Aristotle on the Nature of Analogy

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To Stacy, Tre, Aniya, and Theia

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Acknowledgments

Introduction

Course of this Study

The essential goal of this book is to establish the structure of analogy in Aristotle's thought. Traditionally, the Aristotelian analogy has been described in one of two ways. One way describes analogy as a mathematical formation which compares four things, for example, A is to B as C is to D. Here, analogy is simply a mathematical term that can say little or nothing about the nature of the things being compared. As a mathematical term, analogy can only characterize the way certain things stand in comparison with certain other things—analogy compares different things mathematically and analogy can do nothing more. The other traditional way of describing analogy in Aristotle points to the linguistic idea that explains how different uses of a particular word refer back to some common and general understanding of that word. For example, healthy habits, healthy food, and a healthy attitude refer to specifically different things while all correlating back to some common understanding of "health." Here, the Aristotelian analogy is thought to offer a different type of comparison, one that "compares" individual uses of a term with its generally understood meaning. This is not a mathematical comparison of four things but rather a reference to the specific applications of a word's broader meaning. These two traditional descriptions outline the course for our study. The attempt to establish the structure of the Aristotelian analogy will thus take shape through a critical analysis of these two approaches.

Specifically, it will be argued that the structure of analogy lies at the root of *logos*. *Logos* is a term that captures a being's addressability. That is, *logos* refers to the intelligible organization of a thing gathered in language, a definition, an argument, a story—the words into which speakable things are put. *Logos* sometimes gets translated as "form" or "formula." Throughout our study, the term *logos* will remain untranslated. One reason *logos* will not be

translated is because a certain relationship the term holds with analogy will be developed. Aristotle's *Physics* Alpha is the place where the relationship between *logos* and analogy emerges. In this text, Aristotle discusses the principles of becoming. As Aristotle develops his argument against the "earlier thinkers," the structure of analogy comes into sight. *Logos* is the first of Aristotle's principles of natural becoming. The other two principles are privation (*sterēsis*) and underlying substance (*hypokeimenon*). These other two principles account for the always silent features of *logos*, the silent features of the addressable thing that is in a constant state of moving and be-coming. As we will see, these silent features enable the addressable thing to come into being in the first place. As a result, these silent (*a-logos*) features are inseparable from *logos* but require a different form of addressability since these features always remain silent. This is to say, as beings emerge in their addressable form (as *logos*) their silent features emerge as well. At the root of addressability then is this different form that addresses the being's silent features. This different form of addressability is analogy. The structure of analogy that will be developed throughout our study reveals that analogy functions as the root of *logos*. Therefore, we will argue that *logos* is radical analogy.

The structure of analogy will come about along with the three principles of natural becoming from *Physics* Alpha. The structure of analogy then is three-fold insofar as it offers a form of addressability that includes the three principles of becoming. The traditional mathematical approach to the Aristotelian analogy compares beings as they are perceivable and directly addressable. The other traditional approach seems to compare beings in their addressable form with an underlying meaning of that term which is more generally understood. To put these two traditional approaches in terms of Aristotle's three principles of natural becoming, the mathematical approach focuses on the being qua *logos* while the other correlative approach focuses on the being in reference to its underlying substance (*hypokeimenon*). The structure of analogy that will be argued for throughout our study will focus less on *logos* and *hypokeimenon* and more on the other principle of becoming, *sterēsis*. Aristotle seems to give *hypokeimenon* a privileged position among the three principles since it accounts for unqualified being and thus can be understood as potentiality in the highest degree. Unqualified being refers to that which remains the same throughout change, for Aristotle. As a seed becomes a plant, some individual thing is undergoing change and this thing entails all of the potentiality of that seed. As such, *hypokeimenon* remains unqualified and indeterminate yet still accounts for the underlying essence of, in this example, the seed. The underlying substance holds an authoritative position in the order of existence. However, this authority may not hold for the order of speech. The structure of analogy, although it entails all three of Aristotle's principles of natural becoming, emphasizes the pri-

mary role of *sterēsis*. Underlying substance accounts for unqualified being; *sterēsis* accounts for qualified non-being. *Sterēsis* marks the domain of the potentiality unique to the addressable being. By emphasizing *sterēsis,* the structure of analogy pivots on the limited and unique potentiality that defines the addressable being in the first place. Thinking about analogy in such a way as to underscore *sterēsis* is a departure from the two traditional approaches mentioned above.

By nature, the structure of analogy stresses the primary role of *sterēsis* and as such harbors the many possible forms of the being as addressable. Aristotle often claimed that being can be *said in many ways*. This is to imply that the being qua *logos* (the being as addressable) entails the ability to express other addressable forms. It is through the structure of analogy that such ambiguity can be preserved. It is not the case for Aristotle that the ambiguity of being should be overcome. Rather, this ambiguity should be safe-kept since it is a part of the very nature of the being qua *logos*. This benefit of being able to preserve the manifold expressions of beings enables us to revisit the relationship between *logos* and intuition (*nous*). For Aristotle, there is an unbridgeable gap between *logos* and *nous*. We intuitively grasp certain principles of nature through experience that exist beyond the limits of speech, beyond the bounds of *logos*. Yet, by way of the structure of analogy, this relationship between *logos* and *nous* can be re-claimed and the principles of experience that we intuitively acquire now have a form of speech fit to identify them. The "gap" between *logos* and *nous* is not bridged but analogy offers a way of making these intuitive principles addressable.

This book will unfold according to four chapters. The first chapter addresses different positions on the meaning and significance of analogy in Aristotle's thought. Throughout this first chapter, the different positions will be categorized according to the two basic interpretations of the Aristotelian analogy: (1) mathematical, and (2) correlational. The first interpretation will be labeled "mathematical" since here analogy is taken strictly as a formal ratio. Since this interpretation characterizes analogy to be applied as a mathematical formation only, it is an inadequate manner of explanation and is thus something which can say little to nothing about the *nature* of beings. The other interpretation will be labeled "correlational" since here analogy can account for the way beings correlate back to their natural movements, origins, and sources of being thereby rendering addressable—amid the unbridgeable gap between *nous* and *logos*—even the silent principles that explain a being according to *its* nature.[1] What seems to be the primary point of contention that separates these two interpretations centers on the role "focal meaning" plays (or does not play) in Aristotle's use of analogy. Some commentators argue that analogy for Aristotle refers to the linguistic abilities equipped to return the various meanings of a particular term to some common, single, and previously established meaning of that term. For these

commentators, analogy can claim to unify being because it brings the manifold significance of being back to one common and single understanding of the term "being."[2] This interpretation extends the reading of "analogy" beyond the actual use of the term by Aristotle, whereby the meaning of analogy is seen even when the term "analogy" is not employed. Those opposed to this "correlative" interpretation suggest that the meaning of the term analogy for Aristotle must be derived from those specific times when Aristotle used the word. Such liberalism regarding the meaning of analogy, according to the "mathematical" interpretation, has enabled Aristotle to be linked to (or even seen as the source of) the doctrine of the analogy of being. That this doctrine has emerged is not under attack by the "mathematical" interpreters; that this doctrine is ascribed to Aristotle, though, is. However, as I will attempt to establish, the "mathematical" critique of the "correlational" interpretation allows too many problems to remain. What we appear to be left with at the end of this first chapter, is an unresolved position regarding the primary location of analogy in Aristotelian thought. It is this lack of resolution that motivates our investigation of the original place and significance of analogy for Aristotle.

In the next three chapters of this book, I attempt to identify the original location and structure of analogy. For this, I turn to Aristotle's *Physics* Alpha. Again, I will argue that through the nine chapters of *Physics* Alpha, Aristotle unfolds the original location of the structure of analogy. It will be argued that this location reveals the very root of *logos*. The key passage that will enable our investigation to claim the primary location of analogy is in chapter 7 of the *Physics* at 191a 8–14. In this passage, Aristotle speaks of the three principles of beings that exist by nature and it is here that the three principles of natural motion (*genesis*) emerge along with the analogical root of *logos*; i.e., the principles emerge along with the way to speak them.

Aristotle's approach in the *Physics* begins by offering certain suggestions that should govern any investigation of the principles of nature. These suggestions occupy the first two chapters of the *Physics*. In subsequent chapters, Aristotle places himself in dialogue with earlier thinkers who attempt to articulate the principles of becoming beings and Aristotle offers why their positions are problematic. For Aristotle, there appears to be methodological problems with earlier approaches to the first principles of nature and it is their methodology, he seems to argue, that precludes them from arriving at the proper principles. Thus, *how* one arrives at the principles of nature dictates *if* they will arrive at them accurately. I will argue in chapter two that Aristotle's method is predicated on his perceived understanding of analogy. Thus, it is by way of analogy that the principles of nature are identified and receive articulation.

There appears to be a parallel between the identifying of the principles of natural beings and the original location of analogy. To organize the explana-

tion of this parallel, I will divide *Physics* Alpha into three parts. Each part will be comprised of a certain number of chapters from book Alpha. Each of these parts will be treated in individual chapters below. Each of our chapters will be characterized according to the specific principle that Aristotle seems to be working to establish. That is, our first chapter will treat chapters one and two of *Physics* Alpha and be characterized according to *logos* since Aristotle seems to be attempting to establish the access to nature (*physis*). It is in these first two chapters of book Alpha that Aristotle stresses the role of experience and the importance of always remaining within it for the truthful uncovering of natural principles. Here, the relationship between sense-perception (*aisthēsis*) and intellect/intuition (*nous*) will be given attention. Although other Aristotelian texts will be addressed in our chapter two below, *Physics* Alpha will remain the principal guide.

Our chapter three will be characterized according to *sterēsis* and treat chapter 3, 4, and 5 of *Physics* Alpha. It is through these chapters of the *Physics* that a revision of the traditional understanding of qualified non-being appears to be offered by Aristotle. Qualified non-being plays a primary role for Aristotle regarding the principles of nature (as has already been suggested above). As such, this part of our investigation will open with a description of the primary role of *sterēsis*. From this description of *sterēsis*, the role of silence (*a-logos*) will emerge as formative for the addressing of the becoming being.

Chapter four below will address *Physics* Alpha, 6–9. *Physics* Alpha 6–9 will be characterized according to *hypokeimenon* since here Aristotle discusses unqualified being. Again, it is along with the arrival of the role of unqualified being that the original place of the structure of analogy comes forth. Beings as addressable are accounted for by *logos*. Beings' qualified potentiality, which remains forever hidden and silent, is accounted for by *a-logos*. Unqualified being then can only receive articulation according to its more essential withdrawal from qualification, from *a-logos*, which is accounted for as analogy (*ana-logia*).

So, this book sets out to accomplish the principal task of establishing the structure of analogy in Aristotle's thought. Again, the primary location of analogy's structure will be found in Aristotle's *Physics* Alpha. The structure of analogy will emerge as the three principles of becoming beings are developed by Aristotle. The structure of analogy will emphasize the primary role of *sterēsis* and reveal that it holds an equal rank to the ontological status of substance (*hypokeimenon*). As such, analogy makes addressable the ambiguity of being and thus enables the relationship between language and intuitive thought to be reclaimed. This is the case in that the structure of analogy uncovers an inherent type of mobility of *logos* that enables it to reflect the constant state of becoming of natural beings.

GENESIS AND ANALOGY

Throughout the study of nature in Aristotle's *Physics*, "movement" plays a vital role. Aristotle will "make the assumption that things existing by nature are in motion" (185a 14). *Kinēsis*, though the type of motion Aristotle is "assuming," turns out to not be the most essential movement regarding natural beings. *Genesis*, the change from non-existent to existent, is the movement that characterizes the essence of nature (*physis*). *Genesis* refers to the substantial change (the change of substance) that precedes, in a sense, the other types of change. It is on the basis of *genesis* that *kinēsis* can be understood as the assumed characterization of nature. This is not to say that *kinēsis* is to be thought as the same as *genesis*; instead, *genesis* is a more fundamental (the most fundamental) kind of change. In that *genesis* accounts for coming into existence, what is produced is substance (*ousia*). *Genesis*, however, does not bring a substance into existence then hands the substance off for the other types of motion. Rather, *genesis* governs the entire generating span of natural beings. The emergence into existence as well as the sustaining of existence refers to the motion of *genesis*.

Genesis is the motion proper to natural beings. *Genesis* differs from *kinēsis* in that *kinēsis* operates between contraries, where *genesis* moves within contradictions. Regarding natural generation, Aristotle writes:

> A natural generation is a generation of something which is generated from nature; that out of which something is generated is what we call "matter"; that by which it is generated is a thing which exists by nature; and that which is generated is a man or a plant or something else of this kind, which we call "a substance" in the highest degree. Now all things which are generated, whether by nature or by art, have matter; for there is a potentiality for each of them to be, and also not to be, and this potentiality is the matter in each. (1032a 16–23)[3]

Although generation refers to the emergence from non-being into being, still there is something undergoing *genesis*. This means, in part, that non-being is itself a type of being (*eidos*, cf. 193b 20) able to thrust into existence, into visibility and speakability. Non-being, which will be treated below according to its two senses of qualified non-being and unqualified being, accounts for the potentiality that makes *genesis* possible. For this reason, *genesis* moves from out of the potentiality expressed as non-being. Aristotle writes:

> So, as the saying goes, nothing could be generated if nothing were existing before. It is evident, then, that some part of the thing generated must exist before, for matter is a part; for matter is present during the generation and it is this matter that is becoming something. . . . In some cases, after the thing has been generated, it is called, when referred to the matter out of which it was generated. . . . However, a healthy man is not called after that from which he

becomes healthy; the cause of this is the fact that he comes to be healthy from the privation as well as from the subject which we call "matter" . . . but we speak of him becoming healthy from the privation rather than from the subject, that is, he becomes healthy from being sick rather than from being a man. (1032b 33–1033a 13)[4]

Genesis moves from within the silent potentiality of non-being. *Genesis* emerges from this silent non-being into addressability, while never completely abandoning the formation of the potentiality from which it originally emerged. However, privation (*sterēsis*) does not entail such generative dynamics on its own. Privation operates in accordance with the unqualified sense of being that "returns" the dynamics of *sterēsis* back to speakability. The nature of this "return" will be described below when the analogical roots of *logos* are discussed. For here, what is important to note is that qualified non-being (*sterēsis*) and unqualified being[5] (*hypokeimenon*) work together in the process of *genesis*.

What can be pulled from all of this is that the content of *genesis* seems to be three-fold (form, privation, and underlying matter). This three-fold alludes to the three principles of natural beings, the three principles (*arkhai*) of becoming, that Aristotle writes of in *Physics* Alpha (and beyond). What I am primarily concerned with here is locating the original place of the structure of analogy in Aristotle's thought. I will argue that analogy is appropriately located at the root of *logos*. This argument is supported by a passage in *Physics* Alpha, 7 where Aristotle writes that *hypokeimenon*, that which underlies the process of *genesis* and itself generates, can be understood by way of analogy. However, the structure of analogy (*analogia*) itself emerges gradually throughout the first few chapters of Aristotle's *Physics* Alpha. That is, as Aristotle arrives at each principle of becoming, the way of speaking the principle also comes into being. As the principles are identified, the structure of analogy is generated. One principle (*logos*) accounts for the addressable form of natural beings. Another principle (*sterēsis*) accounts for the always silent (*a-logos*) privative character of the addressable form. The third principle (*hypokeimenon*) accounts for the possibility of continuity in generation. This last principle—and it will be argued that all three principles—receive articulation by way of analogy. This ability to articulate natural principles does not completely show itself until analogy is brought into the discussion. It is only at that point, it is only when analogy enters as the way of speaking unqualified being, that all which is said in the speaking of *logos* can be totally identified. This means that *logos*, the first principle which accounts for the addressable form of natural beings, cannot be fully heard until its analogical roots are recognized.

Genesis, then, is the most fundamental movement of nature and requires analogy for its articulation. That is, a generating thing *as generating* can only

be addressable if the analogical roots of *logos* are understood. As we get closer to our analysis of the structure of analogy in Aristotle's thought, we should acknowledge what Aristotle himself offers as a description of analogy. In the *Poetics* at 1457b 6–26, Aristotle writes:

> Metaphor is the application of a word that belongs to another thing: either from genus to species, species to genus, species to species, or by analogy. By "from genus to species" I mean e.g., "my ship stands here": mooring is a kind of standing. Species to genus: "ten thousand noble deeds has Odysseus accomplished"; ten thousand is many, and the poet has used it here instead of "many." Species to species: e.g., "drawing off the life with bronze," and "cutting with slender-edged bronze"; here he has used "drawing off" for "cutting" and *vice versa*, as both are kinds of removing. I call "by analogy" cases where B is to A as D is to C: one will then speak of D instead of B, or B instead of D. . . . In some cases of analogy no current term exists, but the same form of expression will still be used.

In this passage, Aristotle describes analogy as an application of metaphor. Metaphor is described as a transference of a term's meaning from one term to a different term. For this transference to be informative for the poet, the term from which the metaphor transfers must be already known. To say "my ship stands here" is to say nothing of the ship if there is not already an understanding of the meaning of "standing." The poet relies on this prior understanding of terms in order to say something intelligible—let alone poetic. So, what Aristotle seems to be offering in this passage is a description of metaphor that relies on a type of referring back to some prior understanding, some previous sense of the terms' meanings. It is only due to this reference back to a prior sense of understanding that the metaphor can be informative in any way.

Aristotle, in this passage from the *Poetics*, uses analogy as a proportional comparison of four terms. One term relates to a second term as a third term relates to a fourth. Analogy can also account for the way the first term relates to a third term as the second term relates to a fourth term. However, this does not mean that four known terms are required for an analogy. If the relationship of A and B are known, then something can be said about the relationship of C and D even if there is no term for one of either C or D. That is, one of the compared terms (C or D) must be understood on some level, but not necessarily both (C and D). For example, if one has a sense of A and B and C, then the sense of D can be gathered from the analogy of A : B :: C : D. Even when there is no term for D, a sense of D can be gathered from the understanding of the relationship of A and B. At 1457b 26–29, Aristotle writes, ". . . to release seed is to 'sow,' while the sun's release of fire lacks a name; but the latter stands to the sun as does sowing to the seed, hence the phrase 'sowing his divine fire.'" Here, a proportional comparison is made

even though there are not four particular terms in the analogy. In this example, something that does not have a name can still be spoken by way of analogy. Analogy is a unique form of articulation in this way.

It seems safe to say that if metaphor relies on a reference back to a prior sense of terms and analogy is an application of metaphor, then analogy—at least on some level—also relies on a reference back to a prior sense of the employed terms. Analogy relies on this reference back to a "focal meaning"[6] but it does not necessarily rely on four distinct terms. Although analogy is most often a proportional comparison of four parts, it is not always such a comparison (as the previous line cited from Aristotle indicates). Whether analogy for Aristotle is a four term proportional comparison *only* or if analogy entails a reference back to some "focal meaning" frames the traditional debate regarding the meaning of the Aristotelian analogy.

COMPARABILITY AND UNDERLYING NATURE

In *On the Several Senses of Being in Aristotle*, Franz Brentano emphasizes the point that analogy in Aristotle extends beyond a four part proportional comparison. Brentano writes, when referencing Aristotle's *Metaphysics* Books IX and XI, that these books ". . . indeed represent analogy as qualitative proportionality; but the examples which Aristotle adduces in order to clarify the manner in which being applies to the categories by analogy do not show anything of the sort."[7] Brentano goes on from here to discuss Aristotle's examples of "health" and "medical"—examples that essentially characterize analogy according to its ability to recall prior understandings. Healthy food and healthy complexion are both "healthy" (refer back to some prior understanding of "health") yet they are not "healthy" because of any proportionality, nor is their healthiness understood due to a proportionality. To say that food and complexion are "healthy" is to compare them to a prior and general sense of "health" as already understood.

For Brentano, analogy in Aristotle accounts for *both* proportional comparability and a reference back to some focal meaning. This point is advanced by Günther Patzig in his *Theology and Ontology in Aristotle's Metaphysics,*[8] where he writes of analogy as a paronymy with a "greater degree of precision." "Paronymy"[9] we see at the beginning of Aristotle's *Categories*. Here, the different categories are themselves references back to substance; each category entails a sort of pre-ontological sense of *ousia/hypokeimenon* (the first of the categories). However, Patzig points out, this type of referring back to something prior is different in Aristotle than it is for Plato. For Plato, to understand any particular thing is a reference back to that thing's essential Form. For Aristotle, basic ontological concepts such as "form," "matter," "actuality," and "potentiality" do not refer back to a first essential Form but

instead these concepts must be grasped by way of analogy. For Patzig, analogy is a type of method according to Aristotle—one which enables current experiences to be compared to prior knowledge (earlier experiences) for the sake of advancing one's understanding. Patzig writes:

> The analogical method no longer singles out a special case, which sometimes, as with the "prime mover," lies beyond the bounds of possible experience. It is still true that every natural thing has its "matter" (*hyle*) but it is no longer true that there is something that is the "matter" (*hyle*) of everything. . . . Now, as before, it is true that every being has its "substance" (*ousia*), but it is no longer true that there is a being which is the "substance" (*ousia*) of everything.[10]

Patzig seems to be pointing to an evolution in the use of analogy from Plato to Aristotle. For Patzig, Aristotle moves away from language and understanding being structured as a reference back to something "ontologically" prior. Instead, Aristotle employs analogy as a method where one's understanding can be placed in the context of past experiences. Here, every experience entails a reference back to some prior experience, some prior understanding. Analogy is being described by Patzig as this method of comparison.

Although Patzig characterizes analogy as paronymy, a difference between these two can be seen. Paronymy is a form of speech that points back to a prior and more common/general meaning. Analogy, on the other hand, although entails the comparison with something prior, does not require the understanding of ontological categories that extend beyond experience. Additionally, analogy can reveal something specific and unique about beings, something unambiguous regarding particular qualities. Paronymy remains general and vague about details of beings. To say one is a grammarian is not to point out any differences between this grammarian and other grammarians.

This move from what Patzig calls "paronymous ontology" to "analogical ontology" marks a development in the use of analogy from Plato to Aristotle. It also appears to face analogy away from Plato's version of focal meaning toward (four term) proportional comparison. Patzig's position loosens the grip of analogy to claim focal meaning. John R. Betz, in the translator's introduction to Erich Przywara's *Analogia Entis,*[11] claims that the idea of analogy accounting for focal meaning comes from medieval commentators. For Betz, "Aristotle, when he uses the term analogy . . . invariably means a proportion of four terms," yet certain medieval commentators "tend to employ the word *analogy* in this [*pros hen*] connection." Focal meaning is only to be considered as a part of the structure of analogy "if one admits a broader definition of analogy." Betz implies here that it is only truly safe to treat analogy in Aristotle as four term proportionality, thus suggesting that the connection by the medieval commentators of Aristotle to the doctrine of the

analogy of being requires an added assumption. Betz seems to further relax the grip of analogy to claim focal meaning. Later, the positions of G. E. L. Owen and Pierre Aubenque will be discussed. Owen and Aubenque will argue that analogy cannot account for focal meaning at all. At this point, the stance that analogy entails a reference back to a focal meaning is fading and the position that analogy accounts exclusively for the proportional comparison of four terms is emerging.

All of this raises a few important questions for our study. Does analogy in Aristotle account for focal meaning or should analogy be reserved only as a proportionality of four parts? Part of the aim of this study is to show that focal meaning can in fact be articulated in the structure of analogy. This is not necessarily to say that those, like Owen and Aubenque, are incorrect when they describe analogy as four part proportionality only; but, this is to suggest that there is more to the structure of analogy than merely proportional comparison. If there is more to the structure of analogy than proportional comparison, then analogy speaks beyond the four parts of its comparison and says something about the underlying nature of the compared beings. This raises another important question: does analogy entail the ability to address being (a thing's underlying nature)? According to Betz, Aristotle does not employ analogy for the sake of understanding being; however, it will be argued that analogy's structure is able to account for the underlying nature and, as such, enables one to speak and understand something that lies beyond the details of the lived-experience. This is not an attempt to legitimize the connections of Aristotle with the doctrine of the analogy of being, nor is this an attempt to accuse Aristotle of some form of Platonism. Yet, if the structure of analogy can be established, then the reference back to a prior understanding can be enfolded into the meaning of analogy in Aristotle. The structure of analogy reveals a formation of speech that extends beyond what can be directly experienced and spoken. As such, analogy stretches the possibility of *logos* to account for—in a unique manner—what *logos* by itself cannot. This raises a third important question for our study: how does analogy address the unbridgeable gap between *logos* and the intuition (*nous*)? It will be argued that the *structure* of analogy reveals a potentiality within *logos* that allows for intuitive first principles to be given a form of speech not previously assumed. As a result, analogy as this unique form of speech may bring *logos* and *nous* together in a way that their difference is preserved. The intuitive first principles are indirectly experienced by way of *logos*, and it is analogy that provides the indirect manner of speech fit to address these principles; principles that are otherwise outside of the domain of *logos*.

The ability of analogy to account for principles that lie beyond direct experience has served as the foundation for those who see Aristotle as the source of the doctrine of the analogy of being. The term analogy has been taken in various ways,[12] though one way that has dominated the thinking of

analogy in (since) Aristotle is this doctrine of the analogy of being. This doctrine has been taken as the way finite human beings are able to speak about an infinite God. Analogy here becomes the only way that matters of divinity can be addressed. This study is not concerned with the doctrine of the analogy of being. As such, no attention will be given to the historical development of this doctrine per se. What we are concerned with in this book is the structure of analogy in Aristotle. After the structure of analogy is established, the ability to speak of divine and infinite matters may be seen. However, it is important to note that the divine is merely an object that *can* be addressed by analogy but divinity is not a necessary aspect of analogy's structure. So, in our attempt to establish the structure of analogy in Aristotle, it is not necessary to enter into dialogue with the historical development of the doctrine of the *analogia entis*. This doctrine lies beyond the scope of this study due to its basic design as the manner of speaking about the oneness of Being, the oneness of divinity. Since it is designed to address how to speak about God, this doctrine overlooks analogy's ability to articulate finite beings. It is the ability to address the silent principles of finite natural beings that gives analogy its place of importance for Aristotle. Developing analogy for the sake of the infinite, as the doctrine of the analogy of being seems to do, takes Aristotle's analogy in a different direction. This different direction then places analogy outside of the concerns of this study.

Even though we do not need to formally address the history of the doctrine of the analogy of being, there is something valuable about this doctrine for our study. This doctrine avoids the temptation to reduce analogy to simply mathematical proportionality. As such, this doctrine avoids presenting analogy in terms of horizontal, four part comparisons only. Although this doctrine seems to go too far, so to speak, by necessitating the idea of an infinite oneness of being in its basic design, this doctrine does account for the possibility of vertical comparisons. In other words, this doctrine appears to take Aristotle's claims of substance seriously by acknowledging that the mere inability to speak directly about the nature of a being does not preclude that being's nature from receiving some form of articulation. The recognition that *logos* is limited and a more robust manner of speech is possible and required for the articulation of natural beings is an essential principle of this doctrine. It is due to this point that the doctrine will be generally discussed but the historical development of the doctrine will not. What this doctrine is and how it is linked to Aristotle is our only "historical" concern. A full treatment of medieval thinkers who address this doctrine and where this doctrine stands today will not be considered. Consequently, only St. Thomas Aquinas will be discussed since he is one of the more authoritative framers of this doctrine.

The mathematical interpretation of analogy seems to be a reaction to this idea that the doctrine of the analogy of being is rooted in Aristotle. Here, the

idea of a common ground that underlies the various expressions of being is not to be included in the discussion of analogy. This position on analogy in Aristotle allows for neither the necessitating of God as an underlying substance nor the inclusion of any change of substance whatsoever. In this mathematical approach, analogy speaks to the horizontal comparing of different beings and cannot account for the vertical comparing of kinetic beings with their underlying substance. Although perhaps simple composite (stagnant) substance can be identified by horizontal proportions, substantive change (change of substance) cannot.

The primary motivation of this mathematical position seems to center on Aristotle's use of the term "analogy" instead of the *structure* of analogy. Analogy in Aristotle is debated between these two positions because of the way Aristotle is said to employ individual analogies. Since, according to the mathematical approach, analogy only offers horizontal comparisons, it can say nothing of the relationship between kinetic substance and attributes. Even though I will argue that analogy in Aristotle can in fact account for such substantive relationships, this mathematical approach to analogy will not be completely dismissed. Just as we can see something valuable in the doctrine of the analogy of being, there is something valuable about this opposing mathematical view. Analogy does enable one to speak to the way different beings stand in relation to one another. Analogy thought as proportional comparison is not incorrect but incomplete insofar as it does not account for the very foundation of any comparison; namely, the intellectual (noetic) first principles of beings. This is to say, before different beings can be compared to one another, their nature must be brought to the level of addressability. The fullness of speech cannot be glossed over; the addressability of a being cannot be reduced to the naming of a being in its appearance only. Rather, analogy must be identified as a manner of speech (*logos*) which then yields a fuller articulation of each thing held in proportional comparison.

With all of this in mind, the nature and place of analogy in Aristotle's thought seems to reside somewhere outside of these two lines of interpretation. These two lines of interpretation were labeled above as the "mathematical" and the "correlative" interpretations. Again, the "mathematical" interpretation (which accounts for horizontal comparisons) can be described as the more literal approach to analogy that treats the concept only as the term "analogy" itself is employed by Aristotle. Here, analogy is understood not just primarily, but exclusively formally or mathematically, i.e., according to proportional comparisons. Formally, analogy for Aristotle speaks to the relationship of two things by referring to the relationship of two other things. Formal analogy as proportional comparison is guided by the mathematical formation that enables claims to be made about things by referring back to other, already understood "like" things. Analogy as proportional comparison

is a bringing back to some prior point of reference by way of holding different beings in relation to one another. What I will attempt to establish is that such proportionality relies on an understanding of likeness that proportionality itself must circumvent. Mathematics can only speak formally about beings and as such is inherently unable to compare beings on the grounds of their natures.

Conversely, the "correlative" interpretation (vertical comparisons) appears to be the more liberal approach to analogy in Aristotle where the structure of such proportional comparisons is addressed even if the term "analogy" itself is absent. This more liberal interpretation seems to take its momentum from Aristotle's *Metaphysics* Gamma, 2 (1003a 32–35) where the various senses of "being" are said to be used with reference to one central idea, one definite nature. This movement of referring back to one central nature has been presented as the same movement (itself a sort of an analogy) as the proportional bringing back to some prior point of reference. For this reason, the pointing out of a single nature as that to which the term "being" always correlates back has been taken as the content of analogy. So, the formal interpretation of analogy can be described as the strict treatment of the term *analogia* and its cognates. The "correlative" interpretation can be described as an approach to the term *analogia* through the reference in *Metaphysics* Gamma, 2 to a single nature or "focal meaning" that underlies the various senses of "being." The essential difference between these two lines of interpretation is that the formal, mathematical approach involves two relationships between, usually, four beings (but overlooks the understanding of kinetic beings according to their nature); where the more liberal, correlative approach concerns the referencing back to something common that lies, in some way, underneath what is outwardly expressed.

After the illustration of these two interpretations, a discussion will be entered centering on the idea that perhaps neither interpretation is complete. It will be argued that the two interpretations create a polarity that overlooks what might be the essential component to the understanding of analogy in Aristotle. This essential component, it will be argued, is the ability of analogy to reveal precise and individualized qualities of kinetic beings through *sterēsis,* and not just the ability to reveal substance. Again, perhaps the most appropriate pivot point upon which the understanding of analogy centers is neither the form of analogy (the beings directly addressed) nor analogy's underlying potentiality but rather the way analogy articulates what unites these beings with their underlying potentiality, i.e., qualified non-being. Said differently, perhaps the structure of analogy emphasizes the ontological status of *sterēsis* and as such reveals comparability as an essential part of the nature of beings. Privation becomes the pivotal point for analogy since it serves as a point of unification from which underlying substance gains its

significance. It is only as a result of the type of articulation of *sterēsis* (*a-logos*) that *hypokeimenon* can be given analogical (*ana-logos*) addressability.

NOTES

1. In part, the labeling of these two interpretations of analogy in Aristotle is motivated by Aristotle's apparent general attitude that the "physical" information (received by way of an openness to *physis*, i.e., the understanding of beings according to their nature) of experience and not merely logical argumentation is the basis for knowledge. Nature (*physis*) seems to receive a privileged position over mathematics (ratio, *logos*). This point can be seen throughout Aristotle's critiques of the Platonic forms. In *On Generation and Corruption*, Aristotle writes: "Lack of experience diminishes our power of taking a comprehensive view of the admitted facts. Hence those who dwell in the intimate association with nature and its phenomena are more able to lay down principles such as to admit of a wide and coherent development; while those whom devotion to abstract discussions has rendered unobservant of the facts are too ready to dogmatize on the basis of a few observations. The rival treatment of the subject now before us will serve to illustrate how great the difference between a scientific and a dialectical method of inquiry. For, as the one school argues that there must be atomic magnitudes because otherwise The Triangle will be more than one, Democritus would appear to have been convinced by argument appropriate to the subject, i.e., drawn from the science of nature." (316a 5–14, Joachim translation). For a thorough discussion of mathematics in Aristotle cf. John Cleary, *Aristotle and Mathematics: Aporetic Method in Cosmology and Metaphysics* (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1995).

2. It must be kept in mind here and throughout that *logos* addresses individual beings that may have multiple meanings. Analogy has the power, for Aristotle, to unify a being with its manifoldness; but this is not to say that the *structure* of analogy brings single beings in unity with some general and primordial notion of "Being." Although analogy can perhaps do this, we must be aware that this is not necessarily a part of analogy's essential structure. Analogy, for Aristotle, is intimately related to *logos* and therefore enables *logos* to extend beyond itself and account for that which it cannot directly claim for itself. Again, this is not to say analogy is unable to speak of the oneness of Being, or of the Divine, or of God; this is to say, however, that speaking the oneness of Being is a possibility of analogy and is not a part of its structure.

3. Hippocrates G. Apostle, *Aristotle's Metaphysics*, (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1966) p. 118

4. Apostle, *Aristotle's Metaphysics*, p. 117–118.

5. A note should be made regarding the clumsiness of the phrase "unqualified being" used for a type of non-being. "Unqualified being," as un-qualified, lacks the identifiable qualities that enable a being to be directly claimed. It is this lack of direct addressability that prevents this aspect of a being qua *logos* from being accounted for in perception. So, substance (*ousia*, *hypokeimenon*) is referred to as a type of non-being even though it is, for Aristotle, being in its highest sense.

6. G. E. L. Owen, "Logic and Metaphysics in Some Early Works of Aristotle" in *Logic, Science, and Dialectic* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1986). p. 180–199.

