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Gerald Hartung, Colin G. King,
Christof Rapp (Eds.)

ARISTOTELIAN STUDIES IN 19TH CENTURY PHILOSOPHY

NEW STUDIES IN THE HISTORY AND HISTORIOGRAPHY OF PHILOSOPHY

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Aristotelian Studies in 19th Century Philosophy

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Gerald Hartung and Sebastian Luft

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Preface

The contributions to this volume originated as invited papers for a conference on *Aristotelische Forschungen im 19. Jahrhundert* in March 2013. The conference was generously funded by the Thyssen-Stiftung and kindly hosted by the Center for Advanced Studies of the Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität in Munich in cooperation with the August-Boeckh-Antikezentrum of the Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin. In the long process of gestation which led to this publication, the editors incurred many debts of gratitude: to Aengus Daly, who took on the difficult task of translating the greater part of the contributions from German into English; to our student research assistants, whose support was essential for the success of our conference and the volume; and not least to the authors themselves, for whose patience and encouragement through the long process of translation and revision we are very grateful.

In the interval between our conference and the publication of these papers, we received the sad news of the untimely death of one of our authors, Dale Jacquette (1953 – 2016). Dale Jacquette was an outstanding scholar of Franz Brentano (among many other things) with an unusual range of interests. It seems fitting that we dedicate this volume to his memory.

Gerald Hartung, Colin Guthrie King and Christof Rapp
Wuppertal, Providence and Munich, April 2018

Gerald Hartung, Colin Guthrie King, Christof Rapp

Introduction: Contours of Aristotelian Studies in the 19th Century

The 19th century witnessed a process of institutionalization in European philosophy which was to have unforeseen consequences continuing right into the present day.[1] With the changing of the shape and scope of faculties at the universities, the role of philosophy shifted ever more to a kind of introduction to science. At the same time, another process took place. Under the guiding influence of philosophy, the program of "education through science" would develop together with a new orientation of the sciences on the model of research.[2] The gradual establishment at the universities of the seminar (Wolf in Halle, Boeckh in Berlin) led to a professionalization of teaching and the creation of new forms of research organization. Through co-operation between the universities and the academies, new research projects emerged which would serve as models until the very end of the 19th century. Before the rise of the natural sciences and engineering, these projects were mostly within the realm of *Altertumswissenschaften* and Classical philology.[3] The transformation of science and research emerged from the reform movement of New Humanism with which Fichte, Humboldt and Schleiermacher were associated, and which would take institutional form at the beginning of the 19th century with the founding of the Friedrich-Wilhelms University (currently Humboldt-Universität) in Berlin (1809–10).[4]

I Aristotelian Studies of the 19th Century

Aristotelian studies in the 19th century are part and parcel of these processes in the transformation of institutional forms and disciplinary boundaries, processes which in turn wrought changes in techniques and methods of research in the individual departments of scientific and academic research.[5] The historiography of philosophy in the 18th century, from Johann Jakob Brucker to Wilhelm Gottlieb Tennemann and Wilhelm Traugott Krug, did little to nothing for the history of

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1 See Köhnke (1989), 832–846.
2 See Turner (1980), 68–93.
3 See Horstmann (1978), 27–57.
4 See Nipperdey (2013); Osterhammel (2009); Schneider (1999); Schnädelbach (1983).
5 See Hartung (2011), 450–455.

Aristotelian philosophy. The 19th century, by contrast, has long been dubbed the "age of the Aristotle Renaissance".[6] In its first decades the renewal of Aristotelian studies would be exclusively the concern of *Altertumswissenschaft* and Classical philology (Barthold Georg Niebuhr and August Boeckh). The first document of the philological efforts, besides the massive *Corpus Inscriptionum Graecarum* (1825–1877), is the first modern critical edition of Aristotle's complete works (1831), an edition which in many ways still informs the textual foundation of Aristotelian studies today. In 1817 the Prussian Academy of Sciences resolved, not least due to the advocacy of Schleiermacher, to undertake a critical edition of Aristotle's works, a task entrusted to Immanuel Bekker and, as his assistant, Christian August Brandis.

Bekker would subsequently travel through Europe for three and a half years, transcribing manuscripts of Aristotle's works in Paris, Oxford, Cambridge and Leyden; his Aristotle would set new standards for text-critical editions. On January 8, 1821, a Commission for the Edition of Aristotle's works was established by the Prussian Academy, and to this committee Bekker, Boeckh, Philipp Karl Buttmann and Schleiermacher were appointed. In consequence of a resolution of the Commission, Bekker was hired for a period of six years, during which time he was to be devoted exclusively to the edition of Aristotle's works.[7] The edition would appear beginning in 1831, and the story of its development and reception reveal that this project was the place of several converging but distinct interests. It is clear, for one, that the philological work on Aristotelian texts was inseparable from philosophical system-thinking. In the texts of the time it can be seen that there is a systematic interest in Aristotle's works, an interest motivated by "the idea of an essential confluence of historical appearances, a unity of the historical process"[8] which was supposed to be represented in these works. The decisive factor for the success of the research program of Aristotelian studies consists less in systematic questions as in the implications of these studies for the politics of knowledge. The progress of philological research on Aristotle's texts – for which Immanuel Bekker, in the eyes of his contemporaries, did so much[9] – would develop in the further course of the century a dynamic of its own. This in turn led to the demand for an ever more exact under-

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6 See Petersen (1913), 137.

7 Details concerning the planning and organization of the *Opera omnia Aristotelis* may be found in Wilt Aden Schröder (2009), 329–368, with information about the Akademie-Ausgabe, 345 ff. Originally, Schleiermacher asked August Boeckh to be the editor; it is unclear why Boeckh did not take up this task.

8 See Zeller (1910), 1–85; here: 52. See also Hartung (2010).

9 See Bonitz (1862), 3.

standing of texts *as* texts and of text-critical procedures, and bolstered the drive for innovative research in the sciences.

Philological foundational research and historiography of philosophy entered into a dynamic and symbiotic relationship. Whereas philologists from Christian August Brandis to Adolf Stahr and Hermann Bonitz were primarily concerned with the reconstruction and emendation of texts, the historiography of philosophy, building on this textual work, came to fruition with Heinrich Ritter and Eduard Zeller.[10] In Zeller's *The Philosophy of the Greeks in its Historical Development* (1. Edition: 1844 – 1852), Aristotle emerges from Plato's shadow and takes a central place in the presentation of ancient philosophy. New foundational work in the history of philosophy offered, in turn, new impulses for large edition projects in the academies of science, projects for which Zeller but also Mommsen were responsible.[11] The return to Aristotle even becomes a sort of political program.[12] These strands of Aristotle reception and the complex projects which they helped to form can be understood in terms of a project of reconstructing a concept of philosophy for all branches of the sciences, of making an "Aristotelian worldview" (Franz Brentano) a basic model for the knowledge of reality.

Due to its intensity and many facets in philology, historiography of philosophy and the politics of knowledge and the academy, the Aristotelian Renaissance of the 19th century was a major research project, particularly in German-speaking lands. But this should not detract attention from the fact that there were major studies of Aristotle in other places at this time, for example in France, where Jean Gaspard Félix Ravaisson-Mollien would produce an important monograph on Aristotle's *Metaphysics*.[13] We may claim nonetheless that the developments in the German context summarized above were those which would mark the 19th century and give rise, in the history of Aristotle reception, to "Aristotelian discourses" (Gutschker 2002) in the 20th century, both on the Continent and in Anglo-American traditions of philosophy.[14]

By way of introduction, we will limit ourselves here to mentioning only a few salient aspects and examples of Aristotelian studies of the 19th century. First, the reception of Aristotle's *Categories* and doctrine of categories opens a productive controversy between "realist" and "antirealist" currents in philosophy after Hegel, not unlike some controversies which would later take place in analytic

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10 See Hartung (2015), 9 – 24.

11 See Rebenich (1997).

12 See Hartung (2008), 297 – 319.

13 See Ravaisson (Paris 1837 – 1846). See also Aubenque (2004), 157 – 170.

14 See for example Gutschker (2002).

philosophy.[15] Through the formative influence of Friedrich Adolf Trendelenburg and his *Logical Investigations* (1840) and *History of the Doctrine of Categories* (1846), this strand of Aristotle reception also produced lively investigations into the relationship between logic, psychology and language. Second, the study of Aristotelian concepts also served as a basis for the larger systematic and historical investigation of the history of categories (from Bonitz and Teichmüller to Windelband, Lask and Hartmann), for the study of philosophical terminology (Eucken) and the dictionaries of philosophy (Lalande, Eisler, and others). Third, Aristotle's theory of the soul was revived (by Eucken, Dilthey, Brentano, and in the psychology of thinking) and would become an important option in the psychologism controversy around 1900. Fourth, in the debate concerning the right reception and understanding of Darwin's biology as a scientific hypothesis, the option of a non-teleological understanding of nature plays a large role in the controversy concerning the conception of ends in nature which took place in the second half of the 19th century.[16] This discussion would be pursued by Friedrich Albert Lange, Wilhelm Dilthey and Friedrich Paulsen, and continued into the 20th century, when a controversy between materialists on the one hand and neo-vitalist adherents of Aristotle (e.g. Hans Driesch) on the other would take place. It is amazing that Aristotle's philosophy, which already substantially formed the intellectual world in the Middle Ages and Early Modern period up to the 18th century, would experience such intense reception yet again in the 19th century. It is a desideratum of future research to analyse this fact with a view to the historical differences between these very different phases of Aristotle reception.

II Uses of Aristotelian Studies for Studying Aristotle Today

All of these aspects are important for understanding the modern formation of the historiography of (particularly: ancient) philosophy. Yet it is a distinguishing mark of at least some contemporary historiography of ancient philosophy to care rather little about history, ancient or otherwise. To correctly interpret an ancient philosophical text is, on this method of interpretation at least, to simply make the best philosophical sense out of the text, regardless of its context. The task of the interpreter is to defend an Aristotelian position, not to embed

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15 See Beaney (2013), 30 – 60.
16 See Hartung (2003), 171 – 191.

it historically. Contemporary philosophical exegesis of ancient texts bears little resemblance to that practiced in the 19th century in another way. Then, much effort then was spent on showing the contours of ancient philosophy and particularly Aristotle as some organic whole. The project of showing the unity and coherence of the Aristotelian corpus and particular works within it was a perpetual occupation of Aristotle interpreters in the 19th century, one which found its expression at the outset of the 20th century in Werner Jaeger's "foundation" for the history of Aristotle's development.[17] Today, the developmental approach is largely eschewed, and the attempt at integrating Aristotle's works as wholes is seldom undertaken.[18] What, then, can we learn from this history of Aristotelianism in the 19th century for the purposes of our current exegetic practice in work on ancient philosophy?

One important thing we can learn is how Aristotle and other ancient philosophers became interlocutors in philosophical discussions quite generally in the form of an Aristotelian point of view, while *at the same time* being understood historically – a "stereo" setting which is seldom found in contemporary practices of interpretation. By studying the way that Aristotelian positions were constructed and defended in the 19th century, we may witness a mode of interpretation from which much remains to be learned. But we can also learn the history of how Aristotle and his texts were involved as witnesses (and sometimes defendants) in a whole range of controversies and discussions which, in turn, would determine the further history of Aristotle reception. The contributions to this volume have tales to tell in this regard; here we will briefly summarize them with a view to the specific way in which the 19th century itself, with its various agendas and controversies, formed the Aristotle we have today.

The obvious place to begin the story of the philosophical reception of Aristotle in the German 19th century is Kant, who laid the ground not just for much of German philosophy in the 19th Century, but for approaches to philosophy's past. The bifurcated reception of Aristotle – as logician *or* metaphysician (Hegel), and, from Hegel to Schelling, as two very different metaphysicians – was possible because of an assumption that logic needed to be subjected to criticism upon the basis of metaphysical theorizing, an assumption that was widespread in German-language philosophy due to Kant's own insistence on this point. The place for resistance to this trend was thus precisely Aristotle's *Categories*. The interpretation of this text became the *locus* to pursue the further philo-

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17 Jaeger (1923).

18 Stephen Menn's monumental interpretation of Aristotle's *Metaphysics* as a whole can be seen in this respect as an exception and a return to earlier models of scholarship.

sophical aim of defending logic against an epistemological recalibration of concepts such as that found in the transcendental and metaphysical deductions of Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason.* As Colin Guthrie King argues, this was the ultimate philosophical ambition of Adolf Trendelenburg's interpretation of Aristotle's doctrine of categories, but perhaps more important than this project itself were its derivatives: a model for the proper philosophical interpretation of an ancient philosophical text, and an exemplary show of how to defend such a text against an influential anachronistic interpretation.

Reforming logic from the conceptual level up is an ongoing philosophical preoccupation in the 19th century, and Aristotle is often centrally involved as the author who, by turns, either must be rejected or should be consulted. This was also true of Aristotle reception before 1850, of which our volume provides a few prominent examples in the cases of Hegel and Schelling. If Aristotle the "classical" logician was a favourite enemy of Hegel, Aristotle the metaphysician could be a Hegelian friend, as Valentin Pluder argues in his contribution on "Aristotle's and Hegel's Logic". And yet, as Thomas Buchheim shows in his contribution to this volume, the later Schelling would also develop a metaphysical affinity to an Aristotle quite different from Hegel's, an Aristotle "to whom more than anyone else the world owes the insight that only the individual exists". – Shifts in the reception of Aristotle can be indicative of deeper underlying philosophical differences, which can be tracked through such reception.

The neo-Kantian groundswell in philosophy in the latter half of the 19th century made the place of logic particularly contested. Gerald Hartung shows just how different projects could be while sharing the title of "Logical Investigations", a title which was used by such disparate figures as Trendelenburg, Husserl, Frege and Wittgenstein. For Hartung, the crucial background for the reception of Aristotle after 1840 is a battle for conceptually determining territory which is shared by philosophy and the nascent fields of psychology and linguistics. As in the case of Ostwald, the status of the logic implicit in language as used is at issue here: the philosophical analysis of grammar ultimately issues in a critique of language itself. This is a development to which Trendelenburg's Aristotelianism very much contributed, but which would develop a philosophical dynamic of its own in the second half of the 19th century. And yet even the programs of phenomenology and the re-grounding of logic through Frege and Russell do not end the pattern of a recourse to Aristotle. As Christian Pfeiffer shows, also at the beginning of the 20th century the Neo-Scholastic philosopher Joseph Geyser (1869 – 1948) would attempt to reform logic through return to an Aristotelian point of view, in full cognizance and explicit rejection of both the phenomenological approach and that of Frege and Russell. This can be seen (as Pfeiffer points out) as the persistence of a conception of logic which is

broad and includes what we would today call theory of language and ontology. The persistence of an Aristotelian point of view in this connection is thus, at the same time, an indication of the durability of the metaphysical and linguistic conception of logic, which would haunt philosophy even after Frege, Russell and even Husserl did their best to dispel at least its psychologistic remains.

Aristotle's perceived influence on the formation of concepts would also provide cause for opposition to the Stagirite. For at least one prominent German-language scientist and philosopher of science in the 19th century, Aristotle was the devil himself, and concepts derived from Aristotelian philosophy were the devil's work. Wilhelm Ostwald (1853–1932), the Nobel-prize winning chemist from Riga, cites Aristotle in connection with Mephistopheles in his *Vorlesungen über Naturphilosophie:* here he claims that it is Aristotle's remaining influence, his presence as "colleague", which presents problems for the proper formation of scientific concepts.[19] The alleged problem with Aristotle's modern presence in this respect is, interestingly, precisely what later interpreters such as G.E.L. Owen would praise: a tendency to take "ordinary usage as the basis for further conceptual refinement in philosophy" (Ziche, infra, 132). The problem with using ordinary usage as a guide to the most basic concepts and their *relata* is that these concepts are not sufficiently empirically informed, they are not flexible enough to accommodate new information on what there is. This critique, as Ziche shows, also tends to implicate Aristotle's syllogistic which, as most authors of the 19th century assume, is supposed to be based on the metaphysical structure expressed in the *Categories.*

It is particularly interesting to see how Aristotle's own theory of intellect was used as a resource by Franz Brentano, whose Aristotelianism was not the less sophisticated for being frankly partisan and programmatic. Dale Jacquette argues that Brentano's *Habilitationsschrift* on Aristotle's theory of *nous poietikos* would provide a lasting systematic contribution to a precise problem in the theory of mind: the problem of how the mind generates abstractions from subjectively experienced sense impression and perceptions. One of the surprising results of studying Brentano's work in this connection is the manner in which his interpretation of Aristotle engages mind-theoretical themes and assumptions from British Empiricism, all while defending Aristotelian metaphysics against such a tradition. The inevitable tensions of this interpretation are ultimately the price Brentano has to pay for maintaining Aristotelian positions on certain definitively post-Aristotelian questions in the theory of mind.

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19 See Paul Ziche, "'Aristoteles und Mephistopheles' – Debates about the Formation of Scientific Concepts in the 19th Century", pages 131–148, below.

Perhaps one of the more exotic cases in the history of the reception of Aristotle in the 19th century is discussed in Christof Rapp's contribution on Georg von Hertling as an interpreter of Aristotle. Von Hertling, a prominent member of the Catholic Centre Party (and a relation of Franz Brentano), would go on, after studying with Trendelenburg and writing his dissertation on Aristotle's notion of the one, to ultimately become a leading member of the German Reichstag. Toward the end of his life he became Chancellor of the German Reich, a post he held for less than one year before resigning it in protest against the introduction of democratic reforms (he was a monarchist). Von Hertling's reception and interpretation of Aristotle is interesting not only because of the theory of individual forms which he attributed to the author of the *Metaphysics* (a perpetual issue of contention among Aristotelians), but also for the confessional and political debates in which his interpretation of Aristotle's texts played a role – notably on the topic of the immortality of the human soul.

In his contribution on Trendelenburg's critique of Kantian ethics through an Aristotelian lens, Philipp Brüllmann offers a critical appraisal of Trendelenburg's attempt, well before the virtue ethics of the 20th century, to make Aristotelian ethics a viable alternative to Kant's deontological theory. The difficulty in Trendelenburg's interpretation, as Brüllmann argues, is that he makes Aristotle's ethics out to be precisely what most interpreters think it is not: an ethics based on principles. The Kantian assumptions of what a proper theory of morality must involve would seem, in this case at least, to hold sway even when one is using Aristotle to criticize Kant (as if to say Aristotle were the better Kantian). Still, Trendelenburg's attempt to rehabilitate Aristotle's ethics may serve as an early example of what would later become a larger philosophical movement in English-language philosophy.

In his study of Ernst Havet's rehabilitation of Aristotle's rhetoric in post-revolutionary France, Denis Thouard explains how Aristotelian texts would be appropriated in another way. In post-revolutionary France, Victor Hugo echoed the sentiments of many in declaring a "war on rhetoric" and in particular on Aristotle's *Rhetoric*. This, Thouard argues, was part of a levelling of discourse which was meant to inculcate truthfulness and eliminate power differentials tied to variations in the power to persuade: an ambitious program tied to the ideals of the French Revolution. Tracing the fate of Aristotle's *Rhetoric* and the theory of rhetoric from Romanticism to Positivism in French literary theory and culture in the long 19th century, Thouard localizes the currents and movements which determined the reception of Aristotle's *Rhetoric* in a wider cultural context.

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Colin Guthrie King
Aristotle's *Categories* in the 19th Century[1]

Abstract: This chapter explores interpretive debates about Aristotle's *Categories* in the 19th century. The interpretation of this text became the *locus* to pursue the further philosophical aim of defending logic against an epistemological recalibration of concepts such as that found in the transcendental and metaphysical deductions of Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason*. As Colin Guthrie King argues, this was the ultimate philosophical ambition of Friedrich Adolf Trendelenburg's interpretation of Aristotle's doctrine of categories, but perhaps more important than this project itself were its derivatives: a model for the proper philosophical interpretation of an ancient philosophical text, and an exemplary model of how to defend such a text against an influential anachronistic interpretation.

I Interpreting Aristotle in the 19th Century

The 19th century was a productive one for the study of Aristotle. As amply noted by previous authors, the preparation of the first modern critical edition of Aristotle's works in Greek at the Prussian Academy of Sciences coincides roughly with a renewed philosophical interest in Aristotle which in good part was due to Hegel; and both of these were, in different but intersecting ways, initiators of the flood of editions, commentaries and interpretive literature which ensued after the publication of the first volume of Bekker's Aristotle in 1831.[2] Conspicuous in this general boom of Aristotle scholarship is the attention paid to Aristotle's *Categories*, an attention which seems incongruous by the lights of contemporary scholarship. Trendelenburg's *Geschichte der Kategorienlehre* and the main lines of discussion it caused (criticism from Bonitz but also a very independent

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1 For helpful criticism of this chapter in various stages of its development I would like to thank Gerald Hartung, Rolf-Peter Horstmann, Anthony Jensen, Stephen Menn, Christof Rapp, and Denis Thouard.

2 For a helpful overview of the enormous scholarly productivity on Aristotle in the 19th century, see the introduction in Thouard (2004), 9–21; there is a useful bibliographic index at the back of the volume of the principal editions, commentaries and editions of commentaries on Aristotle in the 19th century. Stephen Menn (2010), in his discussion of "Zeller and the Debates about Aristotle's *Metaphysics*", traces Hegel's influence on these debates and on Zeller in particular. Ferrarin (2009) presents evidence for the prominent place of Aristotle in Hegel's historiography of philosophy.

dissertation under Trendelenburg's direction by Franz Brentano) are well known; lesser known discussions of the theory of categories continued throughout the century in scholarly journals and in prominent parts of various histories of ancient philosophy.[3] The attraction to the *Categories* is symptomatic of an association which 19th century readers of Aristotle could hardly put to rest, it seems: that with Kant's appropriation of the term 'category' for the *a priori* concepts of understanding.[4] This bit of Kantian borrowing, along with Kant's use of Plato's 'idea' as the term for the *a priori* concepts of reason, would give rise to a consistently recurring historiographical model in which Plato played ancient philosophy's Idealist and Aristotle – whose criticism of Plato's theory of ideas was not hard to see – took on the role of antagonist. The model was persistent: Plato's ideas would be introduced in one early 19th century handbook of the history of philosophy as *a priori* concepts of pure reason; at the century's end, Paul Natorp would write a work on *Plato's Theory of Ideas* with the subtitle "An Introduction to Idealism".[5]

The Kantian reading of Plato as Idealist *avant la lettre* is a frame which would have many implications (sometimes even contradictory ones) for the interpretation of Aristotle. It is by reference to this frame that Aristotle would figure prominently as a vehicle for criticism of Hegel at the hands of such diverse figures as Trendelenburg, Marx and Kierkegaard.[6] This has a certain irony, of course, as Hegel figures so importantly in the renewed reception of Aristotle; and the frame did not keep certain writers such as Zeller from interpreting Aristotle in an unrepentantly Hegelian way as the more sophisticated, as it were re-

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3 See Apelt (1891) for a synoptic discussion of this literature and its main questions: What is the metaphysical status of the doctrine of categories? What is being distinguished with the categories? Why does Aristotle use a plurality of different terms to refer to categories, and what are these? What is the relationship between Kantian and Aristotelian categories? And what is the origin of Aristotle's theory?

4 KrV B106–107 and *Prolegomena* § 39, which I discuss below at length.

5 See Buhle (1797), 96: "Die Platonischen Ideen sind Vernunftbegriffe *a priori*, durch welche das Wesen der Dinge gedacht wird, die aber selbst in einer Vernunft ihren Grund haben, und nicht außerhalb derselben existiren." Natorp (1903), viii–ix, sees Idealism in the position of an endangered philosophical position at the time of his writing, one which must be re-won through its progenitor: "Es ist das Verständnis des Idealismus, welches unsrem Zeitalter, man muß es sagen, so gut wie abhanden gekommen ist... Platos Ideenlehre, das ist die Geburt des Idealismus in der Geschichte der Menschheit; welchen richtigeren Eingang zum Idealismus könnte es also geben als durch das Nacherleben dieser seiner Geburt in der Entwicklung der Philosophie Platos?"

6 See Berti (2004) and Thouard (2004b).

formed, Idealist.[7] More importantly perhaps, Hegel is (in stark contrast to Kant) the figure who makes the history of philosophy central to the systematic character of philosophy itself. Appropriating the philosophical past is, in this view, an act which is part of the process by which thought comes to itself through history.[8]

Still, for those with Aristotelian sympathies, interpreting the thoughts in Aristotle's *Categories* proved challenging in the philosophical present of the 19th century. The text of the *Categories* is much more difficult than it seems; but 19th century philosophy brought further expectations to bear on it which made matters even more difficult. The then current idea that epistemology precedes and grounds logic perhaps led many an interpreter to place fond hopes of finding such a grounding at the beginning of the *Organon* in this slender work. The history of the interpretation of the *Categories* in the 19th century is thus often also a history of attempts to either extricate Aristotle from, or harmonize Aristotle with, this particularly dominant Idealist assumption concerning the relationship between logic and epistemology. The two tendencies (one of extrication, one of implication) could easily co-exist in one interpretation, and of course proponents of one tendency could agree on much with proponents of another.

My main purpose here is to situate the work of Friedrich Adolf Trendelenburg in the 19th century reception of the *Categories*. The history of this text's reception in the 19th century is itself of basic philosophical interest, as it illustrates how substantive issues concerning the relationship between language and thought, and concepts and things, played out in the nascent historiography of ancient philosophy. For this historiography and these issues, Trendelenburg's influence was very great. It was through writing history of philosophy that Trendelenburg brought views on the relationship between thought, world and language to bear. And Trendelenburg is a seminal figure in the historiography of ancient philosophy for another reason. In his writings and the reception of them, issues concerning the proper *use* of the history of philosophy arise again and again. The

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7 This is shown by Menn (2010) with respect to Zeller's interpretation of Aristotle's *Metaphysics* (and metaphysics) in particular. Menn traces the disappearance of explicit references to Hegel through the three editions of Zeller's *Die Philosophie der Griechen in ihrer geschichtlichen Entwicklung*, the title of which already belies Hegelian influence.

8 See Hegel (c. 1825/1970), 23, Fussnote 10 (addition by Michelet from the Berliner Vorlesungen): "Die Geschichte, die wir vor uns haben, ist die Geschichte von dem Sich-selbst-Finden des Gedankens, und bei dem Gedanken ist es der Fall, daß er sich nur findet, indem er sich hervorbringt, ja, daß er nur existiert und wirklich ist, indem er sich findet. Diese Hervorbringungen sind die Philosophien. Und die Reihe dieser Hervorbringungen, diese Entdeckungen, auf die der Gedanke ausgeht, sich selbst zu entdecken, ist eine Arbeit von dritthalbtausend Jahren". Thus Hegel sees himself as thinking the thought of three and a half millenia through (to its end).

issues are discussed against the background of an ongoing debate concerning the role of the history of philosophy with relation to the philosophical present. The history of the interpretation of the *Categories* in the 19th century, written as it was in the shadow of Kant and Hegel, is rife with such reflections, for the authors are (for the most part) well aware that their own conceptual vocabulary is largely determined by Kantian and Idealist assumptions. The lasting legacy of Trendelenburg is, in this connection, to have gone very far in extricating himself at least from these background assumptions in his exegesis of Aristotelian texts, though he clearly and intentionally implicated these texts in contemporary debates concerning the place of logic in philosophy and the grounding relationship between concepts, language, and the world. In order to illustrate how he both extricates and implicates Aristotle's *Categories* in his own philosophical present, it will be necessary to focus as much on the Kantian and Idealist background and its influence in later historiography of ancient philosophy as on Trendelenburg. My aim in doing so is not to provide a complete doxography of the scholarship on the *Categories* in the 19th century, but rather to observe the interaction between the style and substance of the interpretations involved.

II Aristotle's *Categories* in Kant's Architectonic of Reason

There is an inconspicuous passage at the end of the second edition of *Kant's Critique of Pure Reason* which is arguably one of the seminal statements for a certain modern approach to ancient philosophy. The passage is seminal in its system-driven approach to understanding past knowledge, an approach which would hold sway in the historiography of philosophy long after system-philosophy itself ceased to be paradigmatic.[9] It is to be found in the final chapters of "transcendental theory of method" (*transzendentale Methodenlehre*), where Kant formulates the demands of pure reason for the ordering of knowledge.[10] The rule of reason demands that knowledge be organized in a system. In characterizing the negative correlate to the systematic constitution of knowledge, Kant uses a pregnant metaphor. He characterizes unsystematically existing knowledge as "rhapsody":

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9 See Geldsetzer (1965) as well as Hartung/Pluder (2015).

10 These chapters were added in the second edition of the *Critique of Pure Reason* (1787).

> Under the government of reason our knowledge must not be rhapsody, rather it must constitute a system in which only our knowledge supports and carries its own essential ends. Now by system I understand a unity of diverse kinds of knowledge under an idea (KrV B860).[11]

This notion of "rhapsody" recurs conspicuously in Kant's criticism of Aristotle's theory of categories. As a cipher for Aristotle and ancient philosophy, it carries many different possible associations, suggesting the theory it describes is inspired, creative, productive – but also primitive and blind. In the *Methodenlehre*, Kant's intention is to derive from this concept of ordered knowledge principles for the interpretation and ordering of the knowledge of others. As no one attempts to found a science without an "idea", we are warranted to explain and determine the sciences and existing knowledge according to this idea, and not according to the description of that science which its author gives:

> No one attempts to found a science without basing it upon an idea. But in the development of a science it only seldom comes to pass that the schema or even the definition of the science corresponds to the idea. For this idea lies hidden in reason like a germ in which all the parts are still enfolded and barely recognizable, even to microscopic observation. Hence all sciences – being devised from the viewpoint of a certain universal interest – must be explicated and determined not according to the description which their originator gives of them, but according to the idea that, judging from the natural unity of the parts which the originator brought together, is based in reason itself (KrV B862).[12]

Kant ends the second edition of the first *Critique* with a view of the ruins which populate the history of pure reason: a place in the system of philosophy which Kant marks, but does not fill (KrV 880). The few schematic remarks in the *Methodenlehre* concerning the history of philosophy are inconsequential. But the

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11 "Unter der Regierung der Vernunft dürfen unsere Erkentnisse überhaupt keine Rhapsodie, sondern sie müssen ein System ausmachen, in welchem sie allein die wesentlichen Zwecke derselben unterstützen und befördern können. Ich verstehe aber unter einem Systeme die Einheit der mannigfaltigen Erkenntnisse unter einer Idee" (KrV B860). This and the following translations from the *Critique of Pure Reason* are my own.
12 "Niemand versucht es, eine Wissenschaft zu Stande zu bringen, ohne daß ihm eine Idee zum Grunde liege. Allein in der Ausarbeitung derselben entspricht das Schema, ja sogar die Definition, die er gleich zu Anfange von seiner Wissenschaft giebt, sehr selten seiner Idee; denn diese liegt wie ein Keim in der Vernunft, in welchem alle Theile noch sehr eingewickelt und kaum der mikroskopischen Beobachtung kennbar verborgen liegen. Um deswillen muss man Wissenschaften, weil sie doch alle aus dem Gesichtspunkte eines gewissen allgemeinen Interesse ausgedacht werden, nicht nach der Beschreibung, die der Urheber derselben davon giebt, sondern nach der Idee, welche man aus der natürlichen Einheit der Theile, die er zusammengebracht hat, in der Vernunft selbst gegründet findet, erklären und bestimmen" (KrV B862).

principle of interpretation which Kant introduces here has far-reaching consequences. The principle states that we are warranted to interpret previous knowledge within the framework of a system, the *idea* of which is derived from a better informed philosophical present.

We may observe this principle and its application in Kant's own approach to Aristotle's theory of categories. Kant frames Aristotle's categories in an influential way by treating them as the deficient ancestors of his own notion of the pure concepts of understanding, "reine Verstandesbegriffe". His systematization of Aristotle's rhapsodical categories is a salient example of the use of an idea of pure reason to organize existing knowledge in the realm of metaphysics. The most famous, but not the only passage in which Kant proceeds in this way is in the "Transcendental Analytic" of the *Critique of Pure Reason*. There, Kant is concerned with deriving systematically, or with a so-called *Leitfaden*, the conceptual basis for our judgments concerning experience. He derives this basis from the pure concepts of understanding, which we apply universally and *a priori* to objects, regardless of how they affect our senses. Thus these concepts are such that we have not derived them from the objects themselves, rather, we need them in order to conceptualize the objects of sensory experience in the first place.

A main object of the argument of the transcendental analytic is a completeness claim regarding the concepts of the understanding. Kant says there are precisely twelve such concepts, and that they may be "deduced" or derived from exactly as many forms of judgment (KrV B 95–107). It is within the context of this first, "metaphysical" deduction of the categories that Kant acknowledges Aristotle for having brought together certain fundamental concepts ("Grundbegriffe"), while criticizing him for not finding the right ones, and not looking in the right way:

> This, then, is the list of all the original pure concepts of synthesis that the understanding contains *a priori*, and because of which it is a pure understanding; for through them alone can the understanding grasp something in the manifold of intuition, i.e. think an object of intuition. This division of the categories is systematic and based upon a common principle, namely the capacity to judge (which is the same as the capacity to think). It has not been derived rhapsodically, by the search for pure concepts by luck. There, we can never be sure that the concepts derived are complete in number, as they are derived by induction and without a thought for the fact that, in proceeding in this way, we may never understand why precisely these and no other concepts inhere in pure understanding. To search for such basic concepts was a move worthy of a very sharp man, and it was Aristotle's. But having no principle, he snatched them up as they occurred to him, and came up with ten, which he called categories (*predicamenta*). Afterwards he thought he came up with five more, which he added as *postpredicamenta*. Moreover, we find among these some modes of pure sensibility (*quando*, *ubi*, *situs*, as well as *prius*, *simul*), and an empirical

mode (*motus*), none of which belong to the register of the root concepts of understanding. Or they are derivative concepts (*actio*, *passio*) which do not belong to the original concepts, and some of the original concepts are completely missing (KrV B106–107).[13]

Aristotle's categories are wrong, because they are inadequate when interpreted as concepts of pure understanding: The categories of "quando", "ubi", and "situs" (i.e. κεῖσθαι) are concepts derived from pure forms of sensation, and "motus" is just an empirical concept. Kant repeats this critique of Aristotle's categories in point of the method of their derivation in his remarks in § 39 of the *Prolegomena zu einer jeden künftigen Metaphysik, die als Wissenschaft wird auftreten können* (1783). There, two procedures for the derivation of categories are contrasted: one which simply collects general concepts, and which thus consists in nothing more than "deriving from a given language rules concerning the actual use of words, in order to thus assemble the elements of a grammar" (A118); and another procedure, precisely Kant's own, which traces the categories back to a principle. The one procedure is arbitrary, because merely linguistic; the other is explanatory, since it gives an account of the place of categories in the most basic discursive functions of mind, those which make experience of objects possible (A120–121).

The alternative presented here between a merely linguistic derivation of concepts on the one hand and a properly systematic and scientific metaphysical one on the other would long haunt the conception of language and its relation to thought and things, and with that, the interpretation of Aristotle's *Categories*. The Kantian metaphysical framework would inform later readers of Aristotle

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13 "Dieses ist nun die Verzeichnung aller ursprünglich reinen Begriffe der Synthesis, die der Verstand a priori in sich enthält, und um deren willen er auch nur ein reiner Verstand ist; indem er durch sie allein etwas bei dem Mannigfaltigen der Anschauung verstehen, d.i. ein Objekt derselben denken kann. Diese Einteilung ist systematisch aus einem gemeinschaftlichen Prinzip, nämlich dem Vermögen zu urteilen (welches eben so viel ist, als das Vermögen zu denken), erzeugt, und nicht rhapsodistisch, aus einer auf gut Glück unternommenen Aufsuchung reiner Begriffe entstanden, von deren Vollzähligkeit man niemals gewiß sein kann, da sie nur durch Induktion geschlossen wird, ohne zu gedenken, daß man noch auf die letztere Art niemals einsieht, warum denn gerade diese und nicht andre Begriffe dem reinen Verstande beiwohnen. Es war ein eines scharfsinnigen Mannes würdiger Anschlag des Aristoteles, diese Grundbegriffe aufzusuchen. Da er aber kein Principium hatte, so raffte er sie auf, wie sie ihm aufstießen, und trieb deren zuerst zehn auf, die er Kategorien (Prädikamente) nannte. In der Folge glaubte er noch ihrer fünfe aufgefunden zu haben, die er unter dem Namen Postprädikamente hinzufügte. Außerdem finden sich auch einige Modi der reinen Sinnlichkeit darunter (quando, ubi, situs, imgleichen prius, simul), auch ein empirischer (motus), die in dieses Stammregister des Verstandes gar nicht gehören, oder es sind die abgeleiteten Begriffe mit unter die Urbegriffe gezählt (actio, passio), und an einigen der letzteren fehlt es gänzlich" (KrV B106–107).

due to the manner in which Kant appropriates two terms from ancient philosophy. "Idea", the Platonic term, is used to designate the concepts of pure reason, which are not applied to objects of sense, whereas "categories" are said to be pure concepts as applied to sensible objects. This gives Aristotle a problem which Plato does not have: namely "the problem of explaining how we can apply to objects concepts which we have not taken from the objects".[14] As Stephen Menn has shown, this would prove influential for the interpretation of Aristotle's *Metaphysics* in the mid-19th century. Hegel, in this very much a Kantian, thinks of the main problem of ancient philosophy after Plato as the problem of the relation of concepts to objects; and Zeller and Schwegler interpret Aristotle's *Metaphysics* in this light, as a series of problems resulting from Aristotle's critique of Plato on the ontological status of concepts.[15] Insofar as the *Categories* are considered to belong to Aristotle's metaphysical project, and up until and even after Bonitz tries to debunk this in 1853 this is generally so, this conception affects the interpretation of the *Categories*, too. How this is so, we shall see in a moment. But first we should note the character of Kant's remarks on Aristotle's categories as a methodological position for understanding past knowledge.

Kant's remarks belittling the merely linguistic derivation of categories are to be understood against the background of the architectonic of pure reason. According to this architectonic, Aristotle's theory of categories belong to an era of pre-scientific philosophical methodology. The relativisation of a theory in this way is a hallmark of interpretation in the architectonic mode. Such interpretation invokes the principle of the ordering of unscientific or subscientific knowledge by organizing this knowledge through an idea of the science to which it belongs as a primitive root. It is architectonic in the sense that it assigns past theory a specific place in a modern system of knowledge. Architectonic interpretation thus involves a tacit acknowledgement but also subordination of the thing so interpreted.

III Trendelenburg on Categories and *Categories*

Kant's architectonic appropriation of the term "category" for his own metaphysical purposes had two immediate consequences for subsequent interpretations of Aristotle's *Categories*. First, it creates the assumption that Aristotle's catego-

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14 Menn (2010), 106.
15 Menn (2010), 109–110.

ries are concepts ("Begriffe") as applicable to things.[16] Second, it puts pressure on future interpreters to provide some *Leitfaden* or guiding thread for their derivation, or at least to show that the derivation of Aristotle's categories is not completely arbitrary. Later interpreters would accept both these challenges, discharging them in different ways, while nevertheless resisting or rejecting architectonic interpretation. Rather than ordering past knowledge through the idea of a system, interpreters such as Friedrich Adolf Trendelenburg and Franz Brentano sought to use ancient philosophy, and in particular Aristotle, as a *corrective* to contemporary philosophy. Trendelenburg writes programmatically about this interpretive goal in the preface to the first part of his *Geschichte der Kategorienlehre:*

> The author seeks, in these "historical contributions to philosophy", to contribute to the research and evaluation of past systems, and to use the results for the contemporary challenges in science; for history, rightly understood, provides us in this area with sufficient warnings and indicators.[17]

History (*rightly* understood) is sufficient as a corrective of contemporary metaphysics. One can infer from this and many statements like it that contemporary metaphysics will not provide the framework, architectonic or otherwise, for the right understanding of philosophy's history. But how do we understand this history rightly?

This question is addressed, in an exemplary piece of both philosophical and philological exegesis, in Trendelenburg's *Geschichte der Kategorienlehre* (1846). This work has two parts: a detailed reconstruction of the doctrine using all relevant texts of the Aristotelian corpus, particularly the *Metaphysics*; and a history, in outline, of category theories before and after Aristotle. Whereas Trendelenburg characterizes his own procedure in the first, exegetical part of his project as the collection of fragments of a theory (e. g. in Trendelenburg (1846), 196), the second part is presented as a sketch of cross-sections of historical systems of philosophy, made with a view to a systematic endeavour (Trendelenburg (1846), 196). The first part is probably the most thoroughly argued and carefully execut-

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16 According to Kapp (1942), 29 – 30, the use of the word "concept" in relation to Aristotle goes back to Latin comments on the first chapter of *De interpretatione*, and originally meant "a notion of a thing produced by the thing in the soul and indicated by a word".

17 "In den vorliegenden 'historischen Beiträgen zur Philosophie' wünscht der Verfasser für Erforschung und Beurtheilung des Geschichtlichen in den Systemen zu wirken und das Ergebniss für die gegenwärtigen Aufgaben der Wissenschaft zu verwenden; denn die Geschichte enthält, richtig aufgefasst, auf diesem Gebiete Warnungen und Hinweise genug" (Trendelenburg 1846, vii).

ed interpretation of Aristotle's theory of categories in the 19th century. It is also a *tour de force* of the history of concepts, *Begriffsgeschichte*.[18] The second part is notable in its use of the history of reception and interpretation of category theory as an integrated part of the interpretation of that theory. This approach Trendelenburg employs to track and criticize contemporary metaphysical theories (particularly Hegel's) against the background of a history of category theory. This part of the project is architectonic, but in a way different from and perhaps even opposite to Kantian architectonics: with Trendelenburg, contemporary theories are interpreted and critically evaluated against the background of a series of connections which carry ancient philosophy into the present. Trendelenburg writes that, like "ancient works of art", ancient philosophical theories inform the critical evaluation of the philosophical present, not immediately but through a series of connections; and only those who can survey these connections know the meaning of the theories at their beginning.[19] Understanding the liaisons connecting philosophical past and present is, in this way, a necessary condition for understanding the philosophical past.

The two parts of *Geschichte der Kategorienlehre* thus correspond to a two-part movement against interpretation of the architectonic type. In the first, a distinctly philological mode of interpretation reconstructs the semasiological background of Aristotle's concept of category in the *Categories*. Trendelenburg's approach is philological in the sense of the philologist August Boeckh's *Erkentniss des Erkannten:* as the historical understanding of knowledge and concepts as they were used in their time.[20] The second part of his interpretation was philological in this sense, too, as it served to show the time and place of later category theories, with a particular view to the way in which these theories transformed, that is to say: completely changed the Aristotelian concepts they purported to develop. The undercurrent of Trendelenburg's struggle with Hegel becomes explicit here, whereas it remains mostly implicit in the proper

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18 On Trendelenburg's contribution to the development of the history of concepts as an approach in the history of philosophy, see Scholz (2006).

19 See Trendelenburg (1846), 197: "Die alten Kunstwerke haben eine bleibende Gegenwart, indem sie, angeschaut, den Geist befriedigen, den allgemeinen Geschmack bilden und die Empfänglichkeit zu neuen Schöpfungen erregen. In einem ähnlichen Sinne vermögen auch die Gestaltungen der alten Philosophie zu wirken. Aber nicht so unmittelbar. Zwischen ihren und unsern Auffassungen liegen viele Zwischenglieder; erst durch diese knüpfen sie an unsere Wissenschaft an; und nur wer diese überblickt, erkennt die Bedeutung jener".

20 The famous definition of philology given in Boeckh's posthumously published, but from 1811 until 1860 continually held, lectures, to be found in *Encyclopädie und Methodologie der philologischen Wissenschaften*, cited here as Boeckh (1886), 10–11. Trendelenburg was a student and protégé of Boeckh.

interpretation of Aristotle's theory of categories. In order to understand Trendelenburg's interpretation in its time and place, it is important to briefly touch upon this background, which on Trendelenburg's own account motivated his history of the doctrine of the categories. In the next section (3.1.), I will briefly outline the motivation and object of Trendelenburg's critique of Hegel, and then introduce the Aristotelian theory Trendelenburg sought to employ in making it. Then, we will examine Trendelenburg's interpretation of Aristotle's theory of categories in detail (3.2.) and consider the criticism his interpretation elicited from Herman Bonitz (3.3.).

III.1 Aristotelian Logic vs. Hegelian Dialectic

To appreciate the ambitions of this interpretive project we must first consider Aristotle's theory of categories and its perceived potential for Trendelenburg's own time and place. In the preface of *Geschichte der Kategorienlehre* Trendelenburg states that the question of the scientific value of Hegel's dialectic is the point on which a historical account of the theory of categories ultimately depends.[21] His occasional remarks against "the abstract" and Hegel in the course of the *History* (for example on pages 90, 115) make it seem as if the purpose of the book were also to confirm through history of philosophy what Trendelenburg had previously attempted through direct critique: to show that Hegel's dialectical derivation of all concepts from two basic ones, *Sein* and *Nichts*, is itself not a scientific procedure, and that it cannot be made consistent and coherent through further interpretation.[22] The two *Streitschriften* on the logical question in Hegel's system are a précis and defence of the critique of Hegel's dialectic offered in his *Logische Untersuchungen* (first edition 1840, second expanded edition 1862); and he returns to this critique again in his *History of the Theory of Categories* when he

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21 Trendelenburg (1846), ix: "Der Gang der geschichtlichen Darstellung musste in der Kategorienlehre auf den Streitpunkt über den wissenschaftlichen Werth der hegelschen Dialektik zurückführen".

22 Trendelenburg (1843). In the first of these (previously printed) polemics Trendelenburg is willing to allow that Hegel's dialectic has a "scientific value", but denies that it is, itself, scientific; see Trendelenburg (1843), 26. The second polemic is in fact a defense against polemics from Hegelian reviewers of his *Logische Untersuchungen*.

expresses the hope that its second part will make the basis of his own system in the *Logical Investigations* more clear.[23]

What was at stake in the critique of Hegel and the conflict with the Hegelians? Trendelenburg makes strong statements in this connection in the preface to his *Logical Investigations*. There he notes the (in his view, historically contingent) renewal of Hegelian philosophy in some quarters, and warns of its consequences (1862):

> It comes about in such a situation that philosophy, carried along by the times and by nations, is deemed a transitory element of culture, an echo of the changed feelings of the day; and it is banned from the history of the sciences into the history of culture or even of the poetry of a national literature. The philosophy which is called to unite peoples and times in a universal human outlook and in a necessary task of the sciences, as Plato and Aristotle did throughout the Occident and Orient, must leave this shameful position into which it has been driven; the *Logical Investigations* seek to contribute to this.[24]

What is at stake, then, is the status of philosophy as a universal and scientifically viable discipline. Trendelenburg emphatically claims that the "principles" for this task need not be discovered through unnecessary ingenuity:

> The principle has already been found; it lies in the organic view of the world which was founded in Plato and Aristotle, which continued on from them and which must be articulated through deeper investigation of the fundamental concepts in their particular aspects, in concert with the real sciences, and thus be gradually perfected.[25]

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23 Trendelenburg (1846), viii: "Vielleicht trägt der Schluss der vorliegenden Schrift dazu bei, von der Seite der Kategorien den Gedanken des Ganzen, den die logischen Untersuchungen verfolgen, zu deutlicherer Anschauung zu tragen".

24 Trendelenburg, (1870), viii: "In einem solchen Zusammenhange geschieht es, dass man die Philosophie, von den Stimmungen der Zeiten und Völker getragen, nur als ein vorübergehendes Culturelement ansieht, als ein Echo von den veränderten Empfindungen des Tages und sie aus der Geschichte der Wissenschaften in die Culturgeschichte oder gleich der Poesie in die Nationalliteratur verweist. Die Philosophie, die berufen ist, in einer allgemeinen menschlichen Anschauung und in einer nothwendigen Aufgabe der Wissenschaften die Völker und Zeiten zu vereinigen, wie einst Plato und Aristoteles thaten, durch Abendland und Morgenland hindurchgehend, muss aus dieser demüthigenden Stellung, in die se gedrängt wird, wieder heraus; und die logischen Untersuchungen wünschten dazu mitzuwirken".

25 Trendelenburg (1870), ix: "Das Princip ist gefunden; es liegt in der organischen Weltanschauung, welche sich in Plato und Aristoteles gründete, sich von ihnen her fortsetzte und sich in tieferer Untersuchung der Grundbegriffe sowie der einzelnen Seiten und in Wechselwirkung mit den realen Wissenschaften ausbilden und nach und nach wollenden muss".

The interpretation of Aristotle's theory of categories is the project to which Trendelenburg turns after having made such statements, so it is reasonable to assume that he seeks the principles for the scientification and universalization of philosophy here. This interpretive project is thus about much more than just Aristotle's texts; it aims at shoring up a conceptual foundation which will support the sciences.[26] In particular, Aristotelian concepts are recommended as a new basis upon which to begin a discussion between philosophy and the particular (and highly successful) sciences; Aristotelian philosophy provides a model for philosophy as a theory of science; and through its application to the core concepts of all sciences, a renewed and integrating conceptual foundation can be won.[27]

III.2 The *Categories* as "Connecting Knot" between Logic and Metaphysics

The relevant texts in Aristotle's works are not obviously suited to these purposes. Perhaps the greatest exegetical challenge is posed by the treatise with the title *Categories*, "a work of exceptional ambiguity both in purpose and in content".[28] The title of this work is likely spurious and certainly strange: we get no explication of what categories are, as one might expect; and the term κατηγορία occurs twice and only well into the work, in a passage on οὐσία (3a35, 3a37). It begins, instead, by introducing three relations between things and the linguistic expressions which signify them. These relations are expressed in terms of "names" and "definition of being", but the object of the *Categories* is not expressions, but things as related to language. Two things are "homonyms" if they have the same name but the definitions of their being are different. Both a human being and the picture of an animal can be said to be ζῷον, but what it is to be an animal is for each of these is different (1a1–6). "Synonyms" are things with the same name and the same definition of being. For example man and cow have, *qua* living things, the same definition of their being. And there is a relation of expressions for things which we might call derivative or denominative, characterized as "paronymy": it occurs when one word differs from another

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26 See Hartung (2006).

27 Thus Hartung (2006), 309, who embeds these aspects of the history of the reception of Aristotle in the 19th century in the context of the revival of a teleological worldview and vision of an over-riding purpose for nature and knowledge, one which is lost in the wake of Idealism's demise.

28 Kneale/Kneale (1962), 25.

only in ending, which in the Greek language is often the case due to the substantive use of adjectives in different genders (see German *der Grammatiker* and *die Grammatik*).

The notion of derivative or paronymic expressions seems to be mainly grammatical, but the other two distinctions are semantic in a general sense, as they concern the relation between expressions and the things they signify. The text continues in a second chapter with the distinctions which group things according to the manner in which they are "said", i.e. referred to in language. Of "things said" (τὰ λεγόμενα), some are expressed "in combination" (κατὰ συμπλοκήν), and some "without combination" (ἄνευ συμπλοκῆς). The examples cited for things "in combination" are complex sentences with a substantive and a verb: "man runs", "man wins" (1a17–18). As examples for expressions without combination the words "man", "cow" but also the verbs "(he) runs", "(he) wins" are cited (1a18–19). Though these last expressions could be construed in Greek as sentences, Aristotle seems to think that they are non-propositional expressions, for we will later read that things said outside of combination are not in a "statement" (κατάφασις), and things not in a statement cannot be true or false (2a4–10).

We then find a further two-fold distinction regarding things (τὰ ὄντα), one concerning how they are "said" (λέγεται), another concerning the relation of "inherence", a relation which holds when something is "in" something else (1a20–1b9). The operative term in both parts of the distinction is the word ὑποκείμενον, which can refer either to a logical subject to which certain attributes are ascribed, or a real subject in which certain properties inhere. Apparently both meanings are fully instantiated in each arm of the distinction. Certain items are said of, or predicated to, a subject, but they are not in one, for example we ascribe the expression "man" to a certain person, but the genus "man" is not "in" something else. The relationship of "being-in" here is technical, but not completely clear. The explanation of the relation in our text states that "by "being-in" I mean that which is in something, but not as a part, and which cannot exist separately from that in which it is" (1a24–25).

The second part of this stipulation, known as the "rule of inseparability", has been the topic of some interpretive controversy in recent literature, but we can assume the traditional interpretation here. This is as follows. Let A be the subject and B the thing which inheres in it. On the traditional interpretation, the inseparability rule states that B is ontologically dependent upon A, that is: B cannot exist without A. Thus species such as "man" and genera such as "animal" are not dependent for their being on anything. Also individuals, which are neither in something else nor predicated of something else, would be ontologically independent. These two classes of things qualify as substances, and in

the *Categories* it is individuals which qualify as substance in the primary sense. Those things which are "in" something else are thus non-substantial somethings. Those which are said of other things are genera, or general, such as the disposition "knowledge": it is in a soul, and predicated of a particular kind of knowledge, namely grammatical knowledge. Those things which are in something else but not said of something else are perhaps most controversial, but for now it will suffice to call them individual non-substantial qualities such as the colour of a particular body, or the knowledge of grammar instantiated in a particular person.

The inherence relation and the "being-said" relation would then yield four types of things: 1. substantial individuals, beings in the primary sense; 2. genera and species of substances, beings in a secondary sense; 3. genera and species of non-substantial things such as dispositions (knowledge, virtue); 4. non-substantial individuals such as properties inhering in particular individuals (the white in Socrates' beard). Chapter 4 of the *Categories* then introduces the list of ten categories which is familiar, and which we otherwise only find in the *Topics*, though references to certain of them, with terminological variation, are plentiful in the rest of the corpus. Those things which are not said in combination "signify", i. e. refer to, substance, quantity, quality, et cet. (Cat. 4, 1b25–27). In Chapters 5–8, the categories of substance, quantity, quality and relation are treated, before there is a break in the text, or perhaps even two lacunae. Chapter 9 picks up with remarks concerning the last two categories, doing and being affected. Chapters 10–15, which might not belong to the *Categories*, contain remarks on senses in which things can be said to be opposites (chapters 10–11), on how one thing is said to be prior to another (chapter 12), on how things are said to be co-instantaneous (chapter 13), on the kinds of change (chapter 14), and a brief chapter on ways of expressing the notion of "having", e. g. through a disposition or a state like having knowledge or virtue, or having a quantity like a certain size (chapter 15).

One can easily see how a mixed treatise as this could fall prey to systematizing critique in the wake of Kant. After Kant, a theory of categories belongs to logic, but logic is "the science of the necessary and universal laws of thought", and does not involve things directly, certainly not how things "are said".[29] We find this concept of logic freely applied in the history of ancient philosophy and particularly in treatments of Aristotle's logic, where the categories are the

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29 This definition of logic is from the early Kantian Ludwig Heinrich Jakob. See Jakob (1792), 23.

first thing to be mentioned.[30] Thus Aristotle's logic is understood by Hegel as a descriptive project, a "natural history of finite thought", as expressed in the following passage:

> It is the immortal merit of Aristotle to become conscious of the activities of abstract understanding, to have grasped and determined the forms which thought takes in us. For what interests us is concrete thought, thought steeped in external perception: those forms are steeped in this, and such thought is a net of infinite flexibility; and to determine and make conscious these fine threads which run through everything – these forms – is a masterpiece of empirical research, a consciousness of absolute value.[31]

Hegel compares such descriptive activity to the study of an "awful amount of animals, insects, 167 kinds of cuckoo, where one of them has a little bush on its head which is different from the others", and concludes that Aristotle's description of the forms of thought is more worthwhile than such "learned entomology".[32] The problem with Aristotle's logic as Hegel conceives it, is not that it is purely formal, but that it is purely "material": as a description of thought, it is not yet informed by the totality of a system which would guarantee its truth. The forms of thought which Aristotle determines have according to Hegel "the mistake that they are too much content". The Kantian critique of Aristotle's theory of categories is given a new turn when Hegel writes:

> This content is nothing other than the speculative idea. Concepts of understanding or reason are the being of things, though not for that view (which despises logic, CGK), but in truth; and for Aristotle, too, the concepts of understanding – the categories – are the essen-

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30 See e. g. Biese (1835), 45 – 46: "Den Inhalt dieser Schriften (sc. des Organons) bildet die Denk-thätigkeit des Verstands; diese wird nach ihren verschiedenen Richtungen empirisch durchforscht, und die geistigen Formen für das Erkennen werden nach einander entwickelt, so dass sich auf diesem Wege gleichsam 'eine Naturgeschichte des endlichen Denkens' ergibt". Biese is citing Hegel's *Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie*, vol. II, which I consulted in: *Werke*, vol. 19, Frankfurt a. M. 1970, 229.

31 Hegel (c. 1825/1970), 237: "Es ist ein unsterbliches *Verdienst* des Aristoteles, dies Bewußtwer-den über die Tätigkeiten des abstrakten Verstandes, diese Formen erkannt und bestimmt zu haben, die das Denken in uns nimmt. Denn was uns sonst interessiert, ist das konkrete Denken, das Denken versenkt in äußere Anschauung: jene Formen sind darin versenkt, es ist ein Netz von unendlicher Beweglichkeit; und diese feinen, sich durch alles durchziehenden Faden – jene Formen – zu fixieren, zum Bewusstsein zu bringen, ist ein Meisterstück von Empirie, und dies Bewußtsein ist von absolutem Wert".

32 Hegel (c. 1825/1970), 238.

ces of being. If they are true in and of themselves, then they are their own content, namely their very highest content; but this is not the case.[33]

Here, the Kantian determination of categories as the concepts of understanding is faithfully rendered, but an additional problem is adduced for Aristotle's categories: that they are, as concepts, not true "in and of themselves", since they are not categories of being.

What Trendelenburg confronts in his interpretation of Aristotle's theory of categories is thus not just the real exegetical difficulties raised by the *Categories* and the *Metaphysics*, but also pressure of two kinds emanating from Kant and Hegel: a critique of the method of their derivation, of their character as "system", and subsequently, particularly from Hegel, a question concerning the legitimacy of their character as categories of being. There is also a general difficulty in the wake of Idealism of clarifying the status of concepts in their relationship to objects (be they objects "in themselves" or the objects of perceptual experience), and – thanks to Kant – anything laying claim to being a category would be immediately subject to this difficulty.

Trendelenburg's approach to the exegetical difficulties of his project is at the same time indicative of his answer to these philosophical challenges to Aristotle's theory of categories. An integrated approach to all difficulties, exegetical and philosophical, is characteristic of Trendelenburg as an interpreter of ancient philosophical texts in general, and of his *History of the Theory of Categories* in particular. We find it already in his inaugural lecture *De Aristotelis Categoriis* of 1833, which sets out the problem of interpreting Aristotle's theory in the following way:

> If the categories were the things upon which the universal discipline of logic depended as upon a foundation, then the *Analytics* and the book *De interpretatione* would have to refer to them. Yet each of these books goes its own way and ignores that foundation. Though Aristotle wished for logic and first philosophy to cohere as nicely as possible, he placed the *Categories* between each as a kind of connecting knot. The nature of thought, which seems most to be treated in the *Analytics*, having been already discussed, the *Categories* provide a way, as indicators, to those notions which govern, as principles, all of nature, and to the causes of those notions which are the topic of the *Metaphysics*. From this connection be-

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33 Hegel (c. 1825/1970), 240: "Dieser Inhalt ist nichts anderes als die spekulative Idee. Begriffe des Verstandes oder der Vernunft sind das Wesen der Dinge, freilich nicht für jene Ansicht, aber in Wahrheit; auch für Aristoteles [sind] die Begriffe des Verstandes – die Kategorien – die Wesenheiten des Seins. Wenn sie also an und für sich wahr, so sind sie selbst ihr eigener Inhalt, und zwar sogar höchster Inhalt; allein dies ist nicht der Fall".

tween the *Categories* and the *Metaphysics* it seems to have come about that the same notions as are treated in the *Categories* are also treated in the *Metaphysics*.[34]

The theory of categories thus occupies a theoretical space which is neither logical nor metaphysical, but which links these parts of Aristotle's philosophy as an "internodum", a "connecting knot". Trendelenburg correctly identifies a fact often overlooked by those who would have the *Categories* be the beginning of logic: the *Analytics*, which present the theory of syllogistic, make no use of the theory. The placing of the *Categories* at the beginning of the Organon seems to have suggested that this little treatise is the way into what would be considered Aristotle's logic. But we have it on the authority of the ancient commentators that both the title of this work and its position in the Organon were a matter of some dispute.[35]

Trendelenburg advances the thesis that the categories are derived from the grammatical analysis of simple propositions, and that the ten categories represent linguistic types which correspond imperfectly with our own grammatical concepts. On this interpretation, οὐσία, "substance", represents the grammatical subject; ποσόν and ποιόν, "quantity" and "quality", represent two types of adjective; ποῦ and ποτέ, "where" and "when", are adverbs of place and time; πρός τι, "relation", can be seen as a relative adverb; and the four verbal categories, "doing" (ποιεῖν), "undergoing" (πάσχειν), "being placed" (κεῖσθαι) and "having" (ἔχειν), are plausibly related to different aspects of verbal expression: what we would call the active and passive voices, intransitivity and completed

34 Trendelenburg (1833), 4–5: "Quodsi categoriae eae essent, quibus universa logicae ars tanquam fundamento niteretur: analytica certe et de interpretatione libellus ad categorias redire deberent: sed hi libri suam quisque viam sequentes eiusmodi fundamentum ignorant. Aristoteles, quum logicam et primam philosophiam arctissime inter se cohaerere vellet, categorias fortasse inter utramque quasi internodium posuit. Tradita enim cognitionis natura, id quod analyticis maxime absolvitur, categorias ad eas notiones, quae tanquam principes universam naturam regunt, harumque ad notionum causas, qua re metaphysica continentur, viam parare iudices. Ex qua categoriarum et metaphysicorum cognatione factum esse videtur, ut notionum eaedem in categoriis, eaedem in metaphysicis tractarentur". See Zeller (1879), 258 ff., who places the *Categories* between Aristotle's logic and metaphysics, prefacing his treatment of the *Categories* with the remark: "Mit dieser Frage (nach den allgemeinen Gesichtspunkten, aus denen sich das Wirkliche betrachten lässt, den höchsten Gattungebegriffen) beschäftigt sich die Kategorienlehre, welche im aristotelischen System das eigentliche Bindeglied zwischen der Logik und der Metaphysik bildet".
35 The *Categories* also went by another title in the early history of the editions of Aristotle's works: the Before-the-Topics (πρὸ τῶν τοπικῶν), attested by Porphyry (*In Categorias*, 56–57) and Simplicius (*In Categorias*, 15–16). For an interpretation of the work as part of the *Topics*, see Menn (1995).

aspect (Trendelenburg 1846: 23–33). Moreover, Trendelenburg was committed to explaining how the grammatical origins of the theory are related both to Aristotle's logic and his *Metaphysics*, and to analysing the application of the theory of categories throughout the Corpus.

Trendelenburg was cognizant of the difficulties of such a project. He admits himself that the logical works which immediately follow the *Categories* in the Organon rely in no readily apparent way on the theory of categories. In the *Topics* we find "the kinds of categories" mentioned in connection with the four *praedicabilia*, "accident", "genus", "*differentia specifica*", and the "definition" (Top. 103b20–104a2), but neither work elucidates this connection or the function of the theory of categories. And there are other problems. As Trendelenburg puts it in his inaugural address, the *Categories* and the *Metaphysics* are concerned with the same notions, but not in the same way. There he writes: "the *Categories* provide a way, as indicators, to those notions which govern, as principles, all of nature, and to the causes of those notions which are the topic of the *Metaphysics*" (Trendelenburg 1833: 4–5). He is not only referring here to a problem which is well-known for contemporary Aristotelians, namely the discrepancy between the accounts of substance given in the *Categories* and the *Metaphysics:* in the *Categories*, the individual which cannot be said of something else is determined to be primary substance, whereas in the *Metaphysics* (and in particular *Metaphysics* Z) primary substance is determined as the substantial form of a thing. He is also advertising a more general problem of explaining how the theory of categories relates to Aristotle's metaphysical problems of the relation between δύναμις and ἐνέργεια, matter and form.

Trendelenburg's interpretation of the *Categories* assumes, first of all, that the writing comes down to us as the *Categories* is incomplete, and second, that despite this fact the theory it contains is very important for understanding Aristotle's philosophy. The first assumption has been *communis opinio* since Trendelenburg's day. The second held for Trendelenburg and many other historians of philosophy in the 19th century after him, but holds much less today. Still under the influence of Kant's *Critique*, the debates among historians of philosophy in the first half of the 19th century are not about whether Aristotle's *Categories* is important, but how. But the critique which Bonitz will exercise on Trendelenburg in a publication from 1853 dedicated entirely to criticizing it already provides strong reasons to relativize the importance of the theory of the *Categories* as a metaphysical theory.

