published online March 26, 2009, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1758-6623.2003.tb00467.x.

6. See, for instance, C. R. D. Halisi, *Black Political Thought in the Making of South African Democracy* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1999); and

David Everatt, *The Origins of Non-Racialism: White Opposition to Apartheid in the 1950s* (Johannesburg: Wits University Press, 2009).

7. There are important books that detail some of Mandela's weaknesses as a person and as a leader. See, for instance, Danny Schechter, *Madiba A to Z: The Many Faces of Nelson Mandela* (Johannesburg: Jacana Media, 2013); Anthony Sampson, *Mandela: The Authorized Biography* (New York: Knopf, 1999); and Slavoj Zizek, "Mandela's Socialist Failure," *New York Times*, December 6, 2013.

8. Sabelo J. Ndlovu-Gatsheni, "Rhetoric, Autobiography, and Iconography: A Critical Decolonial Ethical Tribute to Political Formation of Nelson Mandela as Global Icon," *African Journal of Rhetoric* 6 (2014): 19.

9. Ndlovu-Gatsheni, "Decolonial Mandela," 306–7.

10. Nelson Mandela, *Long Walk to Freedom: The Autobiography of Nelson Mandela* (London: Little, Brown, 1994), 609.

11. Ibid.

12. Joshuan Muravchik, quoted in Betty Glad and Robert Blanton, "F. W. de Klerk and Nelson Mandela: A Study in Cooperative Transformational Leadership," *Presidential Studies Quarterly* 27, no. 3 (1997): 570.

13. Rob Nixon, "Mandela, Messianism, and the Media," *Transition* 51 (1991): 51–52.

14. Van Zyl Slabbert, "Truth without Reconciliation, Reconciliation without Truth," 62.

15. "Nelson Mandela's Address to a Rally in Cape Town on His Release from Prison," posted to YouTube by "Nelson Mandela," December 7, 2013, video, 28:39, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pTgQZJTJ0To.

16. Ibid.

17. Andrew Brough, "Apartheid Has No Future—A Rhetorical Analysis of Nelson Mandela's Speech," 2015, http://www.andrewbrough.com/white-papers/apartheid-has-no-future-rhetorical-analysis-nelson-mandelas-speech-11-february-1990.

18. Betty Glad, "Passing the Baton: Transformational Political Leadership from Gorbachev to Yeltsin, from de Klerk to Mandela," *Political Psychology* 17, no. 1 (1996): 14.

19. Ibid., 15.

20. Ibid., 15–16.

21. I understand politics in the sense Hannah Arendt uses it. See Hannah Arendt, *The Human Condition* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1958), 13.

22. Martha Nussbaum, *Upheavals of Thought: The Intelligence of Emotions* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 330–31.

23. Fanon suggests that this idea underlines the colonial ideology. See Frantz Fanon, *The Wretched of the Earth*, trans. Constance Farrington (Harmondsworth, UK: Penguin, 1985), 32.

24. Nussbaum, *Upheavals of Thought*, 335.

25. Halpern and Weinstein, "Rehumanizing the Other," 568.

26. Nelson Mandela, Address by President Nelson Mandela to the Interfaith Commissioning Service for the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Feb. 13,

1996, http://www.sahistory.org.za/archive/address-president-nelson-mandela-interfaith-commissioning-service-truth-and-reconciliation-c.

27. Kenneth S. Zagacki and Patrick A. Boleyn-Fitzgerald, "Rhetoric and Anger," *Philosophy and Rhetoric* 39, no. 4 (2006): 298.

28. Ibid., 306.

29. Nelson Mandela, *In His Own Words*, ed. Kader Asmal, David Chidester, and Wilmot James (New York: Little, Brown, 2003), 471.

30. Ibid.

31. Kenneth S. Zagacki, "Rhetoric, Dialogue, and Performance in Nelson Mandela's 'Televised Address on the Assassination of Chris Hani,'" *Rhetoric and Public Affairs* 6, no. 4 (2003): 721.

32. Mandela, *In His Own Words*, 471–72.

33. Philippe-Joseph Salazar, *An African Athens: Rhetoric and the Shaping of Democracy in South Africa* (Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 2002), 21.