7. F. Brentano, *On the Several Senses of Being in Aristotle*, trans. Rolf George (Berkeley, University of California Press, 1975) p. 64.

8. G. Patzig "Theology and Ontology in Aristotle's *Metaphysics*" trans. Jennifer and Jonathan Barnes, in *Articles on Aristotle* (edited by Jonathan Barnes, Malcom Schofield and Richard Sorabji) (London, Gerald Duckworth and Co. 1979).

9. J. L. Ackrill translates lines 1a 13–15 of Aristotle's *Categories*: "When things get their name from something, with a difference of ending, they are called *paronymous*. Thus, for example, the grammarian gets his name from grammar, the brave get theirs from bravery." Paronymy marks a shared root word, a common meaning between one term (or a type of human activity, in Aristotle's description) and another; where each term, as indicated by the shared root, entails a reference back to what is common between them.

10. Patzig, *Theology and Ontology in Aristotle's Metaphysics*, p. 48.

11. Przywara, Erich, *Analogia Entis: Metaphysics Original Structure and Universal Rhythm*, trans. John Betz and David Bentley Hart (Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdman's Publishing Co., 2014).

12. Cf. Frederick Ferre, "Analogy in Theology" in *The Encyclopedia of Philosophy vol. 1, 2* (New York: MacMillan, Inc., 1972). Here, on page 94, Frederick writes: "*Analogia* was originally developed within mathematics to indicate a proportionality—that is, a common or reciprocal (*ana*) relation, such as 'double' or 'triple'—between two direct proportions (*logoi*). However, this original employment of *analogia* did not long remain its only one, either in ordinary Greek usage or in philosophic discourse. 'Analogy' came soon to have the now more familiar sense of a direct comparison between somehow similar *terms*, as well as its older sense of a likeness between *relations*."

Chapter One

Locating the Structure of Analogy in Aristotle's Thought

TWO DETERMINATE POINTS IF REFERENCE
FOR THE STUDY OF ANALOGY IN ARISTOTLE:
METAPHYSICS GAMMA, 2 AND LAMBDA, 4

Before this study engages the two lines of interpretation of analogy in Aristotle, two points of reference should be mentioned. These two ways of reading "analogy" each take their departure from two passages in the *Metaphysics*. The purpose for mentioning these two passages is only to assist in orienting this study as it attempts to establish these two lines of interpretation. A thorough development of these passages will not be offered; instead, our concern is simply how they serve as points of departure for these different courses of interpreting "analogy."

The first line of interpretation, the "correlative" course, seems to assume that all uses of analogy revert back to a determinant idea offered in *Metaphysics* Gamma, 2. Here, Aristotle writes:

> The term "being" is used in many senses, yet not equivocally, but all of these are related to something which is one and a single nature. It is like everything that is called "healthy," which is related to health by preserving health, or by being a sign of health, or by being receptive of health. And what is called "medical" is similarly related to the medical art; for it is so called by possessing the medical art, or by being naturally adapted for it, or by being something done by it. And we can find other terms that are used in the same way as "healthy" and "medical." (1003a 33–1003b 5)[1]

The lack of equivocation that Aristotle sees in the ambiguous use of the term "being" will receive attention below. Also, a more developed explication of

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the focal meaning of "being" will likewise be given later. For now, what should be noted is that this passage unveils something determinate regarding the correlative interpretation of analogy. What this course of interpretation will show is that the common or shared meaning of terms such as "healthy," "medical," and "being" is what all specific expressions of these terms correlate back to. This is not to say that there is one definition that underlies every individual use, but this does point out that there exists some sort of correspondence within every reference, every individual *logos*.

What makes this passage from *Metaphysics* Gamma, 2 determinate for analogy is that analogy gets illustrated by some philosophers (Aquinas will receive direct attention below) as the way of speaking this correspondence. In other words, and our critique will see this in both Aquinas and Heidegger, analogy is described as bringing each particular articulation back to (corresponding to) an underlying "common" signification.

As was mentioned above, this revealing of an underlying common meaning does not completely render inaccurate analogy as proportional comparison. However, this understanding of analogy does alter the more traditional, mathematical formulation. Here, it can be demonstrated how one particular expression corresponds to its underlying meaning the way another particular expression corresponds to the same underlying meaning. So, this passage is determinant for the correlative interpretation of analogy while, as should be noticed, the passage makes no mention of the term "analogy" itself. It is the absence of the term "analogy" in this passage by Aristotle that motivate some thinkers—Owen and Aubenque will be discussed—to read such correspondence as beyond the scope of analogical predication.

The other determinant passage that can be brought up at this point comes from *Metaphysics* Lambda, 4. In this chapter, Aristotle is speaking about the way in which causes and principles are in one sense the same but in another sense different. What is important to note from this passage, though, is the role of analogy. Aristotle writes:

> In one sense they [beings] do have the same elements but in another sense they do not. For example, in the case of sensible bodies, perhaps the elements are, the hot as form, then again the cold as privation, and as matter, that which in virtue of itself and proximately is potentially hot or cold; and all these, as well as the composites of these as principles, are substances, and so is any unity which is generated from the hot and the cold, such as flesh or bone (for that which is generated must be distinct from its elements). Then these are the elements and principles of things just stated, but of other things there are other elements and principles; and so, in view of the manner in which we have stated the case, the principles and elements cannot be the same for all things, except by analogy, that is, in the sense in which one might say that there are three principles, form, privation, and matter. But each of these is distinct for each genus. (1070b 12–20)[2]

This lengthy passage points to one particular role of analogy for Aristotle. Here, analogy is the way that the manifold components of a thing, of being, can be said to be the same. "Substance" is that which underlies beings in their perceivable presentation, but this does not mean that substance is one in number or of one single type. Substances differ from each other and the unity between them requires a manifold sort of speech to articulate it. The manifold sort of speech equipped to speak to the unity between different substances is analogy.

One message that this passage seems to imply is that the uniqueness of analogy, the inherent dynamic of analogy to articulate the unity and sameness of different things, restores the ambiguity of being that Aristotle seems so concerned with. In other words, Aristotle is telling us in this passage that "substance" is something that cannot be reduced to a homogeneous concept—made up of identical principles and elements in every case. "Substance" entails difference, and analogy is able to speak this difference through specific expressions. Each expression of substance includes both a specific indication and the difference that underlies it. As Heidegger holds, every *logos* speaks of what "is" and what "is" "as." The uniqueness of analogy is emphasized through such varied expressing of that which, for Aristotle, is always and already manifold. With each analogical predication, the ambiguity and manifold-ness of being (of that particular being addressed) is, in a sense, preserved. While remaining within the ambiguity of being, analogy creates space for itself to illustrate proportional comparisons.

This passage from *Metaphysics* Gamma, 4 is determinant for the "mathematical" interpretation of analogy in Aristotle not just because it has Aristotle showing where analogy is at work, but because it explains *how* analogy is at work. The passage illustrates that the cause of "a" is to the cause of "b" as "a" is to "b." For the "mathematical" thinkers of analogical predication, this passage is sufficient for a complete description of analogy. As such, anything that extended beyond this description of where and how analogy is at work gets attacked as departing from Aristotle's intended meaning.

These two passages from the *Metaphysics*, then, can serve as two points of reference for the development of the "correlative" and "mathematical" interpretations of analogy. These two passages will be referred to throughout this development by Aquinas, G. E. L. Owen, and Pierre Aubenque. These two above passages are by no means exhaustive descriptions of analogy in Aristotle, nor are they intended to be; but they are the determinant points of reference from which the divergent interpretations depart. Again, the point of spending a few pages on these two passages (without offering a thorough analysis of them) is merely to orient the establishing of competing understandings of the place of *analogia* in Aristotle's thought. From here, how Aquinas appropriates analogy in Aristotle can be addressed. Whether the appropriation by Aquinas is too liberal will be developed later. For now, the

way Aquinas employs analogy and that he seems to understand it as rooted in
Aristotle can be described.

ARISTOTLE'S "COMMON NATURE" AS
THE GROUND OF ANALOGY IN AQUINAS

Before this analysis can enter a discussion of analogy for Aquinas, there must
be an attempt to establish that the origin of the use of analogy for Aquinas is
rooted in Aristotle. This is not an attempt to discredit the contribution that
Aquinas has made to the historical dialogue of analogy. Instead, this is an
attempt to show that the way Aquinas used analogy finds its beginnings in
Aristotle. The attempt to make this case will take shape according to a few
passages from Aquinas' *Commentary on Aristotle's* Metaphysics.

In his *Commentary on Aristotle's* Metaphysics, while describing the
opening line of *Metaphysics* Gamma, 2, Aquinas writes:

> Those things which have one term predicated of them in common, not univo-
> cally but analogously, belong to the consideration of one science. But the term
> being is thus predicated of all beings. Therefore, all beings, i.e., both sub-
> stances and accidents, belong to the consideration of one science which con-
> siders being as being.[3]

Describing the first line in this manner seems insightful for the way Aquinas
understands analogy in Aristotle. Aristotle does not use the term "analogy" in
this line, or even in this chapter. Here, Aristotle is laying open the possibility
of one common term that can account for all uses of "being" without being
univocal. Aristotle does not mention univocal predication here. Aquinas,
though, seems to be using Aristotle's reference to equivocation, and its in-
ability to capture the commonness of Aristotle's understanding of the term
"being," as the foundation for the meaning of analogy in Aristotle.

As Aquinas continues to characterize the opening line of *Metaphysics*
Gamma, 2, he claims that Aristotle is referring to different types of predica-
tion. Again, it seems as though Aquinas is leaping from Aristotle's denial
that equivocation claims the manifold nature of being to a discussion of the
various ways "focal meaning" can be said. Aquinas writes:

> He [Aristotle] accordingly says, first, that the term being, or what is, has
> several meanings. But it must be noted that a term is predicated of different
> things in various senses. Sometimes it is predicated of them according to a
> meaning which is entirely the same, and then it is predicated of them univocal-
> ly. . . . Sometimes it is predicated of them according to meanings which are
> entirely different, and then it is said to be predicated of them equivocally. . . .
> And sometimes it is predicated of them according to meanings which are
> partly different and partly not . . . and then it is said "to be predicated analo-

gously," i.e., proportionally, according as each one by its own relationship is referred to that one same thing.[4]

Aquinas in this passage appears to be describing Aristotle's examples of "healthy" and "medical" from *Metaphysics* Gamma, 2. Aristotle himself offers the example of health to describe the flexible ways that certain terms can correspond to their different applications. Aquinas may have made an interesting point had he drawn out Aristotle's use of the "health" example as an analogy itself. However, he did not do this but, instead, illustrated the example of health according to three predications, namely, the univocal, equivocal, and analogical.

Aquinas follows this last point, and to a certain degree concludes his offering of the Aristotelian origin of analogy, with the following note:

> It must be noted that the one thing to which the different relationships are referred in the case of analogical things is numerically one and not just one in meaning, which is the kind of oneness designated by a univocal term. Hence he says that, although the term being has several senses, still it is not predicated equivocally but in reference to one thing; not the one thing which is one merely in meaning, but to one which is one as a single definite nature. This is evident in the examples given in the text.[5]

It is clear from this passage that Aquinas understands the "healthy" example as an example of analogical naming. Since Aristotle, for Aquinas, is offering analogical predication as the way of claiming the manifold nature of being, then any talk of the unified meaning of the term "being" implicitly points to analogy.

Aquinas' analysis of Aristotle's *Metaphysics* Gamma, 2 seems to unfold as follows: being entails a manifold nature of expression, which is not captured through equivocation. If the fullness of being cannot be captured through equivocation, then neither can it be claimed univocally. If the manifold of being is claimed neither univocally nor through equivocation, then it must be predicated analogically. Therefore, the unity of being is claimed analogically. Analogy speaks to the unity of being since only analogy can speak to the common meaning entailed in the many different expressions of the term. Since it is analogy only that can claim the common meaning underlying the many expressions of being, then whenever Aristotle speaks of common meaning, he is inherently speaking about analogy. It can then be concluded that the foundation of the understanding of analogy in Aquinas emerges from Aristotle's discussion of common meaning in *Metaphysics* Gamma, 2.

As we will see, it is the momentum from the commentary on this Aristotelian passage that seems to give evidence of Aquinas' understanding of analogy in Aristotle. It is, then, from this understanding of analogy in Aristo-

tle that Aquinas enters his description of analogical predication and the rest
of the doctrine of the analogy of being. Consequently, Aquinas' use of the
analogy of being and analogical naming have their origin in Aristotle, in
particular, Aristotle's discussion of the varied yet unified meaning of the
term "being."

It is on the ground of this idea that focal, common meaning is included in
the dynamics of analogy that enables Aquinas to be the model for the "correl-
ative" interpretation of analogy in Aristotle. Having addressed this inclusion
of focal meaning, further treatment of the way Aquinas employs analogy can
be had. It appears that Aquinas consumes focal meaning in his use of analogy
which permits him to design both the "analogical names" and "analogy of
being."

Aquinas on Analogical Names

According to John F. Wipple,[6] the issue of analogy for Aquinas emerges
from two different concerns. The first of these concerns focuses on "being"
itself. Here, Aquinas is concerned with how beings which are discovered
through sensation also serve as the access to "being." The other concern of
Aquinas that provokes the issue of analogy focuses on how to speak about
God. This second concern develops according to the need to be able to speak
of different substances with similar language. Here, analogy is framed
through the discussion of univocal and equivocal terms.

Aquinas, in the *Summa Theologiae*, asks if there are words appropriate to
address God. God, for Aquinas, is the creator of all beings. As such, God is
the principal cause of all things and is thus a part of creation. At the same
time, God transcends creation and so is separate from it. A puzzle emerges
for Aquinas, then, concerning the possibility of speaking about a transcen-
dent being from the creatures' limited and average-everyday linguistic abil-
ities. As a result, the issue of language and how to speak about God was an
essential concern for Aquinas. Either the same words can be used for God
and creation or different words need to be used when speaking of God and
when speaking of creation. If the same words are used for both God and
creation, then these words (although the same words) must express different
meaning since, for example, speaking the goodness of a human being and
God's goodness refer to different meanings of the good. If the words used to
speak about God are different than the words used for human beings, then
their definitions must express some degree of overlap since, otherwise, the
mere ability to express an idea about God would extend beyond the abilities
of the human being. Therefore, there must be a way to employ terms that are
at times different and at times the same; and these terms must express defini-
tions that also are at times different and at times the same. Aquinas writes:

> Nothing can be said univocally of God and creatures. For effects that don't measure up to the power of their cause resemble it inadequately, . . . the uniform energy of the sun, for example, produces manifold and various forms of effect on earth. And in the same way, as we have said, all the many and various perfections existing in creatures pre-exist in God in simple unity.[7]

The essential concern for Aquinas here seems to rest on the idea that God, although the sole creator, is only partly and thus inadequately represented in his own creation. Univocal language becomes a misleading form of articulation when terms used to describe creation are applied to God. The "simple unity" of powers entailed in God can never be completely and adequately vocalized.

Most specifically, even when the human being speaks about the perfections of creation, still univocal language is inadequate. Aquinas writes:

> In this way then words expressing creaturely perfections express them as distinct from one another; *wise*, for example, used of a human being expresses a perfection distinct from his nature, his powers, his existence, and so on; but when we use it of God we don't want to express anything distinct from his substance, power, and existence. So the word *wise* used of human beings somehow contains and delimits what is meant; when used of God, however, it doesn't, but leaves what it means uncontained and going beyond what the word can express. Clearly then the word *wise* isn't used in the same sense of God and man, and the same is true of all other words. No word, then, is said of God and creatures univocally.[8]

In this passage, Aquinas reforms the notion that language is inadequately able to claim God and the human being in the same manner. Here, Aquinas notes that language about the human being qualifies the human being and brings into focus the boundaries and limitations of the human being. Insofar as God does not have such limitations, the same language cannot be employed when speaking about God. For these two primary reasons, namely, the inadequacy of an effect to express its cause and the lack of limitations that are naturally spoken through "human" speech, univocal language cannot be said of both God and creatures.

Since univocal language is inadequate to speak about God, Aquinas then ponders the possibility of equivocal language. Can the inherent possibilities of language to speak equivocally, adequately articulate the nature of God? Aquinas writes:

> But neither are they said purely equivocally, as some people have held. For that would mean nothing could be known or proved about God from creatures, but all such arguments would commit the logical fallacy of equivocation.[9]

Aquinas points out here that merely equivocal language also fails when claiming the nature of God.[10] Essentially, Aquinas seems to be saying that there must be some point of departure from which God can be understood. Without such ground, nothing claimed of God would be provable or disputable. This does not necessitate sameness within terms; especially since univocal language has been disavowed. However, there must be some common ground shared between the language which is had by the human being and the language which is able to reveal God.

What is common throughout these two ways of speaking seems to be that they both entail the element of hidden-ness. Aquinas appears to be indicating that there is a manner of language of the human being that somehow secretly speaks the nature of God. It is this type of language that claims what is common between mankind and God yet is neither equivocal nor univocal. Aquinas writes:

> Our answer then is that these words apply to God and creatures by analogy or proportion. There are two ways in which this happens with words. It happens when two or more things are 'proportioned' to one another: the word *healthy*, for example, is applied both to medicine and to urine because both are related or 'proportioned' to the health of some organism, the one as its cause and the other as its symptom. It also happens when one thing is directly 'proportioned' to another: the word *healthy* applies to the medicine and to the organism itself, since the medicine is the cause of health in the organism. And it is in this way that words are used analogically of God and creatures, not purely equivocally and not purely univocally.[11]

Analogy, then, for Aquinas, is the way of speaking about God from out of the same language that bounds the human being. Language is shared, in a sense, in that similarity of terms can express different but symmetrically relational meanings. It is the idea of "sharing" words that enables Aquinas to avoid the either/or trappings of univocal and equivocal language.

Such linguistic sharing unfolds in two ways, for Aquinas. One way shows how analogy reveals the commensurate positioning of two different things. Urine is like medicine insofar as they both stand equally near "health." The other way analogy unfolds itself for Aquinas claims the way a portion of one thing stands in relation to the whole of that thing. The "healthy" that proportionally unites medicine and urine is a portion or characteristic of the organism. So, it can be said analogically that medicine is to health as health is to the organism.

These two ways that analogy unfolds for Aquinas maintain one common component, namely, that all proportional relations take words as understood by the human being as the point of departure for establishing and expressing claims about God. This is the only way, Aquinas states, which God can be spoken of. What this means regarding analogy is that it primarily articulates

something which finds no other means of articulation elsewhere. In other words, although analogy always employs "common" language (for the ultimate sake of the commonality within language), always uses terms understood according to their direct and implied meanings, analogy essentially speaks something that underlies this common language. The focal point of analogy for Aquinas is God, the cause and underlying substance of created things. It is through the analogical articulation of these created things that enables what underlies them to be spoken. Aquinas writes:

> For our only words for God come from creatures, as we have said, and so whatever we say of God and creatures is said in virtue of the relationship creatures bear to God as to the source and cause in which all their creaturely perfections pre-exist in a more excellent way. [12]

Again, it is in virtue of the words used for creatures that what pre-exists creation can find articulation. As a result, analogical naming can be described as a means of bringing to light through speech the primary cause and underlying source of specific created things spoken about. For Aquinas, the essence of analogical naming seems to be the ability to speak about God by way of illuminating the symmetrical relationship of created things with the creator.

Aquinas concludes this thought on analogical naming by solidifying it as a means of articulation that rests between univocal and equivocal speech. Aquinas writes:

> And this way of sharing a word lies somewhere between pure equivocation and straight forward univocalness. For analogical use doesn't presuppose one and the same sense as univocalness does, nor totally different senses as equivocation does, but a word said in senses that differ by expressing different proportions to one and the same thing, as *healthy* said of urine means it is a symptom of the organism's health, and said of medicine means it is a cause of the same health. [13]

Aquinas describes analogy here in terms of the relationship of a term and its meaning. Essentially, Aquinas points to three possible categories regarding such relations. Insofar as Aquinas holds God to be the cause and underlying source of all things, analogy emerges as the only one of these three linguistic categories that can claim God. Analogy emerges as the only appropriate form of speech for claiming God because of Aquinas' understanding of the nature of being/beings.

Aquinas on the Analogy of Being

In chapter six of *De Principiis Naturae*, Aquinas again addresses the issue of analogy. Here, Aquinas approaches analogy for the sake of illuminating the

natural principles of being. Again, Aquinas speaks of three types of predica-
tions; when one being expresses a manifold of meanings (the equivocal),
when a manifold of beings express one underlying meaning (the univocal),
and when a manifold of beings express a manifold of meanings which are at
times the same and at times different (the analogical). Although the univocal,
the equivocal, and the analogical were referred to above as linguistic catego-
ries, here Aquinas uses them as categories of predication for the illumination
of the principles of being.

   When discussing analogical naming, Aquinas neatly places the analogical
in between the univocal and the equivocal. However, when discussing the
natural principles of being and the way categories such as quality, quantity,
etc. are predicated on substance, Aquinas seems to re-locate the place of
analogy. Aquinas writes:

> For an understanding of this, it should be kept in mind that there are three
> ways in which something is predicated of many things: univocally, equivocal-
> ly, and analogically. That is predicated univocally which is predicated accord-
> ing to the same word and according to the same meaning, or definition, as
> "animal" is predicated of man and of ass. . . . That is predicated equivocally
> which is predicated of a number of things according to the same word and
> according to a diverse meaning, as "dog" is said of what is capable of barking
> and of the heavenly body, which have in common only the word, but not the
> definition or signification; for that which is signified by a word is the defini-
> tion, as is said in book four of the *Metaphysics*. That is said to be predicated
> analogically which is predicated of many things so that the meaning is differ-
> ent for each, but so that there is an attribution of some one and the same thing,
> as "healthy" is said of a body of an animal and of urine and of a drink, but does
> not mean wholly the same thing with respect to all of them. For it is said of
> urine as a sign of health, of the body as the subject of health, and of the drink
> as a cause of health. Nonetheless, all of these meanings include an attribution
> to one end, namely, health. [14]

Earlier it was mentioned that Aquinas collapses the strict use of the term
analogy in Aristotle with what Aristotle spoke of as "one and a single na-
ture." In this long passage, Aquinas hints at the use of analogy for the sake of
illuminating this "single nature" or "focal meaning." Although Aquinas
presents analogy as a third type of predication here, analogy is being re-
formed into a style of predication that might underlie the other two types. In
other words, it seems as though Aquinas presents univocal and equivocal
predication as opposite manners of bringing attributes back to substance.
Where univocal predication points out the way multiple attributes are
brought back to a common substance, equivocal predication points out how
different substances, different beings are spoken and identified according to
common attributes. Analogical predication, however, seems to transcend
both univocal and equivocal predication by bringing the substance/attribute

relationship back to a prior relationship of substance. Analogy illuminates a first meaning or relationship that it retained throughout "additional" relationships. It is a prior meaning of health, a prior relationship of health to the organism, to which all the additional claims of health are brought-back. In a manner of speaking, at least, univocal and equivocal predications appear to be types of analogical predications.

To further stress the point that analogical predication is the way of referring back to prior substance, Aquinas writes:

> Now, sometimes the things which are the same according to an analogy—that is, in a proportion or comparison or agreement—are attributed to one end, as is clear from the example just noted. Sometimes they are attributed to one agent, as "medical" is said both of someone who works by means of his art and of someone who works without the art, as an old experienced woman, and even of instruments; and of each of these cases by an attribution to one agent which is the art of medicine. At other times, they are attributed to one subject as "being" is said of substances and of quantity and quality and the other predicaments. For that by which substance is a being, on the one hand, and that by which quantity and the others are beings, on the other hand, are not wholly the same. All of these others are said to be beings because of the fact that they are attributed to substance, which of course is the subject of all of them. And so, "being" is said first of all of substance, and posteriorly of the others. And this is why being is not a genus in relation to substance and quantity, i.e., because no genus is predicated of its species, first of one, and posteriorly of others, and being is predicated just that way, i.e., analogically. And this is what we said above, that substance and quantity differ in genus, but are the same according to analogy. [15]

In this lengthy passage, Aquinas makes clear that analogy returns attributes to their corresponding subjects. These subjects are, by virtue of being subjects, said to be corresponding to substance or "being," purely. It is this reference to the "one end" or goal of being—the fulfilling of the potentiality of the being to "be" this way or that way, i.e., according to the categories— that is claimed only through analogy. Analogy, then, entails the ability to articulate the hierarchy of being that Aquinas understands to exist. Analogical predication takes its point of departure from the attribution (received by way of sensation). It is the identifying of beings according to their attributes, identifying substances through the accidents, which bring to light the manifold ordering of "being" expressed by analogy. And only analogy predicates that attributes are attributes of subjects, substances, beings (all of which seem to be used interchangeably by Aquinas here). Only analogical predication, for Aquinas, speaks with such manifold force.

Having said this, the other forms of predications, namely, the univocal and the equivocal, can be subsumed under analogical predication. It is only through analogy that "being" can be said of attributes, subject, and substance

(although in different ways). Once "being," for example, can be said of each category and every subject, then and only then can univocal or equivocal predication be acknowledged. In other words, the manifoldness of "being" finds articulation through analogical predication, whereas the univocal and the equivocal identify the way *types* of beings are predicated. Analogical predication transcends, in a sense, the univocal and equivocal predications by identifying the "one end," as Aquinas writes, of existing things; which is "being" in its simple potentiality.

Concluding Comments on Aquinas on Analogy

At this point, concluding comments on this description of Aquinas on analogy can be made. There seem to be two main strands of thought within the doctrine of Aquinas: (a) to reveal the implicit dynamic of language that claims both the human experience as well as God—the source of the human experience; and (b) to reveal the manifoldness of being that requires a hierarchical order of predication.

This first strand is illustrated by his description of analogical naming, where the ability to speak about limitless God with the same limiting language of the human being is explained. Here, univocal and equivocal language fail to account for the way terms need to express meaning in, at times the same and at times different, ways. The ability to speak about God extends beyond the mere term/meaning relationship. To speak about God, for Aquinas, requires the ability to claim the one goal and ultimate purpose of named things. Identifying God as the ultimate source of things indicates the hierarchy of being that designs the second strand of Aquinas' thinking on analogy. This hierarchy of being requires analogical predication. Univocal or equivocal predication, for Aquinas, is insufficient here since only analogy penetrates the subject/attributes relationship.

Now that a brief description of Aquinas' doctrine of analogy has been offered, we can address some of its critical commentary. The attack on the doctrine of analogy is less a criticism of Aquinas' position and more a criticism of Aquinas' ascription to Aristotle as the origin of this doctrine. Collapsing a characterization of Aristotle's strict use of the term *analogia* (and its cognates) with Aristotle's mentioning of a "one and a single *physis*" from *Metaphysics* Gamma, 2, some have argued, is too liberal of an interpretation of the term to credit Aristotle as its source. Below, critiques of the legitimacy of ascribing the doctrine of the analogy of being to Aristotle will be offered. Before the critiques are discussed, there is one more important note to be made regarding Aquinas' position. For Thomas, analogy only becomes an issue when dealing with matters of infinity. Regarding finite beings, as Aristotle seems to be primarily concerned with, equivocal and univocal language seem to be sufficient for Thomas. So, the analogy of being for Aquinas is

apparently to be thought according to the desire to establish a manner of speech that can account for the infinite God. Although speaking of the divine analogically is a possibility for Aristotle, the infinite is not a part of the structure of analogy. That is, the structure of analogy for Aristotle primarily concerns finite beings; even though this structure allows for the concerns of infinite being. Since the structure of analogy does indeed allow for the addressing of the divine, to claim that the doctrine of the analogy of being *comes from* Aristotle (i.e., is taken as an extension of Aristotle's notion of analogy) is not inaccurate.

The critique of Aquinas, and thus the critique of the "correlative" interpretation of analogy, will center on the claim that analogy is unable to address the "common nature" that Aristotle referred to in the *Metaphysics*. If analogy is unable to account for "common nature," then analogy is unable to address the nature of beings, and thus the nature of Being. Consequently, the "mathematical" interpretation of analogy attempts to separate the doctrine of the analogy of being from Aristotle as its source.

ARISTOTLE'S "COMMON NATURE" AS THE GROUND OF THE ABUSE OF ANALOGY

The critique of the Thomistic position regarding the analogy of being centers on the idea that analogy cannot account for the "common nature" Aristotle refers to in *Metaphysics* Gamma, 2. Analogy, here, is to be reserved for mathematical proportionality and this limits analogy's ability to address horizontal relationships between beings only. This critique will unfold according to a few primary points regarding this mathematical interpretation of analogy. The first point is that including Aristotle's "common nature" or "focal meaning" into the design of analogy results in an abuse of the way Aquinas used analogy and analogies. Aristotle's "common nature" is a necessary component of the understanding of being in general. Being, which itself is steeped in ambiguity for Aristotle, cannot merely be reduced to the forms of beings. So, the "common nature" that being is said to refer back to in the *Metaphysics* is something that must be accounted for if being itself is to be accounted for. The mathematical interpretation of analogy, though, only accounts for the formation of beings standing in proportional relation to one another. If only the formation of proportional relation can be accounted for by analogy, then the ambiguity of being (and thus "common nature") cannot. What results for this position, then, is that analogy is unable to account for being. Thus, the analogy of being cannot be ascribed to Aristotle's reference to a "common nature."

The presentation of the critique of Aquinas, which is really an attempt to separate the doctrine of analogy by Thomas from the use of *analogia* by

Aristotle, will center primarily on two essays. The first essay is by G. E. L. Owen entitled "Logic and Metaphysics in Some Early Works of Aristotle."[16] This essay illustrates the idea of "focal meaning." Through Owen's description of "focal meaning," the distancing from the use of analogy that the mathematical interpretation desires will begin to take shape. After "focal meaning" is addressed, this study will deal with an essay by Pierre Aubenque entitled "The Origin of the Doctrine of the Analogy of Being: on the History of a Misunderstanding." Aubenque's essay treats the more strict use of the term *analogia* and argues that the only appropriate understanding of the term concerns mathematical proportionality, a sort of mathematical predication. After briefly describing Owen's "focal meaning," and Aubenque's analogy as mathematical proportionality, it will be suggested that these be thought together. Not only does Aubenque reference the Owen essay, but the basic thrust of his argument begins by using "focal meaning" as a wedge to separate Aristotle from the doctrine of the analogy of being. Neither Owen's illustration of "focal meaning" nor Aubenque's description of analogy's inability to account for being is entirely incorrect; however, both points are incomplete.

The reason these two essays will receive so much attention is due to the belief that they so clearly illustrate the essence of the mathematical interpretation of analogy. Other authors will be referred to here, but other authors only seem to support the same basic position that the Owen and Aubenque essays (thought together) illustrate. G. E. R. Lloyd, for example, thoroughly describes the use of analogical argumentation in Aristotle. However, Lloyd makes the basic assumption that analogy for Aristotle refers to mathematical proportionality and is thus a weak form of explanation regarding the nature of beings. Lloyd writes:

> And if in practice it is often as preliminary hypotheses that Aristotle uses analogies (notably in the psychological treatises), what is missing in the *Organon* is due recognition of *this* role of analogy, not as a method of demonstration, but as a source of tentative suggestions which await criticism and confirmation.[17]

Later, while discussing the role *nous* plays in the structure of analogy, the apprehension of intellectual noetic principles will be confronted. Here, analogy will be seen not just as an argumentative form, but as the way first principles receive articulation. It is only as a result of the way analogy brings these principles (that are by nature without *logos*) to addressability that any reasoning or science can be done. In other words, the structure of analogy is not a mere argumentative formation, but the very possibility of argument formation (it is argued later that analogy lies at the very root of *logos* and thus enables all science, all reasoning to occur).

Included in the idea that analogy is an argumentative form for Aristotle are those commentators that draw analogy into an intimate relation with metaphor.[18] Abraham Edel writes: "Analogy involves four terms so related that as the second is to the first, the fourth is to the third. To use the fourth for the second is then metaphorical."[19] Analogy, here, breeds metaphor, the transference of a name to something other than itself. Analogy is held by Edel as a mode of explanation that maneuvers between beings qua *logos* and is thus unable to extend beyond the scope of *logos* and account for the nature of beings named. Edel continues: "Aristotle never simply dismisses analogy; sometimes, particularly in the biological works, he uses it to probe structural similarities."[20] Here, clearly, Edel confines the power of analogy to probing beings according to their structures, their forms, perhaps. Also, to suggest that Aristotle does not dismiss analogy implies that it is even possible for him to do so. Perhaps this will not be seen until later in this thesis, however, the fundamental nature analogy plays for Aristotle is being completely over-looked. This overlooking seems to be the result of reducing the structure of analogy to particular analogies or the specific uses of the term "analogy."

Analogy is treated in each of these cases as an approach at comparing the forms of different beings while the nature of these beings remains unattainable. As such, analogy is understood as a maneuver of formal logic,[21] overly concerned with the structure of ratios and in denial about the experiences of nature. Jonathan Barnes writes of Aristotle and analogy:

> Aristotelian analogies are almost invariably functional; why then can we not "get one identical thing which (all the analogous parts) should be called" (98a 21)? If the parts all fulfill some function *F*, then their "one identical thing" can be named by the term "substance fulfilling function *F*." Aristotle would argue that this term does not pick out any "nature"; it is a purely formal description and (necessarily) does not specify the stuff or shape of the substance concerned; but a "nature" needs materials as well as formal specification.[22]

Aristotle would not argue that the (analogical) term is unequipped to identify the nature of a being. Insofar as the noetic first principles of experience receive a manner of articulation by way of analogy, as will be described below, the nature of beings can be spoken. Barnes, while referring to analogy as a "purely formal description," demonstrates that, like Aubenque, he has reduced the structure of analogy to mathematical proportion. As such, he denies its most potent aspect; namely, to enable *logos* to stretch beyond its normal boundaries and account for the principles of perceived beings.

At this point, the two essays by Owen and Aubenque can be treated. Again, the reason these two essays will receive such privileged status here is because they are believed to offer precise and thorough articulations of what we are calling the "mathematical" interpretation of analogy in Aristotle. What we have seen, or will see after the treatment of the Aubenque essay, is

that the other commentators of the meaning of analogy in Aristotle can be subsumed under the Owen/Aubenque combination. This broad umbrella is formatted by the two guiding premises that (a) Aristotle's "common nature" is not to be included in the structure of analogy and (b) that analogy can say nothing about the nature of beings. I will present these two essays on their terms, meaning I will attempt with little analytical imposition to offer the stances of Owen and Aubenque. This is not an uncritical acceptance of their positions, but rather an attempt to present their positions as they intended them to be. Again, the primary purpose of discussing their positions in the first place is to demonstrate the incomplete nature of their position (thought together, they form one position). Illuminating their incompleteness may clear the path for our diagramming of the structure of analogy in Aristotle.