In arguing that the theory of categories is grammatical and logical in origin, Trendelenburg takes up the challenge issued by Kant and attempts to show that they are derived with a "grammatischer Leitfaden" (Trendelenburg 1846, 25). Grammar as Aristotle practices it in the *Categories* is relevant to logic, for the

roots of a logical theory concerning forms of judgment is to be seen in a grammatical theory concerning sentences. The guiding philosophical motive in making the connection between language and logic so tight is realism: a desire to root logical relations in distinctions which do not relate to thought, but to things. But Trendelenburg is ready to admit that for Aristotle, the origin is not determinative of the further development of the theory. He seeks to distinguish between the origin and the further development and employment of the theory elsewhere in the corpus, but without offering any developmental hypotheses. Still, he holds that the theory influences Aristotle's reflections upon substance, that the work may be fragmentary but the theory is coherent, and that the order of the categories even serves to express an ontological order (Trendelenburg 1846: 71–78), with a ranking of entities according to the reality of their being in descending order and beginning with substance. This Neo-Platonic picture of a hierarchically ordered ontology not just between substances and non-substances, but including many grades of non-substantial things, would prove important for Brentano and many who were influenced by him.

III.3 Bonitz *contra* Trendelenburg

In accordance with the grammatical "guiding thread" which he sees in the determination of the categories, Trendelenburg interprets them as kinds of predicate.[36] There is a problem with this interpretation which Hermann Bonitz will point out: if first substance is that which neither inheres in another thing nor is said of another thing, then the prominent and first category, that of substance, cannot be conceived of as a predicate, even if substance in the sense of genus and species can be predicated.[37] To this Bonitz adds the further objection that the term κατηγορία need not refer to predication, i.e. the formation of a simple proposition; he cites several examples in which it may only mean the use of the term in a certain sense.[38] Both of these objections lead Bonitz to reject the view that the theory of categories is based primarily upon systematic reflection concerning features of language and their relation to entities; he opts, instead, for interpreting the categories as determinations of being based upon our experience of objects.[39] This conclusion bears a striking resemblance to the Kantian understanding of Aristotle's categories, and it is clear that this is not so good

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36 Trendelenburg (1846), 6, 18, 20.
37 Bonitz (1853), 618.
38 Bonitz (1853), 618–622.
39 Bonitz (1853), 605.

for the status of the theory as a metaphysical one, at least in a neo-Kantian environment, for then it will just seem naive or at least in need of further justification. Bonitz is ready to countenance this conclusion, he even emphasizes it by pointing out that the important metaphysical concepts of matter and form, cause, principle, and potentiality and actuality, have no clear relation to the theory of categories. He also rejects, by way of counter-examples, the grammatical "guiding thread" for the categories and the suggestion that their order implies an ontological hierarchy. Bonitz reads the *Categories* instead as a natural synthesis of previous Greek philosophy, with the prominence of substance being a typical Platonic element. He proposes that the list should be read in two sets of five: the first five categories (substance, quantity, quality, relation, place) concern things insofar as they are considered unchanged, the second set of five categories (when or being placed or having or doing or being affected), relating to things insofar as they are conceived as changeable.[40] This interpretation amounts to both a historically contextualizing and philosophically deflating reading of the *Categories*.

Trendelenburg's interpretation, by contrast, has explicitly philosophical ambitions; he wishes to use history of philosophy to make a philosophical point. In this he differs from Bonitz in his approach to history of philosophy generally, and the tone of the remarks by Bonitz sometimes indicate that it is this philosophical or issue-driven style of interpretation that provides the real impetus for his critique. One guiding philosophical motivation of Trendelenburg is easily found in the *Logische Untersuchungen*, which preceded his *Geschichte der Kategorienlehre* and in some ways set an agenda for Trendelenburg's historical research. It is to correct, by way of the history of philosophy, a conception of the relationship between logic and metaphysics which comes from Kantian critical philosophy and emerges ever more clearly in the course of in the 19th century. According to this conception, which Trendelenburg identifies with Hegel but which can be traced to Kant, traditional logic is at best a handmaiden to a higher or more fundamental, metaphysical "methodology" which concerns logic's foundation. Trendelenburg's attack on "formal logic" in the first volume of his *Logische Untersuchungen* can be seen as a flanking deflation of such claims to have found such a "method" of analysing pure concepts. It is in this connection that Trendelenburg takes pains to argue that Aristotle was not a "formal" logician.[41] Against this tendency he cites a passage from *Metaphysics* Γ concerning the principle of non-contradiction in order to argue that Aristotle's logic has

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40 Bonitz (1853), 643–644.
41 Trendelenburg (1870), 30–33.

its basis in metaphysical principles derived from the nature of things. (T. tellingly refers to the *ontological* version of the principle, which he calls principle of identity.) And as evidence for his interpretation he cites the fact that Aristotle formulates this principle in a non-formal way, namely that it is impossible for the same attribute at once to belong and not to belong to the same thing in the same relation (Met. Γ 3, 1005b19–20). The alternative is for logic to have its basis in something psychological, which is what many philosophers and also historians of philosophy in the latter half of the 19th century, including Trendelenburg's own student Brentano, will accept as true.

IV Brentano on Aristotle's Theory of Categories

Brentano's *Von der mannigfachen Bedeutung des Seienden nach Aristoteles* came to be as a dissertation under the direction of Trendelenburg. In it, Brentano attempts to determine the kinds of being which constitute the proper object of metaphysics as first philosophy. Gerald Hartung has described a general tendency of the sort of Aristotelianism with which we are concerned as "die Wiederaufnahme der Aristotelischen Kategorienlehre als Grundgerüst einer Theorie der Wisenschaften und einer Theorie der Wirklichkeit, von denen die Wissenschaften nur Ausschnitte liefern". This nicely fits Brentano's famous book, for by recourse to Aristotle's *Categories* Brentano attempts to establish the categories as the extra-mental object of a "scientific" metaphysics.

An important aspect of his interpretation is that the categories are not part of Aristotle's logic. The reason for this is that the objects of logic and metaphysics are different in kind: logic treats of truth and falsehood, and these are not attributes of things; they exist only in judgments, and judgments are mental.[42] Brentano picks up a distinction between four senses of being from *Metaphysics* E 2 (1026a33 ff.) which he takes as fundamental: being in an accidental sense, beings as true and false, being in actuality and potentiality, and being according to the figure of the categories. The four main chapters of his book treat each of these types of being. Brentano uses a typically Aristotelian process of elimination to determine the kind of being which is the proper object of metaphysics. Having eliminated accidental being and being as true and false, Brentano arrives at being in actuality and potentiality and categorially determined being as the proper objects of metaphysics.

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42 Brentano (1862), 38–39.

Thus the core chapter of Brentano's book is dedicated to an interpretation of Aristotle's theory of categories. He sets up three positions for the interpretation of the theory: 1. Zeller's, who rejected the interpretation of the categories as predicates but also shuns calling the categories "concepts", and describes them instead as providing a "Fachwerk" for conceptual determinations of being; 2. Trendelenburg's interpretation of the categories as predicates; and 3. an interpretation which states that the categories are the highest concepts for being, one which he ascribes to Bonitz, but also to Hegel. Brentano clearly opts for a version of this last interpretation, but with a decisive difference: in arguing that the metaphysician derives and distinguishes the concepts of being by identifying their many senses, Brentano makes the analysis of "meaning" and linguistic relations the basis for metaphysical research. In this way, he also integrates Trendelenburg's interpretation of the categories, and even raises something like semantic analysis to the central method of metaphysics. Yet very much unlike Trendelenburg, the study of the manifold senses of being is an extra-logical enterprise; with Brentano, semantics becomes metaphysical, while logic and metaphysics part ways.

It is striking how little this enormously influential little book is cited in the professionalized *Fachliteratur* of the history of ancient philosophy. Zeller dedicates some condescending remarks to it in the footnotes of the last edition of his *Philosophie der Griechen* of 1879, but Heinrich Maier, who is quite scholarly and explicitly treats the syllogism against the background of "die Unterschiede des Seins", mentions Brentano not at all.[43] At least Brentano makes it into two footnotes of Otto Apelt's exhaustive review of the debate at the end of the century, but his interpretation is not discussed. I take this as some indication that explicitly philosophically motivated interpretations of ancient philosophy were not considered to be proper contributions to the history of philosophy. If one considers the lasting influence of Hegel even on scholars such as Brandis, Zeller and certainly Schwegler, whose own histories of philosophy were clearly motivated by the concept of development and certain assumptions from the philosophy of history, this tendency may seem hypocritical. Perhaps it is indicative of a tension between those like Trendelenburg and Brentano who interpret Aristotle in such a way as to make his theories a viable foundation for contemporary research, and those who – like Zeller and Bonitz – read him primarily with an interest in finding the proper place of Aristotle's philosophy in history.

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43 Brentano is mentioned cursorily and dismissively in Zeller (1879), 260 – 261, note 2, and 262 – 263, note 2.

V Conclusion

A central lesson from this history of the interpretation of Aristotle's theory of categories is this: these two very different interpretive motivations – one with a view to interpreting Aristotle historically in order to make him a feasible contemporary, another with an interest in understanding his theories historically from a certain contemporary point of view – could lead to differences even in points where interpreters agreed in the main points of their descriptions of a theory. It is with respect to this largely subtextual conflict of interpretive interests that small distinctions could make a big difference. In Zeller's account of Aristotle's doctrine of categories, for instance, he argues on textual grounds that the basis of the categories cannot lie in forms of predication (Trendelenburg), experience-based concepts (Bonitz) or real distinctions (Brentano). But of course Zeller's own account of categories does not deny that the categories correspond to kinds of predication, and he affirms that they are not merely subjective, and are based upon a realism.[44] What he rather wishes to emphasize in determining the categories as a "Fachwerk" for the determinations of the real is the proper theoretical point of contact between metaphysics and logic. Zeller assumes much, of course, about what metaphysics and logic (in Aristotle and generally) are in so doing. These assumptions become explicit at latest when he basically repeats Kant's judgment on the categories as being merely empirically derived, i. e. without principle (Zeller 1879, 264 – 266); but the theory with its emphasis on the primacy of οὐσία is then explained to have been at least a bit of progress for Aristotle's time. As has been shown by Menn (2010), there is much Hegelian metaphysics behind Zeller's assumptions concerning Aristotle's metaphysics; we have seen that these metaphysical assumptions have wide-ranging consequences for the place of ancient philosophy in the architectonic historiography of philosophy which attends them.

Trendelenburg is a striking and almost subversive figure in the history of the historiography of ancient philosophy because he radically departs from this rather patronizing mode of interpretation of ancient texts. He reads these against the present, giving the interpretation of Aristotle as it were a "critical" function (thus Thouard 2004b). It is true that an important aspect of this critical function was to recover reflections in Aristotle bearing on the relation between thought and language, or logic and grammar.[45] In this Trendelenburg was both in and before his time: though surely many of his philosophical progenitors and contemporaries

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44 See his remarks in Zeller (1879), 258 – 262.
45 As emphasized by Thouard (2004b).

had discovered reflection on language as a philosophical resource, it is particularly contemporary historians of Aristotle's philosophy who are concerned to understand how the language-theoretical elements of Aristotle's involve metaphysical assumptions, ones which are perhaps peculiar to the purposes of the *Organon*.[46] But in his work on Aristotle's theory of categories Trendelenburg was also decidedly against his time. For instead of embedding Aristotle and his categories into a narrative of development within antiquity, he takes it as a work to be understood first and foremost against the background of linguistic usage of his time and the Aristotelian corpus. In the history of the doctrine of categories after Aristotle Trendelenburg studies how subsequent appropriations of the theory came to transform it through the introduction of further questions and concerns. In essence he writes the history of reception of the theory, having first tried his best to make it as viable as possible upon the basis of the texts. In this approach his work remains exemplary.

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46 This latter line on the problem is taken up by Menn (1995).

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Valentin Pluder
Aristotle's and Hegel's Logic

Abstract: This chapter deals with the relation of Hegelian speculative logic to the 'classical' logic that is or was attributed to Aristotle. While on the one hand Hegel thought of Aristotle as the founder of what became known as classical or formal logic, he ascribed to Aristotle on the other hand "truly speculative ideas", thus honouring him as a precursor of his own speculative philosophy. Points of contact between Aristotle and Hegel are e. g. the thought of teleology, the distinction of potentiality and actuality as well as the peculiar Aristotelian figure of *noesis noeseos*. Although at first glance speculative and Aristotelian logic seem to be at odds with each other, Valentin Pluder shows how Aristotelian logic can serve several functions within the project of Hegel's speculative philosophy.

The topic of Aristotle and Hegel is hardly a virginal one. At the time of Hegel's death a discussion had already begun concerning the relation of the both thinkers, ranging from the question of the general relation of both philosophies to the question of the philological accuracy of Hegel's reading of Aristotle. The research literature is accordingly wide ranging and sophisticated. In the following I will restrict myself to a less considered question, namely the question of the relation of Hegelian speculative logic to the 'classical' logic that is or was attributed to Aristotle.[1]

To enable a better understanding of the following undertaking, the systematic and the historical points of view are initially presented separately. In systematic regard what is at issue is a contrast between 'classical logic' (what this is supposed to be and what it has to do with Aristotle will be at least roughly indicated under point II.1) and Hegelian logic. Accordingly the paper is structured by first presenting Hegelian speculative logic, then classical logic, and finally the opposition and coherence of both logics. From the historical point of view it is clear that Hegelian logic is a phenomenon of the 19th century. However what

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[1] The question of just what, at the beginning of the 19th century, standard logic was is hard to answer because one had the impression that almost every philosophy professor at this time brought forward his own logic. At the same time this does not mean that, despite the differences, there were many qualitatively different logics. For in fact all these logics were not only almost always 'classical' and equipped with a more or less diffuse reference to Aristotle but also – at least at first glance – abundantly stereotyped in their further elaboration.

it has to do with Aristotle or with the Aristotelian research of the 19th century is open to question.

Aristotle appears in Hegel's work in two forms. The first form is that of the representative or, better, the godfather of what Hegel calls the 'common' ['ge-meine'] logic, which Kant designated as 'formal logic' and which is one or even *the* classical logic. Essentially Hegel and Kant mean by this those aspects of Aristotelian logic that could be reconstructed as monadic predicate logic in the 20th century.[2] In contrast to this, those aspects of the Aristotelian *Organon* which cannot be reconstructed as classical logic not only lie outside Kant and Hegel's field of vision but also outside that of the philosophy of the 18th and early 19th century generally.[3] The second form of Aristotle in Hegel is that of the speculative philosopher who basically or better *in nuce* followed the Hegelian programme and who thus conceives of reality as a differentiated as well as com-prehensive unity. Both roles are completely opposed: Hegel seems to have scarcely any appreciation for the traditional logic that appeals to Aristotle as an authority. On the other hand Hegel sees in Aristotle the speculative philoso-pher a kindred spirit to whom he never tired of paying tribute. The confrontation of classical with Hegelian speculative logic can accordingly be traced through the confrontation of the two forms of Aristotle in Hegel. Thus the question of how Hegel receives Aristotle can be answered in a differentiated manner accord-ing to the two concepts of logic. It should of course go without saying that Aris-totle is not exhausted when depicted either as the speculative philosopher or as the classical logician.

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2 That is of course not a definition but merely a very rough marking out, the bounds of which evidently refers to facts such as that in predicate logic, for example, particular affirmative prop-ositions do not necessarily follow from universal affirmative propositions because there can be empty predicates.

3 Thus in the 19th century no one thinks of using Aristotle to criticise the existing and consis-tently classical logic. Rather at the beginning of this century phenomena such as the anthropo-logization of logic by Fries or its psychologization by Herbart and Beneke can be seen. In the course of this the question concerning the status of logical axioms was posed but not the ques-tion of their validity and the validity of the framework.

I Hegel's Reception of Aristotle

I.1 Negative – Aristotle as Classical Logician

For Hegel the common logic or the doctrine of reason [Vernunftlehre][4] is primarily that of the theory of inference sculpted and refined in Scholasticism. The principles of identity, contradiction and excluded middle as well as the assertoric syllogisms of the Aristotelian *analytica priora* are at its bivalent core. Like Kant, Hegel thinks that this logic has not taken a step forward since Aristotle. Unlike Kant however Hegel does not conclude from this that logic was completed early on. Rather he sees the all the more urgent necessity for its 'total reworking'.[5] He thinks new life must be breathed into the 'ossified material', the 'dead matter', the 'devastated land' of the useless inherited empty wisdom of schools.[6] This resuscitation cannot happen through the supplementation of a 'pure logic' with an 'applied logic' and still less through "all the *psychology* and *anthropology* that is commonly deemed necessary to interpolate into logic."[7] Such phenomena as Fries's logic for example are for Hegel the symptom of the crisis and not its cure.[8]

It is the abstractness of formal logic that occasions the need for its supplementation. This cannot be overcome upon the basis of logic itself. So as not to be arbitrary every concretization would need a general rule of concretization, which would in turn need a rule of concretization and so on. But above all it is the question concerning the truth of the logical forms themselves that Hegel poses. This question breaks the mould of a formal logic because it is only inside a formal logic that something can be proved true or false. The framework itself, the axiomatic, lies beyond the realm of its judgment.[9] The impossibility of an ex-

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4 Reimarus (1756).

5 See Hegel (2010), 31. Compare Hegel (1985), 35 ff.

6 See Hegel (2010), 507. Compare Hegel (1981), 5.

7 See Hegel (2010), 676. Compare Hegel (1981), 179.

8 See Hegel (2010), 31 note (compare Hegel (1978), 23 note): "A just published and most up-to-date adaptation of this science, Fries's *System of Logic* [Fries 1811], goes back to its anthropological foundations. The shallowness of the representation or opinion on which it is based, in and of itself, and of the execution, dispenses me from the trouble of taking any notice of this insignificant publication."

9 Another argument states that, even under the presupposition of a simple correspondence theory of truth which identifies truth as the agreement of concept and object, it is immediately apparent that a purely formal logic cannot be evaluated by itself in this regard. Hegel (2010), 525 (compare Hegel (1981), 28): "how should the judgment possibly contain truth seeing that its con-

amination of logic itself on its own truth makes it appear as arbitrary. The criticism that Kant voiced against the Aristotelian categories is one which Hegel extends to logic overall, namely that its forms are merely historical and, as it were, gathered up empirically, without it being questioned and without it being capable of being questioned whether they are in fact true for themselves.[10] In the face of this criticism it is clear why for Hegel the 'total reworking' of logic is at stake. Any testing of the truth of a formal logic through a formal 'metalogic' would entail the question concerning the truth of this metalogic and so on. Hegel thinks he can escape this problematic through his concept of the concrete universal which however is not based in a classical formal logic but precisely in Hegel's speculative logic.

I.2 Positive – Aristotle as Speculative Thinker

Although Hegel ultimately traces the formal logic of his time back to Aristotle it is to Aristotle that Hegel attributes – as to scarcely any other philosophers – "truly speculative ideas".[11] In that Hegel sets the speculative Aristotle in the foreground, he lays claim to protecting Aristotle not only from a thoughtless tradition but also from Aristotelian formal logic.[12] From the Aristotelian lines of thinking, which Hegel interprets as speculative[13], three prominent aspects are singled out: (i) teleology, (ii) the relation of *dynamis* und *energeia* and (iii) the thinking of thinking. At the same time these are likely to be the points at which the Hegelian reshaping of Aristotelian thought emerges most clearly.

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cept and the intended object do not agree, as also that the concept is missing and indeed the object as well?"

10 See Hegel (2010), 525 (compare Hegel (1981), 28): "Even if there were nothing more to the forms of logic than these formal functions of judgment, for that reason alone they would already be worthwhile investigating to see how far, by themselves, they correspond to the *truth*. A logic that does not perform this task can at most claim the value of a natural description of the phenomena of thought as they simply occur. It is an infinite merit of Aristotle, one that must fill us with the highest admiration for the power of his genius, that he was the first to undertake this description. But it is necessary to go further and determine both the systematic connection of these forms and their value."

11 See Hegel (2010), 692. Compare Hegel (1981), 195.

12 See Hegel (2006), 225. Compare Hegel (1996), 59. Also: Hegel (2006), 261 (Compare Hegel (1996), 98 f): "We certainly must not suppose that Aristotle thought, proceeded, or carried out demonstrations according to this [formal] logic of his, according to these forms in the *Organon*. Had he done so, he would not have arrived at any speculative thesis."

13 In Hegel (2006), 225–261. Compare Hegel (1996), 59–99.

i. One point of contact between Hegel and Aristotle is the thought of a teleology that characterizes being itself.[14] Hegel explicitly ascribes to Aristotle the thought that not only action but also *nature* is purposive activity.[15] At the same time Hegel does not restrict the usage of the notion of purpose to the understanding of human praxis and nature. For Hegel the purpose characterizes (not exhaustively, because the purpose is not the idea) all actuality and particularly and above all thinking: "What has just been said can also be expressed by saying that Reason is *purposive activity.*"[16] Accordingly Hegel considers the purpose as occupying the role of the Aristotelian first substance: "[...] the purpose is what is immediate and *at rest,* the unmoved, which is also *self-moving* [...]."[17] The purpose receives its pre-eminent position in Hegel because it not only stands at the end but in equal measure at the beginning of the process which realizes it. The purpose actualizes itself through a process that it itself initiated. For this reason the process is continually moulded by one and the same purpose from the beginning through all its stages and up to the end. The process receives thereby its homogeneity.[18] At the same time the purpose presupposes an actuality that does not correspond to it. For otherwise the process would already be actualized and would need no actualizing process. It would not make sense to speak of purpose. The difference between actuality and purpose at the beginning of its actualization is therefore just as constitutive for the purpose as the sublation or, respectively, suspension of this difference at the end. The purpose is thus the unity of change and continuity. In the context of his remarks on Aristotle in the *History of Philosophy* Hegel mentions purpose in the same breath as the *concept*, the very notion in which his logical thought finds its focus: "The purpose is the concept understood as that which re-establishes itself in the other."[19] For Hegel as in Aristotle the thought of purposiveness thus plays a central role. This could, of course, just be a coincidence. In fact the introduction or, better, the re-introduction of purpose in Hegelian thinking and his deepened reading of Aristotelian

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14 This fact is of course qualified by the disagreement of both thinkers with regard to the question of what 'being' properly is. The treatment of the ontological interpretation of logical axioms below will refer to precisely this difference and will thus illustrate the two faces of Aristotle in Hegel.

15 Hegel (1977), 12. Compare Hegel (1980), 20.

16 Hegel (1977), 12. Compare Hegel (1980), 20.

17 Hegel (1977), 12. Compare Hegel (1980), 20. Compare also Hegel (1980), 488.

18 See Hegel (2010), for example 664. Compare Hegel (1981), 167.

19 At least according to the 'circle of friends' edition: Hegel (1971), 178: "Der Zweck ist der Begriff als das sich im Anderen Wiederherstellende."

texts both occur at the end of the Jena period, around 1805. Hegel seems to be inspired by Aristotle in his inclusion of the thought of teleology.[20]

The pattern according to which Hegel understands or assimilates Aristotelian thinking may now be identified with regard to the conception of teleology: certain lines of thinking are emphasized and installed as comprehensive principles. The mere coexistence of different determinations in Aristotle thus becomes systematized. The whole, which is of course not abstract, appears to gain precedence over the isolated parts.[21]

ii. It is not too far to the relationship of potentiality and actuality from the thought of teleology. Hegel's view of the conceptual pair *dynamis* and *energeia* in particular is characterized by three aspects that are not or are only partly congruent with the Aristotelian text. For one, *energeia* is invariably regarded as activity, secondly *dynamis* is equated with the immediate physical appearing, and thirdly finally *energeia*, in addition to its determination as the opposite of *dynamis*, is raised to a comprehensive unity which embraces *dynamis*. 1. Hegel understands the conceptual pair *dynamis*/*energeia* not as potentiality and actuality but as capacity and activity. Possibility does not stand opposed to any fixed objectified state of fulfilment. The counterpart to possibility is rather a process or an implementation in the sense of the active *exercise* of capacity. This interpretation is not un-Aristotelian but it does not fully converge with the meaning of *energeia*.

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20 See on this for example Kimmerle (1982), 171, note 100. At the same time it must not be overlooked that in Hegel's thematization of purpose it is not the final state but the process of actualization that takes the spotlight. For with the fixed object that the purpose actualizes, the purpose is extinguished as the principle of activity and therewith at the same time its dignity is extinguished. Correspondingly its speculative essence only completely reveals the purpose, if it has already gone beyond it, as an end-in-itself, as it is introduced in the *Science of Logic* after the *Teleology* in the context with the thematization of life. With the end-in-itself the idea of a finite process goes completely into the background, in favour of a self-continuing process which runs steadily through well distinguished stages. However, Aristotle's position is: "Natural origination is a process that is directed towards a more complete realization of the potential of the natural being to its form. This process culminates in a state of complete actuality, whereby the potentiality exists for the sake of actuality. [...] The realized form of something *is* its final cause" (Rapp/Corcilius (2011), 349).

21 Of course all of this occurs against the background of Hegelian thinking. Although this means on the one hand that non-Aristotelian theoretical elements are interlaced with it – as such the idea of concrete universality – and on the other hand it also means that Aristotle is not reduced to an abstract position – such as that of an empiricist. For Hegel what is always at issue is the idea of a unity that does not level down differences but which constitutes them from out of itself. By trying to make Aristotle a speculative thinker after his image, he therefore wants to do justice to his full and also possibly partly contradictory breadth.

In Aristotle the concept can also refer to a fact.[22] 2. How , then, does Hegel grasp the other of activity, i.e. static objective being? He characterizes it analogously to the Aristotelian dichotomy as *dynamis* and yet leaves at the same time Aristotelian ground. For the view that the physical is inauthentic and would exist only as the potential of being carried out is not found in Aristotle. According to Hegel the immediately physical first arrives to its proper being when it is set in motion, when it is a moment of an activity and therewith overcomes its mere physical appearance. This view is, of course, not wholly without a point of connection to Aristotle. After all in *De Anima* Aristotle identifies the soul as the substance or *ousia* of the body. In *this* sense Hegel locates actuality in the proper sense not in static objective appearance but in that which moves the individual and makes it a part of the process of being carried out. For Hegel therefore substance or *ousia* in the proper sense is the essence, the formal cause or the idea. But only so long as it is not reified within or outside of the process as an isolated, abstract determination, be this determination physical or mental. . Accordingly, Hegel says: "The absolute substance, what truly has being in and for itself, is accordingly what is unmoved, immovable, and eternal, but is at the same time pure activity, *actus purus*."[23] 3. That however does not suffice for the reinterpretation of the Aristotelian dichotomy of *dynamis* and *energeia,* as for Hegel of course pure determinations are never what is at stake. Thus it is not pure movement or pure soul that is at issue. For him these are deficient abstractions. Actual movement, like the actual soul, is bound to the objective bodily, for a process is only actual if it moves or changes concrete objects. The soul is only actual if it is the soul of a concrete body (and *vice versa*). Hegel correspondingly releases the concept of *energeia* from its unambiguous opposition to the concept of *dynamis*. The two opposing concepts do not face each other at eye level. Rather *dynamis* too is a moment of *energeia,* which latter thus receives a double determination: namely one time as the opposite and the other as unity. This is not of course an Aristotelian thought. However it can already be found in Hegel's view of purpose. This is, on the one hand, the final state as opposed to an initial state in which it is not actualized and, on the other hand and at the same time, it is the unity of the initial and the final state. According to Hegel *energeia* should just be the unity of *dynamis* and *energeia*. Hegel illustrates his interpretation by means of a paraphrase of an example from De Anima*:*

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22 Accordingly Hegel mostly translates *entelecheia* with activity or also with efficacy but not with actuality or completion. Thus with regard to the meaning of *energeia* as well as *entelecheia* (and in accordance with his philosophical standpoint) Hegel omits the fact in favour of the activity. See Hegel (2006), 235 – 237. Compare Hegel (1996), 69 – 71.
23 Hegel (2006), 237. Compare Hegel (1996), 71.

'If the eye by itself were a living thing, then vision would be its soul, for vision is the *ousia* of the eye from the standpoint of its concept or its *logos*. But the outward eye is only the material basis for vision; if vision be lost, then it is an eye in name only. This is how things stand for the whole, just as they do for the individual case.' The corporeal element in the eye is not what is real, but is only its potentiality. Vision is the eye's being, its entelechy, its substance, its soul. According to this relationship, the eye is vision and the eyeball is only potentiality. In the same way soul and body constitute the living thing and are therefore inseparable. This is a genuinely speculative concept.[24]

Just what is it that is speculative here? Two aspects are at issue: 1. The proper substance is not the objective eye with its 'nerves, humours, flesh' but the active unity of these parts, and thus accomplished vision. 2. The non-reductionist character is speculative too. Although the unity of the things is granted through the shared and non-physical function, namely sight, the bodily elements are likewise conceived as constitutive for this process. Unity is not actual without its concrete parts. That is why unity cannot be understood as abstractly as pure self-identical universality. Hegel finds this thought also in Aristotle: "Thus it is also not dry identity in Aristotle but [...] energy. It is activity, movement, repulsion, and thus not dead identity, it is in distinguishing simultaneously identical with itself."[25]

iii. It is in the interpretation of *noesis noeseos* that the reshaping of Aristotelian thought through Hegelian thought emerges most clearly. Hegel links the Aristotelian statements on the highest region of being (*próte ousía*) with the statements on human thinking. He therefore combines so to speak *de mente divina* with *de anima*.[26] Statements that merely lay adjacent in Aristotle are brought together. In Hegel, the structure of the thinking that thinks itself does not exclusively describe the highest point of actuality. It is a principle immanent to all of actuality[27] and all actuality itself is *nous*, or spirit.[28] Spirit or *nous*, which is

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24 Hegel (2006), 246. Compare Hegel (1996), 81. The sentence in quotation marks is a paraphrase of *De Anima* II 1, 412 b9 – 413 a5.

25 Hegel (1971), 163 f.

26 That means *Metaph*. XII 9 with *De Anima* III 4.

27 Hegel was not unaware that this is not congruent with the Aristotelian text. Yet he writes with respect to the discussion of thinking as *adjacent to* other topics: "It only seems as if he is speaking about thinking alongside something else. Sequential treatment of that sort is indeed found in Aristotle. What he says about thinking, however, is of itself what is absolutely speculative and bears no relation to anything else [...]" (Hegel (2006), 254. Compare Hegel (1996), 91).

28 "*Nous* is everything implicitly, is totality, the true as such according to its implicit being, and therefore what is thought, but also true being in-and-for-itself, or thinking – the activity that is being-for-self *and* being-in-and-for-self, the thinking of thinking, which is thus defined in abstract fashion and of itself constitutes the nature of absolute spirit." (Hegel (2006), 254 f. Com-

all actuality, is however not thought reductively by Hegel but as an internally differentiated unity. *Nous* is the subject, the active, thinking and the object that is thought. Aristotle distinguishes both "but he also speaks just as strictly and firmly of the identity of both."[29] Thus again the speculative thought of a unity of unity and difference is attributed to Aristotle.

But how exactly should thinking and what is thought represent an internally differentiated unity? Whoever advances the hypothesis that all actuality is spirit, *nous* or thinking must reckon with two crucial questions: first, *how* and second, *why* should what is thought and thinking or object and subject be distinguished? Hegel would have Aristotle answer these questions too. It is in this context that Hegel rejects both the view, represented at the time by Tennemann for instance[30], that Aristotle was an empiricist as well as the view that Aristotle adhered to a realist 'picture theory'. What is thought does not affect the spirit from outside and the mind does not receive it passively.[31] Thought and what is thought reciprocally and simultaneously constitute each other as concrete opposites. This happens inside of the spirit. However this comprehensive spirit is not actual as an empty space but is nothing other than the unity of the concrete opposites in it. The reciprocal constitution of thinking and what is the thought as opposites also constitutes at the same time their concrete unity. Each determinate moment of this unity necessarily presupposes the other moments. The moments are identical in this respect. At the same time the relationship of thinking and what is thought can only be concrete, thus it cannot be free of determination: if both sides distinguish themselves, they are thus non-identical. "This separation or distinction, and the relation to the subject of what is made distinct, are one and the same, with the result that *nous* and *noetón* are the same [...]."[32] Only the concrete opposition between thinking and what is thought actualizes thinking and what is thought as well as the unity of these in thinking or in

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pare Hegel (1996), 91. On the one hand this interpretation of *nous* as totality certainly does not correspond to Aristotelian philosophy. On the other hand Hegel does not pluck his interpretation from the air. He grounds it in specific Aristotelian statements: For example that *nous* is not compound and keeps from itself everything alien to it (*De Anima* III 4, 429 a 16 – 22) or that for that which is without matter, and is thus in spirit, thinking and being thought are one and the same (*De Anima* III 4, 430 a 2 – 9).

29 Hegel (1971), 218. Hegel says immediately before this: "That which we today call the unity of the subjective and the objective is here expressed in the highest determinacy" (Hegel (1971), 217 f). Compare Hegel (1996), 91.

30 Wilhelm Gottlieb Tennemann in particular identifies Aristotle as an 'empiricist of the crudest sort'. (Hegel (2006), 250. Compare Hegel (1996), 85). See Tennemann (1801), 47– 60.

31 Hegel (2006), 249 – 251. Compare Hegel (1996), 85 f.

32 Hegel (2006), 253. Compare Hegel (1996), 90.

spirit. In the centre of the Hegelian interest stands the active relationship between thinking and what is thought as a productive self-relation of thinking. And when Aristotle assigns divine quality to the *noesis noeseos*, Hegel opines that he does this because it is an activity that specifies itself in its self-reference. Hegel's best known misinterpretation is probably this idea that Aristotle had characterized the active and self-constituting relation of thinking to itself as divine. Hegel says wholly explicitly: "It is incorrect to take thought's content, the object, for something divine; on the contrary, the very acting itself is what is divine."[33] In fact for Aristotle however divine thinking distinguishes itself as divine in its content and not in its being carried out.[34] In Aristotle and in Hegel the *noesis noeseos* is 'divine' for different reasons. This difference at the same time marks out an essential distinction between classical-Aristotelian logic and Hegelian speculative logic. So once again: for Hegel the ground of divinity lies in the dynamic *relation* of thinking and what is thought. For Aristotle the ground of divinity lies in the *content* of thinking. Thus while Hegel reflects on the relation, Aristotle reflects on the 'object' of thought. So much for the interpretation of Aristotle by Hegel.

Here we give a brief interim summary of the main points so far. When does Hegel characterize Aristotelian thinking as speculative? The short answer reads: wherever Aristotelian thought is or can be made compatible with his own thinking. This speculative thinking is characterized through the thought of the identity of identity and non-identity or through the pattern of a unity which is internally differentiated. Hence a unity which is not only the unity of unity and difference but determines itself from out of the concrete difference as the unity of the different. To illustrate this again with the preceding examples: In order to actualize itself the purpose requires a point of departure that does not correspond to it and a final state that does correspond to it. Activity requires the static facts that it moves or changes so as to be actual. Thinking has need of what is thought, to which it can refer itself, so as not to be abstract and empty but determinate. In all cases an instance appears in two modes. In the first it appears as part of a relationship of opposition because a state of departure is not a final state, an activity is not a fact and thinking is not what is thought. Second it appears as the unity that comprehends the opposition because the purpose comprehends the initial state as well as the final state, the fact is a moment of activity (in that the latter is carried out on the former) and thought is itself part of

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33 Hegel (2006), 253. Compare Hegel (1996), 90.

34 It is *Metaph.* XII 7, 1071 b 23 that is at issue. Hegel's reinterpretation is, of course, also owed to the text he used as a basis, that is, Erasmus' Basel edition. See Halfwassen (2005), 353 and also fn 81 on this.

thinking. This double determination is intended by Hegel. This doubled determined instance should in fact be one.[35] The identity of both determinations, however, is not immediately recognizable. No thinking can simultaneously take the standpoint of one of the opponents *and* take the standpoint of both opposites into a comprehensive unity. The identity or unity must therefore be conceived successively, in the course of a thinking process. The motor of this process is contradiction which, according to Hegel, occurs insofar as only one moment of a relationship is to be thought in isolation. The attempt to eliminate this contradiction allows thinking to oscillate between different moments of the overall process. In this process thinking thus grasps the whole. It must not be forgotten that this processuality is suppressed when Hegelian logic is reduced to the abstract formula of identity and non-identity.

II The Relationship between Speculative, Classical, and Aristotelian Logic

II.1 The Difference between the Logics

The equation of Aristotelian with classical logic is false. Aristotle's works on logic are by no means limited to classical logic. A logic counts as 'classical' when it follows two principles. 1. The bivalence principle that says that just two truth values exist, such as 1 and 0. These truth values can be interpreted relatively non-violently as false and true in a bivalent logic. 2. The extensionality principle which says that the truth value of a composite proposition is unambiguously determined through the truth value of its component propositions. However it is the naval battle argument from *De Interpretatione* 9, which inspired Jan Łukasiewicz in 1920 to sketch the first trivalent and therefore non-classical calculus.[36] In addition to the truth – or better pseudo-truth – values 0 and 1, Łukasiewicz introduces a third pseudo-truth value, ½. The interpretation of such pseudo-truth values is no longer easy. The value ½ can for example be considered as '*not proven but also not contradicted*', as *possible* or as *unknown*. Moreover, Aristotle's remarks in the *Analytica Priora* are not confined to the assertoric syllogism. He also develops a modal logic that could largely be interpreted as a

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35 Differentiation into different respects, perspectives or various conditions does not lead beyond this consequence. See for example Hegel (1977), 77. Compare Hegel (1980), 79.
36 Łukasiewicz (1920), 170 f; in English in Łukasiewicz (1970), 87 f. With regard to a many-valued logic in Aristotle see *Analytica Priora* II 2–4 and compare Öffenberger (1990), 3.

modal predicate logic in the course of the 20th century.[37] Modal logics comprehend non-extensional operators such as 'necessary' and 'possible' and therefore, because the extensionality principle is not fulfilled, are just as little classical as trivalent logics which do not fulfil the bivalence principle. It is therefore an undue restriction to identify Aristotelian logic with classical logic. However there were no attempts to break out from this restriction in Hegel's time. When the limits of classical logic were overstepped in the 20th century, Aristotle's writings also came into focus. But at the beginning of the 19th century no one has recourse to the *Organon* so as to attack classical logic.[38]

The traditional explication of Aristotle's logic as classical logic is characterized by three core principles or laws[39], in addition to or along with bivalence and extensionality. 1. The law of identity, which can indeed be seen in Aristotle but which was however first expressly formulated as a law by Leibniz. In the *Analytica Priora* one finds the formulation that "everything that is true must in every respect agree with itself."[40] Interpreted ontologically[41] this can be construed as the hypothesis that being is identical with itself. This corresponds to 2. the law of non-contradiction that says that it is impossible that "[...] the same can be ascribed to and not ascribed to itself in the same regard".[42] This, according to Aristotle, is the most certain law. He also interpreted it ontologically: Something cannot be and at the same time not be. Being is therefore only truly thought when it is thought free of contradiction. In addition to this there is 3. the law of the ex-

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37 Compare for example Schmidt (2000). Aristotle's remarks on modal logic can be found in *Analytica Priora* I 3 as well as 8 – 22.

38 It appears that aside from the classical German philosophy and independently of Aristotle the mathematization of classical logic from the middle of the 19th century by thinkers such as Boole (1847) was required in order to exceed its limits.

39 Compare Günther (1976), 147.

40 *Analytica Priora* I 32, 47 a.

41 Even if Aristotle's remarks on logic here are restricted to classical, that is bivalent, extensional logic, Aristotle's ontological interpretation of logic should not be disregarded. For as Hegel or Hartmann too Aristotle does not represent a purely formal calculus, but a logic that is interpreted in terms of being: "To say of what is that it is not or of what is not that it is is false, while to say of what is that it is and of what it not that it is not is true. Thus whoever predicates being or not-being must speak of true and false" (*Metaph.* IV 7, 1011 b 23 ff). As well as: "It is not because we judge right in thinking that you are white that you are white; it is because you are white that we are right in saying so" (*Metaph.* IX 10, 1051 b 1 – 9). See also Rapp/Corcilius (2011), 324. Moreover the starting point is the – admittedly not uncontroversial – assumption that Aristotle supports a correspondence theory of truth coupled with an epistemological realism. The truth-value 'true' accordingly expresses the agreement of a proposition with an entity independent of the proposition, the truth-value 'false' non-agreement.

42 See *Metaph.* IV 3, 1005 b 17.

cluded middle: between two opposed propositions there is 'no middle'[43]. Based on two truth values this means that either something is true or false or, when this is interpreted ontologically in its turn: Either something is or it is not. These three laws correspond to the meaning of negation in classical logic. Negation unambiguously inverts the truth-values such that a double negation leads back to the initial value.

Obviously speculative logic collides with each of these core principles. This can be illustrated simply by referring to the formula of the 'identity of identity and non-identity'. It seems in Hegel that: 1. The principle of identity is not applicable, because the true is precisely distinguished not by agreeing with itself in every regard. Such a 'dry' or 'dead' identity is a meaningless abstraction. Instead the properly true or actual encompasses its opposite. Seemingly in Hegel 2. the principle of contradiction is not applicable either, especially since a resolution of contradictory propositions by differentiation in different regards will be rejected.[44] In addition 3. the principle of the excluded middle does not hold, because in addition to two antagonists, for example of identity and non-identity, there is a third option that is neither identity nor non-identity but is the identity of identity and non-identity. Accordingly two modes of negation can be distinguished. One, a simple negation where the antagonists are inverted. Two, the negation which, as double negation, does not lead back to its initial state but to a unity that embraces the both antagonists. Depending on which negation is used, the negation of non-identity either leads back to identity or leads to the identity of identity and non-identity.[45]

Thus the case seems clear. That which Hegel markets as logic in his *Science of Logic* seemingly has nothing to do with classical logic but in the best case is a completely alternative conception of logic and in the worst case a wild jumble of contradictory propositions.

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43 See *Metaph.* IV 7, 1011 b 23 f and *De Interpretatione* 8, 18 a 31.

44 Here again, see Hegel (1977), 77. Compare Hegel (1980), 79.

45 This two modes of negation must not be understood as a hierarchy. Just as the condition of double negation is simple negation, the condition of simple negation is the double. For a simple negation always presupposes a relation or describes a relation. A relation, however, is a unity. Double negation leads to just this unity of the non-identical – and not of a unity of the identical. The different modi – affirmation, simple negation, double negation – thus explicate, if you like, in each case distinct and at the same time reciprocally conditioning aspects of a logical fact (in Hegel's sense).

II.2 Coherence of the Logics

The assumption of two completely incompatible conceptions of logic is however questionable through Hegel's – relative – appreciation of classical-Aristotelian logic in the *History of Philosophy*. Hegel explicitly says of classical or 'ordinary logic' there: "It is Aristotle's undying merit to have recognized and drawn attention to these forms and to have brought them to light." He continues to call this Aristotelian logic a 'masterpiece' and asserts that the thus generated consciousness is of 'absolute importance'.[46] Hegel thus appears not to shy away from self-contradiction with regard to his assessment of ordinary logic. The resolution of this contradiction, however, follows on the heels of this and through a differentiation:

> But these forms, which are set forth in the Aristotelian books as logical forms, are still only the forms of thinking at the level of the understanding [Formen des *verständigen* Denkens]; they are not the forms of speculative thinking [des *spekulativen* Denkens] or of rationality as distinct from the sphere of the understanding. This is a logic of the finite; but we must familiarize ourselves with it, for we encounter it everywhere in the finite domain.[47]

The problem of the apparent contradiction of Hegelian and classical logic while at the same time the (albeit partial) appreciation of this latter could thus be resolved at least in principle, for it seems there are two separate spheres of thinking. On the one hand there is finite or understanding thinking and on the other infinite or rational thinking. Different laws of thinking prevail in the two spheres, one the classical-Aristotelian logic and one the speculative logic. However this resolution is not congruent with Hegel's concept of reason or of speculative thinking. Reason is not simply the other of the understanding. It cannot, as infinite, end at the limits of the understanding. Reason must thus include the understanding, and that means Aristotelian-classical logic can only be an integral part of a speculative logic and precisely as such also enjoys Hegel's appreciation.

Aristotelian logic should therefore be a moment of speculative logic. Accordingly it must be able to be located within the structure of speculative logic. Here it is worth looking at the Aristotelian method as Hegel understands it. According to Hegel Aristotle begins with empirical facts in the widest sense. The individual objects then are precisely differentiated from one another in order to be finally brought together under a concept. In so doing this common concept should not arise through abstraction (thus in the omission of differences) but in taking

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46 Hegel (2006), 260. Compare Hegel (1996), 96 f.

47 Hegel (2006), 260 f. Compare Hegel (1996), 97.

into account differences as concrete universality.[48] This last step is obviously owed to Hegelian philosophy. The recapitulation is the achievement of speculative reason. It integrates reciprocally differentiated individual determinations in a whole which includes and sustains these determinations and so is not an abstract unity. The abundance of determination that this concept of reason should have, however, presupposes the previous differentiation through the understanding. It is precisely in this sphere of differentiation according to the understanding that the rules of classical-Aristotelian logic apply. In the sphere of the understanding, logic is bivalent and the laws of identity, of contradiction and the excluded middle apply. According to the understanding identity is only identity, *energeia* is only *energeia* and thinking is only thinking. These determinations are here separated from their opposite through simple negation and only one of the two can be the case.

Hegelian reason or respectively speculative logic first appears on the scene when the relationship of oppositions is reflected upon. A relationship of opposition is not only characterized by mutual exclusion but at the same time by reciprocal dependence as regards the concrete determination of the opposites as such. Determination of an activity is dependent on the negation of the facts of the matter, otherwise it is – if anything – only an abstract indeterminate flux. What is thought can be identified as something thought only in opposition to current thinking and thinking would be empty without a something thought.

However why should the relationship of the antagonists not be discussed again in the framework of a classical logic? Why do we need a speculative logic? In the framework of a classical logic the relationship should be interpreted according to its basic laws, that is to say, as identical with itself, free of contradiction and unambiguously negatable. It would thus necessarily lose all determinations that characterize it as a concrete relation. A relation can only be appropriately described as a relation with the inclusion of its moments and thus as the unity of the dissimilar. There is no place for such a determination in classical-Aristotelian logic. The interpretation of *noesis noeseos*, as outlined above, provides an indication of these differences. In Hegel this determination receives its dignity as a thematisation of a specific relation, in Aristotle as thematisation of a specific content.

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48 See Hegel (1971), 147 f. Compare also Hegel (1971), 132. There Hegel praises Aristotle's ability to differentiate and emphasizes it as formative for the individual sciences, while indicating at the same time however that he does not remain with isolated concepts of the understanding. However Hegel cannot resist complaining that Aristotle was not systematic in the sense of a system of thought.

Yet in his logic Hegel nonetheless also makes use of a classical terminology to describe speculative unities. There is, in Hegel, no specific formalism of speculative logic. Contradiction is necessarily the result of this description of the sphere of non-classical thinking in a classical terminology. Every exceeding the a logical sphere can only assume two forms within this sphere. It must either appear as indeterminate and senseless or it must appear as contradictory, that is to say, as a violation of the rules. Classical-Aristotelian logic thus fulfils two functions inside speculative logic. For one it fans out the abundance of dissimilar determinations by providing clear differentiations. For another it allows the exceeding of the classical sphere to become apparent in the mode of infraction.[49]

III Two Questions by Way of Conclusion

In conclusion two questions remain: is it (1.) quite unfortunate in many ways but necessary to describe speculative logic in the form of contradictory propositions which are placed within the frame of a classical logic? And does Hegel (2.) in fact engage in Aristotelian research or is Aristotle only a victim of Hegel's attempt to historically legitimate himself? Hegel himself had rejected an adequate formalization of his speculative logic as impossible. However Hegel could not foresee which developments formal logic and its formalization would undergo from the middle of the 19th century. Today, against this background, a formalization of at least aspects of speculative logic might be possible. The aim would not only be the contradiction-free representation of speculative logic (whereby this speculative freedom from contradiction cannot be the freedom from contradiction of a classical logic) but also the logical determination of the relationship of speculative to classical logic. This task was assumed by Gotthard Günther in the 20th century.[50] For all the differences between them, Hegel and Günther are likely to agree on one point. The reflection on a relation of opposition (such as that of being and thinking) inside a classical bivalent logic operates reductively and that means the quality of the relationship as such is not reflected under the requirements of a classical logic. Günther's counter strategy envisages

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49 This static view, of course, only sheds light on Hegelian speculation from one angle. The self-movement of the concept, which is initiated by contradiction, remains left out.

50 For Günther, however, a reconstruction of the *Science of Logic* is not what is at issue here. His aim is in general to overcome the restriction that in his view a classical bivalent logic places on thinking. According to Günther Hegel and respectively classical German philosophy – starting with Kant's transcendental logic – only characterize the beginning of this undertaking. Compare Günther (1976), 189.

the introduction of a second mode of negation, which is analogous to Hegelian double negation. In addition he relativizes the classical truth values *true* and *false.* Instead of the truth or falseness of propositions, the location or sense within a logical complex is specified either as one of two moments of a classical oppositional relationship or as reflection of this relationship.[51] Günther's logic is thus trivalent. However this trivalence is fundamentally different from a trivalent logic in the wake of Łukasiwicz which, as compared to Günther's trivalence, is still relatively close to classical logic. Against this background Hegel's logic is understood as an attempt to put logic in turn into a logical context again. Hegel's logic, like Günther's, is accordingly a polycontextual logic. This evaluation is congruent with Hegel's question concerning the truth of classical forms of inference themselves. In the context of classical logic this question does not make sense. A polycontextual logic should be able to make this question possible.

2. Does Hegel engage in Aristotelian research? It is beyond question that Hegel projects his own philosophy onto Aristotle. To this extent one might think that Hegel does not attend to Aristotle himself and accordingly that Hegel is not engaging in Aristotelian research. The picture becomes somewhat more nuanced if one considers how Hegel came to his interpretation: Hegel intensively studied the original texts as far as they were accessible and thereby came to his own interpretation of Aristotle, an interpretation which opposed the then prevailing view (in the form of Tennemann). Regardless of whether Hegel's interpretation is accurate or not, he opened therewith a space for discussion in his time within which apparently fixed interpretations could be questioned and challenged. Moreover Hegel responds at least in part to the ambiguity within the Aristotelian texts themselves. Here also the Hegelian proposals for resolution lie far from the historical philosophy of antiquity, but they are at least proposals that are able to be discussed and refuted through their recourse to the Aristotelian texts themselves. Within a bivalent logic Hegel's conception of Aristotle would be held to be untrue, would thus be just plain false. In the context of the history of understanding of Aristotelian texts its refutation allows a deepening of this understanding and that is what this research is all about.

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51 What a statement refers to is thus differentiated In Günther's logic : for example to a being, to thinking as the other of being, or to the relation of being and thinking. See for example Günther (1976), 48 ff.

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Thomas Buchheim

"Aristotle, to whom more than anyone else the world owes the insight that only the individual exists". – On the driving force of Aristotelian notions in the later Schelling*

Abstract: The occupation of the later Schelling with Aristotelian *Metaphysics* is not very well studied. This chapter argues that the later Schelling develops a metaphysical affinity to an Aristotle quite different from Hegel's. Thomas Buchheim shows how, in his estimation, basic notions from Aristotelian philosophy, especially from the *Metaphysics*, could exert through Schelling a legitimate and important influence on the modern, decidedly post-Idealistic, new formation of the concept of science and of the relationship of our knowledge to objective actuality. Schelling is not to be regarded as the main source for such a new formation of science, but he certainly is an amplifier and systematiser of intellectual tendencies that emerged from many sources in Berlin from the 1830s to the 1860s.

In the following observations I neither wish to recall a forgotten contribution to Aristotelian studies in the 19th century, for Schelling did not provide such a concrete contribution, nor to make plausible certain of the main features of Schelling's late philosophy in general, as this does not belong to the theme of our project: *Aristotelian studies in the 19th century*. Instead, I want to show how, in my estimation, basic notions from Aristotelian philosophy, especially from the *Metaphysics*, could exert through a philosopher such as Schelling a legitimate and important influence on the modern, decidedly post-Idealistic, new formation of the concept of science and of the relationship of our knowledge to objective actuality. Schelling is not to be regarded as the main source for such a new formation of science, but he certainly is an amplifier and systematiser of intellectual tendencies that emerged from many sources in Berlin in the 1830s to the 1860s. The citation in the title documents what Schelling regarded as the chief ontological service of Aristotelian philosophy, the recognition of which he himself, Schelling, had to laboriously arrive at over the course of his own philosoph-

ical work: the principal distinctiveness of the particular or individual as the factor that constitutes and determines the actuality and reality of all things.[1]

I The "Figure of Being" in the Later Schelling

The later Schelling is fascinated by a distinction that he, in common with others and following the example of Kant, had not really wanted to admit in his earlier, Idealistic period: namely the distinction between a 'figure' which is conceptually prescribed in thinking, a mere notional schema of being and what being *is*, and, on the other side of the distinction, that which would fulfil the notional figure, the respective concept. I speak in the subjunctive ("would fulfil") because the figure of that which is does not signify a concrete concept for Schelling and that which fulfils it does not signify a determinate object, but a wholly general form in which we refer to being in all cases. I cite from Schelling's last and unfortunately incomplete work, the *Presentation of the Purely Rational Philosophy*, written between the end of the 1840s and the beginning of the 1850s.

> [1] It is the figure of being, not that which is itself, the *stuff* [*Stoff*] of the actual idea, not the idea itself, the idea in actuality, as Aristotle says of dynamis in general: it is the *stuff* of the general. It is only raised to actuality if one or something *is* which embodies these possibilities that up to now are merely pure noemata in thought. However, that which embodies these possibilities cannot conceptually itself be again a possibility. [2]

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1 "Aristotle, to whom more than anyone else the world owes the insight that only the individual exists, that being considered abstractly [das Seiende] is only an attribute (κατηγόρημα μόνον), and not that which is being itself [selbst-Seyendes], like that which alone πρώτως can be posited in the first place – Aristotle, whose expression οὖ ἡ οὐσία ἐνέργεια would defeat all doubts" (Schelling (1856b), 588).

2 Schelling (1856a), 313. Schelling adds at this point a footnote with reference to Aristotle, *Met.* M 10, 1087 a 16–18. ἡ μὲν οὖν δύναμις ὡς ὕλη τοῦ καθόλου οὖσα καὶ ἀόριστος τοῦ καθόλου καὶ ἀορίστου ἐστίν, ἡ δ' ἐνέργεια ὡρισμένη καὶ ὡρισμένου, τόδε τι οὖσα τοῦδέ τινος (Aristotle, *Met.* M 10, 1087 a 15–19). At 1087 a 17 the manuscripts also have a definite article before the first καθόλου ('stuff or material of the general' ['*Stoff oder Materie des Allgemeinen*']). The article was eradicated by Bonitz (Bonitz (1842), 57) with reference to the allegedly completely parallel construction of the contrasted part of the sentence ἐνέργεια ὡρισμένη. This was followed by all publishers since then. However, H 6 shows that even within a general concept (λόγος), one has to distinguish by default between δύναμις and ἐνέργεια. See 1045 a 23 f.: τὸ μὲν ὕλη τὸ δὲ μορφή, καὶ τὸ μὲν δυνάμει τὸ δ' ἐνεργείᾳ and 1045 a 34 f.: αἰεὶ τοῦ λόγου τὸ μὲν ὕλη τὸ δ' ἐνέργεια, further compare 1045a14–17. Thus what seems to be most adequate to the matter at hand is to leave the univocally transmitted article and then to translate it in Schelling's sense. "Now the dynamis, which itself resembles a matter of the general and is undetermined, targets the general and

German original: Es ist die Figur des Seyenden, nicht Es selbst, der *Stoff* der wirklichen Idee, nicht sie selbst, sie wirklich, wie Aristoteles von der Dynamis im Allgemeinen sagt: sie sei der *Stoff* des Allgemeinen. Zur Wirklichkeit wird es erst dann erhoben, wenn Eines oder Etwas Ist, das diese Möglichkeiten ist, die bis jetzt bloß in Gedanken reine Noemata sind. Dieses aber, was diese Möglichkeiten Ist, kann begreiflicherweise nicht selbst wieder eine Möglichkeit seyn.

Schelling sees this distinction, and that it generally is a distinction, confirmed by Aristotle's philosophy. I do not claim that he had first gained it from Aristotle. Rather Schelling was already, long before he studied Aristotle, engaged with this distinction which directed him away from Idealism ever more decisively. But he sees himself confirmed by Aristotle in this regard and inspired in his thinking's philosophical tendency, a tendency which was already becoming dominant.[3] Before I turn in more detail to the affinities between Schelling and Aristotle, I want to briefly emphasize two more general basic features of Schelling's conception of a "figure of being" as distinguished from "that which is itself":

(1) Schelling agrees with Frege *avant la lettre* that that which objectively is, in other words that which objectively *exists*, can never be a feature or a component of the concept which one inserts into the general figure of being.[4] Rather that which is, considered as objectively existing, may fulfil the outlined concept – but it is not a component of any concept of objects. Such an entity as fulfils the concept is, according to Schelling, always something that exists individually, that *is* or instantiates in actuality the outlined thinkability or possibility. It is true that Schelling does not speak, like Frege, of 'fulfilling'. He expresses it much rather in such a way that it is being or the existent 'itself' which in a given case Is ("*Ist*" is capitalised here) the figure of being or the respective concept. Elsewhere, ten years earlier, he expresses it in such a way that it is being in a 'predicative' or 'objective' sense.[5]

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undetermined, while the active actuality as itself determined also targets the determined, because a *tode ti* is related to a *tode ti*" (Aristotle, *Met.* M 10, 1087 a 15 – 29).

3 Schelling's perception and interpretations of Aristotle's philosophy, in particular of the *Metaphysics*, are underestimated or ignored by researchers exploring the reception of Aristotle in the 19th century. Thus for example Denis Thouard's collection (Thouard (2004)) contains no contribution and no attention is paid to Schelling's contribution any more than there is in Menn (2010) in his overview of the debates on Aristotle's *Metaphysics* in the 19th century up to Zeller.

4 This can be clearly shown with reference to Schelling's critique of the ontological proof for the existence of God. Compare Buchheim (2012), 125 – 129.

5 For example in Schelling (1861a), 18 f.

(2) In order that the outlined concept (for example the pathogen of BSE) is able *to signify* something that is definitively not a component but the objective fulfilment of the concept, the figure of being must be endowed with an internal mental complexity. This mental complexity of the figure of being is not congruent with the form of the asserted statement in the contemporary perspective, but nevertheless it has similar structural components. Schelling calls these structural components "potentialities" ['*Potenzen*'][6], "possibilities" (see quote [1]) or "moments"[7] of being, and this is consistent of him, since single constituents of that which only in unity and in sum manifests the figure of being cannot be 'existents' in the full sense of the word. There are, according to Schelling, three of these potentialities of being which together form its figure. First, the basis of being, which Schelling mostly calls 'subject' or 'capability of being' ['*Seinkönnendes*']; second, that which is being expressed about it, or (according to the conceptual claim) can be considered objectively valid, which he therefore mostly calls 'object' or being 'in the verbal sense' (in other words, that which is stated or claimed about it); third, the integration of both of the aforementioned in thought, since only something that unites both in it could be considered *being* as the figure prescribes or predesignates it. This is comparable to the determination of a point in the Cartesian coordinate system where first the one ordinate is assigned a value and then the other ordinate. Both taken together locate a definite point, are able to refer to it. Only one special feature additionally characterises the figure of being: even the completion of the figure in the third step is not identified with the intended or signified being, but is still only the mentally formed construct with the aid of which one makes reference to, or directs oneself towards, that which objectively is outside of the concept.

Since the beginning of the 1840s, Schelling connects the 'principle of contradiction' with the construction of the figure of being out of three internal moments so as to make thought capable of referring to that being which is beyond the concept. He calls the figure an 'organism of reason' according to which being can never be thought at once, but only through an internal distribution and succession of moments:

> [2] One can say: in thinking there are only two concepts, we have no more original concepts than subject and object; but I cannot immediately (in the first thinking) posit subject and object as one, because both act as not-being and being [*als Nicht-Seyn und Seyn*] – I can first and immediately posit only subject (−A), the *principium contradictionis* necessitates this for

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6 For example in Schelling (1856a), 289.

7 Schelling (1856a), 289.

me, but I can posit −A only already under the presupposition that +A follows it (+A acts as *ratio determinans* of −A [...]) [...].[8]

German original: Man kann sagen: im Denken sind nur zwei Begriffe, wir haben keine ursprünglicheren Begriffe als Subjekt und Objekt; aber ich kann Subjekt und Objekt nicht unmittelbar (im ersten Denken) als Eins setzen, denn beide verhalten sich als Nicht-Seyn und Seyn, – ich kann zuerst und unmittelbar nur Subjekt (−A) setzen, dazu nöthigt mich das das *principium contradictionis*, aber ich kann −A schon nur unter der Voraussetzung setzen, daß +A ihm folge (+A verhält sich als *ratio determinans* von −A [...]) [...].

'Subject' in our sense of the word means, according to the explanation provided above, being in terms of a situated X, thus "that of which being [*Seyn*] can be expressed";[9] while 'object' – qua *ratio determinans* – designates in general the determining predicate which is to be expressed of it.

Schelling's aforementioned distinction between a figure of being, prescribing and prescribable within thinking and that which fulfils the figure, the 'is' of being, is similar on Schelling's view – which I here agree with – to the Aristotelian distinction between first substance on the one hand and its defining Logos or concept on the other. A defining concept always only describes being in general terms, a difference which is exposed in the *Metaphysics* in a prominent and meticulous fashion. However it is already at least foreshadowed in the *Categories* in the distinction between first and second substance. I would like to at least mention one example of this from the *Metaphysics:*

[3] [...] since the substance of that which is one is one and things whose substance are numerically one are numerically one, evidently neither unity nor being can be the substance of things, just as being an element or a principle cannot be the substance of things, but we ask what (τίς), then, the principle is, that we may reduce the thing to something more knowable. Now of the concepts 'being' and 'unity' are more substantial than the last named [...] but not even the former are substance, since in general nothing that is common is substance; for substance does not belong to anything but to itself and to that which has it, of which it is the substance.[10]

Schelling himself cites the last part of this sentence as evidence that with Aristotle one must already, in the intellectually established outline of *that which is* in general (his figure of being), carefully distinguish between the more general notation of being and the substance or the principle itself, to which one refers through and by means of the figure.[11] This distinction in the sense of the *Meta-*

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8 Schelling (1861b), 305.
9 Schelling (1858), 77.
10 Aristotle, *Met.* Z 16, 1040b16 – 24.
11 See Schelling (1856a), 364.

physics forms, in my view, the main reason why the later Schelling so intensely devotes himself to Aristotle and tries to employ him for his foundation of philosophical thinking and of all scientific thinking.

II The Concept of "Emphatical" Being

It can be said that with this Schelling strikes a nerve of the time – and not only strikes this nerve, but is among those who first contextualizes it in a philosophical-systematic theory of principles. I will come back to this in more detail later. In the earlier, Idealistic phase of his work, however, following Kant's theory of the constitution of scientific objects, *being* [i.e. that which objectively exists] is simplified and, in general terms, "constructed" in the framework of a basic form of reality as such, which is always characterised by a subjective-objective build and commanded *a priori* by reason or our transcendental imagination respectively. The object or thing, which one refers to and thus can be constructed in this basic form always fulfils the lawfulness of the basic form and is at the same time ideal and real, an object for a subject, in which however moments of thinking subjectivity too are, as it were, always already contained. This reality *constructing* procedure should be scientifically secured by the fact that the basic form itself, the subjective-objectivity of the world and all that is, is anchored in an intellectual intuition, to which the individual thinking subject *can potentially* gain access philosophically, even though not everyone may succeed.

The model for this kind of reality-constructing philosophy was provided by the idea of Kant's transcendental deduction, only with the difference that with Kant intuition, by which we are capable of constructing the objects of knowledge with the manipulations or functions of our understanding, always has to be *sensible* intuition, and can never be intellectual. Thus the content of the constructed objects at any given time can only ever be gained from experience or empirically. We have to note, however, that the forms of sensible intuition, space and time, are also on Kant's view subjective, which means that they are transcendental contributions of the knowing subject in the constitution of all objects of science. Therefore, the entire domain of knowable objects is inextricably tied to the conditions of sensual appearance.

However, as I already said, it is characteristic of those Berlin years in which we are presently interested that such a basic constructive concept of scientific knowledge will no longer be considered acceptable, either in its original Kantian version as restricted to empirical knowledge or in the Idealistic extensions towards the science of the actual in general. I cite only as an example from Trendelenburg's *Logische Untersuchungen* [*Logical Investigations*] of 1840:

[4] The nerve that stimulates [*der spannende Nerv*] all cognition [*Erkennen*] is our wanting to reach the thing as it is; we want the thing, not ourselves. This nerve is paralyzed by that assumption [of the pure subjective quality of space and time], due to which we hunt for things but capture ourselves. People have praised the modesty of the critical viewpoint [*Ansicht*], but with such modesty we will soon go begging in the sciences.[12]

We will go begging in science because, in this form, it would not be the science of things themselves but of our perception or intuition of things. This became unacceptable for the natural sciences, which were in the process of gathering speed, and just as much in a very fundamental way for the metaphysical-philosophical approach of the later Schelling's thought.

