Dante as Political Theorist

Reading Monarchia

Edited and with an Introduction by

Maria Luisa Ardizzone

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

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INTRODUCTION

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In 1921, the sixth hundred anniversary of Dante's death, Pope Benedict XV (1914–1921) promulgated the Encyclical, *In Praeclara summorum*, addressed to "Dilectis filiis doctoribus et alumnis litterarum artiumque optimarum orbis catholici". In the Encyclical, the only intellectual recalled and praised as one of the highest geniuses of the Catholic faith, was Dante Alighieri. His works were quoted, and his fight with the papacy was minimized or deleted. The Encyclical, recalling or citing some of Dante's works, among them the *Monarchia*, intended to show how respectful the poet was of the Church, and how his Christian learning, which was influential, made him the perfect model of an intellectual and a poet. But nothing was said about the troubled history of the *Monarchia* and the contention with the Church that this work brought on its author.[1] Placed on the Index in 1559 at the time of the Counter-Reformation, Dante's *Monarchia* had a contentious past. The contention started immediately after the death of the poet, when the Pope John XXII and Cardinal Bertrand of Pujet condemned the book, which, according to Boccaccio, was publically burnt. Later, around 1327, Guido Vernani, a Dominican friar from Rimini, theologian, and supporter of the Church's temporal power, discovered traces of Averroism in the book and opposed Dante's philosophical and political positions in his *De reprobation "Monarchiae" compositae a Dante Aligherio Florentino*.

The events of the 14th century, however, did not hinder the reading and interpretation of Dante's political treatise, which was, at that time, already well-known. Around the middle of the 14th century, Cola di Rienzo, the Roman Tribune friend of Petrarch and admirer of Dante, gave his own lecture on the Latin treatise, writing a commentary on it, in which he

[1] Benedict XV, *In Praeclara summorum*, encyclical letter, Vatican website, April 30, 1921, http://w2.vatican.va/content /benedict-xv/la/encyclicals/documents/hf_ben-xv_enc_30041921_in-praeclara-summorum.html.

stressed the role of the Emperor, the Roman roots of the Empire, and the Roman virtues, as celebrated by the Latin treatise, as well as opposing the temporal claims of the Church. Later, in the 15th century, Marsilio Ficino, the translator of Plato and leader of the Platonic Academy of Florence, made a vernacular translation of the treatise. The philosophical ground of *Monarchia* and Ficino's Platonism may have prompted Ficino's interest in the political treatise. But probably the translation (made at the request of Bernardo del Nero and Antonio da Tuccio Manetti) was determined by ideological reasons in an attempt to propose a theory of an absolute State, which was mostly synchronic with Florence's cultural and political climate under the Medici. Due to the fact that the treatise cost Dante the accusation of heresy (as noted by Boccaccio and Bartolo of Sassoferrato), it was not in Italy but in the Protestant Basilea that the *Monarchia*'s first printed edition appeared in 1559, published by Giovanni Oporinus (a humanistic pseudonym for Johannes Herbst). That Dante's political work, although rooted in the medieval debates, anticipated in some ways the spirit of Reform is suggested not only by its troubled reception but also by the work itself. The decision of the Tridentine Concilium to place the *Monarchia* on the Index—its reception, contents, and theses being responsible for this decision—comes as no surprise. Dante's *Monarchia* remained on the Index of prohibited books until the end of the 19th century.

Assumed by some readers to be a utopian treatise that looks at the restauration of the feudal sacred Roman Empire, and thus a re-evaluation of the role of nobility and its historical meaning, the *Monarchia* has as its antecedent the critique of nobility of birth and heritage in his canzone, *Le dolci rime d'amor ch'io solia*, and later in the fourth treatise of *Convivio*. This critique, a common topic in Dante's age, shared by poets like Guido Guinizzelli and Guittone D'Arezzo, became more prevalent in Florence at the time of Giano della Bella *Ordinamenti di Giustizia* (1293). It was used as an object of reflection in Dante, which *Monarchy* reshapes in order to show a different perspective.

The Crisis and the Reshaping of the Notion of Excellence

Read (as it must be) in continuity with the *Convivio*, it is evident that Dante, while addressing the *Monarchia* to people able to read Latin and thus experts in the field of politics, history, and law, intends to establish a new basis for the idea and role of nobility. The importance of family inheritance is no longer denied, and individual virtue gives worth to the excellence of the noble tradition.

Since *Le dolci rime d'amor ch'io solia*, Dante, in his criticism of the nobility of birth, began to transform a theory of *censo* and inheritance and thus *pretium* into an ethical value[2]. The canzone, *Poscia ch'amor del tutto m'ha lasciato*, implies a reflection on what is named and assumed as a value, *leggiadria*, in the attempt to establish what the true *leggiadria* is. Between the fourth book of *Convivio* and *Monarchia* we may follow Dante's attempt to give voice to a new historical sense, which corresponds to a transformation of perspective expressed at first in the vernacular of the *lingua del sì* and, afterwards, in Latin. *Monarchia* seems to respond to crucial issues of an historical crisis, as witnessed in the *Convivio;* this is particularly evident in the fourth treatise.

This signalled a double crisis affecting two historical categories: nobility of birth and the aristocracy of the intellect. One had been rooted in European history since the time of barbaric invasions and the genesis of feudal society; the other in the entrance of Aristotle and Aristotelianism beginning in the 12th century. Both Platonism and Aristotelianism, in different ways, established intellectual excellence as something divine in the human being. In Dante's time, both issues were at the center of a heated debate. The *Convivio*, in the first three treatises, attempted to discuss and establish human intellectual activity in its power and its limits. But the final treatise of the *Convivio* expresses the crisis of both: that of nobility of birth and intellectual aristocracy. Under scrutiny was the notion of excellence.[3] In the fourth treatise, Dante utilizes ethics to show that earthly human happiness is built not on the intellectual virtues but on the *metron* of the right medium or mean. Intellectual happiness, we read, is the highest form of happiness but does not belong to earthly life. In a way that mysteriously parallels this idea, aristocracy of birth is criticized, and a new idea of nobility is introduced: nobility is a gift that is received from God as *grazia*, an intellectual gift. Thanks to this gift, human beings are able to choose the right medium. In light of Aristotle's *Nichomachean Ethics*, the treatise establishes the practice of the *mezzo* (the Greek *mesotes* and Latin *mediocritas)* as a way to live, according to the eleven ethical virtues (*Convivio* 4.18). In the same treatise, when Dante discusses the intellectual virtues, he is assuming a position that is not purely Aristotelian, but implies a Christianized re-reading of Aristotle. It is true that intellectual virtues are more excellent than the moral ones, but Dante here assigns the

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2. "Ne la selva erronea." *Dante's Quaestio about Nobility. The Criticism of Materialism as a Pathway to the* Inferno. In *Dante's Convivio: Or How to Restart a Career in Exile.* Edited by F. Meier. University of Leeds Press, 2018, pp. 34-65.

3 Maria Luisa Ardizzone, *Reading as the Angels Read: Speculation and Politics in Dante's Banquet* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2016),pp. 321–359

practice of the highest of them, contemplation, to eternal life (*Convivio* 4.22). In this solution, he signals the decline of the highest intellectual excellence that he attempted to establish in the first three treatises of the *Convivio*. This decline comes out in continuity with the historical crisis of the feudal idea of nobility based on the privilege of birth, on the inheritance of riches and aristocratic tradition.[4] What takes place is a reshaping of the notion of excellence.

If in *Convivio* 4 the inheritance of family tradition based on material goods was opposed and replaced by the individual value of virtue, in the *Monarchia* the idea of excellence is built on a new basis: it is individual virtue that must empower the tradition of nobility. As we read, virtue must be proper both to the individual and to his ancestors. In other words, Dante stresses the ethical value of the individual and establishes a coincidence between ethical and historical nobility. Here he re-evaluates the role of family tradition and ancestors. Therefore, he says, "the reward of a position of authority is appropriate to the nobles by reason of the cause of their nobility" (2.3.4-5).[5] While confronting the discourse on nobility and intellection, Dante actually was participating in the public debate of his time.[6]

Since the *Convivio*, and his falling in love with the *Donna gentile*, Dante was wearing the garb of philosopher, and his poetry and prose were explicitly linked to philosophy and doctrine. Doctrinal poetry and moral poetry both answered and were a part of a circulating debate. Dante as poet and intellectual takes on the garb and practice of the public philosopher and starts openly, from the time of *Convivio*, to educate his

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[4] Ibid.

[5] I quote from Prue Shaw, trans., *Monarchy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).

[6] Since the first chapter programmatically Dante makes manifest his intent: " intemptatas ab aliis ostendere veritates" to reveal truths that have not been attempted by others (1.1.3) and explains that : "Cumque, inter alias veritates occultas et utiles, temporalis Monarchie notitia utilissima sit et maxime latens et, propter non se habere inmediate ad lucrum, ab omnibus intemptata, in proposito est hanc de suis enucleare latibulis". (Now since among other truths which are hidden and useful, a knowledge of temporal monarchy is both extremely useful and most inaccessible, and since no one has attempted to elucidate it (on account of its not leading directly to material gain), I propose to draw it forth from where it lies hidden). He has an aspiration non only to be useful to the world, but also to gain glory and recognition: "tum ut utiliter mundo pervigilem, tum etiam ut palmam tanti bravii primus in meam gloriam adipiscar" (so that my wakeful nights may be of benefit to the world, and so that I may be the first to win for my own glory the honor of so great a prize) (1.1.5).

reader.

Dante's Commitment as a Public Philosopher

Dante's inclination to intellectual militancy is not hard to understand. Since his Florentine years, some lyric texts, for instance *Poscia ch'amor del tutto m'ha lasciato* or *Doglia mi reca nello cor ardire*, show that he is involved in a debate and anticipates issues to which he will return in *Monarchia.* Thus, works like the unfinished *Convivio*, which never circulated in Dante's life, or the *De vulgari eloquentia*, also left unfinished, were thought by Dante as to be influential for his time and society. Dante is not an academic, and his intellectual militancy is mostly active in his years of exile, when he lives at the court of statesmen, and in some cases collaborates with a few of them. Some of Dante's Epistles document this. No doubt, *Monarchia* is part of a debate on the idea and praxis of sovereignty. But Dante participates in it in a way that is peculiar. While *Convivio* shaped an educational project, in *Monarchia* Dante enters the political synchronic debate taking his own position on crucial political issues. Along with sovereignty and power, Dante focuses on the natural necessity of State, the natural condition for the human beings in the City, which must be a universal City. He gives a special role to a new subject of political reality, *humanitas*, *genus humanum*, *Universitas*. By detaching the Emperor from the Church and establishing that the Emperor depends directly on God, Dante organizes an idea of Empire that offers a new perspective; he includes *humanitas* as a new subject of history and affirms human happiness as the goal of Empire. A philosophical-pragmatic issue shapes a political endeavor and both are aimed at temporal Monarchy, a theme that, according to what we read, is *intemptatum*, though of great utility. The reception of this work shows how powerful its impact was, and also how dangerous it was assumed to be. The way in which Dante presents his arguments through syllogistic reasoning and the relational field he creates makes his political treatise more powerful as a means to proof and science. But what seems most peculiar to him is *temporalization*, that is, his attempt to transfer values traditionally rooted in metaphysics to what is in time. (On this issue see Quaglioni's perspective in his essay in this volume pp. 150-165). I use the word *temporalization* to stress the tendency to temporalize metaphysical values mostly derived from medieval Platonism and its rereading of Plato's theory of ideas. This temporalization takes form in parallel with the importance that Christology assumes in his discussion of universal Empire. The event that is basic for this end is the Incarnation.

Dante's *Vita nuova* was the first vernacular document written by an intellectual that implied the value of what belongs to the world and to time, leading to the assessment of the human being as a living being endowed with a divine component. A new way to conceive love was one of the manifestations of this idea.[7] The Incarnation and the importance of what belongs to time are, in Dante's view, intertwined, and in *Monarchia* his discussion about Empire is part of it. What Chiesa and Tabarroni have re-proposed in their edition, which is of a progressive in time compilation of the work,[8] could perhaps explain the difference between the first treatise and the other two. One of most interesting aspects of temporalization is the way Dante discusses the idea of "one". No doubt the one is identified with the divine being, and the Emperor as one is conceived in the likeness of God who, we read, likes most what resembles him. However, the *Monarchia* encloses the importance of the one in time. Rather than evaluating the metaphysical value of what is in time, *Monarchia* attempts to bring into time values regarded as metaphysical, for instance, when the one is related and identified as the "form" of order we must evaluate "form" in this way, where "form" is a model that enters time.[9] This happens, for instance, when the relationship among parts is the order of

[7] I have stressed these themes in Maria Luisa Ardizzone, *Dante :Il paradigma Intellettuale. Un'inventio degli anni fiorentini* (Florence: Olschki,2011) especially in the first part of the book devoted to Dante's *Vita nuova*, pp. 1–114.

[8] See the introduction to *Monarchia*, ed. Paolo Chiesa and Andrea Tabarroni, vol. 4 of Dante Alighieri, *Le Opere* (Rome: Salerno, 2013), LXVI.

[9] " Et sicut se habet pars ad totum, sic ordo partialis ad totalem. Pars ad totum se habet sicut ad finem et optimum: ergo et ordo in parte ad ordinem in toto, sicut ad finem et optimum. Ex quo habetur quod bonitas ordinis partialis non excedit bonitatem totalis ordinis, sed magis e converse […]Unde si forma huius ordinis reperitur in partibus humane multitudinis, multo magis debet reperiri in ipsa multitudine sive totalitate per vim sillogismi premissi, cum sit ordo melior sive forma ordinis; sed reperitur in omnibus partibus humane multitudinis, ut per ea que dicta sunt in capitulo precedenti satis est manifestum: ergo et in ipsa totalitate reperiri debet". And as a part stands in relation to the whole, so the order in a part stands to the order in the whole. A part stands in relation to the whole as to its end and perfection: therefore the order in a part stands to the order in the whole as to its end and perfection. From this it can be deduced that the goodness of the order in a part does not exceed the goodness of the order in the whole, but rather the reverse[…]So if this second kind of order is discernible in the constituent parts which make up the human race, then with all the more reason must it be observable (by the force of our earlier syllogism) in the human race considered as a whole or totality, given that it is a better order or kind of order; but it *is* found in all the parts which make up the human race, as is quite clear from what was said in the previous chapter: therefore it must be observable in the totality (1.6.1–4).

things in relation to the one.[10] Also words like *humanitas* and *universitas* represent the value of one in time and space. They, in fact, indicate a collectivity that is one and is an historical reality.

Temporalization

At the beginning of *Monarchia,* Dante introduces his discourse on what he calls *Monarchia temporalis*, a discourse that is *intemptatum*. Explaining the meaning of *temporalis* he says that the word refers to that which is measured in time.[11] Time in *Convivio* (4.2.6), following Aristotle's *Physics*, was something that measures motion according to the before and after ("il tempo è numero di movimento secondo prima e poi"). Everything we read in *Monarchia* must be seen in this context and, therefore, within nature and time. Dante's discussion seeks to transfer into time what has its roots in a transcendent dimension. As the discussion about the one has its roots in the metaphysics of the One, in the same way the Emperor's power derives from God. Also, the foundations of *ius* are metaphysical, because they are in the mind of God, and nature has a metaphysical basis. In fact, it, too, is said to be in the mind of God (*Monarchia* 2). This paradigm, which has its source in the ancient-medieval theory of the ideas in the mind of God and which the *Convivio* had introduced powerfully,[12] shows that *Monarchia* has*,* as one of its goals, the temporalization of a patrimony of metaphysical ideas. Dante's effort which aims to consider inside the laws of time things that find their value in their transcendent origin, is one of the aspects most worthy of reflection. That the Incarnation heralds that the *verbum* (word and action) takes things out of eternity and brings them into time is part of the meanings that the birth of Christ establishes. Here Dante's method of exploration and construction must be taken into consideration. Earthly human happiness, as the true aim of the book, is part of Dante's project. Chapter 1.12.6 of *Monarchia* opens the idea of intellectual freedom as possible under the World Ruler and of happiness; thereby, distinguishing

[10] See *Monarchia.* "Ordo partium ad unum est melior" (1.6.2). See also Chiesa-Tabarroni, ed., note p.30, and Nardi's long explanation in his edition. *Monarchia*, ed, Bruno Nardi, in Dante Alighieri, *Opere minori*, vol. 5, tomo II, in *La letteratura italiana: Storia e testi* (Milan: Ricciardi, 1979) notes, pp.312–315.

[11] *"*Est ergo temporalis Monarchia, quam dicunt 'Imperium', unicus principatus et super omnes in tempore vel in hiis et super hiis que tempore mensurantur*"* (1.2.1) .

[12] This is an issue generally neglected by scholars, that I have introduced in Ardizzone, *Dante: Il paradigma intellettuale;* and again in Ardizzone, *Reading as the Angels Read*, pp.114–189.

happiness in life, where the individual is "happy as man", from that of Paradise, where souls are happy "as gods".[13]

Dante introduces duality as a tool, which involves acknowledging the existence of two diverse dimensions. There are two forms of happiness because there are two lives, eternal and terrestrial, and *Monarchia* deals with the earthly one. There are two powers, that of the Emperor and that of the Pope, but only one, the Imperial, presides over human temporal life, while the other belongs to the soul's eternal life. These diverse authorities that can be reduced to one as men, cannot however to be reduced to one for what belongs to their different roles as Pope and Emperor (3.12). So not only reduction *ad unum* but also duality is part of Dante's idea about political discourse.[14] Earthly things are *per se* reality. It is an autonomous discourse as result of an autonomous condition. *Monarchia* distinguishes what is in time from what is eternal, where the human being is like the horizon between infinite and finite (3.16). This returns when Dante distinguishes the *philosophica documenta* from the *documenta spiritualia*.[15] Duality, which implies a binary dimension, is the result of

[13] quia per ipsum hic felicitamur ut homines, per ipsum alibi felicitamur ut dii. since by virtue of it we become happy here as men, by virtue of it we become happy elsewhere as gods.(1.12.6).

[14] "Propter quod opus fuit homini duplici directivo secundum duplicem finem: scilicet summo Pontefice, qui secundum revelata humanum genus perduceret ad vitam ecternam, et Imperatore, qui secundum philosophica documenta genus humanum ad temporalem felicitatem dirigeret." It is for this reason that man had need of two guides corresponding to his twofold goal: that is to say the supreme Pontiff, to lead mankind to eternal life in conformity with revealed truth, and the Emperor, to guide mankind to temporal happiness in conformity with the teachings of philosophy (3.15.10)

[15] "Duos igitur fines providentia illa inenarrabilis homini proposuit intendendos: beatitudinem scilicet huius vite, que in operatione proprie virtutis consistit et per terrestrem paradisum figuratur; et beatitudinem vite ecterne, que consistit in fruitione divini aspectus ad quam propria virtus ascendere non potest, nisi lumine divino adiuta, que per paradisum celestem intelligi datur. Ad has quidem beatitudines, velut ad diversas conclusiones, per diversa media venire oportet. Nam ad primam per philosophica documenta venimus, dummodo illa sequamur secundum virtutes morales et intellectuales operando; ad secundam vero per documenta spiritualia que humanam rationem trascendunt, dummodo illa sequamur secundum virtutes theologicas operando, fidem spem scilicet et caritate. Has igitur conclusiones et media, licet ostensa sint nobis hec ab humana ratione que per philosophos tota nobis innotuit, hec a Spiritu Sancto qui per prophetas et agiographos, qui per eius discipulos supernaturalem veritatem ac nobis necessariam revelavit, humana cupiditas postergaret nisi homines, tamquam equi, sua bestialitate vagantes "in camo et freno" compescerentur in via." Ineffable

Dante's strong intuition of a new space and method of inquiry. It heralds the view that a dimension we may call temporal *perseitas* enters the field of politics.

Dante announces this at the beginning of the treatise, when he presents his discourse as focused on something never before attempted, namely, temporal Monarchy, which insures temporal beatitude in life and the well-being of the human race. Temporalization is a goal that inscribes itself in the results of a work that goes beyond what Dante himself perhaps intended to activate. One aspect of Dante's public political commitment (as is well known) is *Monarchia*'s detachment of the political from the ecclesiastical power. As noted above, according to Dante the Emperor depends not on the Pope but directly on God (*Monarchia* 3.15-16). This detachment, once considered in relation to the human being, locates within the individual a stronger responsibility. What presides over human earthly life and over the goal of this life not only has its center in the political organization; human desires and ends are also inscribed in the state, which is regulated by the Emperor, who is directly linked to God.

In fact, if the Emperor depends directly on God and the political State depends on Him, earthy human life depends on the Emperor and on God, and because God is within the human being, a new dimension seems to be delineated which stresses the role of interiority. Dante emphasizes the drama of human responsibility in the *Commedia*. This drama is shaped on free will, which is central in the *Monarchia* as well. This leads to the consideration of how Dante as political theorist shapes his discourse.

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providence has thus set before us two goals to aim for: happiness in this life, which consists of the exercise of our own powers and is figured in the earthly paradise; and happiness in the eternal life, which consists in the enjoyment of the vision of God (to which our own powers cannot raise us except with the help of God's light) and which is signified by the heavenly paradise. Now these two kinds of happiness must be reached by different means, as they represent different ends. For we attain the first through the teachings of philosophy, provided that we follow them putting into practice the moral and intellectual virtues; whereas we attain the second through spiritual teachings which transcend human reason, provided that we follow them putting into practice the theological virtues, i.e. faith, hope and charity. These ends and the means to attain them have been shown to us on the one hand by human reason, which has been entirely revealed to us by the philosophers, and on the other by the Holy Spirit, who through the prophets and sacred writers, through Jesus Christ the son of God, co-eternal with him, and through his disciples, has revealed to us the transcendent truth we cannot do without; yet human greed would cast these ends and means aside if men, like horses, prompted to wander by their animal natures, were not held in check "with bit and bridle" on their journey *Monarchia* (3.16.7–9)

It is a book on Monarchy. But more than addressing kingship, Dante speaks about the goal of humanity. He postulates a new use of power, not the right of the Sovereign, as it was established for instance by the jurists of the Diet of Roncaglia(1154 and 1158), which was centered on a feudal perspective of power and on the rights of the Emperor. Rather, the new subject and true goal of Monarchy is the well-being or happiness of human beings. A reversal of perspective seems to be active.

Perhaps a kind of political pamphlet dealing with issues debated at the time, *Monarchia* is a realistic work. But its realism is built on a perspective that is proper to Dante: what is real temporalizes an ideal dimension and thus brings value to what is in time and space. Actually, the way in which his discourse is shaped shows a perspective at once realistic and utopian. But the reader of the discourse on temporal Monarchy who perhaps is a man of politics and thus learned and able to read in Latin, and to deal with the essential principles of law, justice, and politics must be aware of the fact that human life and its goal is rooted in time and space. To such a man the *Monarchia* is directed, perhaps as a kind of pamphlet to support the election of the Emperor. As Chiesa-Tabarroni and Quaglioni write, Dante has a peculiar approach to politics: he is a theorist of something real, and his discourse is pragmatic. But it is possible to detect that utopia here works together with praxis, and the idealization of the Empire is something hard to deny. Many of Dante's assumptions are in fact gratuitous. Universalism in an age of political fragmentation, absence of greed in the Emperor, miracles as proof of the rightness of the Empire willed by divine Providence are all parts of the same utopian vision partially still grounded in theology. But other aspects can be considered as part of, or as an anticipation of an idea that is not only realistic and pragmatic but which also paves the way for the consideration of politics as a science *per se*.

The One and the Many: The Plural One

In the first chapters of the political treatise, Dante confronts the crucial issue of the universal goal of human beings. He declares in fact what his project of *inquisition* is: "Nunc autem videndum est quid sit finis totius humane civilitatis" 1. 3.1.[16] The answer that he offers, after a series of clarifications and distinctions, is the following: "Patet igitur quod ultimum de potentia ipsius humanitatis est potentia sive virtus intellective" (It is

[16] We must therefore now see what is the purpose of human society as a whole (1.3.1).

thus clear that the highest potentiality of mankind is his intellectual potentiality or faculty 1.3.7-8). Due to the fact that such power cannot be "*tota*" "*simul*" actualized by just a man or a single community, there needs be a vast number of individual people in the human race, through whom the whole of this potentiality can be actualized (1.3.8).[17] Summarizing, he says: "Satis igitur declaratum est quod proprium opus humani generis totaliter accepti est actuare *semper* totam potentiam intellectus possibilis, per prius ad speculandum et secundario propter hoc ad operandum per suam extensionem" (1.4.1).[18] Dante's discourse on Monarchy focuses, right from the beginning, on the ends and desires of the *humanum genus*. According to the above quoted fragments, it is evident that Dante assigns one goal for the whole humanity, which he considers as one. Here there begins to take form a one-to-one correspondence that can be better understood if we follow Dante's line of thought in relation to a subtext which is recalled in chapter 1. 3: i.e., Averroes' *De anima* (see Brenet's essay in this volume pp. 59-80). Introducing the notion of the possible intellect, whose potentiality can be actualized only by all human beings,[19] Dante organizes his own pathway. What interests him is not the notion of the intellect as separated but rather the idea that all human beings think best if they think together.[20] In fact, the possible intellect to be actualized needs the whole *humanum genus*. Utilizing expressions like *humanum genus* or words like *humanitas*, or *universitas*, he creates the sense of a plurality that works as one, or of a unity that is plural, because it is made

[17] "Et quia potentia ista per unum hominem seu per aliquam particularium comunitatum superius distinctarum tota *simul* in actum reduci non potest, necesse est multitudinem esse in humano genere, per quam quidem tota potentia hec actuetur" And since that potentiality cannot be fully actualised all at once in any one individual or in any one of the particular social groupings enumerated above, there must needs be a vast number of individual people in the human race, through whom the whole of this potentiality can be actualized.(1.3.8).

[18] Now it has been sufficiently explained that the activity proper to mankind considered as a whole is constantly to actualise the full intellectual potential of humanity, primarily through thought and secondarily through action, as a function and extension of thought (1.4.1).

[19] Patet igitur quod ultimum de potentia ipsius humanitatis est potentia sive virtus intellectiva. Et quia potentia ista per unum hominem seu per aliquam particularium comunitatum superius distinctarum tota simul in actum reduci non potest, necesse est multitudinem esse in humano genere, per quam quidem tota potentia hec actuetur (1.3.7-8).

[20] In order to explain this passage,1.4.1 Nardi recalls John of Jandun who says that human beings are "intelligent" and not "divisive" but "collective". See Nardi, ed., *Monarchia*, p. 302.

by many. Such unity, which is primarily intellectual, provides the natural basis for the universal Empire.

Names that are singular and can be followed by verbs in the singular or in the plural according to grammar but which enclose the universality of human beings, become key words in Dante's idea of Empire. In *Monarchia*, they are new subjects of history and this perspective is evident from the first book of the treatise. Here what seems to be suggested is that human beings think together: a view that is perhaps influenced by the theory that the possible intellect is one. In fact, if the actualization of the possible intellect *semper* requires entire humanity and this intellect is recalled only in the singular, Averroes' theory, may be filtered through his readers, penetrates. However, what is certain is that Dante does not deal with the field to which Averroes' theory of the unity of intellect is bounded. The intellect is said to be actualized in virtue of the many, or better by all human beings. From this derives a most interesting aspect: the being of one is one and plural at once. Such plurality, which is also one, seems to be one of the foci of the *Monarchia* that Dante stresses by introducing a strong awareness of terminology and vocabulary. More than focusing on the notion of *reductio ad unum* in the *Monarchia*, what seems most evident is the correlation Dante introduces between the one and the many. More than seeing them as contraries (as in Aristotle's *Metaphysics* 10), the *Monarchia* considers them as correlative. A new idea in politics seems to arise in which a new space is considered and open for the plurality, once this plurality is seen as one and plural at once.

The idea that human beings share an intellectual activity is the foundation for Dante's idea of temporal Monarchy. Rather than insisting on the Averroistic roots of this idea, it is more appropriate to stress the way in which Dante organizes the issue. The perspective offered is that all humanity collaborates in the activity of thinking, which is the highest act of human beings. The political treatise formulates an idea of excellence in the unity, which is reached when human beings think together.[21] Quoting

[21] Dante organizes a pathway in which the fact that human beings think together parallels the idea of Monarchy as the government of just *unus princeps*. I quote a fragment of the pathway that is organized in the first book of *Monarchia* and that starts with: "Et quia presens tractatus est inquisitio quedam, ante omnia de principio scruptandum esse videtur in cuius virtute inferiora consistant… Cum ergo materia presens politica sit, ymo fons atque principium rectarum politiarum, et omne politicum nostre potestati subiaceat, manifestum est… quod est finis universalis civilitatis humani generis, erit hic principium per quod omnia que inferius probanda sunt erunt manifesta sufficienter: esse autem finem huius civilitatis et illius, et non esse unum omnium finem arbitrari stultum est (1.2.4-8).

Aristotle's *Politics*, 1.2.1252a32 in chapter 3 of the first book, it is said that men of vigorous intellect naturally rule over others (1.3.10). Human actions and arts are part of the things that are active in the city, but they are under the dominion of the people able to use the intellect. *Politeia*, which implies a ruled society in its positive meaning, as in Aristotle's *Politics*, offers to the plurality of human beings a role in the *intemptatum* discourse on *temporal* Monarchy.

Nominatio: Grammar and Logic

To establish this new dimension of the one as both plural and one, Dante follows a path that is not only philosophical. He seems to be strongly aware of logical-grammatical notions that help him. Collective names that he utilizes have introduced the sense of a singular that is plural, ever since the canzone *Amor che nella mente mi ragiona*. In this poem, we must note that Dante uses the word *gente* to introduce the idea that a plurality has a power to know that is superior to that of the individual. The prose of *Convivio* 3 was partially constructed on this problematic issue.[22] Dante's interest in this issue—i.e., collectivity as one and plural—also appears in the *De vulgari,* where the ideal *typus* of language (Spitzer), the *vulgare illustre*, creates a *koinè*, which represents a unified plurality. [23]The *vulgare illustre* has as its background a political scenario, the court of the Emperor

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At 1.7.3 a parallel is established in cosmological terms between "unum principium" and "unicum principem": "ad ipsum universum sive ad eius principem, qui Deus est et Monarcha, simpliciter bene respondet per unum principium tantum, scilicet unicum principem." And since this present treatise is a kind of inquiry, we must at the outset investigate the principle whose truth provides a firm foundation for later propositions…Now since our present subject is political, indeed is the source and starting-point of just forms of government, and everything in the political sphere comes under human control it is clear …therefore whatever constitutes the purpose of the whole of human society will be here the first principle, in terms of which all subsequent propositions to be proved will be demonstrated with sufficient rigour; for it would be foolish to suppose that there is one purpose for this society and another for that, and not a common purpose for all of them... for its parts are well adapted to it in relation to a single principle, and so absolutely speaking it too is well adapted to the universe (or to its ruler, who is God and Monarch) in relation to a single principle, i.e. one ruler. (1.2.4–8; 1.7-3)

[22] I discuss this issue in Ardizzone, *Reading as the Angels Read*, chapters 3–4. See also my essay in this volume, pp.222-246.

[23] Leo Spitzer, "La 'tipologia ideale' nel *De vulgari eloquentia* di Dante", in *Scritti Italiani*, ed. Claudio Scarpati (Milan: Vita e pensiero. Pubblicazioni dell'Università Cattolica, 1976), pp.191–212

Frederick the Second and of his son Manfredi, in this court there were active poets who were great intellectuals and with them start the vernacular of Italy. Dante writes the court is dispersed but the new unifying principle is, according to Dante, in the *vulgare illustre*. Different texts create a unity derived from poets belonging to different geographies and territories. Dante attempts to create a new ideal unity. The court is dispersed, but the vernacular *illustre* which is also *aulicum* and *curiale* creates a new *koinonia*. The poetic body is one but is constituted by many, and among them Dante himself and his friend Cino da Pistoia. If the *koine* of *vulgare illustre* was made by poets and their poetry, the *Convivio* attempted to establish a new *koine*, philosophical and scientific, based on the old and new learning formulated in Italian. Not just poetry, as part of *trivium* and *quadrivium*, but, also, philosophy, sciences, and theology were now at the center of the new attempted *koine*. The various fields were neither opposed nor conciliated but instead were brought on the same page so that the reader might know and confront them. The *Convivio* has an educational goal, and the true aim of the treatise is the formation of his reader. The entire educational canon as circulating after the entrance of Greek-Arabic learning—philosophy, science, cosmology—was rethought and was addressed primarily to people who were not able to read Latin but were naturally hungry for knowledge. The readers of the doctrinal vernacular work, whose identity is not established but who are certainly not limited to women and Barons, Dante recalls in the first treatise. These readers to be formed are in some ways an anticipation of the *humanitas* of *Monarchia,* which aims to show how human beings can be happy in life in continuity with the *Convivio*'s attempt (see my essay in this volume, pp. 222-245).

The word *typo* (type), as modeled in *Monarchia*, is used, for instance, at 1.2.1 in order to describe the ideal peculiarities of temporal Monarchy. According to the indications of the treatise, it is in it that the human genus can reach earthly fulfilment, that is, well-being and happiness. To this *typus* of temporal Monarchy there corresponds an ideal-real earthly happiness. In this discourse, many words are introduced to shape new meanings. I have underlined the word *humanitas*, which, as Dante uses it, must be considered in light of the various meanings of the word. The meaning of the word in fact is not *paideia*, nor *benevolentia*, but *comitas*: a collective name, a singular that encloses a plurality. This meaning of the word was widely accepted in the years of the late Empire (Balbi).[24] In the

[24] "mutual connection among men […] the humanitas as a mutual connection implies that the men have a common nature." Andrea Balbo, "Humanitas in

same way, the word *universitas*, as Dante uses it, has nothing to do with the sense of a legal recognized community (Michaud Quantin) but rather suggests the sense of a unified goal, in which social unity is thought in agreement with that of the universe. As we read, *universum unum principium unicum principem*, it implies a link between *principium* and *princeps* in relation to the universe (1.7). Moreover, both the *Convivio* and *Monarchia* start with an adjective that implies collectivity: "*Tutti gli uomini*" in *Convivio* 1.1, and "*omnium hominum*" in *Monarchia* (1.1). These phrases indicate a subject that is a collective one and is constituted by the many who share something. In the *Convivio*, this is the desire to know that is naturally shared by all human beings. In *Monarchia*, we find a further unifying principle in the O*mnium hominum*, namely, a natural inclination among humans to use their energies to the advantage of posterity. Here the unifying factor is primarily the love of truth, which continues the work of the ancients. The word *ditati* implies the wealth of cultural capital that is to be used for the foundation of the *res publica*.

The *humanitas* of *Monarchia*, whose possible intellect works better because it is actualized by all human beings together, reveals the natural basis on which to build the best conditions for human life. The answer that Dante offers is in some way tautological. In fact, in light of this anticipation, the best form of government—that is, Monarchy—guarantees the best form of life, because it is natural to human beings who think together to live together in the superior unity of Monarchy. *Pace* and *Concordia* enter as necessary conditions for the accomplishment of human goals. Both words imply unity and plurality. Dante stresses the plural-one meaning of the word *Concordia*.[25]

Dante's position, usually seen as derived from the field of philosophy, suggests something more, namely, that a logical-grammatical awareness is part of his discussion. Grammar and logic are natural, because both are related to the *logos*, which is a natural human endowment (*De vulgari*, 1). Dante has a strong sense of vocabulary, of which the *De vulgari* offers an example. But it is not limited to what we read in it. The making of the

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Imperial Age: Some Reflections on Seneca and Quintilian", *The Journal of Greco-Roman Studies* 42 (2012): pp. 76–77.

[25] Que quidem radix apparebit, si natura vel ratio concordie summatur: est enim concordia uniformis motus plurium voluntatum; in qua quidem ratione apparet unitatem voluntatum, que per uniformem motum datur intelligi, concordie radicem esse vel ipsam concordiam". (What this root is will appear if we consider the nature or meaning of concord, for concord is a uniform movement of several wills; from this definition it is clear that unity of wills, which is what is signified by "uniform movement", is the root of concord or indeed is concord itself) (1.15.5).

singular which is plural as *genus humanum*, or *humanitas* or *universitas*, and *Ecclesia*, one and plural at once, opens a new space that is logical and political at once and no doubt philosophical, too. But the fact that the universal empire establishes the earthly goal of human beings as the true goal of State, and because human beings have as natural goal happiness, establishes that the natural happiness rules the natural idea of State.

Politics and Nature

As is well known, Dante's Empire has a solid basis in the fact that it is a natural organization—natural because it corresponds to human nature—which *Convivio* 4 had defined as *compagnevole* [26], following Aristotle's *Politics*, perhaps filtered by a medieval reader. The *Monarchia*, however, signals a further step, since the Empire guarantees a political universal unity, thus allowing the best way for human beings to live. This best way is primarily intellectual; due to the fact that human beings think better when they think together (actualization of the possible intellect), the intellectual nature of the human beings needs a political organism that allows them to be happy together. The political state is natural, also because it fulfils the intellectual nature of human beings. Natural means is that corresponds to the nature of human beings. Aristotle in the *Politics* has indicated in the *logos* the natural necessity of the polis-state. The political state is a natural one because the human being is endowed with *logos*, which implies universal reason and speech: *logos* in Ancient Greek includes "relation".[27] Dante stresses the Aristotelian idea that *logos* is universal by following a stoic idea as interpreted by Christianity. The first book of *Monarchia*, chapter 16, introduces the coincidence between the birth of Christ and that of Empire. The importance of Christ in the Monarchy is thus part of the political discourse.

Dante follows Aristotle's *Politics*: the origin of society is based primarily on biology, love, and, therefore, family and friendship, which are in fact archetypical forms of society. Human nature is fulfilled within a society. The Emperor and the Pope are the two traditionally ruling powers. Close to them Dante sets out a one that is both one and plural: *Humanitas* or *Universitas.* Marsilius of Padua will identify in this *humanitas* the sources of democracy. Dante, instead, establishes a correlation with the

[26] *Convivio,* 4.4.1

[27] Giovanni Reale, *Per una nuova interpretazione di Platone. Rilettura della Metafisica dei grandi dialoghi alla luce delle "Dottrine non scritte"* (Milan: Vita e pensiero, 1991), p. 233.

principle of one, in which *pluralitas* and *unitas* are associated and virtually coincident. This plural unity was part of the 13th century intellectual debate, as confirmed by an article condemned in Paris in 1277, which states, *Humanitas est no forma rei, sed rationis*. [28] Stigmatized by the censor it confirms that this new element of politics is the result, perhaps, of a philosophical idea, the intellectual unity of human beings, that becomes a real operative thing that penetrates in history.

The Christological Implant

The historical dimension that governs the treatise implies a pathway that Dante organizes and that demands our attention. We note that the work is highly Christological. The temporal coincidence of the birth of Empire under Augustus and that of Christ is not accidental, given the importance that the God-man signifies and announces for the human beings: salvation implies the importance of earthly life and leads to the possibility of happiness in this life. Such happiness takes place in an earthly universal political organization that is naturally predisposed to a common thinking or, as Dante indicates, to the actualization of the possible intellect as the result of human beings thinking together. Universal Monarchy forges a link between the universal *logos* considered in time in light of the Incarnation and the possible intellect actualized because human beings think better when they think together: i.e., in the universal State or Monarchy, historically created by Augustus. A terminology rooted in Aristotelianism postulates the universal thought of human beings. But the *verbum incarnatum*, word and action, is an element of great importance. It is the Word made flesh that lives among human beings and that will establish a new sense of earthly life. If this link does exist, the field of Aristotelianism is confronted with the Gospels, in particular the Gospel of John. But the importance that the scribe of the life of Christ, Luke assumes in *Monarchia* (2. 2) shows the relevance of God as man. Dante relates it to the birth of Empire under Augustus. *Concordia* (universal peace) delineates an earthly paradise, to which the Incarnation points.

The Christological dimension of *Monarchia* does not oppose temporalization; on the contrary, the value of time is stressed. *Monarchia*, while aware of the theological center of Medieval culture, stresses a theology linked to an historical human perspective and goal. In this perspective, the Incarnation plays a crucial role, which the reader is called

[28] Roland Hissette, *Enquête sur les 219 articles condamnés a Paris le 7 Mars 1277* (Paris: Publications Universitaires,1977), p. 201: prop. 124.

upon to evaluate and understand.

Political power becomes stronger and acquires a sacred dimension because it is willed by Divine Providence. But this sacred dimension, of course reminiscent of the Holy Roman Empire, grounds its sacredness not in the Church but directly in God. Dante contributes to this idea when he associates the Divine as one to the Emperor as one. In the same way that he establishes the identification between one and *bonum* as good (1.15), Dante attempts to show how much this oneness is also part of time and history. *Humanitas*, *Universitas*, Peace, and Concord, are all variants of the same idea: what is one is the best, but it can be constituted by the many. *Concordia* is one of the modes of the one in time.

Justice and Ius: Utopia and the Value of Temporal Things

What the temporal dimension implies in the *intemptato* discourse on Monarchy can be better understood if we recall the way Dante introduces and discusses justice and *ius*. Both, in different ways, are conceived in relation to a model of perfection. This confirms how much reality and the ideal world are related. A chapter not yet written on the criticism of *Monarchia* should map the uncharted territory of how what is real in time and space is measured in its goodness on an archetype and by an archetype. This is a form of Platonism, which in *Monarchia* establishes the necessity of an ideal dimension as a utopia, the true focus of which is the temporal. In *Monarchia*, *iustizia* is *quaedam rectitudo sive regula*, which, in its perfect being, is compared to the abstract notion of whiteness, of which the white, a composite, is the imperfect realization. In this context Dante introduces the word "form", thereby distinguishing its abstract being from the contingent and the *Magister of the Six Principiorum* is recalled. What is indicated as the more and the less is refuted. Justice rejects the oblique, a dimension expressed in geometrical terms, to which Dante opposes the right.[29] This allows him to speak about the difference

[29] "Ad evidentiam subassumpte sciendum quod iustitia, de se et in propria natura considerata, est quedam rectitudo sive regula obliquum hinc inde abiciens: et sic non recipit magis et minus, quemadmodum albedo in suo abstracto considerata. Sunt enim huiusmodi forme quedam compositioni contingentes, et consistentes simplici et invariabili essentia, ut Magister Sex Principiorum recte ait. Recipiunt tamen magis et minus huiusmodi qualitates ex parte subiectorum quibus concernuntur, secundum quod magis et minus in subiectis de contrariis admiscetur". To clarify the minor premise, it must be understood that justice, considered in itself and in its own nature, is a kind of rectitude or rule which spurns deviation from the straight path to either side; and, thus, it does not admit of

and distinction between an abstract idea of justice and an applied one. Justice seems to be perfect in its abstract form, just as whiteness is an abstract dimension, of which white is the imperfect realization. Justice is perfect only in its abstract being, and this abstract perfection, however, seems to be the canon or measure on which to measure its concrete value, because it is by approaching such an abstract dimension that something is just.

Perfection is an ideal inspirational principle. The perfect white is whiteness: an abstract being. The ideal presides over the real, as a necessary utopia. Introducing the more and the less, Dante's discussion takes into consideration that human justice deals with the category of quality, of which the more and the less("magis et minus") are parts. Quality, greater and less in Aristotle's *Categories*, belong to the world of accidents and thus of physics (*Categories* 8). Justice is linked to measure, because we deal with an applied Justice. Here we have another glimpse of Dante's method of temporalization, and imperfection is part of this dimension. Therefore, justice is at its strongest where there is least of what is opposed to justice, both in the disposition and in the actions of an agent. Justice is the result of the will and power of someone who has power. As Dante writes, justice is at its strongest only under a Monarch; therefore, the best ordering of the world requires Monarchy or Empire (1.11).

The same abstract or archetypal dimension is active in the discussion about *ius*. *Ius* derives from God, it is (we read) in the mind of God: "Ex hiis iam liquet quod ius, cum sit bonum, per prius in mente Dei est" (right, being a good, exists firstly in the mind of God). Such *ius* penetrates in nature: i.e., in things that are in space and time (2.2–3). Dante does not explain in which way but he says that *natura* is in the mind of God and then in celo as in the instrument by means of which the image of eternal goodness is set forth in fluctuating matter : "Est enim natura in mente primi motoris, qui Deus est; deinde in celo, tanquam in organo quo mediante similitudo bonitatis ecterne in fluitantem materiam explicator".[30] In line with that *ius* is in nature (2.2.5), the suggestion should be to look at

a more and a less: just like whiteness considered in the abstract. There are forms of this kind, in fact, which are to be found in composites, but which in themselves consist of a simple and unchangeable essence, as the Master of the Six Principles rightly says. Such qualities are present to a greater or lesser degree depending on the subjects in which they are given concrete form, according as these subjects contain more or less of their opposites (1.11.3–5).

[30] For nature is in the mind of the first mover, who is God; then in the heavens, as in the instrument by means of which the image of eternal goodness is set forth in fluctuating matter (2.2.2-3).

nature as an *auctoritas* because it derives from the mind of God and in the mediation of the heavens moved by the angelic intelligences.

Dante focuses here on what occurs in nature and, therefore, implies that the *auctoritates* that organize the historical *ius* have their archetype in nature and in its model in the mind of God. Dante writes that since it is a good, *ius* is willed by God, and the Empire too is willed by God. The Empire is therefore built on *ius*: from that the idea of state based on *ius* and on the rights of human beings. Whoever looks to the *bonum* of the State looks at the aim of *ius*, and every *ius* is a common good (2.5.2). The Romans, in conquering the world, aimed at *ius*. The fundaments of *ius* are in things. Nature has located these foundations in things, and *ius* is natural "et illud quod natura ordinavit de iure servatur" (2.6.1).[31]

Following a medieval line of thought, *ius* is in the mind of God but also exists in nature. The archetypes are ideal, but Dante intends to focus on their presence in the world. Nature is created by God; in fact, it is as model in the mind of God, and *ius* is both in the mind of God and in nature, which is in time and is time. A platonic trace is active in both the ways in which Dante considers nature and *ius*. This is part of a method Dante had displayed in the *Convivio* and which the *Monarchia* confirms. When he writes in the *Commedia* that Christ is an idea (Paradiso,13.53), he follows Augustine and his medieval tradition but implies that the Incarnation brings the ideas into the world.

It seems evident that in what Dante indicates as temporal monarchy and in its *intemptata* discussion what is assumed to be ideal and divine archetypes are presented in their earthly dimension as well. One of the efforts of *Monarchia* is a rethinking of a patrimony of learning which is an ideal brought into time; the other is to rethink what is in time according to its idealistic pattern. In other words, Dante shows how the ideal becomes real. The meaning of the Incarnation implies the temporalization and spatialization of the ideal, which becomes real in history. Here, what I have termed the Christological implant of Monarchy is extremely important.

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[31] " Propter quod patet quod natura ordinat res cum respectu suarum facultatum, qui respectus est fundamentum iuris in rebus a natura positum. Ex quo sequitur quod ordo naturalis in rebus absque iure servari non possit, cum inseparabiliter iuris fundamentum ordini sit annexum: necesse igitur est ordinem de iure servari." From this it is clear that nature orders things according to their capacities, and this taking into account of their capacities is the basis of right established by nature in the created world. From this it follows that the natural order in the created world cannot be maintained without right, since the basis of right is inseparably bound up with that order: the preservation of that order is therefore necessarily right (2.6.3-4)

Law as Dante discusses it is part of temporalization, Dante's discussion deals with universal law and local laws. In *Monarchia*, we read that the Monarch is the one who best is able to govern the world and, in this context, he confronts and recalls both universal law and particular laws. In chapter 14.4–7 of the first book, while pointing out the importance of the Monarch and his universal government and law, Dante recalls the small political entities, showing his attention to what comes out from different peoples and their everyday lives and geographies. Law is universal but must also consider local identities and their expressions. Temporalization is an imperative that urges us to take into consideration differences among people. The universal is perfect, but what is needed also is the particular and concrete. If law does not consider the local identities it is partially empty. *Monarchia* introduces the Aristotelian *Epieikeia* (N.E. 5) that Dante reads, perhaps aware of Gratianus' canonical *ius* and of the importance that local laws have in his *Decretum*. [32]

The Empire is universal, but different peoples have different needs, according to their traditions and local realities. What is particular is the result of the history and geography of the local, singular identities of various human communities. This creates the exception within the universal. When he speaks about *vicinia* previously in the *Convivio* 4 and then in *Monarchia* 1.5, Dante considers the collective organizations of collective goods held by a community. The *vicinie* (*Monarchia* 1. 5) are in fact rural aggregations regulated by *pacta* of administrative nature among private citizens.[33] They are consortia of an administrative nature (i.e. economics) but they anticipate the rural communes that arise at a later time.[34]

Dante opens spaces that he proceeds to fill sometimes in different texts. Temporalization, a dimension that I have attempted to stress, cannot be understood, however, without evaluating the economic element which Dante offers as a glimpse in his discourse on Monarchy. In the next section, I will discuss what I indicate as the principle of economics in order to show the continuity that Dante establishes between a logical principle and a principle more properly economic. At the center of this principle we find nature, as we will see, because this economic principle

[32] Maria Luisa Ardizzone, "The *Vicinia* and its Role in Dante's Political Thought," *Dante Studies* 130 (2012): pp.163–182.
[33] Ibid.
[34] Starting with book 4 of *Convivio* Dante evalutes the old *vicus* in its becoming and in virtue of such becoming a new word is introduced, "vicinia" (*Convivio* 4). *Vicinia* is a latin word but in *Convivio* Dante uses it as a vernacular one. See Ardizzone, "The *Vicinia*", pp. 163–182.

has its *auctoritas* in nature.

Politics and a Logic of Economics

As previously said at the beginning of his political treatise, Dante informs his readers that his subject is *Monarchia temporalis*, which he further explains as follows: "Est ergo temporalis Monarchia, quam dicunt 'Imperium', unicus principatus et super omnes in tempore vel in hiis et super hiis que tempore mensurantur."[35] He continues to state that this is an *intemptatum* discourse. The word *Monarchia*, as he discusses it, has not just one meaning but essentially three: as a political organization of State, as the principle or government of the one, and finally the one as an archetype, that is, something perfect and thus a model on which to shape and rule. While the first meaning is clear, the other two make Dante's discourse complex by suggesting nuances and meanings that enter in his discussion of Empire. But Monarchia as *monos–arche* (the principle of one), or the one as archetype or model, includes a logical meaning. This logic appears to be grounded not just on the metaphysics of the one but also on nature. When Dante in the first book establishes the principle of his discussion on operation (because the goal is practical), what is suggested is that the principle of his inquiry is the goal of an action that exists in time (1.2.6–7).[36] At the center of Dante's treatise there is, therefore, what Alfarabi indicated in his *De scientiis,* chapter 5, which is devoted to politics, as accidents, that is, things that happen in time and

[35] "Est ergo temporalis Monarchia, quam dicunt 'Imperium', unicus principatus et super omnes in tempore vel in hiis et super hiis que tempore mensurantur". Temporal monarchy, then, which men call "empire", is a single sovereign authority set over all others in time, that is to say over all authorities which operate in those things and over those things which are measured by time (1.2.2).

[36] "Cum ergo materia presens politica sit, ymo fons atque principium rectarum politiarum, et omne politicum nostre potestati subiaceat, manifestum est quod materia presens non ad speculationem per prius, sed ad operationem ordinatur. Rursus, cum in operabilibus principium et causa omnium sit ultimus finis—movet enim primo agentem—consequens est ut omnis ratio eorum que sunt ad finem ab ipso fine summatur." Now since our present subject is political, indeed is the source and starting-point of just forms of government, and everything in the political sphere comes under human control, it is clear that the present subject is not directed primarily towards theoretical understanding but towards action. Again, since in actions it is the final objective which sets in motion and causes everything—for that is what first moves a person who acts—it follows that the whole basis of the means for attaining an end is derived from the end itself (1.2.6–7).

because of time.[37] Thus, Dante writes that if there does exist a universal goal for the human *civitas*, it will be the logical principle of his investigation. Due to the fact that the universal goal is the actualization of the possible intellect, Dante establishes the roots and results of human intellectual activity in time, adding that the speculative intellect, by extension, becomes practical. This reasoning in which the dimension of the one is always active—one universal goal, one universal thought that is also active in human operation and by extension, because the contemplative intellect becomes practical—opens up the possibility of establishing a role of the one in time. These considerations are intended to stress an aspect of Dante's political treatise not yet confronted. What I have introduced above as different though related meanings of the word "monarchia" leads me to consider an implication that derives from the meanings established above. I focus on chapter 14 of Treatise 1. Here we read that what it is possible to do with one tool or instrument is better and coincides with the good and, of course, the government of the one, because is one, is the best for the *bene esse* of the world. This first level of meaning is evident. But the way in which Dante organizes his discourse here makes explicit the internal link between the *monos arche* as the Imperium of the one, and the one as a principle or archetype on which to model or rule actions of various kinds.

What I wish to emphasize at first is the mode of Dante's reasoning. This mode introduces a method which can be assumed as a rule that Dante applies to the field of politics, but which perhaps can be utilized in a larger context. To emphasize this larger context is the aim of my discussion. It can be summarized in the following way: to act at best requires to utilize only essential resources. In this essentiality, the one is the paradigm. Chapter 14 of the Book 1 programmatically establishes this method and demonstrates it by linking what is optimum with what is one. This one, which is suggested as being a unity to measure, is a principle that is active in space and time. From the way in which the discussion is organized, the goal of the discussion itself can be reached

Therefore, I introduce the word "economy" to stress Dante's assertion that the use of one tool or instrument is the best way to act or to do something.[38] Tools, we read, must be those naturally required in order to reach a goal. And this is derived and linked to the one. What is excluded is

[37] Alfarabi, *Catalogo de las ciencias*, ed. Ángel Gonzáles Palencia (Madrid: Imprenta E. Mestre, 1932).

[38] Tabarroni–Chiesa in their commentary to Monarchia,1.14.1 introduce the term economy. However, they do not discuss the issue, they are—to my knowledge—the only ones to touch on it in recent editions of *Monarchia*.

the recourse to the superfluous. Dante's reasoning is in line with a principle that we find in Aristotle and which was passed on to the scholastics: "frustra fit per plura quod potest per pauciora" and also "Deus et natura nihil facit frustra". The latter Dante also utilizes in a different form: "Deus autem et natura nihil otiosum faciunt" (1.3).[39] Dante seems to use a principle proper to nature as derived from authorities to conclude his discussion of temporal Monarchy of the first treatise. The fact that according to Aristotle's *Politics,* Book 1, the State is a natural thing could explain Dante's method, in which a natural principle, the refusal of superfluous, becomes a logical principle for the construction of a discourse on something that is natural, namely, the Monarchy. The construction of a discourse on the Universal State avoids the superfluous and proceeds by virtue of an instrumental economy that is natural.

We may say that according to the principles above enunciated and deduced from nature, Dante inaugurates an economic law linked to the one, to be used as a method for the field of Politics and also for various forms of action. Reading Dante's chapter 1.14.1–3, we see a link between the one as principle, or archetype or model, and the method that such principle introduces. Dante stresses that the one as principle of an action works better. What rules is the attempt to remain as close as possible to the one. At different levels, different things can be made just in virtue of one tool or one mean. The law of nature is based on this and reflects Aristotle's idea that nature achieves its goal with the minimum of possible means: "Natura nihil facit frustra" (*De caelo* 2.11).

In this context, introducing the repudiation of what is *frustra* or useless, *otiosus*, Dante establishes a principle that is at once logic and economic. This is active when in *Monarchia* he looks at what is essential for human needs, or when he considers what is essential in the action of the Monarch. Human needs are many, but one thing is essential: "*Concordia*". The activities of the Monarch for the political State are many, but his goal is one: to govern for the well-being of *humanitas*. Human beings are many, but when they think together (unity) they activate their best thinking because they are able to think the highest good or, as we read, to actualize the possible intellect. And the highest good is one. Rather than evaluating only the metaphysical nature of this tendency toward the one, Dante looks at the one as a principle that has to rule the choices and actions of the human being. For instance, as noted above, the one presides over the order of things, and, as we read in the book (X.1) of

[39] Consequently, the first point to bear in mind is that God and nature do nothing in vain (1.3).

Methaphysics, is the "measure of quantity". In the same book, Aristotle explains that according to this meaning the one is not a metaphysical notion (X.2). Here, in *Monarchia*, it is said that what is made according to the one is better because it avoids what is *frustra* and *otiosus*. The laws that preside over this discussion are an extension of those that prevail in nature. Therefore, the way in which the one is utilized suggests a closeness to what is the few; Aristotle discusses this meaning in *Metaphysics* 10, but Dante does not deal with it, but what is introduced seems to be that the few, being closer to the one, is better. And this, I repeat, appears to be a general statement to be utilized in the field of politics.

Aristotle lays the foundations for his political theory in *Politics* Book I by arguing that the city-state and political organization are "natural." As nature: *Nihil facit frustra*, in the same way the choice of the one is natural. Dante's theory of one, therefore, suggests a correlation between the principle of the one and that of economy. It is a logical principle in itself and economical in the sense of avoiding the superfluous, as well as excess, and is a rule of measure and limit that can be utilized for reasoning, discussing which, of course, includes politics and monarchy. An anticipation of what will be called *logic of parsimonia* seems to be announced.

In light of this assumption, we may finally read chapter 14 of Book 1 of *Monarchia.* Here something that is clearly conceived as canonical is introduced, and in fact is a canon that is enunciated: "Et quod potest fieri per unum, melius est per unum fieri quam per plura." To this follows a demonstration that utilizes a syllogism: "Quod sic declaratur: sit unum, per quod aliquid fieri potest, A, et sint plura, per que similiter illud fieri potest, A et B; si ergo illud idem quod fit per A et B potest fieri per A tantum, frustra ibi assummitur B, quia ex ipsius assumptione nihil sequitur, cum prius illud idem fiebat per A solum (1.14.1-2.).[40]

We note that the excellence of the one is related to what is possible to do with just one tool or instrument: if an action can be performed with just one tool, it should not to be made with many. The latter is refused because is useless. The text introduces the word *supefluum* and the superfluous is refuted because it displeases both God and nature: "Et cum omnis talis

[40] And what can be brought about by a single agent is better done by a single agent than by more than one. This can be explained as follows: let there be one agent (A) by which something can be brought about, and let there be several agents (A and B) by which it can equally be brought about; now if that same thing which can be brought about by means of A and B can be brought about by A alone, then B is introduced unnecessarily, because nothing is achieved by the introduction of B, since that same thing was already achieved by means of A alone. (1.14.1-2.).

assumptio sit otiosa sive *superflua,* et omne superfluum Deo et nature displiceat" (14.2). The conclusion reads: "et omne quod Deo et nature displicet sit malum, ut manifestum est de se, sequitur non solum melius esse fieri per unum, si fieri potest, quam fieri per plura, sed quod fieri per unum est bonum, per plura simpliciter malum" (1.14.2).[41]

A new syllogism follows and its focus has to do with proximity. What is close to the one is closer to the good because to do through the one is closer to the goal; the reason for such proximity is real because the pathway to reach C is longer if one passes through A and B rather than just through A: "Preterea, res dicitur melior per esse propinquior optime; et finis habet rationem optimi; sed fieri per unum est propinquius fini: ergo est melius. Et quod sit propinquius patet sic: sit finis C; fieri per unum A; per plura A et B: manifestum est quod longior est via ab A per B in C, quam ab A tantum in C"[42] (1.14.3). A syllogism utilized to refute what is superfluous, because it is *otiosum*, shows that what is economic can be demonstrated through logic. Thus Chapter 14 shapes a link between logic and economy, and what comes out is that what is economic is logical and natural. While talking about Monarchy, Dante establishes a methodology that does not belong just to politics or Monarchy rather it introduces a general principle to be utilized for doing and discussing. It is ruled by a system that is economic because it is based on saving: what can be done or made with one tool is better and is coincident with what is good.

In Chapter 15, the theory of the one is related to a text of great importance, Aristotle's *Categories*, and the fifth way to say "first". The coincidence between the one and the optimum, if linked to the repudiation of the *otiosum*, includes the condemnation of the superfluous or excessive, and is rejected because excesses are condemned by Aristotle as in conflict with the idea of proportion as beautiful and ethical. Such coincidence between a logical principle (what is superfluous is logically useless) and

[41]And since the introduction of any such means is unnecessary and pointless, and everything which is pointless is displeasing to God and to nature, and everything which is displeasing to God and to nature is evil (as is self-evident), it follows that not only is it better that something should be brought about by a single agent, where that is possible, rather than by several, but that being brought about by a single agent is good, by more than one is in absolute terms bad. (1.14.2)

[42] Moreover, a thing is said to be better the closer it is to the best; and the goal itself is the measure of what is best; but to be brought about by a single tool is closer to the goal; therefore, it is better. And that it is closer can be shown as follows: let the goal be C; let the achieving of that goal by a single tool be A, and by several tools be A and B; it is clear that to go from A through B to C is a longer route than to go from A directly to C. (1.14.3)

an economic principle (what is superfluous is anti-economic) can be read in relation to the field of ethics and the condemnation of excesses as in Aristotle's Ethics.

Dante has utilized *misura* as a value since the *Vita nuova*.[43] In *Convivio* 4, he introduced Aristotle's *mesotes/mediocritas*, that is, the right medium and the rightness of the medium in Aristotle's *Ethics* is what opposes the excess of the extremes.[44] *Monarchia* seems to say something more: it suggests a link between the rightness that is in nature, that opposes excesses and presides to what is right in a specific but also in a general sense, and Dante's repudiation of the superfluous as a principle which is natural and economic and is, therefore, close to the good. The refutation of excess will in fact form the basis of his discussion and condemnation of avarice and *cupiditas*. Excess and the superfluous are in some way in relation to each other, as excess opposes moral virtue, while the superfluous opposes the natural logic of economy and parsimony. No doubt, Dante follows an Aristotelian pathway. In Aristotle's *Politics*, for instance, chrematistic as an excessive earning is condemned (on Dante's economy, see Hittinger in this volume, pp.). Chapter 1.14 of Monarchy, however, discloses a larger perspective which, in the same way, anticipates William Ockam's so called method of parsimony or razor. A method that will be crucial in the history of science from Galileo to Einstein, and so on, which T.S. Kuhn has interpreted by saying that economy is a logical function.[45] What is important is that this conceptual scheme is related to temporalization: the one in time gives value to measure, to economics, to parsimony. It establishes a method for reasoning and demonstration. The optimum is coincident with the good as one and is a principle natural and logical at once.

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[43] The roots of this word as we find it in the Canzone *Donne ch'avete* intelletto d'amore are in the tradition that establishes measura as one of God's names. According to Dyonisius, one of the names of God is *metron*. Also, in Augustine and Severinus Boethius God is *metron*. In *Donne ch'avete intelletto d'amore,* "misura" is a word attributed to Beatrice and is opposed to what is *oltre misura* in Cavalcanti. In the canzone, Dante is perhaps opposing Cavalcanti's theory of love in *Donna me prega* which discussed love as an excess that is "oltre misura" beyond measure. See Ardizzone, *Dante: il paradigma*, 39–57.

[44] Teodolinda Barolini, "Aristotle's *Mezzo*, Courtly Misura, and Dante's Canzone *Le dolci rime*: Humanism, Ethics, and Social Anxiety", in *Dante and the Greeks*, ed. Jan M. Ziolkowski (Washington: Dumbarton Oaks, 2014), 163–79.

[45] Thomas S. Kuhn, *La Rivoluzione Copernicana: L'Astronomia planetaria nello sviluppo del pensiero occidentale*, trans. Tommaso Gaino (Turin: Einaudi, 2000), 50.

Conclusion

Confronting a political theme in an economic way, Dante introduces a method for constructing politics as a discipline deduced from and organized on natural principles. Economy works primarily as a natural logical function. Dante's discourse is at once, therefore, economic, political, and natural. *Monarchia* introduces a conception of politics based on its own principles as an autonomous science. It circumscribes its field in the things that are in the measure of time by detaching politics from the Church and affirming an earthly happiness for the human being that takes place in the Universal Imperial State. This is different from eternal happiness. What Dante does is to limit the space of politics to earthly happiness. Dante is, of course, a theorist who deals with facts related to his own political experience and to his life at a time of crisis and decadence. The virtuous Monarch who aims at the happiness of his subjects is free from the desires of material goods and avarice. The excessive desire for material goods contains a diagnosis of the crisis of society. Thus, the Emperor, who already possesses everything, is above avarice. This shows that above all Dante has a realistic sense of human beings as naturally inclined to materiality and *concupiscentia*.

Monarchy, as said above, has a militant tone that Dante introduces right at the beginning: those who are supposed to understand the message of the work are not only the princes- electors but also the people who live in a world of decadence and whom the Empire should rescue. No doubt people who have political responsibilities are Dante's privileged interlocutors. The reception of the work shows that in the world of power the militant aspect of the work was understood and not underestimated. Dante detaches the State from the Church and considers that its authority comes directly from God. He stresses the importance of earthly well-being. This is the goal of the Empire: the happiness of human beings. Dante identifies liberty and perfection. At 1.12.8 we read that a thing is free which exists "for its own sake and not for the sake of something else." The human being can be perfect in time and space. The political state is the natural form of life, and the rights of human beings can be recognized within a politically regulated society built on the one. The *verbum*-Christ, so important in *Monarchia*, allows the removal of ideal things from eternity and brings them into time. *Verbum* means not only *word* but also action. The Christological implant of *Monarchia* is perhaps the main venue for Dante's temporalization, which must not, however, be confused with secularization.

In light of his discourse on the best form of State, what in fact takes

form is the idea that the dependence of the political State on the Church is a construction. Theology, of course, is revealed truth, but our relation to God, which has to be mediated by the Church, is conceived as the result of a human construction which has its historical ground. This takes place in the *Monarchia*, where it is said that the link between the Emperor and God is direct, and that there is no mediation by the Church. The first result is that an historical pillar is removed. As a consequence, there is not an absolute truth about it, because truths are related to time, which can modify them. Before Spinoza, Dante, via Aristotle, introduces an anthropomorphism in his *Monarchia*. From this perspective, we see the coincidence between the birth of Empire and the Incarnation of the *verbum*-God. *Humanitas* and *Universitas* fulfill their goal in the political state, that is, in the time and space of the Universal Monarchy. The State ruled by the one guarantees the human *conviventia* in *Pace* and *Concordia*. Many other meanings are also implied, but not stated. For instance, to assert that the Emperor does not depend on the Church but derives his authority directly from God suggests that human beings, in matters belonging to their earthly life and happiness, do not depend on the Church. It is here that the God *incarnatus* guides us; he is inside us and drives us, while the State orders human beings toward earthly happiness and gives us the *summum bonum* as common good in *ius*. Ethics, politics, the Gospels interact to shape a new sense of life. A modern concept of political state announces a new interior freedom for human beings that seems to shake the walls of the medieval ideological construction, but this goal in which temporalization plays a major role, is reached utilizing ancient and medieval tools which are not just philosophical but, and perhaps first of all, theological.

This introduction serves as a context within which the reader can locate the various essays that this volume collects. They are the result of the first symposium of the Global Dante Project of New York, which is committed to the reading of the whole of Dante's *opus*, and this started with a conference devoted to *Monarchia* in 2015. On that occasion, a community of scholars from both Europe and US confronted Dante's political treatise and generated a fertile discussion. The essays contained in this volume utilize different methodologies and perspectives while confronting different issues. I will now briefly summarize their studies.

Teodolinda Barolini devotes her study to links between *Monarchia* and *Paradiso*. She focuses on the logic of distinction, an ancient and medieval logical structure that Dante, following Aristotle's *De Sophisticis Elenchis*, introduces in *Monarchia*. Barolini confronts one type of refutation in particular, *solutio distinctiva*, and demonstrates how Dante, who discusses

this kind of *confutatio* in *Monarchia*, creates a narrative that performs *solutio distinctiva* in *Paradiso* 3-4. Here she shows the importance of a logic of *differentia* which works as "a method of conflict resolution" and tool to reach an understanding that is free from error. J. Baptiste Brenet has a philosophical approach and offers an accurate contribution to our understanding of Dante's relation with the philosophy of Averroes. He not only establishes a firm interpretation of Dante's position but also provides an answer to some of the *aporiae* left unresolved in Dante's criticism about his concept of monarchy and that of the possible human intellect actualized in the Universal Empire. Paolo Chiesa discusses and comments on *Monarchia*'s three prologues, examining the difference between the scientific role Dante assigns to himself in the prologue of the first treatise and the progressively prophetic one in the second prologue, which is followed by the wholly prophetic in the third. These roles, although distinct, ultimately coincide. Dante "the scientist" and Dante "the prophet" converge. What is different is the tone, style, and rhetoric and, even more importantly, the interlocutor. Iacopo Costa utilizes a philosophical approach and stresses the unity of will in *Monarchia*, indicating that it is parallel to Dante's idea of a common intellect as proposed in the first book of his political treatise on the pathway of Averroes. Then he introduces what he calls, "affective Averroism", showing how the concept of charity as shaped by the famous theologian, Peter Lombard, presents aspects of similarity and difference between the two theories as his discussion of the word, *concordia*, suggests. Warren Ginsberg uses a historical approach. His essay organizes an exploration of what he calls a "displacement", that is, Dante's substitution of Rome for Jerusalem as God's city of peace. Ginsberg reads Dante's view of Rome and Empire as the result of providential history, in relation to Augustine *De Civitate dei* and the *Bible*. But, he underlines that what was seen as a triumph in Dante, was imperfection and failing in Augustine, who variously criticized Roman Empire. In addition, he points out that the Bible elected two Kings, David and Solomon. According to Ginsberg, both kings adumbrate the Emperor, although Dante bypasses Jerusalem in favor of Rome. In the *Monarchia*, he points out, David and Solomon are not celebrated as kings. The first is mostly indicated as the psalmist and the second as the author of *Proverbs*. Francis Hittinger discusses economy in *Monarchia* and also in *Convivio* 4, stressing how Dante's theory is derived from Aristotle's economical thought as in *Nicomacheian ethics* and in *Politics*. According to Hittinger, Dante's position is critical of medieval political economy. Stressing Dante's condemnation (at once Aristotelian, Franciscan, and Dominican) of avarice, immoderate earning, usury, wealth, and property, his essay

links Dante's criticism with that of modern critics of political economy and capitalism and among them, first of all, Karl Marx. Diego Quaglioni discusses Dante's political theories both in *Convivio* and *Monarchia* confronting primarily the debate on medieval political theology and opposing the largely diffused theory that political concepts are nothing more than "secularized theological concepts". Quaglioni reverses this perspective and introduces the idea that the history of political thought in the West can be regarded as the history of a "spiritualization" of secular power. He refers to Kantorowicz and writes that the doctrine of theology and canon law has been transferred by the jurists from the theological sphere to that of the State, and that the theological theories have been elaborated with the heritage of legal doctrines. The interaction between law and theology is part of what his paper explores and discusses as the true political theology. Donatella Stocchi-Perucchio presents two medieval documents, both in the original Latin and in her English translation. The texts belong to the 13th century, the first is of juridical nature, while the second is the well-known *Coronation Encyclical* promulgated by Henry VII of Luxembourg in 1312. Stocchi-Perucchio studies and discusses the two documents locating them inside a tradition, which has linked theology, law and politics, since the 12th century. It also shows how Dante's *Monarchia* is connected to this tradition, although it encompasses it in a way that is peculiar to Dante. Prue Shaw has a philological approach to *Monarchia*, her essay discusses a view proposed in recent years about the transmission history of Monarchy which she does not accept. In her argument she takes into consideration two documents: a manuscript discovered at British Library a few years ago and dated mid-fourteenth century, but may be even earlier. She discusses the manuscript and considers the debate among scholars concerning the manuscript, mostly in relation to the problematic dating of *Monarchia* itself. She also introduces the earliest German translation of the *Monarchia*, printed in Basel in autumn 1559 at the same time as the *editio princeps*, and now available to scholars in a digitalized edition. Paola Ureni's focus is on medical science and its medieval Latin tradition. She, in particular, points out *Monarchia*'s reference to a text by Galen, which Dante knew perhaps directly or indirectly. Dante's explanation of the word, *Concordia*, allows her to establish a parallel between the hegemonic role Dante gives to the Emperor in the political body and the role of intellectual hegemony in the human being, as discussed by Galen in the field of medicine. Maria Luisa Ardizzone uses a logical-philosophical approach, which considers the well-known continuity between *Convivio* and *Monarchia* while focusing on the invisible rather than evident links between the two works.