Owen on Focal Meaning

While interested in establishing the role of logic in Aristotle's thought, G. E. L. Owen writes of "focal meaning." Pulling this idea from Aristotle's reference to "one and a single nature" in *Metaphysics* Gamma, 2, Owen attempts in this essay[23] to show how focal meaning is not the content of analogical predication for Aristotle. Historically, Owen claims, the idea of focal meaning has been subsumed under the role of analogy and thus the expression "analogy of being" has been ascribed to Aristotle. Owen sets out here to show the separation of analogy and focal meaning, so as to revise the historical over-willingness to find unity with Aristotle's thought.

Owen writes of the place of synonyms and homonyms for the sake of setting up Aristotle's use of analogy. Owen writes:

> In his [Aristotle's] logic he tended at this time to work with the simple dichotomy of synonymy and homonymy; apparently he saw little if any importance in that *tertium quid* for which he was gradually to find such notable uses. In metaphysics this simple scheme enables him, as part of his critique of Plato and the Academy, to deny the possibility of any universal science of being. This denial was framed without provisions for the system he was himself to propose in *Metaphysics* IV, VI, and VII. True, he had held a theory of categories in which priority was ascribed to substance, but this priority was of an older Academic vintage which did not involve focal meaning. So it did nothing to mitigate the ambiguity that Aristotle claimed to find in "being."[24]

Throughout this essay, Owen is writing with a strong sense of the chronology of Aristotle's work. Focal meaning is something, Owen claims, Aristotle did not make full use of until the *Metaphysics* when his interests centered on the study of being qua being. Prior to this concentration on "being" itself, Aristotle employed a sense of "prior meaning" where terms were discussed in reference to an implied and more primary definition. Structurally, the idea of

prior meaning is present in the *Categories* where categories 2 through 10 were claimed with the underlying implication of the first, most primary category of substance. In this passage, though, Owen is making the case that the reference back to a prior definition was framed by way of synonyms and homonyms (or the equivocal [*aequivoce*] and the univocal [*univoce*] as the Greek terms were translated into Latin and discussed above from our section on Aquinas). Insofar as "being" in general was recognized by Aristotle as not predicated synonymously nor through homonyms, there could be no general science of "being." Neither of these two predications are able to claim the ambiguity of "being" that Aristotle found to be so essential.

For Aristotle, "being" is studied through the approach to substance. For this reason, Owen notes, Aristotle criticized those earlier thinkers who approached "being" by attempting to establish the elements of all things that exist. By limiting their search to the elements, previous thinkers overlooked the inherent ambiguity of the term "being." Focal meaning, then, assists in the attempt to safe-keep, in a sense, the ambiguity of "being," for Aristotle. So, on the one hand, Aristotle approaches "being" with the assistance of the idea of focal meaning; on the other hand, Aristotle suggests that the only elements that can lead to the understanding of "being" are the basic elements of substance. Still, it is substance through which "being" is to be studied. Owen writes regarding the privileging of substance as the point of departure for the study of being qua being:

> This does not formally contradict the argument of the forth book, but it is out of tune with the claim that a general inquiry into the elements of the things that are is legitimate and that those who had engaged in such an inquiry were on the right track (1003a 28–32). It contrast too with the argument in *Metaphysics* XII that all things can be said to have the same elements "by analogy" (XII 4, esp. 1070b 10–21). But now it is time to take up an earlier promise and show that these two pronouncements, in IV and XII respectively, are by no means equivalent, despite the immemorial tendency of commentators to describe the theory in IV as "the analogy of being."[25]

What Owen is framing here is the difference between focal meaning and analogical predication. The search into the elemental makeup of being is only fruitful by analogy. That is, it can be noted that the elements of this being are like the elements of that being according to their side-by-side comparison. This analogical comparison is, in a sense, a bringing-back of the elemental makeup of a being to the elemental makeup of another being. This maneuver of bringing-back to something prior seems to be the basic structure of focal meaning. However, Owen wants to stress here that focal meaning and analogical predication are not the same. Nevertheless, the apparent similarity between them has caused for the traditional collapsing of the one into the other. So, it now becomes the goal of Owen to sharply distinguish their

primary difference. This difference must be made for the sake of establishing Owen's position that even though focal meaning and analogical predication appear similar, they are to remain separate. It has been the confusing of their difference that has lead to the reading of focal meaning as the ground for the "analogy of being."

On the distinct functional difference between focal meaning and analogical predication, Owen writes:

> The claim of IV that "being" is an expression with focal meaning is a claim that statements about non-substances can be reduced to—translated into—statements about substances; and it seems to be a corollary of this theory that non-substances cannot have matter or form of their own since they are no more than logical shadows of substance (1044b 8–11). The formulation in terms of "analogy" involves no such reduction and is therefore free to suggest that the distinction of form, privation and matter is not confined to the first category (1070b 19–21). To establish a case of focal meaning is to show a particular connexion between the definitions of a polychrestic word. To find an analogy, whether between the uses of such a word or anything else, is not to engage in any such analysis of meanings; it is merely to arrange certain terms in a (supposedly) self-evident scheme of proportion. So when Aristotle says in *Metaphysics* XII that the elements of all things are the same by analogy, the priority that he ascribes to substance is only natural priority (1071a 33–5) and does not recognize any general science of being *qua* being.[26]

According to Owen, what seems to lie between focal meaning and analogical predication is a sort of topological difference. Both can be seen as a style of comparison; both can be seen as ways of claiming a being by referring it back to something previously established. It is here that they have been traditionally confused. However, even though it is safe to understand them as manners of comparison, they compare beings according to different directions. Focal meaning acknowledges an underlying definition that gives the particular claim its current significance. Insofar as focal meaning relates a being with what underlies it, particular beings can be reduced to temporary manifestations of their underlying meaning that is shared with other expressions of that same meaning (thus making the meaning "focal" regarding the various expressions). For example, one's healthy complexion can be seen as a particular temporary expression of the meaning of "healthy." This is apparently what Owen means when he claims that focal meaning can reduce statements of non-substance to statements of substance.

Analogical predication, on the other hand, is not a comparison with such reductive powers, for Owen. Analogically, beings can be compared to other beings that stand along side them. Analogically, the comparison seems to always be next-to or side-by-side. Here, statements about substances cannot be reduced to non-substances; they can only be held in comparison to other beings that function "like" them "next" to them. So, the topological distinc-

tion Owen seems to be making is that focal meaning moves "inward" toward the being's underlying meaning; whereas analogy moves "outward" in order to compare beings along side of other beings.

It is through this last cited passage that the separation between focal meaning and analogical predication is most clearly illustrated. What Owen contributes to the historical dialogue on Aristotle and analogy is the closeness with which focal meaning and proportionality can be seen. If nothing else, Owen makes the confusion between the two somewhat legitimate. That is, Owen seems to pinpoint what he sees as the location (*Metaphysics* Gamma and Lambda) where Aristotle appears to be illustrating the content of analogy as focal meaning. If both are concerned with substance and the study of "being" takes substance as its point of departure, then saying that the manifold senses of being refer to one underlying sense and that their elements are the same by analogy could be read as a unified claim. In light of the fact that focal meaning is not mentioned in *Metaphysics* Lambda and analogy is not mentioned in *Metaphysics* Gamma, Owen makes the case that analogical predication does not account for claims of focal meaning.

To make the case even more emphatically that analogy in Aristotle does not entail focal meaning, I will now turn to another essay. This essay is by Pierre Aubenque.[27] Aubenque, to a certain degree, reduces the easiness with which the confusion can occur. Aubenque attempts to reorient the dialogue on the "analogy of being" by tracing the specific uses of the term "analogy" and examples of different analogies in Aristotle. As will be discussed, it is only these direct references (to "analogy" and analogies) that are permitted to shape the understanding of the term and its subsequent abuses.

Aubenque on "The Origin of the Doctrine of the Analogy of Being"

Aubenque opens the essay by unmistakably stating the course of his thesis. Aubenque writes:

> A TRADITION that has long held sway has claimed to find in Aristotle the origins and even the distinctive characteristics of a doctrine which, in fact, was sustained and developed only in the Middle Ages: the doctrine in question is that of the analogy of being. We believe we have shown that this doctrine is to be found neither explicitly nor even implicitly in any part of Aristotle's work and that its retrospective attribution to the Greek philosopher did not only constitute a terminological anachronism, but a blatant misunderstanding. At least one fact is no longer in question: in the Middle Ages "analogy of attribution" (or "of proportion") was the label given to the only structure Aristotle acknowledges to unify the multiple significations of the word "being" and which he names *pros en symainein* or *pros en legesthai*, which can be translated most literally as "unity of signification by convergence" or, taking one's

inspiration from recent English translations, as "focal unity of meaning." Aristotle who did not ignore the term *analogia*, never used it in this respect.[28]

Immediately and without hesitation, Aubenque orients this essay while reorienting the entire traditional dialogue on the issue of Aristotle and analogy. The possibility of collapsing analogical predication with focal meaning is, for Aubenque, "no longer in question." In other words, for Aubenque, not only does focal meaning have no place in the discussion of analogy in Aristotle, the question of its possible connection is an illegitimate inquiry. Our analysis here will attempt to show that Aubenque is incorrect to say that the doctrine of the analogy of being is found neither implicitly nor explicitly in Aristotle's work. As was mentioned above while discussing Aquinas, the structure of analogy in Aristotle permits for that approach to being that became this doctrine (even if the doctrine itself goes too far by drawing such an intimate relation between analogy and infinity).

Like Owen, Aubenque points to the ambiguity within the nature of "being" that Aristotle sees as the point of origin for the reflection on analogy. However, Aubenque decisively separates the claiming of the manifold nature of "being" from the use of analogy. Aristotle, according to Aubenque, does not engage the ambiguity of "being" along the lines of proportional relations. Aristotle only deals with the various ways of saying "being" through what Owen called "focal meaning." Aubenque writes:

> We are aware of the problem concerning being that Aristotle meant to at least formulate, if not solve. The term 'being' has a plurality of significations. . . . In fact, the multiple significations of being and, in particular, its categorical significations, share a certain kinship in that one of these significations—that of essence (*ousia*)—is primary and all the others imply in their definition a relation to this primordial signification. The affinity among the different meanings that Aristotle wants to manifest by this kinship does not rest on an equality of relations but on the fact that an identical term is involved in these relations, which are different on each occasion. One is therefore faced with the structure of the type a/b, a/c, a/d. etc.[29]

In this passage we can hear the guiding premise of Aubenque's position; namely, that the ambiguity of "being" rests on focal meaning and not "an equality of relations." An equality of relations indicates that some set of beings stands in relation to each other the same way as some other set of beings stands in relation to each other. This *same way as* characterization is Aubenque's reference to analogy thought as proportionality (or as Aubenque wrote earlier, "analogy of attribution"). By Aubenque characterizing analogy in this manner, *analogia* for Aristotle is not even able to account for focal meaning. Focal meaning, the phrase by Owen that Aubenque adopts, does not in itself involve relationships of beings. If the logical extension of this

idea can be thought for a moment, Aubenque seems to be suggesting that the only way focal meaning would overlap with analogy is when beings that have different focal meanings are held in proportional relation. Where a : b :: c : d, possibly each term (a, b, c, and d) would correspond to a different underlying definition, i.e., a different focal meaning. If analogy yields (if not necessitates) underlying definitions to such variety, then it says little if anything about the "one and a single nature" to which all applications of the term "being" comply.

To make the case further that focal meaning must be thought as separate from analogy for Aristotle, Aubenque references two parts of the *Metaphysics* where Aristotle explains what "analogy" signifies. Aubenque uses these two references, from books Delta and Lambda, in an attempt to demarcate the scope within which analogy should be understood. The first reference points to analogical unity which, in the end, is marked as the "weakest" form of unity. As a weak type of unity, analogy could not be that which joins a being in its appearance with the underlying meaning that defines it. Said differently, focal meaning is a way of reining in the ambiguity of being, and thus, not subject to such "weakness." Underlying Aubenque's remarks on analogical unity is the unspoken claim that analogy is to be thought as proportionality only. Once analogical predication is molded according to a relational comparison between sets of things, then the vitality of analogy resides in its strength of comparison; i.e., analogy is measured according to how strongly it unifies its sets. Insofar as analogy leaves open the distance between sets of comparables—analogy compares without closing the gap between, i.e., speaking specifically about sets of beings that are being compared—analogy says little regarding the underlying nature of beings. Thus, analogy is the weakest form of unity; analogy can only state how a set of beings stand in relation to other sets of beings, without saying anything else about the beings themselves.

So, Aubenque's first qualification of analogy in Aristotle entails two basic components, namely, that analogy is measured on the strength of its ability to unify and that analogy is the weakest form of unification since analogy says nothing specific about the nature of beings.

Aubenque's second qualification of analogy in Aristotle stresses the unifying component mentioned in the first qualification. Aubenque notes Aristotle's wondering about the ability of (analogical) unification within the variations of the categories, within the ambiguity of being. It seems as though Aubenque wants to show the extent of analogical relation. Any being, and thus, any of the categories are able to be brought together by way of analogical unity. This does not imply that analogical unity is any stronger than previously claimed, but it does demonstrate the length with which analogical predication extends. Regarding the strength or weakness of analogical unity, in fact, stressing the extent of its reach may be a way of emphasizing analo-

gy's inability to speak directly and in a detailed manner about beings. In other words, not only does analogical unity say little to nothing about the underlying nature of a being, the comparisons that analogical unity make are themselves so broad that little to nothing can be taken from their comparison. Not only is analogical predication unable to address focal meaning, it is unable to address a type of "focal comparison," some specific established point of reference that comparables (or "analogates," as Owen might say) are thought in relation to. Analogy, for Aubenque, seems to simply be the mathematical observation which reveals general—and apparently temporary and tenuous—relationships between sets of beings . . . and nothing more.

Early in the essay, Aubenque, like Owen, claims that it is the ambiguity of being that makes the issue of analogy an important one. At the same time, it is the ambiguity of being that often yields the confusion of the proper place of analogy in Aristotle. How can Aristotle claim being specifically while repeatedly noting that being can be said in many ways? The answer, for Aubenque, lies in the articulation of principles. It is the speaking of principles that can be analogical, for Aristotle. Aubenque points to this comment (from *Metaphysics* Gamma, 2 presumably) but implicitly states that nothing beyond the exact words should be read into this. That is, Aristotle claims that the principles of being are the same analogically; which, for Aubenque, is not to say that beings are the same analogically. Aubenque writes:

> The notion of analogy occurs in the same context as the doctrine of the multiple significations of being. But analogy is nowhere invoked to unify these meanings. On the contrary, far from attenuating or correcting the affirmation of the plurality of the significations of being, the entire passage, in its radicality, presupposes it since the irreducible character of this plurality alone demands recourse to analogy to allow for a minimum of unity—albeit a "general" unity—in our discourse about the principles and causes. It is not being, therefore, which is analogical but the principles and causes in being. And the analogy of the causes and the principles is not deduced from a so-called analogy of being any more than the latter can be deduced from the former, since the definition of analogical unity does not at all imply the unity (analogical or not) of its fields of application. To put it yet another way, the principles and causes would be one by analogy even if being were not one by analogy, and Aristotle nowhere says that being is one by analogy.[30]

The point Aubenque seems to be stressing here, with great emphasis, is that not only is analogy able to articulate neither focal meaning nor a sort of focal comparison, but analogy is unable to speak "being" at all. Within the ever-present ambiguity of being, analogy speaks to a very small aspect of this ambiguity, namely, the way sets of beings are held in comparison. Even further, the small aspect of this ambiguity that analogy is equipped to articulate, this ability to reveal certain mathematical comparisons, itself says little

about the beings which are held in comparison. The only powers of analogical predication lie in the ability to speak vaguely about similarities between causes and principles of beings as they are placed along side one another.

Aubenque seems to be implying that this mistaken tradition of analogy in Aristotle rests as much on a misunderstanding of being as it does on a misunderstanding of analogy. What analogy can give us, and Aubenque seems to want to indicate that this is the extent of analogy, is vague comparisons. Through analogical predication, one can say the cause of "x" is to the cause of "y" like "x" is to "y"; or cx : cy :: x : y. Then, if "x" and "y" become the causes of "a" and "b," then one could say xa : yb :: a : b. Through analogy one could also then say that cx : cy :: a : b. Continuing, if "a" and "b" become the causes of "p" and "q," then one could say that cx : cy :: p : q. Such a line of analogical comparisons could continue to the point where all beings and their causes are accounted for. However, such an account of the totality of beings is not the same as accounting for being. That is, this line of analogical comparison is not the ambiguity of being that Aristotle speaks about; this ambiguity is not something that can quantify proportionality as such. It is only if being could be quantified as such that analogical comparing (analogy of proportionality) could speak to "being" itself. Insofar as "being" is not quantified as such, analogy is unable to speak of "being." So, for Aubenque, perhaps the misunderstanding of the way Aristotle uses analogy is a result of the misunderstanding of what "being" means for Aristotle.

WHAT HEIDEGGER ADDS TO THE LOCATING OF THE STRUCTURE OF ANALOGY IN ARISTOTLE

At this point, I can attempt to rein in these two lines of thought (the "correlative"/"mathematical" interpretations) regarding analogy in Aristotle. The point of contention between the two interpretations seems to rest on the possibility of analogy to speak focal meaning. Aquinas illustrates analogy as having such powers. The problem with Aquinas' position, according to his critics, is not the manner in which he employs analogy but the ascribing of his position to Aristotle. That Aquinas himself sees analogy as entailing the potential to speak some sort of primary meaning that underlies each expression is not a problem; signifying that Aristotle does the same is a claim that other philosophers find disagreeable. It is the understanding of analogy in its strictest, most conservative usage that has Aquinas being attacked. Here, analogy is not only unable to account for focal meaning; analogy lacks the ability to offer any significant claim regarding the nature of the being at all. Analogy is only able to reveal "weak" comparisons that may exist between sets of beings. Beyond this, analogy is believed to be utterly impotent.

Heidegger seems to be offering something different and interesting regarding the place of analogy in Aristotle. On the one hand, Heidegger collapses the "correlative" and "mathematical" interpretations into each other by claiming that analogy both accounts for focal meaning yet, essentially offers little about the nature of being itself. On the other hand, though, Heidegger leaves his meditation on analogy in Aristotle by seeming to suggest that analogy perpetuates and safe-keeps the questionableness (*fragwürdigkeit*) of being. Analogy has this dynamic, Heidegger appears to be saying, because analogy is uniquely equipped to retain the ambiguity of being through each expression.

Heidegger approaches analogy through Aristotle's position that genus only inadequately claims the unity of being. Before Heidegger's understanding of analogy is directly addressed, then, we will turn to *Metaphysics* Beta, 3 for the explanation of Aristotle's claim that being is not a genus.

According to Aristotle, "being" is unified not by genus but by analogy (contrary to the claim of the "mathematical" interpretation). This is the case because genus qua genus requires species. Insofar as species entail determining qualities, qualities that singly (but not independently) exist, the differentiation between genus/species collapses. That is, "being" cannot be claimed as a genus if the species that determine the genus also "are." On this point, Aristotle writes:

> But it is not possible for either "unity" or "being" to be a genus of things; for each differentiae of any genus must *be* and also be *one*, but it is impossible either for the species of a genus or for that genus alone to be a predicate of the *proper* differentiae of the species. Thus, if "unity" or "being" is indeed a genus, no differentia will be either a being or one. (998b 23–27)[31]

By claiming that being is not unified by genus, Aristotle is suggesting a few things. Firstly, the term "being" is not simply used synonymously. As was addressed, synonymously or univocally, being is able to be expressed in multiple ways but always for the sake of one meaning, one definition. This one definition would be the genus that gets spoken through each different articulation; where the different "applications" of the definition would be seen as its species. Secondly, and as a result of the first suggestion, since the term "being" cannot be reduced to one single definition, being must be understood as entailing a manifold significance. The inability to shrink the meaning of being to one independent expression elucidates the ambiguous nature of being. A third suggestion that can be pulled from the above passage is that being is a sort of "unity" that, and this is the second suggestion, remains within some type of absence of unity. That and how this is not a description of a paradoxical nature of being will be discussed below when

the analogical root of *logos* is illustrated. For now, it is important to note that being entails both unity and disunity within itself without being a paradox.

Here, we can return to Heidegger and address where he sees analogy in light of Aristotle's thesis that genus does not unify being. In a section entitled "The Unity of Analogy (of the *pros hen*) as Sense of the Unity of Multiple Beings in *Ousia*,"[32] Heidegger describes the way analogy (only) unifies being. Here, Heidegger turns his attention to *Metaphysics* Gamma, 2, the passage discussed above that speaks to focal meaning. Heidegger writes:

> *Met.* Γ 2: "Beings are called beings in several senses." (1003a 33). Therefore Being is understood in several senses as well. But the manifoldness of the meaning of Being is not an utterly disparate one. It is not simply a matter of one and the same word used with completely different meanings, such as the cock [*Hahn*] of the chicken coop and of the water spigot: the same word, but the meaning is altogether different. Thus the expression "Being" is not equivocal, *oukh homonumos* ["not merely homonymous"] (1003a 34), *aequivoce*, but neither is it—since *pollakhōs*—*synonumos* ["synonymous"], *univoce*, having the same meaning in every context.[33]

Heidegger is describing Aristotle's claim that being is unified by analogy and not genus by directing our attention to focal meaning. Since being is not a genus, the various expressions of focal significance cannot be reduced to a type of species under a single genus. Just as the species-constituting-differentia are not separate from the genus "being" (as if "being" could be a genus), the various articulations of terms with focal meaning are not separate from the focal meaning itself. That is, the various expressions of a focal meaning are not representations detached from the focal meaning but rather are enfolded in the focal meaning. Various expressions each contribute to the understanding of the underlying focal meaning. Genus seems to be taken here to be the way to understand its species, and not the other way around. This seems to be one way that Heidegger is presenting the inability of genus to claim the unity of being. Likewise, this also seems to be the model Heidegger is using to describe the structure of analogy. In other words, it seems that Heidegger is saying that the idea of "focal meaning" both undermines the ability of genus to claim the unity of being and offers the basic design of analogy. Thus, analogy, and not genus, is able to claim the unity of being.

Heidegger, like the other thinkers, acknowledges the ambiguity of being as the apparent guiding issue of Aristotle's study of being. Heidegger approaches the ambiguity of "being" through a discussion of the "as" structure inherent in speech itself. *Logos* is essentially split insofar as all speech indicates both substance and relation of the thing spoken about. That is, every expression of *logos* indicates that a thing "is" and what the thing "is" "as." What is entailed in this, Heidegger explains, is the ever-present ambiguous nature of *logos*. *Logos* does not simply speak, *logos* speaks in a particular

way each time; and this reveals a manifold within *logos* itself. The ambiguity of "being," expressed through this inherent manifold (*pollakhōs*) within the nature of *logos*, centers around the guiding principle that *logos* speaks "being" (*ousia*) in every thing that is spoken (*legomenon*). So, *logos* essentially brings *ousia* to the level of experience, where *ousia* itself is taken as the oneness that unifies and sustains each and every articulation.

Since "being" (*ousia*) is one and this oneness is spoken in every expression of *logos*, then there is a oneness spoken in every *logos*. However, Heidegger points out, this oneness is always spoken according to a manifold, which implies that this oneness itself (*ousia*) is a manifold. If there is a oneness spoken in every *logos*, then how is this oneness ("being," *ousia*, substance) to be understood? This oneness is to be understood as that to which all things, all expressions are brought-back. So, this underlying oneness is expressed as a relation between itself and the specific thing spoken about.

It is this sort of relational expressing that Heidegger seems to understand analogy in Aristotle. Analogy has the ability to show correspondence within different expressions. As such, and similarly to Aquinas, Heidegger seems to structure analogy according to the idea of focal meaning described in *Metaphysics* Gamma, 2. A specific reference to the joining of this chapter and analogy can be seen when Heidegger writes that "[t]he unity of the meaning of "health" is an example of analogy. "Being" signifies in a way that corresponds to the way "health" signifies."[34]

Heidegger's thinking on analogy here seems to move along this line: being is unified not by genus but by analogy; analogy presents beings in a corresponding manner with their underlying substance. Insofar as analogy speaks beings according to their focal meaning, analogy reveals what is common among them. From here, what Heidegger sets out to determine is how analogy unifies the underlying commonness of being within specific expressions. Heidegger writes:

> Now it must be shown how Aristotle establishes the unity of analogy as that unity according to which *on*, *hen*, and *koinon ti* belong to the *pollakhōs legomena*. The *legesthai* of this *pollakhōs* is the *legein* of *analogia*. Accordingly, the question arises: *pros ti legetai ta pollakhōs legomena*—with respect to what? It must be a *proton* and an *arkhē*, and, since what is at issue is *on*, it must be the *proton on* or the *on protos legomenon*. Thus what is being sought is the sustaining and leading fundamental meaning of *on*, of being, *pros o ta alla legetai*—with respect to which the others are said.[35]

The unity of being is claimed by analogy. What this means, then, is that analogy is the only way that the underlying ambiguity of being is gathered and spoken in each articulation. This underlying ambiguity, this underlying manifoldness, is the "fundamental meaning"—perhaps focal meaning—ac-

cording to which all speech refers back toward. So, what Heidegger seems to be accusing analogy of being able to do is articulate particular beings in their presence without excluding their underlying manifold nature. The gathering of this manifold is the gathering of analogy. The gathering of analogy is gathered with respect to something primary (*proton*) and common (*koinon*). What this gathering seems to be is the bringing together of those "like" principles that beings carry along with them in their presentation, yet always in a concealed manner.

Heidegger tells that this primary and common underlying meaning toward which all speech, all references are brought-back is *ousia*, the first category. Heidegger writes:

> The first category is the sustaining and guiding fundamental meaning of being and as such the *koinon*, which imparts itself to all the others so that these themselves have the meaning of being due to their relationship to it. But it is well to note that *ousia* as this *hen* and *proton* is not *koinon* in the sense of a genus which is named and said of the other categories as species. Being so constituted and being so much are not kinds of *ousia* but ways of being related to it.[36]

The bringing-back is the bringing-back to substance. So, analogy, as the "peculiar kind of meaning in language" equipped to execute such bringing-back, is the manner of speech that unites being by claiming beings along with their underlying substance. This, Heidegger appears to be implying, is the content of focal meaning. The one and a single nature that Aristotle refers to in Gamma, 2 of the *Metaphysics* is a single substance that enables beings to express themselves according to their uniqueness. It is this single nature, substance itself, which is the focal point of relation for analogical predication. However, and Heidegger is here stressing a point developed earlier, this focal point of relation is not "one" as a genus, rather it is "one" by being that which is always brought-back toward. Although Heidegger does not say this, it seems as though he is suggesting that this "one" refers to a single directionality back to *ousia*. A reason which supports Aristotle's claim that being is not unified as genus can be the idea that directional movement (back toward *ousia*) is not something quantifiable according to genus.

So, as Heidegger explains, analogy speaks and unifies beings by bringing them back (through speech) to their underlying manifold nature. However, in the end, Heidegger points out that this says very little about being. This simply tells us *that* being finds access through analogy to demonstrate its ambiguous nature by way of specific presentations. Analogy does not tell us much about the being that is held in relation to substance, nor substance itself. Analogy illuminates, though, according to Heidegger, that being entails an underlying manifold nature. Heidegger writes:

> The analogy of being—this designation is not a solution to the being question, indeed not even an actual posing of the question, but the title for the most stringent aporia, the impasse in which ancient philosophy, and along with it all subsequent philosophy right up to today, is enmeshed.[37]

Heidegger offers much in this passage. Firstly, analogy—neither for Aristotle or the subsequent history of philosophy—does not "solve" anything. To claim that being is unified by analogy, insofar as analogy says little about being, ultimately says little about *unified* being. Secondly, Heidegger is saying that analogy (of being) is the name of the most rigorous puzzle that occupies philosophy to date. So, on the one hand, Heidegger points out that analogy for Aristotle does not resolve any of the problems it, in a way, claims to resolve; yet on the other hand, analogy is the title of what underlies all—even current—philosophical inquiry. Is Heidegger saying that analogy is a sort of paradox that is both uninformative and essential for philosophy (the study of being)? This is probably not the case. Instead of suggesting that Heidegger is drawing out some type of paradox, it seems he is signifying that analogy leaves open the question of the ambiguity of being. Although it may fail as a definitive resolution, analogy for Aristotle, according to Heidegger, stresses that in every presentation of a being, through speech or otherwise, the being's underlying manifold is brought along and as such brought to the fore of the presentation. Heidegger writes:

> The first and ultimate *proton on*, *pros o ta alla legetai*, which is thus the first meaning for the *pollakhōs* in the broad sense, is obscure. And therefore the *protē philosophia*, genuine philosophizing, is inherently questionable in a radical sense. All this is later erased by the thesis that being is the most self-evident.[38]

Here, it seems Heidegger is extending his previous point that analogy ultimately says little and perhaps nothing definite about primary being. Although through the unifying of being, analogy raises and in a sense safe-keeps the question of primary being, analogy does so in an "obscure" way. It is this reference to obscurity as a characterization of being that will serve as the point of departure for the conclusion of these comments on the location of the structure of analogy in Aristotle. Although I agree with Heidegger that perhaps the essential value of analogy in Aristotle is that it opens-up and retains the questioning of the ambiguity of being, I disagree as to the nature of this obscurity. It is what gets revealed in a hidden way, specifically qualified non-being (*sterēsis*), that our study will argue is the primary content of *analogia*. It is my opinion that Heidegger simply leaving the issue of analogy rest with the accusation that it speaks obscurity does not go far enough. That and how this obscurity is unconcealment (*alētheia*) will underlie all further concerns of our analysis.

PROBLEMS WITH THE "CORRELATIVE"
AND "MATHEMATICAL" INTERPRETATIONS
OF ANALOGY IN ARISTOTLE

So far, in attempting to locate the structure of analogy in Aristotle's thought, we have discussed what seem to be the two primary interpretations of analogy. Our analysis has referred to these two as the "correlative" interpretation and the "mathematical" interpretation of analogy. The essential difference between these two interpretations concerns the inclusion of focal meaning. The "correlative" approach, designed according to Aquinas and for the most part Heidegger, constructs analogy around the ability to account for and correspond to a common underlying definition. This interpretation takes its basic formation from Gamma, 2 of Aristotle's *Metaphysics*. Here, the example Aristotle uses of "health" is offered as the archetypical example of an analogy. As the standard according to which analogy is to be understood, the "health" example shows the type of flexible correspondence that the term "being" demonstrates. This, in part, makes the "health" example a type of analogy itself for the understanding of "being," but, additionally, this example shows a necessary bring-back movement entailed in analogy. It is that toward which something is brought-back, the one and a single nature, that serves as the underlying content of (each) analogy. This "correlative" interpretation of analogy does not deny or overlook proportionality and ratio. Instead, proportion is subsumed, in a sense, under the understanding of analogy that has it always corresponding to an already established underlying meaning. As such, analogy as proportionality is a sort of second in rank version of analogy—not an incorrect version of analogy, but a version that does not capture the primary dynamism of the term.

The "mathematical" interpretation of analogy in Aristotle, on the other hand, rejects the inclusion of focal meaning. Here, analogy is understood strictly speaking as the proportional relationship between sets of beings. This interpretation denies the potentiality of analogy to extend beyond mere mathematical relations. The only way analogy can be in-formative about being is to demonstrate the manner in which a being's relationship to a second being compares to the way a third being stands in relation to a fourth. Here, there is no corresponding to any type of focal meaning or underlying nature. Analogy, here, is limited to proportional comparisons; where the attempt by some to design analogy according to *Metaphysics* Gamma, 2 is an abuse of the term. Support for this accusation of abuse comes from the evidence that the term "analogy" is not used by Aristotle in this chapter of the *Metaphysics*. The absence of the term is taken by the "mathematical" interpretation as evidence that focal meaning is not the fundamental ground of analogy's dynamism. Even further, since the term analogy is not present at all in *Meta-*

physics Gamma, 2, there is nothing that points to the content of this chapter as something vital to the understanding of the term itself.

   Although these two interpretations offer important ways of understanding analogy in Aristotle, it is my opinion that both positions fail to go far enough to properly characterize the term. The "correlative" interpretation of analogy in Aristotle seems to reduce the potential for analogy to articulate the necessary relations between beings. It will be discussed below how motion, actuality, and potentiality serve as ontological components of being for Aristotle. Throughout this discussion, the point that beings necessarily stand in relation to one another will be attempted. If this point can be successfully made, then *how* beings stand in relation to other beings will be a required (and perhaps open) issue that needs to be confronted for the understanding of being itself. What analogy entails, yet seems to be overlooked by the "correlative" interpretation, is a possible way of articulating this question of relational predication; i.e., the way one being is in part defined by the way it stands in relation to an other being. For the "correlative" interpretation to base the understanding of analogy on the inclusion of focal meaning while apparently reducing the ontological importance of relational predication makes the interpretation incomplete.

   In addition to pointing out that the "correlative" interpretation's inclusion of focal meaning—which seems to really mean the *grounding* of analogy on focal meaning—is incomplete, further discussions will show that the idea of focal meaning might be a reductive concept in the first place. Aristotle is not saying that all senses of being share the same definition; instead, Aristotle is saying that there is a common *physis* to which all senses of being correspond. This common nature that the manifold senses of being correspond to includes, if it is not the essential thing Aristotle is referring to, the underlying ambiguity of being that finds expression through the presencing of each being. This "focal meaning" does not exclude or reduce away the hidden dynamics that every being, every *logos* claims. The general sense of Owen's development of focal meaning is that what underlies the various applications of a term such as "being" (and, thus other terms like "health" and "medical") is less flexible than the diversity of expression demonstrated by different beings. In other words, it seems as though Owen is suggesting that the ambiguity in being for Aristotle lies not in the underlying nature that beings correspond to but in the variety of expressions that this "single *physis*" finds in presentations. For Owen, he may be implying that the hidden and underlying potentiality of a being is in some way unified where its actuality is manifold. If this is a fair characterization of Owen's "focal meaning," then the incompleteness of his position can be seen insofar as the hidden and underlying potentiality of a being is itself manifold and ambiguous. To reduce the placement of ambiguity to actuality only is a reduction of the ambiguity of being for Aristotle.