Let us return to Schelling's pure figure of being as granting a general prescription or prefiguration of it on the one hand and on the other hand of that which is itself, or of the primary substance which, as Schelling assumes with Aristotle, is always individual and particular and forms a wholly different context to the inferential context of our concepts and the principles of thinking. Namely – for Schelling and, as it appears, also for Aristotle – the context of that which is individually is a *causal* one, stamped and impelled by movement and events; the context of rationally or theoretically coherent concepts of that which is, as already said, is of a logical-inferential nature. How is it that the one corresponds to the other? And how is it that we (sometimes) recognize the thing when we think a general connectedness of the concepts of that which is although the idea and method of construction have become obsolete? Both were obviously and admittedly the main *aporiai* which kept the Aristotelian *Metaphysics* occupied and that can be found discussed in a particularly dense fashion, for example, in the 10th chapter of book *M*, a chapter that the later Schelling had studied and excerpted from with particular dedication in his *Presentation of the Purely Rational Philosophy*.

For the earlier model of scientific knowledge that still followed the constructive method, these questions posed no problem at all: the object constructed in the basic form corresponds to the general concept because it must be generated *a priori* according to the concept in the subjective-objective form – necessarily so because of the existing inferential contexts. And it is recognized thus in full extension or stature because it is *nothing more* beyond its embedding in the network of constructive knowledge, beyond its figure or assessment in this network. It is hardly surprising to observe that there is full correspondence between said network and that which is in no way different from the constructed figure. One, as I find, very pretty and almost Wittgensteinian passage out of Schelling's *Pre-*

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12 Trendelenburg (1840), 127 f.; Trendelenburg (1870), 163.

sentation of the Purely Rational Philosophy illustrates the difference and distance that Schelling's later view assumes with regard to the earlier, constructively proceeding approach.

> [5] Assume, for instance, that the example [*Muster*] of a figure be given and someone else be tasked to outline or cut out another figure using this example one. In case they fail to reproduce the figure, if one wishes to express not merely the fact of difference, but the failed intention, then to say they are *different* is not sufficient; one will have to say that the figure reproduced is not actually identical to its model [*Vorbild*], μὴ ἴσον. [13]

> *German original:* Es sey z. B. das Muster einer Figur gegeben, wonach jemand eine andere zeichnen oder ausschneiden soll, so wird im Fall des Mißlingens, wenn man nicht bloß das Factum der Ungleichheit, sondern die verfehlte Absicht ausdrücken will, *ungleich* nicht ausreichen, man wird sagen müssen, das Nachgebildete sei dem Vorbild nicht wirklich gleich, μὴ ἴσον.

What is *de facto* "not actual" in a certain prescribed or prefigured way, however, *could have had the potential* to be in this way. And inversely: what is *actual* in a conceptually indexical way could also have materialised in a different, divergent manner. This kind of being and this kind of form of its expression as factual correspondence and fulfilment of a prescribed figure of that which is or, indeed, is not (since there is always a potentiality to be otherwise) Schelling describes as being which "*emphatically*" expresses and characterises the actual or that which is,[14] which in his view constitutes the actual wit of all scientific knowledge. He also calls it the "positive" in the lawful stature or construction of all that is, which was erected and governed by the principle of contradiction:

> [6] Through this, the usually merely negative law [sc. of contradiction] obtains a positive meaning, and it conceives itself as the law of *all* beings and in such a way as to be the most fertile and rich in content of all laws. The full comprehension of this must, of course, be reserved for the following, but what already is evident here is that without the law so understood, only meaningless sentences remain, and emphatical ones, i. e. those that really say anything, would be impossible. Because that of which we can say that it is light, is in and of itself dark, or that of which we can we say that it is sick, is that which can be otherwise than sick, hence, that which is in and of itself healthy.[15]

> *German original:* Hierdurch erhält das sonst bloß negative Gesetz [sc. des Widerspruchs] positive Bedeutung, und es begreift sich, wie es das Gesetz *alles* Seyenden, also das frucht-

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13 Schelling (1856a), 308.

14 Compare, in addition to the following citation, also Schelling (1858), 228 and Schelling (1857), 53 f. On the emphatic character of scientific propositions concerning actuality in Schelling, see Buchheim (1992), 90 – 101.

15 Schelling (1856a), 305.

barste und inhaltsreichste aller Gesetze seyn kann. Vollständig dieß einzusehen muß frei-
lich der Folge vorbehalten bleiben, aber was schon hier einleuchtet ist, daß ohne das so
verstandene nur nichtssagende Sätze übrig bleiben, und emphatische, d. h. die wirklich
etwas aussprechen, unmöglich seyn würden. Denn wovon läßt sich sagen, daß es hell
ist, als von dem an sich Dunkeln, wovon, es sey krank, als von dem bloß krank seyn Kön-
nenden, an sich also Gesunden.

According to the view of the later Schelling, being in an emphatic sense – a pos-
itive, yet-to-be-discovered sense which is significant for knowledge – always is
accompanied by the circumstance that things could have been different, but
that through certain causes and reasons (which are to be identified with the
help of science) things are the way they are stated to be (when the statement
is true). Being in its emphatic meaning is thus inimical to a merely analytic rep-
etition of the prescribed or pre-designated figure of being within the object
which fulfils it. Rather there is always a moment of *surprise* or *accentuation* in
that which is actual or is not actual. Idealistic philosophy had caused this mo-
ment to completely disappear. The later Schelling discovers it again in Aristotle
and gives a systematic exposition of it in his later philosophy of principles. And
indeed Schelling sees, interestingly enough, its root in the principle of contradic-
tion in its Aristotelian version. Being, he claims, is, thanks to the "figure of
being", generally constructed in such a way that structurally it always opposes
a possible and thinkable opposite.

III The Principle of Contradiction in Aristotle and its Reception by Schelling

Opinions can be divided over whether Schelling is always right about the partic-
ular points he draws from Aristotle. On the whole however, I think the approach
and the chosen goal of thinking and of such an understanding of scientific
knowledge does justice to Aristotle as well as to the fundamental line of thinking
in the *Metaphysics*. I want to examine this in more detail with an example from
the text in the remainder of my considerations. I refer now to that passage which
Schelling had in mind in citation [6] – i.e. the principle of contradiction in its
Aristotelian version – which, according to Schelling's opinion, contains the
root of the emphatic meaning of all that is. It thus concerns Schelling's interpre-
tation of the principle of contradiction as it is presented by Aristotle in *Metaphy-
sics Γ* 3 and 6. As is well-known, in these texts Aristotle points to the principle of
contradiction as the most certain and best known law or "axiom" which applies

to all being in general in so far as it is being,[16] and which is thus neither a mere hypothesis nor can be derived from any previous principle.[17] It is true Aristotle states several quite different versions of the principle which, however, all are based on a first and most important formulation according to which it

> [7] is impossible that the same is attributed to and simultaneously (ἅμα) is not attributed to the same and in the same respect.[18]

It is often asked whether this principle in its Aristotelian formulation is to be understood as a purely logical or as an ontological principle;[19] whether the "to attribute" (ὑπάρχειν) is to be taken here in the sense of the logical statement of a predicate or in the sense of the attribution of properties. I think, as Schelling does also, that it is to be understood logically in the first place and in its outlook. However at the same time Aristotle also decidedly intended an extension of its validity to precisely all that is also in and of itself. I will refer to some of the evidence for this: first of all it is wholly clear that Aristotle comes to speak of the principle of contradiction as a "syllogistic" or "mathematical" axiom.[20] Yet in *Met.* Γ 3 he poses the question whether the treatment of such a principle is the task of the science of being as such. His answer is an unambiguous 'yes' because, as he stresses several times, it, as a principle, is "attributed to all being

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16 Aristotle, *Met.* Γ 3, 1005a22f., 24, 27; b10f.

17 Aristotle, *Met.* Γ 3, 1005b11–18.

18 Aristotle, *Met.* Γ 3, 1005b19f. (τὸ γὰρ αὐτὸ ἅμα ὑπάρχειν τε καὶ μὴ ὑπάρχειν ἀδύνατον τῷ αὐτῷ καὶ κατὰ τὸ αὐτὸ)

19 Trendelenburg, for example, (Trendelenburg (1870), 31f.) tends to understand the principle primarily as ontological: "the whole expression which Aristotle gives it is markedly removed from that of the merely logical stance in the moderns (A is A and A is not not-A). [... The citation follows the standard formulation ...] Apparently he struggles in this well preserved form of the sentence to arrive at an undividable point pertaining to the things that must be determinate in itself as such and that excludes interpretative ambiguity." Rapp (1993, 526f.) however sees an independent ontological meaning of the principle as downright impossible: "With regard to 'pure' actuality the principle of contradiction cannot be either contested or defended. Just as it would make little sense to say of objects as such that they are situated 'in a respect' as little can it have been Aristotle's intent to refer to a reality prior to all logic and speech and thus to depart from all his other formulations of the principle." Rapp thus overlooks, however, that κατὰ τὸ αὐτὸ does not unconditionally have to mean 'according to the same respect' (for example one and the same thing can be indivisible according to its primary substance but divisible according to the matter); moreover Rapp does not consider the formulation of the principle of contradiction in *Gamma* 6 (Aristotle, *Met.* Γ 6, 1011b13–22) which differentiates different moments in the matter itself without the κατὰ τὸ αὐτὸ.

20 See Aristotle, *Met.* Γ 3, 1005a20 and b7f.

insofar as it is".[21] One can only speculate as to what the argument behind this conviction is supposed to be. I think it is Aristotle's hypothesis that one can only have access to all being via the *logos*, although being does not exist within *logos*. Yet another point of evidence of the priority of logical meaning I find in the fact that for Aristotle truth and error are manifest not in things, but only in thinking,[22] but he uses the impossibility the attribution and negation of a predicate being true at the same time to also justify the exclusion of *contrary oppositions* in regard to the same thing.[23] I will come back to this point.

Nevertheless one can also recognize in the text arguments with which Aristotle attempts to clarify that the principle of contradiction could not claim the certainty (βεβαιότης) which is due to it if it is *merely* considered as purely logical. I cite one of these passages:

> [8] This is the most certain of all principles, since it has the aforementioned distinguishing characteristics [sc. underivable, free of deception, not a mere presupposition and so on as earlier specified]. For it is impossible for anyone to *assume* in reference to one certain thing that it is and is not, as some believe that Heraclitus maintains. For it is, indeed, not necessary that one assumes what he is *saying*. If however it is not possible that contrary features belong to the same thing simultaneously [...] but an opinion asserting the contradiction is the opinion contrary to the first, then it is clear that it is impossible for one to assume that something is and is not at the same time, because otherwise he who is mistaken in this point would hold contrary opinions.[24]

Aristotle asserts here that the mere λέγειν and the *logos* of contradiction is not prohibited *per se*, but first under an assumption (ὑπολαμβάνειν) posited as the norm of truth or thinking. This in turn makes the principle certain, not because it concerns contradiction in the formal sense, but because one cannot harbour contrary views at the same time. It must be owned that Schelling gained his figure of being in exactly the same way, from the serious "attempt" of thinking:

> [9] One must *actually* think so as to *experience* that the contradictory is not to be thought. One must make the attempt to think that which cannot be unified [*Uneinbare*], especially in

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21 Aristotle, *Met.* Γ 3, 1005a27; compare a22; b10 f.

22 See Aristotle, *Met.* E 4.

23 Compare Aristotle, *Met.* IV 6, 1011b15–21.

24 Aristotle, *Met.* IV 3, 1005b22–31: αὕτη δὴ πασῶν ἐστὶ βεβαιοτάτη τῶν ἀρχῶν· ἔχει γὰρ τὸν εἰρημένον διορισμόν. ἀδύνατον γὰρ ὁντινοῦν ταὐτὸν ὑπολαμβάνειν εἶναι καὶ μὴ εἶναι, καθάπερ τινὲς οἴονται λέγειν Ἡράκλειτον· οὐκ ἔστι γὰρ ἀναγκαῖον, ἅ τις λέγει, ταῦτα καὶ ὑπολαμβάνειν. εἰ δὲ μὴ ἐνδέχεται ἅμα ὑπαρχειν τῷ αὐτῷ τἀναντία [...], ἐναντία δ᾽ ἐστὶ δόξα δόξῃ ἡ τῆς ἀντιφάσεως, φανερὸν ὅτι ἀδύνατον ἅμα ὑπολαμβάνειν τὸν αὐτὸν εἶναι καί μὴ εἶναι τὸ αὐτό· ἅμα γὰρ ἂν ἔχοι τὰς ἐναντίας δόξας ὁ διεψευσμένος περὶ τούτου.

order to become aware of the necessity to position it in *different* moments and *not* simultaneously, and thus win the merely simple notions.[25]

German original: Man muß *wirklich* denken um zu *erfahren*, daß das Widersprechende nicht zu denken ist. Man muß den Versuch machen, das Uneinbare zumal zu denken, um der Nothwendigkeit inne zu werden, es in *verschiedenen* Momenten, *nicht* zugleich zu setzen, und so die schlechthin einfachen Begriffe zu gewinnen.

We can thus summarize this point to the effect that Aristotle indeed understands the principle of contradiction primarily in the logical meaning, but first, by recourse to the logical form, he claims its validity for being in itself, and second he claims the certainty of the principle only through anchoring it in the impossibility of thinking contraries at the same time.

IV The Search for the 'Positive' Meaning of the Principle of Contradiction

So far the more general aspects of the conception of the principle of contradiction in Aristotle and Schelling were described. I want in conclusion to say something about why Schelling was so strongly interested in this particular Aristotelian version of it, and what he really believes to gain from it. Schelling's interest is focused particularly on the word ἅμα, i.e. 'at the same time' or 'simultaneously' which Aristotle includes in all formulations of the principle of contradiction and which was decisively rejected by the major author of the Idealistic period, namely Kant. Schelling recognizes in the insertion of this small word something that he calls the "positive meaning" of the principle of contradiction as a pure law of reason.[26] The insertion of this (according to Kant) not only superfluous but also misleading word means (according to Schelling) first, that Aristotle understood being as something to which contradictions can refer, not as an analytic conceptual formation but as an object external to the concept and, secondly, that the word ἅμα yields a clue as to which formal-ontological basic structure of being in itself – independent of our statements – must have at any time to also demand the opposite of the contradictory.

In his detailed examination of the principle as he finds it in the Aristotelian *Metaphysics* (13th lecture in *Presentation of the Purely Rational Philosophy*), Schelling takes up meta-critically, in his turn, Kant's aforementioned critique

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25 Schelling (1856a), 326.
26 Schelling (1856a), 304 f.

of this form as it is given in Aristotle. The critique of the principle of contradiction was also always presented in this form in Kant's time, and Kant insists that with the word "at the same time" (impossible for the same to be attributed and not attributed to some certain thing "at the same time") it is given a completely superfluous and even misleading temporal connotation, although the principle still, as Kant maintains, is to be understood purely logically, universally and thus free of time. In Kant's words:

> [10] No thing can be assigned a predicate which contradicts it.[27]

It is not for nothing that the heading under which Kant treats this principle reads "On the supreme principle of all analytic judgements". For in this form, as it is specified by Kant and in contrast to Aristotle, a contradictory predicate is always already contained in the thing to which a contradictory predicate is assigned. As Kant writes:

> [11] For the contrary of that which already lies and is thought in the cognition of an object is always correctly denied, while the concept itself must necessarily be affirmed of it, since its opposite would contradict the object. [28]

One clearly sees how Kant's thought does not target the respective object or that which is itself but aims at "that which as a concept already lies and is thought in the cognition of the object" and – according to the principle of contradiction – logically rules out anything that is irreconcilable with single traits or characteristics, pertaining to the object.

On this model it is always only a matter of an *analytic* application of the principle such as, for example, being married is excluded from what is conceptualized as a bachelor. However, the object itself or being, as the object of science, is often not even grasped in conceptual knowledge: we simply do not know precisely which predicates can be attributed to it and which cannot. Nevertheless, at least according to Aristotle, it is entirely certain that in each case it fulfils the principle of contradiction *qua* being. Here, 'at the same time' must be added, in so far as the thing of which is spoken the same predicate cannot both be asserted and denied, at least not at the same time, if one only presumes that what is at issue is being; whilst this would be quite possible for the same thing at different times or occasions. The formulation of the principle of contradiction with 'at the same time' is therefore an indication that Aristotle sees the

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27 Kant, *KrV*, A 151, B 190.
28 Kant, *KrV*, A 151, B 190.

identity of things which are spoken of as entirely removed from this discourse and the concepts or predicates applied therein, while Kant understands the things as being thought according to certain concepts or as objects grasped in "cognition". But if this is the case, then the attribution or withholding of a predicate is always to be affirmed as valid or denied as contradictory by way of analysis.

The formulation including 'at the same time' thus presumes being as that to which contradictory discourses refer, independent even of a concept made operable for this purpose (for example ostensively or by proper names), while the Kantian formulation always keeps a conceptual context in mind which is in itself contradictory or free of contradiction.

And so it also becomes clear that the principle of contradiction in the Aristotelian formulation is not *only* supposed to be a logical-analytic principle for conceptual contexts, but a principle for being in general, provided that its stature *demands* to be brought to either affirmative or negating propositions in speech. It can scarcely be disputed that the form of organization of the *logos per se* possesses no exclusive power at all with reference to contradiction, otherwise statements with linguistic structures like the following would be impossible: "It was dark, the moon shone brightly, as a car drove fast as lightning slowly around the corner, inside people sat standing, mutely rapt in conversation [...]."[29] Here evidently a night-time drive is spoken of, but certainly not a summer swim in the sea; but a nightly ride that is not such that it could have taken place. Why not? Answer: because speaking about something that *is* demands that contradictory occurrences do not take place at the same time while this is in no way demanded by merely thematic talk. This feature of being that demands it not be the target of contradictions at the same time is, according to Schelling, the "positive meaning" of the law of contradiction:

> [12] [...] the pure and proper law of reason [...] which defines, as Aristotle says, not a particular kind of being, but being as such and in the mode in which it occurs in reason, the full or positive sense of which [law], however, is subsequently lost in that it is restricted to the contradictory opposites and so damned to unfruitfulness, as it is actually for Kant merely the principle [Grundsatz] for analytic, as he calls them, but in actual fact tautological sentences, while for Aristotle it is at least also permitted to be nothing less than the law for pure opposites (i.e. things opposed as *contrarium* to each other), which of course will only be contradictory in the sense of falling under the principle [Grundsatz] of contradiction when posited at the same time, thus not when the one precedes and the other follows, in which case opposites can be in one and the same thing. And so the otherwise merely

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29 According to Loriot.

negative law obtains a positive meaning and we understand how, according to Aristotle, it can be the law of *all* being, hence the most fruitful and content-rich of all laws.[30]

German original: "[...] das reine und eigentliche Vernunftgesetz [...] von dem, wie Aristoteles sagt, nicht eine besondere Art des Seyenden, sondern das Seyende als solches und wie es in der Vernunft ist, bestimmt wird, dessen voller oder positiver Sinn aber in der Folge verloren gegangen ist, indem es auf das contradictorisch Entgegengesetzte beschränkt und damit zur Unfruchtbarkeit verdammt wurde, wie es für Kant wirklich nur noch Grundsatz für analytische, wie er sie nennt, eigentlich aber tautologische Sätze ist, während Aristoteles es wenigstens nicht minder auch für das bloß Entgegengesetzte (nur als contrarium sich Entgegenstehende) Gesetz seyn läßt, das nämlich nur widersprechend werde, also unter den Grundsatz des Widerspruchs falle, wenn es *zugleich* gesetzt werde, nicht also, wenn das eine vorausgehe, das andere folge, wo Entgegengesetzte[s] allerdings eines und dasselbe seyn können. Hiedurch erhält das sonst bloß negative Gesetz positive Bedeutung, und es begreift sich, wie es nach Aristoteles das Gesetz *alles* Seyenden, also das fruchtbarste und inhaltsreichste aller Gesetze seyn kann.

In fact Schelling is right to say that Aristotle, with at least one of his formulations of the principle of contradiction, explicitly excludes oppositions that are contrary in themselves from that which is. Schelling cites the passage (IV 6, 1011 b 15–22) in its entirety and reproduces its meaning correctly, although he believes one would have to erase two words at one point to preserve this sense. It is only in this that one need not follow him:

[13] 'Since it is impossible, he [sc. Aristotle] says, that contradictory things could be said with truth of the same thing, it is therefore obvious that also contrary things cannot at the same time be one and the same thing. For the one of the opposites is deprivation, deprivation and yet also negation[31] of a certain kind [...] If it is then impossible to affirm and negate in truth at the same time, thus it will also be impossible that contrary things be at the same time one and the same, unless one limits each thing to a specific location [*ein besonderes Wo*], or one affirms one contrary of a certain part (*black*, for example, of the eye), the other contrary (*white*) in general or of the whole.' It is noteworthy how here '*not at the same time*' is substituted for '*not at the same place*' [...].[32]

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30 Schelling (1856a), 304 f.

31 The last sentence reads in Greek: τῶν μὲν γὰρ ἐναντίων θάτερον στέρησίς ἐστιν οὐχ ἧττον [, οὐσίας δὲ στέρησις· ἡ] δὲ στέρησις ἀπόφασίς ἐστιν ἀπό τινος ὡρισμένου γένους. Schelling omits the words οὐσίας δὲ στέρησις ἡ (Aristotle, *Met.* IV 6, 1011b19) that Bonitz, without thereby creating a different meaning from Schelling's, left in the text with Alexander's explanation. The text is thus translated with the words in question: "because one of the opposites is not less privation – privation referred to the substance – privation but negation, namely of a determinate kind".

32 Schelling (1856a), 305 f.

German original: 'Da es unmöglich ist, sagt er [sc. Aristoteles], daß Widersprechendes zu-
gleich von demselben mit Wahrheit gesagt werde, so ist offenbar, daß auch Entgegenge-
setztes nicht zugleich eines und dasselbe seyn kann. Denn das eine der Entgegengesetzten
ist Beraubung, Beraubung aber nicht weniger Verneinung, nämlich einer bestimmten Art
[...] Wenn es also etwas Unmögliches ist, mit Wahrheit zugleich bejahen und verneinen,
so wird auch unmöglich seyn, daß Entgegengesetzte zugleich eines und dasselbe seyn,
man beschränke denn jedes auf ein besonderes Wo, oder sage das eine vom bestimmten
Theil (*schwarz* z. B. vom Auge), das andere (*weiß*) schlechthin oder vom Ganzen.' Merkwür-
dig ist, wie hier dem ‚*nicht zugleich*' das ‚*nicht an derselben Stelle*' substiuirt ist [...].

Schelling draws attention to the fact that Aristotle, at the end of this sentence,
excludes contrary determinations (deprivation and possession of a determinate
way of being [*Seins*]) only insofar as they actually are predicated to being simul-
taneously, and not *distributed* in some way (πῇ ἄμφω, or one of them πῇ and the
other ἁπλῶς). Here we come closest to what Schelling calls the "positive mean-
ing" of the principle of contradiction, which was already mentioned numerous
times. On this interpretation of the principle, being is always being constructed
in such a way that opposing determinations within the identical existent can
only ever exist distributed in different moments, places or plateaus, but never
'at the same time'.

How does being permit such a dispersion [*Verteilung*] but exclude, precisely
for that reason, the simultaneity of opposing determinations? There are certainly
different means and ways to this end. One means, according to Aristotle and
Schelling, is a temporal or sequential succession that is spanned by the identical
being (for example in the case of the growth or the change of a substance); an-
other means is the location, i. e. difference in location, of parts of the same thing;
a third means, which for Aristotle and Schelling is most important, is the already
mentioned difference between 'according to capacity or possibility' and 'accord-
ing to actuality', a difference that is operative in reference to (almost) any sub-
stance and which Aristotle depicts as the basis for the internal unity of a sub-
stance.[33] For by a determinately organized consolidation of that which a
certain thing is according to possibility, it *is* also *one single* and determinate
thing in actuality. Without this integrative step it would be a somewhat contra-
dictory miscellany. As Aristotle writes:

[14] It is impossible that a substance be made out of substances contained in it according to
actuality; for things which are in actuality two are never one. For only if they are two ac-

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33 Compare Aristotle, *Met.* H 6.

cording to potentiality are they one, as for example the sum of two halves, because actuality divides.[34]

And in another place Aristotle describes the same issue in a still narrower affinity with his version of the principle of contradiction:

> [15] Thus, capacity holds of opposites at the same time, yet it is impossible that opposites exist at the same time, and thus the actualities cannot exist at the same time.[35]

And so, since what is an object of scientific discourse must always be something which exists according to actuality, contradictory things can never be stated truthfully about it *at the same time*.

From this, an ontological hypothesis emerges which I find to be of interest, one that Schelling could have taken from Aristotle: that so long as actual being is or in fact possesses some *one* of contradictory determinations, it always trumps, in itself, a potentiality or possibility of the contradictory, and thus is 'emphatical' being, and not merely analytic. Being in an emphatic or actual sense thus constantly exhibits more than just a single 'point' or aspect or possibility of presentation and therefore unites opposites in itself in a certain, namely potential, way. It always has – as *actual* (emphatic) in this rather than in another way – a force of tension in virtue of which its many different possibilities are rearranged and determined by only one actual being. However, being can only have such a force of tension if, in embracing both possibilities, it goes beyond them in a certain sense. According to the *Categories* this is explicitly the privilege of substance, namely to have contradictory determinations and to be able to exceed them:

> [16] It seems most distinctive of substance to be able to receive contraries while being one in number and the same thing, whereas one could never cite as example any of the other things which, while remaining one in number, is able to take on contraries.[36]

However a substance, of course, does not have opposed determinations at the same time, but on each occasion only one *with* and *in spite of* the capacity or po-

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34 Aristotle, *Met*. Z 13, 1039a3–7: ἀδύνατον γὰρ οὐσίαν ἐξ οὐσιῶν εἶναι ἐνυπαρχουσῶν ὡς ἐντελεχείᾳ· τὰ γὰρ δύο οὕτως ἐντελεχείᾳ οὐδέποτε ἓν ἐντελεχείᾳ, ἀλλ᾽ ἐὰν δυνάμει δύο ᾖ, ἔσται ἕν, οἷον ἡ διπλασία ἐκ δύο ἡμίσεων δυνάμει γε· ἡ γὰρ ἐντελέχεια χωρίζει.
35 Aristotle, *Met*. Θ 9, 1051a10–12: τὸ μὲν οὖν δύνασθαι τἀναντία ἅμα ὑπάρχει, τὰ δ᾽ ἐναντία ἅμα ἀδύνατον· καὶ τὰς ἐνεργείας δὲ ἅμα ἀδύνατον ὑπάρχειν.
36 Aristotle, *Cat*. 5, 4a10–12: Μάλιστα δὲ ἴδιον τῆς οὐσίας δοκεῖ εἶναι τὸ ταὐτὸν καὶ ἓν ἀριθμῷ ὂν τῶν ἐναντίων εἶναι δεκτικόν· οἷον ἐπὶ μὲν τῶν ἄλλων οὐδενὸς ἂν ἔχοι τις προενεγκεῖν [ὅσα μή ἐστιν οὐσία], ὃ ἓν ἀριθμῷ ὂν τῶν ἐναντίων δεκτικόν ἐστιν.

tentiality of the opposite determination. The numerical unity or individuality of substance is, when it is able, as one and the same, to receive contrary determinations, something more complex and manifold than the mere spot or instance of something in itself homogenous and simple. This is how Aristotle repeatedly represents it, almost imbues it, as for example in *Met.* Z 13, H 3 and H 6. Just that internal complexity of substance cannot possibly be one made up of components that are substantial in turn, however, it is also not a substance made up of general or instantiated non-substantial determinations. It is rather, as both Aristotle and Schelling (still more clearly) emphasize, a complexity of potentialities or dynamics of being rounding itself out into unity. Aristotle describes this in a famous passage:

> [17] The cause [of all errors] is that one seeks a unifying reason and a difference between potentiality and actuality. But, as has been said, the ultimate matter and the form are one and the same – in the sense of potentiality and the other according to actuality. Thus it is the same, to seek the cause *of* one as to seek the cause for its being one; for each thing is a single one, and that which is according to potentiality and that which is according to actuality are in some way one.[37]

We can therefore summarize the conclusion of this point, namely the question of what the positive meaning of the principle of contradiction in Aristotle is, as follows: in that the principle of contradiction is valid not only for the logical representation of all being in the form of concepts and propositions, but also applies to being in itself apart from all representation, it is maintained of it that it be always just *one* certain and definite arrangement of these possibilities in its factual or emphatic actuality, though contradictory possibilities exist in reference to it.

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37 Aristotle, *Met.* H 6, 1045b16 – 21: αἴτιον δ᾽ ὅτι δυνάμεως καὶ ἐντελεχείας ζητοῦσι λόγον ἑνοποιὸν καὶ διαφοράν. ἔστι δ᾽, ὥσπερ εἴρηται, ἡ ἐσχάτη ὕλη καὶ ἡ μορφὴ ταὐτὸ καὶ ἕν, δυνάμει, τὸ δὲ ἐνεργείᾳ, ὥστε ὅμοιον τὸ ζητεῖν τοῦ ἑνὸς τί αἴτιον καὶ τοῦ ἓν εἶναι· ἓν γάρ τι ἕκαστον, καὶ τὸ δυνάμει καὶ τὸ ἐνεργείᾳ ἕν πώς ἐστίν.

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Gerald Hartung

What are Logical Investigations?

Aristotelian Research in Trendelenburg and Husserl

For László Tengelyi
(1954 – 2014)

Abstract: This chapter shows just how different projects could be while sharing the title "Logical Investigations". Owing to the neo-Kantian movement in the latter half of the 19th century, logic became a particularly contested field. Gerald Hartung shows that there was a battle for conceptually determining this territory, which was shared by philosophy and the nascent fields of psychology and linguistics, and that this battle provided the crucial background for the reception of Aristotle after 1840. Most notably, the status of the logic implicit in language as used is at issue here: the philosophical analysis of grammar ultimately issues in a critique of language itself. This is a development to which Trendelenburg's Aristotelianism very much contributed, but which would develop a philosophical dynamic of its own in the second half of the 19th century.

What lies concealed behind the much used title *Logical Investigations?* Both Friedrich Trendelenburg (1840) and Edmund Husserl (1900/1901) as well as Gottlob Frege (1918 – 1919) and Ludwig Wittgenstein (1921) published one of their main works under this title. But why not simply use *Logic* or *Investigations on Logic?* Why make the substantive "logic" an adjective? Doesn't this already indicate a problematization of the subject investigated and of its method? It is these questions that are at issue in the following historical-systematic study. I want to show that in the second half of the 19th century – and against the background of Aristotelian studies – a questioning of and challenge to classical Aristotelian logic occurred, an occurrence that has shaped our understanding of the contours of this discipline right up to today.[1]

What "logic" as a philosophical discipline means is more or less clear in the period around 1850. Logic could be: a logic of being, or a formal logic of the forms of thinking or categories that are related to the order of beings or, as in Kant, a science of the "mere forms of thinking, the rules of the understanding

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[1] I am thankful to my colleagues at Wuppertal University, especially Laszlo Tengelyi, for the discussions in both fields of interest, the history of 19th century philosophy and phenomenological research.

in general"; or, as in Hegel in the *Encyclopaedia*, logic was "science of the pure idea".[2] Even here there is a large degree of tension between these conceptions. For either we are dealing with a logical structure of beings according to which "thinking" and "being" correspond or correlate, or we are dealing with a formal determination of the structures of thinking that do not fit into an external order. Roughly speaking, we can say that on this path from Aristotle to Kant the formal point of view in logic becomes pre-dominant and formulated ever more precisely.

That is how this relationship is typically depicted in histories of philosophy and in philosophical dictionaries. I do not want to treat this once again, but I do want to look at the second half of the 19th century, which once again struggles with what we can expect from "logic" as a philosophical discipline. This period of the history of philosophy is underestimated today because the path from there, as viewed from the perspective of the subsequent developments, seems to be clear. With Frege and Wittgenstein's endeavours to find a language that is oriented to the exactness of the natural sciences, in particular to mathematics, the task of logic was secured. As stated succinctly in Wittgenstein's *Tractatus* 1.1: "The world is the totality of facts [in logical space], not of things".[3] With this the scene changed, both becoming clearer and more restricted. The extent to which this restriction was a radical move is only apparent when we look at what was addressed in a variety of ways in the *Logical Investigations* that took place between 1840 and 1900: the relation between thinking and being, idea and thing – and the question concerning a "correct thinking" that finds its measure in the order of things, in the order of speech as the image of the world of things, or even in "objective valid units of meaning [*Geltungseinheiten*]".

In the – in my opinion unjustly forgotten – period between 1840 and 1900 what is at issue is the "reform of logic"[4] in reference to, or as delimited from, psychology and linguistics. This theme is of particular significance because it marks a central debate in the philosophy of the 19th century to which many contributed, from Herbart and Beneke through Drobisch, Bolzano, Erdmann, Lotze, Ueberweg, Windelband, Sigwart, Ueberweg, Mill, Comte, Wundt, Brentano, Lipps down to Dewey and Russell. In the following I will limit myself to treating only a part of this debate and I will proceed in three steps. First I will discuss Trendelenburg's reform of logic and his thoughts on the relation between logic and grammar, then in the second part outline the debate regarding the purported interdependency of logic, psychology and linguistics in the period from the 1860s

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2 Hegel (1986), 67.

3 Wittgenstein (1963), 11.

4 Vilkko (2000).

to the 1890s. Finally I will consider Husserl's proposals concerning a "reform of logic" and the introduction of an ideal grammar.

The hypothesis, to which I will return at the end of the paper, is that the "reform of logic" in the 19th century is based on an analysis of the internal link between logic, psychology and linguistics as well as the dissolution of this link–*and* this analysis turns into, in a variety of ways, the critique of language.[5] The presuppositions of Husserl's critical stance towards the logic of language, in my view, have not been sufficiently considered.[6]

I On the Limits of a Formal Logic and Grammatical Analysis

Kant, and obviously also Hegel, already strove to reform traditional logic as it is presented in Christian Wolff's work and the Wolff School in the 18th century. However only in the middle of the 19th century did the call to radical reform become prominent. Here the primary concern is the relationship of philosophy to the sciences and the question of what task is left to philosophy.

The reform movement in logic is associated with the name Adolf Trendelenburg. Trendelenburg is certainly one of the "minor masters of philosophy" (Karlfried Gründer). As such he initiated several debates in the 19th century and influenced a generation of German-speaking school philosophers. In 1840 Trendelenburg published his *Logical Investigations* [*Logischen Untersuchungen*] in two volumes. This work provides analyses of metaphysics, logic, epistemology, psychology and natural philosophy. It begins with a critique of Hegel's logic and Herbart's psychologizing logic. As opposed to the formal logic of Kant and his successors, he voices a demand for the unity of logic and metaphysics. The main argument, which recurs and is varied in the entire work, is a peculiar conception of the correspondence theory of truth, claiming that there is a "mutual relationship between thinking and the object" and that "all the senses [...] have an immediate affinity with the object for which they are intended."[7]

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5 Compare Hartung (2012); Hartung (2013).

6 Compare Dummett (1988), chapter 2: "The Linguistic Turn", 11–23; here 13 (*The Origins of Analytic Philosophy* [1993], 4–14, here 8). Above all there is this question of how is the transformation of logic related to the "linguistic turn"? How is a liberation of thought from that which tainted it with the quality of linguistic expression (as Frege put it in the introduction to the *Begriffschrift*), to be understood as a turn to language? Compare Frege (1879), XIIf.

7 Trendelenburg (1870), 1.

There are two sides to Trendelenburg's take on Kant's formal logic. On the one hand he says that it, as opposed to Hegelian logic, is clear and has precise boundaries, especially as demarcated from psychology. On the other hand, however, it severed the bond to metaphysics and thereby leaves "the connection of the formal with the material, of thinking with being to a future metaphysics."[8]

Instead of now revitalizing a pre-Kantian ontology, Trendelenburg, in an engagement with the natural and the human sciences, takes the path of working out the correspondences between thinking and being, thought and matter, spirit and nature from a 'bottom-up' perspective. Standing in the wake of Romantic natural philosophy, he sees organic forces in interaction everywhere and understands nature as a total organism. However, he also analyses the structures of thinking and of the intellectual world as a whole in conjunction with the materiality of the external world and depicts a genesis of thought from matter, and thus depicts a course of development from the real to the ideal.

What is of interest here is not so much that Trendelenburg's "organic worldview [Weltansicht]" found no followers and that his work was already seen as an anachronism at the time of its publication, but rather that he described his analysis of the materiality of the mind as an Aristotelian approach and it was precisely this aspect that seemed to be thoroughly "modern" and was indeed received as such, together with his speaking in some detail about the determination of the boundaries of logic, psychology and linguistics. This concerned the problem of the genesis and validity of the categories as the elementary structures of human thinking and the indication that formal logic must be supplemented by a material side.

In the first part of his *Logical Investigations* Trendelenburg seeks, in recourse to Aristotle, to make manifest a simple activity of movement in nature and a corresponding constructive movement of receptive consciousness in thinking. He defines this latter as "an originally generative activity". It is the counterpart of external movement and the origin of the internal conceptual world. This equivalence is the basis of his epistemology, in which the Kantian categories are interpreted teleologically as real categories. Logic in the Trendelenburgian sense, then, is tasked to extrapolate this fundamental commonality between the internal world (that of thinking) and the external world, which communality is prior to and makes the meditation of any opposition possible. It analyses the one common activity of thinking and being, which activity is the "ground of knowledge" itself.[9] "We name this movement, as opposed to the external in space, the con-

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8 Trendelenburg (1870), 18.
9 Trendelenburg (1870), 139.

structive"[10] and consider it as a "counterpart" of external movement. Trendelenburg sees in this the foundation or ground for the fact that our thinking, in principle, does not fail to grasp the external world, for the fact that the sciences give an adequate image of the external world, and for logic's ability, as a "theory of the sciences", to develop a synthetic perspective, an organic world-view [Weltanschauung].[11]

Against the background of an organic worldview Trendelenburg goes so far as to broach the question of the validity of the laws of thought by an analysis of their efficacy (psychology) and their development (linguistics, grammar). "Logic has become self-aware through its contact with language and is in many ways a grammar that mediates itself. We recognize the traces of this origin in formal logic on all sides. It can legitimately be demanded that the grammatical form of sentences find grounds in the theory of judgment. If there are grammatically significant forms of sentences that do not let themselves be linked to any logical form, then this grammatical factum would testify against the correct and complete inventory of logic."[12] However, this should not to be: grammar and logic should not testify against each other, but reciprocally confirm each other. That is why Trendelenburg also assumes that categorical determinations originate in thinking, since thinking observes itself within the process of linguistic enactment and in this roundabout fashion recognizes structural regularities. "In that it [thinking] observes and distinguishes the motions and the products and relations, the categories emerge."[13] In Trendelenburg's view the categories are the basic concepts of our thought that ground all other concepts. They are the components of judgmental thought, but not its products. They are "recurring designations which all our thinking becomes subject to, as higher powers, in the concrete as in the abstract."[14] The task of logic is to determine the difference and unity of the categories, "for the basic concepts are either the basic concepts of being or of thinking."[15]

Both aspects are crucial! If thinking were not in a relation to the order of beings, it would become entangled in itself. However thinking bears "the possibility of a community with things in themselves."[16] That is why the categories are products of a "mediating activity" between the levels; that is also why they are

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10 Trendelenburg (1870), 143.
11 Compare Hartung (2006), Hartung (2011).
12 Trendelenburg (1870), 28.
13 Trendelenburg (1870), 338.
14 Trendelenburg (1870), 332.
15 Trendelenburg (1979), 364.
16 Trendelenburg (1870), 365.

"not imaginary figures, not invented guidelines but basic concepts which are in equal measure objective as subjective."[17]

As all concepts, so too are the categories formed through observation; they are however more than mere reproductions of external circumstances, but rather the result of intellectual productivity. "Because they recur in all [concepts], they mark themselves for the mind like the main strokes of a drawing. It cannot be otherwise."[18]

Trendelenburg shows, in analogy to the formation of language, how, from a "chaotic mass of ideas [...] logical thought" gradually forms, as "in the floating sea of sounds fixed forms" are also gradually recognized. The first source of real categories lies in sensible intuition; the "awakened mind" develops the basic concepts in thinking, mostly unconsciously. Within a real genesis, in analogy to the history of language, it should be clear how the recurring basic concepts are contrasted and imprinted with intuitions.[19]

More generally, logic has, according to Trendelenburg, learned much from grammar. Both sciences are virtually twins. In particular this is illustrated in the deduction of the categories in Aristotle. This deduction is based on the sentence, that is, on the structure of judgment, on spoken discourse. Then the elements of judgment, that is, the parts of the proposition, are isolated and finally the general structure of the predicates are determined, i.e. "the categories of substance, quantity, quality, relation, place, time, position, state, action and affection." According to Trendelenburg, Aristotle shows in an exemplary fashion that the real genesis of the categories is coupled to the development of language. "As the categories were apparently discovered by Aristotle through the analysis of the sentence, they accordingly admit of a comparison with the parts of speech that were fully established after Aristotle."[20]

This claim, that Aristotle had followed a "grammatical guideline" in his category theory, garnered much criticism from Eduard Zeller to Hermann Bonitz and Franz Brentano. However the analogy between logic and grammar in Trendelenburg is indispensable for the claim of a real genesis of the categories. He recognizes this as Aristotle's genuine achievement, for "sciences owes to him [i.e. Aristotle] the first overview of the world of ideas, in that he turned the consideration of the sentence away from the expression of sounds towards the

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17 Trendelenburg (1979), 368.
18 Trendelenburg (1870), 338.
19 Compare Trendelenburg (1870), 355.
20 Trendelenburg (1861), 3–4.

meaning of the concepts that appear therein. [It also owes to Aristotle] the attempt at categories, comparable to an artificial system of natural products."[21]

II On Logic, Psychology and Linguistics – A Debate in the Second Half of the 19th Century

Trendelenburg's conceptions of a communality between thinking and being and of organic development is part of the astonishing career of the organism metaphor in the 19th century – not only in linguistics[22] but also in jurisprudence and in Romantic natural philosophy and the Romantic theory of sciences. The thought of "procreation" [Zeugung], "creation" [Erzeugung] and organic development prevails everywhere –from Schelling to Lotze, this thought is present in natural philosophy. We also find the notion of the organic development of language and languages too in the leading linguistic theorist of this time, Wilhelm von Humboldt.[23]

For example, it is said, for example, in Humboldt's early essay on language *Ueber das vergleichende Sprachstudium in Beziehung auf die verschiedenen Epochen der Sprachentwicklung* [*On Comparative Study of Language in Relation to the Different Epochs of Linguistic Development*], which was read on the 29th of June at the Berlin Academy of the Sciences, that: "The immediate breath of an organic being in its sensible and intellectual significance, in this it shares the nature of all organic life, the fact that each [within] can only exist through the other, and the entire can only exist through the one power that pervades the everything."[24] This small section of the text appears at first glance to provide a definition of language, however its enigmatic nature undermines the very requirements of such a definition. Heymann Steinthal speaks of Humbolt's "mysticism".[25] Even an extensive reading of the essay does not provide clarification at all on the following points: How is the relationship between the sensible and the intellectual aspects of language to be determined? Is he speaking only of humans and thus of the language of humans, or of a language of nature?

For philosophy of language this complex of questions may be reduced to one question: is the organic character of language based on the duality of the sensi-

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21 Trendelenburg (1861), 4.
22 Compare Kucharczik (1998), 146–178; Schmidt (1986), 92–100.
23 Humboldt (1821), 240 f.
24 Humboldt (1821), 241.
25 Compare Hartung (2012), 19–40.

ble and intellectual, or does a preceding, fundamental organic power pervade this duality? Karl Ferdinand Becker, in his work *Organism der Sprache* [*The Organism of Language*], whose second edition (1841) is dedicated to "the Memory of Wilhelm von Humboldt", gives an answer to this question that was, in its time, influential and authoritative.[26] Becker's objective is to treat language physiologically and to depict all its conditions as organic conditions.

In the introductory section of *Der Organism der Sprache im Allgemeinen* [*The Organism of Language in General*] (§ 1–12), Becker develops the essential features of his theory of language. On Becker's account, language is "a product of nature". All natural beings have come into being and thus stand in the midst of a process of life. That also applies to language and that is why "the nature and essence of spoken language can first be truly understood when linguistic performance is recognized in its peculiar nature."[27] What is organic about language is the fact that it is part of human nature, from which it has emerged with "with inner necessity". On Becker's account the theory of language is the "physiology of language". The diversity of languages must not deceive us on this point, for language is *not* a product of culture. "When one regards language as a product of culture [...] one misunderstands the nature of humanity and the necessarily given unity of intelligence and language that comes with it."[28]

Becker and Trendelenburg reciprocally corroborate each other's conceptions and cite each other in subsequent editions of their works. Trendelenburg provides Becker with the "organic worldview [organische Weltanschauung]", while Becker in turn conceives a theory of the organism of language which Trendelenburg is able to use as evidence for the tight connection between logic and linguistics. Hardly any serious thinker of the second half of the 19th century would maintain that there is a "given unity of intelligence and speech", even if Fritz Mauthner, in the fervour of his critique of language, claimed just this.[29]

In fact there are a number of interesting attempts to reform logic under the guidance of psychology and linguistics. One such attempt occurs in the most influential *Logik* of these years, that of Christoph Sigwart. Sigwart too speaks of the "natural conditions of human thinking." "In any case we receive a great part of our conceptual elements through the activity of our senses and the functions associated therewith [...]. In this whole region, our thinking is, insofar as its content is concerned, dependent on external conditions [...] And this holds not

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26 Compare Becker (1970).

27 Becker (1970), 1.

28 Becker (1970), 15.

29 Compare Hartung (2012), 139–178.

only of the objects which nature presents for observation outside of human activity, but even and more so of everything that first emerges through humans as object of our conception, of all forms and products of intellectual and spiritual life, of all inventions and arts, of all social relations and institutions."[30] This consideration of the dependence of the elementary structures of thinking on real factors is soberly analysed by Sigwart and thereby removed from ideology [Weltanschauung]. Wilhelm Dilthey says, with a similar thrust, that "presuppositionless epistemology [is] an illusion".[31] Sigwart links the acquisition of the functions of judgment to the "social nature" of humanity, and assigns a special explanatory function to the development of language. We appropriate the external world through language and in language and so gradually consolidate both the structures of judgment and of speech.[32] Language thus becomes a "mighty tool for reproduction and definition [Fixierung]" and we can see "the sure hand of the master [...] Aristotle" in creating awareness of the function of speech in concept formation.[33]

In 1875 Wilhelm Windelband published a treatise on the subject of *Die Erkenntnislehre unter dem völkerpsychologischen Gesichtspunkte* [*The Theory of Knowledge from Social-Psychological Viewpoint*] in which he discusses Sigwart's fundamental ideas.[34] Under the influence of that developmentalist thinking which was dominant since the middle of the 19th century, Windelband gives voice to a suspicion. Let us assume that the awareness of the laws of logic came about under determinate historical conditions and with this they became part of the "psychological development of historical humanity."[35] Whether there is an agreement between the results of logical processes and the order of being is a metaphysical question that cannot be answered.

> The deeper one goes into the psychological character of thinking, the more must one see that a whole series of conceptual constructs [Vorstellungsgebilde], of which we rightly expect that they sustain correct thinking, are far from corresponding to a being.[36]

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30 Sigwart (1904), 7.

31 Dilthey (1957), 150.

32 Sigwart (1904), 8: "Any consideration of thinking, which abstracted from the character of community, from the social nature that man shows in this area too, would have to be one-sided and untrue. This means in particular the duty to pay attention to everything that is received from the ideas of the thinking of everyone through the appropriation of language."

33 Sigwart (1904), 35.

34 Windelband (1875), 166 – 178.

35 Windelband (1875), 167.

36 Windelband (1875), 177.

Windelband wants to show with the help of two examples – the 'principle of contradiction' and the 'principle of sufficient reason' – that social and individual psychology suggest that logic emerges in actual practice. Their collective employment is like an exercise in correct thinking. At the beginning of the process of enculturation stands a practical epistemology, and at its provisional end a scientific epistemology [Erkenntnislehre]. The norms of correct thinking have gradually developed over a natural course of development. The contribution of social-psychological and linguistic investigations to a "history of epistemology" [37] is nowhere near exhausted. Only Wilhelm Wundt with his great, ten volume *Völkerpsychologie. Eine Untersuchung der Entwicklungsgesetze von Sprache, Mythos und Sitte* [*Cultural-Psychology. An Investigation of the Developmental Laws of Language, Myth and Morals*] (1900–1920) addressed this subject exhaustively.

Windelband takes up Sigwart's hypothesis of the "constant relativity [Bedingtheit]" of logical laws and extends it into a developmental-historical perspective: not only do the interests of individual humans and peoples change over through adaption to the currently given "matter of knowledge", but the "application of forms" also changes and only gradually assumes necessity and generality. [38]

Windelband's treatise appeared in the *Zeitschrift für Völkerpsychologie und Sprachwissenschaft* [*Journal for Cultural Psychology and Linguistics*], the editor of which, Heymann Steinthal, took the opportunity to write an "addendum"[39]. Steinthal counts Windelband among those in the Darwinian literature who – besides the question of "physical inheritance" – also strove to solve the enigma of "intellectual inheritance". That would mean: "Forms (and these are logical as well as moral and aesthetic ideas) multiply themselves with the content and with the successive human generations through the ages. The content is more changeable than the form [...]. The forms have more duration and stability; some are, once created, indestructible, i.e. that is to say so adapting to the essence of humanity that they can only disappear or change with it."[40]

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37 Windelband (1875), 174: "And so it would certainly be a praiseworthy task the question of which forms of logical thinking have broken through at different states of linguistic development were investigated from the social-psychological and linguistic point of view."

38 Windelband (1875), 177: "Under these conditions also the dignity of the laws of logic as absolutely valid norms of thinking is fully safeguarded. Originating out of the general forms of thinking and its epistemological purposes, developed and refined in the compensatory movement of the common thinking of humanity, they fully retain the claim to necessity and generality. The laws of logic, however, cannot be more vindicated [than this]."

39 Steinthal (1875), 178–189.

40 Steinthal (1875), 178–179.

The debate took a further turn with Steinthal's addendum: the categories as elementary forms of human thinking were considered from the point of view of adaptation to humans. The human, however, is not a product of nature but is nature, and also the nature of human language is, as Steinthal says in recourse to Humboldt, the result of human cultural development. That concerns logic too, which now – once shifted to the perspective of a real genesis – is stripped of its naturalness.

> Whoever considers this would find it difficult to accommodate the delusion that the logical forms of thinking are in the proper sense of the word organic creations, that the science of logic is the theory of the nature of thinking, and that language is logic that has become physical through organic development. All of what the human is and has is first achieved gradually through work, assisted by luck.[41]

III Edmund Husserl: The Critique of Psychologism in Logic and Pure Logical Grammar

Edmund Husserl published his *Logical Investigations* in two volumes in the years 1900 to 1901. In this text which is foundational for the phenomenological movement, Husserl deals with the reform of logic, with the refutation of psychologism in logic, and with epistemological question of how subjective acts of knowledge can grasp objective contents of knowledge. Husserl refers to the reform movement in logic, which he understands as a continuing dispute over the definition and the method of logic. On his view there is no permanent inventory of logical science that could be binding for the future. The starting point is the question concerning the delimitation of logic from other philosophical disciplines. However, this topic is apparently settled after the attacks of Mill on Hamilton and "after the no less famous although not so fruitful logical investigations of Trendelenberg"[42], for the psychological tendency had well-nigh secured the predominant position in logic. The situation in the reform movement in logic is confusing.

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41 Steinthal (1875), 184. As illustrating this point, Aristotle first discovered the theory of inference and so founded the science of logic and secured logical thinking.
42 Husserl (1928a), 4. The English translation is by J. N. Finlay: Husserl (2001a), 12.

> Even in Hamilton's day, and long before, men differed considerably as to the essential content, the scope and the manner of treatment of logic. One need only compare the works of Hamilton, Bolzano, Mill and Beneke. And how the differences have grown since then. Put together Erdmann and Drobisch, Wundt and Bergmann, Schuppe and Brentano, Sigwart and Überweg, and ask whether one then has then a single science, or only a name.[43]

The disputed questions in logic are: is logic a theoretical or a practical philosophical discipline? Is it independent of psychology and metaphysics? Has it only to do with the form of knowledge or also with its matter? Does it have the character of an *a priori* or an empirical and inductive science? Husserl's answers are: logic is a theoretical discipline that only has to do with the form of knowledge and has the character of an *a priori* science. Husserl understands this as a return to Kant and a rebuttal of neo-Kantian philosophies.

In the centre of Husserl's discussion stands the danger of a psychologistic foundation for logic and his critique of this, the dominant tendency of the time. Psychologistic thinkers (Husserl cites Theodor Lipps at this point[44]) are of the opinion that psychology of knowledge provides the theoretical foundation for the construction of the logical artifice. This, however, according to Husserl, is the wrong course, because the logician is not interested in natural connections "but looks for the ideal connections which he does not always find realized, in fact only exceptionally finds realized in the course of thinking. He aims not at a physics, but at an ethics of thinking."[45] Making direct reference to Christoph Sigwart and Wilhelm Wundt, Husserl critically summarizes a tendency that had taken its starting point from Trendelenburg's *Logical Investigations,* even though he does not count this latter work as psychologism.

> The psychologistic logicians ignore the fundamental, essential, never-to-be-bridged gulf between ideal and real laws, between normative and causal regulation, between logical and real necessity, between logical and real grounds. No conceivable gradation could mediate between the ideal and the real.[46]

That is the wedge that Husserl intends to drive between his approach and any theory of the gradual evolution of matter and thought, nature and world, facticity and logic.[47] That is why he argues that "one should not confuse *psychological*

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43 Husserl (1928a), 35 [Husserl (2001a), 31].

44 Lipps (1880/1881), 530 f.

45 Husserl (1928a), 56 [Husserl (2001a), 43].

46 Husserl (1928a), 68 [Husserl (2001a), 50].

47 Husserl (1928a), 69 [Husserl (2001a), 51]. "No logical law implies a 'matter of fact ', not even the existence of presentations or judgments or other phenomena of knowledge. No logical law,

'presuppositions' and 'bases' of the *knowledge* of a law with the *logical* presuppositions, grounds, premises, of that *law*".[48] A lot is stake here, as the seventh chapter, entitled 'Psychologism as a Sceptical Relativism', makes clear. Husserl recognizes a baleful tendency in the late 19th century to introduce a new form of relativism in epistemology insofar as it posits all truth (and knowledge) as relative to the contingent judging subject. He calls this relativism "anthropologism", and he discovers it in all the logics from Trendelenburg to Sigwart and Wundt.[49]

> What is true is absolutely, intrinsically true: truth is one and the same, whether men or nonmen, angels or gods apprehend and judge it. Logical laws speak of truth in this ideal unity, set over against the real multiplicity of races, individuals, experiences, and it is of this ideal unity that we all speak when we are not confused by relativism.[50]

This is one of the few passages in the *Logical Investigations* in which Husserl departs from his sober tone and, with strategic purpose, seeks to defend his hypothesis of truth as an ideal unity of knowledge. For only with the aid of this hypothesis, he claims, can we surmount the real diversity of individual and collective structures in their "constant relativity [constanten Bedingtheit]" (Sigwart).[51]

Husserl's *Logical Investigations* are aimed, as "prolegomena" to a pure logic, against the dominant form of relativism in his time, which "some Kantian thinkers" too cannot escape, for they are "still [ready to] deduce truth from generic human nature, the ideal from the real, or, more precisely, the necessity of laws from the contingency of facts".[52] Husserl's critique of the anthropologism of Sigwartian *Logic* is impressive. It is of course a fiction, on Sigwart's view, that a judgment can be true apart from some intelligence that thinks this judgment.

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properly understood, is a law for the facticities of mental life, and so not a law for presentations (as experiences), nor for judgments (experiences of judging), nor for our other mental experiences".

48 Husserl (1928a), 75 [Husserl (2001a), 54].

49 Husserl (1928a), 114–115 [Husserl (2001a), 77–78].

50 Husserl (1928a), 117–118 [Husserl (2001a), 79].

51 Sigwart (1904), 7. Husserl (1928a), 121 [Husserl (2001a), 81]: "If we confine ourselves to the only species actually known to us, animal species, then a change in their constitution would mean a change in the world and that although animal species are thought to be evolutionary products of the world. We are playing a pretty game: man evolves from the world and the world from man, God creates man and man God."

52 Husserl (1928a), 124–125 [Husserl (2001a), 83]. This also underlies the newer and especially the German logic: Mill, Bain, Wundt, Sigwart, Erdmann and Lipps.

Thus, for Sigwart truths that are valid in themselves and not known by anyone (because, for example, they exceed the human capacity for knowledge) are mere fictions. In this way he dissolves truth into conscious experiences and, in spite of all protestations to the contrary, abandons discourse on an objective truth. In this Dilthey, Wundt and James are his successors, and with them all followers of a theory of conscious experience.[53] Husserl maintained, contrary to them, that truth is "an idea, and so beyond time".[54] "To define truth in terms of a community of nature is to abandon its notion."[55]

IV Summary – The End of Aristotelian Research in Logic and the Theory of Language?

The debate about the demarcation of logic from individual and social psychology appears to stall at this point. However there still remains the possibility of dissolving this fruitless antagonism at the interface of logic and "language". It is worth looking once again at Husserl's *Logical Investigations* and doing so from this point of view. In the last pages we find a "note" on Heymann Steinthal's *Introduction to Psychology and Linguistics* [*Einleitung in die Psychologie und Sprachwissenschaft*] (2nd edition 1881) in which the affinities and conflicting views of both thinkers are listed. Husserl recognizes an affinity only in the shared reference to Humboldt's idea of an ideal grammar ("beautifully precise statement of the notion of W. v. Humboldt") which however Steinthal had misunderstood. Accordingly Steinthal can undoubtedly be counted among the opposition of which Husserl writes in the *Logical Investigations:* "but our distinctions would seem to have disposed of these all so clearly that no thoroughgoing criticism is required here."[56]

Much can be said concerning Steinthal's incisive, often contradictory, and in its time very prominent theory of language, but this must be omitted here.[57] What is decisive for our present course of thinking is that Steinthal argues for a "general separation of linguistic or grammatical relations from the relations of think-

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[53] Compare Jung (2009).
[54] Husserl (1928a), 128 [Husserl (2001a), 85].
[55] Husserl (1928a), 131 [Husserl (2001a), 87].
[56] Husserl (1928b), 342 [Husserl (2001b), 76].
[57] Steinthal (1881); compare Hartung (2012), 19 – 40.

ing and logic".[58] Husserl, however, begins the second part of his *Logical Investigations* with the indication that every logic must necessarily begin with linguistic discussions, because in linguistic analysis we stand "at the threshold" of logic.[59] Lest there be any misunderstanding, for Husserl this in no way implies an orientation towards empirical and historical linguistic research, but only an indication that the logical in language is given in an incomplete form in more or less "shifting meanings", and must be brought to "epistemological clarity". Analytic phenomenology, in the prolegomena to logic, has, at its starting point, to do with "mere words" and a merely symbolic understanding of words, and goes from this "back to the 'things themselves'".[60] The function of a grammatical analysis of language is ambivalent, for it is at the same time both an aid and an "initiator of illusions".[61]

If there were, as Trendelenburg maintains, a correspondence between thinking and being that expresses itself in correct language, then the analysis of meaning and grammatical analysis would coincide.[62] On Husserl's view, however, there are neither "essential grounds" nor factual evidence for this parallelism. Every proof of a parallelism is due simply to empirical contingency. Here the suggestive power of language is to be exposed because a mere "raw coincidence of verbal and mental differences, of forms of words and of thoughts" tempts us speakers all too often to seek a logical difference behind every grammatical one. We thereby miss, however, the fundamental clarification of this relationship.

Inversely, however, Husserl objects that a mere assertion of the difference between grammatical and logical form leads to confusion. For the knowledge

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58 Steinthal (1881), 79. See also Steinthal (1881), 72: The linguistic and logical categories are therefore disparate concepts, that quietly exist side by side [...]; and it already proves to be a misunderstanding of the true relations when one wants to measure language by logic, be it to ensure conformity with this, be it to exhibit an antagonism against this."
59 Husserl (1928b), 1. See also 2 [Husserl (2001a), 165]. "Linguistic discussions are certainly among the philosophically indispensable preparations for the building of pure logic: only by their aid can the true objects of logical research [...] be refined to a clarity that excludes all misunderstanding."
60 Husserl (1928b), 6 [Husserl (2001a), 168].
61 Husserl (1928b), 6 [Husserl (2001a), 168].
62 Husserl (1928b), 12–13 [Husserl (2001a), 172]: "Rough reflection on our thoughts and their verbal expression, conducted by us without special schooling, and often needed for the practical ends of thinking, suffice to indicate a certain parallelism between thinking and speaking. We all know that words mean something, and that, generally speaking, different words express different meanings. If we could regard such a correspondence as perfect, and as given *a priori*... meaning analysis would, so to speak, coincide with grammatical analysis."

that grammatical differences do not always run parallel to logical differences does not lead to the radical view that logic itself, in view of the material diversity of languages, is to be relativized (Steinthal) or that the region of the logical is to be restrictively delimited (Brentano).

Positively put: an analytic phenomenology of language begins with an analysis of the use of language. It discusses the descriptive difference between the physical appearance of the sign and the semantic intention that is brought to expression. Although we refer ourselves initially to the word, our intention goes beyond this to the sense-giving act. The physical appearance of the word is exceeded and thus the intentional character of a vivid experience.[63] Husserl strictly distinguishes between the objective side of a linguistic expression (the real) and the level of its meaning (the ideal) and here repeats his initial argument that between these levels there is no transition, no development, no mediation that sublimates oppositions.

> Pure logic, wherever it deals with concepts, judgments and syllogisms, is exclusively concerned with the *ideal* unities that we here call 'meanings'. If we take the trouble to detach the ideal essence of meanings from their psychological and grammatical connections, if we try, further, to clear up their *a priori* relations of adequacy, founded in this essence, to the objective correlates that they mean, we are already within the domain of pure logic.[64]

Husserl's position on the theory of language is at the deepest level rich in tensions. He maintains that the *Logical Investigations*, even if they aim at the ideal essences of meanings, must nevertheless be advanced from a discussion of the linguistic givenness of meanings. Crucially, it must be shown how the "detaching" and the accompanying "separation" functions occur. And thus how the programmatic claim "that [linguistic] expression is contingent, and that the thought, the ideally self-same meaning, is what is essential"[65] is implemented in the phenomenological analysis.

It is in no way clear how the relation of Husserlian phenomenology is adapted to its own linguistic practice. Husserl himself had formulated the process of clarification as a remaining task to which, however, he did not return in his later work.

There are, in the *Logical Investigations*, two indications concerning this issue. In one he wants to build on Leibniz's project of a universal grammar.[66]

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63 Husserl (1928b), 40 ff.

64 Husserl (1928b), 91 f. [Husserl (2001a), 224].

65 Husserl (1928b), 94 [Husserl (2001a), 226].

66 Compare Husserl (1928b), 295 [Husserl (2001b), 49]: "Modern grammar thinks it should build exclusively on psychology and other empirical sciences. As against this, we see that the old idea

In the other he considers, in the conflict with the Swiss linguistic theorist Anton Marty, a fundamental clarification of the relation of logic and grammar.[67] Both agree that the concrete form of linguistic praxis is "to a large extent referred to contingent linguistic habits, to matters of mere fact concerning language, which develop in one way in one speech community and in another way in another". However they are based in a more fundamental sense on the "*a priori* law [s] of the combination and transformation of meanings". These laws are revealed "in every developed language in its grammar of forms" and refer to a theory of the forms of meaning.[68]

Husserl therefore aims for another kind of adequacy, one which is to be fundamentally distinguished from that of the developmental theorists of language and logic. What is at issue is an adequacy of meaning and *a priori* grammatical form (for example the basic forms of sentences, the conjunctive, disjunctive, hypothetical sentence unities, the syntaxes of plurality, negation, and of modalities) and not the adequacy of object, word and thought. He bypasses the problem of the real genesis of these structures and forms, since he refers his *a priori* grammar to developed languages and their theory of forms.