Ardizzone shows that a temporal continuity organizes a theoretical discontinuity, which is a clue to an aspect of Dante's method that is firmly grounded in what she indicates as the "principle of complementarity". This way of thinking, which Dante organizes first in the *Convivio*, enters the space-time *continuum* between *Convivio* and *Monarchia* allowing the evaluation of aspects of the work not yet recognized.

CHAPTER ONE

DANTE SQUARES THE CIRCLE: TEXTUAL AND PHILOSOPHICAL AFFINITIES OF *MONARCHIA* AND *PARADISO* (*SOLUTIO DISTINCTIVA* IN *MON.* 3.4.17 AND *PAR.* 4.94–114)

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Book 3 of *Monarchia* is, in many ways, devoted both to the practice of interpretation and to managing the practice of interpretation, as though a collateral meditation to *Paradiso*, that most self-aware and meta-narrative *cantica* of the *Commedia*. Indeed, much of *Monarchia* might be seen as a condensed and dialectical restatement of *Paradiso*, as well as a dialogue with it.[1] To be clear, I am not conducting a chronological or philological demonstration, nor am I trying to show that Dante expressed a specific idea first in one work and later in another, although the textual affinities offered here might prove useful to others engaged in the chronological debate. Rather, I will focus on certain complementary habits of mind in these two late works, and on what they might tell us about the discursive practices and deep belief structures of their common author.

In this essay I consider a specific method of refutation catalogued and described in Aristotle's *On Sophistical Refutations*, namely the tool of Aristotelian logic called by scholastics "solutio distinctiva". I show that Dante turns to *solutio distinctiva* for the dismantling of arguments not only in *Monarchia*, as he explicitly asserts in *Monarchia* 3.4.17, but also in *Paradiso* 4, where Dante has Beatrice execute *solutio distinctiva* in verses

[1] This sentence is a reformulation, based on our updated views of Dantean chronology, of a marginal notation dated April 1985 in my oldest edition of *Monarchia*: "How much of this seems a blueprint for *Paradiso*".

94–114. In the narrative arc of *Paradiso* 4, Dante places the performance of *solutio distinctiva* at the denouement, in a plot-line where *solutio distinctiva* produces the very social conciliation between two adversaries that Dante characterizes as its social function in *Monarchia* 3.4.17.

Ultimately the goal of this essay is to illuminate the overlapping agendas of *Monarchia* and *Paradiso*. For logic and distinction are distinctive traits (pun intended) of *Monarchia*. And *Paradiso*, as analyzed in my narratological study, *The Undivine Comedy*, is a paean to the *opus distinctionis* of cosmic creation and to language and diegesis as the systems of difference that express the *opus distinctionis* in discursive form.[2] Bearing in mind that my use of "difference" is Aristotelian, and thus, as stipulated in *The Undivine Comedy*, akin to Aquinas's use of *distinctio*,[3] it will be apparent that these two great works of Dante's maturity, *Monarchia* and *Paradiso*, coincide in fundamental respects.

Truth Claims and Breastplates: *Monarchia* 3.1.1–3 and *Inferno* 28.117

Book 3 of *Monarchia* begins with a surge of authorial adrenalin, as Dante works himself up to attacking the third and most problematic of the three issues discussed in the treatise, that of the relative authority between Pope and Emperor. The prologue of Book 3 is a textbook example of Dante's signature weaving of the biblical-theological mode with the Aristotelian-philosophical mode, as the Chiesa-Tabarroni commentary amply illustrates.[4] This hallmark of Dantean textuality is present

[2] T. Barolini, *The Undivine Comedy: Detheologizing Dante* (Princeton: Princeton UP, 1992). Chapter 8 of *Undivine Comedy* grounds the analysis of *Paradiso* in Aristotle on time and Augustine on time and language, posing the problem of the expression of paradise (Oneness) by means of language—by definition a differential medium, unable to express simultaneity.

[3] "I use 'difference' as Dante uses it ('In astratto significa il 'differire' tra due o più elementi' [Fernando Salsano, *Enciclopedia Dantesca*, s.v. *differenza*]), and much as St. Thomas uses *distinctio*: 'any type of non-identity between objects and things. Often called diversity or difference' (T. Gilby, Glossary, Blackfriars, *ST* 1967, 8:164). In other words, as will be apparent from the discussion of time and difference in chapter 8, my usage is essentially Aristotelian" (*The Undivine Comedy*, 274). The *Summa Theologiae* is cited in the Blackfriars edition in 61 vols. (New York: McGraw-Hill; London: Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1964–1981).

[4] See the Chiesa-Tabarroni commentary: *Monarchia*, ed. Paolo Chiesa and Andrea Tabarroni, vol. 4 of Dante Alighieri, *Le Opere* (Rome: Salerno, 2013). For instance, in their commentary to the prologue of Book 3 Chiesa-Tabarroni write: "si richiamano qui due *auctoritates*, una sacra (Salomone) e una profana

throughout the *Commedia*, but in *Paradiso* Dante most emphasizes his program of mixing philosophical with biblical *auctoritates*, both Old and New Testament. A series of declarations stud *Paradiso* 24, 25, and 26, reiterating the tandem authority of both classical philosophers (especially Aristotle) and Scripture, and affirming repeatedly that Dante receives his direction from "filosofici argomenti / e per autorità che quinci scende" (from philosophical arguments and from authority that comes down from up here [*Par*. 26.25–26]). [5] Similarly, in the opening of Book 3 of *Monarchia* Dante aligns himself with "our authority on morals, Aristotle"—"preceptor morum Phylosophus" (*Mon.* 3.1.3)—along with a biblical group that includes Old Testament prophets Daniel and Isaiah and, from the New Testament, St. Paul.

Dante dramatically begins *Monarchia* 3 with an *ex abrupto* citation of Daniel 6:22, using a technique that he had used many years earlier when he began Chapter 28 of the *Vita Nuova* with an *ex abrupto* citation of Jeremiah's Lamentations.[6] The *ex abrupto* technique results in what is by definition a non sequitur; in this precise formal sense the opening of Book 3 is thus at odds with the tight and linear unfolding of the Aristotelian syllogism. It is noteworthy that, in associating himself with the biblical prophet, Dante should adopt a rhetorical technique that diverges from the syllogistic, thus transferring into *Monarchia* some of the formal properties of the intense "jumping" rhetorical mode that we find in the mystical sections of *Paradiso*: a mode that is laden with non sequiturs.[7]

(Aristotele): la teologia e la filosofia si accordano a procedere nella stessa direzione, e questo conferisce forza alla dimostrazione" (Dante has recourse here to two *auctoritates*, one sacred, Solomon, and one profane, Aristotle: theology and philosophy work together to proceed in the same direction, and this accord confers force on the demonstration [153]). The other commentaries that I have consulted are: *Monarchia*, ed, Bruno Nardi, in Dante Alighieri, *Opere minori*, vol. 5, tomo II, in *La letteratura italiana: Storia e testi* (Milan: Ricciardi, 1979); and *Monarchia*, ed. Diego Quaglioni, vol. 2 of Dante Alighieri, *Opere* (Milan: Mondadori, 2014).

[5] The text is from *La Commedia secondo l'antica vulgata*, ed. Giorgio Petrocchi, 4 vols. (Milan: Mondadori, 1966–7). The translation of Allen Mandelbaum (with occasional modifications) is accessed on the *Digital Dante* website: http://digitaldante.columbia.edu/.

[6] To the best of my knowledge commentaries have not related Dante's use of this trope in *Monarchia* 3.1.1 to *Vita Nuova* 28.1. In the *libello*, the biblical interruption clears the way to announce the death of Beatrice.

[7] For the analysis of the "jumping" mode of *Paradiso* see Chapter 10 of *The Undivine Comedy*, "The Sacred Poem is Forced to Jump: Closure and the Poetics of Enjambment".

The opening paragraphs of *Monarchia* 3 immediately frame the author as a biblical truth-teller, identifying Dante with the prophet Daniel and embracing the prophetic stance adduced by Paolo Chiesa in his reading of the *Monarchia*'s three prologues.[8] The authorial position in which Dante finds himself at the beginning of Book 3 of *Monarchia* is the writerly equivalent of being the righteous prophet, cast into the lions' den but, through God's protection, emerging unharmed:

> "Conclusit ora leonum, et non nocuerunt michi, quia coram eo iustitia inventa est in me".
>
> In principio huius operis propositum fuit de tribus questionibus, prout materia pateretur, inquirere; de quarum duabus primis in superioribus libris, ut credo, sufficienter peractum est, [2] nunc autem de tertia restat agendum. Cuius quidem veritas, quia sine rubore aliquorum emergere nequit, forsitan alicuius indignationis in me causa erit. (*Mon*. 3.1.1-2)[9]
>
> "He shut the lions' mouths, and they did not harm me, for in his sight righteousness was found in me".
>
> At the beginning of this work it was proposed to inquire into three questions, within the limits allowed by the subject-matter; the first two of them have been dealt with sufficiently, I believe, in the previous books. Now it remains to deal with the third, the truth of which cannot be brought to light without putting certain people to shame, and will therefore perhaps be a cause of some resentment against me.

The truth-telling stance of the prologue of Book 3 of *Monarchia* is linked to the writer's social travails and to the shame that will befall those whom he exposes. Dante has frequently linked writing to shame, although in earlier works the shame that he feared was for himself as narrator, while

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[8] See Chiesa's essay in this volume. Interestingly, *Paradiso* 4 also includes a reference to Daniel in which, however, it is Beatrice who is compared to the prophet, while Dante is implicitly compared to King Nebuchadnezzar, whom the prophet tranquillizes in Daniel 2:1-46: "Fé sì Beatrice qual fé Daniello, / Nabuccodonosor levando d'ira" (Then Beatrice did just as Daniel did, / when he appeased Nebuchadnezzar's anger [*Par*. 4.13-14]). On this comparison, see Robert Hollander, "*Paradiso* 4.14: Dante as Nebuchadnezzar?", in *Electronic Bulletin of the Dante Society of America*, 2005, accessed at: http://www.princeton.edu/~dante/ebdsa/hollander051705.html.

[9] I cite the text from the edition of Chiesa-Tabarroni. The translation is that of Prue Shaw, *Monarchy* (Cambridge: Cambridge U. Press, 1966), as accessed on the website of the Società Dantesca Italiana: http://www.danteonline.it/italiano/home_ita.asp.

in *Monarchia* the shame will belong to those whom he targets. In the *Vita Nuova*, Dante writes that it would be "shameful" for a poet not to be able to account for his poetic practice,[10] and in *Inferno* 16 the arrival of the unbelievable monster Geryon stimulates the narrator to voice concern about the "vergogna" of being considered a liar by his audience (*Inf.* 16.124–26). Most salient for our purposes is a similar moment in *Inferno* 28 when the narrator recounts the fantastical sight of Bertran de Born holding his head in his outstretched hand. As in *Inferno* 16, in *Inferno* 28 Dante once more affirms the fear and shame that gnaw at him as he prepares to tell an unbelievable truth.[11] He is afraid to tell what he saw but he has the protection of his conscience which is like a breastplate of purity:

> Ma io rimasi a riguardar lo stuolo,
> e vidi cosa, ch'io avrei paura,
> sanza più prova, di contarla solo;
> se non che coscïenza m'assicura,
> la buona compagnia che l'uom francheggia
> sotto l'asbergo del sentirsi pura. (*Inf.* 28.112–17)

> But I stayed there to watch that company
> and saw a thing that I should be afraid
> to tell with no more proof than my own self—
> except that I am reassured by conscience,
> that good companion, heartening a man
> beneath the breastplate of its purity.

In this rhetorically complex passage, the poet is reassured by his conscience ("se non che coscienza m'assicura"), personified as "that good companion that heartens a man under the breastplate of feeling pure": "la

[10] See *Vita Nuova* 25.10: "grande vergogna sarebbe a colui che rimasse cose sotto vesta di figura o di colore rettorico, e poscia, domandato, non sapesse denudare le sue parole da cotale vesta, in guisa che avessero verace intendimento"; in the edition of Donato Pirovano, Dante Alighieri, *Vita nuova. Rime*, ed. Donato Pirovano and Marco Grimaldi (Roma: Salerno, 2015).

[11] The preamble to announcing the vision of the headless Bertran de Born reprises a trope that in *The Undivine Comedy* I call "the Geryon principle", whereby "far from giving quarter, backing off when the *materia* being represented is too 'maravigliosa' to be credible, Dante raises the ante by using such moments to underscore his poem's veracity, its status as historical scribal record of what he saw". See, *The Undivine Comedy,* 60. For more on the "Geryon principle", see 90, 98, and 271, n. 33.

buona compagnia che l'uom francheggia / sotto l'asbergo del sentirsi pura" (*Inf.* 28.116–17).

The above passage in *Inferno* 28 may have been in Dante's mind as he penned the prologue of Book 3 of *Monarchia*, where he also uses the military image of the protective "breastplate" ("asbergo" in *Inf.* 28.117; "lorica" in *Mon.* 3.1.3). In *Monarchia* 3.1.2 Dante is worried that his truth-telling will cause shame in his interlocutors and therefore runs the risk of incurring resentment:

> nunc autem de tertia restat agendum. Cuius quidem veritas, quia sine rubore aliquorum emergere nequit, forsitan alicuius indignationis in me causa erit. (*Mon*. 3.1.2)
>
> Now it remains to deal with the third, the truth of which cannot be brought to light without putting certain people to shame, and will therefore perhaps be a cause of some resentment against me.

Here, as in the parallel passage in *Paradiso* 17 noted by the *Monarchia*'s commentators,[12] Dante reveals that he expects and is preparing himself for a negative response, for he will have to tell difficult truths that may well spur the "indignation" of his interlocutors: "forsitan alicuius indignationis in me causa erit" (and will therefore perhaps be a cause of some resentment against me [*Mon.* 3.1.2]). Arming himself for battle, Dante puts on "the breastplate of faith" commanded by St. Paul in 1 Thessalonians 5:8: "iuxta monitionem Pauli fidei loricam induens" (putting on "the breastplate of faith" as Paul exhorts us [*Mon.* 3.1.3]).

Dante's use in *Monarchia* 3.1.3 of the Pauline image of the "breastplate of faith" has a precedent in *Inferno* 28.117, where the "breastplate" of conscience under which the poet must protect himself also belongs to a truth-telling moment. The parallels between the two passages, to the best of my knowledge not noted by commentaries on *Inferno* or *Monarchia*, include the reassurance provided by the breastplate. In *Inferno* 28 the truth-telling narrator figures his conscience as a breastplate under which he can be heartened. Years later, in the opening of Book 3 of *Monarchia*, Dante, again the truth-teller, reassures himself with respect to

[12] Chiesa-Tabarroni writes: "Da un punto di vista tematico, questo prologo trova un parallelo interessante nello scambio di battute fra Dante e Cacciaguida che chiude il XVII canto del *Paradiso* (vv. 106-42), in cui ugualmente si parla del coraggio per la verità, con alcune sottolineature comuni" (From a thematic perspective, this prologue is an interesting parallel to the exchange between Dante and Cacciaguida that closes *Paradiso* 17, verses 106-42, in which, similarly, the theme is the courage to speak the truth, with some common emphases [152]).

his difficult mission by remembering St. Paul's exhortation to "put on the breastplate of faith" ("fidei loricam induens").

In both *Inferno* 28 and *Monarchia* 3 the author arms himself for battle on behalf of truth, using military imagery that the prologue of Book 3 of *Monarchia* elaborates and prolongs. Like a gladiator for truth, the author of *Monarchia* 3.1 enters a public debate, an arena ("gignasium", "palestra") in which he, like his adversaries, will be fully exposed. If he errs, shame will accrue to him, not solely to his opponents. The task that he undertakes, a dangerous and difficult one, is to "cast out the wicked and the lying from the ring", and to do so publicly, "before the eyes of the world" ("spectante mundo"):

> gignasium presens ingrediar, et in brachio Illius qui nos de potestate tenebrarum liberavit in sanguine suo impium atque mendacem de palestra, spectante mundo, eiciam. (*Mon*. 3.1.3)
>
> I shall enter the present arena, and, by his arm who freed us from the power of darkness with his blood, before the eyes of the world I shall cast out the wicked and the lying from the ring.

Such athletic and bellicose language, which reminds us of *Paradiso*'s Saint Dominic, "il santo atleta / benigno a' suoi e a' nemici crudo" (the holy athlete, kind to his own and harsh to enemies [*Par*. 12.56–57]), is intended to offend and wound. It is intended to be shame-inducing. This language from the prologue of Book 3 of *Monarchia* does not offer Dante any opportunity for compromise with his adversaries, nor does he appear to seek any such thing. The possibility of benevolence or mildness toward the author's opponents seems utterly out of reach, remote from the armed struggle at hand. And yet, in only a few chapters, in chapter 4 of *Monarchia* Book 3, Dante discusses a method of refutation that will allow him to be kinder—"mitior"—to his adversaries.

We turn now to this softening of tone and to the methodology, Aristotelian logic, that makes it possible, as well as to a consideration of what is at stake for Dante in executing this shift.

Solutio Distinctiva in *Mon.* 3.4.17

While Aristotelian logic and biblical prophecy are radically unlike in methodology, both endeavors are committed to uncovering the truth. In *On Sophistical Refutations*, Aristotle claims that "it is difficult to distinguish what sort of things belong to the same and what to different categories" and that the person who can do so "very nearly approaches a vision of the

truth": "qui hoc potest facere prope est videre verum" (*De sophisticis elenchis*, 7 169a 22).[13] And, indeed, Aristotle's treatise is devoted to distinguishing appearance from reality, falsehood from truth. From the point of view of *Monarchia*'s truth-telling agenda, its prophetic stance and its deployment of Aristotelian argumentation work to the same end.

In this vein, Chiesa and Tabarroni "seek to show that Dante presents himself in *Monarchia* simultaneously and indissolubly as scientist and prophet".[14] They also make the very important point that the true originality and novelty of the treatise lie not in the theses that it puts forth but in its adoption of the Aristotelian syllogistic method as a method of argumentation for putting forward those theses:

> Abbiamo individuato l'originalità—un'originalità davvero grande—dell'approccio di Dante, quello che distingue la *Monarchia* fra i trattati politici dell'epoca, nell'impiego di un rigoroso metodo scientifico di impianto sillogistico, l'unico che l'autore considerava capace di dar forza all'argomentazione, e che una volta adottato conduceva per lui inevitabilmente alla verità. Le tesi che Dante propone non sono particolarmente nuove, così come non sono nuovi, con alcune importanti eccezioni, gli argomenti che porta a sostegno: nuova è l'idea che il metodo sillogistico—quello che poggia sulla logica, che non si contraddice, e come tale porta l'uomo a conclusioni che sono le conclusoni di Dio—sia la forma giusta per presentarli e discuterli, perché la correttezza del ragionamento diviene inconfutabile garanzia della validità dei risultati. (Chiesa-Tabarroni ed., CXLII)

> We found the originality of Dante's approach—a truly great originality, that which distinguishes the *Monarchia* among the political treatises of the era—in its deployment of a rigorous scientific method based on syllogisms, the only method that the author considered capable of giving force to his argumentation and that, once adopted, inevitably leads to the truth. The theses that Dante puts forth are not particularly new, nor (with some important exceptions) are the arguments with which he supports them.

[13] The Latin text is the Boethius translation, accessed at the *Aristoteles Latinus* database (Turnhout: Brepols Publishers, 2010): http://www.brepolis.net. The English translation is that of E. S. Forster in the Loeb Classical Library edition (London: Heinemann and Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1955). The translation of W. A. Pickard-Cambridge renders the passage as follows: "For it is hard to distinguish what kind of things are signified by the same and what by different kinds of expression: for a man who can do this is practically next door to the understanding of the truth" (*On Sophistical Refutations* [Oxford U. Press, 1928]).

[14] Chiesa-Tabarroni ed., CXLII: "abbiamo cercato di mostrare come in quest'opera egli si proponga contemporaneamente e indissolubilmente come scienziato e profeta".

> What is new is the idea that the syllogistic method—a method that relies on logic, that does not contradict itself, and that, therefore, leads us to conclusions that are God's conclusions—is the right format in which to present and discuss these theses, because the correctness of the reasoning becomes an irrefutable guarantee of the validity of the conclusions. (trans. mine)

In Book 3 chapter 4 of *Monarchia*, Dante begins by laying out the arguments for the superiority of papal power that he intends to refute. These arguments are based on the analogy between the "two great lights" created by God, one greater (the sun) and the other lesser (the moon). These lights have been interpreted, erroneously in Dante's view, as allegorical figures of spiritual and temporal power. Dante proceeds to unpack the full mistaken analogy, which includes the moon's dependence on the sun for its light, taken allegorically to signify the imperial power's analogous dependence for its authority on papal power:

> Deinde arguunt quod, quemadmodum luna, que est luminare minus, non habet lucem nisi prout recipit a sole, sic nec regnum temporale auctoritatem habet nisi prout recipit a spirituali regimine. (*Mon*. 3.4.3)

> They then go on to argue that, just as the moon, which is the lesser light, has no light except that which it receives from the sun, in the same way the temporal power has no authority except that which it receives from the spiritual power.

Having laid out the argument that he intends to refute, Dante pauses to instruct the reader as to the methodology of refutation. His methodological lesson begins by referring explicitly to *De sophisticis elenchis* (*On Sophistical Refutations*), quoting Aristotle's claim that "to refute an argument is to expose an error":

> Propter hanc et propter alias eorum rationes dissolvendas prenotandum quod, sicut Phylosopho placet in hiis que *De sophisticis elenchis*, solutio argumenti est erroris manifestatio. (*Mon*. 3.4.4)

> In order to refute this and other arguments of theirs, it must first be borne in mind that, as Aristotle states in the *Sophistical Refutations*, to refute an argument is to expose an error.

Dante now explains that an argument can be flawed in two ways, in its form and in its content, expounding what Chiesa-Tabarroni call "a doctrine characteristic of medieval exegesis on *Sophistical Refutations*,

according to which a refutation [. . .] can be lacking with respect to content or with respect to form (*peccans in materia / in forma*)".[15]

> Et quia error potest esse in materia et in forma argumenti, dupliciter peccare contingit: aut scilicet assummendo falsum, aut non sillogizando; que duo Phylosophus obiciebat contra Parmenidem et Melissum dicens quia "falsa recipiunt et non sillogizantes sunt". (*Mon.* 3.4.4)
>
> And since an error may occur in the content and in the form of an argument, there are two ways in which an argument can be flawed: either because a false premise has been adopted, or because the logic is faulty; both of these charges were made against Parmenides and Melissus by Aristotle when he said: "They adopt false premises and use invalid syllogisms".

As Dante here points out, errors in both content and in form were imputed by Aristotle to the Greek philosophers Parmenides and Melissus, both of the 5th century BCE: "que duo Phylosophus obiciebat contra Parmenidem et Melissum dicens quia 'falsa recipiunt et non sillogizantes sunt'" (both of these charges were made against Parmenides and Melissus by Aristotle when he said: "They adopt false premises and use invalid syllogisms" [*Mon*. 3.4.4]).[16] Dante critiques these same two philosophers

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[15] The full passage from the Chiesa-Tabarroni commentary is as follows:

> Dante richiama qui una dottrina caratteristica dell'esegesi medievale dei *Sophistici elenchi*, secondo cui una confutazione (*elenchus*, che secondo Aristotele è il sillogismo della contraddittoria rispetto alla tesi confutata) può essere carente secondo la materia o secondo la forma (*peccans in materia / in forma*): nel primo caso il sillogismo è viziato dalla falsità di una o di entrambe le premesse, mentre nel secondo caso è la stessa validità del sillogismo ad essere carente. (Chiesa-Tabarroni ed., 172)
>
> Dante here recalls a doctrine characteristic of medieval exegesis on *Sophistical Refutations*, according to which a refutation (*elenchus*, which according to Aristotle is the proof of the contradictory with respect to the thesis being refuted) can be lacking with respect to content or with respect to form (*peccans in materia / in forma*): in the first case the syllogism is flawed by the falsity of one or both of its premises, while in the second case it is the validity of the syllogism itself to be flawed.

[16] Chiesa-Tabarroni ed., 172, gloss and explain the context in Aristotle's *Physics*: "la sentenza si riscontra due volte in Aristotele, *Physica*, 1 2 185a 4-5 e 1 3 186b 6-7: tra l'una e l'altra occorrenza lo Stagirita demolisce la concezione monistica degli Eleati, mettendone in luce gli errori di metodo e di contenuto e bollandoli come negatori dei principî della filosofia naturale" (Aristotle's dictum recurs in *Physics* 1 2 185a 4-5 and 1 3 186b 6-7: between the two occurrences Aristotle demolishes the Eleatic concept of monism, illuminating their errors of method and

in his own voice in *Paradiso* 13.125, in a verse where he adds the Greek philosopher Bryson, also 5th century BCE ("Brisso"):

> E di ciò sono al mondo aperte prove
> Parmenide, Melisso e Brisso e molti,
> li quali andaro e non sapean dove (*Par*. 13.124-26)
>
> Of this, Parmenides, Melissus, Bryson,
> are clear proofs to the world, and many others
> who went their way but knew not where it went

Bryson too, it is worth noting, was on Aristotle's philosophical hit list. In *On Sophistical Refutations* (a work where Dante could also have found frequent critiques of Melissus) Aristotle labels sophistical Bryson's method of squaring the circle: "Sed ut Brisso quadravit circulum, nam et si quadratur circulus, tamen quia non secundum rem, ideo sophisticus" (Bryson's method of squaring the circle, even though this be successful, is nevertheless sophistical [*Soph. elen*. 10 171b 22]).

We return now to *Monarchia* 3.4.4 and to Dante's lesson on the methodology of refutation. From the statement that an error may occur "in the content and in the form of an argument", Dante moves to illustrate how this error can occur: how an error may manifest itself *in materia argumenti* and how an error may manifest itself *in forma argumenti*. Following the order adopted in the first part of his sentence, in which *materia* precedes *forma* ("error potest esse in materia et in forma argumenti"), Dante explains that an error may occur either because of assuming a false premise (*error in materia*) or because of not syllogizing correctly (*error in forma*): "aut scilicet assummendo falsum, aut non sillogizando" (either because a false premise has been adopted, or because the logic is faulty).[17]

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content and labeling them as deniers of the principles of natural philosophy). The note in Chiesa-Tabarroni goes on to state "Parmenide e Melisso (insieme a Brissone, un altro filosofo nominato nei *Sophistici elenchi*) sono citati anche in *Par*. XIII 125" (Parmenides and Melissus, together with Bryson, another philosopher named in *Sophistical Refutations*, are cited also in *Par*. 13.125).

[17] This key methodological point has been translated variously. Chiesa-Tabarroni unpacks the compact Latin more fully than Shaw's English translation cited above: "o assumendo una premessa falsa, o non applicando le regole della logica" (either assuming a false premise or not applying the rules of logic). In this respect the Chiesa-Tabarroni translation picks up from Nardi's very useful rendering: "o assumendo il falso, o sbagliando il sillogismo" (either assuming a false premise or making a mistake in the construction of the syllogism itself). Less clearly, although more literally, Quaglioni translates "o assumendo il falso, o non sillogizzando"

The manner of refutation is therefore determined by whether the "peccatum" being refuted is an error in the content or in the form.

We can liken the idea expressed in *Monarchia* 3.4.4 on the constitutive elements of a syllogism, an idea that Dante could find in *On Sophistical Refutations*,[18] to the constitutive elements of a vow that involves a sacrifice, as Dante defines such a vow in *Paradiso* 5. A vow in which a penitent offers a sacrifice to God consists of 1) its content, that which one sacrifices ("quella / di che si fa"), and 2) its form, the pact itself ("la convenenza"):

> Due cose si convegnono a l'essenza
> di questo sacrificio: l'una è quella
> di che si fa; l'altr'è la convenenza. (*Par*. 5.43–45)
>
> Two things are of the essence when one vows
> a sacrifice: the matter of the pledge
> and then the formal compact one accepts.

The elements of a vow, its content and its form, are thus analogous to the elements of a syllogism, also parsed in terms of its content and its form. This analogy suggests once more the continued intercourse between *Monarchia* and *Paradiso*, an intercourse particularly strong in the textual

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(either assuming a false premise or not syllogizing), where Dante's point becomes clear if we add "correctly": "not syllogizing correctly".

[18] Chiesa-Tabarroni note that the distinction between *peccans in materia* / *in forma* was derived by the scholastics from *On Sophistical Refutations* chapter 18:

> Quoniam autem est recta quidem solutio manifestatio falsi syllogismi, secundum quamlibet interrogationem accidit falsum, falsus autem syllogismus fit dupliciter (aut enim si syllogizatum est falsum, aut si cum non est syllogismus videtur esse syllogismus), erit et quae nunc dicta est solutio et apparentis syllogismi secundum quam videtur interrogationum correctio.
>
> Quare accidit orationes syllogizatas quidem interimentem, apparentes autem dividentem solvere. (*Soph. elen*. 18, 176b 29)
>
> Since a correct solution is an exposure of genuine false reasoning, indicating the nature of the question on which the fallacy hinges, and since "false reasoning" can mean one of two things (for it occurs either if a false conclusion has been reached or if what is not a proof appears to be such), there must be both the solution described just now, and also the rectification of the apparent proof by showing on which of the questions it hinges. The result is that one solves the correctly reasoned arguments by demolishing them, the apparent reasonings by making distinctions. (Forster trans.)

environs of *Paradiso* 5: Dante's claim in *Monarchia* 1.12.6 that God's greatest gift to human nature is freedom of the will is restated in *Paradiso* 5.19–24 (according to Chiavacci Leonardi, the *Monarchia* passage is translated in the verses of *Paradiso*).[19] This is the same passage in *Monarchia* that features the debated interpolation, "sicut in Paradiso *Comedie* iam dixi" (as I have already said in the Paradiso of the *Comedy*).

If the error in the syllogism is one of form, meaning that the entire syllogism is flawed, then the conclusion has to be demolished ("conclusio interimenda est"), showing that the syllogism itself is not valid: "Si in forma sit peccatum, conclusio interimenda est ab illo qui solvere vult ostendendo formam sillogisticam non esse servatam" (If the error is a formal one, the conclusion has to be demolished by the person who wishes to refute it, by showing that it does not observe the rules of syllogistic argument [*Mon*. 3.4.5]). If, however, the error is an error of content, then a further set of choices presents itself, based on whether the false premise

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[19] Chiavacci Leonardi states that the verses of *Par.* 5.19-24 "traducono, alzandone il livello nel loro splendido ritmo, ciò che è detto in *Mon.* I xii, 6" (translate what is said in *Mon.* 1.12.6, raising the level with their splendid rhythm). See Anna Maria Chiavacci Leonardi, *Paradiso* (Milano: Mondadori, 1991), 96. The relevant passages of *Monarchia* 1.12.6 and *Paradiso* 5 are:

> Hoc viso, iterum manifestum esse potest quod hec libertas sive principium hoc totius nostre libertatis est maximum donum humane nature a Deo collatum [- sicut in Paradiso *Comedie* iam dixi -], quia per ipsum hic felicitamur ut homines, per ipsum alibi felicitamur ut dii. (*Mon*. 1.12.6)
> When this has been grasped, it can also be seen that this freedom (or this principle of all our freedom) is the greatest gift given by God to human nature - as I have already said in the Paradiso of the *Comedy* - since by virtue of it we become happy here as men, by virtue of it we become happy elsewhere as gods.
>
> Lo maggior don che Dio per sua larghezza
> fesse creando, e a la sua bontate
> più conformato, e quel ch'e' più apprezza,
> fu de la volontà la libertate;
> di che le creature intelligenti,
> e tutte e sole, fuoro e son dotate. (*Par.* 5.19-24)
>
> The greatest gift the magnanimity
> of God, as He created, gave, the gift
> most suited to His goodness, gift that He
> most prizes, was the freedom of the will;
> those beings that have intellect—all these and
> none but these—received and do receive this gift.

that has been assumed is false absolutely or false in a certain respect. If the false premise is false absolutely ("simpliciter"), it must be demolished in the same way that the entire conclusion is demolished when the error is in the form: *solutio interemptiva*. If the false premise is false only in a certain respect ("secundum quid"), then one can use the method of refutation called *solutio distinctiva*, in which the false premise is refuted by drawing distinctions:

> Si vero peccatum sit in materia, aut est quia simpliciter falsum assumptum est, aut quia falsum 'secundum quid'. Si simpliciter, per interemptionem assumpti solvendum est; si 'secundum quid', per distinctionem. (*Mon*. 3.4.5)

> If on the other hand the error is one of content, it is because one of the premises adopted is either false absolutely ["simpliciter"[20]] or else false in a certain respect. If it is false absolutely ["simpliciter"], then the argument is refuted by demolishing the premise; if it is false in a certain respect, then it is refuted by drawing distinctions.

Using technical scholastic terminology, Dante here references the mistake of confusing what is true in a certain respect ("secundum quid") with what is true absolutely ("simpliciter"). Known by the scholastic label "Secundum quid et simpliciter" (In a certain respect and simply [i.e., absolutely]), this fallacy is treated by Aristotle in chapter 5 of *On Sophistical Refutations*. The philosopher gives examples of "something predicated in a certain respect and absolutely" (quod secundum quid et simpliciter):

> Similiter autem et quod secundum quid et simpliciter.
> Ut si Indus, cum sit niger, albus est dentibus; albus ergo et non albus est.
> Aut si ambo quo, quoniam simul contraria inerunt.
> Huiusmodi autem in quibusdam quidem omni considerare facile, ut si sumens Aethiopem esse nigrum, dentibus dicat quoniam albus; si ergo ibi albus, quoniam niger et non niger putabitur disputasse syllogistice cum perfecerit interrogationem. (*Soph. elen.*, 5 166b 29)

> In a like manner when something is predicated in a certain respect and absolutely; for example, 'If an Indian, being black all over, is white in respect of his teeth, then he is white and not white.' Or if both attributes belong in a certain respect, they say that the contrary attributes belong simultaneously. In some cases, this sort of fallacy can be easily perceived

[20] I have altered Shaw's translation "without qualification" to "absolutely" on both occasions in this sentence in which "simpliciter" occurs.

> by anyone; if, for example, after securing an admission that the Ethiopian is black, one was to ask whether he is white in respect of his teeth, and then, if he be white in this respect, were to think that he had finished the interrogation and had proved dialectically that he was both black and not black. (Forster trans.)

Before we leave the above passage from chapter 5 of *On Sophistical Refutations*, I take this occasion to offer it as another textual affinity between *Monarchia* and *Paradiso*, as well as a new Aristotelian source for the *Commedia*. The examples of the *secundum quid* fallacy that Aristotle offers above, in *Sophisticis elenchis* 5, are examples based on the blackness of both Indians and Ethiopians: "If an Indian, being black all over, is white in respect of his teeth [. . .] if, for example, after securing an admission that the Ethiopian is black, one was to ask whether he is white in respect of his teeth" (*Soph. elen.*, 5 166b 29). Aristotle here coordinates references to Indians and Ethiopians (in other words to Asians and Africans), as Dante does in *Monarchia* 3.14.7, where he references "Asyani et Affricani" together, and as he does in the *Commedia*, culminating in *Paradiso* 19.[21]

We return to *Monarchia* 3.4 and to Dante's lesson on the methodology of refutation. Dante deploys both types of refutation with respect to an error in content, following precisely the outline of options offered in his previous methodological overview: he refutes the false premises of his opponents both "simpliciter" and "secundum quid". In paragraphs 12–16 of chapter 4 he deploys *solutio interemptiva*, refuting the false premise of his opponents "absolutely" or "simpliciter". In paragraph 17 he turns to refutation of the false premise in a certain respect or "secundum quid": *solutio distinctiva*. In the last paragraph of chapter 4, paragraph 21, Dante turns from refutation of content to demonstration of error in the form of the syllogism itself, thus following through on every aspect of the methodology that he has so painstakingly outlined.

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[21] Aristotle's text provides a model and a source for Dante's own program of coordinated references to Indians and Ethiopians. The *Monarchia* is in general noteworthy for Dante's sourcing of other cultures in Aristotle: the references to Scythians in *Monarchia* 1.14.6 and 3.3.2 are glossed as deriving from Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics.*
On the coordination of Indians and Ethiopians in the *Commedia*, see the *Commento Baroliniano* on *Paradiso* 19 in *Digital Dante*:
https://digitaldante.columbia.edu/dante/divine-comedy/paradiso/paradiso-19/.
In particular, see the "Appendix on Indians and Ethiopians in the *Commedia*, Including a Plausible Source in Aristotle".

It is *solutio distinctiva*, a resolution found by means of making distinctions, which particularly interests us in this essay. In *Monarchia* 3.4.17 Dante offers a brief but fascinating commentary on the nature of *solutio distinctiva*, moving in a social direction not developed by Aristotle. Unlike his *magister*, Dante probes the social uses of refutation through distinction.

Unpacking the latent social implications that are absent from Aristotle's exposition, Dante carefully explains the use of *solutio distinctiva* as a method of refutation that allows one to be "kinder to one's adversary": "mitior nanque est in adversarium solutio distinctiva" (*Mon*. 3.4.17). *Solutio distinctiva* is "kinder"—"mitior"—because, by drawing a distinction rather than demolishing the false premise, one avoids labeling one's adversary a liar. Whereas *solutio interemptiva* irretrievably reveals the opponent to be "mentiens" (lying), *solutio distinctiva* protects one's adversary, "for he does not then seem to be altogether lying": "non enim omnino mentiens esse videtur" (*Mon.* 3.4.17). By "tolerating the false premise" ("mendacium tollerando"), *solutio distinctiva* sidesteps total demolition of the opponent, and thus demonstrates greater tolerance toward the other's viewpoint:[22]

> Potest etiam hoc, mendacium tollerando, per distinctionem dissolvi (mitior nanque est in adversarium solutio distinctiva: non enim omnino mentiens esse videtur, sicut interemptiva illum videri facit). (*Mon*. 3.4.17)[23]
>
> This argument can also be refuted, if we tolerate the false premise, by making a distinction; for a refutation based on a distinction is kinder to one's adversary, in that he does not appear to be asserting an outright falsehood, as a refutation based on demolishing his premise makes him appear to do.

This social application of *solutio distinctiva* plays a role in *Paradiso* 4, where Dante puts it to work as a key mechanism of the narrative arc that

[22] Nardi translates "tollerando il falso asserto" (tolerating the false premise [*Monarchia*, 453]), which Shaw follows in English, while Quaglioni translates "con una certa tolleranza" (with a certain tolerance [*Monarchia*, 1275]. The Chiesa-Tabarroni translation eliminates "tollerando" altogether.

[23] Chiesa-Tabarroni follow Quaglioni in adopting "mendacium" rather than "mendacio" (they classify this shift as one of the "proposte migliorative di Quaglioni rispetto all'edizione di Shaw" [one of the improvements proposed by Quaglioni to Shaw's edition]); see Chiesa-Tabarroni, "Nota al testo", CXXXV. See also Quaglioni's long note on "mendacium tollerando" on 1274 of his commentary.

unfolds from *Paradiso* 3 to *Paradiso* 4. In this plot-line, the social implications of *solutio distinctiva* are not described but performed, in a narrative context where the performance has precisely the softening and accommodating effect that Dante analyzes in the brief characterization of *solutio distinctiva* of *Monarchia* 3.4.17. In other words, the brief but suggestive analysis of the latent social possibilities of *solutio distinctiva* that we find in *Monarchia* 3.4.17 illuminates what happens in *Paradiso* 4, and vice versa: *Paradiso* 4 performs—puts into practice—the effects of *solutio distinctiva* that *Monarchia* 3.4.17 presents in theory.

Solutio Distinctiva in *Paradiso* 4

The technique of *solutio distinctiva* is applied as a method of conflict resolution by Beatrice in *Paradiso* 4, where Dante's plot highlights the strategic use of Aristotelian logic to manage a social interaction in which two parties are apparently on a collision course. I refer to the implicit debate between Piccarda and Beatrice on the will. This debate is triggered by the encounter with souls in the first heaven, Piccarda and Costanza, who were not fully constant in the fulfillment of their monastic vows because of violence done to them by others.

The beginning of this debate is first signaled by the perplexity experienced by Dante and expressed by Beatrice at the outset of *Paradiso* 4. Dante wonders if the souls of the first heaven have been treated unjustly, as Beatrice infers when she begins her reply in *Paradiso* 4.67. The question posed is why the souls of the first heaven, whose "good will persists" ("buon voler dura"), should merit less beatitude than other blessed souls, considering that their inconstancy was caused by the violence of others:

> Tu argomenti: "Se 'l buon voler dura,
> la violenza altrui per qual ragione
> di meritar mi scema la misura? (*Par*. 4.19–21)
>
> You reason: "If my will to good persists,
> why should the violence of others cause
> the measure of my merit to be less?"

The answer to the above query begins in verse 67 and includes the bold assertion that will, if it does not will, can never be coerced: "volontà, se non vuol, non s'ammorza" (will, if it does not want, is not quenched [*Par.* 4.76]). A full will cannot be affected by violence, but always returns to its purpose like a flame that will always rise. If, continues Beatrice, the wills

of Piccarda and Costanza had been truly full—"Se fosse stato lor volere intero" (*Par*. 4. 82)—like the wills of the martyr Saint Lawrence or the Roman Gaius Mucius Scaevola, then no constraint could have altered them and their full wills would have led them back to those cloisters from which they were previously torn by violence:

> Se fosse stato lor volere intero,
> come tenne Lorenzo in su la grada,
> e fece Muzio a la sua man severo,
> così l'avria ripinte per la strada
> ond'eran tratte, come fuoro sciolte;
> ma così salda voglia è troppo rada. (*Par*. 4.82–87)

> Had their will been as whole as that which held
> Lawrence fast to the grate and that which made
> of Mucius one who judged his own hand, then
> once freed, that will would have pushed them back
> down the road from which they had been dragged;
> but it is all too seldom that a will is so intact.

Beatrice's answer is very clear: a *volere intero* cannot be altered, whatever violence is done to it.

But the very clarity of Beatrice's answer generates a new problem, because now there is a contradiction between Beatrice's explanation in *Paradiso* 4 and Piccarda's assertion in *Paradiso* 3. Piccarda claims that Costanza maintained absolute inner constancy in her monastic vows despite the violence done to her and that "she was never released from the veil in her heart" ("non fu dal vel del cor già mai disciolta" [*Par*. 3.117]). Beatrice herself had asserted the truthfulness of the blessed souls, who can never stray from the truth: "la verace luce che le appaga / da sé non lascia lor torcer li piedi" (the truthful light in which they find their peace / will not allow their steps to turn astray [*Par*. 3.32-33]).

The contradiction is therefore as follows: If Piccarda was telling the truth about Costanza's continued faithfulness to her vows, then how can Beatrice be truthful when she affirms that a will that is whole can never be constrained? These two positions contradict each other, as Beatrice spells out, using the terminology of lying ("mentire" in verse 95) and logical contradiction ("contradire" in verse 99) that Dante uses in *Monarchia*:

> Io t'ho per certo ne la mente messo
> ch'alma beata non poria mentire,
> però ch'è sempre al primo vero appresso;

e poi potesti da Piccarda udire
che l'affezion del vel Costanza tenne;
sì ch'ella par qui meco contradire. (*Par*. 4.94–99)

I've set it in your mind as something certain
that souls in blessedness can never lie,
since they are always near the Primal Truth.
But from Piccarda you were also able
to hear how Constance kept her love of the veil:
and here Piccarda seems to contradict me.

Dante-narrator has carefully crafted an impasse between Beatrice and Piccarda. As the narrative denouement of the discussion on will of *Paradiso* 3-4, he creates a logical contradiction that pits the two Florentine ladies against each other. We can have no doubt regarding the structural importance of this impasse within the narrative arc of *Paradiso* 4, for Beatrice presents it in verses 91–93 as an obstacle that the pilgrim cannot resolve on his own:

Ma or ti s'attraversa un altro passo
dinanzi a li occhi, tal che per te stesso
non usciresti: pria saresti lasso. (*Par*. 4.91–93)

But now another obstacle obstructs
your sight; you cannot exit from it by
yourself—it is too wearying to try.

The manufactured nature of this new *dubbio* underscores the importance of the issue at stake for Dante. He seeks to dramatize the ways in which committed argument can lead to genuine social crisis, in that one or the other of those debating risks being labeled a liar. He further dramatizes the resolution of such an impasse through the application of a method that can mitigate the crisis, allowing one to be "mitior" toward one's opponent by not revealing her to be a liar: *solutio distinctiva*.

At this point Beatrice introduces the distinction between absolute and relative will, which melts away the contradiction between her position and Piccarda's. She explains that frequently, in order to flee danger, the will consents to an action that, in an absolute sense, it does not want:

Molte fiate già, frate, addivenne
che, per fuggir periglio, contra grato
si fé di quel che far non si convenne (*Par*. 4.100–2)

> Before this, brother, it has often happened
> that, to flee menace, men unwillingly
> did that which should not be done

Absolute will never consent to force ("Voglia assoluta non consente al danno" [109]), but relative will may consent, fearing otherwise to fall into even greater harm: "ma consentevi in tanto in quanto teme, / se si ritrae, cadere in più affanno" (110–11).[24] Piccarda, it turns out, was referring to relative will, while Beatrice was referring to absolute will:

> Però, quando Piccarda quello spreme,
> de la voglia assoluta intende, e io
> de l'altra; sì che ver diciamo insieme. (*Par*. 4.112–14)

> Therefore, Piccarda means the absolute
> will when she speaks, and I the relative;
> so that the two of us have spoken truth.

Most interesting for our analysis are Beatrice's last words above, in which Beatrice claims that she and Piccarda are both truth-tellers: "sì che ver diciamo insieme" ("so that the two of us have spoken truth" [*Par.* 4.114]). Beatrice and Piccarda are both telling the truth by virtue of the introduction of the distinction, as described in *Monarchia* 3.4.17. By introducing the distinction between relative and absolute will, Beatrice can "win" the argument while simultaneously allowing her "adversary", Piccarda, to also win: by virtue of *solutio distinctiva*, Piccarda is not a liar but is a truth-teller in her own right, "sì che ver diciamo insieme" (114).

Moreover, Beatrice performs her refutation precisely in the way prescribed in the *Monarchia*. Dante thus adds a frisson of conflict to his overdetermined plot and makes the point that battle through syllogism is preferable to other forms of strife. This point is extremely relevant to a canto that deals extensively with the topic of violence and does so using an

[24] Chiavacci Leonardi's commentary glosses the idea of relative will with the phrase "secundum quid": "Il pensiero scolastico, seguendo Aristotele, distingue in questo caso due volontà: una assoluta, che non vuole il male che compie; una relativa ('secundum quid'), che lo vuole solo in quanto così facendo pensa di evitarne uno peggiore" (Scholastic thought, following Aristotle, distinguishes between two wills: an absolute will, which does not want to do wrong, and a relative will ("secundum quid"), which does to the degree that it hopes to avoid a greater wrongdoing). See *Paradiso*, 87.

Aristotelian template: *Nicomachean Ethics* 3.1 is the source of much of Dante's thinking on compulsion of the will.[25]

By constructing a refutation based on a distinction, a potentially difficult situation is smoothed over diplomatically, for one's adversary does not "appear to be asserting a downright falsehood" (*Mon.* 3.4.17). In place of falsehood on one side and truth on the other, a distinction can engineer a result in which both parties are aligned with truth: "sì che ver diciamo insieme" (*Par*. 4.114). No one emerges from the encounter labeled a liar, and a communicative dead end has been averted. Additionally, in an achievement that is perhaps most important with respect to the *Paradiso*'s overall agenda and viewpoint, the narrator has introduced and modeled the practice of intellectual tolerance.

The Art of Fishing for Truth (*Par*. 13.123)

The introducing of distinctions into discourse in the broad sense (rather than in the technical sense of refutation of a false premise) is crucial for the diegetic progress of *Paradiso* as a whole. To give just one example of an expedient that occurs time and again, in *Paradiso* 6 a claim is made that seems self-contradictory (that a just vengeance can be justly avenged) and then in *Paradiso* 7 a distinction is introduced in order to "resolve" the contradiction and, thereby, to move the discourse forward. As a narrative procedure, the introduction of distinction is both the discursive backbone of the *Paradiso* and the source of its intellectual flexibility.

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[25] In 1998 I proposed that Aristotle's examples of compulsion in *Nicomachean Ethics* 3.1 offer Dante both the image that he used for the *contrapasso* of *Inferno* 5 ("if he were to be carried somewhere by a wind") and the philosophical context for Piccarda's story in *Paradiso* 3 ("[if he were to be carried somewhere] by men who had him in their power"): "Those things, then, are thought involuntary, which take place by force or owing to ignorance; and that is compulsory of which the moving principle is outside, being a principle in which nothing is contributed by the person who acts—or, rather, is acted upon, e.g., if he were to be carried somewhere by a wind, or by men who had him in their power" (*Nich. Ethics* 3.1). See "Dante and Cavalcanti: *Inferno* 5 in its Lyric and Autobiographical Context", *Dante Studies* 116 (1998): 31–63; the essay and the passage in question are reprinted in *Dante and the Origins of Italian Literary Culture* (New York: Fordham U. Press, 2006), 74. My interest in Dante's use of Aristotle is ongoing: see "Aristotle's *Mezzo*, Courtly *Misura*, and Dante's Canzone *Le dolci rime*: Humanism, Ethics, and Social Anxiety," in *Dante and the Greeks*, ed. Jan Ziolkowski (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2014), 163-79.

When St. Thomas introduces a distinction in *Paradiso* 13—"Con questa distinzion prendi 'l mio detto"—he states explicitly that the distinction will allow the pilgrim to reconcile two competing viewpoints (regarding the ways in which Solomon can be the "brightest light" given the superiority to all men of Adam and Christ). Dante-narrator thus crafts and subsequently resolves an intellectual impasse, precisely as he did in *Paradiso* 4:

> Con questa distinzion prendi 'l mio detto;
> e così puote star con quel che credi
> del primo padre e del nostro Diletto. (*Par*. 13.109–11)
>
> Take what I said with this distinction then;
> in that way it accords with what you thought
> of the first father and of our Beloved.

Declaring that the ability to make distinctions is essential for affirming and denying or, in other words, for argumentation and reasoned discourse—"ché quelli è tra li stolti bene a basso / che sanza distinzione afferma e nega" (he who affirms or denies without distinguishing / must be among the most obtuse of men [*Par*. 13.115–17])—St. Thomas gives examples of some thinkers who failed to make the requisite distinctions. It is here that we encounter the Greek philosophers originally critiqued by Aristotle and cited in *Monarchia* 3.4.4, Parmenides and Melissus: "Parmenide, Melisso e Brisso e molti, / li quali andaro e non sapean dove" (Parmenides, Melissus and Bryson and many / who went but knew not where [*Par*. 13.125–26]).

For Dante, the failure of these philosophers to introduce appropriate distinctions makes them men who went after the truth but did not know where they were going: "li quali andaro e non sapean dove" (who went and did not know where [*Par*. 13.126]). They were, in another extraordinary image, fishers of truth who had not the art to find it. Rather, they set off in their boats, leaving the shore behind, without the requisite skill to find the truth that they seek:

> Vie più che 'ndarno da riva si parte,
> perché non torna tal qual e' si move,
> chi pesca per lo vero e non ha l'arte. (*Par*. 13.121–23)
>
> Far worse than uselessly he leaves the shore
> (more full of error than he was before)
> who fishes for the truth but lacks the art.

What, then, is the "art" that Parmenides and Melissus and Bryson lacked? The art of fishing for the truth is the art described by Aristotle in *On Sophistical Refutations* and his other works on logic. It is the art in which Dante shows his prowess in the syllogisms of *Monarchia* and in the discursive—non-mystical—sections of *Paradiso*. It is the art that informs the rhetoric of logical and discursive narrativity, deployed by St. Thomas in the heaven of the sun, an art that reflects this heaven of intellectual tolerance and distinction.

However, as I noted at the outset of this essay, the *Paradiso* alternates between two modes, two great rhetorics: Dante-narrator shifts continuously from a discursive logical mode based on embracing *distinzione*, a mode that accepts the fundamental subjection of narrative to linear time, to a "lyrical" or "anti-narrative" mode that depends on metaphor and the circularizing of language to rebel against the dominion of time. In *The Undivine Comedy*, where I classified these two rhetorics of *Paradiso*, I refer to them as the mode of difference and *distinctio* versus the mode of similitude and unity: the former is discursive, logical, linear, "chronologized",[26] and (if we form a category based on the *Paradiso*'s stress on our two faculties) intellective; the latter is the opposite, i.e., nondiscursive, nonlinear or circular, "dechronologized", and affective.[27]

The two rhetorics of *Paradiso* might be seen as analogous to the two rhetorics of *Monarchia*: the Aristotelian-philosophical and the biblical-theological. Neither rhetoric is rejected, for Dante has mastered the art of truth-finding and truth-telling in both manners, as he consummately demonstrates in both these great works of his intellectual and poetic maturity. In terms of authorial personae, Dante's insistence on maintaining the voice of the philosopher within and alongside that of the poet means

[26] This is Ricoeur's term, as cited in *The Undivine Comedy*, 166: "the major tendency of modern theory of narrative . . . is to 'dechronologize' narrative"; see Paul Ricoeur, *Time and Narrative*, trans. Kathleen McLaughlin and David Pellauer (1983; Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984), 30.

[27] In Chapters 8, 9, and 10 of *The Undivine Comedy* I analyze *Paradiso* in terms of an alternation between two distinct rhetorics or poetic modes: on the one hand a discursive, logical, linear mode and, on the other, a lyrical, metaphorical, and circularized mode. Chapter 9 is devoted to the heaven of the sun, the heaven of intellectual tolerance that includes *Paradiso* 13, and is analyzed with the assistance of Thomas Aquinas: "Distinctio autem formalis semper requirit inaequalitatem, quia, ut dicitur in *Meta*., 'formae rerum sunt sicut numeri, in quibus species variantur per additionem vel subtractionem unitatis'" (Now distinction of form always requires inequality, for, to quote the *Metaphysics*, forms of things are like numbers, which vary by addition or subtraction of units [*ST* 1a.47.2]).

that we find the use of the *solutio distinctiva* in *Paradiso* 4 and *Paradiso* 13 and throughout the third canticle.

Who then was Dante? Was he the single-minded possessor of absolute truth, donning his breastplate for battle, or was he the flexible inventor, through *solutio distinctiva*, of his very own doctrine of a double, or indeed multiple, truth, like the multiple and apparently contradictory viewpoints that are reconciled in the divine circles of the heaven of the sun? He was both, and both stances are present in both *Paradiso* and *Monarchia*. Dante believed in some things absolutely, but with notable flexibility and commitment to tolerance, inclusion, *distinctio*. He seeks the avoidance of *litigium* where possible. Thus, in *Monarchia* 3.3, Dante offers examples of those who avoid disputation:

> Multa etenim ignoramus de quibus non litigamus: nam geometra circuli quadraturam ignorat, non tamen de ipsa litigat; theologus vero numerum angelorum ignorat, non tamen de illo litigium facit; Egiptius vero civilitatem Scitharum ignorat, non propter hoc de ipsorum civilitate contendit. (*Mon*. 3.3.1–2)

> [F]or there are many things we do not know about which we do not argue. The geometrician, for example, does not know how to square the circle, but he does not argue about it; the theologian for his part does not know how many angels there are, yet he does not engage in dispute about the matter; the Egyptian likewise is ignorant of the civilization of the Scythians, yet he does not on this account argue about their civilization.

The above passage from *Monarchia* 3.3 constitutes, of course, another example of overlap with *Paradiso*: from the geometer who "does not know how to square the circle, but does not argue about it", Dante moves to the theologian who does not know how many angels there are, but similarly does not dispute the matter. Dante's comparison of himself to the geometer struggling to square the circle at the end of *Paradiso* 33 indicates just how deeply he identified with the problems investigated by Greek philosophers, problems cited by Aristotle in *On Sophistical Refutations* and elsewhere.

The *Monarchia*'s transition from the example of the geometer to the example of the theologian who does not dispute the number of angels shows again the treatise's commitment to its two modes: the philosophical and the theological. The third example, of the Egyptians who do not argue about the civilization of the Scythians, reminds us of the *Monarchia*'s inclusive interest in cultural otherness, an interest also present in *Paradiso*: as discussed previously, the "Asyani et Affricani" of *Monarchia* 3.14.7 are also present in *Paradiso* 19.

Returning to the theologians who do not litigate the number of angels, the *Monarchia* commentaries I have consulted point to *Convivio* 2.4.5 and *Paradiso* 28–29, the canti devoted to angels, as the other relevant passages in which Dante discusses angelic nature and number. Interestingly, in *Paradiso* 29.134, Dante invokes the prophet Daniel on the number of angels,[28] again suggesting the resonance of the opening chapters of *Monarchia* Book 3 throughout *Paradiso*: Dante's *ex abrupto* citation of Daniel 6:22 belongs to *Monarchia* 3.1 and the question of the number of angels is referenced in *Monarchia* 3.3. But the most cogent textual affinity between the non-litigation of the number of angels in *Monarchia* 3.3.2 and *Paradiso*, one to my knowledge not cited by commentaries, must bring us back to *Paradiso* 13.

In *Paradiso* 13, St. Thomas, intent upon distinguishing the kingly wisdom of Solomon from other kinds of wisdom, offers a list of the kinds of wisdom for which Solomon did not pray: he did not pray to be expert in theology, in logic, in physics, or in geometry. These kinds of wisdom are introduced by way of the great intellectual problems they have not been solved, beginning with the problem of the number of angels:

> non per sapere il numero in che enno
> li motor di qua sù, o se *necesse*
> con contingente mai *necesse* fenno;
> non *si est dare primum motum esse*,
> o se del mezzo cerchio far si puote
> triangol sì ch'un retto non avesse. (*Par*. 13.97–102)

> and not to know the number of the angels
> up here nor, if *necesse* combined with a
> contingent ever can produce *necesse*,
> nor *si est dare primum motum esse*,
> nor if, within a semicircle, one
> can draw a triangle with no right angle.

In a move that is itself emblematic of both *Paradiso* and *Monarchia*, Dante shifts in the above list from the theological problem of the number

[28] See *Paradiso* 29.133-35:
> e se tu guardi quel che si revela
> per Daniel, vedrai che 'n sue migliaia
> determinato numero si cela.
> and if you look at that which is revealed
> by Daniel, you will see that, while he mentions
> thousands, he gives no number with precision.

of angels to a highly debated problem pertaining to syllogisms: the question of whether a necessary conclusion may be deduced from necessary and contingent premises.

Again, we see that in *Paradiso* Dante does not turn against logical discourse. Rather, he embraces it. He does not dislike syllogisms. Rather, as he tells us at the beginning of *Paradiso* 11, he dislikes *defective* syllogisms, the type that Aristotle teaches us to identify and to refute in *On Sophistical Refutations*:

> O insensata cura de' mortali,
> quanto son difettivi silogismi
> quei che ti fanno in basso batter l'ali! (*Par*. 11.1–3)
>
> O senseless cares of mortals, how defective
> are those syllogisms that bring your wings
> to flight so low, to earthly things!

These verses from the beginning of *Paradiso* 11 have sometimes been incorrectly glossed as an indictment of syllogistic reasoning. In fact, in another affinity between *Paradiso* and *Monarchia*, Dante is indicting syllogisms that are flawed and defective in their argumentation, precisely as explained in the methodological outline of *Monarchia* 3.4.[29]

Most important is Dante's rejection of dualism in the domain of expressing and knowing the truth. Thus, in the long struggle between Plato and the poets—between philosophical and poetic discourse—Dante enters the arena as a poet who refuses to concede either discourse. He is a poet who is also a philosopher; he is a poet, even at times a mystical poet, who enjoys philosophical discourse in its logical technicality and is able to infuse even the making of distinctions with the breath of the highest poetry. The *Monarchia* lacks the poetry of *Paradiso*, obviously, for it is written in prose. But if, on the one hand, we allow the biblical-prophetic strand of *Monarchia* to stand as analogous to the mystical jumping rhetoric of *Paradiso* and, on the other hand, we allow the syllogistic Aristotelian strand of *Monarchia* to stand as analogous to the logical and distinction-laden rhetoric of *Paradiso*, we see that *Monarchia* in its own way matches *Paradiso*. The two texts of Dante's maturity are equally committed to the One and to the Many, to unity and to difference: to the unified glory that moves all creation, in *Paradiso*'s first verse, and to the

[29] "Difettosi, cioè probabilmente errati nella premessa" (Defective, that is, probably erring in the premise), is Chiavacci Leonardi's correct gloss of *Paradiso* 11.2; see her commentary to *Paradiso*, 228.

differential allocation of that glory "in one part more and in another less", in *Paradiso*'s third verse.

We can see, in other words, that *Monarchia* and *Paradiso* are complementary in ways that go beyond political theory. In these works, Dante forges a writerly persona that is engaged in syllogism and logic while also following the call of biblical prophets and visionaries. In this way, in the way of a Psalmist-inspired poet of *teodìa* who is also a committed practitioner of Aristotelian logic, the complementarity of *Monarchia* and *Paradiso* is emblematic of Dante's essential authorial self. As a writer, the late Dante did indeed square the circle.

CHAPTER TWO

AVERROES AND DANTE
NEW READINGS OF *MONARCHIA* I, 3

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In this article, I would like to return to the first few chapters of Dante's *Monarchia* and, specifically, to the reference to Averroes in Chapter 3 of Book 1.[1] I will put forward two analyses: the first is a rapid discussion on the issue of the collective actualization of thought. The aim here is to add some possible sources to the discussion. The second analysis is broader. It concerns the notion of *bene esse* and the principle of plenitude. Here, my aim is to assess the coherence of Dante's political project.

The following is the passage of interest:

> It is thus clear that the highest potentiality of mankind is his intellectual potentiality or faculty. And since that potentiality cannot be fully (*tota*) actualized all at once (*simul*) in any one individual or in any one of the particular social groupings enumerated above, there must needs be a vast number of individual people (*multitudinem*) in the human race, through whom the whole (*tota*) of this potentiality can be actualized; just as there must be a great variety (*multitudinem*) of things which can be generated so that the whole potentiality of prime matter can continuously (*semper*) be actualized; otherwise one would be postulating a potentiality existing

[1] It can only be a very modest proposal, given the numerous works written on the subject by the most respected specialists. On the issue of Averroism in Dante, see in particular, among recent articles, John Marenbon, "Dante's Averroism," in *Poetry and Philosophy in the Middle Ages. A Festschrift for Peter Dronke*, ed. John Marenbon (Leiden: Brill, 2001); Luca Bianchi, "L'averroismo di Dante: qualche osservazione critica" *Le Tre Corone. Rivista internazionale di studi su Dante, Petrarca, Boccaccio* 2 (2015): 71–110. I would also like to point readers to J.-B. Brenet, "Organisation politique et théorie de l'intellect chez Dante et Averroès", *Rivista di Filosofia Neoscolastica* 98 (2006): 467–487.

> separately from actualization, which is impossible. And Averroes is in agreement with this opinion in his commentary on the *De anima*.[2]

In order to understand this famous passage, we must briefly recall Dante's reasoning. Let us do so by breaking down the text:

a) Dante seeks to determine what the universal goal of humankind is (*quid sit finis totius humane civilitatis; finis universalis civilitatis humani generis*). That is, for what reason and purpose did God bring the human race into being (*ad quem* […] *genus humanum Deus* […] *in esse producit*).
b) Determining this goal means finding the proper *function* of humankind, because everything is created so as to serve a certain function.[3] It is, therefore, a question of defining the proper function of the whole of humanity (*propria operatio humane universitatis, ad quam ipsa universitas hominum* […] *ordinatur*).
c) In order to determine this proper function of humankind, we must understand the *ultimum de potentia* (the highest capacity) of the whole of humanity,[4] namely the essential capacity of humanity itself. In order to know what task humanity performs exclusively, we must know what capacity defines it exclusively.

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[2] Dante Alighieri, *Monarchy*, trans. and ed. Prue Shaw (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), I.3, p.7; cf. *Dante's Monarchia*, trans. and ed. R. Kay (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1998), 17–19; for the Latin cf. Dante, *Monarchia*, ed. P. Chiesa, A. Tabarroni, and D. Ellero (Rome: Salerno, 2013), 18-19: "Patet igitur quod ultimum de potentia ipsius humanitatis est potentia sive virtus intellectiva. Et quia potentia ista per unum hominem seu per aliquam particularium comunitatum superius distinctarum tota simul in actum reduci non potest, necesse est multitudinem esse in humano genere, per quam quidem tota potentia hec actuetur; sicut necesse est multitudinem rerum generabilium ut potentia tota materie prime semper sub actu sit: aliter esset dare potentiam separatam, quod est inpossibile. Et huic sententie concordat Averrois in comento super hiis que *De anima*."

[3] All *essence*, Dante then writes, exists in preparation for a function: "non enim essentia ulla creata ultimus finis est in intentione creantis, in quantum creans, sed propria essentie operatio: unde est quod non operatio propria propter essentiam, sed hec propter illam habet ut sit." It is a complex formulation, which amounts to recognizing in humankind (*genus humanum*), in all humans as such (*universitas hominum*), an essence.

[4] Cf. Dante, *Monarchia*, ed. Chiesa, Tabarroni, and Ellero, I.3, p.16: "Que autem sit illa (l'opération propre), manifestum fiet si ultimum de potentia totius humanitatis appareat."

d) This *ultimum de potentia*, for humankind, is intellectual potentiality (*potentia sive virtus intellectiva*), that is, technically,[5] the potentiality of the "possible intellect" (*intellectus possibilis*). What characterizes humanity and humankind is understanding the world, as well as the reality of the world, through the possible intellect: in other words, an intellect that is first and foremost potential, empty, and open to receiving universal forms.

This is where our text appears. It argues its point in four steps:

e) If it is true that the proper function of humankind, of humanity, is the potentiality of the possible intellect,
   (i) then its proper function (and, therefore, its aim, which justifies its existence) must be to actualize it, and more precisely,
   (ii) to actualize it fully (*tota*), all at once (*simul*), and continuously (*semper*), [6]
   (iii) otherwise a separate potentiality would exist (i.e. separate from its actualization), which is impossible.
   (iv) This necessitates a "multitude" (*multitudo*) in the human race, that is, a vast number of people with varied capabilities and activities, because no individual, no family, no village, no city, no particular kingdom is capable of doing it on its own.[7] And this is what (*huic sententie*), our passage concludes, Averroes agrees with this in his *Long Commentary on* Aristotle's *De Anima*.

It is not easy to figure out exactly what, in everything that has just been said, to what Averroes subscribes and lends his authority. Does he agree with the whole of the argument, and all of its elements? In other words, the following: (a) the possible intellect is the proper potentiality of humanity;

[5] In reference, obviously, to Aristotle, *De anima*, III, 4, 429a10.

[6] There are in fact three aspects (completeness, simultaneity, permanence), and not just two. To the *total simul* of actualization that appears first, we must add that which appears in the comparison with prime matter: "sicut necesse est multitudinem rerum generabilium ut potentia tota materie prime *semper* sub actu sit" (emphasis added). Then that which opens the following chapter: "proprium opus humani generis totaliter accepti est actuare *semper* totam potentiam intellectus possibilis" (emphasis added).

[7] Cf. what Dante reiterates—and explains, in a sense—in *Monarchia* II.6. See, Dante, *Monarchia*, ed. Chiesa, Tabarroni, and Ellero, 112: "Propter quod bene Phylosophus naturam semper agere propter finem in secundo *De naturali auditu* probat. Et quia ad hunc finem natura pertingere non potest per unum hominem, cum multe sint operationes necessarie ad ipsum, que multitudinem requirunt in operantibus, necesse est naturam producere hominum multitudinem ad diversas operationes ordinatorum".

(b) a multitude is needed to actualize it *tota*, *simul*, and *semper*; otherwise, (c) we should accept the absurdity of a potentiality separate from its actuality. Or does he only accept *some* of its elements, particularly,[8] the principle "of plenitude" (the idea that it is impossible to find a *potentia separata*)?

For Dante, most likely, Averroes agrees with all three elements, but given the reference to the *Long Commentary on the De Anima*,[9] he is thinking of the conclusion about the necessity for a multitude in particular here. And this is what I would like to talk about first.

Let us reiterate this well-known conclusion. If nature does nothing in vain, the proper potentially of humanity must be wholly (*tota*), simultaneously (*simul*), and continuously (*semper*) actualized, and that is why the multitude is necessary in humankind. The human multitude, the multitude within humanity, appears to be the requirement for full and continuous actualization of the possible intellect: in other words, the requirement for the proper function of humankind. Re-enacting the notion of *multitudo*, Dante says the following: it is *through* the multitude that humanity's intellectuality becomes completely actualized; the multitude is the necessary means, agent, or mover for the goal of humankind.

As far as Averroes is concerned, in my view, two things seem settled now. First, Dante implicitly refers to two passages from Book III

[8] Given the sentence, one could indeed think that Averroes' endorsement only applies to the last element he mentions, namely the impossibility of a separate potentiality.

[9] It is certain that Dante also finds in Averroes the justification of the principle of plenitude, according to which potentiality could not remain separate from its actuality. But, as Dante's *Questio de acqua et terra* indicates, it is in the *De substantia orbis* (he believes), and not in the *Long Commentary on the De anima*, that he will find the idea. See Dante, *Questio de aqua et terra*, ed. F. Mazzoni, in Dante Alighieri, *Opere minori*, ed. P. V. Mengaldo, B. Nardi, A. Frugoni, G. Brugnoli, E. Cecchini, F. Mazzoni (Milan: Riccardo Ricciardi, 1979), XVIII, 2:758: "Propter quod sciendum est quod Natura universalis non frustratur suo fine; unde, licet natura particularis aliquando propter inobedientiam materie ab intento fine frustretur, Natura tamen universalis nullo modo potest a sua intentione deficere, cum Nature universali equaliter actus et potentia rerum, que possunt esse et non esse, subiaceant. Sed intentio Nature universalis est ut omnes forme, que sunt in potentia materie prime, reducantur in actum, et secundum rationem speciei sint in actu; ut materia prima secundum suam totalitatem sit sub omni forma materiali, licet secundum partem sit sub omni privatione opposita, preter unam. Nam cum omnes forme, que sunt in potentia materie, ydealiter sint in actu in Motore celi, ut dicit Comentator in *De Substantia Orbis*, si omnes iste forme non essent semper in actu, Motor celi deficeret ab integritate diffusionis sue bonitatis, quod non est dicendum."