Having said this, the incompleteness of the "mathematical" interpretation of analogy in Aristotle might unfold quite easily. Although relational predication is recognized as a necessary component of the understanding of being in Aristotle, it is not enough. Analogy does enable, for Aristotle, the articulation of a sort of focal meaning. However, as was just discussed, the "focal meaning" of G. E. L. Owen and the underlying nature ("single *physis*") toward which each expression of (a term like) being corresponds are not the same. So, the excluding of focal meaning and thus the rejection of *Metaphysics* Gamma, 2 as the ground of analogy in Aristotle remains an incomplete position. Again, it will not be until motion, actuality, and potentiality are discussed that this will be fully clear. However, for now it can be noted that due to its ability to articulate the underlying ambiguity of being, analogy entails a corresponding movement back to a determinant and underlying signification that demonstrates the unified diversity of being. Simply, does this mean that analogy for Aristotle entails the inclusion of focal meaning? Yes, provided "focal meaning" is properly understood as the unified diversity of both a being qua actual and a being emerging from out of its hidden and underlying potentiality.

NOTES

1. Apostle, *Aristotle's Metaphysics*, p. 54.
2. Apostle, *Aristotle's Metaphysics*, p. 200.
3. Thomas Aquinas, *Commentary on Aristotle's* Metaphysics, trans. John P. Rowan (Notre Dame, Indiana: Dumb Ox Press, 1995) § 534 p. 198.
4. Aquinas, *Commentary on Aristotle's* Metaphysics, § 535 p. 198–199.
5. Aquinas, *Commentary on Aristotle's* Metaphysics, § 536 p. 199.
6. John F. Wipple, "Metaphysics" from *The Cambridge Companion to Aquinas*. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993).
7. Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae* (I, Q 13, Art. 5, co 1), trans. Timothy McDermott (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), p. 224.
8. Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae* (I, Q 13, Art. 5, co 1), translator's p. 224.
9. Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae* (I, Q 13, Art. 5, co 1), translator's p. 224.
10. A further outcome of the failures of equivocation is that knowledge of God becomes impossible. The relation between language (*logos*) and concealment will be addressed below during our discussion of *nous*.
11. Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae* (I, Q 13, Art. 5, co 1), translator's p. 224–225.
12. Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae* (I, Q 13, Art. 5, co 1), translator's p. 225.
13. Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae* (I, Q 13, Art. 5, co 1), translator's p. 225.
14. Thomas Aquinas, *De Principiis Naturae*, trans. Joseph Bobik (Notre Dame, Indiana: Notre Dame University Press, 2006), chapter 6, section 33 p. 92–93.
15. Aquinas, *De Principiis Naturae*, chapter 6, section 34 p. 95–96.
16. Owen, "Logic and Metaphysics in Some Early Works of Aristotle," p. 180–199.
17. G. E. R. Lloyd, *Polarity and Analogy: Two Types of Argumentation in Early Greek Thought*, (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Co., 1992), p. 413.
18. On the relationship of analogy and metaphor, cf. E. Jennifer Ashworth, "Metaphor and the Logicians from Aristotle to Cajetan" in *Vivarium* 45 (2007) p. 311–327. Cf. also, Ralph McInerny, "Metaphor and Analogy" in *Inquiries into Medieval Philosophy*, (Westport: Green-

wood Publishing Co., 1971) p. 75–98. Also, Philip Wheelwright, *Aristotle*, (Odyssey Press, 1951) p. 315–316.

19. Abraham Edel, *Aristotle and His Philosophy*, (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1982) p. 225.

20. Edel, *Aristotle and His Philosophy*, p. 225.

21. On the relationship of analogy and formal logic, cf., I.M. Bochenski, "On Analogy"; and on the relationship of analogy and semantics, cf., James Ross, "Analogy as a Rule of Meaning for Religious Language" both essays in *Inquiries into Medieval Philosophy*, ed. James Ross, (Westport: Greenwood Publishing Co., 1971).

22. Jonathan Barnes, trans., *Aristotle's Posterior Analytics*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975) p. 240.

23. Owen, "Logic and Metaphysics in Some Early Works of Aristotle," p. 180–199.

24. Owen, "Logic and Metaphysics in Some Early Works of Aristotle," p. 192.

25. Owen, "Logic and Metaphysics in Some Early Works of Aristotle," p 192.

26. Owen, "Logic and Metaphysics in Some Early Works of Aristotle," p. 192–193.

27. Pierre Aubenque, "The Origin of the Doctrine of the Analogy of Being: On the History of a Misunderstanding," trans., Zeki H. Bilgin, in *Graduate Faculty Philosophy Journal*, vol. 11 number 1 (1986), p. 35–45.

28. Aubenque, "The Origin of the Doctrine of the Analogy of Being: On the History of a Misunderstanding," p. 35.

29. Aubenque, "The Origin of the Doctrine of the Analogy of Being: On the History of a Misunderstanding," p. 36.

30. Aubenque, "The Origin of the Doctrine of the Analogy of Being: On the History of a Misunderstanding," p. 37–38.

31. Apostle, *Aristotle's Metaphysics*, p. 45.

32. Martin Heidegger, *Basic Concepts of Ancient Philosophy*, trans. Richard Rojcewicz, (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2008) p. 126.

33. Heidegger, *Basic Concepts of Ancient Philosophy*, 126–127.

34. Martin Heidegger, *Aristotle's* Metaphysics *Θ 1–3: On the Essence and Actuality of Force*, trans. Walter Brogan and Peter Warnek, (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1995) p. 34.

35. Heidegger, *Aristotle's* Metaphysics *Θ 1–3: On the Essence and Actuality of Force*. p. 34–35.

36. Heidegger, *Aristotle's* Metaphysics *Θ 1–3: On the Essence and Actuality of Force*, p. 35.

37. Heidegger, *Aristotle's* Metaphysics *Θ 1–3: On the Essence and Actuality of Force*, p. 38.

38. Heidegger, *Aristotle's* Metaphysics *Θ 1–3: On the Essence and Actuality of Force*, p. 38.

Chapter Two

Speaking By Nature

At this point of our study, what is understood as the location of the structure of analogy for Aristotle can begin to be identified. What has been addressed so far through the two formative interpretations of analogy is that its structure for Aristotle's thought remains in question. This accusation that these interpretations are incomplete is not an implicit promise that I will, in some definite way, complete their efforts. Rather, it is my hope to continue the dialogue established by these commentators regarding the location of the structure of the Aristotelian analogy. In an attempt to further this dialogue, *Physics* book Alpha will now be entered.

What is seen in *Physics* Alpha is a gradual development toward analogy's structure. The location of analogy is arrived at, by Aristotle, as he engages previous thinkers regarding the principles (*arkhai*) of nature (*physis*). It is by way of this investigation into the principles of nature that the proper role of being (both qualified non-being and unqualified being) emerges. It is the proper role of being because Aristotle designs *Physics* Alpha according to his (re)vision of earlier philosophers. It is not the case that thinkers prior to Aristotle ignored non-being, nor is it the case that Aristotle simply disregards their discoveries. Aristotle engages the earlier thinkers in such a way that their stances are partly retained and, in different ways, reoriented for a more *natural* illustration. It is this *natural* illustration, the discovery of principles "by nature," that unfolds the proper place of the structure of analogy in Aristotle's thought.

Our analysis of book Alpha of Aristotle's *Physics* will be divided into three parts. Each part will be characterized according to the three principles of the becoming being that Aristotle offers at 191a 8–14; namely, *logos*, *sterēsis*, and *hypokeimenon*. The first two chapters of the text will be characterized as the *logos* chapters. The reason for this characterization is because

Aristotle seems to be concerned with how to articulate (*logos*) the principles of nature according to the presented form of natural beings. This is not to suggest that Aristotle's first in rank concern is "human" language. However, designating *logos* as the description of the first two chapters does suggest that an essential concern is the way we experience beings qua *logos* before we are able to speak about them. Aristotle might be suggesting that a prerequisite for speaking "by nature" is how the principles of nature are first received from *physis* itself. It is during the attention given to these first two chapters that such landmarks as *aisthēsis* (sense-perception), *nous* (intellection), *epagōgē* (induction), and *kinēsis* (motion) will be discussed. These landmarks deliver an outline of Aristotle's methodology (met-hodo-logy) that explains the way the principles of nature are received from nature. It is the reception of these principles (opposed to the principles being imposed onto nature by the investigator, the imposing of human "form" onto nature), that yields the appropriate articulation, the appropriate *logos*, of the principles of nature. Without this proper method of reception, *logos* is bound to speak falsely about nature. If *logos* speaks falsely about nature, then the principles of nature will not be truthfully received; i.e., nature will only be received according to the way it was already spoken about ("already" implying that *logos* received priority over the lived experience). The proper form of *logos*, then, emerges once the "assumption" of motion is made and "induction" is offered as the way of maneuvering within the circularity of experiencing a nature that we have always and already been experiencing.

ARISTOTLE′S WAY AS AN
ANALOGICAL MOVEMENT OF DISCOVERY

Before we address qualified non-being and unqualified being (*sterēsis/hypokeimenon*, primarily from Aristotle's *Physics*, Alpha) in the attempt to locate the structure of analogy, there are a few notes to be made regarding methodology. Met-hodo-logy (*meta/hodos/logos*) is understood here as the articulating (*logos*) of the pathway (*hodos*) that penetrates into and emerges after (*meta*) previous techniques into the revealing of the very roots of (in this case) *physis*. It can be seen throughout Aristotle that methodology itself can disclose truth.[1] The methodology Aristotle seems to employ for arriving at the place of analogy as well as the proper role of non-being emerges out of the first two chapters of *Physics* book Alpha. Aristotle makes clear early in the *Physics* that the investigation into the principles of becoming beings is never separate from the manifold of human affairs. What seems to be most important about this is that the pathway which enables non-being to be identified is one that begins and remains in the lived experience. So, regarding Aristotle's methodology, the pathway which enables these principles to be

identified and spoken within the lived experience should be noted prior to focusing our gaze on the principles themselves. Moreover, it is this methodology that shows why these three principles (and not other principles) are the principles of a becoming being.

Aristotle's methodology reveals the first principles of becoming beings by allowing nature to hold a privileged status over *logos*. It is only by first listening to nature, by allowing the principles to emerge on their own, that speaking about natural principles is proper. Implicit in his critique of the earlier thinkers, Aristotle seems to be accusing them of privileging *logos* over nature (*physis*)—which means nature is spoken about prior to being heard. Once the speaking about principles is placed ahead of the emerging of the principles themselves, then the principles may be received according to the already established articulation, an already established formation. A possible result is that the principles are stuffed into a type of casing rather than received as they show themselves. The mis-speaking of the principles *of* nature results from the mis-taking of the principles *by* nature.

There appears to be an analogical movement of discovery being presented by Aristotle in the first two chapters of *Physics* Alpha. This analogical movement of discovery seems to characterize most basically the pathway (*hodos*) Aristotle is employing in the beginning of this text. The first two chapters design a sort of discovery in that the principles of becoming beings are able to be determined/revealed. This discovery can be described as a sort of movement since Aristotle suggests that we begin within the greater horizon of perception and move more and more narrowly toward the principles of becoming. Upon reaching these principles, we can more thoroughly understand the greater horizon of perception within which we originally began. This movement of discovery is analogical insofar as the structure or direction of this movement remains the same while different types of beings are investigated. What results is a proportional structure for discovering the principles of beings (regardless of the type of being under consideration). The basic interest of this movement of discovery balances on the idea that there is a unique relationship between the part[2] or constituent or principles of a "whole" and the "whole" itself. In this relationship, the "whole" characterizes the being that is first encountered yet can only be known through an analysis of its principles. It is only through an analysis of its principles—which itself is arrived at by virtue of extraction from the whole—that the being which was already engaged can be understood. So, this unique relationship of principles and whole reveals that the whole is first met yet last known. The very possibility of identifying principles of the whole is predicated on the proper engagement with its constituents. It is a "proper" engagement since it is engaging the principles both from out of and for the sake of understanding the whole.

This back-and-forth relationship between whole and principles is analogous to the relationship between substance(s) and attributes. Just as a whole, for example a forest, is perceived according to its parts, for example the individual trees that make up the forest, substance is perceived by virtue of its attributes; or, put in proportional form, substance is to forest as attributes are to trees. Things are perceived by virtue of their attributes but are "known" when these attributes are penetrated and what underlies them, their principles, are unveiled. Again, Aristotle seems to be suggesting that the study of nature must begin in the lived experience, must begin in nature itself. The lived experience shows itself as "mingled" and indiscriminate (*sugkekhumena* 184a 23) insofar as beings are inter-coursing—sometimes in motion and sometimes at rest, yet always alongside each other in the horizon of perception (*aisthēsis/nous*). So, Aristotle's first component of the study of nature is the recognition that we are not extracting beings from their landscape and engaging them in isolated and controlled (purely formal) ways. Rather, we are confronting the broad horizon of perception of co-operating beings as a whole. It is this mingled whole that serves as the appropriate point of departure toward principles.

It is only at this point that the diversity of principles and elements that make-up a being in its totality and singularity can become the focus of our attention. In doing so, as will be seen later in *Physics* Alpha, there seems to be another analogical movement of discovery within substance (subject). By the end of *Physics* Alpha, chapter 7 in particular, we can see that the focus on prime matter in chapters 8 and 9 is structurally the same as (or analogous to) the focus on the attributes of individual composite beings, which is itself analogous to the focus on the individual beings that make-up the landscape of perception.

For the sake of our immediate interests, but not just for our immediate interests, this analogical movement of discovery seems to be the pathway along which Aristotle arrives at the difficulties of "prime matter." At first read, *Physics* Alpha appears as though Aristotle is concerned with the lack of a sufficient account of *ousia*/*hypokeimenon* and thus he sets out to resolve this deficiency of the earlier thinkers. However, as a result of this, if not to some degree a cause of this, the analogical narrowing movement of *Physics* Alpha can be read as Aristotle's doctrine of the qualification of things. In other words, what is gained from the beginning of *Physics* Alpha to its end are the principles that enable a being to be understood as the thing it is, and the type of thing only it can be. That is to say, the qualified potentiality that reveals a thing within its own-most limitations is where we ultimately arrive when following the analogical narrowing movement of discovery. This is not (necessarily) to reduce the importance of reading *Physics* Alpha as an important place where Aristotle establishes *ousia* and the need of an underlying subject. However, the primacy of Aristotle's doctrine of *ousia* may in some

sense be compromised by the establishing of *sterēsis* (qualified non-being). That is, perhaps *Physics* Alpha can be read as Aristotle's establishment of the primary role of *sterēsis*, i.e., the ontological significance of a thing's own-most limitations—along with his account of *ousia/hypokeimenon* as such. By the end of *Physics* Alpha 9, *sterēsis* seems to be established as equally as important as *ousia/hypokeimenon*.

PHYSICS ALPHA 1

Aristotle's *Physics* is concerned with the study of nature. For the study of nature, Aristotle tells us that "we should first try to determine what is the case with regard to the principles." (184a 15–16) Establishing that the understanding of the governing principles of a thing is the standard of knowledge serves as the first determination of Aristotle's methodology, his pathway. We can take this as the first determination of Aristotle's methodology insofar as it marks the goal of the study. Marking the principles of nature as the goal of his investigation of nature means that the methodology, the pursuing of first principles, reveals the direction with which the study unfolds. As will be addressed, the manner of this study is bound by a "natural way" of investigation that requires us to be open to the intelligence of nature, permitting nature to speak on its own behalf—instead of controlling the principles of nature according to the investigator's directives.

The way to proceed, Aristotle writes, is to move from what we immediately experience to what is more known by nature. This is an important initiative by Aristotle because it will eventually enable the investigator to revise the positions of the "earlier thinkers" which led to the overlooking of the appropriate role of qualified non-being (*sterēsis*), the limitations of *logos*, and the enigmatic origin that is *ousia/hypokeimenon*. As our project moves forward, the importance of focusing on Aristotle's pathway rests with how qualified non-being emerges as formative. Our immediate interests in Aristotle's revision of the earlier thinkers concerns the role of non-being, how this role is transformed from something nonexistent or contradictory to something qualified, necessary, and formative. It can be stated that Aristotle's pathway, as described here, enables him to more clearly recognize the appropriate role of *sterēsis*. Conversely, it can perhaps be claimed that being open to the proper role of *sterēsis*, i.e., discovering the proper way with which to articulate a thing's formative deprivation, helps to unfold what appears to be Aristotle's pathway. If so, then it can be claimed that Aristotle's method is both the result of as well as the way to the articulation of *sterēsis*.[3]

Aristotle avoids beginning the investigation of nature by uncritically accepting claims of previous thinkers. Instead, Aristotle seems to suggest that the principles, in a sense, come to us. Aristotle frames the investigation in

such a way that the principles of nature can be known only by those open to allowing the principles to reveal themselves. The nature of this "openness" will be addressed below, primarily when *nous* is discussed. However, for now, it is important to note that what is more known by nature is not that which is clearer and more known by us through our first person independent experiences. Yet, what is more known by nature *is entailed* in our experiences. It is an indistinct ordering of what is known by us and known by nature that characterizes Aristotle's pathway. Aristotle's pathway, then, takes shape in this study through the aesthetic confrontation (*aisthēsis*) within the broad landscape of the lived experience and moves by dissecting its parts toward the essential principles of beings that exist by nature. Aristotle writes:

> Now the things that are at first plain and clear to us are rather mingled, and it is later that their elements and principles become known to those who distinguish them. Consequently, in the case of each thing, we should proceed from its entirety to each of its constituents, for it is the whole that is more known by sensation; and a thing in its entirety, since it includes many constituents as parts, is a kind of whole. (184a 22–184b 10)[4]

Analogous to analyzing a landscape by identifying the individual things that make up the scene, an individual thing can be analyzed for the sake of seeing its elements and principles. These principles are folded into experience even though they are not themselves perceived throughout our everyday experiences, i.e., they are not directly received through *aisthēsis*. Rather, the principles themselves lay hidden from *aisthēsis* and must in some way be uncovered to be understood and articulated.

There is a type of non-linear movement or directionality that is offered in this passage. In order for the constituents of a thing to be understood, there must be a movement away from the entirety (*katholou*) of what is sensed. However, the entirety that is departed is not left behind but is brought along as a launching point for the attaining of principles. Each particular, singularly sensed thing is an expression of something universal. The singular thing sensed is an outlet for such universality and as such demonstrates that it is predicated on its universality. Likewise, and conversely, the single thing formulates its universality by serving as the point of departure for noetic apprehension of the thing's constituting principles. The type of movement toward the apprehension of principles that seems to be offered in this passage is a back-and-forth between universals and particulars, between the singular things sensed and the universal principles that constitute them.[5] So, each perception, then, is in a way two-fold in that when singular things are sensed their principles are also *in some way* sensed. At stake here is the relationship between *aisthēsis* and *nous*.

Principles are grasped by uncovering what is experienced as first covered. Such uncovering is itself a withdrawal from the whole originally perceived.

As such, Aristotle orients the pathway of (toward) the principles of nature according to the aesthetic confrontation of things. It is from out of the aesthetic experience that the principles of nature are disclosed. The unconcealment (*alētheia*) of the principles of nature[6] is both moving away from and remaining within the aesthetic experience, i.e., one's first person engagement with things. So, each perception, then, is in a way two-fold in that when singular things are sensed their principles are also *in some way* perceived. To strengthen this point, more should be said regarding the intertwinement of *nous* and *aisthēsis*. For this, our investigation will briefly enter *On the Soul*, Gamma 1–6 and *Nicomachean Ethics*, book Zeta. What is of particular interest here is the role *nous* plays for the structure of analogy. In the next few sections of our study, what is referred to as three conditions of *nous* is discussed. These three conditions unfold the governance of *nous* from the aesthetic confrontation with beings to the first principles of the perceived beings.

Three Conditions of *Nous* for the Structure of Analogy

In book Gamma of *De Anima* (chapters 1–6 in particular), three circumstances of noetic perception seem to emerge as necessary conditions for the structure of analogy. These three conditions are not necessarily to be understood as separate from each other. Rather, these conditions draw out the role *nous* plays in human experience in general. These three conditions are: a) *nous* and its intertwinement[7] with sensation (*aisthēsis*); b) *nous* and its expression through *logos*; c) *nous* as extended beyond *logos* for the original and im-mediate confrontation with first principles. One reason these three conditions should not be separated is due to the sense of temporality in the third condition. The immediate perceiving of the (unspeakable or at least "pre" speak-able) principles of objects experienced implies that the third condition, in a way, comes before the second condition. The indivisibles, essences, and/or principles that are first received by *nous* are last in the order of speech. In other words, along with the aesthetic reception of an object as a whole, *nous* perceives the principles that constitute the object. *Logos* enables judgments, but *logos* is unable to articulate the first principles as perceived noetically. However, that *nous* extends beyond *logos* remains the third condition since the realization, i.e., speak-ability, of the noetic principles occurs only when the formula (*logos*) of the object presents itself to the intellect through experience.

Each of these three conditions will be addressed throughout the remainder of this section. Even though these conditions are inseparable, each condition will be treated individually (throughout which their inseparability will emerge). So, this section will begin by addressing the co-operation between *aisthēsis* and *nous*. This first condition will lead directly into the place of

logos for human experience in general. Once the extent and limit of *logos* is seen, addressing the idea that *nous* extends beyond *logos* can be considered. *Nous* is able to confront what *logos* itself cannot (directly) articulate. By treating that condition of noetic perception that extends beyond *logos* will (somewhat circularly) allow this study to point to what enables *logos* in the first place. In the end, these three conditions of *nous*—insofar as they mirror the three principles of becoming beings—can be seen as the very foundation of the structure of analogy. How *nous* makes *logos* possible (the third condition), how *nous* permits the truthful identifying of qualified non-being (the second condition), and how organized whole beings are received for addressability (the first condition) stresses the way that these conditions of *nous* ground the three-fold structure of analogy mentioned earlier.

The Co-operation of *Nous* and *Aisthēsis*

Aristotle opens Gamma, 1 of *De Anima* by telling us that there are only five senses. However, sense-perception receives more than just the five "proper" objects of the individual sense organs. Aristotle also speaks of "common" (*koinōn*) sense objects and "incidental" (*symbebēkos*) sense objects. These sense objects are not taken in by any additional sense organs, instead they are perceived incidentally by each of the five senses. Aristotle writes:

> But, again, it is impossible that there should be a special sense organ to perceive common sensibles, which we perceive incidentally by each sense, such, I mean, as motion, rest, shape, magnitude, number and unity; for we perceive all these things by movement; for instance we perceive magnitude by movement, and shape also; for shape is a form of magnitude. (425a 14–18)

Immediately, Aristotle points to an aspect of sense-perception that extends beyond the direct taking in by the five sense organs.[8] What we may pull from this is the beginning of Aristotle stressing the intertwinement of *nous* with *aisthēsis*. Motion itself is not received through an organ uniquely designed to detect it. Instead, one takes in the proper senses (color by the eyes, sound by the ears, etc.) and only incidentally arrives at something not directly received. *Aisthēsis* always takes in organized, whole beings and it is the organization itself that seems to be pointed to by Aristotle when mentioning common and incidental sense objects. Although there is no particular sense organ that unifies and organizes the "proper" sense objects received,[9] the "proper" sense objects are received as an organized unit. This, Aristotle tells us, is what enables us to recognize something sweet by sight. Aristotle continues:

> But we do this because we happen to have a sense for each of these qualities [the sweet and the visible], and so recognize them when they occur together; otherwise we should never perceive them except incidentally, as, e.g., we

perceive Cleon's son, not that he is Cleon's son, but that he is white; and this white object is incidentally Cleon's son. (425a 23–26)[10]

The unifying quality of *nous* will receive more attention below when its third condition is discussed; however, it can already be anticipated here. *Aisthēsis* does not seem to take in a manifold of sense-impression as Kant explains in the *Critique of Pure Reason*. Instead, sense-perception receives objects as organized and whole due to a unifying faculty that co-operates with *aisthēsis*.

All of this is not to suggest that *aisthēsis* in some way comes after this unifying quality; however, this is to suggest that *aisthēsis* does not do its own organizing. The senses work together as a result of their unity and allow for the incidental perception of each other's proper objects. Aristotle writes:

> The senses perceive each other's proper objects incidentally, not in their own identity, but acting together as one, when sensation occurs simultaneously in the case of the same object, as for instance of bile, that it is bitter and yellow; for it is not the part of any single sense to state that both objects are one. (425a 31–425b 3)

Although Aristotle is discussing the senses and their objects, he continues to direct the discussion toward common and incidental sense objects. In this passage, he implies that even in the case of proper sense objects, the proper sense objects of other senses may be received. Even though it is not always accurate to imply one proper sense object from another (not all yellow things are bitter and thus bile), it remains that the proper sense objects of each of the senses is a distinct quality of an organized whole that entails other sensible qualities. Thus, the senses always act as though they are one, even though they do not directly receive anything beyond their proper objects.[11] Aristotle writes:

> One might ask why we have several senses and not only one. It may be in order that the accompanying common sensibles, such as movement, size and number, may escape us less; for if vision were our only sense, and it perceived mere whiteness, they would be less apparent; indeed all sensibles would be indistinguishable, because of the concomitance of, e.g., color and size. As it is, the fact that common sensibles inhere in the objects of more than one sense shows that each of them is something distinct. (425b 3–11)[12]

Aristotle ends Gamma, 1 of *De Anima* by stressing that each of the five senses offers something different and individual to the organized whole thing sensed. Such individuation, though, can never be understood apart from the manifold unity that every sense experience offers. Cleon's son is sensed as a white thing; only incidentally is he perceived as the person he is identified to be. Such "incidental" perceiving shows the intertwinement of *aisthēsis* and *nous*.[13]

This by no means exhausts the first condition of *nous*, that is, the co-operation of *aisthēsis* and *nous*. However, it does allow us to anticipate the further development of this relationship. The extent of this relationship will not come into fuller view until *De Anima* Gamma, 6 is treated. There, the noetic perception of indivisibles and essences will be discussed. At that point, *aisthēsis* can be held in relation to the principles of its objects. There, that the principles of sensed objects can be understood as, in some way, prior to sensation itself will be considered. Only then can the cooperation of *aisthēsis* and *nous* be more clearly seen. Only then can the role *aisthēsis* plays for the structure of analogy emerge.

Nous and its Expression through *Logos*

Beginning in Gamma, 2 of Aristotle's *De Anima*, a transition appears to take place. This apparent transition centers on *logos*. For sense perception to take place "properly," that is, for the sense organs to accurately receive their proper objects, a harmonious sensation must occur. A harmonious sensation occurs when the sense organ does not take in too much or too little of its proper object—since such lack of harmony could destroy sensation. When this harmony is had, *aisthēsis* is a *logos*. When *aisthēsis* is a *logos*, an assertion can be made about sensed objects. Here is the apparent transition: Aristotle seems to move from *aisthēsis* as *logos* to *logos* as assertion.[14] From this transition, Gamma, 3 is set up to speak about the proper entry point of falsity.

In the act of sensation, the sense object and the sensing become one. This joint activity of sensation (e.g., hearing) and sense object (e.g., sound) takes place in what is being acted upon; namely the sense organ of the sensing subject (e.g., the hearer). The sensitive subject, being acted upon, possesses in potentiality the proper sense objects—enabling the activity (*energeia*) of sensation to occur. Aristotle writes:

> The activity of the sensible object and of the sensation is one and the same, though their essence is not the same; in saying that they are the same, I mean the actual sound and the actual hearing; for it is possible for one who possesses hearing not to hear, and that which has sound is not always sounding. But when that which has the power of hearing is exercising its power, and that which can sound is sounding, then the active hearing and the active sound occur together; we may call them respectively audition and sonance. (425b 26–426a 2)[15]

For our investigation, what is most important about this passage is the opening line. Here, Aristotle notes that the activity of the sensible object and the activity of the sensing that receives its function as a type of sameness. This is to say, simply, that one cannot hear unless what is to be heard is sounding (at

the same time). Additionally, this activity takes place in the sensing subject (the hearer). The sense organs of the sensing subject are moved[16] by the activity of that which expresses itself as a proper sensible. Aristotle writes:

> If then the movement, that is, the acting and being acted upon, takes place in that which is acted upon, then the sound and the hearing in a state of activity must reside in the potential hearing; for the activity of what is moving and active takes place in what is being acted upon. Hence that which causes motion need not be moved. (426a 3–7)[17]

What causes motion is the object sensed. To say that this does not need to be moved is to note that sensation does not begin, in a manner of speaking, in the sensing subject. Rather, sensation is the activity of being acted upon; i.e., receiving proper objects through the sense organs. The reason this becomes so important to make note of is because noetic perception occurs somewhat the same but also somewhat differently; and it is the difference that prevents *aisthēsis* and *nous* from being understood analogically. To further make this point, how *aisthēsis* is a *logos* should be addresses.

Sensation is the actuality of acting and being acted upon. Proper sense objects act, while the sense organs of the sensing subject are acted upon. In the event that the acting sense objects over stimulate the receiving sense organs (e.g., light that is too bright or sound too loud), sensation itself is ruined. This may result in the damaging of the organs, or it may simply render the sense organs ineffective. So, for sensation to be effective, that is, for sensible objects to be taken in successfully and accurately, *aisthēsis* must be a harmonious balance of the abilities of the sense organ with the expression of the sensible object. Aristotle writes:

> If harmony is a species of voice, and voice and hearing are in one sense one and the same, and if harmony is a ratio, then it follows that hearing must be in some sense a ratio. That is why both high and low pitch, if excessive, destroy hearing; in the same way flavors excess destroys taste, and in colors the over-brilliant or over-dark destroys vision, and in smelling the strong scent, whether sweet or bitter, destroys smell; which implies that sense is some kind of ratio. This is also why things are pleasant when they enter pure and unmixed into the ratio, e.g., acid, sweet or salt; for in that case they are pleasant. But generally speaking a mixed constitution produces a better harmony than the high or low pitch, and to the touch that is more pleasant which can be warmed or cooled; the sense is the ratio, and excess hurts or destroys. (426a 27–426b 8)[18]

The harmonious balance that yields accurate sensation is a proper ratio (*logos*) of sensibility of the sensing subject and the stimuli expressed by the sensed thing.[19] This balance or ratio or *logos* is what *aisthēsis* becomes when excess stimuli is avoided ("excess" in relation to what the sense organs are equipped to take-in). Aristotle seems to be suggesting here that *logos* as ratio

is a characterization of properly functioning sense-perception. Later, the relationship between truth (*alētheia*) and *logos* will be mentioned. For now, what can be said regarding this relationship is that *logos* entails the possibility of truth, i.e., the possibility of un-concealing sensed things by way of "proper" sense objects. The possibility of un-concealing in this way opens the door to un-concealing, i.e., giving voice to, the noetic principles and elements that cause the sensed thing to be in the first place. Even though these noetic principles always remain essentially concealed, *logos* can still reveal beings by reference to the manner of (their) concealment.

Does the point that *aisthēsis* functions accurately when excessive stimuli are avoided privilege, in some way, *logos* over the sense organs themselves? Posed differently, is the faculty which identifies the ratio (*logos*) of accurate perception—and is able to thus make an assertion (*logos*) about the ratio—something which determines sensation in general? Aristotle tells us that this faculty or sense must be one, since it unites the different sense objects taken in through *aisthēsis* to form one sensed thing. Aristotle writes:

> That which asserts the difference must be one; for sweet differs from white. It is the same faculty, then, that asserts this; hence as it asserts, so it thinks and perceives. Evidently, therefore, it is impossible to pass judgment on separate objects by separate faculties; and it is also obvious from the following considerations that they are not judged at separate times. For just as the same faculty declares that good and evil are different, so also when it declares that one is different and the other different, the "time when" is not merely incidental. . . . The faculty says now, and also that the difference is now; hence both are different at once. So the judging sense must be undivided, and also must be without an interval. (426b 21–30)[20]

The faculty that unifies the differing proper sense objects is the same faculty that asserts the sensed thing as a united, whole, and organized thing. The faculty or sense that has such power seems to receive a certain type of privilege, here. The faculty that unifies also asserts, and it is because of the assertion, i.e., the identifying of the ratio, i.e., the recognizing of the form of the sensed thing, that this faculty can then think (the sensed thing) and perceive (the sensed thing). The thinking and perceiving of the unified sensed thing apparently comes after, in some way, the assertion of it by the unifying faculty. The question was asked above if there is a sort of privileging of this faculty in the experience of *aisthēsis*; the answer seems to be that it is privileged. The full significance of this privileging will likely not be seen until the later chapters of *Physics*, Alpha are discussed. Until then, what can be noted is that the unifying and asserting faculty, which we will see is *nous*, here finds expression through *logos*. However, it is not enough to note that *nous* finds expression through *logos* here; it is by virtue of the ability to express through *logos* that enables further thinking and perceiving to occur.

Regarding *logos* in particular, it can be seen that it (*logos*) serves as both a point of departure for the continued thinking and perceiving as well as the result of the unifying of different proper sense objects by *nous*. The intertwined cooperation of *aisthēsis* and *nous* precludes any linear articulation of the "process" of perception. It remains, perhaps intentionally, vague as to which, *aisthēsis* or *nous*, precedes the other.

There is something else from the above passage that should perhaps be noted. Aristotle writes that the judging sense must be undivided and judge without intervals. The unifying faculty (which we will see is *nous*) entails the ability to both judge what is received by each sense faculty (colors as colors taken-in through vision, sounds as sounds taken-in through hearing) and judge the unified thing that expresses colors and sounds. However, this judgment of essentially two different things occurs simultaneously. It is in the "now," Aristotle writes, that both assertions are made. As such, the assertion (the *logos*) is in a way fractured and in a way whole.[21]

Here, what asserts is the unifying faculty of *nous*. So, perhaps the point can be drawn that the temporality of this unifying faculty, i.e., the temporality of *nous*, is the "now." Below, when *nous* receives more direct attention, it will be discussed that the principles and elements taken-in by *nous* are themselves universal and indivisible. With this in mind, the point that the "now" can be thought as the temporality of *nous* can be seen as a foreshadowing of what is to come in *De Anima* Gamma, 5 and 6.