In his *Logical Investigations* Husserl treats the question of the relationship of linguistic and logical structures, which since Trendelenburg had been a central issue in Aristotelian research, where the question was whether a reform of logic was to follow linguistic reflection, or be distinguished from it. As opposed to his contemporaries, including Anton Marty who was, on this point, the nearest to him, Husserl is consistent in the separation of the empirical and the *a priori* part of research in terms of both logic and the theory of language. He sees that the empirical element is partly "determined by universal, yet merely factual traits of human nature, partly by the peculiarities of race, nationality and national history, or by peculiarities of the individual and his individual life experience" and is the object of individual and social psychology as well as anthropological

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of a universal, or even of an *a priori* grammar, has unquestionably acquired a foundation and a definite sphere of validity, from our pointing out that there are *a priori* laws which can determine the possible forms of meaning."

67 Compare Husserl (1928b), 337–338. Marty had attempted to expand universal grammar beyond the sphere of the *a priori* by reference to the sphere of universal humanity, which Husserl does want to not contest. But in the interests of philosophy, the sphere of the *a priori* and the empirical must be strictly separated from one another. This means adhering to the great Kantian insight that a haziness in the demarcation between the sciences leads to a deformation. Today, comprehensive empirical research takes place while the *a priori* is neglected. Husserl wants to draw attention to the *a priori* and to explicate a philosophical grammar which aims at the logic of language, at the *a priori* of forms of meaning.

68 Husserl (1928b), 328–329 [Husserl (2001b), 68].

research. Apart from this he demands the exploration of the *a priori*, rather "obvious, even trivial" foundations of language and logic whose "systematic demonstration, theoretical pursuit and phenomenological clarification remains of supreme scientific and philosophical interest, and is by no means easy."[69]

Both parts of the research are related to one another as basis and implementation. Language has not only just its physiological, psychological and cultural-historical developmental elements, but also its *a priori* basis.

> The latter deals with the essential meaning-forms and their *a priori* laws of compounding or modification, and no speech is conceivable that is not in part essentially determined by this *a priori*. Every investigator of language operates with notions stemming from this field, whether he is clear on the matter or not.[70]

That is a clear vote by Husserl for logical and linguistic apriorism. As regards the relation between logic and grammar, this means ideally marking off, first, a pure theory of forms of meanings and, secondly, an ideal framework which every factual language fills in and clothes with empirical material. Husserl had developed his logical and linguistic apriorism as explicitly differentiated from 19th century neo-Aristotelian research in logic, psychology and linguistics, and thus took away the basis of this Aristotelian research. However, this happens at the price of a radical idealization of the forms of thinking and language as well as a turning from the social and natural sciences. An integrative concept of the logic of the forms of thinking and language which will dissolve the Husserlian limits will also have to reintegrate elements of Aristotelian research – for example: questions concerning the real content of the categories, and the materiality of forms of the relationship between reality and ideality. These questions point in different, wholly heterogeneous directions, pointing to a theory of symbolic forms (Ernst Cassirer), of the real categories (Nicolai Hartmann) or categories of life (Scheler, Plessner) as well as the concept of a form of life (Wittgenstein). This, however, is not only a new topic but it also contains within itself a great number of new research questions.

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Christian Pfeiffer
Negation and Judgment in Joseph Geyser

Aristotelian Research in the 19th Century

Abstract: At the beginning of the 20th century the Neo-Scholastic philosopher Joseph Geyser attempted to reform logic through a return to an Aristotelian point of view, in full knowledge and explicit rejection of both the phenomenological approach and that of Frege and Russell. Geyser gives Aristotelian analyses of judgment, negation, and of the role of the copula. In this chapter Christian Pfeiffer goes through Geyser's arguments and points out how his attempt to revive Aristotelian logic can be seen as, among other things, being based on a conception of logic which is broad and includes what we would today call "theory of language and ontology".

I Introduction

I.1 The Question concerning Logic

In his contribution to the *Festschrift* for Eduard Zeller's 70th birthday, Wilhem Windelband writes that

> the transformation [*Umwälzung*] which logic is presently undergoing, [... is] at no point so visible as in the system of the forms of judgment. [...] The point of departure for this perhaps long unfinished movement lies in the Achilles' heel of Kant's philosophy: in Kant's logical prejudice.[1]

Were only the first part of the sentence read, Windelband could be thought a prophet. A few years later, logic was in fact fundamentally "transformed" through the propositional calculus and predicate logic established by Frege and Russell. However, what must surprise the logicians and philosophers schooled in Frege and Russell is the area in which Windelband sees the revolution in logic. Few logicians and philosophers would locate the originality and

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[1] Windelband (1884), 167: "Die Umwälzung, in der sich die Logik gegenwärtig befindet, (...) an keinem Punkt so sichtbar, wie an dem System der Urtheilsformen [sei]. (...) Der Ausgangspunkt dieser vielleicht für lange noch nicht abgeschlossenen Bewegung liegt an der Achillesferse der Kantischen Philosophie: in Kants logischem Vorurtheil."

progress of the Frege-Russell tradition in the system of the forms of judgment or in negative judgment, which Windelband particularly emphasizes. The simple explanation is of course that Windelband speaks of another transformation which he saw as underway then, but which is almost forgotten today.

Windelband refers to authors such as Sigwart and Lotze (among others), authors who attempted, against Kant, to reunite logic with metaphysics and epistemology. What Windelband here calls Kant's "prejudice" is, from the point of view of these philosophers, the assumption that logic is a "formal" science. The supposed transformation is directed against this tradition.[2]

In this essay the debate will be traced through the example of Joseph Geyser's theory of negative judgment. Joseph Geyser (1869 – 1948) suggests himself for consideration for both historical and systematic reasons. Historically, because he is in a series of authors such as Trendelenberg, Sigwart or Lotze who opposed "Kant's logical prejudice"[3] and wanted to argue for a logic intertwined with ontology and epistemology. An interest in Geyser in particular is justified because he argues for this conception of logic in the knowledge of modern rivals such as Frege and Russell and the phenomenological movement, starting from Brentano, to Husserl or Reinach. And as regards systematic reasons, Geyser explicitly appeals to Aristotle and this allows the study, in an exemplary fashion, of how Aristotelian thoughts are taken up in this debate. Accordingly, Geyser's Aristotelianism is not naive and uncritical but is established as a genuine counterposition to Frege and Russell and to phenomenology.[4]

It goes without saying that Geyser's project was ultimately doomed to failure. Today, philosophical logic is primarily based on the Frege-Russell tradition and, for a few, on the phenomenological movement. However, even a failed project may merit consideration. It is capable of showing that the history of philosophy was more polyphonic than one usually thinks. It is also capable of showing that these authors put forward theories that were coherent and well-grounded in themselves. And finally, I think that it can also be seen in Geyser's writings how Aristotelian positions can be modified and further developed in argument.

In the following I wish, first of all, to describe Geyser's Aristotelianism (section I.2) and to sketch the generally Aristotelian roots of "objective logic".[5] This

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2 I do not mean to say with this that the positions of the above mentioned philosophers coincide with each other. This is certainly not the case. However they have a similar project and questions, as I want to make clear in the following.

3 Windelband (1884), 167.

4 See Smith (1978) for an essay that outlines the connection between these two movements using the theme of negative states of affairs.

5 Geyser (1919), V.

will provide the framework for the detailed study of negative judgment in section II.

I.2 Geyser's Aristotelianism

Joseph Geyser writes, in the foreword to the revision of Geyser (1909a), that:

> (T1) I have thus not needed to change my basic conception. I still profess an objective conception of logic determined through Aristotelianism and realism, that means, I consider the general forms and laws of thinking as dependent on the relationship to the purpose of reconstructively knowing ideal and real being.[6]

This is a programmatic remark and should be seen as such. Without this general methodological setting Geyer's views must remain incomprehensible. That obviously does not mean that Geyser's understanding of logic or philosophy is only shaped by Aristotle. Certainly there are other influences, but it can nonetheless be maintained that Geyser's theory is essentially shaped by this. And, as was said above, it is this that makes engagement with his theory interesting. For, despite knowledge of modern theories and conceptions of logic, Geyser still prefers the foundation of Aristotelianism.[7] One concern of this essay is to show that there are good and systematic grounds for taking such a conception seriously and that an examination of this philosopher who was inspired by Aristotle is capable of providing a contribution that transcends purely historical interest. It is a contribution that obviously cannot consist in a rejection of the formal logic based on Frege-Russell – this must in fact be seen as naivety on Geyser's part. But it can show, on the one hand, that a *philosophy* of logic and of judgment cannot only consist in purely formal considerations, but must establish reference to more general ontological or epistemological considerations. And on the other hand, it shows that a source of such considerations can be of Aristotelian inspiration. And this in a double sense: in that for one thing it shows how Aristotelian thoughts can be found transformed in Geyser and for another it shows how Aristotle's logic may in general be taken up in a systematic way.

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6 Geyser (1919), V: "Meine Grundauffassung habe ich dabei nicht zu ändern gebraucht. Nach wie vor bekenne ich mich zu einer durch Aristotelismus und Realismus bestimmten gegenständlichen Auffassung der Logik; d. h. ich betrachte die allgemeinen Formen und Gesetze des Denkens als abhängig von der Beziehung auf den Zweck, das ideale und reale Sein nachschaffend zu erkennen."

7 On this see especially Geyser (1909b) where he reviews modern approaches in logic.

1.3 Aristotelianism and Logic

Geyser wants to present an "objective logic" which is shaped by Aristotle's conception of logic. What is meant here by the word "logic"? As the above citation suggests, logic is, according to Geyser, occupied with the general "forms and laws of thinking". While it is true that these laws of thinking are general, they are not to be equated with the formality of formal logic. In fact Geyser explicitly turns against formal logic (Russell, Frege) since it is, according to him, the "purest formalism".[8]

One of Geyser's critical points, although one which is not wholly accurate, is that logical formalism remains empty precisely because it disregards all content of concepts.[9] For our purposes this critique is informative because with it the second component of Geyser's conception of logic moves into view. Logic is oriented towards the structure of objects. In other words, if the task of logic is to recreate real or ideal being, then, according to Geyser, a purely formal theory focused on mathematics does not suffice. This treats, according to Geyser, concepts only insofar as they have an extension that includes other concepts. But it does not question what the structure of these concepts is or how this structure is determined by its objects.

From a modern-day perspective, Geyser's critique is hard to understand and unconvincing. He seems to think that logic is primarily based on extensional relations between concepts. Nevertheless these brief remarks are important for the specific elements of the "objective logic"[10] that become apparent in his criticism of formal logic. Ultimately another understanding of what logic really is underlies Geyser's conceptions. Geyser's understanding of the task of logic is shaped by the direction Windelband characterized in the citation above. And so it is no wonder that Geyser also rejects the Kantian determination of logic as the "form of thinking" alone, without taking into account the objects of thought. His logical project aims to show that logic is essentially intertwined with epistemology, linguistic philosophy and metaphysics.[11]

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8 Geyser (1909b), 132.
9 See Geyser (1909b), 132.
10 Geyser (1919), 197.
11 Compare Geyser (1917), 46.

(T2) Aristotle's logic seeks nothing less than disregarding objects in its investigations and determinations. It is rather thoroughly [...] oriented by the nature of the objects of knowledge.[12]

(T3) In truth, however, Aristotle's logic comprises its own region of theoretical investigations and thus forms a determinate part of philosophy. It researches the general nature of concept, judgment and inference, organizes these forms of thinking into their species and determines the basic laws on which the truth of thinking depends.[13]

Here logic is not to be understood as a formal system which has concepts such as validity or deduction at its core. According to Geyser, logic also comprises more general investigations that one would nowadays more readily reckon as belonging to the domains of philosophy of language and ontology.[14]

Since "the general nature of concept, judgment and inference" can only be determined in connection with their ontological correlates, logic is not sharply distinguished from ontology. So, for example, judgment can only be correctly determined when one takes into account the structure of that about which the judgment is made and so also the content and objects of judgment. This point will be central to the determination of negative judgment in the following. Geyser himself sometimes expresses this interrelation with the concept of derivation:

(T4) The essence of objective logic lies in the scientific determination of the essence, the species and the laws of the forms of thinking through derivation from the determinations and differentiations of the objects of knowledge and their states of affairs.[15]

"Derivation" must not, of course, be understood as logical deduction. In this context "derivation" means that objects and states of affairs possess an explan-

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12 Geyser (1917), 46: "Die Logik des Aristoteles bemüht sich um nichts weniger als darum, bei ihren Untersuchungen und Bestimmungen von den Gegenständen abzusehen. Sie ist vielmehr durch und durch an der Natur der Erkenntnisgegenstände (...) orientiert."
13 Geyser (1917), 47: "In Wahrheit umfaßt aber die Logik des Aristoteles einen eigenen Umkreis theoretischer Untersuchungen, und bildet darum einen bestimmten Teil der Philosophie. Sie erforscht die allgemeine Natur von Begriff, Urteil und Schluß, teilt diese Formen des Denkens in ihre Arten ein, und bestimmt die Grundsätze, von denen die Wahrheit des Denkens abhängt."
14 Nevertheless the emphasis here lies on the "nowadays". For Geyser's conception of logic was more common in the 19th century. Reconstructing this would be a philosophically worthwhile project and, as mentioned in the introduction, the present essay can be understood as a small step in this direction.
15 Geyser (1919), 197: "Das Wesen der gegenständlichen Logik liegt in der wissenschaftlichen Bestimmung des Wesens, der Arten und der Gesetze und Denkformen durch die Ableitung aus den Bestimmtheiten und Verschiedenheiten der Gegenstände der Erkenntnis und ihrer Sachverhalte."

atory primacy, in that the analysis of logically basic concepts must begin by an analysis of its objects. Geyser clarifies this with the example of the carpenter. Just as a carpenter must respond to the nature of the wood in making furniture, so too must the logician respond to his or her "material", the structure of objects.

II On the Theory of Judgment

A theory of judgment is an essential component of logic for Geyser. And Geyser's theory of judgment, like his understanding of logic, is shaped by Aristotle. Consequently the theory of judgment too is oriented towards objects, like logic generally. Briefly put, judging for Geyser is "thinking of states of affairs [*Sachverhaltsdenken*]":

> (T5) It is necessary for judgment that the relationship is conceived as an objective one, that means, a relationship that is related to determinate objects in that it exists between them.[16]

> (T6) Thus judgment, according to its essence, is defined as a thought that refers to a determinate state of affairs of a determinate object.[17]

A judgment is a thought (or more accurately thought-content) that expresses a relationship between an object and a state of affairs concerning it. For example, the judgment "the rose is red" expresses a relationship between the rose and being red. It expresses the state of affairs of the rose's being red, which is a state of affairs concerning the rose. Here an idiosyncrasy in Geyser's use of "state of affairs" must be noted. As will be explained in greater detail below, he sometimes maintains that a judgment as a whole expresses the state of affairs, the rose's being red. More technically, he maintains that the state of affairs is *the being red* and it is the state of affair *of* an object, the rose. In this technical usage, in a judgment a state of affairs is attributed to an object. In this sense, one can say that a state of affair expresses how things stand with respect to an object. The judgment is true if and only if that the state of affairs is as it is stated in the judgment. Insofar as the state of affairs is not as it is stated, the judgment is false. We have, with this, named the general characteristics of judgment: A judgment is a statement of a state of affairs that is true or false. It should be noted

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16 Geyser (1922), 139: "Nötig ist zum Urteil, daß die Beziehung als eine gegenständliche erfaßt sei, d. h. als eine solche, die auf bestimmte Objekte als eine zwischen ihnen bestehende bezogen ist."

17 Geyser (1922), 126: "Das Urteil ist somit seinem Wesen nach zu definieren als ein Gedanke, der auf einen bestimmten Gegenstand einen bestimmten Sachverhalt bezieht."

that in this determination of judgment Geyser intends to make an explicit connection to Aristotle.

> (T7) The conception of judgment not only corresponds to the objective relation [*dem objektiven Verhältnis*], as I have just shown, but also to that conception that Aristotle had of judgments, when he saw its essence in a mental relationship, i.e. he sought it in a purely theoretical field.[18]

II.1 The Characteristics of Judgment

Judging is thus thinking states of affairs. Judgments are thoughts that state that a determinate state of affairs belongs to a determinate object . If this corresponds to reality, the judgment is true, if it does not, the judgment is false. In the following this will be analysed more precisely. In section II.1.1 judgment is distinguished from acceptance or rejection of some content. In section II.1.2 the concept essential to judgment, namely that of a state of affairs, is explained. Finally in section II.1.3, I explain judgment and its relationship to truth and falsity.

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18 Geyser (1922), 138: "Nur so entspricht die Auffassung des Urteils nicht nur dem objektiven Verhältnis, wie ich es soeben zeigte, sondern auch jener Auffassung, die Aristoteles vom Urteile hatte, als er sein Wesen in einer gedanklichen Beziehung sah: d.h. es im rein theoretischen Gebiet suchte." How plausible is Geyser's view? If we concentrate on the determination of the truth of judgment we see that Geyser's interpretation agrees with modern commentators.

(T8) For Aristotle the truth of knowledge consists in the agreement of the state of affairs asserted in judgment with the state of affairs existing in the object of judgment [So besteht für Aristoteles die Wahrheit der Erkenntnis in der Übereinstimmung des im Urteil behaupteten Sachverhalts mit dem am Gegenstande des Urteils bestehenden Sachverhalts]. (Geyser (1917), 54)

(T9) This circumstance brings it about that Aristotle's theory of truth for assertions counts as a correspondence theory of truth in that it regards an assertion as true when and only when it 'asserts its object to be as it is'. (Crivelli (2004), 137)

Certainly two citations cannot *prove* that Geyser has a plausible interpretation of Aristotle and one which agrees with contemporary research. Nevertheless it must be said that long stretches of Geyser (1917) need not fear comparision with commentaries that originated many years later. And in my opinion Geyser, as an interpreter of Aristotle in the narrower sense, presents ideas that are still of interest. However our main focus remains on Geyer's own systematic explanations of judgment.

II.1.1 Judgment is Different from Acceptance and Rejection

A judgment as such is different from the rejection or acceptance of some content. A judgment is the having of a determinate thought-content, not the acceptance or rejection of it. Rather misleadingly, Geyser sometimes calls the content of the judgment "representation [*Vorstellung*]".[19]

> (T10) In the question concerning the essence of judgment, two meanings of the expression "I judge that" must be well distinguished. In the one meaning this expression states a purely theoretical mentalact, in the other, a practical one. In the first sense "I judge" means as much as "I have a representation that is true or false". In the second sense, however, the expression means "I have taken up a stance towards a representation that is correct or incorrect".[20]

This distinction is important, for it prevents psychologistic misinterpretations and ensures the objectivity of judgment. In the second sense judgment is an actively taken up stance towards a content of thought. The thought "Robert Musil wrote 'The Man without Qualities'" is true (or false). But the thought does not yet determine the stance that one can take towards this content. Thus Mary holds it to be false, because she is of the opinion that Heimito von Doderer authored 'The Man without Qualities'. If she holds this thought to be false, she has taken a position towards this thought. It is for this reason that Geyser calls it a practical mental act. "Mary judges that Heimito von Doderer authored 'The Man without Qualities'" expresses Mary's stance *towards* the content "Heimito von Doderer authored 'The Man without Qualities'". This stance can be seen as the *holding-true* or *holding-false* of a thought-content. This is a psychological stance.

This stance is to be strictly separated from the grasping of the thought-content itself. This corresponds to the first sense of "I judge, that...". It is not a stance towards a thought-content that is meant here, but the mere having of a thought-content. "Mary judges, that Robert Musil authored 'The Man without Qualities'" expresses in this sense that Mary has the thought that "Robert Musil authored

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19 Geyser (1922), 135: "Man muß in der Frage nach dem Wesen des Urteil zwei Bedeutungen des Ausdrucks: "Ich urteile, daß" wohl auseinanderhalten. In der einen Bedeutung wird durch diesen Ausdruck ein rein theoretischer, in der anderen ein praktischer Geistesakt ausgedrückt. In dem ersten Sinn bedeutet "Ich urteile" so viel als: "Ich habe eine Vorste1lung, die wahr oder falsch ist." In dem zweiten Sinne aber bedeutet dieser Ausdruck: ‚Ich habe zu einer Vorstellung eine Stellung eingenommen, die richtig oder unrichtig ist." Misleadingly, because in contemporary usage "representation" (or the German word "Vorstellung") is understood as the subjective mental episode of a person rather than as objective thought-content.
20 Geyser (1922), 135 f.

'The Man without Qualities'". In this case no statement is made as to whether Mary thinks that the thought is true or false. It is merely claimed that Mary thinks this thought. That is why Geyser calls it a 'theoretical' mental-act. It is a mental act in which an objective content that is true or false and accessible to several people is grasped. In this sense judgment in Geyser is comparable to the grasping of a thought in Frege.

For Geyser, as opposed to Frege's thoughts, judgments depend for their existence on thinking, as they are the *having* of a representation.[21] Insofar as no one thinks "Robert Musil authored 'The Man without qualities'", this judgment does not exist. However that does not mean that the *content* of the thought is subjective. That which is thought when one judges that Robert Musil authored 'The Man without Qualities' is objectively determined. This is because the content of judgment is determined by its relation to a state of affairs. Thus the content is general and two people can think the same thing.

Now that the two meanings of "I judge, that..." have been differentiated, it is necessary to consider more closely the aforementioned relation between judgment and states of affairs.

II.1.2 Judgments and States of Affairs

A judgment expresses a state of affairs.[22] The meaning of this can be clarified by contrasting concepts with judgments:

> (1) The bicycle is red.
>
> (2) The red bicycle...

(2) is a concept. A concept is a determination of an object. In this case an object is determined as a "red bicycle".

> (T11) Concepts are thought-contents whose intention is to make an indeterminate object a determinate or more determinate object for knowledge. [...] Concepts are thought-contents which determine (establish) something as that which it is.[23]

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21 See Geyser (1913a), 128 f.: "Begriffe sind Denkinhalte, deren Intention ist, ein unbestimmtes Objekt zu einem für das Wissen bestimmten bzw. bestimmteren Objekt zu machen. (...) Begriffe sind Denkinhalte, durch die von einem bestimmt wird (festgestellt) wird, was es ist."
22 In section II.2.2 I will set out what is meant by "statement".
23 Geyser (1919), 48.

Concepts are accordingly neither true nor false, but refer to objects [*Objekte*] or things [*Gegenstände*].[24] By (2) something is determined as a red bicycle. However there no judgment is made nor is anything stated.

In (1) a state of affairs is expressed in a judgment. It is said of an already conceptually determined object *that* it is something or something holds of it. In (1) it is said of a bicycle that it is red. The judgment is that the object determined conceptually as a "bicycle" is red. A judgment refers not to an object, as concepts do, but to a state of affairs. In other words: (1) refers to the bicycle's being red. A state of affairs can thus be provisionally characterized as what is stated in the that-clause of a judgment. Insofar as judgments state states of affairs, one can specify the following canonical form of judgements vis-à-vis states of affairs: A person judges of an X, that [state-of-affairs]. The aforementioned state of affairs is embedded in the that-clause as an assertoric statement.[25]

Geyser thereby assumes a determinate structure of states of affairs or judgments, a structure I shall call the *Aristotelian structure.* In a judgment it is said that a state of affairs belongs to a conceptually determinate object. Geyser also calls judgment a statement about relations. He does not mean with this that a relation such as "greater than" is at issue, but that there is a relationship or relation between the subject and the predicate. The special feature of the *Aristotelian structure* can be linguistically marked through a prolepsis. Proposition (1) can accordingly be rendered more precisely as follows:

(3) The bicycle, that it is red.

Geyser himself uses the following phrases: "Extension [being] a state of affairs of matter [...] non- extended [being] a state of affairs of the soul."[26] Explaining this structure and delimiting the judgment from the concept, Geyser writes:

(T12) Hence also the sense of the intention is different in concept and judgment. Concerning the concept, it consists in taking uncertainty away from the object, concerning judgment, it consists in completing already existing knowledge of the object, in that it adds new knowledge to this knowledge of the state of affairs of the object concerned. Unlike judgment, nothing is claimed as such in the concept. [...] Inversely, judgment has the meaning: "I

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24 Not all concepts are determinations of objects in the same way, for objects can be determined essentially or accidentally. However this distinction modelled on Aristotle can be ignored here.

25 This canonical form is suggested by (T12).

26 Geyser (1919), 45.

claim the following (positive or negative) determination also belongs to the so-and-so determined something."[27]

I have already discussed the difference between concepts and states of affairs above. Here Geyser's remarks concerning states of affairs must be considered in more detail. States of affairs are always states of affairs *of an object*.

(4) A determinate X, that it is φ.

A judgment consists of a subject, i.e. an object to which a state of affairs is assigned as a predicate.[28] The states of affairs of an object are thus the sum of states of affairs that belong to it as a subject.

In addition, (4) is an identity criterion for judgments. The judgment "A determinate X, that it is φ" and "A determinate Y, that it is ψ" are different if and only if X ≠ Y or φ ≠ ψ (or the copula is different).[29]

Geyser's view of judgments raises at least three questions that I want to briefly address. First, what are the constituents of a judgment? Geyser seems to believe that judgments consist of concepts (rather than objects) plus the copula, although it is true – in a certain way – that the object itself is a constituent of the judgment. Being red is attributed to the *object*, which is a bicycle. On the other hand Geyser repeatedly stresses that the object must be already conceptually determined. And this conceptual determination is part of the judgment. "This bicycle" and "Lucy's birthday present" is a conceptual determination of the same thing. However the judgments "This bicycle, that it is red" and "Lucy's birthday present, that it is red" are different judgments. Hence one must presumably take the above identity-criterion more precisely: In a judgment the subject X must be already conceptually determined and, in modern terms, be embedded in intensional contexts.

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27 Geyser (1919), 49: "Darum ist auch der Sinn der Intention bei Begriff und Urteil ein verschiedener. Beim Begriff besteht er darin, dem Objekt die Unbestimmtheit zu nehmen, beim Urteil darin, das schon von dem Objekt vorhandene Wissen zu vervollständigen, indem zu diesem Wissen das neue Wissen der Sachverhalte des betreffenden Objektes hinzugefügt wird. Im Begriff als solchem wird nichts behauptet wie im Urteil. (...) Umgekehrt hat das Urteil den Sinn: "Von dem soundso bestimmten Etwas behaupte ich, daß ihm auch noch die folgende (positive oder negative) Bestimmtheit eigen sei."

28 What is the subject and what is the predicate is not arbitrary. Bicycle serves as the subject rather than red. Here Geyser cites Aristotle, *APo* I 22. However for our purposes we can leave the question of natural subjects aside for the time being.

29 See section II.2.3 on the copula.

Secondly, the question arises as to whether the subject of the judgment must exist. I have not found any explicit discussion of the presupposition of existence in Geyser.

Thirdly, the object-domain of X is conceived very broadly. Judgments too, as we will later see, can be understood as objects [*Gegenstände*] and be subjects of a judgment. It should therefore not be assumed that the object-domain of X comprises only "natural" subjects or those that would be described as substances.[30]

In summary the *form* of judgment can be characterized as follows:

(5) A judgment is a statement regarding a determinate X, that it is φ.[31]

We have now seen that judgments express states of affairs, or more precisely that a judgment expresses that a state of affairs belongs to an object. In order to arrive at a complete theory of judgment and of negative judgment in particular, the central concept of the statement needs to be clarified along with the concept of the copula. This is the theme of section II.2.2. By way of preparation, however, the relationship of judgment to truth and falsity still needs to be clarified.

II.1.3 Truth and Falsity of Judgments

A characteristic of judgments is the following: every judgment is true or false. The truth or falsity of judgments is due to the fact that they are statements (as opposed to questions). That is why one could think that judgments, insofar as they are statements, are essentially determined by truth and falsity and that a definition of judgment is explicated by using the concepts of truth and falsity.

For Geyser, however, this is not the case. The truth and falsity of judgments is a *consecutive,* not a *constitutive* characteristic of judgments.[32] Judgments are not defined by the fact that they are true or false. Being true or false is not a part of what it is to be a judgment. To this extent it is not a constitutive feature. But it *follows* from the definition of judgment that it is true or false. To speak

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30 However in Geyser formulations to the effect that there are "natural" subjects or a hierarchy of judgments can be found. See section II.2.1.
31 The extent to which Geyser's analysis can be applied to conditional judgments is not clear to me. Obviously it is difficult to bring these into canonical form. Furthermore, Geyser's remarks in Geyser (1909b), 129 indicate that he did not wholly understand it. For him, the judgment "All circles are curves" is "If P, then Q". He does not see that P and Q are *propositional-variables*, as opposed to variables for *terms.*
32 See Geyser (1913b), 121.

more precisely, it follows from the definition of judgment as a statement that it is true or false. The intention of the judgment is to state things as they are. A judgment is a thought that seeks to grasp the objectively existing state of affairs as it is. If this is successful, the judgment is true. If not, the judgment is false.[33] Thus if the judgment expresses the state of affairs as it is, then it is true.

With this Geyser proposes an identity theory of the truth of judgments. If a judgment states the state of affairs as it is, then it is identical with it. This is especially important because, as we will see, the identity theory of truth motivates Geyser's assumption that negative and positive judgment are on a par with each other. How does Geyser come to this conception of truth?

First of all Geyser explains that truth is a property of the thought-content and truth and falsity arise from a relation between it and the objectively existing state of affairs.

(T13) This consists in the fact that the property of truth or respectively of falsity pertaining to the thought-content results from a relation in which one element [*Glied*] is the thought-content itself and whose other element relates to it such that it binds it as generally valid.[34]

We should remember here the relevance of the first of the above meanings [*Sinne*] of "I judge, that…". A judgment is a determinate thought-content. This in turn is generally bound by the other part, that is, the state of affairs. I understand this to mean that the state of affairs is independent of the thought-content and is superordinate to this it. The "bond" is to be understood thus: the thought-content is true whenever the stated/ intended state of affairs is indeed as it is stated. In the case of a true judgment the said relation is the relation of identity:

(T14) Such a thought-content always expresses a determinate state of affairs considered by itself, that means, a determinate relation between a determinate (real or ideal) object a conceptually determinate thought. The state of affairs is, however, in the first instance or in itself only one that is thought, one posited within and by thinking. With the objective or actually existing state of affairs that thinking wants to grasp through it [the thought state of affairs], it necessarily shares, taken in itself, the object of the state of affairs, because each state of affairs in thought must be about than the object of the objective state of affairs. Both thus refer to the same identical object. It is, however, the intention of the thought state of affairs to go further towards identity and not to be other than the state of affairs as given in the object itself. If this is so, the judgment is true, if however

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33 I will explain in more detail this conception of the judgment-intention in section II.2.2. See in particular (T20).

34 Geyser (1913b), 121: "Es besteht dieses darin, daß die Eigenschaft der Wahrheit bzw. Falschheit des Denkinhaltes aus einer Relation resultiert, deren eines Glied er selbst ist und deren anderes Glied sich zu ihm so verhält, daß es ihn allgemeingültig bindet."

the state of affairs associated by thought with the object is not identical with that the objectively given state of affairs then the judgment is false.[35]

Independently of whether the judgment is true or false, the judgment must be about the object whose state of affairs are concerned in the judgment. This is a condition that ensures that the judgment is about a determinate state-of-affairs at all. To return to the above example:

(3) The bicycle, that it is red.

A judgment concerning the state of affairs named in (3) is only possible if the subject of judgment is the bicycle named in (3). To put it in another way, the subject of the judgment must refer to the object whose state of affairs is expressed. This is a necessary condition for making a judgment about states of affairs at all. In the form of the judgment introduced here

(5) A judgment is a statement of a determinate X, that it is φ

means that one must, with the variable X, refer to the characterized object, such that a judgment concerning the state of affairs of X, its being φ, is made.

The truth and the falsity of the judgment is based on whether the predicate "that it is φ" in fact expresses a state of affairs of the object. By way of illustration, we can consider the judgment that (3) the bicycle is red. The judgment is true because in addition to the grasping of the object, the property of red is also said to belong to the object. The stated state of affairs is thus not other than, i.e. is identical with, the objectively existing state of affairs. A judgment is therefore true if and only if the state of affairs expressed in it is identical to the objectively existing state of affairs.

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35 Geyser (1913b), 122: "Ein solcher Gedankeninhalt drückt immer für sich betrachtet einen bestimmten Sachverhalt aus, d. h. ein bestimmtes Verhältnis zwischen einem bestimmten (realen oder idealen) Gegenstande und dem in einem bestimmten Begriff gedachten Inhalt. Dieser Sachverhalt ist aber zunächst oder an sich nur ein gedachter, ein im und vom Denken gesetzter. Mit dem objektiven oder dem wirklich bestehenden Sachverhalt, den das Denken durch ihn erfassen will, hat er darum aus sich nur den Gegenstand des Sachverhaltes notwendig gemeinsam, weil jeder gedachte Sachverhalt von keinem andern als dem Gegenstande des objektiven Sachverhaltes gedacht wird. Beide beziehen sich also auf denselben identischen Gegenstand. Jedoch ist es die Intention des gedachten Sachverhaltes, noch weiter in der Identität zu gehen, nämlich kein anderer Sachverhalt zu sein als der am Gegenstand selbst gegebene. Trifft dies zu, so ist das Urteil wahr, ist aber der vom Denken dem Gegenstande beigelegte Sachverhalt mit dem an ihm gegebenen nicht identisch, so ist das Urteil falsch."

These aforementioned characteristics of judgment are important mosaic stones for the overall picture of negative judgment that Geyser seeks to create. We recall that in the question concerning negative judgment, it is the first of the senses of "I judge, that…" presented in section II.1.1 that is relevant. The question is whether there is a thought-content that is negative: is there, in addition to the judgment that the bicycle is red, also the judgment, on a par with the first, that the bicycle is not green? This is to be strictly separated from the question of whether one can hold a judgment to be false. The question of whether one can have an accepting or rejecting stance towards a thought-content is not what is at issue, but rather whether there are positive as well as negative thought-contents.

Thought-contents are thus conceived objectively: a content expresses a determinate state of affairs. The sense or intention of a judgment is, one can provisionally say, to express the state of affairs as it is. This is important because it determines the judgment neither as essentially positive nor as a negative.[36] This is an important step towards the claim of an equal status [*Gleichordnung*] between negative and positive judgment, as will be explained later in more detail. Furthermore, a consecutive result of this determination is that the thought-content is the bearer of truth and falsity. Neither psychological states as such nor the object or state of affairs itself is the bearer of truth and falsity.[37] If the judgment is true, what is stated in the judgment is identical with the objectively existing state of affairs. It follows that the structure of states of affairs are isomorphic with the structure of true judgments. If a negative judgment is true, it seems to be obvious that a negative state of affairs is expressed.

II.2 Negative judgments

Following this initial characterization of judgments and states of affairs, we can pose the opening question anew: is there, in addition to positive judgment, a negative judgment that is on a par with it? The above example (5), as well as the objectual correlative, holds for affirming judgments. We can now say more precisely:

(5) A positive/ affirmative judgment is a statement of determinate X, that it is φ.

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36 I will lay this out in more detail in section II.2.2.

37 See also Geyser's interpretation of Aristotle in Geyser (1917), 54. Geyser does not pose the question concerning the truth of states of affairs. In this he greatly differs from modern interpretations such as Crivelli (2004). This is important for the assessment of negative states of affairs.

(5*) A negative [*negatives*]/ negating [*verneinendes*] judgment is a statement of a determinate X, that it is *not* φ.

The question is thus whether (5) and (5*) are on a par [*gleichgeordnet sind*], that is to say, whether they are both elementary forms of judgment that are irreducible to one another. Geyser argues that this is so. And, as he remarks, a successful answer must satisfy two conditions.

1. The judgment "X is not φ" is different to the judgment "it is false that X is φ".[38]

2. A general characterization of judgment must be given which is neither positive nor negative.[39]

The first condition ensures that the negative judgment cannot be traced back to a positive judgment. The second condition ensures that the negative judgment on par with positive judgment.

II.2.1 'It is false, that X is φ' *versus* 'X is not φ'

Since Geyser holds that negative judgment is in parity with positive judgment, he must assume that a negative judgment is different from a judgment in which falsity is predicated. In order to understand Geyser's answer, the individuation criterion for judgments must be considered again: the state of affairs "A determinate X, that it is φ" and "A determinate Y, that it is ψ" are different if and only if X ≠ Y or φ ≠ ψ (or the copula is different). Let us consider the following propositions:[40]

(6) It is false, that X is φ.

(7) X is not φ.

If both judgments say the same thing, then there is no negative judgment in addition to the positive. Are these judgments thus the same? According to Geyser, no. For by the identity-criterion for judgments just cited, (6) and (7) are obviously different. (6) and (7) each have different subjects and predicates. Therefore they

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38 See Geyser (1913a), 118.
39 See Geyser (1913a), 120.
40 For the sake of simplicity I will not use the canonical notation in (6) and (7).

are different judgments. (6) refers to the state of affairs "'X is φ', that it is false". (7) refers to the state of affairs "X, that it is not φ".

> (T15) The two judgments, "S is not P" and "It is not true (or: it is false), that S is P", are, for this reason, not the same judgment. They both have a different logical subject as well as a different logical predicate. In the first the concept S is the subject, in the second the judgment that "S is P" and in latter the concept P forms the predicate, in the former the concept of truth forms the predicate.[41]

In this way we may see how Geyser can differentiate both judgments within his theory. A negative judgement is a judgement in which a state of affairs is denied of an object. However, the predication of falsity is a positive judgment. Here falsity is assigned to the judgment of a state of affairs.

This cumbersome formulation already suggests an objection. Geyser's diffentiation between the judgments only makes sense when the *states of affairs* expressed in the judgments are different. Now one might agree with Geyser that, *grammatically* considered, the judgments (6) and (7) are different. But surely an *ontological* distinction should not be made here. It might be thought that the state of affairs expressed in judgments (6) and (7) is the same. Why should one assume that there is both the state of affairs "X is not φ" as well as the state of affairs "It is false, that X is φ"? Such an assumption seems, for reasons of ontological parsimony, problematic. For, if there is in addition to the state of affairs expressed in the judgment "X is φ" a distinct state of affairs expressed in the judgment "It is true, that 'X is φ'", an infinite series of new states of affairs can be constructed for every judgment: X is φ; it is true that X is φ; it is true, that it is true, that X is φ and so on. According to the above criterion of individuation these are altogether different states of affairs.

Geyser himself does not discuss these difficulties to the best of my knowledge. However one can perhaps to some degree justify Geyser's implicit assumption in that he makes a clear distinction between the kinds of judgments that are carried out in (6) and (7). (6) is a meta-judgment. It is a judgment concerning another judgment. The judgment carried out in (6) presupposes (7).

> (T16) The actually intended meaning of the judgment "S is not P" lies in the exclusion of S from the domain of P or of the characteristic P from the content of S. As in the judgment "S

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41 Geyser (1913b), 120: "Die beiden Urteile: "S ist nicht P", und: "Es ist nicht wahr (oder: es ist falsch), daß S P ist"", sind auch aus dem Grunde nicht dasselbe Urteil, weil sie sowohl ein anderes logisches Subjekt als auch ein anderes logisches Prädikat besitzen. Im ersten ist der Begriff S, im zweiten das Urteil "S ist P" Subjekt, und in jenem bildet der Begriff P, in diesem der Begriff der Wahrheit das Prädikat."

is P", P is affirmed of S, so too is P immediately negated from S in the judgment "S is not P". And only the knowledge of this being-separated of P from S gives the logical fundament to new judgment: "It is not true that S is P."[42]

The idea relevant to meeting the above objection is that of the "logical fundament". Judgments of the kind "S is P" are the logical fundament for judgments of the kind "It is true that S is P". Geyser can assume a hierarchy of judgments and states of affairs through this graduated model of logical precedence or subordination. There are certainly different ways to explicate this hierarchy, but the general idea is simple: although they are different states of affairs – there is thus an ontological and not merely a grammatical difference between (6) and (7) – these states of affairs are not independent of each other. It is rather that one of the state of affairs is the *ontological ground* of another state of affairs.[43]

In this sense, a state of affairs such as (6) is, to take up a famous phrase, an "ontological free lunch".[44] The ontology is indeed richer, but at the same time there is a structure of dependence that orders the world hierarchically. So there is indeed an infinite regress of states of affairs but this regress is not threatening because all higher-level states of affairs are grounded in the state of affairs of the first level. In addition, the hierarchization of states of affairs permits making a corresponding distinction between objects and properties of the first level and objects and properties of the higher levels. So it can be argued that judgments in which truth and falsity are predicated of other judgments express states of affairs of higher levels which must be grounded in lower-level states of affairs.

It can thus be said that Geyser's conception of the individuation of states of affairs can both clarify why a the predication of falsity in judgment (6) "It is false that X is φ" is a different judgment the negative judgment (7) "X is not φ and meet some potential objections to his conception of the individuation of states of affairs through the assumption that basic judgments are the logical fundament for higher-order judgments.[45]

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42 Geyser (1913b), 120: "Der wirklich gemeinte Sinn des Urteils "S ist nicht P" liegt in der Ausschließung des S vom Umfange des P bzw. des Merkmals P vom Inhalt des S. Wie im Urteil "S ist P" P von S bejaht wird, so wird ebenso unmittelbar im Urteil "S ist nicht P" P von S verneint. Und nur die Erkenntnis dieses Getrenntseins des P von S gibt dem neuen Urteil: "Es ist nicht wahr, daß S P ist", das logische Fundament."

43 For a contemporary overview on "grounding" see Correia/Schnieder (2012).

44 Armstrong (1997), 12.

45 It must be remarked that Geyser's theory here commits him to the view that the same thoughts or judgments are not expressed in the principle *duplex negatio est affirmatio*. (8) "It is not the case, that the bicycle is not red" is not the same judgment as (1) "The bicycle is red".

II.2.2 A More General Characterization of Judgment

The arguments of the previous section are only a first step towards a satisfactory theory of negative judgment. As said above, it is even more important to bring to light a general characterization of judgment that is not based on the affirmative character of judgment. To see the significance of this suppose that a judgment were essentially determined through the concept of affirmation or of assigning. One could, for example, think that in a judgment an object is always *assigned* a property. As can easily be seen, such a definition makes the determination of negative judgment impossible, for it is difficult to maintain that negative judgment *assigns* a property to the subject.[46] On the contrary, negative judgment seems to be precisely distinguished in that a property is *denied*. Thus if every judgment is determined through its affirmative character, negative judgment cannot be on a par with it.

Here one could object that it has still not been shown why a general characterization of judgment is required. One could conceive positive judgment as an assigning and negative judgment as a denial of a property. But this conception of positive and negative judgment does not explain why both are judgments. It is precisely regarding this point that Geyser criticizes Aristotle's theory:

> (T17) Thus in this way Aristotle informs us of his views of the content of those statements that can be true or false, but he does not teach us about the element common to both kinds of judgment which takes concrete shape in both forms of the "connection or separation established by the understanding".[47]

Geyser, like Aristotle, holds that negative and positive judgment are kinds of judgment that are irreducible to one another. He nevertheless requires that, as species of judgment, they be grasped under a common genus:

> (T18) According to our argument, positive and negative judgment are, in logical regard, two species of elementary judgment. They must relate to one another in such a way that the general essence of judgment is collectively attributed as their genus. Consequently the judg-

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46 On the other hand, it could be thought that negative judgment attributes a negative property to the subject. As against such a view, see "the locus of negation" in section II.2.3.

47 Geyser (1913b), 121: "Somit unterrichtet uns Aristoteles hierdurch zwar über seine Ansicht von dem Inhalt jener Aussagen, die entweder wahr oder falsch sind, belehrt uns aber nicht über das beiden Urteilsarten gemeinsame Moment, das in den beiden Formen der "vom Verstande geschaffenen Verbindung oder Trennung" konkrete Gestalt gewinnt." Geyser is referring here, as is evident from the context of the passage, to Aristotle, *de An.* III 6.

ment must itself be so determined that neither the affirmation of the predicate to the subject nor the negation of it belongs to its features.[48]

The decisive difficulty is to determine the common genus in such a way that there is no recourse to negation or affirmation. Affirmation and negation are, according to this conception, *differentiae specificae* that differentiate the genus of judgment. But of course the determination of the genus of judgment cannot itself contain one of these differences.

Judgment generally understood is not a judgment above and beyond positive and negative judgment. As Geyser stresses, the requirement for the determination of the genus of judgment does not, of course, imply that one can make a judgment that is neither positive nor negative. Every judgment is necessarily either negative or positive. The thesis is thus not that there is a general judgment as a third form of judgment in addition to negative and positive judgment. Rather the thesis is that a common account of judgment applies to both. Geyser illustrates this with the example of the triangle:

> (T19) As the right-, acute- and obtuse-angled triangles are three species of flat triangle, and as accordingly no individual triangle is possible which is only "the triangle" and does not fall under one of the three types of triangle, just so the fact that every concrete judgment is either positive or negative also does not speak against the logical existence of generic judgment in general. A judgment that would only be a judgment and thus not neither positive nor negative can certainly not be carried out. Nevertheless that through which the positive judgment is a judgment can very well be identical with the general element through which the negative judgement is a judgment. Or to put it in another way: positive and negative judgments are the two forms in which the general essence of judgment is concrete and individual.[49]

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48 Geyser (1913b), 120: "Gemäß unserer Schlußfolgerung sind bejahendes und verneinendes Urteil in logischem Betracht zwei Arten des elementaren Urteils. Sie müssen sich mithin so zueinander verhalten, daß ihnen das allgemeine Wesen des Urteils als ihre Gattung gemeinsam zukommt. Konsequent muß sich das Urteil in einer Weise bestimmen lassen, daß zu seinen Merkmalen weder die Bejahung des Prädikates vom Subjekt noch die Verneinung gehört."

49 Geyser (1913b), 120 f.: "Wie das recht-, spitz- und stumpfwinkelige Dreieck drei Arten des ebenen Dreiecks sind, und wie dennoch kein individuell bestimmtes Dreieck möglich ist, welches nur "das Dreieck" wäre und nicht unter eine der drei Arten des Dreiecks fiele, so verschlägt es auch nichts gegen die logische Existenz des gattungsmäßigen Urteils überhaupt, daß jedes konkrete Urteil notwendig entweder ein bejahendes oder ein verneinendes ist. Ein Urteil, das nur Urteil und nicht auch entweder Bejahung oder Verneinung wäre, kann sicherlich nicht vollzogen werden. Dennoch kann das, wodurch das bejahende Urteil zum Urteil wird, sehr wohl mit dem allgemeinen Moment identisch sein, durch welches das verneinende Urteil zum Urteil wird. Oder anders ausgedrückt: Bejahung und Verneinung sind die beiden Formen, in denen das allgemeine Wesen des Urteils konkret und individuell wird."

No triangle can exist that is not one of the three species of triangle. Nevertheless there can be a general account of triangle that does not refer to any of the three species of triangle. According to Geyser, the same should apply to judgment.

Judgment generally understood as statement-intention. One essential characteristic of judgment generally understood was already mentioned in the previous section. A judgment expresses a state of affairs of an object. This must now be grasped in more detail, as it is the key to understanding judgment in general.

> (T20) The intention of the judgment is to think of the state of affairs that actually exists between the content of the predicate and the object. Consequently, this intention does not contain an affirmation nor negation of predicative conceptual content of the object. Rather the intention of the judgment, according to its meaning and essence, stands above it. Whether it has to be completed as affirmation or as denial depends upon the objective state of affairs.[50]

Geyser argues that a judgment is essentially determined by the intention to think the objective state of affairs. States of affairs are, as presented in section II.1.2, always states of affairs of an object. A state of affairs arises from the relation of an object to a property, the content of a predicate. A property can be attributed to an object or not. That is the basis of positive and negative judgment. To recall:

> (5) A positive judgment is a statement of a determinate X, that it is φ.
>
> (5*) A negative judgment is a statement of a determinate X, that it is *not* φ.

Positive and negative judgments are both determined through the general element of seeking to state the state of affairs as it is. This basic determination of judgment is however bound neither to the positive nor to the negative judgment. Rather it *arises*, as Geyser notes, whether the judgment is positive or negative insofar as the intention of the judgment is to express the state of affairs as it is. It is a consequence of this general intention of judgment that it is sometimes positive, as in (5), and sometimes negative, as in (5*).

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50 Geyser (1913b), 123: "Die Intention des Urteils ist die, zwischen dem Inhalt des Prädikates und dem Gegenstand eben den Sachverhalt zu denken, der tatsächlich zwischen ihnen besteht. Folglich ist in dieser Intention weder enthalten, den prädikativen Begriffsinhalt vom Gegenstande zu bejahen, noch auch, ihn von diesem zu verneinen. Vielmehr steht die Intention des Urteils ihrem Sinn und Wesen nach darüber. Ob sie sich als Bejahung oder als Verneinung zu vollenden hat, hängt von dem objektiven Sachverhalt ab."

"Intention" must not be misunderstood as a psychological state here.[51] Intention does not refer to a mental state of judging. Intention rather means that the content of a thought is directed at a state of affairs. The content of a thought is in an intentional relationship to the state of affairs. And the particular intention of the judgment is to express the state of affairs, that is to say, to establish identity between the content of judgment and the objective state of affairs.

So when Mary judges that the bicycle is red, the relevant intention here is not Mary's intention to make a judgment, although this undoubtedly also exists and explains why a judgment was made at all. The relevant intention is rather the intentional relation which exists between the content of the judgment and the objective state of affairs. The judgment that the bicycle is red is directed at the state of affairs of the bicycle's being red. And the particular intention of the judgment is that this relation is identity: the expressed state of affairs should be the same as the objectively existing state of affairs.

This way of applying the concept of intention also motivates Geyser's application of the concept of statement. The characterization of judgment as statement does not imply that to judge is an "external or an internal speaking".[52] Geyser thinks of a statement in its legal usage:

> (T21) Concerning the choice of the term "statement", I meant the typical usage of this word in judicial proceedings. For the intent to bring the actual facts faithfully to expression is decisive for the "statements" of the witness. And this is precisely the characteristic intention of judgment too.[53]

Just as the intention of the statement of a witness consists in stating at the facts, so too the intention of judgement is to state the objective state of affairs. Also when Geyser speaks here of the "intent of the witness", one should not, as the context makes clear, read this as falling back upon a psychological theory. I think that one should rather understand Geyser's remark as saying that a witness statement *qua* witness statement aims to report a fact. When one says that a witness has the intent of getting at the objective fact, one does not make a statement about what occurs in the heads of the individual witnesses. It is a determi-

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51 This is also a criticism that Geyser aims at Reinach because he thinks that Reinach has misunderstood the intention of the judgment as psychological. See Geyser (1913a).

52 Geyser (1913b), 123.

53 Geyser (1913b), 123: "Zu der Wahl der Bezeichnung "Aussage" bestimmt mich vielmehr die charakteristische Benützung dieses Wortes in der Gerichtsverhandlung. Ist ja doch für die "Aussage" des Zeugen die Absicht maßgebend, den wirklichen Tatbestand treu zum Ausdruck zu bringen. Und eben dies ist auch die charakteristische Intention des Urteils."

nation of what a witness and a witness statement are. Geyser's characterization of judgment in general must be understood against this background:

> (T22) A judgment is a statement about objective states of affairs.[54]

The intention of the judgment, namely to express the state of affairs as it is, makes the thought-content into a judgment. The intention of the judgment is to think the states of affairs of the object, that means, its relation to different properties as they exist in reality. This is a general definition of judgment. It applies to both negative as well as to positive judgment and characterizes them as judgments. However, as required, it does not make reference to either the positive or the negative character of the two species of judgment.

II.2.3 Negative Judgment and the Copula

Geyser can provide a general determination of judgment that comprises positive and negative judgment as well as distinguish a negative judgment from a positive judgment in which falsity is predicated. However this is not yet an answer to the question of what is specific to negative judgment and how this is supposed to be possible. The analysis carried out up to this point makes available essential conceptual equipment which we can draw upon, but it is not yet a philosophically satisfying answer. The remainder of this essay will provide this answer. A central theme will be the analysis of the copula and the predicate which figure in judgment. A judgment is, as just noted, determined by its statement-intention – the intention to state the objective state of affairs as it is. Central to Geyser's theory of negative judgment is his view that the intention of the statement is concretized in the copula. The general function of the copula is thus to express the relationship that an object in a state of affairs has to a property. A judgment is therefore tripartite: It consists of subject, predicate and the copula. This last expresses the relationship in which the subject and the predicate stand.

> (T23) In contrast [i. e. to Sigwart], however, we can now show in an easy way that three parts belong to every judgment. These are 1. the object, 2. the concept used for the statement and 3. the intention, linked to this concept, of thinking the relationship which exists between its content and that object. Of these three parts, the object constitutes the subject of judgment, the stated concept the predicate and the copula is the statement-intention which makes the concept a predicate. In negative judgment the copula is by no means negated and abolish-

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54 Geyser (1913b), 123: "Ein Urteil ist eine Aussage über objektive Sachverhalte."

ed. It rather remains in it just as in positive judgment. The affirmation of positive judgment as well as the negation of the negative are a further moment taken up in the copula, namely as the concrete implementation of the intention or as the factual determination of the intended state of affairs.[55]

The central statement is that in negative judgment the copula is not abolished. In negative judgment the copula is not *negated* but *negation* occurs as an additional moment of the copula. This must now be explained.

The copula as statement-intention. With the distinction between a *negated* copula and *negation* as concrete implementation of the copula, Geyser addresses the basic problem which clung to theories such as Sigwart's. For Sigwart

(T24) negation always [directs] itself against the attempt at a synthesis and thus presupposes a somehow externally approaching or internally originating demand to connect subject and predicate.[56]

This theory is unsatisfactory because it immediately raises the question of the extent to which we can speak of a judgment at all when the copula is negated. How is this separation different from that of an enumeration? What is the difference between the judgment "The bicycle is not red" and the list "bicycle, red"? Frege famously parodied theories such as Sigwart's in the essay *Verneinung* with the image of cutting a piece of paper.[57]

A satisfactory theory of negative judgment can thus not be based on assuming that in negative judgment, as opposed to positive judgment, subject and predicate are not connected. Geyser, who places negative judgment on the same logical level as positive judgment, stresses for this reason that in negative judgment too subject and predicate are connected. The link between subject and

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55 Geyser (1913), 125: "Demgegenüber vermögen wir jedoch ungezwungen zu zeigen, daß zu jedem Urteil drei Glieder gehören. Diese sind 1. der Gegenstand, 2. der zur Aussage verwendete Begriff und 3. die an diesen Begriff geknüpfte Intention, das Verhältnis zu denken, welches zwischen seinem Inhalt und jenem Gegenstand besteht. Von diesen drei Gliedern bildet der Gegenstand das Subjekt des Urteils, der genannte Begriff das Prädikat und die ihn zum Prädikat erhebende Aussage-Intention die Kopula. Im verneinenden Urteil wird mithin die Kopula mitnichten verneint und aufgehoben. Sie bleibt vielmehr in ihm genau so bestehen wie im positiven Urteil. Die Bejahung des positiven Urteils sowohl wie die Verneinung des negativen treten zur Kopula als weiteres Moment hinzu, nämlich als konkrete Ausführung der Intention oder als die faktische Bestimmung des intendierten Sachverhaltes."

56 Sigwart (1893), 150: "...[richtet] sich [die Verneinung] immer gegen den Versuch einer Synthesis, und setzt also eine irgendwie von aussen herangekommene oder innerlich entstandene Zumuthung, Subject und Prädicat zu verknüpfen, voraus."

57 See Frege (2003), 70.

predicate through the copula is present both in positive as well as in negative judgment. They are distinguished, however, through the "concrete implementation of the intention or [...] the factual determination of the intended state of affairs".[58] Since both the positive and the negative judgment are constituted by the general intention of the statement to say the state of affairs as it is,[59] and since the state of affairs too can be positive or negative, the relationship of the subject and the predicate of judgment can be determined in two ways by the copula. The copula can thus factually determine the states of affairs in two ways, as Geyser notes.

It follows from this that in a negative judgment too the copula is present. Depending on the quality of the judgment, the copula is present in a "special form", as Geyser says:

> (T25) Thus the affirmation or negation is not a new component standing over and above the copula, but they are the copula itself, though each in a special form.[60]

The copula connects in both negative and in positive judgment. It may sound cumbersome to speak of a negative link. However, this can be somewhat mitigated if the theoretical function of the copula is envisioned together with Geyser's views of predication:

> (T26) Accordingly, to predicate means to classify the content of a certain concept in the state of affairs of a determinate object.[61]

Every judgment involves predication. The kind of predication is determined by the copula. There are two ways of classification, depending on whether the concept belongs to an object or not. The function of the copula in judgment is thus to bring the object and the concept into the relation which objectively exists. Concepts are applied to objects by the copula. This takes the form of positive or negative predicates.

> (5*) A negative judgment is a statement of a determinate X, that it is *not* φ.

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58 Geyser (1913b), 125.

59 See also (T28).

60 Geyser (1913b), 125: "Deshalb ist die Bejahung oder Verneinung nicht ein neuer Urteilsbestandteil gegenüber der Kopula, sondern sie sind die Kopula selbst, aber je in einer speziellen Form."

61 Geyser (1913b), 132: "Prädizieren heißt demnach, den Inhalt eines gewissen Begriffes den Sachverhalten eines bestimmten Gegenstandes einordnen."

In (5*) the not-being-φ is predicated of X, that is to say, φ is classified in the states of affairs of X. For the existing state of affairs of X is that it is not φ and precisely this relationship is expressed through the copula. The copula classifies the state-of-affairs "that it is *not* φ" in the states-of-affairs of the object X.

The place of negation. The thought, essential to Geyser's theory, that the copula relates concepts to objects in the form of predicates, must be further explained. To this end, it is necessary to determine the place of negation. If the place of negation is correctly determined, it can be seen that the putative paradox of negative connection dissolves and that negative judgment contains a genuine predication.

> (T27) That which is to be understood by state of affairs is what is stated in the judgment about the object. That is why the state of affairs is the predicate of judgment while the previously mentioned predicate concept is only a component part of the predicate. In the judgment "The cornflower is blue", "blue" is not the predicate but rather "being-blue"; in the judgment "A lies on the left of B" it is not "left" but rather "lying on the left of B" that is the predicate.[62]

According to Geyser, in a judgment the state of affairs itself is the predicate and not merely the concept that is stated about an object. The concept that occurs in a judgment is intended in the predicate concept. In Geyser's example, this is "blue". However, the predicate in the proper sense is the entire state of affairs. This is why negation, strictly speaking, does not concern the copula but the state of affairs. The copula is the intention to state the objectively existing state of affairs of the subject of judgment. And to the extent that it is the state of affairs of X not to be φ, that which is negated is the state of affairs.

> (T28) For the intention, namely the statement of the objective state-of-affairs, remains completely in positive validity. What is negated is not the intentional relation ("copula") between the stated and the objective state of affairs but the state of affairs, or more accurately the co-belonging of the conceptual content, to that which is the object.[63]

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62 Geyser (1913b), 389: "Unter dem Sachverhalt ist dasjenige zu verstehen, was im Urteil vom Gegenstande ausgesagt wird. Daher ist der Sachverhalt das Prädikat des Urteils, während der vorhin erwähnte Prädikatsbegriff nur ein Bestandteil des Prädikates ist. In dem Urteil "die Kornblume ist blau" ist nicht "blau", sondern das "Blausein" Prädikat; im Urteil "A liegt links von B" ist nicht "links", sondern das "Links-von-B-gelegen-sein" Prädikat."

63 Geyser (1913b), 126: "Denn die Intention: Aussage des objektiven Sachverhaltes, bleibt völlig in positiver Geltung. Was verneint wird, ist nicht die intentionale Beziehung ("Kopula") des ausgesagten auf den objektiven Sachverhalt, sondern der Sachverhalt, oder genauer die Zugehörigkeit des Begriffsinhaltes zu dem, was der Gegenstand ist."

This can be made clear with the following examples.

(9) The soul, that it is not mortal.

(10) The soul, that is it immortal.

(11) The soul, that it is non-mortal.

(12) It is not the case: the soul is mortal.

(10) is not a negative judgment, but a positive one. In (10) the property of immortality is predicated of the soul. The corresponding state of affairs is: the soul, that it is immortal. Similarly (11) is not a negative judgment. Here the negation refers to the predicate concept, not to the entire predicate. In (12) negation is a propositional operator. It refers to the proposition "The soul is mortal". Only (9) is a negative judgment in the proper sense. In (9), mortality's belonging to the state of affairs of the soul is negated.

(9) The soul, that it *is not* mortal.

Here the negation refers to the *being*-mortal of the soul. It is thus neither said that the state of affairs, namely that the soul is mortal, does not exist nor does it say that the negated predicate "not-mortal" is attributed to the soul. It is said that that *it is not* mortal is a state of affairs of the soul.

The predication of a negative state of affairs thus arises, according to Geyser, because a determinate conceptual content determines a state of affairs together with the copula and is stated as the predicate of an object.

(T29) It is of course obvious that the copula and the predicate belong to each other, in that the copula without a predicate is empty, the predicate without copula is blind. The predicate implements what the copula intends, the copula for its part gives the predicate the judgmental directedness towards the subject, thus precisely making the predicate [in so doing].[64]

Through the intention of the copula, the state of affairs of the object (soul) is expressed as it is: the conceptual content (mortality) is negatively related to the object (the soul). The (complete) predicate thus is the negative state of affairs ("that it is not mortal") predicated of the soul.

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64 Geyser (1913a), 391: "Denn daß Kopula und Prädikat zueinander gehören, indem die Kopula ohne Prädikat leer, das Prädikat ohne Kopula blind wäre, ist selbstverständlich. Das Prädikat führt aus, was die Kopula intendiert, die Kopula andererseits gibt dem Prädikat die urteilsmäßige Richtung auf das Subjekt, und macht es dadurch eben zum Prädikat."

Two questions for Geyser's theory. At this point (at least) two questions arise for Geyser's theory of negative judgment. The first is that the assumption of a negating copula may still seem bizarre. How can a negative connection be thought? Is this not a *contradictio in adjecto?* One can also give expression to this idea by saying that that (9)-(12) necessarily have the same truth value. Should it not be assumed that the propositions are equivalent and that (9) is only another way of writing (12)? For another thing, Geyser assumes not only that negative and positive judgments, but also that negative states of affairs and positive states of affairs are on a par ontologically. How can this assumption be justified? The first question can be understood as a criticism of Geyer's giving negation too great a role. It is important that the relationship between predicate and subject is negated. But the question of how exactly this happens is meaningless. The second question raises doubts about the ontology presupposed by Geyser in his theory of judgment.

Let us turn to the first question. I think that it goes back in part to considerations set out in section II.2.1. Ultimately one can say that there too the propositions

(6) It is false, that X is φ.

(7) X is not φ.

necessarily possess the same truth-value. However, it was already explained above that judgments are not individuated through their truth value but through the state of affairs to which they refer. The same thus holds for propositions (9)-(12). Accordingly it can be argued here too that there are different judgments by means of the individuation-criterion for judgments. However this would hardly satisfy the critics because this answer appears to be equivalent to a *petitio principii*. For the question is not so much that of whether one can *designate* a difference between propositions (9)-(12). Certainly that is possible, as was just observed. The question is rather whether the distinction between the propositions can be *explained* in a meaningful way. How can the distinction between a negative state of affairs and the negation that refers to the entire proposition be understood?

Perhaps it is helpful to clarify this distinction by means of a concrete example:[65] Suppose there are the elements a; b; c as well as the corresponding sets {*a*}, {*b*}, {*c*}, {*a; b*}, {*b; c*}, {*a; c*}, {*a; b; c*} and so on. The following applies to every element and every set: either the element is contained in the set or not.

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65 I owe this example to Karl-Georg Niebergall.

If an element is contained in a set, this relation is expressed by e. If an element is not contained in a set, this relation is expressed by ∉. For example:

(13) *a* e{*a*; *b*; *c*}

(14) *a* ∉ {*b*; *c*}

In this system the relations e and ∉ are primitive. They cannot be derived from others but indicate the two basal relations between elements and sets. It can also be said that it is not denied that there is a relation between *a* and {*b*; *c*} in (14). On the contrary, *a* and {*b*; *c*} stand in a relation, namely the relation ∉. This relation implies that *a* is not contained in {*b*; *c*}. So understood, the relation ∉ is on a par with the relation e. The reader will have noticed that we have established a set-theoretical model of Geyser's theory of judgment here. *a; b; c* correspond to the objects, the sets {*a*},{*b*},{*c*} correspond to the concepts that can be stated through the copula as affirming or negating states of affairs of objects. This was expressed through the relations ∉ and e in our example. It is not the case that we cannot understand the relation ∉ or that the properly basic relation – whatever that should mean – is e. Just as e and ∉ are the two basic relations that exist between elements and sets, so the copula in Geyser expresses the two basic kinds of states of affairs, namely *that X is φ* and *that X is not φ*. If we take one as meaningful, we should take the other as meaningful too.[66]

Nor is an objection to the theory that in another system proposition (14) can be expressed by

(15) ~(*a* e {*b*; *c*})

(15) is neither "more natural" or "more understandable" than (14), nor does it imply that (14) is "in truth" an abbreviation of (15). For, equally plausibly, (13) can be understood as an abbreviation of

(16) ~ (*a* ∉ {*a*; *b*; *c*})

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[66] Using this example, Aristotle's conception of predication and the copula, as it is presented in the *Analytica Priora*, can be understood: "I call a term that into which a statement can be analysed [*zerlegen*], namely into that which is stated (as predicate) and of which it (as of a subject) is stated, in that one adds 'is' or 'is not'" (Aristotle, *APr.* I 1, 24b16 – 17). It is also clear here that there are two ways of combining subject and predicate that are of equal status. Aristotle does not apply negation here as propositional operator, but as copula between two terms. Geyser's theory is also close to the Aristotelian view in this respect.