(commentaries 5 and 20) of Averroes' *Long Commentary*, in which the Commentator explains that the eternal material intellect is always in actuality *when we relate it to humanity that is itself eternal* (in other words, more precisely, to images of *some* individuals within the species). Second, this justification for the permanent actuality of intelligence in humankind is not the only one Averroes provides, since he also defends, perhaps above all, the position that at least one "philosopher" always exists in the world at every instant. This "philosopher" is a perfect individual, in whom all knowledge comes together, and by whom all that is universal becomes actualized (so the possible intellect will not become complete via the multitude, but via a single person, who is perfectly fulfilled).[10] Let us put aside this last point now, and focus instead on the more common idea of an actualization of the intellect *by reference to the species*,[11] by calling to mind several passages. Averroes writes:

> for it does not occur for the intellect which is called material, according to what we have said, that sometimes it understands and sometimes it does not, except in regard to the forms of the imagination existing in each individual, not with regard to the species. For instance, it does not occur for it that sometimes it understands the intelligible of horse and sometimes it does not, except with regard to Socrates and Plato. But without qualification and with regard to the species, it always understands this universal, unless the human species be altogether defunct, which is impossible.[12]

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[10] On this topic, see J.-B. Brenet, *Transferts du sujet. La noétique d'Averroès selon Jean de Jandun* (Paris: Vrin, 2003), 406; and Brenet, "Organisation politique et théorie de l'intellect chez Dante et Averroès." In addition, cf. S. Pinès' pioneering article, "La philosophie dans l'économie du genre humain selon Averroès: une réponse à al-Farabi?" in *Multiple Averroès. Actes du Colloque International organisé à l'occasion du 850e anniversaire de la naissance d'Averroès. Paris 20-23 septembre 1976*, ed. J. Jolivet (Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 1978), 189-207; as well as the recent book by G. Agamben, *L'usage des corps. Homo Sacer, IV, 2*, trans. Joël Gayraud (Paris: Seuil, 2014), 292–295.

[11] On the "Averroist" idea—in Dante's era—that the species can be considered to be the first perfectible of the intellect, see, with the footnotes, J.-B. Brenet, *Les possibilités de jonction. Averroès-Thomas Wylton* (Berlin: de Gruyter, 2013), 160-163.

[12] Averroes (Ibn Rushd) of Cordoba, *Long Commentary on the De Anima of Aristotle*, trans. and ed. R. C. Taylor and Th.-A. Druart (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2009) III.c.20, p. 358; for the Latin cf. *Averrois Cordubensis Commentarium Magnum in Aristotelis De Anima Libros*, ed. F. St. Crawford (Cambridge, MA: The Medieval Academy of America, 1953) III.c.20, p. 448: "intellectus enim qui dicitur materialis […] non accidit ei ut quandoque

The idea is clear. *In respectu speciei*, the material intellect is always actualized, and furthermore, this is the case at all levels: both at the level of the first principles of thought (the first intelligibles, the first principles), and at the level of subsequent intelligibles: in other words, thought itself, which we call the "theoretical intellect". Let us put it another way. The universal exists only though the image, its subject-mover. With respect to some individual, who is born, who will die, who at times imagines, and at times does not, it is clear that this universal is unstable. It appears then disappears, according to the whims of this limited imagination. But as for the human race, or the flux of ordinary individuals continuously renewed, the universal, as such, endures. During the "evacuation" of a "subject", or its removal, the intervention of another replaces it,[13] so that, in relation to this population of continuous images, to the general structure of fantasy, the possible intellect remains in actuality, and reality is not in vain.[14] The universal thus has an ambiguous status. In humankind, writes Averroes, its being is "intermediate for them between being which perishes (*amissum*) and being which persists (*remanens*)."[15] Being lies between loss and perseverance, depending on whether we consider the ordinary individual and his temporary life, or the human race and the inevitable profusion of its thoughts.

This text is doubtlessly Dante's main source. However, it's clear that there are other texts by Aristotle himself that it would be invaluable to examine in order to gain a better understanding of the idea of a collective actualization of knowledge through the aggregation of all individual knowledge. I propose two texts by Aristotle, which are also very well known.

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intelligat et quandoque non nisi in respectu formarum ymaginationis existentium in unoquoque individuo, non in respectu speciei; v. g. quod non accidit ei ut quandoque intelligat intellectum equi et quandoque non nisi in respectu Socratis et Platonis; simpliciter autem et respectu speciei semper intelligit hoc universale, nisi species humana deficiat omnino, quod est impossibile."

[13] Cf. Averroes, *Commentarium Magnum in Aristotelis De Anima Libros*, ed. Crawford, III.c.5, pp. 408, 626.

[14] Which would be the case if the forms in potentiality were not abstract. Let us note that the thesis of the eternity of the intellect in actuality was condemned by the Church in 1277; see David Piché, ed. and trans., *La condamnation parisienne de 1277* (Paris: Vrin, 1999), 117; cf. Roland Hissette, *Enquête sur les 219 articles condamnés à Paris le 7 mars 1277* (Louvain: Publications Universitaires-Vander-Oyez, 1977), 209-210.

[15] Averroes, *Commentarium Magnum in Aristotelis De Anima Libros*, ed. Crawford, III.c.5, pp. 407, 600-601.

First, the beginning of *Metaphysics* II, 1, 993a30 sq., when Aristotle explains that we can never miss the truth completely, so that even if no one can find it all on his own in its entirety, each person can "do his bit", so to speak, and contribute to knowledge as a whole. In short, each person, without possessing all knowledge, possesses a part of knowledge, such that "by the union of all a considerable amount is amassed", since it is by aggregating the knowledge of individuals that we will attain the whole truth. Consider this opening text:

> De ueritate theoria sic quidem difficilis est, sic uero facilis. Signum autem est *neque* digne nullum *adipisci ipsam* posse nec omnes *exsortes esse*, sed unumquemque aliquid de natura dicere, et secundum unum quidem nichil aut parum ei immittere, ex omnibus autem coarticulatis fieri *magnitudinem* aliquam. Quare *si* uidetur habere ut *prouerbialiter* dicimus "in foribus quis *delinquet*?", *sic* quidem *utique erit* facilis; habere *autem* totum et partem non posse difficultatem eius ostendit.[16]

Here Aristotle most probably has a rather diachronic conception of the process of accumulation. Dante's distinguishing feature would be that he has a synchronic reading of it: knowledge is not, *over time*, over the course of history, the sum of bits of partial knowledge from the past, but the perfect result of their aggregation *at each moment in time* (or when Monarchy occurs; at each moment in time when it occurs)[17]. It is along these lines, as it were, that Thomas Aquinas' commentary unfolds. Aristotle shows the grasp of truth is in one way easy and, in another, difficult. Aquinas explains:

> Here he gives the second indication. He says that, while the amount of truth that one man can discover or contribute to the knowledge of truth by his own study and talents is small compared with a complete knowledge of truth, nevertheless what is known as a result of "the combined efforts" of all: i.e., what is discovered and collected into one whole, becomes quite extensive. This can be seen in the case of the particular arts, which have developed in a marvelous manner as a result of the studies and talents of different men.[18]

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[16] G. Vuillemin-Diem, ed., *Aristoteles Latinus, Metaphysica, lib. I-XIV. Recensio et Translatio Guillelmi de Moerbeka* (Leiden: Brill, 1995), II:43, 993a30.

[17] In fact, everything depends, on Dante's conception of the "principle of plenitude"; this is what I talk about below.

[18] Thomas Aquinas, *Commentary on the Metaphysics of Aristotle*, trans. John P. Rowan (Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1961). For the Latin text, see Aquinas, *In Metaphysicam Aristotelis Commentaria*, ed. R.-R. Cathala, R. M. Spiazzi (Turin: Marietti, 1964), II.I, n. 276: "dicens quod licet id quod unus homo

But another source appears to be key. It is a passage in Aristotle's *Politics* that Dante could well have read: Book III, Chapter 11 (1281b4 sq.). In this text, Aristotle defends popular sovereignty and explains that the masses, taken as a body, may be superior to individuals (even the best of them). The main idea is that the multitude is endowed with a superior power of deliberation and judgment because it simultaneously integrates and unifies the scattered abilities of each person. Here is what we read in the passage:

> The principle that the multitude ought to be in power rather than the few might seem to be solved and to contain some difficulty and perhaps even truth. For the many, of whom each individual is not a good man, when they meet together may be better than the few good, if regarded not individually but collectively, just as a feast to which many contribute is better than a dinner provided out of a single purse. For each individual among the many has a share of excellence and practical wisdom, and when they meet together, just as they become in a manner one man, who has many feet, and hands, and senses, so too with regard to their character and thought. Hence the many are better judges than a single man of music and poetry; for some understand one part, and some another, and among them they understand the whole.[19]

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potest immittere vel apponere ad cognitionem veritatis suo studio et ingenio, sit aliquid parvum per comparationem ad totam considerationem veritatis, tamen illud quod aggregatur ex omnibus 'coarticulatis', idest exquisitis et collectis, fit aliquid magnum, ut potest apparere in singulis artibus, quae per diversorum studia et ingenia ad mirabile incrementum pervenerunt." Cf. en revanche Albert the Great, *Metaphysica*, ed. Bernhard Geyer, in *Alberti Magni Opera Omnia* (Monasterii Westfalorum, Münster: Aschendorff, 1951-), vol. 16.1, lib. II, cap.1, pp. 47, 91: "signum vero ulterius facilitatis est, quod *ex omnium* considerantium in veritate dictis simul *coarticulatis fit aliqua* notabilis sapientiae *mensura* quantitatis. Dico autem 'ex dictis simul coarticulatis', quia, sicut in antehabito libro diximus, antiqui dicta sua non articulauerunt. Nos autem et articulabimus, quae balbutientes dixerunt, et coadminiculabimus in unum, quae sparsa et non congregata dixerunt"

[19] Aristotle, *Politics*, trans. Benjamin Jowett, in Jonathan Barnes, (ed.), *The Complete Works of Aristotle* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984) 2.2033-2034. Cf. Vuillemin-Diem, ed., *Aristoteles Latinus*, *Politica,* 1281a39: "de aliis quidem igitur sit aliqua altera ratio: quod autem oportet dominans esse magis multitudinem quam optimos quidem, paucos autem, videbitur utique solvi et alicuius habere dubitationem, forte autem <et utique> veritatem. Multos enim, quorum unusquisque est non studiosus vir, tamen contingit, cum convenerint, esse meliores illis, non ut singulum, sed ut simul omnes, veluti comportatae coenae hiis, quae ex una expensa elargitae sunt: multis enim existentibus unumquemque partem habere virtutis et prudentiae, et fieri congregatorum quasi unum hominem

At least two things are interesting in Aristotle's text (and the example there of the meal may also bring to mind the *Convivio*): first, the fact that it concerns *deliberation and judgment* (and he has this *practical* dimension in mind when he talks about intellectual qualities); and second, that he intends to defend the sovereignty *of the masses*. If Dante had indeed read this text and was inspired by it, he has modified Aristotle's ideas in two ways: first, the notion of a beneficial aggregation of partial capabilities is extended to the strictly *theoretical* level; second, the principle that aims to defend the masses is (paradoxically) distorted—since Dante does not stay with the *multitude*—in favor of *Monarchy*.

Here again, Dante could have taken advantage of Latin texts (Averroes, as we know, was unable to comment on the *Politics*, for lack of an Arabic translation) in addition to Aristotle's. I am referring especially to Albertus Magnus and Peter of Auvergne, since Thomas Aquinas did not reach this far in his commentary. Albertus Magnus talks about the *potentia multitudinis*[20] and emphasizes the idea that the *multitudo* of humans, taken *ut simul omnes*, makes a more complete *collectio* of thought possible. He explains Aristotle's passage as follows:

> Et hoc probat per simile, ibi, *Multos enim quorum unusquisque est non studiosus uir*, *tamen* secundum quod vir dicitur a vi mentis vel a virore virtutis, *contingit cum conuenerint esse meliores illis*, scilicet paucis virtuosis, vel uno, *non ut singulum*, supple, contingit esse meliores paucis aut uno, *sed ut simul omnes*. Et date simile, ibi, *Veluti comportare coenam* (alia littera "comportare censum") *iis quae ex una expensa elargitae sunt*. *Multis enim existentibus* qui sic largiuntur et dant symbola, *unumquodque partem habere uirtutis et prudentiae*, supple, contingit, *et fieri congregatorum quasi unum hominem multitudinem*, id est, tota multitudo fit quasi unus homo, *multorum pedum, et multarum manuum, et multos sensus habentem*. Et intelligit quod multitudo semper proficit ad sapientiam quasi multis pedibus, et multa adjutoria confert civitati quasi multis manibus, et multa concipit utilia quasi multis sensibus.
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> […] Dicit ergo primo adaptando similitudinem : *Sic et quae circa mores*, in moralibus scilicet scientiis, *et circa intellectum*, in physicis, sic habet, sicut habet in expensa a multis comportata, ubi (sicut dicit in *Elenchis*) multi multas adinvenerunt partes : et in primo *Metaphysicae* dicit quod non

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multitudinem multorum pedum et multarum manuum et multos sensus habentem, sic et quae circa mores et circa intellectum. Propter quod et kries melius qui multi et quae musicae opera et quae poetarum: alii enim aliam aliquam particulam, omnia autem omnes."

[20] See for example, Albert the Great, *In Polit*., III, cap. 8, in *Alberti Magni Opera Omnia*, ed. Auguste Borgnet (Paris: Vivès, 1891), III.8, p. 278.

> tenemur tantum reddere gratias illis qui boni aliquid et veri adinvenerunt, sed etiam illis qui erraverunt, quia etiam errantes excitaverunt ingenia nostra ad inquisitionem veritatis, errorisque destructionem. Ex hoc concludit, ibi, *Propter quod et melius*, supple, judicant *qui multi*, quam pauci, vel unus solus.[21]

And then, further:

> multitudo si colligatur virtus existens in singulis in unum, praevalebit virtuti paucorum virtuosorum et unius. Similiter multitudo eadem ratione praevalet in divitiis uni vel paucis : et si propter virtutem dominium conceditur paucis, nunc multitudo praevalens in virtute, magis principabitur quam unus vel pauci. Similiter si propter divitias conceditur principatus, multitudo habens majores divitias, magnis principabitur.
>
> Deinde cum dicit, *Nihil enim prohibet*, etc. ponit rationem dicens: *Nihil enim prohibet multitudinem aliquando esse meliorem*, secundum virtutem scilicet, paucis, id est, quam pauci sint, vel unus : et sic multitudo magis principabitur quam unus vel pauci. Et similiter objicit de divitiis, ibi, *Et*, supple, nihil prohibet multitudinem aliquando esse, *ditiorem*, supple, uno vel paucis : et si tunc propter divitias conceditur principatus, iterum principabitur multitudo. Et subdit qualiter debet fieri comparatio ut verum sit quod ponitur, ibi, *Non ut singulum*, id est, non ut singuli ad singulos comparentur secundum excessum, *sed ut simul omnes*, id est, ut omnes de tota multitudine congregati virtutem et collectas habentes divitias comparentur ad unum vel paucos: quia scilicet multitudo excedit in virtute et divitiis.[22]

Peter of Auvergne, in turn, emphasizes the idea that humans, *simul iuncti*, and not *divisim*, can produce something like a single unit as far as the intellect is concerned, which is superior to what scattered individuals create:

> In prima dicit, quod si sint multi non virtuosi simpliciter, cum convenient in aliquod unum, facient unum aliquod studiosum, non sic quidem, ut quilibet faciat aliquid studiosum per se, et aliquid melius, *sed omnes simul faciant unum aliquid studiosum, et sunt aliquid melius quam quilibet divisim acceptus*. Et hoc declaravit per simile; et dicit, quod sicut illi qui faciunt coenam ad communes expensas et quilibet modicum apportat, quod autem collectum est ex omnibus apportatis magnae quantitatis est, sic est in

[21] Ibid., cap. 7, p. 257–58.

[22] Ibid., cap. 8, p. 276-78: "sicut dictum est saepius, potentia multitudinis semper praevalet uni vel paucis : et ideo videbitur principatus dandus multitudini. Et quod dixit, explanat, ibi, *Eam quae illius solum*, id est, virtus politica et potentia unius solum, non potest comparari virtuti et politicae potentiae totius multitudinis."

> proposito, si sint multi et quilibet aliquid habeat virtutis et prudentiae, *cum convenerint in unum facient unum aliquid magnum et virtuosum* […]. Et sic cum convenerit, facient quasi unum hominem virtuosum et perfectum: hominem dico habentem multitudinem sensuum, per quos discernere possit, et multitudine manuum et pedum per quae possit moveri ad operationem et operari.
>
> *Similiter etiam quantum ad mores et quantum ad intellectum se habet*. Ex omnibus enim, cum convenerint, *efficietur quasi unus homo perfectus secundum intellectum*, quantum ad virtutes intellectuales, et secundum appetitum quantum ad morales. Et adducit aliud simile : dicens, quod propter hoc quod multi sunt aliquid melius *simul iuncti*, quam quilibet illorum, contingit quod opera musicalia, et opera poetarum melius facta sunt et ducta ad perfectionem per plures quam per unum.[23]

So here are two texts that should be added to the reference to Averroes in order to shed light on Dante's understanding of a collective actualization of knowledge.

Let us move on to my second point. It concerns the key notion of *bene esse* and is, therefore, *the angle through which the necessity for monarchy is assessed in Dante*. This aspect, in my view, has been greatly overlooked by specialists. First, let us begin with a problem. It is easy to pick out a sort of contradiction or inconsistency in the very idea of Dante's *Monarchia.* If, indeed, *as the reference to Averroes* (in I, 3) *seems to suggest*, humanity's intellectual potentiality is always (*semper*) wholly and simultaneously (*tota simul*) actualized ("otherwise one would be postulating a potentiality existing separately from actualization, which is impossible."), and this is the proper aim of humankind, *what is the use of monarchy*, and why write a political book intended to promote it? In other words, what is the sense of speaking "as a political and social reformer, as the herald of a community which has *to be created*" (Gilson),[24] if reality is essentially as it should be and if humankind has at every instant attained its goal? What is the point of defending a political institution, justifying it, *hoping for it*, if that which it is supposed to produce—complete and permanent thought—is already and has always been the case (ever since humans have existed)? If, simply because there is a multitude, it is and has always been the case, by virtue of a metaphysical-theological principle of

[23] Peter of Auvergne, in Thomas Aquinas, *In Libros Politicorum Aristotelis Expositio*, ed. R.M. Spiazzi (Rome: Marietti, 1951), lib. III, lectio 8, n. 424. For Thomas Aquinas' own commentary: *Sententia Libri Politicorum,* in *Opera omnia* (Rome: Leonine Comm., 1971), vol. 43.

[24] Étienne Gilson, *Dante the philosopher* (London: Sheed and Ward, 1948), 170. Emphasis mine.

plenitude? Let me reiterate: if the aim of humankind, that is, its exclusive function, namely the actualization of its own potentiality, is not a vision, a hope, a plan, but a permanent state of affairs, required by nature itself (which cannot act in vain, since it is the working of God's intelligence), why not limit oneself to a purely *descriptive* text, whose title would be *De Multitudine*?

In their edition of the *Monarchia*, A. Tabarroni and P. Chiesa formulate this difficulty clearly. In the introduction, they talk about "*un inquietante interrogativo*":

> se il fine dell'uomo coincide con quello del genere umano e se questo, come dice Averroè, spiega perché ci sia sempre una moltitudine di esseri umani che traduce sempre in atto l'intera potenza dell'(unico) intelletto possibile, allora questo fine è già sempre realizzato e non c'è alcun bisogno di promuovere una particolare organizzazione politica dell'umanità tutta intera per poterlo raggiungere. La necessità del discorso scientifico sulla monarchia sembra alla fine cancellare il suo stesso scopo, quello di svelare una verità utilissima proprio perché ci può indurre all'azione politica. [25]

They repeat it as a footnote in their translation: "se l'umanità pone già sempre in atto senza residui l'intelletto possibile, a che serve porsi come obiettivo quello di raggiungere la pace universale ?"[26]

Gilson had noticed this problem long ago, [27] but he seems to have resolved it without much trouble. Of course, he explains, Dante makes reference to Averroes, who, with the metaphysical being that is his possible intellect, presented him "with a kind of individual human race whose unity would always be realized in a concrete way, *while at every moment of its duration it would actualize the whole of the knowledge accessible to man*." [28] So, of course, he finds in Averroes the idea of a possible intellect in which "the human race would have its goal eternally

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[25] Dante, *Monarchia*, ed. Chiesa, Tabarroni, and Ellero, LII. They refer to G. Sasso, *Dante. L'Imperatore e Aristotele* (Rome: Istituto Storico Italiano per il Medioevo, 2002); G. Vinay, *Interpretazione della 'Monarchia' di Dante* (Florence: Le Monnier, 1962). B. Nardi, unless I am mistaken, does not say anything about it in his edition of *De Monarchia*, in Dante Alighieri, *Opere minori*, ed. Mengaldo, Nardi, Frugoni, et al.; in contrast, see Dante Alighieri, *Monarchia*, ed. and trans. G. Vinay (Florence: Sansoni, 1950) 23-25, n. 16.

[26] Dante, *Monarchia*, ed. Chiesa and Tabarroni, p. 19, n. 8.

[27] Gilson writes: "If Dante had accepted Averroism in this particular his own doctrine would have had no justification, since, with or without a universal community, the goal of humanity would be everlastingly attained in the permanence of the independent possible intellect", *Dante the Philosopher*, 170.

[28] Ibid., 169.

and permanently within its grasp".[29] But the argument, transposed to Dante, is transformed. What in Averroes was established, already a given and already the case (by virtue of the very structure of the universe), becomes a future prospect in Dante. For, according to Gilson, the *multitudo* that appears with humanity is not *immediately* endowed with the unity that it requires to achieve its goal: the unity that Averroes' separate possible intellect, as a single intellectual substance separate from any body, possesses *essentially*. In Dante, in other words, we must distinguish *that which exists* from *that which does not yet exist*, and which we can imagine, and which we must aim for and construct.

That which exists are people, the diversity of people, by nature, but that which must be constructed is their unity, their unity as a universal human society. Dante's humanity, writes Gilson, "does not yet possess" this unity, "and will […] enjoy it only if it accepts the unifying hegemony of the Emperor" (p. 170).[30] According to Gilson, in Dante we must look at what the reference to the Commentator is used to indicate and not what Averroes himself meant: "a community that man must create so that he may secure a peace which does not yet exist, with a view to attaining an object which humanity has not yet secured, because before it can be secured it must first exist."[31] In short, there is neither contradiction nor inconsistency in Dante's political project. The *raison d'être* of Monarchy is, on the basis of the natural multitude of individuals, to unify universal human society, making it possible for "man to develop to the highest pitch his aptitude for discovering truth [and] consequently to attain his goal."[32]

A. Tabarroni and P. Chiesa, for their part, propose an elegant and profound solution that also "saves" Dante from theoretical inconsistency, and is in fact equivalent to Gilson's.[33] It involves distinguishing two levels. First, the metaphysical level of the multitude. That is, the necessary existence of a very wide variety of individuals who are *liable* to activate, to bring to actuality the intellective potentiality that is constitutive of humanity; this first level would technically be the level of the actuality of the "first kind,"[34] still in potentiality to its full accomplishment. Second,

[29] Ibid.
[30] Ibid., p. 170.
[31] Ibid., p. 171.
[32] Ibid.
[33] To do this, they use the article by I. Costa, "Principio di finalità e fine nella *Monarchia* dantesca," in *"Ad ingenii acuitionem." Studies in Honour of Alfonso Maierú*, ed. S. Caroti, R. Imbach, Z. Kaluza, G. Stabile, and L. Sturlese (Louvain-la-Neuve: FIDEM, 2006), 39–65.
[34] Cf. Aristotle, *De anima*, II.1 (421a 22); II.5 (417b16).

the level of the Monarchy as the best political organization that makes it possible for humanity to achieve its potentiality *to the fullest*, to reach the *ultimum*, which this time would be the level of the actuality of the "second kind" and understood as the full exercise of the actuality of the first kind. Therefore, even if the multitude of humans is provided by "nature", Monarchy is required as an optimal political framework for the complete fulfilment of their power of thinking:

> Dante afferma che la completa e simultanea realizzazione in atto di tutta la potenzialità conoscitiva dell'uomo non è alla portata né di un singolo né di alcuna comunità parziale, ma essa può essere compiuta soltanto dall'umanità nella sua interezza. […] La prima condizione, dunque, è che vi sia sempre una molteplicità di uomini e di aggregazioni politicamente organizzate, che garantisca la necessaria varietà degli atti intellettivi propri della facoltà intellettiva dell'umanità. In questo modo tale facoltà trova una sua prima attualizzazione nella varietà delle specie degli enti. Ci si muove quindi, fino a questo punto, sul piano dell'atto primo […]. Ma il ragionamento di Dante non può fermarsi qui, altrimenti egli avrebbe ottenuto in questo modo soltanto una fondazione metafisica della necessità (ontologica) dell'esistenza di molti uomini e delle loro comunità politiche in ogni momento della storia. Egli dunque fa leva sul concetto stesso di *ultimum de potentia*—che nel suo contesto originale si riferisce al limite massimo che può essere raggiunto dall'esercizio di una data facoltà operativa—per continuare a cercare le condizioni che si richiedono, affinché l'umanità tutta intera possa raggiungere il limite massimo delle sue capacità intellettuali (possa conoscere tutto ciò che essa può conoscere), e in questo modo realizzare il proprio fine, come realizzazione senza residui dell'atto secondo della sua potenza conoscitiva. Per questa via Dante intende fondare la necessità (deontologica) dell'impero come migliore organizzazione politica di tutti gli uomini.[35]

Perhaps, indeed, this is what Dante means; we will come back to this. But I propose a different approach, by starting from the key notion of *bene esse* to clarify the first question Dante asks. This first question, as we know, is whether Monarchy is necessary for the *bene esse* of the world (*queritur an ad bene esse mundi necessaria sit*), and all of Book I is devoted to answering it. But what does this mean exactly?

Asking whether one thing is necessary for another always includes another question: *In what way*, or *from which perspective*, do we envision this necessity? And for a medieval philosopher (such as Thomas Aquinas, for example—if we take someone Dante could well have been familiar with) at least two points of view are possible: a necessity as far as the *esse*

[35] Dante, *Monarchia*, ed. Chiesa and Tabarroni, 19n8.

is concerned, first, and a necessity as far as the *bene esse* is concerned, second. [36]

Let us posit that X is necessary for Y. The proposition, as such, is insufficient, since it should be specified whether X is necessary for *the being of Y*, or if it only is for its *bene esse*. It is clearly not the same thing. In the first case, X is necessary for the very being of Y, that is, it is required *for Y to exist*: it is included, like one of its essential components, in Y's existence. In the second case, X is no longer required for Y to exist, that is, for it to occur, but simply for its *bene esse*.[37] Therefore, when Dante asks whether Monarchy is necessary for the *bene esse* of the world, this means—if we rephrase the sentence—that he is seeking to determine whether Monarchy is necessary for the world *as far as its* bene esse *is concerned*, or *in terms of its* bene esse,[38] and consequently, not in terms of its *esse*.

So be it. But what does this notion of *bene esse* refer to? This is not so easy to answer.[39] *Bene esse*, which is a translation of the Greek *eû zên*, a frequent expression in Aristotle, seems ambiguous indeed. In the strongest sense (a), the notion may refer to the perfect state of a being, of a reality, its full accomplishment, its fulfillment, or even, to use a conceptually charged word: its perfection. *Bene esse* would, in this sense, be the complete fulfilment of the *esse*: the virtuous or happy life, for example, compared to normal life. In a weaker sense (b), *bene esse* no longer corresponds to the perfect actuality of a being, but simply to a favorable state, a state in which a being finds itself that improves, facilitates (but does not determine) the unfolding of its existence, the execution of its actions, or the achievement of its virtue.

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[36] Here is an example of this distinction drawn from Thomas Aquinas, *Super Sent.*, lib.4d.7 q.1.a.1 qc.2.co.: "uno modo dicitur necessarium *sine quo aliquis non potest conservari in esse*, sicut nutrimentum animali. Alio modo *sine quo non potest haberi quod pertinet ad bene esse*, sicut equus dicitur necessarius ambulare volenti, et medicina ad hoc quod homo sane vivat." Or, *Summa Theologiae* I, q.41a.2–5: "dicitur aliquid esse necessarium in his quae sunt ad finem, inquantum sine hoc *non potest esse finis, vel bene esse*". Emphasis added.

[37] That being so, as I write below, there is a "strong" reading of *bene esse*, which relates to the full unfolding of the *esse*, and not only a favorable state that is completely incidental, with no effect on the *esse*.

[38] It is possible to make a more complex reading, which would doubtlessly be a more muddled one, and ask the following: when Dante seeks to find out whether monarchy is necessary for the *bene esse* of the world, does he seek it as far as the *esse*, or the *bene esse* is concerned?

[39] And would require a long examination that we cannot conduct here.

So, which meaning holds for Dante's reasoning when he asks whether Monarchy is necessary for the *bene esse* of the world (that is, of humanity, of humankind first and foremost)? Does it consist in asking if Monarchy is necessary (a) for the perfection of humankind, for its *bene esse* in the stronger sense, that is, for the full unfolding of its being, or whether it is "only" necessary (b) for its *bene esse* in the weaker sense, that is, by establishing favorable conditions for its *esse,* which is in other respects wholly fulfilled. The two answers are not equivalent, and both, perhaps, are possible, *depending on the reading one gives to the principle of plenitude in Dante*.

A complete answer to this question, which cannot be given here, requires at least three things: establishing how Averroes himself, after Aristotle, meant this principle; then how Latin scholasticism, in view of the texts available to it, could have understood it, and what it in fact says on the matter;[40] and lastly, by measuring the potential divergences,[41] how Dante renders and appropriates it, while making reference to Averroes and taking the complete and permanent actualization of prime matter as a

[40] On the principle of plenitude, see the classic: A. O. Lovejoy, *The Great Chain of Being* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1936); then J. Hintikka, *Time and Necessity: Studies in Aristotle's Theory of Modality* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1973); for the Latin tradition, in particular, see S. Knuuttila, ed., *Reforging the Great Chain of Being* (Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1981; Knuuttila, *Modalities in Medieval Philosophy* (London: Routledge, 1993); for the understanding of this principle in Averroes, see T. Kukkonen, "Possible Worlds in the Tahafut al-tahafut: Averroes on Plenitude and Possibility," *Journal of the History of Philosophy* 38/3 (2000): 329-347; Kukkonen, "Infinite Power and Plenitude. Two Traditions on the Necessity of the Eternal," in *Medieval Philosophy and the Classical Tradition*, ed. J. Inglis (London: Curzon, 2002), 154-169; Kukkonen, "Plenitude, Possibility, and the Limits of Reason: A Medieval Arabic Debate on the Metaphysics of Nature," *Journal of the History of Ideas* 61/4 (2000): 539-560.

[41] And gaps are unavoidable, and perhaps cannot be completely overcome. Indeed, the meaning of the principle of plenitude changes radically when we go from an eternalist system like Averroes' (which therefore does not subscribe to the thesis of the creation of the world) to a creationist philosophy such as Dante's (where the world really has a beginning). In Averroes, it is the *eternity* of the world (the *infinite* course of things) that guarantees that the possibles are always all actualized; in Dante, this guarantee can only be found in God, and means, perhaps, not that all the possibles have always: i.e., since creation, been actualized, but that we cannot be certain that they will be at a moment in time. That said, if these possibles must come into being because God cannot have created unfulfillable potentialities, what is the point of the political project?.

model.[42] However, here again, it would seem that, two readings are possible: a) a "strong" reading (emphasizing *semper*), according to which, if it is true that the world was not made in vain, all potentiality (at the specific level) not only must become actuality, but has always already done so, and fully completed it (at least, since it has existed, if the world has a beginning); b) a "weak" reading, saying only that all potentiality (at the specific level) must be actualized or be fully actualized at a given moment in time.

Let us now distinguish the different possible scenarios, by combining the various meanings of *bene* esse and the principle of plenitude. There are two of them, if we simplify.

1) First, let us accept that Dante has a "strong" reading of the principle of plenitude, and that he, therefore, posits that by the multitude of humans, and since the moment people have existed in the created world, the potentiality of the possible intellect that is a constituent unit of humanity (inasmuch as it is its *ultimum de potentia*) has been actualized *tota simul*. Since the moment people have existed, consequently, whatever the mode, whatever the means, everything thinkable by humankind would have been thought: always thought, fully thought, and simultaneously thought. This is because humankind is destined to think, designed to think, and it can only *be*, that is, it can only exist *as the human race* by doing it, by constantly fulfilling (and not only at a given moment, but also in the future) all of its mental potentiality.

But would we not then run into the same problem we started with? How indeed do we maintain that Monarchy, as a human institution, is necessary for the always complete actualization of the intellect if this actualization, which stems from the very being of humanity, has always already occurred since humans existed? The problem, in truth, would no longer arise if we considered that Monarchy is necessary, not for the *esse* of humanity (and through it, of the world), but for its *bene esse*, and that this *bene esse*, in a "weak" sense, refers to the favorable state, or the most favorable state, of human existence, as a sort of optimization of its manifestation.

[42] We will remember that Dante refers to this principle of plenitude when he writes that it is impossible for a potentiality to be "separate": in other words, separate from its actuality, in the sense that it will always remain in potentiality, without ever being completely (and simultaneously) fulfilled. And I repeat his argument that the multitude is necessary in humankind so that its proper potentiality, that of the possible intellect (or that *which is* the possible intellect) is actualized *tota simul* and *semper*.

In this reading, this is precisely what universal peace would bring. Universal peace would not be the condition of possibility for humanity to obtain and continually perform its proper work. This work, by virtue of the principle of plenitude (understood in the strong sense, that is the actualization of the possible intellect, *total simul* and *semper*), would be carried out continuously and completely by the human race *despite everything*; humankind would accomplish it regardless of what happens. But in peace, humankind would find the *propinquissimum medium* of achieving it. In peace, humanity would find a better means (*melius*) of accomplishing it, or rather (*ymo*), humans would find *optime*, in the best way, the means of accomplishing it.

This is one way in which we can understand what Dante is trying to hammer home. Peace, in this reading, *is not the condition of possibility* for humanity's work; it is the means of optimizing it, the condition of optimization for its fulfilment (without pursuing it in the best way affects the end obtained itself). Peace is the state that makes it possible for humanity to connect *optime* to its goal; to get there *liberrime atque facillime.* [43]

What changes here with Monarchy, inasmuch as it ensures peace, is therefore not access to the proper work (success, accomplishment), but how it is done, its modality. Commentators should be more careful here. "No peace", writes Gilson, "no philosophy". That would be inaccurate.[44] As Averroes himself says—in the text Dante cites—philosophy is always perfect, regardless of the political systems leading individuals, it is

[43] The whole of Book I is based on comparatives and superlatives, and on the catchphrase, *optime se habere*, which does not always seem to have the same meaning in Dante. An example: in I.4, peace appears to be that by which *melius*, and even that by which *optime*, humankind achieves its proper work (*pertingit ad opus proprium*). But does this mean that humanity would reach this proper work anyway, whatever happens, and that peace is—and is *only*, in a certain way—the best way of achieving it (the *propinquissimum medium*, as Dante also writes)? This is what I am suggesting here. Or does it mean that this *optime*, this best way, is in truth the *only* way for the proper work to be *genuinely* achieved, as is suggested, this time, by a phrase in I.5: *aliter ad felicitatem pervenire non potest*; *aliter* […] *finem non assecuntur*? It is not far-fetched to consider that this tension shapes Dante's whole argument.

[44] The reproach would apply first and foremost to myself, in "Théorie de l'intellect et organisation politique," 471: "Pas de paix, en effet, pas de société humaine universelle, pas de 'multitude' à même d'accomplir ce pour quoi l'homme est fait. C'est par la juste organisation *politique* du monde qu'il peut revenir à l'homme d'atteindre à chaque instant sa fin propre". It would be imprecise, or insufficiently clear. And this, in my view, is the case in nearly all the commentators.

consubstantial with humanity. Peace is not, from this perspective, the *sine qua non* condition for accomplishing the perfection of the human race, its occurrence, and its coming into being. The work of humanity, it should be said, is achieved well and truly without peace, even if, without peace, and without Monarchy, this fulfilment *is not optimal*: this is the point. That is what the *bene esse* of humanity is: not the full achievement of its function (which makes nature not act in vain), but the full achievement of this function *in the best possible way*, in the best state: by being, for example, as unhindered as possible.

This is because human happiness, as the *Nicomachean Ethics* teaches us, has two components: the first, which is essential, is virtue, and in this case, the full activity of the intellect; the other consists of external goods, which are like instruments used by this virtue in order to exercise itself, and whose assistance and effectiveness vary. To give an example from Thomas Aquinas, who comments on this idea:

> dicendum, quod, sicut dicit Philosophus in 1 Ethic. in felicitate *aliquid invenitur essentiale ipsius*, sicut virtutes quae faciunt operationem perfectam; *aliquid autem quod facit ad bene esse felicitatis*, sicut divitiae, et amici, et hujusmodi.[45]

Monarchy is necessary for the *bene esse mundi*, yes, but, in this reading, this is because it is necessary for achieving the optimal conditions of existence for the thinking multitude. With Monarchy, therefore, Dante is not trying to conceptualize the political conditions for *constituting* such a multitude (or its unification), but rather, to reiterate, the condition for *optimizing* it.

The human race exists, and it is a unit, yes; but in Monarchy it will be *maxime unum* (I, 8). In Monarchy, the world *optime dispositus est* (I, 11), which means that it produces *the most*, but not the only, effective order. If justice is needed for humanity's well-being, well, in Monarchy this justice is *potissima* (I, 11). If freedom is needed, well, in Monarchy humankind is *potissime liberum* (I, 12) and so on. As a result, we understand why the problem of an inconsistency or a contradiction between the principle of plenitude that Dante calls upon and the very idea of *De Monarchia* disappears. Why write the *Monarchia*, we ask, if nature (directed by God) makes humankind always fully accomplish its proper work? The question would be pertinent if the goal of the Monarchy that Dante promotes consisted, needlessly, of rendering this accomplishment *possible.* But this

[45] Thomas Aquinas, *Super Sent.,* lib.3d.18 q.1a.4 qc.3co. (cf. Aristotle, *Nichomachean Ethics*, I.1 (1099b1)).

is not the case: Monarchy is not necessary for the being of humanity or the world, not even for their *bene esse,* if *bene esse* refers to the complete and continuous fulfilment of their potentiality. It is necessary, however, for their *bene esse,* if *bene esse* refers to the optimal state for this fulfilment.

In this way, we can come back to Averroes. For Averroes, there is always philosophy in the world, whatever happens, and always at least one philosopher. But it still makes sense to write a commentary on Plato's *Republic*; it still makes sense to defend the power of the Almohads and hope for a truly virtuous city to come into being and expand, because humankind has the power not to complete nature, but to make its perfect work bear fruit.[46]

2) But there is another reading of the text, if this time we stick to a "weak" reading of the principle of plenitude in Dante. Here we would say that potentiality must of course be fulfilled (at least on the specific level), otherwise nature would be acting in vain, but that it is not fulfilled yet, either because it is not at all actualized (as in the case of a pure potentiality), or because it is actualized, but only in a state of the first kind of actuality (and, therefore, awaiting its full actualization). The *bene esse* of humankind (and subsequently of the world) then itself takes on another meaning. It no longer refers to simply a favorable state, a simple means of optimizing a result that is already there, that has already been attained, *but to the perfection of this human race*, the completed, fully achieved state of its *esse*, where it no longer lacks anything. This is *bene esse* in the "strong" sense. This means that Monarchy, this time, is necessary not only to provide favorable or optimal conditions for attaining and performing the *opus proprium* of humanity (which could be take place in other ways, although with more difficulty and in a less satisfying fashion), but it constitutes the *only* way of perfecting the human race (on earth) by allowing it to completely actualize all of its potentiality (whether it is pure,

[46] In fact, in his commentary on Plato's *Republic*, Averroes above all underscores the difficulty in finding the perfection embodied in a single human being, and, from this point of view, politics makes it possible for humanity to genuinely achieve its goal. Cf. this crucial passage (where the principle of plenitude, which deserves a long commentary appears). See R. Lerner, ed. and trans., *Averroes on Plato's* Republic (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1974), 75: "it is possible for individuals to grow up with these natural qualities that we have attributed to them. Developing, moreover, so as to choose the general common nomos that not a single nation can help choosing; and besides, their particular Law would not be far from the human Laws; [if these conditions are fulfilled] wisdom would have been completed in their time. This is as matters are in this time of ours and in our Law. If it should happen that the likes of these come to rule for an infinite time, it is possible for this city to come into being."

distant, or proximate). *Optime*, consequently, is understood differently from before. It is no longer a question of saying that Monarchy makes it possible for humankind to do in the best way what, in other respects, it would be doing without it, but rather it allows humanity to develop its ability to know to the fullest, and in doing so, it puts humankind *truly* in possession of its goal. It is this reading, in my view, to which Gilson and A. Tabarroni and P. Chiesa subscribe. Additionally, as was mentioned previously, it also eliminates the inconsistency in Dante's political project since Monarchy does not needlessly duplicate reality, but truly constitutes its necessary perfection.

Here too a reference to Averroes is apposite. Let us consider this comment by Alexander of Aphrodisias (one of his major sources) from his own *De Anima*: "man is not born in a possession of this habitus, but only with a capacity and propensity to receive it; and it is only in course of time that he gradually acquires it. This fact is a clear indication that the rational power does not add anything to the existence (*einai*) of its possessor, but rather enables him to exist in a more excellent way (*pros to eû einai*).[47] Humans are not born equipped with an intellectual faculty in the state of first realization, already fully constituted for the direct exercise of its cognitive activity. At first, humans only have a shoot or an embryo (*épitédéiotès*) of this faculty, only an aptitude to receive it, namely the "material intellect" (that is, the possible intellect of Latin thinkers), and humans, fundamentally, can exist as humans without developing it. An individual can *be*, and be *human*, without ever actualizing this potentiality (if he should first acquire it, then exercise it without mediation). But if he exercises it, he reaches his *bene esse*. What does this mean? Exactly what I was saying in the beginning of this essay: his perfection, the perfection of his *esse*, the state of the most complete fulfilment of his human form. Averroes is an heir to this doctrine of perfection (*téléiotès*) as plenitude of the form,[48] when he makes the agent intellect the form that the material intellect must become at the end of the theoretical course.[49] The full actualization of this intellect in potentiality is its *bene esse*, and this is

[47] Alexander of Aphrodisias, *De anima*, in *The* De anima o*f Alexander of Aphrodisias*, ed. and trans., A. P. Fotinis (Washington, DC: University Press of America, 1979), 81.13, p. 104.

[48] On this topic, see M. Rashed, *Alexandre d'Aphrodise, Commentaire perdu à la Physique d'Aristote (Livres IV-VIII). Les scholies byzantines* (Berlin: de Gruyter, 2011), chap. V, p. 115.

[49] On this subject, see Brenet, *Les possibilités de jonction*, 124–26. I am very grateful to John Marenbon for having read the English version of this paper.

what a perfect political framework could optimize (Averroes) or strictly determine and constitute (Dante).

CHAPTER THREE

DANTE THE "SCIENTIST" AND DANTE THE PROPHET IN THE THREE PROLOGUES OF *MONARCHIA*

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Each of the three books of Dante's *Monarchia* is preceded by a prologue, the first one serving as an introduction to the whole work, the other two being devoted to the particular theme of the book that follows it. These prologues authorize both a vertical and a horizontal reading: vertical, if we connect each of them to the body of the text, respecting their introductory function; horizontal, if we join the three of them together to form a continuous discourse in the margin of the main argument. A horizontal reading of this kind is justified: the prologues are written in a rhetorical style very different from the "scientific" language of the other parts;[1] they do not aim to prove anything, but merely to set out a programme. Each single word in these prologues is chosen with care, and each single sentence is carefully constructed; they can be counted among the finest literary achievements in Dante's prose. In them he both reveals his self-awareness and creates a bond between himself and his work.[2]

I propose to read these prologues horizontally, showing Dante shifting from a "scientific" position to a prophetic one, and showing how he

[1] For example, in each prologue the *cursus* is generally respected, which rarely happens in the other parts of the *Monarchia*; in Dante's time, this rhetorical device was prescribed for literary texts in the high style, such as epistles or orations, but it was avoided in "scientific" prose.

[2] On Dante's self-consciousness towards his works see, especially, Ascoli, *Dante and the Making of a Modern Author*.

identified himself successively first as a scientist[3] and then as a prophet. At the end, in his language and in his praxis, these roles converge until they coincide, but they remain distinct because of the argument he is dealing with and the public he is speaking to.

The first book of the *Monarchia*, devoted to demonstrating the necessity of universal empire, is purely philosophical and "scientific"; only in the last chapter (I 16) does Dante introduce a faith argument supporting the metaphysical assertions he has produced up to that point. In line with this, the prologue of the first book is strictly "scientific"; but, as the prologue to the whole work, it incorporates some of the typical features of this literary genre.[4] The prologue begins like this (I will discuss the underlined words in detail):[5]

> Omnium hominum, quos ad amorem veritatis natura superior impressit, hoc maxime interesse videtur, ut, quemadmodum de labore antiquorum ditati sunt, ita et ipsi posteris prolaborent, quatenus ab eis posteritas habeat quo ditetur. Longe nanque ab offitio se esse non dubitet, qui, publicis documentis imbutus, ad rem publicam aliquid afferre non curat: non enim est lignum, quod secus decursus aquarum fructificat in tempore suo, sed potius perniciosa vorago semper ingurgitans et nunquam ingurgitata refundens.[6]
>
> For all men whom the Higher Nature has endowed with a love of truth, this above all appears to be a matter of concern, that just as they have been enriched by the efforts of their forebears, so they too may work for future generations, in order that posterity may be enriched by their efforts. For the man who is steeped in the teachings which form our common heritage, yet has no interest in contributing something to the community, is failing in his

[33] Dante considers himself , and actually is, a distinguished practitioner of what the Middle Ages called a "science"; this was a form of knowledge (*scientia* is derived from *scire*, "to know") established by the use of specific methods and procedures, and employing the highly technical language of syllogistic logic. In late medieval schools, *vir scientificus* is a customary title for those whom we might call "scholars". I shall, therefore, refer to him as a "scientist", consciously bending the normal meaning of this word in modern English.

[4] For instance, Uguccione's prologue to the *Derivationes*—a work well known to Dante—likewise quoted the parable of the talents and highlighted the *communis utilitas* (*prol.* 6: Uguccione da Pisa, *Derivationes*, 4; Martina, "Uguccione nel proemio").

[5] The Latin text of the *Monarchy* is quoted from the critical edition Shaw 2009; on the one occasion where we change the reading (I 1 5: *provigilem*), we explain the reason in a footnote. The English translation is based on the one by Prue Shaw (1995, then 2006), sometimes with small adjustments.

[6] *Mon.* I 1, 1–2.

> duty: let him be in no doubt of that; for he is not «a tree planted by the rivers of water, that bringeth forth his fruit in due season», but rather a destructive whirlpool which forever swallows things down and never gives back what it has swallowed.

The *incipit* echoes Sallust, *Con. Cat.* I 1[7] and introduces mankind as a whole (*omnes homines*) as belonging to a common species: differences in race or in geographical location have no importance at all, and nor do different religions. In a philosophical (Aristotelian) view, the distinctive feature of mankind, and of each individual human being as a component part of mankind, is the *intellectus*; the arguments set out in this book are *rationes* in a syllogistic line, therefore understandable and shareable by every man. It is not by chance that in the first book God is always called *Deus*, a philosophical and generic term, and never *Dominus*,[8] the word Dante uses elsewhere to connote specifically the Christian God—as he does often in the second and third books, when faith arguments become more and more important.[9] Dante speaks, therefore, to *omnes homines*, although conscious that not every man has the same skills; the identical nature shared by humanity, as a species, goes hand in hand with differences in circumstances[10] and personal qualities, as they are figured in the parable of the talents. Dante leaves it ambiguous—a deliberate ambiguity, we assume—who exactly those people are *qui ad amorem veritatis natura superior impressit*: all men or, as the Sallustian model suggests, that part of mankind fitted for teaching or leading others: a part which obviously includes Dante himself. The prologue actually begins with a strong unitary vision of mankind and shifts slightly towards a

[7] "Omnes homines, qui sese student praestare ceteris animalibus, summa ope niti decet, ne vita silentio transeant veluti pecora quae natura prona atque ventri oboedientia finxit".

[8] The only exception is a biblical quotation at I 8, 3.

[9] For this (and for other reasons) we disagree with Belloni and Quaglioni, "Un restauro dantesco". They emended the famous and controversial passage of *Mon.* I 12, 6 (where most manuscripts have *in Paradiso Comedie*) to *inmissum a domino inmediate*, following the British Library ms. Add. 6891. If the original reading were that claimed by Belloni and Quaglioni, in the context of the first book, it should be emended to *inmissum a deo inmediate*; actually, the reading of the London manuscript is not *domino*, but a corrupted *diso*, which can hardly be supposed to derive from *deo*.

[10] For people's different features connected with their local position, in a sort of geographic determinism, see *Mon.* I 14, 6 and I 6, 6.

graded, non-egalitarian ranking, where individual elements such as culture and personal effort[11] determine the gradations.

Dante constructs the first sentence of the work very carefully, placing some keywords of the whole work, the first book in particular, in prominent positions in order to highlight them. After *omnes homines*, the second theme is *veritas*, a word which we are going to find twice again in this prologue and even more frequently in the others. *Veritas* is a universal and absolute term, which does not allow gradations: once *veritas* is known, its opponent *falsitas* can no longer hold good, and what is not true is automatically destroyed—we will see in the second prologue that *veritas* has this power. Despite its universal and definite nature, *veritas* may sometimes not be recognized by the whole of mankind: there are truths which are attainable only through faith, not through "scientific" investigation, and which, therefore, are unavailable to people who are not Christian.[12] However, in this first "secular" prologue, the meaning of *veritas* is fully "scientific": ancient and pagan philosophers demonstrate the truths Dante is dealing with, as the examples[13] show.

The first sentence continues with a striking image of mankind as a whole, where individual men are closely connected with each other not only synchronically, but also diachronically. Each man's task, in the limits he has been assigned, is to contribute to the growth of mankind, and the sum of all men's actions passes through time and history.[14] Men must increase the wealth their forebears pass on to them, letting posterity in its turn be enriched by their efforts. Redundancies in this sentence are meaningful: Dante twice uses *ditari*—a merchant or banking metaphor applied to knowledge—,twice *posteri/posteritas*, and masterfully expresses continuity in time with *prolaborent*, ("working hard in the present towards a prospected future"). A pair of biblical images underscores the linking of the economic metaphor of wealth with the political duty of enriching humanity: the positive tree producing fruits; the negative whirlpool swallowing everything and giving nothing back. Dante presents this task not as a noble choice, but as a necessity: *hoc maxime interesse videtur*

[11] A problematic theme for Dante is that superiority in rank should not originate from nobility of birth, but from personal qualities, although this idea is not always coherently maintained by him. On this much debated subject see Carpi, *La nobiltà di Dante* and Borsa, "Sub nomine nobilitatis".

[12] Another of Dante's problematic themes; in the *Monarchia* it is presented in Book II 7, 4–6, but see, especially, *Par.* XIX 70–8.

[13] *Mon.* I 1, 3.

[14] Such an opinion was obviously in sympathy with an Averroistic vision of mankind.

("this above all appears to be a matter of concern"), where *videtur* has no subjective meaning ("it seems"). However, the philosophical strength of the experiential evidence is all provided by sight. The content of such a "matter of concern" is expressed by an explicatory sentence constructed with a remarkable syllogistic rhythm (though it is not syllogistic in its structure): the verb of the first clause (*ditati sunt*) and the noun of the second (*posteri*) are repeated and linked in the third (*posteritas habeat quo ditetur*), bringing the sentence to a powerful close. Such a necessity implies, in ethical terms, a moral duty (*officium*) of the individual towards the whole of mankind, as Dante goes on to remark: "the man who is steeped in the teachings which form our common heritage, yet has no interest in contributing something to the community of men, is failing in his duty". Dante derives his words from classical politics: in accordance with the "Roman" lines of the *Monarchia*, he calls to mind Cicero rather than Aristotle, the latter quoted as the highest authority in ethics, but not in politics.[15] The heavy use of Cicero in the treatise, namely in the second book, has perhaps not been sufficiently emphasised: in four cases (II 5, 7; II 5, 17; II 7, 12; II 9, 4) Dante literally quotes long passages from the *De officiis*, a privilege reserved to no other prose author because the concept of *res publica* as a compact and responsible body is more Roman than Greek.

After introducing the pithy *sententia* on the unity of mankind and on the choral progress that is its duty, Dante appears in his own person, writing the second part of the prologue in the first person.

> Hec igitur sepe mecum recogitans, ne de infossi talenti culpa quandoque redarguar, publice utilitati non modo turgescere, quinymo fructificare desidero, et intemptatas ab aliis ostendere veritates. Nam quem fructum, ille qui theorema quoddam Euclidis iterum demonstraret, qui ab Aristotile felicitatem ostensam reostendere conaretur, qui senectutem a Cicerone defensam resummeret defensandam? Nullum quippe, sed fastidium potius illa superfluitas tediosa prestaret.[16]
>
> Thinking often about these things, lest some day I be accused of burying my talent, I wish not just to put forth buds but to bear fruit for the benefit of all, and to reveal truths that have not been attempted by others. For what fruit would a man bear who proved once again a theorem of Euclid's? or who sought to show once again the nature of happiness, which has already

[15] It is debated whether Dante knew Aristotle's *Politics* (see Berti, "Politica"); he sometimes quotes the work, but does not seem to consider it the main authority in this field.
[16] *Mon.* I 1, 3–4.

> been shown by Aristotle? or who took up the defence of old age which has already been defended by Cicero? None at all; indeed, the tiresome pointlessness of the exercise would arouse distaste.

Quoting the evangelical parable of the talents,[17] the author declares how he has applied to himself the general duty of mankind to contribute to public benefit (*publica utilitas*): a dominant concept in the political theories of the middle ages, for instance in John of Salisbury's *Policraticus*, a work which had a strong influence on Dante.[18] The keywords are, once again, *fructificare* and *fructus*, connected with the tree of the Psalm, but taking up the opening wealth metaphor as well. Dante has to identify his own task, has to declare which specific field he is planning to deal with; but before doing that, he keeps his reader in suspense, in order to highlight how lofty and important the announced task is. He will treat "a truth never attempted by anyone" as an exalted but neglected area of knowledge. His models—or better, his colleagues—were the greatest thinkers in the antiquity: Euclid for geometry, Aristotle for ethics, Cicero for the defence of old age. The name of Cicero (and the particular restricted theme he is associated with) is the least expected and most surprising in the list of the three ancient thinkers because, as we have said, the role of Cicero in the *Monarchia* is very important, and Dante seems to offer an early tribute to him at this crucial point in the work. He could not invoke Cicero as the highest authority in ethics (that was Aristotle's role), nor in politics (a field he had to reserve to himself) and so he assigns him a noble but eccentric space, outside any traditional set of scholastic disciplines.

By quoting Euclid, Aristotle, and Cicero (three *pagan* thinkers!) Dante compares himself to them by ranking himself fourth on this Mt. Olympus of the sciences. Only at this point, after a long wait and a presumed increasing curiosity in the reader, does Dante declare what his own task will be:

> Cumque, inter alias veritates occultas et utiles, temporalis monarchie notitia utilissima sit et maxime latens et, propter non se habere inmediate ad lucrum, ab omnibus intemptata, in proposito est hanc de suis enucleare latibulis, tum ut utiliter mundo provigilem[19], tum etiam ut palmam tanti bravii primus in meam gloriam adipiscar[20].

[17] Mt. 25, 14-30; Lc. 19, 12–27.

[18] On Dante's debt towards John of Salisbury see Pézard, "Du Policraticus à la Divine Comédie", and González Fernández, "Corona in capite".

[19] We prefer the reading *provigilem* (rather than *pervigilem*, preferred by Ricci, Shaw and Quaglioni) because of the connection with *prolaborent* at I 1, 1: the

> Now since among other truths which are hidden and useful, a knowledge of temporal monarchy is both extremely useful and most inaccessible, and since no one has attempted to elucidate it (on account of its not leading directly to material gain), I propose to draw it forth from where it lies hidden, so that my wakeful nights may be of benefit to the world, and so that I may be the first to win for my own glory the honour of so great a prize.

The *veritas* he is going to teach is the *monarchie temporalis notitia* (the "knowledge of temporal monarchy", I 1, 5). The most useful of truths, and the most hidden: no one has brought it to light, because it gives no immediate economic benefit to its detector. Describing his goals, Dante uses a common metaphor for "scientific" investigation in the Middle Ages (*de suis enucleare latibulis*, "draw it forth from where it lies hidden"). Here, the *veritates* do exist, but they are concealed, and nothing new has to be (nor obviously can be) created by men; to discover knowledge is simply to reveal what is unknown. Human solidarity is once more invoked and the genuine and noble *utilitas* of the whole of mankind is clearly opposed to the apparent *lucrum* of the individual.

Dante closes the first prologue referring back to the opening concept of progress through time. "I write this treatise", he says, "to contribute now with my hard work to the future profit of mankind" and also "to win for my glory the honour of so great a prize": first in time, first in knowledge as well. This statement comes with a mandatory tribute to God, as the main actor in the gnoseological process.[21] In the medieval Christian vision, knowledge is bestowed by God with mankind as a whole being its destination and the single man merely the instrument through which it is communicated. Dante will recall this point and develop it further in the second prologue.

After demonstrating that universal empire is the form of government chosen by God for mankind's well-being, Dante devotes the second book of the *Monarchia* to proving that "the Roman people took on the dignity of

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prefix *pro-* indicates the projection into the future. The manuscript tradition here is in any case split between the two readings, without reflecting stemmatic status.

[20] *Mon.* I 1, 5.

[21] *Mon.* I 1, 5: "Arduum quidem opus et ultra vires aggredior, non tam de propria virtute confidens, quam de lumine Largitoris illius 'qui dat omnibus affluenter et non improperat'" ("It is indeed an arduous task, and one beyond my strength, that I embark on, trusting not so much in my own powers as in the light of that Giver who 'giveth to all men liberally, and upbraideth not'").

empire by right".[22] The first book was essentially metaphysical but, in contrast, the predominant themes of the second book are historical and legal.

In the prologue to the second book, Dante reaffirms his role as "scientist", but with a significant shift in tone.[23] This prologue is immediately connected with the last chapter of the preceding book (I 16). A typical stylistic feature used by Dante in the *Monarchia* is to raise the literary level of his prose at the end of each book, creating—in the case of the first and the second books—a harmonious bridge linking to the rhetorical prologue of the following book. Indeed, the last chapter of the first book draws a grim picture of mankind, ill and unable to find its own way after the going astray (*diverticulum*) due to Constantine, who wretchedly transferred imperial prerogatives to the pope. This sorry condition creates divisions, and prevents the unity of mankind in God as figured by Psalm 132: "Behold how good and how pleasant it is for brothers to dwell together in unity!".[24] Despite the pessimistic context, the very end of the chapter recalls once more the linking theme of human community, which was introduced so strongly in the first prologue. The following sentence, where the second prologue begins, is another quotation from the Psalms (*Ps.* II 1–3) but here peace and pleasure, the consequences of the desired unity of mankind, have been swallowed up in a very different conflict where the *gentes* riot against God.

> Quare fremuerunt gentes et populi meditati sunt inania? Astiterunt reges terre et principes convenerunt in unum adversus Dominum et adversus Cristum eius. Dirumpamus vincula eorum et proiciamus a nobis iugum ipsorum![25]
>
> Why have the nations raged, and the peoples meditated vain things? The kings of the earth have arisen, and the princes have gathered together against the Lord and again hiss Christ. Let us burst their chains and cast their yoke from us!

This striking sentence remains suspended but Dante will recall it later, after giving us a lesson in the psychology of the cognitive process.

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[22] "Utrum Romanus populus de iure sibi asciverit imperii dignitatem" (*Mon.* II 2, 1).
[23] On the prologue to the second book and Dante's prophetic role in it, see Chiesa and Tabarroni, "Dante demonstrator", 141–151.
[24] "Ecce quam bonum et quam iocundum habitare fratres in unum!" (*Mon.* I 16, 5).
[25] *Mon.* II 1, 1.

The biblical quotation is followed by an aphorism, again first presented as valid for every human being, and then applied to the specific case of Dante himself. The aphorism deals with the psychological implications of not-knowing or knowing, and with the passage from the first to the second state: when observing a phenomenon (the effect of a cause), but ignoring the cause that has produced it, the observer is at first baffled but, after finding the cause, the observer feels superior to those who remain in ignorance and looks at them with scorn. The personal application of this process points to the theme of the second book. Dante said that in the past he was baffled over how the Roman Empire could have subjected the whole world (the effect) and he supposed it had happened merely by virtue of armed force (*armorum violentia*, a false cause), until he realized that this subjection was by right (*de iure fuisse*) and in accordance with divine will (*divinam providentiam hec effecisse*, the true cause). He then began to look with scorn at other people, who remained in ignorance. The gaining of knowledge is here represented as a meditative inquiry (*medullitus oculos mentis infixi*) and is supported by strong evidence (*per efficacissima signa cognovi*).

> Sicut ad faciem cause non pertingentes novum effectum comuniter admiramur, sic, cum causam cognoscimus, eos qui sunt in admiratione restantes quadam derisione despicimus. Admirabar equidem aliquando Romanum populum in orbe terrarum sine ulla resistentia fuisse prefectum, cum, tantum superficialiter intuens, illum nullo iure sed armorum tantummodo violentia obtinuisse arbitrabar. [3] Sed postquam medullitus oculos mentis infixi et per efficacissima signa divinam providentiam hoc effecisse cognovi, admiratione cedente, derisiva quedam supervenit despectio, cum gentes noverim contra Romani populi preheminentiam fremuisse, cum videam populos vana meditantes, ut ipse solebam, cum insuper doleam reges et principes in hoc unico concordantes, ut adversentur Domino suo et uncto suo, Romano principi.[26]
>
> When confronted with an unfamiliar phenomenon whose cause we do not comprehend we usually feel amazement; and equally, when we do understand the cause, we look down almost mockingly on those who continue to be amazed. For my own part, I used once to be amazed that the Roman people had set themselves as rulers over the whole world without encountering any resistance, for I looked at the matter only in a superficial way and I thought that they had attained their supremacy not by right but only by force of arms. But when I penetrated with my mind's eye to the heart of the matter and understood through unmistakable signs that this was the work of divine providence, my amazement faded and a kind of

[26] *Mon.* II 1, 2–3.

> scornful derision took its place, on seeing how the nations raged against the supremacy of the Roman people, on seeing the peoples meditate vain things, as I myself once did; and I grieved too that kings and princes should be united only in this one thing: in opposing their Lord and his Anointed, the Roman prince.

Dante's language in these paragraphs is still strictly "scientific": bafflement (*admiratio*, *admirari*), a spur to investigation in Aristotelian gnoseology, is repeated three times, and the knowledge, once acquired, is definitive. Nevertheless, the sentence, remarkably effective in literary terms, develops in an increasingly personal tone. *Derisio* or *despectio* (seven times repeated in this chapter, a sentiment we suppose fits well with Dante's personality) is mixed up with grief: *derisio* towards the men who are still in the dark, grief for their ignorance and suffering, which is the ignorance and suffering of the whole of mankind. This personal involvement is expressed in a rhetorical crescendo, with a final explosion:

> Propter quod derisive, non sine dolore quodam, cum illo clamare possum pro populo glorioso, pro Cesare, qui pro principe celi clamabat: «Quare fremuerunt gentes et populi meditati sunt inania? Astiterunt reges terre et principes convenerunt in unum adversus Dominum et adversus Cristum eius»[27].
>
> For this reason, I can cry out in defence of that glorious people and of Caesar—mockingly, yet not without some feeling of grief—along with him who cried out for the prince of Heaven: "Why did the nations rage, and the peoples meditate vain things? The kings of the earth have arisen, and the princes have gathered together, against their Lord and against his Christ".

By appropriating and repeating the Psalm, Dante takes on a new persona. The man who speaks is no longer the "scientist", but a man who takes on his shoulders the role that was David's: the prophet. From here on, both figures—"scientist" and prophet—are indissolubly connected, although the prophet will become increasingly important, as religious issues dominate in the third book. Here, the "scientist" soon reappears, as Dante takes up the widely used metaphors of knowledge as light.

> Verum quia naturalis amor diuturnam esse derisionem non patitur, sed, ut sol estivus qui disiectis nebulis matutinis oriens luculenter irradiat, derisione omissa lucem correctionis effundere mavult, ad dirumpendum vincula ignorantie regum atque principum talium, ad ostendendum genus humanum liberum a iugo ipsorum, cum propheta sanctissimo me me

[27] *Mon.* II 1, 4.

> subsequenter hortabor subsequentia subassummens, «dirumpamus – videlicet – vincula eorum, et proiciamus a nobis iugum ipsorum». Hec equidem duo fient sufficienter si secundam partem presentis propositi prosecutus fuero et instantis questionis veritatem ostendero. Nam per hoc quod Romanum imperium de iure fuisse monstrabitur, non solum ab oculis regum et principum, qui gubernacula publica sibi usurpant, hoc ipsum de Romano populo mendaciter extimantes, ignorantie nebula eluetur, sed mortales omnes esse se liberos a iugo sic usurpantium recognoscent.[28]
>
> But since natural love does not allow scorn to last long, preferring (like the summer sun which as it rises disperses the morning clouds and shines forth radiantly) to cast scorn aside and to pour forth the light of correction, I too then, in order to break the chains of ignorance of kings and princes such as these, and to show that the human race is free of their yoke, shall take heart along with the most holy prophet, by making my own the words of his which follow: "Let us burst their chains, and cast their yoke from us". These two things will be sufficiently accomplished when I have brought to completion the second part of my present project and shown the truth of the question we are now considering. For showing that the Roman empire is founded on right will not only disperse the fog of ignorance from the eyes of kings and princes who usurp control of public affairs for themselves, falsely believing the Roman people to have done the same thing, but it will make all men understand that they are free of the yoke of usurpers of this kind.

Light, like natural love (*naturalis amor*), dissipates the moral fog (*nebula*) of *derisio*: generosity defeats the arrogant superiority of the man who knows. Dante will show his knowledge, the *veritas* he has acquired, to *mortales omnes*. Once again, the contribution of a single man yields a benefit for the whole of mankind: the single man is an instrument, the whole of mankind is the beneficiary. The verbs of action are demonstrative: with *ostendere*, *monstrare*, *patere* on the side of Dante "scientist" and *nosse*, *cognoscere*, *recognoscere* on the side of mankind-receiver. In the first prologue Dante has taken upon himself, as a moral duty, the task of explaining the *veritas* of the *monarchia universalis*, in conformity with the lesson of the great ancient thinkers; here he spurs himself on (*me me subsequenter hortabor*) using the words of the Psalm to speak by himself (*subsequentia subassummens*).[29]

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[28] *Mon.* II 1, 5–6.

[29] Dante's understanding of this passage, interpreting *dirumpamus... proiciamus* as *pluralia maiestatis*, makes the psalmist (i.e. Dante himself) the subject; this is different from the traditional one, according to which it was the *gentes* who said these words; see Chiesa and Tabarroni, "Dante demonstrator", 144–145.

What can be astonishing for a modern reader is that in Dante's vision political truth is a static one: the discovering of a hidden truth, namely what is the best government for mankind, does not imply a revolution. According to the Parmenidean notion of *veritas* as something fixed, accepted by both Platonism and Aristotelianism and congenial to Christian doctrine, what is real is also definite and stable. Political *veritas* need not be constructed, is not progressive or perfectible, but needs only to be discovered; once discovered, it will stand firm thanks to its own strength. So, Dante does not propose himself as a political leader, at least not as a revolutionary. Indeed, the task is not that of leading to a change, but—from a merely philosophical perspective—that of showing an immanent truth (*veritatem ostendero*): every man, understanding it, will automatically accept the universal empire. This means that he takes upon himself the prophetic duty of breaking the chains (*ad dirumpendum vincula*), according to the words of the Psalm, these are the metaphorical chains of ignorance and not the real fetters of political subjection. Those who are supposed to be set free are not the subjects but the *principes* themselves, until now enchained by ignorance; when Dante shows them the truth, the fog will be dissipated from their eyes and the whole of mankind (*mortales omnes*) will realize they are free from the chains. They will be free by merely realizing the truth, not by breaking off any actual fetters: liberation comes through knowledge and a revolution in consciousness, not by force of arms.

The third book deals with the source of imperial power: does that power come directly from God, or is it mediated through some human authority such as God's vicar, in other words, the pope? This appears to be a theoretical question but it is one with important and dangerous practical consequences: is the emperor's power subject to the pope? Does the pope claim rights in the nomination of the emperor? May he claim the guidance of imperial politics to himself? May he depose a disliked emperor? Dante deals with the question on a theoretical level, but at the time of Henry VII it was also debated through armed combat and the same thing happened later, during the reign of Ludwig of Bavaria. In contrast to the first and the second, the third question is understandable only inside the Christian world and not in the geographical space of the whole of mankind. Dante says in a later significant passage (III 14, 7) that those people who are not Christian do not recognize the authority of the pope as religious leader; nevertheless, they are the majority and the universal monarchy is supposed to govern them as well. Therefore, the arguments of the third book are addressed not to the whole of mankind (a great part of it does not need convincing) but, instead, to some particular interlocutors who, through an

excess of zeal, think that the papal has a right to superiority over the empire. By contrast, as Dante says in III 3, 17 it is of no use to speak to other kinds of Christians, who assert the same out of bad conscience and for their own personal interest.

Thus, the third book deals with a burning, but non-philosophical, theme. The method of this book is very different from the others: here Dante introduces the arguments of his opponents (which are for the most part canonistic) in order to refute them, and only in the last chapters (13–16) does he introduce his own arguments (there are few of them, and they are prevalently metaphysical). Dante explains these differences in method more fully in chapter 4, but the difference in approach is already reflected in the prologue of the book, which is considered to be "Christian". The structure parallels that of the second book: a striking biblical quotation as *incipit*, followed by a meditative passage creating expectation, then the resumption of the opening quotation, and a crescendo of personal assumptions, with which Dante proclaims himself ready for the task is now quite different and reveals "scientific" truth. Indeed, the word *veritas* is repeated almost obsessively five times in a few lines, indicating a struggle against the opponent. Dante says that rational demonstration cannot be effective because discussion is polluted by passions, such as *rubor* and *indignatio*, but also *familiaritas*: a struggle will be necessary. He declares that he is certain of victory, but the role of *auctoritas* will no longer be played (or will only be played incidentally) by the ancient philosophers: Dante's fight will be supported directly by God, through the voice of the biblical writers.