To more fully illustrate the unifying assertion that occurs in perception; i.e., the unifying and organizing of *nous* that is expressed through *logos*, the place of falsity needs to be located. In *De Anima* at 427b 13–14, Aristotle writes, "for the perception of proper objects is always true, and it is a characteristic of all living creatures, but it is possible to think falsely, and thought belongs to no animal which has not reasoning power [*logos*]." This is to say, falsity resides within the domain of *logos*, entailed within the asserting of what is taken-in as organized by *aisthēsis* and *nous*. It is the faculty of reasoning that asserts (*logos* actualizing itself). This faculty extends beyond *aisthēsis* insofar as what is not "properly" perceived (i.e., what is "commonly" and "incidentally" perceived) is asserted as a part of the object received in perception. Aristotle writes:

> The perception of proper objects is true, or is only capable of error to the least possible degree. Next comes perception that they are attributes, and here a possibility of error at once arises; for perception does not err in perceiving that an object is white, but only as to whether the white object is one thing or anther. Thirdly comes perception of common attributes which accompany the concomitants to which the proper sensibles belong (I mean, e.g., motion and magnitude); it is about these that error is most likely to occur. But the movement produced by the sense activity will differ from the actual sensation in each of these three modes of perception. The first is true whenever the sensa-

tion is present, but the others may be false both when it is present and when it is absent, and especially when the sensible object is at a distance. (428b 18–30)[22]

Perhaps the most important lines in this passage, at least for our current point, is at 26–27 where Aristotle notes that what is produced by sense activity "will differ" from actual sensation (generally). Aristotle might be saying here that *aisthēsis*—although referring to all three modes of perception—most directly yields "proper" objects, i.e., the sense objects of the five senses. The other two modes of perception, the "common" and the "incidental," are more reliant on *logos* for their perceptive reception. Where *aisthēsis* (and *nous*) receive the proper sense objects of the five senses, *logos* is the faculty that takes-in what "accompany the concomitants to which the proper sensibles belong." Since what accompanies the five senses is not received as certainly as the proper sense objects themselves, the possibility of falsity immediately emerges.

This accompanying aspect to *aisthēsis*, which is always and already folded within *aisthēsis*, seems to mirror what was earlier said about *sterēsis*. *Sterēsis* was described as the qualified non-being principle of becoming beings. Qualified non-being since what privation indicates is that aspect of the becoming being that does not present itself as directly appearing form, nor as what remains the same as the being becomes. Rather, *sterēsis* accounts for the potentiality unique to the thing experienced/sensed. As the domain of the being's unique potentiality, *sterēsis* accompanies beings as they present themselves qua *logos*, yet the content of *sterēsis* (i.e., the being's unique potentiality) never receives direct articulation (i.e., never actualizes itself). Regarding *aisthēsis*, "common" and "incidental" sense objects are, like the content of *sterēsis*, a part of the form of the sensed object but they themselves are only perceived in an accompanying and less direct sort of way. So, it seems as though the location of falsity folded within the organization of *aisthēsis* mirrors the place and role of *sterēsis* within the three principles of becoming beings.

The second condition of *nous*, it was mentioned earlier, concerns its relation to *logos*, particularly, that *nous* expresses itself through *logos*. Perhaps now what this means can be more clearly seen. *Logos* expresses the "now" within which the unifying powers of *nous* bring together the proper sense objects of different sense organs. More than bringing together the objects of different sense organs, *nous* unifies the three modes (as Aristotle calls them) of perception: the proper, common, and incidental sense objects. It is here that the role of *logos* emerges. As *nous* unites these three modes of perception, *logos* asserts/speaks/articulates the common and incidental modes—and defines the being as such.

To say *nous* expresses itself through *logos* refers to just this: that *logos* makes vocal what *nous* makes unified. However, this should not be taken too far. It is true that *logos* is the addressing of what *nous* unifies, but *nous* also unifies indefinable elements. These indefinable and indivisible principles remain beyond the limits of *logos*. What we will see (as the third condition of *nous* for the structure of analogy is considered) is that these indefinable principles are what enable *logos* to define beings in the first place. For now, it is important to see the limits of *logos* in order to see the way *nous* extends beyond it.

Nous and the Apprehending of First Principles

There is one essential goal in this section; namely, to describe the way *nous* acquires the principles of nature. This section is not an attempt to illustrate what *nous* is in itself. Rather, that *nous* is the disposition that enables one to acquire principles is our primary goal. What might be seen from the accomplishing of this goal is that *nous*, both and at the same time, relies on *logos* (in a manner of speaking) and "makes" *logos* possible in the first place. *Logos*, as was touched on above in the second condition of *nous* for analogy, enables judgments to be made about the beings received in sense-perception. *Logos* enables the beings taken-in through *aisthēsis* to be identified "as" this or that type of being. It is within this identifying of sensed beings that falsity is possible. However, now we want to extend beyond this identifying, judging and naming, and we want to go beyond the "as" structure of *logos* and address the acquisition of the first principles that make the "as" structure possible. These noetic principles cannot be identified "as" this or that type of being. As such, the principles acquired through *nous* are always true and are therefore without *logos*.[23] It is these principles, as will hopefully be seen in the end, which can only receive articulation by way of analogy.

In the *Nicomachean Ethics* Zeta, 6, Aristotle addresses the five intellectual virtues. Regarding *nous*, Aristotle writes:

> Scientific Knowledge is a mode of conception dealing with universals and things that are of necessity; and demonstrated truths are all scientific knowledge (since this involves reasoning) are derived from first principles. Consequently the first principles from which scientific truths are derived cannot themselves be reached by Science; nor yet are they apprehended by Art, nor by Prudence. To be matter of Scientific Knowledge a truth must be demonstrated by deduction from other truths; while Art and Prudence are concerned only with things that admit of variation. Nor is Wisdom the knowledge of first principles either; for the philosopher has to arrive at some things by demonstration. If then the qualities whereby we attain truth, and are never led into falsehood, whether about things invariable or things variable, are Scientific Knowledge, Prudence, Wisdom, and Intelligence, and if the quality which enables us to apprehend first principles cannot be any one among three of

these, namely Scientific Knowledge, Prudence, and Wisdom, it remains that
first principles must be apprehended by Intelligence. (1140b 31–1140b 9)[24]

In this passage, all five of the intellectual virtues are mentioned. Only *nous*,
though, can be said to be without *logos* (and only this in part). It is that part
of *nous* that extends beyond *logos* that apprehends first principles. Along
with noting that *nous* outreaches that scope of *logos*, this *a-logos* region of
nous highlights the boundaries of reason. First principles remain unspeakable
even though they are the basis upon which the other four intellectual virtues
(all within the domain of *logos*) operate.

   Regarding the other four intellectual virtues; scientific knowledge
(*epistēmē*) functions with principles already known.[25] Scientific knowledge
either employs principles arrived at through induction (*epagōgē*), or demon-
strates its operation through deduction (*syllogismos*) which works from prin-
ciples or universals not discovered scientifically. Art (*technē*) is described as
a rational quality concerned with making and doing.[26] The making and doing
from this disposition is for the purpose of reasoning truly. *Technē* makes use
of principles that it did not discover and employs them for the purpose of
essentially (re)affirming the "logical" usefulness of these principles. Pru-
dence (*phronēsis*) is similar but not the same as *epistēmē* and *technē*[27] insofar
as it is a "truth-attaining rational quality concerned with action in relation to
things that are good and bad for human beings." (1140b 6–7)

   The last intellectual virtue is wisdom (*sophia*), which Aristotle describes
as the scientific demonstration of first principles.[28] Insofar as wisdom oper-
ates within the scope of demonstration, it likewise remains within the scope
of *logos*. By remaining within the scope of *logos*, wisdom entails the pos-
sibility of articulating (in some way) the first principles demonstrated. This
ability to speak first principles makes *sophia* the "most perfect" of the intel-
lectual virtues. Aristotle writes:

> Hence it is clear that Wisdom must be the most perfect of the modes of
> knowledge. The wise man therefore must not only know the conclusions that
> follow from his first principles, but also have a true conception of those princi-
> ples themselves. Hence Wisdom must be a combination of Intelligence and
> Scientific Knowledge: it must be a consummated knowledge of the most ex-
> alted objects. (1141a 16–20)[29]

It seems to be the case here that Aristotle holds *sophia* to be the most extreme
possibility of *logos*. It is not that suddenly through *sophia* first principles can
be apprehended in a way that previously only *nous* could apprehend. Al-
though it may be the case that *sophia* can discover principles, something
which radically separates it from *technē*, *epistēmē*, and *phronēsis*, these prin-
ciples of *sophia* are still "logical"; i.e., remain within the domain of *logos*. As
employing the services of *epistēmē*, *sophia* maneuvers according to inductive

and deductive reasoning and thus remains discursive. Therefore, in the end, although *sophia* is called the "most perfect" of the intellectual virtues,[30] it is still unable to apprehend the indefinable and indivisible first principles that can be apprehended only by *nous*.

The indefinable and indivisible first principles apprehended by *nous* precede, in the order of being but not in the order of understanding, the principles of demonstration and scientific reasoning. Since these first principles lie outside of the reach of *logos* they are described by Aristotle as ultimates (*eschatōn*) and more primary (*prōtōn*) than that which is graspable by *logos*. Aristotle writes:

> Also Intelligence apprehends the ultimates in both aspects—since ultimates as well as primary definitions are grasped by Intelligence and not reached by reason: in demonstrations Intelligence apprehends the immutable and primary definitions, in practical inferences it apprehends the ultimate and contingent fact, and the minor premise, since these are the first principles from which the end is inferred, as general rules are based on particular cases; hence we must have perception of particulars, and this immediate perception is Intelligence. (1143a 35–1143b 6)[31]

And a few lines later, Aristotle writes:

> Hence Intelligence is both a beginning and an end, for these things are both the starting-point and subject matter of demonstration. (1143b 10–11)[32]

Nous apprehends the starting-point and subject matter of demonstration, i.e., syllogistic explanation, as well as the beginning and content of all aesthetic experiences (*aisthēsis*). Through particular experiences, which are always the particular experiences with silent and concealed first principles, the limitations of *logos* may become apparent. This does not mean that the principles themselves are beyond human grasp-ability; instead, it refers to the way first principles are confronted in perception as *a-logos*. As was discussed earlier, the intertwinement of *aisthēsis* and *nous* shows not only their potential inseparability but also the way first principles are received prior (in a manner of speaking) to the casting of a name on the perceived. In other words, in the order of being at least, *aisthēsis* and *nous* engage beings before any judgment or account—any *logos*—of the being is had. In the passages here under consideration, Aristotle implies a sort of return to the *aisthēsis* and *nous* intertwinement and calls it a beginning and an end.

Perhaps by calling *nous* a beginning and an end ("starting-point and subject matter") Aristotle is not describing *nous* as two things, but one. On the one hand, *arkhē* and *telos* may refer to a type of substance[33] that underlies sense-perception and the ability to apprehend first principles. On the other hand, and perhaps more in line with the general theme of our study of

analogy, Aristotle may describe *nous* this way because it captures the original way that the confrontation with this being is like the confrontation with other similar beings. The first principles apprehended through the perception of one being, for example, may enable one to apprehend the first principles of another being. What will become our next consideration of *nous* is whether these first principles can be brought to the level of articulation. Being able to speak these unspeakable and shared first principles might enable us to anticipate the structure of analogy. Said differently, perhaps it is this characterization of *nous* as a beginning and end that makes analogy possible in the first place.

The reception of these unspeakable principles is addressed by Aristotle throughout *De Anima* Gamma, 4. The last few lines of this fourth chapter of book Gamma tell that *nous* perceives these principles and as such becomes an object for its own thinking.[34] Aristotle writes:

> What the mind thinks must be in it in the same sense as letters are on a tablet which bears no actual writing; this is just what happens in the case of the mind. It is also itself thinkable, just like other objects of thought. For in the case of things without matter that which thinks and that which is thought are the same; for speculative knowledge is the same as its object. (We must consider why mind does not always think.) In things which have matter, each of the objects of thought is only potentially present. Hence while material objects will not have mind in them (for it is apart from their matter that mind is potentially identical with them) mind will still have the capacity of being thought. (429b 32–430a 9)[35]

The always silent first principles of perceived beings are in the mind potentially prior to the actual perception/thinking of beings. As these principles are perceived/thought, *nous* becomes identical with them (as is the case with all forms thought). As the mind becomes unified with the first principles noetically perceived, the mind becomes a potential object for its own activity; or, said differently, *nous* can think itself. But what it means to say that *nous* can think itself may be that *nous* can contemplate (*theōria*[36]) those principles (or, at least, according to those principles) that are received noetically and without *logos*.

The idea of *nous* thinking itself may uncover the very locus of analogy (*an-a-logia*). If *nous* thinking itself refers to self-reflective contemplation of first principles in the absence of *logos* and these always silent principles are first in the order of being (yet last in the order of understanding), then first principles received noetically are those which enable the addressability of perceived beings. In other words, the principles that are received noetically seem to be what "make" beings addressable/accountable/reasonable, i.e., what makes them able to be beings qua *logos*. If this is true, then the oscilla-

tion of "productive" and "passive" *nous* addressed in *De Anima*, Gamma, 5 can be anticipated. Here, Aristotle writes:

> Since in every class of objects, just as in the whole of nature, there is something which is their matter, i.e., which is potentially all the individuals, and something else which is their cause or agent in that it makes them all—the two being related as an act to its material—these distinct elements must be present in the soul also. Mind in the passive sense is such because it becomes all things, but mind has another aspect in that it makes all things; that is a kind of positive state like light; for in a sense light makes potential into actual colors. Mind in this sense is separable, impassive and unmixed, since it is essentially an activity; for the agent is always superior to the patient, and the originating cause to the matter. Actual knowledge is identical with its object. Potential is prior in time to actual knowledge in the individual, but in general it is not prior in time. Mind does not think intermittently. When isolated it is its true self and nothing more, and this alone is immortal and everlasting (we do not remember because, while mind in this sense cannot be acted upon, mind in the passive sense is perishable), and without this nothing thinks. (430a 10–25)[37]

As certain parts of this passage are discussed, it should be qualified from the start that the discussions must remain within the scope of analogy. In particular, what this passage contributes to our establishing of the structure of analogy for Aristotle is the domain within which all comments should stay. This is to say, precisely what "passive" *nous* is, is not our concern; nor are we concerned with establishing the nature of "productive" *nous*. What our concern is, and our only concern, is the way this passage continues the development of the structure of analogy for Aristotle.[38]

What appears to be most interesting here is the idea that *nous* makes all things.[39] Perhaps another way of saying the same thing would be that *nous* brings all things to the level of *logos*. In the absence of this "productive" aspect of *nous*, one's ability to speak and account for beings would likewise be absent. It was discussed earlier that *nous* apprehends the first principles that enable the other four intellectual virtues to operate. Only *nous* is empowered with the principles that the other intellectual virtues assume according to *logos*. It is the ability of *nous* to remain beyond the domain of *logos* and apprehend the first principles that *epistēmē, technē, phronēsis,* and *sophia* work with and enable these virtues to discover truths in the first place.[40] So, what seem to be "made" (*poiēsis*) by *nous* is not the very existence of beings received through perception but the speak-ability of these beings. *Nous* makes perceived beings addressable and thus the material for the functioning of the intellectual virtues.

What *nous* apprehends, and thus makes addressable, are the always true first principles that are received as indivisible and indefinable. As indefinable, these principles are outside of the reach of *logos* and consequently not subject to falsity. Aristotle writes:

> The thinking of individual objects of thought occur among things concerning which there can be no falsehood; where truth and falsehood are possible there is implied a compounding of thoughts into a fresh unity. . . . But if the thinking is concerned with things past or future, then we take into account and include the notion of time. For falsehood always lies in the process of combination, for if a man calls white not-white, he has combined the notion not-white. It is equally possible to say that all these cases involve division. At any rate it is not merely true or false to say that Cleon is white, but also that he was or will be. The principle which unifies is in every case the mind. (430a 26–430b 6)[41]

Above, in what was called the second condition of *nous*, the place *logos* occupied in sense-perception was discussed. Within the place occupied by *logos* is the possibility of falsity. In this passage, falsity is described as a result of an inaccurate combination of judgments. It is important to point out here, though, that although *logos* is a part of the combination (that may or may not be false), *logos* does not do the combining. The combining or unifying is done or "made" by *nous*. This unifying aspect of *nous* may further advance the meaning of *nous* as "productive." What *nous* produces, i.e., what *nous* brings to the level of speak-ability, is the unity of indivisible and indefinable (*a-logos*) first principles. It seems, based on this last cited passage, that *nous* does such producing, that *nous* brings beings to *logos* by unifying and combining those aspects of perception that are addressable according to the principles intuitively and truthfully received. Falsity lies not in this unifying by *nous* but in the (inaccurate) naming of those addressable parts of perceived beings. It is not false to combine name (Cleon's son) with perceived white object (white person that I see); rather it is false when the combination entails the incorrect name.

A Few More Words on *Nous* and the Return to the Analogical Movement of Discovery

What needs to be clearly described now is the role *nous* plays in the structure of analogy for Aristotle. Throughout the above meditation on *nous*, the limitations of *logos* were brought to the fore. In fact, the primary thrust of the discussion of *nous* centered on that aspect of the intellect that remains beyond speech. Although *nous* remains beyond *logos*, *nous* still entails the ability to apprehend the first principles of perceived beings. This seems to mean that, for Aristotle, *logos* can only tell us part of the story; there is more to perception than what one can account for. Yet, Aristotle merely acknowledging that there is something beyond speech indicates that there is something else to be spoken. Said differently, there must be a (different) way of speaking these things (these first principles) that can be apprehended in perception—but only as indefinable. This different way of speaking, of course, refers to analogy. It is analogy that affords the manner of articulation for

addressing first principles. Insofar as these indefinable first principles make perceived beings addressable, we can say that analogical speech enables *logos*. Said differently, *logos* is radical analogy.

To say *logos* is radical analogy is to stress the role *nous* plays in the structure of *an-a-logia*. What *nous* apprehends in the absence of *logos* are the first principles that "make" knowledge possible in the first place. The intellectual virtues operate according to the first principles received through noetic perception. It seems to be the bringing of these principles to addressability, to think-ability, that shows the way different beings stand in relation to one another. Therefore, *nous* can be identified as the very locus of the structure of analogy in that it apprehends the principles that different perceived beings share. It is these shared first principles that enable beings to stand in comparison to other beings. Such comparability allows for proportionality. We can then conclude that proportionality is predicated on the first principles of addressable beings apprehended noetically. At the very root of the being qua *logos* lies comparability of shared principles. This shows that before analogy can be thought in terms of proportionality, analogy should be thought as the manner of bringing noetic first principles to the level of speak-ability. Only then can proportionality, i.e., the comparing of one being to another, be addressed. Now, this study can return to book Alpha of the *Physics* and further describe the analogical movement of discovery.

The analogical movement of discovery that characterizes the way of Aristotle is heard clearly in the last few lines of *Physics* Alpha, 1. Here, Aristotle explains how we first observe landscapes as a whole and only then individual beings; individual beings as a whole and only then the underlying principles of these beings (even though noetically, these principles are perceived "prior" to the landscape first identified). This movement of discovery from whole to principles is analogous to words and their meanings. On this point, Aristotle writes:

> In a sense, a name is related to its formula in the same way, first a name signifies some whole without distinguishing its parts, as in the case of "a circle"; but its definition analyzes the whole into its constituents. Children, too, at first call every man "papa" and every woman "mama," but later on they distinguish each of them. (184b 10–14)[42]

Here, Aristotle presents the analogical relationship between name and being in a completely proportional way. That is, Aristotle is saying that name is to definition as whole is to part. This relationship of term and being will become blurred as our study continues. Later, while engaged with *Physics* Alpha, 7, how *logos* does this collapsing will be examined. For now, it can be noted that Aristotle concludes Alpha, 1 by drawing out, perhaps foreshadowing, the analogical relationship between term and being. Specifically, what is

foreshadowed here is the analogical roots of *logos*. Again, our investigation is attempting to read *Physics* Alpha 1, 2 with an emphasis on *logos* itself; specifically the possibility of *logos* to speak (truthfully) the first principles of nature.

PHYSICS ALPHA 2

For the further establishment of Aristotle's way, what the principles of nature might be are addressed at the start of *Physics* Alpha, 2. Aristotle writes:

> It is necessary that there be either one principle or many; and if one, then either immoveable, as Parmenides and Melissus say, or in motion, as the physicists say—some of the latter asserting that the first principle is air and others that it is water; but if many, then either finite or infinite. If finite, but more than one, then they are two or three or four or some other number; but if infinite, then they are either generically one but differ in shape and kind, as Democritus says, or even contrary. (184b 15–22)[43]

This passage reads as though Aristotle is offering all of the previously established logical possibilities for articulating the principles of nature. Aristotle mentions Parmenides, Melissus, and Democritus by name; but also Anaximander and Diogenes by "air," Thales by "water," and Empedocles who claims all four elements of nature. After shining light on these previous stances, Aristotle makes an interesting comment regarding method. Aristotle writes:

> Also those who inquire into the number of things do so in a similar way; for they first inquire whether the constituents of things are one or many, and if many, whether finite or infinite. Thus, they inquire whether the principles or elements are one or many. (184b 23–26)[44]

It is interesting that Aristotle would follow all of the previously established "logical" possibilities for articulating the principles of nature with a comment about methodology. Perhaps this can be taken as further evidence of a link between the method of accessing the principles of nature with the principles themselves. Again, our primary interest in this section of our project is Aristotle's revision (revealing) of the way to articulate natural principles, and specifically how to speak the true role of non-being. With this in mind, this passage reads as though Aristotle is beginning to criticize the previous ways of articulating first principles along the lines of methodology. If the manner of articulating the principles of nature is methodologically incorrect, then the true role of "non-being" (both qualified non-being and unqualified being) will inevitably remain concealed. Aristotle tells us that the earlier thinkers "first inquire" the number of principles. This might be an immediate indica-

tion that Aristotle sees the answer to the question (of the number of princi-
ples) being limited prior to the acknowledging of the fullness of the question
itself. In other words, might Aristotle be suggesting that the question as
posed by the earlier thinkers regarding the number of principles is sought
outside, in a manner of speaking, the lived experience? Is *logos* being privi-
leged by the early thinkers over the unable-to-be-false noetic perception that,
for Aristotle, allows for *logos* to *be* in the first place? Let's remind ourselves
that in *Physics* Alpha, 1, Aristotle told us to move from what is more familiar
to us to what is more familiar by nature. Aristotle seems to be saying here
that the suggestion of induction (*epagōgē*) has been distorted and the specific
questioning into the number of principles is asked too early, or at least in the
wrong order. The number of principles is being sought before the first princi-
ples have been allowed to reveal themselves. That is, *logos* is not revealing
the apprehensions of *nous* but concealing them. The first step in accessing
the principles of nature needs to begin in the lived experience; i.e., the inves-
tigation needs to take its shape from the information directly given through
experience, i.e., by nature as *it* presents *itself* in *logos*.

Recognizing the importance of the lived experience, Aristotle writes at
184b 27–185a 1, "[n]ow to inquire whether being is one and immoveable is
not to inquire about nature." What experience announces is that motion
(*kinēsis*) happens. Insofar as motion organizes the landscape, denying or
reducing motion's existence requires the lessoning of, at least part of, the
lived experience. So, the denial of motion, in that it requires the ignoring of
elements of experience, is the rejection of the very foundation of Aristotle's
methodology. Additionally, claiming being to be "immoveable" overlooks
the possibility of the manifold nature of being. Without *kinēsis*, coming to be
is an illusion. Consequently, without motion, being must be one. Yet, similar
to the way immovability reduces parts of the lived experience, claiming
being to be only one denies the plural ways (*pollakhōs*) in which being can
be said.

From here, Aristotle can offer what serves as the guiding premise of the
Physics. At 185a 13–15, Aristotle writes: "[w]e, on the one hand, make the
assumption that things existing by nature are in motion, either all or some of
them; and this is clear by induction." In many respects, this sentence can be
read as a concluding statement of all that has been said so far in the *Physics*.
In *Physics* Alpha, 1, Aristotle tells us that to know a thing is to know its
principles. Here, he is telling us that things existing by nature are determined
by moved-ness. Therefore, to know the principles of things existing by na-
ture requires that we understand that these principles exist by virtue of
kinēsis. Before, we inquire how many principles there might be or whether
the principles are finite or infinite, we must take the moved-ness of the lived
experience seriously. As Aristotle implied earlier, it is from the lived experi-
ence and always within the lived experience that the principles of a natural

thing can be claimed. How these principles are claimed, Aristotle tells us, is through *epagōgē*.

Epagōgē must be engaged with the earlier discussion of *nous/aisthēsis* in mind. Earlier, it was claimed that *aisthēsis* and *nous* are primarily receptive features of the human condition. The knowledge of first principles acquired through sense-perception is predicated on the openness to noetic perception which actually, actively enables *aisthēsis* in the first place. Here, as *epagōgē* is approached, receptivity and openness to origins and principles guides our understanding of its meaning. For the illustration of the term's receptive essence, the taking-in of that which is not itself, I will turn to Claudia Baracchi. Baracchi's description of the term will be appropriated here because of the way she shines light on the term's receptive foundation. Such receptivity seems to be decisive for understanding *epagōgē*. As a result, Baracchi will be cited at length.

> Induction, *epagōgē*, then is the operation whereby I take in (*epagō*) the surrounding and, in so doing, make possible the lighting up of an intuition that is no longer limited to the contingent particular or configuration I am sensing, but rather embraces all possible analogous cases and illuminates something *katholou*, "according to the whole"—universally, so to speak. More precisely still, induction refers to that *possibility* that introduces (*epagō*) itself into me with the sensory experience. Indeed, sensation brings (*agō*) into and upon (*epi*) me the possibility of an insight exceeding the scope of my immediate sensing or observing—the possibility of revealing and actualizing the capacity for such an insight, the power of *nous*. Strictly speaking, sensation pertains to being affected by individuals, and yet, it implies the possibility of grasping that which cannot be reduced to individuals and, rather, gathers and configures them. The interpenetration of affection and formative involvement should be noted in this regard.[45]

It is by way of induction that the manifold possibility of a being received through sensation can be had. This "having," however, is not a quantitative collection and presentation of a checklist of individual potencies. Instead, the manifold possibility that is "had" refers to *nous*, to the intellectual engagement with the ambiguity of being(s). In a literal but somewhat reductive sense, induction is the sensing of an individual being en route to grasping what lies universally at the root of the being. The universal, here, appears to have a double-sense. On the one hand, what is universally received through the activity of induction captures the principles of the sensed being, those principles that make-up the being as the being it is. On the other hand, the universal points to the inter-coursing of beings that elucidate the way beings affect each other in the broad landscape of one's surrounding. This double-sense can be thought together where the universal (*katholou*) describes the way beings affect each other which determines the first principles that make

beings the beings they (already) are. The principles here that are brought to light through *epagōgē* reveal that beings themselves are "according to the whole" of nature (*physis*). This is not to say that there is some sort of "one-ness" from out of which all things get their "being." Instead, this is to point to the necessary inter-play between beings—that beings by their nature, which means according to their principles, are never in isolation but always along-side and along-with other beings.

It was discussed above how *nous* intuitively confronts the landscape of an experience and in so doing, enables *aisthēsis* to materialize the landscape according to their sense-abilities. It seems to be through the materialization of *aisthēsis* that brings the "active" sense of *nous* to the reception of first principles and the landscape originally and intuitively confronted. This *nous/aisthēsis* relationship structures the process of induction (*epagōgē*). Through induction, the universality and inter-coursings of beings engaged in experience are arrived at—but arrived at as the very beginnings of the experience. What *aisthēsis* and *logos* do, essentially, is dissect and take apart aspects of the already "mingled" landscape. What *nous* seems to do is engage the min-gled and inter-coursings of beings as they are, namely, as mingled and inde-terminate (*sugkekhumena*). Induction is the way of moving beyond the mate-rialization of *aisthēsis*, which also conceals the first principles that constitute the beings sensed, and elucidates the way the materialized beings/landscapes are inter-coursing with and through each other.

Induction enables the principles of beings to be brought to intellection. Once brought to the intellect, principles are recognized as orienting the aesthetic experience from the beginning. This is not to say, at least not completely, that induction brings hidden, silent principles to the level of articulation. Rather, induction is the way of safe-keeping the un-addressable constituents of articulation. That is, induction is the maneuver of *nous* clear-ing a path with *aisthēsis* to configure beings for the sake of *logos*, for the sake of speech and reason, so the principles of the aesthetic experience can be returned to for the sake of knowledge. It may be safe to characterize *epagōgē* here as not only a form of acquiring knowledge but also—perhaps more primarily—a process necessary for the enabling of any kind of knowledge.

CONCLUDING THOUGHTS ON
THE ANALOGICAL MOVEMENT OF DISCOVERY

What has been referred to throughout as the analogical movement of discov-ery or *Aristotle's way* is designed according to three important landmarks, namely, *nous*, *aisthēsis*, and *epagōgē*. What these three landmarks reveal is the passivity with which the first principles of nature are attained. This is not, of course, to suggest that for Aristotle no active contemplation is had. What

the passivity of Aristotle's way does suggest, though, is that the way of acquiring the principles of nature (by nature) begins with the listening to nature. It is only when nature is first heard that anything can be truthfully said (*logos*) about it.

This gesture toward a priority of listening to nature seems to illuminate an implied privileging of *physis* over *logos*, for Aristotle—at least in order, if not in rank. *Logos* mediates between a sort of noetic intuition that initiates an experience and the acquiring of the principles that unites in an unqualified way the mingled beings of the experience. The nature of a being as experienced is the concern of *nous*. The nature of a being refers to the being's principles. This means that the principles of things are the concern of *nous*. The principles/origins of beings precede any possibility of speaking about the beings. Therefore, *logos* is to take its cue from the first principles of nature in order to claim nature in a truthful way. Aristotle's way, designed according to the three landmarks mentioned above, enables *physis* to determine the mediating power of *logos*.

It can perhaps be seen how Aristotle's way is an analogical movement of discovery. The three landmarks that design this movement of discovery unfold the way the principles of nature are intuitively confronted from out of the experiencing of nature as a whole and mingled totality of beings standing alongside one another. This mingled totality refers to the perceptual landscape within which the principles of nature reveal themselves. It is this way, this movement, of maneuvering from whole (noetically perceived) to parts (aesthetically materialized) back to the whole (noetic apprehension of first principles) that structures the possibility of speaking (*logos*) truthfully by nature. Aristotle's way, then, is an analogical movement of discovery.

NOTES

1. It will be seen later through our analysis of *nous*, as is elaborately the case in the ethical writings, which for Aristotle the "way" something is done orients and shapes the result of the doing. In the ethical writings, this can be seen when Aristotle discusses the virtuous disposition, where one becomes virtuous by doing virtuous things. The future discussion of *nous* will describe the noetic disposition in an analogous manner.

2. In *Physics* at 187b 15–16, Aristotle writes, "by 'a part' I mean that which is present and into which the whole is divisible."

3. Already a sort of anachronism can be seen. There is a prevailing clumsiness inherent in speaking about the "method" of Aristotle when what is at issue is how the completion of the method is the continuing of its own activity. This clumsiness does seem to make a determinate point about speech, though; specifically, that speech is predicated on the same self-emerging principles (at least analogically) that form becoming beings. Just as a becoming being can find its source in what it can be, speech (*logos*) articulates a being in its current situation by expressing what the being can be. This is not an attempt to privilege potentiality over actuality. However, this does emphasize the qualified movement of an *actual* becoming being.

4. Hippocrates G. Apostle, *Aristotle's Physics*, (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1980) p. 8.

5. In the Wicksteed and Cornford translation of Aristotle's *Physics* page 10, a footnote is offered regarding Aristotle's use of *katholou* and *kath hekasta* in the above quoted passage (184a 22–184b 10). These terms "when contrasted, usually mean 'general' and 'particular'; but here they are used in the other and less frequent sense of 'concrete whole' and 'constituent factors.'" Additionally, Joseph Owens writes of this peculiarity of Aristotle in an essay entitled, "The Universality of the Sensible in the Aristotelian Noetic" in *Aristotle: the Collected Papers of Joseph Owens*, (Albany: SUNY Press, 1981) p. 59–73. For our immediate sake, what seems most important is that an inseparability yet difference is seen between universals and particulars. The relationship between universals and particulars may be one way of stressing the importance of analogy, in that analogy unites the ambiguity of these terms without reducing the ambiguity to something unambiguous. Perhaps the ambiguity of these terms (universal/particular) serves as the trajectory of the relationship between *nous* and *aisthēsis*; as well as the trajectory of *analogia* itself.

6. On the topic of "truth" and acquiring first principles through perception in Aristotle, cf. Christopher P. Long, *Aristotle on the Nature of Truth* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013), especially p. 117–131.

7. The idea that *aisthēsis* and *nous* are intertrined is based on the idea that one cannot be said to preceed the other. Even within *aisthēsis* itself, there is no determined order to the process. Such an order is offered by Michael Wedin (*Mind and Imagination in Aristotle*, Yale University Press, 1988; page 30). What Wedin seems to overlook is that *aisthēsis* does not do its own unifying of the "parts" of perception; "The principle which unifies is in every case *nous*." (430b 5–6) At the very least, what this may mean is that *aisthēsis* is too deeply steeped in *nous* to illustrate a definite order to the process.

8. On the idea that Aristotle is under the influence of materialism, cf. chapter 5 of David Ross, *Aristotle* (London: Methuen and Co. LTD, 1966).

9. Aristotle seems to want to stress the point that we lack a special sense organ for "common" and "incidental" sense objects so he can later make the point that *aisthēsis* and *nous* are not analogous. As Aristotle continues to explain what *aisthēsis* is, the line that separates *nous* and *aisthēsis* becomes increasingly difficult to locate. Making the point that there is no special organ—even though *nous* appears at first to function like one—serves as the ground for the latter point that they are not analogous. So, stressing that we lack a special organ is really the first step in showing the difference between *aisthēsis* and *nous*.

10. W. S. Hett, trans., *Aristotle, On the Soul*, The Loeb Classic Library (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1957) p. 142,43–144,45.

11. On the privileging of vision above the other senses, cf. p. 86ff. of John Herman.Randall *Aristotle* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1960).

12. Hett, *Aristotle, On the Soul*, p. 144,45.

13. Charles Kahn makes a similar point in his essay "Aristotle on Thinking" in *Essays on Aristotle's* De Anima*, ed. Martha Nussbaum and A. O. Rorty, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992). Here, Kahn argues that what separates *aisthēsis* and *nous* are the objects each perceives. The perception of "incidentals" shows an "overlap" of *aisthēsis* and *nous*. I do not think Kahn goes far enough, here. To say that there is an overlap between sense-perception and intellect is to imply that there is, at times, clear separability between them. It seems to me that for Aristotle in *De Anima* Gamma, 1 such separability is missing. In this chapter, the three objects of sensation (proper, common, and incidental) are, in the end, shown to be in-separable. It is only in thought, which is addressed later this text, that these three objects of sensation are identifiable in isolation. Regarding *aisthēsis* itself in this chapter, sense-perception always receives whole and organized things, whose organization is granted by, as we will see, *nous*. Yet, for *aisthēsis*, such organization is only experienced through the sense-perceiving itself.

14. This is not to say that Aristotle is using the term *logos* in the same way here. Nor is this to suggest that Aristotle is in some way equivocating the term *logos*. Instead, the suggestion is that Aristotle offers a rather smooth shift in focus from sense-perception to *logos* as ratio to *logos* as assertion.