Negative states of affairs. This example, which is to illustrate the equal status [*Gleichordnung*] of positive and negative judgments, is thus capable of justifying the assumption of negative states of affairs. For – and here we return to our point of departure – according to Geyser the separation of logical-linguistic theory and ontological theory is artificial. Geyser presents an objective conception of logic. Logical considerations are thus not separated from ontological ones. That is why I assume that from Geyser's perspective an analysis of negative judgment is at the same time an analysis of negative states of affairs. Geyser does not first draw up a theory of propositions, much less a formal language, and then, in a second step, ask what ontological implications this theory has. Rather the above presented analysis of negative judgment is also an analysis and theory of negative states of affairs. A further clue that this could have corresponded to Geyser's views is his conception of truth and falsity. Geyser argues that a true judgment is identical with the state of affairs that it expresses.[67] The identity theory of truth means that true judgments cannot be explained at all independently of states of affairs.[68] Figuratively speaking it can be said that there is no gap between true judgments and the expressed states of affairs. In my opinion, these reasons speak for Geyser's defence of negative judgment as necessarily implying a defence of negative states of affairs.

Geyser's defence is based on two considerations. For one, Geyser indicates that the word "exist" is ambiguous. For it can mean in one sense that a state of affairs objectively exists in an object. In another sense it can mean that a determinate relation to an object exists.[69] In the first usage a supposed paradox arises, as noted above. However when we speak of a negative state of affairs we use "exist" in the second sense. One says that it is objectively the case that the state of affairs of the flower, namely that it is not red, exists.

And here, secondly, the particular Aristotelian structure of states of affairs is essential.[70] States of affairs are always states of affairs *of an object*. I have attempted to make this identifiable by means of a prolepsis:

(9) The soul, that it *is not* mortal.

It belongs to the states of affairs of the soul that it is not mortal. By means of this formulation one can recognize that for Geyser the question concerning the exis-

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[67] See section II.1.3.

[68] This is of course expressed very simply. For a more detailed description of the identity theory of truth, see Dodd (2000); David (2002).

[69] See also Geyser (1913a), 388.

[70] See section II.1.2.

tence of negative states of affairs corresponds with the question concerning negative relations.

> (T30) The meaning of "negative states of affairs" or, better, the state of affairs expressed in negative judgment, also immediately follows from this. And this is precisely the state of affairs that a certain relation to a determine object does not exist or, briefly, the state of affairs of the non-existence of a relation.[71]

There is undoubtedly a certain difficulty in saying that there is a state of affairs that is characterized by not existing. For example, one might be tempted to say: "There is the negative state of affairs $\sim p$, that means, the state of affairs that p does not exist." However by means of the example of set theory from the last paragraph it should be clear that Geyser's theory does not force us to employ such linguistic extravagancies. Rather (9) is only understood as saying that mortality does not belong to the states of affairs of the soul. The relationship between the soul and mortality is such that the soul is not mortal. Just as the relationship between a and $\{b; c\}$ is such that a is not an element of the set $\{b; c\}$.[72]

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71 Geyser (1913a), 386: "Daraus ergibt sich sofort auch der Sinn des "negativen Sachverhaltes", oder besser des im negativen Urteil ausgesagten Sachverhaltes. Es ist dies eben der Sachverhalt, daß eine gewisse Relation an einem bestimmten Gegenstande nicht besteht, oder kurz der Sachverhalt des Nichtbestehens einer Relation."

72 Finally it must be mentioned that Geyser thus considers himself on firm Aristotelian terrain:

(T31) For Aristotle these relationships arise from the circumstance that there is also a being-connected or divided in the objects of knowledge or, to speak more generally, that there are states of affairs of being and not-being. Thought enters into an intentional relation to these objective states of affairs. It is directed towards the object in that it has the goal of grasping and reflecting the connections and divisions of the object in the connecting and dividing posited by thought. [Diese Beziehungen ergeben sich für Aristoteles aus dem Umstande, daß es auch im Gebiete der Gegenstände des Erkennens ein Verknüpft- bzw. Getrenntsein, oder allgemeiner gesprochen, Sachverhalte des Seins und Nichtseins gibt. Zu diesem objektivem Sachverhalt tritt nämlich der Gedanke in intentionale Beziehung. Er ist auf den Gegenstand gerichtet, indem er das Ziel hat, durch die von ihm gesetzte Verknüpfung bzw. Trennung die Verknüpfungen bzw. Trennungen des Gegenstandes zu erfassen und wiederzugeben.] (Geyser (1917), 53)

Geyser refers here to Aristotle, *Met.* IV 7, 1011b23–29; IX 10, 1051b3–9; *de An.* III 6, 430a26-b6. A reference to Aristotle is not a legitimation of the assumption of negative states of affairs but an explanation of why Geyser can hold them to be relatively unproblematic. Geyser apparently thinks that the assumption of negative states of affairs already occurs in Aristotle. This assumption is in no way trivial and is disputed, for example, by Crivelli (2004), 49–50. Nevertheless the authority of Aristotle can make negative states of affairs appear less problematic than perhaps they are in fact.

III Concluding Remarks

This concludes our investigation into Joseph Geyser's theory of negative judgment. Departing from his objective logic, a logic that was based on Aristotle, I have shown how Geyser established a theory of negative judgment and negative states of affairs. Geyser can be understood as a paradigmatic representative of one of the 19th and early 20th century philosophies inspired by Aristotelian logic and ontology, but also as an additional voice in the debate that endures to this day as to how to define judgment and states of affairs. It is a voice that may sound strange at first to philosophers influenced by contemporary analytic philosophy. But it is also a voice that it is worthwhile listening to, as has hopefully become clear though the detailed study of negative judgment. Whether Geyser and the Aristotelian tradition in which he stands can be philosophically revived is a question that only time can answer.

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Paul Ziche

"Aristoteles und Mephistopheles" – Debates about the Formation of Scientific Concepts in the 19th Century

Abstract: This chapter draws attention to a quite peculiar issue: the problem of concept formation from a scientific point of view. According to Wilhelm Ostwald (1853–1932), the Nobel-prize winning chemist from Riga, it is Aristotle's remaining influence that is responsible for a scientific terminology that starts with ordinary usage and, in the end, turns out to be insufficiently empirically informed and flexible to accommodate new information on what there is. Paul Ziche tracks the corresponding debate, starting from Ostwald via Alois Riehl, Heinrich Rickert, and all the way down to Ernst Cassirer, and brings in the contrasting views of the contemporaneous Aristotelians Trendelenburg, Brentano and Geyser.

I Concept Formation: A 19th Century Topic within and beyond Aristotelian Traditions

"Aristoteles und Mephistopheles" reads the sub-title of a chapter on "language" in Wilhelm Ostwald's *Vorlesungen über Naturphilosophie* from 1902 (Ostwald (1902), IX, 31; see also Ostwald (1914), 53–4). More precisely, this evocative title is used in the extensive analytical table of contents of Ostwald's volume, and refers to a section that, according to the page header, deals with "Begriff und Wort", with concepts, words and the relationship between both. Ostwald's quip on those two names (there has been considerable debate as to whether the two names are etymologically related)[1] is illuminating in highlighting the importance of the topic of concept formation in larger philosophical debates around 1900. After all, it is the emptiness of scholastic words that are not accompanied by a concept that is one of the issues Mephistopheles draws attention to when impersonating a scholar in the *Faust*. Ostwald's Aristotle-reference also

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1 See, e. g., websites such as http://www.faust.com/legend/mephistopheles/. On a more serious note, see Goebel (1904). Goethe, as the most eminent Mephistopheles-author and the background for Ostwald's reference, states that he himself was unable to answer the question as to the origin of this name (Schöne (1999), 167). – All translations in this text are mine and in most cases, the German original is also given.

leads – involuntarily, we may assume – to a rather funny sentence where Ost-wald makes Aristotle into a contemporary. In the conviction that language is a store of insight, improved over generations and still in need of further improve-ment and clarification, Ostwald views himself as being in agreement with Aris-totle who is addressed as the direct colleague of a German academic from 1900: "Indeed, we see one of the most eminent philosophers of nature of all times, the Greek professor *Aristotle*, proceed in precisely this manner" ("In der That sehen wir einen der hervorragenden Naturphilosophen aller Zeiten, den griechischen Professor *Aristoteles*, in solcher Weise vorgehen"; Ostwald (1902), 31), namely by taking ordinary usage as the basis for further conceptual refinement in phi-losophy. The allusion to Mephistopheles, however, emphasizes that this proce-dure did not prevent Aristotle from committing "serious mistakes", "grobe Feh-ler". The dialogue between Mephistopheles and the "Schüler" in Goethe's *Faust* serves as the prime witness for the disastrous consequences of a mismatch be-tween words, concepts and things.

Concept formation is a key topic in a surprisingly broad range of fields in the period around 1900.[2] In logic, while the standard three-step account of concepts-judgements-logical inferences had been challenged by, for instance, Christoph Sigwart, concepts still occupied a central place in most textbooks. Even in those mathematics-oriented traditions that gave a new analysis of the structure of predication in terms of functions and relational structures, much work was de-voted to understanding concepts and new forms of introducing concepts (for ex-ample, via implicit definitions or Frege's innovative account of definition by ab-straction). Neo-Kantians and Aristotelians alike studied the role of categories, but also considered introducing new types of concepts (such as the functional concepts emphasized so strongly by Ernst Cassirer, for instance). The topic of or-dering and classifying the various sciences, one of the key issues across the phil-osophical schools of this period, was frequently approached via the differences one could establish between the types of concepts used in the different disci-plines (see Heinrich Rickert's discussion of the types of concept formation as em-ployed in the natural sciences and the humanities, respectively). Three points are

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2 Broader literature on these questions is scarce. See, for instance, Poggi (2004), for issues con-cerning Aristotle's "logique de la science", with a focus on neo-Kantianism and Catholic philos-ophy. Poggi refers to Switalski (1912) who gives an overview over current issues – in particular as regards the role of transcendental idealism – pertaining to the problem of concept formation. Lazarsfeld (1966) discusses the (history of) ideas about concept formation in the context of the social sciences; see also Gerring (1999) for another overview from a social-sciences perspec-tive, with numerous references to literature in the philosophy of language. – For an overview over issues concerning the reception of Aristotle in the 19th century, see Thouard (Ed.) (2004).

particularly important in assessing these ways of dealing with concepts: in all these cases, we find a strong focus on the *formation* of concepts as a necessary step in understanding how concepts function; concepts are not seen as static. The necessity to adjust to the status of *science* and to include the philosophy of science is of key importance; and in all those issues, *Aristotle* remains an important partner for discussion.

Ostwald perfectly illustrates the importance that has been accorded to the issue of concept formation. Himself a celebrated natural scientist, he also became one of the most prominent representatives of a philosophy of nature around 1900, and made important contributions to the philosophy and historiography of science.[3] Ostwald's programme as a philosopher, as an active propagator of a scientific world-view, as a historian of science and also as actively advocating a truly international language, can be aptly summarized by the issues hinted at in the "Aristoteles und Mephistopheles"-phrase. A theory of concept-formation lies at the very heart of his philosophy of nature; concepts, being the most fundamental ingredients of all scientific reasoning, need to form the basis of the most fundamental and general science of all, and it is this most general science that a philosophy of nature is intended to provide for our study of things in nature. An investigation of existing languages – as Ostwald claims is Aristotle's strategy – is not sufficient to grant concepts this fundamental status. This argument has some surprising implications. On the one hand, Ostwald proclaims that strict standards of precision are necessary for all usages of language, everyday and scientific, and supports the introduction of artificial languages (e. g. Ostwald (1914), 48 – 57, 67 – 76). On the other hand, he concedes to the language of science a rather far-reaching autonomy from the standards of strict unification (see Ziche in Ostwald (2009)), in order to accommodate the terminology of science in its ever-changing historicity and in order to allow for further progress in science. What we need, therefore, is an account of concepts that allows for the *conceptual flexibility* which is required for promoting and accommodating scientific progress. On two levels we begin to see tensions in Ostwald, but also in the period more generally: conceptual clarity is an important goal, but clarity needs to be balanced with conceptual creativity when we are interested in progress in science. Ostwald treats Aristotle as a contemporary as regards a theory of language and concepts, but the ridicule Goethe bestows on the scholastics is never far away.

The issue of concept formation and the role that is ascribed to Aristotle in this context defy a clear demarcation in terms of existing sub-disciplines of phi-

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3 On Ostwald's various fields of activity, see: Görs/Psarros/Ziche (Eds.) 2005.

losophy. Concept formation is as much a topic in logic (where it further complicates the standard account of a 'modern' vs. 'traditional' logic) as in metaphysics, the philosophy of nature and of science,[4] and in psychology. Aristotle illustrates the link between metaphysics and logic when, in the *Analytica Posteriora*, he claims that the concepts used in scientific demonstrations are required to label the essences of the subject matter of this demonstration. Studying the discussions concerning concept formation around 1900 thus brings one directly to a genuine problem for the self-positioning of philosophy: how can it become possible to combine the flexibility and openness required for scientific progress while, on the other hand, maintaining the highest possible standards as regards the scientific nature of the statements and concepts involved in this progress? Aristotle repeatedly emerges as a crucial point of reference in these debates, sometimes in a rather loose way – as in Ostwald –, sometimes in the form of a thoroughgoing debate. This paper will study these issues in three steps: (1) I will illustrate the close interaction between these diverse fields, and the role that references to Aristotle play there, by drawing together in rather panoramic fashion a number of eminent authors of the period around 1900; (2) I will look more closely at three typically "Aristotelian" authors, namely Trendelenburg, Brentano, and Geyser, and will ask how their way of dealing with Aristotle fits into the field sketched so far; (3) finally, I will return to the systematic issue of integrating claims to being scientific with conceptual flexibility.

II Concept Formation as an Issue in 19th Century Philosophy of Nature

Ostwald's philosophy of nature pursues an ambitious goal. The systematic motivation underlying a renewed interest in the philosophy of nature can be summarized as searching for the *most general structure underlying the realm of nature.*[5] This definition leaves open a number of important and contested issues in the period under consideration: how do concepts and structures of reality relate to each other? Are we looking for one single, or very few, most general concepts? Do we need to consider an entire hierarchy of (perhaps, as it were, infin-

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4 See, for instance, Rudolf Carnap's and Ernst Mach's philosophical and historical studies on concept formation in science (Carnap 1926; Mach 1969).
5 The hotly contested issue of an idealist vs. a realist approach in the philosophy of nature can presently be left aside. – On the topic of generality and generalization in science, see the collection Hagner/Laubichler (2006).

itely dense) systematically ordered concepts? How can a system of concepts, with some sort of hierarchy built into it, account for the necessity of standing open for new concepts and for new discoveries about reality?

Ostwald does indeed look for the most basic steps and elements in the process of scientific reasoning and finds them in the formation of concepts, where concepts are formed on the basis of the repeated occurrence of similar experiences (the most important addition to classical empiricist theorizing here consists in Ostwald's adoption of mathematical terms such as "group" or "manifold" and in his explicitly advocating the creation of artificial languages). In his entry on "Naturphilosophie" in the volume on systematic philosophy in Paul Hinneberg's enormous encyclopaedia presenting the "Kultur der Gegenwart", Ostwald relates the formation of general concepts to science in the most intimate way. Any scientific investigation aims at forming concepts that in a second step are labelled with names.[6] Interestingly, Ostwald here adopts an explicitly neutral stance as to the natural sciences-humanities divide; both fields equally aim at establishing concepts (Ostwald (1907), 142). Note also that, according to Ostwald, concepts come earlier than "names", than the words we use to label concepts.

The programme of a philosophy of nature claims a particularly high level of generality. It borders upon the special sciences, but actively occupies a meta-reflective stance by including the methodological meta-reflection on these sciences, and in doing so it takes "science" in the broadest sense possible. Ostwald rephrases the task of his philosophy of nature, up to now stated via the formation of concepts, in terms of (natural) laws: "philosophy of nature deals with propositions of the most general kind with the character of natural laws" (Ostwald (1907), 145). If Ostwald deems concepts to be so important, this means that concepts and laws need to be treated in parallel by Ostwald, and he indeed transfers the two characteristics of "content" and "scope", "Inhalt" and "Umfang", intension and extension, from concepts to laws. Interestingly, he actively insists on *not* treating these two characteristics as being inversely proportional. According to Ostwald, it is not the case, as one might suppose, that the richer in content a concept is, the more specific and therefore the more restricted in scope it becomes. In the practice of the sciences (he gives the example of the chemical elements that are fundamental for the very discipline of chemistry, but that at the same time are concretely determined results of scientific research), it is just the opposite. What science aims at is not an increase along one of these di-

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6 "Das Ergebnis einer solchen Untersuchung wird meist mit einem *Namen* bezeichnet, nachdem der Inbegriff des Übereinstimmenden oder kurz der entsprechende *Begriff* gebildet worden ist" (Ostwald (1907), 142).

mensions while accepting loss on the other; along both dimensions progress has to be, and can be, achieved. We need concepts that are both as general as possible, *and* have as much content as possible. Concepts, as it were, are extended two-dimensionally, and Ostwald fittingly employs the simile of a rectangle whose both sides need to be extended (Ostwald (1907), 145). The implications are far-reaching. This idea clearly goes against a simplified theory of concept formation via abstraction in the sense of stripping a particular off its concrete determinations, and it also provides evidence against the idea of an ultimate list of ultimately general (or simple, or elementary) concepts.[7]

III Concept formation between Issues in General Methodology and Aristotelian Debates

The issues that have come to the fore so far – the formation of concepts lying at the heart of what science needs to achieve; critical arguments raised against the idea that concepts can be formed via abstraction; the combination of ultimate generality with being embedded into the process and progress of science – get us into the characteristic Aristotelian and anti-Aristotelian debates of the 19th century. A few illustrations may suffice. Take Alois Riehl's handbook-article on "Logik und Erkenntnistheorie", which appeared in the same Hinneberg-volume in which Ostwald published his mission statement regarding the philosophy of nature.[8] Logic is here defined as concerning the very "form of science" (Riehl 1907, 75). In contrast to Ostwald's search for the most general science on the basis of recent developments in the natural sciences, Riehl sets the framework for his discussion of logic and epistemology by referring directly to Aristotle. For Riehl, too, logic has to be measured against the practice of science, and it is here that Riehl charges Aristotle's logic with serious deficits. With an argument that is closely similar to Ostwald's point about necessarily flexible concepts, Riehl charges syllogistic deduction with being infertile as a mode of scientific discovery. It is the metaphysical "assumption that there are unchanging forms", "die Annahme unveränderlicher Formen", or that of a "system of real concepts or general things", "eines Systems realer Begriffe oder allgemeiner Dinge", that render the logical strategy of syllogistic reasoning unfit for science

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7 The issue of concept formation also remains crucial in Ostwald's later monographs on the philosophy of nature (Ostwald (1908), 19 – 20; Ostwald (1914), 106 – 123).
8 For many details concerning Riehl that help to clarify his broadly neo-Kantian position, see Köhnke (1986), *passim*.

(Riehl 1907, 78–9). Riehl claims that any change in our view as to what the fundamental constituents of reality are, therefore, negatively affects the value of Aristotelian logic. Also, Riehl charges Aristotle, because of his thinking in terms of rigid classifications, with making it impossible to develop a form of "non-subsumptive" reasoning (Riehl (1907), 78).

Riehl's text discusses some issues that further complicate matters: how, precisely, are the non-subsumptive and non-syllogistic methodologies supposed to work?[9] Can systems of concepts and the fundamental structures of reality vary independently? If we aim for ultimately general conceptual structures, what must they look like in order to escape their being co-varied with the course of scientific progress? Riehl presents these issues under the heading of a "critique of Aristotelian logic". This implies that "Aristotelian logic", in the usage of the time, contained rather large portions of Aristotle's metaphysics. It is also somewhat unexpected when compared to standard accounts of the history of logic that would seek the point of departure from Aristotle elsewhere, namely in establishing a formal account of relations. Clearly, innovating logic and engaging critically with Aristotle was a rather more complex problem around 1900 than the textbooks suggest.

The various lines of criticizing Aristotle's logic, however, converge. Not only do we need a new account of propositions and predication that uses the formalism of functions; relational structures also become essential when forming adequate concepts within the sciences. The issue of how to provide definitions via abstraction is another concern shared by various groups of philosophers. The new methods leading to innovations in formal logic can also be read as contributing to a better understanding of the formation of concepts, and the question as to what the basic concepts might look like can be related directly to Aristotelian issues: is it a notion of substance or form, or is it one or the other of the categories, or do we need entirely new concepts that can fulfil the role of the categories or the fundamental metaphysical constituents of reality?

Perhaps the most prominent author working at this intersection between an account of relational and functional concepts (and methods of reasoning) inspired by mathematics on the one hand and historical issues concerning the role of concepts and the structure of cognition on the other, is Ernst Cassirer. Cassirer's attitude towards Aristotle is rather ambivalent. On the one hand, he opens his *Substanzbegriff und Funktionsbegriff* with a discussion of the issue of concept

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9 Riehl does not work out here how this form of reasoning is supposed to work. A somewhat cryptic reference, in brackets, to Plato is all he provides. He marks this issue as an important but "partially, as yet, unsolved problem of logic" (Riehl (1907), 78).

formation and a summary of Aristotle's theory of concepts and he also analyses the intricate relationship that binds together Aristotle's theory of concept formation via abstraction on the one hand and his metaphysical convictions on the other. In the end, however, Cassirer wants to distance himself from Aristotle by charging the latter with a thing-based ontology and metaphysics which results in an impoverished and insufficient account of concepts and of concept formation. As the title of his enormous book from 1910 indicates, he wants to replace "substance concepts" by "function concepts" and he is eager to embrace all metaphysical consequences this might have. An immediate implication can be stated directly. It is notable as a direct echo of Ostwald's insistence that *contentful general concepts*, "genuine concepts", "echt[e] Begriff[e]", are not formed by neglecting the particularities of content that become subsumed under the concept, but, quite to the opposite, by proving them to be necessary ("Der echte Begriff läßt die Eigentümlichkeiten und Besonderheiten der Inhalte, die er unter sich faßt, nicht achtlos beiseite, sondern er sucht das Auftreten und den Zusammenhang eben dieser Besonderheiten als *notwendig* zu erweisen" (Cassirer (1910), 25).

Heinrich Rickert's account of concept formation, in his monumental *Grenzen der naturwissenschaftlichen Begriffsbildung* (first edition from 1896, here the 3rd/4th edition from 1921 is used), seems at first sight to take the opposite position as regards the question of the content of general concepts.[10] Both the extension and the intension of the manifold of data structures we perceive need to be reduced, and concepts – via their dual structure of "scope" and "content" – achieve precisely this reduction. The extensive manifold is reduced by grasping simultaneously, by using a meaningful word, a number of intuitively real things. And as regards intension, we can efficiently refer to a thing via a word even if we do not grasp the thing in full detail (Rickert (1921), 31). On the other hand, however, Rickert embraces whole-heartedly the programme of investigating processes of generalization. Not only is the formation of concepts – precisely as in Ostwald – the telos of scientific research; but the result of itself gets presented, in its final state, in a concept (Rickert (1921), 15; on the status of the issue of concept formation within philosophy at large, see also Rickert (1921), 19, 26). In fact all scientific fields, the humanities and natural sciences alike, have to form and employ general concepts, and on the level of concepts the clear difference between generalizing and individualizing approaches breaks down (Rickert (1921), 33, 49). An

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10 On Rickert, see in this context the brief discussion of concept formation (as part of an extensive treatment of the constitution of objects) in Krijnen (2001), 207–209. The emphasis here lies on the "transformative" function of concepts; cognition is always based upon "*complexes* of verbal meanings", "*Komplexionen* von Wortbedeutungen".

adequate theory of concept formation, according to Rickert, and in agreement with, for instance, the statements by Ostwald already quoted, has to go beyond comparing natural things or events on the basis of similarities. In order to come up with the structure required for scientific theorizing, we need to inject the generalizing function of natural laws. The kind of "generality" Rickert is looking for is not the generality of a genos and thus does not derive from comparing empirical instances, but that of a law or of relational structures, and it is here that he distinguishes his account of concept formation explicitly from "the logic of the ancients" (Rickert (1921), 49–51). The idea that concepts and laws have to be closely related can be motivated by a number of strategies. It can be seen as Kantian or neo-Kantian (see Kant's statements that concepts are "rules" in, for instance, Kant (1787), 750), but it also flows naturally from an investigation into the fundamental elements of science.

One final example should be given here. *Wilhelm Wundt*, perhaps the best-known philosopher in Germany during his lifetime, prominent as an empirical psychologist, schooled in the natural sciences, gives the "general empirical concepts" great importance in his *System der Philosophie* (first edition in 1889). He explicitly acknowledges the existence of a hierarchy in the generality of concepts, with the categories being the "*most general concepts of experience*", "*allgemeinste Erfahrungsbegriffe*" (Wundt (1897), 219). What – certainly in a Kantian context – has strange undertones is that the difference between categories and empirical concepts breaks down here. In a paper from 1885, Wundt discusses the history and theory of abstract concepts in more detail (Wundt (1885)). In a manner that is characteristic of Wundt's approach to philosophy, this paper brings together the most diverse trends in philosophy. In this case, he contrasts metaphysics' tendency to be a monistic "Einheitsphilosophie" (Wundt (1885), 165) with Herbartian "Mannigfaltigkeitsphilosophie" (which is, strictly speaking, not a technical term within Herbart's philosophy), and links the two together. Indeed, "manifold" is a key concept for Wundt: it is the most general predicate concept and it also governs the classification of the sciences (Wundt (1885), 192).[11] Wundt's argument is simple and it involves a strongly anti-Aristotelian point. The notion of substance turns out to be hypothetical, and the sciences cannot, and need not, assume the existence of substances as a necessary starting point. Correlatively, the possible predicates that are traditionally ascribed to substances become autonomous. They are not necessarily referred to a conceptual substratum, but the manifold predicates can also produce this substratum

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11 On the role of the conception of "manifold" and the importance of its mathematical background, see Ziche (2008), ch. 6.

themselves.[12] Note, importantly, that this manifold of possible predicates does not lead into arbitrariness. On the contrary, the theory of manifolds has become a scientific discipline in its own right – starting from mathematics, but with implications ranging far beyond mathematics. Ostwald and Cassirer also employ the notion of "manifold" with precisely this function in their works.

Some common threads emerge from co-presenting these authors who all come from different disciplinary affiliations and from different schools in philosophy. These differences notwithstanding, all of them search for ever more general concepts that, by virtue of their generality, cannot be labels for things or substances, but need to include laws or relational structures. This also allows these concepts to be rich in content , and supports the creation of innovative and complex concepts at the basis of the sciences. This, then, affects the entire methodology of science. Abstraction no longer needs to be thought of as necessitating leaving details aside, and non-subsumptive modes of reasoning can be taken seriously within the very foundations of the sciences.

IV Three Aristotelians: Trendelenburg, Brentano, Geyser

All of the authors discussed so far critically engage with Aristotle or more generally with the "logic of the ancients". It is not surprising, therefore, that the typical problems associated with the formation of concepts can also be found in authors that are more directly influenced by Aristotelian studies. I'll trace some of these issues – in particular the necessity for *flexible concepts* and the vicissitudes of generality and generalization – in outline through a consideration of texts by three eminent Aristotelians: Trendelenburg, Geyser, Brentano.

Adolf Trendelenburg′s key idea consists in setting the system of concepts, as it were, in motion. This idea is clearly related to the problem of concept formation, and Trendelenburg can use it to criticize both Hegel *and* Aristotle[13]. According to Trendelenburg's *Geschichte der Kategorienlehre*, Aristotle does not take account of the *genesis* of concepts (Trendelenburg (1846), 363). In criticizing Aristotle and Hegel, Trendelenburg employs two rather diverging sets of terms.

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12 "dieselben keineswegs bloß auf ein durch den Erfahrungsinhalt ihnen dargebotenes Begriffssubstrat sich zu beziehen brauchen, sondern dieses Substrat selbst sich zu schaffen im Stande sind" (Wundt (1885), 192).

13 For an overview, see Beiser (2013), also on Trendelenburg's "Metaphysics of Motion".Beiser also emphasizes Trendelenburg's interest in issues of concept formation (13).

On the one hand, the Aristotelian subtext is obvious in that categories should be understood on the basis of what "comes earlier in nature". On the other hand he employs, as against Hegel, terms indicating the creative character of forming categories, using a style reminiscent of romantic traditions ("creative intuition", "bildende Anschauung"; thinking's getting to see concepts in its own "act of creation", "das Denken soll sie mitten in der schöpferischen That werden sehen"[14]). Categories have to be understood via the process of their formation (Trendelenburg (1846), 366: "Handlungsweise der Erzeugung"; 368: "aus der Bewegung entworfene Kategorien") and it is this processuality that links concepts to the realm of reality that is characterized by the category of motion. Only if concepts mirror the basic structure of reality is there hope that we can grasp reality in the medium of conceptual thinking. Here, clearly, an issue in the philosophy of nature translates directly into one in logic and the theory of concepts.

Trendelenburg's *Logische Untersuchungen* work these ideas out in more detail in the chapter on concepts in part II of the *Logische Untersuchungen*, with particular reference to the problem of the generality of concepts. Generality is not related to the number of instances compared and subsumed under a concept. The methodological procedures of zooming in on the individual, characteristic for history and for art, need themselves to be guided by "the general" and the individual can thus not be the unquestioned starting-point for the formation of concepts. Concepts express the "process of producing determination", "das Verfahren der Erzeugung", "die Handlungsweise der Determination" (Trendelenburg (1870), 246), such that Trendelenburg's focus on processuality is here imported into a theory of the role of concepts. Again, Trendelenburg uses rather emphatic and romantic language ("wenn das Ganze unsern Geist trifft und zauberisch zum Nachschaffen erregt oder in einer eigenthümlichen Stimmung bindet" (Trendelenburg (1870), 241), thus again broadening the horizon within which these debates need to be conducted.

For Trendelenburg, another key disputed field is the (Hegelian, in Trendelenburg's analysis) spectre of the "pure", "imageless" concept. Again, based upon his idea that motion is inherently necessary for the formation and the functioning of concepts, it follows that no concept can be without intuitive aspects. This sets limits to abstraction; again, abstraction cannot just strip away (intuitive) content by way of substraction. In a footnote he refers to Immanuel Hermann

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14 The very term "bildende Anschauung" forms yet another link to issues in 20th century logic, and in particular to debates that themselves defy easy classification. See the work of the Dutch mathematician and theosophist Mathieu Schoenmaekers, in which the idea of the "beeldende denken" is central, and which idea strongly influenced L.E.J. Brouwer's ideas about logic and the foundations of mathematics (Jager/Matthes/Schoenmaekers (1992)).

Fichte and his idea that abstraction needs a kind of "inner hold" (Trendelenburg (1870), 243). It would be an illusion to assume that concepts reach beyond intuition, the "Begriff liegt nur scheinbar jenseits der Anschauung" (Trendelenburg (1870), 244). As in Cassirer, decades later, it is mathematics that provides conclusive evidence for the fact that abstraction cannot achieve its goal if it proceeds by just stripping away content (Trendelenburg (1870), 249–50). A final side remark against Aristotle discusses the idea that perhaps a "*dynamis*" might be sufficient to account for the kind of motion Trendelenburg deems necessary. He rejects this suggestion, however, and for reasons similar to the above-mentioned: a mere *dynamis* is too vague; forms of motion need to get specific content (Trendelenburg (1870), 258).

Joseph Geyser's much-quoted *Grundlagen der Logik und Erkenntnislehre* from 1909 approaches these issues within a framework inspired by neo-Thomism and phenomenology.[15] Geyser devotes two entire chapters to Aristotle, offering a series of critical theses that, again, are completely in line with the issues discussed so far. I will list these charges without going into detail (for a summary, see Geyser (1909), 92): Aristotle completely failed to see the problem of how it might be possible to obtain scientifically viable, i.e. generally valid knowledge about individual objects (Geyser (1909), 84); in an Aristotelian framework, it is not clear how many individuals, as constantly changing, can be united under one species concept; this also means that Aristotle does not give an adequate account of induction (Geyser (1909), 85–6); Aristotle's logic is "not completely adequate" to mathematics, because Aristotle did not distinguish clearly between mathematical concepts and concepts of natural things (Geyser (1909), 88); Aristotle did not give an adequate account of how we arrive at the definitions (pertaining to essences) that need to enter into the premises of scientific syllogisms (Geyser (1909), 88–9).

It is clear along which lines one might look for improvement. The relationship between metaphysical and empirical concepts needs to be clarified, with the latter being the basis ("Grundlage"), the former the telos of the process of science. This would improve our understanding of induction (Geyser (1909), 89). We can also refine the psychological understanding of the process of cognition and of concept formation. In particular, we have – yet again, just as in Riehl, but here even more remarkably, given Geyser's Thomist leanings – to severe the ties between logic and real essences. Aristotle was right in making us look for generalities but his "*interpretation* of the real-general" ("*Deutung* des Real-Allge-

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15 On Geyser, see Poggi (2004); on Geyser as a logician see also Pulkkinen (2005), 214–5, 278–9.

meinen") was mistaken: we no longer can look for unchanging, unified real essences ("unveränderliche, einheitliche Wesensrealitäten"), but have to replace these substantial essences by the "*concept of law*" (Geyser (1909), 91). This will make it possible for a logic inspired by Aristotle to become "adapted to the modern standpoint of science" (Geyser (1909), 91). Accordingly – and Geyser arrives at this statement after having stated his strongly Husserlian ideas about essences and the ubiquity of essences in everything we can come to know, and by building upon his study of the psychology of using concepts – "concepts cannot be viewed as being rigid and brittle", "Begriffe [...] sind nichts Starres und Sprödes" (Geyser (1909), 128).

The motives that surface repeatedly in these debates inspired by Aristotle can be summarized by referring, briefly, to a manuscript treatise by *Franz Brentano* in which he deals with the problem of "terminology" (Brentano (1986)). In the *pollachos legetai* – the topic of Brentano's dissertation from 1862, dedicated to Trendelenburg (Brentano (1862)) –, Aristotle's own terminological innovations and his stance with regard to existence terms are related to the topic of abstraction (Brentano (1986), 178–9, 183) and to the possibility of accidents which seem to be indisputably real in our own immediate inner experience (Brentano (1986), 174). In his overall very sympathetic account of Aristotle, Brentano raises one severe point of criticism that, again, brings together issues from metaphysics and from logic and epistemology. In the account of categories and definitions *and* in that of matter and form, "serious deficits", "große Mängel" become visible, which can be summarized – rather tentatively – as a "certain swaying from an individual element towards a general species concept", as a "gewisses Hinüberschwanken von einem individuellen Element zu einem allgemeinen Artbegriff" (Brentano (1986), 183; see also 179 for similar issues with regard to "laws").

Brentano adds an interesting dimension by at least asking what the role of insights from empirical psychology might be here. This again is remarkable: the clear opposition between logic and psychology thus becomes permeable, at least when adopting the proper notion and methodology of psychology. The debates on concept formation, with all their Aristotelian and anti-Aristotelian ingredients, clearly show the philosophical sub-disciplines at a cross-roads: many options are discussed for combining creativity and scientific precision, for understanding existing conceptual frameworks and the creation of new ones.

V 19th Century Issues: Empiricist Generality, Scientistic Openness, Controlled Immediacy

To tie the foregoing considerations together:[16] all of the authors presented so far relate in a critical fashion to a standard account of concept formation that has been repeatedly associated with Aristotle. Cassirer (Cassirer (1910), 5–6) summarizes this account in terms of a manifold of things on the basis of which the mind can detect features shared by several things and thus arrive at similarity classes that allow for an ordered hierarchy of concepts. What is pretty universally rejected in this picture are the metaphysical assumptions of a clearly ordered and structured world of individual things. Once this assumption is dropped, it becomes crucial to combine an approach that is more open and flexible, and which can integrate an empirical methodology, with the unwavering confidence in the possibility of providing the ultimate foundations for all sciences. We can summarize some implications of this field of problems under three headings:

(1) Meaning variation vs. stable terms. In a developing science, all terms need to be open for change. What "element" means, for example, may be subject to revision. On the other hand, science always aims at stability. In both the humanities and the natural sciences, there is an attempt to integrate those two requirements. In the natural sciences, we see a shift from the extensive generality of collecting many instances under one term towards the general validity of a *law*. At the same time, *relational concepts* receive more and more attention: these concepts can be understood as incorporating laws and law-like structures into the form of a concept. If we follow Cassirer, for instance, these concepts operate on a level that is beyond the natural sciences-humanities distinction and they can thus also function as the basis for the humanities. In analogy to laws in the natural sciences, one can speak, in terms with a greater affinity to the humanities, of an "inner hold" (in I.H. Fichte's terms) or the "inner form" (still used by Gadamer in *Wahrheit und Methode* (Gadamer (1990), 444)).

Conceptual hierarchies thus become smoothed out without thereby losing out as regards the generality or scientific status of the higher concepts. A particularly clear statement of this idea can be found in *Oswald Külpe*'s treatise on "Kategorienlehre", presented in Munich in 1915. Külpe, who devoted an experi-

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16 The field could be characterized in a yet broader fashion, e. g., see Beiser's study of Lotze as a key figure of 19th century philosophy, which treats many issues similar to those discussed here (see Beiser (2013), 179 on Lotze's criticism of substance concepts and his favouring of functional concepts; 183 on Lotze's arguments against an abstractive theory of concepts and in favour of basic concepts that are rich in content).

mental investigation to the psychology of abstraction (Külpe (1904)),[17] emphasizes that categories, i.e. the highest conceptual determinations of objects of any kind, function in the same way as more special concepts: "They refer to the objective determinations of a realm of discourse in *precisely* the same way as the more special concepts" ("Wir betonten, daß die Kategorialbegriffe auf Gegenstandsbestimmtheiten eines Gebiets *gerade* so hinweisen, wie speziellere Begriffe desselben"; Külpe (1915), 71). This allows for a continuous transition between the most special and the most highly generalized concepts and implies that the formation of these concepts can rely on the same capacities of our understanding (Külpe (1915), 72–3). Even these most general functions of thought are, consequently, concrete: they never come bare and detached (Külpe (1915), 40) and are thus also open to an empirical investigation by means of psychology.

(2) New methods. The boundaries between "higher" and "lower" levels of objects and methods are re-drawn, as is perfectly illustrated in the work of Külpe as a philosopher and psychologist whose results are interlaced with the issues discussed so far on a number of levels. Take one of his key results as a psychologist, namely that thought proceeds, far more frequently and importantly than usually assumed, without images, in an "imageless" fashion, which is precisely the term Trendelenburg used to chastise Hegel.[18] On various levels, this is related to discussions in methodology. Not only does psychology become an acceptable partner here, for instance in the work of Külpe, Geyser, and Brentano, but moreover the process of abstraction undergoes revision. To take one example of an interaction of methodological ideas across the boundaries of different schools: J.S. Mill emphasizes that abstraction is not a purely mental activity but needs to have some basis in reality: "The conception is not furnished *by* the mind until it has been furnished *to* the mind" (Mill (1930), 428). The conception that we want to use as an abstract concept is not a mere hypothesis, but rather it has to somehow emerge from dealing with empirical particulars, however, the manner in which this works remains opaque. It, as it were, sticks out at a certain moment and becomes visible in a sort of Gestalt experience. If this description is correct, it brings us back to the Külpe-context in which the first generation of Gestalt psychologists received their early training. It is also worth mentioning that Mill discusses the problem of the variation of meaning at length.

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17 On the experimental work of the "Würzburg School" of experimental thought psychology, directed by Külpe and continuously transgressing the borderline between experimental psychology and philosophy, see Ziche (1999).

18 Quite a number cross-references link Külpe's "Würzburger Schule" with the authors mentioned so far; see, for instance, Geyser (1909), 31.

(3) Contentful abstraction and controlled immediacy. The authors discussed here agree that abstraction needs to lead to *rich* concepts. Here, too, it is rewarding to briefly glance at empiricist traditions and in particular at William Whewell's notion of "superinduction" (Whewell (1847), 46–48; discussed at length by Mill, too). This is a form of induction that *adds* something to the data in place of arriving at the common core of the data we are presented with by way of abstraction. Külpe illustrates the other side of this idea when he claims to have experimentally established that we can directly experience complex elementary states of thought. When we follow Sorabji's translation of Aristotle's "nous" as used in the *Analytica Posteriora* II,19 as "intellectual spotting" (Sorabiji (2004), 101), this issue of obtaining direct access to fundamental notions might lead us into yet further debates pro and contra Aristotle.

Taken together, these three points delineate contexts of critically engaging with Aristotle around 1900 that became relevant for philosophical and scientific innovations in this period. Aristotle is viewed as an advocate of a stable order; as a natural scientist; as an abstraction theorist as regards the formation of concepts; as the propagator of a strictly and one-sidedly syllogistic account of logic. In discussion with Aristotle, this framework is besieged from various directions, each of which tries to go beyond the Aristotelian framework but which at the same time maintains Aristotelian standards such as compatibility with empirical research, the simultaneous investigation of the fundamental structures of reality and thought, and the focus on the role of concepts. If one wanted to summarize the historical predicament of philosophy in this period in a very general fashion, one would need to state that this period was at the same time over-determined and under-determined by the interaction of various intellectual forces – of which Aristotle continued to be a particularly important one.

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Dale Jacquette
Brentano on Aristotle's Psychology of the Active Intellect

Abstract: One of the battlefields of Aristotelian studies in the 19th century is Aristotle's theory of the intellect. Franz Brentano's famous Habilitationsschrift on this topic became very much contested among Aristotle scholars of this time. In this chapter Dale Jacquette argues that by this treatise Brentano provides a lasting systematic contribution to a precise problem in the theory of mind: the problem of how the mind generates abstractions from subjectively experienced sense impression and perceptions. One of the surprising results of studying Brentano's work in this connection is the manner in which his interpretation of Aristotle engages mind-theoretical themes and assumptions from British Empiricism, all while defending Aristotelian metaphysics against such a tradition.

I Neo-Aristotelian among the Post-Kantians

Franz C. Brentano, in his Würzburg Habilitationsschrift of 1865, published in 1867 under the title, *Die Psychologie des Aristoteles, insbesondere seine Lehre vom noûs poietikos* (Brentano 1867), addresses one of the most important and elusive questions in the philosophy of mind. Brentano's second installment in what was eventually to become a four-part suite of investigations of the Aristotelian corpus is a highly focused study of Aristotle's *De Anima* explanation of the mind's ability to derive abstract concepts from the contents of subjectively experienced sense impressions and perceptions.

It is true to say, though not the preferred place to start, that Brentano sought to renew a more general philosophical interest in Aristotle among his contemporaries, and to promote a future of a more Aristotelian scientific empirical approach to philosophical inquiry. Brentano (1874; 1907; 1982), pursuing this program, offered the first steps toward understanding the mind from an explicitly self-consciously empirical point of view. Building on a solid foundation of exemplary classical scholarship in a closely examined investigation of Aristotelian metaphysics, Brentano offers his subsequent writings as contributions to a scientific philosophical psychology. Brentano is a conflicted empiricist, but not a positivist in the narrow sense. He does not suppose that the only meaningful study of psychology must be done in terms of publicly observable behaviour or experimental effects of conditioning. He thinks that there is a perfectly respectable em-

pirical way to gain perfectly respectable scientific knowledge of the mind through a faculty of inner perception that complements the experience of outer perception by means of the five senses. He considers inner perception to be in every way as empirical a capacity as looking through a microscope or telescope at the relevant external phenomena of a non-psychological natural science.

Brentano is passionately Aristotelian, but he does not seem to be so purely out of predisposition. Brentano's Aristotelianism is fuelled by his hard-earned progress in both the interdependent scholarly labour of trying to understand exactly what Aristotle is saying, and the philosophical task of asking at every stage whether Aristotle's ideas can be consistently interpreted and insightfully applied. Brentano is not an Aristotelian because he wants to oppose certain post-Kantian trends in the popular philosophy of his day. It is rather the other way around. Brentano champions Aristotle because his critical philosophical study of the Aristotelian texts and surrounding literature, exploring and reflecting on their meaning, has persuaded him of the rightness of an Aristotelian metaphysics of ontic categories, properly interpreted, and the being alone of individual substances and their inherent properties.

II Metaphysical and Epistemological Orientations in Empiricism

Brentano is nevertheless divided in his loyalties to opposing developments of philosophical empiricism. They take the form in Brentano's work as a *naïve Aristotelian realism*, that is not easily reconciled with an eighteenth century British Enlightenment *phenomenalism*. Different types of empiricism in Aristotle and the British empiricists are built upon different empiricism-friendly metaphysics.

The Aristotelian empiricism model seeks first a metaphysics that enshrines the common-sense intuition that there exists a world of mind-independent physical objects or primary substances. British empiricism represented by the work, among others, of George Berkeley, David Hume, and Edmund Burke, proceeds on the basis of an approved epistemology, demanding credentials for the experiential origins of ideas included in any philosophical explanation.

It proceeds on a more disciplined epistemology than Aristotle's, in accepting and allowing into philosophical reasoning only what is actually known to be present to the mind in moments of sensation and perception, as opposed especially to whatever can be compellingly associated or logically inferred.

It is a conflict that Brentano never fully resolves, but in response to which he makes a number of philosophically interesting adjustments throughout his span of writings. Brentano's attitude toward the naïve realist metaphysics of an Aristotelian empiricism is seen from the moment he steps upon the Aristotelian platform of ontic categories he sets in place with qualified approval already in the Dissertation. The conflict between Aristotelian and British empiricism is afterward frequently encountered once its appearance is expected. It surfaces most dramatically in such proposals as the immanent intentionality or in-existence thesis of Brentano's *Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt* – favouring British empiricism in some variant of phenomenalism, while starkly contradicting naïve realist Aristotelianism – to Brentano's always latent but later more explicitly emphasized reism – favouring a naïve realist Aristotelian metaphysics of individual mind-independent primary substances once again over the phenomenalism of mainstream British empiricism.

Empiricism based on such different metaphysical principles and epistemological scruples cannot make peace with itself, except by fighting things out at the foundational level. Brentano seems to find both models of empiricism compelling, and he is Aristotelian in his ontology and unwilling further to take on a battle with the empiricist epistemology-grounded metaphysics of British phenomenalism. The result is a conflicted Aristotelian empiricist metaphysician of mind-independent substances and a British phenomenalist metaphysician that rejects or is sceptical of the existence of any mind-independent reality, considers the immediate objects of perception to be ideas, and interprets physical objects as structured assemblages of mind-dependent ideas that they are associated with, constructed out of, or inferred as existing in the presence of certain ideas. Brentano either does not notice, thinks that he can safely ignore, or believes that he has somehow resolved or can anyway tolerate the conflict between Aristotle's naïve metaphysical realism and idealist or sceptical British phenomenalism.

Brentano presented and published his Dissertation, *Von der mannigfachen Bedeutung des Seienden nach Aristoteles*, in the same year (Brentano 1862). Brentano's third work on related subjects, *Aristoteles Lehre vom Ursprung des menschlichen Geistes* (Brentano 1911b), and, finally in this series, the fourth, *Aristoteles und seine Weltanschauung* (Brentano 1911c), were both published relatively late in Brentano's life. Of these four scholarly projects on Aristotle taken together, Brentano's Dissertation and Habilitationsschrift are the obvious most significant precursors of his most famous work. They provide the foundations and framework, respectively, for a quasi-Aristotelian scientific approach to psychology in defiance of what were then predominant post-Kantian trends, to

appear in several editions of Brentano's *Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt* (Brentano 1874; 1911a; 1924).

Brentano has Aristotle in mind early in the *Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt*. He writes with approval of Aristotle as having properly established the subject matter of psychology in the first chapter, 'Concept and Purpose':

> In spite of the modification in the concept, then, there seems to be nothing to prevent us from defining psychology in the terms in which Aristotle once defined it, namely as the science of the soul. So it appears that just as the natural sciences study the properties and laws of physical bodies, which are the objects of our external perception, psychology is the science which studies the properties and laws of the soul, which we discover within ourselves directly by means of inner perception, and which we infer, by analogy, to exist in others.[1]

Of importance in this passage is not merely the fact that Brentano mentions Aristotle by name as the founding thinker of philosophical psychology. One could with equal justice nominate Socrates or Plato for this honour among Aristotle's near contemporaries. Rather, it is the fact that Brentano in explaining his methodology makes specific reference to the concept of 'inner perception'.

Innere Wahrnehmung, as an empirical faculty on a par with *äussere Wahrnehmung* in the exercise of the five senses, is essential to Brentano's *Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt*. It remains so also in his later philosophical studies, culminating in the theory of psychognosy or phenomenology in his later 1874 lectures on *Deskriptive Psychologie* (Brentano 1982). It is in Brentano's Habilitationsschrift of 1865, however, *Die Psychologie des Aristoteles*, on Aristotle's *De Anima* (Περὶ Ψυχῆς) (Aristotle 1984), with its concentration on Aristotle's doctrine of the active intellect or *noûs poietikos*, that, in the course of his extended exposition and interpretation, Brentano acknowledges Aristotle's argument for the existence of a special faculty of inner perception.

If we think of major proponents of Aristotelianism in nineteenth century *Philosophie des deutschen Sprachraums*, Brentano's role is prominent. He is nevertheless not absolutely the first, and he is not absolutely alone. Brentano's own teacher Friedrich Adolf Trendelenburg, in his commentary on the three books of Aristotle's *De Anima* (Trendelenburg 1833), must be mentioned, among numerous others, many of whom Brentano in these early writings takes notice. These thinkers had already made significant scholarly contributions toward the better understanding of Aristotle's psychology in general and in the topics that especially interested Brentano. Nor should we overlook Theophrastus, Themistius,

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1 Brentano (1973), 5.

Averroës, Thomas Aquinas, and many commentators of the past whose thought is relevant to the topic, on whom Brentano freely draws, whom he studied with care, and on whose thought he often sheds new light. Brentano's impact was nevertheless measurably greater, because his applications of Aristotelianism, and hence his enthusiasm for the subject, reached far beyond his predecessors' scholarly textual exegesis and often superficial philosophical interpretation of Aristotle's writings.

Brentano had a more profound influence through the indirect spread of his descriptive psychology. By presenting a powerful paradigm for the disciplined application of a generically Aristotelian concept of inner perception some years later, Edmund Husserl's transcendental phenomenology launched an ultimately non-Brentanian disciplined investigation of the structures of thought revealed to what seems to be Brentano's identification of an empirical psychological faculty of reflective *innere Wahrnehmung*.[2] Husserl's mature so-called transcendental phase of phenomenology after 1913 is marked by the publication in that year of Book I of the *Ideen* (Husserl 1913). Despite efforts to distance himself ideologically and methodologically from the anathema of *psychologism* with which Brentano was sometimes accused, Husserl remains committed, even when leaning most conspicuously toward Kant, to roughly the same kind of Aristotelian scientific model in philosophy that Brentano had promoted. Brentano scarcely undertakes to thematise the concept of inner perception afterward, as though he is comfortable taking it largely for granted in subsequent writings. It is only in emphasizing a specific application of what Aristotle speaks of as inner perception that Brentano in the Habilitationsschrift calls attention to this indispensable empirical mode of exploring the phenomenological contents and relational structures among moments of consciousness.

What lends Brentano's Aristotelianism its special authority is not merely the fact that Brentano persuasively recommends an Aristotelian orientation in philosophy against a prevailing trend of neo-Kantianism, and especially Hegelianism, first, in the nineteenth century German language philosophical community, but that in doing so he begins by establishing sound scholarly credentials for such endorsements and applications in his own systematic researches by the publication of his Dissertation and Habilitationsschrift on scholarly topics of a very exacting nature centred exclusively on Aristotle's metaphysics and psychology. Having alerted the German speaking philosophical world to the importance of the concepts of inner perception and the active intellect in Aristotle, Brentano in his later philosophy of mind goes on to distinguish inner perception from in-

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2 Brentano (1977), 58–65; Brentano (1973), 34, 91–93.

trospection, in what has nevertheless appeared to many commentators as more of a philosophically unsubstantial terminological scruple.[3] It is by these sincerely motivated choices that Brentano's appreciable influence on the reception and revival of Aristotelianism in nineteenth philosophy can best be understood.[4]

III Brentano on Aristotle's Psychology of the Active Intellect

In explaining selected parts of Brentano's interpretation of Aristotle's psychology, the intention is to emphasize Brentano's recovery of Aristotle's concept of and arguments for the existence of the previously mentioned psychological faculty of inner sense or mental inner perception, and the complementary category of the active intellect engaged in the derivation of concepts from percepts. The purpose is not merely historical, but also, like Brentano's original inquiry, systematic. What is wanted is a style of explanation in psychology, cognitive studies, epistemology and the philosophy of mind, that is inspired by Brentano's Aristotelianism, and in particular by his advocacy of the inner sense and the role of the active intellect in extracting concepts from perceptions. It is the philosophical problem that Aristotle tries to address, discussed in Brentano's treatise *Die Psychologie des Aristoteles*, that partly motivates Brentano's inquiry about Aristotle's cognitive perception-to-concept-building theory.

Brentano understands the significance of his project, in setting the problem his investigation is meant to answer. He is keenly aware of the importance of Aristotle's questions in the contemporary philosophy of his day:

> Let us ask: What is the philosophical problem that lies at the basis of the Aristotelian doctrine of the *nous poietikos*? What psychological problem did Aristotle seek to resolve by introducing it in his *De Anima*? It is a problem that even now is of the highest importance and that has never failed to arouse the investigative impulse, namely, the problem of the moving principle of our thought.[5]

The problem with which Aristotle is engaged, principally in Book 3, chapters 4 and 5 of *De Anima*, is one that equally concerns Brentano. It engages Brentano as a philosopher and historian of philosophy, investigating what he considers to be the only defensible methodological choice. It is the task of understanding

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3 Brentano (1973), 29.
4 See George/Koehn (2004).
5 Brentano (1977), 157.

how *concepts*, as the building blocks of judgments in which properties are combinatorially predicated of objects, can possibly arise through sensory experiential encounter with an external world of mind-independent objects.

Brentano says of Aristotle's theory of the active intellect, by way of anticipation, that it is "perhaps the most important finding concerning the origin of our thoughts which research has yet brought to light".[6] This is no exaggeration. Post-Positivist waves of physical reductivisms in the philosophy of mind are eloquent testimony to the *poverty* of cognitive psychology that tries to ignore Aristotle's study of the active intellect. If we consider the causal mechanisms by which sensation takes place between events involving these physical entities, then the whole process does not seem to lend itself immediately in and of itself to anything *remotely* cognitive. We may imagine light rays striking an apple and an image of the apple being conveyed to the retinas of a perceiver's eyes. Or, similarly, for any of the other sensory modalities that receive and the neural networks that record corresponding incoming ambient sensory data.

There the photon-produced image of the apple *passively*, and, for that and no other reason, we might say, with no insult to any *thinking* entity, *stupidly*, sits or resides. As an alteration of a physical substance, it does nothing on its own, but awaits an active agency, where possible, speaking metaphorically, to select from it the definitions, secondary substances, or properties that are inherent in the image of a primary substance for Aristotle, just as they are in the primary substance itself. It is only by means of knowing the properties inherent in the mind's passively received inactive percepts of a primary substance that we come to know the substance's inherent properties. We acquire in the course of passively receiving inactive apple images as so far described no *concept* of any kind. No concept of apple is yet available to thought, or, for that matter, of redness, roundness, fruit, physical spatio-temporal entity, the being or having of any of these and other properties we normally suppose a visually experienced apple to exemplify. Brentano recognizes that, despite these explanatory obstacles, we are somehow undoubtedly provisioned with these among many other concepts. He wants to understand how they become available to the mind for at least the cognitive activities revealed by inner perception, in our predications and all that they make possible propositionally to the mind.

Brentano is concerned to ask whether, and, if so, in what sense, the mind's acquisition of concepts is related to the facts and contents of empirical experience, as he believes it must be. A reductively causal or functional explanation of the eyes' reception of light rays reflected from an apple to the brain at that

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6 Brentano (1977), Preface, xiii.

level does not take us beyond the image receiving and retaining function of a video camera or equivalent mechanical data recording device. If *passively* receiving and retaining an image of the apple is not yet to conceptualize any of the apple's properties, then, since manifestly we do derive apple-related concepts from empirical sensory encounters in these among endlessly other ways, there must also be something *active* involved, something that goes beyond the brain's purely passive video-camera-like receiving and recording facility, weak or strong, or even distorting, as it may turn out to be in each individual perceiver's case. Aristotle does not approach the question in this fashion, disregarding the contemporary videography analogy. We may nevertheless independently recognize the need for a theory of an active principle within the faculties of mind that acts upon and thereby does something with and based upon the video-camera-like images of objects that are passively causally inscribed by the senses into the brain, among other inert objects in the world of perceivable dynamic individual spatio-temporal entities, like a stylus on a classically empiricist clay tablet.

Brentano explains the purpose of *Die Psychologie des Aristoteles* in these terms:

> We want to attend to a certain aspect of the origin of our intellectual cognitions. Aristotle, upon considering this aspect, found himself unable to explain it fully in terms of the intellect [*nous*] that becomes all things, or in terms of the activity of the senses. He thus felt forced to introduce the active intellect. We cannot fail to notice signs of the activity ascribed to it; and through them we can hope to discover clues of Aristotle's intentions concerning the active intellect, and the meaning he connects with it. For the method that Aristotle himself recommended as necessary, and that he himself everywhere followed, was to discover the nature of the powers by using knowledge of their effects and activities. Hence by using the same method, we follow his own tracks, which are certainly best suited to lead us to his conception of the intellectual powers.[7]

Mind-body reductive theories are hard-pressed to explain how thought advances from camera-like images engraved on the nervous system via the sense organs to concepts of any of a visible object's instantiations of properties. Effectively, it is to inquire after the mind's pathway from percepts to concepts. Reductivism in this sense, whether behavioural, material, functional, causal, computational, or of any other type, cannot bridge the explanatory disparity of accounting for the occurrence of *concepts* arising out of a thinking subject's passive receptive sensory encounters with a world of presumably mind-independent external perceptible objects.

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7 Brentano (1977), 27; see also 74–75.

Inactive devices like cameras know or think nothing of the apple, and, according to Aristotle in *De Anima*, as Brentano interprets his teaching, neither does the mind considered only in passive terms of the receptive intellect's causal functioning in the mechanics of sensation. Whether or not the new-born or as yet unborn mind is a *tabula rasa*, as some empiricists, like John Locke in the 1700 fourth edition of his *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, have suggested, it is for Brentano's Aristotle something like Locke's white sheet of paper, initially blank or otherwise, in receiving a literal impression when an inked stylus is pressed against its surface, written upon by accumulated experience.[8] The particular indentation that results in the clay or pattern of ink on the paper is once again a picture or image of the stylus tip, if nothing else. The paper or clay tablet, like the camera and the mind or brain in this regard, know nothing consciously of the stylus or its properties when it is altered with lines and figures in efficient causal interactions with the movements of scribe's writing utensil. Brentano accordingly concludes:

> But in addition to the affected entity in which it exists, each affection presupposes an active principle. What then is the active principle that brings forth the intelligible forms in our intellect? Aristotle says that the origin of our knowledge is in the senses. This agrees with what he teaches elsewhere, namely, that the soul cognizes nothing without images. But no corporeal thing can call forth an impression in something incorporeal; thus, according to Aristotle, the mere power of sensory bodies does not suffice for the generation of our thoughts, but something higher is required. In the third book of *De Anima* he says, "the active surpasses the affected in dignity".[9]

The mind's *passive* reception of ambient information presented in sensation needs to be supplemented by a superior *active* agency that acts upon and thereby does something specific to the impressions after they are made on and recorded in the mind. Something within the mind must *do* something to the impressions of sensation and perception. The mind by some of its agencies must *act* upon the impressions of sensation and perception in a certain way, so that the mind can collect concepts from sensory experience of the world to put together in judgments, acts of imagination, and any and all propositional attitudes.

How this all might work is the difficult question from which Aristotle and Brentano do not shrink, even though they end up inevitably telling only part of the story. Passive video-camera-like reception and recording of sensory data by itself can never accomplish the further purpose of transforming percepts into concepts. Sensing can never make concepts available to the mind merely

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8 Locke (1975), Book II, Chapter I, *Of* Ideas *in general, and their Original*, §2, 104.
9 Brentano (1977), 13f.

by registering locally ambient sensory information like a stylus pressed against moist clay. Later, near the end of the book, Brentano returns to emphasize this central theme:

> Hence in order to understand the influence of the sensitive upon the intellectual part we must assume in the latter a further active power. For obviously it is not the activity of the will from which this influence upon the sensitive part proceeds, for this influence is not subject to our will and takes place unconsciously, as it is presupposed in all intellectual cognition. This power will have to be called the *poietikon* [productive agent] for the intellect, as Aristotle similarly called the sensible quality the *poietikon* for the senses; this power is the so-called *nous poietikos*; it forms the fourth of the intellectual powers of the soul, or, if one considered the will and the consciously moving faculty of the intellect to be one, it would form the third.[10]

There is an apple. The apple is red. Thus empirical knowledge proceeds. We cannot even get epistemology started without such basic concepts. We need *propositions*, accordingly, even if these are only sentences in any form proposing the existence of a state of affairs as the intended objects of potential assumptions, judgments, and beliefs. We need for this purpose the availability of predications by which an object is said to have a property, expressing a true or false judgment. All of this *presupposes* conceptualization, rather than serving as a reductive substitute for the existence of concepts for the brain's syntactical engines to combine in a large variety of logical and grammatical combinations, and especially in formulating and considering the predication of properties to objects.

Whether in earnest judgment in expectation of expressing the truth, or in idle fantasy or spinning a fiction, as in lying, or for the sake of providing oneself or others with imaginative entertainment, the mind functions only by putting together concepts for objects with concepts for properties, typically accompanied by a propositional attitude and or an act of will. It is the same operations that we have said are linguistically modelled as predicates being applied to constants or other singular referring terms. The explanation is fruitful in other ways, if only the mind's stock and store of concepts can first be understood, especially in relation to the passively received contents or images of sense perception. It is this vital piece in the puzzle for a complete philosophy of mind or cognitive philosophy that Brentano wants fully to understand in explicating Aristotle's doctrine of the active soul or intellect.

If contemporary cognitive scientists and philosophers of mind prefer to challenge Brentano's Aristotelian argument for the existence of a *noûs poietikos* deriving concepts from percepts, then we are entitled to learn from these reducti-

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10 Brentano (1977), 107.

vists how the mind is otherwise supposed to proceed from passively received sense impressions to concepts, without the intervention of an active rational mental agency. This is precisely the quandary in which any reductivism stands in contemporary philosophy of mind, in the absence of an Aristotelian theory of the active intellect capable of harvesting concepts from raw sensations for use in property-object judgments and their expression as predicate-constant (or quantified) predications. If mind-body reductivism cannot satisfy this explanatory need, then there is no prospect of reductivism adequately explaining judgment, assumption, belief, doubt, knowledge, or, hence, consciousness, in any of the ways the word is usually used, let alone in language acquisition. Brentano's study of the *noûs poietikos* implies that contemporary philosophy of mind is debited with the explanatory inadequacy of reductivism as an article of faith in a future theory that at present cannot even be adequately conceptualized. If such an imagined reduction should ever take place, it will predictably involve only passive factors in mechanical interaction, rendering it incapable of accounting for the mind's generous supply of concepts for combining into judgments and linguistic and artistic predicational thoughts and expressions.

IV Acting on the Intelligible Forms in Images

Brentano's *Psychologie des Aristoteles* is confined in its immediate attention primarily to two short chapters of Aristotle's *De Anima*. These are lines 429a10 – 430a26, that, for example, in the Jonathan Barnes Oxford University Press revised edition translation, barely top three full pages of printed text.[11] Brentano's Habilitationsschrift, despite its scholarly minutiae, is nevertheless of interest not only to historians of ancient Greek philosophy. Whether the torch bearers of contemporary philosophy of mind are aware of the fact or not, Brentano's treatise on Aristotle's psychology remains essential background for systematic approaches to any comprehensive consideration of the mind-body problem, and of the mind's full economy of functional capabilities.