> "Conclusit ora leonum, et non nocuerunt michi, quia coram eo iustitia inventa est in me". In principio huius operis propositum fuit de tribus questionibus, prout materia pateretur, inquirere; de quarum duabus primis in superioribus libris, ut credo, sufficienter peractum est, nunc autem de tertia restat agendum. Cuius quidem veritas, quia sine rubore aliquorum emergere nequit, forsitan alicuius indignationis in me causa erit. Sed quia de trono inmutabili suo Veritas deprecatur, Salomon etiam silvam Proverbiorum ingrediens meditandam veritatem, impium detestandum in se facturo nos docet, ac preceptor morum Phylosophus familiaria destruenda pro veritate suadet, assumpta fiducia de verbis Danielis premissis, in quibus divina potentia clipeus defensorum veritatis astruitur, iuxta monitionem Pauli fidei loricam induens, in calore carbonis illius quem unus de seraphin accepit de altari celesti et tetigit labia Ysaie, gignasium presens ingrediar, et in brachio Illius qui nos de potestate tenebrarum liberavit in sanguine suo impium atque mendacem de palestra, spectante mundo, eiciam. Quid timeam, cum Spiritus Patri et Filio coecternus aiat

per os David: "In memoria ecterna erit iustus, ab auditione mala non timebit?"[30]

> "He shut the lions' mouths, and they did not harm me, for in his sight righteousness was found in me". At the beginning of this work it was proposed to inquire into three questions, within the limits allowed by the subject-matter; the first two of them have been dealt with sufficiently, I believe, in the previous books. Now it remains to deal with the third, the truth of which cannot be brought to light without putting certain people to shame, and will, therefore, perhaps be a cause of some resentment against me. But since truth from its unchangeable throne implores us, and Solomon too, entering the forest of *Proverbs*, teaches us by his own example to meditate on truth and loathe wickedness and since our authority on morals, Aristotle, urges us to destroy what touches us closely for the sake of maintaining truth; then, having taken heart from the words of Daniel cited above, in which divine power is said to be a shield of the defenders of truth, and putting on "the breast-plate of faith" as Paul exhorts us, afire with that burning coal which one of the seraphim took from the heavenly altar to touch Isaiah's lips, I shall enter the present arena, and, by his arm, who freed us from the power of darkness with his blood, before the eyes of the world I shall cast out the wicked and the lying from the ring. What should I fear, when the Spirit who is coeternal with the Father and the Son says through the mouth of David: "the righteous shall be in everlasting remembrance and shall not be afraid of ill report".

The opening quotation derives from the book of Daniel (6, 22). The prophet proclaims his victory, which happened thanks to the protection God accorded him for his righteousness (*iustitia*). As will soon be clear, the lions are Dante's opponents and he who closed the mouth of the lions is God. The question remains, who is going to protect Dante as he once protected Daniel? The identification between Daniel and Dante is even more explicit than the identification with David in the second prologue. Besides Daniel, the authorities which support Dante's choice to enter the battlefield—*gignasium* […] *palestra*, a Pauline metaphor which recalls the duel theme, extensively dealt with by Dante in the second book[31]—are God himself, the *Veritas* who "from his throne requests" Dante's action. A throne called *immutabilis* is a new reminder of the definite steadiness of the truth; this can be found in Solomon in *Proverbs*; Aristotle; the apostle Paul; and the prophet Isaiah. The famous passage from Isaiah is quoted (6, 6) where a seraph touches the prophet's lips with burning coals taken from heaven's altar charging him to speak in the name of God. In the same way

[30] *Mon.* III 1, 1–4.
[31] Where he also connects combat with justice: see *Mon.* II 9, 1–3.

Dante will speak for *Veritas*, God will sustain his arms and victory is certain. God here is remarkably the God who bestows knowledge. When Dante qualifies Him as the One "who set us free from the power of darkness", he does not speak about some obscure demonic presence, but about ignorance without light. These are the same group of metaphors—often routine literary commonplaces, but here more significant—already introduced in the first and in the second prologues; the result of the combat will be the defeat of *impium* and *mendax* (of what is false respectively in the perspective of faith or the perspective of science). The last biblical authority is David again, with a quotation from Psalm 111, 7: "the righteous shall be in everlasting remembrance and shall not be afraid of ill reports": the declaratory part of this prologue closes with a reference back to the idea of justice, expressed in the opening sentence of Daniel. *Iustitia* must agree with *veritas*, for both are expressions of God's will;[32] a contradiction between them is ruled out, as His will cannot be in contradiction with itself.

Dante the "scientist" and Dante the prophet therefore converges in the same function; what is different is the tone and, even more importantly, the interlocutor. The whole of mankind, addressee of the first book, narrows to those who live in the western part of the world in the second book, and to the only Christians who acknowledge the pope as their leader in the third book. The scientist's task and the prophet's task are actually the same: to demonstrate hidden truths. The method is different, demonstrating the *rationes* through the scientists but bringing the *revelationes* through the prophets; however, the truth is one and the same, attainable by two parallel paths. The convergence of the two, philosophical evidence and theological precepts, is a sure guarantee of truth.[33]

In the last, most famous chapter of the *Monarchia* (III 16), Dante, drawing his treatise to a conclusion in a higher synthesis, introduces a dualism of powers inside a unitary world, without any contradiction or inconsistency. The dualism is between the emperor and the pope; it does not imply a duality of governments, but of competences: the emperor's action is ordered to the *beatitudo huius vite*, the pope's action to the *beatitudo vite ecterne*. The former is guided by philosophical teaching and exercises the moral virtues; the latter is guided by theological precepts and exercises the spiritual virtues. According to the general plan of the work, the *beatitudo huius vite* is understandable and shareable by every man, irrespective of differences in faith (as we have said, philosophical teaching

[32] See *Mon.* II 2, 4–6, where Dante identifies right as God's will.

[33] "Que due, cum simul ad unum concurrunt, celum et terram simul assentire necesse est" (*Mon.* II 1, 7).

is rational, and *ratio* is shared by every man, by virtue of his being a man). However, the *beatitudo vite ecterne* is reserved for Christians, theological precepts being understandable only within a faith perspective. The *beatitudo vite ecterne* is timeless and, therefore, it has a higher value and dignity: incommensurably higher, as eternity is incommensurable with human life in time. For this reason, but only for this reason, the pope is held to be superior to the emperor; however, this difference in quality does not affect the rigorous division of competences, nor the independence of each authority in its own field. Surprisingly, in the last, much debated sentence of the treatise, Dante suddenly changes his interlocutor and his tone. Until now, in the third book, he has spoken to the Christians who fail by being unaware of the truth, but now, in the closing sentence, for the first and only time in the whole work, he speaks directly to the emperor. *Illa igitur reverentia Cesar utatur ad Petrum qua primogenitus filius debet uti ad patrem* ("let Caesar therefore show that reverence towards Peter which a firstborn son must show his father")[34] is a Latin hortatory subjunctive, not actually an order, but a rhetorical form more evocative than an order. The person who speaks in this way to a monarch could be a philosopher, as Aristotle spoke to Alexander, but he is more likely to be a prophet, an old-testamentary one, charged by God to advise the king. So, in the last sentence, Dante enacts his own role, introducing himself in a concrete way as the inspired source of guidance to the emperor.[35]

[34] *Mon.* III 16, 18.

[35] I am grateful to Patrick Boyde, Prue Shaw and Andrea Tabarroni for many useful suggestions.

CHAPTER FOUR

THE WILL OF THE EMPEROR AND FREEDOM IN THE EMPIRE

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In Book I of the Monarchia, Dante presents an ideal portrait of the Emperor. From both a practical and anthropological point of view, the traits of this figure are quite extraordinary. In his portrayal, Dante demonstrates that the Emperor has the power to achieve justice at the topmost level and describes him as an agent at the highest degree, who is both willing and powerful ("subiectum volentissimum et potentissimum": Mn I, XI, 8).

In the same Book I, Dante describes the relationship between freedom and empire, elaborating on the idea of a common will stemming from humankind. Love (or charity) is one of the main elements of Dante's theory: the Emperor's will is indeed shaped by charity or fair love ("karitas", "recta dilectio").[1] This will is so powerful, that it can possess and inform the will of the whole of humanity. The Emperor represents the whole will since it is the will of everyone; his freedom is then a global, or universal, freedom.

Such a moral and political theory can be compared to what Thomas Aquinas, in his treatise *On the unity of intellect* (*De unitate intellectus*), thinks to be one of the natural consequences of monopsychism, namely, a separation of will.[2] Aquinas' argument is simple: intellect and will are the

[1] Mn I, XI, 14. In this paper, I am quotinng from the text of the Monarchia edited in Dante Alighieri, *Monarchia*, ed. Paolo Chiesa, Andrea Tabarroni and Diego Ellero (Roma: Salerno Editrice, 2013).

[2] Medieval philosophers and theologians see monopsychism (that is the position according to which all human beings share a unique intellect) as one of the main

two faculties that make up the intellective soul. Indeed, any rational creature is also a free creature, that is to say endowed with free will. Hence, we cannot conceive only one of these faculties to be separated: if the intellect is both one and separated, the will, therefore, is also both one and separated. The consequence of this assumption is that personal responsibility and moral philosophy become impossible:[3]

> If intellect doesn't belong to this man and if it doesn't form a real unity with him; if, on the contrary, it unites with this man only by means of images or as an external mover, the will will not be in this man, but in the separated intellect. Hence, this man will be no more the master of his actions and his actions will be no more praiseworthy or reprehensible, which means to tear up the principles of moral philosophy.[4]

> If there is only one intellect, then there is only one intelligent and willing being and only one free user of which distinguishes individual men one from the other. Moreover, there will be no difference between men in regards to free voluntary choices, since the intellect, which has mastery and power of using the other "human faculties" is one and undivided for all men. It is evident that this is false and impossible: this goes against common experience and destroys the whole moral science as well as the groundings of political society, which is natural, according to Aristotle.[5]

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features of Averroes' interpretation of Aristotle. See Alain de Libera, *L'unité de l'intellect de Thomas d'Aquin* (Paris: Vrin, 2004).

[3] This is the "réfutation morale" of averroïsm, according to de Libera, *L'unité de l'intellect*, 313.

[4] Thomas de Aquino, *De unitate intellectus*, ed. Hyacinthe François Dondaine (Rome: Editori di San Tommaso, 1976), 306, 347-354: "Si igitur intellectus non est aliquid huius hominis ut sit uere unum cum eo, sed unitur ei solum per fantasmata uel sicut motor, non erit in hoc homine uoluntas, sed in intellectu separato. Et ita hic homo non erit dominus sui actus, nec aliquis eius actus erit laudabilis uel uituperabilis : quod est diuellere principia moralis philosophiae".

[5] Thomas de Aquino, *De unitate intellectus*, ed. Hyacinthe François Dondaine (Rome: Editori di San Tommaso, 1976), 308, 81-95: "Si igitur sit unus intellectus omnium, ex necessitate sequitur quod sit unus intelligens, et per consequens unus uolens et unus utens pro sue uoluntatis arbitrio omnibus illis secundum que homines diversificantur ad inuicem. Et ex hoc ulterius sequitur quod nulla differentia sit inter homines quantum ad liberam uoluntatis electionem, sed eadem sit omnium, si intellectus, apud quem solum residet principalitas et dominium utendi omnibus aliis, est unus et indiuisus in omnibus. Quod est manifeste falsum et impossibile : repugnat enim hiis que apparent, et destruit totam scientiam moralem et omnia que pertinent ad conuersationem ciuilem, que est hominibus naturalis, ut Aristoteles dicit".

The hypothesis of a separation of the will, strongly refuted by Aquinas, attributes the totality of human volitions to a unique subject of will. The fact that only voluntary actions, according to Aquinas, are properly human, the separation of the will would simply cause a paralysis in human dynamism: after "hic homo non intelligit", we would have to deal with "hic homo non agit".[6]

Nevertheless, this is not the only way to conceive the common will of a multitude of individuals; for example, Thomas Aquinas has himself theorized, in his doctrine of charity, the possibility of a volition that exceeds human individuals. This theory indeed implies the idea of the unification of many singular wills in a common act of rational desire.

It is well known that Saint Paul has delivered some important elements concerning the virtue of charity to Christian theology and so I would like to point out that one of the Paulinian texts on charity includes the only Ancient Greek word close to our 'monopsychism': the adjective "σύμψυχοι" (in Latin "unanimes": those who share the soul). Saint Paul affirms (Phil. 2, 1–2):

> If then there is any comfort in Christ, any help given by love, any uniting of hearts in the Spirit, any loving mercies and pity, make my joy complete by being of the same mind, having the same love, being in harmony and of one mind.[7]

I will then take into account the problem of a possible relation existing between charity, monopsychism, and both Aquinas' and Dante's theories on the common will. I will divide this paper into three sections: first, I will present the relationship between charity and monopsychism;[8] second, I

[6] "Hic homo non intelligit" ("this individual man does not think") is the phrase by which the theologians and philosophers of the 13th century, as well as the authors of Parisian condemnations of 1270 and 1277, resume the consequences of Averroes' gnosiological theory: see Jean-Baptiste Brenet, *Les possiblités de jonction: Averroès – Thomas Wylton*. Berlin/Boston: De Gruyter, 2013.

[7] "Si qua ergo consolatio in Christo, si quod solacium caritatis, si qua societas spiritus, si quae viscera et miserationes, implete gaudium meum, ut idem sapiatis, eandem caritatem habentes, unanimes, id ipsum sentientes" ("Εἴ τις οὖν παράκλησις ἐν Χριστῷ, εἴ τι παραμύθιον ἀγάπης, εἴ τις κοινωνία πνεύματος, εἴ τις σπλάγχνα καὶ οἰκτιρμοί, πληρώσατέ μου τὴν χαράν, ἵνα τὸ αὐτὸ φρονῆτε, τὴν αὐτὴν ἀγάπην ἔχοντες, σύμψυχοι, τὸ ἓν φρονοῦντες").

[8] To my knowledge, this relationship has never been noticed by scholars of medieval philosophy and theology. I present here the first results of a study that I will expand upon and deepen in the near future.

will recall some essential elements of Aquinas' conception of charity; third, I will study the developments of these issues in Dante's *Monarchia*.

Charity and monopsychism

Studying theories of charity from the mid 13th century to the beginning of the 14th, one will easily observe an astounding phenomenon, which can be called 'affective Averroism'. The main character of this Averroism is to be an entirely Latin and Catholic product. His unconscious inventor is no other than the unsuspected Peter Lombard. The Master of *Sentences* declares:

> The Holy Spirit is Himself the love or charity by which we love God and our neighbour; when charity is on us to make us love God and our neighbor, then we say that the Holy Spirit is sent or given to us.[9]

Peter Lombard's text is unmistakable: the Holy Spirit is the charity itself (that is the disposition or theological virtue of charity); being a virtue, or disposition, of man, charity is nevertheless uncreated (*increata*). According to the interpretation that several commentators have provided on the *Sentences*, this means that when the Holy Spirit is sent to the heart of man, the Holy Spirit himself dwells in man and in man's charity. On the contrary, individual acts of charity (acts of love toward God and our neighbors) belong to individual men. However, when the other theological virtues (faith and hope) are created, individual men possess both their acts and their dispositions.

The virtue of charity realizes then an ontological disproportion between the disposition and its acts, that is a disproportion analogous to the one existing between the uncreated and the created being, the Creator and creature. However, the other theological virtues (and, even more so, the completely natural cardinal virtues) are adequate to their acts: in this case, both the dispositions and the acts are creatures (*creata*).

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[9] Petrus Lombardus, *Sententiae in IV libris distinctae*, ed. Ignatius Brady (Grottaferrata: Editiones Collegii S. Bonaventurae ad Claras Aquas, 1971-1981), I, d. 17, 1, 2, p. 142, 9-12: "His autem addendum est quod ipse idem Spiritus Sanctus est amor sive caritas, qua nos diligimus Deum et proximum; quae caritas cum ita est in nobis ut nos faciat diligere Deum et proximum, tunc Spiritus Sanctus dicitur mitti vel dari nobis". On Peter's sources, especially saint Augustin, see Artur Michael Landgraf, "Anfänge enier Lehre vom *Concursus Simultaneus* im XIII. Jahrhundert," *Recherches de théologie ancienne et médiévale* 1 (1929): 202-228, 338-355.

Our thesis is that the position, according to which an uncreated being acts in the will of individuals, is overturned in a very original way in Dante's *Monarchia*. This is, in fact, a problem generated by Peter Lombard. According to a theologian of the 13th or 14th century, the Holy Spirit is a separate substance; therefore, the position of Peter Lombard risks reproducing, from the point of view of love (or, more precisely, of the *affectus*), the same structure of the monopsychism, in which a separate substance thinks in the individuals: according to Peter, a separate substance loves and acts in the individuals. Given that charity is not a virtue like the others, since it encompasses every virtuous disposition, to locate charity outside man simply means to remove from man his free actions, his merits, and his person. The individual man would simply cease to act. This position materializes the moral threats of the Averroism, as they are presented in Aquinas' treatise, *On the unity of intellect*.

I have found, in the medieval commentaries of the *Sentences* that I have studied, no argument explicitly relating Peter's position to monopsychism; still, I have found out that at least three celebrated theologians use, against Peter, classical anti-Averroist arguments. These three theologians are Albert the Great,[10] Thomas Aquinas, and John Duns Scot.

The case of Aquinas, who has dedicated several texts to the examination of Peter's position, is particularly clear. In the *Summa theologiae* (II^a II^{ae}, 23, 2), one of the arguments directed against Peter is almost identical to one of the arguments he used against Averroes in the treatise *On the unity of intellect*. The arguments are grounded on the notion of instrumental cause. Here is the argument against Peter from the *Summa*:

> One cannot state that the Holy Spirit moves the will to the act of love by mean of a motion similar to the motion by which the instrument is moved; despite the fact that the instrument is the principle of the act, it's not up to the instrument to act or not to act. By doing so, "the act of love" would loose its being voluntary and the form of merit, while we have said that love of charity is the root of merit.[11]

[10] See Albertus Magnus, *In Sent. I*, ed. Augustus Borgnet (Paris: Vivès, 1893), d. 17, 461–466. I will not examine Albert's position on this point, since this requires a wide examination of his theory of light.

[11] Thomas de Aquino, *Summa theologiae*, ed. Fratrum Praedicatorum (Rome : Typographia poliglotta S. C. de Propaganda Fide, 1895), II^a II^{ae}, 23, 2, resp.: "[…] non potest dici quod sic moveat Spiritus Sanctus voluntatem ad actum diligendi sicut movetur instrumentum, quod etsi sit principium actus, non tamen est in ipso

In his treatise, *On the unity of intellect*, Aquinas uses a similar argument against the hypotheses that the intellect is connected to man in the same way as the mover is connected to what is moved (for instance as the pilot to the ship, or the carpenter to the saw):[12]

> The proper action of the mover doesn't belong to the instrument or to what is moved; on the contrary, the action of the instrument belongs to the main mover. Hence, we cannot say that the saw masters the artefact, but we can say that the carpenter works "the wood", which is the function of the saw. Then the proper action of intellect is thinking; and so, even if thinking was an action passing in another thing, as movement, it wouldn't result that thinking belonged to Socrates if intellect was joined to him only as a mover.[13]

The argument is clear: the instrument achieves some action (the saw cuts the wood), however, since it acts in virtue of a superior agent (the carpenter), the instrument has no mastery of the action and its achievement. According to Aquinas, both the positions of Averroes and Peter Lombard reduce men to an instrumental cause, respectively from a gnosiological and a moral point of view. The two cases are analogous, so that the example of the saw can be used for both.[14]

The Franciscan theologian John Duns Scot offers another interesting example in his *Ordinatio* (I, d. 17). Here he criticizes the thesis that insists the Holy Spirit is charity and, instead, uses the argument, which will subsequently become a canonical anti-Averroist argument, of the *forma coassistens*.

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agere vel non agere. Sic enim etiam tolleretur ratio voluntarii, et excluderetur ratio meriti: cum tamen supra habitum sit quod dilectio caritatis est radix merendi".

[12] On this point, see de Libera, *L'unité*, 209-210.

[13] Thomas de Aquino, *De unitate intellectus*, 304-305, 197-207: "[…] actio mouentis propria non attribuitur instrumento aut moto, sed magis e conuerso actio instrumenti attribuitur principali mouenti: non enim potest dici quod serra disponat de artificio, potest tamen dici quod artifex secat, quod est opus serre. Propria autem operatio ipsius intellectus est intelligere; unde dato etiam quod intelligere esset actio transiens in alterum sicut mouere, non sequitur quod intelligere conueniret Sorti si intellectus uniatur ei solum ut motor".

[14] Aquinas employs the argument of the saw against Peter Lombard in the *De caritate* (Rome-Turin: Marietti 1953) 1, resp., 755 : "Omne enim agens quod non agit secundum formam propriam, sed solum secundum quod est motum ab altero, est agens instrumentaliter tantum ; sicut securis agit prout est mota ab artifice. Sic igitur si anima non agit actum caritatis per aliquam formam propriam, sed solum secundum quod est mota ab exteriori agente, scilicet spiritu sancto ; sequetur quod ad hunc actum se habeat sicut instrumentum tantum".

> If the agent is not the owner of the form by which it can act, action is not n his power: in fact, if it can't act through an assistant "being", which is external to the agent itself and who is not in his power, the action itself is not in his power, just as the assistance of the assistant "being" is not in his power. The assistance of the Holy Spirit to the will is certainly not in the power of the will, since the action of the superior cause is not in the power of the inferior cause. Consequently, if the will could only act through the assistance "of the Holy Spirit" and had in itself no form through which act meritoriously, then the meritorious act wouldn't be in its power, and this seems to be incorrect.[15]

In John Duns Scot's works, I have not found analogous arguments against the unity of intellect (that is anti-Averroist arguments); nevertheless, in the 14th century, the arguments exploiting the notion of assistant form are broadly used in the discussions on the unity of intellect.[16]

These authors clearly show that an "Averroist accident" occurred within Catholic theology. However, it must be clear that, from an historical point of view, Peter Lombard's Averroism shares nothing with Averroes. Nonetheless, what Peter says about charity, at the time of Albert the Great and Thomas Aquinas, on behalf of the interpretation of Averroes given at this time, could easily be related to monopsychism. This Catholic form of Averroism, which I call "affective Averroism", is the product of anti-Averroist developments.

The nature of charity according to Aquinas

There are many texts by Aquinas on charity: *Summa theologiae*, Quodlibetal questions, *Sermons* and so on. I will now focus on the problem with the principle of charity. The principle of charity is God, and,

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[15] Ioannes Duns Scotus, *Ordinatio I, 11–25*, ed. by the Commissio Scotistica (Civitas Vaticana: Typis Polyglottis Vaticanis, 1959), 199, 3-13: "Preterea, nulla actio est in potestate agentis nisi ipsum habeat formam per quam possit agere : si enim per aliquid coassistens sibi – extrinsecum tantum – quod non est in potestate eius, possit agere, talis actio non est in potestate eius, sicut nec coassistentia illius extrinseci est in potestate eius. Sed Spiritum sanctum coassistere voluntati non est in potestate voluntatis, sicut nec universaliter actio causae superioris est in potestate causae inferioris. Ergo si ex illa sola coassistentia possit agere, et non habeat in se formam qua sufficienter possit exire in actum meritorium, sequitur quod actus meritorius non esset in potestate eius, – quod videtur inconveniens".

[16] See Brenet, 2013, p. 000-000; see also de Libera, "Formes assistantes et formes inhérentes." http://www.college-de-france.fr/site/claudine-tiercelin/symposium-2013-01-18-14h30.htm. (Accessed February the 1th 2016.)

more precisely, the Holy Spirit; besides, Jesus Christ is some kind of historical principle of charity, since he has settled, by dying on the cross, the Law of love.

Christ has a fundamental role in determining the dynamism of human history. Aquinas elucidates this point in his commentary in the Letter to the Philippians, where Saint Paul states: "To me Christ is life and death is a profit" (1, 21: "Mihi enim vivere Christus est et mori lucrum"). What does it means that Christ is the life of a Christian? Aquinas states that Christ is the mover of humankind and, especially, of the will of men. Life implies a certain motion ("quaedam motio"), since every living creature is capable of self-motion (see Aristotle, Phys. VIII, 255a5–11). The root ("radix") of human life coincides with the principle of human motion, principle of vital motion, and this root is the object, that is the end, of human "affectus". [17]

> Life implies some kind of motion. Indeed we say that those beings are alive who are capable of self-motion. Hence, we can state that the root of human life is the principle of motion in man. This is the object to which the affectus adheres as to its end, since the end of man is the motor of all his actions. This is why some say that what makes them act is their life, in the way that hunters say that hunting of their life or a friend says that his friend "is his life". This is how Christ is our life, since He is the whole principle of our life and of our actions. For this reason, the Apostle says: "To me Christ is life" etc., because only Christ moves him.[18].

Christ is the principle of human life and action, since He established the law of love that is the New Law:

> The New Law, which is mainly grounded in spiritual grace infused to the hearts, is a law of love. And it has spiritual and eternal promises, who are the object of the virtues, and especially of charity. For this reason, "men"

[17] It is hard to translate this Latin term in our modern languages; in medieval anthropology, "affectus" means both rational and irrational appetitive faculties, hence both "will" and sensitive "desire".

[18] Thomas de Aquino, *Super Epistolam ad Philippenses Lectura* (Rome-Turin: Marietti, 1953), I, IV, n. 32, 96: "Vita enim importat motionem quamdam. Illa enim vivere dicuntur quae ex se moventur. Et inde est quod illud videtur esse radicaliter vita hominis quod est principium motus in eo. Hoc autem est illud cui affectus unitur sicut fini, quia ex hoc movetur homo ad omnia. Unde aliqui dicunt illud ex quo moventur ad operandum vitam suam, ut venatores venationem et amici amicum. Sic ergo Christus est vita nostra quoniam totum principium vitae nostrae et operationis est Christus. Et ideo dicit Apostolus: *Mihi enim vivere* etc., quia solus Christus movebat eum" (punctuation has been modified).

> aim to these "goods" not as to things who don't belong to them, but as to thing proper to them.[19]

Human will, informed by charity, is the agent of the union with God and, being a voluntary union, it is a free union, and being free, it is praiseworthy ("meritorium").

How can we conceive that will is shaped by the form of love, as charity dwells in human souls? In fact, Aquinas has to exclude the hypothesis that this form comes from a separate substance that acts in the will as disposition, rather than a proper individual disposition in its place. Therefore, Aquinas has to exclude the incorrect position of Peter Lombard. Thus, Aquinas differentiates two sorts of causality: the efficient and the formal causality. Through the former ("effective"), God gives charity to man, while through the latter, charity gives life to the soul. This means that God gives man a form, which is part of the individual and allows them to love and act freely; as man has received it from God, this form is endowed with a full formal efficiency. This solution offers two benefits: first, it allows the difference between the Creator and creatures (the form/disposition of charity being created), and second, it does not remove from man the principle of his free acts and of their moral quality.

> God is, as an efficient cause, the life of the soul through the charity and the life of the body through the soul, nevertheless, charity is the life of the soul as a formal cause, in the same way as the soul "is the life" of the body. We can hence conclude that as the soul is immediately united to the body, charity is immediately united to the soul. […] Charity acts like a form. The efficiency of the form comes from the power of the agent who gives the form. [20]

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[19] Thomas de Aquino, *Summa theologiae*, ed. Fratrum Praedicatorum (Rome: Typographia poliglotta S. C. de Propaganda Fide, 1892), I^{a} II^{ae}, 107, 1, ad 2m: "Et ideo lex nova, cuius principalitas consistit in ipsa spirituali gratia indita cordibus, dicitur *lex amoris*. Et dicitur habere promissa spiritualia et aeterna, quae sunt obiecta virtutis, praecipue caritatis. Et ita per se in ea inclinantur, non quasi in extranea, sed quasi in propria".

[20] Thomas de Aquino, *Summa theologiae*, ed. Fratrum Praedicatorum (Rome : Typographia poliglotta S. C. de Propaganda Fide, 1895), II^{a} II^{ae}, 23, 2, ad 2m, ad 3m: "Ad secundum dicendum quod Deus est vita effective et animae per caritatem et corporis per animam: sed formaliter caritas est vita animae, sicut et anima corporis. Unde per hoc potest concludi quod, sicut anima immediate unitur corpori, ita caritas animae. Ad tertium dicendum quod caritas operatur formaliter. Efficacia autem formae est secundum virtutem agentis qui inducit formam. Et ideo quod caritas non est vanitas, sed facit effectum infinitum dum contingit animam Deo

In the *Summa theologiae* (II[a] II[ae], 184), Aquinas deals with the relationship between charity and Christian life ("vita christiana"), that is one of the "states of perfection" of human life. The perfection of Christian life grounds charity as the virtue that, through love, unites man to God. According to the teaching of Saint John: "everyone who lives in charity lives in God, and God lives in him" (1 Jn 4, 16).

> Each being is said perfect insofar as it attains its end, which is his ultimate perfection. Charity realizes our union with God, which is the ultimate end of human spirit, since *everyone who lives in charity lives in God, and God lives in him* (1 John, IV [16]). It is, therefore, on behalf of charity that we have to estimate the perfection of Christian life. [21]

Therefore, we can state that Aquinas has conceived the idea of a unity of wills. The two main characteristics of this unity are the following: first, its causes are supernatural (these are the infusion of theological virtue of charity and the New Law settled by Christ); second, this unity only concerns Christians. Both these elements are subverted in Dante's *Monarchia*.

Liberty and Empire in Dante (Mn I)

In order to appreciate the originality of Dante's conception of freedom, I propose to read chapters XI, XII and XV of Book I of the *Monarchia* as a textual coherent unity. These chapters demonstrate respectively that the Emperor grants the highest degree of justice, liberty, and concord. This means that there is no conflict between liberty and empire and that, on the contrary, the empire is one of the conditions that allows the realization of human liberty.

Dante's Emperor represents the principle of freedom of humankind, since he allows men to express their freedom in the fullest way. Here, we can find a difference from Aquinas's conception of the union of the wills:

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iustificando ipsam, hoc demonstrat infinitatem virtutis divinae, quae est caritatis auctor".

[21] Thomas de Aquino, *Summa theologiae*, ed. Fratrum Praedicatorum (Rome : Typographia poliglotta S. C. de Propaganda Fide, 1899), II[a] II[ae], 184, 1, resp.: "Respondeo dicendum quod unumquodque dicitur esse perfectum inquantum attingit proprium finem, qui est ultima rei perfectio. Caritas autem est quae unit nos Deo, qui est ultimus finis humanae mentis: quia *qui manet in caritate, in Deo manet et Deus in eo*, ut dicitur I Ioan. IV [16]. Et ideo secundum caritatem specialiter attenditur perfectio vitae Christianae".

according to Thomas, this union is realized by Christians, while according to Dante, it is universally realized by humankind.

Dante conceives human beings as an intermediate between the *animalia bruta* on the one side, and the angels and the blessed on the other. The former have no intellect or will and their appetites are determined by sensibility, while the latter are purely intellectual creatures and their will cannot be inhibited by a sensitive appetite. Man shares this sensitive appetite with the *animalia bruta* and is, therefore, an intellectual soul alongside the angels and the blessed; he can then either have his sensitive appetite inhibiting his reason (his intellect and will), or his will and intellect can dominate his inferior appetites. The function of the Emperor is, among others, to make humankind resemble the angels and the blessed (I, XII, 5).

Given that human will is weak and fallible, the Monarch can, in fact, make humankind free at the highest point. Dante clarifies this point by means of the Aristotelian concepts of self-causation. According to Aristotle, the highest wisdom, that is metaphysics, is a free wisdom; we search this wisdom only for the sake of itself:

> It is evident that we do not seek this wisdom because of some task other than being wise; just as we say free [ἐλεύτερος] the man who is the cause of himself, so we only say it [the σοφία] to be free among sciences.[22]

We search for theoretical wisdom for no other goal than being wise, indicating that theoretical wisdom is not a means to obtain something else, but the goal (or final cause) to which other sciences aim. When a man is said to be the "cause of himself", it means that he acts only for himself and not for others. Therefore, to be free means that a thing is the final cause of itself. Due to the love he has for humankind, the Monarch makes men causes (that is goals) of themselves, while the corrupted forms of power (democracies, oligarchies, and tyrannies) enslave subjects (I, XII, 8–13).

In Chapter XV, Dante clarifies the real nature of such freedom. He argues that the function of the Emperor's will is to order and ensure the submission of his subject's wills; this is, therefore, the principle of coercion ("principium coactivum"). The wills of the subjects are simultaneously free and constrained or, more precisely, free in the form of constraint. Dante uses the classical theory of transcendentals in order to demonstrate that the highest degree of unity corresponds with the highest degree of good, while the highest degree of multiplicity aligns with the highest degree of evil:

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[22] *Metaphysics*, I, 982b24–28.

> in every kind of thing that is excellent, which subsists at the highest degree of unity […] and given that concord is in itself a good, it is evident that it must subsist as a unity in its own root. The essence of this root will appear if one observes the nature, or the form, of concord. Concord is indeed a homogeneous motion of many wills; this shows that the unity of wills, is the meaning of "homogeneous motion" and is the root of concord or concord itself. And just as we should call concordant many clods for they all descend to the center, and many flames concordant for they all ascend to the circumference, if they did this voluntarily, so we call many men concordant because they simultaneously move through their wills to one end which is formally in their wills, just as one formal quality is in clods, namely gravity, and another is in flames, namely levity.[23]

Despite its seemingly paradoxical nature, the identification of freedom to coercion is not a novelty in medieval thought: Anselm of Canterbury, for example, states that the impossibility of sin is rather an increase than a diminution of freedom (*De libertate arbitrii*, I); likewise, Bernard of Clairvaux argues that our freedom will be perfect when we are subjected to God (*De gratia et libero arbitrio*, VI, 18). Aquinas clearly writes that angels who cannot sin are freer than us (I^a, 62, 8, ad 3m: "free will is greater in the angels, who cannot sin, than in us, who can sin"). The deeply innovative angle in Dante's *Monarchia* is that the principle of coercion is the Emperor rather than the uncreated being.

Concord ("concordia") is the psychological counterpart of the union of wills. According to Dante, concord is "the uniform motion of many wills", or "of the wills of many" ("uniformis motus plurium voluntatum", Mn I, XV, 5).

The origin of the concept of concord, in the way Dante uses it, is Aristotelian. Robert Grosseteste also used the Latin "concordia" to translate the Greek ὁμόνοια (*Nicomachean Ethics* IX). The following are,

[23] Mn I, XV, p. 64: "in omni genere rerum illud est optimum quod est maxime unum […] Et cum concordia, in quantum huiusmodi, sit quoddam bonum, manifestum est ipsam consistere in aliquo uno tanquam in propria radice. Que quidem radix apparebit si natura vel ratio concordie summatur. Est enim concordia uniformis motus plurium voluntatum; in qua quidem ratione apparet unitatem voluntatum, que per uniformem motum datur intelligi, concordie radicem esse vel ipsam concordiam. Nam sicut plures glebas diceremus concordes propter condescendere omnes ad medium, et plures flammas propter condescendere omnes ad circumferentiam, si voluntarie hoc facerent, ita homines plures concordes dicimus propter simul moveri secundum velle ad unum quod est formaliter in suis voluntatibus, sicut qualitas una formaliter in glebis, scilicet gravitas, et una in flammis, scilicet levitas".

according to Aristotle, the main characteristics of concord:[24] first, concord occurs in a political context (the one of the πόλις). Second, it concerns practical matters (περὶ τὰ πρακτὰ) and, therefore, has a moral worth. Finally, ὁμόνοια makes uniform the choices and actions of citizens (περὶ τῶν συμφερόντων ὁμογνωμονῶσι καὶ ταὐτὰ προαιρῶνται καὶ πράττωσι τὰ κοινῆ δόξαντα, 1167a26–27).

The idea that concord is a disposition of the will, or of the wills, does not come from Aristotle but from Albert the Great. In his first commentary of the *Nicomachean Ethics*, the Dominican theologian writes:

> Concord does not mean the harmony of virtues in a sole individual, but rather the harmony of the wills of several men concerning an object of action.[25]

Aquinas includes peace and concord (*pax*, *concordia*) among the effects of charity. According to him, "peace" means the harmony between the rational and irrational appetite contained within the individual. However, "concord" means the harmony of wills of many individuals and because Aquinas's concord is an effect of charity, a theological virtue, it has supernatural origins.[26]

Dante has developed a highly original position on the conception of concord because, according to him, the empire perfectly realizes concord, since the Monarch's will masters and makes uniform the volition of all the subjects. Monarch's will is then "one, master, ruler":

> Concorde always depends by the unity of the wills […] Such a unity cannot be realized without a will who is unique, master and ruler of every will in a single "volition" […] And such a will cannot exist in the absence of a universal monarch, whose will can be the master and the ruler of all the wills.[27]

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[24] See *Nicomachean Ethics* IX, 1167a22–b16.

[25] Albertus Magnus, *Super Ethica*, ed. Winfried Kübel (Münster i. W: Aschendorff, 1968–1987), p. 678, 37–40: "concordia non dicitur consonantia virtutum in homine uno, sed potius consonantia voluntatum in pluribus hominibus super aliquo operabili".

[26] See Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae*, II^{a} II^{ae}, 29.

[27] *Mn* I, XV, 64-66: "omnis concordia dependet ab unitate que est in voluntatibus […] Sed hoc non potest esse nisi sit voluntas una, domina et regulatrix omnium aliarum virtutum in unum […] Nec ista una potest esse, nisi sit princeps unus omnium, cuius voluntas domina et regulatrix aliarum omnium esse possit".

In order to evaluate the novelty of this position, it should be noted that Dante states (I, XI), that men are united to the Emperor by a relationship of charity and fair love:

> As well as cupidity, albeit small, obscure the virtue of justice, charity, or fair love, increases and makes it shine. Then, in whomever fair love can be at the highest degree, justice can be in him at the highest degree; such is the monarch; therefore, justice can be perfectly realized under such a monarch.[28]

This position is extremely daring, since it shifts the Monarch's power into one that can unify wills in a single volition, which Aquinas had previously considered to be the supernatural action of the Holy Spirit.

Dante's conception of concord presents two main analogies with Aquinas' conception. Firstly, both imply a hierarchy of wills that unite in an homogeneous volition: according to Aquinas, the Holy Spirit is the principle that allows rational creatures to love God and, therefore, are uniformly submitted to love; according to Dante, the Emperor's will is the principle that orders the wills of his subjects in a single volition (I, XVI, 4–9) and this is a principle of love (I, XI, 14).[29] In both cases, there is a "summit" and a "base" to the loving volition. Secondly, both Aquinas and Dante think that this union is accomplished through free acts of love: charity, according to Aquinas, is a disposition of the will, hence it acts freely; according to Dante, the wills of the subjects freely adhere to the will of the Monarch. On one point, however, Dante's position is deeply incompatible with Aquinas: in the *Monarchia*, the agent who allows the wills to be united is the will of the Monarch and this is a created (natural) will, while in Aquinas this agent is the Holy Spirit, an uncreated (supernatural) principle. Moreover, Dante seems to think that the union of the wills is actualized by the humankind as a whole, while Thomas states that the convergence of volitions only concerns the member of the Church.

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[28] *Mn* I, XI, 13, 44: "Preterea quemadmodum cupiditas habitualem iustitiam quodammodo, quantumcumque pauca, obnubilat, sic karitas seu recta dilectio illam acuit atque dilucidat. Cui ergo maxime recta dilectio inesse potest, potissimum locum in illo potest habere iustitia; huiusmodi est monarcha; ergo eo existente iustitia potissima est vel esse potest".

[29] One could object to my interpretation that given that the Latin *caritas* does not necessarily refer to the theological theory of infused virtues (see, for instance Cicero, *Laelius de amicitia*, VI, 20), Dante could simply speak about friendship or love; I would argue against this objection that Dante's *caritas* clearly reproduces the hierarchical structure of the theological virtue rather than the structure of a simple relationship of love or affection.

Finally, another noteworthy feature of Dante's conception of freedom is "affective Averroism". Peter Lombard incorrectly believes this to be an *uncreated* principle of love and freedom that acts in the heart of men, while Dante considers it a *created* principle of love and freedom that acts in the will of the subjects.

Conclusion

In this paper, I have offered a new interpretation of Dante's conception of the relationship between empire and human freedom. Nonetheless, a similar evaluation of Dante's originality has been made previously, just after the composition of the *Monarchia*. Between 1327 and 1334 (but most likely before 1329), the Dominican, Guido Vernani, wrote a treatise against the *Monarchia* called the *De reprobatione Monarchie*.[30] Here, the author blames Dante for having put the Monarch in Christ's place. The following passage is particularly noteworthy:

> This is what, according to the Gospel of John [17, 11], this true Monarch [i.e. Christ] asked and obtained: that all men are one. According to Augustine (*On Trinity*, IV, chapter 9 [12]) this does not mean that they are one by nature, but that they are one by the same charity, aiming at the same beatitude, and by a will at the highest degree concord in one spirit is somehow inflated by the fire of charity. Briefly and in sum, we can conclude that all the arguments that he [i.e. Dante] exposes in the first part of his treatise and that contain some truth, can only suit our Lord Jesus Christ.[31]

Even without endorsing Guido Vernani's criticism, one has to admit that these few lines grasp both the essential teaching of Dante's conception of freedom and the subversive potential of the *Monarchia* as it argues that human freedom can be perfectly attainable not through grace but through nature.

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[30] *Mn*, p. 319-323.

[31] *Mn*, p. 338. "Hoc enim obtinuit et rogavit iste verus monarcha, secundum *Evangelium* Iohannis [17, 11], ut omnes homines sint unum; quod intelligendum est secundum Augustinum (IV *De Trinit.*, cap. 9 [12]) quod sint unum non tantum per naturam, sed essent unum per eandem caritatem in eandem beatitudinem conspirantem, et concordissimam voluntatem in unum spiritum quodammodo caritatis igne conflatum. Et sic breviter et summatim, omnes rationes quas ponit in prima parte sui tractatus habentes aliquam speciem veritatis in nullo alio monarcha possunt nec unquam potuerunt veraciter inveniri nisi in Domino Iesu Christo" (Chiesa-Tabarroni, 2013, p. 338).

CHAPTER FIVE

"FENNO UNA ROTA DI SÉ TUTTI E TREI": DIALECTIC, RHETORIC, AND HISTORY IN DANTE'S *MONARCHIA*

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Compared to the account in Matthew, Luke's Annunciation is incendiary, an insurgent manifesto that upends not only the political and social order but nature itself:

> And the angel said to her: Fear not, Mary, for thou hast found grace with God. Behold thou shalt conceive in thy womb, and shalt bring forth a son and thou shalt call his name Jesus. He shall be great, and shall be called the Son of the most High; and the Lord God shall give unto him the throne of David his father; and he shall reign in the house of Jacob for ever. And of his kingdom there shall be no end. (Luke 1: 30–33).

In place of the unnamed angel that appears to Joseph in a dream in the first Gospel, Luke's Gabriel speaks directly to Mary, who so eclipses her husband he entirely drops from view. Even the phrases Luke uses to describe Jesus's conception and birth, "*concipies in utero*" and "*paries filium*", seem to give his mother a more active role than Aristotle believed women had in the generation of offspring. Indeed, the child that Mary brings forth will change the world more radically still. He should be named Jesus, Gabriel says, not because "he will save his people from their sins", as the angel in Matthew insists, but because he is the "melech yisrael". Descended from the house of David, Luke's Jesus is less the savior who fulfills Isaiah's prophecies of personal redemption than the God-anointed king destined to liberate his people and establish them as his everlasting nation.

The monarch whose advent Gabriel announces here is the ruler Daniel foresaw when he interpreted Nebuchadnezzar's dream. The King's power,

Daniel tells him, has made him like the head of gold atop the statue he saw in his vision. After his reign, the prophet continues, a throne of silver will rise up, and then give way to one of brass, and the brass will yield to iron, until the realm will be iron mixed with clay. Then the God of heaven shall come to the divided land and "set up a kingdom that will never be destroyed, and his kingdom will not be delivered up to another people, and it will break in pieces and shall consume all these kingdoms, and itself shall stand for ever" (Dan. 1. 44).

At the start of the third book of the *Monarchia*, Dante predicts that he will face down a lions' den of decretalists and papal apologists because he knows that God has found justice in him. His reference to Daniel is both brazen and strategic. By likening himself to the prophet, who obeyed the law of the Medes and the Persians and yet miraculously triumphed over it, Dante authorized his participation in a debate that, as Albert Ascoli has shown, he knew he was otherwise unqualified to enter.[1] At the same time, the allusion allowed him to reenact the arguments of the previous book by foreseeing a providential intervention in his own life not unlike those miracles that vindicated Rome's right to empire. Moreover, by staging this scene of what one might call personal preemptive exegesis, he anticipated a key argument that he was about to make: the curia's lawyers have misinterpreted the Bible.

But this righteous Daniel, as apt as he is to the moment, is not so close a muse to Dante's project as the Daniel he does not invoke: the expository Daniel who elucidated God's intentions, the Daniel who saw a divided realm riven by contending jurisdictions and prophesied that it would be unified under a divinely sanctioned monarch whose reign would last forever. This Daniel, Luke's Daniel, haunts Dante's treatise. Along with Samuel, another prophet-interpreter, he points to the biblical past that Dante needed to excise in order to write the *Monarchia*.

To contest the pope's claim to supremacy in temporal matters, Dante knew he had to present his arguments as a detached disputant bent solely on demonstrating the necessity of his conclusions. He could not, therefore, speak as the champion of Frederick II, as he had in the *Convivio*. Nor could he decry the wickedness of the Florentines who opposed Henry VII, as he does in the *Epistles*. Neither could he inveigh against the overreach

[1] For an important reading of the *Monarchia* in general, and of the importance of the "Book of Daniel" in it, see Albert Ascoli, *Dante and the Making of a Modern Author* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 229–73. The privilege Dante claims in order to enter the debate encompasses the idea of lawful violation that Justin Steinberg analyzes in *Dante and the Limits of the Law* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2013), 89-126.

of a Boniface or a Nicholas, as he had in the *Comedy*. But the syllogisms that he does deploy to prove his thesis are not simply the *forma tractandi* his subject demanded and his audience expected.[2] Their impersonality did more than allow Dante to suspend his partisan allegiances; they enabled him to inoculate himself against the two works that challenge perhaps the most startling premise he would advance, that Rome is the city of peace, and its Emperor the chrismed King humankind requires to achieve the happiness we were created to enjoy on earth.

The first of these works, of course, is the *De Civitate Dei*; Dante was aware that many of the figures he would present as proof of the rightness of Rome's triumph Augustine had already said were proof of its flaws. The second, even more formidable text is the Bible, specifically the sequence that runs from Judges through Kings. These books, which relate the founding and fall of the kingdoms of Israel and Judah, are dominated by two ideal monarchs. David fulfilled God's will by gathering the twelve tribes into a nation and by establishing wide dominion over many non-believing peoples. Solomon, given the chance, did not ask God for riches, power, honor, or a long life, but for the wisdom to govern justly; he was given so much of it that, "se 'l vero è vero" as Aquinas puts it in the *Paradiso* (12. 112), his equal has never arisen. In many ways each ruler adumbrates the Emperor and his demesne the Empire that Dante says Christianity so desperately lacks. Yet in the *Monarchia*, David (with one circuitous exception [2.9.10]) is not King David, but the psalmist, and Solomon is never King Solomon, only the author of Proverbs.

Why would Dante suppress these biblical narratives, which he knew well, especially when they seem to bear so directly on many of the propositions he puts forward? One reason, the main one, I will suggest, is that they raise the question of whether Israel should have a king to rule it. In the early source of First and Second Samuel, God ordains David's ascension over Saul and Solomon's over Adonijah, but both coronations are overshadowed by the later Deuteronomic writer's disapprobation of any sovereign: "The people" God tells Samuel, "have not rejected thee, but me, that I should not reign over them" (1 Sam. 8.7).[3] Another reason is

[2] For a good discussion of academic debate, which is the intellectual context of the *Monarchia*, see Anthony K. Cassell, *The "Monarchia" Controversy. An Historical Study with accompanying translations of Dante Alighieri's "Monarchia" Guido Vernani's "Refutation of the Monarchia composed by Dante" and Pope John XXII's Bull "Si Fratrum"* (Washington, DC: The Catholic University of America Press, 2004).

[3] On these biblical books see Gwilym H. Jones, "1 and 2 Samuel," in *The Oxford Bible Commentary*, eds. John Barton and John Muddiman (Oxford: Oxford

that David's treatment of Uriah and Solomon's exogamous marriages substantiate the Augustinian view of human imperfectability. If even these kings, who walked with God and lacked nothing, did wrong, who could say that any monarch would be impervious to sin, no matter how absolute his power, no matter how distant he might be from a motive for greed? Finally, Dante had to quarantine the historical and the political lesson that the scriptural books teach: empires fall. Even ideal kings cannot assure their succession. David saw Absolom rise in rebellion against him. Solomon's sons squabbled after he died. The realm split apart. Eventually Nebuchadnezzar destroyed the Temple and the people were driven into exile.

A reader who recalled these events would be more inclined to think that Rome shared Israel's fate than that it instituted the eternal rule God had decreed for it. He would likely doubt that the idea of the king's two bodies was potent enough to guarantee an Empire's conception, much less its actual duration. Even the suggestion that Rome could be the figure of an ideal *desideratum* would seem not only outlandish but already disproven. Indeed, in the second decade of the fourteenth century, any Italian who felt that the recent fall of Acre had reopened the wound of the Crusaders' expulsion from Jerusalem a century before, who remembered with regret the even more recent collapse of Henry VII's campaign, who despaired that Clement had moved the papal enclave to Avignon, where it remained, who looked upon his own land and saw that it was more faction-torn than ever; anyone, in short, who was at all historically-minded had cause to wonder whether his own fraught times were following a script that the Bible had already chronicled.

Before Dante could elaborate his imperial vision, he had to neutralize the fear that his Christian empire was doomed, as Rome had been, to repeat the fate of Jewish kingdoms. No one who would maintain, as Dante does in the third book of the *Monarchia*, that Samuel was God's messenger rather than his vicar could afford to have his audience think that the kings the prophet anointed, or their successors, presaged his Emperor; to do so would introduce premonitions of defeat, schism, and exile into the Edenic realm that an omnipotent monarch would bring into being. Prior to claiming, as he does in Book II, that victory in single combat certified Rome's right to rule, Dante had to deter his listeners from recalling the conflict-ridden aftermath of David's contest with Goliath, who had

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University Press, 2001); Robert Gordon, *I & II Samuel, A Commentary* (Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 1996).

daunted the tribes of Israel by demanding they send a man with whom he would fight hand to hand in "*singulare certamen*" (1 Sam. 17.10).[4]

The thesis I would like to begin to flesh out in this essay, then, is that by enlisting Aristotle to secure his genealogy of empire, Dante was able to bracket the counter-history that most directly competes with and speaks against it. I will also argue that because he knew that his claims would be judged by the soundness of the syllogisms he constructed from first principles, he could ignore interpretations in which the "carnal" Jerusalem is a synecdoche for the unified kingdom of Israel or, more perilously, a prefiguration of the city of God. Due to the fact that the peace they brought did not last, the lands David and Solomon ruled were, *a priori*, particular and contingent, provincialities rather than realms in which one could see the immanent form of monarchy; as rulers, they, like Charlemagne, were not relevant to a scientific discussion of the conditions an emperor must meet if he is to govern the world the way it should be governed.

Dialectic is always and already rhetorical in the *Monarchia*. The same major and minor premises that Dante generated to prosecute his arguments were the vehicle through which he disqualified his most redoubtable opponents from entering the debate. By making logic the voice of history, he was able to introduce new forms of probative evidence—signs, wonders, athletic contests, single combat—to corroborate Rome's standing as the legitimate, God-ordained fulfillment of political community; typology, allegory, and the other exegetical protocols that had given that honor to Jerusalem were not credentialed discourses in the forum he was addressing.[5] As a result, critics have focused attention on the Bible Dante

[4] For a recent discussion of Dante's opinions on single combat, see Flavio Silvestrini, *Iugum libertatis: Dante e la lettura politica del libero arbitrio* (Rome: Aracne, 2012), 131-40. Dante argues that whatever a winner obtains in a duel, he obtains *de jure*, since victory is tantamount to the unmediated intervention of God. David's duel with Goliath, of course, would be the first supporting instance that would come to a reader's mind. (Cf. Richard Kay's note in his edition, *Dante's Monarchia*, trans. with a commentary by Richard Kay Toronto: Pontifical Institute, 1998). But the concept extends as well to David's subduing of all surrounding peoples under his kingship. Works like the Crusader Bible make it clear that the account in Samuel became a model for the idea of a Christian empire, which makes Dante's failure to refer to it all the more noteworthy.

[5] Dante underscores the inadmissibility of exegesis most emphatically in his Aristotelian demolition of the decretalists' misreading of biblical texts. He introduces his critique, of course, by citing the Augustine of the *De doctrina christiana*. But his refutations are not based on Augustinian principles but on the *De elenchis sophisticis*. See further Antonio Toscano, "Dante: il discorso

cites rather than on the account of kings and kingship that he omits.[6] They have attended far more to the Augustine he engaged, who disdained Rome, than to the Augustine he occluded, who presented David and Solomon as precursors of the king of kings.[7]

I realize, of course, the risk I face in presenting a case whose backbone is that the dog did not bark. But in Dante's earlier works, this *veltro* does bark. In the *Convivio*, for instance, he did not hesitate to associate Israel's rulers with Roman hegemony. In the fourth tractate, Dante quite ostentatiously opens his disquisition on God's election (the verb he uses is "elesse") of the "popolo santo" (Latin race) for rule by quoting Solomon:

> E però io nel cominciamento di questo capitolo posso parlare colla bocca di Salomone, che in persona della Sapienza dice nelli suoi Proverbi: "Udite: però che di grandi cose io debbo parlare" (4.5.2).[8]
>
> I am therefore at the beginning of this chapter able to recite the words of Solomon who says in Proverbs, in the person of Wisdom: "Listen, for I will speak of great things."

A few paragraphs later, he explicitly connects Jesus's birth to Rome's imperial destiny. Only a woman, he proclaims, who was finer and more pure than any other was fit to bear the Son of God. That woman was Mary; she was the flower Isaiah had said would spring from the root of Jesse,

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aristotelico nella *Monarchia*", *Forum Italicum* 15 (1981): 139–152; Brenda Deen Schildgen, *Divine Providence: A History: The Bible, Virgil, Orosius, Augustine, and Dante* (London: Continuum, 2012), 98–120; and Cassell, *The "Monarchia" Controversy*.

[6] On Dante's use of the Bible in the *Monarchia*, see Giuseppe Cremascoli, "La Bibbia nella *Monarchia* di Dante," in *La Bibbia di Dante. Esperienza mistica, profezia e teologia biblica in Dante.* Atti del Convegno internazionale di Studi, ed. Giuseppe Ledda (Ravenna: Centro dantesco dei frati minori conventuali, 2011), 31–47; Giovanna Puletti, "Temi biblici nella *Monarchia* e nella trattatistica politica del tempo," *Studi Danteschi*, LXI (1989): 231-288; Cesare Vasoli, "La Bibbia nel *Convivio* e nella *Monarchia*", in *Otto saggi per Dante* (Firenze: Le Lettere, 1995), 65–82.

[7] On Dante's use of Augustine, especially his use of the *De Civitate Dei* in the *Monarchia*, see Theodore Silverstein, "On the Genesis of *De Monarchia*, II, v," *Speculum* 13 (1938): 326-349; Francesca Fontanella, "L'impero romano nel *Convivio* e nella *Monarchia*," *Studi Danteschi* LXXIX (2014): 39-142, and Schildgen, *Divine Providence: A History*.

[8] I quote from Dante Alighieri, *Convivio*, ed. Franca Brambilla Ageno, in *Le Opere di Dante Alighieri*, Edizione Nazionale a cura della Società Dantesca Italiana, III.1–2 (Firenze: Le Lettere, 1995).

David's father. And David, Dante notes, "was born when Rome was born—that is, when Aeneas came to Italy from Troy, which was the origin of the Roman city, according to written records. Thus, the divine choice of the Roman empire is made manifest by the birth of the holy city which was contemporaneous with the root of the family of Mary" (4.5.5).[9]

At the corresponding moment in the *Monarchia*, Dante quotes, without attribution, the beginning of the first of the "royal" psalms:

> Quare fremuerunt gentes, et populi meditati sunt inania? Astiterunt reges terrae, et principes convenerunt in unum adversus Dominum, et adversus Christum ejus. Dirumpamus vincula eorum, et proiciamus a nobis jugum ipsorum (*Mon*. 2.1.1; Psalm II, 1-3).[10]
>
> Why have the Gentiles raged and the people devised vain things? The kings of the earth stood up, and the princes met together, against the Lord and against his Christ. Let us break their bonds asunder: and let us cast away their yoke from us.

God laughs in derision, the psalmist goes on to say, at the rebellions these subject rulers are plotting. He tells the King of Israel: "You are the son I have begotten this day; you shall smash the nations to pieces"—an image the author of Daniel remembered—"as if they were a potter's vessel, and the ends of the earth shall be your possession." For Dante, however, the psalm is not a ringing proclamation about sacramental kingship and the end of history; it is a prop he uses to announce a turnabout in his thinking. Instead of the God-birthed monarch in the psalm, whom Dante thought was David (Acts 4:25-6), and in place of its clear invitation to associate that king with the messiah, in lieu of its dramatic shifts of speaker and audience, as well as its rapid movement from intrigue to ridicule, from awe to command, Dante substitutes an observation, at once detached yet *engagé*, about the relation between knowledge and emotion. People, he explains, are amazed when they confront a thing whose cause remains hidden from them; once they know its nature, though, they look down

[9] *Convivio* 4.5.6: "E tutto questo fu in uno temporale, che David nacque e nacque Roma, cioè che Enea venne di Troia in Italia, che fu origine della cittade romana, sì come testimoniano le scritture. Per che assai è manifesto la divina elezione del romano imperio, per lo nascimento della santa cittade, che fu contemporaneo alla radice della progenie di Maria." Dante found this argument in Orosius's *Historiarum Adversum Paganos Libri VII* (3.8 and 6.22); see Schildgen, 110–12.

[10] I am quoting from Dante Alighieri, *Monarchia*, ed. Pier Giorgio Ricci. Edizione Nazionale (Florence: Società Dantesca Italiana, 1965). All translations are from Dante, *Monarchy*, ed. and trans. Prue Shaw (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).

almost mockingly on those who continue to be amazed. He used to be astonished that Rome established its empire so effortlessly; it must have been the city's might, he thought, that accounted for the lack of resistance it encountered. Now he very nearly scorns those who do not see that Rome's triumph was the work of divine providence. He will therefore endeavor to break the chains of ignorance of kings and princes who rage against the Emperor's sovereignty.[11]

While the manner in which Dante re-purposes the psalm is so audacious it truly can astound us, the reason behind his appropriation of it is clear. By translating God's derisive laughter at scheming kings into his own rueful scorn for his own still flummoxed opponents, he forearms the arguments he is about to launch with the prophetic force of God's pronouncements. Yet there is, one feels, something incongruous about Dante's mustering such thunder to support what in the end is a personal anecdote dressed up as a rhetorical syllogism. The disproportion one senses, which reflects the uneasy mixture of nerve and humility in his self-presentation, marks a point of struggle in the work where political oratory, dialectic, and theology have tried to occupy the same ground. It is a perturbation in the discursive field that has lingered in the wake of their coming together, an after-effect, I submit, of Dante's evacuation of Israel's history—what the psalm clearly is about—so that he might trace Rome's in its stead.

Somewhere between the heuristic practices of the *Convivio* and the *Monarchia*, let me note in passing, is Dante's styling of Henry VII as "the lion of Judah" in Epistle V. The title makes the Emperor less a David *redivivus* than an embodiment of Jesus triumphant. The epithet comes from Revelations 5.5: "And one of the elders saith unto me, Weep not: behold, the Lion of the tribe of Judah, the Root of David, hath prevailed to open the book, and to lose the seven seals thereof." Rather than looking to the Old Testament for Henry's antecedents, Dante looks forward to the end of all earthly realms; he has begun to separate his imperial thinking from the biblical story of kings, but he has not yet sidelined it by turning to the a-historical canons of syllogistic demonstration.[12]

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[11] On this passage generally, see Maria Consiglia De Matteis, "*Il mito dell'impero romano in Dante: a proposito di Monarchia II, i,*" *Letture classensi* 9–10 (1982): 247–256.

[12] On *Epistle V*, see Paola Rigo, *Memoria classica e memoria biblica in Dante* (Florence: Olschki, 1994), 33-44 and Marjorie Reeves, "Dante and the Prophetic View of History", in *The World of Dante*, ed. Cecil Grayson (Oxford: Clarendon, 1980), 44–60. Maurizio Perugi argues that references in Dante to Crusader literature allows him to turn Florence into a new Jerusalem and Henry VII into a

Before he could put quill to parchment to write the *Monarchia*, Dante realized that the exemplarity of events in the Hebrew Bible—a resource he willingly exploited in the *Convivio*, the *Epistles*, and, indeed, the *Comedy*—was a problem he had to address. But he also knew that propositional analysis, precisely because it is disconnected from time and place, would immunize his claims from the powerful objections to them in First and Second Samuel. The most serious of these objections, as I have said, was God's bald statement that the clamor of the children of Israel to have a king over them was a great evil in His sight. "They are forsaking me" the Lord says to Samuel. Nevertheless, he tells his prophet that he should harken to the voice of the people. But God also orders Samuel to make known the *ius regis*, the right of the king, who will judge and rule over them:

> he will take your sons, and put them in his chariots, and will make them his horsemen, and his running footmen to run before his chariots. And he will appoint of them to be his tribunes, and centurions, and to plough his fields, and to reap his corn, and to make him arms and chariots. Your daughters also he will take to make him ointments, and to be his cooks, and bakers. And he will take your fields, and your vineyards, and your best olive yards, and give them to his servants. Moreover, he will take the tenth of your corn, and of the revenues of your vineyards, to give his eunuchs and servants […] Your servants also and handmaids, and your goodliest young men, and your asses he will take away, and put them to his work. Your flocks also he will tithe, and you shall be his servants (1Sam 8: 12–17).

Even though these expropriations will make the people cry out (1 Sam 19), neither the anti-monarchial Deuteronomic author nor anyone else ever doubted their legitimacy.

These verses cast a pall over the first two books of the *Monarchia*. The picture they paint of how a ruler may come to covet nothing because he has taken everything shakes the foundation of the prologistic edifice Dante erects to prove that the Emperor who loves justice most will be free of cupidity, since he will have everything he could want. No matter how rigorously Dante would argue that Rome gained its empire *de iure*,

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crusading prince who will liberate the city from new infidel; see "Il Sordello di Dante e la tradizione mediolatina dell'invettiva," *Studi danteschi* 55 (1983): 23–135, esp. 107–8. See further Olivia Holmes, *Dante's Two Beloveds* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2008), 134–36.

Samuel's enumeration of the right of the king begs the question of whether any monarch, much less the monarchy he rules, can be inherently just.[13]

Dante would have found the Early Source's approbation of Israel's first kings no less troubling. God tells Samuel that he will anoint Saul to be ruler and that "he shall save my people out of the hand of the Philistines" because He has "looked down upon my people, because their cry is come to me" (1 Sam 9. 16). Later, He changes Saul's heart ("immutavit ei Deus cor aliud", 1 Sam 10. 9) so that he prophesies; everyone is amazed, many ask "Is Saul also among the prophets?" Yet almost immediately after this suggestively proto-Pentecostal moment, in which Saul might nearly seem to assume both crown and mitre, he disobeys God's command to smite Amalek and "utterly destroy all that he hath; spare him not, nor covet anything that is his, but slay man and woman, child and suckling, ox and sheep, camel and ass" (1 Sam 15. 3). Before he attacks, however, Saul tells the Kinites, who had been kind to the Israelites when they left Egypt, to leave the city. He then slaughtered everyone who remained, except king Agag, whom he and the people decided to spare, and the best of the sheep and oxen, which they took with them. As domestic and as foreign policy, these actions are politically astute; they cost Saul his kingship. In the face of God's bidding, Saul learns, much to his sorrow, human reason has no purchase. Neither mercy nor pragmatism carries any weight; compassion and judgment must give way to absolute obedience. How could Dante argue that the necessary consequence of the premise that the prophet was not God's vicar but His messenger is that the pope does not have the power to do what Samuel did, unless he excised the circumstances that led to Saul's downfall, and the logic-defying truth it exemplifies?

Even more than Saul, David and Solomon were exalted by God. As the *antenati* of "lo imperador che sempre regna" (*Par*. 12. 40), they are the kings one would have thought Dante thought were the forerunners of the monarch he describes. In the *Paradiso*, after all, David has pride of place among the just. He is the pupil of the eye of the imperial eagle; his is the greatest reward of all just rulers. In the heaven of the Sun, Solomon is also glorified as king and *re* appears twice in the *terzina* in which Aquinas celebrates him:

[13] Cf. Piero Fiorelli, "Sul senso del diritto nella *Monarchia*," *Letture classensi* 15 (1987): 79–97.

> Non ho parlato sì, che tu non posse
>
> ben veder ch'el fu re, che chiese senno
>
> acciò che re sufficïente fosse (*Par*. 13. 94-7).
>
> I have not spoken in such a way that you cannot see clearly that he was a king who asked for the wisdom to be a worthy king.

The celebration of both sovereigns—and of Solomon in particular, since many commentators, Augustine and Brunetto Latini among them, numbered him as one of the damned—makes their marginalization in the *Monarchia* all the more conspicuous.

It was not David's lust or Solomon's idolatry, however, that prevented them from being admissible antecedents of Dante's emperor so much as the authorized afterlife of the city that was the center of their kingdom and earthly home of the house of God. How could Dante counter the hierocratic claim that the power the Pope wielded was both prior to and greater than any monarch's because the bishop of Rome had inherited, in St Bernard's words, all Christ's royal authority "as priest and king in the order of Malchisedech" (Gen. 14. 18; Ps. 110. 4; Heb. 6. 20, 7. 1ff.), if he did not first bridle typological readings of history, which override the axiom that primacy of place is convertible with precedence in time? How could he base his own arguments in support of the Emperor's sovereignty with regard to worldly affairs on the claim that the Empire was chronologically prior to the church, unless he muted the idea that the terrestrial Jerusalem foreshadowed its heavenly counterpart?

Dante's most imposing disputant in this regard was Augustine, but not the Augustine he in fact did engage, who had minimized the virtues of Cincinnatus, Fabricius, Camillus, Brutus, Mutius, the Decii, and Cato.[14] Although the Bishop of Hippo grants that these men acted to preserve the wellbeing of the commonwealth, he insisted that they cared more about human glory than their immortal souls. This charge Dante deftly parried by using their devotion to the public good as his proof that the whole world enjoyed the freedom from strife that was seen to be its God-intended state when under Roman rule (*Mon*. 2. 5). The Augustine that Dante had to circumvent entirely was the theologian who saw in the earthly Jerusalem a

[14] Dante mentions these figures in *Monarchia* 2. 5; in Augustine all of them except Cato appear in *De Civitate Dei* 5.18. Cato appears in 1. 23.

glimmer, dark but visible, of the heavenly city of peace. In Book 17 of the *De Civitate Dei*, he quotes Nathan's prophecy (2 Sam 7. 10–11):[15]

> And I will appoint a place for my people Israel, and will plant him, and he shall dwell apart, and shall be troubled no more, and the son of iniquity shall not humble him anymore, as from the beginning, from the days when I appointed judges over my people Israel.

But, he immediately adds, "Whoever hopes for this so great good in this world, and in this earth, his wisdom is but folly." "Can anyone think" he continues, "it was fulfilled in the peace of Solomon's reign? Scripture certainly commends that peace with excellent praise as a shadow of that which is to come." But there were periods of war during the forty years that Solomon was king; moreover, under Ehud, there were eighty years of peace. Augustine concludes,

> Be it far from us […] that we should believe the times of Solomon are predicted in this promise, *much less indeed those of any other king whatever*. For none other of them reigned in such great peace as he; nor did that nation ever at all hold that kingdom so as to have no anxiety lest it should be subdued by enemies: *for in the very great mutability of human affairs such great security is never given to any people, that it should not dread invasions hostile to this life*. Therefore, the place of this promised peaceful and secure habitation is eternal, and of right belongs eternally to Jerusalem, the free mother, where the genuine people of Israel shall be: for this name is interpreted Seeing God; in the desire of which reward a pious life is to be led through faith in this miserable pilgrimage (*DCD* 17. 13; emphasis added).

No syllogism proving the right of Roman rule, whether or not based on the nobility of the race, no enthymeme, whether or not supported by miracles, by signs, or by the order of nature, can triumph unless it contends with Augustine's categorical denial that any empire will bring the peace human beings need to be truly happy. Dante labors mightily to show that Rome's victories were revelations of God's judgment, but Augustine had already reminded Christians that the *pax Romana*, although it lasted two hundred years, was not a time free from war. Dante demonstrates by denying the consequent that Jesus, who is incapable of injustice, would not have been born in the days of Augustus Caesar had the census he ordered been unlawful; he calls on the principle that the contradictory of a false proposition is true in order to prove that Adam's sin would not have been

[15] I quote from Saint Augustine, *The City of God*, trans. Marcus Dods (New York: Random House, 1950).

legitimately punished in Christ if the Empire had not existed by right. But Augustine had established that any right to dominion Rome could claim was contingent; the eternal city, already sacked when he began the *City of God*, fell forever some half century after he completed it. In the *Convivio* (4. 5. 7), Dante had written of the perfect balance that Rome had brought to the world:

> Né 'l mondo mai non fu né sarà sì perfettamente disposto come allora che alla voce d'un solo, principe del roma[n] populo e comandatore, si [descrisse, sì] come testimonia Luca evangelista. E però [che] pace universale era per tutto, che mai, più non fu né fia, la nave dell'umana compagnia dirittamente per dolce cammino a debito porto correa.
>
> The world was never so perfectly disposed, nor ever will be, as at the time when it was guided by the voice of the one sole prince and commander of the Roman people […] Since universal peace reigned everywhere, which it never did before nor ever shall again, the ship of human society was speeding on an even course directly toward its proper port.

The emphasis Augustine placed on peacefulness and security in his critique of empire explains why Dante could not repeat this claim in the *Monarchia*. In order to give the kingdom he envisioned a past as well as a future, he had to veil those doctrinal readings of history that agreed with him but located that past and that future elsewhere.

I doubt it is an accident that the only time Dante quotes the *De Civitate Dei* is when he is discussing errors in interpreting the mystical sense of Scripture, or that his analysis is embedded in a larger disquisition on false premises and invalid syllogisms (*Mon*. 3. 4). As the language of disputation, dialectic is the screen lady of the *Monarchia*; its rules and regulations permitted Dante to keep David and Solomon backstage and his reader from remembering Jerusalem while he unfolded his arguments about Rome. Ultimately, Dante made dialectic a theory of history that competes with the allegory of theologians. By contemplating the essential and universal in the things it considered, it sanctioned both his excision of the Bible's circumstance-filled narratives of kings and kingdoms and the catalogue *raisonné* of providential politics he put in its place. Paradoxically, however, both discourses rely on the same epistemic principle; no less than the Christian transformation of events in Hebrew Scriptures into shadows of events in the New Testament, Dante's occlusions depend on—indeed could not exist without—a prior belief in the supersession of the Jews.