15. Hett, *Aristotle, On the Soul*, p. 146,47.

16. At 425a 19, Aristotle notes that perception occurs by movement; meaning one perceives a thing as it moves and how it moves.

17. Hett, *Aristotle, On the Soul*, p. 146,47.

18. Hett, *Aristotle, On the Soul*, p. 148,49–150,51.

19. On the harmony of the body (but not the soul), cf. Thomas Aquinas, *Commentary on Aristotle's* De Anima. trans. Kenelm Foster and Silvester Humphries, (New Haven: Yale University Press,1965).

20. Hett, *Aristotle, On the Soul*, p. 150,51–152,53.

21. Franz Brentano writes of the "now" in *De Anima*, Gamma, 3 as analogous to a point that connects two lines. On the one hand, this connecting point is one point; while on the other hand, it is two insofar as it is the end of two different lines. Franz Brentano, *The Psychology of Aristotle* trans., Rolf George (Berkeley: University of Cal. Press, 1977) p. 61–62.

22. Hett, *Aristotle, On the Soul*, p. 162,63.

23. On the extent and limit of *logos*, cf. section 26 of Martin Heidegger *Plato's* Sophist, trans. Richard Rojcewicz and Andre Schuwer (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1997) p. 123–129.

24. H. Rackham, trans., *Aristotle, The Nicomachean Ethics*, The Loeb Classical Library (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1934) p. 340,41.

25. Cf. 1139b 18–35.

26. 140a 1–23.

27. 140a 24–1140b 30.

28. 141a 9–1141b 7.

29. Rackham, *Aristotle, The Nicomachean Ethics*, p. 342,43.

30. To call *sophia* "most perfect" may indicate that Aristotle sees it as the most truthful manner of addressability for the human being. This could be taken as a launching point to identify "productive *nous*" with "divine *nous.*" On the combining of "productive *nous*" and "divine *nous*" cf. Victor Caston's "Aristotle's Two Intellects: A Modest Proposal." *Phronesis* 44 (1999) 199–227.

31. Rackham, *Aristotle, The Nicomachean Ethics*, p. 360,62–361,63.

32. Rackham, *Aristotle, The Nicomachean Ethics*, p. 362,63.

33. Cf. Richard Norman "Aristotle's Philosopher God" in *Articles on Aristotle: Psychology and Aesthetics*, ed. Jonathan Barnes, Malcolm Schofield and Richard Sorabji, (London: Duckworth and Company Limited, 1979) p. 96–97; and L. A. Kosman "What Does the Maker Mind Make?" in Nussbaum and Rorty, eds., *Essays on Aristotle's* De Anima, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992) p. 357. For the view that *nous* is not only substance but perhaps "prime matter" itself, cf. Russell Winslow *Aristotle and Rational Discovery: Speaking of Nature*. (New York: Continuum International Publishing Co., 2007). For the view that *nous* is not a substance but an attribute of substance, cf. Jonathan Barnes "Aristotle's Concept of Mind." (London: Duckworth and Company Limited, 1979) p. 41.

34. On the Platonic nature of *nous* in Aristotle, cf. Werner. Jaeger *Aristotle: Fundamentals of the History of His Development* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1962) p. 332 ff.

35. Hett, *Aristotle, On the Soul*, p. 168,69.

36. Kosman argues that *theōria* is the activity of the maker mind on page 356 of his essay, "What Does the Mind-Maker Make?" Cf. also, Fredrick. Woodbridge on the life of reason in his *Aristotle's Vision of Nature* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1965).

37. Hett, *Aristotle, On the Soul*, p. 170,71.

38. Cf. Jonathan Barnes on the incomplete and "careless" nature of *De Anima*, Gamma, 5 in "Aristotle's Concept of Mind."

39. Cf. L. A. Kosman, "What Does the Mind-Maker Make?" Here, Kosman argues that "active thinking, thinking as *theōria*, which the maker mind makes, a thinking most fully exemplified in the unremittingly active thinking of the divine mind." (p. 356). On the point that "active *nous*" makes perceiving possible in the first place (or that "active *nous*" enables "passive *nous*"), cf. Heidegger's GA 18 p. 326. Also Charlotta Weigelt's commentary on this Heidegger passage in *The Logic of Life: Heidegger's Retrieval of Aristotle's Concept of Logos.* (Stockholm: Almqvist and Wiksell International, 2002) p. 130–133.

40. On what the different sciences and modes of truth finding share, cf. chapter three of J. Randall, *Aristotle* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1960).

41. Hett, *Aristotle, On the Soul*, p. 170,72–171,73.

42. Apostle, *Aristotle's Physics*, p. 8.
43. Apostle, *Aristotle's Physics*, p. 8–9.
44. Apostle, *Aristotle's Physics*, p. 9.
45. Claudia Baracchi, *Aristotle's Ethics as First Philosophy*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008) p. 32.

Chapter Three

On The Primary Role of *Sterēsis*

Physics Alpha 3, 4, and 5 can be characterized according to the emerging role of *sterēsis*. These chapters can be characterized according to *sterēsis* for two primary reasons: (1) Aristotle seems to be concerned with the appropriate understanding of non-being—and specifically qualified non-being; and (2) the focus of the articulation of the first principles of nature moves from addressing beings in their presence to addressing the privation of these beings. Here, the formative role of *a-logos* begins to emerge. The concern of qualification takes shape during this second "primary reason." Earlier, it was described how the first two chapters of *Physics* Alpha could be characterized according to *logos*. In Alpha 3, 4, and 5, what lies beyond mere presence and direct addressability is this focus—but in a qualified way. In these three chapters, the speaking of (by) the alpha-privative begins to take form. This is not to suggest that *logos* in some way is left behind; but this is to suggest that there are silent constituents of *logos* that now need to be focused on for a more complete understanding of the way addressable forms (*logos*) can claim the principles of nature. These three chapters will now be approached for the sake of the development of qualified non-being. Before we enter chapter three, however, a few words can be used to describe the meaning of *sterēsis*. What can be seen after the definitions of *sterēsis* are addressed is two essential functions that appear to guide the role of *sterēsis* in Aristotle's *Physics*. These two essential functions are unification and uniqueness. *Sterēsis* entails the power to unify beings with their always hidden potentiality. This potentiality, this indication of silent principles, unfolds how beings interact through each other and rely on each other for their very existence. *Sterēsis* also entails the power to reveal the uniqueness of a being. By capturing the qualified potentiality of a being, *sterēsis* indicates the qualities that unfold the only way that a particular being can be; i.e., can move within its being.

Within the point that unification and uniqueness direct the meaning of *sterēsis*, it can be noted that *sterēsis* concerns qualified non-being. What continues to emerge as we get closer to the location of the structure of analogy is the roles of qualified non-being and unqualified being. Both qualified non-being and unqualified being find articulation through analogy. Unqualified being has already begun to reveal itself in our discussion of *aisthēsis*/*nous*. It is *nous* that concerns unqualified being.[1] What is attempted in this chapter is the bridge between unqualified being and the expression of a being qua *logos* that is made possible by it. That is, as *logos* captures beings in their speak-able form, *nous* acquires the being's unqualified form; i.e., the potentiality that underlies and enables *logos* in the first place. What *sterēsis* does is speak to the qualified potentiality of the being qua *logos*. It is the qualified potentiality, qualified non-being, which unites the being qua *logos* with the unqualified form acquired through noetic perception. The result is that *sterēsis* tends to that unique "space" that lies at the separation between *logos* and *nous*.

UNIFICATION AND UNIQUENESS AS
THE GUIDING SIGNIFICATION OF *STERĒSIS*

The attempt to present the fundamental meaning of *sterēsis* in Aristotle should probably begin with the addressing of *sterēsis* from the list of definitions offered in *Metaphysics* Delta. Here, Aristotle offers four articulations of *sterēsis*. These four descriptions may be more responsibly treated as four modes or articulations of *sterēsis* and not necessarily four distinct or different definitions. These four articulations of *sterēsis* entail some degree of overlap, so attempting to hold them as distinct from each other will eventually fail. However, before these definitions can be addressed, there is one important point that can be made. Although *sterēsis* is always and already silent and hidden, it is also a sort of form (*eidos*). To take *sterēsis* as simply a feature of *logos* (of the being qua *logos*) would reduce its potency from the start and disallow the original significance of *sterēsis* from being understood. Although *sterēsis* is never exhaustively thought in isolation, it also fails to receive complete treatment when held in a second rank position to the thing from which it withdrawals (the being in its addressable form).

At the core of the meaning of *sterēsis* lies some *thing* that is missing. As original as the "missing" is the "thing" that *is-not*. In other words, the essence of *sterēsis* lies not only in its indication of lack and not-ness, but also in its indication that this lack characterizes a thing itself, i.e., the thing qua *logos* is constituted by this lack. What is characterized, here, are three; namely, the missing thing (the "material" of *sterēsis*) and the thing that is missing something (the formula of the thing that is without, or, the "form" of the

point from which *sterēsis* departs, or, the being qua *logos*), and the missing itself (the "lack" which underlies and brings together the "material" and "form" of *sterēsis*). The "missing" brings the lacking thing and the thing that lacks together and presents it as a unified deprived thing. It is this "missing," this lack, which partly characterizes the being qua *logos*. Without the lacking itself, the missing thing and *logos* (the thing that is missing something) are merely two disjointed objects.

Since *sterēsis* can be thought in terms of being the unifier of lacking thing and thing that lacks, *sterēsis* can be thought as having an ontological status. *Sterēsis* is not simply a characteristic of certain beings, but an originary characteristic that brings disconnected things together into a unification that always retains its originary dis-connect. As such, *sterēsis* must be confronted as a type of being or form itself. This point is made clear by Aristotle when, in the *Physics,* he writes of the role *sterēsis* plays in *genesis*:

> Into what does [*physis*] grow? Not into that from which it begins but into that toward which it proceeds. Thus it is the *form* that is the nature. "*Form*" and "nature," it may be added, has two senses, for privation, too, is in a way a form. (193b 17–21)[2]

Here, Aristotle makes clear that privation is itself a present thing, a thing with presence. As a thing with presence, *sterēsis* shows the "missing" to be formative. As showing the formative nature of the "missing," *sterēsis* draws different beings (including being and non-being) together into one-manifold thing, a folded presence. It is this drawing together, this indication of a formative difference, which will serve as part of the original, guiding signification of *sterēsis* as it is discussed throughout.

READING THE DEFINITIONS OF *STERĒSIS* IN METAPHYSICS DELTA, 22

That *unification* and *uniqueness* are qualities that underlie the meaning of *sterēsis* can be seen in the definitions themselves as offered by Aristotle. In *Metaphysics* Delta, 22, Aristotle delivers four ways in which *sterēsis* can be said. After presenting the four numbered articulations, Aristotle offers two characteristics that may prevail throughout these articulations, namely, degree and intermediacy. Following the explanation of each of the articulations, an attempt will be made to arrive at a cohesive meaning of Aristotle's use of *sterēsis*. In other words, the upcoming descriptions of *Metaphysics* Delta, 22 will be brought together with the above mentioned underlying qualities of *sterēsis.* Perhaps from here, some stable ground can be established from which the thinking of *sterēsis* for analogy can proceed. What may be seen in the end, however, is that the most stable ground upon which *sterēsis* can be

thought requires the admission that *sterēsis* can be "said in many ways." In the end, perhaps *sterēsis* gestures toward the ambiguity of being by revealing the qualified ways, which are many and manifold, a particular being can be.

Aristotle's first offering of the meaning of *sterēsis* from *Metaphysics* Delta, 22 reads:

> "Privation" means (1) not having something which can be had by nature, even if that which does not have it would not by nature have it; for example, the plant is said to be deprived of eyes. (1022b 22–24)[3]

The first way of speaking about *sterēsis* refers to mere lack. Here, what is lacking is anything have-able in any way. Whether the deficient thing can naturally possess what it is missing is not a part of the consideration in this first definition. This articulation, which is, perhaps, the most general way of speaking about *sterēsis*, points to utterly not-having something. This utter lack describes the deficient thing not in any specific way but in a general, although decisive, way. This describes the deficient thing in a general way by not pointing out what is specifically lacking. Yet the deprived thing is described in a decisive way by having its incompleteness illuminated; i.e., the thing that lacks—in so far as it lacks—is an incomplete thing. So, it may be safe to pull from this first articulation of *sterēsis* that *sterēsis* announces the incompleteness of the lacking thing. Reading this first articulation as general yet decisive, perhaps it can be said that the following ways of speaking about *sterēsis* can be subsumed under this first offering.

Within this idea that *sterēsis* points to mere lack, it should be noted that privation illuminates an aspect of beings qua *logos* that forever remains hidden and silent. Mere deficiency is only relevant if it contributes to the basic formation of the incomplete being. However, insofar as this particular constituent is (merely) lacking, it is always concealed in and from appearance. So, along with thinking the being qua *logos* as incomplete—since it is formatted by lacking constituents—it can also be thought of as entailing an aspect that is formative and hidden, an aspect that contributes to the basic design of the being qua *logos* while always remaining silent. In addition to thinking *sterēsis* as the way of articulating the utterly lacking contributions to the being qua *logos*, *sterēsis* should also be thought as the way of pointing out the hidden aspects of its basic design; i.e., *sterēsis* makes its silent incompleteness addressable.

Aristotle's second definition of *sterēsis* from *Metaphysics* Delta, 22 reads:

> (2) Not having something which a thing, either itself or its genus, should by nature have. For example, in one sense a blind man is said to be deprived of sight, in another sense a mole is said to be so deprived; for the latter is

deprived with respect to its genus, the former with respect to himself. (1022b 25–28)[4]

In this second numbered offering, Aristotle's focus narrows a bit. No longer is Aristotle talking in terms of mere lack, instead he is pointing out that deficiency can characterize a genus (of something) or an individual (who belongs to some genus that is not characterized by a particular deficiency). If we pay attention to the order with which Aristotle groups these two (genus and individuals) together, perhaps it is safe to read them as the same type of privation. In other words, a thing can be said to be deficient because it *must* be deficient—the thing's genus is characterized by such lack—or because the thing *can* be deficient—the thing's genus is characterized by the *possibility* of such lack. It may be appropriate to read this second numbered articulation of *sterēsis* within a discussion of actuality (and/or necessity) and potentiality. The mole, to stay with Aristotle's example, is without vision by virtue of it actualizing its natural, necessary goal. The blind person is without vision by virtue of the potential of human beings to lack vision.

With the inseparability of actuality and potentiality in mind, in light of the earlier claim that the guiding signification of *sterēsis* entails a unifying feature, perhaps we can look at *sterēsis* here as that element of a thing that unites the thing's actuality and potentiality. Although I will revisit this idea later, it may be helpful to point out now that *sterēsis* can be read (in this second articulation, at least) as that which gathers together and makes unified *logos* and *hypokeimenon/nous*. Later, *hypokeimenon* will be described, in part, as demonstrating a potentiality that enables *logos* to fulfill itself. For now, though, we can cast our gaze on the privative aspect of the fulfillment of *logos* and recognize that the "primary" potentiality of *hypokeimenon* takes its cue from *sterēsis*. Aristotle sees *hypokeimenon* as potentiality in the highest degree (1029a 2). Although I do not want to reject that claim, the primary role of *sterēsis* should be recognized as something that contributes to the "highest degree" (*prōton*) status of *hypokeimenon*. The primacy of *sterēsis* unifies the highest, most radical potentiality which characterizes *hypokeimenon* with the temporary manifestation, i.e., actualization, which characterizes *logos*. That is to say, *sterēsis* should be recognized as holding such a primary position since it is responsible for the unification of the being qua *logos* with its most radical and unqualified form. For this reason, this second articulation of *sterēsis* can itself be characterized as the interplay of actuality and potentiality.

Aristotle's third offering of the meaning of *sterēsis* from *Metaphysics* Delta, 22 reads:

> (3) Not having something if and when a thing should by nature have it; for blindness is a privation, yet one is not called "blind" at every age but if he has

no sight when he by nature should have sight. Similarly, a thing is said to be
deprived of something if it does not have it, although it should by nature have
it, in something or with respect to something or in relation to something or in a
certain manner. (1022b 29–33)[5]

This third definition of *sterēsis* escorts privation into the scope of temporal-
ity. With the talk of potentiality in the second articulation, it may have been
clear to see that temporality was on the horizon. Within possibility is the
opportunity of change (1019a 15 ff). Change enables the thing that lacks to
fulfill its deficiency and move beyond itself qua deficient (in that manner).
As such, *when* the lacking thing lacks—at the time of the thing's depriva-
tion—becomes a part of establishing the thing as deprived. Just as the second
articulation of *sterēsis* offered by Aristotle seems to have narrowed the scope
of the first offering, this articulation seems to narrow the scope even further.
This offering does not present *sterēsis* according to lack in general or even
potentiality in general, but according to the temporal sense inherent in poten-
tiality. In other words, what *sterēsis* points out here is that privation is a
primary condition for the possibility of temporality. Since it is not possible
for a baby to see immediately after birth, it is not correct to say the baby is
deprived of sight. It is true that the newborn is utterly lacking vision
(Aristotle's first articulation of *sterēsis*) and it is also true that this partic-
ular newborn will possibly see (Aristotle's second articulation); however,
it would not be said that this newborn is blind since the possibility of sight
has yet to emerge as a part of this child's being. The only difference
between a blind adult and a newborn that cannot see (but is not considered
blind) is temporality.

   The intimate relationship with temporality announced in this third defini-
tion of *sterēsis* entails the *manner* of privation. In this offering, *sterēsis* does
not just speak to when a thing is deprived, but also the way in which a thing
is deprived. At the end of this third definition's paragraph, Aristotle writes
that privation is said "in something or with respect to something or in relation
to something or in a certain manner." Here, more so than not having some-
thing when this something should be had, *sterēsis* articulates not having
something *the way* it should be had by nature. One may have vision, but not
be able to precisely see something that is a mile away. This deficiency is one
of manner, where the lacking thing, e.g., vision, is present but not in the
manner it needs to be in order to accomplish the current task, e.g., precisely
seeing something that is a mile in the distance. Later, that *sterēsis* announces
deficiency of degree will be discussed. Here, however, what Aristotle seems
to be offering is not a degree of lack but a manner of lack. For example, what
may be preventing one from precisely seeing something a mile away is not
nearsightedness, but missing binoculars. This point must be stressed in order
to capture the full import of this third articulation of *sterēsis*. "Privation,"

here (this third articulation), is not privation of degree; it is privation of manner and/or relation. Vision may be lacking because something stands between the looker and what one desires to look at. Something can only stand in the way of one's course of vision when one has the goal or desire to look beyond the obstruction to something else. It is only when the obstruction is seen that privation (lack of *desired* vision) emerges. It is the seen obstruction that causes the deprivation of sight to be formative. The temporary nature of this obstruction marks the type of privation spoken of in this third definition of *sterēsis*. Privation, here, captures *when* one stands in relation to something un-desired. This third definition of *sterēsis* gathers together both time and relation—the "when" and the "manner"—of being without.

To unfold the scope of this third definition, a note should be made regarding the significance of "manner." *Sterēsis*, pointing to the manner with which a thing stands in relation to an other, is not merely the calling out of certain surrounding objects. Instead, what *sterēsis* speaks to here is the way that a thing brings its surroundings into itself and allows them (the others that establish the thing's surroundings) to contribute to the deprived thing's being.

This third articulation of *sterēsis* announces the necessary role of the other by showing how the deprived thing is open to the contributions of its surroundings. This articulation begins to reveal the manifold nature of the "guiding signification" discussed above. Earlier we spoke of the ever-present unifying power underlying all definitions of *sterēsis*. This originary unifying power extends beyond itself and shows the manner in which the deprived thing is established by (or at least along with) *the other*. Here, analogy will unfold not simply as a way of comparing one thing to another, but, and perhaps more importantly, as the way in which each relies on the other for its very (manner of) existence.

Aristotle's fourth definition of *sterēsis* from *Metaphysics* Delta, 22 reads: "(4) The taking away of something by force is called 'privation'" (1022b 34). Here, *sterēsis* is being described as the violent taking away of something. The missing is not simply a reference to some thing that was removed by some other thing. Instead, Aristotle writes of a violent or forceful taking away. In the above offerings, Aristotle offers no example of this articulation of *sterēsis*, but leaves it as self explanatory. Although this fourth definition is presented as self-evident, there are a few points that can be pulled from it.

The first point that is striking here is that Aristotle seems to continue the narrowing order of the first three articulations of *sterēsis*. In articulations one through three, Aristotle seems to maneuver directly from mere lack to a more specific way of speaking lack in terms of actuality and potentiality to an even more specific and momentary lack regarding the temporal and relational importance of *sterēsis*. Each articulation appears to sharpen the focus of its previous offering. However, it should be remembered that the third articula-

tion had the additional component of also focusing in on the necessary role of the other. This narrowing order appears to move from the deprived thing to the role of other beings that take part in the deprivation. Where articulations one, two, and part of three center on the deprived thing itself, part of the third articulation and here again in the forth, Aristotle seems to be focusing on the other and sharpens its focus therein. Here, Aristotle talks of a violent taking away. *Sterēsis*, at first, reads as a gathering into and exploiting of an other—instead of indicating some degree of deficiency within itself. Immediately the questions arise: Is there no further narrowing of *sterēsis* regarding the thing that lacks? Do all further contributions to the meaning of *sterēsis* require a shift in focus to the other? Is *sterēsis*, now that articulation three recognizes the other as necessary, a way of speaking about the other? Is *sterēsis*, ultimately, the way of speaking about a thing in such a way that shows inseparability between the deprived thing and the other(s) that contribute to its being?

Through this fourth definition, Aristotle reaches out to include the other in the establishing of the thing qua deprived. The violent taking away captures a type of interplay of (at least) two things. One thing takes something away, with violence or force, from other thing(s). But what Aristotle offers in this fourth articulation is the taking away itself, which characterizes this interplay, and not (at least not directly) the things that are mingling. However, why a "forceful taking away"? By describing the "taking" of "taking away" as "forcible" or "violent," Aristotle ushers in degree as a part of this definition of *sterēsis*. Aristotle does not simply say that "taking away" occurs (which presupposes the actualization of the potential to take-away) but that the "taking away" is done so by way of an emphasized degree; the "taking away" here is a grabbing-from, exploiting, appropriating of an other. The phrase "taking away" in this fourth offering is not some random act of violence, but one that illuminates the role the other plays in the establishing and qualifying of the thing deprived; "violence" qualifies which of the others constitute the thing qua deprived.

What *sterēsis* presents is an indication of qualified non-being. Although this is implicitly the case with all four of the numbered articulations offered by Aristotle so far, this fourth articulation seems to make this point most directly. The interacting of things is not random but appropriate. "Appropriate" not in the sense of justice or being morally acceptable, but appropriate in the sense of appropriation, where a thing uses, exploits, violates only that which it can make use of. It is in this *making use of* that the other—that which is used, appropriated—becomes a qualified other. Insofar as the other becomes a qualified other, the other contributes to the nature of the employing thing. As a qualified other, the other likewise receives its being (in part) from being used by the employing thing. It is the use itself, the appropriating itself, the violating itself that unites the violator and the violated in a way that establishes each as the things they are. So, to emphasize a point made above,

"violence" can be read as an indication of unification by qualifying each as constitutive vis-à-vis the other.

This concludes the four numbered ways of defining *sterēsis* offered in *Metaphysics* Delta, 22. Aristotle writes the remainder of this chapter as though it recapitulates the four numbered definitions. However, it will now be argued that there are two more themes concerning *sterēsis* offered in this chapter's remaining lines. These concluding remarks are not additional definitions of *sterēsis* but prevailing issues that underlie the four definitions discussed above. The first prevailing issue speaks to not having something well. The second prevailing issue speaks to the intermediate state between extremes.

Shortly after the fourth offering of *sterēsis,* Aristotle writes:

> For a thing is called "unequal" if it does not have equality although it can by nature have it; a thing is called "invisible" if it has no color at all or if it has a faint color; and a thing is called "footless" if it has no feet at all or if it has them but badly. Again, a thing is said to be deprived of something if it has it to a small degree, as in the case of the seedless fruit; for this somehow comes under the heading of having something badly. Again, a thing is said to be deprived of something if the latter belongs to the thing but not easily or well; for example, by "uncuttable" we mean not only that which cannot be cut, but also that which cannot be cut easily or well. Again, a thing is said to be deprived if it lacks all; for it is not he who has only one eye that is called "blind," but he who has no sight at all. According to this, it is not true that every man is either good or bad, either just or unjust, but there is also an intermediate state. (1022b 34–1023a 8)[6]

Here, Aristotle seems to be ushering the issues of degree and intermediacy into the discussion. *Sterēsis* does not only speak to the complete lack of something, but to lacking something to a certain degree as well which unfolds an "intermediate state." Perhaps it can be said that the reason these last two issues emerge but are not numbered ways of speaking about *sterēsis* is because these issues prevail throughout each of the four numbered definitions.

Firstly, the possibility of pulling the issue of "degree" from this chapter's concluding paragraph can be addressed. Above, while addressing the third numbered definition of *sterēsis*, it was explained that the *when* and the *where* (time and juxtaposition) of *sterēsis* speaks to the manner of privation but it does not necessarily speak to the degree of privation. Perhaps the case can be made that the degree of lack may in some way get subsumed under the broader articulation regarding time and juxtaposition, but the third articulation does not directly speak to degree itself. Above, it was discussed that vision, for example, may be lacking because something is obstructing one's view. One's vision may be as strong as needed to accomplish its current goal

of visualizing something in the distance. The vision that is lacking is a result of the looker's position in relation to the obstruction at that particular time. But having one's vision obstructed at a given time does not, necessarily, point to a lesser degree of vision. In fact, it says nothing regarding the "strength" of vision at all. To describe *sterēsis* in terms of degree excludes talk of anything like obstructions (i.e., particular things in the way) and instead focuses on the lack of fully satisfying nature's promises. That is to say, these final remarks on *sterēsis* do not speak to utter impotence, but to a deficiency of potentiality that disables the thing from fully actualizing its naturally given potentiality. To speak of a degree of privation is to speak of a withdrawal from the actualization of the outermost limits of the thing's potentiality; where complete actualization of potentiality is held as the basis from which *sterēsis* is seen in the first place.

These final remarks illuminate a sort of inner movement of *sterēsis* which itself shines light on how to think privation in terms of degree. In other words, degree of privation can be said to refer to the way a thing withdrawals away from the actualization of its outermost potentiality. If we think "outermost potentiality" in terms of the complete fulfillment of a thing's fundamental nature, then degree of privation refers to how far a thing has withdrawn from this complete fulfillment. Degree of privation, which is the result of thinking *sterēsis* exclusively as withdrawal, speaks to privation as it stands against the foundation of a thing's fulfilled nature.

At the very end of *Metaphysics* Delta, 22, Aristotle injects the concept of the "intermediate state." There is something important to focus on regarding intermediacy itself. An intermediate state (any intermediate state) is a position that stands somewhere between extreme poles. The "state" being characterized as "inter-mediate" lies simultaneously away from the poles which stand in opposition to each other. It is the withdrawal from the opposite poles that constitutes the intermediate state as such. Such a withdrawal from opposite poles seems to characterize these final remarks on *sterēsis* and elucidate the prevailing ground of all of the ways of speaking it.

Although opposite poles stress the way privation can be thought in terms of degree, "degree" of privation is probably not the most important theme to pull from this final articulation. What is perhaps more important, and certainly more dominantly stated here, is that *sterēsis* announces the play of its opposite poles. It is the poles themselves that are brought to light through the speaking of *sterēsis*; even though the opposite poles always remain hidden. *Sterēsis* now can be understood as a way of elucidating the extreme opposites between which the deprived thing is. So, *sterēsis* announces the extreme possibilities that are never actualized yet always present in the thing qua deprived. It is this announcing of the opposite poles that marks the positioning for an "intermediate state."

Within the announcing of the always hidden presence of opposition, *sterēsis* demonstrates its unifying powers by holding opposites together to form an intermediate state. Perhaps it is safe to say that the unifying of the opposites rests more fundamentally at the core of thinking *sterēsis* in terms of the formation of intermediacy. The announcing of opposition only maintains relevance once the opposites themselves are taken as formative for the being that announces, i.e., the being qua deprived. Here, what was above called the "guiding signification" of *sterēsis* shows itself by announcing the unity of opposites.

A FEW MORE WORDS REGARDING THE ARTICULATIONS OF *STERĒSIS* FROM METAPHYSICS DELTA, 22

Before we return to book Alpha of Aristotle's *Physics*, a few concluding remarks can be made about the illustration of *sterēsis* from *Metaphysics* Delta, 22. Perhaps these concluding remarks will produce a helpful momentum that can be carried into the unfolding of qualified non-being from *Physics* Alpha 3, 4, and 5.

Sterēsis can be said in a few ways: (1) as utter lack, which is an illumination of the silent constituents of the being qua *logos*; (2) as the unifying of actuality and potentiality which brings *hypokeimenon* as potentiality in the "highest degree" into play; (3) as the manner with which the being qua *logos* gathers the other and opens itself up to the contributions of its surroundings; and (4) as the violent unification which shines light on the usefulness that beings offer each other throughout the inter-coursings of nature. What prevails throughout these four articulations are the two issues: (a) the moving away from the actualization of the being's extreme potentiality and (b) the unfolding of an intermediate state within which the being qua *logos* always is.

The ways of speaking privation can, in a way, stand on their own; however, it may be most fruitful to understand each in relation to the others. In other words, a being qua *logos* in an intermediate state (b) entails a withdrawal from the extreme and opposite potentialities (a) of the deprived being. Insofar as an intermediate state, already a withdrawal from and gathering of opposition, is constituted by other beings (qua *logos*), it reveals a (4) dependency on the appropriating of and being appropriated by the other. This type of appropriation (4) is a constituent of the deprived being qua *logos* in that the manner of exploitation—to what extent the other is used/uses—characterizes (3) the manner in which the being qua *logos* is deprived at the time. How a being is deprived at a particular time characterizes (2) the primacy of *sterēsis* by allowing *hypokeimenon* to secure its place of relevance. As the feature that makes immediately present the always silent underlying sub-

stance of *logos*, *sterēsis* announces (1) the always hidden qualified constituents of the being qua *logos*.

At this point in our project, a transition can take place back into Aristotle's *Physics*. What should be pulled from the description of *sterēsis* is the possibility that qualified non-being is formative. As the march toward the structure of analogy in Aristotle's thought continues, the role *sterēsis* plays for the principles of natural beings will emerge as a priority. Not just the role *sterēsis* plays, but the manner of speaking this role, i.e., the speech of silence (*a-logos*) will be what comes forward throughout the following illustration of *Physics* Alpha 3, 4, and 5.

PHYSICS ALPHA 3, 4, AND 5

At the beginning of Alpha 3, Aristotle attacks the positions of Melissus and Parmenides. Less than an isolated attack on these two early thinkers, Aristotle seems to be using them as prototypical presentations of the errors of thinking the oneness of being and motion together. Regarding Melissus, Aristotle questions the need for immovability for the oneness of being. Why can't being be both one and movable? Aristotle believes that Melissus holds the position that being is one and infinite. As such, being entails no parts, for Melissus. According to Melissus, being cannot be one if it has parts, and if it has parts then it could be movable. By describing Melissus' position in this way, Aristotle seems to be setting up the identity, location, and function of non-being. Aristotle asks, why must the oneness of being preclude having parts? If being is infinite, then it would apparently have an infinite number of parts; why, then, are these parts immovable—even if only some of the parts move? Aristotle holds that, clearly, being is not of only one kind (since I am not the pen with which I am currently writing). If being entails different types, then it must have, to some degree, different parts. If being entails parts, then being is not one—at least not univocally. If being is not one, then it is not necessarily immovable. What Aristotle seems to be pointing out here is that Melissus overlooks the mere possibility of *kinēsis*, which Aristotle told us in chapter two (185a 14) was the basic assumption of things existing by nature (*physis*). Without developing Melissus' position any further, Aristotle seems to essentially be saying that Melissus offers no approach to the study of the first principles (*arkhai*) of nature.

One way of interpreting Aristotle's apparent implication that Melissus does not really offer a legitimate approach to the study of nature is to point out that Melissus appears to see no role for non-being (neither qualified non-being nor unqualified being). If Melissus does not recognize a basic role of motion, then there is no need whatsoever for non-being. If there is no need for non-being, then the idea of qualified non-being, of a formative privation,

should never enter the discussion. By never entering the discussion, qualified non-being is never considered as a first principle of nature.

Parmenides, according to Aristotle, assumes being to have a single meaning, and thus his position is essentially the same as Melissus. Parmenides is overlooking an obvious feature of being, according to Aristotle, by not acknowledging the manifold expressions of this "one" meaning. Even if "white" has only one meaning, Aristotle analogizes, there are still many white things which itself shows a distinction between the meaning of "white" and the meaning of this white thing. Citing Aristotle extensively:

> Now Parmenides must grant not only that "being" signifies one thing, of whatever it might be predicated, but also that it signifies just a being and what is just one. For an attribute is predicated of some subject, and so that of which it is an attribute, being distinct from being, would not be [a being]; and then a non-being would exist [be a being]. Certainly, then, just being could not belong to something else, for the latter would not be a being unless "being" had many senses, in which case each might be some kind of being; but it was assumed that "being" has [only] one meaning.
>
> If, on the other hand, just being is not an attribute of anything, but something else is an attribute of it, how does "just being" signify a being rather than nonbeing? For if just being were to be itself and also white, the essence of white would still not be a just being (for even being could not be an attribute of white, since what is not a just being is not a being), and so it would be a nonbeing, and not in a qualified sense but entirely a nonbeing. So a just being would be a nonbeing, for it would be true to say "just being is white," and "white" was just shown to signify a nonbeing. So if "white" too were to signify a just being, then "being" would have many senses. (186a 32–186b 13)[7]

In this passage, Aristotle makes explicit the concern of qualified non-being and unqualified being. For Parmenides (and Melissus) to hold being to have only one meaning, it cannot be differentiated from its (being's) predicates, i.e., being cannot be articulated. This would mean that the attributes that are predicated of being would be non-beings. If attributes were non-beings, insofar as they do exist, then non-being would exist. If being only had one meaning, then the non-being status of attributes would be unrelated to being; for there to be a relation of some sort between being and attributes (non-beings) then being would have to be manifold—which Parmenides rejects. If the situation was reversed and being was thought as an attribute of something else, then the same problem regarding the relationship (or lack thereof) between being/non-being would emerge. So, either being has many senses for Parmenides, which he claims it does not, or non-being exists but in an unrelated and unqualified way. What Aristotle seems to be setting up is the lack of qualified non-being (using Parmenides as an example). Aristotle writes:

> It is also evident that it is not true to say that nonbeing will not exist if "being" has just one meaning and contradictions are impossible; for nothing prevents nonbeing from being a qualified nonbeing and not an unqualified nonbeing. As for the statement that all things will be one if nothing else exists besides being itself, it is certainly absurd. For who would learn what being itself is if just being were not a kind of a thing. And if this is so, then, as we said, nothing prevents things from being many. It is clear, then, that being cannot be one in the manner it is claimed to be. (187a 4–11)[8]

Here, Aristotle shows that impossibilities emerge when qualified non-being is overlooked. Perhaps, again, these impossibilities would be avoided if *kinēsis* was recognized as an essential assumption for the study of the principles of nature. However, Parmenides and Melissus represent a position toward nature that denies the viability of *kinēsis* and, as such, precludes the very possibility of receiving qualified non-being as a basic framer of natural, becoming beings.