We have concepts that cannot result from sensation and perception alone, however essential these faculties may also be to the derivation of concepts from experience. When we intelligent consciousnesses perceive an apple, we generally come away from the experience not only with passively recorded sensory images, but also with concepts of the thing. How does this happen, if not by some mental agency? Brentano, in explaining Aristotle, speaks here of 'intelligi-

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11 Aristotle (1984), 682–685.

ble forms' inherent in the images of things transmitted by the senses and record-
ed by the soul.[12] These intelligible forms are the 'definitions' or secondary sub-
stances, according to Aristotle, and as Brentano rightly understands Aristotle's
philosophical psychology, they inhere in the primary substances that are the
cause or occasion of external sense perceptions. They are partially conveyed
also in the structural features of their corresponding images. Intelligible forms
are inherent in sensible forms, in the mind's passively received psychological
portraits of perceived primary substances. The active intellect unconsciously
chooses from among these intelligible forms in conceptualizing selections
from the full range of information contained within the mind's selective recorded
representations of perceived things.

As Brentano explains, Aristotle accounts for these presumed facts by posit-
ing a distinction between passive and active parts of the soul, the *noûs pathetikos*
and *noûs poietikos*.[13] The latter category literally describes a *making* mind, in the
sense of the Greek word *poiesis*, meaning *to make*. The *noûs poietikos* or active
intellect in Aristotle's philosophy of mind, as Brentano recounts the theory in
his *Psychologie des Aristoteles*, is a part, capability, or function of mind that
does something to perceptions, to the physical images of things once they are re-
ceived, in order to make some of the concepts they embody and inherently exem-
plify available for unlimitedly many uses in thought and its expression. Brentano
writes:

> The active intellect illuminates the images and abstracts the intelligible species from the
> images. It *illuminates* [*erleuchtet*] them; the images are to the intellect as colours are to
> the sense of sight. The influence of the active intellect prepares the images so that intellec-
> tual concepts can be abstracted from them, just as the sensitive part is raised to a higher
> power through its union with the intellective part. The active intellect *abstracts* the intelli-
> gible species from the images, i.e., through the power of the active intellect we can grasp
> and consider the general nature of things without their individual determinations; the rep-
> resentations of this nature are received into the potential intellect as forms.[14]

Moreover, thought, for Aristotle, as a consequence, surprising as it may at first
appear, is itself potentially all things. For, in principle, thought can contain with-
in itself the intelligible forms of all things, which is to say, their essences. Bren-
tano elaborates:

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12 Aristotle (1984), 684; 430a10 – 25.
13 Brentano (1977), 17.
14 Brentano (1977), 14.

Thus further down [Aristotle] says quite unambiguously: "The intellect is in a way potentially the intelligible things." And in the beginning of the eighth chapter Aristotle contrasts the sensible with the intelligible by saying: "Things are some of them sensible, some of them intelligible; now knowledge" – the context shows that he means by it all intellectual knowledge – "is in a way the intelligible, but sensation the sensible," and he concludes that therefore "the soul is in a way all things".[15]

As our knowledge of the world through assimilation of its intelligible forms expands, so also, even more unexpectedly, perhaps, according to Aristotle, does our approximation to divinity. Which is finally not to say all that much. Actual, not merely apparent knowledge, is divine, as Brentano reads Aristotle. The active intellect in producing concepts from percepts is accordingly a possession of each individual human thinker, is also potentially a knower of all things, but actually throughout a lifetime comes to actually know relatively few truths. The position Brentano finds attractive here is contrary, as he notes in lengthy comparison, to the early fourth century non-Christian commentator Themistius, or to Brentano's contemporary the neo-Hegelian historian of ancient Greek philosophy, Eduard Zeller, who attribute Aristotle's active intellect to the divine forces, personified as the god Apollo or God as World Spirit or the Absolute.[16]

V Brentano on Aristotle's Category of Inner Sense

Instrumental in the process of conceptualizing features of sensory data input to the mind in Brentano's picture of Aristotle's theory is therefore the previously mentioned category of *inner sense* as contrasted with the five outer external senses. Inner sense, in Brentano's exposition of Aristotle, is a special faculty that complements the external senses of vision, hearing, taste, touch and smell. Inner sense in Aristotle later becomes Brentano's highly serviceable category, as previously remarked, of *innere Wahrnehmung* or more literally internal perception, which he distinguishes from introspection. Psychognosy, phenomenology, descriptive psychology by any other name, flourishing in this tradition, are inconceivable without Aristotle's reasoning in support of an empirical inner perception by an empirical inner sense.

Offered in support below is a highly condensed selection of relevant texts from Part 3 b) of *Die Psychologie des Aristoteles*, 'Of the Sense of Sensation'

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15 Brentano (1977), 79.
16 Brentano (1977), 26, 181–183.

(§§5 – 12). There Brentano at greater length maintains in a run of argument that requires no pauses for commentary, in the sequential ordering of the following citations gallery:

> It must be this sense that perceives not only what we sense, but also the remaining sensitive operations, for example, sensual desire, and that gives us self-consciousness to the extent to which it belongs to the sensory part. Without question, therefore, it is preeminent among all senses.[17]

> But perhaps not everyone is aware how great an importance this [inner] sense has for us by allowing us to distinguish any sensory object from any other; thus we believe we ought to call attention to this with at least a few words. First of all it must be noted that without this inner sense we would fail to perceive not only the differences between the proper objects of different sensory faculties, but also between those objects that can indeed be perceived through several senses, but each of which is in fact only apprehended by one external sense.[18]

> For example, let someone perceive by touch an angular body and at the same time see a round one, and let him recognize the distinction of the two shapes. He distinguishes them neither through the sense of sight nor through the sense of touch. According to our considerations, it can only be the inner sense that makes the distinction possible for him. Thus through touch as well as through sight we can perceive the spatial separation of two things, but in a case in which someone actually only sees one and only feels the other, it is again the inner sense alone that teaches him the spatial separation of the two.[19]

> But every sense that notices the distinctions in an object is also in a position to recognize the lack of such distinctions. Thus the inner sense, since it perceives the spatial separation of two objects, one of which was apprehended through touch, the other through sight, will also notice that such a distinction does not exist when it is one and the same thing that we touch and also see at one and the same time; in this way we can recognize that the touched object and the seen object are one, since they coincide spatially.[20]

> From this it follows that when, for example, warmth and redness coexist in one subject and are simultaneously perceived by us, we do indeed sense that the warm thing is red and the red thing warm, but we neither see nor feel this, but perceive it through a sensory activity that is different from these two, i. e., through the activity of the inner sense. Without it we should sense the unity of warmth and redness not otherwise than *per accidens*....[21]

> Anyone can easily draw the consequences that would follow from such an isolation of sensory perceptions for science, for art, for all kinds of practical activities, since even the simplest movement would hardly be possible any longer. Hence the inner sense is extremely important not only as that which gives us self-consciousness, but also as the faculty that

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17 Brentano (1977), 64.
18 Brentano (1977), 64.
19 Brentano (1977), 64.
20 Brentano (1977), 64.
21 Brentano (1977), 64.

distinguishes the sensory objects of different senses from each other. Obviously it is the highest sense, higher even than hearing and sight; yet it is found, since it is indispensable for all animals, as we have noted, also in the lowest species of animals, which partake in no other outer sense than touch and taste.[22]

Aristotle presents only one albeit impressive argument for the existence of an inner sense. The reasoning manages its burden of justification quite creditably in Brentano's treatise, and, importantly, appears to do so without circularity. The inference in simplest terms is that an inner sense must exist because the mind is able to distinguish between deliverances of, say, the eyes in sight and the ears in sound, which it could not do by exercising either vision or hearing exclusively, nor by any sequence of individual external senses exercised alone and considered only in and of themselves. Input to the individual external senses must therefore be monitored by another source of empirical input, which, all external senses having been excluded, can only be an inner or internal sense.

We cannot hear colours or see bird chirpings, intriguing reports of synaesthesia notwithstanding. Synaesthesia is readily understood in Brentanian Aristotelian terms as a cross-wire malfunctioning of inner sense.[23] We need not assume that there can be sound input feeding into visual information processing, or the reverse, if it is a malfunctioning inner sense that associationally confuses one kind of information processing output for another synaesthetically inverted category of sensory input information processing.[24] If none of the external senses individually or in concert is capable of comparing the contents of distinct external senses, yet we know phenomenologically that the mind makes such judgmental comparisons, then we may feel entitled to conclude that the feat can only be accomplished by another sense faculty that is not among the external senses, and that consequently can only be internal in its monitoring of other thought contents. There must then be an *inner sense* that is dedicated to surveying what the external senses disclose concerning the properties of the external world among other input. Inner sense is related to the active agency of consciousness, and Brentano intriguingly speculates that it may constitute the basis more especially of self-consciousness. It is an instance of a thought checking on the contents and progression of other thoughts.

Brentano does not try to develop this promising suggestion concerning self-consciousness further in the Habilitationsschrift, nor even to explain in greater

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22 Brentano (1977), 65.
23 Brentano (1907).
24 Brentano (1977), 64–67.

detail what it might be supposed to mean. Postulating an inner sense that alone has the capability of perceiving that colours are not sounds nevertheless marks a significant step in an interesting direction toward the emergence and in our understanding of the empirical phenomena of consciousness and self-consciousness. It tells us something remarkable about the conditions by which thought represents an awareness of differences in other states of mind, the contents of which in the first instance are themselves the result of sensations produced by causal interactions with information sources about the properties of the objects to which the senses are attuned, and, in the second instance, what an inner sense can tell us about successive states of consciousness containing the contents and objects of perceptions and other occurrently streaming thoughts.

If inner perception is a meta-perception of the immediate contents and later memory traces of external perceptions, then, potentially, among its other cognitive roles, inner perception may also serve as a primitive basis for conscious states, including self-reflective states of self-conscious awareness. Inner sense keeps track of what the outer senses receive as information about the mind-independent external world, without commitment to the activity of inner sense as objectionably homuncular. The account is particularly promising for those who favour an accompanying plausible philosophical anthropology for the origin of any of our ideas. This is the classical empiricist preoccupation shared by Brentano with many Enlightenment era British empiricists, especially Hume, Berkeley, Burke, and others on the European continent, including also Arthur Schopenhauer, who would not necessarily agree on philosophical grounds with other principles of Aristotle's naïve realist metaphysics of mind-independent substances.[25]

VI Brentano's Empiricism in Historical Perspective

Aristotle's inner sense is also the key to explaining how the active intellect is able to derive concepts from inert inactive sense impressions received and stored by the passive receptive intellect. The passive intellect in Aristotle's psychology, like the lifeless images captured by a camera shutter and lens, and deposited onto its film or into digital memory, has to do with psychological occurrences that are at best preconceptual. They are the passive raw material from which Aristotle supposes concepts to be derived by an active faculty of mind.

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25 As spokesperson for this philosophical position, see Hume (1978), 1–7.

Inner sense perceives what the outer senses have registered and then somehow actively, poetically, in the literal sense of the word, extracts concepts from the imagistic contents of perceptions. Once the active intellect performs this feat of conceptualization, the concepts of objects and properties are thereafter freely available to be combined together in further acts of thought. The mind can judge, for example, that in a certain place and time a certain object has a certain property: that there is an apple and that the apple is red. The mind, we know from direct phenomenological acquaintance with the end result, can formulate expressions of these judgments in speech act behaviour more generally, exploiting and building upon socially accepted conventions of communication by means of language, art, and artefacts to say in endless varieties of ways that an object has a property. In the process, the development and mastery by many individuals socially plays an enormous part in enhancing the mind's practical facility in conceptualizing the world.

Without the active intellect's agency, there can be no concepts at the foundations of thought, in putting together an object concept with a property concept in formulating the judgment that the object has the property. The precisely parallel point is made by speaking theoretically in the linguistic model of the mind's joining predicate or property terms with singular referring expression for objects as the bearers of properties in order to construct the simplest predicational propositions. The theory gains strength whenever the alternative choices in trying to explain the relation between percepts and concepts is undertaken without appealing to some version of Aristotle's theory of the active intellect's role in the events of consciousness as complementing the passive mechanical events of perception and recording of perceived properties by the video-camera-like or tablet and stylus causal functioning of the receptive sensitive soul or *noûs pathetikos*. With concepts in hand, judgment, inference, and imagination, among other faculties of mind, have the rudimentary materials needed to work with, making it possible for judgment in an act of will to put together in thought the concept of an object like the apple with the concept of something's being red.

It is precisely this link in the cognitive chain that Aristotle's *De Anima* Book 3 Chapters 4 – 5 seeks to understand, and that Brentano's treatise *Die Psychologie des Aristoteles* proposes to analyse, interpret and explain. The marvel is that, historically and in contemporary discussions in philosophy of mind, so little has been said about this essential part of the process of thinking thoughts, and, indeed, of having the building blocks of even the most basic thoughts to think, at the foundations of the conceptual contents of acts of consciousness. Brentano, to his undying credit, is more alert to the problem and eager to thoroughly investigate the topic in Aristotle, effectively providing a prelude to his own development of an empiricist theory of consciousness, seven years later in *Psychologie*

vom empirischen Standpunkt. If Aristotle's inner sense is essential to the account of the percept-to-concept train in philosophy of mind, with widely radiating consequences for cognitive psychology, epistemology, and other philosophical subdisciplines, then it is easy to understand how an Aristotelian account of the active intellectual soul is demanded by a complete empiricist philosophical psychology of the sort to which Brentano aspires.

Inner perception, as much as outer or external perception, is perception of contingent ongoing occurrences, whether without or within the mind. Such perceptions are experiences of the facts of the world in their respective orders of incidents, in which the mind monitors either mind-independent external or proximately mind-dependent internal events. Brentano further explains:

> The active intellect without images would be like a bow without an arrow; the images without the active intellect, like an arrow without the propelling force of the bow; it would be impossible for either of them alone to reach the target, for they would be incapable of generating thought.[26]

If Aristotle and Brentano are right, then inner perception is every bit as methodologically empirical as outer perception. In that sense, and contrary to later positivist objections to the subjectivity of phenomenology, inner as well as outer perception is just as deservedly scientific in the sense of being observational, and hence and in that general sense just as deservedly empirical. Inner sense is even subject, presumably, to parallel kinds of inner experimentation with the contents of consciousness as are the moments of external perception, despite being subjective rather than objective in the sense of being inscrutable to public observability.

What 'public' observability means after all is only that there are positive correlations or agreements in the contents of experience expressed by multiple mutually impenetrable or 'private' subjectivities. When there is agreement by several perceivers concerning objects that are supposed to exist outside of any particular individual thinker's subjectivity, or when we are justified in expecting such concurrence to be forthcoming for a certain class of objects, physical entities that are big enough or hold still long enough for several perceivers to get them in their sights, and more or less agree on the content of the experience afterward, then we speak of public observability. For Brentano, this is only half of the story, since inner perception, as should be expected, does not obey the constraints of outer perception. Brentano's Aristotelianism in the theory of the active intellectual soul is an endorsement of empirical phenomenological science, in

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26 Brentano (1977), 142.

the proper sense of the word, as it came to emerge in nineteenth century German language philosophical psychology and philosophy of mind. In historical context, it was nevertheless an innovation that was to have philosophically interesting ramifications.

Aristotle and Brentano provide sufficient encouragement for many developments of phenomenology to take their place on general empirical grounds alongside externalist empiricisms in the philosophy of mind. Phenomenology in Brentano's wide-spread school, based on the faculty of inner perception, completes the sources of scientific information about the mind available to psychologies that are more limitedly favoured by mind-body reductivism and eliminativism. With an empiricist, and hence equally respectably broadly construed scientific, methodological foundation, disclosed to experience in the exercise of inner perception, psychology from an empirical standpoint understands the mind in both its internal subjective content and intentionality, and its external objective in the sense of publicly observable behavioural and neurophysiological properties. This seems to be how Brentano himself may have thought of psychology as pendant on the discoveries of an *innere Wahrnehmung*. Whatever Brentano's undocumented intentions, he succeeds in showcasing the possibilities for an empirical philosophical *science* of the mind.

A philosophy of mind that relies on Aristotle's category of the inner sense can be refined in a variety of ways to serve specific explanatory purposes. It can be invoked to account for the mind's active monitoring of the passive reception and recording of sensory information. A typical case is that of consciously perceiving during moments of awareness in our ongoing experience of the external world. Aristotle's inner sense can help explain the mind's ability to consider object and property concepts, and whatever the mind can make up out of the mentally inscribed data of the senses in wilful acts of judgment. Whether history is ultimately on his side or not, Brentano's question remains important for philosophy of mind, and for its comprehensive range of related theoretical applications in many areas of philosophy and science.

Empiricists are often especially motivated to uncover the legitimizing or authenticating source, if any exists, for purported philosophical concepts, distinctions and principles, some of which may be suspected of having no perceptual credentials beyond an empty combination of words. Justly or not, this is precisely the charge levelled by a vanguard of nineteenth century Aristotelians against a philosophically stagnant neo-Kantianism in a surrounding increasingly scientific culture. Brentano at first in nineteenth century Germany and Austria, and then addressing a larger international audience, builds his empirical psychology on the assumption of the possibility of Aristotle's inner sense. Philosophy in fairness was historically prepared for such a reflective turn in large part by Georg

Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel's differently conceived logic and phenomenology, anticipations of certain chapters of which are also to be found in Aristotle. After Johann Gottlieb Fichte, regrettably, neo-Kantianism has had virtually nothing more to say for itself. It appears historically to have exhausted its resources fighting for the subjectivity of knowledge, and when it took up its new freedom after a self-proclaimed victory, it had nothing particularly interesting to say in advancing philosophical understanding. As its non-starter status overcame its poetic and in some instances romantic freedom-versus-necessity philosophical charm, neo-Kantianism historically as a dominant trend in European and world philosophy largely withered on the vine.

Brentano, in Herculean spirit, in the first of two masterful scholarly studies of Aristotle's metaphysics and psychology, sifts through the Augean stables of two thousand years of Aristotle scholarship to emerge with a strongly supported philosophically intriguing interpretation of some otherwise obscure or popularly neglected aspect of Aristotle's thought. In his Dissertation, he presents a coherent reconstruction of Aristotle's categories of being. He explains their meaningful arrangement in an easily surveyable table or branching schematic tree. The Aristotelian ontology or ousiology depicts the categories of primary substances in relation to their inherent ontically dependent or supervenient 'definitions' or secondary substances.[27] Subsequently, in his *Habilitationsschrift* on Aristotle's psychology, Brentano performs a similar task for the variety of interpretations and misinterpretations that have historically accumulated around Aristotle's scant remarks concerning the active and passive intellect, along with a rich network of collateral distinctions in philosophical psychology, centring especially again on *De Anima*.[28]

It may be tempting to conjecture that Brentano's stealthy purpose in *Die Psychologie des Aristoteles* is to introduce Aristotle's concept of inner perception. He does so apparently only as a sideline. In historical retrospect, however, approving Aristotle's argument for the existence of an inner sense may after all be considered among Brentano's primary objectives in the Habilitationsschrift. It is this faculty of thought, more than the active intellect, that Brentano depends on and heavily exploits. He does so not only in *Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt*, but throughout his philosophical career, culminating most notably in the later lectures on *Deskriptive Psychologie*, during his last year as Ordinarius. Brentano in *Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt* further trades on Aristotle's argument that the mind cannot be adequately explained as a purely passive phenom-

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27 Brentano (1975) resp. Brentano (1862); Jacquette (2011; 2012).
28 Aristotle (1984), 682–684; 429a10–430a26.

enon, so that there must be an active intellect as well as a passive video-camera-like receptive intellect. If we limit philosophy of mind to the explanatory resources of modern day reductivists and eliminativists, those who propose to solve the mind-body problem by reducing or eliminating all purported mental phenomena to or away in favour of purely physical phenomena, then, if Aristotle is right, as Brentano believes, there can be no adequate explanation of how the mind obtains concepts from the data of perceptions.

An inner sense, like an inner camera, and again like any of the outer senses understood only causally or mechanically, is entirely passive. By itself, Brentano insists, it does not because it cannot do anything to supply the mind with concepts from its passively received and recorded perceptions. If we agree with Brentano, then mechanisms made of purely passive components can never explain the existence of the mind's concepts. As followers of Brentano, we can look reductivists in the eye and demand to know how they propose to explain the origin of concepts. If Brentano's explanation of Aristotle's argument for the active intellect is correct, then there can be no reduction of concepts to causal relations obtaining between purely passive neurologically engraved images of perceived or otherwise experienced external physical things. Images of an external reality within the mind or neurophysiological brain states will never transform themselves into concepts. An active mental agency of some order must do something to or with the images in order to extract their inherent concepts, such as the redness or roundness of the apple.

The inner sense, consequently, following Aristotle's persuasive reasoning in support of its existence, does not function alone. Inner sense, like the outer senses, provides the mind with concepts only in conjunction with the activity of an active principle that uses passively received and recorded perceptions or perceptual images. To or with these it then does something, acts somehow upon them, in order to produce concepts. If we want a competent comprehensive philosophy of mind to explain such psychological phenomena as the mind's ability to arrive at conceptualizations, to make judgments in which concepts of properties are predicated of concepts of objects, then we cannot rely entirely on analyses that serve as well for but cannot go beyond the explanatory limits of any non-cognitive workings of a camera or similar purely mechanical neurological recording device. If Brentano wants to make reference and appeal methodologically to the deliverances of an Aristotelian inner sense in descriptive psychology, phenomenology, or 'psychognosy', then he cannot avoid also including in his empirical psychology a provision for an Aristotelian active intellect. If the proposed interpretation is correct, then, in Brentano's account of Aristotle's psychology, as a consequence Brentano appears to welcome and endorse, inner per-

ception and the active intellect are interimplicative. The two go together and are ontically inseparable, interdependent.

Without inner sense, if Aristotle is right, we cannot empirically distinguish between and compare the data of distinct outer senses. The active intellect by itself in that case cannot be properly targeted to specific passively received and recorded perceptions. It can only be guided by an inner sense perceiving the contents of other thoughts and possibly itself, self-reflectively. Without an active intellect in Aristotle's theory, as Brentano explains his thought, we can of necessity never know anything conceptual about the contents of inner perception. We attain this higher level of phenomenological awareness only through the agency of an active intellect acting upon passively received and neurophysiologically stored sensory data, whether of the five outer senses or the mind's introspective inner sense.

Since we do manifestly conceptualize the contents of inner perception, as our thought and linguistic and artistic expression testify, both in every day reflection and in methodologically highly disciplined descriptive psychology or phenomenology, we may find it compelling to conclude with Brentano in *Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt*, that, in order to make progress in psychology as a philosophically respectable science of thought, we must explain the mind's ability to produce concepts from the data of both inner and outer sense perception. The mind's purely passively receiving and recording of inner perceptual information takes us no distance toward the concepts we manifestly possess, without the equivalent of an Aristotelian active intellect to complement the passive causal-mechanical-physical video-camera-like receiving and recording operations especially of outer but equally of inner perception, by what Brentano calls the passive intellect or *noûs pathetikos*.

VII Characterizing Brentano's Aristotelianism

The extent to which Brentano is philosophically indebted in his own development of empirical psychology to both Aristotle's principles of inner sense and active intellect indicates that Brentano's metaphysical groundwork for empirical experimental psychology in its complete statement is thoroughly Aristotelian. Nor is this yet to say anything of Brentano's commitment to an Aristotelian metaphysics of primary substances as the only existent entities or Aristotelian categories of being, examined in Brentano's Dissertation. The ontology resurfaces more prominently also in Brentano's later reism of individuals, but is in firm evidence as well throughout Brentano's early Thomistic philosophical writings, in its broadly Aristotelian metaphysical architectonic.

Aristotle's proto-scientific methodology is essential to Brentano's empiricist philosophical psychology and philosophy of mind. Brentano is every inch an Aristotelian, when it comes to the subject side of empirical experience. Although he tends more toward the mainstream of British Enlightenment empiricism in considering what metaphysics can know concerning the ontic status of perceived objects of experience. He is an Aristotelian in this respect, moreover, who pays his way toward the particular interpretation of Aristotle he accepts with admirable scholarly excavation of primary sources and tight insightful philosophical argumentation. Brentano ventures into the thickets of conflicting Aristotle commentary on the available texts in several languages, and with only a few trusted sources as his guides, he arrives at a place of philosophical convergence with what he takes to be Aristotle's original ideas. These then become his starting points for a contemporary Aristotle-inspired empiricist philosophical psychology. Brentano by these strokes makes himself the driving force of a new empiricism in 19th century philosophy and psychology, with his roots firmly planted in an Aristotelian tradition that he is convinced is deserving of revival.

Brentano summarizes the interpretive conclusions of his treatise in the following remarks offered midway through the exposition:

> Thus it has become more and more obvious in what way the assumption of an unconsciously acting intellectual power, analogous to the unconscious powers of the bodily part, was in fact a necessity for Aristotle. It is this power of which he speaks in the fifth chapter of the third book of *De Anima*; it is none other than the active intellect [*nous poietikos*] which is active before all thought, since it is the active principle of intellectual cognition. The proof for this must wait until later discussions; at this point we merely want to call attention to the fact that the harmonious development of Aristotle's doctrine of the soul required such a fourth genus of intellectual capacities.[29]

The question of how the mind actively procures concepts in acting upon passively received and recorded perceptions is now considered. It must be agentive in some sense, although presumably not homuncular. The model in Aristotle, as Brentano explains, seen through the usual complications of original texts and manifold interpretations in the subsequent literature, modernizing some parts of Brentano's interpretation, works as follows.

Images of external primary substances, inert in and of themselves, are passively received in video-camera-like fashion by the passively receptive sensitive soul. Such images in some sense duplicate the properties of the primary substances of which they are the causally inscribed images. The sensory information recorded by the brain accompanies the states of mind in which image properties

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29 Brentano (1977), 50.

are inseparably inherent in corresponding causally image-originating primary substances.

The inherent definitions or secondary substances, properties of primary substances, are partially shared, therefore, by the mental images of which they are imperfect copies. The idea is much the same as might be applied in a Platonic metaphysics of the world of appearances, by counselling investors that it must be possible to double one's wealth by holding up a mirror to capture the reflection of a hoard of gold. Inner sense in Aristotle similarly passively receives comparisons of the images bestowed by the passively receptive outer senses. The intellectual soul in this way actively although not generally wilfully, deliberately, voluntarily, or even consciously, grasps certain of the secondary substances that inhere as much in the images of externally perceived primary substances as they do in the image-originating primary substances themselves. The active soul or intellect *selects* these features from among the passive perceptual images the senses have provided, which is consequently the active soul *doing* something.

What the active intellectual soul does is in one sense minimal. It collects concepts in the form of definitions or secondary substances that are already inherent in the mind's passively received mental images of primary substances possessing the very same secondary substances as those that are conceptualized. How exactly the active intellect accomplishes this crucial step of the process is not examined in detail, either by Aristotle or Brentano. The argument ends only with the insight that somehow the connection must succeed. The idea is supposed to be conveyed by such metaphorical descriptions as the active intellect's grasping or identifying the relevant secondary substances in the mind's passively received and recorded images of any perceived corresponding mind-independent primary substance, of extracting or abstracting them from the images of primary substances in which they reside, as much as in the primary substances of which they are images. It appears a work of noticing, choosing, focusing upon, or fastening onto, the appropriate secondary substances that inhere in the images of externally perceived primary substances in the larger Aristotelian philosophy of mind. All of which again is actively doing something with or to the mind's passively recorded inner or outer perceptual images. The active intellect discovers and treasures aside concepts from among the secondary substances presented to it, which it abstracts individually from the total images of primary substances received as sensory input and recorded by the passively receptive intellect, including all of their secondary substances occurring together in one integrated bundle.

The active intellect seeks among these properties, to speak metaphorically again, and grasps them individually in isolation from the others, in order to

make its selection serve as representing a concept which can then enter into judgment, imagination, assumption, and related propositional psychological activities. From the mental image of an externally perceived apple, returning to a previously fruitful example, the active intellect can in this way extract the property or secondary substance of redness, roundness, being an apple, being edible, a three-dimensional physical spatio-temporal object, the ripened ovary of an apple tree, and everything else that belongs as secondary substance to the primary substance of an externally perceived apple, that can be disclosed by natural science. The active intellect acts upon the passively received and recorded images of the receptive intellect or soul in Aristotle's terminology, through the channel of the outer senses and inner sense, and in the process taking away subconsciously selected secondary substances from the images of externally perceived primary substances.

There is accordingly a collaborative partnership between passive and active intellects in Aristotle's philosophy of mind. As Brentano explains this vitally important and often neglected link in the chain of psychological occurrences leading from perceptions to concepts via inherent intelligible forms transferred from objects to their passively recorded images, the passive and active souls must function cooperatively together. That passive video-camera-like mechanisms and explanations in their terms cannot adequately account for the mind's ability to produce concepts from its empirical experiences of an external world is as obvious to Aristotle as it is to Brentano. Something must be done with passive perceptions in order to make or take from them the concepts used in perception-originating psychological events, in making judgments or imaginative projections that combine concepts into thoughts possessing propositional contents. If something must be done, then something must do it, unless we are to deny that we think or that we think by means and in terms of concepts. The concepts found in our judgments and assumptions, inferences to conclusions, and the like, must come from somewhere, especially if empiricism is true and concepts are not innate. The needed active principle is the active intellect in Aristotle's theory, which Brentano as good as endorses already in *Die Psychologie des Aristoteles*, and on which he relies heavily in advancing a systematically Aristotelian empiricist psychology and philosophy of mind, beginning later in his *Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt* and related writings in philosophical psychology.

Where Hume in his 1739 – 1740 *A Treatise of Human Nature* is content to 'explain' the passive derivation of ideas from immediate sense impressions merely as a matter of the impressions variably 'fading' with time into less vivid ideas, Aristotle, in Brentano's inquiry, has looked more deeply into the process and reflected on the underlying metaphysics and epistemology required for the mind to arrive at concepts originating in external sensations of the outside world. For

Hume, impressions become ideas without the active intervention of any further psychological agency. They fade from the most vivid immediate sense impressions into ideas entirely on their own, like a speeded-up version of a watercolour painting left to hang for years in a brightly sunlit room.[30] Something happens to immediate sense impressions in order to produce ideas that is as passive as their reception when they are first collected by the senses as impressions, that does not require any special activity of the sort Aristotle describes and Brentano later explains. Hume's theory of the origin of ideas, whose empiricism inquires into the experiential pedigree of any philosophically interesting idea, despite two thousand intervening years of philosophical development, accordingly appears extraordinarily unsophisticated in comparison with Aristotle's positing of the active intellect and its role in the mind's effecting a transition from percept to concept, as a condition for the attribution in thought and judgment, and the predication in language of properties to objects.

Brentano summarizes his accomplishments in *Die Psychologie des Aristoteles* in this three-part enumeration:

> [...] we have gained the following truths, which are important as guidelines for the investigation of the doctrine of the *nous poietikos*. Firstly, the intellect of man is a passive, form-apprehending faculty analogous to the senses and is by nature the mere potentiality of thought, so that it, like the senses, requires a principle that leads it to actuality.
>
> Secondly, this faculty is not a faculty of the ensouled body, but of the soul alone, so that the intellect receiving the thought, the *nous dynamei*, is spiritual and immortal. This will be of importance especially for the determination of the union of the *nous dynamei* and the *nous poietikos*; in Aristotle's view the latter is indubitably a spiritual thing.
>
> Thirdly, man has only a single faculty of intellectual knowledge, since actual cognition is not given to the human mind by nature, and since there is only one single intellect that is the potentiality of intellectual cognition. This proposition is of special importance, because it keeps us from espousing the widespread error of taking the *nous poietikos* for another faculty of intellectual cognition in man.[31]

Later still, near the end of the book, Brentano adds this further concluding synopsis in support of the present interpretation:

> Now the full doctrine of the active intellect, as we have developed it earlier, is composed of just these elements. For that it is intellectual, Theophrastus repeats with Aristotle's own unequivocal words; that it belongs to our soul; that it is, furthermore, an accident, in fact by nature an accidental actuality of the soul; that it is a moving faculty; that through its agen-

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30 Hume (1978), 1f., 106, 629.
31 Brentano (1977), 94.

cy it produces thoughts in the receptive intellect; that its activity is initially directed toward the sensitive part; that it is unconscious and thus acts of necessity whenever the sensitive part is capable of receiving its effect; that it can in no way itself be considered to be something that thinks [...].[32]

Brentano's psychology was influential in bringing Aristotelianism into German language philosophy, and finally to the world's attention, by motivating serious discussion and philosophical acceptance of a broadly interpreted but historically grounded: (1) Aristotelian category scheme of primary and secondary substances. In effect, Brentano accepts a world of individuals in which universals and other abstracta have no ontically independent existence, but exist only insofar as they inhere as secondary substances in primary substances. These are, more specifically speaking, all the empirically experienceable spatio-temporal dynamic things, the furniture of the physical universe. (2) Aristotelian faculty of inner sense or *innere Wahrnehmung* as a foundation of an empirical psychology of internal psychological states with their accidental qualia and essential intentionality. This is to say effectively as the foundation of a scientific *phenomenology* or what Brentano in later lectures spoke of unpopularly as *psychognosy*. (3) Aristotelian commitment to an active intellect or *noûs poietikos*, actively deriving concepts from among the inherent secondary substances shared by perceptually experienced sense-originating primary substances, and their passively received and inert recorded images.

Brentano thereby teaches nineteenth century philosophy much that it did not previously know about Aristotle's metaphysics of being, his theory of the active intellect in the derivation of concepts from percepts, and the Aristotelian philosophical psychology of the body-animating soul. At the same time, he unteaches many of the misapprehensions surrounding Aristotle's theory of the passive and active intellect that had collected around Aristotle's name in a number of related traditions in a long history of occasionally confused or incompetent, even ideologically prejudicial, commentary. Additionally, in the process, Brentano finds himself becoming a powerful advocate for a revival of Aristotelian methodology in philosophy that was to have a further more significant and lasting impact on the progressive development of empirical scientific psychology and phenomenology, as for metaphysics, philosophy of language and philosophy of mind.[33]

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32 Brentano (1977), 152f.

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Christof Rapp

The German Chancellor, Confessional Struggles, therein Aristotle & his Allegedly Individual Forms[1]

Georg von Hertling as an Interpreter of Aristotle

Abstract: Georg von Hertling (1843–1919) – a cousin of Franz Brentano – is the only Aristotle Scholar and Professor of Philosophy who has ever held the German Chancellorship. Before becoming a conservative politician, he was a spearhead of the German Catholic academics during the confessional struggles in the 1870s. He published a treatise with the title *Materie und Form und die Definition der Seele bei Aristoteles*, in which he defended a theory of individual forms in Aristotle. To a certain extent, he published this treatise in defence of his cousin Franz Brentano; but while Brentano's theses on the soul were severely attacked by (mostly Protestant) Aristotle scholars for their Thomistic-Catholic spirit, the "critical method" adopted by Hertling was mostly met with cautious approval.

I Georg von Hertling

Georg Friedrich Freiherr von Hertling was born in Darmstadt on the 31st of August 1843.[2] He was related on his mother's side to the Brentano family. His grandmother was Magdalena Maria (better known as "Meline") Brentano, whose youngest brother Christian Brentano was the father of the philosopher Franz Brentano (born in 1838). Georg von Hertling studied philosophy in Münster, Munich and finally in Berlin, where he completed his doctoral studies under the supervision of Friedrich Adolf Trendelenburg. The title of his dissertation was *De Aristotelis Notione Unius,* on Aristotle's notion of the one. He completed his ha-

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1 This is an extended and revised version of a talk I gave in March 2013. The original paper was translated from German into English by Aengus Daly. The extended version was revised by Colin G. King. I would like to thank Stephen Menn for helpful suggestions.

2 The biographical details about Georg von Hertling I take mostly from the succinct and extremely helpful survey by Katharina Weigand (2012); wherever possible I tried to check the information provided by Weigand against Hertling's memoirs, from which I will quote in the biographical passages of the following paper. I also benefited a great deal from the background information and in-depth discussions in Becker (1981).

bilitation at the University of Bonn in 1867 with an unpublished and lost work that was devoted to a critical comparison of Schopenhauer and Aristotle. For many years in Bonn he waited in vain as a private lecturer for the promotion to professor. It was only in 1880 – thirteen years after his habilitation – that he received, against the will of the faculty, a call to the rank of an "Extraordinarius", comparable to the position of an associate professor, at the University of Bonn. Two years later he accepted the position of full professor at the Ludwig-Maximilians-University in Munich, offered to him by the Bavarian Minister for Culture, Johann von Lutz.

Georg von Hertling was a member of the Catholic Centre Party ("Deutsche Zentrumspartei" or ZENTRUM), founded in 1870/71. He was a member of this party in the German parliament (Reichstag) from 1875 to 1890 and from 1890 to 1912; he also acted as party chairman in the Reichstag from 1909 on. At the beginning of 1912 Hertling was, much to his own surprise, appointed as the chairman of the Bavarian Council of Ministers by Prince Regent Luitpold. He accepted the post of the Prime Minister, but resigned at the same time from his position in the Centre Party so as to be able to act as the representative of the will of the sovereign in a constitutional monarchy and not as the agent of a parliamentary majority. From 1914 on he bore the title of Count. When the incumbent Chancellor of the German Reich, Bethmann Hollweg, was ousted at the instigation of Ludendorff and Hindenburg, Count Georg von Hertling was offered the Chancellorship by the German Kaiser. He declined and someone else, a person by the name of Georg Michaelis, became Reich Chancellor for three and a half months. After the unexpectedly rapid failure of the Michaelis government, there followed a renewed offer to Hertling from Kaiser Wilhelm II. Hertling finally became Chancellor of the German Reich on the 1st of November 1917 – in the middle of World War I. Being the Reich Chancellor, Hertling, who wanted to stick to a constitutional monarchy, fought against granting further powers to the parliament, which had been demanded on many sides. However, in 1918, when the military High Command, because of the looming surrender of the German army and the imminent ceasefire, called for a further parliamentary basis for the national government, the Kaiser agreed to a parliamentary system of government in the so-called "October reforms". With this the Chancellorship of the monarchist Hertling came to a sudden end after only eleven months. During his tenure of the Chancellorship the seventy-four year old was already, according to the judgment of a contemporary, in a state of "physical decline".[3] He died three months after

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3 The contemporary mentioned is Bernhard Fürst von Bülow; I take the reference from Weigand (2012), 336.

the end of his Chancellorship in his summer house in Ruhpolding, Upper Bavaria, on the 4th of January 1919.[4]

II A Spearhead of Catholic Scholarship

Hertling was raised in a Catholic environment. His mother saw to his religious education. He himself often thought about taking up the study of theology and at times the priesthood attracted his consideration. That he eventually studied philosophy and that he first went to Münster and subsequently to Berlin for doctoral studies is due to the advice of his famous cousin Franz Brentano, who was five and a half years his senior. It was also Brentano who advised Hertling on the themes of his doctoral thesis and his habilitation treatise. And it was Brentano with whom Hertling talked through his doctoral thesis a number of times. "The goal that had always attracted me was that of becoming a spearhead of Catholic scholarship", wrote Hertling in his memoirs[5]. And an in-depth study of philosophy, he thought, could constitute the first step towards this. "Inspired by Franz Brentano, I thought of … going to Berlin, to let myself be introduced to a knowledge of Aristotle by Trendelenburg, to gain a PhD in philosophy and from there then to pursue theology, perhaps in Tübingen."[6] In Hertling's first meeting with Trendelenburg, the latter mentioned an "increased activity in the field of Aristotelian philosophy in recent times."[7] Trendelenburg also mentioned that during the last holidays he had received Franz Brentano's treatise *Über die mannigfache Bedeutung des Seienden nach Aristoteles*[8], which had pleased him very much. Trendelenburg explained that in Brentano's treatise he found an attempt

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4 The dramatic events during the final months of Hertling's life are nicely summarized by Menn (2010), 114, footnote 51: "When the Kaiser finally agreed to the principle of responsible government, Hertling resigned; everything collapsed a month later, and Hertling responded, as many of those deeply committed to the old order seem to have done, by dying almost immediately." This is possibly the right occasion to acknowledge that Stephen Menn, while preparing his 2010 paper on Eduard Zeller and Aristotle's *Metaphysics*, was the first to draw my attention to Georg von Hertling's studies in Aristotle.

5 Hertling (1919) I, 50: "Vorkämpfer katholischer Wissenschaft zu werden war das Ziel, das mich schon immer gelockt hatte."

6 Hertling (1919) I, 50: "Durch Franz Brentano angeregt, dachte ich … nach Berlin zu gehen, um mich von Trendelenburg in die Kenntnis des Aristoteles einführen zu lassen, dort mir den Doktorgrad in der Philosophie zu erwerben und hierauf dann die Theologie etwa in Tübingen folgen zu lassen."

7 Hertling (1919) I, 54.

8 Brentano (1862).

at a new and perspicuous way of explaining Aristotelian teachings against which nothing essential can be objected. Friedrich Adolf Trendelenburg was renowned as one of the most outstanding Aristotle scholars of his time. Hertling felt flattered, hence, by Trendelenburg's praise of his older cousin and he made, as he writes in his memoirs, no secret of his relational ties to the author of the mentioned monograph on the manifold meaning of being in Aristotle; he was, thus, directly introduced to Brentano's teacher Trendelenburg, who also became Hertling's teacher and adviser. When Trendelenburg advised him, then, to choose a dissertation theme rapidly and to deal with the One in Aristotle – a topic that is related and in a way complementary to his older cousin's treatment of Being, Hertling at first responded reluctantly: "At first I had no real inclination, but Franz Brentano, whom I asked for advice, found the theme excellent and so I began to collect material already in that semester. It was a particular attraction for me to find again in Aristotle thoughts that I had first learned in his great student Thomas [Aquinas scil.]."[9] The dissertation itself, which Hertling finally submitted in 1864, received the grade of "*docta et accurata*" and the philosophical part of the oral examination, where he was questioned by Trendelenburg on Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics*, went well. The exams in the minor subjects Latin philology and physics, in which he was examined by August Boeckh and Heinrich Gustav Magnus, proved to be more problematic and in the end he had to settle with the disappointing grade of *cum laude.*

The completion of the dissertation was followed by an extended trip to Italy and, due to the fact that he was seeking a university career at the time, Hertling needed a habilitation. Neither the habilitation treatise nor the oral exam presented too great a challenge for Hertling. He produced the writing during the winter term of 1866/67: "I wrote diligently on the treatise which was to be my habilitation thesis. Admittedly the theme, which Franz had given me, never made real sense to me. I was to compare Schopenhauer's fundamental teaching of the will in nature with the Aristotelian teaching, according to which a striving resides in things corresponding to their essence … My good uncle Louis Brentano had also been fascinated by him [Schopenhauer scil.] for a time. When he heard of my work, he sent me his own copy of *Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung* and wrote a couple of friendly lines in which he asked me to thoroughly study the

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9 Hertling (1919) I, 54–5: "Ich hatte zuerst keine rechte Neigung, aber Franz Brentano, den ich um Rat fragte, fand das Thema vortrefflich, und so begann ich noch in diesem Semester das Material zu sammeln. Daß ich bei Aristoteles die Gedanken wiederfand, die ich zuerst bei seinem großen Schüler Thomas kennen gelernt hatte, war für mich ein besonderer Reiz."

work and to refute it."[10] Apparently, Brentano meant to detect a parallel between Aristotle's teaching from *Physics* II that all natural entities have an internal principle of rest and change and Schopenhauer's notion of a will. Hertling, however, is quite frank about the fact that he himself did not find this topic very appealing. At any rate, the treatise on Schopenhauer – which does not seem to be preserved – served its purpose and was smoothly accepted as a habilitation thesis. As regards how the subsequent application and examination in Bonn went, after Hertling's habilitation lecture (which at the same time served as a sort of job interview), Christian August Brandis spoke first for a little while and – so Hertling in his memoirs – "recounted his encounter with Schopenhauer, without requesting an answer from me. A brief concluding disputation with [Franz Peter, scil.] Knoodt followed, which soon petered out, whereupon he was welcoming me without much ado as a colleague."[11]

Although his move to the University of Bonn and his acceptance as a private lecturer went smoothly and in a quite unspectacular way, Hertling later regretted his choice of the university, particularly lamenting the isolation of Catholic scholars there. He was twice refused the promotion to associate professor by the faculty in Bonn, in 1875 and 1879 respectively. Other applications were also unsuccessful. Hertling saw the academic failure that he experienced in this time as a reaction to his role as a Catholic activist in what was later called the "cultural struggle" (Kulturkampf) between the government of the German Reich under Bismarck's Chancellorship and the Catholic Church under the papacy of Pius IX. In 1864 Pope Pius had published the Encyclical *Quanta cura* with the appendix *syllabus errorum*, in which he denounced what he took to be the main aberrations of the present, such as liberalism, socialism, democracy and freedom of belief. The First Vatican Council, which sat from 1869 to 1870, raised papal infallibility to the status of dogma. The cultural struggle was ratcheted up on the part of Bismarck's Berlin government by a series of laws which pushed

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10 Hertling (1919) I, 168: "Ich schrieb fleißig an der Abhandlung, die meine Habilitationsschrift werden sollte. Das Thema freilich, das mir Franz gegeben hatte, wollte mir niemals recht einleuchten. Ich sollte Schopenhauers Grundlehre vom Willen in der Natur mit der aristotelischen Lehre vergleichen, wonach den Dingen ein ihrem Wesen entsprechendes Streben innewohnt ... Auch mein guter Onkel Louis Brentano in Frankfurt war eine Zeitlang von ihm (Schopenhauer) gefesselt worden. Als er von meiner Arbeit hörte, schenkte er mir sein eigenes Exemplar von der ,Welt als Wille und Vorstellung' und schrieb ein paar freundliche Zeilen dazu, in denen er mich aufforderte, das Werk gründlich zu studieren und zu widerlegen."

11 Hertling (1919), 172–3: "indem er von seinem Zusammentreffen mit Schopenhauer erzählte, ohne eine Antwort von mir dabei zu verlangen. Hieran schloß sich eine kleine Disputation mit Knoodt, die aber auch bald im Sande verlief, worauf er mich ohne Sang und Klang als Kollegen begrüßte."

back the influence of the church and was meant to result in a further separation of church and society: the school inspection law, the Jesuit law, the bread basket law and the May law of 1873, which was to regulate the education and appointment of clergy and granted the sole recognition of civil marriage to the state. From his times as a student Hertling had been involved in this debate as a spokesman for student fraternities as well as in meetings of the Catholic activists; from 1875 onwards he defended the Catholic point of view as a member of the Centre Party in the German Parliament, the Reichstag. In 1876 he founded in Bonn the *Görres-Gesellschaft zur Pflege der Wissenschaft im katholischen Deutschland* – an association and interest group of Catholic intellectuals in Germany. He served the *Görres-Society* as its president up until his death. From early on the *Görres-Society* had considered the establishment of an organ of philosophical publication with the mission of regenerating (Catholic) philosophy in Germany. This idea was realized in 1888, among other things, with the establishment of the *Philosophisches Jahrbuch,* which persists down to the present day. The file memos of the University of Bonn actually mention, in connection with decisions against Hertling's promotion, his position on the question of papal infallibility and the popularity of his lectures among hearers coming from Catholic student fraternities. Hertling was thus probably right to suspect that his professional failure was due to his role as a Catholic activist. The offers that Hertling finally received for positions in Bonn and then Munich from the respective incumbent Ministers for Culture were frowned upon by the faculties both in Bonn and in Munich – apparently because they perceived Hertling's promotion as a politically motivated act which, with the de-escalation of the cultural struggle at the end of the 1870s and the increasing influence of the Centre Party, had become possible or even opportune. When Hertling took up his position as professor at the University of Munich, a friend urgently advised him against participating in the first faculty council meeting. Hertling had initially not understood the reason for this, but later, in the second faculty council meeting, he found out that the subject of the first meeting was the official protest of the faculty against his appointment.

III Hertling and his Famous Cousin

We now turn back briefly to Hertling's relationship to Franz Brentano. Hertling said of the relationship with Franz Brentano's family that both his own and Bren-

tano's families shared the same basic religious convictions[12] and that he venerated their common ancestor Clemens Brentano[13], although he did not want to know of his sister Bettina von Arnim, born Brentano, on account of her freethinking. Hertling wrote of Franz Brentano in his memoirs as follows: "Precisely because I recognized his superiority, I feared, through a prolonged interaction, falling into a complete intellectual dependence"[14]. And he once wrote to his mother: "As much as I like Franz, and such great benefits as communication with him has granted, I do not always want to rely on him. He has precious little freshness and often lets himself go terribly."[15] In 1867, the same year in which Hertling joined the philosophy faculty in Bonn as a private lecturer, Franz Brentano published his own habilitation treatise on Aristotle's psychology with special consideration of Aristotle's theory of *nous poiêtikos* – a topic that is notoriously controversial since the time of the ancient commentators and bears upon the issue of the possible afterlife of the individual soul. Hertling authored a laudatory review that was printed in *Der Katholik* 47/II.[16] In what was presumably Hertling's most important work on Aristotle, the treatise *Materie und Form und die Definition der Seele bei Aristoteles*, published in 1871, he begins with a multipage résumé of Brentano's psychological writing and defends Brentano in the sharpest tones against criticisms that had been published in the meantime by Eugen Eberhard[17] and Friedrich Ferdinand Kampe.[18]

Yet in the meantime something had changed in Hertling's attitude towards the great authority Franz, of whose rich talents there was no doubt in the extended family. Franz Brentano had, in addition to his philosophical career, studied theology and, between the completion of his doctoral studies and his habilitation, he was ordained as a Catholic priest. Hertling describes this move on Brentano's part in an exceptionally distant manner: "Franz had in the meanwhile gone through all kinds of phases. Immediately after he had completed his first work on Aristotle, he joined the Dominicans in Graz as a novice. No one in the family was particularly surprised by this; however they were surprised

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12 Hertling (1919) I, 22.

13 Hertling (1919) I, 23.

14 Hertling (1919) I, 174: "Gerade weil ich seine Überlegenheit anerkannte, fürchtete ich bei längerem Zusammensein in vollständige geistige Abhängigkeit zu geraten."

15 Hertling (1919) I, 174: "So gerne ich Franz habe, und so großen Nutzen der Verkehr mit ihm mir gewährt, so möchte ich doch nicht immer auf ihn angewiesen sein. Er hat gar so wenig Frische und läßt sich oft entsetzlich hängen ..."

16 Hertling (1867).

17 Eberhard (1968).

18 Kampe (1970).

when he left a year and a day later. He later said to me that he had joined the order because he had longed for guidance; but there was no one there that would have been really suitable. With this however, he did not renounce the clergy; he studied theology… and became ordained as a priest in August 1864. Now one would expect – and he himself also expected – that he would be employed for a period of time in pastoral care. This also came to nothing. As grounds for this he indicated to me that the bishop knew no of priest to whom he could send him as chaplain."[19] By force of circumstances, or so it seems, Brentano had to continue his philosophical career, became a private lecturer and finally a professor at the University of Würzburg. Of his teaching duties in Würzburg, Hertling wrote: "The professors at that time used to lecture for considerably longer than later. Franz however surpassed them all in that he continued his lectures a whole week longer. This mightily annoyed the old who, when I happened to encounter him, said angrily to me: 'Does Dr Brentano know more than the others, or does he just draw things out?'"[20].

After these last meetings in Würzburg the contact between the two became sparse. The following meeting, on the occasion of a familial bereavement and before the publication of *Materie und Form,* contributed to this: "I met with Franz Brentano in the Hertling house. Immediately he sat with me on a sofa apart from the rest and completely monopolized me and my attention. He was completely preoccupied with the [First Vatican, scil.] Council and the awaited decision. If the church was to fall into the swamp – he used a still stronger expression – it would be preferable if it happened soon. There would then still remain the great truths: existence of God, immortality of the soul, freedom of will. One

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19 Hertling (1919) I, 162: "Franz hatte inzwischen allerlei Phasen durchgemacht. Unmittelbar, nachdem er sein Erstlingswerk über Aristoteles vollendet hatte, trat er bei den Dominikanern in Graz als Novize ein. In der Familie war man davon nicht besonders überrascht; um so mehr war man es, als er nach Jahr und Tag wieder austrat. Er hat mir später gesagt, er sei in den Orden getreten, weil er sich nach einer Leitung gesehnt hätte; es sei aber niemand dort gewesen, der sich so recht dazu geeignet hätte. Dem geistlichen Stande hat er aber damit nicht entsagt; er studierte Theologie … und wurde im August 1964 zum Priester geweiht. Nun erwartete man und auch er selbst, daß er eine Zeit lang in der Seelsorge beschäftigt werden würde. Auch daraus wurde nichts. Als Grund gab er mir an, der Bischof wisse keinen Pfarrer, zu dem er ihn als Kaplan schicken könne." Apparently, the problem was that no ordinary parish priest was willing to accept Brentano as an assistant. It seems that at this time Brentano already had a reputation either for being overly smart or for being a difficult personality.

20 Hertling (1919) I, 169: "Die Professoren pflegten damals erheblich länger zu lesen als später. Franz aber übertraf sie alle, indem er noch eine ganze Woche länger seine Vorlesungen fortsetzte. Das verdroß den alten Pedell mächtig, der mir bei zufälliger Begegnung ärgerlich sagte: 'Weiß denn der Dr. Brentano mehr wie die andern, oder zieht er die Sache nur in die Länge?'."

will then bear it like the great philosophers of antiquity, withdrawing oneself to these truths but not opposing the religion of the people. A cold shiver went down my spine. 'But Franz,' I said, 'there remains still the person of the Redeemer.' '*Oh well*', he opined, 'as long as one reads the Gospels, one is under their spell, but as soon as one closes the book, thorns appear everywhere.' It was clear that his break with the faith of the church was already complete. Deeply shaken, I left him, never to see him again. The paths of our lives parted from that time."[21]

In the discussions regarding the First Vatican Council Franz Brentano joined the anti-infallibilists, in 1873 he resigned his priesthood and married, and in 1879 he left the Roman-Catholic church for good. Hertling had little sympathy for this development of his cousin. For him the inner vocation to the scholarly spearhead of the Catholic laity was always more important than the time shared with Brentano and the philosophical interest in Aristotelianism it inspired.

Brentano himself became the subject of scholarly debates and sharp attacks by colleagues. Apart from the already mentioned authors, it was most notably Eduard Zeller who took efforts to refute Brentano's views on the soul and on God. Brentano made Aristotle's so-called productive intellect, which is said to be eternal and incorruptible, a part of the human soul, a move which allows of the possibility of immortality of at least a part of the human soul. In addition, he denied that a person's intellect could pre-exist that person and concluded that, since the immaterial intellect cannot be developed from the body, it is God who "creatively" brings about the immortal part of the human soul,[22] thus making Aristotle's god a kind of creator God. Since these are interpretative moves that could help to align Aristotle with the position of Thomas Aquinas and with the Catholic faith, one might well have had the impression that Brentano's views were not unbiased by his confessional point of view. And Brentano

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21 Hertling (1919) I, 213–4: "Im Hertlingschen Hause traf ich mit Franz Brentano zusammen. Sofort setzte er sich mit mir abseits von den übrigen auf ein Sofa und nahm mich vollständig in Beschlag. Das Konzil und die erwartete Entscheidung erfüllten ihn ganz und gar. Wenn die Kirche in den Sumpf geraten könne – er gebrauchte einen noch stärkeren Ausdruck – so sei es gut, wenn das bald geschähe. Dann blieben noch die großen Wahrheiten: Dasein Gottes, Unsterblichkeit der Seele, Freiheit des Willens. Man werde es dann halten wie die großen Philosophen des Altertums, sich selbst auf jene Wahrheiten zurückziehen, der Volksreligion aber nicht feindlich entgegentreten. Mir lief es eiskalt den Rücken hinunter. ‚Aber Franz,' sagte ich, es bleibt doch die Person des Heilands.' ‚Ach ja,' meinte er, solange man die Evangelien liest, steht man unter ihrem Zauber, aber so bald man das Buch schließt, kommen überall die Dornen.' Es war deutlich, der Bruch mit dem Glauben der Kirche war in ihm schon vollzogen. Tieferschüttert verließ ich ihn, um ihn nie wieder zu sehen. Unsere Lebenswege gingen seitdem auseinander."

22 See Brentano (1882).

himself suspected that people like the Protestant Zeller thought of him as a defendant of Catholic positions. After he had left the church he articulated this suspicion quite openly. He thought that his colleagues found his affinity to Thomas Aquinas objectionable, for learning from a scholastic philosopher with no knowledge of Greek about Aristotle "seemed so paradoxical to most that they would not have found it worthwhile even to take up his commentaries. Rather many of them derived from my words the suspicion, suggested by my former relation to the Catholic Church, that ... I had introduced Thomistic doctrine into Aristotle, and that I was less interested in explaining Aristotle than in adding more glory to the reputation of the Doctor Angelicus."[23]

IV The Dissertation

Let us turn to Hertling's doctoral work on the concept of the One in Aristotle[24]. This slim work comprises 78 printed pages, was submitted in Latin (Hertling commissioned a student from Latin philology with the translation) and was published in a run of 100 copies. One can well imagine that both Trendelenburg and Brentano, after the successful dissertation of the latter on the concept of Being in Aristotle, would welcome a treatise on the complementary and, indeed, related concept of the One, which, according to Aristotle, can be found everywhere where there is some Being. However, quite unlike the three times as extensive work of his older cousin Brentano (which was written in German, not in Latin), Hertling's work is at times made up of long winded Greek citations, that for the most part deal in a purely expository way with the different meanings of the One, with modes and characteristics of the One and with the opposites to what is One. Unsurprisingly, most citations are taken from Book X (*Iota*) of Aristotle's *Metaphysics* as well as from the corresponding places in Book V (*Delta*). Only in the last part of the work, from pages 59 to 76, is Hertling's

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23 Brentano (1882), 3: "Dass ein des Griechischen unkundiger Scholastiker uns Aristoteles verstehen lehren solle, schien den Meisten allzu paradox, als dass sie es der Mühe wert gefunden hätten, seine Commentare auch nur einmal in die Hand zu nehmen. Viele schöpften vielmehr aus meinen Worten den Verdacht, den meine damalige Stellung zur katholischen Kirche nahe legte, dass ich selbst, die Meinung des ‚Fürsten der Theologien' überschätzend, nur mit befangenem Blicke die Schriften des Aristoteles betrachte, thomistische Lehren hineininterpretire, ja vielleicht gar weniger darauf ausgehe, Aristoteles zu erklären, als dem Doctor Angelicus einen neuen Titel des Ruhms zu sichern." The English translation printed above partly relies on George/Koehn (2004).
24 Hertling (1864).

own somewhat more independent argumentation developed in trying to solve the puzzles raised about the different meanings of the One. In addition to brief references to current research – such as to Trendelenburg, Bonitz, Brandis, Zeller, and Schwegler, amongst others – there is a conspicuous German citation of more than one page from Brentano's dissertation through which Hertling wants to clarify the definability of accidents.

Among the puzzles that the author formulates at the beginning of the work is the distinction – an insufficiently clear distinction in his opinion – between the "unum metaphysicum" on the one hand and the One which is referred to as the principle of number on the other. In the fourth book of the *Metaphysics* Aristotle clearly indicates that the One is coextensive with Being and akin to it (e.g. Met. IV.2, 1003b30 – 33 and elsewhere); this is, indeed the basis for treating the One as one of the transcendentals and for speaking of "transcendental unity". By contrast, the tenth book of the *Metaphysics* seems to be more interested in the One as measure or principle of numbers (e.g. Met. X. 1, 1052b20), in which case the One rather belongs to one specific category, i.e. the category of quantity. It had been noticed by medieval commentators that these two views are not easy to reconcile. At the end of his work Hertling stipulates that both concepts are to be rigorously distinguished from each other. The author also shows greater ambition on the question of the definition and the definability of the One, arguing that because both the One and Being belong to the most general concepts, a definition according to the *genus-differentia* schema is not possible. Nevertheless, it is possible to identify what is peculiar to the One. This can be found, according to Aristotle, in indivisibility. On this Hertling comments: "... Aristoteles omnium unitatis rationum consensum in eo positum putat quod sint modi indivisibilitatis. Omnis enim res si eam intelligimus indivisibilem, unitatis rationem exhibit, ut multis locis dicitur."[25] Perhaps the caveat "si eam *intelligimus* indivisibilem" should be emphasized. In this one can possibly see a thought indicated that will become central in the treatise *Materie und Form* (which will be considered in more detail below), where Hertling thinks it is necessary in each instance to correct Aristotle by stating that the determinate properties of matter and form are not located in the thing itself, but in concepts that we form of these things. A minor quasi-Kantian move of a kind may thus be seen in his emphasis that we *(just) regard* things as indivisible. Correspondingly, in discussing the "unum metaphysicum" he also stresses that it is ultimately nothing else than being (ens) "per suam individuam naturam perceptum"[26] – taken in its individ-

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25 Hertling (1864), 19.

26 Hertling (1864), 76.

ual perceived nature. And he explains this in turn as follows, making a clear allusion to *Metaphysics* I (= A) 1 und *Posterior Analytics* II 19: we get the concept of the One (in the metaphysical sense) "si in rebus multis singularibus, sensus ferientibus, diversitatem disiungentem quasi in animo remittimus, easque quadam ratione uniente intelligimus." In other words, we grasp the notion of the One if we go through the many particular, perceptible beings, setting the differences aside and understanding them by what they have in common, i.e. by what makes each of them something unified.

All in all, Hertling's doctoral thesis is not overwhelmingly insightful and philosophically rather on the immature side. It must be acknowledged, though, that, by this time, contemporary scholarship had not really discovered Aristotle's account of the One as a pertinent research field, so that Hertling's treatise was somehow pioneering in this particular field. From time to time Hertling's doctoral thesis is cited by interpreters who favour a "henological" interpretation of Aristotle's *Metaphysics*, i.e. an interpretation that argues against overestimating the role of Being in comparison to the One.[27] On the whole, however, Hertling's debut work has not been widely received and is almost completely forgotten in modern scholarship.[28] Curiously enough, another descendant of the Brentano clan also started her academic career with a dissertation on the same rare topic; Margeritha von Brentano, later vice-President of the Freie Universität Berlin, wrote her doctoral thesis on the significance of the One as a basic concept in Aristotle's *Metaphysics* under the supervision of Martin Heidegger in Freiburg.[29]

V Hertling and Individual Forms in Aristotle

This is the background against which we must read Hertling's work on matter and form and the definability of the soul, published in 1871. Considering that the doctoral thesis was still a rather juvenile creation and the habilitation thesis was to provide access to an academic career with a manageable workload, the text *Materie und Form* is the only work in which Hertling examines Aristotle's metaphysics in more detail and thereby gives expression to some of his own philosophical preferences. Because of the overall biographical constellation and the recent rift with Franz Brentano on questions of faith and ecclesiastical matters, it might be assumed that if Hertling were to deviate from Brentano's hypotheses at

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27 For such interpretations see, e.g., Leo Elders (1961), Karen Gloy (1985).

28 One of the few appearances of Hertling's dissertation in more recent modern scholarship is in Morrison (1993).

29 von Brentano (1948).

all in interpreting Aristotle, then it would only be in the direction of a reading decidedly close to the church or faithful to Thomism. However, as a matter of fact, Hertling's attitude to Aristotle and Aristotle studies turns out to be more complex. In the introduction to *Materie und Form* Hertling states that he wants to author a critical contribution to the history of philosophy. Often the praise bestowed upon Aristotle in modern times is not in keeping with what he actually taught.[30] It must rather be noted, he says, that these doctrines originated from intellectual and spiritual requirements completely different from those of contemporary theory formation. The examination of these doctrines must therefore in each case be accompanied by reflection on "which palpable interest of the inquiring human spirit, which intricate appearance of the actual led to the establishment of a theoretical explanation."[31] Trendelenburg's *Geschichte der Kategorielehre*,[32] Hertling says, is a model for this kind of approach. In the introduction it is still not clear where this approach is to lead, but in the course of the treatise it becomes increasingly clear that Hertling often takes a distanced and sometimes critical tone towards Aristotle's doctrines. He adds to his criticism appeals to the modern understanding of nature in general, essentially Kantian concerns about a naïve realism as well as borrowings from Hermann Lotze, whose book *Mikrokosmos* Hertling had reviewed in 1869.[33] Also, there is a clearly identifiable influence of Friedrich Albert Lange's *History of Materialism*,[34] which was originally published in 1866.

In the end, Hertling's book was, for all intents and purposes, well-received. Carl Stumpf, e. g., dedicates a detailed discussion to *Materie und Form* and praises Hertling for his diligence and insights; in particular, he highlights that Hertling, as opposed to Brentano, gives a critical discussion of the fundaments of Aristotle's psychology[35] and helps to get to the bottom of the contradiction within Aristotle's system.[36] Martin Katzenberger includes a discussion of Hertling's book in a book note on works regarding Aristotle and modern science. He acknowledges that Hertling is not just a scholiast, but a thorough and honest

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30 Hertling (1871), 7.