In the title of this paper, I invoked the wheel that Iacopo Rusticucci and his civic-minded companions formed as they made their way through

the fiery rain and burning sand of the seventh circle of Hell. I have argued elsewhere that, as they whirl about, they become speaking embodiments of the "rota virgilii", a medieval adaptation of the ancient idea that an orator's diction should be consonant with his subject.[16] One could say that the same principle of literary decorum governs the dialogue that the dialectic of the *Monarchia* conducts with the poetry of the *Commedia*. Each is the proper form of discourse for the matter it treats; each, in effect, supports the superiority of the other in the arena where it is deployed. In a sense, Dante had already forecast the relation between the works when he said in the *Vita Nova* that vernacular poets had the same license to use prosopopoeia as Latin poets, not indiscriminately ("sanza ragione alcuna") but with a reason that later could be explicated in prose ("ma con ragione la quale poi sia possibile d'aprire per prosa" (*VN* 25. 8)). The prose of the *Monarchia* sets forth in the language of *ragione* what the poetic figurations set forth in the *Comedy*. The works are cognate; they share the same familial bond that Dante says joins the pope and emperor in the final lines of his tractate. Which text, though, is father, and which first-born son, we will have to decide for ourselves.[17]

That, at least, is an optimistic reading of the implications of my argument. A colder eye would calibrate the dimensions of the ripple disturbing the logic of any political theology that relies on substituting Christians for Jews as God's chosen people. From this perspective, the bracketing of typology in the *Monarchia*, which in essence is a bracketing of history, backlights the inadequacy of propositional logic to underwrite a sustainable future for the state. Philosophy can prove to be a necessity for an emperor and it can demarcate his authority and that of the empire he oversees, but it cannot fully express the genesis and genealogy of either until its syllogisms become, as it were, extra-rational.[18] To be congruent with its subject, political theology must speak the language Bernard speaks at the summit of paradise: a language that exceeds the law of

[16] Warren Ginsberg, "From Simile to Prologue: Geography as Link in Dante, Petrarch, and Chaucer" in *Through A Classical Eye: Transcultural and Transhistorical Visions in Medieval English, Italian, and Latin Literature in Honor of Winthrop Wetherbee*, eds. Andrew Galloway and R. F. Yeager (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2009), 145-64.

[17] The relationship between the *Monarchia* and the *Commedia* has, of course, been endlessly discussed. I cite here only one study, which will have to stand for many others: Anna Maria Chiavacci Leonardi, "La *Monarchia* di Dante alla luce della *Commedia,*" *Studi Medievali* 18 (1977): 147–183.

[18] I owe this thought to Giuseppe Mazzotta, whom I would like to thank for reading an early version of this essay.

contradiction, a language that is incarnational and Trinitarian, that transcends the distinction between father and son, that is unabashedly partisan because it is unabashedly Christological. The language of Canto 33 *Paradiso* is no less supersessionary than that of the *Monarchia*, but it has the advantage of not distinguishing among the things it supersedes, because it supersedes all things. To me, that is a more forthright way of representing the overt and covert accommodations that Dante’s politics makes with his theology and his theology with his politics.

CHAPTER SIX

DANTE AS CRITIC OF POLITICAL ECONOMY IN THE *MONARCHIA*

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Throughout the *Commedia,* Dante condemns greed and the accumulation of wealth as directly intertwined with the political dysfunction and injustice of the Italy of his time. In his conversation with Forese Donati in *Purgatorio*, Dante describes Florence as the place that "di giorno in giorno più di ben si spolpa, e a trista ruina par disposto" (day by day [is] deprived of good and seems along the way to wretched ruin).[1] In the canto of Brunetto Latini—in which Dante links sodomy and usury—we learn that while Florence was once great, it has become a "nido di malizia" (nest of wickedness) where "gent'è avara, invidiosa e superba" ([there is] a people presumptuous, avaricious, envious).[2] Furthermore, we discover in *Inferno 16* a sentiment reiterated in *Paradiso* 15-18 that "la gente nuova e i sùbiti guadagni" (the newcomers to the city and quick gains) have infected Florence with "dismisura" (excess).[3]

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[1] *Purg.* 27.79-81; text and translations of the *Commedia* (Mandelbaum) and *Convivio* (Lansing) are adapted from *Columbia Digital Dante* (New York: Columbia University Libraries, 2015) https://digitaldante.columbia.edu/. Text and translations of *Monarchia* are adapted from the edition of Prue Shaw, *Dante, Monarchia* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995). Translations of Aristotle's *Politics* appear in the new standard edition of Benjamin Jowett in *Complete Works of Aristotle: The Revised Oxford Translation. Volume 2*, ed. Jonathan Barnes (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995).

[2] *Inf.* 15.78; *Inf.* 15.68

[3] *Inf.* 16.73-74; on the Aristotelian valence of the term *misura* and its place within the larger courtly, sociological, and ethical framework of the *Commedia* and Dante's lyric poetry, see Teodolinda Barolini, "Sociology of the Brigata: Gendered Groups in Dante, Forese, Folgore, Boccaccio—From 'Guido, i' vorrei' to Griselda", *Italian Studies* 67, no. 1 (2012): 4-22 and Teodolinda Barolini, "Aristotle's *Mezzo*,

In his encounter with Sordello, before vituperating the corruption of Florence, Dante cries out for a Monarch—a Caesar—capable of restoring peace and order to an Italy that is "serva, di dolore ostello, sanza nocchiere in gran tempesta" ([an] abject…inn of sorrows…[a] ship without a helmsman in harsh seas) and devoid of peace.[4] Everywhere, Dante insists, "virtù così per nimica si fuga" (all flee from [virtue] as if it were an enemy). Throughout Italy he asserts, in words evoking *Ecclesiastes,* there is not a single government linked with philosophical authority: "lo cui re è nobile e li cui principi usano il suo tempo a bisogno, e non a lussuria" (whose king is noble and whose princes devote their time to the people's needs and not to their own wantonness).[5] In *Paradiso*, where corrupt church and state governance is contrasted with the divine governance of the cosmos, Beatrice decries "cupidigia che i mortali affonde sì sotto te, che nessuno ha podere di trarre li occhi fuori delle tue onde!" (greediness…who—within your depths—cause mortals to sink so, that none is left able to lift his eyes above your waves!).[6] When hailing the possible coming of "alto Arrigo"—Henry VII of Luxembourg, who Dante once believed would restore just political order — Beatrice declares that Italy is incapable of accepting this monarchical rule because "la cieca cupidigia che v'ammalia simili fatti v'ha al fantolino che muor per fame e caccia via la balia" (the blind greediness bewitching you has made you like the child who dies of hunger and drives off his nurse).[7]

Courtly *Misura*, and Dante's *Canzone Le Dolci Rime*: Humanism, Ethics, and Social Anxiety," in *Dante and the Greeks*, ed. Jan M. Ziolkowski (Washington, DC: Dumbarton Oaks, 2014). For a comprehensive catalogue of greed and monetary corruption in the *Commedia,* see Leonid M. Batkin, *Dante e la società italiana del '300* (Bari: De Donato, 1970).

[4] *Purg*. 6.127-151; *Purg.* 6.76-77

[5] *Purg.* 14.37; *Conv.* 4.6.16

[6] *Par.* 27.121-123

[7] *Par.* 30.139-141; Dante, of course, views greed, whether as *cupidigia* or *avarizia* (Lat. *cupiditas* and *avaritia*), as one with a "Ulyssian" desire for knowledge, mastery, and all forms of *folle volere.* On the latter point, see Teodolinda Barolini, "Guittone's *Ora Parrà*, Dante's *Doglia Mi Reca*, and the *Commedia*'s Anatomy of Desire," in *Dante and the Origins of Italian Literary Culture* (New York: Fordham University Press, 2006). But Dante's linkage of greed with the insatiable desire for money, political power, and domination—within the theological and moral condemnation of deadly sins and vices generally—is not merely an abstract reflection on the perennial *pondus amoris* and Dante's moral investigation of multivalent *incontinenza,* but also a recognition, as I will show, of actual *monetary* greed stratified within and enabled by political power and corporate-private interests.

Just as the *Commedia* explores the strong interconnection between greed and political corruption, so too in *Convivio* and *Monarchia*, Dante posits that political dysfunction, wars, and social maladies are the consequences of capital accumulation and the intertwining of politics and economics. The latter economic facts, as I will argue in this essay, are what undergird the superstructure of medieval church-imperial contests in which smaller political party interests and municipal sovereignties engaged and to which they bent. In *Monarchia*, Dante argues that the end of his proposed universal polity is justice, which by replacing the ravenous domain of greed, not only brings about peace but fosters the intellectual development and eudemonistic fulfillment of all human beings. As I will show, however, chrematistic polities or wealth-getting states—which in Dante's time were early Italian capitalistic states that wielded international capitalist power—thwart the achievement of that goal and make Dante's new theory of the state and empire a necessary political project.[8] Thus, Dante is perhaps one of the first critics of political economy in the Latin west because he accurately grasped Aristotle's critique of chrematistics and political economy in the *Politics* and *Nicomachean Ethics* and incorporated them into his own analysis.[9] Dante's early critique of

[8] For a philosophically rich and accurate picture of Dante's theory of empire and state, see the preeminently coherent work of Bruno Nardi, "Il concetto dell'impero nello svolgimento del pensiero dantesco," in *Saggi di dilosofia Dantesca* (Firenze: La nuova Italia, 1967).

[9] "Political economy" is a term most often associated with the field of study that emerged with the French physiocrats and took form in its eighteenth and nineteenth century "classical" exemplars, such as Smith, Ricardo, Malthus, and Mill. The phrase "critique of political economy", whence I model the title of this essay, is inspired by the titles of several of Karl Marx's major works, including *Capital: A Critique of Political Economy* (London: Penguin in association with New Left Review, 1976); *Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy* (New York: International Publishers, 1981); and *Grundrisse: Foundations of the Critique of Political Economy (Rough Draft)* (London: Penguin Books, 1993). In this paper, however, I use the phrase "political economy" in its purely classical-antique, and by extension, medieval formulation (see note 10, below). In my use, its meaning ultimately derives from Aristotle's arguments regarding the difference between politics (*politike*) and household management (*oikonomia* or *oikonomike*); natural and unnatural wealth-getting (*chrematistike*); exchange (*kapelike*); and the relationships of each to justice (*dikaiosune*), which are examined especially, but not exclusively, in his *Politics* (Book 1) and *Nicomachean Ethics* (Book 5). Below, I briefly review Aristotle's understanding of political economy and how it relates to Dante's political thought. By "critique," I mean a moral-philosophical claim against a union of state power, monetary interests, and the pursuit of the bad sort of wealth-getting/accumulation as defined by Aristotle. For political economy in the

capitalism places him far ahead of his scholastic contemporaries in the history of economic thought; in contrast to Dante, they increasingly appropriated Aristotle to legitimize usury and chrematistic business practices.[10] Furthermore, I will demonstrate the existence of "political economy" in Dante's Florence and Italy. Not only will this new perspective on the economic and political history of his time allow us to understand Dante's use of Aristotle in *Monarchia*, it will also show that his normative political theory depends in part upon a critique of political economy.[11] Understanding Dante's political theory as such a critique not

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Aristotelian vein see Spencer J. Pack, *Aristotle, Adam Smith and Karl Marx on Some Fundamental Issues in 21st Century Political Economy* (Cheltenham, UK; Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar, 2010); Ricardo F. Crespo, *A Re-assessment of Aristotle's Economic Thought* (New York: Routledge, 2013); Odd Langholm, *Wealth and Money in the Aristotelian Tradition: A Study in Scholastic Economic Sources* (Bergen: Universitetsforlaget, 1983); Scott Meikle, *Aristotle's Economic Thought* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995); Nicolas J. Theocarakis, "Nicomachean Ethics in Political Economy: The Trajectory of the Problem of Value," *History of Economic Ideas* 14, no. 1 (2006): 9; and M. I. Finley, "Aristotle and Economic Analysis", *Past & Present* , no. 47 (1970): doi:10.2307/650446. On the relationship between the Aristotle and modern theories of economy and political economy, see Spencer J. Pack, "Aristotle's Difficult Relationship with Modern Economic Theory," *Foundations of Science* 13, no. 3-4 (2008); Ricardo F. Crespo, *Philosophy of the Economy: An Aristotelian Approach* (New York: Springer, 2013); Cornelius Castoriadis, "Value, Equality, Justice, Politics: From Marx to Aristotle and From Aristotle to Ourselves," in *Crossroads in the Labyrinth* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1984); Joseph A. Schumpeter, *History of Economic Analysis* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1954); and Karl Polanyi, "Aristotle Discovers the Economy," in *Trade and Market in the Early Empires* (Glencoe, IL: The Free Press 1957).

[10] While there is a vast literature on medieval economics, for the centrality of Aristotle along with Roman Law and the Patristic Fathers in its early medieval and scholastic development—especially concerning permitted profit, interest, and chrematistic market activities in an emerging "market" context —see Odd Langholm, *Economics in the Medieval Schools: Wealth, Exchange, Value, Money, and Usury According to the Paris Theological Tradition, 1200-1350* (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1992); Odd Langholm, *The Legacy of Scholasticism in Economic Thought: Antecedents of Choice and Power* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998); Joel Kaye, *Economy and Nature in the Fourteenth Century: Money, Market Exchange and the Emergence of Scientific Thought* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000); and Henri Pirenne, *Economic and Social History of Medieval Europe* (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1937).

[11] In paving the way for this analysis on political economy, I am indebted to Joan M. Ferrante, *The Political Vision of the Divine Comedy* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984), 41, for demonstrating the centrality of "commerce,"

only re-contextualizes his stringent denunciations of greed and political dysfunction throughout the *Commedia*, but it is crucial to historicizing Dante as a unique, consistent political theorist in all his works, especially in the *Monarchia*.[12]

As Marx observed in *Capital: A Critique of Political Economy*, in a chapter on the primitive accumulation of wealth, "capitalist production developed earliest" in medieval Italy.[13] Considering the grounds upon which Dante can be said to "critique" political economy, it is clear that in late-thirteenth and early-fourteenth century Italy, despite the nuances of particular academic debates regarding the origins of capitalism, we are talking about early or "proto" capitalism.[14] As Gaetano Salvemini notes,

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within the nexus of "the independent city-state, the claims of empire, and the church," as the dominant preoccupation of Dante's political thought. Moreover, Justin Steinberg's work, *Accounting for Dante: Urban Readers and Writers in Late Medieval Italy* (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2007), which establishes the wide circulation of Dante's lyric within the merchant and bourgeois classes, inspired me to further investigate the historicizing of other socio-economic questions in Dante's political work.

[12] On the need for historicism, see Teodolinda Barolini, ""Only Historicize": History, Material Culture (Food, Clothes, Books), and the Future of Dante Studies", *Dante Studies, with the Annual Report of the Dante Society*, no. 127 (2009): 37-54. In arguing for Dante as a *consistent* theorist, I disagree with Albert Ascoli's assertions in *Dante and the Making of a Modern Author* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008, 229), that Dante's *Monarchia* "had been notoriously difficult to locate, both chronologically and conceptually within Dante's career," but also with his claim that Dante's political argument is riddled with illogical "internal contradictions" (59). According to Ascoli's thesis about Dante, sharing much with Minnis' theories about authorship and authority, the *Monarchia* is predominantly a rhetorical exercise (229) in "auctoritas" appropriation that is unable to "absorb and interpret the materials of history" and might better be interpreted in a "transhistorical" figural mode (292). To the contrary, I hold that a strongly historicist method ought to lead one to opposite conclusions. First, the *Monarchia* is a strongly coherent moral and political response to concrete contemporary social and historical conditions (and not merely fanciful epideictic "auctoritas" appropriation). Second, as Bruno Nardi has stated in "Le rime filosofiche e il «Convivio»," in *Dal "Convivio" alla "Commedia." (Sei Saggi Danteschi)* (Roma: Nella sede dell'Istituto Palazzo Borromini, 1992), 35, far from being difficult to locate in his career, "la dottrina di Dante sulla Monarchia era ormai saldamente costituita in tutti i suoi elementi essenziali" from his early lyrics, like *Doglia mi reca* and *Le dolci rime* to the *Convivio* and *Commedia*.

[13] Marx, *Capital: A Critique of Political Economy,* 876.

[14] Fernand Braudel and Siân Reynolds, *Civilization and Capitalism, 15th-18th Century. Volume III: The Perspective of the World* (New York: Harper & Row,

"it was Dante's fate to be living just at a time when society had come under the control of moneyed merchants."[15] Historian John Larner concurs

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1984), 57; Janet L. Abu-Lughod, *Before European Hegemony: The World System A.D. 1250-1350* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), 8-40; Philip J. Jones, *The Italian City-state: From Commune to Signoria* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997), 186. Whereas Marx mostly elaborated on "Kapital," Sombart, who was a colleague of Weber, extensively uses the term "Kapitalismus" in his *Der moderne Kapitalismus, 2 vols*. (Leipzig: Duncker & Humblot, 1902) and identifies medieval Northern Italy as prototypically capitalistic. Also, see Sombart's extensive treatment of Florence in *The Quintessence of Capitalism: A Study of the History and Psychology of the Modern Business Man* (London: T. Fisher Unwin, 1915). It should also be noted that contemporaneously with Sombart, it was the judgment of Robert Davidsohn, in the *Storia di Firenze Vol. II, Pt. 2* (Firenze: Sansoni, 1972), 538 (in the tenth chapter on the "Ordinamenti di Giustizia e la caduta di Giano della Bella," in the subchapter "La Genesi del Capitalismo" (Die Entstehung des Kapitalismus [The origin of Capitalism])), that "nel secolo decimoterzo in tutte le grandi città dell'Alta e Media Italia la società assunse un nuovo assetto economico, come a Firenze, dove però le conseguenze politiche del mutato regime economico furono più manifeste che altrove. Lo sviluppo del capitalismo, di cui nei tempi moderni la scienza si è affaticata a scoprire le origini, fu quello che dette la sua impronta a quell'epoca." While it has since been vociferously debated whether or not it is appropriate to refer to "capitalism" in the thirteenth century, many intelligent critics identify enough features of mercantile, financial, commercial, world-economy, and political development in the period's history, which permit me to insist, in a qualified sense, that in Dante's Florence and northern Italy of the mid-thirteenth through early fourteenth centuries, we are witnessing an early form of capitalism, so to speak, with a lower-case 'c'—if we can invent this historiographical category—even if many wish to restrict the origins of "C"apitalism to post-sixteenth century Europe. A valid warrant for denying its existence in earlier forms remains wanting. On the vast discussions and debates regarding the origins of capitalism in medieval Italy—and its status as "capitalism"—see, among so many innumerable others: Abu-Lughod, *Before European Hegemony: The World System A.D. 1250-1350*; Immanuel Maurice Wallerstein, *Capitalist Agriculture and the Origins of the European World-economy in the Sixteenth Century* (New York: Academic Press, 1974); Fernand Braudel and Siân Reynolds, *Civilization and Capitalism, 15th-18th Century. Volume I: The Structures of Everyday Life, the Limits of the Possible* (New York: Harper & Row, 1981); Ellen Meiksins Wood, *The Origin of Capitalism: A Longer View* (London: Verso, 2002); Martha C. Howell, *Commerce Before Capitalism in Europe, 1300-1600* (Cambridge University Press, 2010); and William Caferro, "Economy: Hard Times or Prosperity?", in *Contesting the Renaissance* (Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2011).

[15] Gaetano Salvemini, "Florence in the Time of Dante", *Speculum* 11, no. 03 (1936): 317-326.

because, by around 1300, Italy had inherited a "revolution" which, from its beginnings in the eleventh century, had "given to the whole of Europe a new prosperity, and to Italy the supremacy of the medieval world."[16] In short, Italy brought forth an unprecedented "commercial" revolution.[17] Consequently the locus of power shifted from Rome—whose days as the ecclesiastical capital of Europe were numbered—to Florence. Florence was "a city with no civilized past but an apparently infinite capacity for expansion fed by its industrial workshops and its mastery of international finance."[18] The rule of "gente nuova" (*nouveaux riches*) that took shape in the mid-thirteenth century and whose *primo popolo* first minted the gold florin—which quickly became an international currency—turned Florence into Europe's economic powerhouse and dominated the republic's communal life for the next two centuries to come.[19]

Florentine banks like the Mozzi, Spini, Bardi, and Peruzzi, to name just a few, had branches and dealings not just in Italy but throughout Europe and the Middle East.[20] Much of this activity was what we would easily identify as financial, not merely industrial-productive, capitalism in collusion with multiple layers of state and ecclesiastical powers. Florentine bankers lent huge sums of money to the kings, feudal nobles, convents, bishops, popes, municipalities and, of course, private enterprises of Europe, at rates of interest between 36% and 262%.[21] This lending produced massive profits. According to Salvemini, for example, at the end of the thirteenth century the firm of the Florentine Cerchi was regarded as among the most powerful in the world and was believed to possess capital of 900,000 florins.[22] Vieri de' Cerchi's personal wealth was estimated at over 600,000 florins. Other powerful firms, like the Bardi and the Peruzzi, also had massive capital valuations. For instance, in 1319 the annual turnover in the public books of the Bardi firm was 873,638 florins, and the

[16] John Larner, *Culture and Society in Italy, 1290-1420* (New York: Scribner, 1971), 22.
[17] Robert S. Lopez, *The Commercial Revolution of the Middle Ages, 950-1350* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976).
[18] George Holmes, *Florence, Rome, and the Origins of the Renaissance* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), 3.
[19] John M. Najemy, *A History of Florence 1200-1575* (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2006), 6.
[20] Edwin S. Hunt, *The Medieval Super-companies: A Study of the Peruzzi Company of Florence* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 38-75; Jones, *The Italian City-state: From Commune to Signoria*, 187.
[21] Salvemini, "Florence in the Time of Dante," 319.
[22] Ibid., 320.

combined war debts—owed mostly to the Bardi and Peruzzi banks by Edward III of England—had, by 1339, risen to 1,365,000 florins.[23] How much is 900,000 to 1.5 million florins of capital worth in contemporary estimations? To put those monies into rough perspective, here are a few examples: in the year 1300, eight thousand florins was considered a large fortune; in 1268 Florence purchased the town of Poggibonsi for 20,000 florins; and in 1348 the entire city of Avignon was sold to the pope for 80,000 florins.[24] When talking about Florentine firms from 1260 until the financial crisis of the 1340s (the period that overlaps Dante's lifetime), we are talking about capital assets that rival today's multinational industrial corporations and investment banking complexes such as Haliburton, Citibank, GE, Goldman Sachs, Koch Industries, and so forth. The capital of some individual Florentine firms was greater than the sovereign wealth of entire kingdoms and the total of amount of debts—"tra di capitale e provisioni e riguardi" (including capital, fees, and interest)—owed by England, as Villani puts it, "valeano un reame" (were worth an entire kingdom).[25] From their first appearance in the 1230s, the chief *campsores papae* were Tuscan *mercatores* and most were conspicuously Florentines; both monopolized the management and swelled the coffers of papal finances at great profit to themselves.[26]

We simply cannot, therefore, interpret the split between the Church and Empire, Guelf and Ghibelline, and the later White Guelph and Black Guelf rift without already seeing beneath this superstructure a vast functioning system of international capital, determining not only the broader ideological contests but also the actual internal structure of politics within Florence itself.[27] In this political economy not only did state

[23] On the accounting and organizational structure of the Peruzzi corporation, see the magisterial study of Hunt, *Op. cit*.
[24] Jones, *The Italian City-state: From Commune to Signoria,* 197.
[25] Giovanni Villani, *Giovanni Villani: Nuova Cronica* (Roma: Istituto poligrafico e Zecca dello Stato, 2002), 856; Najemy, *A History of Florence 1200-1575,* 133; Carlo M. Cipolla, *Before the Industrial Revolution: European Society and Economy, 1000-1700* (New York: Norton, 1976), 200.
[26] Jones, *The Italian City-state: From Commune to Signoria*; Gino Arias, "I banchieri italiani e la S. Sede nel XIII secolo: linee della storia esterna," in *Studi e documenti di storia del diritto* (Firenze: Le Monnier, 1902).
[27] For essential works on the topic, see Sergio Raveggi et al., *Ghibellini, guelfi e popolo grasso: i detentori del potere politico a Firenze nella seconda metà del dugento*, ed. Sergio Raveggi (Firenze: La nuova Italia, 1978); Gino Masi, "La struttura sociale delle fazioni politiche fiorentine ai tempi di Dante", *Giornale Dantesco* 31 (1930): 3-28; Gino Masi, "I banchieri fiorentini nella vita politica della città", *Archivio Giuridico*

interests bend to financial interests, the powers of the state also acted in unison with oligarchies and formations of power centered around networks of allied and competing interests, which increasingly became one. The history of Florentine political changes and "popular revolutions," which culminates in the anti-magnate "ordinamenti di giustizia" legislation of 1292, were, nonetheless, all revolutions involving capitalist interests (*popolani*, *popolo grasso*, *grandi*). It is also important to remember that while these revolutions may have been anti-magnate, they were neither anti-capitalist nor anti-oligarchical.[28] Starting with the *primo popolo* (1250–1260), its rule was "not a social revolution" but rather emerged from a disagreement within the elite between those dedicated to "factions and those who saw such alliances as damaging to the economic interests of their class and city."[29] In fact, throughout Florentine history, we see the unification of capitalist interests with its most powerful guilds (*arti maggiori*) such as the *Caliama*, *Lana*, and *Cambio*. The consolidation of the most powerful banking and industrial-trade firms resulted in restricted access to state power and culminated in Florence's "guild republicanism".[30] The most overt and open institutional example of the latter, of course, is seen in Florence's 1308 *mercanzia* or *universitas mercantorum*: a wedding of the most powerful guilds of *Calimala*, *Cambio*, *Lana*, *Por Santa Maria*, and *Medici, Speziali, Merciai,* into a governing state power.[31] Authority and power in this period were often directly related to the possession or demands of capital accumulation, including access to markets.[32] As Jones points out, the consolidation of

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"Filippo Serafini" 9 (1931): 57-89; and Gino Arias, "Il fondamento economico delle fazioni Fiorentine dei Guelfi Bianchi e de Guelfi Neri e le origini dell'ufficio della Mercanzia in Firenze," in *Studi e documenti di storia del diritto* (Firenze: Le Monnier, 1902). For the interpretive insight of base and superstructure in Marx's historical materialism, which should be employed heuristically rather than be understood as an over-determined methodological criterion, see its seminal formulation in the *Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy*.

[28] Najemy, *A History of Florence 1200-1575*, 68-69; Davidsohn, *Storia di Firenze. Vol. II, Pt. 2*, 537ff.

[29] Najemy, *A History of Florence 1200-1575*, 68.

[30] John M. Najemy, "Guild Republicanism in Trecento Florence: The Successes and Ultimate Failure of Corporate Politics", *The American Historical Review* (1979): 53-71.

[31] On the mercanzia, see Antonella Astorri, *La Mercanzia a Firenze nella prima metà del Trecento: Il potere dei grandi mercanti* (Firenze: L.S. Olschki, 1998).

[32] The still definitive work regarding the history of the Florentine guilds is Alfred Doren, *Le arti fiorentine,* 2 Vols. (Florence: Le Monnier, 1940). See also, Antony

power in the Italian city-states was directly linked to "wealth and migrated with movements of wealth, and through all revolutions of political and economic regime, oligarchy, in fact or law, was the predominant form of government."[33] Of course, the bonding of economic interests with state power is a cause of a state becoming unjust, the reasons for which we will we will explore with Dante and Aristotle. A significant historical example of such an unjust state, as related to Dante's challenge regarding the dueling authorities of church and state grafted onto the political economic situation in Florence, is Urban IV's quest to overthrow Manfred Hohenstaufen's Ghibelline rule of Florence following Montaperti in 1261.

When the Ghibellines returned to rule in Florence for six years, with Guido Novello of the Counts Guidi (a cousin of Guelf Guido Guerra) governing in the name of Manfred Hohenstaufen, we see the full extent of capital driving politics. While old Ghibelline elites did return to political life, the participation of non-elite guildsmen in government as in the period of the *primo popolo* was negligible. In this play of moneyed interests, Najemy points out that the "fatal weakness" of the Ghibelline restoration was, in fact, its "inability to control the influence of Florentine merchant capital in and outside the city."[34] The major figures of the commercial and banking companies who were exiled in 1260, among whom were the Bardi, Mozzi, Rossi and Scali, suffered only temporary loss of their Florentine properties, "but not [the loss of] their far-flung investments and assets, which were beyond the reach of the Ghibellines. Even companies that continued to direct operations from Florence were difficult to control."[35] The mobility and power of capital, in this case operating at a level above multiple individual state powers, highlights the embryonic world-economy nature of capitalism that would later be articulated by modern investigators of the logic of capitalism.[36] In this historical situation, the power of capital was a key determinant of political events, not just within the internal class relations of Florence itself and its

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Black, *Guilds and Civil Society in European Political Thought From the Twelfth Century to the Present* (London: Methuen, 1984).

[33] Philip J. Jones, "Communes and Despots: The City State in Late-Medieval Italy", *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society (Fifth Series)* 15 (1965): 71-96.

[34] Najemy, *A History of Florence 1200-1575*, 72.

[35] Ibid., 72.

[36] In particular, see Robert L. Heilbroner, *The Nature and Logic of Capitalism* (New York: Norton, 1985); Wallerstein, *Capitalist Agriculture and the Origins of the European World-economy in the Sixteenth Century*; Karl Marx, *The German Ideology: Including Theses on Feuerbach and Introduction to the Critique of Political Economy* (Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books, 1998).

wealthy *popolo*, but also at the "world" level of relations with other Italian cities and power-plays among monarchic, church, and seigniorial elements.[37]

Pope Urban IV and, later, Pope Clement IV saw the weakness of the Ghibelline state on account of its disaffected capitalist interests as well as its potential, through financial leverage, to seize upon international opportunities. Urban found a challenger to Manfred in Charles of Anjou, the brother of King Louis XI of France. Charles, however, required significant funds to fulfill his role in displacing Manfred. Urban pressured the Florentine bankers to rally against the Hohenstaufen by threatening to release their debtors from obligations, to interrupt the import of Flemish textiles, and even to impound or confiscate their goods. According to Najemy, as the result of secret negotiations with papal officials, many firms agreed to pledge financial support for the Angevin campaign to avoid these punitive measures.[38] Davidsohn, characterizing these strategies as the "conquista dei banchieri fiorentini" (victory of the Florentine bankers), reports that the Pope also manipulated the *Arte della Lana* with the textile issue and generally "cercò di piegare ai suoi disegni i membri delle corporazioni, minnacciando i loro interessi economici" (tried to force the members of the guilds to accede to his plans, threatening their economic interests). He later intensified this effort with "minacce all'Arte di Calimala, la corporazione dei banchieri" (threats to *Calimala,* the bankers' guild).[39] What is remarkable here is not just the fact that such

[37] While the emergence of "world-economy" in the middle ages (as opposed to Wallerstein's hypothesis of the sixteenth century) has been effectively explored *in nuce* and defended by Abu-Lughod in *Before European Hegemony: The World System A.D. 1250-1350*, Heilbroner's comment in *The Nature and Logic of Capitalism,* 94, regarding the nature of state capitalism and supranational corporations is especially applicable to the situation described here: "Thus capital, which arises within the state and which exists only at the pleasure of the state, becomes increasingly capable of defying, or of existing 'above,' the state. A network of commodity flows cuts through the boundaries of national sovereignty to form a 'system' that operates according to the dictates of its own logic, with less regard for those of politics. Such a world system came into existence originally with the rise of integrated market flows of broad dimensions sixteenth-century—what Wallerstein has called a 'world-economy'—but in recent years its presence has become dramatically apparent in the emergence of supranational corporations and pools of money seemingly capable of eluding all constraints of political boundaries."

[38] Najemy, *A History of Florence 1200-1575,* 72-73.

[39] Robert Davidsohn, *Storia di Firenze. Vol. II, Pt. 1. Guelfi e Ghibellini* (Firenze: Sansoni, 1972), 763-764.

negotiations were on-going despite the Ghibelline state (apparently ignorant of the conspiracy for two years), but that the state, backed by Manfred's "empire," was ineffectual in combatting the movement of capital and the greater power of capital-linked interests. In the end, 181 Florentine bankers and merchants from twenty-one major companies pledged loyalty to the Papacy and the Guelf cause and committed to the destruction of Ghibelline rule and Hohenstaufen power.[40] This alliance signaled a major shift of power in Italy against the Hohenstaufen and which would later turn against the Angevins. The wealth of the Florentine merchant-bankers, allied with the papacy and the house of Anjou, transformed Florence into the "financial core" of Guelf power and linked it to both the kingdom of France and the entire south of Italy, creating access to a new large and protected commercial territory.[41]

This example of the strength of capital-linked polities and states reveals why the scholarly discussion about the conflict between "spiritual" or "temporal" realms and the competing claims between them needs to be more precise. The fact is that in reality these two realms are often intermixed. Even a binary distinction between church and empire in an abstractly theological or juridical vein can be misleading as a heuristic category for medieval Italian politics, albeit one suggested in the voluminous works of medieval publicist tracts on politics. On the papal side of the deal that financed Charles' imperial army, the capitalists provided interest-bearing loans backed by repayment in ecclesiastical or papal taxes that they collected as agents of the papacy throughout Europe, especially in France. Furthermore, since the pope declared Manfred a "Muslim" and "Heretic" the war became a Crusade and hence eligible to be supported by levied crusade taxes; these were also collected by Italian banking firms. On the other side of the ecclesiastical taxation privilege, since many church entities and prelates could not pay their assessments, the same bankers loaned them "ecclesiastical" monies to pay the taxes *they themselves* were collecting with additional loans at interest and fees. Florentine firms thus secured an astonishing double-dip and sometimes even a triple-dip profit from loans to Charles and those ecclesiastical entities taxed on the authority of the pope to repay them. The most lucrative gain of all to the bankers from the imperial side was Charles' granting expansive commercial, trading, and banking privileges to the same creditors, the Italian capitalist elements, in the southern Italian

[40] Najemy, *A History of Florence 1200-1575*, 73; Raveggi et al., *Ghibellini, guelfi e popolo grasso: i detentori del potere politico a Firenze nella seconda metà del Dugento,* 60.
[41] Ibid., 73.

territories that he was about to conquer. In 1267, Charles of Anjou was made *podestà*, and thus the eve of the *secondo popolo* in 1268 provides a major example—between municipal, imperial, and church elements—that Italian politics was no longer merely some ideological conflict over investiture or a theological dispute about secular versus temporal power, but also, and perhaps primarily, a contest of power the politics of which reflect the material conditions of a developed capitalistic political economy.

According to Najemy, this period marks the beginning of a shift around the time of Dante's birth and early childhood in which "economic realities worked inexorably to define the ruling class […] and the merchant and trading giants became the core of a newly configured elite. This was by no means the triumph of a 'bourgeoisie' over an 'aristocracy.' It was rather a process of evolution within the elite itself, a replacement at the center of power of elite families that did not adapt to the age's booming capitalism."[42] The scope of this essay does not permit the enumeration of further examples. However, the debacle following the *Ordinamenti di Giustizia*, involving Boniface VIII, the Cerchi-Donati Feud, the White and Black Guelfs, Philip IV of France and Charles of Valois, which casts a shadow over Dante's and the White Guelfs' exile is worth a mention in that it has been widely shown to be similar in its political-economic entwinements to the above example from the 1260s.[43] As Philip Jones observes about this period: "the warring powers of [the rest] of [old] feudal Europe were bound in common alliance with [new] Italian capitalism."[44]

Dante is deeply critical of this dominant capitalist political economy of his time. He repeatedly argues in *Monarchia* (using the word *cupiditas* sixteen times) that greed destroys justice and that the only defense against the unjust state is a one-world monarch. In fact, stopping the destructive power of greed is one of the central themes of Dante's political thought. According to Dante, the main way one stops greed, and its deleterious effects, depends on not confounding the purpose of a polity writ large and according to proper ends with mere wealth-getting which—in Aristotelian terms— appears sometimes analogous to the purpose of the polity. Dante goes to great trouble to make this point in the fourth book of *Convivio* where, in his commentary on *Le dolci rime* and referring to Aristotle's *Politics* 4.8, he challenges the linking of imperial authority with the

[42] Ibid., 74.
[43] Holmes, *Florence, Rome, and the Origins of the Renaissance,* 163-185; Davidsohn, *Storia di Firenze. Vol. II, Pt. 2,* 537-758.
[44] Jones, *The Italian City-state: From Commune to Signoria,* 198.

possession of "antica ricchezza e belli costumi" (ancestral wealth and fine manners).[45] Here, he disputes the notion that the wealthy have some implicit or natural nobility, accentuated by time. He argues that "le divizie, sì come si crede […] non possono causare nobilitade" (riches cannot, as others believe, confer nobility) and, therefore, the authority to rule because of their capital holdings (as reflected in the political realities of Florence).[46] Drawing on the Aristotelian idea that the principle of proportional reciprocity and distributive justice binds the city together, he argues, moreover, that the first function of the state is to meet actual social needs, and thus the state must prevent greed and the "gloria d'aquistare" (glory of acquiring).[47] In the later chapters of *Convivio* 4, particularly chapters 11–14, Dante asserts that this sort of governance must stop along with the deleterious and vicious mania for monetary accumulation, which goes beyond any social or individual need, thus generating injustice.

Riches, he says, are "vili" (base) and "imperfette" (imperfect).[48] Their defect lies "ne lo indiscreto loro avvenimento; secondamente, nel pericoloso loro accresimento; terziamente, ne la dannosa loro possessione" (in the lack of discretion attending their appropriation; second, in the danger that accompanies their increment; thirdly, in the ruin resulting from their possession).[49] In this section, Dante argues that gold and pearls as objects in themselves (use values) have no actual, intrinsic value as riches or money, but only socially instantiated value (exchange value): "quanto è per esse in loro considerate, cose perfette sono, ma non sono richezze, ma oro e margherite; ma in quanto sono ordinate a la possessione de l'uomo, sono richezze" (that insofar as they are considered in themselves, they are perfect things, and are not riches but gold or pearls; but insofar as they are conceived as a possession of man, they are riches).[50] This insight would much later be central to Marx's notion of commodity fetishism.[51] Dante further asserts that the appropriation of riches lacks discretion. Why? Because through various kinds of business and all the "modi per li quali esse vegnono" (ways in which riches are acquired) of either a legally licit or illicit nature (*immoral* wealth-getting can be *legal*) "nulla distributiva giustiza risplende, ma tutta iniquitade" (no distributive justice is present,

[45] *Conv.* 4.3
[46] *Conv.* 4.10.7
[47] *Pol.* 2.1261a29-31*; Eth.* 5.5.1132b30-1133a15
[48] *Conv.* 4.11.2
[49] *Conv.* 4.11.4
[50] *Conv.* 4.11.5
[51] Marx, *Capital: A Critique of Political Economy*, 163f.

while injustice […] almost always is).[52] Dante holds the radical position that all wealth-getting of riches—"in ciascuno modo quelle ricchezze iniquamente avvenire" (the appropriation of these riches in whatever way results in injustice)—violates Aristotle's definition of the distributive justice that binds political communities in friendship, one in which just distribution of property and resources, and settlements of disputes are done proportionally, according to need of individuals and criteria of virtue.[53]

The arguments Dante advances concerning the accumulation of wealth in *Convivio* 4.12–13 are indebted to Aristotle's distinction between two kinds of wealth-getting: one that is natural and the other that is one with the habit of greed (chrematistic wealth-getting) and which is *specifically* related to *monetary accumulation*—the accumulation of riches. Speaking of the accumulation of riches and their possession, Dante says that they are "pericolose" (dangerous) because "promettono le false traditrici sempre, in certo numero adunate, rendere lo raunatore pieno d'ogni appagamento; e con questa promissione conducono l'umana voluntade in vizio d'avarizia" (these false traitresses always promise to bring complete satisfaction to the person who gathers them in sufficient quantity, and by this promise they lead the human will into the vice of avarice).[54] Although they promise satiation in "certa quantità di loro accrescimento […] in loco di bastanza recando nuovo termine, cioè maggiore quantitade a desiderio, e, conquesta, paura grande e sollicitudine sopra l'acquisto" (fulfillment of this promise when they have increased to a certain amount […] in place of sufficiency they set up a new goal: that is, a greater quantity to be desired, and once this has been realized, they instill a great fear and concern for what has been acquired).[55] Citing a canon of authorities that have denounced greed, from Cicero and Boethius, to the Scriptures and Roman poets, Dante links the *acquisition*, *accumulation*, and *possession* of capital to destructive political and social consequences, or to use a stronger word, "iniquitade" (injustice).[56] In short, in the mania of acquiring wealth, all means are taken to get, to accumulate more, and to hold on to riches without limit or ethical consideration. Dante sarcastically challenges his readers to consider the lives and consequences of those who chase after and accumulate riches: "E che altro cotidianamente pericola e uccide le cittadi, le contrade, le singulari persone, tanto quanto lo nuovo raunamento d'avere appo alcuno? Lo quale raunamento nuovi desiderii discuopre, a lo

[52] *Conv*. 4.11.6-7
[53] *Pol*. 2.1261a29-31*; Eth.* 5.5.1132b30-1133a15
[54] *Conv*. 4.12.3-4
[55] *Conv.* 4.125.5
[56] *Conv.* 4.11.6

fine de li quali sanza ingiuria d'alcuno venire non si può" (And what imperils and destroys cities, territories, and individuals day by day more than the accumulation of wealth by some new person? Such an accumulation uncovers new desires which cannot be satiated without causing injury to someone).[57]

Dante argues for just laws and political order to stop the disastrous effects of greed in *Convivio* as he will repeatedly do in *Monarchia* as well. In Dante's view, the laws were founded to curb the effects of greed: "E che altro intende di meditare l'una e l'altra Ragione, Canonica dico e Civile, tanto quanto a riparare a la cupiditade che, raunando richezze, cresce? Certo assai lo manifesta, e l'una e l'altra Ragione, se li loro cominciamente, dico de la loro scrittura, si leggono" (What else were the two categories of Law, namely Canon Law and Civil Law, intended to curb if not the surge of greed brought about by the amassing of wealth? Certainly both categories of Law make this quite evident if we read their beginnings, that is, the beginnings of their written record).[58] He argues for the necessity of one world authority, one monarch: "lo quale, tutto possedendo e più desiderare non possendo, li regi tegna contenti ne li termini de li regni, sì che pace intra loro sia, ne la quale si posino le cittadi, e in questa posa le vicinanze s'amino, in questo amore le case prendano ogni loro bisogno, lo qual preso, l'uomo viva felicemente (who, possessing all things and being unable to desire anything else, would keep the kings content within the boundaries of their kingdoms and preserve among them the peace in which the cities might rest. Through this peace the communities would come to love one another, and by this love all households would provide for their needs, which when provided would bring man happiness, for this is the end for which he is born).[59]

Significant here is that Dante is speaking of *bisogno,* since *bisogno* (need) connects with the idea of meeting economic needs in a state, rather than a state merely being a platform in which individuals, entities, or groups set about acquiring, amassing, and possessing riches. In this understanding, good economy is *using* and *providing* riches—true riches are wealth understood as something that people "use" justly—while bad economic wealth-getting is merely acquiring, amassing, and possessing money beyond its instrumental use-value.[60] In the *Aristoteles latinus*, Moerbeke translates the passage from *Politics* 1.7 (1255b14-20) that Dante alludes to in *Convivio* 4.4, as "yconomica quidem monarchia" (the rule of

[57] *Conv* 4.12.8-9
[58] *Conv.* 4.12.9-10
[59] *Conv.* 4.4.4-6
[60] *Pol.* 1.7 1256a11-18

a household is a monarchy).[61] It is important to understand right political rule as involving the distribution and regulation of property for self-sufficiency, social need, and the good life, while preventing greed from turning the laws to bad ends. Invoking Aristotle's maxim (*Pol.* 1.2.1253a2–4) that "man is a political animal", Dante says the root of "la imperial maistade" (imperial majesty) is "la necessità de la umana civiltade, che a uno fine è ordinata, cioè a vita felice; a la quale nullo per sé è sufficiente a venire sanza l'aiutorio d'alcuno, con ciò sia cosa che l'uomo abbisogna di molte cose, a le quali uno solo satisfare non può" (the need for human society, which is established for a single end: namely, a life of happiness, which no one is able to attain by himself without the aid of someone else, since one has need of many things which no single individual is able to provide).[62] Dante posits the authority of *imperium* to regulate *dominium*: the distribution of property and exchange according to Aristotelian moral ends.[63]

What does Dante have in mind, then, if the "yconomica" is like a "monarchia"? First, in the beginning of the *Politics*, Aristotle goes to great lengths to clarify that the wealth provisionary functions of the *oikonomia* is *not* the same thing as the art of politics (*politike episteme*).[64] This distinction is important in so far as it rejects the equation of politics—the attainment of human social ends—to mere wealth-getting, while also placing economy squarely beneath political authority as a subsidiary function of the latter's regulation. Second, if Dante intends to suggest that a single monarch is necessary to prevent uncontrollable greed in the world, as he does in the above passages of *Convivio* and in *Monarchia* 1.5 and 1.11, then in regards to the political rule over the economy, the polity would have to exert a single authority over wealth-getting, as Dante argues, for the sake of the proper ends and good life of the entire human

[61] William Moerbeka and Aristotle, *Aristoteles Latinus Database*, ed. Traditio Litterarum Centre (Turnhout: Brepols Publishers, 2011).
[62] *Conv*. 4.4.1
[63] For an overview of the Dominican and Franciscan disputes regarding property and the complexities of the terms *dominium* and *imperium* in legal (civil and canon) and in medieval publicist texts, see Janet Coleman's *A History of Political Thought: From the Middle Ages to the Renaissance* (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishers, 2000) and "Property and Poverty" in *The Cambridge History of Medieval Political Thought C. 350-c. 1450*, ed. J H Burns (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988).
[64] *Pol.* 1.1.1252a8-24; *Pol.* 1.8.1256aff.

race.[65] The *Monarch* would be of superior intellect and able to rule in so far as he thinks in proper ethical political categories, that is "secundum phylosophica documenta" (in conformity with the teachings of philosophy) as a lawgiver, or "oikonomos" over the state. Furthermore, he does so because "ad hunc portum vel nulli vel pauci […] pervenire possint, nisi sedatis fluctibus blande cupiditatis genus humanum liberum in pacis tranquilitate possit" (none […] or few [...] can reach this harbor […] unless the waves of seductive greed are calmed and the human race rests free in the tranquility of peace).[66]

A serious concern in Aristotle's political thought that develops through the first book of *Politics* is the real danger of confusing the "economic" mode of authority (which also includes despotic and regal rule) with the activity concomitant with acquiring things (*chremata*) or wealth necessary for the good life. For this reason, Aristotle sees the imminent importance of discussing household management (*oikonomia*) and the other aspect of it, "the art of getting wealth" and property, as a prerequisite to understanding the particular forms of state. For Aristotle, the extent to which and mode in which societies seek and distribute wealth plays an immense role not only in the degree to which states are just, but also in the various forms of state and their respective transmutations from one form to another.[67] Chrematistic activity (from *ta chremata)* for Aristotle is the acquisition of useful things and is a natural part of the household or state management as well. These useful things can be accumulated and provisioned, but as Aristotle writes, "the amount of property which is needed for a good life […] is not unlimited, although Solon in one of his poems says that *no bound for riches has been fixed for man*."[68]

Thus, while there is a good, "natural" economic activity, in *Politics* 1.9 we encounter the seminal discussion of another type of acquisitiveness described as *chrematistike*, and designated as bad *chrematistike*, because it is "unnatural". The latter violates the acquisition of wealth qua "use" values, in other words, the acquisition of things necessary to consume and exchange for human life in society (with correct teleological ends, but not for exchange itself). Aristotle observes that acquisitiveness is "commonly

[65] Aristotle acknowledges that wealth-getting is a concern of the statesman, even if the economic mode is not to be confused with the political, and discusses the importance of considering economics at the state level in *Pol.* 1.5.1259a35-39.
[66] *Mon*. 3.16.10; On the legal arguments of the *Monarchia*, as pertaining to economic issues, see Vittorio Russo, *Impero e stato di diritto: studio su "Monarchia" ed "Epistole Politiche" di Dante* (Napoli: Bibliopolis, 1987).
[67] *Pol.* 2.1267a-1267b20; *Pol*. 3.1279a19-1280a20
[68] *Pol.* 1.8.1256b31-38

and rightly called an art of wealth-getting, and has in fact suggested the notion that riches and property have no limit. Being nearly connected with the preceding, it is often identified with it."[69] Bad chrematistics happens in the context of a developed monetary economy, where money's usefulness as a token of exchange has become a foundation for money to become a "useful" thing in itself qua exchange, thus breeding more money, and starting the infamous the Money-Commodity-Money' chain that Marx identifies in *Capital* on the basis of Aristotle's very discussion here in *Politics* 1.9.[70] It is on these grounds that the thought of Marx, Aristotle, and Dante coincide and agree.[71] In Dante's time monetary exchange of this second sort was fully developed and, as we have seen above, exhibits many of the major political and economic characteristics of the fully formed capitalism of our time.

For Aristotle, one of the biggest problems for the health of the state is that people come to believe that wealth-getting consists in the procurement of wealth qua coin, qua money (the second bad chrematistics). The consequence of this belief is that people misunderstand the basic economic function, which should be the exchange of goods between diverse and unequally needy individuals, houses, and families in a division of labor or social intercourse, of the sort Dante describes in *Convivio* 4.4, for the meeting of human needs and eudemonism. The right understanding of the basic economic function would be friendship bound by the principle of proportional reciprocity and distributive justice, instead of the mere procurement and accumulation of monetary wealth.[72] Some people are led, Aristotle says, in a passage that shows Dante's debt to the philosopher's economic thought in *Convivio*, "to believe that getting wealth is the object of household management, and the whole idea of their lives is that they ought either to increase their money without limit, or at any rate not to lose it."[73] We have now arrived at the point from which we departed, that of the political economy under critique or, in other words, the confusion over the notion of wealth-getting, as well as misunderstanding the proper mode of political authority in relation to wealth-getting.

As Dante puts it in *Monarchia*, referring directly to the above noted passages in Aristotle on distributive justice and monetary exchange, "ad

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[69] *Pol.* 1.8.1256b40-1257a3
[70] Marx, *Capital: A Critique of Political Economy*, 248.
[71] In fact, one of Marx's earliest attempts to articulate a "critique" of political economy, in the *Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy,* starts with a discussion of Aristotle's *Politics* 1.9.1257a.
[72] *Pol.* 2.1261a29-32; *Eth.* 5.5.1132b30-1133a15
[73] *Pol.* 1.9.1257b35-40

evidentiam primi notandum quod iustitie maxime contrariatur cupiditas, ut innuit Aristotiles in quinto *ad Nicomacum*" (it must be noted that the thing most contrary to justice is greed, as Aristotle states in the fifth book of the *Ethics*).[74] As we have seen, Dante goes to great lengths to make clear that the monarchy is necessary, through the exercise of law and state power, to stop greed and install "pax universalis" (universal peace); a corollary of this argument is that the purpose of the state is not wealth-getting, because that enterprise prevents mankind from engaging in the activities most proper to humanity.[75] At the outset of *Monarchia*, it is clear that Dante desires to bear fruit for public benefit but this intention is at odds with the individual who does not care for the common good, like a "perniciosa vorago semper ingurgitans" (a destructive whirlpool which forever swallows things down).[76] At the beginning of *Monarchia*, Dante also notes that temporal monarchy has not been investigated "propter se non habere ad lucrum" (on account of its not leading directly to material gain), which immediately opposes his idea of monarchy to a chrematistic state in which the exercise of politics is linked to profit. It was, after all, as Cary Nederman has shown, Dante's Ser Brunetto who advocated in his *Tresor* for a conception of politics based upon a totally perverse reading of Aristotle in which "'increasing wealth may serve as a positive blessing to the city'" and politics and justice in the city are concomitant with the good desire for personal profit.[77] As Brunetto writes, adumbrating classical political economists like Adam Smith, commercial exchange and market relationships are real civil friendship, and the act of seeking money and personal advantage is a natural thing to do: "Among them […citizens…], there is a common thing that is loved, through which they arrange and conform their business, and that is gold and silver."[78]

However, if one opposes Brunetto's inversion of the Aristotelian teleology—that merely *living* as market exchange actors in a political economy in pursuit of sterile monetary accumulation is truly living *well*—Dante argues that we should reject such a situation as "unnatural" and change it. In *Monarchia* 1.2.5–8, he clearly asserts that the political realm

[74] *Mon.* 1.11.11
[75] *Mon.* 1.11.11; *Mon.* 1.4; *Mon.* 1.4.5
[76] *Mon.*1.3
[77] Cary J. Nederman, "Brunetto Latini's Commercial Republicanism", in *Lineages of European Political Thought: Explorations Along the Medieval/Modern Divide from John of Salisbury to Hegel* (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 2009), 143.
[78] *Tresor* 2.5.2; as quoted in Nederman, "Brunetto Latini's Commercial Republicanism", 148.

is under our deliberative control: "cum ergo materia prasens politica sit, ymo fons atque principium rectarum politiarum, et omne politicum nostre potestati subiaceat, manifestum est quod materia presens non ad speculationem per prius, sed ad operationem ordinatur" (now since our present subject is political, indeed is the source and starting-point of just forms of government, and everything in the political sphere comes under human control, it is clear that the present subject is not directed primarily towards theoretical understanding but towards action). In this passage, Dante anticipates Marx's aphorism on theory and praxis from the *Theses on Feuerbach* that "the Philosophers have hitherto only *interpreted* the world [...] the point is to *change* it."[79] Since the political sphere is changeable and under our control, Dante argues in *Monarchia* 1.3–7 that we can change it for the good, but only by understanding humanity's real political and moral ends as distinct from the ceaseless activity of wealth-getting and the damage we inflict upon ourselves in the service of its ends.

For Dante, the true end of humanity is intellectual development and eudemonistic fulfillment. This goal is also ultimately the same end of the human political community and at its core is human freedom. This assertion underlies his argument that only by living under the monarch is the human race "potissime liberum" (supremely free), because it exists "sui met et non alterius gratia […] ut Pylosopho placet in hiis que *De simpliciter ente*" (for its own sake and not for the sake of something else, as Aristotle states in the *Metaphysics*).[80] It is fairly clear that for Dante the "something else" is the non-monarchical holder of authority's perverted desire to accumulate wealth and hence his deployment of all the organs of the polis in their diversity as instruments to such ends. Freedom includes freedom from being instrumental to mere wealth-getting. Dante meditating on later books of the *Politics*, where Aristotle discusses the role of money in the form of just and unjust regimes, argues that freedom occurs only under the rule of the monarch, since only in the monarchical form of government is man secure from *bad forms* of government—democracies, oligarchies, and tyrannies—"que in servitutem cogunt genus humanum" (which force mankind into slavery).[81] For Dante, just governments seek freedom so that "homines propter se sint. Non enim cives propter consules nec gens propter regem, sed e converso consules propter cives et rex propter gentem" (men should exist for their own sake. For citizens do not

[79] Marx, *The German Ideology: Including Theses on Feuerbach and Introduction to the Critique of Political Economy,* 571.
[80] *Mon.* 1.12.8
[81] *Mon.* 1.12.9

exist for the sake of consuls, nor the people for the sake of the king).[82] The laws exist for the sake of the common good, not for the disordered ends of the authorities. Given the Aristotelian conception (*Pol.* 1.1253b1–39) that politics is an activity that takes place among *free* men and that *slaves* are *living-tools* under a purely household (oikonomical-regal) despotism, Dante's is an unmistakably political-economic critique.

According to Dante, only under the monarch are the laws framed for the benefit of the community which must, as we now understand, have its basic economic needs met. Justice in this order is the fulfillment of unequal needs in community not according to the arithmetical demands of money (and the arithmetical definition of justice), but according to the actual need of persons and with a view to the intellectual fulfillment of all men: a view that has often been called Dante's "Averroism." For Dante this fulfillment cannot come about in chrematistic states, namely because people (especially the *popolo minuto*) are treated like living tools for wealth-getting, pure labor commodities exploited/involved in extraordinary "cura familiare e civile" (domestic and civic responsibilities) and subject to other myriad social ills that result from the mania for monetary wealth, which Dante passionately illustrates and condemns, for example, in his poem *Doglia mi reca*.[83]

At the world level, there is no doubt that the monarch is necessary so that, as Dante puts it in *Mon.* 1.10, there is no regression of conflict between the interests of parties motivated by greed, as was so obviously evidenced by the political and social troubles of his time. He writes "et sic aut erit processus in infinitum, quod esse non potest, aut oportebit devenire ad iudicem primum et summum de cuius iudicio cuncta litigia dirimantur sive mediate sive inmediate: et hic erit Monarcha sive Imperator" (either this situation will continue *ad infinitum* […] or else we must come to a first and supreme judge, whose judgment resolves all disputes either directly or indirectly, and this man will be the monarch or emperor).[84] Dante undoubtedly has in mind the cessation of disputes such as the one between Boniface and Charles of Valois or the end of conflicting claims to authority as we saw in the example of Charles of Anjou, the Florentine bankers, and Urban IV and Clement IV. Dante also certainly calls into question the Florentine political institutions that throughout his lifetime became solidly oligarchical and factious, with greedy citizens lining up

[82] *Mon.* 1.12.10-12; *Pol*. 3.6.1179a1-21
[83] *Conv.* 1.1; *Doglia mi reca,* 64-147; on the social and economic struggles of the *popolo minuto* in 14th century Italy, see Niccolò Rodolico, *Il popolo minuto* (Firenze: Leo S. Olschki, 1968).
[84] Mon 1.10.5

behind these powers for profit at the cost of the common good. A just state, Dante argues, can only come about with a monarch who understands that chrematistic accumulation is not the end of the polity and who is willing to use the universal authority or *imperium* that trumps *dominium*, in order to stop the fires, regressive conflicts, and the destruction of true human happiness caused by greed. In other words, without having a modern anti-capitalist vocabulary, Dante addressed this very problem in his *Monarchia*.

At this point, we can now understand how Dante's political thought is a "critique of political economy". I have historicized the situation of the capitalist base that undergirded the traditional medieval superstructural claims to authority. Having done so, we can better understand why Dante argues that only under the monarch can we have true justice: Dante's monarch subverts not only traditional city-state, imperial, and church claims to power, but the monarch also rejects the immoral economic capitalist base inherent in all of them. Dante's ideal monarch is arguably a "utopian" conception, but Dante intends his vision to be the foundation for a serious political program: in Dante's normative political theory the monarch is not only a political ruler of great philosophical wisdom, but one who is also a good economist, in the right way. This leads me back to Aristotle's observation that "yconomica quidem monarchia" (the rule of a household is a monarchy). Dante's monarchy is to be a polity ruled like a just household, in which the monarch exercises all *imperium* over wealth-getting at a world-wide level: an idea that would be vigorously taken up again by Trotsky. While Dante, of course, is silent on the rather modern debate between proponents of socialism and capitalism regarding whether the principles of distributive justice ought to require a planned economy or not—perhaps because aspects of just such an idea were not at all radical in the relatively recent memory of feudal economic organization—his position on the regulatory role of the monarch in a political economy is nonetheless in accordance with the traditional Socialist maxim "from each according to his ability, to each according to his need."[85] In this polity, as outlined in Aristotle's *Ethics* 5, all wealth-getting and exchange is to be in accord with proportional justice or the *contrapassum*, based on need and with the end goal of making good citizens, rather than better claimants to city, church, or empire. In contrast to the economically illegitimate society, the just society is one rightly governed according to the virtues and for the perfection of the "multitudo".

[85] Karl Marx, "Critique of the Gotha Programme," in *Marx/Engels Selected Works, Vol. 3* (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1970), 19.

CHAPTER SEVEN

BETWEEN LAW AND THEOLOGY: FROM *CONVIVIO* TO *MONARCHIA*

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A few years ago the book *Political Theology and Early Modernity*, edited by Graham Hammill and Julia Reinhard Lupton, suggested once again that political theology was a distinctly modern problem, showing that its origins stemmed from the early modern period, and were rooted "in medieval iconographies of sacred kingship and the critique of traditional sovereignty mounted by Hobbes and Spinoza."[1] After almost sixty years since the publication of the seminal book by Ernst Kantorowicz, medieval political theology still emerges as a key expression in the history of Western political thought.[2]

If taken in the sense, prevalent today, that all modern legal and political concepts are nothing more than "secularized theological concepts", the expression "political theology", in spite of everything, still denounces its origin as an ideological deformation, instrumental to the construction of an authoritarian conception of sovereignty. This is, in fact,

[1] Graham Hammill and Julia Reinhard Lupton, eds., *Political Theology and Early Modernity*, with a Postscript by Étienne Balibar (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 2012). The book has been reviewed by Hollis Phelps, *Reviews in Religion & Theology* 20 (2013): 419–22, and by Russ Leo, *Renaissance Quarterly* 68 (2015): 1444-45.

[2] Ernst H. Kantorowicz, *The King's Two Bodies. A Study in Medieval Political Theology* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966); see Charles Davis, "Kantorowicz and Dante," in *Ernst Kantorowicz. Erträge der Doppeltagung Institute for Advanced Studies, Princeton/J.W. Goethe-Universität, Frankfurt M.*, eds. Robert L. Benson and Johannes Fried (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1997), 240–264. For further discussion see Victoria Kahn, *The Future of Illusion. Political Theology and Early Modern Texts* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2014), reviewed by Russ Leo, *Renaissance Quarterly* 68 (2015): 276–77.

a simplified and sometimes simplistic vision, or at least as it appears in Carl Schmitt's thought, which the great Dutch historian and philosopher, Joann Huizinga, called in 1936 "a manner which is strongly reminiscent of the infancy of scholasticism".[3]

History of political thought in the West can be regarded, from a different vantage point, as the history of a "spiritualization" of secular power, as argued by the late Harold J. Berman in his last masterpiece, *Law and Revolution II. The Impact of the Protestant Reformations on the Western Legal Tradition*.[4] After Kantorowicz's *The King's Two Bodies*, we can only think of political theology as the typical Western *interaction* between law and theology. If it is true, as Kantorowicz has put it, that "it is

[3] Johan Huizinga, *In the Shadow of Tomorrow. A Diagnosis of the Spiritual Ills of Our Time*, trans. JacobHerman Huizinga (New York: W.W. Norton, & Co., 1964), 121. The English translation first appeared in 1936 and received controversial judgments by American readers. See Louis Mumford, "In the Shadow of Yesterday" *The New Republic* (September 30, 1936): 230–31; Barbara Spofford Morgan, "A Choice of Revolutions" *The Saturday Review* (October 3, 1936): 16, 23; and Marvin McCord Lowes, "The Modern Desease" *The American Review* (December 1936): 251-56, who puts the book among the "works of a generally leftist and collectivist nature." In Europe the book became very soon a symbol of the anti-totalitarian movement, especially in Italy, Switzerland, Spain, and France, where it circulated thanks to translations provided by great intellectuals like Luigi Einaudi, Werner Kaegi, José Ortega y Gasset, and Gabriel Marcel. For further discussion see Diego Quaglioni, "The Weakening of Judgment: Johan Huizinga (1872–1945) and the Crisis of the Western Legal Tradition" soon to be published in Kaius Tuori and Heta Björklund, eds., *Roman Law and the Idea of Europe* (London: Bloomsbury).

[4] Harold J. Berman, *Law and Revolution, II. The Impact of the Protestant Reformations on the Western Legal Tradition* (Cambridge, Massachusetts/London, England: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2003; see Thomas Glyn Watkin, *Journal of Law and Religion* 21 (2005-2006): 479-84, and the wider reviews by Nicholas Aroney, "Law, Revolution, and Religion: Harold Berman's Interpretation of the English Revolution," *Journal of Markets & Morality* 8 (2005): 355-85, and William Ewald, "The Protestant Revolutions and Western World," *Constitutional Commentary* 22 (2005): 181-96. See also Diego Quaglioni, "Presentazione dell'edizione italiana," in Harold J. Berman, *Diritto e rivoluzione, II. L'impatto delle Riforme protestanti sulla tradizione giuridica occidentale*, trans. Diego Quaglioni (Bologna: il Mulino, 2010), IX-XXIII; Italo Birocchi, Diego Quaglioni and Aldo Mazzacane, "La tradizione giuridica occidentale nella prospettiva della sua crisi presente," *Quaderni fiorentini per la storia del pensiero giuridico moderno* 40 (2011): 1031-59; and Diego Quaglioni, "'The Outer and the Inner Aspects of Social Life'," *Rechtsgeschichte – Legal History* 21 (2013): 189-91.

evident that the doctrine of theology and canon law […] has been transferred by the jurists from the theological sphere to that of the state",[5] then it is also true that theologians evidently could not elaborate their theories without the long-lasting heritage of legal doctrines. "Religious concepts" we may say, "are nothing but spiritualized legal and political concepts."[6]

Even the political work of Dante has been falsely indicated by the fascist philosopher, Giovanni Gentile, as one of the early manifestations of a modern and "secularized" vision of power, as indeed, to quote his exact words, "the first act of rebellion to the Scholastic's transcendence" is to be free "from all supernaturalism".[7] The study of Dante's major doctrinal works shows that there was a stronger and a more complex interrelation among his religious, political, and legal concepts. Justin Steinberg has recently demonstrated in his seminal book, *Dante and the Limits of the Law*, that "Dante's literary-theoretical framework is simultaneously and

[5] Kantorowicz, *The King's Two Bodies*, 15-16. It is a formula that has become almost mandatory in the vast field of the studies on power and religion, but also in the larger domain of literature and religion: see, for instance, Steven Jablonsky, "'Under Their Head Embodied All in One". Milton's Reinterpretation of the Organic Analogy in Paradise Lost" in Charles Durham and Kristin Pruitt McColgan, eds., *Spokesperson Milton. Voices in Contemporary Criticism* (Selinsgrove: Susquehanna University Press – London and Toronto: Associated University Press, 1994), 113-127: 115; Stephen Greenblatt, *Renaissance Self-Fashioning. From More to Shakespeare*. With a new preface (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 2005), 281, note 51. Just like every idea that comes in vogue, Kantorowicz's formula has also sometimes been adopted by political scientists: see David Campbell, *Writing Security. United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1992), 89.

[6] See Diego Quaglioni, "I miracoli tra teologia e diritto," *Rivista di Storia e Letteratura Religiosa* 43 (2007): 495-505.

[7] Giovanni Gentile, *Storia della filosofia italiana (fino a Lorenzo Valla)*, I, 4, *Dante Alighieri* (Florence: La Nuova Italia, 1962), 181-84: "primo atto della ribellione alla trascendenza scolastica" affrancata "da ogni sovrannaturalismo". See Diego Quaglioni, "'Arte di bene e d'equitade'. Ancora sul senso del diritto in Dante (*Monarchia*, II v 1)," *Studi danteschi* 76 (2011): 27-46: 36-37.

manifestly a legal one"[8] and I also hope to have sufficiently clarified this aspect in my recent edition of Dante's *Monarchia*.[9]

Some years ago Ken Pennington, a distinguished scholar in the history of medieval canon law, stressed in his book *The Prince and the Law*, written on the controversy between the emperor, Henry VII, and the pope, Clement V, that no contemporary judge would have taken the arguments of their defenders seriously. Pennington states:

> A jurist from Pavia, Johannes Branchazolus sent Henry a treatise on the "Powers of the Pope and of the Emperor", in which he justified imperial authority. Just as the bees have one king, nature fashioned one ruler for the human race. Petrarch would use the metaphor of the bees making honey to describe creative genius, but metaphors that work in the realm of literature not always work in law. No fourteenth-century judge would have taken Johannes's argument seriously. Still, it was Dante Alighieri who produced the most famous defence of imperial authority during this time, his *Monarchia*. However, *Monarchia* was not a work of jurisprudence. Although Dante made most of the same general points as Johannes Branchazolus, he justified Henry's position with literary and theological arguments for imperial authority that also would not stand the careful scrutiny of a judge.[10]

It is permissible to consider the dispute between the pope and the emperor "from a purely legal point of view" and this forces us to acknowledge that Henry VII "needed good legal counsel, not unenforceable claims". However, we cannot know at which point a judge of the fourteenth century could estimate the "literary and theological arguments" which coexisted in the legal *consilia* favorable to the emperor or in Dante's *Monarchia* with references to civil and canon law ('l'una e

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[8] Justin Steinberg, *Dante and the Limits of the Law* (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 2013), 1. See the reviews by Diego Quaglioni, *Rassegna europea di letteratura italiana* 43 (2014):125-30, and Charles S. Ross, *Renaissance Quarterly* 68 (2015): 368-69.

[9] Dante Alighieri, *Monarchia*, ed. Diego Quaglioni (Milan: Mondadori, 2015[2)]; for my approach to a new edition of Dante's *Monarchia*; see Diego Quaglioni, "Un nuovo testimone per l'edizione della 'Monarchia' di Dante: il manoscritto additional 6891 della British Library," *Laboratoire italien* 11 (2011): 231-79; see also Gian Paolo Renello, "A proposito della *Monarchia*. Note in margine al ritrovamento del ms. Additional 6891," *L'Alighieri* 41 (2013): 115-56.

[10] Kenneth Pennington, *The Prince and the Law, 1200–1600. Sovereignty and Rights in the Western Legal Tradition* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1993), 175.

l'altra Ragione' in the language of Dante's *Convivio*).[11] Still, the "metaphor of the bees" was not, in the Middle Ages, just a literary reference to Virgilian poetic world, but a strict legal argument, drawn from Gratian's *Decretum*, the greatest *auctoritas* for both jurists and theologians. In fact, it was the argument of the canon, *In apibus*, as well as an *excerptum* from an epistle of saint Jerome, where the example of the bees is at the basis of the idea of the unity of both secular and religious power: "In apibus princeps unus est […]; inperator unus, iudex unus prouinciae" (C. 7, q. 1, c. 41).[12]

The times when the jurist Azo warned that to the civil lawyers "non licet allegare nisi Iustiniani leges" ("it is allowed to cite only Justinian's laws"), were long gone.[13] During Dante's day no one would have been surprised to find, in legal literature, the idea of an "at least" integrative function of literary texts. Exemplary in this regard, is Alberto Gandino, who authored the *Tractatus de maleficiis* at the beginning of the fourteenth century; this was a real criminal procedure manual for generations of inquisitors. Quoting Ovid and Virgil, Gandino points out: "Quas auctoritates et maxime, ubi leges deficiunt, non est prohibitum allegare."[14] "Maxime ubi leges deficient" especially in the absence or in the silence of the legal rules, it is permissible to quote moral authorities. Even the judge Gandino loves to make use of literary and theological arguments, quoting first Scripture ("quia legitur in divinis"), then the Latin poets, Ovid and Virgil, and finally the legal authorities.[15]

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[11] Dante Alighieri, *Convivio*, IV xii 9, ed. Gianfranco Fioravanti, in *Opere* 2 (Milan: Mondadori, 2014), 3-805: 646-47.