34. "Ingrid Jonker," Show Me Helderberg, July 5, 2012, http://showme.co.za/helderberg/news/ingrid-jonker/.

35. I do not suggest that all those who experience humiliation automatically learn to empathize with others. In fact, there is a high probability that they will themselves become oppressors. However, in Ingrid Jonker's case, the humiliating experience provided her an opportunity to reflect on the pain of others; she thereby transcended the artificial conditions and the system that made such a situation possible. What is said about Ingrid Jonker can be said about Nelson Mandela.

36. Ingrid Jonker, "The Child Who Was Shot Dead by Soldiers in Nyanga," trans. Antjie Krog and André Brink (Cape Town: Human & Rousseau, 2007), Poetry International Web, http://www.poetryinternationalweb.net/pi/site/poem/item/11239/auto/THE-CHILD-WHO-WAS-SHOT-DEAD-BY-SOLDIERS-IN-NYANGA.

37. Mandela, *In His Own Words*, 148.

38. Ibid.

39. Ibid., 151.

40. Zagacki, "Rhetoric, Dialogue," 711.

41. Ibid., 712.

42. Ibid., 720.

43. Mandela, *In His Own Words*, 128.

44. Ibid., 129.

45. Zagacki, "Rhetoric, Dialogue," 712.

46. Mandela, *In His Own Words*, 137.

47. James S. Damico and Mark Baildon, "Content Literacy for the 21st Century: Excavation, Elevation, and Relational Cosmopolitanism in the Classroom," *Journal of Adolescent & Adult Literacy* 55, no. 3 (2011): 239.

48. Abigail Frymann, "'I'd Rather Go to Hell Than Worship a Homophobic God': Desmond Tutu Speaks Out as He Compares Gay Rights to the Struggle against Apartheid in South Africa," *Daily Mail*, July 27, 2013, www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2380058/Id-hell-worship-homophobic-

God-Desmond-Tutu-speaks-compares-gay-rights-struggle-apartheid-South-Africa.html#ixzz3rO1uFzkI.

49. Desmond Tutu, "Foreword," in Truth and Reconciliation Commission, *Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa Report* (Cape Town: Juta, 1998), vol. 1, chap. 1, para. 1.

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Chapter Five

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15. Benjamin, "On the Concept of History," 3. All subsequent quotes refer to the number of the thesis.

16. Benjamin, thesis VII.

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19. Benjamin uses messianic language to invoke both Jewish and Christian notions of salvation.

20. Benjamin, thesis IV.

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23. Krog, *Skinned*, 55.

24. Krog will make a subtle reference to Table Mountain in *Country of My Skull*, revealing its role in her mythopoetic world.

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Conclusion

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Index

Nelson Mandela and Desmond Tutu left an enduring legacy of forgiveness, openness, and solidarity in South Africa. This book looks at how the country's historic transition to democracy has not only changed the negative narrative about South Africa but also provided a model for a new form of ethical participation in the world. In addition to Mandela and Tutu, this book considers South African cultural theorists, poets, and novelists such as J. M. Coetzee, Nadine Gordimer, Zakes Mda, Njabulo Ndebele, and Antjie Krog, all of whom have engaged with the struggle to overcome the legacies of apartheid and create a more humane society. Most of these figures share common cultural and moral traits with Mandela and Tutu, the most outstanding of which is their belief in the notion of global citizenship. In engaging the latter concept, this work seeks to answer the following questions: How can we understand being human in a world that is increasingly marked by hatred of others? Can Mandela's vision of his society provide us with a theory of how to live in our globalized world? This wide-ranging volume will appeal to scholars and students of history, African studies, literature, ethics, and international affairs.

"This book, which reimagines the ethics of living together in a modern world haunted by legacies of colonialism and apartheid, is timely and very significant. Informed by the spirit of humanism and empathetic cosmopolitanism embodied by Nelson Mandela and Desmond Tutu, *Race, Decolonization, and Global Citizenship in South Africa* enjoins all of us not to give up the struggle for a better world in which diversity is never used to create walls and boundaries or to justify exclusion, oppression, and exploitation of one race by another."

—SABELO J. NDLOVU-GATSHENI, UNIVERSITY OF SOUTH AFRICA

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