31 Hertling (1871), 7: "… welches nachfühlbare Interesse des forschenden Menschengeistes, welche verwickelte Erscheinung des Wirklichen zur Aufstellung einer theoretischen Erklärung führte."

32 Trendelenburg (1846).

33 Hertling (1869)

34 Lange (1866).

35 Stumpf (1871), 1300.

36 Stumpf (1871), 1296.

thinker and, hence, also comments on the weaknesses of Aristotle's thinking.[37] Franz Susemihl, finally, one of the leading scholars in ancient philosophy of this time, gives a markedly favourable discussion, which nevertheless warns the young colleague against continuing "to defend [Franz Brentano's] breakneck exegetical tight-rope walking acts."[38] It seems, hence, that the "critical approach" to Aristotle that Hertling announces and practices really hit the nerve of the time. Although his relation to Brentano seems to be well known at this time and although he even presents parts of the treatise as an attempt to support Brentano's approach, Hertling was mostly received as a critical thinker and a distanced interpreter of Aristotle. Ironically, Hertling thus became acceptable in the critical-historical and the rather scientifically-minded camp (including Protestants – although the Protestant Zeller, of course, was less favourable[39]), while Brentano's affirmative and sometimes enthusiastic style was tentatively associated with Scholasticism. Nevertheless, there is little awareness of Hertling's work on Aristotle in the scholarship of the 20th and 21st centuries,[40] while Brentano's philosophy and his indebtedness to Aristotle is, of course, very well known.

Hertling's treatise *Materie und Form* consists of two parts. In the first part the Aristotelian distinction between matter and form is at issue, in the second part the Aristotelian definition of the soul as form of the potentially living body. There is a critical-programmatic interim summary between the two main parts which explains some of the difficulties uncovered in the first part through the through the ancient philosophers' alleged realist way of thinking, from which apparently Aristotle too was unable to liberate himself.

Fundamental to the interpretation of matter and form in the first main part of the essay is the contention that Aristotle arrives at this distinction on the basis of two independent lines of thought. The first line of thought is that of the first book of Aristotle's *Physics*, where Aristotle explains that all that is becoming or coming into being requires a persistent substrate which undergoes the process of becoming or coming into being. "Matter is posited in order to clarify becoming and to avoid origination out of nothing. Accordingly, we are not allowed to

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37 Katzenberger (1872), 240.

38 Susemihl (1873): "...die halsbrecherischen exegetischen Seiltänzerkünste [Franz Brentanos] zu vertheidigen"; I take this quote from Becker (1981), 172, footnote 103.

39 Which is, to some extent surprising; a probable explanation for Zeller's relatively hostile attitude is provided by Menn (2010), 114: "Zeller, engaged in a long polemic with Brentano, may well have regarded Hertling as an extension of his teacher and older relative Brentano (although I am not sure how many of Hertling's distinctive views Brentano actually shared)."

40 With one notable exception, which is Heinz Happ's (1971) monumental study on Aristotle's *hylê*, in which he dedicates twelve pages of discussion to Hertling's *Materie und Form*.

seek matter everywhere, but only in that which is subject to becoming and change. The absolutely unchangeable is immaterial."[41] The matter inferred in this way is a purely passive principle: "That is why we want to bring the nature of matter to the most general expression, such that we say that it is the possibility of not-being or being otherwise of things."[42] Aristotle gains, however, not only the concept of matter from the consideration of becoming but also that of form, namely the form "as that element of the being in the process of becoming, which in the coming to be and through the process of becoming enters into matter, in that it displaces the other form that up to then constituted with the same matter the prior thing which was passing in becoming. It [form] is, so to speak, the aim of becoming, that into which the transformation takes place."[43] "Matter proves itself to be in and for itself without determination: thus form is the ground of all determinateness for things, it is that which gives them their singular nature."[44] Matter and form, as principles of being and becoming, are not themselves subject to becoming. As regards matter this is self-evident. "[B]ut also, form cannot be reckoned among the things subject to becoming in turn, because otherwise one would need to also distinguish those two constituents in it, [that is] to suppose a form and a matter of the form… and so on to infinity."[45] One must, however, distance form so conceived from the notion that it is a pure abstraction or that it is merely the particular thought "under which we think the completed thing."[46]

This is the first line of thought which leads to the distinction between matter and form. However, according to Hertling, Aristotle also gains a similar distinction from a wholly unrelated train of thought. This second line of thinking advances with a reference to Socrates who, opposing the Sophists, pointed to the "always unchanging content of general concepts."[47] Conceptual determination takes into account the representative features of individual cases which fall

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41 Hertling (1871), 19–20.

42 Hertling (1871), 20: "Wollen wir daher die Natur der Materie auf den allgemeinsten Ausdruck bringen, so werden wir sagen sie sei für die Dinge die Möglichkeit des Nichtseins oder des Andersseins."

43 Hertling (1871), 25: "… als jenes Element des gewordenen Seins, das im Werden und durch den Process des Werdens in die Materie eintritt, indem es die andre Form, die zuvor mit der gleichen Materie das im Werden vergehende frühere Ding constituirte, aus ihr verdrängt. Sie ist gleichsam das Ziel des Werdens …"

44 Hertling (1871), 26.

45 Hertling (1871), 27.

46 Hertling (1871), 26: "… kein blosses Abstractum, nicht etwa nur der besondere Gedanke …, unte dem wir das vollendete Ding denken."

47 Hertling (1871), 31.

under the same concept. This impulse had been taken by Plato, and in his brief sketch of the Platonic theory of ideas Hertling follows the account in Aristotle's *Metaphysics* according to which Plato, as a student of the Heraclitean Cratylus, had accepted change without any real existence in the perceptible things.[48] That is why knowledge and knowing must be related to a region different from the sensible and corporeal world.[49] Hertling holds what he is prone to calling the "perfect parallelism of thought and being"[50] responsible for this conclusion: "Just as that which is not cannot be thought or known, so too, conversely the actual existence of certain knowledge must lead to the assumption of a real being which corresponds in its content to the content of those general concepts …".[51] That Aristotle denies the theory of ideas is sufficiently well-known, however er he shares certain presuppositions with his teacher, namely the distinction between sensory perception and understanding and, in addition, the assumption that knowledge and science refer to the universal. For Aristotle, this conviction is based, on the one hand, on the role of general concepts in scientific proofs and, on the other, on the fact that knowledge according to its nature is permanent, such that the known, as opposed to the merely opined or conjectured, also excludes all change.[52]

Nevertheless, Aristotle was far from agreeing with the Heraclitean complaint about the permanent flux of all things, for Aristotle in no way believes that everything in the sensible and corporeal world must be subject to change. In this context Hertling refers to Aristotle's claim that although the individual exemplars perish, natural kinds are sustained, and that only in this way do the members of a kind participate in immortality and eternal being.[53] If there is knowledge of the transitory world, it is only given insofar as something unchangeable is found in it. Thus we are directly dependent in this regard on what is the real object of knowledge for us, the essence, which tells us what something is.[54] "It is the essence of a thing that is expressed through its concept; what a thing is should be indicated by its definition, in fact these two, concept and essence, correspond to one another so completely that the concept is nothing other than the essence, such as it appears as taken up by thought, and this is nothing other

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48 Hertling (1871), 32.

49 Hertling (1871), 32.

50 Hertling (1871), 32–3.

51 Hertling (1871), 33.

52 Hertling (1871), 37.

53 Hertling (1871), 38, referring to *On Generation and Corruption* 338b14, *On the Generation of Animals* 731b31 and *On the soul* (*De Anima*) 415a26 ff.

54 Hertling (1871), 39.

than the objectivized concept; the definition breaks down the unified concept into words."[55] "In the concepts of the understanding ... we grasp the constant and permanent essence of corruptible things."[56] It is therefore clear that we can never grasp the whole thing, with its perishable and changing characteristics, in the concept: "Definition and the definiendum do not coincide completely when it is a matter of the knowledge of a sensible corporeal thing."[57] The understanding only grasps the "permanent and necessary essence"[58] and that is why the concepts of the understanding are general. The unchangeable is of course contained in the universal.[59] The source of "these differences that are inaccessible to the understanding"[60] is ultimately matter, because it is responsible for the perishable, changeable and contingent and because it – as the principle of individuation – separates the individuals from one another. For that reason the difference between eternal and immaterial substances on the one hand and perishable substances on the other is important. The former converge "together with the content of the concepts through which they are known, without any residue"[61], while in the latter case that which is grasped as the essence in the concept is in actuality only found dispersed in various different exemplars.

On this second line of thinking Aristotle assumes a permanency in the essences of sensible things grasped by the concepts of the understanding. This essence is to be distinguished from the parts of the individual, perishable actuality which cannot be grasped by concepts. Thus this line of thinking comes down to a distinction that appears wholly similar to that of form and matter in the first line of thinking – but is not completely congruent with this – because the concept, the conceptually grasped essence is something abstract, the form, that cannot reach the individual substance in the process of becoming. Before we turn to the comparison of these two meanings of 'form', I want to point out a notable implication of this, which Hertling developed against a well-known argument of Eduard Zeller's.

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55 Hertling (1871), 40: "Das Wesen eines Dinges ist es, das durch seinen Begriff ausgedrückt wird, was ein Ding sei, soll die Definition angeben, ja jene beiden, Begriff und Wesen, entsprechen einander so vollkommen, dass der Begriff nichts Anderes ist als das Wesen, so wie es in dem Gedanken aufgenommen erscheint, und dieses nichts Anderes als der objectivirte Begriff; die Definition aber legt den einheitlich gedachten Begriff in Worten auseinander."
56 Hertling (1871), 40.
57 Hertling (1871), 40.
58 Hertling (1871), 41.
59 Hertling (1871), 42.
60 Hertling (1871), 42.
61 Hertling (1871), 43.

If – according to Hertling's frequently invoked parallelism of thinking and being in antiquity – the universal essence is the truly knowable, then it must also be actual in the highest degree. However, Aristotle asserts that only the individual is actual. Eduard Zeller says that in this context we are not just dealing with a gap but with a "highly disruptive contradiction in [Aristotle's] system".[62] Hertling tries to invalidate the 'contradiction thesis' by explaining that the form of generality is not "the indispensable condition of knowledge" "under all circumstances and in all areas",[63] but only in the perishable corporeal world. For here – and unlike the eternal immaterial substances – the unchangeable is manifest as the universal. But since, in the sensible-corporeal region, this permanent, unchangeable content "is never the entire thing but is found in it entangled with the indeterminate and the accidental, which has its origin in matter, so the concept, through which we think the permanent content, necessarily takes the character of generality vis-a-vis this concrete thing. Here too what we comprehend in it is the essential, the actual in the highest sense, only it is not really so as we apprehend it ..."[64], i.e. it does not really exist in the way we apprehend it. "As things are, however, in this form of universality vis-à-vis a multitude of individual things it [i.e. the essential, ChR] cannot occur in actuality...."[65] The argument against Zeller hence seems to be this: In the case of eternal substances, there are no two substances of the same kind, which means that the concept is congruent with the thing known. A general term or universal is not required. In the case of sensible substance the universal is in fact required; however it is only general or universal relative to the individual things and is actual only by being dependent on them. Moreover it does not actually exist in the way in which we apprehend it – what we grasp is a concept of the understanding; in actuality (the one outside of the understanding) we only find it "entangled" with the indeterminate. Hertling explains this being "entangled" by moving in the direction of a hylomorphic notion of the concept of essence. He refers to Aristotle's dictum that the forms of natural objects do not work in the same way as the mathematical

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62 Zeller (1879), 312 (Hertling, of course, was quoting from an earlier edition).

63 Hertling (1871), 43.

64 Hertling (1871), 44: "niemals das ganze Ding ist, sondern sich in ihm nur verwickelt mit alle dem Unbestimmten und Zufälligen findet, welches seinen Ursprung in der Materie hat, so nimmt der Begriff, durch den wir jenen beständigen Inhalt denken, diesen concreten Dingen gegenüber nothwendig den Charakter der Allgemeinheit an. Was wir in ihm erfassen, ist auch hier das Wesenhafte, das Wirkliche im höchsten Sinne, nur dass es nicht so wirklich ist, wie wir es erfassen ...".

65 "So aber, in dieser Form des Allgemeinen gegenüber einer Vielheit von Einzeldingen, kann es dann freilich in Wirklichkeit gar nicht vorkommen."

forms where, for example, the circle can be defined in complete disregard of the kind of matter in which the form of the circle appears. "However, matter is part of the essence of sensible-corporeal, perishable things which of course is the reason why in any particular case we cannot completely know the thing, but it must also, however, be included, in a certain way at least, in the universal concept through which alone we are able to think it ... the concepts of the essence of corruptible substances [are] not abstracted from the matter like the other elements, but from the individual things which have assumed matter."[66] Zeller, by the way, took up this challenge in the 1879 edition of *Die Philosophie der Griechen* and added two footnotes to the corresponding passage, in which he pointed out that Hertling does not provide a solution to this problem; rather Hertling's remarks are bound to lead to the question of how the compound, in which the permanent aspect is entangled with the contingent, could be more substantial than the form that itself represents this permanent aspect.[67]

Let us return to the two lines of thought which, according to Hertling, moved Aristotle on independent grounds to make the distinctions between matter and form or respectively between matter and essence. Hertling raises the question of whether the Greek concept for that which is the contrary of matter, *eidos*, has one and the same meaning in both cases. He answers this question in the negative. The two lines of thinking require very different meanings of *eidos* – in the one it means the principle of form and in the other the concept of essence. The concept of essence is universal and an essence is predicated of all beings to which the essence refers to. It also represents an abstraction from the entire sensible object composed of form and matter, such that the essence always also includes the material aspect. The form, however, cannot be predicated of that whose form it is; in contrast to the concept of essence, the form is individual and is in itself abstracted from the matter. Taken together with matter it constitutes the entire thing.[68] Hertling argues that Aristotle seems to be clearly aware of the distinction between the two meanings in many places[69], while in other passages he uses the expression *eidos* so as to encompass both meanings at the same time.[70] Furthermore, Hertling mentions places where the concept is exclusively used in one of the two meanings and, again, such places where he hesitates to make an unambiguous attribution of one or the other meaning. By analysing typical uses of *eidos* and subsuming those which speak against the individuality of *eidos* to

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66 Hertling (1871), 46–7.
67 Zeller (1879), 312, footnotes 1 and 4.
68 Hertling (1871), 49–50.
69 Hertling (1871), 55.
70 Hertling (1871), 53.

the concept of essence (as opposed to the principle of form), Hertling in fact develops a theory of individual forms in Aristotle. He also speaks positively and explicitly of each person's having their own particular *eidos*, having their own form, which internally constitutes them as this individual of a general kind. However this theory of the individual form – as opposed to its twentieth century counterparts, for example, Michael Frede's and Günther Patzig's theory of individual form[71] – is accompanied by the substantial criticism that Aristotle oscillates between the two meanings of the word, which is why some of the tasks related to *eidos* can be assumed by *eidos*/essence, but not by *eidos*/form. In contrast Frede/Patzig would insist that all these functions can be assumed by *eidos*/form applied univocally. Some usages which, as Hertling shows, must clearly be translated as "according to kind" and "according to concept" (as when Aristotle says that different things are one according to the *eidos* but different according to number, as in *Metaphysics* VII 8, 1034a7–8) would be dismissed by Frede/Patzig as an obsolete manner of speaking. Unlike Frede/Patzig and like Hertling, many other modern researchers recognize the ambiguity of *eidos* employed in the sense of a more universal kind or species which generalizes over the particular compound substance and is predicated of it on the one hand and forms that cannot be predicated of the particular compound substance (but are the cause of being of such a substance) on the other.[72] However, unlike Hertling, this is nowadays for the most part not regarded as a misleading confusion or mix-up, but as a conscious differentiation on the part of Aristotle, although virtually no-one would dispute – and therein lies the attraction of Hertling's analysis – that there are many undecidable instances. Unlike Hertling, these modern interpreters would probably not associate *eidos* in the sense of a universal species with the essence (*ti ên einai*), because Aristotle quite clearly equates the essence with the non-predicated form. A peculiarity of the individual form on the Frede/Patzig account is that this form is thought to be also the subject of accidental predicates – the form of Socrates, not Socrates himself, would then be the subject of the predicates "is drunk", "has an itchy rash" and so on. Hertling maintains nothing of the sort, however the requirement that the *eidos* should also be the subject provides certain difficulties for him.[73] He refers to "pure forms", apparently meaning the incorporeal substances which, however, Aristotle would not treat as "pure forms".

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71 Frede/Patzig (1988).

72 See, e.g. Driscoll (1981).

73 Hertling (1871), 52.

Hertling's advocacy of individual forms earned him a fierce response in the third edition of Eduard Zeller's *Philosophie der Griechen*. Zeller dedicates unusually long footnotes to Hertling's work[74] and goes so far as to claim, against Hertling, that the place in *Metaphysics* Λ (XII 5, 1071a20), according to which the universal human is not the principle of human but the individual human Peleus is the principle of the individual human Achilles, has nothing to do with the fact that the form, like all principles, is individual.[75] Zeller's response to Hertling is not without some idiosyncratic ideas; on some of them Stephen Menn has already commented.[76] There are, I think, two or three points that deserve to be highlighted. First, Zeller does not explicitly deal with Hertling's main thesis, i.e. that the concepts of matter and form in Aristotle are derived from a confusion of two quite different ways of thinking. This might be a further indication that Zeller primarily perceived him as a supporter of his cousin's theses. Second, in some passages Zeller seems to presuppose that the introduction of individual forms would only make sense if they were meant to account for individual qualitative differences (Zeller 1879, 341: "... sie [die Formen] werden also nur insofern verschieden sein, wiefern sie in verschiedenen Subjekten sind, nur ihrem Dasein, nicht ihrer Beschaffenheit nach"). Finally, Zeller's main point against Hertling seems to be that matter, and not form, is the principle of individuation. Forms become individually instantiated because of the contribution of matter, while they themselves are never individual. Hence, he explicitly criticizes Hertling's remark that the form is the constitutive principle of individual being.[77]

It was already said that interpreters of Aristotle actually have to struggle with the two tendencies that Hertling had located in the two meanings of *eidos* – that it is part of the individual being on the hand, and meant to represent a universal definable content on the other. Therefore it is important how the coexistence of these two tendencies that Hertling diagnosed is evaluated in the end. Herein lies perhaps the most distinctive feature of Hertling's interpretation. He articulates the reasons for which the two meanings of *eidos* could tend to converge. The first reason lies in the phenomenon of artificial production. On the one hand everything that has to do with production and coming to be requires, on Hertling's schema, the (individual) form and not the (universal) concept. In the production of artefacts, however, the cause for their coming to be, bearing the same form as the artefact, lies in the mind of the craftsman or artist; the cause for the origination of a shoe is the *eidos* of the shoe in the mind of the cobbler; equally, the

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74 Zeller (1879), 340, footnote 6, 342, footnote 1.

75 Zeller (1879), 342, footnote 1.

76 Menn (2010), 113 – 5.

77 In this respect Frede/Patzig would clearly side with Hertling.

cause for the healing or the health brought about by the doctor is the *eidos* of health in the doctor's mind. However, what the shoemaker or the doctor has in mind is not the individual form that is found in the matter, but the essence of the shoe, the essence of health, its concept – and thus something universal. Hertling recognizes this as a comprehensible reason for the conflation of the two meanings, essence and form. It is the knowledge of the essence of health that brings forth the form of health in the patient.[78]

A second context where, according to Hertling, the concept "takes the place of the form with total legitimacy"[79] is the region of mathematics. There is no generation and coming to be here – thus there is only an analogue to the form, namely the concept. Form this perspective, Hertling acknowledges that there are reasons for the conflation of the two meanings, perhaps even good reasons. And although it seems that he considered these reasons understandable, he takes a further step and traces this conflation back to a way of thinking that in no way corresponds to what he regards as the modern "examination of natural processes"[80] and which ultimately comes down to an undue substantialization or reification of the merely conceptual: "The non-self-conscious man has at all times adhered to the notion that things are as his senses show them, and he acts as if red was red without an eye that sees it and hardness hard without a hand that feels it. That is the realism of everyday life ... The realism of the incipient science, however, goes still further when it projects not only the impressions of immediately present things onto such objects but also accepts the products of the thinking stimulated by them as well as the thought alienated from living intuition as independent realities."[81] "This is the complete parallelism between thinking and being which, as earlier remarked, was assumed in the entire philosophy of antiquity and which has its representative not only in Plato but also in Aristotle, as confirmed recently in the judgement that had to be made on the material causes as hypothesized by Aristotle. It was of course shown at the same time how Aristotle does not stop with the mere objectification of what truly was only a production of comparative thought. Even to make the alleged principle of reality more apprehensible, which principle can never wholly deny its origin in conceptual considerations, characteristics had to be transferred to it which were not shown or given in the original derivation or even were hostile to this."[82]

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78 Hertling (1871), 60 – 1.
79 Hertling (1871), 63.
80 Hertling (1871), 104.
81 Hertling (1871), 97.
82 Hertling (1871), 98: "Das ist jene angenommene völlige Parallelität zwischen Denken und Sein, von der, wie früher bemerkt, die gesamte Philosophie der Alterthums ausging, und dass

These general mechanisms explain how the Aristotelian notion of form has come about: "The other principle of being and becoming, the correlate of matter, form, is the product of the same realist way of thinking. Criticism found in it of course only an abstract concept, a summary of the principal features by which we distinguish things from one another in thought. For Aristotle, however, it is so real that the ground or reason for all reality should lie in it."[83] In the end, all this implies that the notion of Aristotelian form has been conceived as the result of a conflation of concepts and reality. This follows from what Hertling takes to be the realistic way of thinking that he finds in antiquity.[84]

Sometimes it seems that Hertling is somehow torn between saying that there is an understandable process leading from the one meaning of *eidos* to the other, and saying that the conflation of the two meanings is something fallacious. At the end of his methodological discussions he seems to lean rather towards the second, the fallacious, reading: "Enough has now probably been said to demonstrate that Aristotelian form is an untenable intermediate between a mere abstraction and an effective reality, and this fact finds a further confirmation in that which emerged earlier concerning the relation between form and conceptual essence. According to the original purpose they are separate from one another but, as it turned out, they are mixed-up with one another in many places so completely that the one practically stands for the other."[85]

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sie nicht nur in Plato, sondern ebenso in Aristoteles ihren Vertreter habe, bestätigte sich kürzlich noch in dem Urtheile, das über die von ihm aufgestellte Materialursache gefällt werden musste. Freilich zeigte sich zugleich, wie Aristoteles bei der blossen Objectivierung dessen, was doch in Wahrheit nur ein Erzeugniss des vergleichenden Gedankens war, nicht stehen blieb. Einzig schon um das vermeintliche Realprincip, welches seinen Ursprung aus begrifflichen Erwägungen niemals ganz verläugnen konnte, der Vorstellbarkeit näher zu bringen, mussten Züge auf dasselbe übertragen werden, welche sich aus der ursprünglichen Ableitung nicht ergaben oder ihr gar feindlich gegenüber standen."

83 Hertling (1871), 98 – 9: "Ein Erzeugniss der gleichen realistischen Denkweise ist auch das andere Princip des Seins und Werdens, das Correlat der Materie, die Form. Die Kritik fand in ihr freilich nur einen abstracten Begriff, die im Gedanken vollzogene Zusammenfassung der Hauptsächlichsten Merkmale, durch welche wir die Dinge von einander unterscheiden, in der Absicht des Aristoteles ist sie dagegen so sehr ein Reales, dass in ihr jedesmal der Grund aller Realität liegen soll."

84 Sometimes he stresses that this is a common way of thinking, at other times he sees the same attitude as something deriving from Socrates' interest in definitions and concepts; Hertling (1871), 103: "Finally the popular overestimation of conceptual knowledge in antiquity since Socrates meant that one does not ask how we arrive at the concepts but how what is given in concepts is in actuality."

85 Hertling (1871), 101.

It is one thing to say that Aristotle's *eidos* occurs in several roles or that it has several meanings or that it has adopted a secondary meaning that somehow derives from a single original use, etc. It is a quite different thing to say that this notion is an untenable intermediate. That Hertling finally settles for the last option seems to be a manifestation of the "critical attitude" he wants to adopt in his studies of Aristotle. In some respects, Hertling's discussion of Aristotle even resembles the analysis of Friedrich Albert Lange, who in his *Geschichte des Materialismus* complains about Aristotle's "relentless anthropomorphism"[86] and about the origin of Aristotle's notion of matter from the idea of a mere potentiality[87]. His basic error, Lange says, was to import the notion of potentiality, which by its nature is just a subjective assumption, into the things themselves.[88] As we have seen, this new tone has been acknowledged by his reviewers and was welcomed as a mark distinguishing him from his cousin Brentano.

VI Hertling on Aristotle's Definition of the Soul

By way of conclusion let us consider briefly the second part of the essay, which deals with the Aristotelian definition of the soul. This part takes up little more than a third of the volume. What is at issue here for Hertling is, first, the application of his general considerations concerning form to the Aristotelian doctrine that the soul is the form of a body and, second, certain themes that are central to Brentano's writing on psychology. As already mentioned, Hertling had initially given an approving assessment of Brentano's writing and took from this the desideratum of dealing with the Aristotle definition of the soul as a form, as Brentano had not made sufficient use of this definition. Hertling seems to agree with Brentano's position that the so-called *nous poiêtikos*, which is alone characterized as immortal, is part of the individual soul and not – as "the fantastic explanations of the philosophizing Arabs" said – a super-individual entity. Her-

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86 Lange (1866), 63; I owe this reference to Happ (1971), 13. By "anthropomorphism" Lange wants to express his thesis that Aristotle's worldview is derived from human interests and purposes (and is, thus, anthropo*centric* rather than anthropomorphic), just as his teleology seems to be constraint by human interests. A similar mechanism, Lange seems to suggest, is at work, when Aristotle, according to Lange's analysis, takes human concepts for the real thing, i.e. for real properties.

87 Lange (1866), 143–144.

88 Lange (1866), 144: "Der Grundirrthum steckt darin, dass der Begriff des Möglichen, des δυνάμει ὄν, das doch seiner Natur nach eine blosse subjective Annahme ist, in die Dinge hineingetragen wird."

tling, who shows himself to be more cautious than Brentano on this point, asks whether *nous* first enters the living being when the corporeal conditions are created for it.[89] However, he seems generally not adverse to the view that a divine intervention is responsible for the origination of *nous*.[90] With regard to the distinctions within *nous*, Hertling like Brentano assumes, in addition to the active and the passive *nous*, another receptive *nous*, which again is sharply rejected by Zeller.[91] Hertling repeatedly stresses the thought-forming function of *nous poietikos* but denies through a series of somewhat more daring arguments that it is this alone which Aristotle characterizes as separable and immortal; rather these features pertain to the intellectual capacity as a whole.[92]

More important than these remarks however, which follow along the lines of Brentano's agenda, is the question of how the theoretical statements on the status of the form are applicable to the theorem that the soul is form of the potentially living body. In response to this question Hertling first of all refers to another Aristotelian theorem, namely that there is no general definition which covers all kinds of souls – the animal soul and the human soul, the vegetative soul, the perceiving soul and the intellectual soul. He reasonably infers from this that the definition of the soul only indicates the general manner of causality "which the soul assumes vis-à-vis the ensouled, but what their more precise nature is in the individual genera of the latter … can only be established through a comparative consideration of the individual genera."[93] He argues, using the terms of the first section, that the soul in Aristotle is ultimately only a thought that summarizes and unifies what the singularity of the individual ensouled being is.[94] That soul and life are joined in intimate unity without a further tie is therefore only a seemingly meaningful formulation of a tautological truth.[95] For Hertling, the "Aristotelian definition of the soul fundamentally signifies nothing other than the thought of ensouledness, which is removed from the living being, then objectified and placed prior to the real things."[96] For this thesis Hertling refers to the following Aristotelian theorem: According to Aristotle the body which has lost its life dows not have the possibility of being alive, but only that body which is alive. Thus the following is also true of the soul: "the meaning of the formal

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89 Hertling (1871), 170.
90 Hertling (1871), 169. The reply by Zeller (1879) follows on page 594, footnote 3.
91 Zeller (1879), 577, footnote 2
92 Hertling (1871), 174.
93 Hertling (1871), 126.
94 Hertling (1871), 127.
95 Hertling (1871), 127–8.
96 Hertling (1871), 128.

cause corresponding to the original derivation, according to which it is not the essence but the principle of the essence, not that which is grasped in the concept but the principle of this, is in no way maintained."[97] Even if different people have for all intents and purposes the same essence, they surely do not have the same soul.[98] The soul too therefore is endowed with more real elements than was provided for by the original purpose of the system.[99] The soul thus approximates the concept of the ensouled, which latter was treated as a real principle under the influence of the realist manner of thinking. Lastly, this is also decisive for the question of the soul's unity: "Just that unity, however, is true of the soul in the Aristotelian sense, because the form of the ensouled is, as was shown, ultimately only the thought of ensouledness. But that this unity was maintained by him also in regard to the human soul results from realist thinking."[100]

The concept of the soul thus inherits the allegedly dubious features of the notion of form. Although Hertling verbally agrees with Brentano's account of the Aristotelian soul in many particular respects, his support is Janus-faced, as he undermines the credibility of Aristotle's psychology in the same breath. We do not know what Brentano thought about his cousins "critical" conversion, but we do know that he took Aristotle's account of the soul seriously enough to ascribe the discovery of intentionality to it.

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97 Hertling (1871), 131.
98 Hertling (1871), 131.
99 Hertling (1871), 141.
100 Hertling (1871), 177.

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Philipp Brüllmann

The Concrete Universal: Friedrich Adolf Trendelenburg on Kant, Aristotle and the Ethical Principle

Abstract: Friedrich Adolf Trendelenburg, who today is mostly known for his work on Aristotle's *Categories* and *De Anima*, also had a strong interest in Aristotle's moral philosophy. This chapter offers a critical appraisal of Trendelenburg's attempt, well before the virtue ethics of the 20th century, to make Aristotelian ethics a viable alternative to Kant's deontological theory. The difficulty, however, in Trendelenburg's interpretation, as Philipp Brüllmann argues, is that he makes Aristotle's ethics out to be precisely what most interpreters think it is not: an ethics based on principles. Still, Trendelenburg's attempt to rehabilitate Aristotle's ethics may serve as an early example of what would later become a larger philosophical movement in English-language philosophy.

I The Problem

"Ethical Investigations" were a part of Friedrich Adolf Trendelenburg's systematic project. Unfortunately, however, these investigations remained incomplete,[1] so we have to rely on other sources for his ethical position. Three of these sources seem to be of particular interest. First, there is Trendelenburg's main work, the *Logical Investigations* (*Logische Untersuchungen*) ([2]1862 [[1]1840]), which contain some remarks on the question of how ethics fits into a philosophically based system of the sciences and what role it plays there. Then, there is the second major monograph *Natural Law on the Basis of Ethics* (*Naturrecht auf dem Grunde der Ethik*) ([2]1868 [[1]1860]), which offers a detailed "development of the ethical principle", prefacing Trendelenberg's theory of natural right. And finally, there are two comprehensive essays in which Trendelenburg considers more or less contemporary approaches in ethics, which permits *ex negativo* inferences on his own conception.

One of these essays, published in 1867, is entitled "The Conflict between Kant and Aristotle in Ethics" (*Conflict* in what follows) and offers a critical ex-

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1 On Trendelenburg's systematic project, see Beiser (2013), 28–68; on the Ethical Investigations, see Hartung (2006b).

amination of Immanuel Kant's practical philosophy.[2] The most remarkable feature of that examination is that Trendelenburg does not just criticize Kant, pointing out the putative weakness of his moral philosophy, but attempts at the same time to establish another historical approach, namely Aristotle's ethics, as the superior alternative. Trendelenburg obviously assumes that an appropriate ethical theory should be based in a crucial respect , not on Kant, but on Aristotle. The *Conflict* thus offers not merely a building block for the incomplete *Ethical Investigations*. It also indicates the extent to which Trendelenburg conceives his ethics as 'Aristotelian'. This is precisely the question that I am going to discuss in what follows.[3]

To approach this question and make it more concise, let me begin by formulating three theses, which I take to outline Trendelenburg's attitude towards the ethical theories of Kant and Aristotle, respectively (his argument is of course greatly abridged here):

(1) Kant's significance for ethics lies in his drawing our attention to the moral (or ethical) principle. An appropriate ethical theory must be based on such a principle.[4]

(2) By making the "form of the law" (the "formal universal") the principle of ethics, however, Kant has the wrong conception of that principle.

(3) Aristotle, on the other hand, for whom "human nature" (the "concrete universal") is the principle of ethics, has the right conception of it.

The accusation of a problematic formalism is surely one of the most common objections to Kant's moral philosophy. Trendelenburg is not the first to voice this criticism. Rather, to mention only the most important predecessor, it is an essential characteristic of G. W. F. Hegel's practical philosophy.[5] Neither is it unusual to consider Aristotle's ethics as an approach that can help to avoid this formalism. This thought too can already be found in Trendelenburg's predecessors.[6] Nevertheless, the three theses should seem irritating at first glance, both when viewed from a 'Kantian' and when viewed from an 'Aristotelian' perspective.

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2 Trendelenburg (1867a). The text consists of two lectures to the Academy, "Concerning a Difference in the Ethical Principle" and "Pleasure and the Ethical Principle", held in 1860 and 1858, respectively. The second of the above-named essays deals with Johann Friedrich Herbart's practical philosophy. It was also published in 1867 (Trendelenburg 1867b).

3 On Trendelenburg as Aristotelian, see Hartung (2006a) (with bibliography).

4 Compare also Trendelenburg (1867b), 122–124.

5 On Hegel's critique of Kant in ethics, see O'Hagan (1987); Wood (1990), in particular chapters 7–9. Trendelenburg himself names Schleiermacher as a model (Trendelenburg (1867b), 124).

6 On Hegel, compare again Wood's depiction (1993).

We begin with Kant. The claim that morality cannot be grounded in anthropology belongs to the fundamental assumptions of Kant's ethical theory. Although there might be universal rules of conduct that hold for us because and insofar as we are human, such rules can never be moral laws, according to Kant, and this, *nota bene*, on grounds that have to do with the concept of morality as such.[7] The point of Kant's argument is hence that an anthropologically founded morality (regardless of *what* exactly it prescribes) is not simply false or badly founded; it is rather no morality at all. But how, so one might ask, can Trendelenburg then adhere to Kant's concept of the moral principle in a relevant way (1) and at the same suggest to raise human nature to this principle (3)?

What about Aristotle? From a contemporary perspective, it seems rather odd to characterize Aristotle as proposing an ethics of principles. Most philosophers who argue today for a return to Aristotle see in his virtue-oriented approach the exact counter-model to such an ethics, and hence an *alternative* to Kant's approach.[8] But even if one leaves this modern prejudice aside and concentrates on the ethical writings of Aristotle himself, one would not immediately assume that the equivalent of a Kantian moral principle is to be found in human nature, of all things. It is true that Aristotle's account of happiness (*eudaimonia*) starts from human nature, the specifically human function (*ergon*), and establishes on that basis the practice of human virtues as the decisive factor for a happy life.[9] But there is no (unambiguous) indication that Aristotle would conceive human nature as a 'principle of action': as something that – to use Trendelenburg's own formulation – "should determine of willing and acting".[10] In attempting to identify such a principle one would, if anything, run up against concepts such as *hôs dei*[11] ("as one should"), *prepon*[12] ("appropriate"), *kalon*[13] ("beauti-

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7 Compare GMS 4:410 – 413, 425 f.; KpV 5:25 f., 61 f. and elsewhere. (Kant's writings are here, as is customary, cited according to the volume and page number of the Prussian Academy edition). Kant's basic thought, much simplified, is that moral rules are not distinguished from other rules by their content but by their claim to "universal" and "necessary" validity. This claim can only be justified, according to Kant, as a requirement of pure reason. Correspondingly, the moral law is not directed to humans but to "rational beings". We will come back to this below.

8 Achtenberg (2002), chapter 1 presents a helpful summary and critique of this particularist interpretation of Aristotelian ethics.

9 NE I 7, 1097b22 – 1098a20.

10 Trendelenburg (1867a), 171.

11 For example NE II 6, 1106b14 – 23.

12 For example NE X 8, 1178a9 – 13.

13 For example NE IV 1, 1120a23 f.

ful", "noble") or *orthos logos*[14] ("right explanation" or "right reason"). The virtuous person does not direct herself by human nature but by what is right or appropriate; and she does not act for the sake of actualizing her own nature but for the sake of virtue or the good.

This account is of course very imprecise; and we will return to both aspects of it. For the time being, however, it can be said that the irritation in theses (1) to (3) comes down to the following question:

How can Aristotle's reference to the human function be taken as a reference to a moral principle in the sense of Kant?

In the following, I will try to answer this question. This answer should, on the one hand, help us to better understand Trendelenburg's ethical Aristotelianism. On the other, it should offer some clues about Trendelenburg's concept of principles, which at first glance links his ethics with Kant. This will enable us to state more precisely why Trendelenburg maintains that Aristotle had "not worked out his principle so that everything emerges from what lies therein".[15] Our aim is, hence, to locate Trendelenburg between Aristotle and Kant.

After looking at the arguments that Trendelenburg puts forward for the superiority of human nature as a principle of ethics (II), we will undertake a more exacting comparison between the *Conflict*, on the one hand, and the ethical writings of Kant and Aristotle, respectively, on the other (III). This comparison will yield a delimitation of Trendelenburg's position which permits us to then attempt to locate his position and to determine what his ethical Aristotelianism amounts to (IV).

II Human Nature as the Superior Principle of Ethics

Let us first of all take a look at the argument of the *Conflict*. It is not necessary to give a comprehensive overview of this essay, but we should at least sketch how Trendelenburg introduces the contrast between Kant and Aristotle and how he argues for the superiority of 'human nature' as against the 'form of the law'.[16]

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14 For example NE VI 13, 1144b21–28.

15 Trendelenburg (1867a), 187.

16 For further explanatory notes concerning the *Conflict*, see for example Beiser (2013), 80 f.

II.1 How Is the Contrast between Kant and Aristotle Introduced?

The general strategy of the *Conflict* is to show that Kant, although he explicitly argues against an anthropological foundation of morality, strictly speaking *overlooks* Aristotle's suggestion: the "spirits", in a formulation reminiscent of Luther, have not "collided".[17] Kant does not recognize the option of making human nature the principle of ethics and thus misses, at least in Trendelenburg's eyes, the crucial alternative to his own approach.

Trendelenburg's introduction of the opponents is wholly geared to this strategy. The very brief summary of the Kantian approach runs to the thesis that the good will, according to Kant, has the "formal universal" for its principle; then, it focuses completely on Kant's rejection of anthropology.[18]

Trendelenburg cites from the *Groundwork* that

> we must not let ourselves think of deriving the reality of this principle from the special property of human nature. For, duty is to be practical unconditional necessity of action and it must therefore hold for all rational beings (to which alone an imperative can apply at all) and only because of this be also a law for all human wills.[19]

This he interprets as a prohibition to "derive the ethical principle from the particular property of human nature"[20].

The sketch of the Aristotelian position,[21] which is based in its essentials on the first book of the *Nichomachean Ethics*, leads – in line with Trendelenburg's overall strategy – to the claim that Aristotle, "in the derivation of the good", consciously does what Kant prohibits as a "clouding of the principle" (*eine Trübung des Princips*).[22] Trendelenburg does not explicate this claim in more detail but obviously refers to Aristotle's proceeding from the concept of a human function in the definition of the good for humans.

Trendelenburg attempts to prove that Kant ultimately 'overlooks' Aristotle mainly by referring to the so-called "table of practical material determining grounds" that is found in Kant's *Critique of Practical Reason*.[23] In this list of

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17 Trendelenburg (1867a), 179.
18 Trendelenburg (1867a), 175 – 179.
19 Trendelenburg (1867a), 175; GMS 4:425. (The English translations of Kant's works are generally by Mary J. Gregor in Kant (2006).)
20 Trendelenburg (1867a), 176.
21 Trendelenburg (1867a), 179 – 182.
22 Trendelenburg (1867a), 181 f.
23 KpV 5:40.

six possible determining grounds, all of which Kant rejects, human nature does not appear – and this, as Trendelenburg emphasizes with consternation, although "in the *Metaphysics of Morals* Kant [directs] his acumen against those who want to derive the ethical principle from the particular constitution of human nature".[24] Trendelenburg writes:

> If we further consider the historical representatives of practical material determining grounds that Kant mentions, we cannot avoid noticing that Montaigne and Mandeville and Hutcheson are named, men of the second and third rank in the history of ethics, but there is not a single word on the classics of ethics, Plato and Aristotle. It can also be further inferred from Kant's writings that he knew both only through derivative reports and not in their original essence from his own study.[25]

In the present context, it is not necessary to decide to what extent Trendelenburg's objection does justice to Kant's own position. It is surely true that Aristotle's ethics is a 'blind spot' in Kant's examination of his predecessors. When Kant refers to the ethics of the 'ancients', he usually thinks in terms of the opposition between Epicurus and the Stoics and thus takes a quasi Hellenistic perspective.[26]

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24 Trendelenburg (1867a), 178 f. The material determining grounds named by Kant are (i) "education", (ii) "civil constitution", (iii) "physical feeling", (iv) "moral feeling", (v) "perfection" and (vi) "the will of God". Even if Kant strives for a complete systematics with the distinctions between "subjective" (i – iv) and "objective" (v – vi) or between "external" (i, ii and vi) and "internal" (iii – v) determining grounds (and the options allocated to different historical persons), the point of the table is not to be found in this systematics (or these allocations). The point rather lies in the claim that in all these cases it is the purpose that determines the will, which is incompatible with the notion of unconditional duty. According to Kant this explicitly includes option (v), which is the nearest thing to Trendelenburg's 'nature of humanity': "But the concept of perfection in the *practical* sense is the fitness or adequacy of the thing for all sorts of ends. This perfection, as a *characteristic* of the human being and so as internal, is nothing other than talent and what strengthens or completes this, *skill*" (KpV 5:41). Insofar as the purpose "in relation to which alone the concept of perfection can be the determining ground of the will" "must first be given to us" (KpV 5:41), this manner of determining the will is also, according to Kant, "empirical" and does not present an appropriate basis for the foundation of morality (compare Trendelenburg's corresponding critique in Trendelenburg (1867a), 177 f.).

25 "Wirft man ferner auf die von Kant angeführten historischen Repräsentanten der praktischen materialen Bestimmungsgründe einen Blick, so muss es auffallen, dass zwar Montaigne und Mandeville und Hutcheson genannt sind, Männer zweiter und dritter Ordnung in der Geschichte der Ethik, aber die Klassiker der Ethik Plato und Aristoteles mit keinem Worte. Es lässt sich auch sonst aus Kants Schriften schliessen, dass er beide nur aus abgeleiteten Notizen und nicht in ihrem ursprünglichen Wesen aus eigenem Studium kannte" (Trendelenburg (1867a), 178).

26 See for example "The Moral Systemata of the Ancients" in the *Lectures on Universal Practical Philosophy and Ethics* (Kaehler's postscript) (Kant (2004), 9 – 20) as well as the section "On the

It is also true that the claim that the table of material determining grounds is complete seems rather forced.[27] On the other hand, it cannot be denied that the critique of anthropology is one *leitmotif* of Immanuel Kant's moral philosophy and that he would have considered human nature as a 'heteronomous' determining ground of the will. As we will see, one must read Aristotle in a very specific way if he is to count as an 'overlooked' alternative.

For the moment there are two observations that we should note: first, Trendelenburg shows a tendency to use in a wider sense concepts that are *termini technici* in Kant (and thus appear bound up with a determinate theoretical context). So it is not always clear just how far he really follows and where he differentiates himself from Kant. Secondly, the simple contrast between Kant and Aristotle is only possible because Trendelenburg more or less silently equates the following statements: (i) The reality of the moral principle is derived from human nature.[28] (ii) The principle is derived from human nature.[29] (iii) The good is derived from human nature.[30] (iv) Human nature is the principle.[31] (v) Human nature is the determining ground of the will.[32] Two things are remarkable about these equations. First, they obviously undermine the difference between an approach that is based on the concept of law, on the one hand (Kant), and an approach that is based on the concept of the good, on the other (Aristotle). Second they do not seem to distinguish between questions concerning the *content* of the moral principle and questions concerning its *validity*. We will return to these issues below.

II.2 Which Arguments Does Trendelenburg Make?

Trendelenburg maintains that Aristotle does exactly what Kant prohibits: establishing human nature as the principle of ethics. Let us now turn to the arguments that are made in the *Conflict* for the superiority of this principle, supposedly overlooked by Kant. In essence there are three aspects in which this superiority is taken to manifest itself.

Dialectic of Pure Reason in the Determining of the Concept of the Highest Good" in the *Critique of Practical Reason* (in particular KpV 5:110 – 119).

27 KpV 5:39.

28 Trendelenburg (1867a), 175.

29 Trendelenburg (1867a), 176.

30 Trendelenburg (1867a), 181.

31 Trendelenburg (1867a), 184.

32 Implicitly in Trendelenburg (1867a), 190.

The *first aspect* concerns the epistemological and metaphysical foundations of the project. As is well known, Kant sees a tight connection between necessity, apriority and formality.[33] What is *necessarily* (and 'strictly universally') the case can only be cognized *a priori* through pure reason, whereas experience only provides insight into contingent (and at most 'comparatively universal') facts. The point of Kant's transcendental philosophy is – as again is well-known – that all necessary truths we can actually know are either analytic or concern the form under which the objects of experience appear. Correspondingly, a moral philosophy must, if it wants to make a legitimate claim to "absolute necessity", be based "wholly on its pure part"[34] and will thus also have a formal foundation.

Trendelenburg objects.[35] According to the theory of the "organic worldview" that he projects in the *Logical Investigations* it is possible to overcome the Kantian dualism of (*a priori*) form and (empirically given) content. Hence it is also possible to make judgments about human essence that are both necessarily true and determined in their content. The truth of these judgments is not cognized *a priori* but in an interplay between conceptual and empirical elements (we will return to this). Morality can claim to be objectively valid without ethics having to be formal.

The *second aspect* concerns Kant's theory of action.[36] Kant maintains that all cases in which we do something *because* we strive for a certain object (in which there is a "material" determining ground of the will) are in a decisive respect the same. For in all these cases we are moved to action because we expect the presence of the desired object to be pleasurable, and Kant never tires of emphasizing that this is true no matter what object is at issue.[37] If one connects this assumption with the assertions (i) that we cannot know *a priori* which objects procure us pleasure and (ii) that not all people will find the same things pleasurable, then there results an important consequence for the validity of practical rules or principles. All principles that concern the question of how certain objects can be attained will only then have validity for us – they will only then determine our action – if we contingently expect pleasure from those objects. Principles of this kind – Kant calls them principles of "self-love" or "one's own happiness"[38] –

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33 The significance of this relation for ethics is most evident in the "Preface" to the *Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals* (GMS 4:387–392). See also Scarano (2006).

34 GMS 4:389.

35 Trendelenburg (1867a), 185–187, 201–203.

36 For the following compare in particular §§ 1–6 of the "first main part" of the "analytic" of the *Critique of Practical Reason* (KpV 5:19–30); on Kant's theory of action, see Willaschek (1992).

37 See in particular KpV 5:23–25.

38 KpV 5:22.

can never be universal laws, valid without any exception, for this is excluded by the underlying theory of action. If there are such laws (if the idea of such laws is not, to speak with Kant, a 'chimera'), then they will not influence our actions through the fact that we are striving for certain objects but through the fact that we have recognized them *as* universal laws. This, much simplified, is what Kant understands by the "formal determination of the will", which, on his view, is the distinguishing characteristic of a (morally) good will.

Trendelenburg objects once again.[39] On his view there is in fact an object that can determine our will without our being promised pleasure by its attainment. This object is the essence or inner purpose of human being. The *Conflict* does not explicate just how this works. But let me at least cite the relevant passage:

> Wherever in the inner essence and purpose of the human the principle for willing and acting is located, wherever this essence thus is grasped to such an extent in the entire depth and majesty, that the human is completed in its reason, in parts by cultivating the virtues of knowing in itself, in parts in teaching the blind drives to follow the thinking part, wherever pleasure is not sought for its own sake but is only considered as a perfecting consequence which springs out of the activity according to nature in and of itself: there is such a material, practical principle far distant from the principle of self-love and of one's own happiness.[40]

The *good will,* so determined, is a "pure will" insofar as it is "determined not by one's own life in its own potency but only by the subordination of one's own life to the will of its ground [that is to say, the purpose]".[41]

The *third aspect* in which the superiority of human nature as the principle of ethics is supposed to be shown concerns the role of pleasure in moral philosophy. As already indicated, the good will of Kant cannot be determined by one's expecting pleasure from the actuality of an object; and as also indicated, Kant relates such material determination of the will to the concept of happiness, which he once defines as consciousness of the uninterrupted agreeableness of

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39 Trendelenburg (1867a), 182–188, 201–203.
40 "Wo in dem innern Wesen und Zweck des Menschen das Princip für das Wollen und Handeln liegt, wo dies Wesen dergestalt in der ganzen Tiefe und Hoheit gefasst ist, dass der Mensch sich in seiner Vernunft vollendet, theils indem er die Tugenden des Erkennens in sich ausbildet, theils indem er seine blinden Triebe dem denkenden Theile zu folgen lehrt, wo die Lust nicht um ihrer selbst willen gesucht, sondern nur als eine vollendende Folge betrachtet wird, aus der an und für sich gesuchten naturgemässen Thätigkeit entspringend: da ist ein solches materiales, praktisches Princip von dem Princip der Selbstliebe und der eigenen Glückseligkeit weit entfernt" (Trendelenburg (1867a), 184 f.).
41 Trendelenburg (1867a), 202.

life[42] and once as a condition in which all "goes according to wish and will".[43] That the good will is *determined* through the form of the law does not mean, however, that it has no object or that happiness is not a goal for the moral agent. On the contrary: the moral agent strives towards a highest good in which virtue and happiness coincide; and he or she must, according to Kant, act on the assumption that this good is realizable.[44] (Why this is, is a difficult question that we can leave to one side here.) Now, how should it be guaranteed that all "goes according to wish and will" for a morally acting being? Kant's answer: in the sensible world this cannot be guaranteed.[45] This is precisely the antinomy of practical reason which is ultimately resolved with the help of the theory of the postulates.[46]

This manner of connecting morality and happiness, so rich in presuppositions and demanding, is particularly sharply criticized by Trendelenburg. He maintains (and probably not wholly illegitimately) that it is "artificial" and an "open defect" in Kant's system.[47] And he again attempts to show that with human nature a principle is found that allows morality and pleasure (morality and happiness) to be connected in a much simpler and less artificial way. This claim is based on the (Aristotelian) notion of pleasure as something that is present when we act in accordance with our own nature: "In pleasure we feel", Trendelenburg states, "that one's own life in itself is preserved or elevated"[48], whereby "one's own life" does not refer to mere survival but also to higher activities such as seeing or thinking.[49] Pleasure is therefore not the motive of action but, as it were, a by-product of the fulfilment of our natural purpose. In this way it can, says Trendelenburg, "strengthen" duty instead of, as Kant thinks, merely "obstructing" it.[50]

In summary we can thus enumerate three advantages that according to Trendelenburg speak for human nature as the principle of ethics:

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42 KpV 5:22.

43 KpV 5:124.

44 KpV 5:107–119.

45 KpV 5:114 f.

46 KpV 5:119–134.

47 Trendelenburg (1867a), 190.

48 Trendelenburg (1867a), 204. Trendelenburg here refers to Aristotle's conception of a 'pleasure in activity' that does not conceive pleasure as a perceptible balancing of a deficient physical state and therefore as *genesis* (as in Plato) but as a concomitant phenomenon of an uninhibited activity (*energeia*) of the natural disposition (NE VII 12, 1153a12–15; VII 13, 1153b9–12; compare NE X 4–5).

49 Trendelenburg (1867a), 204.

50 Trendelenburg (1867a), 191, 196 and *passim*.

(4) Judgements about human nature can be universal and necessary in a strict sense and at the same time have definite content.

(5) Human nature provides a "material determination of the will" that is not hedonistic or egoistic.

(6) Human nature makes it possible to bring together pleasure (happiness) and morality in a simple way without making pleasure the motive of action.

These three theses also represent three criteria by which Kant's moral principle can be characterized, according to Trendelenburg (and that he evidently held to be correct). First, this principle claims universal and necessary validity; secondly, it contains a non-hedonistic and non-egoistic determination of the will; yet thirdly, its observance is nonetheless connected with pleasure.

We now have a first answer to our initial question ('How can Aristotle's reference to the human function be taken as a reference to a moral principle in the sense of Kant?'). We know the criteria by which Trendelenburg characterizes Kant's principle, and we know why he takes the concept of human nature to fulfil these criteria. In the next step, we will compare Trendelenburg's theses more closely with what we actually find in Aristotle's and Kant's ethical writings. In this way similarities and differences will be highlighted, and the presuppositions of Trendelenburg's recourse to these philosophers will be uncovered.

III Between Aristotle and Kant

Let us begin with the first criterion (thesis 4): the principle of morality claims to be universally and necessarily valid. While Kant assumes that this claim can only be met by the 'formal universal', Trendelenburg argues that with human nature the 'concrete universal' can be raised to the principle. As already mentioned, this is not so much a matter of an ethical but of a metaphysical or epistemological thesis. Its philosophical basis lies in the so-called 'organic world-view' that Trendelenburg develops in his *Logical Investigations* and that he explicitly refers to in the *Conflict*.[51]

The theory of the organic world-view, which is the core of Friedrich Adolf Trendelenburg's philosophical system, is complex and cannot be reconstructed here in detail.[52] What should be noted, however, is that this world-view comes

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[51] Trendelenburg (1867a), 201.

[52] On the theory of the organic worldview, its role in Trendelenburg's systematic project as well as its precursors in ancient philosophy and German Idealism, see Hartung (2006a), 294–307

with a *teleological*, as opposed to a mechanistic, explanation of nature. This explanation, directed by the "inner purposes" of objects, is supposed to provide the basis for a unified system of the sciences that can at least claim to overcome the dualism of form and content, or thinking and being, and that is conceived as a model of stages.[53] The highest stage of this system is the science of ethics, which refers to "humanity" and accordingly starts from the "inner purpose of humanity" (*der innere Zweck des Menschen*): "The ethical emerges from the organic as the common ground, through the distinguishing difference of the human".[54]

In the present context, it is first of all crucial to see that Trendelenburg understands the organic world-view as a revitalization of an ancient, particularly Aristotelian, conception.[55] The similarities are in fact obvious. For Aristotle assumes (i) that an appropriate explanation of nature has to be teleological, (ii) that the indispensability of such a teleological explanation results from the purposiveness and regularity of natural processes and (iii) that processes aiming towards a goal are linked with a specific form of necessity.[56] Furthermore, Aristotle also identifies the 'inner purposes' of objects as principles (*archai*) of their explanation. It is in fact characteristic of Aristotle's teleology that it exclusively deals with such inner purposes. What is at issue is the teleological explanation of the properties and behaviour of substances but, not the claim that the events of nature as a whole are directed towards a purpose.[57]

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and Beiser (2013), 32–68. The significance of the organic worldview for Trendelenburg's ethics is discussed by Hartung (2006b).

53 What is central to this overcoming is the concept of "movement", which, according to Trendelenburg, denotes the decisive similarity between thinking and being. In addition compare Schmidt (1977), 9–17; as well as Lachmann (2006), 15–26. Further compare Hartung (2006b), 88 f. on Trendelenburg's concept of philosophy as a "formation of hypotheses" that does not simply begin in pure thinking but rather presupposes the "intuition of beings – and indeed their radical singularity and irreducible plurality" (p. 88).

54 "Aus dem Organischen als dem Gemeinsamen geht durch den artbildenden Unterschied des Menschen das Ethische hervor". Trendelenburg (1862), vol. 2, 90.

55 Note, however, that Trendelenburg usually characterizes the teleological, anti-mechanistic explanation as "Platonism" (for example in Trendelenburg (1862), vol. 2, 458 ff.; Trendelenburg (1868), § 18).

56 For evidence on the indispensability of teleological explanations of nature see in particular Aristotle, *Physics* II and *De partibus animalium* I 1 (in addition compare the example from the chapter "The Purpose" in Trendelenburg's *Logical Investigations:* Trendelenburg (1862), vol. 2. Chapter IX). *Physics* II 9 is relevant for the concept of hypothetical necessity (*anankaion ex hypotheseôs*).

57 Compare, on Trendelenburg's position on this question, Beiser (2013), 55: "The organic worldview demands that we view nature as more than a collection or composite of distinct organisms; rather, we must regard it as a *single* organism. Idealism then means that all of nature

Trendelenburg's ethical project thus appears to be 'Aristotelian' to the extent that it is based on an understanding of nature marked by Aristotelian(-Platonic) thought. By starting from the inner purpose of humanity (in Aristotle: its *ergon*), ethics applies the universal principle of the organic world-view (the basic principle of all explanation of nature) to the concrete case of the human, according to Trendelenburg. Ethical propositions are thus given a natural-philosophical basis.

Despite those obvious correspondences, however, it is not perfectly clear whether Aristotle pursues the same issues when he refers to the human function in ethics. On the one hand, it is true that this recourse establishes a link between ethics and natural philosophy: Aristotle's teleological understanding of nature includes living organisms, whose properties and traits are explained with reference to their specific function. And the claim that actualizing this function is in some way good for the corresponding living organism[58] is quite familiar from Aristotle's natural philosophy.[59] On the other hand, it seems highly debatable whether this link is supposed to offer a natural-philosophical basis for the account of human happiness, that is, whether Aristotle's ethics is *grounded* in his philosophy of nature. Doubts about this view arise primarily because Aristotle conceives ethics as a dialectical investigation and thus compares the conclusion of his function argument with established opinions about happiness and the highest good.[60]

Furthermore: the thrust of Aristotle's ethical writings does not fit very well with the idea that the human function would indicate necessities that are imposed on us by human nature, so to speak, and that we have to appropriate. The concept of human nature, or propositions belonging to the field of natural philosophy on a more general level, are just not sufficiently present there to support such a reading. Besides, with the definition of ethics as the "philosophy of human affairs" (*hê peri ta anthrôpeia philosophia*[61]) Aristotle does not refer to the

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should conform to a single purpose, idea or concept." Strictly speaking such a conception of nature as an organism is reminiscent of the Plato of the *Timeaus* rather than Aristotelian natural philosophy.

58 NE I 7, 1097b26 – 8.

59 Aristotle treats the expressions *telos* and *agathon* as practically interchangeable (for example: *Metaphysics* A 3, 983a31 f.; α 2, 996a23 – 26; K 1, 1059a35 – 38 and *passim*). However, he regularly emphasizes that what is at issue in goods as ends is not the 'absolute' but a specific good (see for example NE I 5, 1097a16 – 20; Aristotle, *Eudemian Ethics* I 8, 1218a30 – 33).

60 NE I 8. The complex debate concerning naturalism and Aristotelian ethics cannot be properly presented here. It is important to understand that the reference to the nature of human beings should not be automatically equated with the project of a 'validation from the outside'.

61 NE X 9, 1181b15.

object but to the goal of ethics. Ethics is distinguished by the fact that it primarily aims, not at knowledge but at *action*.[62]

Here we come up against a limit of Trendelenburg's appropriation of Aristotle: Trendelenburg reads the reference to the human function as introducing an ethical principle in a specific sense which is not substantiated in Aristotle, although the idea a teleological explanation of nature is thoroughly Aristotelian, and although his definition of human happiness draws upon the function, the inner purpose, of a human being.

But thesis (4) seems no less revealing in regard to Trendelenburg's more precise relationship to Kant. So we should dwell on it a little longer.

What has been said so far suggests something like the following picture: Trendelenburg's main philosophical objective is to project a system of the sciences that has a unified logical basis (in the sense of the *Logical Investigations*) and encompasses all regions of reality. Ethics is the science that is concerned with the human, that is, the 'ethical', sphere. It fits into the system, because it extends the principle of the organic worldview (i.e., the purpose) to that sphere and grasps it, thereby, as a stage (*Stufe*) built on that worldview.

The concern for a metaphysical foundation of the sciences appears to represent an important similarity between Kant and Trendelenburg, even if the underlying metaphysics is different. Nevertheless, Trendelenburg's critique of Kant's ethics seems to miss its object in a peculiar way. For however Kant's moral law (or his categorical imperative) is to be understood, it is not a principle of a science of ethics one sphere of reality. It is rather a moral principle, just as Kant's metaphysics of morals is primarily *moral philosophy*. Now, what does this mean?

At the very least, it means the following: the highest "principle of morality"[63] is not a law in the sense that we could derive from it propositions concerning what is universally and necessarily the case, but propositions concerning what is universally and necessarily to be done. It is, in Kant's words, a "practical law"[64], a law that concerns reason in its "practical application"[65]. Even if Kant starts from the assumption of a unity of reason, it would be quite misleading to take this practical application to be a 'stage' of the theoretical.[66] And despite all simplifications, it should be evident that the differences between theory and

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[62] NE I 3, 1095a2–6; II 2, 1103b26–31.

[63] GMS 4:392.

[64] KpV 5:27 passim.

[65] KpV 5:15.

[66] Compare the "Preface" and the "Introduction" to the *Critique of Practical Reason* (KpV 5:3–16).

practice, between knowledge and action, have significant effects on how we understand the concept of *validity* that is mentioned in thesis (4). Trendelenburg, on the other hand, gives remarkably little thought to the difference between knowledge and action in the *Conflict*. His model of stages appears to simply skate over this distinction.

This aspect is worth pursuing further, but before that I would like to introduce two features that, according to Kant, distinguish the moral-practical law:

(7) The moral law is a *principium diiudicationis* and thus allows a distinction between the morally right and the morally wrong (this is the point of the universalization test).

(8) The moral law is *principium executionis* and thus provides an "incentive" (*Triebfeder*), a motive for moral action (this is the point of Kant's distinction between legality and morality and his conception of an action out of respect [*Achtung*] for the moral law).[67]

And there is something else that seems important with a view to thesis (4). Although it is certainly true that Kant offers a *system* of ethics, it should be borne in mind that he does not develop his moral principle on the basis of this system but in departure from what we would call moral intuitions and what he names "common moral rational cognition" (*gemeine sittliche Vernunft-erkenntnis*).[68] That moral laws claim universal and necessary validity does not depend in the first instance on their having an appropriate metaphysical foundation, but on the fact that our everyday moral judgments claim to be valid without exception. In Kant's words, this "is clear of itself from the common idea of duty and of moral laws".[69] (The awareness of this claim, which for Kant properly defines the entire domain of morality, is a "factum" of reason.[70])

Now, whatever one may think of this concept of morality, the aspects just mentioned (the principle is a moral criterion, it provides a motive and it starts from our everyday moral understanding) seem to specify conditions that any al-

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67 Compare Kant's *Lectures on Moral Philosophy* on these two concepts, for example Kant (2004), 55 f.: "Here we have to first see two parts, on the *principium* of the *diiudication* of the obligation and on the *principium* of the execution or the achievement of the obligation. Guiding principle and incentive are to be distinguished here. [...] When the question is that of what is morally good or not, it is the *principium* of the *diiudication* according to which I judge the *Bonitaet* and *Pravitaet* of the action. When the question is what moves me to live according to these laws, so that is the *principium* of the incentive".

68 GMS, "First Section" (4:393–406).

69 GMS 4:389.

70 KpV 5:30–33.

ternative has to meet in order to even be recognizable as a moral principle in a relevant Kantian sense. But at first glance Trendelenburg's principle of ethics does not appear to fulfil these conditions at all. It is a principle in a completely different sense (such that we arrive at a similar conclusion as in the comparison with Aristotle). Does this mean that Trendelenburg is talking at cross-purposes to Kant?

I do not think that this is the case. It appears to me more correct to say that for Trendelenburg human nature should ultimately achieve both. It is the principle of a science of ethics in the sense of the *Ethical Investigations*,[71] and it is a moral principle in the Kantian sense. But since Trendelenburg does not really draw this distinction,[72] it is a task of interpretation to collect his references to human nature as a moral principle in the sense of (7) and (8). In the following, I would like to present some of these references.

First, however, it should be remembered that Aristotle's dealings with the human function present hardly any points of connection in this regard. The reason has already been mentioned. Although the concept of a human function is indeed the starting point of Aristotle's account of happiness, there is no indication that the virtuous person would be oriented in a comparable way by that concept as the Kantian moral actor is oriented by the form of the law in that she (i) tests her maxim by universalization and (ii) always acts for the sake of the law. If there is something like a *principium diiudicationis* in Aristotle, then it would rather be found in the concepts *orthos logos* or *hôs dei*. (It is instructive, by the way, that Kant himself did not take the principle of Aristotelian ethics to be human nature but rather the *mean*[73], since the mean is in fact the specific difference between virtue and vice and thus approaches the notion of a *principium diiudicationis*. As an interpretation of Aristotle this may still be problematic,[74] but it confirms what we said about Kant's concept of principles.) But also as a *principium executionis* in Aristotle, human nature seems to be hardly suitable. For however

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[71] Compare again Hartung (2006b).