[12] *Corpus Iuris Canonici*, ed. Emil Friedberg, 1, *Decretum Magistri Gratiani* (Leipzig: B. Tauchnitz, 1879, repr. Graz: Akademische Druck- u. Verlagsanstalt, 1959), 582: "In apibus princeps unus est; grues unam secuntur ordine litterato; inperator unus, iudex unus prouinciae. Roma condita duos fratres simul habere reges non potuit et parricidio dedicatur. In Rebeccae utero Esau et Iacob bella gesserunt; singuli ecclesiarum episcopi, singuli archiepiscopi, singuli archidiaconi, et omnis ordo ecclesiasticus suis rectoribus nititur,"

[13] See Ennio Cortese, *Il rinascimento giuridico medievale* (Rome: Bulzoni, 1992), 36-37 and note 101.

[14] Albertus de Gandino, *Tractatus de maleficiis*, Rubr. *Quid sit fama*, § 1, ed. Hermann U. Kantorowicz, *Albertus de Gandino und das Strafrecht der Scholastik*, 2, *Die Theorie. Kritische Ausgabe des Tractatus de Maleficiis nebst textkritischer Einleitung* (Berlin: J. Guttentag, 1907), 52. See Diego Quaglioni, "Gandino, Alberto," in Italo Birocchi et al., *Dizionario biografico dei giuristi italiani* (Bologna: il Mulino, 2013), 942-44.

[15] Gandino, *Tractatus de maleficiis*, Rubr. *Quid sit fama*, § 1, 52: "Sciendum est tamen et notandum, quod nomen dignitatis, positum in diffinitione fame, non

Maybe Dante's *Monarchia* is not a work of jurisprudence, but it is hard not to recognize its nature as a work of doctrine that crosses boundaries between branches of knowledge and that, even in the absence of the technicalities of the legal literature of the time, it is located in a scientific landscape in intimate relationship with the *ius commune*. It is not sufficient to recognize Dante's confidence "toward Justinian and toward Roman Law in general" or to ask "whether or not Dante Studied Law", as Ernst Kantorowicz did.[16] *Monarchia* is the major text on the medieval doctrine of sovereignty and the supreme secular jurisdiction. Dante's treatise shows a conceptual and lexical structure which is common to theology, law, and politics.

In the vast system of *auctoritates* of Dante's *Monarchia*, the scriptural presuppositions of theology live together with the moral examples of Latinity and with the principles of the *ius commune* ("l'una e l'altra Ragione"). Even before *Monarchia* we can clearly see that in *Convivio*, in particular in Chapter XII of the fourth treatise, where Dante, commenting the verses 56–60 of the *canzone* ("Le dolci rime d'amor ch'i' solìa") seems to display his entire moral library:[17]

> Come detto è, la imperfezione delle ricchezze non solamente nel loro [indiscreto] avenimento si può comprendere, ma eziandio nel pericoloso loro acrescimento; e però che in ciò più si può vedere di loro difetto, solo di questo fa menzione lo testo, dicendo quelle, *quantunque collette*, non solamente non quietare, ma dare più sete e rendere altrui più defettivo e

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sumitur pro aliquo honore publico aut administratione, secundum quod sumitur alias C. de dignitatibus lib. XII. [C. 12, 1], sed dignitatis nomen hic est sumendum et habendum pro potentia attributa homini a natura. Et quod homo sit dignior omnium aliarum creaturarum, potest multis rationibus comprobari. Et primo, quia legitur in divinis [*Ps*. 90, 11], quod virtus angelica est hominis servitio deputata, et auctoritates divinas tamquam leges allegare conceditur [...]. Est etiam secunda ratione dignior, quia omnes proprietates creaturarum in se admittit: Nam cum inanimatis habet communicationem, ut sit, cum herbis et arboribus, ut vivat, cum brutis, ut sentiat et fructus percipiat, et ideo dictum est, quod gratia hominis rerum natura fructus procreavit, ut ff. de furtis l. qui vas § ex furtivis [D. 47, 2, 48, 6] et ff. de usuris l. in pecudum [D. 22, 1, 28]. Tertia ratione, quia habet communicationem cum angelis, ut discernat et mente contemplet celestia, unde Ovidius [*Met*., I, 84-86]: 'Pronaque cum spectent animalia cetera terram, / Os homini sublime dedit celumque videre / Iussit et erectos ad sidera tollere vultus' / et alibi, ut Virgilius [*Aen*., VI, 730] / 'Celestique origo illi est.' / Quas auctoritates et maxime, ubi leges deficiunt, non est prohibitum allegare, ut ff. de statu hominum l. septimo [D. 1, 5, 12] et ff. de solutionibus l. si pater [D. 46, 3, 36]."

[16] Kantorowicz, *The King's Two Bodies*, 453.

[17] Dante, *Convivio*, IV xii 1-5, 518, 534 (verses); 640-43.

> insufficiente. E qui si vuole sapere che le cose defettive possono aver li loro difetti per modo che nella prima faccia non paiono, ma sotto pretesto di perfezione la imperfezione si nasconde; e possono avere quelli sì che del tutto sono discoperti, sì che apertamente nella prima faccia si conosce la imperfezione. E quelle cose che prima non mostrano li loro difetti sono più pericolose, però che di loro molte fiate prendere guardia non si può; sì come vedemo nel traditore, che nella faccia dinanzi si mostra amico, sì che fa di sé fede avere, e sotto pretesto d'amistade chiude lo difetto della inimistade. E per questo modo le ricchezze pericolosamente nel loro accrescimento sono imperfette, che, sommettendo ciò che promettono, apportano lo contrario. Promettono le false traditrici sempre, in certo numero adunate, rendere lo raunatore pieno d'ogni appagamento; e con questa promissione conducono l'umana volontade in vizio d'avarizia. E per questo le chiama Boezio, in quello Di Consolazione, pericolose, dicendo: 'Ohmè! chi fu quel primo che li pesi dell'oro coperto, e le pietre che si voleano ascondere, preziosi pericoli, cavoe?' Promettono le false traditrici, se bene si guarda, di tôrre ogni sete e ogni mancanza, e aportare ogni saziamento e bastanza; e questo fanno nel principio a ciascuno uomo, questa promissione in certa quantità di loro accrescimento affermando: e poi che quivi sono adunate, in loco di saziamento e di refrigerio danno e recano sete di casso febricante intollerabile; e in loco di bastanza recano nuovo termine, cioè maggiore quantitade a[l] desiderio, e, con questa, paura grande [e] sollicitudine sopra l'acquisto. Sì che veramente non quietano, ma più danno cura, la qual prima sanza loro non si avea.

Boethius' *Consolatio Philosophiae* opens the series of his doctrinal authorities.[18] And it is still Boethius who precedes the long quotation from Cicero's *Paradoxa Stoicorum*.[19] Dante then encloses in a single extract the Proverbs of Solomon and the Psalms of David, Seneca, Horace, and

[18] Boethius, Anicius Manlius Severinus, *Consolatio Philosophiae*, II, m. 5, 27-30, ed. Claudio Moreschini (Munich-Leipzig: K.G. Saur, 2005[2]), 46: "Heu, primus qui fuit ille / auri qui pondera tecti / gemmasque latere volentes / pretiosa pericula fodit?"

[19] Ibid., II, m. 2, 1-8, 33: "Si quantas rapidis flatibus incitus / pontus versat harenas / aut quot stelliferis edita noctibus / caelo sidera fulgent / tantas fundat opes, nec retrahat manum / pleno Copia cornu / humanum miseras haud ideo genus / cesset flere querelas." Cicero, Marcus Tullius, *Paradoxa*, 6, ed. Renato Badalì (Milan: Mondadori, 1968), 44-45: "Numquam mercule ego neque pecunias istorum neque tecta magnifica neque opes neque imperia neque eas, quibus maxume adstricti sunt, uoluptates in bonis rebus aut expetendis esse duxi, quippe cum uiderem rebus his circumfluentis eas tamen desiderare maxime quibus abundarent. Neque enim umquam expletur nec satiatur cupiditatis sitis; neque solum ea qui habent libidine augendi cruciantur sed etiam amittendi metu."

Juvenal[20] and, furthermore, "quanto ogni scrittore, ogni poeta" and "quanto la verace Scrittura divina chiama".[21]

> E però dice Tullio in quello Di Paradosso, abominando le ricchezze: 'Io in nullo tempo per fermo né le pecunie di costoro, né le magioni magnifiche, né le ricchezze, né le signorie, né l'allegrezze delle quali massimamente sono astretti, tra cose buone o desiderabili esser dissi; con ciò sia cosa che certo io vedesse li uomini nell'abondanza di queste cose massimamente desiderare quelle di che abonda[va]no. Però che in nullo tempo si compie né si sazia la sete della cupiditate; né solamente per desiderio d'accrescere quelle cose che hanno si tormentano, ma eziandio tormento hanno nella paura di perdere quelle.' E queste tutte parole sono di Tulio, e così giacciono in quello libro che detto è. E a maggiore testimonianza di questa imperfezione, ecco Boezio in quello Di Consolazione dicente: 'Se quanta rena volve lo mare turbato dal vento, se quante stelle rilucono, la dea, della ricchezza largisca, l'umana generazione non cesserà di piangere.' E perché più testimonianza a ciò ridurre per pruova si conviene, lascisi stare quanto contra esse Salomone e suo padre grida; quanto contra esse Seneca, massimamente a Lucillo scrivendo; quanto Orazio, quanto Iuvenale e, brievemente, quanto ogni scrittore, ogni poeta; e quanto la verace Scrittura divina chiama contra queste false meretrici, piene di tutti defetti; e pongasi mente, per avere oculata fede, pur alla vita di coloro che dietro a esse vanno, come vivono sicuri quando di quelle hanno raunate, come s'apagano, come si riposano!

It is at this point that Dante, before quoting Seneca, Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics*, and the Holy Scripture one more time, puts the principles of *utrumque ius* at the center of the speech:

> E che altro cotidianamente pericola e uccide le cittadi, le contrade, le singulari persone, tanto quanto lo nuovo raunamento d'avere appo alcuno? Lo quale raunamento nuovi desiderii discuopre, allo fine delli quali sanza ingiuria d'alcuno venire non si può. E che altro intende di meditare l'una e l'altra Ragione, Canonica dico e Civile, tanto quanto a riparare alla cupiditade che, raunando ricchezze, cresce? Certo assai lo manifesta e l'una e l'altra Ragione, se li loro cominciamenti, dico della loro scrittura, si leggono. Oh com'è manifesto, anzi manifestissimo, quelle in accrescendo

[20] As Gianfranco Fioravanti put it in his commentary to Dante, *Convivio*, IV xii 8, 646: "Con tutta probabilità Dante si serve del *Tresor,* che riporta i giudizi di Orazio e di Giovenale sulle ricchezze." See Brunetto Latini, *Tresor*, II, 118, 3-8, ed. Pietro G. Beltrami et al. (Turin: Einaudi, 2007), 600, 602.
[21] Dante, *Convivio*, IV xii 6-8, 644-46.

> essere del tutto imperfette, quando di loro altro che imperfezione nascere non può, quanto che acolte siano! E questo è quello che lo testo dice.[22]

The words "dico della loro scrittura", which seem unnecessarily didactic, are instead a precise indication of the *initia* of the *ratio scripta*, which are also its *principia*: the principles of human conduct discussed at the opening of to the two *corpora iuris*.

One of the most important commentators of the *Convivio*, the Jesuit Giovanni Busnelli (1866–1944), was wrong about this reference to the *initia* of the collections of canon and civil law. Following the accumulation of a number of inaccuracies and genuine misunderstandings, he wrote that Dante referred, on the one side, to the "epistle" of Pope Gregory IX, "which acts as a preface to the Decretals", and, on the other, to the "preface of Justinian's Institutes."[23] In Busnelli's opinion the "beginnings" would be the constitution, *Rex pacificus*, sent by pope Gregory IX in 1234 to the universities together with his *Liber Extra*, the collection of decretals compiled by Raymond of Penyafort,[24] and the law *Imperatoriam maiestatem* (A.D. 533), as well as the preface of Justinian's Institutes.[25]

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[22] Dante, *Convivio*, IV xii 9-10, 646–47.

[23] Dante Alighieri, *Il Convivio*, eds. Giovanni Busnelli and Giuseppe Vandelli, with an introduction by Michele Barbi (Second edition with an appendix, ed. Antonio Enzo Quaglio, Florence: Le Monnier, 1964), II, 141.

[24] *Corpus Iuris Canonici*, ed- Emil Friedberg, 2, *Decretalium Collectiones* (Leipzig: B, Tauchnitz, 1879; repr. Graz: Akademische Druck- u. Verlagsanstalt, 1959), 1-4: 1-2: "Rex pacificus pia miseratione disposuit sibi subditos fore pudicos, pacificos et honestos. Sed effrenata cupiditas, sui prodiga, pacis aemula, mater litium, materia iurgiorum, tot quotidie nova litigia generat, ut, nisi iustitia conatus eius sua virtute reprimeret, et quaestiones ipsius implicitas explicaret, ius humani foederis litigatorum abusus exstingueret, et dato libello repudii concordia extra mundi terminos exsularet. Ideoque lex proditur, ut appetitus noxius sub iuris regula limitetur, per quam genus humanum, ut honeste vivat, alterum non laedat, ius suum unicuique tribuat, informatur." On the making of *Liber Extra* see Stephan Kuttner, "Raymond of Peñafort as Editor. The 'Decretales' and 'Constitutiones' of Gregory IX," *Bulletin of Medieval Canon Law* 12 (1982), 65–80.

[25] *Corpus Iuris Civilis*, 1, *Institutiones*, ed. Paul Krueger (Berlin: Weidmann, 1872), [XXII]: "Imperatoriam maiestatem non solum armis decoratam, sed etiam legibus oportet esse armatam, ut utrumque tempus et bellorum et pacis recte possit gubernari et princeps Romanus victor existat non solum in hostilibus proeliis, sed etiam per legitimos tramites calumniantium iniquitates expellens, et fiat tam iuris religiosissimus quam victis hostibus triumphato." On Justinian's legal reforms and their cultural and religious presuppositions see Gian Gualberto Archi, *Giustiniano legislatore* (Bologna: il Mulino, 1970).

But if we listen to Dante's words, it is easy to understand that the "beginnings of both civil and canon law"—the "cominciamenti […] della loro scrittura" (i.e. their beginnings and, at the same time, their "principles" and foundations—are elsewhere.[26] They certainly refer primarily to that norm of mixed content, equally partaking of theological, moral and legal values, in the very beginning of Gratian's *Decretum* (*dictum a*. D. 1, c. 1). This is where Gratian, distinguishing divine and natural law from human law, places at the basis of every legal order the evangelical norm: "Omnia quaecumque vultis faciant vobis ut homines, et vos eadem facite illis" (*Mt* 7, 12).[27] They also refer to the two parallel passages of the Institutes and the Digest (Inst. 1, 1, 3 = Dig. 1, 1, 10, 1), which highlight the *praecepta iuris* "honeste vivere, alterum non laedere, suum cuique tribuere."[28]

This is the passage where Accursius, the author of the *Magna Glossa* to the *Corpus Iuris Civilis*, interpreting the words "alterum non laedere" ("do no harm to others") cites the evangelical norm placed at the beginning of the *Decretum* as a corresponding principle: "unde illud: Quod tibi non vis fieri, alii ne feceris, ut in Decretis in principio."[29] Both laws, "l'una e l'altra Ragione", come together in a unique interaction. It is in this interaction, in the tenth *canto* of his *Paradise*, 104–105, that Dante reveals Gratian "to either forum lent […] help," ("l'uno e l'altro foro / aiutò", i.e. (helped both jurisdictions, spiritual and secular").

If we read these famous verses in the light of *Convivio*, we cannot interpret them in the way that some great legal historians of the past, such

[26] See Dante, *Monarchia*, I iii 1, 24: "Nunc autem videndum est quid sit finis totius humane civilitatis: quo viso, plus quam dimidium laboris erit transactum." Dante quotes Aristotle, *Ethica ad Nicomachum*, 1098 b 6-7, but he for sure recalls the Roman jurist Gaius in D. 1, 2, 1: "et certe cuiusque rei potissima pars principium est:" *Corpus Iuris Civilis*, 1, *Digesta*, ed. Theodor Mommsen (Berlin: Weidmann, 1872), 2.

[27] *Decretum Magistri Gratiani*, 1: "*Humanum genus duobus regitur, naturali uidelicet iure et moribus. Ius naturae est, quod in lege et euangelio continetur, quo quisque iubetur alii facere, quod sibi uult fieri, et prohibetur alii inferrem quod sibi nolit fieri. Unde Christus in euangelio: 'Omnia quecunque uultis ut faciant uobis homines, et uos eadem facite illis. Haec est enim lex et prophetae.'* "

[28] *Corpus Iuris Civilis*, 1, *Institutiones*, 1; *Digesta*, 1.

[29] Accursius, Gloss "alterum non laedere" to *Inst*. 1, 1, 3, in *Volumen* (Lyon: Ugo della Porta, 1558), 11; and see also the gloss "laedere" to *Dig*. 1, 1, 10, 1, in *Digestum Vetus* (Lyon : Ugo della Porta, 1560), 17: "et hoc ad proximum: unde illud, Quod tibi non vis fieri, alii ne feceris."

as Francesco Brandileone and Francesco Ruffini, have suggested.[30] Like Francesco Calasso, they were, in fact, convinced that Dante was referring "to Gratian's successful attempt to reconcile theology and canon law"[31] thanks to the distinction between the internal forum and external forum; between the Court of Conscience, which judges according to the laws blown in by God himself; and the Court of Men, which judges according to the laws of men. It has been rightly observed that nowhere in Gratian's *Decretum* is there is any trace of such formulations. However, the ancient interpreter, Pietro Alighieri, who was a good lawyer, commented on his father's verses in Gratian: "Composuit decretum ad utrumque forum canonicum et civile respiciens". Another great commentator, Francesco Buti, wrote that Dante "dimostra come si convegna e concordi la legge civile con la ecclesiastica et e contrario"[32] ("demonstrates how civil law is in accordance and consonance with ecclesiastical law, and vice versa").

Gratian's *Concordance* was realized without no need to separate theology from law. Indeed, Gratian knowingly held tight the connection between theology and law and placed the natural law, contained in the Bible and in the Gospel, in a relationship with the legal sources, both ecclesiastical and secular: "l'uno e l'altro foro/ aiutò sì che piace in Paradiso" ("to either forum lent/ such help, as favor wins in Paradise"). The evidence of the circularity that characterizes the works of Dante compels us to recognize that the verses of the tenth canto of *Paradise* are the purest expression of Dante's legal universalism and of Dante's political theology. This is, of course, consistently dualistic, while at the same time opposed to any disharmony between the spiritual and the secular, just like the dualism present in the "harmony from dissonance" of Gratian's *Concordia discordantium canonum*.[33]

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[30] See Francesco Brandileone, "Perché Dante colloca in Paradiso il fondatore della scienza del diritto canonico," *Rendiconti dell'Accademia Nazionale dei Lincei*, 6, 2 (1926): 65–149, with the review by Francesco Ruffini, *Studi danteschi*, 13 (1928): 119-26, in response to Niccolò Tamassia, *Dante e Magister Gratianus* (Venezia: Officine Grafiche C. Ferrari, 1923).

[31] Francesco Calasso, *Medio Evo del Diritto*, 1, *Le fonti* (Milan: Giuffrè, 1954), 396. See Diego Quaglioni, "Graziano," in *Dizionario biografico degli Italiani*, 57 (Rome: Istituto della Enciclopedia Italiana, 2002), 122-30, and Peter Armour, "Law," in Richard Lansing, ed., *The Dante Encyclopedia* (New York: Routledge, 2010[2]), 557-60.

[32] Both quoted by Vincenzo Valente, "Fòro", in *Enciclopedia dantesca*, 2 (Rome: Istituto della Enciclopedia Italiana, 1970), 985.

[33] I am quoting from Stephan Kuttner, *Harmony from Dissonance: An Interpretation of Medieval Canon Law. Wimmer Lecture X* (Latrobe, Penn.: The

As André Pézard has put it, we owe to Gratian the highest attempt "de mettre en harmonie selon la sagesse les lois ecclésiastiques et les lois civiles."[34] He wrote

> C'est donc une réparation éclatante que l'Alighieri accorde à Gratien en le faisant entrer dans la première de deux couronnes de douze étoiles qui brillent au ciel des saints docteurs. La *Comédie* honore en lui un légiste qui discerne soigneusement les compétences, respectant aussi bien celles du droit canon que celles du droit civil; au lieu d'abuser du droit canon pour exploiter l'ordre temporel, *il vient en aide à l'un et l'autre droit*.[35]

And a great medievalist and a great interpreter of Dante's spirituality, the late Raoul Manselli, has written:

> Dante effectively highlights the importance of the *Decretum* for both civil and religious life, as an aid towards the achievement of a reciprocal concordance between balance and harmony; in these verses are also evidences of the spiritual consonance of the poet, whose aspiration is precisely to achieve an autonomous, but not indifferent, convergence of civil and religious power.[36]

A further confirmation seems to be offered once again by Pietro Alighieri, in his comment on the sixth *canto* of the *Inferno*, where the echoes of Gratian and Accursius are even more clearly detectable:[37]

Archabbey Press, 1961), now in Kuttner, *The History of Ideas and Doctrines of Canon Law in the Middle Ages* (London: Variorum, 1980), n. 1.

[34] André Pézard, *Dante sous la pluie de feu (Enfer, chant XV)* (Paris: Vrin, 1950), 192.

[35] Ibid., 192-193. See also Étienne Gilson, *Dante et la Philosophie* (Paris: Vrin, 1939), 255.

[36] Raoul Manselli, "Graziano," in *Enciclopedia dantesca*, 2, 285; see also Manselli, "Dante e l'Ecclesia spiritualis," in *Dante e Roma* (Florence: Olschki, 1965), 116-35. On Manselli's vaste historiographical work see Diego Quaglioni, "L''ansia di sapere' dello storico. A proposito degli 'Scritti sul Medioevo' di Raoul Manselli, *Annali dell'Istituto storico italo-germanico in Trento*, 20 (1994): 11-37, and Quaglioni, "Manselli, Raoul," in *Dizionario biografico degli Italiani*, 69 (Rome: Istituto della Enciclopedia Italiana, 2007), 142-44.

[37] This text has been edited by Massimo Seriacopi, "Il sesto canto dell'Inferno all'interno di un volgarizzamento inedito trecentesco del *Comentum* di Pietro Alighieri," *Tenzone*, 8 (2007): 147-58, partcularly 157-58. On the interpretation of Dante's verses see especially Claudia Di Fonzo, "Giusti son due e non vi sono intesi," *Forum Italicum*, 44 (2010): 5-32, now in Di Fonzo, *Dante tra diritto teologia ed esegesi antica* (Neaples: EdiSES, 2012), 55-74.

> Poi adomanda se in quella città di Firenze è alcuna cosa iusta, al quale risponde che nel mondo sono due cose iuste per le quali è governata l'umana generazione, ciò è ragione naturale e costumi, come dice Graziano nel principio de' Decreti, le quali due cose in quella città non sono udite in effetto. Altri spongono che sono due leggi principali, che niuna si serva in quella città. L'una è legge naturale, nella quale si dice non fare altrui quello che non vuogli sia fatto a te, e fa' altrui quello che vuogli sia fatto a te, secondo che Cristo dice nel Vangelio. L'altra è legge delle genti, ciò è legge umana, la quale comanda che a ogni persona sia dato quello ch'è suo, e niuno arichisca con danno altrui; e questa legge è figliuola della detta legge naturale. E queste due leggi non hanno effetto in quella città di Firenze perché l'uno ruba e usurpa e beni dell'altro, e l'uno caccia l'altro, e que' interviene per tre vizii che regnano ivi. Onde alla terza questione ch'ello domanda, della cagione di tanta malizia, risponde Ciacco che questo interviene per tre vizii principali che regnano in quella città di Firenze, ciò è superbia, invidia e avarizia.

After listening to the words of Dante, "between poetry and reason", in *Convivio* and in the *Comedy*, we can go back to listen to the words of Dante in his *Monarchia*. In *Monarchia*, I xi 5–7 Dante demonstrates that justice is at its strongest under the secular monarch and that justice is at its strongest where there is least opposing her; then it can be said of her, as Aristotle indicates, "neither the morning star nor the evening star is so wondrous" ("Ubi ergo minimum de contrario iustitie admiscetur et quantum ad habitum et quantum ad operationem, ibi iustitia potissima est; et vere tunc potest dici de illa, ut Phylosophus inquit [*Ethica ad Nicomachum*, 1129 b 28], 'neque Hesperus neque Lucifer sic admirabilis est'").[38] What is opposed (*contrarium*) to justice, both in the disposition and in the actions of an agent, exists sometimes in a defect of the will and sometimes in a defect of power. Where, in fact, the will is not free of all greed (*cupiditas*), even if justice is present, nonetheless it is not entirely present in all the splendor of its purity and this is why those who try to disturb a judge's mind are rightly rebuffed.

The example of the judge who is potentially misguided by passions is presented once again in *Monarchia*, I xi 11–14, where greed (*cupiditas*) is identified as the opponent of justice at its strongest and highest degree, which indicates that, once all the causes of greed are removed, justice will not have any obstacle. So, therefore, in line with Aristotle's thinking, it is proper for the law to determine, as far as possible, the conduct of the judge. Precisely in this sense the secular monarch is free from all covetousness, for he is beyond any competition as since his jurisdiction is

[38] Dante, *Monarchia*, I xi 5, 84-86.

limited only by the Oceans.[39] This proposition seemed to someone just a philosophical *naïveté*,[40] but, writing on this matter, Dante could not fail to have in mind the Novella *De rebus not alienandis aut permutandis ecclesiasticis immobilibus* (Auth. Coll. II, 1, 1 = Nov. VII, 1), where Justinian speaks of "terrae nostrae […] usque ad Oceanum".[41] This is in addition to the famous fragment from which originates the doctrinal dispute on the *imperator dominus mundi*, that is the rescript preserved in the *Digestum Vetus* under the title *De lege Rhodia de iactu* (Dig. 14, 2, 9), with its famous appeal to the law of the sea: "Ego quidem dominus mundi, lex autem maris."[42]

We can find the same reference elsewhere in *Monarchia* and in *Convivio*, IV iv 3–4, where Dante speaks about monarchy as the sole remedy against wars, writing:

> Onde, con ciò sia cosa che l'animo umano in terminata possessione di terra non si queti, ma sempre desideri gloria d'acquistare, sì come per esperienza vedemo, discordie e guerre conviene surgere intra regno e regno, le quali sono tribulazioni delle cittadi, e per le cittadi delle vicinanze, e per le vicinanze delle case, [e per le case] dell'uomo; e così s'impedisce la felicitade. Il perché, a queste guerre e alle loro ragioni torre via, conviene di necessitade tutta la terra, e quanto a l'umana generazione a possedere è dato, essere Monarchia, cioè uno solo principato, e uno prencipe avere; lo quale, tutto possedendo e più desiderare non possendo, li regi tegna contenti nelli termini delli regni, sì che pace intra loro sia, nella quale si posino le cittadi, e in questa posa le vicinanze s'amino, in questo

[39] Ibid., I xi 11-12, 92-96: "Ad evidentiam primi notandum quod iustitie maxime contrariatur cupiditas, ut innuit Aristotiles in quinto *ad Nicomacum* [1129a 32 – b 10]. Remota cupiditate omnino, nichil iustitie restat adversum; unde sententia Phylosphi est ut que lege determinari possunt nullo modo iudici relinquantur. Et hoc metu cupiditatis fieri oportet, de facili mentes hominum detorquentis. Ubi ergo non est quod possit optari, inpossibile est ibi cupiditatem esse: destructis enim obiectis, passiones esse non possunt. Sed Monarcha non habet quod possit optare: sua nanque iurisdictio terminatur Occeano solum: quod non cntingit principibus aliis, quorum principatus ad alios terminantur."

[40] Francesco Furlan, "Introduzione," in Dante Alighieri, *Monarchia con il Commentario di Cola di Rienzo e il volgarizzamento di Marsilio Ficino*, ed. Francesco Furlan (Milan: Mondadori, 2004), LXIII.

[41] *Corpus Iuris Civilis*, I, *Novellae*, eds. Rudolph Schoell and Wilhelm Kroll (Berlin: Weidmann, 1895), 52.

[42] *Corpus Iuris Civilis*, 1, *Digesta*, 188.

> amore le case prendano ogni loro bisogno, lo qual preso, l'uomo viva felicemente; che è quello per che esso è nato.[43]

Everybody can see that this is simply an indirect quotation from the law, *Bene a Zenone*, in Justinian Code (Cod. 7, 37, 3), which states that everything belongs to the emperor ("cum omnia principis esse intelligantur").[44] Clearly, Dante alludes to the emperor *dominus mundi*, who was the subject of the famous dispute among the jurists of the twelfth century on the limits of imperial jurisdiction and on the nature of the *iura regalia*.[45]

Finally, if the previous arguments sufficiently demonstrate, as contended by Bruno Nardi, that justice is *potissima* in the universal monarch since he is immune to greed, we may now observe how Dante pulls out from his philosophical arsenal one further, and no less subtle, contention: greed is opposed to charity or, in other words, to the *recta dilectio* of God and humanity:[46]

> Preterea, quemadmodum cupiditas habitualem iustitiam quodammodo, quantumcunque pauca, obnubilat, sic karitas seu recta dilectio illam acuit atque dilucidat. Cui ergo maxime recta dilectio inesse potest, potissimum locum in illo potest habere iustitia; huiusmodi est Monarcha: ergo, eo

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[43] Dante, *Convivio*, IV iv 3-4, 564-566); and see *Monarchia*, III x 10, 444: "Imperium est iurisdictio omnem temporalem iurisdictionem ambitu suo comprehendens," a formula which echoes the law *Omnis iurisdictio*. This was one of the four imperial laws given at Roncaglia in 1158 by Frederick I Barbarossa and "lost" because they were not inserted in the *Libri feudorum*, although they were well known by jurists at least until the first half of the 15th century. See Vittore Colorni, "Le tre leggi perdute di Roncaglia (1158) ritrovate in un manoscritto parigino (Bibl. Nat. Cod. Lat. 4677)," in *Scritti in memoria di Antonino Giuffrè*, 1, *Rievocazioni, filosofia e storia del diritto, diritto romano e storia delle idee* (Milan: Giuffrè, 1967), 111-70; Diego Quaglioni, "Il diritto comune pubblico e le leggi di Roncaglia. Nuove testimonianze sulla l. *Omnis iurisdictio*," in Gerhard Dilcher and Diego Quaglioni, eds., *Gli inizi del diritto pubblico. L'età di Federico Barbarossa: legislazione e scienza del diritto – Die Anfänge des öffentlichen Rechts. Gesetzgebung im Zeitalter Friedrich Barbarossas und das gelehrte Recht* (Bologna – Berlin: il Mulino – Duncker & Humblot, 2007), 47-65; Quaglioni, "Vecchie e nuove testimonianze sulla l. *Omnis iurisdictio*," in Vincenzo Colli and Emanuele Conte, eds., *Iuris Historia. Liber amicorum Gero Dolezalek (*Berkeley: Robbins Collection, 2008), 89-104.

[44] *Corpus Iuris Civilis*, 2, *Codex Iustinianus*. Ed. Paul Krueger (Berlin, Weidmann, 1877), 310.

[45] See Francesco Calasso, *I Glossatori e la teoria della sovranità. Studio di diritto comune pubblico* (Milan: Giuffrè, 1957[3]), 85-86.

[46] Dante, *Monarchia*, I xi 13-14, 96-98.

> existente, iustitia potissima est vel esse potest. Quod autem recta dilectio faciat quod dictum est, hinc haberi potest: cupiditas nanque, perseitate hominum spreta, querit alia; karitas vero, spretis aliis omnibus, querit Deum et hominem, et per consequens bonum hominis. Cumque inter alia bona hominis potissimum sit in pace vivere – ut supra dicebatur – et hoc operetur maxime atque potissime iustitia, karitas maxime iustitiam vigorabit et potior potius.

Monarchia brings us back to the topics of controversialist literature where we began. These visibly feed on the complex authorities where only our modern eye can distinguish between the domain of politics and the domain of theology, or, indeed, the domain of law from the domain of poetry and literature. In Dante's political theology, ecclesiology, ethics, and law feed off each other.

CHAPTER EIGHT

THE *STEMMA CODICUM* OF DANTE'S *MONARCHIA*: A REFUTATION OF RENELLO'S HYPOTHESIS*

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Two very different kinds of dantista work on Dante's texts today: Italians and Americans. For Italians, the validity of neo-Lachmannian methodology in producing a critical text of a medieval work might almost be called an article of faith; for Americans, the idea of trying to reconstruct texts of the past to make them as close as possible to the author's lost original, reflecting his supposed intention, has been unfashionable for decades, and is perhaps even a lost cause.

This article is an old-fashioned exercise in philological methodology *all'italiana*: it aims to show that a view recently advanced about the transmission history of the *Monarchia* is, quite simply, wrong and that it is not supported by, and indeed not compatible with, the evidence. A chief concern is to clarify questions of principle for scholars who are unaccustomed to thinking about these questions, or thinking in this way: to show what weight certain kinds of evidence might have in the broad context of all the surviving evidence and what that surviving evidence tells us about the textual transmission of Dante's treatise.

The opening paragraph of my introduction to the *edizione nazionale* of the *Monarchia* (henceforth *EN*) sets out a principle which informs the work of textual scholars editing medieval texts:

* I would like to thank scholars and friends who have read this paper and made valuable comments: Patrick Boyde, Judy Davies, John Dickie, Giulio and Laura Lepschy, Peter Marsh, Paolo Pellegrini, Michael Reeve, David Robey.

> A critical text of any medieval work which survives in multiple manuscript copies is, as Gianfranco Contini was in the habit of saying, *un'ipotesi di lavoro*, a working hypothesis. Assuming that we have no autograph copy and that, as is almost invariably the case, surviving copies are already several (and often many) generations removed from the original, the text reflects or embodies the best hypothesis the editor is able to construct to explain the inter-relationships among the individual extant copies, and the relationship of all of them to the author's original. This hypothesis, formulated after scrupulous analysis of all the available evidence, should ideally account for the facts as economically as possible (respecting the principle of parsimony), and leave as little as possible unaccounted for.[1]

The introduction goes on explicitly to acknowledge the possibility that the discovery of new evidence may require an editor to modify that hypothesis: "The discovery of additional evidence in the form of new manuscripts may well provoke a need to re-examine and refine the hypothesis, or, in extreme cases, abandon it and attempt to formulate a new one."[2]

Two new pieces of evidence have come to light since the publication of the *EN* in 2009: a new manuscript, British Library ms. Add. 6891 (henceforth Y), and the 1559 German translation by Johannes Heroldt.[3] Ms. Y dates from the mid-fourteenth century, and perhaps even earlier; it may well be the oldest surviving manuscript of the treatise. For this reason, if for no other, its coming to light is an event of great importance in Dante scholarship. I analyzed the manuscript and assessed its relationship to the other extant witnesses in an article published in *Studi danteschi* in 2011.[4] The Heroldt translation had been consulted by Witte in preparing his 1874 edition of the *Monarchia*, where he described it as very

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[1] Dante Alighieri, *Monarchia*, ed. Prue Shaw, vol. 5 of *Le opere di Dante Alighieri. Edizione Nazionale,* edited by the Società Dantesca Italiana (Florence: Le Lettere, 2009).

[2] Ibid., 3.

[3] London, British Library, MS Add. 6891, fols. 1r-17v [=Y]; Dante Alighieri, *Monarchey Oder Daß das Keyserthumb, zu der wolfart diser Welt von nöten: Den Römern billich zugehört, unnd allein Gott dem Herren, sonst niemands, hafft seye, auch dem Bapst nit. Herren Dantis Aligherij des Florentiners, ein zierlichs büchlein, in drey teyl außgeteilt. Durch Basilium Joannem Heroldt.* (Basel: Niclaus Bischoff, 1559).

[4] Prue Shaw, "Un secondo manoscritto londinese della *Monarchia,*" *Studi Danteschi* 76 (2011): 223-64. See also Diego Quaglioni, "Un nuovo testimone per l'edizione della *Monarchia* di Dante: il Ms. Add. 6891 della British Library," *Laboratoire italien* 11 (2011): 231–279.

rare.[5] Since then it has not been used by editors of the treatise, until, very recently, it became available and easily consultable online. Like the *editio princeps*, the German translation was published in Basle in autumn 1559. The *princeps* editor, Oporino, had close working ties with Heroldt, and the relationship between these two high-functioning German-speaking intellectuals has some bearing on the issues I will be examining.

So we have two remarkable new pieces of evidence. It is not only understandable, but welcome, that scholars should look closely at the *EN* hypothesis about manuscript relationships in the light of this new evidence.

The hypothesis I examine in this article is the one put forward by Gian Paolo Renello in articles published in 2011 and 2013.[6] Both of them concern the textual transmission of the *Monarchia*. The first article suggested that K, the *editio princeps*, does not represent an independent line of transmission from the archetype, as the *EN* argues, but instead is to be located within the β family of manuscripts. The second article returned to this thesis with new arguments based on the new evidence, and, in a refinement of the 2011 thesis, now placed K close to the subgroups β2/β3 within β. The abstract of this article gives a précis of his conclusions:

> L'autore, prendendo spunto dal recente ritrovamento di un testimone del trattato dantesco, sviluppa una serie di considerazioni che si oppongono alla ricostruzione stemmatica proposta dall'ultima edizione critica di Prue Shaw, in particolare per quel che riguarda la posizione dell'*editio princeps* (K). Essa infatti, benché presenti, a suo giudizio, evidenti elementi di contaminazione con la famiglia α, viene ora ricondotta all'interno della famiglia β. L'autore prende in esame, assieme all'*editio princeps*, anche la prima traduzione tedesca ad essa coeva e il volgarizzamento di Ficino su cui si basa quest'ultima. Partendo dalle dichiarazioni del volgarizzatore tedesco, secondo il quale la sua traduzione è stata ricontrollata su un ms. latino, e dall'esame comparato delle tre versioni, l'autore ipotizza che tale ms. sia interno a β e sia lo stesso servito come base della princeps K.[7]

My aim in this article is to look at Renello's arguments in support of his hypothesis and to assess their validity. It should be emphasized at the outset that this is not an exercise in point-scoring; on the contrary, it

[5] *Dantis Alligherii de Monarchia libri III, codicum manuscriptorum ope emendati,* ed. Carolus [Karl] Witte (Vienna: Braumüller, 1874), lxxii.

[6] Gian Paolo Renello, "L'Edizione critica della *Monarchia,*" *Italianistica* 40.1 (2011): 141-80; Renello, "A proposito della *Monarchia*. Note in margine al ritrovamento del ms. Additional 6891," *L'Alighieri* 41 (2013): 115–156.

[7] Renello, "A proposito della *Monarchia*", 115.

touches on fundamental questions of methodology and the weight to be attributed to certain kinds of evidence when formulating a hypothesis about manuscript relationships. In the case of the *Monarchia* we now have 22 witnesses: 21 manuscripts, including Y, and the *editio princeps*. It is important to note that the editor of the *princeps* used a manuscript which does not survive and of which his printed text is our only, albeit indirect, record.

The hypothesis represented in the *EN* stemma shows three lines of descent from the archetype (K, α and β):



How does our new manuscript Y relate to the stemma? Quite independently, Diego Quaglioni and I reached an identical conclusion on where Y goes in the stemma: namely, within the sub-branch β2. This is a gratifying confirmation, were one needed, of the functionality of neo-Lachmannian methodology and the value of applying it to the textual tradition of the *Monarchia*. Why does Y go in β2? because it shares some 70 errors and characteristic variants with these manuscripts and these manuscripts alone. These four manuscripts have a shared ancestor (β2), which represents the point at which those errors and variants were introduced into the tradition.

Some key facts about the Heroldt translation will prove important when we come to assess the light it throws on the transmission history of the treatise. Heroldt translated not from a Latin text, but from Ficino's 1467 Italian version, which he tells us he then checked against a Latin manuscript. Ficino's translation was based on a poor-quality Latin

manuscript close to manuscripts in the β4 and β3 subgroups. Furthermore —a crucial point—Ficino translates very freely, cutting and simplifying the Latin original, pruning it of rather heavy-handed and repetitious phraseology, often using concrete rather than abstract language, meeting his reader half way in terms of making Dante's argument accessible to a lay public not versed in Latin or in the technicalities of syllogistic argument.

The following table shows the sorts of intervention Ficino makes in the text: in bold are some Latin words, phrases, clauses, and even whole sentences omitted in his Italian version.

analetice; liberrime atque facillime; simpliciter; similiter; pariter; subtiliter; aperte; quasi equaliter; dupliciter; typice; omnino; saltem

ut in principio huius capituli est probatum; ut dictum est; ut iam tactum est; ut superius est ostensum; ut iam declaratum est; quod de se patet; ut manifestum est de se; ut patet; ex quo sequitur quod; propter quod sciendum; sed constat quod

I iv 6	**Quod erat necessarium, ut dictum fuit,** velut signum prefixum ...
I vii 1	Est enim quoddam totum ad regna particularia et ad gentes, **ut superiora ostendunt**; et est quedam pars ad totum universum. **Et hoc est de se manifestum.**
I vii 2	… per unum principium tantum, **ut ex superioribus colligi potest de facili:**
I vii 3	… per unum principium tantum, scilicet unicum principem. **Ex quo sequitur Monarchiam necessariam mundo ut bene sit.**
I ix 3	Monarchiam esse, **sive unicum principatum qui 'Imperium' appellatur.**
I x 5	**et hic erit Monarcha sive Imperator. Est igitur Monarchia necessaria mundo.**
I xi 20	**Satis igitur declarata subassumpta principalis, quia conclusio certa est: scilicet quod ad optimam dispositionem mundi necesse est Monarchiam esse.**
I xiii 8	**Bene igitur dictum est cum dicitur in subassumpta quod** Monarcha solus est ille …
I xiv 10	**et sic per Monarcham qui unicus est princeps;**
I ii 1	… **typo ut dicam et secundum intentionem.**

II iii 13	… **‘eius’, idest Affrice, quia de ipsa loquebatur.**
II x 9	Reducitur enim sic: omne iniustum persuadetur iniuste; Cristus non persuasit iniuste: ergo non persuasit iniustum. **A positione antecedentis sic: omne iniustum persuadetur iniuste; Cristus persuasit quoddam iniustum: ergo persuasit iniuste.**
II iii 6	Titus Livius, **gestorum romanorum scriba egregius,** …
II v 15	… **ut Livius, non quantum est dignum, sed quantum potest glorificando renarrat;**

As is clear from these examples, Ficino cuts not just isolated words, or small phrases which form the scaffolding of the argument, but sometimes larger portions of text which are part of its substance; he has little time for the deference and rhetoric used in the citing of authorities. This limited sample aims to give a sense of Ficino’s approach to Dante’s original, but perforce gives no inkling of the extensive scale of his interventions, which operate over the whole length of the treatise.[8] Potentially there is a great deal of material where Heroldt might have amended his translation from the Italian by consulting a Latin manuscript. This is a fruitful area of enquiry, and Renello has made a useful start on analyzing the situation.

But the situation, it must be emphasized, is extremely complicated: the manuscript on which the *princeps* is based does not survive; Heroldt is translating from Ficino, but not from any of the eleven surviving manuscripts of Ficino’s version; Ficino translates from a Latin manuscript which also does not survive. And we have three very independent and enterprising editors and translators (Oporino, Heroldt, Ficino), each in his own way demonstrably taking liberties with his base text to produce what he thinks is a version true to Dante’s thinking yet accessible to a contemporary audience. There is a great deal of room for speculation here. Speculation is of course perfectly legitimate as long as it is not at odds

[8] To appreciate fully the scale of Ficino’s interventions in the text, see Prudence Shaw, ed., “La versione ficiniana della *Monarchia,*” *Studi danteschi* 51 (1978): 308–24. Ficino’s cuts to the text are noted systematically in the recent reprint of my critical text by Francesco Furlan, who retains the original orthography. See Dante Alighieri, *Monarchia con il Commentario di Cola di Rienzo e il volgarizzamento di Marsilio Ficino*, ed. Francesco Furlan (Milan: Mondadori, 2004). The cuts are also noted by Diego Ellero, who offers the text with modernised spelling. See Marsilio Ficino, *La Monarchia di Dante*, ed. Diego Ellero, in Dante Alighieri, *Monarchia,* ed. Paolo Chiesa and Andrea Tabarroni (Rome: Salerno, 2014), 451–536.

with basic considerations of probability and logic and philological methodology.

One of Renello's conclusions, and I think he is very likely to be right about this, is that the manuscript Heroldt consulted to check his translation of Ficino's Italian—his Latin "manoscritto di controllo"—was the one used by Oporino as the basis for the *princeps*. But that, of course, is a very different thing from saying that that Latin manuscript is "all'interno della famiglia β". The place of that manuscript within the stemma is the point at issue.

A comparison between the *EN* stemma in its upper levels and Renello's proposed stemma will help to clarify the point. If K descends directly from the archetype, we have a three-branched tree:



If it is "all'interno della famiglia β", as Renello believes, we have a two-branched tree:[9]



[9] Renello, "L'Edizione critica della *Monarchia*," 159.

To create his two-branched tree, Renello has introduced an extra stage into the transmission, a hypothetical β_o.

The fundamental principle of manuscript classification, which lies behind the creation of a stemma, is vertical descent established by the sharing of common errors. What is the case for thinking that K descends independently from the archetype? It has no errors in common with α (as I was at pains to demonstrate in the *EN*—Pier Giorgio Ricci in his 1965 edition had placed it in α);[10] and it has none of the fifteen errors which link all the manuscripts of β.

How does Renello explain the absence of β errors and lacunae in the *princeps*? Renello asserts repeatedly, but without ever discussing the implications of his claim, that the absence of these readings in K is a result of K's contamination with the α ms. T (either the scribe of the manuscript on which the *princeps* is based, or the editor of the printed version itself—he does not say which—introduced these correct readings by taking them from T).[11] This is asserted almost casually, *en passant*, then repeated, without ever being discussed or considered in depth. What starts as speculation seems to harden into certainty with repetition. Thus K is described as "contaminato con T" as if this were an established fact.[12] But, of course, if the manuscript on which K is based is not a β manuscript, we do not have to make this assumption about contamination with T. In the same way Renello refers to "il manoscritto β di controllo", as if that too were a fact, when it is precisely the affiliation of the control manuscript that he is trying to establish.[13]

There is a vanishingly small chance that if Oporino, or the scribe of his exemplar, had contaminated with T he would have introduced exactly and precisely and only the corrections to the β errors. A much simpler and more economical explanation for the presence of *all* the correct readings in K is that K inherited these good readings by direct descent from the archetype. Renello's thesis offends against the principle of parsimony

[10] Dante Alighieri, *Monarchia,* ed. Pier Giorgio Ricci, vol. 5 of *Le opere di Dante Alighieri. Edizione Nazionale*, edited by the Società Dantesca Italiana (Milan: Mondadori, 1965).

[11] In the last footnote to his article Renello seems to imply that the contamination happened in the manuscript rather than in the edition: "Se l'*editio princeps*, come credo, era contaminata con testimoni di entrambe le famiglie, allora lo era senz'altro anche il suo antigrafo." See Renello, "A proposito della *Monarchia*," 153n123. The 2013 hypothesis about contamination of K with T makes the 2011 notion of a β_o redundant, but Renello does not spell out this methodological point.

[12] Ibid., 152.

[13] Ibid., 139.

(Occam's razor): we do not need the hypothetical entity β_o to explain the data, nor do we need the notion of contamination. The fact that in his second article Renello does not reproduce the diagram and indeed seems to have abandoned the notion of a β_o, perhaps suggests that he has come to see the weakness of this position.

If we look at the stemma which represents Renello's hypothesis about K being "all'interno della famiglia β", then the difficulties with his view are easy to see. While both for α and for β we have a substantial list of incontrovertible errors shared by all manuscripts in the family,[14] for Renello's hypothetical β_o we have a short list of very problematical readings. Renello admits candidly that most of these readings are certainly polygenetic: "in molti casi si tratta di indubbi errori poligenetici."[15] One could add that in the second half of the treatise, where T alone represents α, an alternative explanation is that these are archetype errors corrected in T. It seems worth reiterating this key point: there are no clear, unequivocal errors linking K and β.

Let's move on to Renello's hypothesis as it is laid out in his 2013 article, where K is said to be based on "un esemplare vicino a β2/β3". Renello has two arguments to support this assertion: a shared chapter break at II v 18, and a very small number of errors shared by K with just one β3 manuscript, ms. E. A supplementary argument, presented very tendentiously, is that the state of the cross-reference to *Paradiso* at I xii 6 —notoriously missing in K—is a possible textual link between K and β2.

We can begin with the chapter break argument. It is true that there is a chapter break at II v 18 in K and in the manuscripts of β2/β3, a break not found in other manuscripts. Before moving on to the general question of the validity of an argument for manuscript affiliations based on chapter breaks, a couple of small factual points seem relevant.

II v is the longest chapter in the treatise, and by a very considerable margin. It is almost half as long again as the next longest chapter. It has 142 lines of text in the *EN*; the next longest chapter is II ix at 106 lines, the third longest is I xi at 86 lines. The average chapter length is 48 lines. Chapter II v is a *very* long chapter; it is perhaps not unlikely that a copyist or editor might think it time for a break.

It seems worth pointing out also that the readings are not identical in K and in the β manuscripts which start a new chapter here. The β2/β3 manuscripts, in line with the text of the *EN*, have (with slight variations) *Declarata* (FP *Declarat*, Ph *Declaratum*) *igitur duo sunt*, looking back to

[14] See *EN*, 81-82 for α; *EN*, 69–78 for β.
[15] Renello, "L'Edizione critica della *Monarchia*," 155.

the argument already articulated; K by contrast has *Declaranda igitur duo sunt*, which looks forward, not back. *Declaranda* does not make much sense in context, suggesting that the *princeps* editor (or the copyist of the Latin manuscript he was using) did not track the development of the argument. But it does suggest that the motivation for introducing a break here was a different one, however muddled. And we can just note in passing that where there is a chapter break at III xi which does not fit Renello's thesis, because it suggests that K does not go with β, he explains it away, saying that Oporino will have introduced that break independently, off his own bat.[16]

But the important point is a general one: what weight does a shared chapter break have in establishing manuscript relationships? There are many chapter breaks (or indeed missing chapter breaks) which considered on their own might suggest manuscript affiliations which are not supported by textual evidence, but if there is no textual evidence linking the manuscripts, we attribute no weight to the chapter breaks at all.

Let us briefly consider this broader picture. There are numerous cases of otherwise unrelated manuscripts sharing or omitting a chapter break: thus, A^1 and D have no division at I vi 1 *Et sic se habet* and there is no reason to think this is by anything but chance. D and S introduce a division at II x 4 *Dico ergo quod*: again, the convergence is fortuitous. There is no new chapter at III ix 1 *Accipiunt etiam illud Luce* in C H L P Y Z, but this is not an argument for a close link between these six manuscripts, except in the case of H and Z, where it fits the pattern revealed by a long list of common errors and variants. Where A^2 and β2 (PFNY) introduce a chapter break at III x 12 *Amplius*, this is not evidence of a link between A^2 and β2, since they have only a single variant in common (*habentes* for *abeuntes* at I xii 5). But when A^2 and the core manuscripts of β3 (DGPhV) introduce a break at II ix 12 *Sed romanus populus*, and another at II x 1 *Maxime enim fremuerunt* (instead of at *Usque adhuc* one sentence earlier), this double break, which sets these witnesses apart from the remaining manuscripts, confirms a connection already established by a network of shared variants.

For anyone who has worked on the manuscripts of the *Monarchia*, the general fluidity or malleability of the text in relation to chapter breaks is quite striking. It can be further illustrated by the many points where isolated manuscripts omit breaks found in all the other witnesses: at I iv 1 *Satis* there is no new chapter in ms. V; at I vii 1 *Amplius humana universitas* there is no chapter break in ms. D; at I ix 1 *Item* there is no break in ms. A; at I x 1 *Et ubicunque* again there is no break in ms. A; at I

[16] Renello, "A proposito della *Monarchia*," 135.

xvi 1 *Rationibus* there is no new chapter in ms. V; at II iv 1 *Illud* there is no break in ms. A. At other points anomalous chapter breaks are introduced in isolated manuscripts: at I v 7 *Si vero* only in ms. A; at II ix 15 *Cumque duo populi* only in S; at III xvi 16 *Et iam* only in P. In the Hyères manuscript of the Ficino volgarizzamento there is a chapter break at III x 10 *Ancora* (Latin: *Preterea*) which has no counterpart in any other manuscript, Latin or vernacular. In the volgarizzamento anonimo there is a new chapter at I xiv 5 *Habent nanque nationes* (*Ànno però le nazioni*): again, there is no counterpart in any surviving Latin manuscript, or in Ficino's version. And the volgarizzamento anonimo starts a new chapter at III xi *Adhuc dicunt*, like KTMD and no other Latin manuscript (and again this chapter break is not in Ficino).

There are even more surprising anomalies and convergences in the way the text is divided in different manuscripts. In ms. P, Book II begins not at II i, but at II ii, which has a splendid decorated initial fully thirteen lines deep and a scribal note to the effect that this is *Monarchie secundus*, whereas II i (the authentic first chapter of Book II) has a marginal note by the copyist to the effect that *In hoc ultimo capitulo dantes invehit in principes et reges terre contra Romanum Imperium insurgentes etcetera*. The same thing happens in ms. S, a manuscript which has no connection to ms. P, where again Book II starts not at II i, but at II ii, with a large capital letter. But P and S share only three variants not found in other manuscripts (II i 5 *ad rumpendum* for *ad dirumpendum*; II v 15 *quam* for *quantum*; III iii 6 *genera hominum* for *hominum genera*; see below for a discussion of such chance convergent readings). The shared idiosyncrasy in layout and textual division, striking though it is, is not evidence of a link between mss. P and S.

The complexity of the data in respect of chapter breaks in the treatise cautions against any simplistic assumption that the shared break at II v 18, on its own and unsupported by any other evidence, constitutes proof of a link between K and β2/β3. The *Monarchia* is a text which introduces chapter breaks or loses them very easily: this is a fact that Renello does not consider. A striking example of a shared chapter break which has no probative force at all is the one at II x 1, shared by just three witnesses: Latin ms. T *Usque adhuc*; the Heroldt translation, *BIß hieher*;[17] and the Hyères manuscript alone among the eleven surviving manuscripts of the Ficino version, *Infino quy*. No other manuscript (Latin or vernacular) has a chapter break here, nor does the *princeps*. But it would be unwise to argue on this basis that there is a link between these three witnesses. Only when

[17] Dante, *Monarchey Oder Daß das Keyserthumb*, 121.

a chapter break fits in with the pattern of distribution of errors and variants does it become a significant piece of evidence.

Chapter breaks in the Ficino and Heroldt translations show how easily breaks are introduced or ignored, yet Renello specifically makes the chapter breaks in the two translations a part of his argument, and discusses them at some length. Most of what he says is factually true and interesting, but I'm obliged to point out that it does not support his argument in any way.

The table below shows chapter breaks in the Latin text, in Ficino, and in Heroldt, in Book I of the *Monarchia*:

Latin Book I	**Ficino**	**Heroldt**
	proemio	Vorrede
i	i	Vorrede
		Epitaphium
ii	ii	Das erste Capitel
	iii [=Latin ii, 5-8]	
iii	iv	Das ander Capitel
iv	v	Das dritt Capitel
	vi [=Latin iv, 5-6]	
v	vii	Das iiij. Capitel
vi	viii	Das v. Capitel
vii	ix	Das sechßt Capitel
viii	x	Das vii. Capitel
ix	xi	Das neündt Capitel
x	xii	Das ix. Cap.
xi	xiii	Das x. Capitel
xii	xiv	Das xj. Capitel
xiii	xv	Das xij. Capitel
xiv	xvi	Das xij. Capitel
xv	xvii	Das xiiij. Cap.
xvi	xviii	Das xv. Cap.

A glance at the table shows that Ficino has introduced breaks that are not in the Latin, and that Heroldt has, in these instances, corrected them but that his numbering is erratic. What is less apparent from the table is that Heroldt has radically rethought the textual organization of the opening section of the treatise.

Heroldt has taken notable liberties in the way he structures the layout of the argument. He calls chapter i a foreword (*Vorrede*), so that chapter ii of the Latin text becomes his chapter i. He moves a sentence from the beginning of one chapter to the end of the previous one, and moves another sentence from the end of one chapter to the beginning of the next one. He introduces Dante's epitaph, in Latin and German, to occupy a whole page between his foreword and his chapter i, in other words between what we know as chapters i and ii of the Latin text. (No manuscript does this, although ms. C adds the epitaph at the end of the treatise.) The German translation of the epitaph specifically identifies Dante as author not just of the *Monarchia*, but of *Hell*, *Purgatory* and *Paradise* as well, a point we will come back to:

> Lebend bschreyb ich, das Keyserthumb,
> Hell, Fegfewr, Pardiß umb und umb.

Renello draws attention to these Ficino and Heroldt anomalies in chapter divisions, but he still feels able to say: "la struttura dei capitoli dei testimoni latini, del volgarizzamento di Ficino e della traduzione di Heroldt ci ha portato ad affermare che sotto questo aspetto K sembra appartenere alla famiglia β." This conclusion is baffling; there is no link between the evidence he has given and what he deduces from it. Most of what he has said about chapter divisions in his detailed analysis has no bearing on the question. The only relevant fact is the chapter break at II v 18; none of the additional data leads to his conclusion. The wealth of detail is interesting in itself for establishing Heroldt's *modus operandi* (and Renello surely underestimates the German translator's autonomy); but it has no bearing at all on the argument about the position of K.

To summarize: when a chapter division is shared by witnesses that share other errors and variants, it is likely to be part of a shared pattern of innovation, and can be considered a confirmation of the existence of a common ancestor for the manuscripts which share it. When there are no shared errors and variants, the shared chapter division may be, is indeed likely to be, a chance convergence. The *Monarchia* is a text which both splits and joins easily: scribes (and editors) introduce new chapter breaks, or fail to do so, not necessarily following their exemplar. As the table shows, Ficino introduces breaks where no Latin manuscript does so: Latin

I ii becomes Ficino's I ii and iii, Latin I iv becomes Ficino's I v and vi. Heroldt does the same thing at yet other points: Ficino's III xv becomes Heroldt's xv, xvi and a final unnumbered chapter.

A final argument involving chapter breaks is used by Renello to establish the supposed closeness of the "manoscritto di controllo" to β3. It goes as follows:

> Siamo dunque di fronte a un nuovo e interessante indizio: solo i manoscritti della famiglia β3 con l'esclusione di D, presentano contemporaneamente un nuovo capitolo a II v 18 e, come visto sopra, non hanno la suddivisione di capitolo a III xi. Possiamo in tal modo restringere ulteriormente l'area di collegamento del manoscritto di controllo a quest'ultima famiglia.[18]

This is both factually inaccurate and beside the point. Factually inaccurate, because the β2 mss. share these same characteristics, which are thus not exclusive to β3. Beside the point, because, as Renello fails to mention, the Ficino version, on which Heroldt's translation is based, has these same divisions. (The chapter divisions in Ficino and Heroldt in books II and III of the *Monarchia* are set out in a table in the Appendix to this article.) The shared pattern might be an argument for linking Ficino (and thus Heroldt) to β2/β3, but it tells us nothing at all about the "manoscritto di controllo". Heroldt often follows Ficino when the Ficino reading differs from K, as it does here, of course: K has the chapter break at III xi. Once again, Renello's conclusion does not follow from the facts. Those facts do not allow us to conclude anything at all about the "manoscritto di controllo".

In short, the evidence about chapter breaks across the tradition as a whole suggests precisely the opposite conclusion to the one reached by Renello: the shared break at II v 18 is *not* evidence of a close relationship between K and β2/β3.

Renello's second argument in support of his hypothesis about the position of K is based on a small number of errors shared by K with ms. E. I mentioned these errors in the *EN*, precisely to illustrate the point I am now going to elaborate, that the textual material in the extant witnesses is not "razionalizzabile al 100%".[19] My explanation of the small number of errors shared by K and E is contamination of K by E, or perhaps of E by K, in a small section of the text: the two striking errors occur within a few lines of one another, at III xii 8 and III xii 9. We must appeal here to a sense of what this tiny number of anomalous variants counts for when set

[18] Renello, "A proposito della *Monarchia*," 134.
[19] *EN*, 62–63.

against the weight of the overall distribution of variants across the tradition. I discounted these variants as being of insufficient weight or substance when set against the overwhelmingly persuasive lists of variants which establish the existence of α, of β, and of β1, β2, β3 and β4.

What Renello makes no attempt to explain is how a manuscript can be close to β2 when it has none of the errors on the basis of which we identify these manuscripts as forming one branch of the stemma (of the seventy-odd such errors and variants listed in my analysis of ms. Y, K has not a single one);[20] or how it can be close to β3 when, likewise, it shares none of the errors characterizing the manuscripts which constitute that family.[21]

The errors K shares with E must be seen against this background; they cannot count for more than the many identifying errors of these two groups *not* present in K. Renello never mentions this countervailing evidence. Also, as noted, he does not attempt to draw a stemma or diagram to show how K relates to β2 and β3. This is not surprising: it would be impossible to devise a graphic representation of the relations he posits, a situation which defies genealogical and pictorial logic.

There is something else that Renello never takes into consideration. It is surely relevant that E is not unique in sharing isolated errors and variants with K: every other manuscript with the exception of L (and its *descripts* Q) has a small number of such shared readings, some of them quite striking.[22] By picking out isolated readings which do not fit the overall pattern of errors, we could construct an alternative hypothesis just as plausible to someone not familiar with the whole tradition, and just as baseless. One could, for example, posit a special link of K to the manuscripts M, D and G. Let us consider this hypothesis, for the sake of argument, not to suggest that it has any merit, but to show that the hypothesis advanced by Renello about a K link to ms. E has no more substance than the alternative that he does not consider. It is instructive to weigh the evidence which might link K to these manuscripts against the evidence Renello puts forward for a link between K and ms. E.

First, a singular correspondence. Only K and M have the interpolated phrase *Et hoc simul accipe dictum* inserted into the middle of the quotation from Cicero (who in his turn is quoting Ennius) at II ix 8. (The phrase is

[20] See Shaw, "Un secondo manoscritto," 228–31.
[21] *EN*, 114–21, 136–40.
[22] The figures and readings are easily obtained using Vbase on the DVD-Rom. See Dante Alighieri, *Monarchia* [DVD-ROM], ed. Prue Shaw (Birmingham and Florence: Scholarly Digital Editions—Società Dantesca Italiana, 2006); the figures are listed in Shaw, "Un secondo manoscritto," 247n42.

an interpolation in Dante's text, since he cites the lines from Ennius omitting these words.)

> Vosne velit an me regnare Hera, quidve ferat sors,
> virtute experiamur. Et hoc simul accipe dictum:
> Quorum virtuti belli fortuna pepercit,
> eorundem me libertati parcere certum est.

This is surely just as remarkable as the errors shared by K with E. As well as this shared interpolation, found in no other manuscript, there are two other less significant variants found only in K and M (at II iii 6 *veterum testimonia* for *testimonia veterum*; at II ix 8 *horundem* for *eorundem*).

There is in addition a series of errors and variants, including three omissions, present only in K and ms. D (the shared readings are in the left-hand column, the readings in the right-hand column are those of the *EN*):

I xi 17	est magis est causa	magis est causa
II vii 8	*om.*secundo Paralipomenon	
II viii 6	cum intentione	et intentionem
II ix 190	*om.* quidem	
II x 6	*om.* homo	
III iii 7	grecorum	gregum
III iv 11	sompniis	sompnis
III x 5	facile	de facili

This is, incidentally, a more impressive list of correspondences than the one Renello produces for K and E.

And just as K shares a chapter break at II v 18 with β2/β3, so too it shares a chapter break at III xi 1 with MD and T only, a break found in no other manuscript. Does this justify a hypothesis that K is "vicino ad un esemplare β4/β3", and particularly close to the contaminated manuscripts M and D? No, it does not. These shared variants go against the overall picture, just as the K + E readings do. And if we look at possible links between K and ms. G, the manuscript to which D is closely related, we find another interesting list of shared variants found in no other manuscript (again the shared readings are in the left-hand column, the readings in the right-hand column are those of the *EN*):

I iv 5	opera nostra	nostra opera
I xi 20	declarata est	declarata
II v 3	*om.* sunt	
II v 5	aversa	adversa
II viii 12	qui	que (twice)
II ix 15	*om.* hinc	
III iii 2	*om.* vero	
III iv 18	in libro de Doctrina	in Doctrina

Another indicator, it could be argued, that K's affiliations with β, such as they are, are with MDG.

All these anomalous readings linking K with M, with D, and with G, just like the others I have listed elsewhere, are readings which do not fit the pattern suggested by the preponderance of the evidence.[23] They form part of the complexity of the picture to which I referred when in the *EN* I used the phrase I have already quoted, pointing out that the textual tradition of the *Monarchia* is not "razionalizzabile al 100%". Renello, seizing on a possible link with E—to which I myself drew attention as the most obvious example of data which did not quite fit—overlooks similar possible links with other manuscripts which must be ruled out in order to have a workable view of the material.[24]

To summarize on the issue of textual substance: there are scores of chance agreements between manuscripts not stemmatically related, as anyone browsing the Word Collation on the DVD-Rom *Monarchia* will immediately appreciate. These exist alongside the far larger number of errors and variants which unequivocally establish family groupings and enable us to orientate ourselves within the textual tradition, and prove the existence of α, of β, and of β1, β2, β3 and β4 and their smaller subgroups. Disconcerting though the anomalous readings sometimes are, the point is that there are not large numbers of them: there are not enough of them to be significant or to invalidate the main hypothesis.

How do we account for these anomalous correspondences which do not fit the larger pattern? There are two possible explanations: either polygenetic error (to which the *Monarchia* text is notoriously prone), or contamination (and where the readings are particularly striking, this seems the most likely explanation). Contamination is a necessary

[23] Shaw, "Un secondo manoscritto," 247n42.
[24] *EN*, 63.

explanatory concept for the textual critic; it is certainly true that K seems to be a very contaminated witness. But it is playing fast and loose with the notion of contamination to use it as Renello does in relation to K, to explain away the absence of β errors, but not to accept that it must account for the small number of random coincidences in readings on which he bases his argument. Contamination cannot be invoked as an all-purpose get-out to explain away anything that does not fit an eccentric hypothesis.

It is perhaps worth restating the usefulness and limitations of neo-Lachmannian methodology. That methodology gives an orientation among surviving witnesses; it will not necessarily be able to account for *all* the data, some of which may remain puzzling. The process by which a text is copied through many generations does not operate according to rules of mathematical precision: we are not talking about mathematically watertight certainties when we produce a stemma. Contamination, scribal conjecture, polygenetic error are explanatory tools the philologist perforce uses, but they must be used with a respect for the elementary logic of evolutionary descent and with methodological sobriety and propriety.

By basing his stemmatic hypothesis on a small number of anomalous readings and avoiding the overwhelming preponderance of the evidence, Renello ignores the necessary logic of vertical descent and the formation of a stemma. The argument based on textual substance (a tiny number of shared errors in K and E) is no more persuasive than the argument based on a shared chapter break for believing that there is a relationship of descent between K and β, and that K is to be positioned "all'interno di β, vicino ad un esemplare β2/β3".

A third argument developed at some length by Renello in his 2013 article involves the notorious cross-reference to *Paradiso* at I xii 6. That cross-reference is missing in the *princeps*; Oporino in his *lettera dedicatoria* tells us that the author of the *Monarchia* is not Dante, the famous old poet, but a contemporary of Poliziano's: "Sunt autem quos adiunximus, primùm DANTIS Alighierii, non vetustioris illius Florentini poetæ celeberrimi, sed philosophi acutissimi atque doctiss. viri, & Angeli Politiani familiaris quondam, de Monarchia libri tres"[25].

[25] Dante Alighieri, *Andreæ Alciati iure consulti clariss. De formula Romani Imperii Libellus. Accesserunt non dissimilis argumenti, Dantis Florentini "De Monarchia" libri tres. Radulphi Carnotensis De translatione Imperii libellus. Chronica M. Iordanis, Qualiter Romanum Imperium translatum sit ad Germanos. Omnia nunc primùm in lucem edita* (Basel: Ioannes Oporinus, 1559), 51.

Perhaps the single most striking fact about ms. Y is that it carries the cross-reference in a garbled form, with an unintelligible phrase (*inminuadiso*) in place of the words *in Paradiso*, and the word *inmediate* instead of *Commedia*. Renello suggests that this garbled state of the inciso in ms. Y constitutes a textual link between K, where it is missing, and β2, where it is problematic in two of the manuscripts. In β2 mss. P and F it is present only in part, with a blank space left where the missing words should be. Renello describes this situation in a tendentious way, saying, for example, that K and F "non riportano l'inciso" and that F is "totalmente lacunoso", turns of phrase which fudge the very real difference between a witness where the phrase is entirely absent and a witness where there is a blank space left for some missing words.[26] I am not going to talk here about the substance of the Y reading.[27] I want rather to track Renello's argument, showing how he links the Y reading to K, and then connects both of them to Heroldt, in ways that in my view raise more problems than they solve.

Renello believes the K ms. may have had the inciso in a garbled form similar to Y. He repeats this conjecture often, as though by dint of repetition a conjecture becomes a fact.[28] If it were true that the K manuscript had the inciso in a garbled form (and it is a big if), this would constitute a textual link between K and β2; Renello has not so far given us any such textual links, for the very good reason that none exist. His next point is that *if* the K ms. had a garbled inciso, that could explain why Oporino cut it in the *princeps*. That makes perfect sense. But he seems to be saying more than this: that a garbled inciso in his exemplar will have confirmed Oporino's belief that the author of the treatise was not Dante, the famous old poet. This is harder to accept: an unintelligible phrase would surely have no bearing on the identity of the author.

There are also difficulties with Renello's position which, ironically, his own findings highlight. His article throws interesting light on the relationship between Oporino and Heroldt, showing it to have been one of collaboration, esteem, and even friendship, with Heroldt referring to Oporino in print as "Oporinus ille noster", "benemerito homini Oporino

[26] Renello, "A proposito della *Monarchia*," 130.

[27] I plan to deal with the subject elsewhere. See Annalisa Belloni and Diego Quaglioni, "Un restauro dantesco: *Monarchia* I xii 6," *Aevum* 88 (2014): 493–501.

[28] Thus: "lacunoso o oscuro," 152; "guasta, o lacunosa, o comunque illeggibile," 153; "forse difficilmente leggibile e quindi inutilizzabile, o comunque non credibile," ibid.; "illeggibile o non affidabile," 154; "una frase forse lacunosa, incomprensibile, o addirittura assente," ibid. (Renello, "L'Edizione critica della *Monarchia*").

nostro."[29] He shows that Heroldt helped Oporino with the preparation of the *princeps* volume, and surmises that in exchange Oporino let Heroldt see the *princeps* Latin manuscript: "Come non pensare, allora, che il curatore della traduzione tedesca abbia avuto il permesso di consultare il ms. latino".[30] This also makes perfect sense.