In *Physics* Alpha, 4, Aristotle continues to sharpen his focus on qualified non-being by critiquing the "physicists"—those earlier thinkers who, unlike Parmenides and Melissus, recognize the foundational role that motion and change play in the constitution of nature (*physis*). Aristotle opens chapter 4 (187a 12) with: "According to the statements [*legousi*] of the physicists [*phusikoi*]." Again, as was discussed above, Aristotle seems to be concerned throughout book Alpha with the articulation (*logos*) of the principles of nature. After addressing the impossibilities that emerge when the *logos* of being(s) overlooks movement, now Aristotle appears to want to address the *logos* of being(s) when movement is understood. The recognition of qualified non-being is at the same time the recognition of how *to speak* qualified non-being. As we saw earlier when discussing *nous*, the disposition from out of which the articulation of the principles of nature emerges develops according to the noetic perception of nature that enables *logos* in the first place. This means that the ability to appropriately articulate qualified non-being is predicated on the proper receiving of such qualification from/within *physis* itself. So, as Aristotle moves forward to sharpen his position on qualified non-being—through an attack on the "physicists"—the way movement characterizes the perception of nature will be the point of departure.

Some physicists believe there to be one infinite principle that underlies all natural beings. For these thinkers, motion (*kinēsis*) results from the alteration of this one underlying element. Although not all of these thinkers hold the same one element to underlie nature, still all natural beings emerge from the existence and alteration of just one basic principle.[9] For these physicists, motion is understood in only one way, namely, as alteration. The very cause of being is itself alteration.

Some other physicists believe that there is more than one element that causes natural being. For these thinkers, nature is not simply the result of the

alteration of one infinite principle; here, beings are the combination or blends of elements (still infinite) that can then alter. For these physicists, motion is understood in two ways, generation (from the underlying infinite elements) and alteration (of the generated beings). [10]

For Aristotle, there is an obvious problem with these two positions of the physicists. The problem concerns the infinity of the underlying elements that comprise the beings of nature. To know a thing is to know its causes and principles and elements (184a 10–11). However, "the infinite qua infinite is unknowable" (187b 9). If the causes of natural beings for the physicists are infinite, then the causes, according to Aristotle, are unknowable. If they are unknowable, then, two things: (1) the physicists are mis-speaking the breadth of their understanding of nature; and (2) as unknowable, these principles would be unable to be received through the noetic experience of nature. Similar to Aristotle's earlier attack on Parmenides and Melissus and their denial of motion as a principle of nature, the overlooking of an aspect fundamental to the lived experience, the noetic engagement with one's surroundings, precludes a legitimate approach to the study of the things that exist by nature. Simply put, the inability to know the elements and causes of being(s) makes speaking about them (*logos*) false and truthfully experiencing them (*nous*) not possible. Perhaps this can be read as an example of (the physicists) privileging *logos* over *nous* regarding the knowledge of the first principles of nature.

Moreover, and directly in line with our current concerns, the inability to know the underlying infinite first principles seems to result from a more essential concern of Aristotle's, specifically, qualification. Qualification seems more essential in that it is what gets overlooked when infinite principles are posited. In other words, the experience of nature sees individual and limited beings inter-coursing with and through each other. Even if infinite principles were knowable, their understanding would rely on the encounter with specific beings at specific times. This specificity, or, as was discussed above, the "parts" of the "whole" of experience, would need to be included (not overlooked) in the formation of knowledge. So, it appears that what Aristotle is pointing to with his critique of "knowable" infinity is the denial of the specificity and limitation of individual beings. By discussing the limitations of the potentiality of beings, qualification and qualified non-being is emerging as a vital part of the proper understanding of nature (*physis*).

Aristotle continues to formulate the role of qualified non-being through the following passage where he discusses the recognition of limited potentiality. Aristotle writes:

> Again, if each part of a thing can be of any size in the direction of greatness and of smallness, then necessarily the thing itself can be of any size likewise (by "a part" I mean that which is present and into which the whole is divis-

ible). So if an animal or a plant cannot be of any size in the direction of
greatness and of smallness, it is evident that neither can any part of it be of any
size likewise (or else the whole would be of any size likewise). But flesh and
bone and the like are parts of an animal, and fruits are parts of plants; clearly,
then, it is impossible for flesh or bone or some other part to be of any size,
whether in the direction of greatness or of smallness. (187b 14–23) [11]

Here, Aristotle speaks to the inherent limitations entailed in beings and as
such implies the finitude of being. Aristotle presents this passage in reaction
to the physicists' position on the infinity (and thus inability to have knowl-
edge) of the principles of nature. For our current concerns, the development
of human knowledge is not primary, nor is this development of an exhaustive
account of potentiality. What occupies us now is the point that Aristotle is
injecting the topic of limited potentiality into his revision of the earlier physi-
cists. Aristotle maneuvers toward limitation/qualification by returning to the
dichotomy of parts and whole. Without reengaging that earlier discussion, it
may be sufficient to note here that for Aristotle a whole thing is always
divisible into its parts; showing the parts to be, in a sense, responsible for the
thing qua whole. Conversely, the parts themselves are "parts" only insofar as
the "whole" that they comprise orders the unique way of their mingling. It is
the mingling of parts that both determine the parts as parts and unfolds the
functioning of the whole as whole. This point, which reminds us of an earlier
concern had during the discussion of *nous*, is necessarily understood for the
orientation of knowledge since it is what gets noetically perceived through
the experience of nature. It is through such noetic apprehension that the
underlying components (principles, elements, causes, etc.) of nature are re-
ceived—and received according to this dichotomy of parts/whole.

What makes the dichotomy of parts/whole a dichotomy is that it illus-
trates a sort of split in the experience of nature. What is split is the experience
itself. The horizon of perception is one (whole) landscape with apparent
individual beings (parts). Each part itself is a whole with parts. This split
eventually enables first principles to be apprehended. This is the orientation
of the principles qua received and thus necessary for the understanding of the
principles themselves. Once the first principles are arrived at, then the nature
of the experience, the nature of the parts and the whole, can be grasped in
light of the principles—making the dichotomy of parts/whole transparently
understood. It seems as though Aristotle is making note here that the physi-
cists bypassed this dichotomy and never identified it as a necessary part of
the forming of principles.

All earlier thinkers, even those not labeled "physicists," employed contra-
riety in their thinking of nature. However, these earlier thinkers, since they
posit no underlying material from which alteration and/or generation
emerges, offer nothing that underlies contrariety. Aristotle writes:

> It is clear, then, that in a sense all thinkers posit contraries as principles, and with good reason; for (a) neither must one principle be composed of another principle, (b) nor should they be composed of other things but the other things should be composed of them. Now the primary contraries possess both these attributes: (b) They are not composed of other things because they are primary, and (a) neither of them is composed of the other because they are contraries. (188a 27–32)[12]

In this passage, we can read Aristotle setting up the difference between qualified non-being and unqualified being. For Aristotle, contrariety is recognized by the earlier thinkers "with good reason." Aristotle will himself employ the merits of contrariety as he continues to develop his thesis from out of the mistakes of his predecessors. Contrariety will structure Aristotle's understanding of qualified non-being. A particular course is opened up by contrariety that puts *sterēsis* in play as a principle of the nature of beings. Further establishment of the specific role of *sterēsis* as a principle will come later. From this passage, however, two notes can be made: firstly, that Aristotle seems to be setting-up the structure of qualified non-being (*sterēsis*) through contrariety, and secondly, immediately the call for an unqualified being emerges as necessary. The immediate call for unqualified being can be seen in Aristotle's claim that (contrary) principles, as both primary and *not from each other*, require some thing to act on. It is this unqualified being that is both acted upon and from which contrariety is granted its potency. Later, while discussing unqualified being (*hypokeimenon*) in light of potentiality, Aristotle's claim that this underlying matter or prime matter is "potentiality in the highest degree" will be noted. Already here at 188a 19 ff., the value to which Aristotle gives that which underlies contrariety can be seen. Again, this call for such an unqualified being emerges along with the basic structure of qualified non-being. Perhaps this is a foreshadowing of the development of the totality of non-being that permits us to hold qualified non-being and unqualified being as inseparable from each other. This recalls our earlier discussion of the primary role of *sterēsis*—where *sterēsis* may be understood as equally important as *hypokeimenon*.

For the development of analogy in Aristotle, the structure of qualified non-being, i.e., the structure of *sterēsis*, is important. It was mentioned above how contrariety unfolds the basic blueprint of *sterēsis* and its role in analogy. This unfolding of the qualification of non-being produced by contrariety can be clearly read in the following passage.

> First we must grant that no thing by nature acts on, or is acted on by, any other chance thing, nor does any thing come to be from any other [chance] thing, unless one grants that this takes place in virtue of an attribute. For how could the white come to be from the musical unless the musical were an accident of the not-white or the black? But the white does come to be from the nonwhite,

> not from any nonwhite but from black or some intermediate color; and the
> musical comes to be from the nonmusical, not from any nonmusical but from
> the unmusical or something between the musical and the unmusical, if there is
> such. (188a 33–188b 3)[13]

What seems to be most important here is that contrariety opens a path for
kinēsis; not motion in general, but qualified motion. Aristotle tells us in this
passage that beings by nature do not move in random directions but in deter-
mined directions. What determines the direction for *kinēsis* are two: the
being qua *logos*, i.e., the being in its current presence; and the opposite pole
of the being qua attributed. For example, the attribute "white" can only move
toward "black" and not in the direction of some other attribute; i.e., it can
move only in the direction of its opposite attribute. In this chapter of the
Physics, Aristotle discusses contrariety in terms of attribution. An attribute
moves toward its opposite. Later in the opening book of the *Physics*, Aristo-
tle discusses motion in terms of *hypokeimenon*. Although some commenta-
tors[14] refer to this as a type of shift in Aristotle's thinking, I will argue that
the talk of a shift is overstated and what Aristotle presents here regarding
attribution holds equally when discussing substance. I do not want to outright
deny the possibility of a "shift" (in Alpha 7 specifically) in Aristotle's think-
ing here, but due to the location and identification of the structure of analogy,
the *articulation* of the principles enables the principles to not be compro-
mised. That is, because of analogy, such a "shift" can be labeled as an
overstatement.

What is brought to the fore through this talk of contrariety is the produc-
tive powers of opposition. Aristotle writes:

> If, then, all this is true, every thing that is generated or destroyed is so from or
> to a contrary or an intermediate. As for the intermediates, they are composed
> of contraries; the other colors, for example, are composed of white and black.
> Thus every thing which is generated by nature is a contrary or composed of
> contraries. (188b 22–26)[15]

For this reason, Aristotle can say at 189a 10 that "[i]t is evident, then, that the
principles should be contraries." On the way to describing nature as principle
and cause of being moved (192b 21–22), Aristotle lays open the pathway that
motion travels. This pathway cannot simply be random since the experience
of nature is sufficiently predictable. So, a particular structure is needed to
determine and order the direction of motion that eventually will be pointed to
as the very foundation of nature. However, unlike the earlier thinkers, contra-
riety is not by nature a principle of becoming beings. As was mentioned
above, contrariety structures *sterēsis*, and it is by nature a principle of be-
coming beings. In addition to being one of the three principles of becoming

beings, *sterēsis* also receives articulation through the analogical roots of *logos*. The development of this point is forthcoming.

There is one last issue mentioned near the end of *Physics* Alpha, 5 that reminds us of our characterization of Aristotle's critique of the earlier thinkers. It was mentioned above that Aristotle seems to be accusing the earlier thinkers of privileging *logos* over *nous* in their thinking of the first principles of nature. Such privileging precludes the principles of nature from being received noetically since nothing beyond speech seems to be acknowledged as a part of the grasping of these principles. If nothing beyond speech and what is addressable (*logos*) is taken as formative for the apprehension of the principles of nature, then intellection without speech is overlooked. Aristotle seems to imply that the early thinkers remain always within the domain of *logos*—which, for Aristotle is also the domain for the possibility of falsity— and as such, they simply offered different versions or different ways of speaking the principles of nature. Aristotle, referring to the earlier thinkers, writes:

> So the principles which they used are in one way the same but in another distinct. They are distinct in the manner in which most thinkers took them to be; but they are the same insofar as they are analogous, for they are taken from the same two sets of contraries, some of them being wider while others narrower in extent. In this way, then, they spoke of them in the same and also in a distinct manner, some in a worse others in a better way, and, as we said, some posited them as more known according to formula while others as more known according to sensation. (188b 35–189a 5)[16]

The principles of the early thinkers are different from each other in that the specific elements differ between them. However, the principles are also analogous between the thinkers. Before the exact location and identification of analogy in Aristotle is argued for, it may be safe to claim here that Aristotle sees the different positions regarding natural principles as simply the same position with different names given to the principles. If Aristotle is accusing the early thinkers of being retained by *logos*, then whether the principles are posited according to "formula" (*logos*) or according to "sensation" (*aisthēsis*) makes no difference. If *logos* is being privileged above noetic perception, then the way one thinker revises the positions of other thinkers would be little more than a re-articulation of what was previously said.

This, in a sense, appears to be a reminder and stressing of the importance of the way (*hodos*) discussed in Alpha, 1 and 2. There, the merits of *logos* were carefully positioned vis-à-vis *nous* and the analogical movements of discovery were privileged above the mere imposition of one's claiming. It reads as though Aristotle is attacking the earlier thinkers for not doing what he laid out as the "natural way" (184a 17). Perhaps Aristotle would say that

the earlier thinkers proceeded not along the "natural way" but rather according their private "vocal way."[17]

CONCLUDING REMARKS ON QUALIFIED NON-BEING

What qualified non-being (*sterēsis*) contributes to the principles of nature is the domain within which the manifold expressions of a natural being's potentiality resides. It is with the focusing on this ever silent (*a-logos*) domain that the ambiguity of being can begin to find articulation. In that *sterēsis* always stands against *logos*, it reveals itself as a type of speech. *Sterēsis* is always a qualified silence and it is from it that *genesis* proceeds.

Sterēsis is the principle that implies the potentiality of natural beings but in a qualified way. As such, *sterēsis* holds the uniqueness of the being from which it withdraws in its silent domain. This holding of a being's uniqueness is the holding back of the totality of differing forms that the natural being may express. Although each expression of the being qua addressable form, being qua *logos*, is a manifestation of certain previously hidden potential, the remainder of the possible ways of being are concealed. *Sterēsis* is not a principle that implies a quantifiable account of a being's possibilities; rather, *sterēsis* is the concealed form of the being that has potentiality latent until expressed qua *logos*.

The primary role of *sterēsis* requires a more radical sense of potentiality to enable its latent potentiality to be fruitful. That is to say, unqualified potentiality is called on by *sterēsis* for facilitating the unique potential of a particular being to find articulation. Earlier, while discussing *nous*, the acquisition of the first principles of nature was described as the object of the intellect. What *nous* acquires is the principles that form the nature of all natural beings—those principles that make such beings "natural." The nature or substance of natural beings is noetically had but, as such, had silently. Such unspoken principles require a form of articulation (*logos*) for them to be expressed. Such articulation emerges out of the domain of qualified potentiality implied by *sterēsis*. Therefore, what lays between the unspoken principles that are grasped through but beyond *logos* and *logos* itself is the qualified potentiality entailed by *sterēsis*.

What we can now discuss is the unqualified generation that articulates, in its own way, the three principles of naturally becoming beings. It is in this next chapter that the *genesis* of analogy will emerge along with the direct articulation of Aristotle's natural principles.

NOTES

1. It should be kept in mind here that we are primarily concerned with the structure of analogy. Thus, how the always concealed principles of perceived beings are brought to the level of addressability is always at the fore of our study. "Unqualified-being" here refers to these concealed first principles which, insofar as they are perceivable noetically, i.e., without *logos*, are the concern of *nous* only.

2. Apostle, *Aristotle's Physics*, p. 27.

3. Apostle, *Aristotle's Metaphysics*, p. 95.

4. Apostle, *Aristotle's Metaphysics*, p. 95.

5. Apostle, *Aristotle's Metaphysics*, p. 95.

6. Apostle, *Aristotle's Metaphysics*, p. 95.

7. Apostle, *Aristotle's Physics*, p. 12.

8. Apostle, *Aristotle's Physics*, p. 13.

9. Cf. Aristotle, *Physics* 187a 13–20.

10. Cf. Aristotle, *Physics* 187a 21–187b 8.

11. Apostle, *Aristotle's Physics*, p. 14.

12. Apostle, *Aristotle's Physics*, p. 16.

13. Apostle, *Aristotle's Physics*, p. 16.

14. Among these commentators is Christopher P. Long. Cf. Long, *The Ethics of Ontology: Rethinking an Aristotelian Legacy*. (Albany: SUNY Press, 2004), p. 31ff. Also Sean Kelsey who will be directly addressed below.

15. Apostle, *Aristotle's Physics*, p. 17.

16. Apostle, *Aristotle's Physics*, p. 17.

17. The Heraclitian criticism expressed in his fragment 1 can be heard in this apparent privileging of one's private "vocal way" over Aristotle's "natural way."

Chapter Four

On the Analogical Preservation of the Ambiguity of Natural Being

The concluding four chapters of Aristotle's *Physics* will be characterized according to *hypokeimenon*. This characterization refers to the concern of the underlying matter that Aristotle seems to have throughout these chapters. What has been seen so far is that Aristotle has, in part, addressed the relationship between *logos* and *sterēsis*, the relationship between the being as addressable and its contrary constituents. Although these contrary constituents always remain silent (*a-logos*), they are formative nonetheless. What will be seen in the concluding chapters of the *Physics* is Aristotle's consideration of unqualified being. Unqualified being allows for the union, in a manner of speaking, of the being qua *logos* with its privative components. As the jointure of that which is addressable with its silent constituents, *hypokeimenon* itself remains silent and out of sight. *Hypokeimenon* is something that can only receive indirect articulation. What Aristotle will tell us in chapter 7 is that *hypokeimenon* requires analogy for its articulation. So, our investigation will characterize these final chapters of book Alpha according to *hypokeimenon* because it is the emergence of it that parallels the emergence of the structure of *analogia*. Analogy occupies the place it does for Aristotle since *hypokeimenon* plays the role it plays for the first principles of nature.

Beginning in chapter six of Aristotle's *Physics*, unqualified being is under consideration. Unqualified being is not a radically different type of non-being from that addressed by *sterēsis*. Unqualified being is certainly different, but its difference lies in that, as unqualified, it moves in a contradictory manner. This unqualified movement, this unqualified becoming, accounts for the movement of substance (*ousia/hypokeimenon*). Insofar as substance qua substance has no opposite, moving toward its contrary is not possible. Instead, the movement here is from being to non-being and its reverse; i.e.,

becoming in the direction of what it (whatever "it" is) currently is not. In the introduction to our project, the topic of *genesis* was mentioned. The movement implied by *genesis* captures the transitioning of substance, i.e., the transitioning abilities of unqualified being. Again, as was mentioned in the introduction, the "assumption" that beings by nature are kinetic (a point Aristotle makes in *Physics* Alpha, 2) seems to be predicated on the more original understanding of natural motion accounted for by *genesis*. Although natural beings are kinetic, it is their *genesis* that makes them beings "by nature."[1]

What will emerge as the key concern in chapters 6 and 7 of book Alpha of Aristotle's *Physics* is the *genesis* of *hypokeimenon*. Our study will continue to read the *Physics* for the sake of locating the structure of analogy. What will come forth by the middle part of Alpha 7 is the ability to identify this structure. Aristotle does not directly announce the exact place of analogy; rather, we will attempt to extract the structure of analogy from what Aristotle does say about *hypokeimenon*. Insofar as the underlying substance gets addressed as itself moving, the way to identify, speak, and "know" *hypokeimenon* becomes an utmost concern. It is from what Aristotle says about how *hypokeimenon* can be known; i.e., how it becomes addressable, that the structure of analogy can be located.

ALPHA 6–9

After arriving at the position that contraries are principles and that contraries require some underlying material upon which to act, Aristotle opens Alpha 6 with the claim that "we should consider whether the principles are two or three or more than three" (189a 11–12). The previous chapter foreshadowed what appears to be the primary contribution of this current chapter, namely, an underlying substance (*ousia*). This underlying substance/subject is that of which the contrary principles are predicated. The underlying subject itself, however, is not predicated on any other thing. If it was, another underlying subject would be required since this subject would entail its own contrary— and would thus need something upon which to act. Aristotle writes:

> From a consideration of these and other such arguments, then, it would seem that there is some reason in maintaining that the elements are three, as we said before; but there is no reason in maintaining that they are more than three, for one element is sufficient [as a subject] to be acted upon. (189b 17–20)[2]

Moreover:

> And along with this, the primary contrarieties cannot be many; for "substance" is a single genus of being, so the principles can differ in priority and posterior-

ity and not in genus (for in a single genus there can be only one contrariety, and all other contrarieties [in that genus] are thought to be referred to one). (189b 23–27)[3]

It may seem clear that Aristotle is offering three principles of natural beings. However, Aristotle leaves this chapter by writing that "there is much difficulty as to whether there are two or three" (189b 28–29) principles. Aristotle's apparent hesitation rests with deciding the exact number of principles contrariety represents.[4] Do contraries represent one principle or two principles? We need to remind ourselves periodically that contrariety offers the basic structure of *sterēsis*—and not the reverse. So, perhaps the issue that Aristotle is pondering here at the end of chapter 6 is whether *sterēsis* is really a principle of natural beings at all.[5]

It should always be kept in mind that our investigation is interested in the idea that Aristotle is essentially concerned with the articulation of the first principles of nature (the *arkhai* of *physis*). This is not to say that Aristotle is solely concerned with speech. Quite the contrary; to say that Aristotle is essentially concerned with the articulation of first principles is to say that he is primarily focused on the receiving of and listening to the speech *of* nature. It is only after one hears nature speak on its own behalf, only after one noetically receives the expressions of nature, that anything can be truthfully said *about* nature. Truthful articulation of principles is predicated on the proper listening to *physis*. So, as chapter 7 opens with the claim that "[w]e shall now give our own account," it should not be taken that Aristotle is in some way *transitioning* into his words (as though what has been accomplished up to this point has not been his own), rather, Aristotle is here claiming that mistakes of the earlier thinkers have been revised and cleared away so that the truthful way of the principles of nature can be spoken. Said differently, "now" that the earlier thinkers' privileging of *logos* over and beyond *nous* has been identified and displaced, *logos* can return to its proper function of articulating what *nous* perceives.

Alpha 6 points to the need for an underlying substance that enables the contrary principles to emerge as formative. However, nothing was decisively said about the nature of this underlying subject (or the nature of the contrary principles, for that matter). Chapter 7 sets out to detail what these principles might be. Aristotle begins his description by making a distinction between the "simple" (*hapla*) beings and "composite" (*sugkeimena*) beings. "Simple" refers to those aspects of a "composite" being that can be spoken singly. "Composite" refers to the being that has these "simple" aspects lying together in a manner that allows for the "composite" to present itself as something that itself can be spoken singly. This is a different articulation—an analogy—of what was above spoken of as the parts/whole dichotomy. It may be

important to keep that discussion in mind here since Aristotle is on the way to describing the principles in terms of "simple" "parts."

Aristotle writes of these simple parts:

> Of simple things that come to be something, some of them persist throughout the generation but others do not. For when a man becomes musical, he persists during the generation and is still a man [at the end of it], but the not-musical or the unmusical does not persist, whether as a simple thing or when combined with the subject . . . With these distinctions granted, then from all things which are being generated one may gather this, if he is to attend carefully to the manner of our statement—that there must always be something which underlies that which is in the process of becoming and that this, even if numerically one, in kind at least is not one (and by "in kind" I mean the same thing as by "in formula," for "to be a man" and "to be unmusical" do not have the same meaning). And one part of that which is being generated persists but the other does not, that is, what is not an opposite persists (for the man persists) but the musical or the unmusical does not, and neither does the composite persist, i.e., the unmusical man. (190a 10–20)[6]

There are a few things that can be noted from this long passage. One thing is that generation is being discussed here in terms of attribution only. Although Aristotle will shortly address the possibility of substantive generation, in this passage only attributive change is mentioned. That Aristotle discusses generation according to attribution only here serves as a point of contention for certain commentators[7] that see a "shift" in this chapter. An argument will be offered in reaction to this idea of a shift in Alpha, 7. Another point that can be extracted from the above passage is the beginning of Aristotle's development of unqualified being. Qualified non-being can be seen in the determined direction laid open by contrariety. This determined manner refers to the direction certain attributes of an underlying subject/substance can move. However, regarding the underlying substance, this passage merely claims that it persists throughout the movement of the attributes. In other words, while attributed movement occurs, the underlying substance "simply" persists.

A certain structure for generation and the movement by nature emerges from this above passage. The structure that seems implicit unfolds according to the generation of the natural beings which require three aspects: (1) a starting point for motion, (2) an extreme end point that orders the direction of the movement, and (3) something that underlies the movement preventing the movement from destroying the thing moved. In the above passage, and this is what is referred to as the change of the first of "two parts"[8] of Alpha, 7, change only seems to occur between an attribute and its opposite. However, this three part structure can be clearly seen regardless of which of the "simple" parts occupies which position. In other words, if the structure of

change can be extracted from the description of attributive change that is offered, then it appears safe to claim that Aristotle is offering a structure of generation that will withstand the "shift" to substantive generation.

Regarding this shift, it is noted by Christopher P. Long that the first part of Alpha, 7 ends at 190b 5.[9] Long claims that it is here that Aristotle first addresses substantive or unqualified or simple change. The lines leading up to this "end point" are as follows:

> Now "becoming" has many senses: (a) In certain cases a thing is said to become a this in a qualified sense, while (b) a becoming without qualification exists only of substances. And it is evident that in the former cases something underlies that which is in the process of generation; for in the generation of some quantity or some quality or some relation or sometime or somewhere, there is some underlying subject, because only a substance is not said of [predicated of] some other underlying subject whereas all others are said of substances. However, it will become evident on further examination that also substances and all other unqualified beings are generated from some underlying subject, for there is always some underlying subject from which the thing generated comes to be, i.e., plants and animals from seeds. (190a 32–190b 5)[10]

If a shift is taking place here, it is seemingly occurring without hesitation. This is not to outright deny any possibility of a shift happening. Perhaps Aristotle is indeed recognizing the need to move away from what has been established so far regarding the underlying subject/substance (both in this text as well as the *Categories* where *hypokeimenon* was discussed [2a 11–2b 6]). However, and this repeats an earlier point of our investigation, the "problem" presented here seems to be based on a particular premise that may not hold such sway. It is only if the principles, whatever they may be, are spoken in isolation (as the earlier thinkers spoke them) that the manner of their mingling becomes a topic for discussion. In other words, if the principles are identified, noetically received, as inseparable from each other (as if there actually is an "each" "other" here), then their interactions are seen along with the principles themselves. The manner of the inter-coursings of the principles, which might just be a reference to the "generation" (*genesis*) of the principles by nature, is what enables the principles to emerge as the principles they are. What results is that the articulating of these principles is likewise framed by the speaking of beings according to *genesis*. Speaking according to *genesis* (by nature) allows for the principles of beings by nature to be understood as enfolded instead of separate things cooperating with one another. Although this point will hopefully become clearer when analogy receives direct attention below, it may be safe to claim at this point that seeing a "shift" or transition in Aristotle's development of generation is overstated.

Having attempted to reorient the above passage according to a primary concern of Aristotle's (namely, the proper receiving of *logos* which enables the silent constituents of *logos* to be had), an interpretation of the essence of this passage can be offered. Our attempted reorientation creates an approach to Aristotle's possible transition that flattens its "problematic" status. So far, Aristotle tells us that the principles by nature are two or three in number and that they entail contraries and an underlying subject. Aristotle has not identified these principles by name—although he will do so a few lines after the above passage. What Aristotle offers is simply the structure of the principles by nature. This structure is not affected by any sort of transition from attributive change to substantive change. What changes by nature is always a being comprised of the (two or three) principles, thus it is always a composite. As a composite, "simple" change is possible, but only within the organization of the composite being. This seems clear in the following passage:

> Things in the process of generation without specification may be generated by the changing of shape, as a statue from bronze; or by addition, like things which increase; or else by removal of something, like the statue Hermes from the stone; or by composition, like a house; or by alteration, like things which alter with respect to their matter. It is evident that all things which are being generated in this manner are generated from an underlying subject. So it is clear from what has been said that the thing in generation is always a composite, and there is that [say, A] which is generated, and what comes to be that [i.e., A] is something else, and this in two senses, either the subject or the opposite. By "the opposite" I mean, for example, the unmusical; by "the subject" I mean the man; and the shapelessness and the formlessness and the disorder are opposites, while the bronze and the stone and the gold are underlying subjects. (190b 6–17)[11]

What Aristotle is telling us here, which appears to be consistent with the idea that he is delivering us a *structure* for generation primarily, is that simple change has many forms and requires an underlying subject. Aristotle is not telling us in this passage that the underlying subject need always be something other than the attributes. That is, Aristotle is not saying that change regarding the attributes is in some way spoken differently than substantive change. The generation of a plant from a seed fits this "kinetic" structure in the same way that the unmusical person becomes musical. The seed is analogous to the person, in these examples. These two examples of change (attributive and substantive) can be compared analogically because they can be organized by this three-part change structure of two contraries and an underlying subject.

Again, it should be noted that we are not outright rejecting the possibility of some sort of transition occurring from the early lines of Alpha, 7 to its later lines. However, it does seem that characterizing this transition as a

"shift"—as if to accuse Aristotle of changing course—is overstated. If Alpha, 7 is read with a focus on the structure of change instead of a focus on types of change, then transitioning from attributive to substantive change is merely an example of furthering the point that (any) change by nature happens according to this structure. If Aristotle's focus is on the articulation of the first principles of beings by nature, then this structure of generation that Aristotle seems to be offering would have to be able to be articulated. This point is present in the following passage (which follows directly after the previously cited passage in the *Physics*):

> Thus if, of things by nature, there are causes or principles of which those things are composed primarily and from which they come to be not accidentally, but come to be what each of them is called according to its substance, then everything which is generated is generated from a subject and a form; for the musical man is composed, in a sense, of a man and the musical, since one would be analyzing the formula [of the musical man] by giving a formula of each of these two. Clearly, then, things in generation come to be from these [causes or principles]. (190b 18–24)[12]

Everything generated comes from a being which is a composite of substance[13] and form (*morphē*). Such composite beings show themselves as addressable and are the beings that throughout our investigation have been referred to as beings qua *logos* (referring to the definition, *logos*, that is given to a being as it presents itself in the world—the definition that emerges from the being's form, *morphē*). It is due to the fact that these beings are speakable that they are able to be analyzed. As the simple parts of composite beings are focused on, they are named and given a "formula."

From this passage there also seems to be a potential privileging of *logos, morphē* over substance.[14] Apparently, this is the passage of Alpha, 7 that Sean Kelsey sees as the turning point. He refers to this passage as a natural break in the chapter because "formula" receives an esteemed position in the organization of the principles of generation. Following Kelsey's line of thinking, Aristotle is revising the first part of Alpha, 7 in order to account for substantive change (which Kelsey sees as lacking in the first part of the chapter). However, our study sees this so-called privileging of form as Aristotle doing something else, something in line with our claim that Aristotle is concerned with the articulation of the first principles as received by nature. It seems to be more the case that Aristotle is describing a certain flexibility in the way of speaking the kinetic principles instead of editing the work put forth in the first part of Alpha, 7. The principles of motion function in a certain way.[15] One principle functions as the form and another principle functions as what stays the same throughout generation. In terms of *morphē* and *hypokeimenon*, these should perhaps be thought of as descriptions of the way principles function opposed to thinking the principles in a more inactive

manner; i.e., to name a principle is to name its function. [16] In doing so, it becomes possible to think of "form" as remaining itself while substance, although always underlying, undergoes change. In the first part of the chapter, Aristotle speaks only of *hypokeimenon* as remaining the same throughout change. In the second part of the chapter, Aristotle claims that all things generated are "generated from *hypokeimenou* and *morphēs*" (190b 21) and that subjects (*hypokeimenon*) can change. Does this mean that form (*morphē*) remains the same? Aristotle does not exactly say this, nor will Aristotle say so in a few lines when he directly articulates the three principles of becoming beings. Instead, Aristotle will name *logos* as that principle that is neither *hypokeimenon* nor *sterēsis*. This seems to be the case since although the material form (*morphē*) does not remain the same through substantive change, the being's definition (*logos*) does. [17] For example, the seed's form (*morphē*) does not remain the same as the plant emerges into presence, but the definition (*logos*) of the seed does—not qua seed but qua the type of seed that it is. What results is that since *logos* defines/speaks the composite being, whichever of the principles is currently under analysis will be "given a formula" (190b 24), i.e., will be qua *logos*. This is not to say that each principle reveals itself in the same way as composite beings reveal themselves. Silent principles remain just that—silent (*a-logos*). The only thing that seems to change as chapter 7 continues is that the different functioning principles can each be expressed according to the composite being in its totality. In other words, since the principles of becoming beings mingle, the speaking of any of the principles implies the other principles. That is, speaking of any one of the principles is a *way* of speaking of the composite being in its totality. This does not mean Aristotle is changing the functioning of the principles or in some way changing the principles themselves to account for a previously unrealized type of generation. Instead, what Aristotle seems to be suggesting is that either of the principles can be spoken from out of the articulation of the composite being. So, the functioning of the principles remains the same, only the ability to speak different principles is injected into the discussion. As such, Aristotle does not revise himself in the middle of Alpha 7; he simply begins to engage the dynamics of how to speak the principles of composite beings—some of which are "spoken" silently.