[72] Compare Aristotle's concept of *archê*, which has a comparably broad meaning and is in the most general sense simply a "starting point" – be it the point of departure of an explanation, a deliberation, an action and so on (compare Aristotle, *Metaphysics* Δ 1).

[73] Thus for example in the *Lecture on Universal Practical Philosophy and Ethics* (postscript: Kaehler) (Kant (2004), 60 f.).

[74] The mean does indeed present a criterion for the distinction between virtue and vice. But this does not imply that that concept of the mean must play a role in the deliberations of the virtuous agent as one might expect of a moral principle in the narrow sense. For the Aristotelian conception this is even less likely.

Aristotle might conceive of virtuous action, there is no indication that insight into nature would play any part in it.[75]

Now, what does Trendelenburg have to say about these points?

What he states in the *Conflict* about human nature as a moral criterion (*principium diiudicationis*) is not really helpful. It is more productive to take a look at the aforementioned "Development of the Ethical Principle" in *Natural Law on the Basis of Ethics*,[76] and in particular at how this principle is determined with regard to its content.[77] Unlike Kant, Trendelenburg does not start from our common moral rational cognition but from considerations concerning the history of philosophy. He thus does not ask: 'What is common to our everyday moral judgments?', but: 'What becomes apparent when we look at philosophical conceptions of the ethical principle in their development?' Having introduced the teleological perspective as authoritative for ethics, Trendelenburg sketches a number of such conceptions, which he conceives as "stages" (*Stufen*) on the path to the right principle, that is, human nature. Roughly put, these stages move on the one side from the "individual" and "subjective" to the "universal" and "objective" (the steps are pleasure, self-love, self-preservation and self-perfection)[78] and on the other from the formal universal to the universal of inner purpose (the steps are Kant, Herbart and Clarke)[79]. They hence approach the principle of human nature as it were from two sides; and Trendelenburg emphasizes as particularly important that while the individual stages point ahead to the principle in one way or another, this principle adopts aspects of all the stages into itself.

But is it, then, even possible to compare Kant's "Transition from the Common Moral Rational Knowledge to the Philosophical"[80] to Trendelenburg's "Development of the Ethical Principle"? The theoretical presuppositions are certainly very different. While Kant starts from his project of a critique of reason, Trendelenburg's historical perspective is obviously stamped by the philosophy of post-Kantian Idealism. However, it is interesting that Trendelenburg seems to see Kant's service to ethics precisely in his view of the *concept* of morality. According to Trendelenburg, Kant's essential insight is to find the moral criterion (the *principium diiudicationis*) in the *universal* in which "the self-seeking partic-

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75 The relationship between natural teleology and the teleology of action belong rather to the basic problems of an interpretation of Aristotelian ethics.

76 Trendelenburg (1868), §§ 17–44. On this text, see Weiss (1960); Hartung (2008).

77 Trendelenburg (1868), § 20 ff.

78 Trendelenburg (1868), §§ 22–28.

79 Trendelenburg (1868), §§ 31–33.

80 GMS, 'First Section'.

ular [...] is dismissed".[81] His only mistake is that he determines this universal falsely, namely in formal terms. This way of putting things is surely problematic, for it neglects the theoretical shifts needed for a transition from the formal to the concrete universal. It helps us, however, to more accurately determine Trendelenburg's relation to Kant and above all to his concept of principles. The interpretation of human nature as a *moral principle* (in contrast to its interpretation as a principle of knowledge of a determinate sphere of reality) lies "in the rigor of the universal".[82]

Now, what about human nature as *principium executionis?* It follows already from theses (5) and (6) that Trendelenburg wants to attribute this role to his ethical principle. He shares Kant's view that moral action must not be done for the sake of pleasure, but he denies the conclusion that the form of the law must inevitably yield the determining ground of the will. In Trendelenburg's picture, the idea of humanity is an object that can determine the will without one's needing to expect pleasure from obtaining it. But how does that work?

To answer this question, it does not suffice to point out that actualizing the idea of humanity has nothing to do with egoism or self-love. For Kant is not concerned with evaluating the object of desire itself but with the question of how such an object moves us to action. The rejection of self-love is not a moral issue but a principle in the theory of action.

Whether there is a worked-out theory of action underlying theses (5) and (6) cannot be properly answered here. The basic thought, which is formulated in volume II of the *Logical Investigations*[83] and sketched once again in the *Conflict*,[84] seems to be clear, however: Gaining insight into the sphere of the ethical (into the inner purpose of humanity, based on an organic worldview) has, motivational consequences. According to Trendelenburg, human beings do not unconsciously and blindly desire their inherent purpose, as animals do, but consciously want it. By grasping the higher determination of humanity , we also grasp the "ethical task"[85] to actualize it and overcome our animal nature. It is crucial that for Trendelenburg the knowledge of nature does not generate counsels of prudence but something that comes quite close to the Kantian concept of duty:

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81 Trendelenburg (1867b), 123. Here are some further criteria, resulting from the development of the ethical principle in *Natural Law on the Ground of Ethics:* moral activity is, for example "consistent", "universal", "strong character", "autonomous", "not animalistic", "not self-seeking" and "directed towards the community".

82 Trendelenburg (1867b), 123.

83 Trendelenburg (1862), vol. 2, Chapter X.

84 Trendelenburg (1867a), 185–192, 201–203.

85 Trendelenburg (1867a), 201.

One must explicate to oneself the inner purpose according to its origin and its effect so as to see that we must recognize it in the realm of the ethical as the law of life, which commands so that we obey. For the inner purpose is the thought of existence (*der Gedanke des Daseins*), that for the sake of which something exists or exists in the way it does. As therefore the things are only through it, they are also towards it; it is the will of the ground (*der Wille des Grundes*), in as far as the will first gives thought power over existence; and in it rests the measure for all value of life. Whoever fails to obey this law distances themselves from the will of the ground and falls away from this which alone gives the moral world meaning and the right of a power.[86]

Let us briefly summarize, once again, this somewhat complicated train of thought. At first glance Trendelenburg appears to start from a concept of principles which is totally different from that of Kant. The relationship between the metaphysics of nature and the metaphysics of morals in Kant is not readily comparable to the relationship between the different stages of the organic worldview in Trendelenburg's system. On second glance, however, it turns out that this system provides a rationale for the idea that human nature might also fulfil the functions that distinguish Kant's moral law. Human nature is a criterion of morality insofar as it represents the universal (i. e., what is non-egoistic), and it provides an incentive insofar as it discloses a task that is imposed upon us as humans.

IV Aristotelianism in Ethics

We now have a more accurate picture of the similarities and differences between Trendelenburg's *Conflict*, on the one side, and Kant's and Aristotle's ethical writings, respectively, on the other. It has been emphasized that the situation is quite complex – more complex in any case than would be suggested by the idea of an 'overlooked alternative'. Starting from this diagnosis, I will now, by way of con-

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86 "Man muss sich den innern Zweck nach seinem Ursprung und nach seiner Wirkung deutlich machen, um einzusehen, dass wir ihn auf dem Gebiete des Ethischen als das Gesetz des Lebens erkennen müssen, das da befiehlt, damit wir gehorchen. Denn der innere Zweck ist der Gedanke des Daseins, dasjenige um dessen willen etwas da ist oder so da ist wie es ist. Wie daher die Dinge nur durch ihn sind, so sind sie auch zu ihm; er ist der Wille des Grundes, inwiefern erst der Wille dem Gedanken Macht über das Dasein giebt; und es ruht daher in ihm das Mass für allen Werth des Lebens. Wer diesem Gesetze den Gehorsam versagt, entfernt sich von dem Willen des Grundes und fällt von dem ab, was ihm allein in der sittlichen Welt Bedeutung und das Recht einer Macht giebt" (Trendelenburg (1867a), 202).

clusion, try to locate Trendelenburg between Aristotle and Kant and sketch, insofar as the *Conflict* is concerned, what his ethical Aristotelianism amounts to.

Trendelenburg's basic thesis is, as we recall, that Kant was right to ground ethics on a principle but that he determined this principle falsely, namely in formal terms. In contrast to this, Aristotle identified the right principle of ethics: human nature. So we should follow Aristotle in moral philosophy.

At first blush, this is a bewildering thesis. For it not only seems to contradict some of Kant's and Aristotle's basic assumptions about ethics. It also does not seem to make much sense, unless one starts from a very broad interpretation of what it means to be a principle of ethics: an interpretation that comprises Aristotle's *ergon* as *archê* of a natural-philosophical explanation as well as Kant's moral principle as an explicitly practical law. The more detailed comparison in section III has confirmed that bewilderment. But it has also made clear that the different concepts of principles in Trendelenburg are tightly bound to each other. What at first glance appeared to be terminological neglect is on closer examination the expression of determinate theoretical presuppositions.

In contrast to Kant, Trendelenburg appears to start from a concept of principles which (i) rests on a different metaphysics (a metaphysics allowing for judgements about the "concrete universal") and in which (ii) the contrast between knowing and acting plays no role. In Trendelenburg, insight into human nature is also insight into reasons for action. These reasons do not concern counsels for obtaining our natural goals but are duties that human nature imposes on us (such that Trendelenburg can see similarities between Kant's concept of the moral and his own). This is an essential feature of Trendelenburg's systematic approach; and even if it is not so presented in the *Conflict*, this feature appears to be central for locating Trendelenburg *vis-à-vis* Kant. Without significant shifts in the theory of action, human nature could never become a serious candidate for being the principle of morality. But as Trendelenburg tends to speak of a difference between the formal and the concrete universal, this aspect is not immediately evident.

Following this, it is now clearer why Trendelenburg thinks that Aristotle had "not worked out his principle such that everything emerges from what lies therein".[87] For it is indeed true that the reference to the human function in *Nichomachean Ethics* I 7 establishes a connection to natural philosophy that is similar to what Trendelenburg has in mind. But the relationship between ethics and theo-

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87 Trendelenburg (1867a), 187.

retical philosophy is here conceived in a completely different way.[88] At least two developments are needed such that the human function can emerge as a competitor to Kant's form of the universal. First, the human function must explicitly be conceived of as something universal, as opposed to something individual. Second, it must, with regard to motivation, be established as a non-egoistic determining ground of the will. To do the latter, Trendelenburg connects – in a rather unconventional manner – Aristotle's conception of a pleasure that emerges when we act according to our nature with Kant's contrast between an action "out of duty" and an action "out of inclination". This connection is also unconventional because Trendelenburg, in considering the pleasure of unimpeded activity as the key to overcoming "Kant's antinomy between good will and pleasure, morality and happiness",[89] ultimately starts from a Kantian concept of happiness. It is true that Aristotle regards pleasure as a component of the happy life,[90] but he certainly would not equate *eudaimonia* with an enduring feeling of happiness. – Trendelenburg's ethical Aristotelianism is decidedly an Aristotelianism of the 19th century.

A postscript: if one seeks an ancient model for Trendelenburg's approach, one would rather find it in Hellenistic ethics, as discussed, for example, in the fifth book of Cicero's *De finibus bonorum et malorum*. For in Hellenistic philosophers, we see combined the naturalistic approach with a psychological perspective that cannot be found in Aristotle. According to the Stoic-Peripatetic theory of natural 'appropriation' (*oikeiôsis*), for instance, insight into nature – be it human or cosmic nature – is also an insight into what we have reason to do. It is this idea of *following* nature that connects Trendelenburg's approach with Hellenistic (rather than Aristotelian) thoughts.[91]

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88 Interestingly, what is at issue both in the differentiation of Trendelenburg and Kant as well as in the differentation of Trendelenburg and Aristotle is the question concerning the relation of theory and praxis: just as Kant in his moral philosophy relied upon a critique of *practical* (as opposed to theoretical) reason, Aristotle sees the essential characteristic of ethics in its reference to *action* (as opposed to knowledge). Both distinctions are evidently suspended in Trendelenburg's system.

89 Trendelenburg (1867a), 209.

90 NE I 8, 1099a7–21.

91 The most important passages are *De finibus* III 16–22 and V 24 ff. The parallels are striking between Trendelenburg's approach and the 'Academic-Peripatetic' position that Cicero treats in Book V and that probably goes back to of Antiochus of Ascalon. Spelling out these parallels, however, would be the task of another investigation.

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Denis Thouard

War on Rhetoric? Aristotle's *Rhetoric* in the 19th Century

No art cultivated by man has suffered more in the revolutions of taste and opinion than the
art of Rhetoric.
Thomas de Quincey

Abstract: This chapter tackles the peculiar reception of Aristotle's *Rhetoric* in post-revolutionary France. In his study of Ernst Havet's rehabilitation of Aristotle's rhetoric in 19th century France, Denis Thouard explains how Aristotelian texts were politicized in various ways. Victor Hugo echoed the sentiments of many in declaring a "war on rhetoric", and in particular on Aristotle's *Rhetoric*. It is argued that this was part of a levelling of discourse which was meant to inculcate truthfulness and eliminate power differentials tied to variations in the power to persuade: an ambitious program allied with the ideals of the French Revolution. Tracing the fate of Aristotle's *Rhetoric* and the theory of rhetoric from Romanticism to Positivism in French literary theory and culture in the long 19th century, Thouard localizes the reception of Aristotle's *Rhetoric* in a wider cultural context.

By all appearances the *Rhetoric* was not a favourite of the 19th century. Although there was renewed interest in a certain Renaissance of Aristotle, it hardly touched this text. Rather the *Metaphysics* and the *Organon* stood at the centre of an unexpected and considerable re-appropriation. When one thinks of those great promoters of this history, from Trendelenburg to Brentano, or of Felix Ravaisson in France, the *Rhetoric* is conspicuous by its absence. One searches for it in vain in the volume *Aristote au 19e siècle* (Thouard (2004)). The volume *Aristotelische Rhetorik-Tradition*, edited by Joachim Knape and Thomas Schirren, slides from Vossius to Heidegger (Knape/Schirren (2005)).[1] In other words, the entire 19th century is skipped. That is certainly not an oversight but rather documents its second-class status in a double sense: in the Aristotelian corpus as well as in the course of the Aristotelian tradition.

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1 Françoise Douay-Soublin (1990) proves successfully that this rhetoric, as theory and as practice, had not disappeared. On religious oratory in the 19th century, the important contribution by Frank Paul Bowman (1980).

Even though much in the *Rhetoric* remains unsurpassed and even if hardly anything obsolete can be discerned in it, as opposed, perhaps, to other books such as the *Physics*, the following will not contradict this sobering picture. However it is nonetheless interesting to ask why this general rejection occurred, especially in France, a country that would *a priori* have offered a favourable field for its blossoming between 1789 and 1914. The liberation of the citizens and speech, the gradual universalization of their rights, their participation in public life – this whole movement, which expressed itself in the rapid succession of new governments and constitutions in the course of the century, lent the spoken word renewed relevance. From the great orators of the revolution to the heroes of the Third Republic, eloquence flourished in parliamentary praxis. There are thus good grounds for dealing with the case of France in particular.

In the following, first, I will attempt to show the context of the general rejection of Aristotle's *Rhetoric*, so as to situate the particular position of rhetoric appropriately in this time. What is predominantly at issue is expression for the Romantics, the restriction of tropes for Structuralism, and the accusation of being unscientific for Positivism. Secondly, on the basis of these preliminaries, I mention some prominent translations of the *Rhetoric*, which are contextualized but not treated in detail. Finally, I explore the contrast between two important contributions to Aristotelian *Rhetoric*, Ernest Havet's 1843 dissertation and Anthelme-Edouard Chaignet's later book from 1888.

I Turning Away from Rhetoric

I.1 Guerre à la rhétorique! – War on Rhetoric!

No one had drawn the poetological consequences of the revolutionary experience better than Victor Hugo in his *Réponse à un acte d'accusation* from January 1834 that he added to the volume *Les Contemplations* (1864; Hugo (1973)). This was not just about "setting a red cap on the old dictionary", i.e. taking words from all walks of society[2]. There are no noble or privileged words and thus also none that are ostracized.

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2 Je fis souffler un vent révolutionnaire.
Je mis un bonnet rouge au vieux dictionnaire.
Plus de mot sénateur ! plus de mot roturier !
Je fis une tempête au fond de l'encrier [...]

The Enlightenment dealt also with words: they all came to their majority; they became empowered to speak for themselves. The authority of Aristotle must thus be deposed:

> [...] je montai sur la borne Aristote,
> Et déclarai les mots égaux, libres, majeurs.
> I climbed on the milestone Aristotle
> And declared all words equal, free, of age

This declaration of the universal rights of words, however, is only the superficial side of Victor Hugo's romantic revolution (Jenny (2006)). The antithesis *Guerre à la rhétorique / et paix à la syntaxe (War on rhetoric/and peace to syntax)* is more important to him. With this Hugo stated the core of a very specific French poetics that had fashioned itself from Racine to Mallarmé, Valéry or Ponge. The intellectualism of French poetry is actually based on this syntactic centring, that Valéry pointedly expressed in his summary formulation: "*La syntaxe est une faculté de l'âme*" (syntax is a faculty of the soul).[3]

Even if Hugo is somewhat given to the use of emphasis, he stands nevertheless for this core and thus is important for an understanding of the view of rhetoric in this context. As Hugo writes:

> [...] et je criai dans la foudre et le vent:
> *Guerre à la rhétorique et paix à la syntaxe!*
> Et tout quatre-vingt-treize éclata. Sur leur axe,
> On vit trembler l'athos, l'ithos et le pathos.[4]

It makes little sense to accuse such a poet of exaggeration when this is precisely the very core of his occupation. However, it is significant that he literally invokes 1793, i.e., he invokes a reign of terror which he expressly wants to transpose into literature.[5]

The reintroduction of rhetoric in the 20th century by the logician and lawyer Chaim Perelman was much encouraged by a French literary critic and the editor

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3 Valéry (1960), 481.

4 And then I shouted to thunderbolt and wind / war against rhetoric and peace to syntax! / And all 93 blew up. On their axis / trembled athos, ithos, and pathos (Hugo 1973).

5 *Nota bene:* Hugo was only politically for the revolutionaries after he had revolutionized literature. This lead him to Guernesey in a protest against Napoleon III's coup d'état (*Les Châtiments,* 1853) and to a sympathetic attitude towards the Paris Commune (*L'Année terrible,* 1872). He had initially given himself out to be a legitimist (*Odes,* 1820).

of the *Nouvelle Revue Française:* Jean Paulhan.[6] In his book *Les fleurs de Tarbes ou la Terreur dans les Lettres*, published in 1941, Paulhan takes issue with the Romantic inheritance that lead to peculiar excesses in Surrealism in particular, in part to an arbitrariness of expression with which he found it difficult to live. Paulhan resists the mania to write without rhetoric, that is *without rule* and, as it were, from genius alone. The whole of Romanticism would thus have been an aberration. It would now be important to invent a "suitable rhetoric" instead of leading a war against it.[7] And he even gave excerpts from the *Livre dou Trésor* and *Rettorica* by Brunetto Latini, who had taught Dante and who modelled himself on Cicero (which latter's works he translated in part), excerpts that make vividly clear what rhetoric can be (Paulhan (1941), 202–215)[8]. The effect of this apology was very powerful, far beyond literary criticism.

I.2 Traité des tropes

The second reason for a disappearance of rhetoric in the 19th century is its so-called reduction of it to tropes. This reduction is itself an invention of French Structuralism which, as is well known, had little sense for history. Roland Barthes had, however, suspected that certain features of modern poetics had already been described by the "ancienne rhétorique". Then Gérard Genette defended the hypothesis that 19th century rhetoric had dwindled to a theory of tropes. Just as Foucault wanted to identify the episteme of the 17th century with the Port-Royal *Grammar*, in the blessed year 1968 Genette introduced a paperback edition of Pierre Fontanier's *Les figures du discours*[9] and soon afterwards disseminated the fundamental thesis of his account under the motto of "abridged rhetoric", "La rhétorique restreinte". Pierre Fontanier, who for the sake of Rousseau liked to be called "Emile", published his *Manuel classique pour l'étude des tropes* in 1821and his *Traité général des figures du discours* in 1827, which Genette assumed as the only still valid sum of the rhetorical tradition.

It was only in 1990 that the first refutation of the myth of the "restricted rhetoric" appeared (Douay 1990). Through these discoveries it gradually became clear that rhetoric in all its dimensions did not disappear in the 19th century but was rather unnoticed and unexplored. The history of rhetoric flourished

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6 Perelman (1977), 9.

7 Paulhan (1941), 99–168.

8 Jean Paulhan, in particular, "L'invention d'une rhétorique"; "D'un traité de rhétorique", in: Paulhan (1941), 99–215.

9 A scholarly reprint was published in 1968.

thereafter. The era of Marc Fumaroli's History of rhetoric [*Histoire de la rhétorique dans l'Europe moderne 1450 – 1950]* from 1999, thus a considerable time after the "age of eloquence" (l'âge de l'éloquence) he had praised, replaced Genette's era (Fumaroli 1994). At last the 19th century was no longer neglected. Pierre Emile Fontanier himself was contextualized in the volume *La rhétorique ou les figures de la Révolution à la Restauration* (Douay/Sermain 2007). So long as the "Genettic" hypothesis was dominant, the genetic and historical itself could not be maintained. In the time of the reign of poetics, no one was interested in rhetoric!

I.3 Between Romanticism and Positivism

Finally the *anti-rhetorical* fronts remain to be considered, which certainly did not constitute a favourable starting point for an evaluation of rhetoric. Speaking very generally, these are the following:

Romanticism despised the artificiality of a *Technê* that fundamentally accepts language as a falsification of the sentiments and even stresses this falsification emphatically. Genius should dispense with the crutches of art-theory. Shakespeare and not Aristotle is the focus.

It was not better, however, in the opposite direction, which was soon to be *positivism.* Even in the times of the Revolution "Idéologues" following Destutt de Tracy worked on a model of speech that resisted any decoration and praised like Stendhal the austere style of the Napoleonic Civil Code as the pinnacle of expression. The penchant for science, and indeed of the most austere kind, left hardly any room for a serious treatment of practical life.

The restorative attempts at eclectic *metaphysics* of Victor Cousin's School were in any case unsuitable for sufficiently recognizing rhetoric as such. Either in the form of a fuzzy rationalism or even as a spiritualism which balked at the effects of the revolution, it was necessary, if anything, to subordinate rhetoric to the eternal values of the good, beautiful and true.

The reception of rhetoric thus played itself out against the background of the romantic burden between the two opposing camps of the spiritualists and the positivists. Before the depiction of this dispute, it is fitting to take a look at the different translations of the work throughout the century.

II Translations of the *Rhetoric*

There was hardly any philological editing of the *Rhetoric* in France (Hecquet (2004); Erickson (1975)). However reference was often made to German editions

by Spengel and Roemer (Spengel (1844), Roemer (1899)). But all the same a series of five translations can be found which testify that the work was anything but forgotten among the philologists.

Etienne Gros (1797 – 1856) published a "new translation" together with the Greek text in 1822. This had no great claim to accuracy, as can be judged from the following beginning of his translation:

> La rhétorique a du rapport à la dialectique; car, comme les matières dont elles traitent toutes les deux sont communes à plusieurs arts, tout le monde en a la connaissance jusqu'à un certain point (Gros (1822), 3).[10]

"[A] du rapport", "refers to in some way" or "has some relation to", is a rather vague translation of ἀντίστροφος. In so translating, Gros emphasizes the "philosophical" relevance of the work. In this early attempt, when he was still "professeur adjoint au collège royal de Saint-Louis" and thus a secondary school teacher, he invokes the critic La Harpe. Gros' further development leads him to a synthesis concerning the old rhetoric (Gros 1835, 1836, 1840) which he dedicated to Abel-Francois Villemain (1790 – 1870) and to a courageous Latin translation of Philodemos' Rhetoric as reproduced in the English reprinting: *Philodemi Rhetorica ex Herculanensi papyro lithographice oxonii excusa restituit latine vertit E. Gros.* This translation appeared in 1840 with the triple dedication to Jean-Francois Boissonnade (1774 – 1857), Joseph Victor Le Clerc (1789 – 1865) and Charles Benoît (Karl Benedikt) Hase (1780 – 1864) (Perraky 2005; Maufroy 2005).

In 1837, *L'art de la rhétorique par Aristote* appeared, by the Greek scholar Minoide Mynas (1790 – 1860). He was "ex professeur de philosophie et de rhétorique en Macédoine", who was renowned for a translation of Fénelon's *Télémaque* into ancient Greek. He had finished his translation in 1826 but the publication was delayed for almost ten years. As a Greek, Minoide Mynas claimed to have a direct access to the matter itself, which claim his opponents sometimes doubted or simply ridiculed. He expressed his disappointment with Bekker and relied instead on the manuscripts of the Royal Library in Paris. Turning to the Incipit it can be understood why his self-assessment met with little acclaim. Thus the beginning reads: "La rhétorique est l'inverse de la dialectique" (rhetoric is the inversion of dialectic). Where Gros was too imprecise, Mynas threatens to upend the meaning.

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10 Rhetoric refers in a way to dialectics: then as the matter both are dealing with what is common to several arts, everyone has knowledge of it up to a certain point. Rhetoric refers in a way to dialectic; then, as the matter both are dealing with what isis common to several arts, everyone has knowledge of it up to a certain point. .

However the manner in which he emphasizes the relevance of the work is interesting. The *Rhetoric*, this very famous work ("cet ouvrage dont on parle beaucoup"), was no longer read. Mynas brings the value of rhetoric explicitly into relation with the needs of modern political life:

> Supposez que la chambre va délibérer sur une question quelconque; par exemple: la France doit-elle intervenir dans les affaires d'Espagne ou non? si vous n'admettez pas les lieux communs, vous détruisez toute sorte de délibération qui doit rouler et qui roule toujours sur l'intérêt, le beau, le possible, le difficile etc., car l'orateur qui prendra la parole n'a qu'à prouver que c'est dans l'intérêt de la France; et que cette mesure ajoutera à sa gloire etc.[11]

Norbert Bonafous (1809 – 1882), like Gros, came from the great school of Victor Cousins, Villemains and Le Clercs, but he also acknowledges his teacher Burnouf, a philologist who also influenced Renan (*L'Avenir de la science* is dedicated to him). Here a positivistic turn can already be detected: tellingly, his Latin doctoral work was dedicated to Poliziano (Bonafous 1845). The foreword to his *Rhétorique d'Aristote*, published in 1856, mentions the predecessors and acknowledges a particular indebtedness to Ernest Havet und Emile Egger.[12] His formulations are also more precise than both of the aforementioned: "La rhétorique est le pendant de la dialectique; leur objet à toutes deux est en quelque façon accessible à tous les esprits et ne réclame aucune connaissance spéciale." (Rhetoric is the counterpart of dialectic, their common subject is quite accessible to every mind and needs no special knowledge).

Jules Barthélémy Saint-Hilaire (1805 – 1895) published his translation of the *Rhetoric* in 1870, which originated from the project of a global translation of Aristotle's works and on account of this was distinctly less conspicuous (Barthélémy Saint-Hilaire 1870). In his version, the Incipit reads:

> La rhétorique est la contre-partie de la dialectique. Elles roulent toutes les deux également sur certaines matières communes, dont la connaissance appartient en somme à tout le monde et qui ne forment pas l'objet d'une science spéciale.[13]

He emphasizes in a footnote that "contre-partie" can also be rendered as "pendant" (as in Bonafous), which however is much closer to the Greek (i.e. ἀντίστροφος).

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11 Mynas (1837), XIV.
12 Bonafous (1856), X; Egger (1849).
13 Rhetoric is the counterpart of dialectic. Bothe deal equally on common matters, which knowledge belongs indeed to everyone and don't form the object of a special science.

According to Charles Emile Ruelle (1833 – 1912), Bonafous' translation is a leap forward as compared to the previous:

> M. Norbert Bonafous publia, en 1856 (Paris, Aug. Durand, in-8°), la *Rhétorique*, accompagnée d'un riche commentaire et d'une nouvelle traduction qui laissait bien loin derrière elle toutes les précédentes. Pour la première fois, le texte était serré de près, mais nous avons dit plus haut que ce système, appliqué dans toute sa rigueur, n'était pas, du moins à notre avis, sans inconvénient. La traduction donnée, en 1870, par M. Barthélemy-Saint Hilaire est d'une lecture facile et agréable, mais encourrait plutôt la critique opposée. Elle avoisine la paraphrase.[14]

Charles Emile Ruelle still enjoys a certain relevance inasmuch as his 1883 translation of the *Rhetoric* (together with the *Poetics*) was reprinted in 1991 as a paperback. Although revised, it still retains most of the original footnotes (Ruelle (1991)). In an edition introduced by Michel Meyer, Ruelle is employed for the services of the School of Bruxelles, founded by Perelman (Lempereur (1990)). Thus, the circle could be closed. Ruelle is still honoured today not as a classic, but as a solid translation, perhaps also as a translation that is free of copyright. As regards its content, Ruelle follows Havet's study, which had suitably emphasized the philosophical implications of rhetoric.[15] In this Ruelle proves himself to be a good authority regarding the tradition, both of the Germans (Spengel, Brandis, Vahlen, Bonitz) and of the English (Meredith Cope). In his version, the Incipit reads:

> La rhétorique se rattache à la dialectique. L'une comme l'autre s'occupe de certaines choses qui, communes par quelque point à tout le monde, peuvent être connues sans le secours d'aucune science déterminée. Aussi tout le monde, plus ou moins, les pratique l'un et l'autre ; tout le monde, dans une certaine mesure, essaie de combattre et de soutenir une raison, de défendre, d'accuser.[16]

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14 Ruelle (1883), Mr. Bonafous published 1856 (Paris, Aug. Durand, in-8°) the *Rhetoric*, together with a rich commentary and a new translation that left former attempts far behind it. For the first time, the text was taken closely, but we already said that this method, applied in all its rigor, was not, to our opinion, without drawbacks. The translation that Mr. Barthélémy-Sainte-Hilaire gave in 1870 is pleasant to read, but would be summited to the opposite critique. It comes close to being a paraphrase.

15 Ruelle (1883), XI.

16 Rhetoric is connected to dialectic. Both deal with certain matters somehow common to everyone which can be learned without any other special science. Therefore everyone, more or less, uses both; everyone, somehow, tries to fight and sustain an argument, to defend, to accuse.

Without being always highly accurate, this translation is mostly good. Because of the many translations mentioned above, Aristotle's *Rhetoric* gained a presence that stood in contrast to the disdain for rhetoric itself. To what extent can this presence be confirmed through an actual exploration of Aristotle's theory of rhetoric?

III Science or Values?

Two studies of the *Rhetoric* stand out in that they reveal much about the intellectual and ideological battlegrounds of France in the 19th century. On the one hand there is the doctoral work of the young Ernest Havet (1813 – 1889), *De la rhétorique d'Aristote*, from 1843, and on the other *La rhétorique et son histoire* by Anthelme-Edouard Chaignet (1819 – 1903) which appeared in 1888. While Havet turns to rigorous philology of German origin and to positivism, Chaignet, as a student of Cousin's School, adheres to a conception of philosophy attached to ideal values.

Chaignet's work is less interesting and hence will only be briefly outlined.[17] It is a sprawling paraphrase of the *Rhetoric*, sometimes erudite, sometimes pedantic, which is preceded by a history of rhetoric in Antiquity. Plato is unambiguously preferred, he believed in the good, the beautiful, the true. Aristotle however is understood to be characterized by quite a number of contradictions. In this Chaignet's presentation of certain points is detailed.[18]

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[17] Born in Paris in 1819, Anthelme-Edouard Chaignet was a secondary school teacher for many years in the militaristic Prytanée at La Flèche (where he had also studied) and then in Paris. He received his doctorate with a work on Plato's psychology (*La Psychologie de Platon*, Paris, 1862) and a Latin thesis *De Iambico versu* (Paris, 1862). Afterwards he was a Professor in Poitiers and the Rector of this academy from 1870 (until 1890). In 1871 he won the "Victor Cousin" prize with a writing on Pythagorean philosophy and again in 1873 with a long essay on *De Anima*, *Essai sur la Psychologie d'Aristote contenant l'histoire de sa vie et de ses écrits*, Paris, Hachette, 1883. Among his other publications, the following should be mentioned: *Histoire de la psychologie des Grecs*, vol. 1–5, Paris, Hachette, 1887–93; *La rhétorique et son histoire*, Paris, Vieweg, 1888; Damascius, *Le Diadoque. Problèmes et solutions touchant les premiers principes*, vol. 1–3, translated with commentary, Paris, E. Leroux, 1898; Proclus, *Commentaire sur le Parménide*, vol. 1–3, Paris, Leroux, 1900–1903. Chaignet died in Paris in 1903.

[18] He appears more likely to have used Bonafous' translation: "L'éloquence fait le pendant de la dialectique, dit Aristote (Rh I, 1)", p. 83. But the same solution can be found in Charles Thurot (Thurot (1850), 265) who emphasizes, however, like Ruelle in the first footnote of his translation that ἀντίστροφος can be relationally understood: "La rhétorique n'est pas subordonnée à la dialectique, elle lui est coordonnée (ἀντίστροφος)", Thurot (1850), 171, cited from Ruelle (1991), 75.

The intention of this work is apparent only in the context of the dispute between the old and the new educational system.[19] The Third Republic had just fundamentally changed the school regulations with the Ferry Laws of 1885 and thereby accorded less room to the "humanities". The teaching of rhetoric had even disappeared as such[20] which, for Chaignet, represented a "danger for the education of the youth" however also "for the development and position of classical taste and of the *esprit français*" in general.[21] The positivists are primarily to blame, for example Mr Taine, whose relativism no longer draws a distinction between "the Iliad and a Kaffir's song". The prejudices that surface here appear to be of common parlance in this time, but they breach the principles of these new ways of doing science for which reason someone like Chaignet would be prompted to oppose them. He struggles against the new trend of Sainte-Beuve, Guizot, and also Taine (Nordmann 1992), who surpasses all of the aforementioned:

> These doctrines, which are fundamentally nothing but the conquest of the region of ideas by history, the triumph of fact over reason, which [former] is the law and the cause [of the latter], have exercised such a general if not deep influence on the mind [...] such that one has come to the point of dissolving the classes of rhetoric.[22]

The book thus had the political goal of working for the restoration of such teaching. Rhetoric is indeed presented in detail, i.e. without any reduction of the tropes, however it remains representative of education, of the Paideia that is to be saved. But even when the principles of pedagogy are at stake, the contrast to his contemporary Havet is enormous.

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19 Fumaroli (1994), 5–6; for context: Compagnon (1983), "Historiens et rhéteurs: rivaux à tous les niveaux", 35 ff.

20 Compagnon (1983), 40: "C'est la mort de la rhétorique, dont le nom, vidé de sens, ne sera cependant rayé officiellement qu'en 1902, où il désignait encore la classe la plus noble du lycée". For a nuanced and detailed appraisal of the disappearance of rhetoric from the curriculum after 1880, see Francoise Douay-Soublin (1995), 51–154, in particular 94–104, and on the Third Republic's "réformes rhétoricides" see 86 ff.

21 Chaignet (1888), Foreword VII.

22 Chaignet (1888), XV: Ces doctrines qui ne sont au fond que l'envahissement de l'histoire du domaine des idées, le triomphe du fait sur la raison qui en est la loi et la cause, ont exercé sur les esprits et particulièrement dans la critique une influence sinon profonde, du moins générale. C'est une de leurs conséquences qui a fait supprimer de la classe de rhétorique l'enseignement de la rhétorique théorique qui lui avait donné son nom,

To get an impression of Havet's importance, the words that Ernest Renan said at his grave on the 24th of December should be called to mind.[23] Renan honours him as a servant of the "obstinate quest for truth [recherche obstinée de la vérité]", a servant of the Greek's great revelation of reason:

> La Grèce a préparé le cadre scientifique, susceptible d'être indéfiniment élargi, et le cadre philosophique, susceptible de tout embrasser, où n'ont cessé de se mouvoir, depuis deux mille ans, les efforts intellectuels et moraux de la race à laquelle nous appartenons. [...] La culture grecque ne demande aucun sacrifice à la raison. [...] Suivre ce grand cordon d'eau vive, ce Nil bleu qui traverse les déserts, fut la tâche de Havet. Il s'en acquitta avec une sorte de foi. Jamais croyant ne fut plus fidèle à son dogme que Havet à sa philosophie.[24]

How can this iron rationalist deign to treat rhetoric? How does this fit in with the picture Renan projects of him? Renan mentions his work concerning the *Origins of Christendom*, a work which he partly appreciates, but remarks that its author can be inclined to a certain rational dogmatism: "It's an inflexible book. Havet believes in truth and doesn't compromise".[25] And yet in the end:

> Sa grande âme traversa le monde, sans autre souci que le vrai. Les séductions, les charmes décevants de la probabilité ne l'attiraient pas. Il n'aimait que le certain; les mirages lui échappèrent; il ne vit que ce qui dure, la raison.[26]

Renan himself had always shown a strong aversion to any rhetoric and dialectic[27]. Havet, however, his companion at the Collège de France, who– long before

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23 He likewise esteemed Hippolyte Taine as his master (Nordmann 1992, 139). On this see Taine (1903–1904).

24 Renan (1994), 1128. Greece prepared the scientific frame, to be extended indefinitely, and the philosophical frame, able to embrace everything, wherein, for 2000 years, all intellectual and moral endeavours of our race moved. [...] Greek culture doesn't afford any sacrifice to reason. [...] To follow this long track of vivid water, this blue Nile which cuts the deserts, this was Havet's task. He did it with a kind of faith. Never was a believer more faithful to his dogma than Havet was to his philosophy.

25 Renan (1994), 1129: "C'est un livre inflexible. Havet croit au vrai; il ne transige pas".

26 Renan (1994), 1129–1130: «His great soul crossed the world without thought to anything but the truth. The seductions and deceiving charms of probability didn't interest him. He wanted only what is certain, mirages went forth from him, he only saw what remains, reason».

27 He hated the "metaphysical subtleties" of the Middle Ages, and always preferred the "creative", "spontaneous epochs" to the congealed, reflective epochs. This led him, for example, to the following judgments in his *Leben Jesus* so as to reject certain texts: "On sent le procédé factice, la rhétorique, l'apprêt." (Renan (1962), 66).

Renan's volatile membership – won in 1854 the chair there for "Latin eloquence", had actually treated rhetoric scientifically.[28]

In addition to his two doctoral theses on Aristotle and Homer, Havet had also made a name for himself as an editor of Pascal (Havet (1852, 1864b, 1889)) and as well as a defender of his colleague Renan at the time of his banishment from Collège de France after his infamous lecture on "Jesus, this incomparable man" ("Jésus, cet homme incomparable") (Havet (1863, 1864a))[29]. This apology lead to the four-volume work *Le christianisme et ses origines*, which was published by Michel Lévy, who was also Renan's publisher, and which apparently outstripped even Renan's goals, such that Renan welcomed it only conditionally.[30]

In the "terrible" year of 1871 he wrote two pages, as his work was going to the press, by way of summary of his philosophy: "We will only rescue ourselves by freedom, under the two basic forms of Republic and freethinkers and by rule [...], i.e. by morality and discipline. We must liberate ourselves from all authority, from all traditions that are not based on reason and at the same time strictly master ourselves [...]."[31] Havet draws on philology and the history of religion in order to buttress his moral view. His book bears a political intention. But what about his earlier Aristotelian work?

Havet's alignment, just outlined, is actually already evident in his earlier work on rhetoric, a work which is still worth reading today (Havet 1983). There

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28 Born in 1813, Ernest Havet lost his faith early on. In 1832 he entered the Ecole Normale Superieure where he taught until his double doctorate in 1836. He received his doctorate in Latin on the Homeric question, in French on Aristotle's *Rhetoric*. Shortly afterwards he was employed as the co-worker of Joseph Victor Le Clerc (1789–1865), perhaps the most important rhetorician of his time. He taught at the Ecole Polytechnique from 1844, then from 1854 in the Collège de France and from 1880 in the Ecole Pratique des Hautes Etudes. When he died in 1889 his son Louis, also a Latin philologist, replaced him in the Collège de France and soon afterwards set to the modernization of spelling, the spread of secular ideas and the defence of Dreyfus (Thouard (2014)).

29 The formulation "l'homme incomparable", which initiated the scandal in the oral presentation, can be read in Renan (1963), 94.

30 Havet attempts to essentially anchor Christianity in Hellenism and distances himself from its centring on Jesus. Moral progress would have happened without Christianity although probably in another form, see Havet (1871), VI. In his eyes, Renan even insists too much on Jesus. Havet writes of the proximity of both undertakings: "Le titre que j'ai donné à mes études *Le Christianisme et ses origines* reproduit presque le titre général sous lequel M. Renan a rassemblé ses derniers travaux: *Histoire des origines du Christianisme*. Peut-être que mon ouvrage répond encore plus exactement que le sien à ce titre, puisque M. Renan raconte plutôt la naissance du Christianisme qu'il n'en cherche les origines" (Havet (1871), XLIII-XLIV).

31 Havet (1871), II.

Voltaire, as the author of the *Philosophical Dictionary*, is willingly and approvingly cited! This concise book, which comprises 129 pages in the first edition and 124 in the second, expanded edition (in which the author defends himself in some footnotes against certain comments), contains more than many certainly more comprehensive studies. Havet presents an original, actually a truly *Cartesian* interpretation of rhetoric which emphasizes the mental activity of the orator.

Havet investigates the uses of rhetoric *today* and wants to show that this precisely remains *new and fruitful.* For him it is the "only philosophical" rhetoric. His book can remain concise because he adheres to the principle of leaving all the details to one side and follows the resolution of "developing its method"[32]. He thus explicitly defends a conception which recognizes rhetoric in all its argumentative implications and relativizes ornamentation. He not only explains that Aristotle philosophically rescues rhetoric from its despisers but identifies his basic procedure, saying that "Aristotle rigorously enclosed eloquence in proof".[33] He responds to Malebranche's rationalistic criticism, made with an unduly restrictive Cartesianism, that does not see how Aristotle wrote against the rhetorician as sophist[34]. But at the same time he reprimands Fénelon's literary view for paying too little respect to rule and method.[35]

In this respect, Havet highlights the uses as well as the universality of rhetoric. Everyone speaks and can improve their ability to speak with some effort. For rhetoric is nothing but the reflection of a universal human facility. And it is for this reason that it is of philosophical significance. The aim is thus to expand our powers. This universality is not without a certain democratic connotation which should be heard "today". He traces the recognition of human understanding (bon sens) further to a development of human capabilities.

> [...] L'art de persuader est à l'usage de tout le monde. La rhétorique n'est qu'une méthode pour le développement d'une faculté qui est dans tous, et que tout homme a intérêt à fortifier en lui, s'il veut vivre de la vie de l'intelligence.[36]

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32 Havet (1843), 1.

33 Havet (1843), 72: "[...] la sévérité avec laquelle Aristote renferme l'éloquence dans la preuve [...]."

34 In an addition to the second edition, where he states that in *Recherche de la vérité* V, 2 Malebranche takes aim at the wrong opponent (Havet 1846, 20).

35 Havet (1843), 23.

36 Havet (1843), 26: «The art of persuasion is for everyone's use. Rhetoric is no more than a method in order to develop an innate faculty in everyone, that every person has to fortify for himself if he wants to live for the intelligence».

This universality lends rhetoric its philosophical legitimation as an intermediary between science and the masses. Truth, as we said, is the new deity for a man such as Havet. "La vérité, c'est où doit aller l'orateur par l'imagination comme le philosophe par la science".[37] However only a philosophical doctrine of art can plausibly work for the dissemination of truth. On account of this, Aristotle's rhetoric takes on a new role in a time in which truth and universality threaten to diverge. That is the case on the one side when science had become specialized and thus also has abandoned philology to the status of *Belles Lettres*, as the result, then, of a division of labour; and on the other side when people become equal and strive for equal rights, a process that was, of course, irresistibly advanced by the French Revolution. Havet thinks he can mediate this tension in the sense of a universal education:

> Qu'est-ce en effet que l'éducation en général, et en quoi consiste-t-elle sinon à mettre insensiblement à la portée de tous la lumière qui n'éclairait d'abord qu'un petit nombre d'intelligences, de manière que la foule, longtemps aveugle, prenne enfin sa part du spectacle?[38]

The wish to bring truth to all inspires education when it is not just passively imitated but active and regulated. A classical education does not aim at the authors being read and read again, what is at issue is rather the understanding of how such classical works are made in that one attempts "to extract the spirit and the method":

> On fera enfin le travail qu'a tracé Aristote [...] Car il n'a pas pu tout dire; et ce n'est pas un des moindres avantages à tirer de sa rhétorique que de pouvoir se faire à soi-même, en suivant sa méthode, une rhétorique beaucoup plus complète.[39]

He thus underlines this "creative rhetoric" or *rhétorique créatrice*, based on a self-appropriation of the methodological core of rhetoric that is still valid today. He always returns to the principles and thus provides more than a study, rather a philosophical update of rhetoric.

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37 Havet (1843), 122.

38 Havet (1843), 53: «What, indeed, is education in general? In what else does it consist but in bringing imperceptibly to all the lights that first enlightened only few minds, so that the crowd, so long blind, takes its part in the show?»

39 Havet (1843), 54: «We'll then follow and complete Aristotle's work [...] For he was not able to say everything, and it's no small advantage of his *Rhetoric* that it allows us to make for ourselves, following his method, a much more complete rhetoric».

In its basic features this update is, firstly, a brilliant exposition of Aristotle's dialectical intent which is not without political consequences. Secondly he emphasizes at the same time the ethical conditions, what he calls the "éthique oratoire"[40], in as much as rhetoric concerns "all that pertains to a free people", "tous les objets qui intéressent un peuple libre".[41]

He distances himself from the Ciceronian conception of the orator as *vir bonus* in that he relies on the principle that "good causes can be better defended than bad [ones]".[42] *Proof* constitutes the basis of rhetoric: "La preuve, c'est le corps du discours, c'est la substance de l'éloquence, c'est l'aliment même de la passion".[43]

How does Havet understand the doctrine of rhetorical proof? To better understand his view of this it is worth considering the short sections that Havet dedicates to the enthymeme.

The enthymeme is the instrument of proof (1355a). It does not matter whether a premise remains unexpressed or not. The enthymeme is rather a correct syllogism, that means, a "rigorous scientific deduction"; only it is rooted in opinion and probability, provided that these are sufficient for the business of life.[44]

What is important for Havet is the distinction between the universal *Topoi* and the specific *Eidè* ("argument spécial ou selon les espèces", subject-specific propositions, specific basic propositions according to Krapinger). The *Topoi* that pass from universalities to specifics can even be construed as the law of the syllogism in general. Topoi are any logical forms of the arrangement of the argu-

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40 Havet (1843), 40.

41 Havet (1843), 72.

42 Havet (1843), 31.

43 Havet (1843), 34.

44 Havet (1843), 37: "L'instrument de la preuve, c'est l'enthymème. Ce mot n'exprime pas simplement, comme chez nous, un accident extérieur du raisonnement, qui consiste en ce qu'une des deux prémisses n'est pas exprimée; c'est là une distinction superficielle et sans aucune importance. Quand Aristote appelle l'enthymème le syllogisme oratoire, il entend par syllogisme une déduction rigoureuse et scientifique, par enthymème, un raisonnement fondé sur l'opinion, et sur ces probabilités qui suffisent dans la pratique des affaires". Havet refers with this to Aristotle, *Analytica priora* II, 29, 2. Thomas de Quincey insisted in an essay published in *Blackwood's*, on this important difference: "An enthymeme differs from a syllogism, not in the accident of suppressing one of its propositions; either may do this, or neither; the difference is essential, and in the nature of the matter: that of the syllogism proper being certain and apodeictic; that of the enthymeme simply probable, and drawn from the province of opinion" (De Quincey 1890, 90). De Quincey quotes extensively the Italian scholar Jacopo Facciolati *De Enthymemate* (1724): Nego enthymema esse syllogismum mutilum, ut vulgo dialectici docent. I deny, says he, that the enthymeme properly understood is a truncated syllogism, as commonly is taught by dialecticians (Facciolati 1729, 229).

ments. However, the orator treats specific problems and therefore cannot directly rely on philosophy, he simply requires specific arguments to establish his proof. According to Havet it is *ta eidè*, the facts, "les observations, les faits ou les idées", that provide the material of the proof.[45] Thus in a successful proof both belong together. When, however, the orator has hardly any Topoi he can use for his purposes, because the former are too general, he will prefer to take specific arguments drawn from observation and praxis so as to develop his speech in an efficient and pragmatic manner. The orator does not always need the "absolute", i.e., philosophical dialectic, but develops his own "rhetorical" dialectic.

However the question is: where can rhetoric can take its tenets from? Havet appeals to 1356a25[46] so as to find the source of the basic principles of rhetoric in moral philosophy and politics. However its imprecision is advantageous because he thus avoids an all too sharp separation between dialectic and politics or moral philosophy, which would threaten the unity of rhetoric.

> With less stringency but with more accuracy Aristotle understood that even though rhetoric, abstractly and ideally considered, does not have a separate existence and the orator, so taken, has not a science of his own, he nevertheless has a specific use of this science in practice [...].[47]

Havet sees the performance of rhetoric as located between dialectic and ethics, inasmuch as Aristotle is the only one who worked out a "rhetorical ethics", that is, not a pure dialectic or a pure ethics but the bringing together of basic ethical propositions that are authoritative for the orator. Accordingly rhetorical proof does not correspond to a dialectical syllogism but is based on its own rhetorical

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45 Havet (1843), 38. The relevant passage is: "En un mot, les *topoi* ne sont que des formes logiques, et en poussant l'analyse un peu avant, on trouvera que le premier des *lieux* est la loi même du syllogisme, qui consiste à conclure pour le cas particulier ce qui a été établi en général ; on pourrait l'appeler le *lieu* du général au particulier : *Ta eidê* au contraire, ce sont les observations, les faits ou les idées, qui font la matière du raisonnement, et sans lesquels ces formes sont vides".

46 "It follows that the *Rhetoric* is to some extent an offshoot of dialectic and the preoccupation with ethics, and that earned the designation 'statecraft'".

47 Havet (1843), 39: "Avec moins de rigueur et plus de justesse, il a compris que si la rhétorique, considérée abstraitement et en idée, n'a pas d'existence à part, si l'orateur, à le prendre de cette manière, n'a pas une science à lui, il a néanmoins dans la pratique un emploi particulier à faire de la science", and further: "qu'il n'est pas un dialecticien ni un philosophe de profession, mais qu'il emprunte seulement à la philosophie certaines ressources pour venir à bout de certaines difficultés ; enfin, qu'outre la dialectique et l'éthique absolues, il y a une dialectique de l'orateur, une éthique de l'orateur, et que c'est ce qui doit composer un traité de rhétorique."

principles such as can be formulated according to the three main genres of speech. When Havet notes immediately that for the orator this "inventory of observations and principles of moral science and politics [inventaire des observations et des principes de la science morale et politique]" is actually not only unfinishable but also hardly representable, he thus reveals once again what it is that interests him in rhetoric: the basic structure and methodology rather than their execution. It is certainly regrettable that he does not go deeper into detail here.[48] However it is entirely consistent with what Havet sees as his priority: "Aristotle cannot say everything but he has given us a method that we can follow and it is up to us to apply it".[49]

Scarcely more could be expected from a youthful work from the 1840s in France – much remains unfulfilled, and precisely the points on which one would have liked to know more are not further clarified. These defects notwithstanding, this work can be still be appreciated on account of its focus and concision and also because the basic intention of the work is taken seriously and considered with topical, i. e. political, intentions.

IV A Political Dialectic

Havet's rationalism is directed towards a political view, namely that of democratization. Rhetoric was important to him as a popular-philosophical reflection. He especially emphasizes in this "une dialectique populaire, une dialectique politique"[50], thus a popular dialectic, a political dialectic. This characterization is actually meant otherwise than in the later and reactionary interpretation by Chaignet. Havet's topical and thus political reading testifies to the greatness but also to the narrowness of his professed positivism. His line has been drawn and he will remain true to it.

Nothing shows this better than his predictable reaction to the infamous passage on torture (1356a35; 1377a), "the most odious and regrettable passage of the *Rhetoric*" ("le passage le plus honteux et le plus déplorable de la *Rhétorique*)".[51] The only thing which Havet can say in Aristotle's defense is that he contents himself with a "dry assertion". Otherwise this is of course scandalous. He is

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48 Havet (1843), 37: "De l'enthymème. C'est ici qu'Aristote entre dans les détails de son sujet, et commence l'étude de la preuve et de l'argumentation oratoire."

49 Havet (1843), 41. "[...] Aristote n'a pas pu tout dire, mais il nous a donné une méthode à suivre, et c'est à nous de l'appliquer."

50 Havet (1843), 127.

51 Havet (1843), 77.

said to have felt such fierce discomfort about this point that he added a comment in the second edition, three years later. Doing so, he cites the interpolation to 1377a[52] from Robert Estienne's translation from 1624 that is found in certain codices (Venezia, Speier) but was rightly removed from the text by Vettori[53]. It is interesting to see how Havet interprets this interpolation as a protest!

> It's pleasant to see this French [translator] speaking suddenly himself where his author wasn't loud enough, in order to penetrate the truth, with the most familiar and vivid expressions, in the head of his fellow citizens. .[54]

Bonafous had expressed another explanation of this part of the text. In a condescending remark he asks himself when commenting on Havet's mistake in relation to this interpolation, whether "Monsieur Havet, who is known for always having so much taste and measure, had not perhaps let himself be carried away by the zest of his character when he so heavily castigates Aristotle's indifference to torture?"[55]. However Bonafous' explanation would scarcely satisfy Havet. Bonafous writes:

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52 "Or ce qu'il convient proposer c'est Que les tesmoignages tirez des tortures ne sont point certains ny veritables; attendu que par fois il se trouve des hommes forts et robustes, lesquels ayant la peau dure comme pierre et le courage fort et puissant endurent et supportent constamment la rigueur de la gesne; au lieu que les hommes timides et apprehensifs avant que d'avoir veu les tortures, demeurent incontinent éperdus et troublez. Tellement qu'il n'y a point de certitude aux tesmoignages tirez des tortures." Havet quotes from *La Rhétorique d'Aristote*, traduicte en françois, par le sieur Rob. Estienne, Paris: Impr. de R. Estienne, 1624 (Estienne 1630, p. 87 [=1377a]) The Budé edition of *La Rhetorique* puts this passage in brackets (p. 141).

53 Pietro Vettori had done this in his *Commentarii in tres libros Aristotelis de Arte dicendi*, published in 1548 in Florence. As Norbert Bonafous remarks in Bonafous (1856), 415: "La protestation de Robert Estienne est tout simplement la traduction d'un texte grec qui ne se trouve pas dans l'édition des Aldes mais qu'on peut lire dans la seconde édition de Venise, dans celle de Camotius, de Spire, de Majoragius." His study of Poliziano had certainly made Bonafous be attentive to the problems of philological critique. The interpolated text was varied by Montaigne (*Essais* II, 5): "C'est une dangereuse invention que celle des gehennes, et semble que ce soit plustost un essay de patience que de vérité" (Montaigne (1950), 405).

54 Havet (1846), 71: "On aime à voir ce Français qui prend tout à coup la parole pour dire à sa manière ce que l'auteur grec n'a pas dit assez fortement à son gré et pour mieux enfoncer la vérité, au moyen de ses expressions familières et vives, dans la tête de ses concitoyens".

55 Bonafous (1856), 415: "M. Havet d'ailleurs, qui a toujours tant de goût et de mesure, ne se laisse-t-il pas entraîner par la générosité de son caractère, quand il flétrit avec tant de force l'indifférence d'Aristote relativement aux tortures?"

> Moreover, Aristotle, living in a time that considered slavery as a natural right, couldn't see, on human dignity, the true and right ideas given to us by the Gospel.[56]

Above all Havet disputes whether this actually assigns a correct origin to these ideas. Havet's engagement for the matter of progress in human rights will only be confirmed in his later work. In the book *Le Christianisme et ses origines*, in which he campaigns for the Hellenistic share in early Christianity, we read this clear warning in the preface:

> L'Eglise a régné dix-huit cent ans et l'esclavage, la torture, l'éducation par les coups, bien d'autres injustices encore, ont continué tout ce temps, de l'aveu de l'Eglise et dans l'Eglise : la philosophie libre n'a régné qu'un jour, à la fin du XVIIIe siècle, et elle a tout emporté presque d'un seul coup.[57]

This can also be well understood as a response to Bonafous – and at the same time illustrates the indispensability of the political context for a fair assessment of the reception of rhetoric.

<p style="text-align:center">⋆ ⋆ ⋆</p>

Under the auspices of Renan, but perhaps long after him, a discussion took place in the course of the 19th century concerning rhetoric and its proper place, a conversation that was at times not purely academic, but was not for that less interesting.

Havet had programmatically delineated the function of rhetoric in modern France. His reading is explicitly philosophical in that rhetoric is firstly a theory of proof, secondly an analysis of the passions and of morals and thirdly a theory of expression. Havet understands the *Rhetoric* as part of the "science of man", "Une partie de la science de l'homme".[58] The expansion of the dialectic of *probabilities* to a *popular*, even *political* dialectic is characteristic of his concerns: "Aristotle gives the truest idea of Rhetoric one can give. It's a dialectic of the probable, a popular and political dialectic" ("L'idée qu'Aristote donne de la

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56 Bonafous (1856), 415: "De plus, Aristote, vivant dans un temps où l'esclavage était regardé comme un droit naturel, ne pouvait avoir sur la dignité de l'homme les idées vraies et justes que l'Evangile nous a données". There is also the following writing from Bonafous, which possibly explains this reaction (Bonafous 1864).

57 Havet (1871), XXII: «Christendom reigned for 1800 years and slavery, torture, education through corporal punishment, and many other injuries were still in use all the time in the church and with the church : the free philosophical thought dominated only one day, at the end of the eighteenth century, and took all this at one go».

58 Havet (1846), 127.

rhétorique est la plus vraie qu'on s'en puisse faire. C'est une dialectique du vrai-semblable, une dialectique populaire, une dialectique politique").[59] Havet had no interest in subtleties, and thus kept with the "philosophical spirit" he praised. In this his interpretation is all the clearer. It bears the mark of a philosophical and political actualization of Aristotle's *Rhetoric* that will be determinative for the 20th century. Rhetoric articulates a universal human competence, its method is subject-directed, and because of this it acts as a means of democratization. Thus Havet is able to rescue rhetoric from the anti-rhetorical front by wanting to make the rational core of the *enthymema* fruitful for the new "science of man".

If Romantic poetry had loudly and colourfully declared the war on rhetoric, this latter nonetheless flourished in the political domain. The spoken word was still the main means of political confrontation well into the Third Republic. Until 1885, the general curriculum still included the elementary knowledge of rhetoric, a fact which several translations of Aristotelian works confirm. However, this text was not rediscovered, as was the case in the 20th century, on account of the theory of affects (Heidegger) or the regaining of the natural doctrine of argumentation (Perelman). The *Rhetoric* remained a material for use in school teaching and in this way was confirmed further that it remains in the centre of language reflection and praxis, thanks to a rather beneficial political condition.

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59 Havet (1846), 127.

Annex: Ernest Havet on Enthymema, topoi and eide (1843, 37 – 40)

De l'enthymeme

Des εἴδη et des τόποι

De l'Enthymème.

C'est ici qu'Aristote entre dans les détails de son sujet, et commence l'étude de la preuve et de l'argumentation oratoire. L'instrument de la preuve, c'est l'enthymème. Ce mot n'exprime pas simplement, comme chez nous, un accident extérieur du raisonnement, qui consiste en ce qu'une des deux prémisses n'est pas exprimée; c'est là une distinction superficielle et sans aucune importance. Quand Aristote appelle l'enthymème le *syllogisme oratoire*, il entend par syllogisme une déduction rigoureuse et scientifique, par enthymème, un raisonnement fondé sur l'opinion, et sur ces probabilités qui suffisent dans la pratique des affaires. C'est ce que toute la Rhétorique fait entendre, et c'est ce qu'il a exprimé positivement dans *les Premières Analytiques* (***II***, 29, 2) : «L'enthymème est un syllogisme fait avec des vraisemblances, Ἐνθύμημα μὲν οὖν ἐστι συλλογισμὸς ἐξ εἰκότων.»

Des Εἴδη et des Τόποι

«Mais, dit Aristote, il y a entre les enthymèmes une grande différence, et que personne n'a aperçue.» Cette différence, la voici : quand on conclut par exemple du plus au moins, ἐκ τοῦ μᾶλλον, on fait un argument qui peut s'appliquer à toute matière, et qui ne se fonde ni sur le droit, ni sur la politique, ni sur aucune connaissance des choses physiques ou morales, mais sur les lois mêmes du raisonnement. Ce sont là des cadres où tout peut rentrer, et c'est pourquoi on les appelle des lieux communs, ou simplement des lieux, τόποι. Au lieu de cela, quand on raisonne d'après certaines notions particulières, l'argument ne peut s'appliquer qu'aux matières auxquelles se rapportent ces notions. *Il est alors spécial* ou, selon les espèces, κατὰ τὰ εἴδη.

En un mot, les τόποι ne sont que des formes logiques, et en poussant l'analyse un peu avant, on trouvera que le premier des *lieux* est la loi même du syllogisme, qui consiste à conclure pour le cas particulier ce qui a été établi en général ; on pourrait l'appeler le *lieu* du général au particulier.

Τὰ εἴδη au contraire, ce sont les observations, les faits ou les idées, qui font la matière du raisonnement, et sans lesquels les formes sont vides.

Voici maintenant l'importance de cette distinction. Si la rhétorique n'est qu'une faculté générale indépendante de toute application, un procédé de démonstration et de persuasion, pour ainsi dire, où prendra-t-elle ces notions spéciales, ces opinions et ces principes, sans lesquels elle ne produirait rien, puisqu'elle travaillerait sur rien?

Ce sera dans la philosophie morale et politique; là est le fond que l'orateur mettra en œuvre avec l'instrument de l'argumentation, et c'est ainsi qu'Aristote a pu dire : La rhétorique tient à la fois de la dialectique et de la morale, παραφυές τι τῆς διαλεκτικῆς εἶναι καὶ τῆς περὶ τὰ ἤθη πραγματείας.

Mais il n'a point abusé de cette analyse comme l'ont fait plus tard les philosophes de son école, reprenant la dialectique d'un côté, la morale et la politique de l'autre, et laissant la rhétorique entre ces deux choses comme un vain mot. Avec moins de rigueur et plus de justesse, il a compris que si la rhétorique, considérée abstraitement et en idée, n'a pas d'existence à part, si l'orateur, à le prendre de cette manière, n'a pas une science à lui, il a néanmoins dans la pratique un emploi particulier à faire de la science : qu'il n'est pas un dialecticien ni un philosophe de profession, mais qu'il emprunte seulement à la philosophie certaines ressources pour venir à bout de certaines difficultés ; enfin, qu'outre la dialectique et l'éthique absolues, il y a une dialectique de l'orateur, une éthique de l'orateur, et que c'est ce qui doit composer un traité de rhétorique.

Cependant, de ces deux choses, les rhéteurs n'en étudient qu'une, et c'est la moins importante. *Ils font un peu de dialectique, les uns plus, les autres moins; ceux-ci se bornant à passer en revue les noms et les formes des différentes sortes d'arguments ceux-là entrant dans la théorie des topiques. Mais pour une éthique oratoire, un inventaire des observations et des principes que la science morale et politique fournit à l'orateur, et qui sont les vraies sources du raisonnement, c'est ce qu'Aristote seul a fait, c'est par où son livre est original, et aujourd'hui encore cette théorie n'est pas moins neuve que lorsqu'il remarquait qu'elle était aussi ignorée qu'importante, μάλιστα λεληθυῖα σχεδὸν πάντας.*

(Ernest Havet, *Etude sur la rhétorique d'Aristote*, Paris: Delalain, 1846, p. 37 – 40).

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On the contributors

Philipp Brüllmann is Assistant Professor of Philosophy at the Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität, Munich.

Thomas Buchheim is Professor of Philosophy at the Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität, München.

Gerald Hartung is Professor of Philosophy at Bergische Universität Wuppertal.

Dale Jacquette (†) was Professor of Philosophy at the Universität Bern.

Colin Guthrie King is Associate Professor of Philosophy at Providence College and Visiting Professor of Philosophy at the Universität Basel.

Christian Pfeiffer is Assistant Professor of Philosophy at the Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität, Munich.

Valentin Pluder is Assistant Professor of Philosophy at the Universität Siegen.

Christof Rapp is Professor of Ancient Philosophy at the Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität, Munich.

Denis Thouard is Research Director at the Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS), Centre Georg Simmel-EHESS, Paris.

Paul Ziche is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Utrecht.

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