But this hypothesis (that Oporino lent Heroldt the K manuscript as his "manoscrito di controllo", to check his translation from Ficino), far from throwing light on Oporino's conviction that the *Monarchia* is not by Dante, surely makes the situation even more puzzling, because Heroldt, of course, knows very well that the author of the *Monarchia* is Dante, the famous old poet.

Indeed, one might almost think that Heroldt goes out of his way to underline Dante's authorship of the treatise. He includes the cross-reference to the *Paradiso* at I xii 6: *wie ich dann inn meinem Büch von dem Paradeis ettwa gemeldet hab*. He translates Ficino's *proemio*, which leaves Dante's identity in no doubt and speaks of him in highly laudatory terms as the author of the *Commedia*. He adds within the text, and translates, the epitaph which spells out Dante's authorship of *Monarchia* and *Inferno*, *Purgatorio* and *Paradiso*. In his own foreword he gives a lively account of the banning and burning of the political treatise in Bologna by Bernard du Poujet, conveying a sense of outrage that the Cardinal wanted to dig up Dante's bones and throw them on the pyre as well (all the details are taken from Boccaccio's *Trattatello*):

> Da was Bertrand von Castenet, der Cardinal Portuensis, ein hochtragender roher freueler Frantzose Bäpstlicher zu Bononien Legat, der selbig verfolget allen anhang, menschen unnd schriffte, so Keyser Ludwigen beigstanden, unnd so fleysigst auch wie vil er diser büechlin erfaren unnd zwegen bringen kundt, ließ er sye alle alß ketzerisch offentlich in fewr verprennen on allen widerstand, dann mänigcklich war erhaset. Also das er so freuel, unn das grab Dantis zu Ravenna, dorein jne der herr daselbst Guido Novello da Polenta, ehrlich bestattet hatt, auffbrechen lassen wolt, unnd den todten cörpel Dantis oder das gepeyn als eins kätzers zu äschen machen. Und das ward jhme hart abgebetten, durch zwen fürstmässig Herren, die dem Cardinal gar wol an, dero der ein Pino delle [*sic*] Tosa, der ander Astigo von Polenta gnannt.[31]

[29] Dante, *Andreæ Alciati iure consulti clariss.* 259, 260.
[30] Renello, "A proposito della *Monarchia*," 151.
[31] The opening pages of the Heroldt translation, including all the introductory material, are unnumbered in the printed volume. For the convenience of readers wishing to view this material on the website, I list here the image numbers of the

And evidently unaware of Dante's reluctance to name himself, in accordance with the rules of medieval rhetoric, unless it is absolutely essential to do so, he adds Dante's name within the text of the treatise, at III iii 10, for rhetorical emphasis: "noch darff man sich sollicher jünglingen nit verwundern. dann **ich Dantes** hab selbs von iro eynem gehört, das er unverschämpter weiß kain blatt für den mundt genommen, schwören dorfft, die Decret und solliche satzungen der kirchen wäre eyn grundtvestin Christliches glaubens." It seems no exaggeration to say that Heroldt's little book is not just a translation of Dante's political treatise, but also a celebration of its author's life and works.

But Renello is forced by the logic of his own position to say that Oporino will not have known about Ficino's version, even though he lends Heroldt a Latin manuscript to check his translation against: "Oporino, all'oscuro della copia ficiniana".[32] If the circumstances Renello describes about their relationship are true, is it likely that Oporino could have been "all'oscuro della versione ficiniana"? What Renello has established about Oporino and Heroldt and their friendly and collaborative relationship makes Oporino's denial of Dante's authorship more puzzling, not less so. In spite of Renello's extensive ruminations on the subject, the *princeps* editor's reasons for believing the treatise not to be by Dante, if he believes that in good faith, remain more mysterious than ever.

To conclude: it seems important to pinpoint the real and welcome contribution made by Renello to our knowledge and understanding of the textual transmission of the *Monarchia*, and to separate that contribution from the dubious speculative and argumentative material in which it is embedded. Renello has made a valuable start on analyzing the relationship of Heroldt's translation both to the Ficino version on which it is based, and to the text of the *princeps*, showing convincingly that the "manoscritto di controllo" used by Heroldt is very likely to have been the one used by Oporino for his edition. This is certainly a significant finding. But what Renello has quite failed to prove is that the "manoscritto di controllo" belongs in the β family.

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passages referred to in the text: Ficino's proemio: images 29–30; Dante's epitaph: image 35; the passage which describes Bernard du Poujet's plan to throw Dante's bones on the fire along with copies of the *Monarchia*: images 23–4. The cross-reference to *Paradiso* is on p. 38; the self-citation at III iii 10 is on p. 140. A digital copy of the work is available online at:
http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:bvb:12-bsb00039127-5

[32] Renello, "A proposito della *Monarchia*", 153.

Renello's presentation of the evidence about the position of K in the stemma is selective, tendentious, and sometimes plain wrong. His hypothesis about the stemma and the position of the *princeps* in it is not, with all due respect, "meritevole di attenzione", as one scholar has suggested.[33] It has no merit. It should be rejected out of hand.[34]

Appendix: Chapter breaks in Ficino and Heroldt in Books II and III of the *Monarchia*

Latin	Ficino	Heroldt
Book II		
i	i	Vorrede
ii	ii	Das erste Capitel
iii	iii	Das ij. Cap.
iv	iv	Das dritt Capitel
v	v	Das iiij. Cap.
	vi [=Latin v, 18-26]	Das fünfft Capitel
vi	vii	Das sechßt Capitel
vii	viii	Das vij Cap.
viii	ix	Das viij. Capitel
ix	x [=Latin ix + x]	Das neündt Capitel
x		Das x. Cap.
xi	xi	Das xj. Capitel

[33] Quaglioni, "Un nuovo testimone", 235.

[34] A fuller discussion of some of the issues raised in this article can now be found in the Appendice to the *EN*, published by the Società Dantesca Italiana: *Il ms. London, British Library Add. 6891 della Monarchia*, ed. Prue Shaw (Florence, Le Lettere, 2018).

Book III		
i	i	Vorrede
ii	ii	Das erst Cap.
iii	iii	Das ij. Cap.
iv	iv	Das iij. Cap.
v	v	Das iiij. Cap.
vi	vi	Das v. Capitel
vii	vii	[=Latin vi + vii, but vi is omitted from the numbering]
viii	viii	Das vij. Capitel
ix	ix	Das viij. Capitel
x	x [=Latin x + xi]	Das neundte Capittel
xi		[=Latin x + xi; x is omitted from the numbering]
xii	xi	Das xi. Cap.
xiii	xii	Das xij Cap.
xiv	xiii	Das xiij Cap.
xv	xiv	Das xiiij. Cap.
xvi	xv	Das xv. Capitel
		[=Latin xvi, 1-11]
		Das xvi. Cap.
		[=Latin xvi, 12-15]
		There is a rubric but no chapter number for the last division.
		[=Latin xvi, 16-18]
		Thus, Latin III xvi becomes three chapters in Heroldt, although it remains only one chapter in Ficino.

CHAPTER NINE

POWER AND RIGHT: DANTE'S *MONARCHIA* AND TWO DOCUMENTS OF JURIDICAL LITERATURE FROM THE XIII AND EARLY XIV CENTURIES

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The two documents presented here, both in the original Latin and in my English translation, belong to distant historical epochs and bear overt differences in terms of notoriety, genre, authorship, and dating.[1] The first is a rather obscure anonymous text of juridical nature whose hypothetical date of composition oscillates between the third and the fifth decade of the 13th century, either at the time or near the time of Frederick II Hohenstaufen. The second is the well-known *Coronation Encyclical* promulgated by Henry VII of Luxembourg when he was anointed emperor of the Holy Roman Empire on June 29, 1312. Aside from their differences, both texts are part of a tradition that since the 12th century flourished in Europe on the intersection of theology, law, and political theory and was characterized by concerns with the problem of justice, as well as the nature, origin, and extent of sovereignty and kingship, the relationship of power and right, and the role and mutual relation of the universal powers. Given the centrality of these themes in Dante's *Monarchy* and without claiming on my part any mastery of the technical and juridical aspects of the documents, I propose them as relevant voices in an ongoing debate in which Dante—the political theorist and the poet alike—is a prominent protagonist and contributor.

In this tradition, the two emperors who bracket Dante's political reflection—Frederick II and Henry VII—were both legislators and

[1] I am not aware of any other English translation of these texts.

political theorists as testified by Frederick's *Constitutions of Melfi*, alias *Liber Augustalis*, with their famous *Proem* of 1231 and, eight decades later, Henry's *Pisan Constitutions* and *Coronation Encyclical*. Illustrious medieval historians, such as Ernst H. Kantorowicz and Antonino De Stefano, were indeed convinced that Frederick II anticipated in practice what Dante later theorized and saw in the Swabian ruler the embodiment of Dante's imperial ideal.[2] As for the *Coronation Encyclical* of Henry VII, the initial paragraph of the text has been recently reproposed by Diego Quaglioni in his introduction to the Mondadori Edition of the *Monarchy*, where he considers it to be an "extraordinary ideological manifesto" whose statements of principle closely recall the first book of Dante's treatise.[3]

In fact, the ideal continuity between the two emperors is sanctioned not only by Dante who sees in Henry the promise of an imperial rebirth after the demise of the "last emperor of the Romans" (*Cv* IV iii 6), but also by Henry himself who claims a proximity to Frederick II—"once our predecessor" (*Encyclical*, par. 2)—prior to the imperial vacancy that his Roman coronation is bringing to an end.[4] As Kantorowicz pointed out in *The King's Two Bodies*, it is with Frederick II and his grandfather Roger II of Sicily that the conception of kingship becomes law centered while maintaining a symbolic continuity with the earlier Christocentric conception.[5] Kantorowicz's argument finds a confirmation in the encomiastic literature produced in that period within and without the Swabian court, instances of which would offer an implicit commentary to Frederick's juridical pronouncements while serving the propagandistic purpose of legitimizing his power.[6] The possibility that the *Liber*

[2] Ernst H. Kantorowicz, *Federico II, Imperatore* (Milano: Garzanti. 2000), 239; De Stefano, *L'idea imperiale di Federico II* (Parma: All'insegna del Veltro, 1999), 50-76.

[3] Diego Quaglioni, "Introduzione" to *Monarchia,* ed. Diego Quaglioni. In Dante Alighieri. *Opere* (Milano: Mondadori. 2014), 846. See also Quaglioni, "La Monarchia, l'deologia imperiale e la cancelleria di Enrico VII." In *Enrico VII, Dante e Pisa a 700 anni dalla morte dell'imperatore e dalla* Monarchia *(1313-2013),* eds. Giuseppe Petralia and Marco Santagata (Ravenna: Longo, 2016), 323-335.

[4] On the imperial vacancy, see *Dino Compagni e la sua Cronica* per Isidoro del Lungo, Book III, xxiii, 345-347. Vol II (Firenze: Successori Le Monnier, 1879); and Dante, "Non sarà tutto tempo sanza reda / l'aguglia" (The eagle…will not forever be / without an heir), *Pg* XXXIII 37-38.

[5] Kantorowicz, *The King's Two Bodies: A Study in Mediaeval Political Theology* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957), 102.

[6] Fulvio Delle Donne, *Il Potere e la sua legittimazione: Letteratura encomiastica*

Augustalis and this attending literature—in particular the *preconium* by Pier delle Vigne and the *dictamen* by Nicholas of Bari—played a role in Dante's musing on sovereignty has already been an object of study, including my own, in relation to both the *Comedy* and the *Monarchy*.[7] Not so for the anonymous text presented here. As I hope to now show, the piece that I designate as an *Anonymous Preface,* deserves attention not only for being a document of medieval philosophy and hermeneutics of the law but also for its political value insofar as it presents an alternative to the hermeneutical—and hence ideological—agenda of the encomiastic texts, offering valuable points of comparison with Dante's political theories in and beyond the *Monarchy*.

Monarchia II I 1–8: A Hub of Connections

The prologue of the second Book of the *Monarchy* provides a suitable entry point into the text-context relation that I want to focus on here. It does so first with its specific theme that fits within the broader parameters of the relation of power and right: the demonstration of the legitimacy of the Roman Empire.[8] Dante begins with a quote from *Psalm* 2: "Quare fremuerunt gentes, et populi meditate sunt inania? Astiterunt reges terre, et principer convenerunt in unum, adversus Dominum et adversus Cristum eius. Dirumpamus vincula eorum, et proiciamus a nobis iugum isporum" (Why have the nations raged, and the peoples meditated vain things? The

in onore di Federico II di Svevia (Arce, FR: Nuovi Segnali, 2005).

[7] William Stephany, "Pier della Vigna's Self-fulfilling Prophecies: The 'Eulogy' of Frederick II and *Inferno* 13," *Traditio* 38 (1982), 193-212; Donatella Stocchi-Perucchio, "Federico II e l'ambivalenza del sacro nella *Commedia*," *Tra Amici: Studies in Honor of Giuseppe Mazzotta*, eds. Walter Stephens, Theodore Cachey, Jr., Zygmunt Baranski, Teresa Kennedy, *MLN Italian Issue Supplement* 127.1 (January 2012), S233-S244.

For the most recent edition of both *preconium* and *dictamen* see Delle Donne, ibid., 59-130. Notice that Delle Donne does not classify the latter as a *dictamen* or epistle, but as a sermon (*predica*). For the text of the Proem to the *Liber Augustalis*, see Wolfgang Stürner, "*Rerum necessitas* und *divina provisio*, Zur Interpretation des Prooemiums der Konstitutionem von Melfi (1231) *Deutsches Archiv für Erforschung des Mittelalters*. 39. Jahrgang (1983): 548-554.

[8] On the "demonstrative" aspect of the prologue, see Paolo Chiesa and Andrea Tabarroni, "Dante *demonstrator* nel secondo libro della *Monarchia,*" in *Leggere Dante oggi: i testi, l'esegesi. Atti del Convegno-seminario di Roma*, 25-27 *Ottobre 2010*, eds. Enrico Malato and Andrea Mazzucchi (Roma: Salerno, 2012), 141-62.

kings of the earth have arisen, and the princes have gathered together against the Lord and against his Christ. Let us burst their chains and cast their yoke from us).[9] He then allegorizes the Cristum as "their Lord and his Anointed, the Roman prince" and the kings and princes in turmoil against the Prince of Heaven as the kings and princes opposing and plotting against the Roman prince. By appropriating the words of the Prophet, Dante wants to dissipate their ignorance—ignorance he confesses to have shared in the past: "Dirumpamus vincula eorum". As David did to defend Christ, he also wants to cry in defense of the glorious people of Rome and of the Caesar with whom it identifies. In his commentary to the *Monarchy*, Quaglioni observes that Dante's choice falls on what Giovanna Puletti defines as "a messianic psalm par excellence", due to the fact that the *Acts of the Apostles* had been taken to signify the kingship of Christ.[10] This testifies to Dante's familiarity with, and partaking in, the tradition of Christocentric kingship, highlighted by Kantorowicz as a major feature of medieval juridical culture. In fact, the presence of the allegorized psalm in such prominent position at the opening of the book containing Dante's theoretical pronouncements on justice, *ius*, and law in relation to sovereignty, suggests that the Christocentric kingship Dante refers to here coincides with juricentric kingship. This is the tradition in which our *Anonymous Preface* and—*mutatis mutandis*—Nicholas' *dictamen* also insert themselves. In both cases, the authors express this notion of kingship with the same solar metaphors Dante employs in the *Comedy* when addressing the themes of wisdom in government and justice in the Heavens of the Sun and of Jupiter respectively, which also characterize his *Epistles* V and VII in which the "messianic investiture" is bestowed on Henry VII.[11]

In its content, tone, and lexicon, the prologue also resonates with Dante's invective against the Florentines in *Epistle* VI suggesting the identification of the rebellious *gentes*, *reges*, and *principes* of *Monarchy* II with the anti-imperial cities—Florence, Brescia, and others—and the

[9] The English translations of the *Monarchy* are by Prue Shaw.

[10] See Quaglioni, "Introduzione," 1052, 1053; and Giovanna Puletti, "Temi biblici nella *Monarchia* e nella trattatistica politica del tempo," *Studi Danteschi* 61 (1989), 239-47.

[11] In her commentary to *Epistle* V, Claudia Villa states that "the epistle contains echoes of the political publications of the time of Frederick II in the identification of the emperor with Christ and in the concept of renewed justice, expressed in the envoy of the *Liber Augustalis*." See Villa, ed. Dante Alighieri, *Epistole*. In Dante Alighieri. *Opere* (Milano: Mondadori, 2014), 1541.

rulers—Charles of Anjou and Philip the Fair—who sided against Henry VII during his descent toward Rome in the spring of 1311 and after his coronation in 1312, respectively. A significant piece of evidence in favor of placing the *Monarchy* in chronological vicinity with these events is the *Coronation Encyclical* reported here along with the theoretical statements occupying the first section that tells part of the story of that opposition—the siege of Brescia—almost a response to those who, like Dante in *Epistle* VII, had lamented Henry's delayed arrival to his fateful destination.

I. Anonymous Preface

This anonymous text was discovered in 1954 by Rudolf M. Kloos in the University Library of Erlangen, along with two other texts both inscribed with the name of Nicolaus and ascribable to the first half of the 13th century. Kloos identified Nicolaus with the Abbot and Deacon of the Church of Bari and, relying on rather conjectural evidence, attributed all three texts to the same author. The first (*I. Vorwort,* ca. 1231–1239) he took as a preface to what he believed was a gloss to the *Constitutions of Melfi*, the second (*II. Lob Frederick II*, nach 1235) as an encomiastic sermon in honor of Frederick II (referred to above as *dictamen*), and the third as an encomium to Pier delle Vigne in epistolary form (*III. Lob des Petrus de Vinea*, ca. 1239–1249). Later, in a Postscript of 1964, he noted that the first document—the Preface—also belonged in a collection of epistles by Riccardo da Pofi, a notary whose presence at the pontifical court is attested in 1256.[12] Unlike Kloos, both Nicola Pice and Delle Donne, in the context of their respective studies on the second document, classify this anonymous preface as an introduction to some lessons of the *Corpus Iuris*, while Pice questions Kloos' attribution to the same Nicolaus author of the *dictamen* on the basis of both its different stylistic register and ideological position.[13]

In agreement with Pice's interpretation of the *dictamen* as an endorsement of imperial theocracy reflecting the dominant ideology at

[12] Rudolf M. Kloos, "Nikolaus von Bari, eine neue Quelle zur Entwicklung der Kaiseridee unter Friederch II," in *"Stupor Mundi"*: *Zur Geschichte Friederichs II von Hohenstaufen*, ed. Gunther G. Wolf (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgsellschaft, 1982), 130-160. (190 ?); Delle Donne, *Riccardo da Pofi*, http://www.treccani.it/enciclopedia/riccardo-da-pofi_(Dizionario-Biografico)/

[13] Nicola Pice, "Il 'dictamen' di Nicolaus, uno scritto encomiastico dell'età federiciana," *Cultura e società in Puglia in età sveva e angioina*, Bitonto: Centro Ricerche di Storia e Arte Bitontina (1989): 290; Delle Donne, *Il potere e la sua legittimazione*, 100.

Frederick's court in the 1230s and 40s, my previous study argued that while Nicholas erects a veritable monument to the imperial Christomimesis based on a politicized reading of the *Proem* to the *Constitutions*, Dante's poem, through his treatment of Frederick II in *Inferno*, dismantles that very monument. In my reading, Dante's Frederick is the embodiment of a political heresy in which both theology and right become instruments of power. As for the *Anonymous Preface*, once read in parallel with the *dictamen*—a reading admittedly encouraged by the interesting proximity of the two texts in the manuscript tradition—the evidence for its different authorship lies, in my view, not only in its conclusions, which advocate the subordination of the political power to the Church, but also, and primarily, in the different conception of Christomimetic kingship in relation to right that, intentionally or not, challenges the vision of the *dictamen*, thereby redirecting the interpretation of the *Liber Augustalis*. In that sense, the *Anonymous Preface* could present analogies with Dante's thought in spite of its diametrically opposed conclusions.

The gist of the *Preface* is, in brief, that the task of princes is to administer justice. Their source and model is Christ, Sun of Justice, whose light reflects on them. Justice is like a shield: a defensive instrument in service of the weaker. Faith is the foundation of justice. The princes must submit everything to the authority of the Church as the only vicar of Christ and, through the imitation of Christ, administer justice according to right and custom in praise and glory of the Heavenly Majesty. It must be noted that the term "prince" stands here, as it does in the *Liber Augustalis*, for "monarch with no superiors". This is the way the term came to be used by jurists by the first half of the 13th century.[14]

Latin Text[15]

I. Preface by Nicholas, Abbot, and Deacon of the Church of Bari, to his work on the Constitutions of Frederick II (ca. 1231–1239).

[14] See Kenneth Pennington: "As Marinus de Caramanico wrote in the prologue to his commentary on the *Liber Augustalis*, 'the name, 'prince,' is commonly used for a king and as well as for the emperor." *The Prince and the Law, 1200–1600. Sovereignty and Rights in the Western Legal Tradition* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), 90.

[15] The Latin text transcribed here is from the edition of Kloos in "Nikolaus von Bari." The present transcription includes Kloos' notes but omits his variants to the text.

(Vorwort des Nikolaus, Abtes und Diakons der Kirche von Bari, zu seinem Werk über die Konstitutionen Friedrichs II)

(1) Sumit eloquium nostrum ab ingenito patre principium, qui dat esse rebus, balbucientibus eloquenciam tribuit, velud in excellencie sue bonitate mirabilis virtutis presidia debilibus inpartitur. Ab unigenito vero, quem sine viri semine virgo puerpera genuit, huius prosecucio sermonis extenditur, quem utique summum doctorem gencium[16] profitentes verbum nostrum sub eius doctrina prosequimur et in splendore lucis ipsius viam ingredimur veritatis. Presentis autem oracionis effectum producet paraclitus ab utroque procedens illumque reddat sacri muneris infusione prelucidum et in via salutaris studii penitus profectivum.

(2) Horum itaque trium individuam habencium unitatis essenciam laudem pro viribus extollentes, de ineffabili ipsorum misericordia spe concepta labia fiducialiter aperimus, ut quod intendit et iubet iuris sublimitas, in quantum sciencie desursum nobis tradite parvitati permittitur,[17] suscepta spiritus sancti gracia perfruamur.

(3) Sacre quidem pagine monstrat auctoritas, quod *sol refulsit in clipeos aureos, et insplenduerunt montes ab eis*[18] estque dissipata gencium fortitudo. Hunc profecto solem profitemur dominum Iesum Christum, solem nempe iusticie, solem sapiencie, solem vite, qui velud iustus in omnibus viis suis posuit tabernaculum suum in sole,[19] ut omnibus in sua potestate conclusis iudicia secundum suam omnipotenciam exerceret cunctaque conspergeret solaris luminis claritate.

(4) Hic est vere sol, quem scriptura testatur: *Orietur sol iusticie timentibus nomen meum*;[20] sed hoc presertim et de illis accipitur, qui sapiencia permanent, iusticiam diligunt et quorum vultus respicit equitatem. Hic est sol vite secundum veritatem ewangelicam [*sic*] et qui vite prebet exemplum, in omnique legitur hoc ut in nostro resplendeat opere, quod per fidem fulget in mente. Hic est, de quo errantes in execucione iusticie

[16] See 1. *Tim* 2, 7.
[17] See Jean-Louis-Alphonse Huillard-Bréholles, *Vie et correspondence de Pierre de la Vigne, ministre de l'Empereur Frédéric II* (Paris: Plon, 1865), Document No. 107, ll. 1-2. (The document Kloos recalls here is the *preconium* to Frederick II by Pier delle Vigne, subsequently abbreviated as HB. 107)
[18] 1. *Macc* 6, 39.
[19] See *Ps* 18, 6.
[20] *Mal* 4, 2.

conqueruntur dicentes: *A via veritatis erravimus et nobis lumen iusticie non illuxit*.[21]

(5) Nec indigne dicitur, quod *refulget sol in clipeos aureos*, videlicet in iusticie defensores[22] et *facta*[23] *causarum ambigua dirimentes, qui sue defensionis viribus in rebus publicis et privatis lapsa erigunt, fatigata reparant nec minus humano generi provident quam si preliis atque e vulneribus patriam parentesque salvarent*. Hinc Iustiniana sanccio non *solos illos militare* decrevit, *qui gladiis, clipiis et toracibus* utunturr, *sed et* illos, qui presidio *gloriosi muneris laborancium spem vitam posterosque defendunt*, ne potenciorum manus validior afficiat humiliores iniuriis prematque iacturis clipeo iusticie non adiutos.

(6) Tales na[m]que clipeos auteos divina merito presignavit auctoritas, cum per aurum virtutum nobilitas et specialiter fortitudo fidei designatur. Numquid a talibus clipeis montes, ut pute seculares principes, non resplendent? Profecto eorum fulgore coruscant consistens in eis velud in stabilibus firmamentis fundamenta fidei et iusticie. In montibus sanctis, videlicet in catholicis et devotis principibus, qui securitatis, defensionis et tuicionis clipeos deferentes fidei fortitudine, vite sanctitate ac rectitudinis gracia divinitus accenduntur. Sicque muniti et illuminati virtutibus infidelium gencium et iusticie derogancium fortitudinem dissipant et effrenes iuris frenis ac exleges lance legum artant et rectificant et compescunt.

(7) Horum namque devocionis et virtutis claritas luce puriori tamquam sidus irradiat, dum amore fidei divina[m] clemencia[m] reverentes et iusticie terminos observantes Deo et sanctissime Romane ecclesie vel sedi cuncta subiciunt ac ad eius deducunt fidelibus studiis unitatem. Fulget enim luce clarius recta fides in principe, conservatur religionis unitas, regni regimen recte dirigitur et tranquillitas in populo custoditur.

(8) Restat ergo, viri prudentes, ingenio floridi et devocione preclari, ut primo et principaliter congregacione per fidem habita vere ac individue trinitatis, sanctam et catholicam militantem ecclesiam vicariam triumphantis reverentibus colamus animis et in ea speciosissimi nostri sanctissimi redemptoris, quantum potest humana fragilitas, imitemur, ut consistentibus totaliter sensibus nostris in ipso, quid fidei catholice dicta,

[21] *Sap* 5, 6.
[22] HB. 107, ll. 24-25.
[23] *Cod. Iust*. 1. 14. C. 2. 7.

quid iurium constituciones exposcunt, quid swadet equitas et quid conswetudines [*sic*] introducant, ad superne maiestatis laudem et gloriam evidencius comprehendere valeamus.

(9) Quare in ipsius nomine trinitatis studiorum nostrorum assumentes inicia dicimus, quod iste liber sacri cesaris constitucionibus consecratus in quinque partes dividitur, etc.

***Anonymous Preface* (English)**

(1) Our faculty of speech originates from the unbegotten Father, who gives being to things and bestows eloquence to the stutterers, just as in the goodness of His superiority He imparts on the weak the assistance of His glorious strength. And from the Son, whom the virgin bore without the seed of a man, proceeds our utterance and, recognizing Him as the greatest teacher of the peoples (*Tim* 2, 7), we derive our word from His teaching. The present speech will draw its effect from the Paraclete, who proceeds from both the father and the son. And may He render it so that it shines brilliantly by pouring in His sacred gift and so that it is thoroughly beneficial upon the road of salutary study.

(2) And so, raising up the praise of these three who have an indivisible essence of unity as much as our strength allows, and in the hope of their ineffable mercy, we trustingly open our lips so that, since we have received the grace of the Holy Spirit, we might fully enjoy what the sublime nature of the law concerns and demands, as far as is permitted to the limits of the science that has been handed down to us from above.

(3) The authority of a sacred page shows that *the sun shone on the golden shields, and the mountains were illuminated by them* (1. *Macc* 6, 39) and the strength of the peoples was scattered. This sun we declare with certainty is our Lord Jesus Christ, Sun of Justice, Sun of Wisdom, Sun of Life, the one who, by being just in all His ways has placed His tent in the sun (*Ps* 18, 6) so that, because everything has been enclosed in His power, He might employ His judgements according to His omnipotence and sprinkle everything with the clarity of the sunlight.

(4) In truth this is the Sun to which the Scriptures testify, *the Sun of Justice will arise for all those fearful of my name* (*Mal* 4, 2); but this is said especially of those who remain in wisdom, love justice, and whose countenance reflects equity. This is the Sun of Life according to the evangelic truth, one who offers the model for life, a highly visible model,

so that what shines through faith in our mind may gleam also in our work. This is the one about whom those who err in the execution of justice complain saying: "We strayed from the way of truth and the light of justice did not shine for us" (*Sap* 5, 6).

(5) And not improperly is it said that *the sun shines on the golden shields*, that is, on those who defend justice and *on those who resolve the debatable aspects of the causes, who raise with the strength of their defense what has fallen in private and public matters, restore what is damaged, and look after mankind no less than if they were saving at the cost of battles and injuries their homeland and their parents* (*Cod. Iust.* 1. 14. C. 2. 7). This definition by Justinian thus establishes that soldiers are not only those who utilize swords, shields, and breastplates, but also those who, with the aid of a glorious task, defend the hope, the life, and the descendants of those who suffer, so that the stronger hand of those who are more powerful would not injure the weaker and oppress with losses all those who are not assisted by a shield of justice.

(6) Divine authority properly called these shields golden because it is with gold that the nobility of virtue and especially the strength of faith is denoted. Do not the mountains, that is, the secular princes, receive splendor from these shields? Indeed, the foundation of faith and justice, which stand firmly in them as if on stable supports, glitter by their splendor. They are divinely lighted in the holy mountains, that is, in the catholic and devout princes who hold the shields of security, of protection, and of defense, by the strength of faith, the sanctity of virtue, and the grace of righteousness. And thus, protected and illuminated by virtue, they scatter the strength of the infidels and of those who deviate from justice, and bind, channel on the right way, and restrain the unbridled with the bridle of right and the outlaws with the lance of the law.

(7) The clarity of their devotion and virtue beams forth as a star of the purest light, while revering, out of love for faith, divine mercy, and observing the boundaries of justice, they subject everything to God and the Most Holy Roman Church or See, and lead [everything] with faithful commitment to its unity. In fact, the right faith shines more brightly than light in the prince, the unity of religion is preserved, the government of the kingdom is directed rightly, and tranquility is preserved in the people.

(8) Since the congregation is held together through faith in the indivisible Trinity, it remains, therefore, oh wise men famous for your flourishing wit and devotion, that we first and foremost honor with reverent hearts the

holy, Catholic Church, which, in its militancy, is the vicar of the one who triumphs. And it remains that we imitate in it the spirit of our most holy redeemer, as much as human frailty allows. And we must do these things so that, with our senses completely focused on Him, we might more clearly comprehend the dictates of the Catholic faith, what the constitutions of the laws demand, what equity prescribes, and what customs may introduce, for the praise and glory of His heavenly majesty.

(9) On this basis, therefore, beginning our studies in the very name of the Trinity, we say that this book, dedicated to the constitutions of Sacred Caesar, is divided in five parts, etc.

II. Henry VII — *Coronation Encyclical*

The Coronation Encyclical, recently revisited by Quaglioni, had been already placed in relation to the *Monarchy* by Alessandro D'Ancona in 1912 along with three other coeval letters containing a practically identical message. This material allowed Giovanni Gentile in his essay, "La profezia di Dante" (Dante's Prophecy), of 1918 to corroborate his own thesis that the *Monarchy* was developed around the Italian enterprise of Henry VII. In particular, Gentile reports an anonymous letter written by a notary from Brescia, who incites the Florentines to rebel against the Emperor, and places it in relation to Dante's *Epistle* VI to the Florentines as if the latter were an implicit rebuttal to the former. This is especially significant since Henry's *Encyclical* devotes an entire paragraph to the siege of Brescia as the main reason for his delay in reaching Rome. The three excerpts D'Ancona reports are taken as exemplary of Henry's pronouncements that appear to coincide with Dante's positions. The first is a fragment in Italian translation of Henry's letter to the King of England, which is a different edition from the one utilized by Shwalm: textually different but conceptually identical. The second is a fragment from what Shwalm classifies as *Encyclica in Forma Minori*. The third is a fragment from the letter to the King of Cyprus that corresponds to Shwalm's *Encyclica in Forma Maiori* reported here and called, in the Doenniges edition, *Form of the Letter of Coronation*. The comparison with these fragments confirms the ideological stance expressed in the Coronation letter. In arguing for the connection of Dante's treatise with the enterprise of Henry VII in Italy, D'Ancona attributes to the *Monarchy* a realistic foundation and a practical finality. As in the historical account of Isidoro Del Lungo, he indicates that the two might have met in Milan in 1311, when Henry, having crossed the Alps, was heading toward Rome. He considers it a plausible hypothesis that Dante had sent his treatise to him

prior to this descent or, in alternative, that he began to write on a subject long meditated upon at the news of the elections of the new Emperor.[24] More recently, Chris Jones, in *Eclipse of Empire*, made the analogous hypothesis that Dante had disclosed his ideas to the Emperor, thereby influencing his Coronation pronouncements:

> The circumstances in which Henry formulated such an exalted view of his new office remain unclear. There is little to indicate that the Count of Luxembourg entered upon his Romzug with such precise conceptions. It seems probable that this particular idea was the product of Ghibelline and other enthusiastic pro-imperialist influences. The most prominent of those to proffer such an elevated view of imperial authority to the emperor-elect as he journeyed through northern Italy was the exiled Florentine, Dante Alighieri.[25]

Among the correspondences of Henry's *Coronation Encyclical* with Dante's *Monarchy*, Quaglioni lists the inspiring motif of unity and peace, the use of "the analogic principle of *similitudo ordinis* […] the reference to the historical variations of the empires and of the providential attribution of the Empire to the Romans […] the allusion to the Pauline notion of *plenitudo temporis*."[26]

[24] Alessandro D'Ancona, *Scritti danteschi* (Firenze: Sansoni, 1912), 356 and ff.; Giovanni Gentile, *Studi su Dante. Raccolti da Vito A. Bellezza* (Firenze: Sansoni, 1965), 135, 144-147; Del Lungo, *Da Bonifazio VIII ad Arrigo VII*, *Pagine di storia fiorentina per la vita di Dante* (Milano: Hoepli, 1899), 19-20.
[25] Chris Jones. *Eclipse of the Empire: Perceptions of the Western Empire and its Rulers in Late-Medieval France* (Turnhout, Belgium: Brepols, 2007), 219.
[26] Quaglioni, "Introduzione," 846-47.

Latin Text[27]

801. *Encyclica in forma maiori*
Henricus Dei gratia Romanorum imperator semper augustus
1. 2. illustri principi Cypri regi consanguineo dilecto salutem et sincere dilectionis affectum.
3. venerabili Iohanni Argentinensi episcopo principi suo dilecto gratiam suam et omne bonum.

(1) Magnus Dominus et laudabilis valde; qui in excelso divinitatis sue solio residens universis, que sue magestatis ineffabili potencia condidit, clementer et suaviter imperat, tanto dignitatis honore ac decore glorie hominem quem inter universa creaverat extulit, ut cui imaginem sue divinitatis impresserat, super cuncta que fecit tribueret principatum et ut creatura tam nobilis a celestium ierarchia non differret similitudine ordinis, cum quibus convenit grandi parilitate nature, voluit, ut quemadmodum sub se Deo uno omnes ordines celestium agminum militant, sic universi

[27] The Latin text is from *Litterae encyclicae Imperatoris*, *Encyclica in forma maiori*, ed. Jacobus Schwalm, in *MGH*, *Legum Sectio* IV, *Constitutiones et acta publica imperatorum et regum*, Tome IV, Part 2, No. 801, 801-804 (Hannover and Lipsia: Bibliopolii Haniani, 1909-11. The present transcription omits Schwalm's notes and variants to the text. Shwalm premises the text with the following bibliographical references for the various versions of the *Encyclical* here reported in translation:
1. The copy sent to Henry II King of Cyprus, recorded among the *Acts of Bernard* (op. cit. n. 796 fol. 64 and ff.), was entitled by the same notary *Form of the Letter of Coronation*, published by Doenniges (op. cit. II, 52 n. 24) and again faithfully reported by us.
2. The copy destined for Edward II King of England, inserted within the code of the library of Paris in the fragment named 'New Latin Acquisitions 321' of the XIV cent. 5º fol., n. IV, was delivered by a person named A. Dopsch; from the edition prepared by Rymer 'The Pacts,' edited by Clarkee and Holbrooke 1818 II, 1 p. 170, whose autograph was quite corrupted, we omitted the annotation of the various texts because Karolous Hampe, at the time our collaborator, did not succeed, despite his efforts, in finding the autograph. The title given by Rymer is *To the Illustrius Prince Edward King of England our Beloved Friend*.
3. In the copy destined to the Bishop John of Strasbourg, preserved in the well-known code of the library of Vienna Lat. 410 (*Canon Law* 60), see n. 457, fol. 8º n. 61., the Red fol. n. 24 is entitled as follows: *The Way Emperor Henry Wrote to the Lord of Strasbourg About his Good Successes so that He Would Rejoice with Him about Them*. The text was already published once by Chmel, op. cit. above II, 327 n. 17; we report it again. We did not annotate all the small variants of the text, especially *e 2*. — Böhmer, Reg. Heinr. 490. (P. missing)

homines distincti regnis et provinciis separati uni principi monarche subessent, quatinus eo consurgeret machina mundi preclarior, quo ab uno Deo suo factore progrediens sub uno princìpe moderata et in se pacis ac unitatis augmenta susciperet et in unum Deum et dominum per amoris gressum et devote fidei stabilimenta rediret. Et quamvis huiusmodi principatus prioribus seculis in diversis fuerit nationibus quasi cum gentibus a suo factore oberrantibus errans, novissime tamen appropinquante plenitudine temporis, quando idem Deus et dominus noster inenarrabili dignationis sue munificencia homo fieri voluit, ut hominem per culpe lapsum perditum et per obrupta deviaque viciorum labentem ad loca virtutum irrigua et eterne beatitudinis pascua virentia revocaret, dictum imperium transit ad Romanos provide Dei disponente clemencia, quod illuc preiret imperialis excellencie thronus, ubi futura erat sacerdotalis et apostolica sedes, ac in eodem loco pontificis et imperatoris auctoritas refulgeret illius vicariam representans imaginem, qui pro nobis ex intemerato virginis utero natus sacerdos ipse sacerdocium eternum instituit ac tamquam rex regum et dominus dominorum ad culminis sui fastigium omnia trahens sub sue ditionis imperio universa subgessit.

(2) Sane ipsa evidencia rerum ad vestram et aliorum scimus advenisse noticiam, quod ab olim post transitum Frederici quondam predecessoris nostri olim Romanorum imperatoris eodem vacante imperio, licet quam plures preclare fame et grandium meritorum principes ad ipsum imperium per principes Alamagnie, quibus huismodi incumbit electio, concorditer et rite fuissent electi, nullus tamen eorum temporis impediente malicia aut fortune furentis invidia ad imperii dyadema pervenit. Cum autem illustris memorie Albertus rex quondam Romanorum, qui nuperrime nos precessit de presenti regno fuisset Deo volente subtractus et prefati principes, ad quos ut prediximus imperialis spectat electio, nos tunc comitem Lucemburgensem in regem Romanorum futurum imperatorem concorditer elegissent, nosque licet sciremus humeros nostros ad tam pregrande onus inhabiles, de omnipotentis Dei benignitate confisi prebuissemus facte de nobis electioni consensum, mox decrevimus, regnis Alamagnie Boemieque dispositis, ad Urbem pro suscipienda consecratione et imperiali dyademate proficisci, mittentes sollempnes nuncios ad sanctissimum patrem dominum Clementem sancte Romane ac universalis ecclesie summum pontificem, ad quem de consuetudine et more maiorum coronatio nostra spectat, ut ad Urbem dignaretur venire et nobis coronationis prefate sollempnia exhibere. Qui ex innata sibi clementia et paterno affectu, quem habet ad nos specialiter et ad sacrum imperium, satisfecisset liberaliter votis nostris, nisi grandia negocia sacri concilii in proximo celebrandi et indicti iam prius, quam super predictis requireretur

a nobis, illum detinuissent in remotioribus partibus occupatum. Verum nolens idem pontifex et indignum iudicans ac dispendiosum eidem imperio, propter sui absenciam prefate nostre coronationis et consecrationis gaudia retardari, venerabilibus patribus dominis Arnaldo Sabinensi apostolice sedis legato, Leonardo Albanensi et Nycholao Ostiensi ac Velletrensi episcopis et Francisco Sancte Lucie in Silice ac Luce Sancte Marie in Via lata [*sic*] dyaconis cardinalibus vices suas plenissimas in hac parte commisit, in suis litteris expresse declarans et volens, ut si aliquem vel aliquos eorum contingeret impediri, per superstites vel superstitem dictum coronationis nostre negotium compleri valeret, ipsosque ad nos et nobiscum ad Urbem pro exequenda commissione illis facta celeriter venire mandavit, iniungens eisdem, ut in die assumptionis virginis Marie, quem nos iam elegeramus, ad perficiendum celebritatem predictam vel alia die, quam nostra celsitudo duceret eligendam, memorate nostre coronationis sollempnia celebrarent.

(3) Quia vero dum per Lombardiam terram nostro imperio subiectam contenderemus ad Urbem, ut in die assumptionis prefate de coronationis nostre felicibus auspiciis gauderemus, civitas Brixiensis nefando ausu nostro culmini rebellavit, et indignum erat minusque providum, nos inde discedere, donec sub sceptro nostro colla submitteret, ne forte fieret reliquis Lombardie civitatibus in scandalum et ruinam, ad tempus negocium coronationis predicte suspendimus et dictam civitatem tam diu dura obsidione vexavimus, donec non valens diucius potencie nostre resistere, se libere nostris manibus reddidit et clemencie nostre arbitrio de commisso in magestatem nostram crimine castigandam puniendamque submisit.

(4) Hac ergo pestifera civitate victoriose subacta, festum perficiendum coronationis nostre resumpsimus et pervenientes ad Urbem in presencia prenominatorum dominorum cardinalium, Albanensi et Francisco dumtaxat exceptis, quos ab humano consortio conditio vite mortalis absolverat, ad perficiendum coronationis eiusdem sollempnia diem festum apostolorum Petri et Pauli duximus eligendum. Qua die in ecclesia beati Iohannis Lateranensis per dictos dominos cardinales oleo acro uncti fuimus ac imperiali dyademate coronati et omnibus aliis sollempniis, que tam celebria requirunt facta, prout decuit insigniti, presente copiosa multitudine archiepiscoporum, episcoporum, abbatum et aliorum prelatorum ac ecclesiasticorum ordinum Urbis necnon ducum, comitum, baronum, militum, nobilium et universa pompa imperialis curie, nostrorum fidelium et populi numerosa caterva, qui ad videndum mundo nova exorta

gaudia et congaudendum Romano imperio iam renato, sicut flagranti desiderio videre dudum optaverant, convenerunt.

(5) Hec autem magnificencie vestre insinuare curavimus, certi quod eo amplius pre ceteris hominibus vos regio decore prefulgidi de imperii nostri successibus felicibus gaudeatis, quo proximior est imperiali maiestati regia dignitas, et sicut ibi invicem sunt quadam glorie vicinitate consimiles, sic debent esse amoris participio et caritatis unione conformes. Quales nos esse erga magnitudinem vestram, quando fuerit oportunum, per operum evidenciam cognoscetis.

(5) Hec autem sinceritati tue volumus intimare, ut de nostris felicibus successibus, sicut ex sincere fidei tue devotione teneris, valeas exultare.

Dat. Rome, III. Kal. Iulii, regni nostri anno quarto, imperii vero primo.

Henry VII — *Coronation Encyclical* (English)
801. *Encyclical in Longer Form*
Henry, by the Grace of God Emperor of Romans Forever Augustus
1. 2. To the Illustrious Prince King of Cyprus Beloved Kindred, Sincere Greetings and Affection.
3. To the Venerable Bishop John of Argentoratum, his Beloved Prince, Gratitude and all Goodness.[28]

(1) The Great Lord who is most worthy of praise and who, residing in the lofty see of His divinity, rules mercifully and sweetly over all that He has made with the ineffable power of His majesty, has exalted man—whom He had created among all things with such honor of greatness and with such great glory and whom He had imprinted with the image of His divinity—that He conferred upon him supremacy over all things that He has made, and that so noble a creature not differ, as far as similarity of rank is concerned, from the hierarchy of the celestial beings with whom he compares by the great equality of nature, He willed that just as all the ranks of the heavenly hosts serve under Him, the one God, so all men, although distinct in kingdom and province, might be placed under one chief monarch so that the more brilliant the universe grows, the more it might progress in peace and unity, proceeding under one chief from the one God, its creator, and return to the one God and Lord through the path of love and the supports of a devout faith. And although a Principate of this kind existed in previous centuries in different nations, it was casting

[28] Argentoratum is the Roman name for Strasbourg (note of the translator).

about with people who were wandering away from their creator. Nevertheless, when the ultimate fullness of time was quickly approaching and when by the ineffable generosity of His greatness, our God and Lord Himself wished to become man in order to recall man, who had fallen because of the original sin and who was wandering through steep and straying paths, to well-watered places and green pastures of eternal blessedness, this imperial power was transferred to the Romans by the clemency of God which allots things providentially, so that the throne of imperial excellence might go where the priestly and apostolic see was destined to be and in the same place would shine the authority of the pope and the emperor, [both] representing the vicarious image of the one who—born for us from the chaste uterus of the virgin, He himself a priest—instituted the eternal priesthood and, as king of kings and lord of lords, subjugated everything under the power of His rule, drawing all things up to the summit of His own height.

(2) Certainly, by the very evidence of the facts we know that you and others have become aware that from the time following the death of Frederick, once our predecessor, and at that time when the same power of the emperor of the Romans was vacant, even if more princes of outstanding reputation and great merits were harmoniously and duly elected by the princes of Alamagnia who are in charge of such an election, nevertheless none of them, due to the obstructive wickedness of time or the envy of an adverse fortune, achieved the imperial diadem. Moreover, when Albert with his illustrious memory, once king of the Romans, who recently preceded us in this kingdom was, by divine will, deprived of life and the princes who, as said above, are in charge of the imperial election, after solemnly announcing it, have unanimously elected us, then count of Luxembourg, as king of the Romans and future emperor, and even though we know that our shoulders are unsuitable for such a big burden, trusting the benevolence of the Almighty God, we submitted our acceptance of the election. After making arrangements for the kingdoms of Alamagnia and Bohemia, we immediately decreed to leave for Rome to receive the consecration and assume the imperial diadem by sending official ambassadors to the most holy Father and Lord Clement, the supreme pontiff of the holy and universal church who, by tradition and the custom of our ancestors, is in charge of our coronation, so that he would deign to come to Rome and attend the solemn rituals of our announced coronation. And he—thanks to his innate clemency and paternal affection especially toward us and the holy empire—would have generously satisfied our prayers, if the great commitments of the sacred council—which had to be celebrated right away, and had already been announced before he was

sought by us for the aforementioned tasks—had not detained him in far-off places. Indeed, the same pontiff, although unwilling and judging unworthy and costly for the same empire to delay due to his absence the joy of our announced coronation and consecration, entrusted the venerable fathers Arnold bishop of Sabina, ambassador of the apostolic seat, Leonard bishop of Albano and Nicholas bishop of Ostia and Velletri, and the deacons cardinals Francis of Santa Lucia in Silice and Luke of Santa Maria in Via Lata, with this function on his behalf, declaring and explicitly ordering in his letter that if any of them should happen to be impeded, the above-mentioned business of our coronation would be able to be completed by the survivors or even only one survivor, and he ordered to them to come quickly to us and go with us to Rome to perform the task entrusted to them, ordering them to celebrate the solemn rituals of our above said coronation on the day of the Assumption of the Virgin Mary, which we had already chosen for the completion of the aforementioned celebration, or on another day that our Highness felt appropriate to choose.

(3) Since in truth—while we were heading to Rome through the Lombard land subjected to our power so that we might enjoy the happy auspices of our coronation on the Feast of the Assumption—the city of Brescia, with a wicked act of audacity, rebelled against our power, and it was unworthy and less than prudent that we would go away from there until it was subjected to our scepter lest by chance it would end in a scandal and ruin for other cities in Lombardy, we suspended the time fixed for our foretold coronation and we tested that city with a siege so long and hard until it could no longer resist our power and freely surrendered to us and submitted itself to our clemency over the crime committed towards our majesty in order to be corrected and punished.

(4) So, after we victoriously subjugated this dangerous city, we resumed the feast for the completion of our coronation and arriving in Rome in the presence of the aforementioned cardinal lords except for the one from Albano and Francis, whom the condition of mortal life had freed from human fellowship, we choose to do the solemn rituals of this coronation on the Feast day of the Apostles Peter and Paul. And on this day, in the church of Saint John Lateran, by the aforementioned cardinal lords, we were anointed with the sacred oil and crowned with the imperial diadem, and adorned as was fitting with all the other solemn accoutrements that such celebrated events demand, in the presence of a copious multitude of archbishops, bishops, abbots, and other prelates and ecclesiastics of the Roman orders, as well as dukes, counts, barons, soldiers, nobles, and all the procession of the imperial curia, an enormous crowd of our faithful

people who had convened to see the new joy arisen in the world and to enjoy together because the Roman Empire was now reborn, as they had long wanted to see with intense desire.

(5) These things we have presented to your magnificence, certain that the more you—resplendent in your royal glory—delight in the successes of our empire before the other men, the closer the royal dignity is to the imperial majesty, and just as these two dignities are in the same way very similar by a certain nearness to glory, so they ought to conform to one another by participation of love and union of charity. What sort of people we are with respect to your magnificent rank, you will know by the evidence of the work when appropriate.

(5) Thus, we want to present these things to your sincerity so that you will be able to exult in our happy successes just as you are committed to the devotion of your sincere loyalty.

Rome, the third day before the Calends of July [June 29], the fourth year of our reign, the very first of the empire. [29]

[29] Regarding both translations presented here, my heartfelt thanks go to Osvalda Andrei and Patrizia Fazzi who contributed to my intelligence of the Latin, to Bradley Evert for his assistance with German, to Nicholas Gresens who helped me refine my English translations, and to Paolo Chiesa who reviewed the translations and offered useful suggestions for their improvement. Any remaining flaws in the rendering of these texts are entirely my responsibility.

Chapter Ten

Medicine and Dante's Political Thought

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In Dante's *Monarchia*, the focus on intellectual and political perfection overshadows the corporeal and biological dimensions, which emerge more explicitly in other Dantean works such as the *Commedia* and the *Convivio*. Nevertheless, a few traces of the biological aspect of human life are still present in Dante's political treatise. In this article, I will consider whether the *Monarchia* includes space for a scientific or medical discourse beyond the few explicit allusions to it and if this discourse might intersect in fruitful ways with other dominant philosophical discourses. If this space exists in the *Monarchia*, scientific *auctoritates* will not be lost but rather absorbed in a new synthesis—as part of Dante's political thought—where earthly happiness, guaranteed by the actualization of the possible intellect, finds its autonomy. In this sense, medical knowledge would be part of a continuity as opposed to a fracture between physical and purely intellectual domains of human existence in Dante's writing. Moreover, this persistence of a biological level would be transformed by Dante and carried over to another plane of thought to contribute to the actualization of political and intellectual perfection.

Dante's original synthesis of political and philosophical components results in the necessity of a *universitas hominum* for the constant actualization of the possible intellect under the guidance of the Monarch; the political element becomes functional in order to allow and define the human *ultimum de potentia* as constitutive of the human species. While Dante's definition of the *ultimum de potentia* as the possible intellect, realized by a plural but univocal human *genus*, goes beyond the strictly biological level of medicine, Dante's well-known scientific background

provides possible parallelisms between the individual human being and non-individual entities, such as the human *genus*. The mirroring correspondence between *homo* and *mundus* is shared by scientific, philosophical, and theological discourses. A principle of organized harmony and balance is necessary for the *bene esse* of man as well as of the *mundus*. Expanding on the notion of an organized *concordia*, discussed at length in the *Monarchia*, the echo of scientific notions marks, on the one hand, the different dimension of the political treatise, which ultimately goes beyond the individual, and, on the other, the individual as a possible microcosm of the *genus*. In medieval scientific and philosophical debates, a first level of equivalence links *mundus* and *homo* through the correspondence of the mixture of the four elements in all the *non animantia* and the mixture of the humors in the *animantia*. In the medical terms of Dante's contemporaries, the harmony of the human being, body and soul, and therefore its *sanitas*, depended on the balance among the four humors and their qualities, namely the *complexio*. While explicitly present in Book IV of the *Convivio*, where "complessione" alluded many times to the "buona disposizione" and the "sanitate" of the body and the soul, neither the term nor the precise concept of *complexio* appears in the *Monarchia*, except for the one occurrence of "complessionato" (*Monarchia*, I, III, 6),[1] which, however, signifies the general mixture of the elements in inanimate objects such as minerals. Yet, there emerges the constant presence of the terms *dispositio* and *disponere*, which are often used in the more general sense of a "condition", or the "state of something". A lexical reminiscence of the scientific notion of the human being's good disposition and *sanitas* persists in the broader idea of an organized harmony and order, which is needed both by the individuals, the *singuli*, as well as by the cosmos. This is indicated in the direct quotation from Aristotle's *Metaphysics* XII in *Monarchia*, I, X, 6: "Entia nolunt male disponi; malum autem pluralitas principatuum; unus ergo princeps". A more specific notion of individual *complexio* is assimilated within the broader discourse on *concordia*: when he discusses this concept, Dante introduces a parallelism between the political notion (namely *concordia* of the whole *genus humanum*) rooted in the unity of men's wills under the guidance of the monarch and the idea of *concordia* as the perfect disposition of both the soul and the body of a human being: "omnis concordia dependet ab unitate que est in voluntatibus; genus humanum optime se habens est quedam concordia (nam, sicut unus homo optime se

[1] All the references to the text of Dante's *Monarchia* are from: Dante Alighieri, *Monarchia*, edited and with a commentary by Paolo Chiesa and Andrea Tabarroni (Rome: Salerno Editrice, 2013).

habet et quantum ad animam et quantum ad corpus est concordia quedam, et similiter domus, civitas et regnum, sic totus genus humanum)" (*Monarchia*, I, XV, 8). Soul and body equally participate in the *concordia* of the individual human being, and a man's *concordia quedam* is generated by the perfect condition of both the body and the soul. Besides the notion of *complexio*, medical and, more specifically, Galenic texts relate the idea of *concordia partium* to the *sanitas* of the soul and the body. In his *De Hippocratis et Platonis Placitis*, Galen states, "partium animae inter se discordiam animae morbum esse affirmans, […] sicuti et partium ipsius inter se concordiam commoderationemque sanitatem. […] Sicut enim corporis pulchritudo in partium commoderatione generationem obtinet."[2] The same intimate link that makes *sanitas* the necessary consequence of *concordia* (and *commoderatio*) makes sickness the necessary consequence of *discordia* for both the soul and the body. *Pulchritudo*, which Galen indicates as being generated by the balanced relationship among the parts of the body (*commoderatio* translates the Greek *symmetria*), participates in the Galenic definition of *sanitas*: "Quot sanitatem comitantur? Tria, pulchritudo, bonus habitus, integritas."[3] In Galenic texts, *concordia* and *temperies* (or *complexio*) are strictly connected, precisely in reference to health and sickness: "Partium similarium morbi intemperies sunt."[4] Galen stresses the necessity of a combined action of the parts of the body in order to achieve *sanitas*: "omnes partes in unam actionem conspirant, unamquamque eodem modo: ut omnes ad vitam et ad omnes corporis actiones consentiunt, sic singulae ad singulas actiones conspirent, sicut manus apprehensionis causae factae sunt, oculis aspectus, pedes incessus et caeterae partes pari modo."[5] As the lexical choices of *conspiro* and *consentio* highlight, an organized harmony presides over the operation of the different parts so that they can produce man's well-being, or *sanitas*. Each part of the body is naturally ordered to perform its specific purpose, and at the same time is naturally ordered to participate in the collective purpose of the whole human being. Medical texts, such as Galen's *De usu partium*, present recurrent references to the

[2] *Claudii Galeni De Hippocratis et Platonis Placitis*, liber V, cap. III, in Galen, *Opera Omnia*, ed. C.G. Kuhn (Hildesheim and New York: G. Olms, 2001), vol. V, book V, chap. III, p. 451.
[3] *Galeni Definitiones Medicae*, in Galen, *Opera omnia*, vol. XIX, CXXIX, p. 383.
[4] *Galeni Methodi medendi*, in Galen, *Opera omnia*, vol. X, book II, chap. VI, p. 125.
[5] *Galeni in Hippocratis librum de alimento commentaries III*, in Galen, *Opera Omnia*, vol. XV, chap. XXIV, p. 359.

activity of Nature which is never *otiosa*.[6] If we relate these quotations to the *Monarchia*, we may say that the *temperies* and *concordia* that lead the parts of the body towards a unified operation, parallels the *concordia* of the unified men's wills under the guidance of the monarch. As I will point out later in this article, the "medical" *concordia* as well will need and find guidance in a hegemonic principle that rules the human being.

I would like to briefly dwell on one more occurrence of the concept and the term *sanitas* in the *Monarchia*; Dante indeed alludes to it in the crucial passage of Book II, Chapter V, where he demonstrates the logical relation between the purpose of something and the thing, namely the purpose of right and right: "impossibile est iuris finem querere sine iure, cum quelibet res ad proprium finem se habeat velut consequens ad antecedens" (II v 22). As Iacopo Costa has shown in his essay *Principio di finalità* by connecting this passage to Aristotle's *Physics* and *Nicomachean Ethics*: "la causa finale implica logicamente l'evento che la genera", "si ha un'inversione dei rapporti cronologici rispetto ai rapporti logici […] come da un punto di vista cronologico la causa finale è posteriore rispetto all'evento che la genera, ma logicamente è anteriore rispetto a questo, così da un punto di vista cronologico (o dell'esecuzione) il fine dell'atto umano è posteriore rispetto ai mezzi che lo producono e su cui si delibera, ma logicamente il fine precede il mezzo, poiché è ciò che primo è conosciuto, ed è conosciuto con la stessa certezza con cui si conoscono le massime di una dimostrazione."[7] With respect to the principle that informs the relationship between *finis* and *principium*, Costa points out its formulation in Averroes' *Great Commentary* to Aristotle's *Physics*: "principium enim in cogitatione est finis in operatione, et finis in cogitatione est principium in operatione."[8] As an explanatory comparison of this philosophical concept, Dante again introduces the relationship between the parts of the body and the body's *sanitas*: "nam impossibile est bonam valetudinem membrorum actingere sine sanitate" (*Monarchia* II V 22). In his *Definitiones medicae*, Galen refers to the relationship between

[6] See, for instance, Book IV, 15; Book VI, 16; Book VII, 8; Book X, 14; Book XI, 5; Book XII, 14; Book XIII, 2, 8; Book XV, 4, 5. In Galen, *On the Usefulness of the Parts of the Body*, trans. Margaret Tallmadge May (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1968).

[7] Iacopo Costa, "Principio di finalità e fine nella *Monarchia* dantesca," in *"Ad Ingenii acuitionem." Studies in honour of Alfonso Maierù*, ed. by Stefano Caroti, Ruedi Imbach, Zénon Kaluza, Giorgio Stabile and Loris Sturlese (Louvain-La-Neuve: FIDEM, 2006), 46.

[8] Averroes, *in Physica*, II, comm. 89, in Averroes (Ibn Rushd) *Aristotelis Opera cum Averrois Commentariis* (Venice: Giunti, 1562), vol. IV, fol. 84raC.

sanitas and *valetudo membrorum*, and defines the attributes of *sanitas*, namely *pulchritudo, habitus*, and *integritas*, where *integritas* is "ea quae cunctarum partium numeris omnibus absolutarum roboratio commoderatioque est."[9]

As well as the relevance of possible Galenic references, medieval scientific texts show remarkable intersections and overlap between medical and philosophical discourses, which seem to propose more explicit parallels between the science of the body and political theory. Peter of Abano, for instance, follows Aristotle (*Eth. Nic*. III, 5, 1112b 23-24) and explains the idea of *sanitas* through the notion that the logical *principium* corresponds to the *finis* of the action, and viceversa. The *sanitas* of the soul orders the *sanitas* of the body: "ita accidit, ut sanitas, quae est extra animan, sit a sanitate, quae est in anima: sanitas enim quae est in anima, est compositione secundum intentionem Aristotelis ad esse sanitatis, quae est extra animam, hoc est illud, quod dicitur principium operationis, est finis cognitionis: et principium cognitionis est finis operationis."[10] Another passage from Peter of Abano's *Conciliator* shows a more explicit reference to a strictly medical matter and highlights the presence of significant philosophical threads through the medical fabric of the text. *Differentia 47* discusses the question of the origin of the veins. The main quarrel was between the Galenic and, in general, medical tradition, which correctly located the origin of the veins in the liver, and the Aristotelian position, which believed the heart responsible for the generation of the veins. While with respect to other medical matters Peter of Abano tries to reconcile conflicting Galenic and Aristotelian opinions, he completely sides with Aristotle in reference to the origin of the veins. Peter defends his position stating the necessity of a "omnium prima radix" that rules the whole body, arguing that this is the heart. The notion of a necessary hegemonic principle, which guides the whole human being, was shared by medical and philosophical traditions, but most physicians, following Galen's thought, designated the brain, and not the heart, as the seat of the body's ruling element – the brain being considered the organ where the rational faculty of the soul resides. Peter of Abano maintains that the origin of the veins is the heart as the necessary consequence of the Aristotelian principle according to which the heart presides over the whole body. While the author explains this point, he broadens his discussion beyond strictly medical considerations, and parallels it with scientific and political fields. Indeed, Peter of Abano explicitly refers to book XII of

[9] *Galeni Definitiones medicae*, CXXIX.
[10] Peter of Abano, *Conciliator controversiarum* (Venice: Giunti, 1565), *Diff*. VIII, 3G.

Aristotle's *Metaphysics* and book VIII of the *Physics*, highlighting the necessity of a unitary *pluralitas*, ruled by one principle, and, developing this concept, parallels the idea of an individual human being, the political organization of a city, the more general idea of a "principato" and the universe whose perfection depends on the One:

> Quam equidem opinionem cum his, qui posuerunt venas oriri an hepate, tertio de partibus repellit per haec plurima ita: faciunt namque principia multa, et discepta, cum in unoquoque genere, ac in toto etiam universo unum opus sit esse principium, in quod tandem reducantus cuncta, et per quod regulentur. Unde in fine XII Metaphysica. Entia nolunt male dispositioni; nec bonum pluralitas principatuum; unus igitur princeps. Ex ordine namque universi ad unum perfectio causatur in entibus. Cum igitur animal et maxime homo sit microcosmus (*Fis.*), unum aliquid erit membrum in eo quo trahet originem et gubernantur cetera. Est etiam estimandum animal constare velut civitatem bene legibus regulatam de causa motus animalium: in hac autem omnia derivantur ab uno principe et tendunt; propter quod in corpore animalis unum erit tale ut cor.[11]

With his reference to Aristotle's *Metaphysics*, Peter of Abano explicitly connects the idea of a hegemonic political principle to the ruling element of the individual. The medical debate about the human being's *hegemonikòn* and its location was very lively. As I have already mentioned, Galen and the Galenic tradition located the ruling principle of the human being in the brain, since the brain was considered the seat of the rational part of the soul: "Princeps animae facultas ea est quae partibus animae praeest, quae regnat et imperat in cerebri basi sedem obtinens."[12] Here, the Latin, *regnat* and *imperat*, translate the Greek, *basileuo* and *epitasso*, showing that political terminology was applied to medical matters. While I cannot fully address this for brevity's sake, it is important to note that in other moments of his work, Dante seems to go along with Galen by indentifying the seat of intellectual activity in the brain; this often occurs in the *Convivio* and in the *Commedia*. I will just very briefly recall that in the *Convivio* Dante connects the "nobile parte de l'anima nostra", that is "mente", to the body through the presence of the temperaments: "la nostra mente è fondata sopra le complessioni del corpo"[13]. In addition, the poet localizes this more generic relation of the body and the mind in the organ of the brain, whose "alterazione" can compromise the mind's "sanitate" and operations: "E secondo malizia, o

[11] Peter of Abano, *Conciliator controversiarum*, Diff. XLVII, 2H.
[12] *Galeni Definitiones medicae*, in *Opera omnia*, vol. XIX, CXIII, p.378.
[13] *Convivio*, IV.ii, p. 7.

vero difetto di corpo, può essere la mente non sana; quando per difetto d'alcuno principio de la nativitade, sì come i mentecatti; quando per l'alterazione del cerebro, sì come sono i frenetici" (*Convivio* IV, xv, 17). [14] In the *Monarchia*, where these physical references are absent, the medical doctrine of a hegemonic organ, which presides over the organization and the *sanitas*, therefore the *concordia*, of the whole human being, can exemplify the universal political ruling principle—the Monarch—who guarantees intellectual and political perfection. The natural *hegemonikòn* of the individual mirrors the natural ruling principle of the human *genus*, as the *concordia* of the single man exemplifies the *concordia* of the *genus*. The need for a dominant and normative element is stated by Dante: "quando aliqua plura ordinantur ad unum, oportet unum eorum regulare seu regere, alia vero regulari seu regi" (*Monarchia*, I v 3) and is immediately defined in the sense of an intellectual supremacy: "ex quo iam innotescit illud *Politice*: intellectu, scilicet, vigentes aliis naturaliter principari" (*Monarchia*, I, III 10). Right after stating the necessity of the ruling principle, in I, V, 3, Dante proceeds to define it in relation to *homo*, *domus*, *vicum, civitas*, *regnum*. He writes about the individual man: "Si enim consideremus unum hominem, hoc in eo contingere videbimus, quia, cum onmes vires eius ordinetur ad felicitatem, vis ipsa intellectualis est regulatrix et rectrix omnium aliarum: aliter ad felicitatem pervenire non potest" (*Monarchia*, I, V, 4).

In the quotation from the *Conciliator* I recalled before, Peter of Abano links the existence of an "unico membro", which governs all the others, to the fact that man is a microcosm reflecting in his organization the structure of the macrocosm. The relationship between microcosm and macrocosm is a fundamental one in the *Monarchia*, as Maria Luisa Ardizzone has shown in her essay *The "Vicinia" and its role in Dante's Political Thought*. In her comments on *Monarchia* I, V, 6, where Dante stresses the necessity of an "unum aliorum regulatorem" of the small village, Ardizzone suggests the idea of the *vicinia* as "the microcosm of the macrocosm, the Empire, in its ideal or perfect form" and, again as "the molecular actuality of the utopian empire."[15] Man as the microcosm corresponds to the universe, and through the notion of the human *genus*, we may connect the human being to the macrocosm of the Empire as well. In the renowned passage from *Monarchia* I, III, 2, *Totus Homo* represents the entire organism (with its own different purpose) of which the thumb, hand, and arm represent the parts, and it parallels the *genus humanus*, which, at the end of the political

[14] Ibid., IV.xv, p. 17.

[15] Maria Luisa Ardizzone, "The 'Vicinia' and its Role in Dante's Political Thought," *Dante Studies* 130, 2012: 175.

chain of social aggregations (*familia*, *vicinia*, *civitas*, *regnum*), holds in its purpose the ultimate goal of human society. The human being in the *Monarchia* holds the role of both a "totus" in relation to the bodily parts and of a microcosm in relation to the universal *genus*. In this sense, we may say that man, perhaps similarly to the *vicinia*, exemplifies an organized structure ruled by a hegemonic principle, but within the limits of the individual: these limits will be overcome only by the plurality of the one *universitas hominum* that will make the actualization of the possible intellect effective. This transition from the individual to the *multitudo in humano genere* (*Monarchia* I, III, 8) marks the swerve between a medical reading of man and Dante's idea of the possible intellect which can be actualized only by the *multitudo*, and that, at the same time, is the only one that can guarantee the realization of the nature of the *multitudo*.

On a more general level, though, medical thought proposes rational activity as a faculty that biologically and naturally governs the life of a human being, and is therefore designated by nature to that purpose. In *Monarchia* I, XIII, 6, direct reference to a Galenic text confirms both Galen's renewed diffusion at the time, and Dante's awareness and knowledge of the *corpus galenicus*, already traceable in the *Commedia* and in the *Convivio*. Dante is here highlighting how the Monarch is "optime dispositus ad regendum" since he is the one who, among the other mortals, is subject to the least degree of *cupiditas*, that is the passion responsible for corrupting judgement and preventing justice. The reference to Galen's text exemplifies the statement that "unaqueque res eo facilius et perfectius ad habitum et ad operationem disponitur, quo minus in ea est de contrarietate ad talem dispositionem" and, more specifically, that "facilius et perfectius veniunt ad habitum phylosophice veritatis qui nichil unquam audiverunt, quam qui audiverunt per tempora et falsis oppinionibus imbuti sunt. Propter quod bene Galienus inquit 'Tales duplici tempore indigere ad scientiam acquirendam'" (*Monarchia* I, XIII, 6). As the commentary by Paolo Chiesa and Andrea Tabarroni[16] explains through its reference to Gregory the Great's *Regula pastoralis*, the concept, exemplified by the Galenic quotation, on how false opinions prevent philosophical knowledge more than ignorance, is also rooted in the Patristic tradition. This tradition stated the necessity of destroying "false" pagan knowledge in order to build "true" Christian knowledge; consequently, the first thing to destroy is the learned men's opinion of being knowledgeable. Galen's text parallels the notion of how the learning process is made more difficult by preexistent false opinions. The source of Dante's quotation has been

[16] *Monarchia*, ed. Chiesa and Tabarroni, 54.

identified by Edward Moore as Chapter X of Galen's *De cognosecendis curandisque morbis*. However, in his essay, "Dante, Medicine and the Invisible Body", Vivian Nutton questions this identification and maintains that the *De Cognoscendis curandisque morbis* cannot be the text quoted by Dante; Nutton notices that this text was translated into Latin during the last years of the 13th century by Armengard Blasius, in Montpellier. As Nutton highlights, and as the study by Michael Mc Vaugh confirms,[17] the translation by Armengard is in fact "a pastiche, a condensation created by entirely omitting about two-thirds of the work […] The result corresponds roughly to the second, third, and sixth chapters (of the original ten) in the Greek texts, except that Armengaud has broken his composite, condensed version into five new chapters".[18] Armengard's translation does not seem to be the source for Dante's possible knowledge and citation from the *De cognoscendis*; moreover, a careful reading of chapter X in the Greek text seems to show a discrepancy between Dante's remark and the concepts expressed by Galen.[19] Whether or not Dante is directly quoting the *De Cognoscendis*, the sentiment of his remark in the *Monarchia* is "typically Galenic"[20] and refers to the ethical aspect of Galen's thought rather than to the strictly medical facet. Whether we can locate Dante's reference within the Galenic Corpus or we should, instead, consider an indirect intermediary source, Dante's reference to Galen's "moral" tenet shows significant familiarity with the physician's doctrine. Even indirect knowledge of the content of the *De cognoscendis curandisque animi morbis*, or other similarly ethical Galenic texts, would be relevant to the tentative tracing of a more or less hidden presence of medical knowledge through the *Monarchia*. This is because the *De cognoscendis* deals with the achievement of intellectual satisfaction and perfection through the overcoming of passions, such as *cupiditas*, that are an impediment to the rational activity of the human soul. This quite uncommon Galenic text

[17] I would like to thank Andrea Tabarroni for her recommendation of Armengaud's text and her advice about the question of possible Galenic sources for Dante's quotation. This is an aspect of my research that I intend to further develop.