If this holds true, then the only "shift" that takes place from the beginning to the end of Alpha, 7 is that Aristotle shows that the articulation (*logos*) of the functioning of the principles by nature (which he has still yet to name) is able to move from principle to principle. Such kinetic speech, i.e., the speech of generation/*genesis* refers to the ability of *logos* to move its voice from principle to principle. This shows the ability to demonstrate composite beings according to different principles, different perspectives. This kinetic speech might be an example of what Aristotle means when he writes that being can be said in many ways. It is due to this ability to speak a being

according to different principles, which also refers to the ability to speak the same principles according to different beings, that earlier enabled us to look at the (substantive) change from seed to plant as analogous to the (attributive) change from unmusical person to musical person.

So far, from what has been said about Alpha, 7, there are a few points that can be made. One point is that Aristotle appears to be offering an organization of kinetic principles from which the principles of becoming beings can receive articulation. Another point that can be pulled is that Aristotle seems to design this organization of kinetic principles of nature with a built in flexibility that enables it (the composite's natural arrangement) to be spoken in different ways. This means that all parts of the arrangement of natural principles can be grasped by way of *logos*, though not in the same way. This arrangement always shows itself as a composite being qua *logos*. So, at the root of every expression of *logos* lies the rest of the arrangement that is expressed through the composite's form. That is, the other principles not directly spoken, those non-being constituents that contribute to the being as present and speakable, remain silent at the root of *logos* itself.

Now it is the task of our investigation to attempt to discover how the underlying and silent aspects of this arrangement of principles finds articulation through *logos*. Now it is our goal to discuss how, through *logos*, the totality of the composite being receives articulation.

LOGOS AS RADICAL ANALOGY

By 191a line 8 of the *Physics*, Aristotle offers three principles of the becoming being. These three principles are: (1) the formula [*logos*] of the becoming being; (2) the privation [*sterēsis*] of this form; (3) the underlying matter [*hypokeimenon*] that persists throughout the being's becoming. It is the mingling of these three principles that designs the arrangement of the kinetic principles "by nature" that Aristotle has been working toward throughout *Physics* Alpha.

What this section of our investigation is ultimately concerned with is how the underlying and hidden aspects of the arrangement of these principles find articulation. Specifically, it will be argued that analogy (*analogia*) enables those parts of the structure that do not get expressed directly by *logos* to be spoken. Said differently, this section of our study is concerned with the relationship between analogy and silent non-being roots. Non-being, here, accounts for both qualified non-being and unqualified being. Again, as mentioned in an earlier endnote (endnote 5 in the introduction), since unqualified being resides outside of perception and addressability, it is categorized here as a type of non-being—even though it is essentially "being" in its most proper sense. These two senses of non-being rely on each other for their

existence and function and as such should probably be thought as a two folded non-being. Non-being refers to the aspects of the becoming being that are absent yet still active in the being's becoming. As absent yet still active, non-being stands out as formative for the becoming being. In terms of the three principles that Aristotle offers, non-being is represented by the privation (*sterēsis*) of the being's formula and the underlying matter (*hypokeimenon*) that allows the being to remain itself in the process of becoming. What will now be argued is that non-being, the absent yet active parts of the addressable being, receives articulation by way of analogy.

An attempt will be made to explicate the structure of analogy. *Logos* captures the presence or formula of the becoming being, but it can only analogically articulate the privation of this formula. Included with the privation of this formula is the underlying matter. We can say, then, that it is only by way of analogy that *sterēsis* and *hypokeimenon* can be articulated. For *logos* to fully articulate the being qua becoming, it must pull momentum from the analogical voicing of its silent constituents (*sterēsis* and *hypokeimenon*). Even when *hypokeimenon* can be "directly" named, as in the case of a person underlying the change from unmusical to musical, it is still named as that part of the change that remains concealed and hidden as changed. In other words, the person who changes in the movement from unmusical to musical remains a concealed aspect of the change that takes place. The only way it can be addressed that the person changed is by way of the musical skills that the person has now acquired. The person qua person (where their musical talents are unknown) is not recognized as changed; the change is only able to be accounted for through their new musical abilities. When their musical talents are on display, the person is then an in-formed subject. As an underlying subject, even a material underlying subject, the person as changed is in a way concealed in her/his changing.

What the basic design of analogy shows is that, for the most part, its content is the silent non-being character of the being qua *logos*. That is, the content of analogy is the privation of *logos* (*a-logos*), which is always for the sake of *logos*. The prefix "*ana*" of *analogia* carries the sense of "up," "upon," "in," etc. As such, *ana-logia* claims beings from a type of distance. "Distance," here, in that *ana-logia* claims beings from a position up against *logos*—yet still for the sake of *logos*. This distance entails the non-being content of *logos* that does not receive direct articulation. The distance articulated through *ana-logia* is the distance laid open by *sterēsis* and *hypokeimenon*. Insofar as *ana* entails this two fold sense of non-being, *ana* can almost be thought as *an-a*, as two combined prefixes negating *logos* and the ability to speak directly. Thinking *ana* as *an-a* is not an attempt at making an etymological point. Rather, this merely offers a way to think the relationship between analogy and the non-being principles Aristotle offers in *Physics* Alpha, 7.

Although *logos* names the becoming being in its formula, and as such reveals the being as a whole, it is only from out of the dynamics of analogy that *logos* can do this. That is to say, it is only through the articulation and revelation by analogy that *logos* can speak to the completeness of the becoming being. As such, *logos* is essentially rooted in *ana-logia* in that analogy brings the hidden components of *logos* into speakability. Thus, we can say, *logos* is radical analogy.

Thinking *logos* in terms of radical analogy begins to illuminate what was above called the structure of analogy. The structure of analogy brings to light not just those aspects of the becoming being that are silent in the articulation by *logos*, but, as such, this structure reveals *logos* in its most radical design. *Analogia* reveals how the being becomes, moves, withdraws away from its addressable form then back into its addressability. This movement of withdrawing away then returning back designs "becoming" itself. This movement can be seen in the very coming to be of the being qua *logos*. That is, the structure of analogy articulates the basic movement of the becoming being and thus uncovers a particular movement entailed within the word (*logos*) that claims it. The movement of the becoming being [from being, to non-being, back into being] is structurally identical with, i.e., analogous to, the movement of the becoming of speech (from *logos*, to *ana-logos*, back into *logos*). The structure of analogy, then, articulates the being qua becoming and therefore uncovers the *genesis* of *logos* itself. So, what *logos* offers is a revelation through demonstration. The *genesis* of *logos* is revealed through articulating the being qua becoming.[18]

Essentially, the structure of analogy reveals a three-fold. The three-fold entails the being qua *logos* as the point of departure of its own movement, its privative non-being constituents, and the being qua *logos* as the renewed point of return. To further explain this three-fold, the double-movement that makes the three-fold possible can be noted. The double-movement travels from *logos* qua point of departure, through its concealed non-being features, back to *logos* qua renewed point of return. This renewed *logos* is armed with the abilities to speak from its silent foundation. It will be argued that the withdrawal into silence marks the behavior of *sterēsis*. It will also be argued that the return of this withdrawal back into speakability marks the behavior of *hypokeimenon*. Thought together, *sterēsis* and *hypokeimenon* yield a double directionality that is formative for the becoming being as speakable. Thus, the double movement and the three-fold must be understood as co-determinants of each other. This three-fold double movement is the structure of analogy.

The guiding passage of this section of our study can be seen at *Physics* 191a 8–14. Here, Aristotle not only concisely offers the three principles of the becoming being (*logos, sterēsis,* and *hypokeimenon*) but he also makes clear that *hypokeimenon* is knowable by way of analogy. Through *analogia,*

hypokeimenon can be revealed and articulated. Aristotle does not say here that *sterēsis* can be spoken by way of analogy. Our investigation will argue that *sterēsis* does in fact find its voice through *analogia* but only by way of the analogical articulation of *hypokeimenon*. Aristotle writes:

> As for the underlying nature, it is knowable by analogy. Thus, as bronze is to the statue or the wood is to the bed or the matter or the formless object prior to receiving a form is to that which has form, so is this [underlying nature] to a substance or to a this or to being. This then is one of the principles, though it is not one nor a being in the manner of a this; another [principle] is the formula; then there is the contrary to the latter, and this is the privation. (191a 8–14)[19]

Before I attempt the elucidation of the double movement offered by *sterēsis* and *hypokeimenon*, I will repeat a few important lines from earlier chapters. I think it may be helpful to repeat certain points for two primary reasons: (1) to recapitulate the premises of our project thus far; and (2) to attempt to build momentum for the sake of concisely unfolding the position that *logos* is radical analogy.

Logos, translated as "formula" here, captures the being in its speakable form. What remains hidden in the being captured in its speakable form are the concealed features that allow the being to emerge as it is. In other words, what remains hidden in the speaking of *logos* are the non-being components that move the being into speakability. Now it is the interest of our study to discuss *hypokeimenon* in order to show how the being qua *logos*, i.e., the being as speakable, is moved into speakability.

From here, a few reminders of the speakability of *sterēsis* can be offered for the sake of establishing the analogical root of *logos*. *Sterēsis*, in that it is the privation of the being qua *logos*, should be addressed with the speakability of *logos* in mind. In other words, in that *logos* speaks to the being in its form and *sterēsis* is the privation of this form, *sterēsis* should be read as "against" *logos*. As such, *sterēsis* itself should be recognized as un-addressable, as *a-logos*.

Sterēsis, as absent and voiceless, does not just indicate non-being in general but a qualified non-being. In order to reveal why this is the case, we should remember what was mentioned earlier regarding contrariety (188a 33–188b 2). Essentially, what the being's contrary does is lay open the only possible course for which the being's movement occurs. The being's contrary gives the being its proper course for becoming. The becoming being does not become by simply moving away from what it currently is, i.e., the being does not move in just any direction. Instead, the being becomes in the direction of its opposite. The being's opposite plays a productive role in the being qua *logos*. So, the being's "formula" (the being's arrangement of natural principles expressed by *logos*) entails a reference to its contrary in that it is continuously moving in the direction laid open by its contrary. This en-

ables the movement of becoming to be read as the departing from the current form of the becoming being toward its contrary. It is this departing that makes the being a becoming being. Said differently, what is revealed in the speaking of the becoming being qua *logos* is its reliance on the productive powers of its contrary characteristic (188b 22–26).

For privation (*sterēsis)*, "not having" does not exist by itself; it is always said in relation to some thing. To speak about *sterēsis* is to speak about a *thing* that lacks (as much as it is a speaking about a lacking thing). As such, *sterēsis* can never be exhaustively treated in isolation. The union of the being qua *logos* and its deprivation shows *sterēsis* unfolding a necessary relation within the nature of the being. As a necessary relation, *sterēsis* entails a type of possessive character. That is, in that *sterēsis* is necessary and inseparable from its being qua *logos*, the being takes its "formula," i.e., its speakability, in part, from *sterēsis*. Conversely, *sterēsis* takes its point of departure from the being that lacks. So, it can be said that both the lacking being and *sterēsis* have and are had by each other. In terms of possession, we can read *sterēsis* as both the possession and possessor of the being qua *logos*. They are inseparable in that each possesses the other and thus each contributes to the other's existence. Later, I will address exactly how each contributes to the existence of the other. While addressing *hypokeimenon* below, we will be able to articulate how *sterēsis* is brought back into *logos* that allows *logos* to reveal a fuller and more complete articulation of the becoming being.

Hypokeimenon is the underlying substance that unifies the being qua *logos* with *sterēsis*. Being qua *logos* is in a continuous state of motion in the direction cleared by *sterēsis*. *Sterēsis* shows the being qua *logos* as always and already withdrawing away from its current state toward its contrary state. As such, the being qua *logos* is in a continuous state of destruction and generation while moving away from what it was into what it will be, i.e., while it actualizes the qualified potential accounted for by *sterēsis*. Conversely, this qualified potential is also in a continuous state of destruction and generation in that the potential accounted for by *sterēsis* fades into actuality and future potentialities emerge. *Hypokeimenon* is the substance that survives and remains itself throughout the double destruction and double generation of actuality and potentiality.

As the illustration of the role *hypokeimenon* plays in the structure of analogy begins, it should be remembered that Aristotle sees this underlying matter as a type of substance. Although "type" of substance is used here, *hypokeimenon* is ultimately "substance" in its most radical form. Aristotle writes:

> The term "substance" is spoken of, if not in more, still in four main senses; for the essence is thought to be the substance of an individual, and the universal, and the genus, and fourthly the underlying subject. The subject is that of which

the others are said, but the subject itself is not said of anything else. And so we must describe first the subject; for the primary subject is thought to be a substance in the highest degree. (1028b 33–1029a 2)[20]

Here, it is clear that Aristotle is giving a privileged status to *hypokeimenon* while describing the many ways of thinking substance or being ("*ousia*" is the term used in this passage). *Hypokeimenon*, Aristotle tells us, is not said of anything else; it does not emerge into being in the same manner that other attributes do. As the white thing becomes a not-white thing, the whiteness is being destroyed and the not-whiteness is generating. Throughout this generation, the thing that was white and is now becoming not-white remains the thing it is. What specifically remains, that is, what *hypokeimenon* is in a more concrete sense, will receive treatment below. What is important to note is that *hypokeimenon* is that which survives the change when the addressable being is lead in the direction of its contrary by the being's privation. In this way, *hypokeimenon* serves to unify the being qua *logos* and its privation by allowing the being to remain a being throughout the transition.

As the unifier of shape and material, *hypokeimenon* can be read as a type of persistent matter that prevails throughout both shape and material. It is persistent "matter" because as shaped material changes its shape, the matter remains itself. "Matter," here, needs to be read according to the *potential to be* this shape or that shape. By referring to *hypokeimenon* as persistent matter, then, we can also read *hypokeimenon* as persistent potential. This is the case in that the persistent and prevailing potential demonstrated by *hypokeimenon* is what allows a particular (qualified) shape to be joined with a particular (qualified) material. This way, this potential is inseparable from both shape and material in that it prevails in each individually. This could be what Aristotle is referring to when he writes that *hypokeimenon* is "thought to be substance in the highest degree (*hypokeimenon prōton*)."

Hypokeimenon, as the radical potentiality of the becoming being, "entails" both shape and material of the becoming being. *Hypokeimenon* is a type of source for each (shape and material) in that each only has existence in light of it being unified with the other. Aristotle writes:

> We must reckon as a principle and as primary the matter which underlies, though it is inseparable from, the contrary qualities, for the hot is not matter for the cold nor the cold for the hot, but the *substratum* is matter for them both. Thus as principles we have *firstly* that which is a potentially perceptible body, *secondly* the contraries (I mean, e.g., heat and cold) and *thirdly* Fire, Water and the like. (329a 29–34)[21]

Hypokeimenon is radical potentiality because it is the most original source of "formula" (*logos*) and its privation (*sterēsis*). This radical potentiality can be named a source due to the fact that without it no union of form and privation

could be had. In the absence of *hypokeimenon*, "formula" would refer to an ossified image and "privation" would simply be *lacking*.

Hypokeimenon and *sterēsis*, as the joining of formula with its privation and the privation itself, make up the hidden non-being qualities of the becoming being. What distinguishes these two senses of non-being is the way they function with respect to the being qua *logos*. To illuminate their difference, Aristotle writes:

> For, as that which is in something [in the matter], it is this which in itself is being destroyed, since it is the privation in it [in the matter] that is being destroyed; but as that which exists in virtue of its potentiality, this is not being destroyed in itself but is necessarily indestructible and unchangeable. For (a) if the latter were to be generated, it would have to be generated from something else which is present and must be a primary underlying subject; yet its nature is to be just this, so it would then be existing prior to its generation (for by "matter" here we mean the underlying subject in a thing, from which [matter], as something present but not as an attribute, something else is generated). And (b) if it were to be destroyed, it would ultimately arrive at this very thing, so it would then be destroyed prior to its destruction. (192a 27–34)[22]

Above, it was mentioned that both *sterēsis* and *hypokeimenon* could be thought in light of Aristotle's discussions of potentiality. If we take our cue from what was said above regarding *sterēsis* as the domain of the potentiality of the "lacking" being, then the placement of these two senses of hidden non-being can be seen. *Sterēsis* accounts for potentiality that takes its momentum from contrariety, i.e., *sterēsis* is not radical indeterminacy. As such, the potentiality marked by *sterēsis* heads in a direction away from the being qua *logos* toward its silent (*a-logos*) and qualified non-being. However, for this potentiality to be formative in its absence and silence, as was established above, it must be returned back into articulation; it must be in-formed. It is here that the directionality of *hypokeimenon* can be seen. *Hypokeimenon* offers a more original and radical sense of potentiality than that marked by *sterēsis* in that it enables the potentiality of the being qua *logos* to be unified with *logos* itself. In other words, the potentiality accounted for by *sterēsis* can only be articulated if there is, already existing, a potential to unite it with its being qua *logos*. *Hypokeimenon* (prime matter, radical potentiality) as the unifier of the being qua *logos* and its privation, is basically the potentiality for the implication and articulation of the being's qualified potentiality. As such, we can see that *sterēsis* relies on *hypokeimenon* for its very existence. Said differently, the specific being's potentiality can only be activated by a potentiality of a "higher degree." This potentiality of a higher degree is marked by *hypokeimenon*. It is due to *hypokeimenon* that *sterēsis* is brought back to the being qua *logos* and thus stands-out as formative for it.

Sterēsis is, in a sense, the possession and possessor of the addressable form of the becoming being. Possession, here, regarding *sterēsis* needs to be thought in terms of the unifying feature of *hypokeimenon*. Specifically, possession can be described according to the *direction* in which the unification by *hypokeimenon* occurs.

It was said above that *sterēsis* (*a-logos*), pulling its momentum from contrariety, withdraws away from the speakability of the becoming being. The direction of this withdrawal is always *away*. For this withdrawal away to be constitutive of the being qua *logos*, as was stated above, this withdrawal must somehow be brought back into the *logos* from which it withdrew. It is this bringing back of the withdrawn away potentiality that shows the direction of *hypokeimenon*. *Hypokeimenon* claims the return of the cast out potentiality marked by *sterēsis*. It is only due to this returning by *hypokeimenon* that *sterēsis* is active for the formula of the becoming being. For privation to be a constitutive feature for being, it must be unified by means of this return.

Hypokeimenon redirects the movement of withdrawal laid open by *sterēsis* and returns it to its "original" point of departure. The term "original" is placed in quotes here because, although we are speaking to the point of departure from which potentiality projects, the return signifies a replenished point. *Sterēsis* projects from *logos* and is returned to *logos* by *hypokeimenon* in such a way that *logos* is renewed. It is *renewed* in the sense that the being it always was, still is, as becoming what it will be. As redirecting the movement of withdrawal of *sterēsis, hypokeimenon* can itself be read as a type of withdrawal from the silent non-being implicated by *sterēsis*. It is a withdrawal from *sterēsis* and not simply a departure since *hypokeimenon* does not leave the offering of *sterēsis* behind. In this unifying, *hypokeimenon* escorts *sterēsis,* escorts *a-logos*, back into speakability.

As the privation of *logos* can be said to be *a-logos*, the privation of *a-logos* (*hypokeimenon*) can be marked by *ana-logos*. Here, we return to the opening line of the "guiding passage" (*Physics* 191a 8–14) of this section of our investigation where Aristotle tells us that *hypokeimenon* can be known by way of *analogia*. *Hypokeimenon* can be marked by *ana-logia* because it allows the silence of *sterēsis* to be heard. However, it is important to note that *sterēsis* as *sterēsis* remains silent. A voice is given to *sterēsis* by way of *hypokeimenon,* but this voice speaks differently by announcing, in part, what always remains silent. It is for this reason that the silence of *sterēsis* is not simply disregarded and reduced out of the arrangement. So, we can therefore say that part of what is spoken by way of analogy remains silent.

Again, the two domains of non-being (*sterēsis* and *hypokeimenon*) can be read according to the direction of potentiality that each marks. In other words, the direction of potentiality marked by *sterēsis* is a withdrawing away from the being qua *logos* and into the being's silent and qualified non-being. The direction of potentiality marked by *hypokeimenon* is the returning of the

withdrawn potentiality back into the being qua *logos* which allows this silent qualification to be heard. In that each direction depends on the other, it is perhaps more responsible to read these together as a double directional potentiality. This double directional potentiality is the determinant potentiality that is active in all actuality, for Aristotle. This double directionality characterizes the way *a-logos* withdraws away from and then returns to constitute the being qua *logos*. That is to say, the articulation of this double directional potentiality that puts non-being in play discloses the ability of *logos* to speak beyond mere presence. By revealing the potentiality to speak non-being in this way, *logos* shows that it takes momentum from an implicit silence to claim the being qua becoming. As was mentioned above (endnote 18 in chapter 4), *logos* cannot be unearthed in that the attempt to do so requires *logos* itself. As such, the revelation of *logos* occurs through its own demonstration and generation. Support for the unavoidable nature of *logos* here may be the fact that Aristotle offers, as one of the three principles of the becoming being, "*logos*" for that which claims the "formula" of the becoming being. That is, an immediate confrontation with the being always takes place according to *logos*; all confrontation is the confrontation with the being as addressable.

"Actuality" can be said to refer to the presentation of the being qua *logos*. As our study has discussed thus far, potentiality (which now must always be read as a double directional potentiality) must be articulated differently due to the silence of *sterēsis*. So, it is only by way of *analogia* (the speakability that entails silence) that potentiality can be spoken. Aristotle writes:

> Now actuality is the existence of a thing, not in the way in which we say something exists potentially. For example, we say that Hermes is potentially in the wood and that the half-line is in the whole line, in view of the fact that in each case what exists potentially can be separated from the whole; and we say that the man is the scientist even if he is not in the process of investigating something, provided that he is capable of doing this; but Hermes and the line when separated, and the scientist in the process of investigation, these exist in actuality. What we mean is clear by induction from individual cases, and we should not seek a definition of everything but should also perceive an object by means of analogy. (1048a 32–1048b 7)[23]

The term "definition" in the last line of this passage translates "*horon*." H. G. Apostle notes[24] that *horos* and *logos* (when used as "definition" or "formula") "seem to be used synonymously." This is important for the understanding of this passage. We can re-read this line as saying that we should not base our perceptions on *logos* alone. Being qua *logos* may offer perception an immediate import; however, there is more to the confrontation than what is given by the presentation of *logos*. There is more entailed in the confrontation than *logos* can directly articulate. Aristotle seems to be telling us that

there is something *beyond* the instant offering of *logos*—which means more original and radical than what *logos* directly speaks—that must be considered while claiming the being. This "beyond" *logos* is articulated by way of analogy. What is more radical than *logos* is *analogia*, the offering of the silent privation within speech.

Part of the dynamic of analogy is the ability to articulate the being according to its functionality. In other words, through analogy, *logos* can address a being in relation to other beings. It is here that the thinking of analogy along the lines of a mathematical proportionality can be faced. Aristotle writes:

> Things which are said to be in actuality are not all called so in the same manner but by analogy, that is, as A is in B or is related to B, so C is in D or is related to D, for, in some cases, actuality is to the potential as motion is to the power to move, in others, as a substance to some matter. (1048b 7–10)[25]

What can be seen here, other than the basic formation of mathematical proportionality, is Aristotle offering analogy as a way to address actuality. Our investigation has attempted to establish analogy as the voice of potentiality, but here Aristotle seems to be saying that actuality as well can receive its articulation through analogy. Aristotle illustrates how actuality can be spoken by way of analogy through the basic formation of mathematical proportionality. If we can describe the basic formation of mathematical proportionality in terms of the articulated silence discussed above, then mathematical proportionality is the comparing of being qua *logos* on the basis of its silent constituents. In that analogy identifies a being's silent features, this silence can be compared from one being to another. This silence (*a-logos*) speaks for the privation (*sterēsis*) of the addressable being. *Sterēsis* accounts for the potentiality of a being qua *logos* that, through the returning dynamic of *hypokeimenon,* unfolds the being in its becoming and completeness. It is this becoming (the way, the how, the how far), then, that is articulated through the identified silence of analogy. To speak about the being in its completeness requires this articulation of its silent features. It is only here that the being as actual can be compared to another being as actual. So, to speak about mathematical proportionality is to speak about the comparing of the silent features shared between beings. Likewise, proportionality is the gathering and letting lie side-by-side of the beings spoken about. This comparing and gathering together is analogy thought as mathematical proportionality.

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CONCLUDING REMARKS REGARDING
LOGOS AS RADICAL ANALOGY

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There are few points that can be taken from the above section on the analogical roots of *logos*. One point is that *sterēsis* may be equally important as

hypokeimenon. Although the above section does not set out to deny Aristotle's assertion that *hypokeimenon* holds a privileged status in the organization of kinetic principles, our investigation suggests that *sterēsis* reduces the immediacy of *hypokeimenon* by itself occupying a necessary and primary position in this organization of principles. The primary role of *sterēsis* can be seen in the way it negotiates the "space" between *logos* and *hypokeimenon* in such a way that it (*sterēsis*) "enables" *hypokeimenon* to operate as (*prōton*) potentiality in the highest degree.

Another point that can be taken from the above section on the structure of analogy, and this follows the first point taken, is that potentiality and actuality are necessarily a part of the elucidation of Aristotle's description of *hypokeimenon*. To say that *sterēsis* "enables" *hypokeimenon* to operate as potentiality in the highest degree is to indicate that, in a sense, the potentiality of *hypokeimenon* lies latent until activated by *sterēsis*. This claim, though, is incomplete in that *sterēsis* itself depends on *hypokeimenon* for its ability to withdrawal in the first place. Thus it can be seen that the discussion of *hypokeimenon* requires a discussion of potentiality, which itself requires a discussion of *sterēsis*. Thus, the primary role of *sterēsis* is seen.

The primary role of *sterēsis* not only challenges the first in rank ontological status of *hypokeimenon*, it safe-keeps the many possible forms of the being qua *logos*. Aristotle often claims that being can be said in many ways (*legetai pollakhōs*). To claim that a being can be *said* in many ways suggests that the being entails the possibility to express many addressable forms. An addressable being, however, does not express many forms, rather it expresses one form (at a time). Yet, it is through this single expression that the other possible expressions can be spoken, thought, known, etc. These "hidden" expressions—those not directly announced qua *logos*—are always qualified in that they are withdrawn from the form currently expressed. This shows the currently addressable form to function as a sort of "focal meaning" to which all hidden and possible forms correspond. So, the ability to say a being in many ways might be a gesture toward the primary ontological status of *sterēsis* since the various forms of a being fall within the domain of privation.

As important as it is to point out the essential role of *sterēsis*, it does not account for the ambiguity of being completely. For this, unqualified being/substance need to be considered. What *hypokeimenon* seems to do in an original way is return the qualified potentiality within the domain of *sterēsis* back to the form of the generating natural being. Lacking such potentiality to return, the manifold of forms that each particular form implies would be irrelevant. Without the ability to install the manifold potentiality of *sterēsis*, *genesis* would be reduced to a motion that entailes no continuity (cf. *Metaphysics* 1033a 24–1033b 5). It is this withdrawal from privation back into *logos* that brings the radical potentiality of *hypokeimenon* to addressability. Analogy is this addressability insofar as *hypokeimenon* is the original content

of *analogia*. That is to say, analogy brings the manifold potentiality within the domain of *sterēsis* as well as the radical potentiality demonstrated by *hypokeimenon* to speech, to *logos*. Analogy then is the preservation of the ambiguity of being as expressed through individual beings. The ambiguity of being is safe-kept by claiming *logos* as radical analogy.

Above, it was discussed how the first principles of natural beings are grasped by way of *nous*. At this point, it can be said that the principles of becoming beings are spoken by way of analogy. These two claims gathered together indicate that analogy, along with the ability to speak the principles of natural beings, entails the ability to bring the noetic experience to the level of speech. The noetic experience—described above as a sort of intellectual instinct—makes perceivable the origin of any experience by "making" (430a 15) the origin and nature of any being received through sensation. Bringing the noetic experience into the level of addressability re-claims the relationship between *logos* and *nous*. This does not reduce the gap between these two; in fact, it illuminates their formative differences. The gap between *logos* and *nous* is "formative" in that it sets the course for thinking the origin of being(s) by stressing the inability of *logos* to determine what such origination might be. Such indeterminateness can be formative since the manifoldness and ambiguity of being(s) that is noetically beheld extend beyond what is graspable by *logos* yet speaks of the being qua *logos*. That which extends beyond the grip of *logos* remains within the reach of analogy. As such, analogy has the ability to articulate, although in its own way, the origin/principles/nature of being(s) in a manner that *logos* cannot. So, through the structure of analogy, the gap between *logos* and *nous* points out the limitation of *logos* and thus "forms" the openness and ambiguity of being that Aristotle so frequently claims.

By way of analogy, the ambiguity of being(s) is brought along with every expression of *logos*. The ambiguity of being is spoken analogically. Such ambiguity reveals the principles of becoming beings that, on the one hand, design the nature of each natural being and, on the other hand, are not unique to any single natural being. What seems to result from this is that the principles are spoken (always analogically) according to the particular forms expressed by nature and received throughout the lived experience. It is this way that the principles can be spoken according to different beings and in different ways. Such variation and manifoldness, such ambiguity, always corresponds to the natural principles noetically acquired. So, analogy brings to articulation the noetic experiencing of natural beings according to their qualified potentiality always concealed in privation.

Regarding the two courses of interpreting analogy in Aristotle discussed in chapter one, mathematical proportionality (the "formal" approach) fails to secure the underlying ambiguity that is determined in each expression by *logos*. The "correlative" approach to analogy in Aristotle seems to get closer

to such preservation, but it too seems to reduce the *genesis* that characterizes *logos* to a strictly qualified movement. By way of analogy, every expression of *logos* represents the noetic experience from which it (*logos*) emerges. The noetic experience, the acquiring of principles, can find representation by way of any expression; since analogy lies at the root of the expression. As such, analogy for Aristotle is present in all linguistic expressions and thus seems to serve as the condition for the possibility of the types of interpretations discussed in chapter one. That is to say, for Aristotle, analogy is a noetic form of language under which all other expressions get subsumed. Aristotle does not explain analogy in relation to synonymous (or univocal) and homonymous (or equivocal) speech—as others describing analogy in Aristotle do. Instead, analogy can be seen as generating along with the natural principles that it (analogy) speaks.

To say *logos* is radical analogy is to reclaim the relationship between language and the natural principles we intuitively grasp through experience. These principles of nature are the content of knowledge; to know a thing is to know its principles. Insofar as Aristotle sees a separation between these principles and our ability to speak about them, Aristotle places a limit on our ability to articulate what is knowable. The structure of analogy, insofar as it reveals the ability of *logos* to reflect the kinetic principles of becoming, brings the extent of our knowledge into our linguistic capabilities. Although analogy is a form of indirect speech, it still enables the understanding of an experience to be spoken. For example, I know I love my children but I am unable to directly articulate why I love them, how I love, and the extent to which I love them. I can speak directly of certain qualities of my children—but that only names those certain qualities. That articulating these qualities indicates the love I have for them requires the analogical dynamics of speech to be understood. My love for my children is something I know intuitively and if not for the analogical roots of language, the understanding of love would remain outside of the possibility of articulation. Since we can say *logos* is radical analogy, each direct expression enables the understanding of other experiences that share its principles. Through experience, we undergo the change of gaining knowledge intuitively. The structure of analogy makes possible the expressing of our intuitive understanding even though we are bound by direct speech, even though we are bound by *logos*.

NOTES

1. Cf. Walter Brogan's discussion of Genesis and Sterēsis from *Heidegger and Aristotle: The Two-foldness of Being*. (Albany: SUNY Press, 2005): p. 102 ff.
2. Apostle, *Aristotle's Physics*, p. 18–19.
3. Apostle, *Aristotle's Physics*, p. 19.
4. Cf. Sean Kelsey, "The Place of I 7 in the Argument of *Physics* I." *Phronesis* 53 (2008): p. 183 ff. Also cf. Long. *The Ethics of Ontology: Rethinking an Aristotelian Legacy*, p. 32ff.

5.   Kelsey, "The Place of I7 in the Argument of *Physics* I." p. 183.

6.   Apostle, *Aristotle's Physics*, p. 19–20.

7.   Among those who speak of such a "shift" are Long and Kelsey. Due to the analogical roots of *logos*, however, the idea of a shift will be addressed as overstated (not necessarily denied, though).

8.   Long. *The Ethics of Ontology: Rethinking an Aristotelian Legacy*, p. 33.

9.   Kelsey writes of Alpha 7, "This chapter divides clearly and naturally into two parts at 190b 17." (p. 192).

10.   Apostle, *Aristotle's Physics*, p. 20.

11.   Apostle, *Aristotle's Physics*, p. 20.

12.   Apostle, *Aristotle's Physics*, p. 21.

13.   Aristotle seems to be oscillating between *ousia* and *hypokeimenon*. Perhaps this going back-and-forth between these two terms further strengthens the kinetic nature of what under-lies.

14.   Cf. Long. *The Ethics of Ontology: Rethinking an Aristotelian Legacy*, p. 23.

15.   This current discussion of the functioning of kinetic principles may be served well if we have in mind Heidegger's description of *arkhē* from his essay "On the Essence and Concept of Φύσις in Aristotle's *Physics* B, 1" trans. Thomas Sheehan, *Pathmarks* ed. William McNeill (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998): p. 189. Here Heidegger writes that *arkhē* can be translated as "originating origin and as ordering origin."

16.   Again, with Heidegger in mind, natural *arkhai* should probably never be thought as stagnant, but always kinetic; *arkhai* mark the beginning that develops throughout that which it set in existence.

17.   To a certain degree, this point undermines "formula" as a translation of *logos* (at least at 191a 13). Joe Sachs questions the translation of *logos* as "formula" in the glossary of his translation of *Aristotle's Physics*. (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 2004): p. 224.

18.   There is a somewhat unavoidable awkwardness furnishing this point regarding the original nature of language. At the heart of the issue concerning the "ontology" of *logos* is the inability to unearth language. Language can only reveal itself through its own demonstration since there is no other way for it to be expressed. As Giorgio Agamben writes: "There is no voice for language; rather, language is always already trace and infinite self-transcendence. In other words: language, which in the beginning, is the nullification and deferral of itself, and the signifier is nothing other than the irreducible cipher of this ungroundedness." Giorgio Agamben, *Potentialities*, trans Daniel Heller-Roazen (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999): p. 44.

19.   Apostle, *Aristotle's Physics*, p. 21.

20.   Apostle, *Aristotle's Metaphysics*, p. 110.

21.   H. H. Joachim, trans., *Aristotle, On Generation and Corruption*, The Complete Works of Aristotle vol. 1 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984) p. 539.

22.   Apostle, *Aristotle's Physics*, p. 24.

23.   Apostle, *Aristotle's Metaphysics*, p. 151–152.

24.   This note of Apostle's is offered in the English-Greek glossary in the end of his translation and commentary of *Aristotle's Metaphysics*. (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1970): p. 456.

25.   Apostle, *Aristotle's Metaphysics*, p. 152.

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