[18] Michael Mc Vaugh. *Armengaud Blaise as a Translator of Galen*. In *Texts and Contexts in Ancient and Medieval Science*, edited by Edith Sylla and Michael Mc Vaugh (Leiden-New York-Cologne: Brill, 1997)

[19] The physician mentions that a soul that ignores philosophy will still be able to master passions, but it will be able to do it twice as easily once it is trained in philosophy. He refers to a "double time" but he does not seem to express the same concept conveyed by Dante.

[20] Vivian Nutton, "Dante, Medicine and the Invisible Body," in *Dante and the Human Body: Eight Essays*, ed. John C. Barnes and Jennifer Petrie (Dublin: UCD Foundation for Italian Studies/Four Courts Press, 2007), 56.

highlights intellectual perfection as the realization of the human being and the rational faculty as the hegemonic principle of human life. In the *De cuiusque animi peccatorum dignotione atque medela libellus*—a treatise that completes the *De Cognoscendis* and is more specifically devoted to discussions of the errors of the soul rather than the passions—Galen again explicitly defines the rational faculty as the noblest, and emphasizes the quest for its perfected realization: "illi autem verissimo sese honore decorantes facultatem, quam in anima optimam habebant, exercere et ad finem perducere cupiebant; clarum autem est, quod rationabilem dico".[21]

While the biological element of medical science appears to be absorbed by the intellectual dimension of the *Monarchia*, the text is nonetheless suffused with terminological signs reminiscent of scientific notions that both intersect with and are assimilated by philosophical and theological discourses, such as the recurrent term *dispositio*, or even the *intellectus aegritudine* which closes Book I, or the *peccati infirmitas* and, especially, its *remedium* discussed in Book III, IV, 14–15. In both passages, the idea of sickness of the speculative and practical intellects, and of the soul, is related to the idea of a remedy which, through speculative or practical evidence, is ultimately demonstrated to be the universal monarchy. In order to reinforce the renowned logical arguments against the allegorical interpretation of the *duo luminaria* as Church and Empire, Dante introduces a brief and paradoxical medical comparison to provide an immediate sense of the absurdity of the reasoning he is refuting: "Cum ergo non solum in die quarto peccator homo non erat, sed etiam simpliciter homo non erat, producere remedia fuisset otiosum; quod est contra divinam bonitatem. Stultus etenim esset medicus qui, ante nativitate hominis, pro apostemate future illi emplastrum conficeret." (*Monarchia* III, IV, 15). From the perspective of medical history, Dante's choice of the *exemplum* is remarkable, as the *apostema* with its extremely high mortality rate signified the worst sickness that the human *genus* faced before the relatively recent discovery of antibiotics. I will, therefore, conclude this article with a brief digression on the scientific and philosophical relevance of the "apostema" and its remedy to medieval intellectual discussions, in order to both further contextualize Dante's reference and to consequently highlight the pointed and consistent nature of this reference. As Isidore of Seville states "apostema a *collectione* nomen accipit; nam *collectiones* Graeci apostemata vocant".[22] In medieval

[21] Galen, *De cuiusque animi peccatorum dignotione atque medela libellus*, in Galen, *Opera Omnia*, V.

[22] Isidore of Seville, *Etymologiarum libri*, ed. J.P. Migne, PL 82 (Paris: Garnier, 1850) IV, col. 189.

medical texts, "apostema" is included in the chapter devoted to *aegritudines compositae*, that is complex forms of illness characterized by manifold symptomatology and various causes. "Apostema" is, therefore, in general, a syndrome, that is a combination of possible symptoms generated by a corruption of one of the humors; it can arise in any part of the body producing purulent infections. Avicenna states: "in apostemate quidem omnia aegritudinum genera reperiuntur",[23] Taddeo Alderotti: "omne membrum potest apostemari".[24] Isidore of Seville in his, *Etymologiarum libri*, states: "Empye dicta est apostema intrinsecus, vel in latere, vel in stomacho, cum dolore, et febribus, et tussi, et abundantibus sputis, et purulentiis".[25] Galen's *Tegni* dedicated large space to the discussion of the "apostema", and both Joannitius's commentary to the *Tegni* and Taddeo's own commentary on Joannitius's text, add significant and original contributions about the physiopathology and, therefore, the classification of the "apostema".[26] This was a fundamental notion within contemporary scientific debates, of which Dante was clearly aware. Medieval medical treatises devote large sections to the discussion of the *apostema*, Avicenna speaks about it in several chapters through all the five books of his *Liber Canonis*; in addition, Taddeo, Arnaldus de Villa Nova, Constantinus Africanus, Averroes, Peter of Abano write extensively about it.[27] A few remarks from chapter LIX (*De apostemate*) of Bartholomeus Anglicus's *De proprietatibus rebus*—which derives many of its notions from Constantinus Africanus—will be sufficient:

> Apostema est superfluorum humorum in membro aliquot collectio, putrefactionem faciens et tumorem. Contingit autem membrum apostemari aliquando ex causa exterior, sicut ex percussion, vulnere, casu, fractura & concussione. […] Aliquando autem ab interiori, scilicet ex abundantia humorum corruptorum, qui saepe confluunt ad locum aliquem et concurrunt. […] Et hoc dupliciter fit, quia aliquando ex adunatione

[23] Avicenna, "De aegritudinibus compositis," chap. 5 of *Liber Canonis* (Venice: Giunti, 1582-84) I.II.I, fol. 29*r*.
[24] Taddeo Alderotti, *Expositiones in subtilissimum Joannitii Isagogarum libellum* (Venice: Giunti, 1527), chap XXXIII, fol. 389v.
[25] Isidore of Seville, *Etymologiarum,* IV, col. 189.
[26] Taddeo Alderotti, *Expositiones in subtilissimum Joannitii Isagogarum Libellum*, (Venice: Giunti, 1527), chap. XXXIII.
[27] See: Averroes, *Colliget Averrois totam medicinam* (Venice: H. Scoto, 1549), I, IV, chaps. XLIII-LX; Peter of Abano, *Liber Conciliator Differentiarum* (Venice: Scoto, 1521), *Diff.* XCV-XCVII, pp. 137-43; Constantinus Africanus, *De morborum cognitione et curatione*, in *Constantini Africani Opera* (Basel: Petrus, 1536), 158-159.

> materiae in proprio membro, aliquando ex fluctu materiae de uno membro ad aliud. Et talis fluxus plures sunt causae.[28]

The symptoms of the apostema and their localizations are various (abdominal, cerebral, etc.); in addition, symptoms can be extremely severe and are often fatal. The most common trait of the different syndromes is the presence of fever, which was reduced by the elimination of the *sanies* from the *apostema*. Avicenna distinguishes two types of *sanies*: the first kind is defined as *laudabilis* and it is "alba, lenis, cui non est dolor horribilis"; the second type is *mala*, "est foetida, significans putrefactionem". I convey these descriptive details from Avicenna's work because they help highlight how Albert the Great maintains this distinction within a theological context stating that the name for *putredo* is *tabes* in the cadaver and *apostema* in the living body: "tabes dicit putredo mortui; quia quod est in vivo apostema, hoc est in mortui tabes".[29] This remark is consistent, as I will point out, with some allegorical interpretations of the notion of *apostema* in theological contexts. Before moving to that, though, I would like to make a few more strictly medical references.

As medieval medical texts thoroughly investigate the symptoms, so too do they present detailed indications about the treatment of the different forms of *apostema*. Naturally, the main cure will be to elicit the evacuation of the *sanies*. Bartholomeus Anglicus, and all the authors[30] I have already recalled, describe in detail the preparation of the poultice that should help the production and the consequent elimination of the *sanies*. Arnaldus da Villa Nova provides a thorough classification of the different types of therapy, various medications, and their uses. The treatment is obviously related to the fundamental doctrine of the humors, as these passages by Arnaldus de Villa Nova show: "sanies est humor fluidus et ineptus converti ad membra". Regarding the medication and the treatment he states: "convenit agere in materiam apostematis calefaciendo; et pro parte maxima eius humidum conservandum, quapropter necesse est ut caliditas et humidum dominentur in ea".[31] Evidently Arnaldus's words exemplify how medical procedures indicated the necessity of applying the poultice to the *apostema* as soon as it had been prepared, and not later.

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[28] Bartholomeus Anglicus, *De rerum proprietatibus*, 344-348.
[29] Albertus Magnus, *Super Isaiam* (Münster: Aschendorff, 1952), XIII.7, p. 192.
[30] See, for instance, Averroes, *Colliget*, I. 4, cap. VI.
[31] Arnaldus de Villa Nova, "De cognitione virtutum complexionatorum ex operationibus," chap. XXIX of *Compendium introductionum medicinalium*, in Arnaldus de Villa Nova, *Opera* (Lyon: Carthographica Jacobi, 1532), fols. 15*v*-16*r*.

The *apostema* appears in theological contexts as well, in order to signify the infection of the sin, and the necessary remedy (confession) to free the soul from it. The foundation for this correspondence appears already in Augustine's *Sermones de Scripturis*: "magnam misericordiam magnus peccator implorat: magnam medicinam magnum vulnus desiderat" (*Sermo* XX); "confessio peccatorum ad salute necessaria" (*Sermo* XXIX); "habet ergo maculas et rugas; sed confessione ruga extenditur, confessione macula abluitur" (*Sermo* CLXXXI).[32] Another work that Augustine wrote during the last years of his life, and which has been partly amended after his death, conveys that a child, who was born with his eyelids closed, and for whom the mother refused surgery, was healed "ex cataplasmate Eucharestiae".[33] Finally, in the *Enarratio in Psalmum LXVI* (PL 36, IV,1; col. 809), the benefits of confession are exemplified through the reference to the apostema: "conscientia tua saniem collegerat; apostemata tumuerat ". It also appears here: "Compunctio mala enumerat, confessio condemnat, satisfactio emendat. Compunctio apostema pungit, confessio saniem exprimit, satisfactio cataplasma apponit".[34] John of Damascus as well compares the act of confession to the curative action of the physician: "sed continuo ad spiritualem medicum corramus, venenum peccati per confessionem evomamus, virus eius expuamus".[35] Albert the Great deals with some physiopathological and clinical aspects in his *Quaestiones super de animalibus*,[36] and Thomas Aquinas refers to *apostema* as a severe illness of the body in six of his works. In his *Sententia libri Ethicorum* Thomas writes: "sicut ars medicinae dicit pleuresim, quae est apostema sub costis periculosum at mortale".[37] In the *Expositio super librum Boethii de Trinitate*, he explains the difference between theoretical and practical medicine; in order to define the field of practical medicine, Thomas maintains that practical medicine concerns the operations necessary to heal the sick, and he compares it to the cure of the *apostema*: "sicut quod talibus apostematis sunt talia remedia adhibenda".

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[32] Augustine, *Sermones de Scripturis*, ed. J.P. Migne, PL38 (Paris: Garnier, 1845) cols. 138, 186, 982.

[33] Augustine, *Contra secundam Juliani responsionem*, ed. J.P. Migne, PL 45 (Paris: Garnier, 1845), CLXII, col. 1315.

[34] Augustine, *Enarrationes in Psalmos*, ed. J.P. Migne, PL36 (Paris: Garnier, 1845) col. 809.

[35] John of Damascus, *De confessione,* ed. J.P. Migne, PG95 (Paris: Garnier, 1864), col. 290 [604].

[36] Albertus Magnus, *Quaestiones super de animalibus*, 124 and 241.

[37] *Index Thomisticus*, ed. R. Busa, vol.5, sectio prima (Stuttgart: Frommann-Helzboog, 1974); Italian edition (Milan: Pizzi, 1976), 576.

The renewed relevance attributed to the study of medicine within the *curriculum studiorum* at universities,[38] *per se* and in its strict relation to philosophy, confirms Dante's acquaintance with medical discourses in general, and the fundamental and complex notion of the *apostema* in particular. The poet was probably familiar with the notion from a strictly scientific perspective as well, interpreted according to the assimilation of the *apostema* to sin and of the *cataplasma* to confession. Even though the medical notions of "apostema" and "impiastro" (poultice) participate in the language of non-scientific texts as practical examples of theological concepts, Dante's use of these terms in the *Monarchia* is technical. Dante refers indeed to "impiastro" even in canto XXIV of the *Inferno*, line 18, and in the *Rime*, precisely in the sonnet *Com più vi fere amor co' suo' vincastri*. In both places, "impiastro" is intended as "remedy", as Teodolinda Barolini clarifies in her commentary to the sonnet.[39] In the *Inferno* and in *Com più vi fere amor co' suo' vincastri*, therefore, medical language becomes less technical. Due to the context in which Dante places it, in the *Monarchia* "impiastro" maintains its literal meaning of "cataplasma", indicating that it needs to be applied on the skin immediately after preparation in order to exploit its warm and humid action, as shown by the Arnaldo da Villanova quotation I recalled above. As a physician would be a fool to prepare a "cataplasma" much before its use (before the patient is even born) so the creation of the "duo magna luminaria", the remedy for Original Sin, would make no sense if conceived before the creation of man.

[38] See Nancy Siraisi, *Taddeo Alderotti and his Pupils. Two generations of Italian Medical Learning* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1981); J. Agrimi and C. Crisciani, *Edocere Medicos. Medicina scolastica nei secoli XIII-XV*, (Naples: Guerini e Associati, 1988); *Monarchia*, ed. Chiesa and Tabarroni, 56.

[39] Teodolinda Barolini, in her commentary to *Com più vi fere amor co' suo' vincastri*, clarifies that "dolci 'mpiatri" means "pleasant remedies": "Love, however, is not necessarily cruel in this sonnet. On the contrary: when the right moment comes, Love with his 'pleasant remedies' (the "dolci 'mpiastri" of line 5; *impiastro* in this sense is found, as here thyming with *vincastro*, in Inf. 24.18: 'e così tosto al mal giunse lo 'mpiastro [and so quickly the plaster reached the hurt]) will dispel all torment". In Dante Alighieri, *Dante's Lyric Poetry. Poems of Youth and of the Vita Nuova*, ed. Teodolinda Barolini, trans. Richard Lansing (Toronto, Buffalo, London: Toronto University Press, 2014), 97.

CHAPTER ELEVEN

WIRELESS COMMUNICATIONS: CONTINUITY AND DISCONTINUITY BETWEEN *CONVIVIO* AND *MONARCHIA*

MARIA LUISA ARDIZZONE

The continuity between *Convivio* and *Monarchia* is well known. This study focuses on the invisible rather than evident links between the two works. Taking into consideration the discourse on the possible intellect, as it is briefly presented in *Monarchia* 1, my text points out how a different perspective about the same issue rules the discussion of the possible intellect in the last treatise of the *Convivio*. Although it is generally accepted that *Convivio* 4 is chronologically close to the writing of *Monarchia*, my exploration shows that a temporal continuity organizes a theoretical discontinuity. In the attempt to examine the reasons for this discontinuity, I will first determine whether a modification of perspective may be the reason for this discrepancy. Since the result of this exploration discloses a more complex view, this essay shows that the theoretical discontinuity provides a clue to an aspect of Dante's method that deserves our attention.

By exploring the mode and reason of both continuity and discontinuity, and the extent to which they govern the relationship between the two works, this text seeks to establish Dante's methodology of discourse. This methodology is firmly grounded in what I call the logic of complementarity. This way of thinking, which, apparently, Dante organizes first in the *Convivio*, enters the space–time continuum between *Convivio* and *Monarchy* and will later strongly shape the *Commedia*, mostly its third Canticle.

My title "Wireless Communications" aims to emphasize the network of relations that Dante establishes, not just between *Monarchy* and *Convivio*, but also between them and his first works and the lines of thought that he has activated since then. Part of this text is, therefore, an

attempt to show that in Dante's *Monarchia*, written in the late years of Dante's life (possibly between 1312 and 1313), the political theory is shaped partially by themes and ideas that he had introduced in his younger years. This creates a framework useful for our understanding of the political discourse of *Monarchia* as a turning point of a long and multidirectional reflection. An element to be taken into consideration as part of this political endeavor is in the first book of *Monarchia* as it deals with the notion of the possible intellect. As anticipated above, the reader would expect that, regarding the notion of the possible intellect, a continuity could be established between the fourth treatise of *Convivio* and the first book of *Monarchia*. In fact, in both works the possible intellect is recalled, and, in the fourth book of *Convivio*, chapter 21 is devoted to it. But a careful reading will prove that in the two works this notion is shaped by means of a sharp contrast. In the fourth treatise of *Convivio*, Dante attempts to show that every human being has his own possible intellect, which is given to him by God. Individualization is a key concept in *Convivio* 4, in order to understand the passage on the possible intellect. A reader of the first book of *Monarchia*, on the contrary, will note that Dante here introduces a notion of possible intellect which, as it is described, cannot be regarded as in continuity with the previous description in the fourth treatise of *Convivio*. In *Monarchia* 1, in fact, a plurality of human beings is identified as a thinking subject that can better actualize the power of the possible intellect. Individuality here seems to be replaced by communality. A few lines later, the text recalls Averroes.[1] Whether or not this passage is part of the work as it was conceived by Dante, or was an interpolation, as Chiesa and Tabarroni in their recent edition of Monarchia[2] suggest, the short passage on the possible intellect in *Monarchia* 1 recalls the teaching of the Commentator, even though it is well known that the philosophy of Averroes is something Dante does not deal with and that he had rejected all the deductions usually associated with the Commentator's teaching regarding the unity of the human intellect.

[1] Et huic sententie concordat Averrois in comento super hiis que *De anima* (And Averroes agrees with this opinion in his commentary on the *De anima)*.1.3.9.

[2] *Monarchia*, ed. Paolo Chiesa and Andrea Tabarroni, vol. 4 of Dante Alighieri, *Le Opere* (Rome: Salerno, 2013), cxxxi. In addition to Chiesa-Tabarroni edition the other editions that I have consulted are: Bruno Nardi, in Dante Alighieri, *Opere minori*, vol. 5, tomo II, in *La letteratura italiana: Storia e testi* (Milan: Ricciardi, 1979); and *Monarchia*, ed. Diego Quaglioni, vol. 2 of Dante Alighieri, *Opere* (Milan: Mondadori, 2014).

The discontinuity between *Convivio* 4 and *Monarchia* 1 introduces and stresses the novelty of the first book of the political treatise, where the activity of thinking in the actualization of the possible intellect identifies a community indicated as *humanum genus* or *humanitas*, which becomes one of the protagonists of the political discourse. Due to the fact that human beings in their community with one another better actualize the possible intellect, they constitute a new subject of history. Two are in fact the historical protagonists of the political discourse of Dante's Monarchy—the Emperor or Monarch, and the *Universitas hominum*—while the Pope, who is prevented from having political power, is invested with a spiritual power that guides human beings toward the beatitude of eternal life (3.15.10). Due to the fact that Dante's *Monarchia* deals programmatically with what is in time, its subject of inquiry being "temporal Monarchy", its focus is on earthly things as measured by time (2.2). Thus, the dimension of time enters the discussion on universal empire and on the *humanitas* that lives within the political institution. As we read, the goal of the Emperor and Empire is the temporal well-being and happiness of human beings (3.15.10–11). Monarchy is, therefore, necessary for the well-being of world (" ad bene esse mundi" 1.5.10); this is reiterated many times in the first book as the logical conclusion of a reasoning that intends to demonstrate various different assumptions.

Dante's discussion *intemptata* on temporal Monarchy thus starts by introducing two entities. One is the enrichment generated by learning and knowing, a tradition which is the heritage of our ancestors and in which everybody who aims at a knowledge related to the *rem publicam* should participate, thereby increasing it (1.2).The discussion on Monarchy intends to be a contribution to the common good and is addressed to posterity, that is, to the future (*Monarchia* 1.1–2). This cultural intellectual capital is a form of learning that offers a new awareness of the value of the human temporal life that the imperial state guarantees. Politics, it is suggested, must become part of learning and should be seen in relation to the organization of sciences established in the second treatise of *Convivio*, where, however, politics is not mentioned, but we should hypothesize that it is thought to be included within ethics which is the ninth science. The second entity is the actualization of the possible intellect. Since the beginning of the political treatise, Dante focuses on the *Universitas hominum*. To this is attributed, in so far as it is a universal community, the goal of actualizing the possible intellect in human history. It is worth noting that the intellectual goal does not mention the individual human

being but rather humanity conceived as one.[3] The text proceeds step-by-step and frames a logical discourse in which the actualization of the

[3] Dante organizes his discourse step by step. At first he says that "cum in operabilibus principium et causa omnium sit ultimus finis - movet enim primo agentem -, consequens est ut omnis ratio eorum que sunt ad finem ab ipso fine summatur…"then he asserts that " Illud igitur, siquid est, quod est finis universalis civilitatis humani generis, erit hic principium per quod omnia que inferius probanda sunt erunt manifesta sufficienter: esse autem finem huius civilitatis et illius, et non esse unum omnium finem arbitrari stultum est". Thus " Nunc autem videndum est quid sit finis totius humane civilitatis." 1.2.7-8; 1.3.1.
Here is the answer**:** "Est ergo aliqua propria operatio humane universitatis, ad quam ipsa universitas hominum in tanta multitudine ordinatur; ad quam quidem operationem nec homo unus, nec domus una, nec una vicinia, nec una civitas, nec regnum particulare pertingere potest. Que autem sit illa, manifestum fiet si ultimum de potentia totius humanitatis appareat" 1.3.4… "Patet igitur quod ultimum de potentia ipsius humanitatis est potentia sive virtus intellectiva. Et quia potentia ista per unum hominem seu per aliquam particularium comunitatum superius distinctarum tota simul in actum reduci non potest, necesse est multitudinem esse in humano genere, per quam quidem tota potentia hec actuetur" 1.3.7-8. " Satis igitur declaratum est quod proprium opus humani generis totaliter accepti est actuare semper totam potentiam intellectus possibilis, per prius ad speculandum et secundario propter hoc ad operandum per suam extensionem" 1.4.1–2. And the conclusion is the following: "patet quod genus humanum in quiete sive tranquillitate pacis ad proprium suum opus, quod fere divinum est iuxta illud "Minuisti eum paulominus ab angelis", liberrime atque facillime se habet. Unde manifestum est quod pax universalis est optimum eorum que ad nostram beatitudinem ordinantur"1.4.2–3.
(Since in actions it is the final objective which sets in motion and causes everything—for that is what first moves a person who acts—it follows that the whole basis of the means for attaining an end is derived from the end itself […] Therefore, whatever constitutes the purpose of the whole of human society (if there is such a purpose) will be here the first principle, in terms of which all subsequent propositions to be proved will be demonstrated with sufficient rigour; for it would be foolish to suppose that there is one purpose for this society and another for that, and not a common purpose for all of them […]We must therefore now see what is the purpose of human society as a whole; There is therefore some activity specific to humanity as a whole, for which the whole human race in all its vast number of individual human beings is designed; and no single person, or household, or small community, or city, or individual kingdom can fully achieve it. Now what this activity is will become clear when once we clarify what is the highest potentiality of the whole of mankind […] It is thus clear that the highest potentiality of mankind is his intellectual potentiality or faculty. And since that potentiality cannot be fully actualised all at once in any one individual or in any one of the particular social groupings enumerated above, there must needs be a vast number of individual people in the human race, through whom the whole of this

possible intellect conceived as the goal of *humanitas* is the forerunner of universal *pace* and *concordia*. The link between the field of politics and intellection appears to be a new entity that stresses the natural essence of both.

Monarchy, in fact, is the perfect form of the state, because it is by nature adequate to the human being as a political animal, that is, a being that must live in an organized society. Since human beings, in order to best actualize their intellect, need to live together, the State must be universal, since it corresponds to the intellectual needs of the whole *humanitas*. Thus, Monarchy, or the power of the one, while offering the model of the perfect form of the State, works to establish the one as a general principle. In other words, the one is a logical-functional principle that governs the political treatise.

In chapter 8 of the first book, we read that God is one, and that it is God's intention that every created thing should show forth His likeness. When things in the temporal world have similitude with Him, they are at their best. So, mankind is in a good (indeed, ideal) state when, to the extent that its nature allows, it resembles God. But mankind most closely resembles God when it is a unity. The true nature of the one is solely in God (vera enim ration unius in solo illo est.1.8.3). Therefore, mankind is most like God when it is ruled by one ruler and, consequently, is most in harmony with God's intention. In the field of politics Monarchy is the government of the One and human beings as a community are one because they think best in connection with one other. Here we see that the one is a principle that also serves as a goal. This principle as goal runs in parallel with the other clearly enunciated principle: the actualization of the possible intellect. The one as a goal at different levels permeates the vocabulary and the theory it establishes: universe, universal empire, unity of the *humanum genus* or *universitas*, and *humanitas* are all declinations of the one in the attempt to make it a function of time and space(see my

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potentiality can be actualised […] Now it has been sufficiently explained that the activity proper to mankind considered as a whole is constantly to actualise the full intellectual potential of humanity, primarily through thought and secondarily through action (as a function and extension of thought) […] it is apparent that mankind most freely and readily attends to this activity, an activity which is almost divine, as we read in the psalm: "Thou hast made him a little lower than the angels", in the calm or tranquillity of peace. Hence it is clear that universal peace is the best of those things which are ordained for our human happiness. *Monarchia*. The translation cited is Prue Shaw, trans. and ed., *Monarchy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).

Introduction to this volume and the notion of temporalization that I introduce).

In a language philosophically and logically organized, the text indicates the purpose of the discussion itself: human earthly happiness will be coincident with pace and *Concordia*. Both imply a unity at once intellectual and political and therein lies the best condition that we call happiness. *Pax* and *Concordia* are the goal and result of the Imperial political organization (1.15.4–6).

It is, however, necessary to point out that among the various declinations of the one—God, Emperor, State, intellectual unity, *Humanum genus* and/or *Humanitas*, apparently all the same in relation to the one—it is possible to see a strong difference between the one related to God and to the Monarch (that God is one and the triune is not recalled) as well as the one related to the human community, who is one and plural at once; that is (as we read), it is an intellectual operation that makes human beings one. In light of this, intellectual activity shapes the human political subject, who is one and plural at once, and who lives naturally in the universal empire, a political organization assumed to be natural, not only because, following Aristotle, the human being as a political animal must live in an organized State, but is also suggested that he is *political* because it is in togetherness that human beings are most able to actualize the possible intellect.

Enunciated here with an unprecedented clarity of perspective and terminology, the theory of the possible intellect as common and thus as something shared by all human beings is apparently modelled on a passage from Averroes that J.B. Brenet has identified (see his essay in this volume ,pp. 59-80). But it is no doubt the case that Dante utilizes Averroes' ideas in his own way.

In the next part of this study, I will try to reconstruct the pathway that guides Dante to the lapidary sentence about the possible intellect in *Monarchia* 1. [4] The fact that it is introduced directly and without explanation suggests that this topic was part of a long reflection, this is a hint which the *Convivio*, in some of its sections, confirms and proves.

I am not referring here to treatise 4 of *Convivio*, in which the possible intellect is recalled in a perspective (as above said) very far from that of *Monarchia* 1. As already anticipated, an apparent thematic continuity shows a strong discontinuity between the fourth treatise and the *Monarchia*. I indicate as discontinuity here what shows an attention to the topic of the possible intellect, which, however, the two works depict in

[4] For the text see above note 3.

different ways. My point is to stress that this discontinuity marks instead a continuity with the previous, third treatise of *Convivio*. A re-reading of a few passages of *Convivio* 3 allows us to see that the notion of the possible intellect actualized by the whole of humanity has its antecedent in a few paragraphs of this treatise.

The word "discontinuity", which I use in relation to the notion of intellect between *Convivio* 4 and *Monarchia* 1, requires explanation. The possible intellect theme is confronted in both texts; however, its description shows a different approach in each. *Convivio* 4 seeks to establish individualization, in fact the possible intellect is given by God to an individual soul and the first power for such individualization is in the generative process of the soul that starts when the male seed of the parent falls into its receptacle, the womb 4.21.4–5. *Monarchia* instead establishes, as we have seen, the importance of *universitas* for the best actualization of the possible intellect. In the next section, I will introduce a few sections of Dante's *Convivio* 3. Here my reading points out that the transumptive declination of the love for the *donna gentile* heralds a strong rhetorically organized discussion on human intellection. This issue was introduced in the canzone *Amor che nella mente mi ragiona* and again confronted in the prose commentary. Therefore, *Convivio* 3 suggests that Dante is here perhaps indebted, in an indirect way, to the thought of the Commentator, on whom (if this occurs) he draws freely.[5]

In *Monarchia* 1, confronting what he says about the possible intellect in itself, Dante is mostly interested in the new subject that such noetic activity delineates: a topic that provides a natural foundation for Empire. No doubt the Empire is shaped on the notion of one: the Emperor is one, and the Empire is one, God is one. But Dante's idea of Empire contains a specific element, because this political organism is discussed in relation to human beings who are uniquely endowed with an intellectual nature. And although Dante's sources are in the field of Aristotelianism, it is my proposal to emphasize that *Convivio* 3, in its allegorical commentary on the canzone recalled above, is drawing from another field that Dante was confronting since his first youthful work. So, the question I will attempt to answer is the following: what allows Dante to introduce in the *Monarchia* 1, in so clear a way, the notion of the possible intellect as actualized by the

[5] Maria Luisa Ardizzone, *Dante: il paradigma Intellettuale. Un'inventio degli anni fiorentini* (Florence: Olschki, 2011), 173–216; and *Reading as the Angels Read: Speculation and Politics in Dante's Banquet* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2016), 170–178.

whole of humanity? I will suggest that this notion does not emerge suddenly in Dante. This is the core of the second part of my study.

Before proceeding, it is important to point out that the young Dante began to consider the notion of the possible intellect, which culminated in the *Monarchia* as better actualized by the whole *humanitas,* in his Florentine years. At the same time, he started to narrate his love for a new lady, later indicated as *donna gentile,* in his canzoni *Voi ch'intendendo il terzo ciel movete* and *Amor che nella mente mi ragiona*.[6] In them, he introduced his intellectual love for such lady and with it, in the second canzone, a sense of community which participated in such love. The same sense of community, or of a plural subject unified in intellectual activity, was inserted in the prose of the third treatise of *Convivio*, in which Dante comments on the canzone above recalled, *Amor che nella mente*. Here, in the prose text, he actually invented a shifting logical subject to express and distinguish what, intellectually speaking, a singular one (that is, an individual) can know and what a community or a plural one can know. According to my reading, first of the canzone and afterwards of the prose, Dante, in presenting his intellectual activity in terms of love that is shared by the many, introduced a first glimpse of the idea of a community that this love-intellection creates. [7]

Inventing a Dual Logical Subject

It is evident that Dante deals with materials that he takes from different traditions in order to discuss the topic of human intellectual power. No doubt he is not always consistent. But a careful reader of treatises 2 and 3 of the *Convivio*, if they are considered in their natural continuity with the narrative that the two canzoni contain, will be aware that in the love for the *donna gentile* a framework is organized that allows us to follow Dante's path.[8]. The reader is requested to understand the subtle use of rhetorical figures, such as *nomination*, *pronominatio*, and *prosopopea*, in order to establish the extent to which intellectual experience at its highest level is coincident with a common intellectual experience. The way in which *Convivio* 3 confronts this issue is highly complex. What I present

[6] The Canzone, according to my reading, is conceived in a strong continuity with *Voi ch'intendendo il terzo ciel movete*). See Ardizzone, *Dante: il paradigma*, 173–216. I do not take into consideration here the "donna gentile" of *Vita nuova.*

[7] Ardizzone, *Reading as the Angels Read*, 250-259

[8] The treatise 2 of *Convivio* is conceived as a commentary to Dante's canzone: *Voi ch'intendendo il terzo ciel movete* .

here is grounded on some sections of my previous research.[9] What may be useful to say, and which is also discussed at length in my previous studies, is that Dante uses different materials from the Aristotelian and Neoplatonic-Christian tradition to circumscribe the nature and power of human intellectual activity. The most interesting aspect is that we cannot identify his discussion with the thought of the Commentator, because he encircles his theme in many different ways. Rhetorical subtlety is highly important; the careful utilization of the names that grammar indicates as collective, as well as the utilization of an impersonal verb form which, because it is impersonal, can be plural, introduce his idea of a plural subject that is one and many at once. The first fragment, I quote in note, announces the narrator's awareness of his inferiority to the lady. Here, the logical subject is the human mind. I cite in a note some passages of *Convivio* 3 that show Dante's conflicted perspective.[10] Commenting on a

[9] I discuss this issue in *Reading as the Angels Read*, chapter 4.

[10] I quote here a few fragments from the third treatise, from chapters 3–4(The English translation I cite is Richard H. Lansing, trans. and ed., *Dante's Il convivio: (The Banquet)* (New York: Garland, 1990): "E dico che "move sovente cose che fanno disviare lo 'ntelletto**".** E veramente dico; però che li miei pensieri, di costei ragionando, molte fiate voleano cose conchiudere di lei che *io* non le potea intendere, e smarrivami**,** sì che quasi parea di fuori alienato: come chi guarda col viso *per* una retta linea, prima vede le cose prossime chiaramente; poi, procedendo, meno le vede chiare; poi, più oltre, dubita; poi, massimamente oltre procedendo, lo viso disgiunto nulla vede". And I say that it "often stirs thoughts that bewilder the intellect." I speak truly, for in speaking of her my thoughts many times desired to conclude things about her which I could not understand, and I was so bewildered that outwardly I seemed almost beside myself, like one who looks with his sight fixed along a straight line and at first sees clearly those things nearest him; then, proceeding further away, sees them less clearly; and then, still further away, is left in a state of doubt; and finally, proceeding to the furthest point of all, his vision unfocused, sees nothing 3.3.13. Then he speaks about the weakness of his intellect in its relation to imagination: "Tornando adunque al proposito, dico che nostro intelletto, per difetto della virtù dalla quale trae quello ch'el vede, che è virtù organica, cioè la fantasia, non puote a certe cose salire (però che la fantasia nol puote aiutare, ché non ha lo di che), sì come sono le sustanze partite da materia; le quali, ets*i* alcuna considerazione di quelle avere potemo, intendere non le potemo né comprendere perfettamente". Returning then to the subject, I say that our intellect, by defect of that faculty from which it draws what it perceives, which is an organic power, namely the fantasy, cannot rise to certain things (because the fantasy cannot assist it, since it lacks the means), such as the substances separate from matter. And if we are able to have any concept of these substances, we can nevertheless neither apprehend nor comprehend them perfectly 3.4.9.

few lines of the canzone *Amor che nella mente* and utilizing transumptive rhetorical forms, Dante introduced the relationship between the human mind and the gentle lady as an experience lived by the author himself.

The relation of love between the mind of the narrator's I, here presented as the prototype of the human mind, its cognitive power, and the gentle lady, generates a discussion of human intellectual power that organizes a distinction between what the individual as individual is able to know and what a plurality of human beings together can know. To establish such difference in the text appears to be normative. The theme of ineffability—i.e. the assertion that there are things that the intellect understands but is not able to say, and which is introduced while stressing the divine nature of the Gentle Lady—was leading to the complex issue of the intellectual power of the individual assumed to be weak and, in some way, confronted with the stronger intellectual power of a community. A kind of community in sharing love and intellection in relation to the gentle lady was first introduced in the canzone, *Amor che nella mente mi*

The following fragment explains that, because our knowledge derives from imagination, we are not able to reach a superior kind of knowledge in this life: "E di ciò non è l'uomo da biasimare, ché non esso, di*co*, fue di questo difetto fattore, anzi fece ciò la natura universale, cioè Dio, che volse in questa vita privare noi da questa luce; che, perché elli lo si facesse, presuntuoso sarebbe a ragionare". Man is not to be blamed for this, for as I say he was not the maker of this defect; rather universal nature was, that is, God, who willed that in this life we be deprived of that light. Why he should do this would be presumptuous to discuss. 3.4.10

Then he says that there is consideration, i.e. kind of superior knowledge of which he has a glimpse and which however is superior to his intellectual power:

sì che, se la mia considerazione mi transportava in parte dove la fantasia venia meno allo 'ntelletto, se *io* non potea intendere, non sono da biasimare Consequently if my contemplation has transported me to a region where my fantasy has failed my intellect, if *I* was unable to understand, *I* am not to blame for being unable to understand. (I have modified Lansing's translation of this fragment) 3.4.11.

The following fragment suggest that there are two kinds of knowledge:

Dunque, se 'l pensiero nostro, non solamente quello che a perfetto intelletto non vène ma eziandio quello che a perfetto intelletto si termina, è vincente del parlare, non semo noi da biasimare, però che non semo di ciò fattori.

Therefore, if our thought surpasses our speech--not only that which does not reach perfect understanding but also that which results in perfect understanding--we are not to blame, because it is not of our doing 3.4.12.

ragiona, through the word, *gente* (v. 24).[11] This word offers a clue to be evaluated. In the canzone, in a most cryptic way, the text also utilizes an impersonal form: *s'intende*[12] (what is understood), later reiterated and explained in the commentary. In the prose section, Dante also introduces the expression *perfetto intelletto* (perfect intellect) (3.3.12, quoted in note 10). The two expressions create a pathway of clues to be followed. Association and distinction are the logical categories that govern the reading. Such clues are not visible to the natural eye, but only to the eye that is able to read though the glasses of the rhetorical-philosophical tradition.

Wearing such glasses, we are able to get a crucial piece of information: the individual who is committed to the intellectual enterprise of knowing the *donna gentile* is poorly endowed, but the individual could participate in a superior common knowledge that can reach the *perfetto intelletto*. One of the two linguistic forms (*s'intende*) that I have indicated above was utilized also by Guido Cavalcanti in his Canzone *Donna me prega*, where it was a topic related to the field of radical Aristotelianism. *S'intende* (*"Ven da veduta forma che s'intende"* Comes from a seen form that is understood*,* v. 21[13]) was, according to Maria Corti, the vernacular translation of *quae intelligitur*, which she retraces in a radical anonymous commentary to Aristotle's *De anima*.[14] P*erfetto intelletto* perhaps should

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[11] Ogni Intelletto di là su la mira,/e quella *gente* che qui s'innamora/ne' lor pensieri la truovano ancora, (Every Intelligence admires her from above, And *those* down here who are in love) 23–25(Italics are mine)

[12] " E certo e' mi convien lasciare in pria, / s'io vo' trattar di quel ch'odo di lei / ciò che *lo mio intelletto* non comprende;/ e di quel che *s'intende*/gran parte, perché dirlo non savrei". And surely I must leave aside, if I Should wish to treat of what I hear of her That which my intellect does not conceive. As well as much of what it understands. Because I know not how I should express it. 9–13

This is the commentary: "Poi quando dico: *"e di quel che s'intende*", dico che non pur a quello che lo mio intelletto non sostiene, ma eziandio a quello che *io* intendo sufficientemente, non [sono sufficiente]" Then when I say *And of what it understands* I assert that my inability extends not only to what my intellect does not grasp but even to what I do understand 3.4.3.

[13] Domenico De Robertis, ed., Guido Cavalcanti, *Rime con le rime di Iacopo Cavalcanti* (Turin: Einaudi, 1986). The translation cited is that of Lowry Nelson Jr., trans., *The Poetry of Guido Cavalcanti* (New York: Garland,1986).

[14] Maria Corti devotes a number of pages to the discussion of Cavalcanti's Canzone. See Maria Corti, *La felicità mentale: nuove prospettive per Cavalcanti e Dante* (Turin: Einaudi, 1983), 3-37. On this issue and on *Donna me prega* see Maria Luisa Ardizzone, *Guido Cavalcanti: The Other Middle Ages* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2002), 47–133.

echo the *buon perfetto* (v. 59) of *Donna me prega* that was read as a translated quotation from Aristotle by Nardi[15] and later assimilated by Corti to the radical Aristotelianism of Boethius of Dacia.[16] The two linguistic forms, if read in light of the field they share, suggest that a logical subject, which can be plural because it is impersonal, is able to reach a superior intellectual knowledge, in which the individual, in so far as is he is able to, can participate.

The introduction of this logical subject, if we pay attention to the technical language Dante introduces here, suggests that the *Convivio* was confronting an issue related to the Commentator, perhaps through the mediation of Dante's former first friend, Guido Cavalcanti. What is noteworthy here is that the canzone and the prose commentary (*Convivio* 3) seem to organize a discussion in the confrontation of different lines of thought and different fields. The prose text of *Convivio* 4, however, goes beyond this construction. Dante appears to reshape what he has circumscribed previously. He now seems interested in showing the making of the intellectual individuality and the extent to which an individual, in so far as he is an individual, receives his possible intellect from God. Here the two texts (both the Canzone *Le dolci rime d'amor ch'io solia* (v.117) and the commentary, *Convivio*, 4.20.7–8) introduce a key word, *persona*. This word was discussed and defined by Severinus Boethius, on whom Aquinas commented. According to both, *persona* stresses the perfect individual nature of an intellectual substance, and thus seems to include an answer to the uncertainties that perhaps have shaped Dante's reflection on the power and essence of the intellectual nature of human beings.[17] This reflection, no doubt , is very much in tune with the intellectual European debate of the time.

If this was Dante's position in the fourth treatise of the *Convivio*, it was different (as above already said) from Dante's position in the third of *Convivio*. Thus, in pointing out the discussion of intellection, as it is shaped in the fragments of the third treatise that I have quoted and recalled above, I intend to bring to the surface what has, perhaps, been the backbone of Dante's thinking and, thus, the invisible links that tie *Monarchia* 1 to *Convivio* 3. The introduction of an activity of intellection that is best actualized by the whole human community, as in *Monarchia* 1,

[15] Nardi identifies the aristotelian "bonum perfectum" "téleion agaton"…with the highest goal of human life. To reach such goal is coincident with "eudaimonia", i.e.earthly happiness. Bruno Nardi, *Dante e la cultura medioevale* (Bari: Laterza, 1985), 102.
[16] Corti, *La felicità Mentale*, 29.
[17] Ardizzone, *Reading as the Angels Read*, 350–351, 429–430n11.

seems to be the natural result of the reflection and writing of *Convivio* 3. Dante thus activates a logic of relations that works in multidirectional ways and that the reader has to detect.

Complementarity

To understand what was said above, the reader must first consider the continuity-discontinuity that *Convivio* 3 establishes between the literal commentary (in the sections quoted at note 10) and the allegorical. It is discontinuous because, as the linguistic field testifies, the two sections include a ground of diverse references. The fragments of the literal comment (3.3–4), if juxtaposed with the chapters 12–15 of *Convivio* 3 devoted to the allegorical commentary, are in fact related to two very different lines of medieval culture: one philosophical and the other theological. They are continuous, because they discuss, as we will see, the same issue, but they are also discontinuous, because they refer to fields conceived as different or, sometimes, opposed. Dante does not deal with the theory of the double truth. On the contrary, he seems to think that there is one truth, and that different linguistic formulations shape different paradigms that are useful to describe the same object. Dante's allegorical commentary on the canzone *Amor che nella mente* testifies to the appeal to the theological tradition, as is evident where philosophy is identified with God's thinking.[18] Thus chapters 12–15 of the third treatise show that the discussion of intellection is rethought in relation to the theological field, which becomes the point of departure for a new approach and rethinking. This approach is built on a strong discontinuity with the literal one, as above discussed, but such discontinuity nevertheless includes continuity.

Now the word *discontinuity*, as I use it, acquires a more specific meaning, because it refers to two different fields and traditions. Discontinuity here implies acknowledging that two different linguistic and semantic fields are necessary in order to best describe the same object. This object here is the true nature of the human mind and its intellectual activity. The first most interesting aspect can be found in the relational ground Dante attempts to bring in between the field of intellection, as described in the sections already quoted of the literary commentary of *Convivio* 3, and the *sapientia-logos-verbum* of the biblical tradition

[18] Dico adunque che Dio, che tutto intende (ché suo "girare" è suo "intendere"), non vede tanto gentil cosa quanto elli vede quando mira là dove è questa Filosofia. Ché, avegna che Dio, esso medesimo mirando, veggia insiememente tutto, in quanto la distinzione delle cose è in lui per [lo] modo che lo effetto è nella cagione, vede quelle distinte.

introduced in the allegorical commentary. Actually, it is the word *philosophy*—which is explained in terms of etymology (*philos-sophia*) and attributed to God—that drives the discourse (I have quoted in a note, sections of chapters 12–15 from the third treatise). [19] The love for the *donna gentile* is referred to as the love that rules the relationship between the Father and the Son, and the biblical *sapientia* and the *logos-verbum* of John's Gospel are both recalled.[20] This is important, because the reader is

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Vede adunque questa nobilissima di tutte assolutamente, in quanto perfettissima in sé la vede e in sua essenzia. Ché se a memoria si reduce ciò che detto è di sopra, filosofia è uno amoroso uso di sapienza, lo quale massimamente è in Dio" I say, then, that God, whose understanding embraces everything (for his "circling" is his "understanding"), sees nothing so noble as he sees when he gazes upon the place where this Philosophy dwells. For although God, gazing upon himself, sees all things collectively, yet he sees them discretely insofar as the discreteness of things exists in him in such manner that the effect exists within the cause. He sees then this most noble of things absolutely, insofar as he sees her perfectly in himself and in his essence. For if we recall what has been said above, Philosophy is a loving use of the wisdom which exists in the greatest measure in God 3.12.11–12

"E così si vede come questa è donna primieramente di Dio e secondariamente dell'altre intelligenze separate per continuo sguardare; e appresso dell'umana intelligenza per riguardare discontinuato" So we can see how this lady exists primarily in God and secondarily in the other separate Intelligences, through their continuous contemplation of her, and afterwards in the human intelligence through its discontinuous contemplation of her 3.13.7.

[19] Dunque si vede come nell'aspetto di costei delle cose di Paradiso appaiono. E però si legge nel libro allegato di Sapi . enza, di lei parlando: "Essa è candore della etterna luce e specchio sanza macula della maestà di Dio"Consequently we see how some of the things of Paradise appear in her countenance. So, we read in the book of Wisdom just cited, where it speaks of her: "She is the brightness of the eternal light and the flawless mirror of the majesty of God" 3.15.5.

Ultimamente, in massima laude di sapienza, dico lei essere di tutto madre [e prima di] qualunque principio, dicendo che con lei Dio cominciò lo mondo e spezialmente lo movimento del cielo, lo quale tutte le cose genera e dal quale ogni movimento è principiato e mosso: dicendo: "costei pensò chi mosse l'universo".

Ciò è a dire che nel divino pensiero, ch'è esso intelletto, essa era quando lo mondo fece; onde séguita che ella lo facesse. Finally, expressing supreme praise of Wisdom, I say that she is the mother of all things and the origin of each and every motion by affirming that together with her God created the universe and especially the movement of the heavens which generates all things and from which every other movement takes its origin and its impetus, adding *Conceived by him who set the heavens in motion*. I mean that she existed in the divine thought, which is intellect itself, when he made the universe, from which it follows that she made it. 3.15.15

[20] See note 18 above.

invited to think in terms of complementarity in order to understand what Dante is doing. In fact, he does not attempt to reconcile the two lines of thought; on the contrary, both seem to be essential to the description of the field he is mapping.

The object in the predicate is philosophy and God's thinking. Part of this discussion is our likeness to God, and philosophy is discussed in terms that confirm that the *donna gentile* is a divine idea. Utilizing etymology as a key tool, Dante in these chapters assimilates philosophy in the meaning he circumscribes, as in the *philos-sophia*, to the field of Christology pronounced through the *sapientia*: *logos-verbum*. Different languages and different descriptions are to be included. Dante's method, as noted above, is shaped on what I indicate as the principle of complementarity, and the reader must align his mind with this in order to grasp what the text is attempting to do. A logic of complementarity enters the picture. In order to be better understood, I recall here what the physicist Niels Bohr (1929) wrote many centuries later: "a complete elucidation of one and the same object may require diverse points of view, which defy a unique description."[21] Dante's logic of complementarity in this context takes shape in the *between* of the fragments of the literal commentary of *Convivio* 3 and the allegorical commentary of the same treatise. This logic organizes a discussion in which apparently incompatible fields are essential in defining the same object. Opposite fields can neither be excluded nor conciliated. Dante's discourse shows that different points of view more effectively move us toward the knowledge of something. His inclination toward complementarity builds a method of exploration that opens the path to a world of plural probabilities and possibilities that resist unification, and this perceives the exploration of diverse fields and their results, not as something to be conciliated, but as complementary to each other. *Convivio* 3, in the sections I have selected, shows that the notion of the possible intellect as shared by many, and that of the universal *logos-sapientia*, can be confronted and seen as complementary ways that cannot be reduced to a single perspective. Similarly, in *Monarchia* the Emperor and the Pope in so far as they are Pope and Emperor cannot be reduced to 0ne (3.11.), and earthly happiness and eternal happiness cannot be reduced to one (3.15.7), and philosophical documents are distinguished from spiritual ones (3.15.8). This perspective, which, of course, needs to be explored at greater length, in particular in the *Commedia,* seems to provide a further dimension to Dante's thinking. I will shortly indicate what

[21] Niels Bohr. *Atomic Theory and the Description of Nature* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1961) 94.

emerges from this methodology and how it works in *Monarchia*. The discontinuity I have underlined in *Convivio* 3 between a field philosophically organized and one theological in fact suggests another relation of complementarity, as it takes place between sections of the first and of the third book of *Monarchia*. What I am proposing now is that the Christological implant of *Monarchia*, as it takes place in Chapter 16 of Book 1 and in Book 3, can be perhaps fruitfully related to the discourse of the possible intellect of *Monarchia* 1. This principle allows me to return to Dante's alternative constructive method: that of complementarity.

Something needs to be stressed at this point: the allegorical commentary of *Convivio* 3 introduced the *logos-verbum* as eternal and universal, Incarnation and the Pentecostal event—recalled through the descending flames of fire—were all steps toward the assessment of the commonality of human beings thinking together in the *logos-verbum*. This was pronounced powerfully in theological terms there where the Incarnation was suggested as the historical event that made flesh the *logos-verbum*.[22] Chapter 7 of *Convivio's* treatise 3 was preparing this idea and here we read that our reason has been created by the one who was crucified: *Colui che fu crocifisso creò la nostra ragione*.[23] Therefore, the possible intellect, suggested as actualized by the many, and the *logos-verbum* as relevant to all mankind, were introduced as diverse descriptions of a diverse object, where the object is the human intellect and its thinking. The *Convivio* establishes in this way universalism and from it extends in order to ground a political awareness. The relation between the universal human intellectual nature and its political being points in *Monarchia* to the necessity of the Empire.

Monarchy, for Dante, is natural. This derives from Aristotle's *Politics*: the natural essence of the State and of the human being defined as a political animal, according to Aristotle, were both based on *logos*. *Logos* is natural and universal, while Empire is just universal. In Dante the Universal Empire is the best political organization for human beings, and such optimality includes the fact that the human intellect is best actualized by *humanitas* as a whole. These contents, read in the internal continuity I

[22] In a few paragraphs of 3.13-15 as quoted above takes place the identification between philosophy and the *sapientia-verbum* of biblical tradition. Dante, in fact, identifies at first the donna gentile and philosophia, and then philosophia and sapientia. Philosophy as love for Sophia-sapientia is in the mind of God, God thinks *sapientia* and sapientia is identified with the verbum-logos of John's Gospel, eternal and with whom all things were made.

[23] colui che fu crucifisso - lo quale creò la nostra ragione, e volse che fosse minore del suo potere 3.7.16

have stressed between *Convivio* 3 and *Monarchia* 1, suggest a link between the theory of human intellect and the *logos* and this continuity opens another: that between the first book of Monarchy and the third. But the latter can be understood only if the relation between the literal commentary of *Convivio* 3 (3.3.3–4 see note 10 above) and the allegorical (3.12–15) is grasped. Such a relationship, however, introduces discontinuity. In *Monarchia*, key concepts are not just the one, but also universality and plurality: commonality as they converge in the Empire. A one that is one *and* many at once is the being we are requested to confront and understand. The eagle of *Paradiso* 19 (7–12), who speaks in the singular but intends the plural, is the living exemplum of this meaning and its importance. Here Dante stresses that the intellectual nature of this image has never been understood in virtue of imagination.

Christ's birth under Augustus, which takes place in the *plenitudo temporis*, that is in the Universal Empire, is suggested to be the event that makes manifest in peace and *Concordia* such Universalism (1.15–16). The birth of Christ and the Incarnation imply that the *logos* lives among us. The founding of the Church is related to this universalism. The Christological implant of *Monarchia* can be better understood if seen in a larger context and mostly as the result of a pathway Dante has organized since his youthful Florentine years.

Verbum-logos

As the *Vita nova* shows, the young poet was dealing with this topic since his first work. The *libello* strongly testifies to the importance Dante gives to collectivity and the new sense of history that he introduces in light of the Incarnation and the entrance of the Christ-*verbum* in the world of time. Christ is a man among men. John's Gospel announces that the *verbum carum factum est et habitavit in nobis*. The *Vita nuova* was the attempt to show how such a divine-human dimension is part of everyday life. Christology was the seed implanted in the *Vita nuova*, and it flourished there and in other works by Dante. In the years close to the writing of *Vita nuova*, one of those seeds was sown in the canzone *Amor che nella mente*, which introduced the *interior Word* in relation to the intellectual activity of contemplation. Actually, what the canzone introduced was the Augustinian *verbum-logos*. This is the interior word that Dante, in the canzone, related to contents he derived from the *Liber de causis* and intertwined with an Aristotelian awareness that points to Aquinas. It is in

fact Aquinas who relates the Augustinian *verbum-logos* with the activity of intellection. [24]

The idea of a universal *logos*, of which interior speech is the expression, was present in Dante's work while he was rethinking contents he was dealing with since the time of his relation to Cavalcanti. While he was opposing Guido's Averroistic tenets, contrasting them and reshaping them in a different perspective, he was evaluating and rethinking a different perspective to the idea that human beings think together. Therefore, he both opposes Guido and searches for his own way to activate new lines and new sources. But what he takes from these different lines is something totally new. A sense of community takes form in Dante and this is something that Cavalcanti had no interest in. The canzone *Amor che nella mente mi ragiona* testifies to this point.

As I said above, the canzone *Amor che nella mente mi ragiona* seems to identify the *verbum logos*, as an interior word, with the activity of intellection.[25] Dante, from the beginning, seems interested in the intellectual universal nature of the *verbum-logos*. In the *Vita nuova*, the equation Beatrice-Christ has been variously emphasized. I have stressed the implicit link with the *logos* theory suggested in different sections of the *Vita nuova* and focused, at first, on Dante's introduction of the language of *laude*, as the universal language that declares the intellectual universal nature of the human beings, who in the *Vita nuova* share this intellectual language with the angels.[26] But in particular it is when Beatrice's death is considered as a loss for the city, and when Dante writes to the Princes of the earth about her death, that Beatrice's symbolic meaning appears more clearly as related to the life of the city. The idea of the Christ-*logos* identified with Beatrice once more discloses in the vernacular the meaning of the Incarnation and the sense of the beginning of a new historical era, in which the *logos* takes human form and heralds and dictates the necessity of a new writing, which the young Dante seeks to organize since his first work.[27] Beatrice's death is presented as a loss and a cause of mourning for the city and is, therefore, political. The fact that Dante, quoting Isaiah's *Lamentations*, writes about the city as a *vedova* (widow), because of the

[24] (Bernard Lonergan quotes from *De veritate* 4.2.5: "in intellectu nostro non differt dicere et intelligere." Bernard Lonergan, *Verbum: Word and idea in Thomas Aquinas*, vol.2 of *The Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan*, ed. Frederick E. Crowe and Robert M. Doran (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1997), 196.
[25] Ardizzone, *Dante: Il paradigma,* 173-201.
[26] Ibid.,1-114
[27] Maria Luisa Ardizzone, "Verbum valet plurimum: Tracing a Fragment of Dante's Poetics," *Italica* 90, no.3 (2013): 319–342

death of Beatrice, to the *Principi della terra*—the same expression he will use in a letter written to the cardinals (Epistle 11) in his strongly political years (1314)—shows this endeavor and how much the city does not coincide with Florence, but with the earthly City, which, for such loss, is *vedova*.[28] The Incarnation drives toward universality, and human beings have shared universally the *verbum carum* who *habitavit in nos* since then. An event that is foundational to this thinking, but which the narrative of *Vita nuova* does not deal with, is the birth of Christ. The *De vulgari eloquentia* in its discussion on language (Book 1) was no doubt grounded on the theory of *logos*-*verbum* in its Christian formulation. A form of language was created by God along with the first soul and such a form was con- created with the intellectual soul. In virtue of such form takes place the making of human language which the lips of the first man moulded. In *Monarchia*, Dante links Christ's birth to the birth of the Empire. Stressing *pax* and *Concordia* among human beings as foundational in the Empire (1.15–1.16), *Monarchia* creates a parallel between the universality of the Empire and the universality created in the world by Christ's advent. According to St. Paul, the birth of Christ under the Augustus Empire, recalled in Chapter 16 of the first treatise of *Monarchia*, takes place in the *plenitudo temporis* (*Galati*, 4) and heralds universal peace.[29] This universal happiness is possible in the *Concordia* and it implies a shared principle. Here, Dante's quotation from *Psalm 132*—"Ecce quam bonum et quam iocundum, habitare fratres in unum"(1.16.5)—pronounced by the Holy Spirit, suggests that Dante encompasses the Christological interpretation provided by Augustine in his commentary to the *Psalm 132*

28 "Quomodo sedet sola civitas". *Vita nuova*, 30.1; Isahia's Lamentations is quoted at first at 28.1: "*Quomodo sedet sola civitas plena populo! facta est quasi vidua domina gentium"*. I refer here to Donato Pirovano and Marco Grimaldi, ed., Dante Alighieri, *Vita nuova. Rime* (Rome: Salerno, 2015).

29 "Hinc est quod pastoribus de sursum sonuit non divitie, non voluptates, non honores, non longitudo vite, non sanitas, non robur, non pulcritudo, sed pax**;** inquit enim celestis militia: "Gloria in altissimis Deo, et in terra pax hominibus bone voluntatis. Hinc etiam "Pax vobis" Salus hominum salutabat; decebat enim summum Salvatorem summam salutationem exprimere: quem quidem morem servare voluerunt discipuli eius et Paulus in salutationibus suis, ut omnibus manifestum esse potest". (That is why the message which rang out from on high to the shepherds was not wealth, nor pleasures, nor honours, not long life, nor health, nor strength, nor beauty, but peace; for the heavenly host said: "Glory to God on high, and on earth peace to men of good will. And that is why the Saviour of men used the greeting "Peace be with you", for it was fitting that the supreme Saviour should utter the supreme salutation; and his disciples and Paul chose to preserve this custom in their own greetings, as everybody can verify) 1.4.3–4.

(Migne, *PL* 37,1729–36).Thus, the quoted fragment shows how incarnation, the *logos-verbum incarnatum* who lives in us, and among us, shapes the universal connections between human beings.

This universalism is introduced by Dante in many ways, for instance, through the Greek word *ecclesia*, meaning "assembly". Ecclesia implies the universalism of the Church and its mission. In the Gospels of Luke and John, this universalism is announced at the beginning. The duty given to Peter is evidently a preparation of the role of the ecclesia. Peter is the stone on which the ecclesia will be founded, but Peter is asked to go and *to teach to nations* (Mark 28.16–19). And Dante writes that the *forma* (essence) of Ecclesia is the *vita Christi*.[30] Paul introduces an equality among human beings in his Letter to Galatians, 3.27, where he tells the Galatians that they were baptized in Christ. Paul is attempting to ground the universalism of the Christian Church in Christ's universalism. Paul's universalism, strongly affirmed in his letters to the Ephesians and Colossians, is derived from Hellenism, and Paul devotes himself to substantiate the equation of Christ's life with universalism. The Letter to Romans is a document of it, and the law inscribed in the heart without words and which applies also to Gentiles is a variant of the theory of *logos*, which is universal and seeks to restore the lost unity among human beings.

Augustine echoes Paul when he says that the interior word *verbum* is not Greek or Latin.[31] This leads to a medieval tradition that was retaken and powerfully discussed by philosophers and theologians, such as Anselm from Canterbury and Aquinas. The ecclesia is universal because Christ, the *verbum* is universal. The Romans have realized a universal empire based on *ius,* Dante writes that *ius* is in the mind of God, insofar as *ius* is universal. In *Monarchia*, we read that the archetype of justice is in the mind of God as well as in nature, and because of this, justice is universal.

[30] "Ad evidentiam autem minoris sciendum quod natura Ecclesie forma est Ecclesie: nam, quamvis natura dicatur de materia et forma, per prius tamen dicitur de forma, ut ostensum est in Naturali auditu. Forma autem Ecclesie nichil aliud est quam vita Cristi, tam in dictis quam in factis comprehensa: vita enim ipsius ydea fuit et exemplar militantis Ecclesie." To clarify the minor premise it must be borne in mind that the church's nature is the form of the church; for although "nature" is used with reference to matter and to form, nonetheless it refers first and foremost to form, as is shown in the *Physics* Now the 'form' of the church is simply the life of Christ, including both his words and his deeds; for his life was the model and exemplar for the church militant 3.15.2–3.

[31] Augustine, *Sermo 288* as cited in Ardizzone, "Verbum valet plurimum".

In the *Letter to the Galatians*, the advent of the *plenitude temporis* is the result of God's will. Universality is a divine drive. Division is the opposite of *pace* and *Concordia*. *Pace*, as universal peace, stresses indirectly the naturally endowed universal nature of human beings. In addition, the *censimento* of the Empire at the time of Christ's birth is based on universalism.[32] The unity of the human beings is realized in the universalism of the Empire and the birth of Christ, is the manifestation of a superior and providential will.

The *humanitas* that lives in the Empire is universal in the same way. The word *universitas* means a collectivity that is one,[33] and the terminology of Christianity in many ways enters into this universalism, since *the verbum habitavit in nos* and this *verbum* is not Greek or Latin. Universalism is a crucial issue in Dante's political thought and the notion of the possible intellect that Dante introduced in *Monarchia* 1 indicates its importance.

Ecclesia and *Humanitas* confront each other, and encompass a new idea about the *humanum genus*. The universalism is not just of the Empire but also of the *Ecclesia*. It is a principle that is both secular and theological Christ's advent under Augustus' Empire, as well as the synchronic birth of the Empire and the Son tell us that the goal of a universal earthly happiness governs the destinies of human beings ruled by the Emperor in the respect of their nature and desires. *Ecclesia* is a correlative of *Humanitas* and *Universitas*.

As noted above, in Aristotle's *Politics*, the human being is a political animal, a notion that has its foundation in the theory of *logos*. In the original Greek text, in fact, Aristotle introduces the word *logos* when he recalls that human beings live naturally in community because of their *logos* or discourse (*Politics*,1253 a 5–15). In other words, community manifests our *logos*.[34] According to Aquinas' commentary, this implies

[32] "Hoc etiam testimonium perhibet scriba Cristi Lucas, qui omnia vera dicit, in illa parte sui eloquii: "Exivit edictum a Cesare Augusto, ut describeretur universus orbis"; in quibus verbis universalem mundi iurisdictionem tunc Romanorum fuisse aperte intelligere possumus." Christ's chronicler Luke, who always speaks the truth, bears witness to this also, in the passage where he tells us: "There went out a decree from Caesar Augustus, that all the world should be described" and, in these words, we can clearly perceive that at that time the Romans exercised jurisdiction over the whole world 2.8.14.(I have modified Shaw's translation)

[33]Pierre Michaud-Quantin, *Universitas.Expressions du mouvement communitaire dans le moyen âge latin* (Paris: Vrin,1970), 57

[34] The word *logos* encompasses a stratigraphy of meanings which enclose but can not be reduced to word and ratio. For instance, because of its root in the verb *legein*, *logos* implies to speak and also to lay in the sense of bringing things

intellectual exchanges and so on; following the Stagirite, Aquinas points out that the word or *verbum* belongs exclusively to human beings. More accurately, according to Aristotle, it is the community that activates the *logos*. The first book of *Monarchia*, while discussing Empire and structuring Dante's investigation (*inquisitio1*.2.4.) on the *intemptata* notion of temporal Monarchy, shapes a pathway toward Universalism that in the book will be revealed to be at once political, intellectual, cosmological, and philosophical as well as Christian and juridical.

In summary, I maintain that in the *Monarchia* culminates a line of reflection that Dante initiated when he was young, although he subsequently reshaped it in various ways. What I propose is that *Monarchia*—which introduces a new subject of history, *humanita*s, considered as one and as such able to best actualize the possible intellect in the universal Empire—must be read in light of Christ's advent, which takes place simultaneously with the creation of Empire. The Incarnation implies the *logos* that manifests itself in time. Empire is the natural political construction in which this *logos*, as a shared principle that manifests itself in the *Concordia*, provides the basis for human *conviventia*. The first treatise introduced, in philosophical terms, the possible intellect that is best actualized by the *Universitas Hominum* or *humanitas*: a unity that encloses the universal plurality. Chapter 16 announces, in Christological terms, that, in virtue of incarnation, we live together in the one (1,16). *Psalm 132* contains an awareness of Augustine commentary, as seen in his *Narrationes in Psalmos*. This relates the Psalms to the Holy spirit and Christ, and heralds the unity of the many in the one.[35] In addition, it is worthwhile to recall that, for a reader of Augustine such as Dante, the word *Concordia* is perhaps connected to the Augustinian *verbum cordis*, the *verbum-logos* that is not Greek or Latin

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together. To introduce in a discourse the word, *logos*, imposes at first to recognize that to establish its meaning is problematic For *logos*, in the context of Plato's works, see the classical study of John Sallis, *Being and Logos. Reading the Platonic Dialogues* (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1996). For the becoming of the notion *logos* in Christianity, an introduction is provided in Max Pohlenz, *La Stoa. Storia di un movimento spirituale* (Florence: la Nuova Italia, 1978), 2:261–400.

[35] In Dante's quotation there is a trace of such an interpretation, since the words of the Psalm are pronounced by the Holy Spirit's trumpet: "cum per tubam Sancti Spiritus tibi effletur: "Ecce quam bonum et quam iocundum, habitare fratres in unum" ("when it is breathed into you by the trumpet of the holy spirit: "Behold how good and how pleasant it is to dwell together in unity") 1.16 (I have modified here Shaw's translation). On this see also what I write above at pp. 240-41.

and which does not belong to one single language but is all languages (Ardizzone, *Verbum valet plurimum*,2013). In his denial of temporal power to the Church, Dante stresses the vital importance of its tradition. The Emperor and the Empire depend directly from God but both theological tradition and Empire work together to establish human beings' happiness on earth. Incarnation, the *verbum* made flesh, heralds such happiness in the peace and *concordia* granted by the "*plenitudo temporis*" coincident with the birth of Empire.[36]

Dante's political treatise shows that different linguistic formulations are utilized to describe the same object in different ways. I have introduced the principle of complementarity as useful to evaluating Dante's approach, as it appears to be utilized by him in the *Convivio*, showing how he confronted, without attempting to reconcile them, the philosophical field with the theological.

In this way, in the political treatise the importance of temporal monarchy is demonstrated utilizing tools derived from different traditions and diverse cultural fields. Christology pronounces in theological and historical terms what the Incarnation, the Word made flesh, allows. This has to be confronted with what the First Treatise of Monarchy has established: human beings think better when they think together. The

[36] "Rationibus omnibus supra positis experientia memorabilis attestatur: status videlicet illius mortalium quem Dei Filius, in salutem hominis hominem assumpturus, vel expectavit vel cum voluit ipse disposuit. Nam si a lapsu primorum parentum, qui diverticulum fuit totius nostre deviationis, dispositiones hominum et tempora recolamus, non inveniemus nisi sub divo Augusto monarcha, existente Monarchia perfecta, mundum undique fuisse quietum.
Et quod tunc humanum genus fuerit felix in pacis universalis tranquillitate hoc ystoriographi omnes, hoc poete illustres, hoc etiam scriba mansuetudinis Cristi testari dignatus est; et denique Paulus 'plenitudinem temporis' statum illum felicissimum appellavit. Vere tempus et temporalia queque plena fuerunt, quia nullum nostre felicitatis ministerium ministro vacavit." (All the arguments advanced so far are confirmed by a remarkable historical fact: namely the state of humanity which the Son of God either awaited, or himself chose to bring about, when he was on the point of becoming man for the salvation of mankind. For if we review the ages and the dispositions of men from the fall of our first parents (which was the turning-point at which we went astray), we shall not find that there ever was peace throughout the world except under the immortal Augustus, when a perfect monarchy existed. That mankind was then happy in the calm of universal peace is attested by all historians and by famous poets; even the chronicler of Christ's gentleness deigned to bear witness to it; and finally, Paul called that most happy state "the fullness of time". Truly that time was "full", as were all temporal things, for no ministry to our happiness lacked its minister)1.16.1–2.

universality of the *Ecclesia* parallels the universality of the *humanitas*, because are both based on the naturally endowed essence that human beings share.

The description of the possible intellect is the result of what Dante calls *philosophica documenta*. This description, although complementary to Christology, is different from that announced in relation to Christology, which Dante indicates as embodied in spiritual documents. Dante's position must not be identified as a double truth. The two descriptions, because they are different, play a strong role in establishing a better description for what is temporal Monarchy: its natural essence, its necessity, and its roots.

The new subject is the organized community, the universal community, and is identified in its common noetic activity. The enormous value Dante gives to earthly happiness cannot be understood solely on the basis of the philosophical secular tradition. The importance he gives to the possible intellect must not be thought as fully able to describe the universal power of intellection. The notion of the *verbum-logos*, in its Christian pronunciation, is complementary to it. As *Monarchia* presents it, the *tunica inconsuntile* of Christ is the symbol of the unity and universality of both the Church and Empire.[37] The *vita Christi* is the form and essence of the Ecclesia. Christ's birth heralds the importance of time and earthly life, an importance that the temporal Monarchy heralds too. The synchronicity that Dante underlines between the birth of Empire and that of Christ is not casual. The two events in different ways aim to the happiness of human beings.

The intellectual-political unity is the pre-condition for the temporal earthly happiness that *Monarchia* presents as independent from eternal happiness. The relation between Empire and Christ is the result of many layers, and because Christ is the *verbum-logos* who becomes flesh and lives in us and among us, the Incarnation implies a new sense of what it

[37] The "Qualiter autem se habuerit orbis ex quo tunica ista inconsutilis cupiditatis ungue scissuram primitus passa est, et legere possumus et utinam non videre". What the state of the world has been since that seamless garment was first rent by the talon of cupidity we can read about - would that we might not witness it. 1.16.3 " Si ergo alique dignitates per Constantinum essent alienate - ut dicunt - ab Imperio, et cessissent in potestatem Ecclesie, scissa esset tunica inconsutilis, quam scindere ausi non sunt etiam qui Cristum verum Deum lancea perforarunt". Thus if certain privileges had been taken away from the empire by Constantine, as they maintain, and had passed into the control of the church, that seamless garment would have been torn which even those who pierced Christ the true God with their lance dared not divide.3.10.6

means to be human, and the enormous value of what belongs to time and space. It, therefore, enters powerfully into the historical debate on power and sovereignty, modifying its aims and establishing a new focus for the needs of *humanitas or universitas hominum*.

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INDEX

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